Court Opinion

ID: 9882828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:20:37.78986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:02.738489
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Vacheresse v. Paulchel, 2023-Ohio-3226.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Theresa L. Vacheresse,                              :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,                :
                                                                   No. 22AP-583
          v.                                        :          (C.P.C. No. 20DR-0244)

Ronnie A. Paulchel,                                 :        (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                Defendant-Appellee.                 :

                                           D E C I S I O N

                                  Rendered on September 12, 2023

                On brief: Smith, Meier & Webb, LPA, and Mark D. Webb for
                appellant. Argued: Mark D. Webb.

                On brief: Mary C. Ansbro for appellee. Argued: Mary C.
                Ansbro.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
                             Division of Domestic Relations

EDELSTEIN, J.

          {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Theresa L. Vacheresse, appeals from the August 31, 2022
judgment entry and final divorce decree of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
Division of Domestic Relations. On appeal, Ms. Vacheresse takes issue with the trial court’s
division of marital assets and valuation of marital real estate. For the following reasons, we
affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW
          {¶ 2} Ms. Vacheresse and defendant-appellee, Ronnie A. Paulchel, were married in
2002. No children were born or adopted as issue of the marriage. Because they were
married later in life, the parties brought established careers, assets, and debts to the
No. 22AP-583                                                                                2

marriage. During their marriage, the parties also accumulated significant assets, including
three residences, two businesses, several motor vehicles, bank accounts, and airline miles.
       {¶ 3} Prior to and during their marriage, Ms. Vacheresse worked for Mr. Paulchel
at the Good Feet franchise store (LivWell LLC) he owned before they were wed. During
their marriage, the parties created two new business entities together, LivWell II, LLC and
LivWell III, LLC, whose sole assets are likewise franchises of Good Feet stores. Although
Ms. Vacheresse had a doctorate of podiatric medicine, she was not working in that capacity
during the parties’ relationship and marriage.
       {¶ 4} In 2020, Ms. Vacheresse filed a complaint for divorce. Two weeks later, Mr.
Paulchel filed his answer and counterclaim. Although many contested matters arose during
the pendency of litigation in the court below, most are not relevant to our determination of
the issues before us. Suffice it to say the divorce proceedings were heavily litigated and not
particularly amicable.
       {¶ 5} The trial court held a five-day divorce trial in November/December 2021. As
part of that trial, the parties filed joint stipulations on November 17, 2021, which were
accepted by the trial court and admitted into the record. Among other things, the parties
agreed on the values of many assets and the division of some assets. At trial, both parties
testified extensively about their various assets and debts. Mr. Paulchel also presented
testimony from Kathee Ingram, his business accountant, and Michael Crolius, his business
organizer and friend. After the trial concluded, the parties submitted written closing
arguments and proposed decrees of divorce.
       {¶ 6} On August 31, 2022, the trial court issued a decision with findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the various issues contested by the parties. In relevant part, the trial
court ordered that Mr. Paulchel retain his brokerage accounts and IRA accounts—valued at
approximately $1,434,136—and Ms. Vacheresse retain her IRA account of $26,014. (Aug.
31, 2022 Divorce Decree at 7-8, 18.)
       {¶ 7} The trial court also ordered the real estate located at 855 W. Coshocton Street
in Johnstown, Ohio be sold and the parties equally divide the net proceeds of its sale.
(Divorce Decree at 17.) In the alternative, the trial court afforded Mr. Paulchel the option
to refinance the home and buy out Ms. Vacheresse’s portion of her equity in the home.
(Divorce Decree at 17.) At trial, the parties disagreed on the value of this asset, with each
No. 22AP-583                                                                                                   3

testifying as to their own estimations of its value.1 (Divorce Decree at 4.) Ms. Vacheresse
opined its value was $1,000,000 at the time of trial (Nov. 18, 2021 Trial Tr. Vol. II at 94;
Nov. 30, 2021 Trial Tr. Vol. III at 191-93), while Mr. Paulchel approximated its value was
$420,000 (see Dec. 1, 2021 Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 370-84).
        {¶ 8} Of note, the parties had the Johnstown home appraised prior to trial. (Tr.
Vol. II at 187-89; Tr. Vol. III at 381-82.) Although Mr. Paulchel paid for the appraisal, he
permitted Ms. Vacheresse’s counsel to select the appraiser. (See Tr. Vol. II at 187-89; Tr.
Vol. III at 381-82.) Her attorney chose Samuel D. Koon & Associates, who appraised the
Johnstown home at $575,000. (See Trial Ex. B.) Ms. Vacheresse testified she did not agree
with that appraised value, but conceded she did not have a realtor’s license, real estate
appraisal certificate, real estate sales experience in the area, or a substantive basis for
challenging the qualifications of the appraiser selected by her attorney. (See Tr. Vol. III at
188-93.)     Although Mr. Paulchel believed the appraiser overvalued the property, he
nonetheless indicated his amenability to the appraiser’s $575,000 valuation. (Tr. Vol. IV
at 370-71. See Tr. Vol. III at 189; Trial Ex. B.) Neither party called the appraiser as a witness
at trial, but the appraisal report was admitted into evidence at the close of trial, without
objection from Ms. Vacheresse’s trial counsel. (Dec. 2, 2021 Trial Tr. Vol. V at 593-96. See
Trial Ex. B.)
        {¶ 9} Ultimately, the trial court found that Ms. Vacheresse’s assessment of the
Johnstown property’s value was not “of sufficient credibility to overrule by almost doubling
a professional appraiser’s valuation.” (Divorce Decree at 4.) In accepting the appraised
value of $575,000, the trial court “note[d] the extensive appraisal report, its meticulous
cataloguing of methodology, sources, and extensive supporting materials to justify its
valuation.” (Divorce Decree at 4.) On appeal, Ms. Vacheresse asserts in her second
assignment of error that the trial court erred in admitting and relying on the appraisal’s
valuation of the Johnstown home.

1 The parties also disagreed on whether it was an entirely marital asset (Ms. Vacheresse’s position) or if it had

some separate property contained within its equity (Mr. Paulchel’s position). (Divorce Decree at 4.) The trial
court found Mr. Paulchel failed to prove the separate nature of any part of the home by a preponderance of
the evidence. (Divorce Decree at 4.) Mr. Paulchel did not cross-appeal, so the propriety of that finding is not
before us.
No. 22AP-583                                                                                 4

       {¶ 10} After all allocations were ordered, the trial court recognized its distribution
of the marital assets—which totaled $7,359,385—was not entirely equal. (Divorce Decree
at 20.) Nonetheless, the court declined to order an equalization payment, thus leaving Ms.
Vacheresse with a net marital asset distribution of 45.10 percent and Mr. Paulchel with
54.90 percent of the total marital assets. (Divorce Decree at 21.) In her first assignment of
error, Ms. Vacheresse challenges the trial court’s failure to equalize the marital assets.
       {¶ 11} Ms. Vacheresse timely appealed from the trial court’s August 31, 2022
judgment and asserts two assignments of error for our review:

              [I.] THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND DID NOT MAKE
              AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF PROPERTY IN FAILING TO
              EQUALIZE THE MARITAL ASSETS OF THE PARTIES.

              [II.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RELYING
              UPON AND ADMITTING INAPPROPRIATE EVIDENCE AND IN
              THE VALUATION AND DISPOSITION OF THE MARITAL REAL
              ESTATE LOCATED AT 855 W. COSHOCTON, JOHNSTOWN, OHIO.

II. ANALYSIS
       {¶ 12} Ms. Vacheresse’s first and second assignments of error relate to the trial
court’s division of marital property and valuation of the Johnstown residence, respectively.
Because a trial court’s valuation determinations precede its equitable division analysis, we
address her two assignments of error in reverse order.

       A. Law and Standards of Review
       {¶ 13} In divorce proceedings, the trial court is required to determine what
constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property. R.C. 3105.171(B).
Upon making such determinations, the trial court must divide the marital and separate
property equitably, between the spouses, in accordance with R.C. 3105.171.
R.C. 3105.171(B).
       {¶ 14} R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) generally provides that marital property shall be divided
equally, unless an equal division would be inequitable, in which case the property shall be
divided in the manner the trial court determines equitable. To do this, the trial court must
value the marital property to determine an appropriate division.            See Raymond v.
Raymond, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-363, 2011-Ohio-6173, ¶ 22.
No. 22AP-583                                                                               5

       {¶ 15} A domestic relations court enjoys broad discretion in valuing and fashioning
a division of marital property. See, e.g., Fernando v. Fernando, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-788,
2017-Ohio-9323, ¶ 25-26; Kaechele v. Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 95 (1988); Sangeri v.
Yerra, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-675, 2020-Ohio-5520, ¶ 25. Thus, we generally review the
overall appropriateness of a trial court’s determination of marital property division in
divorce proceedings under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., Teeter v. Teeter, 18
Ohio St.3d 76 (1985), citing Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 355 (1981).
       {¶ 16} “[A]buse of discretion connotes that the court’s attitude is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable.” (Internal quotations omitted.) State v. Weaver, ___ Ohio
St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-
6679, ¶ 60, quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980). “A decision is
unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support the decision.”
(Internal quotations omitted.) Fernando at ¶ 7, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). A decision is
arbitrary if it is made “without consideration of or regard for facts [or] circumstances.”
(Internal quotations omitted.) State v. Hill, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-4544, ¶ 9,
quoting State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12, quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 125 (10th Ed.2014). A decision may also be arbitrary if it lacks any adequate
determining principle and is not governed by any fixed rules or standards. See Beasley at
¶ 12, citing Dayton ex rel. Scandrick v. McGee, 67 Ohio St.2d 356, 359 (1981), citing Black’s
Law Dictionary 96 (5th Ed.1979). See also State v. Hackett, 164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-
6699, ¶ 19. A decision is unconscionable if it “affronts the sense of justice, decency, or
reasonableness.” Fernando at ¶ 7, citing Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, LLP v. Frutta
Del Mondo, Ltd., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-69, 2008-Ohio-3567, ¶ 11.
       {¶ 17} An abuse of discretion may also be found where a trial court “applies the
wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous
findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶ 15 (8th
Dist.). See also New Asian Super Mkt. v. Jiahe Weng, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-207, 2018-Ohio-
1248, ¶ 16.
No. 22AP-583                                                                                  6

       B. Second Assignment of Error
       {¶ 18} Ms. Vacheresse’s second assignment of error relates to the trial court’s
valuation of the Johnstown property. Ms. Vacheresse testified she believed it was worth
approximately $1,000,000 (Tr. Vol. II at 94), whereas Mr. Paulchel estimated its value at
$420,000 (Tr. Vol. IV at 370). At trial, Mr. Paulchel also produced an appraisal report—
from an appraiser selected by Ms. Vacheresse’s trial counsel—which valued the Johnstown
property at $575,000. (See Tr. Vol. III at 188-94; Tr. Vol. IV at 370-87; Trial Ex. B.)
Although the trial court sustained objections to trial counsel’s attempt to question Ms.
Vacheresse about this report (Tr. Vol. III at 190-91, 260-63), the appraisal report was
nonetheless admitted as evidence without objection at the close of trial (Tr. Vol. V at 593-
96). Neither party called its authors to testify at trial, and Ms. Vacheresse did not present
any expert evidence—e.g., a report from another appraiser or testimony from a qualified
realtor—concerning the value of the Johnstown property at trial.
       {¶ 19} On appeal, Ms. Vacheresse asserts the trial court erred and abused its
discretion by admitting and relying on the appraisal report to determine the value for the
Johnstown residence. For the following reasons, we disagree.

       1. Legal Standards
       {¶ 20} “R.C. 3105.171 expresses no specific way for the trial court to determine
valuation.” Banchefsky v. Banchefsky, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1011, 2010-Ohio-4267, ¶ 43,
citing Focke v. Focke, 83 Ohio App.3d 552, 554 (10th Dist.1992). Furthermore, “ ‘Ohio
courts have not specified that only one method of valuation is appropriate when dividing
marital property.’ ” Kuper v. Halbach, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-899, 2010-Ohio-3020, ¶ 12,
quoting Herrmann v. Herrmann, 12th Dist. No. CA99-01-006, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS
5146, *14 (Nov. 6, 2000). Accordingly, “[w]hen determining the value of marital assets, a
trial court is not confined to the use of a particular valuation method, but can make its own
determination as to valuation based on the evidence presented.” Day v. Day, 10th Dist.
No. 08AP-440, 2009-Ohio-638, ¶ 10, citing James v. James, 101 Ohio App.3d 668, 681 (2d
Dist.1995). See also Smoyer v. Smoyer, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-365, 2019-Ohio-3461, ¶ 40.
       {¶ 21} It is well-established, then, that a trial court generally has broad discretion to
develop some measure of value. See, e.g., Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318 (1982);
Sangeri, 2020-Ohio-5520 at ¶ 25. Thus, the “valuation of marital assets is typically a
No. 22AP-583                                                                                  7

factual issue that is left to the discretion of the trial court.” Roberts v. Roberts, 10th Dist.
No. 08AP-27, 2008-Ohio-6121, ¶ 18, citing Berish at 319. See also Raymond, 2011-Ohio-
6173 at ¶ 22; Day at ¶ 11.
       {¶ 22} “ ‘Although a trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining the value of a
marital asset, such discretion is not without limit.’ ” Fernando, 2017-Ohio-9323 at ¶ 26,
quoting Apps v. Apps, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1072, 2003-Ohio-7154, ¶ 38. “A trial court’s
assignment of an asset’s value must be based upon competent, credible evidence,” meaning
“evidence that is both competent, credible evidence of value and a rational basis upon which
to establish the value.” Warren v. Warren, 10th Dist. No 09AP-101, 2009-Ohio-6567, ¶ 15.
That is to say, “[a] trial court must have a rational evidentiary basis for assigning value to
marital property.” Fernando at ¶ 26. See also Dach v. Homewood, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-
502, 2015-Ohio-4191, ¶ 36.
       {¶ 23} “ ‘An appellate court’s duty is not to require the adoption of any particular
method of valuation, but to determine whether, based upon all the relevant facts and
circumstances, the court abused its discretion in arriving at a value.’ ” Fernando at ¶ 26,
quoting Apps at ¶ 38. Because this court is not a trier of fact, our role is to determine
whether there is relevant, competent, and credible evidence upon which the fact finder
could base his or her judgment. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-877, 2021-
Ohio-4573, ¶ 15; Tennant v. Martin-Auer, 188 Ohio App.3d 768, 2010-Ohio-3489, ¶ 16 (5th
Dist.). We must uphold “ ‘a trial court’s determination of valuation which is based upon
competent, credible evidence absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.’ ” Banchefsky at
¶ 43, quoting Moro v. Moro, 68 Ohio App.3d 630, 637 (8th Dist.1990).

       2. Analysis
       {¶ 24} On appeal, Ms. Vacheresse contends the trial court erred when it admitted
the appraisal report as evidence of the Johnstown property’s value because neither of its
authors—Brian J. Sapp and Samuel D. Koon of Samuel D. Koon & Associates—appeared as
a witness to testify and be subject to cross-examination about it. She also argues the trial
court abused its discretion in relying on this report to value the Johnstown property.
       {¶ 25} “ ‘Ordinarily, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the
admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in
line with the rules of procedure and evidence.’ ” State v. L.E.F., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1042,
No. 22AP-583                                                                                  8

2014-Ohio-4585, ¶ 4, quoting Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271 (1991).
Accordingly, an appellate court generally limits its review of a trial court’s admission or
exclusion of evidence to whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id., citing Reinoehl
v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 130 Ohio App.3d 186, 195 (10th Dist.1998).
       {¶ 26} Ms. Vacheresse concedes, however, that her trial counsel did not object to the
admission of the appraisal report that she now alleges was erroneously admitted by the trial
court. (Appellant’s Brief at 22.) But, she nonetheless “asserts that plain error is not
appropriate” because her trial counsel objected to the report when she was questioned
about it on cross-examination. (Appellant’s Brief at 23.) That argument is not well-taken.
       {¶ 27} It is well-established that “[g]enerally, when a party fails to renew an
objection at the time exhibits are admitted into evidence, that party waives the ability to
raise the admission as error on appeal, unless plain error is shown.” Odita v. Phillips, 10th
Dist. No. 09AP-1172, 2010-Ohio-4321, ¶ 56, citing Nicula v. Nicula, 8th Dist. No. 84049,
2009-Ohio-2114. See also State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 107 (1997). Because Ms.
Vacheresse’s trial counsel failed to object to the admission of the appraisal report as an
exhibit at the time Mr. Paulchel’s counsel moved to admit it into evidence, we limit our
review to whether the alleged error rises to the level of plain error. Evid.R. 103(A)(1), (D).
       {¶ 28} “In civil cases, courts apply the doctrine of plain error ‘with the utmost
caution.’ ” Marshall v. Marshall, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-543, 2019-Ohio-684, ¶ 8, quoting
Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 (1997). Courts find plain error “ ‘only in the
extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error * * * seriously affects
the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging
the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.’ ” Id., quoting Goldfuss at syllabus.
       {¶ 29} Ms. Vacheresse has not presented this court with any argument explaining
how the trial court’s alleged error in admitting the appraisal report for the Johnstown home
undermined the legitimacy of the judicial process in this case. Instead, she generally claims
“the admission of and reliance upon [the] valuation [contained in that report] did seriously
affect the process and [her] substantial rights[,]” without explaining why she believes that
is so. (See Appellant’s Brief at 23.) Ms. Vacheresse cites to the “amount of discrepancy at
issue” and her “failure to confront” the appraiser about the valuation as issues that bore out
from the erroneous admission of the report. (See Appellant’s Brief at 23.) But even
No. 22AP-583                                                                                 9

assuming the admission of this appraisal report was erroneous, we do not find its admission
undermined the legitimacy of the judicial process given the facts and circumstances of this
case. Thus, we decline to address whether the trial court plainly erred in admitting the
appraisal report because we find that, even if it did, Ms. Vacheresse does not sufficiently
establish she was prejudiced by its admission, for the reasons that follow.
       {¶ 30} Ms. Vacheresse’s trial counsel selected the appraiser for the Johnstown
property. (See Tr. Vol. III at 188-89; Tr. Vol. IV at 381-82.) Evidence in the record suggests
a copy of the report was sent to Ms. Vacheresse’s trial counsel on April 19, 2021. (See Trial
Ex. B.) At trial, Ms. Vacheresse’s attorney did not contest the qualifications of the appraiser
she selected. Nor did Ms. Vacheresse’s trial counsel claim the report relied on inaccurate
information or unaccepted methods of valuation. And although neither party agreed with
the appraiser’s valuation of the Johnstown property, only Mr. Paulchel indicated a
willingness to accept it. (See Tr. Vol. IV at 370-87.)
       {¶ 31} Neither party called the appraiser to testify about the report at trial. And,
other than offering their own lay opinions about the value of the property, neither party
presented alternative expert evidence concerning the value of the Johnstown property.
While there is no general burden of proof with respect to the division of property, “ ‘[e]ach
side has the burden of going forward with evidence as to any [R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)] factor
which it wants considered, bringing forth facts tending to prove its version of the manner
in which such factors should be applied.’ ” Banchefsky v. Banchefsky, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-
300, 2014-Ohio-899, ¶ 28, quoting Barrientos v. Barrientos, 3d Dist. No. 5-12-13, 2013-
Ohio-424, ¶ 37, citing Stetler v. Stetler, 6 Ohio App.3d 29 (3d Dist.1983). See also Reichert
v. Reichert, 3d Dist. No. 8-90-21, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 294, *4-5 (Jan. 17, 1992).
       {¶ 32} Because her trial counsel received the report months before the divorce trial
commenced (see Trial Ex. B), Ms. Vacheresse had ample time to seek an alternative expert
opinion that was more in-line with the valuation she felt was appropriate. Yet, Ms.
Vacheresse presented no such expert opinion at trial. She did not offer her own appraisals
into evidence or call any qualified experts to testify about their assessment of the Johnstown
property’s value. Thus, Ms. Vacheresse submitted no evidence to establish, or support
No. 22AP-583                                                                                                 10

her testimony, that the Johnstown property should be valued at $1,000,000.2
        {¶ 33} In contrast, Mr. Paulchel presented an appraisal report from an appraiser Ms.
Vacheresse’s trial counsel selected. Although the trial court sustained objections concerning
trial counsel’s questioning of Ms. Vacheresse about the report on the third day of trial (Tr.
Vol. III at 190-91, 260-63), Mr. Paulchel was permitted to testify about that appraisal on
the fourth day (see Tr. Vol. IV at 370-87). And, most critically, when Mr. Paulchel’s trial
counsel moved to admit the appraisal report as evidence on the fifth day, Ms. Vacheresse’s
attorney did not object to its admission. (Tr. Vol. V at 593-96.)
        {¶ 34} In supplemental briefing ordered by this court, the parties agree the trial
court’s valuation of the Johnstown property had virtually no impact on the trial court’s
equitable division analysis. (Aug. 21, 2023 Appellant’s Supp. Brief at 1; Aug. 21, 2023
Appellee’s Supp. Brief at 4. See Divorce Decree at 4.) Indeed, this is because the trial court
ordered the parties to sell all three marital properties and equally divide the net proceeds
of those sales. (Divorce Decree at 16-17.) The trial court also gave Mr. Paulchel the option
to refinance the Johnstown property and equally divide the equity in this home with Ms.
Vacheresse. (Divorce Decree at 17.) The same option was extended to Ms. Vacheresse with
respect to the Springboro property. (Id.) Furthermore, while the trial court relied on the
admitted appraisal reports for both the Johnstown and Springboro properties to calculate
each property’s marital value3 (Divorce Decree at 4-5), the parties acknowledge those
values were not included in the trial court’s marital asset distribution analysis (see
Appellant’s Supp. Brief at 1; Appellee’s Supp. Brief at 4).

2 We note that while Mr. Paulchel sought to retain the Johnstown property as his residence (Dec. 23, 2021

Def.’s Proposed Jgmt. Entry at 12-13), Ms. Vacheresse wanted the trial court to order the parties to sell it and
divide the proceeds (Dec. 23, 2023 Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact/ Conclusion of Law at 5). We also note that
Ms. Vacheresse requested to retain the Springboro residence, another contested marital asset, if the trial court
did not order the parties to “sell everything and fairly divide it” (Tr. Vol. II at 99), and Mr. Paulchel was
agreeable to Ms. Vacheresse retaining the Springboro residence if she bought him out of the equity on that
house (Tr. Vol. III at 384-85). At trial, Ms. Vacheresse contested one appraiser’s valuation of the Johnstown
property, but agreed with another appraiser’s valuation of the Springboro property. (See Tr. Vol. III at 193-
94, 260-63.) She conceded, however, she was not aware of any difference in the qualifications, degrees,
education, or knowledge between the two appraisers. (Tr. Vol. III at 193-94.)

3 The trial court calculated the “marital value” of each property by determining the principal balance of the

mortgage on the property and subtracting that number from the valuation set forth in the corresponding
expert appraisal report. (See Divorce Decree at 4-5.)
No. 22AP-583                                                                                  11

       {¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, we find the facts and circumstances of this case are
not exceptional and do not give rise to plain error. We likewise find the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in relying on the appraisal report, as described below.
       {¶ 36} In determining the value of the Johnstown property, the trial court noted that
Ms. Vacheresse testified she believed it was worth $1,000,000 and Mr. Paulchel asserted
its value was approximately $420,000 but would be willing to agree to the $575,000
appraisal. (Divorce Decree at 4.) Ultimately, the trial court opined that Ms. Vacheresse’s
assessment of its valuation was not credible, “[o]r rather, of sufficient credibility to overrule
by almost doubling a professional appraiser’s valuation.” (Id.) It also noted “the extensive
appraisal report, its meticulous cataloguing of methodology, sources, and extensive
supporting materials to justify its valuation.” (Id.)
       {¶ 37} Although Ms. Vacheresse attributes error to the trial court’s admission and
reliance on the appraisal report for the Johnstown property in her second assignment of
error, the arguments she makes in support relate almost exclusively to the report’s
admission. To support her contention that the trial court abused its discretion in relying
on this report when it valued the Johnstown property, Ms. Vacheresse essentially presumes
its admission was error. That is to say, she has not presented this court with any substantive
arguments explaining how or why the trial court’s reliance on an exhibit admitted into
evidence without objection from either party to determine the value of the Johnstown
property constituted an abuse of discretion. Ms. Vacheresse does not argue, for instance,
that the appraisal report itself was so inadequate or ineptly prepared, or relied on clearly
improper facts, sources, and/or methodology, such that the trial court’s reliance on this
admitted trial exhibit was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. And, again, we
emphasize that Ms. Vacheresse did not present any competing expert evidence regarding
the value of that property.
       {¶ 38} Having already found the trial court’s admission of the appraisal report did
not constitute plain error, we thus find the trial court’s determination that the Johnstown
property’s value is $575,000 is supported by some competent, credible evidence in the
record. We further find the trial court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in finding Ms.
Vacheresse’s valuation assessment was not sufficiently credible to counter the professional
appraiser’s valuation where, as was the case here, the credentials of that appraiser were
No. 22AP-583                                                                                12

never in dispute and Ms. Vacheresse had no expert credentials herself. Thus, the trial court
did not err in basing the value of the Johnstown property on the only expert appraisal report
admitted into evidence for that property.
       {¶ 39} For these reasons, Ms. Vacheresse’s second assignment of error is overruled.

       C. First Assignment of Error
       {¶ 40} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Vacheresse asserts the trial court erred
and abused its discretion when it found that an equalization payment of $360,875 from Mr.
Paulchel to Ms. Vacheresse would be inequitable in this case.                Because of this
determination, the net marital assets were not equitably distributed; Ms. Vacheresse
received 45.10 percent ($3,318,817.50) and Mr. Paulchel received 54.90 percent
($4,040,567.50) of the $7,359,385 total marital assets. Based on the record before us,
however, we cannot say this constituted an abuse of discretion.

       1. Legal Standards
       {¶ 41} After determining what constitutes marital property and what constitutes
separate property, a trial court is generally required to divide the marital and separate
property equitably. R.C. 3105.171(B). With respect to marital property, R.C. 3105.171(C)(1)
provides:

              Except as provided in this division or division (E) of this
              section, the division of marital property shall be equal. If an
              equal division of marital property would be inequitable, the
              court shall not divide the marital property equally but instead
              shall divide it between the spouses in the manner the court
              determines equitable. In making a division of marital property,
              the court shall consider all relevant factors, including those set
              forth in division (F) of this section.

       {¶ 42} Thus, although a trial court has broad discretion in determining property
division, an equal distribution should be the starting point of the analysis. Goebel v. Goebel,
10th Dist. No. 15AP-61, 2015-Ohio-5547, ¶ 7, citing Cherry, 66 Ohio St.2d at 353.
       {¶ 43} In making a division of marital property and in determining whether to make
and the amount of any distributive award under this section to ensure equalization of the
marital assets, a trial court considers the following factors:

               1. The duration of the marriage;
No. 22AP-583                                                                                 13

                  2. The assets and liabilities of the spouses;
                  3. The desirability of awarding the family home, or the right
                     to reside in the family home for reasonable periods of time,
                     to the spouse with custody of the children of the marriage;
                  4. The liquidity of the property to be distributed;
                  5. The economic desirability of retaining intact an asset or an
                     interest in an asset;
                  6. The tax consequences of the property division upon the
                     respective awards to be made to each spouse;
                  7. The costs of sale, if it is necessary that an asset be sold to
                     effectuate an equitable distribution of property;
                  8. Any division or disbursement of property made in a
                     separation agreement that was voluntarily entered into by
                     the spouses;
                  9. Any retirement benefits of the spouses, excluding the
                     social security benefits of a spouse except as may be
                     relevant for purposes of dividing a public pension;
                  10. Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be
                      relevant and equitable.

R.C. 3105.171(F). A trial court must evaluate all relevant facts in determining an equitable
division. Caleshu v. Caleshu, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-742, 2020-Ohio-4075, ¶ 8, citing Cherry
at 355.
          {¶ 44} Because we review a trial court’s division of property for an abuse of
discretion, our job “is not to reweigh the evidence but to determine whether competent,
credible evidence in the record supports the trial court’s findings.” Caleshu at ¶ 9, quoting
Hood v. Hood, 10th Dist. 10AP-999, 2011-Ohio-3704, ¶ 14, citing Dunham v. Dunham, 171
Ohio App.3d 147, 2007-Ohio-1167, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.), and Taub v. Taub, 10th Dist. No.
08AP-750, 2009-Ohio-2762, ¶ 15.
          {¶ 45} “ ‘The mere fact that a property division is unequal, does not, standing alone,
amount to an abuse of discretion.’ ” Martin v. Martin, 18 Ohio St.3d 292, 294 (1985),
quoting Cherry at paragraph two of the syllabus.

          2. Analysis
          {¶ 46} In finding an equitable distribution payment of $360,875 would be
inequitable in this case, the trial court stated the following:
No. 22AP-583                                                                              14

              First and foremost, the primary assets driving the difference in
              distribution are [Mr. Paulchel’s] investment accounts. The gap
              between [Mr. Paulchel] and [Ms. Vacheresse] can almost
              entirely be made up from [Mr. Paulchel’s] accounts. But the
              [c]ourt notes [Mr. Paulchel] is older than [Ms. Vacheresse] and
              thus will likely be out of his prime earning years if not upon
              completion of this case[,] then shortly thereafter. [Ms.
              Vacheresse] will, with the acquisition of the Cincinnati and
              Dayton Good Feet stores have considerable income as well as
              time to make good any difference in this distribution. Further,
              both parties will likely see significant infusions of liquid capital
              via the sale of their personal real estate. If they do not, it will be
              because they desired to secure those pieces of property by
              buying the other out. In short, the parties have many options
              for securing their financial futures in a way that is not overly
              burdensome to the other. In the interest of fairness and equity,
              the [c]ourt therefore declines to order an equalization payment
              in this case.
(Aug. 31, 2022 Divorce Decree at 21.)
       {¶ 47} Relatedly, we note that Mr. Paulchel was permitted to retain the Columbus
Good Feet franchise (stipulated value $2,175,000) he owned before the marriage, which
comprises of two brick-and-mortar stores. (Divorce Decree at 19. See also Nov. 17, 2021
Joint Stipulations at No. 9a; Tr. Vol. II at 35-36.) Ms. Vacheresse was awarded the
Cincinnati and Dayton Good Feet franchises (stipulated values $1,174,000 and $1,512,000,
respectively), which the parties acquired together during their marriage. (Divorce Decree
at 19. See also Joint Stipulations at No. 9; Tr. Vol. II at 35-36.) At the time of trial, the
Cincinnati and Dayton franchises each only had one existing store in their respective
market areas. (See Tr. Vol. II at 35-36.)
       {¶ 48} The trial court found this division of the parties’ net marital assets—45.10
percent to Ms. Vacheresse and 54.90 percent to Mr. Paulchel—to be equitable for the
following reasons:
              [T]he long duration of the marriage, the nature of the assets
              and liabilities of the parties, the liquidity of the property to be
              distributed, [Ms. Vacheresse’s] current and future income, the
              economic desirability of retaining their respective business
              interests intact, both parties[’] desire to retain their respective
              business interests, and the opportunities this distribution
              provides both parties.
(Divorce Decree at 21.)
No. 22AP-583                                                                               15

       {¶ 49} Despite acknowledging a trial court has broad discretion in determining the
equitable division of marital property (Appellant’s Brief at 26) and that “an equitable
division [does] not [necessarily] mean equal” (Appellant’s Brief at 10), Ms. Vacheresse
nonetheless argues in her first assignment of error that the trial court abused its discretion
in failing to order an equalization payment to her, and claims the trial court’s distribution
of marital property was inequitable. In support of that contention, Ms. Vacheresse does not
allege the trial court failed to consider the appropriate statutory factors in reaching its
decision on the equitable division of property. Nor does she contend the trial court failed
to consider other relevant facts presented at trial.
       {¶ 50} Instead, Ms. Vacheresse disagrees with the conclusions the trial court
reached after considering those factors and relevant trial testimony. (See Appellant’s Brief
at 11-17.) More precisely, Ms. Vacheresse takes issue with the trial court’s decision not to
equally divide Mr. Paulchel’s brokerage accounts totaling $1,233,389 and the parties’ IRA
accounts—Mr. Paulchel’s valued at $200,747 and Ms. Vacheresse’s valued at $26,014—
between the parties. (Appellant’s Brief at 11.)
       {¶ 51} Having reviewed the record, we find the trial court appropriately considered
multiple relevant statutory factors in R.C. 3105.171(F) and the relevant facts presented at
trial. Furthermore, we find competent, credible evidence in the record supports the trial
court’s equitable division findings, including its determination that ordering an
equalization payment would be inequitable in this case. Particularly significant to this
determination, we believe, is the testimony presented at trial regarding the growth potential
of the Cincinnati and Dayton Good Feet franchise “designated media areas” or “DMAs” (see
Tr. Vol. II at 55) awarded to Ms. Vacheresse.
       {¶ 52} Mr. Paulchel testified that he did not believe the Cincinnati DMA had been
managed to its maximum potential because the franchise agreement expressly provides for
two more stores to be opened in the Cincinnati area. (Tr. Vol. III at 298-300.) Thus, he
opined that, if the trial court awarded that franchise to Ms. Vacheresse—which it ultimately
did—Ms. Vacheresse would receive “more money than the appraised value” for that store
because of the market value associated with the additional stores provided for in the
Cincinnati’s DMA franchise agreement. (See Tr. Vol. III 299-300; Tr. Vol. IV at 437-43.)
Further, as to the Dayton DMA franchise, Mr. Paulchel testified that, although he stipulated
No. 22AP-583                                                                                 16

to its appraised value, he did not fully agree with it. (Tr. Vol. III at 304-05.) He claimed
Dayton had the “best market” “[b]ecause there is always money in [its business] account,
and it is the highest profit margin.” (Tr. Vol. III at 304-06; Tr. Vol. IV at 439-41, 458.) He
also indicated an opportunity existed to open another store in the Dayton DMA under its
franchise agreement. (Tr. Vol. IV at 463-64.)
       {¶ 53} Mr. Paulchel opined that both the Cincinnati and Dayton stores had a
significant potential for increased sales. (Tr. Vol. III at 297-98, 304-06; Tr. Vol. IV at 437-
43.) He also testified that he believed the Cincinnati DMA was “way undervalued compared
to Columbus.” (Tr. Vol. IV at 359-60.) And, of note, Ms. Vacheresse herself recognized the
Dayton and Cincinnati stores were “a whole lot more profitable” than the two Columbus
stores. (Tr. Vol. III at 270.)
       {¶ 54} While it is true, as Ms. Vacheresse points out (see Appellant’s Brief at 15-16),
the trial court found Mr. Paulchel lacked credibility in several areas (Divorce Decree at 3),
nothing in the record refutes or otherwise suggests his testimony about the profitability of
and growth potential for the Cincinnati and Dayton DMAs was not credible. Indeed, his
testimony on this matter is bolstered by virtue of the fact that both parties requested to be
awarded the Cincinnati DMA. (Tr. Vol. III at 214-20, 270; Tr. Vol. IV at 342-43, 359-60.)
       {¶ 55} Moreover, although only Mr. Paulchel was named in the three Good Feet
franchise agreements for the contested Columbus, Cincinnati, and Dayton DMAs, Ms.
Vacheresse testified extensively about her involvement in the stores and good relationship
with Good Feet’s corporate team and her employees at the Cincinnati and Dayton stores.
(See, e.g., Tr. Vol. II 52-85; Tr. Vol. III at 173-75, 214-23, 270. Compare Tr. Vol. III at 296-
307; Tr. Vol. IV at 356-60.) She recounted how her previous training in podiatric medicine
has “immensely” contributed to her success in running these Good Feet stores (Tr. Vol. II
at 68-69), and repeatedly expressed that, although both were opened during the parties’
marriage, the Cincinnati and Dayton locations had always been “[her] stores” (see, e.g., Tr.
Vol. II at 77, 132, 135, 141, 172, 211, 214-15, 217-19, 270, 277, 280). (Compare Tr. Vol. IV at
356-60.) Ms. Vacheresse testified that Good Feet corporate “loved” the podiatry knowledge
she brought to the stores and, at one point, made her the “trainer for pathology” for persons
trying to become “pedorthists.” (Tr. Vol. II at 68-69.) Suffice it to say that there is nothing
in the record to suggest Good Feet corporate would not be amenable to Ms. Vacheresse
No. 22AP-583                                                                                 17

taking over and expanding the Cincinnati and Dayton Good Feet DMAs independent of Mr.
Paulchel.
       {¶ 56} Ms. Vacheresse indicated she intended, if awarded both the Cincinnati and
Dayton DMAs, to continue working. (Tr. Vol. II at 82-85.) In light of Mr. Paulchel’s
unchallenged testimony about the growth potential of both the Cincinnati and Dayton
DMAs, we thus find the trial court’s determination that the difference in the distribution of
marital assets would, in time, be offset by the considerable income earned from the
Cincinnati and Dayton DMAs that were awarded to Ms. Vacheresse to be supported by
competent, credible evidence. (See Divorce Decree at 21.)
       {¶ 57} Ms. Vacheresse also contends the trial court’s second reason for finding an
equalization payment would be inappropriate in this case—potential for significant
infusions of cash from the real estate being sold—is not supported by the trial court’s
decision. (Appellant’s Brief at 14-15.) We disagree.
       {¶ 58} Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to the sale-and-split of the Cincinnati
marital property, but they reached no agreement regarding the Johnstown and Springboro
properties. (See Divorce Decree at 3-5.) Ultimately, the trial court ordered the parties to sell
all three real estate assets in the marital estate and equally split the proceeds therefrom.
(Divorce Decree at 16-17.) However, the trial court also awarded Mr. Paulchel the option
to purchase the Johnstown property (marital value of $260,904.53) and Ms. Vacheresse
the option to purchase the Springboro property (marital value of $98,353.26). (Divorce
Decree at 17.)
       {¶ 59} On appeal, Ms. Vacheresse suggests she would not see a significant infusion
of cash “if the real estate is retained[]” because the marital value of the Johnstown property
“is worth nearly three times” that of the Springboro property. (Appellant’s Brief at 14. See
Divorce Decree at 21.) We note, however, that the divorce decree did not merely award Mr.
Paulchel one property and Ms. Vacheresse the other. To the contrary, the trial court
ordered a sale-and-split arrangement for both properties but gave each party the “option to
refinance the home and buyout [the other party’s] portion of [their] equity in [each] home.”
(Divorce Decree at 17.) If Mr. Paulchel decides to exercise this option and keep the
Johnstown property, he is ordered to pay Ms. Vacheresse “50% of the value of the property,
minus the refinanced debt[.]” (Divorce Decree at 17.) Ms. Vacheresse was given the same
No. 22AP-583                                                                            18

option, conditioned upon the same requirement if exercised, as to the Springboro
residence. (Id.) In light of these terms, then, Ms. Vacheresse’s contention that the trial
court’s decision does not support the trial court’s reasoning is not well-taken. If Mr.
Paulchel exercises his option and retains the Johnstown property, Ms. Vacheresse will still
receive “50% of the value of the property, minus the refinanced debt[.]” (Divorce Decree at
17.) In such event, Ms. Vacheresse would be expected to “see [a] significant infusion[] of
liquid capital[.]” (See Divorce Decree at 21.)
       {¶ 60} For these reasons, and based on our review of the record, we conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding it would be inequitable in this case to
require Mr. Paulchel to make a $360,875 equalization payment to Ms. Vacheresse.
Accordingly, Ms. Vacheresse’s first assignment of error is overruled.

III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 61} Having overruled Ms. Vacheresse’s two assignments of error, we affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations.

                                                                        Judgment affirmed.

                      LUPER SCHUSTER and MENTEL, JJ., concur.