Court Opinion

ID: 9637221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:00:44.135922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:39.874888
License: Public Domain

21-6076
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                         BIA
                                                                               Christensen, IJ
                                                                                A208 374 248

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of August, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                      JON O. NEWMAN,
 8                      DENNY CHIN,
 9                      MICHAEL H. PARK,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   SARABJIT SINGH,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                      v.                                           21-6076
17                                                                   NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                       Deepti Vithal, Esq., Richmond Hill, NY.
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 2                                       General; Sabatino F. Leo, Assistant Director;
 3                                       Corey L. Farrell, Trial Attorney, Office of
 4                                       Immigration Litigation, United States
 5                                       Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

 6         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

 7   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and

 8   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

 9         Petitioner Sarabjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a

10   January 26, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming a May 8, 2018 decision of an

11   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

12   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Sarabjit

13   Singh, No. A 208 374 248 (B.I.A. Jan. 26, 2021), aff’g No. A 208 374 248 (Immigr. Ct.

14   N.Y.C. May 8, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

15   and procedural history.

16         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented and modified by the

17   BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005); Xue Hong Yang v.

18   U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of

19   review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative

20   findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

                                              2
 1   compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76

 2   (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination “under the substantial

 3   evidence standard”).

 4         The IJ may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances, . . . base a

 5   credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the

 6   applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s

 7   written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and

 8   considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the

 9   internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements

10   with other evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such

11   statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

12   goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C.

13   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

14   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could

15   make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,

16   167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. “Where the IJ’s adverse

17   credibility finding is based on specific examples of inconsistent statements or

18   contradictory evidence, a reviewing court will generally not be able to conclude

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1    that a reasonable adjudicator was compelled to find otherwise.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534

2    F.3d at 166 (cleaned up).     “Even where the agency relies on discrepancies or

3    lacunae that, if taken separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the

4    claim, the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential.” Hong

5    Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 77 (quotation marks omitted). “A petitioner must do more

6    than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;

7    he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his

8    testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks

9    omitted).

10         Singh claimed that members of the Bharatiya Janata Party and Akali Dal

11   Badal parties attacked him in February and April 2015 and threatened to kill him

12   if he did not leave the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar party (“Mann Party” or

13   “SADA”).      Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

14   determination.

15         The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Singh’s statements

16   in his affidavit and his hearing testimony, as well as his failure to corroborate his

17   medical treatment, the fact that he omitted discussion of his medical treatment in

18   his affidavit, the fact that his father omitted it in his letter, and the contradiction

                                               4
 1   between Singh’s testimony and a letter from a Mann Party official. See 8 U.S.C.

 2   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

 3            First, Singh made inconsistent statements about his interaction with the

 4   police after alleged attacks by rival party members in February 2015.            His

 5   affidavit says that the “[p]olice inspector asked his constable to push me out of the

6    police station” and the “[p]olice inspector and constable were very rough and aloof

7    with me.” In contrast, he testified about three, not two officers and that he did

8    not know the ranks of the officers who threw him out of the station. He explained

9    that he did not know the ranks of the officers, but that they wore the uniforms of

10   regular policemen. Singh argues that this was not a discrepancy, and that the IJ

11   improperly relied on word usage. This explanation is plausible, but so too is the

12   IJ’s contrary conclusion. We thus defer to the IJ’s choice between two permissible

13   views of the evidence. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2007)

14   (holding that we defer to the factfinder “[w]here there are two permissible views

15   of the evidence” even where a “contrary inference” would be “more plausible or

16   more natural” (quotation marks omitted)).

17          Moreover, other inconsistencies and omissions bolster the adverse

18   credibility determination. Singh testified that he went to the village doctor after

                                              5
 1   the first attack because he had scratches and internal injuries, and the doctor gave

 2   him balm and medication; then, after the second attack, he again went to the

 3   village doctor and received balms and medications. His affidavit, however, does

 4   not mention treatment by a doctor at all, and his father’s letter says “[m]y wife

 5   treated him with home remedies after . . . both harms.” The IJ reasonably relied

 6   on these discrepancies. Although omissions are generally less probative than

 7   inconsistencies, the affidavit identified injuries and other actions taken after the

 8   attack, so it would have been natural to mention medical treatment obtained

 9   between the attack and going to the police. And Singh’s father’s letter not only

10   omitted treatment by a doctor but inconsistently stated that Singh’s mother treated

11   him. See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78-79 (holding that omissions are generally less

12   probative than direct inconsistencies but that the probative value of omissions

13   turns on whether those “facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been

14   expected to disclose”).

15         Moreover, because Singh’s credibility was in question as to his alleged

16   medical treatment, the IJ reasonably relied on the absence of corroborating medical

17   documentation. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may

18   bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an

                                              6
 1   applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into

 2   question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Singh’s father’s

 3   letter did not corroborate either the medial treatment or Singh’s explanation that

 4   his father had tried to obtain medical evidence, but the doctor did not keep

 5   records.

 6         In addition, Singh testified that no one else in his family had problems with

 7   the local administration or rival political groups; but he submitted a supporting

 8   letter from a Mann Party official that states, “Due to his involvement in our party

 9   activities [Singh] and his family had problems with local administration and other

10   political groups. So, [] Singh was forced to flee the country.” Singh argues that

11   the agency should not have relied on this letter because he submitted it to show

12   the treatment of Sikhs and Mann Party members, not to document his own claim.

13   In Amardeep Singh v. Garland, an IJ discredited the petitioner partially because a

14   letter from a Mann Party official omitted the fact that the petitioner had visited the

15   party official. 6 F.4th 418, 429 (2d Cir. 2021). We found agency error because the

16   purpose of the letter “was to report on the brutal treatment that Sikhs and

17   members of SADA receive in India,” and the party official “was not in a position

18   to attest to the veracity of [the petitioner’s] account of his beatings, and did not

                                               7
 1   undertake to do so.” Id. But Amardeep Singh addressed a letter that did not

 2   purport to document the petitioner’s personal claim; in contrast, here—while the

 3   letter talks about the general mistreatment of party members—the letter is specific

 4   to Singh, discusses his father’s membership in the party, and states that Singh and

 5   his family had problems with rival parties, thereby directly contradicting Singh’s

 6   testimony that he was the only member of his family to have problems with the

7    local administration and political groups.

 8         In sum, in light of the various inconsistencies and omissions, the record does

9    not compel a conclusion contrary to the agency’s decision. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534

10   F.3d at 165-66; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. The adverse credibility determination

11   is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection because all

12   three forms of relief were based on the same factual predicate.         See Paul v.

13   Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

14         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

15   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

16                                          FOR THE COURT:
17                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
18                                          Clerk of Court

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