Court Opinion

ID: 9844912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:11:37.637475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:47.059323
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J.,
dissenting. I agree fully with the well settled and well stated principles of law set forth in the Court’s opinion. I differ as to their application to the facts in evidence.
There was plenary evidence that the negligence of Beryl J. Ford proximately caused the collision and plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff having taken a voluntary nonsuit as to Ford’s Administrator, Mrs. *546Grantham is now sole defendant. Pier alleged negligence is based on the fact that she failed to stop or slow down before reaching the bridge and thereby exposed the station wagon she was driving to the danger of collision.
When it was first observed .that Ford’s car was zigzagging, indicating something was wrong with the car or the driver, the station wagon was some five hundred feet south of the bridge. The evidence is not explicit as to where Ford’s car was at that time. It was north of the bridge.
It is well to keep in mind that the highway was on a fill crossing Big Marsh Swamp.
Conceding the evidence was sufficient to cause defendant to apprehend that Ford’s car was out of control, and that defendant was required to exercise due care to avoid a collision, what should she have done? In answering this question, we must bear in mind that the danger (sudden emergency) confronting defendant was caused solely by Ford’s negligence.
It may be conceded that if defendant had stopped or slowed down she could have avoided a collision on the bridge. Whether she could have avoided a collision is another matter. If we attempt to answer this question, we find ourselves resorting to theory and conjecture.
Plaintiff contends there would have been no collision if defendant had stopped or slowed down pending Ford’s further operations. True, it is possible that Ford might have gone off the fill before reaching the bridge, or wrecked on the bridge irrespective of collision, or gone off the fill south of the bridge before reaching the station wagon. On the other hand, if defendant stopped, passively awaiting the unfolding' of events over which she had no control, she would thereby lose all ability to maneuver and expose herself and her companions to the likelihood of being knocked from the road down into the swamp.
Plaintiff contends that defendant, observing that Ford had entered the bridge and that his car was swaying as it proceeded southward, should have stopped; before entering upon the bridge. On the other hand, if it appeared that a collision was probable, it would seem consistent with due care to strive to reach the bridge and thus have the protection of the 15-18 inch solid sides when the collision occurred; for if the collision occurred just south of the bridge the danger of being knocked from the road down into the swamp was imminent.
Whether the consequences would have been more or less serious if defendant had stopped in accordance with plaintiff’s suggestion will’never be known. In view of the circumstances then existing, I reach these conclusions: (1) The evidence is insufficient to support a *547finding that a collision between the vehicles would not have occurred if defendant had slowed down or stopped. (2) Defendant’s action in proceeding, always on her side of the highway, reasonably appeared to involve less risk, certainly no more, than would be involved by slowing down or stopping before reaching the bridge. In the sudden emergency created by Ford’s negligence, I do not think it can be said that defendant’s choice of conduct did not accord with what an ordinarily prudent person would or might have done under the same or similar circumstances. Hence, I vote to sustain the judgment of involuntary nonsuit.
I am authorized to say that Higgins, J., concurs in this opinion.