Court Opinion

ID: 9853527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:49:51.137433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:50.663601
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting).
For the following reasons I dissent. Article I, Sec. 26, Constitution of Utah, declares:
The provisions of the Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.
Article VI, Sec. 22, Constitution of Utah, declares:
Every bill shall be read by title three separate times in every house . no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. .
In my view, these clear constitutional statements leave no room to indulge in wide-ranging presumptions conclusive or otherwise. The purposes served by Secs. 22 and 14 are well known and need not be extended here. In addition, our constitution requires “Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, . . .” (Article VI, Sec. 14, Utah Constitution.) The main opinion would lead us to believe all the journal need contain are the yeas and nays, on the final passage of each bill. However, in view of the requirement to “keep a journal of its proceedings” that journal should be such as is defined in Sutherland1 which is as follows:
The journal should contain a record of all formal action taken by the house whether legislative, administrative or of whatever nature including all appointments, motions, orders, resolutions, introductions of bills, committee referrals, votes, etc.
Where, as here, the journal does not record actions mandated by the constitution, it should cast some doubt upon the validity of the legislation. To say, as does- the main opinion “in order to declare an enactment invalid, it would have to appear affirmatively from the journal that there was some constitutional defect and that this could not be shown by mere silence,” is to depart from reality. In speaking about this, the affirmative contradiction rule, Sutherland2 observes:
It generally results, as does the conclusive presumption rule, in sustaining every statute. Indeed, it is illusory to suppose that a bill may be rendered invalid by an affirmative entry of noncompliance. If there are defects in legislative procedure the defects may appear negatively in the journal, that is, that the journal may fail to show that the bill was read a second time or it may fail to show that a proper vote was recorded. But as a practical matter it would be remarkable for the journal to recite affirmatively that the bill was not read or a vote was not taken or that any required procedural step was not carried out.
The practical issue in these cases is whether or not an inference should arise *82from the legislature’s failure to record procedure in the constitutional form or whether it should be presumed that the procedure was taken, but through neglect, misadventure, or inadvertence, a proper record was not made. In this respect it seems unrealistic to make the difference between validity and invalidity depend on whether the journal contains an affirmative recital of noncompliance. If the conclusive presumption is thought to be too strict, a more reasonable alternative is to accord the enrolled bill prima facie validity and admit reliable evidence to establish the actual facts if its validity is challenged.
This brings us to a consideration of what is known as the reliable evidence rule, which has been adopted in several of our neighboring states, and others.3 Sutherland 4 in speaking of the extrinsic evidence or reliable evidence rule says:
What is called the extrinsic rule accords to the enrolled bill prima facie presumption of validity but permits attack by “clear, satisfactory, and convincing” evidence, establishing that the constitutional requirements which the court deems mandatory have not been met.
This rule appears to me to be consonant with our constitutional duty, whereas sustaining legislation by presumption is not.
In relying on Ritchie v. Richards5 to sustain the affirmative contradiction rule, we rely on an opinion which was written in an era when the telephone was a novelty. Can we say the court, in Ritchie, would not have availed itself of the sophisticated electronic recording methods we have today, had such been available to it.
The main opinion speaks disparagingly of the voice records. I submit the same discredit can, with more force, be directed to the journal, because of its failure to keep a record of the proceedings,' as required by the Constitution.

. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 8.02.

. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 15.-04.

. State v. Freeman, Okl., 440 P.2d 744 (1968); Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P.2d 662 (1948).

.Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 15.-06.

.14 Utah 345, 47 P. 670 (1896).