Court Opinion

ID: 9883775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:18:20.172583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:30.422263
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The focus of my concern in this case is on the methodology of the majority in disposing of appellant’s grounds of error four through seven. Therein the appellant complains of the exclusion of venire-members Michael Knapp, Virginia Gonzales, Frances Bradley and Charlotte Smith; though the State’s asserted basis for its entitlement to the exclusion for cause of Knapp, Gonzales and Smith,1 was their disqualification “under Witherspoon,”2 it is appropriate that we construe each to have been made in fact, because the State believed the prospective juror had “a bias or prejudice against [a] phase of the law upon which the State [was] entitled to rely for ... punishment,”3 since “it is clear beyond preadventure that Witherspoon is not a ground for challenging any prospective juror.” Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 47, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2527, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). (Hereinafter cited as Adams.)
Indeed, I believe the State established its entitlement to the exclusion for cause of venireman Knapp, for his answers revealed he would be unable to be a fair and impartial juror in deliberating the issues to be submitted at punishment. Adams; Vigneault v. State, 600 S.W.2d 318 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Further, I am willing to agree with the majority that venirewoman Smith was a classic “equivocating veniremem-ber,”4 and because the thrust of her voir dire examination as a whole reveals her to be irrevocably committed against imposition of the death penalty, I concur in overruling the ground of error complaining of her exclusion.5
*408However, my review of the record reveals no insidious feature of venirewoman Bradley’s voir dire examination which would require the Court’s deference to a trial judge’s exclusion of an apparently qualified juror without challenge by either party, and over an acknowledged objection by the defense. I cannot agree that a trial judge’s discretion extends this far.
Contrary to the majority opinion’s assertion that Bradley “was at first equivocal in her answers concerning capital punishment,” the record reveals that Bradley approved of the death penalty “dependfing] on the circumstances;” neither was she “unalterably opposed to the death sentence as a punishment for [some crimes].” However, the trial court interrupted Bradley’s first response in this vein with,
“Well, would your conscience permit you under some circumstances, ma’am, to vote for the imposition of death?”
Bradley replied that, to be truthful, she would have to answer “no.” Then, after stating to the court that she was not unalterably opposed to the death penalty for some crimes, she added, “Now, I don’t know if that’s a very good answer.” The trial judge replied,
“Well, it isn’t but it’s a bad answer because it conflicts with your other answer.”
It seems rather clear to me that Bradley was asserting a belief in the viability of capital punishment in the appropriate case, while expressing a doubt as to her personal ability “to vote for the imposition of death,” a fairly common juxtaposition of attitudes which I would not characterize as “conflicting” or “equivocal.”
The majority opinion sets out the trial court’s continued interrogation wherein Bradley reiterated her doubts about her ability “to vote for the death penalty,” while standing firm on her belief that it would be appropriate “if it was a child or minor that couldn’t protect themselves or it was caused — they intended to do it, .... ” But the majority opinion omits the conclusion of what was originally the prosecutor’s examination:
“THE COURT: All right. You may examine further, if you wish.
[PROSECUTOR]: We pass on that issue.
[DEFENSE]: You are not imposing a challenge?
[PROSECUTOR]: No.”
Apparently the majority opinion labels any response or group of responses which reveal Bradley to be a qualified capital jur- or as “equivocation;” illustrative is the following exchange which is not otherwise alluded to by that opinion:
“[By Defense Counsel]
Q: * * * In such a case, the killing of a child, the intentional killing of a child, could you vote for the death penalty in that case if you were on the jury?
A: Yes, I think I could then.
*409Q: Now, that’s not what we have here but nevertheless, ... are there ... other intentional killing circumstances where you could, if the circumstances were such that ... it would be justified, vote for the death penalty? As an example, a killing, an intentional killing while another crime is going on.
A: That’s what I said. That’s the only way I could say, I could vote for a death penalty is if it was an intentional thing or minor that couldn’t protect themself [sic].”
Defense counsel at this point reminded Bradley that all murders would have to be intentional, asking her if she understood, and on her affirmative reply, stated, “All right. We are limiting this to intentional killings;” and on asking her again whether she could “vote for the death penalty” if the “circumstances [were] severe or revolting or shocking enough,” she replied:
“I feel like I am contradicting myself. In some cases I feel like I could if I knew all the evidence. I feel like the death penalty is pretty strong.”
Whereupon the trial judge interrupted, observing, “Yes, it is kind of final Mrs. Bradley,” again stressing the urgency that the court “get a definite commitment, which is not easy for you to make. I don’t imagine you sit around and drink tea everyday and discuss the death penalty.” The trial court then again elicited from Bradley that her “conscience [would] permit [her] ... to vote for the imposition of the death penalty ... if it was one of those two cases.” The trial court continued:
“THE COURT: You told us—
A: I know I said yes and no.
THE COURT: You told us about three different things, now, which is understandable but not very helpful.
A: I just don’t think, to tell you the truth, I would be very good on a murder trial.
THE COURT: We are trying to find out one little thing. * * * [Can Frances Bradley sit on] a jury and work together with eleven other jurors in any case she might conceive and write a death penalty that would spell finish to some old boy. Now can you do it or can’t you?”
Mrs. Bradley again expressed doubts about her ability to “write a death penalty.” When passed back to defense counsel Bradley conceded “part of me says I could and part of me says I couldn’t.” Her voir dire examination was concluded thus,
“A: Well, I would say that I don’t believe I could make the decision for a person’s death.
Q: Which means not sure?
A: That’s right.
THE COURT: Which means to me I’m going to excuse you. Thank you Mrs. Bradley. You will be excused. Was the Clerk there or not? * * *
BAILIFF: I assume he is.
THE COURT: If he is not, be sure to verify Mrs. Bradley’s address. Is that an apartment?
[MRS. BRADLEY]: Yes.
THE COURT: Get the apartment number because we will mail you a check if the clerk isn’t there.
You have objection to my ruling. You are excused now.”
First, it is apparent that the majority opinion errs in concluding no objection was offered to the trial court’s action in excluding Bradley without challenge. I am certainly willing to defer to the trial judge’s acknowledgement of objection to his ruling which is spread on the face of the record, and believe that defense counsel was entitled to assume this Court would give due deference thereto. Thus, in iny view, the trial court committed reversible error when he excluded Bradley sua sponte when she was not shown to be absolutely disqualified under Article 35.16(a)(2), (3) or (4), Y.A.C. C.P.
But my deepest reservation about the majority opinion concerns the holding that we “give due deference to the trial judge’s discretion,” without in any fashion explicating acceptable limitations on that “discretion;” how can we determine whether an “abuse of discretion” has occurred when we *410have failed to delineate what that discretion entails? While it may be appropriate in some cases to wholly defer to the trial judge’s “credibility calls,” such should be the case only where a careful and faithful review of the cold record fails to communicate to us the “feelings,” “beliefs” and “attitudes” held by a capital venireperson regarding the death penalty. The voir dire examination of Mrs. Bradley does not present such a case.
Patently, the trial judge was of the belief that the only issue is whether a prospective juror could “vote for” or “write” a death penalty. Inquiries along other lines — including those suggested by Witherspoon —were interrupted and treated as irrelevant by the trial court. In the case of Mrs. Bradley, it was the trial judge who branded her responses as “conflicting,” and diverted attempts by the attorneys to clarify her relevant attitudes.
We can only speculate about whether Bradley could “consider” the death penalty fairly and answer the special issues according to the evidence, since she was never asked whether she could.6 What does “vote for the death penalty” mean? Every member of the Court has seen capital voir dire examinations in which a prospective juror states unequivocally that he could “never vote for imposition of the death penalty,” only to make an about face when he fully comprehends that jurors in Texas are not called upon to “write a death verdict,” but to answer questions according to evidence so that the trial court can assess the penalty.
Who knows what Mrs. Bradley would have said had she understood the true nature of her “more limited role,” Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at 46, 100 S.Ct. at 2526.
Neither do we know from the record whether Bradley could have “followed the court’s instructions.” Again, she was never asked if she could. Had the trial court allowed a full and fair exploration of these crucial areas before taking over the voir dire examination and then dismissing Bradley sua sponte, the record would likely show an elaboration of her statement — “In some cases I feel like I could [vote for the death penalty] if I knew all the evidence.”
It is most perplexing that the Court fails to condemn such a “method of jury selection,” but the explicit legitimation of it as “discretionary” is incomprehensible.
What we do know about Mrs. Bradley, is that she believed the death penalty is an appropriate punishment in some cases, but would have some difficulty “writing a death sentence.”7 Now, if we only knew what her understanding of “writing a death sentence” was, we might have sufficient information to justify excluding her.8 But because we do not, we can only conclude that she was not shown to be disqualified, and it was therefore error to exclude her. To grant unlimited power to trial judges to conduct ex parte capital voir dire examina*411tion on an improper criterion9 and then make sua sponte exclusions, is perhaps the most dangerous way the Court has taken to date, along a mighty thin line.10
I dissent.
ONION, P.J., and ROBERTS and TEAG-UE, JJ., join.

. Bradley was not challenged by the State; indeed, in passing her the prosecuting attorney expressly declined to make one.

. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). (Hereinafter cited as Witherspoon.)

. To seven of the prosecutor’s ten questions, Smith “honestly didn’t know” how she felt. She “didn’t think” she could think of a crime so damaging to society or the victim that the actor should die for it. The closest Smith got to saying the death penalty might be appropriate in some cases, was “well, if there is no help for anybody anymore, I guess the law has to do something about it;” of course, this too, is painfully ambiguous. (All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.)

.My conclusion in this regard, however, has not been reached without reservation. The record reflects that after the prosecutor posited his questions and challenged Smith for cause, defense counsel elicited Smith’s doubts that she could think of a crime so damaging as to justify the death penalty; he then gave her a hypothet regarding the victim being a child or baby. Smith’s reply indicated she thought the perpetrator of such a crime would have to be mentally ill. Defense counsel negated this contingency in his hypothet and Smith gave the response about guessing “the law has to do something about it.” (See n. 3, ante.) *408At this point, after only five questions from defense counsel, the trial judge interrupted with the following:
“THE COURT: Let me interrupt you here. You told us several times you are so against the death penalty you could not vote for it? A: Yes, that’s right.
THE COURT: Now, which is it? Is that what your feeling is?
A: That’s what my feeling is. If somebody proved to me that somebody would do it again, then I am really not sure of myself. THE COURT: I don’t understand what you’re talking about now. Are you so against the death penalty that you could not vote to send a man to death under any circumstances? How do you feel about that?
A: Under any circumstances?
THE COURT: That’s what I asked you before?
A: I just don’t feel it is my place to put anybody to death.
THE COURT: You will be excused, ma’am. Thank you very much.”
This interruption of defense counsel’s cross voir dire of Smith and the virtual sua sponte dismissal of her by the trial court constitute a risky undertaking in terms of the “method of jury selection” condemned in Witherspoon. See especially the venirewoman who twice said she would not want or like “to be responsible” for “deciding somebody should be put to death,” id., 391 U.S. at 515, 88 S.Ct. at 1773; the Supreme Court scotched an assumption that such a prospective juror “thereby affirms that he could never vote in favor of it or that he would not consider doing so in the case before him,” id., at 516, n. 9, 88 S.Ct. at 1774 n. 9. Here, however, Smith’s last expression does not negate her earlier affirmations.

. In light of experience since Hovila v. State, 532 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), the premise that “the jury will know that their answers will determine whether the defendant is to be punished by death or by life imprisonment,” id., at 294, is not a reliable assumption in voir dire examination. In Texas, “to obey his oath and follow the law,” the juror “must be willing not only to accept that in certain circumstances death is an acceptable penalty but also to answer the statutory questions without conscious distortion or bias," Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at 46, 100 S.Ct. at 2526. That willingness can only be determined from answers to proper questions designed to ascertain it.

. If a majority persists in characterizing such attitudes as “equivocation,” then so be it. But “to not properly respect” the sheer consistency of such attitudes, and require more of the State and the trial court in denotatively refining them, “constitutes a failure to recognize and understand the realities” and complexity of the human psyche.

.There can be no doubt whatever that venire-woman Virginia Gonzales believed that in order to serve on the jury she was required to pre-commit to the trial judge that she would vote for the death penalty. Her misunderstanding is completely understandable in view of the manner in which the voir dire was conducted throughout this case. Though she too was never shown to be disqualified, Bradley’s improper exclusion alone requires reversal of the case. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 399 (1976).

. The writer’s conviction that a juror’s ability to “vote for” or “write” a death penalty, is immaterial to the ability of that juror to serve fairly and impartially on a Texas capital jury, has been very recently fortified. See Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558 (CA5, 1981).

. That is “the line of neutrality” which the State of Texas, not just the prosecution, is constitutionally forbidden to cross and produce “a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die,” Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. at 520, 521, 88 S.Ct. at 1776.