Court Opinion

ID: 9499259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:42:42.449858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:23.032920
License: Public Domain

BYBEE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I write separately because our precedents will not support — and, indeed, they contradict — the majority’s holding. In particular, the majority’s holding clearly conflicts with our decision in United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 309 F.3d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir.2002). I believe that we cannot dismiss this case for want of jurisdiction without seeking en banc approval.
I agree that Jacobo relinquished his pretrial constitutional appeals at sentencing. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). The question is: What are the consequences? Not infrequently, a defendant who has waived his right to appeal in a plea agreement will file an appeal anyway. Ordinarily, in such cases, the government will advise us of the waiver, either by motion or in its brief, and we will dismiss the appeal, often in a memorandum disposition. But in this case, the government answered Ja-cobo’s contentions on the merits, never arguing that Jacobo’s appeal was barred or moving to dismiss his appeal. Nevertheless, the majority holds that Jacobo’s waiver is a jurisdictional bar, and that we must dismiss the appeal, even though the government never raised the point. In support of its holding the majority cites a number of eases in which we dismissed the appeal. Maj. op. at 989. But in those cases, the government properly asserted *991the bar to appeal. See United States v. Lopez-Armenta, 400 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir.2005) (“The government moved to dismiss the appeal” before a motions panel); United States v. Reyes-Platero, 224 F.3d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir.2000) (“The government argues that Reyes-Platero waived these arguments by unconditionally pleading guilty.”); United States v. Floyd, 108 F.3d 202, 203 (9th Cir.1997) (“The government ... moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Floyd’s plea was not a Rule 11(a)(2) conditional guilty plea.”); see also United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir.2000) (“[T]he government clearly preserved its defense by filing a motion to dismiss Nunez’s appeal before filing its appellee’s brief.”); United States v. Cortez, 973 F.2d 764, 766 (9th Cir.1992) (“The United States argues that Cortez’ selective prosecution motion was waived both by Cortez’ failure to file the claim before trial and his plea of guilty.”). Here, the government not only failed to file a motion to dismiss, but also never argued for a waiver of appeal in its brief. When “the government fail[s] to raise this question in its brief or at oral argument, we decline to address it.” United States v. Lewis, 798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir.1986), amending United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir.1986).
More importantly, we have previously held that “the government can waive the waiver” in cases where a defendant appeals despite a guilty plea. United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 309 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.2002). In Garcia-Lopez, the government properly moved to dismiss the appeal, and then explicitly waived the appeals bar in subsequent briefing. We held that “even if a defendant has waived his right to appeal in a plea agreement, we may nevertheless hear the appeal when the government has expressly waived its right to assert the defendant’s waiver.” Id; see also id. at 1123 (the “government ‘waived [its] waiver’ argument by failing to raise it.”) (quoting Fagan v. Washington, 942 F.2d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir.1991) and citing United States v. Lewis, 798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir.1986)) (alteration in original). In that case, express waiver was required because the government had preserved its rights by filing a motion to dismiss the appeal. We reasoned that “[i]f the government can ‘waive waiver’ implicitly by failing to assert it, certainly the government can do so explicitly, as occurred here.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, however, no express waiver is necessary because the government never asserted its right to rely on defendant’s relinquishment of his appeal in the first place. Where the government has never asserted its rights, the issue is “whether the government can waive the waiver. We [have] h[e]ld that it can.” Id. at 1122. We rendered a similar decision in United States v. Doe, 53 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.1995), holding that even if the defendant had relinquished his appeal rights by failing to appeal the imposition of supervised release until years after his sentencing, the waiver would not bar appeal unless the government so requested. “[Defendant’s] [w]aiver does not divest the Court of jurisdiction it otherwise enjoys.” Id. at 1082.
The majority distinguishes Garciar-Lo-pez on the grounds that the defendant in that case sought to appeal a sentencing determination that occurred after the plea, rather than the issue of guilt itself. Maj. Op. at 989 n. 2. But Garcia-Lopez’s plea agreement expressly relinquished appeals for sentencing and guilt, provided the sentence fell within the guidelines. Garcia-Lopez, 309 F.3d at 1122 (quoting the plea agreement’s provisions that “defendant waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence”). Garcia-Lopez was sentenced within the guidelines, but *992appealed nonetheless. He did not allege any breach of the agreement, nor did he attack its validity. His appeal did not fall within the “narrow exception to waiver of the right to appeal” we have recognized in eases “where the sentence imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated agreement.” United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless of whether his claims arose from actions completed before or after the agreement, Garcia-Lopez expressly and effectively bargained away his appeal rights, just as Jacobo has, but was permitted to take them up again after the government declined to enforce the bar. We cannot distinguish his waiver from Jacobo’s.
In fairness to the majority, I recognize that our cases are not entirely consistent and that there is language in our cases stating that “[w]e do not have jurisdiction to decide” post-plea appeals. United States v. Carrasco, 786 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir.1986). A true jurisdictional bar, of course, would not be waivable. Our cases have not always been careful to explain whether the bar to post-plea appeal is a jurisdictional bar, a waiver, or some other kind of defense to appeal. Compare, e.g., Lopez-Armenta, 400 F.3d at 1177 (discussing the plea bar as waiver); United States v. Anglin, 215 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.2000) (discussing the appeals bar as a waiver and providing that “[t]he scope of a knowing and voluntary waiver is demonstrated by the express language of the plea agreement”); Bolinger, 940 F.2d at 480 (noting that “a negotiated plea of guilty” functions as “an express waiver of the right to appeal”) with, e.g., Floyd, 108 F.3d at 204 (“Unless Floyd’s plea conformed with [the Federal] Rule’s specific requirements [for a conditional plea], we have no jurisdiction to hear her appeal. Hence, we cannot reach the merits of her conviction.”); Carrasco, 786 F.2d at 1453-54 (“We do not have jurisdiction to decide Carrasco’s appeal ... unless she entered a valid conditional plea.”). We have sometimes muddled the categories within the same opinion. See Reyes-Platero, 224 F.3d at 1114 (“The government argues that Reyes-Platero waived these arguments by unconditionally pleading guilty. The implication of the government’s argument is that we do not have jurisdiction....”). The confusion in our cases calls for rehearing en banc, not a simple vote by our panel.1
Absent clarification from the court, sitting en banc, I believe we are bound by Garcictr-Lopez, and would hold that the government has relinquished its objections to Jacobo’s appeal. I would, therefore, reach the merits of the appeal. On that score, I do not find Jacobo’s claims persuasive. He cannot now appeal the admission of the firearms seized in a search of his house because he stipulated, at pleading, that the search was conducted pursuant to probable cause. See United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 431 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir.1980) (“Unless a criminal defendant indicates objection at the time the stipulation is made, he or she is ordinarily bound by such stipulation.”).
*993Because Jacobo did not object to prein-dictment delay at trial, we may only review this claim for plain error. Estrella v. United States, 429 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir.1970). There is none here because Jacobo fails to even allege, much less prove, “actual, non-speculative prejudice from the delay.” United States v. Huntley, 976 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir.1992).
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. The confusion in our own cases is not aided by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975), or Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). See Maj. Op. at 989-990. At most, those cases suggest that "waiver” is not the appropriate term to describe when a defendant bargains away his appeal rights. But nothing in those cases suggests that- relinquishment is jurisdictional. See Menna, 423 U.S. at 62, 96 S.Ct. 241 n. 2; Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266-67, 93 S.Ct. 1602.