Court Opinion

ID: 9959457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 18:01:05.303026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:33.701721
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

BERNICE PEREZ,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
              Appellant,                        NY-0752-22-0091-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: April 10, 2024
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Bernice Perez , Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, pro se.

      Latriece D. Jones , Mobile, Alabama, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed her adverse action appeal for lack of jurisdiction.        For the reasons
discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the
initial decision, and REMAND the case to the New York Field Office for further
adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

                                 BACKGROUND
         On February 15, 2022, the agency issued a final decision removing the
appellant from her Farm Service Agency District Director position based on
13 specifications of inappropriate conduct. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2,
Tab 7 at 20, 22-25. The decision letter informed the appellant that she would be
removed effective February 20, 2022. IAF, Tab 7 at 23. On February 19, 2022,
the appellant retired, and the agency documented the retirement as being in lieu
of involuntary action (“Retirement-ILIA”) on a Standard Form 50 (SF-50). Id.
at 20.
         Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal with the Board, contesting the
merits of the removal action and alleging that the removal pressured her to retire
involuntarily.    IAF, Tab 1 at 4-5.     She raised the affirmative defenses of
discrimination based on age, race, ethnicity, national origin, and sex.          Id.
The administrative judge issued an order notifying the appellant that the Board
may not have jurisdiction over her appeal because “retirements are presumed to
be voluntary, and voluntary actions are not appealable to the Board.” IAF, Tab 4
at 2. The order advised the appellant that her appeal would be dismissed unless
she made a nonfrivolous allegation that she had retired “because of duress,
coercion, or misrepresentation by the agency,” and that her requested hearing
would be held only if she submitted evidence of the same. Id. The appellant did
not respond to the jurisdiction order.         Without holding a hearing, the
administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the
appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her decision to retire was the result
of coercion. IAF, Tab 33, Initial Decision at 6-9 (citations omitted).
         The appellant has filed a petition for review reiterating her arguments
below, and the agency has filed a response.      Petition for Review (PFR) File,
Tabs 1-2, 5.
                                                                                          3

                  DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
       Title 5 United States Code, section 7701(j) provides that “[i]n determining
the appealability under [section 7701] of any case involving a removal from the
service . . . neither an individual’s status under any retirement system established
by or under Federal statute nor any election made by such individual under any
such system may be taken into account.”            The Board and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) have consistently interpreted
this section to provide that an employee does not lose the right to appeal an
agency’s removal decision simply because she retires on or before the date the
removal was to become effective. Mays v. Department of Transportation, 27 F.3d
1577, 1579-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Williams v. Department of Health & Human
Services, 112 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶ 7 (2009). For example, in Mays, on December 1,
1992, the agency issued a final decision to remove the employee, effective
December 4, 1992.       27 F.3d at 1578.      After receiving the decision letter, the
employee retired on December 4, 1992, the same day her removal was to become
effective. Id. The Federal Circuit construed 5 U.S.C. § 7701(j) to find that the
agency’s final decision was an appealable adverse action, and thus the petitioner
could appeal her removal to the Board. 2 Id. at 1579-81.

2
  This appeal can be distinguished from the Federal Circuit’s decision in Jenkins v.
Merit Systems Protection Board, 911 F. 3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2019), which also involved
an employee’s retirement proximate to an agency removal action and the possible
application of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(j). In that case, the court found that the Board lacks
jurisdiction over a removal appeal if the agency completely cancels or rescinds the
removal action before the appeal is filed with the Board, such that an appeal from that
action has become moot “because the agency . . . removed ‘all references to [the
removal action] from [the petitioner’s] official personnel file,’ thereby ‘eliminat[ing] all
consequences of that action.’” Id. at 1374-75 (quoting Cooper v. Department of the
Navy, 108 F.3d 324, 326 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In the instant case, there is no evidence that
the agency canceled or rescinded its decision to remove the appellant. In fact, as noted,
the appellant’s removal is documented on her retirement SF-50. IAF, Tab 7 at 20.
Therefore, as in Mays, the appellant cannot “escape the final agency decision to remove
her.” 27 F.3d at 1580; see Fox v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 22
(2014) (finding that when an agency processes the retirement request and not the
removal action, and when such retirement documentation explicitly references the
removal action, the Board retains jurisdiction over that action).
                                                                                  4

      As set forth previously, the appellant here received written notice on
February 15, 2022, of the agency’s final decision to remove her effective
February 20, 2022. IAF, Tab 7 at 22-25. She retired on February 19, 2022, the
day before her removal became effective, id. at 20; and even though the agency
ultimately processed the appellant’s retirement and not the removal, it issued an
SF-50 documenting her separation as “Retirement-ILIA,” which specifies that the
appellant “retired after receiving written notice on February 15, 2022, of decision
to separate [her] for inappropriate conduct,” id. Thus, this is a case involving a
removal, and we find that the Board has jurisdiction over the appellant’s adverse
action appeal.
      Because we find that the administrative judge erred in dismissing the
adverse action appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we also find that she erred in
adjudicating the appellant’s involuntary retirement claim. The Board has held
that it is an error to adjudicate an appellant’s involuntary retirement claim as a
matter distinct from a removal action.        Fox v. Department of the Army,
120 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 23 (2014); see Williams, 112 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶¶ 7-8 (2009).
Rather, it will examine the merits of the adverse action, and if the agency is
unable to support its removal decision, then the appellant is entitled to all the
relief she could receive if she could show that her retirement was coerced; her
involuntary retirement claim would thereby be mooted. Scalese v. Department of
the Air Force, 68 M.S.P.R. 247, 249 (1995). Conversely, if the agency is able to
show that it properly decided to remove the appellant, then she could not show
her retirement was involuntary based on the threat of the removal action.
Id.; Williams, 112 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶ 7. Accordingly, we vacate the initial decision
and remand this case for adjudication of the adverse action appeal.
      On remand, the administrative judge shall hold the appellant’s requested
hearing and adjudicate the appellant’s removal.     She shall also adjudicate the
appellant’s affirmative defenses. The administrative judge shall then issue a new
initial decision addressing the merits of the appellant’s removal without regard to
                                                                                     5

involuntary retirement or resignation doctrine. However, if the agency meets its
burden with respect to the removal, but evidence or argument on remand raises
the issue of involuntary retirement based on circumstances other than the threat of
removal, the administrative judge should address whether that evidence or
argument    establishes   that   the   appellant’s   retirement   was    involuntary. 3
See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980)
(explaining that an initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and
law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the
administrative judge’s conclusions of law and his legal reasoning, as well as the
authorities on which that reasoning rests).

                                       ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the initial decision and remand
this case to the New York Field office for further adjudication in accordance with
this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                          ______________________________
                                        Gina K. Grippando
                                        Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

3
  On review, the appellant submits numerous additional documents, such as medical
records, performance appraisals, and SF-50s. PFR File, Tabs 1-2. Under 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115, the Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first time
with a petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record
was closed before the administrative judge despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino
v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 213-14 (1980). Because we are remanding this
matter, the administrative judge should consider these documents to the extent they are
relevant to the issues on remand.