Court Opinion

ID: 9953207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 16:14:36.752056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:46.183157
License: Public Domain

J-S01012-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DENNIS LEE ENGLERT                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 841 MDA 2023

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 8, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000357-2020

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DENNIS LEE ENGLERT                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 842 MDA 2023

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 8, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002188-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                         FILED: MARCH 21, 2024

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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       Dennis Lee Englert appeals from the judgment of sentence in two

dockets entered following his convictions of possession of a controlled

substance by an inmate.1 We affirm.

       In an information filed on March 10, 2020, at trial court docket number

CP-40-CR-357-2020, Englert was charged with possession of a controlled

substance by an inmate stemming from possession of Suboxone on April 19,

2019. On November 11, 2020, at trial court docket number CP-40-CR-2188-

2020, the Commonwealth filed an information charging Englert with the same

crime, as well as controlled substance contraband to confined persons

prohibited,2 related to his possession of Suboxone on March 10, 2020.

       On April 23, 2022, Englert proceeded to a one-day jury trial at 357-

2020, at the conclusion of which he was found guilty. On June 8, 2022, the

trial court held a hearing on pre-trial motions at 2188-2020, after which the

court began the sentencing hearing for the matter at 357-2020. Partially

through the sentencing portion of the hearing, after Englert gave his

allocution, a recess was taken. Following the recess, Englert tendered a guilty

plea to the crime of possession of a controlled substance by an inmate in the

case at 2188-2020. The plea agreement reflected that the Commonwealth had

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5123(a.2).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5123(a).

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no objection to the sentence to be imposed at 2188-2020 running concurrently

with the sentence to be imposed at 357-2020.

       After accepting the guilty plea, the trial court proceeded to sentencing.

The court issued a sentence of 42 to 84 months of incarceration at case 357-

2020, which was to run consecutively with any sentence Englert was currently

serving. At case 2188-2020, the court sentenced Englert to serve a term of

incarceration of 42 to 84 months, to run concurrently with the sentence at

357-2020.

       Following proceedings under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, Englert’s post-sentence and appellate rights were

reinstated on March 27, 2023. Englert filed post-sentence motions, which the

trial court denied. This appeal followed.3 Englert presents issues challenging

the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and the discretionary

aspect of sentencing.4

____________________________________________

3 We observe that Englert filed two notices of appeal, one at each of the trial

court docket numbers. On June 30, 2023, the appeals were consolidated.

4 We note with disapproval that the Commonwealth failed to file an appellee’s

brief. “An appellee is required to file a brief that at minimum must contain ‘a
summary of argument and the complete argument for appellee.’”
Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 835 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting
Pa.R.A.P. 2112). In Pappas, the panel referred to the Commonwealth’s failure
to file a proper appellee’s brief as “unacceptable.” Id. We echo that opinion
and remind the Commonwealth of its obligation to file an appellee’s brief in
future appeals.

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       Englert first argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient

evidence to support his conviction of possession of a controlled substance by

an inmate at 357-2020. See Appellant’s Brief, at 6-9. Specifically, he argues

that because the contraband was not found on his person, the Commonwealth

bore the burden of establishing constructive possession. See id. at 7. Englert

asserts that the Commonwealth “presented ‘equivocal evidence’ that drugs

‘may have been found in his locker.’” Id. at 9. He further posits that none of

the Commonwealth’s witnesses “could identify the locker [where the

Suboxone was discovered] as [belonging to Englert] or prove that he had

exclusive access or dominion over said locker.” Id. Accordingly, we are called

upon to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to conclude that

Englert possessed the Suboxone while incarcerated for purposes of Section

5123(a.2).5

____________________________________________

5 To the extent that Englert is attempting to challenge the weight of the
evidence with an attack of the credibility of the evidence presented by the
Commonwealth, we observe that he has failed to preserve a challenge to the
weight of the evidence for our review. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 and its comment
instruct that to preserve a claim that a verdict is against the weight of the
evidence for appellate review, the issue must be raised with the trial judge in
a motion for a new trial either orally or in writing prior to sentencing, or in a
post-sentence motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. We reiterated in Commonwealth
v. Gillard, 850 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2004), “[t]he purpose of this rule
is to make it clear that a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be
raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.” Id. at 1277 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P.
607, cmt). As this Court concluded, “Rule 607 clearly requires that such a
claim be raised initially by a motion to the trial court, and the failure to do so
compels this Court to find the issue waived, even if it was ultimately addressed
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       We analyze arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under

the following parameters:

             Our standard when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
       is whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences
       derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
       Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to establish all
       elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not
       weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
       finder. Additionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude every
       possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any
       doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so
       weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
       fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When
       evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the fact-
       finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. For
       purposes of our review under these principles, we must review the
       entire record and consider all of the evidence introduced.

Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citations omitted).

       The crime of possession of controlled substance contraband by inmate

prohibited is defined in our Crimes Code as follows:

       A prisoner or inmate commits a felony of the second degree if he
       unlawfully has in his possession or under his control any controlled
       substance in violation of section 13(a)(16) of The Controlled
       Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. For purposes of this
       subsection, no amount shall be deemed de minimis.

____________________________________________

by the trial court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion.” Gillard, 850 A.2d at 1277
(citation omitted).

       Here, Englert filed a written post-sentence motion with the trial court
after his rights were reinstated by the PCRA court. However, our review of the
post-sentence motion reflects that Englert did not challenge the weight of the
evidence. Therefore, we conclude that any purported challenge to the weight
of the evidence is waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Gillard, 850 A.2d at 1277.

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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5123(a.2). Therefore, a defendant is guilty of possession of a

controlled substance by an inmate if he unlawfully has a controlled substance

in his possession while he is a prisoner or inmate.

      The Crimes Code defines the term “possession” as “an act, within the

meaning of this section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the

thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to

have been able to terminate his possession.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 301(c).

      To establish the element of possession, this Court has explained that

“[p]ossession can be found by proving actual possession, constructive

possession, or joint constructive possession.” Commonwealth v. Parrish,

191 A.3d 31, 36 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). It is undisputed that

Englert was not in actual possession of the Suboxone. Rather, the contraband

was discovered in one of the two lockers in his prison cell during the execution

of a search. It is further undisputed that Englert’s cellmate, Reid, was not

present during the execution of the search warrant.

      We previously have determined:

             Where a defendant is not in actual possession of the
      prohibited items, the Commonwealth must establish that the
      defendant had constructive possession to support the conviction.
      Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to
      deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. We have
      defined constructive possession as conscious dominion, meaning
      that the defendant has the power to control the contraband
      and the intent to exercise that control. To aid application, we
      have held that constructive possession may be established by the
      totality of the circumstances.

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            It is well established that, as with any other element of a
      crime, constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial
      evidence. In other words, the Commonwealth must establish facts
      from which the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the defendant
      exercised dominion and control over the contraband at issue.

Parrish, 191 A.3d at 36–37 (internal citations and quotations omitted)

(emphasis added).

      In addition, the power and intent to control contraband does not need

to be exclusive to a defendant to find constructive possession. Our Supreme

Court has recognized that “constructive possession may be found in one or

more actors where the item in issue is in an area of joint control and equal

access.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 26 A.3d 1078, 1094 (Pa. 2011)

(citation and brackets omitted).

      In addressing the sufficiency of evidence challenge, the trial court

opined that “[h]aving presided over the trial in this matter, this [c]ourt has no

doubt that the evidence was more than sufficient to enable a jury to find

[Englert] guilty of possession of a controlled substance by an inmate.” Trial

Court Opinion, 8/3/23, at 3. In reviewing the evidence presented the trial

court offered the following:

             At trial Carl Benyon, a corrections officer at SCI Dallas
      testified that he was part of a team tasked with removing the
      Appellant from his cell and conducting a search of that cell. (N.T.
      4/23/2022 pg. 29-30). Mr. Benyon testified that a search of the
      Appellant’s locker in his cell resulted in recovering more than
      twenty (20) suboxone strips. (Id.) The contraband suboxone was
      kept in the locker with various other personal items belonging to
      the Appellant. (pg. 30).

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            Lieutenant Mitkowski was also present when the Appellant
      was removed from his cell prior to the search and he observed the
      Appellant cup his hand and place it over his mouth as though he
      was ingesting something. N.T. (pg. 47-48, 53). The Appellant was
      thereafter taken to a body scanning device kept at the State
      Correctional Facility and the x-ray type machine revealed the
      presence of an unusually dense non food [sic] item in the area of
      the Appellant's stomach. (N.T. pg. 71-72).

            These facts taken together more than amply prove the
      Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the
      jury’s verdict was amply supported by evidence sufficient to
      support the Appellant’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/3/23, at 5. We agree.

      Our review of the record reflects that Corrections Officer Carl Beynon, a

prison guard at SCI Dallas, testified that at approximately 4:30 p.m. on April

19, 2019, he received instructions to conduct an investigative search of

Englert’s cell. See N.T., 4/23/22, at 26-27. Beynon explained that after

Englert was escorted from his cell, Beynon and Corrections Officer Ronny

Pavlick conducted the search. See id. at 28. Beynon stated:

      I found in [Englert’s] wall locker wrapped in an individually-
      wrapped toilet paper [inside of a cardboard tube], it appeared to
      be something orange. Upon further inspection and testing, it was
      20 and, I believe, a half individually-wrapped orange in color strips
      of Suboxone, visibly identified orange color, the N-8 logo. Then
      upon further testing, I believe through the test kit, it tested
      positive for Suboxone.

Id. at 29. Beynon further testified that additional items belonging to Englert

were found in the locker. See id. at 29-30. He observed that the locker held

papers addressed to Englert containing “his name and numbering.” Id. at 30.

In addition, Beynon explained that the cell has two lockers and “One, had

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articles that would indicate they belonged to the other inmate; and the other

had articles that would indicate it belonged to [Englert].” Id. at 44.

      The Commonwealth also presented testimony from Lieutenant James

Mitkowski, II, a corrections officer at SCI Dallas at the time in question.

Mitkowski explained that he was with the team instructed to retrieve Englert

from his cell. See N.T., 4/23/22, at 47. Mitkowski testified that when Englert

was ordered off his bunk, he watched Englert hop down from the top bunk

and place his cupped hand to his mouth as if “placing something in his mouth.”

Id. at 48. Mitkowski described that Englert was handcuffed, taken to another

room for an unclothed search, and then taken to a body scan machine. See

id. at 48-49.

      Likewise, Corrections Officer Geoffrey Kehl testified that he was with the

escort team that retrieved Englert from his cell. See N.T., 4/23/22, at 61-62.

Kehl offered the following concerning his observations:

      I gave [Englert] an order to step down off his bunk. He turned to
      get off the bunk and put something in his mouth for a brief second.
      It was quick. His hand was cupped, and he put it into his mouth.
      … I couldn’t see what was in his hand, but his hand was cupped,
      and he put it in his mouth.

Id. at 62.

      Finally, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Sergeant Michael

Sankey, the officer who performed the machine body scan on Englert. Sankey

stated that the results indicated “[t]here was an 80 percent probability of the

presence of contraband inside of [Englert’s] body.” N.T., 4/23/22, at 71.

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Sankey noted that the imaging showed an object around the stomach area

that did not appear to be food. See id. at 72.

      After review of the record, and consideration of the evidence in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude this evidence, albeit

circumstantial, conclusively ascertains that Englert had the power to control

the contraband discovered in his prison cell and the intent to exercise such

control, thereby establishing his constructive possession of the Suboxone.

Johnson,       920   A.2d   at   882.   Accordingly,   Englert’s   claim   that   the

Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction

lacks merit.

      Englert last argues the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning his

sentence. See Appellant’s Brief, at 10-11. In essence, Englert alleges the trial

court ignored the mitigating factor of his addiction and concomitant

rehabilitative needs. Therefore, he contends the trial court abused its

discretion in failing to consider pertinent factors when creating his sentence.

      Our standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. Sentencing is a

matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence

will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      It is well settled there is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary

aspects of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805 (Pa.

Super. 2006). Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects

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of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a petition for allowance of

appeal. See Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super.

2007).

     As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa.

Super. 2010):

     An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
     must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

           We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
           whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
           see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
           properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
           reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
           720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
           Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
           substantial question that the sentence appealed from
           is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
           Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation and brackets omitted).

     Here, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met. Englert

brought an appropriate appeal, raised the issue in a post-sentence motion,

and included in his appellate brief a concise statement of the reasons relied

upon for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). We next consider

whether he has raised a substantial question requiring us to review the

discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed.

     Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about the

appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-by-case

basis. See Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super.

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2001). As to what constitutes a substantial question, this Court does not

accept bald assertions of sentencing errors. See Commonwealth v.

Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, an appellant must

show actions by the trial court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. See

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735, 737 (Pa. Super. 2006).

       Here, Englert argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

consider mitigating factors pertaining to his addiction and need for

rehabilitation. This Court has found a substantial question exists where there

is an allegation that the sentencing court failed to consider the factors set

forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).6 See Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d

843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (concluding that the appellant raised a substantial

question where it was alleged that the trial court failed to properly consider

the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)). Therefore, Englert has raised

a substantial question. Accordingly, we grant permission to appeal and

proceed to review the merits of this sentencing claim.

       Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion. Commonwealth v. Bankes, 286 A.3d 1302, 1307 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

6 The factors to be considered under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) include: the
protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and
community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9721(b).

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2022). In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error

in judgment. See id. Rather, an appellant must establish by reference to the

record that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, or arrived at a

manifestly unreasonable decision. See id.

      The sentencing judge has broad discretion in determining the proper

penalty, and this Court accords the sentencing court great deference, as it is

the sentencing court that is in the best position “to view a defendant’s

character, displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference and the overall effect

and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa.

2007) (citation omitted). As we have stated, “[a] court is required to consider

the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the

defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(citation omitted). “In particular, the court should refer to the defendant’s

prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his potential for

rehabilitation.” Id.

      In addition, “[o]ur Supreme Court has determined that where the trial

court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is presumed that the court is

aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where

the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.”

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citation omitted).

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      In reviewing Englert’s challenge to the sentence imposed in the standard

range of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the alleged failure to consider

particular factors, the trial court specifically noted its reliance on Englert’s PSI.

The court stated,

      Following [Englert’s] conviction at trial, we [o]rdered a [PSI]. We
      reviewed that PSI prior to sentencing. Where the sentencing court
      has the benefit of reviewing a PSI the Superior Court presumes
      that the sentencing court was aware of relevant information
      regarding the defendant’s character and weighted those
      considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/3/23, at 7-8.

      Our review of the record reflects, and it is undisputed that, at Englert’s

sentencing, the trial court received and reviewed a presentence report and

considered argument from defense counsel. See N.T., 6/8/22, at 9-10, 18-

20. In addition, the trial court heard Englert’s detailed allocution explaining

his struggle with Suboxone addiction, desire for rehabilitation and treatment,

need to care for his fiancée and their children, and his efforts to improve his

life. See id. at 10-12.

      Prior to announcing the judgment of sentence, the trial court discussed

the PSI with Englert and his counsel, which evinced an understanding of the

relevant factors surrounding Englert’s sentence. See id. at 18-20. Because

the trial court had been fully informed and relied upon the PSI, we conclude

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in creating the instant sentence.

Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1133. Accordingly, Englert’s claim that the trial court

abused its discretion by failing to consider the appropriate factors in imposing

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the sentence lacks merit. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgments of

sentence.

     Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2024

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