Court Opinion

ID: 9699694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:46:42.888684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:55.785862
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Eldridge, Cole and Davidson, JJ., dissent. Eldridge, J., filed a dissenting opinion at page 80 infra, in which Cole and Davidson, JJ., concur.
Once again we shall reject an attempt to obtain money damages as a result of alleged negligence or "educational malpractice” in the Montgomery County school system. Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., Mont. Co., 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982), about which we shall have more to say later, was the first such case. We shall apply Hunter and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which concluded that the trial court correctly decided to enter summary judgment in favor of all defendants.
*69i The case
A former student, identified as "John Doe,” and his parents sued the Montgomery County Board of Education (the Board), its then superintendent of schools, a former superintendent who had served during a number of the years in controversy, Montgomery County, the Montgomery County Health Department (Health Department), and two psychologists said to be in the employ of the Health Department.1 Demurrers to the declaration were overruled. A motion for summary judgment then was made on behalf of the defendants. The case reaches us in a somewhat unusual posture because, contrary to the usual case, the court had nothing before it on the issue of summary judgment other than the declaration. In other words, in this proceeding there were no depositions, admissions, or affidavits in the record. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of all the defendants. An appeal to the Court of Special Appeals followed. It affirmed in an unreported opinion, relying upon its opinion in Hunter v. Board of Educ., Mont. Co., 47 Md. App. 709, 425 A.2d 681 (1981). We granted a writ of certiorari to review the important public question here believed to be present, since there was a suggestion that this case arose in a factually different posture from Hunter.
The "flavor” of this case may be better perceived when one notes what was said by the Court of Special Appeals:
"Although the appellants’ argument is replete with allegations of actionable negligence it is clear that the gravamen of their suit is that of the coveted tort of 'educational malpractice.’ Their declaration contains such allegations as: that the plaintiff 'is entitled to a thorough and efficient public education pursuant to’ the Constitution of Maryland; that the board of education is responsible 'to provide or *70arrange for appropriate educational services’; that the board of education is obliged to provide appropriate educational assessments for those 'in need of special education programs and services’; that the board of education is required 'to provide free education programs and services necessary to identify, diagnose, examine, and educate all children through the age of 20 who are found to be in need of special education services’; that John Doe 'has suffered a loss of an equal education and equal educational opportunity’; that he 'has been denied a thorough and efficient public school education’; that he 'has been subjected to a loss of his right to reasonable and sufficient educational facilities for seven years’; and that he 'has been deprived of seven years of learning opportunity.’ ”
In our review of an order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment, all inferences must be resolved against the moving party, the defendants in this instance. Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 246, 434 A.2d 564 (1981). In the circumstances here we shall assume the truth of all material facts which are well-pleaded and of all inferences which reasonably can be drawn from those well-pleaded facts, as would be true upon review of a demurrer. Hunter, 292 Md. at 483, and Hoffman v. Key Fed. Sav. & Loan, 286 Md. 28, 33-34, 416 A.2d 1265 (1979).
ii The declaration
We shall from time to time recite facts which may be gleaned from the declaration. Young Doe was joined in the declaration by "James Doe and Jane Doe, [hisl natural parents ... .” The two psychologists who were made parties defendant were said to be "in the employ of the .. . Health Department, working in cooperation and conjunction with and as an agent of the . . . Board . . . .”
The first count of the declaration is eighteen pages long. All defendants were sued under it. It asserts that under *71Maryland Code (1978) § 4-107, Education Article, the Board is required "to maintain throughout its political subdivision a reasonably uniform system of quality public school education and equal educational opportunity for all youth.” 2 It then says that under § 4-101 (a) "[educational matters affecting Montgomery County are under the control and direction of the .. . Board . . ..” The declaration states that the Board, with the advice of its superintendent, determines the educational policies of the school system and prescribes rules and regulations for the conduct and management of the public schools. References are made to numerous sections of our educational statutes and to the responsibilities of the Board and the Health Department relative to classifying students in the public schools.
When Doe entered the school system in 1967 he was evaluated by Dr. Stickel, "a psychologist in the employ of the ... Health Department, working in cooperation and conjunction with, and as agent of the . .. Board . . ..” Doe was found to have a verbal I.Q. of 79, a performance I.Q. of 76, and a full scale I.Q. of 75. The narr. refers to a number of additional tests which might have been, but were not, administered to Doe. Stickel concluded that Doe "suffered cerebral damage during his infant years and was retarded or of borderline intellectual level functioning.” Doe was placed in the Montgomery County schools upon the basis of Stickel’s evaluation and his recommendation that he be placed in a "brain injured class or if no such [brain injured] class spaces remained, placement within retarded classes .. ..” It is claimed that Stickel recommended that Doe be reevaluated in ten months, which was not done.
*72The plaintiffs further allege that the failure on the part of the defendants included that of not identifying "a specific individualized educational program . ...” Doe charges that the Health Department "failed to provide proper and thorough vision and hearing screening tests” as required by statute and various rules and regulations.
According to the declaration, a private physician notified the Board in October 1968 that he had discovered that Doe was not suffering from a brain injury, "but was, in fact, suffering from a severe case of dyslexia, a learning disability.” The allegations of the declaration include a claim that several neurologists and psychologists notified the Board that Doe was improperly placed in the Montgomery County school system and that he "should not have been placed in a special education program and programmed with the mentally retarded.. . .”
It is asserted that the Board and the Health Department failed to reevaluate Doe until January 27, 1975, when he was. seen by Dr. H. Bruce Johns, also a defendant, who was "a psychologist in the employ of the ... Board ... at Montgomery Blair High School. .. .” Then it is charged that notwithstanding Johns’ acknowledgment of Doe’s "specific learning disabilities and despite the aforesaid evaluations and recommendations by private psychologists and neurologists, ... Johns recommended that [Doe] be retained in the special education program for those with MLH [, 'mild learning handicaps,’] at Blair High School.”
. Johns evaluated Doe again in July 1976 at which time he "recommended a special education program at a military school setting for [Doe],” as well as a complete eye examination. It is claimed that the Board and the Health Department, notwithstanding the requirements of applicable law, "failed to provide a timely, efficient, and complete eye examination” of Doe as Johns had recommended.
The plaintiffs allege that Doe "was being improperly managed by the Montgomery County Public School System” and that "despite obvious indications of specific learning *73disabilities,” Betty H. Roat, an educational diagnostician employed by the Board, recommended that he be retained in the special education program. The declaration then asserts that as a result of the recommendations of the two psychologists and the diagnostician Doe "was caused to be retained in special educational programs and programmed with the mentally retarded . .. for approximately seven (7) years.”
The multitudinous allegations further include that the Board, the Health Department, the two psychologists, and "their agents and employees, consistently and repeatedly, over the course of [Doe’s] seven-year enrollment in the Montgomery County Public School System, misled . .. James Doe and Jane Doe, as to .. . John Doe’s [] true capacity and potential for learning and achieving a level of education consistent with his actual ability and intelligence.”
The complaint that Doe "ha[ d] suffered a loss of an equal education and equal educational opportunity, hald] been denied a thorough and efficient public school education, ha[d] been subjected to a loss of his right to reasonable and sufficient educational facilities for seven years, hal'd] been deprived of seven years of learning opportunity,” etc., was said to be "|a]s a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned negligence of the . . . Board . . . including its agents and employees, in failing to properly and timely evaluate and re-evaluate [Doe’s] intelligence quotient, in hiring incompetent personnel, in failing to discover and in later ignoring [Doe’s] obvious learning disabilities, in neglecting to administer timely and adequate hearing and vision screening tests, in failing to identify and provide proper diagnostic services or educational options for [Doe], and in ignoring repeated, consistent evaluations and recommendations by private psychologists, neurosurgeons, neurologists, and psychiatrists . .. .”
The second count is one on behalf of the parents which incorporates the allegations of the first count. All defendants were sued under it. This count refers to "the negligence and incompetence of the . .. Board,” which they say caused them *74"to expend vast sums of money for the private education, evaluation, diagnosis, counselling, rehabilitation, and treatment of their minor son,” and will cause them to make similar expenditures in the future.
The third count likewise refers to the allegations of the first. Among other things, it charges that Dr. Stickel was "negligent in failing to evaluate, examine, and test.. . Doe ....” It said that "Stickel’s negligence, lack of diligence, and care required under the circumstances, [was] while acting in his official capacity as an employee of the ... Health Department, and as agent of the .. . Board ... .” Similar allegations are made as to Dr. Johns in the fourth count. The narr. claimed that "Johns’ negligence, lack of diligence and care required under the circumstances, [was] while acting in his official capacity as school psychologist for Montgomery Blair High School and .. . [the] Board ....” These counts appear to be against the two psychologists only.
From our extensive review of the declaration it will be seen that, despite the Does’ contentions to the contrary, what we have here is not a claim for malpractice in the treatment of young Doe, but a claim that public employees improperly evaluated him for the school system and that the Board improperly placed him within the school system as a result of such evaluation. Indeed, at oral argument it was conceded that the evaluation by Dr. Stickel was for placement in the school system. The Does state that the contention of the defendant-appellees that the Doe claims make this suit one for "educational malpractice” "fails to address the underlying issue as to whether or not the agents and employees were properly qualified and competent to provide and arrange for such services and to properly examine and evaluate [Doe] and whether or not they did their job without actionable negligence.” (Emphasis removed.)
iii The law
Judge Digges opened the opinion for the Court in Hunter, 292 Md. at 483, by saying that the "case primarily presented] the troubling but nevertheless important *75question, . .. not .. . previously addressed by this Court, of whether an action can be successfully asserted against a school board and various individual employees for improperly evaluating, placing or teaching a student.” He went on to say for the Court:
"As best we can gather from the declaration, the parents (petitioners here) complain that the school system negligently evaluated the child’s learning abilities and caused him to repeat first grade materials while being physically placed in the second grade. It is alleged that this misplacement, which continued at least through grade school, generally caused the student to feel 'embarrassment,’ to develop 'learning deficiencies,’ and to experience 'depletion of ego strength.’ The petitioners further claim that the individual educators, acting intentionally and maliciously, furnished false information to them concerning the student’s learning disability, altered school records to cover up their actions, and demeaned the child.
"It is clear, however, that the gravamen of petitioners’ claim in this case sounds in negligence, asserting damages for the alleged failure of the school system to properly educate young Hunter, and we first focus our attention on this aspect of it.”
Id. at 483-84.
The Court concluded in Hunter after extensive review of the out-of-state authorities:
"We find ourselves in substantial agreement with the reasoning employed by the courts in Peter W. [v. San Francisco United Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976),] and Donohue [v. Copiague UFSD, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979)], for an award of money damages, in our view, represents a singularly inappropriate remedy for asserted errors in the educational process. The misgivings expressed in *76these cases concerning the establishment of legal cause and the inherent immeasurability of damages that is involved in such educational negligence actions against the school systems are indeed well founded. Moreover, to allow petitioners’ asserted negligence claims to proceed would in effect position the courts of this State as overseers of both the day-to-day operation of our educational process as well as the formulation of its governing policies. This responsibility we are loath to impose on our courts. Such matters have been properly entrusted by the General Assembly to the State Department of Education and the local school boards who are invested with authority over them.” Id. at 487-88.
The Court pointed out that parents who felt aggrieved by the actions of public educators affecting their children were not without recourse since various cited administrative procedures were available. Id. at 488.
A case strikingly similar to the one at bar is Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979), which was reviewed in Hunter. (The Does would prefer that we follow the intermediate appellate court’s opinion in Hoffman which the New York Court of Appeals reversed.) In that case the plaintiff child was examined by a certified clinical psychologist in the school system shortly after the child entered kindergarten. The psychologist determined that the child had an I.Q. of 74 and recommended that he be placed in a class for children with retarded mental development. The psychologist was not certain of his findings, however, for reasons that he set forth. He recommended a reevaluation within a two-year period. The child was placed in the program for the mentally retarded. His academic progress was constantly monitored, which seemed to confirm his lack of progress. His intelligence was not retested as recommended, however. At a later date an intelligence test was administered from which it was determined that the child was not retarded. The New York Court of Appeals said:
*77"[The] plaintiff commenced this action against the Board of Education of the City of New York, alleging that the board was negligent in its original assessment of his intellectual ability and that the board negligently failed to retest him pursuant to Dr. Gottsegen’s earlier recommendation. Plaintiff claimed that these negligent acts and omissions caused him to be misclassified and improperly enrolled in the CRMD program which allegedly resulted in severe injury to plaintiffs intellectual and emotional well-being and reduced his ability to obtain employment.” 49 N.Y.2d at 124-25.
The court characterized the plaintiffs recitation of specific acts of negligence as being "in essence, an attack upon the professional judgment of the board of education grounded upon the board’s alleged failure to properly interpret and act upon [the psychologist’s] recommendations and its alleged failure to properly assess plaintiffs intellectual status thereafter.” Id. at 125. The court then stated:
"In order to affirm a finding of liability in these circumstances, this court would be required to allow the finder of fact to substitute its judgment for the professional judgment of the board of education as to the type of psychometric devices to be used and the frequency with which such tests are to be given. Such a decision would also allow a court or a jury to second-guess the determinations of each of plaintiffs teachers. To do so would open the door to an examination of the propriety of each of the procedures used in the education of every student in our school system. Clearly, each and every time a student fails to progress academically, it can be argued that he or she would have done better and received a greater benefit if another educational approach or diagnostic tool had been utilized. Similarly, whenever there was a failure to implement a recommendation made by any person in the school system with respect to the evaluation *78of a pupil or his or her educational program, it could be said, as here, that liability could be predicated on misfeasance. However, the court system is not the proper forum to test the validity of the educational decision to place a particular student in one of the many educational programs offered by the schools of this State. In our view, any dispute concerning the proper placement of a child in a particular educational program can best be resolved by seeking review of such professional educational judgment through the administrative processes provided by statute.” Id. at 126-27.
iv The decision
The Does see this case as different from Hoffman since here there are individual defendants who are alleged to have improperly evaluated young Doe. We view that as a difference without a distinction, however. The attempt here is to recover not only from the governmental agencies, but also from certain individuals for what the Does conceive to have been a negligent evaluation and placement of young Doe in the school system.
We point out once again that Hunter involved, among other things, a "complainlt] that the school system negligently evaluated the child’s learning abilities . ...” 292 Md. at 483. Also, as we said earlier, Judge Digges opened that opinion for the Court by saying that it "primarily presented] the troubling but nevertheless important question ... of whether an action can be successfully asserted against a school board and various individual employees for improperly evaluating, placing or teaching a student.” Id. It is the third count of the declaration upon which the dissent focuses and dwells. The similarity between this case and Hunter will be noted when we again quote from the third count of the declaration in this case that the charge against Dr. Stickel is that he was "negligent in failing to evaluate, examine, and test... Doe ....” It will be *79seen that it is for error in evaluation for purposes of educational placement, regardless of the manner in which others may see fit to characterize it, for which plaintiffs here seek to recover. No school system can operate successfully without a program for evaluating and placing its pupils. No matter how one examines it, the claim here is concerned with the proper administration of the public school system.
The major difference between this case and Hunter is that the latter also involved a claim that certain of the respondents "intentionally and maliciously acted to injure [the plaintiffs’] child.” We remanded the case for trial of that issue, saying:
"In declining to entertain the educational negligence and breach of contract actions, we in no way intend to shield individual educators from liability for their intentional torts. It is our view that where an individual engaged in the educational process is shown to have wilfully and maliciously injured a child entrusted to his educational care, such outrageous conduct greatly outweighs any public policy considerations which would otherwise preclude liability so as to authorize recovery. It may well be true that a claimant will usually face a formidable burden in attempting to produce adequate evidence to establish the intent requirement of the tort, but that factor alone cannot prevent a plaintiff from instituting the action.” 292 Md. at 490-91 (footnotes omitted).
Unlike the allegations in Hunter, however, we have no suggestion here that any defendant acted wilfully or maliciously.
For the reasons stated in Hoffman and pursuant to the holding in Hunter, the trial court and the Court of Special *80Appeals correctly held in this case that summary judgment should be entered in favor of the various defendants.3

Judgment affirmed; appellants to pay the costs.

. The declaration first asserts that Doe’s counsel "is of the opinion that it is not necessary at this time to publicly disclose Plaintiffs name as it would result in further psychological injury . .. .”

. All references in the declaration are to various sections of Art. 77 "of the Annotated Code of Maryland,” without making reference to the volume involved. It would appear that the 1975 replacement volume is intended. Those sections are now found, virtually without change, although with a different number, in Code (1978) Education Article. For convenience, we shall refer to the latter. Article 77 was extensively revised by Ch. 405 of the Acts of 1969. Some of the provisions to which reference is made in the declaration did not come into the Code until after the 1969 revision. At the time John Doe was first enrolled in the Montgomery County public school system in September 1967, the applicable statutes would have been found in Code (1957, 1965 Repl. Vol., 1967 Cum. Supp.), Art. 77.

. In the view we take of this case it is not necessary for us to address such questions as the extent, if any, to which sovereign immunity or governmental immunity might be applicable to an action such as this or whether the arbitration provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act (Code (1975, 1980 Repl. Vol.) §S 3-2A-01 to -09, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article) would be applicable to the claims against the psychologists.