Court Opinion

ID: 9818650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:00:37.370621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:32:37.017178
License: Public Domain

*768LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
Clearly, the Louisiana records and testimony about them were inadmissible, and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the records and testimony into evidence. Without those records and testimony about them, the State failed to sustain its burden of proof. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating Appellant’s guilt. I would, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court.
The majority, however, holds that Appellant forfeited error by not objecting to each and evei-y reference to the complained-of documents. I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe the majority places form over substance.
At the adjudication hearing, Rhett Wallace of the Denton County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (DCCSCD) testified that Appellant’s community supervision had been transferred to Louisiana at Appellant’s request. Wallace then testified about Appellant’s failure to meet some of the conditions of his community supervision.
Much of Wallace’s testimony was based on information purported to have been sent to his department from the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS); the information purported to be information that ICAOS had received from the State of Louisiana. Appellant objected that Wallace’s testimony was based on hearsay; in response, the State offered the raw records, purportedly from Louisiana, that purport to be community supervision records relating to Appellant and asserted the business records exception as the basis for admission. The records contain no affidavit from the custodian of the records, and Wallace, who testified that he was the DCCSCD custodian of records and that he received the records from Louisiana, was unable to testify who had made the record entries, whether the person had personal knowledge of the contents of the entries, whether the entries were made at or near the time of the events recorded, or indeed anything about how the records were made or the source of the information.
Appellant argued below that although Wallace was the custodian of records for DCCSCD, some of the information in the file purportedly had been provided by Iberia Parish in Louisiana, and Wallace had no knowledge as to the trustworthiness or reliability of that information. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the records in the file “as a business record and a government record.”
In order to be admissible as a business record, there must be evidence that the “memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, [was] made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge” and “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity” when it was “the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by affidavit that complies with Rule 902(10) [of the rules of evidence].”1
The documents were also admitted as a public record. Rule 803(8) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for public records and reports, that is,
*769[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies setting forth:
(A) the activities of the office or agency;
(B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel; or
(C) in civil cases as to any party and in criminal cases as against the state, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law;
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.2
Before a public record can be admitted as an exception under the hearsay rule, the party offering the document must show that it is authentic.3 A document is considered authentic if a sponsoring witness is competent to vouch for its authenticity and vouches for its authenticity, or if the document meets the requirements of self-authentication in rule 902 of the rules of evidence.4 As our sister court in Dallas explained, albeit in an unreported case,
Benavides did not, and could not, testify that he or any probation officer had any knowledge on how Heine prepared the letter or whether she had personal knowledge of the events she recorded in the letter. Moreover, because a government office collects a letter in its files does not give the letter sufficient “indi-cia of reliability” for purposes of admissibility under the business record exception to the hearsay rule. Because the State did not authenticate the Heine letter as a business record exception to the hearsay rule and no evidence established the reliability or trustworthiness of the facts described in the letter, we conclude the letter was inadmissible hearsay.5
The documents in question in the case now before this court did not satisfy the requirement of reliability to meet either the business record exception or the public record exception. The documents were neither authenticated nor self-authenticating. No clerk or any other person had certified them as public documents. They were just a stack of papers that nobody could or did vouch for, except to say that they had been received and were part of the Denton County file. Anyone can place any kind of letterhead on anything, but having some anonymous person designate a piece of paper as a public document does not convert it into a public document.
Because the State laid no predicate to show the reliability of the documents purportedly from Louisiana, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting them, *770whether as business records or government documents.
Appellant’s objections to the documents purporting to come from Louisiana and to the testimony about those documents take up fifteen pages in the reporter’s record. The majority calls this waiver, perhaps because Appellant did not use the magic word “suppression.” As we are all aware, a defendant is not required to continue to object to evidence objected to in a motion to suppress that is overruled.6
The purpose of an objection is merely to call to the trial court’s attention the reason a document, a piece of evidence, or testimony is not admissible. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly stated,
To properly preserve an issue concerning the admission of evidence for appeal, “a party’s objection must inform the trial court why or on what basis the otherwise admissible evidence should be excluded.” However, a party need not spout “magic words” or recite a specific statute to make a valid objection. References to a rule, statute, or specific case help to clarify an objection that might otherwise be obscure, but an objection is not defective merely because it does not cite a rule, statute, or specific case. As this Court stated in Lankston v. State,
Straightforward communication in plain English will always suffice.... [A]ll a party has to do to avoid the forfeiture of a complaint on appeal is to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it.
The objection must merely be sufficiently clear to provide the trial judge and opposing counsel an opportunity to address and, if necessary, correct the purported error. In making this determination, Lankston states that an appellate court should consider the context in which the complaint was made and the parties’ understanding of the complaint at the time.7
We have before us a revocation hearing based on a set of documents purporting to have come from a probation department in Louisiana. Revocations are heard by a trial court and never by a jury. Although Appellant never used the magic word “suppress,” he clearly, and at length, objected to the admission of the documents and to any testimony about the documents and their contents. Once the trial court overruled Appellant’s objections, the documents were in evidence. Once the trial court ruled that Wallace would be allowed to testify from those documents, he was going to be allowed to testify from the documents. This is not a case in which the appellant stated that he had no objection either to the documents or to the testimony. Nor is this a case in which the State offered the same evidence through a different source.
The majority suggests that Appellant should have filed a pretrial or pre-hearing motion to suppress. A motion to suppress is merely a specialized objection that allows a defendant in a criminal case to object to the admission of evidence either pretrial or during trial, to have his objection heard outside the presence of the jury, and to preserve his complaint without *771having to object before the jury.8 It also affords opposing counsel an opportunity to remove the objection or supply other evidence.9
Of course, a motion to suppress may be offered in the form of a written motion filed pretrial or during trial, or it may be made orally in the form of an objection heard outside the presence of the jury. But a community supervision revocation hearing has no jury. Does the majority suggest that when there is no jury only a pretrial motion to suppress will preserve a defendant’s objection to evidence? Does the majority .really suggest that either the trial court or the prosecutor was not aware of Appellant’s complaint? Does the majority really suggest that any trial court hearing a motion to revoke community supervision must be burdened by defense counsel jumping up and down like a Jack-in-the-Box at each mention of the documents, complained of by the only witness to testify for the State, the very same witness whose testimony had been objected to by the defendant during the fifteen pages of objection?
After the trial court overruled Appellant’s objections, Wallace testified from the objected-to documents that while in Louisiana, Appellant had tested positive for cocaine in violation of the conditions of his community supervision and had failed to report for two months in 2008, for all of 2009 except June (when he tested positive for cocaine), and for the two months in 2010 prior to the State’s filing the motion to proceed to adjudication. Wallace also testified that Appellant had failed to complete his drug and alcohol evaluation and his theft diversion class while in Louisiana. Again, his testimony was based on the objected-to documents and not on his personal knowledge or records that he or anyone else present could vouch for.
When evidence is improperly admitted, a defendant does not waive his objection to that testimony, curing its improper admission, by seeking to meet, destroy, or explain the improperly admitted evidence by introducing rebutting evidence.10 Appellant testified in an attempt to explain what had happened in Louisiana. Appellant testified that when he tested positive for cocaine, he immediately requested and received another test, which came back negative.
Appellant was also required to maintain employment and to report to his community supervision officer as other conditions of community supervision. Reporting, given his work schedule, would have caused him to lose his job in violation of the conditions of community supervision. Maintaining his employment caused him to fail to report. Specifically, for the period he failed to report, Appellant testified that he worked on an offshore drilling rig for long stretches at a time, and when not working offshore, he worked twelve-hour shifts from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. He testified that the Louisiana officials scheduled his reporting time for noon but that his community supervision officer knew that he would not be reporting during that time. Appellant stated that on other occasions when he did not report but was not at work, his community supervision officer completed home visits instead. Appellant also testified that *772his community supervision officer was later fired for improprieties.
Other than Appellant’s attempt to meet, destroy, or explain the evidence from Louisiana by introducing rebutting evidence, no admissible evidence supported the trial court’s ruling on the State’s motion to proceed to adjudication.
The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to prove the allegation that Appellant failed to make restitution because those records were within the knowledge of Wallace. The State alleged that Appellant violated the term of community supervision that ordered him to
[p]ay restitution in the amount of $32,000.00 as determined by the [DCCSCD]; said amount of restitution or property due (to be delivered to the [DCCSCD] for transfer to the victim or other person OR to be made directly to the victim or other person) in installments of $275.00 per month, beginning on or before the 20th day of March, 2008, and a like payment on the same day of each month thereafter until fully paid.
The State alleged in its motion to adjudicate Appellant’s guilt that Appellant
[violated said term and condition in that he failed to pay $275.00 toward payment of his restitution on or before the 20th day of June 2008, October 2008; March 2009, June 2009, September 2009, October 2009, November 2009, December 2009; January 2010, and February 2010.
The record reflects that although Appellant made no payment in June 2008, he paid $225 in July 2008 and made two payments in August 2008. He paid $825 in September 2008. The record is silent as to October 2008 and shows a $200 payment in November 2008. The record shows that Appellant paid $275 in January 2009 and $470 in February 2009 but made no payment in March. He paid $275 in April 2009, $175 in May 2009, nothing in June 2009, $250 in July 2009, $275 in August 2009, nothing in September 2009, and $100 in October 2009. He made no further payment until April 2010 when he paid $650.
Appellant testified that he had been unable to make some of his payments because he had been out of work and because he was making low wages and supporting his dependents. The testimony regarding inability was uncontroverted.
The State argues that an inability to pay, while still relevant to the State’s allegations of nonpayment of supervision fees and court costs, is immaterial to the State’s allegation regarding restitution, citing an unpublished Austin Court of Appeals case.11 The State bases its argument on the fact that the Texas Legislature omitted restitution and fines from article 42.12, section 21(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.12 Revoking the community supervision of any defendant for failure to comply with an impossible condition of community supervision cannot withstand scrutiny through the lens of due process and equal protection.13 Although the legislature has not enumerated impossibility of compliance as a defense to revocation, due process and equal protection demand it. Failure to comply with a re*773quirement that a defendant on community-supervision report to a nonexistent place or do an act on a nonexistent date cannot, alone, justify revocation. A better reasoned approach is that voiced by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Gonzales:
[A]t a minimum, a trial court may not order a defendant confined for failure to repay the costs of his legal defense pursuant to art. 26.05(e) unless the court considers the defendant’s ability to make the payment. The trial court’s power to order reimbursement should be limited to the extent a defendant is reasonably able to do so. See art. 26.05(e) (stating “the court shall order the defendant to pay the amount that it finds the defendant is able to pay”).14
Although ability to comply is not explicitly to be considered pursuant to article 42.12, the underlying constitutional principles discussed by the Gonzales court still apply.
Here, Appellant testified without contradiction that he had been without work and that when he did work, he earned about $800 per month. He testified that he was supporting his dependents, as required by the conditions of his community supervision.
I agree with the State that when failure to pay is not the only ground alleged for revocation, the State does not bear the burden of proving ability to pay absent a claim of inability to pay. But when, as here, the defendant on community supervision raises inability to pay as his defense to failure to pay and offers some proof, the State must prove ability to pay. The State did not sustain this burden, especially in light of the State’s willingness to accept late payments and Appellant’s testimony that his Louisiana community supervision officer told him to pay what he could.
Because admissible evidence did not otherwise satisfy the State’s burden of proof, I would hold harmful the trial court’s error in admitting the documents purporting to come from the Louisiana community supervision department and the testimony about them and further hold that the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating Appellant’s guilt. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.

. Tex.R. Evid. 803(6).

. Tex.R. Evid. 803(8).

. Tex.R. Evid. 901(a); Poner v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 712 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1986, no writ); see also Henderson v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 600 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding trial court properly excluded document that witness could not identify or authenticate).

. Tex.R. Evid. 902; Castro v. Sebesta, 808 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (op. on reh'g.).

. Estrada v. State, Nos. 05-96-00752-CR, 05-96-00753-CR, 1999 WL 521683, at *7 (Tex.App.-Dallas July 23, 1999, pet. ref’d as untimely filed) (op. on reh’g) (not designated for publication) (citations omitted from excerpt, but relying on former rule of criminal evidence 803(6); Poner v. State, 578 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); and Philpot v. State, 897 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, pet. ref’d)).

. Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 930 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 922, 113 S.Ct. 3035, 125 L.Ed.2d 722 (1993).

. Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (citations omitted).

.Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949, 952 n. 10 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (op. on reh’g) (citing Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (op. on reh’g)); Roberts v. State, 545 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).

. Zillender, 557 S.W.2d at 517.

. Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (citing Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507, 512 (Tex.Crim.App.1978)).

. See Sierra v. State, No. 03-09-00664-CR, 2009 WL 2902706, at *3 (Tex.App.-Austin Aug. 26, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 21(c) (West Supp. 2011).

.See U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV; Tex. Const, art. I, § 19; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.04 (West 2005).

. Ex parte Gonzales, 945 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).