Court Opinion

ID: 1002705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 18:14:53.535774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:09.157169
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 00-4208

RODNEY THOMPSON, a/k/a Main,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Danville.
Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge.
(CR-97-4)

Submitted: August 22, 2000

Decided: October 11, 2000

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Barbara Hudson, Evanston, Illinois, for Appellant. Robert P. Crouch,
Jr., United States Attorney, Donald R. Wolthuis, Assistant United
States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Rodney Thompson appeals his 120-month sentence, imposed upon
re-sentencing, for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base.
On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in determining the
drug amount attributable to him under relevant conduct. We affirm
the sentence.

The district court may consider a wide range of factors in calculat-
ing a defendant's sentence. The court may take relevant conduct into
account in determining a defendant's sentence whether or not the
defendant has been convicted of the charges constituting the relevant
conduct. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3
(1998); United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1316 (4th Cir. 1994).
Relevant conduct includes all acts of the defendant, acts aided and
abetted by him, and acts for which he is otherwise accountable that
were in furtherance of the offense of conviction. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).

In calculating drug amounts, the court may consider any relevant
information, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable accuracy. See United States v.
Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016, 1021 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting U.S.S.G.
§ 6A1.3 (1991)). Consistent with this policy, hearsay alone can pro-
vide sufficiently reliable evidence of drug quantity. See id.

The Government must establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence the amount of drugs attributable to a particular defendant for
sentencing purposes. See United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248,
255 (4th Cir. 1995). The district court's factual findings will be
upheld absent clear error. See 18 U.S.C.A.§ 3742(e) (West Supp.
2000); United States v. Lamarr, 75 F.3d 964, 972 (4th Cir. 1996).

We find that the Government produced sufficient evidence to sup-
port the district court's finding that Thompson was responsible for
73.21 grams of crack cocaine. Despite the apparent plan/scheme that
existed between Skipper and Thompson, the court held Thompson

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responsible for only a portion of Skipper's sales in its drug weight
determination. The court included Skipper's drug sales from the time
Thompson was charged in Count Two until the conclusion of Cun-
ningham's buys from Skipper. Thompson was an adult on the dates
of all of Skipper's transactions for which he was held accountable. To
the extent that Thompson challenges Cunningham's credibility, such
determination is not reviewable on appeal. See United States v.
Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989).*

Accordingly, we affirm Thompson's sentence. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________
*We have considered the effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct.
2348 (2000), and find that, because Smith received sentences of impris-
onment and terms of supervised release that did not exceed the statutory
maximums set out in 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) (West 1999), no plain
error occurred. See United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, No. 99-4098, 2000
WL 988128, at *6 (8th Cir. July 18, 2000).

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