Court Opinion

ID: 9529858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:54:56.14707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:56.222319
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE JIGANTI, dissenting: I agree substantially with the majority’s analyses of the contract and the facts, up to the point where the majority considers the issue of variance which is raised by the plaintiff on appeal and to which defendant has not replied. The majority says that plaintiff has neither alleged facts in its complaint to justify recovery on its theory of waiver, nor did it amend its pleadings to encompass these principles, nor was evidence adduced at trial by the plaintiff supporting that theory. With these contentions I disagree. The complaint alleges full performance of the conditions of the contract precedent to its right to a brokerage fee. Plaintiff alleges that it was employed by the defendant as the agent of Talandis Construction Corporation in negotiating and procuring a loan for the construction of a specified apartment complex; that the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff a one percent commission provided said loan was obtained from a source furnished by the plaintiff within one year; that within one year the loan commitment was obtained as a result of the plaintiff’s efforts; and the apartment project was constructed. Section 33(3) of the Civil Practice Act requires that pleadings shall be liberally construed (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 33(3)) and section 42(2) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 42(2)) states that no pleading is bad which contains sufficient information to reasonably inform the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense. While it is true that a party cannot plead performance without having pleaded such facts, allegations of performance of the contract and acceptance of the services provided render unnecessary an allegation of waiver of performance. Walsh v. North American Cold Storage Co. (1913), 260 Ill. 322, 103 N.E. 185. In my opinion sufficient facts were alleged in the complaint when liberally construed to justify recovery on a theory of waiver. Evidence of waiver was admitted at trial. Plaintiff introduced the parties. He originally contacted Dovenmuehle seeking a conventional mortgage on July 19, 1968, apparently after the initial 60-day contractual period. He subsequently spoke to officers of Dovenmuehle on several occasions; submitted requested documents as required, including plans for the proposed construction site and project; assisted Talandis in negotiating difficulties regarding the proposed site; flew with Talandis in defendant’s plane to Ithaca, New York and Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, to view existing sites and styles of construction similar to the proposed plans of the project; presented to Talandis and attempted to help him complete required FHA documentation; obtained rent comparables from about 10 communities including Highland, Indiana, Dyer, Indiana, Lansing, Illinois, and other similar communities in the area; attended prefeasibility conferences with Talandis and representatives from Dovenmuehle and FHA; and met with the architects of the project. In addition, at the conclusion of the case in its closing argument, counsel for plaintiff alluded to the issue of waiver by saying: “I have supplied the Court with a Memorandum of Law on the issues involved with respect to the brokerage question and basically, the law on the point appears to be that if the broker is the procuring cause of something that happens, that he is then entitled to his commission even if the principal were, for example, to conclude the transaction. And the broker is entitled to his commission even where the transaction as it is finally completed, is different in its terms from that which the broker was originally authorized to negotiate.” I believe there was sufficient evidence and argument adduced at trial to support the theory of waiver. It is clear that a party to an express contract may waive certain of its provisions which inure to his benefit (Bartels v. Denler (1975) 30 Ill. App. 3d 499, 333 N.E.2d 640) and that such waiver may be shown by agreement of the parties, parol evidence, or their course of conduct. (Dunn v. Hoefer (1972), 5 Ill. App. 3d 793, 284 N.E.2d 1; Hill v. Mercury Record Corp. (1960), 26 Ill. App. 2d 350, 168 N.E.2d 461; Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co. (7th Cir. 1949), 176 F.2d 1, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948, 94 L. Ed. 584, 70 S. Ct. 486.) One of the parties to a contract cannot by a long course of conduct lead the other party to believe that it will not insist upon a strict performance of a duty imposed by the contract and then without notice insist upon strict performance. Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co. In the instant case defendant remained silent while plaintiff sought to procure a loan for it. When it became apparent that the terms of the loan would vary significantly from the terms of the procurement agreement, defendant’s silence continued. “Even silence when it is likely to mislead the other party and induce him to believe that further performance of the contract will be accepted may amount to an election: ‘He who is silent when he ought to have spoken, will not be heard to speak when he ought to be silent.’ ” 5 Williston, Contracts, § 688, at 303 (3d ed. 1961). I consider any defects in the performance rendered by plaintiff as waived by defendant’s acceptance and retention of the benefits of these services. (5 Williston, Contracts § 676, at 220, 223 (3d ed. 1961); Restatement of Contracts §§ 296, 297 (1932).) Although plaintiff did not procure a loan of $1,440,000 for 20 years at 7% interest to build a 120-unit complex, it did produce a loan for a larger amount, for a longer term to build a larger complex. Although the interest rate of 7¼% was higher than the specified 7% all the rest of the terms were more favorable to the defendant than called for in the original procurement agreement. It is my opinion that defendant waived any variance in these terms by his conduct and I would reverse.