Court Opinion

ID: 9807947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:21:59.418435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:19.089354
License: Public Domain

*754WiNBORNE, J.
Is there error in the judgment below? We are constrained to hold that there is.
As used in the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, “The term 'death’ as a basis for the right of compensation means only death resulting from an injury,” and “ 'injury’ means an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment . . .” Public Laws 1929, ch. 120, sec. 2 (j) (f). Harden v. Furniture Co., 199 N. C., 733, 153 S. E., 728; Plemmons v. White, 213 N. C., 148, 195 S. E., 370.
“The condition antecedent to compensation is the occurrence of an injury (1) by accident (2) arising out of and (3) in the course of employment.” Conrad v. Foundry Co., 198 N. C., 723, 153 S. E., 260; Plemmons v. White, supra, and cases there cited.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act, sec. 13, also provides in part that: “No compensation shall be payable if the injury or death was occasioned . . . by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself . . .” and that “the burden of proof shall be upon him who claims an exemption or forfeiture under this section.” Public Laws 1929, ch. 120.
Evidence of violent death, unexplained, suggests accident rather than suicide. Warren v. Ins. Co., ante, 402, 2 S. E., 2d, 17; Gorham v. Ins. Co., 214 N. C., 526, 200 S. E., 5.
While the burden of proof is upon those claiming compensation throughout to prove death of employee resulting from injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, when evidence of violent death is shown, they are entitled at least to the benefit of the inference of accident from which, nothing else appearing, the Commission may find, but is not compelled to find, the fact of death resulting from injury by accident, a constituent part of the condition antecedent to compensation, injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. In other words, this inference is sufficient to raise a ;prima facie case as to accident only. Then if employer claims death of employee is by suicide, the statute places the burden on him to go forward with proof negativing the factual inference of death by accident. See Warren v. Ins. Co., supra.
In the case in hand claimants are entitled to have the Industrial Commission, in finding the facts, consider the evidence in the light of these legal principles. It appears that this has not been done.
Facts found under misapprehension of the law will be set aside on the theory that the evidence should be considered in its true legal light. S. v. Fuller, 114 N. C., 886, 19 S. E., 797; S. v. Casey, 201 N. C., 620, 161 S. E., 81. The principle is also applied in Tickle v. Hobgood, 212 N. C., 763, 194 S. E., 474; Bullock v. Williams, 213 N. C., 320, 195 S. E., 791; Farris v. Trust Co., ante, 466, 2 S. E., 2d, 363.
*755The case is remanded to tbé end tbat the North Carolina Industrial Commission, applying the legal principles here declared, may proceed to findings of fact and a determination of the claim in accordance with prescribed practice.
Error and remanded.