Court Opinion

ID: 9366779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 22:00:26.367531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:55.143169
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 22-1052

                  SAKAB SAUDI HOLDING COMPANY,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                               v.

  SAAD KHALID S. ALJABRI; KHALID SAAD KHALID ALJABRI; MOHAMMED
 SAAD KH ALJABRI; NEW EAST (US) INC.; NEW EAST 804 805 LLC; and
                     NEW EAST BACK BAY LLC,

                     Defendants, Appellees,

                         UNITED STATES,

                      Intervenor, Appellee.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

         [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                  Gelpí, Howard, and Thompson,
                        Circuit Judges.

     Michael J. Gottlieb, with whom M. Annie Houghton-Larsen and
Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP were on brief, for appellant.
     Ian H. Gershengorn, with whom Lindsay C. Harrison, Jenner &
Block LLP, R. Robert Popeo, Scott C. Ford, and Mintz Levin Cohn
Ferris Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. were on brief, for appellees Saad
Khalid S. Aljabri and Khalid Saad Khalid Aljabri.
     Faith E. Gay, Caitlin Halligan, Selendy Gay Elsberg PLLC,
Kevin P. Martin, Jaime A. Santos, and Goodwin Procter LLP on brief
for appellees Mohammed Saad Kh Aljabri, New East (US) Inc., New
East 804 805 LLC, and New East Back Bay LLC.
     Lewis S. Yelin, Attorney, Appellate Staff, U.S. Department of
Justice, with whom Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Rachael S. Rollins, United States Attorney, and
H. Thompson Byron III, Attorney, Appellate Staff, U.S. Department
of Justice, were on brief, for intervenor-appellee United States.

                        January 27, 2023
              THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.                 We are called upon today to

examine when ordinary legal procedures must yield to extraordinary

ones    for    the        greater    good.         In     this     case,    a    foreign

counterterrorism corporation (our appellant) filed suit and sought

an   order    freezing         certain   Massachusetts          assets   based   on   its

allegations        that    a    former   government        official      perpetrated    a

massive fraud when he misappropriated billions of dollars from the

corporation.        The defendants to that suit (appellees here) seek to

tell a very different tale in defense of these allegations:                           The

funds   were       received      lawfully    in    connection       with   clandestine

counterterrorism and national security operations that sometimes

were undertaken alongside the United States government.                          But to

prove their story, the appellees say they'd need to divulge United

States state secrets.               Enter stage right:             The United States

government stepped in, asserted the state secrets privilege, and

successfully got that information and, with it, a great deal of

other information excluded from the case.                   And while the appellant

insists the case can proceed nonetheless, and that it should be

awarded      the   preliminary       relief       it    seeks    notwithstanding      the

exclusion of the privileged materials, the appellees are just as

insistent the case cannot be litigated and thus obligates dismissal

because they cannot fairly defend themselves without relying on

the privileged materials.

                                          - 3 -
          The district court concluded it could not tackle the

necessary inquiries to examine the claims and defenses or award

the preliminary equitable relief the appellant sought without

weighing the privileged information and risking disclosure of

state secrets.     Consequently, the district court determined the

case could not be adjudicated and dismissed the suit.

          As we explain below, we affirm.

                              BACKGROUND

          The facts and procedural history of this matter are

something of a global affair.        Bear with us as we tell the story

that paves the way to the issues presented for our appellate

review.

               Players, Places, Suits, and Proceedings

          The appellant is Sakab Saudi Holding Company ("Sakab"),

an entity that bills itself as a creation of the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia ("KSA") that "perform[s] anti-terrorism activities in the

public interest" and is funded by the KSA's Ministry of Finance.

And the appellees are Saad Khalid S. Aljabri ("Aljabri"), a former

high-ranking     KSA   government     official   who   was   engaged   in

counterterrorism and intelligence work, and his sons, Khalid Saad

Khalid Aljabri and Mohammed Saad Kh Aljabri (we'll refer to Aljabri

and his sons as "the Aljabris").            Together, the Aljabris are

managers or directors of New East (US) Inc., New East 804 805 LLC,

                                    - 4 -
and New East Back Bay LLC (collectively, "New East" and, all

together with the Aljabris, "Appellees," who filed a joint brief).

            The case now before us has its genesis in Canada, where

Aljabri lives and where, on January 22, 2021, Sakab sued Appellees

(and some others not involved in the instant matter).               In Ontario

Superior Court, Sakab alleged, inter alia, that Aljabri defrauded

Sakab of billions of dollars, having used a variety of unauthorized

payments and transfers to do so.     Sakab supported its allegations

with a dense forensic accounting report.               Sakab immediately and

successfully sought an interlocutory order freezing the Aljabris'

assets worldwide (a Mareva injunction, see Grupo Mexicano de

Desarollo v. Alliance       Bond Fund,    Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 327-29

(1999)), and the Canadian court also appointed a receiver for

certain assets.   Litigation in Ontario is ongoing.

            Sakab then looked southward to Massachusetts, filing a

March 24, 2021 state court complaint "to give effect to" the

Ontario court's freezing and receivership orders relative to the

Aljabris'   Massachusetts    properties.         The    ten-count    complaint

offers state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty (Count I),

fraud (Count II), fraudulent misrepresentation (Count III), fraud

by omission (Count IV), conversion (Count V), conspiracy (Count

VI), aiding and abetting (Count VII), unjust enrichment (Count

VIII),   fraudulent   transfer   (Count    IX)    and    alter   ego/piercing

corporate veil (Count X).        In it, Sakab alleges, as it did in

                                  - 5 -
Ontario, that Aljabri perpetrated a massive fraud on it, "us[ing]

Sakab as a vehicle to distribute funds that had been allocated for

anti-terrorism activities . . . to himself" and others -- specific

to Massachusetts, the complaint alleges the proceeds of this

fraudulent scheme were used to acquire $29 million worth of

Massachusetts   properties.    And   Sakab   says   those   fraudulently

obtained funds have since been distributed to various companies,

including New East, and also have been used to purchase real estate

in Massachusetts and beyond.    So, Sakab says, the complaint was

filed "to preserve the fruit of the Fraudulent Scheme now located

in Massachusetts that is subject to the Ontario Orders."           Sakab

also filed motions for the preliminary attachment of properties in

Massachusetts, memoranda of lis pendens, and a motion to stay the

proceedings pending the outcome in the Ontario case.

          Appellees swiftly removed the action to Massachusetts

federal district court, citing the case's implication of federal

interests. In so doing, Appellees denied any fraudulent wrongdoing

by Aljabri, insisting the funds in question were lawfully received.

According to Appellees, Aljabri, in his capacity as a government

official under former Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, helped

the Saudi government establish Sakab with "the primary purpose of

funding and undertaking clandestine and sensitive operations in

partnership with the United States Government."             Adjudicating

Sakab's claims, Appellees said, would require the district court

                               - 6 -
to consider whether certain of Aljabri's activities, like "covert

counterterrorism operations in partnership with the United States

Government,   constituted    fraud,     breach   of   fiduciary   duty,   or

conversion under the law of Saudi Arabia."             As a direct result,

the   district   court   would   need   to   examine    the   financing   of

"sensitive    programs     operated     in    partnership"      with    U.S.

intelligence agencies.      Thus, knowing the district court would

have to scrutinize "a partnership between the government of Saudi

Arabia and the intelligence and national security agencies of the

United States Government" to assess the claims and defenses in the

case, Appellees told the court the suit clearly raised "substantial

federal issues."

           Sakab moved in April 2021 to send the case back to state

court, arguing that the only point of the Massachusetts case was

"to obtain prejudgment relief on the basis of comity to the Ontario

Orders . . . and then to stay the Massachusetts Action."               A few

weeks later, the United States government noticed its potential

participation in the action, and on August 3, 2021, the government,

without taking any position on the merits of the case, formally

moved to intervene -- a move Appellees supported but Sakab opposed.

Mindful that any further briefing would run the risk of revealing

state secrets, the government also moved to stay briefing on the

motion to remand.

                                  - 7 -
            About a week later, Aljabri filed an answer to the

Massachusetts complaint in which he not only denied the ten counts

against him, but also asserted affirmative defenses and raised

counterclaims against Sakab.1           Throughout his filing, Aljabri

acknowledged his receipt of funds from Sakab, but insisted they

were lawfully received, and any off-the-book transactions were

off-the-book simply because of the transactions' covert purposes

and necessarily secretive nature.          He raised the specter of his

inability to effectively litigate the case -- to prove his defenses

and counterclaims -- without relying on information he believed

would be deemed privileged (and thus unavailable to him in the

litigation).

                          The Privilege Assertion

            On   August   23,   2021,   Avril   Haines,   the    Director   of

National Intelligence ("the Director"), asserted the state secrets

privilege   and    a   statutory   privilege     pursuant   to    50   U.S.C.

§ 3024(i)(1) "to protect certain classified national security

information . . . at risk of disclosure" in the Sakab case. Indeed,

     1  The answer laid out eighteen affirmative defenses,
including, for example:    failure to state a claim; statute of
limitations problems; waiver; laches; estoppel; and immunity. The
answer also asserted three counterclaims against Sakab.      Those
counterclaims sought: 1) declaratory judgment that the allegedly
fraudulent transactions were actually legal; 2) declaratory
judgment that Sakab is not entitled to enforce the Mareva
injunctive relief in Massachusetts; and 3) judgment against Sakab
for abuse of civil process.

                                   - 8 -
having reviewed the matter, the Director, "as head of the [U.S.

Intelligence     Community],"      explained     that     such    disclosure

"reasonably could be expected to cause serious, and in some cases

exceptionally grave, damage to the national security of the United

States and, accordingly, that this information must be protected

and excluded from use in this case."

           Couching her assertion of the privilege "[i]n general

and unclassified terms," the Director broadly asserted the state

secrets and statutory privileges as to

       information concerning sources, methods, capabilities,
       activities, or interests of the [U.S. Intelligence
       Community], as well as information that might tend to
       reveal or disclose the identities of U.S. Government
       employees, affiliates, or offices with whom one or more
       of the parties or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may have
       had certain interactions and the disclosure of which
       would be damaging to U.S. national security interests.

This   description,   the    Director   explained,       was   "intended   to

specifically include information known to [Aljabri] about such

matters that he seeks to introduce or disclose in this action,

whether through documents, testimony, affidavits, or declarations,

as part of his response and defense to pending claims and motions."

           But   because    "the   complete    factual   basis   for   [this]

privilege assertion [could not] be set forth on the public record

without revealing the very information that [the Director was

seeking] to protect and without risking the very harm to U.S.

national security that [the Director sought] to prevent," the

                                   - 9 -
government submitted for the district court's in camera, ex parte

review     classified          declarations   regarding       the   claim    of    state

secrets.     The declarations, according to the Director, "further

describe     the       categories    of   information      over     which   [she    was]

asserting privilege and explain that the unauthorized disclosure

of this classified information, in this litigation or otherwise,

reasonably could be expected to result in serious, and in some

cases     exceptionally         grave,    damage   to   our   national      security."

"[S]uch harms," she wrote, "include the disclosure of information

that would enable foreign adversaries to evade, undercut, negate,

or otherwise impede critical national security and foreign policy

objectives of the United States."              The Director requested that the

court "take all necessary steps to protect" the "classified and

privileged intelligence information" she had just described.

             As        the     district    court   would      later     note,      those

declarations -- their contents, who swore them, and so on --

"cannot be described in greater detail without risking public

disclosure        of     the     highly    classified     information       contained

therein."     Sakab Saudi Holding Co. v. Aljabri, No. 21-10529-NMG,

2021 WL 8999588, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2021) [hereinafter Sakab

I].   Having also reviewed the declarations,2 this court agrees and

will say no more by way of description.

      2The classified record was made available to us by the
government for our in camera, ex parte review.

                                          - 10 -
              On the basis of the Director's declaration and the

classified declarations, the government asked the district court

to   accept    the    privilege   assertion    and   excise   the   privileged

information from the Sakab case.         In doing so, the government took

"no position on whether [the] invocation of privilege should result

in the dismissal of any aspect of this lawsuit."

                       The Proposed Protective Order

              In the days following the Director's assertion of the

privilege, and still without taking any position on the merits of

the case, the government on August 27, 2021 moved for a protective

order "to establish procedures to protect against the risk of

disclosure in further proceedings" by, inter alia, requiring all

proposed filings be run by the government prior to submission to

the court.     Appellees opposed the protective order request, urging

that the "exclusion of the extraordinarily broad category of

information"     would    prove   "insurmountab[ly]      challeng[ing]     to"

Appellees' ability to prove their defenses. So Appellees requested

that the district court modify the proposed protective order to

allow Appellees to explain "why the case should be dismissed."             In

particular, echoing some of the statements made in their answer

and counterclaims, Appellees urged that the big question in the

case was whether Aljabri received money from Sakab fraudulently or

legally, and getting to the bottom of that would necessitate an

"examination     of     the   programs   and   operations     [Aljabri]   was

                                    - 11 -
compensated for leading or overseeing, how those programs and

operations were funded, [and] why the funding in some cases may

have been especially opaque."      According to Appellees, it was

inescapable that any litigation stemming from these issues would

require scrutiny of privileged materials, to wit, "information

concerning . . . activities, or interests of the [U.S. Intelligence

Community]."

          But   the   government   opposed   Appellees'   requested

adjustments to the proposed order, asserting that any motion to

dismiss that contained privileged information would simply be too

"harmful to the national security interests of the United States."

And, the government posited, if the privilege assertion was valid

-- resulting in the exclusion of the privileged materials --

Appellees would then be able to argue, "without actually using

th[e] privileged information in [a] motion," that the privileged

information was needed to prove their defense.

          Sakab responded by moving for what it styled as a

procedural order, seeking to shepherd for review its motions for

prejudgment attachment, lis pendens, and a subsequent stay of the

case pending the outcome of the Ontario action.       According to

Sakab, there would be no need for privileged information and no

risk to national security interests if the district court would

simply grant Sakab preliminary relief on the basis of comity to

Ontario's court orders.

                              - 12 -
            Initial jockeying complete, it was time for the district

court to weigh in.

                           District Court Rulings

            All told, the pending motions and issues ripe for the

district court's resolution come October 2021 were these:           whether

the government should be allowed to intervene; if permitted to

intervene, whether the government's privilege assertion was a

valid one; and whether the matter should be remanded to state

court, as Sakab requested.

            In fielding these queries, the district court:          granted

the government's motion to intervene, finding the government's

"interest in preventing the disclosure of state secrets [was]

obvious and uncontested," see id. at *2-3; concluded the assertion

of privilege was valid, see id. at *3; and, in light of the clear

"embedded" federal issues, declined to remand to state court, see

id. at *5-7.3

            The court did something else, too.        It directed Sakab to

show cause as to why the case shouldn't be dismissed "in light of

the accepted assertion of the state secrets privilege," which

rendered Appellees unable to "fairly defend themselves" against

the allegations of fraud without resorting to the off-limits

privileged information.4       Id. at *4.

     3   On appeal, Sakab does not contest any of these conclusions.
     4    The   district    court   also     held   under   advisement   the

                                    - 13 -
           Sakab did not dispute the district court's conclusion

that the assertion of privilege was valid. Rather, in its November

9, 2021 show-cause filing, Sakab argued that the district court

could award Sakab the relief it wanted -- a prejudgment attachment

and lis pendens as to the Massachusetts properties, plus the stay

-- without any need to evaluate the privileged materials or even

litigate the case on its merits.        Sakab pointed to comity to the

Ontario litigation's orders to carry its burden to get that

prejudgment-attachment relief, requesting an opportunity to brief

the notion further. Sakab also asserted that it would be premature

to dismiss the case when Appellees hadn't shown any deprivation of

a valid defense, nor had they shown the privileged information was

necessary for a "valid" defense (according to Sakab, a defense

that is "meritorious" or "dispositive").         In Sakab's telling, to

determine that a defense is "valid," a court must conduct an

"appropriately   tailored   in    camera     review"    of   the    excluded

privileged information, and that didn't happen here.               On top of

all of this, Sakab asseverated, Appellees had been able to raise

some   substantive   defenses    in   the   Ontario    litigation    without

resorting to privileged information, so surely the same could be

achieved here.

government's protective-order motion "pending consideration of
[Sakab]'s show cause pleading." Sakab I, 2021 WL 8999588, at *7.

                                 - 14 -
          Many of these arguments were repeated and probed at a

hearing before the district court. After the hearing, the district

court accepted Sakab's supplemental papers wherein Sakab argued

for a lis pendens to encumber the subject properties, which Sakab

urged it was entitled to and would avoid any risk of disclosing

privileged materials.   Appellees responded that a lis pendens was

not an option as a matter of law and, regardless, wouldn't even

avoid litigation on the merits.

          The district court dismissed the case.    See Sakab Saudi

Holding Co. v. Aljabri, 578 F. Supp. 3d 140, 143 (D. Mass. 2021)

[hereinafter Sakab II].   The district court was not persuaded by

Sakab's contention that the court could grant Sakab a prejudgment

attachment order without evaluating the merits of Sakab's claims

against Appellees and, by the same token, the merits of Appellees'

listed defenses.   Id. at 144.    Observing that Rule 64(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a court to enter an order

seizing property to cover a potential judgment when that remedy is

authorized by state law, id. at 143-44, the district court then

explained that Massachusetts law makes "[a] showing of reasonable

likelihood of success on the merits . . . a prerequisite for

attachment," id. at 144 (citation omitted).        From there, the

district court concluded Sakab couldn't establish a reasonable

likelihood of success by relying on the Ontario court's interim

order.   Id.   Instead, Sakab needed to establish a reasonable

                              - 15 -
likelihood   of   success   on   its   fraud   and   other    claims     in   the

Massachusetts action -- but it could not do so unless the court

considered the excluded privileged information.              Id.

          And the district court next explained that it could not

avoid adjudicating the merits of Sakab's case by entering a lis

pendens notice and staying the action.5        Id. at 145.         A lis pendens

notice "provides notice that property is the subject of a pending

action" and "is derivative of the underlying claims," but "the

underlying proceeding to which the lis pendens would refer consists

of ten claims which the Court has determined must be dismissed."

Id.

          Because the district court determined it could not grant

Sakab its requested relief, id. at 144, 146, and having already

determined Appellees could not fairly defend themselves on the

merits without relying on the privileged information, Sakab I,

2021 WL 8999588, at *4; see also Sakab II, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 143,

the court dismissed the case, Sakab II, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 146.6

      5 The   district   court   construed   Sakab's   post-hearing
supplemental memorandum of law as a motion to record a lis pendens.
See Sakab II, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 145 n.1.
      6The district court also noted that, since the "privileged
material is similarly pertinent to Aljabri's first counterclaim
it, too," had to be dismissed; but the court didn't reach "the
merits of [Appellees'] two remaining counterclaims which [it]
dismissed without prejudice." Sakab II, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 143.
To close the matter out, the court also denied as moot the
government's motion for a protective order. Id. at 145-46.

                                  - 16 -
Sakab timely appealed, challenging the dismissal and rejections of

its preliminary relief requests.

                                 DISCUSSION

            The stage set, we proceed to our de novo review of the

district court's legal determinations concerning the effect of a

successful assertion of the state secrets privilege.                See Mohamed

v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010)

(en banc); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir.

2007).     It is well established that "we may affirm the dismissal

of a complaint 'on any basis available in the record.'"                 Yan v.

ReWalk Robotics Ltd., 973 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting

Lemelson v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 721 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir.

2013)); see also Williams v. United States, 858 F.3d 708, 714 (1st

Cir. 2017) ("As always, we are also free to affirm on any basis

apparent    in   the   record,   even   if   it   would   require    ruling   on

arguments not reached by the district court or even presented to

us on appeal.") (internal quotations and brackets omitted).

            There is a tripartite inquiry courts must undertake when

a state secrets question arises:              first, make sure that the

government has followed the proper procedure in making a formal

claim of privilege; then, figure out whether the information

purportedly covered by the privilege assertion does in fact qualify

as privileged; and finally, sort out how -- if at all -- the case

should proceed given the successful assertion of the state secrets

                                   - 17 -
privilege.      See Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec.

Serv., 14 F.4th 276, 302 (4th Cir. 2021) [hereinafter Wikimedia]

(first citing El-Masri, 470 F.3d at 304; and then United States v.

Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)), petition for cert. filed, No.

22-190 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2022).

              In the instant matter, there is no debate about the first

two components of this inquiry.                    Rather, the critical question

here is all about that final query:                      whether this matter should

proceed in light of the privilege claim.                       Id.

              Sakab        says     of     course        its     suit     can    proceed

notwithstanding the privilege assertion, offering a variety of

arguments in its effort to persuade us we should resuscitate the

case, or at least grant it prejudgment attachment, a lis pendens

recording, and a subsequent stay of the case (because, as Sakab

has maintained all along, these forms of preliminary relief don't

even   turn    on     an    ability       to   actually        litigate    the   case   in

Massachusetts).        But before we lay out and drill down on Sakab's

contentions,     because          the    outcome    of    the    appeal   substantially

depends on the overall viability of the underlying suit, we must

start by answering this overarching question:                        Given the assertion

of the state secrets privilege,                    can    litigation of this        suit

proceed?

              The answer is no.           To explain why, we will first explore

the foundational standards and precedent that inform our analysis,

                                           - 18 -
then use that to assess the functional, sweeping consequences of

the government's assertion of privilege on this case.            Along the

way, we'll probe why each of Sakab's various proffers falls short

of persuading us that dismissal is not required.                Then we'll

explain why Sakab has not demonstrated that it is entitled to any

preliminary relief.

                  State Secrets:     Guiding Principles

     Many of the Government's efforts to protect our national
     security are well known. It publicly acknowledges the
     size of our military, the location of our military bases,
     and the names of our ambassadors to Moscow and Peking.
     But protecting our national security sometimes requires
     keeping information about our military, intelligence,
     and diplomatic efforts secret.

Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478, 484 (2011).

            The   state   secrets    privilege,    "an   evidentiary    rule

'bas[ed] in the common law of evidence,'" Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at

294 (quoting El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 304), "permits the Government

to prevent disclosure of information when that disclosure would

harm national security interests," United States v. Zubaydah, 142

S. Ct. 959, 967 (2022).7      Indeed, as the high Court has said, "the

privilege   applies   where    'there   is   a    reasonable   danger   that

compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in

     7 For more on the state secrets doctrine's policy points and
an explanation of its evidentiary roots, the curious reader should
consult in full Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-7, which has been described
as the case that "established the doctrine in its modern form,"
El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 302.

                                    - 19 -
the interest of national security, should not be divulged.'"              Fed.

Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga, 142 S. Ct. 1051, 1061 (2022)

(quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10); see also Gen. Dynamics Corp.,

563   U.S.    at   484   (observing    that    the   privilege   serves   the

"sometimes-compelling      necessity    of    governmental   secrecy"     over

"military, intelligence, and diplomatic" information).

             This "expansive and malleable" privilege can apply to

different types of state secrets, such as materials and information

that could, if made public, disclose our intelligence communities'

information-gathering      methods    and/or    capabilities,    impair   our

country's defenses, and "disrupt[] . . . diplomatic relations with

foreign governments."      Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C.

Cir. 1983).    Indeed, even if a party has made a "strong showing of

necessity" for the discovery or use of such information, Reynolds,

345 U.S. at 11, the state secrets privilege still applies in the

face of "a reasonable danger" that the disclosure of the evidence

in question would harm our national-security interests, Fazaga,

142 S. Ct. at 1061 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10); see also

Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 ("[E]ven the most compelling necessity

cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately

satisfied that [state] secrets are at stake.").

             Now, in the instant matter, as we know, the district

court concluded the government's privilege assertion was properly

interposed as a matter of procedure, and the information it covered

                                  - 20 -
was indeed privileged.                 Sakab I, 2021 WL 8999588, at *3 ("[T]he

government's         assertion         of     the        state     secrets      privilege    is

procedurally proper and validly taken.").                          That conclusion had the

effect of completely excising the privileged material from the

case.      See Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at 302-03 (explaining that, "[o]nce

a court determines that certain facts are state secrets, they are

'absolutely protected from disclosure,'" and there can be "no

attempt . . . to balance the need for secrecy of the privileged

information        against        a     party's          need     for    the    information's

disclosure'" (quoting El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 306)); Al-Haramain

Islamic,     Inc.     v.       Bush,    507   F.3d        1190,    1204    (9th    Cir.   2007)

(reasoning     that        "[t]he      effect       of    the     government's      successful

invocation      of       privilege          'is     simply        that    the     evidence   is

unavailable, as though a witness had died'" (quoting Ellsberg, 709

F.2d at 64)).

              As mentioned above, this is where that pivotal final

part of the tripartite inquiry kicks in:                           What happens to a case

in   the    wake    of     a    successful        assertion        of    the    state   secrets

privilege?      Well, "[i]f a proceeding involving state secrets can

be fairly litigated without resort to the privileged information,

it may continue."              Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at 303 (quoting El-Masri,

479 F.3d at 306).              But "if 'any attempt to proceed will threaten

disclosure of the privileged matters,'" id. (quoting El-Masri, 479

F.3d at 306 (cleaned up)) -- if "the circumstances make clear that

                                              - 21 -
privileged information will be so central to the litigation that

any   attempt     to    proceed   will    threaten    that    information's

disclosure," El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308, and "maintenance of [the]

suit" would risk disclosure, Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1077, 1089

(quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)) -- then

dismissal is not only appropriate, but necessary, El-Masri, 479

F.3d at 308.      Indeed, "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that

some matters are so pervaded by state secrets as to be incapable

of judicial resolution once the privilege has been invoked."             El-

Masri, 479 F.3d at 306 (citing Totten, 92 U.S. at 107; Reynolds,

345 U.S. at 11 n.26).

          Some situations that have required dismissal include

those where: "the very subject matter of the action" (an espionage

agreement being the oft-cited illustration) is a "matter of state

secret," Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26; a plaintiff cannot prove

the prima facie elements of a claim without the use of privileged

evidence; even supposing a plaintiff can make out a prima facie

case without resort to privileged information, "the defendants

could not properly defend themselves without using privileged

evidence";      and    any   "further    litigation   would    present   an

unjustifiable risk of disclosure," Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at 303

                                   - 22 -
(quoting Abilt v. Central Intelligence Agency, 848 F.3d 305, 313-

14 (4th Cir. 2017)).8

            With these foundational guideposts laid out, "cognizant

of the delicate balance to be struck in applying the state secrets

doctrine," El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308, we turn to our review.

                  Dismissal as a Consequence of the
                  State Secrets Privilege Assertion

            Our de novo review confirms that the district court was

correct:    Litigation of this case cannot proceed in the wake of

the government's assertion of the state secrets privilege, and

thus dismissal was necessary.     Sakab urges otherwise, and we'll

get to that, but as an initial matter, it is apparent to us that

the privileged information is so central to this case that any

     8   The El-Masri court elaborated:

     Although Totten has come to primarily represent a
     somewhat narrower principle -- a categorical bar on
     actions to enforce secret contracts for espionage -- it
     rested . . . on the proposition that a cause cannot be
     maintained if its trial would inevitably lead to the
     disclosure of privileged information.    See 92 U.S. at
     107. And in Reynolds, while concluding that dismissal
     was unnecessary because the privileged information was
     peripheral to the plaintiffs' action, the Court made
     clear that where state secrets form the very subject
     matter of a court proceeding, as in Totten, dismissal at
     the pleading stage -- "without ever reaching the
     question of evidence" -- is appropriate. See 345 U.S.
     at 11 n.26.

479 F.3d at 306.

                               - 23 -
attempt to proceed with litigation of the suit would unduly risk

disclosure and thereby compromise our national security.        We

explain,   parrying Sakab's unavailing arguments and rejoinders as

we go.9

     9 As a threshold matter, Sakab takes aim at the district
court's "rush to dismiss this action," deploying the "extreme
remedy" of sua sponte dismissal.      (Sakab links its sua-sponte
related grievances in part to the protective order as a readily
available alternative to dismissal, but we'll talk about the
protective order later.)
          Sakab is right that no formal dispositive motion had
been docketed. To Appellees' way of thinking, and the district
court's for that matter, that was a symptom of the larger problem
presented by the privilege assertion: Appellees represented they
were unable to comprehensively buttress a motion to dismiss. See
Sakab II, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (recapping that the show-cause
directive was issued "[i]n response to [Appellees'] concerns that
they cannot fairly defend themselves (or even substantiate a motion
to dismiss) without recourse to privileged material"). Based on
its own review and analysis, the district court, having gone
through the first parts of the above-described tripartite test,
Sakab I, 2021 WL 8999588, at *3-4, indicated dismissal seemed
likely, but in a thorough and notice-imbued move, the court
afforded Sakab the opportunity to explain why the case could go
forward notwithstanding that lay of the land, id. at *4. After
receiving that initial show-cause briefing, the court went
further: It heard detailed arguments from Sakab, Appellees, and
the government. It even allowed Sakab to file supplemental post-
hearing papers before ultimately dismissing the case. So while
it's true the dismissal did not flow from a dispositive motion,
this wasn't the sort of "strong medicine" sua sponte dismissal our
case law warns about. Martinez-Rivera v. Sanchez Ramos, 498 F.3d
3, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) ("The general rule is that in limited
circumstances, sua sponte dismissals of complaints under Rule
12(b)(6) are appropriate, but that such dismissals are erroneous
unless the parties have been afforded notice and an opportunity to
amend the complaint or otherwise respond.") (cleaned up). Rather,
it was the natural result of the district court's close adherence
to what the precedent demands in this sort of state secrets case,
which dictated that dismissal would be the next step if further
litigation would run afoul of the above-described principles. See
Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at 302-03.

                              - 24 -
          As the precedent shows, when the state secrets privilege

is successfully interposed over information that is so central to

the case that any further litigation presents too much risk of

exposure of that information, the case must not go on.       Here, as

Appellees argue, the privileged information (as covered in the

government's remarkably sweeping privilege assertion) forms the

basis of the factual disputes in this case, so the case cannot be

fairly litigated, and any attempt to do so would risk disclosure

of state secrets.   They are correct.

          Courts should dismiss a state secrets case, even at the

pleadings stage, see Fazaga, 142 S. Ct. at 1062 (observing that

"the state secrets privilege . . . sometimes authorizes district

courts   to   dismiss   claims   on   the   pleadings"),   when   "the

circumstances make clear that privileged information will be so

central to the litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten

that information's disclosure," Abilt, 848 F.3d at 313 (quoting

El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308); Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1079 (cautioning

that dismissal is necessary when litigation "would present an

unacceptable risk of disclosing state secrets"); see also In re

Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 153 (D.C. Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Sealed

Case] (reasoning that if "the subject matter of a case is so

sensitive that there is no way it can be litigated without risking

national secrets, then the case must be dismissed").       Critically,

"[t]he controlling inquiry is not whether the general subject

                                 - 25 -
matter of an action can be described without resort to state

secrets.     Rather, we must ascertain whether an action can be

litigated    without    threatening    the     disclosure    of    such    state

secrets."    El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308.         And "[t]hus, for purposes

of the state secrets analysis, the 'central facts' and 'very

subject matter' of an action are those facts that are essential to

prosecuting the action or defending against it."             Id.

            Recall     that   the   privilege    assertion    here        covered

"information     concerning         sources,     methods,         capabilities,

activities, or interests of the [U.S. Intelligence Community],"

plus "information that might tend to reveal or disclose the

identities of U.S. Government employees, affiliates, or offices

with whom one or more of the parties or the [KSA] may have had

certain interactions and the disclosure of which would be damaging

to U.S. national security interests."              This is not a narrow

interposition of privilege.           Cf.    Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at 282

(privilege assertion covered certain categories of information

concerning a surveillance system used by the National Security

Agency); Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 153 (privilege was interposed

over certain portions of two internal government reports).                   This

privilege assertion covers a wide swath of information -- and was

"intended to specifically include information known to [Aljabri]

about such matters that he seeks to introduce or disclose in this

action,    whether   through    documents,     testimony,    affidavits,      or

                                    - 26 -
declarations, as part of his response and defense to pending claims

and motions."

            Now recall that the basic theory of Sakab's case is that

Aljabri misappropriated massive sums of money from Sakab, and

Appellees say the allegedly fraudulent transactions were actually

legitimate, directed by the then-leadership of the KSA and made in

connection with Aljabri's work on sensitive operations with, or at

least alongside, the U.S. Intelligence Community.                  So, if the case

were   to   proceed,    the    facts   critical      to    its     litigation     and

adjudication would center on getting to the bottom of those

transactions and their nature.         To that end, the parties would be

seeking,    inter      alia,     evidence    about        Aljabri's        role   and

relationships    with     U.S.    agencies,    the        degree    of     Aljabri's

authority, how he participated in the programs and operations, who

else was involved, the existence and execution of the operations

themselves, who authorized and paid for them, and who then directed

payment to or through Aljabri -- not to mention the whens, wheres,

whys, and inverses of any of these things.

            All of this is suffused with sensitive information, and

discovery of any of this cannot be undertaken without risking

disclosure of information that has been swept into oblivion by the

incredibly broad privilege assertion.             See, e.g., El-Masri, 479

F.3d at 309 ("Even marshalling the evidence necessary to make the

requisite    showings    would    implicate    privileged          state    secrets,

                                    - 27 -
because El-Masri would need to rely on witnesses whose identities,

and evidence the very existence of which, must remain confidential

in the interest of national security."); see also Mohamed, 614

F.3d at 1087 (finding dismissal was required "because there [was]

no   feasible    way    to    litigate    [the]       alleged     liability      without

creating   an    unjustifiable      risk    of     divulging       state    secrets");

Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 347-49 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming

dismissal at the pleading stage when the facts central to the

action's litigation consisted of state secrets, noting that "the

very methods by which evidence would be gathered in this case are

themselves      problematic").           Indeed,      all    of   this     information

comprises the "central facts" of the action, i.e., "facts that are

essential to prosecuting the action or defending against it."                          El-

Masri, 479 F.3d at 308.            The district court was right when it

observed as much.            See, e.g., Sakab I, 2021 WL 8999588, at *2

(stating     that      "the    disposition       of     this      matter     threatens

th[e government's] interest" in preventing disclosure of state

secrets,     and    "[n]otwithstanding             [Sakab]'s       request       for    a

disposition     without       consideration      of    the   merits,       the   subject

matter of [this] action for fraud is [Appellees'] property and

transactions which implicate the state secrets claim asserted by

the government").

           This dynamic is compounded by the fact that, as both

Appellees and the government point out, "both sides have an

                                      - 28 -
incentive to probe up to the boundaries of state secrets" -- or

even beyond.        Gen. Dynamics Corp., 563 U.S. at 487.        Indeed, we're

mindful      that    when   parties     "have   every    incentive   to   probe

dangerously close to the state secrets themselves," it's possible

that "state secrets could be compromised even without direct

disclosure."        Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intl'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236,

1243 & n.10 (4th Cir. 1985) ("For example, if a witness is

questioned about facts A and B, the witness testifies that fact A

is not a military secret, and the government objects to any answer

regarding fact B, by implication one might assume that fact B is

a military secret.").         It is all too easy to envision discovery

and trial scenarios in which each side would press for information,

documents, or answers to questions (perhaps posed to "witnesses

with personal knowledge of relevant [state] secrets," id.) that

flirt with the boundaries of the state secrets privilege here.

With this privilege assertion being so broad, the parties would

crash into its outer limits with nearly every propounded discovery

request or deposition question, not to mention the risks of probing

things at trial.

             Sakab suggests that some of this information would be

discoverable without running afoul of the privilege's bounds or

that it could be disentangled from that which is privileged. Sakab

complains that no one has even tried to litigate what, exactly,

could   be    litigated,    so   that    litigation     could   proceed   on   an

                                      - 29 -
unprivileged record.        But such a feat is impossible on the facts

of a case like this, with a very broad privilege assertion and a

complaint that centers on conduct and events awash in privileged

secrecy.   Even an attempt to do what Sakab is asking could risk

disclosure.10      This is the whole point.             All of the pertinent

information is simply too entwined, and (emphasis ours) "any

attempt to proceed [with litigation would] threaten disclosure of

the privileged matters."       Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at 303 (quoting El-

Masri, 479 F.3d at 306 (cleaned up)); see also Mohamed, 614 F.3d

at 1088; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308-09.

           Sakab    would    have   us    fault   the    district   court   for

neglecting to isolate the privileged information from that which

is public and discoverable.              But the district court was not

permitted to disentangle the information here, certainly not after

it had already deemed the privilege assertion valid (and nobody

objected to that conclusion).       Remember, a district court can look

to any evidence it deems necessary when it is trying to figure out

whether the information at issue encompasses state secrets, "[b]ut

after a court makes that determination, the privileged evidence is

excised from the case," Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at 303, like a witness

died, Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1204, and (emphasis ours) "not even

     10 Sakab also urges, without citation, that dismissal isn't
appropriate in the face of litigation that "merely risks (rather
than requires) disclosure." Our above discussion of the precedent
amply refutes this.

                                    - 30 -
the   court    may   look    at    such    material   in    camera"   after     that,

Wikimedia,     14    F.4th    at   303     (collecting     cases).    So   at    this

juncture, the evidence cannot be evaluated ex parte and in camera

to disentangle it.       See Sterling, 416 F.3d at 348, 349 (explaining

that a court is "neither authorized nor qualified to inquire

further" into privileged matters -- "even in camera").

              And in any event, even if some non-privileged evidence

could have been extracted for use in litigation, recall that

litigants must be able to do more than just discuss a case in

general terms -- they need to have access to the information

necessary to actually litigate the case.                 See El-Masri, 479 F.3d

at 310; see also, e.g., Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at 303-04 (observing

that "'it would be a mockery of justice . . .' to permit Wikimedia

to substantiate its claims by presenting its half of the evidence

to the factfinder as if it were the whole" (quoting Sealed Case,

494 F.3d at 148)).           Whether some facts can be set forth without

revealing state secrets -- and perhaps that has been the case to

some extent here -- isn't our inquiry.11                   The point is that the

      11Sakab maintains that litigation is possible here because
Appellees have been "freely litigating" in the Ontario matter
without reference to confidential information.     We have a few
issues with this argument and its premise, though. For one thing,
it's not at all clear that Appellees have been able to do as much
as they'd like by way of defense in that suit or otherwise
meaningfully and fully litigating it since the same state-secrets
obstacle presents in Canada. The attendant barriers to litigation
presented here appear to be in play there too.      Our appellate
record suggests the Ontario case has not proceeded to discovery

                                          - 31 -
essential factual questions central to the resolution of this case

can't be fairly litigated without unduly threatening disclosure of

state secrets.   See El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 308.

          Related   to   its   "disentangle   the   secret   materials"

proposition, Sakab urges that the government's proposed protective

order was a perfectly viable alternative to dismissal.        According

to Sakab, the district court should have just safeguarded the

sensitive materials using the government-approved protective order

and proceeded with litigation from there.12

yet, and, just as they've argued here, Appellees have argued in
Canada that the case shouldn't proceed because of state secrets.
In fact, last we knew, Canada's Federal Court had undertaken
proceedings   to  determine   whether   Appellees'  evidence   is
privileged, the outcome of which will impact the course of the
Ontario litigation. The parties appear to be in a holding pattern
while that process plays out.
          Moreover, it's somewhat beside the point that Appellees
may or may not be saying "more" or enough to defend in Canada, as
Sakab asserts; the inquiry we're presented with is whether the
case can be litigated here. Our government's privilege assertion
is in full force and effect in the matter before us, and that's
what everyone (us included) is up against here.
     12On the topic of the protective order, Sakab posits that the
government advised against dismissal as premature and "propos[ed]
to move forward with the litigation" of Sakab's case under the
proposed protective order. The record before us is clear: The
government did not advise against dismissal, and in floating its
proposed protective order, it took no position on the propriety of
dismissal. Both below and before this court, the government has
consistently taken no position on whether the successful privilege
assertion means the case should be dismissed (or on the impact of
the privilege on the preliminary relief Sakab seeks, for that
matter).   And we decline to read into what Sakab calls "the
[g]overnment's measured forbearance" and intuit that, by not
affirmatively recommending dismissal as it does (Sakab says) "more

                                - 32 -
          Our response to this suggestion echoes what has already

been carefully elucidated by the Ninth Circuit:

     Our conclusion [that further litigation poses an
     unacceptable risk of disclosure of state secrets] holds
     no matter what protective procedures the district court
     might employ.       Adversarial litigation, including
     pretrial discovery of documents and witnesses and the
     presentation of documents and testimony at trial, is
     inherently complex and unpredictable. Although district
     courts are well equipped to wall off isolated secrets
     from disclosure, the challenge is exponentially greater
     in exceptional cases like this one, where the relevant
     secrets are difficult or impossible to isolate and even
     efforts to define a boundary between privileged and
     unprivileged   evidence   would   risk   disclosure   by
     implication. In these rare circumstances, the risk of
     disclosure that further proceedings would create cannot
     be averted through the use of devices such as protective
     orders or restrictions on testimony.

Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1089.   So it is here.13

often than not," the government nonetheless is staking out some
sort of position on this or that it proves the government's belief
error was committed.    Indeed, as the government pointed out at
oral argument, the U.S. doesn't need to support dismissal in order
to protect state secrets, particularly where the United States
isn't a party to this suit between private parties.
     13  We reject Sakab's characterization of the risk-of-
disclosure precedent as not justifying dismissal -- that the case
law limits us to three situations in which dismissal is required
(the very subject matter was a state secret, plaintiffs can't show
a prima facie case, defendants can't properly defend) and the
concept of any attempt to proceed risking disclosure is in essence
just "a different label" for the first type of scenario (the very
subject of litigation is a state secret). Not so.
           The standard is that dismissal is required when any
attempt to proceed would risk or require disclosure of privileged
information -- and the case law bears out examples of circumstances
in which dismissal would protect against that risk (like when a
plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie elements of a claim without
the use of privileged evidence, or a defendant can't properly

                              - 33 -
            Bottom line:       "[S]ome matters are so pervaded by state

secrets    as   to    be   incapable    of    judicial   resolution    once   the

privilege has been invoked," El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 306, and this

is   one   such      matter.    "[T]he       circumstances   make    clear    that

privileged information [is] so central to the litigation that any

attempt to proceed will threaten that information's disclosure."

Id. at 308; see also Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at 303; Mohamed, 614 F.3d

at 1077, 1089 (quoting Totten, 92 U.S. at 107); Sterling, 416 F.3d

at 347-49; Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1243.14

            Before we move along, a few final words.                We recognize

that the successful assertion of the state secrets privilege can

defend without using that information). It's our job to examine
the nature of the privileged information and its centrality to the
anticipated litigation as a whole, then weigh the risk of
disclosure if that litigation proceeds.    It's clear to us that
this case runs this risk for the many reasons described above.
       Our conclusion that, from all the circumstances, privileged
      14

information will be so central to the litigation that any attempt
to proceed will threaten the information's disclosure means we
need not specifically address the availability-of-defenses
quarrel. We do note, though, that it's clear on the facts of this
case the issues are linked (emphases ours):      "Circumstances in
which any valid defense would require resort to privileged
materials are those in which 'state secrets are so central to [the]
proceeding that it cannot be litigated without threatening their
disclosure.'" Wikimedia, 14 F.4th at 304 (quoting El-Masri, 479
F.3d at 308).    See also Gen. Dynamics Corp., 563 U.S. at 486
("Where liability depends upon the validity of a [certain] defense,
and when full litigation of that defense would inevitably lead to
the disclosure of" state secrets, neither party can obtain judicial
relief. (cleaned up)); id. ("It is claims and defenses together
that establish the justification, or lack of justification, for
judicial relief.").

                                       - 34 -
result in a harsh outcome for litigants who want a case to proceed.

See, e.g., Sealed Case, 494 F.3d at 148 ("As Judge Learned Hand

observed, a claim of the state secrets privilege will often impose

a grievous hardship, for it may deprive parties . . . of power to

assert their rights or to defend themselves. That is a consequence

of any evidentiary privilege." (cleaned up)); Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d

at 1238 n.3 ("When the state secrets privilege is validly asserted,

the result is unfairness to individual litigants -- through the

loss of important evidence or dismissal of a case -- in order to

protect a greater public value.").               In this matter, the specific

reasons    for     the    government's     assertion    of    the    state   secrets

privilege     were       explained   in    the    classified     declarations      we

mentioned many pages ago.            Those declarations provide detailed

descriptions of the nature of the information that our Executive

wants to protect, and they also explain why disclosure would

threaten     our   national     security.        The   declarations     decisively

inform and support our conclusion today.                   We can appreciate the

frustration of not being in the know when it comes to some of the

specific (classified) reasons supporting dismissal here.                        Sakab

voices concerns about "graymail tactics" being used by Appellees

(or, as a policy matter, by any defendants who happen to have

knowledge of state secrets) to thwart litigation against them by

harnessing or weaponizing state secrets that aren't actually at

issue   to    secure      a   dismissal.         Perhaps     these   concerns     are

                                      - 35 -
understandable in the abstract, but they are misplaced:                  The

requisite layers of review and scrutiny we've already described in

detail   provide     protection   against     that    type   of    strategic

gamesmanship and prevent attempts to abuse state secrets, and here,

that review and scrutiny counsel our outcome.

          Having answered the threshold "can the case proceed"

question in the negative, we now must answer this question:

Notwithstanding the fact that the case can't be litigated and must

be dismissed as a result of the assertion of the state secrets

privilege,   is    Sakab   nevertheless    entitled   to   the    preliminary

relief it seeks?

                            Preliminary Relief

          Before the district court, Sakab sought a few types of

preliminary relief:        prejudgment attachment; a recording of lis

pendens; and a stay of the Massachusetts case pending the outcome

of the Ontario action.

          Pursuant to our above analysis, litigation of the case

can't proceed, and the complaint must be dismissed.                But Sakab

says that doesn't necessarily mean it isn't entitled to some

preliminary equitable relief. Truth be told, Sakab has represented

throughout the Massachusetts case that it doesn't even want to

pursue litigation here -- it just wants to encumber the subject

Massachusetts properties and to then secure a stay of the action

pending a final judgment in Ontario, where it plans to litigate

                                  - 36 -
the merits.   And in Sakab's telling, we need not pull at the state-

secrets thread or consider the merits of Sakab's complaint to

provide it with preliminary relief.         Like the district court, we

are not persuaded.

                       Prejudgment Attachment

          Sakab   argues   the   district    court's   handling    of   the

prejudgment   attachment   relief   issue     was   both   premature    and

substantively wrong.    Given the nature and posture of this case,

we disagree with Sakab's contentions.

          As a threshold matter, Sakab says any disposition of the

prejudgment attachment was premature because there was no pending

motion for that relief.    But the district court clearly understood

that requested relief to be before it.        And rightly so.     Not only

did Sakab reiterate its interest in and affirmatively argue the

prejudgment attachment issue to the district court in its various

papers and at the November 2021 show-cause hearing, but also the

record reflects that Sakab had a pending motion (with memorandum

of law in support and proposed findings) for prejudgment attachment

in state court, meaning it was transferred with the record to the

district court.   See L.R., D. Mass. 81.1 (providing for filing of

state court record upon removal).            The issue of prejudgment

attachment was squarely presented to the district court.           And in

any event, as we'll explain, the district court's point was that

                                 - 37 -
any such motion would be untenable for the reasons it offered.                    So

let's get into that.

           According to Rule 64(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure,     which    incorporates          state   law    to    determine     the

availability of a prejudgment attachment of property, a court may

grant every remedy, under the law of the state where the court is

located, that "provides for seizing a person or property to secure

satisfaction of the potential judgment."                 Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(a);

Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 330-31.             In Massachusetts, Rule 4.1 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure, along with chapter 223, section 42

of   Massachusetts     General        Laws,     direct    the     availability    of

prejudgment attachment.         Rule 4.1(a) instructs that, "[s]ubsequent

to the commencement of any action under these rules, real estate,

goods and chattels and other property may, in the manner and to

the extent provided by law, but subject to the requirements of

this rule, be attached and held to satisfy the judgment for damages

and costs which the plaintiff may recover."                     Mass. R. Civ. P.

4.1(a).   Before ordering a prejudgment attachment, a court must

first   find   that    "there    is    a   reasonable       likelihood   that    the

plaintiff will recover judgment, including interest and costs, in

an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment

over and above any liability insurance shown by the defendant to

be available to satisfy the judgment."                Mass. R. Civ. P. 4.1(c);

see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223, § 42 (2022) (providing (with

                                       - 38 -
exceptions not relevant to this case) that all real property "may

be attached upon a writ of attachment in any action in which the

debt or damages are recoverable, and may be held as security to

satisfy such judgment as the plaintiff may recover").

          The district court reasoned that Sakab could not make

the prerequisite showing of a reasonable likelihood of success on

the merits without implicating state secrets.   See Sakab II, 578

F. Supp. 3d at 144.    And the district court declined to "rule as

an exercise of comity with respect to the interlocutory decisions

of the Ontario" court that Sakab "has satisfied the reasonable

likelihood standard," particularly when Sakab could not point to

examples of a federal court doing what Sakab was seeking.      Id.

Indeed, as the district court explained, "Rule 64 limits the

available prejudgment remedies to those which 'secure satisfaction

of the potential judgment,'" id. (quoting and emphasizing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 64), while "Rule 4.1 likewise limits prejudgment relief to

that which can be 'held to satisfy the judgment . . . which the

plaintiff may recover,'" id. (quoting and emphasizing Mass. R.

Civ. P. 4.1(a)).   Each of these rules talk about "the" (not "a")

judgment (if there is one) obtained in the action before that

court, and they do not "contemplate that the likelihood of success

in another, foreign action can justify prejudgment attachment in

the action at hand."   Sakab II, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 144.

                              - 39 -
            And, as the district court observed, section 42 stymies

Sakab's argument with a one-two punch:

     [F]irst, in prescribing attachment in actions in which
     the debt or damages are demonstrably recoverable, which
     is not this case, and second, in designating attachment
     as security to satisfy "such judgment as the plaintiff
     may recover", a phrase which read in context gives no
     indication of encompassing judgments recovered in other,
     foreign jurisdictions.

Id. (quoting ch. 223, § 42).

            This   is   all   correct.     Despite   Sakab's   efforts   to

demonstrate otherwise,15 Massachusetts' law and Rule 4.1 are clear

and do not require any mental gymnastics given the posture of this

case:     This attachment relief is available only upon a finding of

reasonable likelihood of success. That likelihood of success could

not be shown in this case for all the state-secrets reasons much

     15  For example, Sakab writes that the district court
"mistakenly assumed that the prejudgment attachment on the basis
of comity would secure a potential Ontario judgment," apparently
suggesting that Sakab wanted an adjudication of its Massachusetts
case. This is difficult to square with Sakab's representations
below that the district court didn't need to "consider the
underlying evidence of the parties' claims and defenses" in the
Massachusetts case because the court could just accord comity to
the Ontario court's rulings. But it's clear to us the focus by
Sakab was and is on using the Ontario Mareva injunction to secure
preliminary relief in Massachusetts. If the name of Sakab's game
had been to secure relief in Massachusetts based on the
Massachusetts state law complaint, it would have needed to show a
likelihood of success on that complaint.     For the same reasons
we've explained and continue to explicate, that merits inquiry
could not be assessed because of the assertion of the state secrets
privilege.

                                  - 40 -
discussed to this point -- doing so would tread too closely to the

boundaries of the privilege assertion, and too much evidence was

swept up within that assertion.   There is no precedent compelling

us to forgo the touchstone merits inquiry necessary to meet Rule

4.1's requirements by relying on comity to Ontario's preliminary

injunction -- a Mareva injunction at that16 -- which provides only

that, as a typical pre-discovery, asset-freezing injunction matter

(as opposed to a final foreign judgment, which Sakab does not

have), Sakab was likely to prevail in the Ontario case -- not the

Massachusetts case.

                           Lis Pendens

          Sakab also asked the district court to issue a lis

pendens recording and then stay the matter, and argues here that

the district court circularly rejected that request based on its

erroneous conclusion that dismissal of the case proper was required

based on the state secrets privilege.    Rather, Sakab argues, the

district court should have simply issued the lis pendens, stayed

the case to preserve the Massachusetts action without any risks to

     16 Global, asset-freezing Mareva orders -- "a powerful tool
for general creditors," Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 329 -- are
unavailable here in the United States, where our Supreme Court has
said "[e]ven when sitting as a court in equity, we have no
authority to craft a 'nuclear weapon' of the law like the one
advocated here," id. at 332-33. See also id. at 333 ("The debate
concerning this formidable power over debtors should be conducted
and resolved where such issues belong in our democracy: in the
Congress.").

                              - 41 -
national security, and awaited a final judgment in the Ontario

case.   These arguments, though, do not persuade.

           "Lis pendens" means "[a] pending lawsuit."         Lis Pendens,

Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also id. ("A notice,

recorded in the chain of title to real property, required or

permitted in some jurisdictions to warn all persons that certain

property   is   the   subject   matter   of   litigation,   and   that   any

interests acquired during the pendency of the suit are subject to

its outcome.").       And specifically under Massachusetts law, a

memorandum or recording of lis pendens may issue if a case's

subject matter concerns a claim of title to real property.               See

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 184, § 15(b).        Indeed, a lis pendens is a tool

meant to provide recorded notice of lawsuits that impact title to

real property.    See, e.g., Wolfe v. Gormally, 802 N.E.2d 64, 67-

68 (Mass. 2004) (citing and discussing evolution of ch. 184, § 15);

id. at 70 (concluding that the record title at issue should

"reflect the pendency of [an] action so as to give notice to

prospective purchasers of the contested lots that the proposed use

of those lots is subject to active legal challenge," so approval

of the memorandum of lis pendens was appropriate);          Debral Realty,

Inc. v. DiChiara, 420 N.E.2d 343, 347 (Mass. 1981) ("A memorandum

of lis pendens, like an attachment of real estate, temporarily

restricts the power of a landowner to sell his or her property, by

depriving the owner of the ability to convey clear title while the

                                  - 42 -
litigation is pending.").       In explaining the history and policy

undergirding the lis pendens mechanism, the Wolfe court observed

that the lis pendens statute "thus allowed courts to retain control

over the subject matter of the litigation while the action was

pending," 802 N.E.2d at 67 (citing F.T. Talty, P.S. Talty, et al.,

Methods   of   Practice   §   8:19    (4th    ed.   2000)),   "and   protected

prospective buyers by enabling them to obtain 'notice of pending

litigation affecting title' through the registry of deeds, in the

same way that they searched for record encumbrances," id. (quoting

DiChiara, 420 N.E.2d at 346).

           Particularly in view of this policy context, we conclude

the district court got the lis pendens issue right, too.                   The

district court rightly explained that a lis pendens is derivative

of the underlying claims -- it should reflect an action's pendency.

Sakab II, 578 F. Supp. 3d at 145 (citing Wolfe, 802 N.E.2d at 70).

It thus declined to issue the lis pendens here because "the

underlying proceeding to which the lis pendens would refer consists

of ten claims [(the entirety of Sakab's complaint, that is)] which

the Court has determined must be dismissed."            Id.

           Indeed, the point of a lis pendens is that it's linked

to litigation -- the idea being that pending litigation is what

the lis pendens is meant to warn third parties about.                So, given

the circumstances of this matter -- we and the district court

having determined the suit will be dismissed -- can a lis pendens

                                     - 43 -
issue nonetheless?      There is no pending Massachusetts lawsuit,

nothing over which the court should or could retain control, see

Wolfe, 802 N.E.2d at 67 (observing the lis pendens statute "allowed

courts    to   retain   control   over     the   subject   matter   of    the

litigation while the action was pending"), so we think not.              Sakab

calls this reasoning circular, but really it's a typical linear

sequence of legal analysis wherein one determination dictates the

outcome of the next.     And like in the district court, the sequence

here ends with us rejecting Sakab's lis pendens position.

           Also    problematic     in    Sakab's     lis-pendens-and-stay

asseveration:     There is no Massachusetts precedent that requires

issuance of a lis pendens recording for an indefinite duration --

and not on the merits of "the underlying proceeding," ch. 184,

§ 15(b), but instead on the (as yet undetermined) merits of a

foreign proceeding.      Indeed, what Sakab is after is encumbrances

of Appellees' real estate in Massachusetts, pre-foreign judgment,

and an indefinite stay of a Massachusetts case it has no intention

of trying to litigate during the pendency of the foreign suit.

Sakab is right, of course, that sometimes our courts will stay

litigation pending the outcome of parallel litigation abroad.             But

the non-binding cases17 to which Sakab points us don't support what

     17 Louis Vuitton N. Am., Inc. v. Schenker S.A., No. 17-CV-
7445, 2019 WL 1507792, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019); Pexcor Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Uponor AB, 920 F. Supp. 2d 151, 152 (D.D.C. 2013);
Argus Media Ltd. v. Tradition Fin. Servs. Inc., No. 09 Civ.

                                  - 44 -
Sakab is trying to do here:   Those cases don't involve stays sought

by the plaintiffs in U.S. suits in the wake of an order encumbering

a defendant's property, nor do they involve a U.S. court putting

a lien on property for the pendency of litigation in a foreign

forum without also entertaining a merits defense against that lien.

                                Stay

          To be clear, the result of our prejudgment attachment

and lis pendens analyses is that Sakab is not entitled to a stay

that would hinge on or flow from either of those forms of relief.

To the extent Sakab is seeking a stay simpliciter, untethered to

any property-secured equitable relief, we likewise conclude it is

not entitled to that relief.      The case is dismissed; there is

nothing to stay.    And we decline to revive the case just to

indefinitely stay it while the Ontario litigation plays out.     To

do so is unsupported by our precedent and runs counter to the idea

that Appellees, as defendants to this ten-count complaint,18 are

entitled to defend against it rather than being stuck in unlimited

limbo.

7966(HB), 2009 WL 5125113, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2009);
Goldhammer v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 248, 250, 256
(D. Mass. 1999); Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int'l Inc., 954
F. Supp. 101, 102-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
     18And of note, Sakab's state law complaint does not include
a claim to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment under
Massachusetts' Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 218, § 4A.

                               - 45 -
          In the end, Sakab has not demonstrated it is entitled at

this time to any of the preliminary relief it requested.19

                            CONCLUSION

          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the

district court.   Each side shall bear its own costs.

     19That said, Sakab's toolkit is not empty. Ontario's Mareva
injunction   includes   the  Massachusetts   properties.      The
comprehensive receivership order likewise lists the Massachusetts
properties, along with a Washington, D.C. property and shares in
a Canadian company. Should Sakab secure the judgment in Ontario,
nothing in today's opinion should be read to prevent it from
pursuing remedies here.

                              - 46 -