Court Opinion

ID: 9528434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:41:08.923325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:51.797630
License: Public Domain

SADLER, Chief Justice (dissenting). The prevailing opinion, seizing upon a dictum announced in Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781, seeks to imbed it in our substantive, law with all the force of stare decisis in what impresses me as a plain case of judicial legislation. Naturally, the writer was gratified at the court’s action in Chavez v. Chavez, supra, in adopting his dissenting opinions in McDonald v. Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 85 P.2d 78, 120 A.L.R. 250, and Newton v. Wilson, 53 N.M. 480, 211 P.2d 776, as the basis for overruling them in so far as such decisions denied the power of spouses to transmute community property into separate estate and vice versa. But the writer’s dissent in neither of those cases, either expressly or by remotest implication, ever germinated the thought resulting in this dictum gratuitously put forward in Chavez v. Chavez, to-wit: “Proof to support such transmutation must be clear, strong and convincing; a mere preponderance of the evidence will not suffice to effect it.” [56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 783.] The prevailing opinion in the present case then follows the quotation of this dictum from the Chavez case with the frank and highly significant admission: “Thus, it is now expressly recognized that, within certain limitations, transmutation of community property between husband and wife is approved. The limitation imposed by the court is contained in the last sentence of the quotation from the Chavez case.1’ (Emphasis mine.) It is quite proper and only fair that the majority should make this admission since, obviously, the legislature imposed no such condition to operation of the statutory presumption erected by it in 1941 Comp. § 65-401, when it enacted: “ * * * but whenever any real or personal property, or any interest therein or encumbrance thereon is acquired by a married woman by an instrument in writing the presumption is that title is thereby vested in her as her separate property.” (Emphasis mine.) ■Unquestionably, the legislature intended that this presumption, in and of itself, absent countervailing proof sufficient to overcome it, should suffice to support an adjudication that property conveyed by the husband to the wife by an instrument in writing, though having previous character as community property, or to her by some third person even if paid for with 'community funds, should become “vested in her as her separate property.” August v. Tillian, 51 N.M. 74, 178 P.2d 590, 591. See, also, Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010, and McClendon v. Dean, 45 N. M. 496, 117 P.2d 250. A rebuttable presumption, to be sure, but solid proof, nevertheless, until rebutted. . . „ The legislature said nothing about the presumption arising only where proof of the transmutation suggested by the transfer “is clear, strong and convincing; more than a mere preponderance of the evidence.” See Mut. Inv., etc., Co. v. Albuquerque Farm, etc., Co., 34 N.M. 10, 275 P. 92. No, indeed, the injection of such a condition represents this court’s excursion into the domain of the legislature — an imposition by the court of what the majority think a propér safeguard from a standpoint of policy. Why is this said? Because the majority frankly admit it. They speak in Chavez v. Chavez of the degree of proof necessary to support transmutation as “The limitation imposed by the court”. This sounds more like a legislative declaration than a judicial pronouncement. In McClendon v. Dean, supra, in an opinion by‘Chief Justice Brice this court was dealing with the presumption created by 1941 Comp. Sec. 65-401, mentioned as Sec. 68-401, N.M. Sts.1929, and stated what seems to be generally recognized that the statute was adopted from the state of California. We gave it the construction in the McClendon case on the question involved that had- been given it in California. We adopted the statute in 1907 as L.1907, c. 37, Sec. 10. The ¡Supreme Court of California holds, contrary to the majority in the case .at bar,'that the presumption created by this statute as to real estate conveyed .to . the wife by an instrument in writing is sufficient in and of itself to support a finding that it is her separate estate. Stafford v. Martinoni, 192 Cal. 724, 221 P. 919. See, also, Goucher v. Goucher, 82 Cal.App. 449, 255 P. 892, and Donze v. Donze, 88 Cal.App. 769, 264 P. 294. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable except that under our statute it becomes conclusive in favor of a good faith purchaser from the wife. Speaking on the subject the Supreme Court of California in Stafford v. Martinoni, said [192 Cal. 724, 221 P. 925]: “The disputable presumption raised 'by section 164 of the Civil Code is a form of evidence under the express terms of section 1957 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be controverted by other evidence, direct or indirect, but unless so controverted the court or jury is bound to find according to the presumption. Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1961-2061. It is therefore for the court or jury to determine whether or not the evidence against the presumption is sufficient to overthrow it. People v. Milner, 122 Cal. 171-179, 54 P. 833; * * * Hitchcock v. Rooney, 171 Cal. 285-289, 152 P. 913.” When we adopted the California statute we adopted the construction theretofore given it by the highest court of that state. In re Vigil’s Estate, 38 N.M. 383, 34 P.2d 667, 93 A.L.R. 1506. It is not my contention that the presumption attending property conveyed to the wife may not be rebutted, save in the single instance where she conveys the property so received to a good faith purchaser. My objection to the majority position is that they maintain, contrary to the holding of the Supreme Court of California in Stafford v. Martinoni, supra, that the statutory presumption does not suffice to support a finding that the property is the wife’s separate estate if the conveyance accomplishes a transmutation of community property into separate estate. Such a contention as already noted above is contrary to the California decisions and as well to our own decision in August v. Tillian, supra. The majority seem to draw some comfort from the case of Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003, 1005. just why, I am unable to see, unless it be because of the holding that it was permissible to show by proof that property held under a deed in joint tenancy by husband and wife was actually intended by them to be community property. There is no disposition on ■ my part to challenge this proposition. Certainly, so much of the opinion in the Siberell case now about to be quoted, insofar as it •has any bearing on this case can not aid the majority position. The court said: “It is true that under the recent holding in the case of Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 296 P. 604 [77 A.L.R. 1015], following Miller v. Brode, 186 Cal. 409, 199 P. 531, and Estate of Regnart, 102 Cal.App. 643, 283 P. 860, it was declared that property deeded to husband and wife without explanation is presumed to vest the wife with a half interest therein as her separate estate and the husband with the remaining half as community property, and because of this holding' it is said to be logical to extend this presumption to the situation before us. But we can see no reason whatsoever to indulge this presumption here. This follows for at least two reasons: “First, from the very nature of the estate, as between husband and wife, a community estate and a joint tenancy cannot exist at the same time in the same property. The use of community funds to purchase the property and the taking of title thereto in the name of the spouses as joint tenants is tantamount to a binding agreement 'between them that the same shall not thereafter be held as community property, but instead as a joint tenancy with all the characteristics of such an estate. It would be manifestly inequitable and a subversion of the rights of both husband and wife to have them in good faith enter into a valid engagement of this character, and, following the demise of either, to have a contention made that his or her share in the property was held for the community, thus bringing into operation the law of descent, administration, rights of creditors, and other complications which would defeat the right of survivorship, the chief incident of the law of joint tenancy. A joint tenancy is one estate, and in it the rights of the spouses are identical and coextensive. “Second, on its face section 164 has no application to a case where 'a different intention is expressed in the instrument,’ and it seems to us to be clear, as already pointed out above, that a joint tenancy, the evidence of which the law requires to be on the face of the conveyance creating it, is of necessity an expression of the intention to hold the property otherwise than as community property, and that the equal interest of the spouses must therefore be classed as their separate but joint estate in the property.” It may be well at this point to quote the statute in question, so far as material, as it stood prior to the amendment by L. 1947, c. 191. An excerpt therefrom has already been quoted. It is the statute prior to amendment ’by which the rights of the parties before us are to be determined. It reads: “All other property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, or both, is community property; but whenever any property is conveyed to a married woman by an instrument in writing the presumption is that title is thereby vested in her as her separate property. And if the conveyance be to such married woman and to her husband, or to her and any other person, the presumption is that the married woman takes the part conveyed to her, as tenant in common unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument, and the presumption in this section mentioned, is conclusive in favor of a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration.” It is questionable whether the majority realize that the practical effect of their holding is to strike down and nullify the legislative mandate that the presumption attending a deed to the wife, or to her and another as for that matter, shall be conclusive in favor of a good faith purchaser. If the effect of the deed is to transmute community property into separate estate of the wife, and she conveys the property acquired to a good faith purchaser, the re-buttable presumption that it was her separate estate then becomes conclusive and neither she, her husband, nor community creditors as for that matter, may prove otherwise. So says the statute. Is it not, then, perfectly obvious that to the extent this presumption is weighted down with added conditions and limitations, “imposed by the court”, touching the quantum of proof necessary to establish existence of the fact which the statutory presumption assumes from the mere manner of conveyance, to such extent is the conclusive character given it by the legislature undermined and annulled? Iiow can a presumption which never comes into -being for want of the degree of proof essential to its existence, as declared by this court, have conclusive character, notwithstanding existence of the fact (conveyance by written instrument to a married woman) which the legislature has said shall create the presumption ? Will the majority please answer, if they can? The majority opinion undertakes a lengthy and extended review of California cases, from a few of which it seems to gain small comfort. However, far the greater number of the California cases cited, such as King v. King, 107 Cal.App.2d 257, 236 P.2d 912; Cummins v. Cummins, 7 Cal.App.2d 294, 46 P.2d 284; Application of Rauer’s Collection Co., 87 Cal.App.2d 248, 196 P.2d 803, and Cox v. Cox, 82 Cal.App.2d 867, 187 P.2d 23, and others not here enumerated, not only afford no support whatever to the majority position but on the contrary uphold the opposite view. Indeed, the author of the majority opinion finally summarizes the lengthy review of California cases by actually agreeing that cases from that jurisdiction (and it is from there we get our statute) are against him, and turns to other community property states, seeking the support he failed to find in California. From Arizona, the cases of Baldwin v. Baldwin, 50 Ariz. 265, 71 P.2d 791; Henderson v. Henderson, 58 Ariz. 514, 121 P.2d 437, and Collier v. Collier, 73 Ariz. 405, 242 P.2d 537, are cited. Nevada cases, such as Petition of Fuller, 63 Nev. 26, 159 P.2d 579; In re Wilson’s Estate, 56 Nev. 353, 53 P.2d 339, and others are also cited. It is not claimed that Arizona has a statute such as our 1941 Comp. Sec. 65-401, creating the presumptions so deadly to the majority position. To say the least, none is mentioned and as to the situation in Nevada the prevailing opinion states: “There is in Nevada no statutory presumption where title is taken in the wife’s name, or in the name of the husband and wife as tenants in common.” Of course, the presence of such a statute as that in California, creating its significant presumptions, and such as ours here in New Mexico, makes all the difference in the world. Apparently, the estate in joint tenancy is looked upon with little favor in Arizona. Baldwin v. Baldwin, supra. The right of survivorship was abolished in estates held jointly, save where expressly vested by the grant or devise creating it. 1939 Ariz. Ann.Code, § 39-110. Moreover, there is a statutory presumption against the creation of such estates. ' Ariz.Ann.Code, § 71-122. These statutes perhaps account •for the fact that it is there not enough that the grantees receive such a deed and hold under it but some extrinsic proof is necessary [50 Ariz. 265, 71 P.2d 795], “such, for instance, as an acceptance of the terms thereof in the handwriting of the grantees, or an endorsement 'by the recorder that it was placed of record at the request of the deceased spouse,” if the property conveyed previously had community character or was purchased with community funds. Baldwin v. Baldwin, supra. (Emphasis mine.) Even conceding that Arizona has a statute authorizing husband and wife to hold real estate in joint tenancy, there are in New Mexico no' statutes so affecting the right as that curtailing the incident of sur-vivorship in such estates, Ariz.Ann.Code, § 39-110, and setting up a presumption against the existence of the estate as their § 71-122, supra. Under our statute, § 65-302, supra, the intention of the spouses in creating such estates in themselves heretofore has been determinable by ordinary standards. If a deed in usual form has employed language appropriate' to the creation of the estate and the spouses hold under it, heretofore it has not been necessary that they support what its language plainly imports by some written affirmation of competency or declaration of understanding before giving it effect as representing the true intention of the parties. There seems to be a growing disposition on the part of some to deplore the progressively increasing tendency of spouses to take title to real property in joint tenancy. The writer has heard it asserted on more than one occasion within the past year or more that there are literally thousands of these deeds in joint tenancy in Bernalillo County alone. So what? Maybe that is the way the grantee spouses have wished it. Such would surely be a fair and natural assumption. If language appropriate to the creation of an estate in joint tenancy is employed in a deed conveying property to husband and wife, what of it? Obviously, it is a matter of no concern to this court, and assuredly one of complete indifference to every, member of it, how husbands and wives take title to property acquired by them. The spouses are free agents and may contract with each other as if unmarried, except to alter their legal relations. 1941 Comp. § 65-206. It becomes all the more important, then, that we do not by self-imposed conditions as to degree of proof essential to validity, applicable not only to deeds in joint tenancy to husbands and wives but as well' to ’ other forms of conveyance in which the wife’s name appears as a grantee, so magnify the burden resting on the wife as a survivor in joint tenancy as to force a practical abandonment of use by spouses of this form of conveyance in taking title to property. • If, indeed, the estates in joint tenancy of husbands and wives are as numerous as suggested in Bernalillo County and throughout the state, as for that matter, then, the law as declared ' today by the majority should be a matter of deepest concern to all spouses so holding, lest their intention in the creation of such estates be utterly defeated. Is it to be necessary hereafter in the creation of estates in joint tenancy in husband and wife, if there be community property, to insure that what they have done in life may be honored after the death of one of them, that independent proof apart from the language of the instrument under which they hold, be furnished? Must the husband and wife, to insure that any such deed will be honored, endorse on its back and both sign this, or this, in substance: . “We are mentally competent and have read and understand this deed. It is exactly, what we want and expresses our bona fide wishes.” Or, perchance, must the husband and wife grantees proceed forthwith, following delivery of a joint tenancy, deed in their fav- or, to take the deposition of each other de bene esse to preserve the testimony of each, against the contingency of either’s death, affirming that what the language of the deed on its face plainly imports, conforms to their wishes and actually represents their true intention ? These are but a few of the' pertinent inquiries which arise to' plague and perplex husbands and wives holding under deeds in joint tenancy, as an incident of to- • day’s- decision in this case. But husbands and wives who are grantees in such deeds are not alone to he concerned. Today’s holding is much broader in its sweep. The limitation “imposed by the court” in Chavez v. Chavez, supra, and further emphasized in today’s decision, strikes just as deadly a blow at the statutory presumption in the wife’s favor attending deeds to her, or to her and her husband, or to her and any other person, if their effect is to accomplish a transmutation of community property into separate estate in the wife. The proof, or evidence, before it can accomplish such transmutation, must be “clear, strong and convincing; a mere preponderance * * will not suffice to effect it.” [56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 783] As already noted, that is what this court, but not the legislature, has said. Contrary to the mistaken idea entertained by the majority, there is no claim on my part that the presumption of a holding by the wife as separate estate arises from a conveyance to her and her husband in joint tenancy. The decision of the Supreme Court of California in Siberell v. Siberell, supra, points out quite clearly why the presumption does not operate in that event and for two well stated reasons. My objection to the holding of the prevailing opinion is that in the kind and type of deeds where the statutory presumption admittedly arises this court, itself, “imposes” an additional burden on what the legislature has said is proof enough, by requiring more than a “mere preponderance” of the evidence. And, likewise, to uphold the conveyance the majority call for the same high degree of proof, practically beyond a reasonable doubt, where title is taken in joint tenancy, if ever the property conveyed or the consideration for it had community character. In closing, may I here and now accept my equal share of responsibility for promulgating the objectionable dictum in the case of Chavez v. Chavez, supra. My concurrence in that opinion, as -finally drafted, will be found along with that of other members of the court. The full import of the dictum escaped me at the time and it was not until I observed the effort to give it added standing by reaffirming it in this case that I gave the matter closer study and became well convinced that the objectionable language was unsound and without support in precedent, reason or logic. I welcome this early opportunity to atone for my error in signing' the opinion in the Chavez case with this erroneous dictum in it. It was unnecessary to a decision and had absolutely no place there. In the inventory filed in the case by the surviving widow as administratrix of her husband’s estate, she stated she was not aware that the property was held in joint tenancy until an abstract held by an insurance company in connection with a loan on the property was returned to her after her husband’s death. It is this legal opinion of a layman, the widow, on the state of the title, one very likely ignorant of the distinction in law between community property, joint tenancy and cotenancy, that is deemed sufficient to destroy the estate in joint tenancy 'between the husband and wife under which both had held title to the property for three years prior to the husband’s death and had joined in mortgaging it as security for a loan. The trial court should be permitted to pass upon the question of whether transmutation of the property to separate estate in the wife took place without imposing on her the burden of establishing it, for all practical purposes, beyond a reasonable doubt, as held by the majority. In a revised edition of the majority opinion, written to take notice of my dissent, it is said: “We deny any responsibility for the failure of the author of the dissenting opinion to distinguish between 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ which is required in criminal cases, and ‘proof that is clear, strong and convincing’ which is required in several types of civil cases.” In attempting thus to restate in the preceding quotation the test “imposed by the court” in Chavez v. Chavez, supra, and here sought to be reaffirmed, the majority omit to give us a material and significant part of it as the essential degree of proof required, —viz., “more than a mere preponderance.” They then speak patronizingly of my inability to locate this criterion at some uncharted point between evidence that merely “preponderates,” the test in civil cases, and “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”, the quantum called for in criminal cases. Will the majority please do it for me? Of course, my dissent nowhere asserts there is not a distinction between “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” and “proof that is clear, strong and convincing; a mere preponderance of the evidence will not effect it.” It does state in substance that the majority have set up a test which “for all practical purposes” will require “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”. The majority pose the test that the requisite quantum of proof to accomplish transmutation must be “more than a mere preponderance”. How much more? They do not say. Is it “much” or “little”? Traditional legal definitions of evidence that “preponderates” and that which satisfies “beyond a reasonable doubt” are to be found in the books but I challenge the majority to say with exactness when it is “more than a mere preponderance”, yet less than “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”. The fact is the majority have set up for the courts a test which they themselves are unable to define — indeed, which is indefinable — and, yet, they characterize my inability to do what they can not as ignorance, in effect, of the distinction between the traditional tests in civil and criminal cases. All I can say is that my guess as to what is “more than a mere preponderance” is as good as theirs! It can easily be seen from the foregoing observations that my views and those of the majority do not coincide. Accordingly, I dissent.