Court Opinion

ID: 9542900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:40:04.711021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:13.323892
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree in the affirmance of appellant’s conviction but would modify his sentence due the State’s renunciation of the stipulation and the prejudicial effect of the introduction of the specific charges for which appellant was being held.
The general rule with regard to the use and effect of a stipulation in a subsequent trial is that it is a binding agreement between the parties. See, e.g., United States v. Marino, 617 F.2d 76, 82 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1915, 100 S.Ct. 575, 66 L.Ed.2d 474 (1980); Kilfoyle v. Heyison, 417 F.Supp. 239 (W.D.Penn.1976); Sevigny v. City of Biddeford, 344 A.2d 34, 39 (Maine 1975); Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1971); Shore v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 128 Colo. 424, 263 P.2d 315 (1953); Higgins v. Guerin, 74 Ariz. 187, 245 P.2d 956 (1952); Gonzales v. Pac. Greyhound Lines, 34 Cal.2d 749, 214 P.2d 809 (1950). Although this Court has never directly addressed the question, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Atlas Life Insurance Co. v. Unger, 198 Okl. 234, 177 P.2d 98, 102 (1947) indicated its intent to follow the general rule by stating that if a stipulation does not, on its face, limit its use to a single trial, it is admissible in a subsequent trial.
Once a stipulation is made, it cannot be disregarded or set aside at will. Lyles v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 614 F.2d 691 (10th Cir.1980). Instead, it is binding on the parties during the process of litigation. See Nanonka v. Hoskins, 645 P.2d 507, 508 (Okla.1982); Higgins v. Guerin, 245 P.2d at 957-58. The withdrawal of a stipulation is not permitted without the consent of the opposing party, “except by leave of court upon cause shown,” because it is tantamount to a contract between the parties. McFarling v. Demco, Inc., 546 P.2d 625, 630 (Okla.1976), citing Coon v. Jones, 303 P.2d 425 (Okla.1956).
In the present case, it is undisputed that appellant and the State entered into a stipulation during the first trial regarding the *910fact that appellant was being held and awaiting trial on felony charges. At the subsequent trial, the State refused to abide by its prior stipulation. After a review of the record, it is clear that the trial judge, in allowing the State to breach its earlier agreement as to the stipulation, failed to follow the rule in McFarling which required that some cause, such as fraud, be shown for the withdrawal of the stipulation. Id. at 630. Thus, it was error to allow the State to withdraw its prior stipulation.
Even assuming arguendo that the stipulation could have been withdrawn, the State was still prohibited from introducing the nature of the specific charges against appellant as they were highly prejudicial and of low probative value. Appellant was awaiting trial on charges of kidnapping, rape, sodomy, attempted perjury and first degree murder. The nature of the specific charges was not probative of any element of the crime of escape. See 21 O.S.1981, § 443. Furthermore, it was highly prejudicial as it put before the jury the many violent crimes with which appellant was charged. Although in some instances it may be permissible to place before the jury the reasons for a defendant incarceration, see Caffey v. State, 739 P.2d 546, 547 (Okla.Crim.App.1987), it is incumbent upon the trial court to make a determination of its probative value and prejudicial effect under 12 O.S.1981, § 2403. In the instant case, the evidence regarding the nature of the charges were totally unnecessary to prove the State’s case, but were highly inflammatory and prejudicial to appellant. See Stewart v. State, 757 P.2d 388, 395 (Okla.Crim.App.1988). Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to admit this information into evidence.