Court Opinion

ID: 9400732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 05:08:03.51346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.560848
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS,                                             UNPUBLISHED
SPECTRUM HEALTH PRIMARY CARE                                           June 8, 2023
PARTNERS, doing business as SPECTRUM
HEALTH MEDICAL GROUP, and SPECTRUM
HEALTH WORTH SERVICES, doing business as
SPECTRUM HEALTH NEURO
REHABILITATION SERVICES,

               Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v                                                                      No. 362651
                                                                       Kent Circuit Court
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,                                            LC No. 21-004265-NF

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and MURRAY and FEENEY, JJ.

MARKEY, P.J. (dissenting).

        In this action brought by plaintiffs, Spectrum Health Hospitals, Spectrum Health Primary
Care Partners, and Spectrum Health Worth Services, to recover no-fault insurance benefits for the
medical care and treatment provided to Linda Lockett (now deceased), plaintiffs appeal by right
the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, Farmers Insurance
Exchange (Farmers), under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court found as a matter of law that
Lockett was the constructive owner of the motor vehicle that she was operating when it was
involved in an accident that eventually took Lockett’s life. Because Lockett did not carry any
automobile insurance and her vehicle was not insured, the trial court ruled that there was no
entitlement to personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Accordingly, Farmers was not
obligated to compensate plaintiffs for the services they rendered to Lockett. Plaintiffs argue on
appeal that the trial court failed to abide by the principles governing motions for summary
disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The majority agrees with plaintiffs’ argument,
reverses the trial court’s ruling, and remands the case for further proceedings. Because I conclude
that the trial court’s decision was legally sound and did not constitute error, I respectfully dissent.

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                         I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        Lockett was driving an uninsured motor vehicle when she lost control and struck a
telephone pole. Two passengers were also inside the car. Lasondra Leffler, Lockett’s friend, died
from injuries sustained in the automobile accident. James Coleman, who was in a dating
relationship with Lockett at the time, was injured but survived the accident. Lockett suffered
significant injuries and received treatment from plaintiffs until she succumbed to her injuries.

        The parties agreed that the registered owner of the uninsured vehicle at the time of the
accident was Lockett’s daughter. Lockett herself was not covered by a policy of automobile
insurance. Farmers was the assigned insurer. Plaintiffs filed a claim with Farmers for PIP benefits
on behalf of Lockett, which Farmers denied. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint against
Farmers seeking the payment of benefits. Farmers moved for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that Lockett was a constructive owner of the vehicle and thus
precluded from receiving benefits in light of the absence of mandatory insurance. Farmers relied
on Coleman’s deposition testimony in asserting that Lockett constructively owned the vehicle
involved in the accident. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, contending that Farmers could not meet
its burden to establish that Lockett was the constructive owner of the vehicle solely on the basis of
Coleman’s testimony. They argued that Coleman’s testimony was at times inconsistent and
speculative. Plaintiffs maintained that close examination of Coleman’s testimony revealed that he
had no true knowledge regarding Lockett’s actual use of the car, and use of the vehicle was
essential to determining constructive ownership. Plaintiffs did not rely on any documentary
evidence that countered Coleman’s testimony; rather, they simply assailed perceived shortcomings
in Coleman’s testimony.

        The trial court dispensed with oral arguments and granted Farmers’ motion for summary
disposition, ruling that Coleman’s testimony created an overall picture that strongly reflected that
Lockett’s use of the vehicle comported with the concept of ownership. The trial court specifically
observed that Coleman had witnessed Lockett’s use of the vehicle for more than 30 days and that
he was in the best position to know about such use. The court explained that Coleman testified
with respect to several facts that indicated ownership. This included Coleman’s belief that it was
Lockett’s vehicle, the presence of the car at their shared apartment, Lockett’s possession of the
keys, her actions in filling the gas tank, the failure to see anyone else—including Lockett’s
daughter–-use the car, Lockett’s use of the vehicle whenever needed, and the fact that Lockett
never asked permission from someone else to use the car. The trial court ruled that Lockett’s
vehicle usage exhibited a regular pattern of unsupervised control of the car and that nearly all the
factors a court should consider when analyzing ownership weighed in favor of finding constructive
ownership. Plaintiffs now appeal.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

        On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting Farmers’ motion for
summary disposition because the court relied on Coleman’s inconsistent and speculative
testimony. Plaintiffs posit that the trial court did not view the evidence in a light most favorable
to plaintiffs, did not make reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, proceeded to act as a fact-
finder, and made credibility assessments.

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        MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides that summary disposition is appropriate when, “[e]xcept as to
the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” A motion brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a party’s action. Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Dells, 301
Mich App 368, 377; 836 NW2d 257 (2013). “Affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence in support of the grounds asserted in the motion are required . . . when
judgment is sought based on subrule (C)(10),” MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b), and such evidence, along
with the pleadings, must be considered by the court when ruling on the (C)(10) motion, MCR
2.116(G)(5). “When a motion under subrule (C)(10) is made and supported . . ., an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” MCR 2.116(G)(4).

        “A trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if the
pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to
the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact.” Pioneer
State, 301 Mich App at 377. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the
benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable
minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). The
trial court is not permitted to assess credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes,
and if material evidence conflicts, it is not appropriate to grant a motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Pioneer State, 301 Mich App at 377. “Like the trial court’s inquiry,
when an appellate court reviews a motion for summary disposition, it makes all legitimate
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162; 516
NW2d 475 (1994). “[S]peculation is insufficient to create an issue of fact.” MEEMIC Ins Co v
DTE Energy Co, 292 Mich App 278, 282; 807 NW2d 407 (2011). A court may only consider
substantively admissible evidence actually proffered by the parties when ruling on the motion.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); see also MCR 2.116(G)(6).

         Under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., “the owner or registrant of a motor
vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under
personal protection insurance and property protection insurance as required under this chapter, and
residual liability insurance.” MCL 500.3101(1). This provision “requires the owner or registrant
of a motor vehicle to carry insurance for personal protection, property protection, and residual
liability.” Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 689; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). “A person is not
entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time
of the accident . . . “[t]he person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle . . . involved in the
accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101 . . . was not in effect.” MCL
500.3113(b); see Ardt, 233 Mich App at 689 (“the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle is not
entitled to personal protection insurance benefits for bodily injury resulting from an accident
involving that vehicle”).

       An “owner” includes “[a] person renting a motor vehicle or having the use of a motor
vehicle, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days.” MCL
500.3101(3)(l)(i). The issue here is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether Lockett had the use of the car for a period greater than 30 days. In Ardt, 233 Mich App
at 690-691, this Court construed the language now found in MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i), stating:

                                                  -3-
               [W]e hold that “having the use” of a motor vehicle for purposes of defining
       “owner” . . . means using the vehicle in ways that comport with concepts of
       ownership. The provision does not equate ownership with any and all uses for thirty
       days, but rather equates ownership with “having the use” of a vehicle for that
       period. Further, we observe that the phrase “having the use []of” appears in tandem
       with references to renting or leasing. These indications imply that ownership
       follows from proprietary or possessory usage, as opposed to merely incidental
       usage under the direction or with the permission of another. [Emphasis in original;
       see also Chop v Zielinski, 244 Mich App 677, 680; 624 NW2d 539 (2001).]

        In Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp, 469 Mich 524, 530-531; 676 NW2d 616 (2004), our
Supreme Court clarified and observed that for purposes of constructive ownership under MCL
500.3101(3)(l)(i), the person need not actually use the vehicle. Instead, the focus is on the “nature
of the person’s right to use the vehicle.” Id. at 530. That said, a spotty and exceptional pattern of
usage may not be sufficient to render a person the owner of a vehicle, while a regular pattern of
unsupervised usage may well support a finding that a person was an owner for purposes of the
statute. Ardt, 233 Mich App at 691.

        In this case, I would hold that the documentary evidence established as a matter of law that
Lockett had the use of the car for a period greater than 30 days. Although Coleman at times
speculated or provided inconsistent deposition testimony with respect to some matters connected
to Lockett’s use of the car, he also provided unscathed testimony demonstrating that Lockett had
full and unfettered use of the vehicle for the requisite period. I initially emphasize that plaintiffs
presented no evidence whatsoever that conflicted with or contradicted Coleman’s deposition
testimony. Coleman testified that he and Lockett had dated for about 11 years, that they shared an
apartment, that while he was serving a short stint in jail Lockett told him via phone that she had
acquired a car, and that when he returned to their apartment about six weeks before the accident,
she had the car at issue in her possession, i.e., Lockett had acquired the vehicle at some point
during Coleman’s incarceration. Coleman testified that Lockett kept the car parked at their
apartment, a fact which I find particularly significant as it would mean the vehicle was parked at
their apartment overnights, and that Lockett had a set of keys for the vehicle. Although Coleman
acknowledged that he worked during the day and that he could not state that there was not a second
set of keys for the car, plaintiffs did not provide any documentary evidence showing that the car
was parked elsewhere during the day or that there was indeed a second set of keys.

         Coleman was asked whether Lockett “own[ed] a car,” and he responded: “I don’t know –
yeah, she had a car, that’s for sure. I thought that was her car.” The majority makes much of
Coleman’s hesitancy and lack of certainty. But the fact is that Lockett did not “own” the vehicle,
at least in terms of ownership as understood by most people, and what was definitive in Coleman’s
answer to the question was that it certainly did appear to him that Lockett had the full use of the
car. Plaintiffs did not present documentary evidence that any other person had use of the vehicle.
Coleman also testified to his belief that Lockett could use the car “when she wanted to use it,
whenever she needed to use it.” Again, plaintiffs did not present any evidence that such was not
the case. Coleman further testified that he never heard Lockett indicate that she needed to ask
someone else for permission to use the car. Plaintiffs did not present any evidence that Lockett
needed to ask or asked for permission to operate the vehicle. Coleman testified that he saw Lockett
“drive [the car] a few times.” He later testified that perhaps she used the vehicle a couple times a

                                                 -4-
week. Plaintiffs did not submit evidence that Lockett did not drive the car or that she operated the
vehicle on less occasions than Coleman indicated. Moreover, MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i) does not
require proof of actual use of the vehicle. Twichel, 469 Mich at 530-531. Here, all indications
pointed to Lockett’s having a continuous right to use the car.

        Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions and the majority’s reasoning, this is not a case in which
the trial court assessed Coleman’s testimony and found him to be truthful or failed to view the
evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs. Rather, the trial court accepted Coleman’s
testimony because there was no competing documentary evidence that conflicted with his
testimony on the matters most relevant to whether Lockett had the use of the vehicle. Under this
uncontroverted evidence, reasonable jurors would agree that Lockett constructively owned the car.

        The majority’s analysis effectively turns the principles of summary disposition on their
head and renders them meaningless. I would fully agree that a jury would need to assess
Coleman’s credibility had conflicting evidence been presented by plaintiffs or had Coleman’s
testimony reflected that he was truly and clearly guessing on all the relevant issues surrounding
Lockett’s connection to the car. The problem is, however, when a party does submit documentary
evidence on a factual material issue and the opposing party fails to counter that evidence, a court
cannot be permitted in the context of a (C)(10) motion to rule that a jury still needs to assess the
credibility of the unchallenged documentary evidence. By way of a simple example, if a party
presented documentary evidence in the form of deposition testimony that a stoplight was red, and
the opposing party did not present any evidence to the contrary, the rules of summary disposition
would dictate that there is no genuine issue of fact that the light was red. It would not be consistent
with the principles of summary disposition to deny summary disposition on the issue of whether
the stoplight was red on the basis that a jury would need to assess the deponent’s credibility. If
the deponent testified that perhaps the stoplight was red or maybe it was green, then I would agree
that summary disposition would be improperly granted. But in the case at bar, I believe that
Coleman’s testimony was sufficiently definitive on the issue whether Lockett had the use of the
car for more than 30 days, such that plaintiffs needed to submit evidence to the contrary rather
than to simply claim that Coleman’s testimony was not worthy of belief or consideration.

        In my view, the majority’s reliance on Baldwin v Nall, 323 Mich 25, 29; 34 NW2d 539
(1948), is misplaced for the very simple reason that Baldwin concerned a jury trial and stands for
the unremarkable proposition that it is a jury’s and not a court’s role to assess credibility and weigh
the evidence, which the court cannot second-guess. Here, we are addressing a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), which specifically requires a court to ascertain whether there
is conflicting evidence regarding a material fact. Pioneer State, 301 Mich App at 377. Baldwin
is inapposite.

                                                 -5-
         The only question in this case is whether Lockett had the use of the car for a period greater
than 30 days, MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i), and Coleman’s testimony that she had keys to the car, that
she drove the vehicle, that the car was kept at their shared apartment, and that she had access to
the vehicle for approximately six weeks established Lockett as the constructive owner of the car
in light of an absence of evidence to the contrary.

     In sum, I would conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Farmers’ motion for
summary disposition. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

                                                              /s/ Jane E. Markey

                                                 -6-