Court Opinion

ID: 9726462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:51:21.428991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:27.560210
License: Public Domain

Hallows, C. J.
(dissenting). This case represents what should not happen in the administration of criminal justice in this state. Through no fault of his, Farley waited to be tried for almost a year. His court-appointed counsel failed for almost eight months to file a brief on a motion and nothing happened in the trial court. After almost a year from the day of arrest, he was brought to trial. This certainly is not speedy justice.
If the Criminal Code, effective July 1,1970, sec. 971.10, Stats., were applicable, Farley would have been entitled to a discharge from custody if he had asked for a trial at the time his motion was made. Under the code he is entitled to a trial on a felony within ninety days.
While the time spent in waiting for trial under the circumstances of this case may not be a ground for “credit” under sec. 959.07, Stats., it should be taken into consideration by the trial court as a relevant factor in sentencing. See American Bar Association Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, p. 186, sec. 3.6, and commentary thereto. In an analogous problem we ordered resentencing in State v. Leonard (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 461, 159 N. W. 2d 577.
The record does not reflect the reasons for the sentence which Farley received but it should if this court is to review sentencing. McCleary v. State (1971), 49 Wis. 2d *117263, 182 N. W. 2d 512. See also: American Bar Association Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, p. 276, sec. 5.8 (iii), which provides, “The court should assure that the record accurately reflects the facts upon which credit for time served prior to sentencing will be computed.” The majority opinion states this court would be compelled to speculate whether the trial court gave consideration to the time Farley spent in jail waiting for trial. Eather than speculate that the trial court gave credit when the record should have reflected it, I would set aside the sentencing judgment and remand the case for resentencing.
I am authorized to state Mr. Justice Wilkie joins in this dissent.