Court Opinion

ID: 9899643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 14:08:37.490475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:44.675798
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Frye, 2023-Ohio-4150.]
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
              FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                   HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,                                      :   APPEAL NO. C-230002
                                                        TRIAL NO. B-2204993
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                        :

   vs.                                              :     O P I N I O N.

ZEE FRYE,                                           :

     Defendant-Appellant.                           :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 17, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond L. Katz, for Defendant-Appellant.
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Presiding Judge.
       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Zee Frye appeals his conviction for failing to

provide periodic verification of his current address in violation of R.C. 2950.06. In

two assignments of error, Mr. Frye challenges his conviction as against the manifest

weight of the evidence and raises due process of law claims. Despite an erroneous,

handwritten edit to the initial entry designating Mr. Frye’s requirements to register as

a sex offender, the trial below demonstrated that he was required to verify his address

in January 2022 and that he failed to do so. Additionally, because he was required to

register by operation of law, the trial court did not violate due process by not affording

him a classification hearing. We therefore affirm his conviction.

                                             I.

       {¶2}    In March 2006, Mr. Frye pleaded guilty to and was convicted of rape,

leading to a seven-year prison sentence, in line with a negotiated plea agreement. In

its sentencing entry, the court found that he was “a sexually oriented offender” under

Megan’s Law, obligating him to register as a sex offender annually for ten years.

However, in a subsequent entry and notice designating and explaining Mr. Frye’s

registration duties, a mark is checked for “Sexually Oriented Offender” multiple times

with handwritten notes after each indicating that he was an “aggravated” offender

under R.C. 2950.01(D). Aggravated sex offenders are subject to a harsher penalty—to

report every 90 days for life. Further, in one of the handwritten notes, the registration

requirement of “ten (10) years” is scratched out and replaced with “lifetime.”

       {¶3}    Mr. Frye was released from prison on January 4, 2013, seven years to

the day after his initial arrest. In a May 2015 entry and notice of registration duties

signed by the trial court and by Mr. Frye, the trial court explained that he was a

sexually oriented offender required to report annually for ten years, rather than the

lifetime requirement erroneously scratched onto the original entry. In the new entry,

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

labeled nunc pro tunc to March 20, 2006, the trial court memorialized that it informed

Mr. Frye of his ten-year reporting requirement and concomitant duties as a sexually

oriented offender.

       {¶4}   Fast forward to October 2022, and we find Mr. Frye indicted for failing

to provide periodic verification of his current address in January 2022, about nine

years after his release from prison, in violation of R.C. 2950.06. After a competency

hearing, the court found him competent to stand trial. He waived his right to counsel

and repeatedly insisted that he wanted to represent himself. Despite his firm assertion

that “I waive any and all counsel,” he refused to sign the waiver form, declaring, “I am

not signing anything.” After walking through a full colloquy with Mr. Frye, the court

entered an order stating that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his

right to counsel and that the court was allowing him to represent himself, even though

he refused to sign the waiver form. The court appointed standby counsel, and Mr. Frye

proceeded to represent himself at trial. The jury found him guilty of the reporting

violation, and the court ultimately sentenced him to three years in prison. He now

appeals, claiming that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence

and that he was denied due process by not receiving an offender classification hearing.

                                          II.

                                          A.

       {¶5}   We turn first to Mr. Frye’s assertion that his conviction ran counter to

the manifest weight of the evidence. In reviewing such a challenge, we sit as a

“thirteenth juror.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541

(1997). The court, “reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether[,] in

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

ordered.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

The conviction will be reversed in only “the exceptional case in which the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at 387, quoting Martin at 175;

State v. Sipple, 2021-Ohio-1319, 170 N.E.3d 1273, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.).

       {¶6}   As the backbone for his argument, Mr. Frye attacks the state’s use of

leading questions in examining its witness, Deputy Caldwell, about his duty to register,

he highlights “ambiguities” in the documentary evidence that were not satisfactorily

explained, and he claims that the deputy’s testimony failed to substantiate the date on

which he was required to verify his current address.

       {¶7}   Mr. Frye’s challenge to the state’s leading questions, insofar as it can be

construed as a manifest weight argument, is not persuasive. As an initial matter, it is

not clear that he properly preserved this challenge for appeal. During the state’s direct

and redirect examination of Deputy Caldwell, Mr. Frye objected several times without

providing a basis. But even if we construe his objections as challenging the leading

nature of the state’s questions, the questions were not prejudicial because the deputy

was testifying to what the documentary evidence already revealed. Though he cross-

examined the deputy, he did not marshal any evidence in his defense seeking to

undermine the state’s theory of the case. On redirect, the deputy restated that Mr.

Frye’s ten-year duty to register began on January 7, 2013, that even without any time

tolled, his duty to register would have continued through January 2023, and that he

failed to verify his current address in January 2022 (the indictment states on or about

January 24, 2022). No evidence emerged at trial to contradict these facts, which were

apparent from the state’s evidence.

       {¶8}   Next, despite the erroneous, handwritten edits to the trial court’s

original entry and notice of registration duties, the court later resolved any ambiguities

as to Mr. Frye’s registration requirements. The documentary evidence established a

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

rape conviction on March 17, 2006, which made him a sexually oriented offender

under Megan’s Law. By operation of law, therefore, he had a duty to verify his current

address annually for ten years. See State v. Schilling, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-

3027, ¶ 25-26; State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502,

¶ 15-16, 18. The erroneous notations on the 2006 notification form indicating that his

crime was “aggravated,” subjecting him to a “lifetime” registration obligation, which

was later corrected to a ten-year registration period in the court’s May 2015 entry

docketed nunc pro tunc to March 20, 2006, do not erase the actual, lesser registration

requirements that he failed to meet.

       {¶9}   In January 2013, prior to the correction, Mr. Frye left prison, restarting

the clock on the ten-year registration period that had been tolled during his

incarceration. See R.C. 2950.07(D). A few days later, he signed the sheriff’s office’s

sex-offender-new-registration form. Further, the May 2015 entry, signed by Mr. Frye

and by the trial court, contained information about his ten-year registration duties and

provided that he had been informed of those duties and understood them.

Additionally, a sheriff’s adult-offender-information form signed by Mr. Frye indicated

that he had verified his current address on January 8, 2021, and that he was required

to provide verification of his current address on January 7, 2022. When he did not

fulfill that obligation, a notification letter was sent to him on January 12, 2022,

affording him a week to remedy the situation. He failed to verify his address consistent

with the instructions, leading to his indictment in this case.

       {¶10} Therefore, our review of the record in this case does not reveal a

manifest miscarriage of justice such that Mr. Frye’s conviction must be reversed and a

new trial ordered. This is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily

against the conviction. Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                           B.

       {¶11} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Frye presents a due process

challenge under the Ohio Constitution. He argues that the court violated his right to

due process by convicting him of failing to verify his current address without affording

him a classification hearing under the law as it existed at the time of his conviction.

       {¶12} As a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law, Mr. Frye, by

operation of law, is subject to a mandatory ten-year registration duty. See Schilling,

Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3027, at ¶ 25-26 (“A person’s conviction for a sexually

oriented offense under Megan’s Law automatically classifies the person as a sexually

oriented offender when the person does not qualify as a habitual sex offender or a

sexual predator.”); Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, at ¶

15-16, 18 (A person’s classification as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law

arises automatically from the person’s conviction for a sexually oriented offense: “The

trial court cannot ‘determine’ anything.” (quoting State v. Hayden, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 18103, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4315, 7 (Sep. 22, 2000) (Young, J.,

dissenting))). In this situation, due process does not require a trial court to conduct a

hearing to determine whether a defendant is a sexually oriented offender under

Megan’s Law, because that determination attaches as a matter of law. Hayden at

paragraph two of the syllabus. Therefore, Mr. Frye is not entitled to a hearing, and no

due process violation can flow from not affording him one. Even so, had the trial court

granted him such a hearing, the lowest level of offender status that he could be

assigned is that which he already holds—a sexually oriented offender with a ten-year

registration requirement. Accordingly, we overrule his second assignment of error.

                                    *       *      *

       {¶13} Having overruled Mr. Frye’s two assignments of error, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                    Judgment affirmed.

WINKLER and BOCK, JJ., concur.

Please note:
       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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