Court Opinion

ID: 9730972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:29:34.664225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:11.773997
License: Public Domain

SCHLEGEL, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Given the significant probability for prejudice to a criminal defendant in a child sexual abuse case if evidence concerning the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) is improperly admitted, I would limit the admissibility of this evidence to dispelling misconceptions concerning how children react to sexual abuse which result specifically from defense counsel’s attempts to intimate to the jury that the victim’s actions are inconsistent with having been abused. The court in People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891-92 (1988), detailed the following examples:
[Wjhere a child delays a significant period of time before reporting an incident or pattern of abuse, an expert could testify that such delayed reporting is not inconsistent with the secretive environment often created by an abuser who occupies a position of trust. Where an alleged victim recants his story in whole or in part, a psychologist could testify on the basis of past research that such behavior is not an uncommon response for an abused child who is seeking to remove himself or herself from the pressure created by police investigations and subsequent court proceedings.
See also State v. Dodson, 452 N.W.2d 610, 612 (Iowa App.1989) (expert opinion testimony may be admissible if offered to rebut the apparent misconception that the complainant is not fearful of the perpetrator following sexual abuse).
CSAAS evidence should be admissible in this limited context solely for the rehabilitative purpose of demonstrating to the jury that defense counsel’s intimations concerning the victim’s actions constitute misconceptions concerning how children react to abuse. In this way, the CSAAS evidence is offered to the jury as a basis for concluding that the particular behavior which defense counsel has intimated as inconsistent with the occurrence of abuse is not inconsistent at all.
To extend the admissibility of CSAAS evidence beyond this limited, rehabilitative function, as the majority has done in this case, exaggerates the limited utility that CSAAS evidence has in assisting the trier of fact to accurately determine facts in issue. See Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d at 395, 249 Cal.Rptr. at 892. The syndrome assumes the child is a “legitimate victim” of sexual abuse. Its purpose is to explain why such victims exhibit specific types of behavior so as to assist psychology professionals in providing therapy and treatment. See Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Int’l J. Child Abuse & Neglect 177, 179-80 (1983).
The value of CSAAS evidence is that it seeks to show why the behavior of the alleged abused child is the same as, not different from, the behavior of a nonabused child. See id. at 179-80; see also Dodson, 452 N.W.2d at 612. Accordingly, in order for the syndrome evidence to be of reliable scientific assistance in a court of law, the jury must first be confronted with a situation in which defense counsel is suggesting the victim’s behavior is inconsistent with having been sexually abused.
In this way, and only in this way, does defense counsel create a “myth” or “misconception” necessitating the State’s use of CSAAS evidence to disabuse the jury of the misconception so that the jury may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of *361popular myths. More importantly, only in this specific situation is CSAAS evidence reliable in providing the jury with “relevant and accurate information regarding ‘recent findinjgs of professional research on the subject of a victim’s reaction to [child abuse]’ without the danger that such information will be misapplied as a predictive index by the jury.” Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d at 394, 249 Cal.Rptr. at 891 (citing People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236, 247, 681 P.2d 291, 302, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 461 (1984)).
To extend the legal admissibility of CSAAS evidence beyond the purpose for which the scientific community relies upon CSAAS, as the majority has done here, improperly exaggerates the ability of this scientific evidence to assist the jury in accurately determining facts in evidence. The obvious result is unfair, unnecessary prejudice to the defendant.
The Bowker court has keenly noted:
It is one thing to say that child abuse victims often exhibit a certain characteristic or that a particular behavior is not inconsistent with a child having been molested. It is quite another to conclude that where a child meets certain criteria, we can predict with a reasonable degree of certainty that he or she has been abused. The former may be appropriate in some circumstances; the latter clearly is not.
While the impropriety in the latter situation is clearest where the expert’s testimony applies the CSAAS theory to the facts of the case and concludes that the victim was molested, it is also present where the expert gives “general” testimony describing the components of the syndrome in such a way as to allow the jury to apply the syndrome to the facts of the case and conclude the child was sexually abused. In fact, there may be more danger where the application is left to the jury because the jurors’ education and training may not have sensitized them to the dangers of drawing predictive conclusions.
Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d at 394, 249 Cal.Rptr. at 891. (Emphasis added.)
This danger is alarmingly apparent in the present case. Here, the majority’s decision turns on its contention that:
[The expert] did not testify she believed the complainant was credible nor did she testify that she believed the complainant had been sexually abused. She limited her discussion to an explanation of the symptoms common to children who have been sexually abused.
An examination of the record clearly indicates otherwise. The evidence in the record reveals the State and its expert, Katie Boley, attempted to personalize the expert opinions and conclusions to refer specifically to the complainant in this case. After testifying that she had personally interviewed the complainant, Boley intentionally chose examples illustrating her testimony concerning the stages of CSAAS which centered around the complainant’s specific behavior and the specific circumstances surrounding the complainant’s experience.
During her discussion of stage one of the syndrome, secrecy, the prosecutor asked Boley if receiving expensive gifts would be viewed by the child as a reason to keep the secret. Boley responded, “[i]t could be viewed that way or it could be viewed that the father is — or the mother — is sorry for what they have done, so they’re trying to make it up to them. So he really is sorry— he or she is sorry — for what he’s doing to me so he’s trying to apologize or make it better by giving me these gifts.”
This testimony followed an extensive examination with demonstrative evidence during the State’s direct examination of the complainant during which the State emphasized the defendant (complainant’s father) had given the complainant gifts in relationship to having sex with him. The complainant testified extensively that if she behaved or listened to the defendant, she would receive many valuable gifts, including a $500 gold necklace, a $2,500 gold necklace (shown to the jury), a radio, a television, and use of the defendant’s car. The State had made it clear to the jury the gifts would be repossessed by the defendant if the complainant refused his sexual requests. This extensive evidence was par*362aded before the jury prior to the expert’s testimony.
Another glaring example of the attempts to conform the expert CSAAS testimony to the complainant’s specific testimony occurred during the expert’s discussion of stages two and three of the syndrome, helplessness and entrapment. The following exchange took place between the prosecutor and the expert:
Q: Okay. And would this be like if a child during a sex act upon her would just lay there and close her eyes and feel nothing? A: Yes, that’s their attempt not to be experiencing what is happening to them.
Q: And would this be — Another part of that would be when they — when a child would say something like, I don’t remember, so they’re blocking it out? A: That could be two things. It could be disassociation but it also could be that the child practices not to remember. And so when they practice that not remembering, that’s part of repression rather than, you know, which, you know, both tie together, but I don’t remember could be depression. And I’m not going to remember this, I don’t want to remember this because I don’t feel like I feel when I remember this.
These questions and answers literally echoed the complainant’s own testimony regarding these same areas of examination; the jury had heard the complainant’s testimony prior to the expert's testimony. The record is replete with numerous similar attempts to tailor the expert CSAAS testimony to fit comfortably around the complainant’s individual experience.
The majority has permitted the State to introduce extensive prejudicial CSAAS evidence despite the resounding fact that the defendant never intimated to the jury that the complainant’s particular behavior was inconsistent with having been sexually abused. Defense counsel did not intimate any “myths” as to how child victims react to abuse. Defense counsel did not intimate any “misconceptions” as to how child victims react to abuse. The defendant’s cross-examination of the complainant was limited solely to complainant's alleged dislike for her father’s ethnicity. Questions were posed to the complainant to elicit her desire to enjoy an American upbringing rather than an upbringing based upon the strict Lao traditions and values. In this way, defense counsel attempted to persuade the jury the child had fabricated the sexual abuse allegations in an attempt to escape her father and his insistence upon the traditional Lao-based upbringing.
Thus, defense counsel merely suggested to the jury that the complainant may have had a motive to fabricate the sexual abuse allegations against her father. This situation is entirely different than the situation where defense counsel intimates to the jury that the complainant’s behavior is inconsistent with the behavior a lay person would normally expect from a child who has been sexually abused, thus necessitating CSAAS evidence to illustrate otherwise. In the former situation, the admission of CSAAS evidence is misplaced and unnecessarily prejudices the defendant.
The majority’s decision to permit CSAAS evidence in this situation is erroneously premised on the majority’s conclusion that Dodson dictates that “[ojnce the witness’s credibility is attacked, expert testimony is admissible to • rehabilitate the witness.” The majority’s conclusion misses its mark in two respects. First, Dodson does not support this proposition. To the contrary, we limited the admissibility of CSAAS evidence in Dodson, recognizing the danger of improperly admitting CSAAS evidence for purposes which transcend its limited utility. We stated:
The problem with this type of evidence is it may incorrectly be used by the fact finder as evidence of abuse. There is a very fine line between an opinion that is helpful to a jury and an opinion that merely conveys a conclusion concerning defendant’s guilt. [Citations omitted.]
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No blanket rule can be adopted on this issue. There may be, however, instances in which expert testimony may explain why children delay reporting sexual abuse or do not appear to be fearful of *363the perpetrator. Such evidence, if admissible, must be limited strictly to rehabilitative functions ... and the fact finder must be instructed that the testimony is limited to rehabilitation and is not to be used as substantive evidence of abuse. [Citation omitted.]
Id. at 612.
Secondly, even if Dodson did support this proposition, the CSAAS evidence in this case was misused for the purpose of rebutting evidence concerning the complainant’s motivation for fabrication — a purpose outside the scope of the syndrome’s scientific validity and reliability. See Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Int’l J. Child Abuse & Neglect 177 (1983); see also People v. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 387, 249 Cal.Rptr. 886, 888 (1988). The allegation concerning the complainant’s possible motive to fabricate does not suggest the complainant has behaved in a manner inconsistent with having been sexually abused. It merely suggests to the trier of fact that the complainant may have a motive to fabricate the sexual abuse allegations.
The admission of CSAAS evidence to account for and explain this possible motivation is a misapplication of the syndrome. Where CSAAS testimony is being used to rebut a defendant’s attack on the credibility of the victim, at a minimum the evidence must be targeted to a specific “myth” or “misconception” suggested by the evidence. Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d at 394, 249 Cal.Rptr. at 891.
Since defense counsel did not elicit evidence from the complainant which intimated to the jury any “misconception,” the State’s expert opinion testimony could not, as the State argues, serve to dispel misconceptions concerning how children react to sexual abuse. To the contrary, the State’s expert testimony served only to incorrectly and impermissibly bolster the weight and credibility of complainant’s testimony.
In future cases, expert testimony regarding the CSAAS or other expert psychological testimony about child complainants in sexual abuse prosecutions should be admitted only for the limited rehabilitative purpose of dispelling misconceptions intimated by defense counsel concerning how child victims react to sexual abuse. I believe the State must carry the burden of establishing to the court by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a misconception which the expert’s testimony is intended to dispel. See Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d at 394, 249 Cal.Rptr. at 891-92.
Where expert testimony concerning the CSAAS or other psychological evidence is introduced, the jury should be directly instructed it is not to use such testimony for the purpose of determining the truth of complainant’s accusations. See Dodson, 452 N.W.2d at 612. The Bowker court has succinctly stated the importance of this requirement which was not met in the instant case:
Beyond the tailoring of the evidence itself, the jury must be instructed simply and directly that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true. The jurors must understand that CSAAS research approaches the issue from a perspective opposite to that of the jury. CSAAS assumes a molestation has occurred and seeks to describe and explain common reactions of children to the experience. [Citation omitted.] The evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested. [Emphasis in original.]
Bowker, 203 Cal.App.3d at 394, 249 Cal.Rptr. at 892.
In the present case the expert’s CSAAS testimony exceeded the permissible limits. Furthermore, the necessary safeguards were not administered to limit the purpose for which the evidence was admitted. As a result of the district court’s abuse of discretion in admitting the State’s expert opinion testimony regarding CSAAS — and the resulting prejudice to the defendant — I would reverse and remand for a new trial.