Court Opinion

ID: 9376962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 15:07:10.211293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:10.736437
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued February 28, 2023

                                          In The

                                 Court of Appeals
                                         For The

                             First District of Texas
                               ————————————
                                 NO. 01-21-00641-CR
                              ———————————
                    JULIE MICHELLE STASTNY, Appellant
                                            V.
                         THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 155th District Court
                              Austin County, Texas
                        Trial Court Case No. 2020R-0027

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Julie Michelle Stastny was convicted of intentionally or knowingly

causing bodily injury to her ten-year old son, J.K.1 In five issues on appeal, Stastny

argues: (1) the trial court violated her constitutionally protected right to a public trial,

1
       See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(a)(3).
(2) the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict because the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that she intentionally

or knowingly injured her son, (3) the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of

outcry witness testimony, and (4) her trial counsel was not permitted to rehabilitate

a potential juror.

       We affirm.

                                      Background

       J.K. and his friend D.D. were at Stastny’s home for a sleepover on January 3,

2020. The boys were upstairs in J.K.’s room playing video and computer games. At

one point that evening, J.K. testified that Stastny and D.D. were play fighting, but

things “progressively got worse,” and the boys tried to leave J.K.’s room. J.K.

testified that they told Stastny they wanted out of the room, but Stastny would not

let them leave and blocked the doorway to his room. D.D. tried to hide in the closet

to keep Stastny from hurting him. J.K. texted his grandmother, Jean Stastny, telling

her that Stastny was “trashing [his] room” and hurting him, and asked Jean to pick

him and D.D. up. In addition to physically blocking the boys from leaving the room,

J.K. testified that Stastny picked him up and dropped him on the floor, causing him

to hit his arm on the side of his bed. J.K. described being dropped as feeling like

“hit[ting] your knee on concrete . . . [a] sharp pain.” J.K. testified that he tried to get

away from Stastny, but she grabbed him by the leg, and he fell, hitting the side of

                                            2
his head. J.K. tried to get away from Stastny again, but she grabbed him by the leg,

held him down on the ground, and bit his calf through his pants.

      Jean arrived at Stastny’s house quickly because she lived nearby. When she

arrived, she saw both boys, who looked afraid, at the top of the stairs trying to get

past Stastny. Jean asked Stastny what was going on, and Stastny responded by

saying, mockingly, “Jean, what is going on?” Jean testified that Stastny seemed

intoxicated and was slurring and repeating words. D.D. was able to run downstairs

past Stastny to get to Jean’s car, but as D.D. tried to get past, she grabbed his arm

and “held him very tight” and said: “If you think I put bruises on you, show them to

me, because you need to be a lot tougher than you are.” The boys were able to get

into Jean’s car and she dropped D.D. off at his nearby home with his mother,

Dezarrie Mauldin, before taking J.K. back to her house. When Jean arrived home

with J.K., he had “tears rolling down his face and he was very terrified looking.”

J.K. told Jean that he and Stastny “were wrestling on the floor, and that she was

holding him down; and at some point, he . . . fell into the door facing and got the

bruise that was on the side of his face.” J.K. also told Jean that Stastny held him

down on the floor and bit him on the back of the leg.

      Dezarrie testified that D.D. seemed “shooken up” when he came home. She

testified that Stastny called her that night and “cussed [her] out on the phone.”

Stastny told Dezarrie that the whole incident was just an accident, that they were

                                          3
“just playing,” and then called Dezarrie a “bitch” and hung up on her. Dezarrie called

the police to report the incident.

      After Dezarrie called the police, Sergeant J. Fullen and Officer I. Tapia with

the Sealy Police Department came to her house and began their investigation. Officer

Tapia testified that D.D. and Dezarrie were concerned about what had happened, so

they went to talk to J.K. and Jean. When they arrived at Jean’s house, the officers

saw a bruise on J.K.’s face and Officer Tapia observed the bite mark on J.K.’s calf

under his pants. Both officers testified the injuries were consistent with bodily injury.

      Sergeant Fullen testified that his main concern was J.K.’s safety, because

“[t]here was nothing keeping [Stastny] from coming back for him, if [they] did not

apprehend her for a criminal charge.” Accordingly, the officers went to Stastny’s

home that night and arrested her. When the officers arrived at Stastny’s house, she

was intoxicated and belligerent, she was unable to maintain her balance, and her

speech was incoherent.

      A few days after the incident, Stastny gave a statement to Detective A.

Manies, with the Sealy Police Department. Detective Manies testified that, in her

written statement, Stastny stated that she was “play fighting” with J.K. and D.D.

when J.K. “accidentally hit his cheek on the doorframe.” She stated that “everything

stopped” after J.K. hit his cheek, and that J.K. insisted on calling his grandmother,

Jean. Stastny stated that she did not intend to harm anyone and that they were only

                                           4
roughhousing. Detective Manies testified that Stastny did not say anything about

biting J.K.

      The jury found Stastny guilty of injury to a child and sentenced her to five

years’ imprisonment.

                                      Public Trial

      In her first issue, Stastny argues that the trial court violated her

constitutionally protected right to a public trial because the livestreaming procedures

put in place by the trial court due to the COVID-19 pandemic stopped working

numerous times and, in at least one instance, the trial court continued the trial despite

the livestream failure.

A.    Standard of Review

      Criminal defendants have a right to a public trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI;

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. The right to a public trial is forfeitable and must be

preserved by a proper objection at trial. Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216, 222–23

(Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Peyronel v. State, 465 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015)). Preservation requires a timely, specific objection. TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a)(1)(A); Dixon, 595 S.W.3d at 223. The complaining party must also obtain a

ruling on the objection, or absent a ruling, the complaining party must object to the

trial court’s refusal to rule. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2). As the appealing party, Stastny

                                            5
had the burden to bring forth a record showing that error was preserved. Dixon, 595

S.W.3d at 223.

B.     Analysis

       Following jury selection at the conclusion of the first day of trial, the State put

on the record the following statement related to the agreed-upon trial procedures in

place due to the COVID-19 pandemic:

       I believe the Court has designated the Christian City Fellowship as an
       auxiliary courthouse. And it’s a facility that is outside of the county seat
       of Bellville, but that the Commissioners Court has also designated it as
       an auxiliary courthouse for the purposes of jury selection during Covid,
       since the Court right now is still under the Texas Supreme Court and
       Office of Court Administration Orders regarding social distancing, this
       facility has been agreed upon as a facility that is large enough and has
       the sound equipment and parking facilities necessary as the closest one
       to the County Seat that we could find that would be able to provide
       those facilities to the County, and have, conduct the jury selection here
       and tomorrow going forward, that is the plan, I believe, as the Court has
       discussed, is to have the jurors in the audience box instead of the jury
       box; so that they can socially distance in the audience section of the
       courtroom. And we will have witnesses facing them, and kind of have
       rearranged the courtroom to accommodate that. We have also set up a
       camera with a live feed to a basement meeting room, so if anyone from
       the public wishes to watch the trial, that is not under the rule, then they
       can view a live feed of the trial through that basement meeting room
       live feed, which has been set up.

              So that is my understanding of the agreed upon Covid
       procedures. I think also you, Your Honor, have designated this and
       through the Administrative Judge, as an auxiliary courthouse. So that is
       the procedure that we are working under right now.

The trial court agreed and noted that there were “no pretrial motions filed objecting

to the use of this facility or . . . the anticipated procedures for this portion and/or the

                                            6
evidentiary portion of the trial.” The trial court then asked Stastny’s counsel if there

was anything the defense wanted to state concerning the COVID-19 operating

procedures, to which defense counsel responded, “[n]o, judge.”

      Throughout the trial, there were a few instances when technical issues related

to the livestreaming procedures arose. On one occasion, the trial court explained to

the jury the purposes of the streaming equipment:

             All right. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, what is going on with
      some of the other technical things here, because there is no public
      participation in the actual courtroom because of how we put you in the
      audience portion of the courtroom, the public viewing is available in
      the basement. So this is being streamed to the basement for any persons
      that would choose to watch this down in the basement. So that is what
      is going on with the laptop over there, the webcam, and things of that
      nature. So that is what’s -- and we just realized we had a technical issue
      with it, which that has now been solved and so we may proceed. Thank
      you.

      On another occasion, the trial court and counsel were alerted to an issue that

only the video feed was streaming to the public viewing area, but no audio. Because

no members of the public were currently in attendance, the trial court elected to

continue with the trial, but required court staff to notify him if a member of the public

arrived to view the trial.

      STATE:                 We need to approach about a technical issue.

      (At the bench).

      STATE:                 We just got a message from Rebecca that there is
                             video, but no audio downstairs in the basement. She
                             also said that there are no spectators, so ...

                                            7
      THE COURT:          Okay. Let’s keep on going and try -- where is Ben?

      STATE:              He may have been trying to fix it.
      THE COURT:          Oh, he already; knows about it?

      STATE:              I don’t know. I’m not sure. She said she didn’t think
                          anybody knew.
      THE COURT:          Okay. Let’s try and get Ben to do whatever -- and
                          he can do whatever he needs to, you know, in here,
                          but I think we can keep going, as long as there is no
                          public trying to view it.

      STATE:              I’ll let Lisa know, if that’s okay with the Court and
                          Counsel, to tell Rebecca to text us if anybody does
                          show up.
      THE COURT:          She can call up here if something happens. Give her
                          this extension. She should just call up if something
                          happens. Now, if somebody comes in, and it’s not
                          fixed, then we need to know, too, but I think we can
                          keep going at this point.

      STATE:              Okay.
      THE COURT:          All right. Thank you.

      At no point during any of the above exchanges did Stastny object to the Covid

procedures put in place or otherwise indicate her lack of consent to those procedures.

Nor did she object at any time during the trial when technical difficulties arose, or

when the trial court continued the trial even though audio was not being streamed to

the public viewing area. Stastny never raised the objection that these procedures

denied her the right to a public trial. Because Stastny failed to object, we hold that

                                          8
she failed to preserve her argument that she was denied the right to a public trial. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Dixon, 595 S.W.3d at 222–23.

      We overrule Stastny’s first issue.

                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

      In her second and third issues, Stastny argues that the trial court erred in

denying her motion for judgment non obstante veredicto (JNOV) because the

evidence was legally and factually insufficient to prove that Stastny intentionally or

knowingly caused injury to her son.

      We initially note that it is well established that a trial court does not have

authority to grant a JNOV in a criminal case. State v. Savage, 933 S.W.2d 497, 499

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). When a case is tried by a jury, Article 42.01 of the Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the judgment of the trial court reflect “[t]he

verdict or verdicts of the jury[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.01, § 1(7); see

Savage, 933 S.W.2d at 499. For this reason, the Court of Criminal Appeals held in

Savage that a trial court does not have the authority to grant a different judgment—

a judgment non obstante veredicto—than that rendered by the jury. Savage, 933

S.W.2d at 499. Texas courts have held that the trial court may not receive the jury’s

verdict and then enter a different judgment than the one called for by the jury’s

verdict. Combes v. State, 286 S.W.2d 949, 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956); Dunn v.

State, 176 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); Chafin v. State,

                                           9
95 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). Once the jury has returned

a guilty verdict and that verdict is read aloud in open court, the trial court is not

authorized to then grant a motion for directed verdict and enter a judgment of

acquittal. See Savage, 933 S.W.2d at 499; Dunn, 176 S.W.3d at 885; Chafin, 95

S.W.3d at 555. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying

Stastny’s motion for JNOV as any action by the trial court in entering a different

verdict than the one returned by the jury would have been unauthorized and

improper.

      We turn to Stastny’s sufficiency challenge.2

A.    Standard of Review

      Every criminal conviction must be supported by legally sufficient evidence as

to each element of the offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d

854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In a legal sufficiency review we consider all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we decide whether a rational

2
      Stastny appears to challenge both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
      to prove she injured her son intentionally or knowingly. The Texas Court of
      Criminal Appeals has rejected the applicability of a factual-sufficiency review in
      criminal cases and instead held that “the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency
      standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining
      whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that
      the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323
      S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
      319 (1979)). Accordingly, we apply the legal-sufficiency standard as set forth in
      Jackson.
                                           10
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010).

      The evidence may be circumstantial or direct, and juries may draw multiple

reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. Hooper v. State, 214

S.W.3d 9, 14–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury is the sole judge of witness

credibility and of the weight given to any evidence presented. Merritt v. State, 368

S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A jury may believe or disbelieve some or

all a witness’s testimony. Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App.

1981). We presume that the jury resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the

verdict, and we defer to that determination. Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525–26.

B.    Injury to a Child

      To sustain a conviction for intentional or knowing injury to a child the

evidence must prove that a defendant intentionally or knowingly, by act or omission,

caused bodily injury to a child fourteen years of age or under. TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 22.04(a)(3) (“A person commits an offense if he intentionally [or] knowingly . . .

by act . . . causes to a child . . . bodily injury.”). Injury-to-a-child offenses under

Section 22.04 are “result-oriented” and “requir[e] a mental state that relates not to

the specific conduct but to the result of that conduct.” Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d

742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

                                          11
      “A person acts intentionally or with intent, with respect . . . to a result of [her]

conduct when it is [her] conscious objective or desire to . . . cause the result.” TEX.

PENAL CODE § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect

to the result of her conduct when she is aware that her conduct is reasonably certain

to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). Mental culpability may be inferred from a

defendant’s conduct and the surrounding facts and circumstances. Moore v. State,

969 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Here, the State was required to prove

Stastny intended to, or knew she would, cause bodily injury when she bit J.K. and

“thr[ew] him with her hands” as alleged in the indictment.

C.    Analysis

      Stastny argues that she was only playing with J.K. and his friend and she “had

no intention of harming anyone.” According to Stastny, she was merely

“roughhousing” with the boys, and she did not have reason to believe this

roughhousing “would necessarily result in injury that required the attention of law

enforcement.” She contends that because there was inconsistent testimony in the

record as to the circumstances surrounding J.K.’s injuries, and affirmative testimony

that she was playing with the children when J.K. was injured, no rational trier of fact

could have found her guilty of intentionally or knowingly causing injury to J.K.

      We disagree. Here, J.K. and D.D. both testified that Stastny held J.K. down

and bit him on the leg. J.K. also testified that this occurred after Stastny had dropped

                                           12
him on the floor, and after he told Stastny he wanted out of the room. Jean likewise

testified that J.K. told her Stastny held him on the floor, would not let him get up,

and bit him on the back of the leg. She testified that J.K. showed her the bite mark

on the back of his leg, which she described as “a large, complete mouth imprint, a

bruise.” Additionally, Officer Tapia testified that he observed the bite mark on the

back of J.K.’s leg, and pictures of the bite mark were introduced into evidence. This

evidence of the bite inflicted on J.K. after he had already told Stastny he wanted to

leave the room, that she prevented him from doing so, and that she then picked him

up and dropped him on the floor, supports a finding that Stastny intentionally or

knowingly injured J.K. by biting him. See Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 10 (noting mental

culpability may be inferred from defendant’s conduct and surrounding facts and

circumstances); see also Black v. State, No. 01-11-00261-CR, 2012 WL 2106553, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 7, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (holding that testimony from appellant admitting to biting eleven-

month-old child, from doctor who observed between seven and eight bite marks on

child’s body in various stages of healing, from witnesses that child had bites on large

portion of his body, and from child’s brother that child had cried after being bitten,

was evidence of “more than bruising of an undetermined origin, and supports a

finding that [appellant] intentionally or knowingly injured [child]”).

                                          13
      Further, we reject Stastny’s argument that the inconsistent testimony related

to whether she had been “play fighting” or roughhousing with the boys means that

no rational trier of fact could have found her guilty of intentionally or knowingly

causing injury to J.K. Even if the jury had before it evidence that Stastny had been

play fighting with the boys at some point that night, it also had evidence that the

boys tried to leave the room, Stastny prevented them from doing so, and she dropped

J.K. on the floor and caused him to trip and hit his face on the door frame, all before

finally holding him down and biting his leg, which left a visible bruise. As the fact

finder, the jury was able to evaluate the credibility of the trial witnesses. See

Peterson v. State, 137 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet.

ref’d). The jury was free to believe or disbelieve all or any part of any of the

witnesses’ testimony. See Penagraph, 623 S.W.2d at 343; McKinny v. State, 76

S.W.3d 463, 468–69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). As an appellate

court, we are not free to reject evidence as insufficient “merely because a defendant

offers an explanation of the facts that is different from the explanation offered by the

State.” Peterson, 137 S.W.3d at 745 (citing Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 771, 776

(Tex. Crim. App. 1983)). And from the above evidence, the jury could have

rationally inferred that Stastny intentionally or knowingly injured J.K. by biting him.

Accordingly, as the only element she challenges on appeal is the required mental

                                          14
state, we hold there is sufficient evidence to support Stastny’s conviction for injury

to a child.

       We overrule Stastny’s second and third issues.

                                  Outcry Testimony

       In her fourth issue, Stastny argues that the trial court erred in allowing the

introduction of outcry witness testimony which only served to bolster the testimony

of J.K.

A.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       A trial court has “broad discretion” in admitting outcry witness testimony.

Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We will not reverse the

trial court’s decision to admit outcry witness testimony unless it falls outside the

zone of reasonable disagreement. Buentello v. State, 512 S.W.3d 508, 516–17 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d).

       Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits outcry

statements by certain victims of child abuse, including victims of assaultive offenses

under Chapter 22 of the Penal Code, to be admitted during trial, so long as the rules

of this statute are complied with, despite the hearsay rule. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 38.072. The statute applies to “statements that . . . describe . . . the alleged

offense” and that:

          1. “were made by the child . . . against whom the charged offense . . . was
             allegedly committed; and

                                            15
         2. “were made to the first person, 18 years of age or older, other than the
            defendant, to whom the child . . . made a statement about the offense.”
Id. art. 38.072, § 2(a); Polk v. State, 367 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). The statement must be more than words which give a

general allusion that something in the area of child abuse was occurring. Garcia, 792

S.W.2d at 91. The evidence must clearly show that the victim described the alleged

offense in some discernible manner to the witness. Id.

B.    Analysis

      We disagree that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony

of Jean Stastny, who was determined by the trial court to be the appropriate outcry

witness.3 The trial court conducted an outcry hearing outside the presence of the

jury. At the hearing, Jean testified that she received a text message from J.K. on

January 2, 2020, around 10:15 p.m. Jean stated that J.K. was at Stastny’s townhouse

in Sealy, which was “[j]ust a few blocks away” from Jean’s house. In the text

message, J.K. asked Jean to come get him because “[his] mom was hurting [him].”

Jean drove to Stastny’s house, and when she walked into the house, she saw Stastny

3
      At the outset, we note that although Stastny purports to object to one (or more)
      witnesses testifying as outcry witnesses, she provides no citation to the record for
      the objected-to testimony. Nor does she identify the specific witness, the testimony
      that was objectionable or subject to exclusion, or any reason why such unidentified
      testimony should have been excluded, apart from the conclusory argument that it
      improperly “served to bolster the testimony of [J.K.]” For these reasons, Stastny has
      not properly briefed this argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s
      brief to include “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with
      appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”).
                                            16
at the top of the stairs, saw D.D. at the railing at the top of the stairs, and saw J.K.

standing at the entrance to his bedroom. J.K. said Stastny would not let them come

downstairs. Jean testified that both boys looked afraid. Jean testified that Stastny

appeared to have been drinking because her words were slurred when she talked.

The boys were able to “scoot[] past” Stastny and get downstairs. Jean testified that

she left with both boys and dropped D.D. at his parents’ house.

      After Jean dropped off D.D., Jean took J.K. back to her house, where he told

her that “he was playing on his Xbox and his mom and [D.D.] were playing. And

that at some point, I guess his mom, he was trying to explain that his mom was kind

of upset with him and had wrecked his room, is how he explained it, by throwing

things around or taking the covers off the bed.” J.K. then told Jean that Stastny held

him down on the floor and, during a struggle, he hit the door frame. Jean testified

that J.K. also told her that Stastny held him on the floor and bit him on the back of

his leg. Jean testified that J.K. lifted the leg of his pants and showed Jean a bruise

and “an imprint of a full mouth” on the back of his leg. Jean further testified that

J.K. told her multiple times that Stastny kept dropping him on the floor and hurting

him. Jean confirmed that she was over the age of 18 at the time J.K. made these

statements to her, and that J.K. was ten at the time of the incident.

      Based on her testimony, Jean qualified as a proper outcry witness under

Article 38.072 because she was over the age of 18, J.K. was under the age of 14, and

                                          17
he described the abuse in a discernible manner to Jean. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 38.072; Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 90–91. Stastny does not argue on appeal that Jean

is not qualified to be an outcry witness, nor does she argue that some other witness

should have been the outcry witness, instead of Jean. On the contrary, the only

argument Stastny raises is that Jean’s testimony improperly bolstered J.K.’s

credibility. See Guerra v. State, 771 S.W.2d 453, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)

(“‘Bolstering’ occurs when one item of evidence is improperly used by a party to

add credence or weight to some earlier unimpeached piece of evidence offered by

the same party.”). But, as we have already concluded, Jean was appropriately

identified as the proper outcry witness, and the jury heard directly from J.K. himself.

The jury, therefore, was in the best position to judge J.K.’s credibility, despite Jean’s

outcry testimony. See Rosales v. State, 548 S.W.3d 796, 809 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (concluding outcry testimony was harmless because

jury heard directly from victim and it was in best position to judge victim’s

credibility regardless of outcry testimony); see also Medina v. State, No. 10-18-

00224-CR, 2020 WL 5938766, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 23, 2020, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting appellant’s argument that

admission of outcry testimony was harmful because it allowed State to improperly

bolster victim’s credibility because jury heard from victim directly and was in best

                                           18
position to judge her credibility). Accordingly, we hold that Stastny has not shown

that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the outcry testimony from Jean.

      We overrule Stastny’s fourth issue.

                         Rehabilitation of Potential Juror

      In her fifth issue, Stastny argues that defense counsel was not given an

opportunity to rehabilitate juror 126 before the trial court struck the juror for cause.

According to Stastny, this error was of constitutional magnitude and requires

reversal.

      During voir dire, juror 126 stated that, based on her personal experience, she

was leaning toward thinking that this offense, injury to a child, should not be a

felony. Based on these statements, the State indicated it wanted to challenge juror

126 for cause, but wanted to question her further, resulting in the following

exchange:

      THE COURT:                 Okay. We just want to follow up with some
                                 of the answers you gave to make certain that
                                 we understand what you said or sometimes
                                 didn’t say, for that matter.

      VENIREPERSON:              Well, in fact, let me say something.

      THE COURT:                 Let’s keep our voices down. We are trying to
                                 have a private conversation up here.

      VENIREPERSON:              Something that I didn’t say but that I feel, a
                                 two year minimum seems like a very harsh
                                 sentence for what I have heard so far. Now,
                                 maybe the evidence is way worse than what

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                    I’ve heard so far, but what I’m hearing so far,
                    this seems overly severe.
THE COURT:          Well, I think, obviously, you haven’t heard
                    all of the evidence, but it sounds like you
                    would have a problem with this, probably
                    even hearing all of the evidence, based on --

VENIREPERSON:       I could very easily find the woman guilty, but
                    I still think two years is too harsh.

THE COURT:          And you just don’t think anything would
                    change after hearing the full evidence of the
                    case?
VENIREPERSON:       No.
THE COURT:          That you would think that a two year
                    minimum is harsh, no matter what?
VENIREPERSON:       Well, I would have to --

THE COURT:          Can you give the two year sentence?

VENIREPERSON:       A bite does not seem that serious to me.

THE COURT:          Can you consider the two years minimum or
                    not?

VENIREPERSON:       Not based on what I have heard so far. But,
                    you know.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: May I ask a question?
THE STATE:          Well, we would be first.

THE COURT:          Go ahead.
THE STATE:          [Juror 126]?

VENIREPERSON:       Yes, ma’am.
THE STATE:          And so you understand we don’t, in this type
                    of case, we would not have to prove serious
                            20
                                  injury; and so I may be misunderstanding
                                  you, but it sounds like you may be saying you
                                  think two years in prison would be too harsh,
                                  not something that you could consider unless
                                  you had that serious injury. Is that right?
      VENIREPERSON:               Basically, yes.

      THE STATE:                  Okay. And you know you have to be able to
                                  consider giving the maximum to someone,
                                  too.

      VENIREPERSON:               Okay. I could never do that. I can tell you that
                                  right now.
      THE STATE:                  Thank you.
      THE COURT:                  Thank you, ma’am. You can be seated.

      VENIREPERSON:               Okay.
      THE COURT:                  All right. Number 126 is excused, challenge
                                  for cause is granted. All right.

      Although Stastny complains that she was not given an opportunity to

rehabilitate juror 126, she did not object when juror 126 was struck or otherwise

argue that she was not permitted an opportunity to rehabilitate the juror. Because she

failed to object, she has not preserved her claim of error on appeal. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a)(1); Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 478–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)

(holding appellant’s argument that trial court erred by interrupting his attempt to

rehabilitate juror after trial court decided to grant State’s challenge for cause was not

preserved because appellant did not raise this objection at trial); Ireland v. State, No.

B14-89-00098-CR, 1990 WL 8478, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 1,

                                           21
1990, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (error not preserved where

appellant did not object to rehabilitation of juror at trial); see also Wheeler, Tr. of

L&P Children’s Tr. v. San Miguel Elec. Coop., Inc., 610 S.W.3d 60, 71 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (“The Wheelers complain that they had no chance

to rehabilitate jurors 5 and 6, but they did not object when the[] jurors were struck,

and they failed to preserve a claim of error.”).

      We overrule Stastny’s fifth issue.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                     Amparo Guerra
                                                     Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Hightower, and Guerra.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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