Court Opinion

ID: 9710731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:16:21.13547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:59.485794
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Ladner:
The city’s appeal from the judgment entered for the Society on its motion for judgment n.o.v. presents a question of first impression in this Commonwealth. The lower court entered the judgment on the ground that the Society being a charitable institution was immune from liability. The city contends that the charity should not, in this instance, be permitted to invoke the immunity of charities doctrine. I agree and therefore feel impelled to dissent.
To my mind a municipality, seeking reimbursement by action over, is in an entirely different position from *412that of an injured plaintiff by reason of the statutory duty imposed on property owners without exception. This statutory duty is imposed by the Act of May 16, 1891, P.L. 75, Sec. 11, 53 P. S. 771, which authorizes the municipal authorities to “require sidewalks, boardwalks and curbstone to be laid, set and kept in repair” and to assess the cost and collect the same by lien or action in assumpsit for the same where the work is done by the municipalities after notice to the owner is ignored, and the ordinance of Pittsburgh of 1930, No. 161, adopted pursuant thereto. That ordinance reads in part as follows: Sec. 4. “It shall further be the duty of jail owners of property abutting or adjoining streets, to maintain all sidewalk pavements and curbing in a proper and safe condition. In all cases . . . where sidewalk pavements, curbing and . . . steps are not repaired or reconstructed in conformity with the requirements ■of this ordinance, by the owners of abutting or adjoining properties within 20 days after written notice to the owner or owners . . . the Director of the Department of Public Works is hereby authorized ... to cause such construction to be made at the proper cost and expense of said owner . . . the cost and expense of the same shall constitute a debt, municipal claim and lien against the owner or owners, in favor of the City of Pittsburgh.” (emphasis supplied)
The express duty is thus imposed upon all property owners whether they be charitable organizations or not, and that breach of this duty must also make all owners without exception responsible for the consequences. That conclusion logically follows from the decisions upholding municipal claims, filed against charity-owned real estate, for work done under such an ordinance notwithstanding the statutory exemption of the charity from taxes: Wilkinsburg Bor. v. Home for Aged Women, 131 Pa. 109, 18 A. 937 (1889). In Phila*413delphia v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 143 Pa. 367, 22 A. 744 (1891), it was held that the statutory requirement to keep sidewalks and curbs in repair is a duty imposed on the property owner which is a regulation under the police power from which even a charity cannot be excused. The statutory duty cannot be escaped by an owner in possession and though the municipality may repair and lien the premises, yet, if before that is done an injury follows because of failure to discharge that duty, the municipality, if subject to an action by reason thereof, has a recourse over to such property owner: Brookville Borough v. Arthurs, 152 Pa. 334, 25 A. 551 (1893) ; Dutton v. Landsdowne Borough, 198 Pa. 563, 48 A. 494 (1901); Briggs et al. v. Philadelphia, 316 Pa. 48, 173 A. 316 (1934) ; Fisher et ux. v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Superior Ct. 226, 170 A. 875 (1934) ; Ford v. Philadelphia, 148 Pa. Superior Ct. 195, 24 A. 2d 746 (1942). Nor is it any defense to the municipality’s claim of recourse, that it did not itself make the repairs and lien the property after the owner failed to obey the notice to do so: Ashley v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Co., 232 Pa. 425, 81 A. 442 (1911). 1 see no logical reason why the doctrine of a charity’s immunity from liability for torts of its servants should now be extended to excuse the breach by a charity of the absolute statutory duty imposed without exception on all property owners.
The doctrine of immunity of charities has in recent years been recurrently criticized as outmoded, unrealistic, illogical, inconsistent and not in public interest,1 *3 but nevertheless I agree with the majority that the *414principle is now too firmly imbedded in onr law to be removed except by legislation, but that does not mean that we need extend' the principle to cases where the charity is guilty of failure to observe a duty imposed by law under the police power of a municipality for the safety of its citizens. And, I observe, there is no surer way of bringing about the legislative abolition of the outworn doctrine of charitable immunity from tort liability than by its unrealistic extension to new fields. The trust fund theory as a basis of charitable immunity had its origin, as was pointed out by Justice Rutledge in President etc. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810, 815 (1942) in the dictum of !Lord Cottenham in Feoffees of Heriot’s Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin., 507, 518, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846), where that jurist said, “To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose.” This was followed in Holliday v. St. Leonard (1861), 11 C.B., N.S. 192, so holding but that case and the dictum ton which it rested were directly overruled by Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury (1871), L.R. 6 Q.B. 214. Thus the rule is no longer law in the jurisdiction where it originated.
The modern tendency is against extending the doctrine beyond its present limits. Thus in Winnemore v. Philadelphia, 18 Pa. Superior Ct. 625 (1901), it was held that the rule of charitable immunity did not apply where the charity conducted a business enterprise. Nor is it applicable-where it was-not actually functioning at the time of the injury as a charity: Radobersky v. Imperial Volunteer Fire Department, 368 Pa. 235, 81 A. 2d 865 (1951). Yet in both cases the charitable enterprise .concerned has but -one. treasury, and any judgment recovered has to be paid out of the- general fund. *415Why was there not as much a diversion in these cases as in the other cases? Elsewhere .the tendency to restrict the immunity rule is the same: Thus in Love v. Nashville Agri. & Normal Institute, 146 Tenn. 550, 243 S.W. 304 (1922), it was held that a private charitable corporation cannot be exempted from liability for injuries caused by a nuisance maintained by it on the theory that its funds are held in trust for the purposes of its creation. The strict doctrine has now been either directly repudiated or so modified as to be almost beyond recognition in the majority of common law jurisdictions.2
The majority seeks to justify its extension of the old doctrine by pursuing the familiar patterns of argument that “Public minded benefactors are likely to have their generous impulses discouraged.” This statement though oft repeated is founded upon a theoretical supposition and not upon statistics that show any drying up of the well springs of charity in four of the states that have abandoned or abolished the out-moded doctrine.3 So the professed fear of dissipation of trust funds is more fancied than real in these modern days when that danger can be and in most cases is, easily guarded against by liability insurance to the complete protection of the charity.4
*416In any event there should be no difficulty here in distinguishing between cases where the donor’s right conflicts with the injured individual and where the donor’s right conflicts with the general public interest. A more realistic view requires us to take into consideration the rights of the whole public. The taxpayers are entitled to consideration in the balancing of the equities of the situation. The fancied interest of benefactors of charities in cases such as this must, as a matter of public policy, give way to the greater right of the public.
In short, a sound public policy should require us to decline to extend the doctrine of immunity of charities to an action of recourse by a municipality brought to recover damages it was compelled to pay by reason of the charity’s breach of duty imposed by a general law. If this makes for better care of its property the public is undoubtedly the gainer. In any event I see no great harm to charities since they can, I repeat, protect themselves by liability insurance at a modest cost as do other owners and occupiers of real property. In point of fact, in the very case before us, it was stated at the argument that the additional defendant charity is actually protected by liability insurance covering the premises here in question.
I would reverse the judgment in Appeal No. 43 and enter the same in favor of the City of Pittsburgh.
Mr. Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Chidsey join in this dissent.

 President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (1942) ; 31 Harv. L. Rev. 479, 482 ; 54 Dickinson L. Rev. 6; 9 Pittsburgh L. Rev. 253-265 and the State of Delaware refused to follow the doctrine in the recent ease of Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 83 A. 2d 753.

 See comprehensive review of the cases in President Etc, of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810, 818, 819 (1942) ; Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions, 22 A.B.A.J. 48 (1936).

 Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York and Rhode Island. And of course the doctrine no longer ■ exists in England, nor in Canada nor New Zealand.

 In 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1015, 1016, it was well said, “There is no reason why a corporate charity should not expend a portion of its revenue in insurance and, by so doing, act in accordance with the modern tendency to spread the risk of loss upon as wide a base as possible.” See also DeFraites v. Young Men’s Christian Association, 49 D. & C. 652, 654 (1943).