Court Opinion

ID: 9882155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 16:00:59.984334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:19.310890
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 23-1142
                        ___________________________

                                  Adrianna Beckler

                        lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

                                           v.

                          Rent Recovery Solutions, LLC

                       lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee
                                      ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                         for the District of Minnesota
                                 ____________

                             Submitted: June 15, 2023
                              Filed: October 5, 2023
                                  ____________

Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

      In May 2021, debt collector Rent Recovery Solutions (“RRS”) called Adrianna
Beckler to collect an alleged $900 debt to her former landlord. Beckler said she
disputed the debt and asked RRS to send written documentation to support the claim.
In June, without sending the documents to Beckler, RRS reported her debt to
TransUnion, a credit reporting agency, failing to tell TransUnion that the debt was
disputed. Beckler commenced this action against RRS, alleging that it violated the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by failing to provide requested
documents, reporting the debt to TransUnion without providing the documents, and
failing to tell Trans Union the debt was disputed. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a) and (b),
1692e(8). Beckler sought actual damages, $1,000 in statutory damages, and
reasonable attorneys’ fees. See §§ 1692k(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(3). RRS answered the
Complaint and promptly made an offer of judgment for $2,000 plus reasonable
attorneys’ fees, which Beckler accepted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a).

      Beckler requested an award of $18,810 in attorneys’ fees for work by two
attorneys and a paralegal. RRS challenged the fees requested by both attorneys, who
submitted sworn declarations and detailed billing records. The district court,1
applying the lodestar method of calculating an attorney fee award, found that the
attorneys’ claimed hourly rates were reasonable but the hours expended on the case
were excessive. The court reduced the claimed attorney hours by fifty percent,
exclusive of paralegal work, and awarded Beckler $9,480 in attorneys’ fees. Beckler
appeals. Reviewing the district court’s award for abuse of discretion, we affirm. See
Miller v. Dugan, 764 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard of review).

        Beckler’s attorneys accuse the district court of departing from the lodestar
calculation by imposing a “cap” that violates FDCPA policies and deprives counsel
of full compensation for bringing consumer enforcement actions under this complex
federal statute. We disagree.

      “The starting point for determining attorneys’ fees is the ‘lodestar,’ which is
calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable
hourly rate.” Orduno v. Pietrzak, 932 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2019). The district
court must “exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or

      1
       The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota.

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otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). That is
what the district court carefully did in this case.

       The court began by thoroughly reviewing the question of attorney hourly rates,
finding “that the claimed hourly rates are reasonable and consistent with the rates in
this community for similar services by lawyers of comparable experience.” It then
conducted a detailed review of hours performed on specific tasks by the two
attorneys, concluding that many hours spent on pre-complaint research and
communicating with each other and the client were excessive or redundant. Noting
that the twelve-page Complaint “asserts few facts and only one legal claim,” the court
observed that, “[i]n similar FDCPA lawsuits, when the plaintiff has prevailed at the
pleading stage based on an accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment or default judgment,
judges in this District have approved reasonable attorneys’ fees based on an
expenditure of 22 hours or fewer.” The court concluded:

      Counsel’s expenditure of nearly 50 hours in this case is more than
      double the number of hours approved in analogous FDCPA cases, as
      addressed above. Moreover, the amount of time counsel expended on
      correspondence and research is excessive for the reasons the Court
      previously addressed. As such, a 50 percent reduction in counsel’s
      claimed hours is warranted.

       We accord “substantial deference” to a district court’s determination that fees
were excessive. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). The district court followed
the lodestar method, reducing the award based on its determination of the number of
attorney hours reasonably expended on litigation. There is a “strong presumption”
that the lodestar method represents a reasonable fee. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). Beckler’s contention that
a district court violates the lodestar method by comparing the hours expended in
similar FDCPA cases is absurd. The lodestar method is based on the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation.

                                         -3-
       Despite Beckler’s attempt to paint her FDCPA claims as complex and cutting
edge, we agree with the district court that her case was factually and legally
straightforward, as her acceptance of a quick offer of judgment confirms. The district
court did not abuse its substantial discretion in finding that fifty hours was
unreasonable for such a claim. See Orduno, 932 F.3d at 720 (looking to the factual
complexity of a case). Nor did the court abuse its discretion by focusing on the
reasonableness of the time two attorneys spent on legal research and communicating
with each other, and in finding that a fifty percent reduction was appropriate. We
have ordered or approved flat percentage reductions in appropriate cases. See
Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938, 958-59 (8th Cir. 2010). “A request for attorney’s
fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. “The
essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve
auditing perfection.” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838.

      We look carefully at whether attorneys’ fee claims are excessive, and we
encourage district courts to do likewise, as the court did here. Beckler’s request for
$18,810 for fifty hours of work in a straightforward FDCPA case was unreasonable.
Beckler points out that policies inherent in the FDCPA encourage the award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees, but the key is reasonable.

      The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
                     ______________________________

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