Court Opinion

ID: 9669397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:54:58.364069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:56.189189
License: Public Domain

Spencer, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion because I believe while it gives. lip> service to it, it fails to apply the well-established law of this jurisdiction.
The only question presented by this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence, which is wholly circumstantial, to sustain a conviction. The sufficiency of this, evidence must be established in the light of well-established rules of law. See Kitts v. State, 153 Neb. 784, 46 N. W. 2d 158. In that case we said: “The test by which to- determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of his guilt.”
In State v. Nichols, 175 Neb. 761, 123 N. W. 2d 860, we said: “In order to warrant a conviction on circum*603stantial evidence, the circumstances taken together must be of such conclusive nature and tendency as to produce a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused committed the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
“In determining the weight of circumstantial evidence, a jury must find that the facts and circumstances are of such a conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral certainty every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt of the accused.”
I have no' quarrel with the facts stated in the majority opinion but do believe some additional observations should be made. The front door opens into a 20 by 40 foot showroom, behind which is a repair shop. On the east of the showroom, there is a parts room with an office on its north side. There is an open doorway between the showroom and the parts room which has a counter and a swinging gate. The last time Glessinger looked in the cash box was sometime before 4:30 p.m. On that occasion, someone called out in the showroom and he returned the cash box to the safe, pushed the safe door closed but did not lock it, and went out into the showroom. He cannot remember who it was that called him out. After that he was either in the showroom or the repair shop, and does not believe that anyone could have entered the office without his seeing him, until he left with a friend shortly after 5 p.m. It was not possible to see into the showroom from the repair shop. While the record indicates he was in the repair shop' part “of the time before he left, it does not specify how long this might have been. When he did leave he was gone 10 or 15 minutes.
The majority opinion stresses the fact that Glessinger saw no one else enter or come out of the office but the defendant before he found the checks and money gone. However, Glessinger admits that it was not possible for him to know how many people came in and went out of his showroom while he was away. “It could be quite *604a number.” It was Glessinger who testified as to the finding and return of the checks. This was based entirely on what others told him. The checks were returned to him by a third person to whom they had been given by the person who. allegedly found them. None of these people testified at the trial.
There is absolutely no testimony as to Ohler’s movements after he was seen coming out of the showroom by Glessinger. There is no testimony that he even left town along the road on which the checks, were allegedly found. It was approximately a month later that the accused was picked up. at Clay Center and returned to Greeley County.
I feel that the majority opinion makes an unwarranted assumption in saying: “When he found no one in the office of the Glessinger Motor Company, he did not go into the repair shop where the mechanic was working, as any person would ordinarily do.” (Italics supplied.) It was. at least 10 or 15 minutes after 5 p.m. Ohler testified he knocked on the counter, and when he got no response left the building. An ordinary person would possibly do just that at that time of day.
The majority opinion comments that no other person was seen in or about the office during the 10 or 15 minutes Glessinger was absent. The question not answered is, who was there to see them? Glessinger was gone and the mechanic was working on a car in the repair shop where he could not see the office or the showroom. No one was called by the State to prove this fact. It is apparent that the majority opinion is putting the burden’ on the defendant to prove that someone else was in the vicinity who could have committed the crime.
The majority opinion states: “There are no circumstances pointing to the innocence of the defendant and the only evidence supporting his defense is his denial that he isi guilty.” Have we reached the place in Nebraska where a defendant must prove his; innocence? I believe our rule still is that an accused is presumed to *605be innocent until he has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant has been convicted solely because he had an opportunity to commit the crime because he was on the scene during a part of the period within which the crime could have been committed. It does seem a little strange that in a jurisdiction where possession of stolen property in and of itself is not sufficient to make a prima facie case of burglary or larceny (Henggler v. State, 173 Neb. 171, 112 N. W. 2d 762), that mere presence at the scene of a crime at some time during the period when it could have been committed should be alone sufficient to do so for grand larceny.
The proper rules to be applied are the following from Rimpley v. State, 169 Neb. 171, 98 N. W. 2d 868: “‘The test by which a jury shall determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect the accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude to a moral certainty every rational hypothesis except that of guilt.’ Hoffman v. State, 162 Neb. 806, 77 N. W. 2d 592.
“ ‘To justify a conviction on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the facts and circumstances essential to the conclusion sought must be proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and, when taken together must be of such a character as to be consistent with each other and with the hypothesis sought to be established thereby and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ Jeppesen v. State, 154 Neb. 765, 49 N. W. 2d 611.
“ ‘When circumstantial evidence is relied upon, the facts and circumstances must form a complete chain and point directly to the guilt of the accused in such a conclusive way as to exclude any other reasonable conclusion, every element essential to- the conclusion must be proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the existence of a reasonable doubt as to any *606one of them requires an acquittal.’ Reyes v. State, 151 Neb. 636, 38 N. W. 2d 539. See, also, Jeppesen v. State, supra.
“ Tt is the province of the jury to determine the circumstances surrounding, and which shed light upon, the alleged crime; and if, assuming as proved the facts which the evidence tends to establish, they can be accounted for upon no rational theory which does not include the guilt of the accused, the proof cannot, as a matter of law, be said to have failed.’ Morgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672, 71 N. W. 788. See, also, Kitts v. State, 153 Neb. 784, 46 N. W. 2d 158; Hoffman v. State, supra.”
We said in Sedlacek v. State, 166 Neb. 736, 90 N. W. 2d 340: “The test by which to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in a criminal prosecution is whether the facts and circumstances tending to connect accused with the crime charged are of such conclusive nature as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of his guilt.” In my judgment the evidence adduced does not meet this test. There is still an interval of time when someone else might have been in the office and have had the same opportunity the evidence indicates was presented to the defendant. Glessinger conceded that it was possible for others to have been in the office while he was gone. The most we can say about the evidence adduced is that the defendant had an opportunity to commit the crime and there is a strong suspicion that he did, but this falls, far short of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no question but that the actions of the defendant were to say the least very suspicious, yet suspicion does not suffice for evidence. Without some proof that no one else entered the building during the interval when Glessinger was gone, or connecting the defendant in some way with the fruits of larceny, it is. not possible to say that the evidence adduced is of such conclusive nature as to produce to a reasonable and moral certainty that the *607defendant committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The following quotation from Reyes v. State, 151 Neb. 636, 38 N. W. 2d 539, is particularly meaningful in this case: “When circumstantial evidence is relied upon, the facts and circumstances must form a complete chain and point directly to the guilt of the accused in such a conclusive way as to exclude any other reasonable conclusion, every element essential to the conclusion must be proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the existence of a reasonable doubt as to any one of them requires an acquittal. Treppish v. State, supra; Lowe v. State, supra; Walbridge v. State, 13 Neb. 236, 13 N. W. 209; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 1217, p, 1068; Vinciquerra v. State, supra; Harms v. State, supra; State v. Hooper, 222 Iowa 481, 269 N. W. 431; State v. Sigman, 220 Iowa 146, 261 N. W. 538; State v. Lewis, 69 W. Va. 472, 72 S. E. 475, Ann. Cas. 1913A 1203; State v. Suitor, 43 Mont. 31, 114 P. 112, Ann. Cas. 1912C 230; 23 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 907, pp. 154 to 156.
“Caution should be exercised in drawing inferences from circumstances proved in a criminal case. Suspicion or speculation may never justify a conviction. Circumstantial evidence as a basis of a conviction of crime should be acted on and weighed cautiously, and this is especially true where the crime is heinous. A conviction should not be based on the weakness of the status of the accused, the embarrassing position in which he finds himself, or the mere fact that some unfavorable circumstances are not satisfactorily explained. In determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support a conviction, each case must be determined on its own peculiar circumstances. Bourne v. State, 116 Neb. 141, 216 N. W. 173; Lowe v. State, supra; O’Neil v. State, 118 Neb. 360, 224 N. W. 855; Vinciquerra v. State, supra; Hiner v. State, 196 Ind. 594, 149 N. W. 168; State v. Pienick, supra; 23 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 907, p. 146.”
*608The offense charged is not supported by sufficient evidence. Defendant’s motion to dismiss, made at the conclusion of all of the evidence, should have been sustained. The judgment of the district court should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss.
I am authorized to state that Justices Boslaugh and Brower join in this dissent.