Court Opinion

ID: 9789377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:35:43.368149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:59.068277
License: Public Domain

Reed, A.C.J.
Gordon Pederson appeals his conviction of *392second degree burglary. Of the issues raised by defendant on appeal, only two merit discussion. They are: whether the trial court erred (1) in admitting the testimony of a polyg-rapher who had examined Pederson pursuant to stipulation, and (2) in admitting evidence of Pederson's prior felony conviction. Finding that the court did not err in admitting the polygraph expert's testimony, but that admission of the prior conviction was error of constitutional magnitude and not harmless, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
A store in Amboy was entered illegally during the night of June 9 and 10, 1983, through an attic window. The attic floor was broken through, and clothing and camping gear were taken from the floor below. John Byers, a friend of Pederson's, testified that Pederson had appeared at Byers' home in the early morning of June 10 with a man named Dave and a woman, both of whom were unknown to Byers. Pederson's truck had broken down and he requested Byers' assistance. When the truck was driven up into Byers' driveway, Byers saw that its bed was filled with clothing and camping gear. Pederson and his companions obtained a ride into Vancouver. Byers left the house too, but later that day, when he returned, the truck had been moved behind his house and the bed had been emptied. From the truck bed police later seized insulation fibers that were like those that had been severed in breaking through the attic floor of the store in Amboy.
Pederson and a friend, David Wilford, were arrested when they returned to the truck. The stolen goods were recovered at the Vancouver apartment of Lorna Roberts, Wilford's girl friend. Wilford and Pederson were charged with second degree burglary. Wilford pleaded guilty and testified against Pederson. Wilford confirmed that he and Roberts had been Pederson's companions at Byers' home. Wilford testified that Pederson had participated in the burglary by entering with Wilford and remaining in the attic to throw stolen merchandise to the ground after Wilford handed it up to him. Pederson denied his participa*393tion, testifying on his own behalf that he had fallen into a drunken stupor in his truck and had awakened to find that his drinking companion, Wilford, had burglarized the store and loaded the stolen merchandise into the truck.
Before trial, Pederson asked to have a polygraph administered. Pederson's lawyer prepared, on legal form paper imprinted with his firm's name and address, a stipulation that the results of the polygraph, (otherwise inadmissible for or against Pederson) would be admissible "by [sic] either party subject to evidentiary objections." The stipulation, although prepared by the defense, made no reference to a waiver of constitutional rights. The stipulation was prepared for the signatures of the deputy prosecuting attorney and of Pederson only, without any space for defense counsel's own signature. Only the deputy prosecutor and Pederson signed.
The polygrapher agreed upon was unavailable on the date stipulated, and defense counsel moved for continuance of the scheduled trial date, so that an examination could be obtained. He argued that Lorna Roberts could not then be located, making it "even more imperative" that Pederson "be allowed the opportunity to bolster his testimony via the use of a polygraph examination." When the examiner still could not schedule an examination, Pederson's lawyer presented an order, over his signature, to the trial judge for appointment of Dr. Stanley Abrams, an expert selected by the defense and approved by the State.
At trial, when the State offered Dr. Abrams' testimony, the defense objected on the basis that counsel had not signed the stipulation. Defense counsel conceded that his omission had been inadvertent — he had not been aware of the case law requiring his signature — and that he had obtained a continuance and the appointment of Dr. Abrams.1 However, he attempted to minimize the signifi-*394canee of his actions by explaining that, although he had wished to cooperate with Pederson's desire to be examined, he had nevertheless advised him several time not to undergo polygraphy. The objection was overruled and Dr. Abrams testified that Pederson's responses to the test questions were not truthful.
Before Pederson testified on his own behalf, the defense moved in limine to exclude cross examination on a prior conviction for attempted first degree escape. The motion was denied and Pederson conceded that he had been convicted.
We first consider whether the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Abrams' testimony. Until 1972 Washington generally did not permit the admission of polygraph results, even with consent of the parties. See State v. Stiltner, 80 Wn.2d 47, 51, 491 P.2d 1043 (1971); State v. Rowe, 77 Wn.2d 955, 958, 468 P.2d 1000 (1970). In State v. Ross, 7 Wn. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343, 53 A.L.R.3d 997, review denied, 81 Wn.2d 1003 (1972), this court ruled that polygraph results may be admitted for the purpose of corroboration under conditions laid down in State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962). Those conditions are: (1) there must be a stipulation signed by the prosecuting attorney, the defendant and the defendant's counsel; (2) the trial judge must, in any event, exercise his discretion in determining whether the examiner was qualified and whether the test was conducted under proper circumstances; (3) the opposing party has the right to cross-examine the polygrapher on his qualifications, the testing conditions, the limitations of polygraphy, and any other matter deemed pertinent by the trial judge; and (4) the jury must be instructed that the examiner's testimony could prove or disprove, at most, the examinee's truthfulness at the time of the examination. The Washing*395ton Supreme Court later adopted these standards in toto. State v. Renfro, 96 Wn.2d 902, 906-07, 639 P.2d 737, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 842 (1982). We will refer to them here as the Valdez/Renfro standards.
Pederson argues that his trial counsel's failure to sign the stipulation requires reversal. We therefore ask whether the lack of a defense attorney's signature must in all cases vitiate such a stipulation.
Unfortunately, neither Renfro nor Valdez provides a rationale for requiring an attorney's signature. There is suggestion in an opinion that predates Valdez, however, that the rule arises from the appropriateness of requiring opposing attorneys to negotiate the terms of a legally binding document. State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568, 574 (1960). Another likely reason for the requirement is that the decision to sign a polygraph stipulation is essentially a decision not to object to otherwise inadmissible evidence and thus could be classified as trial strategy, ordinarily the exclusive domain of the lawyer. It is clear, at the very least, that this requirement ensures that defense counsel can properly advise his client regarding his rights and the risks entailed by such a test and, if strictly construed, will block an impetuous decision of the client.
In any event, we believe that substantial rather than strict compliance with the Valdez/Renfro standards is sufficient. We find substantial compliance in this case. Any conceivable purpose of the signature requirement was satisfied. Defendant's attorney conceded that he had only inadvertently failed to sign — because of ignorance of the precise terms of the Valdez/Renfro standards. Nevertheless he did nothing, either orally before the trial court or in his written motions, to obstruct his client's desire to undergo polygraphy. Once Pederson elected not to follow his lawyer's advice, the latter actively ensured that his client would be tested. He certainly "negotiated" the stipulation, and it is clear he advised Pederson of his rights and the dangers of such a stipulation. On these facts the Valdez/ Renfro requirements were substantially satisfied; the trial *396court did not err when it permitted Dr. Abrams to testify.2
Pederson also contends that, even if the Valdez/ Renfro standards are satisfied otherwise, the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting the test results. However, discretion is abused only when it can be said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Blight, 89 Wn.2d 38, 41, 569 P.2d 1129 (1977). The trial court allowed sufficient latitude on cross examination. We find no abuse of discretion.
 Pederson next assigns error to permitting the use of his prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The State in effect concedes this was improper, and devotes its entire argument to harmless error. We cannot agree. Error in admitting evidence of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes is of constitutional magnitude, and conviction after such error must be reversed unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 101 Wn.2d 113, 124-25, 677 P.2d 131 (1984). In order to find the error harmless we must find overwhelming untainted evidence of guilt. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 425, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1208 (1986). We cannot do so in this case because, as the deputy prosecutor argued so forcefully when seeking admission of the conviction, "the central issue [in this case] is actually credibility." Except for the accomplice testimony of Wilford there was little proof linking defendant to the actual burglary. The only other evidence consisted of the admitted presence of the stolen goods in defendant's pickup and his failure to pass the lie detector test. This last, although stipulated to, remains suspect in the eyes of the law. When all of this evidence is considered together it hardly can be described as overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Defendant's other assignments of error either are totally without merit or were not properly raised in the trial court.
*397Defendant's conviction is reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial.
Petrich, J., concurs.

Defense counsel's exact words were: "So insofar as my position on this, I never signed the stipulation. I would admit that it was done inadvertently before I knew I was required to sign it. I cannot represent to this Court that I have never *394been a party to Dr. Abrams' testing of Mr. Pederson, because that's not the way it went. In fact, I, on behalf of Mr. Pederson, made several requests for a polygraph examination. It should be noted that was not my idea. That was Mr. Pederson's idea."

It should be observed that even the Renfro court did not insist upon strict compliance, when the trial court did not give the instruction required by Valdez's fourth requirement.