Court Opinion

ID: 9551850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:00:48.468714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:51.584511
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J., pro tem., Dissenting.
I dissent.
The fact that the testator used the words “in trust” is not necessarily determinative of an intention upon his part to create a trust, but such intention must be ascertained by a reading of the entire will. (In re Dever’s Will, 173 Wis. 208 [180 N. W. 839] ; Danforth v. Oshkosh, 119 Wis. 262 [97 N. W. 258] ; Norman v. Prince, 41 R. I. 402 [101 Atl. 126].) In the case first above cited it is declared: “In construing a will, the constant effort of courts is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the testator. The phrase ‘in trust', or ‘upon trust’, has a well-settled technical meaning, and when used advisedly in a will, in connection with a devise or ‘ bequest, affords rather plain evidence of the intention of the testator. This, we say, is the result where the words have been used advisedly. As was said of this, or a similar, phrase in Davies v. Davies, 109 Wis. 129, at page 133 [85 N. W. 201], at page 203: ‘Had these words been used by a trained lawyer, the argument that they must receive their true technical meaning would be strong; but here the fact that they were used by a layman, albeit an educated man, is of great importance. The word “trust”, in its popular sense, covers many things besides the legal and technical trust. ’
“In Danforth v. Oshkosh, 119 Wis. 262, at page 276 [97 N. W. 258], at page 263, it is said: ‘Of course, the presence, or absence of words declaring an estate to be in trust is not conclusive, though they may be more or less significant of the purpose in the grantor’s mind. The question is whether the testator’s intent involved the elements of a trust as known to the law.’
“These expressions sufficiently indicate that this court has not considered the use of these words as conclusive of the intention of the testator, and has not felt precluded from making further inquiry concerning such intention, merely because the phrase ‘in trust’ or ‘upon trust’ is used in con*729nection with a devise or bequest contained in a will. We are also impressed with the thought that where a testator says he gives ‘in trust’ or ‘upon trust’, but makes no attempt to prescribe the terms or purposes of the trust, a court may well pause and consider whether it was really the intention of the testator to create a trust in the legal sense. When the phrase ‘in trust', or ‘upon trust’, is used advisedly, he who uses it understands that the terms and conditions of the trust must be defined with definiteness and certainty. When a testator says he gives ‘in trust’, and says no more, the query most naturally arises as to whether the phrase was inserted for the purpose of creating a trust in the true legal sense. We think such a situation gives rise to an ambiguity, and the court may summon to its aid all legitimate considerations that will enable it to determine the intent of the testator with reference to the disposition of the residue of his estate . . .
“ . . . We think the phrase ‘in trust’ was used by the testator, not in its technical and legal, but in its popular, sense, and that in the connection in which it was thus used it was intended to be expressive of the trust and confidence which the testator reposed in his'lifelong friends and associates, and that it was his intention that they should take the residue of the estate, to use or dispose of as they might see fit. A gift of this kind carries with it absolute ownership. ...”
Construing the will in the instant case in the light of the foregoing authorities, I believe that the court below correctly determined that the instrument failed to impress a trust upon the property but rather disclosed an intention to make an absolute gift to Kagarise with “absolute authority” in him to dispose of the property “as he may see fit”. In view of the total absence of any language attempting to name a trust beneficiary or to specify a trust purpose, and of the evident intention to make an absolute gift to Kagarise, it must be concluded that the testator did not employ the words “in trust” in their technical sense. Moreover, even if it be conceded for present purposes that there is some uncertainty as to the testator’s intention, the will should be so construed as to validate rather than invalidate its main provisions (Civ. Code, sec. 3541) with resulting *730intestacy. The construction given to the will by the • court below achieves this purpose.
In my opinion the decree should be affirmed.
Rehearing denied.