Court Opinion

ID: 9837044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:06.423544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:20.032739
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent. It may well have been unfair (and perhaps legal error) for the judge to allow appellant to be put in a position while he was testifying where he could not give full answers to questions that were being asked of him. I note, however, that no legal authority for such error is cited by the majority. In any event, I believe such error, if it did occur, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the circumstances of this case.
Under the controlling law in this case, the prosecution was required to show that appellant had sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent. Even if the prosecution had established that the alleged victim did not consent, appellant might still have defended himself on the basis that he made an honest and reasonable mistake of fact as to the alleged victim’s consent. Clearly, evidence of the alleged victim’s reputation for engaging in sexual intercourse was not relevant or admissible to show that she consented to appellant on the night in question. See United States v. Greaves, 40 MJ 432 (CMA 1994). However, evidence of an accused’s knowledge of the alleged victim’s sexual reputation could, in some circumstances, be a factor which might bear on the honesty of a claim of mistake as to consent in a particular rape case. See United States v. Willis, 41 MJ 435, 438 (1995); United States v. True, 41 MJ 424, 426 (1995); United States v. Elvine, 16 MJ 14, 18 (CMA 1983). Nevertheless, as this Court said in Elvine:
[T]he fact that appellant knew that she had some type of reputation for “coming on” in her unit was not shown to be an important issue in this case.

Id.

Here, like in Elvine, the fact that appellant knew the sexual reputation of the victim as *107“being easy” was not important or “weighty.” See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 307, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1264, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998). This reputation evidence was not important here, because the victim was sick, asleep, and in such a drunken state that she could not have consented. Moreover, appellant had not even met the victim before he raped her. In these circumstances, undisputed at trial, it would not matter what the sexual reputation of the victim was — such a drunken victim could not give consent anyway since she was passed out and incoherent. See United States v. Palmer, 33 MJ 7, 9 (CMA 1991).
It is also undisputed that appellant knew she was in this state, not only by his personal observation of her drunken condition, but because Lance Corporal Elder told him so, and even told appellant not to “mess with her.” Therefore, I conclude that the judge properly tried to keep out the evidence of the victim’s sexual reputation pursuant to Mil.R.Evid. 412, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.).
The judge clearly did so in a poor fashion. That may have amounted to error, but as I have said before, if it was error, it was harmless in this case. The jury properly heard all the relevant evidence concerning the alleged victim’s condition and appellant’s knowledge of it. In my view, it overwhelmingly showed her incapacity and appellant’s knowledge of that fact. Appellant’s state of mind concerning the victim’s consent was simply not material in this context. See generally United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982)(constitutional violation requires showing denial of testimony which would be material and helpful to defense).
No one has the right to rape an unconscious, drunken female. It does not matter what the victim’s reputation in this case was, or whether she was a nun or a prostitute, or what appellant believed her reputation was. See United States v. Palmer, supra. I would affirm. Art. 59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 859(a).