Court Opinion

ID: 9703732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:06:10.418846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:51.320489
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Musmanno:
The Trial Judge in this case presides over trials with an Ability, impartiality, and obvious love of justice that makes him an ideal arbiter in the arena of legal controversy. It is, therefore, with no diminution of admiration for his juristic attributes that I conclude that in this case he was in error. This conclusion is certainly no reflection on his laudable trial record, because it will be remembered that even Homer nodded.
The issue in the trial was a simple one. A fire hydrant in front of the premises owned by the plaintiffs was struck by an automobile and sheared off at ground level, bringing to the children in the area the joy of a gushing geyser and to their parents the threat of an inundation. The City hurried to the aqueous scene with its workmen who shut off the valve on the water main servicing the hydrant and then proceeded to make the complete repairs necessary to restore water service. Since they could not complete the job by nightfall, they reopened the valve in the main, closed the valve leading to the hydrant and departed for their homes, apparently satisfied that all would be well until the following morning when they would return to complete their operation.
However, during the night the plunging waters in the pipes broke their bondage and flooded the basement of the premises belonging to the plaintiffs who brought suit against the City of Philadelphia for the damages they suffered. The plaintiffs charged negligence on the part of the workmen who had left the night of the first *309day without taking the necessary precautions to protect the properties adjacent to the decapitated hydrant.
The City denied negligence and the cause came to trial. After the issue had been submitted to the jury for deliberation and verdict, the jury returned to the courtroom to ask the Judge two questions. We are concerned only with the second question, namely, “Does taking sufficient care mean guarding against a third party tampering with the fire hydrant?” The Court answered: “The city would not be expected and could not be required to have some guard stand there all night and see that nobody disrupted or interfered with what they had done. What duty the City, however, would be required to do would be to reasonably protect and warn people from going near it by putting up the barricades, setting up the lights. If they did that, I would say, under the circumstances, they did everything that the City would be required to do.”
The plaintiff’s attorney objected to this ruling and asked for an exception. Then the following ensued: The Court: “You may have it. That is what I think about the law. If I am wrong, why I will have to be corrected. You are not suggesting the City ought to put a policeman there all night, are you?” Mr. Bank: “No, sir. But I am suggesting the stem or the fire hydrant could have been capped off so nobody could touch it.” The Court: “I do not agree with that, members of the jury. I believe that stem could be and is protected in the barrel. It is underground. It is covered by a board. In my opinion, the City did everything it should under those circumstances, and the valve that eventually was put in place and set, and was set throughout according to the testimony of the City’s witnesses, was set after noon, because they said they dug in their shoes, without boots, because there was no water in there. As I understand it, that was the valve that was *310set in the rod that went down to the compression valve at the bottom of this hydrant. Well, see what you can do, members of the jury.”
It must be obvious here that by these instructions the Court took the whole question of negligence away from the jury. In his main charge the Judge had said that the City was required “to exercise due care in making the repairs in order not to injure the property of others.” Did the City use due care? Until the Judge answered the question put by the jury, the problem of due care was to be solved by the jury. However, after the Judge spoke, the jury had nothing to say about due care, it had nothing to say at all about the case. The Judge spoke for them when he said: “The City would not be expected and could not be required to have some guard stand there all night and see that nobody disrupted or interfered with what they had done.”
But it is not to be excluded that the City might have had an obligation to place a guard at the site of the missing hydrant. If the danger was great, if the surrounding area could be flooded to a depth which might endanger life, it would certainly have been the duty of the City to post a guard.- If there had been a fire at this point and shaky walls had been left standing, the City would certainly have been required to station a fireman or policeman there to see to it that no third persons tampered with the walls, imperiling people and property in the area.
The Judge said that if the City put up barricades and set up lights, that that would be enough to disobligate the City from responsibility for any ensuing damage, but the City could barricade and light up the hydrant spot and still be negligent because it would be a question for the jury as to whether the barricade and lights had been properly installed and were adequate under all the circumstances.
*311But the Judge went further. With great respect I say that he waded deeper into error when he said: “In my opinion, the City did everything it should under those circumstances.” If the City did everything it should under the circumstances, that was the end of the case. When a jury comes into the courtroom and asks for specific instructions, and the Judge tells them that the defendant has done all that can be expected of it under the circumstances, there is only one thing for the jury to do and that is to render a verdict for the defendant, which the jury here promptly proceeded to do.
The Judge did not say that his opinion was not binding on the jury. Categorically he said that it was his opinion the City was not liable. He emphasized his view when he said: “That is what I think about the law. If I am wrong, why I will have to be corrected.” Since no one stood up and corrected the Judge at that point, the jury could well conclude that the Judge stood uncorrected. It is unnecessary to add that the jury had no reason to assume that the correction had to come from an appellate court. Even so, it was bound by what the Trial Judge said to them and not what they might imagine, speculate, and guess as to what an appellate court would do, many months later.
When the Judge spoke as he did, he in effect turned off the hydrant of deliberation, he shut off the flow of discussion, he stopped the stream of reasoning. There was nothing more for the jury to do but to bring in the dry, mud-caked verdict already prepared for them.
This Court, in affirming the action of the Trial Judge, dwells on the point that the Trial Judge had in his main charge charged the jurors that they were the sole finders of the fact. The Majority Opinion admits, however, that the instructions by the Judge given at the last minute “may sometimes outweigh a previous *312instruction.” But, after this forthright concession the Majority Opinion goes on to say: “but it does not appear to us to have been so in this case.” By what clairvoyance the Majority arrives at this conclusion the Majority does not say. How does the Majority know that the jury was not influenced by the Trial Judge’s last words to them? The fact that there was the possibility that the jury could have been so influenced was enough in itself to vitiate the verdict.
The Majority Opinion also justifies the Trial Judge’s last minute instructions by asserting: “It must be remembered that in concluding his answer to the forelady’s second question, the Trial Judge stated: ‘If they did that, I would say, under the circumstances, they did everything that the City would be required to do’ ”. It must be noted, however, that, later the Trial Judge said: “In my opinion, the City did everything it should under the circumstances.”
I dissent.