Court Opinion

ID: 9881826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 14:00:48.58919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:12.528110
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14177    Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 10/04/2023   Page: 1 of 16

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-14177
                           ____________________

        ISMETA KADRIBASIC,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        WAL-MART, INC.,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-03498-SDG
                           ____________________
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                    21-14177

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, and
        PROCTOR, ∗ District Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
               This appeal requires us to determine whether an employee
        who failed to comply with her company’s leave policy, which re-
        quires an employee to provide notice to a third party administrator
        of her intent to take leave under the Family Medical Leave Act
        (“FMLA”), was nonetheless entitled to FMLA protection. After
        careful review, and with the beneﬁt of oral argument, we conclude
        she was not. We aﬃrm the decision of the district court granting
        the employer’s motion for summary judgment.
                                        I. Background
        A.     Kadribasic’s Employment History
               Ismeta Kadribasic was a long-time employee of Walmart.
        Walmart hired Kadribasic as a part-time cashier in 2003 at its Sam’s
        Club store in Snellville, Georgia. In 2013, she was promoted to club
        manager of the Snellville store. In March 2017, Kadribasic became
        the club manager of the Sam’s Club in Duluth, Georgia. As man-
        ager of the Duluth store, Kadribasic was responsible for the opera-
        tion of the facility, provided direction and guidance to subordi-
        nates, and ensured planning and execution to achieve results at the
        Club.

        ∗ Honorable R. David Proctor, United States District Judge for the Northern
        District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
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        21-14177                Opinion of the Court                          3

                In April 2018, Angela Taylor was hired as market manager
        for the Atlanta area and became Kadribasic’s supervisor. On April
        20, 2018, Taylor made a scheduled visit to the Duluth store. She
        noticed trash inside and outside the store and that the store’s
        “claims cage” was disorganized. Taylor brought these concerns to
        Kadribasic’s attention. Kadribasic responded that the associate
        tasked with cleaning the trash had called out of work and the asso-
        ciate responsible for organizing the claims cage simply had not
        done the work. Taylor issued Kadribasic her ﬁrst “written coach-
        ing” (i.e., a disciplinary write-up), citing the failure to maintain the
        store in accordance with company standards.
               Two months later, in June 2018, Kadribasic left the doors to
        the Club unlocked when she left for the night. Taylor planned to
        issue Kadribasic’s second written coaching in July 2018, but each
        time Taylor visited the store, Kadribasic was not there.
               Between July 12, 2018 and October 7, 2018, Kadribasic was
        away from the store on a combination of paid time oﬀ (“PTO”)
        and maternity leave. Before taking her maternity leave, Kadribasic
        properly submitted a request for leave to Walmart’s third-party
        leave administrator, Sedgwick.
        B.     Kadribasic’s Injury
              On October 18, 2018, soon after returning from this ex-
        tended leave, Kadribasic injured her back at work while bending
        down to push a pallet of merchandise. Walmart’s company policy
        regarding work related injuries provides:
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-14177

               Associates must report a work related injury or inci-
               dent immediately to their supervisor or a member of
               management . . . .
               Associate injuries not requiring medical attention are
               referred to as Associate Incidents. All associate inci-
               dents are required to be reported to the Claims Ad-
               ministrator and to be keyed into the Incident Report-
               ing System (IRS) within 24 hours of notice.
               Associate injuries requiring medical attention must
               be reported by a member of management through
               the . . . [IRS] within 24 hours from the time the asso-
               ciate requests medical treatment or when a member
               of management ﬁrst becomes aware that the associ-
               ate sought medical treatment.
                On the day she was injured, Kadribasic completed a written
        “associate incident report” and asked general merchandise man-
        ager Hajra Kadric, who was with Kadribasic at the time of the in-
        jury, to “key in” the incident. Walmart’s policy prohibits an injured
        employee from keying information about her own injury into the
        system. Therefore, it was Kadric’s responsibility to key in the injury
        once she learned of it.
               On October 21, 2018, Kadribasic informed Taylor that she
        had gone to the emergency room about her back that afternoon
        and that the doctor had excused her from work for two days. In
        response, Taylor told Kadribasic to have Kadric key in the incident,
        but Taylor did not mention any rule violation. Although the inci-
        dent occurred on October 18, Kadric did not key in the incident
        until October 21. On October 23, Kadribasic was diagnosed with
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        21-14177               Opinion of the Court                        5

        muscle strains and sciatica, but she was permitted to return to work
        that day with certain restrictions on physical exertion.
                On October 28 or 29, Kadribasic and Taylor had an in-person
        conversation at the Duluth store. Kadribasic broke down crying.
        Kadribasic claims that she cried as she told Taylor that she needed
        to take time oﬀ due to her back injury. Taylor testiﬁed that Kadriba-
        sic did not discuss her back injury or ask for leave during that con-
        versation, but instead broke down because the Duluth store was
        “too big of a club for her.”
               On October 29, following a lunchtime doctor’s appoint-
        ment, Kadribasic texted Taylor saying that she was going home be-
        cause she was in an “incredible amount of pain” but she would be
        back the following day “unless I feel like today.” On November 6,
        2018, she texted Taylor saying that she was again in pain and unable
        to go into work. Upon receiving Kadribasic’s November 6 text mes-
        sage, Taylor communicated with fellow supervisor Darryl Stinson
        that Kadribasic “is constantly saying she is in pain and not working.
        How should we proceed with her? [ ] I really believe she is dodging
        me so I cannot administer the coaching [for the unlocked door in-
        cident].”
        C.    Kadribasic’s Termination
               On November 8, 2018, Kadribasic, Taylor, and Kadric met to
        conduct a walkthrough of the Duluth store in preparation for a
        companywide sales event scheduled for November 10. Kadribasic
        and Kadric both testiﬁed that Taylor commented on how good the
        store looked. Taylor denied saying anything of the sort. Kadribasic
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-14177

        had trouble walking during the November 8 walkthrough. She re-
        quested a break, but Taylor did not allow it until about thirty to
        forty minutes later. Kadribasic also told Taylor that she would
        “need some time oﬀ.”
               During the course of the day, Taylor was ﬁnally able to ad-
        minister to Kadribasic the written coaching for the June 26 un-
        locked door incident, her second written coaching. That coaching
        stated that Kadribasic had “failed to ensure that the outside and in-
        side entrance door was deadbolted when exiting the Club.”
                Later in the day on November 8, Kadribasic went to physical
        therapy, the orthopedist, and eventually the emergency room. She
        informed Taylor that she was cleared to return to work on Novem-
        ber 10. Her orthopedist recommended certain restrictions, but the
        ER stated she could return to work on November 10 with no re-
        strictions. On the morning of November 9, Kadribasic told Taylor
        that she was still in pain but would “probably” be at the store later
        for ﬁnal preparations in anticipation of the sales event scheduled
        the next day. When Taylor visited the facility on November 9, she
        was concerned that the store was not ready. Later that morning,
        Kadribasic texted Taylor that she would try to come in that evening
        for ﬁnal preparations.
              At 12:55 PM on November 9, Taylor called Walmart’s Field
        People Partner, Alejandro Muñoz, to discuss her concerns about
        Kadribasic. During that phone call, Muñoz approved Kadribasic’s
        termination. At 3:48 p.m. on November 9, after the termination
        had been approved, Kadribasic texted Taylor to see if Taylor would
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        21-14177              Opinion of the Court                        7

        be opposed to Kadribasic taking a week of PTO to “see if that
        [would] help [her] get back to normal” because “the pain [was] hor-
        rible.” Taylor suggested they discuss the request in person the fol-
        lowing Monday. When Kadribasic asked if Taylor was denying her
        PTO request, Taylor responded that they needed to clarify the
        schedule before she could grant PTO.
              Sometime on November 9, unaware of her pending termi-
        nation, Kadribasic contacted Sedgwick requesting six weeks of
        “baby bonding” leave. That evening, after submitting the request,
        Kadribasic went into the Duluth store. Taylor was there, and she
        administered a third written coaching to Kadribasic for not report-
        ing her October 18 work injury to her supervisor until October 21
        and for not having the incident keyed into the system within 24
        hours. Taylor further informed Kadribasic that her employment
        was being terminated due to her failure to ensure that the store
        would be prepared for the November 10 one-day sale. The oﬃcial
        reason given for Kadribasic’s termination was her “Inability to Per-
        form Job.” Taylor was unaware of Kadribasic’s FMLA request to
        Sedgwick at this time.
               A few hours after Kadribasic submitted her FMLA request,
        but after Taylor terminated her, Sedgwick conﬁrmed receipt of the
        request for leave. This conﬁrmation was sent at 10:14 p.m. on No-
        vember 9.
                As noted above, although she texted Taylor about the possi-
        bility of taking PTO, Kadribasic did not specify that she wished to
        take FMLA leave at any time before her employment was
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                21-14177

        terminated. Taylor testiﬁed that there was no reason to discuss
        FMLA leave with Kadribasic because Kadribasic “had the ability to
        apply for leave at any time she chose to.”
                Walmart policy requires an employee to notify both her
        manager and the third party administrator, Sedgwick, “as soon as
        practicable” if the need for leave is not foreseeable. Both parties
        acknowledge that the need for Kadribasic to take the leave at issue
        was unforeseeable. Walmart’s policy also requires supervisors to
        direct associates to Sedgwick when they “become aware of an as-
        sociate’s need or request to take FMLA leave.” Under the policy, a
        supervisor “must recognize when an associate’s request for time oﬀ
        is for an FMLA-qualifying circumstance and direct them to contact
        Sedgwick.” Kadribasic was familiar with Walmart’s FMLA leave
        policy. She had properly requested and been granted FMLA leave
        at least four times during her tenure with the company.
        D.    Proceedings Below
               On August 2, 2019, Kadribasic sued Walmart alleging that
        Walmart interfered with her rights under the FMLA. The parties
        ﬁled cross-motions for summary judgment. On February 12, 2021,
        the Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation
        (“R&R”) recommending that the court grant summary judgment
        in favor of Walmart on Kadribasic’s FMLA interference claim. Both
        parties objected to the R&R.
              The District Court adopted in part and denied in part the
        Magistrate Judge’s R&R. The District Court concluded that alt-
        hough the parties disputed whether Taylor was aware of
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        21-14177                Opinion of the Court                          9

        Kadribasic’s need or desire to take FMLA leave, that dispute was
        not material because Kadribasic failed to comply with Walmart’s
        FMLA policy and thus could not “show she was entitled to FMLA
        leave or suﬀered interference with her FMLA rights.” For that rea-
        son, the District Court granted summary judgment on Kadribasic’s
        FLMA interference claim. Kadribasic appeals the district court’s
        ruling.
                              II. Standard of Review
                We review the granting of summary judgment de novo, ap-
        plying the same legal standards that bound the district court. What-
        ley v. CNA Ins. Cos., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Haves
        v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)).
                                   III. Discussion
              On appeal, Kadribasic argues that the District Court erred in
        granting summary judgment. We disagree. For the reasons ex-
        plained below, the district court’s entry of summary judgment is
        due to be aﬃrmed.
               In their brieﬁng and at oral argument, the parties have fo-
        cused on the Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations related to
        FMLA leave requests. The DOL regulation that interprets the
        FMLA on the issue presented here is unambiguous: “[w]hen the
        need for leave is not foreseeable, an employee must comply with
        the employer’s usual and customary notice and procedural require-
        ments for requesting leave, absent unusual circumstances.” 29
        C.F.R. § 825.303(c). Here, it is undisputed that Kadribasic did not
        comply with Walmart’s internal notice and procedural
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14177

        requirements for requesting FMLA leave. Because she failed to es-
        tablish that unusual circumstances prevented her from doing so,
        we hold that she was not entitled to FMLA leave. Accordingly, we
        aﬃrm.
              We divide our discussion into three parts. First, we explain
        why 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c) controls our inquiry. Second, we con-
        sider whether Kadribasic has identiﬁed any “unusual circum-
        stances” that would relieve her of her responsibility under §
        825.303(c) to follow Walmart’s FMLA policy. Finally, we address
        Kadribasic’s argument that Walmart’s conduct implied a waiver of
        her obligation to comply with the company’s FMLA policy.
        A.     Section 825.303(c)
                “The FMLA entitles employees to take leave for certain fam-
        ily and medical reasons.” Ramji v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., 992 F.3d
        1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2612). “Under
        the FMLA, a covered employer may not interfere with, restrain, or
        deny the employee’s exercise or attempted exercise of her FMLA
        rights to coverage, leave entitlement, notice, beneﬁts continuation,
        and job restoration.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. §§
        2601–2604; 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100–825.803).
                “To establish an FMLA interference claim, an employee
        must show she was entitled to a beneﬁt under the FMLA and her
        employer denied her that beneﬁt.” Id. (citing Muñoz v. Selig Enters.,
        Inc., 981 F.3d 1265, 1274 (11th Cir. 2020)). To establish that she was
        entitled to an FMLA beneﬁt, “an eligible employee must demon-
        strate that she sought leave for a qualifying reason and that she
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        21-14177                Opinion of the Court                         11

        provided notice meeting certain criteria.” Id. at 1242 (footnote
        omitted) (citing White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188,
        1194-96 (11th Cir. 2015)). The issue here is whether Kadribasic com-
        plied with Walmart’s leave policy such that she was entitled to
        FMLA leave. She did not.
                “An employee’s notice of her need for FMLA leave must sat-
        isfy two criteria—timing and content—both of which diﬀer de-
        pending on whether the need for leave is foreseeable or unforesee-
        able.” White, 789 F.3d at 1195. Here, the parties agree that Kadriba-
        sic’s need for leave was unforeseeable. Notice requirements for un-
        foreseeable FMLA leave are governed by 29 C.F.R. § 825.303. As we
        review § 825.303, we note that § 825.303(a) deals with the timing of
        an employee’s notice, while § 825.303(b) concerns the content of the
        notice. That is, subsections (a) and (b) outline the standards that
        apply in determining whether an employee has provided suﬃcient
        notice to the employer of the need to take FMLA leave.
               It is § 825.303(c), however, that makes clear that if an em-
        ployer establishes “usual and customary notice and procedural re-
        quirements for requesting leave”—absent “unusual circum-
        stances”—those requirements control. In other words, if an em-
        ployer has a company policy specifying how an employee must re-
        quest FMLA leave, an employee must adhere to that policy.
               Here, as the district court explained, “it is undisputed that
        Kadribasic did not follow Walmart’s policy and did not contact
        Sedgwick between October 28 and November 8.” She only con-
        tacted Sedgwick late in the day on November 9, leaving supervisors
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        12                        Opinion of the Court               21-14177

        unaware of her leave request until after she was informed of her
        termination. So, absent Kadribasic showing that “unusual circum-
        stances” prevented her from following Walmart’s policy, Walmart
        was well within its right to deny Kadribasic FMLA leave. See 29
        C.F.R. § 825.303(c) (“If an employee does not comply with the em-
        ployer’s usual notice and procedural requirements, and no unusual
        circumstances justify the failure to comply, FMLA-protected leave
        may be delayed or denied”).
        B.     Unusual Circumstances
                The next question is whether there were unusual circum-
        stances excusing Kadribasic’s failure to comply with her employer’s
        requirements for requesting leave. See id. The regulations do not
        deﬁne the term “unusual circumstances” but § 825.303(c) provides
        that “if an employee requires emergency medical treatment, he or
        she would not be required to follow the call-in procedure until his
        or her condition is stabilized and he or she has access to, and is able
        to use, a phone.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c). In seeking guidance regard-
        ing what constitutes unusual circumstances, we also look to §
        825.302(d), which governs foreseeable leave.
               Unusual circumstances would include situations such
               as when an employee is unable to comply with the
               employer’s policy that requests for leave should be
               made by contacting a speciﬁc number because on the
               day the employee needs to provide notice of his or
               her need for FMLA leave there is no one to answer the
               call-in number and the voice mail box is full.
        29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d).
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        21-14177               Opinion of the Court                         13

                Kadribasic argues that Taylor’s failure to refer her to Sedg-
        wick when Taylor learned of her injuries, as well as Taylor’s “fail-
        ure to point out Ms. Kadribasic’s noncompliance are ‘unusual cir-
        cumstances’ given the compressed timeline and Ms. Kadribasic’s
        extreme pain.” Kadribasic cites to a number of district court cases
        from other circuits to support her assertion that a supervisor’s fail-
        ure to follow or enforce the employer’s FMLA procedures is an un-
        usual circumstance that justiﬁes an employee’s noncompliance. See
        Villegas v. Albertsons, LLC, 96 F. Supp. 3d 624, 634 (W.D. Tex. 2015);
        Dallefeld v. Clubs at River City, Inc., No. 15-cv-1244, 2017 WL
        3013241, at *7-8 (C.D. Ill. July 14, 2017); Woida v. Genesys Reg’l Med.
        Ctr., 4 F. Supp. 3d 880, 896 (E.D. Mich. 2014). But her argument
        misses the mark.
               In Villegas and Dallefeld, the employers did not provide
        proper notice of their respective FMLA policies to employees, and
        the district courts held that a reasonable juror could ﬁnd that unu-
        sual circumstances prevented those employees from complying
        with the employers’ FMLA policies. Villegas, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 627,
        634 (plaintiﬀ’s manager never referred Plaintiﬀ to the handbook or
        informed him of the employer’s FMLA procedures, and appeared
        not to even know the FMLA procedures himself ); Dallefeld, 2017
        WL 3013241, at 6-7 (a manager’s testimony that employees could
        “request [leave] however they care to request it” created a genuine
        issue of fact as to whether the employer waived the notice require-
        ment in its FMLA policy). In contrast, in Woida, the court deter-
        mined that an employee who properly submitted each of her 27
        other requests for FMLA leave could not claim that unusual
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        14                    Opinion of the Court                 21-14177

        circumstances excused her non-compliance with her employer’s
        FMLA notice policy. Woida, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 896-97.
               The facts here are similar to those in Woida. Kadribasic pre-
        viously (and properly) submitted at least four leave requests and
        each one was granted. So, she cannot now argue that she was led
        astray by Taylor’s failure to refer her to Sedgwick to make a re-
        quest. Further, Kadribasic’s argument that “[t]he District Court
        also did not consider the compressed timeframe on November 8”
        is unavailing. Kadribasic injured her back on October 18 and made
        multiple trips to doctors’ oﬃces and the emergency room begin-
        ning on October 21. That she “went to physical therapy, went to
        the orthopedist, was in extreme pain, and went to the emergency
        room” between November 8 and 9 did not foreclose her oppor-
        tunity to properly request FMLA leave at any time in the approxi-
        mately three weeks between her injury and her termination.
               Moreover, the “compressed timeframe” argument fails for
        an additional reason: Kadribasic did ﬁnd the time to request paid
        time oﬀ from Taylor on November 9. The Rule 56 evidence before
        the District Court shows that Kadribasic was familiar with the leave
        process, as evidenced by her repeated and successful requests in the
        past. Similarly, she contacted Sedgwick later on November 9 to re-
        quest six weeks of baby bonding leave. Therefore, Kadribasic failed
        to present evidence creating a material issue of fact about whether
        there was an obstacle to her making a proper FMLA request. Ac-
        cordingly, Kadribasic has failed to demonstrate that unusual
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        21-14177               Opinion of the Court                       15

        circumstances justify her failure to comply with Walmart’s FMLA
        leave policy.
        C.    Waiver
                Title 29 C.F.R. § 825.304(e) provides that “[a]n employer may
        waive employees’ FMLA notice obligations or the employer’s own
        internal rules on leave notice requirements.” The regulation does
        not deﬁne the circumstances under which an employer waives the
        notice obligation. In this Circuit, however, “[w]aiver is the volun-
        tary, intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Searcy v. R.J.
        Reynolds Tobacco Co., 902 F.3d 1342, 1359 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation
        omitted). Kadribasic has not presented any substantial evidence
        that would support her argument that Walmart voluntarily and in-
        tentionally relinquished its right to enforce the notice requirements
        of its FMLA leave policy.
                Kadribasic argues that “[b]ecause Ms. Taylor failed to follow
        Walmart’s notice procedures, a reasonabl[e] jury [could] ﬁnd that
        Walmart waived the policy . . . .” But, there is no legal or factual
        basis for that assertion. Our law on waiver is clear. Kadribasic has
        not shown a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of Walmart’s
        notice requirements. No one at Walmart told Kadribasic that she
        could take FMLA leave without contacting Sedgwick or otherwise
        suggested that she was no longer required to follow the FMLA
        leave policy (a policy that she had followed at least four times pre-
        viously). Further, although Walmart conceded at oral argument
        that its policy requires a manager to direct an associate to Sedgwick
        when the manager becomes aware of an associate’s need or desire
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        16                   Opinion of the Court               21-14177

        to take FMLA leave, it did not concede—and the record does not
        suggest—that any such failure constituted a waiver of Walmart’s
        clear notice policy.
                Indeed, Kadribasic herself apparently recognized that
        Walmart had not waived its policy. On November 9, she reached
        out to Sedgwick to request baby bonding leave. Of course, by that
        time, the decision to terminate her employment had already been
        made. And, her belated request to Sedgwick betrays her own un-
        derstanding of what Walmart’s leave policy required. Therefore,
        Kadribasic failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of
        material fact as to whether Walmart waived its FMLA leave notice
        policy.
                                 IV. CONCLUSION
             The District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of
        Walmart on Kadribasic’s FMLA interference claim is AFFIRMED.