Court Opinion

ID: 9493430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:07:43.592958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:50.067111
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I generally agree with my colleagues’ legal analysis but find that genuine issues *533of material fact preclude summary judgment. I agree with the majority’s determination that the Eighth Amendment is implicated only when prison officials are cognizant of a significant likelihood that an inmate may imminently seek to take his own life. Thus, we have not found prison officials liable for prison suicides without an allegation of suicidal tendencies, evidence of past suicide attempts, or warnings of suicidal conditions. See Payne v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1042 (7th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1004, 119 S.Ct. 2339, 144 L.Ed.2d 236 (1999). Moreover, behaving in a strange or bizarre manner is not enough to put prison officials on notice that an inmate is a substantial suicide risk. See Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88 (7th Cir.1997); State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir.1983).
In Novack’s case, however, genuine issues of material fact exist for a reasonable jury to find that prison officials were aware of a substantial risk that he may imminently commit suicide. For example, when Novack was booked into the Wood County Jail, Deputy Raymond Starks of the Wood County Sheriffs Department informed Officer Denise Ellis that Novack was a suicide risk and that the jail staff should watch him accordingly. Officer Ellis also knew that Novack had been at Norwood Mental Health Center earlier that day. Furthermore, she wrote “watch” on Novack’s medical screening inventory. She was aware that Novack had been diagnosed in the past with a mental illness, and she concluded that Novack had a possible mental illness.
Novack was then placed in an observation cell that is normally used for inmates on suicide watch.1 However, there is no record that the jail officials paid close attention, to Novack while he was in the observation cell. Furthermore, without consulting any mental health experts or insuring that he would be subject to suicide watch scrutiny, the officials inexplicably transferred him to the general jail population.
While in jail, Novack took psychotropic medicine prescribed by his psychiatrist. There is no record of the jail officials insuring that he took his medicine when they handed it to him. Furthermore, his jailers did not máke any record of closely observing Novack to watch his reaction to this prescription medicine. During his time in general population, his mental health did not improve. He pounded on his cell walls almost every day and was subject to regular uncontrolled fits of laughing and giggling. He did not eat all of his meals, he lost weight, and his appearance was unkept. However, jail staff never conducted a full medical evaluation of Novack. •
The facts at issue here are similar to those in Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.1992), where we ruled that a jury, and not the court, must determine whether jail officials were aware of a substantial suicide risk. In Hall, we affirmed the district court’s denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion. We agreed that the detainee’s estate raised genuine issues of material fact whether defendants were aware that the detainee2 was a substantial suicide risk. See id. at 405. After his arrest, the detainee became excited and belligerent. He urinated on the floor and swore at the police officers. See id. at 403. Moreover, he had threatened to commit *534suicide when he was arrested by the same police department nine months prior to the incident in question. See id. at 403-04. The detainee’s prior arrest report states that he has attempted suicide several times. See 'id. at 404. Based on the detainee’s behavior on the day of his arrest and his prior encounters with this police department, we found that the plaintiff had raised genuine issues of material fact whether defendants knew that the detainee was a serious suicide risk. See id. at 405.3
As in Hall, we have more than Novack’s strange and bizarre behavior. We also have evidence that jail officials knew that Novack was a suicide risk and had a possible mental illness. Finally, the jail staff failed to conduct a full medical evaluation and failed to subject Novack to any suicide watch scrutiny. Consequently, from this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that there existed a substantial risk that Novack would imminently commit suicide and that jail officials knew of this risk, yet failed to act.
The majority opinion seems to discount this evidence and instead focuses on the fact that Novack told the intake officer that he was not contemplating suicide. Moreover, the majority opinion focuses on the conversation between Dr. Root, No-vack’s psychiatrist, and jail officials, where Root did not mention that Novack had any suicidal tendencies. These facts do not, however, allow us to draw a legal conclusion that Wood County Jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that Novack would harm himself.
The County.of Wood is the only remaining defendant. Local government liability cannot be based upon the theory of re-spondeat superior. As the majority opinion indicates, however, municipal liability can be demonstrated indirectly if a court can infer from -a series of bad acts that policymakers were condoning subordinates’ misconduct. See Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir.1995).
A reasonable jury could find that Wood County’s customs and lack of procedures caused the deliberate indifference to No-vack’s Eighth Amendment rights. First, the jury could find that there was a custom of not following certain procedures as it relates to mentally ill inmates and that this custom caused Novack’s suicide. For example, evidence suggests that the following jail policies were routinely ignored: (1) referral of mentally ill inmates to medical staff; (2) segregation of mentally ill from non-mentally ill inmates; (3) suicide watch for at-risk inmates where they are checked and a log completed every 15 minutes; (4) medicine consumed in front of officers; and (5) officers determining and documenting the reason that inmates decline food. By ignoring these policies, a reasonable jury could find that the jail showed deliberate indifference toward inmates who, like Novack, already had a demonstrated risk of suicide. Consequently, a jury could *535properly infer from these “bad acts” that Wood County Jail condoned this conduct.4
Second, a reasonable jury could find that the lack of certain jail procedures demonstrates deliberate indifference toward suicide risk inmates. Arden Geisler, the administrator of the jail since 1978, is responsible for policies and procedures at the Wood County Jail. Wisconsin state law makes the sheriff or other jailkeeper responsible for enacting a policy and procedure manual for the operation of the jail. See Wis. Stat. § 302.365(l)(a). The following procedures were not in place at Wood County Jail: (1) no health appraisal is conducted by a health care professional, even when initial screening warrants it; (2) a supervisor may remove an inmate from a suicide watch without consulting with a health professional; (3) no mental health professional examines an inmate after he is put on suicide watch; and (4) suicide risk assessments are not performed, even when initial screening warrants it. By failing to implement procedures to involve health care professionals in the care taking of mentally ill inmates who are specific suicide risks, a reasonable jury could find that the Wood County Jail showed deliberate indifference toward inmates who are known suicide risks.
While the district court should review the whole record, it must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant and can neither weigh the evidence nor make any credibility determinations. Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., — U.S. -, -, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).5 “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Consequently, we must give credence to the numerous facts that support plaintiffs’ allegations that Wood County Jail officials were aware of a substantial risk that Novack may imminently commit suicide. The weighing of this evidence is the sole province of the jury — not the district court, or this court. The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Wood County Jail should be reversed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority cites Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 990 (7th Cir.1998), for the proposition that placing an inmate on suicide watch may not demonstrate a subjective awareness of a substantial risk of imminent suicide. Collignon, however, concerns an inmate who killed himself after being released to the custody of his parents. The issue in Collignon was whether officials had a constitutional obligation to devise a treatment plan for the inmate, not whether they could have prevented his suicide while he was in custody.

. Pretrial detainees, who are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause for maltreatment while in custody, receive the same protection as inmates. See Payne, 161 F.3d at 1041.

. Other courts have denied summary judgment motions by defendants in similar situations. See Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 831-32, 835 (11th Cir.1990) (finding that a factfinder could conclude that defendants were deliberately indifferent to decedent’s needs because defendants were aware that decedent had contemplated suicide, continued to have suicidal tendencies, and was taking antidepressants); Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir.1989) (finding deliberate- indifference because the same jailers had rescued decedent from a previous suicide attempt); Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir.1986) (finding deliberate indifference because defendants knew that decedent had attempted suicide in a previous confinement); Viero v. Bufano, 925 F.Supp. 1374, 1377-78, 1388 (N.D.Ill.1996) (finding genuine issue of material fact because defendants knew about decedent's emotional health, his depression, his thoughts of suicide, and his need for medication); Guglielmoni v. Alexander, 583 F.Supp. 821 (D.Conn.1984) (finding genuine issue because inmate hanged himself after previous faked suicide); Matje v. Leis, 571 F.Supp. 918 (S.D.Ohio 1983) (finding genuine issue because inmate’s counsel had informed jailers of decedent's suicide threats).

. Moreover, the jail was arguably under constructive notice that some of its policies were not working. Less than a month before Nq-vack was incarcerated, another prisoner committed suicide while supposedly under continuous surveillance in the observation cell.

. While Reeves involved a judgment as a matter of law, the summary judgment analysis is identical. See - U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2110 ("[T]he standard for granting summary judgment 'mirrors’ the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that 'the inquiry under each is the same.’ " (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986))).