Court Opinion

ID: 9383643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 21:01:12.809153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:46.945187
License: Public Domain

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                                               PUBLISHED

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 20-7725

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                     Plaintiff – Appellee,

               v.

        DAVID TROY, III, a/k/a Buck Troy,

                      Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
        Terry L. Wooten, Senior District Judge. (4:04-cr-00811-TLW-4)

        Argued: January 27, 2023                                         Decided: March 29, 2023

        Before HARRIS, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Harris and Senior Judge Keenan joined.

        ARGUED: Jeremy A. Thompson, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
        Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Foster Bower, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: M. Rhett
        DeHart, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
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        DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge:

               David Troy III appeals the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under § 404

        of the First Step Act. Troy argues that the district court abused its discretion when it chose

        to retain his original sentence despite reducing his Guidelines range to account for his

        erroneous designation as a career offender. But the First Step Act does not permit a district

        court to recalculate a defendant’s benchmark Guidelines range “in any way other than to

        reflect the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act.” Concepcion v. United

        States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2402 n.6 (2022). Arguments based on other changes in law must

        be considered after determining the benchmark Guidelines range that will “anchor” the

        proceeding. Id. Since the Fair Sentencing Act did not affect Troy’s original Guidelines

        range, that range provides the appropriate starting point for our review. Given that starting

        point, the district court’s retention of his original sentence was both procedurally and

        substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                                      I.

               In 2004, Troy participated in the attempted robbery of Clifton Blackstock, a drug

        dealer in Georgetown County, South Carolina. Troy and his accomplices planned to

        impersonate police officers, pull Blackstock over, and rob him of money and drugs. But

        as Troy approached Blackstock’s door armed with a nine-millimeter handgun, he thought

        he saw Blackstock reach for a gun of his own. Troy fired at Blackstock, hitting him in the

        face. He and his accomplices fled empty-handed. Blackstock, though severely wounded,

        survived.

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               Troy pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 grams of cocaine

        base or 500 grams of cocaine, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, discharging a firearm in

        furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm

        as a convicted felon.     As part of his plea agreement, Troy cooperated with the

        Government’s investigation of a group of corrupt North Carolina police officers with

        whom Troy had committed various crimes, including robbing other drug dealers.

               In calculating a recommended sentence, the probation office determined Troy was

        a career offender based in part on a North Carolina conviction for possession of cocaine

        with intent to sell for which Troy received a ten-month suspended sentence. Because of

        his career offender status, Troy’s initial Guidelines range was 382–447 months. The

        district court then granted the Government’s motion for a four-level downward departure

        based on Troy’s cooperation, which reduced his Guidelines range to between 235 and 293

        months of imprisonment. Ultimately, the court imposed a total sentence of 276 months.

               Almost 15 years after his initial sentencing, Troy moved for a sentence reduction

        under § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, which gives retroactive effect to “the provisions

        of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . that reduced sentencing disparities between cocaine

        and crack cocaine offenses.” United States v. Swain, 49 F.4th 398, 399 (4th Cir. 2022).

        Though the Government opposed Troy’s motion, the parties agreed on three key points:

        (1) Troy was eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act, (2) Troy should not have

        received a career offender enhancement because, pursuant to United States v. Simmons,

        649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), his North Carolina conviction under that state’s

        Structured Sentencing Act was not a valid predicate offense, and (3) absent the Simmons

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        error, his Guidelines range would have been 121–151 months. 1           Nevertheless, the

        Government urged the district court to decline to reduce Troy’s sentence because of his

        criminal history and the violence of his offense.

               The district court agreed. The court found Troy eligible for resentencing and

        concluded that, after recalculating Troy’s Guidelines range to correct the Simmons error,

        his “ultimate sentencing range would be 121 to 151 months.” But rather than immediately

        rule on Troy’s motion for a sentence reduction, the court invited the parties to file

        supplemental briefs because it was “considering an upward departure or variance . . . based

        on the facts set forth in the Presentence Investigation Report and taken into consideration

        at the original sentencing.”

               In response, Troy argued that the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) favored a

        reduction of his sentence. He emphasized that his recalculated Guidelines range already

        accounted for the violence of his offense, that the only other violent crime for which he

        had been convicted — assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury — occurred

        when he was 17, that he had never served a sentence longer than six months before the

        conduct that led to his current incarceration, that the public had already been protected

        from him for 15 years, that his current age (48) reduced the likelihood of recidivism, and

               1
                 In Simmons, we held that a conviction under North Carolina’s Structured
        Sentencing Act is “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” only if the
        defendant himself was exposed to a potential prison sentence greater than one year. 649
        F.3d at 243. At the time of Troy’s original sentencing, by contrast, we considered “the
        maximum aggravated sentence that could be imposed for that crime upon a defendant with
        the worst possible criminal history.” United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir.
        2005), overruled by Simmons, 649 F.3d at 241.
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        that in light of his corrected Guidelines range, retaining his original sentence would

        effectively deny him credit for his cooperation.

               The district court listed these arguments and stated that it had “carefully considered”

        them but concluded that Troy’s proposed Guidelines range “fail[ed] to adequately address

        the egregious conduct in this case, particularly when coupled with [Troy’s] criminal

        history.” In addition to highlighting the details of the robbery and Troy’s prior record, the

        court specifically rejected the “proposition that [Troy] ha[d] aged out of . . . violent

        conduct,” in large part because Troy committed the violent acts for which he had been

        sentenced while in his 30s. The court also recounted “the process” that led to Troy’s initial

        sentence, explaining that because it granted Troy a reduction in his Guidelines range to

        reward his cooperation, Troy’s sentence was significantly lower than his initial sentencing

        range. The court then explained that when it imposed that sentence, “it had no expectation

        that, years later, there would be a change in the law that provides for a possible reduction”

        in Troy’s sentence. Accordingly, it denied Troy’s motion and retained his original 276-

        month sentence.

               Troy timely appealed, challenging the procedural and substantive reasonableness of

        the district court’s decision.

                                                     II.

               Before we can resolve the merits of Troy’s appeal, we must consider the effect of

        the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. 2389.

               Prior to Concepcion, we held that a district court considering a sentence reduction

        motion under the First Step Act must correct retroactive Guidelines errors when

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        recalculating a movant’s benchmark Guidelines range. See United States v. Chambers,

        956 F.3d 667, 673–75 (4th Cir. 2020). Relying on Chambers, Troy, the Government, and

        the district court in this case agreed that Troy’s Guidelines range had to be recalculated to

        account for the Simmons error at his original sentencing.

                But in Concepcion, decided after the briefing in this appeal, the Supreme Court held

        that:

                A district court cannot . . . recalculate a movant’s benchmark Guidelines
                range in any way other than to reflect the retroactive application of the Fair
                Sentencing Act. Rather, the First Step Act directs district courts to calculate
                the Guidelines range as if the Fair Sentencing Act’s amendments had been in
                place at the time of the offense. That Guidelines range “anchor[s]” the
                sentencing proceeding. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541, 133 S.
                Ct. 2072, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013). The district court may then consider
                postsentencing conduct or nonretroactive changes in selecting or rejecting an
                appropriate sentence, with the properly calculated Guidelines range as the
                benchmark.

        142 S. Ct. at 2402 n.6 (emphasis added) (alteration in original). 2

                In other words, Concepcion instructs district courts exercising their discretion under

        the First Step Act to proceed in two steps. First, they must recalculate the movant’s

        Guidelines range “only to the extent it adjusts for the Fair Sentencing Act.” United States

        v. Shields, 48 F.4th 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2022); see also Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2402 n.6,

        2403 n.8. Second, they may (and when raised by the parties, must) consider other legal

                The parties submitted supplemental briefs as to “what effect, if any, Concepcion
                2

        has on calculating the ‘benchmark Guidelines range’ in a First Step Act sentencing
        proceeding.” Order, United States v. Troy, No. 20-7725, ECF No. 41. Both Troy and the
        Government maintain that Concepcion did not abrogate in any way our previous decision
        in Chambers. For the reasons set forth within, we cannot agree.
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        and factual changes when deciding whether to impose a reduced sentence. Concepcion,

        142 S. Ct. at 2396, 2402 n.6.

               Thus, while a district court may consider other changes in the law when determining

        what reduction, if any, is appropriate in an individual case, the proper “benchmark” for the

        district court’s analysis (and for our review) is the impact of the Fair Sentencing Act on the

        defendant’s Guidelines range. Id. at 2402 & n.6. Because Chambers instructed district

        courts to recalculate a movant’s Guidelines range based on “intervening case law”

        unrelated to the Fair Sentencing Act, 956 F.3d at 672–75, that holding of Chambers does

        not survive Concepcion.

               The district court did not err in acknowledging the impact of the Simmons error on

        Troy’s Guidelines range — indeed, it was necessary to do so. Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at

        2404. But the court should not have done so until after it determined the appropriate

        starting point for Troy’s First Step Act proceedings. Id. at 2402 n.6. The correct

        benchmark was Troy’s original Guidelines range, 235 to 293 months, which was

        unaffected by the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act. 3

                                                     III.

               With those principles in mind, we turn to the district court’s denial of Troy’s motion

        for a sentence reduction, which we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Reed,

        58 F.4th 816, 819 (4th Cir. 2023). A district court abuses its discretion if its decision to

               3
                Though the district court erred by recalculating Troy’s benchmark Guidelines
        range to correct the Simmons error, that error was harmless. Even using the lower
        Guidelines range produced by correcting the Simmons error as its benchmark, the court still
        found Troy’s original sentence warranted.
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        retain or reduce a sentence under the First Step Act is procedurally or substantively

        unreasonable. Id. at 820; Swain, 49 F.4th at 399.

                                                    A.

               We begin by considering whether the district court’s denial of Troy’s motion was

        procedurally reasonable. In resolving a motion under the First Step Act, a district court’s

        discretion is broad and its burden light. Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404. District courts

        are not required to modify a sentence “for any reason” and may reject arguments they

        consider unconvincing in “a brief statement of reasons” and “without a detailed

        explanation.” Id. at 2402, 2404. But when district courts consider such motions, they must

        still “sentence the whole person before them,” “explain their decisions,” and “demonstrate

        that they considered the parties’ arguments.” Id. at 2398, 2404. Thus, for its resolution of

        a First Step Act motion to be procedurally reasonable, a district court must “consider a

        defendant’s arguments, give individual consideration to the defendant’s characteristics in

        light of the § 3553(a) factors, determine—following the Fair Sentencing Act—whether a

        given sentence remains appropriate in light of those factors, and adequately explain that

        decision.” United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347, 360 (4th Cir. 2021).

               Troy contends that the district court committed three procedural errors. We address

        each in turn.

                                                     1.

               Troy initially claims that the district court should have responded more thoroughly

        to his arguments about the length of his prior sentences, the amount of time he had already

        served, and his current age. But the court considered each of these arguments and found

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        them unconvincing. The court explained that it had considered “the length of [Troy’s]

        prior sentences,” that “the public has been protected from [Troy] for almost 15 years,” and

        that “his current age reduces the likelihood of recidivism.” It then explained why it

        believed the nature of the offense and Troy’s lengthy and sometimes violent criminal

        history justified his current sentence. Moreover, in addressing Troy’s arguments related to

        his youth at the time of his previous assault conviction, the Court pointed to the conduct

        underlying his current conviction (which occurred when Troy was in his 30s) to explicitly

        reject the “proposition that [Troy] has aged out of . . . violent conduct.”

               This explanation satisfies the “low bar” Concepcion set for district courts

        considering First Step Act motions. Reed, 58 F.4th at 823. The court was not required to

        “make a point-by-point rebuttal of the parties’ arguments.” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2405.

        It is enough that its opinion made clear why it found Troy’s arguments unpersuasive. See

        Reed, 58 F.4th at 823–24.

               Troy also asserts that the district court should have explicitly addressed his

        contention that, had he been charged with attempted murder, his Guidelines range would

        have been comparable to the lower Guidelines range produced by correcting the Simmons

        error. But Troy offered this counterfactual in support of his larger argument that the

        Guidelines already accounted for the seriousness of his offense.              The district court

        addressed that argument at length, concluding that the lower Guidelines range that would

        have applied absent the Simmons error “fail[ed] to adequately address the egregious

        conduct in this case,” particularly given Troy’s criminal history. Having rejected Troy’s

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        “central thesis,” the court was not obliged “to address separately each supporting data point

        marshalled on its behalf.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2020).

                                                     2.

               Troy next argues that the district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation for

        rejecting “the First Step Act’s resentencing mechanism” and the lower Guidelines range

        that correcting the Simmons error would have produced. Br. for Appellant at 20–21. In

        particular, he objects to the court’s remark that “[a]t the time the Court imposed this 23-

        year sentence, it had no expectation that, years later, there would be a change in the law

        that provides for a possible reduction.”

               Of course, the denial of a First Step Act motion may be unreasonable if based on a

        disagreement with Congress’ decision to eliminate the sentencing disparity between

        offenses involving crack and powder cocaine. See Swain, 49 F.4th at 403; United States v.

        Smith, 959 F.3d 701, 703 (6th Cir. 2020). But eliminating that disparity had no impact

        here. Accordingly, the district court’s rejection of this argument does not manifest any

        disagreement with Congress’ “central goal” in enacting the First Step Act. Concepcion,

        142 S. Ct. at 2402.

               Nor did the district court refuse to consider Troy’s argument regarding the Simmons

        error in his Guidelines range. Rather, the court emphasized the “process that occurred after

        [Troy] pled Guilty,” to explain why it believed Troy’s original sentence was “the ‘right’

        sentence,” even though correcting the Simmons error would have produced a lower

        Guidelines range. Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1966 (2018). Thus, the

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        court found that Troy’s 23-year sentence was “still appropriate today when applying the

        § 3553(a) factors.” That finding was procedurally reasonable.

                                                     3.

               Third, relying on United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 2015), Troy asserts

        that the district court failed to sentence him individually. Troy bases this argument on the

        district court’s comment that it would “impose the same sentence . . . on this defendant or

        any other defendant who committed similar conduct with a similar criminal background.”

               In Lymas, the district court imposed the same sentence on three codefendants,

        despite their different roles in the offenses and distinct Guidelines ranges. Id. at 109–11.

        It reasoned that the defendants “should receive the same sentence and should be punished

        equally across the board for what they did.” Id. at 111. We vacated all three sentences,

        explaining that the court had ignored many of the § 3553(a) factors and “essentially

        sentenced the crime itself rather than the individual defendants.” Id. at 113.

               Here, by contrast, examination of the record demonstrates that the district court

        sentenced Troy individually. In denying Troy’s motion, the court emphasized Troy’s

        specific role in the robbery and his individual criminal history. Indeed, at Troy’s original

        sentencing, the court explicitly stated that the different “circumstances” of Troy and his

        codefendants would (and did) produce different sentences. The court explained at the time

        that Troy deserved the highest sentence because he was the one “who fire[d] the shots.”

        Taken in context, the court’s comment was appropriately directed at justifying Troy’s

        sentence, not at “sentenc[ing] the crime itself.” Lymas, 781 F.3d at 111.

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                                                     B.

               Troy also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. To determine

        whether the denial of a First Step Act motion is substantively reasonable, we consider

        whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the district court “abused its discretion in

        concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Reed,

        58 F.4th at 820 (quoting Swain, 49 F.4th at 402). “[D]isagreement with how a district court

        balances the § 3553(a) factors is insufficient to overcome the district court’s discretion.”

        Swain, 49 F.4th at 403. Because Troy’s original Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months is

        the appropriate benchmark for our review, the 276-month sentence retained by the district

        court is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 519–20 (4th

        Cir. 2017).

               Troy relies on United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 2014), to argue that

        the district court placed too much weight on his conviction for an assault he committed

        when he was 17. But unlike the defendant in Howard, Troy’s juvenile offense was “not

        the sole, or even primary, basis for the district court’s decision.” See Nance, 957 F.3d at

        216 (distinguishing Howard). Here, the district court emphasized not just Troy’s juvenile

        assault conviction, but his “lengthy criminal record” that extended into adulthood.

        Moreover, the violence of the offense for which Troy was convicted increased the

        relevance of his earlier assault conviction. By contrast, the crime for which Howard was

        sentenced did not involve “any assaultive or other physically violent behavior.” Howard,

        773 F.3d at 535 n.12. Finally, while in Howard the district court deviated upwards from

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        the Guidelines range of 120–121 months to impose a life sentence, id. at 524, here the

        district court did not deviate from the proper Guidelines range at all.

               Troy also claims that the district court’s emphasis on the violence of the offense

        “cannot withstand serious scrutiny.” Br. for Appellant at 29. He argues that if he had been

        sentenced for attempted murder, his Guidelines range would have been “comparable to his

        correct sentencing range in this case.” Id. But again, Troy’s “correct sentencing range”

        for the purposes of his First Step Act motion is 235 to 293 months. Furthermore, the district

        court did not rely solely on the violence inherent in shooting a man in the face. Instead,

        the court considered the shooting in conjunction with “the highly-orchestrated attempted

        robbery itself” and Troy’s “prior conviction for violent conduct.” Moreover, Troy’s

        hypothetical ignores the complexity of the sentencing process. For example, if Troy were

        sentenced for attempted murder and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a drug

        trafficking crime, his Guidelines range would be ten years higher than if he were sentenced

        for attempted murder alone. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(b). Given these

        facts, the weight the district court placed on the violence of Troy’s offense was

        substantively reasonable.

                                                   IV.

               The district court considered Troy’s arguments and provided an adequate

        explanation for retaining his original sentence. Because its denial of Troy’s motion was

        both procedurally and substantively reasonable, the judgment of the district court is

                                                                                      AFFIRMED.

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