Court Opinion

ID: 9633488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:49:17.064135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:02.265719
License: Public Domain

JACOBSON, Presiding Judge,
dissenting in part, concurring in part.
I dissent only from that portion of the majority opinion granting interest from the date of “eopening. As to the other issues dealt with in the majority opinion, I concur.
My divergence with the majority on the interest issue is a narrow one and stems from what I perceive is a misapplication of A.R.S. § 44-1201, the general interest statute. In Tisdel v. Industrial Commission, 156 Ariz. 211, 213, 751 P.2d 527, 529 (1988), the supreme court held that the general interest statute, which allows for interest on a legal indebtedness, authorizes an award of interest on workers’ compensation benefits not timely paid. However, nothing in Tisdel intimates that a workers’ compensation “indebtedness” should be treated differently from any other legal indebtedness incurred in a commercial transaction or by virtue of a tort liability. While Tisdel’s holding clearly is not limited to permanent scheduled disability awards, the Tisdel claim nevertheless was readily capable of mathematical computation as to the amount of benefits owed by the earner.5 In short, the claim in Tisdel was liquidated.
Unfortunately, such is not the case here. The filing of a petition to reopen does not, in and of itself, establish the amount of compensation due a claimant. Upon reopening, assuming it is granted, compensation depends on a number of factors: (1) whether the reopening results in a determination of loss of earnings and, if so, the amount thereof; (2) whether the reopening results in a determination of additional disability and, if so, the amount thereof; and (3) whether the disability, if found, results in a loss of earning capacity and, if so, the amount thereof. This third factor, if no other, is a highly subjective determination, depending on how much, if anything, the claimant is able to earn on the open labor market with an industrially-caused disability. See generally Roach v. Industrial Comm’n, 137 Ariz. 510, 672 P.2d 175 (1983) (test in determining loss of earning capacity is whether employment reasonably is available that the claimant could reasonably be expected to perform; substantial or competent evidence required with regard to each part of the test). Admittedly, the award in this case involved interest on temporary disability benefits, but even temporary benefits can run the gauntlet from total to partial, with the amount of compensation varying between the two. See A.R.S. §§ 23-1044 and -1045.
The majority recognizes that prejudgment interest is not allowed on unliquidated claims. United California Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 140 Ariz. 238, 310, 681 P.2d 390, 462 (App.1983). The reasoning underlying this requirement of liquidation is essentially one of fairness: before a debtor, who has not agreed to pay interest, is required to do so, he must be given the opportunity to pay the debt and avoid the interest. If the amount of the debt is unknown, the debtor is not afforded this opportunity. See Schwartz v. Schwerin, 85 Ariz. 242, 250, 336 P.2d 144, 149 (1959); Cockrill v. Cockrill, 139 Ariz. 72, *36675, 676 P.2d 1130, 1133 (App.1983); Fogleman v. Peruvian Assocs., 127 Ariz. 504, 507, 622 P.2d 63, 67 (App.1980), overruled in part on other grounds, Fleming v. Pima County, 141 Ariz. 149, 685 P.2d 1301 (1984).
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, this claim is not made liquid merely because the right to recover and the theoretical amount of recovery are fixed by statute. Rather, I believe that this claim is unliquidated because the carrier cannot know, when the petition to reopen is filed, where within the statutory range of temporary disability benefits the claimant’s case will fall. In my opinion, this claim for compensation is not sufficiently mathematically certain so as to afford the carrier the opportunity to pay it and avoid the interest. This uncertainty relieves the carrier from the payment of interest.
I would set aside the award on this basis only.

. Tisdel was found to be stationary with a 10% functional loss of the lower extremity which, based upon Tisdel’s average monthly wage, entitied him to five months of permanent compensation at the rate of $415.18 per month, or $2,075.90. 156 Ariz. at 212, 751 P.2d at 528.