Court Opinion

ID: 9714271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:34:01.983498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:24.785207
License: Public Domain

SAYLOR, Justice,
concurring.
As the majority notes, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951—963 (the “PHRA”), is the initial source of the Reading Human Relations Commission’s (the “Commission’s”) competency to administer claims of discrimination, and subject matter jurisdiction is defined according to the compe*42tency of the administrative body to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented for its consideration belongs. Thus, in order for the Commission to have possessed jurisdiction over the present claim, such claim must fall within the general category of claims contemplated by the PHRA, or some other source of jurisdiction must be identified.
While not specifically couching its decision in jurisdictional terms, the Commonwealth Court plainly concluded that the general category of claims within the contemplation of the PHRA includes claims related to discriminatory conduct in the process of locating and applying for, and the financing, sale or rental of, housing, see 43 P.S. §§ 955(h), 955.3, but does not include claims of interference with a tenant’s quiet enjoyment by a neighbor. Since the present claim falls within this latter category, and no source of jurisdiction other than the PHRA has been identified, I cannot agree with the majority that the Commonwealth Court’s opinion does not in any way suggest that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Rather, in my view, the reasoning employed by the Commonwealth Court, if correct, would compel this conclusion.1
*43In determining the boundaries of unlawful discriminatory conduct, however, the Commonwealth Court looked only to the express provision of the PHRA. See generally 43 P.S. § 955. If the inquiry were so confined, I would be constrained to agree with the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that Section 155.07(Z) of the Ordinance entails a considerable expansion of the category of unlawful discriminatory conduct. Compare 43 P.S. § 955 (enumerating acts of unlawful discriminatory conduct under the PHRA), with Reading City Ordinance § 155.07(Z) (proscribing coercive, intimidating and threatening behavior at the local level).
I find it highly significant, however, that the General Assembly delegated to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (the “PHRC”) the authority to formulate policies and promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes and protections of the PHRA. See 43 P.S. § 957. Pursuant to such authority, the PHRC has enacted a regulation entitled “Coercion, threats and intimidation,” which renders it an unlawful discriminatory activity to
[tjhreaten, intimidate or interfere with persons in their enjoyment of a housing accommodation or commercial property because of the protected class of any person including, but not limited to, visitors or associates of the persons.
16 Pa.Code § 45.11. Assuming its validity, which is not here challenged, this regulation carries the force of law and a general presumption of reasonableness. See Borough of Pottstown v. Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Bd., 551 Pa. 605, 609-10, 712 A.2d 741, 743 (1998).2
Thus, the PHRC has determined that, in order for the right of fair housing to be maintained, the range of discriminatory *44conduct subject to redress must include coercive, intimidating and threatening behavior. The provision of the PHRA enabling local human relations commissions allows that a local commission may be given powers and duties similar to those exercised by the PHRC. See 43 P.S. § 962.1. Therefore, pursuant to such statute and by reference to the PHRC’s regulation, the Reading City Council had the ability to create a local human relations commission competent to redress threatening, coercive and intimidating conduct motivated by racial animus.3
For these reasons, I conclude that the Commission possessed the requisite jurisdiction over subject matter and thus am able to join in the disposition directed by the majority.

. The distinction between jurisdiction and authority is often implicated when dealing with tribunals of general jurisdiction, such as courts of common pleas, which derive their broad grant of general subject matter jurisdiction from the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Pa. Const. Art. V, Section 5. The General Assembly, however, has the power to direct the manner in which the common pleas courts’ jurisdiction is exercised, and thus to define its authority. Id. For example, the General Assembly has provided that the jurisdiction of common pleas courts over certain orphans’ court matters must be exercised through an orphans' court division. See 20 Pa.C.S. § 711. Thus, while courts of common pleas can be said to possess general subject matter jurisdiction over such matters in the first instance, only the orphans’ court divisions have the authority to administer them.
A local human relations commission, on the other hand, is entirely a creature of statute; therefore, the outer limits of its competency (and thus its subject matter jurisdiction) is defined solely by statute, most frequently the enabling legislation. While local governing bodies may have the ability to limit a commission's authority (thus implicating the jurisdiction versus authority question), the issue presented by the Commonwealth Court’s opinion is whether the Reading City Council has attempted to expand the range of the Commission’s competency beyond *43the jurisdictional limit established in the enabling provisions of the PHRA. In my view, this is a question of subject matter jurisdiction.

. Notably, several federal courts have found that Section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3617, which contains language similar to the PHRC regulation, as well as Section 157(Z) of the Ordinance, protects individuals from interference by their neighbors for discriminatory reasons in the peaceful enjoyment of their homes. See, e.g., Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F.Supp. 238, 239, 242-43 (E.D.N.Y.1998).

. I note that the availability of civil penalties for unlawful discriminatory acts (such as the $500 fine imposed by the Commission in this case) is expressly restricted to certain acts enumerated by the PHRA. See 43 P.S. § 959(f)(2). Thus, in my view, there is a substantial legal issue as to the availability of such penalties pursuant to the PHRC’s regulation at 16 Pa.Code § 45.11, and, correspondingly, Section 157(1) of the Ordinance. I would therefore require the Commonwealth Court, on remand, to address this issue to the extent that it has not been waived.