Court Opinion

ID: 9790166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:47:38.693459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:26.943835
License: Public Domain

Hunter, J.
(dissenting) — For the purpose of this dissent, I deem it advisable to again set out the statute under consideration, Laws of 1947, chapter 271, § 1, p. 1155 [cf. RCW 43.51.020].
“There is hereby created a ‘State Parks and Recreation Commission’ consisting of seven electors of the state which shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties now vested in and required to be performed by the State Board of Park Commissioners or the State Parks Committee. The members of the Commission except three shall be appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall serve for a term of six years, expiring on December 31 of even numbered years: Provided, That of the members first appointed one shall be appointed for a term of two years, one for a term of four years, and two for a term of six years. Three members may be elected state officials and shall be appointed by the Governor and serve during the term for which they were elected.
“In making the appointments to the Commission, the Governor shall choose electors who understand park and recreation needs and interests. No person, except the three elected state officials mentioned herein shall be appointed if he holds any elective or appointive state, county or municipal office. Members of the Commission shall be entitled to be paid a per diem of fifteen dollars ($15), except that no public official shall receive a per diem, for each day actually spent on duties pertaining to the Commission, and in addition shall be allowed their expenses incurred while absent from their usual places of residence upon the same basis as expenses are payable to state officials and employees.” (Italics mine.)
In determining the legislative intent in the construction of this statute, the majority most convincingly supports its conclusions by the writer’s scholarly analysis of the history of the enactment, and is even more persuasive by detailing the circumstances of the amendment prior to its adoption *167by the legislature’s substitution of the word “may” in place of the word “shall.”
The majority, however, appears to have overlooked the application of a cardinal rule of statutory construction that the legislative intent is also obtained by a consideration of the act in its entirety. It seems to have placed undue emphasis on the change of one word to the exclusion of the language in the remainder of the enactment, which we are -compelled to consider in the disposition of this case. The rule is succinctly stated in 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.), 339, § 4705:
“ ‘It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.’ A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.” (Italics mine.)
The court stated in Spokane County ex rel. Sullivan v. Glover, 2 Wn. (2d) 162, 97 P. (2d) 628 (1940):
“There is no universal rule or absolute test by which it can be positively determined whether a provision in a statute is mandatory or directory. In the determination of that question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent as disclosed by all the terms and provisions of the act in relation to the subject of legislation, and by a consideration of the nature of the act, the general object to be accomplished, and the consequences that would result from construing the particular statute in one way or another. 59 C. J. 1072, § 631; 25 R.C.L. 767, § 14.” (Italics mine.)
In DeGrief v. Seattle, 50 Wn. (2d) 1, 297 P. (2d) 940 (1956), this court again said:
“ ‘It is too well-established to need citation of authority that a court may not place a narrow, literal, and technical construction upon a part only of a statute and ignore other relevant parts. In the process of construction, the intention of the lawmakers must be extracted from a consideration of all of the provisions of the act.’ In re Cress, 13 Wn. (2d) 7, 123 P. (2d) 767.
“In construing a statute, the legislative intent must be *168gleaned from a consideration of the whole act by giving effect to the entire statute and every part thereof. State v. Houck, 32 Wn. (2d) 681, 203 P. (2d) 693, and cases cited.
• “ ‘It is our duty to construe two statutes dealing with the same subject so that -the integrity of both will be. maintained, . Buell v. McGee, 9 Wn. (2d) 84, 90, 113 P. (2d) 522 (1941). The same rule applies to the construction of parts of one act. Each part must be'construed in connection with every other part or section. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.), 336, § 4703.’ Tacoma v. Cavanaugh, 45 Wn. (2d) 500, 275 P. (2d) 933.” (Italics mine.)
In applying the above rules, the court is bound to glean the legislative intent from that which the statute discloses in its most reasonable sense from its entire examination irrespective of legislative history and change of specific words by amendment. This is a corollary to the rule, so well known citation is unnecessary — that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences 'of his acts. In this instance, the legislature must therefore be presumed to intend to mean just what it says in accordance with the language of the entire enactment through which it speaks.
When read in its entirety the act becomes illogical and inconsistent with construction of the word “may” as permissive, as concluded by the majority. The absurd result of this construction is:
(1) On the one hand, four members of the state parks and recreation commission are appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. On the other hand, three members can be appointed by the -governor who are other than elected state officials, without the advice and consent of the senate.
(2) On the one hand, four members of the state parks and recreation commission are appointed for terms of six years. On the other hand, three members other than elected state officials may be appointed by the governor, with no term whatsoever.
Considering the word “may” as mandatory gives the true meaning and intent of the statutory language. It renders logical the inconsistencies and absurdities above pointed out.
*169- (1) The governor would be-required to appoint to the commission, in addition to the four members appointed with the advice and consent of the senate, three elected state officials who being designated in the enactment by the legislative body, removes any reason for their appointment with the advice and consent of the senate.
(2) The governor would be required to appoint to the commission, four members whose terms would be six years, and three elected state officials whose terms would be that for which they were elected.
The latter construction appears so obviously correct when considered that there would appear to be no room left for disagreement. ' This demonstrated legislative intent found in the statute itself, overcomes any other theory of interpretation. Rules of construction require this court to adopt this logical intendment as compared to the illogical result that must be given the statute with a permissive power of appointment lodged in the governor.
The majority recognizes the rule requiring language which is permissive to be given a mandatory meaning where the act reflects such an intent upon the part of the legislature:
“While it is true that language which is ordinarily permissive is to be given a mandatory construction where the act reflects such an intent upon the part of the legislature [citations omitted], we are unable to find that a mandatory construction of the permissive word ‘may’ is required in the present case in order to effectuate the intent of the legislature.” (Italics mine.)
The error committed in this instance is in the application of the rule by the majority’s failure to consider the legislative language in its entirety.
The majority finally concludes that the word “may” must be permissive to enable the governor to comply with the following language in the enactment:
“ . . . In making the appointments to the Commission, the Governor shall choose electors who understand park and recreation needs and interests.” (Italics mine.)
*170Again this language must be read with the entire act. A mandatory construction of the word “may” would not defeat the appointment of seven qualified electors as contemplated by the statute. The governor would exercise his discretion in appointing four qualified members of the commission, and the remaining three members appointed would be presumed qualified, having been designated by the legislature to be members of the commission. Their ability to “understand park and recreation needs and interests” could hardly be questioned when they are men of such capacity and stature that the majority of the people of the state of Washington were willing to repose in them the necessary trust and confidence to carry out the high responsibilities of the respective offices to which they had been elected.
The language of the statute in its entirety discloses a legislative intent that the word “may” be given a mandatory construction. The governor was without authority to appoint more than four electors who were not elected state officials to the state parks and recreation commission.
The writ should be denied.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Hunter, J.