Court Opinion

ID: 9755406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:37:18.057106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:07.025978
License: Public Domain

SCOTT BRISTER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In hindsight, it appears appellant was not engaged in criminal activity while parked behind a closed strip shopping center at 2:30 a.m. on a cold December night in 1999. His criminal activity (driving while intoxicated-for the second time) occurred when he drove off just after a police officer on patrol turned off the highway to investigate. It is possible appellant’s departure at the same time the police arrived was coincidental, but of course the officer had no way of knowing that at the time. It is possible that “reasonable suspicion” may arise when, among other circumstances, an individual flees at the approach of the police. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1549 n. 1, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and assuming the trial court made implicit findings of fact that would buttress its conclusion, see Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex.Crim.App.2000), I believe the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop appellant. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
I concede that in most Texas cases involving similar fact situations (including several cited in the majority opinion), appellate courts have found the traffic stops improper. But there are at least two reasons why I think these cases may no longer apply.
First, a traffic stop passes Fourth Amendment scrutiny if an officer can point to specific and articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 *78(1968). From 1976 until 1997, however, any observations that were “as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity” could not establish reasonable suspicion. See Armstrong v. State, 550 S.W.2d 25, 31 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). Both the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently rejected this “as consistent with innocent activity” test. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The public rightfully expects officers to investigate circumstances consistent with criminal activity, even if such circumstances may also have an innocent explanation. Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 37. Because most of the cases cited in the majority opinion were decided during this twenty-year period between 1976 and 1997, we do not know how many might be decided differently under current standards.
Second, the “totality of the circumstances” test does not allow us to eliminate particular factors on a piecemeal basis, as the majority opinion partly does. The United States Supreme Court recently rejected this “divide-and-conquer analysis” in its unanimous opinion in United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Instead, we must view all of the factors together, including the officer’s specialized training and familiarity with customs in the area. Id. at 754 (holding Ninth Circuit erred by applying standards of a San Francisco highway to a stop occurring on a primitive road in southeastern Arizona).
In this case, Officer Whitenack had been with the Tomball police department for seven years, and was necessarily familiar with the scene, as it abutted the only major thoroughfare in this small community. He testified he found it suspicious that a pick-up truck would be parked (1) across rather than within painted parking spaces, (2) in a small lot where only employees parked, (3) behind a closed shopping center, (4) at which there had been previous burglaries, (5) at 2:30 a.m. on a cold morning. He also found it suspicious that the truck left when he pulled up to investigate. Viewing all the evidence, I would find that these facts gave rise to a reasonable suspicion, and thus would affirm the trial court’s judgment.