Court Opinion

ID: 9466741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:26:06.698363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:55.641148
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge,
concurring, in which LUMBARD, Circuit Judge, joins:
I concur in part in Judge Newman’s carefully-considered, thorough opinion and in the result he reaches. However, except as to the denial of the petition for transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), I disagree with the resolution of this case on equitable principles.
In my view the action taken by the Federal Communications Commission at the public meeting of December 12,1979, which bound the parties immediately, was sufficiently final not only to serve as the basis for judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 2344 but also to serve as the starting bell for the race to the courthouse dictated by 28 U.S.C. § 2112. In short, the Commission’s adoption of an immediately-effective order on December 12, 1979, accompanied by its release of minutes of the meeting and a description of its decision and order, was both final and unambiguous, rendering it unnecessary to resort to equitable considerations to determine when the Commission’s action became final for purposes of these sections.
The action taken by the Commission at its December 12 meeting had all the basic elements of finality, which are
“whether the process of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences will flow from the agency action.” Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71, 91 S.Ct. 203, 209, 27 L.Ed.2d 203 (1970).
The decision and order, although described in the release as “unofficial,” became effective on that date. ITT and the other international carriers were thereupon bound by it. Since the meeting was a public one all parties had an equal opportunity to learn fairly and simultaneously of the Commission’s action and of the terms of its order and decision. See International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 610 F.2d 956, 963 (D.C.Cir. 1979).
Of course, the Commission has the power to specify the event which starts the race to the courthouse, provided it acts reasonably and does not contravene a statutory objective, Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 676, 70 S.Ct. 876, 881, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. EPA, 610 F.2d 187, 188 (4th Cir. 1979); Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Products Safety Comm’n, 600 F.2d 12, 13 (5th Cir. 1979); Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 969 (D.C.Cir. 1977). Indeed, if the Commission had done so in the present case, its action might have foreclosed the issue before us. As the D.C. Circuit recently stated in a slightly different context in International Union of Electrical,. Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, supra, 610 F.2d at 964,
*1210“If the federal administrative agencies would promulgate straightforward regulations explaining how and when their reviewable orders are to issue, protracted procedural disputes born of the desire to win the race to the courthouse would largely be consigned to an early grave.”
This comment is appropriate here. In the present case the Commission has not expressly fixed any date for the start of the race.
Even if there were an ambiguity as to which event started the race, it should be resolved in favor of the December 12, 1979, date rather than relegate parties in future contests to the uncertainties created by invocation of equitable considerations, which lead to repetitious filings of petitions for review and more frequent litigation, expensive to participants and burdensome to the courts, of the type encountered in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). As Judge Newman notes, we should endeavor to eliminate the necessity for parties to rush to the courthouse every time an agency takes an action which could arguably be considered a final decision. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NRC, 598 F.2d 759, 768 n. 35 (3d Cir. 1979); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costie, 582 F.2d 108, 112 (1st Cir. 1978); Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, 228 (D.C.Cir. 1960). This is avoided by our holding that, absent a regulation fixing another date, the action taken at a public meeting of the type held in this case on December 12, 1979, is final for purposes of both §§ 2112 and 2344.
' For the reasons stated by Judge Newman we also concur in the holding that the petition for transfer should be denied.