Court Opinion

ID: 9479378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:16:07.876382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:59.218659
License: Public Domain

BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
Because I believe that the documents generated in connection with the chemical testing are discoverable under Fed.R. Crim.P. 16, I respectfully dissent.
I. The Discovery Ruling
Rule 16(a)(1)(D) specifies that “[u]pon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports ... of scientific tests or experiments ... which are within the possession, custody or control of the government ... and which are material to the preparation of the defense. ...” The construction of the rule is a question of law which we review de novo. See United States v. Horowitz, 756 F.2d 1400, 1403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 74, 88 L.Ed.2d 60 (1985).
The government refused a request that encompasses the chemist’s log notes. All that has been furnished is a report containing the weight of the substance tested and the conclusory statement that the material contained heroin with a strength of 54.9%.
For its restrictive construction of the terms “any results or reports” the majority relies on certain dictionary definitions of a report as “an official or formal statement of facts or proceedings,” and “result” as “the conclusion or end to which any course or condition of thing leads.” Just as the devil may quote scriptures, however, a dissent can also cite from dictionaries. Thus Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1950), defines “report” as “an account or relation, esp. of some matter specially investigated”. Id. at 2113. The log notes are accounts of the chemical investigation. The Random House College Dictionary (rev. ed. 1980), defines “report” as “an account or statement describing in detail an event, situation, or the like.” Id. at 1119. Again, the log notes constitute an account describing in detail the chemical testing. The one line summary submitted, however, describes only the chemist’s conclusion and certainly is not a detailed description of the testing.
When we look to dictionary definitions of “results” we likewise find considerable *1525flexibility. Thus Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1950), includes in its definition “[sjomething obtained, achieved, brought about, etc., by calculation, investigation or the like-” Id. at 2126. The log notes were obtained and brought about by the chemical investigation of the substance. “Result” is defined in the Random House College Dictionary (rev. ed. 1980), as “outcome; consequence.” Id. at 1126. Again the log notes are an outcome and consequence of the testing.
Dictionary definitions, therefore, are not determinative and we must endeavor to ascertain the sense in which the terms were used when the amendments to Rule 16 were enacted.
Originally, Rule 16 discovery grants were discretionary and limited to possessions seized or otherwise obtained from the defendant. Court decisions on narcotics testing held that while defendants were entitled to have their own experts test and independently verify the composition of the drugs at issue, they were not entitled to inspect the government’s records. See, e.g., United States v. Tirado, 25 F.R.D. 270, 271 (S.D.N.Y.1958); United States v. Bentvena, 193 F.Supp. 485, 498 (S.D.N.Y.1960). The rationale was that the drugs obtained by the government had once belonged to the defendant, whereas governmental paperwork was exclusively government property. Tirado, 25 F.R.D. at 271; United States v. Fuentes, 25 F.R.D. 278, 279 (S.D.N.Y.1958); United States v. Lopez, 26 F.R.D. 174, 175 (S.D.N.Y.1960).
In 1966, Rule 16 was amended, inter alia, to authorize discovery of the “results or reports ... of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with a particular case.” The language, however, remained permissive. Despite the drafters’ intent to liberalize discovery, the courts continued to deny detailed information about the government’s drug testing procedures. See, e.g., United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311, 320-21 (10th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915, 94 S.Ct. 1411, 39 L.Ed.2d 469 (1974); Wolford v. United States, 401 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir.1968).
The 1975 amendment to Rule 16 replaced the permissive language with mandatory language. The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules commented that “[t]he rule is intended to prescribe the minimum amount of discovery to which the parties are entitled.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1974 amendment.
The American Bar Association’s recommendations on pretrial discovery were cited frequently in the committee’s notes and were clearly given much weight. The ABA supports discovery of the type requested by Iglesias: “Where counsel is able, prior to trial, to become familiar with relevant tests, to determine that the tests performed were appropriate, and to become familiar with test procedures, midtrial continuances and laborious cross-examinations of the experts may be avoided.” ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Commentary to Standard ll-2.1(a)(iv), (1986 Supp. vol. 2).
The advisory committee notes indicate that the term “any results or reports” is to be given a liberal, not a restricted construction.1 The purpose is to enable counsel, prior to trial, to become familiar with the relevant tests, to determine that the testing was appropriate and to become familiar with the test procedures. A report such as that submitted by the government in this case, which is limited to a statement that the material tested contained heroin, tells nothing but the ultimate result of the relevant tests. It does not enable counsel to determine whether the testing was appropriate or to become familiar with the test procedures. Only if counsel is entitled to inspect and copy the log notes and any *1526other documents generated in connection with the testing will the attorney be able to determine whether the testing was appropriate.
The majority states that “unlike the final reports, the preliminary log notes are much more likely to be distorted and misused.” The final report in this case is of no use in determining whether the testing was appropriate. Only by means of the notes may counsel ascertain anything about the method and accuracy of the testing. Counsel is entitled to explore any inconsistencies or ambiguities contained in the notes.
There is a striking absence of federal case law construing the term “any results or reports.” There is no Ninth Circuit opinion on point. One Fifth Circuit decision ruled on the question without explaining its rationale. If this type of dispute is so unusual, the materials requested by Iglesias must routinely be granted and hence the issue has rarely come before the courts. In fact it is difficult to understand the government’s reluctance to furnish the information sought in this case.
One case supports the majority. In United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir.1981) the Fifth Circuit denied discovery of a chemist’s personal work notes and procedural manual in a case involving charges of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The court, however, gave no analysis of Rule 16 or reasons for its conclusion.
Although none is directly on point, there are a United States Court of Appeals ease and some state cases interpreting “results or reports.” In Holloway v. United States, 343 F.2d 265 (D.C.Cir.1964) the court held that the district court erred in determining a criminal defendant’s competence to stand trial on the basis of a letter merely stating that the accused was competent. Although D.C.Code § 24-301 allowed the trial court to determine competence on the basis of a “report” or “certificate,” the court held the letter in this case did not qualify as a report because it did not inform the court of the information and reasons upon which it rested. Id. at 268.
In State v. Burgess, 482 So.2d 651 (La.Ct.App.1986), the court held that a Louisiana discovery statute similar in part to Rule 16 required more than the conclusory report of two experts. The trial court had held that “results mean the ultimate result, not all of the combined tests that might go into coming to an ultimate result or report.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a purpose of the discovery statute was to afford the defendant a chance to prepare adequately for trial.
We are of the opinion that disclosure of the various examination and/or test results used by an expert to formulate his conclusionary opinion is necessary for defendant’s adequate preparation for trial, particularly the cross-examination of that expert. Fundamental fairness and due process require that the defense be given the opportunity, prior to trial, to examine the basis from which an expert reaches his conclusion.
482 So.2d 651 at 653.
In Wynn v. State, 423 So.2d 294 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), the court held that the term “results” as used in a stipulation for admission of results of a polygraph examination covered not only the examiner’s final conclusion but background information necessary for evaluation of his opinion. Id. at 300.
As indicated previously, there is admittedly scant authority construing Rule 16’s use of the phrase “any results or reports.” It is clear, however, that each amendment of the rule was for the purpose of expanding discovery rights. The goal of the amended rule is to enable counsel, prior to trial, to become familiar with the relevant tests and test procedures and to determine whether the tests performed were appropriate. See ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Commentary to Standard 11-2.-l(a)(iv)(1986 Supp. vol. 2). The conclusory statement furnished in this case furthers none of these goals.
Iglesias requested:
[a]ll documents associated with any aspect of any scientific analysis of any controlled substance seized or otherwise obtained in the course of any investigation leading to or otherwise associated with the prosecution of this case. This request includes but is not limited to *1527those records memorializing the storage and transportation of any such substance from the time of seizure or acquisition and thereafter up to and including the trial in this matter.
I would hold that Iglesias was entitled to inspect and copy “all documents of whatever sort generated in connection with” the tests, including the notes of the examiner. They are “results” of the testing. The manuals or guidelines used in the testing, and the instructions provided by the manufacturers of the test equipment, are not, strictly speaking, results or reports of the tests. The rule, however, is intended to provide the minimum amount of discovery to which the parties are entitled. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1974 amendment.
Although Iglesias appears to have waived the argument, the manuals, guidelines, and instructions may be discoverable under 16(a)(1)(C). See United States v. Bel-Mar Laboratories, Inc., 284 F.Supp. 875, 887 (E.D.N.Y.1968). That subpara-graph of the rule provides that the government shall, upon request, permit the defendant “to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, [or] documents ... which are within the possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense_” The rule is mandatory. Requiring production of testing manuals and instructions appears to further the purpose of the rule and to come within its scope. The government has not questioned the materiality of the items requested. Unless the government shows that the materials are not within its possession, custody, or control, or shows that they are internal government documents falling within the exception set forth in Rule 16(a)(2), it would be error for the district court to deny that portion of the request. Even if Iglesias waived an argument based on Rule 16(a)(1)(C), however, at least some of the requested materials were discoverable under 16(a)(1)(D). Accordingly, I would reverse the discovery ruling.
II. The Consent to Search
I can concur in the affirmance of the district court’s finding that Ms. Anderson’s consent to search was voluntary. I am concerned, however, that officer May allegedly advised that he would “have a grand jury subpoena issued” and would conduct a search with dogs. Truthfully, he could state that he would seek the issuance of the subpoena and a search warrant. While the difference may be a nicety, officers should not overstate their authority in order to induce a consent to search. Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this ease I cannot find that the district court’s finding of voluntariness was clearly erroneous.

. Similarly the Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-247, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p. 674 state: "The Committee believes that it is desirable to promote greater pretrial discovery. As stated in the advisory committee note,
broader discovery by both the defense and the prosecution will contribute to the fair and efficient administration of criminal justice by aiding in informed plea negotiations, by minimizing the undesirable effect of surprise at trial, and by otherwise contributing to an accurate determination of the issue of guilt or innocence_”