Court Opinion

ID: 9965032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 15:12:50.756026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:40.388944
License: Public Domain

No. 282                 May 1, 2024                       389

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

               In the Matter of W. (C.) K.,
                          a Child.
          DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                  Petitioner-Respondent,
                            and
                         W. (C.) K.,
                        Respondent,
                             v.
                          M. A. Z.,
                         Appellant.
             Multnomah County Circuit Court
                  20JU02869; A180913

   Jacqueline L. Alarcón, Judge.
   Argued and submitted September 7, 2023.
   Sarah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Shannon Storey,
Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent Department of Human
Services. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
   Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for respondent W. (C.) K.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
   POWERS, J.
   Affirmed.
390   Dept. of Human Services v. M. A. Z.
Cite as 332 Or App 389 (2024)                             391

        POWERS, J.
         Father appeals from a judgment changing the per-
manency plan for his child, C, from reunification to guard-
ianship. He challenges the juvenile court’s determination
that (1) the Department of Human Services (DHS) made
reasonable efforts toward reunification and (2) that his prog-
ress toward reunification was insufficient. On appeal, father
contends that DHS’s efforts failed to focus on the jurisdic-
tional basis of repairing his relationship with C, and that C’s
attorney, as the party seeking the change in plan, failed to
meet the burden to prove that father’s progress qualified as
insufficient. We conclude that sufficient evidence supports
the juvenile court’s determination and, accordingly, affirm.
          In the absence of de novo review, which neither
party has requested, we are bound by the court’s findings
of fact if there is any evidence in the record to support those
findings. Dept. of Human Services v. G. N., 263 Or App 287,
294, 328 P3d 728, rev den, 356 Or 638 (2014). We view the
evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissi-
ble derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the
juvenile court’s determination and assess whether, when so
viewed, the record was legally sufficient to permit that out-
come. Dept. of Human Services v. D. W. C., 258 Or App 163,
165, 308 P3d 316, rev den, 354 Or 490 (2013). In view of that
standard, we set out a limited recitation of the underlying
facts and procedural history.
                      BACKGROUND
          DHS removed C, who was 10 years old, and C’s two
younger siblings (who are not subject to this appeal) from
mother’s custody in May 2020. Mother, who is not a party
to this appeal, had a history of suffering from paranoia,
schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. Under mother’s care,
the family moved frequently and experienced housing insta-
bility, often living in shelters and motels. Mother told C lies
about father, including telling C that father had “violated”
him when he was younger, and that father was looking for
them and was going to kill them.
         Father lives in Centralia, Washington with his wife
and five boys. He first learned of C’s existence in 2013, when
392                     Dept. of Human Services v. M. A. Z.

C was about three years old, and DHS contacted father to
establish paternity for child support. Sometime in 2014,
mother’s family contacted father and asked him to care for
C. C was in father’s care for approximately one week before
law enforcement removed C and returned him to mother.
Father initiated a pro se custody proceeding but was never
able to locate and serve mother.
         Father was notified after DHS took protective cus-
tody of C in May 2020, and he indicated that he wanted to
parent C. While considering placement, DHS initiated two
psychological assessments for C, which suggested C had
experienced a significant amount of trauma and neglect
in his life. The assessments showed a “high probability”
diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD with
dissociation, derealization, and “intense re-experiencing
including auditory and possibly visual phenomena.” The
assessments also revealed “moderate probability” diagno-
ses for both autism spectrum disorder and attention deficit/
hyperactivity disorder or ADHD, and a “monitor” status for
Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum or other psychotic dis-
orders. The assessments recommended therapy for C and
that any changes in placement be handled carefully and
slowly.
         C was placed in non-relative foster care, and the
juvenile court ordered DHS to “make reasonable efforts to
provide therapeutic visitation” with father. The basis for
dependency jurisdiction was father’s stipulation that he was
“not able to be a custodial resource without DHS involve-
ment to repair the relationship with the child.” DHS facil-
itated visits immediately, including two in May 2020, and
the visits continued although they were infrequent due to
COVID, father’s work schedule, and the geographic distance.
DHS provided funding to help with travel costs, arranged
for father to attend parenting classes, and implemented an
Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC) study
on father’s home. Father identifies as Latino, and the agency
hired a mentor to aid C in adjusting to father’s home because,
according to a DHS caseworker, C was experiencing “culture
shock” having not been around a Latino family.
Cite as 332 Or App 389 (2024)                                 393

         By September 2021, father was approved to host
overnight visits, and DHS implemented monthly weekend
visits between father and C. In October 2021, C started
individual therapy with Durocher, the first therapy he was
provided since DHS took custody in May 2020. C developed
a trusting relationship with Durocher, and DHS asked
her to engage in family therapy with father and C, jointly.
Around the same time, DHS engaged Dr. Bennett to conduct
another psychological evaluation of C. Bennett noted that
C’s struggle to decide whether he wanted to live with father
was generating considerable stress. C expressed ideations of
self-harm during the evaluation, and Bennett stressed that
it was important that C not carry the weight of deciding
where his permanent placement would be. She emphasized
that C needed to be parented by “a skilled caregiver who has
some insights about the impact of his traumatic experiences
on his emotional well-being, and who is capable of providing
calm, consistent, and nurturing responses when he is exhib-
iting distress, sadness or frustration.”
       In February 2022, a number of events occurred that
eventually led to DHS to end visits between father and C:
  •   At the second family therapy session, father arrived
      “escalated” due to a miscommunication about where
      to meet. In C’s presence, father was “pretty upset and
      was raising his voice.” C was supposed to go home with
      father for the weekend, but the caseworker eventually
      cancelled the visit and C left with his resource parent.
  •   At individual therapy, C told Durocher that father
      spanked his other child “pretty hard,” and that “really
      bothered” C.
  •   At individual therapy, C told Durocher that he had
      decided that he did not want to live with father and said
      he wanted to share that with father during their fam-
      ily session. C told Durocher that father had expressed,
      from the beginning, that father would support C’s deci-
      sion on where he wanted to live. At the family session,
      Durocher raised the issue with father, saying “C is say-
      ing that this is what he wants.” Father became upset,
      would not listen to C when he tried to express himself,
      and refused Durocher’s request to leave the office to
      “cool off.” Eventually, Durocher sent C out of the office,
394                      Dept. of Human Services v. M. A. Z.

      the weekend visit with father was cancelled, and father
      was asked to leave. Durocher did not “feel very safe”
      about continuing family therapy with father, and DHS
      made the decision to end it.
  •   At individual therapy, C told Durocher that he consid-
      ered running away or killing himself if he had to live
      with father and that he did not want to continue doing
      family therapy.
         DHS canceled unsupervised visits, met with C to
consider how to support him during visits with father, met
with father to discuss how to continue visits, offered father
anger management classes, and engaged a therapeutic
skill builder to work with father on his relationship with C.
Father attended one supervised visit with C and the skill
builder but did not otherwise engage with her or respond to
her efforts to contact him. Father began individual counsel-
ing with a mental health therapist to gain skills to better
parent C.
         At C’s request, his attorney filed a motion to change
the plan from permanency to guardianship. Following a
hearing, the juvenile court referee issued a permanency
order changing the plan to guardianship. Father requested
a rehearing, which required appearances on six separate
days and took over five months to complete. Conducting
de novo review, the juvenile court determined that DHS
had made reasonable efforts toward reunification and that
father had not made sufficient progress for C to be safely
returned to his care. Specifically, the court found C’s threats
of self-harm to be credible, that father minimized C’s mental
health needs, and that father had “not engaged in therapy
in a way that he can develop a relationship with [C] that is
safe and appropriate.” The court issued a permanency judg-
ment changing the plan from reunification to guardianship.
Father timely appeals from that judgment.
                        DISCUSSION
         Changing a child’s permanency plan from reuni-
fication to guardianship requires a determination by the
juvenile court that the party seeking the change proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) DHS made reasonable
efforts to make it possible for the child to safely reunify with
Cite as 332 Or App 389 (2024)                               395

the parent, and (2) notwithstanding those efforts, the par-
ent’s progress was insufficient to allow reunification. ORS
419B.476(2)(a); Dept. of Human Services v. V. A. R., 301 Or App
565, 567, 456 P3d 681 (2019). Here, C sought the change in
plan and contends that the court correctly determined that
DHS made reasonable efforts toward reunification and that
father’s progress was insufficient. DHS, for its part, con-
tends that it made reasonable efforts but takes no position
as to whether father made sufficient progress or whether the
juvenile court correctly changed the plan to guardianship.
In challenging the court’s determination, father argues that
DHS’s significant delay in implementing therapy was unrea-
sonable in light of the jurisdictional basis and that his efforts
to engage with his own therapist to understand C’s trauma
showed sufficient progress toward reunification.
          Reasonable efforts. For purposes of ORS 419B.476(2)
(a), reasonable efforts are “efforts that focus on ameliorating
the adjudicated bases for jurisdiction, and that give parents
a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate their ability to
adjust their conduct and become minimally adequate par-
ents.” Dept. of Human Services v. W. M., 310 Or App 594,
598, 485 P3d 316 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DHS’s efforts to assist the parent are considered under the
totality of the particular circumstances of the case, with the
paramount concern being the child’s health and safety. Dept.
of Human Services v. M. K., 285 Or App 448, 456, 396 P3d
294, rev den, 361 Or 885 (2017). In considering the totality
of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that, although
DHS significantly delayed implementation of therapy for C,
DHS’s efforts toward reunification were reasonable.
        DHS’s efforts to reunify C with father included a
focus on stabilizing C in appropriate foster care, arranging
parenting classes for father, conducting an ICPC assess-
ment to ensure the safety of father’s home in Washington,
and facilitating visits between father and C. DHS also con-
tracted with a mentor specialist to work with C and help
him become more comfortable with father’s self-identified
cultural background. Those efforts focused on the jurisdic-
tional basis of repairing father’s relationship with C and
were consistent with C’s psychological assessments that
396                     Dept. of Human Services v. M. A. Z.

recommended that any changes in his placement be han-
dled carefully and slowly.
         Regarding therapy, although it was delayed, DHS
did implement therapy for C and father 10 months before the
permanency hearing. Following father’s angry outbursts,
DHS reached out to all parties to discuss how to support
father’s relationship with C and initiated a meeting with
father and Durocher to discuss C’s psychological wellbeing
and needs. When C started threatening self-harm and visi-
tation was paused, DHS met with C to discuss “what would
help [C] feel supported when visiting with father” and also
convened a meeting with a permanency consultant to dis-
cuss how they could “move this case forward for visits to
continue.” DHS also provided father with a therapeutic skill
builder and offered father anger management classes.
         Accordingly, despite the delay in providing therapy,
the record shows that in the year leading up to the perma-
nency hearing, DHS did implement therapy for both C and
father. See Dept. of Human Services v. S. S., 278 Or App
725, 735, 375 P3d 556 (2016) (explaining that we evaluate
DHS’s efforts over the life of the case “with an emphasis
on a period before the hearing sufficient in length to afford
a good opportunity to assess parental progress” (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)). When viewed in
context with DHS’s other efforts toward reunification, the
record sufficiently supports the juvenile court’s determi-
nation that DHS made reasonable efforts to provide father
with services that would facilitate reunification.
         Sufficiency of father’s progress. In summarizing the
legal standard a juvenile court utilizes to assess “sufficient
progress,” the Oregon Supreme Court recently explained
that the court determines “whether the parent has amelio-
rated the conditions or circumstances that led the juvenile
court to make the child a ward of the court to the extent
necessary to make possible—with continued services from
DHS if necessary—the child’s safe return to the parent’s
care.” Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B., 372 Or 133, 151-52,
___ P3d ___ (2024). The determination of whether a parent
has made sufficient progress toward reunification is consid-
ered in the context of the factual basis for jurisdiction. D.
Cite as 332 Or App 389 (2024)                              397

W. C., 258 Or App at 171. In making that determination,
the court gives the highest priority to the child’s health and
welfare. Dept. of Human Services v. L. M. K., 319 Or App
245, 253, 510 P3d 278 (2022). Father contends that he made
sufficient progress toward reunification because he met all
of the expectations set by the juvenile court and had demon-
strated progress toward understanding how to parent C
with a therapist that he engaged on his own initiative.
         The juvenile court determined that, although father
had made progress in his relationship with C, C could not
be safely returned to his care. In particular, the court found
that father had not engaged in therapy in a safe or appro-
priate way and that father minimized C’s mental health
needs, including C’s threats of self-harm. Given the evidence
regarding C’s specific needs, the record sufficiently supports
the court’s determination that father had not made suffi-
cient progress toward reunification.
          In particular, the record surrounding the nature
of C’s trauma and diagnoses established that parenting C
requires emotional stability in a calm environment that
focuses on C’s specific needs. Those needs include being par-
ented by an “emotionally stable adult” who is “capable of pro-
viding calm, consistent, and nurturing responses when he is
exhibiting distress, sadness or frustration.” Father’s behavior,
particularly his angry outbursts during family therapy, were
inconsistent with C’s specific needs and failed to ameliorate
the conditions and circumstances that led to the court’s asser-
tion of jurisdiction over C. Thus, despite father’s progress and
efforts to meet the court’s requirements, sufficient evidence
in the record supports the court’s determination. See G. N.,
263 Or App at 297 (explaining that “[e]ven if a parent has
completed all services that have been required, evidence that
a parent continues to engage in behavior that is harmful to a
child supports a determination that the parent has not made
sufficient progress to make it possible for the child to return
home”). Consequently, the juvenile court did not err in its
determination that father’s progress was not sufficient for C to
safely return to his care. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the juvenile court exercising jurisdiction over C.
        Affirmed.