Court Opinion

ID: 9535859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:45:37.868838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:22.011086
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
(concurring in the result). We are asked to resolve an apparent conflict between the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act of 1969 (WDCA) and the no-fault insurance act.
The specific issue is whether the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer is entitled to reimbursement from the employee’s tort recovery against the third-party tortfeasor for "noneconomic loss”, which recovery is sanctioned by the no-fault act, MCL 500.3135, subds (1), (2)(b); MSA 24.13135, subds (1), (2)(b). I agree with Justice Williams that the answer is "no”, but write separately to emphasize that my agreement rests upon a different rationale.1
The facts of the case are fully detailed in the opinion of my colleagues.
Earlier this year we addressed a problem created by the intersection of the WDCA and the no-fault act in an analogous setting — employees were injured in motor vehicle mishaps in the course of their employment. Mathis v Interstate Motor Freight System, 408 Mich 164, 183, 187; 289 NW2d 708 (1980). We held there that
"an employee who suffers accidental bodily injury in *99the course of his employment while occupying a motor vehicle owned by the employer is entitled to collect no-fault benefits from the no-fault insurer of the employer’s vehicle, and is not limited to workers’ compensation as his sole remedy.”
We also held that, under § 3109(1) of the no-fault act, the
"workers’ compensation benefits must be set off against the no-fault benefits otherwise due.”
The essential difference between Mathis and this case is the involvement of a third-party tortfeasor from whom the employee obtained a recovery in tort in addition to collecting his no-fault and workers’ compensation benefits.2 The existence of the third-party tortfeasor in this case implicates the provisions of the WDCA and no-fault act that concern the right of the injured party to bring an action in tort as distinguished from an administrative claim for the statutory benefits.
The WDCA provides:
"In an action to enforce the liability of a third party, the plaintiff may recover any amount which the employee or his dependents or personal representative would be entitled to recover in an action in tort. Any recovery against the third party for damages resulting from personal injuries or death only, after deducting expenses of recovery, shall first reimburse the employer or carrier for any amounts paid or payable under this act to date of recovery and the balance shall forthwith be paid to the employee or his dependents or personal representative and shall be treated as an advance payment by the employer on account of any future pay*100ments of compensation benefits.” MCL 418.827(5); MSA 17.237(827X5).
The no-fault act provides:
"(1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.
"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was in effect is abolished except as to:
"(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided and limited in subsection (1).
"(c) Damages for allowable expenses, work loss and survivor’s loss as defined in sections 3107 to 3110 in excess of the daily, monthly and 3 year limitations contained in those sections. The party liable for damages is entitled to an exemption reducing his liability by the amount of taxes that would have been payable on account of income the injured person would have received if he had not been injured.” MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135.
What we said in Mathis with respect to the separate purposes of the WDCA and the no-fault act bears repetition here and is the basis for the analysis underlying my conclusion today:
"The Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA) and the no-fault insurance act are complete and self-contained legislative schemes addressing discrete problems. Neither act refers expressly to the other.
"The WDCA provides a substitute for common-law tort liability founded upon an employer’s negligence in failing to maintain a safe working environment. Compensation under this act is for industrial injuries aris*101ing out of and in the course of the injured person’s employment. Compensation is paid by the employer or the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer under an indemnity contract.
"The no-fault act provides a substitute for common-law tort liability based upon the ownership or operation of a motor vehicle. Under this act, victims of motor accidents receive insurance benefits from a no-fault insurance carrier as compensation for their injuries. Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 578-579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).” Mathis, supra, 179.
Under both acts, the primary purpose is to provide benefits to the injured party for economic injury. As Justice Moody observed in Mathis, "both benefits are payable to compensate the recipient for the same economic injuries suffered as a result of the accident”.3 The two statutes differ, however, as to the manner in which the injured party may proceed against a third-party tortfeasor.
Section 827(5) of the WDCA, set out above, permits the injured party to recover "any amount” from the third party, including amounts that would duplicate workers’ compensation benefits. "[T]ort recovery under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act is for all damages, economic and noneconomic * * Workman v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 404 Mich 477, 511; 274 NW2d 373 (1979). This duplication is eliminated, however, by the statutory requirement for reimbursement of the payer of workers’ compensation benefits out of the recovery obtained from the third-party tortfeasor. MCL 418.827(5); MSA 17.237(827)(5). Under the WDCA, therefore, when an employee’s injury arising in the course of employment is attributable to a third party who is neither the employer nor a coemployee, the work*102ers’ compensation benefits can be made essentially irrelevant: the employee’s entire recovery is obtainable from the third party on a common-law tort theory.
The no-fault scheme, however, is different. Under the no-fault act, recovery from third parties based upon tort is limited to those injuries that fall outside the coverage of no-fault benefits: non-economic loss and economic loss exceeding no-fault benefits. Thus, there is no duplication of compensation and, therefore, no need to reimburse the no-fault insurance carrier. This was our holding in Workman, supra, which is now codified.
"A subtraction or reimbursement shall not be due the claimant’s insurer from that portion of any recovery to the extent that recovery is realized for noneconomic loss as provided in section 3135(1) and (2)(b) or for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss as defined in sections 3107 to 3110 in excess of the amount recovered by the claimant from his or her insurer.” MCL 500.3116(4); MSA 24.13116(4).4
Comparison of the WDCA and the no-fault act "indicate[s] that the Legislature, although by different methods, in both acts provided against double recovery”. Workman, supra, 511. It appears, therefore, that prevention of double recovery is a legislative mandate informing both acts, and indeed both acts as "complete and self-contained legislative schemes” achieve this purpose.
In the case before us, however, we are faced with circumstances in which neither act can be applied as a complete and self-contained program because here they are jointly operative. Moreover, *103we are prevented by statute and case law, as will be explained, from declaring that only one of the two acts shall govern the facts of this case.
As Justice Levin correctly implies, the tort liability of third parties in cases like this is determined solely by § 3135 of the no-fault act.5 Paragraph 2 of that section provides in pertinent part:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was in effect is abolished except as [herein provided].” MCL 500.3135(2); MSA 24.13135(2) (emphasis added).
"[A]ny other provision of law” unquestionably encompasses the WDCA and, in particular, § 827(5), which permits an injured employee to bring an action in tort against the third-party tortfeasor for "any” damages. Consequently, to the extent that § 827(5) of the WDCA sanctions tort actions to redress employees’ injuries arising from the use of a motor vehicle, it is rendered inoperative by the no-fault act.6 The WDCA, however, is not entirely excluded from the compensation scheme. By virtue of our construction of § 3109(1) of the no-fault act in Mathis, supra, when workers’ compensation and no-fault benefits are both paid out for the same injury, the workers’ compensation benefits must be applied first.
"The responsibility for * * * benefits rests ñrst on the employer or workers’ compensation insurer, and the *104amount of that payment is to be deducted from the liability of the [no-fault] personal protection insurance carrier.” Mathis, supra, 183.
Consequently, the workers’ compensation benefits will always constitute a portion of the recovery.
What is significant about the foregoing analysis is that the workers’ compensation benefits are subsumed within the no-fault benefit award. In other words, although the source of the recovery is attributable in part to workers’ compensation benefits, the recovery itself adheres to the compensation structure of the no-fault act.7 Since it is established that there is no overlap between no-fault personal protection benefits and tort recovery under § 3135 of the no-fault act (save for intentional torts, which are not in issue here), it follows that there is no overlap between workers’ compensation benefits and § 3135 recovery. The legislative *105mandate is for reimbursement where there is double recovery. Without double recovery, there is no need for reimbursement.
In further support of this view, I refer again to paragraph 5 of § 827 of the WDCA.
"In an action to enforce the liability of a third party, the plaintiff may recover any amount which the employee or his dependents or personal representative would be entitled to recover in an action in tort. Any recovery against the third party for damages resulting from personal injuries or death only, after deducting expenses of recovery, shall first reimburse the employer or carrier for any amounts paid or payable under this act to date of recovery and the balance shall forthwith be paid to the employee or his dependents or personal representative and shall be treated as an advance payment by the employer on account of any future payments of compensation benefits.”
On account of the effective abrogation of the first sentence of the quoted paragraph by the operation of § 3135 of the no-fault act, as explained above, it is only logical to conclude that the second sentence, which provides for reimbursement of the workers’ compensation carrier, and which was enacted as part of a self-contained program of compensation (for injuries due to the tortious conduct of third parties) in conjunction with the cause of action allowed by the immediately preceding sentence, is also effectively abrogated by § 3135.
Unlike my colleagues, I find Pelkey v Elsea Realty & Investment Co, 394 Mich 485, 492; 232 NW2d 154 (1975), to be inapposite to this case. The Pelkey Court interpreted § 827(5) of the WDCA reproduced above and held that:
"When the Legislature stated that damages recovered *106by an employee from a third-party tortfeasor for 'personal injuries or death only’ could be reached by an insurer, the Legislature meant to include damages resulting from pain and suffering.”
Without arguing the merits of the holding, and without calling specific attention to the peculiar circumstances attending that case, it is sufficient to note that Pelkey considered only the WDCA; that Court did not construe the WDCA and the no-fault act together, as we are obliged to do here, because the no-fault act was not in effect when the cause of action arose. Accordingly, I do not find Pelkey instructive with respect to the question we address today.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result reached by my Brother Williams. That result obviates the need to consider constitutional issues.
Williams, J.
(for affirmance). This matter requires us to consider whether, when an employee is injured in a motor vehicle accident during thé course of employment, the employer’s Worker’s Disability Compensation Act insurer is entitled to reimbursement of economic loss benefits out of the employee’s recovery of no-fault act noneconomic loss from the tortfeasor.
The issue is presented because two legislative schemes are applicable to such an injury: the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), and the no-fault insurance act (NFA). Each act is a complete and largely self-contained scheme addressing discrete problems; neither act expressly refers to the other. In the limited area of overlap —the factual situation of the instant case — it must be determined whether the WDCA’s reimbursement provision penetrates the NFA’s scheme of reparations.
*107The WDCA provides a substitute for common-law tort liability founded upon an employer’s negligence in failing to maintain a safe working environment. Recovery under the WDCA is intended to compensate employment-related industrial injuries and is paid by either the employer or the employer’s WDCA insurance carrier under an indemnity contract. The WDCA provides the only source of reparation for an injured worker unless that injury was proximately caused by a force not within the employer’s control, e.g., a defective machine. In such exceptional circumstances, the compensation carrier may be subrogated to the injured employee’s economic and noneconomic third-party recovery. Pelkey v Elsea Realty & Investment Co, 394 Mich 485; 232 NW2d 154 (1975).
The NFA provides a substitute for common-law tort liability based upon the ownership or operation of a motor vehicle. Under this act, victims of motor vehicle accidents receive insurance benefits from a no-fault insurance carrier as compensation for their injuries. Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). If the injured party is an employee, the employer’s no-fault carrier is liable to pay personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. MCL 500.3114(3); MSA 24.13114(3). Again, within the NFA, the only source of reparations for the injured victim is the PIP insurance unless the injury is one causing "death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement”.1 In such exceptional circumstances, the law allows the accident victim to sue the third-party tortfeasor, but only for noneconomic losses; in such a case the no-fault carrier who has paid PIP benefits is not entitled to reimbursement from this third-party noneconomic recovery. Workman v De *108troit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 404 Mich 477; 274 NW2d 373 (1979).
The issue in this case is whether the WDCA carrier can employ his WDCA reimbursement entitlement against an NFA injured party’s NFA non-economic recovery from the tortfeasor. We hold that the insurer is not entitled to reimbursement under these circumstances. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.
I
On January 12, 1976, defendant Peter Queen, an Oakland County deputy sheriff, was driving a patrol car in the course of his employment when he was struck by codefendant Patricia Moore’s oncoming vehicle. Deputy Queen’s serious injuries were aggravated when his automobile was subsequently struck from behind by another vehicle driven by codefendant Michael Hughes.
Plaintiff Great American Insurance paid workers’ compensation benefits totaling $4,567 to Deputy Queen in accordance with its contract with Oakland County. Pursuant to MCL 500.3114(3); MSA 24.13114(3), Deputy Queen also collected certain no-fault benefits for excess economic losses from the insurer of the Oakland County vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident; these losses were not covered by the Great American workers’ compensation policy. He then sought to recover from the third-party tortfeasors, defendants Moore and Hughes, for his noneconomic losses, pursuant to MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1). The case was settled for a total of $18,500. Neither auto insurance company notified Great American of their no-fault disbursements to Queen.
*109Great American thereafter filed suit against Deputy Queen, Moore, and Hughes under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.827; MSA 17.237(827), based upon a purported lien against any third-party payment made to Queen as a result of an automobile accident.
On October 31, 1977, the trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of all three defendants, finding that Great American’s lien was invalid and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a per curiam opinion rendered October 3, 1978. Great American Ins Co v Queen, 86 Mich App 362; 272 NW2d 659 (1978).
This Court granted leave to appeal, 405 Mich 823 (1979). Oral argument was conducted on October 2, 1979.
II
In construing the statutory schemes set up by the WDCA and the NFA it is useful to compare the respective mechanisms employed to "make whole” the injured claimant.
Under the NFA, an employee who is injured in a work-related automobile accident has recourse against the employer’s no-fault carrier by virtue of MCL 500.3114(3); MSA 24.13114(3):2
"An employee, his spouse, or a relative of either domiciled in the same household, who suffers accidental bodily injury while an occupant of a motor vehicle owned or registered by the employer shall receive personal protection insurance benefits to which he is entitled from the insurer of the furnished vehicle.”
*110If the employee is seriously injured, and the accident is the result of the negligence of a third party who is not a coemployee, MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135, confers a right to sue for noneconomic damages only:
"(1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.
"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this state of a motor vehicle * * * is abolished except as to:
"(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided and limited in subsection (1).” (Emphasis added.)
In the event that the injured employee realizes a recovery against the third-party tortfeasor for NFA noneconomic losses, the process of being "made whole” will comprise both a PIP recovery from the employer’s NFA carrier, and a noneconomic recovery from the tortfeasor.
PIP carriers who had made payments to injured employees would then invoke MCL 500.3116; MSA 24.13116, which stated:3
"A subtraction from personal protection insurance benefits shall not be made because of the value of a claim in tort based on the same accidental bodily injury. However, after recovery is realized upon a tort claim, a subtraction shall be made to the extent of the recovery * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
This statute was before the Court in Workman, *111supra. Noting the "apparent and patent absurdity”4 of granting a limited tort recovery in MCL 500.3135, then effectively taking away any tort recovery under MCL 500.3116, we held:5
"[A]n insurance carrier * * * is entitled to reimbursement from the tort recovery of a person injured as a result of a motor vehicle accident only if, and to the extent that, the tort recovery includes damages for losses for which personal injury protection beneñts were paid. Thus, since § 3135 abolishes tort remedy for losses covered under the personal injury protection insurance provisions of the act, an injured plaintiff should recover nothing for which the insurance carrier will have a right of reimbursement under § 3116.” (Emphasis added.)
Workman thus stands for the proposition that the employer’s PIP carrier cannot be reimbursed from the employee’s noneconomic recovery against the third-party tortfeasor.
In contrast to this NFA reparations scheme is the process to be followed in WDCA by a person injured in the course and scope of employment. Entitlement to compensation is provided by MCL 418.301; MSA 17.237(301):
"(1) An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by an employer who is subject to the provisions of this act, at the time of such injury, shall be paid compensation * * * JJ
The injured worker is not foreclosed by the WDCA from seeking collateral recovery. A right of action against third parties is expressly conferred by MCL 418.827(1); MSA 17.237(827)(1):
*112"(1) Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than a natural person in the same employ or the employer to pay damages in respect thereof, the acceptance of compensation benefíts or the taking of proceedings to enforce compensation payments shall not act as an election of remedies but the injured employee or his dependents or personal representative may also proceed to enforce the liability of the third party for damages in accordance with the provisions of this section.” (Emphasis added.)
Once a recovery on a third-party claim has been realized, the WDCA subrogation section becomes applicable. In pertinent part, it reads:
"(5) In an action to enforce the liability of a third party, the plaintiff may recover any amount which the employee or his dependents or personal representative would be entitled to recover in an action in tort. Any recovery against the third party for damages resulting from personal injuries or death only, after deducting expenses of recovery, shall ñrst reimburse the employer or carrier for amounts paid or payable under this act to date of recovery and the balance shall forthwith be paid to the employee or his dependents or personal representative and shall be treated as an advance payment by the employer on account of any future payments of compensation benefits.” (Emphasis added.)
In light of these parallel systems of reparations, the question is whether § 827(5) of the WDCA and our prior opinion in Pelkey, supra, overcome the more recent enactment of § 3135 of the NFA and our opinion in Workman, supra.
Defendants argue strenuously that the conflicts between the NFA and the WDCA require a finding of repeal by implication. Since we are directed by Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US *113288; 56 S Ct 466; 80 L Ed 688 (1936), to consider nonconstitutional issues which will dispose of a case before resolving the case on a constitutional basis,6 we first address defendants’ claim that statutory construction precludes a WDCA carrier’s subrogation from the injured claimant’s third-party recovery.
There is little doubt that the most recent legislative pronouncement in a given area will repeal an earlier act to the extent that the two pieces of legislation are repugnant and inconsistent, despite the general rule that repeals by implication are not favored in the law.7
Considering the vastly different overall impact in this area of the NFA and the WDCA, we conclude that there is a direct repugnance. This comprehensive impression of repugnance is reinforced by specifically recalling that the NFA allows the employee to sue for recovery only for "death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement”, whereas the WDCA allows a third-party suit for any type of proximately caused injury; by specifically recalling that the NFA allows only noneconomic recovery, whereas the WDCA allows general recovery; and by specifically recalling that the NFA disallows the insurer any reimbursement from the employee’s recovery, whereas the WDCA allows the insurer reimbursement, both economic and noneconomic (pain and suffering), from the employee’s recovery. In short, the repugnance appears strong.
The rule of statutory construction in cases of *114conflict between two legislative acts permits a finding of repeal by implication only where the repugnancy is clear and irreconcilable, and both acts cannot be given simultaneous effect. We find a clear and irreconcilable repugnance between the NFA and § 827(5) of the WDCA. This is so because the reimbursement section of the WDCA was enacted as 1952 PA 155 and recodified as 1969 PA 317. The NFA was promulgated by 1972 PA 294. Accordingly, because of this patent conflict, statutory construction mandates a repeal by implication of MCL 418.827(5).
Further, even if we were to hold that an examination of the pertinent passages of the acts did not yield an implicit repealer, we would nonetheless be compelled to find a repeal by implication because to permit § 827(5) to stand in the face of the limited tort recovery under the NFA would result in the creation of an unconstitutional classification, as discussed in Part III. We do not believe that the Legislature, in enacting the WDCA and the NFA, intended such a result.
Ill
Our obligation in reviewing legislative acts is to give them constitutional effect if possible. Accordingly, we seek a reading of each statute which avoids unconstitutionality. In the instant case, we are compelled to hold that the reimbursement provision of the WDCA has been superseded by the enactment of the NFA. A contrary resolution is unacceptable because it would require effectuation of a provision which violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Const 1963, art 1, § 2.
This Court in Shavers, supra, enunciated the *115test for equal protection and due process in construing the NFA:8
"The test to determine whether legislation enacted pursuant to the police power comports with due process is whether the legislation bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective. * * *
"The test to determine whether a statute enacted pursuant to the police power comports with equal protection is, essentially, the same.”
The legislative objective of the NFA is to make whole the seriously injured automobile accident victim. This Court unanimously found in Shavers, supra, that such was a permissible legislative objective. However, this objective is frustrated as a result of the interplay between the NFA and MCL 418.827(5), which results in the creation of two arbitrary classes of similarly situated individuals, i.e., automobile accident victims.
The first class is comprised of automobile accident victims who are not injured in the course and scope of their employment. These automobile accident victims are made whole by seeking economic loss benefits from their own PIP carriers and noneconomic losses from the third-party tortfeasor. By virtue of Workman, supra, and the recent legislative amendment of MCL 500.3116, the PIP carrier is not entitled to reimbursement from the third-party recovery.9
The second class is composed of automobile accident victims who are injured in the course and scope of their employment. These victims similarly recover economic loss benefits.10 However, in suits *116against the third-party tortfeasor, the employee-victims find that, unlike their similarly situated counterparts, MCL 418.827(5) authorizes a lien in favor of the WDCA carrier against any tort recovery. Despite the fact that both classes are similarly situated, MCL 418.827(5) treats the latter class so differently, by diminishing their net recovery through WDCA subrogation, that the permissible legislative objective is frustrated.11
This diverse, unreasonable treatment of similarly situated members of a class solely because of the arbitrary presence or absence of an employment relationship bears no reasonable relationship to the recognized and permissible purpose of the NFA, to render injured accident victims whole. Such contingency constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable variance in the treatment of one natural class — seriously injured accident victims— and is, therefore, barred by the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.12 Const 1963, art 1, §2. _
*117IV
We hold today that, in the context of the interplay between the NFA’s restrictive third-party recovery and the WDCA’s nonrestrictive subrogation provision, a WDCA insurance carrier is not entitled to reimbursement of economic loss benefits out of the employee’s recovery of NFA noneconomic loss from the tortfeasor. We believe that the Legislature intended that the NFA should repeal inconsistent segments of the WDCA. A contrary reading of legislative intent is unacceptable because it would require a violation of the constitutional equal protection guarantee. Accordingly, we are compelled to conclude that MCL 418.827(5) is inapplicable to any recovery obtained under the pertinent provisions of the NFA.
The Court of Appeals is affirmed. No costs, a public issue being involved.
Blair Moody, Jr., J., concurred with Williams, J.

 Sensitivity to traditional bench and bar objection to multiple opinions from this Court seems less compelling with respect to this issue of first impression which has divided panels of the Court of Appeals, compare Reliance Ins Co v Messina Trucking, Inc, 83 Mich App 159; 268 NW2d 328 (1978), and Great American Ins Co v Queen, 86 Mich App 362; 272 NW2d 659 (1978), with Wrobel v Wayne County Road Comm, 79 Mich App 484; 261 NW2d 58 (1977), and involves construction of the relatively new no-fault act.

 The benefits were coordinated as required by § 3109(1) of the no-fault act.

 Mathis v Interstate Motor Freight System, 408 Mich 164, 190 (separate opinion).

 As to harm intentionally caused by third parties, the no-fault act operates like the WDCA — duplicative recovery and reimbursement. MCL 500.3135(2)(a); MSA 24.13135(2)(a); MCL 500.3116(2); MSA 24.13116(2).

 See Justice Levin’s opinion, p 86.

 This appears to foreclose recovery for noneconomic loss incurred by persons who have not suffered "death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement”, MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1).

 For instance, if the plaintiff is entitled to $50 in no-fault benefits and $20 in workers’ compensation benefits, he will receive $30 from the no-fault insurance carrier ($50 with a $20 setoff) and $20 from the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for a total of $50, the amount of no-fault benefits.
As in Mathis, we are not presented here with the unlikely situation in which workers’ compensation benefits exceed no-fault personal protection benefits. Thus, my opinion, unlike Justice Levin’s, does not speak to that occurrence, which I consider to be remote. Workers’ compensation benefits are not as generous as no-fault personal protection benefits because they are intended to serve different purposes. In contrast to no-fault benefits, which are intended to compensate economic injuries, Mathis, supra, 179; Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 578-579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978), workers’ compensation benefits are intended to compensate only those economic injuries "which produce disability and thereby presumably affect earning power”. 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 2.40, p 10. Furthermore, as Professor Larson observed:
"A [workers’] compensation system, unlike a tort recovery, does not pretend to restore to the claimant what he has lost; it gives him a sum which, added to his remaining earning ability, if any, will presumably enable him to exist without being a burden to others.
"If our compensation theory is correct, then the amount of compensation awarded may be expected to go not much higher than is necessary to keep the worker from destitution. This is indeed so.” Id., § 2.50, p 11 (footnote omitted).

 MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135.

 It is noted that the Legislature has amended this statutory provision. 1977 PA 53. The amendment, however, does not affect the decision in this case.

 See fn 2, supra.

 Workman v DAIIE, supra, 404 Mich 509.

 Workman v DAIIE, supra, 404 Mich 510.

 See also Warren Twp v Raymond, 291 Mich 426; 289 NW 201 (1939); Wayne Circuit Judges v Wayne County, 15 Mich App 713; 167 NW2d 337 (1969), aff'd (On Rehearing) 386 Mich 1; 190 NW2d 288 (1971).

 Locke v Macomb County, 31 Mich App 22; 187 NW2d 500 (1971), aff'd 387 Mich 634; 199 NW2d 166 (1972).

 Shavers, supra, 402 Mich 612-613.

 1978 PA 461.

 The employee injured in an automobile accident may recover economic losses from two sources: the WDCA carrier, pursuant to *116MCL 418.301, and the employer’s PIP carrier, pursuant to MCL 500.3114(3). However, there is no double recovery because MCL 500.3109(1); MSA 24.13109(1) requires a setoff of the WDCA benefits against the NFA benefits otherwise due. This setoff was found constitutional in Mathis v Interstate Motor Freight System, 408 Mich 164; 289 NW2d 708 (1980).

 Cf. Bowser v Jacobs, 36 Mich App 320; 194 NW2d 110 (1971). Bowser involved an injured employee’s claim against the Michigan Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund. The claim was initially denied because MCL 257.1129; MSA 9.2829 precludes recovery against the MVACF if any workers’ compensation benefits are payable as a result of the injury. The Bowser Court held MCL 257.1129 unconstitutionally discriminatory.

 The Court of Appeals utilized this equal protection analysis in finding MCL 418.827(5) unconstitutional in this case, Great American Ins Co, supra; see also Reliance Ins Co v Messina Trucking, Inc, 83 Mich App 159; 268 NW2d 328 (1978). The appeals Court in Wrobel v Wayne County Road Comm, 79 Mich App 484; 261 NW2d 58 (1977), reached a contrary result, relying on our decision in Pelkey, supra. We distinguish Pelkey because it applies exclusively to cases within the WDCA milieu. It has no precedential value where the collateral claim for benefits arises from the NFA.