Court Opinion

ID: 9575202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:24.120889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:05.392436
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
This case is before the Court upon the appeal of Mary Hawk Koontz, the defendant below, from a final order of the Circuit Court of Grant County. The appellee is Johnnie M. Koontz. We have reviewed the petition for appeal, the record, and briefs of the parties. We are of the opinion that this case should be reversed and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
I
The appellant and appellee were married on December 21, 1985. Prior to their marriage, the parties lived together for at least one and one-half years in a house owned by Mr. Koontz.1
Mr. Koontz’s house was destroyed by fire and was then washed away by a flood on November 4, 1985. Mr. Koontz collected fire insurance on his house and personal property and received additional gifts and donations. Of these monies, Mr. Koontz placed $40,000 in a certificate of deposit titled in his name “POD [pay on death] to Mary Koontz.” On April 7, 1986, Mr. Koontz redeemed the certificate of deposit to pay the construction costs for a new house and placed the proceeds, $40,752.95, in a joint checking account. Mrs. Koontz’s name had been added to this checking account on January 6, 1986.
The parties purchased a lot in Peters-burg upon which to build a house. The deed for this lot, which was recorded almost one year later, lists “Johnnie M. Koontz and Mary V. Koontz, his wife,” as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The seller of the lot testified that Mr. Koontz told him not to put Mrs. Koontz’s name on the deed. Mr. Koontz testified to the same. There is a controversy, however, as to why Mrs. Koontz’s name was actually put on the deed.
A house was erected on the lot. The circuit court found that the fair market value of this property is $60,000.
Shortly after the purchase of the lot, but before the house was erected, the parties separated. Mrs. Koontz withdrew $15,000 from the joint checking account and placed it in a newly opened account in her own name. Following a reconciliation with her husband, Mrs. Koontz applied some of the funds she had previously withdrawn to the construction of the new house. Both Mr. and Mrs. Koontz helped build the house. *479Mrs. Koontz testified that she installed insulation and did all of the painting and varnishing in the house.
No children were bom of this marriage.
The family law master recommended a divorce be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, determined that the house was Mr. Koontz’s separate property and that the joint checking account funds, although completely spent for house construction, were marital property. The family law master recommended that Mrs. Koontz be awarded $18,532 based on the joint checking account funds.
The family law master’s recommended decision concluded that it was not the voluntary act of Mr. Koontz to jointly title the real estate and that Mr. Koontz did not make a gift of a one-half undivided interest in this property to Mrs. Koontz. Therefore, the family law master concluded that this property upon which the house was constructed is not marital property.
The family law master’s recommended decision also awarded no alimony.2
In April, 1989, the circuit court granted a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, and adopted most of the family law master’s recommendations.3
The appellant, Mrs. Koontz, raises two assignments of error pertaining to distribution of the real estate and alimony.
II
Mrs. Koontz contends that the circuit court committed error by concluding that she is not entitled to an equitable distribution of one-half of the real estate, the fair market value of which is $60,000.
Recently, in Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413 (1990), this Court discussed issues pertaining to the classification of property as separate or marital.4
In syllabus point 3 of Whiting, we noted the legislature’s preference for classifying property as marital as opposed to separate: “W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(l) (1986), defining all property acquired during the marriage as marital property except for certain limited categories of property which are considered separate or nonmarital, expresses a marked preference for characterizing the property of the parties as marital property.”5
*480Counsel for Mr. Koontz, the appel-lee, contends in this appeal that the appellant, Mrs. Koontz, failed to affirmatively prove that Mr. Koontz had made a gift of a one-half interest in the real estate when the property was jointly titled.
However, Mrs. Koontz does not bear the burden of proving that a gift was made by Mr. Koontz.
Rather, the standard is noted in syllabus point 4 of Whiting. There, we held:
Where, during the course of the marriage, one spouse transfers title to his or her separate property into the joint names of both spouses, a presumption that the transferring spouse intended to make a gift of the property to the marital estate is consistent with the principles underlying our equitable distribution statute.
(emphasis supplied)
We pointed out in Whiting that this presumption may be rebutted by a showing that there was no intent to transfer to joint ownership.
Furthermore, W.Va.Code, 48-3-10 [1984] provides:
Where one spouse purchases real or personal property and pays for the same, but takes title in the name of the other spouse, such transaction shall, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention, be presumed to be a gift by the spouse so purchasing to the spouse in whose name the title is taken: Provided, That in the case of an action under the provisions of article two [§ 48-2-1 et seq.] of this chapter wherein the court is required to determine what property of the parties constitutes marital property and equitably divide the same, the presumption created by this section shall not apply, and a gift between spouses must be affirmatively proved.
We pointed out in Whiting that this statutory provision “is consistent with the view of other jurisdictions that joint titling implies a gift to the marital estate[.]” 183 W.Va. at 459, 396 S.E.2d at 421.
Neither the record in this case nor the circuit court’s order, which was based upon the family law master’s recommended decision, addresses the property transaction in this case in relation to the marital estate. Instead, the circuit court’s focus was on whether a gift was made to the other spouse, namely, Mrs. Koontz.
Under the principles we set forth in Whiting, the joint titling of the real property in this case is presumed to be a gift to the marital estate. Consequently, Mr. Koontz, as noted above, must rebut the presumption that it was intended as a gift to the marital estate.
Mr. Koontz points out that the real property at issue in this case was purchased with funds from the insurance proceeds that he received, and, therefore, he maintains that all of the real property should have been awarded to him. This contention raises issues concerning ownership of funds deposited in the joint checking account, which is not raised by the appellant, Mrs. Koontz. However, we note that we addressed in Whiting the possibility that property which is viewed as marital may have nonmarital components. We held:
W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(2) (1986), provides for a marital property component to separate property to the extent that the value of the separate property is increased by the expenditure of marital resources. In this instance, the statute permits a tracing of the parties’ respective contributions to the property in order to determine the marital and nonmar-ital components. This statute has no application where the property has been jointly titled and the presumption of gift *481to the marital estate has not been rebutted.6
Whiting, syl. pt. 5.
We also discussed in Whiting the “source of funds” doctrine, which has been recognized in the absence of statutes similar to W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(2). In syllabus point 6, however, we concluded that “[t]he source of funds doctrine is ordinarily not available to characterize as separate property that property which has been transferred to joint title during the marriage.”
Accordingly, this case must be remanded to the circuit court to reconsider its decision in light of the principles set forth in Whiting.
III
The appellant, Mrs. Koontz, also contends that the circuit court erred by adopting the findings and conclusions of the family law master that neither party should be awarded alimony.
Because of our decision in section II of this opinion, and the effect that it may have upon the distribution of property, the circuit court should reconsider the denial of alimony.
Specifically, W.Va.Code, 48-2-16(b)(5) [1984] provides that a factor that must be considered in awarding alimony is “[t]he distribution of marital property to be made under the terms of a separation agreement or by the court[.]”
Accordingly, upon remand, the circuit court should consider an award of alimony in conjunction with the other aspects of this case.
IV
Finally, Mr. Koontz, in a separate petition for appeal, which we granted, basically cross-assigned several errors relating to the circuit court’s decision which were adverse to him.
Primarily, Mr. Koontz maintains that the circuit court could not divide the joint bank account between the parties because there was no written disclosure of assets of the parties. Therefore, Mr. Koontz contends that there was no evidence in the record to substantiate the exact joint bank account or accounts owned by the parties at the time this suit was filed.
Although our review of the record indicates that there was ample evidence of the existence of a joint bank account, Mr. Koontz will have the opportunity upon remand to bring forth any more evidence which he views is necessary to the disposition of this case.
Mr. Koontz also questions the circuit court’s jurisdiction to render a decision and award property in this case where the property, in this case the bank account, has been expended and was no longer in existence at the time the suit was filed. Counsel has failed to supply any supporting authorities on this position, and, therefore, we will not address it.
V
Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the Circuit Court of Grant County, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.

. Mr. Koontz testified that before they lived together, they had occasionally stayed together but his future wife continued to "spend time out at her home at her mother’s because at that time her mother was sick.” Mrs. Koontz testified that they began living together in October, 1982.

. The family law master’s recommended decision also provided for allocation of court costs, payment of certain bills and distribution of personal property.

. The circuit court determined that Mrs. Koontz had spent $1,844 of the $15,000 she withdrew on joint obligations; therefore, the court deducted the $1,844 from the joint checking account balance of $40,752 and then equally divided the balance of $38,909.

. Classifying property as separate or marital is only the first of three steps in the equitable distribution process.
Equitable distribution under W.Va.Code, 48-2-1, et seg., is a three-step process. The first step is to classify the parties’ property as marital or nonmarital. The second step is to value the marital assets. The third step is to divide the marital estate between the parties in accordance with the principles contained in W.Va.Code, 48-2-32.
Whiting, syl. pt. 1. See 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 529, at 538 (1986).

. W.Va.Cot/e, 48-2-1 was amended in 1990. However, the 1986 version as it pertains to this case, remained unchanged. W.Va.Code, 48-2-1(e)(1) provides:
(e) ‘Marital property’ means:
(1)All property and earnings acquired by either spouse during a marriage, including every valuable right and interest, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, real or personal, regardless of the form of ownership, whether legal or beneficial, whether individually held, held in trust by a third party, or whether held by the parties to the marriage in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy or tenancy in common, joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, or any other form of shared ownership recognized in other jurisdictions without this state, except that marital property shall not include separate property as defined in subsection (f) of this section[.]
W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(f) provides, in relevant part:
(f) ‘Separate property’ means:
(1) Property acquired by a person before marriage; or
(2) Property acquired by a person during marriage in exchange for separate property which was acquired before the marriage; or
(3) Property acquired by a person during marriage, but excluded from treatment as marital property by a valid agreement of the parties entered into before or during the marriage; or
*480(4) Property acquired by a party during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, descent or distribution; or
(5) Property acquired by a party during a marriage but after the separation of the parties and before the granting of a divorce, annulment or decree of separate maintenance[.]

. W.Va.Code, 48-2-1 (e)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
(e) ‘Marital property’ means:
(2) The amount of any increase in value in the separate property of either of the parties to a marriage, which increase results from (A) an expenditure of funds which are marital property, including an expenditure of such funds which reduces indebtedness against separate property, extinguishes liens, or otherwise increases the net value of separate property, or (B) work performed by either or both of the parties during the marriage.