Court Opinion

ID: 9720071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:14:49.449386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:12.852391
License: Public Domain

Snell, J.
(dissenting)- — I respectfully dissent from Division V of the opinion. I think it was error to admit the testimony of plaintiff’s witness Sehmich and that the error was inherently prejudicial.
It may be that what I think was error had no effect on the outcome of the lawsuit, but the use of such evidence should be disapproved.
My dissent arises from a different concept and interpretation of section 321.489, Code, 1958. This statute was enacted in 1937 by the Forty-seventh General Assembly. See Forty-seventh General Assembly, chapter 134, section 508. This statute says: “No record of the conviction of any person for any violation of this' chapter shall be- admissible as evidence in any court in any civil action.” This statute erected a bar against evidence that prior thereto was admissible. It was in derogation of a common-law rule.
Section 4.2, Code, 1962 (and prior Codes), says:
“4.2 Common-law rule of construction. The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. Its provisions and all proceedings under it shall be liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice.”
If the prohibition of section 321.489 is to be limited according to the actual words contained therein, the admission of the testimony of Justice of the Peace Schmich was not error and the majority opinion is correct. I think, however, that the purpose and intent of the statute were to bar evidence of what took place in a criminal prosecution arising from the same incident and that the statute should be interpreted to- that end. As illustrative of reading the purpose into a statute, we have repeatedly held that under section 321.271, Code of 1962 (and prior Codes), providing that written reports of accidents shall not be admissible, information disclosed to an officer while gathering information for a report is likewise privileged under the statute.
*66We may start from the premise that in the absence of the statute, section 321.489, Code, 1958, testimony as to an admission against interest would be admissible against the defendant. Respectable authorities, including our own cases antedating the statute, so hold. Here, however, the harm did not spring from what the defendant admitted but from the circumstances and what was said to him. In admitting that he had only one taillight defendant was not admitting any violation of the law. The fact that his left taillight was out was not in itself a violation of the law and was not negligence per se. It was not submitted as a specification of negligence. It was not relevant to the issues of negligence as submitted, and in connection therewith had no probative value in itself. In Division VI the majority opinion says the evidence was relevant and material on the questions of negligence and sole proximate cause. That was not the purpose for which it was received, and the jury was so instructed. However, the questions of materiality and relevancy are of too little importance here to require reversal.
The majority opinion quotes in full the testimony of the witness Schmich as heard by the jury and minimizes its effect.
In the absence of the jury the witness identified himself as justice of the peace in Carroll for 21 years and testified as to proceedings, the charge against defendant, his plea of guilty and the fine. Later, before the jury, he testified as quoted by the majority. Whether or not his identity was disclosed to the jury does not appear from the record before us, but, if not, it was a most unusual trial court procedure. In any event, it would certainly be naive to think that a jury in Carroll County would fail to get the significance when a man whom they must have known was a justice of the peace was called and testified as to proceedings in his office. He testified that defendant was before him in his office. There was a conversation about taillights. Then “I told him and advised him what he was charged with and he started to tell me that the only violation he had was he had a bad taillight.” The jury was not told what the charge was nor the outcome. That was left to speculation. Jurors in Carroll County are not stupid. They can deduce that when a man is charged with something m the *67office and before a man whom they must have known was a justice of the peace an offense against the law was involved. The almost inevitable inferences drawn from such a situation were, in my opinion, more harmful than if the whole story had been told. The inferences would inspire speculation ulterior to the specifications of negligence submitted and beyond our ability to evaluate.
The testimony of Justice Schmieh as to what defendant said was, as noted by the majority, cumulative and probably nonprejudicial. It was to the effect that defendant had one bad taillight. It was also unnecessary, undisputed and not an issue, but what was said to defendant by the justice and the fact that the defendant was taken before a justice of the peace and charged were not cumulative. It was error if the purpose of the prohibitive statute is to be observed.
Tuthill v. Alden, cited and quoted by the majority opinion, differs from the case at bar. In the cited ease, as shown by the quotation, there was no specific objection in the trial court and defendant himself testified he was fined and paid the fine.
Tucker v. He averio, cited and discussed, was, as noted by the majority, a guest case. The trial court directed a verdict for defendant. On appeal plaintiff contended that defendant’s plea of guilty to reckless driving in justice court generated a jury question of recklessness under the guest statute. It was held that the evidence was not admissible for that purpose. The prejudice to a defendant under circumstances such as we have in the instant case was not considered. The opinion cites Boyle v. Bornholtz, 224 Iowa 90, 100, 275 N.W. 479, as authority for admission of evidence of a plea of guilty as an admission against interest. That case was tried in district court before the effective date of section 321.489 and no construction nor interpretation of the statute was involved.
In a strict, technical sense the majority opinion avoids and may not constitute a construction of section 321.489. I am fearful, however, that the opinion may be considered as a construction or as the first step toward a construction with which I disagree.
I would construe the statute as having a greater prohibitive perimeter than does the majority opinion. I think that admis*68sibn of testimony of the justice contravenes the purpose of the statute as effectively as would the admission of the record of conviction.
Hays, J., joins in this dissent.