Court Opinion

ID: 9904103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:19:19.133955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:07.814277
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                   NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                   FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                   DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

RUKSHAN GOONEWARDENA,

           Appellant,

 v.                                        Case No.    5D21-1073
                                           LT Case No. 2017-CF-1056-A

STATE OF FLORIDA,

          Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed September 23, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Seminole County,
Debra S. Nelson, Judge.

Lisa Jama Ramsey, of Ramsey Law,
PLLC, Lake Mary, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock
McGuigan, Assistant Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

NARDELLA, J.

      Rukshan Goonewardena appeals his conviction for attempted murder.

Of the claims he raises on appeal, only one has merit; namely, that the trial
court erred in concluding that he was competent to stand trial. Because the

trial court did not make an independent determination that Goonewardena

was competent to proceed to trial, we reverse and remand for the trial court

to make a nunc pro tunc determination of competence if possible or to hold

a new trial if not.

       Goonewardena was charged with attempted murder after shooting the

victim at an intersection during a fit of road rage. In the initial stages of the

case, defense counsel requested a psychological evaluation to determine

whether Goonewardena was competent to proceed to trial based on his

“trouble focusing” and “emotional limitations.” The trial court granted the

request and ordered Goonewardena be evaluated by Psychological

Affiliates, Inc. Dr. Kyle Goodwin evaluated Goonewardena and in his written

report to the court stated that the evaluation was inconclusive and that “either

a finding of competence or incompetence would be supported.”

       Due to the report’s inconclusiveness, the trial court ordered that

Goonewardena undergo a second evaluation with a different psychological

therapy office, Advanced Psychological Associates, Inc. Dr. Kathy Oses

evaluated Goonewardena and concluded that he was mentally competent.

Dr. Oses submitted her report to the court, but apparently the parties did not

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bring the report to the court’s attention because the court did not hold a

hearing or make a finding on Goonewardena’s competency.

      In fact, Goonewardena’s competency was not addressed at all until

more than a year after the second report was filed, when defense counsel

unexpectedly raised the issue to the prosecutor at the trial scheduling

conference.   The parties then requested a bench conference, and the

following exchange took place.

          STATE: [Defense counsel] brought up that in the
          (Indiscernible) around here, it doesn’t appear that a
          formal finding of competency was ever made after an
          evaluation was done.

          COURT: Okay. I don’t know when the evaluation was.

          DEFENSE: Well, if you want, Your Honor, I can have it
          printed it out and we can address it [sic] jury selection
          before we begin. Your Honor could review it and—

          STATE: It says he’s competent to proceed. I mean—

          COURT: Well, if you just give me [sic] to look at—you
          don’t have it. What date was the—

          DEFENSE: It would be the older of the two.

          COURT: 17-1056.

          DEFENSE: I’m trying to get this one off your docket,
          Your Honor.

          COURT: Yes, things do eventually happen, right?

          STATE: I’m just knocking on wood just to—

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         DEFENSE: I think it will get done.

         STATE: Yeah.

         DEFENSE: Everything—every single witness, every
         (Indiscernible) us, so that means we’re good.

         COURT: You may not be able to open it up. And who—
         who evaluated?

         STATE: I believe it was the Defense at that time.

         COURT: Was it a psychological—

         DEFENSE: It      was—it    was   court   ordered.   We
         requested—

         COURT: What—oh, (Indiscernible) okay.

         DEFENSE: And the term that is used, competent to—

         COURT: Okay.

         DEFENSE: —proceed.

         COURT: All right. If—we’ll go back on the record, take
         it off of the noise.

         STATE: Thank you, Judge.

         (End bench conference.)

     After the bench conference, the court made the following finding with

respect to Goonewardena’s competency:

         COURT: Okay. On Mr. Goonewardena, case number
         17-CF-1056, the parties have stipulated to the report
         filed by Kyle Godwin [sic] of the evaluation that was

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          conducted on November 1st, 2019, and that evaluation
          says that he is competent to stand trial so—to proceed.
          So the Court will make a finding of competency to
          proceed.

The court did not enter a written order.

      We review a trial court’s finding that a defendant is competent to stand

trial for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848,

862 (Fla. 2011).    A trial court abuses its discretion when it does not

independently determine that a defendant is competent to stand trial. See,

e.g., Losada v. State, 260 So. 3d 1156, 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

      Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) explains how the trial court

should proceed when it has reasonable grounds to believe that a defendant

may not be competent to proceed to trial.

          (b) Motion for Examination. If, at any material stage
          of a criminal proceeding, the court of its own motion, or
          on motion of counsel for the defendant or for the state,
          has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is
          not mentally competent to proceed, the court shall
          immediately enter its order setting a time for a hearing
          to determine the defendant’s mental condition, which
          shall be held no later than 20 days after the date of the
          filing of the motion, and may order the defendant to be
          examined by no more than 3 experts, as needed, prior
          to the date of the hearing. Attorneys for the state and
          the defendant may be present at any examination
          ordered by the court.

In this case, the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe that

Goonewardena was not competent to proceed; otherwise, the court would

                                      5
not have ordered Goonewardena to undergo a psychological evaluation on

his mental competence. See Flaherty v. State, 266 So. 3d 1187, 1188 (Fla.

4th DCA 2019) (“When a trial court orders an evaluation, it suggests there

are reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent.”); Reynolds

v. State, 177 So. 3d 296, 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“Here, the trial court

apparently had reasonable grounds to believe that Appellant was not

competent to proceed because the court appointed an expert to evaluate

Appellant.”).

      Although our Supreme Court has emphasized that trial courts should

follow the specific procedures outlined in Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure

3.210–3.212, which concern a criminal defendant’s competence to proceed

in a case, it has also explained that the hearing requirement of Rule 3.210(b)

can be waived. See Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 678 (Fla. 2014)

(“[W]here the parties and the judge agree, the trial court may decide the issue

of competency on the basis of the written reports alone.” (quoting Fowler v.

State, 255 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1971))); Jones v. State, 125 So. 3d 982,

984 (Fla. 2013) (holding Rule 3.212 was satisfied when trial court based

finding of competence on defense’s two expert competency evaluations

without conducting competency hearing); Fowler, 255 So. 3d at 515 (“Our

decision [that the trial court erred by not setting a hearing to determine the

                                      6
defendant’s competence] is not to be construed as making the hearing

requirement non-waivable.”).       What cannot be waived, however, is a

defendant’s right to have the trial court make an independent, legal

determination that he is competent to proceed once his competency has

been called into question. See, e.g., Dougherty, 149 So. 3d at 676–78

(tracing duty to make independent determination of competency to

defendant’s right to fair trial); Zern v. State, 191 So. 3d 962, 965 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2016) (stating that “an independent competency finding is a due-

process right”).

         Accordingly, a trial court commits reversible error when it does not

make an independent determination that a defendant is competent to stand

trial.    See, e.g., Zern, 191 So. 3d at 965 (“Because an independent

competency finding is a due-process right that cannot be waived once a

reason for a competency hearing has surfaced, the trial court fundamentally

err[s] in failing to make such a finding.”). The trial court’s duty to make an

independent determination is not absolved when the parties stipulate to a

defendant’s competence and the psychological evaluations conclude that he

is. See Dougherty, 149 So. 3d at 678 (“Even in a situation where all the

experts opine that a defendant is competent, the trial court could presumably

disagree based on other evidence such as the defendant’s courtroom

                                       7
behavior or attorney representations.”); Jones, 125 So. 3d at 984 (holding

parties cannot stipulate that a defendant is competent).

      In this case, the trial court did not make an independent determination

that Goonewardena was competent to proceed to trial. In its oral ruling, the

trial court based its finding of competency on only two things: (1) the

stipulation of the parties; and (2) the (mistaken) belief that the report of

Goonewardena’s first evaluation concluded that he was competent. The

record does not demonstrate that the trial court reviewed the two reports it

ordered at the time it ruled or in anticipation of ruling. This is made clear by

the trial court’s mischaracterization of the first report, which mimics what

counsel told the trial court. Further, the trial court made no mention of the

second report, and there is no other evidence in the record to suggest it was

ever reviewed. Also missing from the record are any observations by the

trial court which would suggest that the trial court made an independent

determination.

      When a trial court fails to make an independent determination that a

defendant is competent for trial after his competency has been called into

question, the proper remedy is usually to reverse and remand for a new trial.

Dougherty, 149 So. 3d at 678–79.           However, our Supreme Court has

recognized that the trial court need not hold a new trial if it can retroactively

                                       8
determine a defendant’s competency. Id. at 679. Such a determination is

“inherently difficult” but can be accomplished “where ‘there are a sufficient

number of expert and lay witnesses who have examined or observed the

defendant contemporaneous with trial available to offer pertinent evidence

at a retrospective hearing.’” Id. (quoting Mason v. State, 489 So. 2d 734, 737

(Fla. 1986)). Consequently, when this Court has reversed a trial court for

making an erroneous finding of competence, we have instructed the lower

court to conduct a nunc pro tunc determination of competence if possible

and to hold a new trial if not. Yancy v. State, 280 So. 3d 1112, 1113 (Fla.

5th DCA 2019); Bynum v. State, 247 So. 3d 601, 604 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018).

     Therefore, because the trial court in this case abused its discretion by

not making an independent determination that Goonewardena was

competent to proceed to trial, we reverse and remand for a nunc pro tunc

determination of competence. To the extent such a determination cannot be

made, we remand for a new trial.

     REVERSED and REMANDED.

COHEN and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur.

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