Court Opinion

ID: 9892881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 14:03:40.619674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:59.164340
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1203   Document: 43     Page: 1    Filed: 10/25/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                    NETFLIX, INC.,
                      Appellant

                            v.

                      DIVX, LLC,
                        Appellee
                 ______________________

                  2022-1203, 2022-1204
                 ______________________

     Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2020-
 00647, IPR2020-00648.
                  ______________________

                Decided: October 25, 2023
                 ______________________

     THOMAS SAUNDERS, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and
 Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also rep-
 resented by ROBERT STILLER; MARK CHRISTOPHER
 FLEMING, SARAH R. FRAZIER, MELISSA N. MOREL, Boston,
 MA.

    MICHAEL GREGORY PATTILLO, JR., MoloLamken LLP,
 Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by
 RAYINER HASHEM, JEFFREY A. LAMKEN; JONATHAN E.
 BARBEE, NATHANIEL RUBIN, New York, NY; NATHAN NOBU
 LOWENSTEIN, KENNETH J. WEATHERWAX, Lowenstein &
 Weatherwax LLP, Santa Monica, CA.
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 2                                  NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

                  ______________________

        Before DYK, LINN, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
     Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CHEN.
       Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK.
 CHEN, Circuit Judge
      Netflix, Inc. (Netflix) appeals two final written deci-
 sions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) deter-
 mining Netflix did not meet its burden of proving claims 1–
 5 and 12 of U.S. Patent No. 9,270,720 (’720 patent) and
 claims 1–6, 8–10, 13–14, 16–17, and 19 of U.S. Patent No.
 9,998,515 (’515 patent) unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
 § 103. See Hulu, LLC v. DivX, LLC, No. IPR2020-00647,
 2021 WL 4859625 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 27, 2021) (’720 Patent De-
 cision); Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, No. IPR 2021-00648,
 2021 WL 4859708 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 27, 2021) (’515 Patent De-
 cision). Each Board decision in these inter partes reviews
 (IPR) is lengthy, with the Board closely analyzing the ar-
 guments and evidence presented by Netflix and the patent
 owner DivX, LLC (DivX). Netflix’s appeal does not chal-
 lenge any of the Board’s substantive analysis. It instead
 makes a purely procedural argument, accusing the Board
 of falling down on the job by failing to address several ar-
 guments purportedly raised in Netflix’s petitions. After
 marching through the relevant papers below, we see no er-
 ror in how the Board understood Netflix’s petition argu-
 ments. Because all of Netflix’s arguments on appeal were
 not raised below, they are forfeited. We affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
                  A. The Challenged Patents
    The ’720 and ’515 patents, assigned to DivX, relate to a
 method for adaptive bitrate streaming of content on a play-
 back device, such as a mobile phone or personal computer.
 “Adaptive bit rate streaming involves detecting the present
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                   3

 streaming conditions (e.g., the playback device’s network
 bandwidth and video decoding capacity) in real time and
 adjusting the quality of the streamed media accordingly.”
 ’720 patent col 1 ll. 30–34. 1 To accomplish this adjustment,
 the method creates an index file that points to alternate
 source media streams (what the claim refers to as “assets”),
 where each stream contains video and audio data. ’720 pa-
 tent col. 1 ll. 57–60. Each alternate source stream can en-
 code media at different maximum bitrates, and the
 playback device may switch between the alternate
 streams. ’720 patent col. 7 ll. 29–42.
     The ’720 patent and ’515 patent both generally claim a
 method for receiving a request for content from a playback
 device, retrieving a list of assets associated with the re-
 quested content, filtering the list of assets based on certain
 criteria, generating an index that describes each asset in
 the filtered list, and sending the index to the playback de-
 vice. For the ’720 patent, claim 1 is representative (empha-
 ses added):
     1. A method of generating a top level index file, com-
 prising:
     receiving a request from a playback device at a
     playback server system, where the request (i) iden-
     tifies a piece of content and (ii) includes a product
     identifier;
     retrieving, using the playback server system,
     (i) a list of assets associated with the identified
     piece of content and (ii) at least one device capabil-
     ity based upon the product identifier, wherein

     1    The ’515 patent is a continuation of an application
 that issued as the ’720 patent. The specifications of the
 ’515 patent and ’720 patent are thus nearly identical. We
 refer to the ’720 patent unless otherwise noted.
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 4                                    NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

     each asset is a different stream associated
     with the piece of content;
     filtering the list of assets using the at least one de-
     vice capability using the playback server system,
     wherein the playback server system maintains a
     database of product identifiers and associated de-
     vice capabilities;
     generating a top level index file describing each as-
     set in the filtered list of assets using the playback
     server system; and
     sending the top level index file to the playback de-
     vice using the playback server system, wherein the
     top level index file is used by the playback device
     to determine which assets to request for playback
     on the device.
     For the ’515 patent, claim 1 is representative and
 closely mirrors the ’720 patent’s claim 1 but provides more
 detail for the top level index file (emphasis added):
     1. A method for authorizing playback of content, com-
 prising:
     receiving a request for content from a playback de-
     vice at a playback server, where the request in-
     cludes a product identifier that identifies a device
     configuration;
     identifying, using the playback server, based on the
     product identifier, a plurality of device capabilities
     including a device type and a device software ver-
     sion indicating a version number for an adaptive
     streaming software component implemented on the
     playback device;
     retrieving, using the playback server, a list of as-
     sets associated with the identified piece of content,
     wherein each asset is a different stream associated
     with the piece of content;
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                      5

     filtering, using the playback server, the list of as-
     sets based on the plurality of device capabilities;
     generating, using the playback server, a top level
     index file describing each asset in the filtered list
     of assets, wherein the top level index file identifies
     locations and bitrates of a plurality of alternative
     streams capable of being used to perform adaptive
     streaming of the content; and
     sending the top level index file from the playback
     server to the playback device.
           B. The IPR Petitions and Board Decisions
     Netflix filed petitions for inter partes review for several
 claims of the ’720 patent and the ’515 patent under 35
 U.S.C. § 103, challenging the claims of both patents over:
 (1) the combination of Pyle 2 and Marusi 3 and (2) the com-
 bination of Lewis4 and Marusi. At issue in this appeal is
 whether Netflix’s petitions contained certain arguments di-
 rected to the “filtering the list of assets” limitation of claim
 1 of the ’720 patent, the “retrieving . . . a list of assets” lim-
 itation of claim 1 in both patents, and the “generating . . .
 a top level index file” limitation of claim 1 of the ’515 pa-
 tent.
     For the “filtering the list of assets” limitation of the ’720
 patent, Netflix argued that Pyle’s selection of a pre-existing
 manifest met this limitation. Netflix also argued that to the
 extent Pyle does not teach or render obvious the filtering
 limitation’s “database of product identifiers and associated
 device capabilities,” Marusi’s database would. As for the
 “generating . . . a top level index file” limitation, Netflix

     2   U.S. Patent No. 8,782,268.
     3   European Application EP 2180664.
     4   U.S. Patent Publication No. 2012/0047542.
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 6                                     NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

 argued that Pyle’s creation of a new manifest teaches this
 limitation.
      The Board observed a disconnect in how Netflix used
 Pyle to teach both the “filtering” and “generating” limita-
 tions of the ’720 patent. The “generating” limitation cre-
 ates a top level index file that describes “each asset in the
 filtered list of assets,” and so the index file’s content is nec-
 essarily a byproduct of what the “filtering” step produces.
 But because Netflix relied on Pyle’s selection of a pre-exist-
 ing manifest to satisfy the “filtering” limitation and relied
 on Pyle’s creation of a new, separate manifest, which is un-
 related to Pyle’s pre-existing manifests, for the “generat-
 ing” limitation, Pyle’s new manifest could not describe each
 asset in the filtered list of assets as required by the “filter-
 ing” limitation. ’720 Patent Decision, 2021 WL 4859625, at
 *15. The Board similarly found the combination of Pyle
 and Marusi deficient for also relying on Pyle’s selection of
 a pre-existing manifest to perform the “filtering” limita-
 tion. Id.
     For the “retrieving . . . a list of assets” limitation in the
 ’720 patent and ’515 patent, Netflix argued “[t]he combina-
 tion of Lewis and Marusi renders this limitation obvious.”
 J.A. 6069; No. IPR 2020-00648, Paper No. 3 at 60 (P.T.A.B.
 Mar. 11, 2020). Specifically, Netflix argued, “[a] [skilled
 artisan] would have found it obvious to retrieve a list of as-
 sets using the playback server system because Lewis
 teaches that the manifest file server and rule resolution
 server generate[] a dynamic file manifest, and Lewis
 teaches that a dynamic manifest file contains a list of URLs
 to container files containing content.” J.A. 6070; J.A. 7070.
     The Board rejected this argument, finding that a result
 achieved in Lewis—i.e., generating a dynamic manifest file
 containing a list of URLs—cannot, without further expla-
 nation, render obvious an intermediate prior step of “re-
 trieving.” ’720 Patent Decision, 2021 WL 4859625, at *19.
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                   7

      Finally, for the “generating . . . a top level file index”
 limitation in the ’515 patent, Netflix argued that Pyle’s
 transmission of a manifest (either a pre-existing or a new
 manifest) into storage teaches this limitation. The Board
 rejected this argument and found that a skilled artisan
 would not have understood transmitting a file into memory
 to correspond to the “generating” limitation. ’515 Patent
 Decision, 2021 WL 4859708, at *14. The Board further
 found that—contrary to Netflix’s characterization of its pe-
 tition arguments in its Reply brief—the petition did not as-
 sert the additional argument that Pyle’s creation of a new
 manifest also met the “generating” limitation. Id. at *14 &
 n.9.
     Netflix timely appealed both final written decisions to
 our court.     We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(4)(A).
                     STANDARD OF REVIEW
      We review the Board’s judgments concerning what ar-
 guments are fairly presented in a petition and other plead-
 ings for abuse of discretion. See Ericsson Inc. v. Intell.
 Ventures I LLC, 901 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Al-
 taire Pharms., Inc. v. Paragon Bioteck, Inc., 889 F.3d 1274,
 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2018), remand order modified by stipula-
 tion,738 F. App’x 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Likewise, “[t]he
 Board’s determinations that a party exceeded the scope of
 a proper reply are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Apple
 Inc. v. Andrea Elec. Corp., 949 F.3d 697, 705 (Fed. Cir.
 2020). “An abuse of discretion is found if the decision: (1)
 is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based
 on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erro-
 neous fact finding; or (4) involves a record that contains no
 evidence on which the Board could rationally base its deci-
 sion.” Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge
 Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omit-
 ted).
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 8                                   NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

                         DISCUSSION
     This appeal is yet another instance where an IPR peti-
 tioner contends that a particular argument was properly
 raised, but overlooked or otherwise incorrectly interpreted
 by the Board. We begin by acknowledging the challenge
 the Board faces when interpreting inter partes review peti-
 tions. We have previously reprimanded the Board for fail-
 ing to address arguments that were presented in a petition.
 See, e.g., Provisur Techs. Inc. v. Weber, Inc., 50 F.4th 117,
 123–24 (Fed. Cir. 2022); Netflix v. DivX, LLC, 2023 WL
 3115576, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023); Uniloc 2017 LLC
 v. Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL 5370480, at *8–9 (Fed. Cir. Nov.
 18, 2021); Microsoft Corp. v. Parallel Networks Licensing,
 LLC, 715 F. App’x 1013, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We have
 likewise reprimanded the Board for finding a claim un-
 patentable based on theories not presented in the petition.
 See, e.g., In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364,
 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re NuVasive Inc., 841 F.3d 966,
 968 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Oren Techs., LLC v. Proppant Express
 Invest., LLC, 2021 WL 3120819, at *4–*5 (Fed. Cir. July
 23, 2021). Given this backdrop, the Board walks a fine line
 when interpreting the scope of a petition and determining
 what arguments have been fairly presented. 5
     While the Board should not take an overly mechanistic
 view of a petition and decline to address an argument be-
 cause the petitioner did not present it with ideal vigor and
 clarity, the Board should also not have to decode a petition
 to locate additional arguments beyond the ones clearly
 made. A petitioner may not rely on a vague, generic, and/or
 meandering petition and later fault the Board for failing to
 understand what the petition really meant. Ultimately, it

     5    Judge Rich once remarked: “The life of a patent so-
 licitor has always been a hard one.” In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d
 990, 993 (CCPA 1967). That observation certainly applies
 today to administrative patent judges conducting IPRs.
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                  9

 is the petitioner’s burden to present a clear argument. In-
 telligent Bio-Systems, 821 F.3d at 1367 (“It is of the utmost
 importance that petitioners in the IPR proceedings adhere
 to the requirement that the initial petition identify ‘with
 particularity’ the ‘evidence that supports the grounds for
 the challenge to each claim.’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C.
 § 312(a)(3) (2012)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4)–(5)
 (2012) (requiring a petitioner to identify “[h]ow the con-
 strued claim is unpatentable,” “specify where each element
 of the claim is found in the prior art patents or printed pub-
 lications relied upon,” and identify “[t]he exhibit number of
 the supporting evidence relied upon to support the chal-
 lenge and the relevance of the evidence to the challenge
 raised, including identifying specific portions of the evi-
 dence that support the challenge”).
      The Board is entitled to discretion in how it interprets
 petitions. See Ericsson Inc., 901 F.3d at 1379 (the Board’s
 compliance with its procedures reviewed for abuse of dis-
 cretion). And we have rejected, many times, post-hoc at-
 tempts on appeal to include additional, new arguments not
 contained in the petition. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Bis-
 cotti, Inc., 878 F.3d 1052, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Microsoft
 did not present to the Board the full argument that it pre-
 sents here on appeal . . . Microsoft’s brief on appeal is far
 more detailed and contains substantial new arguments re-
 garding why it believes Kenoyer anticipates this limitation
 of claim 69.”); see also Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto.
 Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“We also
 are unpersuaded by Continental’s attempts to cure the pe-
 tition’s deficiencies in its subsequent briefing to the Board
 and to us.”); Yita LLC v. MacNeil IP LLC, 69 F.4th 1356,
 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (disagreeing with Yita that an ar-
 gument was raised in petition and thus finding no abuse of
 discretion by the Board in “declining to consider Yita’s ar-
 gument about modifying the teaching of Rabbe . . . because
 it was presented too late—in a footnote in Yita’s reply
 brief”); Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d
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 10                                    NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Board did not abuse its
 discretion by holding HPC to the obviousness theory in its
 petition”); Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata Health, Inc., 805
 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We see no error in the
 Board’s rejection of Ariosa’s reliance, in its Reply submis-
 sions, on previously unidentified portions of a prior-art ref-
 erence to make a meaningfully distinct contention.”). Any
 argument not raised to the Board is forfeited, and we de-
 cline to consider it for the first time on appeal. In re Google
 Tech. Holdings, 980 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
      Netflix contends that the Board ignored several argu-
 ments allegedly raised in its petitions. First, for the “filter-
 ing” limitation in the ’720 patent, Netflix argues that its
 petition relied on (1) Pyle’s new manifest as disclosing this
 limitation (in addition to relying on Pyle’s pre-existing
 manifest), and alternatively (2) Marusi for performing this
 filtering assets step. Appellant’s Br. 38, 42–43. Second, for
 the “retrieving” limitation in the ’720 patent and ’515 pa-
 tent, Netflix argues the Board misinterpreted Lewis as a
 § 103 obviousness reference when the petition relied on
 Lewis as a § 102 anticipatory reference. Id. at 53. Finally,
 for the “generating” limitation in the ’515 patent, Netflix
 argues that the Board erred in treating the argument that
 Pyle’s new manifest could also satisfy the “generating” lim-
 itation as an improper reply argument that had no basis in
 the original petition. Id. at 45. As explained below, none
 of Netflix’s contentions has merit.
                   I. “Filtering” Limitation
      Netflix’s petition plainly explained how the “filtering”
 limitation corresponded to Pyle’s selection of a pre-existing
 manifest. We see no discussion in the petition’s “filtering”
 section, however, of how Pyle’s creation of a new manifest
 meets this limitation. It was more than reasonable, then,
 for the Board to understand Netflix as only mapping Pyle’s
 pre-existing manifest embodiment, and not also its new
 manifest embodiment, to the “filtering” limitation. On
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                   11

 appeal, Netflix points to the petition’s block quote from
 Pyle stating that the new manifest “can be optimized”
 based on certain features. Appellant’s Br. 36–37. But
 nothing in that quoted language itself signals to a reader
 that an optimized new manifest equates to “filtering the
 list of assets,” let alone that Netflix was advancing such an
 argument. And contrary to the dissent, the petition’s asso-
 ciated statement that “Pyle teaches the use of new mani-
 fest files that can be created based upon particular
 device(s) or capabilities,” likewise fails to indicate what it
 is about Pyle’s new manifest that discloses a list of assets
 that then gets filtered. J.A. 6046; see Dissent at 4.
      In stark comparison, the petition made it quite clear
 Netflix was focused on Pyle’s pre-existing manifest as
 teaching the “filtering the list of assets” limitation. When
 arguing that Pyle’s selection of a pre-existing manifest met
 this limitation, Netflix specifically stated “Pyle . . . filters
 lists of assets by selecting from the various manifests an
 appropriate manifest to send.” J.A. 6046–47 (emphasis
 added). Netflix thus showed it knew how to put forward a
 clear mapping of Pyle to the filtering limitation, but never
 connected Pyle’s new manifest to that limitation like it did
 for Pyle’s selection of a pre-existing manifest. While it is
 not strictly necessary for a petition to use the exact words
 of a limitation when making an argument, in this instance,
 the Board appropriately understood Netflix’s “filtering”
 section of the petition to be devoted to relying solely on
 Pyle’s pre-existing manifest. Moreover, even in its appel-
 late briefing and at oral argument, Netflix does not explain
 how the items selected to create Pyle’s new manifest could
 be regarded as “a list of assets” “wherein each asset is a
 different stream” associated with a piece of content, further
 underscoring the lack of clarity with Netflix’s new manifest
 argument. Oral Argument at 15:51–17:04. In sum, while
 the petition explained that Pyle disclosed two embodi-
 ments—a new manifest and a pre-existing manifest—the
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 12                                   NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

 petition’s explanation for how Pyle taught the filtering lim-
 itation was limited to just Pyle’s pre-existing manifest.
      The dissent cites the Board’s institution decision as ev-
 idence that the Board understood Netflix’s petition as ar-
 guing that Pyle’s new manifest met the “filtering”
 limitation. Dissent at 4–5. But the institution decision did
 nothing more than recognize that the petition described
 Pyle’s two manifest embodiments and focused on only the
 pre-existing manifest for “filtering.” In fact, the Board’s in-
 stitution decision never opined on the persuasiveness of
 any potentially-raised new manifest argument; its analysis
 was limited to the petition’s pre-existing manifest conten-
 tion, because that was the only relevant argument from
 Pyle for it to address. See No. IPR2020-00647, Paper No. 9
 at 32 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1. 2020) (Institution Decision) (noting
 for “filtering,” “[w]e do not agree, on this record, that Peti-
 tioner’s showing is deficient. Specifically, petitioner relies
 upon Pyle’s teaching that ‘composition component 210 can
 examine data included in request 420 and determine a suit-
 able or optimal [pre-existing] manifest, and select and
 transmit that manifest to the requesting device.’”). As for
 the other portion of the institution decision which the dis-
 sent relies upon for support, it lays out the Board’s analysis
 of Netflix’s separate “generating” limitation arguments,
 and not the “filtering” limitation in dispute here. See Dis-
 sent at 5–6 (citing Institution Decision at 35 relating to
 “generating” limitation).
      The dissent also points to another portion of the peti-
 tion where it sees Netflix as having made its “new mani-
 fest” argument. Dissent at 5. However, Netflix’s statement
 that “Pyle is teaching the generating of new manifest files
 by filtering the available list of assets . . .” is an argument
 Netflix made when mapping Pyle to the “generating” limi-
 tation, not the “filtering” limitation. J.A. 6052 (emphasis
 added), see also J.A. 6050 (showing heading of “generating”
 limitation). While the Board should review a petition ho-
 listically, it is not obligated to “cobble together assertions
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                    13

 from different sections of a petition or citations of various
 exhibits in order to infer every possible permutation of a
 petitioner’s argument[].” Microsoft Corp. v. FG SRG, LLC,
 860 F. App’x 708, 713 (Fed. Cir., 2021). In sum, we do not
 fault the Board for holding Netflix to the argument it chose
 to make in the “filtering” section of its petition, as opposed
 to reading in an additional potential “filtering” mapping
 from a different petition section related to a different claim
 limitation. 6
      Turning to Netflix’s argument based on Pyle and Ma-
 rusi, Netflix argues the Board overlooked its alternative ar-
 gument relying on Marusi (and not Pyle) for the step of
 filtering assets. We do not agree; the Board could not have
 overlooked that argument because it was never there. The
 Board reasonably understood this portion of the petition to
 rely on Pyle for filtering a list of assets and use Marusi for
 its database teachings.
      To understand how Netflix’s petition relied on Marusi,
 it is helpful to revisit claim 1’s filtering limitation (empha-
 sis added):
     filtering the list of assets using the at least one de-
     vice capability using the playback server system,
     wherein the playback server system maintains a
     database of product identifiers and associated de-
     vice capabilities.
      Netflix initially relied on just Pyle to meet all the fea-
 tures of this limitation, by arguing that Pyle’s selection of
 a pre-existing manifest was the same thing as “filtering the
 list of assets,” and then contending that it would be “obvi-
 ous” for Pyle to include a server with a database of product
 identifiers and device capabilities: “a [skilled artisan]

     6   Netflix’s arguments pointing to what it said in the
 sections of its petition challenging different claims (claims
 2 and 3) fail for the same reasons. Appellant’s Br. 37–38.
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 14                                  NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

 would have found it obvious looking at the teachings of Pyle
 that the product identifiers and associated device capabili-
 ties be maintained by the server, such as in a database.”
 J.A. 6047.
      As a backup argument, Netflix then argued that to the
 extent Pyle “does not satisfy this limitation, it would have
 been obvious to combine the teachings of Pyle with Ma-
 rusi.” J.A. 6048. The petition then presented a drawn-out
 pastiche of block quotes from Marusi, but highlighted par-
 ticular, select language in bold to signal what the reader
 should focus on: Marusi’s “database” which stores “termi-
 nal capabilities information.” J.A. 6048–49. Netflix then
 concluded its argument with its sole articulation for which
 elements it relied on from Pyle and Marusi for the filtering
 limitation: “A [skilled artisan] would have been motivated
 to employ a known component (Marusi’s database of iden-
 tifiers and associated assets) in a predictable way (for Pyle
 to filter assets to obtain a subset in a format compatible
 with the requesting device).” J.A. 6049. The Board
 acknowledged that, at one point in the petition, Netflix
 stated that “Marusi filters from a database,” but neverthe-
 less reasonably concluded that, for the Pyle-Marusi combi-
 nation, Netflix “maintains reliance upon Pyle for filtering,”
 given Netflix’s concluding sentence mapping Pyle to filter-
 ing and Marusi to the database component, and the bolded
 language in block quotes highlighting Marusi’s database.
 ’720 Patent Decision, 2021 WL 4859625, at *14. Moreover,
 we note that the petition’s lone “Marusi filters” statement
 never suggests or explains how Marusi filters “a list of as-
 sets” as claimed. In sum, we reject Netflix’s contention that
 the Board was “absurd” in how it understood Netflix’s ar-
 gument. See Appellant’s Br. at 45.
      We do not wish to discourage petitioners from making
 arguments in the alternative. Rather, we emphasize that
 it is the petitioner’s burden to make clear when alternative
 arguments are being presented and to sufficiently expound
 on each one. The Board should not have to work as hard
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                  15

 as Netflix wants to identify all arguments fairly presented
 in a petition.
                  II. “Retrieving” Limitation
      Turning to the “retrieving . . . a list of assets” limita-
 tion, Netflix argues that the Board wrongfully viewed
 Lewis as the basis for a § 103 obviousness challenge that
 required modification to Lewis, when, in Netflix’s view, the
 petition argued Lewis disclosed this limitation. Appel-
 lant’s Br. 53–54. Specifically, Netflix argues that the peti-
 tion’s “use of language like ‘a [skilled artisan] would have
 found it obvious to retrieve a list of assets’ does not suggest
 that Lewis requires any modification.” Appellant’s Br. 61.
 Patent lawyers would be surprised by this statement.
 There is no word in patent law that sends a more unmis-
 takable signal that § 103, rather than § 102, is being in-
 voked than the word “obvious.” See Connell v. Sears,
 Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he
 need to determine obviousness presumes anticipation is
 lacking”); see also Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529
 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[T]hough anticipation is the epitome of
 obviousness, [they] are separate and distinct concepts.”).
 Nor did the Board err in requiring Netflix to articulate a
 modification of Lewis. As the Board explained, Netflix only
 relied on Lewis’s disclosure of a result—generating a dy-
 namic manifest file containing a list of URLs—but had
 failed to explain how Lewis’s disclosure of this result nec-
 essarily would have rendered obvious an intermediate pro-
 cess step (retrieving a list of assets). ’720 Patent Decision,
 2021 WL 4859625, at *19.
      Netflix contends that the Board misunderstood its ar-
 gument, asserting the petition contemplated that creating
 a manifest containing URLs pointing to the selected pro-
 cessed video necessarily involves first retrieving a list of
 assets that reside in the manifest itself. Appellant’s Br. 60.
 In other words, according to Netflix, creating the manifest
 file and retrieving a list of assets are one and the same. We
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 16                                    NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

 conclude that it was eminently reasonable for the Board to
 interpret Netflix’s petition differently because (1) the peti-
 tion never made this sort of part-and-parcel inherency ar-
 gument and (2) the petition’s use of the word “obvious”
 suggests that retrieving a list of assets and creating a man-
 ifest are not the same. See J.A. 6070 (arguing that “[a]
 [skilled artisan] would have found it obvious to retrieve a
 list of assets” because Lewis teaches creation of a dynamic
 manifest). Netflix’s petition never established or suggested
 that Lewis’s creation of a manifest necessarily involves re-
 trieval of a list of assets. ’720 Patent Decision, 2021 WL
 4859625, at *19.
      The dissent finds that Netflix sufficiently presented
 this argument because “if a method produces or uses a list,
 then the list needs to be retrieved. A list cannot be used
 without retrieving it.” Dissent at 7. That reasoning could
 have been helpful to avoid forfeiture if Netflix had offered
 it in its petition, but it did not. Moreover, in these patent
 claims, the generated list (“generating a top level index de-
 scribing each asset”) is a different, smaller list than the re-
 trieved list, due to the intervening “filtering the list of
 assets” step. See ’720 Patent at claim 1. Thus, if Netflix
 intended to argue that Lewis teaches (as opposed to ren-
 ders obvious) the retrieving limitation, some reasoning had
 to be presented for why Lewis necessarily retrieves an ini-
 tially larger list that would then go through a filtering pro-
 cess to arrive at a final, generated list. This absence of
 needed explanation reinforces our view that Netflix never
 raised this potential argument in its petition, and the
 Board correctly declined to assume that such an argument
 had been raised.
                 III. “Generating” Limitation
      Finally, turning to the “generating . . . a top level index
 file” limitation in the ’515 patent, the Board correctly de-
 termined that Netflix’s reply improperly argued for the
 first time that Pyle’s creation of a new manifest satisfied
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                 17

 the “generating” limitation. Netflix argues the Board over-
 looked its reliance on Pyle’s new manifest, but Netflix re-
 sorts to pointing to sections of its petition devoted to its
 analysis for the “retrieving” and “filtering” limitations. Ap-
 pellant’s Br. 46–47. Given the plain language of the ’515
 patent petition and the substantially more developed anal-
 ysis of an analogous limitation in the ’720 patent petition,
 we disagree with Netflix.
      The ’515 patent petition plainly shows that Netflix ar-
 gued the “generating” limitation was met by Pyle’s trans-
 mission of a manifest into storage, which is entirely
 different from Pyle’s creation of a new manifest. Netflix
 argued: “A [skilled artisan] would have understood that the
 manifest file sent in response to a request for content is
 generated because the manifest file must be placed in
 memory for transmission to a client device.” J.A. 7043 (em-
 phasis added); see also J.A. 7042 (“Pyle further teaches
 transmitting a manifest file to the requesting device in re-
 sponse to the request for content.”). We agree with the
 Board and conclude that Pyle’s transmission of a manifest
 into storage was the only argument presented in the peti-
 tion. ’515 Patent Decision, 2021 WL 4859708 at *13. Net-
 flix points to various parts of the petition—including
 citations to Pyle’s Figure 4 and to passages in Pyle describ-
 ing creation of a new manifest—that allegedly describe
 how Pyle’s new manifest satisfies the “generating” limita-
 tions. Appellant’s Br. 48. While these portions of Pyle de-
 scribe a new manifest, Netflix only referred to these
 portions in citations to support the statement that “Pyle
 further teaches transmitting a manifest file to the request-
 ing device in response to a request for content.” J.A. 7042.
 It was reasonable for the Board to consider only the theory
 encapsulated in the plain words of this statement and de-
 cline to discern another theory from the citations alone.
     Moreover, in contrast to the ’515 patent petition, the
 ’720 patent petition clearly argued that Pyle’s new mani-
 fest met the ’720 patent’s corresponding “generating”
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 18                                   NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

 limitation. In the ’720 patent petition, Netflix argued,
 “Pyle teaches generating manifest files that are opti-
 mized . . . using the composition component 210 to create
 new manifests,” J.A. 6051 (emphasis added), and “[a]
 [skilled artisan] would have found it obvious to generate a
 top level index file . . . because as explained for limitations
 1(c) and 1(d), Pyle teaches . . . creating new manifest
 files . . . .” J.A. 6050 (emphasis added). Comparing these
 arguments to those of the ’515 patent petition, we agree
 with the Board that, “[Netflix] knew how to raise the argu-
 ment (that creating a new manifest teaches generating a
 top level index file) if [Netflix] chose to do so.” ’515 Patent
 Decision, 2021 WL 4859708 at *14. Thus, the Board did
 not abuse its discretion in finding that Netflix improperly
 argued that Pyle’s new manifest met the “generating” lim-
 itation for the first time in its reply.
                         CONCLUSION
     For the reasons stated above, all of Netflix’s arguments
 on appeal were not presented below and are thus forfeited.
 We affirm the Board’s decision upholding the challenged
 claims of the ’720 patent and ’515 patent.
                         AFFIRMED
Case: 22-1203    Document: 43      Page: 19    Filed: 10/25/2023

    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                   ______________________

                      NETFLIX, INC.,
                        Appellant

                              v.

                        DIVX, LLC,
                          Appellee
                   ______________________

                    2022-1203, 2022-1204
                   ______________________

     Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2020-
 00647, IPR2020-00648.
                  ______________________

 DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
     Contrary to the majority, I think that the Board im-
 properly ignored arguments that Netflix raised in its peti-
 tion. In IPRs we are confronted with situations in which
 parties without basis argue that arguments were pre-
 sented to and ignored by the Board, and equally with situ-
 ations in which the Board ignores arguments that were
 properly preserved. 1 In my view this case, at least in part,

     1  See, e.g., Ericsson Inc. v. Intell. Ventures I LLC, 901
 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that the
 Board erred by “parsing [petitioner’s] arguments . . . with
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 2                                   NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

 falls in the latter category, and the Board improperly de-
 clined to consider arguments that Netflix raised in its peti-
 tion. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary
 conclusion.
                               I
     Netflix challenged claims of both the ’720 and ’515 pa-
 tents, which are directed at methods for generating “a top
 level index file” for use with media streaming. In media
 streaming, content (such as a movie) is typically stored as
 separate “streams” suitable for different device capabili-
 ties. ’720 patent col. 1 ll. 35–38. Thus, a playback device
 must be able to select an appropriate media file from the
 available streams. The specification of the ’720 and ’515
 patents discusses “methods for automatically generating
 top level index files,” which “describe[] the location and
 content of container files containing streams of media.”
 ’720 patent col. 6 ll. 36–43. Claim 1 of both patents recites

 too fine of a filter”); Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear,
 LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (remanding be-
 cause it was “unclear whether the Board meaningfully con-
 sidered all of [petitioner’s] arguments and evidence”);
 Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, No. 2022-1043, 2023 WL
 3115576, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023) (holding that “the
 Board erred in not adequately assessing Netflix’s argu-
 ments regarding limitation 1[c]”); Netflix, Inc. v. DivX,
 LLC, 80 F.4th 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding that
 “the Board abused its discretion in requiring Netflix to ex-
 plicitly identify the field of endeavor using specific lan-
 guage”); Provisur Techs., Inc. v. Weber, Inc., 50 F.4th 117,
 123–24 (Fed. Cir. 2022); Microsoft Corp. v. Parallel Net-
 works Licensing, LLC, 715 F. App’x 1013, 1021 (Fed. Cir.
 Dec. 1, 2017); Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 2019-
 2159, 2021 WL 5370480, at *8–9 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2021);
 AMC Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Fall Line Pats., LLC, No. 2021-
 1051, 2021 WL 4470062, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 2021).
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                    3

 a method comprising “receiving” a request for content, “re-
 trieving” a list of assets associated with the content, “filter-
 ing” the list of assets using device capability, “generating”
 “a top level index file describing each asset in the filtered
 list of assets,” and “sending the top level index file” to the
 playback device.
      In the IPRs, Netflix relied on the Pyle and Lewis pub-
 lications as prior art. Pyle describes the use of a “mani-
 fest,” which is a file that “describe[s] the locations of
 various content segments.” ’720 Patent Decision, 2021 WL
 4859625, at *8 (quoting Pyle). Pyle’s manifests can be “op-
 timized in connection with . . . particular devices or capa-
 bilities thereof.” Id. at *9. In one embodiment, a manifest
 can be “selected . . . from the set of available manifests” and
 in another a “new manifest” can be composed. Id. Lewis
 describes an embodiment wherein video content is pro-
 cessed and customized according to particular client device
 parameters, and “when [a] client device requests video con-
 tent represented by stored video segments, [a] dynamic
 manifest file server may provide [a] manifest file.” Petition
 for Inter Partes Review, Hulu, LLC v. DivX, LLC, at 63 (No.
 IPR2020-00647) (“Petition”) (quoting Lewis) (reference
 numbers omitted).
                                II
     Netflix argues that the Board in three instances errone-
 ously determined that the petitioner had not made argu-
 ments that in fact were made in the petition. I agree with
 the majority as to one of these (though I view it as a close
 question)—that the Board did not abuse its discretion in
 finding that Netflix failed to raise an argument that the
 “generating” limitation of the ’515 patent was met by Pyle’s
 “new manifest.” But I disagree with the majority that Net-
 flix failed to make arguments in two other respects—re-
 garding the “filtering” limitation of the ’720 patent and the
 “retrieving” limitations of both the ’720 and ’515 patents.
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 4                                    NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

 In my view, the Board was required to address the merits
 of these arguments.
         A. “Filtering” Limitation of the ’720 Patent
    In its final written decision, the Board concluded that
 the “filtering” limitation was not met by the selection of an
 existing manifest. The Board found it “dispositive” that
 Netflix relied on Pyle’s selection of an existing manifest,
 and not the creation of a new manifest, to meet the “filter-
 ing” limitation. ’720 Patent Decision, 2021 WL 4859625, at
 *7, *15. The majority approves of the Board’s conclusion.
 Maj. Op. 6, 10. But, contrary to the majority, Maj. Op. 10,
 Netflix’s petition plainly presented an alternative argu-
 ment that Pyle, by generating a new manifest, met the ’720
 patent’s “filtering” limitation, and the Board’s institution
 decision credited this argument.
     In the petition, under the heading “filtering the list of
 assets,” petitioner explained that Pyle’s “new manifest”
 teaches filtering. Petition, at 37 (emphasis added). The
 petition argued that Pyle “teaches filtering the lists of as-
 sets using at least one device capability” in one of two ways:
 (a) “Pyle teaches the use of new manifest files that can be
 created based upon particular device(s) or capabilities [new
 manifests]” and (b) “Pyle also teaches keeping sets of dif-
 ferent manifest[] files [existing manifests].” Id. at 38 (em-
 phasis added). In the paragraph discussing new manifest
 files, Netflix quoted from Pyle to show how the new mani-
 fest can be optimized based on device capabilities, network
 conditions, and user preferences. Id. Here, Netflix pre-
 sented its “new manifest” argument on the very page the
 majority cites as lacking it. Maj. Op. 11.
    Contrary to the majority, Maj. Op. 12, in its institution
 decision the Board explicitly recognized the argument that
 Pyle’s new manifest meets the “filtering” limitation. Under
 the heading for “Limitation 1[d],” which “recites ‘filtering
 the list of assets . . .,’” the Board recognized that “[f]irst,
 Petitioner contends Pyle ‘teaches the use of new manifest
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                   5

 files that can be created based upon particular device(s) or
 capabilities,’” and the Board quoted Pyle’s “new manifest”
 disclosure. No. IPR2020-00647, Paper No. 9 at 28–29
 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 1. 2020) (“Institution Decision”) (emphasis in
 original).
     Moreover, other aspects of the petition and the institu-
 tion decision reiterate the conclusion that the new manifest
 teaches “filtering.” Under the heading for the “generating”
 limitation, which follows the “filtering” limitation, Netflix
 explained at length that “Pyle is teaching the generating of
 new manifest files by filtering the available list of assets to
 include only a subset of assets based upon the product iden-
 tifier information,” and cited expert testimony in support.
 Petition, at 44 (emphasis added). Thus, Netflix’s petition
 further tied the new manifest to the “filtering” limitation.
 The institution decision similarly demonstrates the
 Board’s understanding of Netflix’s position. The Board rea-
 soned that, although DivX responded to the “existing man-
 ifest” argument in its preliminary response, the petition
 also raised a “new manifest” argument that DivX ignored,
 which was sufficient for institution:
     Additionally, Patent Owner’s argument ignores Pe-
     titioner’s contention that one of ordinary skill in
     the art would understand Pyle to teach generating
     new manifest files by “filtering the available list of
     assets to include only a subset of assets based upon
     the product identifier information, including for ex-
     ample the capabilities of the device.” On this rec-
     ord, Petitioner’s position is reasonable and
     supported by the ’720 patent and Dr. Reader’s tes-
     timony.
     Second, Patent Owner contends that Petitioner
     fails to explain how Pyle’s manifest file “describ[es]
     each asset in the filtered list.” Specifically, Patent
     Owner contends that Pyle “teaches a system for
     streaming content based on manifests that
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 6                                     NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

     already exist when the request for content is sub-
     mitted” and does not teach composing a new mani-
     fest in response to or based on a request for content.
     Patent Owner’s argument, however, fails to detract
     from Petitioner’s position, explained above, regard-
     ing filtering the available list of assets and Pyle’s
     teaching regarding optimizing a new manifest
     based on particular device capabilities.
 Institution Decision, at 35 (citations and parentheticals
 omitted) (emphasis in original).
      In its final written decision the Board backtracked,
 finding instead that Netflix’s petition presented only one
 argument—that Pyle teaches filtering by selecting an ex-
 isting manifest. The Board dismissed Netflix’s “new man-
 ifest” position, judging that Netflix presented only a
 “single-paragraph discussion,” which “does not (a) ex-
 pressly assert that Pyle’s creation of a new manifest in-
 volves ‘filtering’ or (b) explain how Pyle’s new optimized
 manifest teaches filtering.” ’720 Patent Decision, 2021 WL
 4859625, at *14 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
 The final written decision does not acknowledge the peti-
 tion’s express new manifest argument under the filtering
 heading or the Board’s express statements in its institution
 decision regarding Pyle’s teaching of “filtering” by creating
 new manifest files. See Institution Decision, at 28–29, 35.
     When the Board recognizes two arguments in its insti-
 tution decision but addresses only one on the merits, a re-
 mand is required. Google LLC v. Conversant Wireless
 Licensing S.A.R.L., 753 F. App’x 890, 895 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
 (“In its institution decision, the Board clearly and correctly
 understood that Petitioners made two distinct arguments
 in their petition . . . . Yet, in its final written decision, the
 Board concluded that Petitioners’ arguments failed with-
 out even discussing Petitioners’ [first] argument.”). Here,
 the Board recognized in the institution decision the alter-
 native argument that Pyle teaches that the “new manifest”
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                                   7

 “generates top level index files by filtering assets,” yet did
 not address this aspect of the institution decision in the fi-
 nal written decision. Institution Decision, at 35 (quotation
 omitted); see also id. at 28–29. The Board cannot contra-
 dict itself without explanation. The majority does not rec-
 ognize the evident contradiction between the Board’s
 institution decision and its final written decision or the
 Board’s failure to explain the contradiction in its final writ-
 ten decision.
    I would remand for the Board to consider the merits of
 Netflix’s “new manifest” argument for claims 1–5 and 12 of
 the ’720 patent.
   B. “Retrieving” Limitations of the ’720 and ’515 Patents
     The “retrieving” limitation of both the ’720 and ’515 pa-
 tents recites “retrieving, using the playback server [sys-
 tem,] a list of assets associated with the identified piece of
 content . . . .” Netflix relied on Lewis as demonstrating this
 limitation. The Board concluded that the argument failed
 because Netflix did not show how it would be obvious to
 modify Lewis to retrieve a list of assets:
     Fundamentally, Petitioner fails to provide any rea-
     son in the Petition as to why one of ordinary skill
     in the art would have found it obvious to retrieve a
     list of assets based on Lewis. Instead of providing
     a reason as to why retrieving a list of assets would
     have been obvious, Petitioner points to a result
     achieved by Lewis—generating a dynamic mani-
     fest file that contains a list of URLs to container
     files containing content.
 ’720 Patent Decision, 2021 WL 4859625, at *19; ’515 Patent
 Decision, 2021 WL 4859708, at *22 (emphasis in original).
 The majority approves this decision. Maj. Op. 15. How-
 ever, if a method produces or uses a list, then the list needs
 to be retrieved. A list cannot be used without retrieving it.
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 8                                     NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC

 Netflix adequately raised an argument that the “retriev-
 ing” limitation was met without modifying Lewis.
     In both petitions, Netflix argued:
     A POSITA would have found it obvious to retrieve
     a list of assets using the playback server system be-
     cause Lewis teaches that the manifest file server
     and rule resolution server generate[s] a dynamic
     file manifest, and Lewis teaches that a dynamic
     manifest file contains a list of URLs to container
     files containing content . . . . In other words, be-
     cause a manifest file is a file that contains a list of
     URLs that point to container files, a POSITA would
     have found it obvious that the manifest file server
     and rule resolution server retrieve a list of assets
     because the manifest file server and rule resolution
     server ultimately produce a list of assets to the cli-
     ent device in the form of a manifest file.
 Petition, 62–63; J.A. 7070 (citations omitted) (emphasis
 added).
     Netflix explained how Lewis alone teaches the “retriev-
 ing” limitations because “a POSITA would have found it
 obvious that the manifest file server and rule resolution
 server retrieve a list of assets.” Petition, 62–63; J.A. 7070.
 Netflix’s argument was not that a POSITA would find it
 obvious to modify Lewis to retrieve a list of assets. Rather,
 it was that a “POSITA would have found it obvious” that
 Lewis already did “retrieve a list of assets” as it produced
 its manifest file to the client. In Netflix’s argument, “re-
 trieve” is in the present tense, and there is no hint that
 Netflix thought Lewis needed to be modified.
                               III
     Contrary to the Board’s conclusions, Netflix’s petitions
 adequately raised arguments that the “filtering” limitation
 in the challenged claims of the ’720 patent (based on Pyle)
 and the “retrieving” limitations in the challenged claims of
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 NETFLIX, INC. v. DIVX, LLC                               9

 both patents (based on Lewis) were obvious. I would re-
 mand for the Board to consider Netflix’s arguments regard-
 ing the ’720 patent’s “filtering” limitation and the
 “retrieving” limitations with respect to claims 1–6 and 12
 of the ’720 patent and claims 1–6, 8–10, and 13 of the ’515
 patent. I respectfully dissent.