Court Opinion

ID: 9353809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 20:02:10.13849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:12:00.373487
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/11/23 Kane v. Hiekali CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

DAWN KANE,                                                B314033

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                          Super. Ct. No. 19STCV17207)
         v.

NASSER HIEKALI et al.,

     Defendants and
Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Patricia D. Nieto and Kristin S. Escalante,
Judges. Affirmed.

         Dawn Kane, in propria persona, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

      R.J. Ryan Law, Richard J. Ryan and Aaron J. Weissman
for Defendants and Respondents.
       Dawn Kane (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered
after the trial court sustained demurrers filed by Nasser Hiekali,
United Medical Imaging, Inc. (UMI), United Medical Imaging
Healthcare, Inc. (UMIH), and United Medical Imaging
Management, Inc. (UMIM) (collectively respondents), and
dismissed appellant’s claims against respondents on the ground
that they were barred under the applicable statute of limitations.
We affirm.

                         BACKGROUND
Appellant’s complaint
      Appellant filed her complaint for general negligence,
personal injury, and damages against Hiekali doing business as
UMI and Does 1-10 on May 17, 2019. Appellant alleged that on
Thursday, May 18, 2017, she went for a magnetic resonance
imaging scan (MRI) pursuant to her doctor’s orders at UMI in Los
Angeles. Upon arriving at 8:15 p.m. for her 8:30 p.m.
appointment, she was surprised to find the waiting room busy.
Appellant was the last person to be seen and was called in for her
MRI at approximately 9:30 p.m. The technician let appellant
know that the MRI was going to be long and could last over an
hour. The technician also told appellant that he would
communicate with her through a speaker inside of the machine.
Once she was in the machine, appellant fell asleep.
      When she awoke appellant felt it was unusually quiet. She
asked the technician if she was done and received no answer.
Appellant became fearful and started yelling louder and louder.
She was soon in a “full state of panic.” She still heard nothing
from the technician. Appellant started yelling as loudly as she
could, moving her body and banging herself against the machine.

                                2
When she finally came out she was shaking, crying, and
hysterical. Appellant experienced neck and arm pain after the
experience. A friend went to appellant’s home on May 21, 2017,
and convinced appellant to make a formal complaint to LA
CARE. The following week appellant saw her doctor again and
insisted that she had new pain that she believed resulted from
UMI’s negligence.
       Appellant’s complaint alleged that UMI was negligent in
failing to have its technician service her in a customary and
normal manner and failing to have a doctor on duty supervising
the technician.
First demurrer and motion to strike
       On September 26, 2019, Hiekali and UMI filed a demurrer
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 and motion to
strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 435. Hiekali
and UMI asserted that appellant’s complaint failed to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them and sought
to strike portions of the complaint. The demurrer failed to raise
the issue of the statute of limitations applicable to claims of
medical negligence.
       Appellant submitted no opposition to either the demurrer
or motion to strike. On February 7, 2020, the court found that
the complaint stated a cause of action against Hiekali and UMI
for general negligence. However, it found that appellant stated
insufficient facts to state a prima facie claim for punitive
damages. Accordingly, the punitive damages claim was stricken.
The demurrer was overruled, and the motion to strike was
granted with 20 days leave to amend.

                                3
First amended complaint
       On January 14, 2020, appellant substituted UMI as Doe
No. 1 and UMIH as Doe No. 2. On February 20, 2020, appellant
substituted UMIM as Doe No. 3.
       On February 27, 2020, appellant filed her first amended
complaint (FAC) against respondents. Appellant listed causes of
action for (1) knowledge of probable dangerous consequences by
willful conduct and marketing fraud; (2) willful deviation of the
normal standard of care; (3) authorized and ratified employees’
wrongful conduct; and (4) history of fraudulent, “malicient [sic]”
and oppressive acts. Appellant alleged the same underlying facts
set forth in her original complaint. Appellant sought punitive
damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3294.
       In support of her first cause of action, appellant added facts
including that respondents’ marketing materials claim that they
provide “‘Quality Care, Quality Service, Quality Reports’ and
‘puts their patients at the center of everything they do.’”
Appellant claimed that respondents willfully run their business
in a way that puts patients at risk. Appellant also alleged that it
appeared that the employee that performed her MRI was
overworked and not adequately trained. In support of her second
cause of action, appellant added facts including a failure to
purchase accessories to ensure appellant’s safety in the MRI
machine. In support of her third cause of action, appellant added
facts suggesting that an employee of respondents tampered with
data in order to undermine appellant’s assertion that she was left
in the MRI machine. All allegations surrounded appellant’s
initial claims of negligence stemming from her experience during
the MRI procedure.

                                  4
Demurrer to the FAC
       After substituting new counsel on March 16, 2020,
respondents filed a demurrer to the FAC on March 27, 2020. In
their demurrer to the FAC, respondents first raised the point
that appellant’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. Specifically, respondents argued that appellant’s
FAC revolves around a simple allegation that appellant sustained
physical and emotional injuries while an MRI technician was
performing scans pursuant to a physician referral. Because the
alleged May 18, 2017 incident took place during the course of a
medical procedure, respondents argued, it implicated the one-
year statute of limitations for medical procedures found in Code
of Civil Procedure section 340.5 (section 340.5). Because
appellant’s claim against respondents was not filed until May 17,
2019, two years after the incident, appellant’s claims were
barred.
       In her opposition to respondents’ demurrer, appellant
“agree[d] with [respondents] that this case is a medical
negligence case but disagree[d] that it [was] time-barred.”
(Boldface and italics omitted.) Among other things, appellant
argued that she was still discovering harm and that the statute is
tolled when fraud is proven.
       On October 14, 2020, the trial court sustained respondents’
demurrer. The court found that the medical malpractice statute
of limitations applied to all of appellant’s causes of action, which
revolved around the alleged May 18, 2017 incident involving a
medical procedure. Based on the pled facts, appellant knew of
the injury and its negligent cause on May 18, 2017. In fact, she
reported the incident on May 21, 2017. Thus, under section
340.5, she had one year to bring her malpractice-based claims.

                                 5
The court disagreed that the fraud exception would serve to toll
the statute of limitations in this case.
       As to appellant’s fraud-based causes of action, the trial
court determined that to the extent that they were not barred by
the statute of limitations, they failed to state a claim as they
were not pled with the requisite specificity. The court noted,
“[t]he examples of marketing, such as ‘quality care’ and other
ambiguous statements of opinion that amount to mere puffery,
also cannot form the basis of a claim.” Appellant failed to allege
any reliance on such statements.
       The trial court granted appellant 20 days leave to amend
her complaint.
Second amended complaint
       On November 2, 2020, appellant filed her second amended
complaint (SAC). Appellant listed causes of action for negligence,
negligent hiring and supervision, premises liability, and violation
of Business and Professions Code section 17200. In spite of
changing the captions of her causes of action, appellant alleged
the exact same facts that she had alleged in her original
complaint regarding the events of May 18, 2017.
       In her first cause of action, appellant alleged that
respondents breached their duty of care to carefully and
diligently manage and operate the health care centers and failed
to implement proper safeguards that led to appellant’s damages.
In her second cause of action, appellant alleged that respondents
undertook the responsibility for staffing the centers but failed to
hire adequately licensed, experienced and trained technicians. In
addition, appellant alleged that respondents worked their
technicians late into the night without sufficient time off and
overscheduled patients. Appellant alleged that respondents’

                                 6
breach of duty led to her damages after being trapped in an MRI
machine for an unacceptable period of time. The third cause of
action asserted that respondents breached their duty of care to
take reasonable measures to ensure that appellant would not be
exposed to unreasonable risk of harm. In her fourth cause of
action for violation of Business and Professions Code section
17200, appellant claimed that respondents engaged in unlawful,
unfair and fraudulent business practices by failing to carefully
and diligently manage their health care facilities, improperly
hiring and training technicians, and establishing inadequate
staffing protocols.
Demurrer to the SAC
       On November 13, 2020, respondents filed and served their
demurrer to appellant’s SAC, arguing that it was barred in its
entirety under section 340.5. Respondents noted that despite the
fact that appellant had agreed that her claim was for medical
negligence, that cause of action was conspicuously absent from
her complaint. Respondents argued that underlying the entirety
of the SAC was a time-barred claim for medical negligence and
that, regardless of the captions, all her causes of action were
barred. Respondents cited supporting case law confirming that
creative pleading cannot transform a claim of medical negligence
into ordinary negligence. Respondents cited Flowers v. Torrance
Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1000
(Flowers) for the proposition that the same alleged breach of duty
cannot give rise to distinct causes of action for ordinary as well as
professional negligence.
       On April 26, 2021, the trial court sustained respondents’
demurrer without leave to amend as to Hiekali, UMI and UMIH.
The court found that “each claim is directly related to the

                                  7
provision of medical services, to wit, the MRI scan. . . . The
medical malpractice statute of limitations applies to all of the
causes of action based on the negligent MRI scans.” The trial
court’s dismissal of the SAC with prejudice as to Hiekali, UMI
and UMIH was entered on May 21, 2021.
       The trial court continued the demurrer as to UMIM until
June 28, 2021, because at the time of the hearing UMIM’s
corporate status was suspended.
Further proceedings regarding UMIM
       On June 28, 2021, UMIM’s corporate status had not yet
been resolved. Thus, UMIM still had no standing to defend the
lawsuit. The court scheduled an order to show cause re: UMIM’s
corporate status for August 27, 2021.
       On July 9, 2021, UMIM submitted documentation that the
corporation was dissolved. As such, it was authorized to wind up
its affairs. The trial court instructed UMIM to file and serve a
motion to have the fully briefed demurrer ruled upon in favor of
UMIM. On November 4, 2021, the trial court granted UMIM’s
motion for order sustaining fully briefed demurrer without leave
to amend and to enter order of dismissal based thereupon. The
court stated, “The court sustains the demurrer of UMIM for the
reasons stated in [the court’s] [m]inute [o]rder dated April 26,
2021. The second amended complaint is dismissed as against
UMIM.” The court noted that the same outcome would have
resulted even if UMIM had not revived its corporate status. The
court cited Molen v. Friedman (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153-
1154, for the proposition that where a complaint fails to state a
cause of action, it is error for the court to enter a default
judgment against any defendant.

                                8
      The order dismissing appellant’s SAC with prejudice was
entered and served on all parties on November 4, 2021.
Notices of appeal and consolidation
      On July 7, 2021, appellant timely appealed from the
dismissal with prejudice of Hiekali, UMI and UMIH entered on
May 21, 2021. The appeal was given case No. B314033.
      On December 29, 2021, appellant timely appealed from the
court’s order of dismissal as to UMIM on November 4, 2021. The
appeal was given case No. B317917.
      On February 16, 2022, this court ordered the appeals
consolidated.

                             DISCUSSION
I.     Standards of review
       A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.
(Hernandez v. City of Pomona (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1492, 1497
(Hernandez).) First we review the complaint de novo to
determine whether it contains sufficient facts to state a cause of
action. (Ibid.) “In doing so, we accept as true the properly
pleaded material factual allegations of the complaint, together
with facts that may be properly judicially noticed.” (Ibid.)
Reversal is warranted if facts were alleged showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief under any possible legal theory.
(Ibid.)
       Where the complaint is sustained without leave to amend,
we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion
in declining to grant leave to amend. (Hernandez, supra, 49
Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.) “[W]e will only reverse for abuse of
discretion if we determine there is a reasonable possibility the
pleading can be cured by amendment.” (Id. at p. 1498.) “The

                                 9
burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the
plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
        A party may not avoid defects in its original complaint by
omitting facts that rendered the prior complaint defective or
adding facts that are inconsistent with prior allegations. “‘Under
the sham-pleading doctrine, admissions in an original complaint
that has been superseded by an amended pleading remain within
the court’s cognizance and the alteration of such statements by
amendment designed to conceal fundamental vulnerabilities in a
plaintiff’s case will not be accepted.’” (Lockton v. O’Rourke (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061.)
II.     Section 340.5 and applicable law
        Section 340.5 provides that “[i]n an action for injury or
death against a health care provider based upon such person’s
alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement
of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year
after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs
first.”
        The term “health care provider” is defined as “any person
licensed or certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with
Section 500) of the Business and Professions Code . . . or licensed
pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1440) of
Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code and any clinic, health
dispensary, or health facility, licensed pursuant to Division 2
(commencing with Section 1200) of the Health and Safety Code.”
(§ 340.5, subd. (1).) The term “health care provider” also
“includes the legal representatives of a health care provider.”
(Ibid.)

                                 10
       The term “professional negligence” is defined as “a
negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the
rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the
proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided
that such services are within the scope of services for which the
provider is licensed.” (§ 340.5, subd. (2).)
       To determine whether a statute of limitations applies to
bar a cause of action, “it is necessary to identify the nature of the
cause of action, i.e., the ‘gravamen’ of the cause of action.”
(Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 22.) “‘[T]he
nature of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the
relief demanded determines the applicability of the statute of
limitations . . . .’” (Id. at p. 23.) Where the gravamen of the
complaint asserts professional malpractice, the applicable
malpractice statute of limitations applies to the entire complaint
“notwithstanding the existence of other claims against the
professionals, such as misrepresentation, for which a different
statute of limitations might otherwise apply.” (Sahadi v.
Scheaffer (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 704, 715; see Hydro-Mill Co.,
Inc. v. Hayward, Tilton & Rolapp Ins. Associates, Inc. (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 1145, 1159 [holding that “the allegations of
professional negligence subsume all of the allegations for breach
of fiduciary duty” for the purposes of determining the statute of
limitations].)
III. Section 340.5 applies to bar all four causes of action
       in the SAC
       Applying the standards set forth above, we find that the
trial court properly sustained respondents’ demurrer to
appellant’s SAC on the ground that appellant’s claims are barred
by the statute of limitations found in section 340.5. In spite of

                                 11
the titles of appellant’s causes of action, the gravamen of each
cause of action is medical negligence, therefore the causes of
action are barred under section 340.5.
       A.      First cause of action for negligence
       Although appellant has framed her first cause of action as
one for general negligence, her allegations concern medical
negligence. Appellant admits that respondents “were in the
business of managing and operating the United Medical Imaging
Healthcare centers which provided medical diagnostic services to
patients/clients.” In this role, respondents “breached their duty
of care . . . by failing to carefully and diligently manage and
operate the healthcare centers . . . which resulted in [appellant’s]
damages.”
       The SAC does not allege that respondent health care
facilities are not
“licensed pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with Section 1200)
of the Health and Safety Code.” (§ 340.5, subd. (1).) In fact, it
admits they were facilities that “provided medical diagnostic
services to patients/clients.” Thus, any claim arising out of
respondents’ act of providing health care services to appellant
was subject to section 340.5.1
       The term “health care provider” also “includes the legal
representatives of a health care provider.” (§ 340.5, subd. (1).)

1     As will be discussed further in part IV of this opinion,
appellant appears to put forward a new claim that the corporate
respondents were not properly licensed as health care providers
because various directors were not licensed physicians. Any such
claim is properly brought before the applicable licensing board
and does not change the fundamental nature of appellant’s
claims in this lawsuit.

                                 12
Appellant does not dispute that Hiekali falls into this category.
Thus, in the context of this lawsuit, section 340.5 applies to bar
appellant’s claims against him as well.2
       Because the cause of action for negligence involves
negligence that occurred during the rendering of health care
services, section 340.5 applies, and appellant’s first cause of
action is barred. (Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Serivce, Inc.
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 404 (Canister) [noting that “the
relevant test is . . . whether the negligence occurred in the
rendering of services for which a provider is licensed”]; see
Flowers, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1000 [holding that “whether the
cause of action is denominated ‘ordinary’ or ‘professional’
negligence, or both, ultimately only a single standard can obtain
under any given set of facts”].)
       B.    Second cause of action for negligent hiring and
             supervision
       Appellant’s second cause of action for negligent hiring and
supervision also has at its core the incident of May 18, 2017.
Appellant claims that respondents had a duty to hire licensed,
experienced and adequately trained individuals, as well as
implement protocols to avoid overscheduling and difficult hours
for staff. Appellant alleges that respondents’ breach of this duty
led to the event during which she was trapped in an MRI
machine for an unacceptable amount of time.

2      Appellant asserts that MRI technicians are not regulated in
California. We note that appellant’s position does not appear to
be correct. (See Health & Safety Code, § 114870; Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 17, § 30441.) However, we decline to address this point
further, as appellant is not suing the MRI technician, but the
health care facilities and their legal representative.

                                13
       Because the cause of action for negligent hiring and
supervision involves negligence that occurred during the
rendering of health care services, section 340.5 applies, and
appellant’s second cause of action is barred. (Canister, supra, 160
Cal.App.4th at p. 404.)
       C.    Third cause of action for premises liability
       Appellant’s third cause of action for premises liability is
also a claim of medical negligence. In it, appellant alleges that
respondents were under a duty of care to take reasonable
measures that appellant would not be exposed to unreasonable
risk of harm while on the premises of the facility where her MRI
was performed. However, the only incident alleged at that
facility was an incident of alleged medical negligence, in which
appellant was allegedly harmed while undergoing an MRI
procedure.
       Because the cause of action for premises liability involves
negligence that occurred during the rendering of health care
services, section 340.5 applies and appellant’s third cause of
action is barred. (Canister, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 404.)
       D.    Fourth cause of action for violation of Business
             and Professions Code section 17200
       Preliminarily, we note that appellant has failed to show
that she obtained permission to add this new cause of action in
her SAC. “The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a
new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so,
unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order
granting leave to amend.” (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB
(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.)
       The purpose of the unfair competition law (UCL) is to
“safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of

                                14
monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by
prohibiting unfair, dishonest, deceptive, destructive, fraudulent
and discriminatory practices by which fair and honest
competition is destroyed or prevented.” (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17001.) “[A]n action under the UCL ‘is not an all-purpose
substitute for a tort or contract action.’” (Korea Supply Co. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1150.)
      In her fourth cause of action, appellant alleges that
respondents engaged in unlawful, unfair and fraudulent business
practices when they “failed to carefully and diligently manage
and operate” their health care centers, “failed to implement
proper safeguards and protocols,” and “negligently and
improperly hired and trained technicians,” resulting in the
incident that caused appellant’s alleged damages. Despite the
caption of the cause of action, the gravamen of the claim was that
appellant was subjected to negligent medical care. Because the
core of appellant’s cause of action is desire for tort damages for
professional negligence, it is barred by section 340.5. (Canister,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 404.)
      The one-year statute of limitations found in section 340.5
applies to all four of appellant’s causes of action in the SAC.
Therefore, they are time-barred, and appellant failed to state a
cause of action.
IV. Appellant has failed to show error
      In support of her position that the demurrer was
erroneously sustained, appellant argues that respondents are not
health care providers. Appellant argues that Hiekali is not a
doctor, and the medical facilities were not licensed. We reject
appellant’s argument for several reasons.

                                15
       Hiekali, as the legal representative of the health care
facilities, may take advantage of the one-year statute of
limitations found in section 340.5, subdivision (1). Appellant fails
to cite case law suggesting that section 340.5 does not apply when
the legal representative is not a doctor. It is appellant’s burden
to prove any reasonable possibility that her claims may survive if
amended. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) In the
absence of legal authority, we decline to find that section 340.5
does not apply to Hiekali under the circumstances.
       Appellant’s position that the facility-respondents are not
licensed is conclusory and lacks support in the record.
Appellant’s argument is difficult to follow. She claims that the
trial court allowed respondents to hold themselves out as health
care providers, when in fact they are “Medical Service
Organizations.” Appellant’s argument that respondents have
somehow defrauded the licensing authorities is not properly
before this court and does not change the nature of her claims.
Further, appellant fails to provide legal authority explaining how
any licensing irregularity affects the statute of limitations.
Instead, she cites various YouTube videos and claims that the
“co-mingling of MSO and HCP here is a clear indicator of the
Corporate Practice of Medicine.” Appellant fails to provide legal
authority that the corporate structure of the respondent facilities
places them outside of the limitations of section 340.5.3

3      Appellant cites Business and Professions Code section
2400, which states that “[c]orporations and other artificial legal
entities shall have no professional rights, privileges, or powers.”
However, appellant fails to provide any authority suggesting that
this section affects the relevant statute of limitations.

                                16
      “[A]n appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal
authority, but also explain how it applies in his case.” (Hodjat v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1,
10.) “[W]e may disregard conclusory arguments that are not
supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the
reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he
wants us to adopt.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 266, 287.) As appellant has failed to provide legal
authority or cogent legal argument, we decline to address this
claim further.
      Appellant cites Marik v. Superior Court (1987) 191
Cal.App.3d 1136 for the proposition that Hiekali was not
qualified to be a director of UMIH. The argument is irrelevant to
the question of whether appellant’s complaint sufficiently stated
a claim and does not alter the nature of appellant’s complaint.4
Because the gravamen of the complaint asserts professional
malpractice, the applicable malpractice statute of limitations
applies to the entire complaint “notwithstanding the existence of
other claims against the professionals.” (Sahadi v. Scheaffer,
supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 715.) Regardless of Hiekali’s alleged
lack of qualification, the foundation of appellant’s complaint—
medical negligence—remains the same.
      Appellant argues that the court erred in dismissing UMIM,
as in doing so the court “ignore[ed] Judge 3[’]s previous ruling
that all further proceedings should be stayed pending a final
determination on corporate status of UMIM, INC. which had yet
to be determined.” Appellant argues that the court erroneously

4     Equally irrelevant is appellant’s reference to Hiekali’s
brother, who is not a party to this lawsuit.

                                17
allowed UMIM to defend itself prior to full dissolution of the
corporation on June 10, 2022. Appellant argues that Hiekali
perjured himself by declaring that UMIM had no liabilities.
       These arguments are irrelevant. As the trial court noted,
the same outcome would have resulted even if UMIM had not
resolved its corporate status, because appellant failed to state a
claim against it. (Molen v. Friedman, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1153-1154.) Appellant fails to cite any law challenging this
legal authority.
       Appellant bears the burden of showing reversible error on
appeal. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) She has
failed to do so.5

                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs of appeal.

                                     CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:

LUI, P. J.                           BENKE, J.*

5     Appellant makes various arguments regarding
respondents’ motion to tax costs. We decline to address them, as
appellant has not appealed from an order on a motion to tax
costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); see City of Los
Angeles v. Aalbers (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 80, 82 [“An order
determining costs is separately appealable as an order after
judgment.”].)
*      Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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