Court Opinion

ID: 9401070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 21:00:49.965659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.554812
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-2247      Doc: 15         Filed: 06/08/2023    Pg: 1 of 4

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-2247

        CHARLES A. YOUNG, JR.,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        CITY OF MANASSAS; BRYAN FOSTER, Deputy City Manager,

                            Defendants - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, Senior District Judge. (1:21-cv-00590-LO-TCB)

        Submitted: March 31, 2023                                            Decided: June 8, 2023

        Before WYNN, DIAZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Alan S. Shachter, Manassas, Virginia, for Appellant. Heather K. Bardot,
        MCGAVIN, BOYCE, BARDOT, THORSEN & KATZ, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for
        Appellees.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Charles A. Young appeals the district court’s orders dismissing his complaint and

        denying reconsideration. In his complaint, Young alleged that he was an employee for the

        City of Manassas, Virginia (“the City”), and that the City and the Deputy City Manager,

        Bryan Foster, violated his procedural due process rights by suspending him for three days

        without pay. * On appeal, Young argues that the court erred in dismissing his complaint

        because he properly alleged violations of the Due Process Clause and state constitutional

        and statutory law. We affirm.

               We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss under Fed.

        R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “accept[ing] the factual allegations of the complaint as true and

        constru[ing] them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Rockville Cars,

        LLC v. City of Rockville, 891 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 2018). “To survive a motion to

        dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim

        to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). In other words, “a plaintiff must provide sufficient detail to

        show that he has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.” Upstate

        Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 645 (4th Cir. 2018)

        (cleaned up), vacated on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020).

               *
                 Young initially filed suit in state court, but the City and Foster removed the case
        to the federal district court.

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               Young argues on appeal that his complaint properly alleged a procedural due

        process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. A plaintiff must adequately allege “three

        elements” to state a viable procedural due process claim. Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head,

        724 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2013). First, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that he had a

        constitutionally cognizable life, liberty, or property interest.” Id. “Second, he must show

        that the deprivation of that interest was caused by some form of state action.” Id. (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “Third, he must prove that the procedures employed were

        constitutionally inadequate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Here, Young admits that he withdrew from the City’s grievance process prior to its

        completion. Because Young failed to fully participate in the grievance process and his

        allegations did not suggest that the process was fundamentally unfair, he could not show

        that the challenged procedures were constitutionally deficient. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494

        U.S. 113, 126 (1990) (noting that a due process violation “is not complete” when the

        deprivation of a protected right occurs; rather, it is only complete when the government

        “fails to provide due process”); Ashley v. N.L.R.B., 255 F. App’x 707, 710 (4th Cir. 2007)

        (per curiam) (“[T]o state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have

        taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or her, unless those processes

        are unavailable or patently inadequate.” (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d

        Cir. 2000))). Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Young failed to allege a

        viable due process claim under federal law. Further, because the “due process guarantees

        of . . . the Constitution of Virginia are virtually identical to those of the United States

        Constitution,” the court properly determined that Young’s allegations were also

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        insufficient to state a due process claim under state law. L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 721

        n.7 (Va. 2013). Finally, while Young argues that he adequately alleged a claim that the

        City’s grievance process violated Virginia statutory law and that the district court should

        have afforded him leave to amend his complaint, we have reviewed the record and conclude

        that the district court made no error in dismissing his complaint or denying leave to amend.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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