Court Opinion

ID: 9912845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 18:10:59.508324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:05.507386
License: Public Domain

NUMBERS 13-23-00191-CV, 13-23-00524-CV

                    COURT OF APPEALS

             THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

               CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

GUADALUPE COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE AND
GUADALUPE COUNTY,                                      Appellants,

                                v.

PRISCILLA GARCIA,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT
FRIEND OF M.G., AND TOM
GARCIA,                                                Appellees.

              On appeal from the 73rd District Court
                    of Bexar County, Texas.

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

  Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Peña
              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña
        In this combined appeal and petition for writ of mandamus, appellants/relators

Guadalupe County Sheriff’s Office and Guadalupe County (collectively GCSO) challenge

the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction, seeking to dismiss a suit brought by

appellees/real parties in interest Priscilla Garcia, individually and as next friend of M.G.,

a minor child, and Tom Garcia (the Garcias). In three issues, which we construe as two,

GCSO argues that: (1) the trial court erred in implicitly denying its plea to the jurisdiction

by granting a motion to continue the plea to the jurisdiction hearing and permitting

discovery; and (2) alternatively, GCSO is entitled to mandamus relief based on the trial

court’s refusal to rule on its plea to the jurisdiction. We conclude that the trial court did not

implicitly deny GCSO’s plea to the jurisdiction and did not refuse to rule. Accordingly, we

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and we deny mandamus relief. 1

                                         I.      BACKGROUND 2

        GCSO deputies responded to a report of a stolen pickup truck in Seguin, Texas.

The owner of the truck informed the deputies that there was a loaded pistol located in the

vehicle. GCSO deputies soon located the truck and attempted a traffic stop, but the driver

of the vehicle, later identified as David Sauceda, refused to pull over. The deputies

continued to pursue Sauceda. Eventually, Sauceda ran a red light and struck a vehicle

occupied by the Garcias, which in turn struck two additional vehicles. After a short foot

chase, a GCSO deputy was able to apprehend Sauceda.

        1 GCSO filed its notice of appeal in cause number 13-23-00191-CV. In that cause, GCSO has filed

a motion to consider its appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. We grant the motion, and we assign the
following appellate cause number to the original proceeding: 13-23-00524-CV. The original proceeding
arises from trial court cause number 2022CI21852 in the 73rd District Court of Bexar County, Texas, and
the respondent is the Honorable Walden Sheldon. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.2. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court of Texas has transferred this case from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio to this Court
pursuant to a docket-equalization order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.

        2 The following undisputed facts are derived from the jurisdictional record.

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         The Garcias sued GCSO for negligence and asserted that the Texas Tort Claims

Act (TTCA) waived its governmental immunity because their injuries arose from the

operation or use of a motor vehicle. 3 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(1).

GCSO filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that its governmental immunity was not

waived because a GCSO county vehicle was not involved in the collision and because

the emergency exception to the TTCA applied. See id. § 101.055. GCSO maintained that

the Garcias could not show that its deputies acted with conscious indifference or reckless

disregard as required to negate the application of the emergency exception. Finally,

GCSO maintained that its sheriff’s office was a non-jural entity and that Guadalupe

County was the only proper party to the suit. GCSO attached various offense reports to

its plea.

         The Garcias filed a response to the plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for

continuance of the hearing. The Garcias stated that they were entitled to depose the

deputies involved in the vehicular pursuit because this discovery was relevant to whether

the emergency exception to the TTCA was applicable.

         After a hearing on the competing motions, the trial court granted the Garcias’

motion to continue the plea to the jurisdiction hearing and permitted the Garcias to engage

in the requested discovery. This combined appeal and original proceeding followed.

                                           II.      IMPLICIT DENIAL

         In its first issue, GCSO argues that the trial court erred in implicitly denying its plea

to the jurisdiction.

         3 Priscilla Garcia, individually and as next friend of M.G., initially filed suit as the sole plaintiff. Tom

Garcia later filed a petition in intervention.

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       “Unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal, appellate courts generally

only have jurisdiction over final judgments.” CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447

(Tex. 2011); see Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Tex. 2006). Whether we have

jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v.

Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007). Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice

and Remedies Code allows an appeal from an interlocutory order that grants or denies a

plea to the jurisdiction by a government entity. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 51.014(a)(8). The trial court in this case never explicitly ruled on GCSO’s plea to the

jurisdiction. However, the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction may be implied from the

context. Bass v. Waller Cnty. Sub-Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 514 S.W.3d 908, 914 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2017, no pet.). An implicit ruling is “one that, though unspoken, reasonably

can be inferred from something else.” Trevino v. City of Pearland, 531 S.W.3d 290, 299

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). A trial court’s interlocutory ruling on the

merits of a case operates as an implicit denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and is subject

to appeal under § 51.014(a)(8). Long, 207 S.W.3d at 339–40 (“Because a trial court

cannot reach the merits of a case without subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court that rules

on the merits of an issue without explicitly rejecting an asserted jurisdictional attack has

implicitly denied the jurisdictional challenge.”).

       Here, the trial court granted the Garcias’ motion to continue the plea to the

jurisdiction hearing for the purpose of permitting discovery relating to GCSO’s various

jurisdictional arguments. In so doing, the trial court did not rule on the merits of any issue;

therefore, its order does not constitute an implicit denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. See

City of Galveston v. Gray, 93 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. App.—Houston 2002, pet. denied)

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(holding that order granting motion for continuance and allowing discovery did not

constitute implicit denial of plea to jurisdiction); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.

Salazar, No. 03-11-00206-CV, 2011 WL 1469429, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 19, 2011,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). Without a ruling by the trial court, implicit or otherwise, an

interlocutory appeal is not authorized, and we lack appellate jurisdiction. 4 See CMH

Homes, 340 S.W.3d at 447. We overrule GCSO’s first issue.

                                         III.    FAILURE TO RULE

        In its second issue, GCSO argues in the alternative that it is entitled to mandamus

relief because the trial court refused to rule on GCSO’s plea to jurisdiction.

A.      Standard of Review & Applicable Law

        Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate Indem.

Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836,

840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148

S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). To be entitled to relief, the relator must

show that (1) the trial court abused its discretion, and (2) the relator lacks an adequate

remedy on appeal. In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig.

          4 In a post-submission letter brief, GCSO relies on Rusk State Hospital v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88

(Tex. 2012), in arguing that this Court should address the merits of its immunity arguments despite the
absence of a ruling from the trial court on its plea to the jurisdiction. Rusk State Hospital involved an
interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss a health care liability claim. Id. at 92. The
Hospital argued for the first time on appeal that it was protected by sovereign immunity. Id. The Texas
Supreme Court held that jurisdictional arguments such as immunity could be raised for the first time on
appeal, where the appellate court otherwise has jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order and where the
plaintiff has had a full and fair opportunity in the trial court to develop the record and amend the pleadings
related to a jurisdictional challenge. Id. at 96–97. Here, there is no interlocutory order authorizing appellate
jurisdiction, and the Garcias have not had the opportunity to develop the record in response to GCSO’s
jurisdictional challenge. Therefore, we conclude that Rusk State Hospital is inapposite. See Vill. of Tiki
Island v. Ronquille, 463 S.W.3d 562, 574 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“Rusk State
Hospital supports the view that subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time in an otherwise
properly perfected and timely appeal of an interlocutory order.”).

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proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135–36; Walker v. Packer,

827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).

       “A trial court has a ministerial duty to consider and rule on motions properly filed

and pending before it, and mandamus may issue to compel the trial court to act.” In re

Henry, 525 S.W.3d 381, 382 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding)

(first citing In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig.

proceeding); and then citing Ex parte Bates, 65 S.W.3d 133, 134 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2001, orig. proceeding)). To obtain mandamus relief for the trial court’s refusal to rule on

a motion, a relator must establish that the trial court: (1) had a legal duty to rule on the

motion; (2) was asked to rule on the motion; and (3) failed or refused to rule on the motion

within a reasonable time. See In re Pete, 589 S.W.3d 320, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing In re Henry, 525 S.W.3d at 382).

Whether a reasonable time for the trial court to act has lapsed is dependent upon the

circumstances of each case. See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662 (citing Barnes v.

State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding)).

B.     Analysis

       Contrary to GCSO’s contention, there is no indication that the trial court in this case

has refused or failed to rule on its plea to the jurisdiction within a reasonable time. Rather,

the trial court has granted the Garcias’ duly-filed motion to continue the plea to the

jurisdiction hearing to allow for limited jurisdictional discovery. Generally, the erroneous

grant of a stay or continuance is considered an incidental trial ruling for which there is an

adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Smart, 103 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding). Ordinarily, in these circumstances, mandamus relief is

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not available. Id.; see also In re Tex. Dep’t of Ins., No. 13-10-00471-CV, 2010 WL

3596844, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 14, 2010, orig. proceeding)

(mem. op. per curiam). Further, “the scheduling of a hearing of a plea to the jurisdiction

is left to the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to evaluate the

appropriate time frame for hearing a plea in any particular case.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks &

Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 229 (Tex. 2004). When a determination regarding

the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction requires the examination of evidence, the trial

court has discretion to decide whether the jurisdictional determination “should be made

at a preliminary hearing or await a fuller development of the case, mindful that this

determination must be made as soon as practicable.” Id. at 227. In this context, the trial

court has broad discretion to schedule and define the scope of discovery. In re Alford

Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 181 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); see Hearts Bluff

Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 491 (Tex. 2012) (“[C]ourts should allow [a]

reasonable opportunity for targeted discovery if necessary to illuminate jurisdictional facts

in a plea to the jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, appellate courts “have denied mandamus relief

in situations in which the trial court deferred ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction for a

reasonable period of time in order to permit targeted discovery related to the jurisdictional

issue.” In re Congregation B’Nai Zion of El Paso, 657 S.W.3d 578, 584 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2022, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 483 S.W.3d 795,

797 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, orig. proceeding)).

       In the instant case, the trial court signed its order granting a continuance and

permitting jurisdictional discovery within two months of the filing of the plea to the

jurisdiction. GCSO filed the present mandamus action within a week of the trial court’s

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ruling. The record fails to establish that the trial court has not set the hearing on the plea

to the jurisdiction “as soon as practicable,” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227, or has otherwise

abused its discretion by acting unreasonably. See Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173.

Therefore, GCSO is not entitled to mandamus relief compelling the trial court to rule on

its plea to the jurisdiction. See Diocese of Galveston-Hous. v. Stone, 892 S.W.2d 169,

174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (“Thus, we believe that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking steps to clarify the factual context of the

Diocese’s jurisdictional challenge and that the mandamus at this stage of the proceeding

is premature.”); see also In re Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 2010 WL 3596844, at *2 (denying

mandamus relief for the trial court’s order granting a continuance of a hearing on a plea

to the jurisdiction where the record failed to establish that the court had not set the hearing

“as soon as practicable”). We overrule GCSO’s second issue.

                                     IV.    CONCLUSION

       We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). Further,

having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, this Court is of

the opinion that GCSO has not shown itself entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the

petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See id. R. 52.8(a).

                                                                 L. ARON PEÑA JR.
                                                                 Justice

Delivered and filed on the
21st day of December, 2023.

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