Court Opinion

ID: 9405597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 20:04:22.909774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.874004
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                                  )
                                                    )
            v.                                      ) ID Nos. 2111014013, 2112000947
                                                    )
LUIS FIDLAGO,                                       )
                                                    )
                    Defendant.                      )
                                                    )

                                Date Submitted: June 23, 2023
                                 Date Decided: June 27, 2023

                                               ORDER

        AND NOW TO WIT, this 27th day of June 2023, the Court having duly

considered Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief,1 Defendant’s Letter

Motion for Appointment of Postconviction Counsel,2 Defendant’s Amended Motion

for Postconviction Relief,3 the State’s Response,4 Superior Court Criminal Rule 61,5

and the Record in these cases, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motions are

DENIED as meritless for the following reasons:

1
  ID No. 2111014013, D.I. 10; ID No. 2112000947, D.I. 12.
2
  ID No. 2111014013, D.I. 17; ID No. 2112000947, D.I. 17.
3
  ID No. 2111014013, D.I. 18; ID No. 2112000947, D.I. 18.
4
  ID No. 2111014013, D.I. 19; ID No. 2112000947, D.I. 19.
5
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61. This Order addresses the merits of Fidlago’s motion because it is not
procedurally barred by the rules. First, Fidlago’ was sentenced in December 2022, and he did not
file a direct appeal with the Supreme Court; therefore, his motion was timely filed. Id. at 61(i)(1).
Second, this is Fidlago’s first postconviction motion, so it is not barred as repetitive. Id. at 61(i)(2).
Third, Fidlago alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, which could not have been raised on direct
appeal, so his motion is not procedurally defaulted. Id. at 61(i)(3). Furthermore, Fidlago’s claims
were not formerly adjudicated. Id. at 61(i)(4).
       The Record makes clear that (1) Fidlago was not coerced into accepting the

plea offer,6 (2) Trial Counsel’s representation did not fall below an objective

standard of reasonableness,7 and (3) Fidlago knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily admitted he possessed a deadly weapon during the act.8

       Concerning Fidlago’s Motion for Appointment of Postconviction Counsel,

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(3) sets the applicable standard for the

appointment of postconviction counsel.9 The rule affords the Court discretion to

appoint counsel only if the following conditions are met:

       (i) the conviction has been affirmed by final order upon direct appellate
       review or direct appellate review is unavailable; (ii) the motion sets
       forth a substantial claim that the movant received ineffective assistance
       of counsel in relation to the plea of guilty or nolo contendere; (iii)
       granting the motion would result in vacatur of the judgment of
       conviction for which the movant is in custody; and (iv) specific
       exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel.10

6
  See Plea Colloquy Tr. at 7-14, 24-29, ID No. 2111014013, D.I. 12; Plea Colloquy Tr. at 7-14,
24-29, ID No. 2112000947, D.I. 15. The Trial Judge recalls Fidlago’s plea colloquy because he
told the Court, at the outset, he did not want to accept the plea and felt he was being coerced. Plea
Colloquy Tr. at 6:11-16, ID No. 2111014013, D.I. 12; Plea Colloquy Tr. at 6:11-16, ID No.
2112000947, D.I. 15. The Court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Fidlago and emphasized
repeatedly that he did not have to accept a plea. See Plea Colloquy Tr. at 6-8, 10-11, 12-13, 24-
27, 29, ID No. 2111014013, D.I. 12; Plea Colloquy Tr. at 6-8, 10-11, 12-13, 24-27, 29, ID No.
2112000947, D.I. 15.
7
  See State’s Resp. at 6, ID No. 2111014013, D.I. 19; State’s Resp. at 6, ID No. 2112000947, D.I.
19.
8
  Plea Colloquy Tr. at 15:1-17:4, ID No. 2111014013, D.I. 12; Plea Colloquy Tr. at 15:1-17:4, ID
No. 2112000947, D.I. 15. He is bound to the statements he made during his colloquy. See Palmer
v. State, 2002 WL 31546531, at *1 (Del. 2002) (citing Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del.
1997); Plea Colloquy Tr. at 15, at 28:4-6), ID No. 2111014013, D.I. 12; Plea Colloquy Tr. at 28:4-
6, ID No. 2112000947, D.I. 15. (“Have all your answers to the Court today been truthful? . . .
[ANSWER:] . . . Yes.)
9
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(3).
10
   Id.

                                                 2
         The Rule requires that all conditions stated therein be met, so where a

defendant fails to meet one condition, he will be ineligible for appointment of

postconviction counsel.11 Defendant’s motion for appointment of counsel fails

because Fidlago did not file a direct appeal with the Supreme Court; his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit; and Fidlago has not presented the

Court with any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the appointment of

counsel.

                                                   /s/ Jan R. Jurden
                                             Jan R. Jurden, President Judge

Original to Prothonotary

cc:      Christina M. Davis, DAG
         Luis Fidlago

11
     State v. Hooker, 2023 WL 2707227, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 29, 2023).

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