Court Opinion

ID: 9809421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:12:51.211814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:15.672028
License: Public Domain

Merribion, J..,
(after stating the case). The testator of the defendants was a trustee of an express trust, having in his hands at the time of his death a considerable part of the trust fund with which he was charged by the trust that he had not distributed to the creditors entitled to have the same. This it appears passed into the hands of the defendants, the executors of his will, not to be administered by them — they have and hold it for no such purpose — but simply to turn the same over to the substituted trustee, vice their testator, the deceased trustee. University v. Hughes, 90 N. C., 537.
The plaintiff was duly appointed such substituted trustee, as allowed by the statute, [The Code, §1276,) which authorizes and empowers the Clerk of the Superior Court of the county where the deed of trust was executed, as in the statute provided, “ to appoint some discreet, competent person to act and execute the said deed of trust according to-its true intent and meaning, and as fully as if appointed by the parties to the deed.”
This provision plainly and necessarily implies and contemplates that the trustee so appointed must have possession and control of and dominion over the trust property just as the original trustee had, of course subject to the control of the proper Court upon due application asking its interference. Otherwise the substituted trustee could not execute-the various provisions of the deed, dispose of the property,, pass the title thereto, collect debts and administer the trust, fund as contemplated by it.
*194Incident to the right of the trustee to so have the property of the trust of whatever nature, is his right to sue for and recover the same in a proper action for that purpose, when it is unlawfully withheld from him. It may be that the legal title to the trust property, in cases like the present one, if the property be real estate, passes to the heir-at-law of the deceased trustee, and if personalty, to the executor or administrator, as was held in the case of Guion v. Melvin, 69 N. C., 242; but the heir and personal representative hold simply the legal title for the substituted trustee and should pass the same to the latter, to the end he may properly execute the trust as intended by its terms and as contemplated by the statute. The trust must be administered by the trustee— the statute so provides.
This action is brought by the substituted trustee only for the purpose of recovering from the executors of the will of his deceased predecessor the remainder of the trust fund in their hands, which they have refused to surrender to him. It is not any part of its purpose to litigate and settle the rights of parties claiming an interest in the trust fund, or to administer it at all — the purpose is to enable the trustee to obtain possession of it, and then, as suggested by the Court below in its judgment, the trustee or the cestui que trust may, .if need be, bring an action for the purpose of settling the -rights of parties claiming, and the distribution of the fund.
In this action the only proper thing to be done was to ascertain what the remainder of the trust fund in the hands of the defendants was, and give judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the same. This seems to have been done.
The assignments of error do not extend to the judgments directly, but to the refusal of the Court to order that A. T. Bruce & Co., creditors, and all other persons interested in the trust fund, be made parties to the action; thus practically turning it into an action to settle and administer the fund in the hands of the defendants. This cannot be done. *195Certainly it cannot, unless by agreement of all parties, with the sanction of the Court. Because to do so would be to incorporate into the action a multiplicity of inconsistent causes of action, and bring into it parties more or less numerous, having diverse rights, the settlement and determination of which, in this action, would lead to confusion. To recover the balance of the trust fund and have it in hand to be administered, as the plaintiff seeks to do by this action, is dis- • tinct and essentially different from the purpose of an action brought by the plaintiff to have settled the conflicting rights of creditors of the fourth and sixth classes to share in that fund, as provided in the deed of trust. In the present action A. T. Bruce & Co. and other creditors are not parties necessary to a complete determination of the matter in litigation. They will, however be proper parties in an action brought to close the trust and settle their respective rights to share in the trust fund. If in such action it should turn out that A. T. Bruce & Co. were entitled by virtue of their judgment named against the first trustee or their debt on which it is founded, to share in the trust fund, they would be allowed to do so, otherwise they would not. The Court could not in any case hear and determine in this action any question as to the regularity or propriety of their judgment; it could not set it aside for irregularity, error or fraud; taking it to be such a judgment, as it appears to be, it could not be attacked in this or any action collaterally.
The assignments of error cannot be sustained, and the judgment must be affirmed.
Affirmed.