Court Opinion

ID: 9392205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 16:01:50.272722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:38.568261
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-2704
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                        v.

                           Katherine L. Woitaszewski

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                          for the District of Nebraska
                                 ____________

                           Submitted: January 10, 2023
                              Filed: May 4, 2023
                                 [Unpublished]
                                ____________

Before GRASZ, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Katherine Woitaszewski entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon
in possession of a firearm and possessing a stolen firearm. On appeal, Woitaszewski
argues the district court1 erred by denying her motion to suppress incriminating
statements and evidence because law enforcement should have provided warnings
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We affirm.

                                 I. Background

       Based on information from a confidential informant, United States Deputy
Marshal Daniel Potter believed Woitaszewski, a former inmate with outstanding
arrest warrants, was planning to assist a prison break. Deputy Potter sought
assistance from the Omaha Police Department. He told the Omaha Police
Department that Woitaszewski and the confidential informant would be in a black
Ford F-350 near the airport in Omaha, Nebraska. Two City of Omaha police officers
pulled over a truck that matched the description. Deputy Potter later identified
Woitaszewski, at which point she was removed from the truck and placed in
handcuffs. While Woitaszewski was exiting the truck, Deputy Potter asked whether
she had a weapon. It is unclear what, if anything, Woitaszewski said in response.

       Woitaszewski was eventually placed in the back of a patrol car. In total,
approximately eighteen minutes elapsed between the truck stop and when
Woitaszewski was placed in handcuffs. Sometime after Woitaszewski was placed
in the patrol car, she asked to speak with Deputy Potter. When Deputy Potter walked
up to Woitaszewski, she told him there was a gun in a backpack in the truck. An
officer searched the backpack and found a gun, ammunition, and drugs. Notably,
Woitaszewski received no Miranda warnings before she was asked if she had a
weapon or before she said there was a gun in the backpack.

      Following her arrest, Woitaszewski was indicted for being a felon in
possession of a firearm and possessing a stolen firearm. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),

      1
       The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Nebraska, adopting the report and recommendation of the
Honorable Susan M. Bazis, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
Nebraska.
                                        -2-
(j), and 924(a)(2). Woitaszewski later filed a motion to suppress incriminating
statements and evidence obtained during the traffic stop. After an evidentiary
hearing, the magistrate judge recommended the district court deny the motion. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b). The district court overruled
Woitaszewski’s objection, adopted the recommendation, and denied the motion to
suppress.

       Woitaszewski later pled guilty but preserved the right to appeal the district
court’s denial of her motion to suppress. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). After the
district court sentenced Woitaszewski to 54 months of imprisonment, Woitaszewski
timely appealed.

                                    II. Analysis

      Woitaszewski raises a single issue on appeal: whether the district court erred
by denying her motion to suppress because law enforcement should have provided
her Miranda warnings before she volunteered incriminating information. Under
Miranda, “a law enforcement officer, prior to conducting custodial interrogation,
must advise the suspect of his [or her] right to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination and to the assistance of counsel.” United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345
F.3d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 2003). A district court’s denial of a motion to suppress based
on Miranda is subject to a mixed standard of review: we review legal conclusions
de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Sanchez, 676 F.3d 627,
630 (8th Cir. 2012).

       Woitaszewski argues she was subject to custodial interrogation under
Miranda when Deputy Potter asked if she had a weapon while Woitaszewski was
exiting the truck. It is unclear whether Woitaszewski responded to the question, but
a number of events followed: Woitaszewski was placed in handcuffs, a female
officer was called to conduct a pat-down search, the female officer arrived and
completed the pat-down search, Woitaszewski said goodbye to her dog, and law
enforcement placed her in the back of a patrol car. Woitaszewski later asked one of
                                         -3-
the police officers, multiple times, if she could speak with Deputy Potter. When
Deputy Potter finally approached Woitaszewski, he told her that he would talk to her
later. Woitaszewski nonetheless volunteered to him that there was a gun in a
backpack in the truck.

        We need not decide whether Woitaszewski was subjected to custodial
interrogation when she was asked if she had a weapon. Even assuming Deputy
Potter subjected Woitaszewski to custodial interrogation under Miranda, any
questioning by Deputy Potter unambiguously ended before Woitaszewski re-
initiated the conversation and volunteered incriminating information. “An unwarned
statement is admissible if it is made voluntarily after police questioning has ended.”
United States v. Bailey, 831 F.3d 1035, 1038 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v.
Briones, 390 F.3d 610, 612–13 (8th Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Harris, 64
F.4th 999, 1002 (8th Cir. 2023). Accordingly, the district court did not err by
denying the motion to suppress. See Bailey, 831 F.3d at 1038; Briones, 390 F.3d at
612–13.

                                  III. Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the district court.
                      ______________________________

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