Court Opinion

ID: 9459147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:11:43.408274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:02.123821
License: Public Domain

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
My colleagues, I believe, have supplanted the District Judge’s evidentiary ruling with the ruling they would have made had they been acting in his stead. That, in my view, is neither our function nor our prerogative. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I
Two wholesome precepts weigh heavily on an appellate court called upon to review evidentiary rulings by a trial court. The first is that the Anglo-American law of evidence vests exclusively in the trial judge the task of establishing the admissibility, or inadmis*196sibility of evidence in the first instance.1 An obvious justification for this allocation of responsibility lies in that judge’s direct and ready access to the factual information on which the decision to admit or exclude must frequently be grounded. For rulings on evidence often necessitate determinations of preliminary facts, as did the ruling on spontaneity of the proffered statements which the District Judge was required to make here.
As we recently observed in a closely allied context,
The trial court is not only the traditional but also the superior tribunal for the kind of information-gathering which a sound foundation [for its ruling] . . '. inevitably requires. For it is there that, at a hearing, the judge can come face-to-face with the primary informational sources, and probe for what is obscure, trap what is elusive, and settle what is controversial.2
The second principle is that the trial court’s resolution of a question of admissibility of evidence may be disturbed on appeal only in the event that it amounts, in the familiar idiom, to an abuse of that court’s discretion.3 Rulings of that sort summon the trial judge’s appraisal of preliminary facts, his special feel of the case and his overall judgment on admissibility — all in a flash. The very nature of the trial process demands that the trial judge be indulged some leeway to exploit his intimacy with trial matters.
“Discretion,” by definition, involves the idea of choice, of an exertion of the will, of a selection between competing considerations.4 The Supreme Court has described its proper exercise as the use of conscientious judgment which “ . . . takes account of the law and the particular circumstances of the case and ‘is directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.’ ” 5 And where the discretionary act turns upon an antecedent factual determination, as it does here, “an abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference in judicial opinion between the trial and appellate courts.”6 The challenged action must, we have said, be found to be “arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable,” 7 or “clearly erroneous”8 in order to be invalidated on appeal. If, on the other hand, reasonable men could differ as to its propriety, then it cannot be said that the trial judge abused his discretion.9
Thus the question on this appeal is a very narrow one. It is whether the Dis*197trict Judge’s evidentiary ruling is without any reasonable foundation and is, by the same token, clearly erroneous. I am unable to say that it is.
When a party seeks to introduce hearsay evidence, that party bears the burden of showing that the proffered statement fits into one of the exceptions to the rule outlawing hearsay.10 Exceptions to the exclusionary rule have grown up only in instances where there is a strict necessity for the evidence and the surrounding circumstances insure a high degree of trustworthiness.11 Thus this court, in common with others, has held that exclamations by the victim of a crime are sometimes admissible on the theory that the victim was in a state of physical shock producing a condition of nervous excitement sufficient to suspend the deliberative faculties which otherwise might allow him to fabricate his statements.12 An utterance made under an “immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses”13 during a brief period when considerations of self-interest cannot be brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection is thought to possess the requisite reliability.14 In sum, admission of a statement under the “spontaneous utterance” exception to the hearsay rule requires a determination by the trial court that (a) the declarant was in a state of physical shock (b) which generated the stress of nervous excitement (c) sufficient to still his reflective faculties, thereby preventing any opportunity for deliberation which might lead the declarant to be untruthful.15
The application of this test must of necessity depend on the facts peculiar to each case.16 The trial judge must assess not only the amount of time which has elapsed between the shocking event and the statement, but also the declarant’s activities and attitudes in the meanwhile, to determine if there was occasion for deviation from the truth under the impetus of reflection.17 Our function is to abide that assessment unless it is plainly wrong.18
II
The record on appeal discloses that the District Court had at its disposal the stipulated testimony of police officers who assisted the decedent at the station-house at the time she made the statements sought to be admitted, a portion of a statement made by the decedent’s neighbor to the police, and extensive tes*198timony by Dr. William J. Brownlee, Deputy Medical Examiner for the District of Columbia, who performed an autopsy on the decedent.
Dr. Brownlee indicated that the decedent’s wounds were of such a grave nature that a person who had suffered them would go into shock and, in his opinion, would not have survived more than an hour and a half without medical treatment. It appears then, that something less than an hour and a half transpired between the infliction of the wounds and the decedent’s responses to officers at the stationhouse. The critical focus of the District Judge’s inquiry was whether or not during that undetermined period of time the decedent might have had the capability of reflecting on her answers naming appellee as her attacker.
Dr. Brownlee testified that at the time of the victim’s death her blood contained .28 per cent alcohol by volume. His examination also revealed that she was obese and bore the physiological signs characteristic of a chronic user of alcohol. In Dr. Brownlee’s opinion, such a person would obtain a higher blood level of alcohol within a shorter length of time than would a normal individual, and would also have a higher tolerance for alcohol. He stated further that it would be impossible for him to say at what blood alcohol level the decedent’s auditory and visual perceptions would become impaired, but that at .28 per cent she would have had some changes in her perceptions, both visual and auditory. Nevertheless, he believed that the decedent could have recognized who attacked her if it were someone with whom she had lived for six or seven months, and that she could have correctly answered the questions put to her at the stationhouse regarding her attacker’s identity.
But even with this testimony, the District Judge realized that the factors to be considered in evaluating the spontaneity of utterances are not the declar-ant’s ability to observe at the time of the incident, nor the declarant’s ability to recount what happened.19 The key question left unanswered by Dr. Brown-lee was whether the decedent could have reflected prior to making her statements, and no other witness in the case supplied an answer to that question.
While the medical testimony suggests that the decedent probably had pain from her injuries, it also indicates that the alcohol she had consumed would have served to some extent as an analgesic. Whether this could have alleviated the pain enough to permit deliberation, and the risk of contrivance inherent in an opportunity for deliberation, cannot possibly be determined decisively from the evidence presented to the District Judge.20 Nor can there be any doubt as to the thorough and conscientious effort of the judge to resolve this question. The transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress the decedent’s statements consumes in excess of a hundred pages of which thirty contain testimony by Dr. Brownlee.21 Nothing in that transcript sheds light on whether the decedent’s reflective faculties were impaired by the *199shock of her injury for the entire period of time — however long it may have been — before she arrived at the sta-tionhouse 22 I am unwilling to say that no reasonable basis existed for concluding that the decedent might not have lost all power to deliberate.
The statements sought to be introduced at appellee’s trial are of the most prejudicial sort, and the District Judge was accordingly required to exercise particular care in assessing their reliability.23 While it may be that another trial judge might have resolved the question of admissibility differently, an appellate judge must guard against the temptation to merely substitute his own judgment for that of the acting judge in scrutinizing exercises of his discretion. This, to be sure, is a grim case, but its grimness cannot be permitted to obscure proper standards, either of admissibility or review.
I think the ruling under challenge quite easily passes muster. The spontaneity of the statements sought to be introduced is open to serious question. The District Judge’s conclusion on' that score falls well within the zone of reasonableness. For our part, in reviewing his action, we would do well to recall what we said in an analogous situation:
The matter is, we reiterate, one for the exercise of discretion; and, as is generally in accord with sound judicial administration, that discretion is to be accorded a respect appropriately reflective of the inescapable remoteness of appellate review.24
Like my colleagues, I believe the spontaneous exclamation exception is a rule indifferent to the party invoking it. The statements challenged here encounter difficulty whether offered to exonerate or to incriminate.25 They become no more admissible to condemn appellant by naming him than they would have been to acquit him had they named somebody else. The District Judge, focusing not on the content of the utterances but on the circumstances under which they were made, deemed them beyond the pale of spontaneity. According that determination the respect that is due, I would affirm.

. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2550 (3d ed. 1940) ; McCormick, Law of Evidence § 53 (1954). The recently proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, which were submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court on November 20, 1972, adhere to the principle that evidentiary matters are to be resolved preliminarily by the trial judge. See proposed Eed.R. Evidence 104(a) and the accompanying Advisory Committee Note.

. United States v. Stanley, 152 U.S.App. D.C. 170, 469 F.2d 576 (1972).

. United States v. Hardin, 143 U.S.App. D.C. 320, 322, 443 F.2d 735, 737 (1971) ; United States v. Comer, 137 U.S.App. D.C. 214, 217 n. 3, 421 F.2d 1149, 1152 n. 3 (1970) ; Beausoliel v. United States, 71 App.D.C. 111, 113-114, 107 F.2d 292, 294-295 (1939) ; Guest v. Bailes, 448 F. 2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1971).

. Spalding v. Spalding, 355 Mich. 382, 94 N.W.2d 810, 811 (1959).

. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 222-223, 53 S.Ct. 154, 156, 77 L.Ed. 266 (1932), quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 51 S.Ct. 243, 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931).

. Spalding v. Spalding, supra note 4, 94 N.W.2d at 811.

. United States v. McWilliams, 82 U.S. App.D.C. 259, 261, 163 F.2d 695, 697 (1947).

. United States v. Hardin, supra note 3, .143 U.S.App.D.C. at 322, 443 F.2d at 737; Beausoliel v. United States, supra note 3, 71 App.D.C. at 114, 107 F.2d at 295.

. Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942).

. E. g., Guest v. Bailes, supra note 3, 448 F.2d at 436.

. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1420 (3d ed. 1940).

. Beausoliel v. United States, supra note 3, 71 App.D.C. at 113, 107 F.2d at 294. See also 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1747 (3d ed. 1940).

. Beausoliel v. United States, supra note 3, 71 App.D.C. at 113, 107 F.2d at 294.

. Id.

. The hearsay exception for spontaneous utterances is incorporated into the proposed Federal Buies of Evidence, see note 1, supra. Buie 803(2) permits admission of “a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Fed.B. Evidence 803 (2). The Advisory Committee points out that admissibility hinges on whether the utterance was made while the state of excitement endured; and further observes that there are no “pat answers” to the question, “How long can excitement prevail?” Advisory Committee Note, Fed.B. Evidence 803(2).

. Beausoliel v. United States, supra note 3, 71 App.D.C. at 114, 107 F.2d at 295; 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1750 (3d ed. 1940). See also e. g., United States v. Kearney, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 328, 333, 420 F.2d 170, 175 (1969) ; Lampe v. United States, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 162, 229 F.2d 43, 45 (1956), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 929, 79 S.Ct. 612, 3 L.Ed.2d 631 (1959) ; Wheeler v. United States, 93 U.S.App. D.C. 159, 164-165, 211 F.2d 19, 24-25, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019, 74 S.Ct. 876, 98 L.Ed. 1140 (1954) ; Guthrie v. United States, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 361, 365, 207 F.2d 19, 23 (1953).

. United States v. Kearney, supra note 16, 136 U.S.App.D.C. at 333 n. 11, 420 F.2d at 175 n. 11.

. See text supra at notes 3-7.

. This is not to diminish the relevance of the decedent’s powers of observation and recollection. Clearly a spontaneous utterance would be useless if it pertained to an event inaccurately observed or recalled. But the issue of spontaneity itself encompasses another inquiry as well— whether or not the excitement was of such character and duration as to preclude any opportunity for calculated falsehood.

. The question which troubled the District Judge concerning the high blood alcohol level does not, ns my colleagues suggest, go merely to the weight of the decedent’s statement. If the alcohol dulled the pain sufficiently to allow reflection, the statement would be inadmissible.

. In Guthrie v. United States, supra note 16, the trial court also conducted a “painstaking inquiry” into the circumstances and conditions under which the alleged spontaneous utterance was made. We, in turn, observed that such a careful exercise of judicial discretion should only be disturbed on appeal for “the most compelling reason.” 92 U.S.App.D.C. at 365, 207 F.2d at 23. In light of the District Judge’s effort here, I would exercise the same restraint.

. I cannot agree that “it is plain” that the decedent made her statement “only minutes” after she was fatally stabbed. See p. 195, supra. There is no evidence as to precisely when she left her apartment, nor do we know just how she got to the stationhouse. Crediting the approximations of the decedent’s neighbor and Officer Knox, some twenty minutes elapsed between her departure from home and arrival at the precinct.

. The District Judge in his ruling makes specific mention of the statement given by decedent’s neighbor to the police concerning arguments between the decedent and appellee which recurred throughout the period in which they lived together. This evidence of hostility warrants even greater caution in ruling on statements prior to the making of which there could have been an opportunity for fabrication.

. Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 157, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (1965).

. The statements were not of a confes-sionary nature. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1476 (3d ed. 1940) ; proposed Eed.R. Evidence 804(b) (4) and accompanying Advisory Committee Note.