Court Opinion

ID: 9893354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 18:00:45.122473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:59.523816
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 26 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PHUN YEM,                                       No. 22-364
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A027-341-758
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                      Argued and Submitted October 4, 2023
                            San Francisco, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, TALLMAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

      Phun Yem, a native and citizen of Cambodia, petitions for review of the Board

of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of the Immigration

Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his motion to reopen and terminate his removal proceedings

as time barred and not subject to equitable tolling. Yem’s order of removal became

final on June 10, 2005. The statutory filing deadline for his motion to reopen was

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
ninety days later on September 8, 2005. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Our decision

in Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey invalidated the original basis for Yem’s removal on

October 20, 2008. 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008). Yem filed the motion to reopen

that gave rise to this case on December 10, 2019, eleven years later. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

      A more detailed explanation by the BIA would have been desirable; however,

the facts of this case are sufficiently clear such that we may discern from the existing

record the basis of the BIA’s denial of relief. In Lona v. Barr, we observed that

equitable tolling cases “typically arise in conjunction with claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel,” but also that the BIA may choose to toll statutory filing

deadlines “in cases where the petitioner seeks excusal from untimeliness based on a

change in the law that invalidates the original basis for removal.” 958 F.3d 1225,

1230 (9th Cir. 2020). Still, petitioners bear the burden of proof to demonstrate that

they were prevented from filing a timely motion to reopen “because of deception,

fraud, or error,” and that they acted with “due diligence in discovering the deception,

fraud, or error” for equitable tolling to apply. Iturribarria v. I.N.S., 321 F.3d 889,

897 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, a threshold question in any equitable tolling analysis is

whether a petitioner diligently pursued his rights. See Lona, 958 F.3d at 1232

(framing the inquiry as whether petitioner demonstrated “a diligent pursuit of her

rights in the intervening years between her removal and [the change in law]”);

                                         2                                     22-364
Goulart v. Garland, 18 F.4th 653, 655 (9th Cir. 2021) (same).

      Yem does not offer sufficient evidence that he diligently pursued his rights in

the fourteen years between when his removal order became final in 2005 and when

he filed his motion to reopen in 2019. Yem makes two arguments to support a

finding of diligence: (1) that he had initial consultations with two immigration

attorneys in 2007, both of whom told him that there was nothing that could be done

about his then-valid removal order, and (2) that he checked in with ICE every three

to six months as a condition of his release from immigration detention. First, Yem

did not retain either attorney from 2007, he did not provide their names to the BIA,

and he never again checked in with them, or any other attorneys, for the next twelve

years. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 583 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding a petitioner

did not act with due diligence when he waited six years to pursue further legal advice

after an initial consultation with a pro bono attorney at an immigration workshop).

Second, Yem offered no evidence that he asked ICE about the status of his case at

any of his check-ins, that ICE was under any obligation to inform him about changes

in the law underlying his removal order, or that these meetings were anything other

than mandatory check-ins related to his outstanding removal order. This evidence

falls well short of the reasonable diligence required to warrant equitable tolling.

      The BIA concluded that Yem waited too long to file his motion to reopen,

even considering his personal circumstances. We have considered the fact that the

                                         3                                    22-364
agency did not discuss the evidence that Yem submitted to support a finding of due

diligence.   While we would have preferred a more detailed explanation to

demonstrate the basis for the agency’s decision, we see no need to remand on this

record when “it is obvious that the BIA . . . would explicitly deny equitable tolling

for the reasons we set forth.” Lona, 958 F.3d at 1231 n.7.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                        4                                   22-364