Court Opinion

ID: 9481276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:13:00.321795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:11.308862
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge,
Concurring.
I concur but solely on the ground of flagrant deficiencies by Kelly in the summary judgment proceedings.9
As the Court’s opinion reflects, Kelly wholly failed, as required by local Rule 18, to file an opposition statement or controverting factual affidavits. Thus the government’s statement and supporting facts were uncontradicted. More than ignoring a local rule, this non-action flies directly in the face of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 275 (1986), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211 (1986), and this Court’s Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990).
But under Manual § 8121(A)(1), knowledge, by the local Bureau Chief (or his deputy), or at least some awareness of some gossip, rumor, or information that Kelly was involved in the leak, was indispensable to trigger the obligation to report to OIS.
Having completely failed even to remotely challenge that fact, that should be, as it was, really the end of the case.
But the Court does not stop there. Indeed, with all of the earmarks of deliberative certainty the Court enters the slippery field of discretionary function. If we had an outline of definitively authoritative principles this effort to rule categorically might be acceptable.
But one thing is sure: the Supreme Court, with all due respect, by its undulations from Dalehite10 to Indian Towing11 and Rayonier12 to Varig Airlines13 to Berkowitz14 provides anything but a predictable certitude on what is, or is not, within a discretionary function. In this Serbodian bog we ought not to guess whether “will” means “must” or something less; or whether the lower ranking subordinate employee is the one to exercise that high level governmental judgment to declare the instruction discretionary beyond judicial scrutiny.
There is time in which to decide such issues after full briefing and argument on a record which under Article III really raises the issues.
Hence, my limited concurrence.

. I concur as to substitution of the United States as the sole defendant.

. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953).

. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955).

. Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 77 S.Ct. 374, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 (1957).

. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984).

. Kevan Berkowitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988).