Court Opinion

ID: 9471570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:35:52.117298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:28.336872
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
As is apparent from the majority’s recitation of the facts, there were numerous meetings between various individuals before the actual cocaine transaction was made. The evidence at trial established that Finnigan, Rassey, Allen and Marcangello met on at least three occasions while Allen, Marcangello and Piccolo also met on several occasions. The indictment charged a conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine with overt acts which involved various persons whose names were both known and unknown. Because I view this indictment to be insufficient in that it was not specific enough to link the grand jury’s concerns to the evidence presented by the prosecution at trial, I respectfully dissent.
Count one of the indictment makes a general charge of a conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. The appellant contends that the indictment was lacking in specificity in that it failed to state exactly what conspiracy Piccolo joined. It is urged by the government that-the indictment adequately set out the object of the conspiracy, i.e. to possess and distribute cocaine. Further, it is argued that Piccolo was a member of it. The majority concludes that the indictment met the requirement of specificity for a conspiracy. Yet, under the rule of Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962), one of the purposes of the specificity requirement is to make sure that the indictment serves both as a check on the grand jury and as a link between the grand jury’s, considerations and the prosecution’s presentation of its case. In my view of the indictment and the evidence, which can arguably be construed to establish two separate conspiracies, the check and link purpose of specificity required in Russell was not satisfied.
In Russell, the Supreme Court noted that it is difficult to imagine a case in which the insufficiency of an indictment results in its complete failure to inform the defendant of the nature of the accusation against him. Yet, when an indictment leaves “the prosecution free to roam at large — to shift its *1242theory of criminality so as to take advantage of each passing vicissitude of the trial” 369 U.S. at 768, 82 S.Ct. at 1049, it is invalid for it lacks in specificity and does not confine the prosecutor to a particular conspiratorial agreement. In such a case, when either the indictment fails to allege a specific conspiracy or when the proof at trial establishes the possibility of more than one conspiracy, the indictment’s failure to name specific individuals as co-conspirators renders the indictment insufficient. The latter is clearly the case here.
In my opinion, the evidence presented at trial is susceptible to several constructions. The jury could very well have construed the evidence to establish two separate conspiracies — one between Finnigan, Rassay, Allen and Marcangello and another between Allen, Marcangello and Piccolo. Since this construction allows for the possibility that the jurors were not in agreement as to which conspiracy had been proven, the failure of the indictment to specify all known co-conspirators renders it insufficient. Moreover, I construe the evidence to be lacking because proof does not clearly establish that Piccolo entered into a conspiracy to make cocaine sales on a continuous basis as opposed to his merely agreeing to make the isolated sale which occurred on February 15, 1979. In each of these instances, the potential for a due process violation exists because of the uncertainty as to whether the grand jury which issued the indictment and the jury which rendered the guilty verdict had the same facts in mind. This important consideration was emphasized in Russell when the Court stated:
To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him.
369 U.S. at 770, 82 S.Ct. at 1050.
In light of the foregoing considerations, I remain of the view that the indictment failed to satisfy the Russell requirement of specificity. The government failed to ensure that the considerations before the jury at the close of the trial were the same as those before the grand jury at the time the indictment was issued. Therefore, I dissent.