Court Opinion

ID: 9369057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 19:02:28.40254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:12.616562
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/23 Tillman v. Mills CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

ED TILLMAN,                                                            B317990

     Cross-complainant and                                             (Los Angeles County
Appellant,                                                             Super. Ct. No. 19NWCV00782)

         v.

CHRISTOPHER LEMONT MILLS
et al.,

     Cross-defendants and
Respondents.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Olivia Rosales, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.

      Law Offices of Alan G. Novodor and Alan G. Novodor for
Cross-complainant and Appellant.

         No appearance for Cross-defendants and Respondents.
                        ____________________
       Cross-complainant and appellant Ed Tillman (Tillman)
appeals from a trial court order setting aside the defaults of
cross-defendants and respondents Christopher Lemont Mills and
Constantina S. Mills (collectively cross-defendants or the Millses)
and the resulting default judgment entered in favor of Tillman.
Tillman argues that the trial court erred in granting cross-
defendants’ motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
473, subdivision (b).1
       We agree with Tillman that cross-defendants’ motions to
set aside their defaults were untimely. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court’s order and direct the trial court to reinstate the
defaults and default judgment.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Factual Background
       Tillman leased a 2011 Bentley Mulsanne automobile from
Porsche Leasing Ltd. and Porsche Financial Services, Inc. doing
business as Bentley Financial Services (collectively Porsche
Leasing).
       Tillman was a longtime personal friend of the Millses.
When they asked if they could sublease the Bentley from him, he
agreed. In August 2014, Tillman and cross-defendants entered
into an oral agreement, pursuant to which the Millses agreed to
timely make the lease payments to Porsche Leasing and
promptly return the vehicle to Tillman before the end of the lease
or upon demand.

1
     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

                                 2
       On July 17, 2019, Porsche Leasing notified Tillman that
the Millses had failed to make the required monthly payments.
Tillman contacted the Millses, demanding that they either make
the lease payments or return the Bentley to him. They failed to
do so, prompting this litigation.
Complaint
       On October 8, 2019, Porsche Leasing filed a complaint
against Tillman.
Cross-complaint
       On November 22, 2019, Tillman filed a cross-complaint
against the Millses.
Service by publication
       After repeated attempts at personal service and service
pursuant to section 415.302 failed, Tillman obtained an order to
serve cross-defendants by publication. Proof of publication was
filed with the trial court.
Request for entry of default
       When cross-defendants neglected to answer the cross-
complaint, on October 9, 2020, their defaults were entered.
Default judgment
       A default judgment in favor of Tillman and against cross-
defendants was entered on July 13, 2021.

2
      Section 415.30, subdivision (a) provides that “A summons
may be served by mail as provided in this section. A copy of the
summons and of the complaint shall be mailed (by first-class mail
or airmail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together
with two copies of the notice and acknowledgment provided for in
subdivision (b) and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed
to the sender.”

                                3
Motions to set aside defaults
       Approximately one week later, cross-defendants each filed
a motion to set aside their default pursuant to section 473,
subdivision (b). Specifically, they sought “discretionary relief”
from the trial court on the grounds that their defaults and the
resulting default judgment “occurred as a result of surprise and
excusable neglect because [they were] never personally served
with a copy of the Summons or Cross-Complaint and only
recently learned of this action.”
       Tillman opposed the motions. He argued, inter alia, that
the motions were untimely: Under section 473, subdivision (b), a
motion to vacate a default must be brought within six months of
the date of the default. Because the motions were filed in July
2021, more than six months after cross-defendants’ defaults were
entered in October 2020, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
grant the motions.
       After entertaining oral argument, the trial court granted
cross-defendants’ motions pursuant to section 473, subdivision
(b),3 setting aside cross-defendants’ defaults and the resulting
default judgment.
Appeal
       Tillman’s timely appeal ensued.

3
       The first page of trial court’s minute order indicates that
the motions were brought under section 473.5, although its
analysis specifically cites and quotes section 473, subdivision (b).
In light of the parties’ written arguments, the absence of a
reporter’s transcript, and the substance of the trial court’s order,
we presume the reference to section 473.5 is a typographical
error.

                                  4
                            DISCUSSION
       The purpose of section 473, subdivision (b), is to promote
the determination of actions on their merits. (Even Zohar
Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 839.) To that end, it offers two avenues,
one discretionary and one mandatory, for parties to obtain relief
from defaults and default judgments. The discretionary relief
portion of the statute is at issue here. It provides: ‘The court
may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her
legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other
proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this
relief . . . shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case
exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or
proceeding was taken.” (§ 473, subd. (b); see also Pulte Homes
Corp. v. Williams Mechanical, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 267, 273
(Pulte Homes).)
       “The general rule is that the six-month period within which
to bring a motion to vacate under section 473 runs from the date
of the default and not from the judgment taken thereafter.
[Citations.]” (Rutan v. Summit Sports (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d
965, 970; see also Sugasawara v. Newland (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
294, 296–297 [noting that this rule applies in cases of
discretionary relief]; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide:
Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022, ¶ 5:279,
p. 5-74).) “This six-month time limitation is jurisdictional; the
court has no power to grant relief under section 473 once the time
has lapsed.” (Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 918, 928.)

                                5
       Cross-defendants’ defaults were entered on October 9,
2020, and the default judgment was entered against them on
July 13, 2021. While their motions for relief were filed less than
six months after entry of the default judgment, they were filed
more than six months after entry of their defaults. Under these
circumstances, “[t]he trial court . . . could not set aside the
default[s] under . . . section 473. And because it could not set
aside the default[s], it also could not set aside the default
judgment under . . . section 473, because that would be ‘“an idle
act.”’ [Citation.] ‘‘‘If the judgment were vacated, it would be the
duty of the court immediately to render another judgment of like
effect, and the [cross-]defendants, still being in default, could not
be heard in opposition thereto. . . .”’ [Citations.]” (Pulte Homes,
supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 273.)
       We therefore conclude that the Millses were not entitled to
relief under section 473.4

4
      In his opening brief, Tillman further argues that the
Millses were not entitled to relief either under section 473.5 or
pursuant to the trial court’s equitable powers. Because cross-
defendants did not raise these grounds either on appeal or in
their motions, and the trial court did not rely upon them, we need
not address them here.

                                  6
                           DISPOSITION
      The order setting aside cross-defendants’ defaults and the
default judgment against them is reversed. The trial court is
directed to reinstate the defaults and the default judgment.
Tillman is entitled to costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                               _____________________, J.
                               ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

                                  7