Court Opinion

ID: 9855414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:24:31.807495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:20.548749
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority and therefore join in its judgment.
Although there may be much of merit in what Judge Grant has written about L.B. 1,1 agree with the majority’s conclusion that the enactment cannot be constitutionally applied for the 1989 tax year.
Once that determination is made, further examination *382appears inappropriate. See County of Hall ex rel. Tejral v. Antonson, 231 Neb. 764, 437 N.W.2d 813 (1989) (courts refrain from passing on the constitutionality of legislation unless such determination is necessary for the proper disposition of the questions raised on appeal). Accord, State ex rel. Labedz v. Beermann, 229 Neb. 657, 428 N.W.2d 608 (1988); State v. Radcliffe, 228 Neb. 868, 424 N.W.2d 608 (1988); Morse v. City of Omaha, 67 Neb. 426, 93 N.W. 734 (1903).
L.B. 7 provides that for the 1989 tax year, the relevant section applies “to railroad rolling stock upon which no levy has been made or upon which no tax may lawfully be collected.” As the majority’s analysis of L.B. 1 demonstrates, the entire process for levying taxes on valuations established in 1989 had been fully completed by the time L.B. 7 was enacted. Consequently, L.B. 7, by its own terms, cannot apply to the issues presented for judicial determination in these cases.
Thus, again, while there may be merit in much of what the majority has declared with respect to L.B. 7, and perhaps too in much of what Judges White and Fahrnbruch have expressed in that regard, the above-cited rule of judicial self-restraint counsels against any present exploration of those issues.