Court Opinion

ID: 9899022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 19:04:13.050367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:19.471697
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/15/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION SEVEN

GARY SEPANOSSIAN,                     B319260

       Plaintiff and Appellant,       (Los Angeles County
                                      Super. Ct. No. 20STCV13996)
       v.

NATIONAL READY MIX
COMPANY, INC.,

       Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Amy D. Hogue, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
      Price Armstrong and Nicholas W. Armstrong for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
      Covington & Burling, Sonya D. Winner, Ashley M.
Simonsen and Alaxander L. Schultz for Defendant and
Respondent.
                     _______________________
                        INTRODUCTION

       Gary Sepanossian, dba G.S. Construction (Sepanossian),
individually and as class representative, filed a class action
against National Ready Mix Concrete Co., Inc. (Ready Mix),1
alleging Ready Mix charged its customers an “energy” fee and an
“environmental” fee “wholly untethered to any actual cost for
‘energy’ or ‘environmental’ issues” that Ready Mix instead
“recognize[s] as profit.” The complaint alleges causes of action for
(1) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL)
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.2) under the fraudulent and
unfair business practices prongs; (2) breach of contract; and
(3) “unjust enrichment.”
       After Ready Mix answered the complaint, Sepanossian filed
a motion for class certification. The trial court granted class
certification, but expressed doubts about Sepanossian’s legal
claims and invited the parties to present a motion for judgment
on the pleadings to address the merits before class notice. The
parties agreed to do so, and Ready Mix subsequently filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court
granted on the UCL and unjust enrichment causes of action. We
reverse because Sepanossian alleged facts sufficient to state a
cause of action under the UCL, but affirm dismissal of the unjust
enrichment cause of action.

1    Sepanossian sued Ready Mix as “National Ready Mix
Company, Inc.,” which Ready Mix’s brief notes was incorrect.
Ready Mix advances no argument this error affects our analysis
on appeal.
2    Statutory references are to the Business and Professions
Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                 2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

       Ready Mix sells mixed concrete to small businesses for
construction projects. Sepanossian operates a construction
business in Encino, California. Sepanossian and the class he
represents are customers of Ready Mix who pay Ready Mix a “set
rate” for its concrete products. To each sale, Ready Mix adds an
“energy” fee and an “environmental” fee separate from the set
rate.4 These fees are uniform and do not correlate to or fluctuate
in any way with any actual energy or environmental costs
incurred by Ready Mix or the size of the order. The complaint
alleges the “energy” fee has no relationship to Ready Mix’s fuel or
energy costs and the “environmental” fee does not relate to any
environmental costs incurred by Ready Mix. Sepanossian further
alleges the fees are recognized by Ready Mix as profit. The
energy and environmental fee amounts are separately itemized
on invoices and disclosed to customers, but no further
explanation or information about the nature of the fees is
provided. According to the quotes and invoices judicially noticed
by the trial court, the environmental fees and energy fees are
generally approximately $30 each per delivery. The gravamen of
Sepanossian’s complaint is not that class members did not know

3     On review from a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
“we accept as true all material allegations in the complaint.”
(National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. State of California
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 428, 432 (Sports Foundation).)
4     The trial court took judicial notice of four exemplar quotes
and invoices reflecting those fees. The parties agreed such
judicial notice was proper so Sepanossian did not have to file an
amended complaint attaching these documents.

                                 3
the amount of these charges, but rather that the terms
environmental fee and energy fee were misleading.
      In April 2020 Sepanossian filed a class action complaint
against Ready Mix on behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated, seeking restitution, injunctive relief, and damages.
Sepanossian’s complaint alleges in relevant part that, in
connection with its sales of concrete, Ready Mix fraudulently,
deceptively, and unfairly added “energy” and “environmental”
fees above the set rate that are unrelated to Ready Mix’s actual
energy or environmental costs, and that Ready Mix was unjustly
enriched by these practices.
      The complaint alleges Ready Mix’s practice of charging
customers for “energy” and “environmental” fees is likely to
deceive reasonable customers into believing these are legitimate
charges directly related to actual costs incurred by Ready Mix in
delivering its orders of ready-mixed concrete. The complaint
further alleges that Sepanossian and class members were
induced to purchase the concrete and pay the fees because they
were misled by the labels.5 Sepanossian also alleges, “Plaintiff

5      For example, as to the UCL claim, the complaint alleges
Ready Mix’s “fraudulent acts” include “(a) Representing, through
the commonly understood . . . term ‘energy’ and ‘environmental’
fees” that such fees were “implemented, calculated, charged, and
collected to offset Ready Mix’s actual or increased fuel costs. This
representation was made uniformly on the form contracts at
issue and invoices. Plaintiff and class members relied upon this
understood meaning, as used by Ready Mix, in entering the
contract and paying the fee. This representation was material as
Plaintiff and class members would not have paid the ‘energy’ and
‘environmental’ fees had they known [they were] simply a profit-
enhancement tool. This representation is false as” such fees are
“not related to or used to offset Ready Mix’s actual or increased

                                 4
and class members would not have entered into contracts with
Ready Mix and would not have paid the fees at issue had they
known the truth about the ‘energy’ and ‘environmental’ fees and
had not been subject to Ready Mix’s misrepresentations and
omissions.”
       Ready Mix answered the complaint, and the parties
proceeded to class certification.
       In July 2021 the trial court certified the two proposed
classes (an “energy fee class” and an “environmental fee class”)
but expressed “serious questions regarding the merits of
Plaintiff’s claims.” At the hearing, the court stated that although
it could not reach the merits on the motion for class certification,
its ruling “certainly signal[s] pretty strongly that I think [Ready
Mix is] right.” The court invited the parties to present a
dispositive motion on the merits before undertaking the expense
of class notice, and suggested a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, with the relevant invoices incorporated, as an
alternative to a summary judgment motion. The parties
subsequently conferred and stipulated to do so, and in
September 2021 Ready Mix filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings and an unopposed request for judicial notice of the
quotes and invoices reflecting the challenged fees.

costs of fuel. Ready Mix made these representations in order to,
and with the effect of, inducing Plaintiff and class members to
pay the fee.” The complaint contains substantially similar
allegations under an omissions theory.

                                 5
       In October 2021 the trial court granted Ready Mix’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings as to the UCL and unjust
enrichment causes of action. The trial court ruled that “the
terms ‘environmental’ and ‘energy,’ standing alone, are at best
ambiguous and there is no allegation Ready Mix further
promised or represented how it would use the fees,” thus, as a
matter of law, they were not misleading or deceptive. It further
ruled that because Ready Mix clearly disclosed the amount of fees
as part of the total cost, the practice as a matter of law was not
unfair. With regard to unjust enrichment, the court reasoned
that because there was an express contract between the parties
covering the fees (i.e., the form contracts listing the fees), and the
contract was not procured by fraud or otherwise unenforceable or
ineffective, Sepanossian could not assert a claim for restitution
based on unjust enrichment.
       On December 22, 2021 Sepanossian voluntarily dismissed
the remaining breach of contract cause of action. On
December 29, the trial court dismissed the entire action with
prejudice.6
       Sepanossian timely appealed.7

6      The trial court issued an “Order re Dismissal,” which is an
appealable final judgment. (See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967)
67 Cal.2d 695, 699 [“‘[A]n order of dismissal is to be treated as a
judgment for the purposes of taking an appeal when it finally
disposes of the particular action and prevents further proceedings
as effectually as would any formal judgment.’”].)
7     Sepanossian does not appeal the dismissal of the contract
claim.

                                  6
                          DISCUSSION

A.     Standard of Review
       “‘A judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is
appropriate when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to
state a cause of action. [Citation.] A motion for judgment on the
pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and is governed by the
same de novo standard of review.’ [Citation.] ‘All properly
pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not contentions,
deductions, or conclusions of fact or law . . . .’ [Citation.] Courts
may consider judicially noticeable matters in the motion as well.”
(People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014)
59 Cal.4th 772, 777; see generally Code Civ. Proc., § 438.) Our
review is de novo because the trial court’s ruling on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings “resolves a mixed question of law and
fact that is predominantly one of law, viz., whether or not the
factual allegations that the plaintiff makes are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515.)
       “A trial court’s determination of a motion for judgment on
the pleadings accepts as true the factual allegations that the
plaintiff makes. [Citations.] In addition, it gives them a liberal
construction. [Citations.] [¶] An appellate court’s consideration
of the ensuing determination by the trial court involves the same
acceptance and liberal construction of the factual allegations in
question. [Citations.].” (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, supra,
24 Cal.4th at pp. 515-516; accord, Aron v. U-Haul Co. of
California (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 796, 802 (Aron).)

                                  7
B.    The UCL
      The purpose of the UCL “‘“is to protect both consumers and
competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets
for goods and services.”’” (California Medical Association v.
Aetna Health of California Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1075, 1085
(California Medical Association); accord, McGill v. Citibank, N.A.
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 954; Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th
939, 949.) “‘Through the UCL a plaintiff may obtain restitution
and/or injunctive relief against unfair or unlawful practices.’”
(Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th
1134, 1144.) The UCL is broad in scope (Kasky, at p. 949), and
defines “‘unfair competition’” to mean and include “any unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business act or practice” (§ 17200). “Because
the statute is framed in the disjunctive, a business practice need
only meet one of the three criteria to be considered unfair
competition,” and a cause of action under the UCL may be
established “‘“independent of any contractual relationship
between the parties.”’” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc.
(2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1471 (McKell).)
      “To state a cause of action under consumer protection
statutes designed to protect the public from fraudulent or
deceptive representations, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
‘“members of the public are likely to be deceived.”’” (Aron, supra,
143 Cal.App.4th at p. 806; accord, Morgan v. AT&T Wireless
Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1255 [a “fraudulent”
business practice under the UCL “is one that is likely to deceive
members of the public”].) We apply the “reasonable consumer”
standard to actions involving claims under the UCL for deceptive
or unfair business practices. (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012)
202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1380 (Klein); Aron, at p. 806; Consumer

                                 8
Advocates v. Echostar Satellite Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th
1351, 1360.)
      Under the reasonable consumer standard, whether a
business practice is deceptive under the “‘fraudulent’” prong of
the UCL “‘is based on the likely effect such practice would have
on a reasonable consumer.’” (Klein, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1380; accord, Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co. (2003)
105 Cal.App.4th 496, 508 [whether an advertisement or business
practice violates the UCL is measured “by the likely effect on the
normally credulous consumer”].) “This is determined by
considering a reasonable consumer who is neither the most
vigilant and suspicious . . . nor the most unwary and
unsophisticated, but instead is ‘the ordinary consumer within the
target population.’” (Chapman v. Skype Inc. (2013)
220 Cal.App.4th 217, 226 (Chapman).) ‘““Likely to deceive” for
purposes of the UCL indicates “it is probable that a significant
portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers,
acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’” (Id. at
p. 226.) A claim under the UCL “‘may be based on
representations to the public which are untrue, and “‘also those
which may be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to
mislead or deceive. . . . A perfectly true statement couched in
such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the
consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant
information, is actionable under’” the UCL.’” (Klein, at p. 1380;
accord, McKell, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1471.)
      Whether consumers are likely to be deceived is generally a
question of fact that can be decided at the pleadings stage “only if
the facts alleged in the complaint, and facts judicially noticed,
compel the conclusion as a matter of law that consumers are not

                                 9
likely to be deceived.” (Chapman, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 226-227; accord, Klein, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381
[“‘“[U]nless we can say as a matter of law that contrary to the
complaint’s allegations, members of the public were not likely to
be deceived or misled by [the defendant’s alleged conduct], we
must hold that [plaintiffs] stated a cause of action.”’”].)
       With regard to the “‘unfair’” prong of the UCL, “a business
practice is ‘unfair’ if (1) the consumer injury is substantial; (2) the
injury is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to
consumers or competition; and (3) the injury could not reasonably
have been avoided by consumers themselves.” (Klein, supra,
202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376, quoting Camacho v. Automobile Club
of Southern California (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403; accord,
Davis v. Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 581,
598 (Davis).) “Whether a practice is . . . unfair is generally a
question of fact . . . which usually cannot be [decided] on
demurrer.” (Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc.
(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 115, 134-135.)

C.    Sepanossian Has Stated a Claim Under Both the
      “Fraudulent” and “Unfair” Prongs of the UCL
      1.    “Fraudulent” prong of the UCL
      Sepanossian alleged that by adding “energy” and
“environmental” fees to each order on top of the set rate for its
concrete product sales, Ready Mix fraudulently deceived
customers into believing they were being charged fees bearing
some relation to energy-related or environmental-related costs
borne by Ready Mix. Specifically, Sepanossian alleged, “[i]n
truth, Ready Mix’s charges for ‘energy’ and ‘environmental’ fees
were not designed to cover anything related to additional ‘energy’

                                  10
costs or any ‘environmental’ fee. The amount of these charges are
arbitrary and are simply designed to increase the agreed base
price and generate extra profit at its customer’s expense.”
Sepanossian alleged Ready Mix’s conduct deceptively and
unfairly misleads consumers because the listed fees did not in
fact, “in intent or practice,” relate to any fuel, energy or
environmental costs incurred or anticipated by Ready Mix, and
there was no way for consumers to reasonably avoid the injury
because the fees were mandatory.
       At the pleading stage, we cannot conclude, as a matter of
law, that consumers are not likely to be deceived in the manner
alleged. Sepanossian alleged facts which, if true, may reveal that
members of the public believed the fees Ready Mix charged them
had some nexus to energy or environmental costs, when in fact
the listed fees had no such relationship and were solely added to
increase profits to Ready Mix.
       Aron, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th 796, a case this court decided
that was not cited by either party, dealt with the same UCL
provisions at issue here. There the plaintiff alleged that a
“fueling fee” imposed by U-Haul when customers returned a
rental truck with less fuel than originally provided was an unfair
and misleading designation “because the fuel is not in fact
replaced [before the next truck rental] and this fact is not
disclosed to the consumer.” (Id. at p. 806.) We reversed the trial
court’s judgment on the pleadings in U-Haul’s favor, rejecting
U-Haul’s arguments that “there is nothing deceptive about
calling the fee charged when a customer returns a truck with less
fuel than provided a ‘fueling fee.’” Aron further rejected U-Haul’s
arguments that “it makes no express or implied representations
suggesting that it refuels returned vehicles, and that what it does

                                11
with the fuel charges is of no concern to the customers.” (Ibid.)
Aron determined the facts alleged were sufficient to show that
calling a charge a “fueling fee” when a truck rental customer
returns with less fuel than provided “would be misleading to a
reasonable consumer because there is no connection between the
imposition of a fee or cost and whether the customer has in fact
refueled the vehicle.” (Id. at p. 807.) Aron concluded the plaintiff
alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for fraudulent
business practices under the UCL. (Ibid.)
       Here, similar to Aron, Sepanossian alleged facts sufficient
to show Ready Mix’s fees are misleading to a reasonable
consumer because there is no connection between the imposition
of Ready Mix’s “energy” or “environmental” fees and whether
Ready Mix is in fact charging its customers for energy or
environmental costs. “‘“‘A perfectly true statement couched in
such a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the
consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant
information, is actionable.’”’” (Klein, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1380.) The invoices clearly list the “energy” and
“environmental” fees and accurately reflect the dollar amount
charged, but the fees are presented to a consumer in such a way
that it is probable a consumer would be misled or deceived into
believing it was being charged bona fide fees for energy or
environmental costs borne by Ready Mix. In other words, a
reasonable consumer would likely be surprised to learn that a
charge expressly identified as an “energy” or “environmental” fee,
added on top of the set rate for a concrete purchase, had no actual
relationship of any kind to Ready Mix’s energy or environmental
costs and was pure profit.

                                12
       Ready Mix maintains that Sepanossian failed to state a
claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL because “the terms
‘energy fee’ and ‘environmental fee,’ standing alone, do not
constitute affirmative representations that the amounts charged
are (or are not) exclusive of profit.” Ready Mix contends there is
no actionable misrepresentation because “a reasonable consumer
is not likely to construe [Ready Mix]’s fee labels, standing alone,
as unequivocal representations that the amounts charged were
wholly tethered to [its] costs and not the source of any profit.” As
noted above, Aron rejected a similar argument by U-Haul at
pages 806 to 807.
       In all events, Ready Mix relies on Wayne v. Staples, Inc.
(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 466 (Wayne), a case this court decided on
summary judgment. In Wayne, the plaintiff in a putative class
action alleged Staples’s parcel shipping order form was deceptive
under the False Advertising Act (§ 17500 et seq.)8 because the
form failed to properly disclose Staples’s 100 percent profit or
markup on the sale of optional “declared value coverage.” (Id. at
p. 473.) The form indicated such coverage would be provided
through the carrier (UPS), not Staples, and informed customers
they could instead use an independent company. It further
stated, “‘Please note that we may surcharge the cost of this
product as an administrative expense, for services such as
processing of potential claims and related services.’” (Id. at

8     The UCL incorporates by reference the False Advertising
Act. (See § 17200 [UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue
or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1
(commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7 of the
Business and Professions Code.”].)

                                 13
p. 483.) Staples did not dispute it automatically marked up the
cost of the coverage on each purchase without regard to actual
administrative expense. (Ibid.) The trial court granted Staples’s
motion for summary judgment, and this court affirmed,
concluding that “[i]n light of Staples’s clear disclosure of the
actual price it would charge its customers for declared value
coverage prior to any purchase, the trial court properly concluded
any ambiguity in the order form as to whether the amount
charged includes a ‘surcharge’ or profit for Staples was not
misleading or deceptive.” (Id. at p. 484.)
       Ready Mix also relies on Searle v. Wyndham International,
Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334 (Searle), which affirmed a
demurrer to plaintiff’s UCL claims brought against a hotel.
Searle ruled it was not deceptive or unfair for the hotel not to
specify that a clearly stated 17 percent hotel “service charge” on
room service orders was paid directly to servers. (Searle, at
p. 1334.) According to Searle, guests had no legitimate interest
in how this charge was distributed and were “given both clear
notice the [room] service being offered comes at a hefty premium
and the freedom to decline the service.” (Ibid.)
       Wayne and Searle are distinguishable from the facts
alleged in Sepanossian’s complaint. Sepanossian’s central
allegation is that the energy and environmental fees charged by
Ready Mix are misleadingly named, have no relation “in intent or
practice” to any actual energy or environmental costs, and are
wholly profit for which customers receive nothing in return
(since, as the complaint alleges, customers pay for the concrete
with the agreed-upon “set rate”). By contrast, in Searle, the
plaintiffs did not allege the service charge was misleadingly
labeled, and there was no allegation or contention the “service

                               14
charge” for room service was unrelated to the service actually
received. The Searle plaintiffs only complained that the hotel did
not disclose how it allocated the service charge, and, in those
circumstances, the court properly concluded that a customer “has
no legitimate interest in what the hotel does with the service
charge.” (Searle, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334.) In Searle,
the service charge was not fraudulent (or unfair) because it was a
bona fide service charge for which plaintiffs received something
in return.
       Similarly, in Wayne, the core allegation was essentially
that customers paid a steep markup for shipping insurance
coverage and that the size of the markup was undisclosed, not
that the “declared value coverage” charge was misleadingly
labeled or unrelated to actual insurance coverage. Further, the
order form in Wayne disclosed that the “declared value coverage”
charge could be surcharged to cover administrative expenses.
That is, it expressly disclosed the charge for coverage could be
surcharged and that such surcharge was intended to cover (but
not limited to) anticipated expenses for processing potential
claims and related services. By contrast, Ready Mix’s quotes and
invoices—attached to its motion for judgment on the pleadings—
do not contain comparable disclosures regarding the
environmental and energy fees it charges. Wayne also was
decided on summary judgment, not judgment on the pleadings,
with discovery regarding the nature of the charges and their
relation to actual expenses.9

9     Ready Mix relies on several federal cases applying
California law. “We, of course, are not bound by federal decisions
on matters of state law.” (Haynes v. EMC Mortgage Corp. (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 329, 335; accord, Bank of Italy National Trust &

                                15
       More fundamentally, Ready Mix’s framing ignores that
clear disclosure of the amount of a particular charge on a
customer’s invoices does not foreclose the possibility that the
label attached to that charge—which is fully within its control—
could mislead a reasonable consumer. Reasonable consumers are
entitled to infer that the descriptive name attached to a
particular fee they are being charged has some connection to the
fee unless otherwise indicated. If the terms “energy” and
“environmental” had been defined, or their function and intent
described in the quotes and invoices, a UCL cause of action under
the fraudulent prong may have failed at the pleadings stage. But
here, where we accept as true Sepanossian’s allegations that
consumers are not informed the fees they pay have nothing to do
with actual energy or environmental costs, consumers receive
nothing in return for payment of those fees, and the fees are
instead solely intended for Ready Mix to increase its profit from
the transaction above the set rate, the complaint properly stated
a claim. Under these circumstances, we cannot “‘“say as a matter
of law that contrary to the complaint’s allegations, members of
the public were not likely to be deceived or misled by”’” Ready
Mix’s alleged conduct. (Klein, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381.)

Savings Association v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 653 [noting a
holding of federal court on California law “would not be binding
or conclusive on the courts of this state”].) Similarly, we are not
bound by federal court decisions decided under the consumer
protection statutes of other states that Sepanossian cites.

                                16
       2.    “Unfairness” prong of the UCL
       Sepanossian has also adequately alleged Ready Mix’s
energy and environmental fees are unfair under the UCL. The
complaint alleges and we must accept as true that (1) such fees
are automatically added to every concrete purchase, thus causing
substantial injury to customers; (2) the fees provide no
countervailing benefit to customers; and (3) the fees were
mandatory and unavoidable, thus there was no way for
customers to reasonably avoid the injury because if they wanted
to purchase concrete from Ready Mix, they had to pay the fees.
(See Davis, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 597-598 [to adequately
allege unfairness, “(1) the consumer injury must be substantial;
(2) the injury must not be outweighed by any countervailing
benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) it must be an injury
that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided”].)
       Ready Mix contends that businesses do not engage in
unfair conduct under the UCL by charging a fee when a
consumer is given the freedom to avoid the fee. Relying on
Shvarts v. Budget Group, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1159-
1160, Ready Mix argues Sepanossian could have avoided the
injury alleged because the fees at issue were disclosed before
contracting. Shvarts held that a car rental agency’s per-gallon
charges for replacing fuel were “avoidable” and did not violate the
UCL where three payment options and the agency’s dollar-per-
gallon rate were “clearly printed” in the rental agreement and
statutory law protected rental companies’ ability to “‘charge for
an item or service provided in connection with a particular rental
transaction if the renter could have avoided incurring the charge
by choosing not to obtain or utilize the optional item or service.’”
(Id. at p. 1158 [affirming order of dismissal after sustaining

                                17
demurrer without leave to amend].) However, the fees in that
case were both clearly disclosed and optional for the company’s
customers: Budget customers could rent a car from Budget yet
avoid its allegedly inflated per-gallon rate by simply buying
replacement fuel elsewhere.
       Here, Ready Mix customers cannot buy concrete from it
while avoiding being charged the energy and environmental fees.
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings we must accept as
true Sepanossian’s allegation the fees were unavoidable for
customers who wished to purchase concrete from Ready Mix.
(See Sports Foundation, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 432 [“we accept as
true all material allegations in the complaint”]; see also Aron,
supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 805 [where plaintiff “specifically
pleads that customers must pay a charge one way or the other,”
such allegations support a claim under the unfairness prong of
the UCL that a customer cannot avoid the charge].)
       Ready Mix also cites Searle, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at
page 1334, for the proposition that “clear notice” and “the
freedom to decline the service” defeat a claim of unfairness under
the UCL. But with regard to the imposition of the misleadingly
labeled fees here, “[a]s [Sepanossian] has adequately alleged that
[such fees are] not, in fact, avoidable, Searle provides no
protection for [Ready Mix’s] imposition of a charge for a service it
does not provide.” (Aron, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 805-806
[rejecting U-Haul’s assertion that “the fact that it incurs no
refueling charges is irrelevant to the unfairness analysis”].)
       Accordingly, the complaint stated a cause for violation of
the UCL under both the fraudulent and unfairness prongs.

                                 18
D.     Judgment on the Pleadings on the Unjust Enrichment
       Cause of Action Was Appropriate
       Sepanossian’s complaint states the third cause of action for
“unjust enrichment” is pleaded “in the alternative” and “[t]o the
extent necessary.” The cause of action incorporates all preceding
allegations by reference and further alleges: “By charging and
collecting ‘energy’ and ‘environmental’ fees which it knew to not
be justified by any fuel cost in incurred, by suppressing and
misrepresenting material facts (including that it would charge
‘energy’ and ‘environmental’ fees that were unrelated to its actual
or increased fuel costs), and by engaging in other wrongful and
unlawful conduct as set out herein, Ready Mix obtained a benefit,
in the form of money, which properly belongs to the putative
class. The benefit conferred by the putative class was non-
gratuitous and Ready Mix realized value from this benefit. . . .
[¶] Due to Ready Mix’s conduct, it would be unjust for Ready Mix
to retain the benefit bestowed by Plaintiff and the class members
at the expenses of Plaintiff and the class members.”
       As an initial matter, “[t]here is no cause of action in
California labeled ‘unjust enrichment.’” (City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 458, 477 (Oakland).)
Rather, an unjust enrichment claim is grounded in equitable
principles of restitution. (See Hirsch v. Bank of America (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 708, 721 (Hirsch); see also Durell v. Sharp
Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370 (Durell) [“Unjust
enrichment is synonymous with restitution.”].) Unjust
enrichment is sometimes considered “‘“a general principle,
underlying various legal doctrines and remedies,”’ rather than a
remedy itself.” (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793.)

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         Unjust enrichment is generally an inapplicable basis for
restitution where the parties have an enforceable express
contract, however, “restitution may be awarded in lieu of breach
of contract damages when the parties had an express contract,
but it was procured by fraud or is unenforceable or ineffective for
some reason,” or “where the defendant obtained a benefit from
the plaintiff by fraud, duress, conversion, or similar conduct.”
(Durell, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1370.) “Common law
principles of restitution require a party to return a benefit when
the retention of such benefit would unjustly enrich the recipient;
a typical cause of action involving such remedy is ‘quasi-
contract.’” (Munoz v. MacMillan (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 648,
661; see Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1996) 14 Cal.4th 39, 51 [“Under
the law of restitution, an individual may be required to make
restitution if he is unjustly enriched at the expense of another.”].)
         Thus, Sepanossian’s “unjust enrichment” claim “does not
properly state a cause of action.” (Levine v. Blue Shield of
California (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1138.) Because
Sepanossian does not dispute there were express form contracts
in this case, he cannot assert a quasi-contract claim for
restitution based on unjust enrichment. “Although a plaintiff
may plead inconsistent claims that allege both the existence of an
enforceable agreement and the absence of an enforceable
agreement, that is not what occurred here. Instead,
[Sepanossian’s] breach of contract claim pleaded the existence
of . . . enforceable agreement[s] and [his] unjust enrichment claim
did not deny the existence or enforceability of [those]
agreement[s]. [Sepanossian is] therefore precluded from
asserting a quasi-contract claim under the theory of unjust
enrichment.” (Klein, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1389-1390.)

                                 20
       More fundamentally, “[b]ecause we have found that
[Sepanossian’s] remedies at law are adequate” (i.e., his count
alleged under the UCL), a separate claim for restitution is
unnecessary. (Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
249, 260 (Collins) [on review of a successful motion for judgment
on the pleadings, where appellate court determined plaintiffs
stated valid claims under the UCL, Consumers Legal Remedies
Act, and fraud, “a claim for restitution, alleging that [defendant]
has been unjustly enriched by its fraud, is unnecessary”].) “This
conclusion follows from the general principle of equity that
equitable relief (such as restitution) will not be given when the
plaintiff’s remedies at law are adequate.” (Id. at p. 260.)
       Here, the gravamen of Sepanossian’s unjust enrichment
claim is that Ready Mix was unjustly enriched by customers
paying fees that were fraudulent and unfair under the UCL, and
that such customers are entitled to recover those fees from Ready
Mix. The unjust enrichment claim merely incorporates the
allegations, derivative of the UCL claim, that Ready Mix received
a financial advantage—money obtained from misleadingly named
fees charged to its customers—which it unjustly retained at their
expense. Restitution is already an available remedy under the
UCL cause of action, within the broad equitable discretion of the
trial court. (See § 17203 [restitution is available “to restore to
any person in interest any money or property . . . which may have
been acquired by means of such unfair competition”]; see also
In re Tobacco Cases II (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 779, 790.) Thus, a
separate claim is unnecessary for Sepanossian to recover
restitution. “In light of the adequate legal remedies, we conclude
the complaint does not state a claim for restitution based on
unjust enrichment.” (Collins, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 260.)

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                         DISPOSITION

       The order of dismissal is reversed. The order granting the
motion for judgment on the pleadings is also reversed, and the
trial court is directed to enter a new order denying the motion on
the UCL cause of action and granting it on the unjust enrichment
cause of action. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

                              MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

      PERLUSS, P. J.

      SEGAL, J.

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