Court Opinion

ID: 9943478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:04:25.507427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:04.193805
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Feb 23 2024, 9:44 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                      Fernando Marroquin,
                                          Appellant-Plaintiff

                                                    v.

                                         Christina Reagle,
                                          Appellee-Defendant

                                          February 23, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-MI-2545
                             Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court
                          The Honorable Kristine A. Osterday, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                        20D01-1903-MI-90

                                  Opinion by Judge Vaidik
                             Judges May and Kenworthy concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024                 Page 1 of 6
      Vaidik, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Fernando Marroquin was convicted of Class D felony sexual misconduct with a

      minor, which is not (and has never been) a crime that requires sex-offender

      registration in Indiana. However, he then moved to Virginia, where such a

      crime requires lifetime registration. When he later moved back to Indiana, he

      was told he must register for life because he had been required to do so in

      Virginia. The basis for this purported requirement is Indiana Code section 11-8-

      8-19(f), which provides, “A person who is required to register as a sex or violent

      offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required by the other

      jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is longer.”

      Marroquin challenged the Indiana registration requirement, and the trial court

      ruled that Section 11-8-8-19(f) applies even when the only reason the offender

      would have to register in another jurisdiction is the existence of an Indiana

      conviction. We disagree and reverse.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In 1998, the State charged Marroquin with Class D felony sexual misconduct

      with a minor, alleging that he “touch[ed], fondle[d] and caress[ed]” the breast

      of a fourteen-year-old girl. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 103-04; see also Ind.

      Code § 35-42-4-9(b) (1998). Marroquin pled guilty and was sentenced to a short

      period of incarceration followed by two-and-a-half years of probation.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024         Page 2 of 6
[3]   Marroquin’s conviction did not require him to register as a sex offender in

      Indiana. See I.C. § 5-2-12-4 (1998) (recodified at I.C. § 11-8-8-5 in 2006).1 But

      Marroquin moved to Virginia in 2000 and lived there until 2018. When he

      moved there, Virginia law required that he register for ten years based on the

      Indiana conviction. In 2007, Virginia amended its law to require lifetime

      registration for offenders like Marroquin. Marroquin registered as required the

      entire time he lived in Virginia.2

[4]   In 2018, Marroquin moved back to Indiana. The Elkhart County Sheriff’s

      Office told him he needed to register in Indiana for life, just as he had been

      required to do in Virginia, under Section 11-8-8-19(f). Marroquin then sued the

      Commissioner of the Department of Correction, seeking a declaratory

      judgment that he need not register. The parties filed cross-motions for summary

      judgment. The trial court denied Marroquin’s motion and granted the

      Commissioner’s. The court held that, under Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143

      (Ind. 2016), the registration requirement under Section 11-8-8-19(f) “is triggered

      if, when an offender moves to Indiana, he is required to register in the state

      1
        Marroquin says his conviction required him to register for ten years in Indiana. He is incorrect. Since their
      original enactment in 1994, Indiana’s registration statutes have never required registration for Class D felony
      sexual misconduct with a minor (or its successor, Level 6 felony sexual misconduct with a minor). See I.C. §
      5-2-12-4 (1994) (recodified at I.C. § 11-8-8-5 in 2006).
      2
        The trial court expressed some doubt as to whether Marroquin was actually required to register for life in
      Virginia, see Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 132, but both parties tell us that he was. We accept the parties’
      representation for purposes of this appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024                               Page 3 of 6
      from which he came, regardless of the state of conviction.” Appellant’s App.

      Vol. II pp. 134-35.

[5]   Marroquin now appeals.

      Discussion and Decision
[6]   Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows

      that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

      is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Here, the

      relevant facts are undisputed. The only issue is the proper interpretation of

      Indiana Code section 11-8-8-19(f). Statutory interpretation is an issue of law

      that we review de novo, giving no deference to the trial court’s ruling. Tyson v.

      State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 90 (Ind. 2016).

[7]   Again, Section 11-8-8-19(f) provides, “A person who is required to register as a

      sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the period required

      by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is

      longer.” Marroquin contends this statute doesn’t apply when the requirement to

      register in another jurisdiction is based entirely on the existence of an Indiana

      conviction—that is, when there is no “independent requirement” to register in

      another jurisdiction. Appellant’s Br. p. 10. We agree.

[8]   The first part of Section 11-8-8-19(f)—“A person who is required to register as a

      sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction . . .”—matches language from Section

      11-8-8-5, the statute that defines “sex or violent offender.” As relevant here, that

      statute provides that a “sex or violent offender” is (1) a person who has been
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024       Page 4 of 6
      convicted of any of a list of Indiana criminal offenses, I.C. § 11-8-8-5(a), or (2)

      “a person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any

      jurisdiction,” id. at (b)(1). In discussing the latter provision, subsection (b)(1),

      our Supreme Court has explained that “by requiring registration from

      individuals who are required to register elsewhere, Indiana avoids becoming a

      safe haven for offenders attempting to evade their obligation.” Tyson, 51 N.E.3d

      at 96 (holding that offender who had to register in Texas based on Texas offense

      also had to register in Indiana). In other words, the purpose of Section 11-8-8-

      5(b)(1) is to ensure that a person who is required to register in another

      jurisdiction because of a sex offense in that jurisdiction cannot avoid

      registration by moving to Indiana. See id. at 95 (explaining that “Indiana is

      choosing to defer to offender status determinations made by other states”). And

      Section 11-8-8-19(f) simply establishes how long such out-of-state offenders

      must register in Indiana. Because Marroquin committed his sex offense in

      Indiana, he is not included in Section 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and is not subject to

      Section 11-8-8-19(f).

[9]   The Commissioner argues, and the trial court found, that our Supreme Court

      reached the opposite conclusion in Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143 (Ind. 2016).

      There, the Court cited Sections 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and 11-8-8-19(f) in upholding the

      Indiana registration requirement of an offender who committed child molesting

      in Indiana, moved to Iowa (where he had to register based on the Indiana

      conviction), then returned to Indiana. But the offender didn’t raise the statutory

      issue Marroquin raises here. That is, the offender didn’t dispute that he fell

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024         Page 5 of 6
       within the language of Sections 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and 11-8-8-19(f). He argued only

       that applying these statutes to him violated the ex post facto clause of the

       Indiana Constitution because the statutes didn’t exist when he committed his

       crime. Id. at 144. Our Supreme Court addressed and rejected that constitutional

       argument, but it didn’t address the statutory argument Marroquin makes here.

       Therefore, the Court’s holding doesn’t control the outcome of this appeal.

[10]   Because Section 11-8-8-19(f) doesn’t apply to Marroquin, and because Indiana

       doesn’t require registration for Class D felony sexual misconduct with a minor,

       we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Commissioner

       and remand for the entry of summary judgment for Marroquin.

[11]   Reversed and remanded.

       May, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Scott H. Duerring
       South Bend, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General
       David A. Arthur
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-2545 | February 23, 2024      Page 6 of 6