Court Opinion

ID: 2965981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:47:15.994918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:08.250636
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

       [NOT FOR PUBLICATIONNOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 99-1184

                          LANCE HULLUM,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                   MICHAEL T. MALONEY, ET AL.,
                                
                     Defendants, Appellees.
                                
                                
                                
          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                                
          [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
                                
                                
                                
                             Before
                                
                    Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
                        Circuit Judges.
                                
                                
                                
                                
     Lance Hullum on brief pro se.
     Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, and Susanne G. Levsen,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Bureau, on brief for
appellees.

September 16, 1999

                                
                                

            Per Curiam. Petitioner Lance Hullum appeals from the
  dismissal of his habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
  The  district court, applying the one-year limitations period
  introduced by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
  of 1996 (AEDPA), see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), concluded that the
  petition was time-barred, see Hullum v. Maloney, 14 F. Supp. 2d
  164 (D. Mass. 1998) (adopting report of the magistrate-judge). 
  It thereafter granted a certificate of appealability (COA).  We
  affirm but on different grounds.
            Petitioner, who seeks to challenge a 1990
  Massachusetts conviction, filed the instant pro se petition on
  February 12, 1998 (or possibly some days earlier).  Even with
  the grace period included, see, e.g., Gaskins v. Duval, ___
  F.3d ___, 1999 WL 447129 (1st Cir. July 7, 1999), and even with
  the period during which state remedies were being pursued
  excluded, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), his petition was late. 
  Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on this basis.  By way of
  opposition, petitioner explained as follows: that he had been
  confined since 1994 in the "department disciplinary unit" (DDU)
  at MCI-Cedar Junction; that the main prison library did not
  "start sending" a copy of AEDPA to DDU inmates until "late
  1997" and that he did not learn thereof until early 1998; that
  he otherwise lacked access to "almost all important
  information" regarding the Act, as well as to updated legal
  materials or any form of legal assistance; and that he would
  have filed a timely petition had he known of the one-year
  requirement.  For these reasons, he sought to invoke the
  statutory provision that tolls the running of the limitations
  period until
                      the date on which the impediment to filing
            an application created by State action in
            violation of the Constitution or laws of
            the United States is removed, if the
            applicant was prevented from filing by
            such State action.
  
  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B).  Petitioner's factual assertions
  have not been contested.
            The district court construed these allegations as
  setting forth a predicate claim of denial of the right of
  access to the courts, in violation of Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
  343 (1996), and Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).  It then
  concluded that no viable such claim had been presented, such
  that § 2244(d)(1)(B) was inapplicable.  The court emphasized
  two factors in this regard.  It found that petitioner had not
  "diligently pursued his federal claims," noting in particular
  that two extended periods of time had elapsed (of nearly 29 and
  13 months, respectively) when no state court proceeding was
  pending.  See 14 F. Supp. 2d at 166.  And it determined that
  any deficiencies in the library system had not "prevented"
  petitioner from pursuing those claims.  In this regard, it
  noted, inter alia, that the federal claims were identical to
  those raised earlier in state court, and that petitioner had
  initiated or pursued other court actions during the relevant
  period.  See id. at 166-67. 
            This structure of analysis raises questions.  First,
  if petitioner's improbable allegations are accepted as true and
  we assume that he had no reasonable means of learning of the
  limitations period in timely fashion, was he thereby
  "prevented" from filing his petition within the meaning of §
  2244(d)(1)(B)?  Cf. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (explaining that a
  right-of-access claim might be established by showing "that a
  complaint ... was dismissed for failure to satisfy some
  technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the
  prison's legal assistance facilities, [the inmate] could not
  have known"); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir.
  1999) ("[i]n the right circumstances, a delay in receiving
  information might call for equitable tolling--such as if the
  prison did not obtain copies of AEDPA for months and months"). 
  Second, must a petitioner act with "due diligence" in order to
  invoke § 2244(d)(1)(B) (as suggested in Miller v. Marr, 141
  F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 210 (1998)),
  or alternatively to state a claim under Lewis (as suggested by
  the district court)?  Cf. Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of
  Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1998) (requiring
  diligence in order to invoke equitable tolling); 28 U.S.C. §
  2244(d)(1)(D) (setting forth explicit diligence requirement).
            Resolving these questions is not necessary here
  because petitioner's three substantive claims prove to be
  frivolous.  His central claim is that a provision in his plea
  agreement--that he receive treatment as a sexual offender at
  Bridgewater State Hospital--was never honored, thereby
  rendering his guilty plea invalid.  See, e.g., Santobello v.
  United States, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).  Petitioner states that all
  pertinent facts "appear on the face of the plea hearing
  transcript."  Brief at 27.  Yet that transcript, a copy of
  which he has supplied to this court, makes it clear that this
  claim fails for at least three reasons.  First, the stipulation
  in question provided--not that petitioner would receive such
  treatment--but that the court would so recommend.  Second, the
  court subsequently did just that.  Most important, this
  stipulation was not part of the plea agreement, but was reached
  only after the plea had been accepted.  The fact that
  petitioner apparently ended up not receiving treatment thus
  provides no basis for challenging his plea.  
            Petitioner also complains that he is innocent of the
  crimes and that his trial attorney should have engaged a DNA
  expert.  Yet the scattered findings on which he relies from
  certain serology reports are of no consequence, particularly in
  light of the factual proffer articulated by the government (and
  accepted by petitioner) at the change-of-plea hearing.  These
  claims, even apart from the procedural hurdles they face, see,
  e.g., United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569-74 (1989),
  prove utterly baseless. 
            We therefore choose to affirm on the basis that the
  petition is substantively meritless.  To the extent that the
  grant of the COA might be thought to confine our review to the
  limitations issue, we would add the following.  A right-of-
  access challenge requires a showing that a "nonfrivolous" legal
  claim has been frustrated or impeded.  Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353. 
  Petitioner, having failed to present a nonfrivolous claim,
  cannot make such a showing.  For that reason, § 2244(d)(1)(B)
  is inapplicable, which in turn means that his petition was also
  properly dismissed on limitations grounds. 
            Affirmed.