Court Opinion

ID: 9955850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 16:08:37.168947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:26.709753
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Isaifan v. Ahmar, 2024-Ohio-1201.]

STATE OF OHIO                    )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                 )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                 )

MADDALEENA ISAIFAN, et al.                            C.A. No.       30651

        Appellants

        v.                                            APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                      ENTERED IN THE
HUSEIN AHMAR, et al.                                  COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                      COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellee                                      CASE No.   CV-2021-02-0585

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 29, 2024

        FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge

        {¶1}    Appellants Maddaleena Isaifan and Kimberly Vaughn appeal the decision of the

Summit County Court of Common Pleas, denying their motions for relief from judgment and new

trial. This Court affirms.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}    Mohammad Isaifan died in December of 2019. The Appellants filed a complaint

pro se against Appellees, Hussein Ahmar and Ahmad Khamis. The appellees were Mohammad

Isaifan’s residential landlords prior to his death. The complaint sought damages for the alleged

removal and disposal of Mohammad Isaifan’s personal property.

        {¶3}    While the action against the landlords was pending, the Appellants hired an attorney

to open Mohammad Isaifan’s estate in probate court. Mohammad Isaifan’s ex-wife, Vaughn, was

named executor of his estate. Vaughn shared a child with Mohammad Isaifan, Maddaleena Isaifan.
                                                   2

        {¶4}    On July 12, 2021, Appellants filed a motion to correct a misspelling of defendant’s

name in the complaint. However, Appellants did not move the court for leave to amend their

complaint to substitute the estate as plaintiff.

        {¶5}    Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the Appellees’ motion for directed

verdict, finding that Appellants lacked standing to bring the action. The trial court found that the

Appellants did not have standing because they brought the action as individuals, not on behalf of

the estate.

        {¶6}    Appellants hired an attorney and filed a motion for relief from judgment and a

motion for new trial. The trial court denied both motions. Appellants now appeal the trial court’s

denial of their relief from judgment and motion for new trial, raising one assignment of error for

our review.

                                                   II.

                                   ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S
        MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
        HAVE DETERMINED WHETHER APPELLANT KIMBERLY VAUGHN
        HAD STANDING TO BRING HER CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF HER
        DAUGHTER AND DECEDENT BEFORE SHE PRESENTED HER FULL
        CASE IN CHIEF AT TRIAL.

        {¶7}    The Appellants argue that the trial court erred when it denied them relief from

judgment. The Appellants assert that they were mistaken and excusably negligent by failing to

amend their complaint to name the estate. The Appellants also assert that their failure to hire an

attorney to represent Mohammad Isaifan’s estate was a mistake. The Appellants argue that their

mistakes and excusable neglect entitle them to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1). We disagree.

        {¶8}    The trial court’s decision to grant or deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from

judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent
                                                  3

an abuse of discretion. Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77 (1987). An abuse of discretion is

more than an error of law or judgment; rather, it is a finding that the court’s attitude is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219

(1983). Under this standard of review, an appellate court may not merely substitute its judgment

for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).

       {¶9}    Civ.R. 60(B) states, relevant to this case, as follows:

       On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
       representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:
       (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; * * * or (5) any other
       reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
       reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the
       judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
       subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.

       {¶10} The Appellants sought relief in the trial court pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1). This

provision allows the trial court to grant relief from judgment for “mistake” and “excusable

neglect.” To be entitled to relief for mistake, the movant must show why the party was justified in

failing to avoid the mistake or inadvertence; gross carelessness is not enough. Shanks v. Shanks,

4th Dist. Ross No. 96CA2252, 1997 WL 114397, *5 (March 10, 1997), citing State v. The Bug

Inn, 2d Dist. Miami No. 90-CA-23, 1991 WL 47531 (Apr. 5, 1991). Appellants assert that their

status as pro se litigants justified their mistakes. However:

       ‘It is well established that pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the
       law and legal procedures and that they are held to the same standard as litigants
       who are represented by counsel.’ ‘[P]ro se civil litigants are bound by the same
       rules and procedures as those litigants who retain counsel.’ As such, confusion or
       misunderstanding of the law by a pro se litigant does not provide grounds for
       granting a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.

(Citations omitted.) Huntington Natl. Bank v. D’Egidio, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 05CA008647,

2005-Ohio-5497, ¶ 11. Their condition as pro se litigants does not justify Appellants’ failure to
                                                  4

avoid their mistake. Shanks at *5. The Appellants are not entitled to relief from judgment

because of an alleged mistake merely because they are unhappy with the result. Id.

       {¶11} Here, the proper party to bring a suit regarding Mohammad Isaifan’s personal

property was Mohammad Isaifan’s estate. The Appellants assert that their failure to substitute

Mohammad Isaifan’s estate as the party bringing the complaint constituted excusable neglect. An

act is one of “neglect” when it constitutes an omission or failure to do a thing that can be done, but

it may also import a failure of care or attention in the doing or omission of a given act. Fed. Nat.

Mortg. Ass'n v. Banks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 12692, 1991 WL 254652, *2 (Dec. 6, 1991).

“The general definition of excusable neglect is some action ‘not in consequence of the party's own

carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of

some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident.’” Hai v. Flower Hosp., 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-07-1423, 2008-Ohio-5295, ¶ 21, quoting Vanest v. Pillsbury Co., 124 Ohio App.3d 525,

536, fn. 8 (4th Dist.1997). The Appellants’ failure to substitute the proper party is not in

consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident. As such, Appellants’ error

is not excusable neglect.

       {¶12} Appellants have failed to establish that they are entitled to relief pursuant to Civ.R.

60(B)(1). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants’ motion for relief

from judgment and motion for new trial.

       {¶13} The Appellants’ assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 III.

       {¶14} The Appellants’ sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                 Judgment affirmed.
                                                 5

         There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

         We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

         Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

         Costs taxed to Appellants.

                                                      JILL FLAGG LANZINGER
                                                      FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, J.
CONCURS.

CARR, P. J.
DISSENTING.

         {¶15} I respectfully dissent as I believe that the general division of the common pleas

court lost subject matter jurisdiction in this matter when Mr. Isaifan’s estate was opened in probate

court.
                                                   6

        {¶16} R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(c) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the

probate court has exclusive jurisdiction * * * [t]o direct and control the conduct and settle the

accounts of executors and administrators and order the distribution of estates * * *[.]” “Therefore,

any matter related to the administration of an estate and the distribution of its assets [is] within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court.” (Internal quotations and citation omitted.) Grimes v.

Grimes, 173 Ohio App.3d 537, 2007-Ohio-5653, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.). The concealed or embezzled

assets statute, set forth in R.C. 2109.50, “is designed to be a quick, summary, and streamlined

method in probate court for obtaining possession of estate assets, rather than being forced into a

more elaborate process in the general division of the court.” Matter of Estate of Thompson, 7th

Dist. Columbiana No. 22 CO 0004, 2023-Ohio-2547, ¶ 23. “The purpose of R.C. 2109.50 is to

provide a speedy and effective method of discovering assets belonging to the estate and securing

their recovery.” Wozniak v. Wozniak, 90 Ohio App.3d 400, 407 (9th Dist.1993).

        [T]he inquiry under R.C. 2109.50 focuses on the ownership of the asset and whether
        possession of the asset is being impermissibly concealed or withheld from the
        estate. Thus, a plaintiff has stated an actionable cause under R.C. 2109.50 if he
        alleges that the asset is the exclusive property of the estate and that the defendant
        has unauthorized possession of the asset or in some way has impermissibly
        disposed of it.”

Id.

        {¶17} There was a great deal of confusion during the proceedings below, evidenced most

prominently by the fact that the matter proceeded all the way to trial before the trial court granted

a motion for directed verdict against Appellants on the basis that they lacked standing to pursue

their claims. I would sustain Appellants’ sole assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s

judgment solely on the basis that the subject matter of this case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction

of the probate court.
                                          7

APPEARANCES:

HANNE-LORE M. GAMBRELL, Attorney at Law, for Appellants.

TYLER J. WHITNEY, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.