Court Opinion

ID: 9742774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:20:03.940464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:36.488205
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: The majority opinion chooses to exonerate tenants who negligently cause fires and damage leased premises. Such decision, rooted in public policy considerations expressed in cases from other jurisdictions, is both poor public policy and is contrary to the common law of Illinois. At common law a tenant is responsible for damage to leased premises resulting from his own negligence. (Ford v. Jennings (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 219, 387 N.E.2d 1125.) However, Illinois courts have given a liberal interpretation to yield-up clauses, holding that exceptions for fire damage includes fires caused by the tenant’s negligence. (Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. John Co. (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 393, 131 N.E.2d 100. Cerny-Pickas and the cases that follow it are good law. The instant case, however, is distinguishable in that there is no exculpatory clause of any kind or any other evidence that traditional landlord-tenant law would not apply. As it was aptly stated in a case which liberally construed an exculpatory clause: “[T]he key factor in determining whether the parties intended to exculpate lessee negligence is the allocation of insurance burdens as evidenced by the terms of the lease.” (Continental Casualty Co. v. Polk Brothers, Inc. (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 395, 401, 457 N.E.2d 1271, 1276.) As the tenant admits in his brief, there was no mention of insurance or tenant liability for negligence during lease negotiations. Accordingly, it is incomprehensible how it can be concluded that the landlord intended to exonerate the tenant from his own negligence or carry him as a co-insured on the insurance policy. The effect of the majority’s decision would be that whenever the landlord insures the premises against fire loss, the tenant could not be held liable for negligently causing the fire. To begin with, that is simply not the law in Illinois. In Ford, the landlord had insured the premises and exculpated the tenant from his own negligence. However, we held that a sublessee who negligently caused a fire could not have the benefit of that provision. Were we to accept the majority’s reasoning, Ford would be effectively reversed. Even though defendant there was a tenant of a tenant, he would, under the reasoning of the majority here, still be insulated from liability, since the gist of the majority’s holding is that a contract of fire insurance constitutes a de facto waiver by the landlord of recovery for a fire caused by the negligence of the occupier of the premises. The Oklahoma case relied on so heavily by the majority (Sutton v. Jondahl (Okla. App. 1975), 532 P.2d 478), is simply wrong. The cited portion of the case is laced with lofty preachments about natural justice and equity. Properly defined, of course, everyone agrees with natural justice and equity. As used in Sutton, however, such pronouncements are a dodge and an evasion of the real issue, which is a fundamental tenet of common law. That is, that people should be responsible for their own negligence. The Sutton case is further flawed by a gross misstatement of the law. It is held that “the law considers the tenant as a co-insured of the landlord absent an express agreement to the contrary.” (532 P.2d 478, 481.) Once the Sutton court made this holding, the case was over. In fact, this is the exact opposite of Illinois law as expressed in Cerny-Pickas. The tenant is only a “co-insured” when there is something in the lease which can be interpreted as exonerating him from his own negligence. Moreover, the procuring by the landlord of fire insurance should not be elevated to something which it is not. Contrary to the assumption in Sutton, we have no evidence that the tenant effectively paid for the insurance through his rents. As was stated in Page v. Scott (1978), 263 Ark. 684, 687-88, 567 S.W.2d 101, 104: “Such a fiction ignores the fact that more often than not the market *** is the controlling factor in fixing and negotiating rents.” Illinois law is supportive of the tenants’ right to contract in their lease agreements to shift the consequences of their negligence in causing fires. That is clear. We have no such contract in the instant case, however, and it is not the function of the court to either make a new contract for the parties or to find a contract where none exists. In the final analysis, insurance, which the majority finds to be paramount, is almost irrelevant. There is no question that a guest or a business invitee on premises is liable for negligently causing fire or damages to the premises. Are tenant occupiers under an oral lease entitled to different consideration? A logical extension of the majority’s reasoning in this case would extend exoneration to anyone negligently causing a fire if the owner had a fire insurance policy. Perhaps it could even be extended to protect the negligent tenant, guest or business invitee when the owner didn’t have insurance, since it might be reasoned that such occupiers had a right to assume that the owner had taken out insurance for their protection. And, if that proposition is accepted, why limit exoneration to negligence causing fires? Why not extend it to all negligence? That is the absurdity of the majority position. Accordingly, I dissent. This case should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.