Court Opinion

ID: 9853838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:06.684036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:10.109176
License: Public Domain

Thompson, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I cannot agree that OCGA § 17-7-53.1 applies only to quashed indictments returned by the grand jury of a single county, I must respectfully dissent.
Keeping in mind that criminal statutes must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused, Bankston v. State, 258 Ga. 188,190 (367 SE2d 36) (1988), I can only interpret OCGA § 17-7-53.1 to mean what it says: If two “true bills” of indictments are returned by a grand jury and quashed, any further prosecution is prohibited.
In its introduction to OCGA § 17-7-53.1, the legislature stated that that Code section was designed:
[T]o provide that if two indictments on the same offense, charge, or allegation are quashed, whether by motion, demurrer, special plea or exception, or other pleading of the defendant or by the court’s own motion, such actions shall be a bar to future prosecution for the offense, charge, or allegation. . . .
Ga. L. 1987, p. 529. Notably, the words “grand jury” do not even appear in the legislature’s own description of the statute. Thus, the *544legislature made it clear when it enacted OCGA § 17-7-53.1 that the focus of that Code section was to be indictments, not grand juries.
Decided October 6, 1997 —
Reconsideration denied October 31, 1997.
J. David Miller, District Attorney, Mark E. Mitchell, James E. Hardy, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
Kirho, McCalley & Forehand, Thomas L. Kirbo III, Jon V. Forehand, James C. Bonner, Michael Mears, for appellee.
The statute itself says nothing about indictments returned by different grand juries, whether in the same county or separate counties. It simply says indictments by “a grand jury.” To interpret the words “grand jury” to m®an the grand jury of a single county is to strain a gnat and swallow a camel. After all, whenever a statute uses a word in the singular, that word is to be interpreted as encompassing the plural, unless the plural is “expressly excluded” by the statute. OCGA § 1-3-1 (d) (6). Since OCGA § 17-7-53.1 does not expressly exclude the plural use of the words “grand jury,” I can only conclude that the legislature intended those words to mean “grand jury” or “grand juries.”
My interpretation is consistent with the legislature’s goal of protecting an accused from defending multiple indictments. And it is logical. The State is a single sovereign and each and every grand jury returns its indictments on behalf of the State. See State v. Sallie, 206 Ga. App. 732, 736 (427 SE2d 11) (1992). To the extent that OCGA § 17-7-53.1 is designed to protect an individual from an abuse of the State’s power to indict, it makes no sense to distinguish between the grand jury of one county and that of another.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher and Justice Sears join in this dissent.