Court Opinion

ID: 9556993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 13:03:57.524201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:50.589961
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: August 21, 2023

                 S22G1035. IN THE INTEREST OF A. H., A CHILD.

         COLVIN, Justice.

        After adjudicating A. H. delinquent but finding that he was not

in need of treatment, rehabilitation, or supervision, the juvenile

court in this case entered an order dismissing the delinquency

proceedings under OCGA § 15-11-600 (d) and sealing the record

under OCGA § 15-11-701. The State appealed the juvenile court’s

decision to seal the record, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the

appeal, concluding that neither subsection (a) (1) nor subsection

(a) (6) of OCGA § 5-7-1 authorized the State to appeal from the

juvenile court’s order. We granted certiorari to determine whether

“the Court of Appeals err[ed] in concluding that the State was not

permitted to appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a).”

        1.       After carefully considering the full record and the briefs
of the parties, this Court has determined that the writ of certiorari

issued in Case No. S22G1035 was improvidently granted. The Court

of Appeals determined that the juvenile court’s order was not

appealable under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (6) because it was not a “void”

order. But this issue is a difficult one given the state of our case law

in this area, and the issue was neither fully litigated below nor

briefed by the parties in significant depth in this Court. Thus,

although this issue is properly before us in a narrow sense, it is not

presented in a form that would allow us to clarify the law or

otherwise provide meaningful guidance. Accordingly, the writ is

vacated, and the petition for certiorari in Case No. S22C1035 is

denied.

     2.    In connection with this case, we observe that this Court

has not fully explained the contours of what makes an erroneous

order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction “void” under state

law for purposes of OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (6) (providing that the State

may appeal “in criminal cases and adjudication of delinquency cases

. . . [f]rom an order, decision, or judgment of a court where the court

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does not have jurisdiction or the order is otherwise void under the

Constitution or laws of this state” (emphasis supplied)). We have

held that, even when a court has jurisdiction over a case, certain

types of errors can render the court’s order “void,” but we have not

explicitly identified what principle or principles of law distinguish

erroneous-but-valid orders from erroneous orders that are “void and

of no legal effect.” Triola v. Triola, 299 Ga. 220, 221 (1) (787 SE2d

206) (2016). Compare State v. Owens, 296 Ga. 205, 212 (3) (b) (766

SE2d 66) (2014) (stating that “[a] judgment entered on mutually

exclusive verdicts is void” without explaining why such an error

renders the judgment void rather than merely erroneous), overruled

on other grounds as recognized by Booth v. State, 311 Ga. 374 (858

SE2d 39) (2021); State v. Sumlin, 281 Ga. 183, 184 (1) (637 SE2d 36)

(2006) (holding that an order granting a mistrial after the jury

returned its verdict was void because “the time for granting a

mistrial ha[d] passed,” but not explaining why this procedural error

caused the order to be void rather than merely erroneous); and

Crumbley v. State, 261 Ga. 610, 610 (1) (409 SE2d 517) (1991)

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(noting our longstanding rule that criminal sentences and

judgments are “void if [a] court imposes punishment that the law

does not allow,” without explaining the basis for that rule); with

State v. Evans, 282 Ga. 63, 65 (646 SE2d 77) (2007) (noting that not

just “any improper exercise of a trial court’s authority renders a

judgment void” and holding that a court’s decision to conduct a

bench trial over the State’s objection resulted only in “an ineffective

waiver of the right to trial by jury, not a void judgment,” without

explaining why an error of that type did not render the judgment

void (emphasis in original)); and State v. Glover, 281 Ga. 633, 633

(641 SE2d 543) (2007) (holding that an order dismissing the State’s

appeal pursuant to a statute authorizing orders of that type was not

void without fully explaining why the court’s procedural and factual

errors did not render its order void).     Perhaps we will have an

opportunity to further explain the legal principles governing

voidness in a case where the issue is squarely presented and fully

briefed. But this is not that case.

     Writ of certiorari vacated and petition for certiorari denied. All

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the Justices concur, except Pinson, J., who concurs in Division 1 and
in the judgment.

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