Court Opinion

ID: 9547881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:53:45.382204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:11.354503
License: Public Domain

Roe, C.J.
Christopher Dean Brown appeals his conviction of the unlawful possession of a controlled substance— diazepam. His appeal has been consolidated with his personal restraint petition since it involves the conviction *845appealed from.
Brown, a previously convicted felon, was an inmate at the Geiger Pre-Release Facility in Spokane, having been sent there from the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla. On January 20, 1981, following a visit by his wife, he was strip searched and two Valium pills were discovered. Brown contends the pills were planted on him by the guards.1 Representing himself at his bench trial, he was found guilty of violating RCW 69.50.401(d),2 the unlawful possession of a controlled substance—diazepam.
First, Brown contends he was denied his right to a speedy trial under CrR 3.3. After the search he was transferred to the Spokane County Jail. An arrest warrant was not served until February 4, 1981. On March 31, 1981, 1 day before his scheduled trial, Brown requested and was granted a continuance. He contends the speedy trial clock commenced running on January 20, 1981, the day he was transferred to the county jail.3 Assuming arguendo the speedy trial clock began that day, 70 days elapsed from the date of the search to the date of the continuance being granted. When a defendant is incarcerated on other unrelated charges, the 90-day rule of CrR 3.3 applies. State v. Keith, 86 Wn.2d 229, 232, 543 P.2d 235 (1975); State v. *846Champion, 28 Wn. App. 281, 284 n.4, 622 P.2d 905 (1981); State v. Christianson, 17 Wn. App. 264, 562 P.2d 671 (1977). Here, Brown was incarcerated on other unrelated charges and only 70 days elapsed from the date of the search to the date of the continuance being granted; thus, there can be no violation of the speedy trial rule.
Next, Brown contends RCW 69.50.210(c)(7) violates his procedural due process rights because it outlaws the compound diazepam without reference to the name "Valium", which is the trade name and familiar name of diazepam. He contends the common man has no way of knowing that Valium is outlawed.
First, Brown makes no pretense that he did not know Valium is a controlled substance. This would only be reasonable because of his penitentiary experience and his immediate disclaimer of any knowledge of the presence of the pills. He alleges no prejudice personal to him.4
Procedural due process requires that citizens be given fair notice of conduct forbidden by a penal statute. The statutory language must convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. The test is whether a person of common intelligence can, with reasonable certainty, determine what substances are designated or scheduled as controlled substances. State v. Dougall, 89 Wn.2d 118, 121, 570 P.2d 135 (1977); In re McCrea, 28 Wn. App. 777, 781, 626 P.2d 992 (1981). Impossible standards of specificity are not required. Blondheim v. State, 84 Wn.2d 874, 878, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975).
A person of common intelligence could discover that *847Valium is diazepam or that diazepam is Valium by simply referring to the Physicians' Desk Reference, a well known dictionary of drugs which is commonly found in reference libraries, doctors' offices and pharmacies. Other publications about drugs readily available for consumers could provide the same information. An examination of the substances listed in the schedules in RCW 69.50 indicates that none of the substances are listed by their common trade names; rather, they are listed by definite chemical names. To demand trade, common or street name listing would require the Legislature to continually update its schedules with any new name in the marketplace. This would require continual monitoring with its notice problems and attendant costs. The law would never catch up with the criminal activity. We hold the Legislature's action in listing only the chemical names of controlled substances satisfies due process.5
Our position is supported by State v. Dougall, 89 Wn.2d 118, 121, 570 P.2d 135 (1977), which struck down a controlled substances conviction, noting the crime appeared by reference to the Federal Register only and "without [it] appearing in either a state statute or the state administrative code." Here, diazepam appeared in the state statute.
In his pro se brief, Brown appears to argue that the State has the burden of proving he did not have a valid prescription for the drug. This contention is contrary to the law. RCW 69.50.401(d) makes the possession of a controlled substance a crime and the State has the burden of proving the defendant possessed the controlled substance. However, under the exception therein, the defendant has the burden *848of coming forward with some evidence that the substance was possessed unwittingly or by means of a valid prescription. RCW 69.50.506; State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 381, 635 P.2d 435 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982); State v. Sainz, 23 Wn. App. 532, 539, 596 P.2d 1090 (1979). Brown failed to meet this burden.
Brown further contends that his right against self-incrimination was violated. He argues the pills were obtained by compelled custodial coercion and that he was arrested without being given his Miranda warnings and subjected to an impermissible search.
At the time of the search, Brown had just completed a visit with his wife where there had been a considerable amount of personal contact. The reasonableness of an inmate search must be determined by balancing the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights which the search entails. State v. Baker, 28 Wn. App. 423, 623 P.2d 1172 (1981). Under these circumstances, the search of Brown was reasonable. Since Brown was not given his Miranda warnings at the time of the search, the trial court suppressed his reply to the guard. This reply was not raised by the prosecution at trial. Because the State did not, nor attempt to, use any custodial statements made by Brown, there was no violation of his right against self-incrimination.
Next Brown contends he was convicted under the wrong statute and should have been charged under RCW 9.94.041, which provides:
Every person serving a sentence in any penal institution of this state who, without authorization, while in such penal institution or while being conveyed to or from such penal institution, . . . possesses or carries upon his or her person or has under his or her control any narcotic drug ... is guilty of a class C felony.
Brown contends that the prosecutor's failure to charge him under RCW 9.94.041 constitutes a denial of due process and equal protection.
*849Both RCW 9.94.041 and RCW 69.50.401(d)6 provide for a maximum imprisonment of not more than 5 years; RCW 69.50.401(d) further provides for a fine of not more than $10,000, or both. Brown was given a deferred sentence and placed on probation for a period of 1 year. He has shown no prejudice. This sentence did not exceed the possible punishment available under RCW 9.94.041. Prosecutorial discretion must necessarily be broad and Brown has failed to prove that the prosecutor's conduct was without reasonable justification and constituted intentional or purposeful systematic discrimination in the enforcement of the law. State v. Price, 94 Wn.2d 810, 816-17, 620 P.2d 994 (1980).
Brown also contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel and his right to counsel. He argues he unintelligently, under mental duress, chose to represent himself. The record shows Brown was displeased with his court-appointed attorney whom he claims "acted arbitrary in my interests". He repeatedly asked for the dismissal of his court-appointed attorney and for permission to represent himself which was eventually granted. His court-appointed attorney, however, was ordered to serve in an advisory capacity.
A criminal defendant has a right to represent himself provided he is mentally competent. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 569, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975). Brown was thoroughly questioned as to his capacity to represent himself. He stated he had an associate of arts degree in sociology and had been before the court on charges two other times. When a defendant competently elects to exercise his constitutional right to be his own counsel, he is bound by that choice. He is not permitted to gamble on that course and, when he loses, claim error. The record is clear that Brown voluntarily elected to represent himself and was mentally competent to do so. His claim that his election denied him the effective assistance of *850counsel and his right to counsel is without merit.
Finally, Brown contends he failed to receive a fair trial. Our review of the entire record leads us to the conclusion that Brown did in fact receive a fair trial.
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed and the personal restraint petition is denied.
Green, J., concurs.

 When the officer discovered the pills in defendant's sock, he said, "What have we here? . . . Valium"; defendant responded, "Man, I don't know nothing [sic] about it."

 RCW 69.50.401(d) provides:
"It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a crime, and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than five years, fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or both, except as provided for in subsection (e) of this section."

 Brown contends his transfer from a state facility to a county facility constitutes an "arrest" under the rule announced in State v. Champion, 28 Wn. App. 281, 622 P.2d 905 (1981); Clark Cy. Sheriff v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 95 Wn.2d 445, 626 P.2d 6 (1981). Due to our disposition of the speedy trial issue, we do not address this issue.

 We note the recent decision in State v. Sherman, 98 Wn.2d 53, 653 P.2d 612 (1982), holding that one who brings a void for vagueness claim must establish standing. This is established by claiming the statute is vague as to one's conduct. Failure to provide adequate notice of conduct proscribed is similar to a vagueness claim. Brown has not claimed that he did not know that Valium is a controlled substance and that diazepam is Valium; thus, under Sherman, he lacks standing to raise the issue. Both Sherman and the instant case were simultaneously on appeal. Sherman was decided first and of course would apply here.

 The dissent states diazepam is listed in RCW 69.50.210(c)(7) as a controlled substance. Valium is not. Since Valium is diazepam, that statement is substantively incorrect. The dissent suggests that trade names (not street names) provide that sufficiently definite warning which due process requires. There is no evidence of this. Trade names can change from week to week or month to month, if a manufacturer decides to convert from an existing one. No doubt many are more familiar with street names than some advertising agent's concept of a manufacturer's new trade name. Neither is required by the statute.

 See footnote 2.