Court Opinion

ID: 9707629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:17:01.534125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:35.732583
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting in part.
It seems to me that an award of $9,570 for the loss of use of a 1968 Pontiac automobile which was inoperable and valued at no more than $1,200 was clearly excessive.
A similar factual situation was presented in Kroger Food Company v. Singletary, 438 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). The trial court had awarded the plaintiff, whose car had been converted, $4 a day for loss of use. The car had a value of $175; the damages awarded for loss of use amounted to $1,760. In finding this award excessive the court said at 630: “While we have held that there is some evidence of the loss of use, we do not believe that the amount of this award should be permitted to stand.
“It has been said in one of the cases, Montgomery v. Gallas, 225 S.W. 557, 562 (Tex.Civ.App., 1920, no writ):
“ ‘* * * It is a matter of common knowledge that there would have to be very exceptional circumstances to make the use of property for a year worth 50 per cent, more than its value. * * *’
“There being no ‘exceptional circumstances’ shown here, the award ‘for a year’ is more than eight times the value of the car. In the case from this court cited previously, Brown v. Spector, 70 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex.Civ.App., 1934, no writ), the court, after quoting from Gallas, supra, said:
“ ‘In this case for a period of only 497 days, representing the time the automobile was held by Sheriff Brown up to the filing of the first amended original *244petition, judgment was rendered in Spector’s favor for the use of his automobile a sum in excess of 5y2 times the value of the automobile at the time it was seized. The judgment in the sum of $2,485 for the use of this automobile is so against the “common knowledge” of mankind as to be fundamentally erroneous.’
“Here, the best that plaintiff can contend that he was deprived of the use of his car for approximately six months, that is, until he got a better one. Assuming that he was entitled to the $4.00 for every day as the rental value of his old car (an assumption upon which the evidence is not completely satisfactory), the award would not exceed approximately $900.00. This figure, in itself, is more than five times the market value of his car upon the date it was seized.
“The award of $1,760.00 is so grossly excessive that it shocks the judicial conscience. The amount of the award for loss of use of the car is considered by the court to be excessive by the sum of $860.00. In our opinion, under the circumstances of this case, damages for the loss of use of plaintiff’s vehicle in the amount of $900.00 would be not only adequate but generous.”
It has been held that any award of damages for loss of use must be limited to a certain time period. In United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958), the court said at 923-24: “[T]he plaintiffs were entitled to the market value, or replacement cost ... as of the time of taking, plus the use value . . . during the interim between the taking and the time they, acting prudently, could have replaced [the converted items].
“. . . But the right to such damages [loss of use] does not extend forever, and it is limited to the time in which a prudent person would replace [the items].”
*245In that case the court apparently based the limitation on damages for loss of use on reasoning similar to that found in the avoidable consequences rule. “The plaintiff who is injured by actionable conduct of the defendant, is ordinarily denied recovery for any item of special damages he could have avoided by reasonable acts, including reasonable expenditures, after the actionable conduct takes place.
"... One of the reasons for the avoidable consequences rule and the idea that damages should be minimized is that economic waste should be avoided. The problem usually arises where the cost of repair or replacement of damaged property exceeds its value . . . .” D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 3.7 at 186, 188-89 (1973).
In the present case there are no special circumstances to warrant an award for the loss of use of a used automobile greatly in excess of its value. Although the defendant did not plead that the plaintiffs could or should have minimized their damages, damage for the loss of use which they suffered should be limited to a period in which they, acting prudently, could have replaced the vehicle.
Hastings, J., joins in this dissent.