Court Opinion

ID: 9464897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:45:56.665596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:52.474207
License: Public Domain

*1319WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
While I would prefer the result reached by the majority, I reluctantly conclude that the majority’s analysis cannot be squared with a prior decision of this court. I am, therefore, compelled to dissent.
In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963), the Supreme Court explained that a section 2255 motion may be denied without a hearing “only if . . . (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.” Id. at 15, 83 S.Ct. at 1077 (emphasis added). Clearly, the reciprocal implication of this assertion is that a hearing must be held if the ends of justice would be served by so doing.
In Tannehill v. Fitzharris, 451 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1971), we partially fleshed out the day-to-day application of Sanders by holding that
[i]f the district court dismisses a petition on the basis of a prior adjudication, it must make a specific finding that the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits.
Id. at 1324 (emphasis added).
In this case, the majority asserts that the district judge’s determination regarding the ends of justice “may be implied” from the text of the magistrate’s report. Although I might agree that the report suggests that the judge made such a determination, I cannot equate this implication with the “specific finding” requirement of Tannehill. Thus, I would remand in order for the district judge to make a specific finding on whether the ends of justice would be served by conducting a hearing on Chard’s contention that he was not properly advised of his appeal rights.