Court Opinion

ID: 9668969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:34:38.554226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:50.735495
License: Public Domain

Swepston, Justice
(dissenting).
With deference to my Associates, I cannot concur in the majority opinion. In construing a single section of a voluminous revision of our traffic laws applying to public highways, it announces a conclusion that is (1) utterly unrealistic, (2) contrary to the intent of the General Assembly, and (3) contrary to the weight of authority in the several States.
As a result, if you park your motor vehicle unattended on a public road or highway and lock the ignition but fail to remove the key, you can be held liable if a thief steals the vehicle and causes property damage or personal injury or death. Yet if you park on your own driveway, *64say two feet away from the street, or on the driveway or parking lot or other private property, you cannot he held responsible for the acts of a thief.
The rule of absolute non-liability in the absence of ordinance or statute is the majority view in this country and was adopted in this State in Teague v. Pritchard, 38 •Tenn.App. 686, 279 S.W.2d 706 (Opinion filed March 2, 1954, certiorari denied July 23, 1954).
Therefore, unless the enactment of Ch. 329, sec. 62, of the Public Acts of 1955, was intended by the General Assembly to change the rule of the above-cited case, the latter is still the correct rule in this State. Section 62 now appears as T.O.A. sec. 59-863 and is quoted in full in the majority opinion.
If the majority opinion intended to leave the implication that this amended section was designed to change the rule of Teague v. Pritchard, supra, such is not justified for several reasons. Among them may be suggested that Chapter 329 was the first revision of the Traffic Safety laws since 1931 and one may be sure the Act was not compiled in the short interval between the summer of 1954, when that opinion was released, and the meeting of the 1955 General Assembly. Also, section 62 is obviously not designed as an anti-theft measure, because section 62 as originally drawn contained the words “removing the key” following the word “ignition” and a comma. Those were stricken by amendment No. 22 (Senate Journal 1955 at page 1056).
Thus is demonstrated conclusively the wisdom of that body — they knew and everybody else knows that a thief, be he professional or a young amateur, needs no key to start a motor vehicle. There are at least three ways it *65can be done and it requires only a small piece of wire and about a minute or less to do it tbe simplest way.
Let ns assume arguendo, however, that a statute does contain the express requirement of removal of the key, as was the case in cases cited and strongly relied on in the majority opinion.
One of those eases has been definitely overruled and the other represents the minority view.
The majority opinion cites Wannebo v. Gates, 1949, 227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W.2d 695; 51 A.L.R.2d 663, for the distinction attempted between a case where the thief does the damage hours or days after his original flight has ended and on the other hand when it is still taking place.
That distinction was unequivocally discarded and the case overruled a year later by the same Court in Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272, 273, which case is cited in Teague v. Pritchard, supra. There the same ordinance was involved: “Every person parking a passenger automobile on any public street or alley in the City shall lock the ignition, remove the hey and take the same with him. ’ ’
The Court in holding that the negligence of defendant, if any, was not the proximate cause, said:
“ * * * It is one thing to say that the ordinance is designed to prevent thefts and quite another to say that it is aimed at preventing negligent driving from the scene of the theft. Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330. But for the purpose of this case only, assuming that the violation of the ordinance was negligence, we are of the opinion that the negligent driving of the thieves was the proximate cause of decedent’s *66death and that the negligence of the defendant, if any, was too remote in the eyes of the law to be regarded as connected as canse therewith. The weight of authority is to that effect” (Citing cases from Massachusetts, New York and Louisiana).
The majority opinion has adopted the majority opinion in Ney v. Yellow Gab Co., 2 Ill.2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74, 81, 51 A.L.R.2d 624, holding the opposite view where the statute reads in substance like the one in the Minnesota case, and like ours, except it does not expressly require the removal of the key.
The brief for appellant and the dissenting opinion show and state that the majority opinion has adopted the minority view over the country. Hershey, J., in dissenting, said:
“The majority concludes that all parts of this statute, except that portion referring to the keys, indicate an intention on the part of the legislature to prevent harm to the public by an inadvertent or negligent movement of a parked vehicle, or through its being driven by a young person devoid of experience, judgment, knowledge, or maturity. It finds that the legislature’s purpose in relation to those portions of the statute was not to deter theft. However, the majority then concludes that the portion directing the removal of the keys from the vehicle was to prevent the operation of the vehicle and possible public harm by a thief in flight. The slightest experience renders everyone cognizant of the fact that the removal of automobile ignition keys is only a minor deterrent, if any, to the theft of an automobile and a subsequent flight from detection and pursuit. Consequently, it is only reasonable and logical to *67construe the legislature’s intention in the passage of this portion of the statute in the same light as is attributed the remainder of the section. * * *”
The opinion further states that it was to prevent a mere negligent or inadvertent starting and ensuing uncontrolled movement.
Therefore, it is apparent that the majority opinion in the instant case, regardless of the presence or absence of a key, has adopted the minority view in this country and contrary to the clear legislative intent, as disclosed particularly by the reference, supra, to the Senate Journal, and has reached a result that simply cannot be justified in the light of every day experience and consistency in administration of law.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.