Court Opinion

ID: 9768985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:01:00.423996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:51.733410
License: Public Domain

McCRAW, Justice,
dissenting.
I write the opinion for the majority of this Court predicated upon the assigned errors presented. I am of the opinion, however, that the trial court’s judgment is only interlocutory and that any appeal therefrom is premature.
The questioned judgment, after stating numerous fact findings, recites:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs, Robert Massingill and Ray Reed, and the members of the above-described Class, recover of and from the City of Dallas, Defendant, the sums of money owed each member of the Class, all as prescribed herein, with interest thereon at the legal rate of ten percent (10%) from date of judgment. In the event this judgment is appealed by the Defendants, damages against Defendant City of Dallas shall be calculated during the pendency of the appeal using the guidelines set forth herein above.
Notice of this Final Judgment shall be given to all members of the above-described Class by means of notification of each member of the Class who is presently employed either in the Fire Department or the Police Department, by placing written notice in the pay envelope of such persons, and notifying all other members of the Class who are not pres*338ently employees of either the Fire Department or the Police Department by means of sending such written notice to that person’s last known address.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ application for attorneys’ fees having been previously passed upon and approved by this Court, and having been found to be reasonable, is hereby again approved and the Plaintiffs’ attorneys are awarded 25% of the damages to be paid hereunder as reasonable attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are further awarded all reasonable expenses which they have incurred in the prosecution of this case, including but not limited to court costs. Said attorneys’ fees and expenses shall be deducted from the total amount of damages before the individual damage amounts are paid to the class members.
All costs are taxed against the Defendant City of Dallas, and all other relief not expressly granted herein is denied.
This judgment fails to state a single monetary damage award, or a formula for damage calculation, and it allows ongoing damages to accrue during the pendency of this appeal. Additionally, appellees’ attorneys are awarded unspecified “reasonable expenses which they have incurred in the prosecution of this case, including but not limited to court costs.”
It has long been the rule in Texas “that an appeal may be prosecuted only from a final judgment and that to be final a judgment must dispose of all the issues and parties in a case.” North East Independent School District v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966); Bokemeyer v. Bokemeyer Properties, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, writ dism’d). Texas authority is clear on the judicial definition of final judgment:
A final judgment is one which awards the judicial consequences which the law attaches to the facts and determines the controversies between the parties over the subject matter. It terminates the litigation of the parties on the merits of the case so that nothing remains to be done but to execute it according to its terms. However, if the rights controverted by the parties be settled by the judgment, it will be held final, although further proceedings should be required to carry the judgment into full effect. Such proceedings may be expressly provided for in the face of the judgment without affecting its finality, provided they are merely incidental to its proper execution.
Hargrove v. Insurance Investment Corp., 142 Tex. 111, 117, 176 S.W.2d 744, 747 (1944) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Hinde v. Hinde, 701 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex.1985); Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480, 481 (Tex.1984). The monetary amount of the judgment must be determinable by a ministerial act or the judgment lacks definiteness and is not final. See State v. Producers Utilities Corp., 602 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1980, no writ). A judgment with an unascertainable amount cannot be final. Jones v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 733 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.App.—El Paso, 1987) (not yet reported):
The judgment is clearly not final. It will require more than mere incidental proceedings or a ministerial act to carry it to execution. The City confesses in its brief that it is seeking advisory assistance from this Court — that time-consuming future trial court action will be required to settle and determine the entire controversy:
It should also be pointed out that there are thousands of members of the Appel-lee class. Each individual class member’s entitlement to damages must be calculated.... If any one of Appellant’s points of error or Appellee’s crosspoints of error or Appellee’s crosspoint of error is granted and the District Court’s Final Judgment accordingly modified in any respect, any calculation of individual damages done up to that point would have to be completely redone.
This Court should not give advisory opinions. Although it may prove inconvenient to the parties to construct a final judgment in this case, appeal is improper until this is accomplished.
Applying the Hargrove standard to this decree, I would hold that the judgment *339fails to determine the controversies so that “nothing remains to be done but to execute it according to its terms.” Hargrove, 176 S.W.2d at 747. I would hold the judgment to be interlocutory and pursuant to rule 58(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, would abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court to enter a final judgment.