Court Opinion

ID: 9704232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:27:37.051683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:58.960672
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
There were serious errors, committed by defense counsel, in the defense of this case. So that the reader may appreciate the import of this decision, it should be noted that appellant claims the following deficiencies and, thusly, ineffective assistance of counsel:
(1) Failure to object to, or make motions in limine concerning prior alleged shortages, not thefts;
(2) failure to object to or make a motion in limine concerning testimony regarding termination of his employment;
(3) failure to make a motion for a judgment of acquittal after the jury returned a guilty verdict;
(4) failure to request a limine instruction at the time evidence of the prior shortages was given;
(5) the introduction of an exhibit containing a statement which, in effect, stated that appellant stole the items in question; and
(6) failure to call any defense witnesses to the stand on behalf of appellant.
Defense counsel, unquestionably, failed to make proper objections, motions, and to pursue a well-prepared defense. However, the controlling case on ineffective assistance of counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Strickland added a new dimension to the law on ineffective *547assistance of counsel with several key statements which must be examined in all of these ineffective assistance of counsel cases. Strickland teaches us:
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. Strickland also tells us that an error by counsel, even if unprofessionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment if the error had no effect on the judgment. Furthermore, under Strickland, deficiencies in the performance of counsel must be prejudicial in order to constitute ineffective assistance. This then brings us to the penultimate and ultimate declarations in Strickland. If prejudice is to be found, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. See also, State v. Dornbusch, 384 N.W.2d 682, 687 (S.D.1986) (Henderson, J., concurring), which highlights this language.
Counsel at the trial court level did not make tactical errors; rather, he simply failed to make timely objections to improper, damaging evidence. Counsel should have made pretrial motions concerning the prior acts testimony, for it was professional performance which would be within the customary skills and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney.
However, in this case, the record presents rather overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt at trial. In fact, the State had an eyewitness to the charge of Grand Theft by Embezzlement, specifically, that he was entrusted with bags of sugar owned by E.J. Brachs and Sons Company and did appropriate that property with intent to defraud. David Blackwell testified that he witnessed a truck parked next to appellant’s truck, pull out of the parking lot loaded with large, plain brown bags (sugar). Later, appellant entered a cafe where Blackwell was and bragged to Blackwell that he had just loaded 19 bags of sugar into a pickup truck. Blackwell testified that earlier that day, appellant had approached him at a truck stop and asked him if he was driving into the main terminal at Madison, South Dakota. Witness Blackwell stated that he was, and appellant then retorted: “Oh, well, if you wasn’t going to the terminal I would give you a couple of bags of sugar.” An extreme set of incriminating facts exists here.
Therefore, it strikes me that appellant has failed to satisfy the heavy, if not severe, burden placed upon him by the language in Strickland. This overwhelming evidence does not permit a reversal of this conviction because of ineffective assistance of counsel.