Court Opinion

ID: 9634402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:10:12.567031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:01.849421
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Woodside, J.:
I disagree with the majority in this case.
There are few areas of jurisprudence in which a high degree of certainty is more desirable than that relating to sentencing, and there are few areas where the law of this Commonwealth is in greater confusion. The majority now adds to the confusion by putting its stamp of approval upon a practice which the legislature has tried for over fifty years to abolish, and which the courts should have long since abandoned without legislative prodding.
The practice of “suspending sentence” upon a defendant without placing him on probation for a definite period has always been of doubtful legality. The practice has been considered illegal by a majority of the states; it violates our statutes which require probation to be for a definite period; it is contrary to the present philosophy of parole and probation, and in some cases, it develops into a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to a prompt sentence.
As suggested in the majority opinion, the idea of probation developed from the judicial practice of suspending sentences. The practice, rejected as unlawful in most states,1 had no rules or tests to govern it ex*399cept the test of reasonableness. In Pennsylvania the legislature has not only recognized probation since 1909, but it has developed it into a complete system with detailed rules to govern it. A suspended sentence of the nature here imposed is not recognized in that system.
The Act of June 19, 1911, P. L. 1055, as amended, 19 P.S. §1051, specifically authorized the courts to “suspend the imposing of the sentence, and place the defendant on probation for a definite period.” (Emphasis supplied) This right to place a defendant on probation was limited, however, to cases where the defendant had never been imprisoned and was not guilty of certain enumerated serious crimes. The quarter sessions and oyer and terminer courts of Pennsylvania, without appellate court approval, were suspending sentences prior to this act and some trial courts continued to do so after its passage both in cases falling within the terms of the Act of 1911 and those cases not covered by it.
The power to place a defendant on probation instead of imposing a sentence without the limitations which had been placed upon the court by the Act of 1911 was given to the courts by the legislature in §25 of the Act of August 6, 1941, P. L. 861, 61 P.S. §331.25. This section provides, inter alia, that “the court shall have the power, in its discretion . . . instead of imposing such sentence, to place the person on probation for such definite period as the court shall direct . . .” (Emphasis supplied) The legislature, although not recognizing the legality or propriety of a “suspended sentence,” adopted an alternate procedure to that previously allowed. In doing so it clearly expressed its intent not only to have a definite period of probation when no sentence was imposed, but also to have the court “direct” what that period should be.
Even if the courts originally had inherent power to suspend a sentence in order to observe the future con*400duct of the defendant, and even though the court still has inherent power to temporarily defer sentence while the court seeks information or the defendant applies for pardon or for other sufficient reason, nevertheless, today sentence “suspensions” of the nature here under consideration are made under authority of §25 of the Act of 1941, supra, and its provisions should be followed. Com. ex rel. Wilhelm v. Morgan, supra, 278 Pa. 395, 397, 123 A. 337 (1924). The Act of 1941 contemplates the imposition by the court of a definite period of probation, and the trial courts should be required to follow the law and impose a definite period of probation.
The majority holds that when a court “suspends sentence” without providing for probation for a definite period, there is an implied probation for the maximum period for which the defendant could have been sentenced. Considering the number of crimes for which the penalty is 10, 15 or 20 years the unreasonableness of this conclusion is apparent. This the majority recognizes, for it limits the effective period of the probation to a reasonable time. What can be more indefinite than a “reasonable” time? I think that the appellate courts should require the sentencing courts to comply with the statutory law and to discontinue the imposition of “suspended sentences” without placing the defendant on probation for a definite period. This, of course, would not interfere with the right of a court to defer sentencing temporarily to obtain additional information or for other proper reasons. See Com. ex rel. Wilhelm v. Morgan, supra, at p. 397.
The fountain of judicial thinking in this Commonwealth on suspended sentences comes from the case of Com. ex rel. Wilhelm v. Morgan, supra, although nearly everything written there on the subject is dictum. I am convinced the basic thinking expressed in that opinion supports the position I take in this case, *401although there is also dictum that supports the majority opinion. In that case the Supreme Court questioned “the right to indefinitely defer or suspend sentence, in the absence of statutory authority.” Even when the right to suspend sentence is recognized, the court noted that “manifestly, however, it would be an abuse thereof to impose sentence after a great delay. Hence, under any view of the law, sentence must be imposed, if ever, within a reasonable time after conviction.” “In any event,” the Court continued, “sentence can be suspended only for a reasonable time, which, in conformity with the statute, we hold cannot extend beyond the maximum term of imprisonment,...” The Court held that a suspension of sentence is subject to statutory provisions relating to probation. It said that “the statutory method for the suspension of sentence controls,” and suggested that the suspended sentence shall be coextensive with the probationary period. It accepted as “true” the following quotation from an Illinois court: “If the many criminal courts of the state had the power to enlarge persons convicted of crime, on their own recognizance, during their good behavior or at the discretion of the presiding judge, there would, in effect, be in full force another and different system of parole, without bounds or limitations and without uniformity, but wholly dependent in its operation in each individual case upon the discretion of the sitting judge.” This practice of suspending sentence by some of the courts of this Commonwealth creates “another and different system of parole” condemned by the Supreme Court.
The majority cites Com. v. Giovengo, 188 Pa. Superior Ct. 220, 146 A. 2d 629 (1958). In that case sentence was deferred and not suspended. I understand that a sentence is suspended when the defendant is called before the court, an order of “sentence suspended” or some similar notation made on the docket, *402and the defendant is not thereafter subject to further punishment except for cause arising subsequent to the court’s order. It is a final and appealable order. On the other hand when sentence is deferred no judgment is entered, there is nothing to appeal from, and the court must within a reasonable time call the defendant before it for sentence. It may then either sentence the defendant to a fine or imprisonment or both, or place him on probation. The difference between the two actions is recognized in the Morgan Case, supra, where it is said on page 397 “the right to temporarily defer sentence, while the court seeks information or the defendant applies for pardon or for other sufficient reason, is universally recognized. The practice of an indefinite suspension of sentence has also long been in vogue in this and some other states, although in a majority of jurisdictions such right is denied, . . .” (Emphasis supplied) The reason for deferring the sentence and more particularly the reasonableness of the time it was deferred were before us in the Giovengo case. In connection with this case see United States ex rel. Giovengo v. Maroney, 194 F. Supp. 154 (1961).
I think there is no power in the courts of quarter sessions and oyer and terminer to suspend a sentence without placing the defendant on probation for a definite period. The appellant was given a “suspended sentence” February 24, 1959, without being placed on probation. This order was vacated and sentence imposed January 18, 1963, nearly four years later. In my opinion this delay of nearly four years in the imposition of sentence puts the sentence beyond a reasonable time. See Judge Wright’s concurring opinion in Com. ex rel. Konchick v. Ceraul, 197 Pa. Superior Ct. 171, 177, 177 A. 2d 125 (1962) and his dissenting opinion in Com. v. Giovengo, supra, at page 228. Assuming that both the above cases were properly decided, in those cases there were reasons not here present for de*403ferring sentence. In my opinion tbe procedure followed here constitutes a violation of tbe spirit if not tbe letter of Art. 1, See. 9 of tbe Constitution of Pennsylvania.
Weight and Watkins, JJ., join in this dissent.

 See Com. ex rel. Wilhelm, v. Morgan, 278 Pa. 395, 397, 123 A. 337 (1924).