Court Opinion

ID: 7808659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:09:44.97177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:24.169340
License: Public Domain

Hart, J. (On rehearing.) Counsel for the defendants in their petition for rehearing insists that the court overlooked the theory on which the lower eourt submitted the ease to the jury. The trial court told the jury that the defendants contended that the horse in question was worthless as a breeding stallion, the purpose for which they say that he was purchased, and that therefore, the consideration for which the notes sued on were executed had wholly failed. The eourt further told the jury that if it found from a preponderance of the evidence that the horse was worthless as a breeding stallion, its verdict should be for the defendants. (2) Counsel for the defendants insists that this instruction was correct and to sustain his position cites section 28 of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act, passed by the Legislature of 1913. Acts of 1913, p. 260. The section relied on provides that absence or failure of consideration is a matter of defense against any person, not a holder in due course, and partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise. This section of the statute is but declaratory of the law as it existed before the statute was passed. Webster v. Carter, 99 Ark. 458. It has no application, however, under the facts of this case. In the sale of personal property the seller has a right to define his liability by a special warranty and to provide for the measure of damages or the manner of fulfilling his warranty. This was done in the present ease by the seller. Such a contract is valid at common law and there is nothing in our statute forbidding it. The special guarantee in the present case is that if the horse should not prove himself a satisfactory foal-getter, the purchasers agree to return him to the barn of A. B. Holbert at Greely, Iowa, and to receive another horse of equal value. The horse died before he was returned. (3) Counsel for the defendants say that he died through no fault of theirs. Be that as it may, they did not return the horse as provided in the contract. However harsh the terms of the contract may appear to be, it must be remembered that the parties were capable of contracting and the contract between them was a lawful one. The parties it to must, therefore, abide by its terms. Contracts containing similar provisions to this have been before this court before and it has been uniformly ruled that when the parties to a contract agree upon the remedies that accrue for a breach of it, these remedies .constitute' the only relief that the purchaser has and he must be governed by the stipulations contained in his contract. Harrison v. Walker, 124 Ark. 555, 188 S. W. 17; Crouch v. Leake, 108 Ark. 322; Holland Banking Co. v. Haynes, 125 Ark. 10, 187 S. W. 632. It necessarily follows that the court erred in giving the instruction referred to. The point discussed by us in our former opinion contains the real question of law in the case and we adhere to what we there said with reference to it. The motion for rehearing will be denied.