Court Opinion

ID: 9840493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 20:00:55.878729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:34:04.478700
License: Public Domain

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                                                             [PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10319
                           ____________________

        ZEN GROUP, INC.,
        CARLOS OTAMENDI,
                                                    Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        STATE OF FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH
        CARE ADMINISTRATION,
        SECRETARY, STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY
        FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,
        KELLY BENNETT,
        individually and in her oﬃcial capacity as
        Chief of the Oﬃce of Medicaid Program
        Integrity within the State of Florida, Agency
        for Health Care Administration,
        SHEVAUN HARRIS,
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10319

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-23218-DPG
                           ____________________

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and HULL, Circuit
        Judges.
        WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
                This appeal involves alleged retaliation by oﬃcials of the
        Florida Agency for Health Care Administration against Zen Group,
        Inc., a Medicaid provider. Zen Group asserts that the oﬃcials made
        baseless referrals for investigation of fraud and suspended pay-
        ments to Zen Group in retaliation for its previous exercise of its
        constitutional rights in an administrative proceeding. Zen Group
        complained that the oﬃcials’ retaliation violated its due-process
        right under the Fourteenth Amendment and its speech and petition
        rights under the First Amendment. It sought both damages and in-
        junctive relief. The district court dismissed the complaint. We hold
        that Zen Group’s due-process and First Amendment claims for
        damages are both barred by qualiﬁed immunity. And Zen Group
        lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. So we aﬃrm.
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        22-10319              Opinion of the Court                       3

                               I. BACKGROUND
               Zen Group, Inc., is “a Florida Medicaid provider of services
        to developmentally-disabled minors.” Carlos Otamendi is its
        owner. Zen Group alleges that beginning in 2018, the Florida
        Agency for Health Care Administration wrongfully attempted to
        recoup payments rendered under the Agency’s “Behavior Analysis
        [S]ervices [P]rogram.” In its ﬁnal audit report, the Agency de-
        manded more than $1.5 million from Zen Group. The Agency con-
        cluded that it had overpaid Zen Group by more than $1.3 million
        for services not covered under Medicaid. The Agency determined
        that the Zen Group employees who rendered the services at issue
        were not qualiﬁed or had not properly documented their qualiﬁca-
        tions. It also assessed a ﬁne of $276,067.95 for failing to furnish
        proper records and ﬁling an improper claim. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE
        r. 59G-9.070(7)(c), (e). The Agency explained that it intended to
        withhold payments for Medicaid services if necessary to cover the
        recoupment and ﬁne. The report advised Zen Group of its right
        under state law to request an administrative hearing.
               Zen Group ﬁled a petition for a formal hearing to challenge
        the recoupment and ﬁne. Zen Group alleged that the Agency had
        wrongfully issued “overpayment demands based on newly-created
        retroactively-applied provider qualiﬁcation[] [requirements].” Dur-
        ing the administrative proceedings, Zen Group served the Agency
        with a motion for sanctions. But the Agency enjoyed a 21-day safe-
        harbor period before the motion could be publicly docketed. See
        FLA. STAT. § 57.105(4). Within that period, the parties settled.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-10319

        Under the terms of the settlement, the Agency paid Zen Group
        about $667,000 of the funds it had withheld.
                According to Zen Group, the Agency oﬃcials—particularly
        Kelly Bennett, Chief of the Oﬃce of Medicaid Program Integ-
        rity—retaliated against Zen Group for its administrative challenge
        and for its criticism of the Agency in its motion for sanctions. The
        day after the Agency paid the withheld funds, Zen Group asserts,
        Bennett “embarked on a course of conduct to retaliate against Zen
        Group and to put Zen Group out of business.” The Agency notiﬁed
        Zen Group that it was being investigated for fraud and that “gen-
        eral allegations [against Zen Group] include[d] billing for services
        not rendered.” Zen Group maintains that it “did not in fact commit
        any fraud and [the Agency] and Defendant Bennett were aware
        that Zen Group did not commit any fraud.” It further asserts that
        it provided “[d]ocumentary and testimonial evidence” to the inves-
        tigator that “establishe[d] Zen Group did not commit any fraud.”
               Zen Group received periodic updates from the Medicaid
        Fraud Control Unit of the Florida Attorney General’s Oﬃce, which
        is responsible for determining whether prosecution is warranted.
        See FLA. STAT. § 409.920(9)(d). In February 2020, the assigned inves-
        tigator told Zen Group that “[e]veryone in the Chain of Command
        ha[d] Approved the Closing [of the investigation] for Lack of Evi-
        dence.” They awaited the approval of only the Chief Assistant At-
        torney General. In the meantime, the Unit received two new fraud
        referrals from the Agency’s Oﬃce of Medicaid Program Integrity.
        One referral related to the fraud claim that had previously been
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        22-10319               Opinion of the Court                          5

        settled. The other referral related to billings for a single patient in
        2017.
               During the pendency of the allegedly retaliatory investiga-
        tions, “the Agency [again] suspended Medicaid payments to Zen
        Group.” Federal regulations provide that “[t]he State Medicaid
        agency must suspend all Medicaid payments to a provider after the
        agency determines there is a credible allegation of fraud for which
        an investigation is pending.” 42 C.F.R. § 455.23(a)(1). Zen Group
        continued “providing services to Medicaid patients without receiv-
        ing payment from [the Agency].” From January 10 to April 15,
        2020, it allegedly “accumulate[d] over $1,000,000 in accounts re-
        ceivable from the Agency.” Eventually, the payment suspension
        took a ﬁnancial toll on Zen Group. On April 15, Zen Group had to
        suspend its services. Zen Group alleges that it “completely ceased
        operations” on June 1 but “remain[ed] a Florida Medicaid provider
        subject to” the Agency’s authority.
               On July 1, an assistant attorney general emailed counsel for
        Zen Group requesting information “pertaining to a ‘list of individ-
        uals and dates’ compiled by the [Fraud Control Unit].” Zen Group
        alleges that the requested information “ha[d] nothing to do with
        any of the three fraud referrals from [the Agency] that Zen Group
        ha[d] been made aware of.” It inferred that the Agency had made a
        “fourth separate referral.”
                On August 3, Zen Group ﬁled a complaint in the district
        court against three defendants: the Agency for Health Care Admin-
        istration; Mary Mayhew, Secretary of the Agency; and Kelly
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10319

        Bennett, Chief of the Oﬃce of Medicaid Program Integrity. On
        August 21, Bennett informed Zen Group that the investigation was
        closed and “[t]he Agency [was] hereby discontinuing the payment
        suspension.” Zen Group described the reversal as “far too little, far
        too late.”
               Zen Group then ﬁled an amended complaint. It alleged that
        its payments should not have been suspended because there was no
        credible allegation of fraud. The amended complaint raised six
        claims, including a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
        Process Clause and a violation of the First Amendment’s Free
        Speech and Petition Clauses. It sought money damages and injunc-
        tive relief for both of those claims. The district court dismissed
        both claims for failure to state a claim.
               Zen Group appealed. After oral argument, we requested
        that the parties submit supplemental brieﬁng on the question of
        whether Zen Group had standing to seek injunctive relief. We also
        invited the Attorney General of Florida to ﬁle a brief as amicus cu-
        riae addressing standing as well as the merits.
                           II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
                We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Ho-
        ever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc). And
        we “may affirm on any ground supported by the record, regardless
        of whether that ground was relied upon or even considered be-
        low.” PDVSA US Litig. Tr. v. LukOil Pan Ams. LLC, 65 F.4th 556, 562
        (11th Cir. 2023).
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        22-10319               Opinion of the Court                         7

                                 III. DISCUSSION
                We divide our discussion into three parts. First, we explain
        that Zen Group’s request for damages for retaliation in violation of
        the Due Process Clause is barred by qualified immunity. Second,
        we explain that its request for damages under the First Amendment
        is also barred by qualified immunity. Finally, we explain that Zen
        Group lacks standing to seek injunctive relief.
        A. Zen Group’s Request for Damages for Retaliation Under the Due Pro-
                    cess Clause is Barred by Qualified Immunity.
                Zen Group asserts that officials violated its right to be free
        from retaliation after it exercised its right under the Due Process
        Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
        XIV, § 1. The officials allegedly retaliated—by making a “baseless
        fraud referral” and suspending Medicaid payments—after Zen
        Group exercised its due-process right by administratively challeng-
        ing the Agency’s recoupment demand and civil fine. The district
        court dismissed this claim because it concluded that Zen Group
        had failed to assert any due-process right underlying its retaliation
        claim: because Zen Group did not have a protected “property in-
        terest in the money the Agency paid to Zen Group [for Medicaid
        services],” Zen Group had no due-process right to bring an admin-
        istrative challenge in the first place. And absent this due-process
        right, Zen Group could not state a claim that the officials had retal-
        iated after it had exercised any constitutional right.
             We disagree with the district court in part. Zen Group did
        have a predeprivation right to due process to challenge the
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10319

        Agency’s imposition of a civil fine. But because neither the Su-
        preme Court nor we have held that there is a separate constitu-
        tional right to be free from retaliation for the exercise of a due-pro-
        cess right, Zen Group’s claim is barred by qualified immunity.
               Zen Group’s petition for administrative review was an exer-
        cise of its due-process right because, at a minimum, it had a consti-
        tutional right to challenge a $276,067.95 civil ﬁne. Zen Group
        sought “[a] ﬁnding that the Agency abused its discretion and acted
        arbitrarily in imposing a ﬁne in the amount of $276,067.95.” The
        Agency assessed the ﬁne on the ground that Zen Group had com-
        mitted “violation(s) of Medicaid policy [that] constitute[d] fraud or
        abuse” under Florida law. And the Agency assessed that ﬁne over
        and above the value of the $1.3 million in Medicaid overpayments it
        sought to recoup. The assessment of the $276,067.95 ﬁne threat-
        ened to invade a cognizable property interest distinct from the
        overpayments: Zen Group’s money.
               To be clear, we need not decide whether Zen Group had a
        property interest in the $1.3 million in disputed overpayments sub-
        ject to recoupment. Like our concurring colleague, we recognize
        that other circuits have ruled that providers lack a property interest
        in Medicaid payments subject to recoupment or ﬁnal administra-
        tive review. See Pers. Care Prods., Inc. v. Hawkins, 635 F.3d 155, 159
        (5th Cir. 2011); Yorktown Med. Lab’y, Inc. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 89
        (2d Cir. 1991). But those decisions address only whether providers
        have a cognizable interest in “reimbursements . . . withheld pending
        a fraud investigation”—not whether an additional ﬁne deprives a
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        22-10319                Opinion of the Court                          9

        provider of a property interest. Pers. Care Prods., 635 F.3d at 158 (em-
        phasis added); see also Yorktown, 948 F.2d at 89 (ﬁnding that provid-
        ers had no property interest in “[Medicaid] payment[s] for services
        rendered”).
                Zen Group had at least a due-process right to challenge a
        $276,067.95 ﬁne because the ﬁne would deprive Zen Group of
        money on top of the recoupment of Medicaid payments for services
        rendered. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 59G-9.070(7) (treating separately
        recoupment and the imposition of sanctions). And Zen Group’s ad-
        ministrative hearing request represented its ﬁnal opportunity to
        challenge the assessed ﬁne. Because Florida had issued a Final Audit
        Report, only ministerial steps remained before the ﬁne would be
        levied. The Final Audit Report informed Zen Group that it had 21
        days to initiate an administrative hearing before any challenge was
        “waived” and sanctions became “conclusive and ﬁnal.” See also FLA.
        ADMIN. CODE r. 59G-9.070(2) (deﬁning sanctions as “imposed”
        upon the ﬁling of a Final Order with the Agency Clerk—a ministe-
        rial task—after a ﬁnal audit report is issued).
               Florida may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
        erty, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The
        Supreme Court has recognized that “[its] precedents establish the
        general rule that individuals must receive notice and an oppor-
        tunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of prop-
        erty.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48
        (1993) (emphasis added) (assessing whether adequate process was
        afforded during civil forfeiture). And our precedents establish that
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10319

        a due-process right attaches to the imposition of civil or adminis-
        trative penalties. We have held that “individuals whose property
        interests are at stake due to government actions are entitled to no-
        tice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.” Mesa Val-
        derrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1196 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
        Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167–68 (2002)) (assessing
        whether plaintiff was afforded due process during the administra-
        tive forfeiture of a $100,000 check); see also Robinson v. United States,
        734 F.2d 735, 738–39 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the failure to
        timely initiate civil forfeiture proceedings was a denial of due pro-
        cess); United States v. Castro, 883 F.2d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 1989)
        (recognizing that undue delay in initiating civil forfeiture proceed-
        ings could “demonstrate[] a denial of . . . due process”). And the
        Supreme Court has stated “[t]he general rule” is that “a party can-
        not invoke the power of the state to seize a person’s property with-
        out a prior judicial determination that the seizure is justified.”
        United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n.12 (1983)
        (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378–379 (1971)); see James
        Daniel, 510 U.S. at 53 (recognizing that due process ordinarily re-
        quires “predeprivation notice and hearing”).
               Although Zen Group enjoyed a due-process right to chal-
        lenge the fine, whether its claim for unconstitutional retaliation is
        barred by qualiﬁed immunity is another matter. Qualiﬁed immun-
        ity “shields oﬃcials from civil liability so long as their conduct does
        not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
        which a reasonable person would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna,
        577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks
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        22-10319                Opinion of the Court                           11

        omitted). To determine whether a right is clearly established, “we
        look for ‘fair warning’ to oﬃcers that the conduct at issue violated
        a constitutional right.” Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1208
        (11th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Speciﬁcally, we determine
        whether “a materially similar case” has been decided, a “broader,
        clearly established principle . . . control[s] the novel facts of the sit-
        uation,” or “the conduct involved . . . so obviously violate[s] the
        constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Id. Only holdings
        of “the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit or the law of [the Su-
        preme Court of Florida] . . . can ‘clearly establish’ constitutional
        rights” for purposes of qualified immunity. Amnesty Int’l, USA v.
        Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1184 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
               Zen Group’s right to be free from retaliation for its previous
        exercise of its due-process right was not clearly established. No
        “materially similar case” from the Supreme Court, this Circuit, or
        the Supreme Court of Florida has established an anti-retaliation
        right under the Due Process Clause. Nor does a “broader, clearly
        established principle . . . control the novel facts of the situation.”
        Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1208. Zen Group argues that our First and
        Fourth Amendment retaliation precedents establish the principle
        that any claim for unconstitutional retaliation may be brought un-
        der section 1983. See Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir.
        1986), abrogated on other grounds by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
        399 (1989), as recognized in Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298,
        1324 n.28 (11th Cir. 2017); see also Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176,
        1189 (11th Cir. 1983); Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1255–56
        (11th Cir. 2005). But these precedents cabin the scope of the anti-
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10319

        retaliation right to specific constitutional provisions—most often
        the First Amendment. See Cate, 707 F.2d at 1189 (finding that “re-
        taliation by the state for having exercised First Amendment free-
        doms in the past is particularly proscribed by the First Amend-
        ment”); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 883 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding
        that a claim for retaliatory prosecution sounded under the First
        Amendment); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 847 n.18 (11th Cir.
        2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 356 (2012); accord Leslie, 786 F.2d at 1537 (find-
        ing that “retaliation against [the plaintiff’s] assertion of his right to
        insist upon arrest by warrant” under the Fourth Amendment was
        unconstitutional). We have never recognized a general, free-float-
        ing right to be free from retaliation.
                As we explained in Ratliff v. DeKalb County, the existence of
        an anti-retaliation right is specific to the underlying protected con-
        duct triggering retaliation. 62 F.3d 338, 340–41 (11th Cir. 1995). In
        Ratliff, the plaintiff alleged that public officials had violated her
        rights under the Equal Protection Clause by retaliating because of
        her complaints of gender discrimination. Id. at 340. We reversed a
        denial of qualified immunity because we found that no “clearly es-
        tablished right exists under the equal protection clause to be free
        from retaliation.” Id. We explained that although a claim for retal-
        iation “may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the first
        amendment,” that anti-retaliation right did not exist in the equal-
        protection context. Id. at 341; see also Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d
        1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A pure or generic retaliation claim,
        however, simply does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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        22-10319              Opinion of the Court                          13

               Zen Group fails to identify any precedent recognizing an
        anti-retaliation right under the Due Process Clause. Because we
        have never recognized an anti-retaliation right in the due-process
        context, nor recognized any broadly applicable anti-retaliation
        principle, we cannot say that the oﬃcials’ conduct violated clearly
        established law. Because the oﬃcials are entitled to qualiﬁed im-
        munity, we aﬃrm the dismissal of Zen Group’s due-process claim
        for damages.
          B. Zen Group’s Request for Damages Under the First Amendment is
                           Barred by Qualiﬁed Immunity.
               Zen Group alleges that the oﬃcials “violated [its] First
        Amendment rights to petition the government for redress and to
        free speech” by retaliating against Zen Group for defending itself
        against the recoupment and ﬁne and for criticizing the Agency in
        its sanctions motion. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. As a prelimi-
        nary matter, a plaintiﬀ has a viable First Amendment retaliation
        claim only when speaking “as a citizen” rather than as a govern-
        ment employee. King v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 916 F.3d 1339, 1345
        (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Although Zen Group is a gov-
        ernment contractor, the oﬃcials do not contend that Zen Group
        was speaking in its role as a government agent rather than as a cit-
        izen. So we need not decide whether a contractor not bound by an
        employment relationship is subject to diﬀerent constraints in bring-
        ing a First Amendment claim.
              To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Zen Group
        must establish that (1) it “engaged in constitutionally protected”
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10319

        speech or petition activity, (2) the oﬃcials’ alleged “retaliatory con-
        duct adversely aﬀected that protected speech and right to petition,”
        and (3) “a causal connection exists between the . . . retaliatory con-
        duct and the adverse eﬀect on [Zen Group’s] speech and right to
        petition.” DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1289
        (11th Cir. 2019). The oﬃcials contest only the ﬁrst element:
        whether Zen Group’s speech and petition activities were constitu-
        tionally protected.
               Zen Group’s speech and petition activities are constitution-
        ally protected only if they relate to a matter of public concern. As
        Zen Group acknowledges, the Supreme Court has held that gov-
        ernment contractors’ speech is constitutionally protected only
        when that speech relates to a matter of public concern. Bd. of Cnty.
        Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673–77, 685 (1996). And it has held
        that public employees’ petitions are likewise constitutionally pro-
        tected only with respect to matters of public concern. Borough of
        Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388–89, 393 (2011).
                Zen Group argues that the public-concern test should not be
        further extended to Petition Clause claims brought by government
        contractors. But the logic of the Supreme Court’s decisions easily
        extends to this context. The Court has explained that “[t]he simi-
        larities between government employees and government contrac-
        tors with respect to [speech rights] are obvious.” Umbehr, 518 U.S.
        at 673–74. And it has stated that although “Speech Clause prece-
        dents [do not] necessarily . . . resolve Petition Clause claims,”
        “claims of retaliation by public employees do not call for [a]
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        22-10319                 Opinion of the Court                            15

        divergence” in interpretation. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 388–89. In the
        light of the close connection between government employee and
        government contractor speech claims—as well as government em-
        ployee speech and petition claims—it follows that the public-con-
        cern test controls the government contractors’ petition claims. See
        L.L. Nelson Enters., Inc. v. Cnty. of St. Louis, 673 F.3d 799, 808 (8th Cir.
        2012) (holding that government contractors’ petitions are constitu-
        tionally protected only if they involve matters of public concern).
                To determine whether speech or a petition involves a matter
        of public concern, we “must examine three sub-factors—namely,
        the ‘content, form, and context’ of the [contractor or] employee’s
        statement.” O’Laughlin v. Palm Beach Cnty., 30 F.4th 1045, 1051 (11th
        Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Among these three, content is “un-
        doubtedly the most important.” Id. (citation omitted). At a high
        level of generality, “[t]o fall within the realm of public concern, an
        employee’s speech must relate to any matter of political, social, or
        other concern to the community.” Alves v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
        Sys. of Ga., 804 F.3d 1149, 1162 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation and inter-
        nal quotation marks omitted). It may also qualify if it relates to “a
        subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general in-
        terest and of value and concern to the public.” Lane v. Franks, 573
        U.S. 228, 241 (2014). The goal is to protect the employee or contrac-
        tor’s right, as a citizen, to speak on matters of public concern. See
        O’Laughlin, 30 F.4th at 1051.
             The district court concluded that “[i]n its petition, Zen
        Group did not challenge the Behavior Analysis Services Program
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-10319

        or Agency policies generally; rather, Zen Group’s petition per-
        tained only to its individual grievance.” The district court did not
        address the sanctions motion. We conclude that although the con-
        tent of the petition for a formal hearing does not implicate a matter
        of public concern, the content of the motion for sanctions does.
               The petition for a formal hearing relates to Zen Group’s pri-
        vate dispute with the Agency. One sentence in the prayer for relief
        questions the legal validity of rules that, according to Zen Group,
        were improperly promulgated. Zen Group sought “[a] ﬁnding that
        [the Agency’s] conclusions are un-promulgated rules and without
        any force and eﬀect.” But that sentence is hardly suﬃcient to trans-
        form a petition for a formal hearing that otherwise addresses only
        a private dispute into a petition on a matter of public concern. We
        need not address the form or context of the petition.
               By contrast, the content of the motion for sanctions relates
        to a matter of public concern. In a section entitled “Agency Disar-
        ray In Interpreting And Applying Rule 59G-4.125 Leads To Prohib-
        ited Arbitrary And Capricious Agency Action,” the motion charac-
        terized the approval process for behavioral assistants as “rudder-
        less” and “ad hoc” and protested “the lack of any clear rules or
        standards regarding their required qualiﬁcations.” It alleged that a
        single employee had been tasked with reviewing thousands of ap-
        plications without clear guidelines. And it accused the Agency of
        “re-writing post hoc the experience qualiﬁcation requirement to im-
        pose myriad requirements not included in the duly adopted Agency
        rules or the coverage policies incorporated therein.”
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        22-10319               Opinion of the Court                       17

                Whether speech and petitions by government employees
        and contractors constitute matters of public concern can be diﬃ-
        cult to discern. “[V]irtually all speech which is made in and about a
        public employment [or contracting] setting will have some public
        signiﬁcance . . . .” Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1515 (11th Cir.
        1986). But “a public employee [or contractor] may not transform a
        personal grievance into a matter of public concern by invoking a
        supposed popular interest in the way public institutions are run.”
        Id. at 1516.
                Much of our caselaw about identifying matters of public
        concern arises in the public-education context, and these prece-
        dents are instructive. We have explained that “speech that concerns
        internal administration of the educational system and personal
        grievances will not receive constitutional protection” but that
        “teachers whose speech directly aﬀects the public’s perception of
        the quality of education in a given academic system ﬁnd their
        speech protected.” Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1552–53 (11th
        Cir. 1988). For example, salary levels, course assignments, syllabi,
        tenure decisions, course registration, job sharing, teaching meth-
        ods, and evaluation criteria are not matters of public concern. Id.
        But school funding, university admissions policies and student-
        body sizes, adherence to federal law respecting students with disa-
        bilities, educational standards and accreditation, curriculum weak-
        nesses, facility adequacy, faculty-to-school ratio, and the poor per-
        formance of graduates on professional licensing exams do consti-
        tute matters of public concern. Id. at 1553.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10319

                Although the underlying grievance in this case is particular
        to Zen Group, the problems described in the sanctions motion re-
        late to the functioning of a public agency. The motion addresses
        whether the Agency is operating eﬃciently and according to law.
        The description of an Agency where provider approval decisions
        are made by a single, overburdened employee without proper
        guidelines more closely resembles the concerns that we have deter-
        mined “aﬀect[] the public’s perception of the quality of education
        in a given academic system” than it does those that relate to “inter-
        nal administration of the educational system.” Cf. id. at 1552–53.
        And the information found in the motion would help citizens
        “make informed decisions about the operation of their [state] gov-
        ernment.” Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 924 (9th
        Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). So, the content of the motion relates,
        at least in part, to a matter of public concern.
                That only a portion of the motion relates to a matter of pub-
        lic concern is not fatal to Zen Group’s claim. A document may re-
        late to a matter of public concern even if only a fraction is devoted
        to that issue. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983). But the
        portion that does relate to a matter of public concern must be “di-
        rected to such concerns” and may not merely “touch up against
        matters of public concern.” Alves, 804 F.3d at 1167. “[V]ague and
        sweeping references”—for example, to “the safety and well-being
        of students” or “an adverse impact on client care”—“without refer-
        ence to speciﬁc instances” in which those issues have arisen are in-
        suﬃcient, particularly when coupled with “great detail” and “spe-
        ciﬁc examples” regarding “personal grievances.” Id. In the relevant
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        22-10319                Opinion of the Court                         19

        section of its motion, Zen Group cites emails, depositions, and
        other evidence reﬂecting the Agency’s “[d]isarray” in a way that is
        not speciﬁc to Zen Group’s individual grievance.
                The “form” of the sanctions motion, O’Laughlin, 30 F.4th at
        1051, also supports the conclusion that it relates to a matter of pub-
        lic concern. “A court may . . . consider the employee’s attempt to
        make her concerns public,” but that consideration is “not disposi-
        tive.” Alves, 804 F.3d at 1162; see also Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723,
        727 (11th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has explained that “[p]eti-
        tions to the courts and similar bodies can . . . address matters of
        great public import.” Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 397. Zen Group’s sanc-
        tions motion was intended to be a public ﬁling; it was never pub-
        lished on a public docket only because the parties settled during the
        state-mandated grace period before publication. See FLA. STAT.
        § 57.105(4). But such speech and petitions may still be protected.
        Cf. Ballou v. McElvain, 29 F.4th 413, 431 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining
        that a “state tort notice,” which a party must serve before suing a
        local government entity in Washington, is “a form of speech pro-
        tected by the Petition Clause” because those “notices are part and
        parcel of formal litigation proceedings”). And Zen Group’s mo-
        tion, if granted, would have secured more than “individual com-
        pensation.” Deremo v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 908, 911 n.6, 912 (11th Cir.
        1991). Sanctions would have included public censure, in addition to
        any monetary compensation to the opposing party.
               Finally, the “context” of the sanctions motion, O’Laughlin,
        30 F.4th at 1051, oﬀers little insight. That speech is “motivated by
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10319

        . . . personal interest” does not necessarily “deprive[] the[] speech
        of its publicness.” Id. at 1052–53 (internal quotation marks omit-
        ted). For example, “using [a] petition [in an internal grievance pro-
        cedure] to appeal the termination of [one’s] employment as any
        employee . . . would do” does not suggest that the problem is a
        matter of public concern, but “using the petition . . . as a platform
        to publicly air [one’s] concerns about [a public oﬃcial’s] conduct”
        implies that the topic is one of broader interest. Harmon v. Dallas
        Cnty., 927 F.3d 884, 895 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Zen
        Group appeared to pursue relief both to further its private interests
        and to air a grievance about oﬃcial conduct.
               Ordinarily, our next step would be to determine whether the
        relevant speech and petition interests outweigh the government’s
        interests in serving the public. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
        563, 568 (1968) (establishing the balancing test); O’Laughlin, 30 F.4th
        at 1051 (identifying the steps of the balancing test). But we need
        not reach this issue, because Zen Group’s claim for damages is
        barred by qualiﬁed immunity. Zen Group’s request for damages
        against Bennett in her personal capacity is barred because Zen
        Group’s First Amendment rights are not clearly established. See
        Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1208.
               That a government agency cannot retaliate against a con-
        tractor for exercising its First Amendment rights is clearly estab-
        lished. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 686. But the Supreme Court has “re-
        peatedly told courts . . . not to deﬁne clearly established law at a
        high level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152
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        22-10319                Opinion of the Court                         21

        (2018). It must be clear with respect to the facts of this case that
        Zen Group was exercising its First Amendment rights. Cf. Anderson
        v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (“The relevant question . . . is
        the objective (albeit fact-speciﬁc) question whether a reasonable of-
        ﬁcer could have believed Anderson’s warrantless search to be law-
        ful . . . .”). “If it is unclear whether [Zen Group’s] complaints were
        of the kind held to involve a matter of public concern, then [Ben-
        nett’s] alleged actions did not violate clearly established First Amend-
        ment rights and [she] is entitled to qualiﬁed immunity.” Badia v. City
        of Miami, 133 F.3d 1443, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998). Even when the topic
        of the speech is “obviously a matter of important social interest,”
        “we must focus on what [the oﬃcials] knew” or should have known
        about the facts and the law. Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1093
        (11th Cir. 1996); Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1207.
               The parties failed to identify a “materially similar case” or a
        “broader, clearly established principle” delineating matters of pub-
        lic concern that “control[s] the novel facts of the situation,” and the
        conduct does not “so obviously violate the constitution that prior
        case law is unnecessary.” Gaines, 871 F.3d at 1208 (citation omitted).
        A reasonable oﬃcial would not necessarily have been on notice that
        Zen Group’s motion for sanctions involved a matter of public con-
        cern.
               As we acknowledged in our analysis of the merits, whether
        the motion for sanctions involved a matter of public concern pre-
        sented a close question. We determined that the content of the mo-
        tion related to a matter of public concern by analogy to caselaw
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10319

        from the public-education context, where our decisions make clear
        that “speech [that] directly aﬀects the public’s perception of the
        quality of education in a given academic system” is constitutionally
        protected. Maples, 858 F.2d at 1553. We concluded that the motion
        for sanctions, which would have impacted the public’s perception
        of the operation of the state Medicaid program, is likewise pro-
        tected. But a reasonable oﬃcial might not have anticipated that out-
        come. The form of the motion—a sanctions motion in an admin-
        istrative action that was never publicly docketed—was also unique.
        We relied upon the censuring function of a sanctions motion as
        well as persuasive, out-of-circuit authority to conclude that the mo-
        tion was public in form. Cf. Ballou, 29 F.4th at 431. Again, a reason-
        able oﬃcial might not have anticipated this result. So, the alleged
        retaliation did not violate clearly established law. See Badia, 133 F.3d
        at 1445.
                C. Zen Group Lacks Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief.
               Zen Group also seeks injunctive relief against the oﬃcials in
        their oﬃcial capacities. It requested an injunction “directing that
        Defendant Bennett and the [Agency] Secretary not make any fraud
        referrals . . . (or issue any related Medicaid payment suspensions)
        without ﬁrst conducting a preliminary investigation and otherwise
        verifying any allegations of fraud.” But Zen Group lacks standing
        to seek this relief.
              “The federal courts are under an independent obligation to
        examine their own jurisdiction, and standing is perhaps the most
        important of the jurisdictional doctrines.” Bischoﬀ v. Osceola Cnty.,
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        22-10319                Opinion of the Court                          23

        222 F.3d 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2000) (alteration adopted) (citation
        omitted). To have standing, a “plaintiﬀ must have (1) suﬀered an
        injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct
        of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
        judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). “To
        establish injury in fact, a plaintiﬀ must show that he or she suﬀered
        ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and par-
        ticularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothet-
        ical.’” Id. at 339 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
        (1992)). “[A] plaintiﬀ must demonstrate standing for each claim and
        for each form of relief that is sought.” J W ex rel. Williams v. Bir-
        mingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1264 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation
        and internal quotation marks omitted). “And when plaintiﬀs seek
        prospective relief to prevent future injuries, they must prove that
        their threatened injuries are certainly impending.” Jacobson v. Fla.
        Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation and in-
        ternal quotation marks omitted).
               Zen Group argues that it has alleged an injury in fact capable
        of supporting injunctive relief on two bases. It contends, ﬁrst, that
        the original complaint alleged an ongoing violation, and second,
        that the amended complaint alleged a credible threat of future
        harm. But Zen Group cannot assert standing on either basis.
               Zen Group argues that it has standing because “at the time
        Zen Group and Otamendi commenced this action and ﬁled their
        original Complaint, the constitutional violations were ongoing.” The
        original complaint did not request injunctive relief. Instead, it
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10319

        sought a declaration that “[d]efendants must immediately termi-
        nate the illegal payment suspension.” The oﬃcials then terminated
        the payment suspension. Zen Group amended its complaint to re-
        quest injunctive relief from future harm. “[W]hen a plaintiﬀ ﬁles a
        complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the com-
        plaint, courts look to the amended complaint to determine juris-
        diction.” Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243
        (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Because Zen Group dropped its
        claim for relief based on the oﬃcials’ ongoing activity and asserted
        a new claim for prospective relief against future harm in the
        amended complaint, it cannot now rely on the defunct original
        complaint as a basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 1243–44 (“When [the
        plaintiﬀ] amended his complaint and failed to include . . . any . . .
        federal claim, the basis for the district court’s subject-matter juris-
        diction ceased to exist . . . .”).
                Zen Group also asserts that it has standing to seek prospec-
        tive relief because an injury is “certainly impending.” Jacobson, 974
        F.3d at 1245. In its amended complaint, Zen Group alleged that it
        “completely ceased operations” in June 2020. It also stated that it
        “remains a Florida Medicaid provider subject to the authority of
        Defendants Bennett and Mayhew[] and has a credible fear of fur-
        ther retaliatory conduct, not least in the form of another un-
        founded and false fraud referral to [the Fraud Unit] and another
        debilitating Medicaid payment suspension.” In response to our re-
        quest for supplemental brieﬁng on standing, Zen Group explained
        that after the Agency terminated its payment suspension and be-
        fore it ﬁled the amended complaint, Zen Group resumed providing
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        22-10319                Opinion of the Court                          25

        Medicaid services. Zen Group now argues that, “[a]s a current
        Medicaid provider . . . subject to Agency Defendants’ power to
        make unreviewable fraud referrals and Medicaid payment suspen-
        sions based on nothing but retaliatory animus, . . . [p]laintiﬀs face
        an imminent threat of harm redressable by” injunctive relief.
                Zen Group lacks standing to pursue injunctive relief because
        we are constrained to rely only on the facts that it alleged in its
        amended complaint. Zen Group alleged that it had “completely
        ceased operations” in June 2020. It did not allege that it had re-
        sumed providing services to Medicaid recipients. In that context,
        the most that we can fairly infer from the assertion that Zen Group
        “remains a Florida Medicaid provider” is that Zen Group remains
        an active corporation authorized by the state to provide Medicaid
        services, even though it is not currently doing so. “[A] court’s duty
        to liberally construe a plaintiff’s complaint in the face of a motion
        to dismiss is not the equivalent of a duty to re-write it for [the plain-
        tiff].” Peterson v. Atlanta Hous. Auth., 998 F.2d 904, 912 (11th Cir.
        1993). The allegations in the amended complaint do not support
        the inference that Zen Group faces anything more than a specula-
        tive risk of future injury if it resumes providing services or the offi-
        cials decide to engage in retaliatory fraud referrals against an inac-
        tive provider with respect to services rendered in the past. See Wor-
        thy, 930 F.3d at 1215 (“[A] plaintiﬀ must allege facts from which it
        appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suﬀer injury in
        the future.” (emphasis altered) (citation omitted)); J W ex rel. Wil-
        liams, 904 F.3d at 1264 (“A party has standing to seek injunctive re-
        lief only if the party alleges, and ultimately proves, a real and
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        26                   Opinion of the Court               22-10319

        immediate—as opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical—
        threat of future injury.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
                                  IV. CONCLUSION
              We AFFIRM.
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        22-10319         WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring                    1

        WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, Concurring:
               I write separately to add a thought about the right to be free
        from retaliation after a person exercises his right to due process un-
        der the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court has yet to recognize
        an anti-retaliation right under the Due Process Clause. But our
        opinion today does not prevent us from one day recognizing that
        the government violates the Fourteenth Amendment when it retal-
        iates against a person for invoking his right to due process.
                The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government
        from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
        process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process
        Clause creates procedural safeguards against state invasions of pro-
        tected interests. Its fundamental promise is the opportunity to be
        heard; that is, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees proceedings
        to “aﬀord [persons] an opportunity to present their objections” to
        the deprivation of liberty or property. Mullane v. C. Hanover Bank &
        Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). A due-process hearing helps “secure
        the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of govern-
        ment.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884).
                The opportunity to be heard means little if the government
        may, without consequence, punish persons for availing themselves
        of a hearing. The Constitution bars retaliation against individuals
        who exercise their First Amendment freedoms because of the
        “chilling eﬀect” on protected speech and petition activity. Cate v.
        Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1189 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Bennett v. Hen-
        drix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1254 (11th Cir. 2005) (ﬁnding that retaliatory
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        2                 WILLIAM PRYOR, C.J., Concurring               22-10319

        conduct is unconstitutional if it would “likely deter a person of or-
        dinary ﬁrmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights”); ac-
        cord Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 n.9 (6th Cir. 1999) (“The
        reason why such retaliation oﬀends the Constitution is that it
        threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right.”) (citing Craw-
        ford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998)). That rationale of
        deterrence has equal force in the due-process context. Because the
        government is the only entity that can provide a due-process hear-
        ing, a person must put himself at the government’s mercy to exer-
        cise his right at all.
                That retaliation violates the Due Process Clause ﬂows from
        the Clause itself. The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]o pun-
        ish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him
        to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.” Bordenkircher
        v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); see also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S.
        21, 28 (1974) (“[D]ue process . . . requires that a defendant be freed
        of apprehension of . . . retaliatory motivation.”) (citation omitted).
        It would be odd if that anti-retaliation principle, itself grounded in
        the Fourteenth Amendment, failed to guarantee the right to be
        heard—that “fundamental requisite of due process.” Grannis v. Or-
        dean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
               We should, in an appropriate case, recognize that a person
        has the right to be free from retaliation for invoking his right to be
        heard before a proposed deprivation of his property. Acknowledg-
        ing that anti-retaliation right would help ensure that future due-
        process violations do not go unredressed.
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        22-10319 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part                     1

        HULL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
                I concur in the Court’s opinion except for Section III.A
        concerning Zen Group’s claim for damages for unconstitutional
        retaliation brought under the Due Process Clause. As to Section
        III.A, I join its judgment aﬃrming the dismissal of Zen Group’s
        anti-retaliation claim under the Due Process Clause. I agree that
        “Zen Group fails to identify any precedent recognizing an anti-
        retaliation right under the Due Process Clause,” 1 and the defendant
        oﬃcials are entitled to qualiﬁed immunity. Maj. Op. at 13.
               As all know, to overcome qualiﬁed immunity, Zen Group
        must show: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and
        (2) that right was clearly established. I agree with the Majority’s
        approach of ruling on only the clearly-established prong and
        leaving for another day the ﬁrst prong as to whether a
        constitutional anti-retaliation right exists under the Due Process

        1 To some extent, Appellees argue that our precedent counsels otherwise. See

        Ratliff v. DeKalb Cnty., 62 F.3d 338, 340–41 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
        although a claim for retaliation “may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
        pursuant to the first amendment,” that anti-retaliation right did not exist in the
        equal-protection context); Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1354–55 (11th
        Cir. 1997) (“A pure or generic retaliation claim, however, simply does not
        implicate the Equal Protection Clause.”); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 883
        (11th Cir. 2003) (“Although Wood attempts to rely on the Fourth
        Amendment, there is no retaliation claim under the Fourth Amendment
        separate and distinct from Wood’s malicious prosecution and false arrest
        claims. Instead, the only cause of action for retaliation that arguably applies
        here is retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment.” (footnote
        omitted)); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 847 n.18 (11th Cir. 2010) (same), aff'd,
        566 U.S. 356 (2012).
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        2 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part                 22-10319

        Clause. 2 Maj. Op. at 10–13; Chief Judge Pryor Concurrence at 1–
        2.
               Although unnecessary to do so, the Majority takes the first
        step in answering that constitutional question by addressing
        whether a medical provider, like Zen Group, had an underlying
        “constitutionally protected” property interest in a Medicaid fine
        imposed for fraudulent overpayments, even though the state
        Agency’s overpayments and fine determination was only a
        “probable cause” determination, was not final, and was still under
        a fraud investigation and administrative review when Zen Group
        entered into a favorable settlement with no fine. While the
        Majority limits its opinion to the Medicaid fine, I would bypass the
        entire first prong of qualified immunity altogether. I write to set
        forth six good reasons why we should leave the constitutional
        property-interest issue as to this Medicaid fine, tied to fraudulent
        overpayments, for another day. 3

        2 See Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Both

        elements of th[e qualified immunity] test must be present for an official to lose
        qualified immunity, and th[e] two-pronged analysis may be done in whatever
        order is deemed most appropriate for the case.”).
        3 To be clear, I agree with the well-established constitutional principles under

        the Due Process Clause that: (1) Florida may not deprive any person of
        property without due process of law; (2) individuals must receive notice and
        an opportunity to be heard before the government may deprive them of
        property; and (3) the Due Process Clause creates fundamental safeguards
        against state invasions of constitutionally protected property interests. See
        Maj. Op. at 9 (citing, inter alia, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). Nonetheless, to
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        22-10319 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part                   3

                Alternatively, because the Majority elects to decide that
        question, I set forth why Zen Group had no such property interest
        and why I dissent in part as to Section III.A. As explained in detail
        herein, the Agency audit made only a “probable cause”
        determination as to the overpayments and related fines, and in the
        routine administrative-review process no fine was imposed, much
        less finalized, levied, or paid. My six reasons equally support this
        conclusion as they include a review of the Majority’s flawed
        citations and analyses and demonstrate why Zen Group had no
        such constitutionally protected property interest in the
        preliminary, “probable cause” determination of the overpayment
        fine involved here.
              The Majority states the assessment of the fine “threatened
        to invade a cognizable property interest distinct from the
        overpayments: Zen Group’s money.” Maj. Op. at 8. For sure, Zen
        Group has a property interest in money it owns in its bank account.
        But what Zen Group does not have is a property interest in
        government Medicaid money that Zen Group is not yet legally
        owed by the Medicaid Agency. As discussed herein, the
        contractual relationship between the Medicaid Agency and Zen
        Group is governed by complex state and federal Medicaid statutes
        and regulations. Pursuant thereto, the Medicaid Agency pays up

        invoke the Due Process Clause, the plaintiff must demonstrate it has a
        constitutionally protected property interest. If a plaintiff has no such property
        interest under the facts of a case, there is no constitutional due process right.
        Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972).
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        4 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part          22-10319

        front, then audits for overpayments, makes a “probable cause”
        determination of fraudulent overpayments and 20% of those
        overpayments as a fine, and withholds both sums from current
        reimbursements. Later in an administrative-review process, a
        calculation is made of the amount Zen Group is actually owed.
        Before that calculation, this case settled without any fine. The
        Majority points to no source of law that entitles Zen Group to
        receive Medicaid’s money unfettered by government audits and
        overpayment fines. I now turn to the Majority’s cited cases.
                                Majority’s Cited Cases
               First, the Majority’s cited cases do not address whether a
        property right or interest existed, but involve only whether the due
        process afforded was adequate. The Majority summarily states:
        “And our precedents establish that a due-process right attaches to
        the imposition of civil or administrative penalties,” citing our Mesa
        Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1196 (11th Cir. 2005)
        (citing Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167–68 (2002));
        Robinson v. United States, 734 F.2d 735, 738 (11th Cir. 1984); and
        United States v. Castro, 883 F.2d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 1989). Maj.
        Op. at 10. It also cites United States v. James Daniel Real Property, 510
        U.S. 43, 48 (1993). Id. at 11. Yet, none of these cases addresses
        whether a cognizable property interest existed because each
        plaintiff patently had one.
              For example, in Mesa Valderrama, customs officers seized a
        $100,000 check payable to the plaintiff and other personal property.
        417 F.3d at 1192. In Robinson, the customs officers seized $82,603
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        22-10319 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part        5

        in currency. 734 F.2d at 736. In Castro, the government seized two
        cars and a boat. 883 F.2d at 1019. In James Daniel, the government
        seized a home and a four-acre parcel. 510 U.S. at 49. The issues in
        these cited cases were about the adequacy of the due process
        afforded—not whether a cognizable property interest existed.
               Second, none of the Majority’s cited “precedent” addresses
        Medicaid overpayments and/or fines, and the Majority does not
        discuss how Medicaid audits and administrative reviews work. As
        outlined below, complex federal and state rules (statutory and
        regulatory): (1) govern Medicaid reimbursements, fraudulent
        overpayments, and related fines; (2) permit Florida’s Medicaid
        Agency to audit providers and make a “probable cause
        determination” as to overpayments and fines; (3) allow the Agency
        to recoup overpayments and fines by withholding current
        payments during the fraud investigation; but (4) grant providers
        full administrative review and a formal hearing to challenge both
        the overpayment and fine determinations in the audit before they
        are final. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (setting forth, inter alia,
        requirements of state Medicaid fraud units); Fla. Stat. § 409.913
        (explaining Florida’s oversight of Medicaid providers and its
        interim recoupment authority after a “probable cause
        determination” and pending administrative review, and its ability
        to collect the money owed “upon entry of a final agency order, a
        judgment or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or a
        stipulation of settlement”). None of the Majority’s cited cases
        involve this federal and state labyrinth governing Medicaid.
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        6 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part        22-10319

                        Medicaid’s Reimbursement Process
               Third, two circuit courts have concluded medical providers
        do not have a property interest in contingent Medicaid
        reimbursements, overpayments, or fines, pending a fraud
        investigation and final administrative determination. Pers. Care
        Prods., Inc. v. Hawkins, 635 F.3d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 2011); Yorktown
        Med. Lab’y, Inc. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1991). Before
        reviewing these cases, some Medicaid background is necessary.
               Medicaid processes over a billion claims each year, and each
        claim is not inspected but paid if facially valid. As in this case, the
        Medicaid Agency by rote pays up front and later conducts
        postpayment audits to detect any overpayments or errors. Federal
        law requires state Medicaid plans to provide for procedures of
        prepayment and postpayment claims review. See 42 U.S.C.
        § 1396a(a)(37)(B). In compliance with that requirement, Florida
        promulgated laws authorizing the Agency to audit, verify, and
        withhold payment for claims submitted by Medicaid providers
        pending a final administrative determination. See Fla. Stat.
        § 409.913.
               Accordingly, if the state Agency’s audit makes “a probable
        cause determination” that a Medicaid provider was fraudulently
        overpaid in the past and owes a related fine, the Agency can
        withhold that money and related fine from current, legitimate
        payments owed to the same provider. 42 C.F.R. § 455.23; Fla. St.
        § 409.913(27). That process is called recoupment in the Medicaid
        world but, practically speaking, is an interim contractual offset by
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        22-10319 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part        7

        the state payor against current reimbursements due the medical-
        provider payee. And if the Agency pursues recoupment or an
        offset, the provider has extensive statutory and regulatory
        processes to contest the Agency’s probable cause determination as
        to overpayments and fines. The Agency’s determination of
        overpayments and fines is contingent and not final until that
        administrative-review process is complete with a Final Order, or
        the provider elects not to contest them.
                        Second and Fifth Circuits’ Decisions
                Medicaid’s specialized reimbursement and recoupment
        processes have led two sister circuits to hold that a Medicaid
        provider does not have a constitutionally protected property
        interest in Medicaid reimbursements that are subject to
        recoupment (for overpayments and/or fines) until the fraud
        investigation and the administrative process are complete. See Pers.
        Care Prods., 635 F.3d at 159 (“Nothing in Texas or federal law
        extends a property right in Medicaid reimbursements to a provider
        that is the subject of a fraud investigation . . . . Texas regulations
        plainly permit current reimbursements to be withheld pending
        investigation on prior payments, noting that ‘payments for future
        claims’ may be withheld and stating that payment holds are ‘used
        to withhold payments to providers that may be used subsequently
        to offset the overpayment or penalty amount when an
        investigation is complete.’” (alteration adopted) (emphasis added));
        Yorktown Med. Lab’y, 948 F.2d at 89 (“[The New York State
        Department of Social Services (‘DSS’)] promulgated regulations
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        8 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part               22-10319

        authorizing it to audit, verify, and withhold payment for claims
        submitted by Medicaid providers pending a DSS final
        determination. Thus, [the plaintiff] has no property interest
        grounded in either the Medicaid Act or New York regulations to
        payment for claims pending investigation to determine illegality.”).
               In its property interest discussion, the Majority ignores that
        in these circuit cases current legitimate reimbursements were
        withheld to recoup or offset both prior overpayments and fines
        until the related fraud investigation and administrative process
        were completed with a Final Order; yet the circuit courts held the
        provider had no property interest in those current reimbursements
        despite their use to recoup the penalty. It seems to me that if there
        is no cognizable property interest in current withheld
        reimbursements—a more tangible consequence—to recoup or
        offset a fine, then there is no property interest in the “probable-
        cause” fine itself before the administrative review is completed and
        a Final Order issues. The Majority fails to recognize how
        Medicaid’s contractual process works: rote payments up front,
        postpayment audits that yield only a “probable cause
        determination,” followed by a routine administrative review to
        sort out any overpayments and related fines, and only then a Final
        Order as to overpayments and related fines. 4

        4 As aptly observed by the Firth Circuit in Personal Care Products, “[p]roperty

        interests ‘are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and
        their dimensions are defined by existing rules and understandings that stem
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        22-10319 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part                  9

                           Medicaid Process as to Zen Group
                Fourth, this case involved the same Medicaid process of
        audits, recoupment, and administrative review as that before our
        sister circuits. Here, on February 14, 2019, the Agency issued its
        “Final Audit Report,” which notiﬁed Zen Group that: (1) “[t]he
        Final Audit Report constitutes a probable cause determination by
        the Agency that you were overpaid by the Medicaid program”;
        (2) “you were overpaid $1,367,839.74 for services that in whole or
        in part are not covered by Medicaid”; (3) $495 is owed for the audit
        cost; and (4) the Agency has assessed a “ﬁne of $273,567.95”
        representing 20% of the overpayment amount and $2,500.00 for
        failure to furnish Medicaid records related to overpayments. Fla.
        Admin. Code r. 59G-9.070(4)(a), (7) (prescribing 20% of the
        overpayment amount as a ﬁne for a ﬁrst oﬀense and a $2,500 ﬁne
        for a ﬁrst records violation). 5
               In addition to instructing Zen Group to remit these
        amounts, the Report notiﬁed Zen Group that the Agency may
        collect money owed (1) pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 409.913(25)(d) by

        from an independent source such as state law rules’. . . .” 635 F.3d at 158
        (quoting Bd. of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577). How Medicaid works, under federal
        and state law, impacts the existence of a constitutionally protected property
        interest. No doubt at the conclusion of Florida’s Medicaid administrative
        process, a fine imposed in a Final Order would be a wholly different matter
        than what we have in this case.
        5 These two separate amounts total the $276,067.95 fine referenced in the

        Majority Opinion. For simplicity, I also refer to them as the fine but, as shown
        above, both are directly tied to the overpayments.
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        10 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part           22-10319

        exercising the option to collect money from Medicare that is
        payable to the provider and (2) pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 409.913(27)
        by withholding Medicaid reimbursements to the provider during
        the pendency of an administrative hearing.
               The Report also clariﬁed that “all information obtained
        pursuant to this [audit] review is conﬁdential” until the Agency
        “takes ﬁnal agency action” and “requires repayment of any
        overpayment or imposes an administrative sanction [the ﬁne] by
        Final Order.” The Report advised that Zen Group had twenty-one
        days to ﬁle a petition and initiate an administrative challenge before
        the sanctions became “conclusive and ﬁnal.” In fact, Florida law
        provides that the Agency’s notice in this Final Audit Report about
        the application of sanctions “shall be the point of entry for
        administrative proceedings.” Fla. Admin. Code r. 59G-9.070(2).
               On March 7, 2019 (twenty-one days after the Report), Zen
        Group ﬁled a Petition for a formal administrative hearing to
        challenge the Agency’s probable cause determination of
        $1,367,839.74 in overpayments and the related ﬁne. 6
               As the above history well demonstrates, the Majority is ﬂatly
        wrong when it represents to the reader: “Because Florida had
        issued a Final Audit Report, only ministerial steps remained before
        the ﬁne would be levied.” Maj. Op. at 9. The Final Audit Report is

        6 During the pendency of the administrative proceedings, and as authorized

        by federal and state law, the Agency withheld payments of over $737,000 to
        Zen Group for services rendered to Medicaid patients by Zen Group unrelated
        to the Agency’s claims in the Report.
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        22-10319 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part      11

        only a “probable cause determination,” an initial step in the fraud
        investigation, and the Report basically gives notice of the audit’s
        “probable cause determination” as a point of entry to the
        administrative process, a formal hearing, and a later Final Order,
        which may or may not impose a ﬁne.
               What happened here proves my point. During those
        administrative proceedings, Zen Group served its own sanctions
        motion on the Agency. Settlement then stopped both Zen Group’s
        Petition and the Agency’s interim recoupment eﬀorts. The Agency
        paid Zen Group back about $667,000 of the $737,000 in withheld
        reimbursements, and no ﬁne was imposed. Indeed, the fulsome
        administrative process led to a favorable settlement for Zen Group.
        It makes perfect sense that the Agency conducts an audit and
        advises the provider of its probable cause determinations as to
        overpayments and ﬁnes, and then the provider can challenge them,
        and nothing is ﬁnished, or close to it, until a “Final Order.” This
        again illustrates why there is no need to decide the property-
        interest issue here. However, given the Majority elects to decide
        the issue, this further shows that Zen Group had no property
        interest in the audit’s probable cause ﬁne determination under the
        facts and procedural history here. No ﬁne was imposed, much less
        ﬁnalized, levied, or paid.
                              District Court’s Order
                Fifth, and also contrary to the Majority’s assertion, the
        district court did not rule that “Zen Group had no due-process right
        to bring an administrative challenge in the first place.” Maj. Op. at
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        12 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part      22-10319

        7. Rather, following the lead of, and citing, our sister circuits, the
        district court ruled Zen Group had failed to demonstrate a
        constitutionally protected property interest in Medicaid
        reimbursement payments, reasoning:
                Florida state law permits the Agency to withhold
                Medicaid reimbursement payments from Zen Group,
                a provider, if the Agency makes a probable cause
                determination that overpayment occurred. See
                § 409.913(27)(a), Fla. Stat. Federal regulations also
                require that the Agency suspend payments to Zen
                Group during the fraud investigation if there is a
                credible allegation of fraud unless there is good cause
                to continue payments. See 42 C.F.R. § 455.23(a)(1).
                Because Zen Group’s reimbursement payments are
                contingent on payment determinations by the
                Agency, as prescribed by state and federal rules,
                Plaintiffs do not have a property interest in the
                payments.
        Dist. Ct. Order at 10 (emphasis added). The district court
        concluded “[b]ecause plaintiffs have not alleged a constitutionally
        protected property interest, plaintiffs have not stated a § 1983 claim
        for Fourteenth Amendment violations.” Dist. Ct. Order at 11. The
        district court never indicated Zen Group did not have a due process
        right to bring an administrative challenge, which Zen Group did
        successfully.
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        22-10319 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part      13

                Tellingly too, the district court’s order addressed only
        fraudulent overpayments and current reimbursements and did not
        mention the fraud fine. Fortunately, the Majority does not address
        whether Zen Group had a property interest in fraudulent
        overpayments or the withheld current payments to recoup or
        offset them. Unfortunately, the Majority does address the
        “probable cause” determination of a fine, despite it being
        unnecessary to do so and despite the Agency’s withdrawal of any
        fine during the administrative proceedings. I do not suggest the
        fine issue was waived. But the fact that we have no district court
        ruling on it is yet another reason for my reluctance to address it in
        the first instance.
                                 Final Observation
                A sixth and final observation about the Majority’s
        conclusion that Zen Group had a civil due process right “to
        challenge the Agency’s imposition of a civil fine.” Maj. Op. at 8. It
        glides over the threshold requirement of a constitutionally
        protected property interest to state a constitutional Due Process
        claim. It emphasizes the $276,067.95 fine is “over and above the
        value of the $1.3 million in Medicaid overpayments” and severs the
        fine from the fraudulent overpayments, although the fine was tied
        to them. Maj. Op. at 8 (emphasis in original). It ignores the
        administrative process and that the fine was never final nor close
        to it. And its cited precedent does not address whether a
        cognizable, constitutionally protected property interest exists,
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        14 HULL, J., Concurring in part and Dissenting in part       22-10319

        which is necessary to trigger a due process right. Above I already
        demonstrated that. Here is yet another example.
               The majority’s text quotes footnote 12 from the Supreme
        Court’s decision in United States v. $8,850 in U. S. Currency, 461 U.S.
        555, 562 n.12 (1983) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378–
        379 (1971)), but that case also did not address whether a
        constitutionally protected property interest existed because federal
        Customs officials seized $8,850 in cash and plaintiff patently had
        one.
               I recognize the Majority cites $8,850 in U.S. Currency mainly
        for this proposition: “And the Supreme Court has stated ‘[t]he
        general rule’ is that ‘a party cannot invoke the power of the state
        to seize a person’s property without a prior judicial determination
        that the seizure is justified.’” Maj. Op. at 10 (emphasis in original).
        But the next sentences in that same footnote 12 state (1) “an
        extraordinary situation exists when the government seizes items
        subject to forfeiture” and (2) “Pearson Yacht clearly indicates that
        due process does not require federal Customs officials to conduct a
        hearing before seizing items subject to forfeiture.” $8,850 in U.S.
        Currency, 461 U.S. at 562 n.12 (citing Colero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
        Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)). My only point is this cited
        precedent also has nothing to do with cognizable property
        interests, much less Medicaid fines still under administrative
        review in connection with a fraud audit and investigation. What
        we are left with is an ipse dixit decree that a Medicaid fine, no
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        matter the facts, context, or finality, is a cognizable,
        constitutionally protected property interest.
                           Conclusion as to Section III.A
               In my view, the threshold constitutional property-interest
        question here is not as simplistic as the Majority treats it and, like
        the alleged constitutional anti-retaliation claim based on the Due
        Process Clause, should be deferred until another day.
               Alternatively, because the Majority elects to decide that
        question, I have set forth why I conclude Zen Group had no
        constitutionally protected property interest in the Final Audit
        Report’s “probable cause” determination as to the overpayment
        ﬁne that was subject to the routine administrative process and was
        never imposed, much less ﬁnalized, levied, or paid. Thus, as to
        Section III.A, I join the judgment aﬃrming the dismissal of Zen
        Group’s anti-retaliation claim under the Due Process Clause, but I
        respectfully dissent from the Majority’s ruling that Zen Group had
        a constitutionally protected property interest in the overpayment
        ﬁne under the facts and circumstances of the case.