Court Opinion

ID: 9478210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:43:12.403673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:18.188103
License: Public Domain

FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in reversal of the judgment appealed from, but do not agree that the cost shifting mechanism of Rule 68 is inappropriate in this case.
Rule 68 appears to contemplate an offer of judgment for a specified sum, with costs accrued to that point to be added by the court in the event of acceptance. A defending party may, however, recite that costs are included in the sum he specifies and, where he does so, his offer is valid under Rule 68 for exactly the specified sum. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 6, 105 S.Ct. 3012, 3015, 87 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Although the wording of the Rule makes it necessary to recite that costs are included if the offeror desires to avoid an addition of costs in the event of acceptance, nothing in the Rule has a similar impact on the matter of an attorney’s fee.1
It seems to me, therefore, that an offer of judgment for a specified sum, including costs, necessarily means that if the offer be accepted, the resulting judgment will be for the specified sum, without addition of an attorney’s fee whether or not the attorney’s fee is a part of costs.
In my view, AMOCO’s November 18 offer was plainly an offer of judgment for $525,000, and did not offer a judgment for that amount plus an attorney’s fee to be fixed by the court. Thus I do not agree that resort to extrinsic evidence is required “to determine whether AMOCO intended the offered sum of $525,000 to subsume attorney fees.” Ante, p. 400.
I do agree that although Radecki filed a formal acceptance of the offer, the circumstances, including particularly his simultaneous filing of an application for attorney’s fees, gave his “acceptance” the legal effect of a rejection for the purpose of Rule 68.
With all respect I see no reason why his failure to accept the offer as made should not have the cost shifting consequences provided in the Rule, and I do not join in *404the direction that the cost shifting mechanism shall not operate in future proceedings in this case.
In my view, the offer was plain under Rule 68 and plaintiffs’ professed understanding that the offer was for $525,000 plus an attorney’s fee is not a sufficient reason for exempting plaintiffs from the operation of the Rule if it turns out that the judgment plaintiffs obtained is not more favorable than the offer.

. The offer in Marek happened to specify that the amount included attorney’s fees. I find nothing to indicate that the explicit reference to fees was considered significant.