Court Opinion

ID: 9585085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:55:49.294045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:30.951251
License: Public Domain

FLETCHEE, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
Because the 38 month delay between Wimberly’s indictment and trial should at least trigger an analysis under Barker v. Wingo,4, I cannot join the majority opinion. I concur with the result, however, because Wimberly has failed to show that the State violated his right to a speedy trial under the factors set forth in Barker.
Despite purporting to address the “peculiar circumstances” of this case, the majority has in fact created the bright-line rule that a delay of 38 months between indictment and trial is insufficient to show the “presumptive prejudice” necessary to trigger an inquiry under Barker, so long as the State chose to try a co-defendant first. Worse still, the majority’s use of an elastic notion of “customary promptness” will undermine the efforts of similarly situated defendants, even those who experience longer delays between indictment and trial, to enforce their right to a speedy trial.
*68The supposed reason for holding that the 38 month delay in this case is insufficient to trigger an inquiry under Barker is that the State has proceeded with “customary promptness.”5 The majority cites a number of cases in which longer than 38 months elapsed between indictment and trial, but none of those cases dealt with whether the defendant had made a showing of “presumptive prejudice” in a speedy trial challenge.6 Further, there are just as many or more death penalty cases in which the State proceeded from indictment to trial in less than 38 months,7 even in complicated trials involving multiple defendants in which the State chose to try a co-defendant first.8 Because the concept of “customary promptness” can apparently be stretched to fit the “peculiar circumstances” of any case, the majority opinion undercuts a defendant’s ability to enforce his right to a speedy trial.
The damage inflicted upon that right is unnecessary, however, because Wimberly has failed to establish that his right to a speedy trial has been violated under the Barker factors.9 First, the delay in this case is not so lengthy as to be patently unjustifiable, as evidenced by all the similar cases that took as long to proceed to trial. Second, because the delay in this case has been caused, at least in part, by the State’s decision to prosecute Wimberly’s co-defendant first, this case is distinguishable from those involving inexcusable neglect. Third, as the trial court noted in its ruling, Wimberly has failed to show how his purported “alibi defense” has suffered any actual prejudice as a result of the delay.
I cannot join the majority opinion because it fails to articulate any justifiable grounds for concluding that 38 months is insufficient time to trigger an inquiry under Barker, and because in failing to do so, it undermines the ability of future defendants to protect this important right. Because Wimberly’s right to a speedy trial has not been violated, however, I concur in the result.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this special concurrence.
*69Decided February 7, 2005
Reconsideration denied March 7, 2005.
Randall M. Clark, Bart G. Altman, for appellant.
Stephen D. Kelley, District Attorney, Charles K Higgins, Leslie K. DeVooght, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for appellee.

 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972).

 Majority opinion, p. 66.

 Id. at pp. 66-67. Indeed, none of the majority’s cases involved a speedy trial challenge at all.

 See, e.g., Cross v. State, 271 Ga. 427 (520 SE2d 457) (1999) (15 month delay between indictment and trial); Carruthers v. State, 272 Ga. 306 (528 SE2d 217) (2000) (17 month delay between indictment and trial); Kites v. State, 274 Ga. 312 (553 SE2d 563) (2001) (11 month delay between indictment and trial).

 See, e.g., Butts v. State, 273 Ga. 760 (546 SE2d 472) (2001) (30 month delay between indictment and trial, which followed trial of co-defendant); Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377 (552 SE2d 855) (2001) (20 month delay between indictment and trial, which followed trial of co-defendant).

 407 U. S. at 530.