Court Opinion

ID: 9409038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 18:04:04.213662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.452210
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/14/23 P. v. Martinez-Delgado CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B324286

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. VA064201)
         v.

JESUS MARTINEZ-DELGADO,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lee W. Tsao, Judge. Reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
      Karyn H. Bucur, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S.
Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
       The trial court summarily denied appellant Jesus
Martinez-Delgado’s motion to vacate his conviction. (Pen. Code,
§ 1473.7.)1 Appellant argues that he “did not know that his
guilty plea and the subsequent conviction would lead to
mandatory deportation.” Without addressing the merits of
appellant’s claim of ignorance, we conclude that the court erred
as a matter of law by failing to conduct a hearing on the motion.
(Id., subd. (d).) We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       This is appellant’s second appeal challenging the validity of
his guilty plea. We quote our opinion from People v. Martinez-
Delgado (Sept. 23, 2020, B303417) [nonpub. opn.] (Martinez-
Delgado).
       “Appellant was charged with two felony drug offenses. On
May 11, 2001, he pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine base for
sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5.) The court found a factual
basis for the plea. It sentenced appellant to 120 days in jail and
three years of formal probation.” (Martinez-Delgado, supra,
B303417.)
       “In April 2004, appellant ran a red light at high speed,
nearly colliding with a police patrol car. When stopped, he failed
to produce a driver’s license and said he was on probation for a
narcotic offense. During a probation search, officers found a
plastic bag with $1,320 in cash hidden in the dashboard, bullets,
and bags hidden in the car door panels containing 24.95 grams of
tar heroin and 22.79 grams of cocaine base. As a result, the court
revoked appellant’s probation and sentenced him to the midterm
of four years in prison.” (Martinez-Delgado, supra, B303417.)

      1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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       “In 2019, appellant petitioned for a writ of coram nobis,
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel purportedly
failed to advise appellant that entering a guilty plea made him
subject to mandatory deportation. Appellant declared that he
would have elected to proceed to trial, had he received proper
advice. The court denied the petition.” (Martinez-Delgado,
supra, B303417.)
       “We appointed counsel to represent appellant in his appeal
from the denial of his petition. After examining the record,
counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues. (People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441–443.) We advised appellant that he
could personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished
to raise on appeal. He did not submit a supplemental brief.”
(Martinez-Delgado, supra, B303417.)
       “In his signed guilty plea, appellant initialed boxes stating
he discussed each waiver of his rights and consequence of his plea
with his attorney and ‘I understand that if I am not a citizen of
the United States, the conviction for the offense charged may
have the consequences of deportation.’ At the plea hearing,
appellant was warned, ‘If you are not a citizen, you are hereby
advised that a conviction of the offense for which you have been
charged may have the consequences of deportation.’ The record
supports the court’s finding that appellant ‘was clearly advised of
the consequences of possible deportation’ when he entered his
plea.” (Martinez-Delgado, supra, B303417.) We affirmed the
order denying appellant’s petition.
       In August 2022, appellant moved in propria persona to
vacate his conviction pursuant to section 1473.7. He argued that
counsel was ineffective for failing to advise appellant of the
deportation consequences of his plea or negotiating a plea that

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would have avoided deportation; the plea was not knowing,
intelligent, or voluntary. If he were properly advised, “I would
have elected to proceed to trial.” Appellant avers that counsel
misled him, “never translated discovery documents into Spanish,”
and “did nothing to lower his sentence or obtain a more favorable
plea agreement.” He asked the court to appoint counsel and hold
a hearing.
       The court summarily denied appellant’s motion, finding
him ineligible for relief. Specifically, though appellant completed
his sentence in California for his drug conviction, he is now
incarcerated in federal prison in Florida; therefore, he failed to
show he is not currently “a sentenced prisoner.”
       Appellant “strongly disagree[d]” that he cannot seek relief
while in federal custody, after completing his state sentence. He
asked the court to appoint counsel and reconsider its ruling. The
court granted appellant a certificate of probable cause.
                           DISCUSSION
       Since 2017, “[a] person who is no longer in criminal
custody” may move to vacate a conviction or sentence that “is
legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving
party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) The statute is retroactive
and applies to persons convicted or sentenced before 2017, if its
requirements are met. (People v. Perez (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
818, 827–828.) The order on a motion to vacate is appealable.
(§ 1473.7, subd. (f).)
       The statute specifies, “All motions shall be entitled to a
hearing. Upon the request of the moving party, the court may
hold the hearing without the personal presence of the moving

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party provided that it finds good cause as to why the moving
party cannot be present.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (d), italics added.)
This “plain language” entitles the moving party to a hearing and
to be present at it. (People v. Fryhaat (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 969,
977.) An indigent party is entitled to appointed counsel if the
motion “set[s] forth factual allegations stating a prima facie case
for entitlement to relief.” (Id. at p. 981.)
       Respondent concedes that appellant was deprived of the
hearing mandated by section 1473.7, subdivision (d).2 The court
did not appoint counsel or hear written or oral testimony
regarding appellant’s understanding of his plea or whether trial
counsel advised him of its consequences.
       The trial court found that appellant does not qualify for
relief because his motion was sent from federal prison in Florida.
Appellant avers that he placed his moving papers in the hands of
an employee at the prison, for mailing to California. From this,
the court deduced that appellant is not “[a] person who is no
longer in criminal custody.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a).)
       The statute and case law do not support the trial court’s
interpretation. The question is not whether the moving party is
in custody somewhere for a crime unrelated to the conviction that
is the subject of the section 1473.7 motion. Appellant is no longer
in state custody for the crime that is the subject of his motion.
Instead, he is in federal custody, for an unknown reason.
       “[T]he Legislature intended [section 1473.7, subdivision (a)]
to mean a person may file a motion to vacate a conviction
provided the person is no longer in criminal custody for that
particular conviction, and nothing more.” (People v. Rodriguez

      2Respondent does not concede that appellant’s motion is
meritorious and lists hurdles he must surmount.

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(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 314.) “[T]o interpret the statute
otherwise, as allowing those for whom a conviction is invalid to
challenge it only if they are not in custody for an unrelated
offense, would thwart the Legislature’s purpose of providing a
means for a person who cannot seek habeas corpus to challenge a
conviction on an offense that had adverse immigration
consequences,” after the sentence expires. (Ibid.) The court’s
conclusion that appellant is disqualified from relief owing to his
federal incarceration is legal error. (Id. at p. 315.)
       We reverse and remand the case for a hearing pursuant to
section 1473.7, subdivision (d). On remand, the court should
appoint counsel if appellant is indigent and sets forth a prima
facie case for relief. (People v. Fryhaat, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 978, 983–984.)
       The court should consider, among other things, whether
appellant’s motion is timely (§ 1473.7, subd. (b)); evidence
showing if the consequences were explained to him and appellant
understood his plea (People v. Villalba (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 659,
671–672); objective evidence demonstrating a reasonable
probability he would have obtained a more favorable outcome if
he rejected the plea (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311,
320–321; People v. Lopez (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 698, 714–715);
and any evidence showing the prosecutor “was willing to agree to
an immigration safe disposition.” (People v. Perez, supra, 19
Cal.App.5th at pp. 829–830.) Appellant has the burden of
proving ineffective assistance of counsel “based on facts, not
speculation” (id. at pp. 830–831) after giving counsel “timely
advance notice.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (g).)

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                          DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s denial of appellant’s Penal Code section
1473.7 motion is reversed and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                         LUI, P. J.
We concur:

     ASHMANN-GERST, J.

     HOFFSTADT, J.

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