Court Opinion

ID: 9854420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:07:30.198731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:04.617925
License: Public Domain

DONOFRIO, Judge
(specially concurring) :
Although I agree with my colleagues that the record supports the fact that the defendant was guilty of refusing to leave the courtroom after Rule 27 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure had been invoked, I am unable to agree with their holding that because we are dealing with the Rules *264of Criminal Procedure we are precluded from going into the merits of this case relating to the constitutional questions.
The mere fact that the Supreme Court may have inherent or constitutional authority to adopt Rules of Criminal Procedure does not in and of itself prevent the Court of Appeals from considering the constitutionality of the rules as they may be involved in an appeal, provided the Supreme Court had not already passed on the matter.
I find no quarrel with the cases cited by the majority, however I am unable to read into their reasoning that the Supreme Court holds that once they have adopted a rule of criminal procedure any case on appeal involving the constitutionality of such a rule must not be inquired into by this Court. This in effect is what is being done here as the facts are not in dispute and only the constitutional questions are being presented for the first time.
There is no position which is more clear in American jurisprudence than that every act of authority contrary to the mandates of the Constitution, the supreme law of the the land, is void. “To deny this, would be to affirm * * * that men, acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.” The Federalist #78. This axiom of our law was clearly pointed out in that landmark case, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) :
“Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”
The majority in effect holds that every appeal which attacks the constitutionality of a rule of criminal procedure could not be inquired into by this Court even though it might involve a constitutional question for the first time, and even though at the time of the adoption of the rule by the Supreme Court it may have been oblivious to the particular facts involved in the appeal and the effect of the rule they were adopting as applied to those facts. I do not believe this is tli. import of the cases cited.
Our Supreme Court in Marsin v. Udall, 78 Ariz. 309, 279 P.2d 721 (1955), has recognized that sometimes procedural rules affect valuable substantive rights. They acknowledged that neither the Supreme Court nor the Superior Court can by rule of procedure deprive a party of substantive rights. The case dealt with rules regarding the disqualification of judges. In refusing to apply a rule which would deprive the defendant of the right to a fair and impartial judge, the Court stated:
“ * * * Neither this court nor the superior court can by rule of procedure deprive a party of the opportunity to exercise this right. Courts cannot enact substantive law. A court is limited to passing rules which prescribe procedure for exercising the right. Any rule of court that operates to lessen or eliminate the right is of no legal force. It has even been held by the Supreme Court of the United States that under some circumstances a procedure that had such effect offended the due process clause of the Federal constitution. Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749, 50 A.L.R. 1243.” 78 Ariz. at 312, 279 P.2d at 723.
This is a changing world and many complexities are arising because of these changes. I cannot believe that the Supreme Court when they promulgated each rule had in mind all things that might occur in the future. It would be too much to expect them to have consciously thought out the constitutional aspects of each of the rules at the time of its adoption. There is not the same advocacy proceedings to test a rule when it is adopted as when the trial takes effect.
The Constitution is made for all time and not for one particular period. As time goes on there are new problems and dimensions to life, new practices and ideas. *265An attack to a rule may require a study of that rule in the light of these changes. The Court of Appeals, like the Supreme Court, takes an oath to support the Constitution. Unless the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutional question involved in the appeal this Court would he derelict in its duty if it did not consider the question. Neither would assistance in the enforcement of an unconstitutional rule be in keeping with this oath.
There are several examples of the federal intermediate appellate courts construing the validity of rules espoused by the United States Supreme Court. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 108 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1939), the Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the ultimate question to be determined was the validity of Rule 35(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The federal intermediate appellate court felt no inhibition which would preclude it from entering into an investigation of the validity of the rules espoused by a higher court. When that case was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, there was not the slightest attempt to curtail the lower court’s jurisdiction in this area. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed 479 (1940).
Compare the above case with Murphree v. Mississippi Pub. Corp., 149 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1945), where the federal intermediate appellate court felt that since their superior court had promulgated the rules they could do nothing other than conclude that the court had the power to do so. That Court of Appeals was properly chastised by the Supreme Court when that same case later reached the Supreme Court:
“ * * * The fact that this Court promulgated the rules as formulated and recommended by the Advisory Committee does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning or consistency. * * * ” Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444, 66 S.Ct. 242, 90 L.Ed. 185 (1946).
Unless expressly precluded from doing so, common sense would require a court of appeals to decide all of the issues in an appealable case.
Protection of the rights of individuals is the foundation upon which the superstructure of American jurisprudence was constructed. No judicial authority from the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court to a Justice of the Peace may emasculate from the Constitution common law rights preserved therein.
I therefore submit that this Court not affirm the conviction of Walter Meek until after due examination of the constitutionality of Rule 27 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and a determination of whether the enforcement of this Rule under punishment of contempt violates the defendant’s constitutional rights.