Court Opinion

ID: 9639734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:46:32.582975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:21.437831
License: Public Domain

SPEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
What the court has really decided today is that an injured tort victim should not be held to his bargain if the bargain later appears unfair. In order to reach this result, the court relies on the doctrine of mutual mistake and a long string citation. Yet, the reality is that the cases from other jurisdictions present a jumbled mish-mash of reasonings and results. The “mutual mistake” rationale does not adequately explain their holdings. See Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal.2d 97, 28 Cal.Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579, 587 (1963). Therefore, rather than trying to resolve this case by simple string citation, the court ought to engage in a straight-forward analysis of the issue. Cf Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.L. Rev. 457, 466-67 (1897) (encouraging the candid articulation of judicial reasoning).
Two competing interests are involved. On the one hand, the law favors the peaceful settlement of disputes and the orderly resolution of claims. On the other hand, the law favors the just compensation of accident victims. Our dilemma is to resolve these competing interests, and we ought to do so openly rather than hiding behind the facade of mutual mistake.
Because I believe the law, in general, is better served by encouraging settlements, *266I would uphold the release and affirm the summary judgment in favor of Glash. In its effort to afford equitable relief, the court renders useless most releases. How is one to buy peace and settle a claim? If the release here can be avoided, then no release buys peace until the statute of limitations has run. “Consideration of the conduct of the parties and the information available to them at the time” will present a fact question so as to require a trial in every instance. Bad facts make bad law and that is what has happened here.
Insurers are now faced with a Hobson’s choice. If they settle claims promptly, they are not protected from the later assertion of unknown claims. If they refuse to settle until all injuries are known, then they face potential liability under a bad faith claim. See Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America, 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1988). Their only alternative is to settle known damages only and this defeats their reason for settling. What the insurer wants is to buy peace and put an end to any further claims; this is the very essence of its position. Any mistake as to the nature of injuries is strictly unilateral, not mutual.
Courts cannot legitimately cast themselves in the role of saving people from bad bargains. This sort of benevolent paternalism oversteps the boundaries of our proper role in society. In the short run, it may make life easier for one injured party, but in the long run it distorts the law and creates more problems than it solves. The Maryland court expressed a similar view when it stated:
We are convinced that our society will be best served by adherence to the traditional methodology for interpreting con-tracts_ In our view, the bastardization of the well-founded principles concerning mutual mistake of fact is entirely too high a price to pay for the obtention of an unprincipled, if temporarily desirable, result.
Bernstein v. Kapneck, 290 Md. 452, 430 A.2d 602, 606-608 (1981). And numerous other sister states have also refused to go along with the so-called “modern trend.” 1 Boles v. Blackstock, 484 So.2d 1077 (Ala.1986); Kennedy v. Bateman, 217 Ga. 458, 123 S.E.2d 656 (1961); Castro v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 83 Ill.2d 358, 47 Ill.Dec. 360, 415 N.E.2d 365 (Ill.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941, 101 S.Ct. 3086, 69 L.Ed.2d 956 (1981); Hybarger v. American States Ins. Co., 498 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind.Ct.App.-1st Dist.1986); Reynard v. Bradshaw, 196 Kan. 97, 409 P.2d 1011 (1966); Johns v. Kubaugh, 450 S.W.2d 259 (Ky.1970); Tewksbury v. Fellsway Laundry, Inc., 319 Mass. 386, 65 N.E.2d 918 (1946); Pearson v. Weaver, 252 Miss. 724, 173 So.2d 666, 669 (1965); Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477 (Mo.1972); Sibson v. Farmers Ins. Group, 88 Nev. 417, 498 P.2d 1331 (1972); Maltais v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 318, 386 A.2d 1264 (1978)2; Raroha v. Earle Finance Corp., 47 N.J. 229, 220 A.2d 107 (1966); Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co., 229 Or. 360, 366 P.2d 527 (1961); Emery v. Mackiewicz, 429 Pa. 322, 240 A.2d 68 (1968); Boccarossa v. Watkins, 112 R.I. 551, 313 A.2d 135 (1973).
Moreover, in some of the cases that have allowed releases to be avoided, the courts have at least moderated their decisions by imposing a higher burden of proof on the plaintiff. They have required clear and convincing proof that a mutual mistake was made or that the release was not fairly and knowingly made. E.g., Witt v. Wat*267kins, 579 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1978); Ranta v. Rake, 91 Idaho 376, 421 P.2d 747 (1966); Birch v. Keen, 449 P.2d 700 (Okla.1969); Seaboard Ice Co. v. Lee, 199 Va. 243, 99 S.E.2d 721 (1957). By refusing to impose any higher burden, this court steps beyond even these more moderate decisions in other jurisdictions.
Finally, almost as an afterthought, the court looks to Texas precedent. In order to allow for the invalidation of this release, the court must overrule Houston & T.C.R. Co. v. McCarty, 94 Tex. 298, 60 S.W. 429 (1901) and must disapprove Lawson v. Ulschmid, 578 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Pruitt, 539 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Berry v. Guyer, 482 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.); and McClellan v. Boehmer, 700 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ). In all of these cases, Texas courts upheld the validity of personal injury releases, and the Ulschmid case even involved the same “200-1” notation as exists in this case. This is a lot of Texas precedent for the court to address it in such a summary fashion.
I can understand the desire to do equity,3 but the court’s decision today is too one-sided to fall under the rubric of equity. If the court is determined to reach this result, it ought to at least be candid about its reasons. I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
COOK and HECHT, JJ., join in this dissent.

. I dislike the use of string-cites, but it was the majority’s choice to rely on this mode of analysis. I would be happy to delete all citation to other states and rely solely on Texas authority for this decision.

. The majority attacks Maltais as an example of how, for each case that upheld a release, "it is far from clear that those courts would uphold the release before the court today." However, the same can be said of the cases cited by the majority. In cases that have invalidated releases, it is far from clear that those courts would invalidate the release before this court today. See, e.g., Dorman v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 231 Kan. 128, 642 P.2d 976, 978 (1982) (In an FELA suit for back injuries, the court recognized a fact question on mistake since the release specifically described the plaintiffs injuries as being "to my left thigh and a laceration to my forehead.”).

. I would prefer that Texas address this problem by legislation rather than by judicial fiat. For example, in Idaho, a personal injury release executed within fifteen days after the occurrence may be disavowed at anytime within one year after the occurrence. Idaho Code § 29-113 (1961). For other similar statutes, see also Md.Ann.Code art. 79, § 11 (1957); Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-3 (1953); N.D.Cent.Code § 9-08-08 (1987); Cal.Civ.Code § 1542 (West 1982); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 17, § 3964 (1964); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-572a (1958).