Court Opinion

ID: 9364000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 01:05:21.91717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:35.276784
License: Public Domain

01/17/2023

                                         DA 21-0310
                                                                                   Case Number: DA 21-0310

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                         2023 MT 9N

STATE OF MONTANA,

              Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

GALEN LEWIS HAWK,

              Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:          District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
                      In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC-20-322
                      Honorable Shane A. Vannatta, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

               For Appellant:

                      Gregory D. Birdsong, Birdsong Law Office, Santa Fe, New Mexico

               For Appellee:

                      Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Cori Losing, Assistant
                      Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                      Kirsten Pabst, Missoula County Attorney, Missoula, Montana

                                                Submitted on Briefs: December 14, 2022

                                                          Decided: January 17, 2023

Filed:
                                    ir--6--if
                      __________________________________________
                                       Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1    Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2    Galen Lewis Hawk (Hawk) appeals from the Montana Fourth Judicial District

Court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his no contest plea. We affirm.

¶3    On June 20, 2020, several neighbors witnessed Hawk slashing a car’s tires. One

neighbor asked Hawk to leave. Hawk approached that neighbor with a knife he removed

from a sheath. Hawk moved the knife toward the neighbor. The neighbor dodged the knife

and yelled for someone to call the police. Hawk abandoned the knife and left the area.

Law enforcement responded to a neighbor’s call regarding the incident. They found Hawk

with an empty sheath.

¶4    On June 30, 2020, the Missoula County Attorney filed an Information charging

Hawk with assault with a deadly weapon. On July 9, 2020, Hawk was arraigned in district

court. The District Court confirmed Hawk had reviewed the Information. The court also

provided Hawk with an overview of his rights. Hawk pleaded not guilty. On July 13,

2020, Hawk filed an executed Acknowledgement of Rights form.

¶5    On December 10, 2020, Hawk’s counsel notified the District Court at the second

pretrial conference that the parties had reached a plea agreement. On December 16, 2020,

                                            2
during a change of plea hearing, Hawk’s counsel told the court that he had discussed the

“main provisions about when one pleads guilty,” including specific rights, with Hawk.

However, Hawk’s counsel did not file a signed guilty plea and waiver at that hearing.

Counsel instead planned to sign the form on Hawk’s behalf after the hearing. The court

urged Hawk’s counsel to review the waiver of rights with Hawk before filing.

¶6     Hawk did not object to the District Court’s proposal nor to his counsel signing the

plea on his behalf. Hawk confirmed to the court that he was not under the influence of any

substances, that he was satisfied with his representation, and that he had adequate time to

review his rights with his counsel. Hawk also represented that he understood that pleading

guilty would include waiving his right to a jury trial, his right to challenge the State’s

evidence, and the rights his counsel previously described to him. Hawk declined the

court’s offer to ask any further questions about his rights and his waiver of those rights. In

relevant part, the court and Hawk engaged in the following colloquy:

       THE COURT: And you’ve heard the representations of [your counsel] today
       as to your rights. Have you had adequate time to review all of your rights
       with [your counsel]?

       THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

       THE COURT: And you understand today that if you make a decision to
       change your plea from not guilty to guilty with regard to any of the charges
       filed by the State, that effectively you will be giving up many of your legal
       rights, including the rights identified by [your counsel]: the right to a jury
       trial, the right to challenge the State’s evidence, all of those rights. Do you
       understand that?

       THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

       THE COURT: And are you comfortable waiving your rights and proceeding
       to a change of plea?

                                              3
       THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

       THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all about any of your rights?

       THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

The court read a summary of the allegations in the Information before Hawk entered a plea

of guilty.

¶7     Hawk’s counsel interjected when the District Court asked Hawk to provide his

account of the incident that gave rise to the allegations and advised the court that the parties

had reached an agreement that Hawk could enter a no contest plea. The court told Hawk

that a no contest plea would amount to him “effectively agreeing that if the State brought

this matter before trial, that they could prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that you

engaged in” the alleged conduct. Hawk specifically asserted his “desire to enter a no

contest plea.” On December 22, 2020, Hawk’s counsel filed the signed plea agreement,

which included a signature made on “behalf of Galen Lewis Clark.”

¶8     On February 4, 2021, the District Court held a sentencing hearing. Hawk requested

to withdraw his no contest plea. Hawk alleged that his counsel did not inform him in

advance that he was pleading no contest rather than guilty. The court asked Hawk to clarify

whether he intended to change his plea. Hawk claimed his counsel reached an agreement

with the State without consulting Hawk. The court reiterated that a no contest plea “is

something less than . . . a plea of guilty[.]” Hawk said he understood the significance of a

no contest plea. The court asked Hawk which plea he would enter if the no contest plea

were to be withdrawn. Hawk did not directly answer that question. He responded that he

                                               4
wanted to withdraw his no contest plea because he had yet to sign a plea bargain agreement

in person. The court postponed the sentencing.

¶9     On February 18, 2021, the District Court hosted a status conference. When the court

asked Hawk to clarify his desire to withdraw his no contest plea, Hawk contended that

counsel had misled him to believe that he had no chance of going to trial, claimed that his

counsel had a conflict of interest, and alleged his counsel had inadequately represented him

by conducting limited discovery and withholding discovery from Hawk. In response to

Hawk’s claims of conflict, his counsel requested the court to appoint conflict counsel. The

court declined that request. The court concluded that Hawk was “clear headed” and had

received a complete review of his rights during the change of plea hearing. The court

regarded the conflict identified by Hawk as merely a “personal conflict” rather than a

technical one and specified that Hawk, rather than his counsel, had the burden of

establishing a conflict.

¶10    On March 5, 2021, Hawk’s counsel filed a Notice in Support of Defendant’s Motion

to Withdraw No Contest Plea (Notice) in fulfillment of the District Court’s request. Hawk

made several allegations in the Notice: other inmates receiving better deals revealed his

counsel’s conflict of interest; his counsel withheld discovery from him; his counsel’s belief

that Hawk did not have a viable defense demonstrated deficient performance; and, he did

not intend to plead no contest but did so only at the instruction of his counsel.

¶11    At a hearing on March 19, 2021, the State claimed Hawk received adequate

representation. Hawk again indicated that he was confused by his counsel pleading no

contest on his behalf. Hawk verified that he had read the Notice, and the court went over

                                              5
each of the allegations in the Notice. The court entered a Gillham order,1 and, on April 5,

2021, presided over a Gallagher hearing.2

¶12    Regarding the alleged conflict, Hawk’s counsel explained that settlements of other

cases had no bearing on the deal in Hawk’s case because of the idiosyncratic nature of each

case. The District Court similarly reasoned that each plea offer is “highly dependent on

the facts” of the case at issue.

¶13    Regarding alleged withholding of discovery, Hawk’s counsel countered Hawk’s

claim that Hawk only received a copy of the police report by retelling a counsel-client

meeting during which Hawk had the chance to review nearly all discovery in the case.

Hawk admitted that he had received more discovery than the police report. The District

Court summarized that Hawk had the “opportunity to review” several pieces of discovery

and “had met personally with [his counsel] about” that evidence.

¶14    Regarding the alleged inadequate discovery, Hawk’s counsel testified that they

declined to interview the witness neighbors because each of the neighbors had a similar

account of the episode. The District Court was in possession of video evidence establishing

the consistencies in the respective witnesses’ accounts. The uniformity of their accounts

1
  In re Gillham, 216 Mont. 279, 704 P.2d 1019 (1985); see Marble v. State, 2007 MT 98, ¶ 4, 337
Mont. 99, 169 P.3d 1148 (“An attorney ordered to respond pursuant to a Gillham order issued by
a district court shall not be subject to disciplinary proceeding before the Commission on Practice
nor be subject to charges of malpractice. This immunity extends to all information, testimony or
documents necessarily provided in response to the allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel.”)
2
  State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 39, ¶ 7, 304 Mont. 215, 19 P.3d 817 (describing a closed hearing to
“determine if the defendant could show by a preponderance of the evidence whether he received a
fair trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel”).
                                                6
undermined Hawk’s interpretation of the police report that one of the neighbors would

testify to Hawk being provoked before wielding his knife.

¶15    Regarding the plea, counsel recounted his efforts to explain the no contest plea to

Hawk. Hawk reiterated that he was not aware of the plan to file a no contest plea and stated

to the court that based on the evidence he had seen, he “might as well have said guilty.”

The District Court concluded that it was reasonable for Hawk’s counsel to advise him to

enter a no contest plea, and denied Hawk’s motion to withdraw his no contest plea on the

basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶16    On April 9, 2021, the District Court held a sentencing hearing during which Hawk

again expressed his desire to withdraw his no contest plea. Hawk explained that a change

in his medications contributed to him not understanding the no contest plea he entered.

The court granted Hawk additional time to file a formal motion to raise any new

justifications for the withdrawal of his no contest plea. On April 14, 2021, Hawk’s counsel

submitted a Notice of Filing on behalf of Hawk advising the court that the defense would

not file a motion to withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea.

¶17    On April 23, 2021, the District Court held a sentencing hearing; Hawk’s counsel

told the court that Hawk was likely not prepared to proceed. Hawk confirmed his lack of

readiness because he was still “trying to figure out certain things,” such as how to withdraw

his plea. The court expressed that it had already heard Hawk’s rationale for withdrawing

his plea and, thus, proceeded with the hearing. The court sentenced Hawk pursuant to the

terms of the plea agreement.

                                              7
¶18    On appeal, Hawk challenges the validity of his no contest plea agreement by

claiming the agreement did not constitute a valid, enforceable contract, that he did not

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently enter his no contest plea, and that he had good

cause to withdraw his plea. He also argues the District Court erred by not appointing new

counsel to represent Hawk following his request to withdraw his no contest plea.

¶19    The ultimate issue of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is a mixed question of law

and fact, which we review de novo. State v. Warclub, 2005 MT 149, ¶ 14, 327 Mont. 352,

114 P.3d 254. If the defendant was aware of the consequences of the plea, and if the plea

was not induced by threats, misrepresentation, or improper promises, we will not overturn

a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw plea. State v. Garner, 2014 MT 312, ¶ 27,

377 Mont. 173, 339 P.3d 1.

On the District Court’s Failure to Appoint Conflict Counsel

¶20    Hawk challenges the District Court’s decision not to provide him with conflict

counsel to represent him on his request to withdraw his no contest plea. The State argues

that because Hawk raised the issue of whether conflict counsel should be appointed at the

February 18, 2021 status conference this Court ought to refrain from invoking plain error

review. The fact that the District Court considered the request for appointment of a new

attorney is sufficient for review by this Court.

¶21    The State asserts that the District Court committed no reversible error because Hawk

was afforded opportunities to further explain his motion without speaking through counsel

and because the court concluded that it did not have concerns of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

                                              8
¶22   Hawk was entitled to more than the chance to advocate for himself; he was entitled

to adequate representation at all critical stages in the proceedings. In State v. Johnson,

2019 MT 34, ¶ 20, 394 Mont. 245, 435 P.3d 64, we held that a district court assessing the

need for substitute counsel must focus its inquiry of an alleged conflict or breakdown in

the counsel-client relationship and determine whether the defendant demonstrated good

cause justifying substitute counsel. Johnson, ¶ 20. We determined that disagreement

between counsel and defendant over matters such as defense tactics and trial strategy—

issues potentially relevant to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim—could lead to an

irreconcilable conflict or complete breakdown in communication, justifying substitute

counsel. Johnson, ¶ 20. Additionally, we directed district courts conducting such an

inquiry to focus on whether the defendant presented material facts showing good cause for

his substitution request as demonstrated by: (1) an actual conflict of interest; (2) an

irreconcilable conflict between counsel and the defendant; or (3) a complete breakdown in

communication between counsel and the defendant. Johnson, ¶ 20.

¶23   In State v. DeWise, 2022 MT 145, ¶ 29, 409 Mont. 284, 513 P.3d 1249, we

concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the

defendant failed to raise substantial complaints about his counsel. DeWise expressed a

“general belief that counsel provided ineffective assistance” based on their “independent

strategic assessments and [his belief that they] had not spent enough time with him

personally or had not developed a satisfactory defense” did not result in this Court

reversing the district court’s decision. DeWise, ¶ 29. We affirmed the district court’s

                                            9
decision, in part, because DeWise failed to allege “any breakdown in communication or an

irreconcilable conflict[.]” DeWise, ¶ 29.

¶24    Hawk did continue to express that he was confused about the no contest plea.

However, he did not provide the District Court with facts that demonstrated good cause

justifying substitute counsel.   The court engaged in separate interviews with Hawk

personally and conducted a Gallagher hearing where counsel detailed their

communications with Hawk. Based on this record, we cannot conclude that it was an abuse

of discretion not to appoint conflict counsel.

On the District Court’s Denial of Hawk’s Motion to Withdraw His No Contest Plea

¶25    Hawk points to several instances in the record at which he seemed confused about

the meaning of different kinds of pleas to indicate that he did not knowingly, voluntarily,

and intelligently plead no contest.      Additionally, Hawk claims that the ineffective

assistance of counsel he received rendered him unable to enter an enforceable plea

agreement.

¶26    The State argues that the record counters the arguments offered by Hawk. First, the

State points out that Hawk’s counsel discussed Hawk’s rights and the ramifications of

waiving those rights with Hawk. Second, the State highlights that Hawk confirmed that

his attorney disclosed those rights. And, third, the State notes that the colloquy between

the District Court and Hawk at the change of plea hearing added to the explanation of rights

that Hawk’s counsel already provided.

                                             10
¶27    Hawk’s plea agreement was valid. Hawk was advised on multiple occasions of the

significance of a no contest plea and he did not object to having his counsel sign the

agreement on his behalf.

¶28    Hawk was aware of the consequences of his no contest plea.                 The record

demonstrates that Hawk’s counsel discussed the plea agreement with Hawk including its

main provisions, such as waiver of the right to a trial, to appeal, to challenge the State’s

evidence, and to subpoena witnesses. The District Court ensured that Hawk was aware of

these consequences by reiterating Hawk’s rights, checking if Hawk understood the

ramifications of waiving those rights, and providing Hawk with a chance to ask any

questions about those rights. At the change of plea hearing, the court responded to Hawk’s

counsel disclaiming that Hawk may not have read the guilty plea and waiver of rights form

by specifically asking Hawk if he had done so. Hawk replied that he had “done that now.”

And, as Hawk acknowledges, the court methodically checked to make sure he was fit to

proceed, that he was satisfied with his representation, and that he knew the legal

ramifications of entering the plea agreement. Hawk replied to each of the court’s efforts

to protect and explain his rights and did not suggest any violation of his rights. Finally, the

court recounted the allegations and charges against Hawk before Hawk’s counsel expressed

that Hawk planned to enter a no contest plea. After the court explained the purpose of a

no contest plea, it checked with Hawk that it was his desire to enter a no contest plea. Hawk

responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”

¶29    Hawk did not enter his no contest plea as a result of threat, misrepresentation, or

improper promises. Both Hawk’s counsel and the District Court repeatedly and clearly

                                              11
outlined Hawk’s various options as well as the differences between those options. The

record does not contain any evidence of threats inducing Hawk’s willingness to enter his

no contest plea.    The record also does not contain evidence of improper promises

motivating Hawk to enter his no contest plea. In line with the framework this Court

established in Garner, we uphold the court’s denial of Hawk’s motion to withdraw his no

contest plea.

¶30    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review.

¶31    Affirmed.

                                                 /S/ MIKE McGRATH

We Concur:

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JIM RICE

                                            12