Court Opinion

ID: 9905897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:11:05.158415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:58.055189
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re L.S., 2023-Ohio-4321.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE L.S.                                     :
                                                                No. 112698
A Minor Child                                  :

[Appeal by Former Foster Parents]              :

                                               :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 30, 2023

             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                    Juvenile Division
                                 Case No. AD-19-901719

                                        Appearances:

                 Christina M. Joliat, for appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                 The former foster parents (collectively “appellants”) of the child at issue

in this appeal, L.S., appeal from the juvenile court’s April 21, 2023 judgment

overruling their objections to a magistrate’s decision and affirming, approving, and
adopting the decision. The magistrate’s decision was issued on April 7, 2023, and

denied appellants’ amended motion for legal custody and immediate visitation.

Appellants also appeal from the court’s April 24, 2023 judgment overruling their

objections to the magistrate’s recommendation, also contained in the April 7, 2023

decision, that appellants’ motion for referral to the diagnostic clinic and for

emergency visitation be denied; the court affirmed, approved, and adopted the

magistrate’s recommendation. After a thorough review of the facts and pertinent

law, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

              This case began in 2019, when the Cuyahoga County Division of

Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”) filed a complaint alleging

that L.S. was dependent and requesting an order of temporary custody to CCDCFS.

L.S. was a newborn infant at the time. The child was later adjudicated to be

dependent and was placed in the agency’s temporary custody. In 2020, L.S.’s

parents’ rights were terminated, and the child was placed in the permanent custody

of CCDCFS. The record indicates that since L.S.’s birth the child has been placed

with numerous different care providers, including appellants.

              The child was removed from appellants’ care in August 2022, and on

August 29, 2022, the agency filed an amended case plan based on an “emergency

placement change due to physical abuse allegations reported and current

investigation.” In September 2022, appellants filed a motion to intervene and a

motion for “immediate placement and to resume adoption process.” The trial court
held hearings on December 12 and 13, 2023.              The agency initially opposed

appellants’ motion to intervene, filing a brief in opposition, but later orally withdrew

its opposition at the December 12 hearing that was held on appellants’ motion for

immediate placement and to resume adoption process.                In withdrawing its

opposition, CCDCFS specifically stated that it was withdrawing its opposition only

as to the hearing on the placement motion in an effort to expedite permanency for

L.S. Specifically, the agency stated that it was withdrawing its opposition “with

regard to this particular motion. We believe that permanency for [the child] should

be expedited and certainly our doing a [hearing on the] Motion to Intervene isn’t in

[the child’s] best interest at this point, so we are willing to concede that [appellants]

can be parties for purposes of this hearing.” (Emphasis added.) Tr. 5. The agency

maintained that regardless of appellants’ party status, the trial court lacked

authority to order immediate placement or resumption of adoption proceedings.

               The following witnesses testified at the December 2022 hearings:

(1) L.S.’s therapist, (2) appellants, (3) two character witnesses for appellants,

(4) agency supervisor Wendy Horn, (5) agency case worker Andrea Flynn, and

(6) agency permanency support worker Noreen Thomas. L.S.’s guardian ad litem

(“GAL”) filed a report and recommendation ahead of the hearing and stated her

recommendation on the record; the parties were allowed to cross-examine her.

               L.S.’s therapist testified that she had had concerning interactions with

appellant former foster mother. Specifically, former foster mother would describe

L.S. as “evil,” “manipulative,” and “bad” in the presence of the child. The therapist
also testified that appellants failed to consistently utilize the recommended

strategies for dealing with the child’s behaviors and, therefore, she had concerns for

L.S. if the child were to be returned to appellants’ home.

              Appellants testified that they love L.S. and they believe that they were

unfairly treated by CCDCFS and the agency wrongfully removed the child from their

home. Appellants’ character witnesses testified that their own children were cared

for by appellant former foster mother; the witnesses were complimentary of her.

              CCDCFS supervisor Horn testified about the professionalism of case

worker Flynn during the six years she had supervised her. Horn also testified that

appellants consistently negatively portrayed L.S.       She explained the agency’s

extensive efforts to remedy the situation in order to preserve the placement.

According to Horn, appellants were unwilling to document their claims regarding

the child’s extreme behaviors and were unwilling to participate in services to try to

improve the bond between appellant former foster mother and L.S. Horn further

testified regarding the ultimate decision to remove the child from her placement

with appellants. She explained how difficult it was in light of all of the multiple

placements L.S. had been through. She testified, however, that it was her belief that

removing L.S. from appellants was in the child’s best interest.

              Thomas, a CCDCFS permanency support worker, testified that in

February 2022, appellants asked to put L.S.’s adoption on hold because of their

concerns over the child’s behaviors. According to Thomas, appellant former foster

mother disagreed with the therapist’s characterization of the child’s behaviors as
“typical toddler behaviors.” Thomas further testified that appellants refused to

engage in services to improve their handling of the child’s needs.           Thomas

corroborated Horn’s testimony regarding Flynn’s professionalism in working with

appellants. Thomas believed that L.S. should not be returned to appellants’ care.

              Agency case worker Flynn testified that appellant former foster

mother repeatedly referred to L.S. as “bad” and as “having the devil in her.”

Appellants wanted to pursue additional services for the child, but Flynn believed the

services they wanted to pursue were not age appropriate for a three-year old. Flynn

also testified about clashes appellant foster mother had with L.S.’s therapist and the

appellants’ unwillingness to engage in recommended services.

              L.S.’s GAL stated her recommendation that appellants’ request to

have L.S. placed in their home should be denied.

              On January 13, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision recommending

that appellants’ motion for immediate placement and to resume adoption process

be denied. Appellants filed objections to the magistrate’s decision and CCDCFS filed

a motion to strike and brief in opposition to appellants’ objections.

              On February 27, 2023, appellants filed a motion for legal custody and

immediate visitation.    CCDCFS filed a brief in opposition to this motion on

March 9, 2023. The appellants amended their motion in an April 2, 2023 filing.

Appellants also filed a motion for diagnostic clinic evaluation on March 7, 2023;

CCDCFS filed a motion to dismiss and brief in opposition to the motion for

diagnostic evaluation.
              Two pertinent decisions were filed by the trial court on April 7, 2023.

In one, the trial court overruled appellants’ objections and affirmed, approved, and

adopted the magistrate’s decision, thus denying appellants’ motion for immediate

placement and to resume adoption process. In that same judgment, the trial court

stated that the “parties stipulated to motion to intervene. CCDCFS withdrew its

opposition. The Court, upon due consideration, grants the Motion to Intervene.” In

the other April 7 filing, the magistrate issued a decision recommending that

appellants’ motion for diagnostic clinic evaluation be denied.

              On April 16, 2023, appellants filed objections to the magistrate’s

April 7 decision recommending denial of their motion for a diagnostic clinic

evaluation. The trial court overruled the objections on April 21, 2023. In that same

April 21 judgment, the trial court denied appellants’ amended motion for legal

custody and immediate visitation. Further, in an April 24, 2023 judgment, the trial

court denied appellants’ motion for diagnostic clinic evaluation.

              Appellants filed their notice of appeal on May 1, 2023. Their notice

states that they are appealing the judgments denying their amended motion for legal

custody and immediate visitation and their motion for diagnostic clinic evaluation.

Appellants present two assignments of error for our review:

      I.     Intervenor’s [sic] are case parties since their motion to intervene
             was granted by the trial court.

      II.    The trial court is able to order a change in the placement of a
             child in the permanent custody of the agency and was in error
             denying the motion for legal custody and immediate [visitation]
             without further hearing.
Law and Analysis

               We initially address CCDCFS’s contention that appellants failed to

present us with certified transcript of proceedings in accordance with

App.R. 9(B)(6)(j), which provides in relevant part that “[t]he transcriber shall certify

the transcript of proceedings as correct.” Appellants counter with the following:

“The certified transcript was e-filed with the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court for

objections purposes and incorporated as part of the record. Counsel spoke with

appellate clerk staff regarding e-filing and certification. No further requests were

made of counsel regarding said transcript.”

               The record demonstrates that appellants have provided this court

with two copies of the transcripts — a paper version and an e-filed version. Neither

version is compliant with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The paper version is not

bound as required under App.R. 9(B)(6)(b), and it is not signed by the transcriber

as required under App.R. 9(B)(6)(j). The e-filed version is not signed and therefore

it is not compliant with App.R. 9(B)(6)(b).

               However, this court did not sua sponte strike the transcripts when

they were filed: CCDCFS has neither requested same nor argued that we merely

presume the regularity of the proceedings. Indeed, the agency has largely relied on

the transcripts in their brief in opposition. “Fairness and justice are best served

when a court disposes of a case on the merits.” DeHart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 69

Ohio St.2d 189, 193, 431 N.E.2d 644 (1982). Therefore, we will consider the

transcripts.
               In another preliminary matter, as noted by the agency, appellants

have appealed from two judgments: (1) the April 21, 2023 judgment that overruled

appellants’ objections to the April 7, 2023 magistrate’s decision recommending

denial of their motion for diagnostic clinic evaluation and denied appellants’

amended motion for legal custody and immediate visitation, and (2) the April 24,

2023 judgment that formally denied appellants’ motion for diagnostic clinic

evaluation (the April 21 judgment overruled the appellants’ objection but did not

explicitly state that their motion was denied). Appellants’ notice of appeal does not

state that they are appealing the trial court’s April 7, 2023 judgment overruling

appellants’ objections to the magistrate’s decision that appellants’ motion for

immediate placement and motion to resume the adoption process be denied.

Despite their failure to identify that judgment in their notice of appeal, appellants

challenge it in this appeal.

               “The Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure specify the means for

perfecting an appeal from an adverse judgment.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Robledo,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-278, 2014-Ohio-1185, ¶ 11. App.R. 3(A) provides that

“[a]n appeal as of right shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the

trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4.” App.R. 4(A) requires a party to file a

notice of appeal “within thirty days of the later of entry of the judgment or order

appealed or, in a civil case, service of the notice of judgment and its entry if service

is not made on the party within the three-day period in Rule 58(B) of the Ohio Rules

of Civil Procedure.” The timely filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional
requirement for perfecting a valid appeal. Id. at ¶ 12, citing Transamerica Ins. Co.

v. Nolan, 72 Ohio St.3d 320, 649 N.E.2d 1229 (1995), syllabus.

               Here, the appellants timely filed their notice of appeal. Thus, they

have perfected the only jurisdictional requirement for perfecting a valid appeal and,

in the interest of justice, we will consider their contention regarding the trial court’s

April 7, 2023 judgment overruling appellants’ objections to the magistrate’s decision

that appellants’ motion for immediate placement and motion to resume the

adoption process be denied.

               Having addressed the above-mentioned preliminary issues, we turn

to appellants’ first assignment of error. The assignment of error does not present

any alleged error for us to review in violation of App.R. 16(A). Rather, it is merely

appellants’ contention that they “are case parties since their motion to intervene was

granted by the trial court.” Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2), an appellate court may

disregard any assignment of error, or portion thereof, if the appellant fails to make

a separate argument. State v. Wells, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98388, 2013-Ohio-

3722, ¶ 55. Notwithstanding appellants’ failure to comply with the appellate rules,

we address their contention and disagree with it.

               The trial court stated the following in its April 7, 2023 judgment

relative to appellants’ motion to intervene: “Parties stipulated to the motion to

intervene. CCDCFS withdrew its opposition. The Court, upon due consideration,

grants the Motion to Intervene.” Although at first blush it may appear that the trial

court made appellants parties to the case without limitation, a deeper examination
of the record does not support this. Specifically at the start of the December 12, 2022

hearing, the trial court questioned CCDCFS’s attorney about appellants’ motion to

intervene, to which the attorney responded:

      Your Honor, we filed a Brief in Opposition. We withdrew that Brief in
      Opposition with regard to this particular motion. We believe that
      permanency for [the child] should be expedited and certainly our doing
      a Motion to Intervene isn’t in her best interest at this point, so we are
      willing to concede that [appellants] can be parties for purposes of this
      hearing.

(Emphasis added.) Tr. 5.

               It was after hearing that statement that the trial court allowed

appellants to intervene. It was not a carte blanche intervention; rather, it was for

the limited purpose of the December 2022 hearing.

               Appellants cite two cases in their “assignment of error”:

(1) In re Ring, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93 APF12-1693, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 2841

(June 28, 1994), and (2) In re Baatz, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 92CA005478 and

92CA005479, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3996 (Aug. 11, 1993). Interestingly, both of

those cases held that foster parents are not automatically guaranteed party status in

custody determinations and affirmed the trial courts’ denial of the foster parents’

motions to intervene. See In re Ring at 9-13; In re Baatz at 2-9. According to

appellants, despite the fact that “Ohio court have consistently held that foster care

relationship is not one that gives rise to a claim of ‘in loco parentis’ for purposes of

intervention[,] * * * in the case at bar the court proceeded with the case and stated
that the Motion to Intervene was granted.” Appellants’ brief, p. 19. For the reasons

stated, this is not accurate description of what occurred.

               Further, although a foster parent is not automatically entitled to party

status, Juv.R. 2(Y) gives the trial court “wide discretion to name parties to a juvenile

court action, and this discretion includes naming foster parents as parties.” In the

Matter of:     Rhonda Zhang, 135 Ohio App.3d 350, 357, 734 N.E.2d 379

(8th Dist.1999). See also In re: McDaniel, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2002-L-158 and

2002-L-159, 2004-Ohio-2595, ¶ 16.          The rule “affords a procedural device

permitting a trial court to include individuals not specifically otherwise designated

a party but whose presence is necessary to fully litigate an issue presented in the

action.” In re Franklin, 88 Ohio App.3d 277, 280, 623 N.E.2d 720 (3d Dist.1993).

Thus, “the court may protect and adjudicate all legitimate claims, protect all

interests appearing, avoid multiple litigation and conserve judicial time in the

orderly administration of justice.” Id. In deciding a motion to intervene in a juvenile

case, the court must look to whether intervention is in the best interest of the child.

In re: B.O., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2011-L-055, 2011-Ohio-6210, ¶ 40-41.

               Because the trial court granted the appellants’ motion in accordance

with CCDCFS’s concession — that they be allowed to intervene for the limited

purpose of the December 2022 hearings — the trial court did not hold a hearing to

determine whether allowing appellants full-party status would be in L.S.’s best

interest. Further, appellants did not contest the agency’s statement at the December
2022 hearing that it was conceding intervention for the limited purpose of that

hearing.

              In light of the above, the first assignment of error is overruled.

              In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the

juvenile court was able to order a change in L.S.’s placement and it was error to deny

their motion for legal custody without further hearing.

              In its April 7, 2023 judgment overruling appellants’ objections to the

magistrate’s January 13, 2023 decision the trial court stated the following:

      The Court agrees with the argument of CCDCFS [that] while ORC
      2151.417(A) does give the court the ability to review a child’s placement,
      it does not give the court the authority to order a specific placement.
      The [appellants] are requesting the Court to make orders for a specific
      placement with them and to order CCDCFS to resume the adoption
      process with them that this Court is not legally able to make. The Court
      further notes that the final determination in adoption falls[s] within the
      jurisdiction of the Probate Court.

April 7, 2023 judgment, record at 598.

              The procedural posture of the case at the time appellants filed their

motion for legal custody is relevant to the resolution of this issue. Specifically,

appellants filed their motion in September 2022. At that time, L.S. was in the

permanent custody of CCDCFS because the biological parents’ rights had been

terminated in September 2020.        “[L]egal custody and permanent custody are

alternative disposition choices.”   In re Fell, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 2004-CA-39,

2005-Ohio-2415, ¶ 17.      The juvenile court already chose the disposition of

permanent custody to CCDCFS.
               Intertwined in this assignment of error is appellants’ party status in

the juvenile court at the time of their motion for legal custody. Predisposition award

of legal custody of a child can be made “to either parent or to any other person who

* * * files a motion requesting legal custody of the child or is identified as a proposed

legal custodian in a complaint or motion filed prior to the dispositional hearing by

any party to the proceedings.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). The statute

does not require a nonparent filing for legal custody prior to disposition to be a party.

               However, the law limits the filing of post-disposition motions, as

relative to this case, to parties. Specifically, R.C. 2151.353(F)(2) provides as follows:

      Any public children services agency, any private child placing agency,
      the department of job and family services, or any party, other than any
      parent whose parental rights with respect to the child have been
      terminated pursuant to an order issued under division (A)(4) of this
      section, by filing a motion with the court, may at any time request the
      court to modify or terminate any order of disposition issued pursuant
      to division (A) of this section or section 2151.414 or 2151.415 of the
      Revised Code. The court shall hold a hearing upon the motion as if the
      hearing were the original dispositional hearing and shall give all parties
      to the action and the guardian ad litem notice of the hearing pursuant
      to the Juvenile Rules. If applicable, the court shall comply with section
      2151.42 of the Revised Code.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2151.353(F)(2).

               The earliest appellants were parties, if at all, was April 7, 2023, when

the trial court issued its judgment stating that their motion to intervene was granted.

See State ex rel. Indus. Comm. v. Day, 136 Ohio St. 477, 479, 26 N.E.2d 1014 (1940).

(“[O]ne of the most important fundamentals of the law [is] that a court of record

speaks through its journal.”).      Thus, at the time appellants filed their post-
disposition motion for legal custody in February 2023, it was not properly before the

court under R.C. 2151.353(F)(2).

                 In regard to CCDCFS’s contention that the juvenile court could not

have ordered appellants’ adoption of L.S. to resume, see appellee brief, p. 14,

although the agency is correct that, in Ohio, adoption matters are within the

exclusive jurisdiction of probate court,1 the juvenile court could have ordered the

agency to proceed with appellants’ adoption of L.S. if it found that to be in the child’s

best interest. Specifically, R.C. 2151.417 gives the juvenile court the ability to weigh

in on the pre-probate court adoption process. The statute provides as follows:

      Any court that issues a dispositional order pursuant to section
      2151.353, 2151.414, or 2151.415 of the Revised Code may review at any
      time the child’s placement or custody arrangement, the case plan
      prepared for the child pursuant to section 2151.412 of the Revised Code,
      the actions of the public children services agency or private child
      placing agency in implementing that case plan, the child’s permanency
      plan if the child’s permanency plan has been approved, and any other
      aspects of the child’s placement or custody arrangement. In
      conducting the review, the court shall determine the appropriateness
      of any agency actions, the safety and appropriateness of continuing
      the child’s placement or custody arrangement, and whether any
      changes should be made with respect to the child’s permanency plan
      or placement or custody arrangement or with respect to the actions of
      the agency under the child’s placement or custody arrangement.
      Based upon the evidence presented at a hearing held after notice to all
      parties and the guardian ad litem of the child, the court may require
      the agency, the parents, guardian, or custodian of the child, and the
      physical custodians of the child to take any reasonable action that the
      court determines is necessary and in the best interest of the child or to
      discontinue any action that it determines is not in the best interest of
      the child.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2151.417(A).

      1
          See In re Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324, 574 N.E.2d 1055 (1991).
              Here, the juvenile court specifically found that “there is ample

evidence in the transcript to support the Magistrate’s Decision [that the agency

should not be ordered to resume appellants’ desire to adopt L.S.], the actions of

CCDCFS, and the recommendation of the child’s GAL.” The record supports the

court’s finding. The child’s therapist, an agency supervisor, an agency permanency

support worker, and an agency case worker all testified about concerning

interactions they had had with former foster mother vis-à-vis the child and

appellants’ unwillingness to engage in recommended services. Additionally, L.S.’s

GAL believed it was in the child’s best interest not to be placed with appellants.

              Finally, appellants also contend in this second assignment of error

that the “trial court should have ordered the requested diagnostic clinic evaluation.”

Again, the appellants have not provided argument to support their contention — a

violation of App.R. 12(A)(2). Our response is simple: by approximately age three,

L.S. had been in numerous different placements, none of which were with her

biological parents. The child deserves permanency; further litigation surrounding

placement with appellants would only serve to delay permanency.

              The second assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR