Court Opinion

ID: 9957526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 17:01:50.31663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:29.581534
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10568    Document: 46-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024   Page: 1 of 21

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10568
                           ____________________

        ISAAC FLOWERS,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-01075-MHH
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10568

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               This social security case revolves around an unusual but not
        unheard-of scenario. A person applies for Social Security Disability
        benefits and the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denies his claim,
        finding in the process that the applicant can perform jobs involving
        “sedentary work”—the lightest work capacity in the Social Security
        regulations. After that proceeding becomes final, the person
        applies for benefits again. This time, without referencing or
        distinguishing the prior ALJ’s finding that the claimant could only
        perform “sedentary work,” the ALJ denies benefits, finding in the
        process that the claimant can perform jobs involving “light
        work”—a work capacity slightly more intensive than “sedentary
        work.” In a line of unpublished cases, we have held that this sort
        of scenario does not pose a res judicata problem because the ALJs
        are considering the claimant’s capacity in distinct (though close-in-
        time) periods.
               In this case, claimant-appellant Isaac Flowers urges us to
        view such cases through a different lens. He argues, pointing to
        decisions of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, that the problem with
        ALJs reaching these seemingly inconsistent findings about the level
        of work that an applicant can perform is not res judicata, but
        substantial evidence. The argument goes that, if an ALJ finds a
        claimant is limited to “sedentary work,” a subsequent finding that
        the claimant can do “light work” would lack substantial evidence if
        the ALJ did not acknowledge and distinguish the previous finding
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        22-10568               Opinion of the Court                         3

        by showing some improvement in the claimant’s condition.
        Because the ALJ below did not do so, Flowers maintains that the
        decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
                After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument,
        we reject Flowers’s position. First, we conclude that Flowers failed
        to raise this legal issue below, and we decline to consider it for the
        first time on appeal. Second, even if Flowers had raised the issue
        below, any error would be harmless because (given the outcome
        of his last application) Flowers has not shown that he would have
        a right to disability benefits even if the ALJ had once again found
        that he was limited to “sedentary work.” Finally, and regardless,
        we reject Flowers’s suggestion that the ALJ’s decision was not
        supported by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm.
                                  I.     Background
              Flowers suffers from back, neck, shoulder, and joint
        problems and related pain. Flowers is also obese, complains of
        vision loss in his left eye, and has depression and opioid
        dependence.
               Flowers applied for social security disability benefits in 2014
        based on a disability onset date of August 9, 2013, and his claim was
        denied on April 17, 2017. See Flowers v. Berryhill, No. 4:18-cv-00529-
        JEO, 2019 WL 2469792, *1 (N.D. Ala. June 13, 2019), aff’d Flowers v.
        Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 817 Fed. App’x 942 (11th Cir. 2020). The
        ALJ found Flowers “had the residual functional capacity (‘RFC’) to
        perform sedentary work with postural, reaching, and
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                    22-10568

        environmental limitations.” Id. The regulations define “sedentary
        work” as follows:
               Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10
               pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying
               articles like docket ﬁles, ledgers, and small tools.
               Although a sedentary job is deﬁned as one which
               involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and
               standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties.
               Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are
               required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are
               met.

        20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). Because Flowers could perform sedentary
        work and there were jobs in the national economy he could do, the
        ALJ denied benefits. Flowers, 2019 WL 2469792, *1. The appeals
        council denied Flowers’s request for review. Id. And we affirmed
        on appeal. Flowers, 817 Fed. App’x at 946.
               After the appeals council denied review of the first claim,
        Flowers applied again, this time claiming a disability as of April 18,
        2017—the day after his first application was denied. Flowers
        argued that he “just [did] not have the physical residual functional
        capacity to perform full-time employment.”
               But this time, the ALJ found that Flowers “has the residual
        functional capacity to perform light work” with minor
        modifications. 1 As defined by the regulations,

        1 Speciﬁcally the ALJ found that Flowers could perform light work with the
        following limitations: Flowers could “occasionally climb stairs and ramps;”
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        22-10568                  Opinion of the Court                               5

               [l]ight work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds
               at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects
               weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight
               lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when
               it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or
               when it involves sitting most of the time with some
               pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be
               considered capable of performing a full or wide range
               of light work, [one] must have the ability to do
               substantially all of these activities.

        20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); id. § 416.967(b) (same); Social Security
        Ruling (SSR) 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5 (Jan. 1, 1983) (further
        defining light work).
               To reach this determination, the ALJ reviewed the medical
        evidence, including Flowers’s statements regarding his functional
        limitations and restrictions in daily activities. 2 The ALJ concluded
        that Flowers’s “medically determinable impairments could

        could not “climb[] . . . ladders and scaﬀolding;” could “occasionally balance,
        stoop, and crouch;” could not “kneel[] or crawl[];” should
        “avoid[] . . . concentrated exposure to temperature extremes;” and would
        “require a sit stand option deﬁned as a brief positional change from sitting to
        standing and vice versa with no more than one change in position every 20
        minutes[.]” These modiﬁcations are not at issue in this appeal.
        2 The ALJ noted that, since the denial of his first claim, Flowers has used

        Hydrocodone for pain relief, managing “really bad days” with ice and
        medication, “acknowledg[ing] that his medication [keeps] his pain under
        control for the most part.” But the ALJ also acknowledged that Flowers
        continues to have limited range of motion in his spine, as well as “body aches
        and joint pain causing sleep disturbance.”
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10568

        reasonably be expected to cause” pain and limitations, but his
        “statements concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and limiting
        effects of these symptoms [we]re not entirely consistent with the
        medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” Further, the
        ALJ said, “imaging studies do not support a finding of disability and
        treatment notes do not document any significant physical
        examination findings.” The ALJ noted that, “[o]verall, while the
        medical evidence demonstrate[d] a history of degenerative disc
        disease of the cervical and lumbar spine and obesity, it . . . d[id] not
        support [Flowers’s] allegations” about its severity and his
        limitations “given the effectiveness of conservative treatment.” As
        for medical opinions given in the case, the ALJ credited the
        functional assessments of the Agency’s consultative examiner and
        the State Agency medical consultant (including on necessary
        modifications to the usual light work standards) because those
        opinions “[were] consistent with and supported by the objective
        evidence[.]” On the other hand, the ALJ found that Flowers’s
        medical experts were “not persuasive” because their work
        “predate[d] the alleged onset date and cover[ed] a period already
        adjudicated by a prior ALJ denial decision” and “[was] not
        supported by the subsequently received medical evidence[.]” The
        ALJ did not explicitly note or reference any improvement in
        Flowers’s condition.
              “In sum,” the ALJ found, a modified light work RFC was
        “supported by the medical evidence of record.” The ALJ
        concluded that, “[a]lthough the evidence establishe[d] underlying
        medical conditions capable of producing some pain or other
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        22-10568               Opinion of the Court                        7

        limitations, the substantial evidence of record [did] not confirm
        disabling pain or other limitations” or “support a conclusion” that
        Flowers had “disabling pain or other limitations.”
               Applying that RFC, the ALJ found that there were “jobs that
        exist[ed] in significant numbers in the national economy that
        [Flowers could] perform,” and, therefore, that Flowers was not
        disabled. The appeals council again denied review.
                Flowers sought judicial review. He argued that his
        condition had only worsened since the earlier benefits denial for his
        first claim and therefore that the denial of his new claim was not
        based on substantial evidence. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s
        decision, and Flowers appealed.
                             II.    Standard of Review
                When, as here, “an ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals
        Council denies review, we review the ALJ’s decision as the
        Commissioner’s final decision.” Samuels v. Acting Comm’r of Soc.
        Sec., 959 F.3d 1042, 1045 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). The
        factual findings of the Commissioner are “conclusive” if
        “substantial evidence” supports them. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “We
        review de novo both the Commissioner’s legal conclusions and the
        district court’s decision about whether the Commissioner’s
        decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Walker v. Soc. Sec.
        Admin., Comm’r, 987 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal
        citations omitted).
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                    22-10568

                                   III.    Discussion
                On appeal, Flowers argues that the ALJ erred because it did
        not consider or distinguish the previous RFC determination that he
        could perform only “sedentary work,” and instead found that
        Flowers could perform “light work” even though there was no
        substantial evidence that his condition had improved. In other
        words, Flowers’s position is that the RFC determination from a
        prior application should be a factor considered by the ALJ and,
        while not necessarily binding, should not be disturbed absent
        substantial evidence of a change in his condition. We disagree. We
        reject Flowers’s legal argument because Flowers did not raise the
        issue below—and we do not usually consider issues raised for the
        first time on appeal. But even if Flowers had preserved the issue,
        his argument would still fail because he has not shown that the
        difference between “sedentary work” and “light work” would
        make any difference to his disability status. And, finally, we reject
        Flowers’s argument that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported
        by substantial evidence.
                  A. Flowers failed to preserve the legal issue he argues on
                     appeal.
               Flowers’s primary argument is that the ALJ erred because he
        did not consider and distinguish Flowers’s previous RFC finding.
        He acknowledges a line of unpublished cases from our court
        explaining that an ALJ’s RFC findings are not res judicata on later
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        22-10568                   Opinion of the Court                                 9

        such findings3—even if the relevant applications and disability
        onset periods are close in time—but he urges us to “treat the
        findings in earlier ALJ decisions as prominent facts and analyze the
        deviation from those prominent facts . . . through the lens of
        substantial evidence.” Because Flowers did not raise this issue
        before the ALJ or the district court, we decline to consider it for the
        first time on appeal.
               Arguments not raised before the agency or the district court
        are forfeited, and we generally do not consider them on appeal,
        Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999), absent
        extraordinary circumstances, United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860,
        872–73 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022). 4
        As an initial matter, Flowers’s argument makes little sense based
        on this record. Flowers himself points out that he argued to the

        3 See, e.g., Spence v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-12909, 2022 WL 1415888 (11th

        Cir. May 4, 2022); Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 828 Fed. App’x 560 (11th Cir.
        2020); Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 819 Fed. App’x 886 (11th Cir. 2020); Griffin
        v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 Fed. App’x 837 (11th Cir. 2014).
        4 Such “extraordinary circumstances” include situations where

                (1) the issue involves a pure question of law and refusal to
                consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice; (2) the party
                lacked an opportunity to raise the issue at the district court
                level; (3) the interest of substantial justice is at stake; (4) the
                proper resolution is beyond any doubt; or (5) the issue presents
                signiﬁcant questions of general impact or of great public
                concern.

        Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873. Flowers has not argued any such circumstances
        exist, and we see none.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10568

        ALJ and the district court that his condition had only worsened
        since the earlier benefits denial and therefore that the denial of his
        new claim was not based on substantial evidence. But Flowers
        never made the argument he makes now—i.e., that, as a legal
        matter, an ALJ has to consider a prior RFC determination, and to
        reach a different RFC determination, the ALJ must have substantial
        evidence demonstrating a change in claimant’s condition. Thus,
        under ordinary forfeiture principles, we decline to consider it. See
        Apfel, 185 F.3d at 1215.
               We recognize, of course, that “there is a difference between
        raising new issues and making new arguments on appeal.” In re
        Home Depot Inc., 931 F.3d 1065, 1086 (11th Cir. 2019). But Flowers’s
        submission here is not merely a different argument on the same
        issue—it is a new issue altogether. To put a finer point on it: below,
        Flowers argued a factual point—his condition had worsened, not
        improved. Here, he makes a legal point: the ALJ was categorically
        required to consider and distinguish a particular fact (the prior RFC
        finding) and, if it did not do so, its decision necessarily lacked
        substantial evidence. Under our precedents, those are two separate
        issues. Compare In re Home Depot, 931 F.3d at 1086 (permitting the
        appellant to pivot between legal arguments for negating a lodestar-
        multiplier), and Bourtzakis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 940 F.3d 616, 620–21
        (11th Cir. 2019) (allowing the appellant to raise a new legal
        argument about the scope of a Washington statute because it fit
        within the preserved question of “whether [his] Washington drug
        conviction qualifie[d] as an aggravated felony”), with Crawford v.
        Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004) (declining
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        22-10568               Opinion of the Court                         11

        to “address Crawford’s contention that the ALJ’s hypothetical
        question to the VE was inadequate” because Crawford had only
        argued that the district court should build certain medical opinions
        into the hypothetical).
                Nor, for similar reasons, is the issue preserved under the
        broader question of whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by
        substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence is . . . such relevant
        evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
        support a conclusion.” Samuels, 959 F.3d at 1045 (alteration in
        original) (quotations omitted). Whether substantial evidence
        exists is an intensely factual question, and the standard of review
        “does not allow us to decide the facts anew, make credibility
        determinations, or re-weigh evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted).
        By contrast, Flowers’s argument that the ALJ was categorically
        required to consider the prior finding is a question of law, which
        we review de novo. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th
        Cir. 2005); see also Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 21 F.3d
        1064, 1066 (11th Cir.1994) (“The . . . failure to apply the correct law
        or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for
        determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted
        mandates reversal.”). These differing standards of review
        demonstrate that Flowers’s position has shifted into new territory,
        and his new argument does not raise the same issue as his
        argument below simply because both fall under the broader rubric
        of substantial evidence.
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                         22-10568

               Thus, Flowers’s legal argument raises a different issue than
        his argument below and is not preserved for our review. 5

        5 Though Flowers’s failure to make the argument below is enough to dispose

        of the issue, we are skeptical that there is any per se rule like the one he
        advocates. Substantial evidence is inherently a case-by-case inquiry. Cf.
        Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1157 (2019) (“Where Biestek goes wrong, at
        bottom, is in pressing for a categorical rule, applying to every [Social Security]
        case in which a vocational expert refuses a request for underlying data. . . . The
        inquiry, as is usually true in determining the substantiality of evidence, is case-
        by-case.”). The cases Flowers relies on to persuade us otherwise are out-of-
        circuit res judicata cases, Lively v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 820 F.2d 1391,
        1391–92 (4th Cir. 1987), Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837, 842 (6th
        Cir. 1997), recast by more recent precedents to be substantial evidence cases,
        Albright v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 473, 477 (4th Cir. 1999), Earley
        v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 893 F.3d 929, 932–35 (6th Cir. 2018). And even those
        more recent cases did not go so far as to say an ALJ must always consider and
        distinguish a past RFC finding.
        Besides—Flowers’s own situation shows that the substantial evidence
        standard does not necessarily require ALJs to consider and distinguish a prior
        RFC finding. Flowers’s designations were “sedentary work” for his first claim,
        Flowers, 2019 WL 2469792, at *1, and “light work”—the next capacity level
        up—for his second claim. See also Drummond, 126 F.3d at 838–39 (considering
        an initial RFC of “sedentary work” versus a subsequent RFC of “medium
        work”—two capacity levels away). It is not inherently suspect that the same
        person, in roughly the same condition, could be found to be capable of either
        light or sedentary work. To the contrary, the capacity levels demonstrated by
        these two RFCs are not far apart. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) (defining
        sedentary work as “involv[ing] lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and
        occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small
        tools” as well as “involv[ing] sitting[ and] a certain amount of walking and
        standing”), with id. § 404.1567(b) (“Light work involves lifting no more than
        20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
        ten pounds. . . . [A] job is in this category when it requires a good deal of
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        22-10568                   Opinion of the Court                                13

                    B. Even if Flowers had preserved his legal argument, he
                       has not shown prejudice from the purported error.
               Flowers has also failed to show that his argument would
        make any difference to his application for disability benefits. See
        Raper v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 89 F.4th 1261, 1274 n.11 (11th Cir. 2024)
        (“Remand is unwarranted unless an error creates fundamental
        unfairness or prejudice.”). Here, although Flowers’s RFC changed
        from “sedentary” to “light work,” he was denied benefits even
        under the lower RFC designation of “sedentary.” Flowers, 2019 WL
        2469792, at *1. Flowers does not argue that he would have been
        entitled to benefits if the ALJ had once again found him limited to
        “sedentary work.” See Raper, 89 F.4th at 1274 n.11. So even if
        Flowers were right that the ALJ should have considered his prior
        RFC finding, winning that point does not help him. Thus, we
        conclude any such error was harmless.

        walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some
        pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.”); see also id. § 404.1567 (b) (“If
        someone can do light work,” the SSA “determine[s] that he or she can also do
        sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors[.]”). It is simply in
        the nature of deferential standards like “substantial evidence” that reasonable
        fact finders could reach slightly different conclusions on the same facts.
        Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (explaining that even if we would have reached a contrary result as the finder
        of fact, and even if a preponderance of the evidence weighs against the
        Commissioner’s decision, this Court must affirm if substantial evidence
        supports the Commissioner’s decision). And since fact finders can reach
        slightly different conclusions supported by substantial evidence, it is (at a
        minimum) not necessarily the case that an ALJ must distinguish a prior RFC
        finding in order to support his own finding with substantial evidence.
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                         22-10568

               Flowers urges us to adopt the reasoning of cases from the
        Fourth and Sixth Circuits, but even if we set aside the numerous
        reasons why those cases do not help Flowers, the supposed error
        in those cases was not harmless. 6 See Albright, 174 F.3d at 474;
        Earley, 893 F.3d at 930. In Albright and Earley, the ALJ’s subsequent
        RFC findings effectively denied the claimant benefits; had the
        second RFC findings in those cases been the same as the first, the
        claimants would have been disabled by operation of law simply
        because they were older. See, e.g., Drummond, 126 F.3d at 839, 842
        (explaining that claimant would have been entitled to benefits as a
        person fifty years or older if she were limited to “sedentary work,”
        as found initially, but the ALJ concluded she could perform
        “medium work”); Lively, 820 F.2d at 1392 (explaining that claimant
        had turned 55, “thus qualifying as a person of ‘advanced age’” who

        6 There are at least three reasons why Albright and Earley do not help Flowers.

        For one thing, the decisions of other circuits obviously do not bind us. See
        Pitts v. United States, 4 F.4th 1109, 1116 n.3 (11th Cir. 2021). For another,
        Albright and Earley both concluded that ALJs should not give conclusive weight
        to prior RFC findings, Albright, 174 F.3d at 474–76; Earley, 893 F.3d at 931–32,
        so the actual holdings of those cases do not support the proposition that the
        ALJ should have considered and distinguished the prior RFC finding. See United
        States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920, 926 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that the holding of
        the case is determined from what the decision “does”—not what it “says”).
        And finally, Flowers’s argument (which relies not on the holdings of those
        cases as such, but how they describe previous decisions (Lively and Drummond))
        also fails to appreciate that Lively and Drummond were avowedly res judicata
        cases, not substantial evidence cases, see Lively, 820 F.2d at 1392; Drummond,
        126 F.3d at 839, 842–43—so even the descriptions of them by Albright and
        Earley do not persuasively support Flowers’s point.
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        22-10568                Opinion of the Court                      15

        would be “considered disabled” if he was limited to “light work,”
        as found initially, but the second ALJ found him capable “of work
        activity at any exertional level”). Once again, Flowers does not
        argue that he would be entitled to benefits if only the RFC finding
        below was “light work.” Nor can he, as he was denied benefits for
        his first claim when it was found he could perform sedentary work.
        At best, he points out that the jobs that the ALJ relied on would not
        be suitable if he had been found limited to “sedentary work.” But
        that argument just shows that the analysis would be different, not
        that the error was harmful.
               We therefore conclude that, even if Flowers had preserved
        (and prevailed on) his legal argument, it would be harmless error.
        See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983).
                   C. Regardless, the ALJ’s finding was supported by
                      substantial evidence.
               Finally, Flowers argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination of
        “light work” was “not supported by substantial evidence” because
        the ALJ did not substantiate the implicit “finding that Flowers[’s
        condition] had improved[.]” We find no error.
               Explaining the flaw in Flowers’s argument requires some
        background. A disability under the Social Security Act is an
        “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
        any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
        can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
        expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
        months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “The burden is primarily on
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10568

        the claimant to prove that he is disabled[.]” Doughty v. Apfel, 245
        F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001).
               “The social security regulations establish a five-step
        evaluation process . . . to determine disability[.]” Moore, 405 F.3d
        at 1211; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). First, the claimant has the
        burden to show that he is not currently engaged in substantial
        gainful activity. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). Second, the claimant
        must show that he has a “severe impairment,” id. §
        404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c), meaning an impairment or combination of
        circumstances that significantly limits the claimant’s “physical or
        mental ability to do basic work activities,” id. § 404.1520(c), and
        “causes more than a minimal limitation on a claimant’s ability to
        function,” Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 1993); see 20
        C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, the claimant gets the chance to show
        that his impairment meets or equals a list of specified (or pre-
        approved) impairments—if it does, he is eligible for benefits; if not,
        the analysis goes on. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d).
               Flowers’s argument deals with the fourth step. At step four,
        the claimant must show that he has an impairment that prevents
        him from performing his past work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f),
        (h). This step requires the ALJ to assess the claimant’s RFC and its
        compatibility with the claimant’s past work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4).
        The RFC assessment is “based upon all of the relevant evidence[]
        of a claimant’s remaining ability to do work[.]” Lewis v. Callahan,
        125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). To flesh out the RFC analysis,
        the Social Security Administration has adopted terms from the
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        22-10568              Opinion of the Court                       17

        Dictionary of Occupational Titles defining physical exertion from
        “sedentary” (at the very bottom of the scale) to “very heavy work”
        (at the very top). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. As discussed, the
        regulations provide that a person is capable of “light work” if they
        are able to lift up to 20 pounds, lift and carry 10-pound objects
        often, and can walk, stand, and push or pull arm or leg controls.
        See id. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b) (same).
                But the fourth step does not exist in a vacuum—if the
        claimant manages to show that he cannot perform his past relevant
        work because of some severe impairment, then we go to step five,
        where the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that a
        significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the
        claimant can perform. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g), 416.920(a)(4);
        Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004). At this
        point, “[t]he ALJ must articulate specific jobs that the claimant is
        able to perform, and this finding must be supported by substantial
        evidence, not mere intuition or conjecture.” Wilson v.
        Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002).
               Because “we review the [ALJ’s] decision only to determine
        whether it is supported by substantial evidence,” the ALJ’s decision
        stands if its decision was based on “such relevant evidence as a
        reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
        conclusion.” Samuels, 959 F.3d at 1045 (quotations omitted). This
        threshold is “not high” and appellate courts generally defer to the
        ALJ, “who has seen the hearing up close.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at
        1154, 1157. Thus, even if we would have reached a different result
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                22-10568

        and even if a preponderance of the evidence weighs against the
        Commissioner’s decision, we must still affirm if the ALJ’s decision
        clears the low evidentiary bar. See Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782.
               Here, the ALJ diligently walked through the evidence and
        concluded that Flowers could perform a modified form of light
        work, for which there are “jobs that exist in significant numbers in
        the national economy[.]” The ALJ explained that “[a]lthough the
        evidence establishes underlying medical conditions capable of
        producing some pain or other limitations,” it “does not confirm
        disabling pain or other limitations arising from those impairments,
        nor does it support a conclusion that the objectively determined
        medical conditions were of such severity that they could
        reasonably be expected to give rise to disabling pain or other
        limitations.” The ALJ found Flowers’s expert’s opinions to the
        contrary “not persuasive” because “they predate[d] the alleged
        onset date [of disability] and cover[ed]” the prior period,
        adjudicated by the previous ALJ. Moreover, the ALJ found, “these
        opinions are not supported by the subsequently received medical
        evidence of mild physical and radiographic findings, the
        effectiveness of ongoing conservative care, and the lack of specialty
        care[.]” And the ALJ concluded, based on the testimony of a
        vocational expert, that there are around 115,000 jobs available in
        the national economy for someone with Flowers’s functional
        capacity. Based on our review of the record, we find no error in
        that reasoning—let alone an error sufficient to say that the decision
        was not supported by substantial evidence.
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        22-10568              Opinion of the Court                      19

               Flowers fails to show otherwise. His argument that the
        decision lacks substantial evidence presumes that, to be capable of
        “light work,” his condition must have improved since the prior
        determination. He notes, for example, that the ALJ found that
        many of Flowers’s conditions “continued” on their previous
        course. He points out that “[t]here is no notation in the ALJ
        decision of [any] improvement” in his condition. And he
        emphasizes that the ALJ here found more severe impairments than
        did the ALJ who found his RFC to be “sedentary work.” The
        problem is that all of Flowers’s observations of the ALJ’s decision
        rely on the prior ALJ’s finding—and assume the “sedentary work”
        finding was not only correct but also set a benchmark that must be
        distinguished. Nothing about Flowers’s argument shows that the
        modified “light work” finding here was not supported by
        substantial evidence in its own right. And Flowers completely fails
        to grapple with the ALJ’s finding that there is work available
        despite his reduced capacity.
                So, having rejected Flowers’s argument that the ALJ was
        required to consider and distinguish the prior RFC finding, we are
        satisfied that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
        evidence.
                                 IV.    Conclusion
                In sum: because Flowers raises his legal argument for the
        first time on appeal; because any error was harmless; and because
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        20                   Opinion of the Court             22-10568

        the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence in any
        event; we affirm the judgment below.
              AFFIRMED.
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        23-10459             Newsom, J., Concurring                       1

        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the
        judgment:
               I join all but Part III.B of the Court’s opinion. Cf. United
        States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920, 931–35 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom, J.,
        concurring) (expressing skepticism about the value and propriety
        of alternative holdings).