Court Opinion

ID: 9897567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:13.746284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:54.781324
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2641-21

MALCOM A. ISLER,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE HOUSING AUTHORITY
OF THE CITY OF CAMDEN and
VICTOR D. FIGUEROA,

     Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________

                   Argued October 25, 2023 – Decided November 14, 2023

                   Before Judges Mayer and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-3547-19.

                   Ian M. Bryson argued the cause for appellant (Derek
                   Smith Law Group, PLLC, attorneys; Ian M. Bryson, on
                   the briefs).

                   Louis R. Lessig argued the cause for respondents
                   (Brown & Connery, LLP, attorneys; Louis R. Lessig
                   and Andrew S. Brown, on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Malcom Isler appeals from a March 18, 2022 order granting

summary judgment to defendants the Housing Authority of the City of Camden

(HACC) and Victor D. Figueroa, and dismissing plaintiff's claims under the New

Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, with

prejudice. We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Daniel A.

Bernardin's comprehensive written opinion.

                                       I.

      We glean the following facts from the motion record. The HACC hired

plaintiff in 2000. He served in various positions in the HACC and in 2016, he

became the Director of Asset Management. He resigned from that position on

February 22, 2019. At all relevant times, plaintiff was the only Black male

department director at HACC.

      According    to   Figueroa,   HACC's    Executive    Director,   plaintiff's

responsibilities as Director of Asset Management included:

            direct oversight of the property managers to ensure that
            they were . . . fulfilling their obligations, such as
            collecting the rent, turning units over from vacancy to
            occupancy within [twenty] to [thirty] days, [and]
            making sure that the occupancy rate stayed above a
            certain level required by [the United States Department
            of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)].

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     On January 16, 2019, plaintiff filed a workplace complaint entitled

"Employee     Complaint      for    Hostile    Work      Environment/Workplace

Discrimination," and delivered it to his immediate supervisor, Kathryn

Blackshear, HACC's Deputy Executive Director. In his complaint, plaintiff

stated he was "frustrated, angry, disheartened and . . . fe[lt] anxiety" when

reporting to work.    He also alleged he was subjected to a hostile work

environment and discrimination by Figueroa, stating:

                  In the past and . . . lately, I am constantly made
            the    subject     of    unwarranted      reprimands, . . .
            micromanaged and treated much differently than my
            other middle-aged non-black department directors.
            This has caused a r[]ise in my stress level and [a]
            change in my demeanor; which in turn, is affecting my
            office staff, as they see the [nit-]picking and actions to
            try to discredit me and call into question my work
            ethic[] and ability to perform my duties. . . . It has
            become a personal witch-hunt towards me[,] and this
            treatment is unfair and one-sided.

                          ....

                  . . . I am often tried and convicted before I ever
            have an opportunity to respond or give clarification,
            which I have continuously brought to the attention of
            the Executive Director. For example, the collection of
            rent for public housing properties is being questioned.
            Recently, immediately after a personnel meeting, . . .
            the [E]xecutive [D]irector brought up the issue of rent
            collection and that there was $300[,000] of uncollected
            rent. I disagreed, noting that there [were] delinquent
            accounts[,] and the property managers [were] aware of

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            how to handle them. . . . The temperament after my
            responses[] gave me a strong feeling that an opinion
            and mindset had already been made up, before the
            subject was discussed. To this day, I have not been
            brought in to ask about rent collection procedures or
            actual financials, nor the opportunity for a corrective
            action plan to be developed and implemented[,] if
            needed. The whispers and rumor mill of HACC, which
            always pan[] out [to be] true, is that I am negligent in
            my duties and that the Executive Director, who I only
            met with informally once, wants me disciplined.

      On January 18, 2019, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Figueroa and John

Kostyal, HACC's Human Resource Manager, met with plaintiff and suspended

him for twenty days without pay, based on plaintiff's failure to oversee the

collection of $39,680 in unpaid rents and late fees from various tenants at one

of HACC's public housing complexes. Figueroa advised plaintiff that a review

of tenant accounts receivables from other HACC sites showed over $348,000 in

additional rents also remained uncollected. The notice of disciplinary action

listed the formal reasons for plaintiff's suspension as:        "[u]nprofessional

behavior, [c]onduct [u]nbecoming an HACC employee, [i]nsubordination,

[n]eglect of [d]uty, [i]ncompetency, [i]nsufficiency and [f]ailure to [p]erform

[d]uties, [p]oor [j]ob [p]erformance and [o]ther [s]ufficient [c]ause."

      Figueroa subsequently testified during a deposition that he did not receive

a copy of plaintiff's January 16 employee complaint until after he met with

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plaintiff on January 18 and imposed the suspension. In fact, Figueroa stated he

received plaintiff's complaint from his secretary "around 1:35 p.m." on January

18, and then "read it before [he] date[d] and timestamped it at 2:41 p.m." that

day.   Kostyal provided similar testimony regarding Figueroa's receipt of

plaintiff's employee complaint. Additionally, Kostyal testified the draft version

of plaintiff's disciplinary action underwent "multiple changes," with the earliest

draft penned on December 17, 2018, one month before plaintiff filed his

employee complaint. Kostyal also stated he and Figueroa addressed another

draft version of the disciplinary action on January 2, 2019.

       During her deposition, Blackshear testified about the timestamp on

plaintiff's employee's complaint, which read, "RECEIVED JAN 18, 2019," and

included the handwritten notation, "2:41 [p].[m].[,] actually hand delivered at

about 1:35 [p].[m]." Blackshear stated "this [was Figueroa's] handwriting."

However, Blackshear provided conflicting testimony about whether she gave

plaintiff's complaint directly to Figueroa or Figueroa's secretary. At one point,

after Blackshear testified that she gave the employee complaint to Figueroa and

discussed it with him, she withdrew that testimony, stating, "I get confused and

stuff. I handed [the employee complaint] to [Figueroa's secretary]. Whenever

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she got time, she gave it to [Figueroa]. . . . I remember[] that his door was

closed, so I handed it to [Figueroa's secretary]."

      Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he "was called down to . . .

Figueroa's office" around "10:30 in the morning" on January 18, 2019, and told

he was suspended for twenty days without pay.        When plaintiff was asked

whether he had "specific knowledge" as to whether Blackshear "actually spoke

with . . . Figueroa about [the employee complaint] on [January] 16th," plaintiff

stated, "I do not have specific knowledge." Plaintiff also was asked if he had

"any personal knowledge as to how or in what way [Blackshear] may or may not

have shared [plaintiff's employee complaint]" with Figueroa.            Plaintiff

answered, "I do not, that is correct."

      On February 19, 2019, Figueroa informed plaintiff that HACC received

multiple allegations about plaintiff that needed to be investigated, including an

allegation that he permitted housing applicants to "jump" other people on the

waiting list and receive public housing in violation of HUD regulations. Based

on these allegations, Figueroa told plaintiff he was going to be placed on paid

administrative leave. Two days later, plaintiff resigned, claiming he "bec[a]me

a target for unwarranted disciplinary actions, taunting, and race discrimination,

[and] all that ha[d] created a hostile work environment." He stated, "[f]or the

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                                         6
betterment of my overall health and family obligations, I am unhappily resigning

as the Director of Asset Management effective Friday, February 22, 2019."

      Plaintiff subsequently applied for, and was denied, unemployment

benefits from the State. In rejecting plaintiff's request for benefits, the State

explained, "[y]ou voluntarily left your job because you were dissatisfied with

your working conditions. You did not exhaust all opportunities to resolve the

problems with your employer before leaving. Therefore, your reason [] for

leaving does not constitute good cause attributable to the work."

      In September 2019, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against HACC

and Figueroa.    The first three counts of the complaint alleged defendants

violated the NJLAD based on their: (1) discriminatory discharge; (2) hostile

work environment; and (3) retaliation.         Additionally, plaintiff alleged

defendants violated his equal protection rights under the New Jersey Civil

Rights Act (NJCRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. The parties subsequently entered

into a stipulation, dismissing the NJCRA claim with prejudice.

      Upon the completion of discovery, defendants moved for summary

judgment. Judge Bernardin heard argument on the motion and entered an order

on October 29, 2021, denying defendants' application. Defendants moved for

reconsideration. On March 18, 2022, Judge Bernardin conducted argument on

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                                       7
the motion and acknowledged he "did not properly assess [plaintiff's NJLAD

claims under] McDonnell[]Douglas"1 before signing the October 29 order. Later

that day, he issued an order, granting defendants summary judgment and

dismissing plaintiff's remaining claims with prejudice.

       In a thoughtful written opinion accompanying the March 18 order, Judge

Bernardin concluded plaintiff's discriminatory discharge claim was "based

entirely on his subjective belief that Figueroa treated him differently than other

department directors because none shared the same protected status as

[p]laintiff." The judge found plaintiff provided no "evidence linking an adverse

employment action to his race, color or sex." Further, the judge determined

"defendants state[d] a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for any adverse

employment action," specifically, "the serious offense of failure to oversee rent

collection[,] resulting in $348,749.45 in uncollected rent and fees." Moreover,

the judge found plaintiff did not establish "the reason for discharge was

pretextual and that discriminatory intent played a role in his discharge."

       Turning to plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, the judge found this

claim stemmed from plaintiff's "dissatisfaction with Figueroa's management

1
    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).

                                                                             A-2641-21
                                        8
style as [E]xecutive [D]irector."     The judge concluded, "claims of close

supervision and micromanagement do not constitute an adverse employment

[action] under the [NJ]LAD," and "[a] reasonable jury could not, as a matter of

law, find that [p]laintiff's workplace was permeated with discriminatory

intimidation, ridicule and insult that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment."

      Finally, Judge Bernardin addressed plaintiff's retaliation claim, finding it

was grounded in plaintiff's belief that Figueroa received his employee complaint

before he suspended plaintiff on January 18, 2019. The judge determined that

while plaintiff averred he handed his employee complaint directly to Blackshear

on January 16, 2019, Blackshear's deposition testimony "about when she

received the complaint and what she did with it after receipt" was "vague and

uncertain." Additionally, the judge found plaintiff presented no competent

evidence to refute Figueroa's testimony that he received the complaint from his

secretary on the afternoon of January 18 and read it at 2:41 p.m. that day, as

evidenced by the timestamp and Figueroa's handwriting on the document.

      Further, the judge stated plaintiff was unable to "establish a link between

the filing of the employee complaint and his suspension because defendants

planned to suspend plaintiff nearly one month before January 16[ and] . . . began

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                                        9
taking affirmative steps to discipline plaintiff as early as December 17, 2019."

The judge continued:

            Drafts of the suspension notice were exchanged
            between [Figueroa and Kostyal] with the final
            suspension notice issued to plaintiff on January 18[].
            From the "whispers and rumor mill [of HACC,"]
            plaintiff expected to be suspended. Plaintiff cannot
            establish that his protected activity played a role in
            defendant[s'] decision to discipline him on January
            18[].     Plaintiff's claim that defendant employer
            retaliated by opposing his application [for
            unemployment benefits] is rejected as that state agency
            applied information received and made an independent
            decision to deny [plaintiff unemployment benefits].

                  The competent evidence supports the finding that
            Figueroa did not know of the [January 16]
            complaint . . . before issuing discipline. There is no
            competent contrary [evidence] and no fact issue.
            Summary [j]udgment on the retaliation claim is
            granted.

                                           II.

      On appeal, plaintiff solely argues the judge "erred in granting summary

judgment to defendants because defendants retaliated against plaintiff for

complaining about unlawful employment discrimination."2           We are not

2
   Because plaintiff does not advance any arguments on appeal regarding the
dismissal of his claims for discriminatory discharge or hostile work
environment, any argument regarding these claims is deemed waived.

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                                      10
persuaded.

      "We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard as the trial court." Norman Int'l, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 251 N.J. 538,

549 (2022) (quoting Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511

(2019)). Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.

4:46-2(c). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide

whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Ct. Reporting

& Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)

(quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 935 (App. Div.

2007)). "[A]n issue of [material fact] is genuine only if, considering the burden

of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion,

together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party,

would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact." Bhagat v. Bhagat,

217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).

Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) (citations
omitted) ("An issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived.").
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                                       11
      A party does not create a genuine issue of fact simply by offering a sworn

statement. Carroll v. N.J. Transit, 366 N.J. Super. 380, 388 (App. Div. 2004).

Also, "'conclusory and self-serving assertions' in certifications without

explanatory or supporting facts will not defeat a meritorious motion

for summary judgment." Hoffman v. Asseenontv.Com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super.

415, 425-26 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440

(2005)). "Competent opposition requires 'competent evidential material' beyond

mere 'speculation' and 'fanciful arguments.'" Cortez v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super.

589, 605 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Hoffman, 404 N.J. Super. at 425-26).

      In addressing a summary judgment motion, the trial court "must analyze

the record in light of the substantive standard and burden of proof that a

factfinder would apply in the event that the case was tried." Globe Motor Co.

v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016) (citations omitted). Accordingly, "neither

the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the elements of the cause of

action or the evidential standard governing the cause of action." Bhagat, 217

N.J. at 38.

      It also is well settled that a trial court's decision to grant a motion for

reconsideration should be upheld on appeal unless the decision was an abuse of

discretion. Granata v. Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2016).

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                                      12
An abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is 'made without a rational

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an

impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571

(2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d

1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).

      Reconsideration is appropriate in two circumstances: (1) when the court's

decision is "based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis," or (2) when "it

is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the

significance of probative, competent evidence." Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.

Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super.

393, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).

      Next, we recognize the NJLAD is remedial legislation designed to root

out "the cancer of discrimination." Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214

N.J. 518, 546 (2013) (quoting Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (1988)).

It prohibits unlawful employment practices and discrimination "based on race,

religion, sex, or other protected status, that creates a hostile work environment."

Cutler v. Dorn, 196 N.J. 419, 430 (2008) (citing Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.,

132 N.J. 587, 601 (1993)); see also N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). "Further, it prohibits

reprisals against an employee who asserts rights granted by the [NJ]LAD."

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                                       13
Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters, 437 N.J. Super. 366, 375

(App. Div. 2014) (citing N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d)).

      Trial and appellate courts utilize the three-part test set forth in McDonnell

Douglas to analyze NJLAD claims "when there is only 'circumstantial evidence'

of [racial] discrimination." Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 204 N.J. 320,

330 (2010) (quoting Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 446-47 (2005)).

Under that burden-shifting test:

            (1) the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient
            evidence to constitute a prima facie case of
            discrimination; (2) the defendant then must show a
            legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision;
            and (3) the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity
            to show that defendant's stated reason was merely a
            pretext or discriminatory in its application.

            [Id. at 331 (quoting Dixon v Rutgers, The State Univ.
            of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 442 (1988)).]

      Based on the McDonnell Douglas methodology, a plaintiff must first

"demonstrate that [they] can meet each of the elements of a prima facie case."

Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 408 (2010) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.

at 802). The elements depend on the nature of the claim asserted. Because

plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging discriminatory discharge, a hostile

work environment, and retaliation, we briefly address the nature of those claims.

      To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, a plaintiff

                                                                              A-2641-21
                                        14
must show: "(1) that plaintiff is in a protected class; (2) that plaintiff was

otherwise qualified and performing the essential functions of the job; (3) that

plaintiff was terminated; and (4) that the employer thereafter sought similarly

qualified individuals for that job." Id. at 409.

      A plaintiff asserting a hostile work environment claim must establish the

following "prima facie elements: (1) that plaintiff is in a protected class; (2)

that plaintiff was subjected to conduct that would not have occurred but for that

protected status; and (3) that it was severe or pervasive enough to alter the

conditions of employment." Ibid.

      Finally, a plaintiff asserting a claim of retaliation under the NJLAD must

establish the following prima facie elements: "(1) plaintiff was in a protected

class; (2) plaintiff engaged in protected activity known to the employer; (3)

plaintiff was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment consequence; and

(4) that there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

employment consequence." Ibid.

      As we have indicated, "[t]he establishment of the prima face case creates

an inference of discrimination [after which] . . . the burden of production shifts

to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

employer's action." Henry, 204 N.J. at 331 (alternation in original) (quoting

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                                       15
Zive, 182 N.J. at 449). "Subsequently, 'the burden of production shifts back to

the employee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason

articulated by the employer was merely a pretext for discrimination and not the

true reason for the employment decision.'" Ibid. (quoting Zive, 182 N.J. at 449).

         Here, defendants acknowledge: plaintiff is a member of a protected class;

his January 16 employee complaint constituted a protected activity; and his

unpaid suspension was an adverse employment action. However, they contend

Judge Bernardin correctly found plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case

of retaliation under the NJLAD because plaintiff failed to show a causal link

between the filing of his employee complaint and his unpaid suspension. We

agree.

         As the judge noted, plaintiff based his retaliation claim on the belief

"Figueroa received the January 16[] complaint before issuing the [twenty]-day

suspension," but plaintiff's own deposition testimony reflected he had no direct

knowledge of when Figueroa received and reviewed that complaint. Moreover,

the judge found: "Blackshear's [deposition] testimony on th[is] issue was vague,

inconsistent and contradictory"; her testimony was "not competent"; and "a

reasonable jury could not glean from her testimony that Figueroa was aware of

the complaint before he suspended plaintiff on January 18." Additionally, as the

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judge aptly noted, the deposition testimony from Figueroa and Kostyal

confirmed Figueroa did not read the employee complaint until hours after he

suspended plaintiff, and Figueroa and Kostyal contemplated disciplining

plaintiff approximately a month before plaintiff filed his employee complaint

because plaintiff failed to oversee the collection of $39,680 in unpaid rents from

one of HACC's public housing complexes and additional rent and late fees

totaling over $348,000 remained due. The judge's factual findings are amply

supported on the record. Accordingly, his legal conclusion that no genuine issue

as to any material fact existed relative to plaintiff's retaliation claim is

unassailable.

      Affirmed.

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