Court Opinion

ID: 9949694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 14:08:31.511332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.837027
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0520-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KERLO A. BARTHELUS, and
KHAALIQ SKINNER,

     Defendants-Appellants.
__________________________

                   Argued February 14, 2024 – Decided March 12, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Vanek.

                   On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
                   Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County,
                   Indictment Nos. 23-04-0254 and 23-04-0255.

                   Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated Counsel,
                   argued the cause for appellant Kerlo A. Barthelus
                   (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney;
                   Andrew Robert Burroughs, on the briefs).

                   Ashley T. Brooks, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant Khaaliq Skinner
                   (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney;
                   Ashley T. Brooks, of counsel and on the briefs).
            Michele C. Buckley, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
            cause for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union County
            Prosecutor, attorney; Michele C. Buckley, of counsel
            and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendants Kerlo A. Barthelus and Khaaliq Skinner appeal from an

August 17, 2023 order denying their motion to suppress evidence —a weapon

and controlled dangerous substances (CDS)—seized during a warrantless search

following a motor vehicle stop. Skinner was the driver, and Barthelus, his

brother, was the back-seat passenger. After carefully reviewing the record in

light of the arguments of the parties and the applicable principles of law, we

conclude the stop was lawful, but defendants' motion to suppress should have

been granted because the police unlawfully ordered defendants out of the car ,

wrongfully detained them, and searched the vehicle without a warrant. We

therefore reverse the motion court's order denying defendants' motion to

suppress.

                                      I.

      Defendants were charged in an indictment with second-degree unlawful

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), and third-degree possession of

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                                      2
CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). Skinner was also charged with a second count

of third-degree possession of a CDS.

        After defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search,

the motion judge conducted a two-day hearing during which the State presented

testimony from Lieutenant Anthony Gural, 1 video footage of the encounter

recorded by Gural's body worn camera (BWC), and a LawSoft2 screenshot,

which were moved into evidence.

        Gural testified that at approximately 9:52 p.m. on November 10, 2022, he

was traveling east on North Avenue in Elizabeth and stopped at a traffic light at

Pennsylvania Avenue. Gural observed a red Honda Civic, driven by Skinner,

stopped at the traffic light facing west. When both traffic lights turned green,

1
    Also referred to as "Garal" in the record.
2
   LawSoft, Inc. (LawSoft) is a private entity that provides and streamlines law
enforcement software. Home, LAWSOFT, INC., https://www.lawsoft-inc.com/
(last visited Mar. 5, 2024). LawSoft "integrates[] . . . [l]aw [e]nforcement
software systems to allow . . . the ability to move data between these systems
and eliminate redundant entry of information." Interfaces, L AWSOFT, INC.,
https://www.lawsoft-inc.com/fire-cad (last visited Mar. 5, 2024). LawSoft's
products include, among others, Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) and Record
Management System (RMS). Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), LAWSOFT,
INC., https://www.lawsoft-inc.com/gallery (last visited Mar. 5, 2024); Record
Management (RMS), L AWSOFT, INC., https://www.lawsoft-inc.com/copy-of-
police-cad (last visited Mar. 5, 2024).

                                                                           A-0520-23
                                          3
Gural proceeded straight, and the Honda cut him off by making a left turn in

front of his police car onto Pennsylvania Avenue. Gural directed Skinner to pull

over, illuminated his vehicle lights and siren, and notified police headquarters.

Gural approached the Honda and did not wait for backup to arrive.

      Gural observed that the Honda had heavily tinted windows and

Pennsylvania license plates. As he approached the vehicle, Gural noticed the

windows were rolled up and extremely loud music was playing inside the

vehicle. He could not see the occupants. From the rear of the driver's side

passenger door, Gural instructed Skinner to lower the music and roll down all

the windows. Gural also asked Barthelus, who was seated behind Skinner, to

put his hands on the headrest of Skinner's seat. Skinner immediately rolled down

the windows, and Barthelus put his hands on the headrest. Gural claimed he still

could not ascertain how many passengers were in the vehicle.

      Gural asked for Skinner's credentials, whom he recognized from "prior

encounters." At the time, Gural indicated he was concerned for his safety

because he was alone, the Honda's windows were heavily tinted, and the

occupants continued to play music loudly during the stop, which he thought was

unusual and contrary to his instructions. Gural advised the occupants that he

was concerned for his safety and asked Skinner to step out of the car. Gural

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                                       4
claimed Skinner appeared nervous and asked why he was stopped. Gural told

Skinner that he cut him off. Skinner apologized to him and explained that he

thought Gural was slowing down or letting him go.

        Skinner got out of the car and moved to the rear of the Honda as instructed

by Gural. Officers Christian Estrema and L. Rodriguez 3 responded to the scene

to assist. Gural proceeded to question Skinner about his vehicle, insurance, and

probationary driver's license status. According to Gural, Skinner continued to

appear extremely nervous and kept reaching into his pockets. When Gural asked

Skinner to stop reaching into his pockets, he complied. Gural also observed that

Skinner kept turning his head, looking around, and would not make eye contact

with him.

        Gural continued to question Skinner. In response, Skinner told Gural that

the front seat passenger was his girlfriend, Mariah Thomas, and the rear seat

passenger—Barthelus—was his brother. Gural asked Skinner where he was

going, and Skinner responded that he was taking Barthelus home to Woodbridge.

Gural noticed inconsistencies in Skinner's answers, particularly the route he was

taking.

3
    Officer Rodriguez's first name is not contained in the record.
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                                         5
      Gural testified that when he was assigned to the Street Crimes and

Narcotic Unit, he had previously encountered Skinner and Barthelus in high

crime areas. The record indicates another officer identified Barthelus and told

Gural "where he spends his time." Gural searched Skinner's name on LawSoft

and found a discrepancy in his address, which caused Gural concern. Skinner's

driver's license indicated an address in Willingboro, and other documents listed

an address in Elizabeth.

      While Gural was speaking with Skinner at the rear of the vehicle,

Rodriguez illuminated the inside of the vehicle. Barthelus offered to roll the

window down. The record is unclear, but somehow the rear passenger door was

unexpectedly opened. Concerned by what he thought was unusual behavior,

together with Skinner's nervousness, Rodriguez requested Barthelus exit the

vehicle, which he did.

      Gural questioned both defendants about where they lived, where they were

coming from, and where they were going. Both defendants claimed they had

been hanging out and smoking marijuana at Kellogg Park located a few blocks

away. Gural questioned Skinner as to why he did not drive east on North Avenue

toward the highway after leaving the park instead of driving west on North

Avenue before turning left onto Pennsylvania Avenue. Skinner answered that

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he made the wrong turn after leaving the park and tried to turn around. However,

Barthelus said he lived in downtown Elizabeth. Gural was troubled because the

two were not headed in the direction Skinner stated. Gural then instructed the

other officers to check Barthelus's "identification," and he produced his driver's

license.

      When questioned about his girlfriend, Skinner indicated they lived

together in Willingboro. Thomas was removed from the vehicle by Rodriguez,

and after he asked where she lived, she answered, "Newark." After the three

occupants had been removed from the vehicle and were ordered to stand at the

rear of the car, no pat down search was conducted of any of them. Gural

admitted he extended the scope of the stop since he recognized both defendants,

they lived and hung out in "high-crime areas", and because he wanted "to

investigate the inconsistencies" in their statements.

      Gural testified he thought defendants' answers were "deceptive" and gave

him a "funny feeling," but agreed their answers had nothing to do with anything

illegal. And, Gural conceded that the investigation was unrelated to illegal

drugs, firearms, or defendants being suspects for other crimes. The car had not

been reported as being involved in some other offense. Gural ultimately verified

Skinner's driver's license address was correct after checking the Motor Vehicle

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                                        7
Commission database. Gural asked defendants whether the officers were going

to find anything illegal inside the car, and Barthelus responded "no."

      After two or three of the vehicle's doors were open and all three occupants

were situated at the rear of the Honda, Gural instructed the other officers to

conduct a protective sweep of the vehicle because he was concerned for the

officers' safety. Prior to the search, Gural testified the three officers were within

a foot or two of the three occupants and "had visuals" on them. The officers

found a Beretta nine-millimeter handgun on the front passenger floorboard. The

three occupants were then handcuffed and told to sit down while the officers

further searched the vehicle.     They discovered vacuum-sealed packages of

unregulated marijuana inside the driver's side door pocket and a bottle

containing Oxycontin pills. The officers also recovered fourteen bags of cocaine

from Skinner's front pants pocket. Skinner was not issued any traffic violation

summonses.

      Following the close of the hearing, the motion judge gave an oral decision.

The motion judge noted Skinner was cooperative with the police, and the scene

was not "chaotic." In the motion judge's view, the litany of questions Gural

asked defendants was appropriate, as to where they were coming from and

headed. The motion judge found defendants' stories did not "match up," and

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                                         8
that Skinner was "evasive with the police" when asked about whether there was

contraband in the car and allowed Barthelus to answer for him.

      The motion judge denied defendants' motion to suppress finding: the stop

of the car was justified based on reasonable articulable suspicion of a motor

vehicle violation because Skinner "cut in front" of Gural's vehicle; the stop was

not pretextual based on the race of the occupants in the vehicle; the vehicle had

tinted windows and Gural did not know who he had pulled over; the stop was

not unlawfully prolonged; Gural had a specific and articulable basis to

investigate the occupants; and defendants providing conflicting statements to

the police, and acting "oddly[,]" furnishing the officers with probable cause to

search the vehicle to ensure their safety. The motion judge found the stop lasted

about fifteen minutes.

      The motion judge reasoned that Gural's "antenna" went off based on his

"experience" in conducting multiple motor vehicle stops. The motion judge

determined "the officers were allowed to search the interior of the vehicle for

the weapons or for contraband to . . . ensure their own safety in the stop." The

motion judge found the actions taken by the police officers were "justified" and

"within the parameters of the law." A memorializing order was entered. This

appeal followed.

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                                       9
Barthelus presents the following arguments for our consideration:

      POINT I

      AS THE MOTOR VEHICLE STOP IN THIS CASE
      WAS UNLAWFUL, ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED
      DURING THE SUBSEQUENT WARRANTLESS
      SEARCH OF CO-DEFENDANT'S SKINNER'S
      VEHICLE MUST BE SUPPRESSED.

      POINT II

      AS   THERE    WAS    AN   INSUFFICIENT
      REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION
      THAT DEFENDANT [BARTHELUS] HAD BEEN OR
      WAS ENGAGED IN ANY CRIMINAL CONDUCT
      TO JUSTIFY THE INVESTIGATORY STOP, THE
      CONTINUED SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT WAS
      UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

      POINT III

      AS THERE WAS NOT A REASONABLE AND
      ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT
      [BARTHELUS] PRESENTED A DANGER OR WAS
      IN ANY MANNER ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL
      CONDUCT, HIS REMOVAL FROM SKINNER'S
      VEHICLE AND THE DEMAND THAT HE
      PRODUCE HIS DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS
      UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

            (A) The Removal And Seizure Of Defendant
            [Barthelus] By Police Was Unreasonable And
            Unconstitutional.

            (B) The Demand By [Gural] That Defendant
            [Barthelus] Produce His Driver's License Was An
            Unjustified And Unreasonable Privacy Intrusion.

                                                                    A-0520-23
                               10
      POINT IV

      AS THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE
      CAUSE THAT THERE WAS CONTRABAND IN
      SKINNER'S VEHICLE AND THAT DEFENDANTS
      HAD BEEN OR WERE ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL
      ACTIVITIES, THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO
      THE SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT DOES
      NOT APPLY.

      POINT V

      AS THERE WAS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR A
      PROTECTIVE SWEEP TO JUSTIFY THE ENTRY
      INTO AND SEARCH OF CO-DEFENDANT'S
      SKINNER'S VEHICLE, ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED
      THEREOF MUST BE SUPPRESSED.

Skinner presents the following arguments for our consideration:

      POINT I

      THE POLICE UNLAWFULLY STOPPED THE CAR,
      DEMANDED . . . BARTHELUS'[S] IDENTIFICA-
      TION, PULLED THE PASSENGERS OUT OF THE
      CAR, PROLONGED THE STOP AND SEARCHED
      THE CAR WITHOUT A WARRANT. THE
      EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED.

            A. The State Failed To Establish That Gural Had
            Reasonable Articulable Suspicion For The Motor
            Vehicle Stop.

            B. The Police Did Not Have A Basis To Demand
            . . . Barthelus'[s] License Or To Order . . .
            Barthelus Out Of The Car.

                                                                  A-0520-23
                               11
                  C. The Officers Did Not Have Reasonable And
                  Articulable Suspicion To Continue To Detain . . .
                  Skinner And . . . Barthelus After Confirming The
                  Validity Of . . . Skinner's Insurance, License And
                  Registration.

                  D. The Police Did Not Have A Reasonable And
                  Articulable Basis For A Protective Sweep.

                  E. The Police Lacked Probable Cause To Believe
                  Contraband Or Evidence Of Criminal Activity
                  Was Inside The Car.

                                       II.

      Our scope of review of a trial court's suppression ruling is well

established. We must "defer[] to the trial court's factual findings" and uphold

them so long as they are supported by "sufficient credible evidenc e in the

record." State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. 540, 551 (2019). "The governing principle,

then, is that '[a] trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so

clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and

correction.'" State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009) (alteration in original)

(quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). In contrast, we review the

trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal "consequences that flow from

established facts" de novo. State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014).

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                                       12
      Turning to the substantive legal principles governing this appeal, "[t]he

Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the

New Jersey Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures." Nelson, 237 N.J. at 552 (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV;

N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7). "Our jurisprudence under both constitutional provisions

expresses a preference that police officers secure a warrant before they execute

a search." State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 422 (2015). "Warrantless searches are

permissible only if 'justified by one of the "few specifically established and well-

delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement.'" Ibid. (quoting State v.

Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385

(1978))). "[T]he State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

evidence that [the] warrantless search or seizure" falls within an exception.

Elders, 192 N.J. at 246.

      Before we consider whether an exception existed to search the vehicle, we

must conclude there was a lawful traffic stop. "A lawful roadside stop by a

police officer constitutes a seizure under both the Federal and New Jersey

Constitutions." State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 532 (2017). "To be lawful, an

automobile stop 'must be based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an

offense, including a minor traffic offense, has been or is being committed.'"

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                                        13
State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017) (quoting State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632,

639-40, modified on other grounds, 174 N.J. 351 (2002)); see also State v.

Bernokeits, 423 N.J. Super. 365, 370 (App. Div. 2011) ("A motor vehic[le]

violation, no matter how minor, justifies a stop without any reasonable suspicion

that the motorist has committed a crime or other unlawful act.").

      The reasonable suspicion standard requires "'some minimal level of

objective justification for making the stop.'" State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511

(2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). "[R]aw,

inchoate suspicion grounded in speculation cannot be the basis for a valid stop."

State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 34 (2016). "Although reasonable suspicion is a

less demanding standard than probable cause, '[n]either "inarticulate hunches"

nor an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify infringement of a

citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 527

(2022) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 372

(2002) (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

      "Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists . . . is a

highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of 'the totality of

circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's

interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be

                                                                            A-0520-23
                                       14
protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" Id. at 528

(quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)). "It is fundamental to a

totality of the circumstances analysis of whether reasonable suspicion exists that

courts may consider the experience and knowledge of law enforcement officers."

Stovall, 170 N.J. at 363.

      In assessing the totality of the circumstances for a stop based on a motor

vehicle violation, a reviewing court must determine "[whether] the facts

available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant [an individual]

of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." State

v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 7-8 (1997) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22

(1968)). Stated differently, the stop must be lawful at the moment the Fourth

Amendment seizure is initiated.

      However, "the State is not required to prove that the suspected motor-

vehicle violation occurred." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). Rather,

"[c]onstitutional precedent requires only reasonableness on the part of the

police, not legal perfection. Therefore, the State need prove only that the police

lawfully stopped the car, not that it could convict the driver of the motor -vehicle

offense." State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302, 304 (1994); see also State v.

Sutherland, 231 N.J. 429, 439 (2018).

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                                        15
      The search incident to arrest exception "was limned for two specific

purposes—the protection of the police and the preservation of evidence." State

v. Eckel, 185 N.J. 523, 524 (2006). However, when law enforcement has

probable cause to arrest, it is not unlawful to search the individual prior to

placing them under arrest. State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 614-15 (2007). In

evaluating whether there is probable cause to arrest, courts consider the "totality

of the circumstances . . . from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police

officer." State v. Basil, 202 N.J. 570, 585 (2010) (internal citations omitted).

      Probable cause is a "'common-sense, practical standard' dealing with

'probabilities' and the 'practical considerations of everyday life,[']" and is

generally understood to mean "'less than legal evidence necessary to convict

though more than mere naked suspicion.'" State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 381

(2003) (first quoting State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 211 (2001); and then

quoting State v. Mark, 46 N.J. 262, 271 (1966)).

                                        A.

      We first address defendants' contention that Gural did not have a

reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the motor vehicle stop. Defendants

argue that the video evidence does not support Gural's assertion Skinner made

an illegal left turn or violated any motor vehicle laws. According to defendants,

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                                       16
the BWC footage is inconsistent with Gural's testimony because the video shows

Gural driving towards the intersection of North and Pennsylvania Avenues , and

the traffic light had turned green before he reached the intersection.

      Defendants allege the video does not show any oncoming car lights in the

intersection as Gural approached it, and no other vehicle can be observed in the

intersection, leading to the inference that Skinner's vehicle must have already

turned left onto Pennsylvania Avenue from North Avenue before Gural entered

the intersection. Defendants assert Gural did not memorialize in his report that

he had to "stop short" as he testified to on cross-examination and that Skinner

almost struck his vehicle. Defendants point out Gural testified that making a

left turn at an intersection is not necessarily illegal. We reject defendants'

argument.

      Based upon Gural's "credible" testimony, which was corroborated by his

BWC, he was stopped at a red light waiting for the light to change when

Skinner's vehicle, which was traveling in the opposite direction, made a quick

left turn in front of his vehicle and failed to yield.

      N.J.S.A. 39:4-90 provides:

             The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection
             shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which has
             entered the intersection. When [two] vehicles enter an
             intersection at the same time the driver of the vehicle

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                                         17
            on the left shall yield the right of way to the driver of
            the vehicle on the right.

            The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending
            to turn to the left shall yield to a vehicle approaching
            from the opposite direction which is within the
            intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an
            immediate hazard, but the driver having so yielded, and
            having given a signal when and as required by law, may
            make the left turn; and other vehicles approaching the
            intersection from the opposite direction shall yield to
            the driver making the left turn.

      Contrary to defendants' assertions, the BWC footage showed Gural was

stopped at the red light for approximately ten seconds before the light turned

green, oncoming lights were shining into his car, and Skinner's vehicle made a

quick left-hand turn in front of him, thus failing to yield to Gural's vehicle.

Gural then made a right-hand turn towards Skinner's vehicle. In addressing the

issue, the motion judge found there was a reasonable basis for Gural to initiate

a motor vehicle stop for a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-90 because Skinner "cut

off" his police car while making a left-hand turn instead of yielding to oncoming

traffic. The record supports the motion judge's finding.

      Moreover, Skinner was recorded on the BWC footage saying "he's sorry"

to Gural for cutting his police car off while making the left turn. In deferring to

those credibility findings, we are satisfied there was sufficient evidence to

                                                                             A-0520-23
                                       18
support the motion judge's determination that Gural had a reasonable articulable

suspicion for the motor vehicle stop.

                                         B.

       We turn to defendants' argument that, even if the traffic stop was justified,

Gural unlawfully prolonged the stop into an investigative detention, and

therefore, the warrantless search was unconstitutional and did not fall within the

automobile exception.      Barthelus claims the police officers requested his

identification—driver's license—and removed him from the vehicle without

reason to suspect him of criminal activity or a belief that he posed a safety risk

to them. Defendants argue Gural prolonged the detention and expended its

scope "based on impermissible race-based stereotypes"4 and without any

objective basis for reasonable suspicion. Defendants also assert the police

searched the vehicle without having reasonable suspicion that a weapon might

be inside the vehicle, or that any of the individuals had access to the vehicle,

and without probable cause, warranting suppression of the weapons and CDS.

       During a lawful traffic stop, a police officer is permitted to "inquire 'into

matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop,'" Dunbar, 229 N.J. at

533 (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)), and "may make

4
    Defendants are African-American males.
                                                                              A-0520-23
                                        19
'ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop,'" Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 533. "If,

during the course of the stop or as a result of the reasonable inquiries initiated

by the officer, the circumstances 'give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic

offense, an officer may broaden [the] inquiry and satisfy those suspicions.'"

State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 479-80 (1998) (quoting United States v. Johnson,

58 F.3d 356, 357-58 (8th Cir. 1995)).

      The inquiries, however, "may not [be performed] 'in any way that prolongs

the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify

detaining an individual.'" Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 535. A detention following a

lawful stop "must be reasonable both at its inception and throughout its entire

execution." Coles, 218 N.J. at 344. Prolonging a traffic stop "beyond the time

reasonably required to complete the . . . stop's purpose . . . is unlawful absent

independent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Dunbar, 229 N.J. at 536.

      In determining "whether an investigative detention is unreasonable,

common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria. "

Dickey, 152 N.J. at 477 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685

(1985)). "An officer does not need a warrant to make [an investigatory] stop if

it is based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

                                                                             A-0520-23
                                        20
inferences from those facts,' give rise to a reasonable suspicion of activity."

State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126-27 (2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).

      Our Supreme Court has declared the "standard for reasonable suspicion

required to uphold an investigative detention is lower than the standard of

probable cause to justify an arrest[,]" Nishina, 175 N.J. at 511, and "must be

based on the law enforcement officer's assessment of the totality of the

circumstances he [or she] faced," Id., (quoting State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504

(1986)). A detention, however, becomes unlawful when it is longer than is

reasonably necessary to diligently investigate an officer's reasonable suspicion

of criminal activity. Dickey, 152 N.J. at 476-79.

      "Nervousness and excited movements are common responses to

unanticipated encounters with police officers on the road." State v. Rosario, 229

N.J. 263, 277 (2017). Such "cannot support a detention in the first place[,]" let

alone extending the detention. Ibid; see also Nyema, 249 N.J. at 533 (finding

that "nervous behavior or lack of eye contact with police cannot drive the

reasonable suspicion analysis given the wide range of behavior exhibited by

many different people for varying reasons while in the presence of police");

State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 47 (1990) (noting that "[o]rdinarily, mere furtive

gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an articulable

                                                                           A-0520-23
                                      21
suspicion suggesting criminal activity").    In State v. Carty, in addition to

nervousness, our Court reasoned an officer's concern about conflicting stories

does not support reasonable suspicion if that concern could possibly be

incorrect. 170 N.J. 632, 648 (2002).

      Here, Gural testified he detained defendants based on their conflicting

stores. However, Gural confirmed that Skinner's address on his driver's license

was correct. Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence that defendants or

Thomas made any furtive movements to create the "chaotic" scene that Gural

described in his testimony. To the contrary, the BWC footage shows defendants

were not "nervous" as Gural testified to that would have led to a heightened

sense of caution. And, the testimony and evidence bore out that both defendants

were compliant with every instruction and order that Gural and the other officers

gave. The motion judge found the scene was not chaotic and that defendants

were cooperative with the police.

      Although Gural and another officer recognized defendants from prior

encounters, that information alone was insufficient to find a reasonable and

articulable suspicion justifying the stop beyond issuing a motor vehicle

summons, which was not done here. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333

(finding police inquiries to passengers unrelated to the justification of stop

                                                                           A-0520-23
                                       22
convert it to an unlawful detention it if measurably extends the stop). We thus

conclude the State failed to meet its burden at the suppression hearing, and that

the weapon and CDS found in the Honda and on Skinner's person must be

suppressed as fruit of the unlawful motor vehicle search. Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) (rejecting the proposition that a search

unlawful at its inception may be validated by what it turns up.")

                                       C.

      We next address Barthelus's argument that there was no reasonable and

articulable suspicion that he presented a danger or was in any manner engaged

in illegal conduct, thereby making his removal from the vehicle and demanding

he produce his driver's license unconstitutional. Barthelus contends the police

acted illegally in requesting his driver's license and ordering him out of the car

because there was no reason for the officers to suspect him of any wrongdoing

or to believe they were in danger. Barthelus further avers that from the moment

they were pulled over, he and Skinner were "perfectly compliant," Skinner rolled

down his driver's side window, gave Gural his credentials without being asked,

and turned down the music as soon as he finished putting his documentation

together as instructed.

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                                       23
      Even though Gural testified Skinner wrongfully turned left in front of him

as he approached the intersection and delayed in turning down the music,

Barthelus contends these reasons did not constitute an objective basis for

reasonable suspicion. Barthelus also claims the rear windows of Skinner's

vehicle were tinted but that did not provide a basis for concern because tinted

rear windows are not illegal.

      "For ordering occupants out of a vehicle during a routine stop or a traffic

violation, in order to adequately protect police officers, our Court announced a

standard of 'heightened caution' . . . ."

             [T]he officer need not point to specific facts that the
             occupants are "armed and dangerous." Rather, the
             officer need point only to some fact or facts in the
             totality of the circumstances that would create in a
             police officer a heightened awareness of danger that
             would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in
             securing the scene in a more effective manner by
             ordering the passenger to alight from the car.

             [State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 618 (1994).]

Our Court elaborated that "the officer must be able to articulate specific reasons

why the person's gestures or other circumstances caused the officer to expect

more danger from this traffic stop than from other routine traffic stops." Id. at

619; see Id. at 619-20 (concluding that the circumstances were sufficient to

warrant the order that the passengers leave the vehicle because: (1) the occupants

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                                            24
made suspicious movements; (2) it was 2:29 a.m.; and (3) the Turnpike, where

the stop occurred, was deserted).

      Here, the record shows that Barthelus remained compliant and did not

make any furtive movements during the police encounter. The BWC footage is

not clear as to how the rear passenger-side door became open during the stop.

The State speculates it was Barthelus as a passenger who opened the door from

the rear seat on the driver's side, but Thomas could have also opened the door

from the front seat passenger side. In any event, the BWC footage indicates that

minutes elapsed between the opening of the door and the police ordering

Barthelus out of the vehicle, and there is no evidence in the record that either he

or Thomas made any movements to create heightened suspicion. Gural was

unable to testify as to any specific and articulable facts that suggested defendants

or Thomas were dangerous. Therefore, we conclude that the heightened caution

standard was not satisfied here.

      Moreover, officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they demand

identification from passengers in a vehicle regarding whom they h ave no

suspicion. Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Co., 351 N.J. Super. 577, 612 (App. Div.

2002). "This view is most consistent with our Supreme Court's decision in Carty

and the prophylactic purpose of discouraging the police from turning a routine

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                                        25
traffic stop into a "fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the stop."

Id. at 614.   Like in Hornberger v. American Broadcasting Co., where the

passengers had done nothing more suspicious than riding in a car with tinted

windows and a request for passengers' identification with a reasonable suspicion

of criminal conduct was improper, Barthelus did not do anything suspicious and

remained compliant. Id. at 611-12, 614. Therefore, the request for Barthelus's

driver's license was also improper.

                                         D.

      Finally, we address defendants' argument that the police did not have a

reasonable and articulable basis to conduct a protective sweep, and the

protective sweep exception does not apply to uphold the search. We agree.

      The protective sweep doctrine is a recognized exception to the warrant

requirement. The exception derives from the United States Supreme Court's

holding in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing the limited intrusion of

a police "stop and frisk" of a pedestrian where there is reasonable suspicion that

the individual may have engaged in criminal activity).

      In Long, the United States Supreme Court applied the protective sweep

exception in an automobile setting. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049

(1983). There, the Court authorized a limited search of a vehicle's passenger

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                                        26
area for purposes of officer safety. Ibid. The Court observed in Long that such

a "protective sweep" should be restricted to those areas where a weapon could

be hidden or placed if an officer "possesses a reasonable belief based on specific

and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those

facts, reasonably warrant" the officer’s belief that the suspect poses a danger

and "may gain immediate control of weapons." Ibid. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.

at 21.) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      In Lund, our Court adopted the federal test for vehicular protective sweeps

that had been articulated in Long. 119 N.J. at 48-50. Hence, the coterminous

federal and state constitutional standard for a valid protective sweep is whether

the State demonstrates "specific and articulable facts that, considered with t he

rational inferences from those facts, warrant a belief that an individual in the

vehicle is dangerous and that he or she 'may gain immediate control of

weapons.'" State v. Robinson, 228 N.J. 529, 547 (2017) (quoting Long, 463 U.S.

at 1049.) See also State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 432 (2014). The police may

perform a warrantless protective sweep of a vehicle's passenger compartment

where the totality of circumstances support "a reasonable suspicion that a driver

or passenger 'is dangerous and may gain immediate access to weapons.'"

Robinson, 228 N.J. at 534 (quoting Gamble, 218 N.J. at 432).

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                                       27
      Our Court concluded on the factual record in Gamble that a warrantless

protective sweep of a car interior was justified. 218 N.J. at 433. In that case,

the police conducted an investigatory stop of a vehicle matching the reported

description of a van in which a man had been seen sitting with a gun in his lap.

Id. at 418-19. As the two police officers on the scene approached the van, the

defendant driver and his passenger were "moving frantically inside the vehicle,

as if trying to hide something." Id. at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted).

      When the lead officer ordered the occupants out of the vehicle, the

defendant aborted his exit from the vehicle and tried to return to the driver's seat.

Id. at 420. The lead officer pulled the defendant from the van, frisked him for

weapons, and placed him under the supervision of the other officer who was also

guarding the passenger. Ibid. Our Court held in Gamble that, in light of

defendant's defiant conduct and the officers' failure to find a weapon on the

person of either occupant, a protective sweep of the vehicle was justified at that

point. Id. at 433. Our Court reasoned that the officers had a reasonable basis to

believe that the individuals were dangerous and could gain immediate access to

weapons. Id. at 434.

      In its later May 2017 opinion in Robinson, our Court reached an opposite

conclusion, striking down as illegal the warrantless search of a passenger

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                                        28
compartment after a valid motor vehicle stop. There, a single officer in a marked

patrol car conducted a valid motor vehicle stop, saw four people in the car, and

noticed that none of the occupants were wearing a seatbelt. 228 N.J. at 536.

Shortly after making the stop, the officer was advised by his department's

dispatcher that the driver of the car had an outstanding warrant for a drug

offense. Id. at 537. The dispatcher also told the officer to use caution because

the defendant was known to carry weapons. Ibid. The dispatcher further advised

the officer that one of the passengers also had an outstanding traffic warrant.

Ibid. The officer called for backup and was met by four other uniformed

officers, who assisted in directing two of the four occupants out of the car, as

well as handcuffing, and arresting them. Id. at 537-38. The officers detained,

but failed to arrest, the other two occupants. Id. at 538.

      The officers then patted down the two detained individuals, but found no

weapons. Ibid. The two men, who remained uncuffed, were then told to stand

on the roadside as the officers monitored them. Ibid. The testifying officer

stated that he did not see either of the detained passengers reach for a weapon,

attempt to hide anything, or resist the officers' directions. Ibid. The sergeant

on the scene then directed one of the officers to conduct a sweep of the car's

interior to check for weapons.     Ibid. After searching the front driver and

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                                       29
passenger areas, the officer lifted a purse found on the front passenger seat. Ibid.

The officer testified that he felt the outline of a gun when he felt the bottom of

the purse. Id. at 538-39. The gun was retrieved by the officer, all passengers

were secured, and the five officers on the scene then decided to obtain a search

warrant. Id. at 539.

      Our Court found the on-the-spot search of the car that produced the

handgun was not within the warrant requirement's protective sweep exception.

Robinson, 228 N.J. at 549.          Our Court concluded that, although the

circumstances justified a reasonable suspicion a weapon was in the vehicle, the

five officers' "swift and coordinated action eliminated the risk that any of the

four occupants would gain immediate access to the weapon." Id. at 535.

      Our Court recognized in Robinson that there was "no doubt" that the

officers had justifiable support for a reasonable suspicion that at least some of

the occupants were armed and that a weapon was present, especially given the

late hour of the stop, among other considerations. Id. at 548. In addition, our

Court recognized that although no weapons were found on the occupants when

they were frisked, the absence of weapons did not remove the need for concern.

Ibid.; see Gamble, 218 N.J. at 432-33. Even so, our Court emphasized that this

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                                        30
potential danger had been met at the scene with effective and prompt police

action. Robinson, 228 N.J. at 549.

      The Robinson Court further noted that because the original responding

officer had "summoned four backup officers, the officers outnumbered the

occupants of the vehicle." Ibid. Two of the occupants were handcuffed, while

those that remained unsecured "were cooperative" and "carefully monitored."

Ibid. Our Court concluded that the officers collectively were therefore able to

maintain control of the vehicle and the scene generally. Ibid. Because of this

prudent police work, none of the vehicle's former occupants realistically had the

opportunity to access the vehicle or a weapon. Ibid.

      Governed by the principles, we are convinced there were no grounds to

support a protective sweep here. Defendants and Thomas had been removed

from the Honda and complied with Gural's and the other officers' commands.

The record is devoid of any evidence that Gural or the other officers suspected

defendants committed a crime or what they expected to find in the vehicle.

Moreover, Gural did not feel sufficiently threatened to pat down defendants or

Thomas, who had already been removed and secured, before ordering the

protective sweep.

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                                      31
      When the protective sweep was conducted, the Honda's doors were open,

the occupants had been removed, and the interior of the vehicle was readily

visible to Gural and the officers. And, Estrema and Rodriguez had already

inspected the interior of the Honda using their flashlights before Gural ordered

the protective sweep. Approximately fifteen minutes had elapsed before the

protective sweep occurred. We conclude there was ample time in light of the

facts and circumstances presented here for Gural and the officers to secure

defendants and Thomas. Ibid. at 533. The protective sweep was not justified

based on our review of the record.

      For all of the reasons stated, we reverse the August 17, 2023 order denying

defendants' motion to suppress. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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                                      32