Court Opinion

ID: 9904953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 15:08:38.663088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:55.949576
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3247-20

MAJEK INVESTMENTS LLC,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CONVENTUS, LLC,

          Defendant,

and

PASSAIC MAIN NORSE LLC,
ELIZABETH CATHERINE
VENTURES LLC, LL REO
VENTURES LLC, ELIZABETH
LOUISA VENTURES LLC,
PLAINFIELD PA VENTURES
LLC, NEXUS CAPTIAL
INVESTMENTS, LLC, and
PRIVCAP FUNDING, LLC,

     Defendants-Respondents.
_______________________________

                   Argued October 23, 2023 – Decided November 28, 2023

                   Before Judges Sabatino, Mawla and Vinci.
            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
            Chancery Division, Union County, Docket No. C-
            000138-19.

            Haralampo Kasolas argued the cause for appellant
            (Brach Eichler LLC, attorneys; Haralampo Kasolas, of
            counsel and on the briefs).

            Abraham S. Beinhorn argued the cause for respondent
            Nexus Capital Investments, LLC (Jacobowitz,
            Newman, Tversky LLP, attorneys; Abraham S.
            Beinhorn and Evan M. Newman, on the brief).

            Timothy Patrick Duggan argued the cause for
            respondent Privcap Funding, LLC (Stark & Stark PC,
            attorneys; Timothy Patrick Duggan, of counsel and on
            the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Majek Investments, LLC ("Majek") appeals from the trial court's

order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting summary

judgment to defendants Nexus Capital Investments, LLC ("Nexus") and Privcap

Funding, LLC ("Privcap"), and an order denying its motion for reconsideration.

Based on our review of the record and the applicable principles of law, we

affirm.

                                      I.

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                                      2
      We summarize the facts developed in the record on the parties' cross-

motions for summary judgment. 1

                                      A.

      Majek alleged the following facts. On March 19, 2019, Majek entered

into a commercial loan agreement with Norse Holdings, LLC ("Norse"), in the

principal amount of $750,000 (the "Majek Loan"). The Majek Loan was secured

by a promissory note executed by Norse. Norse is one of many companies

affiliated with Seth Levine ("Levine"). The Majek Loan was also secured by a

guaranty of payment and performance executed by Levine and his wife, Shira

Levine.   The Majek Loan was further secured by a pledge and security

agreement executed by Levine and his wife granting Majek a security interest in

Hillside Norse, LLC ("Hillside"), another company affiliated with Levine. At

Levine's direction, Majek wired the proceeds of the Majek Loan to an account

owned by Hillside.

      Majek contended, following receipt of the Majek Loan proceeds, its

borrower, Norse, made several fraudulent transfers to respondents Nexus and

Privcap. Majek alleges Norse made three outgoing wire transfers to Nexus on

1
   The record indicates certain documents were filed under seal. At oral
argument on appeal, counsel stipulated the court can refer to any documents in
the record.
                                                                         A-3247-20
                                      3
April 19, May 8, and May 15, 2019, in the total amount of $1,503,000 to satisfy

loans Nexus made to Levine individually. Majek alleges Norse made five

outgoing wire transfers to Privcap as follows: (1) March 19, 2019, in the amount

of $14,000; (2) March 25, 2019, in the amount of $177,345; (3) April 19, 2019,

in the amount of $34,000; and (4) two on May 22, 2019, in the total amount of

$700,000.

      Majek contended that on May 1, 2019, Norse had balances in its TD Bank

accounts of $48,318.61 and $29,055.31, and on May 31, 2019, those accounts

had negative balances.

      On August 16, 2019, Norse defaulted on the Majek Loan and, on

September 16, 2019, Majek filed suit in the Law Division against Norse,

Hillside, and the guarantors, captioned Majek Investments LLC v. Hillside

Norse LLC, Docket No. L-6525-19 (the "Bergen County Action"). On March

31, 2020, Majek obtained final judgment by default against Levine, Hillside,

and Norse in the amount of $1,105,195.60.

      On or about March 18, 2021, Levine pleaded guilty to conspiracy to

commit bank fraud in the matter United States v. Seth Levine, 2:21-CR-00234-

SDW-1. Majek contended, based on the Information filed in that case by the

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                                       4
United States Attorney, that Levine admitted Norse was insolvent when it made

the alleged fraudulent payments to Nexus and Privcap.

      The government alleged in the Information that Levine "did knowingly

and intentionally conspire and agree with others, the co-conspirators, to execute

and attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud financial institutions."

It alleged Levine was the owner and managing member of Norse and Norse "was

the parent company of more than [seventy] other limited liability companies (the

'Subsidiary Companies'), of which L[evine] was also the founding partner,

owner, and managing member." The government continued, "through Norse

Holdings, and the Subsidiary Companies, L[evine] controlled at least [seventy]

multifamily properties, comprising [of] approximately 2,500 apartments (the

'Multifamily Properties')."

      The government also alleged it "was the goal of the conspiracy for

L[evine] and [his] co-conspirators to enrich themselves by inducing financial

institutions to issue mortgage loans based on false pretenses, representations,

and promises." It contended that "[f]rom at least in or about 2009 and through

in or about August 2019, L[evine] directed a scheme to refinance the

Multifamily Properties held in the names of the Subsidiary Companies using

fraudulent information about the true value of, and the income generated by, the

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                                       5
Multifamily Properties." The government also asserted that "[a]s a result of

each fraudulent refinance, the Subsidiary Company that owned the multifamily

property received a cash payout, which L[evine] and his co-conspirators used

for their own enrichment, to repay investors, and continue the conspiracy."

      Majek contended Privcap had actual or constructive knowledge that

Levine and his entities were insolvent at the time of the alleged fraudulent

transfers to Privcap because Levine was in default on or was late in paying

certain loans extended by Privcap. In support of this claim, Majek asserted that

on March 12, 2019, Privcap and Levine entered into a loan agreement in the

total amount of $490,000 payable no later than March 20, 2019 (the "March 12,

2019 Loan"). On March 13, 2019, Privcap wired $484,950 to Levine's personal

TD Bank account. On March 25, 2019, $325,000 of this amount was applied to

fund a loan by Privcap to another entity affiliated with Levine, Perth LP

Ventures, LLC (the "Perth LP Loan"). The same day, Norse wired the remaining

$177,345 to Privcap in satisfaction of the March 12, 2019 Loan.           Majek

contended Levine was already in default by March 25, 2019, because the March

12, 2019 Loan was payable no later than March 20, 2019.

      Majek also argued that, at the time Privcap entered into these loan

agreements with Levine and his affiliated entities, two other entities affiliated

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                                       6
with Levine, Red Clay Norse, LLC ("Red Clay"), and Riverside Norse, LLC

("Riverside Norse"), were in default on loans made by Privcap to those entities

in 2018. Majek alleged that on March 19, and April 19, 2019, Norse wired

Privcap payments of $14,000 in connection with these loans.

      Majek next argued that on March 28, 2019, Privcap entered into a loan

agreement with Levine individually in the amount of $720,000 (the "March 28,

2019 Loan"). The same day, Privcap wired $700,000 to Norse in two payments

of $499,000 and $201,000. The March 28, 2019 Loan was payable on April 2,

2019. On April 19, 2019, Norse wired $20,000 to Privcap representing a fee for

the March 28, 2019 Loan. On May 22, 2019, Norse made two wire transfers to

Privcap in the amounts of $450,000 and $250,000 to repay the March 28, 2019

Loan. Again, Majek contended Levine was in default because the loan was

payable on April 2, 2019, but was not paid on time.

      Majek contended Nexus had constructive knowledge of Levine's

insolvency based on similar arguments. On January 25, 2018, Nexus loaned

Levine $850,000 (the "January 25, 2018 Loan"). On February 6, 2018, Nexus

loaned Levine $1,075,000 (the "February 6, 2018 Loan"). On February 22,

2018, Nexus loaned Levine $520,000 (the "February 22, 2018 Loan"). Majek

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                                      7
contended these loans were repaid late and Levine was in default when they

were paid.

      Majek also argued that on or around August 7, 2018, Nexus facilitated a

loan by Powercap Partners, LLP ("Powercap") to Levine in the amount of

$1,200,000 (the "Powercap Loan"). It argued Nexus arranged for this loan to

Levine while Levine was in default on its own January 25, February 6, and

February 22, 2018 loans. After the Powercap Loan funds were disbursed,

Levine paid Nexus $1,075,000 in satisfaction of Nexus's February 6, 2018 Loan.

On August 13, 2018, Levine paid the remaining $433,500 due under Nexus's

January 25, 2018 Loan.

      The Powercap Loan was initially payable by December 7, 2018, but was

subsequently extended. On January 7, 2019, Powercap's interest in the loan was

bought out by new investors. On April 7, 2019, a new investor, SN Funding,

bought out the Powercap Loan, and Nexus continued to service the loan. On

May 8, and 15, 2019, Norse made wire transfers to Nexus in the amount of

$700,000 and $428,000, which Nexus forwarded to SN Funding to pay off the

Powercap Loan in full. According to Majek, the Powercap Loan demonstrates

Nexus knew Levine was insolvent and engaged in a "Ponzi scheme."

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                                      8
        Finally, Majek alleged Nexus loaned $375,000 to Levine in April 2018.

The loan was initially due on October 17, 2018, but was repaid late by Norse on

April 17, 2019.

                                        B.

        Privcap asserted the following facts in response to Majek's allegations.

According to Daniel Cohen, the managing member of Privcap, Privcap made

eighteen to twenty loans to numerous entities controlled by Levine beginning in

2016.

        On November 13, 2018, an entity affiliated with Levine, Red Clay, entered

into a commercial loan agreement with Privcap (the "Red Clay Loan"). The Red

Clay Loan had an original maturity date of February 11, 2019. Red Clay and

Privcap agreed to extend the loan due date provided Red Clay made monthly

payments until the loan was repaid.

        On November 14, 2018, Riverside Norse, another entity affiliated with

Levine, entered into a commercial loan agreement with Privcap (the "Riverside

Norse Loan"). The Riverside Norse Loan had an original maturity date of May

14, 2019. As with the Red Clay Loan, Riverside Norse and Privcap agreed to

extend the loan due date provided Riverside Norse made monthly payment s.

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                                        9
      On March 19, 2019, Norse wired $14,000 to satisfy the extension

payments owed by Red Clay and Riverside Norse under their respective loans.

On April 19, 2019, Norse again wired $14,000 to satisfy the extension payments

owed by Red Clay and Riverside Norse in connection with those loans. As a

result, Privcap did not consider Red Clay or Riverside Norse to be in default as

alleged by Majek.

      On March 12, 2019, Levine and Privcap entered into a short-term loan in

the amount of $490,000 with an initial maturity date of March 20, 2019. On

March 13, 2019, Privcap wired $484,950 to Levine's personal bank account. On

March 25, 2019, $325,000 of that loan was used to fund the Perth LP Loan. The

remaining $177,345, which represented the balance of the principal plus interest,

was returned to Privcap on March 25, 2019. The Perth LP Loan remains unpaid.

      On March 28, 2019, Privcap made another personal loan to Levine in the

amount of $720,000. The March 28 Loan was due on April 2, 2019. On March

28, 2019, at Levine's direction, Privcap wired $700,000 to Norse in two separate

transfers of $201,000 and $499,000. After transferring the funds to Norse,

Levine no longer required the March 28, 2019 Loan because a certain deal was

not completed and the funds were returned to Privcap. On April 19, 2019, Norse

paid a $20,000 fee for the March 28, 2019 Loan. On May 22, 2019, Norse paid

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                                      10
the remaining $700,000 due under the March 28 Loan in two payments of

$450,000 and $250,000.

                                         C.

       Nexus added the following facts in response to Majek's claims.            On

January 25, 2018, Nexus loaned Levine $850,000. The January 25, 2018 Loan

was "due and payable on the earlier of April 25, 2018 . . . or the sale or refinance"

of certain properties. Nexus agreed to extend the loan maturity date to August

13, 2018, subject to Levine making extension payments. Nexus did not consider

the borrower in default because Nexus received the required extension

payments. On or about August 13, 2018, the January 25, 2018 Loan was paid

off in full.

       Nexus made two other loans to Levine on February 6, and 22, 2018. Under

the term of the February 6, 2018 Loan, Levine was required to repay $1,075,000

to Nexus no later than May 6, 2018. Again, the loan documents gave Levine the

contractual right to extend the maturity date. Although the loan technically

matured on July 6, 2018, Nexus agreed to extend the maturity date to August 6,

2018, in exchange for payment of an extension fee. The February 6, 2018 Loan

was never deemed to be in default by Nexus and it was timely paid in full on

August 6, 2018, in connection with the Powercap Loan.

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        Under the terms of February 22, 2018 Loan, Levine was required to repay

$520,000 to Nexus no later than May 22, 2018.           Again, Levine had the

contractual right to extend that maturity date. According to Nexus, on or about

July 22, 2018, the parties agreed to refinance the loan, and, thereafter, entered

into several extension agreements. As a result, the new maturity date was

January 22, 2019. On or about January 17, 2019, the loan was repaid in full.

Nexus did not consider the February 22, 2018 Loan to have ever been in default.

        On August 7, 2018, Nexus participated in and serviced the Powercap

Loan.     Powercap disbursed a total of $1,122,500 after deducting fees and

expenses. Of the $1,122,500 disbursed under Powercap Loan, $47,500 was

wired to the Levine's personal bank account, and the remaining $1,075,00 0 was

transferred to Nexus to pay off the February 6, 2018 Loan. The Powercap Loan

was essentially a refinance of the February 6, 2018 Loan.

        Although the original maturity date of the Powercap Loan was October 7,

2018, Levine exercised his contractual right to extend the loan through

December 7, 2018, and, thereafter, Nexus agreed to extend the loan for another

month through January 7, 2019. Levine paid and Nexus received fees for each

extension, which Nexus distributed to the investors.

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                                      12
      On January 7, 2019, Powercap's interest in the loan was bought out by

new investors and the loan was refinanced.      Powercap was paid off after

collecting interest, Nexus received its fees for refinancing and extending the

loan, and the new investors found a new business opportunity.

      On April 7, 2019, a new investor, SN Funding, bought out Nexus's

investors and bought the Powercap Loan.       Nexus continued to service the

Powercap Loan. On May 8, and 15, 2019, Nexus received wire transfers for

$700,000 and $428,000 from Norse to pay off the Powercap Loan, which Nexus

forwarded to SN Funding.

      On April 17, 2018, Nexus loaned $375,000 to Levine (the "April 17, 2018

Loan"). The original maturity date was October 17, 2018. Levine had the right

to extend the maturity date until April 17, 2019, which he did. Levine repaid

the April 17, 2018 Loan on April 17, 2019.

      Nexus also contended Norse continued to conduct business after the last

alleged fraudulent transfer to Nexus on May 15, 2019. This included payments

by Norse to Majek. The Majek Loan was initially payable on April 17, 2019.

Norse paid three monthly extension fees of $7,500 per month to Majek and

extended the maturity date to July 17, 2019. On July 30, 2019, Norse paid Majek

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                                     13
an additional $37,500 forbearance fee to extend the payment date of the Majek

Loan to August 2, 2019.

       Nexus argued that Majek's own allegations demonstrate Norse continued

to conduct business after May 15, 2019. For example, Majek alleged Norse paid

$700,000 to Privcap on May 22, 2019. Majek also contended Norse received

funds as a result of a loan by Coventus, LLC, from June 4, 2019 through July 3,

2019 (the "Coventus Loan").2

                                        III.

       On May 19, 2021, the trial court issued a written opinion granting

summary judgment to Nexus and Privcap and denying summary judgment to

Majek. The court explained:

             The court finds no evidence of the badges of fraud
             being demonstrated.

                   ....

             Further, the court finds that the transfers from Norse to
             Nexus and Privcap did not render Norse insolvent. As
             Nexus points out, Norse engaged in other
             lending/receiving business after it . . . [paid] off its
             debts to Nexus and Privcap. While Norse did not have
             money in its account after paying off Nexus and
             Privcap, Norse subsequently had money in its account
             not too long after and used it to engage in other business
             schemes.

2
    While this appeal was pending, Majek reached a settlement with Coventus.
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                                        14
The court noted "Majek ha[d] already obtained a judgment in [the] Bergen

County [Action] against Seth and Shira Levine, Norse, and Hillside, [and] the

present action . . . appears to be a way in which to satisfy same."

      On June 25, 2021, the trial court issued a written opinion denying Majek's

motion for reconsideration. The court reaffirmed its finding that Majek failed

to demonstrate any of the "badges of fraud" and failed to establish Norse was

insolvent. Additionally, the court observed:

            Majek has been unable to collect on its judgment
            against Levine and Norse from the Bergen County
            [A]ction, and is going down the line trying to collect
            from entities that did business with Levine (as did
            Majek) but are not owned or controlled by Levine.
            While the [c]ourt is sympathetic to those who obtain
            judgments and are unable to collect them, the [c]ourt
            cannot enforce said judgment as to parties for which the
            judgment was not obtained.

      This appeal followed. Majek argues the trial court erred in determining

Norse was not insolvent, failed to consider whether the transfers were made for

reasonably equivalent value, erred in applying the "badges of fraud" analysis to

its actual fraud claim, and failed to consider whether the alleged fraudulent

payments were made to "insiders."

                                       IV.

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                                       15
      We review the trial court's denial of a summary judgment motion de novo.

Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). No special deference

is accorded to a trial judge's assessment, as the decision to grant or withhold

summary judgment amounts to a ruling on a question of law. See Manalapan

Realty, LP v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). We must

"consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a

rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-

moving party." Statewide Ins. Fund v. Star Ins. Co., 253 N.J. 119, 125 (2023)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).

      We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the court's May 19, and

June 25, 2021 written opinions. We add the following comments.

      The purpose of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA")3 "is to

prevent a debtor from placing his or her property beyond a creditor's reach" and

from "deliberately cheat[ing] a creditor by removing his property from 'the jaws

of execution.'" Gilchinsky v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, 159 N.J. 463, 475 (1999)

3
  The UFTA was amended effective August 10, 2021. We will apply the law in
effect at the time of the decisions below.
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                                      16
(quoting Klein v. Rossi, 251 F.Supp. 1,2 (E.D.N.Y. 1966)). The UFTA allows

a creditor to undo a wrongful transaction so as to bring the property within the

ambit of collection. Id. at 475. If a fraudulent transfer is proven, a creditor may

obtain "[a]voidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy

the creditor's claim." N.J.S.A. 25:2-29(a)(1). Where the transfer cannot be

undone, a creditor may obtain a judgment for the value of the asset fraudulently

transferred against "[t]he first transferee of the asset or the person for whose

benefit the transfer was made." N.J.S.A. 25:2-30(b)(1)(A).

      The UFTA contains two subsections that provide relief to plaintiffs for

fraudulent transfers. N.J.S.A. 25:2-25 governs fraudulent transfers as to present

and future creditors. It provides:

            a.     A transfer made or obligation incurred by a
            debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the
            creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
            made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made
            the transfer or incurred the obligation:

                   (1)   With actual intent to hinder, delay, or
                         defraud any creditor of the debtor; or

                   (2)   Without receiving a reasonably equivalent
                         value in exchange for the transfer or
                         obligation, and the debtor:

                         (a) Was engaged or was about to engage in
                             a business or a transaction for which the
                             remaining assets of the debtor were

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                                        17
                           unreasonably small in relation to the
                           business or transaction; or

                        (b) Intended to incur, or believed or
                            reasonably should have believed that
                            the debtor would incur, debts beyond
                            the debtor's ability to pay as they
                            become due.

            [N.J.S.A. 25:2-25(a).]

      N.J.S.A. 25:2-27 governs fraudulent transfers as to present creditors. It

states:

            a. A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
            fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the
            transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the
            debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation
            without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
            exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor
            was insolvent at that time or the debtor became
            insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.

            b. A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
            creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was
            made if the transfer was made to an insider for an
            antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time,
            and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the
            debtor was insolvent.

      A court applying the UFTA must undertake a fact-sensitive inquiry,

analyzing the circumstances and the terms of the transfer at issue. Motorworld,

Inc. v. Benkendorf, 228 N.J. 311, 326 (2017). The plaintiff bears the burden of

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                                      18
establishing a claim under the UFTA by clear and convincing evidence. 4 Jecker

v. Hidden Valley, Inc., 422 N.J. Super. 155, 164 (App. Div. 2011); Barsotti v.

Merced, 346 N.J. Super. 504, 520 (App. Div. 2002).

      Majek contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on its

claims under N.J.S.A. 25:2-25(b) and N.J.S.A. 25:2-27(a) because Norse was

insolvent, and it did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the payments to

Nexus and Privcap. We are not persuaded.

      Under the UFTA, "[a] debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts

is greater than all of the debtor's assets, at a fair valuation." N.J.S.A. 25:2-23(a).

Further, "[a] debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is

presumed to be insolvent." N.J.S.A. 25:2-23(b).

      The trial court determined correctly that Majek failed to produce

competent proof that Norse was insolvent at the relevant time. In support of this

claim, Majek relies almost exclusively on the Information filed by the

government against Levine. The Information, however, is a charging document

that set forth the government's allegations. The Information is not evidence of

4
  The 2021 amendment changed the burden of proof to a preponderance of the
evidence effective August 10, 2021. N.J.S.A. 25:2-25; N.J.S.A. 25:2-37. Again,
we will apply the burden of proof applicable at the time of the decisions below.
Majek's claims, however, fail under either standard.
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                                         19
any statements allegedly made by Levine. The fact that Levine pleaded guilty

to the charges does not prove he admitted all of the allegations included in the

Information.

      Even if Majek proved Levine made such admissions, Levine's alleged

statements are not admissible against Nexus and Privcap. Majek improperly

conflates the concepts of judicial notice pursuant to N.J.R.E. 201(b) and self-

authentication under N.J.R.E. 902 with the admissibility of Levine's alleged

hearsay statements against Nexus and Privcap under N.J.R.E. 802.           Under

N.J.R.E. 801, hearsay means an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth

of the matter asserted. Hearsay is not admissible absent an applicable exception.

N.J.R.E. 802. Levine's alleged statements are plainly hearsay. Majek does not

identify any applicable hearsay exception. Levine's alleged statements are not

admissible against Nexus and Privcap to prove the truth of the matters asserted.

      The allegations set forth in the Information are insufficient to prove Norse

was insolvent at the relevant time. They refer generally to Levine and the more

than seventy Subsidiary Companies that owned at the Multifamily Properties

over a period of ten years beginning in 2009. Majek's contention that the

government's allegations prove Norse was insolvent when the alleged fraudulent

transfers were made in 2019 is without merit.

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                                      20
      The trial court also concluded correctly that Majek failed to offer any

competent evidence to establish Norse was in default of its obligations to Nexus

and Privcap or was not paying its debts as they became due. Majek's claims that

Norse was in default in connection with loans made by Nexus and Privcap are

based on nothing more than Majek's unsupported supposition and conjecture. In

response to Majek's allegations, Nexus and Privcap established Norse was not

in default on any of their loans. In fact, at least two of the allegedly fraudulent

transfers to Privcap were for extension fees paid in connection with the Red Clay

Loan and the Riverside Norse Loan so those loans would not be in default.

      In addition, as the trial court correctly noted, Norse continued to do

business after the last allegedly fraudulent transfer to Privcap on May 22, 2019.

This included receiving proceeds from the Coventus Loan in June and July 2019 ,

and making substantial payments to Majek in connection with the Majek Loan

through July 30, 2019.

      Majek also failed to offer any competent evidence to establish Norse's

debts were greater than its assets at fair valuation. Majek did not proffer any

evidence of Norse's total debts or the fair value of its assets. The trial court

concluded correctly that Majek failed to produce evidence sufficient for a

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                                       21
reasonable fact finder to conclude either, by clear and convincing evidence or

by a preponderance of the evidence, that Norse was insolvent.

      We are also unpersuaded by Majek's claim that Norse did not receive

reasonably equivalent value for the subject payments to Nexus and Privcap.

Generally, "a 'transfer made in satisfaction of the debt of another is not made for

reasonably equivalent value.'" Motorworld, 228 N.J. at 328 (quoting Nat'l

Westminster Bank N.J. v. Anders Eng'g, Inc., 289 N.J. Super. 602, 606 (App.

Div. 1996)).

            However, exceptions to the general rule can be found
            where the debtor receives the benefit of the original
            consideration, . . . or where the debtor and third party
            "are so related or situated that they share an identity of
            interests because what benefits one will, in such case
            benefit the other to some degree."

            [In re R.M.L., 195 B.R. 602, 618 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
            1996) (internal citation omitted) (quoting In re
            Pembroke Dev. Corp., 124 B.R. 398, 400 (Bankr. S.D.
            Fla. 1991)).]

      "When we apply a uniform act, we may consider the law of other

jurisdictions that have enacted similar provisions." Motorworld, 228 N.J. at 325

n.4. In determining whether reasonably equivalent value has been given to the

debtor in exchange for a transfer, courts consider whether the debtor received

any "indirect benefit" from other parties. See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro

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Comms., Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 646 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[I]n evaluating whether

reasonably equivalent value has been given the debtor under section 548 [of the

bankruptcy code], indirect benefits may also be evaluated. If the consideration

[debtor] received from the transaction, even though indirect, approximates t he

value it gave [to the transferee], this can satisfy the terms of the statute."); Rubin

v. Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991 (2d Cir. 1981) (although transfers

solely for the benefit of third parties do not furnish fair consideration, the

transaction's benefit to the debtor need not be direct and may come through a

third party); Image Masters, Inc. v. Chase Home Fin., 489 B.R. 375, 387 (E.D.

Pa. 2013) (courts may consider both direct and indirect benefits conferred by the

transfer in its evaluation of reasonable equivalent value).

      As Majek alleges, the subject transfers were made by Norse to satisfy

obligations of Levine, who was the owner and managing member of Norse, and

other entities affiliated with Levine and Norse. The transfers to Nexus paid off

loans extended by Nexus to Levine. The transfers to Privcap were made in

connection with the Red Clay Loan, the Riverside Norse Loan, the March 12,

2019 Loan, and the March 28, 2019 Loan.

      As Majek contends, Levine, Norse and the other Levine entities comingled

funds, shared obligations, and were essentially indistinct from each other. The

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Majek Loan, for example was secured by a promissory note executed by Norse,

but the funds were deposited, at Levine's direction, into an account owned by

Levine's affiliated entity, Hillside. Moreover, the Majek Loan was secured by

a personal guaranty executed by Levine and a pledge of his interest in Hillside.

Under the specific facts of this case as alleged by Majek, by satisfying debts and

obligations of Levine and entities affiliated with Levine and Norse, Norse

indirectly received reasonably equivalent value for the transfers.

      Majek's claim that the transfers to Nexus and Privcap were made to

statutory "insiders" in violation of N.J.S.A. 25:2-27(b) is baseless. N.J.S.A.

25:2-22(b) defines an insider to include:

            (1) [a] director of the debtor; (2) [a]n officer of the
            debtor; (3) [a] person in control of the debtor; (4) [a]
            partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; (5)
            [a] general partner in a partnership [in which the debtor
            is a general partner]; or (6) [a] relative of a general
            partner, director, officer, or person in control of the
            debtor[.]

      "The unifying theme among the enumerated persons is that they stand in

such close relation to the debtor as to give rise to the inference that they have

the ability to influence or control the debtor's actions." Gilchinsky, 159 N.J. at

478. Majek does not offer any evidence to support a finding that Nexus and

Privcap were "insiders" of Norse or any other entity affiliated with Levine.

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Nexus and Privcap, like Majek, were creditors as a result of loans extended to

Levine and his affiliated entities. They were not insiders.

      The trial court also concluded correctly that Majek did not establish any

of the "badges of fraud" and properly granted summary judgment on its "actual

fraud" claim under N.J.S.A. 25:2-25(a). Under N.J.S.A. 25:2-25(a), a transfer

from a debtor is fraudulent when it is made "[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay,

or defraud any creditor of the debtor." N.J.S.A. 25:2-26 lists the "badges of

fraud" that courts should consider in determining whether a debtor conveyed

property with the actual intent to place it beyond the reach of creditors.

Gilchinsky, 159 N.J. at 476. It provides:

            In determining actual intent under subsection (a) of
            [N.J.S.A.] 25:2-25 consideration may be given, among
            other factors, to whether:

                   a. The transfer or obligation was to an insider;

                   b. The debtor retained possession or control of
                   the property transferred after the transfer;

                   c. The transfer or obligation was disclosed or
                   concealed;

                   d. Before the transfer was made or obligation was
                   incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened
                   with suit;

                   e. The transfer was of substantially all the
                   debtor's assets;

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            f. The debtor absconded;

            g. The debtor removed or concealed assets;

            h. The value of the consideration received by the
            debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of
            the asset transferred or the amount of the
            obligation incurred;

            i. The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent
            shortly after the transfer was made or the
            obligation was incurred;

            j. The transfer occurred shortly before or shortly
            after a substantial debt was incurred; and

            k. The debtor transferred the essential assets of
            the business to a lienor who transferred the assets
            to an insider of the debtor.

      [N.J.S.A. 25:2-26.]

As to the badges of fraud, the Gilchinsky Court instructed:

      In determining actual intent to defraud, courts should
      balance the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 25:2-26, as
      well as any other factors relevant to the transaction . . . .
      The proper inquiry is whether the badges of fraud are
      present, not whether some factors are absent. Although
      the presence of a single factor, i.e. badge of fraud, may
      cast suspicion on the transferor's intent, the confluence
      of several in one transaction generally provides
      conclusive evidence of an actual intent to defraud.

      [Gilchinsky, 159 N.J. at 477.]

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      We have already considered and rejected Majek's claims that Norse was

insolvent, Nexus and Privcap were insiders of Norse, and Norse did not receive

reasonably equivalent value for the transfers. Those "badges of fraud" do not

apply.

      Majek's claim that Levine "absconded" because he was arrested is entirely

without merit. Levine did not abscond. Being arrested is not the equivalent of

absconding. Majek's claim that Nexus and Privcap were engaged in or aided

Levine's "Ponzi scheme" is also baseless. Nexus and Privcap, like Majek, were

creditors of Levine and his affiliated entities.    There is no evidence they

participated in any type of fraudulent conduct and there is absolutely no

evidence they participated in or aided a "Ponzi scheme."

      Majek failed to offer evidence sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to

determine either, by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the payments to Nexus and Privcap were made with actual intent

to hinder, delay, or defraud Majek.

      To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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