Court Opinion

ID: 9755125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:26:35.732859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:03.208077
License: Public Domain

*418Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell:
In the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, parol evidence as to a prior or contemporaneous or inducing oral promise or representation or agreement is not admissible in evidence if it alters or adds to or modifies or contradicts or conflicts with a written agreement which purportedly contains the entire agreement between the parties: Furjanick Estate, 375 Pa. 484, 100 A. 2d 85; Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 79 A. 2d 255; Walker v. Saricks, 360 Pa. 594, 63 A. 2d 9; McMinn v. Mammone, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 1, 82 A. 2d 70.
The reason for and the wisdom of the so-called modern Pennsylvania Parol Evidence Buie is apparent from the many decisions of this Court commencing with Gianni v. Russell & Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791. As recently as 1953 we said in Furjanick Estate, 375 Pa.., supra (page 491): “We have repeatedly said and we reiterate that we intend to uphold the integrity of written instruments and will not permit the Parol Evidence Rule to be circumvented or undermined.” That is unfortunately exactly what the majority opinion does.
There is, in my judgment, no difference in reason or in principle between the cases hereinabove cited and a case where the alleged prior oral agreement would make the written agreement null and void. The admission of oral testimony to nullify and destroy a complete written agreement subsequently entered into (and delivered) by the parties, without fraud, accident or mistake, emasculates and nullifies the Parol Evidence Rule, and, as Mr. Justice Drew pointed out, opens wide the door to misrecollection or false statements just as much as does an inducing oral representation or agreement which changes or contradicts the written agreement. The reason for the modern Parol Evidence Rule is exactly the same in each such case — if it is *419wise to exclude parol evidence when it seeks to modify or contradict the written agreement it is, a fortiori, wise to exclude it when it seeks to destroy the written agreement. Experience has demonstrated that the advantages of the Rule far outweigh the injury which occasionally results. Smilow v. Dickerson, 357 Pa. 455, 463, 54 A. 2d 883, is out of line with all the decisions of this Court in the last 30 years and in my judgment should not be followed.
A person who is injured by a breach of a conditional or inducing or contemporaneous oral agreement is not helpless or without remedy. For example, where fraud, accident or mistake occurs, the rule against the admission of parol evidence does not apply; similarly, if an agent or third party violates oral instructions or breaches an alleged oral agreement, or an escrow agreement, the person injured may recover for such breach. It is, I am convinced, very unwise to relax or breach our sound and salutary Parol Evidence Rule which brought order and certainty out of chaos and has worked so well ever since its adoption in 1924.
The actions of Miss Callahan are morally indefensible, but I agree with the majority that even if parol evidence be admissible, neither equity nor law can, under the evidence in this case, relieve plaintiff from his foolish act.