Court Opinion

ID: 9841280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 19:11:28.059357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:48.368187
License: Public Domain

2023 UT 20

                                IN THE

       SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

                           STATE OF UTAH,
                             Appellant,
                                  v.
                        KOLBY RYAN BARNETT,
                              Appellee.

                            No. 20220636
                         Heard May 15, 2023
                      Filed September 21, 2023

                 On Appeal of Interlocutory Order
             On Certification from the Court of Appeals

                    Second District, Farmington
                   The Honorable Rita M. Cornish
                          No. 221700665

                             Attorneys 1
  Troy S. Rawlings, Cnty. Att’y, Jeffrey G. Thomson, Deputy Cnty.
                 Att’y, Farmington, for appellant
Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, Sara Pfrommer, Cherise M. Bacalski,
       Bountiful, Todd Utzinger, Farmington, for appellee

 ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE authored the opinion of the Court,
        in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE PETERSEN,
           JUSTICE HAGEN, and JUSTICE POHLMAN joined.

   ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE, opinion of the Court:
                         INTRODUCTION
    ¶1 Kolby Ryan Barnett was already serving probation when he
was arrested and charged with felony crimes in Salt Lake and Davis
counties. At Barnett’s Davis County bail hearing, the State argued that
article I, section 8(1) of the Utah Constitution mandates that a judge
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   1 Attorneys for amicus curiae Utah Association of Criminal Defense

Lawyers: David A. Ferguson and Jeremy M. Delicino, Salt Lake City.
                           STATE v. BARNETT
                         Opinion of the Court

deny bail to a defendant charged with a felony if that defendant is
already serving probation on a felony conviction. The district court
rejected the State’s constitutional interpretation and set bail.
    ¶2 Article I, section 8(1) guarantees a right to bail in most
circumstances, but it outlines three instances where bail is not
guaranteed. We conclude that the people of Utah did not intend to
constitutionally strip judges of the ability to grant bail in those three
circumstances. In other words, an alleged “double felony defendant”
like Barnett is not guaranteed bail, but the constitution does not forbid
the district court from setting bail. We are not asked to review the
district court’s bail decision on the merits, and so we affirm.
                           BACKGROUND
    ¶3 Barnett was serving probation for a felony conviction when
both Salt Lake and Davis counties charged him with several new
felonies. At his Davis County bail hearing, the State opposed Barnett’s
pre-trial release.
    ¶4 Relying on article I, section 8(1) of the Utah Constitution (Bail
Provision), the State argued that the district court was constitutionally
prohibited from granting Barnett bail. Part of that provision reads:
“All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except . . . persons
charged with a felony while on probation or parole, or while free on
bail awaiting trial on a previous felony charge, when there is
substantial evidence to support the new felony charge.” UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 8(1)(b). 2
    ¶5 There was no dispute that Barnett was a “person[] charged
with a . . . felony while on probation or parole.” Id. Nor was there any
dispute that substantial evidence supported the new charges. The
question before the district court boiled down to what the Utah
Constitution means when it provides: “All persons charged with a
crime shall be bailable except” those falling into certain categories.
The State argued that this meant a district court was prohibited from
setting bail for anyone to whom the exceptions applied.

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   2 Article I, section 8(1) has two other subsections containing
exceptions to the right to bail: (1) those charged with a capital offense
when substantial evidence supports the charge, and (2) those charged
with a crime statutorily exempted from the right when substantial
evidence supports the charge, and the judge finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant constitutes a substantial
danger or flight risk. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8(1)(a), (c).
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    ¶6 Barnett argued “shall be bailable except” meant that though
the person charged was not guaranteed bail, a district court could still
grant it. The district court accepted Barnett’s interpretation and set
bail.
    ¶7 The State seeks interlocutory review. The State argues that the
district court erred when it concluded it had discretion to grant
Barnett bail. The State further contends that the district court
misconstrued the Bail Provision’s plain language to reach its result.
Lastly, the State argues that the district court should have looked to
the original public meaning of the Bail Provision and that if it had, the
district court would have learned that the people of Utah understood
they were removing a judge’s discretion to grant bail to certain
categories of defendants. 3
                      STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶8 “We review constitutional interpretation issues for correctness,
granting no deference to the district court.” Richards v. Cox, 2019 UT
57, ¶ 7, 450 P.3d 1074.
                              ANALYSIS
    ¶9 The district court interpreted the Bail Provision to guarantee
bail in most instances. It further concluded that the Bail Provision does
not guarantee bail in the three outlined exceptions. But the district
court also concluded that the provision does not forbid the court from
granting bail in those circumstances. The State argues that the district
court misread the plain language to reach this conclusion. The State
posits that the district court “advanced a present-day,
plain-language-only construction” of the constitution. The State
predicts that if the district court had properly focused on the original
public meaning of the Bail Provision, it would have decided that the
people of Utah intended to prohibit bail in certain circumstances.
   ¶10 When we interpret the Utah Constitution, the “text’s plain
language may begin and end the analysis.” South Salt Lake City v.
Maese, 2019 UT 58, ¶ 23, 450 P.3d 1092. But unlike other forms of
analysis, “constitutional inquiry does not require us to find a textual
ambiguity before we turn to . . . sources” outside the text. Id. Parties
can present courts with evidence that the plain language would have
been understood differently by those who put that language into the
constitution. This means that while “the text is generally the best place

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   3  Barnett moved to strike the State’s response to the Utah
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ amicus brief. Because we
rule in Barnett’s favor, we need not address the motion to strike.
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                         Opinion of the Court

to look for understanding, historical sources can be essential to our
effort to discern and confirm the original public meaning of the
language.” 4 Id.
    ¶11 Before we turn to the State’s arguments, it is helpful to
understand the evolution of the language the district court
interpreted. The original Bail Provision read: “All prisoners shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the
proof is evident or the presumption strong.” UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8
(1896).
    ¶12 Voters expanded the exception in 1973 to include defendants
in Barnett’s circumstance. After the amendment, the constitution read:
       All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
       except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or
       the presumption strong or where a person is accused of
       the commission of a felony while on probation or parole,
       or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous felony
       charge, and where the proof is evident or the
       presumption strong.
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (1973).
   ¶13 In 1988, the voters overhauled the Bail Provision. Voters
changed “All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties” to “All
persons charged with a crime shall be bailable except.” Compare UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 8 (1973) with UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8(1) (1989). The
voters also added a new exception to the bail guarantee by giving the
Legislature the ability to statutorily designate crimes for which a court
could deny bail. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8(1)(c).
    ¶14 The voters additionally changed the Bail Provision’s
structure by separating and individually lettering each of the three
exceptions. After passage, the provision reads:
       (1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
       except:

_____________________________________________________________
   4 To determine the original public meaning, we “interpret the
Constitution according to how the words of the document would have
been understood by a competent and reasonable speaker of the
language at the time of the document’s enactment.” Maese, 2019 UT
58, ¶ 19 n.6 (quoting John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case
Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 761 (2009)).
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       (a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
       substantial evidence to support the charge; or
       (b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
       parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
       felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
       support the new felony charge; or
       (c) persons charged with any other crime, designated by
       statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
       substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
       finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
       would constitute a substantial danger to any other
       person or to the community or is likely to flee the
       jurisdiction of the court if released on bail.
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8(1).
    ¶15 The State presents two arguments. The State first focuses on
the language “shall be bailable except.” The State claims that
“bailable” means able to be bailed and that double felony defendants
are “excepted” from being able to be bailed. This prompts the State to
argue that the district court erred because the Bail Provision’s plain
language means that judges do not have discretion to grant bail to
double felony defendants.
    ¶16 The State also claims that a form of the phrase “shall be
bailable except” was present in the original constitution. And that
historically, that language had meant that anyone meeting the
exception was not eligible for bail. The State contends that this
meaning would have been apparent to the people of Utah in 1895
when they put it into the original constitution. The State also argues
that the voters who amended the Bail Provision in 1973 and 1988
would have shared that understanding. This permits the State to
argue that “shall be bailable except” meant the same thing in 1988 that
it meant in 1895 and that it carries that meaning today.
   ¶17 We disagree. The Bail Provision’s plain language provides
that a defendant is guaranteed bail in all but a few circumstances and
that in those instances, the district court may still grant bail. This
conclusion does not change when we look at what the people of Utah
would have understood the Bail Provision to mean in 1988.
 I. THE BAIL PROVISION’S PLAIN LANGUAGE GUARANTEES
     BAIL TO MOST DEFENDANTS BUT PROVIDES THAT A
              COURT MAY DENY IT TO OTHERS
   ¶18 The State claims that the district court erred in its analysis of
the Bail Provision’s plain language. The State posits that the district
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court’s interpretation “neither mirrors nor gives effect to all of
Subsection 8(1)’s actual and precise terms.”
    ¶19 The State’s plain language argument first focuses on the
term “bailable.” The State contends that the suffix “able” “has long
meant ‘capable of, fit for, or worthy of.’” (Quoting -able,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/able (last visited
July 16, 2023)). The State argues that the word “bailable” therefore
means “capable, fit, worthy, competent, or qualified for ‘bail.’” If a
person is bailable, then “bail ‘may be’ granted.” In other words, if a
person is bailable, the court is “authorized” to grant them bail.
    ¶20 The State further argues that bail may not be granted to
double felony defendants because the term “bailable” is followed by
the word “except.” The State maintains that “except” “has been
ordinarily understood to mean ‘exclude.’” In the State’s reading,
double felony defendants are “constitutionally excluded from being
bailable.” Because they are excluded from being “bailable,” courts are
not authorized to grant double felony defendants bail. So, according
to the State, “a court [that] is without discretion, is not ‘authorized,’ to
give [bail].”
   ¶21 The State offers a plausible reading of the Bail Provision. But
when the Bail Provision is read in context, a different meaning
becomes apparent.
    ¶22 As an initial matter, no express language in the Bail
Provision states that bail cannot be granted to double felony
defendants. Moreover, the language the State uses to read the
prohibition into the provision—“shall be bailable”—is followed by
three exceptions. The third of these exceptions, found in subsection
(1)(c), states that those “charged with any other crime, designated by
statute as one for which bail may be denied,” are also excepted from
the right to bail. Because the subsection recognizes that the Legislature
will designate crimes for which bail may be denied, “[s]hall be bailable
except” in that instance could not be—as the State argues—a phrase
that categorically denies anyone listed in subsection (1)(c) the ability
to be granted bail. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8(1)(c) (emphasis added).
Tellingly, subsection (1)(c) does not provide that the Legislature can
designate crimes for which bail must be denied. This undercuts the
State’s contention that “shall be bailable” must be read as a precursor
to a constitutional bar on the grant of bail.
   ¶23 The Bail Provision’s location in the constitution also subverts
the State’s interpretation. See State ex rel. Salt Lake City v. Eldredge, 27
Utah 477, 76 P. 337, 339 (1904) (providing that “in construing a

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                          Opinion of the Court
particular section [of the constitution], the court may refer to any other
section or provision to ascertain” the meaning of the provision). The
guarantee of “bailability” resides in article I of the constitution. Article
I, titled “Declaration of Rights,” enumerates some of Utahns’
“inherent and inalienable right[s].” 5 Article I is home to several
guarantees of individual liberty, including the free exercise of religion
(section 4), due process of law (section 7), and the right to trial by jury
(section 10). It follows, then that “shall be bailable” does more than
proclaim who is eligible for bail—as the State claims. The Bail
Provision’s placement in the Declaration of Rights strongly suggests
that “shall be bailable” is a guarantee of the right to bail.
    ¶24 This reading comports with how we have interpreted the
Bail Provision. We have said many times that the Bail Provision
provides a right to bail. In Scott v. Ryan, for example, we held that
“[t]he provision affirms the fundamental right to bail of one accused
of a crime.” 548 P.2d 235, 236 (Utah 1976); see also Randolph v. State,
2022 UT 34, ¶ 15, 515 P.3d 444 (“By inference, Article I, Section 8 of the
Utah Constitution guarantees bail as a matter of right.”) (cleaned up).
The State’s proffered construction of “bailable” would effectively
overturn those cases and replace the guarantee of bail with a
guarantee of an opportunity to seek bail.
    ¶25 The State leans into that novel construction and cites article
I, section 26 of the constitution for support. Section 26 states: “The
provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless
by express words they are declared to be otherwise.” UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 26.
    ¶26 The State then argues the “may” in subsection 8(1)(c) means
that the subsection is not “mandatory and prohibitory” and contrasts
that with subsections 8(1)(a) and (b) (regarding capital offenders and
double felony defendants). The State claims that this contrast
highlights that 8(1)(a) and (b) are “mandatory and prohibitory”
subsections, a conclusion that requires the court to infer that the
exceptions in subsections 8(1)(a) and (b) involve crimes for which bail
must be denied. In the State’s view, this “forecloses a court’s ability to
infer some residual discretion” into subsections 8(1)(a) and (1)(b). In
other words, the State contends that the permissive “may” in
subsection 8(1)(c) does not give the court discretion to grant bail when
the charged offense falls under subsections 8(1)(a) or (1)(b). The State

_____________________________________________________________
   5 The constitution does not list all rights guaranteed to the people

of Utah. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 25 (“This enumeration of rights shall not
be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.”).
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                            STATE v. BARNETT
                          Opinion of the Court

concludes “[i]nsofar as Subsection 8(1) grants a right,” the district
court correctly “recognized the rule’s mandatory nature.” But, says
the State, the district court erred because “insofar as Subsection 8(1)
withholds a right, the court ignored its corresponding prohibitory
exception.”
    ¶27 We have stated that “[a]rticle I, section 26 rivets [all] . . .
rights in the Declaration of Rights[] into the fundamental law of the
State and makes them enforceable in a court of law.” Berry ex rel. Berry
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985). Section 26 means
that because each part of the constitution is “mandatory and
prohibitory,” courts cannot ignore the constitution. That is, courts are
not free to pick and choose which parts of the constitution they will
enforce.
    ¶28 At least, this was the understood meaning of section 26 at
the Constitutional Convention in 1895. See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES
OF THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED TO ADOPT A CONSTITUTION FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH, DAY 23 (Mar. 26, 1895), https://le.utah.gov
/documents/conconv/23.htm. At the convention, one delegate said
the provision “only has such significance as the law gives it. . . . It is
simply a declaration of what the bill of rights is.” Id. Another delegate
suggested amending this language in a way that was “scarcely a
change in substance” so that it would begin with the purpose of the
amendment: “To guard against transgression of the high powers we
have []delegated to the government of the State of Utah.” Id. A motion
to adopt that amendment ultimately failed, but it still sheds light on
the provision’s original meaning: the government must obey the
constitution. See id.
   ¶29 Other states have interpreted their section 26 analogs
similarly. The California Supreme Court read an identical provision
in the California Constitution to determine “all branches of
government are required to comply with constitutional directives or
prohibitions.” Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 P.3d 339, 342 (Cal.
2002) (cleaned up). The Arizona Supreme Court interpreted similar
language in the Arizona Constitution to hold that “the word
‘mandatory’ as used in this Constitutional provision is defined as a
command and hence obligatory, which we must implicitly follow and
obey.” Schock v. Jacka, 460 P.2d 185, 188 (Ariz. 1969).
   ¶30 Against this backdrop, we can conclude the State incorrectly
asserts that section 26 has much to tell us about what the Bail
Provision means.

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   ¶31 Simply put, the district court correctly interpreted the Bail
Provision’s plain language.
II. THE VOTERS WHO AMENDED THE BAIL PROVISION IN 1988
    WOULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CONSTITUTION
    GIVES JUDGES DISCRETION TO GRANT BAIL TO DOUBLE
                   FELONY DEFENDANTS
   ¶32 As noted above, the Utah Constitution’s plain language may
not always end the debate over a provision’s meaning. See South Salt
Lake City v. Maese, 2019 UT 58, ¶ 23, 450 P.3d 1092. We leave open the
opportunity for a party to show that the original public meaning of
the constitution differs from the result the plain language suggests.
See id. ¶ 28 (“We start by acknowledging that the plain language of
the Utah Constitution does not answer the question. . . . We therefore
examine the historical record for evidence . . . .”).
    ¶33 The State avails itself of this opportunity and argues that the
district court erred when it failed to consider the Bail Provision’s
original public meaning. The State insists that if the court had looked
at the history of the provision, it would have seen that the phrase
“shall be bailable . . . except” was a legal term of art “with a well-
understood and established meaning.” The State contends that phrase
has long meant that a “criminal defendant who falls within an
enumerated exception to bailability is nonbailable—‘shall not be
bailable’—by the courts.”
    ¶34 The State asserts that this phrase and its meaning can be
traced back to the 1682 Frame of Government of Pennsylvania. See
Laws Agreed Upon in England, art. XI (May 5, 1682), available at
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/pa04.asp. According to
the State, “shall be bailable . . . except” (with some variation) and its
application to capital offenders was adopted into the Northwest
Territory Ordinance, several other state constitutions, and Utah
territorial laws.
   ¶35 The State appears to have a point about the historical
meaning of the phrase. Several—but not all—states interpreted “shall
be bailable . . . except” to exclude capital offenders from the
opportunity of receiving bail. See, e.g., State v. Horn, 19 Tenn. 473, 476
(1838); State v. Frith, 14 La. 191, 197 (1839); but see State v. Hartzell, 100
N.W. 745, 746 (N.D. 1904) (holding that two people charged with first-
degree murder were “not entitled to bail as a strict legal right” and
that “[t]he allowance of bail [was] then a matter of judicial
discretion”).

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                         Opinion of the Court

     ¶36 The State asserts that this is what Utah voters would have
understood that language to mean when they placed it in Utah’s initial
constitution. We see nothing to contradict that assertion. There was
little debate on the provision’s meaning at the constitutional
convention. And as noted above, many sister states had interpreted
that language in a similar fashion at the time of Utah’s statehood.
   ¶37 The State then argues that the double felony defendant
provision, ratified by the voters in 1972, “was understood to mean and
operate the same as the capital offender exception.” The State claims
that because the capital offender provision never allowed judges the
discretion to grant capital offenders bail, the voters in 1972 would
have understood that they were placing the same restriction on judges
when it came to double felony defendants.
    ¶38 The State points to Scott v. Ryan as evidence of this
interpretation. 548 P.2d 235 (Utah 1976). There, we said that the
double felony defendant exception “represents an intention to create
a classification of comparable gravity” to the “capital offense
exception.” Id. at 236. Again, we see little in the historical record that
would contradict the State’s assertion that the voters in 1972 would
have expected the Bail Provision to operate as it did in 1895.
    ¶39 Next, the State claims that the 1988 amendment “reaffirmed
that the Framers understood the text to preclude bailability from an
enumerated class.” All the State offers to buttress this assertion are
comments from the 1988 Senate floor debates on the joint resolution
that sent the amendment to the voters. See infra ¶¶ 67–72. The State
asserts that because “[t]he 1988 Framers’ understanding was the same
as that of the 1971 and the original Framers,” Utahns in 1988 would
also understand these provisions to be non-discretionary.
    ¶40 Before we test the strength of the State’s arguments, we need
to decide the relevant time frame to examine the meaning of the Bail
Provision.
    ¶41 When we interpret unamended constitutional language, we
examine the original public meaning when voters first approved the
text. But when the voters have amended the language, “we look to the
meaning that the public would have ascribed to the amended
language when it entered the constitution.” Randolph v. State, 2022 UT
34, ¶ 68, 515 P.3d 444 (cleaned up).
   ¶42 Patterson v. State provides an example of this. 2021 UT 52, 504
P.3d 92. There, we were asked to determine if “our constitutionally
granted writ authority” encompassed “post-conviction petitions.” Id.
¶¶ 86–87. This required us to interpret the meaning of the

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constitutional provision that “invested its Supreme Court with
‘original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs’ and its district
courts with ‘power to issue all extraordinary writs.’” Id. ¶ 93 (quoting
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, §§ 3, 5).
   ¶43 The original 1896 constitution “contained language granting
writ authority to the courts.” Id. ¶ 88. But the specific phrase
“extraordinary writs” entered our constitution in 1984, when “the
judicial article of the constitution was repealed and replaced with new
language.” Id. Patterson and the State disagreed “about what the
original public meaning of the constitutional language is, as well as at
what point we should measure that meaning.” Id.
   ¶44 We rejected the State’s argument that we should interpret
the language as it would have been understood in 1895. We instead
held that 1984 was the correct year to assess the meaning of the
constitutional language. Id. ¶¶ 130–42. We said:
       What the State advocates is fundamentally inconsistent
       with the logic of an original public meaning interpretive
       approach. To accept the State’s argument would require
       us to accept that in 1984, the public evaluating the
       proposed amendment would have understood that by
       returning the word “writ” to the constitution, they were
       not using the term as they generally understood it, but
       as people in 1895 would have understood it.
Id. ¶ 138 (cleaned up).
    ¶45 And in Patterson, the State presented no evidence to support
its assertion that the people of Utah in 1984 would have understood
that by inserting the word “writ” into the constitution, they were
giving it the meaning it carried in 1895. Id. ¶ 137. Without evidence
that voters “intended the amended language to carry a meaning from
the previous century,” we concluded that it would be “unreasonable
to look back to the time of statehood to understand language the
voters approved in 1984.” Id. ¶ 137.
    ¶46 That is not to say that the people cannot re-enshrine an
earlier understanding of constitutional language when they amend
the constitution. In State v. Kastanis, we were asked to determine the
“quantity of proof necessary to support a denial of bail” for capital
offenders. 848 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). The language
we needed to interpret had entered the constitution in 1988. The
voters had amended the Bail Provision to provide that bail can be
denied to defendants charged with a capital offense “when there is
substantial evidence to support the charge.” Id. (quoting UTAH CONST.

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art. I, § 8(1) (1989)). The amendment modified the previous standard
that said that bail could be denied “when the proof is evident or the
presumption strong.” Id. (quoting UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (1896)) (also
referred to as the proof evident-presumption strong standard).
   ¶47 We noted that “[i]t would be reasonable to assume an intent
to make a substantive change in the law when the voters change the
language of the constitution.” Id. at 675. But we ultimately concluded
that the assumption was not warranted because the evidence before
us suggested that the voters did not intend to substantively change
the standard. Id.
   ¶48 To reach that conclusion, we examined the minutes from a
meeting of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission. Id. These
minutes described that a member of the Utah Supreme Court Criminal
Rules Committee had reported that “most lawyers do not understand
the standard of ‘proof evident-presumption strong’ because it is
archaic.” Id. The change to “substantial evidence” was suggested
because that language was “more understandable.” Id.
    ¶49 Our review of “succeeding considerations of the
amendment” also supported our determination that the change was
seemingly “accomplished in a perfunctory manner and for the sole
purpose of modernizing the language.” Id. The “succeeding
consideration” we looked to was the 1988 voter guide, which
informed voters that the new language was “more commonly used
and understood by the courts and attorneys.” Id. (quoting Proposition
No. 1 Bail Amendment, in UTAH VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET 1, 7
(1988), https://elections.utah.gov/Media/Default/historical%20VIP
s/1988%20VIP.pdf).
    ¶50 On that record, we determined that “[t]he voters were thus
informed, and undoubtedly understood, that no substantive change
would be effected.” Id. Because our historical analysis demonstrated
that “no substantive change was intended . . . in amending section 8,”
we determined that “the new language should be applied in the same
way as the previous language.” Id. And we did so because that is what
the voters would have understood they were doing when they
amended the constitution.
    ¶51 Likewise, in Randolph v. State, we again “interpret[ed] what
the people of Utah intended ‘substantial evidence’ to mean [in 1988]
when they voted it into article I, section 8 of the constitution.”2022 UT
34, ¶ 56. We determined that people in 1988 understood a “substantial
evidence” standard to have the same meaning as the earlier “proof
evident-presumption strong” standard. Id. ¶¶ 59–64.

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   ¶52 Following our logic in Kastanis, we again quoted the minutes
from the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission and the 1988 voter
guide. Id. ¶¶ 58, 60–61. After reviewing those sources, we explained
that when the voters in 1988 amended the constitution to change
“proof is evident or the presumption strong” to “substantial
evidence,” they understood that they were not changing the
substantive standard. Id. ¶¶ 60–61, 64. We thus determined that “the
new language should be applied in the same way as the previous
language.” Id. ¶ 61.
    ¶53 In Randolph, we looked to 1988 to conduct our original public
meaning analysis because that was when the voters ratified the
relevant part of the constitution. We looked at the meaning of the
constitutional language in years prior to 1988 because meeting
minutes and the voter guide demonstrated that voters in 1988 wanted
the new language to carry the earlier meaning.
   ¶54 Unlike in Kastanis and Randolph, the historical record here
suggests that the voters in 1988 had a different understanding of how
the Bail Provision operated than voters in 1895 and 1972 may have
had. And the amendment that entered the constitution in 1988 is
premised upon that contemporary understanding of how the Bail
Provision worked.
    ¶55 We employ public meaning originalism because the
constitution derives its authority from the democratic action of the
people in whom “[a]ll political power is inherent.” See UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 2. We recognize that our constitution “enshrines principles,
not application of those principles.” Maese, 2019 UT 58, ¶ 70 n.23.
Constitutional interpretation represents our effort to ascertain the
principle that the people of Utah understood they were
constitutionalizing. Stated differently, “the people of this state” are
the “constitutionally sanctioned architects of our society.” Am. Bush v.
City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 84, 140 P.3d 1235 (Durrant, J.,
concurring). That is, the people of Utah make a blueprint for our
society through our constitution. See id.
    ¶56 In this instance, 1988 is the last time the people of Utah
performed a major revision of the part of the blueprint that deals with
bail. The voters’ understanding in 1988 of how the Bail Provision
functioned motivated their decisions on whether to amend the
constitution. That understanding also influenced how they believed
the constitution should be amended. It is this understanding that
defines the principle that the constitution enshrines. That
understanding is the latest word we have on how the people of Utah

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                           STATE v. BARNETT
                         Opinion of the Court

want its constitution to work with respect to bail, and it is that
understanding we work to discover.
   ¶57 The State offers us another possibility. The State suggests
that we could recognize that the phrase “shall be bailable except”
means one thing (based on how the State claims voters in 1895 and
1972 understood it) when interpreting subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of
the Bail Provision but conclude that the same phrase has a different
meaning when we interpret subsection (1)(c). That would require us
to recognize what the precise words meant at the time they first
entered the constitution and then encase them in amber and not allow
them to be interpreted contrary to that meaning, even if the voters
amended the constitution relying on a different understanding of
what those words mean and how they operate.
   ¶58 Such devotion to a formal application of public meaning
originalism would miss the forest for the trees. We don’t seek to
understand what the constitutional language meant at the time it
entered the constitution because that language is imbued with magic.
We seek to understand the original public meaning because it is the
best place to start to understand the principle the people of Utah
placed in the constitution And, in a case like this, we can best ascertain
that principle if we seek to know what the people who last made a
major amendment to that principle understood that principle to be. In
other words, where the historical record suggests that the voters in
1988 amended the Bail Provision with an understanding of how that
Bail Provision works, it is their understanding that the amendment
enshrines. This requires us to turn our attention to 1988 to see what
the Bail Provision meant when the voters amended it.
        A. The Voter Information Pamphlet and Other Published
          Materials in 1988 Support the Conclusion That the Bail
                        Provision is Discretionary
   ¶59 “[T]o ascertain the original public meaning of the
constitutional text, we must ask what principles a fluent speaker of
the framers’ English would have understood a particular
constitutional provision to embody.” Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons &
Parole, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 96, 416 P.3d 663. We have, at times, concluded
that voter guides can help us answer that question. See Randolph, 2022
UT 34, ¶ 58; In re Young, 1999 UT 6, ¶ 21, 976 P.2d 581; Kastanis, 848
P.2d at 673.
   ¶60 The 1988 voter guide told Utah voters that the existing Bail
Provision, as well as the proposed amendment, gave judges discretion
to grant bail to those excepted from the bail guarantee. The voter
guide’s “Impartial Analysis” section explained, “The state
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                         Opinion of the Court
constitution presently allows judges to deny bail to persons who have
been charged with: (1) a capital offense; or (2) a felony while on
probation or parole or while free on bail awaiting trial.” Proposition
No. 1 Bail Amendment, in UTAH VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET 1, 7
(1988), https://elections.utah.gov/Media/Default/Historical%20VI
Ps/1988%20VIP.pdf (emphasis added).
   ¶61 In the “Arguments For” amending the Bail Provision, the
voter guide stated, “The present bail provisions of the Utah
Constitution do not give Utah judges the discretion to deny bail for
charges involving serious offenses” and encouraged voting for
proposition 1 so that judges could be “allowed to deny bail” in such
cases. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
    ¶62 The language of “allow[ing]” judges and “giv[ing] . . . judges
the discretion” indicates that the voter guide’s authors thought that
the existing Bail Provision gave judges discretion to grant bail to
capital offenders and double felony defendants and that the new
provision would do so as well. Absent evidence pointing in the
opposite direction, we can assume that voters who wanted to know
what the amendment would do—and who looked to the voter guide
to find out—would carry that understanding with them into the ballot
box. In this instance, the understanding they would likely have taken
with them was that the Bail Provision gave judges discretion to grant
bail to capital offenders and double felony defendants and that the
amendment they were voting on would add a new category of
defendants to whom bail was available but not guaranteed.
    ¶63 If voters in 1988 had looked to the newspapers for a
discussion about the proposed amendment, they likely would have
understood that the Bail Provision gave courts discretion to deny bail
in some circumstances but did not mandate denial. Opponents to the
proposition penned an op-ed for The Salt Lake Tribune that claimed the
Bail Provision “accommodates excessive interpretation” but they also
acknowledged that “[c]onceivably, the state constitution’s no bail
limits—only in capital cases and for probationers charged with
another felony—should be extended. Judges ought to be allowed the
discretion of holding without bail suspected criminals apt to flee local
court jurisdiction.” Editorial, Split Proposition Vote, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, Nov. 6, 1988, at A32 (emphasis added).
    ¶64 Contemporaneous events and reporting on court cases
generally support this interpretation. An April 1988 newspaper article
described how a court initially set bail at $200,000, and then lowered
it to $100,000 for two men charged with a capital offense. See Chuck
Zehnder & Rosann Fillmore, Two Price Men Charged with Murder, SUN

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                            STATE v. BARNETT
                          Opinion of the Court

ADVOC., Apr. 5, 1988, at 1A. In 1986, newspapers reported on the legal
proceedings for Steven R. James, who was charged with a capital
offense and for whom bail was set at $75,000. See, e.g., Bail Set at
$75,000 for Father of Steven Roy James, PROVO DAILY HERALD, Oct. 28,
1986, at 12. Voters who relied on the reporting of crimes to understand
how the Bail Provision worked would have understood that judges
possessed discretion to grant bail, even to those charged with capital
crimes or double felonies.
    B. Legislative Materials Generally Support the Conclusion That
        Voters in 1988 Would Have Understood That Judges Had
                         Discretion in Bail Cases
    ¶65 The State places its eggs in a basket labeled “legislative
history.” The State claims that voters in 1988 who reviewed the Senate
floor debates would have understood that the Bail Provision removed
judges’ discretion to grant bail in some circumstances. The State
further contends that those debates demonstrate that the State’s
proffered interpretation “was the unchallenged understanding of
Subsection 8(1) the Framers were left with when they voted on it.”
   ¶66 The legislative history does not bear this out. Indeed, a voter
who happened to listen to the Senate floor debates could readily
conclude that the Senate did not entirely agree on what the effect of
the amendment would be.
    ¶67 Senator Winn L. Richards was one of the sponsors of the
resolution that would put the amended Bail Provision before the
people for a vote. During the floor debates on the resolution, Senator
Richards said the proposed constitutional amendment added
additional circumstances when “a judge, in his wisdom, can deny
bail.” Recording of Utah Senate Floor Debates, at 5:14, S.J.R. 3, 47th Leg.,
Gen. Sess., (Jan. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Senate Floor Debates]; Jeffrey G.
Thomson, Jr., The Utah Constitution’s Prohibitory Bail Provisions in Utah
Criminal Proceedings, 4 UTAH J. CRIM. L. 69, 87 (2019); S.J.R. No. 3, 47th
Utah     Leg.,     Gen.     Sess.    (1988),    https://images.archives
.utah.gov/digital/collection/428/id/150796/rec/1.
   ¶68 Senator LeRay L. McAllister, another sponsor, explained
that “the judge would have discretion” to deny bail but that the
resolution “doesn’t say they have to, it simply allows the judge to have
discretion.” Senate Floor Debates, at 01:45; Thomson, supra, at 87.
    ¶69 Senator Darrell G. Renstrom, also a resolution sponsor,
added, “No, I don’t think it’s giving [judges] discretion. It mandates
it as long as there [is] substantial evidence that he committed the
crime.” Senate Floor Debates, at 01:54; Thomson, supra, at 87.

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                           Opinion of the Court
   ¶70 Senator Lyle W. Hillyard, who also sponsored the
resolution, was asked: “You would agree, though, that once the judge
has reached the judgment that there is substantial evidence . . . to
convict, then at that point the judge has lost his option, hasn’t he,
because he’s mandated by the Constitution to deny bail?” Senate Floor
Debates, at 03:24; Thomson, supra, at 88.
    ¶71 Senator Hillyard responded: “That’s correct.” But Senator
Hillyard added “I think that is the discretion touchstone of this bill,
that if a judge . . . wanted to bail a person out, thought he ought to be
eligible for bail, the court simply would not find the substantial
evidence.” Senate Floor Debates, at 03:40; Thomson, supra, at 88–89. 6
    ¶72 Immediately before the vote, a senator said it would be
beneficial “to give the judge that discretion, that they could withhold
bail.” Senate Floor Debates, at 05:32. 7
   ¶73 In original public meaning analysis, “our focus is on the
objective original public meaning of the text, not the intent of those
who wrote it . . . . Evidence of framers’ intent can inform our
understanding of the text’s meaning, but it is only a means to this end,
not an end in itself.” Maese, 2019 UT 58, ¶ 19 n.6. So, even though the
State is correct that some legislators interpreted the Bail Provision to
deny bail in certain circumstances, this information alone is not
dispositive. And even within the Legislature, the question did not
appear fully settled.
_____________________________________________________________
       6 The State cites a journal article that transcribes the debate and

quotes Senator Hillyard as saying, “I think that is the discretion
touched on of this bill.” Thomson, supra, at 88 (emphasis added). Our
own transcription renders the comment as, “I think that is the
discretion touchstone of this bill.” Senate Floor Debates, at 03:40
(emphasis added). Other minor transcription differences exist. None
are material to our analysis.
   7  In 2016, Senator Hillyard sponsored a bill that provided “a
magistrate or judge may deny pre-trial release” for capital offenders
and double felony defendants, among other crimes. See S.B. 202, § 14,
2016 Utah Leg. Gen. Sess. (Utah Feb. 19, 2016), available at https://
le.utah.gov/~2016/bills/static/SB0202.html      (emphasis      added).
Although the understanding of one Senator many years after the
amendment passed is not powerful evidence of how the public would
have understood the language at the time of the vote, it is interesting
that one of the resolution’s sponsors and drafters later took the view
that the Bail Provision did not mandate the denial of bail to capital
offenders and double felony defendants.
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                           STATE v. BARNETT
                         Opinion of the Court

    ¶74 In fact, Senator Richards and, notably, Senator Renstrom—
who pushed back against using discretionary language to describe the
resolution in the floor debate—wrote the arguments in the 1988 voter
guide supporting the Bail Provision amendment. In the guide, they
described that the amendment would “[g]ive judges the right to deny
bail” in certain circumstances and “[r]emove unreasonable
restrictions on the discretion of judges.” Arguments for Proposition No.
1 Bail Amendment, in UTAH VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET 1, 8 (1988),
https://elections.utah.gov/Media/Default/Historical%20VIPs/1988
%20VIP.pdf. It is hard to conclude that Utah voters’ understanding of
the amendment would have been formed by the inconclusive
legislative debate more than the voter guide’s definitive statements.
     C. Court Cases from Utah and Sister States Would Not Have
       Provided Clear Insight into Whether the Bail Provision Was
                      Discretionary or Mandatory
    ¶75 A particularly curious voter in 1988 might also have looked
to this court’s past precedent on the provision’s meaning or even other
states’ caselaw. That curiosity would not have been rewarded. A voter
would not have found anything definitive in our precedent and
would have found mixed results from other states.
    ¶76 Before 1988, our precedent did not give a definitive answer
on whether judges had discretion to grant bail to capital offenders or
double felony defendants. We had never directly decided the
question, but we had offered some observations on the topic. For
example, in Roll v. Larson, we described the Bail Provision in
somewhat permissive terms. 516 P.2d 1392 (Utah 1973). We said the
provision “refers to a specific, distinct category identified as ‘capital
offenses’ for which bail may be denied under certain circumstances.”
Id. at 1392 (emphasis added).
    ¶77 In Scott v. Ryan, on the other hand, we described the Bail
Provision’s operation in seemingly conflicting ways. 548 P.2d 235,
235–37 (Utah 1976). The majority opinion noted that the trial court’s
interpretation of the provision “denies bail to anyone arrested for
another offense while on probation for a first offense, and denies a
hearing for the purpose of determining whether the proof is evident
or the presumption strong in the pending felony proceeding.” Id. at
235–36. But Justice Crockett, in his concurrence, wrote about the
provision in discretionary terms. “[I]f a person is either on probation
or parole . . . and is thereafter accused of a felony, . . . there is no
constitutional mandate that he must be granted bail. And it therefore
may be denied.” Id. at 237 (Crockett, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added).

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                          Opinion of the Court
    ¶78 In Chynoweth v. Larson, we said that the Bail Provision
“affirms the fundamental right to bail of one accused of a crime; and
it does so in mandatory terms unless one of the exceptions exists.” 572
P.2d 1081, 1082 (Utah 1977) (cleaned up). In other words, Chynoweth
affirmed the mandatory nature of the right to bail and said that such
a right was subject to exceptions but did not opine on whether a judge
could grant bail to those subject to the exceptions. It is hard to imagine
a voter in 1988 who explored these cases would come away sure that
this court had decided whether a capital defendant or double felony
defendant could be granted bail. 8
    ¶79 If that curious and dedicated voter looked to other states in
hopes of understanding what the amendment would do, the voter
would find a decidedly mixed record. Some states specifically ruled
that their similarly worded bail provisions left discretion to grant bail
to those who fell into one of the exceptions. See, e.g., Harnish v. State,
531 A.2d 1264, 1269 (Me. 1987) (“Finally, the State’s showing of
probable cause, while defeating a capital defendant’s constitutional
right to bail, leaves intact the discretionary power of the court to admit
any defendant to bail.”); State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717, 718 (Fla. 1980)
(“The constitutional provision does not require that bail release be
denied to all persons charged with capital offenses . . . .”). Others
ruled that denial of bail was mandatory. See, e.g., People v. Dist. Ct. In
& For Adams Cnty., 529 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Colo. 1974) (“[W]e read ‘all
persons shall be bailable . . . except for capital offenses when the proof
is evident or the presumption great’ to mean and say that, when the

_____________________________________________________________
   8 The State supports its argument by referencing several cases from

the Utah Territory: Mead v. Metcalf, 7 Utah 103, 25 P. 729 (Utah Terr.
1891), overruled by Winnovich v. Emery, 93 P. 988 (Utah 1908); Ex parte
Romanes, 1 Utah 23 (Utah Terr. 1876); and Ex parte Springer, 1 Utah 214
(Utah Terr. 1875). These cases do not interpret the Utah Constitution,
so although potentially helpful for explaining the historical context of
the 1890s, they have little to do with how a voter in 1988 would
understand the Bail Provision. The State also argues that a court of
appeals case, State v. Alvillar, supports its reading of the provision. See
748 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In that case, the court, ruling on
whether the defendant’s inability to post bail violated the Equal
Protection Clause, stated that the “defendant was precluded by
statute and by the Utah Constitution—not by his economic
circumstances—from having the opportunity to post bail.” Id. We
agree that Alvillar is a potential data point but we conclude that it is
not a particularly potent one in light of this court’s less definitive
pronouncements.
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                           STATE v. BARNETT
                         Opinion of the Court

proof is evident or the presumption great, denial of bail is
mandatory.”).
   ¶80 Taken together, the historical record before us strongly
supports the conclusion that the original public meaning of the Bail
Provision when the people of Utah ratified the 1988 amendment was
that article I, section 8(1) guaranteed bail to all defendants, except for
those who fell into the exceptions, but a court could still grant bail to
those defendants in certain circumstances.
 III. THE “HERMENEUTICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS”
 THAT THE STATE PERCEIVES WITH THE DISTRICT COURT’S
     INTERPRETATION OF THE BAIL PROVISION MAY BE
              ADDRESSED LEGISLATIVELY
   ¶81 The State argues that the district court’s interpretation of the
constitution was wrong because that interpretation allowed the court
“to assume unrestrained discretion not to enforce the Constitution’s
double felony rule.” The State says this “creates a number of
hermeneutical and practical problems.” 9
    ¶82 The State claims that, among other problems, giving judges
discretion would permit courts “to choose to never even enforce” the
double felony defendant rule. And deciding when to grant bail would
be “unfettered and unguided, not based on some known enumerated
factors.” This “directionless discretion” would lead to a lack of
uniformity and allow courts to “discriminate among otherwise
similarly situated double felony defendants,” which would lead to a
“real risk of unequal treatment among similarly situated double
felony defendants.” The State argues that even if a court is “willing to
apply the rule,” it could impose additional conditions on the State
before it would withhold bail.
    ¶83 “[W]hen we interpret our constitution, we are not simply
shopping for interpretations that we might like. We start our analysis
by trying to understand what the language meant to those who voted
on it, and we go from there.” Randolph v. State, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 69, 515
P.3d 444. Even if we did conclude that the district court’s
interpretation of the Bail Provision could lead to the problems the
State lists, it would still not be for us to choose the State’s
interpretation of the amendment over the one determined by plain
language and original public meaning. Moreover, the State’s concerns
_____________________________________________________________
   9  Hermeneutics is “[t]he art of interpreting texts, esp. as a
technique used in critical legal studies.” Hermeneutics, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
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                       Opinion of the Court
can be, and in some instances perhaps already have been, addressed
legislatively. See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 77-20-201 (2023).
                             CONCLUSION
    ¶84 The district court correctly determined that it could grant
Barnett bail. The Bail Provision’s plain language, as well as the
evidence of what a Utahn in 1988 would have understood the Bail
provision to mean, supports the district court’s interpretation of
article I, section 8(1). We affirm.

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