Court Opinion

ID: 9739805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:21:10.097443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.005223
License: Public Domain

On Petition For Rehearing.
Achor, G. J.
— Appellant objects to the opinion and decision of this court as hereinbefore issued for two reasons.
*6401. Appellant asserts that the court should have denied the appellees any right to judicial review because of noncompliance with the statute [§§48-2110, 48-2117 and 48-4501]. Appellant complains that if the statutes are permitted to be “misused as herein, the taxpayer can drag and stall along and toy with a government unit, and confuse and snarl procedures. The court by its decision thus promotes a misuse of the appropriation procedure of cities.” This statement compels us to comment that much of the delay in the proceedings was caused by appellant’s own carelessness in the clerical aspects of the proceedings, for which neither the appellees nor this court is chargeable.
2. Appellant asserts that the court’s opinion is in conflict with the general rule that if the property owner at a final hearing receives no award, the decree “amounts to a negative finding” as to him, and if he is dissatisfied, “the sole and exclusive judicial remedy is remonstrance and appeal as provided by statute.” In support of this statement of the law appellant cites the cases of Neff v. Indianapolis (1935), 209 Ind. 203, 198 N. E. 328; Windhorst v. Indianapolis (1934), 99 Ind. App. 225, 188 N. E. 328.
However, the facts in this case do not bring it within the general rule as urged by the appellant. Here, at the hearing on such remonstrance, the Board entered a finding that one of the parties was entitled to an award of damages but simply did not enter a decree to that effect. The only proper procedure under such circumstances Avas to file a petition asking that the decree be modified, which was the procedure followed by appellees in this case.
Finally, the. appellant asks that in event the opinion of this court is permitted to stand, the court *641establish “guidelines and standards as to the admissible evidence,” on the issue of “damage to a going bakery not in existence at the time of original appropriation.” Evidence upon that issue was admitted in the trial court.
We are aware of the authorities cited by appellant in support of its position. However, as it was stated in the opinion heretofore written:
“The sole question which must be decided in this action is whether the Circuit Court of Marion County had jurisdiction over this particular subject-matter. . . .” [196 N. E. 2d 896, at page 897.]
Thus the measure of damages allowable to appellees is not a proper subject for consideration in this case.
Appellees, in turn, have filed a response to appellant’s petition for rehearing in which they also ask that the court modify its opinion in two particulars, but that, in the alternative, it deny appellant’s petition for rehearing.
First, appellees contend that because of the many defects in the proceedings before the Board of Public Works this court should have held that such Board was without jurisdiction, and that it was error to hold that appellees “have waived all the many procedural deficiencies therein.” This conclusion, appellees assert, “is completely contrary to the holding in Elliott v. City of Indianapolis (1957), 237 Ind. 287, 142 N. E. 2d 911, and either that case or this must be reconsidered.”
However, the case at bar and the Elliott case, supra, are distinguishable. In the Elliott case a hearing was had on the final assessment roll and a decree was entered which showed no benefits and no damages to appellant. The hearing in that case was had without *642appellant being notified, and without him appearing and filing a remonstrance to the assessment roll as originally published. Later, after learning of the action of the Board, the appellant filed a remonstrance which the Board caused to be dated back to the date of the hearing, so as to permit appellant to file his appeal. In that case, this court held that the decree confirming the roll of ■ benefits and damages was a nullity as to the appellant since he had not been properly notified nor had he appeared and been given an opportunity to be heard before the Board entered its decree, as to the final assessment roll.
In that case the Board was not vested with jurisdiction over the hearing in question, either by notice to the appellant or by reason of his personal and- timely appearance in the proceedings.
However, in the case at bar, although notices, descriptions, etc., were defective, the condemnees did appear in person and by counsel and filed a timely remonstrance in the proceedings prior to the hearing and ‘determination of the issue which was before the Board. Under these circumstances this action by the appellees 'constituted a waiver of the above cited defects.
The petition for rehearing is therefore denied.
Arterburn, Landis and Myers, JJ., concur. Jackson, J., dissents. ...
Note. — Reported in 196 N. E. 2d 896. Rehearing denied 201 N. E. 2d 336.