Court Opinion

ID: 9418062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 21:00:59.055117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:31.889745
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10172    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 08/02/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10172
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       DALLAS TERRELL SMITH,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20079-DPG-1
                          ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10172

       Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             Dallas Terrell Smith appeals his convictions and sentence of
       one year and one day in prison for providing a false statement in
       connection with the purchase of a firearm and dealing in firearms
       without a license. We affirm.
                                        I.
              A federal grand jury charged Smith with three counts of
       making false statements in connection with the purchase of ﬁre-
       arms from a licensed dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)
       (Counts 1–3), and one count of dealing in ﬁrearms without a li-
       cense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) (Count 4). A jury
       found Smith guilty of Counts 1 and 4, and not guilty of Counts 2
       and 3. The district court sentenced Smith to one year and one day
       in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Smith now
       appeals his convictions and sentence, arguing that the evidence pre-
       sented at trial was insuﬃcient to support the jury’s verdict as to
       Counts 1 and 4.
                                       II.
              We review de novo whether the evidence was suﬃcient to
       sustain a jury’s guilty verdict, viewing all evidence and making all
       reasonable inferences and credibility determinations in favor of the
       government. United States v. Isaacson, 752 F.3d 1291, 1303–04 (11th
       Cir. 2014). We will not overturn a jury’s verdict so long as any
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       23-10172                  Opinion of the Court                               3

       reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the
       jury to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
                                            III.
                                             A.
               To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), the gov-
       ernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that in connection
       with the acquisition of ﬁrearms, the defendant knowingly made a
       false or ﬁctitious oral or written statement intended to deceive or
       likely to deceive a licensed ﬁrearms dealer, and that the false state-
       ment was a fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or disposition
       of the ﬁrearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6); see United States v. Frazier, 605
       F.3d 1271, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2010).
              Count 1 of Smith’s indictment charged that on June 2, 2019,
       Smith knowingly made two false statements on a Bureau of Alco-
       hol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) form that he was re-
       quired to complete for the purchase of two pistols from a licensed
       ﬁrearms dealer: that he was the actual buyer of the ﬁrearms, and
       that he resided at a speciﬁc address on Fourth Avenue in Miami,
       Florida. Smith argues that neither of these two statements could
       support his conviction on Count 1 because (1) the government
       failed to prove that he was not the actual buyer, and (2) the resi-
       dence information he provided, though false, was not material to
       the lawfulness of the sale. 1

       1 Smith also argues that the question of whether his allegedly false statements

       were “material” within the meaning of the statute should have been submitted
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       4                           Opinion of the Court                        23-10172

               We need not decide today what evidence was required to
       prove that Smith was not the “actual transferee/buyer” of the ﬁre-
       arms as he stated on the ATF form, because Smith admits to know-
       ingly listing an address where he had not lived for several years as
       his “current” residence on the same form. One false statement is
       enough, provided that the other elements of the oﬀense are satis-
       ﬁed. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).
               And Smith’s argument that a false address is not “material to
       the lawfulness of the sale” of a ﬁrearm is contrary to binding prec-
       edent. In United States v. Gudger, our predecessor court explained
       that a buyer’s intentional misstatement of his home address is ma-
       terial to the lawfulness of the sale because the dealer is required by
       statute to record the name, age, and place of residence of the
       buyer—meaning that “the sale is illegal unless these matters are
       correctly recorded.” 472 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1972) (quotation
       omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5). We are bound by the holding in
       Gudger “unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point
       of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en
       banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008);
       see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981)
       (en banc) (adopting decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued
       prior to October 1, 1981, as binding precedent).

       to the jury. But as we have explained before, whether a statement of fact is
       “material to the lawfulness of the sale” of a firearm is “purely a question of law”
       for the court to decide. United States v. Klais, 68 F.3d 1282, 1283 (11th Cir. 1995)
       (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)).
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       23-10172               Opinion of the Court                         5

              Smith attempts to distinguish Gudger by pointing out that
       the defendant in that case listed a ﬁctitious address, whereas the ad-
       dress he provided was an actual residence—albeit one where he did
       not live at the time and had not lived for several years. We see no
       diﬀerence. Either way, Smith’s statement that the Fourth Avenue
       address was his “current” address was false, and he knew it. Gudger
       makes clear that providing a false address is “material to the lawful-
       ness of the sale” under § 922(a)(6).
                                        IV.
              As to his conviction for dealing in ﬁrearms without a license,
       Smith argues that the government failed to present suﬃcient evi-
       dence that he was “engaged in the business of dealing in ﬁrearms”
       as that term is used in § 922(a)(1)(A). Smith argues that evidence
       that he sold only 24 ﬁrearms over a two-year period shows that he
       was not making a living from selling guns. But the statute does not
       require the government to prove that the defendant engaged in a
       high-volume ﬁrearm business or that he made any minimum dollar
       amount from his sales.
              At the time Smith committed his oﬀenses, Congress deﬁned
       the term “engaged in the business” as used in § 922(a)(6) to mean
       “a person who devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in ﬁre-
       arms as a regular course of trade or business with the principal ob-
       jective of livelihood and proﬁt through the repetitive purchase and
       resale of ﬁrearms,” not including a hobbyist or collector who sells
       from his personal collection. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C) (2019). The
       term “with the principal objective of livelihood and proﬁt” was
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10172

       deﬁned to mean that “the intent underlying the sale or disposition
       of ﬁrearms is predominantly one of obtaining livelihood and pecu-
       niary gain, as opposed to other intents, such as improving or liqui-
       dating a personal ﬁrearms collection.” Id. § 921(a)(22). So a person
       may engage in the business of dealing in ﬁrearms if he regularly
       buys and sells ﬁrearms with the principal intent of making a proﬁt,
       even if that business is not his only (or even his main) source of
       income.
              The evidence showed that Smith purchased at least 26 ﬁre-
       arms between September 2018 and November 2020, including 11
       Taurus G2C 9mm pistols. When he was interviewed in November
       2020, he had only the two most recently purchased ﬁrearms—nei-
       ther of which was a Taurus G2C 9mm—still in his possession. He
       spent about $10,000 on ﬁrearms during that period, though his only
       known source of income (other than ﬁrearm sales) was unemploy-
       ment assistance. And most importantly, Smith admitted to ATF
       agents that he sold ﬁrearms “to pay his bills,” and that he made
       about $50 proﬁt on each ﬁrearm. This evidence was suﬃcient for
       a reasonable jury to ﬁnd that Smith was engaged in buying and sell-
       ing ﬁrearms “with the principal objective of livelihood and proﬁt,”
       though he was not a licensed ﬁrearms dealer. 18 U.S.C.
       § 921(a)(21)(C) (2019).
                                       V.
             We AFFIRM Smith’s convictions and sentence.
             AFFIRMED.