Court Opinion

ID: 9382573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 09:07:54.36683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:40.236724
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                     NO. 03-21-00572-CR
                                     NO. 03-21-00573-CR
                                     NO. 03-21-00574-CR

                                Evan Elon Webber, Appellant

                                                v.

                                 The State of Texas, Appellee

                FROM THE 20TH DISTRICT COURT OF MILAM COUNTY
                        NOS. CR26,337, CR26,338, & CR26,339
               THE HONORABLE JOHN YOUNGBLOOD, JUDGE PRESIDING

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Evan Elon Webber was convicted of two counts of possession of child

pornography and one count of online solicitation of a minor, and he was sentenced to ten years’

imprisonment for each count. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.34, 33.021, 43.26. In four issues on

appeal, Webber contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce extraneous-

act evidence after having failed to give reasonable notice, allowing an expert witness to testify

when the State did not provide timely notice, allowing the indictment to be amended, and

submitting erroneous venue instructions. We will affirm the trial court’s judgments of conviction.

                                       BACKGROUND

               After detecting the presence of what was believed to be two videos of child

pornography, a Facebook employee sent a notification to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children (“Center”). The Center then sent a report to the Texas Attorney General’s

Office, which assigned an investigator to the case. The investigator learned that the Facebook

account that received the videos was an account with Webber’s name, and the investigator

obtained a search warrant for the content from that Facebook account as well as the one for the

person who sent the videos, M.R., who the investigator learned was a fourteen-year-old girl. As

a result of the investigation, Webber was charged with six sex offenses involving at least two

girls—M.R. and E.S.—who were fourteen years old at the time of the alleged offenses, and the

same attorney was appointed to represent Webber in all the charges. Months later and before

trial, the State elected not to pursue the charges involving anyone other than M.R., and a trial

was scheduled for the following charges: two counts for possession of child pornography and

one count of online solicitation of a minor. Webber was arrested while he was in Oklahoma. He

was transported to Texas, and a trial was held in Milam County, Texas.

              During the guilt–innocence portion of the trial, the following witnesses testified:

the investigator, who discussed the information he retrieved from the Facebook accounts; a

digital forensics expert, who testified regarding photos that he discovered on Webber’s phone;

and M.R.’s high school principal, who identified M.R. from one of the videos transmitted

through Facebook and testified that M.R. went to high school and was fourteen years old at the

relevant time. In addition, over twenty exhibits were admitted into evidence. At the beginning

of this phase, the trial court admitted as State’s exhibits 1 and 2 letters that Webber wrote to

individuals while he was in jail awaiting trial in this case in which he discussed what types of

plea deals he would and would not consider.

              In his testimony, the investigator explained that Webber’s Facebook account had

been verified through Webber’s phone and through his email address, meaning that as part of the

                                               2
log-in process, Facebook had sent verifying information to the phone and to the email address

that were used to complete the log-in process. Further, the investigator explained that the IP

address for the computer sending the two videos belonged to M.R.’s mother who lived in

Rockdale, Texas. During the investigator’s testimony, a portion of a Facebook chat between

accounts attributed to Webber and E.S. was admitted into evidence as State’s exhibit 4 and

showed Webber asking E.S. for the contact information for M.R. In addition, a copy of a

Facebook chat exchange between accounts attributed to Webber and M.R. initiated shortly after

Webber communicated with E.S. was admitted into evidence and contained, among others, the

following exchanges:

       Webber tells M.R. that a friend gave him her contact information because he
       heard she was looking for an “older guy to make money” and that he lives in
       Cameron;

       M.R. states that she is fourteen years old and lives in Rockdale;

       Webber and M.R. send multiple exchanges regarding how much money he would
       pay to have sex with her;

       Webber sends M.R. a photo of himself with his shirt raised and wearing light
       colored shorts with the material of the shorts placed to display his penis through
       the shorts;

       Webber sends a photo of a stack of money after M.R. inquires whether he has
       money to pay;

       Webber sends a photo of himself shirtless and wearing dark shorts, and the photo
       shows him grabbing the portion of the shorts covering his penis;

       M.R. sends a photo of herself from her school;

       Webber sends a video of a man masturbating and asks M.R. if she got the video;

       Webber and M.R. discuss what types of sexual activity she would participate in;

       Webber offers to pay extra money for pictures of M.R. in her bra and underwear;

                                                3
       M.R. offers to send a video of her naked, and Webber states that he would pay her
       for that type of video;

       M.R. sends a video of her in the shower with her breasts exposed;

       M.R. sends a video of her masturbating and showing her vagina;

       Webber agrees to pay her for the videos after complimenting the appearance of
       her vagina; and

       Webber asks if M.R. could sneak out of her house and offers to pay her $800 for
       anal intercourse that day.

              Moreover, the investigator related that the internet service provider verified that

Webber was getting service at the apartment where he lived in Cameron, Texas, and that the

Center provided an approximate location of the receiver of the videos as being in Cameron.

Further, the investigator testified that his investigation of the communications between Webber

and M.R. showed that Webber was in Milam County, Texas, during those exchanges. However,

the investigator admitted that he was unable to determine where Webber was when he viewed

the videos and that Webber was in Oklahoma when arrested. The investigator admitted that

Webber could have been in Oklahoma or any Texas county when he viewed the videos, that it

was not possible to tell the location of Webber’s phone when it was used to access a computer,

and that he could not say if Webber’s phone was in Milam County when the videos were

accessed. However, the investigator confirmed that the phone in Webber’s possession when he

was arrested had the same phone number as the phone number associated with Webber’s

Facebook account.

              Additionally, the investigator explained that while searching M.R.’s Facebook

account, he found a picture of her that had been changed with computer filters. When discussing

his search of Webber’s Facebook account, the investigator explained that Webber sent the photos

                                               4
of him in his shorts to multiple individuals. The trial court admitted State’s exhibits 13 to 17,

which were Facebook exchanges in which he sent those photos to five people in 2017 and 2018.

The trial court also admitted State’s exhibits 22 to 27, which were also Facebook messages

between Webber and others in which he stated that he lived in Cameron, Texas, and in which he

stated in one exchange that he was also in the Dallas area.

               Following the investigator’s testimony, the digital forensics expert testified that

he recovered two photos from Webber’s cell phone, and the photos were admitted as exhibits.

The first showed a man in shorts holding his penis through his shorts like the photo that Webber

sent to M.R. and others through Facebook, but this photo stopped at the neck and did not show

the person’s face. The digital forensics expert explained that the photo substantially matched the

photo that Webber sent to others. The second photo was the photo of M.R. that the investigator

found on M.R.’s Facebook account that had filters applied to it, and the digital forensics expert

stated that this photo substantially matched the photo of M.R.

               After considering the evidence, the jury found Webber guilty of all three charged

offenses. During the punishment phase, the investigator was called as a witness again and

testified that before this investigation, he had investigated Webber for another offense. More

specifically, the investigator related that he received a call from a pawn shop owner who

explained that Webber had sold a computer with a video showing a man engaging in sexual

activity with two prepubescent girls.      Further, the investigator testified that he searched

Webber’s home during the former investigation and that Webber was charged with twelve counts

of possession of child pornography. Next, the investigator explained that Webber entered into a

plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to less serious charges of improper visual

recording. The trial court admitted as State’s exhibit 28 the indictment from the former case

                                                 5
listing the twelve counts of possession of child pornography and admitted as State’s exhibits 29

and 30 two orders showing that Webber pleaded guilty to improper visual recording and placing

him on deferred-adjudication community supervision.

                In addition, the investigator discussed additional Facebook chats between Webber

and E.S., and the trial court admitted exhibits 31 to 34 showing the following communications

between them:

       Webber asks E.S. to send him “sexy” pictures of her;

       Webber asks E.S. if he needed to bring condoms and if she will engage in oral and
       anal sex;

       Webber says he will drive to see her and asks why she was not naked yet before
       she responds two hours later to say “thank you”; and

       Webber tells E.S. that he wants to “have fun” with her friend too and tells her to
       ask her friend if she wants to participate.

                At the conclusion of the punishment phase, the jury sentenced Webber to ten

years’ imprisonment for each of the three charges.

                                          DISCUSSION

                In four issues on appeal, Webber contends that the trial court erred by overruling

his objection to the State offering extraneous-act evidence, overruling his objection to the State

calling a digital forensics expert as a witness, allowing the State to amend the indictment over his

objection, and submitting an erroneous venue instruction in the jury charge.

Extraneous Act Evidence

                First, Webber contends that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to

the admission of extraneous-act evidence during the guilt–innocence phase and during the

                                                 6
punishment phase. Months before the trial started, Webber filed a request for notice of the

State’s intent to use extraneous-act evidence at trial. In the days leading up to trial, the State

informed Webber that it planned to introduce copies of letters that he wrote while he was in jail,

evidence relating to the contemporaneous charges for which Webber had been indicted before

the State elected not to pursue those charges, and evidence regarding his being charged with

multiple counts of possession of child pornography before agreeing to plead guilty to lesser

charges and being placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision.1 In response to

receiving this information, Webber filed a motion to exclude the evidence arguing that the

State’s disclosure was not timely, and the trial court held a hearing on the issue outside the

presence of the jury. After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied the motion

to exclude.

               On appeal, Webber contends that he requested notice regarding extraneous-act

evidence more than two years before trial but did not receive the notice until a few days before

the start of trial and asserts that the delay violated the reasonable notice requirements found

in Rule of Evidence 404(b) and subsection (3)(g) of Article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.07, § (3)(g); Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); see also

Hayden v. State, 66 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (noting that whether delivery

“constitutes reasonable notice depends in part on the time of that delivery”). Moreover, Webber

asserts that those provisions require notice for conduct beyond acts deemed bad or unlawful. See

Bishop v. State, 869 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Fain v. State, 986 S.W.2d 666,

683 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d). Although Webber concedes that there is no formal

       1
         The State also indicated that it would be introducing recordings of Webber’s phone calls
while he was in jail, but no jail recordings were admitted at trial.

                                                7
requirement that the notice be in writing, see Hayden, 66 S.W.3d at 273; Chimney v. State,

6 S.W.3d 681, 694-95 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref’d), he asserts that the type of notice

provided in this case was insufficient. Finally, Webber asserts that the failure to comply with the

notice requirements harmed him by affecting his substantial rights and that, therefore, this Court

should reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2.

               In making these claims, Webber specifically challenges the trial court’s rulings

admitting the following State’s exhibits during the guilt–innocence phase: Exhibits 1 and 2,

which were the letters Webber wrote while he was in custody for this case; Exhibit 4, which was

the log of a portion of Webber’s chat exchanges with E.S.; Exhibits 13 to 17, which were logs of

Webber’s chat exchanges with individuals in which he sent photos of himself that he also sent to

M.R.; and Exhibits 22 to 27, which were logs of Webber’s chat exchanges with individuals

in which he discussed where he lived.       Webber also challenges the propriety of the trial

court’s admitting the following State’s exhibits during the punishment phase: Exhibits 28 to 30,

which were the prior indictment charging Webber with multiple counts of possession of child

pornography and the two orders in that case placing him on deferred adjudication for less serious

charges; and Exhibits 31 to 34, which were portions of the chat log between Webber and E.S.

chronicling sexual communication between them.

               Rule 404 governs the admission of extraneous-act evidence and specifies that if a

defendant makes a timely request, the State “must provide reasonable notice before trial that [it]

intends to introduce such evidence” unless the crime, wrong, or other act “aris[es] in the same

transaction” as the charged offense. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Section 3 of Article 37.07 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure governs the use of extraneous-act evidence during punishment and

directs that “[o]n timely request of the defendant, notice of intent to introduce evidence under

                                                8
this article shall be given in the same manner required by Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of

Evidence.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.07, § 3(g).

               For purposes of resolving this issue on appeal, we will assume that the exhibits

constitute evidence falling under Rule 404(b) and Article 37.07 and that the State did not provide

reasonable notice of its intent to use that evidence. See id.; Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Because the

alleged error in this case involves evidentiary rulings, the error is subject to the harmless error

analysis for non-constitutional errors. See Hernandez v. State, 176 S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005). Under that standard, appellate courts disregard the error unless it affected the

defendant’s substantial rights. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b).

               Typically, when determining whether a defendant’s substantial rights are affected,

appellate courts consider whether “the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” Parlin v. State, 591 S.W.3d 214, 224 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.). This is the standard that appellate courts use when assessing the effect

of the erroneous admission of evidence under an evidentiary rule or statute that prohibits the

admission of that type of evidence. Roethel v. State, 80 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex. App.—Austin

2002, no pet.). “That test is appropriate because the erroneous admission of the evidence thwarts

the . . . purpose of shielding the jury from evidence used for improper reasons.” Id.

               However, the notice requirements in Rule 404(b) and Article 37.07 “do not relate

to the substantive admissibility of the evidence,” and “[t]he lack of notice does not render the

evidence inherently unreliable, but instead raises a question about the effect of procedural

noncompliance.” See id. Accordingly, we must assess the harm from the violation of the notice

provisions against their purpose. See Hernandez, 176 S.W.3d at 825; Roethel, 80 S.W.3d at 281.

The purpose of the notice provisions is to prevent surprise, Hayden, 66 S.W.3d at 272, by

                                                 9
“enabl[ing] the defendant to prepare to meet the extraneous offense evidence,” Roethel,

80 S.W.3d at 282. For that reason, appellate courts “examine the record to determine whether

the deficient notice resulted from prosecutorial bad faith or prevented the defendant from

preparing for trial.” Id. Regarding the second factor, appellate courts consider “whether the

defendant was surprised by the substance of the [evidence] and whether that affected his ability

to prepare cross-examination or mitigating evidence.” Id.

               As set out earlier, Webber was initially charged with six offenses, but the State

chose to move forward only with the charges involving M.R. On appeal, Webber asserts that all

the disputed exhibits except exhibits 28 to 30 (indictment and deferred adjudication orders) and

Exhibits 1 to 2 (letters written by Webber while in jail) were evidence relating to the other three

offenses that the State elected not to pursue. During a hearing on Webber’s motion to exclude

extraneous-act evidence, Webber’s attorney admitted that he had received discovery on the

“three other indictments” because he was also the attorney representing Webber in those cases

and had made copies out of the files for the other three charges. Similarly, Webber’s attorney

admitted that he knew about the prior deferred adjudications. Further, Webber’s attorney stated

that the State clarified days before trial which of Webber’s letters it intended to introduce at

trial and furnished copies of those letters. The two letters admitted at trial are less than a page

in length, and each contains a few sentences in which Webber described what kind of plea

agreements he would consider taking.

               Regarding the two jail letters, the State explained that it sent Webber’s attorney an

email saying that it was planning on using at trial some letters that Webber had written while in

jail, that the letters were only a few pages in length, and that after Webber’s attorney asked to be

informed of the specific letters the State intended to use, it sent Webber’s attorney copies of

                                                10
those letters. Concerning the evidence learned in the other cases, the State emphasized that

Webber’s attorney had been aware of the other offenses for years and had been given copies of

“all of the discovery” for those offenses. Further, the State related that Webber’s attorney had

plenty of notice that evidence from those other offenses would be introduced at trial because all

six offenses “stem from a single search warrant” that revealed all the criminal activity at issue in

the six offenses.

               In light of the preceding, we cannot conclude that the State acted in bad faith

when it allegedly failed to provide sufficient notice. Similarly, we cannot conclude that the

record shows that Webber was surprised by the extraneous-act evidence or was unable to prepare

for trial. See Hernandez, 176 S.W.3d at 825 (explaining that admission of evidence even though

notice provision was not complied with might “have had a substantial effect or influence on

the jury’s verdict” but that this effect or influence was not injurious “if the defendant was not

surprised by the evidence”). As set out above, Webber’s attorney admitted that he was aware of

the other offenses, had received and gone through discovery in the other charges, and believed

that he would be representing Webber in those cases until a few weeks before trial in this

case. Cf. Hayden, 66 S.W.3d at 272 (concluding that delivery of witness statements detailing

extraneous offenses can satisfy notice requirement). Similarly, his attorney stated that he had

already been aware that Webber had twice been placed on deferred adjudication. Further, the

evidence pertaining to the other offenses was gathered through the same search warrant and was

relevant to the three offenses involving M.R. Cf. Hernandez, 176 S.W.3d at 825 (explaining that

“it strains credulity to think that this defendant in this case was not on notice that the State

intended to use” extraneous-act evidence “as part of its evidence or that he had not prepared to

                                                11
defend against their use” and noting that State was aware of evidence and had furnished

defendant with copy).

               Additionally, Webber’s attorney did not ask for a continuance. Cf. McDonald v.

State, 179 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining that “had there been legitimate

surprise that required re-evaluation of trial strategy” from failure to provide notice of extraneous-

act evidence, “the appellant could have requested a continuance”). Moreover, when cross-

examining the State’s witnesses, Webber presented his defenses that the evidence did not

establish where the recipient of M.R.’s videos viewed them, that Webber’s Facebook account

could have been hacked and accessed from anywhere in the world, and that the police did not

perform a thorough investigation in this case. During his closing, Webber similarly presented his

defenses regarding venue and regarding the police not properly investigating the case, argued

that the chat exchanges in which Webber told others that he lived in Cameron did not establish

that he lived in Cameron at the relevant time because that evidence also established that he lived

in the Dallas area during that time, and suggested that the evidence showing images of Webber

being sent to others did not prove that Webber sent those pictures. Moreover, “[i]t is hard to

imagine that [Webber’s] defense would have been altered in any meaningful way” had the State

disclosed its intent to introduce evidence of certain extraneous acts earlier. See id.

               On this record, we conclude that Webber’s substantial rights were not affected by

the allegedly deficient notice. Accordingly, we overrule Webber’s first issue on appeal.

Notice Regarding Expert Witness

               In his second issue on appeal, Webber argues that the trial court erred by allowing

one of the State’s experts to testify about the online-solicitation charge over his objection.

                                                 12
Months before the trial started, Webber requested that the State disclose its expert witnesses, and

the State filed its notice twenty days before trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(b). In its

response, the State identified one witness as a digital forensics expert and another witness as a

fingerprint expert. Seven days before trial, the State filed an amended notice adding another

witness whom the State asserted would also testify as a digital forensics expert. Before the

additional expert testified, Webber objected that the third witness had not been timely disclosed.

The State explained that after it filed its first notice, it learned from its first digital forensics

expert that the expert believed that the additional witness was “the more appropriate witness”

for a portion of the testimony. Further, the State explained that after learning this information,

it filed the supplemental notice “as timely as [it] could.” The trial court then overruled Webber’s

objection.

               On appeal, Webber highlights that Article 39.14 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure requires the State to provide notice regarding the expert witnesses that it intends to

call at least twenty days before trial if the defendant requests notice, see id., and argues that

because he made that request months before the trial started, the trial court erred by overruling

his objection to the State’s addition of the previously undisclosed third expert witness. Further,

Webber asserts that the State mentioned during the hearing that it learned of the alleged need for

an additional expert after talking with one of the other experts “less than 20 days before trial.”

Moreover, Webber contends that the State’s failure to obtain this information sooner “is

tantamount to a willful violation of the 20-day notice requirement.”2 Additionally, Webber

       2
         As support for his arguments, Webber refers to a recent decision by one of our sister
courts of appeals. See State v. Heath, 642 S.W.3d 591, 597 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet.
granted). However, we find that case to be distinguishable. See id. (discussing failure to

                                                 13
argues that he could not have and should not have had to anticipate that another digital forensics

expert would be called and should have been able to rely on the first disclosure notice. Webber

also asserts that the alleged error affected his substantial rights and that this Court should reverse

his conviction for online solicitation and remand for a new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d).

               Subarticle 39.14(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if a party

requests the disclosure of “the name and address of each person the” opposing party plans to call

as an expert witness, the opposing party must disclose that information “not later than the 20th

day before the date that jury selection in the trial is scheduled to begin” or “the presentation of

evidence is scheduled to begin” in a bench trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(b). “If [a]

trial court allows a witness who was not” timely disclosed under Subarticle 39.14(b) to testify,

appellate courts “review that decision for an abuse of discretion.”          See Hamann v. State,

428 S.W.3d 221, 227 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). Under that standard, a

trial court’s ruling will only be deemed an abuse of discretion if it is so clearly wrong as to lie

outside the zone of reasonable disagreement, Lopez v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2002), or is arbitrary or unreasonable, State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005). Stated differently, the ruling will be upheld provided that the trial court’s decision

“is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to

the case.” Carrasco v. State, 154 S.W.3d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In addition, an

appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling in light of the record before the court “at the time

disclose evidence under Subarticle 39.14(a), which requires disclosure “as soon as practicable,”
and not addressing Subarticle 39.14(b)). In any event, the analysis from that case is not binding
on this Court. See HWY 3 MHP, LLC v. Electric Reliability Council of Tex., 462 S.W.3d 204,
211 n.4 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.) (explaining that analysis from sister court of appeals
is not binding precedent).

                                                 14
the ruling was made.” Khoshayand v. State, 179 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005,

no pet.).

               “In considering whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider any

showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor in the late designation and whether the

defendant could reasonably anticipate that the witness would testify although his name was not

previously disclosed.” Branum v. State, 535 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no

pet.). “In determining whether the State acted in bad faith, the principal area of inquiry is

whether the defense shows that the State intended to deceive the defendant by failing to provide

the defense with a witness’s name.” Hamann, 428 S.W.3d at 228. When deciding if a defendant

could have reasonably anticipated that the witness would be called, appellate courts may

consider “(1) the degree of surprise to the defendant; (2) the degree of disadvantage inherent in

that surprise (i.e., the defendant was aware of what the witness would say, or the witness testified

about cumulative or uncontested issues); and (3) the degree to which the trial court was able to

remedy that surprise (i.e., by granting the defense a recess, postponement, or continuance, or by

ordering the State to provide the witness’s criminal history).” Id.

               In this case, there was no showing that the State failed to disclose the third

witness through bad faith; instead, the State explained that it only became aware of the need for

the additional witness after one of its other experts indicated that it would be more appropriate

for the third witness to discuss portions of the forensic analysis performed in the case and that it

amended its notice “as timely as [it] could” after receiving this information. See State v. LaRue,

108 S.W.3d 431, 434 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003) (defining willful act as one that is “done

voluntarily and intentionally, with the specific intent to disobey the law”), aff’d, 152 S.W.3d 95

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In addition, although Webber may not have been able to reasonably

                                                15
anticipate that this particular expert would be called as a witness, he had previously been

informed that he had been charged with online solicitation and that another digital forensics

expert would be called to testify. Cf. Hamann, 428 S.W.3d at 228 (noting that although identity

of fingerprint expert was surprise to defendant, degree of disadvantage “was minimal because

[defendant] was aware that the State would call a fingerprint expert”).          Importantly, after

learning about the third witness, Webber did not ask the trial court for a continuance based on

the late designation, rendering any error harmless. Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 328 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1994); Branum, 535 S.W.3d at 226-27.

               Based on the preceding, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by allowing the third expert to testify over Webber’s objection and, therefore, overrule

Webber’s second issue on appeal. Branum, 535 S.W.3d at 227.

Indictment Amendment

               In his third issue, Webber contends either that the State tried but failed to make an

amendment to the online-solicitation indictment or that the trial court erred by allowing the State

to amend the indictment. Regarding the online-solicitation charge, the indictment originally

made the following allegations:

       Webber . . . did then and there, being a person 14 years of age or older,
       intentionally communicate over the Internet, by electronic mail, by commercial
       online service, by text message or other electronic message service or system in a
       sexually explicit manner with a minor, M.R., to wit: by video message and/or
       text messages, with the intent to arouse and gratify the sexual desire of the said
       defendant and the said minor, and the said M.R. was then and there a person 14
       years of age at the time of the commission of the said offense . . . .

               During a hearing held approximately one month before trial, Webber’s attorney

informed the trial court that the State would be amending the indictment, that the State would be

                                                16
sending him the amendment in a few days, and that he would object if he had any concerns

about the amendment. A few days before trial, the State filed a notice of intent to amend

the indictment and explained that the online-solicitation charge should be amended to allege

as follows:

       Webber . . . did then and there, being a person who is 17 years of age or older,
       with the intent to commit the offense of possession of child pornography,
       communicate over the internet, by electronic message, or through a commercial
       online service in a sexually explicit manner with a minor, M.R., and M.R. was
       younger than 17 years of age at the time . . . .

               In another pretrial hearing held the same day, the State provided the court with a

copy of the amended indictment and informed the trial court that it gave a copy of the amended

indictment to Webber’s attorney and that his attorney reviewed the document. At the hearing,

Webber’s attorney asserted that the statute serving as the basis for the charge unconstitutionally

infringes on his right to free speech but did not make any other objection. The trial court

overruled Webber’s constitutional challenge and approved the amendment to the indictment.

               On appeal, Webber notes that under the Code of Criminal Procedure an

indictment may not be amended when a defendant objects to the amendment “if the amended

indictment . . . charges the defendant with an additional or different offense or if the substantial

rights of the defendant are prejudiced.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 28.10(c). Further, Webber

notes that the phrase “different offense” means a different statutory offense. See Marks v. State,

525 S.W.3d 403, 412 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017), aff’d, 560 S.W.3d 169 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018). Building on the preceding, Webber argues that the amendment charged him

with a different offense because the original indictment made allegations based on the language

under a former version of the online-solicitation statute but that the amended indictment was

                                                17
based on the current version of the online-solicitation statute. See Tex. Pen. Code § 33.021;

Act of May 25, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1273, § 1, sec. 33.021, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 4049,

4050 (amended 2015) (“Former § 33.021”). For these reasons, Webber urges that the trial court

erred by amending the indictment over his objection. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 28.10(c).

Alternatively, Webber contends that the amendment was ineffective because it was not

interlineated on the face of the original indictment or on a photocopy of the indictment and

because the trial court did not sign an order effectuating the amendment after orally approving it.

See Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561, 565-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Further, Webber asserts that

the errors affected his substantial rights and that, therefore, this Court should reverse his online-

solicitation conviction and remand for a new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2.

               Although Webber made a constitutional objection to the online-solicitation statute

during the pretrial hearing addressing and approving the State’s proposed amendment, he did

not object on the ground that the amended indictment charged him with a different offense. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 28.01(c). Under Article 1.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a

defendant “waives and forfeits the right to object” “to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or

substance in an indictment” and “may not raise the objection on appeal” if he “does not object

to [the] defect, error, or irregularity . . . before the date on which the trial on the merits

commences.” Id. art. 1.14(b); see Jones v. State, 907 S.W.2d 850, 857 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d); see also Trevino v. State, 470 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (concluding that defendant failed to preserve complaint regarding

amendment to indictment by failing to object); Ex parte Jessep, 281 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d) (noting that “[t]he statute serves the purpose of ensuring that

                                                 18
indictment defects may be objected to and repaired pretrial but would not invalidate an otherwise

valid conviction if not raised before trial”).

                Webber’s complaint that the amendment charged him with a different offense

concerns an alleged “defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance,” and he was therefore

“required to raise an objection prior to trial.” Jones, 907 S.W.2d at 858. By failing to object

before trial to the allegedly improper amendment on the grounds presented on appeal, Webber

may not present his arguments now. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.14(b); Tex. R. App.

P. 33.1; Duffy v. State, 33 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); see also Jenkins v.

State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (recognizing that Texas law requires

defendant to object to any error in indictment before trial); Darcy v. State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 327

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (noting that preservation of error is systemic requirement on appeal);

Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (observing that reviewing

courts should not address merits of issue that has not been preserved for appeal); Babinaux v.

State, No. 01-19-00279-CR, 2020 WL 4457983, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 4,

2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that defendant failed to

preserve issue addressing “the amendment procedure used” where he did not file response to

motion to amend and did not object pretrial); Marks, 525 S.W.3d at 412 (explaining that

amendment does not charge defendant with different offense “if the amendment alters an

element of the offense charged”).

                Regarding Webber’s argument that the amendment was ineffective, Webber

asserted for the first time during the first day of trial that the amendment was improper because

no interlineations were made and because the trial court did not sign an order. Assuming that the

trial court erred by overruling the objection, see Tata v. State, 446 S.W.3d 456, 461-62 (Tex.

                                                 19
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (concluding that motion to modify indictment and

trial court granting request did not constitute amendment where no document amending

indictment was incorporated into record), we would be unable to sustain Webber’s third issue

because he was not harmed by the alleged error.

               In determining whether Webber was harmed, we must bear in mind the nature of

the alleged error. Article 28.10 allows the indictment to be amended at any time before the date

that the trial commences. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 28.10. The statute provides that the

defendant is entitled to at least ten days to respond to the proposed amendment if the defendant

requests that extension, but Webber did not request that time. See id. art. 28.10(a). Similarly, an

indictment cannot be amended over a defendant’s objection if it charges the defendant with an

additional or different offense or prejudices the defendant’s substantial rights, but Webber did

not object on those grounds. See id. art. 28.10(c). Accordingly, the alleged error is not whether

it was improper for the indictment to have been amended under Article 28.10 but whether all the

steps necessary to amend had been completed.

               Assertions that an indictment was not properly amended “are subject to harmless-

error review.” Hamann, 428 S.W.3d at 225. Those types of claims assert non-constitutional

errors for purposes of conducting a harm analysis. Id.; see Gray v. State, 159 S.W.3d 95, 98

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Any non-constitutional error “that does not affect substantial rights

must be disregarded.” Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). An error affects a substantial right “when the

error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King

v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). After looking at the record as a whole,

an appellate court must conclude that the error is harmless and uphold the conviction if it appears

the error “did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d

                                                20
410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). “The critical inquiry is whether the indictment as written

sufficiently informed the defendant of the charge against him to allow him to prepare an

adequate defense at trial and whether prosecution under the original indictment would subject the

defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime.” Hamann, 428 S.W.3d at 226.

               In this case, the original indictment identified the offense as online solicitation of

a minor, referenced the correct statutory provision governing that offense, and identified the

minor victim. Further, the indictment alleged that Webber intentionally communicated with her

in a sexually explicit manner “over the Internet, by electronic mail, by commercial online

service, by text message or other electronic message service or system.” These elements are the

same under the current version of the online-solicitation statute and the prior version forming the

basis for the original indictment. See Tex. Penal Code § 33.021(b); Former § 33.021(b).

               When asserting that his substantial rights were affected, Webber correctly points

out that the original indictment also alleged under the prior version of the online-solicitation

statute that he communicated with M.R. with the intent to arouse or gratify his or her sexual

desire rather than allege under the current statute and as in the amendment that he communicated

with her with the intent to commit the offense of possession of child pornography. Further,

Webber correctly notes that the Court of Criminal Appeals declared unconstitutional the prior

version of the statute prohibiting communication with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual

desire of the offender or victim. See Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

However, the other two indictments in this case charged Webber with possession of child

pornography, alleged the same offense date as the online-solicitation charge, and identified the

statute prohibiting the possession of child pornography. Moreover, Webber was informed of the

State’s desire and need to amend the indictment almost a month before trial, was given a copy of

                                                21
the proposed amendment days before the trial commenced, and did not request any additional

time to review the proposed amendment. Finally, the specificity in the indictment and the record

were sufficient to allow Webber to raise a double-jeopardy defense if the State attempted to try

him again for the same offense. See Tucker v. State, No. 10-17-00154-CR, 2018 WL 6543944,

at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 12, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

               In light of the preceding, the nature of the alleged error, and the record for all

three offenses, we cannot conclude that the original indictment did not provide Webber notice of

the charge against him or allow Webber to prepare a defense or that the alleged error had a

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we

conclude that Webber’s substantial rights were not affected by the alleged error and, therefore,

overrule his third issue on appeal.

Venue Instructions

               In his final issue on appeal, Webber argues that the trial court submitted erroneous

venue instructions in the jury charge for the online-solicitation count. More specifically, Webber

contends that the jury charge contained instructions under Articles 13.01 and 13.19 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure but that it should have included instructions under Article 13.25

instead because online solicitation is a crime involving a computer. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

arts. 13.01, .19, .25. Moreover, Webber asserts that he objected to the erroneous instructions and

that his conviction for online solicitation should be reversed and remanded for new trial because

he suffered some harm from the erroneous instructions. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2.

               When addressing an issue regarding an alleged jury-charge error, appellate courts

must first decide whether there is error before addressing whether the alleged error resulted in

                                                22
any harm. See Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If an appellate court

determines that there is error present in a jury charge, it must then evaluate the harm caused by

the error. See id. The amount of harm needed for a reversal depends on whether a complaint

regarding “that error was preserved in the trial court.” Swearingen v. State, 270 S.W.3d 804, 808

(Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d). If no objection was made, a reversal is warranted only if

the error “resulted in ‘egregious harm.’” See Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 278 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008) (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on

reh’g)). However, if the defendant made a timely objection, as in this case, reversal is required if

there has been “some harm.” Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743 (quoting Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171).

               The venue portion of the jury charge for the online-solicitation charge provided,

in relevant part, as follows:

       Venue is the county where the prosecution of a criminal offense is begun and
       tried. Venue is not a criminative fact and therefore not an element of the offense.
       To sustain the allegation of venue, it shall only be necessary for the State to prove
       by the preponderance of the evidence that by reason of the facts in the case, the
       county where such prosecution is carried on has venue.

       ...

       Offenses committed wholly or in part outside this State may be prosecuted in any
       county in which the offender is found or in any county in which an element of the
       offense occurs.

       If an offense has been committed within the state and it cannot readily be
       determined within which county or counties the commission took place, trial may
       be held in the county in which the defendant resides, in the county in which he is
       apprehended, or the county to which he is extradited.

               The instructions generally tracked the language from Articles 13.01 and 13.19 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 13.01, .19. Webber contends

that the jury should have instead been instructed under Article 13.25, which explains that for

                                                23
offenses under Chapter 33 of the Penal Code, including online solicitation, the defendant “may

be prosecuted in” four places: three of which Webber does not contend apply in this case and the

final place being “any county in which an individual who is a victim of the offense resides.” Id.

art. 13.25(b) (emphasis added).

                From the language of Article 13.25, Webber contends that this statute was the

proper one because the evidence at trial established that M.R. lived in Rockdale, Texas, at the

time of the offense; that the trial court could have taken judicial notice that Rockdale is in Milam

County; and that, therefore, the requirements of Article 13.25 were satisfied because the charged

offense was one under Chapter 33 of the Penal Code and because the evidence established where

M.R. resided.

                “The determination of whether one venue statute or another applies to a particular

case is a mixed question of law and fact.” Stewart v. State, 44 S.W.3d 582, 586 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2001).     “The trial court must examine the facts of the case and apply the statutory

requirements to those facts to determine” which venue statute applies. Id. “Determining which

venue statute is applicable does not involve an evaluation of credibility or demeanor”; rather,

“[i]t involves an examination of the facts as they appear on the record, and a determination of

which venue statute is proper in light of those facts.” Id. Accordingly, appellate courts review

determinations regarding which “venue statute is applicable de novo.” Id.

                The specific provision of Article 13.25 that Webber relies on was enacted by the

legislature for the purpose of addressing “situations in which a person can be victimized and feel

all the effects of certain computer crimes in a location remote from where the offender acted in

violation of the law,” such as circumstances in which an offender from another state harassed

a Texas victim online and could not be prosecuted under the other state’s law, to ensure “that

                                                24
crimes that victimized Texans could be prosecuted in Texas.” See House Comm. On Criminal

Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 222, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013).        In other words, the

provision was added “to better protect victims” by addressing offenses where a victim resides in

a different jurisdiction than the offender. See Senate Comm. On Criminal Justice, Bill Analysis,

Tex. S.B. 222, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013). Moreover, Article 13.25 uses the word “may” rather than

mandatory language when describing the four locations where prosecutions under Chapter 33 of

the Penal Code might occur, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 13.25, indicating that the statute was

designed to expand rather than limit venue options under Chapter 13 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, see Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.016(1) (explaining that use of term “‘[m]ay’ creates

discretionary authority or grants permission or a power”); see also Amador v. State, Nos. 03-16-

00681—00682-CR, 2018 WL 4844713, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 5, 2018, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (explaining that special venue statutes under Chapter 13

“expand the number of counties in which an offense may be prosecuted”).

              In this case, the investigating officers explained that the cell phone records and

information from Webber’s internet service provider did not establish Webber’s location during

the relevant times and that Webber could have been in Oklahoma or any Texas county.

However, the evidence presented at trial indicated that Webber lived in Milam County. Given

the testimony establishing that it was unclear where Webber was at the time in which the crimes

occurred, we conclude Articles 13.01 and 13.19 were proper venue statutes because they address

the proper venue when part or all of an offense occurs outside of Texas and when it is unclear

which county in Texas the offense occurred. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 13.01, .19; see

Amador, 2018 WL 4844713, at *5 (noting that article 13.19 applies where there is uncertainty

about where offense occurred). Moreover, although the evidence showed that M.R. lived in

                                               25
Rockdale, no evidence was presented establishing that Rockdale is in Milam County. In light of

the language and purpose of Article 13.25, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying

Webber’s request for an instruction under Article 13.25.

               Having determined that there was no jury-charge error, we need not address

whether Webber was harmed, and we overrule his fourth issue on appeal.

                                        CONCLUSION

               Having overruled Webber’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

judgments of conviction.

                                             __________________________________________
                                             Thomas J. Baker, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Theofanis, and Jones*

Affirmed

Filed: March 23, 2023

Do Not Publish

*Before J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice (Retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(b).

                                               26