Court Opinion

ID: 9538612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:38:19.048498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:00.180119
License: Public Domain

Mowbray, C. J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that Nevada Rock, as an occupier of open land, had no duty to keep the premises safe from entry or use by David Brannan, whose use was recreational. This holding is compelled by the plain meaning of the language contained in NRS 41.150.
I cannot agree with the majority, however, that the district court erred in refusing to admit evidence of faulty brakes and rejecting the corresponding per se negligence instruction requested by Brannan. The majority’s conclusion, though appealing in light of the dreadful injuries suffered by Brannan, contravenes basic principles of tort law.
An essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence is that there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the harm which the plaintiff has suffered. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984). This connection is dealt with by courts in terms of what usually is called “proximate cause.” Id. In determining whether an act or omission proximately caused the harm in question, our threshold inquiry is whether the act or omission constitutes a cause in “fact” of the *28harm. Id. at 264. Under this inquiry, “[a]n act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it.” Id. at 265.
In the case before us, Nevada Rock was unquestionably negligent in operating its truck without proper brakes, in violation of NRS 484.597. Yet, even if the brakes had been in the best of condition, the driver of Nevada Rock’s truck could not have stopped in time to avoid colliding with Brannan. The evidence firmly established that Brannan was traveling at an excessive speed and that he struck the rear side of the truck, some twenty-five feet from the front of the vehicle. Reasonable minds could not escape the conclusion that the cause in “fact” of the accident was not Nevada Rock’s negligence, but Brannan’s reckless operation of his motorcycle. As a matter of law, then, Nevada Rock’s negligence did not proximately cause the harm suffered by Bran-nan.
Because of the lack of any causal connection whatsoever between the faulty brakes and the accident, the evidence concerning Nevada Rock’s brake maintenance and repair practices has little probative value. See NRS 48.015. At the same time, this evidence is tremendously prejudicial to Nevada Rock’s defense. The trial court, recognizing that the scant probative value of this evidence was vastly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Nevada Rock, correctly refused to admit it at trial. See NRS 48.035.
With respect to the negligence per se instruction requested by Brannan, the district court correctly rejected the instruction unless it can be shown that Brannan presented sufficient evidence to establish that Nevada Rock’s act or omission proximately caused the accident. See Barnes v. Delta Lines, Inc., 99 Nev. 688, 669 P.2d 709 (1983). As noted above, Brannan failed to demonstrate the required causal connection. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing the instruction.
In my view, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.