Court Opinion

ID: 9965475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 16:01:30.924321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.106122
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
            C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                       ________________________

                           No. ACM 40374
                       ________________________

                         UNITED STATES
                             Appellee
                                  v.
                        Logan A. MCLEOD
            Senior Airman (E-4), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                       ________________________

       Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                         Decided 1 May 2024
                       ________________________

Military Judge: Michael A. Schrama.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 24 August 2022 by GCM convened at Max-
well Air Force Base, Alabama. Sentence entered by military judge on 15
September 2022: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 35 years, re-
duction to E-1, and a reprimand.
For Appellant: Major David L. Bosner, USAF; William E. Cassara, Es-
quire; Megan P. Marinos, Esquire.
For Appellee: Colonel Steven R. Kaufman, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel
Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel J. Pete Ferrell, USAF; Ma-
jor Olivia B. Hoff, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
JOHNSON, CADOTTE, and MASON, Appellate Military Judges.
Judge MASON delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Judge
JOHNSON and Senior Judge CADOTTE joined.
                       ________________________

   This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
   precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                      ________________________
                     United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

MASON, Judge:
    Appellant entered mixed pleas at his court-martial. A military judge sitting
as a general court-martial convicted Appellant, consistent with his pleas, of:
one specification of attempted wrongful possession of a controlled substance
(ecstasy) with an intent to distribute; one specification of attempted rape by
force; one specification of attempted kidnapping; one specification of attempted
kidnapping of a minor; one specification of attempted rape of a child; three
specifications of attempted aggravated assault by suffocation upon a person
under the age of 16; one specification of attempted production of child pornog-
raphy; and one specification of attempted distribution of child pornography, all
in violation of Article 80, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§ 880; and one specification of obstruction of justice in violation of Article 131b,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 931b.1 The military judge convicted Appellant, contrary to
his pleas, of: one specification of attempted premeditated murder; one specifi-
cation of attempted conspiracy to commit rape; one specification of attempted
conspiracy to commit kidnapping; one specification of attempted aggravated
assault by strangulation upon a person under the age of 16; one specification
of attempted aggravated assault by suffocation upon a person under the age of
16; and one specification of attempted assault upon a person under the age of
16, all in violation of Article 80, UCMJ.2 Appellant was sentenced to a dishon-
orable discharge, confinement for 35 years, reduction to the grade of E-1, and
a reprimand. The convening authority took no action on the findings or sen-
tence.
    Appellant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is legally
and factually insufficient to support the findings of guilt for attempted murder
of “Sarah”3 and attempted conspiracies to rape and kidnap AB; (2) whether the
sentences to confinement are inappropriately severe; and (3) whether the Gov-
ernment violated Appellant’s Article 10, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 810, speedy trial
right by failing to act with reasonable diligence.4

1 Unless otherwise noted, references to the UCMJ are to the Manual for Courts-Mar-

tial, United States (2019 ed.).
2 Appellant was acquitted of one specification of attempted wrongful possession of a

controlled substance (Xanax) with intent to distribute and two specifications of at-
tempted assault upon a person under the age of 16, all in violation of Article 80, UCMJ.
3 “Sarah” was a fictional name used by law enforcement as explained in the Background

section below.
4 Appellant raises the third issue pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431

(C.M.A. 1982).

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                   United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

    We have carefully considered Appellant’s allegation of error that he was
denied a speedy trial pursuant to Article 10, UCMJ, and find it does not require
discussion or relief. See United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 361 (C.M.A.
1987).
   Though not specifically raised by the parties, the court notes that the sen-
tence entered for Specification 10 of the Additional Charge, attempted assault
consummated by a battery upon a child under the age of 16, includes a confine-
ment term of five years running concurrent to all charges and specifications.
However, the maximum lawful confinement term for this offense was two
years. As discussed below, we have reassessed the sentence. Regarding the re-
maining issues, we find no error that materially prejudiced Appellant’s sub-
stantial rights, and we affirm the findings and modified sentence.

                                I. BACKGROUND
    In 2017, JO met BM online and they became friends. In January 2020, the
two decided to start dating; BM was Appellant’s wife at the time. BM had an
open relationship with Appellant, meaning that they both could see other peo-
ple romantically. JO had a similar relationship with her husband in New York.
In June 2020, JO came to visit BM in Montgomery, Alabama. JO met Appellant
while staying at his and BM’s home. During her week-long visit, JO and Ap-
pellant engaged in sexual relations.
    In September 2020, BM went to New York to visit JO. The visit did not go
well. BM alleged that JO’s husband sexually assaulted her and BM stopped
talking to JO shortly thereafter. About a month later, Appellant text messaged
JO about getting BM’s watch returned and JO responded. Within a day or two,
their text message conversation turned sexual. They continued to talk through
text messages until 27 July 2021, at which time Appellant raised the topics of
domination and submissive sex with a particular person. JO responded, “That
sounds like a lot of fun honestly.” Appellant said, “This is why you need to be
my kidnap partner. Lol.” Appellant asked JO about kidnapping and whether
she would kidnap her own sister. Appellant then stated, “Also, honestly, my
ideal kidnap victim would be 14-15.” When asked if he would rape them, Ap-
pellant said, “Raping them is half the fun[.] The fear in their eyes, their tears,
the muffled screams, their useless struggles[.] Taping their mouth and nose
shut to watch them panic.” After seeing this, JO reported Appellant to the Air
Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI).
    On 5 August 2021, following a telephone interview, Special Agent JP and
another special agent met with JO in New York. Special Agent JP began mon-
itoring JO’s and Appellant’s text messaging and he advised her to keep talking
to Appellant to see where it led.

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                  United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

    Appellant and JO continued to exchange messages. They exchanged hun-
dreds of text messages over the next six weeks. During these conversations,
Appellant spoke continuously about wanting to kidnap and rape someone. Sev-
eral of the earlier conversations were focused on determining their victim. JO
eventually stated that she knew someone, her friend, AB. JO sent Appellant a
picture of AB and after some discussion, Appellant and JO agreed AB would
be their targeted victim. They agreed JO would come to Montgomery, Alabama,
on 18 September 2021 with AB and they would kidnap and rape her for about
ten days before sending AB to JO’s home where AB would serve as JO’s sex
slave.
    The planning of AB’s kidnapping and rape dominated the conversations
between Appellant and JO, and Appellant discussed with extensive detail how
he was going to commit these offenses. They also talked about the logistics of
where to keep AB while she and JO were in Alabama and how to secure her.
They discussed which restraints to use and how to use them. They ultimately
decided that they would hold AB captive in an Airbnb lodging house. Appellant
instructed JO to make the reservation and paid her $230.00 so she could do so.
    As the days moved closer to 18 September 2021, Appellant incessantly de-
tailed how he would rape AB and how excited he was to rape her. While dis-
cussing this, he and JO also discussed the possibility of kidnapping a child or
a child and mother together so they could rape them. Appellant described with
considerable specificity how he wanted to kidnap and rape a child and mother
together, and then kill the mother in the presence of the child. Appellant and
JO discussed logistics and details about how to make this a reality. JO stated
that she had prior contacts. After some exchanges, she put Appellant in touch
with a contact whom Appellant believed was a sex trafficker. Appellant and
the sex trafficker made a deal where Appellant would pay the trafficker to de-
liver a mother and a 14-year-old girl to the Airbnb house where they would
remain for about two weeks. As it became clear that Appellant and JO were
going to be able to kidnap and rape a mother and child and keep them at the
Airbnb beginning on 18 September 2021, Appellant decided not to follow
through on their initial plan of kidnapping and raping AB.
    On 10 September 2021, Appellant met the person he believed was the sex
trafficker and paid a down payment of $150.00 for the mother and child, “Sa-
rah” and “Caitlin,” respectively.
    The conversations continued between Appellant and JO but shifted focus
to the logistics and details of how they would commit these crimes against “Sa-
rah” and “Caitlin,” the names of the mother and child respectively according to
the sex trafficker. All along, this sex trafficker was being portrayed by a law
enforcement agent and there never a was real “Sarah” or “Caitlin.” Appellant,
not aware of the fictitious personas at this time, continued to discuss with

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                     United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

specificity how he would kidnap, restrain, torture, and rape the two. He
planned to rape the child, “Caitlin,” daily while she was his captive, record each
rape, and provide the recordings to the sex trafficker as additional compensa-
tion. He also planned to sell the recordings for additional monies to offset what
he and JO had already invested in travel and related expenses.5 Appellant also
planned to murder “Sarah.” In multiple messages to JO, he expressed a desire
to rape and kill a mother in the presence of her child. Specific to “Sarah,” Ap-
pellant said that he would “snuff” her, meaning suffocate her to death in the
presence of “Caitlin.”
    On 18 September 2021, JO arrived in Montgomery, Alabama, and she met
with law enforcement upon arrival. JO was instructed to call Appellant and
pretend that “Sarah” and “Caitlin” were escaping after they were dropped off
by the sex trafficker. JO made the call to Appellant. Shortly thereafter, Appel-
lant drove to the Airbnb where he was apprehended by law enforcement. In
the trunk of Appellant’s car, law enforcement found chains, tape, glue, and
plastic bags.

                                   II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency
    1. Law
  We review issues of legal and factual sufficiency de novo. United States v.
Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citations omitted).
    “The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Robinson, 77 M.J. 294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (quoting United States
v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2017)). “The term reasonable doubt, how-
ever, does not mean that the evidence must be free from conflict.” United States
v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (citing United States v.
Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684 (A.F.C.M.R. 1986)), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
“[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound to draw every rea-
sonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.”
United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omitted).
As a result, “[t]he standard for legal sufficiency involves a very low threshold
to sustain a conviction.” United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019)

5 These expenses included, amongst others, drugs to help keep the victims under con-

trol; a camera to record the child rapes; chains, padlocks, and a straitjacket to restrain
the mother and child; tape to “mummify” the mother and child; superglue to use on
their lips and nose clips to inhibit breathing; and a mask to hide Appellant’s identity.

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                     United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

(alteration in original) (citation omitted). The test for legal sufficiency “gives
full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.” United States v. Oliver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2011)
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1973)).
    The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 significantly
changed how Courts of Criminal Appeal conduct factual sufficiency reviews.
Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 542, 134 Stat. 3388, 3611–13 (1 Jan. 2021). “Congress
undoubtedly altered the factual sufficiency standard in amending the statute,
making it more difficult for a [C]ourt of [C]riminal [A]ppeals to overturn a con-
viction for factual sufficiency.” United States v. Harvey, 83 M.J. 685, 691 (N.M.
Ct. Crim. App. 2023), rev. granted, ___ M.J.___, No. 23-0239, 2024 CAAF
LEXIS 13 (C.A.A.F. 10 Jan. 2024). Previously, the test for factual sufficiency
required the court, after weighing the evidence in the record of trial and mak-
ing allowances for not having personally observed the witnesses, to be con-
vinced of the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before it could affirm
the finding. United States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2000). “In conduct-
ing this unique appellate role, we [took] ‘a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’
applying ‘neither a presumption of innocence nor a presumption of guilt’ to
‘make [our] own independent determination as to whether the evidence consti-
tutes proof of each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Wheeler, 76
M.J. at 568 (second alteration in original) (quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at
399).6
    The current version of Article 66(B)(i), UCMJ, states:
        (i) In an appeal of a finding of guilty under subsection (b), the
        Court may consider whether the finding is correct in fact upon a
        request of the accused if the accused makes a specific showing of
        a deficiency of proof.
        (ii) After an accused has made a showing, the Court may weigh
        the evidence and determine controverted questions of fact sub-
        ject to—

6 The court is mindful that there are contours of the new factual sufficiency review

standard that arguably could impact applications of the rule as discussed by our sister
service courts. See United States v. Coe, __ M.J. __, 2024 CCA LEXIS 52, at *15 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. 1 Feb. 2024) (en banc); Harvey, 83 M.J. at 685. These contours are not
dispositive in this particular case as the evidence does not make determination of fac-
tual sufficiency a close call for any of the specifications at issue. Even if we applied our
previous factual sufficiency review standard, we would not grant relief as we ourselves
are convinced of Appellant’s guilt of each of the specifications at issue beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.

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                   United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

           (I) appropriate deference to the fact that the trial court saw
           and heard the witnesses and other evidence; and
           (II) appropriate deference to findings of fact entered into the
           record by the military judge.
       (iii) If, as a result of the review conducted under clause (ii), the
       Court is clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against
       the weight of the evidence, the Court may dismiss, set aside, or
       modify the finding, or affirm a lesser finding.
10 U.S.C. § 866(B)(i) (Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2024 ed.)
(2024 MCM)).
     Appellant was convicted of attempted premeditated murder of “Sarah,”
which required the Government to prove the following elements beyond a rea-
sonable doubt: (1) that Appellant did a certain overt act; (2) that such act was
done with the specific intent to kill “Sarah” by means of suffocating her; that
is, to kill without justification or excuse; (3) that such act amounted to more
than mere preparation, that is, it was a substantial step and a direct movement
toward the unlawful killing of “Sarah;” (4) that such act apparently tended to
bring about the commission of the offense of premeditated murder; that is, the
act apparently would have resulted in the actual commission of the offense of
premeditated murder except for a circumstance unknown to Appellant or an
unexpected intervening circumstance which prevented completion of that of-
fense; and (5) that at the time Appellant committed the act alleged, he had the
premeditated design to kill “Sarah.” See Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (2019 ed.) (2019 MCM), pt. IV, ¶¶ 4.b, 56.b.(1)(a); see also Military
Judges’ Benchbook, Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-9 at 1007–08 (29 Feb.
2020).
     Appellant was convicted of attempted conspiracy to rape AB, which re-
quired the Government to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable
doubt: (1) that Appellant did a certain act, that is: provide funding for a lodging
rental; (2) that the act was done with specific intent to commit the offense of
conspiracy to rape; (3) that the act amounted to more than preparation, that
is, it was a substantial step and a direct movement toward the commission of
the intended offense; (4) that such act apparently tended to bring about the
commission of the offense of conspiracy to rape, that is, the act apparently
would have resulted in the actual commission of the offense of conspiracy to
rape except for a circumstance unknown to Appellant or an unexpected inter-
vening circumstance which prevented completion of the offense. See 2019
MCM, pt. IV, ¶¶ 4.b, 5.b.(1); see also Benchbook, at 1003–04.
   Appellant was convicted of attempted conspiracy to kidnap AB, which re-
quired the Government to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable

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                   United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

doubt: (1) that Appellant did a certain act, that is, provide funding for a lodging
rental; (2) that the act was done with specific intent to commit the offense of
conspiracy to kidnap; (3) that the act amounted to more than preparation, that
is, it was a substantial step and a direct movement toward the commission of
the intended offense; and (4) that such act apparently tended to bring about
the commission of the offense of conspiracy to kidnap, that is, the act appar-
ently would have resulted in the actual commission of the offense of conspiracy
to kidnap except for a circumstance unknown to Appellant or an unexpected
intervening circumstance which prevented completion of the offense. See 2019
MCM, pt. IV, ¶¶ 4.b, 5.b.(1); see also Benchbook, at 1003–04.
   Voluntary abandonment may be applicable in an alleged attempt offense.
       It is a defense to an attempt offense that the person voluntarily
       and completely abandoned the intended crime, solely because of
       the person’s own sense that it was wrong, prior to the completion
       of the crime. The voluntary abandonment defense is not allowed
       if the abandonment results, in whole or in part, from other rea-
       sons, for example, the person feared detection or apprehension,
       decided to await a better opportunity for success, was unable to
       complete the crime, or encountered unanticipated difficulties or
       unexpected resistance. . . .
2019 MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 4.c.(4).
   2. Attempted Murder of “Sarah”
    Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of his conviction for
attempted premeditated murder of “Sarah.” He specifically alleges the evi-
dence was insufficient to prove a specific intent to kill or that he committed an
overt act.
       a. Additional Background
     Appellant sent several messages to JO discussing “snuffing”7 their victim.
He wanted to rape two victims together and while doing so, suffocate and kill
one of them. He talked about this in terms of two sisters or a mother and
daughter. He referred to this desire generally and to various specific individu-
als. After settling on AB as their victim-to-be, Appellant and JO discussed the
possibility of “snuffing” AB when they were done with her. Appellant clarified
later that his intention with regard to killing AB was that they would do that
“[i]f that’s the only option.”

7 The context of the messages makes it abundantly clear that when Appellant said

“snuffing” he meant killing someone.

                                        8
                   United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

    When the plan to kidnap and rape “Sarah” and “Caitlin” became concrete
and not just conceptualized, on 4 September 2021 Appellant advised the sex
trafficker, “I have something really [messed] up in mind if you need the mother
gone. But while I’m up for snuff, just know that I do not have any experience
with disposal.” The next day, the conversation continued on disposal of a dead
body. Appellant clarified that he would take care of “Sarah.” Specifically, he
would suffocate her as not to “make any kind of mess.”
     Around 0030 on 8 September 2021, Appellant and JO were discussing spe-
cifics about their plans to rape “Sarah” and “Caitlin.” Appellant said, “This is
their first time sharing a client. And their last.”
   On 8–9 September 2021, Appellant sent JO the following messages:
       2351: I can’t do this
       2353: I don’t know what . . . I’ve been thinking lately but I think
       I need to get help. Don’t say anything to [the sex trafficker] yet
       because I’m afraid of what he’ll do.
       2357: Is he gonna kill me for backing out?
       ....
       0000: I think we should back out. Just don’t say anything to [the
       sex trafficker] yet.
   After sending these messages to JO, he asked to see the text messages be-
tween her and the sex trafficker. After reading their messages, he told JO,
“Okay that made me feel a lot better.” A few minutes later, he told JO that she
sent the sex trafficker the wrong address to the Airbnb house they reserved
and added, “[M]ake sure he knows that for the drop.”
   Later that same day, Appellant and JO talked on the phone. The call was
recorded. During that conversation, Appellant told JO that he only sent those
messages so he would “have it on the record in case this was a . . . cop setup,
basically.”
     Over the next several days, Appellant and JO continued to discuss the spe-
cifics of their plan. On 16 September 2021, Appellant and JO discussed using
drugs to subdue “Sarah” and “Caitlin.” JO asked Appellant on whom they
should use the drugs. Appellant responded, “Mostly the mother. But [‘Caitlin’]
after we off her mother. She’ll probably need it.” JO asked, “[A]re we still snuff-
ing her the night before I have to leave?” Appellant said, “Yes. Is that al-
right[?]” JO then stated, “Yeah just checking! U said [‘Caitlin’] woulda need it
and I didn’t know how long we were planning on keeping her after we kill her
mom. . . .”

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                  United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

       b. Analysis
    The record demonstrates that Appellant formed the requisite specific in-
tent to kill “Sarah” no later than 8 September 2021. Appellant claims that he
did not have the specific intent to kill her and that all his talk about this was
merely fantasy. The context of the text messages with JO simply do not support
that conclusion. While it is arguable that there are some specific exchanges
that seem to be geared towards sexual gratification of Appellant and JO, there
are many exchanges that are just discussions of logistics of their plan to kid-
nap, rape, and torture these victims and to murder “Sarah.” As such, the con-
text of the messages taken together does not support that Appellant was
merely engaging in fantasy. Rather, he had the specific intent to kill “Sarah.”
    Moreover, the recorded phone calls between Appellant and JO were not
sexually charged in any way. Rather, the tone, tenor, and pace of the conver-
sations about the logistics of committing these crimes were as innocuous as
would be expected in a conversation between to two people planning a Sunday
barbeque. There is nothing about these conversations that support a conclusion
that Appellant’s assertions about killing “Sarah” were merely fantasy.
    Further, Appellant’s text message exchanges with the sex trafficker regard-
ing killing “Sarah” were also not merely fantasy as he now alleges. In fact, the
conversation was not sexually charged at all. Considering all the circum-
stances of this case, we find no merit in Appellant’s argument that the asser-
tions made to the sex trafficker were merely fantasy. Instead, the record con-
clusively demonstrates that these assertions were manifestations of his crimi-
nal, specific intent to kill “Sarah.”
   Appellant refers to the 8–9 September 2021 text message exchange, quoted
supra, arguing he did not have the specific intent to kill “Sarah.” However, his
own words categorically refute this argument. He wanted a “record” of his in-
tent to back out of the endeavor in case it was a “cop setup.” Unbeknownst to
him, however, he was being recorded on the phone where he admitted that
such messages were essentially false.
    As late as 16 September 2021, there is clear proof that Appellant intended
to kill “Sarah.” He directly agreed that they would be “snuffing” her the night
before JO returned home. This statement is also consistent with the other ref-
erences reflected in the messages about what he would do with the mother/vic-
tim when he was done with her.
    In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his in-
tent to kill, he also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he engaged
in an overt act. The Government did not charge a specific overt act or acts for
this offense, nor were they required to. See United States v. Norwood, 71 M.J.
204, 206–08 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (citing United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S.

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                     United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

102, 107 (2007)).8 However, the record is replete with evidence of Appellant’s
overt acts, including but not limited to: Appellant’s payment for the Airbnb,
providing money to JO to help with her travel to Montgomery, as well as the
fact that he traveled to the Airbnb where he believed JO, “Sarah,” and “Caitlin”
were located. Each act amounted to more than mere preparation and appar-
ently tended to effect the commission of the intended offense. See 2019 MCM,
pt. IV, ¶ 4.c.(2). If not for the fact that “Sarah” was not a real person, but a
creation of law enforcement, and if not for Appellant being apprehended at the
intended crime scene, the evidence demonstrates that the alleged offense was
intended to have been completed. See 2019 MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 4.c.(3).
   Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the
military judge rationally found Appellant guilty of attempted premeditated
murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the finding is legally sufficient.
See Robinson, 77 M.J. at 297–98.
    Regarding the factual sufficiency of this offense, Appellant has made a re-
quest for a factual sufficiency review and has asserted a specific showing of a
deficiency of proof. However, having given appropriate deference to the fact
that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and other evidence, the court
is not clearly convinced that the finding of guilty was against the weight of the
evidence. Thus, the finding is factually sufficient. Article 66(B)(i), UCMJ (2024
MCM).
    3. Attempted Conspiracy to Kidnap and Rape AB
    Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of his convictions for
attempted conspiracies to kidnap and rape AB. He specifically alleges the evi-
dence was insufficient to prove that he intended to commit these offenses, that
he committed an overt act, or that he did not voluntarily abandon the at-
tempted conspiracy.
    Appellant argues first, as he did regarding the premeditated murder spec-
ification, that his statements were merely fantasies and that he did not believe
his fantasy would be realized. However, the evidence shows he had more than
just mere fantasies about committing these offenses. Rather, he had the spe-
cific intent to kidnap and rape AB. Moreover, he took specific steps to make
that intent reality. He encouraged JO to make arrangements to get AB to come
to Montgomery. When JO did, he saw AB’s messages and proceeded to make
detailed logistical preparations for her arrival. Throughout hundreds of pages
of text messages, Appellant expressed an unwavering intent to commit these

8 Appellant did not raise at trial or here on appeal any allegation of a deficient specifi-

cation or lack of notice regarding the nature of this offense, nor did he raise any concern
regarding which overt act(s) formed the basis of the offense.

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                   United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

crimes. As noted above, the context of these messages dispels any lack of clarity
about this being intent rather than being mere fantasy.
    Appellant argues next the record is not clear that Appellant actually paid
JO for the Airbnb lodging reservation and therefore the evidence is not suffi-
cient to prove the alleged overt act, that Appellant “provided funding for a lodg-
ing rental.” The record demonstrates after discussing different locations for
committing the offenses against AB, Appellant and JO talked about which
Airbnb location to reserve for holding AB captive. Appellant picked one and
sent JO a picture with the website link. JO asked, “So do u want me to book
this now?” Appellant responded, “As long as you’re absolutely sure you can do
this.” JO stated, “Bet. I’ll reserve it now,” and asked Appellant to cover the
$230.00 downpayment. Appellant said, “Yeah I can send you $230 right now[.]
Will you be bringing any restraints?” JO discussed the timing of the reserva-
tion payment and told Appellant, “[W]e definitely should book now so it doesn’t
get snagged.” Appellant responded, “Yeah[,] go ahead and book it and then I’ll
send you the money, if you absolutely need it now. . . .” JO told Appellant, “I
just paid the 230. . . .” and gave Appellant her Venmo name so he could send
her the money.
    On 4 August 2021, Appellant paid JO $230.00 using Venmo and sent JO a
screenshot showing the payment. Immediately before and after he sent this
screenshot, Appellant sent pictures of the inside of their Airbnb reservation
commenting about which room would be the best to keep AB confined.
    Our superior court has recognized that in cases of attempt, travel can con-
stitute a substantial step. United States v. Winckelmann, 70 M.J. 403, 407
(C.A.A.F. 2011) (citations omitted). In analyzing an attempted larceny convic-
tion, our superior court noted it had “recognized that a substantial step could
be comprised of something as benign as travel, arranging a meeting, or making
hotel reservations.” United States v. Hale, 78 M.J. 268, 272 (C.A.A.F. 2019)
(footnote omitted) (citing Winckelmann, 70 M.J. at 407). Here, Appellant, with
the specific, expressed intent to kidnap and rape AB, made lodging arrange-
ments through his co-conspirator to facilitate the commission of these offenses.
He specifically paid $230.00 to JO for this purpose. The evidence is legally and
factually sufficient to prove an overt act was committed as alleged.
    Lastly, Appellant argues that the defense of voluntary abandonment ap-
plied to these offenses. We disagree. The defense of voluntary abandonment
only applies when,
       the person voluntarily and completely abandoned the intended
       crime, solely because of the person’s own sense that it was
       wrong, prior to the completion of the crime. The voluntary aban-
       donment defense is not allowed if the abandonment results, in

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                    United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

        whole or in part, from other reasons, for example, the person
        feared detection or apprehension, decided to await a better op-
        portunity for success, was unable to complete the crime, or en-
        countered unanticipated difficulties or unexpected re-
        sistance. . . .
2019 MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 4.c.(4); see also United States v. Feliciano, 76 M.J. 237,
240 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (reciting the same definition of voluntary abandonment).
Here, Appellant’s own sense that kidnapping and raping AB was wrong was
not the primary or even sole reason he abandoned these offenses. Quite to the
contrary, his abandonment was due to his desire to commit those and more
severe offenses against others whom he considered to be more appealing vic-
tims. After he made the decision to pursue these more appealing victims in-
stead of AB, Appellant noted, AB “will never know the bullet she dodged.”9
   Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the
military judge rationally found Appellant guilty of attempted conspiracy to kid-
nap AB and attempted conspiracy to rape AB beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, the findings are legally sufficient. See Robinson, 77 M.J. at 297–98.
    Regarding the factual sufficiency of attempted conspiracy to kidnap and
rape AB, Appellant has made a request for a factual sufficiency review and has
asserted a specific showing of a deficiency of proof. However, having given ap-
propriate deference to the fact that the trial court saw and heard the witnesses
and other evidence, this court is not clearly convinced that the findings of guilty
were against the weight of the evidence. Thus, the findings are factually suffi-
cient. See Article 66(B)(i), UCMJ, (2024 MCM).
B. Sentence Appropriateness
    1. Law
    We review sentence appropriateness de novo. United States v. Lane, 64
M.J. 1, 2 n.8 (C.A.A.F. 2006). “We assess sentence appropriateness by consid-
ering the particular appellant, the nature and seriousness of the offenses, the
appellant’s record of service, and all matters contained in the record . . . .”
United States v. Fields, 74 M.J. 619, 625 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (citations
omitted). We must also be sensitive to considerations of uniformity and even-
handedness. United States v. Sothen, 54. M.J. 294, 296 (C.A.A.F. 2001). While
we have significant discretion in determining whether a particular sentence is

9 Though Appellant abandoned kidnapping and raping AB at that time, he did not fore-

close the possibility of kidnapping and selling her to the sex trafficker later, saying,
“No [AB] for now. He’s not comfortable enough with me yet.”

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                  United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

appropriate, we are not authorized to engage in exercises of clemency. United
States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 148 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
   When conducting our review, we not only consider the appropriateness of
the entire sentence, but also “must consider the appropriateness of each seg-
ment of a segmented sentence.” United States v. Flores, __ M.J. __, No. 23-0198,
2024 CAAF LEXIS 162, at *7 (C.A.A.F. 14 Mar. 2024).
    The President set forth the maximum punishment for an assault consum-
mated by a battery upon a child under 16 years as: Dishonorable discharge,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for two years. See 2019
MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 77.d.(2)(f). An attempt to commit this offense shared the same
maximum punishment. See 2019 MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 4.d.
   Where the imposed sentence exceeded the maximum lawful sentence, it
materially prejudiced Appellant’s substantial rights. United States v. Beaty, 70
M.J. 39, 45 (C.A.A.F. 2011). In those circumstances, this court may authorize
a rehearing on sentence or if we can, we may reassess the sentence. United
States v. Doss, 57 M.J. 182, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
    We have broad discretion first to decide whether to reassess a sentence,
and then to arrive at a reassessed sentence. United States v. Winckelmann, 73
M.J. 11, 12 (C.A.A.F. 2013). In deciding whether to reassess a sentence or re-
turn a case for a rehearing, we consider the totality of the circumstances in-
cluding the following factors: (1) “Dramatic changes in the penalty landscape
and exposure;” (2) “Whether an appellant chose sentencing by members or a
military judge alone;” (3) “Whether the nature of the remaining offenses cap-
ture[s] the gravamen of criminal conduct included within the original offenses
and . . . whether significant or aggravating circumstances addressed at the
court-martial remain admissible and relevant to the remaining offenses;” and
(4) “Whether the remaining offenses are of the type that judges of the courts of
criminal appeals should have the experience and familiarity with to reliably
determine what sentence would have been imposed at trial.” Id. at 15–16 (ci-
tations omitted).
    If we cannot determine that the sentence would have been at least of a
certain magnitude, we must order a rehearing. United States v. Harris, 53 M.J.
86, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
   2. Analysis
    In undertaking analysis of the appropriateness of Appellant’s sentence, we
revisit the full scope of his criminal endeavors in this case. Appellant at-
tempted to conspire with JO to kidnap and rape AB by baiting her into an all-
expense paid trip to Montgomery to visit JO’s “friend.” Upon arrival, AB would
be restrained, held captive inside an Airbnb house modified to make it “sound-
proof” with blankets and rugs, and repeatedly raped. When discussing these

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                  United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

intended actions, Appellant stated, “I’m really going to enjoy raping her and
watching her cry.” Later, he said, “I can’t wait to hear her muffled screams.”
He intended to keep AB in this condition for ten days before sending her back
with JO to New York where AB was to be in a collar and leash, and serve as a
permanent sex slave to JO as well as Appellant when he visited JO.
    Appellant’s disturbing crimes did not stop with AB. Appellant attempted
to kidnap a mother and her 14-year-old daughter with the intent of holding
them captive at first separately, then together. He planned to subdue them
using ecstasy and rape them repeatedly. With regards to “Caitlin,” whom he
believed to be a 14-year-old girl, he planned to restrain her using various mech-
anisms, including a straitjacket, and rape her every day for ten days. He
planned to record these offenses and sell them to a person he believed to be a
sex trafficker for compensation. He also planned to torture her using a variety
of terrible methods centered on impeding her breathing. All the while, he an-
ticipated deriving gratification from her suffering.
   In addition to raping “Sarah,” who he believed to be the mother of “Caitlin,”
he planned and attempted to murder her. His plan was to tie “Sarah” and
“Caitlin” together, and rape “Sarah” while simultaneously suffocating her. He
wanted “Caitlin” to watch as “Sarah” died. He then intended to ejaculate into
“Sarah’s” “empty husk.” After he was finished, Appellant intended for “Sarah’s”
dead body to remain tied to “Caitlin” for hours to further torment her.
    Before arriving on 18 September 2021 at the reserved Airbnb house, Ap-
pellant procured several of the items needed to commit these offenses, includ-
ing restraining mechanisms and a mask. He communicated to JO that she
should bring other items. He also told JO to delete her text messages because
he knew they were incriminating.
   For his crimes, Appellant was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, 35
years of confinement (consisting of multiple segments that ran concurrent to
the segment of 35 years of confinement for attempted premeditated murder),
reduction to the grade of E-1, and a reprimand.
    The depravity demonstrated by Appellant is rarely seen in the military jus-
tice system. He argues there were no real victims because AB was not harmed,
and “Sarah” and “Caitlin” were fictitious. While it is true “Sarah” and “Caitlin”
were not real people, the salient fact is that Appellant did not know that. As
Appellant himself expressed during his guilty plea inquiry, “I was unaware
until after my apprehension that ‘Sarah’ was a fictional person.” The evidence
demonstrates Appellant attempted to commit these crimes on real people and
his sentence is not inappropriately severe regardless of the fact that “Sarah”
and “Caitlin” were not real. During the sentencing phase of the trial, Appellant

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                  United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

presented testimony from his parents, a written and verbal unsworn state-
ment, and various photos.
    We have assessed the appropriateness of Appellant’s sentence, considered
this particular appellant, the nature and seriousness of the offenses, his record
of service, and all matters contained in the record, including his childhood
abuse. As a whole, Appellant’s sentence is not inappropriately severe.
    This does not end our inquiry, however. We are also charged with reviewing
each segment of the sentence to ensure its lawfulness and appropriateness. We
note that this review revealed that Appellant’s sentence for Specification 10 of
the Additional Charge, attempted assault consummated by a battery upon a
child under the age of 16, included a confinement term of five years—an un-
lawful confinement term as the maximum allowable for this offense was two
years. As the imposed sentence for this segment exceeded the maximum lawful
sentence, it materially prejudiced Appellant’s substantial rights. Beaty, 70
M.J. at 45. Thus, we may order a rehearing or, if we can, reassess the sentence.
    We are able to reassess the sentence. The military judge sentenced Appel-
lant for his various attempted aggravated assaults and the attempted assault
consummated by a battery upon a child under the age of 16 offense to be be-
tween three and five years of confinement for each. That he sentenced Appel-
lant to the higher end of that range for this offense indicates that he viewed
this offense as relatively severe compared to those other offenses. Viewing the
evidence in the case, this is unsurprising. The details of Appellant’s attempt to
assault a 14-year-old child in this manner stands out as particularly aggravat-
ing in a case already quite severe in nature. Considering all the matters of
record, we are confident that the military judge would have adjudged the max-
imum term of two years of confinement running concurrently with all charges
and specifications. We therefore reassess the sentence to reflect that confine-
ment term.
    With the sentence modified, we revisit the appropriateness of the sentence,
including each segment of the modified sentence. After carefully considering
the particular appellant, the nature and seriousness of the offenses, his record
of service, and all matters contained in the record, Appellant’s sentence is not
inappropriately severe.

                               III. CONCLUSION
    The findings as entered are correct in law and fact. We reassess the sen-
tence to confinement for Specification 10 of the Additional Charge to two years,
to run concurrently with all charges and specifications. The remaining seg-
ments of the sentence are unchanged. The findings and sentence, as reas-
sessed, are correct in law and fact, and no additional error materially

                                       16
                  United States v. McLeod, No. ACM 40374

prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles 59(a) and
66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the findings and sen-
tence, as reassessed, are AFFIRMED.

                    FOR THE COURT

                    CAROL K. JOYCE
                    Clerk of the Court

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