Court Opinion

ID: 9449259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 14:09:04.385338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:56.751877
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0219-ME

BRIAN STRONG                                                        APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE THOMAS A. RAUF, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 18-D-00426-003

KRYSTALANNE N. GARY                                                   APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND KAREM, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Brian Strong appeals from the Kenton Circuit Court’s order

denying his petition for an Interpersonal Protection Order (“IPO”) under Kentucky

Revised Statute (“KRS”) Chapter 456. Finding no error, we affirm.

             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

            On December 27, 2022, Strong filed a petition for an IPO against

Krystalanne Gary. In the petition, Strong alleged that Gary had come to his

residence uninvited and had thrown a brick into his window, breaking the window.
In the petition, Strong indicated that he “would like relief of harassment and

stalking and property damage.”

              The circuit court held a hearing on Strong’s petition on January 18,

2023. Strong was present at the hearing with counsel, but Gary was not.

Unfortunately, this Court has not been provided with either a recorded copy or

transcript of the hearing. We are required to assume missing portions of a record

support the decision of the trial court. Smith v. Smith, 450 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Ky.

App. 2014).

              After the hearing, the circuit court entered its findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and order on February 3, 2023. The court made the following

findings:

              1. [Strong] filed a Petition for an [IPO] on December 27, 2022.

              2. [Strong] stated that he and [Gary] were friends in the past.

              3. On December 18, 2022, [Gary] came to [Strong’s] residence.

                 [Strong] states that he had been experiencing a family crisis and

                 did not wish to speak with [Gary]. [Gary] then left the residence.

              4. At some point on December 18, 2022, [Gary] returned to

                 [Strong’s] residence at which time [Strong] states that she threw a

                 brick through his window, breaking the window in the process.

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            5. [Strong] called the police. The police arrived and assessed the

               situation. Approximately 30 minutes later, [Gary] returned to the

               residence at which time the police arrested her.

            6. [Strong] states that a “couple days” after the incident in which

               [Gary] threw the brick, she returned to his residence, knocking on

               his door.

            7. [Strong] indicates that if he is not granted protection, he thinks

               [Gary] will continue returning to his residence.

            The circuit court ultimately dismissed Strong’s petition, finding that

he had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Gary’s acts rose to the

level of stalking under Kentucky law. This appeal followed.

                                   ANALYSIS

            As a preliminary matter, we note that Gary did not file an appellee

brief. As stated in Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 31(H)(3):

            If the appellee’s brief has not been filed within the time
            allowed, the court may: (a) accept the appellant’s
            statement of the facts and issues as correct; (b) reverse
            the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to
            sustain such action; or (c) regard the appellee’s failure as
            a confession of error and reverse the judgment without
            considering the merits of the case.

See also former Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 76.12(8)(c)

(substantially similar to RAP 31(H)(3), which took effect on January 1, 2023).

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However, this Court also has the discretion to decline to exercise any of the options

listed in RAP 31(H)(3). See Roberts v. Bucci, 218 S.W.3d 395, 396 (Ky. App.

2007) (declining options in CR 76.12(8)(c)).

             In this case, we do not specifically elect any of the options provided in

RAP 31(H)(3).

             a. Standard of Review

             We review the circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error. Gomez

v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008) (domestic violence (“DVO”)

appeal). See also Smith v. Doe, 627 S.W.3d 903, 908 (Ky. 2021) (noting statutes

governing IPO and DVO proceedings are interpreted similarly). Findings are not

clearly erroneous if they “are supported by substantial evidence.” Moore v. Asente,

110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted). In our review of an IPO, “the

test is not whether we would have decided it differently, but whether the findings

of the trial judge were clearly erroneous or that he abused his discretion.” Cherry

v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982) (citation omitted). “Abuse of

discretion occurs when a court’s decision is unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary or

capricious.” Castle v. Castle, 567 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation

omitted).

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              b. Discussion

              Entry of an IPO is proper if, following a hearing, “a court finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that dating violence and abuse, sexual assault, or

stalking has occurred and may again occur[.]” KRS 456.060(1). Evidence meets

the preponderance of the evidence standard “when sufficient evidence establishes

that the alleged victim was more likely than not” a victim of dating violence and

abuse, sexual assault, or stalking. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d at 842 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

              Kentucky’s relevant stalking statute states that:

              A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when
              he intentionally:

                  (a) Stalks another person; and

                  (b) Makes an explicit or implicit threat with the intent
                      to place that person in reasonable fear of:

                     1. Sexual contact as defined in KRS 510.010;

                     2. Physical injury; or

                     3. Death.

KRS 508.150(1).

              Moreover, the term “stalk” as used in the foregoing statute is defined

as follows:

              (1)(a) To “stalk” means to engage in an intentional
              course of conduct:

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                   1. Directed at a specific person or persons;

                   2. Which seriously alarms, annoys, intimidates, or
                      harasses the person or persons; and

                   3. Which serves no legitimate purpose.

                (b) The course of conduct shall be that which would
                cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial mental
                distress.

             (2) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct
             composed of two (2) or more acts, evidencing a
             continuity of purpose. . . .

KRS 508.130.

             Thus, Strong was required to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that Gary (1) intentionally threatened Strong, either explicitly or

implicitly, so as to place him in fear of sexual contact, serious injury, or death, and

(2) that she intentionally stalked him, i.e., that she engaged in a course of two or

more harassing, annoying, alarming, or intimidating acts directed toward him with

(a) no legitimate purpose and which both (b) would have caused a reasonable

person in Strong’s position substantial mental distress and (c) did in fact cause

Strong substantial distress.

             In this case, the circuit court’s finding that Gary’s conduct did not

meet the stalking definition is not clearly erroneous or an abuse of its discretion.

As previously discussed, Strong was required to prove two separate instances of

stalking by a preponderance of the evidence. See KRS 508.130(2). However, the

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only proof that Strong provided about the second alleged stalking incident was that

Gary knocked on his door a few days later. Strong offered no proof that Gary did

so with the intent to threaten him or that such action would cause a reasonable

person to suffer substantial emotional distress. Additionally, we can find no

evidence in the record that Strong subjectively suffered emotional distress. Thus,

the statutory elements of “stalking” under Kentucky law were not satisfied.

                                 CONCLUSION

            For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Kenton Circuit Court’s order.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEE.

Robert Gary Defusco
Covington, Kentucky

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