Court Opinion

ID: 9658802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:14:46.351227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:59.708919
License: Public Domain

McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting).
I think the trial judge correctly concluded that this case is controlled by Fuselier v. Police Jury of Parish of Iberia, 109 La. 551, 33 So. 597, 599. There, as here, the police jury, proceeding under Sections 3368 and 3369 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 (now R.S. 48:491^-93), appointed a jury of freeholders to lay out a parish public road and assessed as damages $35 per acre to the owners of the land over which it passed. This action was approved by the police jury and it ordered the appropriation of the land over which the road was to pass, directing payment of the damages to the owners. The plaintiff resisted the taking and proposed occupation of her land for road purposes and brought suit for annulment of the appropriation proceeding, and for an injunction restraining the police jury in the premises. Upon denial of the relief sought in the district court and the Court of Appeal, the case reached this Court on certiorari. In affirming the rulings of the *17courts below, this Court found that Sections 3368 and 3369 of the Revised-Statutes of 1870 authorized the appropriation of such lands as reasonably necessary for the laying out of public parish roads upon the payment to landowners of the damages to be assessed by a jury of freeholders and that the sections were not in conflict with Articles 2626 through 2641 of the Civil Code which deal with the expropriation of property by public bodies and certain corporations impressed with the public interest. In resolving thus, the opinion pointed out that, in the appropriation of lands needed for a parish road, the police jury acquires only the use of the soil for the public purpose or a mere servitude, as distinguished from a taking by expropriation, which vests an indefeasible title or estate in the public body exercising the right. It was observed:
“In the one case, where complete expropriation is had under the articles of the Code, it would seem that the fee, itself, of the land, so far as the purpose for which it is wanted is concerned, is taken, while in the other, to wit: — the laying out of a public road under Rev. St. § 3369, the fee remains altogether in the owner of the soil. Civ.Code, art. 658; Bradley v. Pharr, 45 La.Ann. 426, 12 So. 618, 19 L.R.A. 647.”
In addition, the Fuselier opinion fully answers the questions raised by plaintiff in this case anent the constitutionality of Sections 3368 and 3369 of the Revised Statutes of 1870. It states:
“The owner, over whose lands a public road is ordered laid pursuant to the authority of Rev.St. § 3369, has no just cause of complaint on the score of the ex parte character of the proceedings. He may have 'his day in court.’ He is not bound irrevocably by the action of the police jury, nor by that of the jury of freeholders appointed to lay out the road and assess the damages. Section 3370, Rev.St. (now R.S. 48:494), gives him the right to go into court and contest the action taken, and jurisprudence has recognized and vindicated this right. See authorities hereinbefore cited.”1 (Words in parenthesis mine).
The Fuselier case has been cited with approval by this Court on numerous occasions and the correctness of the decision has been upheld despite vigorous attack. See Police Jury of Evangeline Parish v. Thibodeaux, 158 La. 573, 104 So. 372 and dissent of O’Niell, C. J., therein. The importance of the Fuselier decision to the case at bar cannot be gainsaid. Since it holds that a taking under Sections 3368 and *193369 is a legislative appropriation and not a judicial expropriation (see 18 Am.Jur. verbum “Eminent Domain”, sections 310 and 311), it exposes the error of the Court of Appeal’s opinion in Police Jury of St. Martin v. Kidder, 4 La.App. 296 (heavily relied on by the majority), to the effect that notice to the landowner of the proceedings (both of the jury of freeholders and the police jury) is essential in order to render thp statute constitutional. Obviously, the Kidder case would rewrite the statute, as it neither provides for nor requires the service of notice or citation.
But, even so, this case is clearly distinguishable from the Kidder case in that, there, no notice at 'all was given of any of the proceedings whereas, here, plaintiff admittedly received written notice from the jury of freeholders that his property was to be taken. The contention that the notice of the meeting of the jury of freeholders was too short in point of time to be effective does not impress me and the majority’s resolution that plaintiff should have had another notice from the police jury, prior to its consideration of the action of the jury of freeholders, finds no support in law, being borrowed from dictum to that effect in the Kidder case. Certainly, no requirement for this latter notice is to be found in the statute. Indeed, it is not seen that any further action of the police jury is contemplated after it has appointed the jury of freeholders.
■ The majority also hold that the appropriation of plaintiff’s property was null and void for the reason that it was violently taken prior to payment therefor in contravention of Section 2 of Article 1 of our Constitution. Conceding that the police jury acted prematurely in taking possession of the land on January 28, 1946, I think it clear that its possession was illegal only during that period of time when the constitutional mandate for prepayment of compensation had not been met- — that is, prior to February 15, when plaintiff was tendered the amount assessed as damages by the jury of freeholders. See Ouachita Parish School Board v. Clark, 197 La. 131, 1 So.2d 54, where the court held that the fact that property was illegally appropriated by ■a public body does not operate as a bar to subsequent expropriation proceedings. See also Carrollton R. Co. v. Avart, 9 La. 205; Gay v. New Orleans Pacific Ry. Co., 32 La. Ann. 277 and New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. v. Lavergne, 138 La. 949, 70 So. 921.
The majority holding seems to be that failure to pay compensation in -advance of the taking was fatal to the proceedings and that subsequent compliance by a tender of payment cannot restore their legality. But the cases relied on do not sustain the ruling.
Bickham v. City of Shreveport, 156 La. 648, 101 So. 8, stands for the proposition that the right to expropriate does not legal*21ize the taking of property without payment in advance therefor. It does not stand for the proposition that such taking may not become lawful upon subsequent expropriation proceedings and payment of just compensation.
In De Bouchel v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 172 La. 908, 135 So. 914, the Court properly held unconstitutional, null and void a statute authorizing the highway commission to take possession of property before expropriation and payment, in the event the owner and the commission should not agree upon the price thereof, since such legislation authorized action in direct contravention of a constitutional provision.
And State ex rel. Cotting v. Sommerville, 104 La. 74, 28 So. 977, merely granted to relator, whose property had been appropriated by two railroad companies, the right to appeal suspensively from an order of the district court dissolving an injunction on bond enjoining the railroad companies from taking possession of relator’s property without expropriation proceedings and payment of compensation. In other words, the court simply recognized the right of a private citizen to enjoin an unlawful appropriation of his property.
But where, as in the instant case, all the legal requirements for appropriation have been met, I cannot accede to an invalidation of the entire proceedings merely because possession was taken prematurely and illegally.
Since it is my view that the proceedings were conducted in conformity with Sections 3368 and 3369 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, it would seem to follow that plaintiff is entitled, in addition to the damages assessed by the jury of freeholders, to such damages it has sustained as a result of the violent taking of his premises on January 28, 1946. However, by reversing the judgment of the district court in its entirety, it is evident that the majority feel (although it is not stated in the opinion) that, since the taking was illegal and tortious, no liability may be imposed upon the police jury as it is not responsible for the offenses of its agents and employees while they are engaged in the performance of governmental functions. In thus concluding, the majority have apparently overlooked the fact that the police jury neither appealed nor answered the appeal taken by plaintiff. Consequently, this Court is without jurisdiction to alter, against plaintiff’s interest, the judgment in its favor for $1,625 granted by the district judge.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Cross v. Police Jury, 7 Rob. 121; Fusilier v. Police Jury, 6 La.Ann. 670; Police Jury of Jefferson v. D’Hemecourt, 7 Rob. 509; Zenor v. Parish of Concordia, 7 La.Ann. 150. . .