Court Opinion

ID: 9939835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 21:08:30.80825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:01.725672
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hill, 2024-Ohio-522.]

                                         COURT OF APPEALS
                                      FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                        JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO                                   :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
                                                :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
                          Plaintiff-Appellee    :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                :
-vs-                                            :
                                                :       Case No. 2023-CA-00028
JODI HILL                                       :
                                                :
                     Defendant-Appellant        :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                            Appeal from the Fairfield Municipal Court,
                                                    Case No. TRC 22-06918

JUDGMENT:                                           Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                             February 12, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                              For Defendant-Appellant

ANDREW D. SEMELSBRGER                               SCOTT P. WOOD
Assistant Prosecutor                                Conrad & Wood
136 West Main Street                                120 East Main Street, Ste. 200
Box 1008                                            Lancaster, OH 43130
Lancaster, OH 43130
[Cite as State v. Hill, 2024-Ohio-522.]

Gwin, J.,

          {¶1} Defendant-appellant Jodi Hill [Hill] appeals the May 3, 2023 Judgment Entry

of the Fairfield County Municipal Court, Fairfield, Ohio overruling her motion to suppress.

                                          Facts and Procedural History

          {¶2} On August 14, 2022 at approximately 2:27 a.m., Hill was stopped in her

motor vehicle by Trooper Tawanna L. Young of the Ohio State Highway Patrol and

ultimately charged with OVI, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and a violation of R.C.

4511.12, disobeying a traffic control device.

          {¶3} On September 6, 2022 and October 21, 2022, two additional OVI charges

were filed against Hill based on the results of a urine test that was taken at the time of her

arrest.

          {¶4} On January 13, 2023, with leave of the trial court, Hill filed a motion to

suppress challenging, among other things, her initial stop by law enforcement. On April

5, 2023, an oral hearing was held wherein Hill stated the only issue before the trial court

is “whether or not there was reasonable suspicion to stop [Hill’s] vehicle.” T. Supp.

Hearing at 4.

          {¶5} Trooper Young was the only witness to testify at the hearing on Hill’s motion

to suppress. A video of the traffic stop was also entered into evidence. At the conclusion of

the oral hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.

          {¶6} On May 3, 2023, the trial court issued a written decision overruling Hill’s

motion to suppress, finding that there was reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity to justify

the traffic stop by Trooper Young. The trial court found the following facts, as recounted

in the Suppression Entry.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                                   3

        {¶7} On Sunday, August 14, 2022, at approximately 2:27 a.m., Trooper Young

was on patrol traveling eastbound on Wheeling Street, Lancaster, Fairfield County, Ohio.

Hill’s car was not on Wheeling Street at this time. Trooper Young turned left onto North

Columbus Street, headed northbound. After covering the length of one block, the trooper

made a U-turn on North Columbus Street, now headed southbound on North Columbus

Street. This time, when Trooper Young passed the intersection of North Columbus Street

and Wheeling Street, the trooper observed Hill's car at a red light at the intersection of

Wheeling Street and Memorial Drive, headed westbound on Wheeling Street.

        {¶8} Nearing the intersection of North Columbus Street and Main Street, Trooper

Young turned right onto Main Street, heading westbound. As Trooper Young approached

the intersection of Main Street and Memorial Drive, the trooper was able to observe that

the traffic light for Wheeling Street, the street at which Hill’s car was stationary, was now

green. Trooper Young testified that she, Trooper Young, also had a green light while

westbound on Main Street.

        {¶9} The trooper then turned right onto Memorial Drive, headed northbound

towards the intersection of Wheeling Street and Memorial Drive. As Trooper Young turned

onto Memorial Drive, the trooper saw that her light (i.e., the northbound light on Memorial

Drive at the intersection of Wheeling Street and Memorial Drive) was red, which confirmed

that Hill had a green light. As Trooper Young got closer to the intersection of Wheeling

Street and Memorial Drive, Hill’s vehicle began to move, turning left onto Memorial Drive,

headed southbound.

        {¶10} The trial court reviewed the video of the traffic stop and made the following

findings,
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                                   4

              1. At 02:26:21 Young sees Defendant's vehicle headed west on

       Wheeling Street sitting stationary at the red light.

              2. At 02:26:37 Young turns westbound onto Main Street and her light

       at the intersection of Main Street and Memorial Drive is red.

              3. At 02:26:42 Young's light on Main Street heading westbound turns

       green. Young's dash-cam video shows Young is in a position to see

       Defendant's vehicle and the green light for her at the intersection of

       westbound Wheeling Street and Memorial Drive through the open surface

       parking lot of FCJFS, but the dash-cam video does not show that view.

              4. At 02:26:57 Young turns right onto Memorial Drive heading

       northbound and can again see Defendant's vehicle sitting at the green light.

       Young's dash-cam video is showing Young's light as red so Defendant has

       the green light.

              5. At 02:27:02 Defendant's vehicle begins to move and makes a left

       turn onto Memorial Drive heading southbound.

        {¶11} Based on the dash-cam video evidence above and Trooper Young's

testimony, the trial judge found that Hill’s car sat stationary at a green light for

approximately twenty seconds (02:26:42 to 02:27:02) before moving.

        {¶12} On June 20, 2023, Hill entered a no contest plea and was found guilty of

the impaired OVI charge as a stipulated first offense, with a dismissal of all other charges,

and was sentenced by the trial court.

                                        Assignment of Error

        {¶13} Hill raises one Assignment of Error,
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                                   5

         {¶14} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S MOTION

TO SUPPRESS.”

                                         Law and Analysis

         {¶15} In her sole Assignment of Error, Hill contends that the trial judge erred in

overruling her motion to suppress, as there was no reasonable suspicion of any unlawful

activity to justify the traffic stop.

                                        Standard of Review

         {¶16} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d

71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of

fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness

credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308,314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988;

State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing

court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists

to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 127 Ohio

App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1(4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142,

675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as

true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the

applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio

App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539(4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 534

U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740(2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,

116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911(1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial

court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review Ornelas, supra.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                                    6

Moreover, due weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident

judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663.

       Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the Trooper had either probable cause or

     a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of Hill’s vehicle.

       {¶17} We will first consider whether the facts in the instant case demonstrate that

Trooper Young had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop of Hill’s vehicle. State v.

Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶8.

       {¶18} The Supreme Court of Ohio has observed, “‘[a]uthorities seem to be split as

to whether a traffic stop is reasonable when supported merely by reasonable suspicion,

or whether the heightened standard of probable cause must underlie the stop.’” City of

Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, ¶ 13,

quoting Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 188 F.Supp.2d 762, 767(E.D. Mich. 2002).

       {¶19} There are actually two types of “traffic” stops, and each has a different

constitutional standard applicable to it. In State v. Moller, the Court of Appeals observed,

              First is the typical non-investigatory traffic stop, wherein the police

       officer witnesses a violation of the traffic code, such as crossing over the

       centerline of a road, and then stops the motorist for this traffic violation.

       Second is the investigative or “Terry” stop, wherein the officer does not

       necessarily witness a specific traffic violation, but the officer does have

       sufficient reason to believe that a criminal act has taken place or is

       occurring, and the officer seeks to confirm or refute this suspicion of criminal

       activity. See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-1880

       [20 L.Ed.2d 889]. A non-investigatory traffic stop must be supported by
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                                7

      probable cause, which arises when the stopping officer witnesses the traffic

      violation. See Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct.

      1769, 1772 [135 L.Ed.2d 89]; Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977), 434 U.S. 106,

      109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332 [54 L.Ed.2d 331]. By contrast, an investigatory Terry

      stop is proper so long as the stopping officer has “reasonable articulable

      suspicion” of criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-1880.

12th Dist. Butler No. CA99-07-128, 2000 WL 1577287 (Oct. 23, 2000); Accord, State

Oliver, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21 AP-449, 2023-Ohio-1550, ¶42; State v. Baughman, 192

Ohio App.3d 45, 2011-Ohio-162, 947 N.E.2d 1273 (12th Dist.), ¶ 14; State v. Nwachukwa,

3rd Dist. Marion No. 9-15-03, 2015-Ohio-3282, ¶ 24; ¶ 26; State v. Woods, 5th Dist.

Licking No. 18-CA-13, 2018-Ohio-3379, 117 N.E.3d 1017, ¶14.

       {¶20} The cause for a non-investigatory traffic stop has been succinctly stated by

the Supreme Court of Ohio: “Where a police officer stops a vehicle based upon probable

cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution[.]” Dayton v. Erickson, 76

Ohio St.3d 3, 11-21, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). Probable cause is defined in terms of “facts

or circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had

committed or was committing an offense.’” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct.

854, 861, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225,

13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).

      {¶21} The cause for an investigatory stop was stated by the Supreme Court in

State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4538, 894 N.E.2d 1204. In Mays, the

defendant argued that his actions in the case – twice driving across the white edge line –
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                                    8

were not enough to constitute a violation of the driving within marked lanes statute, R.C.

4511.33. Id. at ¶ 15. The appellant further argued that the stop was unjustified because

there was no reason to suspect that he had failed to first ascertain that leaving the lane

could be done safely or that he had not stayed within his lane “as nearly as [was]

practicable,” within the meaning of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). In rejecting these arguments, the

Supreme Court noted, “the question of whether appellant might have a possible defense

to a charge of violating R.C. 4511.33 is irrelevant in our analysis of whether an officer has

a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. An officer is not required

to determine whether someone who has been observed committing a crime might have

a legal defense to the charge.” Id. at ¶ 17. The Supreme Court concluded that a law-

enforcement officer who witnesses a motorist drift over lane markings in violation of a

statute that requires a driver to drive a vehicle entirely within a single lane of traffic has

reasonable and articulable suspicion sufficient to warrant a traffic stop, even without

further evidence of erratic or unsafe driving. Id. at syllabus. In Mays, the Ohio Supreme

Court made the following observation as it pertains to Ohio law,

              Appellant’s reliance on [Dayton v.] Erickson [76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665

       N.E.2d 1091 (1996)], and in Whren v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 806,

       116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, is misplaced. Probable cause is certainly

       a complete justification for a traffic stop, but we have not held that probable

       cause is required. Probable cause is a stricter standard than reasonable

       and articulable suspicion. State v. Evans (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 411,

       618 N.E.2d 162. The former subsumes the latter. Just as a fact proven

       beyond a reasonable doubt has by necessity been proven by a
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                                  9

        preponderance, an officer who has probable cause necessarily has a

        reasonable and articulable suspicion, which is all the officer needs to justify

        a stop. Erickson and Whren do not hold otherwise.

119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23. The Ohio Supreme Court

concluded, therefore, if an officer’s decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation,

including a traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable and articulable suspicion

considering all the circumstances, then the stop is constitutionally valid. 119 Ohio St.3d

406, ¶8. See, State v. Marcum, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 18-CAC-11 0083, 2019-Ohio-

2293.

        {¶22} The confusion in this area remains. In a case involving a crossing of the fog

line, the single solid white line on the right-hand edge of a roadway, the Supreme Court

of Ohio recently ruled that the statute prohibits crossing, but not touching, of a fog line.

State v. Turner, 163 Ohio St.3d 421, 2020-Ohio-6773, 170 N.E.3d 842, ¶ 3. Turner argued

the traffic stop was invalid because the tires touched, but did not cross the fog line. The

Supreme Court found the pertinent question here, however, is not whether Turner was

guilty of the marked lanes violation but, rather, whether the officer believes a traffic law

has been violated. In that analysis, the focus of the inquiry is whether the officer had

“probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. United States,

517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); see also Dayton v. Erickson,

76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996), syllabus.” State v. Turner, 163 Ohio St.3d 421,

2020-Ohio-6773, 170 N.E.3d 842, ¶ 2

        {¶23} Non-Investigatory Stop. The initial question to be addressed is whether the

traffic stop was justified as a non-investigatory stop because Trooper Young actually
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                                       10

witnessed, or had a reasonable basis to believe she had witnessed, Hill disobeying a

traffic control device in violation of R.C. 4511.12. At the suppression hearing the trooper

indicated that she initiated a traffic stop because Hill’s vehicle had remained stationary at

a green light for an undue length of time. T. Supp. Hearing at 6-9. A citation was issued

for the traffic violation.

        {¶24} Accordingly, we will first confine our analysis of the traffic stop in this case

to the “typical non [-] investigatory stop that officers perform after witnessing specific traffic

violations, premised on probable cause.” State v. Hampton, 1st Dist. No. C-210423, 2022-

Ohio-1380, 2022 WL 1231755, ¶ 8; State Oliver, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21 AP-449, 2023-

Ohio-1550, ¶51.

        {¶25} The trial judge found that Hill remained motionless at the green light for a

period of twenty seconds. Revised Code 4511.13 defines the meanings of different traffic

signal indications. Division (A) defines what a steady green signal means:

        {¶26} Steady green signal indication:

               (1)(a) Vehicular traffic, streetcars, and trackless trolleys facing a

       circular green signal indication are permitted to proceed straight through or

       turn right or left or make a U-turn movement except as such movement is

       modified by a lane-use sign, turn prohibition sign, lane marking, roadway

       design, separate turn signal indication, or other traffic control device. Such

       vehicular traffic, including vehicles turning right or left or making a U-turn

       movement, shall yield the right-of-way to both of the following:

               Pedestrians lawfully within an associated crosswalk;

               Other vehicles lawfully within the intersection.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                                     11

        {¶27} Hill is correct that a green light is not an unconditional command to proceed.

The statute directs a driver to yield to pedestrians and other vehicles, and provides

exceptions for the modification of an unconditional command to proceed. Thus, a failure

to proceed through a green light is not automatically a traffic violation. We are unwilling

to state a bright-line rule as to how long is too long to remain stopped at a green traffic

light. Each case will necessarily turn on its own facts.

        {¶28} Investigatory Stop. Due to the ambiguity as to whether Hill had in fact

violated the statute, the trial judge considered whether the traffic stop was justified as an

investigatory stop because Trooper Young had a reasonable basis to suspect that Hill

had violated the disobeying a traffic control device statute sufficient to allow Trooper

Young to stop Hill to confirm or refute (i.e., investigate) this suspicion of criminal activity,

including the traffic violation. See, e.g., State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-

4538, 894 N.E.2d 1204; State v. Chambers, 5th Dist. No. 2019 AP 07 0021, 2020-Ohio-

1483, ¶ 23, citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. See also Dayton v. Erickson, 76

Ohio St.3d 3, 6, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996); State v. Howell, 1st Dist., 2018-Ohio-591, 106

N.E.3d 337, ¶ 12.

        {¶29} The trial judge viewed the trooper’s actions under the totality of the

circumstances that were present to her at the time,

              In the present case, the Court cannot say that Young was actually

       mistaken as to the law. As the State asserted in its Post-Suppression

       Hearing Closing Arguments everyone knows that "green means go." This

       incident occurred at 2:27 a.m. on a Sunday morning wherein Young

       observed Defendant sit at a green light for approximately twenty (20)
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                               12

      seconds before moving. Young's dash-cam video shows there are only

      three vehicles on the roadway during the entire duration of this incident.

      Defendant's vehicle is sitting at a red light at an intersection with no other

      vehicles around her. Defendant had no pedestrians or vehicles to wait for

      before turning left onto Memorial Drive when the light turned green. There

      were no vehicles approaching the intersection on Memorial Drive that

      Defendant needed to yield to or wait to see if they, in fact, stopped at the

      red light. There was no other vehicular or pedestrian traffic to prevent

      Defendant from proceeding when the light turned green.

       {¶30} On appeal, we “must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are

supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582

N.E.2d 972 (1992), citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982).

In Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 81, 461 N.E.2d 1273(1984), the

Ohio Supreme Court explained:

             A reviewing court should not reverse a decision simply because it

      holds a different opinion concerning the credibility of the witnesses and

      evidence submitted before the trial court. A finding of an error in law is a

      legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of

      witnesses and evidence is not.” See, also State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio

      St.2d 230, syllabus 1.

       {¶31} See also, State v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Stark Nos. 2019CA00143,

2019CA00144, 2020-Ohio-3295, ¶12.
Fairfield County, Case No. 2023-CA-00028                                                 13

        {¶32} Based on our independent review of the cruiser camera video, and in light

of Trooper Young’s unrefuted testimony found by the trial court to be credible, we find

that competent, credible evidence supports the finding that the stop was justified as an

investigatory stop because Trooper Young had a reasonable and articulable suspicion

that Hill disobeyed a traffic control device. The facts known to the trooper were sufficient

under the facts of this case to allow Trooper Young to stop Hill to confirm or refute (i.e.,

investigate) the suspicion that Hill disobeyed a traffic control device.

        {¶33} Hill’s sole Assignment of Error is overruled

        {¶34} The judgment of the Fairfield Municipal Court, Fairfield County, Ohio is

affirmed.

By Gwin, J.,

Delaney, P.J., and

Wise, J., concur