Court Opinion

ID: 9883850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:22:25.000332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:32.199295
License: Public Domain

HEDGES, Justice,
concurring on rehearing on court’s motion.
I join the en banc majority opinion, but also write separately to express that, while I am sympathetic to the dissenting argument, I believe that it is contrary to the dictates of the court of criminal appeals.
In Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), the court of criminal appeals described three categories of rules, the last of which was “rights of litigants that must be implemented upon request.” Id. at 279. For this category of rights, an objection is required in order to preserve a complaint about their denial on appeal. In Moore v. State, 907 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex.App.—Hous*817ton [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd), I wrote that a trial judge’s comment on the weight of the evidence, because it falls in to the last Marin category, requires an objection to avoid waiver. In other words, under Marin, there can never be fundamental error for comment on the weight of the evidence.
I recognize that my holding in Moore was a one-judge holding: one panel member concurred, holding that fundamental error was possible in this context but that the facts before us did not warrant its use, and another panel member dissenting, holding that the judge’s comments in that case constituted fundamental error. I also recognize that there was no en banc review. I simply stand by my own opinion and leave others to draw their own conclusions as to Moore’s prece-dential value.
I also recognize the line of cases cited by the dissenting opinions permit appellate review of this complaint based on fundamental error. I cannot reconcile Marin with these cases. I leave it to the court of criminal appeals to do so.