Court Opinion

ID: 9925679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 19:02:14.045048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.561589
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/22/24 Yager v. Superior Court CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 PAUL YAGER,

          Petitioner,                                                    E082465

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. COM029661)

 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF                                                   OPINION
 RIVERSIDE COUNTY,

          Respondent;

 THE PEOPLE,

          Real Party in Interest.

         ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. Petition granted.

         Paul Yager, in pro. per, for Petitioner.

         No appearance for Respondent.

         No appearance for Real Party in Interest.

                                                             1
       Petitioner Paul Yager (Yager), an inmate at a federal prison in California, has an

arrest warrant and charges pending in the Riverside County Superior Court that prevent

him from being transferred to a residential re-entry program. Yager twice attempted to

file a motion to dismiss the Riverside County charges. Both times, despite a proof of

service that showed Yager served the district attorney’s office, the superior court clerk

rejected the motion and directed Yager “to Penal Code [section] 1381, which requires

you to serve your request on the Office of the District Attorney.”

       Yager sought review by petitioning for writ of mandate in the California Supreme

Court, which transferred the matter to this court. After reviewing Yager’s writ petition,

we requested a response and advised the parties we may issue a peremptory writ in the

first instance under Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.

No response was filed. We agree with Yager that the superior court clerk improperly

rejected his motion to dismiss. However, rather than ordering dismissal of the charges as

Yager requests, we direct the superior court to file and rule on Yager’s motion. We

express no opinion on the merits of the motion.

                                        DISCUSSION

       Penal Code sections 1381 and 1381.5 allow individuals serving a term of

imprisonment in California, and who have state charges pending against them, to demand

the district attorney’s office proceed to trial on the charges, and to file a motion to

dismiss if their case is not brought to trial within the timelines set forth in the statutes.

Penal Code section 1381 governs defendants who are housed in state correctional

                                                2
institutions, and Penal Code section 1381.5 governs defendants, like Yager, who are

housed in federal correctional institutions located in California. Under Penal Code

section 1381, upon receiving a written demand for trial, the district attorney’s office has

90 days to bring the defendant to trial, unless the defendant requests or consents to a

continuance in open court. Similarly, under Penal Code section 1381.5, when the district

attorney’s office receives a demand for trial, it is required to “promptly inquire of the

warden or other head of the federal correctional institution in which such defendant is

confined whether and when such defendant can be released for trial or for sentencing.”

Upon receiving “an assent from authorized federal authorities for release of the defendant

for trial or sentencing . . . the district attorney . . . shall bring him to trial or sentencing

within 90 days . . . unless the federal authorities specify a date of release after 90 days, in

which event the district attorney shall bring the prisoner to trial or sentencing at such

specified time” unless the defendant requests or consents to a continuance in open court.

(Pen. Code, § 1381.5)

       On March 28, 2023, Yager served the district attorney’s office with a written

“notice of demand for trial or disposition” under Penal Code sections 1381 and 1381.5.

       On June 28, 2023, Yager attempted to file a “motion to dismiss for failure to

comply with demand for speedy trial” under Penal Code section 1382. Despite a

declaration that stated Yager served the district attorney’s office with a demand for trial

on March 28, 2023, and a proof of service that showed Yager served the district

attorney’s office with a copy of the motion to dismiss, the superior court clerk rejected

                                                 3
the motion and returned it unfiled, with an ink stamp on the back of the envelope that

directed Yager “to Penal Code [section 1381], which requires you to serve your request

on the Office of the District Attorney.”

       On July 13, 2023, Yager resubmitted the motion with a letter to the clerk

explaining that he had served the district attorney’s office, as required, and that he was

entitled to file the motion because the district attorney’s office did not respond to his

demand for trial within 90 days. The clerk again rejected the motion and returned it to

Yager with the same ink stamp on the back of the envelope that directed him “to serve

[his] request on the Office of the District Attorney” under Penal Code section 1381.

       The clerk improperly rejected Yager’s motion to dismiss for failure to serve the

district attorney’s office. The motion reflected that he had served the district attorney’s

office—both with the demand for trial and with the motion to dismiss. When the clerk

improperly refuses to file a motion, mandate is appropriate to direct a lower court to file

and rule on the merits of the motion. (Voit v. Superior Court (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th

1285, 1287-1288.) “If a document is presented to the clerk’s office for filing in a form

that complies with the rules of court, the clerk’s office has a ministerial duty to file it.”

(Id. at p. 1287.) Whether or not Yager is entitled to dismissal of the charges, the clerk

had a ministerial duty file his motion.

       Having followed the procedures and given the notice described in Palma v. U.S.

Industrial Fasteners, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 178, we find this matter appropriate for

issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance because there has been clear error

                                               4
under well-settled principles of law and undisputed facts. (Lewis v. Superior Court

(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241.)

                                      DISPOSITION

       Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the respondent superior court to

file and rule on Yager’s June 28, 2023 “motion to dismiss for failure to comply with

demand for speedy trial.” This decision shall be final as to this court immediately.

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

       The clerk of this court is DIRECTED to attach a copy of Yager’s motion to

dismiss to the remittitur.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                               RAPHAEL
                                                                               Acting P. J.

We concur:

MILLER
                             J.

FIELDS
                             J.

                                              5