Court Opinion

ID: 9736202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:46:59.279875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.905457
License: Public Domain

*170DUNN, Retired Justice
(dissenting).
A.At the outset, this appeal should be dismissed for failure to provide a proper transcript of the Commission hearing. Appellant’s reliance on SDCL 1-26-32.4 is misplaced. This court has the power to make such requirements as it deems necessary for a transcript on appeal and that is set out in the appendix to SDCL 15-26A (Form 3 Appeal Transcripts), which reads:
1. Appeal transcripts shall consist of volumes of 250 pages or less, prepared on 8V2" X 11" white opaque paper with 25 prenumbered, double-spaced lines per page.
2. Each page shall have ruled margins with ¾" top and bottom margins, a IV2" left margin, and a ½" right margin.
3. The transcript shall be typed using pica type with 10 characters per inch; questions shall start with a “Q” flush at the left margin, with two spaces between “Q” and the text of the question; answers shall start with an “A” flush at the left margin with two spaces between “A” and the beginning of the text of the answer; colloquy, such as the “THE COURT,” “MRS: JONES,” etc., shall start three spaces from the left margin.
4. The pages shall be consecutively numbered throughout the entire transcript (not according to volume) located at the bottom center of each page.
5. Each volume shall be securely bound with a protective cover upon which or through which the following shall appear: (a) a IV2" blank space at the top of the page; (b) the trial court name, location and case number; (c) the case name; (d) the type of proceeding; (e) the date of the proceeding reported in that volume; (f) the name of the judge before whom the proceedings occurred; (g) appearances; (h) the volume number and the pages included in the volume.
6. An index of witnesses, motions, and exhibits shall follow the cover page of the first volume of each transcript; each major event of the proceeding shall be listed separately and identified by the transcript page number at which it begins.
The filing of an eight and one-half hour tape in lieu of a transcript without any index of witnesses, motions, or exhibits, is in violation of the letter and spirit of this rule and, further, is a most severe imposition on a court already beleaguered by appeals. This is particularly true where the issue presented is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commission’s findings.
B. The Highway Patrol violated its own rules when it used a “transfer to Kadoka” as punishment. ARSD 55:02; 21:02. Aware of this, the Commission went through all kinds of “verbal gymnastics” in its brief and in oral argument to make this transfer something besides a disciplinary action. The Highway Patrol, however, is bound by its own language in the disciplinary letter of August 31, 1983. which made it crystal clear in two separate paragraphs that the transfer was part of the punishment. It cannot claim otherwise on appeal.
C. Finally, from the facts and exhibits in the record that are clear and unrefuted, there was not just cause for disciplining this trooper who had thirteen years on the force. The tenor of the majority opinion would lead one to believe that Trooper Sta-vig had not changed his. shirt or taken a bath in thirteen years. If even partially true, this is a most serious indictment of the administration of the Highway Patrol. When you sort out the rumors, the backbiting, and the brown-nosing described in the majority opinion, however, we are left with certain real and unrefuted facts:
(a) Stavig was cited for a bad inspection in April, 1983, relative to his personal grooming and hygiene; and his maintenance of patrol property and equipment.
(b) On August 11, Stavig was given a favorable evaluation on the items he had been cited for in April (Exhibit # 3). At the time of this evaluation, Sgt. Sammons told Stavig that he needed a haircut. When Stavig had not obtained a haircut by August 16, *171he was ordered by Sgt. Sammons to have it cut and he immediately complied. In a discussion with Sgt. Sam-mons, Stavig maintained that his hair was in compliance with Highway Patrol regulations. Sgt. Sammons replied: “It may be in compliance with Highway Patrol regulations but it is not in compliance with mine.”
This disciplinary action followed on August 31, 1983.
These are the unrefuted facts that have destroyed Trooper Stavig’s usefulness on the force after thirteen years; for one dare not question the actions of the Sgt. Sam-mons’ of this world in a grievance procedure and lose. With this court putting its stamp of approval upon a transfer, as punishment, Stavig will barely have time to light between stations until he is harrassed out of the force.
HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully diss.ent. The judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed.
A circuit court is empowered to reverse the decision of an administrative agency if the administrative agency’s decision is based upon an error of law. SDCL 1-26-36(4). The types of discipline which may be imposed by Director Baum are established by rule in ARSD 55:02:21:02.
Forms of disciplinary action. Disciplinary action may be taken for just cause as outlined in § 55:02:21:07 [sic]1 and may include the following:
(1) Suspension without pay;
(2) Involuntary termination;
(3) Demotion; or
(4) Reduction in salary.
It is obvious that transfers are not included in the list. There can be no doubt that the Division of Highway Patrol is bound by the rules of the Law Enforcement Civil Service Commission. SDCL 3-7-5 and SDCL 3-7-18. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that Trooper Stavig was disciplined by transfer to Kadoka, South Dakota. Witness a letter of the Highway Patrol marked Grievant’s Exhibit # 6, dated August 31, 1983. Two basic statements are made in the letter concerning discipline: (l)“Tke above mentioned transfer and suspension from duties are disciplinary actions and are being taken in accordance with Law Enforcement Civil Service Rules 55:02:21:02 and 55:02:21:06”; and (2) “Since this transfer is a disciplinary move, you will not be entitled to receive transfer pay.” (Emphasis supplied.)2
A key South Dakota decision has been overlooked. It simply stands for the proposition that an administrative agency must obey its own rules. In re Fair Hearing for Fort Thompson Senior Citizens, Inc., Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 344 N.W.2d 698, 699 (S.D.1984). See also, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695-96, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3101, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1057 (1974).
The circuit court judge made a determination that the Division of Highway Patrol, by and through Director Baum, made an error of law. This was exemplified by Finding of Fact 9, which provided: “The Director exceeded his authority when he disciplined Trooper Marvin Stavig by transferring him to Kadoka” and by Conclusion of Law H, which provided: “The Law Enforcement Civil Service Commission’s conclusion that Trooper Marvin Stavig could be transferred for disciplinary reasons is an error of law.” Thus, the circuit judge was, in the vernacular of the young people of our nation, “right on.” In the vernacular of those born of another generation, he hit the nail on the head.
Obviously, the circuit court’s ultimate determination that the Law Enforcement Civil Service Commission’s conclusion that *172Trooper Marvin Stavig could be transferred to Kadoka, South Dakota, for disciplinary reasons was an error of law — is not clearly erroneous. SDCL 1-26-37; State, Div. of Human Rights v. Miller, 349 N.W.2d 42, 46 n. 2 (S.D.1984).

. The ARSD manual is incorrect; this should be ARSD 55:02:21:06. The Legislative Research Council has been notified of this mistake by this author and was advised that a correction would be made immediately by computer. Later, when the rules are retyped, this correction will surface.

. The majority opinion now calls this a "management call,” a term of literary creation and a stranger to these proceedings.