Court Opinion

ID: 7277629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-25 20:02:04.592179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:18:55.642321
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Van Orsbel
dissenting:
I cannot agree with my associates that the business here under investigation is embraced within the terms of the statute. *270I am of opinion that the transaction between the merchant and the customer merely amounts to a discount allowed the purchaser on account of the purchase made. The purchaser receives an order, on presentation of which, according to its terms, he can receive his discount, either in cash or merchandise. Between the merchant and the stamp company, the contract is clearly one for advertising. I agree with what is said by my associates in regard to the ancient and legitimate method of advertising through the medium of the newspaper, but I am unable to distinguish it from many other equally legitimate methods of advertising, — the bill board, the distribution of circulars, the various methods adopted through the different kinds of directories, and the numerous other agencies, all alike conducted and solicited through the agency of third parties intervening between the merchant and his. customers. It is true that competition compels the merchant to patronize these agencies, and the public to pay the expense. Deception is at times practised through these methods. It is not apparent, however, from the record before us, that any fraud has been practised or misrepresentation made by the Economy Co-operative Society. The public need not be deceived nor defrauded by this system of discount. The purchaser has his option of taking either cash or merchandise, or refusing both. Neither inconvenience nor delay in securing the discount are in themselves sufficient to bring the transaction within the limitations of the statute.
The system detailed by the record discloses neither a gift enterprise nor a lottery. Every stamp exchanged has a fixed value; and the mere fact that- the transaction is conducted through the medium of a third party does not make it different from a direct payment of the discount by the merchant, or the giving of a stamp redeemable by him on presentation. It is conceded that the merchant himself could legally issue the stamps, redeemable by him in cash or merchandise, as an inducement to secure the patronage of the public. Such a transaction would be perfectly legitimate. Exactly the same result is here accomplished. The same discount is paid, and the customer is accorded the same rights. The advertising is conduct*271ed, as is customary, through the medium of a third party. The right of the merchant to so advertise cannot be controverted. With this neither the customer nor the public is concerned. The customer receives the exact inducement offered, an inducement which, so far as the transaction between the merchant and the customer is concerned, is not condemned by the statute. The mere fact that the purchaser is required to take the stamps for redemption to another point in no way affects the legality of the transaction.
In my opinion, the question of the constitutionality of the statute is not before us, as the matter here involved cannot be -brought within its provisions. Such statutes are to be strictly construed, and no reasonable construction of this statute can bring the transaction here involved within its provisions. It is unnecessary to discuss in this connection the power of Congress, under the exercise of the police power, to regulate or suppress these stamp enterprises, since that question, in my judgment, is not here presented. The mere fact that the profits f the business have been large, or that a middleman is involved, is not sufficient to bring it by implication within the terms of the statute.
In view of the importance of the question involved, and the wide diversity of opinion among the courts of the country, as to the effect of the statute and the power of the legislature to regulate the business in question, I join with my associates in inviting the allowance of a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court.
An application by the defendant in error to the Supreme Court of the United States for the allowance of the writ of certiorari, was denied by that court October 24, 1910.