Court Opinion

ID: 9523651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:45:11.449779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:12.595418
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s holding that a cause of action for wrongful discharge exists where an employee is terminated following a report of suspected criminal activity on the part of his or her employer. I cannot agree, however, with the conclusion that the employee in this case did not have reasonable cause to believe that his employer may have violated the odometer fraud statutes.
Given the conclusion reached by the majority on the facts of this case, I believe we may be creating an unavailing cause of action. The rigorous standard imposed upon employees to establish reasonable cause in these cases may well bury *93meritorious claims forever.
The majority holds that an employee must present evidence suggesting that he or she witnessed an employer commit a crime or have reason to believe that the employer routinely or otherwise engaged in such criminal activity. The majority admits in this case that “Schriner had reasonable cause to believe that odometer fraud had been committed by someone.. . .” I believe that “someone” includes his employer. If Schriner had reasonable cause to believe someone rolled back his car’s odometer, it cannot possibly be unreasonable to infer that the business from which he purchased the vehicle may have been the culprit. Schriner then had reason to believe that his employer, the seller in this circumstance, had “otherwise engaged in” odometer fraud, even without evidence that such was a routine practice or without actually witnessing the act.
This court, in this opinion, is asking employees who suspect employers of criminal activity for a level of certainty above that required for law enforcement agencies to obtain search warrants to enter our homes. In issuing search warrants authorities deal in probabilities, not certainties. We have held that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard for determining probable cause. State v. Duff, 226 Neb. 567, 412 N.W.2d 843 (1987).
I wholeheartedly agree with the majority that “accusing one of a crime is a very serious matter ...” That is precisely why causes of action such as libel, slander per se, and malicious prosecution exist. Such laws serve as a deterrent for false accusations and vengeful and frivolous legal actions.
Given that this court has recognized a cause of action in this case in favor of Schriner, a summary judgment is not proper in this case. Schriner had reasonable cause to believe that his employer, as the vehicle’s former owner, may have changed the car’s odometer. Further, the issue of whether Schriner acted in good faith is a question of fact for a trier of fact and is not properly disposed of by summary judgment. I would have reversed and remanded this cause for further proceedings.
Grant, J., joins in this dissent.