Court Opinion

ID: 9648498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:24:22.18023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:02.128004
License: Public Domain

George Rose Smith, Justice. On March 23, 1983, at 6:55 a.m., the Plainview fire department was called to a fire at Horn’s grocery, which was also the residence of Samuel, Mabel, and John Horn. At the scene the firemen learned that the three Horns were still inside the burning building. In. extinguishing the fire the firemen found the bodies of the three Horns, all of whom had died not from the fire but from having their heads battered and their throats cut. It later appeared that the victims had also been robbed. The appellant Metcalf was convicted on three counts of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole on each count. We need discuss in detail only one of his five arguments for a new trial. At a hearing on a motion to suppress an in-custody statement given by Metcalf, the weight of the testimony showed that when Metcalf was arrested on the night of March 23 he asked for a lawyer, but none was provided. The next morning he was taken from his cell for questioning. An officer testified that when Metcalf was again reminded of his rights he started talking “a mile a minute” even though an officer tried to stop him. A tape recorder was turned on and took the rest of his statement, which was introduced at the trial. The trial judge, in ruling that the statement was admissible, recognized the difficulty: “I do want to state this: This man did request a lawyer and ... I have some serious problems with it.” The judge concluded, however, that Metcalf had waived his rights when he was reminded of them and kept talking. The judge’s ruling was wrong. When a person in custody indicates that he wants a lawyer, under the Miranda rule the interrogation must cease. Moore v. State, 261 Ark. 274, 551 S.W.2d 185 (1977); Davis v. State, 243 Ark. 157, 419 S.W.2d 125 (1967). It is true that the accused person may change his mind and initiate further contact with the officers, but the impetus must come from the accused, not fromthe officers. Oregon v. Bradshaw, _U.S__, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Scroggins v. State, 276 Ark. 177, 633 S.W.2d 33 (1982). Here Metcalf was admittedly taken from his.cell for questioning. He should not have been put in that position without a lawyer being present; so his supposed willingness to make an uncounseled statement is immaterial. Since a new trial is necessary, we mention the other four points. First, the death-qualification of the jury was not improper. Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 659 S.W.2d 168 (1983). Second, Metcalf’s wife could be required to testify for the State, for she was not asked to disclose any confidential communications. Uniform Evidence Rules 501 and 504; Huckaby v. State, 262 Ark. 413, 557 S.W.2d 875 (1977). Third, defense counsel conceded that the State could question Mrs. Metcalf about her prior inconsistent statements, for impeachment. It is argued that the entire statement should not have been admitted; but the statement was brief, and we do not see that the non-impeaching portion conveyed any prejudicial information to the jury. See Davis v. Ark. Best Freight System, 239 Ark. 632, 393 S.W.2d 237, 17 A.L.R. 3d 986 (1965). Fourth, while in jail awaiting trial Metcalf wrote a letter to his wife, urging her and other witnesses to commit perjury in several respects at the trial. Metcalf put the letter in an unsealed envelope and asked a fellow prisoner who was confined for only 10 days, to smuggle it to Metcalf’s wife. The inmate, however, turned the letter over to the sheriff, and it was introduced in evidence by the State. It is argued, first, that the letter was inadmissible, because in entrusting it to the other inmate Metcalf had an expectation of privacy and of freedom from an unreasonable search. We have held, however, that jail officials may examine an unsealed letter written by an inmate. Sumlin v. State, 266 Ark. 709, 587 S.W.2d 571 (1979). Further, weagree with a California decision upholding the admissibility of a letter entrusted by the writer to a fellow prisoner and turned over to the sheriff. People v. Hunt, 133 Cal. App. 3d 543, 184 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1982). There the court said: “The general rule is that an inmate at a jail has no right to privacy. . . .Lack of privacy is a built-in aspect of imprisonment, with censorship and control of communications to and from a jail inherent in its administration. Such authority is necessary to protect against escape.’ ” Second, counsel argues that the letter was inadmissible as being a confidential communication to Metcalf’s wife. An oral communication between spouses, however, is not protected when it is overheard by a third person. Sumlin v. State, 273 Ark. 185, 617 S.W.2d 372 (1981). Similarly, Metcalf waived any possible confidentiality of the letter by delivering it unsealed to a fellow inmate. The State’s motion for an award of costs for a supplemental abstract is denied. The additional material goes largely to the sufficiency of the State’s proof, a matter not questioned by the appellant. Reversed and remanded. Hubbell, C.J., and Hickman and Hays, JJ., dissent.