Court Opinion

ID: 9762266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:18:15.80867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:32.509394
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I perceive no valid reason for refusing to permit a second action if the statute of limitations has not expired and the costs have been paid in the earlier action which was dismissed for inactivity. Cf. Thompson v. Cortese, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 174, 182, 398 A.2d 1079, 1082 (1979).
Pa.R.J.A. 1901, pursuant to which Allegheny County Rule 229(e) was adopted, is an administrative, house-keeping rule intended to eliminate stale cases from the judicial system where the parties have failed to proceed. The rule was not intended to achieve a substantive disposition of cases on *458their merits. This is apparent from the comment to Rule 1901, where it is said: “The rule has no effect on the substantive law and thus a termination effected pursuant to the rule will not necessarily foreclose further proceedings in the matter . . . . ”
This Court has previously compared an order dismissing a civil action for inactivity to an order entering a judgment of non pros. See International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 250 Pa.Superior Ct. 378, 378 A.2d 986 (1977). In such cases, “the crucial fact is that the plaintiff . . . has never been afforded a day in court to present his claim on the merits, albeit due to his own delay or failure to appear. Nevertheless, it is well settled that in . . . these situations the plaintiff is permitted to commence an identical second action provided the statute of limitations has not expired and the costs . . . have been paid.” Commonwealth v. Bailey, 278 Pa.Superior Ct. 51, 54, 419 A.2d 1351, 1352 (1980). See also Brower v. Berlo Vending Co., 254 Pa.Superior Ct. 402, 386 A.2d 11 (1978); Gordon-Stuart Ltd. v. Allen Shops, Inc., 239 Pa.Superior Ct. 35, 361 A.2d 770 (1976); Bucci v. Detroit Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 109 Pa.Superior Ct. 167, 174, 167 A. 425, 427-28 (1933). Compare: Pa.R.C.P. 231(a). The same rule, in my judgment, is applicable where an action has been dismissed pursuant to local rule adopted under Pa.R.J.A. 1901.
The majority impliedly holds that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. My review of the complaint suggests otherwise. The action is in equity and seeks to terminate a current lease and recover damages for continuing violations thereof by the defendant lessor. Accordingly, I am unable to join the majority’s decision to affirm the summary dismissal of the action. Instead, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings in which appellee-defendant, if it chooses to do so, can plead the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense (See Pa.R.C.P. 1030) and the trial court, if the issue be properly raised, can determine the merits thereof.