Court Opinion

ID: 9751547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:35:01.756576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:40.577240
License: Public Domain

STONE (S. J.), P. J.
I dissent.
Appellants’ complaint states that the Westsiders gang used respondents’ property as their gang headquarters. The headquarters was established there because some of the gang members were respondents’ tenants. At these headquarters, gang members conspired to and did commit a multitude of violent crimes on and adjacent to respondents’ premises. Tenants and law enforcement officials repeatedly complained to respondents about the gang’s criminal activities. Respondents had a clause in their lease giving them the power to evict tenants for committing criminal acts on their property. Respondents did not utilize this clause to evict gang members. As a result, gang activities continued on respondents’ property and in the surrounding neighborhood. These activities constituted a dangerous condition which proximately caused the victim’s death. After walking past respondents’ premises, Westsiders gang members chased him from respondents’ property *487to a dead-end street near respondents’ property—allegedly within the gang’s territory—and one of the gang members shot him in the head. These allegations state a cause of action against respondents.
The trial court not only improperly treated appellants’ complaint as proof of their claims, it misinterpreted their allegations.
The trial court determined that appellants’ complaint failed to allege a causal connection between the victim’s death and the condition of respondents’ property because 1) the gang member who shot the victim was not respondents’ tenant, 2) the shootist acted without encouragement from respondents’ tenants, and 3) the shooting occurred off respondents’ premises.
The first and third facts are presumed true. However, the second alleged fact is inaccurate. As pled, the shootist did not act alone but in concert with gang members. The gang members chased the victim along with the killer and all were motivated by gang purposes.
Moreover, although the shootist was not respondents’ tenant, viewing him as an unrelated third party also is inconsistent with the pled facts which state that the shootist was a Westsiders gang member. Like his fellow gang members, he used respondents’ property to threaten and harm people both on and off the premises. The trial court seems to have forgotten that this was a pleading issue, not an issue of proof.
The trial court further appears to have prematurely determined the facts by concluding that evicting gang member tenants would not have prevented the victim’s murder. To the contrary, if respondents had lawfully evicted tenants who were gang members, it may be that the gang would have stopped congregating on their property. If the gang had stopped congregating on respondents’ property, it may be that the victim would not have been attacked by gang members as he walked by the premises. These matters are to be determined in trial, not at the pleading stage.
Although a person generally has no duty to control the conduct of third parties, the rule has no application if the defendant’s failure to act has created an undue risk of harm. (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 48 [123 Cal.Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36].) By unlawfully allowing the Westsiders gang to congregate on their property, appellants claim that respondents have created an undue risk of harm to third persons passing on or near their land. The majority acknowledge that “the congregation of gangs poses a foreseeable risk of harm to the public.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 486.)
According to the majority, the issue here is broadly whether a landowner owes a duty to protect the public against gang members who assault people *488on public streets. That simply is incorrect; this case is not about an assault occurring off the landowner’s property.
This case deals with a landowner’s liability in allowing an alleged known dangerous condition to flourish on its property, which, it is alleged, proximately caused a deadly injury off his property. The issue here is not whether a landowner is liable for isolated criminal acts of unrelated third parties. The issue is whether a landowner owes a duty to protect the public against gang members who congregate on the landowner’s property when the landowner has means to prevent this condition.
The majority impliedly admits that a dangerous condition existed on respondents’ premises by taking judicial notice 1) that street gangs such as the Westsiders generally claim a home territory within which they prohibit rival gang members from entering by violent means; 2) that gang activity spawns violence; and 3) that California is in a state of crisis created by gang violence (Pen. Code, § 186.21).
The leading case authority in the area of dangerous conditions on land is Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358 [178 Cal.Rptr. 783, 636 P.2d 1121]. The majority ignores this authority, as well as the pertinent area of law contained in the Restatement Second of Torts, sections 364 to 370, entitled “Liability of Possessors to Persons Outside of the Land.” Of particular relevance is section 364 of the Restatement, which provides: “A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of the land for physical harm caused by a structure or other artificial condition on the land, which the possessor realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of such harm, if [¶][| (a) the possessor has created the condition, or [¶] (b) the condition is created by a third person with the possessor’s consent or acquiescence while the land is in his possession, or [¶ ] (c) the condition is created by a third person without the possessor’s consent or acquiescence, but reasonable care is not taken to make the condition safe after the possessor knows or should know of it.”
The Sprecher court agreed with the Restatement that a possessor’s liability for harm caused by artificial conditions is determined by ordinary negligence principles. (30 Cal.3d at p. 362, citing Rest.2d Torts, §§ 364-370.) The court also clarified the law relating to dangerous conditions on land in several respects. First, it invalidated the common law rule generally immunizing a landowner from liability for injury caused by a condition of the land to persons or property not on its land. Second, it held that a landowner’s liability for harm caused by a condition of the land, no matter if the condition is natural or artificial, is now determined by ordinary negligence *489principles imposing on a landowner the duty of reasonable care in the maintenance of property. (30 Cal.3d at pp. 363-365, 371.) This duty is based on the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage it. (Id., at pp. 368-369.) Consistent with the Restatement Second of Torts, a landowner is under an affirmative duty to act with regard to a dangerous condition, even if he played no part in the creation of the condition. (30 Cal.3d at pp. 369-370.)
I agree with the majority that a landowner has no right to control and manage property owned by another. (Hamilton v. Gage Bowl, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1706, 1711 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 819].) A fortiori, a defendant cannot be held liable for a dangerous condition of property which defendant did not own, possess or control. (Ibid., citing Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 134 [211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653].) Here, however, the majority seeks, in effect, to reestablish the old common law rule of a landowner’s general immunization against liability for harm occurring outside his property. In other words, the majority appears to believe that a landowner is not liable for a dangerous condition on his land which causes injury outside his land.
The majority’s view is unsupported by its case authority. (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207] [rape in shopping center store controlled by tenant and not by defendant owner of shopping center]; Martinez v. Pacific Bell (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1557 [275 Cal.Rptr. 878] [shooting on another’s property where defendant telephone company had placed a telephone booth]; Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 379 [243 Cal.Rptr. 627] [customer of defendant market struck by car on adjacent public street]; and Steinmetz v. Stockton City Chamber of Commerce (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1142 [214 Cal.Rptr. 405] [fatal stabbing in parking lot over which defendant business had no control].) None of these cases involves the situation of an established dangerous condition over which the landowner allegedly had control. The control which existed here was respondents’ ability to evict gang member tenants.
The majority fails to analyze the major factors which determine if a landowner owes a duty to third persons; the foreseeability of harm to plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of defendant’s burden compared to the consequence to the community, and the availability of insurance for the risk involved. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113 [70 Cal.Rptr. *49097, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 363.) A consideration of these factors here militates in favor of, not against, appellants’ position that respondents owed a duty to the decedent.
The foreseeability factor is fulfilled by the alleged facts in appellants’ complaint that respondents knew the gang congregated on their property and committed violent acts against persons on and off their property. The second factor is met by the victim’s killing as a gang effort.. The third factor of causation is fulfilled by the alleged facts that respondents failed to evict gang member tenants despite respondents’ knowledge of their violent activities, and this failure ensured gang activities would continue on and nearby respondents’ property. The factors of moral blame and policy of preventing future harm are present as shown by the majority’s admission that gangs constitute a serious threat to the public’s safety. The burden/benefit factor also favors appellants; the burden of evicting gang members may be minimal compared to the beneficial community consequence of stopping the gang from using the neighborhood as their “territory.” Finally, landlords normally have insurance for damage caused by tenants.
The majority makes several unsupported conclusions about the purported legal effect of allowing appellants to proceed with their action.
The majority suggests the burden on respondents would be too great. This is based on the erroneous assumption that appellants are advocating a duty by respondents to police the sidewalk and street abutting their property, and on the expense and trouble of filing unlawful detainer actions. Regarding the latter point, this burden is inherent in owning and maintaining any rental property. Regarding the former point, no one is trying to deputize anyone. Appellants’ allegations plainly concern respondents’ failure to clean up their own property. The charge is that respondents knowingly failed to enforce their anticrime lease provision, with the result that the Westsiders gang continued to use respondents’ property for its criminal activities on and off the premises.
The majority additionally erroneously states that appellants are attempting to use the California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (Pen. Code, § 186.20 et seq.) as a basis for “expanding” the duties of landowners. Even if they have the ability to do so, appellants have not pled a cause of action under the act. Their complaint also cannot be interpreted as seeking an “expansion” of landowner duties. Liability for maintaining a dangerous condition on one’s property, the basis of appellants’ complaint, is hardly a new legal theory. (Rest.2d Torts, §§ 364-370; see also Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 511-512 [118 Cal.Rptr. 741, 81 A.L.R.3d *491628] [the law imposes on a landlord the duty to use ordinary care to eliminate a dangerous condition over which the landlord has control]; Moeller v. Fleming (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 241, 244-245 [186 Cal.Rptr. 24] [a landowner may be liable for letting a condition on his property create a dangerous situation on an adjoining public sidewalk]; Rosales v. Stewart (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 130, 133-135 [169 Cal.Rptr. 660] [a landlord may be liable for the dangerous acts of a tenant which were not confined to the leased premises]; Bisetti v. United Refrigeration Corp. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 643, 648-649 [220 Cal.Rptr. 209] [a landlord who has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition on his property owes a duty of care when he has the right to prevent the presence of the dangerous condition].)
Like the trial court, the majority misinterprets appellants’ allegations. The simplistic approach of relying on the single fact that the shooting occurred off respondents’ premises ignores the complete factual allegations presented by appellants’ complaint. When these factual allegations are considered in their entirety, it is evident to me that appellants have pled a cause of action against respondents for premises liability based on the maintenance of a dangerous condition on their land.
I would hold that appellants are entitled to their day in court. I would reverse the judgment.