Court Opinion

ID: 9862790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:11:17.095752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:33:15.036622
License: Public Domain

Burnett, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case.
*633Dupuy was indicted and convicted under Section 39-302,- T.C.A., for an “attempt to procure criminal mis-' carriage” * * * by the “use or employ any instrument or other means with such intent * ** to procure the miscarriage of a- woman”. The majority opinion reverses the conviction below because the “woman never allowed the man to touch her either with his hands or his instruments.” It is thus held that the facts hereinafter to be related do not constitute an attempt.
A generally accepted definition of what constitutes an attempt to commit a crime or violate a certain statute is well stated by the Court of last resort of Virginia in Martin v. Commonwealth, 1954, 195 Va. 1107, 81 S.E.2d 574, 576, as follows:
“It is well settled in this jurisdiction that in criminal law an attempt is an unfinished crime, and is compounded of two elements, the intent to commit the crime and the doing of some direct act towards its consummation, but falling short of the execution of the ultimate design; that it need not be the last proximate act towards the consummation of the crime in contemplation, but is sufficient if it be an act apparently adopted to produce the result intended; mere preparation is not sufficient.”
In this case the uncontroverted facts show that this man had established a reputation in Memphis or at least the police were so informed and suspected him of committing criminal abortions. He confessed to such acts when arrested. As a result of this they planted a trap for the man, had this young woman along with her alleged consort to contact the defendant. After some three or four efforts the defendant was contacted and *634agreed to perform this abortion upon the payment of a certain amount of money. The parties, the woman and man, who contacted this defendant suggested that the operation take place in the hotel but the defendant demurred to this because he was afraid the police might see him and then, at his suggestion, he selected a motel where these parties met for this act to be performed. The parties, that is, the woman and the defendant who was to perform this operation, went into the room, the defendant laid out Ms various instruments and other things that he was to use in this including certain drugs, and prepared for the act. The woman, in an effort to stall him off in the actual doing of the operation for a few minutes until the police arrived, feigned nervousness and asked the defendant to get her a bottle of beer which he did. She drank this beer and after doing so she apparently still seemed to be nervous and he suggested another bottle of beer and just about this time the police arrived and arrested him. The defendant turned back the covers of the bed and spread a piece of cellophane over the sheet. He then took his hypodermic needle and filled it with penicillin ‘ ‘ and told me to take my clothes off and get ready.” He confessed that he was doing such acts because he needed money. There is no controversy as to these facts.
It is true that the defendant did not actually touch the woman in an effort to insert the instruments in her and to perform the operation but he was there ready to do so and had given her this beer to settle her nerves and was just in the act of beginning the operation when he was arrested. This constitutes more than mere preparation. The intent which is the heart of the crime was certainty proven. The man was ready and starting to per*635form .-the-venture. The fact that he did not do the operation was not due to any fault of his. He performed direct ineffectual acts toward the commission of the offense, and when he did this, the attempt to commit the offense was complete. Neither the ineffectuality of his acts nor the prevention of performance by the police was of a kind to rid his acts of their criminal character.
The impossibility of performing this operation was brought about by outside interference, (the police arriving) and grows out of extrenuous facts not within the knowledge and control of the accused. See 8 R.C.L., p. 280, Sec. 298.
The majority seems to think the woman must be pregnant before a conviction can be had under the Statute. The Statute originally contained such a provision. The Codifiers of the 1932 Code omitted such a requirement. The Statute now provides “to procure the miscarriage of a woman’ ’. In this situation the law is:
“A question arises under local statutes whether the defendant can be guilty of an attempt to commit an abortion when the woman was in fact not pregnant.— Thus, when a statute provides for the punishment of an attempt to procure a miscarriage of ‘any woman’ without stating that she must be a ‘pregnant’ woman, it is immaterial whether the woman was actually pregnant or not.” Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 2, Page 568, Sec. 748 and citing cases from many States and none to the contrary.
In this State an overt act is a fact question and a question for the jury. This Court in Johnson v. State, 125 Tenn. 420, 423, 143 S.W. 1134, 1137, Ann.Cas.1913C, 261, said:
*636“This is a question of fact, which must he left to the jury in every case. (Citing authorities.) ‘Overt’ simply means ‘open.’ In homicide cases an overt act is an open act, indicating a present purpose to do immediate great bodily harm. "What this overt act is can be shown in a given case only by the evidence, and the jury must judge of it in the light of all the evidence. The court cannot properly say to them that this or that act is an overt act.”
The general law on the question of an overt act and as to what constitutes is stated thus:
“No definite rule as to what constitutes an overt act, for purposes of an attempt, in particular cases can or should be laid down, but each case must depend largely on its particular facts and the inferences which the jury may reasonably draw therefrom, subject to general principles applied as nearly as can be with a view to working substantial justice.” 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law sec. 75b, p. 140.
In my search of the authorities I find many and sundry attempted definitions as to what constitutes an overt act. This though applies differently to different crimes and to different cases. The best statement as to what constitutes an overt act that I have found is by the Minnesota Court in State v. Dumas, 118 Minn. 77, 136 N.W. 311, at page 314, 41 L.R.A.,N.S., 439, wherein that Court said:
‘ ‘ Our consideration of the adjudged cases has led us to the conclusion that no definite rule, applicable to all cases, can be laid down as to what constitutes an overt act or acts tending to accomplish a particular crime, within the meaning of our statute. Each case *637must depend largely upon its particular facts and the inferences which the jury may reasonably draw therefrom. It may be stated, however, as a general proposition that to constitute an attempt to commit a crime there must be an intent to commit it, followed by an overt act or acts tending, but failing to accomplish it. The overt acts need not be such that, if not interrupted, they must result in the commission of the crime. They must, however, be something more than mere preparation, remote from the time and place of the intended crime; but if they are not thus remote, and are done with the specific intent to commit the crime, and directly tend to some substantial degree to accomplish it, they are sufficient to warrant a conviction. ’ ’
One Court has said very logically, I think, that the accused must take at least one step beyond preparation by doing something directly moving toward and bringing him nearer the crime he intends to commit and though the act need not be the last approximate act to the consummation of the offense intended to be perpetrated, it must be such as will apparently result in the usual and natural course of events, if not hindered by extraneous causes, in the commission of the crime itself.
I would go along in this type of case and under the facts as presented here with the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Stokes v. State, 92 Miss. 415, 46 So. 627, 629, 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 898, when that Court said:
“* * * whenever the design of a person to commit crime is clearly shown, slight acts done in furtherance of this design will constitute an attempt, and this court will not destroy the practical and commonsense ad*638ministration of the law with subleties as to what constitutes preparation and what an act done toward the commission of a crime. Too many snbtle distinctions have been drawn along these lines for practical purposes. Too many loopholes have been made whereby parties are enabled to escape punishment for that which is known to he criminal in its worse sense.”
Thus it is that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion prepared herein. I would affirm because clearly under the undisputed facts which were passed on by the jury, under proper instruction (there is no complaint about the instruction), the factual situation was shown to the jury and was passed on by them and the man found guilty. Under these particular facts and the inferences which the jury may reasonably draw therefrom, the jury found acts constituting an attempt. Clearly the facts do not preponderate against his guilt and an attempt. He comes here presumed to be guilty.