Court Opinion

ID: 9751804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:06:13.329018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:59.845872
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
KLEIN, J.:
¶ 1 I agree with the majority that the trial court properly refused to charge the jury on self-defense. I also agree that the evidence was sufficient to establish criminal conspiracy, although I believe the only conspiracy proven was a conspiracy to commit assault against the victim, not a conspiracy to commit murder. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to support the third-degree murder conviction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent on that issue.
¶ 2 Under Pennsylvania law, if you conspire with another person to conduct a robbery, and, unbeknownst to you, your co-conspirator has a gun, pulls out the gun, and kills someone, the murder would qualify as a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy for which you could be criminally liable as a co-conspirator. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 786 (Pa.Super.1998) (en banc). However, a defendant may not be found guilty of homicide simply because it appears some kind of confrontation was about to take place and another participant, without knowledge, request, or encouragement of the defendant, radically alters the nature of incident by a using deadly weapon that the defendant did not know the participant had. See Commonwealth v. Menginie, 477 Pa. 156, 383 A.2d 870, 873 (1978). Our Court has stated that a defendant may not be liable as a co-conspirator when he or she “had no expectation that a minor scuffle would unexpectedly explode into murder.” Johnson, 719 A.2d at 786.
¶ 3 In this case, the record established that some type of conspiracy did exist between Marquez and his brother, Carlos Jiminez.1 However, the evidence showed nothing more than a conspiracy between the two men to apprehend the victim and presumably beat him up in retaliation for a prior burglary. In my view, it is pure conjecture to conclude that Marquez and his brother shared any intent other than to assault the victim. I do not believe it was a natural and probable consequence of that conspiracy that Marquez’s coconspirator would come along from a separate location and shoot the victim in front of a crowd of people, shooting Marquez in the process. Under these circumstances, I would conclude that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim’s murder was a natural and proba*152ble consequence of the conspiracy to assault him.
¶ 4 To establish a conspiracy, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant (1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person or persons, (2) with shared criminal intent, and (3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Bricker, 882 A.2d 1008, 1017 (Pa.Super.2005). The conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding such conduct may create a web of evidence linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy. Id. An agreement may also be inferred from the relation between the parties, their knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the parties surrounding the crime. Id.
¶ 5 The majority concludes that from the Commonwealth’s evidence, the jury could have inferred that Marquez and Jiminez agreed to commit murder or that Marquez agreed to aid Jiminez in committing murder. (Majority Op. at 149.) I disagree. I believe the prior communication between the brothers regarding Alicea’s location and physical description, coupled with Marquez’s attack of the victim, established nothing more than a conspiracy to commit assault.
¶ 6 It is evident that a conspiracy existed between Marquez and Jiminez. The testimony showed that when he was informed of Alicea’s location, Marquez called someone and told that person to “hurry up” and “come over here.” (N.T. Trial, 10/31/06, at 106.) Marquez and Jiminez arrived in the area of 5th and Cambria Streets within minutes of each other, further suggesting that a common plan existed between them. (Id. at 122.) Although Marquez and Jiminez testified that they merely wanted to hold Alicea for the police, the fact that neither brother called the police, despite having cell phones, contradicts this argument. (Id., 11/2/06, at 40, 48, 84, 98.)
¶ 7 Still, I do not believe this evidence comes close to proving that the brothers had formed a conspiracy to commit murder. Pennsylvania law provides that a person found to be a co-conspirator in a minor crime that develops into a more serious crime is liable for the more serious crime if such crime was a natural and probable consequence of the original conspiracy. See Johnson, supra (defendant who conspired to commit violent attacks with baseball bats is liable for conspiracy to commit third-degree murder because death is natural and probable consequence of such attack, regardless of whether defendant participated in killing); Commonwealth v. La, 433 Pa.Super. 432, 640 A.2d 1336 (1994) (defendant convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for providing knives used in killing, even though defendant only participated in fight and not in killing itself); Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 416 Pa.Super. 449, 611 A.2d 301 (1992) (defendant convicted of third-degree murder and criminal conspiracy when he and three co-conspirators fought victim and one coconspirator used 3/£-foot stick to kill victim).
¶ 8 The evidence in this case does not establish that Alicea’s murder was a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy between Marquez and Jiminez. There is no evidence that Marquez had any knowledge that Jiminez had a gun in his possession. (See N.T. Trial, 11/2/06, at 96, 117.) When Jiminez obtained the gun after the burglary, Marquez was not even present in the home. (Id. at 116.) Jimi-nez did not reveal to police that he had a gun, choosing to keep the gun hidden in his car instead. (Id. at 46, 47.) Without any inclination on Marquez’s part that Jiminez had a gun, Alicea’s murder cannot *153be a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy to assault him. While it may be inferred that Marquez and Jiminez shared an intent to engage in an assault, it cannot be inferred that the two brothers shared a criminal intent to commit murder.
¶ 9 Furthermore, Jiminez shot and killed Alicea in front of a large number of witnesses, and even shot Marquez in the process. (Id. at 108.) Under these facts, and even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that murder was a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy to assault Alicea. In Johnson, supra, this Court specifically distinguished the fact that the defendant had provided the deadly weapons used to kill the victim from a situation where a defendant “had no expectation that a minor scuffle would unexpectedly explode into murder.” 719 A.2d at 786. Here, there is no evidence that Marquez had any expectation that his scuffle with Alicea would result in murder. In fact, eyewitness Anthony Fox’s testimony that “[everything happened so fast” (N.T. Trial, 11/1/06, at 50), supports Marquez’s claim that Jiminez acted suddenly and unexpectedly in pulling out the gun and shooting Alicea.
¶ 10 It is true that in some cases, criminal liability has been extended to a defendant for the acts of his co-conspirators that were committed in furtherance of a common criminal design. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010 (Pa.Super.2002) (defendant convicted of second-degree murder, burglary, and criminal conspiracy for driving co-conspirator to victim’s house, waiting while co-conspirator broke into house, and remaining in car as co-conspirator shot victim in defendant’s presence); Commonwealth v. Baskerville, 452 Pa.Super. 82, 681 A.2d 195 (1996) (defendant convicted of second-degree murder and criminal conspiracy when co-conspirator shot and killed victim during armed robbery).
¶ 11 These cases, however, are distinguishable from the situation before us. In each one, the defendant’s involvement in the actions leading up to the more serious crime supports the notion that the more serious crime arose as a natural and probable consequence of the original crime. Unlike the defendants in Lambert and Baskerville, Marquez did not arrive at the scene with his coconspirator. There is no evidence that Marquez even conversed with Jiminez prior to the shooting. (See N.T. Trial, 11/2/06, at 110.) Furthermore, I believe Alicea’s murder arose out of a conspiracy to commit assault, not a conspiracy to commit robbery or burglary, for which murder would be a natural and probable consequence, as was the case in Lambert and Baskerville.2
¶ 12 Consequently, the evidence of record is insufficient to show that Alicea’s murder was a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy to assault him. While the Commonwealth proved the existence of a conspiracy to commit assault, it failed to prove a conspiracy to commit murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority on this issue.

. Though not mentioned in the majority’s opinion, a third brother, Orlando Jiminez, was the person who initially called Marquez to tell him that he had seen Alicea at 5th and Cambria Streets. Orlando was not a co-defendant in this case.

. One case that did uphold a murder conviction arising out of a conspiracy to commit assault is also distinguishable because the defendant in that case continued to participate in the assault after the deadly act had been performed. See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 418 Pa.Super. 218, 614 A.2d 239 (1992) (defendant convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy for continuing to hit victim after co-conspirator had stabbed victim, even though defendant had no knowledge that co-conspirator had a knife). Here, Marquez released Alicea the moment the shots were fired, thus eliminating any evidence of collusive behavior to kill Alicea. (N.T. Trial, 11/2/06, at 90, 109.)