Court Opinion

ID: 9861508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:08:01.976902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:37.075908
License: Public Domain

LONG, J.,
dissenting.
I believe that because Ambrose Harris’s death sentence was impermissibly influenced by extensive, adverse publicity prior to and during his trial, meaningful proportionality review is impossible to conduct. Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent.
I.
Local news coverage of Harris’s case was massive and intense. The coverage began during the initial disappearance of the victim, Kristin Huggins, in December 1992, lasted throughout the trial, and continued even during the appeal. The local newspaper is well known for its colorfully unsympathetic treatment of criminals, but it singled out Harris for particularly inflammatory treatment; its coverage of his case was out-of-proportion to its coverage of any other capital defendant. Even the trial court stated that Hams was “the most publicly despised criminal that this Court can recall.”
In different articles, the local newspaper referred to Harris as a monster, a beast, a wild animal, and a “useless savage.” On February 24, 1993, the newspaper’s cover was a large picture of Harris next to the giant headline: “Profile of a MONSTER,” and in smaller type, “The Man Who Killed Kristin Huggins Committed His First Rape as a Teenager.” The front section story was juxtaposed next to a half-page picture of Harris and the large caption: “From Boy to Beast.” Another bold headline ran: “I Don’t Think He’s a Man,” quoting the victim’s mother. Another article on February 21, 1993, featured a large mug shot of Harris *386next to the headline: “Huggins Suspect ‘Would Kill You in a Heartbeat.’ ”
Even more disturbing is the newspaper’s heated calls for the immediate execution of Harris without a trial. Editorial responses to readers’ spoken opinions in a section known as “BackTalk” are particularly striking. Under the headline “Bring Back Hangings,” one reader called for a public hanging of Harris on Trenton High School’s football field, and suggested that: “[W]e can invite everybody from all around to see what happens to people who don’t care about other people. Why not give it a shot? I’ll pay for the rope!” The newspaper’s response was: “Nice try, but I was the first to offer to pay for the rope. You can buy lumber for the gallows, though.” The newspaper also ran the headline “KILL HIM” in one-and-a-half inch bold type next to Harris’s picture on the cover of the June 10,1994, paper. On the first day of jury deliberations in the penalty phase, the headline on the editorial page ran: “Death for Harris.”1
During the trial, jurors were not sequestered and were likely to see the local newspaper headlines in stands located around the courtroom and along the juror bus route. The trial court denied Harris’s motion for a change of venue and responded to the publicity instead by making limited inquiries during voir dire whether jurors had been exposed to the newspaper coverage. The trial court, however, did not fully explore the effect of the publicity on the jurors who read it. Nor did the trial court inquire about whether any jurors had learned of Harris’s criminal history, about which they would not have otherwise known, from the publicity. The trial court refused to reroute the juror bus to avoid exposure to the newspaper stands, to require the jury to remain in *387the jury room during lunch, to sequester the jury during the penalty phase, and to voir dire the jurors individually about the publicity during the penalty phase while inflammatory publicity about the case continued.
The trial court, Appellate Division, and this Court agreed that, in light of the volume, intensity, and virulence of the publicity, there was a presumption of prejudice. State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 145, 716 A.2d 458 (1998) (Harris I); State v. Harris, 282 N.J.Super. 409, 413-15, 660 A.2d 539 (App.Div.1995). However, those courts ultimately concluded that no actual prejudice resulted from the publicity because the trial court took adequate remedial measures to counteract the potential effect of the publicity. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 146, 153-54, 716 A.2d 458. It is obvious to me that Harris suffered actual prejudice. The publicity was scathing, calculated to influence the jury, was likely to have reached one or more of the jurors, and was not met by serious efforts to minimize the prejudice. Accordingly, I must concur with Justice Handler’s conclusion that, “the pervasive pretrial and midtrial publicity that surrounded this prosecution created a realistic likelihood that defendant would not receive a fair trial,” and that, “[t]he precautions taken by the trial court to overcome that publicity were woefully inadequate to assure a fair trial.” Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 218, 716 A.2d 458 (Handler, J., dissenting).
II.
Precedent-seeking review, the most significant method of measuring proportionality, State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 335, 724 A.2d 129 (Loftin II), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 897, 120 S.Ct. 229, 145 L.Ed.2d 193 (1999), is largely based upon aggravating and mitigating factors found by the penalty phase jury. Because Harris’s penalty phase jury was most likely influenced by the local newspaper’s scathing publicity, we cannot rely on its findings. Without accurate and reliable findings concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it is simply impossible to compare Harris’s case with other cases to determine his relative culpability. All that we *388can hope to accomplish in Harris’s proportionality review is to assess his moral culpability in the abstract, without reference to other cases or our established standards for comparative culpability. That is an unacceptable means to “administer the most extreme penalty in a fair and consistent manner.” Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 279, 724 A.2d 129.
I, therefore, dissent.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices O’HERN, STEIN and LaVECCHIA — 4.
To vacate and for remandment — Justices COLEMAN and LONG — 2.

 For a full account of the newspaper coverage and selected reprints, see State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 202-10, 212-18, 716 A.2d 458 (Handler, J., dissenting). See also Harris N. Feldman, Free Press vs. Fair Trial in New Jersey: Capital Appeals based on Prejudicial Media Publicity, 31 Rutgers Law J. 209 (1999) (discussing adverse publicity claims in State v. Harris and State v. Timmendequas).