Court Opinion

ID: 9390740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 15:01:14.951473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.467599
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1475   Document: 39     Page: 1   Filed: 04/28/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                  TIMOTHY MOORE,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2022-1475
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:21-cv-01931-CFL, Senior Judge Charles F. Lettow.
                   ______________________

                 Decided: April 28, 2023
                 ______________________

     PETER BROIDA, Arlington, VA, argued for plaintiff-ap-
 pellant.

     RAFIQUE OMAR ANDERSON, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also
 represented by REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.
                  ______________________

     Before PROST, REYNA, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-1475       Document: 39    Page: 2    Filed: 04/28/2023

 2                                                MOORE   v. US

      MOORE, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, LOURIE, DYK, PROST,
     REYNA, TARANTO, CHEN, HUGHES, STOLL, CUNNINGHAM,
     and STARK, Circuit Judges, have joined Part II.B of this
                           opinion.
 PROST, Circuit Judge.
      Timothy Moore appeals the U.S. Court of Federal
 Claims’ dismissal of his complaint alleging that his em-
 ployer, the government, violated the Equal Pay Act
 (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). We vacate the dismissal and
 remand for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
 ion.
                                I
                                A
     The complaint alleges the following facts. Mr. Moore,
 a man, is an Examination Manager at the Washington,
 D.C. headquarters of the Securities and Exchange Com-
 mission (“SEC”). The SEC also employs two women Exam-
 ination Managers (“comparators”) in that same office.
 Mr. Moore and the comparators perform the same work
 and have the same jobs, which require equal skill, effort,
 and responsibility and are performed under similar work-
 ing conditions.
     In 2014, the SEC initiated a Pay Transition Program
 (“Program”) to recalibrate its employees’ pay so that they
 could receive credit for years of relevant work experience
 regardless of their SEC hire date. The Program was open
 to all SEC employees. To be considered for the Program,
 employees had to apply, which required stating interest
 and supplying a résumé that included work history, job ti-
 tles and duties, those jobs’ start and end dates, and
 whether they were full- or part-time. The open period for
 Program applications was approximately September 14,
 2014, to October 14, 2014. The comparators applied for the
 Program during this open period. Mr. Moore, however, did
 not, due to family-related issues then occupying his
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 MOORE   v. US                                              3

 attention. The SEC permitted about ten other SEC em-
 ployees impacted by extenuating circumstances to apply
 for the Program in November and December 2014, after the
 Program’s open period had closed.
      Pay adjustments under the Program began to take ef-
 fect around June 2015. At that time, the comparators’ sal-
 aries were increased via the Program. In August and
 September 2016, Mr. Moore tried to apply for the Program,
 but the SEC’s personnel director declined to consider him.
 Since June 2015, the comparators have been paid more an-
 nually than Mr. Moore.
      According to the complaint, the SEC lacks justification
 under the EPA for any Program-related pay differential be-
 tween him and the comparators because: (1) the Program’s
 application process was unnecessary, given that the SEC
 has always had in its records the information it needed to
 evaluate the proper level of his pay; and (2) the SEC had
 no valid basis for creating, or not extending, a deadline for
 any employee to apply for and obtain the Program’s bene-
 fits. Mr. Moore seeks damages under the EPA greater than
 $10,000 to account for the past and present pay differential
 between him and the comparators.
                              B
     The government moved to dismiss Mr. Moore’s com-
 plaint under Court of Federal Claims Rule 12(b)(6), relying
 heavily on our decision in Yant v. United States, 588 F.3d
 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
     In Yant, a group of nurse practitioners at the Depart-
 ment of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) sued the government, al-
 leging that it violated the EPA by paying nurse
 practitioners (around 80% of whom were women) less than
 physician assistants (around 60% of whom were men) de-
 spite the jobs’ equivalence. The Court of Federal Claims
 granted summary judgment for the government, conclud-
 ing that “the EPA does not contemplate” mixed-gender
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 4                                                 MOORE   v. US

 groups with such a substantial portion of the “putatively
 preferred” gender in the lower-paid category and the “pu-
 tatively disadvantaged” gender in the higher-paid cate-
 gory. Yant v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 264, 272 (2009).
      On appeal in Yant, we affirmed—but for a different
 reason. We first articulated the usual standard for an EPA
 claimant’s prima facie case: showing “that an employer
 pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes for
 equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
 skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
 under similar working conditions.” Yant, 588 F.3d at 1372
 (cleaned up) (quoting Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,
 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974)). But we then added an extra el-
 ement to the claimant’s prima facie case—namely, a show-
 ing that the pay differential “is either historically or
 presently based on sex.” Id. And we affirmed the summary
 judgment because the claimants had failed to raise a tria-
 ble issue of fact on this element. Id. at 1374 (“Because the
 Yant plaintiffs fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact
 that the pay differential . . . is based on sex, they have
 failed to make a prim[a] facie case.”); see also id. (reasoning
 that, because the claimants failed to make such a showing,
 “the ratios of males to females are irrelevant”).
     The government’s motion in this case argued that Yant
 compelled dismissing Mr. Moore’s complaint. It noted the
 complaint’s acknowledgement that the Program was open
 to all employees and that it created a pay differential be-
 tween Mr. Moore and the comparators given Mr. Moore’s
 failure to timely apply for the Program. The government
 also noted the complaint’s lack of allegations that any dif-
 ferential was based on sex. The government therefore ar-
 gued that Mr. Moore had not met Yant’s prima facie
 element of showing that any differential was based on sex.
 See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. at 7–10, Moore v.
 United States, No. 1:21-cv-01931 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 29, 2021)
 (quoting and citing Yant throughout), ECF No. 5. Reiter-
 ating Yant in its reply, the government insisted that the
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 MOORE   v. US                                               5

 Court of Federal Claims was “required to follow Yant, as it
 is binding precedent”; that “post Yant, the [c]ourt no longer
 has the authority to infer that sex discrimination occurred
 simply because there is a difference in pay between men
 and women in jobs requiring similar skills, effort, and re-
 sponsibility”; and that “Yant applies to all EPA cases in the
 [c]ircuit.” Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dis-
 miss at 4, 5, 7, Moore v. United States, No. 1:21-cv-01931
 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 14, 2022), ECF No. 10.
      The Court of Federal Claims relied on Yant to dismiss
 the complaint for failing to state an EPA claim. Moore v.
 United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 747 (2022). The court observed
 that Mr. Moore had the burden to “show[] that discrimina-
 tion based on sex exists or at one time existed,” id. at 750
 (alteration in original) (quoting Yant, 588 F.3d at 1373),
 and that it could “not ignore binding authority from the
 Federal Circuit,” id. at 750 n.3 (referencing Yant). And,
 after noting both (1) the complaint’s acknowledgements
 that the Program was open to all employees but, unlike the
 comparators, Mr. Moore didn’t timely apply for it, and
 (2) that the complaint “does not claim that the difference in
 pay for equal work is the result of past or present discrim-
 ination based on sex,” the court concluded that Mr. Moore
 did “not state a prima facie violation of [the EPA], 29 U.S.C.
 § 206(d)(1).” Id. at 750 (cleaned up).
     Mr. Moore timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un-
 der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
                               II
     We review de novo the Court of Federal Claims’
 Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
 claim. E.g., Creative Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. United States,
 989 F.3d 955, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
     Our discussion has three parts. First, we consider
 whether, assuming Yant is good law, its prima facie stand-
 ard is applicable in this case (it is). Second, we consider en
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 6                                                MOORE   v. US

 banc whether Yant’s prima facie standard is good law (it is
 not). Third, we consider whether affirming the dismissal
 on grounds independent of Yant is appropriate (it is not).
                               A
     Initially, both parties argue on appeal that Yant’s
 prima facie standard doesn’t apply here because this case
 doesn’t involve the same mixed-gender-group fact pattern
 as did Yant. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 38 (“Yant does not
 dictate application to comparator-to-comparator[] cases of
 the analysis for a mixed-gender quasi-class action . . . .”);
 Appellee’s Br. 11–12 (arguing that Yant “was highly de-
 pendent on its unusual facts” and that, given the factual
 differences between Yant and this case, Yant “is of limited
 relevance”). 1
      We are unpersuaded. The court in Yant spoke broadly
 of the prima facie standard governing EPA cases, never
 suggesting that its standard applied only in cases present-
 ing the same fact pattern. If anything, the Yant court dis-
 claimed reliance on that case’s particular facts. See Yant,
 588 F.3d at 1374 (reasoning that, because the plaintiffs
 failed to “demonstrate[] past or present discrimination
 based on sex,” “the ratios of males to females are irrelevant”
 (emphasis added)).
      And indeed, we have applied Yant’s prima facie stand-
 ard in a case involving factual allegations much more sim-
 ilar to this case than to Yant. In Gordon v. United States,

     1   This differs markedly from what the government
 told the Court of Federal Claims. There, the government
 maintained not only that Yant was highly relevant, but
 also that Yant’s prima facie standard “applies to all EPA
 cases in the [c]ircuit.” Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s
 Mot. to Dismiss at 7–8, Moore v. United States,
 No. 1:21-cv-01931 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 14, 2022) (emphasis
 added), ECF No. 10; see also supra pp. 4–5.
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 MOORE   v. US                                               7

 903 F.3d 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2018), vacated on other grounds,
 754 F. App’x 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2019), two women physicians
 with the VA sued the government, alleging that it violated
 the EPA by paying certain men physicians more for equal
 work. Relying on Yant, we affirmed the Court of Federal
 Claims’ summary judgment for the government because
 the women physicians had “point[ed] to no evidence that
 the pay differential complained of was based on sex, either
 historically or presently.” Id. at 1254 (citing Yant, 588 F.3d
 at 1372); see also id. at 1252 (“This court’s decision in
 Yant . . . further requires that, as part of the prima facie
 case, an EPA plaintiff bears the burden of showing that
 discrimination based on sex exists or at one time existed.”
 (cleaned up)). 2
     Accordingly, assuming Yant’s prima facie standard is
 good law, that standard applies in this case and would com-
 pel affirmance.
                              B3
     We now consider en banc whether Yant’s prima facie
 standard is good law. We conclude it is not.
     The EPA states in relevant part:

     2    Although we vacated our opinion in Gordon due to
 the parties’ subsequent settlement and stipulated dismis-
 sal, see 754 F. App’x 1007, we are aware of nothing that
 would call into question the cited reasoning in that opinion.
 See Hadley v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 591, 594–95 (1981)
 (observing that, despite an opinion’s vacatur, its reasoning
 may still “remain[] valid”).
     3    Part II.B of this opinion has been considered by an
 en banc court formed of MOORE, Chief Judge, NEWMAN,
 LOURIE, DYK, PROST, REYNA, TARANTO, CHEN, HUGHES,
 STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
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 8                                                MOORE   v. US

     No employer having employees subject to any pro-
     visions of this section shall discriminate, within
     any establishment in which such employees are
     employed, between employees on the basis of sex by
     paying wages to employees in such establishment
     at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages
     to employees of the opposite sex in such establish-
     ment for equal work on jobs the performance of
     which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibil-
     ity, and which are performed under similar work-
     ing conditions, except where such payment is made
     pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit sys-
     tem; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
     quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differen-
     tial based on any other factor other than sex . . . .
 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
      Nearly fifty years ago, the Supreme Court described
 the EPA’s basic operation as “straightforward.” Corning
 Glass, 417 U.S. at 195. To make out a prima facie EPA
 case, a claimant bears the burden to “show that an em-
 ployer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes
 ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
 equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
 formed under similar working conditions.’” Id. (quoting
 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)).
     Every other circuit articulates an EPA claimant’s
 prima facie case the same (or materially the same) way as
 the Supreme Court. E.g., McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for the
 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 298
 (1st Cir. 1998); Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135–36
 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v.
 Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000);
 Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000);
 EEOC v. Md. Ins. Admin., 879 F.3d 114, 120–21 (4th Cir.
 2018); Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1136–37
 (5th Cir. 1983); Buntin v. Breathitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
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 MOORE   v. US                                               9

 134 F.3d 796, 799–800 (6th Cir. 1998); Fallon v. Illinois,
 882 F.2d 1206, 1208, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. White,
 321 F.3d 710, 715–16 (8th Cir. 2003); Rizo v. Yovino,
 950 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Mickelson v.
 N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1304, 1311 & n.5 (10th Cir.
 2006); Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1995);
 Goodrich v. Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO,
 815 F.2d 1519, 1522–24 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
     In Yant, this circuit added an extra element to an EPA
 claimant’s prima facie case—namely, a showing that the
 pay differential “is either historically or presently based on
 sex.” 4 Yant, 588 F.3d at 1372. This extra element is prob-
 lematic for a few reasons—all related. First, it’s simply ex-
 traneous in view of the Supreme Court’s articulation of an
 EPA claimant’s prima facie case. Second, it violates the
 principle that “the EPA does not require . . . proof of inten-
 tional discrimination.” Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
 ber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 640 (2007), superseded on other
 grounds by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
 Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. Having to prove—on top of
 a pay differential across sexes for equal work—that the dif-
 ferential is “based on” sex is tantamount to having to prove
 that it’s because of sex, which is tantamount to having to
 prove intentional discrimination. Third, it misallocates the
 EPA’s burdens. Once an EPA claimant carries the burden
 on the (properly understood) prima facie case, it becomes

     4    This move was noted at the time. See Yant,
 588 F.3d at 1375 (Prost, J., concurring in the result) (not-
 ing that “the majority imports a novel requirement into the
 plaintiff’s prima facie case”). It has been noted since. See
 Gordon, 903 F.3d at 1256–57 (Reyna, J., additional views)
 (noting that “Yant decidedly changed th[e] standard by re-
 quiring, as part of the prima facie case, evidence that the
 pertinent pay differential is based on sex,” and that “[n]o
 other circuit imposes such a requirement on the plaintiff”).
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 10                                                 MOORE   v. US

 the employer’s burden to prove—as an affirmative de-
 fense—that the pay differential has a permissible non-sex-
 based justification. See Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 195–96,
 see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (providing four permissible
 non-sex-based justifications for paying different sexes dif-
 ferently for equal work—i.e., “where such payment is made
 pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a
 system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
 production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor
 other than sex” (emphasis added)).
      Given these problems with Yant’s extra prima facie el-
 ement, it’s perhaps unsurprising that the government—by
 far the most frequent (and perhaps the only) employer that
 comes before this circuit facing an EPA claim—declines to
 defend this aspect of Yant on appeal. Oral Arg. at
 42:40–43:07 (“We don’t necessarily agree with Yant all the
 way . . . . [S]ome of it has to deal with what the plaintiffs
 are required to do at the opening part of their case. In
 terms of saying that there has to be a showing of past or
 present discrimination, we don’t necessarily agree with
 that part.”); 5 see Appellee’s Br. 11–12 (declining to embrace
 Yant, instead arguing that the Court of Federal Claims
 “did not need to apply Yant” to dismiss the complaint).
      We therefore take this opportunity to bring this circuit
 in line with our sister circuits and the Supreme Court. To
 make out a prima facie EPA case, a claimant bears the bur-
 den to “show that an employer pays different wages to em-
 ployees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the
 performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and re-
 sponsibility, and which are performed under similar work-
 ing conditions.’” Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 195 (quoting

      5   No. 22-1475, https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.
      gov/default.aspx?fl=22-1475_02062023.mp3.
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 MOORE   v. US                                              11

 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). Yant is overruled to the extent it is
 inconsistent with the foregoing.
                               C
      We lastly consider whether to affirm the complaint’s
 dismissal on grounds having nothing to do with Yant. We
 decline to do so. Although the government argues that
 Yant-independent grounds warrant dismissal, see, e.g.,
 Oral Arg. at 17:30–32 (“We don’t have to touch Yant at
 all . . . .”); Appellee’s Br. 11–12 (arguing that the Court of
 Federal Claims “did not need to apply Yant” to dismiss the
 complaint), the government’s arguments in this regard
 have not been adequately developed in this appeal (nor,
 seemingly, in the Court of Federal Claims). Because the
 Court of Federal Claims relied on Yant to dismiss the com-
 plaint, and because Yant’s prima facie standard is no
 longer good law, we believe the appropriate course is to va-
 cate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings con-
 sistent with this opinion. If, on remand, the government
 again pursues a Rule 12 motion, it will be able to develop
 its Yant-independent arguments, and the Court of Federal
 Claims will be able to review the complaint free of Yant’s
 prima facie standard. Additionally, the Court of Federal
 Claims may wish to provide Mr. Moore an opportunity to
 amend his complaint, now that he knows he no longer
 needs to meet Yant’s requirements.
      Before remanding, however, we address a misconcep-
 tion that has become evident on appeal—one that may be
 relevant to the government’s suggestion that Mr. Moore
 “plead[ed] [his] way out of court.” See Oral Arg. at
 25:00–18. Both the government and the Court of Federal
 Claims seem to believe that the complaint affirmatively
 states that the pay differential was not based on sex. See,
 e.g., Appellee’s Br. 12 (“[T]he complaint plainly states that
 the reason for the wage difference was because of the [Pro-
 gram]; and not because of sex/gender.” (emphasis added));
 id. at 15 (“[Mr. Moore] alleges that the complained of wage
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 12                                               MOORE   v. US

 differential was not based on sex . . . .” (emphasis in origi-
 nal)); Moore, 157 Fed. Cl. at 750 (stating that “the com-
 plaint affirmatively acknowledges that no sex-based
 discrimination caused the difference in pay”). The com-
 plaint does not do so. To be sure, it alleges that the reason
 for the pay differential is one that’s seemingly unrelated to
 sex—i.e., Mr. Moore didn’t timely apply for the Program.
 But identifying the reason for the pay differential as one
 that doesn’t seem based on sex is not the same as conceding
 that the differential was not based on sex. Nowhere does
 the complaint do the latter. Appellee’s App’x 1–7; accord
 Reply Br. 17 (“[Mr.] Moore does not concede or agree that
 the salary differentials were not because of, on account of,
 or the result of sex under the EPA.”). 6 To be clear, we ex-
 press no view on the merits of any “pleaded yourself out of
 court” argument that might be developed on remand

      6   We further note that the complaint alleges that the
 SEC lacked an acceptable business reason for (1) requiring
 Program applications at all, and (2) creating, or not extend-
 ing, a deadline for any employee to apply for and obtain the
 Program’s benefits. Appellee’s App’x 6 ¶ 17. These allega-
 tions may be relevant to the EPA’s fourth statutory affirm-
 ative defense—a pay differential “based on any other factor
 other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Some circuits have
 held that the statutory “any other factor other than sex”
 must be job-related or related to a legitimate business rea-
 son. See, e.g., Belfi, 191 F.3d at 136; EEOC v. J.C. Penny
 Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988); Rizo, 950 F.3d
 at 1227. Other circuits have been less willing to restrict
 what qualifies as “any other factor other than sex.” See,
 e.g., Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1462
 (7th Cir. 1994); Taylor, 321 F.3d at 717–20. Our circuit has
 not waded into this debate, and we are in no position to do
 so today. We simply note the issue in the event it becomes
 relevant.
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 MOORE   v. US                                              13

 (whether as to this complaint or any amended one). We
 simply observe that, as currently written, the complaint it-
 self does not affirmatively state or concede that the pay dif-
 ferential was not based on sex.
                              III
     We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. Because the Court of Federal
 Claims’ dismissal relied on Yant, which is now overruled,
 and because we decline to affirm on any Yant-independent
 grounds, we vacate the dismissal and remand for further
 proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                 VACATED AND REMANDED
                            COSTS
 Costs to appellant.