Court Opinion

ID: 9948889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 14:02:16.496159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:17.846643
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-182
                   LT Case No. 2018-CA-1360
                 _____________________________

E&R ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES,
LLC,

    Appellant,

    v.

SIHLE FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
f/k/a GHG Insurance, Inc. and
Sihle Insurance Group, Inc.,

    Appellees.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Bruce R. Anderson, Jr., Judge.

John D. Webb, of John D. Webb, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Michael R. D’Lugo, of Wicker Smith O’Hara McCoy & Ford, P.A.,
Orlando, for Appellees.

                         March 8, 2024

PER CURIAM.

     Appellant (“E&R”) sued Appellee (“Sihle”) for negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty. E&R’s claims stemmed from its purchase
of an insurance policy from Sihle. The trial court granted Sihle’s
motion for summary judgment, finding that result was warranted
for multiple reasons. We disagree as to each. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.

                                I.

    E&R is a disaster management business. Sihle is an insurance
agency.1 Sihle had been advising E&R on insurance matters and
obtaining policies for E&R for many years.

     E&R signed an agreement with Danos & Curole Marine
Contractors, LLC (“Danos”) to help clean an oil spill that occurred
along the Louisiana coast. The agreement required E&R to
indemnify Danos and its affiliated companies for certain legal
claims that might arise during the project. E&R bought an
insurance policy through Sihle. Based on its understanding of its
communications with Sihle, E&R believed the policy that Sihle
procured met the needs of the Danos contract, including those
concerning indemnification.

     An accident later occurred at the Louisiana job site, and
personal injury litigation ensued. Danos filed a third-party
complaint against E&R, seeking indemnification pursuant to their
contract. In the proceedings that followed, E&R discovered that
the insurance policy it bought through Sihle did not provide the
coverage that E&R believed it did. Ultimately, E&R settled the
Louisiana litigation.

     E&R then filed suit against Sihle for negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty. Both claims were based on E&R’s belief that Sihle
botched its review of the Danos contract and the related insurance
policy that it procured—which left E&R exposed when the accident
occurred in Louisiana. E&R sought restitution for the Louisiana
settlement.

    Sihle moved for summary judgment, and the court granted the
motion. The court ruled that E&R could not establish standing,

    1 Sihle is the successor of GHG Insurance, Inc. In the interest

of simplicity, we refer to GHG and Sihle by the same name
(“Sihle”).

                                2
that E&R’s complaint was barred by judicial estoppel, and that
E&R could prove neither the breach nor damages elements of its
claims. We address each of these rulings below.

                                II.

     When seeking summary judgment, the movant must show (1)
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and (2) “the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.510(a). “The court views the evidence in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party, and a genuine dispute occurs when the
evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that
party.” Welch v. CHLN, Inc., 357 So. 3d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA
2023). On appeal, the standard of review is de novo. See id.

                                A.

     We first consider E&R’s argument that the court erred by
disregarding Michael Greene’s affidavit, which precipitated the
court’s ruling that E&R lacks standing.2 Greene is E&R’s chief
financial officer and one of its owners. E&R cited his affidavit as
part of its opposition to Sihle’s motion for summary judgment.

     In his affidavit, Greene reported that he maintains financial
records for E&R and a related business, Eisman & Russo, Inc.
(“Eisman”). Greene swore that Eisman “internally transferred
money to E&R in order to settle the Louisiana Litigation,” and that
as such, E&R is indebted to Eisman.

     In its summary judgment order, the court discounted Greene’s
affidavit as “self-serving” and “an attempt to establish standing.”
Among its findings, the court determined that Greene’s affidavit
contradicted his deposition testimony on the issue of “the payment

    2 E&R claims the trial court’s “first error” was its “wholesale

verbatim adoption” of Sihle’s proposed summary judgment order.
See Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 2004). Since we
reverse the court’s order on the merits of its legal conclusions, we
need not decide whether the order was also reversible under
Perlow and its progeny.

                                 3
of the settlement funds,”—i.e., whether E&R had already
reimbursed Eisman for the settlement payment. Having rejected
Greene’s affidavit, the court concluded that E&R could not show
an injury needed to establish standing, reasoning there was “no
record that the reimbursement payment was paid and/or remains
outstanding.”

     The trouble with the court’s analysis is that it does not
account for the court’s previous order granting E&R’s motion to
suppress Greene’s deposition transcript. In that order, the court
found there was no evidence that “Greene was afforded a
reasonable amount of time to review and read his deposition
transcript and fill out an errata sheet.” The court gave Greene
fifteen days “to read and review his deposition transcript and
complete the errata sheet if so required after his review.”

     In keeping with the court’s order, Greene submitted an errata
sheet. Among the corrections to his deposition listed there,
Greene’s errata sheet reported that E&R still owed money to
Eisman from the Louisiana settlement. The errata sheet explained
that this correction was the result of an “[i]nternal accounting
clarification.”

     The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow a witness to make
changes to the form or substance of his or her deposition
transcript. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310(e); see, e.g., Dungan v. Mem’l
Health Sys., Inc., 325 So. 3d 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020). Here, the
court expressly allowed Greene to make such changes, and Sihle
never successfully re-opened Greene’s deposition to inquire about
the changes.3 See Dungan, 325 So. 3d at 925 (“We write specifically

    3 Greene sat for a follow-up deposition, but E&R’s counsel
terminated the session because he believed that Sihle’s counsel
was asking questions beyond the limits of the court’s order, which
allowed Sihle “to re-depose [Greene] within the narrow scope” of
his deposition amendments. Afterwards, the court ordered Greene
to complete his follow-up deposition via written questions under
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.320. However, “by agreement of
counsel and for reasons asserted in the Motion,” the court later
granted E&R’s motion to terminate Greene’s written deposition.

                                 4
to note that, while [a witness] was permitted to make substantive
changes to his deposition testimony pursuant to Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.310(e), Petitioner is not required to simply accept
the amended testimony. [The witness] has put himself in a position
where his deposition can be re-opened to allow Petitioner to
inquire about the changed testimony.”).

     Given this record, the court erred in its treatment of Greene’s
affidavit. Because the court allowed Greene to amend his
deposition, any comparison of his deposition to his affidavit had to
account for the deposition amendments, including the one
reflecting that E&R still owed a debt from the Louisiana
settlement. Accordingly, the court should not have excluded
Greene’s affidavit as contradictory. See Kling v. DiSclafani, 983
So. 2d 648, 654 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (observing that while a party
may not repudiate his deposition testimony with an affidavit to
avoid a summary judgment, he may explain his deposition
testimony in an affidavit that is not contradictory, “even though it
creates a jury issue on the opponent’s motion for summary
judgment”). And had the court considered Greene’s affidavit and
his amended deposition in a light most favorable to E&R, it would
not have ruled that E&R lacked standing.

                                 B.

     The court also awarded summary judgment based on judicial
estoppel. The court found that in the Louisiana litigation, E&R
argued that its contract with Danos was invalid, meaning that
E&R had no duty of indemnification. However, the court found
that “E&R completely changed” that position in this case by
“alleging that the [Danos] contract was in fact valid” and that
under the contract, E&R was obligated to indemnify Danos and its
subcontractors.

     “Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that is used to
prevent litigants from taking totally inconsistent positions in
separate judicial, including quasi-judicial, proceedings.” Salazar-
Abreu v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc., 277 So. 3d 629,
631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (quoting Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.,
790 So. 2d 1061, 1066 (Fla. 2001)). It has four elements, the first
of which is that a party successfully maintained a claim or position

                                 5
in a former proceeding. Id. (quoting Grau v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 396, 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).

     For this first element to be present, the court in the prior case
must have “adopt[ed] the claim or position either as a preliminary
matter or as part of a final disposition.” Brown & Brown, Inc. v.
Sch. Bd. of Hamilton Cnty., 97 So. 3d 918, 920 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
Such judicial adoption does not occur when “the prior claim was
resolved by settlement.” Id. at 921; see also Zeeuw v. BFI Waste
Sys. of N. Am., Inc., 997 So. 2d 1218, 1220–21 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

     Here, as Sihle acknowledges, the Louisiana litigation ended
in a settlement. Indeed, E&R attached a copy of the settlement
agreement to its complaint. Because there is no indication that the
Louisiana court adopted any positions advanced by E&R—
including those concerning the validity of the contract between
E&R and Davos—the first element of judicial estoppel is not
present. Thus, the court should not have granted summary
judgment on the estoppel theory.

                                 C.

    The court also concluded, apparently based on the notion that
E&R sent only portions of the Danos contract to Sihle, that Sihle
obtained the insurance E&R requested (thereby defeating the
breach elements in E&R’s complaint). And the court found that in
any event, the insurance E&R claims Sihle should have obtained
was unavailable in the marketplace (thereby defeating the
damages elements in E&R’s complaint).

     Again, a genuine factual dispute occurs when the evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, would
allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that party. Welch,
357 So. 3d at 1278. Here, on the question of whether Sihle obtained
the insurance that E&R requested, Greene’s affidavit alleged that
he relied upon Sihle, “by and through [his] longstanding personal
and professional relationship with” Sihle’s agent, “to properly
procure for E&R . . . all necessary insurance” for its “business
operations, including [those] with Danos.” Greene further alleged
that he sent the Danos contract to Sihle for “review in order to
procure insurance coverages as set forth in that contract.” Sihle’s

                                  6
agent, in his deposition, did not dispute that Greene sent him at
least portions of the Danos contract (though he could not recall
viewing the contract in its entirety). He also acknowledged that he
later informed Greene that he mishandled the E&R/Danos matter.

    Taken in a light most favorable to E&R, this evidence creates
a genuine dispute about whether Sihle obtained the insurance that
E&R requested—i.e., insurance that fully comported with the
Danos contract. Because of this genuine dispute, summary
judgment was not appropriate.

     As for the question about the availability of insurance, even if
coverage was not available in the marketplace—as Sihle
maintains—that fact would not necessarily be fatal to E&R’s
complaint. “An insurance agent or broker who agrees or
undertakes to procure certain insurance coverage owes his
principal a duty to do so within a reasonable time.” deMarlor v.
Foley Carter Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). When
the agent fails to do so, even if the agent “is not to blame for the
failure,” he “may nevertheless become liable for damages if he fails
to inform his principal that the requested insurance has not been
procured.” Id.

     Applying this principle, a reasonable jury could find that even
if the insurance E&R wanted was unavailable in the marketplace,
Sihle should have timely notified E&R so that E&R could consider
its alternatives—such as seeking to remove the indemnity
provision from the Danos contract. Therefore, the court erred by
concluding that the unavailability of coverage—even if true—was
dispositive of E&R’s claims.

                                III.

     “A reversal of summary judgment is not a finding for the
plaintiff, but merely a recognition that the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.” Welch, 357 So. 3d at
1280. Here, the evidence—including Greene’s affidavit—is such
that a reasonable jury could find for E&R.4 Accordingly, the court

    4 We note that if the case proceeds to trial, Sihle will be able

to use Greene’s “original and changed answers” from his deposition

                                 7
should not have entered summary judgment for Sihle. See Fla. R.
Civ. P. 1.510(a).

    REVERSED AND REMANDED.

WALLIS, JAY, and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.

                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

“to cross-examine and to impeach” him. See Dungan, 325 So. 3d at
925.

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