Court Opinion

ID: 9558150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:03:26.207615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:22.214518
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. The law should be so written so as to not give an advantage to a defendant or to the State. It should be written to treat a defendant and the State impartially. The majority opinion gives to the defendant a special right to which he is not entitled and deprives the State of the right to enforce the law.
In every plea bargain, a defendant is given an opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser offense and many times to have several other crimes for which he is charged dismissed. The prosecutor will not file additional charges which could later result in a habitual criminal charge or consecutive sentences in the event a defendant is found guilty.
It is surely understood in plea bargaining that the State will act in good faith and that the defendant will abide by the law while he is awaiting sentencing.
*858One of the purposes served by plea bargaining is to give a defendant an opportunity to clear himself of more serious criminal charges and to obtain a lesser punishment, with the understanding that one of his aims is rehabilitation.
The State likewise obtains certain benefits from plea bargaining. It expeditiously clears up many crimes and avoids lengthy trials. The courts in approving plea bargains hope and assume that leniency will enhance the defendants' chance of rehabilitation.
To permit a defendant to claim the benefit of his plea bargain even though he has continued to pursue a course of unlawful conduct defeats the positive purposes of plea bargaining. When the prosecuting attorney agrees to make a recommendation and the defendant commits other crimes while awaiting sentencing, it is a useless act to require the prosecutor to recommend probation to the plea judge. How can any conscientious judge grant probation in the face of unrefuted evidence that its terms have already been broken? Requiring the prosecutor to recommend probation under such circumstances compromises his conscience and his oath of office.
In this case the commission of new crimes was not seriously disputed.5 His attorney merely argued that probation should still be afforded him. The attorney did not object when the prosecutor refused to recommend probation and *859made no recommendation, nor did he move to withdraw the guilty plea. These facts are sufficient to constitute waiver.
I do not agree that where the defense does not request a hearing, it is incumbent on the court to hold one anyway to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty of crimes reported in the presentencing report. Denying probation is not a conviction of such crimes. We have always recognized that a court may be aided by hearsay evidence in determining the sentence to be imposed. The defendant may discredit the report if he can, and presumably the court will disregard any reported facts which are challenged and not established to its satisfaction.
Furthermore, I do not agree that this is a proper case in which to grant relief, as there has been no significant change in the law since the sentence was imposed.
The facts of this case do not bring into play all of the constitutional rights that the majority envisions. Lest there be any confusion, let me point out the holding in In re Keene, 95 Wn.2d 203, 622 P.2d 360 (1980). The defendant was charged with the crime of forgery, RCW 9A.60.010(4), (5). Neither Keene's admission contained in his statement nor the facts subsequently revealed in the presentence report would support the conviction of forgery. The instrument was neither falsely made nor falsely completed.
A person cannot, constitutionally, be convicted of a crime where there is no evidence to show that he committed that offense; nor can his plea of guilty to an information which charges a crime for which defendant's acts would not constitute a crime charged, be sustained.
The case holds that an individual cannot be imprisoned for a crime which he did not commit; and whenever such a miscarriage of justice is called to the attention of the court, the individual is entitled to be released from imprisonment, regardless of the legal procedures involved.
I would deny the petitioner any relief.
Brachtenbach, C.J., and Dore and Dimmick, JJ., concur with Rosellini, J.

 At time of sentence James never denied the facts as set forth in the supplemental presentence report. He simply stated he had learned his lesson and deserved another chance. The report recited:
According to the officers' report on the Simple Assault Charge, the victim, Eric Schweiger gave $25 to James for a prostitute. The prostitute refused to go with the victim and he wanted his money back from James. When James advised the victim that he did not have the money, the victim demanded it back and James hit him in the head with a pool cue. James then ran and the victim chased him.
James told the Officers that he did not take victim's money but was willing to give it back. He admitted having hit the victim with a pool cue but said that the victim was coming after him with a knife. . . .
This case was set for trial for January 7, 1980, and we assume the case was never heard as James was sentenced to the Department of Institutions on December 10, 1979.