Court Opinion

ID: 9868332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:30:16.800214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:49.619997
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear.
It is frankly stated by KnoxTenn Theatres, Inc., in its petition to rehear that the insistences advanced in this petition are closely “interwoven” with arguments previously made. Any extensive response to these insis-tences would necessarily amount principally to a repetition of the statements in our opinion heretofore rendered.
It is first asserted that it is not declared a privilege either by the statute now under consideration or any other statute to attend places of amusement where an admission fee is charged.
The original brief filed by this petitioner in support of its assignments of error correctly construed the act as making it a taxable privilege to attend in Knox County the places of amusement referred to in the act. The petition to rehear indirectly recognizes and expressly anticipates the thought that “the levy of the tax implies the purpose to create a privilege”. It is now insisted, however, “that the privilege must be created beforehand” or by the act itself by express words.
 While we find no decision on the exact point, our Court does not seem to have considered such a rigid requirement as essential. By way of illustration, the Tennessee Inheritance Tax Law enacted by Chapter 29 of the Public Acts of 1929, Extra Session, no where expressly *125declares the receiving of property from the estate of decedents a taxable privilege. Tet, in Hutchinson v. Montgomery, 172 Tenn. 375, 379, 112 S. W. 2d 827, 830, this Court in discussing that act held that the act indicates an intent to impose a tax “upon the privilege of receiving property” and concludes with the statement, page 384 of 172 Tenn., page 830 of 112 S. W. 2d, that the act “is a tax upon the privilege of acquiring” property from the estate of a decedent. To hold upon this point as insisted in the petition to rehear would amount to a violation of the general rule that “we must give full scope to the legislative intent and apply a rule of construction that will not defeat the plain purposes of the act”. Bergeda v. State, 179 Tenn. 460, 466, 167 S. W. 2d 338, 340, 144 A. L. R. 696. It seems to be recognized on all sides in this case that the plain purpose of this act, as reflected by its provisions, is to make it a taxable privilege to attend the places of amusement referred to in the act. By necessary implication this statute makes the act in question a taxable privilege.
The next insistence is that “the General Assembly is without authority to declare the right to attend such amusements a taxable privilege”. "We doubt that we can make any more comprehensive response to this insistence than that made in our original opinion. We do direct attention, however, to the opinion written for this Court by Chief Justice GreeN in the case of Seven Springs Water Co. v. Kennedy, 156 Tenn. 1, 299 S. W. 792, 56 A. L. R. 496, wherein it is said: “In fact it has been said in two of our cases that, if thought proper, the Legislature might make the business of farming a privilege. . . . The term ‘privilege’ embraces any and all occupations that the Legislature may in its discretion choose to declare a privilege and tax as such, , , , Under more *126recent cases, a single act may be declared a privilege.” A number of our cases are- cited by the Chief Justice in support of these statements at page 5 of 156 Tenn., 299 S. W. 793.
Next there is renewed the insistence that the act imposes upon those attending such places of amusement in Knox County a burden not so imposed upon people elsewhere in the state and confers special favors upon Knox County and Knoxville. We undertook to dispose of this insistence in the opinion now very courteously questioned. It must be recognized that the statute in question was intended to and does primarily effect Knox County and Knoxville in their governmental capacities, and that the payment of the tax by the individual exercising the taxable privilege is the resulting incident of that primary purpose. That conclusion is inescapable. This being-true, the fact that it affects only Knox County and Knoxville does not render the act unconstitutional unless it suspends a general law applicable to all other counties and cities of the state, in which event it must be predicated upon a reasonable basis. Darnell v. Shapard, 156 Tenn. 544, 3 S. W. (2d) 661; Town of McMinnville v. Curtis, 183 Tenn. 442-448, 192 S. W. (2d) 998, and cases there cited. The act does not suspend any general law applicable to the other counties and cities of this state.
Our opinion previously rendered disposed of the question with reference to requiring operators of these places of amusement to collect the tax imposed from their customers. So, it will not be again discussed, since we reached what we consider to be a correct conclusion upon that question.
The petition to rehear must be denied.
All concur.