Court Opinion

ID: 9489807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:24:46.02332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:43.752341
License: Public Domain

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Charita Chalmers was a star employee of Tulon Company, and Tulon had rapidly pro*1022moted her to the top management position in its Richmond office. There is no suggestion in the record that she' did not perform her job weH, that she was ever disciplined before the incident in this case, or that Tulon’s Richmond office did not function successfully. Nevertheless, Chalmers was fired without warning after she sent a proselytizing letter to her supervisor as a continuation of their earlier religious discussions. The letter, written because of Chalmers’ unease with her supervisor’s business practices, urged her supervisor “to get right with God” by repenting. While the letter stated that the supervisor was doing “some things” that were not pleasing to God, it made no specific accusations. Chalmers sent the letter to her supervisor’s home, explaining, “I wrote this letter at home so if you have a problem with it you can’t relate it to work.” She also wrote that she expected no response and that any response should be made to God.
After Chalmers’ supervisor made the request to his superior that Chalmers be fired, Tulon discovered that Chalmers had written a similar letter to a fellow employee. Accordingly, Tulon included the writing of both letters as its reason for terminating Chal-mers. The letters violated no company policy, practice, or instruction, express or implied.
In affirming dismissal of Chalmers’ religious discrimination claim on review of summary judgment, the majority has repeatedly and unfairly cast Chalmers’ religious activity in the worst possible light, failing to take the facts in the light most favorable to her. This approach is not only unnecessarily hostile to Chalmers’ religious practice, it violates our standard for reviewing summary judgments by taking facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Evans v. Technologies Applications and Service Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir.1996) (requiring that facts be viewed in the light most favorable to non-moving party). Not only must we take facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but we must also draw all legitimate inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Evans, 80 F.3d at 958. The majority opinion turns our standard of review on its head, indulging all of Tulon’s characterizations of the facts, ignoring every inference in support of Chalmers, and finding that there is no factual support for Chalmers’ claim.
For example, instead of treating the letter that Chalmers sent to her supervisor in a light most favorable to her, the majority accepts Tulon’s characterizations and refers to the letter variously as disturbing, annoying, judgmental, accusatory, and critical. The majority also accepts the disputed claim that the letter disturbed Tulon’s workplace and rejected Chalmers’ claim that it was sent as sensitive, caring advice, making no accusations and demanding no response. And it is this single letter — the characterization and effect of which is so disputed — that indisputably led LaMantia to ask that Chalmers be fired.
Moreover, after taking the facts in a light hostile to Chalmers, the majority subjects those facts to a legal standard inconsistent with the language of Title VII. The majority imposes on Chalmers, as a condition to recovery, the requirement not imposed by statute to notify her employer in advance of her intent to send the letters in question and of their significance to her religion. Furthermore, it imposes on Chalmers the burden of proving that her religious practice could be accommodated by her employer, reversing the burden statutorily assigned to the employer that the practice could not reasonably be accommodated.
Because I would find that the facts taken in a light most favorable to Chalmers make out a prima facie case under Title VII for religious discrimination and that Tulon has not, as a matter of law, demonstrated undue hardship in accommodating Chalmers’ religion, I would remand this case for trial. Therefore, I dissent.
I
The record before the district court, taken in the light most favorable to Chalmers, demonstrates the following facts.
Chalmers has been a Baptist all her life, and in June 1984, she became an evangelical Christian, accepting Jesus Christ as her personal savior. Since then, she has tried to *1023influence others to accept Jesus and partake of- salvation. In accord with her belief that she should share the gospel, Chalmers openly speaks with others about religion and their spiritual health. She believes that she should look for opportunities to share the gospel with others, especially when others initiate religious conversations.
Chalmers began work for Tulon in October 1988 and, because of her superior job performance, was made supervisor in 1991. As supervisor, she was the only management-level employee in Tulon’s Richmond plant. Chalmers reported to Richard LaMantia, who managed plants throughout the eastern United States and visited • Richmond a few days each month.
LaMantia knew that Chalmers was a deeply religious woman and, prior to the incident giving rise to her termination, appeared to respect her for it. For instance, when in Chalmers’ presence, LaMantia generally refrained from using profanity, whereas around others who did not care, “he would say whatever he wanted to say.” Chalmers and La-Mantia had many religious discussions, often initiated by LaMantia. LaMantia confided in Chalmers that three other persons had similarly urged him to accept Jesus Christ. Pri- or to the time that Chalmers was fired, Chal-mers and LaMantia were having religious discussions approximately every three months. LaMantia never discouraged these discussions, never expressed discomfort, and never indicated that it was improper for Chalmers to try to influence others in a religious way.1
In the course of their work together in Richmond, it became clear to Chalmers that LaMantia was misrepresenting to customers Tulon’s ability to fulfill orders quickly. Chal-mers said she was “led by the Lord” to write him because LaMantia’s lying was “one of those things he needed to stop doing,” “one of the things he needed to get right with. God.” Chalmers felt that she could write LaMantia about his lying because LaMantia believed in God and she and LaMantia had a personal relationship — Chalmers and La-Mantia had shared religious experiences and LaMantia had taken Chalmers and her husband out to dinner. Chalmers did not, however, specifically refer to lying in her letter. Not, wanting the letter to affect their relationship at work, Chalmers sent the letter to LaMantia’s home and requested no response to it.2
When the letter arrived, LaMantia’s estranged wife opened it and thought that the portion of the letter referring to “things in [LaMantia’s] life that God was not pleased with” in fact referred to adultery. Mrs. La-Mantia ' called Chalmers and asked her whether LaMantia was having an affair with an individual in the New Hampshire area where LaMantia supervised another facility. Mrs. LaMantia explained that she and La-Mantia had separated three years earlier because of LaMantia’s infidelity and that she now suspected it again. Chalmers told Mrs. LaMantia that she was unaware of any affair and that the letter was not referring to any adulterous conduct. Chalmers stated she was sorry that the letter upset Mrs. LaMan-tia, assuring Mrs. LaMantia that she was referring only to LaMantia’s business practices. Unconvinced of Chalmers’ explanation, Mrs. LaMantia called her husband. Bel cause of Mrs. LaMantia’s misinterpretation of the letter and refusal to accept Chalmers’ explanation, the LaMantias’ relationship became further strained. When Chalmers heard that the letter had been misinterpreted and had upset the LaMantias, she called the LaMantias’ home and,. on reaching no one, left a message on the answering machine that she was sorry and did not mean to offend anyone.
Angered that Chalmers had sent the letter, LaMantia informed Tulon’s vice president of administration, Craig Faber, that he could no longer work with Chalmers and *1024requested that Chalmers be fired. LaMantia and Faber agreed that Faber should “handle the termination.” Faber conducted a brief investigation without questioning Chalmers and then sent Chalmers a letter of termination.
While investigating the incident, Faber discovered that Chalmers had sent another religious letter to Tulon employee Brenda Combs. Combs had confided in Chalmers that she had been involved in an adulterous relationship and had recently given birth out of wedlock. Chalmers also knew that Combs had been away from work for months, attempting to recover from an illness that doctors had been unable to diagnose. In her letter to Combs, Chalmers tried to persuade Combs to repent of her sexual misconduct. She explained that when people sin, “[God] will allow things to happen to them or their family until they open their eyes and [accept] Him,” and “God can put a sickness on you that no doctor could ever find out what it is.” Chalmers added, though, “I’m not saying this is what happened to you.”3 While Combs was upset upon reading the letter, she explained in a statement that she did not find it offensive and, more importantly, that it did not affect her working relationship with Chalmers. Indeed, Combs never complained to anyone at Tulon, and she acknowledged to Tulon management that she received the letter only when Faber independently found out about it and contacted her. During the two-week period after the letters were sent and before Chalmers was fired, there was no adverse change in the Richmond workplace. The only disruption at Tulon’s Richmond plant came when employees learned that Chalmers was being fired for sending the letters. “They couldn’t believe it.”
Even though Combs has stated that the letter to her “did not offend me nor did it damage our working relationship,” Faber informed Chalmers that she was being fired because she had made “a serious error in judgment ... in sending letters to Rich La-Mantia and Brenda Combs,” which “offended them ... and damaged[their] work relationship.” The parties agree that Tulon fired Chalmers because she wrote the letters, and all agree that the letters addressed religious concerns. Chalmers concluded at the time of her termination, “I was terminated because I had written two letters to Rich and Brenda regarding salvation and God.” Similarly, in his May 6, 1994 affidavit, Faber acknowledged that the letters were “religious in nature.” Indeed, the very language of the letters unquestionably support that conclusion.
Challenging her termination from employment, Chalmers filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for religious discrimination and failure to accommodate her religious practices. The district court entered summary judgment, concluding that Chalmers had not made out a prima facie case and that even if she had, Tulon had articulated a, legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her firing. Without articulating the reason, the court added,
And the fact that Ms. Chalmers in her zealotry writes disruptive letters in effect accusing people of criminal activity and things of that nature has such an impact on other employees’ ability to perform in the work place, that the company would have been derelict in its responsibility if it didn’t try to get rid of her and have a less disruptive employee in the lineup.
The district court pointed to no facts in the record to support those conclusions.
From the district court’s judgment, Chal-mers appealed.
II
The provision of Title VII on which Chal-mers bases her claim makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual ... because of such individual’s ... religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). “The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious ... practice ... unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s ... practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (emphasis added). The legal analysis for a claim under those provisions must therefore address two burdens: Chalmers’ burden of showing that she was fired because of a religious practice *1025and Tulon’s burden of demonstrating that it could not accommodate the practice without undue hardship.
To satisfy her burden and establish a pri-ma facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII, Chalmers must prove (1) that she engaged in a religious practice, (2) that the employer discharged her or took other adverse employment action against her, and (3) that the employer’s action was motivated at least in part by her religious practice. In short, she must show she was discharged “because of’ the religious practice.
Because Chalmers’ conduct in sending proselytizing letters was unquestionably a religious practice and she was discharged, she has indisputably established the first two elements of her case. As for the third element, a factfinder could reasonably conclude that her discharge was motivated by the religious practice of sending proselytizing letters. Tulon advised Chalmers she was being terminated because she sent the two letters, and indeed, the majority appropriately notes that “[t]he parties agree that Tulon fired Chalmers because she wrote the letters.” Op. at 1019. In providing evidence to establish these three statutorily required elements, Chalmers has made out a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Yet the majority would impose a significantly greater burden on Chalmers without explaining how its views are either required or warranted by the statute.
Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas RR Co., 736 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir.1984), the majority concludes that Chalmers’ claim was fatally flawed because she somehow failed to give Tulon notice of her religious beliefs. Obviously, if an employer is to be charged with discrimination against an employee “because of’ the employee’s religious beliefs or practice, the employer must be aware of the beliefs or practice and understand their religious nature. But the majority errs both legally and factually when it decides that Chalmers’ claim must fail because she did not explicitly inform Tulon that she would write religious letters to co-workers.
A
It is legal error to construe Title VII to impose a burden on the employee of informing her employer in advance about each practice the employee will follow in furtherance of religious beliefs. It is undoubtedly true that an employer cannot be held liable for religious discrimination by, for example, assigning an employee to work on Sunday when the employer has no knowledge that work on Sunday violates the employee’s religious beliefs. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 116 (4th Cir.1988); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (7th Cir.1978). But that does not impose an additional religious disclosure burden on Title VII plaintiffs. Instead, it is merely a recognition that Title VII’s “because of’ requirement cannot be satisfied where the employer has no knowledge that the conduct warranting discharge was religious in nature.
The majority has grafted a claim-defeating notice requirement onto the statutory requirements for establishing a prima facie case, concluding as a .matter of law, “any knowledge Tulon may have possessed regarding Chalmers’ beliefs could not reasonably have put it on notice that she would write and send accusatory letters to eowork-ers’ homes.” Op. at 1020. This notice requirement would preclude liability for every adverse employment action taken because of a religious practice if the employer did not know in advance that the practice would take place, even though the employer recognized the practice as religious in nature. Under that rule an employer would automatically be exonerated from liability when, e.g., it fired an employee who arrived at work on Ash Wednesday with a cross of ashes marked on her forehead, because the employee violated a work rule against face paint. The irrationality of such a rule is readily apparent.
In Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir.1995) (en banc), the Eighth Circuit appropriately avoided such an irrational rule. It noted, “Because the first reprimand related directly to religious activities by Mr. Brown, we agree with the district court that the defendants were well aware of the potential for conflict between their expectations *1026and Mr. Brown’s religious activities.” Id. at 654 (emphasis added). The court concluded that the employer violated Title VII when it fired Brown (without attempting accommodation) based on the religious activities giving rise to the first reprimand. See id. at 657. Brown thus stands for the precise proposition that the majority rejects: Religious conduct violating employment requirements may be sufficient to put an employer on notice of the need to accommodate the religious practice.
The wisdom of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Brown is demonstrable by understanding the irrational ramifications of the majority’s ruling. The majority’s rule would mean that as a matter of law a Jew could not make out a -prima facie case under Title VII if, on the first day of work, he was fired for wearing a yarmulke that, unknown to him, violated his company’s dress code. Similarly, a Muslim would have no case for being fired the first time mandatory company meetings conflicted with his prayer schedule; a Jehovah’s Witness would have none upon being fired for her disrespect in refusing to attend a company-wide celebration of the CEO’s birthday; a Mormon would have none for being fired' the first time he refused to work late on church-wide family nights. And, of course, as the majority concludes, an evangelical Baptist’s case would fail as a matter of law if she is fired the first time she puts in writing the religious ideas that she has been permitted and encouraged to speak. This is not the law of Title VII. If the employer knows that conduct is religious when it makes the discharge decision “because of’ that- conduct, the prima facie elements of a religious discrimination claim have been satisfied.
B
Even assuming that the law requires Chal-mers to inform Tulon about the practices she might take in furtherance of her beliefs, the majority impermissibly finds facts when it says “any knowledge Tulon may have possessed regarding Chalmers’ beliefs could not reasonably have put it on notice that she would write and send accusatory letters to co-workers’ homes.”1 Op. at 1020 (emphasis added). While one might be able to conclude that Tulon had no notice that the LaMantias would experience stress from Chalmers’ letter — a fact irrelevant for assessing Chalmers’ prima facie ease — a factfinder would certainly be entitled to view the record and conclude (1) that LaMantia was aware that Chalmers believed she should urge eowork-ers to accept Jesus Christ and (2) that the letters were a religious practice in furtherance of that belief. Indeed, when viewed in a light most favorable to Chalmers, Chalmers’ assertions that she discussed religion repeatedly with LaMantia, that LaMantia talked about his own religious encounters, that he showed Chalmers particular respeqt in the workplace, and that he never objected or took exception to any religious discussion with Chalmers could support the conclusion that he was encouraging her to continue her practices. The majority seems to conclude, however, that religious conversations are so dissimilar from written letters of identical content that a reasonable factfinder could never find sufficient employer notice of the employee’s religious practices. But, if Tulon denies the sufficiency of notice based on La-Mantia’s experience with Chalmers, then the issue is in dispute and can only be resolved by factfinding.
Ill
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under Title VII, the burden shifts to the employer tp demonstrate that it is “unable to reasonably accommodate to the ... [religious] practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); Ithaca, 849 F.2d at 118; Redmond, 574 F.2d at 901.
To meet its burden, Tulon must at a minimum demonstrate that Chalmers’ practice was inconsistent with the.needs of its workplace. Absent some inconsistency, Tulon cannot rely on the practice as a reason for discharging Chalmers. That is, if a religious practice is not in some way' inconsistent with a company policy, custom, or requirement (whether explicit or not), permitting the practice cannot unduly burden the conduct of business. Yet Tulon has failed to demonstrate that the letters violated any company policy, custom, or requirement. Indeed, in briefing this case Tulon has pointedly conceded that it “had [no] policy prohibiting ... the sending of letters (religious or not) to the homes of Tulon employees.” ' Nor has it es*1027tablished beyond dispute that sending the letters in fact disrupted the workplace. Despite the statements of Combs and Chalmers that the workplace was not disrupted, the majority finds the opposite. To conclude, as the majority has, that the employee disrupted the workplace requires several factual findings that are impermissible on review of a summary judgment.
Without Tulon even taking a position that it could not accommodate Chalmers’ religious practice, the majority rules also that “Chal-mers’ conduct is not the type that an employer can possibly accommodate, even with notice.” Op. at 1021. Even if it were within the majority’s province to make such a finding, it could not do so on the present record, drawing all legitimate inferences in favor of Chalmers.
The majority assumes that Chalmers’ “need” to write evangelical letters is absolute and that she would not stop writing them if asked to do so. This conclusion is drawn from the unsupported belief that Chalmers’ “religious beliefs required her to send personal, disturbing letters to her co-workers,” op. at 1019 (emphasis added) and also at 1020, or that they “compelled her to write them,” op. at 1020, and that “she has a religious need to impose personally and directly on fellow employees.” Op. at 1021 (emphasis added).4 These conclusions, however, are not supported by the record. Chal-mers stated that she was “led by the Lord” and “inspired ” to write LaMantia. To conclude that these statements mean that she could not, consistent with her religious beliefs, accept requests to stop writing may not even be a legitimate inference, much less the only legitimate inference. Certainly, it requires factfinding, which we are not free to do.
The majority’s holding that Chalmers’ conduct was beyond accommodation is even more remarkable in light of the fact that the statute imposes the burden on the employer to demonstrate that a religious practice cannot be accommodated without undue hardship. The parties have not even been given an opportunity to explore that issue at trial.. By ruling that as a matter of law Chalmers’ conduct was not susceptible to accommodation, the majority in effect shifts to Title VII plaintiffs the burden of refuting a defense that the defendant neither asserted nor demonstrated.
IV
Whatever we or the district court think about Chalmers’ religious practices, it is not our place to preempt a trial of her claim by assuming that all factual disputes will be resolved against her. And we err legally by imposing a statutorily ungrounded prior notice requirement in circumstances where the employer fully appreciates the religious nature of a practice. Finally, we compound that error by shifting to the plaintiff a burden that the statute places on the defendant.
The judgment should be vacated and the ease remanded for trial.

. In the district court, counsel'for Chalmers referred to an affidavit, or perhaps a portion of her deposition, where she also testified that LaMan-tia had "asked her on several occasions, When are you going to start a Bible study here." J.A. 120. That portion of her deposition, which even suggests LaMantia’s encouragement, was not, however, formally attached to Chalmers’ response to Tulon’s motion for summary judgment.

. The text of the letter is quoted in the majority opinion.

. The text of the letter is quoted in the majority opinion.

. In applying Title VII, the majority also appears to distinguish religious beliefs from religious practices. See e.g., op. at 1017, 1019, 1020. Yet, Title VII prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), defining religion explicitly to include "all aspects of religious ... practice," see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Chalmers’ letters are unquestionably an aspect of her religious practice, and they were recognized as such.