Court Opinion

ID: 9861564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:10:12.092097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:40.602055
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing defendant’s conviction and agree with much of the Court’s reasoning. I write separately because in my view no limiting instruction, no matter how meticulously phrased, can offset the devastatingly prejudicial impact of the proffered Rule 55 testimony. See Evid.R. 4.
The Court correctly observes that the evidence of defendant’s September drug-related activities on the sidewalk outside of the Copa Lounge was relevant on an issue materially disputed in the prosecution of the August offense — the issue whether defendant constructively possessed the drugs found in the car parked across the street from the Lounge. Presented with testimony of defendant’s September drug-related activities outside the Copa Lounge, a jury could reasonably infer that defendant’s presence on the sidewalk in August was also drug-related, leading to the conclusion that defendant exercised dominion over the drugs found in his mother’s car.
The difficulty arises when a trial court attempts to explain to a jury that it may consider evidence of the September event only on the issue of defendant’s constructive possession of the drugs found in connection with the August incident, but not on *343the issue of defendant’s propensity to possess and distribute drugs. That required explanation would either be incomprehensible to the average juror or, if understood, incapable of application. The minds of jurors are not divided into sealed compartments. The conceptual separation contemplated by the mandatory limiting instruction is too subtle to be achieved by any jury. Presented with evidence that this defendant sold drugs outside the same bar on September as he allegedly did in August, the jury’s ultimate determination of guilt will be inevitable, and neither the judge nor the jurors will know whether the subtle distinction carefully outlined in the limiting instruction was considered or, more likely, disregarded. As one commentator explains: “The theory of ‘limited use’ under which such explosive evidence is put before the jury fails to correspond to the actual effect of the evidence even in the minds of the most sober and conscientious jurors.” H.R. Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U.Pa.L.Rev. 845, 882 (1982).
This is precisely the kind of Rule 55 evidence referred to by the Court in State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 558 A.2d 833 (1989), in which we observed: “[the] inflammatory characteristic of other-crime evidence * * * mandates a careful and pragmatic evaluation by trial courts, based on the specific context in which the evidence is offered, to determine whether the probative worth of the evidence outweighs its potential for undue prejudice.” Id. at 303, 558 A.2d 833.
Because the undue prejudice of the Rule 55 evidence substantially outweighs its probative value, I would require the State to prove its case without it.
Justice STEIN concurring in result.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and STEIN. — 7.
For affirmance — None.