Court Opinion

ID: 9719704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:00:37.053523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:09.196201
License: Public Domain

FRANSON, Acting P. J.—I respectfully dissent.
Although I agree with the desirability of providing a high school education to every person regardless of his or her age and strongly condemn any father *146who would purposely deprive a son or daughter of a basic education by withholding support payments which would enable the child to complete high school, I submit the problem is for the Legislature and not the courts.
The Legislature has made its intent clear in the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act (Civ. Code, § 241 et seq.). Civil Code section 241, subdivision (d) provides that “child” who is entitled to support under Civil Code section 242 means “a son or daughter under the age of 18 years and a son or daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means.” (Italics added.) As the learned trial judge found, appellant was not “incapacitated” from earning a living because of his need to finish his high school education. He could have quit school and presumably gone to work.
The majority uses Civil Code section 206 to impose liability on respondent to support his son during his final year in high school. This statute provides in pertinent part, “It is the duty of the father, ... of any person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. ...” (Italics added.) The language is explicit and clear—before a person may impose an obligation of support on his father under section 206, he must show an inability to maintain himself “by work. ” This normally requires proof of a mental or physical handicap which prevents the person from being able to work (Farber v. Olkon (1953) 40 Cal.2d 503, 505 [254 P.2d 540] [mentally ill]; Paxton v. Paxton (1907) 150 Cal. 667, 669, 673 [89 P. 1083] [son invalid and blind; no details on daughter]; Anderson v. Anderson (1899) 124 Cal. 48, 55 [56 P. 630] [invalid daughter]; Levy v. Levy (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 341, 347 [53 Cal.Rptr. 790] [mentally disturbed son]; In re Dudley (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 402 [48 Cal.Rptr. 790] [mentally deficient daughter]; Woolams v. Woolams (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 1, 2 [251 P.2d 392] [daughter paralyzed from polio]; Tuller v. Superior Court (1932) 215 Cal. 352, 354 [10 P.2d 43] [daughter “in danger of tuberculosis and was in immediate need of medical attention”]), or at least proof of inability to find a job due to factors beyond the person’s control. The inability to work because the person wishes to complete his high school education, however commendable, simply will not suffice standing alone.
Judges may not construe a statute to ascertain the legislative intent behind the statute unless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty on the face of the statute. (58 Cal.Jur.3d, Statutes, § 84, pp. 434-435.) I find no ambiguity in Civil Code section 206. Attending high school by an 18-year-old is simply not a predicate for triggering a parent’s support obligation. If it were, then what would prevent attendance at a community college or other school of higher learning from triggering a support obligation? That this was not the *147legislative intent may be inferred from the pending legislation to add a new section to the Civil Code (§ 196.5) providing that the parental duty of support imposed under section 196 would continue for unmarried children, residing at home, who are making a good faith effort to obtain a high school education until the child completes the 12th grade or reaches age 19. (Assem. Bill No. 716 (1984-1985 Reg. Sess.).) Hopefully, the Legislature will recognize the harmful policy which exists under the current law and adopt the new statute.
I would affirm the judgment.