Court Opinion

ID: 9893698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 09:54:06.21035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:48.392025
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-22-00166-CR
          No. 02-22-00167-CR
     ___________________________

 TAMAR JAVONNE WESSON, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 371st District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
  Trial Court Nos. 1712549D, 1712555D

  Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted Appellant Tamar Wesson of the offenses of evading arrest or

detention with a motor vehicle and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (a motor

vehicle) and assessed punishment for each offense at seven years’ confinement and a

$1,250 fine. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. The jury

acquitted Appellant of the offense of accident involving injury. In his sole issue,

Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We

affirm.

                                BACKGROUOND

      In the early morning hours of December 5, 2021, the Grand Prairie Police

Department responded to an “intersection takeover” where forty to fifty cars were

doing “burnouts” and engaging in illegal street racing. When the officers approached

the area, the cars began dispersing. Officer Cody Rhew testified at Appellant’s trial

that he observed an older model white Mercedes with no license plate, which

concerned him that the vehicle might be stolen. Officer Rhew initiated a traffic stop

on the white Mercedes, but the driver made an illegal u-turn and sped away.

      A white Yukon vehicle appeared and blocked the officers from pursuing the

white Mercedes. Officer Rhew testified that the white Yukon committed multiple

offenses in addition to hindering the apprehension of the Mercedes, including

speeding, driving on the wrong side of the road, and running red lights. Officer John

Killian observed the driver of the white Yukon, with the window down, waving to the

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driver of the white Mercedes saying, “Go, go, go.” The officers identified Appellant as

the driver of the white Yukon.

      The officers then pursued Appellant in the white Yukon and traveled at speeds

in excess of 100 miles per hour. At one point Appellant turned off the lights of his

vehicle and “darked out” to make it harder for the officers to see him. Appellant

eventually crashed into another vehicle, sending that vehicle flying into the parking lot

of a Toyota dealership. Officer Killian described the collision by stating it appeared to

be an explosion with smoke, dust, and debris flying through the air. Appellant’s white

Yukon came to rest on the driver’s side. Appellant climbed out of the passenger side

of the vehicle and attempted to run from the officers despite Officer Killian warning

him not to run. Officer Killian released his K-9 dog from his vehicle, and the K-

9 stopped Appellant until the officers arrived and detained him. Officer Rhew

testified that after Appellant was detained, he admitted to running from the officers

and crashing into the vehicle. He said that he could not slow down because he knew

the officers were behind him.

      According to Officer Killian, he expected to find the driver of the vehicle

struck by Appellant to be deceased. However, the driver of the vehicle survived the

accident and testified at trial that she suffered broken ribs, that her head was cut open,

and that she had swelling in her leg.

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                      SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

      In the first issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support

his convictions for evading arrest or detention with a vehicle and aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon.

A. Standard of Review

      Federal due process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt

every element of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S. Ct.

2781, 2787 (1979); see U.S. Const. amend XIV. The Jackson standard of review, which

is explained below, is the “only standard that a reviewing court should apply in

determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal

offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (overruling Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d

126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). “[W]e review the sufficiency of the evidence establishing

the elements of a criminal offense under the single sufficiency standard set out in

Jackson v. Virginia.” Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

      In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319,

99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The

factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We

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may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our judgment

for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine whether the

necessary inferences are reasonable based on the cumulative force of the evidence

when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d

593, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a ‘divide

and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.”).

We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of

the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608.

B. Substantive Law and Analysis

      Appellant was charged with evading arrest or detention and aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon. A person commits the offense of evading arrest or detention if

he “intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer . . . attempting

lawfully to arrest or detain him.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(a). The offense is a

third-degree felony if the actor uses a vehicle while the actor is in flight. Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 38.04(b)(2).

      The jury heard testimony that Appellant hindered the apprehension of the

white Mercedes and also committed numerous traffic violations. Officer Killian

testified that the officers pursued Appellant in marked police vehicles with the sirens

and lights activated. The jury was able to observe videos from the dash cameras of the

patrol vehicles as well as body camera video from the officers. Officer Rhew testified

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that Appellant admitted that he was the driver of the vehicle and that he ran from the

officers. Appellant acknowledged after he was detained that he did not slow down

because he knew the officers were behind him. That video was also played before the

jury. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for

evading arrest or detention.

       Regarding the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon charge, the trial court’s

charge authorized the jury to convict Appellant of the offense of aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon if they believed from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt

that Appellant:

               recklessly, namely, by driving at a speed or speeds exceeding the
       posted speed limit and/or by evading marked Grand Prairie Police
       Department patrol units using a motor vehicle and/or by disregarding a
       traffic control device caus[ing] bodily injury to [the victim] by causing
       [Appellant’s] vehicle to strike the vehicle of [the victim,] and the
       [Appellant] did use or exhibit a deadly weapon during the commission of
       the assault, namely a motor vehicle.

Bodily injury is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical

condition.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(8).

       The evidence showed that Appellant’s vehicle struck another vehicle causing

considerable damage to that vehicle. The driver of the vehicle struck by Appellant

testified at trial that she suffered broken ribs, that her head was cut open, and that she

had swelling in her leg. She told the jury that she still has pain from her injuries.

       The Court of Criminal Appeals has established a two-part test for determining

whether a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that a

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defendant used or exhibited a vehicle as a deadly weapon. See Sierra v. State,

280 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Under this test, we must first “evaluate

the manner in which the defendant used the motor vehicle during the felony” and

then “consider whether, during the felony, the motor vehicle was capable of causing

death or serious bodily injury.” Id.

       In determining Appellant’s manner of driving, we consider several factors such

as: (1) intoxication; (2) speeding; (3) disregarding traffic signs and signals; (4) driving

erratically; and (5) failure to control the vehicle. Orlando v. State, No. 02-22-00239-CR,

2023 WL 3251010 at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 4, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication).

       The evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Appellant’s driving was

reckless. The jury heard evidence that Appellant was traveling in a motor vehicle at

speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour while fleeing from the Grand Prairie Police

Department. The officers testified that Appellant committed numerous traffic

violations, including disregarding traffic signs and signals, while fleeing from the

officers. As previously stated, the jury was able to observe the videos from the dash

cameras of the patrol vehicles.

       Under the second prong of the Sierra test, we must determine whether

Appellant used his vehicle in a manner capable of causing death or serious bodily

injury. See Sierra, 280 S.W.3d at 255. To support a deadly weapon finding, the record

must show more than a hypothetical potential for danger. Moore v. State, 520 S.W.3d

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906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Orlando, 2023 WL 3251010 at *3. Rather, there must

be evidence that others were actually endangered. Orlando, 2023 WL 3251010 at *3.

The record shows more than a hypothetical potential for danger as Appellant struck

another vehicle causing bodily injury to the driver, including broken ribs, a cut on her

head, and swelling in her leg. Officer Killian described that the impact looked like an

explosion and that he expected a fatality from the accident. Thus, there is more than

sufficient evidence to support a finding that Appellant’s reckless or dangerous driving

actually endangered others. See id. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to prove that

Appellant committed the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. We

overrule his sole issue.

                                   CONCLUSION

       Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                      /s/ Mike Wallach
                                                      Mike Wallach
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: October 26, 2023

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