Court Opinion

ID: 9814642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 00:00:12.226667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:12.802719
License: Public Domain

No. 2362.
OPINION
By THE COURT:
Submitted on application for rehearing. Although our rules now make no provision for such an application, we consider briefly the several causes set up.
Failure to fully consider:
I. Assignment of error No. 2 and assignment of error No. 7-j, refusal of the trial judge to give Special Instruction No. 8 relating to notice.
On páge 12 of the opinion, we state that we are considering the five groupings in the first assignment of error, one of which was “or of any notice that one existed and that the proof established the plaintiff assumed the risk and was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.” (Emphasis ours.)
On page 13, we held that these assignments were not well made as against the right of the plaintiff to have his case submitted to the jury. It is true that we did not specifically discuss the question of the requisites of notice to the defendant, but we did hold generally near the end of the opinion that no error assigned was well made. We specifically held that defendant’s special instruction No. 8 relating to notice was properly refused. These holdings are sufficient to support a judgment entry, if desired, finding that the assignments relating to the failure of the court to charge further on the subject of notice to the defendant of the presence of the covered hole are not supported.
The application for re-hearing continues:
“This Court finds, on page 11 of the decision, that Mr. Feig had no knowledge of the hole through which the plaintiff fell, had been covered; and—‘as late as 11.30 a. m., had been covered by 2 x 2’s, or 2 x 6’s and 2 x 8’s extending from wall to wall in wigwam fashion to the floor beyond the hole.’ ”
*480This conclusion of appellant is not exact. That part quoted is but a recitation of the claim of defendant and of supporting testimony offered by it.
Appellant again presses the failure of the evidence to establish joint control on the part of Main-Nottingham and ABCo. This proposition was considered at length, and we expressed our views respecting it.
II. Counsel calls attention to our statement that Mr. Beerman had introduced Mr. Feig to plaintiff. Appellant is correct in this contention, and we were in error in the statement. However, in the light of all of the evidence on the subject, the variance is not such as to affect; the right of the plaintiff to have the question of agency by estoppel •determined by the jury.
Appellant excepts to our characterizing the west entrance to the Main-Nottingham building as a main entrance, and urges that the main entrance was on the east side. We had no misapprehension respecting the entrances to the east and west and which was the principal entrance. Both were intended eventually to afford entrances by tenants and the public to the building.
Appellant on page 6 states:
“The Court on page 10 has said that Mr. Feig ‘unlocked and opened the door and thereafter placed certain cement blocks just inside the door to make access easier.’ ”
This seems to us to be a hyper-critical criticism of the language employed. The record on the subject is as follows:
Q. to plaintiff: “Then what was done after the door was open?”
A. “Right under the door, there was about a 2 foot step and I called it to his (Feig’s) attention and he had a fellow who was working on the project place two or three cement blocks there for him to step on.”
“Qui facit per alium facit per se.” Manifestly, the fact that Feig instructed a workman to place the blocks instead of placing them himself makes no difference whatever in the effect of the testimony.
III. Appellant urges that we did not give application to the case of Gedra v. Dallmer, 153 Oh St 258, in our holding that the plaintiff made a case for the jury as to the joint liability of Main-Nottingham. We expressed our view of the law on the subject.
We gave full, careful and lengthy consideration to the manifold assignments of error and the voluminous briefs of appellant in our original opinion, and find no substantial reason for the granting of the application for rehearing. It will be denied.
HORNBECK, CONN and DEEDS, JJ, concur.