Court Opinion

ID: 9413389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 23:00:28.290515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:42:21.791777
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 22-1786
A.C., a minor child by his next friend, mother and legal guard-
ian, M.C.,
                                              Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                v.

METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICT OF MARTINSVILLE and FRED
KUTRUFF, in his official capacity as Principal of John R.
Wooden Middle School,
                                     Defendants-Appellants.
                    ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
          Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
   No. 1:21-cv-02965-TWP-MPB — Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge.
                    ____________________
No. 22-2318
B.E. and S.E., minor children by their next friend, mother and
legal guardian, L.E.,
                                             Plaintiffs-Appellees,

                                v.

VIGO COUNTY SCHOOL CORPORATION and PRINCIPAL OF TERRE
HAUTE NORTH VIGO HIGH SCHOOL, in his official capacity,
                                   Defendants-Appellants.
2                                        Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

                     ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
         Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
      No. 2:21-cv-00415-JRS-MG — James R. Sweeney, II, Judge.
                     ____________________

    ARGUED FEBRUARY 15, 2023 — DECIDED AUGUST 1, 2023
                 ____________________

    Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    WOOD, Circuit Judge. A.C., B.E., and S.E. are three boys
with a simple request: they want to use the boys’ bathrooms
at their schools. But because the three boys are transgender,
the districts said no. The boys sued the districts and the school
principals, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title IX
of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The boys also
requested preliminary injunctions that would order the
schools to grant them access to the boys’ bathrooms and, in
the case of B.E. and S.E., access to the boys’ locker rooms when
changing for gym class. The district courts in both cases
granted the preliminary injunctions, relying on our decision
in Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No.
1 Board of Education, 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017).
   In this consolidated appeal, the school districts invite us to
reverse those preliminary injunctions and revisit our holding
in Whitaker. We see no reason to do so, however. Litigation
over transgender rights is occurring all over the country, and
we assume that at some point the Supreme Court will step in
with more guidance than it has furnished so far. Until then,
we will stay the course and follow Whitaker. That is just what
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                        3

the district courts did, in crafting narrowly tailored and fact-
bound injunctions. We aﬃrm their orders.
                               I
                          A. A.C.’s Case
    A.C. is a 13-year-old boy who lives with his mother M.C.
in Martinsville, Indiana. A.C. is transgender and has identi-
fied as a boy since he was about eight years old. He socially
transitioned when he was nine, meaning he began going by a
male name, using male pronouns, and adopting a typically
masculine haircut and clothing. He has never wavered from
this identity since his social transition.
    A.C. receives professional medical care from the Gender
Health Program at Riley Children’s Health, where he was di-
agnosed with gender dysphoria, a condition that causes him
to experience “a marked incongruence between [his] experi-
enced/expressed gender and [his] assigned gender.” Ameri-
can Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 452
(5th ed. 2013). A.C.’s gender dysphoria comes with “signifi-
cant distress, depression, and anxiety.” He receives therapy
as well as prescribed hormonal suppression drugs that block
his menstruation. He intends to begin testosterone supple-
ments, which will further masculinize his appearance, once
he is able. Additionally, the Indiana courts have authorized
both a legal name change and a gender-marker change for
him. A.C. and his medical care providers agree that being
treated as a boy is the best way to ameliorate his depression
and anxiety. This includes access to bathrooms and facilities
that are consistent with his experienced gender identity. We
refer to this as gender-aﬃrming facility access.
4                                      Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

    In 2021 A.C. began seventh grade at John R. Wooden Mid-
dle School in the Metropolitan School District of Martinsville,
Indiana. The school maintains sex-segregated bathrooms—a
practice that A.C. does not challenge. At the beginning of the
school year A.C.’s stepfather contacted the school to ask that
A.C. be granted gender-aﬃrming bathroom access. The
school refused and said that A.C. had to use either the girls’
bathrooms or the unisex bathroom in the health clinic. But
A.C. could not use the girls’ bathrooms because it exacerbated
his dysphoria and exposed him as transgender to his class-
mates. The health clinic bathroom was unsatisfactory because
it was far from A.C.’s classes and stigmatized him. A.C. had
to ask permission and sign into the health oﬃce each time he
used it.
    Martinsville did accommodate A.C. by refraining from
punishing him for tardiness caused by his use of the health
clinic bathroom. It also oﬀered A.C. the option to attend
school entirely online, but A.C. declined. For a time, A.C. de-
fied the school’s orders and used the boys’ bathrooms. He im-
mediately felt more comfortable at school and better about
himself. No students raised any issues or questioned A.C.’s
presence, but a staﬀ member reported him. The school re-
sponded by telling A.C. that he would be disciplined if he
continued using the boys’ bathrooms.
    A.C. felt isolated and punished by the school because of
his transgender status. This aﬀected his academic perfor-
mance. Before middle school, A.C. earned good grades and
was in the gifted and talented program. At Wooden, he found
it diﬃcult to attend school. His education was disrupted, his
grades fell, and he became depressed, humiliated, and angry.
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                         5

He tried to avoid using the bathroom while at school, which
was distracting, uncomfortable, and medically dangerous.
    Martinsville has an unoﬃcial policy for handling gender-
aﬃrming bathroom access for transgender students at the
high school level. The district evaluates each bathroom-access
request based on an extensive list of factors: the length of time
the student has identified as transgender; whether the student
is under a physician’s care; whether the student has been di-
agnosed with gender dysphoria; whether the student receives
hormone treatment; and whether the student has received a
legal name change or gender-marker change. A.C. attempted
to show the school district that he qualified for an accommo-
dation based on these criteria, but Martinsville said the policy
could not be implemented in the district’s middle schools and
refused to change its position.
    In December 2021, A.C. filed this lawsuit against Martins-
ville and Fred Kutruﬀ, Wooden’s principal, seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief that would assure his access to gen-
der-aﬃrming bathrooms. On April 29, 2022, the district court
granted A.C.’s motion for a preliminary injunction and issued
the mandatory stand-alone order on May 19, 2022. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(d). The injunction prohibited Martinsville from
“stopping, preventing, or in any way interfering with A.C.
freely using any boys’ restroom.”
                       B. B.E. & S.E.’s Cases
  B.E. and S.E. are 15-year-old twins who live in Terre
Haute, Indiana, with their mother L.E. They attend Terre
Haute North Vigo High School. They are transgender boys
who socially transitioned at age 11, when they adopted male
names, male pronouns, and traditionally masculine
6                                      Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

appearances. Like A.C., both B.E. and S.E. were diagnosed
with gender dysphoria and are receiving professional care at
the Riley Gender Health Clinic. Under the Clinic’s supervi-
sion, the boys have received testosterone treatment since No-
vember 2021. This treatment causes the cessation of menstru-
ation and the development of deeper voices, facial and body
hair growth, and increased muscle mass. B.E. and S.E. ob-
tained legal name changes and gender-marker changes in In-
diana state court. Unrelated to their gender identity, both B.E.
and S.E. have a condition that impedes colon function and re-
quires them to take laxatives, making bathroom access a par-
ticularly sensitive issue.
     The twins used the boys’ bathrooms at North Vigo at the
beginning of the 2021–2022 school year; no students raised
concerns about their presence there. School employees, how-
ever, informally reprimanded B.E. and S.E. and told them not
to use the boys’ bathrooms again. Their mother had a meeting
with the vice principal to alert the school to both the gender
dysphoria diagnoses and the colon conditions of the two
boys. She requested that they be granted gender-aﬃrming fa-
cility access, including access to the boys’ locker rooms to
change before and after gym class. B.E. and S.E. confirmed
that they planned to use the stalls in the locker room to change
in privacy and did not seek access to the locker room showers.
The school denied their request; it instructed them to use ei-
ther the girls’ bathrooms or the unisex bathroom in the
school’s health oﬃce. They could change for gym class only
in the girls’ locker room or the health oﬃce bathroom.
   B.E. and S.E. found this solution profoundly upsetting. Us-
ing the girls’ bathrooms and locker rooms revealed them as
transgender, and they worried about upsetting female
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                       7

students who might wonder why boys were in those facilities.
B.E. and S.E. also had problems with the unisex bathroom. It
was far from their classrooms, and the health oﬃce was
locked at unpredictable times. B.E. suﬀered at least one em-
barrassing accident because of his colon condition and inabil-
ity to get to the health oﬃce bathroom on time. Both boys
missed time in class because they had to use a remote bath-
room, and they felt stigmatized by the requirement. As a re-
sult, they tried to avoid using the bathroom while at school—
again, a practice that is painful, distracting, and medically
dangerous. They dreaded going to school and suﬀered de-
pression and humiliation.
    Vigo County has an oﬃcial policy regarding bathroom ac-
cess for transgender students. It contemplates accommodat-
ing transgender students based on a smorgasbord of factors,
including: the student’s age; the gender marker on the birth
certificate; the duration of the social transition; whether the
student has name and pronoun change requests on file with
the School Corporation; the student’s gender dysphoria diag-
nosis; the receipt of hormone treatment; the duration of hor-
mone treatment; the receipt of other transition-related medi-
cal procedures; other medical conditions; concerns raised by
other students or parents; facility restrictions; and accommo-
dations oﬀered to other similarly situated students. At the
same time, North Vigo insisted that surgical change was re-
quired before a transgender student could use gender-aﬃrm-
ing bathrooms. That rule rendered most of the policy nuga-
tory—Indiana prohibits such surgery for patients younger
than 18 (the great majority of high school students), and some
transgender persons opt not to undergo surgical transition
given the risks and costs of the procedure. See Whitaker, 858
F.3d at 1041.
8                                        Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

    After North Vigo refused to grant B.E. and S.E. gender-af-
firming facility access, the boys filed this lawsuit against Vigo
County School Corporation and the principal of the high
school. On June 24, 2022, the district court granted their mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction and issued a stand-alone or-
der compelling the school district to provide B.E. and S.E.
“with access to the boys’ restrooms and locker room, exclud-
ing the showers.” The district court rested its decision on their
likelihood of success under Title IX; it did not reach their con-
stitutional theory.
    Both Martinsville and Vigo County appealed the issuance
of the preliminary injunctions. At the request of the parties,
we consolidated the cases on appeal.
                                II
    For a preliminary injunction to issue, a plaintiﬀ “must es-
tablish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suﬀer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Orders granting or
denying preliminary injunctive relief are immediately appeal-
able. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Our review depends on the kind
of issue we are considering: “[w]e review the district court’s
findings of fact for clear error, its legal conclusions de novo,
and its balancing of the factors for a preliminary injunction
for abuse of discretion.” Doe v. University of Southern Indiana,
43 F.4th 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing D.U. v. Rhoades, 825 F.3d 331, 335 (7th Cir. 2016)).
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                        9

                     A. Whitaker and Bostock
    We begin by addressing the appellants’ contention that
our decision in Whitaker is no longer authoritative, given a
change in the law governing preliminary injunctions or, in the
alternative, given the Supreme Court’s intervening decision
in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
    The plaintiﬀ in Whitaker (A.W.) was a 17-year-old
transgender boy who sued the Kenosha (Wisconsin) Unified
School District, alleging that the refusal to allow him to use
the boys’ bathrooms violated his rights under Title IX and the
Fourteenth Amendment. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1042. A.W. so-
cially transitioned when he was 13 and received professional
care for gender dysphoria. When he sought gender-aﬃrming
facility access, however, he was told that he could use only the
girls’ bathrooms or a unisex bathroom in the school’s main
oﬃce, which was far from his classes. He felt that using the
remote unisex bathroom drew undesirable attention to his
transgender status. Id. at 1040.
    Like the plaintiﬀs in our cases, A.W. attempted to restrict
his water intake in order to avoid any bathroom use. This ex-
acerbated a preexisting medical condition—vasovagal syn-
cope—making him susceptible to headaches, fainting, and
seizures. He tried ignoring the school’s orders and using the
boys’ bathrooms. Again as in the present case, no students
complained but school employees did. He sought an accom-
modation with evidence of his prolonged social transition, his
gender dysphoria diagnosis, and his doctor’s recommenda-
tion that he be allowed to use gender-aﬃrming facilities, but
to no avail. The school district insisted that A.W. had to up-
date his gender in the school’s records, which the school
would do only if he provided an amended birth certificate.
10                                       Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

This put him up against a brick wall: under Wisconsin law,
the records would not be changed without surgical transition,
but those procedures are unavailable to minors, risky, and ex-
pensive. A.W. reported feeling distressed, depressed, and su-
icidal as a result. See id. at 1041–42, 1053.
    We held that A.W.’s worsening mental and physical
health, coupled with his suicidality, meant that the harm was
irreparable and could not be adequately remedied at law. Id.
at 1045–46. We added that since this was not a “typical tort
action” about past harm, but instead a case where the harms
were prospective and ongoing, that monetary damages
would be insuﬃcient. Id. at 1046. We concluded that A.W. had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on both his Title IX and
Fourteenth Amendment claims. Notably, we did not criticize
the defendant school district’s decision to maintain sex-segre-
gated bathrooms. Our focus was on the district’s policy for
“decid[ing] which bathroom a student may use.” Id. at 1051.
    For the Title IX claim, we were guided by analogy to Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and its holding that
discrimination based on sex-stereotyping violates Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1047. We
reasoned that “[a] policy that requires an individual to use a
bathroom that does not conform with his or her gender iden-
tity punishes that individual for his or her gender non-con-
formance, which in turn violates Title IX.” Id. at 1049.
    For A.W.’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, we applied in-
termediate scrutiny to the defendant school district’s bath-
room access policy, because it was “based upon a sex classifi-
cation.” Id. at 1051. We therefore required the defendants to
provide an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for their
policy. Id. at 1051–52 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                      11

515, 533 (1996)). The proﬀered justification the school gave
was the need “to protect the privacy rights of all 22,160 stu-
dents.” Id. at 1052. We found this unconvincing (more or less
the opposite of “exceedingly persuasive”) because there was
no evidence that A.W. was less discreet than other students
while using the bathroom or that the stall doors in the bath-
rooms did not provide adequate privacy to all. Id.
    Finally, we aﬃrmed the district court’s balancing of the
harms. The school district’s claims of harm were “specula-
tive,” especially because, prior to the lawsuit, A.W. had used
the boys’ bathrooms for almost six months without incident.
This supported a finding that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by finding that the privacy rights of other stu-
dents were not invaded and that no other negative conse-
quences materialized. Id. at 1054.
    Whitaker answers almost all the questions raised by these
consolidated appeals. But the school districts oﬀer three rea-
sons why we ought to revisit that decision. First, they urge
that Whitaker was partially abrogated by Illinois Republican
Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2020). Second, they
point out that the Supreme Court has provided intervening
guidance on how to analyze issues of transgender discrimina-
tion in Bostock. Third, they contend that Whitaker did not ade-
quately grapple with a provision in Title IX that permits edu-
cational institutions to “maintain[] separate living facilities
for the diﬀerent sexes.” 20 U.S.C. § 1686. We address those ar-
guments in turn.
        1. Standard for Likelihood of Success on Merits
   In Whitaker, we applied the now-abrogated standard for
evaluating the likelihood of success on the merits under
12                                      Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

which a plaintiﬀ had to show only that he had a “better than
negligible” chance of success on the merits. 858 F.3d at 1046.
That standard is now gone. In Nken v. Holder, in the closely
related context of a stay pending judicial review, the Supreme
Court went out of its way to say that “[i]t is not enough that
the chance of success on the merits be better than negligible.’”
556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). Adhering to that guidance in Illinois
Republican Party, we concluded that the showing must be a
strong one, though the applicant “need not show that [he] def-
initely will win the case.” 973 F.3d at 763. The school districts
contend that this shift has weakened Whitaker’s authoritative
value.
    Perhaps there are some cases that have been aﬀected by
the need to make a more compelling showing of likelihood of
success, but Whitaker is not one of them. Whitaker did not even
hint that the likelihood of success on the merits was a close
issue or that anything hinged on the better-than-negligible
threshold. Furthermore, both district courts in the cases now
before us applied the correct standard and came out the same
way, finding that the law and the evidentiary records estab-
lished the necessary strong likelihood of success.
     The crucial question for the Title IX theory in both of the
cases now before us, just as in Whitaker, is one of law: how
does one interpret Title IX’s prohibition against discrimina-
tion “on the basis of sex” as applied to transgender people? In
Whitaker, we answered that discrimination against
transgender students is a form of sex discrimination. Our an-
swer to that legal question did not depend on the plaintiﬀ’s
evidentiary showing, and that answer does not change with a
more rigorous threshold for success on the merits. It is also
telling that, in the closely related area of Title VII law, the
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                           13

Supreme Court held in Bostock that discrimination based on
transgender status is a form of sex discrimination. 140 S. Ct.
at 1744. Both Title VII, at issue in Bostock, and Title IX, at issue
here and in Whitaker, involve sex stereotypes and less favora-
ble treatment because of the disfavored person’s sex. Bostock
thus provides useful guidance here, even though the particu-
lar application of sex discrimination it addressed was diﬀer-
ent.
                              2. Bostock
     Though Bostock strengthens Whitaker’s conclusion that dis-
crimination based on transgender status is a form of sex dis-
crimination, the school districts argue that a diﬀerent part of
Bostock undermines Whitaker. They are referring to the Court’s
decision to refrain from addressing how “sex-segregated
bathrooms, locker rooms, and dress codes” were aﬀected by
its ruling. Id. at 1753. The school districts reason that the Court
exercised this restraint because it saw a fundamental diﬀer-
ence between bathroom policies and employment decisions.
From that, they conclude that Bostock’s definition of sex dis-
crimination does not apply in the bathroom context.
     That is reading quite a bit into a statement that says, in
essence, “we aren’t reaching this point.” The Supreme Court,
and for that matter our court, does this all the time. It is an
important tool with which we respect the principles of party
presentation, see United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct.
1575, 1579 (2020), and incremental development of the law. It
is best to take the Court at its word. When we do so, we see
that it was simply focusing on “[t]he only question before
[it],” which did not involve gender-aﬃrming bathroom ac-
cess. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753.
14                                       Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

    Applying Bostock’s reasoning to Title IX, we have no trou-
ble concluding that discrimination against transgender per-
sons is sex discrimination for Title IX purposes, just as it is for
Title VII purposes. As Bostock instructs, we ask whether our
three plaintiﬀs are suﬀering negative consequences (for Title
IX, lack of equal access to school programs) for behavior that
is being tolerated in male students who are not transgender.
See id. at 1741. Our decision in Whitaker followed this ap-
proach.
                  3. Relevance of 20 U.S.C. § 1686
    The last alleged flaw in Whitaker that the school districts
see is its supposed failure to mention 20 U.S.C. § 1686. That
statute, which is part of Title IX, reads as follows:
         Notwithstanding anything to the contrary con-
     tained in this chapter, nothing contained herein shall
     be construed to prohibit any educational institution re-
     ceiving funds under this Act, from maintaining sepa-
     rate living facilities for the diﬀerent sexes.
If Whitaker had failed to take that admonition into account,
maybe there would be a problem. But it did no such thing.
Whitaker cited the relevant implementing regulation, 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.33, which aﬃrmatively permits recipients of educational
funds to “provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower fa-
cilities” on the basis of sex, provided that the separate facili-
ties are comparable. We noted that neither Title IX nor its im-
plementing regulations define the term “sex,” and in looking
to case law for guidance, we saw nothing to suggest that “sex”
referred only to biological sex. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1047. We
concluded that bathroom-access policies that engaged in sex-
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                        15

stereotyping could violate Title IX, notwithstanding 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.33.
   Similarly, section 1686 is of little relevance to this appeal.
Though it certainly permits the maintenance of sex-segre-
gated facilities, we stress again that neither the plaintiﬀ in
Whitaker nor the plaintiﬀs in these cases have any quarrel with
that rule. The question is diﬀerent: who counts as a “boy” for
the boys’ rooms, and who counts as a “girl” for the girls’
rooms—essentially, how do we sort by gender? The statute
says nothing on this topic, and so nothing we say here risks
rendering section 1686 a nullity.
    We also reject the notion that Whitaker (and perhaps Bos-
tock itself) make it impossible to have “truly sex-separated
bathrooms.” That argument presupposes one definition of
sex, as something assigned at birth or a function of chromo-
somal make-up. But Title IX does not define sex. Dictionary
definitions from around 1972 (when Title IX was passed) are
equally inconclusive. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary, Sex
(4th ed. 1968) (defining sex narrowly as “[t]he sum of the pe-
culiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male
from a female organism” and broadly as “the character of be-
ing male or female”); Webster’s New World Dictionary, Sex
(2d ed. 1972) (defining sex both “with reference to … repro-
ductive functions” and broadly as “all the attributes by which
males and females are distinguished”). There is insuﬃcient
evidence to support the assumption that sex can mean only
biological sex. And there is less certainty than meets the eye
in such a definition: what, for instance, should we do about
someone who is intersex? There are several conditions that
create discrepancies between external and internal sex mark-
ers, which can produce XX males or XY females, or other
16                                        Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

chromosomal combinations such as XXY or XXX that aﬀect
overall sexual development. People with this genetic make-
up are entitled to Title IX’s protections, and an educational
institution’s policy for facility access would fail to account for
them if biological sex were the only permissible sorting mech-
anism. Narrow definitions of sex do not account for the com-
plexity of the necessary inquiry.
    The implementing regulations do not provide much addi-
tional guidance. When 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 was codified, it was
published without public comment because it was viewed as
working “no substantive changes.” Department of Education,
Establishment of Title 34, 45 Fed. Reg. 30802, 30802 (May 9,
1980). With no indication that 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 was meant to
cover any more ground than 20 U.S.C. § 1686, we reject the
school districts’ presupposition that separate facilities for the
sexes forecloses access policies based on gender identity.
Nothing in section 1686 requires this outcome.
                      4. Existing Circuit Split
    Finally, there is already a circuit split on the issues raised
in this appeal. The Fourth Circuit has decided that denying
gender-aﬃrming bathroom access can violate both Title IX
and the Equal Protection Clause, while the Eleventh Circuit
found no violations based on substantially similar facts. Com-
pare Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, 972 F.3d 586 (4th
Cir. 2020), with Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns
County, 57 F.4th 791 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
    It makes little sense for us to jump from one side of the
circuit split to the other, particularly in light of the intervening
guidance in Bostock. As we have noted before:
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                          17

   Overruling circuit law can be beneficial when the cir-
   cuit is an outlier and can save work for Congress and
   the Supreme Court by eliminating a conflict. Even
   when an overruling does not end the conflict, it might
   supply a new line of argument that would lead other
   circuits to change their positions in turn. Finally, over-
   ruling is more appropriate when prevailing doctrine
   works a substantial injury.
Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2009) (en
banc).
     These factors do not weigh in favor of overruling Whitaker.
We cannot resolve the conflict between the Fourth and Elev-
enth Circuits on our own. Nor can we supply a new line of
argument. Much of what is needed to resolve this conflict is
present in the majority opinion and four dissents oﬀered by
the Eleventh Circuit in Adams; neither party here has broken
new ground. Finally, consistency on our part does not cause
a serious harm. Whitaker has been the governing decision in
our circuit since 2017, and the school districts have not iden-
tified any substantial injuries it has caused. As a result,
“[o]verruling would not be consistent with a proper regard
for the stability of our decisions.” Id. at 565.
                   B. Preliminary Injunctions
    Having resolved the question of Whitaker’s authoritative
value, we are now free to apply it to these cases. We address
the factors governing a preliminary injunction—likelihood of
success on the merits, irreparable harm, and the balance of eq-
uities, including the public interest—in that order.
18                                       Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

              1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
    The first, and normally the most important, criterion is
likelihood of success on the merits. As we noted earlier, the
plaintiﬀs had to make a strong showing of their chance of pre-
vailing. See Illinois Republican Party, 973 F.3d at 763. For the
Title IX claims, they had to demonstrate that they were “sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance,” and that this dis-
criminatory treatment was “on the basis of sex.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a). For the Equal Protection Clause (involved in only
A.C.’s case), they had to show intentional discrimination on
the basis of sex. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,
130–31 (1994).
    It is not disputed that Wooden Middle School and North
Vigo High School receive federal funding and are covered by
Title IX. The point of contention is whether the school dis-
tricts’ refusal to grant gender-aﬃrming facility access to the
plaintiﬀs amounts to discrimination on the basis of sex. Both
district courts decided that the plaintiﬀs had made a suﬃ-
ciently strong showing of sex discrimination. We see no errors
in those conclusions.
   Using Whitaker as a guide, both district courts evaluated
the school districts’ facility access policies, not their decisions
to maintain sex-segregated facilities. The courts then rea-
soned that an access policy that punished a student for their
transgender identity would violate Title IX, see Whitaker, 858
F.3d at 1049, and that A.C., B.E., and S.E. all showed they were
punished by the school districts’ access policies. Like the
plaintiﬀ in Whitaker, they were threatened with discipline if
they used the boys’ bathrooms. All three reported feeling de-
pressed, humiliated, and excluded by the requirement to use
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                         19

either the girls’ bathrooms or the unisex bathroom. B.E. and
S.E. were also placed at an increased risk of not making it to
the bathroom on time because of their colon conditions. As a
result, just as in Whitaker, the “gender-neutral alternatives
were not true alternatives because of their distant location to
[plaintiﬀs’] classrooms and the increased stigmatization they
caused [plaintiﬀs].” Id. at 1050. And in A.C.’s case, oﬀering re-
mote schooling and therefore denying a transgender student
the opportunity to socialize with and learn alongside his
classmates is not a true alternative. Further, the harms that the
plaintiﬀs suﬀered meet Bostock’s definition of sex discrimina-
tion, which requires that the plaintiﬀ be treated worse than a
similarly situated person because of sex. 140 S. Ct. at 1740.
Here, the school districts persisted in treating the three plain-
tiﬀs worse than other boys because of their transgender sta-
tus.
    The plaintiﬀs in B.E./S.E. asked the district court to include
access to both bathrooms and locker rooms in the injunction,
and the court obliged. It reasoned that the “distinction” be-
tween bathrooms and locker rooms was “immaterial,” partic-
ularly since B.E. and S.E. “would use the stalls in the locker
room, just as they used the stalls in the restroom,” and com-
munal showers were by consent carved out of the injunction.
We see no clear error in the district court’s factual conclusion
that B.E.’s and S.E.’s locker room use would be comparable to
their bathroom use. Vigo County argues that nothing in the
district court’s injunction confines the plaintiﬀs to the stalls,
and so (it believes) B.E. and S.E. “may change in the open ar-
eas of the locker room, exposing their physical anatomy to
their classmates, and vice versa.” But this argument is unteth-
ered to the evidentiary record. Both B.E. and S.E. averred that
the stalls in the locker room would allow them and other
20                                      Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

students to change privately, and that students do not disrobe
entirely or use the locker room showers during the school
day. As a result, the district court’s conclusion that locker
room use would be indistinguishable from bathroom use in
this instance is not clearly erroneous.
    The district court in A.C.’s case also decided that A.C. had
made a strong showing of likely success on his Fourteenth
Amendment claim. Per Whitaker’s guidance, Martinsville’s ac-
cess policy relies on sex-based classifications and is therefore
subject to heightened scrutiny. 858 F.3d at 1051. “[A] party
seeking to uphold government action based on sex must es-
tablish an exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classi-
fication.” Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524 (quoting Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). “The justifi-
cation must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc
in response to litigation.” Id. at 516.
    The school district attempted to justify its access policy by
invoking the privacy concerns of other students. The district
court found, however, that the privacy concerns “appear[] en-
tirely conjectural.” See also Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1052 (“[T]he
School District’s privacy argument is based upon sheer con-
jecture and abstraction.”). No students complained about
A.C.’s use of the bathroom. Martinsville insists that such evi-
dence is unnecessary and that the privacy interest in protect-
ing students from “exposure of their bodies to the opposite
sex” is long-protected, legitimate, and clearly related to deny-
ing gender-aﬃrming facility access. But the district is fighting
a phantom. Gender-aﬃrming facility access does not impli-
cate the interest in preventing bodily exposure, because there
is no such exposure. This is unlike the nudity ordinance that
we contemplated in Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375 (7th
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                        21

Cir. 2017), where bodily exposure was expressly and directly
at issue. There is no evidence that any students will be ex-
posed to A.C. or vice versa. “Common sense tells us that the
communal restroom is a place where individuals act in a dis-
creet manner to protect their privacy and those who have true
privacy concerns are able to utilize a stall.” Whitaker, 858 F.3d
at 1052. Martinsville has not identified how A.C.’s presence
behind the door of a bathroom stall threatens student privacy.
    In addition to the likelihood of success on the Title IX and
equal protection claims, we note also that the school districts
in these two cases may be violating Indiana law. Given that
all three plaintiﬀs have received amended birth certificates
and legal name changes that identify them as boys, they ap-
pear to be boys in the eyes of the State of Indiana. If so, then
it would be contrary to Indiana law for the school districts to
treat A.C., B.E., and S.E. as though they are not boys and to
require them to use the girls’ bathrooms and locker rooms.
But no plaintiﬀ has pursued this theory of state-law violation,
and so we do not explore it further.
    We add a few words about the scope of our decision. First,
we are addressing only the issue before us. We express no
opinion on how Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause regu-
lates other sex-segregated living facilities, educational pro-
grams, or sports teams. The district courts took the same ap-
proach in the injunctions they issued, properly confining their
analysis to the immediate problem.
   We also leave the door open to reasonable measures taken
by the school districts to ensure that a student genuinely
needs the requested accommodations. Just like the plaintiﬀ in
Whitaker, A.C., B.E., and S.E. have all provided ample evi-
dence of their medical diagnoses and the care they receive
22                                      Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

from professionals to assist in their transitions. They have also
demonstrated that their gender identities are enduring. All
three have legal name changes and gender-marker changes.
B.E. and S.E. have been receiving testosterone treatment for
over a year. These are not cases where the plaintiﬀs’ good-
faith requests for gender-aﬃrming facility access could be
questioned. Nor do these cases present the scenario oﬀered
by Indiana and other states in their amicus brief, where only
subjective “self-identification” is oﬀered as the basis for the
plaintiﬀs’ requests.
    Further, nothing in the district courts’ injunctions restricts
a school district’s ability to monitor student conduct in bath-
rooms and locker rooms. If a student enters a girls’ locker
room and engages in misconduct, that student has violated
school rules regardless of whether the student is a girl who is
properly in the space, a boy who is improperly in the space,
or a boy who pretends to be a transgender girl to gain school-
authorized access to the space. As the amicus brief of school
administrators from 16 states and the District of Columbia as-
sures us, “schools generally are adept at disciplining students
for infractions of school rules,” and gender-aﬃrming access
policies neither thwart rule enforcement nor increase the risk
of misbehavior in bathrooms and locker rooms. We are also
unconvinced that students will take advantage of gender-af-
firming facility access policies by masquerading as
transgender. Based on the accounts of amici school adminis-
trators who have implemented gender-aﬃrming facility ac-
cess policies, such a scenario has never materialized.
                       2. Irreparable Harm
  “[P]laintiﬀs seeking preliminary relief [are required] to
demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                          23

an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. Irreparable harm occurs
when the “legal remedies available to the movant are inade-
quate.” DM Trans, LLC v. Scott, 38 F.4th 608, 618 (7th Cir.
2022).
    Both district courts determined that the plaintiﬀs were
likely to suﬀer irreparable harm, noting the similarities be-
tween the cases of A.C., B.E. and S.E. and the plaintiﬀ in Whit-
aker. The school districts attempted to distinguish Whitaker,
pointing out that A.C. did not report suicidal ideation and
that B.E. and S.E. did not show they had restricted water in-
take. But the district courts found those factual distinctions
insignificant.
   We have little to add to their analysis, except to note again
that the district courts based their decisions on facts in the rec-
ord, and that the school districts have not shown clear error.
The plaintiﬀs have established that the harm they face is on-
going, debilitating, and cannot be remedied with monetary
damages. Although the plaintiﬀ in Whitaker experienced sui-
cidal thoughts, that is not essential for these cases.
          3. Balance of Equities and the Public Interest
    Before issuing an injunction, courts are required to “bal-
ance the competing claims of injury” and “consider the eﬀect
on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested
relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (quoting Amoco Production Co. v.
Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)). This includes “par-
ticular regard for the public consequences” should the pre-
liminary injunction be issued. Id. (quoting Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).
   Both district courts found the school districts’ claims of in-
jury unconvincing. In A.C., Martinsville’s claims of harm were
24                                      Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

unsupported, given that high school students were granted
accommodations without incident. Similarly, in B.E., the
plaintiﬀs had used the boys’ bathrooms at the beginning of
the year without incident and there was no evidence of harm
to Vigo County in the record. The records showed only spec-
ulative harms, which are not enough to tip the balance. See
Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1054.
    The district courts also agreed that the public interest
weighed in favor of issuing the injunctions. They noted that
protecting civil and constitutional rights is in the public inter-
est, and they saw no harm to the public. The district court in
A.C. acknowledged the importance of individual privacy in-
terests to the public, but A.C.’s presence in the boys’ bathroom
did not threaten those privacy interests. And the district court
in B.E. observed that the school district’s insistence upon the
need for executive or congressional guidance was under-
mined by the fact that Whitaker has been controlling law in the
Seventh Circuit since 2017. Indeed, Vigo County crafted an ef-
fective written policy to manage gender-aﬃrming facility ac-
cess despite the lack of additional rulemaking or legislation.
    There was no abuse of discretion in this balancing of the
equities and the public interest. Nor do we see either legal er-
ror in the underlying analysis or clear error in any of the sup-
porting factual findings. That is enough to resolve these ap-
peals.
                               III
   These consolidated appeals are almost indistinguishable
from Whitaker. Because our reasoning in Whitaker controls, we
AFFIRM the orders granting the plaintiﬀs’ motions for prelim-
inary injunctions.
Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318                                         25

    EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, concurring. Given Whitaker v.
Kenosha School District, 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017), this is an
easy case for the plaintiﬀs. I am no more disposed than my
colleagues to overrule Whitaker. A conflict among the circuits
will exist no matter what happens in the current suits. The Su-
preme Court or Congress could produce a nationally uniform
approach; we cannot.
   I concur only in the judgment, however, because, although
I admire my colleagues’ thoughtful opinion, they endorse
Whitaker, while I think that Adams v. St. Johns County School
Board, 57 F.4th 791 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), better under-
stands how Title IX applies to transgender students.
    My colleagues express confidence that Title VII (the sub-
ject of Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020)) and
Title IX use “sex” in the same way. See slip op. 13–14. The ma-
jority in Adams was equally confident of the opposite propo-
sition. I am not so sure about either view. Title IX does not
define the word, which can refer to biological sex (encoded in
a person’s genes) or to social relations (gender). Sex is such a
complex subject that any invocation of plain meaning is apt to
misfire. I think, however, that Adams is closer to the mark in
concluding that “sex” in Title IX has a genetic sense, given
that word’s normal usage when the statute was enacted.
     Indiana has elected to use a social definition rather than a
genetic one; the state’s judiciary has entered orders classifying
all three plaintiﬀs as boys. Like my colleagues (see slip op. 21)
I’m puzzled that the school districts did not act on the logical
implication of these orders. Much of life reflects social rela-
tions and desires rather than instructions encoded in DNA.
Nurture and nature both play large roles in human life. Clas-
sifying as “boys” youngsters who are socially boys (even if not
26                                       Nos. 22-1786 & 22-2318

genetically male) is an act of kindness without serious costs to
third parties. But if Title IX uses the word “sex” in the genetic
sense, then federal law does not compel states to do this.