Court Opinion

ID: 9724514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:59:55.16001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:01.710547
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW dissenting: As part of the death penalty reforms enacted by the General Assembly in 2003 (see Pub. Act 93—605, eff. November 11, 2003), a new provision was added to section 9—l(i) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9—l(i) (West 2004)). This provision, often referred to as the fundamental justice amendment, places upon this court the responsibility to set aside a death sentence — even in the absence of any trial error — if the court determines that the death sentence is “fundamentally unjust.” People v. Mertz, 218 Ill. 2d 1, 54 (2005). In full, section 9—l(i) provides: “(i) Appellate Procedure. The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and order the imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections if the court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case. If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case, independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the Illinois Supreme Court shall issue a written opinion explaining this finding.” 720 ILCS 5/9 — l(i) (West 2004). State Senators Cullerton and Dillard, the cosponsors of the legislation which introduced the fundamentally unjust standard, have explained the significance of this provision: “The fundamental justice amendment of [Public Act 93—605] is ground breaking in scope and conception. It is a result of deliberations beginning in the Capital Litigation Subcommittee of the Illinois Senate Judiciary Committee during the 92nd General Assembly and continuing through deliberations in the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 93rd General Assembly. This fundamental justice amendment authorizes the Supreme Court to engage, in death penalty cases only, in a new and important kind of appellate review. This new kind of appellate review is designed to be substantive, rather than procedural, focusing on the key substantive question: whether the death sentence is ‘fundamentally just’ as applied to the particular case. * * * The fundamental justice amendment contemplates that the new ‘fundamental justice’ appellate review — which is not the same as ‘comparative proportionality review’ — will be fact-based and highly discretionary, and will lead to appellate reversal on substantive grounds in only a very small number of death penalty cases. *** The ‘fundamental justice’ of a death sentence, as applied to a particular case, cannot generally be determined on the basis of legal rules. It is a moral issue, not a legal one, and must be based on the facts of the particular case and the moral compass of the decision maker.” (Emphasis in original.) J. Cullerton, K. Dillard & E Baroni, Capital Punishment Reform in Illinois—A Model for the Nation, DCBA Brief, at 10-12 (April 2004). See also R Weisberg, Apology, Legislation and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1415, 1438 (2004) (the fundamental justice amendment “enables appellate [sic] judges to grant mercy to otherwise properly sentenced capital defendants because, in the view of the appellate [sic] court, the technical and procedural rules by which they were supposed to monitor capital sentencing could not capture the moral concerns that society demands”). Professor Joseph Hoffmann, the individual who initially proposed the fundamental justice provision (see 93d 111. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 5, 2003, at 43), has explained that the fundamental justice of a death sentence is distinct from whether that sentence is excessive: “After surveying the history of both guilt-innocence and ‘excessiveness’ review in Illinois capital cases, *** I believe that both grants of authority generally have been construed quite narrowly — in sharp contrast to the broad, open-ended authority contemplated by the FJA [fundamental justice amendment], *** The FJA — at a bare minimum — should serve as a clear and influential statement, by an overwhelming, bi-partisan majority of the Illinois Legislature, that such substantive review is both desirable and wholly consistent with legislative intent. The FJA thus should eliminate any concerns that the exercise of substantive appellate review authority by the Illinois Supreme Court is illegitimate, or contrary to the will of the people of Illinois, as expressed by the Illinois Legislature.” J. Hoffman, Protecting the Innocent: The Massachusetts Governor’s Council Report, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 561, 577 n.83 (2005). See also DCBA Brief, at 12 (distinguishing the fundamental justice inquiry from the excessiveness inquiry and noting that under the fundamental justice amendment, all issues that might relate to the fundamental justice of a death sentence may be considered by this court). The fundamental justice determination differs from the traditional appellate review conducted in death penalty cases. Section 9 — l(i) directs this court to determine the fundamental justice of the death sentence in the first instance, when the case is on direct appeal to this court. The fundamental justice inquiry is not conducted in the circuit court and the circuit court enters no finding regarding the fundamental justice of the death sentence. Thus, while this court must give deference to any findings of fact made by the circuit court during trial and sentencing, principles of deference and standards of review do not play a role in the fundamental justice determination itself — they simply are not relevant. Stated otherwise, section 9 — l(i) authorizes this court, in every death penalty case, to conduct an independent evaluation of the facts of record, as established in the circuit court, and determine whether the imposition of the death penalty is “fundamentally unjust,” even when the defendant has been “otherwise properly sentenced” (82 N.C. L. Rev. at 1437-38). Applying that standard here, I conclude that the imposition of the death penalty would be fundamentally unjust in this case. A principal reason why imposing the death penalty would be fundamentally unjust in this case is defendant’s mental condition. There is no dispute that the defendant was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the offenses he committed. All three experts who testified at trial so stated. The only dispute is with regard to the type of disorder, i.e., whether defendant suffers from a delusional disorder of the persecutory type, found by defense witnesses, Drs. Day and Chapman, or a paranoid personality disorder, found by Day and the State’s witness, Dr. Kowalkowski. Further, as the majority notes, defendant’s belligerent actions following his arrest and during trial were completely irrational, given that he was facing a possible death sentence. See 222 111. 2d at 44. This point underscores the fact that defendant’s mental processes do not function in a normal fashion. In addition, defendant does not have a significant prior criminal history. At the time of the murders in this case, defendant was 60 years old. His prior criminal history consisted of only four misdemeanor convictions— two for disorderly conduct, one for reckless driving, and one Class C misdemeanor assault. Defendant had no felony convictions of any type. Defendant was not an incorrigible felon with an extensive criminal history. Indeed, as the majority notes, the murders defendant committed “were uniquely extreme in terms of defendant’s past conduct.” 222 Ill. 2d at 50. Moreover, the record contains numerous examples of defendant’s positive attributes. For most of his adult life, defendant worked and supported his wife and three children. He provided each child with a college education and helped raise them to become productive citizens. Further, throughout his life, defendant often engaged in acts of generosity toward others. Among other things, defendant rushed to the aid of neighbors when they lost their home in a fire, returned a borrowed tractor in the middle of a heavy snowstorm because he thought the owner might need it to plow snow, installed a wood-burning stove in the house of another neighbor who had no heat, asking for nothing in return, and repaired that neighbor’s roof without being asked. At the death penalty hearing, several persons testified on defendant’s behalf, describing defendant as “a good, dependable worker,” a “good father,” a “good friend,” and “the nicest guy you would ever want to meet.” In my view, this evidence demonstrates that the crimes committed by defendant were aberrant events fueled by his unstable mental condition. Finally, as defense counsel has noted, defendant is now 63 years old, largely deaf, and in poor health. And, while defendant was verbally abusive when in custody during trial, the only physical action he took was clogging a toilet. Defendant has never physically assaulted any prisoner or prison official. Compare, e.g., People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 333-34 (2000) (defendant’s repeated attacks on prison officials used as aggravating evidence). Defendant does not pose so serious a safety risk in prison that execution is the only means of protecting other inmates and prison officials. Incarceration in prison for the remainder of his life without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release is an alternative that will both protect the public and punish defendant. The seriousness of defendant’s offenses cannot be overstated. The crimes he committed were unquestionably horrific. However, in the exercise of discretion afforded this court under section 9 — l(i), I must conclude that the imposition of the death sentence in this case is fundamentally unjust. I note that in reaching this conclusion, my decision is informed by familiar principles: “It is this court’s ‘responsibility in every death penalty case to carefully consider the character of the defendant and the circumstances of his crime before we sanction the termination of his life.’ People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1990) (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In fulfilling this responsibility, we are ‘guided by the recognition that “each capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty.” [Citation.]’ People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 98 (1997). *** *** Anytime a human being unjustifiably takes the fife of another, a civilized society should be horrified. ‘[C]apital punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.’ Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 880, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2930 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Nevertheless, our society and laws do not sanction the death penalty for all crimes which may shock a civilized society. Instead, we reserve it for those ‘crimes [which] are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.’ Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 881, 96 S. Ct. at 2930 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 165-66 (1998) (McMorrow, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The appropriate sentence in this case is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory supervised release. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.