Court Opinion

ID: 9368899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 14:02:23.694622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:11.606200
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
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 official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                  Decided: February 7, 2023

                      S22A1223. JACKSON v. THE STATE.

       LAGRUA, Justice.

      Appellant Desmond Sherron Jackson was convicted of felony

murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal shooting of

Heather Smith, the shooting of Quantavious Banks, and the

aggravated assault of Kendaishia Jefferies, all of which occurred on

August 20, 2017. On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence

was legally insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial

judge erred by not recusing himself, and that the trial court erred by

allowing improper extrinsic evidence to be presented against

Appellant at trial. 1                 For the reasons that follow, we affirm

      1In October 2017, Appellant was indicted by a Walton County grand jury
on charges of malice murder, felony murder, three counts of aggravated
assault, aggravated battery, and five counts of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony. In May 2019, a jury found Appellant guilty of all
counts except malice murder and one count of possession of a firearm during
Appellant’s convictions.

     Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence

presented at Appellant’s trial showed that approximately a week

and a half before the shootings in this case occurred, Appellant and

Banks got into a dispute over a botched drug transaction. According

to Banks’s testimony at trial, on or about August 10, 2017, Banks

went to the house where Appellant was staying in Social Circle to

purchase four ounces of marijuana from Appellant. Banks testified

that, although he paid Appellant for four ounces of marijuana,

Appellant gave Banks less than that amount in the sale. Later that

day, when Banks opened the package and discovered he had been

“shorted,” he went back to Appellant’s house to pick up the rest of

the commission of a felony. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in
prison, plus an additional 40 years. One of the aggravated assault counts
merged with the felony murder count for sentencing purposes. On June 3,
2019, Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended twice
through new counsel on March 11, 2021, and June 29, 2021. The State filed a
response in opposition to the motion for new trial on June 1, 2022, and
Appellant amended his motion for new trial a third time on June 10, 2022,
after which he waived his right to a hearing on the motion. The trial court
considered the existing record and denied Appellant’s motion for new trial
without a hearing on June 20, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal
to this Court on June 27, 2022, and the case was docketed to the August 2022
term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
                                     2
the marijuana he had purchased. According to Banks, when he went

inside Appellant’s house, Appellant was sitting around with some

other people and told Banks that “he was going to straighten it out

but he couldn’t right then and there.” Banks and Appellant started

to argue, and Banks said he “had already done paid [Appellant], [he]

can’t be waiting.” Banks then observed some marijuana sitting on

the table, so he took it and left, acknowledging that he “got more

weed than [he’d] really paid for.”

     Over the next few days, the dispute between Banks and

Appellant escalated. Banks testified that, when he took the

marijuana and walked out, no one said anything to him, but later,

he received “phone calls saying [Appellant] and his people better not

see me no more.” Banks said he also received “threats about [his]

daughter and all type of other stuff,” including hostile postings about

the incident on Facebook from associates of Appellant. According to

Banks, “that’s how [he] knew then there was a problem.”

     However, Banks also admitted to posting a statement on his

Facebook account suggesting he wanted to fight Appellant “one on

                                     3
one.” And, according to the trial testimony of Appellant’s girlfriend,

Banks frequently drove by Appellant’s house and would “lay on the

horn.” Appellant’s brother, Datavious Sheats, testified that he also

received a threatening phone call after the incident from Smith,

Banks’s girlfriend.   In addition to threatening phone calls and

Facebook posts, Banks, Smith, and some of Appellant’s friends and

relatives were also involved in at least two hostile encounters during

this time period.

     The first encounter took place on August 13, 2017. According

to Charles Shy, a friend of Appellant’s, Shy was hanging out at a

house in Social Circle on August 13 when Banks and Smith stopped

by looking for Appellant. Shy testified that Smith stayed in the car,

but Banks came inside the house and, “in so many words[,] said that

he was trying to justify the fact that he robbed [Appellant] and when

he seen [Appellant] he was going to handle it.” Shy testified that

Banks had a “firearm on his hip,” but Banks did not “pull it out,

point it at [Shy], threaten anybody or anything like that.” Shy

stated that he thought Banks was just trying to scare them and

                                  4
“make it known that he was going to handle [Appellant] when he

saw him.” Banks and Smith left after this exchange with Shy.

     A few minutes later, Banks and Smith showed up at the nearby

home of Darius Still, another friend of Appellant’s. Shy, who had

come over to Still’s house after the encounter with Banks, testified

that Smith stayed in the car again, but Banks came up to the house

with a gun “on his hip,” asking where Appellant was. According to

the trial testimony of Shy and Sheats, as well as Appellant’s

statement to the police, Appellant and Sheats were also at Still’s

house at this time, but they hid in a closet when Banks and Smith

pulled up in front of the house.      Shy testified that Appellant

appeared to be “trying to avoid the situation—at all costs.” Shy also

testified that during this second exchange with Banks, Banks did

not point his gun at anyone or threaten anyone with it.

     The next day, Banks and Smith got into an argument with

Appellant’s mother, Keshia Jackson, outside of Ms. Jackson’s home.

Ms. Jackson testified at trial that she was standing on her front

porch talking on the telephone when Smith, who was down the

                                 5
street with Banks, started yelling at Ms. Jackson and calling her

names.    According to Ms. Jackson, Banks and Smith then

approached Ms. Jackson’s house, and Banks had a gun “tucked into

his pants.” Ms. Jackson said that Banks did not point the gun at

her, but told her that he “was going to do” Appellant and “was going

to take [Appellant] out because [Banks] was tired of the back and

forth.” Ms. Jackson testified that she knew Appellant and Banks

were in a disagreement because she “understood [Banks] stole

money from [her] son.”

     Sheats testified that he was at Ms. Jackson’s house at the time

of her encounter with Banks and Smith, and he heard Smith “telling

us they was going to kill us.” Sheats said that Ms. Jackson then

“made [Sheats] leave,” so he left the house. According to Banks,

Sheats was armed when Banks and Smith encountered him at Ms.

Jackson’s house, and Sheats threatened them, saying, “we’re gonna

catch you slipping.” Ms. Jackson and Sheats testified that when

they told Appellant about this encounter, Appellant was “terrified.”

     Several days later, on August 20—the day of the shootings—

                                 6
Banks and Smith gave Smith’s close friend, Jefferies, and Jefferies’s

one-year-old son a ride to Rutledge so Jefferies could take her son to

a relative’s house. According to Jefferies, on the way to Rutledge

from Social Circle, Banks stopped and left his gun at a friend’s house

because “he didn’t want to ride with the gun to Rutledge.” 2 Jefferies

testified that, after they dropped off her son and were driving back

to Social Circle, Banks received a phone call from Appellant.

Jefferies testified that Banks put the call on speaker phone, and she

overheard Appellant say to Banks, “[B]ring my stuff back or ya’ll

going to have to see about me.” Jefferies said Banks and Appellant

then had several phone conversations during the drive, and she

heard Banks tell Appellant, “[Y]ou need to check my résumé . . . I

ain’t bringing nothing back.”

     According to Banks, this phone call was the first time he spoke

directly to Appellant after the incident on August 10.                   Banks

testified that, when Appellant called him the first time, Appellant

said he was at his house and asked Banks to “[s]hoot [him] or one,”

     2   At trial, Banks testified that he did not have a gun with him that day.
                                        7
meaning Appellant wanted to fight Banks “one on one.” Banks

responded, “all right” and started driving towards Appellant’s

house.

     According to Jefferies, she asked Banks to drop her off before

he went to Appellant’s house, but Banks said he “just going to go

ahead and go up here and see what [Appellant] wants.” Jefferies

testified that, when they arrived at Appellant’s house around 1:00

or 2:00 p.m., they did not see Appellant outside the house. So, Banks

drove a short distance away and called Appellant, telling him, “[Y]ou

called me up here, come outside.” Banks then drove back to

Appellant’s house and parked the car at the intersection adjacent to

it. Smith was sitting in the front passenger seat, and Jefferies was

sitting in the backseat behind Banks. The window next to Jefferies

was rolled down.

     Jefferies testified that, when they pulled back up to the

intersection, Appellant was standing on the front porch of his house,

“right there by the door,” armed with an AR-15. Banks jumped out

of the car and started “walking fast” into the front yard of

                                 8
Appellant’s house. Jefferies saw Banks lift up his shirt and beat on

his chest, saying to Appellant, “You need to check my résumé.”

According to Jefferies, as Banks approached Appellant’s front porch

from the yard, Appellant told Banks to “step back.” Banks testified

that he turned around at this point because—although Appellant

had told him “to pull up and fight”—Appellant had a gun, so Banks

was not “fixing to get into it with [Appellant].”

      According to Banks and Jefferies, as soon as Banks turned

around and started walking back towards the car, Appellant started

shooting, hitting Banks in the back of his right leg. 3 Banks fell to

the ground. Jefferies testified that Smith got out of the car on the

passenger side to check on Banks, and as Smith started walking

around the back of the vehicle, Appellant shot her twice—once in the

arm and once in the chest.4 Smith grabbed her chest and said to

Jefferies, who was still seated in the backseat, “[H]e done shot me.

      3  An orthopedic surgeon testified that the bullet shattered Banks’s right
femur and then exited his right leg on the groin side, grazing his left leg.
       4 The record reflects that when Banks was shot, he fell to the ground

about 78 feet from the front porch of Appellant’s house, and when Smith was
shot, she fell about 93 feet from the front porch of Appellant’s house.
                                       9
Call the police.” Smith slid to the ground beside the car. 5

     Jefferies testified that she remained in the backseat of the car

during the shootings, “praying that she would not get shot.” Several

of the gunshots struck the car near where Jefferies was seated.

After Smith was shot, Jefferies heard Appellant say, “[W]hoever in

the back seat need to step out” because “he was fixing to get ready

to shoot[] up the car.” Jefferies also overheard Appellant’s friend,

Still, who was standing on the front porch with Appellant, tell

Appellant to shoot her and “leave no witnesses.”             As Jefferies

stepped out of the car, she looked down at Smith’s body and saw that

her chest was soaked with blood and she was not moving. Banks

asked Jefferies what was going on, and she told him that Smith was

dead. Jefferies testified that she and Appellant are cousins, and

when she stepped out of the car, she could tell Appellant recognized

her. Jefferies then heard Appellant ask one of his friends for a phone

to call the police.

     5  The medical examiner testified that Smith died from a gunshot wound
of the chest.
                                    10
     The police arrived at the scene several minutes later. Jefferies

did not approach the police, but instead, walked to a nearby

relative’s house because she was “in shock mode.”        Emergency

medical personnel also arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and

transported Banks to the hospital. The police located Appellant’s

AR-15—the only weapon found at the scene—and nine shell casings

just inside the front door and on the front porch of Appellant’s

residence. Appellant was arrested and taken into custody.

     During Appellant’s custodial interview, the police asked him

what “led up” to the shootings, and Appellant told the police that,

earlier that day, he called Banks and “asked him was he going to

give [Appellant] [his] stuff—[his] money back. And [Banks] started

talking sh**.” Appellant explained that, two weeks prior to the

shootings, Banks had “snatched all [Appellant’s] money and ran out

of the house,” and since that time, Banks had “been looking for

[Appellant],” “talking sh**” to Appellant and his “momma,” and

“threatening [Appellant’s] little brother.”   Appellant said that,

“every other day ever since [the robbery] happened,” Banks would

                                 11
“ride up and down the street” where Appellant lived and follow

Appellant, once forcing Appellant to hide in the back room of his

cousin’s house. Appellant said he “really felt threatened” and “like

[his] back was against the wall.” The police asked Appellant why he

did not contact them “when [Banks] robbed [Appellant] a couple

weeks ago,” and Appellant responded that he did not “want to see

nobody get in trouble” and “just want[ed] [his] money back.”

     Appellant told the police that he was “tired of it” and decided

to call Banks about getting the money back. Appellant said when

he called Banks earlier that day, Banks “started getting irate on the

phone.”   And, when Banks pulled up to Appellant’s house and

jumped out of the car, Appellant knew he had to “protect [him]self,”

explaining that “[Banks] was going to hurt [Appellant] or

[Appellant] was going to hurt [Banks].” And “[Appellant] wasn’t

going to let [Banks] hurt [him].” As Banks was “coming down the

yard” and “walking toward” Appellant, Appellant “opened the door

and step[ped] out with the gun and point[ed] it at [Banks].” When

Banks “kept walking up,” Appellant “shot,” and when Smith got out

                                 12
of the car, Appellant “shot over there, too.” Appellant “just shot

[until] it wouldn’t shoot no more.” Appellant admitted that he did

not see Banks or Smith with a gun that day and had, in fact, never

seen them with a gun before. Appellant also acknowledged that

Banks was not close to him when Appellant started shooting at

Banks.

     At trial, Banks and Jefferies testified that neither Banks nor

Smith was armed at the time of the shootings—Jefferies confirmed

that the only gun she ever saw on Banks was the one he dropped off

earlier in the day before arriving in Rutledge. According to Jefferies,

Banks “never fired no shots,” and Appellant “never fired no shots

until Banks turned his back,” and “that’s when [Appellant] started

firing the shot.” Jefferies said that Banks wanted “to fight,” but

Appellant wanted “to shoot.”

     1.   On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was

insufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of all the charges of which he was

convicted.   When evaluating challenges to the sufficiency of the

                                  13
evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, “the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781,

61 LE2d 560) (1979) (emphasis in original). “This Court views the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to

the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.”

Sams v. State, 314 Ga. 306, 309 (2) (875 SE2d 757) (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted). Applying this standard, we conclude that

the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions, and

thus, Appellant’s challenges—discussed in more detail below—are

without merit. See id.

     (a) Aggravated Assault Against Jefferies and Related Charge

     Appellant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient

to support his convictions for aggravated assault against Jefferies

and the related charge of possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony. In support thereof, Appellant argues that,

                                 14
while the evidence established that gunfire struck the vehicle in

which Jefferies was seated, the evidence did not show that Appellant

pointed the AR-15 directly at Jefferies or establish the specific area

of the car where Appellant pointed his weapon.           Additionally,

Appellant argues that Jefferies never testified to being in fear of her

safety or her life or to being in reasonable apprehension of

immediately receiving a violent injury. And Appellant contends

that, because Jefferies left the scene after the shootings occurred

without speaking to the police, a reasonable hypothesis exists that

she did not believe a crime had been committed against her.

     A person commits the offense of aggravated assault
     [under OCGA §§ 16-5-20 and 16-5-21] when he uses a
     deadly weapon to commit an act which places another
     person in reasonable apprehension of immediately
     receiving a violent injury. Whether a victim has been
     placed in reasonable apprehension of injury is a question
     of fact, which may be established by indirect or
     circumstantial evidence. The presence of a deadly weapon
     would normally place a victim in reasonable
     apprehension of being injured violently.

Stewart v. State, 299 Ga. 622, 626 (2) (a) (791 SE2d 61) (2016)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

                                  15
     In this case, Jefferies testified extensively about witnessing

Appellant shoot Banks and Smith, while “praying that she would

not get shot.” Jefferies also testified that Appellant told her to get

out of the car because he “was fixing to get ready to shoot[] [it] up.”

When Jefferies exited the car, she had to step over Smith’s body, and

she overheard Appellant’s friend tell him to shoot her so there would

be no witnesses. The State also presented evidence that several

gunshots struck the driver’s side of the vehicle close to the area

where Jefferies was seated.

     A jury could infer from this evidence that Jefferies was placed

in “reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent

injury.”    OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2). Therefore, the evidence was

“sufficient to prove the aggravated assault,” as well as the

possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony predicated

on that aggravated assault. Stewart, 299 Ga. at 626 (2) (a) (citation

omitted).

     (b) Felony Murder and Related Charges

     Appellant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to

                                  16
support his convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault,

aggravated battery, and possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony because there was evidence presented to

show that, when Appellant shot Banks and Smith, he was acting in

self-defense or as a result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible

passion, resulting from the victims’ serious provocation and

repeated attempts to confront Appellant. We disagree.

     “A person is justified in threatening or using force against

another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes

that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or herself or

a third person against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force.”

OCGA § 16-3-21 (a). However, “[a] person is justified in using force

which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only

if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to

prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or a third

person or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” Nelson v.

State, 283 Ga. 119, 120 (1) (657 SE2d 201) (2008) (citing OCGA § 16-

3-21 (a)).   “A homicide is not justified if the force used by the

                                 17
defendant exceeds that which a reasonable person would believe was

necessary to defend against the victim’s unlawful act.” Id. (citations

and punctuation omitted). The evidence in this case was more than

sufficient for the jury to reject Appellant’s assertion that he was

acting in self-defense when he shot Banks and Smith.

        No evidence was presented to show that, at the time of the

shootings, Banks or Smith was armed or that Appellant was

otherwise in danger of the “imminent use of unlawful force” which

was “likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” OCGA § 16-3-21

(a). In fact, Appellant told the police that he did not see Banks or

Smith with a gun that day, and the only weapon found at the scene

was the AR-15 used by Appellant. The evidence showed that, when

the shooting occurred, Banks was not within close range of

Appellant—who never left his front porch—and Banks was walking

back towards his car.      Similarly, Smith was not threatening

Appellant in any way at the time he shot her. Accordingly, the jury

was authorized to reject Appellant’s justification defense in this

case.

                                 18
     The jury was also authorized to reject the theory that

Appellant was acting as a result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible

passion when he shot Banks and Smith. See OCGA § 16-5-2.6 In

this case, the trial court charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter

and instructed the jury that, “if after consideration of all the

evidence and before you would be authorized to return a verdict of

guilty of malice murder or felony murder, you must first determine

whether mitigating circumstances, if any, would cause the offense

to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter.” The jury apparently

found no such mitigating circumstances present here, and the

evidence was sufficient to support that finding. See Watkins v.

     6 Pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-2 (a),
     [a] person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he
     causes the death of another human being under circumstances
     which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result
     of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious
     provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable
     person; however, if there should have been an interval between the
     provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and
     humanity to be heard, of which the jury in all cases shall be the
     judge, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge and be
     punished as murder.

                                      19
State, 313 Ga. 573, 576 (2) (872 SE2d 293) (2022).

     As noted above, the evidence showed that Banks and Smith—

who were unarmed—did not engage in any “provocation sufficient to

excite” a “sudden, violent, and irresistible passion” in Appellant

when the shootings occurred. Ware v. State, 303 Ga. 847, 849-850

(III) (815 SE2d 837) (2018). Banks was retreating from Appellant’s

yard at the time Appellant shot him, and Smith was simply getting

out of the car—presumably to check on Banks. And, the prior

difficulties between these parties were insufficient to demonstrate

provocation in this case. See Francis v. State, 296 Ga. 190, 193 (2)

(766 SE2d 52) (2014) (holding that “words alone generally are not

sufficient provocation to excite the passion necessary to give rise to

voluntary manslaughter”).

     Accordingly, after properly viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdicts, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient under the Jackson standard for a jury to find Appellant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the crimes of which he was

convicted. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (III) (B). See also Boyd v.

                                 20
State, 306 Ga. 204, 207 (1) (830 SE2d 160) (2019).

     2. Appellant also contends that the trial judge erred by not

recusing himself from this case, alleging that certain of the trial

judge’s comments and conduct during trial demonstrated a lack of

impartiality and a bias in favor of the State. We see no merit to this

contention.

     First, Appellant asserts that, after the State rested its case, the

trial judge interjected during trial counsel’s direct examination of

witnesses—often without any objection from the State—but did not

interject when the State was examining witnesses on direct or cross.

Appellant argues that the trial judge’s interjections during only the

defense portion of the case could have made Appellant’s witnesses

look less credible in the eyes of the jury. Appellant cites to numerous

pages of the trial transcript where the trial court made comments

during Appellant’s examination of witnesses, but does not argue

that any specific comments, by themselves, demonstrated a bias in

favor of the State.

     Appellant also claims that two specific instances during trial

                                  21
demonstrated the trial judge’s bias in favor of the State. The first

alleged instance occurred during the charge conference—outside the

presence of the jury—when Appellant asked the trial judge to give

the following jury charge defining “forcible felony”: “A forcible felony

is any felony that involves the use or threat of force or violence

against any person. (Insert name of offense) is a felony, defined as

follows: (Give Definition of Felony).” Appellant argued that this

charge was appropriate to explain to the jury that, if it found the

victims were attempting to inflict a “forcible felony” on Appellant,

the jury could find Appellant “not guilty based upon self-defense.”

The State argued that this charge did not adequately define any

offense, and Appellant responded that the trial judge could insert

the name of any felony in this case—murder, felony murder,

aggravated assault, etc.—as they were all potentially applicable to

what the victims were attempting to inflict upon Appellant.

     The trial judge disagreed, explaining that, in the context of the

evidence presented at trial, it was not clear which offense should be

included and defined in the requested instruction. The trial judge

                                  22
stated, “There was a threat of fight, that’s the most I feel you could

say, counsel. I know what you’re arguing. Lucky for you I’m not on

this jury, I don’t buy it, and what they buy is on them.” Then, after

hearing again from both parties, the trial judge declined to “define a

forcible felony in this case,” stating,

     I think given the convoluted nature of the facts that have
     been presented in this case the only way if I give this I am
     in some way I feel commenting, maybe not commenting,
     but at least inserting, the Court’s—as it relates to it. You
     can argue all you wish as it relates to that. And to me that
     term is not one that needs a definition. Any forcible
     felony. You can talk about that all day long. You know,
     assaults, battery, you know, all the way up to murder and
     everything in between that would have occurred there as
     well.

     Appellant then inquired of the trial judge, “So by not giving it

you’re not in any way limiting my ability to make those arguments

to the jury?” The trial judge responded, “No, that’s what your whole

argument is; am I right?”

     The next alleged instance of bias took place when the jury

returned the verdicts and the trial judge reviewed the verdict form.

The trial judge observed that the jury failed to render a verdict on

                                   23
one of the gun possession counts, so the trial court returned the

verdict form to the foreperson, stating, “You’ve got a count you did

not complete. It’s just the third page back there, and sign it for me.

Probably won’t take but a second[.]”

     Appellant contends that the trial judge’s interjections during

trial counsel’s examination of witnesses and his comments on

Appellant’s requested jury charge showed partiality and bias in

favor of the State, and thus, the trial judge should have recused

himself, citing Johnson v. State, 278 Ga. 344, 348 (3) (602 SE2d 623)

(2004) (noting that trial judges are bound to recuse themselves

whenever their impartiality might reasonably be questioned).

Appellant also contends that the trial judge’s comment to the jury

that it would only take “a second” to complete the verdict form was

“a direct statement on the guilt of the accused” and clearly showed

a lack of impartiality by the trial judge. We disagree.

     As an initial matter, the record shows that, at the time of trial,

Appellant “was aware of the circumstances that, he says on appeal,

evidence the partiality of the judge.” Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 749

                                  24
(5) (784 SE2d 759) (2016). Even so, Appellant did not object to any

of the trial judge’s conduct or comments during trial and “filed no

motion to recuse the trial judge.” Id.

     “Generally speaking, ‘[w]hen a party learns of grounds for the

potential disqualification of the judge, he must promptly move for

the recusal of the judge, and if he does not, the question of

disqualification is not preserved for appellate review.’” Pyatt, 298

Ga. at 749 (5) (quoting State v. Hargis, 294 Ga. 818, 821 (1) (756

SE2d 529) (2014)). Here, however, Appellant “waited until after he

had been tried, convicted, and sentenced to raise the recusal issue,

which he first asserted in his []amended motion for new trial.”

Battle v. State, 298 Ga. 661, 666 (2) (a) (784 SE2d 381) (2016). See

also Butts v. State, 273 Ga. 760, 762 (3) (546 SE2d 472) (2001) (“We

find that the issue of the trial judge’s alleged error for failing to

recuse herself is waived because Butts and his trial counsel failed to

raise the issue at or before trial.”).    Accordingly, “[u]nder our

precedents, [Appellant] has failed to preserve any claim of error

about the partiality of the trial judge for appellate review.” Pyatt,

                                 25
298 Ga. at 750 (5).

     However, “[e]ven assuming [a] trial judge’s failure to recuse

could in a rare instance constitute reversible error even though the

parties knew of the grounds for recusal but did not make a motion,

there is no reversible error here.” Barnett v. State, 300 Ga. 551, 554

(2) (796 SE2d 653) (2017). “Judges shall disqualify themselves in

any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” Id. But the record in this case shows there was no such

partiality here.

     First, as to Appellant’s contention that the trial judge

improperly interjected himself during trial counsel’s questioning of

witnesses—allegedly demonstrating partiality in favor of the

State—that contention is unsupported by the record. The record

reflects that, throughout the trial and during both parties’

questioning of witnesses, the trial judge interjected only when

necessary to prevent the solicitation of hearsay testimony or the

leading of witnesses, among other things.

     “It is the duty of the trial [judge] to control the trial of the case

                                   26
and to ensure a fair trial to both sides on the disputed issues in the

case[,]” and “[s]ometimes this requires interference by the court with

the conduct of counsel.” Bonner v. State, 295 Ga. 10, 15 (3) (757

SE2d 118) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted). Appellant has

not shown that the trial judge’s interjections were anything other

than the use of the trial court’s discretion to ensure that the

proceedings were “orderly and fair” and that the “rules of evidence

and procedure [were] followed.” Johnson, 278 Ga. at 348. See also

Smith v. State, 297 Ga. 268, 270 (2) (773 SE2d 269) (2015) (“[A] trial

court has considerable discretion to control the trial of the case to

ensure a fair trial and the orderly administration justice.”).

     Additionally, the trial judge’s denial of Appellant’s request to

charge the jury on the definition of forcible felony occurred during

the charge conference outside the presence of the jury. And the

record does not reflect and Appellant has not shown that this ruling

demonstrated any partiality on the part of the judge or any bias on

his part in favor of the State. “Judicial rulings alone almost never

constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Barnett, 300

                                  27
Ga. at 555 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     With respect to the trial judge’s statement when he advised the

jury that it needed to complete a count on the verdict form—i.e., that

it “[p]robably won’t take but a second”—the most reasonable way to

construe this statement, when read in context, is that the trial judge

was instructing the jury to complete an administrative task—i.e., to

finish filling out the verdict form that the jury had already discussed

one way or another. Appellant has failed to offer any evidence

supporting an alternate reading, and he has not shown—and the

record does not demonstrate—that this statement was in any way

motivated by any alleged bias in favor of the State or was a violation

of the trial judge’s duty to maintain his impartiality. See Barnett,

300 Ga. at 554-556 (2).

     As to any allegation that Appellant was “denied a trial before

a fair and impartial judge in violation of the constitutional

guarantee of due process,” the record in this case “discloses no actual

bias and involves no circumstance that has been recognized as

presenting an intolerably high probability of actual bias.” Pyatt, 298

                                  28
Ga. at 752-753 (5). “The law presumes honesty and integrity on the

part of those serving as adjudicators, and [Appellant] has failed to

overcome the presumption in this case.” Id. at 753 (citation and

punctuation omitted).

         3. Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court “erred by

allowing improper extrinsic evidence to be presented at trial,” citing

Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69 (829 SE2d 142) (2019). This contention

fails.

         In a pretrial motion in limine, Appellant moved to exclude any

evidence or testimony related to the alleged use, sale, or purchase of

illegal substances on Appellant’s part, and at the pretrial hearing,

Appellant requested that “the State not be allowed to bring up []

uncorroborated allegations by Quantavious Banks that there was

some kind of drug sale or drug activity being conducted by

[Appellant].” In response, the State argued that the specific drug

transaction between Appellant and Banks that Appellant sought to

exclude was intrinsic to the crime because it initiated the dispute

between Appellant and the victims, and so, “even if it incidentally

                                    29
might place any character issues on the table,” the evidence was

admissible. The trial court agreed and denied Appellant’s motion in

limine, concluding that this evidence was intrinsic to the crimes.

     On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in

allowing this evidence to be presented at trial because the charges

in this case were “associated with the shooting death of [Smith],”

and evidence that Appellant “sold or used marijuana could not make

any material fact surrounding the death of [Smith] more probable,

therefore making the evidence irrelevant.” Appellant also contends

that this evidence “reflected highly negatively on Appellant’s

character,” and that, “[e]ven if the [trial court] was correct in finding

the evidence relevant, the evidence should have been excluded due

to its extreme prejudicial value.”

     Appellant’s contention that evidence of the drug transaction

between Appellant and Banks was “improper extrinsic evidence” is

incorrect. “The limitations and prohibition on ‘other acts’ evidence

set out in OCGA § 24–4–404 (b)7 do not apply to intrinsic evidence.”

     7   Pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b):
                                     30
Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 (IV) (d) (807 SE2d 350) (2017)

(citation and punctuation omitted).           “Evidence is admissible as

intrinsic evidence when it is (1) an uncharged offense arising from

the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense;

(2) necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably

intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” Id.

(citation and punctuation omitted).

     In applying these factors, this Court has explained that

     [e]vidence pertaining to the chain of events explaining the
     context, motive, and set-up of the crime is properly
     admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances with the
     charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an
     account of the crime, or is necessary to complete
     the story of the crime for the jury. Evidence of other acts

     Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible
     to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
     conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
     purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive,
     opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
     absence of mistake or accident. The prosecution in a criminal
     proceeding shall provide reasonable notice to the defense in
     advance of trial, unless pretrial notice is excused by the court upon
     good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
     intends to introduce at trial. Notice shall not be required when the
     evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is offered to prove the
     circumstances immediately surrounding the charged crime,
     motive, or prior difficulties between the accused and the alleged
     victim.
                                      31
     is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding
     the charged offense if it forms an integral and natural
     part of the witness’s accounts of the circumstances
     surrounding the offenses for which the defendant was
     indicted. And this sort of intrinsic evidence remains
     admissible even if it incidentally places the defendant’s
     character at issue.

Heade v. State, 312 Ga. 19, 24-25 (3) (860 SE2d 509) (2021),

(citations and punctuation omitted).             Moreover, “[t]here is no

brightline rule regarding how close in time evidence must be to the

charged offenses, or requiring evidence to pertain directly to the

victims of the charged offenses, for that evidence to be admitted

properly   as intrinsic evidence.”    Id.   at    25   (3)   (citation   and

punctuation omitted).

     The story of this case began with a drug transaction. The

evidence showed that, when Banks paid Appellant for marijuana

that he did not receive and then, in retribution, took from Appellant

either money or marijuana that Banks did not pay for, a dispute

arose between these men that festered, leading to the shootings of

Banks and Smith. And, during Appellant’s custodial interview with

the police, he discussed this dispute at length, confirming that it

                                     32
started when Banks took Appellant’s “stuff” or “money” and

escalated over the next two weeks as threatening exchanges and

encounters occurred, directly resulting in the shootings of Banks

and Smith.     As such, Appellant’s own statements rendered this

evidence intrinsic.

       This evidence was “necessary to complete the story of the crime

for the jury,” Heade, 312 Ga. at 24-25 (3), and to explain why

Appellant and Banks were engaged in an ongoing feud that led to

the shootings. The evidence was also “inextricably intertwined with

the evidence” regarding the crimes for which Appellant was indicted

because it formed “an integral and natural part” of Appellant’s

account of the circumstances surrounding the crimes and explained

how the dispute between Appellant and Banks originated. Id. at 25

(3).   Without evidence of the initial drug transaction and Banks’s

theft of marijuana or money from Appellant afterwards, there would

be no explanation for the dispute between Appellant and Banks and

for the subsequent threats and confrontations that took place—

                                  33
about which Appellant’s friends and family members testified

extensively. See id.

     Accordingly, we conclude that evidence of the drug transaction

was relevant and “properly admitted as intrinsic evidence, so we

need not address its potential admission as extrinsic evidence under

Rule 404 (b).” Heade, 312 Ga. at 24 (3). See also Smith v. State, 307

Ga. 263, 272 (2) (c) (834 SE2d 1) (2019) (“[B]ecause the evidence was

intrinsic, it was outside the reach of Rule 404 (b).” (citation and

punctuation omitted)).    And, while “[r]elevant evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the

jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence,” OCGA § 24-4-403, “there is no

mechanical solution for this balancing test.” State v. Jones, 297 Ga.

156, 163 (3) (773 SE2d 170) (2015).

     Instead, a trial court must undertake in each case a
     considered evaluation of the proffered justification for the
     admission of such evidence and make an independent
     determination of whether the probative value of the
     evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of

                                 34
     unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
     the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
     time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Id. at 175-176 (citation and punctuation omitted).      “We have

explained that this balance should be struck in favor of

admissibility,” Heade, 312 Ga. at 25 (3), and in this case, the

testimony concerning the drug transaction was highly probative and

necessary to explain the context of the crime. See Hughes v. State,

312 Ga. 149, 153 (1) (861 SE2d 94) (2021).

     Although Appellant’s character might have incidentally been

placed at issue by evidence that he sold drugs, any prejudicial

impact Appellant suffered as a result of the admission of this

evidence did not outweigh its probative value under OCGA § 24-4-

403. In fact, Appellant relied upon this botched drug transaction

and the ensuing dispute to attempt to justify the shootings in this

case. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that evidence of the drug transaction was

admissible.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                35