Court Opinion

ID: 9529490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:51:19.183551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:49.240162
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
There is much in the majority opinion with which I readily agree. For instance, the case law holdings of this Court relative to directed verdicts are well stated. To those cases should also be added our more recent case of Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). The majority writes:
On a motion for a directed verdict the moving party admits the truth of the adverse party’s evidence and ever legitimate inference that may be drawn therefrom____ A directed verdict should only be granted when the evidence is so clear and undisputed that all reasonable minds must reach the same conclusion____ A motion for directed verdict presents a trial judge with a pure question of law, i.e., whether, as a matter of law, plaintiff produced sufficient evidence (not a mere scintilla) from which reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was proper. Upon appeal the standard of review is the same, i.e., to determine whether as a matter of law plaintiff produced sufficient evidence from which reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was proper____
... [Although the court has power to grant a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’s case, the better and safer practice is to defer a ruling upon the motion until both sides have finally rested. It is also stated that even at the close of all the evidence it may be desirable to refrain from directing a verdict and submit the cause to the jury. Thereafter, on appellate review, if it is determined the trial court was in error in its appraisal of the evidence, judgment on the verdict can be entered without the need for an entire new trial. Majority opinion, p. 998 (citations omitted).
The majority opinion adequately acquaints the reader with the distinction between the German-manufactured Prym pins and the standard American-made “common” pins. Speaking of the Prym pins:
The metal used in the manufacturing process is of hardened tempered steel so it can be drawn to a thousandth of an inch. The pins are longer and thinner than common pins, are sold for use on fine materials, and hence the points are much sharper than a common pin so that *82the fine materials will not be damaged. Id., p. 997.
And the majority informs of the comparatively little use of the Pryms in this country: “Although popular in Europe, only approximately five percent of the dressmaking pins sold in the United States are of the Prym type of needle-steel pins.” Id., p. 998.1
The majority provides an account of how the injury to Michelle Sidwell was caused by a Prym pin:
Plaintiff Sidwell was wearing a dress, and her mother was using pins to place a hem in the dress. When Sidwell bumped or brushed against a coffee table the impact drove a pin into her knee area with sufficient force to strike the end of her femur. The pin broke into three pieces, two of which remained in the knee. One of those fragments was surgically removed, but the other had lodged in the bone and since its removal would cause permanent impairment of the knee, it was not removed. There has been resultant pain and a serious curtailment of the activities of Sidwell. Id., p. 997.
The majority stated fairly well the nature of Michelle Sidwell’s claim against the defendants:
[Tjhat the pins were defective and unusually dangerous, that they were defectively designed, and that there was a duty to warn of the brittle nature of the pins. Sidwell asserted that the pins in question here differ from common ordinary pins used in dressmaking. She asserts that common ordinary pins are made from a material which is ductile, and hence the pins will bend when placed under stress. The pins at issue here, however, are made from a different type of material which is not ductile and hence are brittle, with a tendency to break rather than bend when placed under stress. Id.
Such would be a more acceptable statement of the claim if the word “asserted” were not used. The evidence established that the Prym pins do differ from common pins, and that common pins are ductile, and will bend, whereas the Prym pins are brittle and do break rather than bend. The pins were marketed in this country without any warning that they are brittle and do break rather than bend.
As the majority does note, we do:
review the record to determine if Sidwell produced sufficient evidence upon which reasonable minds could find in favor of Sidwell. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Sidwell. In any event, the evidence is essentially uncontroverted. At this juncture there is no question but the accident happened and that Sidwell suffered some damage therefrom. Majority opinion, p. 998.
The majority, however, then proceeds into an analysis of the evidence which the directed verdict precluded the “reasonable minds” of twelve jurors from doing, as is their function.
Citing the Rindlisbaker case for the proposition that a failure to warn of a danger which a manufacturer had reason to anticipate may give rise to strict liability, but observing that this rule is limited to situations where the danger is not obvious, the majority correctly notes it to be “clear that the manufacturer could anticipate the danger of a pin pricking, puncturing, or piercing dressmaking or other materials or the bodily surface of a user.” The majority opinion then states the obvious: All of those who use pins know that they can prick and/or puncture. Majority opinion, p. 999. So far, well and good. The majority then commendably points out the focus in Michelle Sidwell’s case “is not the danger of piercing or puncturing, but rather the danger that a [Prym] pin will be driven into the body with such force that it strikes a bone and shatters because of its brittle nature.” Id.
*83Whether Michelle Sidwell should have been warned of the unknown shattering propensities of Prym pins was what the whole lawsuit was all about. But the majority, reasoning like some jurors might have done, or might not have done, then expostulates that Prym pins are no different than “a needle, a knife, or a pointed piece of lead in a pencil” — all of which, it is said: “if driven into [against] a solid object with sufficient force will break rather than bend.” Id. Michelle’s mother probably knew that about steel needles, but she was not using steel needles to outline and fit the line of hemming Michelle’s dress, and for obvious reasons — it would have posed a danger. Likewise, she was not using a knife, nor a lead pencil. She was using pins of which neither she nor Michelle had any knowledge or warning were not bendable pins, but brittle pins which readily shatter.
Having meaninglessly discoursed on knives, needles and lead pencils, the majority pauses briefly to note other possible dangers which might result from unwarned use of Prym pins, none of which are involved or of concern in this case, and then returns to Rindlisbaker ’s language that the “manufacturer must anticipate the product being used ‘for the uses for which it is manufactured’ or ‘by its probable use,’ ” majority opinion, p. 999, and seemingly concedes that William Prym, Inc., “could anticipate that a user might attempt in dressmaking to bend such a pin or attempt to sew over the top of such pins, and in either event a fracture might result.” Id. Then, the majority sets the stage for its holding which is dispositive against Michelle Sidwell’s claim for the injury done here: “In the instant case, however, the manufacturer is asked to anticipate not only that pins will pierce, but they will be driven into the body with such force as to strike a bone and thus shatter.”2 Id., p. 999. It is then stated by the majority:
The circumstances of this case have been described as a freak accident that probably could not be duplicated under any conditions. Defendant’s knee and the dress material had to strike the coffee table at a precise point and angle, and with such force that the pin was driven into the knee area to a depth where it struck a bone. It is argued that such a series of events could never be experimentally duplicated.3 Id., p. 999.
Having set the stage, the majority writes out the verdict which it feels would have to be reached by twelve jurors:
We hold as a matter of law that reasonable minds could not differ on the inability of Prym to foresee the danger that the pins would be thrust into the body with sufficient force to strike a bone and shatter. We hold therefore that reasonable minds could not differ on the duty of Prym to warn of a danger which could not be foreseen. Id., p. 999.
Begging to differ with the majority, I submit that on a jury of twelve men of reasonable minds, at least nine of them might very well wonder why the Prym Company did not warn American buyers that Prym pins were not your ordinary run-of-the-mill garden variety of common pins that do bend, and rather easily at that. With a jury of twelve women of reasonable minds, it would not be surprising if the jury verdict would be unanimous.
The “freak accident” argument might prove not in the least persuasive to a jury. A jury might easily see that in the process of marking or outlining a hem on a standing girl, there would be an opportunity for a pinhead to come in contact with a piece of furniture, and drive it into the leg. The main aspect of this incident was that the pin penetrated not the calf, not the thigh, but the knee. The only freak aspect of the case is that the pin not only shattered on impact with bone, but surgical technology *84was unavailable to remove the one fragment.
Could reasonable minds differ? One would think so. For certain, able counsel for Michelle did not believe himself wasting his time and her money in pursuing the claim against Prym. As is true in many of such cases of product liability, it would have taken little effort and little money to warn the United States market that Prym pins are brittle and not your common American pin.
The jury had heard from three women who were experienced seamstresses, Michelle Dike, Sandra Dike, and Carol Stoddard, and a Mr. Galbreath who owned and operated a tailor’s shop with six employees. Not one of these people, prior to Michelle Sidwell’s accident, was aware that there was such a thing as a brittle straight pin such as the one here involved. There was nothing in the packaging, or otherwise, about the pins that would in any way indicate that they were brittle in nature.
The three women testified that if they had known that the pins were so brittle, they would never have allowed them in their home for fear of injury. Carol Stoddard and Sandra Dike, both, considered the sewing pins to be dangerous. Ralph Gal-breath stated that there was no legitimate use for such brittle pins, that these pins would definitely break if used in leather or heavy materials, that he would never knowingly allow these breakable pins in his establishment, that the brittle pins would break in his normal use, and that, in his opinion, a reasonable, prudent tailor would not use such pins if he knew what they were.
Conceded that this was an accident, the jury very well might have found it to be foreseeable. That foreseeable accidents have to be taken into account was established as law in Idaho in the case of Farmer v. International Harvester, 97 Idaho 742, 751, 553 P.2d 1306, 1314 (1976): “The intended use of the truck includes within its scope, the reasonably foreseeable likelihood that in the normal course of operation a truck may be involved in a collision or other accident____” This Court recently held that “[t]he factual question of foreseeability is for the jury to determine.” Sliman v. Aluminum Company of America, 112 Idaho 277, 283, 731 P.2d 1267, 1273 (1986). The majority inexplicably ignores this controlling precedent, and that the trial judge improperly usurped the role of the jury.
The trial court at the least should have let the case go to the jury. In that manner it would have had the benefit of the reasonable minds of twelve ordinary people. Had the jury decided for the defendants, Michelle Sidwell could have had her day in court, as ordained by the Idaho Constitution, and undoubtedly would have thanked the judge and jurors for their consideration of her claim. If the jury decided for the plaintiff, the court still retained the power to set aside the verdict under Idaho procedure. As stated in this Court’s most recent pronouncement:
“[T]he trial judge must view all of the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in favor of the non-moving party, and decide if there was substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury, or, in other words, that there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have reached. Stephens [Stearns ] supra, 106 Idaho [249] at 253, 678 P.2d [41] at [45] [1984]; Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 733, 639 P.2d 429, [431] (1981).” Quick v. Crane, supra, 111 Idaho at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192.
A trial judge who is not influenced by the views of the jury will be an unusual jurist. Where the trial court, under the teaching of Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1, 592 P.2d 57 (1979), has allowed the jury to render its decision, and that decision is in favor of the plaintiff, a motion for judgment n.o.v. still affords “the trial court [a] last opportunity to order the judgment that the law requires.” Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192.

. The majority does not inform us as to whether Prym is subject to strict liability abroad as it must be in this country and this state. If Prym is to market its pins in Idaho, then it must comply with the Idaho common law requirement to afford adequate warning.

. It would take no great force to drive a slim, steel pin through one-eighth inch of skin and strike into bone and/or cartilage.

. The "freak accident" language was that of counsel for Prym at oral argument. Likewise, with the "could never be experimentally duplicated.”