Court Opinion

ID: 9638543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:46:25.995081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:07.630949
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
I disagree with the result reached by the majority in considering the alleged error in the charge. If counsel was of the view that the language used by the judge was less than clear and may have caused confusion in the minds of the jury members he should have made an appropriate request to the court for clarification. However, I consider the failure by counsel for appellant to object to this language, or request clarification, conclusive of this issue.
The proper functioning of our guilt-determining process neither requires nor assures a defendant an errorless trial. A defendant is, however, entitled to a fair trial free of such trial errors as his trial counsel timely sought to have corrected by calling them to the court’s attention. Trial errors are made in the courtroom and it is there that the correction process should at least be initiated.
*570The defense may not successfully complain of trial errors for the first time only after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty, unless the errors were initially challenged at trial, and thereby preserved on appeal. The majority now—contrary to the whole course of modern trial procedure—encourages defense counsel to sit by silently without calling errors to the trial court’s attention until after the guilty verdict is returned. In effect the majority’s present approach places the appellate court in the role of a super-trial-defense counsel. Where counsel fails to call errors to the attention of the trial judge, the majority ignores that deficiency and assumes the function of protecting those failures by granting relief despite the silence of counsel at trial.
I suggest that the majority now not only approves and encourages such trial silence, but more tragically places a distinct premium upon such strategy. This may well become one of the frequently used techniques of trial counsel for obtaining a new trial—simply do not seek to have errors corrected before the jury retires to deliberate. See Commonwealth v. Simon, 432 Pa. 386, 248 A. 2d 289 (1968).
Furthermore, as I have stated both in Simon and Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 432 Pa. 571, 248 A. 2d 295 (1968), I think the basic and fundamental error test used by the majority in the instant case is too vague and lends itself to inconsistent results. Surely, all must agree that the very first ingredient of a constitutionally acceptable rule of law is that it must be impartial and equal as applied to all who come within its principle. Yet a comparison of the error in the charge in this case with the denial of the right to the assistance of counsel in the Seoleri case indicates that this impartiality may be lacking. Such obvious and glaring lack of uniformity imperils the stability of this court’s adjudication process, especially in the in*571stance where one defendant is afforded far less decisional protection and relief than another defendant similarly situated. I believe that the majority’s decision to give Williams a new trial while denying relief to Scoleri does precisely that.
Therefore, I dissent.