Court Opinion

ID: 9736600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:00:40.347543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:07.500733
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BURKE, dissenting: The court today devotes its opinion to addressing the constitutionality of a statute that no longer exists. This is serious error. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. After pleading guilty, defendant, Charles Johnson, was convicted of the armed robbery of 60-year-old Elmora Kimbrough and the aggravated kidnapping of her 20-month-old granddaughter. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 17 years’ imprisonment. At the time of defendant’s convictions, aggravated kidnapping of a minor by a person who was not the minor’s parent was defined as a “sex offense” under section 2(B)(1.5) of the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.5) (West 2000)). Section 2(B)(1.5) provided: “(B) As used in this Section, ‘sex offense’ means: (1.5) A felony violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age, the defendant is not a parent of the victim, and the offense was committed on or after January 1, 1996: 10 — 2 (aggravated kidnapping) [.] Hi * * An attempt to commit any of these offenses.” 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.5) (West 2000). Thus, in addition to the sentences of imprisonment imposed for the criminal offenses, defendant was also required to register as a sex offender. On appeal, defendant contended that the definition of a sex offense under section 2(B)(1.5) was unconstitutional as applied in this case because the aggravated kidnapping of the granddaughter was not sexually motivated. Defendant maintained there was no evidence of any sexual conduct toward the granddaughter and no indication of any sexual intent. According to defendant, the kidnapping was undertaken solely with a financial motivation, i.e., to collect a ransom. Thus, because the crime was not sexually motivated, defendant contended it was a violation of due process to classify him as a sex offender. Addressing defendant’s constitutional challenge to the definition of a sex offense as applied in this case, the appellate court first determined that the aggravated kidnapping of the granddaughter was “not sexually motivated and had no sexual purpose.” 363 Ill. App. 3d 356, 363. The court then held that, because defendant’s crime was not sexually motivated, defining that crime as a sex offense bore no rational relationship to the state’s interest in protecting the public from sex offenders. 363 Ill. App. 3d at 363-64. Thus, the court concluded that section 2(B) (1.5) of the Sex Offender Registration Act was unconstitutional as applied to defendant. Shortly after the appellate court filed its decision in this case, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 94— 945. Effective June 27, 2006, Public Act 94 — 945 made two significant changes to the registration laws that are relevant to this appeal. First, Public Act 94 — 945 amended section 2(B)(1.5) of the Sex Offender Registration Act. As amended, section 2(B)(1.5) now defines aggravated kidnapping of a minor as a “sex offense” only if the offense was sexually motivated. Section 2(B)(1.5) currently provides: “(B) As used in this Article, ‘sex offense’ means: (1.5) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age, the defendant is not a parent of the victim, the offense was sexually motivated as defined in Section 10 of the Sex Offender Management Board Act, and the offense was committed on or after January 1, 1996: 10 — 2 (aggravated kidnapping) [.]” (Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 94 — 945, §1025, eff. June 27, 2006 (amending 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.5)). The second significant change made by Public Act 94 — 945 was the enactment of the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (Violent Offender Registration Act) (Pub. Act 94 — 945, eff. June 27, 2006 (adding 730 ILCS 154/1 et seq.)). The Violent Offender Registration Act creates a new registry for offenders who commit certain violent crimes, including aggravated kidnapping of a child by a nonparent, when those crimes are committed without sexual motivation. Under this new statute, a nonparent who commits aggravated kidnapping of a child without sexual motivation will be required to register as a violent offender. He will not, however, be a registered sex offender. Moreover, section 11 of the Violent Offender Registration Act authorizes the transfer of the registration information of a person convicted of aggravated kidnapping from the sex offender registry to the violent offender registry, if the crime was not sexually motivated. See Pub. Act 94 — 945, eff. June 27, 2006 (adding 730 ILCS 154/11). In light of the changes made to section 2(B)(1.5) of the Sex Offender Registration Act by Public Act 94 — 945, defendant’s challenge to the preamended version of that statute is moot. The rule is well settled. It is a basic tenet of justiciability that reviewing courts will not decide moot or abstract questions or render advisory opinions. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State of Illinois, 162 Ill. 2d 117, 130 (1994), quoting Barth v. Reagan, 139 Ill. 2d 399, 419 (1990). An appeal is considered moot where it presents no actual controversy or where the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have rendered it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party. In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, 349-50 (2006). In this case, the amended version of section 2(B)(1.5) states that it applies to those defendants convicted of aggravated kidnapping of a minor when “the offense was committed on or after January 1, 1996.” Pub. Act 94 — 945, §1025, eff. June 27, 2006 (amending 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.5)). The amended statute thus includes defendant, who committed the aggravated kidnapping at issue in this case in 1999. Further, since the preamended version of section 2(B) (1.5) also covered only those offenses committed on or after January 1, 1996, there are no persons who remain subject to the original statute. The amended section 2(B)(1.5) supersedes the original statute in its entirety. Because the new version of section 2(B)(1.5) has superseded the old, there is no “actual controversy” regarding the constitutionality of the preamended statute as it applies to defendant. As this court has held, “in those cases where, during the pendency of the case, an amendment remove[s] or alter[s] the potentially unconstitutional language or aspect of a challenged statute, *** the constitutional challenge to the statute is moot.” Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 511 (1997); see also Forest Preserve District v. City of Aurora, 151 Ill. 2d 90, 94 (1992) (“ ‘where a challenged statute is amended while the cause is pending, the question of the statute’s validity becomes moot, thus rendering unnecessary its review by the court’ ”), quoting People v. B.D.A., 102 Ill. 2d 229, 233 (1984); Arrington v. City of Chicago, 45 Ill. 2d 316 (1970). The amendment to section 2(B)(1.5) eliminated that aspect of the statute which defendant challenged as being unconstitutional as applied to him, i.e., the unqualified definition of aggravated kidnapping of a minor as a sexual offense. Accordingly, the constitutionality of the preamended version of section 2(B) (1.5) as applied to defendant is a moot question. Nevertheless, without citation to any authority which would call into question these settled principles, the court addresses the constitutionality of the superseded version of section 2(B) (1.5) as it applies to defendant. In order to justify its actions, the court does not look to the definition of “sex offense” in either the old or new version of section 2(B)(1.5), but, instead, focuses on the transfer provision found in section 11 of the Violent Offender Registration Act. 225 Ill. 2d at 579-84. As the court notes, nothing in section 11 authorizes an offender to go before a court of law to seek transfer from the sex offender registry to the violent offender registry. 225 Ill. 2d at 583-84. Rather, an offender who wants to ensure that he or she is transferred off the sex offender registry to the violent offender registry will have to contact the “State’s Attorney’s Office in the county in which the offender was convicted” and request that the office verify, “on a form prescribed by the Illinois State Police,” that the crime was not sexually motivated. Pub. Act 94 — 945, eff. June 27, 2006 (adding 730 ILCS 154/ 11(a)(2)). Transfer cannot occur until the registering law enforcement agency, and the Illinois State Police (the department that maintains the sex offender registry), have received the completed form. Pub. Act 94 — 945, eff. June 27, 2006 (adding 730 ILCS 154/ll(a)(3)). Further, according to the court, section 11 “does not contemplate judicial review of a decision by the State’s Attorney that the offense was sexually motivated, and consequently that the person is ineligible for a transfer.” 225 Ill. 2d at 582. With this understanding of section 11, the court presumes, based on arguments made in this appeal, that the State’s Attorney of Cook County (the county in which defendant was convicted) will decide that defendant’s crime is sexually motivated. 225 Ill. 2d at 583. This decision, the court states, “exemplifies the problem with the statutory scheme” (225 Ill. 2d at 582), because, now, defendant has “no way off” the sex offender registry (225 Ill. 2d at 584). From this, the court then concludes, without offering any further explanation, that “[t]he constitutionality of original section 2(B) (1.5)” is “squarely before us.” 225 Ill. 2d at 584. There are several problems with the court’s justification for addressing the merits of defendant’s challenge to the original section 2(B)(1.5). First, the State’s Attorney of Cook County, although of counsel to the State in this appeal, has not made any representations to this court as to how defendant’s crime will be treated under section 11 of the Violent Offender Registration Act. It is inappropriate for “a reviewing court to make fact determinations” (225 Ill. 2d at 582), particularly when those determinations require predicting the future. Further, it is unclear why the court believes it is a “problem” for defendant to remain on the sex offender registry when the State’s Attorney has concluded that his crime was sexually motivated. Does the court mean to say that it disagrees with the State’s Attorney’s decision regarding sexual motivation in this particular case and the “problem” is that the court has no way to review that decision? Or does the court mean to say that the “problem” with section 11 of the Violent Offender Registration Act is that it gives a State’s Attorney the authority to make the decision, in every case, regarding sexual motivation? Or does the court mean something else? The court never says. The fundamental difficulty with the court’s reasoning, however, is that there is no connection between finding a “problem” with section 11, the transfer provision of the Violent Offender Registration Act, and reviving the old section 2(B)(1.5), the definition provision of the Sex Offender Registration Act. Regardless of what “problem” exists with section 11 — whether it is the inability to review a State’s Attorney’s decision regarding sexual motivation, the granting of the authority to a State’s Attorney to make that decision in the first place, or something else — the old version of section 2(B)(1.5) is no longer in effect. The only way for the court to revive the old version of section 2(B)(1.5) would be to hold the new version of that section void, thus leaving in place the law that previously existed. See, e.g., Harshman v. DePhillips, 218 Ill. 2d 482, 489 n.1 (2006). The court does not do this. Instead, the court looks to section 11 of the Violent Offender Registration Act, determines that defendant has “no way off” the sex offender registry, and concludes that this “problem” revives the old section 2(B)(1.5) of the Sex Offender Registration Act. But any problem with transfer under section 11 of the Violent Offender Registration Act is just that — a problem with section 11, not section 2(B)(1.5) of the Sex Offender Registration Act. The new definition of “sex offense” found in the amended version of section 2(B)(1.5) remains unchanged and in effect. The preamended version of section 2(B) (1.5) — the statute that was addressed by the appellate court below — no longer exists. Perhaps, as the court seems to suggest, defendant has some legal claim to bring against section 11 of the Violent Offender Registration Act. However, his claim that the preamended version of section 2(B) (1.5) is unconstitutional as applied to him is plainly moot. Finally, any question as to whether the court has erred in reaching defendant’s constitutional argument is answered by considering the fundamental structure of the court’s analysis. On the one hand, the court expressly holds that the amended version of sectiop, 2(B)(1.5) has superseded the previous version of the statute and that the new section 2(B)(1.5) applies to this case. 225 Ill. 2d at 580. On the other hand, the court expressly holds that the previous version of section 2(B)(1.5) is “squarely before us.” 225 Ill. 2d at 584. In other words, the court is holding — quite literally — that both statutes are in effect at the same time. This cannot be correct. This court should adhere to the straightforward rule set forth in our case law: “ ‘where a challenged statute is amended while the cause is pending, the question of the statute’s validity becomes moot, thus rendering unnecessary its review by the court.’ ” Forest Preserve District v. City of Aurora, 151 Ill. 2d 90, 94 (1992), quoting People v. B.D.A., 102 Ill. 2d 229, 233 (1984). In accordance with this established precedent, this court should hold that it is a moot question whether the preamended version of section 2(B)(1.5) is unconstitutional as applied to defendant. The court should then vacate that portion of the appellate court’s judgment that addressed the constitutionality of the preamended version of section 2(B)(1.5). See Forest Preserve District, 151 Ill. 2d at 94; B.D.A., 102 Ill. 2d at 234. Questions regarding the interpretation and legality of section 11 should be left to another day, when those questions are squarely before us. I disagree with the court’s decision to reach the merits of defendant’s constitutional claim. However, even if I were to agree that it is appropriate to address that claim, for the following reasons I cannot join the court’s opinion. The judgment of the appellate court below was that the preamended section 2(B) (1.5) was unconstitutional as applied to defendant. It is this decision which the State appealed (see 225 Ill. 2d at 575-76), and which the court asserts is “squarely before us” (225 Ill. 2d at 584). The court reverses the appellate court’s judgment, holding: “Here, the legislature had a rational basis for enacting original section 2(B)(1.5), and that statute is not unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) 225 Ill. 2d at 592. The court cannot reach this conclusion on the record before us. As we have previously explained: “A court is not capable of making an ‘as applied’ determination of unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and no findings of fact. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. at 300-01, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 15-16, 113 S. Ct. at 1446 (when there are no findings or evidentiary record, the constitutional challenge must be facial). Without an evidentiary record, any finding that a statute is unconstitutional ‘as applied’ is premature. See In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 299-300 (2001); see also Desnick v. Department of Professional Regulation, 171 Ill. 2d 510, 555-56 (1996) (McMorrow, dissenting) (reaching the merits of a constitutional ‘as applied’ challenge without the presentment or circuit court consideration of any evidence creates constitutional due process concerns). Nor would it be appropriate for this court, sua sponte, to consider whether [a] statute has been constitutionally applied since we, as a reviewing court, are not arbiters of the facts.” In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253, 268 (2004). In this case, the court notes that the circuit court made no findings regarding the sexual motivation of defendant’s crime. 225 Ill. 2d at 582. In addition, the court vacates the appellate court’s determination that defendant’s crime was not sexually motivated. 225 Ill. 2d at 582. Thus, as this case presently stands, there are no judicial findings of fact with respect to whether defendant’s crime was sexually motivated. It is error, therefore, for the court to make an as-applied determination regarding the constitutionality of the preamended section 2(B)(1.5). For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. JUSTICES FREEMAN and KILBRIDE join in this dissent.