Court Opinion

ID: 9550320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:33:59.032566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:23.528557
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. It does not require coruscations of genius to conclude that Connie and Joyce did not effect a common-law marriage in Texas because they had not “lived together in this state as husband and wife.” Connie and Joyce were domiciled in Jal, New Mexico from about the time they first met until the time of Joyce’s death. During the years they lived together in New Mexico, they established a common-law marriage, one not recognized in New Mexico. During the years of this New Mexico relationship, Joyce never changed her will. Let us compare the New Mexico relationship with that of Texas. When Connie was asked to characterize all of his visits to Texas in the company of Joyce, he said: My wife and I went on vacation, a week, two weeks, week-ends. Went for sickness, deaths. Connie and Joyce never established residence or domicile in Texas. They never purchased or leased a place of residence and never lived together there as husband and wife on a temporary or permanent basis. We recognized a common-law marriage in the State of Texas. Gallegos v. Wilkerson, 79 N.M. 549, 445 P.2d 970 (1968). In doing so, Justice Moise said: . Such a marriage is considered to be a status arrived at by express or implied mutual consent or agreement of the parties, followed by cohabitation as husband and wife and publicly holding themselves out as such. . . . Proof is present that they went to El Paso, rented an apartment, agreed to a marriage between themselves, lived together there, and held themselves out as husband and wife. . . . [Emphasis added.] [Id. 552, 445 P.2d 973.] To cohabit means living together as man and wife within a common dwelling. People v. Burke, 400 Ill. 240, 79 N.E.2d 488 (1948); Graham v. Graham, 130 Colo. 225, 274 P.2d 605 (1954). It does not include mere visits or journeys. Jones v. State, 182 Tenn. 60, 184 S.W.2d 167 (1944); Colley v. Colley, 204 Va. 225, 129 S.E.2d 630 (1963). “Rather, the living together should be in the same house on a permanent basis.” Davis, Common-Law Marriage in Texas, 21 Sw.L.J. 647, 652 (1967). In re Estate of Stahl, 13 Ill.App.3d 680, 301 N.E.2d 82 (1973) did not recognize an alleged common-law marriage in Texas. Mrs. Stahl and decedent, who had lived together in Illinois, had travelled to Texas for a period of three days for purposes of a vacation and to consider whether Texas should be a future retirement site. They held themselves out as husband and wife during this stay in Texas and privately exchanged marital vows in their hotel room. Mrs. Stahl claimed she was the common-law widow of decedent and was entitled to an intestate share of decedent’s estate. The court said: “No.” She failed to establish that she and decedent had been domiciled in Texas. They had not contracted a common-law marriage. The statutory provision that “they had lived together in this state” is equivalent to “has a domicile,” Holt v. Holt, 253 Mass. 411, 149 N.E. 40 (1925); Nelson v. Nelson, 71 S.D. 342, 24 N.W.2d 327 (1946), or an established place of abode with which the parties may be identified as members of the community. Kennedy v. Damron, 268 S.W.2d 22 (Ky.1954). 52 Am.Jur.2d Marriage, § 46 (1970) says: Despite its judicial acceptance in many states, the doctrine of common-law marriage is generally frowned upon in this country, even in some of the states that have accepted it. It has been declared contrary to public policy and public morals, and in view of the ease with which it can be contracted, it has been described as a fruitful source of perjury and fraud — to be tolerated and not encouraged. One of the reasons is that “It puts in doubt the certainty of the rights of inheritance. It opens the door to false pretenses of marriage and the imposition upon estates of supposititious heirs.” Sorensen v. Sorensen, 68 Neb. 500, 100 N.W. 930, 932 (1904), adhered to on rehearing, 68 Neb. 509, 103 N.W. 455 (1905). A stringent test of common-law marriage required by a standard of strict scrutiny has the desirable effect of weeding out fraudulent claims where property rights are involved and the claimed spouse is dead. The Connie-Joyce New Mexico relationship is presumed to continue. Only upon clear and convincing proof of an actual common-law marriage in Texas wherein Connie and Joyce lived together there as husband and wife, can the New Mexico relationship be changed to one of marriage. Otherwise harsh and inequitable results will occur. There is no evidence that Connie and Joyce intended to make Texas their home, residence or domicile. They did not live together in Texas as husband and wife. Although I disagree with Judge Neal, I compliment him on stating the reasons for his decision. It is unfortunate that oral arguments were not recorded. Judge Neal seemed to have been without legal authority on the subject matter of common-law marriage. In his comments, he omitted any statements that Connie had established any form of residence, domicile, or cohabitation in Texas sufficient to prove a common-law marriage. In matters of this kind, memorandum briefs should bfe submitted to the court long before trial, not after the decision of the court. These comments are of little value because the vast majority of trial lawyers do not read these opinions to discover the art of presenting a case to a district court. The appellant’s attorney on this appeal did not represent Mabe in the trial court. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.