Court Opinion

ID: 9738270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:47:23.261756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.096692
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY,
¶ 42. J. (concurring). I agree with the majority that mere consequential damage to property resulting from government action is not a taking. Majority op., ¶ 24.1 also agree with the majority that the essence of this case sounds in tort. Id., ¶ 5. Given the circuit court's conclusion that the District is immune from tort liability, I conclude that the District is not hable for these damages to E-L's property.
¶ 43. Over three decades ago, this court established that a property owner's remedy for unreasonable interference with its use of groundwater sounds in tort. State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 (1974). The Michels Pipeline court adopted the portion of the then-existing draft of the Restatement *116(Second) Torts which addressed liability for use of groundwater. In relevant part, that section provided:
A possessor of land or his grantee who withdraws ground water from the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not subject to liability for interference with the use of water by another, unless
(a) The withdrawal of water causes unreasonable harm through lowering the water table or reducing artesian pressure....
Restatement (Second) Torts, Tentative Draft No. 17, April 26, 1971, § 858A.1
¶ 44. Under the circumstances presented here, the withdrawal of groundwater may have caused unreasonable harm to E-L. But the remedy for this wrong sounds not in takings, but in tort.2
¶ 45. Indeed, as this case was presented to the jury, E-L's "takings" claim strongly resembled a tort claim. E-L argued that the District should have foreseen the harm and could have taken measures to avoid it. Additionally, E-L sought as damages the amount of money that it lost in rent and the amount of money that it paid out of pocket to repair the building.3
*117¶ 46. Further, portions of the jury instructions and special verdict also resembled a tort inquiry. For instance, the jury was instructed to determine whether the District's use of groundwater was unreasonable:
The burden is on E-L to satisfy you by the greater weight of the credible evidence, to a reasonable certainty, that the District's use of E-L's groundwater was unreasonable. In determining whether the District's use of E-L's groundwater was unreasonable, you should consider the District's need for the groundwater, E-L's need for the groundwater, the cost to E-L, if any, of the District's use of the groundwater, the cost to the District, if any, of not using the groundwater or of replacing the groundwater and whether the District's purposes for using E-L's groundwater could have been achieved through other means.
The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the District's actions is not a takings question — it is a tort question.
¶ 47. The circuit court determined that the District is immune from tort liability. E-L's attempt to dress up its tort claim in takings clothes to circumvent the District's immunity is unavailing. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

 This section was modified slightly before it was approved by the American Law Institute in 1979 as Restatement (Second) Torts § 858.

 In addition to filing tort and takings claims against the District, E-L also filed tort claims against the insurance company that insured BCI/TCI, the now-defunct subcontractor that constructed the tunnel. E-L and BCI/TCI settled the dispute for an undisclosed sum of money. Based on this record, it is unclear whether E-L has already been compensated in whole, or in part, for the cost of repairing its building.

 At closing arguments, E-L's attorney explained: "And the cost to E-L in the District's use of that groundwater... it's *117roughly $309,000 is what it's cost E-L, plus loss of rent, what it's cost E-L because of the removal of the groundwater outside the trench by the District."
When there has been a partial taking, compensation is typically measured as either (1) the fair market value of the portion of the property that was taken; or (2) "severance damages," measured as the difference between the fair market value of the property before the taking and the fair market value of the remaining parcel after the taking. Russell M. Ware, The Law of Damages in Wisconsin § 19.12 (5th ed. 2010); Arents v. ANR Pipeline Co., 2005 WI App 61, ¶ 14, 281 Wis. 2d 173, 696 N.W.2d 194.