Court Opinion

ID: 9464503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:35:18.971178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:40.399355
License: Public Domain

BAUER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The opinion, if I read it correctly, reverses the conviction on *1027Count IX because part of the evidence as to extortion payments could not, says the majority, have even a minimal effect on interstate commerce. Even if that were true, the evidence of extortion affecting interstate commerce on the other payments prior to the decision of the “victim” company to dissolve was overwhelming. Much of the equipment used by the company was manufactured out-of-state, and the company performed jobs out-of-state throughout the period charged, including 1973.
The majority opinion says that “the testimony relating to IST’s out-of-state jobs was far from conclusive,” but this ignores the testimony which discusses various jobs outside of Illinois that were still in progress in 1973. Moreover, the testimony described eight separate purchases of out-of-state equipment used in Maywood — all substantial purchases.
The 1973 payments to Elders were extortion payments for regular tree and landscape work done in Maywood that year and for the sale to Maywood by 1ST of a “tree stumper.” The majority opinion finds that, since 1ST had decided to phase itself out of business in early 1973, payments made after that decision could not have even a minimal effect on interstate commerce. This ignores the fact that goods in interstate commerce were used on the regular tree work in 1973, and indeed, the very tree stumper purchased from 1ST by Maywood — for which Elders received a kick-back — was manufactured in Iowa. Since Maywood had determined that it needed a stumper, why is it not logical that the Village would have purchased such a piece of equipment from another out-of-state manufacturer? Why does not the sale of the out-of-state equipment of itself satisfy the “affecting interstate commerce” requirement? In my view, the effect on interstate commerce that is the jurisdictional requirement was adequately met to uphold the 1973 transactions regardless of whether the decision to “phase out” had been made.
This Court has held, as the majority agrees, that the Act should receive an expansive interpretation to cope with “the levy of blackmail upon industry.” Further, we have upheld convictions where the extortion payment was demanded and paid after the event which had any possibility of affecting commerce had occurred. United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1975). We also affirmed a conviction where no effect on interstate commerce ever occurred — only a proposal, later abandoned, to build a building which probably would have required purchases out of state. United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) (Judges Swygert and Sprecher dissenting). With the opinion in this case, we have turned our backs on the “expansive interpretation to cover a wide range of extortionate activity” and have opted for a narrow alley of jurisdictional footpaths. I would affirm.