Court Opinion

ID: 9440257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 08:08:15.60442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:17.871987
License: Public Domain

In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                        Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                        No. 07-23-00025-CV

                            MELANIE ANN HANDY, APPELLANT

                                                  V.

                  1100 REINLI STREET LLC AND GVA, LLC, APPELLEES

                           On Appeal from the 200th District Court
                                    Travis County, Texas1
          Trial Court No. D-1-GN-21-000795, Honorable Madeleine Connor, Presiding

                                           July 31, 2023
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       Appellant, Melanie Ann Handy, appeals the trial court’s no-evidence summary

judgments granted in favor of Appellees, 1100 Reinli Street LLC; New Aspen

Management, LLC d/b/a GVA Property Management; and GVA, LLC. We affirm the

judgments of the trial court.

       1 Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts, this case was transferred to this

Court from the Third Court of Appeals. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. In the event of any conflict,
we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
                                              BACKGROUND

        This case arises out of an alleged slip-and-fall accident occurring at Handy’s

apartment complex on November 10, 2020. Handy claims that there was a defect on the

stairs of the apartment that caused her to fall. On February 23, 2021, Handy filed suit

against Appellees for premises liability, negligent undertaking, and gross negligence. At

the time of filing her suit, Handy was represented by counsel. For approximately eighteen

months, the parties engaged in discovery. On August 15, 2022, the trial court granted

Handy’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. Thereafter, Handy represented herself.

        On October 3, 2022, 1100 Reinli Street filed a no-evidence motion for summary

judgment. Handy did not file a response to this motion.2 The trial court, after holding a

hearing and considering the parties’ filings and argument, granted 1100 Reinli Street’s

motion for summary judgment on November 18. On December 12, New Aspen and GVA

filed their no-evidence motion for summary judgment. On December 16, Handy filed

notice of appeal seeking to appeal the trial court’s November 18 grant of summary

judgment in favor of 1100 Reinli Street. This notice of appeal had six exhibits appended.

At the subsequent hearing on New Aspen’s and GVA’s summary judgment, the trial court

requested briefing in response to Handy’s December 16 “notice of appeal” filing. New

Aspen and GVA filed a response arguing that nothing in Handy’s filing constitutes a

scintilla of evidence in support of her claims. They also moved to strike Handy’s summary

        2 Counsel for 1100 Reinli Street, indicates that Handy emailed him a document titled “Introduction:

D-1-GN-000795,” that consisted of “a brief, incoherent argument and six ‘exhibits.’” However, Handy did
not file this document with the trial court in response to 1100 Reinli Street’s motion. Counsel discusses the
document and exhibits and states that “nothing in the document responded to []1100 Reinli Street’s motion
for summary judgment and the ‘exhibits’ were not proper summary judgment evidence . . . .”

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judgment evidence as inadmissible and improper. The trial court agreed and entered an

order granting New Aspen’s and GVA’s summary judgment motion and motion to strike.

      Handy filed her appellate brief on March 3, 2023. However, because this briefing

did not comply with the appellate briefing requirements contained in Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 38.1, we directed Handy to file a corrected brief.             Handy

subsequently filed a new brief on March 17. However, this brief was the same document

filed on March 3, with documents attached that appear to be a noncertified copy of

Handy’s original petition, an email sent to the trial court judge, and medical bills and

records. Handy does not identify any issues presented in her brief but it appears that she

is challenging whether she has provided evidence sufficient to overcome Appellees’ no-

evidence summary judgment motions.

                                        ANALYSIS

      As an initial matter, we note that a self-represented litigant is held to the same

standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rules of

procedure. Gonzalez v. Magana, No. 03-14-00387-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8593, at

*3–4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 18, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). A relaxation of the rules

in favor of self-represented litigants would provide such parties with an unfair advantage

over parties who are represented by counsel. Viasana v. Ward Cnty., 296 S.W.3d 652,

654 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.).

      The rules of appellate procedure govern the required contents and organization of

an appellant’s brief.   TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.    One of those requirements is that an

appellant’s brief must contain a clear and concise argument including appropriate

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citations to legal authorities and the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Failure to cite legal

authority or provide substantive analysis of the legal issue presented effects a waiver of

that issue on appeal. Martinez v. El Paso Cnty., 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2007, pet. struck). An appellate court has no duty to perform an independent review

of the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error in the lower court.

Id.

       Handy’s brief does not identify any issues presented, does not cite any legal

authority in support of her contentions, and does not cite to the record. In fact, nothing in

her brief attempts to identify any evidence that could establish any of her claims and

overcome Appellees’ no-evidence summary judgment motions. Thus, Handy’s attempted

appeal is inadequately briefed and presents nothing for review.                See McKellar v.

Cervantes, 367 S.W.3d 478, 484 n.5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (“Bare

assertions of error, without argument or authority, waive error.”); Valadez v. Avitia, 238

S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.) (requirements of TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1 is not satisfied by brief conclusory statements unsupported by legal citations); see

also Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284–85 (Tex. 1994)

(discussing “long-standing rule” that point may be waived due to inadequate briefing).

       Further, Handy does not challenge the trial court’s grant of New Aspen’s and

GVA’s motion to strike her summary judgment evidence.3 We cannot reverse a ruling of

a trial court that was not challenged on appeal. See Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56,

       3 We assume for purposes of this analysis that the documents attached to Handy’s “notice of

appeal” were intended to be presented as summary judgment evidence.

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58 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (“We have held repeatedly that the courts of appeals may not

reverse the judgment of a trial court for a reason not raised in a point of error.”).

                                        CONCLUSION

       Concluding that any issues presented by Handy were inadequately briefed, we

affirm the summary judgments of the trial court.

                                                          Judy C. Parker
                                                             Justice

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