Court Opinion

ID: 9627185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:37:46.836874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:42.108657
License: Public Domain

DOOLING, J.
I concur, but since the opinion of the Presiding Justice omits all discussion of the point most stressed by appellant I feel obliged to add the following comments:
Appellant argues, with citation of supporting authority from other jurisdictions, that the use of ruse or deception to retake possession of a chattel is tortious even though the recaptor is legally entitled to the possession. She then argues that if a reasonably foreseeable result of the recaption by ruse or deception is that the plaintiff might be injured in attempting to regain the property and such injury does occur, the retaking is a proximate cause of the resulting injury. Appellant’s argument amounts to this: Hunt in driving off the car as he did might reasonably foresee that she would believe that he was stealing the car, and would run over the rough ground in an attempt to retake it and might in so doing fall and injure herself.
Conceding, without deciding, that such conduct would be actionable the plain answer is that appellant did not plead such a cause of action. She pleaded in Count 1 assault and battery and in Count 2 a negligent driving of the automobile *410“so as to cause it to strike plaintiff and to drag her along the road.”
These two issues went to the jury under instructions that would make it their duty to find for the plaintiff if they found these allegations of either count to be true. We must therefore conclude that the jury found against plaintiff on both issues. Appellant cannot, under settled principles, introduce on appeal a third issue which was not presented by her pleadings.
Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 14, 1958. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.