Court Opinion

ID: 9713149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:09:26.643634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.965697
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring: In all respects, I concur fully with the majority opinion. However, I take this opportunity to address impeachment by prior conviction and the problems inherent in impeachment procedures now in place. I also propose revised procedures to better accommodate the needs of our criminal justice system. The defendant was tried before a jury on the charge of residential burglary. After he testified, he was impeached by evidence showing that he had two prior convictions for burglary and one conviction for felony criminal damage to property. These circumstances reveal the ongoing problem in this State and nation regarding the use of prior convictions to impeach a defendant in a jury trial. On the one hand, the State correctly argues that the jury, in evaluating the credibility of a defendant who chooses to take the witness stand, should be informed of the defendant’s prior convictions as the jury goes about the difficult task of evaluating the defendant’s credibility and considering it along ■with the credibility of all of the other witnesses in the case. On the other hand, defendants correctly argue that such evidence is often so inherently prejudicial that they cannot receive a fair trial because the jury will simply conclude that they have a propensity to commit crime, especially where the conviction used to impeach the defendant is for the same or similar offense for which the defendant is on trial. I reluctantly conclude that the adoption of a rule requiring procedures discussed in this concurring opinion should only come from the Illinois Supreme Court and not this court. A. THE ILLINOIS RULE ON IMPEACHMENT OF THE DEFENDANT BY PRIOR CONVICTION In 1971, the Illinois Supreme Court attempted to clarify and modernize Illinois practice with respect to impeachment by prior conviction. In People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510, 519, 268 N.E.2d 695, 700, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted in toto the then-proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (Fed. R. Evid. 609), which provided in part: “ ‘For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.’ ” Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d at 698, quoting proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a). The supreme court adopted this rule to address the legitimate concerns of both the prosecution and the defense in criminal cases. Almost two decades of experience suggest the need for further revision. B. THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE ON IMPEACHMENT OF DEFENDANTS BY PRIOR CONVICTION Since the adoption of the Montgomery rule, there have been dozens of reported cases on appeal in which the admission of a defendant’s prior conviction for purposes of impeachment was challenged on appeal as being improper. These cases contain arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that the probative value of the impeaching conviction outweighed its prejudicial impact. Almost none of these arguments has been successful on appeal. Examples of cases in which this argument was raised and rejected include the following: People v. Poliquin (1st Dist. 1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 122, 421 N.E.2d 1362 (defendant on trial for conspiracy to commit armed robbery and murder during the course of the armed robbery properly impeached with his armed robbery conviction), appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 572; People v. Monigan (5th Dist. 1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 885, 423 N.E.2d 546 (defendant on trial for murder chooses not to testify after the trial court rules that his conviction of voluntary manslaughter would be admissible for impeachment); People v. Johnson (3d Dist. 1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 228, 424 N.E.2d 610 (defendant on trial for burglary properly impeached with his burglary conviction); People v. Tribett (1st Dist. 1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 663, 424 N.E.2d 688 (defendant on trial for possession of a controlled substance — heroin — properly impeached with his conviction for possession of a controlled substance — heroin); People v. Medreno (3d Dist. 1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 449, 425 N.E.2d 588 (defendant on trial for home invasion, rape, and deviate sexual assault properly impeached with his rape conviction); People v. Garlin (5th Dist. 1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 716, 428 N.E.2d 697 (defendant on trial for burglary and theft properly impeached with his burglary conviction); People v. Hancock (1st Dist. 1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 953, 443 N.E.2d 226 (defendant on trial for multiple counts of armed robbery properly impeached with his armed robbery conviction); People v. Minor (5th Dist. 1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 451 N.E.2d 1011 (defendant on trial for felony theft involving three automobiles chooses not to testify after the trial court rules that his two convictions of tampering with an automobile would be admissible for impeachment); People v. Hall (1st Dist. 1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 788, 453 N.E.2d 1327 (defendant on trial for attempt (rape) and armed robbery chooses not to testify after the trial court rules that his conviction of rape would be admissible for impeachment), appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 562; People v. Saunders (2d Dist. 1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 922, 461 N.E.2d 1006 (defendant on trial for home invasion, rape, and deviate sexual assault properly impeached with his attempt (rape) conviction); People v. Redman (4th Dist. 1986), 141 Ill. App. 3d 691, 490 N.E.2d 958 (defendant on trial for home invasion and rape chooses not to testify after the trial court rules that his convictions of rape and deviate sexual assault, among others, would be admissible for impeachment), appeal denied (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 566; People v. Marron (2d Dist. 1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 975, 496 N.E.2d 297 (defendant on trial for aggravated battery chooses not to testify after the trial court rules that his conviction of aggravated battery was admissible for impeachment); and People v. Rixie (2d Dist. 1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 818, 546 N.E.2d 52 (defendant on trial for felony murder and armed robbery properly impeached with his robbery conviction), appeal denied (1990), 129 Ill. 2d 570. The concerns each defendant in the above cases raised about the fairness of his trial were far from groundless. Accordingly, I believe some additional fine-tuning in this area of the law is needed. C. NEW PROCEDURES TO BE EMPLOYED IN THE USE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS TO IMPEACH DEFENDANTS In order to address the legitimate concerns of both the prosecution and the defense regarding the impeachment of defendants by prior convictions, the trial courts should henceforth handle such impeachment in the following manner. When the State is prepared to offer into evidence for impeachment purposes the record of a defendant’s prior felony conviction and the trial court has determined that such evidence is admissible for that purpose under the Montgomery standards, instead of permitting this evidence to come before the jury in the usual way, the trial court should inform the jury of the felony conviction and of the date and county in which it occurred. Immediately upon doing so, the trial court should orally instruct the jury in accordance with Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.13 (2d ed. 1981) (IPI Criminal 2d), unless the defense indicates that it does not wish that instruction to be given. If the trial court determines that more than one felony conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes, then each such conviction should be treated in the same fashion. An example of what the trial court should say in informing the jury of the prior conviction is the following: “Ladies and gentlemen, the court now informs you that the defendant, Mr. Smith, was convicted of a felony offense in Macon County, Illinois, in March 1982. He was also convicted of a felony offense in Champaign County, Illinois, in August 1986.” In the absence of the defendant’s objection, the court would then read IPI Criminal 2d No. 3.13. If, in its discretion, the trial court chooses to resolve the admissibility of the defendant’s prior conviction for impeachment purposes prior to the defendant’s testifying, then the trial court should give the defendant the option of having the information concerning his prior conviction told to the jury in the fashion previously described or through the direct examination of the defendant by his counsel. If the defendant chooses the latter option, then the questions asked and the answers given must be as follows: “Q. [Defense counsel]: Mr. Smith, were you convicted of a felony offense in Macon County, Illinois, in March 1982? A. [Defendant]: Yes. Q. And were you also convicted of a felony offense in Champaign County, Illinois, in August 1986? A. Yes.” If the foregoing is the extent of the questions asked by defense counsel and the answers given by the defendant concerning the subject of his prior convictions, then the trial court should bar the prosecution from any cross-examination on that subject. The trial court should carefully admonish both defendant and defense counsel of the importance of adhering to this precise language. As an example of a problem that might arise without such adherence, assume defense counsel were to ask, “Mr. Smith, did you plead guilty to a felony offense in Macon County, Illinois, in March 1982, and did you plead guilty to a felony offense in Champaign County, Illinois, in August 1986?” (Emphasis added.) With these questions, defense counsel has put an entirely different “spin” on the information being conveyed to the jury. That “spin” is the suggestion that defendant is the kind of person who, when charged with a crime that he is in fact guilty of, owns up to it and pleads guilty. These questions further suggest that the defendant is pleading not guilty in the case then on trial because this is a charge of which he is not guilty. A defendant who conveys to the jury that he pleaded guilty to a felony offense has thereby opened the door on cross-examination to the State’s fully probing the circumstances surrounding that guilty plea. In most instances, those circumstances would reveal that the defendant pleaded guilty not for the reason suggested by defense counsel’s question, but because of some plea agreement. Under these circumstances, the full scope of the plea agreement becomes probative and admissible. Because defense counsel almost certainly would elect to keep such information from coming before the jury, the trial courts would, necessarily, need to carefully admonish the defendant and his counsel in advance of defendant’s testifying to avoid any unpleasant surprises. There are three exceptions to these procedures set forth above. They are (1) the defendant chooses to have the jury informed of his prior conviction for impeachment purposes in the traditional way, including the name of the offense(s) of which he stands convicted; or (2) the defendant has a prior conviction of a misdemeanor offense that is admissible for impeachment purposes; or (3) the prior conviction to be used for impeachment purposes is for perjury (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 32 — 2), subornation of perjury (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 32 — 3), obstructing justice (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 31 — 4), or any other felony offense the conviction of which, in the judgment of the trial court, has evidentiary value in and of itself, as with the three foregoing offenses. By evidentiary value in this context, I mean offenses which, like perjury, strike at the heart of either the judicial process or at the significance of giving sworn testimony. Such procedures obviously cannot work when the court is admitting misdemeanor convictions for impeachment purposes under the Montgomery standards, namely, those which involve dishonesty or false statement, because by definition the jury cannot be told that the defendant was convicted of a felony offense on a certain date in a certain place. However; the use of misdemeanor convictions to impeach defendants is both less frequent and qualitatively distinct so, in my estimation, special rules need not be designed to accommodate it. D. USE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS TO IMPEACH DEFENDANTS The procedures delineated above are the result of careful consideration of the problems experienced in Illinois in the administration of the Montgomery rule, as well as careful consideration of the decisions from other jurisdictions that have dealt with the same issues. Other jurisdictions have adopted procedures similar to those set forth in the previous section, and in most such jurisdictions, the procedures are termed the “mere fact” rule. Apparently, this is in reference to how only the “mere fact” of the felony conviction is to be brought to the jury’s attention, as opposed to informing the jury of the precise offense of which the defendant has been convicted or the circumstances surrounding that prior conviction or both. The following States have adopted the “mere fact” rule: Florida (Fulton v. State (Fla. 1976), 335 So. 2d 280); Idaho (State v. Palin (Idaho App. 1983), 106 Idaho 70, 675 P.2d 49); Kentucky (Sabastian v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1968), 436 S.W.2d 66); Montana (State v. Gray (1968), 152 Mont. 145, 447 P.2d 475); Nevada (Plunkett v. State (1968), 84 Nev. 145, 437 P.2d 92); New Mexico (State v. Williams (1966), 76 N.M. 578, 417 P.2d 62); Washington (State v. Coles (1981), 28 Wash. App. 563, 625 P.2d 713); Nebraska (State v. Olsan (1989), 231 Neb. 214, 436 N.W.2d 128); and Wisconsin (Voith v. Buser (1978), 83 Wis. 2d 540, 266 N.W.2d 304). Michigan is the only State that expressly disallows impeachment by an unspecified felony. (People v. Van Dorsten (1980), 409 Mich. 942, 298 N.W.2d 421.) Alaska, Connecticut, Oregon, and South Dakota leave to the trial court’s discretion whether to use the “mere fact” of a defendant’s felony conviction as the basis for impeachment. City of Fairbanks v. Johnson (Alaska 1986), 723 P.2d 79; State v. Anderson (1988), 16 Conn. App. 346, 547 A.2d 1368; State v. Sims (1984), 298 Or. 360, 692 P.2d 575; State v. Means (S.D. 1985), 363 N.W.2d 565. The Federal courts have similarly dealt with this issue. In two cases heard by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, each defendant offered to stipulate to the existence of his prior convictions in exchange for the government’s being foreclosed from bringing out the nature of the offense, thereby limiting his impeachment to the “mere fact” of his conviction. In both cases, the Sixth Circuit determined that the government was not required to accept the defendant’s stipulation. (United States v. Blackburn (6th Cir. 1979), 592 F.2d 300, 301; United States v. Burkhart (6th Cir. 1976), 545 F.2d 14, 15.) See also United States v. Fields (6th Cir. 1974), 500 F.2d 69, 70, which appears to have the same holding, although there was some question as to whether the defendant in fact offered to stipulate to the existence of the prior convictions. A partial dissent was filed in Fields, stating in part, “[Disclosure of information about prior convictions is so unnecessarily prejudicial that it should not be permitted if a defendant is willing to stipulate to their existence.” Fields, 500 F.2d at 71 (McCree, Circuit Judge, concurring in other part, and dissenting in relevant part). A concurring opinion was filed in Blackburn, which suggested that the government’s right to reject this kind of stipulation should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Blackburn, 592 F.2d at 301.) The concurring opinion further stated: “Disclosure of the nature of prior felony convictions makes it difficult to assure an accused a fair and impartial jury. Without doubt, it places an unnecessary burden upon the presumption of innocence. The government cannot justify the need for routinely referring to the nature of the prior felony convictions in the indictment.” Blackburn, 592 F.2d at 301. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has, however, discussed with approval a Federal district court decision rejecting the “mere fact” approach out of concern that its prejudicial effect may be greater than that generated from the disclosure of the specific prior felony. (See United States v. Shaw (5th Cir. 1983), 701 F.2d 367, 385, reh’g denied (1983), 714 F.2d 544, cert. denied (1984), 465 U.S. 1067, 79 L. Ed. 2d 744, 104 S. Ct. 1419.) According to the Fifth Circuit, the failure to reveal the nature of the offense will lead the jury to speculate that the nature of the crime was withheld because it was horrible or extremely heinous. Shaw, 701 F.2d at 385. A most recent Federal decision on point is from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In Campbell v. Greer (7th Cir. 1987), 831 F.2d 700, the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal involving a Federal civil rights suit (see 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982)) brought by an Illinois prison inmate who argued that the nature of his felony conviction — rape-should not have been revealed to the jury. Instead the jury should only have been allowed to learn that he was a duly convicted felon. The Seventh Circuit made the following observations: “There is no precedent for withholding the identity of the felony from the jury when using a conviction to impeach a witness’s testimony, and we are not minded to create one. Most jurors have only an indistinct sense of the range of offenses connoted by the term ‘felony’; defining it as a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year (the federal — not the universal — definition) would add little to their understanding. Rule 609 and the common law tradition out of which it evolved rest on the common-sense proposition that a person who has flouted society’s most fundamental norms, as embodied in its felony statutes, is less likely than other members of society to be deterred from lying under oath in a trial by the solemnity of the oath, the (minuscule) danger of prosecution for perjury, or internalized ethical norms against lying. If so, this is something a jury should be permitted to take into account in evaluating a witness’s believability. The jury cannot do this if all it is told is that the witness was convicted of a ‘felony.’ The crime must be named. It always has been where impeachment by a prior conviction has been permitted.” Campbell, 831 F.2d at 707. I agree with the Seventh Circuit’s statement of the reasons which underlie the admissibility of a felony conviction for impeachment purposes, but disagree with the court’s ultimate conclusion. I am convinced that telling a jury that a defendant is a convicted felon conveys all the information that the State has any legitimate interest in conveying, thereby enabling the jury as it evaluates the defendant’s credibility to consider that he has in the past seriously violated societal norms. See People v. Medreno (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 449, 452-53, 425 N.E.2d 588, 591, for a further discussion of the policy underlying the admissibility of a prior felony conviction. Another way of looking at this issue is to view it as one of expectations. A jury may reasonably expect that a person who takes the witness stand and is sworn to tell the truth will feel moral and societal pressures to do so. Telling a jury that a witness has a prior felony conviction informs the jury that on some occasion in the past, this witness has seriously violated societal (and probably moral) rules, thereby permitting the jury to infer, if it so chooses, that this witness may feel fewer moral and societal pressures to tell the truth than would be felt by a witness who has no prior felony conviction. If the jurors draw this inference, they may use it along with all the other evidence in the case as they evaluate the credibility of that witness. In sum, a convicted felon may be less worthy of belief solely because of that felony conviction than a witness who is not a convicted felon. Whether in a given case a particular witness should have his or her credibility adversely affected by reason of having a prior felony conviction is a matter for the jury to determine. My point is that the jury has a legitimate interest in learning this information and using it, if it so chooses, in the manner stated. Despite the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, I am unpersuaded that a jury cannot not properly evaluate the information concerning a witness’ status as a convicted felon unless the jury is specifically told what crime he was convicted of. Whatever slight probative value that additional information might add (and frankly I doubt that it adds any), the profound prejudicial effect that additional information usually causes clearly outweighs whatever minimal probative value it might possess. The obvious response to the objection raised by the Fifth Circuit to the “mere fact” mode of impeachment is to give the defendant the option, as proposed above, of selecting which mode of impeachment the court should use. I am confident experience will demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of defendants will opt for the “mere fact” method. E. RULE GOVERNING IMPEACHMENT OF DEFENDANTS BY PRIOR CONVICTIONS IS APPLICABLE TO OTHER WITNESSES AS WELL These procedures for the impeachment of defendants by their prior felony convictions should be equally applicable to witnesses other than defendants. While a prime factor in setting forth these procedures is to keep from the jury prejudicial information concerning the defendant on trial, that is not the only factor. This rule strengthens the truth-seeking processes of jury trials when applied either to a defendant or to other witnesses. Nor does it matter whether those witnesses are called by the State or the defense. The previous analysis concerning how the information regarding a witness’ prior felony conviction should be utilized by the jury was not premised upon the witness in question being a defendant, and it is fully applicable to other witnesses. The nature of the non-defendant witness’ felony conviction is a mere collateral matter which adds nothing to the proceedings and which may confuse or distract the jury from its real work. F. CONCLUSION Trial courts have the discretion to begin to employ these procedures immediately, and they should do so in order to provide both the defendant and the State with the fair trial to which each is entitled.