Court Opinion

ID: 9951073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 16:01:19.531233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:11.477803
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
            C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                       ________________________

                           No. ACM 40337
                       ________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee
                                   v.
                        Michael B. KIGHT
            Senior Airman (E-4), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                       ________________________

       Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                       Decided 14 March 2024
                       ________________________

Military Judge: Dayle P. Percle.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged on 29 April 2022 by GCM convened at
Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas. Sentence entered by military judge on
20 June 2022: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 66 months, re-
duction to E-1, and a reprimand.
For Appellant: Major Samantha P. Golseth, USAF; Scott R. Hocken-
berry, Esquire; Brad W. Simon, Esquire.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel J. Pete Ferrell, USAF; Major Olivia B.
Hoff, USAF; Major Jocelyn Q. Wright, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Es-
quire.
Before ANNEXSTAD, GRUEN, and KEARLEY, Appellate Military
Judges.
Senior Judge ANNEXSTAD delivered the opinion of the court, in which
Judge GRUEN and Judge KEARLEY joined.
                       ________________________

   This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
   precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                      ________________________
                      United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

ANNEXSTAD, Senior Judge:
    Appellant was tried by a general court-martial at Sheppard Air Force Base
(AFB), Texas. Contrary to his pleas, a panel of officer and enlisted members
found Appellant guilty of two specifications of sexual assault, in violation of
Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920. 1,2 The
military judge sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement
for 66 months, reduction to the grade of E-1, and a reprimand. The convening
authority deferred the automatic forfeitures until entry of judgment and
waived the automatic forfeitures for the benefit of Appellant’s dependent child.
    On 27 December 2023, Appellant raised four issues which we have re-
worded and reordered into five issues: whether (1) Appellant’s convictions for
sexual assault are legally and factually sufficient; (2) the military judge erred
in allowing the Government to admit improper evidence; (3) trial counsel com-
mitted prosecutorial misconduct during argument; (4) Appellant was denied
effective assistance of counsel; and (5) Appellant was denied his right to a
unanimous verdict.
    With respect to issue (5), we have carefully considered Appellant’s conten-
tions and find they do not require further discussion or warrant relief. See
United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J. 291, 302 (C.A.A.F. 2023), cert. denied, No.
23-437, 601 U.S. __ (20 Feb. 2024); United States v. Guinn, 81 M.J. 195, 204
(C.A.A.F. 2021) (citing United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 361 (C.M.A.
1987)).
   Finding no error that materially prejudiced a substantial right of Appel-
lant, we affirm the findings and sentence.

                                  I. BACKGROUND
    In early 2018, Appellant met CT while they were both attending technical
school. Shortly thereafter, the two began dating and later were engaged, while
still in training and while Appellant was still married. CT believed Appellant
was separated from his spouse and was going through the divorce process. In
the fall of 2018, Appellant and CT graduated from technical school. Subse-
quently, Appellant received orders to Sheppard AFB, Texas, while CT received

1 All references to the UCMJ, Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.), and Military Rules of

Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.) are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.).
2 The members also found Appellant not guilty of one specification of sexual assault

(Specification 3 of Charge I) and one specification of assault (Specification 2 of Charge
II) in violation of Articles 120 and 128, UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 928.

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                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

orders to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Both were excited at the relative proxim-
ity of their assignments to one another, and frequently saw each other on week-
ends and holidays, until the summer of 2019.
    In the summer of 2019, CT ended the relationship with Appellant because
she found out Appellant was still married, and he was pursuing a relationship
with another woman near Sheppard AFB. However, the two continued to talk
with one another, and had discussed the possibility of restarting their relation-
ship at some point. Eventually, Appellant and CT stopped talking and both
began dating other people. In December 2019, Appellant began pursuing a re-
lationship with CT again.
A. CT’s Testimony
    At trial, CT described Appellant as “desperate to reenter” into a relation-
ship with her. Appellant came to visit CT at Barksdale AFB in June of 2020 in
an attempt to be a supportive friend following the end of CT’s relationship with
another man. While CT was not sure of the exact day, she was certain it was
in June and before the Fourth of July weekend. During this visit, CT and Ap-
pellant spent the day fishing and kayaking, and later returned to her dormi-
tory room to relax and watch television. While in the dormitory room, CT was
sitting on her bed and Appellant was sitting on a chair at her desk. At some
point, CT noticed Appellant’s “demeanor kind of changed” and “he seemed very
forward.” As he approached CT, Appellant told her that “he had come out all
this way to help [her] and that this was the least [she] could do for him.” CT
understood Appellant’s statement to mean that Appellant wanted to have sex
with her. Next, Appellant got into CT’s bed, climbed on top of her, and “caged”
her in with his legs. CT told Appellant, “No,” and that she “wasn’t ready, that
[she] didn’t want to” have sex with him. She also attempted to push him off
her, but despite her efforts, Appellant proceeded to remove her clothing. Ap-
pellant then grabbed a condom from his wallet and penetrated her while she
was protesting by trying to push him off and crying. CT described the experi-
ence as painful, specifically saying, “[I] hurt where [Appellant] penetrated me.”
    CT described a second incident where Appellant sexually assaulted her.
Although she could not remember an exact date, she did recall that it was be-
fore the Fourth of July weekend and approximately two weeks after the first
assault that occurred in June. This incident was very similar to the first as-
sault described above. She and Appellant went fishing and kayaking and later
returned to her dormitory room. While there, Appellant approached CT as she
was lying on her bed, climbed on top of her, caged her in with his legs, and
removed her pants. CT told Appellant “no” and she “didn’t want this.” CT also
described that Appellant again grabbed a condom from his wallet and pro-
ceeded to penetrate her vagina with his penis as she was crying. On this occa-
sion, CT specifically remembered Appellant telling her to “stop crying” and he

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                   United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

“ended up putting a pillow over [her] face.” After Appellant ejaculated, he told
CT it was not enjoyable “[b]ecause [she] was crying the whole time.”
    The following exchange occurred between trial counsel and CT:
       Q: When he got on top of you in the bed in your dorm room and
       inserted himself into you after you told him no and you weren’t
       ready, did any part of you consent to that?
       A: No.
       Q: When he did it again two weeks later and put a pillow over
       your head as you cried, was that consensual?
       A: No.
   CT explained she did not immediately report either of the sexual assaults
and did not see Appellant again in person after the second assault. The two
continued to talk infrequently on the telephone until August 2020 when CT
confronted Appellant about the assaults. The conversation ended in an argu-
ment culminating in CT blocking Appellant’s ability to contact her via her iPh-
one.
B. Message Exchange
    CT had no contact with Appellant until December 2020 when he reached
out to her via a messaging application which allowed text messages to go
through because it “gave him like an alternate number.” In one of the text mes-
sages Appellant apologized to CT for his actions, stating, “I’m sorry for every-
thing I did, the emotional and mental torture I put you through. I have a lot to
say, but I don’t wanna waste a lot of your time. I’ve done enough of that al-
ready.” Appellant continued:
       I’ve done a lot of bad things to you. Manipulation, using you for
       things, cheating, leaving you in a time of need. Not truly seeing
       you for your actual worth. This is just to name a few. I manipu-
       lated you and made you feel like you were crazy. Not truly caring
       about you. Being selfish and not understanding the true mean-
       ing of love. Forcing my insecurities onto you. Making you feel
       insignificant.
    CT was unconvinced Appellant appreciated what he had done to her, and
responded to his message with, “[Y]ou forced me to have sex with you. [Y]ou
even hurt me physically on multiple occasions and played it off as us just
rough[-]housing or having fun.” Appellant immediately called CT in response
to her message, but she refused to take his call. Appellant continued to call CT
and texted her stating, “[I want t]o do what I should have done a long time
ago[.] I want to admit to things over the phone if you can just pick up and

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                     United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

listen. You don’t have to speak.” CT refused to take his phone call and texted,
“[I]f you[’]re truly sorry[,] then apologize,” to which Appellant responded, “You
won’t report me?” CT asked Appellant to type out why he was sorry, and Ap-
pellant texted the following:
        I used to push you and yell at you. I used you sexually. I can’t
        take back the things [I]’ve done, but [I]’m changing myself for
        the future. I’m sorry, and I wish I could take back all the things
        [I]’ve done, but I can’t. I can’t change them.
The collection of text messages detailed above was admitted as a prosecution
exhibit.
   CT did not respond to Appellant’s message and had no contact with him
until February 2021 when he reached out to her again using a different phone
number. This text string was also admitted as a prosecution exhibit and
showed CT stating, “[D]ude, you raped me[,] and [I’]ve blocked you[,] and you
have a wife.” Appellant responded, “Okay[.] I won’t contact you ever again.”

C. Pretext Conversations
    In March of 2021, security forces began investigating a domestic dispute
between Appellant and his wife. After learning that Appellant may have sex-
ually assaulted CT, the investigation was passed to the Air Force Office of Spe-
cial Investigations (AFOSI). Special Agent (SA) RF was the lead agent on Ap-
pellant’s case. SA RF testified at trial that after he contacted CT and gathered
details regarding the sexual assaults that took place in the summer of 2020,
he asked CT to initiate a “pretext” phone call with Appellant. She did. SA RF
explained three pretext conversations took place but nothing significant came
of the first two pretext exchanges. However, the third pretext conversation,
which took place over FaceTime on 22 April 2021, did have evidentiary value—
as explained further below. 3 The video recording of the hour-long conversation
on 22 April 2021 was admitted as a prosecution exhibit and was played for the
panel members during trial.
    During this conversation, CT expressed a desire to rekindle her relation-
ship with Appellant and asked him to acknowledge what he had done to her.
In response, Appellant stated he knew “what [he] did was wrong” and was
“sorry for [ ] taking advantage of [her] sexually whenever [she] w[as] in a mo-
ment of f[**]king crisis and [she] w[as] crying, and then [he] just kind of left
[her] there after everything was done.” Appellant also stated he was sorry for
trying to “control” CT. Later Appellant described himself as a “monster” and
explained it was “wrong” that he had “used [her] for sex.” Appellant asked CT

3 FaceTime is an application for real-time video and voice calls over the Internet.

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                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

what she wanted from him saying, “Like I can’t take back like the things that
happened. I really can’t.” CT continued to press Appellant to describe why he
was sorry and, in response, Appellant stated,
       I hit you. Like I took your clothes off. Like I tried to take back
       my shirt proportionally. Like you told me to stop. Like to not
       take your shirt off. Like I was like laying [sic] in bed and I got
       on to [sic] you, and you told me to stop. All these things like you
       told me to stop and told me not to do. And you may not feel like
       it is genuine.
       ....
       I’m sorry for hitting you. I’m sorry for pushing you. I’m sorry for
       taking off your shirt after you said stop. I’m sorry for f[**]king
       making you cry, for like trying to have sex with you when you
       didn’t want to have sex, for having sex with you. Like I’m sorry
       for all those things, but I can’t make them go away. They’re
       there, and they will always be there at least for you. And I
       f[**]king hate myself for it, [CT].
   Towards the end of the FaceTime call, Appellant stated, “And like I know
that if you tell them that like I sexually assaulted you or that I physically as-
saulted you, I’m definitely probably going to end up going to jail, so prison.”

                                 II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal and Factual Sufficiency
    On appeal, Appellant asks this court to consider whether his “substantial
rights were prejudiced where he was convicted of two specifications of sexual
assault alleging overlapping date ranges and otherwise identical language.”
Appellant contends his convictions for sexual assault are ambiguous and that
“the panel was never orientated as to which allegation corresponded to which
specification.” Additionally, Appellant argues the ambiguity prevents this
court from conducting its factual sufficiency review. After considering Appel-
lant’s contentions, we find his convictions to both specifications legally and fac-
tually sufficient and that no relief is warranted.
   1. Law
    Issues of legal and factual sufficiency are reviewed de novo. United States
v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002).
    “The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Robinson, 77 M.J. 294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (quoting United States

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                     United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

v. Rosario, 76 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2017)). “The term reasonable doubt, how-
ever, does not mean that the evidence must be free from conflict.” United States
v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (citing United States v.
Lips, 22 M.J. 679, 684 (A.F.C.M.R. 1986)), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
“[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound to draw every rea-
sonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution.”
United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omitted).
As a result, “[t]he standard for legal sufficiency involves a very low threshold
to sustain a conviction.” United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). The test for legal sufficiency “gives
full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.” Unites States v. Oliver, 70 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2011)
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1973)).
    “The test for factual sufficiency ‘is whether, after weighing the evidence in
the record of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed
the witnesses,’ [this] court is ‘convinced of the [appellant]’s guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.’” United States v. Reed, 54 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987)). “In conducting this
unique appellate role, we take ‘a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’ applying
‘neither a presumption of innocence nor a presumption of guilt’ to ‘make [our]
own independent determination as to whether the evidence constitutes proof
of each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Wheeler, 76 M.J. at 568
(alteration in original) (quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at 399). The term “rea-
sonable doubt” does not mean evidence free from conflict. See Lips, 22 M.J. at
684. This court’s review of the factual sufficiency of evidence for findings is
limited to the evidence admitted at trial. See Article 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 866(d); United States v. Beatty, 64 M.J. 456, 458 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citations
omitted).
   “[T]he finder of fact at the trial level is always in the best position to deter-
mine the credibility of a witness.” United States v. Peterson, 48 M.J. 81, 83
(C.A.A.F. 1998).
    Appellant was convicted of sexual assault, in violation of Article 120,
UCMJ, which required the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the following two elements: (1) Appellant committed a sexual act upon another
person; and (2) Appellant did so without the consent of the other person. See
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.), pt. IV, ¶ 60.b.(2)(d).
   The two specifications that Appellant was charged with read as follows:
       Specification 1: In that [Appellant] . . . did, at or near Barksdale
       Air Force Base, Louisiana, between on or about 1 June 2020 and

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                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

       on or about 30 June 2020, commit a sexual act upon [CT], by
       penetrating her vulva with his penis, without her consent.
       Specification 2: In that [Appellant] . . . did, at or near Barksdale
       Air Force Base, Louisiana, between on or about 8 June 2020 and
       on or about 31 July 2020, commit a sexual act upon [CT], by pen-
       etrating her vulva with his penis, without her consent.
(Emphasis added).
    An “ambiguous verdict” is one which prevents the reviewing court from
conducting their Article 66, UCMJ, review. United States v. Walters, 58 M.J.
391, 397 (C.A.A.F. 2003). “[T]he remedy for a Walters violation is to set aside
the finding of guilty to the affected specification and dismiss it with prejudice.”
United States v. Scheurer, 62 M.J. 100, 112 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (footnote omitted).
    “With minor exceptions for capital cases, a ‘court-martial panel, like a ci-
vilian jury, returns a general verdict and does not specify how the law applies
to the facts, nor does the panel otherwise explain the reasons for its decision to
convict or acquit.’” United States v. Brown, 65 M.J. 356, 359 (C.A.A.F. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Hardy, 46 M.J. 67, 73 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).
   2. Analysis
    The Government introduced sufficient evidence of Appellant’s guilt during
the court-martial. The weight of the evidence came directly from the victim,
CT, who described in sufficient detail two different sexual assaults which oc-
curred in the summer of 2020. During CT’s testimony, she recounted how Ap-
pellant penetrated her vulva without her consent. She testified both assaults
took place in her dormitory room at Barksdale AFB. She was also clear the
first time she was sexually assaulted by Appellant was in June of 2020 and the
second sexual assault occurred approximately two weeks later. She confirmed
both sexual assaults occurred before the Fourth of July 2020 weekend. She did
not consent to the sexual acts and communicated her lack of consent to Appel-
lant through her words and actions. We find CT’s testimony alone is sufficient
to support Appellant’s convictions for the charged offenses. As an evidentiary
standard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require more than one wit-
ness to testify credibly. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 63 M.J. 372, 383
(C.A.A.F. 2006) (explaining the testimony of a single witness may satisfy the
Government’s burden to prove every element of a charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt). We also find CT’s testimony is supported by the text mes-
sages Appellant sent to CT concerning the sexual assaults, as well as the state-
ments made by Appellant during the third pretext video call. Finally, we are
cognizant that “the finder of fact at the trial level is always in the best position
to determine the credibility of a witness.” Peterson, 48 M.J. at 83.

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                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

    Appellant’s primary contention on appeal is the verdict in his case is am-
biguous, which he argues makes it impossible for this court to complete its
factual sufficiency review. Citing Walters, Appellant contends that because
CT’s allegations could fall within the language of either charged specification,
we cannot be sure which facts support which offense. We do not share Appel-
lant’s confusion. Walters only applies in those “narrow circumstance[s] involv-
ing the conversion of a ‘divers occasions’ specification to a ‘one occasion’ speci-
fication through exceptions and substitutions.” 58 M.J. at 396. It is clear the
narrow holding in Walters does not apply to this case, since neither specifica-
tion was charged on divers occasions.
    Moreover, we find the specifications indicate two distinct sexual assaults,
and that one assault happened before the other. We also find the evidence itself
clearly provides this court with an adequate indication, beyond a reasonable
doubt, as to what conduct formed the basis for each specification, and in no
way inhibits our ability to conduct a factual sufficiency review. As we stated
above, CT’s testimony clearly supports two distinct sexual assaults. The first
assault occurred in June, with the second occurring approximately two weeks
later.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Prosecution, we
conclude a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See Robinson, 77 M.J. at 297−98. Further-
more, after weighing all the evidence in the record of trial and making allow-
ances for not having personally observed the witnesses, we are ourselves con-
vinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Reed, 54 M.J. at 41
(citation omitted).
B. Uncharged Misconduct
    Appellant argues the military judge abused her discretion by allowing the
Government to present evidence of Appellant’s “prior bad acts.” Appellant
highlights the following testimony from CT which he contends was inadmissi-
ble character evidence: Appellant (1) was married while he was dating her; (2)
was dishonest with her regarding the status of his separation and divorce; (3)
cheated on CT and lied to her about cheating on her; (4) used threats of suicide
as a manipulation tactic; (5) had a violent temper; (6) made a racist and derog-
atory remark to her; and (7) used fake phone numbers to call her. Additionally,
Appellant complains it was improper that CT was allowed to discuss how she
felt about Appellant’s apology, and it was improper that SA RF was allowed to
testify about CT’s emotional state following the pretext phone calls. Finally,
Appellant complains SA RF improperly presented “human lie detector testi-
mony” when he discussed the goals of the pretext phone calls. We find that the
military judge did not abuse her discretion in permitting the above testimony,
and, therefore, no relief is warranted.

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                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

   1. Additional Background
   All of the statements that Appellant contends are uncharged misconduct
were elicited during the testimony of CT and SA RF.
       a. CT’s Testimony
    During CT’s testimony, she described when she first met Appellant: “My
initial impression of [Appellant] -- he kind of made some like derogatory jokes
regarding my appearance and ethnicity and intelligence, and so we didn’t re-
ally -- I didn’t really interact very much with him.” She eventually changed her
mind about him and described the progression of their relationship as “a
friendship initially,” as Appellant “was going through a separation with his
wife at the time, so [she] offered advice and support like in any way that [she]
could. And then [she] just -- eventually, as he was going through the separa-
tion, developed romantic feelings” for him. The following sequence between
trial counsel and CT expanded on Appellant’s marital status:
       Q: At the time that you developed romantic feelings, did you un-
       derstand what the status was of his marriage?
       A: He told me that he was going through a divorce.
       Q: Did you know whether papers had been filed or anything like
       that?
       A: At that time, not to my knowledge.
       Q: Can you tell the panel a little bit about how serious your re-
       lationship got during technical school?
       A: Like examples of like what -- like our relationship status or -
       -
       Q: Uh-huh.
       A: So we had started dating at [Appellant]’s insistence. He was
       very forward with me. He would say a lot of the times that he
       knew what he wanted when he saw it, and so I felt maybe flat-
       tered. And I felt as if he seemed to show a desire to want to, like,
       improve as a person. And so when we had started our romantic
       relationship, we had often went out to eat, and we had just done
       like a lot of activities that tech schoolers do together. And even-
       tually we had gotten engaged very early on, so . . .
       Q: Who proposed?
       A: [Appellant].
       Q: What was your response?

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                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

       A: It was yes. It was kind of in an informal setting. He proposed
       to me in his dorm room bathroom.
       Q: Was there a ring?
       A: Yes.
       Q: Did you ever during tech school discover that the relationship
       with his wife wasn’t what it seemed?
       A: Yes.
       Q: How so?
       A: She would call him and text him very often crying. And he
       would, like, walk off into the bathroom and speak to her. And I
       would overhear their conversation sometimes, where she would
       ask why he was doing this to her.
       Q: Did it seem to you at times like they were divorcing?
       A: No.
       [Trial Defense Counsel]: Objection. Speculation.
       [Military Judge]: Sustained. Ask a different question, [t]rial
       [c]ounsel. Members, please disregard the question and the an-
       swer.
       Q: Was his relationship with his then-wife a source of stress or
       a source of conflict for you even in technical school?
       A: Yes.
       Q: Despite that, did the two of you make plans to see each other
       after tech school?
       A: Yes.
       Q: Did the engagement continue past technical school?
       A: It did.
(Omission in original).
    CT then described to trial counsel the change of circumstances in her rela-
tionship with Appellant:
       Q: Into 2019, you continued to see [Appellant] as your then-fi-
       ancé?
       A: Yes, until the summer of that year.
       Q: Until the summer. And what happened in the summer?

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                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

       A: In the summer of that year I discovered that [Appellant] was
       lying to me and he was pursuing a relationship with someone
       else.
       Q: I want to talk about that for a minute. How did you discover
       that he was pursuing a relationship with someone else?
       A: He eventually ended up telling me.
    CT described that during their relationship, she and Appellant shared their
locations with each other using an application on their phones. She stated they
did this because Appellant “wanted security” and wanted to know “what [she]
was doing.” She later described that Appellant would frequently check her lo-
cation and would “blow up [her] phone a lot saying that [she] should be home
and that [she] shouldn’t be like hanging out with anybody.”
    Although their relationship ended in the summer of 2019, CT explained
how Appellant pursued getting back together with her. She had blocked Ap-
pellant from being able to contact her following their break-up, but Appellant
used a “phone-texting” application to contact her. During one phone call in De-
cember 2019, Appellant threatened to harm himself if they did not get back
together. She testified, “I eventually picked up one of his phone calls. And from
what I believe and what he had told me, he was already starting that five-hour
drive to Barksdale [AFB], and he was threatening to kill himself if we didn’t
reenter a relationship.” CT began a romantic relationship with another person
in the fall of 2019 which lasted until “the end of spring 2020 into the summer
of 2020.” She did not see Appellant in person until the summer of 2020, follow-
ing the end of her relationship with the other person.
   Later in her testimony CT described Appellant’s temper:
       Q: Was there conflict at all during this chapter of you all’s rela-
       tionship in the spring/summer of [2020]?
       A: Yes. It angered [Appellant] that I had pursued a different re-
       lationship with [another Air Force member]. It was something
       that frustrated him very often why I could possibly be with some-
       body else.
       Q: Can you describe what that anger looked like?
       A: It was pretty explosive. Like he would have angry outbursts
       and yell, like hit things. He would occasionally like -- he was just
       a very physical person.
       Q: Was there ever an occasion where he put his hands on you?
       A: Yes.

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                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

   CT then described events related to a physical assault that Appellant was
charged with—Specification 2 of Charge II—of which Appellant was ultimately
acquitted.
    CT also described a text exchange where she asked Appellant to apologize
for sexually assaulting her. After reading Appellant’s response, she was asked
by trial counsel if the “apology sufficiently addressed what [Appellant] had ac-
tually done to [her],” and she answered, “No.”
       b. SA RF’s Testimony
   At trial, SA RF discussed goals of the pretext phone calls between CT and
Appellant. He stated:
       The goal of the recorded conversations, which occurred over a
       series of approximately 48 hours from 20 April 2021 to 22 April
       2021, was to elicit information from [Appellant] in an environ-
       ment and atmosphere that he was more likely to provide truth-
       ful statements and not withhold information that he would have
       otherwise withheld from [AFOSI] had we had the opportunity to
       interview him in person.
SA RF went on to describe the objective and usefulness of pretext communica-
tions:
       We were hoping to introduce the topic of the various nights or
       days that these alleged offenses occurred. And then based on
       training and experience, typically if we can get an individual
       talking and recounting those events, if they did, in fact, do what
       the party is alleging that they did, in some cases they might apol-
       ogize about the incident, and that’s essentially what we were
       hoping to get is an apology.
    During the end of SA RF’s testimony, he was asked to describe CT’s emo-
tional state following the last pretext phone call. The following exchange oc-
curred between the trial counsel and SA RF:
       Q: And did you or the other agents make any attempts to console
       [CT] after that had concluded?
       A: Yes, sir. [SA TC] hugged [CT].
       Q: Is [SA TC] a male or female?
       A: Female.
       Q: All right. And is there a reason she did that?
       A: They knew each other prior to [SA TC] joining [AF]OSI.

                                       13
                      United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

       Q: I see. Was [CT], was she emotional as a result of that interac-
       tion?
       A: Yes, sir.
   2. Law
    “The standard of review for a military judge’s decision to admit evidence is
abuse of discretion.” United States v. Fetrow, 76 M.J. 181, 185 (C.A.A.F. 2017)
(citing United States v. Yammine, 69 M.J. 70, 73 (C.A.A.F. 2010)). “A military
judge abuses his discretion when: (1) the findings of fact upon which he predi-
cates his ruling are not supported by the evidence of record; (2) if incorrect legal
principles were used; or (3) if his application of the correct legal principles to
the facts is clearly unreasonable.” United States v. Ellis, 68 M.J. 341, 344
(C.A.A.F. 2010) (citation omitted).
    Whether an accused has waived or instead forfeited an issue is a question
of law this court reviews de novo. United States v. Ahern, 76 M.J. 194, 197
(C.A.A.F. 2017) (citation omitted). In the absence of waiver, a plain error stand-
ard of review applies to situations where a counsel fails to object or where an
objection failed to preserve discrete issues. See United States v. Tyler, 81 M.J.
108, 113 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (explaining an accused has a duty to state the specific
ground for objection in order to preserve a claim of error on appeal). Under the
plain error standard, an appellant must show “(1) there was an error; (2) it was
plain or obvious; and (3) the error materially prejudiced a substantial right.”
United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2007). “[W]here a for-
feited constitutional error was clear or obvious, ‘material prejudice’ is assessed
using the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard . . . .” United States
v. Tovarchavez, 78 M.J. 458, 460 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (citing Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)) (additional citation omitted). “That standard is met
where a court is confident that there was no reasonable possibility that the
error might have contributed to the conviction.” Id. (citing Chapman, 386 U.S.
at 24). “[T]he Government must prove that the [nonstructural constitutional]
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even on plain error review.”
United States v. Palacios Cueto, 82 M.J. 323, 334 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citing To-
varchavez, 78 M.J. at 460).
    Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence
more or less probable. Mil. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is generally admis-
sible absent a rule requiring otherwise. Mil. R. Evid. 402. Even when evidence
is relevant, a military judge may prohibit its admission when the evidence’s
probative value is substantially outweighed by such considerations as unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or waste of time. Mil. R. Evid. 403.
    Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) provides that evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act
by a person is generally not admissible as evidence of the person’s character in

                                        14
                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

order to show the person acted in conformity with that character on a particu-
lar occasion. However, such evidence may be admissible for another purpose,
including, inter alia, proving motive, intent, or absence of mistake. Mil. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2). The list of potential purposes in Mil. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) “is il-
lustrative, not exhaustive.” United States v. Ferguson, 28 M.J. 104, 108 (C.M.A.
1989).
    We apply a three-part test to review the admissibility of evidence under
Mil. R. Evid. 404(b): (1) does the evidence “reasonably support a finding” that
the accused committed the prior crime, wrong, or act; (2) what “fact of . . . con-
sequence is made more or less probable” by the proffered evidence; and (3) is
the “probative value . . . substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice?” United States v. Reynolds, 29 M.J. 105, 109 (C.M.A. 1989) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Upon defense request, the Govern-
ment must “provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evi-
dence” it intends to offer, either before trial or—if the military judge excuses
the lack of pretrial notice for good cause—during trial. Mil. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
   3. Analysis
   Since trial defense counsel failed to object to the above-referenced testi-
mony, we review the admissibility of the testimony for plain error. We conclude
that Appellant has failed to establish any error, let alone plain or obvious error.
    First, we discuss the evidence concerning Appellant’s behavior during his
relationship with CT; specifically, the testimony concerning his deceptive ac-
tions and statements, sudden outbursts of anger, previous violence toward CT,
and attempts to control CT. Appellant argues that this evidence was inadmis-
sible character evidence. We disagree. Mil. R. of Evid 404(b) is “a rule of inclu-
sion, not exclusion.” United States v. Humphreys, 57 M.J. 83, 90 (C.A.A.F.
2002). Here, we find that the testimony meets all three prongs of the Reynolds
test. First, the evidence reasonably supports the finding by the factfinder that
Appellant engaged in the behavior described by the testimony. Here, the Gov-
ernment offered evidence—in the form of CT’s testimony—that the acts actu-
ally occurred. Second, the behavior displayed by Appellant are facts and cir-
cumstances that explain Appellant’s on-again, off-again relationship with CT,
which speaks directly to the facts of consequence in this case involving consent,
lack of mistake as to consent, control, and violence. Additionally, we find the
evidence at issue was permissible to show Appellant’s motive, intent, and plan
to dominate and control CT. See United States v. Moore, 78 M.J. 868, 874 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 2019) (finding a military member’s controlling behavior was
admissible to prove two sexual assault offenses charged under Articles 120 and
128, UCMJ). As in Moore, the testimony here was also probative and necessary
for the Government to overcome any presumption that a boyfriend would not
physically or sexually harm his girlfriend. Third, we find the probative value

                                        15
                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

of the evidence to be high and the risk of unfair prejudice to be low. We con-
clude that Appellant has not demonstrated any error, let alone plain or obvious
error, in the military judge allowing this evidence.
    Next Appellant argues it was improper that CT was allowed to discuss how
she felt about Appellant’s apology and that SA RF was allowed to discuss CT’s
emotional state following the third pretext phone call. Appellant argues this
testimony was improper “victim impact” evidence. Again, trial defense counsel
did not object so we review the admission of this testimony for plain error. Ap-
pellant’s argument is misplaced. This evidence was not offered as victim im-
pact evidence; it was offered during the Government’s case-in-chief to show CT
had a past negative interaction with Appellant, did not accept his apology, and
that it was emotionally difficult for her to speak with him. We find this testi-
mony relevant on the issue of whether CT consented to the sexual activity.
Therefore, we do not find Appellant has demonstrated plain or obvious error.
However, even if we were to find plain or obvious error here, Appellant cannot
demonstrate prejudice, as the members would have been able to see CT’s emo-
tional state following the pretext calls on the video admitted at trial and would
have been able to glean her tone after reading her terse responses to Appel-
lant’s text messages.
    Next, Appellant argues that SA RF improperly commented on Appellant’s
Fifth Amendment4 right against self-incrimination. Appellant highlights a por-
tion of SA RF’s testimony where he discussed the goal of the pretext phone
calls between CT and Appellant. There was no objection raised concerning this
testimony, so we again review for plain error. In the testimony at issue, SA RF
stated that the goal of the pretext communications was “to elicit information
from [Appellant] in an environment and atmosphere that he was more likely
to provide truthful statements and not withhold information that he would
have otherwise withheld from us had [AFOSI] had the opportunity to interview
him in person.” (Emphasis added). We do not find the highlighted statement to
be commenting on Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights. We read this state-
ment as expressing that AFOSI did not interview Appellant. This conclusion
was further supported by SA RF’s testimony, where he indicated that he chose
to pursue a pretext call instead of interviewing Appellant. Therefore, we find
no plain error.
    Lastly, Appellant argues that SA RF provided improper “human lie detec-
tor” testimony. Appellant specifically highlights the following testimony: “[I]f
we can get an individual talking and recounting those events, if they did, in
fact, do what the party is alleging that they did, in some cases they might apol-
ogize about the incident, and that’s essentially what we were hoping to get is

4 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

                                       16
                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

an apology.” There was no objection to this testimony, so we again review for
plain error. Human lie detector testimony is “an opinion as to whether a person
was truthful in making a specific statement regarding a fact at issue in the
case.” United States v. Kasper¸ 58 M.J. 314, 315 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (citations omit-
ted). In our review of the record, including the above statement, we find no
evidence SA RF indicated that he had the ability to determine whether Appel-
lant was being deceptive or honest. Specifically looking at the statement above,
SA RF testified, “[I]f they did, in fact, do what the party is alleging that they
did, in some cases they might apologize.” (Emphasis added). Therefore, we con-
clude SA RF’s statement did not amount to impermissible human lie detector
testimony, and Appellant has not established plain error.
C. Trial Counsel’s Findings Argument
    Appellant also argues that several comments trial counsel made during his
findings and rebuttal arguments constituted improper remarks and prosecuto-
rial misconduct. Specifically, Appellant contends trial counsel improperly (1)
vouched for the credibility of witnesses and Appellant’s guilt; (2) personalized
his argument; and (3) addressed trial defense counsel. We find no error oc-
curred and no relief is warranted.
   1. Additional Background
    Appellant argues trial counsel repeatedly engaged in improper vouching by
using the phrase “three credible witnesses” at multiple points during his find-
ings argument. However, the record establishes that trial counsel also repeat-
edly reminded the panel members to “consider the judge’s instructions on cred-
ibility, and [ ] apply [that] criteria.”
    Appellant also argues trial counsel improperly personalized his argument,
and emphasized trial counsel’s argument as follows: “If somebody accuses you
of rape, under what circumstances, on what planet are you just going to ignore
that, are you not going to correct the record.”
    Finally, Appellant contends trial counsel improperly addressed trial de-
fense counsel when he argued, “But you’re right, [d]efense [c]ounsel, it wasn’t
a violent struggle” while addressing the level of resistance displayed by CT.
   Trial defense counsel did not object to any of the above-referenced argu-
ments. Following argument by both counsel, the military judge gave the fol-
lowing curative instruction to the panel:
       Members of the court, if you believe you heard either counsel
       express their personal opinion about a witness’s character or the
       strength of the evidence, you may not consider it for that pur-
       pose. Counsel are not permitted to offer their personal opinions.
       This was merely argument. Neither counsel’s personal opinions,

                                       17
                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

       qualifications, or personal conduct in court are matters relevant
       for your consideration in resolving the matters before you. You
       and you alone determine the credibility of witnesses and
       whether the Government has proven the element of any offense
       beyond a reasonable doubt.
       I’ll remind you that argument by counsel is not evidence. Coun-
       sel are not witnesses. If the facts as you remember them differ
       from the way counsel stated the facts, it is your memory of the
       facts that controls.
       And finally to the extent counsel have referred to my instruc-
       tions, if there is any inconsistency between what counsel have
       said and the instructions I gave you, you must accept my state-
       ment as being true.
   2. Law
   “We review prosecutorial misconduct and improper argument de novo and
where . . . no objection is made, we review for plain error.” United States v.
Voorhees, 79 M.J. 5, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (citing United States v. Andrews, 77 M.J.
393, 398 (C.A.A.F. 2018)).
    “Plain error occurs when (1) there is error, (2) the error is plain or obvious,
and (3) the error results in material prejudice to a substantial right of the ac-
cused.” United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 179 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citation
omitted). Generally, the burden of persuasion under a plain error review is on
the appellant. See United States v. Bungert, 62 M.J. 346, 348 (C.A.A.F. 2006)
(citation omitted).
    Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when trial counsel “oversteps the bounds
of that propriety and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such
an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense.” Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 178
(quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935)). Such conduct “can be
generally defined as action or inaction by a prosecutor in violation of some legal
norm or standard, e.g., a constitutional provision, a statute, a Manual rule, or
an applicable professional ethics canon.” United States v. Hornback, 73 M.J.
155, 160 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Meek, 44 M.J. 1, 5 (C.A.A.F.
1996)).
   “Improper argument” by trial counsel “is one facet of prosecutorial miscon-
duct.” United States v. Sewell, 76 M.J. 14, 18 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (citation omitted).
Counsel must limit arguments to evidence in the record and reasonable infer-
ences that can be drawn from such evidence. United States v. Baer, 53 M.J.
235, 237 (C.A.A.F. 2000). By this standard, a prosecutor is permitted to com-
ment on government witnesses’ credibility in summation when the accused
made prior efforts to impeach those witnesses during the evidentiary phase of

                                        18
                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

trial. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). On the other hand, a
prosecutor may not “make arguments that ‘unduly . . . inflame the passions or
prejudices of the court members.’” United States v. Schroder, 65 M.J. 49, 58
(C.A.A.F. 2007) (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Clifton, 15 M.J.
26, 30 (C.M.A. 1983)) (additional citation omitted). Trial counsel is also prohib-
ited from discussing facts not in evidence or personal opinions about the truth
or falsity of testimony or evidence. See id.; Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 179; Rule for
Courts-Martial 919(b), Discussion.
    “[A]rgument by a trial counsel must be viewed within the context of the
entire court-martial. The focus of [the] inquiry should not be on words in isola-
tion.” Baer, 53 M.J. at 238 (citations omitted). “[I]t is improper to ‘surgically
carve’ out a portion of the argument with no regard to its context.” Id. In judg-
ing the propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks, “the lack of a defense objection is
‘some measure of the minimal impact of a prosecutor’s improper comment.’”
United States v. Gilley, 56 M.J. 113, 123 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting United States
v. Carpenter, 51 M.J. 393, 397 (C.A.A.F. 1999)).
    “When a trial counsel makes an improper argument during findings, ‘re-
versal is warranted only when the trial counsel’s comments taken as a whole
were so damaging that we cannot be confident that the members convicted the
appellant on the basis of the evidence alone.’” United States v. Norwood, 81
M.J. 12, 19 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (quoting Andrews, 77 M.J. at 401–02), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 2864 (2021). “We weigh three factors to determine whether trial
counsel’s improper arguments were prejudicial: ‘(1) the severity of the miscon-
duct, (2) the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and (3) the weight of
the evidence supporting the conviction.’” Andrews, 77 M.J. at 402 (quoting
Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 184).
   3. Analysis
    Since trial defense counsel did not object, we review trial counsel’s findings
and rebuttal arguments for plain error. Even if we were to assume plain error,
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the alleged misconduct was “so dam-
aging” as to call into question whether the panel members convicted Appellant
on the basis of the evidence alone. See Norwood, 81 M.J. at 19. “In assessing
prejudice, we look at the cumulative impact of any prosecutorial misconduct
on the accused’s substantial rights and the fairness and integrity of his trial.”
Voorhees, 79 M.J. at 12 (quoting Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 184).
    Applying the first Fletcher factor, we find that the alleged misconduct taken
together was not severe and amounted to a few isolated words in an otherwise
lengthy argument. We find that trial defense counsel’s failure to object to any
of the argument highlighted above is “some measure of the minimal impact of
[the] prosecutor’s improper argument.” Gilley, 56 M.J. at 113.

                                       19
                     United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

    As to the second factor, the record establishes that the military judge pro-
vided curative instructions following both parties’ findings arguments. One of
the instructions specifically addressed the possibility that both trial counsel
and trial defense counsel had expressed their personal opinions regarding the
character of the witnesses or the strength of the evidence, and reminded mem-
bers that they alone determine the credibility of witnesses and whether the
Government has proven the element of any offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The curative instruction also reminded the panel members that argument by
counsel was not evidence, and that they were to follow the military judge’s in-
structions in reaching a verdict.
    Finally, as to the third factor, we find the weight of the evidence supporting
the convictions was strong, including compelling testimony from CT and incul-
patory statements made by Appellant during the pretext conversation and text
messages. In conclusion, we are confident Appellant was properly convicted on
the basis of the evidence alone. See Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 184.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    Appellant argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment 5 due to alleged deficiencies in the performance of his trial
defense counsel. Specifically, Appellant highlights two areas where his trial
defense counsel were deficient. First, he argues his trial defense counsel per-
fected an otherwise missing element from the offenses during the cross-exam-
ination of CT by confirming that her testimony was Appellant “penetrated her
vulva with his penis.” Appellant claims there was no evidence of penetration
before the court prior to trial defense counsel’s questions. Second, Appellant
argues trial defense counsel failed to object to “voluminous improper evidence
and argument.” The evidence and argument highlighted here by Appellant is
the same as we discussed supra. We find Appellant has failed to establish that
his trial defense were deficient, and therefore conclude no relief is warranted.
   1. Additional Background
   On 8 January 2024, we ordered both of Appellant’s trial defense counsel,
Major (Maj) AM and Maj NA, to provide responsive declarations to address
Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. On 14 February 2024, the
court attached those declarations to the record of trial. 6

5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

6 Because the issue was raised in the record but was not fully resolvable by those ma-

terials, we may consider the declarations submitted by the parties consistent with
United States v. Jessie, 79 M.J. 437, 444 (C.A.A.F. 2020).

                                         20
                     United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

   We have considered whether a post-trial evidentiary hearing is required to
resolve any factual disputes between Appellant’s assertions and his trial de-
fense counsel’s assertions. See Article 66(f)(3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(f)(3);
United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 248 (C.A.A.F. 1997); United States v.
DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411, 413 (C.M.A. 1967) (per curiam). We find a hearing un-
necessary to resolve Appellant’s claims.
    In his declaration, Maj AM provided this court with the following back-
ground to add context to the decisions they made during their representation
of Appellant. Appellant was initially charged with offenses against three dif-
ferent women, none of whom knew each other, as well as animal abuse.
Maj AM explained that law enforcement initially became involved in the case
after responding to a domestic disturbance between Appellant and his wife, at
which point law enforcement officials began speaking to women from Appel-
lant’s past in an attempt to establish a pattern of behavior. By the time
Maj AM and Maj NA got involved with the case, Appellant had made a number
of statements to CT, including: “I had sex with you when you didn’t want to;”
“I wanted to be in control;” “I’m sorry—I don’t know what you want me to do
about it, though;” and “What’s done is done.”
    Maj AM also highlighted in his declaration the following testimony from
trial counsel’s direct examination with CT: 7
       Q: Did you fight him off or push him or in any way struggle?
       A: When he -- when he -- when he was penetrating me, yeah, I
       kind of tried to push him off.
       Q: You said that you struggled when he penetrated you; is that
       correct?
       A: Yes.
       Q: When did he actually penetrate you? How soon after putting
       the condom on?
       A: It was pretty fast.
       Q: Did he ask you for permission if he could penetrate you?
       A: No.
       Q: Before he penetrated you, had you continued to protest?
       A: Yes.

7 The exchange in this paragraph is taken verbatim from the declaration Maj AM pro-

vided in response to this court’s 8 January 2024 order.

                                          21
                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

       Q: Was it painful?
       A: Yes.
       Q: Where did it hurt?
       A: It hurt where he penetrated me.
       Q: Did he kiss you or try to?
       A: He tried to.
       Q: When?
       A: When he was having -- when he was on . . .
       Q: Was it after he had put himself inside of you, ma’am?
       A: Yeah.
       Q: When he got on top of you in the bed in your dorm room and
       inserted himself into you after you told him no and you weren’t
       ready, did any part of you consent to that?
       A: No.
       Q: When he did it again two weeks later and he put a pillow over
       your head as you cried, was that consensual?
       A: No.
(Omission in original) (citations omitted).
   On cross-examination Maj AM asked CT the following questions:
       Q: Okay. Understood. So whether the condom is on or not, at this
       point in time is when he penetrates your vagina with his penis?
       A: Yes.
       ....
       Q: Okay. So both instances you don’t recall if he wore the con-
       dom?
       A: I don’t recall if he wore the condom, but I do know that he had
       the condoms in his wallet.
       Q: All right. So regardless if he puts it on or he just opened it to
       open it, he then proceeds to penetrate your vagina with his pe-
       nis?
       A: Yes.
    Maj AM also explained that the Defense considered a number of different
options for presenting the best defense for Appellant. He described in some

                                       22
                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

detail that the most promising trial defense strategy for an acquittal was not
to argue that Appellant and CT never had sex. Rather they believed a better
path would be to use the evidence to imply that if Appellant and CT did have
sex, CT regretted it because of her conflicted feelings with regard to her rela-
tionship with another person. They chose that strategy because it permitted
the Defense to argue that CT had a bias and motive to fabricate, which in turn
caused her to transform a consensual sexual encounter into a sexual assault.
Additionally, Maj AM explained the Defense made a conscious decision to lev-
erage the evidence of uncharged misconduct to show that the charges did not
stem from independent, unrelated reports but instead arose from investigative
overreach by the law enforcement that produced false reports—that Appellant
had sexually assaulted CT on two occasions—long after the offenses occurred.
   2. Law
    The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel. Gilley, 56 M.J. at 124. In assessing the effectiveness of coun-
sel, we apply the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984), and begin with the presumption of competence announced in
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). See Gilley, 56 M.J. at 124
(citing United States v. Grigoruk, 52 M.J. 312, 315 (C.A.A.F. 2000)). We review
allegations of ineffective assistance de novo. United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J.
353, 362 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citing United States v. Mazza, 67 M.J. 470, 474
(C.A.A.F. 2009)).
    We utilize the following three-part test to determine whether the presump-
tion of competence has been overcome:
       1. Are the appellant’s allegations true; if so, “is there a reasona-
       ble explanation for counsel’s actions”?
       2. If the allegations are true, did defense counsel’s level of advo-
       cacy “fall measurably below the performance . . . [ordinarily ex-
       pected] of fallible lawyers”?
       3. If defense counsel was ineffective, is there “a reasonable prob-
       ability that, absent the errors,” there would have been a differ-
       ent result?
Id. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting United States v. Polk, 32 M.J.
150, 153 (C.M.A. 1991)). The burden is on an appellant to demonstrate both
that counsel’s performance was deficient, and the deficiency resulted in preju-
dice. United States v. Datavs, 71 M.J. 420, 424 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (citation omit-
ted). An appellant overcomes the presumption of competence only when he
shows there were “errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687.

                                       23
                     United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

    “Defense counsel do not perform deficiently when they make a strategic
decision to accept a risk or forego a potential benefit, where it is objectively
reasonable to do so.” Datavs, 71 M.J. at 424 (citations omitted). In reviewing
the decisions and actions of trial defense counsel, this court ordinarily does not
second-guess strategic or tactical decisions. See United States v. Morgan, 37
M.J. 407, 410 (C.M.A. 1993) (citations omitted). It is only in those limited cir-
cumstances where a purported “strategic” or “deliberate” decision is unreason-
able or based on inadequate investigation that it can provide the foundation
for a finding of ineffective assistance. See United States v. Davis, 60 M.J. 469,
474 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
    “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is premised on counsel’s
failure to make a motion . . . , an appellant must show that there is a reasona-
ble probability that such a motion would have been meritorious.” United States
v. Beauge, 82 M.J. 157, 167 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (omission in original) (citation
omitted).
     This court does “not measure deficiency based on the success of a trial de-
fense counsel’s strategy, but instead examine[s] ‘whether counsel made an ob-
jectively reasonable choice in strategy’ from the available alternatives.” United
States v. Akbar, 74 M.J. 364, 379 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Dewrell, 55 M.J. 131, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2001)). For this reason, defense counsel
receive wide latitude in making tactical decisions. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 195 (2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). This also applies to
trial defense counsel’s strategic decisions. Morgan, 37 M.J. at 410. “[S]trategic
choices made by trial defense counsel are virtually unchallengeable after thor-
ough investigation of the law and the facts relevant to the plausible options.”
Akbar, 74 M.J. at 371 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
     In making this determination, courts must be “highly deferential” to trial
defense counsel and make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689. Moreover, “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be sub-
stantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)
(citation omitted).
      In adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, “[i]f it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
. . . that course should be followed.” Datavs, 71 M.J. at 424–25 (first alteration
in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).
   3. Analysis
    We address Appellant’s contentions in the order presented. Appellant’s
first contention is that his counsel perfected an otherwise missing element

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                    United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

from an offense during the cross-examination of CT by confirming her testi-
mony was Appellant “penetrated her vulva with his penis.” We find ample ev-
idence in the record CT had already testified—multiple times—that Appellant
penetrated her without her consent on two occasions in the summer of 2020.
Contrary to Appellant’s contentions on appeal, the record is also sufficiently
clear CT was describing the penetration of her vulva by Appellant’s penis. As
the record does not support Appellant’s contentions, we find Appellant has
failed to establish that his counsel performed deficiently.
    As to Appellant’s second claim that his counsel failed to object to certain
testimony and argument, we also find Appellant has failed to establish defi-
cient performance. In their declarations to this court, both trial defense counsel
stated they considered a number of different possibilities on how to present the
best defense. Ultimately, they decided it was better not to question whether
the sexual acts occurred, but to challenge the element of consent. They de-
scribed in detail how this strategy allowed them to argue CT had a bias and
motive to fabricate, which, in turn, caused her to transform a consensual sex-
ual encounter into a sexual assault. Both trial defense counsel indicated they
allowed the Government to adduce certain testimony which might have been
objectionable under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b) because it allowed them to “strengthen
several key elements of their theory—most notably [CT]’s independent motives
to fabricate.” Both trial defense counsel also included specific examples of the
points they made with each witness called to testify and explained how those
examples supported their overall case strategy.
    We find Appellant has not demonstrated deficient performance. In fact, we
find the record supports that both his trial defense counsel chose a reasonable
strategy from available alternatives given the evidence, including the pretrial
statements made by Appellant. We also note trial defense counsel’s strategy
ultimately resulted in Appellant being acquitted of one specification of sexual
assault and one specification of assault. We will not second-guess reasonable
strategic decisions. See Morgan, 37 M.J. at 410. Therefore, Appellant has not
met his burden to show deficient performance for failing to object to either the
testimony or argument.

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                      United States v. Kight, No. ACM 40337

                                  III. CONCLUSION
   The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. Article
59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). 8 Accordingly, the findings
and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                   FOR THE COURT

                   FLEMING E. KEEFE, Capt, USAF
                   Acting Clerk of the Court

8 Although not raised by Appellant, we note that the entry of judgment (EoJ) does not

comply with the requirements of R.C.M. 1111(b)(3)(A)(B) concerning Appellant’s re-
quest for deferment and waiver of the automatic forfeitures. Specifically, the EoJ omits
the nature of requests, the convening authority’s action on the requests, and the effec-
tive dates and length of any relief granted by the convening authority. Appellant has
not claimed prejudice as a result of this error, and we find none. We direct the Chief
Trial Judge, Air Force Trial Judiciary, to have a detailed military judge correct the EoJ
accordingly and prior to completion of the final order under R.C.M. 1209(b).

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