Court Opinion

ID: 9898273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:35.498306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:36.728982
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                  No. 83769-9-I
              Respondent,
                                                  DIVISION ONE
              v.
                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 PEREACE E. HORTON,

              Appellant.

      BIRK, J. — Pereace Horton appeals a superior court order revoking a

deferred sentence following Horton’s plea agreement on a misdemeanor. We

conclude the superior court revocation did not meet the minimum due process

requirement that the evidence relied on and the court’s reasoning be adequately

identified, we accept the State’s concession of error in regard to the term of

probation, and we decline to reach in the first instance the application of new

statutory provisions governing restitution. We reverse and remand.

                                         I

      By information dated November 6, 2018, the State charged Horton with first

degree theft, a class B felony. According to the certification for determination of

probable cause, a criminal investigator with the Department of Social and Health

Services (DSHS) investigated Horton’s receipt of DSHS benefits.         Generally,

according to the State, in benefits applications and other documents submitted to

DSHS between June 3, 2013 and June 16, 2015, Horton represented having
No. 83769-9-I/2

income of only about $416.00 per month in child support. Despite this, a “cross

match” with the Department of Employment Security led to an investigation by

DSHS showing Horton was on payroll with a private employer and earned income

at least from May 2013 through June 2015. Horton had also indicated to DSHS

she was single, but DSHS’s investigator located records showing she had married

her still current husband in 2009. DSHS claimed it overpaid Horton $16,651.00 in

food benefits between December 1, 2012 and June 30, 2015.

      In pretrial proceedings, the superior court entered an agreed order setting

restitution of $500.00 to DSHS, and an additional order setting restitution of

$1,000.00 to DSHS. On July 2, 2019, Horton paid $500.00; on August 27, 2019,

she paid $250.00; and on October 1, 2019, she paid $400.00.

      E-mail discussions in the court file indicate the prosecutor’s office discussed

the case with DSHS. By e-mail dated January 23, 2020, the State offered a plea

agreement. The proposed agreement contemplated amending the charge to third

degree theft, a gross misdemeanor, and Horton’s agreement to pay as restitution

DSHS’s claimed overpayment.         Horton would pay directly to DSHS.          The

prosecutor stated, “My understanding is that DSHS generally gives 60 months to

pay back restitution with $75 being the minimum payment. What your client’s

payment plan is will be between her and DSHS. Her payments may deviate from

the above practice.” The record does not show it was discussed, but we calculate

that paying $75.00 per month for 60 months would total $4,500.00.

      On February 26, 2020, the parties appeared in court to enter the plea

agreement. Horton’s counsel described the agreement as “a heavily negotiated

                                         2
No. 83769-9-I/3

resolution that’s taken some time for us to get here.” Defense counsel indicated,

“[T]he idea is that Ms. Horton would set up a payment plan with them based on her

financial means, which are pretty limited.” Defense counsel noted the stated

overpayment was not solely amounts allegedly overpaid to Horton, but included

other payments obtained by her husband. Horton intended to move to vacate the

charges within two years, “even if the full amount hasn’t been paid off,” based on

an anticipated track record of making timely payments on a payment plan. The

statement of defendant on plea of guilty indicated the State “does not object to

Defense moving for dismissal after 24 months of timely payments, even if full

payment has not been made.”1 The court accepted an amended information

charging third degree theft, and entered a sentence deferred for 24 months, with

unsupervised probation, requiring Horton to refrain from criminal law violations and

pay additional restitution of $15,151.00. The order setting the additional restitution

indicated “payments [are] to be made directly to DSHS – interest waived per

agreement of [the] parties.”

       On January 11, 2022, the court held a review hearing on the suspended

sentence. The State argued, “One of the conditions was for Ms. Horton to pay

restitution in the amount of $15,151 to DSHS.” The prosecutor described having

documentation of Horton’s payments to date and having provided it to Horton’s

counsel, and according to the record provided a copy to the court, but this court’s

       1 The State did not commit to any position on the anticipated motion for

dismissal.

                                          3
No. 83769-9-I/4

record does not indicate this documentation was filed at the time of the hearing.2

The prosecutor stated, and the documentation showed, Horton paid $100.00 on

November 19, 2020; $300.00 on February 3, 2021; and $400.00 on September 29,

2021. At the time of the review hearing, Horton had paid $1,950.00 and still owed

$14,814.61. After listing Horton’s payment dates and the amount outstanding, the

State argued Horton was “not in compliance with the conditions of the deferred

sentence.” The prosecutor acknowledged, “The State realizes that we’ve been

going through a pandemic, which has caused a lot of hardship on many people,

and that this is a large sum of money, which involved a rather large financial

welfare case.” Defense counsel sought dismissal of the charges, arguing, “[I]t was

contemplated that [Horton] would not have the full amount paid by the time the

deferred period had run and that we could still seek a dismissal.”            Horton

addressed the court, indicating she lost her job at the start of the COVID-19

pandemic and received regular paperwork from DSHS indicating she was to pay

$25.00 “every three weeks or something along that line.”          We calculate that

payments of $25.00 every three weeks for two years would total $850.

       The court revoked the deferred sentence, ruling, “I can’t find that there’s

been sufficient compliance to be able to dismiss this case.” Defense counsel

argued for a final opportunity to make additional payments, but the court did not

grant any explicit relief, commenting, “[I]t’s such an extraordinary amount

outstanding. I mean, if a third of it had been paid, a half of it been paid, that’d be

       2 At oral argument, the State conceded that the document was not filed at

the time of the hearing. It came into the record almost a month later attached to
the State’s response to Horton’s motion to reconsider.

                                          4
No. 83769-9-I/5

one thing. But, this was a pretty small amount in comparison to the entire amount.”

The court entered an order revoking the deferred sentence and found Horton

violated the terms and conditions of her probation by “[f]ailing to pay restitution as

required,” but with Horton participating by telephone it did not enter a final

judgment and sentence.

       On February 4, 2022, Horton moved for reconsideration of the order

revoking the deferred sentence. After the review hearing and before the motion

for reconsideration, Horton paid $500.00 on January 19, 2022; $3,000.00 on

January 20, 2022; and $2,000.00 on January 26, 2022. With these additional

payments, Horton had paid $7,450.00, and still owed $9,314.61. Horton indicated

in her motion for reconsideration that she had been unable to confer with her

counsel at the Zoom review hearing, but, if she had been able to, she would have

informed her counsel she could potentially “deplete her savings account and

borrow money from friends and family members to demonstrate to the Court her

willingness to comply – even though it would put her in a financial bind.” The State

opposed reconsideration, arguing, “A condition of probation was that Horton pay

restitution in the amount of $15,151 to DSHS within 24 months of sentencing.”3

The State also argued the motion for reconsideration was untimely.

       On February 17, 2022, the court held a final sentencing hearing. The court

denied the motion for reconsideration without stating a rationale.         The court

       3  The deferred sentence ordered Horton to pay the entire amount of
restitution, but nothing in the record supports the State’s assertion that an express
condition of probation was that she do so “within 24 months.” The State’s e-mail
offer of a plea agreement adverting to DSHS’s typically allowing “60 months” for
repayment contradicts this assertion.

                                          5
No. 83769-9-I/6

imposed a suspended sentence of 364 days in jail with credit for time served, a

further 24 month term of unsupervised probation, and required restitution of the

outstanding amount after credit for the payments Horton had made. On March 1,

2022, the court entered an order finding Horton indigent for purposes of appeal.

Horton timely appeals.

                                         II

       In challenging the revocation of the deferred sentence, Horton argues her

due process rights were violated because the court’s finding that she violated a

condition of probation is not supported by the record. We conclude the superior

court’s revocation of Horton’s deferred sentence did not meet the minimum due

process requirement that the evidence relied on be adequately identified.

                                         A

       Minimum due process is required in probation revocation hearings. Arment

v. Henry, 98 Wn.2d 775, 778, 658 P.2d 663 (1983). A “ ‘written statement by the

factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking (probation or)

parole,’ is one of the minimum requirements of due process.” State v. Murray, 28

Wn. App. 897, 900, 627 P.2d 115 (1981) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.

778, 786, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973)). However, a court’s failure to

make written findings for revoking probation is not fatal if the court indicates, on

the record, what evidence it relied on. State v. Robinson, 120 Wn. App. 294, 300-

01, 85 P.3d 376 (2004).

       In Murray, the court held the trial court’s failure to create an oral record

sufficient for review resulted in a violation of the defendant’s due process rights.

                                         6
No. 83769-9-I/7

Murray, 28 Wn. App. at 901. Even if the trial court had adequately explained its

reasons to revoke the defendant’s probation, it did not state on what evidence it

relied on to make two conclusions. Id. The Murray court reversed and remanded

with direction to conduct a new revocation hearing, reasoning under the

circumstances it could not be said that “ ‘no useful purpose would be served, . . .

by remanding the matter solely to complete the formality of providing written

reasons.’ ” Id. at 901-02 (quoting State v. Sonneland, 80 Wn.2d 343, 350, 494

P.2d 469 (1972)).

      We are unable to determine the evidence the court was relying on, or its

reasoning, in reaching its conclusion that Horton failed to pay restitution “as

required.” The judgment and sentence indicated the order of restitution would “be

paid through DSHS.” The State’s plea offer and Horton’s statements at the review

hearing indicated it was contemplated Horton would effectuate that requirement by

following a payment plan acceptable to DSHS. As far as the record indicates, the

potential payment terms between Horton and DSHS could have called for total

payments of potentially either $4,500.00 ($75.00 per month for 60 months) or

$850.00 ($25.00 every three weeks for two years). At the time of the revision

hearing, Horton had paid $800.00 since the order deferring sentence, and by the

time of the court’s imposition of sentence Horton had paid $7,450.00. At oral

argument before this court, the State conceded our record is silent as to the

monthly amount Horton was required pay to DSHS.4            In contrast, the State

      4 Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, State v. Horton, No. 83769-9-I

(Jun. 15, 2023), at 16 min., 46 sec. to 17 min.,                        12    sec.,
https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2023061204/.

                                        7
No. 83769-9-I/8

appeared to argue at the hearing that Horton was not in compliance because she

had not paid the full amount, which the State contended was required on the face

of the order deferring sentence.      The State acknowledged that “in the Plea

Agreement the recommendation specifically states that Defense could move for a

dismissal after 24 months of timely payments even if the full payment has not been

made.” But the State argued that dismissal was not appropriate because the

“financial summary report shows that her payments were not timely.”

       The court’s oral ruling stated Horton had not sufficiently complied because

“there is an extraordinar[y] amount of restitution still outstanding.” We cannot tell

if the court believed Horton’s noncompliance was her failure to pay the entire

amount as the State argued, or if it was her failure to pay enough of the total

amount, which would reasonably involve consideration of any agreed payment

plan. We also cannot tell if the court revoked Horton’s sentence because of her

failure to comply with the agreed payment plan, which is not in the record. The

State did not offer and the superior court did not make any written findings further

explaining the order revoking Horton’s deferred sentence.

       Because the record does not indicate the evidence or the reasoning on

whose basis the superior court found Horton not in compliance, we reverse and

remand with direction to conduct a new revocation hearing.

                                          B

       We are not persuaded by the State’s argument, which is unsupported, that

Horton’s efforts “likely left the court with the impression that Horton had attempted

to ‘game the system’ by paying a small amount of the total restitution obligation . . .

                                          8
No. 83769-9-I/9

and then, only after realizing that the court was not going to let her skate by in this

fashion, coming up with over $5[,]000 in funds in a few short weeks.” The State’s

impugning of Horton’s motives is the likely impetus for Horton’s emphasizing in

reply the argument that the court’s revocation “reinforce[d] existing systems of bias

and contribute[d] to racial disproportionality.”5 As Horton’s authorities show, racial

bias and disproportionality have a long and persisting history of entrenchment in

legal proceedings, including in the context of probation.

       Nevertheless, while the State’s unsupported argument about Horton’s

motives misses the mark, Horton does not on this record establish that the superior

court proceedings were affected by racial bias or disproportionality.

                                          III

       The State concedes “the trial court was not permitted to impose an

additional 24 months of probation.” The statute governing the applicable statutory

probation authorization states in relevant part, “[T]he superior court may suspend

the imposition or the execution of the sentence and may direct that the suspension

may continue upon such conditions and for such time as it shall designate, not

exceeding the maximum term of sentence or two years, whichever is longer.”

RCW 9.95.210(1)(a). We accept the State’s concession and hold that in any order

entered on remand the superior court must not impose probation exceeding two

years in violation of RCW 9.95.210.

       5 Horton did not assign error on the basis of racial bias or disproportionality,

and we do not interpret Horton’s reply as attempting to raise a new claim of error
for the first time in reply. Although she did not assign error in her opening brief,
Horton did observe, “[p]rosecuting people of color for crimes of poverty further
entrenches systemic inequities.”

                                          9
No. 83769-9-I/10

                                          IV

       Effective January 1, 2023, an amendment to RCW 9.95.210 took effect

which states in relevant part, “At any time, including at sentencing, the court may

determine that the offender is not required to pay, or may relieve the offender of

the requirement to pay, full or partial restitution and accrued interest on restitution

where the entity to whom restitution is owed is . . . a state agency, . . . if the court

finds that the offender does not have the current or likely future ability to pay.”

RCW 9.95.210(4). We decline to apply the statute in the first instance. On remand,

the parties may present appropriate argument to the superior court concerning the

applicability of, and potential relief under, the January 1, 2023 amendments.

       We do not reach Horton’s remaining claims of error.              Reversed and

remanded.

WE CONCUR:

                                          10