Court Opinion

ID: 9725280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:38:42.133653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:13.389125
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the Majority's conclusion that this conviction must be reversed because the trial court failed sua sponte to investigate the claim of juror intimidation, and therefore respectfully dissent.
Everyone, including the Majority, Ca-ruthers, the State, and this writer, agree that the trial court should have investigated further the allegation of jury intimidation. I feel compelled to observe at the outset that Caruthers presents the issue in two forms-first as ineffective assistance of trial counsel (for failing to request that the trial court pursue the matter), and second as a claim of trial court error in failing to pursue the matter on its own initiative. The Majority addresses the issue only in the latter context, and correctly so. It appears that Caruthers' appellate counsel was also his trial counsel. Thus, in *512presenting the former claim, counsel is arguing his own ineffectiveness at trial. "Arguing one's own ineffectiveness is not permissible under the Rules of Professional Conduct." Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind.1999). For this reason, "under most cireumstances we will not entertain a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel presented on appeal by the same attorney who tried the case." Id. See also Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 612 n. 2 (Ind.2001) ("[to the extent it is an argument concerning counsel's own ineffectiveness, it cannot be raised"), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 839, 123 S.Ct. 162, 154 L.Ed.2d 61 (2002).
Moving now to the conclusion that the trial court committed fundamental error in failing to initiate an inquiry into jury intimidation, as I see it, the Majority opinion in effect creates a rule that the failure to employ Lindsey procedures in cases such as this is per se fundamental, and thus reversible, error. I draw this conelusion from the Majority's rejection of the State's harmless error argument. According to the harmless error doctrine, "[an error is harmless if its probable impact on the jury, in light of all of the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect a party's substantial rights" Brown v. State, 770 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ind.2002). The State claims the doctrine applies here to defeat Caruthers's claim of fundamental error, and I agree.
The considerable and compelling evidence of guilt need not be recounted again in detail. It included the establishment of motive, eyewitnesses placing Caruthers at the seene of the murder, shooting a weapon, and claiming, "Man, I think I got him." Transcript at 523. It also included a subsequent admission to a friend that he shot the victim by mistake, an attempt to sanitize and get rid of the murder weapon, and forensic ballistic evidence connecting Ca-ruthers to the shooting. Unless we reject the damning testimony of several witnesses on the basis of Caruthers's "incredible dubiosity" argument-an argument neither my colleagues nor I accept-the evidence of guilt was considerable, even overwhelming. The Majority acknowledges the strength of the evidence in determining that Caruthers may be retried consistent with double jeopardy principles.
Against this evidence stands the bailiff's report to the judge during trial that members of the jury had expressed concerns for their safety during trial as a result of unspecified actions of Caruthers, his family, and the victim's family. It is, I think, somewhat ironic that the Majority concludes that the trial court's curative measures settle the question onee and for all that this was fundamental error, Le.,
Trial courts have discretion to deal with this type of problem. But in this case, where the trial court instituted protective measures known to the jury as a result of juror reports of being threatened, the trial court abused its discretion by not inquiring as to the impact of those threats on the jury's impartiality.
Op. at 510. I share my colleagues' views on the erucial importance of impartial jurors, as ably expressed in the discussion of Issue I in the majority opinion, but I cannot agree that what occurred here created an "egregious cireumstance[ ]", Brown v. State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind.2003), that was "'so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible'" Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind.2002) (quoting Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 444-45 (Ind.1999)). In my view, although the court should have inquired further as to the effect on the jury, if any, of the alleged actions, the failure to do so did not rise to the level of fundamental error. Thus, I would dispose *513of this argument by noting that it has not been preserved. See Carter v. State, 754 N.E.2d 877 (Ind.2001) (an appellate court need only expound upon those contentions of fundamental error that it thinks warrant relief; otherwise, it is enough to note that the claim has not been preserved), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 831, 123 S.Ct. 135, 154 L.Ed.2d 47 (2002). I would affirm the conviction.