Court Opinion

ID: 9376032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 17:07:11.238093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.867100
License: Public Domain

J-S04043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                    :
                v.                                  :
                                                    :
                                                    :
    MARVEN BELOTTE                                  :
                                                    :
                       Appellant                    :   No. 885 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 4, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0008046-2021

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                                 FILED MARCH 1, 2023

        Marven Belotte (Belotte) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court)

following his bench conviction of simple assault and false imprisonment.1

Belotte challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

We affirm.

                                               I.

        This case arises from a June 2021 altercation involving Belotte and his

then-girlfriend, Kimberly Kravets (Kravets). Belotte and Kravets were in a

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

118 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a)(1) (attempts to cause or causes bodily injury, graded
as a second-degree misdemeanor (M2) and 2903(a)).
J-S04043-23

relationship from December 2020 through June 2021 and they resided

together in Kravets’ apartment located on the second floor of a rowhome in

Northeast Philadelphia.       Kravets’ friend, Amala Muhammad, Muhammad’s

boyfriend Brian,2 and their two-year-old daughter also lived in the apartment

and were present during the incident.

                                               A.

        Belotte waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial on

February 18, 2022, at which Kravets was the only witnesses. Kravets testified

that on June 5, 2021, at about 8:30 a.m., she tried to end her relationship

with Belotte, as she had at many points in the past. Kravets recounted that

Belotte “wasn’t happy to hear it,” ignored her requests that he leave, and “we

got into an altercation in which he snatched off a necklace from my neck that

he had given me.”         (N.T. Trial, 2/18/22, at 11).   Kravets went into the

bathroom, saw that her neck was bleeding and called 911. When she locked

the door, Belotte “continued to force the door open with a knife.” (Id. at 12).

Kravets went into the kitchen and told Belotte that she had called the police.

She recounted that Belotte “then followed me into the front room . . . and he

shoved me to the ground as I was trying to run . . . when he shoved me to

the ground, I busted my knee open, and my hands also got a little scratched

up.” (Id. at 14). While Kravets was on the ground, Belotte kicked her in the

____________________________________________

2   Brian’s last name is not apparent from the record.

                                           -2-
J-S04043-23

back and ripped the pocket of her shorts open while she protected her cell

phone. As Brian attempted to calm the situation, Kravets got up and called

911 a second time.

      Kravets testified: “I knew I had called the police and I was trying to get

myself outside [. . . but Belotte] wasn’t letting me, so I had to push him down

the steps, and he caught himself, and then I somehow made it running []

down the steps and when I got to the bottom, he was blocking the door and

telling me ‘You’re not going anywhere,’ that I was not allowed to leave[.]”

(Id. at 16).    Kravets received a phone call from a police officer, [and]

“eventually after a couple of minutes [Belotte] finally let me to go outside,”

where police had arrived at the scene. (Id.). Kravets testified that during

the altercation, she sustained a scratch to her neck and a bloody, busted knee

that left her with a scar.

      On cross-examination, Kravets indicated that she and Belotte argued

frequently and that the incident lasted for over an hour. Kravets conceded

that she tried to push Belotte down the steps and bit his arm, but explained

that she took these actions in self-defense. Kravets also acknowledged that

she had hurt her knee before this altercation, but that Belotte reinjured it and

the wound reopened.

      On redirect examination, Kravets clarified:      “When I tried to push

[Belotte] down the stairs, it was because I felt I was being held hostage in my

house and was not allowed to go outside where the police were, and I felt I

                                     -3-
J-S04043-23

was being held against my will, so I felt the need to defend myself and try to

get him out of my way” as he blocked her path down the steps. (Id. at 44).

Kravets explained that she bit Belotte on the arm while she was on the ground

protecting her cell phone “to try to get him off of me.” (Id. at 45).

       The trial court found Belotte guilty of the above-mentioned offenses. On

March 4, 2022, the court sentenced him to 6 to 12 months’ incarceration,

followed by two years of probation. Belotte timely appealed and he and the

trial court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).

                                               II.

                                               A.

       Belotte first contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction of simple assault.3 In doing so, Belotte characterizes the incident

____________________________________________

3

       In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a
       defendant’s conviction, we must review the evidence admitted
       during the trial along with any reasonable inferences that may be
       drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the
       Commonwealth as the verdict winner. If we find, based on that
       review, that the jury could have found every element of the crime
       beyond a reasonable doubt, we must sustain the defendant’s
       conviction. Further, a conviction may be sustained wholly on
       circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact—while passing on the
       credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence—is free
       to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. In conducting this
       review, the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and
       substitute its judgment for the fact-finder.

Commonwealth v. Hummel, 283 A.3d 839, 846 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations
omitted).

                                           -4-
J-S04043-23

between himself and Kravets as a “mutual domestic argument” that, at most,

established simple assault graded as an M3 instead of the M2 conviction.

Belotte also contends the evidence shows he lacked criminal intent to cause

or attempt to cause bodily injury to Kravets, that she “exaggerated and

oversold her injuries,” which were superficial only, and that he and Kravets

acted in a “reciprocally cruel” manner. (Id. at 17-19).

      A defendant is guilty of simple assault if he “attempts to cause or

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.”       18

Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). “Bodily injury” is defined as “impairment of physical

condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. “The Commonwealth need

not establish the victim actually suffered bodily injury; rather, it is sufficient

to support a conviction if the Commonwealth establishes an attempt to inflict

bodily injury.” Commonwealth v. Wroten, 257 A.3d 734, 744 (Pa. Super.

2021) (citation omitted). “This intent may be shown by circumstances, which

reasonably suggest that a defendant intended to cause injury.” Id. (citation

omitted).   “The existence of substantial pain may be inferred from the

circumstances surrounding the use of physical force even in the absence of a

significant injury.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Because Kravets was the only witness at trial, we note that it is well-

settled that a single witness’s testimony can establish every element of a

criminal offense. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481 (Pa.

Super. 2018), appeal denied, 205 A.3d 315 (Pa. 2019). Additionally, in light

                                      -5-
J-S04043-23

of Belotte’s claim disputing the grading of the simple assault charge, we

observe that the offense is generally graded as an M2 unless committed: “in

a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a

misdemeanor of the third degree.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(b)(1).

      In this case, the trial court found that the evidence was sufficient to

convict Belotte of simple assault against Kravets graded as an M2.          It

explained:

             The requisite intent to cause bodily injury could be
      reasonably inferred from the surrounding circumstances,
      specifically, Appellant’s actions of shoving the Complainant in the
      back as she was facing away from him with enough force for her
      to hit the ground and bust her knee, and then kicking her in the
      back while she was on the ground.

            Appellant [] further contends that the incident was a mutual
      domestic argument that, at most may have established the crime
      of simple assault—mutual consent (M3). This trial court finds that
      this argument is belied by the fact that the Complainant was
      actually moving away from the Appellant when he shoved her to
      the ground and kicked her in the back.

(Trial Court Opinion, 8/24/22, at 3) (citations omitted).

      We agree with the trial court’s analysis and emphasize that despite

Belotte’s attempt to minimize this incident by characterizing it as a mutual

dispute, the record does not support his claim. The evidence instead reflects

that Belotte protested Kravets’ ending of their relationship by physically

retaliating against her, prompting her to seek police assistance. Insofar as

Belotte challenges Kravets’ credibility by asserting that she exaggerated the

details of the event, the trial court, as fact-finder, after hearing Kravets’

                                     -6-
J-S04043-23

testimony and observing her demeanor, was free to credit her version of

events.    Viewing the evidence in the light most             favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient to support Belotte’s simple assault conviction.

                                       B.

      Belotte next contends the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction of false imprisonment. Belotte maintains that the Commonwealth

failed to establish that he knowingly restrained or substantially interfered with

Kravets’ ability to move freely during the altercation, and that the evidence

instead shows that they engaged “in a rancorous marathon-like argument.”

(Belotte’s Brief, at 20; see id. at 7, 19-21).

      A defendant commits the crime of false imprisonment if “he knowingly

restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with h[er] liberty.”

18 Pa.C.S. § 2903(a). In determining the degree of restraint necessary for

false imprisonment, this Court has recognized that the offense covers

restraints which are less serious than those necessary for kidnapping and

unlawful restraint. See In re M.G., 916 A.2d 1179, 1181 (Pa. Super. 2007).

In determining whether the restraint at issue “substantially” interfered with a

person’s liberty, we give the word its plain meaning and have interpreted it to

cover restraint where an individual’s liberty is interfered with in an ample or

considerable manner. See id. 1182; see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a) (governing

statutory interpretation).

                                      -7-
J-S04043-23

      In this case, the trial court rejected Belotte’s sufficiency challenge

concerning false imprisonment and explained:

            After being physically assaulted by Appellant, the
      Complainant was attempting to exit her apartment. The Appellant
      then proceeded to block the exit door to the apartment and tell
      the Complainant that she was “not going anywhere.”             The
      Appellant did not allow her to exit her apartment until a couple of
      minutes after she received a call from a police officer.

            The Appellant’s conduct in preventing the Complainant from
      exiting her apartment after physically assaulting her is sufficient
      evidence to establish that the Appellant unlawfully restrained the
      Complainant against her will in a manner to interfere substantially
      with her liberty in violation of [Section] 2903.

(Trial Ct. Op., at 4-5).

      Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the record shows Belotte

intentionally and substantially interfered with Kravets’ liberty and ability to

leave her own home by blocking her path on the stairs, warning her that she

was not “going anywhere” and relenting only after police intervention.

Belotte’s final claim merits no relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/01/2023

                                          -8-