Court Opinion

ID: 9772013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:04:58.299545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:41.317521
License: Public Domain

CORNYN, Justice,
dissenting.
The Court’s resolution of this case is misguided both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, the issue presented is not clear enough to resolve without the benefit of oral argument. Substantively, the Court confuses the issue of duty with the issue of responsibility as determined under our rules of comparative negligence. Accordingly, I dissent.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 170 provides that the Court “may determine that causes should be submitted without oral argument, upon the vote of at least six members.” Although the issuing of opinions without oral argument is essential to the Court’s ability to meet the demands of its docket, the procedure should be used sparingly, and should be reserved for questions controlled by clear Supreme Court authority or plain application of statutes or the Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure.
Today the Court resolves in summary fashion an issue on which the Court has never spoken. It distinguishes the one case that arguably controls the analysis, City of Fort Worth v. Lee, 143 Tex. 551, 186 S.W.2d 954 (1945), and bases its holding on sections of the Restatement of ToRTS, Texas cases relying on those sections “in other contexts,” and decisions of other states. 898 S.W.2d at 811. Although these are all legitimate sources of authority, and although the Court’s opinion demonstrates the legal craft of drawing on disparate sources to explain its reasoning, such a process is inappropriate in this case without the consideration and careful study attendant full submission.
As for the Court’s resolution of the substantive question presented, I believe the Court errs by holding that the City has no duty as a matter of law “to warn those who are not traveling with reasonable care upon the adjoining highway.” 898 S.W.2d at 811. The driver’s conduct is a question for the jury to consider under the comparative responsibility statute, Tex.Civ.PRAc. & Rem. *813Code § 33.001, and City of Fort Worth v. Lee, in my opinion, defines the duty to be obeyed. I agree with the court of appeals that “[w]hile this evidence [that the driver was intoxicated] may prove dispositive at trial, it fails to prove, as a matter of law, that the City owed no duty to De La Garza as a traveler on the abutting roadway.” 881 S.W.2d at 605.
For the reasons highlighted above I would deny the application for writ of error, and therefore dissent from the Court’s opinion.