Court Opinion

ID: 9564045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:53:38.258898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:12.009940
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
1. An examination of the transcript shows that the jury was charged that the plaintiff was contending that the defendant acted in bad faith and was stubbornly litigious, and was further charged that it could award attorney fees if the defendant acted in bad faith or was stubbornly litigious, or caused the moving party unnecessary trouble or expense. The jury was not charged that attorney fees could be awarded for fraud and deceit, as alleged in the amended complaint. In other words, the basis for the award of attorney fees was the mere refusal to pay, which the majority holds is not sufficient to sustain such an award.
Moreover, the portion of the judgment awarding attorney fees cannot stand, as this issue was decided adversely to the plaintiff on summary judgment and no appeal was taken from that decision. The grant of summary judgment is a decision on the merits. Usher v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 420, 422 (278 SE2d 70) (1981); Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 218 (235 SE2d 729) (1977). Appellee’s argument that the trial court had the- power to amend the order granting summary judgment is without any merit whatsoever. A trial court may change its judgment during the term in which it is rendered, but this authority does not exist beyond that time. If, however, proceedings are begun during a given term, they may be continued over and the judgment set aside or modified after the term has expired. Ammons v. Bolick, 233 Ga. 324, 325 (210 SE2d 796) (1974). “[T]he term of court in which the judgment rendered became effective is controlling; that is, when it was entered by filing the signed order with the clerk.” Bowen v. State, 239 Ga. 517, 519 (238 SE2d 62) (1977); Bowen v. State, 144 Ga. App. 329, 330 (241 SE2d 431) (1977). After the term at which the order was filed with the clerk has expired, the court cannot set aside the order or judgment.
The Baldwin Superior Court has four terms per year, which begin on the second Monday in January, April, July, and October. OCGA § 15-6-3 (26) (A). The order granting summary judgment during the July 1984 term of court could not be altered at the April 1985 term. Accordingly, I find that the trial court erred in allowing the issue of *525attorney fees to go to the jury and would reverse that portion of the judgment which awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff.
Decided June 3, 1986
Rehearing denied June 27, 1986
Robert H. Herndon, for appellant.
Patricia A. Hoin, W. Cary Herin, Jr., for appellee.
2. As to the majority’s second reason for affirming the award of attorney fees, I must also disagree because the majority has held that breach of contract and mere refusal to pay is insufficient to support such an award. I reiterate that the jury was not charged that fraud and deceit can serve as a basis for such an award.
I must respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.