Court Opinion

ID: 9398527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 16:11:00.958798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.282801
License: Public Domain

J-S16018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: E.F., A MINOR          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: E.F., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 243 EDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered December 21, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Juvenile Division at CP-51-DP-0001045-2020

    IN THE INTEREST OF: E.R.U.F., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: E.F., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 244 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered December 21, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Juvenile Division at CP-51-AP-0000047-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                  FILED MAY 31, 2023

        E.F. (Father) appeals from the decree terminating his parental rights to

E.R.U.F. (Child), and the order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption.1

We affirm.

____________________________________________

1   This Court consolidated the appeals on March 28, 2023.
J-S16018-23

       Child was born in October 2012 to Father and N.C., a/k/a, N.S.

(Mother).2 According to Father, Child lived with both parents until 2016, when

Mother and Father separated, and Father moved from the home.             N.T.,

12/21/22, at 66-67. After 2016, Father saw Child on weekends, but had a

“poor relationship” with Mother, and Father’s relationship with Child from 2016

to 2020 was “on and off.” Id. at 68, 83. Father stated that Mother “has

mental problems” and “would use [Child] as a pawn.” Id. In addition, Father

has been incarcerated “at different periods” throughout Child’s life. Father’s

Brief at 6. According to Father, he was incarcerated from August 2019 - May

2020; June 2021 - March 2022; and from July 2022 through the December

21, 2022 termination hearing. N.T., 12/21/22, at 64-65.

       Child came to the attention of the Philadelphia Department of Human

Services (DHS) on August 28, 2018, when DHS received a report that Mother

had physically abused Child’s one-year-old sibling. At that time, Child was “in

the care of the maternal grandmother (Grandmother).”3 Interest of E.F.,

284 A.3d 956 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum at 2).              The

younger sibling was adjudicated dependent and placed with Grandmother,

“with whom Child lived.” Id. at 2.

____________________________________________

2 The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights. She has appealed
the termination at 2851 EDA 2022 and the goal change at 242 EDA 2023.

3Grandmother had custody of Child “per a custody order obtained from the
Domestic Relations Court.” DHS Brief at 4.

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       In June 2020, Mother gave birth to another child. Mother had regained

custody of Child from Grandmother, and Mother, Child, and the newborn

moved to a shelter. Id. At that time, Father was “not involved in the care

of” Child. Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/22, at 12.4

       In September 2020, Child came into the care of DHS as a result of

“Mother’s incidents with her other children and her inability to care for” Child.

N.T., 12/21/22, at 29. On October 2, 2020, DHS filed an “urgent dependency

petition” regarding Child. Int. of E.F., supra at 3.

        On January 6, 2021, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent,

transferred legal custody to DHS, and placed Child in a confidential foster care

location. Id. Between January 2021 and January 2022, Child was placed in

11 different foster homes. Id. at 4.

       On January 19, 2022, DHS petitioned to terminate Father’s parental

rights and change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. The trial court held

a hearing on December 21, 2022. Child was represented by guardian ad litem,

Andre Martino, Esquire, and legal counsel, Emily Cherniak, Esquire.5        DHS

____________________________________________

4 The trial court wrote the opinion in response to Mother’s appeal. In
correspondence dated February 16, 2023, the First Judicial District Director of
Court Listings advised this Court that the trial court judge had retired and
“there is no Opinion forthcoming.” See Father’s Brief at 40 (Appendix).

5 A child’s legal and best interests are distinct. Representing a child’s legal
interests “denotes that an attorney is to express the child’s wishes to the court
regardless of whether the attorney agrees with the child’s recommendation,”
while a guardian ad litem discerns the child’s best interests; in each case,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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presented testimony from case manager, Tamika Palmer. Father testified in

opposition to DHS’s request to terminate his parental rights and change Child’s

permanency goal to adoption.

       Ms. Palmer testified to becoming involved with the family on February

9, 2022, while Father was incarcerated. N.T., 12/21/22, at 10. When Father

was released from prison in April 2022, Ms. Palmer called him to “review his

single case plan, inform him of an upcoming meeting, and also discuss visits.”

Id. at 11. The case plan required Father to make “his whereabouts known,

complete … parenting [classes], engage in supervised visits with [Child], and

obtain safe and suitable housing.” Id. at 12. In addition, Father was referred

for a dual diagnosis assessment and screening for mental health and

substance abuse. Id.

       According to Ms. Palmer, DHS arranged for Father’s visitation with Child,

but Father “did not make himself available, [and] he never showed” for the

one visit he confirmed. Id. at 14-15. Ms. Palmer attempted to reach Father

by phone; she called weekly and left messages when Father did not answer.

Id. at 17-18. Ms. Palmer learned that Father was incarcerated in September

or October of 2022. Id. at 19. When counsel for DHS asked which case plan

goals Father achieved, Ms. Palmer replied, “None.” Id. at 21. She stated that

Father “made no progress.” Id.
____________________________________________

these interests are ultimately determined by the orphans’ court. In re P.G.F,
247 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted).

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       Ms. Palmer testified that Father has not met any of Child’s needs. Id.

at 23. She stated that Father is “not able to meet [Child’s] needs mentally

and emotionally.” Id. at 27. Ms. Palmer opined that Child could not be safely

returned to Father “today … or in the near future.” Id. at 25.

       Ms. Palmer further testified that Child was doing well in placement. Id.

at 9. Child has been in her current placement since December 17, 2021.6 Id.

at 31. Ms. Palmer stated that Child does not mention Father. Id. at 22. When

Ms. Palmer has asked Child about Father, Child “says she knows her father

and is aware of him[, b]ut she doesn’t say anything outside of that,” and has

not requested visits or communication with Father. Id. Ms. Palmer testified

that Child “looks to her current foster parent for all of her basic needs and

wants.” Id. at 23. Ms. Palmer opined that termination would not “have a

harmful impact” on Child. Id. at 23. Ms. Palmer also opined that adoption is

in Child’s best interest. Id. at 25.

       Father was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing.7 Father

testified that he lived with Mother and Child for the first four years of Child’s

life, from 2012 – 2016, and was involved in parenting and financially

supporting Child. Id. at 66-67. In 2016, Father and Mother separated, and
____________________________________________

6 Father’s counsel noted that Child’s placement was confidential due to “issues
regarding M[other], her behavior, her threat, her risk of a threat. Nothing to
[do with] Father.” N.T., 12/21/22, at 31.

7 Referencing Father’s criminal docket, the trial court observed that Father
was arrested July 30, 2022 for charges related to delivery and possession of
controlled substances. N.T., 12/21/22, at 51; Exhibit D-34.

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Father began living with his sister.     Id. at 73, 83.   Father described his

relationship with Child from 2016 — 2020 as “on and off,” but stated that he

saw Child on weekends, and continued to “provide whatever [Mother] told me

[Child] needed.” Id. at 68, 83. Father also stated that Mother “has mental

problems” and “would use [Child] as a pawn.” Id. at 83. He stated he did

not file for custody of Child “because her grandmother had her at first.” Id.

at 84.

         Father testified that he was incarcerated August 2019 - May 2020; June

2021 - March 2022; and from July 2022 through the December 21, 2022

termination hearing. Id. at 64-65. Father stated that he was scheduled to

go to trial on December 28, 2022. Id. at 75. He was also “being held on a

separate detainer for probation violations because of [his most recent] arrest.”

Id. at 76.

         Father testified that he had no contact with DHS or their service

providers until after he was released from prison in March 2022. Id. at 71.

When Father was first incarcerated, he did not know about DHS’s involvement

with Child; later, Father did not have contact information for DHS and did not

know that he could try to arrange visits with Child at the prison. Id. at 79-

80. Father stated he “wasn’t aware of” his case plan objectives and he did

not believe he needed parenting classes.         Id. at 72.    When he’s not

incarcerated, Father lives with his sister in a three bedroom apartment. Id.

at 73-76, 85. He also has employment at his brother’s auto body shop and

earns sufficient income to support Child. Id. at 77.

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     Father believes Child loves him and has a bond with him. Id. at 78, 81.

Father disagreed with Ms. Palmer’s testimony that Child would not be harmed

by termination of Father’s rights. Id. at 80-81. Father stated that he loves

Child and believes he can meet her needs. Id. at 83. Father last spoke with

Child during a brief telephone conversation facilitated by Ms. Palmer in 2022.

Id. at 16-17, 87-88. Father testified that he last saw Child in 2020, “on her

8th birthday.” Id. at 87.

     Attorney Cherniak, who represented Child’s legal interests, stated that

she “spoke with [Child]. She did not mention her father when I spoke with

her.” Id. at 58.

     Following the hearing, the trial court entered a decree terminating

Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8)

and (b). Decree, 12/21/22. The trial court also entered an order changing

Child’s permanency goal to adoption.       Order, 12/21/22.    Father timely

appealed.

     Father presents the following issues for review:

     1. Whether the trial court committed error by involuntarily
        terminating   [Father’s]   parental   rights   where     such
        determination was not supported by clear and convincing
        evidence establishing grounds for termination under the
        Adoption Act, 23 Pa. C.S.A. §§2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and
        (a)(8), and without giving primary consideration to the
        developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of
        the child as required by the Adoption Act, 23 Pa. C.S.A.
        §2511(b)?

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       2. Whether the trial court committed error by changing
          [C]hild[]’s permanency goal from reunification with the
          parent(s) to adoption?

Father’s Brief at 5.

       Father argues the trial court erred in finding clear and convincing

evidence to support termination of his parental rights.8 DHS has the burden

to prove by clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for

termination are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

“[T]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that

is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come

to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in

issue.” Id.

       As an appellate court, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. In re

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012).

       [O]ur standard of review requires [us to] accept the findings of
       fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
       supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported,
       appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
       error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an
       abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
       court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a
       decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
       demonstration     of     manifest   unreasonableness,    partiality,
       prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

       As [the Supreme Court] discussed in In re: R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179,
       1190 (Pa. 2010)], there are clear reasons for applying an abuse
       of discretion standard of review in these cases. [U]nlike trial
____________________________________________

8DHS and the Guardian Ad Litem argue that termination and the goal change
were proper. See DHS’s Brief at 13-27; Guardian Ad Litem’s Brief at 16-24.

                                           -8-
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      courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific
      determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are
      observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often
      presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and
      parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts
      could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
      dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist
      the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own
      credibility determinations and judgment; instead, we must defer
      to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by
      the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of
      an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations

omitted).

              § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

      Under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, “the court must engage in a bifurcated

process prior to terminating parental rights.” In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511

(Pa. Super. 2007). Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent pursuant

to § 2511(a). Id.

                               Section 2511(a)

      This Court need only agree “as to any one subsection in order to affirm

the termination of parental rights.” In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 478 (Pa. Super.

2010). Here, we address the subsection which provides for termination when

a parent’s

      repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of
      the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental
      care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
      well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
      neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

      Section 2511(a)(2) “emphasizes the child’s present and future need for

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or

mental well-being.” In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

and quotation marks omitted).       Grounds for termination under subsection

(a)(2) are not limited to affirmative misconduct. Id. “Where the parent does

not exercise reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles, h[is

parental] rights may be forfeited.” Id. at 83. Grounds for termination may

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re

S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021). A parent is required to make

diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental

responsibilities. In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super.

2017).

      In challenging termination under Section 2511(a)(2), Father asserts:

      By his association with [M]other, DHS … assumed similar issues
      existed as to [Father], like negligen[ce], parenting inability,
      disinterest, substance abuse, transience and mental health
      disorders. In fact, [F]ather had been involved in [Child]’s life since
      her birth and had been her primary custodian and caregiver prior
      to his incarceration. The information that DHS … had regarding
      [F]ather and his address, contact information and whereabouts
      were provided to them by [M]other, who was belligerent and
      oppositional. [Father] was only once afforded the opportunity to
      be brought from prison and attend [C]hild’s court proceedings,
      which was the date of the termination/goal change hearing.
      Father appeared and testified that he loved his daughter, cared
      for her, had a bond with her, and wanted to be reunified with her
      upon his release.

Father’s Brief at 23.

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      Father contends “DHS did not show with clear and convincing evidence

… that [Father] has [evidenced a] repeated and continued incapacity to

properly parent his daughter.” Id. at 31. We are unpersuaded by Father’s

argument.

      At the time of the termination hearing, Child had been in DHS’s care for

approximately two years. According to Father, he was incarcerated for 16

months of the two years (June 2021 to March 2022, and July 2022 through

the December 21, 2022 termination hearing).        N.T., 12/21/22, at 64-65.

Father stated that he first learned about Child being in DHS’s care in May

2021, “as soon as I came home [from jail] … the first week I was out.” Id. at

69. Father testified that DHS did not communicate with him when he was

incarcerated or when he was living with his sister. Id. at 69-71. Father stated

that after he learned about DHS’s involvement, he “wound up getting locked

back up, so I didn’t [do anything]. I couldn’t do anything until I was recently

out.” Id. at 70.

      We reiterate that grounds for termination due to parental incapacity are

not limited to affirmative misconduct. In re T.L.C., 199 A.3d 1270, 1278 (Pa.

Super. 2018). This Court recently recognized “a parent’s fundamental duty

to protect one’s child, a duty that necessarily includes knowing the

whereabouts and living arrangements of his or her minor child.” Int. of R.C.-

G., --- A.3d ---2023 PA Super 55 (Mar. 31, 2023) (Opinion at 6 n.24).

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     With respect to incarcerated parents, our Supreme Court has
     held that “incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination,
     can be determinative of the question of whether a parent is
     incapable of providing essential parental care, control, or
     subsistence.” In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 47 A.3d
     817, 830 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
     Incarceration alone is not sufficient to support termination under
     any subsection, but “incarceration will certainly impact a parent’s
     capability of performing parental duties, and may render a
     parent incapable of performing parental duties under subsection
     (a)(2).” In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82–83 (Pa. Super. 2008)
     (emphasis in original).

     “Each case of an incarcerated parent facing termination must be
     analyzed on its own facts, keeping in mind ... that the child’s
     need for consistent parental care and stability cannot be put
     aside or put on hold[.]” Id. at 84. “Parental rights are not
     preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to
     perform one’s parental responsibilities while others provide the
     child with his or her physical and emotional needs.” B.N.M., 856
     A.2d at 855 (citation omitted). Rather, “[a] parent must utilize
     all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
     must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed
     in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.” Id.
     (citations omitted).

Interest of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 474 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc).

     Here, the trial court found Father’s continued incapacity to parent has

caused Child to be without parental care, and Father’s incapacity could not be

remedied. The court stated:

     … Father did nothing to rekindle th[e] relationship [with Child].
     He did nothing to find out where [C]hild was, although he had
     more than reasonable belief … that the child was in DHS’s care.
     But during that time, he did nothing to determine where [C]hild
     was. [Father made n]o effort to keep the parent/child relationship
     alive, and essentially walked away from [C]hild.

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      And despite the many opportunities he had to connect with DHS,
      the agency, [and] specific case workers[,] he did nothing. And he
      was in prison on a number of those occasions. He was in and out
      of prison. But when he came out of prison, he did nothing to find
      [C]hild, although he had reasonable beliefs that the child was in
      DHS’s care.

      And he stands before the [c]ourt now still in prison. He has a trial
      date next week on the 28th. … [Father h]as no reasonable
      prospect of being able to care for this child in the future. The child
      has maybe a part[ial] understanding of who her father is, but has
      no parental relationship, and hasn’t had one for at least two years
      and possibly going back to … 2016, when [Father] separated from
      Mother. So for [] six years[, Father] … has been a fleeting
      presence in [Child’s] life.

      And he’s done nothing to remedy it. Specifically, the goals that
      were set for him were never complied with. But more importantly,
      as we sit here today, he is neither ready, willing, or able to care
      for this child. And his speculation about what he’s going to do
      when he gets out of jail is just that.

      It’s speculation. …

      [Father] doesn’t even know when he’s going to get out of jail, let
      alone when he’s going to be in a position to care for this child.
      And the child is in a placement where she is receiving care. …

      She’s a needy child because of her special circumstances. And
      [Father] presents no ability to care for a child with these needs.
      So looking at the record as a whole … Father has failed to remedy
      the issues that brought the child into care. …

      … [Father has been] absen[t] in this child’s life.     And we want
      better for our children.

N.T., 12/21/22, at 90-92.

      The above findings are supported by the record and legally sound. In

re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27 (stating appellate courts must defer

to trial judges when factual findings are supported by the record and the trial

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court’s legal conclusions are not the result of error); In re R.J.S., 901 A.2d

502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“a child's life cannot be held in abeyance while a

parent attempts to … assume parenting responsibilities.”).       Thus, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Father’s continued

incapacity to parent has caused Child to be without essential parental care,

and the conditions and causes of the incapacity will not be remedied.

                               Section 2511(b)

      Father also argues the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights

under Section 2511(b), which requires the court “give primary consideration

to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the

child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Father claims DHS did not present clear and

convincing evidence as to “whether termination … would best serve the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare” of Child. Father’s

Brief at 34.

      “Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second

part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs

and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.” In

re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). When the trial court considers

a child’s needs and welfare, the “extent of any [parental] bond analysis ...

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”         In re

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. 2008). This Court has instructed:

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      [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
      emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also
      consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and
      stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally,
      … the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
      relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be
      severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re A.S., 11 A.3d at 483 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

      Father conceded he was absent from Child’s life in recent years,

including periods when he was not incarcerated. Child was 10 years old at

the time of the termination hearing, and Father stated he last saw Child “on

her 8th birthday.” N.T., 12/21/22, at 87. Ms. Palmer testified that Child was

doing well in placement. Id. at 9, 31. Ms. Palmer stated that Child “looks to

her current foster parent for all of her basic needs and wants.” Id. at 23. Ms.

Palmer also stated that Child “knows [F]ather and is aware of him[, b]ut she

doesn’t say anything outside of that,” and has not requested contact with

Father. Id. at 22. Ms. Palmer testified that termination would not “have a

harmful impact” on Child. Id. at 23. Ms. Palmer opined that adoption is in

Child’s best interest. Id. at 25.

      Based on this evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

considering Child’s best interests and terminating Father’s parental rights

under Section 2511(b).

                                    Goal Change

      Father next argues, without citing any legal authority, that the trial court

erred in changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.

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Father’s Brief at 35-36. Father asserts the order changing Child’s permanency

goal to adoption “was not supported by clear and convincing evidence … and

is not in [C]hild’s best interests.” Id. at 36. This issue is moot because we

have concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating

Father’s parental rights. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446

(Pa. Super. 2021) (“[T]he effect of our decision to affirm the orphans’ court’s

termination decree necessarily renders moot the dependency court’s decision

to change Child’s goal to adoption.”) (citing Interest of D.R.–W., 227 A.3d

905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon

the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force of effect.”)

(citation omitted)).

        For the above reasons, we affirm the decree terminating Father’s

parental rights and the order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption.

        Decree and order affirmed.

        Judge McCaffery joins the memorandum.

        Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/31/2023

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