Court Opinion

ID: 9479953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:33:47.228216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:23.576750
License: Public Domain

WINTER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff appeals from Judge Elfvin’s decision dismissing his complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.
Plaintiffs claim arises out of the discontinuance of his public assistance benefits. In November 1984, the New York State Department of Social Services (“NYSDSS”) required Sawma, as a condition of receiving such benefits, to complete and submit a medical form regarding employability in a “Work Experience Program.” Completion of the form requires a medical examination. Sawma refused to undergo such an examination on the ground that the examination concerned only his ability to perform menial physical labor for which he believes himself to be overqualified. In January 1985, the NYSDSS advised Sawma that his benefits would be discontinued effective January 31 for his willful failure to comply with the eligibility requirement of a medical exam. See N.Y.Soe.Servs.Law § 131(5)(g) (McKinney Supp.1990) (no assistance shall be given to an employable person who “refuses or willfully fails to report for scheduled counseling, testing, training or other appropriate job services”); see also 18 NYCRR § 385.14 (1987). Sawma requested a hearing, and his benefits were continued until the hearing in March 1985.
In findings issued after the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“AU”) determined that Sawma’s work history and his conduct at the hearing provided reasonable grounds to believe that Sawma is mentally disabled and presumptively unemployable. Because benefits may not be discontinued for a non-willful failure to comply with employment requirements, Sawma’s benefits were ordered continued. The AU also ordered that Sawma be referred for a diagnostic psychiatric examination. See 18 NYCRR § 385.3 (1987). After another hearing, a second AU approved the discontinuance of benefits because of Sawma’s willful failure to submit to an examination.
Sawma subsequently filed two actions in New York state court seeking an order to continue payment of benefits and a declaratory finding that the AU’s characterization of him as mentally disabled constituted “libel per se.” Both state suits were dismissed. See Sawma v. Perales, 129 A.D.2d 976, 514 N.Y.S.2d 290, leave to ap*93peal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 610, 516 N.E.2d 1223, 522 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1987); Sawma v. State, 136 A.D.2d 965, 525 N.Y.S.2d 163, leave to appeal denied, 72 N.Y.2d 907, 532 N.Y.S.2d 753, 528 N.E.2d 1226 (1988).
Sawma then brought the present civil rights action pro se. Construed liberally, the complaint alleges that discontinuance of his public assistance benefits was a violation of his equal protection and due process rights because a psychiatric evaluation bears no rational relation to legitimate, employment-related welfare eligibility concerns. He does not claim that NYSDSS has failed to inform him of what he must do to have his benefits reinstated or to offer him assistance in getting the required psychiatric examination. Rather, he objects to the requirement itself. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Sawma appeals, and we affirm.
Even the most liberal construction of Sawma’s papers indicates that there is no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). As to Sawma's equal protection claim, the requirement of a diagnostic examination in no way involves a suspect category or impinges on a fundamental right. Moreover, a requirement of a medical examination as a condition of receiving benefits is self-evidently constitutional in view of the state’s legitimate interest in allocating public assistance resources. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1080, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981) (stating rational relation test for equal protection claims).
We also find no viable substantive due process claim here because the examination requirement does not impinge on a constitutionally protected fundamental interest and is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 601 (2d Cir.) (noting rational relation standard for substantive due process claims involving property interests), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 72, 102 L.Ed.2d 48 (1988).
Sawma’s procedural due process claim also is untenable. His papers concede that he twice received notice and the opportunity to be heard before termination of his benefits. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).
Because Sawma understands that NYSDSS is denying him benefits solely because he has refused to undergo a psychiatric examination, his case is distinguishable from Parker v. Califano, 644 F.2d 1199 (6th Cir.1981). In Parker, the claimant alleged that she did not receive meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard because she did not have the capacity to understand and comply with a notice of further administrative proceeding. Cf. Hines v. Bowen, 671 F.Supp. 10 (D.N.J. 1987) (colorable constitutional challenge is presented where claimant alleges that mental impairment rendered him unable to act upon notice of administrative remedies).
The sole question then is whether NYSDSS was constitutionally obligated to take further steps with regard to Sawma’s application. We believe it was not. As stated, NYSDSS was authorized to deny disability benefits absent a psychiatric evaluation. Because Sawma was, and is, aware that further processing of his application for benefits is contingent upon the psychiatric evaluation, any further assistance by NYSDSS would require it to resort to legal compulsion against Sawma seeking to force him to undergo a psychiatric examination. We know of no authority for the proposition that a state is constitutionally obligated to compel a person seeking public benefits to undergo a psychiatric examination where the person declines to do so. Indeed, it is not entirely clear that a state may force someone to undergo an unwanted psychiatric examination even where the failure to do so will result in a loss of public benefits. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18, 324, 91 S.Ct. 381, 385-86, 389, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (benefits may be contingent on applicant’s consent to home visit, but visit will not be forced or compelled).
Affirmed.