Court Opinion

ID: 9369015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 17:08:45.846341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:12.170996
License: Public Domain

J-A03015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JOEY DIXON                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1042 EDA 2020

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 20, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0003861-2011

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 7, 2023

        Appellant Joey Dixon appeals from the order of the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County denying his petition pursuant to the Post-

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We dismiss the appeal.

        On June 5, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of robbery, aggravated

assault, possession of an instrument of crime, and possession of a firearm

without a license. In a bifurcated portion of the trial, the trial court convicted

Appellant of persons prohibited from possessing firearms. On August 6, 2014,

the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of twenty to forty

years’ imprisonment to be followed by five years’ probation.

        On August 8, 2014, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion which the

trial court subsequently denied. On June 7, 2016, this Court affirmed the
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-A03015-23

judgment of sentence and on October 19, 2016, the Supreme Court denied

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.

        Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition on October 18, 2017 and an

amended PCRA petition on August 28, 2018. On December 6, 2019, the PCRA

court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim. 907. On February 20, 2020, the PCRA court dismissed

the petition. On March 19, 2020, Appellant filed this appeal.

        This Court initially directed Appellant to file a docketing statement

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 3517 by May 19, 2020.2 Counsel failed to respond, and

on June 3, 2020, this Court directed counsel to file the docketing statement

by June 15, 2020. Once again counsel failed to respond, and thereafter, on

June 29, 2020, this Court dismissed the appeal. The appeal was remitted to

the PCRA court on August 5, 2020.

        Nearly six months after the appeal was dismissed, on December 15,

2020, Appellant’s counsel filed an application to file the docketing statement

nunc pro tunc, averring that he experienced multiple COVID-related

____________________________________________

2   Rule 3517 provides that:

        Whenever a notice of appeal to the Superior Court is filed, the
        Prothonotary shall send a docketing statement form which shall
        be completed and returned within ten (10) days in order that the
        Court shall be able to more efficiently and expeditiously administer
        the scheduling of argument and submission of cases on appeal.
        Failure to file a docketing statement may result in dismissal of the
        appeal.

Pa.R.A.P. 3517.

                                           -2-
J-A03015-23

complications during the time period in which the statement was due. The

record does not contain any indication that counsel made any effort

whatsoever during that six-month period to alert the Court to his alleged

“COVID-related” problems.

      On January 5, 2021, this Court vacated the June 29, 2020 order and

reinstated the appeal. However, this per curiam order was entered without

prejudice for the merits panel to determine whether this appeal should be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

      As such, before we reach the merits of this appeal, we must consider

whether this Court had jurisdiction to vacate our June 15, 2020 order.

      § 5505. Modification of orders

      Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon
      notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30
      days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any
      term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or
      allowed.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. Thus, as a general rule, a court loses jurisdiction to alter,

modify, or rescind a final order after the thirty-day statutory limitation set

forth in Section 5505 expires. Id.

      Nevertheless, certain exceptions to this general rule exist as the “time

constraint imposed by section 5505 does not affect the inherent powers of the

court to modify a sentence in order to amend records, to correct mistakes of

court officers or counsel's inadvertencies, or to supply defects or omissions in

the record.” Commonwealth v. Walters, 814 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa.Super.

2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235, 1238

                                      -3-
J-A03015-23

(Pa.Super.    1994))   (internal   quotation   marks    omitted).   See    also

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 593 Pa. 601, 615, 933 A.2d 57, 65 (2007)

(recognizing the “inherent power of a court to correct obvious and patent

mistakes in its orders, judgments and decrees”).

      Moreover, a court has the authority to open or vacate a prior order after

the 30-day period has expired “where a showing of fraud or another

circumstance so grave or compelling as to constitute extraordinary causes

justifying intervention by the court.” Walters, 814 A.2d at 256 (quoting

Cardwell v. Chrysler Fin. Corp.,804 A.2d 18, 22 (Pa.Super. 2002) (internal

quotation marks omitted). This Court has recognized that an “extraordinary

cause” is limited in nature such that “mistakes or ordinary neglect by counsel

do not constitute extraordinary circumstances.” Manufacturers & Traders

Tr. Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology, SC, 108 A.3d 913, 919 (Pa.Super.

2015).

      In order to grant Appellant’s December 15, 2020 request for permission

to file a docketing statement nunc pro tunc, it would be necessary to vacate

our June 29, 2020 dismissal order nearly six months after it was entered.

However, Appellant’s latest request is again untimely and clearly beyond the

thirty-day time limitation set forth in Section 5505.

      Appellant does not claim that the June 29, 2020 order dismissing the

appeal contained any error but suggests that extraordinary circumstances

existed that authorized this Court to vacate the order and reinstate the appeal.

Specifically, Appellant’s counsel claims that he missed this Court’s mailing

                                     -4-
J-A03015-23

directing him to file a docketing statement, as he did not go into his office to

retrieve his mail in June 2020, which counsel characterizes as the “initial surge

of the COVID-19 pandemic.” Motion to File a Nunc Pro Tunc Docketing

Statement, at 1. Counsel contends that his age and health conditions placed

him in a “high risk” category during the pandemic and asserts that he had

certain medical procedures performed that concluded with “potentially serious

unexpected results.” Id. at 2.

       On March 18, 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order declaring a

statewide judicial emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in which

it suspended “all time calculations for purposes of time computation relevant

to court cases or other judicial business, as well as time deadlines[.]” See In

re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1283, 1285 (Pa.

2020). The statewide judicial emergency was extended to and ended on June

1, 2020. See In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 229 A.3d 229

(Pa. 2020); In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 230 A.3d 1015

(Pa. 2020); In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 234 A.3d 408

(Pa. 2020).3

       In its May 27, 2020 order, the Supreme Court provided specific guidance

to legal professionals:

____________________________________________

3However, the Supreme Court allowed local judicial districts to extend their
emergency orders beyond June 1, 2020. In re General Statewide Judicial
Emergency, 234 A.3d 408 (Pa. 2020).

                                           -5-
J-A03015-23

      In previous orders, this Court authorized and encouraged both
      courts and legal professionals to use advanced communication
      technology whenever possible to protect public health and safety.
      In addition, our April 28, 2020 order specifically referenced
      guidance by the executive branch providing that while law offices
      (like most other businesses) remained generally closed, lawyers
      and staff could access their physical offices under certain
      circumstances.

                                      ***
      As regions of the state reopen, and as courts resume the full range
      of court business, the need for legal professionals to gain greater
      physical access to their offices naturally increases as well.
      Pennsylvania attorneys have an obligation under our Rules of
      Professional Conduct to promptly, competently, and diligently
      represent their clients. To that end, attorneys and staff must be
      able to, and therefore may, access their physical offices at least
      to the extent the attorneys reasonably believe doing so is
      necessary to satisfy their professional obligations, provided they
      take appropriate measures to protect the safety of their
      employees and the public.

In re Gen. Statewide Jud. Emergency, 234 A.3d at 409.

      As noted above, on June 3, 2020, this Court directed Appellant to file a

docketing statement on June 15, 2020, after the statewide judicial emergency

had ended on June 1, 2020. While counsel asserts that he could not access

his office in June 2020, the Supreme Court’s May 27, 2020 order authorized

attorneys to obtain access their physical offices to satisfy their professional

obligations. While the COVID-19 pandemic may have made the practice of law

more difficult during this time period, it did not excuse counsel from fulfilling

his duty to promptly, competently, and diligently represent his clients. We

reject counsel’s suggestion that he was not required to arrange to obtain mail

sent to his physical office after the judicial emergency ended.

                                      -6-
J-A03015-23

      As a result, we find Appellant’s failure to file a docketing statement was

the result of counsel’s ordinary neglect. Thus, this Court correctly dismissed

this appeal on June 29, 2020 due to Appellant’s failure to file a docketing

statement   pursuant   to   Rule   3517.   Appellant   has   not   presented   a

“circumstance so grave or compelling as to constitute [an] extraordinary

cause[] justifying intervention by the court” to allow this Court to rescind its

June 29, 2020 order dismissing the appeal. Walters, supra; Manufacturers

& Traders Tr. Co., supra.

      This Court’s January 5, 2021 per curiam order reinstated the appeal and

directed our merits panel to determine whether this Court had authority to

rescind the June 29, 2020 dismissal order to allow Appellant to file a docketing

statement nunc pro tunc. We conclude that this Court did not have jurisdiction

to rescind the dismissal order beyond the time limitation set forth in 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5505.

      Appeal dismissed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/7/2023

                                     -7-