Court Opinion

ID: 9375221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-25 21:00:32.821424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:56.955860
License: Public Domain

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                                          PUBLISHED

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                           No. 20-4537

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                  v.

        CHRISTOPHER LEWIS TUCKER,

                                       Defendant-Appellant.

                                           No. 21-4166

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                  v.

        CHRISTOPHER LEWIS TUCKER,

                                       Defendant-Appellant.

                                           No. 22-4025

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
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                                     v.

        CHRISTOPHER LEWIS TUCKER,

                                           Defendant-Appellant.

                                               No. 22-4026

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                           Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                     v.

        CHRISTOPHER LEWIS TUCKER,

                                           Defendant-Appellant.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:17-cr-00221-TDS-1)

        Argued: January 27, 2023                                      Decided: February 24, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Heytens wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
        Gregory and Judge Wilkinson joined.

        ARGUED: Eric J. Brignac, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol Niemeier, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois,
        Federal Public Defender, Jaclyn L. Tarlton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE
        OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
        Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Eric L. Iverson, Assistant United States

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        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
        Carolina, for Appellee.

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        TOBY HEYTENS, Circuit Judge:

               This case involves a criminal defendant who has been declared mentally

        incompetent to stand trial and languished in pretrial custody for more than five years. The

        district court found that involuntary medication is substantially likely to render the

        defendant competent and ordered a final extension of confinement to permit that

        medication to work. We affirm.

                                                     I.

               The Fifth Amendment declares no person “shall be . . . deprived of . . . liberty . . .

        without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The issues in this case concern several

        overlapping strands of that guarantee.

               A criminal prosecution may not proceed unless the defendant is competent. See Pate

        v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). For constitutional purposes, the test “is whether the

        defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree

        of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the

        proceedings against him.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (quotation marks

        omitted). A person who is not competent may not be tried for—or plead guilty to—a crime.

        See id. at 391.

               The Due Process Clause also limits the government’s efforts to restore a person’s

        competency. On the one hand, “the Constitution permits the [g]overnment involuntarily to

        administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges

        in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial.” Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.

        166, 179 (2003). But because doing so implicates “a significant constitutionally protected

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        liberty interest,” the Due Process Clause imposes restrictions as well. Id. at 178 (quotation

        marks omitted). Under Sell’s four-factor test, involuntary medication may be ordered

        “only” if: (1) “important governmental interests are at stake”; (2) “involuntary medication

        will significantly further those . . . interests”; (3) “involuntary medication is necessary to

        further those interests”; and (4) “administration of the drugs is medically appropriate.” Id.

        at 179–81 (emphasis removed). “The government must establish each element of this test

        by clear and convincing evidence.” United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d 369, 374 (4th Cir.

        2013).

                 Similarly, the Due Process Clause allows civil commitment to restore a defendant’s

        competency but “requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some

        reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Jackson v.

        Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). For that reason, a person charged “with a criminal

        offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be

        held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a

        substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.” Id.

        “Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand

        trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal.” Id.

                 Congress has enacted procedures for implementing Jackson’s requirements. At any

        time before sentencing, a court may hold a hearing “to determine the mental competency

        of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). If the court finds by a preponderance of the

        evidence that the defendant “is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the

        proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense, the court shall commit the

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        defendant to the custody of the Attorney General,” who “shall hospitalize the defendant for

        treatment in a suitable facility.” § 4241(d).

               Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson, however, such periods of

        hospitalization must be limited. The defendant may initially be hospitalized “for such a

        reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether

        there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to

        permit the proceedings to go forward.” § 4241(d)(1). The defendant may then be

        hospitalized “for an additional reasonable period of time until” the “earlier” of two events.

        § 4241(d)(2). The first is if the defendant’s “mental condition is so improved that trial may

        proceed,” so long as “the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within such

        additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go

        forward.” § 4241(d)(2)(A). The second is if all “pending charges . . . are disposed of

        according to law.” § 4241(d)(2)(B).

                                                        II.

               Christopher Lewis Tucker was arrested almost six years ago and has been in federal

        custody ever since. Under the controlling indictment, Tucker is charged with two counts

        of attempting to persuade people he believed to be minors to produce child pornography;

        one count of transporting or shipping child pornography; one count of receiving child

        pornography; and one count of possessing a firearm while being addicted to a controlled

        substance. The first two counts carry sentences of “not less than 15 years nor more than 30

        years.” 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). The other two child pornography offenses authorize sentences

        of “not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years,” § 2252A(b)(1), with the firearms

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        offense having a potential sentence of “not more than 15 years,” § 924(a)(8). Following

        any incarceration, the four child pornography offenses would each require a supervised

        release term of “not less than 5” years and up to life. § 3583(k).

               In August 2017—three months after Tucker was arrested—his lawyer moved to

        have him declared mentally incompetent. In September 2017, the district court found

        Tucker incompetent and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General.

               Tucker spent the next seven months being evaluated at correctional institutions in

        Chicago and San Diego. In May 2018, the district court held another hearing, at which it

        recommitted Tucker to the custody of the Attorney General for a restoration of

        competency. At no point before or during that hearing did Tucker’s lawyer “object to the

        length of [Tucker’s] evaluation” or “challenge the court’s authority to order a subsequent

        period.” JA 954 n.4. To the contrary, defense counsel “agreed with . . . the court’s intention

        to commit Tucker to the custody of the Attorney General for restoration of competency.”

        JA 954.

               In June 2018, Tucker was admitted to the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North

        Carolina. Just over five months later, a forensic psychologist submitted a report concluding

        Tucker was still not competent to stand trial but there was “a substantial likelihood . . .

        Tucker [could] be restored to competency in the foreseeable future with [a] combination

        of ” medication and individualized treatment. JA 955. The forensic psychologist thus

        “requested an additional period of evaluation and treatment to continue restoration efforts.”

        JA 956. Once again, Tucker’s counsel “did not object,” and the district court ordered “that

        Tucker’s period of restoration of competency be extended.” JA 956.

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               In May 2019, the forensic psychologist submitted another report detailing the efforts

        to restore Tucker’s competency. That report described Tucker as only intermittently

        compliant with his medication regimen but stated that his symptoms “responded well to

        medication treatment with antipsychotics and antidepressants in the past” and there was

        “substantial probability that his symptoms would be further attenuated with ongoing

        medication treatment.” JA 957. The report said Tucker was “right at the threshold of

        competency, and likely would have been restored had he complied with medication

        treatment.” JA 958. The report recommended another period of evaluation and treatment,

        as well as an order permitting the involuntary administration of medication should Tucker

        continue to resist taking it.

               The government requested an involuntary medication order and the district court set

        a hearing. Before that hearing could take place, however, Tucker’s mother hired a new

        lawyer to represent Tucker, who requested a delay. The district court reset the hearing for

        August 30, 2019.

               Before the hearing, the government moved for a further extension of the time for

        evaluation and treatment and withdrew its request for an involuntary medication order. On

        August 12, 2019, Tucker filed a written objection to that motion, arguing that, absent a

        request for involuntary medication, there was no basis for his continued detention. Two

        days later, the government renewed its request for an involuntary medication order, citing

        a report from the medical facility’s chief psychiatrist that Tucker had “firmly and

        unequivocally told us . . . he was stopping all of his psychiatric medications going forward”

        and was insisting that he was “competent to stand trial.” JA 961. The hearing was delayed

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        again after Tucker had “a physical altercation with another inmate,” and his attorneys

        requested a continuance. JA 962.

               The district court ultimately held two hearings in September 2019, at which three

        medical professionals testified, two for the government and one for Tucker. On October

        22, 2019, the district court issued a 49-page opinion finding “the Government ha[d] shown,

        by clear and convincing evidence, that involuntary medication under Sell is appropriate

        and that an additional [four-month] period to restore Tucker to competency through mental

        health treatment is warranted.” JA 545–46.

               Tucker filed a notice of appeal and asked the district court to stay its order pending

        that appeal. The district court granted Tucker’s request, staying its order “until such time

        as Defendant’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit is resolved.” JA 548. Almost two years later,

        this Court granted the government’s motion to remand the case to the district court for

        further consideration of “whether the administration of drugs, as currently prescribed,

        [wa]s substantially likely to render Tucker competent to stand trial.” United States v.

        Tucker, No. 19-4805, 2021 WL 4352382, at *2 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). This Court’s

        mandate issued on October 18, 2021.

               After the case was remanded, Tucker moved to dismiss the indictment and argued

        for his immediate release. The district court conducted another hearing, at which it again

        heard testimony from the chief psychiatrist. Less than a month later, the court issued a 42-

        page opinion concluding an involuntary medication order was appropriate and granting the

        government “four months within which to” restore Tucker’s competency. JA 987. The

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        district court also stayed its involuntary medication order “until such time as [Tucker’s]

        appeal to the Fourth Circuit is resolved.” JA 987.

               Tucker appeals anew, challenging both the involuntary medication order and his

        continued detention. We have appellate jurisdiction to consider both under 28 U.S.C.

        § 1291. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 175–77 (appeals from involuntary medication orders fall

        within the collateral order doctrine); United States v. Curbow, 16 F.4th 92, 115 (4th Cir.

        2021) (appeals from commitment order entered under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2) also fall

        within the collateral order doctrine). 1

                                                     III.

               Our role is confined by the applicable standards of appellate review. The first Sell

        factor—whether “important governmental interests are at stake,” 539 U.S. at 180

        (emphasis removed)—presents “a legal conclusion that we review de novo, although we

        review any factual findings relevant to this legal determination for clear error.” United

        States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 236 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In contrast, “[t]he

        remaining three [Sell] factors”—which seek to predict the likely success of an involuntary

        medication order and to assess alternatives—“present factual questions subject to clear

        error review.” United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2010). The district

        court’s determination that Tucker’s continued hospitalization is reasonable under

               1
                 Tucker also filed several pro se notices of appeal that have been consolidated with
        his counseled appeal in No. 20-4537. We also have jurisdiction over these appeals under
        the collateral order doctrine. We conclude any challenge to the district court’s competency
        order is forfeited because it was not raised in Tucker’s opening brief. See Grayson O Co.
        v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017). Tucker’s remaining pro se
        challenges are subsumed by our reasons for rejecting the arguments raised by his attorneys.

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        18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2) is also “a finding of fact that we review for clear error.” Curbow,

        16 F.4th at 109.

                                                     A.

               We hold the district court committed no reversible error in entering an involuntary

        medication order. Tucker challenges two facets of the district court’s decision. First,

        Tucker contends the district court failed to properly consider that he has already spent more

        than five years in federal custody. Second, Tucker asserts the district court clearly erred in

        concluding the government’s proposed treatment plan is likely to restore his competency.

        We are not persuaded by either argument.

                                                      1.

               The first Sell factor asks whether “important governmental interests are at stake.”

        539 U.S. at 180. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has emphasized the government has

        an “important” interest “in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime.” Id.

        At the same time, “[c]ourts . . . must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating

        the [g]overnment’s interest in prosecution,” including whether “[s]pecial circumstances

        may lessen the importance of that interest” in a particular situation. Id.

               “[T]he central consideration when determining whether a particular crime is serious

        enough to satisfy [the first Sell] factor is the ‘maximum penalty authorized by statute.’”

        Chatmon, 718 F.3d at 374 (quoting Evans, 404 F.3d at 237). This Court has declared it

        “beyond dispute” that the government has “an important interest in trying a defendant

        charged with a felony carrying a maximum punishment of 10 years imprisonment.” Evans,

        404 F.3d at 238. Here, the offenses Tucker is charged with carry maximum penalties

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        ranging from 15 to 30 years of imprisonment. See pp. 5–6, supra.

               The circumstances of this case, taken as a whole, do not eliminate the government’s

        otherwise substantial interest in prosecuting Tucker. Tucker emphasizes he has already

        been detained for more than five years. He also notes that, before he was even arrested, the

        government agreed to let him plead guilty to a single count of transporting child

        pornography—an offense whose penalty range would have been between five and 20 years

        of imprisonment. Had he ultimately decided to plead guilty, Tucker argues, “he would

        likely have had an advisory Guidelines range at or near the minimum sentence of 60

        months.” Tucker Br. 43.

               Without question, the fact that Tucker “has already been confined for a significant

        amount of time” cuts against the government. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. Tucker is also right

        that this Court has considered the length of a defendant’s “likely prison sentence” in

        assessing whether an extended period of pretrial detention undermines “the government’s

        interests in protecting the public, in general and specific deterrence, and in obtaining just

        punishment.” White, 620 F.3d at 413, 415. And although Tucker cites no decision of any

        court that has considered evidence of previous potential plea agreements in assessing the

        strength of the government’s interest, we need not—and do not—treat such evidence as

        irrelevant to the Sell analysis.

               Instead, we hold only that—under “the facts of th[is] individual case”—the

        government retains a substantial interest in prosecuting Tucker. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.

        Tucker is charged with five felony offenses, two of which carry minimum sentences of 15

        years of imprisonment. See pp. 5–6, supra. Unlike White, then, this is not a situation where

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        Tucker’s pretrial detention will last “considerably longer than [his] likely sentence.”

        620 F.3d at 418.

               In addition, the offenses with which Tucker is charged are not comparable to the

        purely financial crimes at issue in White. See 620 F.3d at 405 (describing charges). Despite

        often being shorthanded as “child pornography,” this Court has recently emphasized that

        the term “child sexual abuse material” more “accurately reflect[s] what is depicted—the

        sexual abuse and exploitation of children.” United States v. Morehouse, 34 F.4th 381, 384

        n.1 (4th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). Tucker is not only charged with knowingly

        possessing or transferring such materials. Rather, Tucker is accused of twice seeking to

        convince “a person whom [he] believed to be a minor to engage in . . . sexually explicit

        conduct for the purpose of producing [a] visual depiction of such conduct, knowing and

        having reason to know that such visual depiction[] would be transported” in interstate or

        foreign commerce. JA 81. While “[n]ot every serious crime is equally serious,” White,

        620 F.3d at 419, the ones charged here are grave by any measure.

               Finally, this is not a situation when “[t]he defendant’s failure to take drugs

        voluntarily” will result in “lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill.” Sell,

        539 U.S. at 180. To some extent, that fact cuts both for and against Tucker because the

        reason he may be ineligible for indefinite civil commitment is that the government cannot

        show his release would create a substantial danger to others. See Oral Arg. 32:10–33:46;

        see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246(d), 4247(a)(5), 4248(d). At the same time, however, the

        unlikelihood of future confinement absent an involuntary medication order means “the

        risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious

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        crime” are not eliminated. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. Here, such risks would notably include an

        inability to provide “appropriate monitoring” through a period of supervised release.

        United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 815 (4th Cir. 2009).

                                                     2.

               We also conclude the district court committed no clear error in finding an

        involuntary medication order would significantly further the government’s interest in

        prosecuting Tucker. Under the second Sell factor, the government must show

        “administration of the drugs is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to

        stand trial” and that administration of such drugs “is substantially unlikely to have side

        effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in

        conducting a trial defense.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. “[T]he government must not only show

        that a treatment plan works on a defendant’s type of mental disease in general, but that it

        is likely to work on this defendant in particular.” Bush, 585 F.3d at 816.

               Tucker’s argument has two parts. First, Tucker asserts the district court “basically

        ordered the same medication course (with a slight dosage alteration)” that had been tried

        previously without an involuntary medication order. Tucker Br. 37. Second, Tucker insists

        “we know” the treatment plan ordered by the district court “would be unlikely to work” for

        him “because it ha[s] already been tried and failed.” Id. at 38.

               Had we been sitting as the court of first instance, we might have agreed with Tucker

        on these points. But the parties competing arguments delve deep into the particulars of

        Tucker’s extensive medical history and the intricacies of treating a severe mental illness—

        areas where the district court’s comparative expertise is at its zenith and ours its nadir.

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        What is more, the ultimate question before the district court was not what happened in the

        past or why. Instead, as the government correctly observes, the district court was tasked

        with “evaluating Tucker’s current prognosis and the likelihood that the currently

        recommended treatment would render him competent.” U.S. Br. 36. Having scrutinized the

        parties’ arguments and the record, we are not left “with the definite and firm conviction

        that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.

        364, 395 (1948). We thus hold the district court committed no reversible error in finding

        the second Sell requirement was satisfied.

                                                     B.

               We also conclude the district court made no clear error in finding Tucker’s current

        confinement “reasonable” under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A) and thus denying his motion

        for immediate release. 2

               In assessing whether a period of confinement can be justified, “precedent and the

        governing statutory framework require the [g]overnment to act with reasonable speed”

        rather than “in the quickest possible manner.” Curbow, 16 F.4th at 112. Thus, a

        commitment period under Section 4241(d)(2)(A) is generally reasonable so long as it is not

        attributable to more than “reasonable explainable administrative delays.” United States v.

        Wayda, 966 F.3d 294, 308 (4th Cir. 2020); see Tucker Br. 25 (acknowledging Curbow and

        Wayda provide the governing standard). In addition, because “the proper time and place to

        contest [any] alleged unreasonable delays” is at the time of the relevant delay, a defendant’s

               2
                 Although Tucker asserts his continued detention also violates the Due Process
        Clause, he develops no separate argument on that point.

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        failure to lodge a timely objection to a particular period forfeits or waives any later

        challenge. See Curbow, 16 F.4th at 115–16 & n.11. This remains true even if the defendant

        “has been deemed mentally incompetent and unable to understand and assist in the

        proceedings against him,” so long as the defendant “has continuously been represented by

        counsel responsible for choosing his legal strategy and protecting his interests.” Id. at 117.

               Under Curbow, we must begin by identifying which—if any—periods we may

        properly review. And, like the district court, we conclude Tucker has forfeited (if not

        waived) any challenge to most of his confinement. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

        725, 733 (1993) (describing the difference between waiver and forfeiture).

               Tucker acknowledges he made no objection to his detention until August 12, 2019.

        At that point, the district court was scheduled to hold a hearing on August 30—just 18 days

        later. That hearing, however, was delayed for several more weeks at Tucker’s request,

        before ultimately being held on dates suggested by Tucker’s counsel. Less than a month

        after the final hearing, the district court issued a comprehensive order finding involuntary

        medication was warranted and ordering Tucker detained for four months to carry out such

        treatment. The next day, Tucker moved to stay the involuntary medication order pending

        appeal, and that stay has been in place ever since. After this Court remanded for further

        proceedings, the district court scheduled a new evidentiary hearing for 30 days later, but

        delayed the hearing for 16 additional days “at the request of both parties.” JA 967 n.16.

        Once the remand hearing was held, the district court issued a new decision less than a

        month later, concluding involuntary medication remained appropriate and ordering another

        four-month period of confinement to facilitate efforts to restore Tucker’s competency.

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        Since then, the case has been before this Court on Tucker’s various appeals. See note 1,

        supra.

                 Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the district court did not clearly

        err in finding Tucker’s continued detention was reasonable. Even were we to grant

        Tucker’s premise that he has continually objected to his detention since August 2019, the

        vast majority of that time occurred after the district court concluded (and then re-

        concluded) an involuntary medication order was appropriate and while Tucker pursued two

        rounds of appeals to this Court. Tucker was, of course, well within his rights to challenge

        the district court’s involuntary medication order and seek a stay of that order until its

        lawfulness was resolved. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 177 (emphasizing the “severity of the

        intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue[s]” raised by

        involuntary medication orders). At the same time, the delays associated with those appeals

        do not fatally undermine the district court’s finding that an additional period of

        commitment is reasonable to give its involuntary medication order an opportunity to work.

                                               *      *      *

                 Involuntary medication orders “carry an unsavory pedigree,” and prolonged pretrial

        detention of a presumptively innocent person “is serious business.” Chatmon, 718 F.3d at

        374 (first quote); United States v. Williams, 53 F.4th 825, 832 (4th Cir. 2022) (second

        quote). Given the deferential standards of review, we conclude the district court committed

        no reversible error in deciding an involuntary medication order was warranted and finding

        it appropriate to grant one final four-month period of confinement to attempt to restore

        Tucker’s competency. We emphasize, however, that “[a]t some point [the government]

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        can’t keep trying and failing and trying and failing, hoping to get it right,” JA 481, and we

        trust no further extensions will be sought once the current appeal is finally resolved. The

        orders of the district court are

                                                                                       AFFIRMED.

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