Court Opinion

ID: 9926128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 20:03:31.93731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:05.292984
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/23/24 P. v. Wang CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B323015

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. A576188)
           v.

 WILLIAM WANG,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed.
      Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                             ____________________________
       “Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed
Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Appellant
William Wang, also known as Wei Wen Wang, whom a jury
convicted of two counts of first degree murder among other
charges, appeals from the resentencing court’s finding after a
hearing that Wang failed to make a prima facie showing for
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6, subdivision (a).
       A resentencing court may consider the record of conviction
at the prima facie stage “to distinguish petitions with potential
merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971; see also People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708 (Strong.) We conclude that as a matter of law, Wang
failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for resentencing on his
two murder convictions because the record of conviction shows
the jury necessarily found all elements of felony murder under
current law. Although the jury also convicted Wang of attempted
murder, he concedes he is not entitled to resentencing on that
conviction. We thus affirm.

      1   Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

                                    2
                        BACKGROUND

1.    Wang’s description of events leading to the
      conviction2
      On appeal, Wang states he “is serving a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole for his involvement in a robbery
on February 5, 1988, that erupted into a gun battle resulting in
the deaths of two Drug Enforcement Administration (‘DEA’)
agents and the attempted murder of a third DEA agent. Two of
the perpetrators also were killed in the shooting. Appellant
[Wang] was shot nine times but survived. The robbery was the
culmination of a DEA undercover operation related to the
importation of heroin from Thailand.”
      He also recites in his appellate briefing, “On February 5,
1988, Frank Kow, Michael Sun, appellant, and Michael Chia
were involved in the sale of heroin to DEA Agents Paul Seema,
Jose Martinez, and George Montoya.” During the course of the
transaction, “Kow and appellant opened fire on them [the
undercover agents].” Wang further states the agents were in a
Volvo and after the shooting, Agent Seema was “laying face down
on the right side of the Volvo without a pulse. Agent Montoya
was laying face up outside of the Volvo bleeding from his
nostrils.”
      Wang also summarizes his statements after the killings
made during an interview with officers. According to Wang, he

      2 The facts underlying the conviction are not relevant to
any legal issue on appeal. The jury instructions and jury verdict
are dispositive. For purposes of this appeal only, we quote
Wang’s description of events to provide context for the jury
instructions.

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admitted that the night before the robbery, he delivered a
.45 caliber pistol and a box of ammunition to Kow. Also
according to Wang, Kow used the .45 caliber pistol during the
robbery and shooting.

2.    Wang’s counsel’s jury argument
      During the guilt phase of Wang’s trial at which he was the
sole defendant, Wang’s counsel chose not to make closing
argument.
      During the penalty phase, Wang’s counsel argued: “I am
representing this 18-year-old kid who participated in a robbery,
who was brought in by a 25, 27-year-old dope dealer, petty dope
dealer, Frank Kow; told he was going to participate in a robbery
and killing and it was supposed to be dope dealers. [¶] And he
goes along with it. He does it.” Counsel indicated that Wang
“admitt[ed] his responsibility in the crime. He shot them.”

3.    Jury instructions
       The trial court instructed the jury that “[o]ne who aids and
abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that to his
knowledge his confederates are contemplating committing, but he
is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any act
that he knowingly and intentionally aided or encouraged.”
       The court instructed the jury on conspiracy as well: “A
member of a conspiracy is not only guilty of the particular crime
that to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating
committing, but is also liable for the natural and probable
consequences of any act of a co-conspirator to further the object of
the conspiracy even though such act was not intended as a part of
the original plan and even though he was not present at the time
of the commission of such act.”

                                    4
       The court told the jury that first degree murder is a “wilful,
deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice
aforethought . . . .” The court further instructed, “If you find that
the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate
intent on the part of the defendant to kill which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation so that it must have been formed
upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of
passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is
murder of the first degree.” The court also explained
premeditation: “To constitute a deliberate and premeditated
killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing
and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in
mind the consequences, he decides to and does kill.”
       Regarding felony murder, the court told the jury, “The
unlawful killing of a human being—whether intentional,
unintentional or accidental—which occurs during the commission
or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the
first degree . . . .”
       The court instructed the jury on the robbery murder special
circumstance as follows: “If defendant was an aider and abettor
but not the actual killer, it must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that he intended to aid in the killing of a human being
before you are permitted to find the alleged special circumstance
of that first degree murder to be true as to defendant.”
       The court further instructed the jury: “To find that the
special circumstance referred to in these instructions as murder in
the commission of robbery is true, it must be proved: [¶] 1. That
the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in or
was an accomplice in the commission of a robbery; [¶] 2. That the
defendant intended to kill a human being or intended to aid

                                     5
another in the killing of a human being; [¶] 3. That the murder
was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of
the crime of robbery or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to
avoid detection.” (Italics added.)
       The court instructed the jury that “[i]t is further alleged
that, at the time of the commission of the crimes charged in
counts one, two, three and four of the information, that the
defendant discharged a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle
which caused great bodily injury and death to another. [¶] If
you find defendant guilty of the crimes charged in counts one,
two, three and four of the information, you must determine
whether or not the truth of this allegation has been proved. [¶]
The People have the burden of proving the truth of this
allegation. (Italics added.)

4.    The jury convicts Wang of two murders and one
      attempted murder and finds true the special
      circumstances and firearm allegations
      As relevant to this appeal, the jury convicted Wang as
follows:

      a.    Count 1—Murder of Paul Seema
      The jury found Wang guilty of the first degree murder of
Seema. The jury found the robbery murder special circumstance
true. The jury further found Wang personally used a firearm and
that he discharged a firearm at an occupied vehicle causing
death. The jury found a principal was armed with a firearm.

      b.    Count 2—Murder of George Montoya
     The jury found Wang guilty of the first degree murder of
Montoya. The jury found the robbery murder and multiple

                                   6
murder special circumstances true. The jury found Wang
personally used a firearm and that he discharged a firearm at an
occupied motor vehicle causing death. The jury found a principal
was armed with a firearm.

      c.    Robbery
       The jury found Wang guilty of second degree robbery. The
jury found that in the commission of the robbery, Wang
personally used a firearm and discharged a firearm at an
occupied motor vehicle causing great bodily injury and death.
       The jury also convicted Wang of the attempted murder of
Jose Martinez. On appeal Wang concedes he is not eligible for
resentencing for that attempted murder count.

5.    Appeal from the judgment of conviction
      Wang appealed from the judgment of conviction and this
court affirmed. (People v. Wang (June 3, 1992, B049641)
[nonpub. opn].) In discussing the special circumstance
instruction, we stated the jury finding that Wang personally used
a revolver during the murders of Seema and Montoya indicated
the jury convicted Wang as the actual killer, not an aider and
abettor. (Ibid.)

6.    The resentencing court denies Wang’s petition for
      resentencing
       After Wang petitioned for resentencing, the resentencing
court appointed counsel and held a hearing. The resentencing
court found that as a matter of law Wang, did not make a prima
facie showing for relief. Based on the record of conviction, the
resentencing court found Wang was the actual killer. The court
stated, “[I]n this case the record of conviction demonstrates that

                                    7
petitioner cannot make a prima facie showing based on the jury
instructions and the verdicts. The court rules and finds that the
jury determined that Mr. Wang was the actual killer. And
reviewing the facts in the record, there was really
incontrovertible evidence that he was the actual killer . . . .”

                         DISCUSSION

A.    Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
      Prior to 2019, a jury could convict a defendant of murder
under the felony-murder rule and natural and probable
consequences doctrine without finding malice. Under the felony-
murder rule as it existed before 2019, malice was imputed if the
defendant intended to commit the underlying qualifying felony.
(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184 [“ ‘The felony-
murder rule imputes the requisite malice for a murder conviction
to those who commit a homicide during the perpetration of a
felony inherently dangerous to human life.’ ”].) Under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it existed before
2019, an aider and abettor could be held liable for any offense
that was the natural and probable consequence of the crime aided
and abetted. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158
[describing former law].)
      Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–4) modified the law
relating to accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a murder theory
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843) and more
narrowly defining felony murder (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 703; §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e)(3)). Senate Bill
No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95 providing the

                                   8
procedure for a defendant convicted of felony murder or murder
based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
request resentencing relief. (Gentile, at p. 843.)
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) amended section 1170.95.
In addition to convictions based on the natural consequences and
felony murder doctrines, persons convicted on a “theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime” are eligible for resentencing relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see also former § 1170.95, subd. (a).) The bill
clarified that persons convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter also may petition for resentencing. (People v.
Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, 30.) It further clarified that
the burden of proof applicable in the evidentiary hearing is
beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Owens (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1020–1021.) The Legislature then
renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without
substantive change. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, fn. 2,
citing Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
       Section 1172.6 describes a multipart process for
resentencing petitions. The first step is making a prima facie
case for relief. “When the trial court receives a petition
containing the necessary declaration and other required
information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’
[Citations.] If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) When evaluating a petition, the resentencing court may

                                     9
consider the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 972.)
       In People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, our Supreme
Court held that “a petitioner who alleges that he or she could not
currently be convicted of a homicide offense ‘because of changes
to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019’ (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3)) puts at issue all elements of the offense under a valid
theory.” (Curiel, at p. 462.) The allegation “is not refuted by the
record unless the record conclusively establishes every element of
the offense. If only one element of the offense is established by
the record, the petitioner could still be correct that he or she
could not currently be convicted of the relevant offense based on
the absence of other elements.” (Id. at p. 463.) Curiel did not
consider the mental state required for felony murder. (Id. at
p. 470, fn. 7.)
       In Strong, our high court did consider the prerequisites for
a prima facie case of felony murder. As relevant here, Strong
explained: “Penal Code section 189, as amended, now limits
liability under a felony-murder theory principally to ‘actual
killer[s]’ (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e)(1)) and those who, ‘with the
intent to kill,’ aid or abet ‘the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree’ (id., subd. (e)(2)). Defendants who
were neither actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be
held liable for murder only if they were ‘major participant[s] in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [Penal Code]
Section 190.2’—that is, the statute defining the felony-murder
special circumstance.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)

                                    10
B.    Wang Is Ineligible for Resentencing
       The denial of a resentencing petition at the prima facie
stage is a legal question, which we review de novo. (People v.
Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
       The jury’s findings show as a matter of law that Wang
committed the felony murder of Montoya and Seema as felony
murder is defined under current law. Section 189 provides that
murder committed in the perpetration of a robbery is first degree
murder if “one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was
the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer,
but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life . . . .” (§ 189,
subd. (e).)3
       The jury’s findings demonstrate that Wang was convicted
under one of two currently valid felony murder theories. Either
he was the actual killer of Seema and Montoya because the jury
found that in the commission of the robbery, he discharged a
firearm at an occupied vehicle causing death. As the actual
killer, Wang is not eligible for resentencing. (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 710 [relief under section 1172.6 is unavailable if
the petitioner was the actual killer]; People v. Garrison (2021)

      3 These requirements do not apply when the victim is a
peace officer and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance
of a peace officer’s duties. (§ 189, subd. (f).) Here, it appears that
Wang did not know Seema and Montoya were federal agents, and
we do not rely on the exception applicable to peace officers.

                                     11
73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745 [actual killer ineligible for resentencing
as a matter of law].)
       Alternatively, the jury found true that during the robbery
for which it convicted Wang, Wang intended to kill or intended to
aid in the killings, and actually aided the killer in the murders by
discharging a firearm at the occupied vehicle. These findings
show all elements of felony murder under current law. In sum,
the record of conviction conclusively establishes that Wang is
ineligible for resentencing on his murder convictions. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 [if the record, including the court’s
own documents, “ ‘ “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made
in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ”].)

C.    Wang’s Remaining Arguments Do Not Show a Prima
      Facie Case for Resentencing
      Wang argues the record does not show all elements of
murder under an aiding and abetting theory. We need not
discuss this issue because we have concluded that the jury
necessarily found all elements of felony murder under current
law.
      Wang argues the resentencing court erred in making
factual determinations. Wang also argues those purported
findings prejudiced him. The resentencing court correctly
concluded that based on the jury instructions and verdict, Wang
could not demonstrate prima facie eligibility for resentencing. To
the extent, if any, the resentencing court made additional factual
determinations, those were surplusage. In any event, we have
considered Wang’s eligibility de novo and conclude he is ineligible
as a matter of law.

                                     12
       The parties dispute whether for felony murder, Wang was
required to assist in the underlying robbery or assist in the
murder. As described above, a person commits a felony murder
when “[t]he person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent
to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(2).) We need not
resolve the parties’ dispute because the jury’s findings
demonstrate that Wang assisted in both.4 Specifically, the jury
convicted him of robbery and concluded that he discharged a
firearm in the commission of the murder.

                         DISPOSITION
      The order denying William Wang’s resentencing petition is
affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          BENDIX, J.
We concur:

      ROTHSCHILD, P. J.                   CHANEY, J.

      4  The majority in People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
566 holds that under the current definition of felony murder, the
petitioner must aid and abet the underlying felony. (Id. at
pp. 577–578.) The dissent concludes the petitioner must aid and
abet the murder rather than the underlying felony. (Id. at
p. 580.)

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