Court Opinion

ID: 9546776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:35:13.862321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:50.808520
License: Public Domain

GARFF, Judge:
(concurring)
I have some problem with the majority opinion in its interpretation of Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2). The majority concluded that because the trial court failed to take any evidence regarding the factual circumstances around defendant’s prior conviction for aggravated robbery, there was no determination whether the actual crime involved dishonesty or false statement. Therefore, the conviction was inadmissible under the Rule.
The record indicates that the trial court had significant information on the nature and timing of defendant’s prior conviction. Defendant committed the crime of aggravated robbery on February 18, 1977. He was convicted and sentenced to prison for this offense on February 28, 1978 and was paroled in 1980. He was tried on the present charge of automobile homicide on June 13, 1986, approximately six years after his release from prison and eight years after his conviction. At the pre-trial hearing on defendant’s motion to exclude any testimony pertaining to this prior conviction, the State furnished the court with a copy of defendant’s rap sheet. Counsel for defendant argued that defendant’s conviction should be excluded, stating that he “would be the first to admit such a crime would go to a person’s honesty and trustworthiness” but thought that its admission would be more prejudicial than probative. The trial court ruled that defendant’s prior conviction was admissible under Rule 609(a).
Rule 609(a) provides as follows:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be held to mean what its language plainly expresses. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.01 (4th ed. 1984). In construing such a statute, we must, therefore, give effect to the Congress’s underlying intent by assuming that each term in the statute was used advisedly, Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah Ct.App.1988), giving the words their ordinary, plain meaning unless there is something in the total context of the legislation which would justify a different meaning. In re M.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
In Rule 609(a)(2), the terms “dishonesty” and “false statement” are separated by the term “or.” “Or” is “[a] disjunctive particle used ... as a function word to indicate an alternative between different or unlike things.... ” Black’s Law Dictionary 987 (5th ed. 1979). The plain meaning of Rule 609(a)(2) is that all felonies and misdemeanors involving either dishonesty or false statements are automatically admitted without balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, “or” indicating that “dishonesty” and “false statement” have different or unlike meanings.
The issue in the present case, then, is whether aggravated robbery involves either dishonesty or false statements. If it involves either, evidence of a conviction for aggravated robbery should be automatically admissible without balancing its probative value against its prejudicial effect.
The majority opinion implies that aggravated robbery does not necessarily involve dishonesty or false statement and, therefore, the trial court is obligated to make inquiry into the underlying facts of the crime to determine if either of those elements were present. In support of this position, it relies on United States v. Lips*21comb, 702 F.2d 1049 (D.C.Cir.1983). Lipscomb agonizes over the difficulty of distinguishing between crimes involving dishonesty and false statement and those which do not,1 but finally concludes that the prior robbery conviction of Lipscomb was admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) because its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. The court also stated that the trial judge, in exercising his discretion, made this determination based on the circumstances of the case, and did not abuse his discretion. Id. at 1073. Thus, the Lipscomb court and the majority opinion conclude that robbery is not necessarily an act of dishonesty and that the trial court is required to examine the factual circumstances of robbery to determine if dishonesty or false statement is involved.
However, other circuits have approved admission of prior robbery convictions under Rule 609(a)(2), reasoning that theft offenses are fundamentally dishonest: United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867, 871 n. 3 (1st Cir.1982) (robbery, as a theft offense, reflects adversely upon credibility); and United States v. Halbert, 668 F.2d 489, 495 (10th Cir.1982) cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934, 102 S.Ct. 1989, 72 L.Ed.2d 453 (1982) (“It is improbable that one who undertakes to rob a bank with a gun will prove to be a person of high character who is devoted to truth.”). These cases are consistent with rulings from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469, 476 (Alaska 1980) (“Although robbery involves the additional element of force or putting in fear, it, like larceny, concerns the unlawful taking of something of value. We hold that robbery is a crime of dishonesty within the terms of Alaska Rule of Evidence 609(a).”); People v. Holman, 43 Ill.App.3d 56, 1 Ill.Dec. 833, 836, 356 N.E.2d 1115, 1118 (1976) (“We recognize that the crime of armed robbery does involve an element of violence, but, as a form of stealing, it also reflects on a person’s honesty. We are of the opinion ... that the crime of robbery, armed or otherwise, is probative of the perpetrator’s veracity as a witness.”); State v. Day, 91 N.M. 570, 577 P.2d 878, 884 (1978) (“[R]ob-bery may not be a crime involving deceit, that is, false statement. However, it clearly involves theft, which is dishonesty.”); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 244 Pa.Super.Ct. 505, 368 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1976) (“[Aggravated robbery is a crime involving serious moral turpitude ... [and] certainly indicates a propensity for dishon-esty_ As such it would be highly relevant in determining the truth of what the defendant had to say.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the record of the crime could be introduced to impeach defendant’s testimony.)
The majority opinion quotes United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 847 (7th Cir.1977) as support for the argument that conviction of robbery alone is not sufficient to show dishonesty or false statement, and, therefore, that further inquiry is required to determine if the behavior was based on fraudulent or deceitful conduct. Although apparently sympathetic to this approach, the Papia court, highlighting the substantial split of authority on this issue, declined to enter the controversy:
Precisely because of the variance between the common meaning of “dishonesty” and the more restrictive meaning in which Congress apparently used the word, courts have split on the question of whether prior convictions for crimes involving stealing, without more, are admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2).
As the developing conflict between the Circuits reveals, reasonable men may disagree about whether a witness’s propensity to steal reflects upon his honesty in a manner that bears adversely on his propensity to tell the truth. Frankly, we are not anxious to enter the fray and, fortunately, are able to decide this case without having to rule on the general question of whether all crimes involving *22stealing necessarily involve “dishonesty” within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2).
Id. at 846-47. See also United States v. Carroll, 663 F.Supp. 210, 214 (D.Md.1986).
In my view, the preferable line of authority is that which holds robbery to be a crime involving dishonesty because it contains the element of theft. This is consistent with the per curiam opinion of State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1984), which stated: “[t]he only conviction for misdemeanor that would be admissible to test credibility would be one ‘involving dishonesty or false statement.’ The prosecution correctly contends that impliedly theft is admissible since it obviously involves ‘dishonesty.’ ” Requiring further inquiry into the factual circumstances of an aggravated robbery that occurred nine years previously, in an effort to show that the conviction “rested on facts warranting the dishonesty or false statement description,” Papia, 560 F.2d at 847, would appear to be a useless act and impacts heavily on judicial procedures and resources. Additionally, consideration must be given to the fact that, in many trials, no transcript is prepared and a review by a subsequent court of the proof at trial of a prior conviction could be a very time-consuming, if not frustrating, experience.
Robbery, which includes theft, must certainly be a crime with veracity-related elements. Therefore, I would permit the prior aggravated robbery conviction to come in automatically under Rule 609(a)(2).

. "Robbery is generally less probative [of credibility] than crimes that involve deception or stealth. But it does involve theft and is a serious crime that shows conscious disregard for the rights of others. Such conduct reflects more strongly on credibility than, say, crimes of impulse, or simple narcotics or weapons possession." Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1070-71.