Court Opinion

ID: 9635289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:45:53.26208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:23.505490
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
This case is not about “[l]ooking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,” or “[not requiring] the government to negate every possible inference of innocence.” Compare Blackledge v. United States, 447 A.2d 46, 49 (D.C.1982) cited by the majority at p. 1375. This case is rather a challenge to any factfinder; how far can one go in constructing a scenario from inferences, a scenario that relieves the government of proving beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of a crime — intent? How far can an appellate court go in reciting talismanic legal litanies to sustain a factfinder’s evidentiary construction that is logically flawed? Today the majority goes too far.
Penelope Wormsley has made the mistake of shopping for a dress which a court *1376has deemed inappropriate for a pregnant woman, of folding the dress, failing at first to place it back on a hanger while mingling it with her own clothing, and most distressing of all, of having only two dollars in her possession. As a result she has been charged with, and convicted of, attempted taking of property without right.
The majority has been most selective in grounding its inferences. Yet the government’s evidence reveals that in this very small shop, appellant requested permission to enter the fitting room, showing the shopkeeper the two items of clothing which she wished to carry therein. The fitting room was located just ten steps away from the counter where the shopkeeper remained seated; the curtain at its entrance was calf-length. There is no question that appellant had from the beginning the shopkeeper’s undivided attention, that the latter could see the folded blue dress below the fitting room curtain, and that when appellant emerged therefrom (after the shopkeeper locked the front door), the shopkeeper was “positive” that the blue dress was “knotted up" inside appellant’s sweater with its tags visible and its sash dangling some four inches. There is likewise no question that when appellant emerged from the fitting room a second time, after selecting other items to carry therein, she placed all of the items back on the display racks from which they had been removed. If it were at all relevant, one might ask whether it is reasonable to infer that a thief, as the only customer in a small store, would show the shopkeeper the dresses she planned to try on, prepare to steal one by folding it up in the plain view of the shopkeeper, carry it in a manner supposedly meant to hide it, yet leave the tags and sash hanging out, and return it to the rack with all other selected items?
The majority has correctly defined the elements of the offense of taking property without right; the government must prove that the defendant (1) took and (2) carried away (3) the property of another (4) without right to do so. See Tibbs v. United States, 507 A.2d 141, 144 (D.C.1986). I do not question that one need not cross the threshold of store property or pass a cash register to be convicted of the traditional crime of shoplifting. I do suggest that the evidence here does not establish an essential element of the offense of taking property without right — the element of “carrying away,” or the attempt to do so. See Sellers v. United States, 131 A.2d 300, 301 (D.C.1957) (to show an attempt the government need only prove an overt act with intent to commit a crime and which, except for some interference, would have resulted in the commission of the crime). Surely the mere folding of a dress in a small fitting room cannot be considered an overt act sufficient to denote an intention to carry it away; if its proximity to appellant’s sweater, observed after the door was locked, could be called a concealment relevant to intent, one is left with the question of what was the act of interference which thwarted the commission of the crime.
In any event, the cases upholding convictions for shoplifting or larceny on sufficiency grounds, relied upon by the majority, are not controlling, for the simple reason that they turn on facts from which a reasonable inference of intent could be drawn. Thus, in Singletary v. United States, 519 A.2d 701 (D.C.1987), where the court found that a person could be found guilty of completing the offense of shoplifting without leaving the store, a private security guard observed the appellant try to conceal a bottle of body lotion inside his sock under his left pants leg. When the security guard approached him, appellant dropped the bottle of lotion and “started to run around the store, ‘hollering’ and acting hysterical.” Id. at 701. The trier of fact could reasonably infer the necessary intent from the appellant’s obvious attempt to conceal as well as his unusual behavior when he realized that he had been observed in the process. In Baldwin v. United States, 521 A.2d 650 (D.C.1987), where the court also found the evidence sufficient to support a conviction for shoplifting, there was similarly strong circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer intent. Appellant was observed tucking rolled-up ladies’ dresses under his arm, draping a concealing coat over the dresses, and leaving the *1377area of the store where the dresses were sold, passing available cash registers. He started to walk towards a stairway exit, but instead came back and shoved the dresses under other dresses on the floor which were under a rack near the stairway. Subsequently, the eyewitness observer directed a security guard to the spot under the rack where the dresses were still rolled up into a ball. In Groomes v. United States, 155 A.2d 73 (D.C.1959), the court, in sustaining a conviction for petit larceny, found that the appellant’s actions were wholly inconsistent with those of a prospective purchaser, where she was observed removing two items from a shelf (including a package of cold meat), secreting them in her closed purse in a shopping cart and approaching a checkout line. When she realized that she was being approached by store employees, she walked to the rear of the store, surrendered the items, and made an incriminating statement.1 By contrast, in the instant case, the evidence is insufficient to show either an attempt to conceal or a consciousness of guilt.
The majority here has sustained a conviction based on mere speculation-^-speculation based on groundless suspicions voiced from the very beginning by the shopkeeper, and subsequently echoed by the trial judge and by this court. I respectfully dissent.

. See also Kinard v. United States, 416 A.2d 1232 (D.C.1980) (defendant was observed placing sheets inside a shopping bag; he passed several cash registers and was arrested only after trying to leave); Montgomery v. United States, 384 A.2d 655 (D.C.1978) (defendant’s companion was viewed putting items into a bag while defendant played lookout; codefendant set the bag down when he realized a security guard was following him on the way out of the store); and Flecker v. United States, 358 A.2d 322 (D.C.1976) (appellant was observed placing items in a paper bag and covering them up, and passed several cash registers before being arrested).