Court Opinion

ID: 9649371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:51:06.735672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:10.319029
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
concurring.
' In his motion for rehearing, Shafer claims that this Court’s initial opinion ignores his Rule 29.15 pleadings. He claims that those pleadings, read broadly, aver that he has a right to a presentence investigation and that the plea court’s decision to sentence him to death without a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of that right is prejudicial per se. The motion court agreed,, expressly finding that Shafer had a right to a presentence investigation because of section 557.026.1, RSMo 1994, and that the plea court had failed to honor that right or seek a valid waiver of the right from Shafer.
The Court’s opinion assumes without saying so that Shafer has the right to a presen-tence investigation that he claims, but determines that his pleadings do not aver any facts that show prejudice. In the absence of a Rule 29.15 pleading stating a factual base for his claim of prejudice, Shafer’s claim of a procedurally-defective waiver of the right to a presentence investigation is waived for purpose of post-conviction review. Although I agree with that analysis, it is unnecessarily contorted. Further, it invites a claim of effective abandonment (or ineffective representation) by Shafer’s post-conviction counsel on the issue. Such claims have sometimes found a friendly audience in the federal system. See Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357 (8th Cir.1995),
I prefer to decide this issue in a more straightforward way.
First, there is no constitutional right to a presentence investigation and report.
Second, there is no statutory right to a presentence investigation. Section 557.026.1, RSMo 1994, provides:
When a probation officer is available to any court, such probation officer shall, unless waived by the defendant, make a presentence investigation in all felony cases and report to the court before any authorized disposition under section 557.011.
(Emphasis added.)
The legislature initially adopted this language in 1978, to take effect January 1,1979, and readopted the language in 1986. Rule 29.07(a)(1) states:
When a probation officer is available to the court, such probation officer shall, unless otherwise directed by the court, make a pre-sentence investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of probation.
(Emphasis added.) This Court initially adopted Rule 29.07(a)(1) in this form in 1979, effective January 1, 1980, and again adopted the Rule in 1988. The Court has authority to “establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts ... which shall have the force and effect of law.” Mo. Const. ART V, seo. 5.
*743Both section 557.026.1 and Rule 29.07(a) each claim to establish a procedure by which a sentencing court may (or may not) avail itself of additional information about the defendant prior to imposing a sentence. Neither the statute nor the rule establish a duty in the court to obtain a presentence investigation. Neither the statute nor the rule establish a right in the defendant to have a presentence investigation. The probation officer must be available “to the court”, not the defendant. Were not the issue addressed in both the statute and the Rule procedural, this Court would have no authority to adopt Rule 29.07(a) ab initio. This is because, as previously noted, our constitutional authority is limited to establishing “rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading.”
State v. Phroper, 619 S.W.2d 83, 91 (Mo.App.1981), properly concludes that the statute and the rule are procedural and are at loggerheads. Under Rule 29.07(a), a sentencing court’s decision to dispense with a presentence investigation is sufficient to terminate the need for such an investigation and report, irrespective of the defendant’s wishes. When a statute is addressed and contradicted by a subsequent procedural rule of this Court, the rule prevails unless the legislature amends or annuls the rule “by a law limited to the purpose.” Mo. Const. ART. V, seo. 5. No such law exists.
This Court has interpreted nearly identical language to make pre-sentence investigations discretionary with the sentencing court, not mandatory. As this Court has said, the language of the rule is “clearly authority for the court to make use of presentence investigation as discretion indicates.” State v. Maloney, 434 S.W.2d 487, 496 (Mo.1968). Accord Phroper; State v. Abram, 634 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Mo.App.1982). To repeat: The presen-tenee investigation is available to the sentencing court as a tool; it is not a right resident in the defendant. Therefore, a pre-sentence investigation is required “unless otherwise directed by the court,” Rule 29.07(a) and section 557.026.1 are a nullity.
I do not read Rule 29.07(a) to require the sentencing court expressly to direct the probation officer not to conduct a presentence investigation. Direction is given by way of acts and deeds as well as words. The decision of the sentencing court to proceed with sentencing without a presentence investigation is a clear, unequivocal direction to the probation officer that the trial court has exercised its discretion against receiving a pre-sentence investigation and report. The plea court’s decision to proceed without the pre-sentence investigation may be reviewed, if at all, only for abuse of discretion and then only on direct appeal.
I would not reach the pleading issue upon which the Court’s opinion turns. It is simply unnecessary to do so.