Court Opinion

ID: 9389070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 16:07:36.477368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:25.201259
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 ANTWON A. STEELE                        :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :   No. 159 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 21, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002364-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                         FILED APRIL 24, 2023

      Antwon A. Steele brings this appeal from the order denying his petition

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-

9546. Upon careful review, we affirm.

      In addressing Steele’s direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts of

this case as follows:

             On April 26, 2016, reports of shots fired at the Sherman
      Hills housing complex in Wilkes-Barre prompted several patrol
      officers to respond to the area. Officer[ James] Verdekal, [along
      with Officers] Majikes, and Lada arrived and encountered [Steele]
      as he exited Building 312 of the apartment complex. [Steele]
      provided his name and stated that he was out on bail, and
      uninvolved in any criminal activity.

             The responding officers later reviewed surveillance footage
      of Sherman Hills that recorded a man, whom the officers
      recognized as [Steele], firing into Building 316. Using the video
      footage as a guide, the officers recovered a bullet casing at the
      location from which [Steele] fired a gun and a bullet fragment in
      the windowsill of Building 316, Apartment 325.
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              The investigating officers apprehended [Steele] based on
        the GPS coordinates of his ankle monitor provided by his bail
        agency. On August 23, 2016, the Commonwealth charged [Steele]
        with one count each of Persons Not to Possess Firearms, Carrying
        a Firearm Without a License, and Discharge of a Firearm into an
        Occupied Structure.

Commonwealth v. Steele, 425 MDA 2018, 221 A.3d 282, at *1-2 (Pa.

Super. filed August 16, 2019) (unpublished memorandum).

        On November 21, 2017, at the conclusion of a nonjury trial, the court

convicted Steele of all three charges. The trial court imposed an aggregated

judgment of sentence of ten to twenty years of incarceration on January 3,

2018.

        Steele filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied. On

August 16, 2019, this Court affirmed Steele’s judgment of sentence on direct

appeal. See Steele, 425 MDA 2018, 221 A.3d 282.

        Steele filed this timely PCRA petition, pro se, on March 18, 2020. The

PCRA court appointed counsel, who then filed an amended PCRA petition. The

PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on March 1, 2021. The PCRA court

denied relief and this timely appeal followed. Steele raises three challenges to

the effective assistance of trial counsel related to the suppression of evidence.

        Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is whether the

record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and whether the PCRA court’s

determination is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d

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317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed

unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. See id.

      Each of Steele’s issues present claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. Concerning ineffective assistance of counsel arguments, we presume

counsel is effective, and Steele bears the burden to prove otherwise. See

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa. 2012). To establish a

right to relief, Steele must demonstrate: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable

merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have

some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for

counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome

of the proceedings would have been different. See Commonwealth v.

Solano, 129 A.3d 1156, 1162-1163 (Pa. 2015).

      We observe that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not self-

proving. See Commonwealth v. Wharton, 811 A.2d 978, 986 (Pa. 2002).

“[A] post-conviction petitioner must, at a minimum, present argumentation

relative to each layer of ineffective assistance, on all three prongs of the

ineffectiveness standard….” Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 812

(Pa. 2004) (citation omitted). “[A]n undeveloped argument, which fails to

meaningfully discuss and apply the standard governing the review of

ineffectiveness claims, simply does not satisfy Appellant’s burden of

establishing that he is entitled to relief.” Commonwealth v. Bracey, 795

A.2d 935, 940 n.4 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong

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of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.”

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. 2009) (citation

omitted).

      Under the first prong of the ineffectiveness test, an appellant is not

entitled to relief if his underlying legal has no merit. See Commonwealth v.

Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2011). In short, counsel cannot be

deemed      ineffective   for   failing   to   pursue   a   meritless   claim.   See

Commonwealth v. Loner, 836 A.2d 125, 132 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).

      Concerning the third prong, we are mindful that prejudice requires proof

that there is a reasonable probability that but-for counsel’s error, the outcome

of the proceeding would have been different. See Commonwealth v. Pierce,

786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001). When an appellant has failed to meet the

prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the claim may

be disposed of on that basis alone, without a determination of whether the

first two prongs have been met. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 880 A.2d

654, 656 (Pa. Super. 2005).

      Here, Steele first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to seek suppression of evidence obtained during his initial encounter with

police. See Appellant’s Brief at 5-6. We observe that “[t]he failure to file a

suppression motion under some circumstances may be evidence of ineffective

assistance of counsel. ... [T]he defendant must establish … there is a

reasonable probability the verdict would have been more favorable.”

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Commonwealth v. Watley, 153 A.3d 1034, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citations & quotation marks omitted).

      Specifically, he contends that “counsel should have filed a pre-trial

motion seeking to suppress his statements to the police.” Appellant’s Brief at

6. Steele claims that “he was forced to give up his identity and admit that he

was on bail during this custodial interrogation.” Id. Therefore, to address

Steele’s argument, we must first assess whether he was subjected to a

custodial interrogation.

      To secure the right of citizens to be free from intrusions by police, courts

in Pennsylvania have long required law enforcement officers to demonstrate

ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens as those

interactions become more intrusive. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 761

A.2d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000).

      It is undisputed that:

      [s]tate case law recognizes three categories of interaction
      between police officers and citizens, which include: (1) a mere
      encounter, or request for information, which need not be
      supported by any level of suspicion, but which carries no official
      compulsion to stop or to respond; (2) an investigative detention,
      which must be supported by reasonable suspicion as it subjects a
      suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve
      such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent
      of an arrest; and (3) arrest or custodial detention, which must be
      supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Bolton, 831 A.2d 734, 735 (Pa. Super. 2003). As the

first level of interaction between police and citizens, a mere encounter is itself

a   “request   for   information,”   which   needs    no   level   of   suspicion.

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Commonwealth v. Acosta, 815 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en

banc).

      “A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction between

an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry by the officer of a

citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that it carries no official compulsion

to stop or respond.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.

Super. 2005) (citation omitted). If the police action becomes too intrusive, a

mere encounter may escalate into an investigatory stop or a seizure. See

Commonwealth v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 336, 340 (Pa. 1998). However, “a

seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual

and asks a few questions.” Commonwealth v. McClease, 750 A.2d 320, 324

(Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has confirmed that,

without more, an officer’s request for a person’s identification does not

transform   a   mere    encounter    into    an   investigatory   detention.   See

Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1009 (Pa. 2012).

      The PCRA court addressed this claim as follows:

      In the present case, Officer Verdekal responded to a report of
      shots fired and upon arriving at the scene he and other officers
      began to ask passers by what they were doing in the area or if
      they had heard gunshots. (N.T. 11/21/2017 pg. 18) … After
      having provided his name, [Steele] was frisked then permitted to
      walk away from Officer Verdekal. (N.T. 11/21/2017 pg. 19) It was
      not until Officer Verdekal reviewed video surveillance of the
      shooting that [Steele] became a suspect. (Id. pg. 20-23) There is
      no evidence in the record which indicates that law enforcement
      drew their weapons on [Steele], physically restrained him or
      otherwise demonstrated lawful authority in a way which would
      objectively cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she

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       was not free to leave. Accordingly, law enforcement’s interaction
       with [Steele] was a mere encounter which requires no level of
       suspicion.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 8-9.

       The record reflects that Officer Verdekal testified he was one of several

officers who responded to multiple 911 calls concerning gun shots being fired

at the Sherman Hills Apartment complex. See N.T., 11/21/17, at 16-17.

During the initial search of the area, the officer encountered Steele outside as

Steele exited the side door of one of the apartment buildings. See id. 17-18.

Officer Verdekal explained, “[W]e were stopping pretty much anybody that we

were able to come in contact with at that point.” Id. at 18.

       The officer testified that Steele was asked what he was doing in the

area, whether he heard any gunshots, and his identity. See id. at 18-19. In

addition, Steele was frisked for a weapon and permitted to leave. See id. at

19. Upon review, we agree with the PCRA court that the initial approach to

Steele by the police was a mere encounter and that no seizure occurred at

that time.1 Therefore, Steele’s claim that trial counsel should have sought

____________________________________________

1 As the Commonwealth aptly observed, Steele has suggested that he “was
detained without any specific suspicion and was surrounded by police when
questioned, thus feeling that he could not leave. (XX-XXXXXXX N.T. p 6, 12)
(11-21-2017 N.T. p. 19).” Appellant’s Brief at 6 (citations in original). If this
allegation was accurate, Steele’s contact with police would have been beyond
a mere encounter and required ascending levels of suspicion. “However,
[Steele’s] [citations to the record] do not indicate any testimony or other
evidence in support of that conclusion.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 14. We have
scoured the record for any reference to bolster the allegation that Steele was
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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suppression of his identification information lacks merit. Accordingly, because

there is no merit to the underlying claim, the allegation of ineffective

assistance fails.

       Steele next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek

suppression of evidence of his historical location gained from his ankle bracelet

GPS device. See Appellant’s Brief at 6-7. Steele alleges that since he was

wearing the bracelet pursuant to a private contract with a bail bond company,

this evidence should be treated like GPS data derived from a mobile phone.

See id. Accordingly, he argues the police should have obtained a search

warrant prior to acquiring the GPS evidence from the third-party bail company.

See id.

       Here, we conclude Steele has failed to establish that he suffered

prejudice from the admission of the GPS evidence. As the PCRA court

accurately observes, Steele’s claim “does not merit PCRA relief because the

GPS dat[a] was cumulative evidence and was not dispositive [of] the issue of

his guilt.” PCRA Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 12. The PCRA court explained:

       Multiple law enforcement officers saw [Steele] near the scene of
       the crime. Later, after viewing a video of the shooting, Officer
       Verdekal recognized the shooter in the video as [Steele]. Officer
       Verdekal recognized the clothing of the person in the video as
       being the same clothing that [Steele] was wearing during their
       meeting. [Steele] even identified himself in the video of the
____________________________________________

surrounded by police officers during the encounter and have discovered no
such support. As such, we have no basis to conclude that trial counsel would
have been successful in arguing that the interaction between Steele and the
police was not a mere encounter.

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      shooting though he did not admit to the shooting. Instead, he
      explained that he was running because someone else was
      shooting at him. See (N.T. 11/21/2017 pg. 65-66) In light of the
      overwhelming evidence of [Steele’s] guilt, we do not hesitate to
      conclude that he would have been convicted of these same
      offenses even if the GPS evidence would have been suppressed.

Id.

      Our review substantiates the PCRA court’s conclusion that Steele did not

suffer prejudice because of the admission of the GPS evidence. The police

arriving at the scene in response to the 911 calls identified Steele from their

initial encounter. See N.T., 11/21/17, at 17-19. Video footage taken from the

complex’s security cameras showed Steele walking around the scene and

ultimately firing a weapon. See id. at 20-28. Officer Verdekal testified that

Steele was wearing the same clothing in the video footage as he was wearing

when he was found by police. See id. at 28. Importantly, Steele admitted he

was the person seen on the video. See id. at 65-67. Hence, the GPS evidence

placing Steele at the apartment complex was cumulative of the evidence noted

above. Consequently, Steele has failed to establish that he suffered prejudice

from the admission of the GPS evidence and is not entitled to relief on this

claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

      Steele last argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to the admission of the GPS evidence at the trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 7-

8. Steele contends that counsel should have objected based on hearsay and

due to a lack of foundation. See id.

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      In addressing the previous issue, we discussed the cumulative nature of

the GPS evidence and concluded that Steele failed to establish a reasonable

probability of a different verdict if the GPS evidence had been suppressed.

Similarly, we conclude that the admission of the GPS evidence at trial did not

result in prejudice to Steele. We agree with the PCRA court’s following

observation regarding the potential prejudice caused by the admission of the

GPS evidence: “[B]ecause the evidence of [Steele’s] guilt was overwhelming,

we also find that he has utterly failed to demonstrate that the court’s verdict

would have been different but for the GPS evidence. This evidence was

cumulative and merely corroborated the trial evidence which pointed to

[Steele’s] guilt.” PCRA Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 15. Therefore, Steele has

not established the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance test, and his

claim fails.

      Since none of Steele’s issues on appeal merit relief, we affirm the order

denying his PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/24/2023

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