Court Opinion

ID: 9409161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-15 21:00:26.534145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.148713
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4046

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        CODI LEE DOUGLAS,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Charleston. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (2:21-cr-00113-1)

        Submitted: June 20, 2023                                          Decided: July 14, 2023

        Before HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: David Schles, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID SCHLES, Charleston, West
        Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Jeremy B. Wolfe,
        Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Codi Lee Douglas pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a). The district court sentenced Douglas to 37

        months’ imprisonment, which was at the low end of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines

        range. On appeal, Douglas argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because

        the district court inadequately explained its basis for denying his request for a downward

        variance. Douglas also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Finding

        no error, we affirm.

               We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the

        Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.

        Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). First,

        we must ensure that the district court “committed no significant procedural error, such as

        failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines

        as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence

        based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”

        United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall v. United States,

        552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). “A sentencing court’s explanation is sufficient if it, although

        somewhat briefly, outlines the defendant’s particular history and characteristics not merely

        in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis of the statutory factors and in response

        to defense counsel’s arguments for a [lesser sentence.]” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d

        513, 519 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).

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               Next, “[i]f the sentence ‘is procedurally sound, [we] then consider the substantive

        reasonableness of the sentence,’ taking into account the totality of the circumstances.”

        United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at

        51). Any sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively

        reasonable. United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934, 945 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct.

        164 (2022). A defendant can rebut the presumption only by showing that the sentence is

        unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Louthian, 756

        F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

               We conclude that Douglas’ sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable.

        Douglas argued for a downward variance based on the nature and circumstances of the

        offense, his family circumstances, personal history, and recent positive employment

        record. The Government asked the district court to impose a sentence at the top of the

        Guidelines range to account for Douglas’ criminal history. After listening to both parties’

        arguments and Douglas’ allocution, the district court cited those arguments and the

        statutory sentencing factors in imposing the 37-month sentence.             The court thus

        “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal

        decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Therefore,

        we discern no error in the court’s explanation for Douglas’ sentence. We have also

        confirmed that the sentence is otherwise procedurally reasonable. See Provance, 944 F.3d

        at 218. And, while Douglas argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, he fails

        to rebut the presumption of reasonableness attached to his within-Guidelines sentence.

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              Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

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