Court Opinion

ID: 9740706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:40:36.382471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.855286
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In my view, the award of no-fault benefits to plaintiff was improper under the circumstances of this case.
The sole issue in this case is whether plaintiff’s injuries "[arose] out of the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.” MCL 500.3105(1); MSA 24.13105(1). In Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 659-660; 391 NW2d 320 (1986), our Supreme Court stated:
In drafting MCL 500.3105(1); MSA 24.13105(1), the Legislature limited no-fault pip benefits to injuries arising out of the "use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.” In our view, this language shows that the Legislature was aware of the causation dispute and chose to provide coverage only where the causal connection between the injury and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is more than incidental, fortuitous, or "but for.” The involvement of the car in the injury should be "directly related to its character as a motor vehi*338cle.” Miller v Auto-Owners [Ins Co, 411 Mich 633; 309 NW2d 544 (1981)]. Therefore, the first consideration under MCL 500.3105(1); MSA 13105(1), must be the relationship between the injury and the vehicular use of a motor vehicle.10 Without a relation that is more than "but for,” incidental, or fortuitous, there can be no recovery of pip benefits.
The majority concludes that because Oaks intended to harm plaintiffs automobile rather than plaintiff, his injuries arose out of the use of his motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. See Jones v Allstate Ins Co, 161 Mich App 450; 411 NW2d 457 (1987). In my opinion, in reaching this conclusion, the majority has misconstrued the Thornton decision. I read Thornton as determining that the intent of an assailant is irrelevant when deciding whether the requisite causation exists under § 3105(1) to justify no-fault coverage.
In Thornton, the plaintiff was injured during an armed robbery of the taxicab that he drove. The Supreme Court concluded that Thornton was not entitled to personal injury protection benefits because the taxi "was merely the situs of the armed robbery—the injury could have occurred whether or not Mr. Thornton used a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.” 425 Mich 660.
This case presents a similar situation. As in Thornton, the inherent nature or the functional *339character of plaintiff’s motor vehicle did not cause his injuries. Instead, plaintiff was injured as a result of his dispute with Oaks, and plaintiff’s automobile merely served as the target of Oaks’ gunfire and the situs where plaintiff was shot. See 425 Mich 660-661.
The relationship between the functional character of plaintiff’s automobile and his injuries is too indirect to satisfy the statutory requirement that the injuries "aris[e] out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.” Because a motor vehicle was not the cause of plaintiff’s injuries, he was not entitled to recover no-fault benefits. Accordingly, I would reverse.

 We reject the focus that the Florida and Minnesota courts place upon the intent of the assailant as providing the requisite nexus between the injury and the use of the motor vehicle. See generally Government Employees Ins Co v Novak, [453 So 2d 1116 (Fla, 1984)] and Meric v Mid-Century Ins, [343 NW2d 688 (Minn App, 1984)]. Under our no-fault legislation, intentionality is relevant where specified by the statute. See, e.g., MCL 500.3105(4); MSA 24.13105(4). However, for purposes of determining whether the requisite causation exists under § 3105(1), the proper focus is upon the relation between the injury and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. [Emphasis in the original.]