Court Opinion

ID: 9740628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:38:57.075685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.269548
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring: Although I agree with the majority’s decision, I write separately to address the mere-fact method of impeachment, which the supreme court has recently rejected for the second time. The supreme court’s decision two years ago in People v. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450, 713 N.E.2d 532 (1999), was deeply flawed, and the supreme court in People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378 (2001), reaffirmed the erroneous position it had taken in Atkinson. Under the mere-fact method of impeachment, a jury is permitted to learn only of the “mere-fact” of a witness’ prior conviction but not the nature of that conviction. Thus, the jury learns, for example, that the defendant on trial is a convicted felon but is not told what felony he committed. The mere-fact method permits the State to put before the jury information it needs for evaluating the testifying defendant’s credibility. At the same time, that method reduces the prejudice the defendant suffers. In Atkinson, the supreme court rejected the mere-fact method and explained, inter alla, as follows: “Our case law interpreting [People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971),] suggests that it is the nature of a past conviction, not merely the fact of it, that aids the jury in assessing a witness’ credibility. [Citations.] The mere-fact approach undermines the Montgomery rule and inhibits the jury’s evaluation of a witness’ credibility by eliminating the jury’s consideration of the nature of the past crime.” Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 458, 713 N.E.2d at 536. For the reasons set forth in the specially concurring opinion in People v. Kunze, 193 Ill, App. 3d 708, 728-36, 550 N.E.2d 284, 297-303 (1990) (Steigmann, J., specially concurring) (which the supreme court in Atkinson explicitly referred to as being the source of the mere-fact method (Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 457, 713 N.E.2d at 535)), the supreme court is wrong. When a defendant on trial for burglary is. impeached with his two prior burglary convictions (as happened in Atkinson), the jury is not aided in assessing the defendant’s credibility; instead, the defendant is denied his right to a fair trial. The jury in Atkinson, when deciding whether the defendant had committed a burglary, could not likely evaluate the evidence against the defendant fairly once the jury heard of his two prior burglary convictions. As a second reason for rejecting the mere-fact method of impeachment, the supreme court in Atkinson cited “potential prejudice to the defendant.” Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 459, 713 N.E.2d at 536. Specifically, the court indicated its concern that telling a jury only that defendant was convicted of a felony without providing the exact nature of the offense “unavoidably invites jury speculation about the nature of the prior crime. There is a potential danger that the jury would speculate that the defendant was previously convicted of a more serious crime.” Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 459, 713 N.E.2d at 536. This objection, of course, is inapposite because it presumes that the mere-fact method is somehow forced upon a defendant. However, as explained in the specially concurring opinion in Kunze, such a forced situation could never occur because an exception to the use of the mere-fact method exists when “the defendant chooses to have the jury informed of his prior conviction for impeachment purposes in the traditional way, including the name of the offense(s) of which he stands convicted.” Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 732, 550 N.E.2d at 300 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring). The suggestion in Atkinson that “the possibility of resulting prejudice to the defendant from revealing the nature of the prior conviction is controlled by the judicial balancing test set forth in the third prong of Montgomery” (Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 459, 713 N.E.2d at 537) will not provide much solace to defendants who, like the defendant in Atkinson, have been deprived of their right to a fair trial. After all, under what circumstances could a panel of the Illinois Appellate Court conclude that a trial court abused its discretion under Montgomery by permitting a jury to be told that, for instance, a defendant standing trial for rape had two prior rape convictions when, in Atkinson, the supreme court explicitly approved a trial court’s Montgomery analysis that resulted in a defendant standing trial for burglary being impeached with two prior burglary convictions? The Atkinson approach achieves a reverse “judicial trifecta”: everyone loses, the parties as well as the trial courts. The State is harmed because, in a case in which the defendant’s credibility is a legitimate issue, the State may not be permitted to inform the jury, when it evaluates a defendant’s credibility, that he is a convicted felon. This will be the result whenever the trial court decides to keep out that prior felony conviction because it is for the same offense for which a defendant is standing trial. Such a defendant will be permitted to testify as if he had no criminal history because the prejudice prong outweighs the probative value. A defendant is harmed because if the trial court does allow in his prior felony conviction by name, he is, for all practical purposes, convicted. Thus, he must either forego testifying or risk being deprived of his right to a fair trial. Trial courts throughout Illinois are harmed because the supreme court has taken away their discretion to use the mere-fact method when, in their judgment, doing so would be appropriate and fair. Trial courts are thus left with the unhappy choice of depriving a jury of important information it needs when evaluating a defendant’s credibility or depriving that defendant of his right to a fair trial. Courts, like other human institutions, sometimes make mistakes. The Supreme Court of Illinois did so in Atkinson. In Cox, the court had a chance to undo its mistake but instead embraced it. While the new supreme court may revisit the issue, the citizens of this state may need to look to the real policy-making body of Illinois, the General Assembly, to undo the approach stated in Atkinson and to enact the mere-fact method of impeachment by statute, at least to the extent of giving trial courts the discretion to decide whether to use it.