Court Opinion

ID: 9770430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:05:02.980429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:17.329615
License: Public Domain

Robinson, J., dissenting. This case does not come within the provisions of Ark. Stats., § 43-3006; before that section would be applicable, it must be alleged that the defendant is charged in the demanding state “with committing an act in this state or in a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand. ’ ’ Here there is no allegation that petitioner committed an act in the State of Arkansas or a third state intentionally resulting in a crime in the demanding state, Missouri. In all the extradition documents introduced in evidence it is specifically charged that petitioner Lester Lindley, while present in Andrew County, Missouri, committed the crime of drawing a bogus check in the sum of $73.50. The complaint filed by the prosecuting witness alleges “On or about January 10, 1953, in Andrew County in the state of Missouri the defendant, Lester Lindley, did then and there unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, ’ ’ etc. The warrant of arrest issued by a magistrate of Andrew County, Missouri, directed to the sheriff, provides: “You are hereby commanded to arrest Lester Lindley who is charged with unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously, on or about the 10th day of January, 1953, writing a bogus check in the sum of $73.50 payable to Bisig & Kretzer, Savannah, Missouri, alleged to have been committed within the jurisdiction of this court.” The petition from the prosecuting attorney of Andrew County directed to the Governor of Missouri, asking for a requisition upon the State of Arkansas for the return of Lester Lindley to the State of Missouri, alleges that he was a fugitive and further alleges: ‘ ‘ The undersigned Alden S. Lance, Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Andrew and State of Missouri, represents that Lester Lindley stands charged . . . with the crime of passing a fraudulent check . . . committed ini the County of Andrew and State of Missouri, on or about the 10th day of January, 1953. . . . That on or about the 10th day of January, 1953, the said Lester Lindley fled from the State of Missouri, and is now, as your petitioner believes, in the County of Washington and State of Arkansas a fugitive from justice of Missouri.” In an extradition proceeding the circuit court has authority to consider a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for two purposes: first, to establish the identity of the prisoner; and second, to determine the question of whether he is a fugitive. State ex rel. Herbert Lewis, Sheriff v. Allen, 194 Ark. 688,109 S. W. 2d 952; Swann v. State, 206 Ark. 184, 174 S. W. 2d 557; and Koelsch, Ex Parte, 212 Ark. 199, 205 S. W. 2d 186. According to these decisions the courts have authority to determine whether the prisoner is a fugitive. Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition, says a fugitive is “A person who commits a crime within a state and withdraws himself from such jurisdiction. See People ex rel. Merklen v. Enright, 217 N. Y. App. Div. 514, 517, 217 N. Y. Supp. 288.” Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 23 S. Ct. 456, 47 L. Ed. 657, cited by the majority, actually supports the contention of the petitioner. There the court said: “The language of § 5278, Rev. Stat., provides, as we think, that the act shall have been committed by an individual who was at the time of its commission personally present within the State which demands his surrender. It speaks of a demand by the executive authority of a State for the surrender of a person as a fugitive from justice, by the executive authority of a State to which such person has fled, and it provides that a copy of the indictment found, or affidavit made before a magistrate of any State, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, etc., certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, shall be produced, and it makes it the duty of the executive authority of the State to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured. Thus the person who is sought must be the one who has fled from the demanding State, and he must have fled (not necessarily directly) to the State where he is found. It is difficult to see how a person can be said to have fled from the State in which he is charged to have committed some act amounting to a crime against that State, when in fact he was not within the State at the time the act is said to have been committed. How can a person flee from a place that he was not in? He could avoid a place that he had not been in; he could omit to go to it; but how can it he said with accuracy that he has fled from a place in which he had not been present? This is neither a narrow, nor, as we think, an incorrect interpretation of the statute. It has been in existence since 1793, and we have found no case decided by this court wherein it has been held that the statute covered a case where the party was not in the State at the time when the act is alleged to have been committed. We think the plain meaning of the act requires such presence, and that it was not intended to include, as a fugitive from the justice of a state, one who had not been in the State at the time when, if ever, the offense was committed, and who had not, therefore in fact, fled therefrom.” At the hearing on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus, Lindley introduced evidence that he was not in the State of Missouri on or about the 10th day of January, 1953; that he was in Dallas, Texas, at that time. This evidence was not contradicted. There was no evidence introduced to show that petitioner was in the State of Missouri at any time. Where it is shown that the one being extradited was not in the State where the crime was alleged to have been committed at the time named in the indictment, and proof showed that the alleged fugitive was not in the state at or about the time the alleged offense was committed, he is entitled to be discharged on a habeas corpus proceeding. Levy v. Splain, 267 Fed. 333 ; Lawrence v. King, 203 Ind. 252, 180 N. E. 1; Wigchert v. Lockhart, 114 Colo. 485, 166 P. 2d 988; Ex Parte Brewer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 388, 143 P. 2d 33; Ex Parte Ellis, 223 Mo. App. 125, 9 S. W. 2d 544.