Court Opinion

ID: 9664411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:18:44.764638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:06.190331
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. McFaddin, Associate Justice (concurring). I concur in the reversal of this case, but for reasons entirely different from those stated in the majority opinion: hence this separate concurrence. I. Proof Of Acts Of A Similar Nature. The majority is reversing the judgment because of the admission of the testimony regarding the attack on Mr. Fen-wick; and the majority says that any admission of testimony regarding the Fenwick incident violates the holding of this Court in Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S. W. 2d 804. I dissented in the Alford case; and I maintain that the majority opinion in the present case does not answer the cases cited in my dissent in the Alford case. I think the Trial Court was correct in the case at bar in allowing the testimony regarding the Fenwick incident; and I would not reverse the judgment for that reason. II. Change Of Venue. My vote to reverse the judgment in the case at bar is because of the failure of the Trial Court to grant a change of venue. I think the matter of change of venue falls within the purview of our holding in Hildreth v. State, 214 Ark. 710, 217 S. W. 2d 622. The situation in the ease at bar needs to be stated in some detail regarding the motion for change of venue. When the defendants were unable to employ-counsel, the Court appointed four splendid lawyers of the Texarkana, Arkansas bar to represent the defendants, jointly and severally. These attorneys wmre Dennis K. Williams, Joe Rosenblum, Van Johnson and William H. Arnold III. Each of these attorneys served, as court-appointed counsel, without compensation of any kind, and exemplified the fine ethics of the legal profession in acting as officers of the court in such capacity.1 The Trial Court advised the four attorneys that they -would work together, but each -would take the responsibility for the individual interest of one particular defendant. The feeling against these four defendants was so high in Miller County that the defendants were kept in another county and the place of confinement was kept secret. The defendants were at one time confined in the jail in Hempstead County and at one time they were placed in the State Penitentiary for safekeeping. When the attorneys desired to consult with their clients, they were taken to the place where the defendants were confined, rather than having the defendants brought back to Miller County. All of this is reflected in the record. The attorneys filed a petition for change of venue, which reads: “Come the defendants, James E. Moore, James Boyd, Rogers Boone and Willie Henry Byrd, jointly and severally, and respectfully petition the Court for a change of venue and state: “This petition for change of venue is made jointly and severally by each and all of us. “We are Negroes and are charged with robbing and murdering M. E. Hamm, an aged white man. Almost immediately upon being arrested in Miller County, Arkansas on the 15th day of May, 1956, we were all taken to the Clark County Jail in Arkadelphia, Arkansas, where we remained several days, and thereafter we were transferred to the Arkansas State Penitentiary, where we remained several days, and thereafter we were transferred to the Hempstead County Jail at Hope, Arkansas, where we remained several days. We were advised by the officers we were taken to these places for safe keeping. “When we were arraigned the first time, we were brought secretly by the Officers from the Hempstead County Jail at Hope, Arkansas, to the Miller County Jail at Texarkana, Arkansas. Attorneys were appointed for us and after brief consultation with one of the attorneys, we entered a plea of not guilty and were immediately taken back to the Hempstead County Jail at Hope, Arkansas; during the meantime, an amended information was filed against us and we were again secretly brought to Texarkana, Arkansas, and arraigned and quietly placed in the Miller County, Arkansas Jail, at Texarkana, Arkansas. “Upon inquiry from the officers as to why we were taken away from Miller County, Arkansas, we were advised the feelings in the minds of the inhabitants of Miller County, Arkansas were so prejudiced against us that there was great danger of mob violence. “The newspapers of Texarkana, Arkansas-Texas published that we had confessed to killing M. E. Hamm, when in truth and in fact, no such confession or statement was made by either or all of us; this erroneous publication caused the minds of the inhabitants of Miller County, Arkansas to become so prejudiced against each and all of us that we cannot receive a fair and impartial trial in said county. “We and each of us believe that the minds of the inhabitants of Miller County, Arkansas are so prejudiced against us that each and all of us believe that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in Miller County, Arkansas. “Wherefore, James E. Moore, James Boyd, Rogers Boóne and Willie Henry Byrd, jointly and severally, pray the Court order removal of this criminal cause to some other county for trial.” The petition for change of venue was not supported by the affidavits of witnesses, as required by law, for the admitted reason that the attorneys appointed by the Court stated that they were unable to obtain any persons to make a survey of Miller County so as to be prepared to testify in the trial. The attorneys published a notice in the Texarkana Gazette for three days, asking that anybody who wanted to obtain employment in making a survey would contact one of the attorneys. Any person answering the notice promptly refused when he found out what kind of work it was. The attorneys then contacted the Texarkana Employment Office, and again, were unable to obtain anyone who would do the work. Here is the statement that Mr. Dennis K. Williams, court-appointed counsel, made to the Court in regard to the petition for change of venue: “My name is Dennis K. Williams, and I am one of the attorneys appointed to represent these defendants; and in the very early stages there, I suggested to the Court and also to the Prosecuting Attorney’s office that we were going to try to get a change of venue, and during that time, why, I tried to contact people, too, that Avould make a survey of the county to find out the feeling of the people, and I was able to get one party that said he would do it. And as late as last Thursday, why, that party said he had made a survey of the county and that all that he contacted said the “niggers” ought to be burned or hung; and that party was also to come to my office this past Saturday morning, and in no event late]- than Monday morning, and I have not even seen the gentleman. I saw him Friday up here at the Courthouse, but I have not seen him since. “Another man that I contacted said he would give me his answer Thursday morning — this past Thursday morning — and lie met us up here at the Courthouse, and we four attorneys talked with him in the library, and told him what we would need and all, and that afternoon, why, he called me and said that he had talked with his wife, and his wife said he couldn’t have any part to do with it. “As Mr. Johnson stated, some of these people, and my good friends, said they would not mind helping me, but this was a horse of a different color, and they refused to partake in it. And as a last resort, we thought we would advertise in the paper and I believe I can state kind of the sum and substance of the ad; I wanted credible persons to make a survey of Miller County on a controversial issue, and we didn’t even sign that; we gave Mr. Yan Johnson’s room number in the State National Bank, and as he has told you about the number of people that have called; and it was impossible for us to get people whom I think to be credible persons to make a survey of the county at this time, and I believe if public opinion subsides some in a few months, we might be able to get this. I know there has been diligence on the part of us attorneys. We have conferences on the average of sometimes one and two times a day. I mean conferences where we were all together, and telephone calls that have been made. Hardly a day goes by that I don’t call one of them or they don’t call me about this matter. We have just had difficulty; in fact, we have not been able so far to get anybody to make a survey of the county for us.” This is not the ordinary case of paid counsel for a defendant making a statement as to inability to comply with the Statute. We have here the case of court-appointed counsel informing the Court that the sentiment in the County was of such a fever that people were unwilling to make a survey, even when offered employment. These four fine lawyers, officers of the Court, did everything they could to comply with the formalities of the Statute; and the change of venue should have been granted because the feeling in the County was so strong that the defendants had to be kept out of the County for safekeeping; and no person in the County was willing to come into the Court and testify as to the feelings of the populace of Miller County. It is putting form before substance to say that the petition for change of venue should have been refused because the legal formalities were not complied with. I submit that the case of Hildreth v. State, 214 Ark. 710, 217 S. W. 2d 622, points the way to the necessity of a change of venue in the case at bar. In the Hildreth case, in speaking of the compliance with the Statute (§ 43-1502 regarding two electors), we said: “The statute is evidently based on the premise that the accused is entitled to a change of venue when hostile public sentiment makes an impartial hearing impossible. It would be patently illogical to grant the petition when affidavits are obtainable, but to refuse relief when public feeling is so antagonistic that the affidavits cannot be had.” In the case at bar the public sentiment, as shown by the court-appointed counsel, was so antagonistic that people refused, to make the affidavits or make the survey. Therefore, I submit that the change of venue should have been granted. It is for this reason alone that I vote to reverse the conviction. Carretón Harris, Chief Justice (dissent). "While it forms no part of the reasons for this dissent, I should like to first express my disapproval of the law as established in the case of Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S. W. 2d 804. I consider that no better evidence can be presented to indicate one’s intentions in a particular instance, than to establish the same or similar acts upon other occasions evidencing the same intention. I think this particularly true in crimes involving sex, as the lust of the perpetrator of a sex crime is only temporarily satiated after the crime is consummated. The urge that prompted the dastardly act will come again and again, and will be acted upon under what is deemed to be proper conditions and circumstances. However, I recognize that the rule announced in the Alford case is the established law in this state until overruled, and my dissent in the case at Bar is based upon the fact that I consider the evidence of the Fen-wick robbery to be admissible despite the rule in Alford v. State, supra. Quoting from the Alford case, which in turn quotes from an earlier case, State v. Dulaney, 87 Ark. 17, 112 S. W. 158; “Generally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.” The information in this case charged defendants with the crime of murder in the first degree, committed while perpetrating the crime of robbery. Under said information, it was necessary that the State prove that defendants robbed or attempted to rob the deceased. The most forceful evidence presented by the State was the confession of each of the defendants that they robbed Hamm. This, of course, standing alone and uncorroborated, was insufficient to establish that fact. It was therefore necessary that the State offer additional proof of the robbery. The evidence corroborating the robbery is thin indeed. Hamm’s empty pocketbook was found near the scene of the crime, and his wife testified that he left home for the purpose of going to town to pay the light bill and get some medicine, but she did not testify that he had any money in his pocketbook. There is practically no evidence in the record, with the exception of the confessions, that Hamm ivas rotted, or that the assault on him was made by the defendants in an attempt to rob him. The testimony of Fenwick established that within a few days (five) of the death of Hamm, two of the defendants (Rogers Boone and James Boyd) pulled up ■where he was waiting for a bus, and said, “Let’s go to Hope.” He accordingly got in with them. ' “The biggest boy suggested that we stop for a nature case, and we all got out, and when we started to get back in, he reached and came out with a claw hammer and said ‘We ain’t going to Hope, but you’re going to Hell right quick’.” Fenwick stated that he was struck and hit with the claw hammer, and fell down. The two men then took his wrist watch and pocketbook. About that time, one of the defendants saw someone coming and started off, but the other said “Wait, I’ve got to kill this old son-of-a-bitch yet,” and kept hitting at him until his companion started driving away. Then he ran and caught the truck. This evidence, in my opinion, was certainly admissible against these two defendants as being directly related to the issue of intent; in other words, it is “independently relevant” to the main issue — relevant in that it is evidence to prove a material point in the case at Bar, e. g., that defendants killed Hamm while committing or attempting to commit the crime of robbery. Of course, the evidence would not be admissible simply to show that they were evil men. In the Alford case, upon which the majority rely, the ravished witness was still alive, and present in Court testifying that she had been raped. Therefore, as set out in that opinion, there was no need of further evidence to show Alford’s intent, for no one would contend that he intended something other than rape. I would likewise agree that if Hamm were alive and testifying he had been robbed by the defendants, evidence of the Fenwick robbery would be inadmissible under the rule herein discussed. But, to the contrary, the victim is dead, and so cannot appear and testify as to what happened, and I repeat, there is no substantial evidence2 (other than confessions) to establish that the deceased was killed while the defendants were perpetrating the crime of robbery. The information does not allege, nor is there any evidence in the record to establish that defendants had a grndge against deceased, or had previously planned to kill him, and the State’s first degree murder allegation must accordingly be sustained by proof of the robbery. The Court cautioned the jury that this evidence could only be used against the two defendants involved, and further, that it was only relevant as showing a general scheme or design. Such evidence has frequently been admitted for such a purpose. In Casteel v. State, 205 Ark. 82, 167 S. W. 2d 634, the defendant was tried for the crime of arson, it being alleged that he did “feloniously aid, abet, assist, and advise and encourage the burning of a * * * Pontiac automobile * * * property of Morris Henson, Bert Casteel and Porter Wilson Finance Company * * Among grounds for reversal, appellant urged that the trial court erred in permitting testimony relating to previous transactions of insurance on other automobiles in which appellant was interested, and which had been burned. Quoting from the Opinion: “Finally appellant urges that the trial court erred in permitting witnesses, J. O. Langley and Rellis Garrett, to testify as to transactions of insurance on other automobiles, and as to the alleged burning of these cars. The testimony is to the effect that this testimony concerned other automobiles, in which appellant was interested, which were insured and burned within a period of time shortly before the one in question here, and closely connected with its burning. This testimony, under proper instructions from the Court, was permitted to go to the jury solely for the purpose of determining appellant’s motive, scheme,- design or intent, and we think it was properly admitted. ’ ’ Again, in the case of Davis v. State, 182 Ark. 123, 30 S. W. 2d 830, Davis was convicted of the crime of murder, and sentenced to death. The evidence showed that he and two others went to the place of business of J. J. Weed, a merchant in North Little Rock, and while engaged in an attempt to rob Weed, killed him. A certain Joe Lee testified that on the same night, and within a few blocks of Weed’s place of business, he was held up by three men and robbed. He identified Davis as participating. This testimony was admitted over the objections of the defendant. The Court admonished the jury that the testimony could be considered only for the purpose of identification and upon the question of “* * * intent of entering Weed’s place of business * * Quoting from the late Justice Smith: “The indictment alleged that Weed was killed in an attempt to rob him, and it was this unlawful intent which made it unnecessary for the State to prove the deliberation and premeditation which would be required to establish murder in the first degree. # * * It ivas essential for the State to show that appellants were in Weed’s place of business for the purpose of committing the crime of robbery. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.) “The testimony was, therefore, competent to show the business in which appellants were engaged that night, and the probable purpose for which they went to Weed’s place of business thereafter.” The fact that the offense admitted in evidence occurred subsequent to the crime for which appellants are being tried is of no effect. Scrape v. State, 189 Ark. 221, 71 S. W. 2d 460. This case, incidentally, seems to be on “all fours” with the case at Bar, and I find absolutely no distinction in the evidence that was admitted there of a similar offense, and the evidence which was herein admitted, and which the majority say constituted reversible error. Scrape was convicted of the crime of robbery of a filling station in Little Rock, which occurred on November 9, 1933. During the trial, and over objections, L. R. Biggs, operator of another filling station in Little Rock, was permitted to testify that appellant and two others had attempted to rob him on November 10, the day following the date of the robbery for which he was on trial. In this connection the Court gave to the jury, over appellant’s objections and exceptions, the following instruction: “The defendant is being tried alone for the crime of robbery. The State has attempted to show by testimony that this defendant engaged in an attempted crime of robbery on the night following the date of the crime for which he is now being tried is alleged to have been committed. If you should believe from the evidence that the defendant did attempt to commit robbery on the night following the alleged crime for which he is being tried, it might be considered by you as showing, if it does so show, a scheme and a design on the part of the defendant in the commission of crime, and for no other purpose; and, even though you should believe him guilty of attempted robbery committed on the day following the day of the robbery for which he is now being tried, yet that would not be sufficient to warrant his conviction on the charge for which he is now being tried unless you believe he was guilty on this particular charge beyond every reasonable doubt.” This instruction was approved by this Court, and in the language of Justice McHaney: “ * * * we have many times held that evidence of similar crimes closely connected with the crime charged, is admissible, not only to show knowledge or intent, but to show a system, plan, or scheme of conduct on the part of the accused. * * *” The majority do not attempt to reconcile the present holding with the Scrape case other than to say that it was a ‘ ‘ conspicuous departure from the general rule ’ ’, an isolated case, and actually occurred because of “oversight”. Yet the majority do not overrule the Scrape decision. It appears to me that the law relating to the admission of similar offenses in the trial of a particular cause, is now so highly technical and apparently conflicting, that lawyers and judges, in trying to distinguish between the various cases, can only reach a complete state of bewilderment. The net result will be that trial courts will never permit the introduction of evidence of similar crimes committed by a defendant which might well tend to prove intent, scheme, or design in the ease under submission. I strongly feel such evidence to be invaluable in the trial of a criminal case. For the reasons herein set out, I am of the opinion that the testimony relating to the Fenwick robbery was competent and relevant evidence, and the Court did not err in admitting same. I accordingly respectfully dissent to the views of the majority. Justice Millwee joins in the dissent.   When the defendants — or someone for them — employed present counsel to perfect this appeal, the Court released the court-appointed counsel.    I emphatically disagree with the majority that the fact a man is missing for five days, his body found on a route not normally taken in going home, and his empty purse found on the side of the road two-tenths of a mile from the body, is such evidence, standing alone, as would warrant a jury in concluding that that individual had been robbed.