Court Opinion

ID: 9365352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-23 20:02:14.687304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:44.983488
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/23/23 P. v. Bridget CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061150

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 13CF1025)

 ANTHONY EDWARD BRIDGET,                                               OPI NION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Cheri T. Pham, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Gordon S. Brownell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                             *               *               *
              A jury convicted defendant Anthony Edward Bridget of conspiracy to
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commit murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a)), first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), aggravated assault (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and false imprisonment by
violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)). As to the murder, the jury found two special
circumstance allegations true: murder for financial gain, and murder by means of lying
in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1), (15)). The trial court found prior conviction enhancement
allegations true for four prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e), 1170.12, subds. (b),(c)), two
serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)). In 2020, another panel of this court affirmed the judgment in part and
reversed it in part. (People v. Bridget (Aug. 31, 2020, G056928) [nonpub. opn.].)
              In November 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under former
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section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). In his petition, defendant averred: “1. A complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against me that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. [¶] 2a. At trial, I was convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder pursuant to the
felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] . . . [¶] 3. I
could not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder because of changes made
to . . . § § 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”
              The trial court summarily denied defendant’s petition for resentencing. The
court concluded defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the murder
conviction was not based on felony murder or a natural and probable consequences
theory. Instead, the court noted defendant’s conviction was based on the theory of aiding
and abetting. The court also held the jury necessarily found defendant acted with the

1
              All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
              Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

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intent to kill in order to find him guilty of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit
murder and to reach true findings on the special circumstance allegations.
              Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal and we appointed counsel to
represent him. Counsel advised the court he was unable to find an issue to argue on
defendant’s behalf and requests that we review the entire record. (People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was given the opportunity to file written argument on
his own behalf, but he has not done so. Although defendant has not filed a supplemental
brief, we exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record and
appointed counsel’s Wende brief. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 232.)
              We have examined the entire record and have not found an arguable issue
on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the postjudgment order.

                                       DISCUSSION
              Defendant’s petition is without merit because the record of conviction
establishes defendant was not convicted based on felony murder or the natural and
probable consequences theory of vicarious liability. In determining whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, the trial court may rely on the record of
conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970-971.) The record of conviction
includes the court’s own documents, including the underlying facts as presented in an
appellate opinion, the trial evidence, the jury instructions, and closing arguments of
counsel. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) As our Supreme Court
explained, “The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry . . . allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971.)
              Here, the jury was never instructed on felony murder or natural and
probable consequences. Instead, defendant was convicted on a theory of aiding and
abetting. In any event, defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he

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was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. Given the guilty verdict on conspiracy to
commit murder, the jury necessarily found the murder count was based on defendant’s
intent to kill. To support a finding of the special circumstance of murder for financial
gain, the jury also necessarily found the murder was intentional. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).)
Likewise, the lying-in-wait special circumstance required the jury to find defendant aided
and abetted the killing of the victim with express malice. (§ 190.2 subd. (a)(15).)
              Relief under section 1172.6 is restricted to those convicted of murder
“under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) Because defendant was
not convicted based upon felony murder or the natural and probable consequences theory,
as he alleges, relief under section 1172.6 is not available to him.

                                      DISPOSITION
              The postjudgment order is affirmed.

                                                  SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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