Court Opinion

ID: 9701504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:21:52.355724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:43.871063
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
Without evaluating the jurisdictional predicate for this appeal, the majority opinion concerns itself with determining whether the prosecutorial misconduct constituted “prosecutorial overreaching.” Since I believe that this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the merits of this appeal, I must dissent.
In Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977), we held that after a mistrial had been declared, and prior to the commencement of a second trial, the defendant has the right to an interlocutory appeal from the denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss on the grounds that the new trial will violate his double jeopardy rights.1 See also, Commonwealth v. Haefner, 473 Pa. 154, 373 A.2d 1094 (1977); Commonwealth v. Potter, 478 Pa. 251, 386 A.2d 918 (1978) . In Commonwealth v. Hogan, 482 Pa. 333, 393 A.2d 1133, we distinguished the right to interlocutory appeals from orders denying motions to dismiss in cases where the trial judge declared a mistrial (Bolden), from cases where a reviewing court granted a new trial. We recognized that:
. mistrials present a distinctly different consideration because the right of the accused to have judgment passed upon by the empanelled tribunal has been frustrated. Such is not the case where the verdict has been rendered and is set aside at the behest of the defendant *345upon a finding of trial error. The very core of the protection offered by the double jeopardy clause is the assurance of an adjudication by a tribunal having jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause and the finality of that judgment. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916). Thus, mistrials touch upon the very heart of the double jeopardy protection since, in those cases, the original tribunal is prevented from passing judgment. Id., 482 Pa. at 341, 393 A.2d at 1137.
We also explained that when a reviewing court finds reversible prosecutorial misconduct upon the complaint of the defendant, whether the government must cease its attempts to try the accused is not a double jeopardy bar, but a due process issue. We reasoned that:
In such an instance, the flexible and evolving concept of due process — rather than the historically rigid rule of double jeopardy — would be the standard against which would be measured the propriety of allowing the government yet another chance to try the accused. Id., 482 Pa. at 343-44, 393 A.2d at 1138.
See also, Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1957). Thus, in Hogan we affirmed the order denying the motion to dismiss since the thrust of the appeal did not involve an interlocutory appealable double jeopardy issue.
The majority opinion ignores our holding in Hogan and assumes jurisdiction over an appeal which involves due process, not double jeopardy considerations. Here, the appellant had the right to a judgment passed on by the empanelled tribunal. The appellant sought to appeal his conviction on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct and this Court ordered a new trial. Under these circumstances, double jeopardy poses no bar to prosecution.
I would dismiss the instant appeal since the appellant raises a non-appealable interlocutory due process issue. Commonwealth v. Klobuchir, 486 Pa. 241, n. 5, 405 A.2d 881, n. 5 (1979).

. In Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 652, 373 A.2d 90, 114 (1977) (Nix, J., dissenting opinion joined by O’Brien, J.), this writer expressed a view contrary to the majority opinion. I warned that interlocutory appeals from the denial of the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds would be inefficient, time consuming and prejudicial to the parties to the controversy. Moreover, I predicted that permitting an interruption of an ongoing judicial proceeding would invite extensive delays and have a disruptive effect on the continuity of the action. See also, Commonwealth v. Bronson, 482 Pa. 207, 211, 393 A.2d 453, 454 (1978) (Nix, J., dissenting opinion joined by O’Brien, J.). Today’s opinion exacerbates the majority’s holding in Bolden by an unwarranted expansion of the double jeopardy clause.