Court Opinion

ID: 9724311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:52:32.296957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:59.215790
License: Public Domain

DONIELSON, Presiding Judge
(specially concurring).
Modifications of dissolution decrees are proceedings in equity. The courts have always recognized that one who seeks equity must do equity. Here, Kieth Van Doren has failed to follow the dictates of prior court orders — he has failed to pay temporary support, child support, alimony, and house payments as ordered by the district court. I am unwilling to reward this failure to abide by court orders with a reduction in the amounts of those ordered payments. The continued enforcement of the original decree will not result in a positive wrong or injustice because the reduction in Kieth’s income appears temporary and less than substantial. And, even though Mary’s income has substantially increased since the dissolution, I yield to my colleagues’ judgment on this issue. (However, I do find this a very close call.) For these reasons, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
I write separately, however, to clearly enunciate my feelings on other matters. Divorce is an unfortunate reality to nearly half of the couples of this state. When a marriage is dissolved, it is understandable that one or both of the ex-partners might prefer to move from the vicinity; career changes are also understandable. Change in one’s profession is certainly not uncommon. Nor is change in residence uncommon. Consequently, such changes do not usually constitute a substantial change in circumstances not within the contemplation of the trial court which would warrant a modification of dissolution decree provisions. But there is no lock on the gate for dissolution parties. They are clearly not bound to stay in the same vicinity, nor stay in the same occupation, nor even to maintain the same level of income. Not all changes in income constitute voluntary reductions of income. In my mind, reductions of income which do not warrant a modification of decree provisions must be accompanied by some additional element of bad faith or lack of responsibility.
In the situation before us, I do not find elements of lack of responsibility or bad faith (at least in Kieth’s employment situation). Kieth was making $60,000 in his law practice when the practice dissolved; he was then unemployed for a few months until he passed the Colorado bar. At that point he practiced law earning $40,000 a year until he joined an insurance company. His salary is now $51,000 plus benefits. I do not find a voluntary income reduction analysis appropriate in this situation. The fact that Kieth joined his girlfriend in Colorado does not change my conclusion, nor do I consider it an adverse factor to be considered. The “starting over” at midlife in one’s residence, job, location, or companion after a dissolution are not unexpected, nor necessarily adverse, circumstances.
Both parties subsequent to a dissolution are free to pursue their private lives without penalty. The courts of this state are not entitled to condemn or punish the parties for their major life choices where no *588evidence suggests those decisions were made other than in good faith. Any statements made by the district court characterizing Kieth’s decisions in a different manner were not considered by this author. Nonetheless, with Kieth’s record on financial and legal responsibilities, I agree with the majority.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the result.