Court Opinion

ID: 9779791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:45:39.583746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:40.781690
License: Public Domain

Graham, J.
(dissenting). While the Commonwealth and the defendant are divided over whether G. L. c. 265, § 13L, is a lesser included offense of G. L. c. 265, § 13J(¿>), both parties agree that the judge should not have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense. The majority finds it unnecessary to determine whether the trial judge did indeed err in giving the *523instruction, and affirms the conviction under § 13L on the concept of invited error, though the court acknowledges that the doctrine lacks a strong foundation.1
Assuming that the doctrine of invited error applies to the defendant’s claim, I conclude that the error in giving the instruction created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.2 First, *524because the Commonwealth tried the case on a different theory — that the defendant committed an assault and battery or wantonly and recklessly permitted another to intentionally inflict injuries on the child, in violation of § 13J(¿>) — and the offense under § 13L is not a lesser included offense of § 13J(6), the jury did not focus on the different, separate elements of the offense under § 13L when hearing the evidence at trial. This raises the question whether there was a full and fair consideration of the evidence in relation to the elements of the offense set out in § 13L. Further, the evidence is not as clear cut as the majority suggests.
As the majority notes, it is uncontested that the baby’s injuries occurred on the night of December 23, sometime during the period in which the defendant and Cambria were alone with the child. On the night in question, the defendant and Cambria slept on the pull-out couch in the living room of the defendant’s apartment, while the baby, then seven weeks old, slept on an adjacent recliner. The defendant testified that she slept with the baby close by so that she could hear him if he woke and cried out.
The majority places great emphasis on the fact that the defendant claimed to have been awakened by the child’s cries during the night, though not by the cries he must have made when his injuries were sustained. The defendant had been awake much of the night before caring for the baby, who had been fussy, refused to eat, and displayed flu-like symptoms. She had then spent the day with the child, visiting the pediatrician and running errands with her father. The defendant did wake to feed the baby twice during the night, though she did not notice any injuries on the child until the following morning. Beyond the living room where the three slept that night, the defendant’s apartment consisted of the defendant’s bedroom, the baby’s bedroom, a small bathroom, and a kitchen. No evidence was presented suggesting that the *525baby sustained his injuries in the immediate vicinity where the defendant lay sleeping. Moreover, it is far from certain that the baby’s injuries occurred, as the majority concludes, “serially” over the course of some period of time.
Accordingly, the erroneous instruction, though invited by defense counsel, created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

As the majority observes, ante at 519 n.5, quoting from Commonwealth v. Knight, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 92, 100 n.2 (1994), “[tjhere is abundant Federal case law to the effect that invited error is not reviewable.” See United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1091 (1981); United States v. Alexander, 695 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986). While review under the concept of invited error is not an established doctrine in the Commonwealth, the language in Lannon v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 786, 792-793 (1980), suggests that the defendant’s claim may not be reviewable because it is invited error. See Commonwealth v. Gladney, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 158 n.3 (1993); Commonwealth v. Knight, supra at 99-100.
It is also to be noted, however, that there is case law holding that if the offense of which a defendant is convicted is not a lesser included offense of the crime charged in the indictment, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to convict and sentence the defendant of that offense and the judgment must be reversed and the verdict set aside. See Commonwealth v. Rowe, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 927 (1984); Commonwealth v. Miranda, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 10, 14 (1986); Commonwealth v. Farrell, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 267, 268-269 (1991) (conviction of offense not alleged in complaint “probably jurisdictional”; if not, is substantial risk of miscarriage of justice; defendant’s consent to instruction immaterial). See also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 441, 443-444 (1988) (confines of indictment limit sentencing); Commonwealth v. Ruidiaz, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 462, 464, 465 (2006) (amendment of indictment may not broaden charge; sentence limited to crime charged in indictment). We need not be concerned with that issue here, because the offense set out in § 13L is a misdemeanor, not a felony (for which indictment is constitutionally required), see ante at 519 n.4, and for that reason, the error does not per se require reversal but rather consideration under the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard. See Commonwealth v. Bynoe, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 691-693 (2000). Compare Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 379, 382 (1981) (to be convicted of offense not charged would “certainly” constitute miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. Farrell, supra (reversed conviction of offense not charged in complaint); Commonwealth v. McGilvery, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 508, 509, 512-513 (2009). In regard to indictments, see also Commonwealth v. Peterson, 445 Mass. 782, 788 (2006) (waiver of right to indictment must be explicit, voluntary, intelligent, and “freely and knowingly given”); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 458 Mass. 446, 451-452 (2010). See generally Smith, Criminal Practice and Procedure §§ 15.30, 15.45-15.47 (3d ed. 2007).

We must evaluate the impact of the contested instruction “in the context of *524the entire trial.” Commonwealth v. Gabbidon, 398 Mass. 1, 5 (1986). “We consider the strength of the Commonwealth’s case, the nature of the error, the significance of the error in the context of the trial, and the possibility that the absence of an objection was the result of a reasonable tactical decision.” Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002). If after such a review we are left with “uncertainty that the defendant’s guilt has been fairly adjudicated,” then the defendant has suffered such a risk. Commonwealth v. Chase, 433 Mass. 293, 299 (2001).