Court Opinion

ID: 9753212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:03:54.459809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:32.256182
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Mb. Justice Eagen,
William Matthews, sentenced to life imprisonment following his conviction by a jury of murder in the first degree, appeals from the judgment of sentence.
The sufficiency of the trial evidence to sustain the verdict is not questioned, nonetheless, we have studied the record and are satisfied the evidence was ample to establish Matthews’ guilt of murder in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt.
*68From the evidence, the jury was warranted in finding that Matthews, on February 23, 1968, acting in concert with his nephew, James Williams, and a friend, James Jackson, robbed Eandolph Butts in Philadelphia and during the perpetration of the robbery Butts was stabbed four times by one of the felons, causing injury which resulted in Butts’ death.
Appellant cites several alleged errors during the prosecution proceedings which he asserts require a new trial. We conclude these assignments of error are without merit for the reasons that follow.
During the investigation of the crimes involved, the police apprehended and questioned Williams, who admitted having participated in the commission of the robbery, and accused Matthews and Jackson of also having participated and informed the police that Matthews had hidden the knife used in the stabbing in an apartment at a certain address. Based on this information, an investigating officer caused a search warrant to issue for the apartment. The complaining affidavit, signed by a police detective, Verbrugghe, stated the following: “On Fr. 2-23-68 about 11:00 p.m. Eandolph Butts 40-N., 4-38 Oreen St., was taken from the highway 3856 Haverford Ave. to the Presbyterian Hosp., and pronounced dead from stab wounds of the back. Investigation disclosed that James Williams 18-N., res. 3856 Haverford Avenue took part in the robbery of Eandolph Butts. James Williams stated that William Matthews 18-N., 3856 Haverford and James Jackson 19-N., 4422 Brown St., had stabbed Eandolph Butts and hid the knife in the 3rd floor apartment [rear] of 3856 Haverford Ave.” The warrant described the property sought as “one pocket knife” and bloody clothing worn by William Matthews on Friday, Februarv 23, 1968.
*69Upon arriving a,t 3856 Haverford Avenue at 12:30 a.m., on February 24th, (the aj>artment of appellant’s sister), the police took appellant into custody, placed him under arrest, and pursuant to the warrant seized an eight-inch kitchen knife (otherwise described as a “butter knife”).
Initially, appellant suggests that the affidavit upon which the search and seizure warrant was based lacks the requisite information for a finding of probable cause.
The foundation of the law of search and seizure is the Fourth Amendment, which is binding on the states under the Hue Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961). The Fourth Amendment in pertinent part provides: “No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation. . . .” And it is now well established that a magistrate may not constitutionally issue a search warrant until he is furnished with information sufficient to persuade a reasonable man that probable cause for the search exists. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509 (1964). The purpose of requiring this information is to give the magistrate the opportunity of knowing and weighing the facts and determining objectively for himself the need for invading a person’s privacy in order to enforce the law. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S. Ct. 191 (1948). His decision must be based solely on the information brought to his attention. Aguilar v. Texas, supra; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245 (1958). He must render his decision based on a commonsense reading of the entire affidavit. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S. Ct. 741 (1965) ; Commonwealth v. Payton, 212 Pa. Superior Ct. 254, 243 A. 2d 202 (1968). Thus *70the long standing principle, that probable cause will be determined by a “neutral and detached magistrate” and not by “the officer engaged in the often competí-, tive enterprise of ferreting out crime”, Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367 (1948), will be complied with.
The appropriate benchmark for a determination of whether a search and seizure warrant is valid is Aguilar v. Texas, supra, as explicated in Spinelli v. United States, supra. In these two cases the United States Supreme Court developed the following two-pronged test for ascertaining the validity of a warrant: “First, the application failed to set forth any of the ‘underlying circumstances’ necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge of the validity of the informant’s conclusions. . . . Second, the affiant-officers did not attempt to support their claim that their informant Avas ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable’.” 393 U.S. 413, 89 S. Ct. at 587.
The thrust of appellant’s argument seems to go to the second facet of the aforementioned test in that the requesting officer did not attempt to support his claim that the informant was credible or his information reliable. The Commonwealth counterargues that since the informant was a participant in the crime “and he personally witnessed, and was a party to, the events related to Detective Yerbrugghe” this should insure his reliability.
The case law is clear that when a person is an admitted participant in a crime, and the police attempt to secure a warrant upon the information received- from him, the second aspect of the Supreme Court’s test is met, since the fact that the individual admits participation in the crime insures his: reliability. See generally, United States v. Viggiano, 433 F. 2d 716 (2d Cir. 1970) ; Louie v. United States, 426 F. 2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1970); *71Gilbert v. United States, 366 F. 2d 923 ( 9th Cir. 1966) ; Owens v. Scafati, 273 F. Supp. 428 (D. Mass. 1967); Commonwealth v. Stewart, Mass. , 267 N.E. 2d 213 (1971); Commonwealth v. Rose, 211 Pa. Superior Ct. 295, 235 A. 2d 462 (1967).
All of the above cases, however, are slightly distinguished from the instant case in that therein there was corroboration from other police information, or the affidavit stated that the informant was an “admitted” participant in the crime, whereas in the instant case there is little corroborating information to insure reliability, and the affidavit does not expressly state that Williams was an admitted participant in the crime. The affidavit herein merely states that investigation disclosed that “James Williams 18-N., res. 3856 Haverford Avenue took part in the robbery of Randolph Butts.” Thus, there is no direct showing, on the face of the affidavit that Williams, the informant, had actually confessed or made inculpatory statements that would tend to show his reliability.
However, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ventresca, supra, at 108-09, 85 S. Ct. at 746, stated that the affidavit “must be tested and interpreted by . . . [this Court] in a common-sense and realistic fashion”, and that we “should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hyper-technical, rather than a common-sense manner”, and that “the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants”. Based on this guideline, it is our view that a common-sense reading of the affidavit involved is sufficient to establish Williams is reliable since he was a “known” participant in the crime, and the magistrate could properly presume Williams knew anything he said would or could be used to implicate him in the crime, and he would not be *72inclined to give false information about himself, or his uncle, the appellant.
Moreover, his recitation of the manner in which the crime was committed was corroborated by the police investigation, since it was clear that a murder had been committed and it occurred as a result of stab wounds, as the informer stated, leading to the conclusion he had first-hand information.
The appellant’s next contention is that the Mtchen knife seized and put in evidence as the murder weapon should have been suppressed because of the “slipshod manner in which Detective Verbrugghe approached his duties when he described the knife he was looking for as a pen knife; whereas he actually confiscated a silver Mtchen knife.”
The affidavit stated that the item to be seized was merely a knife, but the warrant limited the description to “one pocket knife”. According to testimony elicited during the suppression hearing below, when the detectives entered the apartment where appellant was staying, they asked Valerie Williams (an occupant of the apartment) where the “knife” used in the killing was; She pointed it out in a pan of water under the Mtchen table and, as previously noted, the knife was a kitchen knife rather than a “pocket knife”. Thus it is clear that the knife seized does not exactly match the description given in the warrant.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizure, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seised ” [Emphasis added.]
*73The United States Supreme Court in the case of Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74 (1927), discussed the Fourth Amendment requirement of particularity in the following terms: “The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officers executing the warrant.” [Emphasis added.] Id. at 196, 48 S. Ct. at 76.
It cannot be disputed that general or exploratory searches through which officers merely hope to discover evidence of any Mnd of any wrongdoing are not constitutionally permissible. The search must be one directed in good faith towards the objects specified in the warrant. Cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S. Ct. 430 (1950); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420 (1932) ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153 (1931).
We are convinced the search in this case was not “exploratory”, but rather one directed in good faith towards the object specified in the warrant. To rule otherwise, merely because the warrant specified a “pocket knife” whereas “a kitchen knife” was seized would be hypertechnical a,nd contrary to the common-sense approach mandated in United States v. Ventresca, supra Cf. also, State v. Pietraszewski, 285 Minn. 212, 172 N.W. 2d 758 (1969). Moreover, in this connection, we note that several courts have ruled that where the items to be seized are as precisely identified as the nature of the activity permits and an exact description is virtually impossible, the searching officer is only required to describe the general class of the item he is seeking. For example, see James v. United States, 416 F. 2d 467 (5th Cir. 1969), cert denied 397 U.S. 907, 90 *74S. Ct. 902 (1970); United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 822 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); and, United States v. Robinson, 287 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
Appellant next contends constitutional due process was violated at trial by the evidentiary use of a confession he made to the police.
Matthews testified that the confession was coerced through threats of physical violence and that his request for a lawyer during the period of police questioning was ignored. However, this testimony was specifically contradicted by the police officer to whom the confession was given. This officer denied the existence of any coercion and stated no questioning occurred until after Matthews had been fully informed of his rights as mandated by “Miranda”, and indicated he understood his rights and was willing to make a statement without the assistance of legal counsel. Under the circumstances, the credibility of Matthews’ testimony was for the fact-finders below, and we find nothing in the record to cause us to interfere with their rejection of his testimony. Cf. Commonwealth v. Abrams, 443 Pa. 295, 278 A. 2d 902 (1971) ; and Commonwealth ex rel. Joyner v. Brierley, 429 Pa. 156, 239 A. 2d 434 (1968).
Appellant next asserts the trial court committed error in refusing a specific request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, and also in failing to submit to the jury such a finding as a possible verdict. Since there was no evidence which pointed in the slightest degree to the offense of manslaughter, the court’s action did not constitute error. Commonwealth v. LaRue, 381 Pa. 113, 112 A. 2d 362 (1955); and Commonwealth v. Flax, 331 Pa. 145, 200 A. 632 (1938).
Appellant next contends due process was violated at trial by excusing jurors for cause merely because they indicated conscientious scruples against the impo*75sition of the death penalty, because this prevented the accused from being tried by a jury which was a cross section of the community. This contention was considered and rejected in Commonwealth v. Speller, 445 Pa. 32, 282 A. 2d 26 (1971), and we stand on our decision in that case. See also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S. Ct. 1788 (1968); and, Commonwealth v. Roach, 444 Pa. 368, 282 A. 2d 382 (1971).
In this connection, appellant advances another argument not considered in Speller, namely, that the excusing of jurors for cause because of conscientious scruples violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since a jury has absolute discretion in the fixing of the penalty and “could conceivably act differently in different cases.” Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 86 S. Ct. 518 (1966), is cited support of this position.
Giaccio is inapposite. Therein the court ruled unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute permitting a jury to place the costs on a defendant charged with a misdemeanor even though it found him not guilty of the crime. The thrust of the decision was that the statute was too vague and lacked sufficient standards to enable the accused to protect himself against arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of costs. Herein, the proscribed act is the taking of another human life, and there is nothing vague about that.
Furthermore, in speaking for the majority in Giaccio, the late Mr. Justice Black disposed of the contention now under discussion when he said: “In so holding we intend to cast no doubt whatever on the constitutionality of the settled practice of many States to leave to juries finding defendants guilty of a crime the power to fix punishment within legally prescribed limits.” Id. at 405, n. 8, 86 S. Ct. at 522, n. 8.
*76Finally, we note that the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S. Ct. 1454 (1971), while speaking on this very issue rejected the claim that there was a due process violation. Therein the Court pertinently stated: “We consider first McGiautha’s and Crampton’s common claim; that the absence of standards to guide the jury’s discretion on the punishment issue is constitutionally intolerable. To fit their arguments within a constitutional frame of reference petitioners contend that to leave the jury completely at large to impose or withhold the death penalty as it sees fit is fundamentally lawless and therefore violates the basic command of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall deprive a person of his life without due process of law. Despite the undeniable surface appeal of the proposition, we conclude that the courts below correctly rejected it.” Id. at 196, 91 S. Ct. at 1461. The Court went on to state: “In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammelled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. The States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due regard for the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety of factors, many of which will have been suggested by the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel. For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever be really complete. The infinite variety of cases and facets to each case would make general standards either meaningless ‘boiler-plate’ or a statement of the obvious *77that no jury would need.” Id. at 207-08, 91. S. Ct. at 1467-68.
Appellant also urges that there is an equal protection violation inherent in the present jury system. This contention is totally devoid of merit. Generally speaking, the equal protection clause requires a government to treat all those standing in the same position equally, i.e., a government cannot discriminate against a class or group of individuals. In cases such as here involved, there is no discrimination—all those who are found guilty of murder in the first degree can either have their punishment fixed at death or life imprisonment, and that determination rests with the jury based on the facts of each case. There is no apparent, or invidious discrimination against an individual, a group, or a class since the facts of each case are different and the jury makes its determination of the degree of guilt based solely on the facts in the case before it.
Finally, it is urged the trial court favored the Commonwealth and failed to act fairly and impartially throughout the proceedings. Our examination of the record fails to persuade us that there is any merit in this contention.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Bell, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.