Court Opinion

ID: 9393958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 18:03:41.571681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.502678
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/11/23 P. v. Venancio CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                B320236

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. SA101022)
         v.

FERNANDO VENANCIO, JR.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lauren Weis Birnstein, Judge. Affirmed.
      Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blake Armstrong,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _______________________
       Fernando Venancio, Jr., appeals from a judgment of
conviction after the jury found him guilty of the forcible rapes of
Evelyn S., Tracy D., and Lisa M.; the assault of Gabriela S. with
intent to commit rape; sexual penetration by use of force as to
Evelyn; and petty theft as to Lisa and Gabriela. The jury also
found true Venancio used a handgun in the commission of the
rapes of Tracy and Lisa and the assault of Gabriela.
       On appeal, Venancio contends the trial court violated his
constitutional and statutory rights by conducting most of the trial
in his absence after the court found he waived his right to attend
trial by spreading feces on his body and the courthouse holding
cell on three occasions (including after the court’s admonishment)
and by resisting efforts to prepare him to appear in the
courtroom. Venancio also contends his trial attorney provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to hearsay
statements the victims made to sexual assault response team
nurses. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Evidence at Trial
      1.     Evelyn—June 15-16, 2019
      Evelyn testified that on the evening of June 15, 2019
Venancio responded to her online advertisement for escort
services.1 She agreed to meet him for $600 for one hour, and she
drove to a location on 18th Street in Santa Monica. When she

1    Evelyn identified the man she met in response to the
advertisement as Venancio after being shown a six-pack
photographic lineup. Tracy, Lisa, and Gabriela also identified
Venancio from six-pack photographic lineups.

                                2
arrived, Evelyn followed Venancio through a gate to an
abandoned apartment with a mattress on the floor. When Evelyn
told Venancio he needed to pay in advance for sexual services,
Venancio said he did not have the money but would give her
bottles of wine in lieu of payment. Evelyn refused and tried to
leave, but Venancio blocked her path. When she tried to push
him out of the way, he grabbed her throat and pulled her down to
the floor. Keeping one hand on her throat and squeezing when
she resisted, Venancio removed her clothing. Venancio got on top
of her and partially penetrated her vagina with his penis while
covering her mouth and nose. He tried to give her drugs, but she
refused. Venancio then digitally penetrated her vagina with two
of his fingers. Venancio continued to grab Evelyn by the throat
and at times choke her, making it difficult to breathe, and he
partially, then fully penetrated her vagina and engaged in
intercourse. When Venancio got up, Evelyn pushed him hard and
ran out of the apartment naked, screaming for help as she ran
into the street.
       Catherine Hedden testified she was awoken by Evelyn’s
screams for help and went onto the balcony of the rental property
where she was staying. Evelyn was screaming, “‘Help me. Help
me. Somebody help me. He’s trying to kill me.’” Evelyn was
visibly scared and shaking. Hedden dropped a t-shirt down to
Evelyn and went downstairs. A bystander, Carol Martinez,
called 911. She told the dispatcher Evelyn said a man was raping
her and had choked her. Evelyn then came on the line and told
the dispatcher she had been working at a strip club and met a

                               3
man who was going to help her out with money, but he took her
to an abandoned house and raped her.2
       At 4:17 a.m. on June 16 Santa Monica Police Officer Evan
Raleigh received a call from dispatch to respond to the scene.
When he arrived, Evelyn was in the street in an oversized t-shirt
and socks, and she was “shaken up” and crying. Evelyn provided
a physical description of her assailant and told Officer Raleigh
she had agreed to model for Venancio and possibly engage in
sexual relations for a fee, but he attacked and raped her. Raleigh
and other police officers searched for Venancio but did not find
him.
       Officer Raleigh brought Evelyn to the UCLA Santa Monica
Rape Treatment Center (rape treatment center), where she was
examined by Page Courtemanche, a sexual assault response team
(SART) nurse. According to Courtemanche’s report,3 Evelyn told
Courtemanche she met Venancio at a strip club and agreed to
dance for him for $600, but after bringing her back to his
residence, he held her down, choked her, and raped her. He also
forced her to ingest methamphetamine. Evelyn reported
Venancio threatened her, saying, “‘[I]f you’re good, it’s not gonna
be as bad,’” “‘I don’t wanna slap you. You need to settle down,’”
“‘I’m a professional,’” and “‘Give me head.’”
       During her physical examination of Evelyn, Courtemanche
found abrasions on Evelyn’s neck and elbow. Courtemanche took

2     A recording of the 911 call was played for the jury.
3     Elizabeth Tighe, a nurse practitioner and supervisor at the
rape treatment center, testified regarding Courtemanche’s
examination of Evelyn and report. Tighe also testified about
other SART nurses’ examinations of Tracy and Gabriela, as well
as Venancio (after he was apprehended).

                                 4
swabs from various places on Evelyn’s body. Jessica Luna, a
senior criminalist at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department crime lab, testified that analysis of the swabs
showed the presence of sperm cells and Venancio’s DNA on
Evelyn’s breast, hand, chin, and genitals.

       2.    Tracy—July 10, 2019
       In July 2019 Tracy was unhoused and living in a van
parked in Santa Monica. She testified that around 11:00 p.m. on
July 10 she rode her bike to a gas station to buy cigarettes. After
she bought the cigarettes, Venancio came up to her and offered to
give her money for sexual acts, but she declined. However, she
agreed to trade her cigarettes for a small amount of crystal
methamphetamine. Tracy followed Venancio to a parking lot to
complete the transaction.
       When they arrived at the parking lot, Venancio reached
into his backpack and pulled out a handgun. He pointed the gun
at Tracy’s head while wrapping his other arm around her throat,
and she was “scared to death.” With his arm still around her
neck, Venancio took Tracy toward the dumpsters in the back of
the parking lot. He said he would not hurt her but was going to
“‘fuck the shit’” out of her, and he was “‘doing God’s work’” by
“‘teaching you girls not to trust men out here because next time
you might not be so lucky.’”
       Venancio, while still holding the gun, ordered Tracy to
undress and lie down on the ground. He climbed on top of her
and penetrated her vagina with his penis, and they had
intercourse for 10 to 15 minutes. He did not wear a condom, but
he removed his penis before ejaculating. After he finished, he
allowed Tracy to dress and leave.

                                 5
       Tracy told her boyfriend about the rape but initially did not
report it because she felt humiliated. She reported it on July 13
after seeing an article in the newspaper. The police took her to
the rape treatment center, where she was examined by SART
nurse Kari Herrington. Because Tracy had wiped her vaginal
and anal area after the intercourse and had been menstruating,
the potential for recovery of forensic evidence was limited. DNA
testing of swabs from Tracy’s body did not match Venancio’s
DNA.

       3.    Lisa—July 12, 2019
       Lisa testified that at around 9:30 p.m. on July 12, 2019 she
was outside a supermarket on Broadway in Santa Monica on the
phone with her friend Bernard, who was threatening to throw out
the belongings she kept at his residence. She was carrying a bag
with some clothes, a tablet computer, a cell phone charging cord,
and food. Venancio approached her and asked if she was okay.
They talked, and Venancio seemed “really nice” and offered to
drive her to Bernard’s apartment to retrieve her belongings.
Venancio said they needed to walk to a nearby location to get his
car keys. He was persistent, and Lisa reluctantly went with him.
When they arrived at the location, Lisa followed Venancio up a
staircase into a small room with a couch and boxes. He briefly
went into another room, and when he returned, he appeared
“agitated” and “hyper”; she believed he was high on drugs
because he was sniffing something with a straw.
       Venancio pulled a handgun out of his bag and said, “‘I’m
not gonna kill you. But I’m gonna make your night . . . a living
hell.’” He spat on Lisa’s face and punched her in the eye. He
ripped off her clothing while she tried to fight him off, and he

                                 6
pinned her to the couch as he penetrated her vagina with his
penis for approximately 10 minutes without a condom. As they
had intercourse, Lisa could see his gun that was sitting next to
the couch, and she was so scared she defecated. Venancio
abruptly stopped. He then gathered his belongings, took Lisa’s
tablet and the food from her bag, and left.
      Lisa did not initially report the rape to the police because
she was embarrassed, but a few days later a community center
case manager referred her to the Venice Family Clinic to treat
her injuries. On July 18 nurse Nancy Pierre-Paul examined Lisa.
Pierre-Paul testified that Lisa had a swollen black eye and
bruising on her chest. Pierre-Paul filed a “suspicious injury
report,” and Lisa was brought to the rape treatment center.
Lisa’s belongings from July 12 were tested, and Venancio’s DNA
was found on Lisa’s hoodie, tank top, bag, and water bottle, and
on the couch in the room where the incident occurred.

       4.    Gabriela—July 22, 2019
       Gabriela testified that on the afternoon of July 22, 2019 a
man responded to her online advertisement for escort services.
They agreed to $400 for one hour of sexual intercourse. He told
her to meet him at the 18th Street location in Santa Monica.
When she arrived, Venancio gave her a small hug and led her
into “an old garage shack kind of thing.” Gabriela sat down on a
mat with pillows and asked for the money. Venancio said “‘yeah’”
and went behind a partition.
       Venancio returned, holding a handgun and a knife.
Gabriela told him she was leaving, but Venancio said, “‘No. I’m
gonna fuck you. I’m not done with you yet.’” He placed the knife
against her neck and the gun to her chest. Gabriela managed to

                                7
push the emergency button on her phone while it was in her
pocket. Venancio then covered her mouth with his arm, making
it hard for her to breathe, and he punched the side of her face
with the gun and slapped her. He climbed on top of her, and she
tried to fight him off with her nails and a wine opener.
       Venancio then realized she had called the police on her
phone, and he ran off with her phone and his gun and knife.
Gabriela ran after him to try to get her phone back, but she could
not catch him. She called 911 from a bystander’s phone, and the
police arrived shortly thereafter to take her statement. Later
that day Santa Monica Police Detective Brian Spencer detained
Venancio a few blocks away based on Gabriela’s description. No
weapons were found on Venancio.4
       Gabriela was examined by nurse Cindy Swintelski at the
rape treatment center approximately four hours after the
incident. Swintelski prepared a SART report based on her
examination. Tighe testified based on the SART report that
Gabriela told Swintelski that Venancio first offered her wine and
water and massaged her body with oil but then forced his fingers
inside her vagina, “‘tapped’” his penis against her buttocks, and
placed his mouth on her vagina, at which point Gabriela asked
for her money. Venancio brought out a gun and a hammer.
Gabriela told Swintelski that Venancio saw her press the
emergency button on her phone and then grabbed the phone; he
struck her face and choked her; and they struggled as she tried to

4     Detective Spencer brought Venancio to the rape treatment
center where he was examined by nurse Lizette Castro early on
the morning of July 23. Venancio consented to an examination,
and samples were taken from his body. Castro noted an abrasion
on his torso and lacerations on the side of his chest.

                                8
get away. Gabriela reported that Venancio threatened her,
saying: “‘You aren’t leaving until I come’”; “‘I’m trying to teach
you a lesson’”; “‘This isn’t my first rodeo’”; and “‘I teach girls
lessons when they are on these sites.’” Swintelski observed
bruises on Gabriela’s leg, wrist, and forearm, and an injury to her
fingernail. Samples collected from Gabriela’s body showed
Venancio’s DNA on her breasts, exterior genitals, and perianal
region.
      Venancio did not call any witnesses or present evidence.

B.     The Verdicts and Sentencing
       On February 23, 2022 the jury found Venancio guilty of the
forcible rape of Evelyn, Lisa, and Tracy (counts 1, 3, 7; Pen. Code,
§ 261, subd. (a)(2));5 sexual penetration by use of force as to
Evelyn (count 2; § 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)); and assault with the
intent to commit rape as to Gabriela (count 5; § 220, subd. (a)(1)).
The jury found Venancio not guilty of the second degree robberies
of Lisa and Gabriela but guilty of the lesser included offense of
petty theft (counts 4, 6; § 484, subd. (a)). The jury also found true
as to counts 3, 5, and 7 that Venancio personally used a firearm
(a handgun) in the commission of the rapes of Lisa and Tracy and
the assault of Gabriela (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
       In a bifurcated proceeding, on February 23, 2022 the jury
found true as to counts 3 and 7 for forcible rape the special
allegations under section 667.61, subdivisions (a), (c), (e)(3), and
(e)(4), that Venancio used a firearm in the commission of the
rapes and Venancio committed the rapes against more than one
victim. The jury also found true the sentencing factors that

5     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                  9
Venancio’s crime involved the threat of great bodily harm; the
manner in which the crimes were carried out indicated planning
or sophistication; and Venancio engaged in violent conduct that
indicated a serious danger to society.
      On May 9, 2022 the trial court sentenced Venancio to an
aggregate term of 96 years to life in state prison. The court
imposed consecutive indeterminate terms of 15 years to life on
counts 1 and 2 and 25 years to life on counts 3 and 7.6 The court
imposed a 16-year term on count 5 for assault with intent to
commit rape comprised of the upper term of six years for offense,
plus the upper term of 10 years for the firearm-use enhancement.
On counts 4 and 6 for petty theft, the court sentenced Venancio to
concurrent six-month terms in county jail.
      Venancio timely appealed.

6      The 25-years-to-life sentences on counts 3 and 7 were
imposed pursuant to the jury’s fundings under section 667.61,
subdivisions (a), (e)(3) and (e)(4). The jury did not make specific
findings as to counts 1 and 2 (forcible rape and sexual
penetration of Evelyn) under section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and
(e)(4), to support the 15-years-to-life sentences, but the same jury
finding that Venancio was convicted of rape and/or forcible sexual
penetration against more than one victim would apply equally to
counts 1 and 2. Venancio does not argue the lack of specific
findings on these counts was error.

                                10
                         DISCUSSION

A.     The Trial Court Did Not Violate Venancio’s Statutory and
       Constitutional Rights To Be Present at Trial
       1.    Trial court proceedings
       January 5, 2022: On the date set for trial, Venancio
refused to leave his cell in county jail. The trial court issued an
extraction order for January 11.
       January 11: Venancio did not leave the jail because he
reported feeling ill. The trial court ordered a medical
examination and an extraction on January 27.
       January 27: Venancio came to the court in a “suicide vest.”
Defense counsel stated Venancio was noncommunicative and it
had been several months since Venancio’s last psychiatric
evaluation.
       January 28: Venancio missed the first bus from jail, and
Deputy Campos, the courtroom deputy, relayed information from
the jail that Venancio claimed to be hearing voices telling him not
to come to court. Venancio later appeared in a suicide vest, and
when the trial court asked if he would like different clothing,
Venancio stated, “I don’t understand what’s going on. And this
guy right here [referring to defense counsel], he’s not helping me.
I don’t think he’s fair. I don’t know who he is.” Venancio refused
to respond to questions from the court or Deputy Campos. The
court appointed psychiatrist Dr. Kory Knapke, who had
previously examined Venancio, to examine him.
       January 31: Dr. Knapke met with Venancio in an
interview room next to the holding cell in the courthouse
(adjacent to the courtroom). Dr. Knapke reported to the trial
court: “Mr. Venancio entered the interview room and he had no

                                11
eye contact with me whatsoever, which is a big red flag . . . in
terms of the potential of malingering. And he then turned
around, and it looked like he was grabbing for something and he
was. He was putting feces all over his face, started eating his
feces, and then he started smearing feces all over the interview
room.” Venancio told Dr. Knapke, “‘The demons are bothering
me. Everyone’s against me.’” Otherwise, Venancio was
“selectively mute,” refusing to answer Dr. Knapke’s questions
about courtroom proceedings and “only wanting to make a
comment about his alleged psychotic symptoms, which are all
very new symptoms based upon the jail mental health records
that I reviewed.” Dr. Knapke opined, “[C]learly the defendant is
malingering. His symptoms are very contrived and exaggerated,
and I strongly believe that he’s competent to stand trial.” The
court ordered Venancio to be transported to court the following
day in a safety chair “where he’s strapped down and he cannot
have the use of his hands to do what he did [before] tomorrow in
the courtroom.”
       February 1: The trial court ruled Venancio was competent
to stand trial based on Dr. Knapke’s oral and written report.
Venancio appeared in the courtroom strapped into a safety chair,
unable to move his arms. The court admonished Venancio that
his conduct the previous day in spreading feces all over himself
“will not be tolerated during the trial.” The court explained to
Venancio his options: He could assure the court he would not
spread feces again and wanted to remain in the courtroom, or he
could voluntarily absent himself and listen to the trial from a
nearby conference room with access to his attorney.
Alternatively, he could be restrained to prevent the same
behavior (for example, in the safety chair), but appearing in

                               12
restraints could prejudice his case. The court advised Venancio
that if he did not say what he wanted to do, the court was “going
to assume that [he was] going to be disruptive.”
        The trial court told Venancio they were about to start jury
selection and the jurors were in the hallway. The court asked
Venancio to respond “yes” or “no” as to whether he wanted to be
present in the courtroom during trial. Venancio did not respond.
The court gave Venancio an opportunity to talk to his attorney
about his options. Defense counsel talked to Venancio but then
informed the court he “got no response” to the court’s questions.
The court addressed Venancio in making its findings: “You are
competent and that you are malingering and that you did what
you did yesterday because you knew this trial was starting
. . . . And so you are trying to disrupt these proceedings.” The
court found further Venancio intentionally did not respond to the
court’s questions, affirming he did not wish to be present.
        The trial court decided, however, that Venancio should be
present for the swearing in of the jury so he would appreciate
that the trial was commencing. The court, counsel, Deputy
Campos, and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Sergeant Davis-Linton
(assigned to the courthouse) discussed options for restraining
Venancio. Defense counsel did not want Venancio to appear in
handcuffs and suggested a waist chain that would not be visible
to jurors. But Deputy Campos noted a waist chain allowed
Venancio access to his buttocks, and he had been wearing a chain
when he spread his feces the previous day. Defense counsel
requested the sheriff’s deputies dress Venancio in civilian
clothing, but Venancio was uncooperative and “went limp” when
deputies tried to lift his arm to change his shirt. Deputy Campos
and defense counsel agreed it would be acceptable if Venancio

                                13
remained in jail clothes and wore the waist chain. However, after
a recess, Deputy Campos reported Venancio went limp when
deputies attempted to remove him from the safety chair to place
him in a waist chain.
       Defense counsel conceded the attempts to prepare Venancio
for the courtroom were “fruitless” and stated, “It doesn’t make
sense to me if he’s just not cooperating at all why we should make
any additional efforts.” Ultimately, Venancio was brought into
the courtroom in the safety chair while the trial court questioned
jurors about potential hardships. After dismissing the hardship
jurors, the court stated for the record, “Mr. Venancio is still in the
chair, was facing all of the jurors, was present during this
hearing. The court makes a finding that he understands that
this trial is commenced and that we are engaged in the voir dire
process.” The court asked Venancio whether he wanted to be
present in court for the afternoon session; Venancio did not
respond. The court again advised Venancio of his right to be
present and asked him what he wanted to do. Venancio still did
not respond. At the end of the day the court advised the
attorneys that it did not believe Venancio’s refusal to respond to
questions constituted a waiver of his right to appear, and it
ordered that Venancio be extracted from his cell the following day
and restrained with a waist chain, which defense counsel could
conceal with a coat.
       February 2: Venancio was mistakenly transported to court
in the safety chair rather than a waist chain. Deputies
attempted to remove him from the safety chair and dress him in
civilian clothes, but he gripped the arms of the chair and would
not allow the deputies to lift him up. The trial court advised
Venancio that they were trying to remove him from the chair so

                                 14
the jury would not see him restrained because that would be
“very, very prejudicial” to him. The court asked defense counsel
whether Venancio could remain in the safety chair as a “last
resort.” Defense counsel responded, “I think he’s better off not
being here at all, just for the record. This is a sort of chair—it’s
like death chamber. It’s got a ton of straps. It’s very prejudicial.
It’s going to give the impression that [Venancio] is dangerous.
He’s never done anything violent. He’s never acted out in court.”
Deputy Campos released Venancio’s arm from the chair so
another attempt could be made to move him, but Venancio would
not lift up his arm and tensed up when Campos tried again to lift
it.
       The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that
Venancio’s refusal to get out of the chair demonstrated a refusal
to appear in court, explaining, “[B]y virtue of your body language
and your holding on that chair, I am making the finding that you
are uncooperative. You are refusing to be in the courtroom
appropriately and engage in appropriate, conforming behavior in
the court.” The court informed Venancio the trial would proceed
without him but that he would be ordered back the following day,
and he could change his mind and attend the trial if he would
conform his behavior. The court advised counsel: “I want this [to
be] very clear on the record—that [Venancio] is listening to
everything. He understands everything. He’s competent to start
this trial. He’s malingering. And he is purposefully not
answering the court’s questions. And that is my finding by clear
and convincing evidence considering Dr. Knapke’s report and
everything else . . . . He’s being resistive because we can’t get
him out of the stretcher chair or the safety chair to put him into
the chair for trial. He needs to be in that chair for trial because

                                15
I’m not going to have him—and counsel doesn’t want him—I’m
not going to have him in horrible restraints like this in front of
the jury.”
       The trial court ordered that Venancio be placed in a room
that afternoon to listen to jury selection on a speaker. The court
advised the jury, “Mr. Venancio is not present with us today. Do
not consider that for any reason.” However, at some point during
the afternoon session, Venancio was taken back to jail because he
urinated on himself while in the safety chair.7 The court and
attorneys conferred about how to proceed, and the prosecutor
expressed concern there was “not sufficient clarity” to establish
Venancio was voluntarily absenting himself from trial. The court
found Venancio should not have been delivered in a safety chair,
and it ordered that Venancio not be placed in a safety chair the
following day.
       February 3: Venancio came to the courthouse in a waist
chain. However, Sergeant Davis-Linton advised the court that
while Venancio was waiting in a holding cell in the courthouse,
he slipped off his waist chain, defecated, and smeared the feces
all over the cell and himself. Venancio also claimed demons were
talking to him. Sergeant Davis-Linton spoke to the sergeant at
the county jail, who reported that Venancio had been cooperative
and communicative while at the jail, including that morning.
The trial court agreed with Sergeant Davis-Linton that
Venancio’s actions appeared to be calculated. The court

7     During the morning hearing, while Venancio was present,
Sergeant Davis-Linton had expressed his concern that Venancio
would not ask deputies for bathroom breaks while in the lockup
room, and as a result, “he’s almost guaranteed to urinate in his
chair.”

                               16
requested that Venancio be cleaned up in the courthouse holding
cell and read an advisement about his right to be present,8 but
the bailiff responsible for Venancio reported there was no way to
sufficiently clean Venancio because there was no shower in the
courthouse and paper towels were inadequate to remove the feces
he had smeared all over his body. The court ruled, “I am deeming
that he is refusing to come to court today. I find by clear and
convincing evidence that his conduct is a refusal of coming to
court. It’s clear that by slipping the waist chains, by defecating
again, by smearing it all over, that he is refusing to attend his
trial.” The court added that it would order Venancio extracted
every day of the trial “just in case he changes his mind.”
       During the afternoon session, the trial court found, “It is
clear to me, again, that Dr. [Knapke’s] opinion as to the
defendant’s competency has been reinforced by virtue of the
information that we now have; that when he is at the jail near his
cell at county and he’s talked to, he completely responds. He has
no problem at the jail. But as soon as he is transported to his
trial location, that’s when he . . . presents as somebody who is
hearing demons, and it is clear that he is malingering to this
court.” The court continued, “He is disruptive. He is causing
problems. He is trying to muck up our proceedings. And the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that he is
voluntarily, by his behavior, absenting himself from this trial and
that he is disruptive and nonconforming, and that this is the
reason we’re going ahead without him.” The court resumed jury
selection in Venancio’s absence.

8     The court ordered Sergeant Davis-Linton to advise
Venancio daily of his right to appear and provide a recording to
the court.

                                17
       February 7: Sergeant Davis-Linton informed the trial court
that at the jail that morning, Venancio was “coherent and
compliant and came to court. But immediately when he was put
into a cell . . . . [h]ere at LAX court, he smeared feces
everywhere—all over a huge cell.” The court found it was the
third time that Venancio had smeared feces all over the holding
cell and it was clear he was voluntarily absenting himself. The
court asked if Venancio could be brought into the courtroom, but
Sergeant Davis-Linton said it was not possible because Venancio
had smeared feces “all over his face and hair” and possibly
elsewhere on his body, and deputies would be unable to properly
handle him. Sergeant Davis-Linton had opened the holding cell
and asked Venancio if he wanted to appear, but Venancio was
nonresponsive. The court found it was not necessary to bring
Venancio into the courtroom: “He’s been advised over and over
again about his right to attend . . . his trial. So that’s without
question. He knows what’s going on . . . . And it is clear to me
that his behavior is completely different when he’s at county jail
versus when he gets here, and that’s when he starts acting up.
So I am going to send him back to the jail. I’m going to make this
finding throughout the trial that he does not want to be here.
Every so often I will order him to the court. I don’t think I have
to do it every day. But I will order him to be present every few
days, and we’ll see if his behavior has changed.” The court
instructed defense counsel to speak to Venancio at the jail. The
court resumed jury selection in Venancio’s absence, instructing
the jurors not to consider his absence for any purpose.
       February 8: After the conclusion of jury selection, Venancio
was brought into the courtroom strapped to the safety chair
outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel informed the

                                18
trial court that he went to the jail the previous day and waited to
meet with Venancio, but Venancio was not brought out. Defense
counsel did not know why. The court advised Venancio it had
found he voluntarily absented himself and waived his right to be
present by his behavior, but Venancio could be present if he
changed his mind. The court continued, “But we will no longer be
ordering you out every day because now you’ve done this on . . .
three or four occasions. Today, you’re in the safety chair so you
can’t do it again. . . . Do you want to conform your behavior and
do you want to present at your trial? Do you want to be in the
courtroom? Do you want to be in the lockup listening to your
trial on the speaker?” Venancio did not respond.
       February 8 through February 22: Venancio was not present
for any of the trial proceedings that began on the afternoon of
February 8, continued on February 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 22,
and concluded with delivery of the verdict on February 23. As
part of its preliminary jury instructions on February 8, the trial
court advised the jury: “You are not to speculate as to why the
defendant, Fernando Venancio, Jr., is not present during the
trial. His absence is not evidence. You must not consider his
absence in any way. You must not discuss his absence during
your deliberations, and it must not affect your evaluation of this
case or your decision in any way.” On February 16 the court
ordered that Venancio be transferred to the courtroom in a safety
chair. Outside the presence of the jury, the court asked Venancio
if he wanted to attend the trial, and if he wished to testify.
Venancio did not respond.
       May 9, 2022: Venancio was present and testified at his
sentencing hearing.

                                19
       2.       Governing law and standard of review
       “‘“Broadly stated, a criminal defendant has a right to be
personally present at certain pretrial proceedings and at trial
under various provisions of law, including the confrontation
clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, section 15 of
article I of the California Constitution, and sections 977 and
1043.”’” (People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 431; accord,
Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 338 [“One of the most basic
of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the
accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of
his trial . . . .”]; People v. Ramirez (2022) 14 Cal.5th 176, 188
(Ramirez) [“A criminal defendant’s right to be present at trial is
protected under both the federal and state Constitutions.”].)
       However, a defendant’s constitutional right to be present
“‘may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct.’” (People
v. Gutierrez (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1196, 1202 (Gutierrez); see People
v. Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 61, 72 [a defendant’s voluntary
absence from trial “‘operates as a waiver of his right to be
present,’” italics omitted]; People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th
77, 82, fn. 7 [“the doctrine that a defendant impliedly waives the
right of presence by voluntarily absenting himself from trial has
been well established . . . for almost a century”].) “‘“In
determining whether a defendant is absent voluntarily, a court
must look at the ‘totality of the facts.’”’” (Ramirez, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 192; accord, Gutierrez, at p. 1205.) Relevant facts
include whether the defendant was “‘“‘aware of the processes
taking place,”’” he knew of “‘“his right and of his obligation to be

                                20
present,”’” and he had “‘“no sound reason for remaining away.’”’’”
(Ramirez, at p. 190; accord, Espinoza, at p. 74.)
       “Sections 977 and 1043 implement the state constitutional
protection.” (Gutierrez, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1202.)
Section 977, former subdivision (b)(1), in effect at the time of
Venancio’s trial, provided, as relevant here, “[I]n all cases in
which a felony is charged, the accused shall be personally present
at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary
hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken
before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of
sentence. The accused shall be personally present at all other
proceedings unless they shall, with leave of court, execute in open
court, a written waiver of their right to be personally present, as
provided by paragraph (2).”9 (Stats. 2021, ch. 196, §1.)
Section 1043, subdivision (a), similarly provides, “Except as
otherwise provided in this section, the defendant in a felony case
shall be personally present at the trial.” Subdivision (b) provides,
however, “The absence of the defendant in a felony case after the
trial has commenced in their physical presence shall not prevent
continuing the trial to, and including, the return of the verdict in
any of the following cases: [¶] (1) Any case in which the
defendant, after being warned by the judge that they will be
removed if they continue their disruptive behavior, nevertheless
insists on acting in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and
disrespectful of the court that the trial cannot be carried on with
the defendant present in the courtroom. [¶] (2) Any prosecution
for an offense which is not punishable by death in which the

9     Effective June 30, 2022 (sunsetting on January 1, 2024),
section 977, subdivision (b), was amended to provide for physical
or remote presence for certain proceedings.

                                21
defendant is voluntarily absent.” Subdivision (c) provides
further, “Any defendant who is absent from a trial pursuant to
paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) may reclaim the right to be
present at the trial as soon as they are willing to act consistently
with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts
and judicial proceedings.”
       The Supreme Court in Gutierrez clarified that sections 977
and 1043 do not conflict; rather, “under section 1043,
subdivision (b)(2), a trial court may continue a trial in a custodial
defendant’s absence after the trial has commenced in the
defendant’s presence—without first obtaining the defendant’s
written or oral waiver of the right to presence—if other evidence
indicates the defendant has chosen to be absent voluntarily.”
(Gutierrez, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1204, 1206.)
       Our review of the trial court’s factual findings on whether
the defendant’s absence was voluntary is deferential: “Review is
restricted to determining whether the finding is supported by
substantial evidence.” (People v. Espinoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 74; accord, Ramirez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 190.) Further, the
Supreme Court in Ramirez assumed but did not decide that “the
clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applies to the
trial court’s voluntary absence determination.” (Ramirez, at
p. 190.) In applying that standard, the court explained, citing
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995 to 996, “the
question on review is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that defendant’s absence was
voluntary.” (Ramirez, at p. 190.)

                                 22
      3.      Venancio voluntarily absented himself from trial by
              spreading feces and resisting placement in a waist
              chain, making his attendance impossible
        Venancio contends the trial court violated his constitutional
and statutory rights by conducting the trial in his absence
because there was no evidence he refused to attend the trial; he
was never violent; and his conduct, although “it could be deemed
disruptive,” occurred outside the courtroom. We agree with the
trial court that Venancio voluntarily absented himself from the
trial, thereby waiving his constitutional and statutory rights to
attend. (Gutierrez, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1208-1209.)
        Although Venancio never expressly refused to attend the
trial, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
finding by clear and convincing evidence that he intentionally
made it impossible to be present. On the day before jury
selection began, during his examination by Dr. Knapke at the
courthouse, Venancio defecated on his hands, smeared feces all
over his face, and started eating the feces while claiming the
“‘demons are bothering me.’” On the first day of jury selection,
the trial court found Venancio was competent to stand trial,
warned him that spreading feces was unacceptable in the
courtroom, and advised him that his appearance while strapped
to the safety chair would be highly prejudicial to his case. The
court asked Venancio whether he wanted to be placed in a waist
chain and commit to refrain from such conduct or to listen from
another room, but Venancio did not respond. And when the
deputies attempted to place him in a waist chain, Venancio made
his body limp so it was “fruitless” to try to place him in a waist
chain to appear in court (as defense counsel put it). On the
second day of trial, Venancio gripped the arms of the safety chair

                                 23
so deputies could not lift him out of it, and defense counsel
argued it would be worse for Venancio to appear in court in the
chair than to be excluded because the chair had “a ton of straps”
making it look like a “death chamber.” And when Venancio was
placed in another room to listen to the proceedings, he urinated
in the safety chair. On the third day of trial, Venancio was in a
waist chain in the holding cell at the courthouse, but he defecated
and spread feces all over himself and the holding cell, and there
was no way to clean him to safely bring him into the courtroom.
On the fourth day of trial, Venancio again defecated and spread
feces in his holding cell. On each of these days—as well as on
February 8 (day five) and 16 (day 10)—the court made findings
Venancio’s conduct made it impossible for him to attend the trial,
and the court repeatedly advised Venancio of his options,
including that he could at any time assert his desire to attend the
trial. Venancio never responded.
       Under these circumstances, Venancio voluntarily elected
not to be present in the courtroom. Venancio could not attend the
trial covered in feces (and the deputies could not safely escort him
into the courtroom); he could not attend in a waist chain because
it was insufficient to stop him from spreading feces; and he could
not attend while strapped in the safety chair because it would
have been “highly, highly prejudicial.” Moreover, the court made
a finding (not challenged on appeal) that Venancio was
malingering; the court repeatedly and clearly advised of Venancio
of his right to be present and provided him options for being
present; and the court found Venancio knew his conduct made it
impossible for him to attend, yet he persisted in this conduct.
(See Ramirez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 190 [trial absence is
voluntary where defendant is aware of the circumstances, aware

                                24
of his right to be present, and has “‘“‘no sound reason’”’” for
absenting himself].)
       Contrary to Venancio’s contention, there is no requirement
that a defendant refuse to attend trial for the trial court to find
he voluntarily absented himself. In Ramirez, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pages 181 through 192, for example, the Supreme Court
recently affirmed a trial court’s ruling that a defendant
voluntarily absented himself from trial when he took illicit drugs
the night before his second day of trial and was taken to the
hospital. The court held there might be circumstances where a
medical emergency arising from drug use was not a voluntary
absence, but substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
finding by clear and convincing evidence that it was highly
probable the defendant’s absence was voluntary in that he
calculated his behavior to avoid going to trial (and he was not
truly debilitated by the drugs). (Id. at pp. 190-192.)
       Similarly, in People v. Rogers (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 403,
411 through 412, relied on by the People, the Court of Appeal
affirmed a trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance to a self-
represented defendant who claimed he could not be mentally
present on the day he was scheduled to present his defense
because he was suffering from diabetic blackouts. The evidence,
including a physician’s examination and a report from the jail,
showed the defendant’s condition was self-induced, and on the
morning in question, the defendant took a large dose of insulin
without eating breakfast and lunch (after eating well and
participating in the trial actively on prior days). (Id. at p. 413.)
The court concluded, “The defendant, by his own actions, induced
the condition existing in the afternoon of the fourth day of the
trial. This amounted to a waiver of the right to be mentally

                                 25
present granted by [section 1043]. If this were not the rule, many
persons, by their own acts, could effectively prevent themselves
from ever being tried.” (Id. at p. 415.)
       The People also rely on People v. Howze (2001)
85 Cal.App.4th 1380, although the court there considered
whether the defendant by his conduct waived his right to be
present under section 977, not whether he waived his right to be
present under section 1043, subdivision (b).10 In Howze, the
defendant refused to leave his jail cell to attend trial and “did
everything he could to sabotage the proceedings, including
fighting with deputies, acting as if he was being attacked by
imaginary ‘bugs’ or people, claiming to be possessed by different
people, claiming to have various physical maladies that
prevented him from coming to court, not cooperating with doctors
or mental health experts, not cooperating with his attorneys,
stripping naked while in the holding tank to prevent having to go
into the courtroom, and rubbing feces on himself to prevent his
extraction from his cell when he refused to go to court.” (Howze,
at p. 1398.) On this basis, the court denied defendant’s motion
made two days before trial to represent himself. (Ibid.) The
court also concluded that the defendant, who had been “advised
that a failure to leave his cell to be transported to court for the

10    In People v. Howze, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at page 1394, the
defendant was not present at the commencement of trial, so
section 1043, subdivision (b), did not apply. The case was decided
on estoppel grounds because the defendant’s refusal to come to
court, including his statement, “‘I’m not coming back, so do
whatever you’re gonna do,’” was not “in strict formal compliance”
with the statutory requirements for a waiver under section 997.
(Howze, at p. 1395.)

                                26
commencement of trial would be considered a waiver of his right
to be present, and subsequently chose not to leave his cell to be
transported to court,” was “estopped to assert that the trial
improperly commenced in his absence.” (Id. at p. 1396.)
       Venancio argues that the cases in which defendants
forfeited their right to be present at trial involved situations
where they were disruptive inside the courtroom, citing People v.
Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 122 (nine deputies were needed to
subdue the defendant after he started banging on the counsel
table and tried to lift it). But Bell was a capital case, and
section 1043, subdivision (b), allowing a trial to proceed in a
defendant’s absence, did not apply. Here, it is immaterial
whether Venancio smeared feces on himself in the courtroom, the
adjoining conference room, or the courthouse holding cell. The
undisputed evidence is that Venancio could not be cleaned up and
safely and hygienically brought into the courtroom on the days he
spread feces on himself.11
       Finally, Venancio argues defense counsel could not waive
Venancio’s right to be present, citing People v. Johnson (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 943. In that case, the Court of Appeal concluded

11     Venancio also argues that “most cases” in which a
defendant has been found to have forfeited the right to be present
at trial involved situations where the defendant engaged in or
threatened violence, citing People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th
541, in which a defendant who violently attacked his attorney
and cursed at the court in front of the jury was excluded from the
rest of his trial under section 1043, subdivision (b)(1), without
advance warning. The fact that a court may exclude defendants
who are violent in the courtroom without warning does not mean
a court may not find a voluntary absence based on nonviolent
conduct.

                               27
the trial court erred (although the error was harmless) in
allowing the bailiff to demonstrate the operation of a gun to the
jury in the defendant’s absence after the defense attorney
represented that the defendant was voluntarily absenting himself
from the demonstration. (Id. at pp. 956-957.) By contrast,
defense counsel did not purport to waive Venancio’s presence.
The attorney simply agreed with the court’s finding the safety
chair would be very prejudicial and argued the court should
exclude Venancio rather than seating him in the safety chair.
The court’s finding Venancio voluntarily absented himself was
based on Venancio’s conduct, not a waiver on Venancio’s behalf,
and the court personally advised Venancio of his right to be in
court and the consequences of his conduct on at least four
occasions.
       Moreover, to the extent Venancio contends the court should
have ordered him to appear strapped to the safety chair instead
of excluding him (which is not clear from his briefs on appeal), we
agree with the People that Venancio waived this argument under
the rule of invited error. (See People v. Waldon (2023) 14 Cal.5th
288, 304 [“‘“The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an
accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error
made by the trial court at his behest. If defense counsel
intentionally caused the trial court to err, the appellant cannot be
heard to complain on appeal. . . . [I]t also must be clear that
counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or
mistake.”’”]; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1,
49 [same].) It is clear from the comments made by defense
counsel that he believed it was in Venancio’s best interest not to
be present if the only option was to appear in court strapped into
a chair that looked like one used for executions.

                                28
B.     Venancio Has Not Met His Burden To Show Ineffective
       Assistance of Counsel in Failing To Object to the Victims’
       Prior Statements to SART Nurses
       Venancio contends his trial attorney provided ineffective
assistance of counsel when he failed to object to statements
Evelyn and Gabriela made to the SART nurses describing threats
Venancio made during the rape and assault. Venancio argues
Evelyn’s statement to Courtemanche that Venancio told her “I’m
a professional,” and Gabriela’s statement to Swintelski that
Venancio said “This isn’t my first rodeo,” were inadmissible
hearsay and unduly prejudicial because they implied Venancio
had previously raped other women. Venancio has not met his
burden to show ineffective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel had a rational tactical purpose for allowing the jury to
hear the victims’ prior statements: to show inconsistencies
between their accounts to the nurses and their trial testimony.
       To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant bears the burden to show (1) the “‘“counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms”’” and (2) the defendant
“‘“suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”’”
(People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 80; accord, People v. Holmes,
McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 806; see Strickland
v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-692.)
       A court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel “begin[s] with the presumption that counsel’s actions fall
within the broad range of reasonableness, and afford[s] ‘great
deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.’” (People v. Mickel (2016)
2 Cal.5th 181, 198; accord, People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610,

                                 29
661 [“Because we accord great deference to trial counsel’s tactical
decisions, counsel’s failure to object rarely provides a basis for
finding incompetence of counsel.”].) Moreover, the defendant’s
burden is “‘difficult to carry on direct appeal,’ as a reviewing
court will reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal only if there is affirmative evidence that
counsel had ‘“‘no rational tactical purpose’”’ for an action or
omission.” (Mickel, at p. 198; accord, People v. Woodruff (2018)
5 Cal.5th 697, 746; see People v. Sepulveda (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
291, 301 [“‘On direct appeal, if the record “‘sheds no light on why
counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,’” we must
reject the claim “‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation
and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.’”’”].)
       In this case, there is no need to parse the record to find
defense counsel’s objective in not objecting to the victims’ prior
statements. Outside of the presence of the jury—after the
prosecutor adduced Evelyn’s statement but before Gabriela’s
statement—the trial court asked defense counsel whether the
court was correct in assuming he did not object to the statements
made to the nurse at the rape treatment center “for a strategic
reason so that you could get it all in to show whether there were
inconsistencies in the actual narration to these medical
personnel.” Defense counsel answered yes.
       Venancio has not shown this was not a rational objective.
(See People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 661 [rejecting claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to object to
police officer’s testimony about defendant’s postarrest
statements, explaining “nothing in the record suggests defense
counsel lacked a rational tactical reason for not objecting to

                                30
Officer Smith’s testimony. [Citations.] For example, counsel
could reasonably have viewed the officer’s testimony as further
support for the defense position that defendant did not actually
use a weapon during the robbery.”].) It appears from the record
that defense counsel believed the victim’s inconsistent statements
to the nurse supported the defense position that both victims
were escorts who fabricated details of the rape or assault to show
a lack of consent or to conceal their own unlawful conduct.
Indeed, Venancio’s attorney in his closing argument focused on
discrepancies between Evelyn and Gabriela’s statements to the
SART nurses and their testimony at trial. For example, defense
counsel highlighted that Evelyn told Courtemanche that
Venancio forced her to ingest methamphetamine, but she
testified at trial that she did not take the drugs he offered. He
likewise pointed out that Gabriela told Swintelski that Venancio
had repeated sexual contact with her, but at trial she said the
assault ended before any sexual contact. Gabriela also told
Swintelski Venancio wielded a hammer, whereas at trial she said
he had a knife. The attorney argued, “you can consider all her
. . . inconsistent statements that she made that are different from
the date of the incident from her testimony at trial. You can
consider all that stuff in evaluating whether or not there’s a
reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Venancio either robbed or
raped her.”
        Venancio argues his attorney had no legitimate reason not
to object to Evelyn and Gabriela’s specific statements that
Venancio told them, respectively, he was a “professional” and it
was not his “first rodeo” because their trial testimony was silent
(rather than inconsistent) on this point, and so the admission of
the prior statements would not damage their credibility. But

                                31
that is an artificially narrow view of defense counsel’s strategic
objective. He may have felt the “first rodeo” and “professional”
threats were histrionic and would be perceived by the jury to
have been fabricated. Or he may have reasoned that a hearsay
objection to those statements could have led to exclusion of the
victims’ other prior statements that were critical to the defense
strategy. We “begin[] with the presumption that counsel’s actions
fall within the broad range of reasonableness,” and we find no
“affirmative evidence that counsel had ‘“‘no rational tactical
purpose’”’ for an action or omission.” (People v. Mickel, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 198.)
       Venancio also argues that defense counsel was aware that
Evelyn’s and Gabriela’s statements were inadmissible because at
the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, the trial court expressed
a concern that similar proposed testimony by Hedden that Evelyn
told her Venancio said “he had done this several times before”
could be inadmissible hearsay and would be highly prejudicial.
But the fact defense counsel, the trial court, and the prosecutor
were all attuned to the hearsay and prejudice arguments
surrounding the prior statements does not support a showing
that defense counsel had no rational tactical purpose for not
objecting. To the contrary, it is clear from the trial proceedings,
including the trial court’s direct inquiry whether the attorney had
a “strategic reason” for not bringing a hearsay objection, that this
was not a case of inadvertence or incompetence, but a reasoned
strategy.

                                32
                       DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed.

                                        FEUER, J.
We concur:

     PERLUSS, P. J.

     ESCALANTE, J.*

*     Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                              33