Court Opinion

ID: 9419344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:48:58.364014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:42:05.754469
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Stone
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners brought this suit in the United States District Court for Western Pennsylvania to restrain threatened criminal prosecution of them in the state courts by respondents, the City of Jeannette (a Pennsylvania municipal corporation) and its Mayor, for violation of a city ordinance which prohibits the solicitation of orders for merchandise without first procuring a license from the city authorities and paying a license tax. The ordinance as applied is held to be an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech, press and religion in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 105. The questions decisive of the present case are whether the district court has statutory jurisdiction as a federal court to entertain the suit, and whether petitioners have by their pleadings and proof established a cause of action in equity.
The case is not one of diversity of citizenship, since some of the petitioners, like respondents, are citizens of Pennsylvania. The bill of complaint alleges that the named plaintiffs are Jehovah’s Witnesses, persons who entertain religious beliefs and engage in religious practices which it describes; that the suit is a class suit brought in petitioners’ own behalf and in behalf of all other Jehovah’s Witnesses in Pennsylvania and adjoining states to restrain respondents from enforcing ordinance No. 60 of the City of Jeannette against petitioners and all other Jehovah’s Witnesses because, as applied to them, the ordinance abridges the guaranties of freedom of speech, press, and religion of the First Amendment made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth.
*160The suit is alleged to arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The complaint sets up that in the practice of their religion and in conformity to the teachings of the Bible, Jehovah’s Witnesses make, and for many years have made, house to house distribution, among the people of the City of Jeannette, of certain printed books and pamphlets setting forth the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ interpretations of the teachings of the Bible. Municipal Ordinance No. 60 provides: “That all persons canvassing for or soliciting within said Borough (now City of Jeannette), orders for goods . . . wares or merchandise of any kind, or persons delivering such articles under orders so obtained or solicited” without first procuring a license and paying prescribed license taxes, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100 and costs, or if the fine is not paid, by imprisonment from five to thirty days. It is alleged that in April, 1939, respondents arrested and prosecuted petitioners and other Jehovah’s Witnesses for violation of the ordinance because of their described activities in distributing religious literature, without the permits required by the ordinance, and that respondents threaten to continue to enforce the ordinance by arrests and prosecutions— all in violation of petitioners’ civil rights.
No preliminary or interlocutory injunction was granted but the district court, after a trial, held the ordinance invalid, 39 F. Supp. 32, on the authority of Reid v. Borough of Brookville, 39 F. Supp. 30, in that it deprived petitioners of the rights of freedom of press and religion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court enjoined respondents from enforcing the ordinance against petitioners and other Jehovah’s Witnesses.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sustained the jurisdiction of the district court, but reversed on the merits, 130 F. 2d 652, on the authority of Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584. One judge dissented on the ground that the complaint did not sufficiently allege a violation *161of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to entitle petitioners to relief under the Civil Rights Act. We granted certiorari, 318 U. S. 749, and set the case for argument with Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra.
We think it plain that the district court had jurisdiction as a federal court to hear and decide the question of the constitutional validity of the ordinance, although there was no allegation or proof that the matter in controversy exceeded $3,000. By 8 U. S. C. § 43 (derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, continued without substantial change as R. S. § 1979) it is provided that “every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
As we held in Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496, 507-14, 527-32, the district courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by 28 U. S. C. § 41 (14) over suits brought under the Civil Rights Act without the allegation or proof of any jurisdictional amount. Not only do petitioners allege that the present suit was brought under the Civil Rights Act, but their allegations plainly set out an infringement of its provisions. In substance, the complaint alleges that respondents, proceeding under the challenged ordinance, by arrest, detention and by criminal prosecutions of petitioners and other Jehovah’s Witnesses, had subjected them to deprivation of their rights of freedom of speech, press and religion secured by the Constitution, and the complaint seeks equitable relief from such deprivation in the future.
The particular provision of the Constitution on which petitioners rely is the Due Process Clause of the Four*162teenth Amendment, violation of which the dissenting judge below thought was not sufficiently alleged to establish a basis for relief under the Civil Rights Act. But we think this overlooks the special relationship of the Fourteenth Amendment to the rights of freedom of speech, press, and religion guaranteed by the First. We have repeatedly held that the Fourteenth Amendment has made applicable to the states the guaranties of the First. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160, n. 8 and cases cited; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413. Allegations of fact sufficient to show deprivation of the right of free speech under the First Amendment are sufficient to establish deprivation of a constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth, and to state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, whenever it appears that the abridgment of the right is effected under color of a state statute or ordinance. It follows that the bill, which amply alleges the facts relied on to show the abridgment by criminal proceedings under the ordinance, sets out a case or controversy which is within the adjudicatory power of the district court.
Notwithstanding the authority of the district court, as a federal court, to hear and dispose of the case, petitioners are entitled to the relief prayed only if they establish a cause of action in equity. Want of equity jurisdiction, while not going to the power of the court to decide the cause, Di Giovanni v. Camden Ins. Assn., 296 U. S. 64, 69 ; Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 181-82, may nevertheless, in the discretion of the court, be objected to on its own motion. Twist v. Prairie Oil Co., 274 U. S. 684, 690; Pennsylvania v. Williams, supra, 185. Especially should it do so where its powers are invoked to interfere by injunction with threatened criminal prosecutions in a state court.
The power reserved to the states under the Constitution to provide for the determination of controversies in *163their courts may be restricted by federal district courts only in obedience to Congressional legislation in conformity to the judiciary Article of the Constitution. Congress, by its legislation, has adopted the policy, with certain well defined statutory exceptions, of leaving generally to the state courts the trial of criminal cases arising under state laws, subject to review by this Court of any federal questions involved. Hence, courts of equity in the exercise of their -discretionary powers should conform to this policy by refusing to interfere with or embarrass threatened proceedings in state courts save in those exceptional cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and imminent; and equitable remedies infringing this independence of the states — though they might otherwise be given— should be withheld if sought on slight or inconsequential grounds. Di Giovanni v. Camden Ins. Assn., supra, 73; Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525-26; cf. United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U. S. 13; Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U. S. 525.
It is a familiar rule that courts of equity do not ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions. No person is immune from prosecution in good faith for his alleged criminal acts. Its imminence, even though alleged to be in violation of constitutional guaranties, is not a ground for equity relief since the lawfulness or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is based may be determined as readily in the criminal case as in a suit for an injunction. Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207; Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240. Where the threatened prosecution is by state officers for alleged violations of a state law, the state courts are the final arbiters of its meaning and application, subject only to review by this Court on federal grounds appropriately asserted. Hence the arrest by the federal courts of the processes of the criminal law within the *164states, and the determination of questions of criminal liability under state law by a federal court of equity, are to be supported only on a showing of danger of irreparable injury “both great and immediate.” Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 95, and cases cited; Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Corp., 312 U. S. 45, 49, and cases cited; Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387; Williams v. Miller, 317 U. S. 599.
The trial court found that respondents had prosecuted certain of petitioners and other Jehovah’s Witnesses for distributing the literature described in the complaint without having obtained the license required by the ordinance, and had declared their intention further to enforce the ordinance against petitioners and other Jehovah’s Witnesses. But the court made no finding of threatened irreparable injury to petitioners or others, and we cannot say that the declared intention to institute other prosecutions is sufficient to establish irreparable injury in the circumstances of this case.
Before the present suit was begun, convictions had been obtained in the state courts in cases Nos. 480-487, Murdock et al. v. Pennsylvania, supra, which were then pending on appeal and which were brought to this Court for review by certiorari contemporaneously with the present case. It does not appear from the record that petitioners have been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith, or that a federal court of equity by withdrawing the determination of guilt from the state courts could rightly afford petitioners any protection which they could not secure by prompt trial and appeal pursued to this Court. In these respects the case differs from Hague v. C. I. O., supra, 501-02, where local officials forcibly broke up meetings of the complainants and in many instances forcibly .deported them from the state without trial.
*165There is no allegation here and no proof that respondents would not, nor can we assume that they will not, acquiesce in the decision of this Court holding the challenged ordinance unconstitutional as applied to petitioners. If the ordinance had been held constitutional, petitioners could not complain of penalties which would have been but the consequence of their violation of a valid state law.
Nor is it enough to justify the exercise of the equity jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case that there are numerous members of a class threatened with prosecution for violation of the ordinance. In general the jurisdiction of equity to avoid multiplicity of civil suits at law is restricted to those cases where there would otherwise be some necessity for the maintenance of numerous suits between the same parties involving the same issues of law or fact. It does not ordinarily extend to cases where there are numerous parties and the issues between them and the adverse party — here the state — are not necessarily identical. Matthews v. Rodgers, supra, 529-30, and cases cited. Far less should a federal court of equity attempt to envisage in advance all the diverse issues which could engage the attention of state courts in prosecutions of Jehovah’s Witnesses for violations of the present ordinance, or assume to draw to a federal court the determination of those issues in advance, by a decree saying in what circumstances and conditions the application of the city ordinance will be deemed to abridge freedom of speech and religion.
In any event, an injuction looks to the future. Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466, 474; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 163, 182. And in view of the decision rendered today in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra, we find no ground for supposing that the intervention of a federal court, in order to secure petitioners’ constitutional rights, will be either necessary or appropriate.
*166For these reasons, establishing the want of equity in the cause, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of appeals directing that the bill be dismissed.

Affirmed.