Court Opinion

ID: 9828532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:28:03.256323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:50.150457
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[11] Appellant Mutual Home Association, earnestly insists that its motion for an instructed verdict adequately challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of the jury upon the special issues, and would require this court, in the absence of a direct attack on the findings, to consider the-evidence in order to determine the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict upon the question of notice to-the Mutual Home Association. It is further urged that appellants’ motion for judgment required the trial court to disregard the findings of the jury adverse to appellants, as being unsupported by the evidence, and to enter judgment for the defendants. A trial court cannot disregard the findings of the jury upon special issues involving material facts. He may set aside such findings when not sustained by the evidence and grant a new trial, but, under our practice, he cannot enter a judgment non obstante veredicto, when to do so will require him- to disregard findings upon material issues. When a special verdict is returned, he has but two alternatives: (1) Set the verdict aside and grant a new trial; or (2) to enter a judgment upon and in accordance with the verdict. Article 1990, Vernon’s Sayles’ Statutes; Scott v. F. & M. Bank, 66 S. W. 485; Casey-Swasey Co. v. Fire Association Co., 32 Tex. Civ. App. 158, 73 S. W. 865.
[12,13] The majority are of the opinion that when a special verdict is returned, and no attack is made thereon, that a motion for peremptory instructions cannot be held to so challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment as to require this court to examine the statement of facts in detail to determine the matter. A special verdict is conclusive, as between the parties, as to the facts found. Article 1986, Vernon’s Sayles’ Stats.; Robertson v. Kirby, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 472, 61 S. W. 967; Arkansas Fertilizer Co. v. City Natl. Bank, 137 S. W. 1179.
Furthermore, the majority are of the opinion that the evidence in the record to the effect: (1) That Swofford, the notary, and Dykes, who was accompanied by Yeager, spoke to Ameson, the secretary of the association about the loan, prior to the making of the deed from the Dykes to Yeager; (2) that Essex, the attorney and an officer of the association, wrote the deed, the note, and the transfer of the note to the association, together with the deed of trust, all before Mrs. Dykes signed the deed; (3) that the officers of the association inspected the property, at that time occupied by plaintiff as her homestead, and knew that it was worth only $1,-200, and not $2,400, as the consideration was recited in the deed, and that Mr. Furman, one of the directors of the association, who inspected the property, testified that he thought fictitious values were put in deeds, *404and, presumably in this deed, to mislead future purchasers — -are sufficient to sustain the finding as to notice on the part of the association that the transaction was not in fact a bona fide sale. In the opinion of the majority, the case of Stallings v. Hullum, 79 Tex. 421, 15 S. W. 677, is in point, and supports their conclusion. In the last-cited case, the husband contracted to sell his homestead for $1,000. The wife was told by the husband that the purchaser was to pay $2,500 for the homestead, and she consented to sell at that price. A deed was prepared, reciting a consideration of $2,000. This was signed and acknowledged by the wife, and was delivered upon the payment of $1,000. The Supreme Court held that the transaction showed a fraud upon the wife, of which the purchaser had notice, and she was not bound by the deed do obtained from her.
The writer does not agree with the conclusion reached by the majority, if recourse should be had to the statement of facts that the evidence above referred- to is sufficient to show notice to the defendant association; neither does he think the holding in Stallings v. Hullum rests upon a similar state of facts. He thinks the two cases are easily distinguishable upon the facts,
But in consonance with the opinion of the majority, the motion for rehearing is overruled.
BUCK, J., dissenting as noted in the conclusions.