Court Opinion

ID: 9723722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:28:58.793408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:18.675996
License: Public Domain

*854MAY, Judge,
dissenting.
Application of the three part test in Ind.Code § 22-4-8-1 leads me to conclude the instructors of BAAC art classes are independent contractors and not employees of BAAC. I must therefore respectfully dissent.
CONTROL AND DIRECTION
As support for its determination the instructors are subject to BAAC's control and direction the majority points to BAAC's authority to decide whether to offer a class, to decide when to schedule it, and to monitor the instructors' performances. This is insufficient to establish "control and direction." As the majority correctly notes, citing Twin States, 678 N.E.2d at 114, "control" requires more than the power to have the individual cease his or her performance-it requires control over the "manner, method and means" by which the services are performed.
In other words, the right to control includes the right to control the details by which the work is to be accomplished, and not just the result. See, e.g., Lifetime Siding v. United States, 359 F.2d 657, 660 (2d Cir.1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 921, 87 S.Ct. 233, 17 L.Ed.2d 144 (1966) (addressing the right to control as relevant to a determination of employer status for federal unemployment tax purposes); see generally Annotation, Determination of Employer-Employee Relationship for Social Security Contribution and Unemployment Tax Purposes under $121(d)(2) of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (26 U.S.C. 3121(d)(2)), of Federal Unemployment Tax Act (26 U.S.C. 33060)), and Implementing Regulations, 37 ALR Fed. 95 § 6 (1978).
The "services" the instructors perform involve teaching, and neither the State nor the majority point to any evidence in the record to support the conclusion BAAC controls the "manner, method and means" of teaching, i.e., the "details" of how the instructors teach the courses. In fact, the majority acknowledges "the BAAC does not monitor whether the instructors are teaching the correct curriculum in class." (Op. at 851.)
BAAC does not even "monitor," let alone control, the way the instructors perform their teaching services; I therefore would not hold that 1) BAAC's ability to control the time and place where a class meets and 2) the instructors' agreement to "accept the presence and participation of a class monitor," (Op. at 851), demonstrate sufficient control to suggest the instructors could be employees. See Alumiwall Corp. v. Indiana Employment Sec. Bd., 130 Ind.App. 535, 541, 167 N.E.2d 60, 62 (1960) (a restriction that the workers perform their services in a "good and workmanlike manner" did not amount to retention of "direction and control" over such service so as to exclude it from that factor because "such restriction is inherent in all services performed by one for another").
USUAL COURSE OF BUSINESS
The ALJ found part of BAAC's activities include operation of the John Waldron Arts Center, where it "arranges for various performances, has a gallery for exhibitions, has a gift shop, is involved in a grants program for the arts, provides services for artists, and also conducts an arts Education Program with courses including various classes for both youth, [sic] and adults." (Appellant's App. at 2.) The ALJ concluded the art classes were part of BAAC's "usual course of business" (id. at 6) because providing art classes was a "significant part" of BAAC's operation (id. at 5) and BAAC derived twenty to thirty percent of its revenue from tuition stu*855dents paid for the classes. By that standard,3 the ALJ determined the classes were conducted in the usual course of BAAC's business.
I agree with BAAC that if every not-for-profit organization like BAAC that offered some sort of educational opportunity were considered a provider of education, many such educational opportunities would be eliminated because of the financial burden imposed by Ind.Code Title 22 Art. 4. Accordingly, I would determine whether this test is met by applying the standard this court has recognized as applicable to the determination whether one is an employee for other purposes, eg., worker's compensation.
In Crabill v. Livengood, 142 Ind.App. 624, 627, 231 N.E.2d 854, 856 (1967), we noted "certain fundamental guide lines which have been used throughout the years" for determining the nature of an employment relationship, one of which is "tlhe employment must be in the usual course, trade or business of the employer to constitute the status of employee." Thus, "[a] workman is a 'regular employee' if hired to do work in the usual course of trade, business or occupation of employer." Id. at 626, 231 N.E.2d at 855. We relied on State ex rel. Bettman v. Christen, 128 Ohio St. 56, 190 N.E. 233, 237 (1934) where the court stated:
We think that such employment must be employment for work of the kind required in the business of the employer, and it must be in conformity to the established scheme or system of the business. Such scheme or system comprehends the nature of the enterprise, its organization, its personnel requirements, and its methods of operation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Nothing in the record suggests art classes are in any way "required" in BAACs business; nor would I hold, as the majority apparently does, that by virtue of offering art classes BAAC is engaged in "separate and independent kinds of businesses," one of which is an art school. Scott, 114 Ind.App. at 155, 51 N.E.2d at 91. I would accordingly find the art classes are not part of BAACs "usual course of business" despite the ALJs determination the classes are "an intrical [sic] part of the usual course" of its business.
INDEPENDENTLY ESTABLISHED TRADE, OCCUPATION, OR PROFESSION
The majority finds the teachers are not customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business because "very few of the instructors teach art classes elsewhere, and prior teaching experience is not required." (Op. at 858.) I agree with BAAC that whether the instructors actually teach elsewhere is not the test for whether this element is satisfied.
In Alumiwall, 130 Ind.App. at 537, 167 N.E.2d at 60, we determined an "applicator," whose only function was to apply siding to the exterior of a building, was not an employee of Alumiwall, whose business included the furnishing of siding materials to be affized to the exterior of various buildings. In deciding the applicators were engaged in an independent business, we noted they "could perform the same services for other than appellant if they so *856desired." Id. at 541, 167 N.E.2d at 62 (emphasis supplied).
We applied the same test and reached the same result in Twin States, where we found "as a matter of law the carriers are engaged in an independently established business" in part because they "may perform the same services for publishers other than Twin States if they so desire." 678 N.E.2d at 114 (emphasis supplied). Neither the State nor the majority offers authority to the effect more is required.4
I would accordingly reverse the ALJ's determination the art class instructors were employees of BAAC.

. The State's one-paragraph argument in support of this conclusion is devoid of citation to legal authority. Nor does the agency decision include any legal authority to the effect this is the correct standard, or is even a recognized standard, for determining whether these facts demonstrate the classes are conducted in the usual course of BAAC's business.

. Rather, the majority reads Twin States to require an examination of the totality of the As I have explained above, circumstances. the totality of the circumstances leads me to conclude the art instructors are not employees of BAAC.