Court Opinion

ID: 9586996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:17:08.492893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:58.419563
License: Public Domain

Judge Becton
concurring in the result.
Because, and only because, I find a clear suggestion in Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E. 2d 415 (1982) and Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E. 2d 868 (1983) that the applicable statute of repose, N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 1-50(6), is constitutional, I concur in the result affirming the trial court. Indeed, because I personally believe G.S. Sec. 1-50(6) is constitutionally infirm on several grounds, I could have more easily concurred in the opinion authored by Judge Hedrick had I been convinced that the “constitutionality of [the statute] was [not] raised, discussed, considered, or passed upon in the trial court.” Although the judgment itself is silent on the point, the representations made by the parties at oral argument coupled with the stipulations in the record suggest that the trial court considered, and passed upon, the constitutionality of the statute. The “Stipulated Facts” show, among other things, that the plaintiffs intestate was killed while working with the tobacco harvester one day after he purchased it and that plaintiffs action was filed more than six years after the initial sale and delivery of the tobacco harvester. The “Stipulation of Agreed Record on Appeal” recites, among other things, that “for the sole purpose of this appeal, summary judgment on behalf of Long Manufacturing Company, Inc., would only be appropriate if plaintiffs action is barred by the applicable North Carolina statute of limitations.”
For the reasons set forth above, I concur in the result.