Court Opinion

ID: 9945707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:03:17.38354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.523197
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 144
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                      DIVISION II
                                       No. E-23-35

MAEGAN HOLLIS                               Opinion Delivered February 28, 2024

                            APPELLANT       APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD
                                            OF REVIEW
V.                                          [NO. 2022-BR-01750]

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES

                              APPELLEE      AFFIRMED

                       STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

       Maegan Hollis appeals the Board of Review’s (Board’s) dismissal of her appeal due to

an untimely filing. We affirm the Board’s decision.

       Hollis was employed as a nail technician by Nailsville & Spa. She filed her initial

claim for unemployment benefits on April 3, 2020, after being laid off due to the COVID-

19 pandemic; she was paid benefits from May to August 2020. In response to Hollis’s claim,

the employer filed a statement asserting that, when the business reopened on May 4, 2020,

Hollis informed them she would not return to work until August 9 due to the pandemic;

she asked for the promise of “a good paycheck,” which could not be guaranteed due to the

uncertainties of COVID-19; and Hollis chose to not return to work on August 9.

       On December 23, 2020, the Division of Workforce Services (DWS) issued three

agency determinations: (1) Hollis was ineligible to receive benefits beginning May 1, 2020,
because her availability for suitable work was restricted due to COVID-19; she would be

ineligible until that condition no longer existed; and she would need to inform her DWS

office when that condition no longer limited her availability for suitable work; (2) Hollis was

disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits beginning May 4, 2020, because she had

been offered suitable work on that date but had refused that offer of work without good

cause; and (3) Hollis was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits beginning

August 9, 2020, because she refused an offer for suitable work on that date without showing

good cause for that refusal.

       Hollis filed an appeal of these decisions to the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal); in this

appeal, she noted her new home address. The Tribunal set a telephone hearing for May 5,

2021, but the notice was sent to her old address. Hollis failed to appear before the Tribunal

on the date of the telephone hearing. In a decision mailed to Hollis on May 6, 2021, the

hearing officer found that when the nail salon reopened, Hollis told her employer that she

would not be returning to work due to COVID-19 and that Hollis, who was not present to

present evidence that the condition disqualifying her from benefits no longer existed, had

not shown that she was now able and available for suitable work. Hollis was found to be

ineligible for benefits from May 1, 2020, through May 5, 2021.

       Hollis, through her attorney James A. Simpson, Jr., filed a timely appeal of the

Tribunal’s decision to the Board. In a decision mailed July 28, 2021, the Board remanded

the case to the Tribunal to schedule a reopening hearing to determine if Hollis had good

                                              2
cause for failing to appear at the May 5, 2021, Tribunal hearing. This order of remand was

mailed to the local DWS office, the Tribunal, and Simpson.

       The Tribunal mailed a notice of telephone hearing to Hollis at her old address on

August 31, 2021, setting the reopening hearing for September 10; copies were also mailed

to the local DWS office, the Board, and Simpson. The Tribunal mailed another hearing

notice on September 15, 2021, resetting the hearing date for September 27. This notice was

mailed to Hollis at her old address, to the local DWS office, to the Board, and to Simpson.

The Tribunal mailed another notice on September 19, 2021, to Hollis at her old address,

resetting the hearing for October 11, 2021. This notice was also mailed to the local DWS

office, the Board, and Simpson.

       The reopening hearing was held on October 11; Simpson appeared without Hollis.

Simpson informed the Tribunal hearing officer that Hollis’s prior address was still being

used, which had caused the problems now being addressed; the hearing officer recorded

Hollis’s new address and stated that it would be corrected. The hearing officer stated that

the reopening hearing was limited to the issue of whether Hollis had good cause for failing

to appear at the previous Tribunal hearing and would, therefore, be entitled to have the

matter reopened. When asked by the hearing officer why Hollis did not appear at the May

5, 2021, hearing, Simpson pointed out that the hearing notice had been sent to Hollis’s prior

address. He then stated, “There–there were two unemployment cases filed on Ms. Hollis’

behalf. When one of those was resolved, we were under the impression that it resolved both

cases, and I can’t–I–I’d–have to get through–I know we can’t–I’ll put it this way, it was just

                                              3
confusion over that other case as to why this one was still pending is the only excuse I can

give if there were any late filings.” Simpson stated Hollis did not think she had a hearing

because she was under the impression that both cases were resolved, and neither he nor

Hollis was aware a hearing was scheduled. When the hearing officer asked Simpson which

of the three explanations given was the reason Hollis failed to appear at the hearing, Simpson

stated, “Look, she was behind the eight ball from this because of the–when these things were

mailed and–and she brought them to me, it–it had been mailed to the wrong address. And

by the time that they were ever forwarded to her and I got involved, she was no longer

needing unemployment, but she did not want to just avoid the cases, so I got involved and I

thought that [they] were resolved. And–and to my knowledge, she nor I knew that there was

another hearing that day because of the confusion over whether there were two cases that

were all resolved at once or not.”

       The Tribunal decision was issued on October 14, 2021—still bearing Hollis’s incorrect

previous address—denying Hollis’s request to reopen the case. The hearing officer found

Simpson failed to understand Hollis had a hearing because he believed all the issues had

been resolved at prior hearings but determined that belief did not establish good cause to

reopen the matter. A copy of this decision was also sent to the Board and to Simpson.

       In a letter dated July 19, 2022, stamped received by the local DWS office on July 19,

the Board on July 20, and the Tribunal on July 25, Simpson untimely appealed the October

14 Tribunal decision—as well as several other of Hollis’s unemployment cases—to the Board,

asking to reopen the matters so that they could be addressed on the merits. Pursuant to

                                              4
Paulino v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 676, 599 S.W.2d 780 (Ark. App. 1980), Hollis was afforded a

hearing before the Board to explain the reasons behind her late appeal filing from the

October 14, 2021, Tribunal decision to the Board and why the late filing was due to

circumstances beyond her control. A notice of hearing, dated November 21, 2022, and

setting the hearing for December 13, was mailed to Hollis at her new address; copies were

also sent to the local DWS office, the Board, and Simpson. Hollis and Simpson both

appeared at that hearing.1

       The staff attorney explained that the sole issue to be decided was whether Hollis’s

appeal to the Board was timely filed and, if not, whether the untimely filing was a result of

circumstances beyond Hollis’s control. Simpson explained that the notices continued to be

sent to Hollis’s old address, despite the fact that DWS had been given her new address, and

that he did not know this until July 2022. The staff attorney agreed with Simpson that an

incorrect address had been used for Hollis but noted that a copy of the October 14, 2021,

decision was also sent to Simpson at his correct office address. When asked why he did not

timely appeal the October 14 decision when he received it since it was mailed to his correct

address and was addressed to him, Simpson stated that he did not have a copy of that

decision; that the mail was not always reliable, and he knew that there had been issues with

mail delivery; and that it was possible it was somehow thrown away at his office. At that

time, the staff attorney went off the record and listened to the recording of the October 11

       1
       Hollis informed the staff attorney at this hearing that she had recently moved again
and had another new address.

                                             5
Tribunal hearing; when the hearing resumed, the staff attorney stated that at the end of the

Tribunal hearing, Simpson was told to contact the Tribunal if he had not received a decision

within ten days. She questioned why Simpson had not contacted the Tribunal if he had not

received a decision in that time frame; Simpson could not provide an answer, except that he

had been on multiple hearings attempting to explain the irregularities that had occurred in

the case, and if he had failed somewhere in the process, he asked that he be given one

irregularity on Hollis’s behalf when there had been so many irregularities in the case.

       On December 20, 2022, the Board mailed its opinion dismissing the appeal to Hollis

at her correct address.     The Board found that the untimely filing was not due to

circumstances beyond Hollis’s control, stating,

       In this case, as the Appeal Tribunal’s decision was mailed to the claimant on October
       14, 2021, the claimant had until November 3, 2021, to file the appeal. However, the
       appeal was not filed until July 19, 2022. The Board notes that the claimant had
       submitted a timely address change from 508 Wycliffe Searcy, Arkansas, to 12
       Southridge Lane, Searcy, Arkansas. However, the Appeal Tribunal decision was
       mailed to the incorrect address. Normally, the Board would find the claimant had
       filed her appeal untimely but due to circumstances beyond her control. The
       difference in this situation though is that the claimant’s lawyer, James A. Simpson,
       made an appearance at that hearing, and a copy of the Appeal Tribunal [decision] was
       sent to his correct mailing address. Mr. Simpson did not contact the client, and he
       did not file the appeal. When asked why he did not file the appeal, he could only
       state that either he did not receive the Appeal Tribunal decision due to problems with
       the mail or his office received it, and it got put away somewhere. The law presumes
       that a letter is received by the person to whom it is addressed. Skaggs v. State, 287 Ark.
       259, 697 S.W.2d 913 (1985); Moore v. State, 285 Ark. 321, 686 S.W.2d 790 (1985).
       While this is a rebuttable presumption, the evidence presented is insufficient to rebut
       the presumption. Mr. Simpson confirmed the office address the decision was sent to
       was correct. In addition, the claimant and Mr. Simpson [were] told that if they did
       not receive a copy of the Appeal Tribunal decision within 10 days of the hearing, they
       were to contact the Appeal Tribunal to ensure one was mailed to them. Therefore,
       Mr. Simpson has not shown that he did not receive the decision.

                                               6
       In Springdale Memorial Hospital v. Director of Labor, 34 Ark. App. 266, 809 S.W.2d 828

(1991), the Arkansas Court of Appeals held it is a rule of general application that a client is

bound by the acts of his attorney within the scope of the latter’s authority, including the

attorney’s negligent failure to file proper pleadings. Allen v. Kizer, 294 Ark. 1, 740 S.W.2d

137 (1987); DeClerk v. Tribble, 276 Ark. 316, 637 S.W.2d 526 (1982). In Peterson v. Worthen

Bank & Trust Co., 296 Ark. 201, 753 S.W.2d 278 (1988), the court stated the rules of agency

generally apply to the relationship of attorney and client.

       The omissions, as well as commissions, of an attorney are to be regarded as the acts

of the client whom he represents, and his neglect is equivalent to the neglect of the client

himself. Blackstad Mercantile Co. v. Bond, 104 Ark. 45, 148 S.W. 262 (1912). Attorney’s acts

are attributed to the client. Thus, in the absence of fraud, the client is bound, according to

the ordinary rules of agency, by the acts, omissions, or neglect, of the attorney within the

scope of the latter’s authority, Riley v. Vest, 235 Ark. 192, 357 S.W.2d 497 (1962); Beth v.

Harris, 208 Ark. 903, 188 S.W.2d 119 (1945), whether express or implied, apparent or

ostensible. In other words, whatever is done in the progress of the cause by such attorney is

considered as done by the party and is binding on him.

       The fact that proceedings before the Board are less formal than those in courts of law

does not alter the responsibility of a client for the acts of his attorney. Springdale Mem’l Hosp.,

34 Ark. App. 266, 809 S.W.2d 828. The claimant’s attorney, James A. Simpson, is

considered by law to have received the Tribunal decision. Mr. Simpson continued to

                                                7
represent the claimant after the hearing, including appearing at the subsequent Board

hearing. Therefore, Mr. Simpson’s negligence is imputed to the claimant. Thus, the appeal

to the Board was untimely filed, and the claimant has not shown that the untimely filing was

a result of circumstances beyond her control.

       The Board does not have jurisdiction to review the merits of the case if an appeal is

not timely filed. Bennett v. Dir., 73 Ark. App. 281, 42 S.W.3d 588 (2001). Therefore, the

claimant’s appeal to the Board is dismissed on finding that the appeal to the Board was

untimely filed and that the claimant has not shown circumstances beyond her control for

the delay in filing.

       Hollis now appeals that decision to this court.

       On appeal of an unemployment-compensation case, we review the evidence and all

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s

findings. Coleman v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 290, 668 S.W.3d 540. The Board’s findings of

fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. Credibility of

witnesses and the weight to be afforded their testimony are matters for the Board to

determine. Id. Reasons for late filing involve factual issues to be determined by the Board,

not this court on appeal. Id.

       On appeal, Hollis argues that her denial of benefits should be overturned due to the

employer’s false statement that she refused to return to work. However, Tribunal decisions

shall become final unless an appeal is initiated within twenty calendar days after the date of

                                                8
mailing of the notice to the parties’ last known address pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-

10-525. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-524(d)(3)(B) (Supp. 2023). In this case, Hollis did not file

a timely appeal from the Tribunal’s decision to the Board; thus, the only issue before the

Board was whether the untimely filing was due to circumstances beyond her control, not the

underlying merits of her case.

       Hollis argues that the Board’s finding that the late filing was not due to circumstances

beyond her control “ignored the history of the case and went all the way back to October of

2021 finding that Ms. Hollis’ attorney appeared at a hearing but had failed to file a timely

appeal from a decision that was not received.” This is factually untrue. Hollis’s attorney

admitted that the decision was mailed to his correct address; he also stated that the decision

could have been delivered to his office but had been misplaced. Furthermore, he had no

answer when asked by the staff attorney at the hearing before the Board why he had not

contacted the Tribunal, as he had been instructed, if he had not received a decision within

ten days after the hearing. As stated by the Board in its decision, the law presumes that a

letter is received by the person to whom it is addressed, Skaggs, supra, and in the absence of

fraud, the client is bound, according to the ordinary rules of agency, by the acts, omissions,

or neglect, of the attorney within the scope of the attorney’s authority. Riley, supra. Simpson

did not file a timely appeal, and as Hollis’s agent, she is bound by his actions or inactions.

       Hollis also argues that her substantial rights were denied throughout this process

because she never should have been denied benefits, and the substantive findings against her

were a result of the agency’s failure to review its own documents and provide proper notice.

                                               9
This argument ignores the fact that proper notice was provided to Simpson, as her agent, at

his correct address, but he failed to file a timely appeal. She was afforded a Paulino hearing

before the Board—her opportunity to explain why the late filing of her appeal to the Board

was due to circumstances beyond her control. The Due Process Clause does not guarantee

a party the right to unlimited process, but rather guarantees that a party receives the

rudimentary elements of fair play, which have generally been interpreted to mean reasonable

notice of the specific charges; the right to employ counsel if so desired; and the opportunity

to confront adverse witnesses, to speak in one’s own defense, and to call defense witnesses.

Coleman, supra. The issue before the Board and this court is the timeliness of Hollis’s appeal

to the Board, not the underlying reasons for her separation from her employment. Hollis

was present for the hearing before the Board, yet she chose not to testify or to call any

witnesses on her behalf. There is no merit to Hollis’s claim that her substantial rights were

denied throughout the appeals process.

       Affirmed.

       GLADWIN and GRUBER, JJ., agree.

       Simpson & Simpson, by: James A. Simpson, Jr., for appellant.

       Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.

                                              10