Court Opinion

ID: 9744615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:10:24.501132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:50.523576
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCUSKEY, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s sentence and two of his convictions should be affirmed. Accordingly, I concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion. However, based upon my review of the record, I conclude that the defendant’s action in throwing fireworks through the broken window was an "unlawful entry” sufficient to support a second conviction of burglary. As a result, I dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion which vacates the defendant’s second burglary conviction. The courts in both Davis and People v. Palmer (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 732, 404 N.E.2d 853, reasoned that entering a building with only an instrument would support a conviction of burglary if the instrument is inserted with the intention of committing a felony inside the building. Davis, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 739-40, 279 N.E.2d at 179; Palmer, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 404 N.E.2d at 856. Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that an unlawful entry may be made by an instrument when the instrument is inserted into the structure with the intent to commit a felony therein. (Baker v. State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), 622 So. 2d 1333,1335; Sears v. State (Alaska Ct. App. 1986), 713 P.2d 1218, 1219-20; People v. Tragni (1982), 113 Misc. 2d 852, 449 N.Y.S.2d 923, 927.) The court in Tragni noted that an example of an entry for purposes of a burglary would be the breaking of a pane of glass with a wooden torch which can then be tossed inside to ignite combustible material inside the building. Tragni, 113 Misc. 2d at ___, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 927. Here, a fire did not occur inside the Four Corners Tap despite the substantial efforts of the defendant and McLean. They tried to start a fire while they were inside the building. They returned to the Four Corners Tap twice that night when they did not hear the sounds of the fire engine. During the two later visits to the Four Corners Tap, they did not physically enter the building, presumably because of the danger they had caused inside the structure by placing flammable accelerants all over the floor and turning on the natural gas in the ovens. On their second return, the defendant threw fireworks through the broken window. The record is clear the defendant threw the fireworks inside the building so that sparks from the fireworks would ignite the gasoline and liquor and start a fire inside the building. The only conclusion which can be drawn from these facts and the relevant case law is that an unlawful entry was made by the defendant when he threw the fireworks through the broken window. The fireworks were the instruments inserted into the building for the sole purpose of committing the felony of arson. The majority concludes, however, that the defendant’s conviction of a second burglary cannot stand based upon People v. King and the principle of "one act, one crime.” The majority concludes "that when the defendant returned to the Four Corners Tap and threw the chameleon flower fireworks through the broken window, it was not a separate entry. It was a continuation of the original plan to burglarize and burn the building, albeit distinct in time and manner from the initial entry.” (261 Ill. App. 3d 960.) I cannot agree with this analysis. Obviously, if the defendant’s action was "distinct in time and manner” from the earlier illegal acts, it was a separate action which will support a separate conviction. The majority’s holding overlooks the fact that our supreme court in King specifically rejected the "independent motivation” test for determining whether multiple convictions could stand. (King, 66 Ill. 2d at 565-66, 363 N.E.2d at 844.) The court in King stated that there are "no constitutional limitations against multiple convictions and concurrent sentences for different offenses arising from multiple acts which are incidental to or motivated by some greater criminal objective.” King, 66 Ill. 2d at 565, 363 N.E.2d at 844. Accordingly, it is well established that multiple convictions and concurrent sentences are permitted when a defendant has committed several acts, despite the interrelationship of those acts. (People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253, 288, 538 N.E.2d 1118, 1133-34; King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566, 363 N.E.2d at 844; People v. Smith (1993), 246 Ill. App. 3d 647, 652, 616 N.E.2d 737, 741; People v. Wrightner (1991), 219 Ill. App. 3d 231, 234-35, 579 N.E.2d 573, 575.) Therefore, a defendant may be prosecuted for more than one criminal act that arises from the same episode or transaction, so long as the charges do not arise from the same physical act. (People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70, 77, 533 N.E.2d 802, 805; People v. Cobern (1992), 236 Ill. App. 3d 300, 303, 603 N.E.2d 693, 695; People v. Williams (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 129, 137, 582 N.E.2d 1158, 1163.) Among the factors which courts must consider in determining whether a defendant’s conduct constituted a single act or several separate acts are: (1) the time interval between the successive parts of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the existence of an intervening act or event; and (3) whether the conduct occurred at the same location. People v. Keefer (1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d 582, 584, 593 N.E.2d 1109, 1110. In this case, the record is clear that there was a lengthy interval between the defendant’s two entries into Four Corners Tap. In fact, the second entry did not occur until after the defendant had twice gone back and forth between the Four Corners Tap and McLean’s house. Also, numerous intervening acts and events took place prior to the second entry. After reviewing the record and considering these relevant factors, I can only conclude that there were two completely separate acts sufficient to support each conviction of burglary. See Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d at 289, 538 N.E.2d at 1134 (where a number of events intervened between two gunshots, each shot was a separate act sufficient to support a conviction). For the reasons indicated, I would affirm the defendant’s second conviction of burglary. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which vacated that conviction.