Court Opinion

ID: 9645707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:33:18.407936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:52.600175
License: Public Domain

PARRISH, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would grant appellant’s Point III.
Appellant filed a motion to dismiss Count III of respondent’s amended petition for failure to state a cause of action. The trial court demed the motion. Point III contends tMs was error.
Count III was an action for breach of contract. It asserted appellant éxpressly warranted “that Ms treatment would heal [respondent’s] fracture”; that appellant failed to heal respondent’s injury and thereby breached Ms contract.
Parkell v. Fitzporter, 301 Mo. 217, 256 S.W. 239, 242 (banc 1923), declares the duty *427that arises upon establishment of a physician-patient relationship.
The duty of a surgeon to bring skill and care to the amelioration of the condition of his patient does not arise from contract, but has its foundation in public considerations which are inseparable from the nature and exercise of his calling. Although the relation of physician and patient may be, and is perhaps generally, created by contract, the duty of the physician when he assumes it is fixed by rules which operate independently of its origin.
A breach of that duty is actionable in negligence not in contract.1 The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion to dismiss Count III for failure to state a cause of action.
At trial, under the guise that a breach of contract action could be maintained, respondent tendered, and the trial court permitted, the following testimony:
Q. And what was the thrust of that conversation?
A. Well, it was — I heard him telling Dr. Morse that if — -he asked him if he could fix — he thought he could fix my knee. And he said, well — well, it wasn’t that night. I guess it must have been the next morning. He said — I don’t know if I seen Dr. Morse that night or not.
Q. Okay.
A. But it was the next morning when he came in. And he — Dan asked him could he fix it. He said, “If you can’t fix it, I know where I can take her to get it fixed.” And he said, “Well, I can fix it.” And he said, “No doubt.” And that’s — you know, “If you’re not sure, I’ll take her somewhere else.”
Q. Dan said that?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. That if he wasn’t sure he could fix it, he’d take you someplace else?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And what did Dr. Morse respond?
A. He said he could fix it.
Q. Okay.
A. No doubt.
Q. Now, you, of course, at that time remembered that you had been to Memphis and gotten a good result from your earlier fracture?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you rely on Dr. Morse saying he could fix this to make a decision to have it fixed here in Kennett rather than—
[[Image here]]
A. —you know. I trusted him, yeah.
Q. ... Here’s my question. Here’s what I want to know: If he had made any other response, if he’d have said, ‘Well, it’s a bad situation and I don’t know exactly what can be done” or “maybe yes or maybe no” or “there’s no guarantees,” if he’d have said anything other than what he did say, what would you have done to have your knee fixed?
A. I would have went to Memphis. Because we was acquainted down there and everything and I knew — I knew the doctors. But the doctor I had when I had knee surgery, he was retired.
Q. So did you have this work done at Kennett? In other words, did Dr. Morse undertake to work on your knee fracture? A. Yes.
This invited the jury to speculate about whether respondent would have gone to another physician absent these discussions. That issue had no bearing on whether the medical care appellant provided met the standard the law requires. In my opinion *428this testimony, built on the foundation established by the trial court’s failure to grant appellant’s motion to dismiss Count III, was prejudicial. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. Although respondent argues she acted in good faith in attempting to plead a breach of contract action, this is questionable since her request for damages did not comply with requirements of Rule 55.05 for contract actions seeking recovery of money. Rule 55.05 states, in applicable part:
If a recovery of money be demanded, the amount shall be stated, except that in actions for damages based upon an alleged tort, no dollar amount shall be included in the demand except to determine the proper jurisdictional authority, but the prayer shall be for such damages as are fair and reasonable. [Emphasis added.]
Count III did not state the amount of damages it sought. Count III demanded "a sum that is fair and reasonable,” a statement that would be appropriate in a tort claim.