Court Opinion

ID: 9698608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:55:48.767144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.188361
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
I once read that the thoughts imparted by a teacher affects eternity because it can never be determined where his or her influence stops. A coach’s influence on a young athlete is never ending. It lives on with the young athlete throughout his lifetime. Lessons learned on the playing field and the counsel of a coach abides in the mind and spirit throughout a young athlete’s lifetime and it is called upon to use judgment and display courage in the many adversities found in life. If there is a difference between a “coach” and a “teacher”, it must be a nebulous distinction which only lawyers and judges can formulate through legal jargon. A coach’s activities with young students are, inherently, educational in nature. Though sports today have evolved, at some levels, into big time business with an overlay of preposterously high salaries and drug addiction, ancient games of athletics in Greece and Rome were based upon the development and elevation of the soul, mind and body.
Coaching certainly should be elevated, not only professionally, but in the eyes of the Law. It appears that ARSD 24:02:01:09(12) specifically honed in on “coaching” as being “teaching” and made specific reference to head coaches, such as, Coach Reid. On this Court, we must concern ourselves, as Justice Morgan has pointed out, with the law and administrative regulations pertinent thereto, and not be bound, in effect, by decisions of other courts in our sister states.
This administrative rule was enacted in 1986 and becomes more powerful, in law, than our Goodwin and Nelson decisions. Goodwin was handed down in 1975 and the Nelson opinion was filed in 1986. Goodwin was modified by this Court in 1977 in Collins. We cannot bend, in this Court, the intent of the legislature or the enactment of rules and regulations thereunder, to our will. We owe duty to honor an administrative regulation where it is straightforward, unambiguous, and not in conflict with the source statute.
*247Under the provisions of the Continuing Contract Law, SDCL 13-43-9.1, et seq., this Court must first ask the question with reference to the board of education’s non-renewal decision: Did the board comply with the procedural requirements of the Continuing Contract Law? Moran v. Rapid City Area School Dist. No. 51-4, 281 N.W.2d 595, 598 (S.D.1979). Secondly, per Moran, the board’s decision must be examined to determine if the decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.
I would never reach the second issue and would base this Court’s decision solely on issue one.* Indeed, the board failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Continuing Contract Law and stipulated that Coach Reid was not given notice by the third Monday in March, 1988. He was never told, as required by state law, that his position as varsity boy’s basketball coach would not be renewed.
Attached hereto, and by this reference made a part hereof, is the pertinent “TEACHER’S CONTRACT”. Can we not read that the Huron School District called it a “TEACHER’S CONTRACT”? (emphasis supplied mine). Note the 1987 contract, labeled “Exhibit A”, does not specify “extra-curricular activities” nor does it mention “assignment”; rather, it refers to a “TEACHER’S CONTRACT” and that he, Coach Reid, did “accept the position”. Note that the 1988 contract, labeled “Exhibit B”, (not signed by Coach Reid or the board) eliminated the varsity boy’s basketball coach “position” and would change his secondary duty from “assistant varsity football” to “sophomore football coaching”. Huron School District’s position was clear: To cut his salary and demote his professional status. This it could not do for it failed to give notice by the third Monday in March, 1988, as required by the Continuing Contract Law. SDCL 13-43-9.1. Hence, Coach Reid was entitled to the contract as reflected by “Exhibit A” and not “Exhibit B”, i.e., an automatic renewal of the 1987 contract as it explicitly was worded.
Surely, with the many school districts in this state, there are differences in wording of teachers’ contracts. If a school district wishes to preserve a certain degree of elasticity, it would seem that a contract specifically set forth that which constitutes “classroom teaching” or “teaching” from “additional assignments” or “extra-curricular activities”.
I generally agree with Justice Morgan’s writing and wish to confine this Court’s decision to the facts at hand. The critical facts are that the school board is bound by its former contract, exactly as signed by the board and the teacher on April 1, 1987, for the year, 1988, because of the school board’s failure to give notice, as required by this state’s statute. For my part, I do not desire that school boards in this state be hampered in specifying that a teacher has certain “teaching duties” and other “assignments”. “Assignments” of “extracurricular activities” should not, per se, in my opinion, be squarely applicable within South Dakota’s Continuing Contract Law. Here, the contract was quite specific as to Coach Reid’s duties and an exact sum of money was specified for his performance of same. I would not negate the authority of the boards of education to direct and manage the schools but would assuage that each board must be very meticulous in their contracts for form contracts can only produce confusion, expense and litigation.
SDCL 13-46-6 empowers trial courts to enter final judgments, in cases such as we see before us, “As the circumstances and every right of the case may require ... ”. That statute, augmented by our holding in Sutera v. Sully Buttes Bd. of Educ., 351 N.W.2d 457 (S.D.1984) and. as further approved in Jager v. Ramona Bd. of Ed., Ramona School District, 444 N.W.2d 21 *248(S.D.1989), justifies the reinstatement of coach Reid, the damages, prejudgment interest and costs as announced in the penultimate paragraph of the majority decision.
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 This Court can affirm the trial court where it has a right result for the wrong reason. Seymour v. Western Dakota Vocational Technical Institute, 419 N.W.2d 206 (S.D.1988); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d 106 (S.D.1985); South Dakota Medical Service, Inc. v. Minnesota Mut. Fire & Cas. Co., 303 N.W.2d 358 (S.D.1981); Owens v. City of Beresford, 87 S.D. 8, 201 N.W.2d 890 (1972); Northwestern Nat. Bank of Sioux Falls v. Gillis, 82 S.D. 457, 148 N.W.2d 293 (1967).