Court Opinion

ID: 9672038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:47:46.772816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:13.831670
License: Public Domain

HARBISON, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion prepared for the Court by Justice Henry.
In the first place it seems to me that the issue of fraudulent concealment, charged in *518the amended complaint, presents factual issues which are not necessarily overcome in a conclusive manner by the affidavit of the defendant. The burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, of course, to establish any such claim under rules of law which are well settled in this state and which are not disturbed by the opinion in the present case. Otherwise the claim of fraudulent concealment will fail.
It does seem to me that the allegations of continuing negligence are overcome by the affidavit of the doctor, since there does not appear to have been any physician-patient relationship between him and the plaintiff since December 20, 1970, and the suit was not filed until November 15, 1973. The rule of continuing negligence, of course, may in proper cases prevent the running of the statute of limitations so long as a professional relationship continues. Frazor v. Osborne, 57 Tenn.App. 10, 414 S.W.2d 118 (1966).
Apart from these considerations, it does not seem to me that the adoption of a “discovery” rule brings about a drastic change in the law of this state except in a very limited group of cases. As stated in the principal opinion, the rule applies only in cases where the plaintiff does not discover and reasonably could not be expected to discover that he has a right of action. It does not, in my opinion, permit a plaintiff to wait until he knows all of the injurious effects or consequences of a tortious act. See Hudson v. Shoulders, 164 Tenn. 70, 72, 45 S.W.2d 1072 (1932). The statute is tolled only during the period when the plaintiff has no knowledge at all that a wrong has occurred, and, as a reasonable person, is not put on inquiry.
This is essentially the rule which has been applied for many years in this state in workmen’s compensation cases with respect to the statute of limitations as contained in T.C.A. §§ 50-1003 and 1017. This subject was recently reviewed by this Court in the case of Reed v. Genesco, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.1974), and the “general principle” was stated to be that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended “until by reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been sustained.” 512 S.W.2d at 3.
In an opinion released by this Court for publication on November 12, 1974, however, it was pointed out that the Tennessee cases “do not require that a claimant have exact or precise information as to the nature of his injury before the statute begins to run.” Taylor v. Clayton Mobile Homes, Inc., 516 S.W.2d 72 (Tenn.1974).
In the vast majority of personal injury cases, of course, the date of injury and date of discovery are simultaneous. This is also true in many types of property damage actions. It is to be noted, however, that the General Assembly has undertaken to deal specifically with certain types of claims, both for personal injury and property damage, arising out of deficiencies in connection with the building and construction of improvements on real property. It has provided special statutes of limitations in those cases. T.C.A. § 28-314 et seq.
It seems to me that the decision in the present case is consistent with rules of law already being applied in this state in other types of cases, and I do not believe that it imposes any special or particular burden upon the medical profession. Practitioners in the field of malpractice are aware that claimants frequently have added spurious “fraudulent concealment” allegations to complaints in order to attempt to circumvent the statute of limitations, when there was no basis in fact or law for charging the defendant with fraud. The adoption of the “discovery” rule regarding the statute of limitations should tend to minimize this practice and to protect reputable persons from reckless and indiscriminate charges of dishonorable conduct. While the rule here adopted does relax, to some degree, the previous rule in the state regarding the statute of limitations, it does *519so only in favor of an innocent plaintiff who, under all of the circumstances, neither has nor could reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the existence of his claim.
With these observations, I concur in the opinion released today.