Court Opinion

ID: 9686881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:10:32.455626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:22.757239
License: Public Domain

D. C. Riley, J.
(dissenting). I am not persuaded that Branyan v Alpena Flying Service, Inc, 65 *624Mich App 1; 236 NW2d 739 (1975) is dispositive in the case at bar. In Abendschein v Farrell, 382 Mich 510; 170 NW2d 137 (1969), the Supreme Court addressed and rejected the modern trend toward a "dominant contacts”1 inquiry into conflicts analysis, and instead reaffirmed the doctrine of lex loci delicti. Branyan, however, declined to follow Abendschein for the following reason:
"Defendant argues that as an intermediate appellate court, we may neither adopt a conflict-of-laws standard different from that traditionally followed in Michigan nor entertain an invitation to overrule Supreme Court precedent. However, we need not decide whether Abendschein should be overruled in deciding the question before us since the rule enunciated in Abendschein does not apply to this case. The Abendschein Court expressly excluded the lex loci delicti rule from cases involving airplane accidents when it stated at 519; 170 NW2d 140:
" 'Bearing in constant mind that this case and its issue deals only with actions at law for damages arising out of motorcar (not airplane) accidents’. (Emphasis added.)
"Having explained why we cannot, on the authority of Abendschein v Farrell, supra, declare that the plaintiffs are limited in the amount of damages they may recover, we now turn to a disposition of this case which we think both valid and within our authority.” 65 Mich App at 5-6.
For two reasons, I would not hold Branyan applicable in the present case. First, the above quoted passage from Abendschein was mere dicta and was further directly responsive to Babcock v Jackson, 12 NY2d 473; 240 NYS2d 743; 191 NE2d *625279; 95 ALR2d 1 (1963), itself an automobile case and an early proponent of the dominant contacts principle. Second, I am unable to fathom a sufficiently debatable reason why aircraft litigation should be excepted from the lex loci delicti doctrine. Indeed, its underlying policy and justification — to provide for certainty and eliminate forum shopping — is equally relevant not only to automobile and airplane mishaps, but other tort situations as well.
Plaintiff argues that even if Branyan is not directly controlling, the enactment of MCL 259.180a(l); MSA 10.280(1) itself embodies a public policy determination pertaining to the vicarious liability of aircraft owners resulting from collisions that would make defendant here liable. However, the mere fact that a Michigan statute permits a cause of action nonexistent in a foreign jurisdiction has been held insufficient by the Supreme Court to raise the issue of contravention of the forum state’s public policy:
"The fact Michigan statutory regulations of the rights of a motor vehicle guest passenger may differ from Ontario statutory provisions, or even the provisions of the common law governing like rights, is not a reason for holding the statute of the foreign jurisdiction contravenes public policy here.” Kaiser v North, 292 Mich 49, 57; 289 NW 325 (1939).
See also Sexton v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc, 84 Mich App 69, 73; 269 NW2d 308 (1978). In my opinion this judgment is well advised; to hold otherwise would mean, in large part, the eventual engulfment by the public policy exception of the lex loci delicti doctrine itself, for whenever foreign law would prohibit a cause of action sanctioned by our state, "public policy” would automatically die*626tate application of Michigan law, and thus unduly frustrate the intent of the lex loci delicti principle, supra, as a problem solving choice of law rule.
Whatever merits attach to an alternative inquiry into choice of law jurisprudence, I believe we are nevertheless duty bound to apply those principles promulgated by the Supreme Court, unless we are convinced it would rule differently today. Turner v Ford Motor Co, 81 Mich App 521, 527-528; 265 NW2d 400 (1978), Burton Drywall, Inc v Kaufman, 69 Mich App 85, 90; 244 NW2d 367 (1976), rev’d on other grounds, 402 Mich 366; 263 NW2d 249 (1978). Because I am unable to make such a determination, I would affirm the lower court’s grant of summary judgment.

 The "dominant contacts” approach to choice of law questions requires an assessment of the equities of the parties, the contacts involved between the forums, and the competing state policies in an effort to determine what law should apply to the case. Sexton v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc, 84 Mich App 69, 70, fn 2; 269 NW2d 308 (1978).