Court Opinion

ID: 9476563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:59:14.175535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:23.405092
License: Public Domain

BORK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In this case, a tort suit involving the alleged exposure of plaintiff's deceased husband to asbestos products, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant manufacturer. The Supreme Court has now held that the defendant carried its burden, in presenting a motion for summary judgment, of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The issue before us on remand is to specify the plaintiffs burden in opposition to the motion and to assess whether the plaintiff has met her burden in this case. The majority finds that she has met her burden, and has made enough of a showing to defeat the motion for summary judgment. I disagree.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that when one party offers a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the other party’s response, “by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the requirement that “specific facts” must be set forth. Id. at 2511; see also Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C.Cir.1987). *41The Court also said that there is no genuine issue for trial “unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. This standard “mirrors” the standard for a directed verdict. Id.; Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 441-42 (D.C.Cir.1975).
The central issue here on motion for summary judgment is causation. Defendant alleges that plaintiff has made no showing that anyone can offer personal knowledge that any exposure to asbestos occurred in this case. I agree that plaintiff has not identified “specific facts” that would indicate such exposure occurred, and I certainly think that plaintiff has not made the kind of showing necessary to defeat a directed verdict motion. I would therefore grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff has identified two items that may bear on whether anyone has personal knowledge of exposure to asbestos in this case. One is plaintiff’s listing of T.R. Hoff, assistant secretary at a company where plaintiff’s husband had been employed for one year, as a potential witness in the case. The other is a letter from Hoff to his company’s insurer, which states from the company records the dates plaintiff’s husband had been employed, his general duties, and the names of the manufacturers of asbestos products used by the company during that period. Together, these items are thought to provide sufficient “specific facts” to defeat a summary judgment motion on the issue of causation.
It would seem apparent that the mere listing of a potential witness, without more, does not constitute setting forth specific facts. Here plaintiff has never claimed that Mr. Hoff has any personal knowledge that her husband was exposed to asbestos during his year of work at this company, and indeed did not specify the grounds of his possible testimony at all, except to say that he would be able to testify about “facts relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit.” Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 161. On the other hand, plaintiff has failed ever to answer interrogatories served by defendant that asked for a variety of specific items of information she might have about her husband’s possible exposure to asbestos on any occasion. D.E. 47 at 14-16.
The majority concludes, however, that we should interpret plaintiff’s listing of Mr. Hoff as a witness in light of his letter to the insurance company, thereby finding enough evidence to stave off the equivalent of a motion for directed verdict on causation. This conclusion is incorrect for two reasons. First, the sum total of all this “evidence” falls far short of showing, or even suggesting, that anyone has been identified who can testify from personal knowledge about any asbestos exposure. That lack alone requires that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted.
In addition, and also dispositive, the letter itself is inadmissible as evidence and thus cannot be considered by this court in evaluating the summary judgment motion. Rule 56 indicates that a trial judge should decide a summary judgment motion based on “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c), and “by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel.” Id. 56(d). It is settled law that the judge may consider only these specific materials or other evidence that would be admissible at trial. Inadmissible evidence is not to be considered unless, like an affidavit, it is “otherwise provided for” in Rule 56. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2721 (1983) (“[T]he particular forms of evidence mentioned in the rule are not the exclusive means of presenting evidence on a Rule 56 motion. The court may consider any material that would be admissible or usable at trial.”); 6 J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice H 56.11[1.-8] (2d ed. 1972) (“[I]n addition to pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, answers of a party to interrogatories, and affidavits, which Rule 56(c) specifically enumerates, a court may consider oral testimony and any other or additional materials that would be admissible in evidence or otherwise usable *42at trial. Material that does not come within the above broad category should not be considered.”). The strength of this principle is shown by the manner in which a trial judge is supposed to treat affidavit testimony: if some of the testimony contained in the affidavit would be inadmissible if it were offered at trial (e.g., as hearsay), the judge is to consider only the portions that would be admissible at trial and excise the remainder. See 6A J. Moore, supra, ¶ 56.-22[1], at 56-1330 to 56-1331; 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra, § 2738, at 511.
Letters are not among the specific materials listed in Rule 56, and the Hoff letter is inadmissible hearsay. It was not made under oath, and does not purport to be based on personal knowledge. There has been some suggestion that it could fall within the “business records” exception to hearsay, see Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), but I think the suggestion is incorrect. Although the contents of the letter may have been gleaned from business records, the letter itself is not an item “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,” where it “was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation.” Id. Instead, the letter seems to have been written to respond to inquiries that were made in the course of this litigation. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 111-15, 63 S.Ct. 477, 479-81, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943).
The majority refers to the widespread view that unopposed material may be considered in deciding a summary judgment motion. Maj. op. at 36. The record in this case shows, however, that defendant opposed the admissibility of the letter.1 At no stage of these proceedings has any party even suggested the contrary. Indeed, plaintiff’s brief concedes this point, stating that the trial court “apparently accepted Celotex’s argument that the documents submitted by Mrs. Catrett were irrelevant because they would not, themselves, be admissible at trial.” Supplemental Brief for Appellant on Remand at 7. I thus can find no tenable basis for the suggestion that this court should consider the Hoff letter in evaluating the summary judgment motion.
For these reasons, I think plaintiff has not carried her burden in resisting summary judgment. On the causation issue, despite more than two years for discovery, she has been unable to present the district court with any “specific facts” beyond the vague listing of a potential witness not claimed to have any personal knowledge about exposure.2 My concern is that the majority’s view may make decisions on summary judgment both more difficult and more uncertain because the majority’s rationale suggests that trial judges must consider various permutations of vague and inadmissible evidence in reaching those decisions. This indicates that the “directed verdict” standard for evaluating summary judgment motions does not apply only to the evidence currently before the trial court on the motion for summary judgment but also to evidence that may emerge in the later course of the proceedings. That amounts to an automatic and unrequested *43extension of the time that is available for plaintiff to produce admissible evidence. This approach represents a departure from the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[sjummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’ ” Celotex Corp., 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1). I respectfully dissent.

. At the time the Hoff letter was considered in open court, defendant’s counsel discussed it with the judge in a manner that indicated his opposition to admitting it as evidence. Counsel said: "Your Honor, there is only a letter from the assistant secretary and that is not" — at this point the judge interrupted with several questions, but then counsel finished — “We also have, and they rely on this, the deposition of the decedent that was taken of him prior to his death for the compensation claim, which would not be admissible in this case either." D.E. 184B at 3-4 (emphasis added).

. The majority also points to documents that indicate business relationships between the defendant and one of the companies that employed plaintiffs husband. Maj. op. at 38-39. These documents are relevant on the causation issue, because if someone were able to testify from personal knowledge that plaintiffs husband was exposed to asbestos products during the time he worked for that company, these documents would help to establish some probability that the asbestos products he was exposed to were actually manufactured by the defendant. But these documents do not supply the crucial missing step on the causation issue, which involves specifying someone who can testify from personal knowledge about asbestos exposure. For the reasons given in the text, none of the other documents, including the Hoff letter, cures this omission.