Court Opinion

ID: 8633706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-24 19:41:42.944662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:55:51.561455
License: Public Domain

MARSHALL, Circuit Justice.
This is a suit instituted by the plaintiffs to recover against the defendant, damages for the non-conveyance of land, lying in Kentucky, which the defendant had stipulated to convey. The jury in their verdict present to the court certain circumstances which appeared to them to be material, and then pray the advice of the court respecting the standard by which, under those circumstances, damages ought to be measured. They request the opinion of the court whether the damages ought to be regulated by: (1) The value of the land at the date of the contract, or failure to convey; (2) by its value at the time of trial; or, (3) by the price contracted for; or, (4) by their own opinion, under all its circumstances, of the justice of the .case. One of these circumstances is, that the title of the vendor was defective, and this circumstance is connected with one other, to wit, that the plaintiffs resided at the time in Kentucky, where the lands lay, and the defendant in Virginia.
It has always been my inu.vidual opinion, that in a case where the lands sold are retained by the vendor, and he breaks his covenant to convey, in order to avail himself of the increased value, that he ought to be liable for the value of the lands at the time of trial. I suspect that this is not the opinion of the judges of the supreme court; of this, however, I am not confident. Had this been such a case, I am inclined to think that my opinion would have been in favour of the highest sum mentioned in the verdict.2 But this is not such a case. The vendor appears to have sold, without fraud, lands to which he believed himself to be entitled. He was mistaken. The'motives for subjecting him to the increased value of lands exist no longer. If he should be subjected to pay this increased value, it must be on principles of strict law,' in opposition to the *403real justice of the case. I find no such principle of law, and I find maxims entitled to respect which militate against it. One of these is, that in cases of doubtful law, where the one party seeks to make a gain, and the other to avoid a loss, the law will rather favour him who seeks to avoid a loss. But I can find no principle which, in a case of plain mistake with respect to title, will permit the damages to grow after the contract has been broken. I am, therefpre, of opinion, that, in this case, the value of the land at the time of trial is not the standard of damages. Is the value of the land at the date of contract, or which is the same thing in this case, at the time when the deed was demandable and to have been executed, the standard of damages?
The contest is between the value and the price actually given. Upon principle, it appears to me that the value at the time must be taken by the jury as their guide. The reason for this opinion is given in a single sentence. The value affirms the contract, and gives damages for its breach; the price annuls the contract, and replaces the parties in the same situation as if it had never been made. I therefore think myself constrained to say, that the price at the time is not to be the limit of the plaintiffs’ right to recover in this action. But the jury present to the consideration of the court a fourth alternative. If the circumstances stated in the verdict will authorize them to depart from all the standards which are mentioned, then they find other damages than tney would find, if bound in law by any one of those standards. That a jury may, if they ■choose, find a verdict against law, is admitted; and the court must either renuer judgment according to such verdict, or set it aside and award a new trial. But in this case, the jury have not chosen to* find a verdict against law. They have asked the opinion of the court whether, in point of law, the circumstances stated in their verdict, warrant a departure from all the principles ■stated in their preceding findings. Those circumstances, therefore, are to be considered. They are, that the plaintiffs resided in the neighbourhood of the land in Kentucky, and the defendant in Virginia, where the contract was made, that the vendor had no title to the land sold, and that the whole purchase money was not paid, nor was the deed demanded until twelve years after the contract was made, when the defect of the title was known. These circumstances may have some influence in the selection of the standard, or in the estimate of damages under that standard, but they cannot justiry a disregard of every rule whatever. I do not think, therefore, that judgment ought to be rendered upon the fourth finding of the jury.
The argument at the bar will, it is believed, authorize, if it does not require the court, to say something respecting the testimony admitted in this cause. The counsel for the plaintiffs seem to suppose that every species of testimony ought to be excluded, except that which would show the execution of the deed, or the value of the land. I do not think so. To me, it appears that the testimony may tend to fix the standard of damages; and that the complexion of the case may fairly have some influence on the jury, in estimating damages under that standard. The testimony, showing that the non-conveyance of the land, arose from the want of title in the vendor, has decided the opinion of the court .on the question, whether the value at the day of contract, or at the day of trial, ought to have governed the verdict, and was, consequently, very material in the cause. The other circumstances stated in the- verdict, might influence the jury, and, in my opinion, were proper to influence the jury on questions completely within their province. There might be contradictory and doubtful evidence respecting the value of the land, and the whole complexion of the case might have weight in deciding on that testimony. The residence of the parties especially, and their knowledge of the property, might deserve to be considered. On the question of interest too, if the value at the date of contract be the standard, the circumstances attending the case might be very material. There may be cases in which a court would instruct a jury that they ought to include interest in their computation of damages, if they took the value at the date of the contract as their standard; but there may be cases, and this is one, in which the court, on account of the very circumstances stated in this verdict, would be well satisfied with the exclusion of interest from the computation of damages.
These observations would be proper, in a court, unacquainted with the circumstances which occurred at the trial of the cause. But gentlemen engaged in the cause will recollect, that the testimony of which they complain was added by themselves. They stated the defendant’s want of title; they proved the tender in 1805, which established the fact that no previous payment had been made; and they proved it in such manner as to justify the inference, that no previous demand of the deed had been made. Was it for the court to say that this testimony might avail the plaintiffs, and not the defendant? Was it for the court, after the plaintiff had introduced this testimony, and argued upon it, to check the counsel for the defendant when attempting to apply the ■same testimony. The jury had no right to allow the defendant, in their verdict, so much of the purchase money as remained unpaid, and to this point they were instructed by the court. But could the court inform the jury, that they were to weigh the case made out by the plaintiff, according to his testimony, but that the moment their at*404tention was directed to the defence, they were to forget that they had heard it. Without regard, however, to the particular party from whom this testimony came, I have no doubt of its admissibility, under the directions of the court respecting its application.
Judgment rendered for twenty-five hundred and thirty-three dollars, the damages assessed by the jury in the second finding of their verdict.
NOTE, by MARSHALL, Circuit Justice. Since this opinion was given, I find that the uniform course of Kentucky, is to give the purchase money with interest, and to this course I now conform, where- no rents and profits have been received. — Where they have, that circumstance affects the interest.3

 See note 3 at end of this case.