Court Opinion

ID: 9832200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:42:23.651599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:44.102170
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[7] Appellee insists that its pleadings were sufficient to raise the issue which under the statute would entitle it to be released by payment of less than the face of the policy. We have again carefully reviewed the pleadings, and are convinced that our former holding is correct. The pleadings of appellee did set out the clause in the by-laws, but as a basis only for pleading its entire release from liability. There is no allegation whatever relative to a mortuary fund, the existence of any such fund is not declared, nor are any facts set up showing a right to be relieved upon payment of any sum less than the entire benefit named in the contract. Appellee also insists that the judgment should be remanded instead of rendered, because it is apparent from the record that this case was not fully developed upon the first trial. There can be no question but that the ease made by the pleadings was fully developed. It is not asserted in the motion that any facts admissible under the allegations were not introduced. The evident purpose of appellee’s motion is to have the judgment remanded in order that it may amend its pleadings and set up additional *611defensive matter, and correct a defective plea theretofore filed. If on account of the rulings of the trial judge upon demurrer ap-pellee had been forced or induced to proceed with the trial upon defective pleadings, it would be our duty to remand the case in order that it might have an opportunity to correct the defects, but no exceptions were urged to its pleadings. Y.ernon’s Sayles’ Civil Statutes, art. 1626, which controls our action in matters of the kind under consideration, provides that, when a judgment or decree of the trial court shall be reversed, this court shall proceed to render such judgment or decree as the court below should have rendered, except when it is necessary that some matter of fact be ascertained or the damage to be assessed or the matter to be decreed is uncertain, in either of which cases the cause shall be remanded for a new trial in the court below.
Our Supreme Court, in Thompson v. Eanes, 32 Tex. 191, 195, in passing upon this article, which was numbered 1562 in the statutes at that time, announces the effect of the article as follows:
“The other position taken in the application for a rehearing, to show the error of the court for remanding, we consider well taken. By article 1562 we are not permitted.to remand the cause to the district court, ‘except when it is necessary that some new matter of fact be ascertained, or damages to be assessed, or the matter to be decreed is uncertain.’ ”
In Gregory v. Montgomery, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 68, 56 S. W. 231, Pleasants, J., said:
“If appellee had made any defense to plaintiff’s suit in his pleading, other than a general denial and a plea of limitation, which was not sustained by the evidence, notwithstanding the fact that he offered no evidence, and elected to risk his case on the theory that plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to entitle him to recover, it might be proper for us to remand the case and allow appellee to prove his defense. It was ap-pellee’s duty to try his whole case, and we know of no rule of law that requires this court to give him two chances, not only in proving, hut in alleging, his defense, if any he has. To adopt such a rule would be to prolong and delay the administration of justice, and would prevent the termination of litigation by the rendition of judgments by appellate courts, in all cases in which the evidence discloses that there may be facts in existence which, if properly alleged and proven, might demand a different judgment than the one properly rendered on the facts before the court.”
In Michigan Savings & Loan Association v. Atteberry, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 222, 42 S. W. 569, Judge Lightfoot, in discussing this question, said:
“Under the eighth ground of the motion for rehearing it is contended that the case should not have been reversed and rendered, because the record shows that Bigsby had paid his monthly installment on his stock in the loan company up to and including May 23, 1893, and that the record fails to show the amount of monthly installments so paid, thus leaving a question of fact to be determined by the trial court. This proposition is not well taken, for the reason that no such issue was made in the pleadings. The petition of appellee sets up the execution of the note and its transfer to appellant, and seeks to cancel the lien. The cross-bill of appellants sets up the note and lien, and asks for the enforcement of the lien against the property. No question of any credit upon the lien debt was raised by either party. The case should not be remanded for trial upon issues not made by the pleadings.”
Writ of error was denied in this case.
In presenting its defense in the trial court appellee did not urge the issue of its liability to pay less than the face value of the contract under the provisions of the statute quoted in the original opinion, but rested its defense upon an absolute release from ah liability by reason of the suicide of the assured. The cases cited in the motion to sustain the position taken are not applicable. It seems to be the general rule that, where the pleadings are sufficient, and because of erroneous rulings of the court, either upon pleadings or in the admission of evidence, the facts of the case have not been fully developed upon reversal of the judgment, the case will be remanded. Article 1626, supra, requires the appellate courts to adopt this course, but the rule is not applicable, and cases should not be remanded in order that counsel may plead defenses not interposed at the first trial and introduce evidence tending to sustain the new facts pleaded.
The motion is overruled.