Court Opinion

ID: 9904942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 15:07:42.283897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:00.982416
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-481

                          JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

                                       vs.

                          SHANE D'ANDREA & others. 1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Defendant Elizabeth D'Andrea appeals from orders of a

 Housing Court judge dismissing both the summary process amended

 complaint of the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (the

 bank), and the defendants' counterclaims without prejudice.                On

 appeal, Elizabeth claims, among other things, that the judge

 erred in dismissing the counterclaims. 2          Finding no error, we

 affirm.

       In 2008, Dorothy Menzone, Elizabeth's mother, purchased a

 home at 33 Highland Street in Webster, Massachusetts (the

 property) by taking out a loan.          In 2012, Menzone refinanced the

 loan, executing a note in favor of Intercontinental Capital

 1 Elizabeth D'Andrea, Jennifer Wilson, and Dennis Brown.
 2 Because defendants Shane D'Andrea and Elizabeth D'Andrea share
 the same last name, we will refer to them by their first names
 to avoid confusion.
Group, Inc.    The loan was secured by a mortgage encumbering the

property. 3   After her death on March 15, 2013, no further

mortgage payments were made.    On January 14, 2020, the bank

purchased the property from itself at a foreclosure auction

after purportedly sending the required foreclosure notices and

publishing notice of the foreclosure sale.

     The bank then commenced a summary process action on

February 17, 2020, against Shane only, Menzone's great-grandson.

On December 8, 2021, while the summary process action was

pending, the bank sold the property to a third party.    On

December 10, 2021, two days after the sale of the property, the

bank, with leave of court, served the other occupants of the

property in this action with an amended summary process summons

and complaint. 4   Elizabeth filed an answer to the amended

complaint and counterclaims on December 31, 2021, and the other

newly-added defendants filed their answer and counterclaims on

January 3, 2022.    On January 13, 2022, the bank moved to

voluntarily dismiss the summary process action and to dismiss

all counterclaims, as it no longer held title to the property.

A judge held a hearing attended by Elizabeth and then dismissed

the bank's claim for possession and all counterclaims without

3 The mortgage was later acquired by the bank.
4 The amended complaint added Elizabeth; Jennifer Wilson, Shane's
mother; and Dennis Brown, another occupant of the property.

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prejudice because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Elizabeth appeals from the orders. 5

     Discussion.   "We review the allowance of a motion to

dismiss de novo, accepting as true all factual allegations in

the complaint and favorable inferences drawn therefrom."

Lipsitt v. Plaud, 466 Mass. 240, 241 (2013), citing Curtis v.

Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011).

     In her appeal, Elizabeth offer several reasons why the

Housing Court judge erred, each of which can only be addressed

if the Housing Court had jurisdiction over the bank's claim and

the defendants' counterclaims.    See Commonwealth v. Doughty, 491

Mass. 788, 805 (2023) ("Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the

power of the court to entertain a particular category of case").

Accordingly, we begin our analysis with the issue of whether the

Housing Court judge erred in dismissing either the bank's claim

for possession or the defendants' counterclaims.

     1.   Dismissal of summary process action.   The Housing Court

is a court of limited jurisdiction.    LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams

Co., 406 Mass. 888, 896 (1990).   General Laws c. 185C, § 3,

gives the Housing Court jurisdiction over claims involving "the

possession, condition, or use of any particular housing

5 Elizabeth has waived her appeal of the order denying her motion
for reconsideration. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

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accommodations."   Here, it is undisputed that at the time of the

filing of the bank's motion to dismiss, the bank was not the

owner of the property because it had transferred whatever

interest it had in the property to a third party via a quitclaim

deed.   "Where, as here, the plaintiff is neither the owner nor

the lessor of the property, the plaintiff has no standing to

bring a summary process action."       Rental Prop. Mgt. Servs. v.

Hatcher, 479 Mass. 542, 546 (2018).       "[L]egal standing is a

jurisdictional matter; if parties do not have standing, a court

has no jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims."       Matter of

Chapman, 482 Mass. 1012, 1015 (2019).

     After the bank sold its entire interest in the property,

its claim for possession became moot and the bank properly

informed the court of its change in status by filing a motion

for voluntary dismissal.   The judge then acted correctly by

scheduling the matter for a hearing and providing the defendants

an opportunity to be heard.   Because it is undisputed that the

bank no longer even purported to own any interest in the

property, it was not only proper, but also required for the

Housing Court to dismiss the bank's summary process action. 6

There was no error.

6
 Elizabeth appears mistakenly to believe that the order of
dismissal here include a judgment on the merits that the bank
owned the property, a question on which we express no opinion.
Moreover, the order dismissing the bank's claim for possession

                                   4
     2.   Dismissal of counterclaims.   We next address whether

the court had jurisdiction over the counterclaims once the

summary process action had been properly dismissed.    In a

summary process action following foreclosure, "[an] occupant

facing eviction may assert that the power of sale was not

strictly complied with and that the foreclosure is therefore

void . . . [and] other affirmative defenses or counterclaims,

such as those based on violations of G. L. c. 93A or G. L.

c. 151B, and may seek possession, monetary damages, or other

equitable relief."   Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 474 Mass.

329, 339 (2016).

     Elizabeth's answer and counterclaims challenged, among

other things, the validity of the mortgage loan transaction and

the foreclosure sale and alleged unfair business practices under

G. L. c. 93A.   There is no doubt that, in adjudicating a summary

process action, the Housing Court has the authority to consider

an affirmative defense or counterclaim challenging the validity

of the foreclosure sale.   Here, however, the Housing Court did

not have jurisdiction over any of the defendants' counterclaims

for the same reasons it did not have jurisdiction over the

was with prejudice. We also note that the judge had no duty at
any time before issuing his order of dismissal to determine, sua
sponte, whether the bank had standing to bring this action in
the first place.

                                 5
bank's summary process action.    As noted above, the bank no

longer claims to own any interest in the property and the bank's

claim to superior right of possession was moot once its property

interests were transferred.    In fact, at the time Elizabeth

filed her counterclaims, the transfer of the property was

already complete.    The Housing Court correctly noted that

"untethered from a claim for possession, the Housing Court is

without jurisdiction under G. L. c. 185C to adjudicate post-

foreclosure title issues pertaining to the validity of a

mortgage loan transaction or the validity of a foreclosure

sale."   Also as noted by the Housing Court judge, the defendants

are not without a forum to challenge the validity of the

foreclosure sale in a court of competent jurisdiction, and,

should the purchaser of the bank's interest bring a summary

process action, some of the bases of the counterclaims might

perhaps be raised as defenses and counterclaims there, something

about which, again, we express no opinion.    We also express no

opinion on the merits of the defendants' claims.

     Conclusion.    Because the Housing Court did not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate either the summary process action or

the defendants' counterclaims, we affirm the orders entered

January 26, 2022, dismissing the plaintiff's amended complaint

with prejudice and the defendants' counterclaims without

                                  6
prejudice.    The order denying defendant Elizabeth D'Andrea's

motion for reconsideration is affirmed.

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Rubin, Neyman &
                                        Walsh, JJ. 7),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    November 28, 2023.

7   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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