Court Opinion

ID: 9846302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:38:52.922127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:55.106991
License: Public Domain

Justice Lake
dissenting.
The motion to quash the indictment should have been allowed and, therefore, the judgment below should be reversed for the reason that the indictment does not charge a criminal offense. I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion directing a new trial.
The statute in effect at the time of the alleged acts of the defendant, G.S. 14-12.12, made the conduct therein proscribed a crime. The difficulty is the bill of indictment does not charge the defendant with the conduct proscribed by the statute.
The acts declared by this statute to be a crime are: “to place or cause to be placed on the property of another * * * a burning or flaming cross or any manner of exhibit in which a burning or flaming cross, real or simulated, is a whole or a part, without first obtaining written permission of the owner or occupier of the premises so to do.” (Emphasis added.)
*465This statute does not make criminal the placing of a burning circle or triangle on the property of another without his permission, irrespective of the purpose or the effect of such act. Clearly then, had this indictment charged the defendant with placing upon the property of Evans a burning circle, the motion to quash should have been allowed. Why? Simply because the Legislature did not in this statute make that a crime.
The conduct made criminal by this statute is the placing of a burning or flaming cross on the property of another without his permission. A cross, not burning or flaming when placed upon the property, is as truly outside the limits of this statute as is a burning circle. Justice Holmes’ well known statement in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 62 L. Ed. 372, 38 S.Ct. 158, “A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances at the time in which it is used,” may not be taken out of context to make criminal that which the Legislature has not declared to be so, and, of course, the majority does not so use his statement here.
It is fundamental in our system of law that the words used in a criminal statute must be strictly construed and may not be enlarged by construction to take in offenses not clearly described. State v. Gainey, 273 N.C. 620, 160 S.E. 2d 685; State v. Garrett, 263 N.C. 773, 140 S.E. 2d 315; Milk Producers Co-op v. Melville Dairy, Inc., 255 N.C. 1, 120 S.E. 2d 548; State v. Mitchell, 217 N.C. 244, 7 S.E. 2d 567; State v. Ingle, 214 N.C. 276, 199 S.E. 10; State v. Railroad, 168 N.C. 103, 82 S.E. 963. In State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 10, 72 S.E. 2d 97, Justice Barnhill, later Chief Justice, said, “[I]t is axiomatic that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the private citizen.” While it is true that a word in such statute, fairly susceptible of two or more meanings, should be construed so as to avoid giving the statute a ridiculous interpretation, State v. Pinyatello, 272 N.C. 312, 158 S.E. 2d 596, it is also a fundamental principle of statutory construction that when a word has a single, clear meaning, it should be given that meaning in the application of the statute, in the absence of anything in the statute to show a different meaning was intended. Duke Power v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 505, 510, 164 S.E. 2d 289; State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 153, 158 S.E. 2d 37. The reason is, where the meaning of the words used in the statute is plain, there is *466no room for construction and for the court to engage therein, so as to depart from the clear and ordinary meaning of the words used by the Legislature, is to engage in judicial legislation. School Commissioners v. Aldermen, 158 N.C. 191, 196, 73 S.E. 905; Asbury v. Albemarle, 162 N.C. 247, 250, 78 S.E. 146. If this be true in the construction of a statute involved in civil action, it is even more so with reference to the construction of a criminal statute, so as to make criminal that which the plain meaning of the words used does not include.
In School Commissioners v. Aldermen, supra, at page 196, Justice Hoke, speaking for the Court, said:
“Where the statute is free from ambiguity, explicit in its terms and plain meaning, it is the duty of the courts to give effect to law as it is written, and they may not resort to other means of interpretation. * * * Even though the Court should be convinced that some other meaning was intended by the lawmalcing power, and even though the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, still the explicit declaration of the Legislature is the law, and the courts must not depart from it * * * (Emphasis added.)
In Nance v. Railroad, 149 N.C. 366, 63 S.E. 116, Justice Henry G. Connor, speaking for this Court, said at pages 372-374:
“ ‘What the legislative intent was can be derived only from the words they have used. The spirit of the act must be extracted from the words of the act and not from conjecture aliunde.’ Story, J., in Gardner v. Collins, 27 U.S. 93. * * It is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation, or, when the words have a definite and precise meaning, to go elsewhere .in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning. Statutes should be read and understood according to the natural and most obvious import of the language without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation.’ McCluskey v. Cornwell, 11 N.Y. 593. * * * In Coe v. Lawrence, 72 E.C.L. (1 Ellis & B.) 516, it was sought to recover a penalty for violating a statute. Defendant claimed that he was not within its terms. It was insisted that the Court could find an intention to *467include him. Lord Campbell, C.J., said: ‘We are not justified in inserting words for the purpose of extending a penalty clause to cases not expressly comprehended in it. * * *’ Lord Coleridge said: T never heard that it was allowable to insert words for the purpose of extending a penal clause. * * * And even if that were not so, it is quite wrong to alter the language of a statute for the purpose of getting at its meaning,’ and of the same opinion were all the judges. * * * If, as is manifest, the Court cannot insert words to enlarge its scope, certainly they may not strike them out to reach a class of persons which they clearly exclude.”
We are here dealing with a matter of far more significance to the people of this State than the punishment of this defendant for the conduct alleged in the bill of indictment, senseless, offensive and reprehensible though it be. As Justice Sharp said so aptly in State v. Cobb, 262 N.C. 262, 266, 136 S.E. 2d 674:
“A man’s conduct must be judged by the law as it exists at the time his conduct is called into question and not by the law as he and others think it should be rewritten in the interest of social justice. * * * When a court, in effect, constitutes itself a superlegislative body, and attempts to rewrite the law according to its predilections and notions of enlightened legislation, it destroys the separation of powers and thereby upsets the delicate system of checks and balances which has heretofore formed the keystone of our constitutional government.”
This sound observation is even more pertinent when the proposal is to enlarge the plain meaining of the words of a criminal statute so as to extend it to conduct not within such meaning.
How can there be any doubt as to what is meant by a “burning or flaming cross?” “Burning,” as contrasted with “flaming,” would obviously include “smoldering,” but an object which is not ignited at all is neither “flaming” nor “burning.” To place on the property of another a cross is not a violation of this statute. To ignite a cross on the property of another is not a violation of this statute, irrespective of who put it there or how long it has been there. The offense created by this statute is the placing of a burning or flaming cross on the property of another without his permission. To extend this statute to cover *468the placing of an unignited cross, followed by setting it on fire, is as far beyond the power of this Court as it would be to extend it to the placing of a burning triangle, a burning crescent or a burning hammer and sickle. Surely, this statute does not make either of those acts a crime, and it would not cover such an act even if the Ku Klux Klan were to adopt such a burning object as a symbol of its presence.
The bill of indictment very plainly alleges the defendant and his companions placed a cross on the Evans property and “set fire to same.” Consequently, it does not allege the conduct which the statute makes criminal — the placing of a burning or flaming cross — and the motion to quash should have been allowed.
Since the indictment charged no crime, we do not reach the matters discussed in the majority opinion. If those questions were before us, I should concur in the views of the majority concerning them.