Court Opinion

ID: 9802754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 14:50:34.036722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:50.341356
License: Public Domain

COMBS, J.,
with whom KAUGER, J., joins, dissenting:
$1 The central issue of this cause is whether a property owner owes a duty of care to protect third parties from ice that is open and obvious when the actions of the landowner created or enhanced the hazard. The majority determines that the open and obvious doctrine does not apply and a duty is owed in such cireumstances. Because this Court has long held that landowners have no duty to guard against open and obvious hazards, including ice an entrant is aware of, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's departure from this Court's precedent and the settled principles of the common law of Oklahoma.
R
The Open and Obvious Doctrine Concerns the Existence of a Legal Duty on the Part of the Defendant, and Where There is no Duty There Can Be no Liability.
T2 Any actionable claim for negligence requires three fundamental elements: 1) the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury; 2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; and 3) injury to the plaintiff proximately resulting therefrom. Berman v. Lab. Corp. of America, 2011 OK 106, ¶ 16, 268 P.3d 68; Smith v. Himes, 2011 OK 51, 261 P.3d 1129; Scott v. Archon Group, L.P., 2008 OK 45, ¶ 17, 191 P.3d 1207. The threshold question in any negligence action is whether the defendant has a duty to the plaintiff. Sholer v. ERC Mgmt. Group, LLC, 2011 OK 24, ¶ 11, 256 P.3d 38; Scott, 2008 OK 45, ¶ 17, 191 P.3d 1207; Pickens v. Tulsa Metro. Ministry, 1997 OK 152, ¶ 8, 951 P.2d 1079. The reason for this threshold question is that there can be no negligence in the absence of a defendant's duty to the plaintiff. Scott, 2008 OK 45, ¶ 17, 191 P.3d 1207; Tucker v. ADG, Inc., 2004 OK 71, ¶ 21, 102 P.3d 660; City of Tulsa v. Harman, 1931 OK 73, ¶ 37, 148 Okla. 117, 299 P. 462. The question of whether a duty exists is properly a question of law for the court. Bray v. St. John Health Sys., Inc., 2008 OK 51, ¶ 6, 187 P.3d 721; Scott, 2008 OK 45, ¶ 17, 191 P.3d 1207.
3 In the specific context of premises liability, the question of what duty is owed is answered in part by the status of the entrant-a question that is the direct result of the complicated interplay between the histor*464ical rights of landowners and the evolution of the nascent common law of torts. As this Court stated in Sutherland v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 1979 OK 18, ¶ 5, 595 P.2d 780 (footnotes omitted):
[land possessor's liability in negligence for harm occurring upon the premises varies with the status of the entrant complaining of injury. Definition of duty that marks out the limit of protection afforded an entrant broadens or narrows with the beneficial interest of the possessor in the presence of the other upon the land. This has been the common law approach ever since landlord's sovereignty and immunity for acts done within the boundaries of his land gradually gave away to present-day civil accountability. When modern tort law finally incorporated possessor's liability, the concept of negligence came to be applied within the restrictive framework of relational, status-based duties. In short, the common law has never seen fit to extend its principles of general negligence (as they came to be fashioned in the last century) to govern harm occasioned on the premises of others.
14 The result of the evolution described above is the existence of the three classes of entrant discussed briefly by the majority: trespasser, licensee, and invitee. Sholer, 2011 OK 24, ¶ 11, 256 P.3d 38; Scott, 2008 OK 45, ¶ 18, 191 P.3d 1207. In Scoff, this Court restated a concise explanation of the classes of entrant and what duty each is owed by a landowner:
"To a trespasser, a landowner owes ... only a duty to avoid injuring him wilfully or wantonly. To a licensee, an owner owes a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to him the existence of dangerous defects known to the owner, but unlikely to be discovered by the licensee. This duty extends to conditions and instrumentalities which are in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, snares, and the like. To an invitee, an owner owes the additional duty of exercising reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the reception of the visitor. Even vis-a-vis an invitee, to whom a landowner owes the highest duty in this trichotomous classification system, the law does not require that the landowner protect the invitee against dangers which are so apparent and readily observable that one would reasonably expect them to be discovered. In other words, a landowner owes to an invitee, as well as to a licensee, a duty to protect him from conditions which are in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, snares and the like. A hidden danger within this rule of liability need not be totally or partially obscured from vision or withdrawn from sight; the phrase is used to describe a condition presenting a deceptively innocent appearance of safety 'which cloaks a reality of danger.' Furthermore, failure to remove known but obvious hazards by alteration or reconstruction of the premises is not a breach of the landowner's duty even to an invitee."
Scott, 2008 OK 45, ¶ 19, 191 P.3d 1207 (quoting Pickens, 1997 OK 152, ¶ 10, 951 P.2d 1079) (emphasis added).
15 Of the three classes of entrant, the invitee is entitled to the greatest protection. Sholer, 2011 OK 24, ¶ 12, 256 P.3d 38; Scott, 2008 OK 45, ¶ 21, 191 P.3d 1207. However, as the above discussion of the types of entrants indicates, even invitees are not owed a duty by landowners to guard against open and obvious hazards on the premises. Sholer, 2011 OK 24, 112, 256 P.3d 38; Scott, 2008 OK 45, 12, 191 P.3d 1207. This rule is the essence of what has become known as the open and obvious doctrine within the common law, and which this Court has applied consistently since at least 1931.1 Important*465ly, this Court has routinely applied this doe-trine and found no duty even in situations where the hazard was in some way created by the property owner.2 This Court stated the rule very clearly in Nicholson v. Tacker, 1973 OK 75, ¶ 11, 512 P.2d 156 (emphasis added): "[jlust because the defendant has created a risk which harmed the plaintiff that does not mean that, in the absence of some duty to the plaintiff, the defendant will be held liable."
IL.
The Majority's Reliance on Brown v. Alliance Real Estate Group and EKrokow-sky v. Henderson Nat. Corp. is Misplaced Because Wood Was Aware of the Ice and the Danger it Presented.
T6 The majority's assertion that Defendant Mercedez-Benz of Oklahoma City owed a duty to Plaintiff Erica Wood to take remedial measures to protect her from the icy conditions surrounding its facility rests on two main points First, quoting Brown v. Alliance Real Estate Group, 1999 OK 7, ¶ 6, 976 P.2d 1043, the majority asserts that a landowner does have a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to another whenever the cireumstances are such that the owner, as an ordinary prudent person, could reasonably foresee that another will be in danger of injury as a probable consequence of the owner's actions. Second, citing Krokowski v. Henderson Nat. Corp., 1996 OK. 57, ¶¶ 7-8, 917 P.2d 8, the majority asserts that this Court has rejected the open and obvious doctrine for a hazardous accumulation of ice caused or enhanced by the landowner, and determined that the creation of such a dangerous condition would impose a duty on the owner to exercise care for the protection of third parties.
T 7 Both Brown and Krokowski rely extensively on another decision of this Court, Buck v. Del City Apartments, Inc., 1967 OK 81, 431 P.2d 360, and a firm understanding of this Court's determination in Buck is essential for understanding why the majority's reliance on Brown and Krokowski is misplaced. In Buck, a plaintiff sued a motel owner after injuring herself in a fall on ice, that had accumulated on the porch steps and that she did not see. 1967 OK 81, T 18, 481 P.2d 860. After discussing application of the open and obvious doctrine, this Court determined that the plaintiff could not recover because:
It is clear from the evidence that the wife knew or should have known of the general weather conditions. The dangers from them are universally known and were equally as apparent to her as they were to the motelkeepers. There is no evidence here that the usual hazard from the icy condition was in any way increased by an act of the motelkeepers. Where there is no act on the part of the owner or occupant of the premises creating a greater hazard than that brought about by natural causes, dangers created by the elements, such as the forming of ice and the falling of snow, are universally known, and all persons on the property are expected to assume the burden of protecting themselves from them.
Buck, 1967 OK 81, 122, 431 P.2d 360. This Court determined that the landowner in *466Buck did not owe a duty because the injured person should have known of the general weather conditions and the dangers from them, ie. ice, were universally known and were as apparent to her as they were to the motelkeepers. Buck, 1967 OK 81, 122, 431 P.2d 860. The Court's determination was therefore in keeping with its application of the long standing rule of the open and obvious doctrine, which it reiterated:
[tlhe law does not require the owner or occupant of land to warrant that the invitee shall suffer no injury upon the premises; his duty is discharged when reasonable care is taken to prevent the invitee's exposure to dangers which are more or less 'hidden, and not obvious.
Buck, 1967 OK 81, T 21, 431 P.2d 360.
18 In Brown, 1999 OK 7, 976 P.2d 1048, this Court clarified the principles set out in Buck. Notably, this Court clarified that Buck did not declare that under no cireumstances may a premises lHability claim be maintained for an accident attributable to a natural accumulation of snow and ice. Brown, 1999 OK 7, ¶4, 976 P.2d 1043. In other words, the Buck ruling does not mean that natural accumulations of snow and ice are never open and obvious as a matter of law. However, "Buck reasoned that perceptible hazards created by the elements, such as the accumulation of ice and snow, are universally appreciated by all reasonable people using due care and cireum-spection. Buck teaches that an accumulation of ice or snow, visible upon due care and circumspection, does not constitute a hidden danger such that the premises owner is under a duty to give warning." Brown, 1999 OK. 7, T 4, 976 P.2d 1048.
T 9 The majority quotes a single point from Brown concerning foreseeability, but ignores the factual underpinnings of the case. Brown, 1999 OK 7, 16, 976 P.2d 1048 reads in full:
The summary judgment evidentiary material tends to show not only that the pavement in front of the real estate office had a deceptively innocent appearance, but also that the premises owner was on notice of the dangerous patch of invisible ice because of another accident that occurred earlier the same day. Consistent with Buck, a premises owner does have a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to another whenever the cireumstances are such that the owner, as an ordinary prudent person, could reasonably foresee that another will be in danger of injury as a probable consequence of the owner's actions.
In other words, the owner had a duty to protect the plaintiff in Brown from the black ice because 1) it was not an ordinarily perceptible hazard (nor did the particular plaintiff see it) and 2) the owner knew it was there and dangerous because it had already caused an accident. Brown, 1999 OK 7, T1] 5-6, 976 P.2d 1048. The owner in Brown had specific knowledge of a non-obvious danger that might injure someone on the property. Under those facts, the potential harm to others and the likelihood that others would fail to perceive it was foreseeable. Central to the entire determination in Brown, and its application of Buck, is the fact that the black ice was not something a visitor could be expected to see or appreciate the danger of.
10 The majority's reliance on Krokowski is also misplaced. In Krokowski, this Court applied the core holding of Buck to a plaintiff who claimed to have slipped on ice allegedly caused not by natural weather conditions, but by the placement of a landlord's drain pipe. The Court in Krokowski determined that an issue of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff's injury was due to natural accumulation of ice, or by an increase in the natural hazard caused by the placement of the drain pipe. EKrokowski, 1996 OK 57, 18, 917 P.2d 8.
11 The majority reads Krokowski to hold that a landlord owes a duty to guard against any harm caused by an unnatural icy hazard whether the injured party was aware of the hazard or not. This is not the case. Kro-kowski relies upon and quotes a specific passage from Buck:
"... It is clear from the evidence that the wife knew or should have known of the general weather conditions. The dangers from them are universally known and were equally as apparent to her as they were to the motelkeepers. There is no evidence here that the usual hazard from the icy condition was in any way increased by *467an act of the motellkeepers. Where there is no act on the part of the owner or occupant of the premises creating a greater hazard than that brought about by natural causes, dangers created by the elements, such as the forming of ice and the falling of snow, are universally known, and all persons on the property are expected to assume the burden of protecting themselves from them ..."
Krokowski, 1996 OK 57, 16, 917 P.2d 8 (quoting Buck, 1967 OK 81, 122, 481 P.2d 860).
This entire passage indicates that a duty may exist in situations where a property owner increases the hazard caused by natural weather conditions beyond what a visitor could be assumed to be aware of, because while the natural dangers of ice are known, extra ice caused by the landlord's actions may not be something a visitor expects. Remember that the visitor in Buck slipped on ice she did not see. The landlord owed no duty because she should have known of the natural dangers of ice even if she was subjectively unaware of its presence.
{12 In this cause, there is no question whatsoever that Wood was aware of the ice surrounding the dealership. As the majority states, she knew it was important to be careful because she observed ice covering the entire entrance area. This is not a situation analogous to Krokowski or Brown where the owner's actions created an enhanced danger beyond the normal danger of ice, or where there was hidden black ice of which the property owner had prior notice. Even though the ice was formed by sprinklers and not natural precipitation, Wood recognized the ice for what it was and was aware of the danger it presented. This is not a question of what Wood should have known. It is a question of what she did know. By attempting to carve out an exception to the open and obvious doctrine, the majority would erode the clear rule that a property owner owes no duty as a matter of law to guard against dangers that are open and obvious to visitors. This court summed up the rule clearly in Buck, and nothing within this Court's holding in Krokowski or Brown has altered it:
20 The owner or person in charge of the premises has no obligation to warn an invitee, who knew or should have known the condition of a property, against patent and obvious dangers. The invitee assumes all normal or ordinary risks incident to the use of the premises, and the owner or occupant is under no legal duty to reconstruct or alter the premises so as to remove known and obvious hazards, nor is he liable to an invitee for an injury resulting from a danger which was obvious and should have been observed in the exercise of ordinary care. 21 The duty to keep premises in a reasonably safe condition for the use of the invited public applies solely to defects or conditions which may be characterized as in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like-things which are not readily observable. The law does not require the owner or occupant of land to warrant that the invitee shall suffer no injury upon the premises; his duty is discharged when reasonable care is taken to prevent the invitee's exposure to dangers which are more or less hidden, and not obvious. In the absence of a duty neglected or violated, there can be no actionable negligence
Buck, 1967 OK 81, 1T 20-22, 481 P.2d 360 (emphasis added).
Conclusion
13 Actionable negligence requires breach of a duty on the part of the defendant. Ber-man, 2011 OK 106, 11 16, 268 P.3d 68; Smith, 2011 OK 51, 112, 261 P.3d 1129; Scott, 2008 OK 45, 117, 191 P.3d 1207. In premises liability, the duty owed by the defendant is determined by the classification of the entrant, but regardless of the entrant's classification, the defendant owes no duty to guard against hazards that are open and obvious. Sholer, 2011 OK 24, 12, 256 P.8d 88; Scott, 2008 OK 45, T 21, 191 P.3d 1207; Buck, 1967 OK 81, 1 20, 481 P.2d 360.
{14 The rule of Buck, Krokowski, and Brown is this: a property owner owes no duty to safeguard an invitee from dangers created by ice, even ice the property owner has created, if the danger was, under the *468facts, open and obvious to the invitee. Those cases were concerned with what visitors should know or should be assumed to know, whereas this cause concerns what a visitor did know. Without question, the facts indicate that Wood was aware of the ice and the risk it presented. The actions of Mercedes-Benz did not create a hidden danger. Summary judgment was proper, as under the facts of this case, Mercedes-Benz owed no duty to Wood.

. See, eg., Sholer, 2011 OK 24, 256 P.3d 38; Scott, 2008 OK 45, ¶ 10-14, 191 P.3d 1207 (defendant has no duty to guard against open and obvious hazards, but whether a hazard is open and obvious may be a question of fact for the jury); Tucker, 2004 OK 71, 102 P.3d 660; Kastning v. Melvin Simon & Assoc., Inc., 1994 OK 68, ¶ 6, 876 P.2d 239 ("It is well established that a landowner has no duty to warn of dangers that are open and obvious."); Turner v. Rector, 1975 OK 172, ¶ 10, 544 P.2d 507 ("There is no obligation to warn an invitee, who knew the condition of a property, against patent and obvious dangers, and there is no actionable negligence in the absence of a duty neglected or violated.") (quoting Jackson v. Land, 1964 OK 102, ¶ 0, 391 P.2d 904); Nicholson v. Tacker, 1973 OK 75, ¶ 19, 512 P.2d 156 ("the fact that the danger is *465open and obvious nullifies duty of defendant to plaintiff."); C.R. Anthony Co. v. Million, 1967 OK 231, ¶¶ 7-8, 435 P.2d 116 (An "owner or occupant is under no legal duty to reconstruct or alter the premises so as to obviate known and obvious dangers, nor is he liable for injury to an invitee resulting from a danger which was obvious or should have been observed in the exercise of ordinary care.") (quoting Safeway Stores v. McCoy, 1962 OK 194, ¶ 8, 376 P.2d 285); Jackson, 1964 OK 102, ¶ 0, 391 P.2d 904 ("there was no obligation to warn an invitee, who knew the condition of a property, against patent and obvious dangers, and there was no actionable negligence in the absence of a duty neglected or violated.") (citing Long Const. Co. v. Fournier, 1942 OK 83, ¶ 10, 190 Okla. 361, 123 P.2d 689); City of Tulsa v. Harman, 1931 OK 73, ¶ 37, 299 P. 462 ("an injured party will not be permitted to recover damages where he did in fact fully appreciate the peril; so, in respect of such perils as may be said to be patent or obvious, there is no obligation to give any sort of warning.")

. See, eg., Scott, 2008 OK 45, ¶21, 191 P.3d 1207 (clearance beam on owner's property was an open and obvious hazard); Nicholson, 1973 OK 75, ¶ 11, 512 P.2d 156 (defective fishing dock was an open and obvious hazard); Pickens, 1997 OK 152, ¶11, 951 P.2d 1079 (retaining wall was an open and obvious hazard).