Court Opinion

ID: 9762100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:10:38.830388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:30.070229
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Judge
(concurring).
This case involves the important and difficult question of protecting citizens from constitutionally prohibited searches, on the one hand, and providing proper protection to arresting police officers, on the other. I have concluded to concur only in the result reached in the principal opinion for the reasons which follow.
At the outset, it is clear that the state does not seek to and cannot justify the search in this case on the ground that the officer had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained articles he was entitled to seize; hence cases such as Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed.2d 419, and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790, have no application.
The view expressed in Judge Holman’s dissent is that the search was proper because a valid arrest (even though for only a traffic offense) authorized an incidental *68search for weapons of the portion of the vehicle from which arrestee might gain possession of a weapon.
Although I subscribe fully to the statement in State v. Moody, Mo., 443 S.W.2d 802, 804, “that police officers, while in the performance of their official duties, are entitled to all the safety and protection we can give them within constitutional limitations,” I cannot join in the dissenting opinion herein for two reasons. In the first place, I do not believe that the transcript on appeal justifies a conclusion that this search in fact was one for weapons to protect the arresting officer. The transcript discloses that Officer Marbs told of asking defendant as to the ownership of the car, of checking the defendant’s driver’s license, of having defendant get out of the car, of searching his person but finding nothing, of then having the passenger alight from the car, and finally of searching the entire interior portion of the car. When Officer Marbs testified that defendant was standing on the sidewalk beside the car during this search, counsel for defendant sought to impeach him by showing that on a prior motion to suppress before another judge, he had stated that defendant was in the patrol car at the time of the search. Counsel, for that purpose, read to Officer Marbs certain questions and answers from the prior hearing, including the following: “ ‘What were you looking for when you searched Mr. Meeks’ car? Answer: I was not technically looking for anything. I was searching the— Question: You were searching the car for your own protection ? Answer: Yes, sir. Question: At the time Mr. Meeks was in the patrol car and the other person who was in the car — ’ and your answer was ‘Yes.’ ” In my judgment, the record shows that this search was an investigatory or exploratory search rather than a protective one for weapons incidental to the arrest. Officer Marbs at no time in his testimony explained that he searched the car for weapons. The only reference to protection came in the above cited question and answer which were read to Officer Marbs by counsel in connection with possible impeachment on the basis of prior inconsistent testimony. That, in my opinion, was not sufficient to show that this was a protective search for weapons, and if it was not, then this was an unauthorized, warrantless search of the vehicle.
Secondly, I am unwilling in this case to hold that in connection with every valid arrest of a person on a minor traffic charge, there is an absolute right, incidental to that arrest, without more, to search the vehicle adjacent to the driver for weapons. That is the rule which the dissenting opinion would adopt. There is authority for such a rule, but there also is substantial authority to the contrary. A collection of cases and a discussion of this question can be found in Annotation, Search of Vehicle —Traffic Violation, 10 A.L.R.3d 314, and George, Constitutional Limitations on Evidence in Criminal Cases, 1969 Ed., p. 65.
My present view is that something more than a valid arrest for traffic offenses such as an expired license plate, or failure to have a city sticker, or for illegal parking, or for failure to signal a left turn, or for going an extra five miles per hour over the speed limit, is necessary to justify a search of the vehicle for weapons incidental to such arrest. Examples of the “something more” to justify such a search which I would require might consist of the operation of the car itself at high speed in an attempt to escape, weaving back and forth across the highway, suspicious conduct or movements of the driver as the officer approaches, or the presence of some visible suspicious article in the car as the officer approaches to talk to the driver. In my view, the factual situation that existed in State v. Moody, supra, would have justified a search of the vehicle for weapons as well as a search of the person. Counsel for defendant, in argument of this case, expressed a similar viewpoint. I am of the opinion that the same would be true of the factual *69situation in State v. Robinson, Mo., 447 S. W.2d 71. I am not at all sure that the principal opinion is consistent with the viewpoint I here express, and that is one reason why I have concurred therein only in the result.
In addition, the principal opinion stresses the fact that both defendant and his passenger were completely out of the car when defendant was arrested and when the search of the vehicle occurred. There appears to be an implication that the fact that they were not in the automobile at the time of the search would prevent or destroy any right in the officer to search the vehicle for weapons incidental to a valid arrest. I cannot agree with such an implication. As a practical matter, the officer in most instances would need to remove the driver (and possibly also the passenger) in order to search the vehicle for weapons. After the driver (and possibly the passenger) were out of the vehicle, he would need to make the search to prevent the possibility of the person arrested from making a break and seeking to reach into the vehicle to obtain a weapon. In addition, if he were going to permit the arrestee to drive the car later, he would need to insure that a weapon was not available for use in attacking him after the arrestee was permitted back in the car.
I would reverse and remand for the reason that the search was not a protective search for weapons but was an unauthorized, warrantless, exploratory search.