Court Opinion

ID: 9408146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 18:01:18.955623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:42.035855
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20238      Document: 00516816268         Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/11/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                FILED
                                                                         July 11, 2023
                                  No. 22-20238                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Nima Nazerzadeh,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:06-CR-30-1
                  ______________________________

   Before King, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
          The government appeals the district court’s order granting Nima
   Nazerzadeh’s request to terminate his obligation to register as a sex offender.
   Because the unambiguous language of the Sex Offender Registration and
   Notification Act deems Nazerzadeh a tier II sex offender, and because that
   status demands that his registration continues, we REVERSE.
                                          I
          Nazerzadeh pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of child
   pornography and one count of possession of child pornography involving the
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                                    No. 22-20238

   sexual exploitation of minors. He was sentenced to 60 months in prison on
   each count, to run concurrently. The district court also imposed a life term
   of supervised release.
          After serving his sentence, Nazerzadeh was released from prison in
   August 2010. And he successfully completed his sex offender treatment.
   Since his release, he has maintained a clean record and complied with his
   registration requirement.
          In March 2022, Nazerzadeh moved to terminate his federal obligation
   to register as a sex offender. As legal authority, he cited 34 U.S.C. §
   20915(b), which allows “a tier I sex offender” to obtain reduction of the
   registration period if the offender maintained a “clean record” for 10 years.
   The government opposed the motion, arguing that Nazerzadeh’s conviction
   for distribution of child pornography makes him a tier II sex offender, and tier
   II sex offenders are required to register for 25 years. Accordingly, the
   government asserted that: (1) SORNA did not provide a private cause of
   action to seek a reduction in the term of registration; and (2) in the
   alternative, SORNA did not provide for a reduction for tier II sex offenders.
          Without explanation, the district court granted Nazerzadeh’s motion
   and relieved him of his federal obligation to register as a sex offender. The
   government timely appealed. On appeal, the government re-urged only its
   second argument, that § 20915 does not provide for a reduction for tier II sex
   offenders. Accordingly, we address only that argument.
                                          II
          In general, we review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions
   of law de novo. United States v. Huerta, 994 F.3d 711, 714 (5th Cir. 2021). We
   review SORNA’s registration requirement de novo. United States v. Schofield,
   802 F.3d 722, 725 (5th Cir. 2015).

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                                         III
          As to tier I sex offenders, SORNA provides for a 5-year reduction of
   the registration period if the registrant maintained “a clean record” for 10
   years. 34 U.S.C. § 20915(b). As to tier II sex offenders, however, SORNA
   does not allow for any reduction. § 20915(b)(3). The government does not
   dispute that Nazerzadeh has maintained a clean record for the prescribed
   period. It contends, however, that Nazerzadeh is a tier II offender, and so he
   is not entitled to a reduction. But if Nazerzadeh is correct that he is properly
   classified as a tier I offender, then a 5-year reduction (which SORNA
   authorizes for tier I offenders) would terminate his obligation because he has
   fulfilled more than 11 years of the 15-year mandatory registration.
          Given this background, the determinative question is whether
   Nazerzadeh is a tier I or tier II sex offender. As to tier I and tier II
   classifications, SORNA provides as follows:
          (2) Tier I sex offender
          The term “tier I sex offender” means a sex offender other than
          a tier II or tier III sex offender.
          (3) Tier II sex offender
          The term “tier II sex offender” means a sex offender other
          than a tier III sex offender whose offense is punishable by
          imprisonment for more than 1 year and—
                 (A) is comparable to or more severe than the following
                 offenses, when committed against a minor, or an
                 attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense against
                 a minor:
                        (i) sex trafficking (as described in section 1591 of
                        Title 18);
                        (ii) coercion and enticement (as described in
                        section 2422(b) of Title 18);

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                        (iii) transportation with intent to engage in
                        criminal sexual activity (as described in section
                        2423(a))1 of Title 18;
                        (iv) abusive sexual contact (as described in
                        section 2244 of Title 18);
                 (B) involves—
                        (i) use of a minor in a sexual performance;
                        (ii) solicitation       of   a   minor   to    practice
                        prostitution; or
                        (iii) production        or   distribution     of   child
                        pornography; or
                 (C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex
                 offender.
   34 U.S.C. § 20911.
          In interpreting § 20911(3) (tier II classification), the government
   argues for a disjunctive reading of the statute, whereas Nazerzadeh argues for
   a conjunctive reading. Under the government’s reading, conditions (3)(A),
   (3)(B), and (3)(C) are each independently sufficient for tier II classification.
   In contrast, under the Nazerzadeh’s reading, none of the conditions are
   independently sufficient, and (3)(A) is necessary. Or, as he put it, “to be a
   Tier II offender, the offense must be one listed in (3)(A) that involves (3)(B)
   or (3)(C); not an offense listed in (3)(A) or (3)(B) or (3)(C)” (emphasis in
   original).
          Here, the parties’ briefs indicate that condition (3)(B)(iii)—and only
   that condition—is satisfied. And so, the choice between a disjunctive or
   conjunctive reading is outcome determinative. If we adopt the disjunctive
   reading, then Nazerzadeh is a tier II offender. But under the conjunctive
   reading, he would not qualify as a tier II offender because (3)(A) is not
   satisfied, and thus he would be considered as tier I by default.

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                                            A
          We hold that the disjunctive reading is the correct interpretation of
   the statute. The “Supreme Court has noted that ‘or’ is ‘almost always
   disjunctive.’” Cascabel Cattle Co., L.L.C. v. U.S., 955 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir.
   2020) (quoting Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141
   (2018)).    The word “indicates alternatives and requires that those
   alternatives be treated separately.” Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,
   40 F.4th 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
   Thus, as a matter of ordinary English, when a provision requires “A, B, or
   C” it expresses a “disjunctive list, [where] at least one of the three is
   required, but any one (or more) of the three satisfies the requirement.”
   Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
   Texts 116 (2012); see 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 139 (observing that when a
   “conjunction is placed immediately before the last of the series, the same
   connective is understood between the previous members”); see also United
   States v. Palomares, 52 F.4th 640, 643 (5th Cir. 2022) (“An em dash signifies
   that the clause that immediately precedes the dash applies to all of the items
   that follow.” (alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted).).
          And our precedent supports this presumption.               In Navarro, for
   example, we observed that “an offender qualifies as tier II if his sex offense
   was [encompassed under § 20911(3)(A)(iv)].” United States v. Navarro, 54
   F.4th 268, 278 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A)(iv)); see also
   United States v. Walker, 931 F.3d 576, 578 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J.)
   (similarly holding that “a person is a tier II sex offender if his offense [satisfies
   § 20911(3)(A)(iv)]”). In holding so, we understood subsection (3)(A) as
   independently sufficient for tier II classification. That understanding is
   consistent with the disjunctive reading.

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          Our decision in Coleman likewise supports a disjunctive reading.
   United States v. Coleman, 681 F. App’x 413 (5th Cir. 2017). Coleman
   addressed whether a sex offender qualifies as tier III under 34 U.S.C.
   § 20911(4)(A) (previously 42 U.S.C. § 16911(4)(A)).             Like § 20911(3)
   (defining tier II), the text of § 20911(4) (defining tier III) has an “(A), (B), or
   (C)” structure. The subsection reads as follows:
          (4) Tier III sex offender
          The term “tier III sex offender” means a sex offender whose
          offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year
          and—
                  (A) is comparable to or more severe than the following
                  offenses, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an
                  offense:
                         (i) aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as
                         described in sections 2241 and 2242 of Title 18);
                         or
                         (ii) abusive sexual contact (as described in
                         section 2244 of Title 18) against a minor who has
                         not attained the age of 13 years;
                  (B) involves kidnapping of a minor (unless committed
                  by a parent or guardian); or
                  (C) occurs after the offender becomes a tier II sex
                  offender.
   34 U.S.C. § 20911(4).
          The Coleman panel affirmed the district court’s tier III categorization
   because the defendant satisfied (4)(A). In its reasoning, the panel never
   discussed either (4)(B) or (4)(C), indicating that it adopted a disjunctive
   interpretation by reading (4)(A) as independently sufficient. Given that
   § 20911(4) has the exact same structure as § 20911(3), Coleman supports a
   disjunctive reading of § 20911(3). 681 F. App’x 413; see also Walker, 931 F.3d

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   at 576 n.1 (Barrett, J.) (recognizing that there are multiple “ways to qualify
   as a Tier II or Tier III offender”).
                                              B
             Nazerzadeh contends that we should adopt a conjunctive reading
   because the end of subsection (3)(A) does not include the conjunction “or.”
   In other words, he contends that, if Congress had wanted to provide three
   different alternatives for tier II classification, the statute would have stated
   “(3)(A), or (3)(B), or (3)(C).”          Because the first “or” is “missing,”
   Nazerzadeh concludes that, “to be a Tier II offender, the offense must be one
   listed in (3)(A) that involves (3)(B) or (3)(C); not an offense listed in (3)(A)
   or (3)(B) or (3)(C)” (emphasis in original).
             We are unpersuaded by this argument. To be sure, some legal
   drafters, “through abundant caution, put a conjunction between all the
   enumerated items.” Reading Law, at 118. For example, a provision may
   state:
             The seller shall provide:
                    (a) a survey of the property; and
                    (b) the surveyor’s sworn certificate that the survey is
                    authentic and, to the best of the surveyor’s knowledge,
                    accurate; and
                    (c) a policy of title insurance showing the boundaries of
                    the property; and
                    (d) a plat showing the metes and bounds of the property.
   Id.      But the use of multiple conjunctions there (a technique called
   “polysyndeton”) “does not convey a meaning different from that of the
   identical phrasing minus the ands at the end of (a) and (b).” Id.; see also Sierra
   Club v. United States Env’t Prot. Agency, 964 F.3d 882, 892 n.8 (10th Cir.
   2020). Moreover, this technique is disfavored because “over time, it [may]

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   cast doubt on the meaning conveyed by the use of syndeton [i.e., the use of a
   conjunction between the last elements only].” Reading Law, at 118. And so,
   here, although the statute could have used multiple “ors” by stating “(3)(A),
   or (3)(B), or (3)(C),” doing so would not convey a meaning different from
   the current formulation. As a matter of ordinary English, when a provision
   requires “A, B, or C” it expresses a “disjunctive list, [where] at least one of
   the three is required, but any one (or more) of the three satisfies the
   requirement.” Id. at 116.
          Next, Nazerzadeh contends that the Third Circuit’s decision in Hodge
   supports his position. United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2003). In
   Hodge, the Third Circuit addressed whether a “wax-and-flour” mixture is a
   “controlled substance analogue” within the meaning of 21 U.S.C.
   § 802(32)(A). Id. at 431. The relevant provisions state:
          [With certain exceptions not relevant here,] the term
          “controlled substance analogue” means a substance—
                 (i) the chemical structure of which is substantially
                 similar to the chemical structure of a controlled
                 substance in schedule I or II;
                 (ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
                 effect on the central nervous system that is substantially
                 similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or
                 hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a
                 controlled substance in schedule I or II; or
                 (iii) with respect to a particular person, which such
                 person represents or intends to have a stimulant,
                 depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
                 nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater
                 than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect
                 on the central nervous system of a controlled substance
                 in schedule I or II.
   21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A).

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          The government there proposed a disjunctive interpretation, namely,
   that a substance is a controlled substance analogue if it satisfies any one of
   clauses (i), (ii), or (iii). In contrast, the defendants argued that “a controlled
   substance analogue must satisfy both clause (i) and either clause (ii) or (iii).”
   Hodge, 321 F.3d at 433. Under the government’s proposed reading, the
   mixture of candle wax and flour that the defendants sold would be a
   “controlled substance analogue” under subpart (iii) because the defendants
   “represent[ed]” their product as crack cocaine. Id. In contrast, under the
   defendants’ conjunctive interpretation, the mixture would not be a
   controlled substance analogue because it does not satisfy clause (i).
          Relying on the absurdity canon and legislative history, the Hodge panel
   agreed with the defendants’ conjunctive reading. The court observed that
   under a disjunctive reading, powdered sugar or a mixture of candle wax and
   flour “would be an analogue if a defendant represented that it was cocaine.”
   Id. at 434. And the court reasoned that the “treatment of candle wax and
   flour, no matter how it is marketed, as a schedule I controlled substance is an
   ‘absurd’ result of the kind our canons of construction instruct us to avoid.”
   Id. at 439. Pointing to legislative history, the panel noted that “Congress did
   not intend to include innocuous substances such as wax and flour within its
   definition of controlled substance analogues.” Id. at 438–39. Thus, the panel
   adopted a conjunctive interpretation and reversed the defendants’
   convictions that were based on a disjunctive reading of the statute. Id. at 439.
          Even though Hodge addressed a completely different statute,
   Nazerzadeh contends that the structure of the statute in Hodge is similar to
   the structure of the statute at issue here. And so, he asserts that we should
   follow the panel in Hodge and adopt a conjunctive reading. We refuse to do
   so, however, for three reasons.

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          First, we have rejected Hodge’s conjunctive reading of 21 U.S.C. §
   802(32)(A) in United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1990).
   See United States v. Roberts, 363 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2004) (observing that
   the Fifth Circuit in Granberry adopted a disjunctive test as to 21 U.S.C. §
   802(32)(A)).
          Second, we are not persuaded by Hodge’s reasoning because it relies
   on legislative history. “We are reluctant to rely on legislative history for the
   simple reason that [it is] not law.” In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 51 F.4th 138,
   148 n.10 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting In re DeBerry, 945 F.3d 943, 949 (5th Cir.
   2019)). And when we do consider legislative history, it is only because the
   text at issue is ambiguous. Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d
   488, 492 (5th Cir. 2004). Because there is no such ambiguity here, “we are
   not permitted to look to the legislative history.” Id. at 492.
          But even assuming arguendo that we can look to the purpose of the
   statute, it does not support Nazerzadeh’s conjunctive reading. We have
   observed that “Congress enacted SORNA to ‘protect the public from sex
   offenders and offenders against children’ and to ‘establish[] a comprehensive
   national system for the registration of those offenders.’” United States v.
   Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original)
   (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16901). And “SORNA’s language confirms ‘that
   Congress cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as
   possible.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th
   Cir.2010) (en banc)). Thus, to the extent that purpose serves as context, it
   supports a disjunctive, more inclusive reading, of the statute. See United
   States v. Sharp, 62 F.4th 951, 953 (5th Cir. 2023) (observing that “words are
   given meaning by their context, and context includes the purpose of the
   text,” but purpose “is to be described as concretely as possible”) (quoting
   Reading Law, at 56–57).

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          And finally, unlike in Hodge, the absurdity canon is inapplicable here.
   Nazerzadeh contends that a disjunctive reading of the tier II classification
   would lead to an absurd result because it would mean that (3)(C) is
   individually sufficient for tier II categorization. If (3)(C) is individually
   sufficient, he contends that a tier I offender would fall into tier II if convicted
   of a any offense “punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year,” if the
   offense “occurs after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender.” 34 U.S.C.
   § 20911(3)(C). But this argument relies on a misinterpretation. The relevant
   provision reads:
          “The term ‘tier II sex offender’ means a sex offender other
          than a tier III sex offender whose offense is punishable by
          imprisonment for more than 1 year and . . . (C) occurs after the
          offender becomes a tier I sex offender.”
   Given that SORNA is concerned with sex offenses, context would indicate
   that the term “offense” specifically refers to a sex offense, not just any
   offense. And so, under (3)(C), a tier I offender would be elevated into a tier
   II category when he commits a sex offense (not just any offense) that is
   “punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year,” if the offense “occurs
   after the offender becomes a tier I sex offender.” § 20911(3)(C). We see
   nothing absurd about that outcome as it merely reflects Congress’s decision
   to lengthen the registration period for repeat sex offenders.
                                    *        *         *
          As a matter of ordinary English, when a provision requires “A, B, or
   C” it expresses a “disjunctive list, [where] at least one of the three is
   required, but any one (or more) of the three satisfies the requirement.”
   Reading Law, at 116; 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 139. We may consider
   departing from that general presumption only when “context dictates
   otherwise.” Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 45 F.4th
   1340, 1353 (11th Cir. 2022). Context does not dictate otherwise here. Thus,

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   we agree with the government that 34 U.S.C. § 20911(3)(A)–(C) should be
   read disjunctively, whereby (3)(A), (3)(B), and (3)(C) are each independently
   sufficient for tier II classification. 1
           Because he was convicted for distribution of child pornography,
   Nazerzadeh’s crime falls under § 20911(3)(B)(iii), and so he is a tier II sex
   offender. Consequently, he “shall” register for 25 years from the date of his
   release from prison. 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a)(2) (stating that “[a] sex offender
   shall keep the registration current for . . . 25 years, if the offender is a tier II
   sex offender”); id. (stating that the registration period “exclud[es] any time
   the sex offender is in custody or civilly committed”). Furthermore, he is not
   entitled to any reduction of the required registration period under SORNA.
   34 U.S.C. § 20915(b) (providing reduction for tier I and tier III sex offenders,
   but not tier II). Accordingly, the district court’s grant of Nazerzadeh’s
   motion to terminate his federal obligation to register as a sex offender is
   REVERSED.

           _____________________
           1
             Agency deference does not apply here because the statute is unambiguous. See
   Huntington Ingalls, Inc. v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Compen. Programs, U.S. Dept. of Lab., 70
   F.4th 245, 253 (5th Cir. 2023). And even if the statute is ambiguous, we would have applied
   the rule of lenity rather than defer to the agency’s interpretation. See Cargill v. Garland, 57
   F.4th 447, 468 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that agency deference “does not apply [when] the
   statutory language at issue implicates criminal penalties”); United States v. Hoang, 636 F.3d
   677, 682 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]o the extent SORNA may be ambiguous, the rule of lenity
   requires that we interpret the statute in [the Defendant’s] favor.”).

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