Court Opinion

ID: 9710606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:13:02.169076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:58.319049
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER, with whom MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD and MR. JUSTICE RYAN, join, dissenting: Mr. Justice Underwood, Mr. Justice Ryan, and I are unable to agree with the majority opinion, which eliminates the proviso of section 5 — 8—4(h) of the Unified Code of Corrections that paragraph (c) of section 5 — 8—4 is to apply only to persons sentenced after the effective date of the Unified Code of Corrections. The defendant in this case was sentenced prior to. the date when the Unified Code of Corrections became effective. The legislative intention is unmistakable that persons who had received consecutive sentences prior to the effective date of the statute were not to benefit by its provisions. The majority opinion holds that this legislative intention cannot be given effect because in two earlier opinions of this court (People v. Morgan (1974), 59 Ill.2d 276, and People v. Williams (1975), 60 Ill.2d 1), section 5 — 8—4(h) of the statute was not applied although by its terms it was applicable to the sentences involved in those cases. The majority concludes that since this statutory provision was not applied in Morgan and to Williams, it would deprive the present defendant of equal protection if the statute was applied to him. The simple fact is that section 5 — 8—4(h) was not called to the attention of the court in either the Morgan or the Williams cases and its existence was overlooked by the court. Those decisions are not, therefore, to be considered as valid precedents under orthodox notions of stare decisis. Indeed, a case in which a governing statute is not called to the attention of the court which decided the case is the classic example of what is known as a “judgment per incuriam.” (See Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., [1944] 1 K.B. 718, [1944] 2 All E.R. 293.) The term “per incuriam” means “through inadvertence.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1293 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). The effect of the statutory provision, which is the only issue involved in the present case, was neither raised nor discussed in the Morgan and Williams cases. At most, it can be said to have “lurked in the record.” Those decisions are not precedents (KVOS, Inc. v. Associated, Press, 299 U.S. 269, 81 L. Ed. 183), and the fact that the State’s Attorney failed to call the court’s attention to the statute in the Morgan and Williams cases does not create an estoppel in the present case. Nor, in our opinion, would the defendant be deprived of equal protection of the law by the application of the statute to him.