Court Opinion

ID: 9402559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 05:05:39.950963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:00.770050
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     June 15, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    Nos. 359391; 359392; 361917
                                                                     Muskegon Circuit Court
LAMELLE DESHAWN CHILDERS,                                            LC Nos. 2020-004946-FH; 2020-
                                                                             004947-FH; 2020-
                                                                             004945-FH
               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MURRAY and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant was charged in three separate lower court cases with a total of three counts of
delivery of methamphetamine, second or subsequent offense, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i); MCL
333.7413(1). A jury convicted defendant in two of the cases and found him not guilty in the third
case. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to
7 to 26 years’ imprisonment for each of his convictions. The sentences are to be served
concurrently. Defendant appeals as of right.1 We affirm.

       The delivery of methamphetamine charges in the three consolidated cases related to the
alleged sale of methamphetamine to an undercover police officer, Detective Thomas Schmidt of
the West Michigan Enforcement Team (WMET), in Muskegon County on three dates: March 9,
2020, March 11, 2020, and May 16, 2020. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court sua sponte
joined the three cases for trial on the first day of trial. In joining the charges, the trial court
emphasized that the three cases were all noticed for trial on the same date and that judicial economy
strongly supported joinder given that the witnesses were identical in the three cases.

1
 In Docket No. 359392, defendant appeals as of right the judgment of sentence in lower court case
2020-004947, and in Docket No. 361917, defendant appeals as of right the judgment of sentence
entered in case 2020-004945. In Docket No. 359391, defendant also appeals as of right a judgment
of sentence that was erroneously entered in lower court case 2020-004946. The three appeals were
consolidated by this Court. See People v Childers, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered October 5, 2022 (Docket Nos. 359391, 359392, and 361917).
                                                -1-
        In terms of the testimony at trial, most notably, Detective Schmidt testified that WMET
received a tip about a phone number that could be called to purchase drugs from defendant.
Detective Schmidt also testified that on the three dates in question, he communicated with
defendant using that phone number to arrange the purchase of methamphetamine, and on each
date, he met defendant face-to-face to purchase methamphetamine. Detective Schmidt identified
defendant as the individual who sold him drugs on each date.

        The jury convicted defendant of the charges related to the events on March 11, 2020 (case
2020-004945) and May 16, 2020 (case 2020-004947), but the jury found defendant not guilty with
respect to the events on March 9, 2020 (case 2020-004946). However, as a result of some apparent
confusion about the docket numbers, a judgment of sentence erroneously entered in case 2020-
004946 and an order of acquittal erroneously entered in case 2020-004945. The trial court later
corrected the errors in the docket numbers related to the judgment of sentence and the order of
acquittal.

                                  I. JOINDER OF THE CASES

       Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by joining the three cases
sua sponte on the first day of trial. According to defendant, the last-minute joinder “blindsided”
defense counsel and prejudiced the defense, thereby denying him his right to a fair trial in each
case.

               Whether joinder is appropriate is a mixed question of fact and law. To
       determine whether joinder is permissible, a trial court must first find the relevant
       facts and then must decide whether those facts constitute related offenses for which
       joinder is appropriate. This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings for clear
       error and its interpretation of a court rule, which is a question of law, de novo.
       However, the ultimate decision on permissive joinder of related charges lies firmly
       within the discretion of trial courts. [People v Gaines, 306 Mich App 289, 304; 856
       NW2d 222 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

       Permissive joinder of charges is governed by MCR 6.120(B), which in part states:

              On its own initiative, the motion of a party, or the stipulation of all parties,
       except as provided in subrule (C), the court may join offenses charged in two or
       more informations or indictments against a single defendant, or sever offenses
       charged in a single information or indictment against a single defendant, when
       appropriate to promote fairness to the parties and a fair determination of the
       defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense.

               (1) Joinder is appropriate if the offenses are related. For purposes of this
       rule, offenses are related if they are based on

               (a) the same conduct or transaction, or

               (b) a series of connected acts, or

               (c) a series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.

                                                    -2-
                (2) Other relevant factors include the timeliness of the motion, the drain on
        the parties’ resources, the potential for confusion or prejudice stemming from either
        the number of charges or the complexity or nature of the evidence, the potential for
        harassment, the convenience of witnesses, and the parties’ readiness for trial.

               (3) If the court acts on its own initiative, it must provide the parties an
        opportunity to be heard.

In comparison, under MCR 6.120(C), if offenses are not “related” within the meaning of MCR
6.120(B), the trial court must sever the charges for a separate trial if the defendant moves to sever
the offenses.

        For purposes of MCR 6.120, “multiple offenses may be ‘related’ as part of a single scheme
or plan despite a lack of temporal proximity.” People v Williams, 483 Mich 226, 241 n 18; 769
NW2d 605 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, offenses are not “related”
“simply because they were of the same or similar character.” Id. at 235 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Whether evidence of the separate charges would be admissible in separate trials
is “an important consideration” because joinder of charges “cannot prejudice the defendant more
than he would have been by the admissibility of the other evidence in a separate trial.” Id. at 237
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Ultimately, when “counts are logically related, and there
is a large area of overlapping proof, joinder is appropriate.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

       Defendant does not appear to dispute that the three drug charges were related within the
meaning of MCR 6.120(B). The three cases all involved the sale of methamphetamine to Detective
Schmidt and the same cell phone was used to arrange all three sales. The sales took place on three
separate dates, between March and May 2020, in Muskegon County. Although the sales occurred
on different days, on each occasion defendant was engaged in the same scheme to sell
methamphetamine to Detective Schmidt. The offenses were clearly related. Cf. id. at 234-235
(concluding that drugs charges arising from two separate drug raids, months apart, were related
and properly joined); People v Collins, 298 Mich App 458, 470; 828 NW2d 392 (2012)
(concluding that multiple drug deliveries from the defendant to the same buyer, “while separate
crimes, were connected acts” that were related for purposes of MCR 6.120).

         Rather than contest the relatedness of the charged offenses for purposes of MCR 6.120,
defendant’s arguments speak more to the other “relevant factors” under MCR 6.120(B)(2).
Defendant contends that he was “blindsided” when the trial court raised the issue on the first day
of trial and that the joinder unfairly prejudiced him. A review of the record does not, however,
support defendant’s contention.

         With regard to the timing of the trial court’s decision, although the trial court decided to
join the cases for trial on the first day of trial, as noted by the trial court, all three cases were noticed
for trial on the same date. According to defense counsel’s testimony at an evidentiary hearing
after trial, the parties and the trial court were discussing—as recently as the day before trial—
which case would be tried first, and a decision had not yet been made on which case would go
first. Given that the cases were noticed for trial on the same date and that the parties had not yet
agreed on a single case to try first, defense counsel was presumably prepared to try any of the three
cases on August 31, 2021 when he appeared for trial that day. Moreover, defense counsel’s
performance, including his cross-examination of Detective Schmidt, amply demonstrated his
                                                    -3-
preparedness and his familiarity with the facts of all three cases. Defendant—and the prosecutor—
may have been surprised by the last-minute joinder of the three cases, but for purposes of MCR
6.120(B)(2), “the parties’ readiness for trial” actually supports the trial court’s joinder decision.

         Additionally, to the extent that defendant takes issue with the timing of the trial court’s sua
sponte decision, when the trial court takes action on its own initiative to join offenses for trial,
MCR 6.120(B)(3) requires the trial court to “provide the parties an opportunity to be heard.” The
trial court fulfilled this obligation by providing defendant with an opportunity to voice his
objections to joinder of the offenses.2 Defendant has not shown an abuse of discretion on the basis
of the timing of the trial court’s decision.

        Defendant also claims that he was prejudiced by the joinder. He fails, however, to explain
how joinder of the charges unfairly prejudiced him. The facts of the three cases were not complex,
and there was little risk of juror confusion. See Gaines, 306 Mich App at 305 (noting lack of
complexity and “little potential for confusion” as factors supporting joinder of charges).
Substantively, the evidence would be admissible at separate trials under MRE 404(b), a fact which
supports the propriety of joinder in this case. See Williams, 483 Mich at 237. As noted, defendant
was also aware of all the facts of the three cases before trial. Further, defendant’s defense to all
three cases was the same: misidentification. On appeal, he does not even attempt to explain what
he might have done differently if the cases had been tried separately.

        Further, the trial court also took steps to minimize any potential prejudice from the joinder
by instructing prospective jurors during voir dire that defendant was “entitled to a separate
consideration for each of those three charges,” and by reiterating in the final jury instructions that
the fact that defendant was “charged with more than one crime” was not evidence, that the jurors
could not “mix and match elements” from the different dates to arrive at a conviction, and that
they must determine for “each date” whether defendant was guilty or not guilty. Jurors are
presumed to follow their instructions, and these limiting instructions helped alleviate any potential
prejudice. See People v Roscoe, 303 Mich App 633, 646; 846 NW2d 402 (2014). Indeed, the jury
in fact found defendant not guilty of one of the joined counts, supporting that defendant was not
unfairly prejudiced by the joinder.

        Lastly, aside from timing and prejudice concerns, the convenience of the witnesses also
supported joinder. See MCR 6.120(B)(2). There was a total of three witnesses: Detective Schmidt,
the WMET property manager who testified regarding the chain of custody for the drugs, and the
forensic analyst who tested the drugs. All three witnesses would have testified in all three cases,
presenting largely the same testimony in each case. Judicial economy and the convenience of the
witnesses strongly supported joinder under MCR 6.120(B). In sum, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by joining logically related offenses involving overlapping proofs. See Williams,
483 Mich at 237.

2
  Defendant makes the cursory assertion that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to place all the facts relevant to a joinder decision on the record before the trial court. In
actuality, the record supports that defense counsel promptly and specifically objected to the joinder
of the charges. Defense counsel was not ineffective simply because his objection proved
unsuccessful. See People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 190; 891 NW2d 255 (2016).
                                                  -4-
                            II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

        Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence, particularly
with regard to identity, to support defendant’s convictions. This Court reviews de novo a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v Williams, 268 Mich App 416, 419; 707 NW2d 624
(2005).

       When ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a
       conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
       prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
       essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court
       will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining the weight of the
       evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable
       inferences that arise from such evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the
       elements of the crime. All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of
       the prosecution. [Id. (citations omitted).]

       The jury convicted defendant of two counts of delivering methamphetamine, relating to
drug sales on March 11, 2020 and May 16, 2020. The elements of this offense are: (1) that the
defendant delivered a controlled substance, (2) that the substance delivered was
methamphetamine, and (3) that the defendant knew he was delivering methamphetamine. People
v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 619; 696 NW2d 754 (2005). It is also “well settled that identity is
an element of every offense.” People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 356; 749 NW2d 753 (2008).

        Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, the evidence established
that on March 11, 2020, Detective Schmidt called a phone number, which he received as part of a
tip indicating that he could call the number to buy methamphetamine from defendant. Detective
Schmidt spoke with defendant, whose voice he knew from previous interactions. Detective
Schmidt then arranged to meet defendant, and in a face-to-face transaction in broad daylight
defendant sold Detective Schmidt methamphetamine. Detective Schmidt identified defendant as
the man who sold him drugs on March 11, 2020, and at the time of the drug transaction defendant
was also driving a car that police determined was registered to his mother. Similarly, on May 16,
2020, Detective Schmidt received a text message from the same phone number offering to sell him
methamphetamine. Detective Schmidt arranged to meet defendant, and in another face-to-face
transaction in broad daylight defendant sold Detective Schmidt methamphetamine. Detective
Schmidt again identified defendant as the man who sold him drugs on May 16, 2020. Laboratory
analysis confirmed that the substance purchased by Detective Schmidt on both occasions was
methamphetamine.

        Despite this evidence, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient because the
prosecutor failed to establish his identity as the man who sold drugs on the dates in question.
According to defendant, Detective Schmidt’s identification of defendant was, on its own,
insufficient to establish defendant’s identity. To the contrary, “positive identification by witnesses
may be sufficient to support a conviction of a crime,” People v Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700;
617 NW2d 381 (2000), and the credibility of identification testimony is a question for the jury.
See id. Although defendant challenged the reliability of Detective Schmidt’s identification of

                                                 -5-
defendant at trial,3 and even posited that Detective Schmidt may have mistaken defendant for his
brother. Detective Schmidt maintained that he was positive in his identification of defendant, that
he was familiar with both defendant and his brother, and that he could tell them apart. The
credibility of Detective Schmidt’s identification of defendant was for the jury. See id. Viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, Detective Schmidt’s positive identification
of defendant was sufficient to establish defendant’s identity as the individual who sold
methamphetamine to Detective Schmidt on March 11, 2020 and May 16, 2020.

        Although defendant mainly focuses his arguments on the question of identification, he also
briefly claims that Detective Schmidt’s assertion that drug sales occurred was not credible because
Detective Schmidt received less methamphetamine in May 2020 than he received in March 2020
for the same amount of money, which defendant believes is “incredible” and “just does not happen
in the real world.” Detective Schmidt explained this discrepancy at trial, testifying that the
COVID-19 pandemic resulted in an increase in the price of methamphetamine between March
2020 and May 2020. In any event, the credibility of Detective Schmidt’s testimony and the weight
of the evidence in light of the different prices were issues for the jury. See Williams, 268 Mich
App at 419. The prosecutor presented sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions.

                       III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

         Defendant also contends on appeal that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance,
and he offers a long list of purported shortcomings in defense counsel’s performance related to
counsel’s pretrial investigation and discovery requests, the objections made during trial, and the
questions asked on cross-examination. Defendant moved the trial court for a new trial on
ineffective-assistance grounds, and after holding a Ginther4 hearing, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion, holding that defendant received the effective assistance of counsel. Deferring
to the trial court’s factual findings, we likewise see no merit to defendant’s arguments.

        Whether the defendant received the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of
fact and law. People v Ackley, 497 Mich 381, 388; 870 NW2d 858 (2015). This Court reviews a

3
  In the context of his sufficiency argument, defendant asserts that Detective Schmidt used “unduly
suggestive” identification techniques insofar as he viewed a photo of defendant before going to
the drug buys. However, defendant does not argue that the identification procedures were so
impermissibly suggestive as to warrant exclusion on due-process grounds. See generally People
v Sammons, 505 Mich 31, 41; 949 NW2d 36 (2020). Further, he failed to raise this issue in a
motion to suppress in the trial court. See People v Lee, 391 Mich 618, 626-627; 218 NW2d 655
(1974). At this juncture, defendant’s poorly-briefed “unduly suggestive” argument is abandoned.
See People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 679; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). And, absent some
reason to suppose that Detective Schmidt’s identification violated due process, any weaknesses in
Detective Schmidt’s identification was a proper subject for the jury with the aid of cross-
examination, arguments from counsel, and jury instructions on evaluating eyewitness testimony,
see Perry v New Hampshire, 565 US 228, 245; 132 S Ct 716; 181 L Ed 2d 694 (2012), all of which
occurred.
4
    People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
                                                -6-
trial court’s findings of fact, if any, for clear error, while questions of constitutional law are
reviewed de novo. Id.

        “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show (1) that defense
counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, a
different outcome would have resulted.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 600-601; 808
NW2d 541 (2011). “Because the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient
performance and prejudice, the defendant necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual
predicate for his claim.” People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). “Effective
assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.”
People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). “This Court will not second-
guess counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit
of hindsight.” People v Putman, 309 Mich App 240, 248; 870 NW2d 593 (2015) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).

                                         A. DISCOVERY

        Defendant first contends that defense counsel failed to request discovery necessary to
properly investigate and prepare for trial. In making this argument, defendant contends that a
defense attorney must make written discovery requests, and defendant offers a laundry list of
specific items that he asserts defense counsel should have obtained during discovery. Defense
counsel always has “the duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision
that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826
NW2d 136 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The record shows that counsel fulfilled
that obligation.

        As an initial matter, to the extent defendant faults defense counsel for failing to make
written discovery requests, we note that defendant fails to provide any authority for the proposition
that formal written discovery requests are a requirement of professionally competent
representation, and such “rigid requirements for acceptable assistance” are not consistent with the
standards governing ineffective-assistance analysis. See People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 168;
560 NW2d 600 (1997) (“Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable
assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the
acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.”) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Setting aside defendant’s rigid formulation of what he believes was
required, the record is clear that his trial attorney—Marc Curtis—made a reasonable investigation
before trial, including engaging in discovery.

        In particular, at the Ginther hearing, Curtis—who has practiced criminal law in Muskegon
County for 20 years, both as a prosecutor and as a defense attorney—testified at length regarding
discovery generally and his specific efforts to obtain discovery in this case, explaining that he did
not file written discovery requests because doing so was unnecessary. He explained that in
Muskegon there had “always been an open discovery process with the prosecutors and defense
attorney.” According to Curtis’s testimony, once an attorney files an appearance, he or she has
“everything that they have on file” and is “always” given what is needed. If something seemed to
be missing, or if there was anything else Curtis wanted, a phone call or an e-mail would suffice to
discover whether it existed and to have it provided. This open discovery benefited everybody
because the parties were not filing discovery requests back and forth. Consistent with these
                                                 -7-
practices, Curtis asked the prosecutor for discovery, and, with the exception of information about
a confidential tip that the prosecutor refused to disclose, he received everything that he requested
that existed. The trial court credited Curtis’s testimony regarding his discovery efforts, and
contrary to defendant’s representations, his testimony regarding discovery demonstrates that he
undertook a reasonable investigation of the case. See Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52.

        Aside from his general complaints about discovery, defendant provides a list of specific
items that he believes that counsel should have obtained during discovery. According to Curtis’s
testimony at the Ginther hearing, which the trial court found to be credible, Curtis in fact requested
the majority of the items on defendant’s list, and he in fact obtained several of the items, including
the photo of defendant that Detective Schmidt used to identify defendant, all WMET reports and
supplemental reports related to the controlled buys in this case, and a police report relating to the
arrest of defendant’s brother, which Curtis obtained from the brother’s attorney before trial. Curtis
also asked for fingerprint analysis, but none had been performed. He also asked for proof of the
“tip” that WMET initially received about the phone and defendant, but he was told that they were
not going to turn it over. Given that Curtis either obtained these items or at least requested them,
defendant did not establish that Curtis failed to request these items during discovery. See Carbin,
463 Mich at 600.

        Aside from the items that Curtis did seek, defendant also argues that Curtis should have
sought phone logs and text messages related to the phone used to arrange the drug buys. At the
Ginther hearing, Curtis explained, however, that he made a strategic decision not to request this
information. His plan was to argue that someone other than defendant could have used the phone,
and Curtis did not want to risk uncovering records that might link defendant to the phone. In other
words, by not requesting the phone records and text logs, the defense was able to maintain plausible
deniability and to hypothesize that someone other than defendant could have used the phone. This
was a matter of strategy, and this Court will not second-guess trial counsel on matters of trial
strategy. See Putman, 309 Mich App at 248.

        Defendant also contends that Curtis should have asked for WMET work logs showing
assignments of every WMET officer on the day in question. When asked about this information
at the Ginther hearing, Curtis testified that, although he did not specifically ask for the WMET
assignment logs, the assignment information for those involved would have been included in the
reports he received. In other words, Curtis had the relevant information he needed, and he had a
reasonable basis for not seeking additional assignment logs. Defendant has not shown that his
investigation was unreasonable in this regard. See Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52.

        Next, defendant contends that Curtis should have obtained Detective Schmidt’s
disciplinary record. Despite defendant’s burden to establish a factual predicate, and despite the
opportunity for a Ginther hearing, defendant failed to ask Curtis about whether he requested or
obtained Detective Schmidt’s disciplinary record. Accordingly, there is no support for his
assertion that Curtis did not request or obtain this information, and defendant has not established
a factual predicate for his argument. See Carbin, 463 Mich at 600.

        Lastly, defendant contends that Curtis provided ineffective assistance by failing to request
WMET’s policies about “controlled buys.” Curtis testified, however, that, as a criminal attorney
with 20 years’ experience, he has handled numerous drug cases, including those with undercover
sales, and that he was familiar with WMET and its practices. It does not appear that Curtis

                                                 -8-
performed unreasonably by failing to seek policies to further educate himself in this regard. See
Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52.

       In sum, with regard to Curtis’s pretrial performance, the record does not support
defendant’s assertion that Curtis failed to conduct a reasonable investigation and to obtain pertinent
discovery. Accordingly, defendant’s ineffective-assistance argument in this regard fails because
defendant has not shown that Curtis’s discovery efforts fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See Jackson, 292 Mich App at 600-601.

        Moreover, even assuming some deficiency in counsel’s performance, defendant has not
shown that he was prejudiced by any of Curtis’s alleged failures to request the laundry list of
information that defendant now asserts was important. There is, for example, no evidence of the
WMET policies or how they would have aided defendant’s defense. There is no record of the
phone logs or text messages to support that such information would have aided the defense. There
is no information about the “tip” and how it would have aided the defense. There is no evidence
of fingerprint analysis that would have aided the defense. There is no evidence of Detective
Schmidt’s disciplinary record or the WMET work logs to show that this information would have
aided the defense. There is no evidence of the WMET reports, the photo of defendant, or the
brother’s police report to support that there was anything favorable to the defense that Curtis failed
to present at trial. In short, defendant has not identified anything favorable to the defense that
Curtis failed to request or obtain during discovery, and in these circumstances, defendant’s
ineffective-assistance of counsel claim fails because he has not shown prejudice. See id.

                   B. FAILURE TO INTERVIEW A POTENTIAL WITNESS

         Defendant contends that Curtis provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and
call a resident of the home where the first drug sale on March 9, 2020 allegedly occurred in the
driveway. “Decisions regarding whether to call or question witnesses are presumed to be matters
of trial strategy.” People v Russell, 297 Mich App 707, 716; 825 NW2d 623 (2012). As noted,
defense counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations. Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 52. This
duty does not, however, “impose on defense counsel the unconditional obligation to call or
interview every possible witness . . . .” People v Beard, 459 Mich 918; 589 NW2d 774 (1998).
Despite the opportunity for a Ginther hearing, and despite defendant’s obligation to develop a
record excluding “hypotheses consistent with the view that his trial lawyer represented him
adequately,” Mitchell, 454 Mich at 163 (quotation marks and citation omitted), defendant wholly
failed to ask Curtis why he did not attempt to speak to anyone who lived in the home.5 Defense
counsel was not required to interview every conceivable witness. See id.

       Moreover, even assuming that defense counsel should have contacted the resident,
defendant cannot show prejudice. The resident’s testimony would be potentially relevant, if at all,
mainly with regard to the incident on March 9, 2020, but defendant was found not guilty of this

5
  We also note that, at the Ginther hearing, defendant refused to fully waive his attorney-client
privilege, meaning that the full extent of Curtis’s strategic reasoning and his conversations with
defendant were not presented at the hearing. It is difficult to find ineffective assistance when
defense counsel has not been given an opportunity to be heard, which requires a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. See Mitchell, 454 Mich at 168-170.
                                                 -9-
charge. Conceivably, the argument could be made that undermining Detective Schmidt’s
credibility with regard to the events of March 9, 2020 could have also affected his credibility with
respect to the other charges. But, even with regard to the events of March 9, 2020, the resident’s
testimony would have little, if any, value in this respect. At the Ginther hearing, defendant asked
the residents general questions about whether she knew defendant and whether, to her knowledge,
he had been at her house. She testified that she “knew of him” through mutual friends but that she
had never met him. Defendant failed, however, to ask the resident any questions about March 9,
2020, in particular to support that defendant was not at her home on that day. Indeed, the resident
testified that she is generally not at home, and at work during the day between 1:00 p.m. and 9:00
p.m., which would include the time of the drug deal in her driveway on March 9, 2020. Given that
defendant was found not guilty with regard to the events of March 9, 2020, and given the resident’s
lack of knowledge about the events of March 9, 2020, defendant has not shown that defense
counsel’s failure to question her before trial, or to present her as a witness, affected the outcome
of trial. See Jackson, 292 Mich App at 600-601.

                   C. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE SCHMIDT

        Next, defendant argues that defense counsel failed to adequately cross-examine Detective
Schmidt to establish that Detective Schmidt mistook defendant for his brother and, in particular,
failed to make proper use of the brother’s police report—involving Detective Schmidt arresting
the brother for a similar offense—to make this point. How to question witnesses is presumed to
be a matter of trial strategy, and this Court will not second-guess counsel on matters of trial
strategy. See Putman, 309 Mich App at 248. Defendant has not overcome this presumption, and
he has not shown that Curtis’s cross-examination of Detective Schmidt amounted to ineffective
assistance. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that Curtis thoroughly cross-examined
Detective Schmidt on his identification of defendant. Among numerous other avenues of inquiry
aimed at challenging Detective Schmidt’s identification, Curtis specifically suggested that
Detective Schmidt mistakenly identified defendant when it was in fact defendant’s brother who
sold him the drugs. Detective Schmidt acknowledged that he also had contact with the brother and
that during that contact, the brother used the cell phone at issue in this case and drove a black SUV
like the one driven by defendant.

        On the whole, and as the trial court found, the record shows a cross-examination by an
experienced and competent criminal attorney, which specifically included questions to support the
defense theory that Detective Schmidt misidentified defendant when he actually bought drugs from
his brother. The fact that defendant was not acquitted of all counts does not support that counsel’s
strategy was unsound. See People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 190; 891 NW2d 255 (2016).
Indeed, the adequacy of Curtis’s representation is supported by the fact that defendant was found
not guilty of one of the counts. Defendant has not shown that Curtis’s cross-examination fell
below professional norms, and he has not shown prejudice. See Jackson, 292 Mich App at 600-
601.

                    D. FAILURE TO OBJECT OR TO SEEK A MISTRIAL

        We also reject defendant’s argument that defense counsel should have objected and
requested a curative instruction, or moved for a mistrial, in response to what defendant contends
was improper testimony by Detective Schmidt. More specifically, defendant draws this Court’s
attention to three statements by Detective Schmidt: (1) reference to a mug shot, (2) a suggestion
that members of WMET were “aware of” defendant, and (3) testimony that defendant was
                                               -10-
surveillance conscious.6 An attorney’s decision whether to object is generally a matter of trial
strategy. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Indeed, “there are
times when it is better not to object and draw attention to an improper comment.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

        At the Ginther hearing, Curtis was asked about the specific remarks that defendant now
challenges, and Curtis testified that in each instance, his decision not to object was strategic. First,
Curtis correctly noted that the “mug shot” reference was made with regard to Detective Schmidt’s
general practices rather than in reference to defendant in particular having a mug shot. In any
event, Curtis saw this reference to a mug shot as a quick “slip” by Detective Schmidt that was
better to ignore, particularly when the cross-examination was going well—Detective Schmidt
seemed frustrated and was playing into the defense misidentification strategy with his admission
that he looked at photos before meeting people. Second, Curtis did not think that WMET team
members being “aware of” defendant was prejudicial in the context of a case in which WMET
investigated defendant over a few months and three alleged drug sales. It was, in other words,
already apparent that WMET was familiar with defendant. Moreover, Curtis emphasized that
Detective Schmidt was flustered and “looked bad” during this questioning. He was unable to
answer questions adequately, and he came across “very arrogant.” In Curtis’s view, on the whole,
this line of questioning was detrimental to the prosecutor. Third, similarly, Curtis did not object
to Detective Schmidt’s testimony that defendant was surveillance conscious because, in Curtis’s
view, considered as a whole, this line of questioning regarding surveillance was detrimental to the
prosecutor. Detective Schmidt was flustered, and he came across as “very egotistical” and
“arrogant.” Curtis saw no reason to object.

        Given Curtis’s testimony, which the trial court found to be credible, we see no reason to
second-guess Curtis’s strategy to continue with what he viewed as an advantageous line of
questioning rather than interrupting to object and to draw attention to what defendant now contends
were improper comments. See id.; see also People v Barker, 161 Mich App 296, 303-304; 409
NW2d 813 (1987). Moreover, given the brevity and vagueness of the comments, defendant has
not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object. See Jackson, 292 Mich App
at 600-601. In the alternative, defendant also argues that defense counsel should have moved for
a mistrial. However, not every improper comment warrants a mistrial, and the brief comments by
Detective Schmidt did not impair defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial. People v Waclawski,
286 Mich App 634, 710; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). A motion for a mistrial would have been

6
 Although defendant now contends that defense counsel should have objected to these remarks by
Detective Schmidt, defendant fails to explain what legal objections defense counsel should have
made. By failing to adequately brief the issue, defendant essentially abandoned the matter. See
Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 679.

                                                 -11-
meritless, and defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a frivolous motion.7 People v
Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 386; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).8

                          IV. CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS

        Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to vacate a judgment of
sentence erroneously entered in lower court case 2020-004946 and by refusing to resentence
defendant in case 2020-004947. Defendant acknowledges that the trial court in fact took steps to
correct the errors related to the docket numbers in case 2020-004945 and case 2020-004946, but
according to defendant, the trial court erred by treating the errors as clerical. In defendant’s view,
the trial court lacked authority to amend the documents because the prosecutor failed to timely
request modification under MCR 6.429.9 Under defendant’s reasoning, the order of acquittal
entered in case 2020-004945 may not be corrected, but the judgment of sentence entered in case
20-004946 must be set aside. By defendant’s count that means that he has only one conviction (in
case 2020-004947), and he is, therefore, entitled to resentencing in case 2020-004947 because the
trial court relied on acquitted conduct when sentencing defendant as though he had two
convictions.

        Under MCR 6.435(A), the trial court has the authority to correct clerical mistakes at any
time and on its own motion. Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the errors with the docket
numbers are clearly clerical. Defendant was charged with three identical counts: delivery of
methamphetamine. He was convicted in two of the cases and found not guilty in the third case.
At sentencing, he was properly sentenced on two counts of delivery of methamphetamine, but the
trial court simply used the wrong docket number for one of the cases—substituting 2020-004946
for 2020-004945. This kind of error in the docket numbers is nothing more than a clerical error.
See People v Delisle, 507 Mich 983; 959 NW2d 728 (2021) (remanding for correction of “a clerical
error in the judgment of sentence, which appears to refer to an incorrect docket number”); People
v Sartin, 33 Mich App 195, 197; 189 NW2d 755 (1971) (“[A]lthough the transcript of the
sentencing proceedings included the docket number for [a case that had been dropped]. This was
a clerical error and the defendant suffered no prejudice from it.”).

7
  In the context of his ineffective-assistance argument, defendant briefly argues that counsel’s
alleged errors should be considered in the aggregate and that taken together, counsel’s errors
warrant a new trial. However, considering his complaints about counsel’s performance in the
aggregate does not establish that defendant received ineffective assistance because there are no
deficiencies to aggregate. See People v Caballero, 184 Mich App 636, 642; 459 NW2d 80 (1990).
8
 Although defendant already had a Ginther hearing, he moved this Court to remand for another
one. In seeking a second Ginther hearing, defendant fails to provide this Court with an offer of
proof showing that there are additional facts requiring development of a record to determine
whether defense counsel was ineffective. See MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a)(ii). Accordingly, defendant’s
motion to remand for a Ginther hearing will be denied.
9
 MCR 6.429 governs the correction of invalid sentences. It does not apply to the correction of the
clerical errors in this case.

                                                -12-
        Accordingly, under MCR 6.435(A), the trial court possessed the authority to correct this
clerical error at any time. It properly exercised that authority by correcting the docket numbers on
the judgment of sentence and the order of acquittal. Defendant already received the relief to which
he is entitled, and there is no further relief for this Court to provide.10 See People v Billings, 283
Mich App 538, 548; 770 NW2d 893 (2009).

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola

10
   To the extent that defendant contends that he is entitled to resentencing in case 2020-004947
because the trial court relied on acquitted conduct, defendant’s argument is spurious. As we have
discussed, the errors were simple clerical errors properly corrected by the trial court under MCR
6.435(A).     Substantively, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of delivery of
methamphetamine, and in considering those two counts at sentencing, the trial court in no way
relied upon “acquitted conduct” within the meaning of People v Beck, 504 Mich 605, 618; 939
NW2d 213 (2019).
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