Court Opinion

ID: 9555538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 10:07:04.877903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:27.985913
License: Public Domain

In the
          Court of Appeals
  Second Appellate District of Texas
           at Fort Worth
       ___________________________
            No. 02-22-00233-CV
       ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF V.J. AND V.J., CHILDREN

     On Appeal from the 231st District Court
             Tarrant County, Texas
         Trial Court No. 231-699602-21

   Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Womack, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                  I. INTRODUCTION

      Appellant, V.J., appeals from a post-appearance default judgment against him

in a suit affecting the parent–child relationship (SAPCR), in which he had also sought

a divorce, claiming to have been married to C.M., Appellee and the mother of his

children. V.J. raises four issues, in which he argues generally that he is entitled to a

new trial for lack of notice, and a fifth issue complaining about the trial court’s

temporary orders. He also argues that if his notice of appeal was not timely for

purposes of securing a regular appeal, we should review his appeal as a restricted

appeal. To preserve our jurisdiction over the merits, we construe V.J.’s appeal as a

restricted appeal, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                  II. BACKGROUND

      Because the procedural background of this case frames our ultimate appellate

review, we provide a detailed description of the filings and events at the trial-court

level, including both the prejudgment and postjudgment stages.

A. Pretrial Filings and Temporary Orders

      V.J. filed a pro se Original Petition for Divorce on April 29, 2021. He claimed

to be married to C.M. because “on or about October 2013, . . . they agreed to be

married; and after the agreement[,] they lived together in this state continuously as

husband and wife; and they represented to others in Texas and elsewhere that they

were married until February 2021.”         He sought a division of their purported

                                            2
community property, consisting mainly of a residence in Arlington and a business in

Red Oak, and he asked for the parties to be appointed joint managing conservators of

their two children, with him as the conservator with the exclusive right to designate

the children’s primary residence. V.J. further sought a temporary restraining order,

temporary injunction, and permanent injunction prohibiting C.M. from excluding him

from the purported marital residence, based on his allegation that C.M. had moved

out and “secreted [the] children away from” him. Finally, V.J. brought claims against

C.M. for breach of fiduciary duty––in which he included allegations of actual and

constructive fraud and waste of assets––breach of contract, and trespass to try title.

      On May 26, 2021, the trial court signed a temporary restraining order and set a

June 9, 2021 hearing date for the temporary-injunction request and for temporary

orders concerning the children. C.M. filed a pro se motion for a continuance. On

June 9, 2021, V.J. and C.M. signed appearance forms, in which they both represented

that they had been advised of their right to employ counsel but chose to represent

themselves at that time. That same day, after a hearing, an associate judge entered a

mutual temporary injunction and ordered the parties to report to Family Court

Services (FCS) for intake based on “[a]llegations of FV [family violence] agst ea. other

& the children.” According to the court order, C.M. alleged that Child Protective

Services had been involved with the family already, but V.J. claimed that C.M. was

“lying & using [the] allegations as a tactic for the divorce/custody case.”          The

                                           3
associate judge ordered that V.J. would have a minimum of two hours per week

supervised visitation with the children.

        C.M. filed a pro se answer on June 18, 2021. After a hearing on September 13,

2021, which C.M. attended but V.J. did not attend, an associate judge found a “history

of abuse by [V.J.] with subject & other children” and of family violence against C.M.

by V.J. “in [the] presence of the children.” The associate judge made the following

orders “in [the] children’s best interest . . . for their safety & welfare”: (1) C.M. was

named as the temporary sole managing conservator; (2) V.J. was to have supervised

visitation and no other access; and (3) V.J. was required to take a batterer’s

intervention course. The associate judge further found that C.M. contested that the

parties were married, either ceremonially or by common law. The associate judge

therefore awarded C.M. temporary, exclusive use of the residence; ordered V.J. to

vacate it by September 30, 2021; and ordered C.M. to list it for sale by October 1,

2021.

        On September 17, 2021, V.J. filed a motion in which he denied receiving timely

notice of the September 13, 2021 hearing date, contested the findings made as a result

of the hearing, and sought a stay of the associate judge’s rulings. He also filed a

motion for a de novo hearing before the presiding judge. On September 20, 2021, he

filed a “Notice to Designation of Email Address,” in which he notified C.M. and the

court “that he wishe[d] to . . . receive service and notice and all filings in this case via”

a specific email address (referred to herein as the First Gmail Address).

                                             4
      Between September 17 and September 22, 2021, C.M. obtained counsel. On

September 22, 2021, C.M. filed an original counterpetition, in which she sought to be

appointed sole managing conservator of the children and alleged that V.J. had

“engaged in a history or pattern of child abuse,” as well as a “history or pattern of . . .

family violence during the two-year period preceding the date of filing of th[e] suit.”

She requested that the court either deny V.J. access to the children or enter a

possession order designed to protect her and the children’s safety and welfare. C.M.

also pleaded for child support.

      On September 24, 2021, the presiding trial judge held a hearing, at which both

V.J. and C.M. appeared.1 The trial court entered interim temporary orders allowing

V.J. supervised visitation only, ordering that the residence be listed for sale, requiring

V.J. to vacate the residence, and keeping in place the remainder of the associate

judge’s previous orders.2 The trial court set a hearing on the merits for additional

temporary orders for October 12, 2021.3

      1
       In correspondence with this court, the court reporter referred to this hearing
as a De Novo Swear-in.
      2
       The trial court signed this order on October 12, 2021. Beginning with these
interim temporary orders, all orders in the case were signed by the presiding trial
judge.
      3
       C.M.’s counsel was allowed to withdraw before the October 12 hearing. In the
order approving the withdrawal, an associate judge found “that the last known
address of [C.M.] is subject to a nondisclosure through the Attorney General
confidentiality program.” By the time of the October 12 hearing, C.M. had retained
new counsel.

                                            5
      According to later-signed orders,4 both V.J. and C.M. appeared at the

October 12 hearing, after which the trial court appointed a receiver to take possession

of and sell the residence. The trial court also found that V.J. was working and ordered

him to pay monthly child support.         Nothing in the record shows that V.J.

contemporaneously objected to the lack of a reporter’s record for the September and

October temporary-orders hearings.

      On January 7, 2022, a hearing for additional temporary orders was set for

February 11, 2022. The trial judge signed the hearing notice, and under the certificate

of service was a note: “[V.J.] by e-filing manager.” On February 1, 2022, V.J. filed an

Emergency Motion for Continuance to Allow Pro Se Petitioner to Retain Legal

Counsel. In that motion, he alleged that C.M.’s counsel had failed to consult him

before setting the hearing date and that he was incarcerated in the Denton County Jail

and could not attend the February 11, 2022 hearing.5 He asked “for [a] forty-five (45)

day[] continuance so that he [could] retain legal counsel to represent him in this

matter going forward.” He also filed an emergency motion to cancel the February 11,

      4
        The only order signed that day pertained to V.J.’s supervised visitation with
the children at the FCS Visitation Center.
      5
        V.J. never requested to attend this or any other prejudgment hearing via
alternate means.

                                          6
2022 hearing on the same grounds.6 The record does not contain a ruling on these

motions.

       The handwritten report from the February 11, 2022 hearing––which was signed

by the trial court––states, “Court finds [V.J.] is incarcerated at this time. Court finds

he opened his email proving notice of these proceedings.” The trial court ordered

that C.M. could move back into the residence and apply for passports for the children

to take them to Mexico in May for a wedding.

       That same day, the trial court also signed a separate document entitled Notice

of Final Trial, which notified the parties “that the final trial . . . [was] specially set for

April 4, 2022 at 9:30 o’clock a.m.[] before the 231st District Court located in the

Family Law Center, 5th floor, 200 East Weatherford Street, Fort Worth, Texas

76196.” The contested items checked on the form setting order were “Common law

vs No Marriage” and child support. The trial court also ordered the following:

       • “All discovery shall be completed in accordance with the Texas Rules of
       Civil Procedure.”

       • “Each party or attorney shall provide a Witness List to the Court with an
       extra copy for the Court Reporter.”

       • “All exhibits to be introduced at trial shall be pre-marked before trial. Each
       party or attorney is responsible for pre-marking their exhibits or meeting with
       the Court Reporter for pre-marking of exhibits. Parties pre-marking their
       exhibits shall provide an Exhibit List to the Court Reporter just prior to the
       commencement of trial.”

      V.J. e-filed both this motion and the motion for continuance using the First
       6

Gmail Address.

                                              7
      • “Each party or attorney shall provide to the Court a proposed property
      division in typewritten form on the date of trial. If personal property items are
      contested, the party or attorneys shall compare proposed divisions prior to trial
      and be sure that each side has the same items in controversy.”

      On March 30, 2022, V.J. filed a “Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for

Continuance Final Hearing,” in which he alleged that he “want[ed] to preserve his

parental rights”; that he had been “detained in the Denton County [J]ail”7 with only

limited communication from January through March 20228; and that because of that

limited communication ability, he had not been able to obtain counsel. He stated,

“Petitioner understands that if he is not present for this final hearing, by default he

will lose his parental rights.” Therefore, V.J. asked for a twenty-day continuance to

secure counsel. V.J. did not object to having received less than forty-five days’ notice

of the final trial, nor did he seek to attend trial by alternate means. See Tex. R. Civ.

P. 245.

      On April 1, 2022, V.J. filed a Petitioner’s Amended Emergency Motion to

Continue Final Hearing, in which he reiterated that he was incarcerated and knew

about the trial date. He also alleged that he had secured legal representation on

March 31, 2022, but the firm had terminated that representation on the morning of

April 1, 2022 “because they [were] no longer . . . able to appear in court on April 4,

     In his postjudgment filings, V.J. said that he had been incarcerated since
      7

November 2021.
      8
       V.J. attributed the communications problem to “several lockdowns related to
Covid outbreaks,” as well as “a new phone system integration,” which had since been
resolved.

                                           8
2022, for the hearing.” V.J. again asked for a twenty-day continuance for the purpose

of securing counsel. As in his March 30, 2022 motion for a continuance, V.J. did not

object to having received less than forty-five days’ notice of the final trial, nor did he

seek to attend trial by alternate means. Neither this motion nor the March 30, 2022

motion was verified.

B. Final Trial and Default Judgment

      The trial court held the final trial, as scheduled, on April 4, 2022. V.J. did not

appear, and the trial judge verbally denied V.J.’s filed requests for a continuance.

      C.M. testified that she had never been married to V.J., had never agreed to

marry V.J., and had never held herself out to be his wife. She introduced into

evidence her 2014, 2019, and 2020 tax returns, which she had filed individually as

head of household. Those returns show that in 2014, C.M. claimed the older of the

parties’ two children as a dependent, and in 2019 and 2020, she claimed both of their

two children as dependents.9 She also testified that she had purchased the Arlington

residence in October 2014. C.M. is listed as the sole grantee on the deed as “an

unmarried woman,” and a December 2019 loan modification agreement lists C.M., “a

single woman,” as the sole borrower. C.M. also presented evidence that in 2017 V.J.

had filed a divorce petition against A.W., whom he had married in 2003.

      9
       The younger of her two children with V.J. was born in 2015. C.M. has another
child who was not part of the SAPCR.

                                            9
      C.M. testified that in 2018, she had applied for domestic-violence protective

services in Florida because of V.J.’s violence toward her. She also took classes at

SafeHaven while in Texas.

      The trial court admitted into evidence C.M.’s list of requested relief, which

included the following, among other things: (1) that C.M. be named sole managing

conservator of the children and that V.J. be named possessory conservator; (2) that

V.J. pay C.M. $400 per month in child support and $144 per month in medical

support; (3) a finding that she and V.J. were not married; (4) that the residence be

confirmed as C.M.’s separate property; (5) $15,000 in attorney’s fees but only in the

event of an appeal; and (6) a permanent injunction restricting V.J. from contacting

her, from coming closer than 500 feet from her residence or workplace, and from

coming closer than 1,000 feet from the children’s school or after-school programs.

C.M. testified that she was also asking for the trial court to cancel the receiver order

for the property. She further testified that V.J. had not paid any of the temporary

child support the court had ordered, for which he was in arrears $2,412.42. Finally,

C.M. testified that the children were afraid of V.J., and she asked that his visitation

with them be supervised.

      The trial court signed a final order the same day––April 4, 2022––finding V.J.

to be in default and incorporating all of C.M.’s requests. That day, the trial court also

signed an order memorializing the October 12, 2021 temporary orders and an order

containing the same substance as the handwritten February 11, 2022 order.

                                           10
C. V.J.’s Motion for New Trial

      On April 5, 2022, the trial-court clerk emailed C.M.’s attorney, asking for

C.M.’s attorney to submit a certificate of last-known address and an “Austin form.”

The email was also sent to the First Gmail address. The same day, C.M.’s attorney

filed a certificate of last-known address for V.J. at the Denton County Jail’s mailing

address; she served V.J. with the notice via e-filing to the First Gmail Address.

      On May 5, 2022, at 9:38 a.m., V.J. e-filed a verified10 motion for new trial, using

the First Gmail Address. In the text of this motion, V.J. unequivocally stated that he

had received notice of the judgment on April 5, 2022. V.J. also attached an email

chain containing the following messages, all dated April 5, 2022: (1) a 2:06 p.m. email

purporting to be from him11 to the trial-court clerk, asking for “copies of the two

temporary orders and the final order that [were] issued on Monday, April 4, 2022”;

      10
        V.J. included an unsworn declaration substantially in the form prescribed by
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 132.001(e). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 132.001(e). Documents become sworn copies when they are attached to
an unsworn declaration stating under penalty of perjury that the person making the
unsworn declaration has personal knowledge that the copies of the documents
attached are correct copies of the originals. In re Leonard, No. 05-23-00546-CV, 2023
WL 3944376, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 12, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
      11
         The originating email address for V.J.’s request––and the email address to
which the trial-court clerk responded––was not the First Gmail Address. However,
V.J. had used that email address (the Second Gmail Address) in several of the
documents attached to his prejudgment filings in corresponding with various
persons––including C.M.’s counsel. Additionally, in a pro se motion for continuance
filed before she obtained counsel, C.M. had listed the Second Gmail Address as V.J.’s
email address for service.

                                           11
(2) a 2:17 p.m. response from the clerk that the copies would be sent upon payment

of a copying fee; (3) a subsequent email from the Second Gmail Address with a

confirmation number for the payment; and (4) a 3:36 p.m. responsive email from the

trial-court clerk to the Second Gmail Address with “the requested copies” attached.

      On May 12, 2022, and May 24, 2022, respectively, V.J. e-filed from the First

Gmail Address a verified amended motion for new trial and a verified second

amended motion for new trial, in which he backtracked on the date he received notice

of the final judgment. Although he attached to both filings the April 5, 2022 email

correspondence with the trial-court clerk from the Second Gmail Address, he claimed

that he did not actually receive notice of the final judgment until April 27, 2022, and

that it was his cousin––who had been helping him––who had “purchased” the final

judgment on April 5, 2022. According to V.J., the final judgment was delivered to the

Denton County Jail by UPS on April 26, 2022,12 and delivered to him by jail staff the

next day. V.J. stated in both motions that he was “only able to file [m]otions to the

court by dictating the contents of his [m]otions to a third party over the telephone,

which is tedious and time consuming.”

      V.J. also attached to both motions an affidavit from his cousin, in which she

stated that she had ordered and paid for the final judgment on April 5, 2022, but that

she had not sent it to V.J. right away: “Due to a heavy work schedule, by the time my

      12
        V.J. attached a printed confirmation of delivery of a package to the jail on
April 26, 2022, but he claimed that the jail did not deliver that package to him until
the next day.

                                          12
work shifts ended, the US postal service was closed. Eventually, I was able to mail the

final order via UPS, and it was received at the Denton County Jail on April 26th,

2022.” She did not say on what date she actually mailed the final judgment to V.J.

V.J.’s cousin further averred that, “[o]n April 27th, 2022[,] while [she was] speaking

with [V.J.] and informing him of the Final Order, [V.J.] asked [her] to mail a copy of

the Final Order to him as soon as possible,” and she informed him that she had done

so and that it had been delivered the day before. V.J.’s cousin further averred that

V.J. had dictated the contents of his original motion for new trial to her over the

phone on May 1, 2022, and she had both “accidentally left out the fact that [V.J.] told

[her] to specify the date (i.e., April 27, 2022) that [she] told him of the Final Order”

and “mistakenly attributed the April 5th, 2022[,] receipt of the final order to [V.J.] as

opposed to [herself].”

      Accordingly, V.J. contended in his amended and second amended motions for

new trial that he personally did not receive notice of the final judgment until April 27,

2022; therefore, his motion for new trial was timely under Rule 306a(4). Tex. R. Civ.

P. 306a(4).

      C.M. did not respond to any of V.J.’s sworn postjudgment motions or provide

any controverting evidence.

                                           13
      Although the original motion for new trial had been filed one day late, the trial

court held a hearing on the motion on June 17, 2022.13 In arguing the motion, V.J.

told the trial court that he “never” received notice of the final trial date. C.M.’s

counsel told the trial court that she had the final-trial notice delivered to V.J. by

regular mail in care of the Denton County Jail, but she also noted that V.J. had

confirmed in his pleadings that her assistant had sent him a reminder on March 1,

2022. V.J. did not present any other evidence related to the date he received the final

judgment; he referred the court to his cousin’s affidavit, and he argued that even

though he had received notice of some things by email, someone else had to read the

email for him while he was incarcerated. The trial court verbally denied the motion

for new trial, and V.J. filed a notice of appeal on June 21, 2022.

      This court notified V.J. that because his motion for new trial was filed one day

late, “it appears that this appeal was filed as a restricted appeal.” See Tex. R. App. P.

26.1 & (a)(1) (providing that––in absence of timely filed motion for new trial or other

specifically listed postjudgment filing––notice of appeal must be filed within thirty

days after judgment is signed), (c) (providing that notice of restricted appeal may be

filed within six months after the judgment is signed). Because V.J.’s notice of appeal

did not include all of the requirements for a restricted appeal, we directed him to

amend his notice of appeal.        See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(d)(7) (listing additional

      13
        For this hearing, V.J. filed an Emergency Motion to Appear by Telephone or
by Affidavit. The trial court allowed V.J. to appear via Zoom.

                                           14
requirements notice of appeal must include for restricted appeal).          V.J. filed an

amended notice of appeal, but in it he stated, “This is a regular appeal pursuant to

Tex. R. App. P. Rule 26.1(a)(1), not a restricted appeal . . . .” V.J. claimed that he had

met the requirements in Rule 306a(4) and (5) for extending the time to file a motion

for new trial; therefore, his motion for new trial was timely filed and extended the

regular-appeal deadline. Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(4)–(5); see also Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1)

(providing for extension of filing date for notice of regular appeal if the appellant did

not receive notice or acquire actual knowledge of final judgment within twenty days

after its signing). In the docketing statement filed with V.J.’s amended notice of

appeal, he also asserted that he did not receive the judgment until April 27, 2022.

Accordingly, we abated the appeal for the trial court to make findings under Rule

306a(4) and (5) of the date V.J. first received notice or acquired actual knowledge of

the final judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(c).

      In accordance with our order, the trial court filed a supplemental clerk’s record,

in which it included written findings that V.J. had received notice of the final

judgment on April 5, 2022. The trial court based its ultimate finding on the fact

(1) “that on April 5, 2022[,] at 2:17 p.m.[,] copies of the [o]rder were requested by

[V.J.] via his email[, (2) that c]onfirmation was emailed by the TCDC231 at 3:36 p.m.

April 5, 2022, [and (3)] that the request was filled and the requested copies were

attached and sent.” The trial court also found that V.J. had judicially admitted in his

May 5, 2022 motion for new trial that he had received the final judgment on April 5,

                                           15
2022. After receiving the supplemental clerk’s record, we continued the appeal so that

the parties could file briefing on the jurisdictional question.

                                    III. DISCUSSION

       V.J. raises five issues in his pro se brief: (1) whether this court has jurisdiction

over this appeal as a regular appeal; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by

denying V.J.’s motion for new trial because he proved he was not properly notified of

the final trial setting according to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245, and thus,

according to V.J., he proved that he received no notice of the final trial setting at all;

(3) whether V.J. has made the requisite showing that he is entitled to a new trial under

Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 125–26 (Tex. 1939), even if he

failed to prove lack of notice; (4) whether––if jurisdiction exists solely for a restricted

appeal––he has affirmatively shown error on the face of the record; and (5) whether

the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s

September 13, 2021; September 24, 2021; and October 12, 2021 temporary orders.14

A. Jurisdiction Over Restricted Appeal Only

       In considering V.J.’s first issue, we must decide whether we have jurisdiction

over this appeal as a regular appeal, which depends on whether V.J.’s May 5, 2022

motion for new trial was timely filed. If V.J. failed to prove that he did not receive

notice of the final judgment within twenty days after the trial court signed it, both his

        This complaint turns primarily on V.J.’s argument that the trial court
       14

reversibly erred by failing to require the court reporter to make a record of the
temporary-orders hearings.

                                            16
motion for new trial and notice of appeal were untimely, and he failed to invoke this

court’s jurisdiction over a regular appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1), 26.1(a)(1); Tex.

R. Civ. P. 306a(4)–(5), 329b(a).        We must then consider whether he meets the

requirements for a restricted appeal.

       1. Motion for New Trial Untimely

       A motion for new trial must be filed within thirty days after the complained-of

judgment is signed. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a). If a motion for new trial is not timely

filed, a trial court’s plenary power to grant a new trial expires. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d);

see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 306(a)(1) (providing that date judgment is signed is used to

determine plenary power).        Judicial action taken after the trial court’s plenary

jurisdiction over a cause has expired is a nullity. State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d

484, 486 (Tex. 1995).

       An exception to the thirty-day filing rule applies when a party did not receive

timely notice of the final judgment. Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(4) provides,

       If within twenty days after the judgment or other appealable order is
       signed, a party adversely affected by it or his attorney has neither
       received the notice required by paragraph (3) of this rule nor acquired
       actual knowledge of the order, then with respect to that party all the
       periods mentioned in paragraph (1) [including the date for filing a
       motion for new trial] shall begin on the date that such party or his
       attorney received such notice or acquired actual knowledge of the
       signing, whichever occurred first, but in no event shall such periods
       begin more than ninety days after the original judgment or other
       appealable order was signed.

                                            17
Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(4); see Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(a)(1). To establish the date of receipt

or actual notice of the final judgment, Rule 306a(5) first requires the filing of a sworn

motion establishing the date the party or its counsel first learned of the judgment.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(5); In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2006) (orig.

proceeding); see also Tex. R. App. P. 4.2(b). “[I]f the party . . . (1) complies with the

sworn motion, notice[,] and hearing requirements mandated by Rule 306a(5), and

(2) proves it received notice of the judgment more than twenty (but less than ninety-

one) days after it was signed,” then “[p]ost-judgment procedural timetables—

including the period of the trial court’s plenary power—run from the day [the] party

receives notice of [the] judgment, rather than the day judgment is signed.” Lynd Co.,

195 S.W.3d at 685. The sworn Rule 306a(5) motion establishes a prima facie case that

the party lacked timely notice and invokes the trial court’s jurisdiction “for the limited

purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing to determine the date on which the party or

its counsel first received notice or acquired knowledge of the judgment.” Id.

       V.J. contends that he proved he first received notice of the final judgment on

April 27, 2022, more than twenty days after the trial court signed the judgment on

April 4, 2022, but before the ninety-first day after it was signed.

       We review the trial court’s finding of the date a party received notice of

judgment according to the legal and factual sufficiency standards of review. Scott v.

S2S Domain Waco Assocs., LLC, No. 10-20-00133-CV, 2021 WL 5639086, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Waco Dec. 1, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Nathan A. Watson Co. v. Emps.

                                            18
Mut. Cas. Co., 218 S.W.3d 797, 800–01 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).

Under both standards, the trial judge, as the factfinder, is the sole arbiter of the weight

of the evidence and the witnesses’ credibility. See Nathan A. Watson Co., 218 S.W.3d at

801; Texaco, Inc. v. Phan, 137 S.W.3d 763, 767–68 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2004, no pet.).

              a. Legal and Factual Sufficiency Standards of Review

       When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on

which the party had the burden of proof, the party must demonstrate on appeal that

the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Cath.

Diocese of El Paso v. Porter, 622 S.W.3d 824, 834 (Tex. 2021). In determining whether

legally sufficient evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence

favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard

contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete

Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,

827 (Tex. 2005).      We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the

evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658

(Tex. 2018) (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).

       When the party with the burden of proof challenges the factual sufficiency of a

failure to find, the party must show that the failure to find is against the great weight

and preponderance of the credible evidence. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237,

                                            19
242 (Tex. 2001); Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988); see

Gonzalez v. McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 680, 681–82 (Tex. 2006).

             b. Application of Standards

      In his sworn second amended motion for new trial, V.J. stated (1) that he “did

not have actual notice of the [final judgment] until April 27th, 2022,” (2) that because

Denton County Jail has “no computer, law library, e-mail access, or internet access . . .

that [would] allow [him] to type up any [m]otion to the court,” he had to dictate “the

contents of his [m]otions to a third party over the telephone,” and (3) that his cousin

was who had “purchased” the final-judgment copy from the trial-court clerk. V.J.’s

cousin confirmed that she had purchased the copy on April 5, 2022, but averred that

she had delayed mailing it to V.J. and that when he dictated the contents of his

original motion for new trial to her on May 1, 2022, she “accidentally left out” that

V.J. had told her he received the final-judgment copy on April 27, 2022, and

“mistakenly” wrote April 5, 2022, as the date he had received notice.

      V.J. contends that because C.M. did not controvert his sworn motion and his

cousin’s affidavit, the trial court was required to accept them as conclusive proof. See

City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 820 (explaining that factfinder “cannot ignore undisputed

testimony that is clear, positive, direct, otherwise credible, free from contradictions

and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted”). But even if, despite

its internal inconsistencies, V.J.’s motion and attached evidence may have been

sufficient to present a prima facie case that he did not receive notice of the final

                                           20
judgment until April 27, 2022, see Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d at 685, when considered with

V.J.’s other evidence in the record, they created a fact issue for the trial court to

resolve. For example, V.J. also attached to the second amended new trial motion

April 1, 202215 emails from the Second Gmail Address––from which the final-

judgment copy was requested and received on April 5, 2022––that appeared to be

written by him, including several to his cousin’s email address forwarding emails to

her with the message, “Please print.”16 He also attached emails to and from the

Second Gmail Address that show he used that address both before and after he filed

suit, with third parties and with C.M. Additionally, V.J. had previously appeared

before the trial court, giving the judge the opportunity to assess his credibility.17

       Moreover, even if the trial court could not have considered V.J.’s assertion in

his original motion for new trial––that he received actual notice of the final judgment

on April 5th, 2022––as a judicial admission because his amended motions superseded

        V.J. was incarcerated at this time.
       15

        For example, one of the forwarded messages specifically referred to his
       16

cousin in the third person, “There has been a major issue brought to my attention this
morning. My cousin, . . . whom as you know has been helping me find legal
representation for my divorce case received a call from a [law firm] representative.
My cousin was simply told that I’ll be receiving a full refund, as there is no longer an
attorney that can take my case.”

        To the extent V.J.’s statement at the postjudgment hearing––“I actually got
       17

actual notice of the hearing on April 26th, I believe”––could be considered testimony
rather than argument, the trial court could have also considered that conflicting
statement along with the other evidence contradicting V.J.’s averment that he did not
receive notice of the final judgment until April 27, 2022.

                                              21
the original motion, see Lake Jackson Med. Spa, Ltd. v. Gaytan, 640 S.W.3d 830, 839

(Tex. 2022) (“[A]llegations contained in a pleading that is superseded by an amended

pleading are not ‘conclusive and indisputable judicial admissions.’”), the trial court

nevertheless could have considered that assertion as part of the larger picture and

weighed the evidence supporting it (the email responses from the trial-court clerk to

the Second Gmail Address) against V.J.’s sworn second amended motion and his

cousin’s affidavit, cf. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tex. 2018) (describing

summary-judgment “sham affidavit rule,” which provides that “if a party submits an

affidavit that conflicts with the affiant’s prior sworn testimony and does not provide a

sufficient explanation for the conflict, a trial court may disregard the affidavit when

deciding whether the party has raised a genuine fact issue to avoid summary

judgment”); Bay Area Healthcare Grp., Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 235 (Tex. 2007)

(holding that statements from superseded pleadings were not hearsay and therefore

admissible).

      Finally, we may presume the trial court took judicial notice of its own records

and the prior pleadings in the case, which show that the trial court specifically found

that “[e]vidence was presented” at the February 11, 2022 temporary-orders hearing

that V.J.––although incarcerated at the time––“opened his email proving notice of

th[at] proceeding[].” See In re Est. of Clark, 198 S.W.3d 273, 275 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2006, pet. denied) (“The trial court could also take judicial notice of its own records

and prior pleadings in the case with or without a request of a party.”); Bob Smith Bail

                                           22
Bonds, Sur. v. State, 963 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (“A

trial court may take judicial notice of its own file at any stage of proceedings and is

presumed to have done so with or without a request from a party.”). Thus, the record

shows that before the final trial, the trial court had found that V.J. was able to

communicate and receive notice via email from the Denton County Jail.

       V.J. compares the facts of this case to those in Latter & Blum of Tex., LLC v.

Murphy, No. 02-17-00463-CV, 2019 WL 3755765, at *1, *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Aug. 8, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.), but that case is distinguishable. In Latter &

Blum, an attorney filed an answer for one defendant and in that answer purported to

also file it on behalf of Latter & Blum, a codefendant whom he did not represent. Id.

After a default judgment against it, Latter & Blum filed a combined Rule 306a(5)

motion and motion for new trial. Id. at *1. In an affidavit attached to the motion, the

attorney who had filed the answer averred that he had never represented Latter &

Blum and that the statement to the contrary in the answer he had filed was a mistake.

Id. at *4. Latter & Blum’s registered agent filed an affidavit denying that he had been

served with the suit and averring that the first time that Latter & Blum learned of the

default judgment was on November 1, 2017, eighty-five days after the judgment was

signed. Id. at *1, *4–5. All of this evidence was uncontroverted. See id. at *1, *4, *8.

We held that “Latter and Blum’s postjudgment and appellate deadlines ran from

November 1, 2017,” and therefore that its November 8, 2017 motion for new trial

was timely filed. Id. at *7.

                                          23
      But unlike in Latter & Blum, V.J.’s own motion contained conflicting evidence,

and the state of the record was such that, in light of that conflict, the trial court had

discretion not to believe his assertion that he did not receive actual notice of the final

judgment within twenty days of its signing. Thus, the reasoning in Latter & Blum does

not control here.

      When considering all of the evidence presented to, and known by, the trial

court at the time of the postjudgment hearing, we conclude and hold that V.J. did not

conclusively prove that he first received actual notice of the final judgment more than

twenty days after it was signed, nor does the great weight and preponderance of the

evidence compel such a finding; therefore, the trial court’s finding that V.J. first

received actual notice of the entry of the final judgment on April 5, 2022, is supported

by legally and factually sufficient evidence. See Cath. Diocese of El Paso, 622 S.W.3d at

834 (matter-of-law standard of review); Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242 (great-

weight-and-preponderance standard). Based on the trial court’s finding, V.J.’s May 5,

2022 motion for new trial was untimely and did not extend the trial court’s plenary

power to grant a new trial or the time for filing a notice of appeal.

      Because we lack jurisdiction to consider V.J.’s appeal as a regular appeal, we

overrule V.J.’s first issue.18 See In re K.M.Z., 178 S.W.3d 432, 433 (Tex. App.—Fort

      18
         We need not review the merits of V.J.’s second and third issues because the
trial court did not have plenary power to consider and rule on his untimely motion for
new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; cf. Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex.
1985) (op. on reh’g) (reiterating that trial court may consider postjudgment motion

                                            24
Worth 2005, no pet.) (explaining that “[t]he timely filing of a notice of appeal is

jurisdictional in this court”). But because V.J. contends in his fourth issue that if we

cannot review his notice complaint in a regular appeal, we may consider it as a

restricted appeal, we will turn to that issue next.

       2. Jurisdiction Over Restricted Appeal

       This court has jurisdiction to consider V.J.’s appeal as a restricted appeal

if (1) he timely filed his notice of appeal for purposes of a restricted appeal; (2) he was

a party to the underlying suit; and (3) he did not participate in the hearing that resulted

in the complained-of judgment and did not timely file a postjudgment motion, request

for findings of fact and conclusions of law, or a notice of appeal within the time

permitted by Rule 26.1(a). See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(c), 30; Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d

486, 495–96 (Tex. 2020) (holding that these three requirements for a restricted appeal

are jurisdictional).

       C.M. agrees that we have no jurisdiction over a regular appeal because the

notice of appeal was untimely filed. And she does not dispute that V.J. met the

jurisdictional requirements of a restricted appeal. But she urges that V.J. waived his

right to a restricted appeal because his notice of appeal does not contain the required

information under Rule 25.1(d)(7) and because even after we informed him of the

filed outside its plenary power only when it had no jurisdictional power to render the
judgment in the first place, i.e., no “power to hear and determine cases of the general
class to which the particular one belongs”).

                                            25
defect and asked him to file an amended notice of appeal, he refused to do so,

claiming specifically that this is not a restricted appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(d)(7).

       The Texas Supreme Court has made clear that, “[r]ather than disposing of

appeals based on harmless procedural defects, ‘appellate courts should reach the

merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.’” Horton v. Stovall, 591 S.W.3d 567,

567–68 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008)). That

court has also held that a timely filed notice of appeal that omits the requirements of

Rule 25.1(d)(7) nevertheless invokes an intermediate appellate court’s jurisdiction over

a restricted appeal. Sweed v. Nye, 323 S.W.3d 873, 873–75 (Tex. 2010). Although the

appellant in Sweed subsequently amended the notice of appeal to comply with

Rule 25.1(d)(7), that fact did not govern the reasoning supporting the Texas Supreme

Court’s decision in that case. See id. at 874–75.

       In light of V.J.’s argument in his brief that we should review the case as a

restricted appeal if we determine that we do not have jurisdiction over it as a regular

appeal––and based on Sweed and the Texas Supreme Court’s repeated admonition that

we should determine appeals based on their merits, if possible––we will consider this

appeal a restricted appeal.     See id.; Polk v. Polk, No. 02-20-00270-CV, 2021 WL

1134412, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(noting that when appellant alleged that he had not participated in the trial-court

proceedings, this court opted to continue untimely regular appeal “in the event that

[he] was trying to pursue a restricted appeal”). We therefore sustain the part of V.J.’s

                                            26
fourth issue in which he argues that we should consider this case as a restricted

appeal.

B. Restricted-Appeal Standard

       To prevail on the merits in a restricted appeal, V.J. must show error apparent

from the face of the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 30; Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique,

134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004); Inlog, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., No. 02-19-00283-

CV, 2020 WL 1887846, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 16, 2020, no pet.) (mem.

op.). For restricted-appeal purposes, “[t]he face of the record . . . consists of all the

papers on file in the appeal.” Norman Commc’ns v. Tex. Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269,

270 (Tex. 1997). We may not consider evidence that was not before the trial court

when it rendered the final judgment. In re S.W., 614 S.W.3d 311, 315 (Tex. App.––

Fort Worth 2020, no pet.).

C. No Lack of Notice

       V.J. complains that the record affirmatively shows that he did not receive at

least forty-five days’ notice of the final trial.

       Rule of Civil Procedure 245 provides that the trial court “may set contested

cases on written request of any party, or on the court’s own motion, with reasonable

notice of not less than forty-five days to the parties of a first setting for trial, or by

agreement of the parties.”        See Tex. R. Civ. P. 245.    The forty-five-day notice

provision of Rule 245 is mandatory. Custom–Crete, Inc. v. K-Bar Servs., Inc., 82 S.W.3d

655, 659 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); In re Marriage of Parker, 20 S.W.3d

                                               27
812, 818 (Tex. App.––Texarkana 2000, no pet.). “A trial court’s failure to comply

with notice rules in a contested case deprives the defendant of his constitutional right

to be present at the hearing, to voice objections in an appropriate manner, and results

in a violation of fundamental due process.” M.B. v. R.B., No. 02-19-00342-CV, 2021

WL 2252792, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(quoting Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, No. 01-18-00933-CV, 2020 WL 4118023, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 21, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotation

omitted)); Richardson v. Sims, No. 01-15-01115-CV, 2016 WL 5787291, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); Custom–Crete, 82 S.W.3d

at 659.

      Nevertheless, an appellant alleging such a lack of notice carries a heavy burden.

Richardson, 2016 WL 5787291, at *2. Not only does the law presume that a trial court

hears a case only after proper notice to the parties, but also the record generally will

not yield affirmative proof of this type of error because “the rules do not impose a

duty on the trial court or its personnel to include documentary evidence in the record

that notice of a trial setting was given.” Id. at *2; see C.H. v. S.L., No. 02-16-00386-

CV, 2018 WL 4925318, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 11, 2018, no pet.) (mem.

op.). Therefore, if the record is silent about whether notice of a trial setting was given

in accordance with Rule 245, no error appears on the face of the record. Richardson,

2016 WL 5787291, at *2.

                                           28
       The Notice of Final Trial dated February 11, 2022, recites that V.J. had not

appeared for a hearing that day. But it also recites, “The parties have been notified

that the final trial of the above referenced matter is specially set for April 4, 2022[,] at

9:30 o’clock a.m.[] . . . .” And the final judgment itself states that V.J. was “duly

notified.” Nothing else in the record up to the time of the final judgment19 speaks to

how or when V.J. was notified.20 Thus, the record shows that V.J. had notice of the

April 4, 2022 final trial as early as February 11, 2022––fifty-two days before the final-

trial date.21   Moreover, even if the final-trial notice and final judgment had not

       19
         V.J. contends that the April 20, 2022 email correspondence between him and
the trial-court coordinator––attached to his second amended motion for new trial––
conclusively proves that he did not receive notice from the trial court because the
court coordinator replied, “I do not send notices to anyone. It is the responsibility of
the person who sets the hearing.” However, because this email is attached only to a
postjudgment motion, and was not included in the appellate record at the time of the
final judgment, we may not consider it in our analysis of V.J.’s fourth issue. See S.W.,
614 S.W.3d at 315. Moreover, all it proves is that the court coordinator did not
provide such notice.
       20
         The trial court’s handwritten findings from the trial that day note, “Court
finds [that V.J.] is incarcerated at this time. Court finds he opened his email proving
notice of these proceedings.”

        V.J. had not asked for a bench warrant to attend the final trial, nor had he
       21

sought to appear by alternative means, and both of his unverified continuance
motions asked for additional time solely so that he could hire counsel. Taken
together––and considered along with the evidence in the record tending to show
proper notice––these facts indicate that V.J.’s failure to appear was not due to lack of
notice or ability to attend. See Brown v. Preston, No. 01-16-00556-CV, 2017 WL
4171896, at *2–3 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(noting that burden is on incarcerated person to show that he is “entitled to appear in
person or through alternate means,” by requesting such access and providing trial
court with sufficient information to evaluate the request); Smith v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons

                                            29
contained representations of proper notice, the record would be merely silent as to

whether V.J. received at least forty-five days’ notice of the final trial, and he cannot

show error on the face of the record in such a case.22 See Id. at *2; cf. Alexander,

134 S.W.3d at 849–50 (addressing whether “failure of the record to affirmatively show

that notice of the pre-trial hearing was sent to counsel or that notice of the order

dismissing the case was sent to counsel at a particular address is error on the face of

the record”); S.W., 614 S.W.3d at 315 n.6 (addressing lack of notice of final trial);

Hewitt v. Gan, No. 05-18-00913-CV, 2019 WL 2402984, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June

7, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding, in regular appeal, that silent record did not

affirmatively show lack of required forty-five days’ notice).

      We hold that V.J. has not shown that the record affirmatively establishes that

he did not receive sufficient notice of the final trial under Rule 245. Therefore, he

& Paroles, No. 2-02-035-CV, 2003 WL 22724996, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Nov. 20, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (holding that incarcerated pro se
appellant who provided no evidence “demonstrating that he requested a bench
warrant, that he otherwise sought or was denied access to the trial court, or that he
raised this issue by motion, objection, or other complaint in the trial court” failed to
preserve a complaint that he was denied access to the court).
      22
         In his unverified motion and amended motion for a continuance, V.J. did not
allege that he had not received sufficient notice. Instead, he claimed that he needed
more time to hire counsel. As C.M. points out in her brief, V.J.’s notice argument is,
in effect, an argument that the trial court should have continued the final trial so that
he could hire counsel. Because V.J. did not swear to the facts in these motions, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying them. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251; In re
J.S., No. 2-04-277-CV, 2005 WL 1693537, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 21,
2005, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                           30
cannot show error on the face of the record. We overrule the remainder of V.J.’s

fourth issue.

D. Temporary Orders

       In his fifth issue, V.J. contends that he has shown error on the face of the

record because the trial court did not require the court reporter to record the

temporary-orders hearings held on September 13, 2021; September 24, 2021; and

October 12, 2021. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.003(c). He also challenges the trial

court’s substantive rulings in those temporary orders.            A temporary order is

superseded by entry of a final order, rendering moot any complaint about the

temporary order. In re A.C., No. 02-21-00121-CV, 2022 WL 1793419, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth June 2, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re A.K., 487 S.W.3d 679, 683

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.). We may not decide moot controversies.

Moates v. Abbott, No. 02-22-00158-CV, 2022 WL 7231981, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Oct. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly, we overrule V.J.’s fifth

issue.23

                                    IV. CONCLUSION

       Having sustained part of V.J.’s fourth issue only insofar as to construe this

appeal as a restricted appeal, and having overruled the remainder of his fourth issue

and his first and fifth issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

        V.J. does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial
       23

court’s final judgment, which was rendered after a recorded, thirty-seven-page
evidentiary hearing, at which the trial court admitted thirteen exhibits.

                                            31
                                  /s/ Dana Womack

                                  Dana Womack
                                  Justice

Delivered: August 10, 2023

                             32