Court Opinion

ID: 9957784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 14:07:41.842041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:39.670908
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                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                   Court of Appeals

                     NO. 2022-CA-01279-MR

PROVIDENCE GROUP, INC.                              APPELLANT

           APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE MITCH PERRY, JUDGE
                   ACTION NO. 20-CI-001763

DIANNE HOLBROOK, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS EXECUTRIX AND PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF RALPH D. HOLBROOK; AND
LAKE FOREST POST ACUTE, LLC D/B/A
VALHALLA POST ACUTE                                  APPELLEES

                              AND

                     NO. 2022-CA-01396-MR

LAKE FOREST POST ACUTE, LLC
D/B/A VALHALLA POST ACUTE                           APPELLANT

           APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE MITCH PERRY, JUDGE
                   ACTION NO. 20-CI-001763
DIANNE HOLBROOK, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS EXECUTRIX AND PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF RALPH D. HOLBROOK; AND
PROVIDENCE GROUP, INC.                                                   APPELLEES

                                 OPINION
                        REVERSING AND REMANDING
                       IN APPEAL NO. 2022-CA-1279-MR
                              AND AFFIRMING
                       IN APPEAL NO. 2022-CA-1396-MR

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, ECKERLE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellants, Providence Group, Inc. (“PGI”) and Lake Forest

Post Acute, LLC d/b/a Valhalla Post Acute (“Valhalla”), each appeal from a

judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court confirming a jury verdict in favor of

Appellees, Dianne Holbrook, individually and as executrix and personal

representative of the Estate of Ralph D. Holbrook (collectively, “the Estate”). In

its appeal, PGI objects to the language in the post-trial judgment reserving the

claims against PGI “for various liability and collection matters.” PGI further

argues that the Trial Court also erred in allowing the Estate to conduct post-

judgment discovery/depositions to address whether it was subject to liability for

the judgment. PGI also argues that the Trial Court’s final judgment improperly

pierced its corporate veil to hold it liable for the judgment against Valhalla.

                                          -2-
              We agree with PGI that the Trial Court erred by entering the final

judgment because the Estate had not pleaded liability based on that theory, and the

Estate had an outstanding motion to file an amended complaint asserting a claim to

pierce PGI’s corporate veil. Furthermore, the claim was not ripe for adjudication

in the absence of any allegation that the judgment could not be collected against

Valhalla. Therefore, we reverse the judgment against PGI and remand for entry of

a new judgment dismissing the negligence and agency claims against PGI. This

judgment shall be without prejudice to any collection claims against PGI that may

arise in the future.

              In its appeal, Valhalla argues that it was entitled to a directed verdict

on the Estate’s claim for punitive damages, and the Trial Court erred in denying

remittitur of the loss-of-consortium judgment. We conclude that there was

sufficient evidence of gross negligence to warrant submitting punitive damages to

the jury, and Valhalla failed to establish that the loss-of-consortium award was

excessive. Hence, we affirm the judgment against Valhalla.

   I.     Facts and Procedural History

              In March 2019, Ralph Holbrook suffered a fall while he was a patient

at Valhalla, a rehabilitation facility located in Louisville, Jefferson County,

Kentucky. He and his wife, Dianne Holbrook, filed an action against Valhalla and

five individual employees, asserting claims for negligence and loss of consortium.

                                           -3-
They also filed an action against PGI, the management company and controlling

owner of Valhalla, asserting claims for negligent supervision and vicarious

liability. Following Ralph Holbrook’s death, Dianne Holbrook was appointed

Executrix, and the Estate was substituted as a party.

             PGI filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it had no

independent operations or oversight responsibilities at Valhalla. In response, the

Estate asserted that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning PGI’s

management and oversight at Valhalla. The Estate noted that PGI was the sole

owner of Valhalla at the time of Holbrook’s residency. The Estate also argued that

PGI had pervasive oversight of Valhalla’s staff. That authority included the power

to hire and fire Valhalla’s administrator, consultation as to facility managers, and

decision-making regarding budgeting. The Estate separately argued that PGI was

liable for the acts of subagents employed by Valhalla. Finally, the Estate argued

that PGI should remain in the action because it would be ultimately liable for any

judgment against Valhalla.

             Following a hearing, the Trial Court denied PGI’s motion for

summary judgment. Prior to trial, the Estate agreed to dismiss the individual

defendants. The matter then proceeded to a jury trial against Valhalla and PGI

from May 26 until July 2, 2022. The Trial Court granted directed verdicts for PGI

on the issue of corporate negligence but reserved the claims against PGI for

                                         -4-
vicarious liability and collection matters. At the conclusion of proof, the Trial

Court submitted the claims against Valhalla to the jury.

                The jury returned a verdict for Valhalla on the wrongful-death claim.

But on the remaining claims, the jury unanimously found that Valhalla was

negligent, and by a vote of 11-1 concluded that its negligence was the sole cause of

Ralph Holbrook’s injuries. The jury’s damage award was as follows: $360,000

for medical expenses; $500,000 for pain and suffering; $1,200,000 on Dianne

Holbrook’s claim for loss-of-consortium; and $700,000 for punitive damages.

                Following trial, the Trial Court entered a judgment on June 20, 2022.

In addition to setting out the jury’s verdict against Valhalla, the judgment stated,

“[c]laims against [PGI] for vicarious liability and collection matters are reserved

and subject to further entry.”

                On June 30, 2022, Valhalla and PGI filed a timely motion to alter,

amend, or vacate the judgment, pursuant to CR1 59.05. PGI sought to remove the

above-referenced language from the judgment. In addition, Valhalla sought

remittitur of the $1,200,000 loss-of-consortium award, arguing that it was

excessive. On the former issue, the Estate filed a motion to take the deposition of

Valhalla’s corporate representative. The Trial Court granted the motion and

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           -5-
directed the Estate take the deposition prior to the scheduled hearing on August 31,

2022.

             Valhalla and PGI then filed a petition for writ of prohibition to

prevent the Estate from taking depositions on the issue of post-judgment

collections. This Court denied the motion for intermediate relief, concluding that

they had failed to show that the Trial Court was acting outside its jurisdiction, or

that they would suffer immediate and irreparable injury before a hearing may be

had on the petition. Lake Forest Post Acute LLC v. Hon. Mitch Perry, No. 2022-

CA-0909-OA (Order Denying Intermediate Relief August 3, 2022). This Court

subsequently granted a joint motion to dismiss the petition for writ of prohibition.

             PGI and Valhalla identified three corporate representatives: two for

PGI and one for Valhalla. In their depositions, PGI Risk Manager, Jonathan

Teague; PGI General Counsel, John Mitchell; and Valhalla Administrator, Jarom

Schmidt testified concerning the liability coverage available, any disputes or

reservations of rights concerning insurance coverage, any forms of indemnity or

financial security to secure the judgment, and the relationship between PGI and

Valhalla. Based on these depositions, the Estate asserted that Valhalla operated as

an alter ego of PGI, pointing to the common ownership and management of both

companies. The Estate also noted the new evidence showing that Valhalla was

undercapitalized and did not have separate liability coverage. The depositions

                                          -6-
further raised a significant question whether PGI’s insurance would cover the

Estate’s judgment against Valhalla. Consequently, the Estate moved to amend its

complaint to assert new claims against PGI, including a claim to pierce PGI’s

corporate veil to collect the judgment against Valhalla.

             The Estate took several more depositions, and the Trial Court held

additional hearings. On September 30, 2022, the Trial Court entered an amended

judgment. The Trial Court’s order did not address the Estate’s motion to amend

the pleadings, but denied the motion to amend the judgment and found as follows:

             At the series of hearings following the depositions, the
             Plaintiff [Estate] outlines the convoluted web of business
             practices of PGI and the Defendants. The evidence
             indicated a loss of corporate separateness and the
             presence of circumstances under which continued
             recognition of this distinction would promote injustice,
             satisfying the requirements of corporate veil piercing
             outlined in Inter-Tel Technologies v. Linn Station
             Properties, LLC, 360 S.W.3d 153 (Ky. 2012). Thus, this
             Court is convinced from the record and evidence
             presented, that in the interests of justice and equity, it is
             necessary to include PGI in the judgment for collection
             purposes.

             The Court separately denied the motions by PGI and Valhalla for

remittitur of the loss-of-consortium award, concluding that it was supported by

substantial evidence. The Trial Court’s judgment reiterated that the Estate could

collect the full judgment against both PGI and Valhalla. PGI and Valhalla each

filed notices of appeal from portions of the judgment. This Court directed that

                                          -7-
their appeals be heard together. Additional facts will be set forth below as

necessary.

      II.    PGI’s Appeal (Appeal No. 2022-CA-1279-MR)

                In its appeal, PGI first argues that the Trial Court erred by including it

in the judgment “for various liability and collection matters.” Since the Trial Court

dismissed the negligence and other claims against it, PGI contends that it should

not have remained in the judgment following trial. For the same reason, PGI

argues that the Trial Court lacked the authority to require that it participate in the

Estate’s post-trial discovery. In light of the foregoing, PGI argues that the Trial

Court had no authority to pierce its corporate veil and allow the Estate to collect

the judgment against Valhalla from it.

                The Estate’s original and amended complaints asserted claims against

PGI for corporate negligence, violation of the Long-Term Care Resident’s Rights

Act,2 and a claim that PGI:

                by and through its agents, ostensible agents, servants and
                employees, undertook to provide and were responsible
                for providing management services; supervision;
                oversight; financial services and oversight; advice on
                policies, procedures, and business objectives; regulatory
                compliance oversight; and other support services for
                [Valhalla], and its agents, ostensible agents, servants, and
                employees, and the other Defendants named herein.

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 216.510 et seq.

                                              -8-
             The Estate argues that it sufficiently pleaded a vicarious liability claim

against PGI to allow the Trial Court to reserve those issues for post-trial

adjudication. The Estate also notes that, after trial, it sought to file an amended

complaint asserting a claim to pierce PGI’s corporate veil. In addition, CR 15.02

allows a Trial Court to amend the pleadings to conform to matters actually litigated

and considered. See Bowling Green-Warren Cnty. Airport Bd. v. Long, 364

S.W.2d 167, 171 (Ky. 1962). As a result, the Estate maintains that its claim to

pierce PGI’s corporate veil was properly before the Trial Court.

             The most significant question concerns the procedural aspects of this

litigation. Following the trial, the Estate sought discovery against PGI and

Valhalla on the reserved collection issues. PGI argues that such post-trial

discovery is improper. Furthermore, the Estate filed a motion to file an amended

complaint asserting the corporate-veil piercing. The Trial Court ruled on the

ultimate issue without ruling on the motion to amend the complaint. Moreover,

there was no summary judgment motion pending.

             The Estate’s first amended complaint asserts that Valhalla was acting

as PGI’s agent in providing services to Ralph Holbrook. These allegations were

sufficient to plead a claim for vicarious liability. Vicarious liability, sometimes

referred to as the doctrine of respondeat superior, is not predicated upon a tortious

act of the employer, but upon the imputation to the employer of a tortious act of the

                                          -9-
employee “by considerations of public policy and the necessity for holding a

responsible person liable for the acts done by others in the prosecution of his

business, as well as for placing on employers an incentive to hire only careful

employees.” Disabled Am. Veterans, Dep’t of Kentucky, Inc. v. Crabb, 182

S.W.3d 541, 555 (Ky. App. 2005) (quoting American General Life & Accident

Insurance Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Ky. 2002) and Johnson v. Brewer, 266

Ky. 314, 98 S.W.2d 889, 891 (1936)). Vicarious liability is based upon the

existence of a relationship that justifies holding the principal liable for the

negligence of the agent.

             A separate, but related rule governs the liability of a shareholder for

the debts of a corporation or incorporated entity. This rule protects a shareholder

from liability for the corporate debt except upon proof of circumstances that justify

“piercing the corporate veil” or unless there is “a particular statute imposing

liability” for the corporate debt. Smith v. Isaacs, 777 S.W.2d 912, 913 (Ky. 1989)

(citing Morgan v. O’Neil, 652 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Ky. 1983)). Kentucky permits

traditional piercing under an instrumentality or an alter-ego theory when two

dispositive elements are met: (1) domination of the corporation resulting in a loss

of corporate separateness and (2) circumstances under which continued recognition

of the corporation would sanction fraud or promote injustice. Inter-Tel Techs., 360

S.W.3d at 165. Proof of actual fraud is not required, but the injustice must be

                                          -10-
something beyond the mere inability to collect a debt from the corporation. Id.

The decision whether to pierce the corporate veil is an equitable one to be decided

by the Trial Court. Daniels v. CDB Bell, LLC, 300 S.W.3d 204, 213 (Ky. App.

2009).

                The circumstances in this case involve the Estate’s effort to hold a

corporation liable for a judgment against its wholly-owned limited-liability

company. However, the principle and rule remain the same. See also KRS

271B.6-220(2) and 275.150. In any event, piercing the corporate veil and

vicarious liability are distinct theories of joint and several liability.3

               Although the Estate pleaded and argued that Valhalla was acting as an

agent of PGI, the claim to pierce PGI’s corporate veil did not arise until after trial

via its motion to file an amended complaint. The Estate correctly notes that CR

15.02 allowed the Trial Court to amend the pleadings when issues are tried by

express or implied consent of the parties. The Trial Court has broad discretion to

grant a post-trial motion to amend under a theory of implied consent. Nucor Corp.

v. Gen. Elec. Co., 812 S.W.2d 136, 146 (Ky. 1991). That discretion does not turn

on actual consent but on actual prejudice, in the sense that the defendant is unable

to present a defense that would have otherwise been available. Id. The Court must

3
  In its response to the pre-trial motion for summary judgment, the Estate specifically asserted
that its vicarious liability claim against PGI was based upon an agency theory.

                                               -11-
also consider whether the defendant had notice of the claim within any applicable

limitations period. Hill v. State Farm Ins. Co., 390 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Ky. App.

2012).

             In the alternative, the Estate may submit a claim to pierce PGI’s

corporate veil via the supplemental pleading procedure set forth in CR 15.04.

Williams v. Oates, 340 S.W.3d 84, 87 (Ky. App. 2010). But in either case, the

Trial Court must rule on the motion to amend. See Farrow v. Downing, 374

S.W.2d 480, 481 (Ky. 1964). We find no indication in the record that it made such

a ruling.

             PGI further argues that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to permit

entry of an amended complaint. It is well-established that the provisions of CR 15

relating to amended and supplemental proceedings apply only to amendments

offered during the pendency of the action. James v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 299

S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. 1956). PGI contends that Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to

permit an amended complaint more than ten days after the entry of the judgment.

Id. But in this case, the June 20, 2022, Judgment dismissing the claims against

PGI was not designated as final and appealable. Moreover, the filing of a CR

59.05 motion on June 30, 2022, would have operated to suspend the finality of the

judgment. Therefore, the Trial Court retained jurisdiction to consider the amended

complaint.

                                        -12-
             But, as mentioned above and as all parties concede, the Trial Court

never issued a written Order allowing an amended complaint. Indeed, it did not

ever issue an express oral ruling granting the motion to amend. Furthermore, the

Trial Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, allow the calling of witnesses

to testify, or request any documents or briefing. Even if we were to assume that

the Trial Court implicitly granted the Estate’s motion to file an amended complaint

without allowing the taking of proof or argument, the matter still was not ripe for

adjudication. If supplemental pleadings are permitted and then filed, PGI must be

afforded an ample opportunity to answer the pleadings and to mount a full defense.

Williams, 340 S.W.3d at 87. Such defenses may include claims that the execution

proceedings fail to state a claim, are not timely, or are inequitable. Id.

Consequently, the Estate’s claim to pierce PGI’s corporate veil was not properly

before the Trial Court.

             Furthermore, the Estate’s claim to pierce PGI’s corporate veil was not

ripe for yet another reason. In Inter-Tel Techs., Inc., supra, the Kentucky Supreme

Court advised, “[c]ourts should not pierce corporate veils lightly but neither should

they hesitate in those cases where the circumstances are extreme enough to justify

disregard of an allegedly separate corporate entity.” 360 S.W.3d at 168. While

actual fraud is not required, there must be a substantial showing of an injustice

beyond mere inability to collect a debt from the corporation. Id. at 165.

                                         -13-
                 In this case, the Estate alleges that PGI and Valhalla were

substantially intermingled in their assets and governance. But there is no

allegation that the conduct of PGI rendered Valhalla incapable of paying the

judgment against it. At most, there is only some question about Valhalla’s

capitalization and the insurance policies available to Valhalla. However, at oral

arguments, all parties admitted that Valhalla posted bond in this appeal,4 and that

bond is sufficient to cover the judgment. Thus, there has not been, and apparently

there cannot be, a showing of an inability to collect a judgment from Valhalla.

Thus, this issue appears moot and not subject to further review. However, and

conversely, this matter is also not ripe for adjudication. Thus, counsel for PGI’s

oral argument that the appeal is both “too soon,” and simultaneously “too late”

appears valid.

                 The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, not

a cause of action unto itself, which is used as a means of imposing liability where

the continued recognition of corporate separateness would subject the plaintiff to

an unjust loss. Daniels, supra, 300 S.W.3d at 211-12. Any potential question

concerning Valhalla’s ability to pay the judgment has not yet properly arisen.

Thus, remanding this matter for a ruling on the Estate’s motion to file an amended

4
    PGI has also posted an appellate bond.

                                             -14-
complaint would not have any practical effect on the currently existing controversy

on appeal. See Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Ky. 2014).

               As a result, the Trial Court clearly erred by granting a judgment

against PGI. Furthermore, the Estate’s motion to file an amended complaint to

pierce PGI’s corporate veil was premature because there was no current

controversy concerning collection of the judgment against Valhalla. Because there

were no remaining claims pending against PGI, the Trial Court’s orders concerning

post-trial discovery must also be set aside. Consequently, this matter must be

remanded to the Trial Court for entry of a final judgment dismissing the filed

claims against PGI but without prejudice to any collection matters that may later

arise. Only once a final judgment is issued do the issues of post-judgment

execution and a writ pursuant to CR 69.03 potentially arise.

   III.   Valhalla’s Appeal (Appeal No. 2022-CA-1396-MR)

      A. Punitive Damages Award

          i.      Preservation

               In its appeal, Valhalla challenges various aspects of the jury’s verdict

and judgment against it. Valhalla first argues that it was entitled to a directed

verdict on the Estate’s claim for punitive damages. Valhalla raised this issue by

means of a motion for partial summary judgment prior to trial, and motions for

directed verdicts at trial. The Estate argues that Valhalla waived this argument by

                                          -15-
failing to move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) in its post-

trial motion.

                In a bench trial, motions for directed verdict or JNOV are neither

appropriate nor necessary to preserve an objection to the sufficiency of the

evidence. LCH Properties, LLC v. Fannin, No. 2011-CA-001993-MR, 2013 WL

2450526, at *3 (Ky. App. Jun. 7, 2013) (unpublished). But in a jury trial, it is

well-established that a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the

plaintiff’s case is not sufficient to preserve error unless renewed at the close of all

the evidence. Kimbrough v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Ky. 1977),

overruled on other grounds by Ray v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 250 (Ky. 2020).

“A defendant must renew his motion for a directed verdict, thus allowing the trial

court the opportunity to pass on the issue in light of all the evidence, in order to be

preserved for our review.” Steel Technologies, Inc. v. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d 920,

926 (Ky. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Osborne v. Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1

(Ky. 2012).

                However, Congleton goes on to state that a defendant “can only

prevail on an insufficiency of the evidence claim if preserved through a motion for

a JNOV, which in turn must be predicated on a directed verdict motion at the close

of all the proof.” Id. Unlike in the current case, the defendant in Congleton failed

to renew its motion for directed verdict at the close of proof. Nevertheless, the

                                           -16-
Estate maintains that a post-trial JNOV is a prerequisite to preservation of an

insufficiency of the evidence claim even where there were proper motions for

directed verdict. See also Bryan v. CorrectCare-Integrated Health, Inc., 420

S.W.3d 520, 524 (Ky. App. 2013); Russell Cnty. Feed Mill, Inc. v. Kimbler, 520

S.W.2d 309, 312 (Ky. 1975); and Flynn v. Songer, 399 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky.

1966).

             Following entry of the judgment, PGI and Valhalla filed a joint

motion to amend the judgment. PGI argued that the Trial Court should not have

reserved any issues against it following dismissal of the pleaded claims, and both

argued that the loss-of-consortium judgment was excessive. There is some

question whether a CR 59.05 motion is sufficient to preserve a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence. See Popplewell v. Hooe, No. 2010-CA-001627-MR,

2012 WL 592276, at *1 (Ky. App. Feb. 24, 2012) (unpublished). But even

assuming the motion effectively functioned as one for JNOV, the post-trial motion

did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdicts for

compensatory or punitive damages.

             The language in Congleton strongly suggests that Valhalla was

required to file a post-trial JNOV in addition to its requests for a directed verdict at

trial. However, this language emphasized that defendant must move for a directed

verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s case and renew its motion for directed verdict

                                          -17-
at the close of proof. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d at 926. Given this ambiguity in the

law, we have no desire to create unnecessary traps to preservation of issues for

appeal. Preferably, Valhalla should have filed a post-trial motion for JNOV to

preserve its objection to the sufficiency of the evidence for punitive damages.5

However, we conclude that Valhalla’s motions for directed verdict at trial were

sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review.

           ii.      Directed Verdict

                 Assuming that Valhalla’s challenge is preserved, we conclude that the

Trial Court properly submitted the issue to the jury. Valhalla notes that KRS

411.184(2) requires proof of punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.

But see Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Ky. 1998) (questioning the

statute’s “vastly elevated standard for recovery of punitive damages”).

Consequently, Valhalla maintains that the Trial Court must also consider whether

there is clear and convincing evidence in its ruling on a motion for directed verdict

relating to punitive damages. We disagree.

                 The standard of review for a directed verdict is set forth in Daniels v.

CDB Bell, LLC, supra, as follows:

                 When a directed verdict is appealed, the standard of
                 review on appeal consists of two prongs. The prongs are:

5
 Valhalla noted at oral argument that it did file a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, but not on this issue.

                                              -18-
“a trial judge cannot enter a directed verdict unless there
is a complete absence of proof on a material issue or if no
disputed issues of fact exist upon which reasonable
minds could differ.” Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d
16, 18-19 (Ky. 1998). “A motion for directed verdict
admits the truth of all evidence which is favorable to the
party against whom the motion is made.” National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n by and through Bellarmine
College v. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855, 860 (Ky. 1988),
citing Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R. Co. v. Cantrell,
298 Ky. 743, 184 S.W.2d 111 (1944).

       Clearly, if there is conflicting evidence, it is the
responsibility of the jury, the trier of fact, to resolve such
conflicts. Therefore, when a directed verdict motion is
made, the court may not consider the credibility or
weight of the proffered evidence because this function is
reserved for the trier of fact. National, 754 S.W.2d at
860 (citing Cochran v. Downing, 247 S.W.2d 228 (Ky.
1952)).

        In order to review the trial court’s actions in the
case at hand, we must first see whether the trial court
favored the party against whom the motion is made,
including all inferences reasonably drawn from the
evidence. Second, “the trial court must determine
whether the evidence favorable to the party against
whom the motion is made is of such substance that a
verdict rendered thereon would be ‘palpably or
flagrantly’ against the evidence so as ‘to indicate that it
was reached as a result of passion or prejudice.’” If the
answer to this inquiry is affirmative, we must affirm the
trial court granting the motion for a directed verdict. Id.
Moreover, “[i]t is well argued and documented that a
motion for a directed verdict raises only questions of law
as to whether there is any evidence to support a verdict.”
Harris v. Cozatt, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Ky. 1968).
Further, “a reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment
for that of the trial judge unless the trial judge is clearly
erroneous.” Bierman, 967 S.W.2d at 18.

                             -19-
Daniels, 300 S.W.3d at 215.

             Valhalla does not appeal from the jury’s verdict or judgment finding

negligence or awarding compensatory damages. However, Valhalla argues that it

was entitled to a directed verdict on punitive damages. An instruction on punitive

damages is warranted if there is evidence that the defendant acted with oppression,

fraud, malice, or gross negligence with wanton or reckless disregard for the lives,

safety, or property of others. Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 51-

52 (Ky. 2003). A party is entitled to have the jury instructed on the issue of

punitive damages “if there was any evidence to support an award of punitive

damages[.]” Shortridge v. Rice, 929 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Ky. App. 1996).

             The threshold for the award of punitive damages is whether the

misconduct was “outrageous” in character, not whether the injury was intentionally

or negligently inflicted. Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d

382, 389 (Ky. 1985). In a case where gross negligence is used as the basis for

punitive damages, gross negligence has the same character of outrage justifying

punitive damages as willful and malicious misconduct in torts where the injury is

intentionally inflicted. Just as malice need not be expressed and may be implied

from outrageous conduct, so too may wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of

others be implied from the nature of the misconduct. Id. at 389-90.

                                        -20-
             However, a finding of gross negligence clearly requires more than a

failure to exercise ordinary care. It requires a finding of a failure to exercise even

slight care such as to demonstrate a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of

others. Id. See also Phelps, 103 S.W.3d at 51-52. In other words, gross

negligence requires “a finding of failure to exercise reasonable care, and then an

additional finding that this negligence was accompanied by ‘wanton or reckless

disregard for the lives, safety or property of others.’” Gibson v. Fuel Transport,

Inc., 410 S.W.3d 56, 59 (Ky. 2013) (citation omitted). See also Nissan Motor Co.,

Ltd. v. Maddox, 486 S.W.3d 838, 840 (Ky. 2015).

             Valhalla contends that there was no evidence to support a finding of

gross negligence based on its conduct relating to the treatment of Ralph Holbrook.

This inquiry warrants a closer examination of the facts surrounding his injury.

When Ralph Holbrook was admitted, Valhalla assessed him a “high fall risk” due

to his knee replacement surgery and the results of his balance tests. Ralph

Holbrook made steady progress in his physical therapy, gradually improving his

strength and balance. Ralph Holbrook’s injury took place on March 17, 2019, after

he had been undergoing physical therapy for nearly two weeks.

             During an extended physical therapy session, Physical Therapist Eric

Henry (“Henry”) performed a “balloon toss” activity with Ralph Holbrook. This

was the first time Ralph Holbrook performed the activity, and Henry did not

                                         -21-
provide detailed instructions on how to perform the activity. Valhalla’s

rehabilitation director, Jeff Baxter (“Baxter), testified that Henry should have

instructed Ralph Holbrook to bat the balloon above his waist. In contrast, Ralph

Holbrook testified that Henry specifically told him not to allow the balloon to

touch the floor. Both Baxter and Henry’s supervising physical therapist, Kevin

Schoenfeld (“Schoenfeld”), described this instruction as “dangerous” and

“irresponsible” considering Ralph Holbrook’s fall risk.

             Schoenfeld further testified that Henry should have remained within

an arm’s length of Ralph Holbrook. He also testified that Henry should have

stopped the activity in the event Ralph Holbrook dropped the balloon. But during

the activity, the balloon dropped to the floor, and Ralph Holbrook leaned forward

to retrieve it. Instead of stopping the activity, Henry allowed Ralph Holbrook to

pick up the balloon again. However, Ralph Holbrook again dropped the balloon

and leaned forward to obtain it a second time without intervention from Henry,

who once again did not stop the activity. This time, Ralph Holbrook lost his

balance and fell, fracturing his hip. Henry was not within an arm’s length of Ralph

Holbrook either time the balloon fell.

             Although Henry observed Ralph Holbrook laying on the floor

“screaming in pain,” he reported, “no injuries observed” on the incident report.

The incident report was altered after Ralph Holbrook was admitted to the hospital.

                                         -22-
The Estate also introduced evidence of inaccuracies on Henry’s other therapy

reports. Nevertheless, Valhalla argued at trial that Ralph Holbrook was solely at

fault for his fall and injuries, and the jury completely rejected that notion.

                At trial, the Estate argued that Valhalla had an incentive to log

excessive rehabilitation minutes because it would be reimbursed by Medicare a

higher level than if it failed to meet a certain threshold. In support of this

argument, the Estate pointed to Valhalla’s billing practices, asserting that it

documented minutes of improper, or non-existent, care to meet the number of

minutes required to receive maximum reimbursement under the billing threshold.

The Estate also pointed out that Ralph Holbrook was scheduled for 48 minutes of

physical therapy on the day of his fall, but Valhalla billed Medicare for 72 minutes

on that day.6

                The Estate argued that these practices showed that Valhalla pushed

excessive amounts of rehabilitative therapy on patients, increasing the risk of

injuries. The Estate further argued that the profitability of these practices was

relevant to its claim for punitive damages. And the Estate argued that Valhalla’s

billing practices and inaccurate record-keeping suggest Valhalla attempted to

conceal its practices and the severity of Ralph Holbrook’s injuries.

6
 Valhalla maintains that the 72 minutes includes time after Ralph Holbrook’s fall waiting for the
ambulance to arrive.

                                              -23-
             Valhalla separately argues that the punitive damages award should be

set aside because the Trial Court improperly admitted evidence of its billing

practices as proof of the care it provided Ralph Holbrook. Valhalla contends that

the evidence regarding its reimbursement rate improperly implied that its billing

practices contributed to the allegedly negligent treatment of Ralph Holbrook. It

further argues that fraudulent concealment is generally not a basis for punitive

damage unless the concealment causes in separate and distinct damages from the

underlying injury. Hardaway Mgmt. Co. v. Southerland, 977 S.W.2d 910, 917

(Ky. 1998). Consequently, Valhalla asserts that the evidence was either not

relevant to the issue of punitive damages or that its prejudicial effect outweighed

any probative value. In the absence of such evidence, Valhalla maintains that it

would have been entitled to a directed verdict. In the alternative, Valhalla

contends that the punitive-damages judgment was tainted by this evidence, and it

was entitled to a new trial on that issue.

             Valhalla states that it preserved its objection to the admission of this

evidence in its pre-trial motion in limine. The Trial Court passed the motion,

stating that it would address the admissibility of such evidence at trial. In such

cases, a party must renew its objection to the introduction of such evidence at trial

and seek a definitive ruling. See Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151 S.W.3d 332, 350

(Ky. 2004); and Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways v. Darch, 390 S.W.2d 649,

                                             -24-
651 (Ky. 1965). Valhalla does not identify where or how it objected to the

introduction of the evidence or testimony at trial. Therefore, we agree with the

Estate that Valhalla waived its objection to the admission of this evidence.

             Thus, we return to Valhalla’s argument that this evidence was

insufficient to support the jury’s award of punitive damages. Although the

evidence of gross negligence was not overwhelming, the Estate provided notice of

its claims, and Valhalla clearly had knowledge of its intent to seek punitive

damages. It also introduced sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that

Valhalla acted with a wanton or reckless disregard for Ralph Holbrook’s rights,

life, or safety. Most notably, the Estate introduced evidence that Henry

disregarded well-established safety protocols while conducting physical therapy

with Ralph Holbrook. Henry also overlooked or disregarded the extent of Ralph

Holbrook’s injuries both during and after the fall. In so doing, the jury could

conclude that Henry acted with reckless disregard for his health and safety.

             Furthermore, the jury could find that Valhalla pushed excessive

physical therapy minutes on patients to increase its Medicare reimbursement rates.

That motive may have influenced physical therapists such as Henry to extend

physical therapy beyond the capacity of its patients. And Valhalla’s poor record-

keeping both before and after the fall indicates a desire to hide the effects of these

                                         -25-
practices when a patient is injured.7 When the evidence is viewed as a whole, we

conclude that the Trial Court did not err by denying Valhalla’s motion for directed

verdict on punitive damages.

       B. Loss-of-Consortium Award

               Finally, Valhalla argues that the Trial Court erred in denying

remittitur of the judgment for loss-of-consortium. The Estate contends that

Valhalla waived its right to object to the amount of the award for loss-of-

consortium because it failed to object to the “not to exceed” amounts in the jury

instructions. Gibson v. Fuel Transp., Inc., 410 S.W.3d 56, 61 (Ky. 2013). An

objection raised to a jury instruction raised for the first time in a motion for a new

trial is not timely and will not be considered by this Court. Gersh v. Bowman, 239

S.W.3d 567, 574 (Ky. App. 2007),

               In this case, the Trial Court instructed the jury that damages for loss of

consortium were “not to exceed $5,000,000.” Valhalla concedes that it did not

object to the “not to exceed” instruction but argues that the amount awarded for

loss of consortium was disproportionate to the jury’s actual award for negligence.8

7
 The Estate did not allege that it suffered any separate injury from the inaccurate record-keeping
after Ralph Holbrook’s injury. Thus, under Hardaway, supra, the alleged fraud would not serve
as an independent basis for punitive damages. 977 S.W.2d at 917. But under KRS
411.186(2)(e), the jury could consider Valhalla’s actions after the fall in determining the amount
of punitive damages.
8
 The instructions for damages under the negligence award stated that damages were “Not to
exceed” $3,000,000 for Ralph Holbrook’s pain and suffering, and “Not to exceed $543.443.39”

                                              -26-
Since Valhalla’s objection goes to the evidence supporting the verdict rather than

the content of the instructions, we conclude that its post-trial motion was sufficient

to preserve the issue for appeal.9

               Valhalla primarily argues that an award for loss-of-consortium is

presumptively excessive if it exceeds the underlying award for compensatory

damages. Valhalla relies heavily on Ashmore v. Hartford Hosp., 208 A.3d 256,

for Ralph Holbrook’s medical expenses. Given these instructions, Valhalla could not have raised
its argument about the disproportionate judgment for loss of consortium until after the jury
returned its verdicts.
9
  We recognize that “not to exceed” amounts are commonly used in jury instructions to reflect
the plaintiff’s last-stated claim for unliquidated damages. See Fratzke v. Murphy, 12 S.W.3d
269, 271 (Ky. 1999). As noted, the parties here did not object to inclusion of those amounts or
the “not to exceed” wording. However, instructions including “not to exceed” numbers are a
holdover from the Code of Practice in Civil Cases (“Civil Code”), which governed Kentucky
Trial Courts for 100 years until replaced by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1953. Under the Civil
Code, a claimant was required to state amounts of damages sought in the initial pleading. Civil
Code §90. See Bringardner Lumber Co. v. Middleton, 124 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Ky. 1939).
Traditionally, the Trial Court would then instruct the jury about the amount claimed. Now
claimants are not even allowed to state amounts for unliquidated damages in the initial pleading.
CR 8.01(2). Apparently out of habit, we have held on to the practice of giving juries “not to
exceed” numbers under the guise of CR 8.01(2). But that rule says nothing about jury
instructions; it rather limits recovery by way of interrogatory answers regardless of what a jury
may award.

Our neighboring states have expressed valid criticism of this “not to exceed” practice. See, e.g.,
Simmons v. Adams, 121 S.E.2d 379 (Va. 1961); Bales v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 40
S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1931). The practice may mislead the jury to the extent that it implies the Trial
Court endorses a verdict up to the specified amount. The Trial Court should not in this way
comment on the sufficiency of the evidence of damages. But as the practice continues, without
apparent justification, it may be better practice to at least include the qualifier, “the amount
claimed,” to clarify that it is the maximum amount claimed by the plaintiff. In Bales, supra, the
Trial Court added the following language to explain the instruction: “Naming the amount sued
for in this instruction should not influence you in arriving at a verdict, or its amount, if any, and
is mentioned herein only for the purpose of informing you of the amount for which plaintiff has
sued.” Id. at 669. No qualifying phrase was used by the Trial Court in the present case.

                                                -27-
264 (2019), in which the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a spousal loss of

consortium award in a wrongful death action presumptively should not be

substantially greater than the wrongful death award. Id. at 264. The Connecticut

court held that a rational jury’s loss of consortium award ordinarily will be lower

than its noneconomic damages award to the decedent’s estate. Id. at 267.

However, that court explained that it was not adopting a blanket rule that a loss of

consortium award never can exceed the compensation for the underlying spousal

injury.

              Rather, the proposal is simply that we apply a
              presumption that a direct injury to one spouse is no less
              harmful, everything considered, than the concomitant
              loss of consortium suffered by the deprived spouse,
              insofar as the impaired spouse ordinarily will experience
              more or less comparable losses of physical and emotional
              affection, in addition to being the one who suffers all of
              the direct effects of the injury itself. That presumption
              can be overcome, however, by evidence that the marriage
              was an unequal one, in which the deprived spouse relied
              more heavily on the support of or derived far more
              satisfaction than the impaired spouse, or that the impaired
              spouse somehow had less to lose.

Id. at 268.

              In support of this rule, the Court in Ashmore cited cases suggesting

that other jurisdictions have adopted this rule. However, the cited cases do not

stand for such a broad proposition. The Eighth Circuit, applying Missouri law,

merely held that a consortium award that was more than five times the underlying

                                         -28-
compensatory award was likely excessive. Kingman v. Dillard’s, Inc., 721 F.3d

613, 620 (8th Cir. 2013). However, the Court emphasized that the excessiveness

inquiry turned on the evidence presented in the particular case. Id. at 621-22.

Likewise, the Fifth Circuit noted that, while comparing damage awards in similar

cases is helpful in determining whether a particular award is excessive, each case

depends on its own facts. Wheat v. United States, 860 F.2d 1256, 1259 (5th Cir.

1988).10

               Kentucky has never adopted this rule or presumption, and we find no

basis to do so in this case. Indeed, our Supreme Court has cautioned that, “[w]here

there is no statutory presumption, one should not be judicially inferred.”

Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513, 523 (Ky. 2001), overruled on other

grounds by Smith v. McGill, 556 S.W.3d 552 (Ky. 2018). Furthermore, the

assessment of damages is a matter left in the hands of the jury, and their decision

should be disturbed only in the most egregious circumstances. Childers Oil Co. v.

Adkins, 256 S.W.3d 19, 28 (Ky. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Nami Res.

Co., LLC v. Asher Land & Min., Ltd., 554 S.W.3d 323 (Ky. 2018).

10
  The Ashmore Court also cited to Rascop v. Nationwide Carriers, 281 N.W.2d 170, 171 (Minn.
1979). However, that case concerned whether an employer was entitled to a credit against
workers’ compensation for the employee’s settlement with a third-party tortfeasor. The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the employer was not entitled to a credit for the consortium
award as long as the apportionment of the settlement recovery for loss of consortium was
reasonable and not patently arbitrary. Id. at 173. The issue in Rascop is clearly distinct from the
excessiveness inquiry in either Ashmore or the current case.

                                               -29-
             A consortium award that is substantially disproportionate to the

compensatory award may merit closer scrutiny. But the consortium award in this

case was only 1.39 times the total compensatory award, and 2.4 times the award

for Ralph Holbrook’s pain and suffering. Although this award is subject to review

for excessiveness, we do not presume it excessive as a matter of law.

             As noted, Valhalla filed a CR 59 motion to amend the judgment or for

a new trial claiming that the jury’s award for loss-of-consortium was excessive.

Upon such a motion, “the trial court is charged with the responsibility of deciding

whether the jury’s award appears to have been given under the influence of passion

or prejudice or in disregard of the evidence or the instructions of the court.”

Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 813 (Ky. App. 2001) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). This Court will not step “‘into the shoes of the trial court to

inspect the actions of the jury . . . . [Rather], the appellate court reviews only the

actions of the trial judge . . . to determine if his actions constituted an error of

law.’” Gersh, 239 S.W.3d at 574 (quoting Burgess, 44 S.W.3d at 813). In other

words, this Court will not “substitute our judgment on excessiveness . . . for [the

trial court’s] unless clearly erroneous.” Id. (citation omitted).

             Apart from the size of the award, Valhalla contends that loss of

consortium is derivative of the injured party’s bodily injury claim. Daley v. Reed,

87 S.W.3d 247, 248-49 (Ky. 2002). But in Daley, the issue was whether

                                           -30-
consortium claims were subsumed within the coverage limits of an automobile

liability policy. Our Supreme Court held that the loss of consortium claims were

derivative of the wrongful death claim of their mother’s estate and fall within the

“each person” limit of the policy. Id. at 250. The Court was addressing a coverage

issue, not an excessiveness inquiry.

             At trial, Dianne Holbrook testified extensively about her relationship

with Ralph Holbrook. She emphasized their long and happy marriage and

enjoyment of activities together. Diane Holbrook further testified that, before the

hip fracture, Ralph Holbrook mowed the grass, sawed and picked up tree limbs

after storms, and worked extensively around the house and yard. Diane Holbrook

testified that she had to hire outside help to perform these tasks. In addition, Ralph

Holbrook was the primary driver in the family, taking her to most activities outside

the home. After the fall, Dianne Holbrook lost friendships and social activities

because they were not a mobile couple. Dianne Holbrook also testified that Ralph

Holbrook vastly changed after the fall, and she spent much of her time caring for

his needs. He remained in this condition until his death over two years later.

             A claim for loss of consortium includes the right to the services,

assistance, aid, society, companionship, and conjugal relationship between

husband and wife, or wife and husband. KRS 411.145. The adoption of this statute

overrules contrary language in Kotsiris v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Ky. 1970)

                                         -31-
holding that there is no right of recovery for nursing services rendered or to be

rendered to the husband by the wife. Id. at 412.11 And contrary to Valhalla’s

argument, a spouse’s claim for loss of consortium includes the loss of the

household services of the wife or husband. Schulz v. Chadwell, 558 S.W.2d 183,

188 (Ky. App. 1977) (citing Beauchamp v. Davis, 309 Ky. 397, 217 S.W.2d 822,

825 (1948)).

               Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the jury’s award

appears to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice or in

disregard of the evidence or the instructions of the Trial Court. “Loss of

consortium . . . does not lend itself to simple quantification. The entire inquiry

rests on a speculative premise: the value of the decedent’s affection.” Louisville

SW Hotel, LLC v. Lindsey, 636 S.W.3d 508, 519 (Ky. 2021). The jury is uniquely

qualified to make such determinations, and “[i]f the verdict bears any reasonable

relationship to the evidence of loss suffered, it is the duty of the trial court and this

Court not to disturb the jury’s assessment of damages.” Hazelwood v. Beauchamp,

766 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Ky. App. 1989). In this case, there was substantial evidence

about the effect of Ralph Holbrook’s injury on Diane Holbrook. Although loss of

11
   The statute also extends consortium damages beyond the death of the injured spouse. Martin
v. Ohio Cnty. Hosp. Corp., 295 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Ky. 2009). However, the jury in this case
specifically made no award for Diane Holbrook’s loss of consortium following Ralph
Holbrook’s death.

                                             -32-
consortium is difficult to quantify precisely, the jury is tasked with that decision.

The jurors were uniquely and properly free to decide that Ralph Holbrook’s

“value” to his wife was substantially more than the “value” of his own, personal

pain and suffering to him. Furthermore, the jury awarded Diane Holbrook

substantially less in damages for loss of consortium than the instructions allowed.

The Trial Court likewise concluded that the verdict was neither manifestly against

the weight of the evidence nor the result of passion or prejudice. We find no basis

to disturb that conclusion.

   IV.    Conclusion

             Accordingly, in Appeal No. 2022-CA-1279-MR, we reverse the

judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court as it relates to PGI. This matter is

remanded for entry of a final judgment dismissing with prejudice any claims that

the Estate asserted previously against PGI. However, the dismissal shall be

without prejudice to any collection claims that may arise against PGI following

entry of the judgment. In Appeal No. 2022-CA-1396-MR, we affirm the judgment

of the Jefferson Circuit Court as it relates to Valhalla.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                          -33-
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT       BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
FOR APPELLANT PROVIDENCE
GROUP, INC.:                   Chadwick N. Gardner
                               John C. Grey, II
Bethany A. Breetz              Prospect, Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky
                               John C. Robinson
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT LAKE      Benjamin Salyers
FOREST POST ACUTE, LLC:        Shelbyville, Kentucky

Scott A. Davidson              Kevin C. Burke
Rod D. Payne                   Jamie K. Neal
Louisville, Kentucky           Louisville, Kentucky

ORAL ARGUMENT FOR              ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT LAKE FOREST POST     APPELLEES:
ACUTE, LLC:
                               Chadwick N. Gardner
Scott A. Davidson              Prospect, Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky

                             -34-