Court Opinion

ID: 9480100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:38:12.118717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:29.026619
License: Public Domain

WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In this case, the majority affirms the district court, which improperly broadened an indictment making it possible for the defendant to be convicted of selling drugs within 1,000 feet of Central Catholic High School when he was indicted for selling drugs within 1,000 feet of Wheeling Park High School.1 I respectfully dissent.
As the Supreme Court has noted:
If it lies within the province of a court to change the charging part of an indictment to suit its own notions of what it ought to have been, or what the grand jury would probably have made it if their attention had been called to suggested changes, the great importance which the common law attaches to an indictment by a grand jury, as a prerequisite to a pris*434oner’s trial for a crime, and without which the Constitution says “no person shall be held to answer” may be frittered away until its value is almost destroyed.
United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 142-43, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 1818-19, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1984) (quoting Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10, 7 S.Ct. 781, 786, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887)). By not taking this reasoning into account, the majority, in the words of the Court, fritters away this important fifth amendment right by what I suggest is the strained view that the amendment of the indictment which the district court permitted did “not broaden the possible bases for conviction.”2
The grand jury, however, indicted Bled-soe for selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public secondary school in Wheeling, Wheeling Park High School. If the defendant had demurred to the earlier indictment, he would have been found not guilty because he did not sell the cocaine within 1,000 feet of Wheeling Park High School. By striking the word “public” from the indictment, the defendant could be convicted of selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of either Wheeling Park High School or Central Catholic High School. Even adopting the majority’s reasoning, that undoubtedly broadened the possible bases for conviction. In short, Bledsoe was indicted for a crime he did not commit and convicted of a crime for which he was never indicted.
In Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960), the Supreme Court dealt with a similar issue on facts indistinguishable from those at hand. In Stirone, the indictment charged that the defendant violated the Hobbs Act by impeding the movement of sand in interstate commerce. The sand was used in the construction of a steel mill, but no impediment to the movement of steel in commerce was charged in the indictment. At trial, the district court allowed in evidence and permitted a conviction either on the movement of the sand in commerce or that the defendant also impeded the movement of steel from the mill in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction noting that “it has been the rule that after an indictment has been returned its charges may not be broadened through amendment except by the grand jury itself.” Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215-16, 80 S.Ct. at 272-73. The Court went on to state that the “variation here destroyed the defendant’s substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury. Deprivation of such a basic right is far too serious to be treated as nothing more than a variance and then dismissed as harmless error.” 3 361 U.S. at 217, 80 S.Ct. at 273. The Court also noted that even assuming that “under an indictment drawn in general terms a conviction might rest upon a showing that commerce of one kind or another had been burdened,” nevertheless “when only one particular kind of commerce is charged to have been burdened, a conviction must rest on that charge and not another.” 361 U.S. at 218, 80 S.Ct. at 274 (emphasis added). This holding of the Court is quite to the contrary from the majority’s argument that since the statute under which Bledsoe was charged would permit enhancement for sales occurring near either public or private schools, the word “public” in the indictment was mere surplusage. Under the majority’s analysis in the case at hand, the sand in Stirone would have been merely surplusage, and the defendant *435could have been convicted on proof he impeded either the movement of sand or steel in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court expressly rejected that analysis. 361 U.S. at 218, 80 S.Ct. at 273. Once the grand jury indicted for a sale near Wheeling Park High School, only the grand jury could amend the indictment to instead charge a sale near Central Catholic High School.4
Because the majority erroneously affirms the district court’s amendment of the indictment, I dissent. I would reverse and permit the government to reindict, if it be so advised, as we have held in Hooker, supra, at 1233, to be the correct way to treat such matters.

. The indictment in entirety follows:

Indictment

The Grand Jury charges that:

Count One

On or about July 6, 1988, in or near Wheeling, Ohio County, West Virginia, within the Northern Judicial District of West Virginia, defendant JEROME T. BLEDSOE, did unlawfully, knowingly, intentionally and without authority distribute, within one thousand feet of the real property comprising a public secondary school, approximately 0.37 grams of cocaine, also known as "coke”, also known as “crack”, a Schedule II narcotic drug-controlled substance, as designated by Title 21, United States Code, Section 812(c), Schedule 11(a)(4), to a person known to the Grand Jury, for $200.00; in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) and 845(a).
A true bill
It is undisputed that the only public secondary school in Wheeling, West Virginia, is Wheeling Park High School.

. The majority relies on United States v. Kegler, 724 F.2d 190 (D.C.Cir.1984). In Kegler, the court allowed the correction of a clerical error of the name "Angela Mateer” which had been accidentally inserted for "Andrea Mateer” in the indictment. The Kegler court characterized the change as a “minor clerical” change where the "substance of the charge is left totally unaffected and the prerogative of the grand jury is not usurped.” Kegler, 724 F.2d at 194. It also noted that "[cjorrecting the name by changing three letters did not charge a different offense from that alleged by the grand jury.” Kegler, at 195. In our case striking “public” from the indictment did change the offense charged from selling drugs near Wheeling Park High School to selling drugs near either Wheeling Park High School or Central Catholic High School.

. Compare the Supreme Court's language to the majority’s conclusion that "[t]o require the United States to resubmit this case to the grand jury, under these circumstances, would be elevating form over substance.”

. All the government would have had to do in this instance was to go back to the grand jury and reindict. As we noted in United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir.1988) (en banc):
It is obvious that the government could easily have obtained a superseding indictment with little or no delay in the scheduled trial. Its failure to do so resulted in an enormous waste of resources by the court, the government, and the defendant. Regrettably, this is not the first occasion we have had reason to chastise the government for its lax practices in drafting indictments; more regrettably, it is unlikely to be the last.