Court Opinion

ID: 9469664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:46:19.476519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:30.280866
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
While I join in the court’s judgment and in most of Judge Becker’s opinion, I have several minor reservations about his analysis. The first is with respect to his references to the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule. When dealing with the exclusion of evidence seized in' a warrant-less search and seizure, perhaps something can be said for that rationale, although I remain skeptical about that justification. When dealing with the due execution of a *761judicially authorized warrant in accordance with its terms, however, deterrence of police misconduct as a justification for the exclusionary rule seems to me completely illogical. The police went to a judicial officer, obtained a warrant, and executed it in accordance with its terms. They did all that could be reasonably expected of them.
When we suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant, either because the affidavits on which it issued were insufficient or because, as in this case, the subject matter to be searched for was insufficiently particularized, we are in effect exercising appellate review over the judicial performance of the issuing magistrate. We do so because the courts have an affirmative obligation under the fourth amendment to refrain from providing a public forum for dissemination of information which should have remained private. Use by a court of evidence which should, under the fourth amendment, have remained private is itself a violation of the fourth amendment.
Our adoption of the redaction requirement is entirely consistent with my position that judicial use of illegally obtained evidence is a violation of the fourth amendment separate and distinct from any violation committed by the police. By hypothesis the affidavit justified entry to the premises and seizure of some property. Thus there has been no invasion of privacy in the entry, and at least some of the property lost the shield of privacy. On the other hand the seizure of property for which no probable cause showing has been made does involve an invasion of privacy, which the court cannot compound.
Finally, I suggest that on remand, in deciding what evidence should be suppressed, the court may not end its analysis at the point at which it matches up the seized evidence with the probable cause showing in the affidavit. The officers were lawfully on the premises, and were required to examine the company’s books and records in order to execute even the valid parts of the warrant. Under those circumstances the court should consider whether seizure of additional evidence was justified under the plain view doctrine.