Court Opinion

ID: 9365523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 14:13:12.516211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:45.948878
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Humphreys, O’Brien and Chaney
UNPUBLISHED

              ROBERT LAMONT CHU, JR.
                                                                               MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0734-22-3                                           PER CURIAM
                                                                                  JANUARY 24, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY
                                              Bruce D. Albertson, Judge

                               (A. Hunter Jackson; Evans Oliver PLC, on brief), for appellant.
                               Appellant submitting on brief.

                               (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Justin B. Hill, Assistant
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Robert Lamont Chu, Jr., appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Rockingham County

              revoking his suspended sentences for receiving stolen goods, assault or battery by a mob, and

              possession of marijuana. On appeal, Chu argues that the circuit court erred in revoking his

              suspended sentences to impose four years of active incarceration and declining to make a finding

              that he was a good candidate for rehabilitation. After examining the briefs and record in this case,

              the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because the appeal is

              “authoritatively decided” and “wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii); Rule 5A:27(a).

                                                         BACKGROUND

                      On appeal we “view the evidence received at [a] revocation hearing in the light most

              favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, including all reasonable and legitimate

              inferences that may properly be drawn from it.” Green v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 69, 76

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
(2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 266, 274 (2018)).

“In revocation appeals, the trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless

there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529,

535 (2013) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86 (1991)).

       In December of 2013, Chu was convicted of assault and battery and felony receipt of stolen

property. In accordance with the written plea agreement, Chu was sentenced to six-months’

incarceration with six months suspended, and five years’ incarceration with four years and six

months suspended, respectively. The circuit court imposed three years’ supervised probation as a

condition of the suspended sentences. In November of 2015, Chu was convicted of assault or

battery by a mob and possession of marijuana. Again, in accordance with the plea agreement, the

circuit court sentenced Chu to twelve months’ incarceration with six months suspended on each of

the two charges. The circuit court ordered Chu to complete a two-year period of supervised

probation. At that same hearing, Chu was found in violation of the terms of the 2013 suspended

sentences due to the new convictions, along with positive drug screens and absconding from

supervision. The circuit court imposed the balance of his six-month sentence for the assault and

battery but revoked and resuspended the four years and six months’ sentence for the receipt of

stolen property. The circuit court extended Chu’s supervised probation for a period of two years

upon his release from incarceration as a condition of the suspended sentence on the 2013 offense, to

be served concurrently with the supervision for his two new offenses.

       In April of 2018, the circuit court found Chu in violation of the terms and conditions of his

supervised probation and suspended sentences. On the receipt of stolen property offense, the circuit

court revoked the four years and six months’ suspended sentence and resuspended four years of that

sentence. The circuit court revoked and resuspended both of the six-month sentences for the assault

or battery by a mob and possession of marijuana sentences. The circuit court also extended Chu’s

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supervised probation for a period of two years upon his release from incarceration. Again in

October of 2020, the circuit court found Chu in violation of the terms of his supervised probation

and revoked and resuspended the remaining unserved time on his sentences. The circuit court

extended the period of Chu’s supervised probation for a period of one year, commencing

immediately.

       In September 2021, Chu’s probation officer reported that Chu had incurred new charges in

another jurisdiction and asked the circuit court to issue a show cause for Chu. At the revocation

hearing, in May 2022, Chu presented the circuit court with information relating to his successful

completion of a drug and alcohol treatment program. The circuit court found Chu in violation of his

probation and suspended sentences and imposed the full balance of his suspended sentences. The

circuit court ordered the active sentences imposed to run concurrently with one another, for a total

period of four years’ incarceration.

                                            ANALYSIS

       When the circuit court has suspended the imposition of a sentence, it “may revoke the

suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within

the probation period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code

§ 19.2-306(A). “If the court, after hearing, finds good cause to believe that the defendant has

violated the terms of suspension, then the court may revoke the suspension and impose a

sentence in accordance with the provisions of § 19.2-306.1.” Code § 19.2-306(C). Further,

“[t]he court . . . may place the defendant upon terms and conditions or probation.” Id.

       “When coupled with a suspended sentence, probation represents ‘an act of grace on the

part of the Commonwealth to one who has been convicted and sentenced to a term of

confinement.’” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 582, 587 (2010) (quoting Price v.

Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 443, 448 (2008)). “In the absence of a clear statutory or

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constitutional violation, we defer to the discretion of the circuit court regarding the decision of

whether any act of grace is appropriate in the first instance[.]” Green, 75 Va. App. at 77

(alteration in original) (quoting Garibaldi v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 64, 69 (2019)).

Further, “[t]he statutes dealing with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give

the trial court valuable tools to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation,

suspension of all or part of a sentence, and/or restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth,

274 Va. 737, 740 (2007).

       Chu argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by not considering his involvement

in rehabilitation. It was within the circuit court’s purview to weigh any mitigating factors Chu

presented. Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000). The only evidence Chu cites

to support his assertion is the length of the sentence itself and the fact that the circuit court made

no mention of Chu’s involvement with the treatment program. The record does not support

Chu’s claim. The circuit court not only received evidence of Chu’s involvement in the program,

but also admitted individual certificates from the treatment program over the Commonwealth’s

objection. Chu conflates failure to discuss evidence with failure to consider evidence. The

circuit court is not obligated to read into the record every factor it considered and the weight

given to each one. “Absent a statutory requirement to do so, ‘a trial court is not required to give

findings of fact and conclusions of law.’” Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 500 n.8

(2015) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 615, 627 (1982)).

       Chu demonstrated his disregard for the terms of his suspended sentences by committing

more crimes and violating the terms of his supervised probation. The circuit court admonished

Chu at his prior hearing in October of 2020—warning Chu that imposition of his entire

suspended sentence “could have really happened here,” saying “I’ve done it to people who come

back on misdemeanors on their third time. That’s the warning.” At Chu’s fourth revocation

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hearing, it was reasonable for the circuit court to conclude that Chu was not amenable to

rehabilitation. We find no abuse of the circuit court’s discretion in sentencing Chu to the balance

of his previously suspended sentences.

       To the extent that Chu argues the circuit court erred in sentencing him above the

recommended sentencing guidelines, we note that the circuit court was not bound by the

sentencing guidelines. Runyon v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 573, 577-78 (1999). The

guidelines remain “advisory only and do not require trial courts to impose specific sentences.”

Id. A circuit court’s decision regarding whether to follow the discretionary sentencing guidelines

is not reviewable on appeal. Code § 19.2-298.01(F).

                                         CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

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