Court Opinion

ID: 9706123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:32:07.59562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:54.489042
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. I believe that reversal and retrial are warranted because of plain error in the admission of certain testimony by the State’s expert witness. Accordingly, I dissent.
Dr. Pamela Langelier was called by the State to explain the results of her evaluation of the victim. She did not, however, merely explain to the jury “the psychological and emotional profile of PTSD sufferers and [give] an opinion as to whether the testifying complainant suffers from the disorder,” as permitted by State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366, 370, 534 A.2d 184, 187 (1987). In addition, the expert gave her opinion on the tendency of PTSD sufferers to tell the truth about incidents of sexual abuse and even went further by concluding that the victim had been sexually abused by the defendant. We held in Catsam that such testimony constitutes a direct comment on the credibility of the complainant:
By testifying first that sufferers of PTSD generally do not fabricate claims of sexual abuse, and then that the complainant suffers from PTSD, her testimony left one clear and unmistakable inference to be drawn: the complainant would not fabricate this allegation.
Id. at 370, 534 A.2d at 187-88. “Since this type of evidence may unduly influence the jury’s judgment with regard to the truthfulness of the complaining witness, it is not admissible.” Id. at 371, 534 A.2d at 188. See also United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1986); State v. Hicks, 148 Vt. 459, 462, 535 A.2d 776, 778 (1987).
The Court concludes that the trial court’s failure to exclude the testimony was not plain error. I cannot agree.
Application of the plain error rule necessarily involves discretion by the appellate court. Not all errors that potentially prejudice the rights of the defendant are deemed plain under the rule; if they were, trial counsel would have little incentive to object at trial — a result conducive of neither fair trials nor judicial economy — since all prejudicial errors, *474whether preserved by counsel or not, would then mandate retrial. (Nonprejudicial errors do not warrant retrial in any event under the harmless error rule, V.R.Cr.P. 52(a).) The plain error rule, rather, provides: “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” V.R.Cr.P. 52(b) (emphasis added); see State v. Duff, 150 Vt. 329, 337-38, 554 A.2d 214, 219 (1988); State v. Ayers, 148 Vt. 421, 425-26, 535 A.2d 330, 333-34 (1987).
The precise criteria governing this Court’s exercise of discretion in finding a “plain error,” however, are far from self-evident. Our language has been admittedly less than helpful. State v. Turner is a typical example: “[T]he error must be obvious and strike at the very heart of defendant’s constitutional rights or result in a miscarriage of justice if we were to fail to recognize it.” 145 Vt. 399, 403, 491 A.2d 338, 340 (1985). The first requirement recognizes that a trial judge cannot reasonably be expected sua sponte to correct an error unless the error is an obvious one. The second requirement emphasizes only that an error will not be deemed plain unless it is very serious or very prejudicial — and just what this means is open to speculation by those who practice in our courts. I will therefore try to be as explicit as I can in explaining why I would hold that the trial court in these circumstances committed plain error in allowing the expert to give her opinion that PTSD sufferers tend to tell the truth about incidents of sexual abuse and that the complainant had been sexually abused by defendant.
First, the same expert witness testified at the trial of the complainant’s stepfather. In that case, her opinion on the credibility of the victim resulted in a reversal and remand for a new trial. State v. Ross, No. 86-017 (Vt. Mar. 8, 1988) (unpublished order). In my view, it is unfair to affirm defendant’s conviction when admission of the equivalent testimony in the stepfather’s trial warranted a remand.
Second, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. In fact, the issue was raised by the court prior to opening statements. The court inquired about Dr. Langelier’s testimony as follows: “[Sjhe’s not going to testify on the ultimate issue of credibility?” The prosecutor answered: “No, she’s not____ The State in no way is going to solicit testimony on the *475credibility issue. We understand how bad that is.” The trial court thus had in effect ruled against admissibility. As the Court concludes: “It is clear, then, that both the court and counsel had the issue very much in mind.” State v. Ross, 152 Vt. 462, 469, 568 A.2d 335, 340 (1989). Holding the trial court to a duty sua sponte to suppress the inadmissible testimony, therefore, is not unreasonable in these circumstances.
Third, by using an expert to bolster the credibility of the complaining witness, the State intruded on the core function of the jury, infringing upon defendant’s constitutional right to trial by jury. See United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d at 340 (“‘[credibility ... is for the jury — the jury is the lie detector in the courtroom’”) (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974)); United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 705 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981) (“‘exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine credibility’”) (quoting United States v. Ward, 169 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1948)); United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798, 806 (S.D.N.Y.) (“[I]t is hornbook law that the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given his testimony rests exclusively with the jury.”), aff’d, 200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952).
Fourth, the State committed the cardinal sin of eliciting a conclusion from its expert on the guilt of the defendant. Rule 704 of the Vermont Rules of Evidence permits opinion testimony that “embraces an ultimate issue,” but only if it is “otherwise admissible.” The rule on expert testimony provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
V.R.E. 702. This expert was qualified, at best, to render an opinion on the child victim’s symptoms and their etiology, not to tell the jury who abused her. ‘“[S]o long as the expert does not render an opinion on the accuracy of the victim’s recitation of facts, his or her general testimony on the dynamics of sexual abuse does not prejudice the jury.’” State v. Hicks, 148 Vt. at 462, 535 A.2d at 778 (quoting Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348 *476Pa. Super. 368, 377, 502 A.2d 253, 257 (1985)). Dr. Langelier’s opinion that “the frequency [of sexual abuse] with Uncle Jamie was not as frequent as it was with other parties, bpt ... she remembered it clearly and it looks like it was twice if not more,” was an unambiguous conclusion, by the only expert witness who testified, that defendant was guilty. The testimony was inadmissible, highly prejudicial, and deeply invasive of defendant’s right to trial by jury. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that defendant was tried by an expert rather than a jury of his peers.
The Court does not address these concerns. Rather, the Court’s decision apparently relies on the authority of two recent cases. I do not believe those decisions justify today’s result.
In State v. DeJoinville, 145 Vt. 603, 604-05, 496 A.2d 173, 174-75 (1985), we held that the admission of expert testimony on the truthfulness in general of child victims of sexual abuse was not plain error. The victim’s pediatrician had testified that, “based on his experience, children wouldn’t lie about being sexually abused.” Id. at 604, 496 A.2d at 174. The expert in DeJoinville did not, however, conclude that the victim in that case had been sexually assaulted by the defendant. The error in the case at bar simply was more egregious than the error in DeJoinville. Nor were the other factors enumerated above present in DeJoinville, namely, the State’s promise not to elicit testimony on the victim’s credibility and the admission of equivalent testimony causing reversal in a related trial.
State v. Recor, 150 Vt. 40, 45-46, 549 A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1988), also held that the admission of expert testimony pertaining to the credibility of the complaining witness — again a child victim of sexual assault — was not plain error. Again, the particular circumstances in which the forbidden testimony arose here were absent in Recor. In addition, the violation of the Catsam rule in Recor was not clearcut. The State’s psychologist testified as follows:
Q. Does it tell you something as a forensic psychologist when a child remains consistent over several interviews?
A. Well, it gives me a sense that what they are saying happened, happened.
*477Id. at 45, 549 A.2d at 1386. We stated that this testimony, “while not the specific profile evidence at issue in Catsam, appears to be of the general type that violates the spirit of Catsam.” Id. at 46, 549 A.2d at 1386-87. By contrast, the State’s evidence in the instant case violates the precise holding in Catsam, and was even more prejudicial because the expert told the jury she believed the victim had been sexually abused by defendant. The Court ignores these distinctions.
Finally, I would add that the error cannot be dismissed as harmless, as intimated by the Court. “Harmless error analysis requires the reviewing court to inquire if, absent the alleged error, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict regardless of the error.” State v. Hamlin, 146 Vt. 97, 106, 499 A.2d 45, 52 (1985). The burden is on the State to show that the error was harmless. Catsam, 148 Vt. at 372, 534 A.2d at 188. Here, it is far from clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the unlawful testimony had no effect on the verdict. Dr. Langelier was the sole expert witness at trial. Other witnesses testified for the State, but all, except for the victim’s younger brother, based their testimony on what she had told them. Dr. Langelier’s testimony as the State’s expert may have carried great weight with the jury. It did not play “a minor role,” as did the testimony of an expert on rape trauma syndrome in State v. Bubar, 146 Vt. 398, 401, 505 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1985) (holding admission of expert testimony not plain error). In Bubar, we expressed “concern that the [victim’s] counselor, by testifying as an expert on rape trauma syndrome, lent an improper ‘aura of special reliability and trustworthiness’ to the complainant’s testimony.” Id. (quoting State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982)). Our concern is magnified here, where the victim is a child and the expert’s testimony effectively constituted a direct comment on the victim’s credibility. See United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d at 341 (not harmless error where State’s expert bolstered credibility of victim who was “a key government witness in [the] case, and her credibility was a very important issue”); Catsam, 148 Vt. at 371, 534 A.2d at 188 (“this type of evidence may unduly influence the jury’s judgment”). The central point of the expert’s testimony was that defendant was guilty, and that this was evident because the victim was telling the truth.
*478I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Justice Dooley joins in this dissent.