Court Opinion

ID: 9623773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:42:57.96851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:34.716779
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the plain language of the wrongful death statute clearly precludes the plaintiff’s claim, I dissent.
At common law, there was no right to bring a claim for wrongful death.7 Since the legislature enacted the wrongful death statute in derogation of the common law, this Court must strictly construe it.8 When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning to the words of the statute to carry out the legislature’s intention.9 “ ‘The express language of the Act will be followed literally and no exceptions to the requirements of the Act will be read into the statute by the courts.’ ”10 Following this rule of statutory construction, this Court has repeatedly limited the scope of the Wrongful Death Act to its express terms, even when it means denying a person the right to recover.11
OCGA § 51-4-2 gives the surviving spouse and children the right to recover for the homicide of the spouse or parent; OCGA § 19-7-1 governs the right of a parent to recover for the homicide of a child.12 It provides: “If the deceased child does not leave a spouse or child, the right of recovery shall be in the parent or parents.” This provision means that parents have a wrongful death claim only when their child does not leave a surviving spouse or child.
Applying the plain meaning of this statutory language, Deborah Carringer is not entitled to recover for the wrongful death of her son because he left a surviving spouse. Unlike the previous case in which this Court allowed children to sue for the death of their mother despite a surviving spouse,13 Carringer did not depend on her adult *367son for support. More important, the circumstances surrounding his death do not demand the exercise of our equitable powers to permit his mother’s claim to proceed against the City of Barnesville and its police chief.14
Decided March 24, 2003.
Ralph S. Goldberg, for appellant.
Katz, Flatau, Popson & Boyer, Sandra J. Popson, Mullins, Whalen & Westbury, Andrew J. Whalen,III, James R. Westbury, Jr., for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this dissent.

 See Edenfield v. Jackson, 251 Ga. 491 (306 SE2d 911) (1983).

 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 245 Ga. 5 (262 SE2d 895) (1980).

 See Oxford v. Carter, 216 Ga. 821 (120 SE2d 298) (1961).

 See Tolbert v. Maner, 271 Ga. 207 (518 SE2d 423) (1999).

 See Tolbert, 271 Ga. 207 (rejecting claim brought by the descendant of a child who predeceased a parent); Miles v. Ashland Chemical Co., 261 Ga. 726 (410 SE2d 290) (1991) (declining to extend the statute of limitation for wrongful death beyond two years from the date of death); Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657 (238 SE2d 361) (1977) (holding no cause of action for wrongful death under strict liability); Odom v. Atlanta & W.P.R. Co., 208 Ga. 45 (64 SE2d 889) (1951) (rejecting children’s right of action while their father’s widow lives).

 See OCGA § 51-4-4.

 See Brown v. Liberty Oil & Refining Corp., 261 Ga. 214 (403 SE2d 806) (1991).

 See Tessmer v. State, 273 Ga. 220, 221 (539 SE2d 816) (2000).