Court Opinion

ID: 9890037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 00:00:28.736492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:55.481049
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10511     Document: 00516927871        Page: 1   Date Filed: 10/11/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                                                                    FILED
                                                              October 11, 2023
                                 No. 22-10511
                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                      Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                     versus

   Hollis Morrison Greenlaw; Benjamin Lee Wissink; Cara
   Delin Obert; Jeffrey Brandon Jester,

                                                     Defendants—Appellants.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:21-CR-289-1

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
          Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel
   rehearing (5th Cir. R. 35 I.O.P.), the petition is DENIED. Our prior
   panel opinion, United States v. Greenlaw, 2023 WL 4856259 (5th Cir. 2023),
   is WITHDRAWN, and the following opinion is SUBSTITUTED
   therefor.
Case: 22-10511      Document: 00516927871           Page: 2    Date Filed: 10/11/2023

                                     No. 22-10511

          In January 2022, a jury convicted United Development Funding
   (“UDF”) executives Hollis Greenlaw, Benjamin Wissink, Cara Obert, and
   Jeffrey Jester (collectively “Appellants”) of conspiracy to commit wire fraud
   affecting a financial institution, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and
   eight counts of aiding and abetting securities fraud. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1348,
   1349 & 2. Jurors heard evidence that Appellants were involved in what the
   Government deemed “a classic Ponzi-like scheme,” in which Appellants
   transferred money out of one fund to pay distributions to another fund’s
   investors, without disclosing this information to their investors or the
   Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Appellants did not refute that
   they conducted these transactions. They instead pointed to evidence that
   their conduct did not constitute fraud because it amounted to routine
   business transactions that benefited all involved without causing harm to
   their investors. On appeal, they urge this court to view this evidence as proof
   that they did not intend to deprive their investors of money or property as a
   conviction under the fraud statutes requires.
          Appellants each filed separate appeals, challenging their convictions
   on several grounds. Considered together, they argue that (1) the jury verdict
   should be vacated because the evidence at trial was insufficient to support
   their convictions or alternatively, (2) they are entitled to a new trial because
   the jury instructions were improper. As explained below, Appellants have
   demonstrated at least one error in the jury instructions—the intent to
   defraud instruction. Because this error was harmless, and thus, does not
   warrant a new trial, we also address Appellants’ remaining challenges on the
   merits.
          Appellants also argue that the district court erred in (3) limiting cross-
   examination regarding a non-testifying government informant; (4) allowing
   the Government to constructively amend the indictment and include certain
   improper statements in its closing argument; (5) imposing a time limit during

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   trial; and (6) failing to apply the cumulative-error doctrine. Because these
   arguments also do not warrant a new trial, we AFFIRM the jury verdict in
   its entirety.
                                    I. Background
           UDF finances residential real estate developments, which entails
   buying land, building the infrastructure, and selling lots or homes built on
   those lots. Each phase of this development cycle increases the value of the
   real estate and, in turn, the developer profits when the finished product is
   sold for more than the costs of development. Real estate developers typically
   need loans to finance these construction projects, and when they do, they can
   call UDF. Greenlaw co-founded the company,1 which offers a group of
   investment funds—UDF III, UDF IV, and UDF V—to support the
   developments at each stage of the process.2 In return for its loan to
   developers, the investment fund receives liens on the land, and developers
   are required to pay back the loans with interest. The money from the interest
   is then disbursed to the funds’ investors as distributions.
           A. The Trial

           1
               During the indictment period, Greenlaw served as president, chief executive
   officer, and chairman of the board for UDF III, UDF IV, and UDF V, and signed all of the
   filings to the SEC; Wissink was the chief operating officer of UDF III and a voting member
   of the investment committees for UDF III, UDF IV, and UDF V; Obert was the chief
   financial officer that signed all the of SEC filings; and Jester was the director of asset
   management.
           2
             UDF III is a publicly registered, nontraded limited partnership that financed the
   acquisition of land and development into finished lots, raising approximately $350 million
   from investors. UDF IV is a publicly registered, nontraded Real Estate Investment Trust
   (“REIT”), and public offering, raising approximately $49.2 million from investors. UDF
   V is a publicly traded REIT listed on NASDAQ, raising approximately $651 million from
   investors.

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                 i. Evidence of Undisclosed Advances
          Evidence presented at trial revealed that, between January 21, 2011
   and December 29, 2015, the process in which Appellants paid UDF III
   investors their distributions changed. Developers were not paying back the
   loans quick enough, so UDF III was short on funds to pay its investors’ its
   “general rate of return” of 9.75% per year. Even though this rate was not
   promised, it was advertised in marketing materials to “broker/dealers and
   financial advisors.” To remedy this, Appellants transferred money, by way
   of an advance, from UDF IV and UDF V to UDF III to cover the
   distributions, maintain a high distribution rate, and ensure that UDF III
   continued to appear lucrative to the investing public. A Federal Bureau of
   Investigation (“FBI”) forensic accountant testified that $66.8 million was
   transferred to UDF III from UDF IV and UDF V during the relevant period.
          Jurors heard evidence about how UDF was able to conduct these
   transactions. UDF asset manager, Jeff Gilpatrick, testified that developers,
   like Centurion and Buffington, that had loans from UDF entities would
   generally submit a request when they needed an advance, and the approval
   for the advance would come from Jester or Wissink. But emails revealed that,
   as the date of each distribution drew near, Appellants diverted money from
   UDF IV and UDF V to UDF III unbeknownst to the developers. As a means
   to do this, Appellants relied on a clause in the loan agreement between UDF
   IV and UDF V and its developers that gave Appellants authorization to make
   advances without notice or input from the developer. Later, UDF relied on
   this clause to control the advance requests which were funneled into UDF
   III, even over the objection of the developers.
          Obert, Greenlaw, and Jester testified in their own defense at the trial.
   They contended that these advances amounted to a process which they
   likened to refinancing a loan with common borrowers. Each time a fund

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   loaned money to another fund it received a specified amount of collateral that
   was worth more than the loan. Appellants further contended that the
   advances were beneficial because they allowed UDF IV and UDF V to garner
   collateralized loans that would generate interest and allowed UDF III to have
   its loan repaid so it could make distributions to investors and pay its own
   debts.
            Ultimately, as UDF’s auditor explained at trial, these advances made
   it appear as though UDF IV and UDF V had more notes receivable because
   it was issuing new loans, and it also made it appear as though UDF III’s loans
   were getting paid down successfully, when they were not. To further
   exacerbate these allegations, UDF’s SEC filings stated that UDF V would
   not engage in affiliate transactions3 and that the source of funds in UDF III
   would be “cash . . . from operations.” The Government’s theory was that
   the cash was not from operations, but from investors in UDF IV and UDF V
   that Appellants used to pay distributions to investors and to repay loans from
   banks. Moreover, according to the Government, affiliate transactions were
   exactly what Appellants conducted when they transferred money from one
   UDF fund to another, even though UDF V’s SEC filings stated that it
   “would not participate in any investments with . . . any of [its] affiliates.”
                  ii. Evidence of Other Sources Funding the Scheme
            Along with conducting undisclosed advances, jurors heard evidence
   that Jester and Wissink manipulated developers’ cash-flow statements before
   submitting them to auditors, which made the developers appear financially
   capable of paying off their loans earlier than projected. Appellants also used

            3
            The term “affiliate” is defined by the SEC as one “that directly, or indirectly
   through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common
   control with the issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1).

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   loan funds for unauthorized purposes and obtained loans from various banks
   that relied on UDF’s SEC filings when deciding whether to issue loans.
           Upon the conclusion of evidence, the district court delivered
   instructions to the jury. After which, they deliberated for “a day and a half”
   and found Appellants guilty of all charges. The trial lasted a total of seven
   days.
           B. Post Trial
           At the presentencing stage, the United States Probation Office
   collected various victim-impact statements and calculated that Appellants
   caused an “intended loss” of over one million dollars. The Government
   argued that this amount was properly calculated and sought restitution
   reflecting that loss. However, the district court rejected this request and
   determined that the Government failed to meet its burden to show that
   restitution should be imposed on Appellants as part of their sentence.
   Nevertheless, the district court still imposed an enhancement for intended
   loss and for substantial hardship caused to 25 or more victims.
           As a result, Greenlaw was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment,
   Wissink and Obert were sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, and Jester
   was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment. Appellants then filed motions
   for acquittal and for a new trial in which they challenged, inter alia, the jury
   instructions and several other issues they appeal herein. When those
   arguments proved unsuccessful before the district court, they appealed.
                                  II. Discussion
           A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
           “We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo,
   applying the same standard as applied by the district court: could a rational
   jury find that all elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable

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   doubt?” United States v. Chapman, 851 F.3d 363, 376 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation
   omitted). That means, rather than “reweigh the evidence,” we must “search
   the record for evidence to support the convictions beyond a reasonable
   doubt.” United States v. Swenson, 25 F.4th 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (quotations omitted). In doing so, we “view[] all evidence in the light most
   favorable to the government and draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of
   the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 598 (5th Cir. 2016)
   (citing United States v. Eghobor, 812 F.3d 352, 361–62 (5th Cir. 2015)). “This
   standard is ‘highly deferential to the verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
   Roetcisoender, 792 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2015)).
           Recall that Appellants were convicted of one count of conspiracy to
   commit wire fraud affecting a financial institution, in violation of 18
   U.S.C. § 1349 (18 U.S.C. § 1343); one count of conspiracy to commit
   securities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (18 U.S.C. § 1348); and eight
   counts of securities fraud and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18
   U.S.C. §§ 1348 & 2. Pertinent here, each conspiracy count requires that the
   act be completed with a specific “intent to defraud.”4 As for the substantive
   aiding and abetting securities fraud counts, the statutes both require, inter
   alia, that the act be completed with a specific “intent to defraud” and

           4
             “Conspiracy actually has two intent elements—intent to further the unlawful
   purpose and the level of intent required for proving the underlying substantive offense.”
   United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 699 (5th Cir. 2012). Because a “[v]iolation of the
   wire-fraud statute requires the specific intent to defraud, i.e., a conscious knowing intent
   to defraud[,] . . . proving conspiracy to commit wire fraud requires proof that [Appellants]
   joined the conspiracy with the specific intent to defraud.” Id. at 700 (internal quotation
   omitted). The same applies for the conspiracy to commit securities fraud count.

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   prohibit the execution of a “scheme to defraud.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1348;5
   United States v. Hussain, 972 F.3d 1138, 1145–46 (9th Cir. 2020).6
           We have described a scheme to defraud, as including “any false or
   fraudulent pretenses or representations intended to deceive others in order
   to obtain something of value, such as money, from the [entity] to be
   deceived.” United States v. Evans, 892 F.3d 692, 711–12 (5th Cir. 2018), as
   revised (July 6, 2018) (alteration in original); United States v. Scully, 951 F.3d
   656, 671 (5th Cir. 2020) (“To establish that [the defendant] engaged in a
   scheme to defraud, the Government must prove that he ‘made some kind of
   a false or fraudulent material misrepresentation.’” (quotation omitted)).
           As for the “intent to defraud” element, the Government must prove
   “an intent to (1) deceive, and (2) cause some harm to result from the deceit.”
   Evans, 892 F.3d at 712 (quotation omitted). This element is generally
   satisfied “when [a defendant] acts knowingly with the specific intent to
   deceive for the purpose of causing pecuniary loss to another or bringing about

           5
             Securities fraud prohibits executing a “scheme or artifice . . . to defraud any
   person in connection with any” U.S. registered security, 18 U.S.C. at § 1348(1), or “to
   obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money
   or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any” U.S. registered security,
   id. § 1348(2). The district court instructed the jury as to §§ 1348(1) and (2) and stated that
   they must agree on which prong Appellants were guilty under. Neither party argues that
   the applicable section is relevant to our analysis herein.
           6
              There is scant caselaw construing the securities fraud statute in this circuit.
   Nevertheless, section 1348 borrows key concepts from the mail and wire fraud statutes, and
   courts have given the terms similar treatment. See United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782,
   799 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Because section 1348 was modeled on the federal mail and wire fraud
   statutes, the district court certainly was on solid ground in looking to the pattern jury
   instruction for those offenses.”); United States v. Motz, 652 F. Supp. 2d 284, 296 (E.D.N.Y.
   2009) (“The parties agree that because the text and legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1348
   clearly establish that it was modeled on the mail and wire fraud statutes, the [c]ourt’s
   analysis should be guided by the caselaw construing those statutes.”).

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   some financial gain to himself.” Id. (quotation omitted); Scully, 951 F.3d at
   671.
          Appellants argue that (1) the Government failed to prove that they
   made material misrepresentations and (2) those misrepresentations were
   made with the intent to deprive investors of money or property. Separately,
   Jester argues (3) that the evidence failed to show that he had the requisite
   knowledge necessary to support his convictions. We address each argument
   in turn.
                 i. Material Misrepresentation
          “The essence of fraud is that its perpetrator has persuaded his victim
   to believe, beyond the dictates of reason or prudence, what is not so.” United
   States v. Perez-Ceballos, 907 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United
   States v. Church, 888 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1989)). As stated, this principle
   manifests under the “scheme to defraud” prong which requires that the
   defendant have “made some kind of a false or fraudulent material
   misrepresentation.” Scully, 951 F.3d at 671 (quotation omitted). A
   misrepresentation is material if “it ‘has a natural tendency to influence, or is
   capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it
   was addressed.’” United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 339 (5th Cir. 2008)
   (quoting United States v. Harms, 442 F.3d 367, 372 (5th Cir. 2006)).
          The Government’s principal allegation at trial was that Appellants
   used investor money from UDF IV and UDF V to pay distributions to UDF
   III investors and to repay loans from banks, and then lied about it to the
   investing public and the SEC. This allegation was based on two central
   alleged misrepresentations. First, the Government argued that Appellants
   represented on UDF III’s quarterly and annual filings that the source of
   distributions to UDF III investors and lenders would be “cash . . . from
   operations”—i.e., the “interest the developers were paying back on [their

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   UDF III loans].” But the Government asserted that the source of the funds
   was really “cash from investors in UDF IV and UDF V.” Second, the
   Government argued that Appellants represented in their UDF V filings and
   advertised in marketing presentations to brokers, dealers, and financial
   advisors that UDF V would not engage in affiliate transactions. However, the
   Government argued that the money movements from UDF V to UDF III to
   pay distributions and a bank loan constituted affiliate transactions because
   UDF controlled both sides of the transaction.
          Throughout the trial and again on appeal, Appellants contend that the
   money movement was loans to common borrowers, rather than affiliate
   transactions. According to them, as projects in UDF III’s portfolio reached
   later stages of development, UDF IV and UDF V provided subsequent
   financing to developers for specific projects to fund new phases of
   development. In such instances, the developer would become a common
   borrower because they would, for example, take out a loan from UDF III and
   later in the development process take out a loan from UDF IV and UDF V.
   Appellants argue that when it moved money from UDF IV and UDF V to
   UDF III, it was actually paying down the developer’s existing loan with UDF
   III. And in return, the lender, UDF IV or UDF V, obtained an enforceable
   security interest in collateral released through repayment to UDF III.
          As such, Appellants argue that the statements in UDF III’s SEC
   filings were not “false or fraudulent” because the money transferred to UDF
   III was the repayment of an existing UDF III borrower’s debt, and thus cash
   from operations. Moreover, they emphasize that the transactions were not
   between affiliates because they were between UDF and a common borrower,
   as the transferred funds were advanced to the same UDF III borrower
   pursuant to a collateralized loan from UDF IV and UDF V. They maintain
   that, although UDF V represented that it would not engage in certain
   transactions with “affiliates,” that term was ambiguous, not objectively false.

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   Further, they assert that UDF’s filings disclosed that it might “invest in
   multiple mortgage loans that share a common borrower.” Appellants
   therefore urge that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
   finding that they made false or fraudulent material misrepresentations
   beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
                         a. UDF III’s SEC Filings
          There is overwhelming evidence showing that the cash used to pay
   UDF III’s investors was not cash from operations as purported in its annual
   and quarterly SEC filings. One of the Government’s key witnesses, Scott
   Martinez, a forensic accountant at the FBI, exhibited a cash-tracing
   mechanism and generated a report showing that the source of the money—
   over $66 million of the UDF III distributions—was solely cash from investors
   in UDF IV and UDF V. Although Appellants’ witness, Dale Kitchens, a
   certified specialist in financial forensics, testified that the transactions were a
   legitimate business practice intended to pay common borrower’s loans, the
   jury was free to weigh the contrary evidence before it and our role is not to
   reweigh that evidence. See Swenson, 25 F.4th at 316.
          The record shows that Martinez’s cash-tracing testimony was heavily
   supported by emails from several UDF employees explaining that the
   purpose of the money movement was to afford UDF III’s distributions. For
   example, an email of a UDF employee showed that the advances were
   completed “to pay investor distributions so we can ensure it goes out today”
   and another stated that the “bottom line of the transaction was to get cash
   into UDF III in order to fund distributions.” From this evidence, a
   reasonable juror could conclude that the money was not transferred to pay a
   common developer’s loan as Appellants urge.
          Furthermore, Appellants fail to refute extensive evidence showing
   that they paid past due payments on a loan from Legacy Texas Bank using

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   investor money from UDF V and not interest from UDF III’s operations as
   represented in the SEC filings. Testimony revealed that, after Greenlaw and
   Wissink spoke with employees from the bank about the past due payment,
   Wissink and Jester worked together to approve two draw requests from UDF
   V to UDF III’s Legacy Texas bank account to pay the past due amount. This
   evidence exemplifies that their representations were not only false, but also
   material. See Lucas, 516 F.3d at 339–41. The undisclosed advances allowed
   Appellants to mask UDF III’s true financial health from the investing public,
   as the investors in UDF IV and UDF V, along with the re-investors in UDF
   III, believed that they were buying into a more successful fund. In fact,
   auditors testified that they were alarmed by this practice and it would have
   been salient information for their reports.
                          b. UDF V’s SEC Filings
          As to Appellants’ filings for UDF V, the statement—that it would not
   participate in affiliate transactions—is likewise materially false. The term
   “affiliate” is defined by the SEC as one “that directly, or indirectly through
   one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common
   control with the issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1). The term “control” is
   defined as “the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause
   the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through
   ownership     of    voting   securities,        by   contract   or     otherwise.”   17
   C.F.R. § 230.405. The jury was instructed on these definitions, and
   testimony further guided them in their interpretation and application of these
   terms at trial.
          The Government’s witness, Michael Wilson, UDF’s marketing
   director, explained that “an affiliate transaction is when one UDF fund
   would engage in a transaction directly with another UDF fund. So[,] a loan
   to another UDF fund or a profit participation in a loan to another UDF fund

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   or a credit enhancement to another UDF fund.” Thomas Carocci, an
   attorney for the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, described UDF III,
   IV, and V as affiliates and testified that transactions between them must be
   disclosed in SEC filings. Moreover, William Kahane, one UDF V’s own
   board members, testified that “[h]e would have considered money going
   from UDF V to UDF III to pay investors to be an affiliated transaction, and
   he would not have approved.” A reasonable juror could deduce from these
   explanations that UDF V’s transfer of money to UDF III to pay distributions
   was a “loan to another UDF fund,” and thus an affiliate transaction.7
           Appellants’ argument—that the Government failed to prove an
   objectively false statement—is debunked by the evidence. They rely on
   United States v. Harra, a case in which the Third Circuit reversed a false
   statement conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 985 F.3d 196, 225 (3d Cir.
   2021). It ultimately held that “in the face of ambiguous reporting
   requirements, . . . fair warning demands that the Government prove a
   defendant’s statement false under each objectively reasonable interpretation
   of the relevant requirements.” Id. at 211, 213. We see no reason to apply this
   false statement rule here. The term “affiliate” is not undisputedly
   ambiguous. Unlike the term analyzed in Harra, which had “no statutory or
   regulatory definitions illuminating the definition,” the term “affiliate” is
   expressly defined within the statutory and regulatory definitions. Id. at 206.
           Indeed, the defining factor in determining whether these transactions
   constituted affiliate transactions was control, and evidence revealed that
   UDF fully controlled the transaction on each end. Instead of developers
   prompting an advance when they needed money to fund a short-term special

           7
             Jurors also heard testimony that affiliate transactions were akin to “related-
   party” transactions and the terms were used interchangeably in the industry.

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   project, Appellants initiated the advances, determined the amount of these
   advances, and determined which developer would fund the transfer without
   any involvement from the developer. An email from an alarmed auditor
   explained the process:
                 UDF III needed money to pay distributions, UDF IV
                 sent them $1.2M. On UDF IV it was recorded as a
                 debit to [the developer’s] notes receivable and credit
                 to cash. On UDF III they recorded as a debit to cash
                 and credit to one of [the developer’s notes]. They
                 don’t get any kind of approval from [the developer]
                 before they do stuff like this.
   There is even evidence of instances where Appellants initiated an advance on
   the part of a developer who expressly requested that UDF stop the practice.
   Such evidence strongly supports a determination that UDF V’s statements
   were false.
          In the same vein, the evidence demonstrates that UDF V’s
   misrepresentations were material. See Lucas, 516 F.3d at 339. Multiple
   witnesses testified that the industry had shifted away from affiliate
   transactions because they were disfavored and that a no-affiliate-transaction
   policy in UDF V would enable it to participate in a larger network of broker,
   dealers, and investors. Appellants, specifically Greenlaw and Obert,
   participated in meetings with brokers, dealers, and financial advisors who
   represented UDF’s products to their retail investors. To garner business,
   they advertised that UDF V would not conduct affiliate transactions.
          Considering this evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
   light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable juror could have determined
   that Appellants made material misrepresentations in UDF III and UDF V’s
   filings that were sufficient to uphold their convictions. See Scully, 951 F.3d at
   671.

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                    ii. Intent to Deprive of Money or Property
           Appellants’ second argument is that there was insufficient evidence
   to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they intended to deprive the
   investors of money or property.8 Specifically, Appellants state that the
   “scheme to defraud” and “intent to defraud” elements require that a juror
   find not only that they intended to deceive, but also that they intended to
   deprive victims of money or property. According to Appellants, the
   Government introduced no evidence showing that any of the investors were
   harmed or that they intended to harm investors. Appellants emphasize that
   the “uncontradicted evidence establishe[d] that all three funds received
   significant value from the transactions at issue.” Specifically, Appellants
   assert that the advances benefited all involved, including the investors.
           The Government does not refute that it was required to prove that
   Appellants intended to deprive investors of money or property to satisfy
   these elements. It points to evidence that Appellants participated in a scheme
   to defraud investors of their money, emphasizing that when UDF III lacked
   sufficient money in its bank account to pay distributions to its investors, a
   mad scramble ensued moving money between funds. The Government
   further argues that Appellants’ concealment of these transactions from the

           8
             Greenlaw, Obert, and Jester make similar legal arguments regarding the
   Government’s failure to present sufficient evidence of a scheme to defraud and intent to
   defraud. Rather than advancing his own arguments on this issue, Wissink adopts the
   arguments of his co-appellants. Citing United States v. Umawa Oke Imo, the Government
   contends that we should refrain from considering these claims as to Wissink. See 739 F.3d
   226, 230 n.1 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 404 n.2 (5th Cir.
   2009) (“[S]ufficiency of the evidence challenges are fact-specific, so we will not allow the
   appellants to adopt those arguments.”)). Nevertheless, given our holding herein, that there
   was sufficient evidence to sustain each co-appellant’s convictions, we need not address
   whether Wissink’s adoption of their sufficiency challenges was permissible under our
   precedent.

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   investing public, its current investors, and auditors, demonstrates their intent
   to defraud. The Government points to evidence showing that because
   distributions were not tied to the funds’ actual performance, Appellants
   caused investors to believe that they were putting their money into a
   successful business when they were not.
          As an initial matter, Appellants are correct that the “scheme to
   defraud” and “intent to defraud” elements must be based on property
   interests. Although neither the wire nor securities fraud statutes provide a
   definition of what constitutes fraud, we are aided by an extensive line of cases
   construing these provisions from the Supreme Court and this court. These
   cases draw a fine line differentiating conduct that is merely deceitful, from
   conduct that “wrong[s] one in his property rights.” Cleveland v. United
   States, 531 U.S. 12, 19 (2000) (citation omitted) (explaining that the fraud
   statutes “protect[] property rights only”). Only the latter falls within the
   “common understanding” of defraud. Id. (citation omitted). This is not a
   new principle, though recent Supreme Court cases have brought it to the
   forefront.
          In Kelly v. United States, the Court relied on its 1987 decision in
   McNally for the proposition that fraud statutes are “‘limited in scope to the
   protection of property rights.’” 140 S. Ct. 1565, 1571 (2020) (quoting
   McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)). In doing so, the Court
   reversed the wire fraud convictions of defendants that “used deception to
   reduce the city’s access lanes to the George Washington Bridge” for political
   gain. Id. at 1574. It explained that the Government had to prove “not only
   that [the defendants] engaged in deception, but that an object of their fraud
   was property.” Id. at 1571 (cleaned up). Because commandeering the bridge
   did not deprive victims of their “property,” the defendant’s actions were not
   a crime under the fraud statutes. Id. at 1572.

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           Likewise, in Shaw v. United States, the Supreme Court remanded a
   case involving the bank fraud statute for the Ninth Circuit to determine
   whether the jury instructions were erroneous. See 580 U.S. 63, 72 (2016).
   The instructions defined a “scheme to defraud” as “any deliberate plan of
   action or course of conduct by which someone intends to deceive, cheat, or
   deprive a financial institution of something of value.” Id. Although the Court
   did not decide the question, it stated that it agreed with the parties that “the
   scheme must be one to deceive the bank and deprive it of something of
   value.” Id. (emphasis in original).
           Our caselaw has also consistently modeled this principle. See United
   States v. Hoeffner, 626 F.3d 857, 863 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (explaining
   that the mail and wire fraud statutes’ proscriptions reach schemes to deprive
   another person of “money or property by means of false or fraudulent
   pretenses, representations or promises” (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343));
   United States v. Ratcliff, 488 F.3d 639, 645 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming the
   district court’s order dismissing an indictment where it alleged only deceitful
   conduct and failed to allege a scheme that wronged the victim’s property
   rights); United States v. McMillan, 600 F.3d 434, 449 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The
   issue is whether the victims’ property rights were affected by the
   misrepresentations.”).9 As applied to this case, the Government was
   required to prove that the scheme was one in which Appellants intended to
   deprive the investors of money or property through misrepresentations,
   thereby wronging the investors’ property rights. See Ratcliff, 488 F.3d at 645.
   We hold that it met its burden.

           9
            See also United States v. Godwin, 566 F.2d 975, 976 (5th Cir. 1978) (explaining in
   the context of a false statements conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 that deception and
   defrauding “are not synonymous” because to “[d]eceive is to cause to believe the false or
   to mislead [whereas] [d]efraud is to deprive of some right, interest or property by deceit”).

                                                17
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          Evidence strongly supports a finding that Appellants intended to
   conduct a scheme to deprive investors of their money. There is proof that
   they purposefully advertised a desired rate of return to brokers and continued
   to solicit investors to invest their money into UDF III despite knowing that
   UDF III did not have enough money to sustain its current investors.
   Evidence also shows that they purposefully did not invest UDF IV and UDF
   V investors’ money into the business or otherwise use the money to further
   fund developer’s projects. Their intention is further displayed through
   several emails evincing that they were aware that they needed to use new
   investor money to fund their distributions or risk deterring current investors
   from selling stock and new investors from buying stock. A rational trier of
   fact could readily infer from this evidence that new investor money was the
   object of Appellants’ operation because it was only after the money was
   transferred that they were able to pay distributions to UDF III investors. See
   Chapman, 851 F.3d at 376.
          Along with evidence of the undisclosed advances, there is evidence
   that Appellants used bank loans for unapproved purposes and masked the
   developers’ financial health by manipulating the developers’ cash-flow
   statements prior to submitting it to their auditors. By concealing information,
   investors were lured into investing in a business that could not pay its
   distributions in 53 out of the 60 months relevant here. We also agree with the
   Government that Appellants’ concealment of these actions provide support
   for an inference of intent. Scully, 951 F.3d at 671; see United States v. Dobbs,
   63 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that evidence of a defendant’s
   attempt to conceal his actions can support an inference of intent to defraud).
          Jurors also saw that this operation was dependent on each co-
   appellant. For example, they saw an email from Wissink instructing a UDF
   employee to “advance $1.75 million” from UDF IV to UDF III, adding:
   “This will cover the distribution for Monday.” One UDF employee testified

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                                     No. 22-10511

   that Wissink regularly told him to carry out such advance requests. As
   another UDF employee explained: “The bottom line of the transaction was
   to get cash into UDF III in order to fund distributions.” Along with Wissink,
   Jester also directed most of these advances, with Obert included on many of
   the emails. Moreover, during cross-examination, Obert admitted that she
   knew UDF personnel initiated the advance requests and that she was aware
   of this practice of using advance requests to transfer money between UDF
   entities.
          In fact, Obert and Greenlaw signed all of the SEC filings which
   concealed the true source of UDF III’s funds and misrepresented the funds’
   performance. Based on this avalanche of evidence, a rational trier of fact
   could infer that Appellants participated in a scheme to obtain something of
   value—namely, money. See United States v. Jonas, 824 F. App’x 224, 232
   (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding that a reasonable jury
   could infer that the defendant engaged in a scheme to defraud where he used
   misrepresentations “to obtain money from the investors”).
          Appellants’ arguments fail to overcome the sufficient evidence at
   hand. First, their characterization of these acts as normal business
   transactions that benefited the investors is unpersuasive. They emphasize
   that Martinez admitted that he did not assess the economic rationale for the
   transactions or the value of the collateral that secured the loans from UDF
   IV and UDF V. But even if we assumed that evidence of an economic benefit
   to UDF funds would somehow refute that investors were deprived of their
   money, a jury was entitled to reject that evidence and instead credit the
   contrary testimony of the Government’s witnesses. See Scully, 951 F.3d at
   671 (citing United States v. Spalding, 894 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 2018)).
          Second, the fraud convictions are not undermined by the fact that the
   Government did not present evidence showing that investors incurred

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   monetary loss. This is because success of the scheme is immaterial. Take
   Shaw for example. There, the Supreme Court rejected a bank-fraud
   defendant’s argument that “he did not intend to cause the bank financial
   harm.” 580 U.S. at 67. In that case, it was known that “due to standard
   business practices in place at the time of the fraud, no bank involved in the
   scheme ultimately suffered any monetary loss.” Id. The Court reasoned that
   it is “sufficient that the victim . . . be deprived of its right to use of the
   property, even if it ultimately did not suffer unreimbursed loss.” Id. at 67–68
   (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26–27 (1987)); see id. at 68
   (“[W]here cash is taken from a bank but the bank is fully insured, the theft is
   complete when the cash is taken; the fact that the bank has a contract with an
   insurance company enabling it to shift the loss to that company is
   immaterial.” (cleaned up)).
           It follows that Appellants’ argument is unconvincing.10 It does not
   matter that UDF IV and UDF V had collateral on the loans that it transferred
   to UDF III. Nor does it matter that they did not intend to cause investors
   financial loss. See Shaw, 580 U.S. at 67 (“[T]he [fraud] statute, while
   insisting upon ‘a scheme to defraud,’ demands neither a showing of ultimate
   financial loss nor a showing of intent to cause financial loss.”). Appellants
   exposed investors to risks and losses that, if publicly disclosed, would have
   decreased its value and investment power. That is enough to support a fraud
   conviction. See United States v. McCauley, 253 F.3d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 2001);

           10
              For similar reasons, we need not address Appellants’ argument that they lacked
   an intent to deprive investors of money or property because investors were given exactly
   what they bargained for. See United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir.), as
   rev’d (Oct. 3, 2016), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016).
   Investors were exposed to a risk of loss because they thought they were buying into a
   business that was performing well but UDF III was not profitable enough to afford its
   distributions.

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   United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1519 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
   fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions and lenders to risk
   of loss even though the loan was “secured, and [defendants] assumed a legal
   obligation to repay it.”).
          Lastly, Appellants argue that the Government failed to show that they
   affected investors’ property rights because it improperly argued that they
   deprived UDF investors of accurate information about UDF III’s financial
   health. The Government does not refute that it relied on this theory; it
   instead argues that the accurate information theory was subsidiary to its trial
   theory, i.e., that “Appellants defrauded the investing public and their own
   shareholders with the intent to obtain tangible property—money—from
   investors in the later funds to pay distributions on the earlier funds.”
          In making this argument, Appellants highlight the Ninth Circuit’s
   decision in United States v. Yates which held that “[t]here is no cognizable
   property interest in the ethereal right to accurate information.” 16 F.4th 256,
   265 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation omitted). The Ninth Circuit
   explained that if it were to “recogniz[e] accurate information as property,”
   that “would transform all deception into fraud.” Id. This is because “[b]y
   definition, deception entails depriving the victim of accurate information
   about the subject of the deception.” Id. We agree with this interpretation of
   the accurate information theory. As a matter of logic, to deprive someone of
   accurate information is to deprive them of the truth, i.e., to deceive. See
   United States v. Sadler, 750 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that it
   cannot “plausibly be said that the right to accurate information amounts to

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                                           No. 22-10511

   an interest that ‘has long been recognized as property.’” (quoting Cleveland,
   531 U.S. at 23)).11
            Nonetheless, the foremost scheme alleged here was for the
   Appellants to obtain money from investors, and the Government’s mountain
   of evidence supporting this theory is sufficient, regardless of the invalidity of
   its subsidiary theory. See United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 437–38 (5th
   Cir. 2009) (upholding verdict upon finding that it did not rest on an
   insufficient legal theory). Accordingly, we are convinced that the evidence is
   sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt from which a rational jury could infer
   that Appellants participated in a scheme to defraud and acted with an intent
   to defraud investors of their money. See Chapman, 851 F.3d at 376.
                    iii. Jester’s Knowledge
           Jester separately asserts that he did not have the requisite knowledge
   to support his convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to
   commit securities fraud, and aiding and abetting securities fraud. Along with
   a specific intent to defraud, to prove a conspiracy the Government must

           11
              When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ciminelli v. United States,
   Appellants filed a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) letter asserting that the case
   supported their “scheme to defraud” and “intent to defraud” arguments. 143 S. Ct. 1121
   (2023). In Ciminelli, the Court held that “[t]he right to valuable economic information
   needed to make discretionary economic decisions is not a traditional property interest”
   and, thus, a victim’s right to control their assets was not a legally valid theory of fraud. Id.
   at 1128. In response, the Government argued that Ciminelli does not impact this case
   because, unlike the prosecution there, the Government here did not rely on the right-to-
   control theory at trial. Likewise, Appellants do not identify any evidence that the theory
   was ever advanced or proven at trial. In fact, Appellants describe the right-to-control theory
   as a theory of fraud that was “more demanding than anything proven or instructed” in this
   case. Because we cannot alter a jury verdict based on a legal theory that was never tried
   before the jury, we reject Appellants’ contention that Ciminelli applies in this case. See
   McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 270 n.8 (1991) (stating that an appellate court
   may not “retr[y] a case on appeal under different instructions and on a different theory
   than was ever presented to the jury”).

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   prove that “(1) two or more persons made an agreement to commit an
   unlawful act; (2) the defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement;
   and (3) the defendant joined in the agreement willfully, with the intent to
   further the unlawful purpose.” United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539, 547
   (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 643 (5th Cir.
   2012)); see also Brooks, 681 F.3d at 699.
          Jester’s principal contention is that the Government’s case is built on
   two central misrepresentations in UDF V and UDF III’s SEC filings, but,
   because of his position as the director of asset management, he did not have
   any knowledge of the SEC filings or of its contents. We are unpersuaded and
   will not reverse a conviction for “lack of evidence that [he] knew each detail
   of the conspiracy.” United States v. Vergara, 687 F.2d 57, 61 (5th Cir. 1982)
   (citing United States v. Rosado-Fernandez, 614 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1980)).
   Rather, “knowledge may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.”
   Simpson, 741 F.3d at 547; United States v. Sanders, 952 F.3d 263, 273 (5th Cir.
   2020) (“[A] jury can infer from the surrounding circumstances whether a
   defendant participated in and knew of the conspiracy.”).
          Reviewing what is now familiar, the evidence at trial established that
   Jester’s role was prevalent in several parts of the overall scheme in at least
   three central ways. Jester directed many of the undisclosed advance
   transactions at issue; he manipulated developer’s cash flow projection
   spreadsheets by inflating their amount of development projects to make it
   appear as though developers were paying off their loans quicker; and he
   directed that money from loans be used to pay UDF III investor’s
   distributions. Put simply, Jester’s actions were the lifeline to the
   misrepresentations at issue here. See United States v. Thompson, 761 F. App’x
   283, 291 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished) (determining that
   “repeated exposure to the fraud” was probative of the defendant’s
   knowledge). Moreover, during his testimony he revealed that he knew that

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                                     No. 22-10511

   the spreadsheet with the inflated projected cash-flow spreadsheets were
   “going to an independent auditor that was going to rely upon it for its audit
   of the financial statements.”
          His knowledge about the unlawfulness of the scheme also emanates
   from his leadership in the fraudulent actions and his propensity to commit
   deceitful acts that were outside of UDF’s general practice, such as directing
   the undisclosed advances when UDF III had insufficient funds and
   misapplying investor money when UDF was behind on loan payments. See
   United States v. Willett, 751 F.3d 335, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2014) (determining
   that a “position of authority” was probative of knowledge). He also played a
   role in concealing UDF III’s true financial condition. For example, in August
   2013, Jester suggested that distributions could be funded from a UDF loan
   and told a UDF asset manager to “remember to fix this once we finalize some
   of the new deals.” See United States v. Martinez, 921 F.3d 452, 470 (5th Cir.
   2019) (“[E]fforts to assist in the concealment of a conspiracy may help
   support an inference that an alleged conspirator had joined the conspiracy
   while it was still in operation.”) (citation omitted)).
          Despite the prevalence of Jester’s actions throughout this case, he
   analogizes the evidence here to that which was insufficient to show that the
   defendant acted “knowingly and willfully” in United States v. Nora, 988 F.3d
   823 (5th Cir. 2021). Jester asserts that, like the defendant in Nora, although
   he was entangled in the fraudulent transactions, he did not know about the
   specific misrepresentations in the filings as he merely “performed his job
   duties without visibility into that separate part of UDF’s business.” In Nora,
   we held that generalized evidence that a staff member received training on
   compliance which would have alerted him to the unlawful nature of his work
   was insufficient to support his health care fraud and kickback scheme
   convictions. 988 F.3d at 831–34. The evidence here is a far cry from the slim
   evidence in Nora. Here, there is evidence that Jester was present in meetings

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                                    No. 22-10511

   with developers, bank personnel and co-appellants, and had a key role in
   developing the documentation that the auditors relied upon for their reports
   to the SEC. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the knowledge
   element of Jester’s conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud
   convictions. See United States v. Scott, 892 F.3d 791, 797–98 (5th Cir. 2018).
          The analysis is similar for Jester’s aiding and abetting securities fraud
   counts. Id. at 799 (“Typically, the same evidence will support both a
   conspiracy and an aiding and abetting conviction.”). Aiding and abetting “is
   not a separate offense, but it is an alternative charge in every indictment,
   whether explicit or implicit.” United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 633 (5th
   Cir. 1992). It is therefore “not necessary that [Jester] commit the overt acts
   that . . . accomplish the offense or that he have knowledge of the particular
   means his principals . . . employ to carry out the criminal activity.” United
   States v. Austin, 585 F.2d 1271, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978). There likewise does not
   need to “be proof ‘that the defendant was present when the crime was
   committed or that he actively participated therein.’” Sanders, 952 F.3d at 277
   (quoting United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1015 (5th Cir. 1976)). “[T]he
   government need only establish that [he] ‘assisted the actual perpetrator of
   the [fraud] while sharing the requisite criminal intent.’” Stalnaker, 571 F.3d
   at 437 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 295 F.3d 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2002)).
   Considering the “extremely deferential review of jury verdicts,” the
   Government has met this standard as to the aiding and abetting securities
   fraud counts as well. Nora, 988 F.3d at 834; see Stalnaker, 571 F.3d at 437.
          B. Jury Instructions
          Appellants advance two issues pertaining to the jury instructions.
   They argue that the district court (1) misstated elements of the law and (2)

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                                     No. 22-10511

   abused its discretion in denying a proposed instruction. We address each
   argument in turn.
                 i. Misstatement of Law
          First, Appellants argue that even if this court determines that there
   was sufficient evidence to support the “scheme to defraud” and “intent to
   defraud” elements, they deserve a new trial because the district court’s
   instructions defining those elements were incorrect. They insist that the
   instructions did not require the jury to determine that they intended to
   deprive investors of money or property.
          This issue is one of statutory construction, which we review de novo.
   United States v. Gas Pipe, Inc., 997 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2021). “Generally,
   failure to instruct the jury on every essential element of the offense is error.”
   United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir. 1993). That error is then
   “subject to harmless error” review. Gas Pipe, Inc., 997 F.3d at 236 (citation
   omitted). “Erroneous jury instructions are harmless if a court, after a
   thorough examination of the record, is able to conclude beyond a reasonable
   doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.”
   United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 828 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal
   quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,
   501–02 (1987).
          Before the trial, Appellants requested jury instructions which stated
   that a “‘scheme to defraud’ [was] a plan intended to deprive another of
   money or property” and that a “‘specific intent to defraud’ [was] a willful,
   conscious, knowing intent to cheat someone out of money or property.” The
   district court rejected their request and instead relied on language in the Fifth

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                                          No. 22-10511

   Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions.12 The district court instructed the
   jury that:
           A “scheme to defraud” means any plan, pattern, or course of
           action intended to deprive another of money or property or
           bring about some financial gain to the person engaged in the
           scheme . . . [and]
           A “specific intent to defraud” means a conscious, knowing
           intent to deceive or cheat someone.
   See Fifth Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 2.57 (2019)
   (emphasis added).
           Appellants objected to these instructions before the district court.
   Specifically, they argued that in both charges, the second clause after the
   disjunctive “or” results in a misstatement of the law. See Shaw, 580 U.S. at
   72. They further argued that a case in this circuit applying the same jury
   instruction was distinguishable, see United States v. Baker, 923 F.3d 390, 402–
   03 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2565 (2020), and emphasized that
   other circuits have changed their pattern jury instructions after the Supreme
   Court’s decision in Kelly clarified that the focus of the inquiry is property
   rights. These objections were overruled with little to no discussion. On
   appeal, Appellants expound on the same arguments, stating that the current
   model jury instructions for a “scheme to defraud” and “intent to defraud”
   are “inconsistent” with the law.
           Model jury instructions are only proper if they are a “correct
   statement of the law.” United States v. Toure, 965 F.3d 393, 403 (5th Cir.

           12
              After the jury convicted Appellants, they moved for a new trial and reasserted
   their objections to the definitions of “scheme to defraud” and “intent to defraud” in the
   jury instructions on the same grounds argued in this appeal. The district court denied their
   motion in a brief order concluding that the jury instructions were proper.

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   2020) (citing United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 354 (5th Cir. 2009)).
   As explained supra, under the fraud statutes, the proper question is “whether
   the victims’ property rights were affected by the misrepresentations.”
   McMillan, 600 F.3d at 449. Our next step then is to determine whether the
   “scheme to defraud” and “intent to defraud” instructions were aligned with
   our interpretation of the fraud statute’s required inquiry.
          As to the “intent to defraud” instruction, we agree with Appellants
   that the disjunctive “or” makes it a misstatement of law. Under a plain
   reading of the instruction given, the jury could find that the Government
   proved an “intent to defraud” if Appellants merely exhibited a “conscious,
   knowing intent to deceive . . . someone.” But we have already explained that
   deception is not synonymous with depriving another of their property
   interests. The Government provides no argument refuting this construction
   of the intent to defraud language which is directly at odds with our caselaw
   holding that a jury cannot convict a defendant under the fraud statutes based
   on deceit alone. Indeed, it has long been our understanding that an “‘intent
   to defraud’ requires ‘an intent to (1) deceive, and (2) cause some harm to
   result from the deceit.’” Evans, 892 F.3d at 712 (emphasis added) (quoting
   United States v. Moser, 123 F.3d 813, 820 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting in turn
   United States v. Jimenez, 77 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1996))); Ratcliff, 488 F.3d at
   645–49.
          We find support for our interpretation of the “deceive or cheat”
   construction when reviewing our sister circuits’ decisions analyzing similar
   challenges. See United States v. Miller, 953 F.3d 1095, 1101–04 (9th Cir.
   2020). In line with then-existing Ninth Circuit pattern instructions, the
   district court in Miller charged the jury “that, to be guilty of wire fraud, a
   defendant must have acted with the intent to ‘deceive or cheat.’” Id. at 1101.
   (emphasis in original). On appeal, the defendant argued that this instruction

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   misstated the law.13 Id. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that several of its
   cases applying that instruction “were no longer tenable in light of the
   Supreme Court’s intervening ruling” in Shaw. Id. at 1102; 580 U.S. at 72. It
   thus held “that wire fraud requires the intent to deceive and cheat—in other
   words, to deprive the victim of money or property by means of deception.”
   Miller, 953 F.3d at 1103 (emphasis in original).
           Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Takhalov is consistent
   with our view here. 827 F.3d at 1312, 1314. In that case, the defendants tricked
   men to come into their bars and nightclubs by hiring “[women] to pose as
   tourists, locate visiting businessmen, and lure them” in. Id. at 1310. The
   defendants asked the district court to instruct the jury that the “[f]ailure to
   disclose the financial arrangement between the [women] and the Bar, in and
   of itself, [was] not sufficient to convict a defendant of any offense[.]” Id. at
   1314. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the defendant’s instruction was
   a correct statement of the law and rejected the Government’s attempt to
   instruct the “jurors that they could convict only if they found that the
   defendants had schemed to lie about the quality or price of the goods sold to
   the [men].” Id. It therefore made clear that a defendant “cannot be convicted
   of wire fraud on the basis of [a] lie alone . . . [because] deceiving is a necessary
   condition of defrauding but not a sufficient one.” Id. at 1312, 1314.
           Appellants point to these decisions as persuasive authority and we
   agree with our sister circuit’s interpretation of similar instructions of an

           13
             The Ninth Circuit recognized that it was not the “the only circuit that uses the
   ‘deceive or cheat’ language” and cited a case recognizing that, at the time, the Third, Fifth,
   Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had this language too. Miller, 953 F.3d at 1102 (citing
   United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled by Miller, 953 F.3d
   at 1102).

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   intent to defraud.14 This element is present in each count of this case, and
   when confronted with this instruction, a reasonable juror could conclude that
   evidence of Appellants’ misrepresentations and lies alone obligated the jury
   to infer an intent to defraud. Because deception, alone, will not suffice, the
   intent to “deceive or cheat” instruction was erroneous. See Miller, 953 F.3d
   at 1103.
           Our analysis under the “scheme to defraud” instruction, however, is
   much less clear. Appellants argue that, under a plain reading, the jury could
   find that the Government proved a “scheme to defraud” if Appellants
   executed a “plan . . . intended to . . . bring about some financial gain to the
   person engaged in the scheme.” They further assert that this instruction is
   inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Kelly. 140 S. Ct. at
   1574. But the Government rejects this perspective and counters that the
   second phrase after the disjunctive “or” simply modifies the first phrase
   because “[d]epriving a victim of a property right and obtaining financial gain
   from fraud are two sides of the same coin.” Moreover, the Government
   highlights that this court approved of an instruction with identical language
   in Baker, 923 F.3d at 402–03, and this court has relied on Baker and similar
   “financial gain” language even after Kelly.
           As an initial matter, we recognize, as the Government points out, that
   this court has long embraced the notion that an “[i]ntent to defraud exists if

           14
              This requirement is crucial especially considering recent decisions in Shaw and
   Kelly, in which the Supreme Court has urged courts to prevent fraud convictions based on
   deceit alone or convictions that affect by their very nature the victim’s property rights.
   Notably, after Miller and Takhalov, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit changed their intent to
   defraud instruction to clarify this notion. See Takhalov, 827 F.3d at 1309; Miller, 953 F.3d
   at 1101–04; see also Judicial Council of the United States Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Eleventh
   Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal Cases § O51 (2022); Ninth Circuit Jury
   Instructions Committee, Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District
   Courts of the Ninth Circuit § 15.35 (2022).

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   the defendant acts knowingly with the specific intent to deceive for the
   purpose of causing financial loss to another or bringing about some financial
   gain to himself.” Jimenez, 77 F.3d at 97 (citing United States v. St. Gelais, 952
   F.2d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also Evans, 892 F.3d at 712 (same); Moser,
   123 F.3d at 820 (same); United States v. Akpan, 407 F.3d 360, 370 (5th Cir.
   2005) (same); Scully, 951 F.3d at 671 (same). This statement is often
   construed alongside, and read as consistent with, the understanding that
   “[n]ot only must a defendant intend to defraud or deceive, but he must
   intend for some harm to result from the deceit.” St. Gelais, 952 F.2d at 95;
   Evans, 892 F.3d at 712. Moreover, we have explained that a “scheme to
   defraud” is sufficient “insofar as victims were left without money that they
   otherwise would have possessed.” Baker, 923 F.3d at 405 (quoting McMillan,
   600 F.3d at 449). In Baker, when interpreting a “scheme to defraud”
   instruction with identical language, we held that it “allowed for a conviction
   if [the defendant] intended to deceive the victims out of their money for his
   own financial benefit.” Id.
          Nevertheless, after our review of the arguments and the
   accompanying caselaw, we decline to decide herein whether the “scheme to
   defraud” instruction was erroneous, as we have done with the “intent to
   defraud” instruction. Even if the instruction was another error, the error is
   harmless regardless. See United States v. Barraza, 655 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir.
   2011). Established jurisprudence makes clear that the relevant question of
   our harmless analysis is whether the record “is clear beyond a reasonable
   doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the
   error.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999). Put another way, an error
   in the jury instructions is harmless if it does not “contribute to the verdict
   obtained.” Id. at 15; see also Stanford, 823 F.3d at 828.
          Thus, we proceed to examine the harmless error standard established
   in Neder. The instant case involved four defendants tried in a seven-day trial.

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   The record on appeal is 255 volumes and 160 supplemental volumes. Having
   thoroughly examined the record in this case, this court is convinced that a
   rational jury would have found the defendants guilty absent the erroneous
   instruction. Cf. United States v. Skilling, 638 F.3d 480, 483–88 (5th Cir. 2011)
   (holding that one erroneous jury instruction was harmless error because
   multiple pieces of “overwhelming” evidence proved guilt under a valid
   instruction).
          Accordingly, “even if the jury had been properly instructed, . . . we
   are certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would still have found
   that” Appellants met the “scheme to defraud” and “intent to defraud”
   elements. United States v. Allende-Garcia, 407 F. App’x 829, 836 (5th Cir.
   2011) (unpublished). Because any error “did not contribute to the verdict
   obtained,” Neder, 527 U.S. at 15 (quotation omitted), “the conviction can
   stand.” United States v. Foster, 229 F.3d 1196, 1197 (5th Cir. 2000).
                   ii. Requested Falsity Instruction
          Appellants next argue that the district court abused its discretion by
   rejecting their proposed falsity instruction. This argument is unpersuasive.
   “We ‘review challenges to jury instructions for abuse of discretion and afford
   the trial court great latitude in the framing and structure of jury
   instructions.’” Matter of 3 Star Properties, L.L.C., 6 F.4th 595, 609 (5th Cir.
   2021) (quoting Young v. Bd. of Supervisors, 927 F.3d 898, 904 (5th Cir. 2019)).
   In doing so, “we must test the instructions given not against those [that the
   defendant] requested—for a criminal defendant lacks the right to have [his
   or her] requests adopted word for word—but against the law.” United States
   v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095, 1097 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). “[A] trial
   judge’s refusal to deliver a requested instruction constitutes reversible error
   only if three conditions exist: (1) the instruction is substantively correct; (2)
   it is not substantially covered in the charge actually given to the jury; and (3)

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   it concerns an important point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously
   impairs the defendant’s ability to present a given defense effectively.” Id.
   (citation omitted). We have interpreted this to mean that “an abuse of
   discretion occurs only when the failure to give a requested instruction serves
   to prevent the jury from considering the defendant’s defense.” Id.
          Appellants requested that the district court instruct the jury that “[a]
   statement of reasonable opinion is not a false statement.” Appellants again
   cite the Third Circuit’s decision in Harra, see supra Part II.1.A, for the
   proposition that the Government has a burden to prove that its interpretation
   of Appellants’ misrepresentations in the SEC filings were “the only
   reasonable interpretation[s].” 985 F.3d at 216 (quotation omitted). The
   district court denied Appellants’ request because it determined that the rest
   of the charge adequately covered the issue.
          Consistent with the Fifth Circuit pattern instructions, the district
   court instructed the jury that “[a] representation is ‘false’ if it is known to be
   untrue or it is made with reckless indifference as to its truth or falsity” and
   “would also be ‘false’ if it constitutes a half truth, or effectively omits or
   conceals a material fact, provided it is made with the intent to defraud.” 15
   Appellants argue that their requested instruction was not adequately covered
   by the other instructions given by the district court. Specifically, they take
   issue with the district court stating that a true statement is “false” whenever
   it is “made with reckless indifference as to its truth or falsity.” They
   emphasize that “[u]nder [these] instructions it made no difference that
   reasonable minds could deem the disputed statements accurate, or even
   whether they were accurate—so long as the defendants were ‘reckless.’”

          15
               See Fifth Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 2.57 (2019).

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          The Government, on the other hand, argues that the district court did
   not commit reversible error in denying Appellants’ request because they
   thoroughly argued throughout trial that there was a reasonable difference of
   opinion as to whether the relevant representations were false.” As support,
   the Government cites to United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 705 n.22, 708
   n.26 (5th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Gray, 751 F.2d 733, 736–37 (5th Cir.
   1985) and contends that the district court allowed Appellants to provide
   evidence of their reasonable-opinion defense and testimony explaining that
   they did not believe that the transactions at issue were affiliate transactions.
          In Gray, the defendant argued that the district court “erred in refusing
   his requested good-faith instruction.” 751 F.2d at 736. On review, this court
   acknowledged that the defendant had ample opportunity to present evidence
   regarding his good faith during the trial to support his defense that he lacked
   the requisite intent to defraud his customers. This court held that the district
   court’s refusal to give the instruction was not error. Id. at 737. It concluded:
          Taken together, the trial, charge, and closing argument laid
          Gray’s theory squarely before the jury. The court’s charge
          enabled the jury to recognize and understand the defense
          theory, test it against the evidence presented at trial, and then
          make a definitive decision whether, based on that evidence and
          in light of the defense theory, the defendant was guilty or not
          guilty
   Id. at 736–37 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
          Like in Gray, Appellants had ample opportunity to present their
   reasonable opinion defense to the jury and they did so “through evidence,
   closing arguments, or other jury instructions.” United States v. Williams, 774
   F. App’x 247, 248 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished). In fact, on
   direct examination, one of UDF’s auditors testified that affiliate transactions
   were “a judgmental area.” On cross, Appellants questioned him about that

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   statement, and the auditor responded in the affirmative when asked whether
   his statement meant that “reasonable accountants both acting in good faith
   could reach a conclusion that is different regarding whether a particular
   transaction is an [affiliate] transaction.” Appellants also elicited testimony of
   this nature from at least two other auditors that were before the jury.
          Further, as mentioned supra, Appellants brought a witness, Kitchens,
   to testify that UDF V’s money transfers to UDF III were not affiliate
   transactions because they were transactions amongst common borrowers. See
   supra Part II.A.i.a. Moreover, during their closing arguments, Appellants
   concluded based on the culmination of the trial that there was a reasonable
   difference of opinion as to whether the representations in the SEC filings
   were false. In one instance, they stated:
          [Affiliate transactions are] an area where reasonable people,
          objective people, acting in good faith could look at the same
          transaction and reach a different conclusion . . . They are not
          [affiliate] transactions. But even if there was testimony going
          both ways, you could still have all of the executives acting in
          good faith. Why? Because it’s an area of judgment. [The
          Government] cannot get there on the evidence because of this.
          Lastly, the district court presented to the jury a good-faith instruction
   stating:
          In determining whether or not a defendant acted with criminal
          intent to defraud or deceive, you may consider whether or not
          the defendant had a good faith belief that what he or she was
          doing was legal. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or
          not the defendant had a good faith belief that what he or she
          was doing was legal, you must acquit the defendant and say so
          by your verdict [of] not guilty.
   This instruction aided in supporting the crux of Appellants’ argument, which
   is that they were operating under that good faith belief that the transactions

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                                    No. 22-10511

   were not “affiliate” transactions, and such was possible because reasonable
   opinions could differ in good faith on the interpretation of the term. See
   Lucas, 516 F.3d at 324 (holding that the district court did not abuse its
   discretion in omitting a requested instruction because the instructions
   substantially covered the defendants requested instructions).
          Accordingly, even though the district court denied Appellants’
   requested instruction on falsity, they were able to argue that reasonable
   opinions could differ on the misrepresentations through evidence,
   arguments, and other jury instructions. See Williams, 774 F. App’x at 248
   (“Williams has not shown the omission of his requested instruction impaired
   his good-faith defense because he raised the defense in several ways during
   trial.” (citations omitted)). Thus, we hold that the district court did not err
   in denying the addition of Appellants’ reasonable opinion charge. See id.
          C. Cross-Examination
          Appellants next assert that the district court improperly limited their
   cross-examination regarding a non-testifying informant in violation of their
   constitutional rights. We review alleged constitutional violations of the Sixth
   Amendment’s Confrontation Clause de novo. See United States v. Bell, 367
   F.3d 452, 465 (5th Cir. 2004). Likewise, we review “alleged violations of a
   defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense de novo.”
   United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 2008) (emphasis
   omitted). Both claims, however, are subject to harmless error review. See
   Bell, 367 F.3d at 465. And if no constitutional violation has occurred, “we
   review a district court’s limitation on cross-examination for an abuse of
   discretion, which requires a showing that the limitations were clearly
   prejudicial.” Skelton, 514 F.3d at 438.

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          Kyle Bass was the initial informant that contacted the FBI to provide
   information about UDF, which helped prompt the FBI’s investigation.16
   Appellants argue that the district court’s decision to exclude evidence of
   Bass’s role in the Government’s investigation violated their constitutional
   right to present a complete defense and cross-examine key witnesses. They
   contend that Bass’s testimony would have invalidated the prosecution’s star
   witness, Martinez, by demonstrating that his cash-tracing report was tainted
   by Bass’s biased version of Appellants’ actions. We disagree.
          We have explained that a defendant’s right to present a complete
   defense and cross-examine witnesses are “closely related.” United States v.
   Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2008). While these two rights are
   “essential,” they are still subject to limitations. See United States v. Mizell,
   88 F.3d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that these protections are
   “limited and must be weighed against the countervailing interests in the
   integrity of the adversary process . . . the interest in the fair and efficient
   administration of justice . . . and the potential prejudice to the truth-
   determining function of the trial process”) (internal quotations and citations
   omitted).
          One example of such limitation is the district court’s broad discretion
   to constrain or deny the cross-examination of a witness whose testimony
   offers little probative value. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679
   (1986) (permitting trial courts to “impose reasonable limits on cross-
   examinations based on . . . prejudice, confusion of the issue, . . . or
   interrogation that is . . . only marginally relevant”). “[T]he Confrontation

          16
              Appellants made numerous allegations throughout this case that Bass was a
   “disgruntled minority investor” that “hatched a plan to take UDF out.” They further
   alleged that he committed illegal market manipulation by shorting UDF’s stock, which
   occurred at some point after Appellants’ conduct at issue in this case.

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   Clause [only] guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
   cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent,
   the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per
   curiam) (emphasis in original).
          “To establish a violation of the confrontation right, the defendant
   need only establish that a reasonable jury might have received a significantly
   different impression of the witness’s credibility had defense counsel been
   permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross examination.” Skelton, 514
   F.3d at 439–40 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ultimately,
   “[t]he determination of whether the exclusion of evidence is of a
   constitutional dimension depends on the district court’s reason for the
   exclusion and the effect of the exclusion.” Id. This determination often
   entails a Rule 403 analysis. See id.; Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may
   exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
   a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
   issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
   presenting cumulative evidence.”).
          At trial, Appellants sought to cross-examine Martinez about his
   relationship with Bass. They contended that cross-examination was
   necessary because: (1) Martinez was the key witness and responsible for the
   cash-tracing theory that the Government relied on in prosecuting Appellants;
   (2) Martinez could prove that Bass played a substantial role in UDF’s alleged
   financial scheme; and (3) Bass was the primary reason for Martinez’s
   decision to trace UDF’s cashflow and he had a tainted motive for compelling
   the FBI to investigate UDF. In contrast, the Government asked the district
   court to prohibit questioning related to Bass during Martinez’s cross-
   examination because it was irrelevant, time consuming, and substantially
   risked confusing the jury.

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           The district court agreed with the Government and decided that
   Martinez could not be questioned about Bass on cross-examination.17 It
   reasoned that Appellants failed to demonstrate how Bass’s alleged conduct
   related to or negated their potential guilt. It also explained that Appellants
   had not shown how evidence of Bass’s conduct affected any “material fact of
   the crimes charged” against them. Finally, after completing a Rule 403
   balancing, the district court stated that this “evidence would be extremely
   time consuming and confusing,” while only providing minimal “probative
   value.”
           Here, the district court’s decision to deny the use of Bass-related
   information during Martinez’s cross-examination was not a constitutional
   violation because it would not have altered the jury’s impression of
   Martinez’s credibility. First, that Bass informed the FBI of potentially illegal
   conduct at UDF because he intended to benefit from the investigation has no
   effect on the credibility of Martinez’s cash-tracing theory. As the district
   court explained, Bass’s conduct “has no bearing on whether [Appellants]
   committed the crimes charged in the indictment.” Bass, regardless of his
   motive, simply reported what Appellants were doing with numerous UDF
   funds. The FBI chose to act on the information Bass relayed to them, but still
   had to conduct its own investigation and build a case against Appellants.

           17
               Notably, Appellants mischaracterize the district court’s subsequent limited
   permission to use “Bass-related information.” True, the district court stated that this
   information could be used to “impeach potential witnesses and show potential bias.” But
   it clarified that the Bass-related information could only be used against Agent Tedder
   because “his brother, Michael, [was] Bass’[s] close friend and business partner.” Nothing
   in the district court’s order suggests that it gave free reign to the use of Bass-related
   information, so Appellants’ position that the district court changed its mind unexpectantly
   mid-trial has no basis.

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          Second, Appellants argue that the Bass-related information could
   have demonstrated that he was the primary culprit behind UDF’s allegedly
   illicit activities. That position is unpersuasive because even if Bass had
   contributed to some of the allegedly fraudulent behaviors, that would not
   absolve Appellants of their individual roles in the fraudulent scheme.
   Furthermore, any criminal conduct by Bass would not have tainted the
   discoveries Martinez and the FBI made following their discussions with him.
          Third, Appellants would have this court believe that the Bass-related
   information tainted Martinez’s cash-tracing model by compelling him to
   ignore the potential economic benefits UDF and the UDF IV fund provided
   to its investors. But whether Appellants financially harmed their investors is
   not material of their guilt. See Shaw, 580 U.S. at 67–68. Furthermore, they
   still presented a line of questioning regarding the potential benefits their
   funding mechanisms provided to their investors. Specifically, they asked
   Martinez whether he considered the economic benefit provided by UDF’s
   funding scheme, to which, Martinez responded in the negative. So, the jury
   was still able to consider the information that they assert the district court
   deprived them of presenting.
          Finally, the district court’s Rule 403 analysis was correct.18 There was
   very little probative value in parsing Martinez’s relationship with Bass. The
   reality is that all of Appellants’ concerns were still considered by the jury,
   even if those concerns were not raised during Martinez’s cross-examination.
   For example, the jury considered the novelty of Martinez’s framework at
   different stages in the litigation and the lack of economic benefit
   considerations in the cash-tracing model. At best, adding the Bass-related

          18
            Appellants and the Government agree that evidence of bias is always relevant
   under Rule 401. See Fed. R. Evid. 401.

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   information into the mix would be redundant. At worst, it could have
   transformed this case in a trial about Bass instead of Appellants.19 In sum, the
   possibility that the Bass-related information could have caused an undue
   delay or substantially confused the jury far outweighed the probative value
   from using it during Martinez’s cross-examination. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
           Because Rule 403 supports the district court’s decision to exclude the
   Bass-related evidence and prohibiting the information did not significantly
   affect the jury’s impression of Martinez’s credibility, we hold that the district
   court did not violate Appellants’ constitutional rights or abuse its discretion
   in doing so. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; Skelton, 514 F.3d at 440.
           D. Closing Arguments
           Appellants bring two issues which arise out of the closing arguments.
   They argue that the district court (1) allowed the Government to
   constructively amend the indictment and (2) abused its discretion in allowing
   the Government to include certain improper statements in its closing
   argument. We address each argument in turn.
                   i. Constructive Amendment of the Indictment
           Appellants first argue that the district court improperly allowed, over
   their objection, a constructive amendment of the indictment during the
   Government’s closing argument. We review constructive amendment claims
   de novo. McMillan, 600 F.3d at 450. Appellants take issue with the
   Government’s assertion that “they made themselves affiliates with
   Centurion and Buffington.” They aver that this sentence improperly led the
   jury to convict based on a finding that two of UDF’s developers were UDF

           19
              The district court stated in its order granting in part the Government’s motion
   in limine that it would not “permit this [trial] to become a trial over Bass’s actions with
   [Appellants].”

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   V’s prohibited “affiliates.” Appellants argue that this was a theory different
   than what was alleged in the indictment, i.e., that UDF III and UDF IV were
   the prohibited affiliates of UDF V. The Government responds that this
   statement was read out-of-context and that it presented a consistent theory
   throughout trial. We agree.
          The constructive amendment doctrine’s core is in the Fifth
   Amendment, “which provides for criminal prosecution only on the basis of a
   grand jury indictment.” United States v. Doucet, 994 F.2d 169, 172 (5th Cir.
   1993). “[A] court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are
   not made in the indictment against him.” Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S.
   212, 217 (1960). “Only the grand jury can amend an indictment to broaden
   it.” Doucet, 994 F.2d at 172. “This court has held that ‘an implicit or
   constructive amendment . . . occurs when it permits the defendant to be
   convicted upon a factual basis that effectively modifies an essential element
   of the offense charged or permits the [G]overnment to convict the defendant
   on a materially different theory or set of facts than that with which she was
   charged.’” United States v. Hoover, 467 F.3d 496, 500–01 (5th Cir. 2006)
   (quoting United States v. Reasor, 418 F.3d 466, 475 (5th Cir. 2005)).
          As explained supra, the Government’s theory throughout the case
   was that Appellants conducted “affiliate” transactions when they
   transferred investor’s money from UDF V to UDF III to pay distributions
   and loans. Appellants argue that this theory shifted, but we see no indication,
   outside of this singular statement, that would suggest that the Government
   altered its theory from what was alleged in the indictment. See United States
   v. Thompson, 647 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the there was no
   constructive amendment where the Government maintained “a single,
   consistent theory of conviction throughout” the trial). Our review of the
   closing arguments indicates that the Government was not meaningfully
   shifting its theory to suggest that Centurion and Buffington were affiliates,

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                                         No. 22-10511

   but instead explaining to the jury that UDF had control of both ends of the
   transaction, and developers like Centurion and Buffington were just
   “conduits” or “shells” through which Appellants were able to paper over
   their unilateral transactions between UDF entities.20
                   ii. Improper Statements by the Prosecutor
           Appellants next argue that prosecutors made three statements during
   closing arguments that constituted reversible error. First, Appellants rehash
   their constructive amendment argument, asserting that they were prejudiced
   when prosecutors stated that Centurion and Buffington were affiliates of
   UDF V. Second, Appellants argue that the district court committed a similar
   prejudicial error by allowing prosecutors, during their rebuttal, to misstate
   the evidence and claim that Susan Powell, UDF III’s auditor, did not
   understand the transactions, when she in fact knew about the transactions
   and how they were structured. Lastly, Appellants argue that prosecutors
   misstated the law regarding the jury’s consideration of Appellants’ good
   character evidence.
           This court reviews challenges to the statements made by the
   prosecutor for abuse of discretion when the defendant objects to them, but

           20
              Unlike the amendments made in the cases cited by Appellants, the Government
   did not make a statement out of the indictment that was an unreasonable construction of
   the evidence based on the Government’s theory of the case. Cf. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 217
   (reversing a conviction because although the indictment alleged that the defendants
   illegally moved sand through interstate commerce, the defendant was charged for
   interfering movements of steel); United States v. Salinas, 654 F.2d 319, 322–24 (5th Cir.
   1981), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953, 965 (5th Cir.
   1983) (reversing an aiding and abetting conviction because the principal whom the
   defendant aided and abetted was different than the principal listed in the indictment).

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   the district court still admits them over the objection.21 United States v.
   Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). First, we “decide
   whether the prosecutor made an improper remark and, if an improper remark
   was made, we must determine whether the remark affected the substantial
   rights of the defendant.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). “To
   determine whether a remark prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights,
   we assess the magnitude of the statement’s prejudice, the effect of any
   cautionary instructions given, and the strength of the evidence of the
   defendant’s guilt.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
           We have made these assessments of the prosecutor’s remarks at trial,
   and we conclude that even if we were to interpret these statements as
   Appellants do and hold that they were improper, the statements did not
   prejudice their substantial rights. See id. The prejudicial effect of any one of
   these comments, considered alone or together, was minimal. For instance,
   Appellants argue that prosecutors wrongfully stated that the jury could not
   consider evidence of their good character when determining whether they
   possessed an intent to defraud. But they concede that the district court
   charged the jury to consider Appellants’ “evidence of good general
   reputation or opinion testimony concerning: truth and veracity, honesty and
   integrity, or character as a law-abiding citizen” alongside “other evidence in
   the case.”

           21
               Appellants objected to the statement regarding Powell, so that argument was
   preserved. After closing arguments, Appellants asked the court for an opportunity “to
   preserve . . . outside the presence of the jury,” and they objected to the two remaining
   arguments. Thus, these were preserved as well, and the standard is abuse of discretion. See
   Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 615. Appellants contend that the two arguments that were objected to
   after the closing arguments are “arguably” preserved. However, given our determination
   that these statements were not reversible error, we do not need address their arguments on
   this issue.

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           This court has held that “for the ‘improper comment or questioning
   to represent reversible error, it generally must be so pronounced and
   persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” Alaniz, 726
   F.3d at 616 (quotation omitted). Additionally, “[a] prosecutor’s closing
   remarks are reversible error when they ‘cast serious doubt on the correctness
   of the jury’s verdict.’” United States v. Bush, 451 F. App’x 445, 451 (5th Cir.
   2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d
   511, 515 (5th Cir. 2005). Appellants have not met this high standard given
   that the effect of the statements was insignificant and the evidence against
   them was strong.22
           E. Time Limits
           Appellate courts typically review a district court’s implementation of
   time limits under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., United States v.
   Hay, 122 F.3d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). But because no
   objections or requests for additional time were raised at trial, we proceed
   under plain error review. United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 965 (5th Cir.
   1997). “Plain error is error which, when examined in the context of the entire
   case, is so obvious and substantial that failure to notice and correct it would
   affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
   United States v. Vonsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
   (internal quotations and citation omitted).

           22
              See Bush, 451 F. App’x at 452 (“Prosecutors may use expressive language when
   emphasizing the weakness of a defendant’s defense so long as it is clear to the jury that the
   conclusions [the prosecutor] is making are based on the evidence.”); United States v.
   Ceballos, 789 F.3d 607, 624–25 (5th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the defendant’s challenge of a
   statement telling jury not to focus on sympathy because the court “assume[s] that a jury
   has the common sense to discount the hyperbole of an advocate discounting the force of an
   argument”).

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          Jester asserts that the district court’s imposition of a shared fifteen-
   hour time limit among all Appellants violated his constitutional right to
   present a complete defense. He concedes that the district court is entitled to
   a degree of control over the length of each party’s argument but argues that
   it implemented time limits on an unreasonable and arbitrary basis. We
   disagree.
          The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees
   criminal defendants the right to “a meaningful opportunity to present a
   complete defense.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006).
   Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause ensures a
   defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses that the Government puts forth
   against him. See United States v. Moparty, 11 F.4th 280, 293 n.18 (5th Cir.
   2021) (internal citations omitted) (explaining that a Confrontation Clause
   violation occurs where “a reasonable jury might have received a significantly
   different impression of the witness’s credibility had defense counsel been
   permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross examination”).
          Taken together, these constitutional guarantees protect a defendant
   from arbitrary, unreasonable restrictions on his right to present his case-in-
   chief and cross-examine the Government’s witnesses. See United States v.
   Morrison, 833 F.3d 491, 504 (5th Cir. 2016). District courts do not run afoul
   of either guarantee if an implemented time limit (1) allows a defendant the
   “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,” and (2) does not
   deprive the jury of the opportunity to “receive[ ] a significantly different
   impression of [a] witness’s credibility.” Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324; Moparty, 11
   F.4th at 293 n.18.
          Jester alleges that the district court’s time limit violated his
   constitutional right to “put on a complete defense, confront the witnesses
   against him, and testify in his own defense.” He offers three examples in

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   support of his argument. First, he contends that the time constraints reduced
   his testimony to “mere minutes.” Second, he asserts that the limitations
   demanded cursory discussions of the Government’s witnesses during cross-
   examinations. Finally, he argues that the composition of the defendants left
   him isolated in terms of how much time would be dedicated to his unique
   arguments. On the latter point, he notes that each defendant, except for him,
   was an executive at UDF, so he was outnumbered by the executive-
   defendants, who had no reason to prioritize his defense in the fifteen hours
   allotted to their case.
          In support, Jester relies substantially on our decision in Morrison. See
   833 F.3d at 503. There, the district court was dissatisfied with the pace of the
   defendant’s trial and imposed a time limit on remaining witness examinations
   to expedite the proceedings. See id. It required the attorneys to estimate how
   long direct examinations would take for the remaining witnesses and
   enforced those estimations on the Government and the defense for the
   remainder of the trial. Id. The defendant ultimately appealed, arguing that
   the district court’s time limits deprived her of the opportunity to present a
   complete defense to her charges. On appeal, we rejected her argument
   because she failed to make an offer of proof sufficient to preserve her
   objection to the district court’s limits.23 Id. at 505.
          Here, Jester’s arguments fail because he did not preserve his objection
   during the trial and the record states that the district court would have
   granted more time if he had requested it. First, Jester objected to the fifteen-
   hour time limit one time before the trial but failed to do so again at any other

          23
              See Morrison, 833 F.3d at 504 (explaining that even if we considered her
   alternative arguments, the disposition of the case would remain unchanged).

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   point during the trial.24 Like in Morrison, the alleged injustice of the time
   constraint was substantially curbed by Jester’s failure to make an offer of
   proof to preserve his objection. See 833 F.3d at 505–06. Accordingly, his
   “lack of a contemporaneous offer of proof limits our ability on appellate
   review to determine whether the exclusion was harmful.” Id. at 505. Because
   he made no offer of proof during the trial, thus failing to preserve the
   objection, the district court did not err by implementing time constraints.
           Second, the record supports that Jester’s decision not to object to the
   time constraints was potentially a strategic maneuver by Appellants. As the
   district court explained, Appellants likely decided against requesting
   additional time during cross-examinations in hopes of making the
   Government’s burden more difficult. (“The reasonable inference is that
   [Appellants] strategically made no request for additional time to ensure the
   Government received no additional time so as to limit the Government’s
   opportunity to engage in full [cross-examination].”). Indeed, our precedent
   supports the district court’s inference. See Morrison, 833 F.3d at 504 (“If
   anything, it seems that time limits in criminal cases will generally pose more
   of a challenge for the prosecution as it typically presents far more of the
   evidence given that it has the burden of proof.”). Jester cannot benefit from
   the decision not to object to the time constraints during the trial, only to
   assert those same constraints as a reason for overturning his conviction.
           Ultimately, Jester fails to prove that the district court committed
   reversible error by imposing a fifteen-hour limit on both parties. Because the
   district court’s time constraint was not an obvious or substantial error that

           24
              In its order denying Appellants’ post-trial motions, the district court recognized
   that “[a]t no point during the trial did [Jester] request more time.”

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   jeopardized the fairness or integrity of his trial, we hold in favor of the
   Government on this issue. See Vonsteen, 950 F.2d at 1092.
          F. Cumulative Error Doctrine
          Finally, Appellants maintain that they are entitled to relief under the
   cumulative error doctrine. We disagree. “The cumulative error doctrine . . .
   provides that an aggregation of non-reversible errors (i.e., plain errors failing
   to necessitate reversal and harmless errors) can yield a denial of the
   constitutional right to a fair trial, which calls for reversal.” United States v.
   Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 343–44 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted)
   (citing United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 418 (5th Cir. 1998)).
   “Cumulative error justifies reversal only when errors so fatally infect the trial
   that they violated the trial’s fundamental fairness.” Delgado, 672 F.3d at 344
   (quotation marks omitted). We have explained that this doctrine is only
   applied in the “unusual case in which synergic or repetitive error[s] violate [
   ] the trial’s fundamental fairness.” Id.
          Appellants argue that the cumulation of errors throughout their trial
   prejudiced the outcome and deprived them of constitutional rights. In
   response, the Government asserts that the cumulative error doctrine does
   not apply because Appellants have identified no errors and it has presented
   substantial evidence of guilt. The Government’s arguments are persuasive.
   Here, Appellants fail to highlight the multiple errors that they allege occurred
   throughout their trial. The only error they point to involves the district
   court’s jury instructions, and we have already determined that this error was,
   at most, harmless and does not warrant reversal of their convictions. See supra
   Part II.B.i. Absent additional errors, there is nothing for Appellants to
   cumulate. Thus, the doctrine is inapplicable here. See Delgado, 672 F.3d at
   344.

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                             III. Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, the jury verdict is AFFIRMED in its
   entirety.

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