Court Opinion

ID: 9853987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:58:52.554798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:51.998748
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(concurring in the result):
In Call I, the Supreme Court “remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 221-22 (Utah 1979). In Call II, it “remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Utah 1980). Thereafter, a trial was held. The City won. In Call III, the Supreme Court found error in one of the trial court’s legal conclusions and determined that the ordinance pursuant to which the disputed sum had been paid was “void ab initio.” Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986). The Court did not, however, remand for “further proceedings.” On the contrary, it remanded for the very narrow purpose of “entering judgment consistent with this opinion.” Id. at 184. This was not an invitation for a whole new round of litigation. Instead, the Supreme Court expected the trial court, with the guidance of counsel, to enter a judgment in favor of plaintiffs — but only to the extent warranted under the evidence adduced at the trial already held, when considered in light of the Supreme Court opinion.
Despite the convoluted history of this matter and the multiple occasions for appellate involvement to date, plaintiffs are inarguably entitled to appellate review of the final result of the trial court’s effort to square the evidence and the Supreme Court’s opinion. These become the key questions: Did plaintiffs, at trial, put on evidence which, coupled with the Supreme Court holding that the ordinance was unlawfully adopted, would establish their entitlement to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? Even if not, did plaintiffs, at trial, put on evidence which establishes their right to an award of attorney fees on some other basis? Unfortunately, it is impossible for us to provide considered answers to these questions because trial transcripts were not requested and are not part of the record before us. We have only the file of pleadings, motions, and orders. I join my colleagues in assuming, absent some showing in the record to the contrary, that the trial court correctly decided these issues.
My analysis of the claim that additional parties should have been added on remand is similar. Going into trial, plaintiffs asked for class certification. They apparently did not ask, in the alternative, for relief under rule 19. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision not to certify the class. Accordingly, entry of “judgment consistent with” the opinion in Call III meant that the named plaintiffs were entitled to recover the amounts they were due. There was simply no opportunity on remand to revisit the question of the proper parties to the lawsuit and to consider the applicability of rule 19 for the first time.
As to the CPA fees, I agree they are not recoverable as costs. Although I agree the award of the master’s fees is a matter for the trial court’s discretion, I differ somewhat from my colleagues’ treatment of this issue. If the master’s fees were incurred only because of the City’s unprivileged recalcitrance in discovery, requiring the City *1057to pay these fees would be an appropriate sanction — indeed, not to so require under those circumstances might be an abuse of discretion — regardless of whether plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on the claim in connection with which the discovery was sought. But again, our record is deficient. It contains nothing to suggest the master was appointed in response to a motion to compel discovery nor does it otherwise enlighten us as to the circumstances of the master’s appointment. Accordingly, the trial court’s treatment of this issue cannot be disturbed.
Finally, I note that I do not regard the legal issues raised in this appeal to be frivolous. The difficulty with this appeal is that plaintiffs did not provide us with a record adequate to allow us to meaningfully consider the merit of the issues raised.
I join in the court’s judgment of affirmance.