Court Opinion

ID: 9491936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:28:15.085698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:01.283355
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
with whom BRIGHT and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges join, dissenting.
The majority asserts that summary judgment was appropriately granted to Select because Kiel was insubordinate as a matter of law, Select reasonably accommodated Kiel in his job as a matter of law, and that Kiel’s claim must fail as a matter of law because it was unsupported by direct evidence. In my view, the majority is wrong in each respect, and this court should reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
“Courts have recognized the difficulty in disposing of issues of discriminatory or retaliatory intent at the summary judgment stage: ‘Summary judgments should be sparingly used and then only in those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion. All the evidence must point one way and be susceptible of no reasonable inferences sustaining the position of the nonmoving party.’ ” Davis v. Fleming Companies, Inc., 55 F.3d 1369, 1371 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Soc’y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir.1991)); see also Gill v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-6, 32 F.3d 376, 378 (8th Cir.1994) (reviewing summary judgment “with caution in employment discrimination cases ... because intent is inevitably the central issue”); Keys v. Lutheran Family & Children’s Servs. of Mo., 668 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir.1981) (noting in retaliation case that “where motive, intent and credibility are key factors summary judgment is generally inappropriate.”) Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has directed that “[t]here will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.” United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). Faced with this formidable standard and the record before it, the district court approached the summary judgment motion hearing with caution, stating: “I think if there is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason given [for Kiel’s termination], ... then I think that this is a case that’s close for summary judgment. Maybe it could be granted, maybe it should be granted, but if it’s not a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, not legitimate, then obviously the case goes to the jury.” (Summ.J.Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 40-41.)
The majority finds that legitimate reason by concluding Kiel was insubordinate as a matter of law. I disagree. The ADA prohibits discrimination “against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1998). In determining whether an employee was insubordinate, the *1138question is whether the employee’s conduct “was so disruptive, excessive, or ‘generally mimical to [the] employer’s interests ... as to be beyond the protection’ ” of the ADA. Kempcke v. Monsanto Co., 132 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting Hochstadt v. Worcester Found., for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir.1976)); see also Jennings v. Tinley Park Community, 796 F.2d 962, 968 (7th Cir.1986) (applying a reasonableness test to determine whether “disloyal” conduct could provide a legitimate basis for discharge because “almost every form of opposition to an employment practice is in some sense disloyal” and if “mere ‘disloyal’ conduct could provide a legitimate basis for discharge, the protection extended by [anti-discrimination statutes] would be severely limited”). In Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, the Fifth Circuit observed that it is part of a defendant’s rebuttal case to establish that “the form of plaintiffs opposition was unprotected by the statute.” 654 F.2d 1130, 1142 (5th Cir.1981) (citing Rosser v. Laborers’ Int'l Union, Local 438, 616 F.2d 221, 223-24 (5th Cir.1980); Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1035-37 (5th Cir.1980); Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 229-34). Courts have required that oppositional employee conduct “be reasonable in light of the circumstances, and have held that ‘the employer’s right to run his business must be balanced against the rights of the employee to express his grievances and promote his own welfare.’ ” Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1036 (quoting Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 233).
The majority concedes that Kiel’s request for the TDD was protected activity, but concludes that the subsequent comment that Ms. Fry was selfish was unreasonable as a matter of law.3 Kiel was a good employee who had been with the company for more than two years and had never been subject to formal disciplinary action. On F’ebruary 17, 1994, Kiel, drafted a letter requesting that Mr. Fry provide Select’s deaf employees with a TDD. Kiel made copies to show the other deaf employees at Select. After making the copies, he returned to his desk and put the letter in his drawer. Ms. Fry approached Kiel and chastised him for making personal copies at the office notwithstanding the fact that she had never told Kiel that he could not use the copy machine for personal documents. (See Ms. Fry 9/29/95 Dep. at 9.) Moreover, other employees used the copier for personal use and Select did not have a policy against such use. (See Fritz 9/20/95 Dep. at 38; Mr. Fry 9/21/95 Dep. at 16.) February 17, 1994 was the first time Kiel formally requested a TDD, and Ms. Fry admitted that she was not aware that Kiel had approached anyone else with the same request. (See Ms. Fry 9/20/95 Dep. at 36.) Ms. Fry refused Kiel’s request for a TDD as a reasonable accommodation for his disability, whereupon Kiel stated that she was selfish. Shortly after this exchange, Kiel apologized for his statement, and Ms. Fry accepted his apology. (See Kiel 9/20/95 Dep. at 50.)
The majority concludes that Kiel was insubordinate as a matter of law by characterizing Kiel’s statement as insulting, angry, and rude. While a jury might agree with this conclusion, the record certainly does not support the view that Kiel’s reaction to Ms. Fry was insubordinate as a matter of law. Unlike the majority, I am unwilling to declare that opposing the denial of a reasonable accommodation request by declaring that an employer is selfish is unreasonable as a matter of law.4 Kiel did' not use profanity or *1139engage in any conduct that could be considered unreasonable as a matter of law. The majority ignores the requirement at the summary judgment stage of viewing the evidence and drawing all justifiable inference in Kiel’s favor. See Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 441, 139 L.Ed.2d 378 (1997). Kiel stated both at the time of the incident and afterward that he did not realize he was shouting. Nonetheless, the majority cites his statement that “If I want to shout, I shout ” and concludes that he was lying. This conclusion is simply inappropriate. There is no necessary inconsistency in a person, deaf or otherwise, being capable of shouting when they choose to and not realizing that they are shouting on a particular occasion. At the very least, the issue is one for a jury to resolve, not an appellate court without the benefit of live testimony.
The majority also ignores the Payne line of cases, which hold that a handicapped employee may only be discharged for seeking a reasonable accommodation when his behavior is so disruptive, excessive, or generally inimical to the employer’s interests as to be beyond the protection of the ADA. That is an issue to be determined by the jury, not by the court as a matter of law. Accordingly, I would hold that the district court erred because Select failed to meet its burden of establishing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Kiel.
The majority also concludes as a matter of law that Select reasonably accommodated Kiel’s disability. The majority states that Select did so by eliminating from his job the need to make business phone calls and providing him with an interpreter on one occasion so that he could participate in United Parcel Service training. In my view, the court erred by holding that Kiel had been reasonably accommodated as a matter of law. The record reveals that, as to employee meetings, Kiel was not provided with an interpreter and, arguably therefore, a way to function meaningfully as an employee.5 Also, almost immediately after Kiel’s termination but prior to this litigation, Fry asked Wendy Sheu to obtain a TDD for its remaining deaf employees. The reasonableness of Kiel’s request is illustrated by the fact that Select obtained a TDD shortly after his termination. Unlike the majority, I am unable to draw any conclusions as a matter of law from these facts regarding reasonable accommodation. The question of reasonable accommodation is for a jury to decide, not a court of appeals-even one sitting en banc.
The majority holds that Kiel is incapable of showing pretext because he failed to produce direct evidence that Mr. or Ms. Fry made statements or engaged in conduct reflecting a discriminatory attitude and that such an attitude motivated them to dismiss Kiel. It relies on Feltmann v. Sieben, 108 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir.1997), and Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., 75 F.3d 343, 345 (8th Cir.1996), for this proposition. I believe that the majority is in error in this regard because direct evidence is not the only method for satisfying the fundamental inquiry in this case. The ultimate issue is whether Select intentionally discriminated against Kiel. See Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir.1997) (en banc); Kehoe v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 96 F.3d 1095, 1101 (8th Cir.1996); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir.1996). “The requisite causal connection may be proved circumstantially by proof that the discharge *1140followed the protected activity so closely in time as to justify an inference of retaliatory motive.” Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1090 (8th Cir.1992); see also Couty v. Dole, 886 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir.1989) (including proof that time of discharge closely followed protected activity in prima facie. case of retaliatory discharge claim); Keys, 668 F.2d at 358 (same). Moreover, Kiel’s initial evidence is properly considered in evaluating Select’s explanation for its action. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (Initial “evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretexted”). Select is not entitled to summary judgment simply because it declared that Kiel was insubordinate. Rather, the question is whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Select intentionally discriminated against Kiel. In my view, a reasonable jury construing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Kiel could conclude that Select intentionally discriminated against Kiel. In this case, Kiel was a good employee who had worked at Select for more than two years and had never been subject to formal disciplinary action. A jury could conclude from the fact that other employees used the office copier for personal items without incurring management’s attention that Kiel was held to a different standard. Additionally, Kiel’s termination followed on the heels of his vocal opposition to the denied accommodation request. Accordingly, the majority errs by concluding as a matter of law that Kiel cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of pretext.
I have followed the majority in analyzing this case pursuant to McDonnell Douglas. 1 question, however, whether this analysis is appropriate in retaliation eases. I rather believe that the mixed-motive analysis of Price Waterhouse should be used in retaliation cases and that summary judgment is inappropriate when motive, intent, and credibility are the central issues. See Keys, 668 F.2d at 358.
For the reasons stated above, I would reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for trial on all claims. Additionally, 1 would hold that Price Water-house analysis applies to retaliation claims. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. This concession is at odds with the position of Select’s counsel at oral argument. Counsel conceded that the content, not the manner, of Kiel’s comment constituted insubordination:-
Judge Heaney: [I]s it your position that the result would be the same if he had spoken in a well-modulated voice?
Mr. Gianoulakis: I think very clearly it was the content of what he said that was the problem here. If he had shouted at the president, "This is the best company I've ever worked for, and you're the best president I've ever worked for,” I submit to you we wouldn't be here today.
Clearly, counsel’s position is not the law. If it were, no deaf person would ever have the right to oppose his employer's denial of a requested reasonable accommodation for the employee’s deafness. In my view, counsel’s concession alone required that we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

. It may be that, in certain cases, the declaration that an employer is selfish can constitute insubordination for the purposes of summary judgment. Nonetheless, I do not believe that to be the case here.

. At the summary judgment motion hearing, Kiel's counsel stated:
Mr. Kiel testified in his deposition that he didn’t know those meetings were going to take place until they called all the employees together to have the meetings. Who did know that the meetings were going to take place? The company knew that they were planning to have a meeting and could have arranged an interpreter to be there, or could have given Mr. Kiel one day's notice and ask him if he wanted an interpreter for the meeting. But to say that Mr. Kiel didn't put in a timely request for an interpreter for meetings that he was not given advance notice were going to take place, is requiring him to be clairvoyant.
(Summary J.Mot. Hr'g. Tr. at 24.) (See also Kiel 9/20/95 Dep. at 40 ("I wanted to know what was going on [at the meetings]. I wanted equal treatment.”); id. at 41 ("I just do my job until someone said go in that room, and I found a group was talking .... I asked [Terry Fritz] what was going on.... [to which] [s]he shrugged her shoulders. That's her response. That's the only response I got.”); id. at 41-42 ("Well, if we had a meeting, I would like to be kept informed of what’s going on. I’d like to be part of the team.”))