Court Opinion

ID: 9951702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 19:17:27.822764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:05.599959
License: Public Domain

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                       SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                 FILED
James J.,                                                                March 18, 2024
Respondent Below, Petitioner,
                                                                             released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                          C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
                                                                        SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                              OF WEST VIRGINIA
v.) No. 22-562 (Kanawha County, Civil Action No. 21-D-915)

Sarah C.,
Petitioner Below, Respondent.

                          MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner James J., by counsel Scott L. Summers, appeals the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County’s June 8, 2022 Final Order limiting the amount of unsupervised
time that his parents can spend with his minor daughter, L.J.1 Respondent Sarah C.
appears by counsel Erica Lord, and D. Randall Clarke appears as L.J.’s guardian ad
litem (hereinafter “guardian”). On appeal to this Court, Petitioner argues that the
circuit court erred in imposing any limitations upon the unsupervised time that his
parents may spend with L.J. Petitioner requests that this Court reverse the circuit
court’s order and remand the case to the circuit court with directions to enter an order
removing any and all restrictions upon L.J.’s ability to visit with her paternal
grandparents.

       This Court has carefully considered the briefs and oral arguments of the
parties, the submitted record, and the pertinent authorities. Upon review, we agree
with the circuit court’s order restricting the amount of unsupervised time that L.J. is
permitted to spend with her paternal grandparents. Accordingly, we affirm the
circuit court’s order entered on June 8, 2022. Because there is no substantial
question of law, a memorandum decision is appropriate pursuant to Rule 21 of the
West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

      The parties in this matter are the parents of one daughter, L.J. On March 3,
2021, when L.J. was four years old, she disclosed to her day care teacher that she
had been sexually abused by her then-eight-year-old cousin (hereinafter “minor

      1
        We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in
this case. See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).
                                           1
cousin”) while both were at their paternal grandparents’ home.2 Respondent was
called to L.J.’s school and informed of the disclosure. The disclosure was reported
to Child Protective Services (hereinafter “CPS”). Respondent informed Petitioner
and his current wife of the disclosure, and Petitioner, who was working out of state,
returned home. Respondent also reported the disclosure to L.J.’s pediatrician, the
Child Advocacy Center, and the St. Albans Police Department. Although the Child
Advocacy Center declined to interview L.J., it referred Respondent to Colleen
Moran, M.S., a licensed clinical psychologist at Harmony Mental Health, Inc. 3
Respondent and L.J. attended their first intake session with Ms. Moran
approximately two weeks after L.J.’s initial disclosure.4 Respondent continued to
take L.J. to see Ms. Moran, and Petitioner attended one appointment on August 5,
2021. Both parents were provided information regarding trauma experienced by
children. Ms. Moran advised that permitting L.J. to have continued contact with her
minor cousin would re-traumatize her.5 The following month, Petitioner got married,
and pictures were taken at the wedding depicting L.J. and her minor cousin together.6
Thereafter, Respondent instituted proceedings in the Family Court of Kanawha

        2
         According to a police report from the St. Albans Police Department, L.J.
disclosed during “circle time” that her minor cousin “would take her downstairs to
a bathroom at her [paternal grandparents’] house” and “would make her pull down
her pants and panties.” L. J. also indicated that her minor cousin “would kiss her
private parts and her butt.” “She continued by stating [her minor cousin] had told
her to lay on him with her pants down (his pants were down too) and his private was
‘straight.’” L.J. indicated that she told her paternal grandmother, and her paternal
grandmother confronted the minor cousin. During the January 3, 2022 hearing, the
paternal grandmother denied that L.J. reported the minor cousin’s conduct to her or
that she confronted the minor cousin.

       Ms. Moran was included on a list of counselors that was provided by the
        3

Child Advocacy Center.
        4
            According to Ms. Moran, L.J. first disclosed the sexual abuse to her in April
2021.

        Ms. Moran’s report dated November 1, 2021, indicates that Petitioner
        5

“reluctantly” verbalized the need to protect L.J. from her minor cousin.

       Petitioner told the guardian that Respondent was aware that the minor cousin
        6

was going to be at his wedding.
                                             2
County. 7 Because neither of the parties had a court order establishing them as
custodial parent or setting parenting time with L.J., both parties filed petitions for
allocation of custodial responsibility.8

       At the request of the parties, the family court appointed a guardian ad litem
for L.J., and on December 1, 2021, the guardian filed his report. A hearing was held
on December 8, 2021, and, at that time, the parties informed the family court that
they had reached an agreement “on the majority of the issues” that were before the
court. The parties agreed, among other things, to the exercise of parenting time,
shared decision making, the elementary and middle school that L.J. would attend,
and a method to select a new counselor for L.J. In addition, the parties accepted
some of the recommendations made by the guardian. For purposes of this appeal,
the relevant recommendations to which the parties agreed from the guardian’s report
are as follows:
             [L.J.] shall under no circumstances come into direct or
             indirect contact with her minor male cousin [] until further
             Order of the Court.
             [L.J.] is not permitted in the home of the paternal
             grandparents when her minor male cousin [] is present in
             their home.
             If [Petitioner] permits [L.J.] to be in the home of the
             paternal grandparents when her minor male cousin [] is
             present in their home, then the father’s parenting time with
             the minor child will be suspended until a hearing can be
             held before the Court upon the issue of the modification of
             his parenting time with the minor child and until further
             Order of the Court.

       Although the recording system failed or malfunctioned and the proceedings
on December 8, 2021, were not recorded, the order from that hearing clearly
informed the parties that another hearing would be held on January 3, 2022, at which
“[t]he Court will take testimony and hear argument on whether there should be

      7
        Petitioner filed a Petition for Allocation of Custodial Responsibility and a
Motion for Emergency Temporary Relief.
      8
        Following Respondent’s filing, Petitioner filed a Counter Petition to
Establish Allocation of Custodial Responsibility and Parenting Plan.
                                          3
restrictions placed upon the ability of the Father to leave the minor child alone with
the Paternal Grandparents, Child Support and Medical Support.” At the beginning
of the hearing on January 3, 2022, the parties informed the family court that they had
reached agreement with respect to child support and medical expenses. They also
informed the family court that they had been unable to reach an agreement as to the
issue regarding L.J.’s visitation with the paternal grandparents, and the family court
proceeded with a hearing related to that issue.

       During the January 3, 2022 hearing, the family court heard testimony from
the parties and the paternal grandmother. According to the testimony, L.J.’s
disclosure in March 2021 was not the first time there had been an issue relating to
the minor cousin. In October 2020, L.J. indicated that her minor cousin showed her
an inappropriate video, which resulted in Petitioner asking his parents to agree that
L.J. and the minor cousin would not be left alone together. The testimony of the
paternal grandmother revealed that she does not believe L.J.’s allegations of sexual
abuse. Although the paternal grandmother testified that she would “guarantee” that
she would not permit the minor cousin to be in her home when L.J. was present or
to come into contact with L.J., she also testified that she wants to see both of her
grandchildren and that she “want[s] them to be together.” She further testified that
these two children “miss each other.” The family court expressed some concern
about the paternal grandmother’s testimony and specifically noted that “the tone in
her voice caused me to doubt her credibility just a little bit.” The family court
concluded that the paternal grandparents enjoyed a close relationship with L.J., and
it attempted to fashion relief “that preserves [L.J.’s] relationship with the Paternal
Grandparents while at the same time protecting [her] from harm in the future.”
Ultimately, the family court ordered that Petitioner not be permitted to leave L.J. in
the unsupervised care of his parents for more than two (2) days per week and not
more than three (3) hours at a time. However, the family court declined to impose
any restrictions on the paternal grandparents’ interaction with L.J. as long as
Petitioner or his wife are present, and the minor cousin is not present.

       Petitioner appealed the family court’s decision to the circuit court and argued
that the family court “inappropriately limit[ed] and restrict[ed] [his] rights as an
equal custodial parent to make decision[s] concerning his minor child.” By order
entered on June 8, 2022, the circuit court affirmed the family court’s order.
Petitioner’s appeal to this Court followed.

      Although this appeal comes to us from the circuit court, we focus our review
on the family court’s January 12, 2022 order which the circuit court affirmed. As
we have previously stated,

                                          4
                   [i]n reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court
             judge upon a review of, or upon a refusal to review, a final
             order of a family court judge, we review the findings of
             fact made by the family court judge under the clearly
             erroneous standard, and the application of law to the facts
             under an abuse of discretion standard. We review
             questions of law de novo.

Syl., Carr v. Hancock, 216 W. Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004). Guided by this
framework, we will consider Petitioner’s appeal.

      We begin by noting that the restrictions at issue were requested by Respondent
in her motion for emergency temporary relief. She requested that the paternal
grandparents have only supervised visits with L.J. because of L.J.’s allegation that
she was sexually abused by her minor cousin while she was in the care of the paternal
grandparents. In addition, the Respondent alleged that L.J. told her grandparents
about the abuse, and they did not inform either parent of this disclosure.
       Before this Court, Petitioner contends that the family court improperly
infringed upon his fundamental constitutional right as a fit parent to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of his daughter. Respondent argues that
Petitioner’s fundamental rights of care and custody are not impacted by the family
court’s order and, at most, the court’s order dictates only how long he is permitted
to leave L.J. unsupervised with his parents. With respect to this constitutional right,
we have held that:
                    “[t]he Due Process Clauses of Article III, Section 10
             of the Constitution of West Virginia and of the Fourteenth
             Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
             protect the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
             concerning the care, custody, and control of their
             children.” Syl. Pt. 3, Lindsie D.L. v. Richard W.S., 214 W.
             Va. 750, 591 S.E.2d 308 (2003); see also In re Antonio
             R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 388, 719 S.E.2d 850, 858 (2011)
             (“the right of a natural parent to the custody of his or her
             infant child … is a fundamental personal liberty protected
             and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the West
             Virginia and United States Constitutions.”) (citation and
             footnote omitted); Alyssha R. v. Nicholas H., 233 W. Va.
             746, 753, 760 S.E.2d 560, 567 (2014) (“The right of a
             parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
                                          5
             control of her children is among the most cherished
             fundamental liberty interests.”) (citation omitted);
             Hammack v. Wise, 158 W. Va. 343, 348, 211 S.E.2d 118,
             121-122 (1975) (“One’s right to conceive and to raise his
             children has found protection in the Due Process Clause of
             the Fourteenth Amendment and also on the Equal
             Protection Clause thereof, as well as the comparable
             clauses of the West Virginia Constitution.”) (citations
             omitted). 9

In re Adoption of J.S. and K.S., 245 W. Va. 164, 169-170, 858 S.E.2d 214, 219-220
(2021) (footnote added). While this right is well-established, it is important to
recognize that this right does not apply only to Petitioner. Respondent also has the
same fundamental right. Indeed, when faced with competing rights, albeit in the
context of abuse and neglect cases, we have held that “[c]ases involving children
must be decided not just in the context of competing sets of adults’ rights, but also
with a regard for the rights of the child(ren).” Syl. Pt. 7, In re Brian D., 194 W. Va.
623, 461 S.E.2d 129 (1995).

       Petitioner relies heavily upon this Court’s decision in In re Adoption of J.S.
and K.S. in support of his argument that the family court erred in restricting his
ability to decide how often his parents can see L.J. without supervision. In In re
Adoption of J.S. and K.S., this Court overturned a restriction placed on an adoptive
mother prohibiting her from permitting any contact between her children and her ex-
husband. Although Petitioner maintains that this holding supports his position that
he has a constitutional right to permit L.J. to visit with his parents without the
restrictions imposed in this case, we disagree. In the instant case, there is a clear
conflict between Petitioner’s desire to have no restrictions on the unsupervised time
that his parents spend with L.J. and the Respondent’s desire to maintain the
restrictions on visitation with the paternal grandparents which the family court
concluded were in the best interest of L.J.

      9
         This fundamental right has also been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[t]he liberty
interest at issue in this case – the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.”).

                                            6
       The fundamental constitutional right at the heart of Petitioner’s argument is
not absolute. See In re F.S. and Z.S., 233 W. Va. 538, 544, 759 S.E.2d 769, 775
(2014) (“while a parent’s right is fundamental, it is certainly not absolute.”)
“Although parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the primary goal
in cases involving abuse and neglect, as in all family law matters, must be the health
and welfare of the children.” Syl. Pt. 3, In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d
589 (1996) (emphasis added). “[P]arental rights must sometimes yield in situations
where they are in conflict with the best interests of the child[.]” In re Adoption of
J.S. and K.S., 245 W. Va. at 170, 858 S.E.2d at 220. “In visitation as well as custody
matters, we have traditionally held paramount the best interests of the child.” Syl.
Pt. 5, Carter v. Carter, 196 W. Va. 239, 470 S.E.2d 193 (1996). “‘The best interests
of the child is the polar star by which decisions must be made which affect children.’
Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 182 W. Va. 399, 405, 387 S.E.2d 866, 872 (1989).”
Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 227 W. Va. 184, 192, 706 S.E.2d 381, 389 (2011).10

       The family court properly considered the best interests of L.J. pursuant to
Kristopher O. See id. Although the parties appear to have reached agreements as to
many, if not all, of the other issues in this case, they were unable to reach an
agreement about unsupervised visits between L.J. and her paternal grandparents.
The family court expressly recognized that the paternal grandparents enjoyed a close
relationship with L.J., and it concluded that it was “important to fashion relief that
preserves the child’s relationship with the Paternal Grandparents while at the same
time protecting the minor child from harm in the future.” The family court’s concern
for potential harm in the future is supported by the testimony. L.J. disclosed that
she had been sexually abused while in the care of her paternal grandparents.
Petitioner testified that he understood if L.J. and her minor cousin are ever together

      10
         Petitioner disagrees with the family court’s decision to weigh his rights
against the court’s responsibility to protect the best interest of L.J. Specifically,
Petitioner argues that this Court has found this rationale to be “without merit” and
“improper” with regard to a fit parent’s determination of who should be permitted
to see a child. However, given this Court’s cases cited supra, we find Petitioner’s
argument in this regard to be unavailing. Further, Petitioner primarily relies upon
cases involving the assertion by grandparents of their right to visitation, which is not
present in the instant case. However, even if we were examining this case under the
lens of the Grandparent Visitation Act, we would still have to consider the best
interests of the child as “[t]he best interests of the child are expressly incorporated
into the Grandparent Visitation Act.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, In re Hunter H., 231 W. Va.
118, 744 S.E.2d 228 (2013).

                                           7
in his parents’ home, that he would immediately lose his parenting time with his
daughter. Although his mother also expressed her understanding of this restriction,
she testified that she did not believe that L.J. had been sexually abused by the minor
cousin while she was caring for both of the children. In addition, she testified that
she thought the children missed one another and she wanted them to be together.
The family court also heard testimony from Petitioner that his mother had been
experiencing signs of forgetfulness. Although Petitioner believes that the risk of
harm to L.J. has been removed by prohibiting her from being in contact with her
minor cousin, the family court did not agree. After hearing the testimony in this
case, the family court concluded that it had concerns with the paternal grandmother’s
credibility. We will not disturb this credibility determination. See Mulugeta v.
Misailidis, 239 W. Va. 404, 408-409, 801 S.E.2d 282, 286-287 (2017) (“It is within
the sole province of the family court, as fact-finder, to decide issues of credibility,
and this Court will not disturb those determinations.”)
       Petitioner maintains that because he is a fit parent, the court may not interfere
with his parenting decisions as to whether L.J. can be left unsupervised with her
paternal grandparents. Petitioner believes that the family court was required to
conclude that he is unfit before it could proceed to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of L.J. This argument is based, in part, on this Court’s
holding that “[t]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their
children.” Syl. Pt. 4, Lindsie D.L. v. Richard W.S., 214 W. Va. 750, 591 S.E.2d 308
(2003). This is, however, merely a presumption, not a declaration that a fit parent
can make unilateral decisions about a child that is involved in a family court matter.
Family courts make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of children
on a daily basis, and these decisions are largely made without a finding that one
parent is unfit.11 When two fit parents do not agree on an issue regarding their child
in a custody matter, it is often incumbent upon a family court to resolve the dispute.
Such decisions necessarily affect the ability of one or both parents to make unilateral
decisions regarding the child as it did here.

       Petitioner further argues that Respondent did not articulate a rational basis for
the restrictions at issue here. We are not persuaded by this argument. As we have
previously noted, the family court heard testimony regarding the allegations of

      11
         In this case, the family court would have decided the custody arrangement
for L.J. had the parties not reached an agreement. In addition, family courts often
make decisions such as where children attend school and whether parents can
relocate with their children.

                                            8
sexual abuse against L.J. while she was in the care of the paternal grandparents.
Despite testifying that that she did not believe L.J., the paternal grandmother testified
that she would keep the minor cousin away from L.J. However, this testimony was
followed by her declaration that she wants the children to be together. Given this
testimony, as well as testimony regarding the paternal grandmother’s forgetfulness
and the family court’s concerns with her credibility, the family court did not abuse
its discretion in placing the restriction regarding unsupervised visits.

        Finally, although not raised or briefed by the parties, we remind family courts
in cases such as this of their obligation to report suspected abuse or neglect pursuant
to Rule 48 of the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court.
“If a family court has reasonable cause to suspect any minor child involved in family
court proceedings has been abused or neglected, that family court shall immediately
report the suspected abuse or neglect to the state child protective services agency,
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 49-6A-2, and the circuit court.” W. Va. R. Prac. & Proc.
For Fam. Ct. 48. Here, by the time the parties sought court intervention, at least two
referrals had already been made to CPS regarding L.J.’s disclosure of sexual abuse.
It appears that both of those referrals resulted in no further action due to the fact that
the alleged perpetrator of the abuse was also a minor. Therefore, any referral that
might have been made by the family court would have been duplicative. For this
reason, we find the failure of the family court to make a referral under the facts of
this case to be harmless. Although we find this to be harmless error, as we have
noted in the past, we “believe that the better practice would be to follow the strict
language of Rule [48] of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court” and
report the suspected abuse even if other reports had previously been made to the state
child protective services agency. Katherine B.T. v. Jackson, 220 W. Va. 219, 227,
640 S.E.2d 569, 577 (2006).
       For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the family court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing restrictions on L.J.’s visitation with her paternal grandparents.
Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in affirming the family court’s order. Based
upon all of the foregoing, the order of the circuit court is affirmed.

                                                                            Affirmed.

ISSUED: March 18, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

                                            9
Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton

CONCURRING, IN PART, AND DISSENTING, IN PART:

Justice C. Haley Bunn
BUNN, Justice, concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part:
       I agree with the majority’s decision to uphold the limitations on grandparent
visitation ordered by the family court. The allegations that L.J. was sexually abused
by a cousin while in the paternal grandparents’ care, and the grandparents’ denials
that the abuse occurred, demonstrate that it was in L.J.’s best interest to put
appropriate and immediate safeguards in place. See Syl. pt. 5, Carter v. Carter, 196
W. Va. 239, 470 S.E.2d 193 (1996) (“In visitation as well as custody matters, we
have traditionally held paramount the best interests of the child.”). See also Syl. pt.
3, in part, id. (“Because of the extraordinary nature of supervised visitation, such
visitation should be ordered when necessary to protect the best interests of the
children.”).
       However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that the
family court’s failure to refer the new allegations of abuse and neglect to Child
Protective Services (“CPS”) and the circuit court was harmless error. The majority
has overlooked the express, mandatory language of the governing rule and has not
fully considered the factual circumstances giving rise to this appeal.
     Pursuant to Rule 48 of the West Virginia Rules of Practice and Procedure for
Family Court,
             [i]f a family court has reasonable cause to suspect any minor
      child involved in family court proceedings has been abused or
      neglected, that family court shall immediately report the suspected
      abuse or neglect to the state child protective services agency . . . and the
      circuit court.
W. Va. R. Prac. & P. for Fam. Ct. 48(a) (emphasis added). As we have repeatedly
recognized, “use of the word ‘shall’ renders the[] directive[] mandatory.” In re
Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. 14, __, 893 S.E.2d 621, 628 (2023) (citation omitted). See also
Syl. pt. 1, in part, Nelson v. W. Va. Pub. Emps. Ins. Bd., 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d
86 (1982) (“It is well established that the word ‘shall’ . . . should be afforded a
                                          10
mandatory connotation.”). Thus, the express language of Rule 48 imposes a
mandatory duty upon family court judges to immediately report suspected child
abuse and neglect. See Syl. pt. 3, in part, State ex rel. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Res. v. Ruckman, 223 W. Va. 368, 674 S.E.2d 229 (2009) (referencing “mandatory
reporting of abuse or neglect pursuant to . . . Rule 48 of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure for Family Court” (emphasis added)).
       This mandatory reporting duty for family court judges is also codified in West
Virginia Code § 49-2-803(a). See W. Va. Code § 49-2-803(a) (identifying “family
court judge[s]” as among individuals who, upon having “reasonable cause to suspect
that a child is neglected or abused, . . . shall immediately . . . report the
circumstances to the Department of . . . Human [Services]” (emphasis added)). See
also Syl. pt. 8, Katherine B.T. v. Jackson, 220 W. Va. 219, 640 S.E.2d 569 (2006)
(“When any circuit court judge, family court judge, or magistrate has reasonable
cause to suspect that a child is neglected or abused, the circuit court judge, family
court judge, or magistrate shall immediately report the suspected neglect or abuse to
the state child protective services agency pursuant to W. Va. Code, [49-2-803] and,
if applicable, Rule 48 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court.”).
      Moreover, the majority conflates the allegations of abuse and neglect at issue
before the family court with the original allegations that L.J. was sexually abused by
a minor male cousin while the grandparents were caring for both children in the
grandparents’ home in the Spring of 2021. The record reflects that both L.J.’s mother
and teacher reported the original incident to CPS, and that the referral was “screened
out” without investigation because it involved two children.
       However, new allegations of abuse and neglect gave rise to the underlying
custody proceeding that resulted in this appeal, and it is those new allegations of
abuse and neglect that triggered the family court’s duty to refer the matter to CPS
and the circuit court. After the Spring 2021 incident of sexual abuse, L.J.’s mother
sought therapy for L.J., and the therapist recommended that L.J. not have contact
with her minor male cousin because interacting with her abuser would be traumatic
for her. The therapist also cautioned L.J.’s father against allowing further
interactions between the two children.
      Nevertheless, in the Fall of 2021, L.J.’s father married, and during the
wedding reception, either the father or the paternal grandparents allowed L.J. and
her minor male cousin to interact with each other. It is this incident of failing to heed
the advice of the child’s therapist by knowingly allowing L.J. to have interactions
with her alleged abuser that prompted L.J.’s mother to file the underlying custody
proceeding. The interaction between the children potentially subjected L.J. to further
trauma, and constituted new allegations of abuse and neglect by the child’s father
                                           11
and/or her paternal grandparents. The father’s and paternal grandparents’ failure to
protect L.J. from additional interactions with her alleged abuser triggered the family
court’s mandatory duty to refer such allegations to CPS and the circuit court. It does
not appear from the appendix record that these new allegations concerning the
actions of the child’s father or her paternal grandparents were ever referred to CPS
for investigation or to the circuit court. Therefore, the family court’s failure to report
this new incident of abuse and neglect constitutes reversible error, and the case
should be remanded to the family court to require it to comply with the mandatory
reporting duty in Rule 48.
        Finally, even if, as the majority has suggested, the family court’s report of the
allegations of abuse and neglect giving rise to the underlying case had been
duplicative, this Court has cautioned that “the better practice would be to follow the
strict language of Rule 4[8] of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Family Court
even if the petition and incident had been previously reported to the [DHS]. This
practice could help assure that no case ‘slips through the cracks.’” Katherine B.T.,
220 W. Va. at 227-28, 640 S.E.2d at 577-78 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the
family court still should have reported the alleged abuse and neglect of L.J. to ensure
the child’s safety and well-being.
      For these reasons, I respectfully concur, in part, and dissent, in part, from the
majority’s decision in this case.

                                           12