Court Opinion

ID: 9649402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:52:13.41843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:29.095145
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority correctly holds that the admission of the witness’s prior statement was erroneous. Nevertheless, it refuses to reverse appellant’s conviction because it resolves that the error was harmless. Because I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction, I must dissent. See Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa, 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968) ; Commonwealth v. Pearson, 427 Pa. 45, 233 A.2d 552 (1967); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see especially Commonwealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 589-91, 307 A.2d 245, 248-49 (1973); see also Commonwealth v. Bynum, 454 Pa. 9, 12-13, 309 A.2d 545, 547 (1973); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 459 Pa. 371, 387, 329 A.2d 277, 284 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J.); Commonwealth v. Dancer, 452 Pa. 221, 228-29, 305 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Nix & Manderino, JJ.); Commonwealth v. Knudsen, 443 Pa. 412, 416, 278 A.2d 881, 884 (1971) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Eagen, J.).
The Commonwealth called as a witness Joseph Nolley, expecting that he would testify that he observed appellant, a man he apparently knew prior to the incident, fire the fatal shot. However, when the Commonwealth asked the witness if he saw who had the rifle at the time of the incident, Nolley replied that he did not know. The Commonwealth pleaded surprise and was permitted to im*240peach the witness with the following statement the witness had given to the police at the time of the crime:
“He was going, that is when Nate [appellant] grabbed the gun and ran across the street along side the Moose Hall, Moose building, and fired the gun through the window.”
I cannot comprehend how the majority can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this devastating revelation was harmless.* Especially in light of the less definite testimony of the other disinterested witnesses, I cannot fairly say that I believe beyond a reasonable doubt that honest, fair-minded jurors, charged with determining if appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt might not have brought in a different verdict had they not heard the improper statement. See Chapman, supra.
The limitations on the use of a witness’s prior statements, like most of our rules of evidence, are designed to assure fair trial. Courts severely undercut the effectiveness of such rules when they pay lip-service to them while refusing to enforce them under the rubric of harmless error. I would reverse appellant’s conviction and remand the case to the court of common pleas for a new trial.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissent.

 The majority maintains that “any harm to Moore occasioned by the error was further minimized by Nolley’s continued adherence to his initial trial testimony that he was unsure whether Moore or [his accomplice] had the shotgun.” Ante at 450. I cannot agree with this assertion. When a witness adheres to his testimony that he did not know who committed a crime in question, the defendant is without a means to challenge the trustworthiness of the prior statement since he can not cross-examine the witness as to the witness’s ability to perceive the incident and to remember the information contained in the statement at the time the statement was made. Thus, in his situation, the admission of the statement has great potential for unfairness.