Court Opinion

ID: 9947498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 21:18:24.838551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:29.618459
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                     No. 84653-1-I
                      Respondent,
                                                     DIVISION ONE
              v.
                                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION
TREVOR JAMES DICKEY,

                      Appellant.

       HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — Trevor James Dickey appeals a conviction for one

count of assault in the third degree after a jury trial. He avers that his constitutional

right to a fair and impartial jury was violated by the seating of a juror with actual

bias and seeks reversal of his conviction. Because Dickey accepted the jury panel

with three peremptory challenges remaining and chose not to excuse the juror that

he now claims was biased, we do not reach the merits of this claim. Accordingly,

Dickey’s conviction is affirmed, but we remand for the trial court to strike the victim

penalty assessment and to correct the various scrivener’s errors as to the

conditions of probation in the judgment and sentence.

                                        FACTS

       On April 16, 2020, the State charged Trevor Dickey with one count of both

assault in the second degree with a deadly weapon against Scott Claggett and

assault in the third degree against one of the arresting officers, Snohomish County

Sherriff’s Deputy Gabriel Cimino, based on a series of events from the morning of

April 5, 2020. On a motion from the defense, the trial court severed those counts
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for trial. Dickey exercised his right to a jury trial on the charge of assault in the

third degree, wherein the State alleged he had intentionally assaulted Cimino.

        Jury selection began on March 21, 2022. The trial court explained to the

potential jurors that the State was charging Dickey with assaulting a law

enforcement officer who was performing his official duties at the time of the alleged

assault. The court then asked jurors to raise their hands if any of them had been

personally involved, or had family members or close friends who were “involved in

a similar type of allegation or situation.” Multiple jurors raised their hands, including

juror 16. 1 The court questioned the juror as follows:

        THE COURT: Thanks. Juror 16, who was it and what was it?

        JUROR NO. 16: It was my friend. He got in a fight with a cop in
        Arizona.

        THE COURT: How long ago?

        JUROR NO. 16: About two years ago.

        THE COURT: Were there charges filed?

        JUROR NO. 16: Yeah.

        THE COURT: Did you think that the case was handled appropriately
        or inappropriately based on the limited information you may have
        had?

        JUROR NO. 16: Inappropriately.

        THE COURT: What were the concerns?

        JUROR NO. 16: It wasn’t a fair trial for my friend.

        THE COURT: Based on that experience and your relationship with
        him, would you be able to be fair and impartial to both sides in this
        case?

        1 Once seated, juror 16 became juror 3 on the panel.     Because the issue presented centers
on jury selection, we refer to the juror in question by his venire number, 16.

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       JUROR NO. 16: No, I would not.

Neither party challenged juror 16 for cause and the court did not ask the juror any

further questions. This statement of bias was never rehabilitated. Later on,

defense counsel asked juror 16: “What if [Dickey] chooses not to testify? Would

you hold that against him even when the [c]ourt told you you could not?” Juror 16

answered, “No.”

       When the trial court asked whether the attorneys had any additional

challenges for cause, both said no. The parties were allotted seven peremptory

challenges each.     After defense counsel exercised his first two peremptory

challenges, juror 16 was presumptively seated. Defense counsel then used two

more peremptory challenges on other jurors and ultimately accepted the panel as

comprised, including juror 16, with three peremptory challenges remaining. Juror

16 was seated on the jury and deliberated.

       The State called Cimino and Officer Tyler Gaskin of the Lynnwood Police

Department to testify as to their contact with Dickey on April 5, 2020. According

to Cimino, once officers had Dickey in handcuffs, Dickey kicked him in the shin

and Gaskin testified that he watched Dickey kick Cimino. After the State’s case in

chief, Dickey took the stand and testified to his version of events where he denied

kicking Cimino “intentionally” and asserted that the officers were “lying.” The jury

found Dickey guilty as charged.

       On May 23, 2022, the State filed an amended information adding one count

of malicious mischief in the second degree concerning damage to Claggett’s

property. Dickey elected to proceed to trial on the two counts relating to Claggett,

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No. 84653-1-I/4

assault in the second degree with a deadly weapon and malicious mischief in the

second degree, which resulted in a mistrial the following day. The State then filed

a second amended information that reduced those charges involving Claggett to

one count each of assault in the third degree (count 1) and attempted malicious

mischief in the second degree (count 2). Even though it had already been resolved

at trial, the charge of assault in the third degree against Cimino was included as

well (count 3). Dickey entered guilty pleas to counts 1 and 2.

       On October 6, 2022, the trial court sentenced Dickey on all three counts

and imposed a period of confinement of eight months for assault in the third degree

on count 1, 200 days for attempted malicious mischief in the second degree on

count 2, and five months for assault in the third degree against Cimino on count 3,

all to run concurrently. The court also imposed a victim penalty assessment (VPA)

in the judgment and sentence (J&S) for counts 1 and 3, and the J&S for count 2

contained a number of conditions of probation set out in preprinted check boxes

that were not included in the court’s oral imposition of sentence.

       Dickey timely appealed.

                                    ANALYSIS

I.     Right to a Fair and Impartial Jury

       Dickey avers that his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury was

violated by the seating of a biased juror.

       Criminal defendants have a state and federal constitutional right to a fair

and impartial jury. State v. Guevara Diaz, 11 Wn. App. 2d 843, 851, 456 P.3d 869

(2020). Parties may challenge a juror for cause on the basis of actual bias as a

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means of protecting that right. Id. at 855. Trial courts also have an independent

duty to excuse jurors who have exhibited bias or prejudice and are unfit to serve.

RCW 2.36.110. But, our Supreme Court has held that, despite the established

independent statutory duty of the trial court, “‘the burden of preventing trial errors

rests squarely upon counsel for both sides.’” State v. Talbott, 200 Wn.2d 731, 737,

521 P.3d 948 (2022) (quoting State v. Farley, 48 Wn.2d 11, 15, 290 P.2d 987

(1955)). Accordingly, in criminal cases, counsel “must attempt to correct errors at

trial, rather than saving them for appeal ‘in case the verdict goes against them.’”

Id.

       While Dickey’s argument is compelling, as an intermediate appellate court,

we must follow the controlling holding of our Supreme Court in Talbott: “The

question is whether a party who does not use all of their peremptory challenges

and accepts the jury panel as presented may nevertheless appeal on the basis

that a seated juror should have been dismissed for cause. The answer is no.” 200

Wn.2d at 737 (emphasis added). Here, defense counsel had five peremptory

challenges remaining when juror 16 moved onto the presumptive panel. Rather

than using one of those peremptory challenges on juror 16, defense counsel chose

to exercise two additional peremptory challenges on other potential jurors. At the

time defense counsel accepted the panel with juror 16 seated, Dickey still had

three peremptory challenges available. Under Talbott, he has not preserved the

error for review.

       Further, the record establishes that Dickey’s decision to accept juror 16

without challenge was plainly strategic; the context of the initial exchange with the

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No. 84653-1-I/6

judge demonstrates that juror 16’s bias was in favor of the defense, not the State.

Juror 16 explained that his friend was charged with an offense after getting into a

fight with a police officer, and, immediately before he definitively stated that he

could not be fair in the instant trial, juror 16 expressed that, in his estimation, “[i]t

wasn’t a fair trial for my friend.” (emphasis added.) There is a delicate balance to

be reached between calculated defense strategy in jury selection and protecting

an accused person’s right to a fair and impartial jury.          While Dickey makes

compelling arguments against courts weighing the “kind of bias” and insists that

reversal is required based on structural error, again, we are an intermediate

appellate court bound by the holding in Talbott.

II.    Terms and Conditions of the Judgment and Sentence

       Dickey’s final challenges go to errors in the J&S for the felonies in counts 1

and 3 and the separate J&S for the misdemeanor in count 2; the trial court’s

imposition of the VPA and probation conditions that are inconsistent with the

crimes of conviction. He seeks remand for the trial court to strike these from each

J&S. The State concedes both errors and agrees that remand is appropriate to

strike the VPA and the improper probation conditions.

       Although the VPA was mandatory at the time of Dickey’s sentencing, the

legislature subsequently amended the statute and trial courts are now prohibited

from imposing the VPA on indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1; RCW

7.68.035(4). While the court failed to make an express finding of indigency at

sentencing, the State does not contest Dickey’s assertion that he is indigent and

was at the time of sentencing. Because this case is on direct appeal, the amended

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No. 84653-1-I/7

statute applies to Dickey and we remand for the trial court to strike the VPA from

his felony J&S as to count 1. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048

(2023).

      The J&S for Dickey’s misdemeanor conviction of attempted malicious

mischief in count 2 also requires correction. Though he was not convicted of a

DUI offense, the J&S, which appears to have been prepared and presented by the

prosecutor’s office, contains numerous pre-checked boxes imposing seven

separate conditions relating to “DUI/Physical Control.” We accept the State’s

concession on this matter and remand for the trial court to strike the erroneous

probation conditions.

WE CONCUR:

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