Court Opinion

ID: 9892876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 13:07:56.719789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:54.934259
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Mounts, 2023-Ohio-3861.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                             HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                              :   APPEAL NO. C-210608
                                                 TRIAL NO. B-1801231
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                   :
                                                     O P I N I O N.
    vs.                                      :

 JOSHUA MOUNTS,                              :

       Defendant-Appellant.                  :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: October 25, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith Sauter,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Paul Croushore, for Defendant-Appellant.
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Judge.

       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Joshua Mounts appeals from his conviction for

felony murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) in connection with the death of his

seven-month-old son J.F. In four assignments of error, Mounts argues his conviction

was against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial court erred in

prohibiting his expert witnesses from testifying outside the scope of their expert

reports while allowing the state’s expert witnesses to do the same, that the state

improperly presented a lay witness as an expert witness and allowed him to testify to

evidence of Mounts’s guilt, and that the prosecutor’s comments during rebuttal

argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. In his brief, Mounts pointed out on

a number of occasions that he does not challenge whether he received constitutionally

effective representation at his trial, expressly reserving that issue for another day.

       {¶2}    In reviewing the limited assignments of error Mounts raises on appeal,

we hold that Mounts has not demonstrated that the jury lost its way and created a

manifest miscarriage of justice. We further hold that Mounts waived any claim of error

regarding the scope of expert testimony and that the state did not improperly present

a lay witness as an expert witness. Lastly, we hold that, in most instances, Mounts

waived all but plain error by failing to object to the prosecutor’s comments during

rebuttal argument and that under the plain-error doctrine, these comments did not

amount to prosecutorial misconduct. In the one instance in which Mounts preserved

an objection, we hold that the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument were not

improper. Accordingly, we overrule each of Mounts’s assignments of error and affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                        Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶3}   On the early afternoon of January 25, 2018, Emergency Medical

Services (“EMS”) responded to a 911 call for J.F., who was found unresponsive after

spending the night alone with Mounts. J.F. was admitted to Cincinnati Children’s

Hospital, where he was treated for a skull fracture. Because J.F.’s mother, Kayla

Fitzugh, was told by J.F.’s care team that J.F. had no chance of recovery due to severe

brain damage, she made the decision to take J.F. off of life support.

       {¶4}   The state subsequently charged Mounts with one count of aggravated

murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(C) and one count of felony murder in violation of

R.C. 2903.02(B) in connection with the death of J.F.

       {¶5}   At trial, Kayla testified that she was the primary caretaker of J.F. and

lived with her grandparents, while Mounts resided with his parents and visited J.F.

weekly. Kayla testified that she had previously used unprescribed drugs, but had

stopped using a week after she learned that she was pregnant with J.F. Kayla further

testified that J.F. was born prematurely and had experienced at least one “Brief

Unresolved Event” (“BRUE episode”), which had caused J.F. to stop breathing. She

testified that J.F. had not had such an episode for months prior to becoming

unresponsive in Mounts’s care.

       {¶6}    She also testified that J.F. had been to the hospital six months prior to

his death for two instances of a cold. Kayla testified that J.F. was a happy baby who

had just started talking, had no recent change in temperament, and had never been

dropped. She testified that J.F.’s usual routine included waking up between 8:00 and

9:00 a.m. and that he rarely slept past that time. She also testified that J.F. slept on

his back and in his own crib.

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶7}    Kayla testified that the day before J.F. was found unresponsive, she and

J.F. had spent the day with Mounts. She also testified that she saw Mounts purchase

drugs that day. She did not notice anything unusual in J.F.’s behavior before she left

him in Mounts’s care. After realizing that she had an appointment scheduled for the

following morning, she decided to leave J.F. in Mounts’s care overnight. She testified

that she departed the Mounts residence at approximately 11:00 p.m. that evening.

       {¶8}    Kayla testified that before her appointment the following morning, she

received a text message from Theresa Mounts, Mounts’s mother, stating, “911

emergency. Call me.” Per Kayla’s testimony, EMS informed her that they were present

at the Mounts’s residence and that J.F. was not breathing. She testified that she was

told to go to Cincinnati Children’s Hospital immediately, but when she arrived,

Mounts was not there. As Kayla recounted, Mounts told her that he had begged EMS

for a ride to the hospital but was refused assistance, because he did not have custody.

       {¶9}    Kalya testified that J.F. was taken to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit

and was treated for a fracture. She stated that Mounts denied that J.F. had fallen out

of the bed when she asked. She testified that although Mounts appeared visibly upset

when she saw him in the parking lot of the hospital, Mounts never came inside the

hospital to see J.F.

       {¶10} Officer Darian Bookman, a retired officer with the Sharonville Police

Department, was a first responder at Mounts’s residence. At trial, Bookman testified

that when he arrived on the scene and asked Mounts what happened, Mounts told him

that J.F. had slept through the night and woken up crying around 11:00 a.m. He

further testified that Mounts told him that after getting up to make J.F. a bottle, he

came back to find J.F. unresponsive.       Bookman recounted his observations of

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Mounts’s bedroom, noting that the bottle Mounts referenced was still warm when he

picked it up, that the bed had been pushed against a wall presumably to prevent J.F.

from rolling off, and that he noticed a device commonly used for smoking marijuana.

       {¶11} Benjamin Casteel, a clerk for the city of Sharonville and former

firefighter and paramedic for the Springfield Township Fire Department, was also

present at the scene. At trial, Casteel testified that at the time he arrived, J.F. was

already being carried inside an ambulance. Casteel testified that Mounts was unsure

of J.F.’s date of birth and medical history. Casteel also recalled that he found it

unusual that Mounts was rather distant in discussing J.F.’s condition. He further

testified that Mounts refused his offer to take a ride with EMS to the hospital.

       {¶12} Dr. Kathi Makoroff, a doctor at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital and an

expert in child-abuse pediatrics, also testified at trial. She testified that J.F. had a skull

fracture on the right parietal bone and subdural bleed on the left side of his head. She

further testified that for a child of J.F.’s age, a fracture like this would not have

happened spontaneously, and this was an indication of some kind of trauma.

       {¶13} Dr. Dorothy Dean, a forensic pathologist at the Hamilton County

Coroner’s Office, performed J.F.’s autopsy. At trial, Dr. Dean testified that she found

bruising on J.F.’s back that could have been caused by shaking, as the marks were

consistent with fingerprints. She also testified that there was fresh blood near the

fracture site and that there was no evidence of healing, which indicated that this was

a very recent injury. Dr. Dean did not believe the BRUE episodes had anything to do

with J.F.’s cause of death. Rather, she testified that J.F. had likely died from traumatic

brain injury with a skull fracture due to blunt impacts to his head.

                                                  5
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶14} Dr. Dean further testified that J.F.’s skull fell apart in her hands when

she made cuts, which indicated that the bone had not yet formed the fibrous tissue

that cells generate when healing a new fracture. She testified that when looking at the

fracture microscopically, she saw a fresh fracture and did not see any evidence of

healing. She also testified that she provided Mounts’s expert witnesses with recuts of

histology slides from J.F.’s autopsy, but that these experts could have come into the

office to view the original slides in person. And she testified that if there had been any

substantial difference between the original and recut slides, she would have informed

Mounts’s expert witnesses.

       {¶15} Detective Brad Hondorf, a police officer for the city of Sharonville and

the lead detective in the investigation surrounding J.F.’s death, also testified at trial.

He testified that Officer Bookman gave him a report from Cincinnati Children’s

Hospital which noted suspected abuse in J.F.’s case.          He also testified that he

interviewed Mounts over the phone and Mounts told him that J.F. was not acting

abnormally before he became unresponsive. But on cross-examination, Hondorf

admitted that Mounts had told him that J.F. had a deer-in-headlight stare when he

looked at light, but Hondorf did not relay this information to Dr. Dean during the

course of his investigation. Hondorf further testified that he obtained a search warrant

and subpoena for Kayla’s and Mounts’s Facebook messages, and in these messages,

Mounts had relayed to Kayla that he was refused a ride to the hospital, because he did

not have custody of J.F.

       {¶16} At the close of the state’s case, Mounts moved for an acquittal under

Crim.R. 29. The trial court denied Mounts’s motion.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶17} Dr. Andrea Wiens, Dr. Satish Chundru, and Dr. Andrew Guajardo

testified as expert witnesses for Mounts. They were all in agreement that the blood

near the fracture site they identified was not fresh and that there was evidence of

healing, which indicated that J.F.’s injuries were not recent. Dr. Wiens also testified

that with repeated BRUE episodes, there was a greater likelihood that there was an

underlying etiology for J.F.’s condition that had not yet been found.

       {¶18} Returning from a break in her testimony, Dr. Wiens attempted to testify

as to the original histology slides that were not included in her expert report, but the

state objected to her testifying to information outside of her expert report. During a

sidebar to discuss the state’s objection, Mounts’s counsel agreed to move on from this

line of questioning. After defense counsel essentially abandoned the attempt to have

Dr. Wiens testify about the original histology slides, the trial court sustained the state’s

objection.

       {¶19} Dr. Chundru testified that Dr. Dean may have mislabeled some slides

and that he was shocked by her diagnosis of J.F. Dr. Guajardo testified that J.F.’s

injuries were a minimum of three weeks or older.

       {¶20} Theresa Mounts testified as a witness for Mounts. She testified that she

noticed J.F. was not making eye contact with her on the date of the incident and that

he had a blank stare. On cross-examination, Theresa testified that she did not relay

this information to either the police officers investigating J.F.’s death or the physicians

that were treating him. Mounts did not testify.

       {¶21} On rebuttal, the state played the deposition of Dr. Rebecca Folkerth. Dr.

Karen Looman, Chief Deputy Coroner at the Hamilton County Coroner’s Office, also

testified on rebuttal. She testified that she agreed with Dr. Dean’s findings. And Dr.

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Dean testified again on rebuttal, emphasizing that she was still confident in her

findings.

        {¶22} The jury found Mounts guilty of felony murder but acquitted Mounts of

aggravated murder. Mounts filed a motion for a new trial and an acquittal, which the

trial court denied. Mounts was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 15 years to life

imprisonment. He now appeals.

                                        Manifest Weight

        {¶23} When reviewing a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence,1 we

sit as a “thirteenth juror.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 388, 678 N.E.2d

541 (1997). Unlike our review of a sufficiency challenge, review of a manifest-weight

challenge requires us to independently “review the entire record, weigh the evidence,

consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trier of fact clearly

lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Powell, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-190508, 2020-Ohio-4283, ¶ 16, citing Thompkins at 397.                            “A

manifest-weight argument * * * challenges the believability of the evidence.” State v.

Carter, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220041, 2023-Ohio-18, ¶ 12.

        {¶24} However, we will reverse the trial court’s decision to convict and grant

a new trial only in “ ‘exceptional cases in which the evidence weighs heavily against the

conviction.’ ” State v. Sipple, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190462, 2021-Ohio-1319, ¶ 7.

“This is because the weight to be given [to] the evidence and the credibility of the

1 Though Mounts also includes the standard of review for a sufficiency challenge, he does not
develop this argument. Pursuant to App.R. 16(A)(7), “an appellant must provide an argument and
the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of
the record on which the appellant relies.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Covington,
1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190731, 2021-Ohio-2907, ¶ 25. Accordingly, we do not consider Mounts’s
sufficiency challenge here.

                                                     8
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Carter at ¶ 13.

       {¶25} In his first assignment of error, Mounts argues the state’s case was

conjectural or unsupported by the evidence. He further asserts that the only evidence

supporting the argument that he struck J.F. was that J.F. had a skull fracture and

marks on his head. But the evidence supporting Mounts’s conviction was not as

limited as he suggests.

       {¶26} Each of the state’s expert witnesses testified that there was fresh blood

near the fracture site and no evidence of healing, indicating that J.F.’s injuries were

recent. In particular, Dr. Makoroff testified that on the day that J.F. was brought to

Cincinnati Children’s Hospital, she was asked to evaluate him. She further testified

that she specialized in child-abuse pediatrics and that she believed J.F.’s injuries were

caused by some kind of trauma. Though Mounts’s expert witnesses testified to the

contrary, the jury was free to give less weight to their testimony and more weight to

the testimony of physicians who had physically evaluated J.F., including Dr. Makoroff

and Dr. Dean. “Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses at trial, we must

defer to the factfinder’s decisions whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony

of particular witnesses.” State v. Johnson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170354, 2019-

Ohio-3877, ¶ 52.

       {¶27} Additionally, Kayla testified that J.F. had never been dropped before

and that he was behaving normally before she left him with Mounts. Theresa testified

that on the day Kayla left J.F. with Mounts, she observed that J.F. had a blank stare

and would not make eye contact with her. But on cross-examination, Theresa testified

that she did not note these oddities in J.F.’s behavior when speaking with the police or

                                               9
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

J.F.’s physicians. Moreover, Theresa testified on cross-examination that she did not

see J.F. often.

       {¶28} Kayla also testified that she saw Mounts purchase drugs the day before

J.F. died and that he was the sole caregiver present when J.F. stopped breathing.

Further, Casteel testified that Mounts refused his offer for a ride when J.F. was taken

to the hospital.

       {¶29} All of this evidence, taken together, may have undercut Mounts’s theory

of the case in the eyes of the jury. Moreover, even reviewing the evidence in the best

light for Mounts, there were competing experts on both sides and lay-witness

testimony supporting the state’s version of events. We therefore cannot say that the

evidence points overwhelmingly against conviction. On this record, Mounts has

therefore not demonstrated that the jury lost its way and created a manifest

miscarriage of justice. Mounts’s first assignment of error is accordingly overruled.

                             Scope of Expert Testimony

       {¶30} Crim.R. 16(K) requires that “expert witnesses generate written reports

and that those reports be disclosed to the opposing party no later than 21 days before

trial.” State v. Boaston, 160 Ohio St.3d 46, 2020-Ohio-1061, 153 N.E.3d 44, ¶ 46. In

this way, Crim.R. 16(K) “avoid[s] unfair surprise by providing notice to the defense

and allowing the defense an opportunity to challenge the expert’s findings, analysis,

or qualifications.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ¶ 48. Further, we have

held that “Crim.R. 16(K) removes the trial court’s discretion and requires the exclusion

of expert testimony when a written report has not been disclosed in accordance with

the rule.” Id. at ¶ 52, citing State v. Hall, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170699 and C-

170700, 2019-Ohio-2985, ¶ 20.

                                              10
                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶31} Here, Mounts asserts that the trial court erred in prohibiting Dr. Wiens

from testifying to information outside the scope of her expert report. At trial, the state

objected to Dr. Wiens testifying to an original histology slide she had not seen prior to

the trial and failed to include in her report. The state asserted that Dr. Wiens was

provided with a recut slide and that she did not request to see the original slide when

she had the opportunity, and it attempted to prohibit her testimony on this basis.

When the trial court inquired as to the purpose of Dr. Wiens testifying to the original

slide, Mounts’s counsel provided contradictory reasoning. Initially, he asserted that

the recut slides had “some differences” from the original slides. Later, he asserted:

       This testimony answers that question about how [Mounts’s expert

       witnesses] have an opinion of two sides of a healing fracture. They are

       looking at the same thing, that’s my point, and nothing that they’re

       talking about here is anything new. It comes down to the critical issue

       of what these three experts were looking at. They are going to testify

       they are looking at the fracture.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶32} Then, when the trial court inquired as to the difference between the

slides, Mounts’s counsel replied, “at the fracture site, her testimony is there’s a slight

ridge that contains – and I could be misquoting this – it’s going to have bone formation

as well as healing blood within it. That is never mentioned in Dr. Dean’s report

because it’s a different slide.”

       {¶33} Before the trial court could make a ruling as to the objection, it offered

Mounts the opportunity to submit an amended expert report for Dr. Wiens. But

Mounts’s counsel stated he could “move off of this particular slide.” And when the

                                               11
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

trial court sustained the objection to the extent that Dr. Wiens would testify to new

information outside of her report, Mounts’s counsel again stated he would “move on.”

       {¶34} As an initial matter, it is not entirely clear whether Mounts was trying

to elicit testimony that these slides were substantially the same or different. But even

if it was clear, Mounts failed to preserve this alleged error for appellate review by

acquiescing to the state’s objection to Dr. Wiens’s testimony. See, e.g., State v.

Phillips, 4th Dist. Pickaway Nos. 89-CA-32 and 89-CA-33, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS

1016, 24 (Mar. 5, 1992); State v. Gentry, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 83AP-384, 1984 Ohio

App. LEXIS 8718, 3 (Feb. 16, 1984). Not only did Mounts ignore the trial court’s offer

to submit an amended expert report for Dr. Wiens, but he also agreed not to elicit

testimony from Dr. Wiens as to the original slide before the trial court ruled on the

state’s objection. Accordingly, Mounts has waived any claim of error here, and his

second assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶35} In presenting this assignment of error, Mounts also points to comments

by the state in its rebuttal closing in which the state suggested that the recut slides

were less accurate than the original slides. Mounts argues that these comments

demonstrate the prejudice of prohibiting Dr. Wiens’s testimony as to the original

slides. But because Mounts’s counsel failed to preserve an issue with regard to Dr.

Wiens’s testimony, we do not consider the prosecutor’s statements in closing

argument as to whether Dr. Wiens’s testimony was admissible. Moreover, to the

extent Mounts argues that the prosecutor’s comments themselves were improper, we

address that issue later in this opinion. In short, because Mounts did not object to

these comments at trial, we are limited to plain-error review, and the elements of the

plain-error doctrine are not met here.

                                              12
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

        {¶36} Lastly, Mounts contends without explanation that the trial court erred

in prohibiting Dr. Guajardo from testifying outside the scope of his expert report, while

allowing Dr. Looman and Dr. Dean to do the same. As the state correctly notes,

however, Mounts completely abandons these undeveloped arguments regarding the

testimony of Dr. Guajardo and Dr. Looman. Pursuant to App.R. 16(A)(7), an appellant

must provide “an argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect

to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the

contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which

appellant relies.” “[W]e will consider all cognizable contentions presented but will not

create an argument if a * * * litigant fails to develop one.” Marreez v. Jim Collins Auto

Body, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210192, 2021-Ohio-4075, ¶ 4. Thus, we overrule

this undeveloped aspect of Mounts’s claim and overrule Mounts’s second assignment

of error in full.

                        Lay Testimony as to Evidence of Guilt

        {¶37} In his third assignment of error, Mounts argues the trial court erred in

admitting the testimony of Casteel. Mounts makes two separate contentions as to

Casteel’s testimony. First, Mounts argues that Casteel, a lay witness, was improperly

presented as expert witness by the state. Second, Mounts argues that Casteel should

not have been allowed to testify that Mount’s behavior was evidence of guilt.

        {¶38} Decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d

1032.

        {¶39} As to the first argument, Mounts’s belief that Casteel was held out as an

expert witness is wholly misplaced. The state did not in any way hold out Casteel as

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

an expert, did not move to qualify him as such, and did not submit a resume or expert

report that would have given the impression that Casteel was an expert.

       {¶40} At most, the state asked Casteel about the details of his job history as a

firefighter and paramedic. And Casteel’s testimony as to these details did not qualify

him as an expert. For example, the fact that Casteel testified that he held that position

for almost two decades did not qualify or present him as a court-defined expert, but

rather emphasized his credibility on the subject just as any layperson in a seasoned job

role would have credibility to speak to the nuances of his or her own profession.

       {¶41} As to the second issue, Evid.R. 701 governs opinion testimony by lay

witnesses. State v. Graham, 164 Ohio St.3d 187, 2020-Ohio-6700, 172 N.E.3d 841,

¶ 59. The rule provides:

       If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the

       form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences

       which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2)

       helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the

       determination of a fact in issue.

       {¶42} In Graham, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the lay witness’s

testimony satisfied both requirements of Evid.R. 701, reasoning that the lay witness’s

observation of the defendant’s demeanor was relevant to showing the defendant's

evasiveness. Id. at ¶ 60. In the same way, Casteel observed Mounts’s withdrawn and

distant behavior when EMS arrived on scene, and this was relevant in showing

Mounts’s reaction to J.F.’s dire condition. Like that in Graham, Casteel’s testimony

meets both requirements of Evid.R. 701.

                                               14
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶43} First, Casteel’s testimony was rationally based on his own perception,

having been both personally present at the scene and well-versed in emergency

situations such as this one. Second, Casteel’s observations were helpful to a clearer

understanding of his testimony about Mounts’s casual demeanor when his child was

in life-threatening distress. Importantly, the jury was free to weigh this evidence

either for or against Mounts’s guilt.

       {¶44} For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting Casteel’s testimony, and the third assignment of error is accordingly

overruled.

                              Prosecutorial Misconduct

       {¶45} In his fourth assignment of error, Mounts asserts that certain comments

made by the prosecutor in rebuttal arguments amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.

Specifically, Mounts takes issue with the following comments:

       A forensic person – according to Webster – and unless the Judge gives

       you a different definition in his jury instructions, you use the common

       word or the common definition for a word – forensic means you’re

       trained in the law, trained for court.

                                          ***

       So Dr. Guajardo and Dr. Wiens are neuropathologists like Dr. Folkerth,

       but they’re neuropathologists that are trained to come to court and

       trained to testify. And you got to consider that when you’re considering

       their testimony. They’re actual professional testifiers, is what they are.

                                          ***

                                                15
               OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

[Dr. Wiens] said that the cuts weren’t always as good as the first section

that was taken, or the first cut of the section afterwards made. And as

you go down and down and you remember that it’s kind of like

somebody described it as slicing wool pants. And as it gets lower and

lower, the cut, the recut, the legal recut that they were calling it, isn’t as

good.

And so Dr. Wiens says I – she says the first one isn’t as good.

                                    ***

The Defense witnesses called it a team when they were trying to explain

why they didn’t pick up the phone and call Dr. Dean. ‘We’re not on her

team. We’re on his team.’

                                        ***

[Dr. Chundru’s] got a big stake in the game. This is his business. You

think he makes business by telling him, “I’m sorry; the doctor was

correct.” You think he makes business by advertising and by having the

newspaper like The Washington Post in here covering this story * * *

writing an article about him coming to court and testifying, saving the

day. Oh my gosh. He gave up his fee; that’s how committed he is. You

think he’s not getting a benefit from being here?

                                        ***

When you look at those medical records, I read a whole list of names to

you that I subpoenaed. And I just want you to think about how long the

trial would have been if we called every one of those doctors. Dr. Lauren

Jacobs, Amy Holden, Meredith Drake, Hee Kyung, Bernadette Koch,

                                          16
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       Marguerite Care, Julie Guerin, Maya Linn Dewan. They’re all part of

       the treatment team treating [J.F.], trying to [save] his life, and treating

       him as if he was a victim of child abuse and blunt force trauma, recent

       injuries.

                                             ***

       It’s all these doctors who – incidentally, every one of these doctors are

       licensed to practice medicine and actively practice medicine in the State

       of Ohio. Not these outside doctors who can come in here for money and

       say what they want to say and then fly back off to wherever they have to

       fly back off to and hope that you believe what they say.

       {¶46} “The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the remarks were

improper and, if so, whether the remarks prejudicially affected the accused’s

substantial rights.” State v. Dean, 146 Ohio St.3d 106, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 N.E.3d 80,

¶ 238. And when reviewing alleged prosecutorial misconduct, “we must consider all

of the prosecutor’s remarks, irrespective of whether the defense preserved an

objection.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) State v. Ford, 158 Ohio

St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539, 140 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 385.

       {¶47} Here, Mounts only objected to the prosecutor’s comment regarding Dr.

Chundru, and thus this is the only statement that is preserved for our review. But this

particular comment did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. This is the case

because evidence of bias and pecuniary interest is a legitimate subject of inquiry with

respect to an expert witness. “Reasonable inferences and deductions may be drawn

from evidence adduced at trial, * * * and an expert’s bias and pecuniary interest are

fair subjects for a closing argument.” (Citations omitted.) Hyden v. Kroger Co., 10th

                                               17
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-446, 2006-Ohio-6430, ¶ 21. Because the prosecutor was

merely highlighting the potential influence of The Washington Post’s reporting on Dr.

Chundru’s motivations to testify, the prosecutor’s remarks were not improper and did

not affect Mounts’s substantial rights. See Dean at ¶ 238.

       {¶48} Because Mounts did not object at trial to the remaining statements he

now challenges on appeal, our review of those comments is limited to plain error. See

State v. West, 168 Ohio St.3d 605, 2022-Ohio-1556, 200 N.E.3d 1048, ¶ 22.

       {¶49} The Ohio Supreme Court most recently explained the plain-error

doctrine in State v. Bailey:

       Under the plain-error doctrine, intervention by a reviewing court is

       warranted only under exceptional circumstances to prevent injustice.

       To prevail under the plain-error doctrine, [the appellant] must establish

       that an error occurred, that the error was obvious, and that there is a

       reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice, meaning

       that the error affected the outcome of the trial.

(Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) State v. Bailey, Slip Opinion No.

2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 8.

       {¶50} The court in Bailey did not explain what it meant by defining prejudice

based upon the impacts of the plain error on the outcome of the trial. However, in

previous cases, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that, to demonstrate that error

affected the outcome of the trial, the defendant must show that but for the error, the

outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise. West at ¶ 22.

       {¶51} For example, in State v. Brunson, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a

plain-error claim, because the defendant could not demonstrate a reasonable

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                          OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

probability that but for his inability to cross-examine a witness using a recorded

statement, the result of the trial would have been different. State v. Brunson, Slip

Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4299, ¶ 25.

         {¶52} Reading Bailey in concert with West and Brunson, we hold that, under

the plain-error standard, Mounts must demonstrate that a reasonable probability that

but for these comments made by the prosecutor, the outcome of the trial would have

been different.

         {¶53} Most of the comments Mounts did not object to touched on the possible

bias, prejudice, or pecuniary interest of Mounts’s expert witnesses. These comments,

including calling Dr. Guajardo and Dr. Wiens “professional testifiers,” referring to

Mounts’s expert witnesses as a “team,” and noting that Mounts’s expert witnesses were

licensed outside of Ohio, emphasized the motivation for Mounts’s expert witnesses to

testify and their potential biases. Though unartfully stated, these are not comments

which are “so inflammatory as to render the jury’s decision a product solely of passion

and prejudice.” See Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539, 140 N.E.3d 616, at

¶ 385.

         {¶54} For example, in State v. Debardeleben, during cross-examination of the

defendant’s expert witness, the prosecutor noted, “I don’t want to keep you from your

next endeavor * * * Your next baby death case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Debardeleben, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108277, 2020-Ohio-661, ¶ 38. The trial

court admonished these comments as inappropriate and prejudicial. Id. at ¶ 38. The

appellate court, however, held that the defendant did not demonstrate a reasonable

probability that but for these comments the outcome of the trial would have been

different. Id. at ¶ 39.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶55} Likewise, here, we note that the prosecutor could have exercised more

restraint and caution in pointing out the possible bias, prejudice, or pecuniary interest

of Mounts’s expert witnesses. But we do not conclude that but for these comments,

the outcome of the trial would have been different. See West, 168 Ohio St.3d 605,

2022-Ohio-1556, 200 N.E.3d 1048, at ¶ 22.

       {¶56} The prosecutor’s statement regarding potential expert witnesses for the

state who could have testified but did not, however, is more egregious. Because

Mounts was the only witness at the time J.F. stopped breathing, expert testimony as

to the cause and manner of J.F.’s death was particularly important in this case. In

reaching its verdict, the jury was necessarily required to weigh the testimony of the

state’s three expert witnesses against the testimony of Mounts’s three expert

witnesses. By alluding to additional expert witnesses on behalf of the state, the

prosecutor may have improperly tipped the weighing of expert witness testimony in

favor of the state.

       {¶57} But, despite the importance of expert witness testimony in this case, the

jury had other evidence of Mounts’s conduct to consider as well. See State v. Twyford,

94 Ohio St.3d 340, 356, 763 N.E.2d 122 (2002) (holding that although it was improper

for the prosecutor to comment on the defendant’s failure to testify, there was other

compelling evidence of the defendant’s guilt and so he was not prejudiced or denied a

fair trial). The jury may have found that evidence of Mounts’s drug use and withdrawn

behavior at the time of J.F.’s death undercut his theory of the case. And the jury may

have found that Kayla’s testimony regarding J.F.’s behavior prior to his death was

more persuasive than Theresa’s testimony, given Kayla was J.F.’s primary caregiver

and J.F. spent minimal time with Mounts and his family. Moreover, as discussed

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

above, the jury may have more heavily weighed the testimony of Dr. Dean and Dr.

Makoroff, given that they physically examined J.F. and the defense experts did not.

       {¶58} As the Ohio Supreme Court emphasized in Bailey, “the plain-error

doctrine is warranted only under exceptional circumstances to prevent injustice.”

(Emphasis added.) Bailey, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4407, at ¶ 15. To that end, the

instances in which this court, our sister courts, and the Ohio Supreme Court have

found prosecutorial misconduct under plain-error review are few and far between. See

e.g., State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 405-411, 613 N.E.2d 203 (1993) (holding that

despite the defendant’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper comments

during closing argument, these comments deprived the defendant of a fair trial where

the prosecutor disparaged defense counsel, encouraged the jury to substitute emotion

for reasoned advocacy, expressed his personal outrage, called the defendant an

animal, and stabbed a large knife into counsel’s table in front of the jury).

       {¶59} With this context in mind, we cannot conclude that this case presents

exceptional circumstances, as required by Bailey. We certainly do not condone, and

in fact condemn, the prosecutor’s insinuation that additional expert witnesses who did

not testify would have bolstered the state’s case. But without an objection from

defense counsel at trial, we are limited by the application of the plain-error standard

in our review. Given the jury had other evidence of Mounts’s guilt to consider, we

cannot conclude that but for this comment, the outcome of the trial would have been

different. See West, 168 Ohio St.3d 605, 2022-Ohio-1556, 200 N.E.3d 1048, at ¶ 22.

       {¶60} Finally, as to the prosecutor’s comment regarding the quality of the

recut slides, we note that the prosecutor incorrectly attributed Dr. Dean’s testimony to

Dr. Wiens. It was Dr. Dean, not Dr. Wiens, who analogized the difference between the

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

original and recut slides to slicing wool pants. Crucially, Dr. Dean also testified that

the original and recut slides were “substantially the same,” and that if there had been

any differences between the slides, she would have notified Mounts’s expert witnesses.

The jury also heard testimony from Dr. Dean that Mounts’s expert witnesses could

have requested to see the original slides in person but did not do so. And Dr. Wiens

never testified as to the quality of the recut slides. Therefore, no expert witness

testified that the recut slides were “not as good” as the original slides, as the prosecutor

appeared to suggest. But because the jury was able to consider the entirety of Dr.

Dean’s testimony, and because the prosecutor’s arguments in closing argument are

not testimony, we hold that the prosecutor’s mischaracterization of part of Dr. Dean’s

testimony did not amount to reversible error under the plain-error doctrine.

       {¶61} Accordingly, because the one comment to which defense counsel did

object was not improper and because our review of the remaining comments is

constrained to plain error because defense counsel did not object, we hold that none

of the prosecutor’s comments amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. We therefore

overrule Mounts’s fourth assignment of error.

                                       Conclusion

       {¶62} For the reasons set forth above, we overrule each of Mounts’s

assignments of error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., and ZAYAS, J., concur.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Please note:
       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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