Court Opinion

ID: 9561959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:19:40.808476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:08.727822
License: Public Domain

*618SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal from appellant Beam’s conviction of first degree murder and rape and the sentences imposed thereon. The district court sentenced Beam to death for first degree murder and to a fixed period of 30 years for rape. We review in response to the appeal as well as pursuant to the automatic review of death penalty sentences provisions of I.C. § 19-2827. We hold that no reversible error was committed, we affirm the convictions, and find that the sentence of death was validly imposed.
On July 8, 1983, the body of the victim of this crime, a thirteen-year-old girl, was found in the water of a drainage canal in Nampa, Idaho. She had been sexually abused and raped and her death was due to either drowning or a knife wound to her throat. The following day, a criminal complaint was filed charging appellant Beam with first degree murder. He was arrested in Nevada and gave a confession to law enforcement officials that inculpated Michael Shawn Scroggins. On July 11, a criminal complaint was filed charging both Beam and Scroggins with first degree murder, rape, and the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime.
The record reveals the following facts, much of them coming from the testimony of appellant Beam. On July 7, 1983, the victim and a friend were on their way home when they encountered Beam and Scrog-gins. Beam and Scroggins allegedly wanted to get a telephone number and the four agreed to go to the victim’s home for that purpose. Both parents of the victim were at work at that time. Once inside, the four watched television, following which Beam and Scroggins asked the girls if they wanted to go on a walk and offered them marijuana. The men stated that only one of the girls could go with them at a time. The victim agreed to go and left with Beam and Scroggins.
Beam testified to the following account of the crime.1 The three of them walked to a back yard and stopped near a tree. Scroggins had a pair of handcuffs, which he used to manacle the victim and then had oral, vaginal and anal sex with her. Beam then had sexual intercourse with the victim. The handcuffs were removed so she could dress and then replaced on her wrists. Beam and Scroggins then walked the victim toward a drainage ditch, during which time Scroggins twice told the victim they were going to kill her. The victim pleaded with them to let her go and then fell into the stream. Scroggins shoved her head under the water, then pulled her out and slit her throat. Beam then held her head under water until she stopped moving. Her body was left in the stream.
At the August 1983 arraignment and thereafter, Beam and Scroggins were each represented by separate counsel. The possible necessity for severance of the defendants’ trials was discussed at the arraign-, ment because of the existence of the confession by Beam and certain incriminating statements made by Scroggins. The State made a motion to empanel two juries to hear the case simultaneously because of the Beam confession which inculpated Scroggins and the rule in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), that a defendant’s confession may not be used by a jury in deciding the guilt or innocence of a co-defendant.
Ultimately, the trial court ruled in favor of the State’s motion to empanel two juries, holding that the cases would be severed on issues which were not relevant to both defendants, but that the cases would be jointly tried, with both juries sitting as to all other issues. The trial court reserved the right to determine which testimony would be presented to each jury.
Two juries were empaneled and sat simultaneously. Jury A heard the case against Beam and Jury B heard the case *619against Scroggins. When counsel for Beam was engaged in cross-examination, Jury B was dismissed, and when counsel for Scroggins was cross-examining, Jury A was dismissed. When testimony probativé as to Beam but prejudicial to Scroggins was about to be admitted, Scroggins’ Jury B was to be excused from the courtroom, and vice versa. Most of the testimony pertained to both defendants and was not objectionable as to either one and was therefore heard by both juries. Separate opening and closing arguments were given before each jury.
The State’s evidence at trial was not substantially controverted and established that the victim’s wrists were bruised and that there was a knife wound to her right side where one of the defendants had cut her in slicing off her underwear. A pathologist testified as to evidence of semen in her vagina and rectum. Blood was found in the crotch area of her pants, which the testimony indicated was consistent with a traumatic injury to the vagina, inflicted while she was alive. The knife wounds to the victim’s throat consisted of three or four slashes and were about four inches wide and almost an inch deep. The testimony indicated that the throat wounds were inflicted while the victim was alive, but that death was caused by drowning.
The Beam jury found Beam guilty of premeditated first degree murder and rape. The Scroggins jury found Scroggins guilty of first degree murder, finding that he did not commit the crime directly but rather aided and abetted and/or encouraged and advised its commission, and found Scrog-gins guilty of attempted rape. Both juries acquitted their respective defendant of the enhancement charge of using a deadly weapon (the knife) in the commission of a crime.
At Beam’s sentencing hearing, testimony was offered by the State and the defense, the State calling three witnesses, the director of the Canyon County Detention Center (where Beam was incarcerated), a detention center sergeant, and one of Beam’s prior cellmates. The defense called Beam. The trial court also had before it the presentence investigation and psychological evaluation reports. That testimony indicated that Beam abused drugs, was on parole for burglary when the murder was committed, had been exposed to and participated in much sexually deviant behavior, had tortured animals, was impulsive, and lacked any adequate conscience.
Following Beam’s sentencing hearing, the trial court, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515, found the existence of three statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel and it manifested exceptional depravity; (2) that Beam had exhibited utter disregard for human life; and (3) that Beam, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder, had exhibited a propensity to commit murder which would probably constitute a continuing threat to society. The trial court considered six possible mitigating factors: that Beam was 21 years old; that he had been mentally and emotionally deprived; that he had been cooperative with police and had admitted involvement in the crime; that he had limited employment skills as a cook and a mechanic; that he suffered from substance dependency; and that he was raised in a turbulent family setting. The trial court found that these factors did not outweigh the gravity of the aggravating circumstances.
The trial court sentenced Beam to death for the murder and sentenced him to a concurrent determinate sentence of 30 years for the rape in the event that the death penalty was not upheld. Scroggins was sentenced to death for the murder and received a ten-year concurrent determinate sentence for attempted rape. The Scrog-gins’ appeal is pending before this Court.
Beam asserts the following errors: (1) that the Idaho death penalty scheme is unconstitutional; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain photographs of the victim’s body; (3) that I.C. § 18-207, which provides that mental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct, is a denial of due process; and (4) that the use of dual juries in a simultaneous trial of the co-defendants deprived Beam of due process.
*620Beam asserts the imposition of the death sentence in this case is violative of the Idaho Constitution because it was imposed by a judge rather than a jury. This Court has held that neither the United States Constitution, nor ID.CONST. art. 1, § 7, requires the participation of a jury in the sentencing process in a capital case. State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1327, 79 L.Ed.2d 722 (1984); State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 3591, 82 L.Ed.2d 887 (1984). See also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984).
Although Beam also argues that Idaho’s statutory procedure in capital cases is unconstitutional because uneven imposition of the death penalty occurs based on the age of the defendant and the age and sex of the victim, we find those arguments to be without merit. Idaho’s statutorily mandated sentencing in death penalty cases was enacted to give the trial judge specific and detailed guidance in deciding whether to impose the death penalty and thereby avoid an arbitrary or capricious imposition of the penalty. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981). Section 19-2515, Idaho Code, requires a sentencing hearing at which all relevant information is to be presented. The statute lists the aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt by the trial court. The aggravating circumstances must be held to outweigh any mitigating circumstances.
The age of a victim is a legitimate consideration in viewing the aggravating circumstances listed at I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5), (6), which provide in pertinent part:
“(5) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.
“(6) By the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life.”
The age of a defendant is likewise a legitimate consideration in the evaluative process as a mitigating factor. Further, this Court has held that the legislature’s failure to list any mitigating factors in the capital sentencing scheme indicates its in•tent that the sentencing judge entertain the broadest view possible in considering any and all matters appropriate to a determination of imposition of the death penalty. State of Idaho v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 706 P.2d 456 (1985).
Beam provides no basis for his suggestion that the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily in Idaho based on the sex of the victim. Presumably, he argues that the death penalty is imposed more freely when the victim is a woman, but we find no basis for that argument in view of the imposition of the death penalty in recent cases in which the victim was a man. See State of Idaho v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 687 P.2d 570 (1984); State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), and also those recent cases in which the victim was a woman: State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 675 P.2d 33 (1983); State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981).
Beam asserts that the trial court erred in admitting four photographs of the victim taken at the time of autopsy. They included one long-range photograph of the throat wound and three close-up photographs, two showing either side of the wound and one focusing on the knife marks. Those photographs were introduced during the testimony of the pathologist, Dr. Donndelinger. Objections on the basis that they were highly prejudicial and also cumulative were overruled. Beam argues that the photographs were not necessary to illustrate Dr. Donndelinger’s testimony and served merely to inflame the passion of the jury. The trial court has the discretion to admit into evidence photographs of the victim in a homicide case as an aid to the jury in arriving at a fair understanding of the evidence, as proof of the corpus delecti, the extent of the injury, the condition of the body, and for their bearing on the question of the degree and. *621atrociousness of the crime. The fact that the photographs depict the actual body of the victim and the wounds inflicted on her and may tend to excite the emotions of the jury is not a basis for excluding them. State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 706 P.2d 456 (1985); State v. Bean, 109 Idaho 231, 706 P.2d 1342 (1985).
A defendant cannot complain that a jury was inflamed or that the jury’s emotions were excited by evidence which depicts for the jury accurately that a crime was committed and the method, fashion and atrociousness by which the crime was committed. Beam, like Scroggins, was charged with the enhancement crime of using a knife in the commission of this crime. The fact that Beam asserts that Scroggins cut the victim’s throat does not prevent the State from presenting a full and accurate account of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime to the Beam jury. State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 534 P.2d 1107 (1975).
Beam next argues that he was denied due process by the operation of I.C. § 18-207, which provides at subsection (a) that “[mjental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct.”2 Beam argues first that I.C. § 18-207 conflicts with §§ 18-114 and 18-115, which require a showing of intent during the commission of a crime. Section 18-114, Idaho Code, requires that “In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act or intent, or criminal negligence.” Section 18-115, Idaho Code defines “intent” as an element that is “manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the accused.”
Beam does not specify any instance in which evidence relating to his mental condition was offered and excluded by the trial court. Section 18-207, Idaho Code, does not prevent a defendant from presenting relevant evidence of his mental state. We hold that the three statutes are not in conflict since I.C. §§ 18-114 and 18-115 do not mandate the existence of a defense based upon insanity, but rather I.C. § 18-207 reduces the question of mental condition from the status of a formal defense to that of an evidentiary question. Section 18-207(c), Idaho Code, continues to recognize the basic common law premise that only responsible defendants may be convicted.
It is Beam’s second argument that I.C. § 18-207 violates the doctrine established by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which held that due process of law requires that the prosecution prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. It is asserted that I.C. § 18-207 impermissibly relieves the State of that burden, since it operates as a presumption that no defendant can possess such lack of mental capacity as to be unable to formulate the criminal intent. We disagree. I.C. § 18-207(c) specifically provides that a defendant is not prohibited from presenting evidence of mental disease or defect which would negate intent.
Beam finally asserts he was denied due process by the refusal of the trial court to sever the two cases and the trial court’s substitution of a two-jury, simultaneous tri*622al. This is the first case to come before this Court in which such a procedure has been utilized, although other courts have reviewed the process. Therefore, we have carefully reviewed the record to ensure that Beam received a fair trial. We find no reversible error.
The dual jury procedure was employed by the trial court here to avoid prejudice to the two defendants, for reasons of judicial economy, and to avoid the problem of the rule in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). The mere fact that a two-jury procedure was adopted to avoid the impact of Bruton does not defeat its use. United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127, 93 S.Ct. 948, 35 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973).
While no courts appear to have given a dual jury procedure a blanket endorsement, none of them have held that the procedure was a constitutional violation. See Smith v. DeRobertis, 758 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.1985) (attempted murder); United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 996, 104 S.Ct. 492, 78 L.Ed.2d 686 (1984) (conspiring to commit bribery and soliciting bribery); United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040, 103 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed.2d 608 (1983) (conspiracy to import and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana); United States v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir.1977), cert. denied sub nom. Rimar v. United States, 435 U.S. 922, 98 S.Ct. 1484, 55 L.Ed.2d 515 (1978) (stealing and aiding and abetting in theft of goods from interstate commerce); United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied sub nom. Jackson v. United States, 423 U.S. 949, 96 S.Ct. 368, 46 L.Ed.2d 284 (1975) (bank robbery); United States v. Sidman, supra (bank robbery); State of Arizona v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 673 P.2d 1 (1983) (murder); People v. Williams, 93 Ill.2d 309, 67 Ill.Dec. 97, 444 N.E.2d 136 (1982) (murder); State of New Jersey v. Corsi, 86 N.J. 172, 430 A.2d 210 (1981) (murder); People v. Church, 102 Ill.App.3d 155, 57 Ill.Dec. 679, 429 N.E.2d 577 (1981), disapproved on other grounds, 113 Ill.App.3d 305, 69 Ill.Dec. 339, 447 N.E.2d 556 (1983).
As noted in Lambright, 673 P.2d at 7, the authorities to date, including those cases which disapprove of future use of the multiple jury procedure, are unanimous in refusing to reverse a conviction merely based on the use of this procedure, without some specific showing of prejudice. Here we find no indication of prejudice to the appellant Beam.
Beam argues that prejudice resulted to him through the admission of the testimony of the State’s witness, Sandra Wahlen, Beam’s fiance. We disagree. Wahlen testified before both juries that Beam came over to her apartment after the murder had taken place. She was asked to “tell the juries what Ray [Beam] told you that evening.” Jury B (Scroggins jury) was excused from the courtroom and Wahlen then testified that Beam had told her, “I think I killed someone.” Jury A (Beam jury) was then excused and counsel for Scroggins moved that the Scroggins jury should be allowed to hear this statement, which counsel considered exculpatory as to Scroggins. Counsel for the State pointed out that her earlier statement had been that Beam had said, “I think we killed someone,” (emphasis added), and that Wahlen should have an opportunity to correct her testimony. The next day Wahlen was recalled to the stand to testify in front of both juries, where she explained the inaccuracy of her first response and stated that what Beam had actually said was, “I think we killed someone.”
Beam argues that this episode resulted in the juries witnessing both defense counsel attacking each other’s client. We disagree and hold that Beam has not established any prejudice or jury confusion in this record. Beam was incriminated as much by the witness’s second version of the witness’s testimony as he was by her first version. The apparent contradiction in Wahlen’s testimony could only have operated to Beam’s benefit if her testimony appeared contradictory and inaccurate.
*623Beam argues that the dual jury procedure should not have been used because of the antagonistic defenses of Beam and Scroggins. We disagree. If Scroggins and Beam had been tried jointly before one jury, the problem of antagonistic defenses might have been very real. The record here does not reflect any antagonistic defense problem as to Beam. Scroggins did not testify. The only testimony heard by Jury A (Beam jury) as to the acts of rape and murder came from Beam alone. Beam admitted having sex with the victim and drowning her. Jury A heard nothing to contradict Beam’s story that Scroggins handcuffed the victim, initiated the sex acts and slit the victim’s throat.
A motion for severance of trial of multiple defendants is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. I.C.R. 14. While our rules do not explicitly provide for a dual jury procedure, neither do they expressly prohibit it. A trial court may provide whatever relief from prejudicial joinder that justice requires. I.C.R. 14.
The use of a dual jury procedure in trying two co-defendants for murder was utilized in People v. Church, 102 Ill.App.3d 155, 57 Ill.Dec. 679, 429 N.E.2d 577 (1981), where the court stated:
“Moreover, where a defendant is given every opportunity to present a complete defense before one jury, cannot point to any event which confused the jury or affected its ability to render a decision fairly, and the record shows that the trial judge adequately prepared the jurors for the procedure, the two-jury trial is acceptable.” Id. 57 Ill.Dec. at 686, 429 N.E.2d at 584. (Citations omitted.)
The record before us reveals that the trial judge carefully described and explained the procedure which would be used at trial to all of the prospective jurors. After the juries were empaneled, Jury A was advised that it would determine the guilt or innocence of Beam, and Jury B was advised that it would determine the guilt or innocence of Scroggins. The members of the two juries were required to avoid all contact with members of the other panel. A bailiff was assigned to each jury. At the end of the first day of trial, both juries were sequestered at a nearby hotel in such a manner that Jury A was segregated from Jury B. The record indicates that the trial court proceeded with extreme caution throughout the trial and we find no abuse of discretion.
It is argued that this case was an experiment with the dual jury system, which should not have been used in a potential death penalty case. As noted in Sidman, 470 F.2d at 1168, “fair new procedures, which tend to facilitate proper fact finding, are allowable, although not traditional.” See also United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied sub nom. Motlagh v. United States, 464 U.S. 996, 104 S.Ct. 492, 78 L.Ed.2d 686 (1983). While other courts have used the dual jury procedure in murder cases, the death penalty has been given and affirmed in only two such cases. People v. Williams, 93 Ill.2d 309, 67 Ill.Dec. 97, 444 N.E.2d 136 (1982), and State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 673 P.2d 1 (1983). In Lambright, the Court, although affirming the imposition of the death penalty, indicated its belief that death penalty cases are inappropriate vehicles for the procedure and that the practice should be avoided in the future. We do not necessarily agree with the Lam-bright Court. We uphold the use of two juries in the instant case, but like many other courts, our decision is not to be taken as a blanket endorsement. We are not concerned with the fact that the procedure is relatively new to criminal procedure across the country. After all, the procedure is largely designed to protect the constitutional rights of co-defendants under the strictures of decisions of the United States Supreme Court, such as Bruton, supra.
On the other hand, judicial economy, in and of itself, provides no basis for the wholesale use of such procedure. We emphasize that the primary consideration is to be the protection of the constitutional rights of the defendants. Those constitutional rights may well be impacted when *624two separate trials are held with the second defendant laboring under the burden of extensive publicity generated by the first trial. In such a situation, selection of unbiased jurors in some of our smaller populated counties may be difficult, if not impossible. In appropriate cases in the future, total severance of trials for co-defendants will continue to be necessary and desirable. In other appropriate cases, dual jury procedures may well take place.
In this case, the trial judge was cautious and meticulous in his conduct of the trial before the dual juries and we see no indication whatsoever that the procedure resulted in unfairness to Beam, in any prejudice to Beam, or any violation of Beam’s constitutional rights. The decision to utilize a dual jury procedure must be carefully made with the realization of the potential for error. Here, however, we find no error.
As mandated by I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3), we have reviewed the proportionality of the sentence of death imposed here to determine whether it is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, including those collected in State v. Stuart, Idaho, (Sup.Ct. No. 14865, May 3, 1985), and in addition have considered the recent cases of State v. Bean, 109 Idaho 231, 706 P.2d 1342 (1985); and State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 706 P.2d 456 (1985); State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 687 P.2d 570 (1984); State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293 (1984). We hold that the sentence of death imposed in the instant case is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. The record indicates that the instant crime was an extremely violent, atrocious and heinous offense, carried out with excessive cruelty.
Appellant Beam received a fair trial and his guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt. We find no indication that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor. In the sentencing process, the trial court correctly determined the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and found that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the gravity of the aggravating circumstances. He correctly imposed the death sentence upon the appellant.
The judgments of convictions and the sentences imposed thereon are affirmed.
DONALDSON, C.J., and BAKES, J., concur.
HUNTLEY, J., concurs in result.

. The jury for Scroggins clearly did not believe Beam’s testimony, as it found Scroggins guilty of attempted rape and acquitted him of the enhancement charge of using a knife in the commission of the crime.

. “18-207. Mental condition not a defense— Provision for treatment during Incarceration— Reception of evidence. — (a) Mental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct.
(b) If by the provisions of section 19-2523, Idaho Code, the court finds that one convicted of crime suffers from any mental condition requiring treatment, such person shall be committed to the board of correction or such city or county official as provided by law for placement in an appropriate facility for treatment, having regard for such conditions of security as the case may require. In the event a sentence of incarceration has been imposed, the defendant shall receive treatment in a facility which provides for incarceration or less restrictive confinement. In the event that a course of treatment thus commenced shall be concluded prior to the expiration of the sentence imposed, the offender shall remain liable for the remainder of such sentence, but shall have credit for time incarcerated for treatment.
(c) Nothing herein is intended to prevent the admission of expert evidence on the issues of mens rea or any state of mind which is an element of the offense, subject to the rules of evidence."