Court Opinion

ID: 9776603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:40:02.607468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:40.164593
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s disposition of appellant’s first point of error, which I would overrule. Instead, I would reverse and remand the cause for a new trial based on appellant’s second point of error.
Appellant argues that the State did not prove the allegation in the indictment that he “knowingly escape[d] ... after [he] was charged with the offense of Theft....” (Emphasis added.) He points to the fact that the complaint was filed at 4:07 p.m., approximately three hours after the jail guards determined that he was missing.
The Texas Penal Code does not define the words “charged with,” nor did the charge given to the jury. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.07 (Vernon 1989). Words not specifically defined in a statute are to be taken and construed in the sense in which they are understood in common language, taking into consideration the context and subject matter relative to which they are employed. Howard v. State, 690 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).
The only evidence appellant introduced, to show that he had not been charged with the offense of theft at the time he escaped, was that the complaint was not filed until approximately three hours after it was discovered appellant was missing. However, by accepting appellant’s position, the majority does not permit the jury to consider the context in which the term “charged *14with” is used in the area of law enforcement. It is common knowledge among prosecutors that a person becomes charged with an offense at the point when the charges are accepted. The State presented evidence to this effect at trial. Officer Rivera testified that after he arrested appellant, he called the district attorney’s office, which accepted the charges against appellant. At that point, appellant was “charged with” the offense. This fact made the subsequent preparation and eventual filing of the complaint a few hours later a formality that' only affected the manner in which the charge was made. See Burnett v. State, 514 S.W.2d 939, 942 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found that appellant was “charged with” the offense of theft prior to his escape, given that the term “charged with” was to be construed as it is understood in common language, when considered in the context of the area of law enforcement. See Howard, 690 S.W.2d at 254; Houston v. State, 663 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984).