Court Opinion

ID: 9635816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:07:14.334372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:37.131131
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
Although I ultimately agree with the majority’s determination that the challenged supplemental charge was not unduly *400coercive, I would employ a modestly different analysis in reaching that result.
The majority criticizes the Superior Court for utilizing an evaluative framework based on federal decisions analyzing the coerciveness of charges given along the lines of the one at issue in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). Specifically, the majority finds such an approach inapposite because the second supplemental instruction in the present case was more in line with the one approved by this Court in Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971). While I agree that the instruction here overlapped substantially with Spencer, the overarching concern expressed in that decision — especially relative to the Allen charge — was the prospect of a coerced jury verdict in view of the possible effect of the supplemental instruction on jurors in the minority. See id. at 335, 275 A.2d at 303. Indeed, Allen has generally been seen as problematic in this regard — and its use was prospectively foreclosed by Spencer— precisely because of the possibility that minority jurors would feel pressured by the trial judge to vote, against their true beliefs, with jurors in the majority.
Presently, while the trial judge qualified his language with many of the beneficial aspects of Spencer, he also suggested, after learning of the 10-2 split, that “[w]hat this indicates to me is that someone is not talking or someone is not listening,” “you’re almost there,” and “you’re close but no cigar.” I believe that these types of admonitions might be perceived as being directed primarily toward the dissenting jurors, much in the same fashion as an Allen charge. See Allen, 164 U.S. at 501, 17 S.Ct. at 157 (reciting the challenged instruction which suggested that minority jurors should reconsider their position in light of the majority view). The first reference — reflecting the trial judge’s belief that “someone is not talking or someone is not listening” — might be taken by jurors as a criticism of their conduct in the deliberations. Particularly given that trial judges have limited information regarding the actual dynamics of jury deliberations as they unfold in the jury room, and jurors must adhere to their “individual judgment” and *401“honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence,” Spencer, 442 Pa. at 338 n. 7, 275 A.2d at 304 n. 7 (citation omitted), I believe these types of comments should be avoided.1 Likewise, the references to the jurors being “almost there” and “close but no cigar” seem to me to beg the question, “close to what?” In circumstances in which ten jurors favor conviction, such references could reasonably be regarded as being directed toward the minority jurors.
Because this type of language may cause an otherwise proper Spencer charge to encroach into Allen territory, I do not find the Superior Court’s reasoning untoward to the extent it sought guidance from federal Allen jurisprudence in assessing prejudice. In this regard, it bears observation that both Spencer and the federal Allen jurisprudence share an overarching goal of protecting a defendant’s right to a fair trial in the face of potentially coercive actions taken by a trial judge facing a deadlocked jury, particularly where only one or two jurors are in the minority. Furthermore, because of the endless variety of ways in which a trial judge can phrase anti-deadlock instructions — and as illustrated by this case — it is not always possible to place such charges into neat Spencer-versus-Allen categories.
I am ultimately able to join the result reached by the majority because, in my view, any potential coercion by the trial judge was adequately ameliorated by the remaining portions of the charge reflecting Spencer principles. Left to my own devices, however, I would accompany the disposition with a caveat to the effect that trial courts should do their best to adhere to the guidelines approved in Spencer, and avoid any additional types of collateral remarks that could carry a risk of having coercive effects.

. As this portion of the charge is not challenged in Appellee’s brief, however, I do not believe that it should be relied upon as a basis for relief.