Court Opinion

ID: 9467510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:50:39.955316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:23.110185
License: Public Domain

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge,
with whom WINTER, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting:
I cannot concur in the court’s restrictive interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Sound precedent persuades me that a creditor acts under color of law when he unilaterally invokes an attachment statute2 and causes a sheriff to levy on his debtor’s goods before a judicial officer has determined whether the facts justify prejudgment seizure.
In Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980), the Court restated the elements of a cause of action under § 1983:
By the plain terms of § 1983, two — and only two — allegations are required in order to state a cause of action under that statute. First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.
The debtor made both of the required allegations. This appeal, however, is not concerned with the first element. At this stage of the proceedings, the constitutionality of the attachment statute and the creditor’s good faith reliance on it are not issues. Good faith is an affirmative defense. Gomez, 100 S.Ct. at 1924. Moreover, the clerk of court and the sheriff are not indispensible parties. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
The sole issue involves the second element specified in Gomez. In the context of this case, it is whether the creditor acted under color of state law within the meaning attributed to this concept in § 1983.
Dennis v. Sparks, — U.S. —, —, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), reiterates the Court’s explanation of acting under color of law:
[T]o act ‘under color of’ state law for § 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of § 1983 actions.
Dennis reaffirmed the interpretation of § 1983 that the Court expounded in Adickes, supra 398 U.S. at 152, 90 S.Ct. at 1605, but Dennis adds this note of caution: “Of course, merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.” 101 S.Ct. 186. We held as much in District 28 UMW v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083 (4th *1071Cir. 1979), where resort to a court for a temporary injunction did not establish liability under § 1983. But in Wellmore, 609 F.2d at 1086, we carefully distinguished attachment cases, such as Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), where, as here, a creditor unilaterally invoked a statute that did not require notice to the debtor or resort to a court for a hearing before the sheriff seized the debt- or’s property.
Two Supreme Court cases, which are at opposite poles with respect to creditors’ conduct in the context of § 1983, explain the principles that govern this appeal. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978), held that a warehouseman’s proposed sale of goods as permitted by state law was- not state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. There must be something more to attribute the warehouseman’s act to the state, and at 436 U.S. 157, 98 S.Ct. at 1734 the Court explained what was lacking:
This total absence of overt official involvement plainly distinguishes this case from earlier decisions imposing procedural restrictions on creditors’ remedies such as ... Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 [92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556] (1972)....
Since the sale could be conducted without the assistance of any state officials, no claim could be made in Flagg that the warehouseman was acting under color of law by willfully participating with the state’s agents.
In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), the Court found that both elements of a cause of action under § 1983 were satisfied. From the standpoint of the sole issue now before us— whether the creditor acted under color of law — the factual backgrounds of Fuentes and this case are in all material respects similar.3
Both Fuentes and this case arose from creditors’ ex parte applications to clerks of courts for prejudgment writs directing sheriffs to attach the debtors’ property in accordance with state laws. In each case, apart from ascertaining the creditor’s facial compliance with the statute, the officials acted in their ministerial capacities. Unlike a judge, they made no factual findings or legal conclusions about the merits of the creditor’s claim or even about his justification for seeking immediate seizure. They acted at the behest of and in behalf of the creditor. Obedient to the creditor’s petition and the attachment statute, the clerk issued the writ, and the sheriff attached the debt- or’s goods. The creditor willfully participated with the officers in this joint undertaking for it was he alone who induced them to act in accordance with the law that he invoked.
Fuentes emphasizes that a creditor under such circumstances does not play a peripheral role. His participation with the officers is the heart of the enterprise. The Court at 407 U.S. 93, at 92 S.Ct. 2001 described the relationship between state law and creditors in these terms:
The statutes, moreover, abdicate effective state control over state power. Private parties, serving their own private advantage, may unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods from another. No state official participates in the decision to seek a writ; no state official reviews the basis for the claim to repossession; and no state official evaluates the need for immediate seizure. There is not even a requirement that the plaintiff provide any information to the court on these matters. The State acts largely in the dark.
Thus, Fuentes sustains the conclusion that when, as here, a creditor unilaterally invokes a prejudgment attachment statute to have state agents attach his debtor’s goods, it is apparent that the creditor acts under color of state law as a willful participant with the state’s agents in a joint un*1072dertaking. No other source endows him with the power to enlist the services of state officials for his private advantage before adjudication of the debtor’s right to possession.
To be sure, as the majority opinion points out, a private person acts under color of law when he conspires with a public official to corrupt or subvert state power. See Dennis v. Sparks, — U.S. —, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). Fuentes, however, explains at 407 U.S. 93, at 92 S.Ct. 2001 that this is not the only way in which a private person can act under color of law. Indeed, the conclusion this dissent reaches is not unique. Other courts have not questioned that under circumstances essentially similar to those in this case a creditor acts under color of law within the contemplation of § 1983. See, e. g., Welsh v. Kinchla, 577 F.2d 767, 769 (1st Cir. 1978); G. H. McShane Co., Inc. v. McFadden, 554 F.2d 111, 113 (3d Cir. 1977); Kacher v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 545 F.2d 842, 847 (3d Cir. 1976); Tucker v. Maher, 497 F.2d 1309, 1315 (2d Cir. 1974); Rios v. Cessna Finance Corp., 488 F.2d 25, 28 (10th Cir. 1973); Gunter v. Merchants Warren National Bank, 360 F.Supp. 1085, 1092 (D.Me.1973) (three-judge court.)4
I would vacate the district court’s judgment of dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....

. Va.Code §§ 8.01.533-576 (1977).

. This is not to say that the creditor in this case is liable. As previously mentioned, liability depends on a declaration that the Virginia statute is unconstitutional and on the resolution of the creditor’s good faith defense. Neither of these issues has been addressed, and I express no opinion about them.

. In all of these cases, save Gunter where the issue of damages was deferred, judgment was entered for the creditors because they acted in good faith when they attached the debtor’s property. In the case before us, the debtor alleged that the creditor acted maliciously, and this allegation apparently would satisfy the pleadings required by the cases cited in the text. Be that as it may, the question of the creditor’s good faith is not before us in this appeal. As we have previously mentioned, Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1924, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980), now establishes that good faith is an affirmative defense rather than an element of a cause of action under § 1983.