Court Opinion

ID: 9664058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:01:15.96241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:01.781443
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 85. (dissenting). "The denial of public access generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied."1 So sayeth the legislature. The majority opinion candidly admits this is not an "exceptional case," calling it only "uncommon."2 Because neither the majority opinion nor the City of Baraboo has demonstrated how this case is exceptional or even uncommon, I dissent.
¶ 86. Faced with trying to craft a standard to cover this decidedly unexceptional case, the majority opinion ends up, despite its assertions, creating a rule that unfortunately can be applied in a broad array of cases to deny access to records.
*204¶ 87. I disagree with the majority opinion on both its interpretation of the statutory exceptions to record access provided in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am) and its conclusion that there is merit in the reasons proffered by the Baraboo Police Department for denying disclosure under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(a).
¶ 88. Hempel made "a formal request pursuant to Chapter 19" and "Sec. 103.13" that the Police Chief produce copies of any and all materials gathered or considered by him in connection with the complaint against him.3 The majority opinion addresses two provisions in chapter 19, discussing first Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am) and then § 19.35(l)(a). The majority's order for considering the statutes is backwards, according to the directions set forth in § 19.35(4)(c)l.-3. and the plain language of § 19.35(l)(am).
¶ 89. The majority opinion recognizes the legislature's crystal-clear mandate as to the order in which to consider the two statutes,4 but does not take it seriously.5 The majority's order in addressing the stat*205utes demonstrates not only a disregard for the legislature's clear instructions, but also fosters its mistaken interpretation of the statutes.
¶ 90. According to Wis. Stat. § 19.35(4)(c), when an authority receives a request for access to records under either § 19.35(l)(a) or (l)(am), the authority shall first determine whether the requester has a right to inspect or copy a record under § 19.35(l)(a). If the authority grants the request for access under § 19.35(l)(a), it need go no further. If the authority determines that the requester does not have a right to access to the record under § 19.35(l)(a), the authority should then turn to § 19.35(1)(am) to determine whether the request should be granted or denied. Section 19.35(l)(am) thus grants an individual requester greater access to records with personally identifiable information than § 19.35(l)(a) grants to all other requesters who are not seeking personally identifiable information.6
¶ 91. The plain language of § 19.35(l)(am) further resolves the issue of the order of addressing the statutes. Section 19.35(l)(am) begins by saying, "In addition to any right under [§ 19.35(1)] par. (a), any requester who is an individual" may have access to personally identifiable records of that individual. Because Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am) starts with the words *206"[i]n addition to any right under [§ 19.35(l)(a)]" and does not require the government authority to balance interests,7 § 19.35(l)(am) allows greater access to information for personally identified persons than does § 19.35(l)(a).
¶ 92. Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(l)(am) gives a requester more extensive access to information in which the requester is personally identifiable than does § 19.35(l)(a) because, as the majority opinion recognizes, the purpose of paragraph (am) is to enable a person to "determine what information is being maintained and whether this information is accurate."8 Paragraph (am) must therefore be interpreted as an extended right of access to requesters seeking personally identifiable information to allow these requesters to determine the nature and correctness of the information being maintained.
¶ 93. Despite the incorrect order in which the majority opinion discusses the statutes, for the reader's ease I shall follow the order the majority opinion uses.
¶ 94. Hempel sought access to records related to allegations that he engaged in sexual harassment. His request made it clear that he was seeking personally identifiable information about himself.
¶ 95. Section 19.35(l)(am) grants any requester, "in addition" to any other right of access under § 19.35(1)(a), "the right to inspect any record containing personally identifiable information pertaining to the individual that is maintained by an authority . . . ." *207The statute then excepts certain enumerated records from the right to inspect, two of which are at issue here.
¶ 96. According to the majority opinion, the Bara-boo Police Department may deny Hempel access to internal investigation memoranda pertaining to Hempel on the basis of either of two enumerated exceptions to open records set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am)l. and 2.b.9 Because I conclude that neither of these statutory exceptions applies in this case, I would require the Baraboo Police Department to release internal investigation memoranda with information redacted as necessary.
¶ 97. The first exception on which the majority hangs its hat is § 19.35(l)(am)l. Under that provision, the right to inspect does not apply to the following records:
Any record containing personally identifiable information that is collected or maintained in connection with a complaint, investigation or other circumstances that may lead to an enforcement action, administrative proceeding, arbitration proceeding or court proceeding, or any such record that is collected or maintained in connection with such an action or proceeding.
Specifically, the majority asserts that Hempel was the "subject of an investigation 'in connection with a complaint.' The internal investigation records were maintained in connection with that complaint and are being held for possible use in connection with any future complaint."10
¶ 98. The majority opinion declares that the exception is ambiguous and turns to legislative history. The legislative history cited lends little if any informa*208tion about interpreting this exception, but the majority opinion nevertheless surmises from the legislative history that the exception in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am)l. should "not be construed narrowly." If it is not to be construed narrowly, is it to be construed broadly?11 The majority opinion denies that it intends to construe the exception broadly.12 I gather that the majority opinion is advocating that the exception be construed "just right."
¶ 99. Declaring that the exception in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am)l. should "not be construed narrowly" is incongruous. Section 19.35(l)(am) grants individuals *209seeking personally identifiable information additional rights of access as compared to access by the public. Why should the exception to this extensive grant of access be read "not narrowly"? Such a reading of the exception defeats the extensive right of access granted. Furthermore, the general rule for interpreting exceptions to the open records law is that they are to be construed narrowly.131 would follow this general rule in interpreting § 19.35(l)(am)l.
¶ 100. The majority opinion's reasoning is that "[p]aragraph (am) is not subject to a balancing of interests. . . . Therefore, the exceptions to paragraph (am) should not be narrowly construed."14 The conclusion does not follow from the premise.
¶ 101. Paragraph (am) is not subject to a balancing test because the legislature has already done the balancing. In adopting Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am) (granting access to personally identifiable information) and § 103.13 (granting access to one's own personnel files) the legislature has made the policy determination that an individual, above all others, has a right to access documents that may personally impact that individual, except in circumstances specified in the statutes.
¶ 102. So when the majority opinion says that under § 19.35(l)(am), "the person is entitled to inspect the records unless the surrounding factual circumstances reasonably fall within one or more of the statutory exceptions ... ,"15 I am unsure as to what "reasonably fall[s]" means, but the majority cannot mean that a balance test is conducted, because we know *210there is no balancing done in evaluating a request under (am).16 Rather, the majority must simply mean that the person requesting the information is entitled to inspect the record unless one of the statutory exceptions in (am) applies in that particular case. I disagree that an exception in (am) applies in this case.
¶ 103. The majority opinion concludes that the information Hempel requests falls within the exception because there was an ongoing investigation when he made his request.17 On what basis does the majority opinion reach this conclusion, when the Baraboo Police Chief specifically stated that no further action would be taken on the sexual harassment complaint? The majority relies on the fact that the Police Chief advised Hempel that if another complaint of a similar nature arose in the future, the closed complaint could be reexamined.18 Thus, the majority opinion states that "[t]he instant complaint would then be a record 'maintained' in connection with a pending complaint."19
¶ 104. There are two reasons why there was no ongoing investigation for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am)l. First, the Police Chief advised Hempel that the documents would not be released under Wis. Stat. § 103.13 because no records in Hempel's personnel file were used for the purposes specified in § 103.13. Section 103.13 requires "[e]very employer .. . upon the request of an employee . . . [to] permit the employee to inspect any personnel documents which are used or *211which have been used in determining that employee's qualifications for employment, promotion, transfer, additional compensation, termination or other disciplinary action ... ."20
¶ 105. The Chiefs explanation for refusing to release the information under Wis. Stat. § 103.13 means that there was no ongoing investigation into the employee's conduct.21 I do not determine whether the Police Chief was correct in denying the request under § 103.13. That issue is not before us. Rather I make the following point: It is hard to understand how the *212majority can assert there was an ongoing investigation in light of the Police Chiefs assurances to the contrary and his refusal to release the documents pursuant to § 103.13.
¶ 106. Perhaps because of the obstacles to fitting the request into the Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am)l. exception, the majority opinion has difficulty persuading itself that Hempel is the subject of an ongoing investigation for the purposes of § 19.35(l)(am)l. and should be denied access to records. The majority thus hedges its conclusion, stating: "Hence, to some degree, the instant 'investigation or other circumstance' was still 'ongoing' at the time of Hempel's open records request."22
¶ 107. The second reason there is no "ongoing investigation" for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am)l. is that the Police Chiefs memo advised Hempel that the document describing the complaint would be kept for three years starting June 8, 2000.23 Hempel argues that no investigation proceeded after June 2003, yet this case (and the ongoing investigation theory) persists.
¶ 108. As the majority opinion recognizes, the purpose of paragraph (am) is to enable a person to "determine what information is being maintained and whether this information is accurate."24 In keeping with this objective, I conclude that Hempel's request does not fall within the exception to access set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am)l. The information should therefore be released to Hempel with appropriate redactions as needed.
*213¶ 109. The majority opinion next addresses the exception to access to open records contained in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am)2.b., which reads as follows:
2. Any record containing personally identifiable information that, if disclosed, would do any of the following:
b. Identify a confidential informant.
¶ 110. The majority opinion quickly concludes that the phrase "confidential informant"25 is ambiguous and ranges widely in examining legislative history. The majority opinion claims that that § 19.36(8)(a)l. (relating to confidential informants to law enforcement agencies) is part of the background against which paragraph (am) should be interpreted26 and that "[t]he very existence of paragraph (am) may have facilitated [the adoption of § 19.36(8)(a)l.] about access to public records concerning law enforcement informants."27
¶ 111. However, the majority opinion never examines the definition of "informant" in Wis. Stat. § 19.36(8)(a)l., which refers to requests under Wis. Stat. § 19.35 (l)(a), or § 19.36(8)(b), which authorizes redaction of records identifying informants and release of records identifying informants. Section 19.36(8)(a)l. reads as follows:
"Informant" means an individual who requests confidentiality from a law enforcement agency in conjunction with providing information to that agency or, pursuant to an express promise of confidentiality by a law enforcement agency or under circumstances in *214which a promise of confidentiality would reasonably be implied, provides information to a law enforcement agency or, is working with a law enforcement agency to obtain information....
¶ 112. Section 19.36(8)(a)l. requires an express condition of confidentiality in exchange for information or circumstances in which a promise of confidentiality would be implied. Section 19.36(8)(b) allows the authority to release a record after redacting information identifying the informant or to release the record with identifying information intact if the public interest in open records outweighs the harm done the public by providing access.
¶ 113. After examining legislative history, the majority opinion does not define "confidential informant." The closest it comes is the assertion that the Department claims "it told witnesses that any information they provided would remain confidential and therefore this exception [Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)2.b.] would apply to prevent disclosure." Majority op. ¶¶ 39, 57. The Chiefs affidavit, however, does not state that such express promises were made.28
¶ 114. If the majority is saying that a confidential informant means any person to whom the Department promised confidentiality or any person who gives a statement under a policy of confidential investigation, the majority is allowing each governmental entity to avoid the operation of the open records law by promising confidentiality or instituting a policy of confidentiality. I do not believe the statute allows such a result.
*215¶ 115. The majority's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am)2.b. bars the release of the records is unsupported by the record before us, the statutes, or case law.
¶ 116. The record shows that the Police Department successfully redacted personally identifiable information in the documents that it did release. There is no reason it could not do the same in any other documents. The documents can be redacted pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6), which provides that "the authority having custody of the record shall provide the information that is subject to disclosure and delete the information that is not subject to disclosure from the record before release." Section 19.36(8) provides for redacting information about informants when a request for records is made under § 19.35. In order to protect the names of informants, the Police Department can simply redact the names from the record.
¶ 117. The majority opinion admits as much in discussing the records Hempel did get access to: "The redaction authorized by Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6) protected the privacy and confidentiality of certain witnesses without hiding alleged conduct."29
¶ 118. Prior case law illustrates that in the past, names have been ordered redacted when necessary to protect individuals. For example, in Linzmeyer v. Forcey,30 this court stated that the students who had provided information regarding a high school teacher " 'could be protected by a redaction of the Report in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6).' "31
*216¶ 119. In Linzmeyer, the court concluded that the names of the students should be redacted because they had privacy interests, but that the students were not "confidential informants" because none of the students gave information "in exchange for a promise of confidentiality." Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶ 20. The court went on to say that "[although it is arguable that some of the students may have acted under circumstances that reasonably implied a promise of confidentiality, this court is not in a position to determine whether that was the case." Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶ 20.
¶ 120. The Baraboo Police Department rests its confidential informants argument on its contention that it was conducting a "confidential investigation" under the City's Harassment Policy. The Harrassment Policy in the record merely states that upon receiving a complaint of sexual harassment an official shall conduct a confidential investigation.32 The Policy contains no promise of confidentiality in exchange for information.
¶ 121. If this Policy were read to satisfy the standard for "confidential informant" under Wis. Stat. *217§ 19.35(l)(am)2.b., and applied as the majority opinion applies it here, can't every public employer under a blanket of a "confidential investigation" policy protect documents from release and deny an individual access under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(2)b?
¶ 122. The record does not show any express grant of confidentiality in the present case, and the City's Harassment Policy cannot be interpreted as rendering all employees who give any information "confidential informants." In any event, there is no good reason why, like in Linzmeyer, names could not have been redacted in the present case from internal investigatory documents.
¶ 123. Unlike the majority, I would give Hempel documents under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am), redacted as needed.
¶ 124. The majority opinion then examines Hempel's request under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(a) for access to the relevant records. Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(l)(a) grants a requester the right to inspect any record and reads as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right to inspect any record. Substantive common law principles construing the right to inspect, copy or receive copies of records shall remain in effect. The exemptions to the requirement of a governmental body to meet in open session under s. 19.85 are indicative of public policy, but may be used as grounds for denying public access to a record only if the authority or legal custodian under s. 19.33 makes a specific demonstration that there is a need to restrict public access at the time that the request to inspect or copy the record is made.
*218¶ 125. There are statutory and common law exceptions to disclosure. When none applies, Wisconsin law requires a records custodian to conduct a balancing test.33 The custodian in the instant case concluded that permitting inspection would harm the public interest and that this harm trumps the legislatively recognized public interest in an open and transparent government.
¶ 126. The majority frames the issue as follows: "In other words, the custodian [of the records] must determine whether the surrounding factual circumstances create an 'exceptional case’ not governed by the strong presumption of openness."34 Both the City of Baraboo and Hempel agree that the City must show that the harmful effects that might occur in this case outweigh the presumption of disclosure.35
¶ 127. The Police Department provided six reasons it believes make the instant case an exceptional case justifying the denial of Hempel's request for records. As I shall show, however, the reasons proffered are applicable to every case in which a complaint is filed against a police officer; none is specific to the instant request for information. None demonstrates that this case presents exceptional circumstances justifying denial of Hempel's request for records. The Police Chiefs reasons have been paraded before this and other courts time and again. Yet the majority opinion proceeds as if this case is the first time the court has seen these reasons.
*219¶ 128. The reasons seem to be just a general expression of a reluctance to reveal records. Government officials (like most people) prefer to work outside the public eye. This uneasiness with revealing records runs counter to the legislature's unequivocal declaration in Wis. Stat. § 19.31 that government records are presumptively open. By accepting these reasons as valid the majority opinion appears, I think, to allow a police department (and other entities) to adopt a blanket exception to determine when its records are off limits.
¶ 129. I will state and then address each "exceptional reason" relating to the instant case in turn.
¶ 130. Reason #1. The City harassment policy provides for a confidential investigation.
¶ 131. Reason #2. Disclosure would interfere with the ability to conduct thorough, confidential, internal investigations.
¶ 132. Reason #3. "Disclosure .. . would interfere with and hamper the Cityt's] ability to ensure employees an opportunity for satisfying careers and fair treatment . . . and would impinge upon the City's right and opportunity to . . . retain competent law enforcement personnel."36
¶ 133. Reason #4. Nondisclosure is required to protect the privacy rights of individuals who cooperated in the investigation and to protect them from harassment or other jeopardy.
¶ 134. Reason #5. Nondisclosure is required to prevent loss of morale; disclosure could cause officers to choose other employment and could inhibit the City's ability to hire and retain competent personnel.
*220¶ 135. Reason #6. Documents may contain unsubstantiated or untrue information and disclosure might cause unwarranted personal or economic harm.
¶ 136. Reason #1: The stamp of confidentiality. In the same way that a prosecutor cannot "shield documents subject to the open records law simply by placing them into a 'prosecutorial file,' "37 government agencies cannot shield information simply by labeling an investigation leading to the information as confidential. The majority opinion states that a policy of confidentiality is "a factor the custodian may consider in the balancing test."38 The Policy in the instant case takes a blanket approach to all harassment investigations rather than a case-by-case approach. The City cannot, in my opinion, create its own exception to the public records statute. Indeed the Police Chief recognized that Wisconsin law can override the confidentiality of the investigation.39
¶ 137. If this reason is acceptable for denying access, then any governmental entity can institute a confidentiality policy and thereby exempt records from Wisconsin's Open Records Law. Confidentiality cannot be the end-all and be-all. Records can be redacted to protect privacy.
¶ 138. Reason #2: Inability to conduct thorough, internal investigations. This reason is generic and may be given for any investigative record. In Pangman v. Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d 1070, 1077, 473 N.W.2d 538 (1991), the Milwaukee Police Department gave the same rea*221son for denying disciplinary action materials, in that instance to the public, using almost precisely the same words as used in the present case.
¶ 139. Reason #3: Inhibit ability to hire and retain personnel. Again, this is a stock reason for refusing release of an employee record. In Village of Butler v. Cohen, 163 Wis. 2d 819, 828, n.3, 472 N.W.2d 579 (1991), the village gave substantially this same reason for refusing to release police personnel records to the public.
¶ 140. Reason #4: Privacy rights. Again, a generic explanation applicable to all government entities and all personnel records. This reason was also given in Village of Butler, 163 Wis. 2d at 828, n.3. As the legislature has provided, records can be redacted.
¶ 141. Reason #5: Loss of morale and difficulty hiring and retaining officers. Again, standard reasons in several cases. They were given in Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d at 1083, 1089, and in Village of Butler, 163 Wis. 2d 828, n.3.
¶ 142. Reason #6: Protecting employees from personal (reputation) and economic harm. This same general reason was proffered by the police department in Pangman v. Stigler, 161 Wis. 2d 828, 833, 468 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1991) and in Zellmer, 163 Wis. 2d at 1079. Protecting persons from damage to reputation and economic harm is a good reason if it applies to the specific case, rather than as a reason for never allowing access to any officer's files. Here the employee is asking for information about himself. The names of other persons may be redacted as needed.
¶ 143. Thanks to the majority opinion today, we can call these reasons the "Exceptional Six," when in reality not one of the reasons is uncommon, unique, or "exceptional" to this particular case. Each of these *222reasons applies to almost every file involving some sort of investigation at every governmental entity.
¶ 144. Indeed, the majority opinion does not even appear to be persuaded by these reasons, but sets the bar low enough that it nevertheless accepts them. The majority opinion's analysis of the reasons is often noncommittal. For example, the majority, while not "fully endorsing"40 the City's argument, finds Reason #5 "plausible."41 The purpose of the balancing test is to determine whether an exception can override the strong presumption of records disclosure that is vital to the functioning of Wisconsin’s government. A "plausible" reason should not be sufficient to defeat the presumption established by the legislature.
¶ 145. The majority also concedes that the second part of Reason #5, namely, the inability of the Police Department to hire and retain quality employees because of fear that personnel records will be released, is weak: "Public employees are frequently subject to a greater degree of public scrutiny than their private counterparts. This scrutiny comes with the territory."42 The only argument the majority presents for still allowing this reason to "slightly" weigh in the Department's favor is that this case deals with rank-and-file officers who should expect more personal privacy than a prominent public official43
¶ 146. It is unclear from the rest of the majority's hesitant language and analysis how the majority concludes the balancing test weighs in favor of nondisclosure. With this weak application of the balancing test *223under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(a), the majority opinion renders the undistinguished, exceptional.
¶ 147. The majority opinion denies it is creating a "blanket exception to the open records law .. . "44 when in fact that may be exactly what it is doing, provided of course that the next police department (or any other governmental entity) that receives an open records request repeats the "Exceptional Six" for the benefit of the court.
¶ 148. For the reasons set forth, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 149. I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion.

 Wis. Stat. § 19.31. The Wisconsin Legislature's Declaration of Policy as to access to governmental records reads as follows:
In recognition of the fact that a representative government is dependent upon an informed electorate, it is declared to be the public policy of this state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those officers and employees who represent them. Further, providing persons with such information is declared to be an essential function of a representative government and an integral part of the routine duties of officers and employees whose responsibility it is to provide such information. To that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with the conduct of governmental business. The denial of public access generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied.

Id.

 Majority op., ¶ 65.

 Letter from Attorney Aaron N. Halstead to Chief Lobe (Jan. 24, 2001), reproduced in Petitioner's Appendix at 135.
An open records request need not specify the statutory provision under which it is being made. The open records law does not require "a request to contain any 'magic words' nor [does it] prohibit the use of any words." ECO, Inc. v. City of Elkhorn, 2002 WI App 302, ¶ 23, 259 Wis. 2d 276, 655 N.W.2d 510 (Open records request made to city mistakenly cited the federal Freedom of Information Act rather than chapter 19; deemed sufficient). The request is sufficient if " 'it reasonably describes the requested record or the information requested.'" Id., ¶ 23 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(h)).

 Majority op., ¶ 29.

 Majority op., ¶ 32. The majority opinion nevertheless persists in writing that if Hempel cannot get the record under *205§ 19.35(1) (am) he "will always have the right to seek records under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(a)." Majority op., ¶ 56.

 This order is also set forth in Wisconsin Legislative Council Information Memorandum 92-13, New Laws Relating to Personal Information Contained in State and Local Government Records (1991 Wisconsin Acts 39, 269 and 317) at 17-18 (June 16, 1992).
Although the majority opinion relies on this memorandum, it relates to laws that were later revised.

 Majority op., ¶ 56.

 Majority op., ¶ 55.

 Majority op., ¶ 57.

 Majority op., ¶ 57.

 Although an interesting exploration of legislative and executive wordsmithing, the majority opinion's review of selected excerpts of legislative history offers no conclusive interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.35(l)(am)l. or 2.b. in keeping with or contrary to the plain language of the statute.
The majority opinion seizes on the governor's partial veto as indicating that exceptions have to be interpreted broadly because the governor's partial veto eliminated some legislative language. Majority op., ¶ 48 n.13, ¶ 50. Governor Thompson's full veto message explains the veto as follows:
Section 26s specifies that records under the Personal Information Practices Law that are collected or maintained in connection with a complaint, investigation or circumstances that may lead to an enforcement action, court proceeding or other proceeding may be released one year after the conclusion of the action, proceeding or investigation or one year after the filing of a complaint. I am vetoing this provision because it would require prosecutors and investigators to turn over confidential files only one year after the filing of a complaint, at which time a sensitive complaint investigation may not be concluded. Also, I do not believe that confidential investigation files should be available for inspection by criminal defendants at any time.
Governor Tommy Thompson, Veto Message to Senate Bill 483 (available at Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wl).

 Majority op., ¶ 56 n.14.

 Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984).

 Majority op., ¶ 56.

 Majority op., ¶¶ 27, 82.

 Majority op., ¶ 27 ("These requests are not subject to any balancing test; the legislature has done the balancing by enacting statutory exceptions to the disclosure requirements.").

 Majority op., ¶ 57.

 Majority op., ¶ 37.

 Majority op., ¶ 37.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 103.13(6) provides the following exceptions to records open to employees:
(6) Exceptions. The right of the employee or the employee's designated representative under sub. (3) to inspect his or her personnel records does not apply to:
(a) Records relating to the investigation of possible criminal offenses committed by that employee.
(b) Letters of reference for that employee.
(c) Any portion of a test document, except that the employee may see a cumulative total test score for either a section of the test document or for the entire test document.
(d) Materials used by the employer for staff management planning, including judgments or recommendations concerning future salary increases and other wage treatments, management bonus plans, promotions and job assignments or other comments or ratings used for the employer's planning purposes.
(e) Information of a personal nature about a person other than the employee if disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the other person's privacy.
(f) An employer who does not maintain personnel records.
(g) Records relevant to any other pending claim between the employer and the employee which may be discovered in a judicial proceeding.

 See majority op., ¶ 11.

 Majority op., ¶ 37 (emphasis added).

 Majority op., ¶ 37.

 Majority op., ¶ 55.

 Majority op., ¶ 44.

 Majority op., ¶ 55.

 Majority op., ¶ 53.

 The Chiefs affidavit merely interprets the Harassment Policy's stating that a confidential investigation would be conducted as a promise of confidentiality. Hempel's brief in this court seems to accept that such promises were made.

 Majority op., ¶ 70.

 Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811.

 Majority op., ¶ 42 (quoting Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶ 40).
*216Consistent with Linzmeyer, this court in an earlier case upheld a denial of access to records because "portions of the records ... would reveal the name of a confidential informant who had been given a pledge of confidentiality by the Department [of Revenue] in exchange for the information [concerning the informant's employer's tax returns]." Mayfair Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Baldarotta, 162 Wis. 2d 142, 149, 469 N.W.2d 638 (1991).

 The relevant portion of the policy prohibiting sexual harassment reads as follows: "Upon receiving a complaint of harassment prohibited by this policy, the department head, supervisor or official to whom the complaint was made should promptly report the complaint to the Mayor and the Chairperson of the Personnel Committee and also conduct a confidential investigation of the alleged harassing activity."

 Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶ 25 (citing Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 183-84, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996)); see also majority op., ¶ 28.

 Majority op., ¶ 63.

 Brief of City of Baraboo at 5; Brief of Hempel at 20-21.

 Majority op., ¶ 15 (quoting Chief Kluge's reasons for denying access to records).

 Nichols v. Bennett, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 274, 544 N.W.2d 428 (1996).

 Majority op., ¶ 71.

 Appendix of Defendants-Respondents, Exhibit 6, A-153, Letter to Attorney Aaron Halstead from Chief of Police Dennis Kluge, March 13, 2001.

 Majority op., ¶ 74.

 Majority op., ¶ 74.

 Majority op., ¶ 75.

 Majority op., ¶ 75.

 Majority op., ¶ 73.