Court Opinion

ID: 9860456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:22:36.136958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:24:21.395535
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While I concur with the majority in Issues I, II, and III, I must respectfully dissent to the position taken by the majority on Issue IV. I find no grounds for concluding that the maximum sentence im*1024posed by the trial judge was manifestly unreasonable and that ten (10) years aggravation rather than twenty (20) would be reasonable. I suggest that it is not proper in our review of a sentence to impose our judgment over that of the trial judge. It is our duty to change or set aside a sentence that is manifestly unreasonable. The record shows the trial judge here carefully and judiciously considered all of the elements required under Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7 and gave sound reasons supported by the record and the evidence for imposing the sentence he did. The sentence was within the terms set by the Legislature. I find the same problem here that was apparent in Hill v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1103, in which I also dissented and for similar reasons. I fear we may be sending confusing messages to trial judges in interpreting their role and ours in setting sentences. A review for the purpose of determining whether or not a sentence is manifestly unreasonable presumes more than simply substituting our judgment for that of the trial judge. That is what I think the majority is doing here and I must therefore dissent. I would affirm the trial court on all issues.
GIVAN, J., concurs.