Court Opinion

ID: 9736390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:54:27.963099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:06.392012
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BURKE, dissenting: The majority declines to address the State’s contention that defendant forfeited the sentencing credit issue in this case, stating: “The State argues in its brief to this court that defendant forfeited review of the credit issue on appeal because he never requested credit for the time he spent on probation during the sentencing proceeding and did not raise the issue in posttrial motions. Defendant does not dispute the State’s assertion that the claim was forfeited. However, defendant maintains that the forfeiture rule was properly relaxed by the appellate court. We need not address the forfeiture argument raised by the State, or defendant’s arguments in reply, because the State did not include the forfeiture issue in its petition for leave to appeal to this court. Supreme Court Rule 315(b) states that a petition for leave to appeal must contain ‘a statement of the points relied upon for reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court.’ 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b)(3). Rule 315(b) also requires ‘a short argument (including appropriate authorities) stating why review by the Supreme Court is warranted and why the decision of the Appellate Court should be reversed or modified.’ 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b)(5). The State’s petition for leave to appeal does not meet either of these requirements with respect to the issue of forfeiture. Accordingly, we decline to consider the State’s forfeiture argument, as it was not properly preserved for our review. See People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 269 (2005), citing People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309, 318 (2003); see also People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 347 (2000) (‘The rules of waiver are applicable to the State as well as the defendant in criminal proceedings, and the State may waive an argument that the defendant waived an issue by failing to argue waiver in a timely manner’). We turn to the issues properly raised by the State.” 228 Ill. 2d at 508-09. This reasoning is at odds with this court’s decision in Dineen v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill. 2d 248 (1988). In Dineen, the court stated the following about when issues not mentioned in a petition for leave to appeal would be considered by the court: “Our Rule 315(b), which is applicable to both civil and criminal appeals (see 107 Ill. 2d R. 612(b)), requires that the petition for leave to appeal set out ‘(3) a statement of the points relied upon for reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court; *** and (5) a short argument (including appropriate authorities) stating why review by the Supreme Court is warranted and why the decision of the Appellate Court should be reversed or modified.’ (107 Ill. 2d Rules 315(b)(3), (b)(5).) We have previously held that we need not consider an argument that a party raises in a later brief but fails to raise in its petition for leave to appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Ward (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 516, 522-23; People v. Anderson (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 39, 43-44.) In this case, then, the plaintiffs’ failure to specifically raise in their petition for leave to appeal the issue of the effect of the City’s retention of the Illinois Municipal Code provisions may be considered a waiver of the argument for purposes of the proceedings in this court. To be sure, the waiver rule is not a jurisdictional requirement, but a principle of administrative convenience. This is made clear by Rule 366(a)(5), which provides that a reviewing court has the authority to ‘enter any judgment and make any order that ought to have been given or made, and make any other and further orders and grant any relief *** that the case may require.’ (107 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5); see Hux v. Raben (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 223, 224 (discussing relationship between Rule 366(a)(5) and Rule 341(e)(7), pertaining to contents of briefs on appeal).) Thus, a party’s failure to assert the argument in the petition for leave to appeal does not preclude consideration of the question on review, and this court has previously considered matters that an appellant omitted from its petition for leave to appeal. (E.g., Genaust v. Illinois Power Co. (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 456, 462; Schatz v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 143, 144-45.) In both Genaust and Schatz the additional issues that the appellants raised on review in this court concerned portions of their causes of action that had been presented to and adjudicated by the lower courts. The situation here is far different. In this case, the plaintiffs’ new argument poses an alternative theory of the case, one that was not discernible from an examination of the proceedings in the courts below. Thus, in allowing the plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal, we had no inkling of their new theory of the case, which they then asserted, following the allowance of their appeal, in support of the judgment of the circuit court. Clearly, we have the authority to consider the plaintiffs’ new argument. But the resolution of the question is by no means clear, and we decline to consider here an argument that was not presented in the proceedings below and is raised here as an afterthought. We note, however, that our decision in this appeal is made without prejudice to the rights of persons who are not parties to the present action to raise the same argument in a future case, or to the rights of the present plaintiffs to raise the argument in a future case arising from a different cause of action. See Housing Authority v. YMCA (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 246, 251-52.” Dineen, 125 Ill. 2d at 265-66. Thus, according to Dineen, while this court has the authority to review an issue that is not raised in a petition for leave to appeal, it retains the discretion not to do so as a matter of administrative convenience. That discretion, however, is not unbounded or exercised arbitrarily. Rather, the court will decline to reach an issue not raised in the petition for leave to appeal when that issue is new to the case and is “not discernible from an examination of the proceedings in the courts below.” Dineen, 125 Ill. 2d at 265-66. Moreover, as this court has noted, review of an issue not specifically mentioned in a petition for leave to appeal will be appropriate when that issue is “inextricably intertwined” with other matters properly before the court. Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 198 Ill. 2d 420, 430 (2002). Applying these principles here, the State’s forfeiture argument may be considered by the court. The forfeiture issue is not something new to the appeal, but a matter argued by the parties below and ruled on by the appellate court at some length. See 366 Ill. App. 3d at 453-55. Morever, the forfeiture issue appears “inextricably intertwined” with the appellate court’s statutory interpretation and voidness analysis. See 366 Ill. App. 3d at 453-55. In addition, defendant before this court does not object to the State’s raising the forfeiture issue. Instead he argues only that the appellate court properly relaxed the forfeiture rule. The majority’s reasoning in this case turns the failure to mention an issue in a petition for leave to appeal into a de facto jurisdictional bar. Applying the majority’s approach, the court will identify, sua sponte, an issue not mentioned in the petition for leave to appeal and will decline to consider it, even if it was addressed at length by the appellate court below, and even if both parties have addressed the merits of the issue in their respective briefs. Indeed, that the majority intends to treat the failure to mention an issue as a jurisdictional bar is made clear by the fact that the majority recognizes the State’s omission of the forfeiture issue for the first time on consideration of the petition for rehearing. When this court filed its original opinion in this case, the court did not identify any problem with the State’s petition for leave to appeal and, instead, answered the State’s forfeiture argument on the merits. Recognizing the omission at this late date, without any prompting by the parties in their briefs or the petition for rehearing, points to only one reasonable conclusion: the majority has determined that the court has an obligation to consider the omission of an issue from a petition for leave to appeal, on its own motion, at any time — just as the court has an obligation, at any time, to examine its own jurisdiction. Treating the failure to raise an issue in a petition for leave to appeal as a jurisdictional bar may be appropriate as a matter of policy. I express no opinion on that question. My concern in this case is simply with providing clarity to the attorneys who file petitions for leave to appeal in this court. Before barring review of the State’s forfeiture argument, the majority should address Dineen and Hansen, explain why it is necessary to treat the omission of an issue from a petition for leave to appeal as the equivalent of a jurisdictional bar in this case and, most importantly, provide a clear statement as to what this court will henceforth expect to be included in petitions for leave to appeal. Because the majority declines to take these steps, I respectfully dissent. JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.