Court Opinion

ID: 9700073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:09:00.900781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:03.851516
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). The Hon. Charles O. Arch, circuit judge of the county of Hillsdale, in his written findings denying proponent’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, stated:
“A review of the testimony and other evidence in this case and of the pleadings of the respective parties convinces the court that there was evidence before it and the jury, which if believed, would support the verdict rendered.”
I agree with Judge Arch, and, hence, this dissent.
Three special questions were submitted to the jury under the provisions of Court Rule No 37, § 6 (1945), and CL 1948, § 618.39 (Stat Ann § 27.1019). These questions were:
“Question 1. Was Ollie Anderson on August 15, 1938, mentally incompetent to make the will in question in this case by reason of an insane delusion or delusions, as claimed by the contestant in this case ?”
The jury’s answer was “yes.”
“Question 2. Was Ollie G. Anderson on August 15, 1938, of sufficient mental competency to know and *179understand the nature and extent of her property interests ?”
The answer to this question was “no.”
“Question 3. Was Ollie Anderson on August 15, 1938, capable of comprehending and appreciating the claim that her son, Floyd Anderson, had upon her bounty?”
The answer to this question was “no.”
I believe the record sustains appellee’s statement that:
“The instant case is unusual in the line of will contests for several reasons. In the first place, we have been unable to find any recently reported case where so many of the persons who intimately knew the decedent as friends and neighbors, were willing to come in and testify as to her mental condition. Nowhere in the recently reported cases have we found one where special questions were used as was the case here with the answers to all such special questions being adverse to proponent.”
One of the persons who intimately knew the decedent was Earl Hoyt, a well-known insurance man in Blissfield, and who had been acquainted with decedent for many years. Proponent and appellant examined Hoyt and no motion to strike was made to the following questions and answers:
“Q. Mr. Hoyt, are you related to some of the parties in this room?
“A. No, sir * t *
“Q. Is it your testimony, Mr. Hoyt, that on the 15th of August, 1937 {sic), when that will was actually made by Ollie Anderson she did not have the mental capacity to make a will and understand it, a will of that kind?
“A. In my opinion, yes.
*180“Q. In. yonr opinion she did not have the mental capacity to understand and make that simple will?
“A. That is my opinion.
“Q. And you base that on those things you have-told us here?
“A. I base it on my personal observation.”
G-erald Kropscot testified as follows:
“Q. Did you know Ollie Anderson?
“A. Yes, we were acquainted with the Andersons shortly after I moved to Litchfield, when I was a boy.
“Q. Have you seen and talked to her on various occasions ?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Have you seen and talked to her on occasions prior to the time her husband died?
“A. Oh, yes, I used to go there different times to exchange work, that is corn husking, when I was a kid at home, and I also used to work for Fred once in a while a day to help out when he was sick or something.
“Q. Now testimony in this case shows that Mr. Anderson, Fred Anderson, died in December, 1937. Did you have occasion in the summer of 1938 to go to that farm?
“A. Yes, I went out there in 1938 with the idea of trying to buy the farm.
“Q. Who did you go to talk to ?
“A. Mrs. Anderson, Ollie.
“Q. You wanted to buy the farm, is that right?
“A. Yes. * * *
“Q. I will ask you whether or not you did purchase the farm?
“A. No, we did not. * * *
“Q. Now was there anything about her condition in 1938 and in 1945 when you talked to her that bore on your decision to purchase or not purchase the farm?
“A. Yes, I felt she wasn’t in any shape to sell it. I didn’t feel I wanted to buy it. * * * She wasn’t *181anything like she used to be when I used to go there prior to the time Fred died, a few years before that.
“Q. What was the difference, how can you describe the difference in her actions?
“A. Kind of hard to describe. She just didn’t seem - — she seemed confused and bewildered about everything.”
Mrs. Hall, who takes under the will with her 2 sons, testified:
“Q. Let me ask you this: you went out to the home of Mrs. Lamn, didn’t you?
“A. I did.
“Q. Didn’t you ask Mrs. Lamn if she had read the will?
“A. I asked Mrs. Lamn if she knew about the will. * *
“Q. Didn’t you say the following too, in the presence of Mrs. Lamn, ‘We have plenty, we don’t need it.’
“A. No, Mrs. Lamn said that to me.
“Q. Didn’t you say further, ‘Why didn’t she leave it to my mother, why me,’ didn’t you say that?
“A. Yes, I said they were closer. * * *
“Q. All right. Now will you please answer this question for me, wasn’t this statement made by you in the presence of Mrs. Lamn in her home, in a conversation that took place there, where the question of her mental competency had been brought up, didn’t you say, ‘Ollie Anderson had been losing her mind for a long time?’
“A. No, sir. * * *
“Q. You did not say anything in Mrs. Lamn’s home which would lead anyone to believe that there was any doubt in your mind about the mental competency of this woman, of Mrs. Ollie Anderson?
“A. No. I never did.
“Q. You didn’t say in Mrs. Lamn’s home that she had been losing her mind for years, or for a long time?
“A. No, sir, Mr. Dimmers, no.
*182“Q. And your testimony, you are willing your testimony should stand or fall on that, the truth of that answer you made, is that right?
“A. That’s right.
“Q. That is all.”
Yerna Lamn testified as follows:
“Q. Do you have any interest in this ease?
“A. No.
“Q. You haven’t anybody who is a beneficiary of this will?
“A. No.
“Q. Now Mrs. Lamn, do you recall an evening in September of 1956 when Mrs. Grace Hall and her husband were at your home?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Were you discussing with her matters relating-to this will, or did she discuss them in your presence?
“A. She seemed to want to know what I knew about it, that’s the impression. * * *
“Q. All right, what did she say to you. Did she have a copy of the will there?
“A. Yes, she asked me if I had read it, and then she produced a copy from her purse and gave it to me to read.
“Q. What did she say there in addition?
“A. She said, ‘I don’t know why she did this, I didn’t know anything about it.’ She said, ‘Really she didn’t leave me anything. I am 9 years older than Floyd.’
“Q. What—
“A. Well the inference would be that she didn’t give the property to Mrs. Hall, but to her 2 sons. iff * #
“Q. All right. What else did she say to you?
“A. She said, ‘We don’t need it, we have plenty.’
“Q. Did she say anything about her mother?
“A. Yes, she said, ‘Why didn’t she give it to my mother, why to me?’
*183“Q. Now did she relate to you. later in the evening anything about a conversation which she had, or anything about how the will was prepared, who took Mrs. Anderson to have it prepared?
“A. Yes, that was discussed.
“Q. "What did she say about that?
“A. Well, at first she said she knew nothing about it, then later she said, ‘I did take her, she called me, and I took her, but I didn’t know anything about it, about the will, because I stayed out in the waiting room.’ * * *
“Q. Well, you remember I asked her from the witness stand whether she had made a statement in your presence that Ollie had been losing her mind for a long time, or words to that effect. Do you remember that?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Now will you tell this jury if there was any statement made by her to that effect, and the circumstances concerning it: you said her husband was there ?
“A. Yes. Mr. Hall asked me, he turned to me and said, ‘When do you think she began losing her mind?’ I didn’t answer, and Mrs. Hall spoke up and said, ‘She had been losing it for a long time.’
“Q. That is the statement of Mrs. Hall, who took the witness stand and said her case would rise or fall by that statement?
“A. Yes.”
Arlene Anderson (daughter-in-law of deceased) testified:
“Q. Now while you are talking about Mrs. Hall have you had any conversations, or have there been any conversations in your presence with Mrs. Hall about the mental competency of Ollie Anderson?
“Q- When was that?
“A. Well, back in 1938. We left our little house downtown, we still paid rent on it and had our furni*184ture down there, and as I walked into the house one day Ollie Anderson and Grace Hall didn’t hear me enter the house, and when I reached the double doors into the living room Ollie was down on her knees pushing her hands into a little throw rug to show Grace Hall the sand in the rug, and I went on, and the next day Grace took me down to the house to see if our rugs were molding by being shut up, and we were talking about the things she had done, and Grace told me, ‘Don’t pay any attention to her, she’s touched in the head. She is just like her sister, and her sister was crazy.’
“Q. This was in the summer of 1938?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Have you had any other conversation with Mrs. Hall when the mental competency of Ollie Hall [Anderson?] was discussed?
“A. Yes, a couple times. At the funeral, Grace and her family stayed at our place.
“Q. Whose family [funeral?] ?
“A. Ollie’s. Grace stayed at our house, and she said it was too bad Ollie had to go, but it was just as well, as long as she wasn’t in any mental state to enjoy herself. She said ‘After the death of Uncle Fred, Aunt Ollie hasn’t been the same since,’ and I said, ‘I know, I lived with her, she acted like she cracked up,’ and she said ‘Yes, she did.’ Like that. They came back the following Monday after we found out about the will, and Grace said, T told her to stay away from that cemetery, and join the church, do something that would take up her mind and get away from herself so she wouldn’t be so depressed.’ ”
Deceased visited her cousin, Florence Wooden, once or twice a week. Florence Wooden testified:
“Q. Mrs. Wooden, you recall when her husband, Fred, died?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What effect did that seem to have on Mrs. Anderson?
“A. Very bad.
*185“Q. You say very bad — can you describe by her actions, or what she did, what you mean by that?
“A. Well, her head, she complained so with her head.
“Q. She complained so with her head?
“A. Yes.
“Q. What did she say about her head?
“A. She said there was a pressure.
“Q. Those were the words she used, there was a pressure?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did this situation which you have described, exist in the year 1938?
“A. Yes, because she told me so.
“Q. She told you so?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Now will you tell us whether or not, whether you made any observations as to the way she would talk, whether she would talk coherently, or whether she made disconnected sentences, or stop in the middle of sentences, or what?
“A. Yes, in the middle of a sentence she would stop, then she would say, What was I talking about?’
“Q. Did you ever see her make any gestures towards her head?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What did she do? _
_ “A. She would grab it right here (indicating).
“Q. You have seen her do that?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. In the year 1938?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Now subsequent to the year 1938, let’s take the year 1939, she visited your home?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Was there — did that condition which you have described, the things she did, get any better or worse ?
“A. They was getting worse.
“Q. Getting worse — what would you say, tell us as to whether or not that situation which you have *186previously described, continued then during the next years and up to her death?
“A. It did. * * *
“Q. Now you had an opportunity to talk with her ■on many different occasions?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You have described her condition, is that right?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Based upon your talking with her, your observation of her condition, the things which you have •described, I will ask you whether or not you have an opinion as to whether or not she knew the nature ■of her property interests? I will say 1938?
“A. No, I don’t think so.”
In Fabbro v. Soderstrom, 252 Mich 455, 458, 459, this Court stated:
“The jury is the trier of the facts. If their verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, it is the duty of the trial judge to correct it. He has an ■opportunity to do so in passing on a motion for a new trial. When he has weighed the evidence and approved of the verdict, this Court will not disturb it unless there are very clear reasons for doing so.”
In Schneider v. Pomerville, 348 Mich 49, we said, at page 54:
“A jury’s verdict-view of facts is entitled to an ■even higher degree of appellate respect than is a judge’s verdict-view of the same facts, learned though the judge may be in law. For reasons known well to students of American history, a finding of fact by ‘the twelvers’ is more apt to be sound than that of one man.”
In In re Calhoun Estate, 346 Mich 227, this Court ■considered a jury verdict for contestants in a will ■contest. We there stated (pp 232, 233):
*187“The next question is whether the verdict below is contrary to clear weight of the evidence disclosed in the record. Admittedly an appellate court should be slow to overrule determination of a skilled trial judge in such regard. "We realize that his position of judgment behind the plate is better than our spectral view through print from distant bleachers. Perhaps we should openly concede, as did Judge Frank of the United States court of appeals of the 2d circuit in his ‘Courts on Trial’ (Princeton University Press, 1949), p 23, that:
“ ‘The trial court alone is in a position to interpret the demeanor — clues, this “language without words.” An upper court, to use Judge Kennison’s phrase, “has to operate in the partial vacuum of the printed record.” A “stenographic transcript,” wrote Judge Ulman, “fails to reproduce tones of voice and hesitations of speech that often make a sentence mean the reverse of what the mere words signify. The best and most accurate record [of oral testimony] is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of the peach before it was dried.” ’
“For evident reasons our Court on rare occasion has held contrary to the trial judge’s considered appraisal of evidence and verdict on motion for new trial. It is well that we have done so. Nevertheless, when the exceptional case comes here, we are left no alternative than that of exercise of stinted power. This is such a case. "While we cannot and do not decide that proponents would have been entitled to an instructed verdict below had they moved for same, we are bound by constraining authority to hold that the verdict we now scrutinize rests at best on evidence of gossamer weight.”
I do not believe that this appeal presents one of those “rare” occasions, or one of those “exceptional” cases, referred to in In re Calhoun Estate, which would justify our holding “contrary to the trial judge’s considered appraisal of evidence,” and I dis*188agree with my Brother’s conclusion that there was an absence of facts to substantiate the charge of in■competency or incapacity to make a valid will.
Reversible error was not committed in allowing Dr. Rennell to answer the hypothetical question, especially in view of the trial court’s instructions to the jury, as follows:
“Now a person may have insane delusions, and may have many of them, but it may not affect his ability to make a will, or the making of a will. People may have insane delusions in certain fields, but not in these particular fields. People may be peculiar, they may have funny characteristics, and may be out of step with society, but that might not necessarily in and of itself affect their ability to make a will. The mere fact a person may be peculiar, they may be unique, they may be insane on certain things, and they may have certain delusions, but that in and of itself is not important. It must be, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that they were in the realm of the will, and that they did affect her ability to make a will. Now she must not be subject to outside influence to the extent that it changed her wishes on the will. The mere fact someone had an opportunity to, as I said, is not enough. The mere fact that someone may have tried to is not enough. The question is whether they did. If they did assert or extend their influence to the degree that it changed the person’s idea on the will, against their wishes, then it would be undue influence, and would not be their will, and would not be a valid will. * * *
“When a scientific or expert witness testifies you should treat it in the same manner as any other testimony in the case. The mere fact that it was offered by experts does not compel you to take their testimony in preference to any other, but you should give such testimony the same consideration, everything else being equal, as that of any other witness.
*189“Now we had a rather long hypothetical question in this case. You are instructed that an expert witness, in answering a hypothetical question, assumes as true every asserted fact stated in the question. I therefore instruct you that if you find that the evidence fails to establish the truth of the asserted facts of the hypothetical question that you cannot consider the answers of the expert to that hypothetical question, but must disregard such answers.”
The court did not commit reversible error in instructing the jury nor in submitting the question of undue influence. The answer to the special questions established beyond doubt that the jury verdict was not based upon undue influence.
Judgment should he affirmed. Costs to appellee.
Carr, J., concurred with Kelly, J.