Court Opinion

ID: 9619784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:33:18.601684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:31.412757
License: Public Domain

Judge Wynn
dissenting.
In upholding the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the probation violation proceeding at the close of the State’s evidence and at the end of all evidence, the majority concludes that “[b]ecause the defendant did not leave the premises immediately or take another action to avoid being in Isaac’s presence in accordance with his probation conditions, the defendant’s failure to comply with the probation conditions was willful.” Because I do not agree that the facts of this case justify a conclusion that defendant was “willfully” in the presence of Isaac at the time of his alleged violation, I respectfully dissent.
As noted by the majority, “a suspended sentence may not be activated for failure to comply with a term of probation unless the defendant’s failure to comply is willful or without lawful excuse.” State v. Sellers, 61 N.C. App. 558, 560, 301 S.E.2d 105, 106 (1983) (citations omitted). However, our courts have consistently defined the word “willful” as encompassing “more than an intention to do a thing; there must also be purpose and deliberation.” 82 N.C. App. 273, 275, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (citing In re Clark v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 516, 313 S.E.2d, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 756, 321 S.E.2d 128 (1984)).
Applying that definition to this case, defendant’s actions, or lack thereof, cannot be considered purposeful and deliberate so as to constitute “willfulness.” The fact that defendant sat passively in his car as his niece drove into Mr. Mason’s driveway, some 30 feet away from the yard in which Isaac and several other children were playing football, does not amount to him having purposefully and deliberately placed himself in the presence of Isaac or the other children in the yard. Nor does the fact that, while defendant remained passively seated in his car, he exchanged a sentence with Mr. Mason, as Isaac stood by, constitute a purposeful and deliberate intent to be near or around Isaac. The record clearly reveals that although Isaac was *60standing near the car during defendant’s conversation, Mr. Mason was the one who called Isaac over to the car, not defendant. Significantly, the defendant remained in the car as a passenger at all times until Issac left. Thus, by not taking whatever action at whatever time the majority contemplates would have been appropriate, defendant can only be said to have, at best, “constructively” placed himself in Isaac’s presence. Such “constructive” action, however, is not the type of conduct I believe our Supreme Court envisioned when it delineated the rule that a defendant’s suspended sentence could only be activated upon a showing of willfulness or a lack of a lawful excuse. If it were, then defendant in this case could have conceivably had his probation revoked simply because he did not do or say something when a child, on his or her own accord, walked or ran near him in a public area, sat around him in a public movie theater, or walked by him in a public mall. Because of the unfairness that could arise from such a result, I vote to reverse the trial court’s revocation of defendant’s probation.