Court Opinion

ID: 9756693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:48:15.387846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:28.299698
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge (concurring).
I concur with the result and with most of what is said, and well said, in the opinion of the Court. I have difficulty, however, with the holding that the “stricter standard of review,” i. e., the so-called “compelling interest test” applies in all its rigor. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 supra. Cf. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 655, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600.*
Actually what I believe the Court is doing (and quite properly so) is to apply ordinary equal protection standards— weighing the plaintiff’s right to hold office against the countervailing right of the body-politic to establish reasonable nondiscriminatory standards for those who would aspire to represent it in highest office. Given the absence of “invid*1219ious” discrimination, the reasonableness of the limitation, and the obvious interest of the body-politic in those who hold its highest office, the result would seem sound even if John Adams had not had a hand in drafting the disputed constitutional provision.
But I think the difficulty with meaningful application of the compelling interest test suggests the continuing relevance of Mr. Justice Harlan’s criticism of the extension of that standard, Shapiro v. Thompson, above, 659-662, 89 S.Ct. 1322.

 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972), applied the compelling interest test in dealing with an invidious economic barrier to candidacj-. Nothing in Bullock would seem to require extension of the stricter standard to a limitation of the present character which, as the Court amply demonstrates, is reasonably related to experience that might be thought necessary for service in the state’s highest office.