Court Opinion

ID: 9401332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 19:13:57.475627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.993766
License: Public Domain

FILED
No. 22-0439 – SER Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. v. Thompson, et al
                                                                                   June 12, 2023
                                                                                     released at 3:00 p.m.
WOOTON, J., dissenting:                                                          EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                      OF WEST VIRGINIA

              I dissent to the majority’s extension of the Medical Professional Liability Act

(hereinafter “MPLA”) to acts of common, ordinary negligence merely because they

involve a health care provider. This Court has previously determined that a hospital’s

negligence as to postmortem care and handling does not implicate the MPLA because such

postmortem remains are not “patients” as defined therein. See Syl. Pt. 1, Ricottilli v.

Summersville Mem’l Hosp., 188 W. Va. 674, 425 S.E.2d 629 (1992). Here, because the

postmortem remains fortuitously involve a fetus whose mother was contemporaneously

rendered care by the hospital, the majority determines that the mother is the “patient”

necessary to trigger the MPLA. Although the majority painstakingly attempts to pigeon-

hole the cause of action into the MPLA’s definitions, I believe such an expansion of the

MPLA runs contrary to our precedent and the widely understood nature of such claims;

therefore, I respectfully dissent.

              The negligent mishandling of a corpse is well-established cause of action that

does not bear any of the hallmarks of medical professional liability such as to trigger the

special requirements of the MPLA. Handling and transfer of postmortem remains, while

deserving of professionalism and the utmost care, simply does not implicate the type of

negligent “health care services” the MPLA was designed to address. Whether petitioner

Charleston Area Medical Center (hereinafter “CAMC”) was negligent in its handling of

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A.C.L.’s fetal remains by allowing the remains to be placed, unprotected, in a vehicle is a

matter that requires no expert testimony. It requires only the judgment of a lay person,

using his or her ordinary understanding of the concept of “reasonable care.” It is, by any

measure, a tragic, yet “ordinary” tort claim sounding in simple negligence which merely

happens to involve a health care provider in addition to a funeral home. In terms of the

claim of negligent mishandling, the allegations against both CAMC and the funeral home

are effectively the same, i.e. the negligent facilitation of and transport of the unprotected

remains in a vehicle containing both items which threatened the safety of the remains and

an unauthorized individual. Yet, the majority has determined as to CAMC alone, the claim

necessitates the extensive, specialized handling required under the MPLA.

               In a nearly identical case, the Michigan Court of Appeals described precisely

why such a cause of action does not bear any indicia of a medical professional liability

action. In Urbanowicz v. Trinity Health-Michigan, No. 354970, 2021 WL 5021769 (Mich.

Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2021), the mother of a “stillborn child” brought an action for mishandling

a corpse against the hospital where the child was delivered; the hospital was allegedly to

have negligently provided the afterbirth, rather than the remains, of the stillborn child to a

funeral home for cremation. Id. at *1. The trial court dismissed for violation of the statute

of limitations provided under Michigan’s medical malpractice act. Id. The Court of

Appeals reversed, explaining why such a cause of action did not sound in medical

malpractice:

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                      In this case, plaintiff Tricia gave birth at the hospital and
              there was a contractual duty for the hospital to render
              professional healthcare services to her as she gave birth.
              Therefore, the hospital shared a professional relationship with
              plaintiff Tricia. And the parties do not dispute that the hospital,
              doctors, and employees who were rendering care to plaintiff
              Tricia were capable of committing medical malpractice.
              However, the reasonableness of the hospital’s actions in
              determining where and how to store plaintiffs’ stillborn child
              and how to appropriately catalog whether the human remains
              were properly delivered to a third-party funeral home does not
              require medical knowledge or medical judgment. In other
              words, such storage and delivery policies do not require expert
              testimony. They are within the knowledge of any layperson
              who is familiar with administrative tasks.

                     The hospital argues that care for a stillborn child is not
              something that a layperson would know how to perform.
              However, plaintiffs are not claiming that the hospital’s medical
              care was negligent, but rather that the hospital negligently
              cataloged and transferred the wrong human remains to the
              funeral home. Resolving these allegations does not require
              specialized medical knowledge that the jury would only be able
              to understand as explained by an expert.

Id. at *2 (emphasis added). Other courts have come to the same conclusion under similar

facts. See Kelly v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., 745 N.E.2d 969, 975 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)

(observing that negligent mishandling of a corpse is not a “medical malpractice” case);

Dillard v. Parkland Hosp., 136 S.W.3d 16, 21 (Tex. App. 2002) (finding that father did not

have “health care liability claim” for negligent mishandling of his son’s corpse); Janicki v.

Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 966 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that claim of

mishandling of stillborn fetus did not constitute medical malpractice case); Bauer v. N.

Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 242 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (finding medical

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malpractice statute inapplicable as it “governs medical procedures and services offered to

living patients”).

               This is, in fact, the same conclusion to which this Court came nearly thirty

years ago in Ricottilli. The plaintiff in Ricottilli alleged negligence against a health care

provider in connection with her deceased daughter’s autopsy. The Court concluded this

action did not sound in medical malpractice based on the MPLA’s definition of “patient”—

a definition which the majority admits has not changed in the interim. The Ricottilli Court

held: “By definition, a deceased individual does not qualify as a ‘patient’ under the

Medical Professional Liability Act (‘Act’), West Virginia Code §§ 55-7B-1 to -11 (Supp.

1992), and therefore cannot be the basis for a cause of action alleging medical professional

liability pursuant to the Act.” Id., syl. pt. 1.

               The majority quickly and tersely distinguishes this case—not because the

allegations, cause of action, or underlying conduct is substantially different—but simply

because the decedent in Ricottilli was a “prior patient.” (Footnote omitted). In other words,

because the decedent in Ricottilli entered the hospital alive and was given a patient

identification and registration, the decedent was the “patient” to be evaluated under the

MPLA’s definition. However, because CAMC does not provide a stillborn fetus a separate

patient identification or registration, the majority concludes that A.C.L.’s mother—

respondent Angela Lester—is the relevant “patient” who triggers the application of the

MPLA.
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              Essentially then, the majority dispenses with this case on the basis of how

CAMC administratively manages patient registration and fetal deaths. Ostensibly, under

the majority’s analysis, had A.C.L. been born alive for even a moment and/or been

provided patient identification and registration by CAMC and the same subsequent alleged

mishandling of his remains occurred, A.C.L. would qualify as a “deceased prior patient”

as in Ricottilli and the MPLA would be deemed inapplicable. It is the fortuity of A.C.L.

being a stillborn fetus necessitating his mother’s commensurate hospitalization for delivery

that provides the majority an alternate “patient” to trigger the MPLA. CAMC’s care,

custody, and handling of his postmortem remains is, in all other respects, identical to any

other deceased individual.

               Once the majority determined that Mrs. Lester—and not A.C.L.—was the

relevant “patient,” it had little difficulty finding that the handling of A.C.L.’s remains

constituted “health care services” rendered “on behalf of” Mrs. Lester. However, even

assuming Mrs. Lester is the “patient” whose “health care” is at issue, the very definition of

“health care services” reveals how ill-fitting the MPLA is to this cause of action. The

majority utilizes West Virginia Code § 55-7B-2(e) (2022) as the relevant statutory

definition which defines “health care,” in part, as

              (2) Any act, service, or treatment performed or furnished, or
              which should have been performed or furnished, by any health
              care provider . . . for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the
              patient’s medical care, treatment, or confinement, including,
              but not limited to, staffing, medical transport, custodial care,
              or basic care, infection control, positioning, hydration,
              nutrition, and similar patient services[.]
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(emphasis added). These specifically identified items are the type of care and services

requiring some semblance of medical judgment and entail a facility or provider’s rendering

or ability to render appropriate care relative to a patient’s condition. Staffing, transport,

custodial issues all directly impact the adequate provision of more specific, direct health

care to patients such as infection control, positioning, hydration, nutrition, and the like. 1

The post-mortem handling of fetal remains simply does not comport with the specifically

identified types of patient care services that constitute “health care” per the statutory

definition.

              This case once again raises the concern I expressed in State ex rel. W.

Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Scott, 246 W. Va. 184, 204, 866 S.E.2d 350, 370 (2021)

(Wooton, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part) about expanding the reach of the

MPLA to the types of claims which “were not the genesis of the MPLA’s remedial efforts

and are undeserving of the special protections the MPLA affords.” In fact, in its eagerness

to extend the MPLA to virtually any claim involving a health care provider, the majority

boldly extends the MPLA to a purported claim in this case it can neither specifically

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         Nor does postmortem handling of remains reasonably fall within the catch-all term
“similar patient services” because it is entirely dissimilar from the delineated patient care
services which are specifically identified. As the Court has explained, broad statutory
terms are given further refinement by the words which surround them under the canon of
statutory construction known as “noscitur a sociis.” See Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 203 W. Va. 477, 485, 509 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1998) (“The phrase noscitur a sociis literally
means ‘it is known from its associates,’ and the doctrine implies that the meaning of a
general word is or may be known from the meaning of accompanying specific words.”).
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describe nor verify has been viably pled—a claim which was not even subject of

petitioner’s writ.   Without first deciding such a claim has actually been pled—and

disavowing a conclusion either way—the majority finds that any “privacy” claim that can

be found in the subject complaint also falls within the ambit of the MPLA. To affirmatively

resolve the issue of the MPLA’s applicability to a purported claim that might later be found

to have been sufficiently pled is entirely advisory in nature. See Harshbarger v. Gainer,

184 W. Va. 656, 659, 403 S.E.2d 399, 402 (1991) (criticizing advisory opinion which

purported to resolve issue “that was at most a mere contingent possibility[]” lacking

“present controversy” and “present necessity”); see also State ex. rel. Perdue v. McCuskey,

242 W. Va. 474, 479, 836 S.E.2d 441, 446 (2019) (“The Treasurer’s petition presents a

hypothetical controversy that we will not resolve with an advisory opinion.” (footnote

omitted)).

              While the reach of the MPLA may indeed be broad, it is not limitless. If the

Legislature’s intent were to require the MPLA’s application to virtually any case filed

against a health care provider regardless of the nature of the underlying allegations, it

would scarcely have bothered to create definitions at all. Respondents’ allegations of

negligent mishandling of A.C.L.’s remains fall squarely into this Court’s holding in

Ricottilli; the majority’s creation of elastic definitional boundaries in the MPLA

undermines its essential purpose.

              Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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