Court Opinion

ID: 9846184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:36:21.498552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:34.786246
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge
dissenting.
The majority’s opinion reverses the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants and holds plaintiff’s allegations presented a genuine issue of material fact. The majority’s opinion ignores the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision of the insurance contract between the parties. I vote to affirm the trial court’s order and respectfully dissent.
I. Standard of Review
The movant of a motion for summary judgment bears the burden to establish no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hines v. Yates, 171 N.C. App. 150, 157, 614 S.E.2d 385, 389 (2005). The movant can meet this burden by either: 1) proving that an essential element of the opposing party’s claim is nonexistent or 2) showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence sufficient to support an essential element of his claim nor [evidence] sufficient to surmount an affirmative defense to his claim. Id.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Id.) see N.C.R. Civ. R 56(c) (2005). “On appeal, an order allowing summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004).
*278II. Contract Interpretation
“The interpretation of language used in an insurance policy is a question of law, governed by well-established rules of construction.” N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mizell, 138 N.C. App. 530, 532, 530 S.E.2d 93, 95, disc. rev. denied, 352 N.C. 590, 544 S.E.2d 783 (2000). “ ‘An insurance policy is a contract and its provisions govern the rights and duties of the parties thereto.’ ” Herring v. Liner, 163 N.C. App. 534, 538, 594 S.E.2d 117, 120 (2004) (quoting Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co. V. Northfield Ins. Co., 351 N.C. 293, 299, 524 S.E.2d 558, 563 (2000)). “The language in the policy is to be construed as written ‘without rewriting the contract or disregarding the express language used.’ ” Id. (quoting Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Dortch, 318 N.C. 378, 380, 348 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1986)).
The Court determines whether coverage exists under an insurance policy for a claim by examining the four corners of the complaint in the underlying action to determine whether the allegations contained in the claim are covered under the plain and ordinary language used in the policy. See Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986). “ ‘Where a policy defines a term, that definition is to be used. If no definition is given, non-technical words are to be given their meaning in ordinary speech, unless the context clearly indicates another meaning was intended.’ ” Herring, 163 N.C. App. at 538, 594 S.E.2d at 120 (quoting Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 351 N.C. at 299, 524 S.E.2d at 563). “When we [axe required to] construe provisions of an insurance policy, ‘the goal of construction is to arrive at the intent of the parties when the policy was issued.’ ” Id. (quoting Woods v. Insurance Co., 295 N.C. 500, 505, 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978)).
“ ‘Provisions which exclude liability of insurance companies are not favored and therefore all ambiguous provisions will be construed against the insurer ....’” Id. (quoting State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 538, 350 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1986)). “ ‘Exclusions from, conditions upon and limitations of undertakings by the [insurance] company, otherwise contained in the policy, are . .. construed strictly ... to provide coverage.’ ” Herring, 163 N.C. App. at 538, 594 S.E.2d at 120-(quoting Trust Co. v. Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 355, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522-23 (1970)).
The insurance contract between the parties at bar states:
*279We do not cover . . . loss caused directly or indirectly regardless of any cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss:
8. by collapse. We will cover loss from collapse caused by fire; lightening; windstorm; hail; explosion; smoke; aircraft; vehicles; riot; civil commotion; vandalism or malicious mischief; breakage of building glass; falling objects; weight of snow, ice or sleet; water damage; hidden decay; hidden insect or vermin damage; sprinkler leakage; sinkhole collapse; volcanic action; weight of people or personal property; weight of rain that collects on a roof; or use of defective material or methods in construction, remodeling or renovation if the collapse occurs during the course of the construction, remodeling or renovation.
Any damage plaintiff suffered from a “collapse” is expressly excluded from coverage unless plaintiff proves her claim fits into the enumerated exceptions.
Plaintiff alleges in her affidavit that “a portion of the roof of the second story of the building collapsed into the second story of the building.” Under the contract’s plain and unambiguous language, loss caused directly or indirectly from collapse is expressly excluded from coverage. Under plaintiffs own sworn admissions, its claim is not a covered loss under the contract.
Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that its loss resulted from one of the exceptions to the collapse exclusion. In an affidavit, Allen D. Myers, Managing Member of ADM Building Contractors, L.L.C., stated:
[pjrior to the Roof Repair Project, the roof had not collapsed in any manner but was in poor condition and in need of repair .... During the course of the Roof Repair Project, ADM took down portions of the old roof and put in a new roof. ADM was able to assist [plaintiff] during the Roof Repair Project to help ensure that Magnolia sustained no damage to any of their inventory or personal property.
(Emphasis supplied). It is undisputed that plaintiffs loss did not occur until ADM began construction to replace the roof. Under the contract’s plain and unambiguous language, plaintiff’s loss is excluded.
*280On 14 March 2001, defendants denied plaintiffs claim because: (1) the contract excluded plaintiff’s claim and (2) plaintiffs loss was caused by the contractor’s work on the roof. Exclusions numbered 4 and 12 in the insurance contract state, in pertinent parts:
We do not cover . . . loss caused directly or indirectly regardless of any cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss:
12. by faulty, inadequate, or defective
b. design, development of specifications, workmanship, construction;
d. maintenance;
of property whether on or off the insured premises by anyone. We do not cover . . . loss caused:
4. to the interior of the building or the contents by rain, snow, sand, or dust, whether driven by wind or not, unless the exterior of the building first sustains damage to its roof or walls by a covered loss. We will pay for loss caused by or resulting from the thawing of snow, sleet, or ice on the building.
As Myers’s uncontradicted affidavit shows, the roof on the building plaintiff leased had not “collapsed” and plaintiff suffered no covered losses prior to the commencement of work on the “Roof Repair Project.” Myers testified the roof was in “poor condition” and “in need of repair.” Undisputed evidence shows plaintiff’s losses were caused by a poorly maintained roof and during the work to repair or replace it. Construing the contract’s plain and unambiguous language, losses caused by collapse, faulty or inadequate maintenance, or construction are expressly excluded from coverage.
Defendants incurred no liability under the policy for plaintiff’s loss. These losses occurred and resulted for activities expressly excluded from coverage. Plaintiff’s loss is also expressly excluded *281under contract exclusion numbered 4. Reviewing plain and unambiguous provisions contained in the four corners of the contract, plaintiffs loss is excluded from coverage. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants.
TTT. Conclusion
Plaintiff failed to present any genuine issue of material fact. The contract’s plain language expressly excludes coverage for its losses. The trial court “declared that the insurance policy issued to [p]laintiff which is the subject matter of this action provides no insurance coverage for the claims alleged by [pjlaintiff in this action[.]” The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. I vote to affirm and respectfully dissent.