Court Opinion

ID: 9910920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 20:02:14.985111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:00.365596
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/18/23 P. v. Madrid CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B326816

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BA332987)
         v.

DAVID JOSEPH MADRID,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed.
      Tanya Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 ____________________________
       David Joseph Madrid appeals from an order denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His
appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and Madrid filed a supplemental
brief. We review the contentions raised in the supplemental brief
and affirm the order.

       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.     Factual Background
       The following summary is taken from our opinion resolving
Madrid’s direct appeal to provide background and context. (See
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 222, fn. 2.)
       On the evening of November 3, 2007, a group of friends
gathered at the home of Rigoberto Meza located in East Los
Angeles. Two of them, Roberto Romero and a man identified only
as Josue, walked to a nearby store. As they returned to Meza’s
home, a black Cadillac driven by Madrid (who had a shaved
head) and a blue Honda Civic driven by an unidentified man
pulled up alongside them. A man in the Honda asked Josue,
“Hey, what’s up? Where you from?” Josue replied, “No, we’re
from nowhere.” After Romero told the men to leave them alone,
six or seven men (including Madrid) exited the two cars and
began chasing Romero and Josue, who ran towards Meza’s home.
Some of the men carried bats. Madrid was armed with a
revolver.

1      Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10). We hereafter cite to section 1172.6. All further statutory
references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                    2
       At this point, Meza, Jose Beltran, Pedro Torres
Covarrubias, and several other men left Meza’s home and ran
towards Romero and Josue. Madrid shot at the group with a
black .38-caliber revolver as he stood behind a pole. Romero,
Covarrubias, and Beltran were hit, and each sustained serious
injuries. The shootings took place in the territory of the Mariana
Maravilla gang, a rival of the Arizona Maravilla gang. After the
shooting, Madrid threw a gang sign, “AMV,” with his fingers.
       Law enforcement soon arrived. No gun casings were found
at the scene, a fact consistent with a revolver having been used.
The three victims were transported to the hospital and treated
for gunshot wounds.
       On November 29, 2007, police executed a search warrant at
Madrid’s home, and he was placed under arrest. Madrid’s head
was shaved, and the black Cadillac he drove the night of the
shooting was parked in the driveway. In the backyard of the
home, police recovered a loaded and operable chrome .357-Colt
Python revolver wrapped in a towel.
       Madrid testified at trial. He stated he had been in the
Arizona Maravilla gang as a teenager but was no longer a
member. He raised an alibi defense to the charges, testifying he
was in Montebello with “a big household” at the time of the
shootings. He further testified the black Cadillac was not
operable on November 3, 2007. As for the chrome revolver found
hidden in his backyard, he first testified it was not his but then
explained, “I take full responsibility because it’s in that
household on that property so I can’t really say that it’s not mine,
you know? . . . [My family has] registered firearms too, but in
this case it was an unregistered one.” Madrid presented no

                                 3
witnesses to support his alibi defense. (People v. Madrid
(Sep. 10, 2012, B229781 [nonpub. opn.].)

B.     Procedural Background
       In 2010, a jury convicted Madrid of three counts of assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) and three counts of attempted
murder involving victims Robert Romero, Pedro Torres
Covarrubias, and Jose Beltran, with findings that each attempted
murder was committed willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a).) The jury further found
true allegations that Madrid personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b)-(d)) and that each crime was committed to benefit a
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). The jury also found that
during the commission of the gang allegation a principal used a
firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (e).) The trial court sentenced
Madrid to an aggregate term of 122 years to life in state prison.
       In 2012, a panel of this court affirmed Madrid’s convictions
in People v. Madrid (Sept. 10, 2012, B229781) [nonpub. opn.].)
       In 2022, Madrid, represented by defense counsel, filed a
petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95, now
section 1172.6. Madrid argued it was possible he was convicted
under an implied malice theory in light of the prosecutor’s
argument regarding the gang enhancement. Quoting from the
prosecutor’s closing argument, Madrid pointed out the prosecutor
told the jury the gang-related firearm enhancement was “a little
bit different” and only required that a principal discharged a
firearm. The People opposed the petition, arguing Madrid was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law because his jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences theory, and

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Madrid was prosecuted and convicted as a principal who acted
with actual malice in the crimes. The People attached this
court’s opinion from Madrid’s direct appeal, as well as the jury
instructions and verdicts from the underlying trial.
      The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that
Madrid failed to demonstrate prima facie entitlement to relief.
At the hearing on the petition, the court observed no jury
instructions were given regarding natural and probable
consequences. The court further observed the jury found Madrid
guilty as the shooter and found “he had the specific intent to kill
and it was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.”
      Madrid timely appealed.

                            DISCUSSION
A.     Delgadillo Procedures and Supplemental Briefing
       We appointed counsel to represent Madrid, and counsel
filed a brief raising no issues and requesting that this court
proceed pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. This court
advised Madrid of his right to file a supplemental brief (see id. at
pp. 231–232), and Madrid did so. We evaluate the arguments set
forth in that supplemental brief. (Id. at p. 232 [“If the defendant
subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of
Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented
in that brief and to issue a written opinion”].)

B.    Relevant Law Regarding Section 1172.6 Relief
      Under the ameliorative changes to the law relating to
accomplice liability for murder effected by Senate Bill No. 1437
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), malice must be proved to convict a
principal of murder under the narrowed felony-murder rule set

                                 5
forth in revised section 189, subdivision (e). Malice may not be
imputed based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3)). Thus, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine can no longer serve as a basis for finding a
defendant guilty of murder. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842–843; see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984.) As
amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2),
effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 1437’s changes to the
law of murder expressly apply to individuals convicted of
attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
       “Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural
mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek
retroactive relief under the law as amended,” now codified in
section 1172.6. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708;
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959.) “If [a] petitioner ma[kes]
a prima facie showing for relief, the trial court [is] required to
issue an order to show cause for an evidentiary hearing.” (People
v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891; § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
The court may deny the petition if the record of conviction
demonstrates that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972.)
       Where a trial court denies a section 1172.6 petition based
on the failure to make a prima facie case for relief, our review is
de novo. (See People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244,
1251.)

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C.     Madrid Has Failed to Demonstrate Error in the Trial
       Court’s Order Denying Section 1172.6 Relief
       In his supplemental brief, Madrid contends the trial court
erred in denying his resentencing petition for several reasons.
       First, Madrid asserts he is eligible for resentencing relief
because the jury was offered a vicarious theory of liability
through the gang enhancement allegation. Madrid advanced this
argument in his section 1172.6 petition below, but it was properly
rejected in light of the jury instructions and verdicts. That is,
although the prosecutor may have noted in closing argument that
the gang-related firearm enhancement was “a little bit different”
and only required that a principal discharged a firearm during
the crimes, this argument did not change the theory of liability
for attempted murder under which Madrid was convicted. The
prosecutor argued Madrid was the actual shooter in this case,
and no instruction on the natural and probable consequences
theory was given to the jury.
       To the extent the jury was also given an instruction on
direct aiding and abetting, the record here establishes that
Madrid was found to have harbored the requisite malice to
preclude section 1172.6 relief. The jury found that Madrid
committed attempted premeditated murder and personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm that inflicted great bodily
injury on the three victims. CALCRIM No. 600, defining
attempted murder, requires proof of express malice (“[t]he
defendant intended to kill”). CALCRIM No. 601, defining an
attempt to commit willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder
reinforces the requirement that the People prove express malice.
(See People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1191–1192 [even
assuming appellant was convicted of attempted murder as an

                                7
aider and abettor, the instructions necessarily required the jury
to find he intended to aid and abet an unlawful killing—“the very
definition of express malice”].) In short, nothing in the jury’s
verdicts, considered with the instructions given, suggests malice
was imputed to Madrid solely on his participation in the
underlying crimes.
       Second, Madrid makes several arguments asserting defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the section 1172.6
proceedings. For example, Madrid asserts that had counsel
further examined his underlying criminal record, he would have
found that an enhancement allegation for personal infliction of
great bodily injury was dismissed at the preliminary hearing
prior to trial. Counsel would have also found that during
Madrid’s subsequent criminal trial, the jury submitted a question
on “intent”—an indication they were struggling on that issue
before reaching a verdict. Madrid further asserts the evidence of
his identity as the shooter was weak in this case.
       As previously observed by the California Supreme Court,
however, there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel in postconviction proceedings or proceedings to obtain
collateral relief from a judgment of conviction. (Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 226–227.) Even if there were, Madrid does not
demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. (See Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688.) That is, “[t]he mere filing of a
[prior Penal Code] section 1170.95 petition does not afford the
petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error or
attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
findings.” (See People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
Here, the new arguments identified by Madrid do not bear on

                                 8
whether he could “presently be convicted of murder” under
section 1172.6. (See People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792,
843, fn. 24 [defense counsel not ineffective for failing to raise
futile arguments].) As discussed above, the record of conviction
establishes that Madrid is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
       Discerning no basis for disturbing the trial court’s decision,
we affirm the order denying resentencing relief. (Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232; People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th
367, 410 [it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error].)

                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying Madrid’s postconviction petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 is affirmed.

                                            MORI, J.

      We concur:

                   CURREY, P.J.

                   COLLINS, J.

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