Court Opinion

ID: 9833710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:57:38.802614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:06.090373
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
While appellee’s motion for rehearing was pending the de'cision of the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals in Watson et al. v. Sabine Royalty Corporation, 120 S.W.2d 938, appeared, and writ of error was refused by the Supreme Court/ Appellee insists that our decision is in conflict with the views there expressed, and approved by the Supreme Court by the refusal of the writ. We think -not. The .act under consideration in Watson v. Sabine Royalty Corporation, supra, was applicable to counties having a population of not less than 20,000 nor more than 32,500 and taxable property values of not less than $75,-000,000. The Court found that there were forty-two counties which possessed the qualification as to population, but only Rusk County possessed both qualifications. The emergency clause reveals the reason for the classification, which was the necessity of meeting a condition resulting from the development of the oil properties within several counties. Oil development within the- county but outside of certain school districts increased school attendance within the districts without increasing taxable values within them. This condition resulted only when population increased, and the difficulty arose only when values were increased outside of the affected school districts but not within them. There was therefore a reasonable relation between the classification, and the needs of the one county then within the classification and others that might come within it within a reasonable time as a result of the exploitation of their oil possibilities. On the other hand, the only other county that could qualify as to area under the act we are considering is one in which the people depend most largely upon the breeding and *434raising of livestock. The character of the ■ land like that of Presidio County calls for large unimproved tracts. Population grows slowly. In fact in the decade between 1920 and 1930 the increase in Cul-berson County was but 318. At the same rate of increase more than twenty years would elapse before Culberson County could meet the population requirement. Appellee calls our attention to the emergency clause, urging that it shows that the Legislature considered the classification. The language of that clause confirms us in the view at which we arrived reluctantly: that the Legislature intended the Act to be applicable to but one county, for the sole emergency is thus stated, “the fact that there is no adequate provision under existing law for the subdivision of counties having an area of not more than three thousand eight hundred (3,800) square miles and not less than three thousand six hundred (3,600) square miles and a population of not less than nine thousand eight hundred (9,800) and not more than twelve thousand (12,000) inhabitants, according to the last preceding Federal Census, into school districts having sufficient scholastic population to support or justify proper elementary and high school facilities constitutes an emergency and an imperative public necessity.” Acts 1933, 1st Called Sess., c. 108, p. 293, § 14. It would indeed have been difficult to designate Presidio County more definitely and distinguish it more clearly from all other counties in the State.
We recognize the principle that if the question of the reasonableness of the classification w.ere debatable, the judgment of the Legislature would be final, but we may not close our eyes to what is clear to all men. For a discussion of the reasonableness of a classification when there is little probability that a second county will ever come within the newly-created class, see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brown in Shannon et ux. v. Tarrant County, Tex.Civ.App., 99 S.W.2d 964, at page 972. The attempted classification does not meet the test that it should inhere in the subject matter and be natural and not artificial or illusory. Leonard v. Road Maintenance District No. 1, 187 Ark. 599, 61 S. W.2d 70, cited by the Commission of Appeals in Bexar County v. Tynan, 128 Tex. 223, 97 S.W.2d 467. It is apparent that it operates unequally upon counties between which there is no real difference to justify the separate treatment of them undertaken by the Legislature. In re Elm Street in City of New York, 246 N.Y. 72, 158 N.E. 24. As said by Justice Cardozo in the case just cited [page 26], “We close our eyes to realities if we do not see in this act the marks of legislation that is special and local in terms and in effect.” That learned jurist, in the course of the discussion, said: “Roughly speaking, however, the principle of division, considered merely for the purpose of a working approximation, may be stated to be this: If the class in its formation is so unnatural and wayward that only by the rarest coincidence can the range of its extension include more than one locality, and at best but two or three, the act so hedged and circumscribed is local in effect. If the same limits are apparent upon the face of the act, unaided by extrinsic evidence, or are so notorious or obvious as to be the subject of judicial notice, it is also local in its terms.” See discussions in Alexander v. Elizabeth, 56 N.J.L. 71, 28 A. 51, 23 L.R.A. 525; Medders v. Stewart, 172 Ga. 507, 158 S.E. 56 ; Town of Longview v. Crawfordsville, 164 Ind. 117, 73 N.E. 78, 68 L.R.A. 622, 3 Ann.Cas. 496.
The contention of appellee that the Court may not take judicial notice of the areas of Texas counties is unsound. Courts take judicial notice of that which is apparent to persons of intelligence. They take judicial notice of the location of the geographical features, of boundaries (Hoefs v. Short, 114 Tex. 501, 273 S.W. 785, 40 A.L.R. 833), of rivers as boundaries, and of distances (Giddings v. Day, 84 Tex. 605, 19 S.W. 682, Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Branton, Tex.Civ.App., 70 S. W.2d 780), of the fact that two certain railroads are competing lines (Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. State, 72 Tex. 404, 10 S.W. 81, 1 L.R.A. 849, 13 Am.St.Rep. 815), and of the approximate distances between counties. The approximate areas of Texas counties , may be learned with readiness from many sources. There are maps, official and unofficial, bringing this information to the attention of those interested. It is published in the 1930 Federal Census Reports, which we checked carefully before preparing our former opinion. That there may be slight changes in area resulting from erosion on the one hand or accretion upon the other or from errors of surveyors may be admitted, without affecting the right and duty of the Court to take notice of the areas which would not be placed in other classes by such slight differences.
*435Appellee’s objection th^t a taxpayer may not raise the question of the validity of the annexation proceeding in this character of. suit is met by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Parks v. West, 102 Tex. 11, 111. S.W. 726, and by the opinion of the Commission of Appeals in Burns v. Dilley County Line Independent School District, 295 S.W. 1091.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.