Court Opinion

ID: 9850753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:26.81258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:42.855450
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I respectfully dissent. I would *527uphold the rule of abatement ab initio, and apply it to abate the entire criminal cause (i.e., the conviction and any collateral consequences of the conviction) in cases in which the defendant dies pending resolution of his appeal. In other words, I would uphold our prior decision in People v Elauim, 393 Mich 601; 227 NW2d 553 (1975). However, I would take this opportunity to confine Elauim’s application to cases in which the defendant dies pending his appeal of right In cases in which the defendant dies pending a discretionary appeal, I would hold that such an appeal should be dismissed as moot, and that the conviction and collateral consequences of the conviction should stand.1
When a defendant dies while his appeal of right is pending, I believe that the defendant’s appeal and conviction should be abated for the reason endorsed by some federal courts, and by the instant Court of Appeals panel:
The Supreme Court may dismiss the petition without prejudicing the rights of the deceased petitioner, for he has already had the benefit of the appellate review of his conviction to which he was entitled of right. In contrast, when an appeal has been taken from a criminal conviction to the court of appeals and death has deprived the accused of his right to [an appellate] decision, the interests of justice ordinarily require that he not stand convicted without resolution of the merits of *528his appeal, which is an "integral part of [our] system for ñnally adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence.” Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12, 18; 76 S Ct 585, 590; 100 L Ed 891 (1956). [United States v Moehlenkamp, 557 F2d 126, 128 (CA 7, 1977). Emphasis added. See also United States v Asset, 990 F2d 208, 210-211 (CA 5, 1993); United States v Oberlin, 718 F2d 894 (CA 9, 1983); United States v Pauline, 625 F2d 684, 685 (CA 5, 1980); 205 Mich App 312, 317; 517 NW2d 773 (1994).]
When a defendant dies while his appeal of right is pending, I believe that any further sanctions or orders arising from the defendant’s conviction should be abated for the following reasons stated by the instant Court of Appeals panel:
In contrast to the holding in [United States v] Dudley [739 F2d 175 (CA 4, 1984)], we hold that a restitution order is dismissed when it is based on a criminal conviction that is abated ab initio. We arrive at this conclusion by considering the rationale behind the principle of abatement, which provides that a defendant should not stand convicted when death deprives the defendant of the right to an appellate decision. [United States v Asset, supra at 210-211.] This rationale is based on the premise that the resolution of an appeal can reverse a conviction. It is obvious that an appellate decision can also reverse those orders arising from a conviction such as a restitution order. Furthermore, the importance of an appellate decision is apparent in the Michigan Constitution, which declares that criminal defendants have a right to appeal. Const 1963, art 1, § 20. With this in mind, we believe that the principle of abatement extends to a restitution order where a defendant’s death prevents an appeal of the defendant’s conviction.
In order to abide by defendant’s right to appeal, we dismiss the restitution order because appellate review is not possible. Although the victim has a right to restitution, this right does not entitle the *529victim to restitution imposed by an order that is not subject to appellate review.
In addition, we disagree with the analysis in Dudley that a restitution order survives abatement ab initio of the underlying conviction on the ground that the primary purpose of restitution is to compensate the victim. Restitution under MCL 780.766(2); MSA 28.1287(766X2) is part of the court’s sentence, see [People v] Schluter [204 Mich App 60; 514 NW2d 489 (1994)], and is dependent upon the existence of a conviction. If the conviction is void, then the restitution order also becomes void because a victim’s right to restitution remains dependent on a conviction. Thus, we are not convinced that a restitution order’s compensatory purpose determines whether the order survives abatement ab initio of the underlying conviction. [205 Mich App 319-320.]
Obviously, I have a fundamental difference of opinion with the majority concerning the significance of a convicted defendant’s constitutional right to an appeal. I cannot accept the majority’s position that considerations of judicial economy are more important than assuring a proper appellate resolution of the guilt or innocence of a convicted defendant. ("[I]t is better policy to allow the litigation to end and the presumptively valid conviction to stand than it is to allow the convicted defendant’s survivors to pursue litigation ad infinitum, in an effort to clear the deceased defendant’s name.” Ante at 521.) In my view, the interest of justice requires deference to a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to an appeal when the defendant dies during the pendency of an appeal of right. While I am aware that a victim has a constitutional right to restitution and that a convicted defendant is no longer presumed innocent, I also believe that when the issues are compensation stemming from a conviction versus a final adjudication of a defendant’s guilt or innocence, notions *530of fundamental fairness demand giving priority to the latter guarantee.2
Because the defendant in this case died during the pendency of his appeal of right, I would abate the entire criminal cause — including the restitution order stemming from the conviction. The decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 The majority of federal courts likewise distinguish between appeals of right and discretionary appeals, and apply the abatement ab initio rule to abate at least the appeal and conviction when the defendant dies pending an appeal of right. See United States v Davis, 953 F2d 1482 (CA 10, 1992); Clarke v United States, 286 US App DC 256; 915 F2d 699 (1990); United States v Williams, 874 F2d 968 (CA 5, 1989); United States v Schumann, 861 F2d 1234 (CA 11, 1988); United States v Mollica, 849 F2d 723 (CA 2, 1988); United States v Wilcox, 783 F2d 44 (CA 6, 1986); United States v Littlefield, 594 F2d 682 (CA 8, 1979); United States v Bechtel, 547 F2d 1379 (CA 9, 1977).

 The majority misreads the Court of Appeals analysis of the compensatory component to the restitution order. The majority indicates that the reason that the Court of Appeals abated the restitution order in this case was because the Court considered the order to be "primarily penal.” Ante at 526.
The Court of Appeals explicitly acknowledged both the compensatory and penal qualities of a restitution order. ("This Court has recognized that the purpose of restitution is to compensate the injured party. ... In addition, a- restitution order authorized under statute has punitive aspects.” 205 Mich App 319.) However, the Court of Appeals did not find it necessary to determine which qualities predominated in the instant order because the Court’s analysis of the abatement rule’s application to the order did not turn upon the purpose of the order. Instead, the Court emphasized the relationship between the conviction and the restitution order. Recognizing that the conviction had to be abated under its understanding of the abatement doctrine, and further recognizing that the restitution order in this case was based on that conviction, the Court concluded that the restitution order likewise had to be abated. See, i.e., "If the conviction is void, then the restitution order also becomes void because a victim’s right to restitution remains dependent on a conviction.” 205 Mich App 320. Thus, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, whether the restitution served a compensatory or penal purpose was not the dispositive factor under the Court of Appeals analysis.