Court Opinion

ID: 9795569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:31:37.157594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:18.758005
License: Public Domain

BEIER, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion dealing with the absence of a unanimity instruction in this case.
In my view, the facts of this case — particularly the multiple victims’ conflicting testimony about who was touched where and how many times and the undisputed distinctions of time and space between the first incident outside the laundromat and the second incident at or near the defendant’s home — make this case analytically identical to those that have found multiple acts, and their companion potential for jury confusion and lack of unanimity. See *837State v. Wellborn, 27 Kan. App. 2d 393, 394, 4 P.3d 1178, rev. denied 269 Kan. 940 (2000); Crutcher v. State, 27 Kan. App. 2d 674, 675-76, 8 P.3d 1, rev. denied 268 Kan. 885 (1999); State v. Kinmon, 26 Kan. App. 2d 677, 678-79, 995 P.2d 876 (1999); State v. Barber, 26 Kan. App. 2d 330, 331, 988 P.2d 250 (1999).
The Staggs decision upon which the majority relies, State v. Staggs, 27 Kan. App. 2d 865, 9 P.3d 601, rev. denied 270 Kan. 903 (2000), is readily distinguishable on the facts and on the law.
Staggs dealt with one act only: a fight, which happened to include both a punch and a kick. As now Chief Judge Rulon observed for the unanimous panel in that opinion, the punch and the kick within seconds of each other in the same fight between the same individuals could not have been charged separately without being vulnerable to an attack for multiplicity. Staggs, 27 Kan. App. 2d at 867. In other words, the punch and the kick were not multiple acts at all.
In contrast, here we have a situation where at least two physical acts are far more factually separate and far less uniformly described. Depending on which victim’s testimony is believed, there were either two touchings per girl in two different places separated by at least several minutes or one touching per girl, one in one place at one time and one in another place at least several minutes later. As Judge Elliott pointed out in Crutcher, 27 Kan. App. 2d at 676, until the legislature sees fit to convert sex crimes perpetrated on children into continuing course of conduct crimes, each touching could have supported a separate count. Compare State v. Long, 26 Kan. App. 2d 644, 650, 993 P. 2d 1237 (1999), rev. denied 268 Kan. 892 (2000) (multiple penetrations in various rooms over course of 1 to 2 hours can be charged as separate rapes; no multiplicity).
This case, again depending on which girl’s version is believed, could have been charged in two counts or four counts. With no further guidance than they were given here, the members of the jury were free to cobble together their ultimate result from varying versions of the evidence. Confusion and lack of unanimity were genuine and practical hazards, not merely remote or purely academic risks.
*838Barber and its progeny have it right: In order to convict when there is evidence of two or more incidents that could form the basis of a conviction, either the State must tell the jury which incident it is relying upon or the jury must receive a unanimity instruction. See Barber, 26 Kan. App. 2d at 331; P.I.K Crim. 3d 68.09-B (“In order for the defendant to be found guilty of [crime], you must unanimously agree upon the same underlaying act.”); P.I.K Crim. 3d 68.09-B at Notes on Use (“This instruction is for use when distinct incidents separated by time or space are alleged by the State in a single count of the charging document. In other words, under circumstances where the State could have proceeded under multiple counts but chose not to do so.”)
Because this is a multiple acts case in which there was neither an election or its functional equivalent, see State v. Fulton,_ Kan. App. 2d_,_,_P.3d_(No. 84,044 filed April 13, 2001), nor a unanimity instruction, I would reverse Banks’ conviction. As we said in Barber, it is impossible for us to conduct an objective analysis as to which act the jury relied upon to convict or for us to be confident the verdict was unanimous. 26 Kan. App. 2d at 331. In such a situation, a defendant’s failure to request a unanimity instruction is irrelevant. There is structural error. For this reason, I dissent.