Court Opinion

ID: 9490127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:33:45.735953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:54.941588
License: Public Domain

OPINION
SCHALL, Circuit Judge.
Jenoptik AG petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to vacate its order that would permit the submission of protected deposition testimony to a German court hearing a suit between Therma-Wave, Inc. and Jenoptik. ThermaWave opposed. The petition was filed on November 21, 1996, and the response was filed on November 26, 1996. We denied the petition on November 27,1996. Judge Newman dissented from the denial.* Trial in the German court began November 28,1996.
Therma-Wave sued Jenoptik in California seeking a declaratory judgment that Jenoptik’s devices, if made, used, or sold in the United States, would infringe ThermaWave’s patents related to a method and apparatus for detecting thermal waves. Jenoptik counterclaimed for declaratory judgments that the patents would not be infringed, that the patents were invalid, and that the patents were unenforceable. In Germany, ThermaWave brought an action for infringement of a German counterpart of one of the patents at issue in the California action.
A stipulated protective order governing confidential information disclosed during discovery was entered by the district court. The order provided for two types of protection. The first type of protected confidential information was to be identified as “Confidential” and the second type as “Confidential — Trial Counsel Only” (Confidential-TCO).
During discovery in the California action, certain deposition testimony was identified as Confidential-TCO. Thereafter, ThermaWave sought to present portions of the deposition testimony identified as Confidential-TCO to the German court, asserting that the deposition testimony conflicted with a portion of Jenoptik’s brief filed in Germany. Therma-Wave requested that the district court either change the confidential designation of the deposition passages or modify the protective order to release the deposition passages for use in the German court. In its motion, Therma-Wave agreed to be placed “under the same restrictions regarding use of the materials in Germany that they are under here in this action.” Jenoptik opposed the motion.
The district court granted Therma-Wave’s motion to the extent that it modified the protective order to permit the release of the deposition passages for use in the German court. The district court stated that the protective order “should not be a means to keep relevant information from courts ” [emphasis in original]. The district court also requested that the German court “maintain the confidentiality of the information.” The district court was silent with regard to Therma-Wave’s agreement to be bound by the TCO provisions when using the materials in Germany.
Jenoptik requested that we vacate the modification order because (1) the district court failed to adequately address and protect Jenoptik’s interest in maintaining Confidential-TCO information, (2) the district court was required, but failed, to consider that the modification order would circumvent the discovery procedure of German courts, and (3) the district court modified the protective order without sufficient reasons because the deposition testimony at issue did not conflict with statements in Jenoptik’s brief in the German court.
The remedy of mandamus is available only in extraordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power. In re Calmar, Inc., 854 F.2d 461, 464, 7 USPQ2d 1713, 1715 (Fed. Cir.1988). A party seeking a writ bears the *723burden of proving that its right to issuance of the writ is “clear and indisputable.” Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980); In re Regents of the Univ. of California, 101 F.3d 1386, 1387, 40 USPQ2d 1784, 1785 (Fed. Cir.1996).
Jenoptik’s first argument was that the district court failed to protect Jenoptik’s interest in maintaining the TCO-eonfidential status of the deposition excerpts after they were presented to the German court. However, in view of Therma-Wave’s offer in the district court to continue to comply with the provisions of the protective order, we deemed Therma-Wave to be bound by the protective order with regard to the TCO provisions. Thus, Jenoptik did not show that its right to issuance of the writ was clear and indisputable on this ground.
Jenoptik’s second argument was that the modification order circumvented the discovery procedure of German courts and that the district court was required to consider the discoverability of the documents in a German court. Jenoptik asserted that the material in the deposition contained trade secrets. Jenoptik stated that there are no procedures for taking a deposition in Germany and that the only way a German court could obtain testimony of the person deposed in this case would be by live testimony. Jenoptik asserted that a person testifying in a German court can refuse to testify to matters concerning trade secrets.
Jenoptik compared its situation to an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1994). That statute permits a district court to compel a person to give testimony or produce documents for use in a proceeding in a foreign tribunal. Jenoptik argued that the district court should have considered whether the Confidential-TCO deposition testimony would have been discoverable in a German court. Some courts in § 1782 cases have ruled that discoverability is a factor to be considered.
However, this ease was not an action to conduct discovery arising under § 1782. The discoverability of the deposition excerpts was not the appropriate inquiry; Jenoptik did not argue that, if these materials were not confidential, Therma-Wave could not present the excerpts to another court. Jenoptik was seeking an order barring the presentation of the Confidential-TCO deposition testimony— which already had been discovered—to the German court. Thus, it was solely the confidentiality of the deposition testimony that was relevant to the mandamus petition. In short, the district court’s modification order did not circumvent German rules pertaining to discovery. Rather, it simply enabled the German court to have the deposition material before it so that it could apply those rules. Case law interpreting the requirements of section 1782 is not relevant to a determination whether a protective order may be modified to permit the release of deposition testimony, already discovered, to another court.
The Ninth Circuit, whose law we applied in this petition, has considered whether it is appropriate for a district court to modify a protective order to permit confidential materials to be used in a different court proceeding. In Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Insurance Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir.1992), the court stated that “Ninth Circuit precedent strongly favors disclosure to meet the needs of parties in pending litigation.” The court stated that “legitimate interests in privacy can be protected by putting the intervenors [the parties requesting modification of the protective order] under the same restrictions as those contained in the original protective order” and noted that the parties in the case had agreed to use the information only in accordance with the protective orders. Id. Beckman is instructive here. Therma-Wave’s agreement to be bound by the TCO provisions of the protective order in this case satisfied the rule established by Beckman. Further, the district court did all that it could by requesting that the German court continue to treat the documents as confidential. Accordingly, Jenoptik did not show its right to issuance of the writ was clear and indisputable on this second ground.
Jenoptik’s third argument, that the deposition testimony did not conflict with statements in its brief and thus should not be disclosed, could only be resolved by the Ger*724man court. That argument was intertwined with the very reason why Therma-Wave sought to present the testimony to the German court, that is, to show a conflict with statements in Jenoptik’s brief in that court. Jenoptik did not show why the German court could not decide this issue as well as any other issues relating to the material, including admissibility, that the German court deemed appropriate. Thus, mandamus was also not appropriate on Jenoptik’s third argument.
In sum, Jenoptik failed to show that its right to issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order modifying the protective order was clear and indisputable. Accordingly, its petition for a writ of mandamus was denied.

 In our order denying the mandamus petition, we stated that a discussion by the majority and dissent would follow. The present opinion thus explains our previous disposition of the matter.