Court Opinion

ID: 9918503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-13 21:00:46.10592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:00:23.301006
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                          ____________
No. 23-3143                                                     September Term, 2023
                                                                         1:22-cr-00096-CKK-1
                                                                        1:22-cr-00096-CKK-10
                                                                         1:22-cr-00096-CKK-8
                                                            Filed On: September 22, 2023
United States of America,

                 Appellee

        v.

Lauren Handy,

                 Appellant

------------------------------

Consolidated with 23-3146, 23-3147

        BEFORE:           Wilkins, Katsas*, and Walker, Circuit Judges

                                             ORDER

       Upon consideration of the motion for release pending appeal, the response
thereto, and the reply, it is

       ORDERED that the motion be denied. The court declines to exercise its
authority under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(a)(3) because appellant has not
shown that immediate relief before resolution of her expedited appeal is warranted.

                                            Per Curiam

                                                              FOR THE COURT:
                                                              Mark J. Langer, Clerk

                                                      BY:     /s/
                                                              Tatiana Magruder
                                                              Deputy Clerk

* A statement by Circuit Judge Katsas, concurring in this order, is attached.
                 United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                     ____________
No. 23-3143                                                September Term, 2023

KATSAS, Circuit Judge, concurring:

       Lauren Handy was convicted of violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act by use of force. Handy has appealed an order that she be detained
pending her sentencing. In this motion, she seeks release pending the disposition of
that appeal. I vote to deny the motion for the reasons summarized below.

       Defendants convicted of any “crime of violence” must normally be detained
before sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f)(1), 3143(a)(2). For purposes of this rule,
a “crime of violence” includes any “offense that has as an element . . . the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another.” Id. § 3156(a)(4)(A). As relevant here, the offense of conviction covers
whoever “by force” intentionally interferes with any person because she is obtaining or
providing reproductive health services. Id. § 248(a)(1).

        Handy contends that although a crime of violence requires the intentional use of
force, see Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1830 (2021), the offense of
conviction extends to the mere reckless use of force. But we must presume that
criminal prohibitions reach only acts committed intentionally. United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). For example, the Supreme Court has
inferred an intent requirement from a statute making it a crime to take property “by
force.” Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 261, 268 (2000). Likewise, we have
inferred an intent requirement from the prohibition on taking the same property by
“intimidation.” United States v. Carr, 946 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2020). For its force
requirement, section 248(a)(1) does not specify a mens rea lesser than acting
intentionally. Nor does the requirement of a specific intent to interfere with someone
change this analysis: Decades ago, the Supreme Court made clear that specifying an
intent requirement for one element of a criminal statute does not imply that other
elements lack such a requirement. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
270–73 (1952). And in any event, any negative implication would at most rule out a
specific-intent requirement for the force element, as opposed to a lesser general-intent
requirement. For these reasons, Handy is unlikely to succeed on her claim that the
FACE Act permits convictions for the reckless use of force.

        In deciding this motion, we have no occasion to consider whether the FACE Act’s
element of “force” sweeps more broadly than the “physical force” required for a crime of
violence. That possibility arises because the common-law definition of “force”
encompasses even the “slightest offensive touching,” whereas the crime-of-violence
definition of “physical force” requires “violent force—that is, force capable of causing
physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133,

                                          Page 2
                United States Court of Appeals
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                                    ____________
No. 23-3143                                               September Term, 2023

139–40 (2010). So, if FACE Act “force” tracks the broader common-law standard, then
section 248(a)(1) is not a crime of violence. My vote to deny interim relief rests on
Handy’s failure to develop this argument, rather than on any assessment of whether it is
likely to succeed.

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