Court Opinion

ID: 9819177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:19:25.724584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:49.599604
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN, dissenting: Implicit in the majority’s opinion is its finding that the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel had not yet attached when he was identified on April 9, 1991, after being viewed in a lineup conducted at the Cook County jail. I disagree with the finding and, therefore, dissent. Based upon a complaint for preliminary examination signed by a police officer charging the defendant with the offense of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9—1(a)(1) (West 1992)), an arrest warrant was issued and the defendant was taken into custody on March 14, 1991. On March 15, 1991, an assistant public defender filed an appearance purporting to represent the defendant. However, when this case came before the court on March 18, 1991, the defendant was represented by private counsel who filed her appearance. After the court appearance of March 18, the defendant was placed in a lineup at the Cook County jail and identified by James Coleman, a witness to the crime. The defendant’s private attorney was never notified that a lineup was to be conducted. Instead, the police notified the public defender’s office. Although an assistant public defender responded to the notification and presented himself at the jail, he left prior to the lineup being conducted after being informed by the defendant that he was represented by private counsel. My reading of the record reveals that this case came before the trial court on March 18, 1991, for the purpose of conducting a preliminary hearing. The defendant’s private attorney was present at that hearing and filed her appearance. The State informed the court that it was not ready to proceed and requested a continuance. The court granted the State’s motion and set the matter for a preliminary hearing on April 11, 1991. Counsel for the defendant demanded trial. A defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel attaches "at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings— whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (1972); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 436, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1240 (1977); see also People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 432, 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988). However, the exact point at which adversary criminal proceedings are said to be initiated for sixth amendment purposes is not at all clear or well settled. As this court noted in People v. Boswell, 132 Ill. App. 3d 52, 58, 476 N.E.2d 1154 (1985): "In resolving this issue, we must look to the purpose with which the right to counsel serves. The Supreme Court has recognized that the 'core purpose’ of the counsel guarantee is to assure aid at trial, 'when the accused [is] confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.’ (United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300, 309, 37 L. Ed. 2d 619, 626, 93 S. Ct. 2568, 2573.) Similarly, at certain 'critical’ pre-indictment proceedings, the Supreme Court has extended an accused’s right to counsel (Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 688-89, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882), recognizing that 'the accused [is] confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural system, or by his expert adversary, or by both’ (United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300, 310, 37 L. Ed. 2d 619, 627, 93 S. Ct. 2568, 2573), in a situation where the results of the confrontation 'might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.’ (United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 224, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1156, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1930, quoted in United States v. Gouveia (1984), 467 U.S. 180, 189, 81 L. Ed. 2d 146, 155, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 2298.) It is only at that time 'that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.’ (Kirby v. Illinois (1972), 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 418, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882.) While the court has indicated the various contexts in which the right to counsel is implicated, the court has emphasized that '[t]he initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism.’ 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417-18, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882.” This is not a case, as was the circumstance in the cases relied upon by the majority, where a defendant was subjected to a lineup identification without benefit of counsel after his arrest but before he was brought before a judge. See People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 564 N.E.2d 803 (1990); People v. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29, 506 N.E.2d 571 (1987). In this case, the defendant was arrested, held without bond for four days before being brought before a judge for purposes of a preliminary hearing, had counsel of his choice present at the first scheduled preliminary hearing date, and, some 22 days after appearing in court represented by counsel, was placed in a lineup and identified without the benefit of his chosen counsel. The fact that the defendant’s preliminary hearing was continued from March 18, 1991, to April 11, 1991, and the lineup identification took place in the interim is of no significance. The preliminary hearing process had commenced and, to my mind, the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel had attached. See Moore v. Illinois, 430 U.S. 220, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424, 98 S. Ct. 458 (1977). Because I find that the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel was violated when he was placed in a lineup without the benefit of counsel of his choice after adversary judicial criminal proceedings had commenced, and because evidence of Coleman’s April 9 lineup identification of the defendant was introduced at the trial of this cause, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand this case to the circuit court for a new trial.