Court Opinion

ID: 9397654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 20:01:06.092458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:26.706594
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10004       Document: 62-1     Date Filed: 05/25/2023   Page: 1 of 20

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eleventh Circuit

                              ____________________

                                    No. 22-10004
                              Non-Argument Calendar
                              ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                         Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JEREMIE SAINTVIL,
        a.k.a. Jeremie Stvil,
        a.k.a. Jeremie Saint Vil,
        a.k.a. Jeremi Stvil,

                                                      Defendant-Appellant.

                             ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10004

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00013-AW-GRJ-1
                             ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Jeremie Saintvil appeals his conviction and sentence for four
        fraud-related crimes. 1 In short, Saintvil orchestrated an extensive
        scheme to obtain Paycheck Protection Program 2 (“PPP”) loans for
        illegitimate businesses that he created with information he stole
        from elderly persons. On appeal, Saintvil contends that (1) the
        district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the
        indictment for duplicity and failing to strike surplusage from the

        1
         A jury found Saintvil guilty of each count with which he was charged: (1)
        aiding and abetting bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2, (2)
        submitting a false statement to a federally insured institution, in violation of
        18 U.S.C. § 1014, (3) aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
        1028A(a)(1), and (4) making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
        1001(a).
        2
         In March 2020, “as a result of the coronavirus pandemic,” Congress passed
        the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act which
        authorized the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to administer funds
        under the PPP to help businesses retain employees and pay other qualified
        expenses. The CARES Act also included a “special allocation . . . of funds
        committed directly [to] the [Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”)
        program] to respond to the COVID pandemic.” The EIDL program provides
        assistance to businesses affected by certain disasters—in this case, the
        coronavirus pandemic.
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        22-10004                     Opinion of the Court                                3

        indictment, (2) venue was improper, and (3) his sentence is
        substantively unreasonable. For the reasons below, we affirm.
                                      I.      Background
                  A. Factual Background
                From February 2018 through June 2020, Saintvil
        “fraudulently obtained and possessed” the personal identifying
        information of several elderly individuals in assisted or senior living
        facilities. Alongside other fraudulent activities (i.e., opening lines
        of credit, obtaining physical checks and debit cards, and
        transferring funds), Saintvil used the stolen identities to create
        fictitious businesses and apply for nine PPP loans. Seven of the
        nine applications were approved, and funding was distributed. In
        similar fashion, Saintvil also fraudulently applied for, and received,
        an EIDL loan. One way or another, the distributed proceeds—
        which totaled more than $1,000,000—ended up in Saintvil’s
        control.
               In its indictment against Saintvil, the grand jury detailed
        Saintvil’s entire scheme as perpetrated against various banks and
        financial institutions, but in Count One 3 it only charged a single
        execution of bank fraud as against Florida Credit Union (“FCU”). 4

        3
          We focus on Count One for two reasons. First, Saintvil’s duplicity and
        surplusage arguments are targeted at Count One. Second, the remaining
        three counts reallege and incorporate by reference the factual allegations laid
        out in Count One.
        4
            The indictment started by detailing Saintvil’s larger fraudulent scheme:
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10004

        Specifically, the indictment focused on Saintvil’s use of a certain
        individual’s identity (referred to as R.J.H.) to create the fictitious
        business HEJ Holding, Inc. (“HEJ Holding”) and to apply to FCU
        for a PPP loan. Accordingly, our recitation of the factual
        background will focus primarily on facts pertinent to this
        fraudulent instance.5

               B. The Charge
               Between on or about February 1, 2018, and on or about June
               30, 2020, in the Northern District of Florida and elsewhere, the
               defendant, . . . did knowingly and willfully execute and
               attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud a federally
               insured financial institution, that is, FCU, [and 12 other
               institutions], and to obtain moneys owned by and under the
               custody and control of FCU, [and 12 other institutions] by
               means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses,
               representations, and promises.
        The indictment then narrowed in on the fraud related to FCU in outlining the
        “execution” of Saintvil’s fraud.
               D. Execution of the Scheme
               Between on or about May 4, 2020, and on or about May 21,
               2020, for the purpose of executing and attempting to execute
               this fraudulent scheme, the defendant . . . did knowingly and
               willfully submit false and fraudulent representations to FCU in
               an SBA PPP loan application, and in supporting loan
               documents and emails.
        5
          Saintvil’s use of R.J.H.’s identity to create HEJ Holding and apply for a loan
        with FCU is part of a pattern. The rest of Saintvil’s scheme was perpetrated
        in the same way; he just changed the identities and financial institutions that
        he used.
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        22-10004                 Opinion of the Court                              5

               In May 2020, FCU—a federally insured credit union
        headquartered in Gainesville, Florida—received an email
        purportedly from R.J.H. who claimed to be the owner of HEJ
        Holding. 6 The email contained numerous attachments in support
        of HEJ Holding’s request for a PPP loan for $159,202.30. 7 The
        attachments included a PPP Borrower Application Form, two
        federal tax documents for HEJ Holding, a copy of R.J.H.’s Florida
        Driver’s License, and a document showing the average monthly

        6
         The email was sent to Jane Harris, a FCU employee, from a Gmail address
        that included R.J.H.’s name. The email read:
               Good afternoon Jane, I’m a proud Veteran and owner of HEJ
               Holding Inc. I have heard nothing but amazing reviews from
               members of [FCU] about your handling of the SBA [PPP].
               Unlike major banking institutions that has [sic] caused
               tremendous hardship with ineffective processes, we’re in
               desperate need for personalize [sic] banking attention that can
               ensure funding as quickly as possible.
               The pandemic has crippled my business and continue [sic] to
               wreck incalculable havoc to me personally, my team and their
               families. I beg of you to please help me with the prompt
               submittal of my SBA PPP application. I’ve included all
               necessary documents to ensure expeditious processing.
               Thank you very much for all of your help Jane and I look
               forward to hearing from you promptly.
               Sincerely,
               [R.J.H.]
        7
         According to the application, HEJ Holding had 17 employees and average
        monthly payroll expenses of $63,680.92.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10004

        payroll for HEJ Holding. FCU did not immediately issue any
        funding because it believed the application was fraudulent.
               R.J.H. and FCU continued to communicate about the loan
        application. In a series of emails over the next two-and-a-half
        weeks, FCU was “able to capture the IP address from where the
        email originated” which was later determined to be registered to
        Saintvil’s mother and the physical address where the IP was
        registered, in Delray Beach, Florida, was owned by Saintvil. And,
        “[i]n one of the email exchanges between [R.J.H.] and FCU, a
        completed PPP loan application was electronically signed.”
               FCU, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
        (“FBI”) by this time, called R.J.H. to request his physical presence
        in order to complete the loan application process. The FCU
        employee who conducted the call testified that the male voice on
        the other end of the line started the call by attempting to sound like
        an older man but his voice “changed to frustration” as the call
        progressed. The following morning, R.J.H. emailed FCU stating,
        “we have officially concluded it is not in the best interest of our
        team’s safety to have someone or myself drive from South Florida
        to Gainesville to open an account in this day age [sic].”
               Further investigation revealed that (1) R.J.H.’s address was
        changed from a senior living facility to the address for HEJ Holding
        in January 2020, (2) R.J.H. was alive and residing in a “memory
        center, or assisted living facility, in Central Florida,” (3) when
        contacted by the FBI, R.J.H.’s daughter stated that R.J.H. never
        owned a business, never operated HEJ Holding, and did not
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        22-10004                   Opinion of the Court                                  7

        control the email address or phone number associated with the
        PPP loan, (4) HEJ Holding was not a registered business with the
        Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, and the
        State did not have any record of 2019 corporate income tax returns
        for HEJ Holding, and (5) the service used to generate the payroll
        document, Paychex Flex, advised that they could “find no record
        of [HEJ Holding or R.J.H.].” In light of these findings, in June 2020,
        the FBI obtained and executed a search warrant for the Delray
        Beach residence (tied to the IP address from which the email
        application was submitted).
              Saintvil was at the residence when the search warrant was
        executed. The FBI uncovered extensive evidence of Saintvil’s
        fraudulent scheme, including the following evidence 8 specific to
        the R.J.H./HEJ Holding fraud: “[C]redit cards, banking check
        books, and other identification documents for [Saintvil], and
        others, including a . . . debit card in the name of R.J.H.”; and a
        computer on which agents were able to locate “emails pertaining
        to [HEJ Holding’s] SBA PPP loan application, including the same
        attachments that were submitted to FCU in support of the loan.”
                B. Procedural History
               In March 2021, a grand jury indicted Saintvil with bank
        fraud, submission of a false statement to a federally insured

        8
          Significant evidence of Saintvil’s other fraudulent PPP applications was
        uncovered—including numerous debit cards and check books in the names of
        other individuals as well as a copy of one identity-theft victim’s driver’s license
        on a photocopier.
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        8                           Opinion of the Court                      22-10004

        institution (specifically, FCU), aggravated identify theft, and
        making a false statement to the government (specifically, the SBA).
        Based on the indictment, Saintvil filed a Motion to Dismiss or
        Strike Surplusage. He argued first that the district court “should
        dismiss Count One . . . because it is duplicitous,” in that it
        “improperly alleg[ed] two separate offenses in the same count.” In
        other words, Saintvil argued that Count One was duplicitous
        because the bank fraud statute has two subsections, 9 each
        constituting separate offenses, so that he was improperly charged
        with two crimes in a single count of the indictment. Alternatively,
        Saintvil moved the court to “strike as surplusage from Count One
        the allegations regarding the twelve financial institutions [other
        than FCU] . . . and eight businesses [other than HEJ Holding]
        . . . because [their inclusion was] not only irrelevant to the offenses
        charged but also prejudicial to [Saintvil] and inflammatory.”

        9
            The bank fraud statute provides:
                  Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a
                  scheme or artifice—
                         (1) to defraud a financial institution; or
                         (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets,
                         securities, or other property owned by, or under the
                         custody or control of, a financial institution, by means
                         of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
                         promises;
                  shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not
                  more than 30 years, or both.
        18 U.S.C. § 1344.
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        22-10004                   Opinion of the Court                                9

               The district court denied Saintvil’s motion. As to Saintvil’s
        duplicity argument, the district court determined that the bank
        fraud statute’s two subsections provided “alternative ways in
        which the statute may be violated,” rather than separate offenses.
        As such, the district court found that Count One was not
        duplicitous. And, as to Saintvil’s surplusage argument, the district
        court concluded that Saintvil had not met the “exacting standard”
        for showing surplusage because he had not shown that the
        information at issue was immaterial, inflammatory, or prejudicial.
                After an eight-day jury trial in which Saintvil proceeded pro
        se, the jury found Saintvil guilty of all four counts. After the verdict
        but before sentencing, Saintvil filed a motion arguing that venue
        was improper as to each count because his actions took place in the
        Southern, rather than Northern, District of Florida. At sentencing,
        the district court denied Saintvil’s motion, because “at trial there
        was proof to support the venue that was presented,” i.e., the
        Northern District of Florida, and Saintvil’s motion was further
        “untimely” 10 and “unfounded.”

        10
          On this point, the district court questioned Saintvil as to why he had not
        waived his motion by failing to raise it pretrial. Saintvil responded that he
        “was not exposed to the government presentation at trial” so there was “no
        record as to whether they were going to provide evidence to prove [venue].”
        The district court found that venue was proper, but later clarified its statement
        on the untimeliness of Saintvil’s motion:
                I want to correct a misstatement I made earlier when I was
                reviewing your venue motion. I asked if it was waived by not
                raising it pretrial. Of course, you could raise – to the extent
                you could waive it as an evidentiary matter, that time has
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                     22-10004

               In total, the district court sentenced Saintvil to 204 months’
        imprisonment. 11 The district court recognized that this sentence
        was “above the guidelines,” but concluded that it was necessary
        because Saintvil’s case was “out of the heartland of normal fraud
        cases.” Specifically, the district court concluded that an above-
        guideline sentence was proper because “the conduct was
        egregious,” in that “[t]he overall fraud” and “amount of loss” were
        extreme, the “breadth of fraud was extraordinary,” Saintvil
        targeted many people “who were among the most vulnerable
        people there are,” and Saintvil took advantage of the PPP program
        that was intended to move money “quickly to the people who
        need[ed] it.” The district court also considered Saintvil’s abilities
        and education, criminal history, motive, and refusal to accept
        responsibility, which when considered alongside the need to
        protect the public from Saintvil, counseled in favor of a stronger
        sentence. In sum, the district court concluded that “all of the
        circumstances of the offense” showed that “a guideline sentence
        would [not] be sufficient to reflect the seriousness of the offense.”
               Saintvil timely appealed.

               passed, too. There are different kinds of venue objections. At
               any rate, I have denied that motion already.
        11
          The district court sentenced Saintvil to two concurrent terms of 180 months’
        imprisonment as to Counts 1 and 2, as well as a term of 24 months’
        imprisonment as to Count 3 to run consecutively with Counts 1 and 2.
        Additionally, the district court imposed a term of 60 months’ imprisonment as
        to Count 4 to run concurrently with Counts 1 and 2.
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        22-10004                 Opinion of the Court                             11

                                   II.     Discussion
               Saintvil puts forth three arguments on appeal. First, he
        argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
        the indictment as duplicitous and failing to strike surplusage from
        the indictment. Second, he argues that venue was improper.
        Third, he argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
        We address each argument in turn, ultimately affirming Saintvil’s
        conviction and sentence.
               A. Duplicity and Surplusage
               Saintvil’s first set of arguments concern the district court’s
        denial of his motion to dismiss. We start with his argument that
        Count One of his indictment improperly charged him with two
        separate crimes and then consider his argument that the indictment
        contained unlawful surplusage.
                       1. Duplicity
               We review alleged deficiencies in an indictment de novo. See
        United States v. Pacchioli, 718 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013).
               “A count is duplicitous if it charges two or more separate
        and distinct offenses.”12 United States v. Deason, 965 F.3d 1252, 1267
        (11th Cir. 2020). Put differently, each count of an indictment may

        12
           “[D]uplicitous count[s] pose three dangers: (1) A jury may convict a
        defendant without unanimously agreeing on the same offense; (2) A defendant
        may be prejudiced in a subsequent double jeopardy defense; and (3) A court
        may have difficulty determining the admissibility of evidence.” United States
        v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 977 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10004

        only charge a single offense. But “where a statute defines two or
        more ways in which an offense may be committed, all may be
        alleged in the conjunctive in one count.” United States v. Felts, 579
        F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also United
        States v. Burton, 871 F.2d 1566, 1573 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Where a
        penal statute, . . . prescribes several alternative ways in which the
        statute may be violated and each is subject to the same
        punishment . . . the indictment may charge any or all of the acts
        conjunctively, in a single count[.]”); id. at 1574 (“An indictment is
        not duplicitous if, in one count, it charges a defendant with
        violating the statute in both ways.” (footnote omitted)).
               “Bank fraud is established under two alternative methods.”
        United States v. Dennis, 237 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). First,
        to prove bank fraud under § 1344(1), “the government must
        establish that the defendant (1) intentionally participated in a
        scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property; and
        (2) that the victim of the scheme or artifice was an insured financial
        institution.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, to prove bank fraud
        under § 1344(2), the government must establish “(1) that a scheme
        existed in order to obtain money, funds, or credit in the custody of
        the federally insured institution; (2) that the defendant participated
        in the scheme by means of false pretenses, representations or
        promises, which were material; and (3) that the defendant acted
        knowingly.” Id. (quotation omitted). Finally, we have held that
        “[a] conviction can be sustained under either section [of the bank
        fraud statute] when the indictment . . . charge[s] both clauses.” Id.
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        22-10004                Opinion of the Court                           13

               Saintvil relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in
        Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014), which he argues held
        that the bank fraud statute’s subsections establish different
        offenses. Saintvil, however, misstates the law. In Loughrin, the
        Supreme Court held that § 1344(1), unlike § 1344(2), requires a
        showing of “intent to defraud a bank.” Id. at 359–62. That is, the
        two subsections of the bank fraud statute have different elements.
        It does not follow, however, that the two subsections therefore
        define different offenses altogether. Rather, just as the district
        court reasoned, and as we have held, see Dennis, 237 F.3d at 1303,
        subsections (1) and (2) of the bank fraud statute are merely two
        ways to prove the same offense—bank fraud. Loughrin hurts,
        rather than helps, Saintvil’s case.
               Without Loughrin, Saintvil’s position has no support.
        Indeed, his argument collapses in light of our holdings that the
        bank fraud statute provides alternative ways to prove the same
        offense and that the two subsections can be charged together in
        one count. See Dennis, 237 F.3d at 1303; Felts, 579 F.3d at 1344;
        Burton, 871 F.2d at 1573.
               We agree with the district court that Count One was not
        duplicitous.13
                      2. Surplusage

        13
          We need not reach Saintvil’s argument that the jury instructions did not
        properly account for the duplicity because we conclude that Count One was
        not duplicitous.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10004

               We review the district court’s refusal to strike alleged
        surplusage for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Awan, 966
        F.2d 1415, 1426 (11th Cir. 1992).
               “A motion to strike surplusage from an indictment should
        not be granted unless it is clear that the allegations are not relevant
        to the charge and are inflammatory and prejudicial.” Id. (quotation
        omitted). We have recognized that this threshold is a “most
        exacting standard.” Id. (quotation omitted).
               “For an indictment to be valid, it must contain the elements
        of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprise the
        defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.” United States v.
        Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted and
        alterations adopted). Specifically for bank fraud, “[t]he allegation
        of a scheme is an essential element[.]” United States v. Adkinson, 135
        F.3d 1363, 1377 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1344). In other
        words, an indictment that includes bank fraud as a charge should
        “set forth the manner and means by which the scheme and artifice
        to defraud operated.” Bobo, 344 F.3d at 1084.
               Saintvil argues that the indictment included “surplusage”
        because there was extraneous information in Count One (i.e.,
        references to financial institutions other than FCU and fraudulent
        businesses other than HEJ Holding) that referenced parts of his
        scheme that were not directly charged in Count One. This
        argument is a non-starter. Because an allegation of bank fraud
        requires the government to prove the existence of a scheme, and
        the scheme-related evidence is exactly the information that Saintvil
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        22-10004                  Opinion of the Court                             15

        argues is surplusage, he cannot prove that this information is not
        “relevant to the charge.” Awan, 966 F.2d at 1426; see also Bobo, 344
        F.3d at 1083–84. While the included information is extensive, the
        scheme was extravagant and multi-faceted which necessitated the
        inclusion of additional information in the indictment beyond his
        actions vis-à-vis FCU and HEJ Holding. Because the additional
        information was relevant and required in order to charge Saintvil
        properly, 14 Saintvil fails to meet the “exacting standard” for a
        motion to strike surplusage. See Awan, 966 F.2d at 1426. The
        district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining to
        strike certain information from Saintvil’s indictment.
               B. Venue
               “We review de novo a determination that the government
        established venue by a preponderance of the evidence.” United
        States v. Smith, 22 F.4th 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2022). We view
        venue-related evidence “in the light most favorable to the
        government and make all reasonable inferences and credibility
        determinations in favor of the verdict the jury returned.” Id.
               “Like most rights, a defendant’s venue right is not absolute,
        and it will be deemed waived unless asserted prior to trial.” United
        States v. White, 590 F.3d 1210, 1213 (11th Cir. 2009); see also United

        14
          Because Saintvil clearly fails to meet one of three mandatory conditions for
        a motion to strike surplusage, we need not reach his arguments as to the other
        two conditions (that the allegations are inflammatory and prejudicial). We do
        note, however, that his arguments as to the latter two elements also lack
        persuasive force.
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10004

        States v. DiJames, 731 F.2d 758, 761 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that
        “the right to be tried in the state and district where the crime was
        alleged to have been committed may be waived voluntarily by the
        defendant”). If, however, a defendant “has no notice of a defect of
        venue until the [g]overnment rests its case,” the outer limit for
        raising a venue objection is extended so that it “is timely if made at
        the close of the evidence.” United States v. Daniels, 5 F.3d 495, 496
        (11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1152
        (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a challenge to venue failed because
        “appellant did not present his venue objection until the prosecution
        had rested its case”).
                “In many (and perhaps most) cases in which the defendant
        fails to object to a defect in venue, the defendant’s silence may be
        taken to imply a waiver of the venue right.” White, 590 F.3d at 1214
        (alterations adopted and quotations omitted). We will not find
        waiver, however, when “there is evidence which suggests that the
        defendant has not waived his venue right.” Id. In White, for
        example, we held that a defendant waived his venue right through
        silence when he “did not object before or during trial” and instead
        “waited until after he was convicted to complain [about venue].”
        Id.
               Here, Saintvil did not challenge venue before or at trial, but
        rather waited a week prior to sentencing to ﬁle a motion
        challenging venue. As such, he has waived his venue right. See id.
        Indeed, Saintvil was put on notice as to a potential venue challenge
        because the evidence adduced at trial revealed that his actions (i.e.,
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        22-10004               Opinion of the Court                       17

        submitting the fraudulent documents and otherwise carrying out
        his scheme) occurred in the Southern District of Florida rather
        than the Northern District of Florida. Therefore, at the latest,
        Saintvil should have challenged venue during trial. See Daniels, 5
        F.3d at 496; Roberts, 308 F.3d at 1151–52.
              C. Substantive Reasonableness
               We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a
        deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
        U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “A district court abuses its considerable
        discretion and imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence only
        when it ‘(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that
        were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an
        improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
        judgment in considering the proper factors.’” United States v.
        Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United
        States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). “The
        party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that the
        sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a)
        factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.”
        Id.
               Under § 3553(a), a sentencing court must impose a sentence
        that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to reflect the
        seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to
        provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate
        deterrence, and to protect the public from further crimes of the
        defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In addition, the sentencing court
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        must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
        history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences
        available, the guideline sentencing range, and the need to avoid
        unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
        records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. Id.
        § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(4), (6).
               The district court may impose an upward variance based on
        the § 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627,
        637–38 (11th Cir. 2013), but sentences outside the guideline range
        require sufficiently compelling justifications, Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
        For example, the district court may impose an upward variance if
        it concludes that the guideline range insufficiently accounted for
        the defendant’s criminal history. United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814
        F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016). The district court may likewise
        vary upward based on factors already accounted for in calculating
        the guideline range. See United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 619–
        20 (11th Cir. 2015). A district court’s failure to discuss mitigating
        evidence does not indicate that it ignored or failed to consider this
        evidence. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).
                Despite Saintvil’s contention otherwise, his sentence is
        substantively reasonable. First, the district court quite clearly
        “consider[ed] the extent of the deviation and ensure[d] that the
        justification [for the deviation was] sufficiently compelling.” Gall,
        552 U.S. at 50. The district court canvassed the applicable
        considerations on the record, including: the breadth of the fraud,
        the duration of the fraudulent scheme, the large number of victims,
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        22-10004               Opinion of the Court                         19

        the vulnerability of those victims, the high loss amount, the
        circumstances of the offense (i.e., Saintvil taking advantage of
        emergency PPP funds), his history of fraudulent behavior, the need
        for deterrence, the need to protect the public from his actions, and
        his refusal to accept responsibility for his crimes. Each of these
        considerations was explained to Saintvil during sentencing. Id.
        (“After settling on the appropriate sentence, [the district court]
        must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for
        meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
        sentencing.”). Second, these same considerations support the
        district court’s sentencing determination and cut against Saintvil’s
        unfounded argument that he is less culpable than other defendants
        (that he identifies in case law) who received upward variances.
        Third, the district court’s extensive explanation shows that it
        adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and determined that an
        above-guideline sentence was necessary. See Osorio-Moreno, 814
        F.3d at 1288. To the extent that the district court did not recite
        each individual factor, that is not required anyway. Amedeo, 487
        F.3d at 832. Fourth, and finally, Saintvil argues that the district
        court erred in sentencing because “every single one of the grounds
        used by the district court” to support the upward variance was
        “accounted for in the sentencing guidelines.” This argument has
        no support under our law. See Johnson, 803 F.3d at 620 (“[The
        appellant] contends that all relevant factors for the district court to
        consider in imposing a sentence already were incorporated into the
        calculation of his advisory guidelines range, such that no fact or
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        20                   Opinion of the Court              22-10004

        circumstance warranted a variance.          This argument is
        meritless . . . .” (quotation omitted)).
               Simply put, Saintvil has not carried his burden of
        demonstrating that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
        Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256.
              AFFIRMED.