Court Opinion

ID: 9829223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:06:30.803307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:58.620662
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In their motion for rehearing appellees cite the case of Solan & Billings v. Pasche (Tex. Civ. App.) 163 S. W. 674, in support of the proposition presented in the motion that, if it be conceded that article 8201 of the Renal Code, set out in our main • opinion, is so indefinite that it cannot be enforced as a criminal statute, it nevertheless imposed a civil duty the violation of which by plaintiff rendered him guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
The statute under consideration in the case cited did not purport to be a criminal statute, and the learned judge who wrote the opinion 'in that case making a distinction between, the rule of certainty required in a criminal statute and that which is sufficient in a civil held that the statute there invoked was not invalid.
It may be that a statute enacted tor the purpose of defining an offense and prescribing a penalty therefor can be held void for uncertainty in defining the offense for the prevention and punishment of which it was enacted, and yet be held a valid law prescribing a rule of civil conduct, but the logic of such a contention does not seem apparent to us. However this may be, it does not affect the conclusion expressed in our main opinion that, regardless of the validity of the statute pleaded by the defendant in this case, the judgment of the court below should, on the unchallenged findings of the jury, have been in favor of the plaintiff.
The finding of the jury in answer to special issue No. 2, submitted at the request of the defendant, set out in our main opinion, acquits the plaintiff of any negligence in the rate of speed at which he was going at the time he reached a position of danger from the approaching train. The undisputed evidence snows that he realized his danger and lost his presence of mind thereby at or before the time he reached a point 30 feet from the railroad track.
We think the finding above mentioned and the other findings of the jury set out in our *1022main opinion necessarily include the finding that plaintiff did not approach the point 30 feet from the track at a rate of speed that would have prevented his reducing his speed to 6 miles an hour when he reached that point, and that his failure to so reduce his speed was due to Ms fright and confusion of mind caused by the negligence of the defendant. Under this interpretation of the verdict the question of the validity of the statute is immaterial.
We have duly considered all of the questions presented by the motion for rehearing, and feel constrained to adhere to our former conclusion as to the proper disposition of this appeal, and the motion is therefore refused.
Refused.