Court Opinion

ID: 9573717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:57:56.957668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:09.979831
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). Clarence Atkins was convicted of the sale of heroin on the testimony of Edward Nero, a police informer, who said that he purchased the narcotic from Atkins on March 12, 1971.
At the time of the buy, Nero faced charges for a January 24, 1971 breaking and entering. Atkins *175was convicted on August 12, 1971. On November 29, 1971, the court entered an order of nolle prosequi on the breaking and entering charge on the prosecutor’s representations that the stolen property had been returned and Nero had "rendered great assistance in the area of narcotics traffic” including testimony which had "resulted in pleas and convictions regarding narcotics violations”.
At Atkins’ trial, Nero denied that he had been promised leniency.
Nero offered to become a police informer in the fall of 1970 after he was convicted and before sentencing for a theft offense; he was placed on probation for that offense.
The subsequently nol-prossed breaking and entering offense was apparently committed in violation of a condition of Nero’s probation. Nero testified that he was using drugs at the time of the purchase from Atkins.
Nero’s history of narcotic addiction was amply probed at the trial. He said that he renewed the use of narcotics in connection with his work as an informer as it was necessary to appear to be an addict to make buys from drug dealers. He was not using drugs at the time of trial.
The closing arguments were not transcribed. We, therefore, do not know how this case went to the jury.
The pendency of the breaking and entering charge was made known to the jury. Defense counsel declared: "With this kind of man, I think that there is the possibility, and I intend to argue this very strongly, that in his mind there might be a deal”. Defense counsel may have argued without protest or contradiction by the prosecutor that despite the lack of a formal agreement Nero justi*176fiably expected that by testifying for the people he might obtain favorable treatment.
In the context of that statement of defense counsel and the failure to record the closing arguments,1 I cannot predicate reversible error and concur in affirmance of defendant’s conviction.
I
I agree with my colleagues that a prima facie case may be made on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness who has reason to fabricate his testimony and that no distinction in this regard can properly be drawn between interested witnesses generally and addict informers in particular.
We also agree that, absent a request for a cautionary instruction, a trial judge is not obliged to instruct the jury regarding the special scrutiny it should give informer testimony.
If such an instruction is requested, the judge should give it. An informer facing, prosecution for an offense or whose use of drugs in violation of law and of a condition of probation is tolerated by the authorities has the same motive to fabricate as an accomplice. See People v McCoy, 392 Mich 231, 236; 220 NW2d 456 (1974).
I further agree that Atkins is not entitled to a *177new trial simply because the breaking and entering charge against Nero was dismissed.
Rewarding accomplices and informers with leniency or exculpation for their transgressions of the law in exchange for testimony and evidence to convict another person is an accepted prosecutorial practice.
Atkins did not move for a new trial or for an evidentiary hearing whereat he might seek to establish that there was an undisclosed arrangement with Nero. The dismissal of the breaking and entering charge and the failure to charge probation violation do not in and of themselves establish that such concessions were pursuant to an agreement.
Although the record does not support a conclusion that there was an agreement, the probability is that there was a tacit understanding.2
I question the usefulness of a distinction between the "disclosure of facts (immunity or leniency) which the jury should weigh in assessing a witness’s credibility” and " 'disclosure’ of future possibilities for the jury’s speculation”. Some future possibilities may, indeed, appear so extravagant as to be fanciful. Others will, however, have sufficient substantiality to induce "reasonable expectations, as opposed to promises, of leniency or other rewards” and may motivate fabricated testimony.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said:
*178"Concededly promises of immunity are admissible; they are, however, rarely made. Inasmuch as the question involved is the motive for testifying falsely and therefore the state of mind of the prosecuting witnesses, the relevant evidence is not alone the acts or attitude of the district attorney but anything else that would throw light upon the prosecuting witnesses’ state of mind. It is therefore entirely proper, either by cross-examination of the witness himself, or otherwise, to show a belief or even only a hope on his part that he will secure immunity or a lighter sentence, or any other favorable treatment, in return for his testimony, and that, too, even if it be fully conceded that he had not the slightest basis from any act or word of the district attorney for such a belief or hope. The fact that despite a plea of guilty long since entered, the witness had not yet been sentenced, is proper evidence tending to show the existence of such hope or belief.” (Emphasis supplied.) Farkas v United States, 2 F2d 644, 647 (CA 6, 1924).3
II
The United States Supreme Court said:
"The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness.” Napue v Illinois, 360 US 264, 269; 79 S Ct 1173; 3 L Ed 2d 1217 (1959). (Emphasis supplied.)
" * * * deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of justice.’ * * * In Napue v Illinois, 360 US 264 (1959), we said, '[t]he same *179result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.’ Id., at 269.
" * * * evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to [the witness’s] credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it.” (Emphasis supplied.) Giglio v United States, 405 US 150, 153, 155; 92 S Ct 763; 31 L Ed 2d 104 (1972).4
We all begin with the same premises. A prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose to the jury any promise of leniency. He has the same duty of disclosure regarding reasonable expectations, as opposed to promises, of leniency or other rewards for testifying.
We further agree that a prosecutor violates this duty if he fails to correct false evidence that a witness has not been promised consideration for his testimony.
A witness provides false evidence if his testimony gives a false impression. A prosecutor in a position to correct a false impression may not knowingly allow it to go uncorrected.
The prosecutor’s affirmative duty to disclose facts which tend to affect credibility extends to tacit understandings as well as concrete agree-*180merits. His obligation not to allow false evidence to go uncorrected requires that he supplement the record if he is aware that a witness has told a partial truth that may mislead the jury.
All lawyers have a duty to the court to correct testimony they know to be false. Disciplinary Rule 7.102(A) provides that in his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
"(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.
"(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence. ” (Emphasis supplied.)
Disciplinary Rule 7.102(B) obliges a lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that his client has "perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal” to call upon his client to rectify the same and, if he refuses, to "reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal”.
A prosecutor has a special duty to disclose all the evidence whether it tends to support or contravene the prosecution:
"The only legitimate object of the prosecution is, 'to show the whole transaction, as it was, whether its tendency be to establish guilt or innocence.’ The prosecuting officer represents the public interest, which can never be promoted by the conviction of the innocent. His object like that of the court, should be simply justice; and he has no right to sacrifice this to any pride of professional success. And however strong may be his belief of the prisoner’s guilt, he must remember that, though unfair means may happen to result in doing justice to the prisoner in the particular case, yet, justice so attained, is unjust and dangerous to the whole community.” Hurd v People, 25 Mich 405, 416 (1872).
A statement by an accomplice-informer witness *181that no promise has been made to him is misleading although no positive promise has been made if he has a reasonable expectation of leniency or other reward. The statement is not wholly true as it conceals the witness’s expectations, expectations fostered by the practice of granting concessions to accomplice-informer witnesses. The apparent purpose of knowing concealment and a failure to correct the record is to mislead the jury.
Michigan civil jurisprudence fully supports the " 'silence-fraud’ rule”. Williams v Benson, 3 Mich App 9; 141 NW2d 650 (1966).
In an early case, Kenyon v Woodruff, 33 Mich 310, 314 (1876), this Court approved instructions allowing recovery for fraudulent representation "in stating what was particularly and directly untrue and also in stating but part of the truth in respect to other matters”. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sullivan v Ulrich, 326 Mich 218, 229; 40 NW2d 126 (1949), this Court held that a seller had made a misrepresentation to a purchaser where, although the answers were truthful, the tendency was to convey a "false impression”.5
"Failure to disclose a material fact necessary to prevent a false impression is as much a fraud as positive misrepresentation. It is not essential that the pretenses by which a fraud is accomplished be expressed in words.” Michigan National Bank v Marston, 29 Mich App 99, 104; 185 NW2d 47 (1970).
"In Michigan, even without a fiduciary relationship, a *182party is under a duty to use diligence in making a complete disclosure of facts where partial disclosure may convey false impressions and mislead the plaintiff. Such half-truths or non-disclosures are considered to be concealment of facts and, therefore, misrepresentations. Groening v Opsata, 323 Mich 73; 34 NW2d 560 (1948). See also Equitable Life Insurance Co of Iowa v Halsey, Stuart & Co, 312 US 410, 425-426; 61 S Ct 623; 85 L Ed 920 (1941); 1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, pp 586-588 (1956).” Strand v Librascope, Inc, 197 F Supp 743, 753 (ED Mich, 1961).6
Ill
If there is an agreement with a prosecution witness, it must be disclosed to the jury.
If there is no agreement and charges of law violation have been or could be lodged against the witness or sentencing has been deferred, and in similar cases the prosecutor has refrained from prosecuting or has granted or sought charge reduction or leniency in sentencing for witnesses who *183assisted the prosecution, those facts and their significance should be fully disclosed and explained to the jury.
Absent a statement by the prosecutor in the jury’s presence acknowledging that accomplice-informer witnesses may obtain leniency or other concessions and, while there is no formal agreement with the witness in the instant case, he may justifiably expect some leniency, a denial that there is an agreement for leniency is likely to create a false impression that may mislead the jury.
The assumption that juries know that an accomplice-informer witness is telling a partial truth when he denies there is an agreement for leniency is controverted by prosecutorial efforts to confine the scope of the inquiry to actual promises.7 In all events, a judge should not knowingly allow a partial truth to go uncorrected.
The practice of granting leniency to accomplice-informer witnesses is well known to judges, trial and appellate. Judges frequently allow charge reduction and grant sentencing leniency to such witnesses to assist law enforcement. In this case, the judge granted a nolle prosequi on the prosecutor’s representation that Nero had assisted in obtaining convictions.
A judge, aware of such practices, aware of the expectations of accomplice-informer witnesses and that they are in a measure justified by what in fact occurs, should, without a request by defense counsel, require a statement by the prosecutor of the practice or either take judicial notice, as in my *184colleague’s opinion, of, or permit the defendant to prove, the practice.8
We are at approximately the same juncture regarding concessions to accomplice-informers as we were until recently in regard to disclosure of plea-bargaining concessions. A short time ago it was bad form for a defendant to acknowledge, in response to the judge’s question, "have any promises been made to you?”, that there was a plea bargain. The judge might even refuse to accept a plea of guilty if the defendant responded, truthfully, that there had been plea bargaining; in order to obtain the plea bargain defendants were expected to deny it.
The practice of granting leniency to accomplice-informer witnesses should be spread fully on the record.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams, J., concurred with Levin, J.
Lindemer and Ryan, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.

 We should take up where we left off in People v Lee, 391 Mich 618, 630-631; 218 NW2d 655 (1974):
"Waiver of recording of closing arguments is apparently not an uncommon practice in Michigan’s trial courts, judging from a number of recent appeals which have raised the issue. If this failure to record the entire record constitutes unfairness, then the remedy lies in amendment of the statutory and court rule scheme, to make verbatim records of the entire proceedings at trial mandatory in all criminal trials. Without expressing an opinion on the matter we hereby announce our intention to consider whether such an amendment to the court rule would be in order.”

 My colleague writes:
"It would be atypical if an addict-informer did not have an expectation of consideration for his cooperation in a given case. The well of informer cooperation would soon run dry if law enforcement consistently adhered to a policy of no consideration. Furthermore, we would not be so paternalistic as to believe that jurors are not well aware of these facts of life.”

 Accord: Thurman v United States, 316 F2d 205 (CA 9, 1963); Whitton v State, 479 P2d 302, 316 et seq. (Alas, 1970); People v Pantages, 212 Cal 237; 297 P 890, 897 (1931); State v Kent, 4 ND 577; 62 NW 631, 639 (1895).
See also, Alford v United States, 282 US 687, 693; 51 S Ct 218; 75 L Ed 624 (1931).

 In State v Carter, 69 NJ 420; 354 A2d 627, 633 (1976), the trial judge denied a new trial finding that the representations made by a police officer "were not concrete promises” and, therefore the responses of the prosecution’s witnesses "did not constitute clear perjurious testimony.” The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed, stating that "Regardless of whether the representations made to Bello * * * can be characterized as promises for the purpose of proving perjury, it is clear that they could have motivated Bello to testify favorably for the state.” The Court added that an officer’s assurances that he would relay the witness’s "cooperation with the state to the appropriate authorities obviously was intended to convey to [the witness] the notion that he could expect favorable treatment as to his own criminal involvements. Therefore, when [the witness] testified that no promises had been made to him except that of protection, the trial prosecutor having knowledge of [the officer’s] assurances to [the witness], had an obligation to disclose this information to the court and to defense counsel.”

 Where the responses to inquiries "were in such form as naturally tended to reassure plaintiffs and to cause them to proceed on the assumption” that the facts were different than they actually were, "the concealment of the true facts and the deliberate creating of false impressions and inferences is the equivalent of an express and intentional misrepresentation.” (Emphasis supplied.) Groening v Opsata, 323 Mich 73, 82; 34 NW2d 560 (1948).
Similarly see Wolfe v A E Kusterer & Co, 269 Mich 424, 430; 257 NW 729 (1934).

 "A partial truth, as well as a truth taken out of context and used as bait to defraud and deceive, is an actionable false representation.” Nationwide Motorist Association of Michigan, Inc v Nationwide Motorist Association, Inc, 273 F Supp 875, 882 (WD Mich, 1967).
Similarly, see United States Fibres, Inc v Proctor & Schwartz, Inc, 358 F Supp 449, 480-481 (ED Mich, 1972).
The Restatements of Torts and Contracts state the relevant principle:
"(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated
"(a) such matters as the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them; and
"(b) such additional matters as he knows or believes to be necessary to prevent his partial statement of the facts from being misleading; * ** * .” Restatement Torts, 2d (Tentative Draft No 11), § 551, p 42.
"Half-truths. A statement may be true with respect to the facts stated, but may fail to include qualifying matter necessary to prevent the implication of an assertion that is false with respect to other facts. For example, a true statement that an event has recently occurred may carry the false implication that the situation has not changed since its occurrence. Such a half-truth may be as misleading as an assertion that is wholly false.” Restatement Contracts, 2d (Tentative Draft No 11), § 301, comment b, p 7.

 See People v Mata, 68 Mich App 337; 242 NW2d 574 (1976); People v Nettles, 41 Mich App 215; 199 NW2d 845 (1972); People v Dupuie, 52 Mich App 510; 217 NW2d 902 (1974); People v Taylor, 46 Mich App 259; 207 NW2d 899 (1973). Cf. People v Crutchfield, 62 Mich App 149; 233 NW2d 507 (1975); People v Spruell, 61 Mich App 632, 233 NW2d 118 (1975).

 It should not be necessary to divert the trial from the principal issue of guilt or innocence to provide the defendant with an opportunity to prove what those knowledgeable of the criminal justice system are all aware.