Court Opinion

ID: 9639868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:50:29.360042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:22.629549
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). I am unable to agree with the holding of the majority that the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was for the jury. I cannot subscribe to the conclusions that they "cannot say that a prudent man, after looking to the north where he could see a distance of 300 feet along the highway, and seeing no traveler was on the road, would not have assumed that he could safely cross as far as he did without looking in that direction again before reaching the center white line of the road. He was not bound as a matter of law to anticipate that while he was walking 24 feet, an automobile, in utter disregard of his presence on the road, would come out of the unseen distance and, while traveling outside its ordinary and expected lane of travel, knock him down.”
It is my opinion that the factual situation in the instant case does not warrant those conclusions. The majority rely extensively upon Aiken v. Metcalf, 90 Vt 196, 97 A 669. I do not consider it factually in point. There the plaintiff crossed the street in a country village. He crossed from east to west on a cross-walk that bore diagonally to the north. He had reached a point a step or two from the grass on the westerly side of the street, when he was hit by an automobile coming from the south and his left. It was entirely on its left and wrong side of the street and nearly to the grass line on that side. There, the plaintiff; certainly, would not be bound as a matter of law to anticipate that an automobile would come from that direction and on that side of the street. This Court aptly expressed it there by saying, "the plaintiff was run down by the defendant’s automobile.” Even on those facts, however, the Court, after disposing of the question of the defendant’s negligence by saying that the accident would not have happened if he had exercised any care, then went on to say that the question of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence was much more difficult.
*296I would have no difficulty in concurring with the conclusions and holding of the majority if the plaintiff, when he shut the door of the car from which he alighted and at that time looked to the north and saw no car coming from that direction, had proceeded directly across the street. He did not do that. The car from which he alighted started up and the plaintiff then started across the street, but, instead of traveling directly across it, he took a diagonal southerly course. He did not look to the north again at any time. The street was 18% feet wide. He traveled in a diagonal course a distance of 24 feet and when he had reached a point 1% feet easterly of the center white line, he was hit by the defendant’s car which came from the north. If he had proceeded straight across the street he would have reached the westerly side of it and had 5% feet additional remaining. Instead of doing that, in traveling a distance of 24 feet, he had reached a point that was only 8% feet from the easterly side of the street from which he started. He chose his own course, not straight across nor on any diagonal cross-walk. The course he followed was approximately in the direction of two-thirds along the street in a southerly direction.
Aiken v. Metcalf, supra, upon which the majority place so much emphasis was decided in 1916. It seems almost unnecessary to say that the factual conditions in regard to automobile travel and use have materially and greatly changed in 40 years. The danger in crossing streets in country villages and even on what is termed here a "not much traveled” street is entirely different than it was 40 years ago. A not much traveled street is a comparative term. The yardstick by which the care of a prudent person is measured must change accordingly.
The testimony in regard to the plaintiff’s conduct comes from his own lips. If he prevails, he must do so upon the basis that his own testimony is true. He looked to the north only once; that was when he shut the door of the car from which he alighted. The car then started along and the plaintiff stepped into the street and started his diagonal course along and across the street. He was required to exercise for his own safety the measure of care that a prudent man would exercise in the same circumstances, Rush v. Cody, 107 Vt 326, 330, 178 A 891.
*297He says that there was no car coming when he looked and we must take that as true. However, in considering the motion on contributory negligence only, the plaintiff’s negligence must be determined by what he did or omitted to do without regard to the defendant’s lack of care. Seneca v. Bleau, 108 Vt 486, 495, 189 A 139, and cases cited.
It is the rule in this jurisdiction that in a negligence case the burden of showing freedom from contributory negligence is upon the plaintiff. Wright v. Godin, 108 Vt 23, 25, 182 A 189. The test is whether the want of care and prudence contributed in any degree in point of fact, to the happening of the accident. If it did so contribute the plaintiff cannot recover, for the reason that the court and jury cannot be called upon to determine the proportionate effect of the concurring negligence of both parties; and hence it must appear from all the evidence that the fault of the plaintiff did not contribute at all to the happening of the ac cident. The question is whether it can be said that the plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his negligence did not contribute to the accident in the least degree. The evidence to sustain this burden must be of such a quality and character as to justify the jury, acting reasonably, to predicate a verdict theron in favor of the plaintiff. Paquin v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 116 Vt 466, 470-472, 78 A2d 683, 80 A2d 669. See also McKirryher v. Yager, 112 Vt 336, 346-347, 24 A2d 331 ; Merrihew’s Adrnr. v. Goodspeed, 102 Vt 206, 216, 147 A 346, 66 ALR 1109.
I agree with the majority when they say that the plaintiff could have avoided the accident easily enough if he had looked to the north while crossing the highway. I am satisfied that, on the facts here, his conduct was not that of a prudent person.
It is my opinion and considered judgment that the evidence was not of such a quality and character as to meet the test set forth in the cases last cited, and that the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.