Court Opinion

ID: 9735463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:16:36.266461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:58.799390
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Judge COHN.
I concur with the reasoning in parts II and IV of the majority opinion. I dissent from parts I, III and V of the majority opinion.
*948Regarding the breach of contract claim, Part I, I disagree with the majority that plaintiffs may have a breach of contract claim. The trial court was faced with a demurrer. A demurrer may only be sustained when, on the face of the complaint, the law will not permit recovery. Stone and Edwards Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Department of Insurance, 151 Pa.Cmwlth. 266, 616 A.2d 1060 (1992), affirmed, 538 Pa. 276, 648 A.2d 304 (1994). All well-pled allegations must be accepted as true. Id. When considering preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, our scope of review is to determine whether, on the facts alleged, the law states with certainty that no recovery is possible. Rouse & Associates-Ship Road Land Limited Partnership v. Pennsylvania Environmental Quality Board, 164 Pa.Cmwlth. 326, 642 A.2d 642 (1994).
In examining plaintiffs’ third amended complaint, it is clear that their allegation is that the brochure should be regarded as the contract. The brochure stated
Current season ticket holders who apply for a SBL [Stadium Builder License] Section that corresponds with their current seat location in Three Rivers Stadium will be the first assigned to that Section. If that is your choice, we will try to assign seats as close to your current seat location as the new stadium seating configuration will allow. All other seats in a given SBL Section will be assigned using the random priority number. Assignment of your first preference is not guaranteed.
(Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint, Para. 16) (emphasis added).
A contract requires a promise. Ringgold School District v. Abramski, 57 Pa.Cmwlth. 33, 426 A.2d 707 (1981). According to Corbin on Contracts, § 1.15 (1993), “[a] person may express an intention to do something in the future without promising to do it.” Further, “A promise is an expression of intention, but it is not every expression of intention that can properly be called a promise. An expression of intention is not a promise unless it is comr municated to one or more persons under such circumstances that they will expect performance and may reasonably act in reliance upon the expression.” Id. Here, the trial court concluded that as a matter of law plaintiffs’ reliance on the language of the brochure and the accompanying diagram was not reasonable. I agree. First, defendants did nothing more than promise to try to seat people where they wished to be. Second, the accompanying diagram, when viewed in tandem with the brochure, indicates that seating would be as close to the patron’s original seating as the new configuration would allow, making it clear that the configuration would not be a carbon copy of the old stadium. Third, since the building of the new stadium had not even begun, reliance on a general diagram that contained no clear objective components from which one could construe exactly where a section would begin and end, much less where individual seats would be, is, in my view, unreasonable reliance as a matter of law.1 Thus, I would hold that no *949cause of action in contract has been pled.2
Regarding the related count for declaratory judgment discussed in Part III of the majority opinion, wherein plaintiffs sought a ruling that the brochure and original diagram should be integrated with the later signed agreement, because I conclude that the brochure contained no promise as a matter of law, integrating it would not be helpful to plaintiffs’ case. Therefore, while I agree with the majority that the trial court should have ruled on this alternative request, its failure to do so was harmless error.
Regarding Part V, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion as to the unfair trade practices claim. The majority concludes that “SBLs are not ‘licenses’ in the true sense of the word and, therefore, they should be considered ‘goods or services’ within the meaning of UTPCPL [Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law].”3 (Majority Opinion at 16-17.) I disagree. I believe that under Pennsylvania law, SBLs are indeed licenses and that, as such, they fall outside the ambit of the UTPCPL. The majority’s definition of license, taken from Black’s Law Dictionary, is more akin to professional occupational licenses — positions where individuals are granted authorization to engage in specific professional endeavors that, without such authorization, would be illegal to engage in. In contrast, the SBLs are more akin to real property licenses.
In terms of real property, licenses have long been defined by Pennsylvania law to be “an authority to do a particular act or series of acts upon another’s land, without possessing any estate therein.” Baldwin v. Taylor, 166 Pa. 507, 511, 31 A. 250, 251 (1895); accord Kovach v. General Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 340 Pa.Super. 144, 489 A.2d 883 (1985). An example of such a license is when a person buys a ticket for an event. Tickets for events provide a “purchaser [with] a ‘general intangible’ in the nature of a license to come onto the ... premises and a right to view a performance.” Klingner v. Pocono International Raceway, Inc., 289 Pa.Super. 484, 433 A.2d 1357, 1362 (1981). Although licenses are sometimes formed orally or implicitly, they may also arise through written, explicit arrangements. As noted by our sister court, “[a] license based on a valuable consideration is a contract, and the rights and obligations of the parties under such a license agreement depend on the provisions thereof.” Sparrow v. Airport Parking Co. of America, 221 Pa.Super. 32, 289 A.2d 87, 91 (1972) (defining license as the “purely personal privilege *950... to do certain acts [on the land in question], but not to exercise exclusive possession and enjoyment for a term specified.”) (citation omitted).
In the case sub judice, as noted by the trial court, Paragraph 7(a) of the “Additional Terms and Conditions” of the SBL agreement provides that:
The SBL does not grant or provide Licensee with any ownership or other equity interest in the Stadium or the Steel-ers. The SBL is a revocable right of personal privilege and does not confer upon Licensee any interest in real property or any leasehold interest in Stadium seats. Licensee’s relationship with the Licensor is that of licensee and li-censor.
(SBL Agreement.)
I agree with the majority that we are not bound by the nomenclature used by the parties, but from my reading of Pennsylvania law, the nomenclature accurately describes the legal relationship between the parties. Licenses, as used in terms of real or personal property, are neither goods nor services, but are intangible property. The licenses made available by SBLs, as well as the SBLs themselves, are intangible items not subject to a private UTPCPL cause of action. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court ruling as to this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court in toto.

. Although I believe the application and brochure did not, as a matter of law, lead to formation of a contract, there is no doubt that execution of the SBL agreement did create a contract.

. Act of December 17, 1968 P.L. 1224, as amended, 73 P.S. §§ 201-1-201-9.2.
Appellee correctly notes that private causes of action under the UTPCPL require, as a threshold matter, that plaintiffs have purchased or leased a sale of goods. See 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a); see generally Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Limited Partnership, 941 F.Supp. 495, 499-501 (E.D.Pa.1996), affirmed, 126 F.3d 178, 186-88 (3rd Cir.1997) (finding that UTPCPL does not cover sale of securities because securities are intangibles and are not goods or services). In the case sub judice, the majority’s analysis implicitly recognizes this. The majority concludes that the SBLs are neither licenses nor goods, but that an SBL may be a service. As a service, plaintiff's UTPCPL claim would be cognizable. The majority does not conclusively indicate that the UTPCPL claim is cognizable, but leaves the issue to be determined by the trial court, presumably after additional discovery has occurred. The majority offers no guidance as to the factual factors the trial court should consider in assessing whether the SBL is indeed a service.