Court Opinion

ID: 9960087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 12:02:04.879308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:10.141169
License: Public Domain

************************************************
   The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
  The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      0, 0

         2                         ,0                          0 Conn. App. 710
                        Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

                   JEFFERSON SOLAR, LLC v. FUELCELL
                         ENERGY, INC., ET AL.
                              (AC 45620)
                           Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Harper, Js.

                                            Syllabus

         The plaintiff, a renewable energy developer, brought a third action seeking
             to invalidate the winning bid by a competing energy developer, the
             defendant F Co. and its subsidiary, for a long-term clean energy contract
             with a utility company, the defendant I Co. The plaintiff and F Co.
             submitted bids in response to a request by I Co. for proposals to construct
             a shared clean energy facility that would sell energy to the public. Bidders
             were required to show that they had either control of the generation
             site, an unconditional right to acquire control or an unconditional option
             agreement to purchase or lease the site. F Co.’s bid, which contained
             an option to lease agreement, was selected by I Co. and ultimately
             approved by the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority. In a prior action
             the plaintiff brought against F Co., Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell
             Energy, Inc. (213 Conn. App. 288) (prior action), the trial court rendered
             judgment dismissing the action, which this court affirmed on appeal.
             The trial court determined that the plaintiff’s claims were moot and that
             it lacked standing to seek a declaratory ruling as to the viability of the
             option agreement. The court further determined that the plaintiff lacked
             standing as to its claims for tortious interference with prospective con-
             tractual relations and unfair trade practices. In the present action, the
             plaintiff claimed that F Co.’s bid did not meet the site control requirement
             and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to void F Co.’s bid and the
             contract it was awarded as well as damages based on various legal
             theories, including unfair trade practices. The defendants filed a motion
             to dismiss, contending that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue its
             claims. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the plaintiff
             lacked standing to pursue its claims against F Co. for declaratory and
             injunctive relief because the plaintiff was a disappointed bidder for a
             public contract that failed to demonstrate fraud, corruption or favoritism
             that undermined the integrity of the bidding process. The court further
             determined that the plaintiff lacked standing because the damages it
             sought, lost profits from the contract that was awarded to F Co., were
             indirect and too remote from the defendants’ allegedly wrongful conduct
             in submitting and accepting F Co.’s bid. On the plaintiff’s appeal to this
             court, held:
         1. This court determined, consistent with its reasoning in the prior action,
             that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert its various causes of action
             for monetary damages because the injuries it alleged were indirect and
             too remote from F Co.’s alleged wrongdoing: the plaintiff’s claimed
0, 0                          CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       Page 1

       0 Conn. App. 710                                   ,0                           3
                       Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.
           injuries and the defendants’ allegedly wrongful conduct were the same
           in both actions, as the plaintiff’s appellate counsel stated during oral
           argument before this court that there was no meaningful difference
           between the unfair trade practices claims in both actions, and the plain-
           tiff’s other counts that sought damages were based on the same allega-
           tion in the prior action that F Co.’s bid did not comply with the site
           control requirement because the option to lease was invalid; moreover,
           contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court in the prior action
           based its decision on a different complaint with different allegations
           and lacked the benefit of F Co.’s concession in the present action that
           its bid certification was no good, the trial court’s findings and ultimate
           conclusion in the present action regarding the remoteness of the plain-
           tiff’s claimed injuries were consistent with this court’s reasoning in
           the prior action, which applied with equal force in the present case;
           furthermore, the record supported the trial court’s finding that the plain-
           tiff’s claimed injuries were too speculative because there were too many
           links in the chain of causation for F Co.’s conduct to be the direct cause
           of the plaintiff’s injuries and the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority
           retained discretion in awarding contracts.
       2. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to
           assert its claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because it was a
           disappointed bidder on a public contract that failed to demonstrate
           fraud, corruption or favoritism that undermined the bidding process:
           the plaintiff’s claim that the contract was not a public contract because
           the state was not a counterparty was unavailing, as the contract was
           awarded pursuant to competitive bidding in a public procurement pro-
           cess that was developed by and subject to the oversight of two state
           agencies; moreover, the plaintiff’s reliance on the program requirements
           to challenge the award was no different from a disappointed bidder’s
           reliance on state or municipal bidding statutes when challenging the
           award of a government contract, the program requirements, like compet-
           itive bidding laws, having been established for the benefit of the public,
           not bidders, and the trial court’s application of standing rules regarding
           disappointed bidders on public contracts represented a proper balance
           between fulfilling the purposes of competitive bidding rules and pre-
           venting frequent litigation that might result in extensive delays in the
           commencement and completion of government projects to the detriment
           of the public; furthermore, even if, as the plaintiff contended, the contract
           were a public contract and the trial court improperly failed to find that
           F Co. knew its bid certification was false and that I Co. undermined the
           integrity of the bidding process by ignoring the program requirements,
           nothing in the record showed that F Co.’s bid did not conform to the
           site control requirement or that I Co. applied that requirement differently
           to other bidders, as I Co., which was permitted to select bids with option
           leases, applied the program requirements in a consistent, nondiscrimina-
           tory fashion.
               Argued October 19, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024
Page 2                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                    0, 0

         4                        ,0                         0 Conn. App. 710
                        Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

                                     Procedural History

            Action for, inter alia, a declaratory judgment inval-
         idating the award of a contract to the named defendant
         et al. for a shared clean energy facility, and for other
         relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
         trict of New Britain and transferred to the judicial dis-
         trict of Stamford-Norwalk, Complex Litigation Docket,
         where the court, Ozalis, J., granted the motion to dis-
         miss filed by the named defendant et al. and rendered
         judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to
         this court. Affirmed.
             Thomas Melone, for the appellant (plaintiff).
           Erick M. Sandler, with whom, on the brief, were
         Johanna S. Lerner and Lauren G. Moscato, for the
         appellees (named defendant et al.).
           Jennifer L. Morgan, with whom, on the brief was
         Julie A. Lavoie, for the appellee (defendant United Illu-
         minating Company).
            Jill Lacedonia, assistant attorney general, and Wil-
         liam Tong, attorney general, filed a brief for the appel-
         lee (defendant Department of Energy and Environmen-
         tal Protection).
                                           Opinion

           BRIGHT, C. J. The plaintiff, Jefferson Solar, LLC,
         appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing
         the action as to the defendants FuelCell Energy, Inc.,
         and SCEF1 Fuel Cell, LLC (collectively, FuelCell),1 and
         the United Illuminating Company (United Illuminat-
         ing).2 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
           1
             SCEF1 Fuel Cell, LLC, is a subsidiary of FuelCell Energy, Inc., that was
         created to be the entity that would submit a bid in response to the request
         for proposals at issue in the present case. For simplicity, we refer to both
         entities as FuelCell in this opinion.
           2
             The plaintiff also named the Department of Energy and Environmental
         Protection (department) as a defendant in the underlying action. The trial
         court dismissed the action as to the department in a separate decision, and
         the plaintiff does not challenge the judgment as to the department on appeal.
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      Page 3

       0 Conn. App. 710                                 ,0                          5
                      Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       improperly concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing
       to assert its claims. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm
       the judgment of the trial court.3
          The following facts, either as found by the trial court
       after an evidentiary hearing on the defendants’ motion
       to dismiss or as undisputed in the record, and proce-
       dural history are relevant to the plaintiff’s claims on
       appeal. The present case arises from a 2020 request for
       proposals (request) jointly issued by the state’s two
       electric distribution companies (electric companies),
       United Illuminating and Eversource Energy (Ever-
       source), ‘‘ ‘for the purchase of any energy products and
       renewable energy certificates’ produced by any eligible
       Class I Shared Clean Energy Facility’’4 under ‘‘Year 1’’
       of the shared clean energy facility program (program).
       See General Statutes § 16-244z (a) (1) (C).5 The program
       requires the electric distribution companies to conduct
       a procurement process for shared clean energy facilities
       We note that the department nevertheless filed a brief in support of affirming
       the court’s judgment and that it is an appellee in a separate appeal brought
       by the plaintiff challenging the dismissal of its action against the department.
       See Jefferson Solar, LLC v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection,
       224 Conn. App. 688,        A.3d      (2024).
          All references to the defendants in this opinion are to Fuel Cell and United
       Illuminating only.
         3
           The trial court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on the ground that
       they were moot, and the plaintiff has challenged that alternative basis for
       the court’s judgment on appeal. Because we agree with the court’s conclusion
       that the plaintiff lacks standing to assert its claims, we do not address the
       mootness issue. See, e.g., Healey v. Mantell, 216 Conn. App. 514, 527, 528
       n.10, 285 A.3d 823 (2022) (noting that, although courts are not required to
       address jurisdictional claims in specific order, courts should ‘‘address first
       the issue that disposes of the case’’).
         4
           A shared clean energy facility is an electric generation facility that uses
       renewable resources, including but not limited to, solar and wind power,
       fuel cells or geothermal sources. See General Statutes § 16-244x (a) (1); see
       also General Statutes § 16-1 (a) (20).
         5
           We note that the legislature amended § 16-244z subsequent to the events
       at issue. See, e.g., Public Acts 2023, No. 23-102, § 25. Because those amend-
       ments are not relevant to this appeal, we refer in this opinion to the current
       revision of § 16-244z.
Page 4                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       0, 0

         6                         ,0                           0 Conn. App. 710
                         Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

         on an annual basis for six years. General Statutes § 16-
         244z (c) (1) (B). The program allows customers of the
         electric companies who are unable to generate their
         own clean energy to purchase clean energy from shared
         clean energy facilities.
            In accordance with § 16-244z, the Public Utilities Reg-
         ulatory Authority (PURA) initiated a proceeding to
         establish the procurement plan for each electric com-
         pany ‘‘consistent with . . . the requirements to reduce
         greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with [General
         Statutes §] 22a-200a.’’ General Statutes § 16-244z (a) (1)
         (A). In accordance with the program directives, the
         Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
         (department) developed program requirements and tar-
         iff proposals for the procurement plan, which were
         subject to PURA’s final approval. General Statutes § 16-
         244z (a) (1) (C). On December 18, 2019, PURA issued
         a final decision approving the program requirements
         and tariff proposals, as modified. See Final Decision,
         Public Utility Regulatory Authority, ‘‘Review of State-
         wide Shared Clean Energy Facility Program Require-
         ments,’’ Docket No. 19-07-01 (December 18, 2019) (pro-
         gram requirements).
           The program requirements provided that the electric
         companies would select bids with the lowest price pro-
         posals first and that the department ‘‘shall review and
         approve the [electric companies’] final selections before
         the [electric companies] submit them to PURA to ensure
         consistency with the [p]rogram.’’ Accordingly, the pro-
         gram involves a tiered review process for bids6 for
         shared clean energy facilities, pursuant to which the
         electric companies select the winning bids, the depart-
         ment reviews those selected bids for compliance with
             6
              Although the electric companies issued a joint request for proposals, as
         opposed to an invitation for bids, the program requirements provide that
         ‘‘ ‘Bid’ means a responsive submission by a Bidder to the procurement under
         this [p]rogram’’ and that ‘Bidder’ means an entity that submits a [b]id . . . .’’
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       Page 5

       0 Conn. App. 710                          ,0               7
                  Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       the program requirements, and PURA issues final
       approval of the selected bids.
          The request was issued on April 30, 2020, consistent
       with the program requirements. Section 2.4.1 of the
       request provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Bidder must
       demonstrate that it has control of the generation site,
       or an unconditional right, granted by the property
       owner, to acquire such control. . . . In order to be
       considered to have site control for generation, the Bid-
       der must provide copies of executed documents
       between the Bidder and property owner showing . . .
       that the Bidder owns the site or has a lease or easement
       with respect to the site . . . or . . . that the Bidder
       has an unconditional option agreement to purchase or
       lease the site for [a term as long as the term of the
       standard agreement].’’ Section 4.4 of the request further
       specifies that ‘‘[s]ubmission of the completed Bid Certi-
       fication Form, including the affidavit from the owner
       of the project site and the applicable documentation
       demonstrating that the Bidder has control of the genera-
       tion site, or an unconditional right, granted by the prop-
       erty owner, to acquire such control, represents site
       control.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
         The request expressly provided that ‘‘[a]ny agreement
       entered into for the purchase of energy and [renewable
       energy credits] pursuant to this solicitation is contin-
       gent upon obtaining Regulatory Approval by PURA as
       set forth in the Standard Agreement. Pursuant to appli-
       cable Connecticut General Statutes and PURA require-
       ments, each [electric company] will submit required
       information to PURA following the completion of each
       annual procurement process. If any of the Bids and/or
       Standard Agreements do not meet the objectives of
       PURA, PURA may reject the Bid(s) and Standard Agree-
       ment(s). . . . The [electric companies] . . . make no
       commitment to any Bidder that [they] will accept any
       Bid(s). The [c]ompanies reserve the right to discontinue
Page 6                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                          0, 0

         8                   ,0                         0 Conn. App. 710
                    Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

         the [request] process at any time for any reason whatso-
         ever. This is a Request for Proposals and not a binding
         offer to contract.’’ The request was for a total of five
         megawatts in United Illuminating’s service territory.
            In its April 8, 2022 memorandum of decision granting
         the defendants’ September 7, 2021 motion to dismiss,
         the trial court found that, in July, 2020, ‘‘FuelCell and
         the plaintiff submitted bids in response to the [request]
         for year one of the [program] . . . . On its bid certifica-
         tion form, FuelCell submitted an affidavit from Richard
         Dziekan, the Mayor of [the city of] Derby [(city)],
         attesting that [the city], as the owner of the property
         . . . that was the subject of the energy bid [(property)],
         understood the site control requirements of the
         [request] and that FuelCell was authorized to submit a
         bid for a [clean energy] facility to be located on [the
         property]. . . . Attached to [Dziekan’s] affidavit was
         the option to lease agreement between the city . . .
         and FuelCell, dated July 1, 2020. The option to lease
         provided FuelCell with the ‘sole and exclusive right,
         privilege and option to lease [the property] from . . .
         [the city] . . . for good and valuable consideration and
         upon terms and conditions to be negotiated upon exer-
         cise of [the] Option.’ . . . Section 4 of exhibit B to
         the option to lease, entitled ‘Lease Terms,’ provides in
         relevant part: ‘within ninety (90) days after the date of
         Notice, the [c]ity and [FuelCell] shall enter into a lease
         agreement upon the terms and conditions set forth in
         [e]xhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof,
         and such other terms and conditions as the [c]ity and
         [FuelCell] shall negotiate in good faith (the ‘‘Lease’’).’
         . . . Derek Phelps, Director of Government Relations
         and Business Development for FuelCell, testified at the
         April 1, 2022 hearing on [the defendants’] motion to
         dismiss that he believed when FuelCell submitted its
         bid certification to [United Illuminating], that the option
         to lease agreement for the property that it had attached
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       Page 7

       0 Conn. App. 710                          ,0               9
                  Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       to its bid was valid and that such option to lease gave
       it site control of the property where it planned to con-
       struct the proposed . . . facility. . . .
          ‘‘The plaintiff submitted a bid for a 4.0 megawatt solar
       energy project located in North Branford. . . . Fuel-
       Cell submitted a bid for a 2.8 megawatt natural gas-
       powered fuel cell located on the property. . . . [United
       Illuminating] reviewed FuelCell’s bid, its option to lease
       the property agreement, lease terms and the affidavit of
       the [city’s] Mayor as the owner of the property regarding
       site control. . . . [United Illuminating] found [that]
       FuelCell’s bid satisfied the site control [requirement]
       and [that] the option to lease demonstrated site control.
       . . . On September 28, 2020, [United Illuminating]
       selected [FuelCell’s] bid as the winning bid for a 2.8
       megawatt natural gas-powered fuel cell. . . . [United
       Illuminating] selected two other bids for its territory.
       [It] selected a 1.5 megawatt solar project in Milford and
       . . . the plaintiff’s bid but limited the [plaintiff’s proj-
       ect] to a 700 kilowatt facility. . . .
         ‘‘[In October, 2020], the plaintiff made numerous fil-
       ings at PURA in an effort to invalidate FuelCell’s win-
       ning bid and notified [United Illuminating] and [the
       department] that FuelCell’s bid did not meet the site
       control requirement based on public records. . . . The
       plaintiff claimed that [United Illuminating] and [the
       department] were required to reject FuelCell’s bid and
       that they knowingly accepted FuelCell’s bid even
       though it did not meet the program requirements. The
       plaintiff alleged that it would have received the contract
       awarded to FuelCell for the energy capacity awarded
       to FuelCell if [United Illuminating] rejected FuelCell’s
       bid for lack of site control. On January 22, 2021, PURA
       approved [United Illuminating’s] selections . . . .
         ‘‘Pursuant to General Statutes § 7-163[e], a public
       hearing was duly noticed and held on May 13, 2021,
Page 8                     CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                          0, 0

         10                    ,0                        0 Conn. App. 710
                     Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

         with the city of Derby [Board of Aldermen/Alder-
         women] relating to the final lease of the property. . . .
         On May 13, 2021, the [Board of Aldermen/Alderwomen]
         voted in favor of granting FuelCell the final lease in
         connection with the 2.8 megawatt [shared clean energy
         facility]. . . . On August 31, 2021, the final lease was
         executed between the city . . . and FuelCell.’’ (Cita-
         tions omitted.)
            The present case is the third action initiated by the
         plaintiff in which it has sought to invalidate FuelCell’s
         winning bid. See Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell
         Energy, Inc., 213 Conn. App. 288, 288 A.3d 1032 (2022)
         (Jefferson Solar I), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 917, 290
         A.3d 799 (2023); see also Jefferson Solar, LLC v. Dept.
         of Energy & Environmental Protection, 224 Conn. App.
         688,       A.3d     (2024) (Jefferson Solar II).
            In October, 2020, the plaintiff initiated Jefferson Solar
         I against FuelCell in three counts. ‘‘In count one, the
         plaintiff sought a declaratory ruling that the option
         agreement ‘does not provide [FuelCell] with any legally
         enforceable rights’ due to the city’s alleged failure to
         comply with the requirements of the city charter and
         . . . § 7-163e. In count two, the plaintiff alleged that
         [FuelCell] had submitted ‘a false bid certification’ in
         violation of [the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
         Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.] as a
         result of the city’s alleged failure to comply with the
         requirements of the city charter and § 7-163e ‘prior to
         executing’ the option agreement. In count three, the
         plaintiff alleged that the submission of a false bid certifi-
         cation by the defendants constituted tortious interfer-
         ence with prospective contractual relations.
           ‘‘On December 10, 2020, the defendants filed a motion
         to dismiss [Jefferson Solar I], alleging, inter alia, that
         the plaintiff lacked standing. . . . By memorandum of
         decision dated April 30, 2021, the [trial] court granted
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       Page 9

       0 Conn. App. 710                                 ,0                          11
                       Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       the motion to dismiss. The court first concluded that
       the plaintiff’s request for a declaratory ruling was not
       ripe for adjudication, as PURA [had] not yet approved
       [FuelCell’s] bid . . . . For the same reason, the court
       concluded that the plaintiff’s tortious interference with
       prospective contractual relations claim was ‘premature’
       and ‘unripe.’ The court then concluded that the plaintiff
       lacked standing to bring its CUTPA claim [because] its
       alleged injuries ‘are remote and indirect.’ ’’ (Footnote
       omitted.) Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.,
       supra, 213 Conn. App. 291–93. On appeal to this court
       in Jefferson Solar I, the plaintiff claimed that the court
       improperly dismissed its CUTPA claim for lack of stand-
       ing.7 Id., 293. On June 14, 2022, this court affirmed the
       judgment of dismissal, reasoning that, ‘‘[b]ecause the
       utility companies, by the plain terms of the request,
       retained discretion in awarding shared clean energy
       facility contracts and reserved the right to reject any
       or all offers, the plaintiff’s purported injuries are purely
       speculative. . . . We, therefore, agree with the trial
       court’s determination that the plaintiff lacked standing
       to maintain its CUTPA action against the defendants.’’
       (Citations omitted.) Id., 297–98.
          On May 18, 2021, the plaintiff filed Jefferson Solar
       II in the Superior Court, challenging the department’s
       decision declining the plaintiff’s request for a declara-
       tory ruling that FuelCell’s option to lease was illegal
       and did not satisfy the site control requirement under
       the program. Jefferson Solar, LLC v. Dept. of Energy &
       Environmental Protection, supra, 224 Conn. App. 688.
       The Superior Court dismissed that action for lack of
       subject matter jurisdiction on April 27, 2022, and the
       plaintiff appealed. See footnote 2 of this opinion. This
         7
           The plaintiff did not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that its request
       for a declaratory ruling and its tortious interference claim were not ripe.
       See Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc., supra, 213 Conn. App.
       293 n.5.
Page 10                          CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       0, 0

          12                         ,0                          0 Conn. App. 710
                          Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

          court affirmed the judgment. See Jefferson Solar, LLC
          v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection, supra,
          709.
             In June, 2021, while Jefferson Solar I was pending
          in this court, the plaintiff filed the underlying action
          against FuelCell, United Illuminating, and the depart-
          ment. In the operative first amended complaint the
          plaintiff sought (1) a declaratory ruling that FuelCell’s
          bid did not satisfy the request’s site control requirement
          (first count), (2) injunctive relief voiding the selection
          of FuelCell’s bid and contract and awarding the plaintiff
          a contract for 3.5 megawatts instead of the 700 kilowatts
          it was awarded (second count), and (3) monetary dam-
          ages against (i) FuelCell for its alleged violation of
          CUTPA (third count) and tortious interference with
          prospective contractual relations (fourth count) and (ii)
          United Illuminating and the department for violations
          of the filed rate doctrine (fifth count), the shared clean
          energy facility tariff (sixth count),8 and the plaintiff’s
          due process rights (seventh count) based on the selec-
          tion of FuelCell’s allegedly noncompliant bid.
            On September 7, 2021, FuelCell and United Illuminat-
          ing jointly filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
          matter jurisdiction. In their memorandum of law in sup-
          port of that motion, the defendants claimed, inter alia,
          that the plaintiff lacked standing because it is an unsuc-
          cessful bidder on a public contract and because the
             8
               In its operative amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged, as to counts
          five and six, that ‘‘[t]he tariff and filed rate doctrine prohibit [United Illumi-
          nating and the department] from allowing [FuelCell] to receive service and
          a contract that deviates from the tariff.’’ The trial court subsequently
          explained that count five of the operative amended complaint asserted
          ‘‘that [the department], the Commissioner [of Energy and Environmental
          Protection (commissioner)], and [United Illuminating] violated the filed rate
          doctrine when they allowed FuelCell to receive a contract that deviates
          from the tariff’’ and that count six alleged that ‘‘[the department], the commis-
          sioner, and [United Illuminating] violated the tariff when they selected Fuel-
          Cell’s bid, even though FuelCell did not have site control.’’
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      Page 11

       0 Conn. App. 710                                 ,0                         13
                      Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       plaintiff’s alleged injuries were too remote and indirect
       to confer it with standing.9 The plaintiff filed an objec-
       tion to the motion to dismiss on October 6, 2021, and
       the defendants filed a reply on October 19, 2021. On
       November 19, 2021, the court, Ozalis, J., heard oral
       argument on the defendants’ motion. On January 27,
       2022, the court issued an order scheduling the matter
       for an evidentiary hearing ‘‘to determine the facts sur-
       rounding United Illuminating’s selection of [FuelCell’s]
       bid and [FuelCell’s] understanding of its option to lease
       when it submitted it with its . . . bid.’’
          At the start of the evidentiary hearing on April 1,
       2022, the court explained that the hearing would be
       limited to two questions. First, ‘‘if [FuelCell’s] bid had
       not been accepted for any reason, would the plaintiff
       have 100 percent been awarded the [clean energy]
       capacity it desired. That’s . . . from the first amended
       complaint, paragraph 77. And [second], was the option
       to lease submitted by [FuelCell] in its bid a sufficient
       basis to demonstrate site control required under the
       [request].’’ At the hearing, the court heard testimony
       from Christie Prescott, the Director of Wholesale Power
       Contracts for United Illuminating; Attorney Vincent
       Marino, the city’s attorney; and Phelps.
          On April 8, 2022, two months before this court issued
       its decision in Jefferson Solar I, the trial court issued
       its decision dismissing the underlying action as to the
       defendants on the grounds that the plaintiff’s claims
       were moot and that the plaintiff lacked standing. The
       court first concluded that, as a disappointed bidder
       for a public contract, the plaintiff lacked standing to
       challenge the award of a public contract because it
       failed to demonstrate fraud, corruption, or favoritism
         9
           The defendants also claimed that the plaintiff’s claims were moot because
       FuelCell and the city had executed a final lease for the property and that
       the plaintiff’s claims were precluded by operation of the doctrine of collateral
       estoppel based on the trial court’s decision in Jefferson Solar I.
Page 12                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                    0, 0

          14                        ,0                        0 Conn. App. 710
                         Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

          that undermined the bidding process. The court further
          concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert
          its claims because its claimed damages, i.e., the lost
          profits from the contract that was awarded to FuelCell,
          were indirect and too remote from the defendants’ alleg-
          edly wrongful conduct in submitting and accepting
          FuelCell’s allegedly noncompliant bid. This appeal fol-
          lowed.
             On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
          erly concluded that it lacked standing to assert all the
          counts in its complaint against FuelCell. The seven
          counts of the plaintiff’s complaint fall into two catego-
          ries. In the first two counts, the plaintiff sought declara-
          tory and injunctive relief and, in counts three through
          seven, the plaintiff sought monetary damages based on
          various theories. We conclude that this court’s decision
          in Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc., supra,
          213 Conn. App. 297–98, is dispositive of the plaintiff’s
          claims for monetary damages in the present case and
          that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s
          claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because the
          plaintiff lacked standing as a disappointed bidder on a
          public contract.10
             As an initial matter, we set forth the applicable stan-
          dard of review. ‘‘A trial court’s determination of whether
          a plaintiff lacks standing is a conclusion of law that is
          subject to plenary review on appeal.’’ (Internal quota-
          tion marks omitted.) R.S. Silver Enterprises, Inc. v.
          Pascarella, 163 Conn. App. 1, 7, 134 A.3d 662, cert.
          denied, 320 Conn. 929, 133 A.3d 460 (2016). ‘‘[T]rial
          courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject
          matter jurisdiction . . . may encounter different situa-
          tions, depending on the status of the record in the case.
          . . . [W]here a jurisdictional determination is depen-
          dent on the resolution of a critical factual dispute, it
            10
               For ease of discussion, we address the plaintiff’s claims in a different
          order than they are set forth in its principal appellate brief.
0, 0                           CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                          Page 13

       0 Conn. App. 710                                    ,0                            15
                        Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss in the absence
       of an evidentiary hearing to establish jurisdictional
       facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Good Earth
       Tree Care, Inc. v. Fairfield, 151 Conn. App. 680, 685,
       97 A.3d 28 (2014).
          When the trial court resolves disputed factual issues
       after an evidentiary hearing,11 ‘‘[w]e conduct that ple-
       nary review . . . in light of the trial court’s findings of
       fact, which we will not overturn unless they are clearly
       erroneous. . . . This involves a two part function:
       where the legal conclusions of the court are challenged,
       we must determine whether they are legally and logi-
       cally correct and whether they find support in the facts
       set out in the memorandum of decision; where the fac-
       tual basis of the court’s decision is challenged we must
       determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum
       of decision are supported by the evidence or whether,
       in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole
       record, those facts are clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal quo-
       tation marks omitted.) R.S. Silver Enterprises, Inc. v.
       Pascarella, supra, 163 Conn. App. 7–8.
         11
             The plaintiff claims that ‘‘the trial court’s holding violates [the] plaintiff’s
       due process rights and right to a jury trial because the plaintiff is not required
       to establish its case by a preponderance of the evidence at this stage, not
       having had the benefit of discovery. Nor can the court make merits findings
       of fact that are disputed and [are] properly within the province of the jury.’’
       Notably, not only did the plaintiff not object to the evidentiary hearing, it
       requested the hearing. Moreover, the trial court conducted the evidentiary
       hearing to determine disputed jurisdictional facts regarding the alleged mis-
       conduct in the bidding process, a procedure that our Supreme Court has
       endorsed. See, e.g., Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 695–96,
       600 A.2d 1019 (1991) (‘‘With respect to this issue of standing—that is bidder
       injury—questions of fact were raised and the trial court should have allowed
       an evidentiary hearing. When issues of fact are necessary to the determina-
       tion of a court’s jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing
       be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-
       examine adverse witnesses.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks
       omitted.)). Accordingly, the trial court did not violate the plaintiff’s due
       process rights or its right to a jury trial by holding a limited evidentiary
       hearing regarding disputed jurisdictional facts in accordance with the plain-
       tiff’s own request.
Page 14                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                          0, 0

          16                   ,0                        0 Conn. App. 710
                     Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

                                          I
             The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly
          held that its alleged injuries are too remote and indirect
          to provide it with standing to assert its various causes
          of action for monetary damages. As we previously
          stated, our decision in Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell
          Energy, Inc., supra, 213 Conn. App. 297–98, is disposi-
          tive of the plaintiff’s standing to assert those claims.
             On appeal in Jefferson Solar I, the plaintiff claimed
          that ‘‘the court improperly concluded that it lacked
          standing to maintain the CUTPA action . . . .’’ Id., 293.
          In rejecting that claim, this court first set forth the
          relevant legal principles regarding standing and, more
          specifically, the requirement that a plaintiff make a col-
          orable claim of direct injury. Id., 293–95. The court then
          explained: ‘‘It is undisputed that [FuelCell], as part of
          its bid, submitted both the affidavit of Mayor Dziekan,
          in which he attested that [FuelCell] had control of the
          generation site, or an unconditional right . . . to
          acquire such control, and a copy of the option agree-
          ment between the city and FuelCell, which option was
          assigned to the company. Those materials demonstrate
          that the company’s bid comported with the requirement
          . . . that a bidder submit proof that it has control of
          the generation site, or an unconditional right, granted
          by the property owner, to acquire such control. . . .
             ‘‘In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the city’s
          failure to comply with the bid process requirements of
          § 22 of the city charter and § 7-163e rendered the option
          agreement unlawful, without legal effect, and void and
          illusory. The plaintiff further alleged that, as a result of
          the city’s failure to comply with those requirements,
          the [option agreement] does not provide the defendants
          with the unconditional right required by the [request]
          requirements. For that reason, the plaintiff alleged that
          the defendants had submitted a false bid certification
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 15

       0 Conn. App. 710                          ,0               17
                  Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       in violation of CUTPA, which allegedly caused the plain-
       tiff to suffer an ascertainable loss of money because
       [it] will lose the revenue from the [program] that it
       would have received but for [the] defendants’ submis-
       sion of a false bid certification.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Id., 295.
           The trial court in Jefferson Solar I reasoned that
       ‘‘[t]he direct recipient of any injury resulting from false
       certification would be [United Illuminating], the benefi-
       ciary of the project. [United Illuminating] would pre-
       sumably have at least one cause of action against the
       defendants. Additionally, the real party with purported
       unclean hands is [the city], which is claimed to have
       ignored its own city charter in order to furnish the
       option to lease to [FuelCell]. The plaintiff has not
       brought an action against [the city], nor does it appear
       that the plaintiff has standing to maintain such an
       action. The plaintiff’s claims are remote and indirect.
       If there is a potential victim of [FuelCell’s] alleged
       duplicity, it is [United Illuminating], not the plaintiff.
       The plaintiff lacks standing to bring the CUTPA claim.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 296.
          This court agreed with that reasoning and also
       explained that, ‘‘[i]f [FuelCell] knowingly submitted a
       false bid, as the plaintiff alleges, the utility company
       that was a party to the contract for the shared clean
       energy facility would be a directly injured party and
       would be best suited to seek a remedy for the harm.
       Moreover, although the plaintiff claims that it was 100
       percent certai[n] to receive the shared clean energy
       facility contract in question if [FuelCell] lacked the nec-
       essary site control, that contention is undermined by
       the plain language of the request. . . . Because the
       [electric] companies, by the plain terms of the request,
       retained discretion in awarding shared clean energy
       facility contracts and reserved the right to reject any
       or all offers, the plaintiff’s purported injuries are purely
Page 16                     CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                          0, 0

          18                    ,0                        0 Conn. App. 710
                      Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

          speculative.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
          marks omitted.) Id., 296–97. Accordingly, this court held
          that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries—that is, the lost ‘‘rev-
          enue from the [program] that it would have received but
          for [FuelCell’s] submission of a false bid certification’’—
          were purely speculative. Id., 295; see also id., 297.
             In the present case, the trial court likewise concluded
          ‘‘that the plaintiff’s injuries are too remote and indirect
          from FuelCell’s conduct to confer [on] the plaintiff
          standing. . . . Under the first policy factor articulated
          in Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., [258 Conn. 313,
          347–48, 780 A.2d 98 (2002)], it would be difficult to
          determine the damages attributable to FuelCell’s
          wrongdoing as opposed to other independent factors
          because, in all counts of the [operative] complaint, there
          are too many links in the chain of causation for Fuel-
          Cell’s conduct to be the direct cause of the plaintiff[’s]
          not receiving its desired contract. . . .
             ‘‘Under the second policy consideration, [United Illu-
          minating] is the party directly injured by FuelCell’s
          alleged misrepresentations because [United Illuminat-
          ing] is the party [that the] plaintiff claims FuelCell alleg-
          edly made the misrepresentations to and the party [that]
          relied on them. Thus, [United Illuminating], as the party
          to a contract as to which an alleged misrepresentation
          was made, would suffer the direct injury resulting from
          FuelCell[’s] not having site control. Additionally, the
          city . . . would be the more appropriate defendant
          under the facts of this case because it is the city . . .
          that the plaintiff claims did not comply with § 22 of its
          [c]harter, § 7-163e, and the statute of frauds. . . .
          Finally, under the third policy consideration . . . the
          directly injured party, [United Illuminating], can remedy
          the harm without these attendant problems such as
          indirectness of injury and apportionment of damages.’’
          (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.)
0, 0                          CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       Page 17

       0 Conn. App. 710                                  ,0                          19
                       Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

          The plaintiff concedes that there is no meaningful
       difference between its CUTPA claim in Jefferson Solar
       I and its CUTPA claim in the present case.12 In Jefferson
       Solar I, the plaintiff claimed ‘‘damages in an amount
       equal to the sum of all amounts that [the] plaintiff would
       have received over the twenty year term of the [shared
       clean energy facility] tariff contract term for the [shared
       clean energy facility] capacity that is obtained by [Fuel-
       Cell] through the use of the false bid certification that
       would have gone to the plaintiff plus other damages
       and costs to be proved at trial . . . .’’ In the present
       case, the plaintiff’s claimed damages under each count
       for which it sought monetary damages are the same:
       ‘‘damages in an amount equal to the sum of all amounts
       that [the] plaintiff would have received over the twenty
       year term of the [shared clean energy facility] tariff
       contract term for the [shared clean energy facility]
       capacity that would have gone to the plaintiff but for
       [the defendants’ wrongful conduct] . . . .’’ Moreover,
       the plaintiff’s other counts seeking monetary damages
       are based on the same allegation that FuelCell’s bid did
         12
             Although the plaintiff asserted in its reply brief that ‘‘the trial court in
       [Jefferson Solar I] did not hold any factual hearing on the CUTPA claim,
       did not have the benefit of [FuelCell’s] concessions that [it] knew its bid
       certification was no good, and based its decision on a different complaint
       with different allegations,’’ during oral argument before this court, counsel
       for the plaintiff conceded that the allegations in the plaintiff’s CUTPA count
       are the same as the allegations that were made in Jefferson Solar I. The
       respective records confirm the plaintiff’s concession.
          In Jefferson Solar I, the plaintiff alleged in its amended complaint that
       it ‘‘has suffered an ascertainable loss of money because the plaintiff will
       lose the revenue from its [shared clean energy facility] that it would have
       received but for [FuelCell’s] submission of a false bid certification because
       the plaintiff would receive a contract for 700 [kilowatts] and not 3.5 [mega-
       watts], or a smaller facility contract than it otherwise would receive.’’ In
       the present case, the plaintiff likewise alleged that it ‘‘has suffered an ascer-
       tainable loss of money because the plaintiff will lose the revenue from its
       [shared clean energy facility] that it would have received but for [FuelCell’s]
       submission of a false bid certification. The plaintiff has received a contract
       for 700 [kilowatts], and not 3.5 [megawatts], due to [FuelCell’s] fraudulent
       and unfair and deceptive practice.’’
Page 18                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                    0, 0

          20                        ,0                        0 Conn. App. 710
                         Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

          not comply with the site control requirement under the
          request because the option to lease was invalid. Thus,
          whether styled as a CUTPA claim, a tortious interfer-
          ence with prospective contractual relations claim, or
          violations of the filed rate doctrine, the tariff, or the
          plaintiff’s due process rights, the defendants’ alleged
          wrongful conduct and the plaintiff’s claimed injuries
          are the same as they were in Jefferson Solar I—too
          remote and indirect to confer standing on the plaintiff.13
             Because this court held in Jefferson Solar, LLC v.
          FuelCell Energy, Inc., supra, 213 Conn. App. 296–97,
          that the plaintiff’s claimed damages were indirect and
          remote from the alleged wrongful conduct, that deci-
          sion controls our decision in the present case in which
          the plaintiff concedes that it suffered the same injuries
          on account of the same allegedly wrongful conduct.
          See footnote 12 of this opinion. Although the plaintiff
          moved for reconsideration en banc of our decision in
          Jefferson Solar I, this court denied that motion. In
          effect, the plaintiff now requests that we reverse that
          ruling and reach a different conclusion in this appeal
          on the basis of the same allegations and claimed dam-
          ages. We decline to do so. See Staurovsky v. Milford
          Police Dept., 164 Conn. App. 182, 202–203, 134 A.3d
          1263 (2016) (‘‘[T]his court’s policy dictates that one
          panel should not, on its own, reverse the ruling of a
          previous panel. The reversal may be accomplished only
          if the appeal is heard en banc. . . . Prudence, then,
          dictates that this panel decline to revisit such requests.’’
            13
               We recognize that neither this court nor the trial court in Jefferson
          Solar I addressed the plaintiff’s standing to bring its tortious interference
          with contractual relations claim because the trial court concluded that that
          claim was not ripe, and the plaintiff did not challenge that conclusion on
          appeal in Jefferson Solar I. Nevertheless, because the plaintiff’s tortious
          interference claim was based on the same alleged wrongful conduct and
          injuries as were alleged in the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim in Jefferson Solar I,
          this court’s holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert its CUTPA
          claim applies equally to the tortious interference claim.
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 19

       0 Conn. App. 710                          ,0               21
                  Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)),
       appeal dismissed, 324 Conn. 693, 154 A.3d 525 (2017).
       Accordingly, the same reasoning employed by this court
       in Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc., supra,
       296–97, applies with equal force in the present case.
          The plaintiff nevertheless contends that our decision
       in Jefferson Solar I is distinguishable because ‘‘the trial
       court in the first action did not hold any factual hearing
       on the CUTPA claim, did not have the benefit of [Fuel-
       Cell’s] concessions that [it] knew its bid certification
       was no good, and based its decision on a different
       complaint with different allegations from the complaint
       here.’’ We are not persuaded.
          First, as noted in footnote 12 of this opinion, during
       oral argument before this court, counsel for the plaintiff
       conceded that the allegations in the plaintiff’s CUTPA
       count in the present case are the same as the allegations
       that were made in its CUTPA count in Jefferson Solar
       I. Second, although the plaintiff suggests that the facts
       developed at the evidentiary hearing in the present case
       undermine this court’s reasoning in Jefferson Solar I,
       the trial court’s findings and ultimate conclusion regard-
       ing the remoteness of the plaintiff’s claimed injuries in
       the present case are consistent with that reasoning.
       Specifically, the trial court in the present case con-
       cluded that ‘‘in all counts of the plaintiff’s [complaint]
       there are too many links in the chain of causation for
       FuelCell’s conduct to be the direct cause of the plain-
       tiff[’s] not receiving its desired contract.’’ The court
       found that, although Prescott testified that, if FuelCell
       had been disqualified, the plaintiff likely would have
       been selected for the 2.8 megawatts of power awarded
       to FuelCell, it also explained that there was no ‘‘guaran-
       tee that [the plaintiff] would have made it through the
       final approval process with PURA for any portion of
       the 2.8 [megawatts] of power.’’ In other words, because
       PURA retained discretion in awarding the contracts,
Page 20                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                          0, 0

          22                   ,0                        0 Conn. App. 710
                     Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

          the plaintiff’s claimed injuries are speculative. The evi-
          dence in the record supports the court’s finding, as
          Phelps testified that, although Eversource had selected
          FuelCell’s bids for three additional projects in Year 1
          of the shared clean energy program, ‘‘[t]hose selections
          [had] to be affirmed, I’m going to say certified or finally
          approved by . . . PURA in the end, and that did not
          occur with those three projects.’’ Similarly, in Jefferson
          Solar I, this court reasoned that, ‘‘[b]ecause the [elec-
          tric] companies, by the plain terms of the request,
          retained discretion in awarding shared clean energy
          facility contracts and reserved the right to reject any
          or all offers, the plaintiff’s purported injuries are purely
          speculative.’’ Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy,
          Inc., supra, 213 Conn. App. 297. Accordingly, the facts
          developed in the present case do not alter this court’s
          previous analysis.
            Consequently, consistent with that decision, we con-
          clude that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert its
          claims for monetary damages in the present case
          because the plaintiff’s alleged injuries are indirect and
          remote. See id., 296–97.
                                          II
             The plaintiff also claims that the trial court improp-
          erly concluded that it lacked standing to assert its
          claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because it
          is a disappointed bidder on a public contract that failed
          to establish fraud, favoritism, or corruption that under-
          mined the bidding process. We disagree.
             The following legal principles regarding an unsuc-
          cessful bidder on a public contract inform our review.
          ‘‘In the context of competitive bidding, it is well estab-
          lished that an unsuccessful bidder on a state or munici-
          pal contract has no contractual right under the common
          law that would afford standing to challenge the award
          of a contract. . . . [A] bid, even the lowest responsible
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 21

       0 Conn. App. 710                          ,0               23
                  Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       one, submitted in response to an invitation for bids is
       only an offer which, until accepted by the municipality,
       does not give rise to a contract between the parties.
       . . . An unsuccessful bidder, therefore, has no legal or
       equitable right in the contract. Not unlike any other
       person whose offer has been rejected, the disappointed
       bidder has no right to judicial intervention. . . .
          ‘‘Moreover, no statute grants unsuccessful bidders
       standing to challenge the award of a state contract.
       . . . In particular, state and local competitive bidding
       laws have not been enacted in order to protect bidders.
       These laws serve to guard against abuses in the award
       of contracts such as favoritism, fraud or corruption and
       are enacted solely for the benefit of the public and in no
       sense create any rights in those who submit bids. . . .
          ‘‘Despite these substantial constraints, [our Supreme
       Court has] recognized a limited exception to the rules
       of standing in order to provide a means of protecting the
       public’s interest in properly implemented competitive
       bidding processes. . . . Under this exception, unsuc-
       cessful bidders have standing to challenge the award
       of a public contract where fraud, corruption or acts
       undermining the objective and integrity of the bidding
       process existed . . . . [S]uch a suit is brought by one
       who suffers injury as a result of the illegal activity, but
       the suit itself is brought in the public interest by one
       acting essentially as a private attorney general. . . .
          ‘‘Our policy to limit standing so as to deny some
       claims brought by unsuccessful and precluded bidders
       is designed to protect twin goals that serve the public
       interest in various, sometimes conflicting, ways. The
       standing rules aim to strike the proper balance between
       fulfilling the purposes of the competitive bidding stat-
       utes and preventing frequent litigation that might result
       in extensive delay in the commencement and comple-
       tion of government projects to the detriment of the
Page 22                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     0, 0

          24                        ,0                         0 Conn. App. 710
                         Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

          public.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc.
          v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 412–13, 35 A.3d
          188 (2012).
             In addition, ‘‘an unsuccessful bidder to a municipal
          contract has no standing to assert a cause of action for
          money damages for failure of the municipality to follow
          its competitive bidding laws, regardless of whether the
          plaintiff alleges fraud, corruption or favoritism.’’ Law-
          rence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, 247 Conn. 407, 411,
          722 A.2d 271 (1999).14 Thus, in the absence of a colorable
          claim of fraud, corruption or other acts undermining
          the integrity of the bidding process, an unsuccessful
          bidder lacks standing to challenge the award of a public
          contract. Compare Spiniello Construction Co. v. Man-
          chester, 189 Conn. 539, 545, 456 A.2d 1199 (1983) (unsuc-
          cessful bidder had standing to challenge award of con-
          tract because evidence showed that bidding officials
          favored winning bidder by allowing that bidder to devi-
          ate from invitation for bids), with Ardmare Construc-
          tion Co. v. Freedman, 191 Conn. 497, 506, 467 A.2d 674
          (1983) (unsuccessful bidder lacked standing because
          elements traditionally thought to undermine competi-
          tive bidding process were absent when official ‘‘did not
          apply its requirement inconsistently or in a discrimina-
          tory fashion’’).
             In its objection to the defendants’ motion to dismiss
          in the present case, the plaintiff claimed that it is not
          properly characterized as a disappointed bidder because
          the shared clean energy facility contracts are not con-
          tracts with the government and because it has not
            14
              The trial court held that the plaintiff lacked standing as a disappointed
          bidder to assert its claims for monetary damages pursuant to Lawrence
          Brunoli, Inc. Because we conclude in part I of this opinion that the plaintiff
          lacks standing to assert those claims based on this court’s decision in
          Jefferson Solar I, we focus our analysis in part II of this opinion on whether
          the plaintiff has standing as a disappointed bidder to assert its claims for
          declaratory and injunctive relief.
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 23

       0 Conn. App. 710                          ,0               25
                  Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       asserted a breach of contract claim against a govern-
       mental entity. In the alternative, the plaintiff claimed
       that, assuming that it is a disappointed bidder on a
       public contract, it still has standing to seek declaratory
       and injunctive relief because the integrity of the bidding
       process was undermined when United Illuminating and
       the department failed to adhere to the program require-
       ments by awarding FuelCell the contract when FuelCell
       did not demonstrate site control.
          The trial court rejected each of the plaintiff’s argu-
       ments. First, the court held that the shared clean energy
       facility contract is a public contract because, ‘‘although
       the contract is ultimately entered into between the bid-
       der and [United Illuminating], the whole process is pur-
       suant to a state administered program.’’ The court next
       concluded that the limited exception to the standing
       rule did not apply because ‘‘the plaintiff’s conclusory
       allegations do not amount to fraud, favoritism, corrup-
       tion or acts that undermine the integrity of the bidding
       system to confer it standing under [that] exception.
       Additionally, there is nothing in the record to support
       that the bid submitted by FuelCell did not conform with
       the [site control requirement], as the program require-
       ments permitted [United Illuminating] to select bids
       with option leases. . . .
          ‘‘Moreover, there is no allegation, besides a conclu-
       sory assertion, that FuelCell knew its [option to] lease
       violated [the city’s charter] and submitted the bid certifi-
       cation anyway to constitute fraud or to undermine the
       bidding requirements. In fact, the evidence is to the
       contrary. . . . [I]t is clear that [United Illuminating] did
       not use [the city charter] as a basis to reject some bids
       while ignoring [it] to award other bids. . . . Prescott,
       the Director of Wholesale Power Contracts for [United
       Illuminating], who oversaw the bid selection process
       for [United Illuminating], confirmed that [United Illumi-
       nating] found the option to lease submitted by FuelCell
Page 24                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                          0, 0

          26                   ,0                        0 Conn. App. 710
                     Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

          to be acceptable under § 2.4.1 of the [request] and that
          neither she [n]or anyone else at [United Illuminating]
          was advised by someone with the proper authority that
          FuelCell lacked site control and granted the bid anyway
          to undermine the integrity of the bidding process.’’
          (Citations omitted.)
            Finally, the court concluded that, ‘‘as a disappointed
          bidder, the plaintiff cannot request declaratory relief
          as a way to circumvent the fact that it does not have
          standing to assert its claims because [the declaratory
          judgment statute] does not create jurisdiction where it
          would not otherwise exist.’’ (Internal quotation marks
          omitted.) Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff
          lacked standing as a disappointed bidder.
             On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the court
          improperly concluded that the shared clean energy
          facility contracts are public contracts. It argues that,
          although the shared clean energy facility ‘‘contracts are
          a public benefit made available to renewable energy
          developers, the . . . bids are not bids for a contract
          with a municipality or with any governmental agency.
          . . . The [shared clean energy facility] contracts at
          issue are not public contracts under Ardmare [Con-
          struction Co. v. Freedman, supra, 191 Conn. 497]
          because the state is not a counterparty. See, e.g., Con-
          necticut Energy Marketers Assn. v. Dept. of Energy &
          Environmental Protection, 324 Conn. 362, 374 [152 A.3d
          509] (2016) (holding that ‘activities that are proposed
          by state actors, but which are ultimately performed by
          private entities’ are not state activities).’’ We are not
          persuaded.
             The plaintiff’s reliance on our Supreme Court’s hold-
          ing in Connecticut Energy Marketers Assn. is mis-
          placed. In that case, the court addressed whether the
          department’s ‘‘issuance of a comprehensive energy
          strategy . . . pursuant to a legislative directive, and
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 25

       0 Conn. App. 710                          ,0               27
                  Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       the subsequent approval of a plan to expand the use of
       natural gas in this state by the department and [PURA]
       constituted ‘’’actions which may significantly affect the
       environment’’’ within the meaning of General Statutes
       § 22a-1c, thereby triggering the requirement for written
       evaluation of the expansion plan’s environmental
       impact pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-1b (c).’’
       (Footnote omitted.) Id., 364–65. The court held that
       ‘‘activities that are proposed by state actors, but which
       are ultimately performed by private entities, do not
       constitute ‘actions which may significantly affect the
       environment’ for purposes of § 22a-1b (c).’’ Id., 374.
       Because Connecticut Energy Marketers Assn. involved
       an entirely different statutory scheme that is not at
       issue in the present case, our Supreme Court’s holding
       in that case does not resolve the issue presented in the
       present case—whether the shared clean energy facility
       contract constitutes a public contract for purposes of
       the disappointed bidder doctrine.
          In that regard, we recognize that neither the state
       nor any municipality is a party to the contract that was
       awarded to FuelCell. At the same time, the crux of each
       count of the plaintiff’s complaint is that FuelCell’s bid
       failed to comply with the request or the program
       requirements that were developed by the department
       and approved by PURA in accordance with express
       legislative directives. See General Statutes § 16-244z (a)
       (1) (C) (department ‘‘shall . . . develop program
       requirements and tariff proposals for shared clean
       energy facilities’’ and PURA ‘‘shall approve or modify
       such program requirements and tariff proposals submit-
       ted by the department’’); see also General Statutes § 16-
       244z (a) (6) (providing that department’s program
       requirements ‘‘shall include’’ several specific provisions
       and requirements). Thus, although this is not the typical
       disappointed bidder case in which a state or local gov-
       ernment is a party to the contract, the plaintiff seeks
Page 26                     CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                          0, 0

          28                    ,0                        0 Conn. App. 710
                      Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

          to challenge the award of a contract pursuant to com-
          petitive bidding in a public procurement process, which
          was developed by and subject to the oversight of two
          different state agencies. Indeed, the plaintiff’s claims
          depend on the lowest responsible bidder requirement to
          establish that it would have been awarded the contract,
          which is the hallmark of a public procurement process.
          See, e.g., Powder Horn Constructors, Inc. v. Florence,
          754 P.2d 356, 376 (Colo. 1988) (noting that public pro-
          curement process is ‘‘designed to avoid the appearance
          . . . of favoritism . . . in public procurement by
          awarding the contract in all cases to the lowest respon-
          sible bidder,’’ whereas ‘‘[p]rivate parties are not
          required to accept the lowest bid’’).
             Specifically, in the operative complaint, the plaintiff
          alleged that the electric companies ‘‘have no discretion
          in terms of whether they enter into contracts with suc-
          cessful bidders. The contracts are required to be
          entered into under . . . § 16-244z and [the program
          requirements]. . . . Nor do the [electric companies]
          have any discretion as to the basis for selection, which
          is based upon price for qualified bids as provided for
          by the tariffs.’’ The plaintiff further alleged that, notwith-
          standing ‘‘the usual boilerplate disclaimer language that
          purported to reserve to the [electric companies] ‘the
          right to reject any or all offers or proposals’ . . . and
          that the [electric companies] ‘make no commitment to
          any [b]idder that it will accept any [b]id(s)’ and that
          the [request] does not constitute ‘a binding offer to
          contract’ . . . the legal and practical reality is that nei-
          ther [electric company] had the discretion to reject any
          and all offers unless those offers failed to satisfy the
          requirements of the tariff, which incorporates the . . .
          program requirements.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis
          omitted.)
            Consequently, the plaintiff’s reliance on the program
          requirements to challenge the award of the contract in
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 27

       0 Conn. App. 710                          ,0               29
                  Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       the present case is no different than a disappointed
       bidder’s reliance on the state or municipal bidding stat-
       utes to challenge the award of a government contract.
       That is, the program requirements, much like competi-
       tive bidding laws, were established for the benefit of
       the public—not the bidders. See, e.g., General Statutes
       § 16-244z (e) (‘‘The costs incurred by an electric distri-
       bution company pursuant to this section shall be recov-
       ered on a timely basis through a nonbypassable fully
       reconciling component of electric rates for all custom-
       ers of the electric distribution company. Any net reve-
       nues from the sale of products purchased in accordance
       with any tariff offered pursuant to this section shall be
       credited to customers through the same fully reconcil-
       ing rate component for all customers of such electric
       distribution company.’’).
          Therefore, applying our well established standing
       rules regarding disappointed bidders on public con-
       tracts to the present case represents a ‘‘proper balance
       between fulfilling the purposes of the competitive bid-
       ding [rules] and preventing frequent litigation that might
       result in extensive delay in the commencement and
       completion of government projects to the detriment of
       the public.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Electri-
       cal Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, supra, 303
       Conn. 413. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court
       that the shared clean energy facility contract awarded
       pursuant to the request is a public contract.
          The plaintiff contends that ‘‘even if the contract was
       a public contract . . . the trial court’s conclusion . . .
       that FuelCell did not know or have reason to know that
       its lease option was unenforceable is disproven by the
       testimony at the hearing.’’ According to the plaintiff,
       ‘‘at the time [FuelCell] submitted its . . . bid, [Fuel-
       Cell] knew, or at the very least had reason to know,
       that the option to lease and bid certification was no
       good and did not provide [FuelCell] with control to
Page 28                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                          0, 0

          30                   ,0                        0 Conn. App. 710
                     Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

          anything, much less unconditional control.’’ The plain-
          tiff further maintains that the integrity of the bidding
          process was undermined when United Illuminating
          ‘‘ignored the [program requirements] on which [the]
          plaintiff relied when it expended funds necessary to
          submit a compliant bid.’’ The plaintiff’s arguments are
          unavailing.
             The court rejected the plaintiff’s ‘‘conclusory allega-
          tions’’ that fraud, favoritism, corruption, or other acts
          undermined the integrity of the bidding process because
          ‘‘there is nothing in the record to support that the bid
          submitted by FuelCell did not conform with the [site
          control requirement], as the program requirements per-
          mitted [United Illuminating] to select bids with option
          leases.’’ The court relied on testimony from Prescott,
          who evaluated the bids for United Illuminating, and
          found that FuelCell’s bid complied with the site control
          requirements. The court specifically noted that there
          was no evidence that United Illuminating applied the
          site control requirement differently to other bidders
          and, therefore, it would not disturb the bidding official’s
          good faith interpretation of the bidding requirements.
          Put differently, the court found that United Illuminating
          did not exhibit favoritism by interpreting and applying
          the program requirements in a consistent and nondis-
          criminatory fashion. See Good Earth Tree Care, Inc. v.
          Fairfield, supra, 151 Conn. App. 685 (bidding officials
          do ‘‘not exhibit favoritism by making good faith inter-
          pretations of bidding requirements and applying them
          in a consistent and nondiscriminatory fashion’’).
            Accordingly, the plaintiff’s assertion, based on its
          reading of the option to lease and the city charter, that
          FuelCell knew that its bid certification was false does
          not alter the court’s conclusion that there was no fraud,
          favoritism, or corruption that undermined the integrity
          of the bidding process. At bottom, the plaintiff simply
          disagrees with United Illuminating’s, PURA’s, and the
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 29

       0 Conn. App. 710                          ,0               31
                  Jefferson Solar, LLC v. FuelCell Energy, Inc.

       department’s application of the bidding requirements
       and seeks to obtain judicial intervention to set aside
       the award of a public contract on the basis of its own
       interpretation of the bidding requirements. The plain-
       tiff’s interpretation, however, has been rejected by
       those entities, and the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
       that their good faith assessments of their own bidding
       requirements amount to fraud, favoritism or corruption
       that undermined the integrity of the bidding process.
       It is well settled that, ‘‘[a]lthough the assessment of
       the criteria for determining the lowest qualified bidder
       includes some subjective analysis, that subjective analy-
       sis . . . does not carry with it the imprint of favoritism,
       but rather is a wholly permissive exercise of the [bid-
       ding official’s] discretion unless favoritism otherwise
       is illustrated.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
       686. Thus, although the plaintiff asserts that it seeks to
       vindicate the ‘‘public interest in ensuring that govern-
       ment agencies adhere to the law,’’ it has failed to allege
       facts to support its claim that fraud, corruption or favor-
       itism undermined the bidding process. See AAIS Corp.
       v. Dept. of Administrative Services, 93 Conn. App. 327,
       332–33, 888 A.2d 1127 (unsuccessful bidder lacked
       standing to seek injunctive relief because there was ‘‘no
       allegation that any ex parte communications with other
       bidders took place or that the department was favoring
       the use of one brand of product over another in the
       bidding process’’), cert. denied, 277 Conn. 927, 895 A.2d
       798 (2006). Consequently, we conclude that the plaintiff,
       as a disappointed bidder on a public contract, lacked
       standing to challenge the award of the contract because
       it failed to demonstrate fraud, corruption or favoritism
       that undermined the integrity of the bidding process.
       Therefore, the court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s
       claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.
         The judgment is affirmed.
         In this opinion the other judges concurred.