Court Opinion

ID: 9478942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:03:28.883896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:43.134635
License: Public Domain

BRORBY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority’s application of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. *1458573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), I do not agree that the statements and written consents to search given by Patsy and Arthur Maez are extinguished by the Payton violation in this case. Respectfully, I must dissent for two reasons. First, the majority reaches a result not dictated by the record. Second, I cannot endorse the analytical framework of the majority opinion.
Based upon my view of the record, I have no doubt that Patsy and Arthur Maez voluntarily consented to the searches herein. The force of the consents given in this case overcomes the taint placed by the Payton violation. The same is true of the statements made by the defendant. The majority reaches its conclusion only by disregarding the government’s evidence and adopting the defendant’s after-the-fact gloss on what happened the day of his arrest. Such practice blocks a sound disposition in this case.
At the suppression hearing, the government called two FBI agents as witnesses to demonstrate the voluntariness of the consents given by Mrs. Maez to search her home and auto. Special Agent Guyman testified, in part, that when he first spoke to Patsy Maez, he explained to her that her husband was being placed under arrest and charged with a bank robbery which had occurred earlier that afternoon. He told her that her husband matched the description of the robber and a vehicle belonging to him had been used in the robbery.
In response to counsel’s question: “Can you describe how she reacted and responded to you?” Special Agent Guyman testified:
She had indicated that there was no problem that we would be going to search the trailer. She had indicated that the trailer belonged to her and it was in her possession. In essence what I did is I filled out the search form and had her read it out loud to me and then she signed it.
He further testified: “She read it out loud to me and she did not have any ques-tions_ It appeared to me that she understood.” The agent’s testimony is bolstered by the defendant’s testimony. As to the search of the mobile home, the defendant testified that he left the decision as to consent up to his wife. “I told her ‘Well, it’s your trailer. It’s up to you,’ and I shook my head up and down, to go ahead if she wanted to, because the trailer is under her name.”
The consent form which Patsy Maez signed reads as follows:
8/14/87
(date)
ALBUQUERQUE
(Location)
I, PATSY ANN MAEZ, having been informed of my constitutional right not to have a search made of the premises hereinafter mentioned without a search warrant and of my right to refuse to consent to such a search, hereby authorize SA CALVIN E. GUYMAN, and JOSE A, MARRERO, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, to conduct a complete search of my premises located at 9600 CENTRAL SW SPACE 41. These agents are authorized by me to take from my premises any WEAPONS & MONEY, letters, papers, materials or other property which they may desire.
This written permission is being given by me to the above-named Special Agents voluntarily and without threats or promises of any kind.
At the suppression hearing, the government introduced and the court received the executed consent form into evidence.
Special Agent Marrero testified regarding Patsy Maez’ consent to search the vehicle. He stated, in part, as follows:
A She was in the mobile home throughout the search.
Q Were you able to tell during the times that you observed her, did she appear to be — could you describe how she appeared? Did she appear frightened, et cetera?
A She did not appear frightened. She appeared I would say sad, and if I may say so she had a resigned look about her as far as — somehow I got the feeling *1459that what was happening was not a total shock to her, but it was an unpleasant experience for her.
Inside the Maez trailer home, Special Agent Marrero again advised Patsy Maez that she was not under arrest and was under no obligation to talk to the agents. When asked if she would consent to a search of her vehicle, “[s]he agreed to the search and without her asking questions we did explain to her that she was under no obligation to give the consent, though she didn’t ask any questions relating to the consent.” “I showed it to her. I read it to her and I had her read it.” Patsy Maez executed a consent to search her vehicle as well as her home.1
On cross-examination, Special Agent Marrero was asked: “So would it be fair to say your assignment was to accompany Ms. Maez, Mrs. Maez so that she would sign a consent to search form?” Special Agent Marrero responded:
No. My assignment was to accompany her and explain to her if she, not so that she would, but rather if she would. My assignment wasn’t to make her sign the consent. My assignment was to help her understand what the consent entailed and it was totally up to her whether or not she signed it.
When asked if she had cried, Special Agent Marrero testified: “[S]he might have had a tear in her eye, but she wasn’t, she hadn’t broken down into tears or anything like that. She wasn’t uncontrollably crying and sobbing and all this. She was just sitting there minding her child.” When asked if he questioned Patsy Maez about the bank robbery itself, Special Agent Marrero responded: “My conversation with her was limited to making sure that she was comfortable. Would you like some water, she said yes. Is the baby getting heavy, can I help you in any way, that sort of thing, but not relating to the investigation....”
Mrs. Maez testified that she signed the consent to search forms because she felt she “had to.” She stated she was “scared and upset and angry” during the whole procedure, but that she was not crying. On cross-examination the government brought out the facts that Mrs. Maez had worked for the New Mexico Department of Human Services for nineteen years, and that currently she was a clerk-specialist. In the past she had been a notary public. She testified that she knew her husband had been in the penitentiary “[a]bout four times” during their sixteen-year marriage.
In my view the record portrays a scene that is far removed from the thundering drama of police abuse depicted in the majority opinion. Patsy Maez is a literate woman who has held a government position for nineteen years. She has endured a marriage to a man who has been in and out of incarceration. In the bank robbery of the instant case, Arthur Maez was identified as the man who used a firearm to knock unconscious a female bank employee. He admitted to an FBI agent that at the time of his latest arrest, he was using heroin approximately three times per week. One wonders who Patsy Maez was afraid of and angry with during the arrest of this man. I believe we make a mistake when we substitute our perception of the facts for that of the trial court.2
Likewise, I cannot accept the majority’s interpretation of the record as to the consent to search and the statements given by Arthur Maez while in custody. Special Agent Garay testified that he advised the defendant of his constitutional rights orally when he was taken into custody at 7:15 p.m. The defendant was then transported to the FBI office in Albuquerque. Until that point, there had been no conversation between the defendant and the agent.
At the FBI office, Special Agent Garay again advised Arthur Maez of his constitutional rights. Forty-five minutes after his *1460arrest, the defendant read aloud the advisement of rights and executed a waiver identical to the one executed by his wife. Additionally, the defendant read aloud and executed a consent to search his pickup truck. Both of these documents were admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing. Special Agent Garay agreed with counsel that the defendant appeared “to be aware of what was going on” when he was interviewed. The defendant was a man with an extensive criminal record, appeared to understand his rights, and did not appear to be confused or frightened during the interview. Although the defendant vomited three-quarters of the way through the interview, Special Agent Garay testified that he was trained to recognize symptoms of persons who are under the influence of drugs, and that the defendant appeared to have control of himself. Deputy Pacheco of the Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Department testified in part:
Q And that he told you he had taken two valiums?
A Yes.
Q Did he tell you he had taken any other medication or drugs that evening?
A He was asked if he was under the influence of heroin and he said no. Any other drug and he said no. He vomited after he drank the water that we gave him.
Many of these facts are not noted in the majority’s opinion. Again, the majority substitute their perception of the facts for that of the trial court.
What troubles me as much as the majority’s perception of the facts, however, is the majority’s application of legal principles to produce an outcome which is both unwarranted and unwise. The questions presented for review are whether the consent to search given by Patsy Maez to the FBI was voluntary in fact so as to remove the taint of Arthur Maez’ unlawful arrest, and whether Arthur Maez’ consent to search and in-custody statements were sufficiently acts of free will to purge the taint of his illegal arrest. Majority op. at 1453, 1456, 1457. I do not agree with the majority’s disposition of the case or with its usurpation of the trial court’s function.
The majority notes that the district judge found that Patsy Maez’ consent was voluntarily and willingly given. The district judge observed:
And I will find that while the circumstances may have been tense and while the environment may not have been that of the most ideal for considering the signing of a permission to search, that nevertheless she voluntarily and willingly gave the officers a permission to search....
Contrary to the majority’s contention that the district judge “expressed reluctance in making this finding,” majority op. at 1454, I interpret the comments as recognizing the fact that one can give consent voluntarily even under circumstances which are less than conducive to thoughtful reflection. Experience teaches us that commonly, when suspects and/or family members waive constitutional rights and give information to law enforcement officers, the setting is less than pastoral. In this case, I have no doubt that Patsy Maez voluntarily consented to the search of her mobile home. In spite of the illegal arrest, if asked to do so, I would be inclined to hold that the evidence demonstrates her consent was strong enough to overcome the illegality of her husband’s arrest. Similarly, I would be inclined to hold that Arthur Maez’ waiver of Miranda rights and consent to search under the circumstances of this case overcame the illegality of the arrest.
The majority correctly concludes that whether a consent to search preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation is sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest depends on whether it is voluntary in fact The trial court, although incorrectly opining that the arrest was lawful, did hold a factual hearing and determined that the consents and statements were voluntary. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court’s findings must be accepted by this court unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Guglielmo, 834 F.2d 866, 868 (10th Cir.1987) (citing United States v. *1461Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255, 104 S.Ct. 3543, 82 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); United States v. Gabriel, 715 F.2d 1447, 1450 (10th Cir.1983)). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948), cited in, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); Everaard v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 842 F.2d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir.1988). “Questions of fact are reviewed under the deferential, ‘clearly erroneous’ standard as set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(1). Although the standard is a rule of civil procedure, it is applied to certain issues in criminal proceedings.” United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n. 2 (10th Cir.1986). “If findings are not made, this court must uphold the ruling if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.” United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 878, 884 (10th Cir.1985) (citing Anderson, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. at 1506); Colon-Sanchez v. Marsh, 733 F.2d 78 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855, 105 S.Ct. 181, 83 L.Ed.2d 115 (1984); Cooper, 733 F.2d at 1364).
On appeal, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings. Guglielmo, 834 F.2d at 868 (citing United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543 (10th Cir.1985)). See also United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 561 (10th Cir.1987). Stated differently, the reviewing court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir.1988); United States v. Jimenez, 864 F.2d 686, 688 (10th Cir.1988); United States v. Soto-Ornelas, 863 F.2d 1487, 1490 (10th Cir.1988); United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir.1986).
Where a motion to suppress is heard, the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given the evidence, and the drawing of inferences are for the trial judge. Fountain, 776 F.2d at 879 (citing Cooper, 733 F.2d at 1374). Although in footnotes 13 and 15 the majority cites the United States v. Grier, 866 F.2d 908, 935 (7th Cir.1989), a proper use of that case demands that we pay attention to the full quotation therein. The Seventh Circuit case utilized by the majority states the law as I urge herein and which has been set forth in numerous cases of our own circuit. In Grier, the court said:
“A district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence will be affirmed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. We will rely on the district court’s findings of fact absent a showing of clear error. This standard applies to the district court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses, findings that will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. ‘A finding is “clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). ‘Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’ Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985).”
(Quoting United States v. D’Antoni, 856 F.2d 975, 978-79 (7th Cir.1988)). Furthermore, I am not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed by the trial judge as to his finding of voluntariness. In Lone Star Steel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 851 F.2d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir.1988), we applied the concept: “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (Citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342, 70 S.Ct. 177, 94 L.Ed. 150 (1949)). Obviously, there are at least two permissible views of the evidence. For these reasons, I would not overturn the trial court’s findings that the consents and statements were voluntary.
Furthermore, I cannot agree with the procedure used by the majority to effect its *1462result. The majority chose to “take the bull by the horns,” conduct a taint analysis, and suppress the evidence in this case. Such initiative is particularly inappropriate in this case. Based upon the cold slab of a transcript, different readers conjure entirely different scenarios. The trial judge, and only the trial judge, is in a position to discern the truth in a case like this. Resolution of the issue of voluntariness in this case turns on the credibility of the witnesses. Only the trial judge can assess the credibility of participants reliably. The majority does not even address whether the trial judge’s findings are “clearly erroneous,” and yet disregards the findings and renders an opposite result. With all due respect to my fellow appellate judges, there are times when we should “mind our own business,” and this is one of those times. In my view, we should remand for further proceedings consistent with our holding as to the Payton violation. After the trial court is given an opportunity to assess the facts in light of the Payton violation, then, if the case returns to us, we should review the findings under the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.
Citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the majority footnotes the concept that “where the proceedings below 'resulted in a record of amply sufficient detail and depth from which the determination may be made,’ the appellate court may conduct a taint analysis.” Majority op. at 1454 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262). This is not a case in which that procedure is appropriate. In Brown, the Court noted that the illegality “had a quality of purposefulness. The impropriety of the arrest was obvi-ous....” Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262. Remand in Brown would have resulted in mechanical disposition of the case. Such is not true in the instant case, and consequently I must dissent.

. Although no evidence was seized pursuant to this consent, in the context of the whole record, this consent is relevant to show Patsy Maez’ persistence in consenting to searches.

. In determining the voluntariness of the consents and statements, the trial judge must determine the impact of the illegal arrest on Patsy and Arthur Maez, not its impact on our sensibilities.