Court Opinion

ID: 9884992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:27:11.057902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:43.175082
License: Public Domain

HANSON, Justice
(concurring specially)-
I concur in the court’s decision but write separately to expand on the court’s discussion of the third-party or alternate-perpetrator issue. This expansion is necessary because of the potential confusion produced by our prior decisions on this issue.
Gutierrez made a pretrial motion that he be allowed to introduce evidence tending to prove that Peggy Radke, not he, caused Makaio Radke’s death. When third-party perpetrator evidence is offered, it is important to distinguish between two types of evidence: (1) evidence that connects the third party to the offense for which the defendant is charged (i.e., testimony placing the third party at the scene of the crime around the time it was committed; physical evidence of a third party’s prints or DNA at the scene or on or near the victim; or testimony that the third party admitted to committing the crime); and (2) evidence that the third party committed other bad acts in addition to the charged offense (offered to show the motive, intent or opportunity of the third party to commit the charged offense or to identify the third party as the perpetrator). This distinction is important because the admissibility of the former type of evidence requires only that it meet the ordinary evidentiary standards for relevance and foundation,1 whereas the latter type of evidence of other bad acts, as revers e-Spreigl evidence, is admissible only if it meets the heightened “clear and convincing evidence” standard.2 Some of our prior decisions have mistakenly labeled both types of evidence as being “reverse-Spreigl evidence,” when only the second type, evidence of bad acts other than the charged offense, can correctly be called revers e-Spreigl evidence.3
The potential for confusion is perhaps increased because the first type of third-party perpetrator evidence, connecting the third party to the charged offense, serves both as exculpatory evidence for the defendant and as foundation evidence for the use of revers e-Spreigl evidence. See Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d at 159. But this latter function should not change the evidentiary standard applicable to this evidence — it should continue to be judged by the ordinary standards of relevance.
Gutierrez was allowed to offer evidence connecting Peggy Radke to the charged offense. There was proof that Peggy Rad-ke was at her home, where Makaio died, by 1 a.m. on the night of his death and the medical evidence could not establish definitively that Makaio’s death-causing injuries had occurred before that time. Gutierrez’s motion asked that he be allowed to also offer revers e-Spreigl evidence to prove *440that Peggy Radke had been abusive to others, but not Makaio. As to this evidence, Gutierrez’s motion did not qualify as an offer of proof because it only generally described the other bad acts he wanted to prove and did not identify the specific evidence he would offer. See, e.g., Minn. R. Evid. 103(a)(2).
The district court applied the incorrect evidentiary standard as the basis for its rejection of Gutierrez’s motion to allow revers e-Spreigl evidence. The court determined that Gutierrez had failed to prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that a necessary link between Peggy Rad-ke and Makaio’s murder existed, and that this failure eliminated the foundational requirement for revers e-Spreigl evidence, namely, that a defendant first present evidence that has “an inherent tendency to connect such other person with the actual commission of the crime.” Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d at 159 (quoting Marrone v. State, 359 P.2d 969, 984 (Alaska 1961)). As noted earlier, this threshold evidence connecting a third party to the charged offense does not have to meet the clear and convincing standard. Thus, therefore, the district court’s basis for rejecting the proffered revers e-Spreigl evidence was erroneous. Nonetheless, I would conclude that that error was harmless for several reasons.
As to the evidence connecting Peggy Radke to the charged offense, the court’s ruling on Gutierrez’s motion did not preclude it. To the contrary, Gutierrez was permitted to show that Peggy Radke arrived at the home at about 1 a.m. and to attempt to show that the injury and death of Makaio occurred after that time. In fact, Gutierrez argued to the jury that the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gutierrez had committed the crime because, in part, there was evidence from which the jury could find that Peggy Radke had done so (her DNA was found on the plastic rod whereas Gutierrez’s DNA was not; Kristina Baker had testified that she heard Makaio cry as late as 7:30 in the morning; there was no investigation as to precisely where in the house Makaio was injured and it could have been in the basement, where Peggy Radke’s room was located, etc.).
As to the evidence properly characterized as revers e-Spreigl, although the district court’s denial of Gutierrez’s motion was based upon an erroneous evidentiary standard, that error was harmless because the revers e-Spreigl evidence was inadmissible on several other grounds. First, Gutierrez’s motion was insufficient to constitute an appropriate offer of proof. It failed to identify what clear and convincing evidence Gutierrez could provide to show that Peggy Radke had actually committed the other bad acts she was alleged to have committed. Gutierrez’s bare allegations are not sufficient. Second, the proposed reverse-Spreigl evidence was not relevant to the injury to or death of Makaio. The allegations contained in Gutierrez’s motion would, if proven, only show that Peggy Radke was abusive to others, not to Ma-kaio, and most of those allegations referred to events that occurred 5 to 10 years prior to Makaio’s death. Third, the probative value of the proposed reverse-Spreigl evidence was weak and did not outweigh the prejudicial effect of showing Peggy Radke to be a bad person or a bad mother.
Accordingly, the rejection of Gutierrez’s motion to allow revers e-Spreigl evidence was not reversible error.

. See State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 458, 39 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Minn.1949); State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 158 (Minn.1977); State v. Flores, 595 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Minn.1999).

. State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 233 (Minn.1999); State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 433 (Minn.1997).

.See State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275, 285 (Minn.2003); see also Woodruff v. State, 608 N.W.2d 881, 885 (Minn.2000); 9 Henry McCarr & Jack Nordby, Minnesota Practice—Crim. Law and Proc. § 47.41 (3d ed.2001).