Court Opinion

ID: 9713129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:09:01.274996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.884797
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: The principal opinion reverses upon defendant’s argument that the trial court erred: “D ° ° in permitting defendant to proceed pro se at his preliminary hearing without full knowledge of the charge and penalties.” Supreme Court Rule 401(a) contemplates that there may be a waiver of counsel if knowingly and understanding^ made. Colloquy quoted in the principle opinion discloses that defendant was tendered representation by the public defender and the record shows that the offer was firmly and persistently rejected. The cited Coleman v. Alabama was framed in the context that the State “failed to provide counsel” within such constitutional requirement. It does not appear to be argued that defendant was denied counsel. Similarly, it is not, in fact, claimed that the waiver of counsel was not voluntary or that there was actual harm or prejudice resulting from the court’s acquiescence in defendant’s refusal in the appointment of counsel. Rather, the defendant insists upon literal compliance with a rule. In People v. Roberts (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 489,362 N.E.2d 116, the trial court failed to state the nature of the charge or the maximum or minimum sentence. Rule 401(a) contains the same' provisions concerning the admonitions at issue for waiver of counsel. The reviewing court, after considering the opinion in People v. Dudley (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 57, 316 N.E.2d 773, held that a failure to admonish as to the charge or penalty does not require automatic reversal where there is no claim that the waiver was not voluntary, or that harm or prejudice was incurred. The same determination was made in People v. Bedford (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 349 N.E.2d 459, appeal denied (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 558, and People v. Bertsche (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 464, 343 N.E.2d 663. In People v. Pfeiffer (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 924, 354 N.E.2d 678, defendant who was not entitled to appointed counsel, appeared at a preliminary hearing without an attorney. Upon inquiry about counsel, defendant stated that he did not intend to procure counsel unless there was a finding of probable cause. The reviewing court determined that the colloquy of record discloses that defendant was well aware of a right to counsel and that a fair reading disclosed that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. In People v. Heath (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 880, 342 N.E.2d 452, appeal denied (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 553, defendant discharged the public defender during trial. His several requests for an appointment of other counsel were denied. Upon appeal it was argued that there was no knowing waiver of counsel because the trial court did not determine that defendant understood the nature of the charge, or the maximum or minimum sentence which could be imposed. It was determined that the deficiency in formal admonitions was harmless error since defendant was advised of such right and understood the consequences of his action. In the context of an understanding waiver of counsel at this preliminary hearing, this record shows that within the preceding month defendant had been convicted of possession of heroin upon a jury trial. At his subsequent arraignment in this case defendant asked the court to take judicial notice that he had, on other occasions, shown that he was qualified to represent himself and that he did not want the public defender appointed. The record of this preliminary hearing discloses that defendant both cross-examined and testified as to each of the charges at issue, and that defendant understood the nature of the charges through such examination. The record also discloses that defendant advised the court, as in Pfeiffer, that he would determine whether to have counsel if there was probable cause found, and that at the conclusion of the evidence defendant asked the court to dismiss the information. In Coleman v. Alabama, the specific matters considered to be sources of prejudice at a preliminary hearing without counsel included the opportunity to obtain discovery necessary to the preparation of a defense and cross-examination which would: «* « a fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State’s witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear at the trial.” 399 U.S. 1, 9, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387, 397, 90 S. Ct. 1999. In the context of impeachment the prosecution presented only an arresting officer and there was a full transcript of the proceedings that became available at trial for purposes of impeachment. In the context of discovery, it is noted that subsequent to the opinions in Coleman and People v. Adams (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 200, 263 N.E.2d 490, the supreme court adopted Rule 412 effective August 1, 1971, which provides much broader discovery than that available through a preliminary hearing. Here, discovery was obtained through that rule. Upon such fact, we can find no basis for actual prejudice in the light of those matters of specific concern in Coleman. Upon consideration of the several authorities and of the facts of record in this case, it is clear that the trial court’s acquiescence in defendant’s pro se appearance at the preliminary hearing without the admonitions at issue was harmless error and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The principle opinion expresses concern with the matter of corporeal identification resulting from the fact of a preliminary hearing without counsel as discussed in Moore v. Illinois (1977), 434 U.S. 220,54 L. Ed. 2d 424, 98 S. Ct. 458. We are not concerned with a denial of counsel or the refusal of failure of the court to offer counsel to defendant. Here, we examined the record to discover whether there was an understanding waiver of counsel in which defendant persisted. Again, since the drug transaction and the arrest of defendant each occurred in his home, there is not, in fact, an issue of corporeal identification in this case.