Court Opinion

ID: 9939333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 20:02:25.442889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:57.252038
License: Public Domain

Rel: February 9, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter
Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                 Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                              OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
                               _________________________

                                       CR-2023-0112
                                 _________________________

                                Kendall Ramone Spencer

                                                    v.

                                       State of Alabama

                         Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
                          (CC-21-899.70 and CC-21-900.70)

PER CURIAM.

        On January 12, 2023, the Mobile Circuit Court revoked Kendall

Ramone Spencer's probation for violating the terms of probation that it

had placed on him for his April 2022 convictions for first-degree and

second-degree assault. Spencer appeals the circuit court's judgment,
CR-2023-0112

and, citing Ex parte McGowan, 346 So. 3d 10 (Ala. 2021), he argues

that, because the split sentence that the circuit court imposed on him

for his first-degree-assault conviction is "illegal," the circuit court did

not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation in that case.1 The State,

on the other hand, argues that the circuit court properly sentenced

Spencer for his first-degree-assault conviction, but, even if the sentence

is improper, the circuit court's sentencing error "is at most harmless."

(State's brief, p. 6.)

       In Ex parte McGowan, the Alabama Supreme Court explained

that

       "a sentence unauthorized by statute exceeds the jurisdiction
       of the trial court and is void. See Ex parte Batey, 958 So. 2d
       [339] at 342 [(Ala. 2006)] (citing Rogers v. State, 728 So. 2d
       690, 691 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998)).          Except for taking
       measures to cure a jurisdictional defect in sentencing and to
       sentence the defendant in accordance with the law, a trial
       court has no jurisdiction to act on an unauthorized sentence,
       including conducting revocation proceedings and entering a
       revocation order addressing the portion of the sentence that
       was unauthorized in the first place. It matters not that a
       revocation order purports to remove an unauthorized portion

       1Spencer's first-degree-assault case is CC-21-899.70.
                                                          Although the
circuit court revoked Spencer's probation in both CC-21-899.70 and CC-
21-900.70 and although Spencer gave notice of appeal in both cases,
Spencer makes no argument on appeal concerning the circuit court's
judgment revoking his probation in CC-21-900.70 -- i.e., the second-
degree-assault case.
                                     2
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     of a sentence; the trial court must first have subject-matter
     jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings under Rule 27.6, Ala.
     R. Crim. P., and to enter the order of revocation.'

346 So. 3d at 15 (emphasis added). The Alabama Supreme Court held

that, when a circuit court revokes a defendant's probation but the

defendant's sentence "was unauthorized in the first place," the circuit

court's order purporting to revoke probation "is void" and must be

vacated. Id.

     Here, on April 11, 2022, Spencer pleaded guilty to first-degree

assault and the circuit court sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment,

to serve "time served," followed by 5 years of probation.        (C. 22.)

Spencer argues that the "time served" portion of his sentence is illegal

because he had served only 1 year, 5 months, and 23 days at the time

he was sentenced (First Supp. C. 10), and the minimum split sentence

he could have received at the time of his offense under § 15-18-8(a)(2),

Ala. Code 1975, is 3 years' imprisonment.2 Spencer is correct.

     First-degree assault is a Class B Felony offense, see § 13A-6-20,

Ala. Code 1975, and thus carries a range of punishment of "not more

than 20 years or less than 2 years" in prison, see § 13A-5-6(a)(2), Ala.

     2The  record on appeal shows that Spencer committed the first-
degree assault on May 18, 2020. (C. 28.)
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Code 1975. Although a circuit court does not have to split a sentence it

imposes for a Class B Felony conviction, if it chooses to do so, then it

must split that sentence in accordance with § 15-18-8(a), Ala. Code

1975. At the time Spencer committed the first-degree assault and was

sentenced, § 15-18-8(a), Ala. Code 1975, provided, in relevant part, as

follows:

           "(a) When a defendant is convicted of an offense, other
     than a sex offense involving a child as defined in Section 15-
     20A-4(26), that constitutes a Class A or Class B felony
     offense, and receives a sentence of 20 years or less in any
     court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the State of
     Alabama and the judge presiding over the case is satisfied
     that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public as
     well as the defendant will be served thereby, he or she may
     order:

           "....

            "(2) That a defendant convicted of a Class A, Class B,
     or Class C felony with an imposed sentence of greater than
     15 years but not more than 20 years be confined in a prison,
     jail-type institution, or treatment institution for a period of
     three to five years for Class A or Class B felony convictions
     and for a period of three years for Class C felony convictions,
     during which the offender shall not be eligible for parole or
     release because of deduction from sentence for good behavior
     under the Alabama Correctional Incentive Time Act, and
     that the remainder of the sentence be suspended
     notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary and

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CR-2023-0112

     that the defendant be placed on probation for the period
     upon the terms as the court deems best."3

     So, a split sentence of "time served" that equates to only 1 year, 5

months, and 23 days in prison falls far short of the minimum term of 3

years' imprisonment that is required by § 15-18-8(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.

Consequently, Spencer's "time served" split sentence here does not

comply with § 15-18-8(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, and, thus, under

McGowan, supra, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to revoke

his probation for his first-degree assault conviction. Even so, the State

urges this Court to affirm the circuit court's judgment for two reasons.

     First, citing Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124 (Ala. 2005), the

State argues that § 15-18-8(g), Ala. Code 1975, gives the circuit court

the authority to impose a split sentence of less than three years'

imprisonment in this case because the circuit court used the phrase

"time served" and, under § 15-18-8(g), the circuit court has "jurisdiction

... to suspend the unserved balance of the minimum three-year-split

term." (State's brief, p. 5.) The State's argument misunderstands both

Ex parte McCormick, supra, and § 15-18-8(g), Ala. Code 1975.

     3Effective on July 1, 2023, the legislature amended § 15-18-8, Ala.

Code 1975. See Act No. 2023-461, Ala. Acts 2023.
                                    5
CR-2023-0112

     Section 15-18-8(g) provides:

           "Regardless of whether the defendant has begun
     serving the minimum period of confinement ordered under
     the provisions of subsections (a) or (b), if the imposed
     sentence is not more than 20 years, the court shall retain
     jurisdiction and authority throughout that period to suspend
     that portion of the minimum sentence that remains and
     place the defendant on probation, notwithstanding any
     provision of the law to the contrary and the court may
     revoke or modify any condition of probation or may change
     the period of probation."

(Emphasis added).

     In Ex parte McCormick, the Alabama Supreme Court addressed

the question whether a sentencing court could, under § 15-18-8(g),

suspend the entirety of "the minimum sentence of confinement imposed

under § 15-18-8(a) upon a defendant ... and place the defendant on

probation." 932 So. 2d at 129. In that case, Lartasha Gaines, one of the

defendants in McCormick,4 had

     "pleaded guilty, without benefit of a plea agreement, to the
     offense of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance.
     Judge Michael W. McCormick sentenced Gaines to 20 years
     in prison. Judge McCormick then split the sentence and
     ordered Gaines to serve two years in the state penitentiary
     and two years on probation.

     4Ex   parte McCormick involved three petitions for writs of
mandamus, which the Alabama Supreme Court consolidated for the
purpose of issuing one opinion. 932 So. 2d at 125.
                                    6
CR-2023-0112

           "The district attorney for the Tenth Judicial Circuit
     petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of
     mandamus directing Judge McCormick to resentence
     Gaines. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the
     district attorney's argument that Judge McCormick's
     imposition of a two-year sentence of imprisonment for
     Gaines was not authorized by § 15-18-8, Ala. Code 1975.
     State v. Gaines, 932 So. 2d 118 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). The
     court recognized that the 2000 amendment authorized Judge
     McCormick to split Gaines's sentence of 20 years. But the
     court held that § 15-18-8(a)(1) required Judge McCormick to
     sentence Gaines to a minimum of three years of actual
     'confine[ment] in a prison, jail-type institution[,] or
     treatment institution,' see § 15-18-8(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975,
     and further held that Judge McCormick had no authority to
     suspend this 'mandatory minimum term of confinement.'
     Gaines, 932 So. 2d at 122. Accordingly, the Court of
     Criminal Appeals issued a writ of mandamus directing
     Judge McCormick to resentence Gaines. Judge McCormick
     then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court
     asking us to direct the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate
     its writ."

Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d at 126 (footnotes omitted; emphasis

added). The Supreme Court explained:

            "Applying the plain-meaning rule to § 15-18-8, we note
     first that the Court of Criminal Appeals in Gaines correctly
     determined that Judge McCormick had no authority to split
     Gaines's 20-year sentence by ordering Gaines to serve only 2
     years in confinement with 2 years' probation to follow.
     Clearly, Gaines's 20-year sentence was eligible for split-
     sentence consideration under § 15-18-8(a). § 15-18-8(a), Ala.
     Code 1975 ('When a defendant is convicted of an offense and
     receives a sentence of 20 years or less....'). But § 15-18-
     8(a)(1) required Judge McCormick to sentence Gaines to
     serve a minimum of three years' confinement. § 15-18-

                                  7
CR-2023-0112

    8(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975 ('In cases involving an imposed
    sentence of greater than 15 years, but not more than 20
    years, the sentencing judge may order that the convicted
    defendant be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, or
    treatment institution for a period not exceeding five years,
    but not less than three years....'). Judge McCormick's
    attempt to split Gaines's sentence therefore resulted in an
    illegal sentence, and the Court of Criminal Appeals was
    correct in directing Judge McCormick to resentence Gaines.

          "The Court of Criminal Appeals erred, however, in
    holding that a sentencing court has no authority to suspend
    the three-year 'mandatory minimum' term of confinement
    under § 15-18-8(a)(1). Section 15-18-8(c) [now § 15-18-8(g),
    Ala. Code 1975] provides:

               " 'Regardless of whether the defendant has
         begun serving the minimum period of
         confinement ordered under the provisions of
         subsection (a), the court shall retain jurisdiction
         and authority throughout said period to suspend
         that portion of the minimum sentence that
         remains and place the defendant on probation,
         notwithstanding any provision of the law to the
         contrary and the court may revoke or modify any
         condition of probation or may change the period
         of probation.'

    "§ 15-18-8(c), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). Nothing in §
    15-18-8(c) suggests that the phrases 'the minimum period of
    confinement ordered under the provisions of subsection (a)'
    and 'the minimum sentence' do not include the 3-year
    minimum period of confinement required when a defendant's
    20-year sentence is split under § 15-18-8(a)(1). Thus, § 15-
    18-8(c) plainly authorizes a trial court to suspend 'the
    minimum sentence' required to be imposed by § 15-18-8(a),
    including 'the minimum period of confinement' that § 15-18-

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CR-2023-0112

     8(a)(1) requires for sentences greater than 15 years but not
     more than 20 years."

Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d at 132-33 (footnote omitted; some

emphasis added).

     In other words, although the State correctly points out that circuit

courts have the authority to suspend the "unserved balance" of a split

sentence, the plain language of § 15-18-8(g) allows the circuit court to

suspend the "minimum period of confinement." As Ex parte McCormick

explains, when a split sentence is imposed under § 15-18-8(a), the

"minimum period of confinement" that can be imposed is 3 years'

imprisonment. So, contrary to the State's argument on appeal, § 15-18-

8(g) does not allow a circuit court to impose a sentence of "time served"

that is less than the mandatory minimum period of confinement set out

in § 15-18-8(a).

     The State also asserts that Spencer is not entitled to any relief on

appeal because, it argues, the sentencing error here "is at most

harmless." The State claims:

     "Spencer suffered no harm. In fact, he greatly benefitted
     from the split to time-served sentence that he received. He
     was pleased enough with it that he did not raise the claim on
     direct appeal. He was released from incarceration early and
     given an opportunity to reenter society, enjoy freedom, and

                                   9
CR-2023-0112

      prove himself worthy of probation. He only complains now
      because the original sentence has now become inconvenient."

(State's brief, pp. 6-7.)

      Although the State correctly points out that Spencer "greatly

benefitted" from his illegal split sentence because the circuit court

sentenced him below the mandatory minimum split sentence he could

receive, this Court cannot say that the error here is harmless because it

is unclear whether properly sentencing Spencer will have any affect on

his guilty plea in this case.

      This Court, in Enfinger v. State, 123 So. 3d 535 (Ala. Crim. App.

2012), explained:

            "We recognize that the circuit court's revocation of
      Enfinger's probation in this case appears to reach a result
      that is no different than the result that was obtained in
      Simmons [v. State, 879 So. 2d 1218 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003),]
      and Morris [v. State, 879 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)]
      -- i.e., the probation revocation in essence removed the
      unauthorized split. Those cases, however, did not involve
      merely the removal of an improper split. In each of those
      cases, the circuit court was instructed to consider on remand
      whether the removal of the split would affect the
      voluntariness of the defendant's guilty plea. Further, the
      circuit court in each case was instructed that, if the
      defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, it should allow
      the defendant to do so. See Simmons, supra; Morris, 876 So.
      2d at 1178 ('Because the split sentence was a term of the
      appellant's plea agreement, if the appellant moves to
      withdraw his guilty plea, the circuit court should grant the

                                   10
CR-2023-0112

    motion. See Austin v. State, 864 So. 2d 1115 (Ala. Crim.
    App. 2003).') To hold that the circuit court can remedy the
    imposition of an unauthorized split sentence by revoking a
    defendant's probation, however, would prevent that
    defendant from being able to move to withdraw his guilty
    plea and thus would treat him differently than the
    defendants in Simmons and Morris were treated -- i.e., after
    the circuit court conducts a resentencing, the defendant
    would not have the assistance of appointed counsel to move
    to withdraw his guilty plea under Rule 14.4(e), Ala. R. Crim.
    P.; instead, an indigent defendant would have to raise, pro se
    in a Rule 32 petition, the issue that the defendant's guilty
    plea was involuntary.

          "Furthermore, holding that a circuit court can remedy
    the imposition of an improper split sentence by revoking a
    defendant's probation could lead to an absurd result. For
    example, a defendant serving a sentence that is improper
    under the Split-Sentence Act could be charged with violating
    the terms and conditions of his probation and the circuit
    court could thereafter revoke that defendant's probation. On
    appeal, the defendant could contend that the evidence was
    insufficient to support the revocation of his probation, and if,
    after a review of the record, this Court determined that the
    defendant is, in fact, correct, we would be forced to hold that,
    although the evidence was insufficient to support the
    revocation, the imposition of the remainder of his sentence is
    correct because the circuit court could not have imposed a
    split sentence. Such a result is unsound and untenable.

          "Because the circuit court did not have the authority to
    revoke Enfinger's probation, its order revoking Enfinger's
    probation is vacated, and this case is remanded to the circuit
    court for that court to resentence Enfinger in accordance
    with this opinion.

          "Additionally, we note that, although the record
    indicates that Enfinger was convicted of sexual abuse of a

                                  11
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     child under 12 as the result of a 'plea bargain' (C. 8), the
     record is unclear as to whether Enfinger's sentence was part
     of the plea bargain. Thus, 'it is impossible for this Court to
     determine whether resentencing [Enfinger] will affect the
     voluntariness of his plea.' Austin[ v. State], 864 So. 2d
     [1115,] 1119 [(Ala. Crim. App. 2003)]. If the split sentence
     was a term of Enfinger's 'plea bargain,' and, if he moves to
     withdraw his guilty plea, the circuit court should conduct a
     hearing to determine whether withdrawal of the plea is
     necessary to correct a manifest injustice. See Rule 14.4(e),
     Ala. R. Crim. P."

Enfinger v. State, 123 So. 3d at 538-39.

     Here, as in Enfinger, the record on appeal shows that Spencer

pleaded guilty to first-degree assault, and, as in Enfinger, it is unclear

wither Spencer's illegal sentence was the result of a plea agreement

with the State. If so, the circuit court's error in sentencing Spencer

would not be harmless because, upon resentencing, Spencer would be

permitted to move to withdraw his guilty plea and the circuit court

would then be tasked with determining whether withdrawal of the plea

would be appropriate under Rule 14.4(e), Ala. R. Crim. P.

     In sum, Spencer's split sentence to "time served" for his first-

degree assault conviction is unauthorized under § 15-18-8(a), Ala. Code

1975. Thus, under Ex parte McGowan, supra, the circuit court's order

purporting to revoke Spencer's probation for that offense is void, and

                                   12
CR-2023-0112

"[a] void judgment will not support an appeal." Madden v. State, 885

So. 2d 841, 844 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004). Thus, pursuant to Ex parte

McGowan, we order the circuit court to vacate its probation-revocation

order as it relates to his first-degree-assault conviction in CC-21-899.70.

We note that, "at this juncture," the only thing the circuit court may do

is

     " ' "conduct another sentencing hearing and ... reconsider the
     execution of [Spencer's 20]-year sentence[ ]. Because the
     [20]-year sentence[ ] [was] valid, the circuit court may not
     change [it]." ' Enfinger, 123 So. 3d at 538 (quoting Austin v.
     State, 864 So. 2d 1115, 1118 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003), and
     Moore v. State, 871 So. 2d 106, 109-10 (Ala. Crim. App.
     2003))."

Ex parte McGowan, 346 So. 3d at 16.           We further note that, as

explained above, "the record on appeal does not indicate whether

[Spencer's] sentence was the result of a negotiated plea agreement. If it

was, Ex parte McGowan instructs that resentencing [Spencer] could

affect the voluntariness of [his] guilty plea. 346 So. 3d at 16." Shugart

v. State, 360 So. 3d 705, 707 n. 2 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021).

     Finally, Spencer does not contest the sentence imposed in CC-21-

900.70 for the offense of second-degree assault; therefore, he is not

                                    13
CR-2023-0112

entitled to relief in that case and the revocation of his probation for that

offense is affirmed.

     APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

IN PART.

     Windom, P.J., and Kellum, McCool, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.

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