Court Opinion

ID: 9965531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 18:00:42.586036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:10.229653
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60516           Document: 66-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/02/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________
                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit
                                   No. 23-60516
                                 Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                 ____________                                     May 2, 2024
                                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

Jonathan Lewis Jennings,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Mississippi
                           USDC No. 3:19-CR-107-1
                  ______________________________

Before Duncan, Wilson, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Jonathan Lewis Jennings was sentenced to a total of 314 months of
imprisonment after being convicted of two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, two
counts of discharging and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a
crime of violence, and one count of possession of a firearm after a felony
conviction. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in denying

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-60516       Document: 66-1       Page: 2    Date Filed: 05/02/2024

his motion to suppress his statements and in denying his motion for a mistrial
based on the prosecution’s references to his silence after being informed of
his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
       When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the
district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual determinations for
clear error. United States v. Carrillo, 660 F.3d 914, 922 (5th Cir. 2011). The
district court’s determination regarding the voluntariness of a defendant’s
confession and the validity of his waiver of his Miranda rights are questions
of law that are reviewed de novo. United States v. Cardenas, 410 F.3d 287,
292 (5th Cir. 2005). A suspect may waive his Miranda rights, provided that
the waiver is made voluntarily as well as knowingly and intelligently. Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). This determination is made on a case-
by-case basis and is viewed under the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation. Id.
       Despites Jennings’s assertions to the contrary, the record reflects that
he was explicitly informed of his Miranda rights, that he indicated that he
understood those rights, and that he voluntarily and knowingly waived those
rights. See Cardenas, 410 F.3d at 293. Additionally, Jennings’s decision to
speak with the police “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” See id. While Jennings argues
that the police misrepresented that they could not answer any of Jennings’s
questions unless Jennings waived his Miranda rights, “trickery or deceit is
only prohibited to the extent it deprives the suspect of knowledge essential to
his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of
abandoning them,” and this misstatement did not deny Jennings knowledge
essential to his understanding of his Miranda rights and the consequences of
abandoning them. Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Also, the police speculating
that cooperating would have a beneficial effect on Jennings’s sentence is a
Case: 23-60516       Document: 66-1      Page: 3     Date Filed: 05/02/2024

“customary police tactic” that does not “constitute such gross intimidation
or coercion so as to overcome a defendant’s free will and render his
statements inadmissible.”     Cardenas, 410 F.3d at 295.       Based on the
foregoing, the district court did not err in denying Jennings’s motion to
suppress.
       We review the district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Pando Franco, 503 F.3d 389, 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
However, the question of whether the references to Jennings’s silence
violated his due process rights is a constitutional question of law that is
reviewed de novo. Id.
       The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated
where the Government uses a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence
to create an inference of guilt. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
However, “evidence of defendant’s silence and refusal to answer post-arrest
questions is admissible if it is part of an otherwise admissible conversation
pursuant to defendant’s Miranda waiver.” United States v. Lara, 23 F.4th
459, 480 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
       Here Jennings voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and talked with
the police after his arrest. By knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waiving his Miranda rights and then speaking with the police, “[Jennings]
waived his right to have the entire conversation, including the implicit
references to his silence contained therein, used against him as substantive
evidence of guilt.” Pando Franco, 503 F.3d at 397. Because the prosecutor’s
references to Jennings’s silence did not violate his due process rights, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jennings’s motion for a
mistrial.
       AFFIRMED.