Court Opinion

ID: 9645016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:10:45.960559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:21.882287
License: Public Domain

*352
Murphy, C.J.,

dissenting:

I agree that there is a direct conflict between the county ordinance licensing fortunetelling within municipal boundaries and the ordinances of the two home rule municipalities which prohibit fortunetelling within their respective borders. I disagree with the Court, however, that the provisions of the Maryland Constitution and Maryland Code relating to charter counties and to home rule municipalities require that the conflict be resolved in favor of the county ordinance. To the contrary, I think the municipal ordinances prevail over the county ordinance. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
The Court holds, quite correctly, that the purpose behind Art. XI-A was to transfer local lawmaking powers from the State Legislature to the county councils of chartered counties and to invest them with full legislative power to enact local laws on all matters covered by the grant of express powers under Art. XI-A, § 2, as implemented by Art. 25A of the Maryland Code. I most emphatically disagree with the Court’s conclusion, however, that it thereby "logically follows that those counties should generally have the same relationship vis-a-vis municipalities within their borders as the General Assembly would have in enacting public local laws in the county in the absence of county home rule government.” Such a conclusion finds no support in the provisions of Art. XI-A and, moreover, is completely at odds with the purpose of Art. XI-E — the Municipal Home Rule Amendment — and the grant of express powers to municipalities under Art. 23A of the Maryland Code.
Nor do I agree with the Court’s narrow construction of the limitation imposed by Art. XI-A, § 3 upon the power of chartered counties to enact laws for municipalities, namely, that it only prohibits a chartered county from enacting laws effective only for or within a particular municipality but not from enacting countywide legislation affecting municipalities so long as it operates equally in all municipalities within its boundaries. To so conclude is to *353seriously undermine the object and purpose of municipal home rule government. I also disagree with the majority that a chartered county ordinance is a "public local law” within the contemplation of § 2 of Art. 23A of the Code and that as a consequence municipalities may not exercise the "general” police powers there granted in contravention of a county ordinance. This, too, is an erroneous conclusion with dire consequences to the future effectiveness of municipal government — a conclusion never contemplated by the Legislature which, in enacting § 2 seven years prior to the adoption of Art. XI-E, intended only that a municipality could not exercise the general police power there granted if "contrary to the public general or public local laws,” meaning such laws enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland.
Vital to a proper interpretation of Art. XI-A and Art. XI-E of the Maryland Constitution and their implementing statutes is an understanding of fundamental precepts which underlie the relationship between the State, on the one hand, and counties and incorporated municipalities on the other, as well as the relationship between counties and municipalities within their borders. The powers of a county have a direct reference to the general policy of the government of the State, while municipalities are chartered for a specific purpose, i.e., to exercise within a limited sphere the powers of the State in the interest, convenience and advantage of persons residing within the particular incorporated locality. See Centreville v. Queen Anne’s County, 199 Md. 652, 87 A.2d 599 (1951); Daly v. Morgan, 69 Md. 460, 16 A. 287 (1888). Historically, in Maryland, counties and municipalities have been regarded as coequal political subdivisions of the State, each exercising a portion of the State’s delegated governmental powers connected with the administration of local government within its respective sphere of operation. Neither unit of local government is possessed of inherent police power and neither is legislatively superior to the other. They are separate and distinct governmental entities, operating on different and independent tracks, although they derive all of *354their powers from the same source, i.e., from the State through enactments of the General Assembly of Maryland or pursuant to provisions contained in the Maryland Constitution. See Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 229 Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715 (1962), rev’d on other grounds, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Perry v. Board of Appeals, 211 Md. 294, 127 A.2d 507 (1956); Neuenschwander v. Wash. San. Com., 187 Md. 67, 48 A.2d 593 (1946); Clauss v. Board of Education, 181 Md. 513, 30 A.2d 779 (1943); Howard County v. Matthews, 146 Md. 553, 127 A.2d 118 (1924); Daly v. Morgan, supra, Darling v. Baltimore, 51 Md. 1 (1879); J. Spencer, Contemporary Local Government in Maryland (1965); D. Thompson and E. Kelleher, The Applicability in Maryland of County Law to Municipalities Located Within the County (Maryland Technical Advisory Service, 1975). Counties are not sovereign and, like cities, enjoy only the status of municipal corporations. Maryland Committee v. Tawes, supra; Howard County v. Matthews, supra.
It is the general rule that a county has no legal power to legislate for a municipality located within its limits upon any subject which is within the scope of the powers granted to the municipality. 1 C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, § 1.32 (1972); 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 114 (1949); 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations § 18 (1971); Ex Parte Knight, 55 Cal. App. 511, 203 P. 777 (Cal. App. 1921); Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968); City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d 641 (1958).
Prior to the advent of county and municipal home rule in Maryland, counties and municipalities were subject to the absolute control of the State Legislature. The "movement” for county and municipal home rule was "fueled by widespread public indignation over excessive legislative interference with and insensitivity toward local problems and concerns, and by a growing dissatisfaction with the enormously inefficient system of performing local law-making functions at the state level.” Ritchmount Partnership v. Board, 283 Md. 48, 55-56, 388 A.2d 523 (1978). As Ritchmount indicates, the purpose of home rule *355"was to restore and revitalize local government by giving citizens of counties and municipalities the power to legislate as to local matters free from undue encroachment by state legislatures.” Id. at 55. The theory behind the principle of home rule, as explained in Ritchmount, "is that the closer those who make and execute the laws are to the citizens they represent, the better are those citizens represented and governed in accordance with democratic ideals.” Id. at 56.
The Home Rule Amendment, Art. XI-A (ratified in 1915) authorized counties to adopt a charter form of government "subject only to the Constitution and Public General Laws of this State.” § 1. Section 2 of Art. XI-A directed the General Assembly to provide by statute a grant of express powers for those counties adopting a charter. Section 3 invested chartered counties with "full power to enact local laws of said ... County including the power to repeal or amend local laws of said ... County enacted by the General Assembly, upon all matters covered by the express powers granted,” with the proviso, however:
"that nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize or empower the County Council of any County in this State to enact laws or regulations for any incorporated town, village, or municipality in said County, on any matter covered by the powers granted to said town, village, or municipality by the Act incorporating it, or any subsequent Act or Acts amendatory thereto.”
Section 4 of Art. XI-A provided that "no public local law shall be enacted by the General Assembly for said ... County on any subject covered by the express powers granted . . . .”
Our cases indicate that Art. XI-A, as implemented by the express powers granted to chartered counties under Art. 25A of the Code, provided the fullest measure of local self-government to such counties in respect of their local affairs. County Council v. Investors Funding, 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973); Mont. Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, *356253 Md. 151, 252 A.2d 242 (1969). Included among the express powers granted to chartered counties was authority in § 5(S) of Art. 25A to pass all ordinances "deemed expedient in maintaining the peace, good government, health and welfare of the county.” As to this grant of general police power, we said in Mont. Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, supra, 253 Md. at 160-61:
"Gratification would not be afforded the purposes of home rule or the reasons which prompted it if the language of § 5 (S) of Art. 25A were not to be construed as a broad grant of power to legislate on matters not specifically enumerated in Art. 25A and the language of that section clearly indicates that such a construction is sound....
"A grant of power to pass laws for the peace, good government, health and welfare of the community is sometimes referred to as 'a general welfare or general grant of power clause,’ 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.), § 24.43, and:
'Under it ordinances may be passed which are necessary and beneficial, and they will be adjudged valid by the courts, provided they are responsible and consonant with the general powers and purposes of the local corporation, and not inconsistent with the United States Constitution, treaties and statutes, and the laws and policy of the state.’ ”
As we summarized in Ritchmount Partnership:
"The exercise of local legislative powers [by a chartered county] is subject at all times to provisions of the Constitution and general law, and is limited to those matters allocated by the express powers which the Legislature has delegated under Article 25A of the Annotated Code.... [Art. XI-A] mandates that the General Assembly expressly enumerate and delegate those powers exercisable *357by counties electing a charter form of government.... In compliance with this constitutional injunction, the Legislature enacted in 1918 the Express Powers Act, which, as amended, endows charter counties with a wide array of legislative and administrative powers over local affairs. Art. 25A, § 5. These 'legislative powers’ are those usually associated with the objects of government — that is, powers to legislate for the benefit of the health, safety and general welfare of the local community.
"Once a particular power has been delegated under Article 25A, the Home Rule Amendment forbids the State Legislature from enacting any further public local laws within the scope of the express power so granted ... until such time as the Legislature withdraws the power by public general law. Moreover, under Art. XI-A, § 3 the county council of a chartered county has full power to enact local laws and to repeal or amend local laws of the General Assembly applicable solely to the county, so long as the county legislation is covered by one or more of the express powers enumerated in Article 25A.” 283 Md. at 57.
It is thus evident that while the powers of chartered counties are both full and broad, they are, in addition to being subject to the public general laws of the State, also circumscribed by the provisions of the Maryland Constitution and in particular Art. XI-A, § 3 — that a chartered county has no power to enact laws for "any” incorporated municipality within the county on "any” matter covered by the powers granted to the municipality. This limiting provision, in the plainest of language, constitutes explicit recognition of the general rule that a county has no legal power (absent a delegation of power from the General Assembly) to legislate for any municipality located within its boundaries upon any subject which is within the scope of the powers granted to the municipality. *358Indeed, as we said in Md.-Nat’l Cap. P. & P. v. Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 325 A.2d 748 (1974), Art. XI-A, § 3 "limits the power of a County to enact laws for a local municipality” and "precludes counties from exercising the legislative power actually granted to municipalities.” Id. at 557-58 (emphasis supplied). It is thus clear that the General Assembly retained the power to legislate for municipalities to the exclusion of chartered counties. It did not intend to, nor did it, relinquish or transfer any part of its authority over municipalities to chartered counties.
Prior to the ratification in 1954 of Art. XI-E (the Municipal Home Rule Amendment), all municipal charters were granted by the General Assembly, pursuant to public local law, which set forth the powers delegated by the Legislature to the municipality. By ch. 731 of the Acts of 1947 — a public general law now codified as §§ 1 — 5 of Art. 23A of the Maryland Code (and to which charter county ordinances are subordinate) — the Legislature provided incorporated municipalities with a grant of wide-ranging express powers which, as specifically enumerated in § 2, included "general power”:
"to pass such ordinances not contrary to the public general or public local laws and the Constitution of Maryland as they may deem necessary in order to. assure the good government of the municipality, to protect and preserve the municipality’s rights, property, and privileges, to preserve peace and good order, to secure persons and property from danger and destruction, and to protect the health, comfort and convenience of the citizens of the municipality...."
Following this "general” grant of power, § 2 provides that municipalities shall have additional express ordinance-making powers as thereafter enumerated in subsections (1) through (31). Included among such powers, for example, is the power to establish and maintain fire and *359police departments, to acquire property for municipal purposes, and to adopt a municipal building code.1
It was, of course, the purpose of the Municipal Home Rule Amendment to permit municipalities to govern themselves in local matters. Birge v. Town of Easton, 274 Md. 635, 337 A.2d 435 (1975); Woelfel v. Mayor and Aldermen, 209 Md. 314, 121 A.2d 235 (1956); Hitchins v. City of Cumberland, 208 Md. 134, 117 A.2d 854 (1955). To this end, Section 1 of Art. XI-E prohibits the General Assembly from passing any public local law "relating to the incorporation, organization, government, or affairs” of an incorporated municipality. The section provides that the General Assembly "shall act in relation to the incorporation, organization, government, or affairs” of such municipalities only by public general laws applicable alike to all municipalities in one or more classes, as designated by the General Assembly by statute (the General Assembly subsequently designated but one class of municipality). Section 3 permits municipal corporations to amend or repeal existing charters or local laws relating to their incorporation, organization, government, or affairs which were previously enacted by the General Assembly and to adopt new charters and to amend or repeal any charter adopted under the provisions of the Article. Section 6 provides that all such charter provisions or amendments thereto "shall be subject to all applicable laws [i.e. general laws] enacted by the General Assembly.2 Section 6 provides, inter alia, that "any local laws, or amendments thereto, relating to the incorporation, organization, government, or affairs of any municipal corporation” enacted before Art. XI-E became effective "shall be subject to any charter provisions, or amendments thereto, adopted under the provisions of this Article.”
*360Nothing in Art. XI-E indicates that the General Assembly’s power to enact public local laws for municipalities was being transferred to chartered counties. Had this been the intention, then manifestly Art. XI-E would not have expressly authorized home rule municipalities to repeal or supersede existing local laws relating to their incorporation, organization, government or affairs. Nor is there any indication in either Art. XI-A or Art. XI-E that the Legislature’s retained power to act by general law applicable alike to all municipalities in the same class was to be shared with chartered counties, to be thereby exercised through enactment of county ordinances applicable to all municipalities in the county.
Article 23A, § 2, expressly granting broad governmental powers to all municipalities in the State, is a public general law which cannot be transgressed by ordinances enacted by a chartered county. Art. XI-A, §§ 1, 3. The general power is there vested in municipalities to pass ordinances, "not contrary to the public general or public local laws” deemed necessary "to assure the good government of the municipality, to protect and preserve the municipality’s rights, property, and privileges, to preserve peace and good order, to secure persons and property from danger and destruction, and to protect the health, comfort and convenience of the citizens of the municipality.” This grant of power is in all respects similar to — indeed the counterpart of — the express power contained in Art. 25A, § 5 (S) of the Code relating to chartered counties which we construed in Mont. Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 160-61, 252 A.2d 242 (1969), as a "broad grant of power” necessary to gratify the purposes of home rule government.
It is wholly inconsistent with the constitutional and statutory scheme of municipal home rule government to limit these broad express powers granted to municipalities by concluding, as the majority does, that ordinances of chartered counties are "public local laws” within the contemplation of § 2, as to which municipal ordinances enacted pursuant to the "general” powers granted by that section must yield in the event of a conflict.
*361The majority is simply wrong when it holds, in purported reliance upon our cases, that we have consistently viewed the enactments of a chartered county as the "public local laws” of that county. Referring to the authorities relied upon by the majority, Ritchmount Partnership v. Board, supra, 283 Md. at 57, states only that "the county has full power to enact local laws”; the case does not mention "public local laws.” Similarly, in Steimel v. Board, 278 Md. 1, 6-8, 357 A.2d 386 (1976), the Court decided only the validity of a law enacted by the General Assembly which was applicable solely to one charter county. It was this law which we held to be a "public local law.” Again, in State’s Atty. v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 603-05, 337 A.2d 92 (1975), the law in question was enacted by the General Assembly. And in County Council v. Investors Funding, supra, 270 Md. at 413, the Court noted that the Montgomery County Council has the exclusive power to enact"local laws.” The county’s power vel non to pass "public local laws” was not mentioned. Similarly, dicta in Co. Com’rs v. Supervisors of Elec., 192 Md. 196, 205, 63 A.2d 735 (1949), refers to "local laws,” not public local laws. State v. Stewart, 152 Md. 419, 137 A.2d 39 (1927), indicates only that Baltimore City possesses legislative power, but there is no indication that its ordinances constitute "public local laws.”
I do not believe that the term "public local law” has historically encompassed enactments by the county councils of chartered counties. On the contrary, at the time of the passage of Art. 23A, § 2 in 1947, the General Assembly enacted public local laws affecting single municipalities, and the limitation on the exercise of municipal powers under that section simply indicates that municipalities could not contravene such laws.
The only case which lends any support to the majority’s position is Scull v. Montgomery Citizens, 249 Md. 271, 239 A.2d 92 (1968). We there referred to an enactment of the Montgomery County Council interchangeably as "a public local law” or as a "local law.” Id. at 277. We said that counties have "the exclusive power to enact local laws,” and *362we noted that § 4 of Art. XI-A "forbids the legislature to enact a public local law 'on any subject covered by the express powers granted’ [to the counties].” Id. at 274. Thus, while Scull indicates that the term "public local law” has been used in connection with.county enactments, it also reveals that when this is so, the term "local law” has also been used. I think the use of the term "public local law” in Scull represents an inadvertent lack of precision on the part of this Court, rather than any determination that county enactments are "public local laws” in the traditional legislative sense.3 Most certainly, in thp sense contemplated by § 2 of Art. 23A, a "public local law” does not include an ordinance enacted by a chartered county.
The notion that a "public local law” within the contemplation of the prohibition of § 2 of Art. 23A includes a chartered cqunty ordinance is also debunked by Art. 23B of the Maryland Code. As we pointed out in Campbell v. City of Annapolis, 289 Md. 300, 424 A.2d 738 (1981), Article 23B contains a model municipal charter for the use of any incorporated municipality and constitutes a grant of power by the General Assembly to the municipality if the people thereof choose to adopt it. Section 22 of Art. 23B closely parallels the "general powers” language contained in § 2 of Art. 23A but limits the prohibition upon the exercise of such powers to ordinances which are "contrary tq the Constitution and laws of the State of Maryland.” Manifestly, this limitation does not include the enactment of ordinances by chartered counties; it is the true measure of the legislative intention in Art. 23A, § 2 in prohibiting the passage of municipal ordinances which are contrary "to the public general or public local laws” of the State.
I do not, of course, share the majority view that the mere rejection of the Sobeloff Commission recommendation *363concerning a limitation upon county licensing authorization to areas outside of the limits of incorporated municipalities indicates that chartered county licensing ordinances are applicable within home rule municipalities. This is indeed a slender reed upon which to predicate so important a constitutional interpretation. Nor do I share the majority’s concern that some municipalities will die on the vine for lack of vital services unless ordinances of chartered counties are effective within municipalities. This concern is more appropriately addressed to the Legislature which is empowered by Art. XI-E, § 2, to classify municipal corporations into four classes and to enact public general laws as to such classes, as may be deemed necessary.
The majority concedes that its holding is a narrow one limited to the "type of conflict” presented in this case. It acknowledges that if a chartered county ordinance prohibited a municipality from exercising the express enumerated powers granted to it by Art. 23A, § 2 (1) - (31), or any other public general law, "an entirely different case would be presented.” I glean from the majority opinion that because none of these enumerated powers encompassed an express power to the municipalities to prohibit fortunetelling within their corporate limits, their ordinances must yield to the contrary county ordinance. If this accurately reflects the majority holding, then I think it is in error in differentiating the "general” police power provided all municipalities under § 2 of Art. 23 A from the specifically enumerated powers contained in subparagraphs (1) through (31) of that section. I would reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and hold that the municipal ordinances prevail over the conflicting county ordinance.
Judges Smith and Digges authorize me to say that they concur with the views herein expressed except as to the issue of conflict.

. As originally enacted, ch. 731 exempted municipalities in a number of counties from its provisions. All such exemptions were subsequently repealed by ch. 451 of the Acts of 1973.

. Section 5 of Art. XI-E permits the General Assembly to enact, amend or repeal "local laws” limiting the rate of municipal property taxation or the amount of municipal debt.

. Anne Arundel Co. v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 354 A.2d 788 (1976), also relied upon by the majority, does no more than quote that passage from Scull, albeit in a different context, which indicates that under the Montgomery County Charter the term "public local law” encompasses an ordinance of the county council. This, of course, is not determinative of the meaning of the term "public local law” as used by the General Assembly in § 2 of Article 23A.