Court Opinion

ID: 9568187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:01:16.240381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:25.994003
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice.
A practicing dentist in the City of Savannah filed suit against a newspaper, alleging a violation of his right of privacy by the publication of articles to the effect that the dentist was a suspect in a *529murder case, and that certain affidavits reflected adversely upon his private and professional conduct.
Thereafter, the dentist obtained a protective order from the superior court, which prohibits the newspaper from disclosing any information obtained through discovery without following a procedure of notification of intent to disclose and obtaining permission of the court, in the event objection is filed. From the order as amended, the newspaper brings this interlocutory appeal, which this court granted, along with its motion to expedite.
At the outset, we need to state what this case is not. It is not an action for libel, but one for invasion of privacy; it is not a criminal prosecution, but a civil action initiated by the dentist seeking the recovery of $2.4 million dollars. There is no indication in the record that he is the subject of a grand jury investigation, and this case does not involve the classic confrontation of “free press versus fair trial,” as frequently arises in notable criminal prosecutions. Hence, the balancing requirement of free speech and the protection of a criminal defendant’s rights to a fair and impartial jury is not here present.
Nor do we have before us a question of the disclosure of matters of public record, inasmuch as the restraining order issued by the trial court pertains only to discovery materials, which are not matters of public record until filed with the court, in cases of interrogatories and requests for admissions, or opened by order of court in the case of depositions. Code Ann. § 81A-126 (c). See generally Code Ann. §§ 81A-126 — 137.
Instead, the case presents a compelling question of the ambit of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. IV of the Constitution of Georgia, Code Ann. § 2-104, which provides: “No law shall ever be passed to curtail, or restrain the liberty of speech, or of the press; any person may speak, write and publish his sentiments, on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”1
We must now decide whether the restraining order, carefully and precisely drawn by the learned trial judge, runs afoul of these constitutional protections.
We have carefully reviewed the briefs filed on behalf of the parties, and the opinion in In re Halkin, 598 F2d 176 (D.C. Cir., 1979), upon which the trial judge relied, as one of the few authorities relevant to cases of this type.
*530Decided November 13, 1981
Rehearing denied November 24, 1981.
Brannen, Wessels & Searcy, Darlene Y. Ross, Charles Mikell, Jr., for appellants.
Stanley E. Harris, Jr., Alexander L. Zipperer, for appellee.
We conclude that the protections of our own Constitution must remain paramount, to which must yield anything to the contrary found in our statutory law, or in the decisions of this or other jurisdictions, excluding only the highest court of the land. Under its plain language, the newspaper is empowered to write and speak and publish on all subjects, “.. . being responsible for the abuse of that liberty” in the nature of an action for libel or malicious abuse of process, or for invasion of privacy, Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (50 SE 68) (1904), — this last being the basis of the dentist’s complaint.
Accordingly, we find the restraining order, however well-intentioned, to be an unwarranted restraint upon the newspaper’s liberty of speech and of the press.

Judgment reversed and case remanded.

All the Justices concur, except Hill, P.J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Smith, J., who dissents.

 This section has remained unchanged in Georgia since the Constitution of 1877. It is also interesting to note that Art. LXI of the Constitution of 1777, providing “[f]reedom of the press and trial by jury to remain inviolate forever,” predated the Bill of Rights by 14 years.