Court Opinion

ID: 9681028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:42:47.631069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.903519
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting on State’s motion for rehearing.
I find that a majority of the Court, through Judge Clinton, has sufficiently dealt with all of the issues raised in the appellate brief filed by appellant’s court appointed attorney.1 However, not discussed, presumably because it was not raised in the appellate brief, is an issue which I find should be reviewed in the interest of justice,2 and that issue is the applicability of the double jeopardy provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions to this cause.
The freedom from being placed twice in jeopardy, as guaranteed in the Bills of Rights of the Federal and State Constitutions, is such a basic and fundamental part of the American scheme of justice that I believe error involving this right is error usually characterized or labeled “Constitutional Error,” “Fundamental Error,” or “In the Interest of Justice Error.” Error so characterized may be raised for the first time on appeal by the appellant, or by the Court Ex Mero Motu, or may even be raised after a lengthy period of time has elapsed and after the conviction has become final. *958See Ex parte Myers, 618 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). I believe that since the claim of double jeopardy can be raised at any time, unnecessary delay would result if this Court were to postpone at this time the inevitable. Therefore, I believe that we should resolve today, not tomorrow, the double jeopardy question that is present in this cause.3
The United States Supreme Court, see Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978), has ruled that the prohibition against placing a person in Double Jeopardy, as guaranteed under the Federal Constitution, attaches when a jury has been empaneled and sworn. This decision drastically changed Texas law. Needless to say, the Supreme Court did not tarry long when it came to a case from Texas, see McElwee v. Texas, 439 U.S. 949, 99 S.Ct. 344, 58 L.Ed.2d 340 (1978), for it vacated by a per curiam decision, in McElwee, Id., this Court’s judgment, and remanded the case back to this Court for reconsideration in light of Crist v. Bretz, supra. This Court on remand, because of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, see therein Art. VI, ruled that the defendant McElwee was entitled to relief, and reversed his conviction. See McElwee v. State, 589 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). This Court has held since McElwee was decided that Crist v. Bretz, Id., is retroactive to those convictions which had become final prior to the decision by the Supreme Court. See Ex parte Myers, supra.4
From the facts in this cause, and by the above cases, it is obvious that jeopardy attached in appellant’s case once the jury was sworn on October 26, 1977. See Crist v. Bretz, supra. When the trial court declared a mistrial on October 27,1977, a trial with a different jury was thereafter barred unless the appellant consented to the mistrial, or it was shown that the mistrial was mandated by some form of manifest necessity. See Torres v. State, 614 S.W.2d 436 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). I do not concern myself with the latter as the record neither expressly nor impliedly indicates that the mistrial was mandated by some form of manifest necessity. It is, however, apparent from the record that the trial judge declared a mistrial because the State was unable to procure one of its witnesses, a peace officer who was then hospitalized for reasons not stated in the record.5 Under the above cases, I do not find this was a sufficient reason to authorize the trial judge to declare a mistrial — unless appellant consented to the act of the trial judge. E.g., Torres, Id.
The question, whether or not the appellant consented to the mistrial, however, is another and different matter. In Torres, Id., this Court stated:
Consent need not be expressed, but may be implied from the totality of circumstances attendant to a declaration of mistrial. (Citations omitted.) But before a failure to object constitutes an implied consent to a mistrial, a defendant must be given an adequate opportunity to object to the court’s motion. (Citations omitted.) Id. at -441-42).
I find that the record is incomplete at this time, which incompleteness prevents this Court from resolving the question, whether *959or not the appellant consented to the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial on October 27, 1977.
A supplemental statement of facts6 was filed in the trial court on May 30, 1978. It reflects the events that occurred on October 26, 1977. As to October 27, 1977, the only thing that is shown to have occurred is reflected by a short conclusory statement of the court reporter:
(WHEREUPON, on Thursday, October 27th 1977 at 10:00 the State made a Motion for Continuance and it was granted by the Court and the ease was reset for the month of November, 1977).
As easily seen, nothing is expressly stated in the court reporter’s notes concerning either the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial or whether the appellant was present when the motion for continuance was made by the State and granted by the trial court. In fact, the only place in the entire record on appeal, where anything is stated which concerns the trial judge’s declaration of a mistrial, is the docket sheet, and it reflects only the following: “10/27/77 State moved for a cont. Judge granted cont. & case declared a mis-trial. Indictment had not been read and the def. had not answered to it.”7
As noted, the record does not affirmatively reflect whether the appellant was present on the morning of October 27,1977, when the trial judge declared the mistrial and discharged the jury. As to the State’s Motion for Continuance containing a statement, that the appellant did not object to the trial court’s granting the State’s motion, I do not believe that this is the equivalent of him consenting to the trial judge’s declaring a mistrial. The appellant’s consent to the State’s Motion for a Continuance may well have contemplated having the trial recommence with the same jury at a later date.
If the appellant was not present in court on October 27, 1977, when the trial judge declared the mistrial, he was not “given an adequate opportunity to object to the court’s motion.” Torres, supra.
Since the record on appeal is insufficient at this time to permit this Court to make a determination whether appellant’s failure to object constituted an implied consent to the mistrial, and since neither the State8 nor the appellant have had an adequate opportunity to supplement the record on appeal to demonstrate whether consent, either express or implied, may in fact have existed, I would abate this appeal to allow both the State and the appellant the opportunity to supplement the record,9 and to show whether or not the appellant consented to the mistrial. If such consent cannot be demonstrated, I would hold that the appellant’s conviction in this cause was barred by the Federal and State Constitutional provisions of Double Jeopardy.
For failure of the majority not to abate the appeal, I respectfully dissent.

. This does not, of course, mean that I agree with Judge Clinton’s opinion, because I do not. I believe that Judge W. C. Davis adequately disposed of the Faretta question in the Court’s original opinion.

. Although Art. 40.09(13), V.A.C.C.P., has met its demise, such article was in good health at the time this cause was originally filed and submitted to the Court; therefore, Sec. 13 is applicable to this cause. See McCarty v. State, 557 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Young, 517 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).

.While the adversary system generally requires that an appellant must raise an issue before we should consider it, nevertheless, when a fundamental right has been abridged, this Court should notice and review that issue on its own. Art. 40.09(13), supra. When an appellant can raise such fundamental error at any time, it is far better to dispose of the issue as soon as possible, because relevant records and other evidence are more likely to be available, and testimony will likely be more accurate if an evidentiary hearing is required at this time rather than later.

. Almost one year after this Court’s decision in Myers, Id., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Von Burleson v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1982), ruled that Crist v. Bretz, supra, was to be applied retroactively.

. Such fact is reflected in the State’s written Motion for Continuance, which caused the trial judge to declare a mistrial.

. After the appellant raised the issue of whether he had been sufficiently admonished, concerning the dangers of self-representation, the State was correctly permitted to supplement the record to reflect the admonishments which appellant had received on that issue. See Armstrong v. State, 550 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).

. The docket sheet does not reflect that appellant was present in court on October 27, 1977.

. Since the issue has not heretofore been raised, the State had no reason to have the appeal record reflect any facts favorable to a finding of implied consent.

. And their respective appellate briefs, if they desire.