Court Opinion

ID: 9407054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 19:02:24.12278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:35.332736
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13818    Document: 18-1     Date Filed: 07/05/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13818
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MARK TOMLINSON,
       a.k.a. Supa,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00521-TCB-AJB-4
USCA11 Case: 22-13818       Document: 18-1       Date Filed: 07/05/2023      Page: 2 of 6

       2                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13818

                             ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Mark Tomlinson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
       peals the denial of his requests for compassionate release under 18
       U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Tomlinson alleged that he had several de-
       teriorating health conditions—including Type 2 diabetes, hyper-
       tension, high cholesterol, acid reflux, gout, and sickle cell disease—
       which, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in a prison set-
       ting, amounted to extraordinary and compelling reasons for early
       release from his 192-month sentence for drug trafficking. The dis-
       trict court ruled that Tomlinson’s medical conditions did not qual-
       ify him for early release, and that the statutory sentencing factors
       did not warrant a sentence reduction. In response, Tomlinson filed
       a motion for reconsideration and a second motion for compassion-
       ate release, relying on additional medical records. The court de-
       nied both motions, concluding that the additional medical records
       did not establish a qualifying medical reason and that the sentenc-
       ing factors still weighed against early release.
              On appeal, Tomlinson maintains the district court erred in
       evaluating his medical conditions and failing to determine that they
       qualified as extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief.1 In

       1Tomlinson also raises an issue about administrative exhaustion. We assume
       without deciding that Tomlinson properly exhausted both motions.
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       22-13818               Opinion of the Court                          3

       response, the government has moved for summary affirmance,
       claiming that the district court’s decision was clearly correct. After
       careful review, we grant the government’s motion.
               Summary disposition is appropriate where “the result is
       clear as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question
       as to the outcome.” Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.6
       (11th Cir. 2019). We review de novo a determination of eligibility
       for a § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d
       1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). We review the denial of an eligible
       prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. Id.;
       United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). A district
       court acts within its discretion so long as it does not apply an incor-
       rect legal standard, rely on clearly erroneous facts, or commit a
       clear error of judgment. Harris, 989 F.3d at 911–12. Issues not
       raised on appeal are deemed abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Flo-
       ridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680–81 (11th Cir. 2014).
              Section 3582(c) grants the district courts limited authority to
       reduce the sentences of defendants for “extraordinary and compel-
       ling reasons.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting a reduc-
       tion under this provision, the court must find all of the following:
       (1) an extraordinary and compelling reason exists under U.S.S.G. §
       1B1.13’s policy statement; (2) the reduction is supported by the 18
       U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors; and (3) granting a reduction
       would not endanger others. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343,
       1345–46 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237
       (11th Cir. 2021). “Because all three conditions . . . are necessary,
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13818

       the absence of even one would foreclose a sentence reduction.”
       Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1238. Thus, a court may exercise its discretion
       to deny a sentence reduction based on the § 3553(a) factors even if
       the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling ground for
       relief. Id. at 1239.
               Here, the district court properly denied Tomlinson’s mo-
       tions for early release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). For starters, we agree
       that Tomlinson did not establish an extraordinary and compelling
       reason for relief within the meaning of § 1B1.13’s policy statement.
       See id. at 1237. The commentary to § 1B1.13 outlines medical, age,
       and family circumstances which may qualify as sufficiently “ex-
       traordinary and compelling.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)–
       (C). As relevant here, a non-terminal medical condition may be
       grounds for a sentence reduction if it substantially diminishes a
       prisoner’s ability to provide self-care in custody and if it is a condi-
       tion from which he is not expected to recover. Id., cmt. n.1(A).
              We have held that “the confluence of [a prisoner’s] medical
       conditions and COVID-19” did not constitute an extraordinary and
       compelling reason warranting compassionate release where the
       prisoner’s medical conditions did not meet § 1B1.13’s criteria. Gi-
       ron, 15 F.4th at 1346–47. We found that the defendant failed to
       show his “high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and coronary ar-
       tery disease” substantially diminished his ability to provide self-care
       as required by § 1B1.13, stating that they “were manageable in
       prison, despite the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic.” Id.
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       22-13818               Opinion of the Court                          5

              Tomlinson has not established a medical condition meeting
       § 1B1.13’s criteria. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A). Like in Giron,
       while Tomlinson has medical conditions that may put him at
       greater risk of severe illness from COVID-19, the medical records
       he submitted reflect that his conditions are “manageable in prison,
       despite the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic.” See id.
              Summary affirmance is independently warranted because
       Tomlinson fails to address on appeal the district court’s conclusion
       that a sentence reduction was not justified based on the § 3553(a)
       sentencing factors. In particular, the court found that early release
       would not “properly account for the nature and seriousness of his
       drug trafficking activities, promote respect for the law, provide just
       punishment, or afford adequate deterrence or protection.”
               Because any reduction must be supported by the § 3553(a)
       factors, the absence of that requirement “would foreclose a sen-
       tence reduction,” even assuming there’s an extraordinary and com-
       pelling ground for relief. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1238–39. And
       “[w]hen an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of
       the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is
       deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it
       follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Sapuppo, 739 F.3d
       at 680. Tomlinson has not briefed one of the grounds on which the
       district court denied his requests for compassionate release, so it
       follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed on that additional
       ground. See id.
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       6                    Opinion of the Court               22-13818

             For these reasons, we affirm the denial of Tomlinson’s July
       2022 and August 2022 motions for compassionate release and his
       motion for reconsideration related to the July 2022 motion.
             AFFIRMED.