Court Opinion

ID: 9678638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:26:30.677178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:06.404358
License: Public Domain

Justice JEFFERSON,
joined by Justice O’NEILL and Justice SCHNEIDER, dissenting as to Part II only.
In Sanchez v. Schindler, this Court concluded that the common law is best served by permitting a parent “to recover damages for loss of companionship and society ... for the death of his or her child.” 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex.1983). In Reagan v. Vaughn, this Court held that the common law supports a child’s recovery of damages for loss of consortium when a parent is injured but not killed by the tortious act of a third party. 804 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1990). These cases, and others outlined *125below, explain why the Court grudgingly acknowledges a “surface logic” to extending consortium rights to parents whose children are severely injured. Ill S.W.3d at 119. I am at a loss, then, to understand why the Court today concludes that the common law is best served by holding that parents have no such rights. Id. at 120. The Court’s conclusion is contrary to our longstanding precedent, counter to the majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue, and unduly tolerant of the anomaly it creates in the law. And the theme underlying the Court’s decision— that a parent’s loss of consortium claim must be rejected because adults require less protection than children — makes little sense in light of our repeated declarations that parents may recover consortium damages for the death of their children, and adult children are entitled to consortium damages for the death of, or serious injury to, their parents. Because the Court’s opinion creates, but does not adequately justify, a prominent paradox in Texas law, I respectfully dissent.
I
The Evolution of Texas Consortium Law
A. Extending Common Law to Permit Wife’s Separate Consortium Claim
Texas, like most other jurisdictions, initially limited consortium damages to a husband’s claim arising out of injury to the marital relationship. See Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref d n.r.e.) (refusing to recognize wife’s reciprocal claim for consortium damages); see also Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 473-75 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (chronicling history of consortium claims). Although the Garrett court acknowledged that recognizing a wife’s reciprocal cause of action was “in accord with the broad principle of justice motivating” a change in the common-law rule, it nevertheless declined to adopt such a change, opting instead to “follow the majority rule until such time as legislation might effect a change.” Garrett, 271 S.W.2d at 766-67.
This Court criticized the Garrett court’s decision for refusing to recognize a wife’s claim for loss of consortium, calling it “an abdication of judicial responsibility”:
Providing either spouse with a cause of action for loss of consortium would allow us to keep pace with modern society by recognizing that the emotional interests of the marriage relationship are as worthy of protection from negligent invasion as are other legally protected interests.
Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex.1978). Based on this reasoning, we held that “either spouse has a cause of action for loss of consortium that might arise as a result of an injury caused to the other spouse by a third party tortfeasor’s negligence.” Id. Our decision, we noted, brought Texas in line with the majority of jurisdictions and corrected “a paradox in the law.” Id.
B. Extending Common Law to Permit Parent’s Consortium Claim for Child’s Death
Five years after Whittlesey, we were asked to decide whether Texas should revise its position on the traditional common-law principle limiting a surviving parent’s damages for a child’s death “to the pecuniary value of the child’s services and financial contributions, minus the cost of his care, support and education.” Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 251. Describing the pecuniary-loss rule as “antiquated and inequitable,” we rejected the common-law concept which viewed the child as an economic asset. Id. We reasoned that
[t]he real loss sustained by a parent is not the loss of any financial benefit to be gained from the child, but is the loss of *126love, advice, comfort, companionship and society. We, therefore, reject the pecuniary loss limitation and allow a plaintiff to recover damages for loss of companionship and society and damages for mental anguish for the death of his or her child.
Id. Relying primarily on Whittlesey, we concluded that “injuries to the familial relationship are significant injuries and are worthy of compensation” and that “[such injuries] were real, direct, and personal losses ... not too intangible or conjectural to be measured in pecuniary terms.” Id. at 252 (citing Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667, 668). Further, in abrogating the common-law pecuniary-loss rule, we found persuasive the argument that a parent’s claim for damages for the loss of companionship of a child was closely analogous to a spouse’s loss of consortium cause of action. Id.; see also Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 468 (opinion on reh’g) (“The purpose of [recognizing a parental-consortium claim] is to allow children the same protection allowed spouses when a third party causes serious, permanent, and disabling injuries to their parent.”).
C. Extending Common Law to Recognize Child’s Consortium Claim for Parent’s Death
Two years after Sanchez, we again extended the common law, this time to permit children to recover damages for the mental anguish and loss of companionship resulting from their parents’ death. Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex.1985). In Cavnar, we reiterated that injuries to the familial relationship are compensable. Id. (citing Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 252). Then, in recognizing the Cavnar children's right to recover for their mother’s death, we said: “There is no logical reason to treat an injury to the familial relationship resulting from the wrongful death of any family member enumerated [in the wrongful death statute]” differently depending on whether it is the spouse, parent or child that dies. Id. (emphasis added)
D. Extending Common Law to Recognize Child’s Consortium Claim for Parent’s Serious, Permanent Injury
Finally, almost thirteen years ago, we decided that a child may recover damages for loss of consortium and mental anguish when a parent is severely injured by the tortious conduct of a third party. Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466. We found that consortium damages were recoverable in that context because “a serious, permanent and disabling injury to a parent” potentially visits upon the child deprivations as serious as those we recognized in Cavnar, Sanchez, and Whittlesey. Id. at 465-66 (discussing Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d at 551, Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 251, and Whittle-sey, 572 S.W.2d at 667). We reaffirmed our commitment to preserving the parent-child relationship:
While all family members enjoy a mutual interest in consortium, the parent-child relationship is undeniably unique and the wellspring from which other family relationships derive. It is the parent-child relationship which most deserves protection and which, in fact, has received judicial protection in the past. The loss of a parent’s love, care, companionship, and guidance can severely impact a child’s development and have a major influence on a child’s welfare and personality throughout life.
Id. at 466 (quoting Villareal v. State, 160 Ariz. 474, 774 P.2d 213, 217 (1989)). Finding “no principled reason to accord the parent-child relationship second class status[,]” we held that the unquestionable significance of that relationship compelled our recognition of a cause of action for a child’s loss of consortium resulting from a *127parent’s non-fatal injury.1 Id. We also declined to limit the right of recovery to minor children:
Consistent with our prior recognition that adult children may recover for the wrongful death of a parent, [see Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 70S S.W.2d 680, 635 (Tex.1986)], we decline to limit the right of recovery under this cause of action to minor children. “Although minors are the group most likely to suffer real harm due to a disruption of the parent-child relationship, we leave this to the jury to consider in fixing damages.” Ueland [v. Reynolds Metals Co.,] 103 Wash.2d 131, 691 P.2d [190,] 195 [(Wash.1984)]; see also Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf Co., 335 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Iowa 1983) (“even adult and married children have the right to expect the benefit of good parental advice and guidance”) (citing Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d 632, 665 (Iowa 1969)).
Id. at 466.
E. Refusing to Extend Common Law to Recognize Parent’s Consortium Claim for Child’s Serious, Permanent Injury
In the case now before us, the Court confronts the mirror-image of the question presented in Reagan — whether parents may recover damages for loss of consortium and mental anguish when their child is severely, but not fatally, injured by a third party’s tortious conduct. The Court says “No,” and offers as justification many of the same rationales the Court flatly rejected in Whittlesey, Sanchez and Reagan: (i) tort law cannot remedy every wrong; (ii) awarding damages in this context presents special challenges to a fact-finder; (iii) recognizing filial consortium claims would not eliminate differences in the award of intangible damages for wrongful death and personal injury cases; (iv) there are insufficient benefits to justify changing the common law in Texas; and (v) several states that have recognized the child’s right to loss of consortium have denied parents any reciprocal rights.
None of these proffered explanations— when weighed against our prior decisions and the growing body of law and commentary that recognize the symbiotic nature of the parent-child relationship — provide a satisfactory justification for creating an anomaly in Texas law. Moreover, noticeably absent from the Court’s analysis is any meaningful examination of Texas’s consortium precedent, the importance that Texas has historically placed on the parent-child relationship, or this Court’s decisions analogizing that relationship to the *128reciprocal nature of the husband-wife relationship.
II
Deconstructing the Court’s Opinion
A. Tort Law Cannot Remedy Every Wrong
It is, of course, preferable that the law be consistent and predictable. See, e.g., Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 254 (determining that retroactive application of the Court’s decision turned “primarily on the extent of public reliance on the former rule and the ability to foresee a coming change in the law”); Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 669. Today’s decision, however, will come as a great surprise to the bench and bar of Texas. As the Court points out, many of our lower courts and at least one Texas commentator have predicted that this Court, based on its precedent, would recognize a parent’s claim for loss of consortium in this context. See, e.g., Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Anderson, 78 S.W.3d 392, 414 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism’d by agreement); Parkway Hosp. v. Lee, 946 S.W.2d 580, 590 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 322 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no writ); Hall v. Birchfield, 718 S.W.2d 313, 337-38 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 747 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.1987); Benny Agosto, Jr. & Mario A. Rodriguez, What About the Parents? 66 Tex. B.J. 396, 396 (2003). And our decisions have, before now, justified that assumption. See Krishnan v. Sepulveda, 916 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex.1995) (“Assuming that a cause of action exists for loss of a child’s consortium which is derivative of the child’s claim for personal injuries ... there is no negligence cause of action arising out of the treatment or injury of a fetus.”); Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 489 (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting) (“I concur in that portion of the court’s opinion expressly recognizing a cause of action for loss of parental consortium, and implicitly a consortium action by a parent upon injury of a child....”). But today, ineanting that tort law cannot remedy every wrong, the Court announces that Texas does not recognize filial consortium claims for non-fatal injuries.
This [mantra], of course, is the hue and cry in many tort cases and in essence is no more than the fear that some cases will be decided badly. Undoubtedly, the system will not decide each case correctly in this field, just as it does not in any field, but here, as in other areas of tort law, [] it [is] better to adopt a rule which will enable courts to strive for justice in all cases rather than to rely upon one which will ensure injustice to many.
Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz. 309, 705 P.2d 1360, 1364 (App.1985) (recognizing filial consortium claim) (quoting Univ. of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294, 1298 (1983)). The rule the Court adopts, rather than providing parents of seriously injured children the same protections the Court has given to spouses and children, ensures that Texas parents will be denied recovery for a loss the Court has already concluded is real, significant, and worthy of compensation. See Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466 (recognizing parental consortium claim for non-fatal injuries). The error of this rule is compounded by the detour the Court must take from our precedent to arrive at its conclusion.
The Court asserts that tort law generally denies recourse to those who are harmed only indirectly by another’s negligence. Ill S.W.3d at 118. Acknowledging that the consortium claims this Court has recognized are an exception to this rule, the Court then attempts to dis*129tinguish the filial consortium claim at issue here. To do this, the Court asserts that claims for filial consortium are more akin to consortium claims by siblings and stepparents than spouses and children. See id. at 118 (“[W]hile we have recognized that spouses and children can recover loss of consortium, we have concluded that siblings and step-parents cannot.”) (citations omitted). By determining that filial consortium claims are analogous to sibling and step-parent consortium claims, the Court concludes that such claims are not actionable in Texas. See id. at 118; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 383 (Tex.1998) (denying siblings and stepparents consortium damages by adhering to the boundaries for loss of consortium established in Reagan). But we are not dealing with a sibling or step-parent here; Courtnie Williamson is the six-year-old daughter of Lainie and Casey Williamson. We have accorded special treatment to the “obvious and unquestionable” parent-child relationship for years, and for years have consistently rejected arguments that friends, step-parents, and siblings must, in principle, receive equivalent recognition. The Court’s regurgitation of that old issue only diverts attention from its assault on the principles underlying Reagan, 804 S.W.2d 463, Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d 549, Yowell, 703 S.W.2d 630, Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d 249, and Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d 665.
In defiance of our clear holdings in this area, the Court adopts the position that “the parent-child relationship is not reciprocal” and that “the child’s interest deserves greater protection because of the child’s singular emotional dependency on the parents.” Ill S.W.3d at 117. Not only does this constrained view of reciprocity contradict our previous writings, it is unpersuasive in light of the fact that mutual dependency has never been a basis for rejecting consortium claims in any of our prior cases brought by a member of the husband-wife or parent-child relationship.
In the past, we have explained that no logical reason exists for treating injuries to family members identified by the wrongful death statute differently depending on whether the injured party is the spouse, parent or child. This is true regardless of whether the resulting harm is serious, permanent bodily injury or death.2 Cf. Cav-nar, 696 S.W.2d at 551. Applying this principle in Reagan, we remarked that even adult children should be entitled to recover consortium damages when their parents suffer non-fatal injuries. 804 S.W.2d at 466. Because we expressly rejected the notion that consortium damages are available only if the plaintiff is dependent on the injured party, I am unpersuaded that the real reason for rejecting filial consortium claims is the lack of reciprocity in the parent-child relationship.
The Court’s conclusion pertaining to reciprocity is all the more surprising considering that our jurisprudence has settled on *130the proposition that “[t]he real loss sustained by a parent is not the loss of any financial benefit to be gained from the child, but is the loss of love, advice, comfort, companionship and society.” Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 251. We have unequivocally held that these losses are “real, direct, and personal losses” and “worthy of compensation.” Id. at 252. We have never conditioned recovery on dependency.
Even assuming for purposes of argument that this Court has now adopted the view that a parent can “fill in the void of his or her loss” by “seeking out new relationships,” consideration of this factor, as in Reagan, is but one of many facets of the relationship that juries weigh when making damage assessments. 111 S.W.3d at 118 (quoting Hay v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt, 145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d 939, 942 (1985)); see also Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466. In light of our prior holdings pertaining to the parent-child relationship, more persuasive authority is required to deny parents the right to recover filial consortium damages but continue to allow children, including adult children, to recover for the same injuries.
B. Damages Present Special Challenges to Factfinder
Similarly unpersuasive is the Court’s contention that we must reject filial consortium claims because the damage assessment is difficult. Loss of consortium is a common-law doctrine that we have consistently modified to adapt to changes in societal norms and values. Unlike other intangible values compensated by tort, consortium does not focus directly on a plaintiffs internal feelings. See, e.g., Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 467. Instead, recovery for consortium attaches value to a plaintiffs lost opportunity to derive benefit from another person. Id. Stated another way, consortium damages reflect the intangible, non-economic benefits inherent in the interaction associated with certain relationship, ie., spouses and parents and children. See Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 666.
This Court, and almost every court in the nation, recognizes that consortium damages are neither “too intangible [n]or conjectural to be measured in pecuniary terms by a jury.” Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667; Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 253 (dismissing argument that consortium damages are “too speculative to be given a monetary value”); see also cases cited supra note 1 and infra note 4. The Court speculates that “[t]he jury apparently concluded that while the child’s intangible losses would grow with time, her continuing impairment would have no substantial effect on the parent-child relationship in the future.” Ill S.W.3d at 119. The Court also notes that “[ajnother jury after hearing the same evidence might well have reached a very different conclusion.” Id. But is that not true in every jury case? And is that not an issue of factual or legal sufficiency — an inquiry wholly distinct from whether we should recognize the cause of action in the first instance?
It is true that consortium damages are difficult to assess. See, e.g., Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 253; Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667. They are intangible and therefore resist mathematical computation. Because the damages are ethereal, different juries may well award different (and sometimes excessive) amounts based on similar facts. But we have not, until today, let those difficulties overcome our larger interest in the fair adjudication of a valid claim, nor our confidence in our judiciary to fulfill their duty to review awards:
The fear of excessive verdicts is not a sufficient justification for denying recovery for loss of companionship. The judicial system has adequate safeguards to *131prevent recovery of damages based on sympathy or prejudice rather than fair and just compensation for the plaintiffs injuries.
Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 253; see also Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667. Thus, I do not understand how the Court can now, in good faith, contend that the difficulties of calculating damages in filial consortium cases warrant denying such claims altogether.
C. Filial Consortium Claims and Wrongful Death
As another justification for denying filial consortium claims, the Court maintains that when the child survives, there is no need to recognize a parent’s action to prevent the tortfeasor from escaping liability. Ill S.W.3d at 120. Thus, concludes the Court, it is not anomalous to recognize a parent’s intangible damages in death but not personal injury actions. Id. But see Miles, 967 S.W.2d at 388 (“it would be anomalous to recognize a cause of action for loss of consortium for a severe injury to a loved one when there is no recovery for the death of that same family member”). Applying this rationale consistently, however, would preclude consortium damages in all personal injury cases. But, as previously discussed, this Court has already recognized that both spouses and children may recover consortium damages in personal injury actions. Thus, I do not understand how denying the parents’ filial consortium claims here, while permitting recovery in other personal injury cases, does not create an aberration in Texas law.3
By focusing on the differences between wrongful death and personal injury cases, the Court attempts to make more palatable the fact that some plaintiffs may recover consortium damages while others in a similar position may not. While this conclusion itself is problematic, the Court misapprehends the true nature of the inconsistency created by its opinion; two of the three plaintiff groups identified in the wrongful death statute can recover consortium damages in personal injury actions but the third is walled off. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 71.004(b) (identifying persons who may recover under wrongful death statutes). The Court’s decision today also relegates parents to second-class status and reneges on the Court’s earlier *132promise to protect the familial relationship as a whole. See, e.g., Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466; Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 252.
D. Cost-Benefit Analysis
The Court correctly notes that, “[w]hen recognizing a new cause of action and the accompanying expansion of duty, we must perform something akin to a cost-benefit analysis to assure that this expansion of liability is justified.” Ill S.W.3d at 118. In performing its analysis, however, the Court proceeds as if we have never before considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of permitting consortium claims for injuries to the parent-child relationship. Ultimately, the Court concludes that we should reject filial consortium claims associated with a child’s injury because permitting parents a separate cause of action will farther uncertainty in the law and widen the divergence in recoveries among similarly situated victims. Id. And, asserts the Court, “it is not at all clear that this additional layer of liability will produce corresponding benefits of deterrence or fair compensation.” Id. But we have already given due consideration to these principles and concluded that consortium damages should be available for injuries to the parent-child relationship. See Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 464-66; Cavnar, 696 S.W.2d at 551; Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 253-54.
In balancing parents’ interests in compensation for the lost society and companionship of their injured children against tortfeasors’ interests in freedom from additional liability — giving appropriate consideration to the social consequences of each alternative — there are, of course, numerous influencing factors, included but not limited to: (i) whether recognizing filial consortium claims will yield a significant social benefit; (ii) the relative costs born by parents versus those born by the general public; (in) the nature of the asserted loss; (iv) the connection between the plaintiff and defendant; and (v) the ability to fairly assess damages. In Reagan, Cav-nar, and Sanchez, we considered similar factors and concluded that, on balance, they weigh in favor of permitting parents to recover consortium damages related to their children’s injuries, there is no need to analyze them again here. It should suffice to say that, as a matter of stare decisis, our conclusions in those cases govern today.
E. States Recognizing Child’s Rights Have Rejected Parent’s
Finally, the Court suggests that, because some courts that have recognized parental consortium claims have rejected filial consortium claims, so too should Texas. Ill S.W.3d at 120. But most courts recognize the inconsistency in permitting parental consortium claims but denying those for filial consortium. See, e.g., Gil-lispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Alaska 1992) (“We have already held that a wife has the right to sue for loss of ‘care, comfort, companionship and solace’ resulting from an injury to her husband, and that a child is entitled to loss of consortium damages when his parent is tor-tiously injured. To now hold that a parent is not entitled to recover loss of society for the death of his or her child would run counter to this line of precedent.”); Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Ky. 1997); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424, 434 (1981) (Levin, J., dissenting); Pence v. Fox, 248 Mont. 521, 813 P.2d 429, 433 (1991); Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (1993). More specifically, courts across the country widely acknowledge that, within each category of parental or filial consortium, permitting recovery for death but not serious injury creates a legal anomaly. See, e.g., Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc., 335 N.W.2d *133at 149; Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 821; Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 426; Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1057; Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Okla.1990). Unsurprisingly, then, most of the states that recognize the child’s consortium claim also recognize parents’ reciprocal right to recover consortium damages.4 Underlying each of these decisions is the notion that the parent-child relationship is reciprocal, despite the fact that each party to the relationship receives different benefits from the other.
Ill
Conclusion
In the past, this Court has recognized consortium claims for the injury or death of a spouse, the injury or death of a parent, and the death of a child. We have consistently limited consortium claims — as has the Wrongful Death Act — to the husband-wife and parent-child relationships. Today, however, the Court concludes that “no compelling social policy impels us to recognize a parent’s right to damages for the loss of filial consortium” associated with a child’s injury. Ill S.W.3d at 120. By failing to recognize parents’ right to recover damages for injuries tortiously inflicted upon their children, the Court creates an incongruence between its stated policy of protecting the parent-child relationship and the law.
When we decided Reagan v. Vaughn in 1990, we crossed a Rubicon. We committed ourselves .to the proposition that the parent-child relationship — not just the child-parent relationship — is one deserving of “special protection.” Because the Court cannot show that Reagan has become unworkable or that the law has changed so significantly that the consortium doctrine has somehow become antiquated or obsolete, it should be constrained by principles of stare decisis from reversing course and disturbing the settled expectations it has promoted. The Court evades Reagan only by resort to immaterial distinctions between a parent’s loss of companionship resulting from death and a similar loss of companionship resulting from a severe, permanent, and disabling injury.
The Court’s decision marks a significant departure from our consortium precedent, for which the Court provides no adequate justification. I would affirm the court of appeals’ judgment in all respects. Because the Court does otherwise, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the Court’s opinion.

. When we decided Reagan, fewer than ten states recognized a child’s claim for loss of consortium. See Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 465 n. 3 (Tex.1990). Now, twenty-one states recognize, either judicially or by statute, a child’s loss of parental consortium claim. See Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987); Villareal v. Dep’t of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 774 P.2d 213 (1989); Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois C.G.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983); Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318 (Ky.1997); Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980); Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981); Pence v. Fox, 248 Mont. 521, 813 P.2d 429 (1991); Rolf v. Tri State Motor Transit Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 380, 745 N.E.2d 424 (2001); Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131 (Okla.1990); Hancock v. Chattanooga Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 54 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn.2001); Hay v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d 939 (1985); Belcher v. Goins, 184 W.Va. 395, 400 S.E.2d 830 (1990); Theama v. Kenosha, 117 Wis.2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513 (1984); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo.1990); see also Fla. Stat. Ann § 768.0414; Haw.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 663-3; Idaho code § 5-310; La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 2315; Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 18-A, § 2-804(b); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-41; Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.010.

. As the Arizona Supreme Court has recognized, death is often "separated from severe injury by mere fortuity; and it would be anomalous to distinguish between the two when the quality of consortium is negatively affected by both.” Frank v. Superior Court of Ariz., 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955, 957 (1986). The court further explained:
Perhaps the loss of companionship and society experienced by the parents of a child permanently and severely injured ... is in some ways even greater than that suffered by parents of a deceased child. Not only has the normal family relationship been destroyed, as when a child dies, but the parent also is confronted with his loss each time he is with his child and experiences again the child’s diminished capacity to give comfort, society, and companionship.
Id. at 958 (quoting Simpson, The Parental Claim for Loss of Society and Companionship Resulting From the Negligent Injury of a Child: A Proposal for Arizona, 1980 Ariz. St. LJ. 909, 923 (1980)).

. To the extent that the Court is persuaded by reasoning from other courts, there is ample precedent to demonstrate that today’s opinion, in fact, bucks the national trend. See, e.g., Reben v. Ely, 146 Ariz. 309, 705 P.2d 1360, 1364-65 (App.1985) ("The public policy governing a parent’s claim for a child’s death is analogous to the policy controlling the parent’s derivative claim for a child’s injury.”) (quoting Norvell v. Cuyahoga County Hosp., 11 Ohio App.3d 70, 463 N.E.2d 111, 115 (1983)); Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 321 ("there is no legal distinction between the claim of a parent for loss of a child’s consortium from the claim of a child for the loss of a parent’s consortium”); Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 426 ("the real anomaly is to allow a child’s recovery for the loss of a parent’s society and companionship when the loss attends to the parent’s death but to deny such recovery when the loss attends the parent’s injury’’); Pence, 813 P.2d at 433 ("The claim for loss of parental consortium ... is not sufficiently distinguishable from either spousal consortium claims in injury cases or children’s consortium claims in death cases to warrant nonrecognition.”) (quoting Hibpshman, 734 P.2d at 994); Gallimore v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (1993) (”[I]n the present day, it would be incongruous to deny parents recovery for loss of the society and companionship of a seriously injured child while recognizing that such losses are compensable in cases involving death.”); Hook, 804 P.2d at 1137 ("When a parent dies in Oklahoma, it would be an anomaly indeed if a child were allowed recovery for the loss of a parent's society and companionship when the loss attends the parent’s death, but denied recovery when the equivalent loss attends the parent's permanent injury.”).

. Currently, nineteen states recognize a parent’s right to recover, either judicially or by statute, for loss of a child's consortium. See Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992); Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986); United States v. Dempsey, 635 So.2d 961 (Fla.1994); Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566 (1989); Dep’t of Educ. v. Blevins, 707 S.W.2d 782 (Ky.1986); Vincent v. Morgan’s L. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917); Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn.1990); Pence, 248 Mont. 521, 813 P.2d 429; First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, 429 N.W.2d 5 (N.D.1988); Gallimore, 67 Ohio St.3d 244, 617 N.E.2d 1052; Gaither v. City of Tulsa, 664 P.2d 1026 (Okla.1983); Hancock, 54 S.W.3d 234; Belcher, 184 W.Va. 395, 400 S.E.2d 830; Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis.2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975); see also Haw.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 663-3; Idaho code § 5-310; Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.206; La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 2315; Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 231, § 85X; R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-41; Wash. Rev.Code § 4.24.010. Illinois, Minnesota, and North Dakota recognize the parent’s claim but not the child's. See supra, note 4. Conversely, Michigan, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming recognize the child’s claim but not the parent’s. See supra, note 1.