Court Opinion

ID: 9912812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 01:00:35.524391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:55.779350
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30238     Document: 00517011843         Page: 1     Date Filed: 12/22/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                           FILED
                                                               December 22, 2023
                                 No. 22-30238
                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Robert Brumfield, III; Jeremy Esteves

                                          Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:17-CR-201-5
                  ______________________________

   Before Clement, Elrod, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:
          This appeal arises from a 2013 armed robbery of a Loomis armored
   truck in New Orleans. One Loomis truck guard, Hector Trochez, was shot
   and killed during the attack. In total, six people were indicted in connection
   with the robbery and attendant conspiracy. A jury convicted Robert
   Brumfield III and his cousin Jeremy Esteves for their roles in the crime.
          Before sentencing, new evidence emerged regarding the credibility of
   two Government witnesses. Esteves and Brumfield moved for a new trial,
   alleging that the Government had suppressed the evidence in violation of
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                                          No. 22-30238

   Brady v. Maryland 1 and Giglio v. United States.2 The district court denied the
   motion.
          On appeal, Brumfield and Esteves challenge the district court’s denial
   of their motion, contending that the evidence was material impeachment
   evidence. Brumfield separately challenges the denial on the ground that the
   Government failed to correct false testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois.3
   He also appeals his sentence.
          In short, Brumfield is not entitled to a new trial because the new
   evidence is not material in light of the entire trial record; his Napue claim fails
   because he has not shown that the Government knowingly presented
   materially false testimony; and his sentence was procedurally and
   substantively reasonable. But we conclude that the new evidence was
   material as to Esteves, so the district court must consider in the first instance
   whether he has satisfied all the elements of his Brady claim.
          We AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND
   to the district court for further consideration of Esteves’s Brady claim.
                                               I
          In December 2013, a Chevy Tahoe with heavily tinted windows pulled
   up in front of a Chase Bank as an armored Loomis truck was making a
   delivery. Three armed men stepped out. Loomis guard Anjene Treaudo sat
   in the truck’s driver’s seat while a second guard, Hector Trochez, unloaded
   the currency. The three men shot at the truck and Trochez, killing him. The
   men then stole around $260,000 from the truck and sped off in the Tahoe. A

          _____________________
          1
              373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
          2
              405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
          3
              360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).

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   brave eyewitness followed them. He saw two men exit the Tahoe and get into
   a second getaway car—a green Honda. The Tahoe, which was stolen a week
   before the robbery, was found abandoned nearby, its engine still running.
          After a years-long investigation, police traced the robbery to Lilbear
   George, Curtis Johnson, Jr., Chukwudi Ofomata, Esteves, and Brumfield. All
   five were charged with conspiracy and other charges related to the robbery
   and Trochez’s murder. Brumfield and Esteves were charged with three
   counts: (1) conspiracy to obstruct commerce by robbery, in violation of 18
   U.S.C. § 1951(a); (2) obstruction of commerce by robbery, in violation of 18
   U.S.C. § 1951(a); and (3) using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging
   firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence, causing death, in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and (j)(1).
          Brumfield and Esteves moved to sever their cases from the other
   defendants who faced the death penalty. The district court granted the
   motions, and Brumfield and Esteves continued to trial.
          Two days into trial, Brumfield and Esteves learned that the
   Government had failed to disclose two pieces of evidence: (1) phone
   recordings about the Loomis robbery between an FBI informant and
   cooperating witness Jamell Hurst; and (2) the FBI’s informant file on Hurst,
   which contained an agreement between Assistant United States Attorney
   (AUSA) McMahon and the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office not to
   extradite Hurst in connection with a 2013 aggravated burglary warrant.
          Because Hurst’s testimony is central to Brumfield’s and Esteves’s
   Brady claim, we briefly recount his testimony. Hurst was one of the
   Government’s main witnesses. He had been an FBI informant since at least
   2014. At trial, Hurst implicated both Brumfield and Esteves in the robbery
   and conspiracy. As to Brumfield’s involvement, Hurst testified that
   Brumfield told him he was staking out an armored truck in preparation for a

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   robbery and that Brumfield commented that the robbery would be easy
   because the man in the truck was “big, fat, and clumsy.” Hurst also said that
   he spoke with George, who told him Brumfield “was supposed to be involved
   in the robbery, but that he didn’t have the character to pull it off and so he
   was replaced.” Esteves, too, told Hurst that Brumfield was supposed to
   participate in the robbery, but the other participants were concerned he
   would “freeze up.”
          As to Esteves’s involvement, Hurst testified that Esteves confessed
   that he, George, Ofomata, and Johnson committed the robbery and that
   Esteves was a getaway driver. Hurst told an FBI agent that in May 2014,
   Esteves drove him to Esteves’s mother’s home and showed him money in a
   shoebox. The FBI later found approximately $20,000, some of which was in
   a shoebox in the home.
          As to the benefits Hurst received for testifying, Hurst testified that the
   government told him it would inform the Baton Rouge district attorney or
   judge overseeing his pending sexual battery charges that he was cooperating
   with the Loomis investigation. He also testified that the FBI gave him $1,200
   to help buy a new phone and move back to New Orleans and that he was
   interested in the $50,000 reward for the information he provided.
          Brumfield and Esteves moved for a mistrial based on the newly
   disclosed evidence. The district court continued trial to allow the defendants
   to review the evidence. It heard argument and orally denied the motions,
   holding that Brumfield and Esteves were not prejudiced by the
   Government’s failure to disclose the evidence because they had a
   continuance to review the evidence before cross-examining Hurst.
          The jury convicted Esteves on all three counts. But it convicted
   Brumfield only of conspiracy to commit the robbery.

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           After the verdict but before sentencing, Ofomata’s counsel disclosed
   to Brumfield’s and Esteves’s counsel additional evidence about benefits that
   Hurst and another Government witness, Lydell Hinton, obtained for
   cooperating with the Government. Brumfield and Esteves moved for a new
   trial, arguing that the Government violated Brady and Giglio. The district
   court denied the motion, holding that the new evidence was immaterial in
   light of the entire trial record.
           The same district judge sentenced all five defendants. Brumfield filed
   ten objections to his presentence investigation report (PSR). The
   Government opposed all of them. Most relevant here, Brumfield objected to
   (1) the district court’s finding that he was the second getaway driver; (2) its
   rejection of the downward adjustment for being a minor participant; and
   (3) its application of the murder cross-reference for Trochez’s death. The
   district court ruled on each objection in a written order, overruling the three
   objections relevant to this appeal.4 The court sentenced Brumfield to 240
   months’ imprisonment—the statutory maximum. Esteves received 600
   months’ imprisonment—120 months for Counts 1 and 2, and 600 months for
   Count 3, to be served concurrently. He does not appeal his sentence.
           Brumfield and Esteves timely appealed the district court’s denial of
   their motions for a new trial. Brumfield also challenges his sentence.
                                               II
           Brumfield and Esteves both challenge the district court’s denial of
   their motion for a new trial. Brumfield raises two additional arguments. First,
   he argues that the Government violated his due process rights by failing to
   correct allegedly false witness testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois.
           _____________________
           4
              The district court sustained three of Brumfield’s objections relating to certain
   factual information in the PSR and overruled the other seven objections.

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   Second, he argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
   unreasonable. We address the motions for a new trial first.
                                                A
           We first address whether the Government suppressed material
   impeachment evidence in violation of Brady, entitling Brumfield and Esteves
   to a new trial. “We review motions for a new trial based on an alleged Brady
   violation de novo, ‘while acknowledging that we must proceed with deference
   to the factual findings underlying the district court’s decision.’”5
           The district court denied the motions for a new trial because the
   evidence was immaterial in light of the entire trial record. We agree as to
   Brumfield, but not as to Esteves.6
           “To prevail on a Brady claim, ‘a defendant must show: (1) the
   evidence at issue was favorable to the accused, either because it was
   exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the
   prosecution; and (3) the evidence was material.’”7 For evidence to be
   material, there must be “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
   disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

           _____________________
           5
             United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 345 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v.
   Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 479 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Severns, 559 F.3d 274, 278
   (5th Cir. 2009).
           6
            The district court doubted that Brumfield and Esteves could establish that the
   Government suppressed evidence of benefits or promises made to Hurst. Assuming that
   they could produce sufficient evidence of suppression, the district court concluded that
   such evidence would be favorable. But the court held that because the evidence was
   immaterial, their claim would fail even if the first two elements of their Brady claim had
   been met.
           7
            United States v. Swenson, 894 F.3d 677, 683 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States
   v. Dvorin, 817 F.3d 438, 450 (5th Cir. 2016)); see also Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154–55 (applying
   Brady to impeachment evidence).

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   different.”8 “A ‘reasonable probability’ is established when the failure to
   disclose the suppressed evidence ‘could reasonably be taken to put the whole
   case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’” 9
          Brumfield and Esteves contend that the Government suppressed the
   following evidence of Hurst’s benefits for cooperating10:

          • Recordings of seven phone calls from Hurst to his mom
            while he was in jail, in which he asked his mom to call the
            FBI. Hurst said that FBI Special Agent Rayes told him that
            he could get his charges dismissed and that Rayes and
            AUSA McMahon told him they could get him out of
            anything but murder. Hurst’s mom reported to Hurst that
            Special Agent Elmer was working with the district attorney
            to get him out.
          • A New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) incident
            report regarding Hurst’s 2013 aggravated burglary charge
            that states that the victim was “one hundred percent sure”
            that Hurst was the perpetrator. Hurst testified that the
            charges were dismissed because the witness mistakenly
            picked him in the photo lineup.
          • A Brazoria County, Texas, investigation report showing
            that Hurst (1) was arrested for possessing 37 stolen credit
            cards and controlled substances and (2) was later indicted
            for fraudulently possessing only two credit cards. At trial,
            Hurst testified only to the latter.
          • A Baton Rouge Police Department incident report
            regarding Hurst’s 2014 arrest for battery, which stated that
            an officer discovered that Hurst had an outstanding warrant
          _____________________
          8
              United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
          9
             United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 247 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kyles v.
   Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).
          10
               The defendants do not challenge the evidence concerning Hinton’s benefits.

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                 for burglary issued by the NOPD. The report states that
                 the officer was initially advised that the NOPD wanted
                 Hurst booked, but that the officer was then advised by the
                 NOPD to release Hurst because he was an informant.
          • A Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
            file on Hurst, which states that Hurst had an active warrant
            issued by Texas and that “Texas indicated that they were
            coming to get [Hurst].” Another entry states that Special
            Agent Elmer called on the same date that the Texas arrest
            warrant was issued and asked to speak with Hurst’s
            supervising probation officer. Another earlier entry notes
            that Special Agent Elmer called in October 2014 seeking
            Hurst’s contact information and stating that he was trying
            to retrieve “some type of FBI issued equipment.”11
          Brumfield and Esteves argue that Hurst was the only witness who
   implicated them in the crimes, so the above impeachment evidence was
   critical to attacking his credibility.
          We have explained that “when the undisclosed evidence is merely
   cumulative of other evidence in the record,” such as “when it merely
   furnishes an additional basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility
   has already been shown to be questionable,” it is not material.12 Nor is
   suppressed evidence material “when the testimony of the witness who might
   have been impeached by the undisclosed evidence is strongly corroborated
   by additional evidence supporting a guilty verdict.”13 Thus, we must consider
   whether the new evidence was cumulative of the evidence heard at trial and

          _____________________
          11
             Brumfield and Esteves also argued below that the Government suppressed
   evidence concerning Hurst’s mental health, but they do not press that issue on appeal.
          12
               Sipe, 388 F.3d at 478, 489 (cleaned up).
          13
               Id. at 478.

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   whether Hurst’s testimony was strongly corroborated by additional evidence
   supporting the verdicts.
           Hurst was thoroughly impeached at trial, but this doesn’t end our
   inquiry because we agree with the district court that “[t]here is a significant
   difference in degree and kind between the benefits Hurst testified about at
   trial” and the benefits revealed by the undisclosed evidence. Hurst admitted
   that he had initially lied to the FBI about several details about the robbery.
   The jury heard about his criminal history, including his arrest for credit card
   fraud and his cooperation with the Secret Service on that charge, and that at
   one point, he had an open warrant for aggravated burglary. The jury also
   heard that Hurst was currently in jail for simple burglary, criminal damage,
   home invasion, aggravated assault, sexual battery of a six-year-old, and
   indecent behavior with a juvenile.
           As to the benefits Hurst received from cooperating with the
   Government, defense counsel cross-examined Hurst on the evidence that led
   to the motion for a mistrial, which revealed that Hurst was an FBI informant
   and that the NOPD decided not to extradite Hurst on his outstanding
   aggravated battery warrant.14 The jury also heard that Hurst was motivated
   to testify because (1) he hoped the prosecution would talk to the district
   attorney or judge in Baton Rouge about his cooperation, and (2) he was
   interested in receiving the $50,000 reward.

           _____________________
           14
             Special Agent Elmer testified that he did not recall whether or not Hurst had an
   open warrant. But when presented with the FBI form, Elmer testified that he must have
   been aware of it, and if the FBI was able to clear Hurst, he speculated that they may have
   worked with the district attorney. But defense counsel did not press Special Agent Elmer
   on the extradition agreement and whether Special Agent Elmer did in fact intercede on
   Hurst’s behalf.

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           Hurst testified that the Government did not intervene on his behalf
   regarding his aggravated burglary warrant, but the jury did not hear about the
   evidence suggesting (1) that Hurst received additional promises from the
   Government or (2) that the Government may have fulfilled those promises.
   As to the additional promises, the phone call recordings indicate that an FBI
   agent promised to get Hurst out of any charge except murder. The recordings
   and the reports also suggest that the Government may have made good on
   that promise. But whether Hurst actually received help from the
   Government is unclear. The district court noted that the evidence did not
   “conclusively establish that the government assisted Hurst in the past, or
   promised to assist him in the future,” and the Government denied
   intervening in Hurst’s other charges. Even so, the Government’s promise for
   leniency in exchange for Hurst’s testimony would be “more powerful”
   impeachment evidence than the mere possibility of a favorable outcome.15 We
   therefore conclude that the new evidence was not cumulative of the other
   impeachment evidence.
           We next turn to whether Hurst’s testimony was “strongly
   corroborated” by other evidence that supports the guilty verdicts.16 We must
   decide whether there is a reasonable probability that, if the allegedly
   suppressed evidence had been disclosed, the result would have been
   different. Our inquiry “is not a sufficiency of the evidence test,” however.17

           _____________________
           15
                See Dvorin, 817 F.3d at 451.
           16
             See Sipe, 388 F.3d at 478; see also Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 396 (5th Cir.
   2010) (“The materiality of Brady material depends almost entirely on the value of the
   evidence relative to the other evidence mustered by the state.”).
           17
             LaCaze v. Warden, 645 F.3d 728, 737 (5th Cir. 2011); Sipe, 388 F.3d at 489
   (“[T]he materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting
   the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is

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   Instead, we must ask whether the evidence “could reasonably be taken to put
   the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
   verdict.”18 Generally, we have found that undisclosed impeachment
   evidence is material where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was
   “overwhelming.”19 Although there is overwhelming evidence against
   Brumfield, who was convicted only of conspiracy, we cannot say the same for
   Esteves, who was convicted on all three charges.
           Start with the evidence against Brumfield. Hurst testified that
   Brumfield told him that the group was staking out the armored truck and that
   the robbery would be easy because the guard “was big, fat, and clumsy.” This
   evidence was strongly corroborated by other evidence at trial. 20 Hinton
   placed Brumfield squarely within the conspiracy. Hinton owned a rap studio
   where Brumfield and the other conspirators frequented to “get off the street,
   if the police was hot, [to] go in there and take a chill pill.” Hinton testified
   that, after the robbery, Brumfield showed up late to a recording session after
   being questioned by the FBI about the robbery. Brumfield told Hinton that
   he wanted to rap about the FBI questioning him about his involvement.
   Although Hinton counseled against it, he heard that Brumfield later rapped
   about it anyway, but Hinton said he never heard the recording. Hinton also

           _____________________
   sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions.” (alteration in original) (quoting Strickler v.
   Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999))).
           18
                LaCaze, 645 F.3d at 736.
           19
            See, e.g., Perry, 35 F.4th at 347; United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 696 (5th Cir.
   2010); United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 897 (5th Cir. 1997).
           20
              See LaCaze, 645 F.3d at 736 (“A Brady violation is more likely to occur when the
   impeaching evidence would seriously undermine the testimony of a key witness on an
   essential issue or there is no strong corroboration.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted)).

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   testified that Brumfield admitted that he was “waiting” in “a green Honda”
   to be the getaway driver after the robbery.
          Cedric Wade, who grew up with Esteves and was close friends with
   Ofomata and Brumfield, was a critical witness. He testified that Brumfield
   was a well-known, close associate of the other co-conspirators, known as “the
   circle.” Ofomata’s ex-girlfriend testified that Brumfield and Ofomata were
   so close they had “a little brother/big brother type of relationship.” Phone
   records linked Brumfield to a Chase Bank employee, Thierry King,21 and
   showed that Brumfield and Esteves talked the morning of the robbery.
   Shortly after the robbery, the phone associated with Brumfield used a cell
   phone tower that was near both the Chase Bank and Adams Street, where the
   Tahoe was located after the robbery.
          Brumfield primarily relies on two cases in support of his argument that
   the new evidence is material. The first is Smith v. Cain.22 There, the
   prosecution failed to turn over a detective’s notes that stated that the only
   eyewitness expressed doubt about whether he saw the perpetrator’s face. 23
   At trial, the witness had testified that he had “no doubt” about the
   defendant’s identity.24 The Supreme Court held that the evidence was
   material because the detective’s notes directly contradicted the witness’s
   testimony, which “was the only evidence linking [the defendant] to the
   crime.”25 Here, the new evidence is not as critical. To be sure, the new
   evidence shows that the benefits Hurst received were greater than what he

          _____________________
          21
               King was a person of interest in the robbery, but she was not arrested or charged.
          22
               565 U.S. 73 (2012).
          23
               Id. at 74, 76.
          24
               Id. at 76 (cleaned up).
          25
               Id.

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   testified to. But as we explained above, he was impeached on other grounds,
   his testimony wasn’t the only evidence connecting Brumfield to the
   conspiracy, and his testimony was corroborated.
           The second is Wearry v. Cain.26 There, the prosecution withheld
   evidence of two witnesses’ motives to testify. The prosecution failed to
   disclose that (1) the first witness had a personal vendetta against the
   defendant and wanted to ensure the defendant “gets the needle cause he
   jacked [him] over,”27 and (2) the second witness approached the prosecution
   twice, offering to testify in exchange for a deal.28 This contradicted the
   second witness’s testimony at trial that his only motive for testifying was out
   of love for his sister, who was friends with the victim’s sister, a narrative the
   prosecution emphasized.29 The Supreme Court held that both pieces of
   evidence were material. Here, the contrast between Hurst’s testimony and
   his motives as revealed by the new evidence is less stark. At trial, Hurst
   admitted that he asked the Government for help. As explained above, the new
   evidence just shows that there may have been additional benefits.30 And the
   evidence did not reveal that Hurst had an undisclosed vendetta against
   Brumfield.
           Next consider the evidence against Esteves. Hurst also testified that
   Esteves told him that the group staked out the robbery, but most importantly,

           _____________________
           26
                577 U.S. 385 (2016).
           27
                Id. at 389.
           28
                Id. at 390.
           29
                Id. at 394.
           30
             Cf. LaCaze, 645 F.3d at 738 (holding that the prosecutor’s undisclosed promise
   to a witness that the witness’s son would not be prosecuted put the whole case in a
   “different light” where the witness said he likely would not have testified but for the
   promise and that witness was the only witness testifying to a critical element of the crime).

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   unlike his testimony about Brumfield, Hurst testified to Esteves’s specific
   role in the robbery. He said that Esteves told him that he drove the Tahoe
   and “never got out of the car.” Hurst also testified that George, too, told him
   that Esteves was the driver. Finally, Hurst testified that Esteves took him to
   Esteves’s mother’s house and showed him a stack of money in a shoebox but
   that Esteves didn’t say where the money came from.
          While some of Hurst’s testimony was corroborated, we cannot say
   that it was strongly corroborated. Wade testified that Esteves was also part of
   “the circle.” Wade said that on the morning of the robbery, Ofomata,
   Johnson, George, and Esteves arrived at his house to pick up firearms that
   Ofomata had dropped off the night before. According to Wade, Ofomata
   grabbed the bag, checked its contents, and on the way out, told Wade,
   “Watch the news. We going to be straight.” Wade testified that this meant
   that “something is about to happen to where he’s about to get some money.”
   Wade then followed Ofomata out of the house and watched him put the duffle
   bag into the back of a dark gray Tahoe and get in. Wade testified that he could
   see the Tahoe’s other passengers: Esteves was in the driver’s seat, George
   was in the passenger seat, and Johnson was in the backseat behind George.
   But he allegedly saw Esteves through the Tahoe’s windows that were so
   “heavily tinted” that “the normal person” would not have been able see
   through them. Historical cell site data showed that George’s phone made
   calls using cell towers near Wade’s residence and then near the Chase Bank
   on the day of the robbery, but the records don’t reveal whether Esteves was
   near the robbery like Brumfield was.
          Eyewitness accounts and the Chase Bank’s surveillance footage
   generally corroborates Wade’s testimony about the Tahoe’s passengers, but
   there is no specific testimony about the Tahoe’s driver. Treaudo, the other
   Loomis guard, witnessed the robbery from inside the Loomis truck and
   testified that three men exited the vehicle. She said two men exited from the

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                                       No. 22-30238

   passenger side of the vehicle, but she did not remember whether the third
   came from the driver’s seat. The other eyewitness, who watched the robbery
   from his car, testified that he saw two men standing on the side of the Tahoe,
   leaning over the door, and shooting at someone. He also saw a third man
   running to get into the back seat immediately before the robbers made their
   getaway.
          Wade testified that later that day, Ofomata returned to Wade’s
   residence and put money inside an air conditioning unit. Wade also testified
   that Esteves told him that he was concerned that Brumfield was snitching to
   the FBI about the robbery. King also had Esteves’s number in her phone;
   Esteves’s number was in her top ten most contacted numbers. And finally, a
   search warrant of Esteves’s mother’s house revealed $20,000, some of it in
   shoeboxes. Although the information about the money came from Hurst,
   Special Agent Elmer testified to a jail call he listened to between Esteves and
   his girlfriend at the time, in which Esteves told her that he had money in
   shoeboxes in his closet. But Loomis does not tally money by serial number,
   so the only way for the Government to connect the money to the robbery is
   by the bills’ denomination. And there was evidence suggesting that the
   money may have been from Esteves’s employer, who paid him exclusively in
   cash. Much of this evidence implicates Ofomata and the other robbers, rather
   than Esteves.31

          _____________________
          31
            See Wearry, 577 U.S. at 393 (dismissing evidence in a Brady analysis that only
   “suggest[ed], at most, that someone in [the defendant’s] group of friends may have
   committed the crime”).

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                                             No. 22-30238

           Although a close question, we conclude that Esteves has shown that
   “the new evidence is sufficient to ‘undermine confidence in the verdict’”
   and is thus material.32
           In sum, we conclude that based on the evidence presented at trial, the
   evidence was immaterial as to Brumfield, but not as to Esteves. Esteves,
   however, has not satisfied all elements of his Brady claim to warrant a new
   trial. The district court did not consider whether Government suppressed the
   new evidence, so we remand to the district court to consider this prong in the
   first instance.
                                                   B
           We next consider Brumfield’s Napue claim. Although we ordinarily
   review an order denying a new trial under Napue for abuse of discretion,33
   Brumfield raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Brumfield argues that
   he preserved his Napue claim because, in his motion for a new trial, he
   asserted that Hurst falsely testified that he didn’t expect any benefit for
   testifying and that AUSA McMahon knew that wasn’t true. But Brumfield
   discussed the allegedly false statements only in the context of his Brady claim.
   Thus, we review this issue for plain error.34
           To establish a Napue violation, Brumfield must prove: “(1) [the
   witness] testified falsely; (2) the government knew the testimony was false;

           _____________________
           32
                Id. at 392 (quoting Smith, 565 U.S. at 75).
           33
              United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 838 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing United States
   v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 2004)).
           34
             United States v. Oti, 872 F.3d 678, 690, 696 n.13 (5th Cir. 2017). “[E]ven if we
   were to determine that [Brumfield] preserved his challenge under Napue and were to
   review his argument under an abuse of discretion standard of review, we would conclude
   that he does not prevail under that standard.” Id. at 696 n.13.

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                                             No. 22-30238

   and (3) the testimony was material.”35 “Even assuming that the prosecution
   presented (or failed to correct) false testimony, the critical factor is
   materiality.”36 “The Supreme Court has ‘defined materiality in terms of a
   “reasonable probability” of a different outcome,’ which ‘results when
   nondisclosure places the case in a different light so as to undermine
   confidence in the verdict.’”37
           Brumfield asserts that the prosecution failed to correct allegedly false
   testimony three times. As with Brumfield’s Brady claim, the evidence
   concerns Hurst’s benefits from testifying—namely, his 2013 warrant for
   aggravated burglary.
           First, Brumfield argues that Special Agent Elmer falsely testified on
   cross-examination that Hurst “[d]id not have an outstanding warrant” for
   aggravated burglary when the FBI form registering Hurst as an informant
   indicated he did in fact have an outstanding warrant. Second, Brumfield
   argues that Hurst falsely testified that his burglary warrant was not pursued
   because the victim mistook him as the perpetrator when the NOPD incident
   report stated that the victim identified Hurst with “one hundred percent”
   certainty. And finally, Brumfield says that Special Agent Elmer and Hurst
   falsely testified that the FBI did not intervene on Hurst’s behalf after the
   burglary warrant was issued when the new evidence revealed that the New

           _____________________
           35
              United States v. Mason, 293 F.3d 826, 828 (5th Cir. 2002). Brumfield argues that
   the Government violates Napue if it knew or should have known that a witness’s testimony
   was false. In support of this standard, Brumfield cites to one unpublished opinion, in which
   this court noted that it has granted a new trial when the government suppressed evidence
   it should have known was false. See United States v. Jena, 590 F. App’x 324, 327 (5th Cir.
   2014). But we need not address this argument because he has not proven that the testimony
   presented was materially false.
           36
                Stanford, 823 F.3d at 839.
           37
                Id. (citation omitted) (quoting O’Keefe, 128 F.3d at 894).

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                                          No. 22-30238

   Orleans district attorney’s office asked that Hurst not be booked because he
   was an informant.
           As we explained in the Brady analysis, the new evidence regarding
   Hurst’s warrant—and the testimony here—is immaterial in light of the
   entire record. The jury heard testimony about Hurst’s warrant, including the
   new evidence that precipitated the motion for a mistrial, and knew that New
   Orleans chose not to book Hurst on the warrant. What’s more, even
   assuming Elmer’s testimony was false, and not a result of mistake or faulty
   memory,38 defense counsel elicited the testimony during cross-examination.
   We have held that “when the defense elicits the alleged perjury on cross-
   examination, no material falsehood has occurred because the government has
   not itself knowingly presented false testimony.”39
           Thus, Brumfield has failed to demonstrate a Napue violation.
                                                C
           Finally, we consider Brumfield’s challenge to the legality of his
   sentence. In reviewing Brumfield’s sentence, we are “limited to determining
   whether [it is] ‘reasonable.’”40 Our review is bifurcated.41 “First, [we] must

           _____________________
           38
              Special Agent Elmer testified that he thought the form was incorrect, could not
   recall anything about the warrant, and believed there was no warrant. Cf. Stanford, 823 F.3d
   at 841 (“In sum, although the falsehoods that Stanford alleges are based on apparent
   evidentiary inconsistencies, it is questionable whether one could describe the
   inconsistencies as false, let alone material.”).
           39
             O’Keefe, 128 F.3d at 894; see also United States v. Fields, 761 F.3d 443, 477 (5th
   Cir. 2014) (“Here, the falsehood also occurred during cross-examination. As a result, the
   testimony is not material.”).
           40
              United States v. Rhine, 637 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gall v. United
   States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007)).
           41
              United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519, 524–25 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall, 552
   U.S. at 51).

                                                18
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                                            No. 22-30238

   ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error.”42
   If there is no procedural error, we review the sentence’s substantive
   reasonableness for abuse of discretion.43
                                                   1
           First,       procedural      reasonableness.        Procedural      reasonableness
   “requires that the district court calculate the Guidelines range, consider the
   [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, and explain the sentencing decision.”44 When,
   as here, the sentencing objections are preserved, we review “the district
   court’s interpretation or application of the sentencing guidelines de novo, and
   its factual findings for clear error.”45 “A finding of fact is not clearly
   erroneous ‘[a]s long as it is plausible in light of the record read as a whole.’”46
           Brumfield argues that the district court made four procedural errors
   in calculating his sentence: (1) finding that he was the second getaway driver
   without supporting evidence; (2) applying the murder cross-reference for
   Trochez’s death, even though his death was not reasonably foreseeable;
   (3) failing to apply the minor-participant downward variance when Brumfield
   was only peripheral to the crime; and (4) using acquitted conduct to enhance
   his sentence. We address each in turn.

           _____________________
           42
                Id. at 525.
           43
                Id.
           44
             Rhine, 637 F.3d at 528 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51); United States v. Douglas,
   957 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[A] district court commits ‘significant procedural
   error’ when it ‘fail[s] to calculate (or improperly calculate[es]) the Guidelines range.’”
   (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51)).
           45
                United States v. Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 651 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
           46
               United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2005) (alteration in
   original) (quoting United States v. Morris, 46 F.3d 410, 419 (5th Cir. 1995)).

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                                           No. 22-30238

                                                  a
          Brumfield offers two reasons why the district court erred in finding he
   was the second getaway driver. First, he argues that the district court ignored
   his factual arguments in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal
   Procedure 32(i)(3)(B). And second, he argues that this finding was not
   supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
          Under Rule 32, the district court “must—for any disputed portion of
   the presentence report . . .—rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is
   unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because
   the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.”47 We have “rejected
   the proposition that a court must make a catechismic regurgitation of each
   fact determined.”48 Rather, we have explained that “the district court [may]
   make implicit findings by adopting the PSR.”49 Rule 32 is satisfied if “the
   findings in the PSR are so clear that the reviewing court is not left to ‘second-
   guess’ the basis for the sentencing decision.”50
          Here, the district court issued a detailed written order explaining the
   reasons for overruling each of the challenged objections. It explained the
   specific evidence that supported the finding that Brumfield was the getaway
   driver, including testimony from Hinton and Hurst, factual basis statements
   from George and Ofomata, and the fact that the PSR was corroborated by
   witness testimony, cell phone records, and statements by Brumfield’s
   coconspirators.

          _____________________
          47
               Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).
          48
             United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 840 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted).
          49
               Id.
          50
               Id. (quoting United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1231 (5th Cir. 1994)).

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                                           No. 22-30238

          Brumfield also argues that the district court’s finding is unsupported
   by a preponderance of the evidence because (1) the eyewitness testified that
   one of the robbers got into the driver’s seat of the Honda, and (2) the
   evidence showed that Brumfield and Esteves were calling each other, which
   means they could not have been in the Honda together. Neither proves that
   the district court’s finding is clearly erroneous.
          “[T]he district court need only determine its factual findings at
   sentencing by a preponderance of the relevant and sufficiently reliable
   evidence.”51 As to the eyewitness’s testimony, Brumfield misstates the
   record. On cross-examination, the eyewitness testified that one of the co-
   conspirators got in the car on the “driver’s side.” When asked whether the
   individual was getting into the driver’s seat, the witness responded, “One of
   those doors, yes, sir, on the street side of the car.” But he said that he did not
   look long enough to see if anyone was sitting inside the vehicle waiting.
   Consequently, the district court’s conclusion that Brumfield was the driver
   is not inconsistent with eyewitness testimony.
          Brumfield’s second argument fares no better. The eyewitness testified
   that only two robbers got into the second getaway car, although he could not
   identify them. The cell phone records showed that a phone associated with
   Brumfield used a cell phone tower near the Chase Bank and Adams Street,
   where the second getaway car was waiting. So the district court’s finding that
   Brumfield was driving the Honda was “plausible in light of the record read
   as a whole.”52

          _____________________
          51
               Betancourt, 422 F.3d at 247 (citation omitted).
          52
               See id. at 245.

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                                            No. 22-30238

           Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that
   Brumfield was the second getaway driver.
                                                  b
           Brumfield next argues that the district court erred in applying the
   murder cross-reference under § 2B3.1 of the Guidelines because Trochez’s
   murder was not foreseeable from his involvement. Brumfield argues that his
   conduct was outside the scope of what led to Trochez’s murder because (1) at
   most Brumfield took part in the surveillance of the truck the week before the
   robbery, and (2) he withdrew from the conspiracy when he was “kicked
   out.”
           Under § 2B3.1, the murder cross-reference applies “[i]f a victim was
   killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C.
   § 1111.”53 “Co-conspirator liability under § 1B1.3 does not automatically
   arise because of participation in a conspiracy.”54 Rather, “[f]or sentencing
   purposes, a defendant can be liable for conduct that is (1) ‘within the scope
   of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,’ (2) ‘in furtherance of that
   criminal activity,’ and (3) ‘reasonably foreseeable in connection with that
   criminal activity.’”55 “‘Jointly undertaken criminal activity’ is defined as ‘a
   criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant
   in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy.’”56 Whether

           _____________________
           53
                U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1.
           54
                United States v. Morrow, 177 F.3d 272, 302 (5th Cir. 1999).
           55
             United States v. Gonzales, 841 F.3d 339, 359 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting U.S.S.G.
   § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)).
           56
                Morrow, 177 F.3d at 302.

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                                           No. 22-30238

   an action was “reasonably foreseeable” or “in furtherance” of a “jointly
   undertaken criminal activity” is a fact question.57
          The district court did not err in applying the murder cross-reference.
   Brumfield agreed to jointly undertake the armed robbery of the Loomis truck.
   The nature of a bank robbery demands the reasonable foreseeability that a
   weapon would be used during the crime.58 Indeed, bank robbery “is, by its
   nature, a violent crime.”59
          The district court also grounded application of the murder cross-
   reference in an example in the Guidelines that mirrors Brumfield’s
   participation:
          Defendant C is the getaway driver in an armed bank robbery in
          which $15,000 is taken and a teller is assaulted and injured.
          Defendant C is accountable for the money taken under
          subsection (a)(1)(A) because he aided and abetted the act of
          taking the money (the taking of money was the specific
          objective of the offense he joined). Defendant C is accountable
          for the injury to the teller under subsection (a)(1)(B) because
          the assault on the teller was within the scope and in furtherance
          of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery), and
          was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
          activity (given the nature of the offense).60
   Replace “armed bank robbery” for “armored truck robbery” and
   “assaulted” for “killed” and you have this case.

          _____________________
          57
               Id.
          58
               United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 679 (5th Cir. 1997).
          59
               United States v. Jordan, 945 F.3d 245, 264 (5th Cir. 2019).
          60
               U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. 4(B)(i).

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                                            No. 22-30238

           That Brumfield was “kicked out” of the conspiracy is irrelevant.
   What matters is that he did not withdraw. To constitute a withdrawal,
   Brumfield must have committed an “affirmative act to defeat, disavow or
   discourage the conspiracy.”61 He “must show that he has committed
   affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy that [were]
   communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach conspirators.” 62
   He has not done so.
           Thus, the district court did not err in applying the cross-reference.
                                                   c
           Brumfield next argues that the district court erred in declining to apply
   a two-level minor-participant reduction under § 3B1.2(b). He contends that
   he was a minor participant because he was kicked out of the conspiracy,
   didn’t receive any robbery proceeds, and wasn’t heavily involved in the
   planning stages. “Whether [Brumfield] was a minor or minimal participant
   is a factual determination” we review for clear error.63
           Section 3B1.2(b) of the Guidelines allows the court to apply a two-
   level sentence reduction if the defendant “was a minor participant in any
   criminal activity.”64 “[A] ‘minor participant’ is someone who is less culpable
   than most participants but more culpable than a minimal participant.” 65 “A
   ‘minimal participant’ is someone who lacks knowledge or understanding

           _____________________
           61
                United States v. Romans, 823 F.3d 299, 320 (5th Cir. 2016).
           62
                United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 860 (5th Cir. 1998).
           63
              United States v. Gomez-Valle, 828 F.3d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 2016) f(citation
   omitted); see also Jordan, 945 F.3d at 264 (“[W]e also review the district court’s decision
   not to apply a sentencing reduction de novo on the law, but for clear error on the facts.”).
           64
                U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b).
           65
                United States v. Broussard, 882 F.3d 104, 111 (5th Cir. 2018).

                                                  24
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                                         No. 22-30238

   about the scope or structure of the enterprise.”66 This determination “is
   based on the totality of the circumstances” and “is heavily dependent upon
   the facts of the particular case.”67
          In determining whether a defendant’s participation was “minor,” the
   Guidelines instruct courts to consider: (1) the defendant’s understanding of
   the “scope and structure of the criminal activity”; (2) the defendant’s
   “participat[ion] in planning or organizing the criminal activity”; (3) the
   defendant’s “decision-making authority or influence[]”; (4) “the nature and
   extent of the defendant’s participation in the commission of the criminal
   activity, including the acts the defendant performed and the responsibility
   and discretion the defendant had in performing those acts”; and (5) “the
   degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the criminal activity.”68
          The district court made findings on all but the third factor. Based on
   the totality of the circumstances, the court could have reasonably concluded
   that Brumfield understood the scope of the criminal activity. He understood
   that the “armored car guards would not relinquish proceeds of the robbery
   to his co-defendants in response to a ‘please’ and a ‘thank you,’” and that he
   was being replaced due to concerns he would “freeze up” in the face of the
   likely violence. The evidence also supports a finding that Brumfield took part
   in planning and organizing the robbery; that Brumfield’s participation as the
   second getaway driver facilitated the robbery by helping his co-conspirators
   avoid apprehension; and that he stood to benefit financially from the robbery.

          _____________________
          66
               Id.
          67
               U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. 3(C).
          68
               Id.

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                                            No. 22-30238

   That Brumfield did not have decision-making authority does not change this
   analysis.69
           The district court did not clearly err in determining that Brumfield
   was not a minor participant. A reduction based on Brumfield’s role in the
   robbery was unwarranted.
                                                  d
           Finally, Brumfield argues that the district court erred in relying on
   acquitted conduct. But he concedes that this argument is foreclosed under
   United States v. Watts.70 That concession is correct.71 Accordingly, the
   district court did not err in relying on acquitted conduct.
                                                  2
           We        now     turn      to   substantive      reasonableness.   Substantive
   reasonableness “depends on ‘the totality of the circumstances, including the
   extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.’”72 The district court
   sentenced Brumfield to a sentence within the Guidelines, so his sentence is

           _____________________
           69
             See Jordan, 945 F.3d at 265 (“As [the defendant] notes, the Government did not
   provide evidence that [he] had decision-making authority. But, even without such
   evidence, the other three factors support the district court’s finding that [he] was not a
   minimal or minor participant.”).
           70
                519 U.S. 148 (1997).
           71
              Id. at 157 (holding that “a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the
   sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that
   conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence”); see also United States v.
   Gaspar-Felipe, 4 F.4th 330, 343 n.11 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[The defendant’s] argument that the
   Constitution bars considering acquitted conduct during sentencing is foreclosed by
   Supreme Court precedent. And we have repeatedly rejected his follow-up argument that
   Watts is no longer good law.” (citation omitted)).
           72
                Rhine, 637 F.3d at 528 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).

                                                  26
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                                            No. 22-30238

   presumptively reasonable.73 Brumfield can rebut the presumption only by
   “demonstrat[ing] that the sentence does not account for a factor that should
   receive significant weight, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or
   improper factor, or represents a clear error of judgment in balancing
   sentencing factors.”74
           Brumfield argues that the district court erred in sentencing him to the
   statutory maximum because the court did not consider Brumfield’s
   “peripheral” role in the conspiracy, gave too much weight to Brumfield’s
   comment before the robbery that Trochez was “a big, fat, clumsy guy,” and
   improperly weighed the sentencing factors by sentencing Brumfield to a
   sentence that was twice Esteves’s for the same count. None have merit.
           First, as explained above, the district court did not err in rejecting
   Brumfield’s argument that he was a minor participant in the conspiracy. His
   argument fares no better here. Second, the district court did not unduly rely
   on Brumfield’s comment about Trochez before the robbery. Rather, it
   mentioned the comment as one of the many reasons it did not believe that
   Brumfield was remorseful. True, Brumfield was sentenced to more time than
   Esteves on the conspiracy count; Esteves received 120 months and Brumfield
   received 240. But in total, Esteves was sentenced to 600 months (for all three
   counts), while Brumfield was sentenced to 240 months. Disagreement with
   how the district court weighed the various sentencing factors cannot rebut a
   presumption of unreasonableness.75

           _____________________
           73
                Gaspar-Felipe, 4 F.4th at 344.
           74
            United States v. Willis, 76 F.4th 467, 477 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States
   v. Hernandez, 876 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 2017)).
           75
                See United States v. Camero-Renobato, 670 F.3d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 2012).

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                                    No. 22-30238

            Brumfield has not rebutted the presumption that his sentence was
   reasonable. We find no error.
                                         III
            In sum, Brumfield is not entitled to a new trial. Brumfield’s Brady
   claim fails because the new evidence was not material as to him. His Napue
   claim fails because he has not shown that the Government presented
   materially false testimony. And his challenge to his sentence fails because the
   district court did not procedurally or substantively err in sentencing him.
            But Esteves’s claim warrants further consideration. We conclude that
   the undisclosed evidence was material as to him, so the district court must
   consider whether he has satisfied the other elements of his claim.
            We therefore AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and
   REMAND to the district court for further consideration of Esteves’s Brady
   claim.

                                         28