Court Opinion

ID: 9383863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 15:00:39.740963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:48.636412
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11770   Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 03/31/2023    Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                                No. 22-11770
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       JAMES W. TINDALL,
                                                               Petitioner,
       versus
       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
       ADMINSTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD,

                                                              Respondent.

                         ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                             Department of Labor
                          Agency No. ARB-2022-0030
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                22-11770

                           ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Petitioner James W. Tindall, proceeding pro se, seeks review
       of the Administrative Review Board’s (“ARB”) order affirming and
       adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) dismissal of an
       administrative complaint he brought pursuant to the anti-retalia-
       tion provision of the federal Taxpayer First Act (“TFA”), 26 U.S.C.
       § 7623(d).
               Tindall argues to this court that the ARB acted arbitrarily
       and capriciously when it adopted the ALJ’s factual summary as it
       contained incorrect definitions from the dismissal of his claims by
       the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) and
       as it incorrectly limited his complaint to between himself and the
       United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”). Tindall
       further argues that the ARB erred by recognizing the existence of
       federal sovereign immunity and, alternatively, by finding that it
       was not waived by the TFA; the “ultra vires” exception; the Ad-
       ministrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 702; or the Consti-
       tution.
             For ease of reference, we will address each point in turn.
                                       I.
             The anti-retaliation provision of the TFA protects employ-
       ees who have provided information or taken certain other actions
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       22-11770               Opinion of the Court                         3

       relating to an alleged underpayment of tax, tax fraud, or any viola-
       tion of the internal revenue laws. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(d). Under the
       law, an employer cannot retaliate against such an “employee” for
       engaging in lawful activity protected by the TFA. 26 U.S.C.
       § 7623(d)(1). The TFA also allows an employee who alleges dis-
       charge or other reprisal in violation of the foregoing to file an ad-
       ministrative complaint with the Secretary of Labor. 26 U.S.C.
       7623(d)(1), (2).
               OSHA is responsible for receiving and investigating anti-re-
       taliation complaints under the TFA. See Sec’y’s Order No. 8-2020
       (May 15, 2020), 85 Fed. Reg. 58,393 (Sept. 18, 2020); see also Interim
       Final Rule, Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints
       Under the Taxpayer First Act (TFA), 87 Fed. Reg. 12575 (March 7,
       2022), codified at 29 C.F.R. Part 1989 (effective March 7, 2022). The
       ARB, in turn, is responsible for issuing final agency decisions in
       cases arising under the anti-retaliation provisions of TFA. See
       Sec’y’s Order No. 1-2020 (Feb. 21, 2020), 85 Fed. Reg. 13,186 (Mar.
       6, 2020); see also 29 C.F.R. 1989.110(a).
              Following an OSHA determination, an aggrieved complain-
       ant may request a hearing before an ALJ. 29 C.F.R. 1989.106. The
       ALJ may hear the case or decide the case on a dispositive motion if
       appropriate. See 29 C.F.R. 1989.107 (incorporating the DOL ALJ
       rules of procedure at 29 C.F.R. Part 18). Any party who desires
       review of an ALJ decision, including judicial review, must appeal
       the ALJ’s decision administratively to the ARB, and once the ARB’s
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11770

       decision becomes final, it may file a petition for review to a United
       States appellate court. See 29 C.F.R. 1989.109, 1989.110, 1989.112.
              We review the DOL’s actions in accordance with APA
       standards, meaning that we conduct a de novo review of the DOL’s
       legal conclusions and review factual findings for substantial evi-
       dence in the agency record. Stone & Webster Const., Inc. v. U.S.
       Dep’t of Lab., 684 F.3d 1127, 1132 (11th Cir. 2012). We will only
       overturn the ARB’s findings if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an
       abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” or if
       the findings were made “without observance of procedure re-
       quired by law.” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D)).
              “[W]e may affirm on any ground that finds support in the
       record.” Long v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 772 F.3d 670,
       675 (11th Cir. 2014).
                                        II.
              Here, we conclude from the record that Tindall’s alleged fac-
       tual errors are without merit. First, even if OSHA applied an incor-
       rect definition of “employer” and “person” in its original findings,
       this error was corrected by the ALJ. Second, the ALJ correctly
       found that Tindall had brought his administrative complaint
       against the Treasury. While Tindall identified, in his administra-
       tive complaint, two employees of the Treasury, he did so in the
       context of explicitly stating that he sought assistance in investigat-
       ing the “threats of retaliation by the US Department of the Treas-
       ury and the National Advocate’s Office for the ongoing willful
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       22-11770                Opinion of the Court                          5

       refusal by the IRS Whistleblower Office to comply with their obli-
       gations under §7623(a).” Thus, we conclude that the ALJ acted rea-
       sonably by determining that Tindall’s suit was brought against the
       Treasury alone, and the ARB did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
       in accepting the facts laid out within the ALJ’s opinion. As such,
       we deny Tindall’s petition in this respect.
                                         III.
               Sovereign immunity shields the federal government and its
       agencies from suit, absent a waiver of that immunity. F.D.I.C. v.
       Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1000 (1994). “Sovereign
       immunity is jurisdictional,” and absent a waiver of the immunity,
       the court lacks “jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Id. A waiver of
       sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally expressed,” and an ex-
       pressed waiver will be strictly construed. United States v. Nordic
       Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1014-15 (1992) (quo-
       tation marks omitted). “Any ambiguities in the statutory language
       are to be construed in favor of immunity, so that the Government’s
       consent to be sued is never enlarged beyond what a fair reading of
       the text requires. . . . Ambiguity exists if there is a plausible inter-
       pretation of the statute that would not authorize money damages
       against the Government.” Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198, 1209
       (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290, 132
       S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012)).
              Under the TFA, “no employer…may…threaten, harass, or
       in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms
       and conditions of employment…in reprisal for” engaging in a
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11770

       protected whistleblower activity. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(d)(1). Under
       the TFA’s enforcement provision, “a person who alleges discharge
       or other reprisal by any person in violation of paragraph (1) may
       seek relief under paragraph (3) by…filing a complaint with the Sec-
       retary of Labor.” 26 U.S.C. § 7623(d)(2).
               The TFA does not define the terms “employer” or “person.”
       However, 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1) states that, “where not otherwise
       distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent
       thereof,” a “person” is defined for the purpose of Title 26 as “an
       individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company, or
       corporation.” 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1). Additionally, there is a well-
       established presumption that the term “person” does not include
       the sovereign unless there is an “affirmative showing of statutory
       intent to the contrary.” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex
       rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780-81, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1866-67 (2000).
              As an initial matter, we conclude that Tindall’s argument
       that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is inapplicable to the fed-
       eral government and its agencies is meritless. It is well established
       that sovereign immunity shields the federal government and its
       agencies from suit unless unequivocally waived by an act of Con-
       gress. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475, 114 S. Ct. at 1000; Nordic Vill., Inc.,
       503 U.S. at 33-34, 112 S. Ct. at 1014-15.
              Here, the ARB correctly found that Congress did not une-
       quivocally waive sovereign immunity through the passage of the
       TFA. First, the TFA does not define the term “employer,” making
       it unclear whether Congress intended for the substantive provision
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       22-11770               Opinion of the Court                         7

       of the TFA to apply to federal agencies such as the Treasury. How-
       ever, assuming arguendo, as the ALJ did below, that the Treasury
       was an “employer” under the TFA, the statute still does not une-
       quivocally waive sovereign immunity as the enforcement provi-
       sion allows complaints only against a “person.” It is well-estab-
       lished that the term “person” does not include the sovereign unless
       there is an “affirmative showing of statutory intent.” Vt. Agency
       of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 781, 120 S. Ct. at 1866-67. In this case, as
       Congress did not choose to define the term for the purposes of the
       TFA, the general definition of “person” for Title 26 applies, which
       does not include the federal government or its agencies. 26 U.S.C.
       § 7701(a)(1). As such, we conclude that Congress did not unequiv-
       ocally waive sovereign immunity through the TFA. Therefore, we
       deny Tindall’s petition in this respect as well.
                                        IV.
              Issues not raised in an appellant’s initial brief are deemed
       abandoned, and we will not address the issues absent extraordinary
       circumstances. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th
       Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).
              Under the “ultra vires” exception, a suit for specific relief
       may be brought against an officer of the United States acting out-
       side of the scope of his authority or in ways forbidden by the sov-
       ereign. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com. Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
       689, 69 S. Ct. 1457, 1461 (1949). However, an alleged mistake in
       the exercise of a delegated power is insufficient; rather, relief is
       proper only where the officer lacked delegated power. Id. at 690,
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                22-11770

       69 S. Ct. at 1461. As such, an aggrieved individual must set out in
       his complaint the statutory limitation on which he relies. Id. Addi-
       tionally, the “ultra vires” exception does not apply where a suit
       would “expend itself on the public treasury” or compel the govern-
       ment to act. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620, 83 S. Ct. 999, 1006
       (1963).
              Here, we conclude that the ARB correctly found that the
       “ultra vires” exception was inapplicable to Tindall’s administrative
       complaint. First, as discussed above, Tindall brought his complaint
       against the Treasury, not an individual Treasury employee, mak-
       ing the exception inapplicable. Additionally, while asserting nu-
       merous abuses by offices of the Treasury and the DOL, Tindall
       does not argue in his initial brief that the “ultra vires” exception
       applied to his administrative complaint because it was brought
       against individual officers of the Treasury. As such, the issue is
       abandoned. Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873. Finally, even if Tindall’s
       administrative complaint and initial brief had named an individual
       employee of the Treasury, he sought declaratory relief that would
       compel the government to act, which falls outside the scope of the
       “ultra vires” exception. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 620, 83 S. Ct. at 1006.
       Accordingly, we deny Tindall’s petition in this respect as well.
                                       V.
              Section 702 of the APA provides a limited waiver of sover-
       eign immunity allowing for “judicial review” of administrative ac-
       tions in “a court of the United States” where the relief sought is
       non-monetary. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Because neither the ALJ nor the
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       22-11770               Opinion of the Court                         9

       ARB is a “court of the United States,” the ARB correctly found that
       the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply to Tindall’s
       administrative proceedings. Thus, under the plain language of the
       statute, the waiver of sovereign immunity for judicial review is in-
       applicable. Therefore, we deny Tindall’s petition in this respect as
       well.
                                        VI.
              Absent a valid waiver of sovereign immunity, federal agen-
       cies are immune from lawsuits for First or Fifth Amendment viola-
       tions. See, e.g., Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475, 114 S. Ct. at 1000 (absent a
       valid waiver of sovereign immunity, federal agencies are immune
       from lawsuits for due process violations under the Fifth Amend-
       ment); McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 607-08 (11th Cir. 1986)
       (holding that federal employees may not sue their employers for
       violations of their First or Fifth Amendment rights, and dismissing
       claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and on sovereign im-
       munity grounds); United States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373, 1380
       (11th Cir. 1982) (upholding dismissal of Fifth Amendment claims
       on the basis of sovereign immunity). Further, the Constitution
       provides no waiver of sovereign immunity for Tindall’s claims. Ac-
       cordingly, we deny Tindall’s petition in this respect as well.
               Based on the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that Tin-
       dall’s arguments are meritless, and we deny his petition for review.
              PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.