Court Opinion

ID: 9700647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:39:51.891652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:12.824020
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the record contains substantial evidence to support the Zoning Hearing Board’s (ZHB) determination that Eltoron, Inc. (Eltoron) obtained its building permit from the City of Aliquippa (City) through misrepresentation. {See Majority op. at 154.) Thus, I would conclude that the notice requirements of section 616.1 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)1 apply here.
Eltoron applied for a building permit to renovate the property at 1 Constitution Boulevard in the City for use as a nude dance club. Part C of the City’s pre-printed permit application form asks the applicant to designate the proposed use of the property by marking the appropriate box. The first box is labeled “Amusement, recreation,” and the last box is labeled “Other - Specify.” Obviously, it would only be necessary to place a mark in the last box if none of the enumerated uses applied. Eltoron marked the “Amusement, recreation” box, believing that its nude dance club would be recreational. *156While some people might disagree with Eltoron about this, I suspect that the patrons of a nude dance club would find the club’s activities to be recreational.2 Thus, I do not believe that Eltoron misrepresented its proposed use on the permit application form.
The majority concludes otherwise because Eltoron planned to operate its nude dance club for profit. (Majority op. at 154.) Thus, the majority interprets the phrase “Amusement, recreation” on the City’s permit application form to mean non-commercial amusement and recreational uses. I see no reason to depart from the plain words on the application form. Indeed, no applicant could possibly know that the words “amusement” and “recreation” actually mean “non-commercial amusement” and “non-commercial recreation.” If those words really had such meanings, then applicants who are seeking permits to renovate bowling alleys, video arcades, miniature golf courses, movie theaters or any other commercial amusement or recreational establishment could not mark the “Amusement, recreation” box. This is absurd.3
The majority believes that Eltoron concealed its intended commercial use of the property on the application form because: “The City’s zoning ordinance does not permit commercial businesses in conservation districts.” (Majority op. at 154.) However, the majority does not cite any provision of the City’s Official Zoning Ordinance (Zoning Ordinance) to support this statement. Indeed, nothing in the Zoning Ordinance prohibits commercial recreational uses in conservation districts. Quite the contrary, section 707 of the Zoning Ordinance permits “Recreational uses,” without restriction, in conservation districts.
The majority’s interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance flies in the face of at least three established rules of statutory construction.4 First, courts must construe words and phrases according to their common and approved usage. Section 1903(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). This court has recognized that “Recreational uses” is commonly used to refer to commercial recreational uses of property. See Hawkins v. Zoning Hearing Board, 76 Pa.Cmwlth. 470, 463 A.2d 1291 (1983) (applying the phrase “commercial recreational” uses to an adult massage center).
Second, when words are clear and free from all ambiguity, they are not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing their spirit. Section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Here, the phrase “Recreational uses” in section 707 of the Zoning Ordinance is clear and free from ambiguity. Thus, we are not free to ignore its plain meaning because of a procrustean desire to achieve another result.
Third, “absent express limitation, permissive phrases in zoning ordinances are given their broadest meaning, ... and any ambiguities are resolved in favor of the landowner.” Gilbert v. Montgomery Township Zoning Hearing Board, 58 Pa.Cmwlth. 296, 427 A.2d 776, 780 (1981) (citations omitted). Here, section 707 of the Zoning Ordinance puts no limitation, let alone an “express limitation,” on recreational uses in conservation districts. Thus, we are constrained to give the phrase “Recreational uses” its broadest meaning. Moreover, if the phrase were ambiguous, we would be required to resolve any ambiguity in favor of Eltoron *157and conclude that section 707 of the Zoning Ordinance permits commercial recreational uses in conservation districts.
Finally, I note that when the drafters of the Zoning Ordinance intended to limit recreational uses in a particular zoning district, they did so explicitly. For example, in section 702 of the Zoning Ordinance, the drafters permitted only “recreational uses (non-commercial)” in high-density residential districts. The omission of such limiting language in section 707 of the Zoning Ordinance demonstrates that the drafters intended to allow commercial recreational uses in conservation districts.
Because I do not find substantial evidence in the record to support the ZHB’s determination that Eltoron misrepresented its proposed use on the City’s permit application form, I would conclude that the notice requirements of section 616.1 of the MPC apply here. Thus, I would reverse the order of the trial court.

. Section 616.1 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by section 60 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10616.1.

. The word “recreation” means diversion, play, amusement, entertainment or pleasurable diversion. See Hawkins v. Zoning Hearing Board, 76 Pa.Cmwlth. 470, 463 A.2d 1291 (1983).

. We presume that a lawmaker does not intend a result that is absurd. Section 1922(1) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).

.The rules of statutory construction apply to both statutes and ordinances. See Commonwealth v. Geigley, 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 531, 650 A.2d 1224 (1994), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 638, 659 A.2d 557 (1995).