Court Opinion

ID: 9889608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 20:01:16.126628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:20.110013
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10709    Document: 15-1     Date Filed: 10/10/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10709
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       WILLIE JEROME DAVIS,
       a.k.a. Mobey,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
                 D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cr-00087-WKW-CSC-2
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10709

                            ____________________

       Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Willie Jerome Davis, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
       peals the district court’s order denying his motion for compassion-
       ate release. After careful consideration, we affirm.
                                        I.
              In 2013, a jury convicted Davis of one count of conspiring to
       possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of powder
       cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846; nine counts
       of unlawful use of a communication facility, in violation of
       21 U.S.C. § 843; and one count of money laundering, in violation
       of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (a)(2). Because Davis had two
       prior felony drug convictions, he faced a mandatory life sentence
       on the drug conspiracy count. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2013)
       (requiring court to impose a life sentence in a case involving five
       kilograms or more of powder cocaine when the defendant has
       “two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense”). At sen-
       tencing, the district court imposed a life sentence. Davis appealed,
       and we affirmed. See United States v. Reese, 611 F. App’x 961 (11th
       Cir. 2015) (unpublished).
             In 2021, Davis filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
       seeking compassionate release. Davis acknowledged that under
       § 3582(c)(1)(A) the district court had authority to reduce his sen-
       tence only if it found that extraordinary and compelling
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       23-10709               Opinion of the Court                         3

       circumstances warranted a reduction. Davis argued that extraordi-
       nary and compelling circumstances were present based on a
       change in the law. He pointed out that Congress has recently
       amended § 841(b)(1)(A) and argued he would not be subject to a
       mandatory life sentence under the amended statute. After the
       amendment, a defendant who committed an offense involving five
       kilograms or more of powder cocaine was subject to a mandatory
       life sentence due to prior drug convictions only if the prior convic-
       tions qualified as “serious drug felon[ies].” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)
       (2021). And Davis said that his prior convictions did not qualify as
       serious drug felonies.
              The district court denied Davis’s motion. It explained that
       this Court had held that the circumstances rising to the level of ex-
       traordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction were
       limited to the grounds set forth in the policy statement at § 1B1.13
       of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243
       (11th Cir. 2021). Because Davis was relying on a ground that was
       not set forth in § 1B1.13, the district court reasoned, he had not
       shown that extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted a sen-
       tence reduction.
              Over a year later, Davis filed a motion for reconsideration,
       again arguing that he had established extraordinary and compelling
       circumstances for a sentence reduction. While Davis’s motion was
       pending before the district court, he requested a stay because the
       Sentencing Commission was considering an amendment to clarify
       what constituted extraordinary and compelling circumstances
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10709

       under § 1B1.13. Davis asked the court to wait to rule on his motion
       for reconsideration in case the proposed amendment went into ef-
       fect.
              The district court denied Davis’s motions. Based on Bryant,
       it again concluded that Davis had not demonstrated extraordinary
       and compelling circumstances for a sentence reduction. The court
       also denied Davis’s request for a stay. This is Davis’s appeal.
                                        II.
              We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of
       a compassionate release request. See United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d
       908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court abuses its discretion when
       it commits a clear error of judgment, “applies an incorrect legal
       standard, follows improper procedures in making the determina-
       tion, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id. at
       911–12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                                        III.
              Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may reduce an im-
       posed term of imprisonment if, “after considering the factors set
       forth in [§] 3553(a),” it concludes that “extraordinary and compel-
       ling reasons warrant such a reduction” and the reduction is “con-
       sistent with the applicable policy statement” in the Sentencing
       Guidelines: § 1B1.13. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see Bryant, 996 F.3d
       at 1262. “[T]he only circumstances that can rise to the level of ex-
       traordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release are
       limited to those extraordinary and compelling reasons as described
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       23-10709               Opinion of the Court                          5

       by [§] 1B1.13.” United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1346 (11th Cir.
       2021).
              The application notes for § 1B1.13 set forth four categories
       of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for purposes of compas-
       sionate release: (A) serious or terminal medical conditions, (B) ad-
       vanced age, (C) family circumstances, and (D) “[o]ther [r]easons . . .
       [a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.
       Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. Under our precedent,
       courts may not decide the contents of that fourth catch-all category
       of other reasons—such discretion is reserved solely for the Director
       of the Bureau of Prisons. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262–65.
               Here, the district court did not err in denying Davis’s mo-
       tion. On appeal, Davis does not contend that his reasons for relief
       fall within any of the extraordinary and compelling circumstances
       listed in § 1B1.13. Instead, he argues that the district court improp-
       erly concluded that § 1B1.13 contained an exhaustive list of reasons
       that could justify his compassionate release—asserting that
       § 3582(c)(1)(A) empowers courts to identify other extraordinary
       and compelling reasons for relief so long as those justifications are
       “consistent with” those in § 1B1.13.
              This argument is foreclosed by our precedent in Bryant and
       Giron. Bryant held that “district courts are bound by the . . . defini-
       tion of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in [§] 1B1.13,”
       and therefore they must apply that definition when assessing mo-
       tions for compassionate release. 996 F.3d at 1262. Likewise, Giron
       instructed that “the only circumstances that can rise to the level of
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10709

       extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release
       are limited to those extraordinary and compelling reasons as de-
       scribed by [§] 1B1.13.” 15 F.4th at 1346 (emphasis added). Under
       our prior-panel-precedent rule, we are bound by the holdings of
       Bryant and Giron unless they have been “overruled or undermined
       to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court
       sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir.
       2008). Thus, our precedent forecloses Davis’s argument that dis-
       trict courts can identify extraordinary and compelling reasons for
       release outside of those contained in § 1B1.13.
              Davis argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
       Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), overruled our
       precedent. We have recognized that an “intervening decision of the
       Supreme Court can overrule the decision of a prior panel of our
       court” so long as the Supreme Court’s decision is “clearly on
       point.” Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352 (internal quotation marks omitted).
              The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion did not overrule
       or abrogate our precedent that district courts may grant compas-
       sionate release only for the reasons listed in § 1B1.13. In Concepcion,
       the Supreme Court discussed the factors that a district court could
       consider when deciding sentence-reduction motions for crack-co-
       caine convictions under § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018.
       142 S. Ct. at 2401–04. The Court held that when a district court was
       deciding whether to exercise its discretion and award an eligible
       defendant a sentence reduction, it could “consider other interven-
       ing changes of law . . . or changes of fact,” reasoning that there were
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       23-10709               Opinion of the Court                        7

       no statutory constraints in place that prevented district courts from
       doing so. Id. at 2396, 2400.
              Because Concepcion’s holding did not address compassion-
       ate-release motions, the decision did not overrule or abrogate our
       precedent in Bryant and Giron about the types of circumstances that
       are extraordinary and compelling enough for relief under
       § 3582(c)(1)(A). Indeed, Concepcion recognized that for some sen-
       tencing matters, Congress “limited district courts to considering
       only certain factors” by “requiring [them] to abide by the Sentenc-
       ing Commission’s policy statements”—citing § 3582(c)(1)(A) com-
       passionate-release motions as an example where judicial discretion
       is “expressly cabined” by congressional decree. 142 S. Ct. at 2400–
       01. This differentiation shows that Concepcion is not “clearly on
       point.” Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352 (internal quotation marks omitted).
               Davis also challenges on appeal the district court’s decision
       to deny his motion to stay. He says that the district court should
       have waited to see whether the Sentencing Commission’s pro-
       posed amendment to § 1B1.13 would go into effect. But the district
       court had broad discretion in managing its docket and deciding
       when to rule on Davis’s motion. See McLaurin v. Terminix Int’l Co.,
       13 F.4th 1232, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021). We cannot say that the dis-
       trict court abused this discretion when it chose to rule on Davis’s
       motion rather than waiting to see whether a proposed amendment
       to § 1B1.13 went into effect. Notably, as the government points
       out, nothing in the district court’s ruling “prevents Davis from fil-
       ing a future motion for compassionate release” if the proposed
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       8                         Opinion of the Court                      23-10709

       amendment becomes part of the Sentencing Guidelines. Appellee’s
       Br. at 5. 1
              AFFIRMED

       1 Relatedly, Davis asks us to stay his appeal until the proposed amendment to
       the Sentencing Guidelines goes into effect. We decline to do so for the reasons
       set forth above.