Court Opinion

ID: 9629786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:49:20.320021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:23.879314
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge (dissenting). I respectfully disagree with the majority’s application of the law of search and seizure as it applies to the facts of this case. This appeal involves the question of whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress (1) a cellular telephone found in the Pontiac Trans Am driven by him; and (2) the marijuana, cellular telephone, and list of telephone numbers found in a second vehicle (Ford LTD), driven or occupied by two other individuals. Defendant’s written motion to suppress only sought to exclude the evidence obtained “after the stop of [his] vehicle”; however, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, he joined in the motion to suppress evidence found in the second vehicle filed by the driver and passenger thereof. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on Defendants’ joint motions to suppress, the trial court found, among other things, that after Border Patrol officers stopped and searched the Ford LTD, Defendant was observed to have stopped his vehicle, a Pontiac Trans Am, to have turned his car around and then proceed south in the direction he had originally come from. The trial court also found that “a Border Patrol agent having knowledge of the stop of the Ford LTD and the seizure of the marijuana [therein], stopped the [Pontiac driven by Defendant and asked permission to search the vehicle] ... and a cellular telephone was seized----” Based on its findings the trial court concluded, inter alia, that consistent with the training and experience of Border Patrol officers that stopped Defendant’s car, it was being used by Defendant in a manner consistent with a scout car, and that Defendant gave his “lawful consent for the search of the [Pontiac].” The majority opinion holds as a matter of law that the second stop of the Ford LTD was unreasonable, but that the trial court could properly find that from the combination of circumstances there was reasonable suspicion for officers to make the second stop of the Pontiac Trans Am driven by Defendant. I concur with this portion of the majority opinion; however, it is at this point that our views diverge. Despite the majority’s conclusion that the trial court could reasonably determine that the second stop of Defendant’s car was lawful and that the trial court could reasonably find lawful consent was given by Defendant for the search of his car, the majority opinion finds that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress and that the case should be remanded in order to conduct a second evidentiary suppression hearing, where, “[assuming that Defendant has standing to challenge [the seizure of evidence from the second vehicle in which Defendant was not an occupant], the evidence from the [Pontiac] Trans Am [driven by Defendant] was also subject to suppression as the fruit of that unlawful stop.” Op. at 186, 889 P.2d at 221. The result reached by the majority, in my view, incorrectly concludes that Defendant is not required to prove, as a threshold matter incident to his motion to suppress, that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a second vehicle. Defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing and presented no evidence that he was the driver or a passenger of the second car, or that he was the owner, lessor, or bailee of such car or its contents. The majority holds that absent an objection or challenge by the State at trial or a motion to suppress of Defendant’s standing to assert his Fourth Amendment right, the State may not raise the issue on appeal, even where Defendant failed to offer any proof at the hearing below that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the second car. Here, the State prevailed below, and the trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress on other grounds. In my view, the result adopted by the majority concerning the search of the second car departs from the long-standing rule applied by this Court that a defendant may claim the benefit of the exclusionary rule only if the person demonstrates a violation of his or her Fourth Amendment rights, or rights under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. State v. Gardner, 95 N.M. 171, 175, 619 P.2d 847, 851 (Ct.App.), cert. denied (N.M. Oct. 6, 1980); see also State v. Esguerra, 113 N.M. 310, 313, 825 P.2d 243, 246 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Villanueva, 110 N.M. 359, 365, 796 P.2d 252, 258 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 260, 794 P.2d 734 (1990); State v. Hensel, 106 N.M. 8, 9, 738 P.2d 126, 127 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 720, 737 P.2d 79, and cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958, 108 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed.2d 383 (1987); State v. Donaldson, 100 N.M. 111, 118, 666 P.2d 1258, 1265 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 53, 665 P.2d 809 (1983); State v. Waggoner, 97 N.M. 73, 75, 636 P.2d 892, 894 (Ct.App.1981); State v. Ellis, 88 N.M. 90, 92, 537 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct.App.1975), overruled on other grounds by State v. Espinosa, 107 N.M. 293, 298, 756 P.2d 573, 578 (1988). As observed in United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir.1990): Given the personal nature of interest protected, standing is a matter of substantive fourth amendment law. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-40, 99 S.Ct. 421, 428, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). A defendant may not challenge an allegedly unlawful search or seizure unless he demonstrates that his own constitutional rights have been violated. United States v. Boruff, 909 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir.1990). Standing is not conferred vicariously; even if the fourth amendment rights of a third party have been violated, a district court may not suppress evidence unless the defendant has met his burden of proving that the challenged search or seizure infringed on his personal fourth amendment interests. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148, 99 S.Ct. 421, 433, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the validity of the search and seizure of evidence from a vehicle in which the defendant, Rakas, was a passenger. The Court reaffirmed the rule articulated in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389, 88 S.Ct. 967, 973, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), that “the ‘rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal rights, [which] ... may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search and seizure.’ ” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138, 99 S.Ct. at 427 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 389, 88 S.Ct. at 973). Here, Defendant presented no evidence at the motion to suppress that he had any standing to object to the stop, search, or seizure of the Ford LTD or its contents. This Court has previously held that once a defendant has established that the state stopped his vehicle and conducted a warrant-less search and seizure, the state has the burden of coming forward with evidence to show that there was a valid basis for the stop and that the search and seizure came within the ambit of a recognized exception to the search warrant requirements imposed by the Fourth Amendment. State v. Mann, 103 N.M. 660, 663, 712 P.2d 6, 9 (Ct.App.1985), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 740, 713 P.2d 556 (1986). However, where a defendant moves to suppress evidence, he bears the burden of proof of establishing that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place where the search occurred. See Gardner, 95 N.M. at 175, 619 P.2d at 851 (defendants had burden of coming forward with evidence sufficient to raise issue as to the claimed illegal search and seizure); see also State v. Jones, 68 Wash.App. 843, 845 P.2d 1358, 1360, review denied, 122 Wash.2d 1018, 863 P.2d 1352 (1993). See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.2(b), at 221 (2d ed.1987) (most courts follow Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) and place the burden on the defendant to establish standing). I also disagree with that portion of the majority’s opinion which reverses the trial court’s ruling denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, which offers Defendant a second opportunity to prove standing, and invites him to argue the adoption of a rule of “co-conspirator standing” or “automatic standing.” This Court in Waggoner, 97 N.M. at 75, 636 P.2d at 894, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. -, ---, 113 S.Ct. 1936, 1938-39, 123 L.Ed.2d 635, 640-41 (1993) (per curiam), and most other jurisdictions that have examined this issue following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), have rejected the rule of co-conspirator or automatic standing. See State v. Carter, 74 Wash.App. 320, 875 P.2d 1, 3-5 (1994). Although the majority disclaims any opinion as to whether Article II, Section 10 of our state constitution extends a right of automatic standing on the part of an alleged eoconspirator to challenge the search and seizure of items from the vehicle of a third party, them reversal of the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress expressly invites the trial court to litigate an issue not specifically raised below. I do not believe the framers of our constitution intended that Article II, Section 10 would encompass the right of automatic standing on the part of the driver of a vehicle to object to the search of a second vehicle where he has failed to present evidence that his own constitutional rights were violated. While I agree that proof of standing is not jurisdictional, I believe the majority has erred in determining that absent an objection to a defendant’s standing by the state, a defendant, who has filed a motion to suppress, need not offer any evidence of his standing to challenge the search and seizure of evidence from the possession of a third party. I would hold, consistent with United States v. Padilla and Rakas v. Illinois, and following the rationale of the decisions of this Court in Villanueva, Waggoner, and Gardner, that proof of an individual’s substantive rights under the Fourth Amendment or Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution is generally a threshold matter required to be proved by a defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 483, 486 (2d Cir.1980) (threshold question in motion to suppress is whether the defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in area searched or articles seized), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086, 101 S.Ct. 875, 66 L.Ed.2d 812 (1981); United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir.1989) (the defendant has burden to show challenged search and seizure infringed his personal Fourth Amendment interests); State v. McCarthy, 258 Mont. 51, 852 P.2d 111, 113 (1993) (the defendant bears the burden of proving that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle); State v. MacDonald, 105 Or.App. 102, 803 P.2d 1211, 1213 (1990) (the defendant has the burden to establish a protected right in the particular item of property before he can challenge the alleged violation), review denied, 311 Or. 433, 812 P.2d 828 (1991); Sullivan v. State, 564 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (en banc) (state does not have burden of asserting every possible basis for upholding legality of search). I would follow the approach taken by the court in Carter, 875 P.2d at 3. In Carter, like here, the state failed to challenge the defendant’s standing to object to the search and seizure of evidence obtained from the premises occupied by a third party. At trial Carter failed to offer evidence of a possessory interest in. the seized evidence, and the court denied the motion to suppress. The defendant asserted that she had automatic standing to challenge the warrantless entry of the premises. On appeal, the Carter court held: The State did not raise [the issue of the defendant’s lack of standing] at trial. However, it is properly considered on appeal. State v. Grundy, 25 Wash.App. 411, 415-16, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980), review denied, 95 Wash.2d 1008 (1981) (although the State may not raise the issue of a defendant’s standing where it is an appellant, it may raise the issue for the first time on appeal as a respondent because the appellate court has a duty to affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if it is not the ground relied on by the trial court). Id., 875 P.2d at 3 n. 2; see also Sullivan, 564 S.W.2d at 704-05; State v. Munoz, 111 N.M. 118, 120, 802 P.2d 23, 25 (Ct.App.) (reviewing court will not disturb trial court’s denial of motion to suppress if supported by substantial evidence, unless it appears trial court’s ruling was erroneously premised), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 136, 802 P.2d 645 (1990). The majority, citing State v. Franks, 119 N.M. 174, 889 P.2d 209 (Ct.App.1994), reasons that it would be unfair to an appellant to affirm on a fact-dependent ground not raised below because it lacked an opportunity to present evidence relating to the facts. Franks, however, is distinguishable from the instant case because it did not involve a question of standing or the issue of “automatic standing.” I would apply the rule in Carter, 875 P.2d at 3 (where trial court denied motion to suppress, state may challenge on appeal the defendant’s lack of standing; however, rule is to contrary where state is the appellant and failed to raise issue of standing below). Moreover, considering that Defendant’s motion to suppress only referred to the evidence in the vehicle driven by him, Defendant was not misled by the State’s failure to raise the issue of standing at trial. This Court has previously applied the rule that it will affirm the trial court if it is right for any reason. See State v. Lovato, 112 N.M. 517, 521, 817 P.2d 251, 255 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 388, 815 P.2d 1178 (1991); see also Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57, 62, 823 P.2d 299, 304 (1991) (lower court’s decision will be affirmed if it was correct, even if court applied an incorrect rationale). In sum, I disagree with the majority opinion remanding the cause for a new suppression hearing and inviting Defendant to assert the claim of automatic standing. I would hold that Defendant’s failure to present any evidence at the motion to suppress, indicating that he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the evidence seized from the second vehicle, resulted in a failure by him to establish that his Fourth Amendment rights, or rights under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, were violated.