Court Opinion

ID: 9653248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:41:54.84487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:57.299602
License: Public Domain

MANTON, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
On July 30, 1928, the appellant, a resident of Albany, N. Y., was arrested under a body attachment, taken to the city of New York, because he had failed to answer a subpoena issued to compel his attendance as a witness in the trial of one Otto and others, to be had in the Southern district of New York. At the time, Otto had not been arraigned on the indictment and the date of the trial had not been set. The following morning he was arraigned before the District Court and there held in $10,000 bail for his appearance as a material witness.
Without further process, he was directed to appear before the grand jury, then in session. Advised by counsel, he refused to take the oath or give his name or answer questions. He was hailed before the court and directed to take the oath and answer questions. This he did, answering a number of questions, and, upon being interrogated about his business and his acquaintance with individuals, he declined to answer. He was again brought into Court and directed in general terms to answer questions. His refusal to answer was based upon his assertion of a violation of his constitutional rights. He gave as the reasons for his refusal, that the answers would tend to incriminate and degrade him. At the time the grand jury was investigating the so-called Albany baseball pool, which seems to have been a fraudulent scheme, a lottery; and the basis for investigation by the federal grand jury was the use of the mails in connection with this fraudulent scheme. Up to this time the subject interrogated about involved a wide range and scope, which indicated an effort by the United States attorney to, in some way, connect O’Connell with the Albany baseball pool.
Appellant was asked concerning his association with Pringle, Otto, and Kane, who had previously been convieted for participation in a conspiracy. He was interrogated *206concerning an indictment of himself in Boston for some connection with the Albany Baseball Pool to which he had pleaded guilty; as to his business and money transactions with Otto, Kane, and Pringle; whether he ever talked with Otto, Kane, Pringle, or Buchanan about the Albany baseball pool or the stock market pool or a pool of the C. C. & B. M. A. He was examined at great length concerning a check of $129,000; drawn to the order of a man named Quinn, which, it was claimed, was drawn in connection with the operation of this alleged criminal conspiracy. lie was asked whether he retained a certain lawyer to represent the agents of the Albany baseball pool when they pleaded guilty, concerning a combination sheet and a key card in connection with the operation of a pool, and if he had received $40,000 out of the proceeds of the pool, and if he had placed bets through the pool or if he had anything to do with it. He was then asked if he knew whether the Albany baseball pool was operated in connection with a garage by a man ‘ named Dougherty. He made answers to all of these inquiries. No one reading this record in its entirety can escape the conclusion that it was intended to connect appellant with a criminal offense in connection with one of the pools referred to, and it is equally apparent that, when inquiry was made of him as to individuals or places where the pool operated, it was intended to involve the appellant with the operations, even to the extent of sharing in the moneys derived from the operation. He became an object of investigation, as if he were named as a defendant in the proceeding. There could not be a plainer ease of a person testifying against himself than that portrayed by this record. His testimony before the grand jury up to this stage consisted of about 35 pages. Finally "he was asked:
“Q. Do you know a garage in Albany called Dougherty’s Garage? A. Yes.
“Q. How long have you known that garage? A. Six or seven years.
“Q. Who are the proprietors of it? A. I think a man by the name of Dougherty.
“Q. What is his first name ? A. John.
“Q. How long have you known him ? A. Years.
“Q. How many years? A. Twenty-five.
“Q. Have you ever had any business transactions with him? A. None.
“Q. Have, you ever been in his garage? A. Never, other than I might have stopped to get gasoline.
“Q. Have you ever heard of his garage in connection with the Albany baseball pool? A. No.
“Q. Sure of that? A. Yes.
“Q. Had you any knowledge that for a time the Albany baseball pool was operated there? A. None vrhatever.
“Q. Do you know a place in Albany called Malloy’s? A. I refuse to answer that on the grounds it might tend to incriminate and degrade me.
“Q. Is Malloy’s at the comer of Van Zant and Hamilton Streets, Albany? A. I refuse to answer that question on the grounds it might tend to incriminate and degrade me.
“Q. Do you know a man by the name of Malloy? A. I refuse to answer that question on the ground it might tend to incriminate and degrade me.”
Thereupon the witness was taken before the judge. The United States attorney addressed the court at considerable length, and read selected questions and answers of the witness’ testimony before the grand jury, and said: “I therefore ask you to punish him for the contempt I have seen before the Grand Jury.” Counsel for the appellant protested, and argued that the United States attorney had compelled the appellant to incriminate himself before the grand jury; that there was nothing evasive in his answers. What was claimed to be an evasion were answers as to the length of time he knew certain people, and as to these he said he did not know or was unable to say. At the same time he was reminded that he was charged with having evaded a subpoena resulting in the body attachment. The question was argued at some length, and finally counsel for the appellant objected to the procedure in the contempt proceeding. Then the following took place:
“Mr. Cuff: All right, but I say he was brought down here that way. There is no question in my mind about that and this witness has come here and answered certain questions which your Honor ruled he should, and now they are proceeding against him—
“The Court: I not only ruled that he should answer certain questions. I gave him instructions as to his general procedure, as is entirely proper in any ease where a witness •is called before the Grand Jury. There is not a shadow of doubt, not a shadow of doubt, on the record before me, that' he has wilfully and deliberately obstructed the processes of the Court in not answering truthfully and fully the proper questions put to *207him in the proceeding before the Grand Jury. If there ever was a flagrant contempt, it is in this ease — perfectly flagrant.”
There was no record before the court except the statement of the United States attorney. The grand jury had not certified the questions which there had been a refusal to answer on constitutional grounds, nor had proceedings been started by any order or rule to show cause with accompanying affidavits. Then the following took place:
“Mr. Cuff: May we have specified what the questions were?
“The Court: There are a dozen questions in that.
“Mr. Cuff: I think we are entitled to have him specify the questions.
“The Court: The only question I have any doubt about, because I am unfamiliar with it, is the exact procedure whether or not there should be a specific complaint and whether I should read the record alone before the Grand Jury and the witness being in open court, the Court is empowered to punish for contempt. I am not sure. I don’t know.”
But, as if in relief, .the United States attorney stated:
“I have had occasions before and my assistants also, to go through these eases, although not in as.flagrant a ease, and the Judge has taken summary action, whatever the Judge thought was the proper thing.
v- * «
“The Court: The contempt order is based on the conduct of the witness, the completely evasive conduct of this witness before the Grand Jury in not answering or in evading the answers to numerous questions which have been read by the District Attorney.”
It would unduly lengthen this opinion to quote all the questions read. It is sufficient to say that the so-called evasive answering consisted of instances where the witness was uncertain as to the number of years he knew the persons concerning whom he was interrogated or doubt expressed by him as to whether he knew certain other persons. The final questions about which he was hailed before the court the last time on the claim of contemptuous conduct in the grand jury room did not receive attention in the discussion in court. His right to refuse to answer these seems not to have been considered. In view of the scope and range of the inquiry which had transpired, until the questions were asked as to Malloy and the appellant’s acquaintance with him, it appeared with unerring certainty that an effort was made to incriminate the appellant or connect him with the baseball pool. In refusing to answer on the ground that the questions tended to incriminate or degrade him, he unquestionably acted in good faith. If he was in error in his claim of constitutional protection under the Fifth Amendment, the court might well have instructed him accordingly and required him to answer the questions, as it had on two previous occasions. After such previous instruction he answered questions asked, many of which seem in direct violation of his constitutional protection. . The answer to the questions suggested to have been incredible or evasive justified no reasonable conclusion that the appellant’s conduct was contumacious or obstructive. Beading all of the testimony refutes the claim that the appellant willfully and deliberately obstructed the processes of the court in not answering. If he answered untruthfully, the law as to perjury punishes him. But he gave his testimony, and neither the examiner nor the court could reasonably say that-his testimony was false. Nothing appears to show that they had knowledge of facts which were contrary to his testimony. The constitutional privilege which he asserted was his protection in the grand jury room to the effort then obviously made to establish his connection with some criminal offense.
If the record had been strictly adhered to, when the appellant was hailed before the court and punished, and a more deliberate consideration of the facts were had, the authority and dignity of the court would have been fully upheld by advising and directing the witness as to his position on the claimed privilege.
Calling a prospective defendant before a grand jury investigating a criminal proceeding has been severely condemned. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 12 S. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591,16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819; People v. Ferola, 215 N. Y. 285, 109 N. E. 500; People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N. Y. S. 133. To compel him to take an oath virtually compels him to be a witness against himself. People v. Ferola, supra; Brown v. Walker, supra.
In Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 45 S. Ct. 390, 69 L. Ed. 767, where a contempt of court was charged for having written an objectionable letter to a judge, the court pointed out the necessity of proper procedure in instituting and hearing the contempt charged, and made clear the distinction between a contempt committed under the eye or within the view of the court, where the *208court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts and punish the offender without further proof and without issue or trial in any form. See, also, In re Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 9 S. Ct. 77, 32 L. Ed. 405. In Ex parte Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 9 S. Ct. 699, 702, 33 L. Ed. 150, speaking of contempt, the court said:
“In cases of misbehavior of which the judge cannot have such personal knowledge, and is informed thereof only by the confession of the party, or by the testimony under oath of others, the proper practice is, by rule or other process, to require the offender to appear and show cause why he should not be punished.”
Where the contempt is not in open court, there is no reason or right for dispensing with charges and the opportunity of the accused to present his defense by witnesses and argument. If it be a contempt committed before the grand jury, the practice has been to certify the record to the court, Loubriel v. United States, 9 F.(2d) 807 (2d C. C. A.), or make a presentment thereof, People ex rel. Hackley v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74, or by the grand jury confronting the accused personally, Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 31 S. Ct, 538, 55 L. Ed. 771, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 558. Assuming that the testimony given before the grand jury is in the presence of the court and was untruthful only, it would not be a contempt. In Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 39 S. Ct. 337, 339, 63 L. Ed. 656, 11 A. L. R. 333, the court held that a District Court had no power to adjudge a witness guilty of contempt solely because in the court’s opinion he is willfully refusing to testify truthfully and to confine him until he shall purge himself by giving testimony which the court deem truthful. The charge of failure to testify truthfully seems to have been the gravamen of the appellant’s offense. In the Hudgings Case, supra, the court said: .
“An obstruction to the performance of judicial duty resulting from an act done in the presence of the court is, then, the characteristic upon which the power to punish for contempt must rest. This being true, it follows that the presence of that element must clearly be shown in every case where the power to punish for contempt is exerted — a principle which, applied to the subject in hand, exacts that in order to punish perjury in the presence of the court as a contempt there must be added to the essential elements of perjury under the general law the further element of obstruction to the court in the performance of-its duly. As illustrative of this, see United States v. Appel (D. C.) 211 F. 495. It is true that there are decided cases which treat perjury, without any other element, as adequate to sustain a punishment for contempt. But the mistake is, we think, evident, since it either overlooks or misconceives the essential characteristic of the obstructive tendency underlying the contempt power, or mistakenly attributes a necessarily inherent obstructive effect to false swearing. If the conception were true, it would follow that when a court entertained the opinion that a witness was testifying untruthfully the power would result to impose a punishment for eontempt with the object of purpose of exacting from the witness a character of testimony which the court would deem to be truthful; and thus it would come to pass that a potentiality of oppression and wrong would result and the freedom of the citizen when called as a witness in a court would be gravely imperiled.”
What seems to be the offense committed by the appellant is the claim of apparent untruthfulness in his answers by being false in statement. This alone, assuming it to be established, was not a contempt. But his statements and conduct before the grand jury were neither false nor contumacious.
The decree should be reversed.