Court Opinion

ID: 9884228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:48:13.080912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:47.738262
License: Public Domain

CATHELL, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority’s opinion holding that the railroad line at issue was not abandoned under Maryland property law.
The Court reaches its conclusion on the abandonment issue by answering a question not certified to us by the federal court—the effect of federal law on the purported abandonment. In doing so, the majority seeks to answer the ultimate question before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Our task was to answer the third certified question based on Maryland law: “If the deed conveyed an easement ..., has that easement, as a matter of law, been abandoned at any time since its conveyance, and if so, when?”
Recognizing this distinction, it is important to note the context of the federal case from which the certified question was presented. Plaintiffs, possible owners of real property interests, initiated an action in federal court claiming that those property interests had been the subject of an unconstitutional “regulatory taking” by operation of the federal statutes involved and were entitled to just compensation. They asserted that but for the effect of the federal statutes, they would be the owners of the interest in the property under the state law of abandonment. The federal statutes at issue are those described by the majority as forbidding, for the first time in Maryland, abandonment in the absence of compliance. The issue being litigated in federal court is whether the effect of the same statutes deprive the owners of all economically feasible uses of their property. The majority holds that the plaintiffs do not own an interest in the property because of the effect of the same federal statutes on the Maryland common law pertaining to abandonment.
*185The Federal Circuit has asked this Court to interpret the Maryland law on abandonment in the absence of the effect of the federal statutes. The majority tells that court what it already knows, not what it needs to know to resolve whether the statutes’ impact is so severe as to cause a regulatory taking. Federal courts are able to assess the impact upon the property at issue resulting from the application of the federal statutes. The majority, in some type of reverse “boot strapping” beyond my logical comprehension, answers the certified question by incorporating the effect of the federal statutes into Maryland property law. Under the majority’s reasoning, if a federal regulatory statute abolishes a Maryland property right, the property right never existed. Under that theory, an unconstitutional taking of property never could occur.
The question should be answered, and I believe the federal court wanted it answered, as if the federal statutes did not exist. The majority alters an established doctrine of Maryland property law that has existed for one hundred years or more in an attempt to assist the federal government to avoid its constitutional obligation to compensate property owners if a federal statute so impacts the property as to leave the property owner with no viable economical use.
The majority also holds that the conveyances to the railroad in 1911 were conveyances of easements. The United States Court of Federal Claims found to the contrary, but opined that if the early conveyances had granted easements, those easements had been abandoned under Maryland law. Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 37 Fed.Cl. 545, 580 (1997). The majority’s position in this case directly conflicts with that earlier ruling in the same case. The Court of Federal Claims was correct on the Maryland law of abandonment.
In the case sub judiee, all parties agree that railway use of the land ceased and has remained inoperative for an appreciable period of time. As the briefs reflect, uncontested and substantial evidence exists that the railroad did not intend to operate rail service, did not operate rail service for an extensive period of time, and intended to abandon that service. *186The facts are clear, at least to me, that on May 10, 1985, rail service ceased completely due to the deterioration of a bridge over Rock Creek Park and the prohibitive costs of repairing it. Thereafter, on July 22, 1985, the railroad passed a resolution abandoning railway service. That resolution was at least an expression of intent to abandon the right-of-way, notwithstanding the federal statutes at issue in the federal case. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, which had been operating the rail service prior to May 10, 1985, consented to that abandonment or intent to abandon, as the case may be. The railroad then filed appropriate abandonment petitions with the ICC. That agency made a determination that abandonment was appropriate, but held up formal approval for the apparent purpose of permitting Montgomery County (County) and the railroad to take advantage of the federal statutes involved in the federal “takings” claims. The County entered into agreements under the statutes and acquired the right-of-way. The railroad cautiously executed only quit claim deeds to the County.
The true issue to be determined by this Court was what property, if any, did the railroad own? If it owned nothing, it conveyed nothing. If it had abandoned its right-of-way prior to that time, the right-of-way would have reverted to the adjacent fee simple owners under Maryland law as the law existed prior to the majority’s opinion in this case.
Turning to the Maryland law of abandonment, this Court said in a case involving a dispute over a right-of-way created as early as 1790, that rights-of-way can be abandoned by nonuse combined with an intention to abandon:
[I]t must follow, upon every principle, that the non-user of the right may be extinguished, by presuming a release of it for the purpose of quieting the possession. And the presumption of a release in this case is strongly fortified by the circumstance, that the parties, to whom the right of way in question was originally granted, and those claiming under them, had used another and distinct route over the land of the defendant.
*187Wright v. Freeman, 5 H. &, J. 467, 477 (1823). In Vogler v. Geiss, 51 Md. 407, 410 (1879), we stated in clearer language:
It is now very well settled, by authorities of the highest character, that a party entitled to a right of way or other mere easement in the land of another may abandon and extinguish such right by acts in pais, and without deed or other writing. The act or acts relied on, however, to effect such result, must be of a decisive character; and while a mere declaration of an intention to abandon will not alone be sufficient, the question, whether the act of the party entitled to the easement amounts to an abandonment or not, depends upon the intention with which it was done, and that is a subject for the consideration of the jury. A cesser of the use, coupled with any act clearly indicative of an intention to abandon the right, ivould have the same effect as an express release of the easement, without any reference whatever to time. [Second emphasis added.]
The law in Maryland with respect to the abandonment of easements has remained the same, with but one possible aberration.1 Moreover, the law has always focused on intent. Applying the long-standing legal principle to the facts of this case, excluding the effect of the federal statutes, the railroad clearly abandoned its right-of-way: there was a cessation of use since at least 1985, resolutions to abandon by both railroad companies (consent to abandon by one), a petition to the appropriate agency for an approval of the abandonment, and a determination by that agency that abandonment was appropri*188ate. In my view, this is a classic example of abandonment. If the right-of-way at issue were not subject to the federal statutes, and the landowners abutting the easement were able to present in federal court the evidence presented here, it is clear, probably even under the majority’s position, that the traditional elements of abandonment have been met. Except for the actions of the federal entities in attempting to have the federal statutes impact upon that abandonment, the decision of this Court should be simple. Instead, in an attempt to further the environmental concerns of the County and federal governments, the majority changes the law of Maryland, but says that change has always been the law. It has not always been the law and it cannot be logically so asserted.
The law has not changed since Vogler. We have maintained a consistent position until the majority’s opinion in this case. In Canton Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 99 Md. 202, 217-19, 57 A. 637, 638-39 (1904), we found that no abandonment had occurred because there was only evidence of nonuse and no evidence of intent to abandon. Nonetheless, we restated the law of abandonment from Vogler that sufficient evidence of nonuse plus intent to abandon demonstrates an abandonment. Id. at 218, 57 A. at 639. We likewise reiterated the law in Cityco Realty Co. v. Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington Railroad, 158 Md. 221, 226, 148 A. 441, 443-44 (1930):
It is well settled ... that a party entitled to a right of way or other mere easement in the land of another may abandon and extinguish such right by acts in pais. The act or acts relied on, however, to effect such result, must be of a decisive character, and whether the act amounts to an abandonment or not depends upon the intention with which it was done. A cesser of the use, coupled with any act clearly indicative of an intention to abandon the right, would have the same effect as an express release of the easement, without any reference whatever to time. Vogler v. Geiss, 51 Md. 407; Stewart v. May, 119 Md. 10[, 85 A. 957 (1912) ]. * * * It seems to be generally agreed that in this matter no one case can be authority for another. Time is not a necessary element; it is not the duration of the non-user, *189but the nature of the acts done or permitted, and the intention which the one or the other indicates, that are important.
See also Millson v. Laughlin, 217 Md. 576, 588, 142 A.2d 810, 816 (1958) (“Whenever abandonment or non-user, coupled with other circumstances, show an intention to make no further use of the easement, then it will have been extinguished. But intention to abandon is essential.” (emphasis added)); Brehm, v. Richards, 152 Md. 126, 131-32, 136 A. 618, 620 (1927) (“[C]esser of use, coupled with an act clearly indicative of an intention to abandon the easement, would have the same effect as an express release of it.” (emphasis added) (citing Stewart, 119 Md. 10, 85 A. 957; Vogler, 51 Md. at 410)); Knotts v. Summit Park Co., 146 Md. 234, 241, 126 A. 280, 282 (1924) (“A cesser of the use, coupled with any act clearly indicative of an intention to abandon the right, would have the same effect as an express release of the easement, without any reference whatever to time.” (emphasis added)); Public Service Comm’n v. Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R., 122 Md. 438, 443, 89 A. 726, 728 (1914) (same) (citing Vogler, 51 Md. 407; Glenn v. Davis, 35 Md. 208 (1872)).
One of the cases cited by the majority, Maryland & Pennsylvania Railroad v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 224 Md. 34, 166 A.2d 247 (1960), is factually similar to the present case if the impact of the federal statutes is not considered. In that case, the “Ma & Pa” Railroad had used the subject property as a railroad until 1958. That year it ceased operations and removed the rails and ties. The trial court found that the railroad’s title was to an easement only and that the easement had been abandoned. On appeal, this Court held that removal of the rails and ties from the easement constituted an abandonment of it, and noted:
The general rule is that the right and title to a mere easement in land acquired by a quasi-public corporation, either by purchase, condemnation or prescription, for a public purpose is dependent upon the continued use of the property for that purpose, and when such public use is *190abandoned the right to hold the land ceases, and the property reverts to its original owner or his successors in title.
Id. at 39, 166 A.2d at 250. After distinguishing Canton Co., 99 Md. 202, 57 A. 637, on the basis that the railroad officials in that case had testified they had no intention to abandon the right-of-way, while in Maryland & Pennsylvania Railroad there had been no disclaimer of an intent to abandon, we further discussed the Maryland law of abandonment:
[T]he law is well settled that the intent to abandon may be shown by the acts of a party indicating such an intention. Therefore, since the uncontroverted evidence in the present case was to the effect that the defendant had ceased to operate as a railroad in 1958 and had removed its rails and ties from the right of way, and since time is not an element in abandonment if it is shown that use of the easement has ceased and there has been some act clearly indicative of an intention to abandon the right of further use, it was proper for the trial court to conclude, as it did, that there had been abandonment.
Maryland & Pennsylvania R.R., 224 Md. at 40, 166 A.2d at 250 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In East Washington Railway Co. v. Brooke, 244 Md. 287, 223 A.2d 599 (1966), a railway company had obtained possession of a right-of-way through a prescriptive easement.2 Addressing whether the right-of-way had been abandoned, we said:
The removal of the ties and rails, plus the statement of Mr. Rector, the president and general manager of defendant, that the company has no intentions of ever operating a railroad over the contested strip, indicates that the use of the property for railroad purposes has been abandoned. In *191Ma. & Pa., supra, it was stated at page 39 of 224 Md., [166 A.2d at 250]:
“The general rule is that the right and title to a mere easement in land acquired by a q%asi-public corporation, either by purchase, condemnation or prescription, for a public purpose is dependent upon the continued use of the property for that purpose, and when such public use is abandoned the right to hold the land ceases, and the property reverts to its original owner or his successors in title.”
See also Hagerstown & F. Rwy. Co. v. Grove, 141 Md. 143, 118 Atl. 167. Compare Canton Co. v. Balto. & Ohio R. Co., 99 Md. 202, 57 Atl. 637. Because it has abandoned the right-of-way, the Railroad and its successor have no existing claim to the contested strip of land.
Id. at 293, 223 A.2d at 603 (emphasis added); see also D.C. Transit Systems, Inc. v. State Roads Commission, 259 Md. 675, 690-93, 270 A.2d 793, 801-02 (1970) (D.C. Transit /) (restating the law of abandonment by quoting Maryland & Pennsylvania R.R. at length).
In D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. State Roads Commission, 265 Md. 622, 290 A.2d 807 (1972) (D.C. Transit II), we upheld the trial court’s finding of abandonment, notwithstanding the railroad officials’ attempts to disclaim an intent to abandon:
The only question presented here, of course, is whether DCT has abandoned the easements. Relying on Canton Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 99 Md. 202[, 57 A. 637] (1904), it argues that nonuser is insufficient to establish abandonment unless an intention to abandon can be shown. While we agree this is a correct statement of the law, we think Canton is factually distinguishable from the case at bar.
It is generally conceded that the abandonment of a right of way is to a large extent a matter of intent; rarely, however, is intent proved directly. See, e.g., Maryland & Pa. R. Co. v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 224 Md. 34, 40[, 166 A.2d 247] (1960); 44 Am.Jur. Railroads § 108 (1942). Of course, statements of company officials indicat*192ing an intention to abandon or no longer to use a right of way have been afforded considerable weight in finding an abandonment. People v. Ocean Shore R., Inc., 32 Cal.2d 406, 196 P.2d 570 (1948); Westcott v. New York & N.E. R. Co., 152 Mass. 465, 25 N.E. 840 (1890). Ordinarily, however, statements disclaiming an intent to abandon, while of some value, are too weak and too insufficient to bar a contrary finding where there is other evidence. Ocean Shore R. Co. v. Doelger, 179 Cal.App.2d 222, 3 Cal.Rptr. 706 (1960); see Canton, supra. The rule has evolved, therefore, that to produce the abandonment of an easement there must be action in respect of its use which indicates an intention never to make use of it again. 2 American Law of Property § 8.97 (A.J. Casner ed.1952). This rule, in varying forms, has been applied in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., Maryland & Pa. R. Co., supra; Hagerstown & Frederick R. Co. v. Grove, 141 Md. 143[, 118 A. 167] (1922); Smith v. Harris, 181 Kan. 237, 311 P.2d 325 (1957); Sindler v. Wm. M. Bailey Co., 348 Mass. 589, 204 N.E.2d 717 (1965); United Parking Stations, Inc. v. Calvary Temple, 257 Minn. 273, 101 N.W.2d 208 (1960); Freedman v. Lieberman, 2 N.J.Super. 537, 64 A.2d 904 (1949); Spaeder v. Tabak, 170 Pa.Super. 392, 85 A.2d 654 (1952); Spangler v. Schaus, [106 R.I. 795,] 264 A.2d 161 ([] 1970).
Id. at 625-26, 290 A.2d at 810 (emphasis added).
D.C. Transit System contended in that case that it never intended to abandon the right-of-way (a trolley line), but that its intent was “that of planning to use the land for a monorail system and alternatively for a high speed bus line.” Id. at 624, 290 A.2d at 809. By contrast, the uncontested evidence in the case sub judice was that railroad officials intended to abandon the right-of-way, passed resolutions as such, and filed petitions for abandonment. In D.C. Transit II, the trial judge had specifically found that “[v]arious officers of the Transit Company testified that a monorail system has been under study since at least 1957.” Id. Conversely, the uncontested evidence in the case sub judice showed that the railroad officials clearly contemplated the abandonment of service and *193that, only after arrangements were made for a quit claim deed to be delivered to the County by the railroad company, despite the ICC’s preliminary finding that abandonment was appropriate, did the County acquire whatever the railroad had possessed. In D.C. Transit II, many documents supported the railroad’s position that when it discontinued rail service and removed the rails, it did not intend to abandon the right-of-way, but to use it for future transit service by monorail or high-speed buses. The evidence supporting disclaimer of abandonment in D.C. Transit II is one hundred percent stronger than the evidence in the case at bar, in which no evidence exists of anything other than an intent to abandon.
In the present case, the railroad made a decision not to repair the bridge over Rock Creek Park. It then ceased use of the right-of-way in 1985. In that same year, it passed explicit resolutions stating its official intention to abandon. The railroad then filed a petition with the ICC informing that agency of its intention to abandon. Cf. Thompson v. Maryland & Pennsylvania R.R. Preservation Soc’y, 417 Pa.Super. 216, 224, 612 A.2d 450, 454 (1992) (noting that an ICC certificate of abandonment is evidence of intent to abandon a property interest), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 635, 621 A.2d 581 (1993). The ICC found that abandonment was appropriate. There was simply nothing more the railroad could do to prove abandonment. It used every means short of the Goodyear Blimp to announce its intent to abandon. The majority holds that because the ICC failed to approve the abandonment officially (while, coincidentally or intentionally, it was encouraging the railroad to quit claim its rights to the County, disregarding those who, under the Maryland law of abandonment, may have owned the property rights), there has been no abandonment. The majority fails to recognize that under Maryland law and the cases discussed, supra, abandonment is complete when two things exist: 1) cessation of use and 2) intention to abandon. Both of these elements exist in the case at bar. That is all the Federal Circuit wanted us to consider.
*194The majority does at least recognize that “abandonment” under the federal railroad commerce statutes has a different meaning than under general state property law. See majority op. at Part IV.B.1. Under federal law, the term applies to abandonment of service, while under state law it refers to abandonment of the relevant property interest. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Kmezich, 48 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir.1995) (“Actual cessation of service extinguishes interests under the [state] statute. I.C.C. abandonment is not the triggering event.”); Penn Cent. Corp. v. U.S. R.R. Vest Corp., 955 F.2d 1158, 1159 (7th Cir.1992) (noting there are “two senses of abandonment”; one of service and one of title to property); cf. Thompson, 417 Pa.Super. at 227, 612 A.2d at 455 (“A [state] certificate granting permission to abandon railway crossings is not dispositive of whether or not a railroad has abandoned a right of way, as the certificate, without more, does not constitute abandonment.”). What the majority fails to recognize, however, is that abandonment of the property interest can occur before abandonment of service is approved by the federal government. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1546-49 (Fed.Cir.1996) (affirming trial court’s decision that a railroad abandoned its easement ten years before seeking ICC approval of service abandonment); Burlington N. R.R., 48 F.3d at 1050 (holding that, under Iowa state law, railroad abandoned its right-of-way interest when it ended service “prior to 1985,” not when the ICC approved the abandonment of service in 1985); Kansas City Area Transp. Auth. v. 4550 Main Assocs., 742 S.W.2d 182, 190 (Mo.Ct.App. 1986) (noting that the holders of a right-of-way abandoned their interest by selling it six days prior to ICC approval of rail service abandonment), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063, 108 S.Ct. 1020, 98 L.Ed.2d 985 (1988). Thus, despite the majority’s contention, the railroad in this case could and did abandon its right-of-way property interest even though the ICC had not formally approved abandonment of service. It follows that the scope of the original right-of-way is irrelevant because the evidence reflects that the railroad intended to abandon its *195property interest entirely, long before its purported conveyance to the County.
The majority also fails to see that, despite the federal approval of service abandonment, it is only the abandonment of the property interest that determines whether the purported reversionary property interests in this case vested and were subsequently “taken” under the federal rails-to-trails law. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recognized as much in her concurrence in Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 21, 110 S.Ct. 914, 926, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring), when she stated: “Determining what interest [the holders of the right-of-way] would have enjoyed under Vermont law, in the absence of the ICC’s recent actions, will establish whether [the holders of the right-of-way] possess the predicate property interest that must underlie any takings claim.” (Emphasis added.) Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, further explained that
the [ICC]’s actions ... do not displace state law as the traditional source of the real property interests. The Commission’s actions may delay property owners’ enjoyment of their reversionary interests, but that delay burdens and defeats the property interest rather than suspends or defers the vesting of those property rights. Any other conclusion would convert the ICC’s power to pre-empt conflicting state regulation of interstate commerce into the power to preempt the rights guaranteed by state property law, a result incompatible with the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 22-23, 110 S.Ct. at 927, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also National Wildlife Fed’n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C.Cir.1988) (“In any individual case, the effect of trail use on the reversionary owner’s property rights will depend, in part, on precisely what those rights are under relevant state law.” (Emphasis added.)). The position of Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy in Preseault is, in my view, the appropriate position. The majority’s position in this case does exactly what Justice O’Connor said would occur; it converts the “ICC’s power to preempt conflicting state regulation of interstate commerce *196into the power to preempt the rights guaranteed by state property law, a result incompatible with the Fifth Amendment.”
Instead of recognizing the role of state property law, the majority creates a new, third element in the law of abandonment for Maryland. That is, in addition to cessation of use and intent to abandon a property interest, the easement holder also must receive approval of federal authorities of a service cessation, if statutes require such approval, prior to the vesting of reversionary property interests that traditionally would have occurred. In doing so, the majority refuses even to pay lip service to the Fifth Amendment’s property rights provisions. The majority does for the federal government what the Supreme Court has said the federal government cannot do. I reiterate that the federal court was well aware of the federal regulations necessitating approval; the federal regulations and their “takings” effect are the crux of the issue the federal court is deciding. It did not need that information from this Court. It merely wanted to know what, in the absence of the federal regulations, was the law of abandonment in Maryland governing the purported reversionary interest.
The majority goes to some length to argue that the uses the County intends for the property are within the scope of the original right-of-way of the railroad company. I disagree. But, more importantly, that scope is not relevant to whether the railroad company abandoned its right-of-way. If it abandoned its right-of-way, it abandoned all of it and it abandoned it prior to transferring the quit claim deed to the County. As to the question certified to this Court, whether the right-of-way has been abandoned, the intentions of the County as to future uses have absolutely no relevance. If the withholding of abandonment approval pursuant to the federal statutes is the reason the majority proffers, as it appears to, as to why the right-of-way has not been abandoned, that approval is still being withheld.
*197The County’s intentions have nothing to do with this case. Its quit claim deed was extracted from the railroad after the point that abandonment had taken place under what, prior to this case, used to be the law. If the right-of-way was abandoned before the County bought its quit claim interest, it bought a lawsuit. If not, then the certified question is answered and additional questions as to what the County bought have nothing to do with the certified question and should be left to another case, if necessary.
This is the second time in this term that the Court has rendered decisions that constitute, in my view, drastic departures from the theretofore accepted legal doctrines and theories relating, directly or indirectly, to the law of real property. In the present case, the Court adds a new element, final regulatory approval, to the centuries-old Maryland law of abandonment of easements by merely stating that it is so, although the simplicity of the majority’s position is subtly contained in the eighty-plus pages of the Court’s opinion.
In the Court’s departure from long-standing real property principles, the majority in Matthews v. Amberwood Associates Ltd. Partnership, 351 Md. 544, 719 A.2d 119 (1998), held that an unenforced “no pets” provision in a lease subjected a landlord to negligence liability for damages sustained by a tenant’s guest, who was attacked within the tenant’s premises by the tenant’s dog. In my view, no prior Maryland case had ever held a landlord liable for the negligence of a tenant where the act complained of and the resulting injuries that occurred to a tenant’s guest were completely within the confines of the leased premises.
The law of property, and its related fields such as landlord-tenant law, have been among the most stable areas of the law. In my view, that stability has, over the years, been a positive influence on the law. That body of law now may be perceived by real property practitioners as a field of law under attack as a result of the Court’s decisions this term.
In my view, the majority’s position is result-oriented. I have no quarrel with the idea that unused railway rights-of-*198way are potential resources for recreation and environmental protection. The elements of the law of abandonment are, in substantial part, judge-made law and, while I do not advocate such an approach, this Court presumably has the power to impose prospectively an additional element in respect to the doctrine. Instead of now imposing a new, prospectively applicable element, however, the majority holds that this new element, approval of federal agencies, has always been part of the Maryland law of abandonment. That simply is not so.
Finally, the majority’s opinion will leave members of the bar at risk who may have been advising clients on abandonment issues under the traditional cessation of use and evidence of intent standards. We owe it to the bar to acknowledge change, even if it means acknowledging a departure from precedent or from the holdings of prior cases, when change is what the Court is doing.

. The Court of Special Appeals in Anne Arundel County v. Baltimore & Annapolis Railroad, 46 Md.App. 350, 416 A.2d 777 (1980), though faced with a jurisdictional question in a case in which the remaining issue before it was the applicability of an express reverter, opined at length on the nature of the abandonment requirements under federal railway abandonment statutes. The opinion assumed that federal regulatory abandonment requirements were the same as the Maryland law of abandonment. Whether they were the same was not at issue; nor was there any question as to regulatory unconstitutional takings issues. The issues before this Court in this case go to fundamental principles of Maryland property law and whether takings issues can be avoided by using the impact of the federal statutes to divest Maryland property owners of property rights they otherwise would possess.

. The railway’s deed to the property had been preceded by a conveyance to another party. The trial court thus ruled that the railway’s deed was invalid, but then found that because it had operated the rail line for the period necessary to obtain a prescriptive easement, it had a valid right-of-way. East Washington Ry., 244 Md. at 289, 223 A.2d at 600-01. The issue, therefore, was whether it had abandoned the right-of-way it had obtained by prescription.