Court Opinion

ID: 9523257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:37:47.109824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:46.746373
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting: The axiom on which the majority relies that words which appear in an ordinance “may be declared mere surplusage to give effect to the legislative intent” is rebutted by the equally respectable axioms that a court is not warranted in attributing to a legislative body an intent to place superfluous provisions in its enactments (Skillet Fork River Outlet Union Drainage District v. Fogle (1943), 382 Ill. 77, 85, 46 N.E.2d 73) and that legislative enactments should be construed so that no word is superfluous and each has a purpose. (Mier v. Staley (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 373, 379, 329 N.E.2d 1; Tan v. Tan (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 671, 674, 279 N.E.2d486.) However, this appeal should not be resolved by the weight of the axioms but rather by the common sense interpretation of the ordinance in question. I agree that the word “may” can be interpreted as the equivalent of “shall” so that the ordinance is not entirely permissive. I also agree that “satisfactory proof” is not substantially different from plain, old fashioned proof so that the use of the word “satisfactory” does not give the licensing authority leeway it would not have in the absence of that word. However, I cannot accept the majority’s treatment of the words “fit and proper.” Conceding that the words “fit” and “proper” can be regarded as synonymous, the ordinance must still be read as containing at least one of these words. Neither “fit” nor “proper” would, standing alone, be an adequate standard for a licensing authority. Neither word is more specific than any of the following standards, all of which were held to be too vague to satisfy first amendment requirements: “not of good character” or “not free from fraud” (Schneider v. State (1939), 308 U.S. 147,158, 84 L. Ed. 155,163, 60 S. Ct. 146); “[of] such character as to be prejudicial to the best interest of the people” (Gelling v. Texas (1952), 343 U.S. 960, 96 L. Ed. 1359,72 S. Ct. 1002); or “for good reasons” (Kunz.v. New York (1951), 340 U.S. 290, 293, 95 L. Ed. 280, 283, 71 S. Ct. 312). The majority, however, states that the phrase “fit and proper” must be considered in the context of the other provisions of the ordinance. If the reasoning of the majority is that a “fit and proper” person within the meaning of the second paragraph of section 101 — 5 of the ordinance is one who has been approved by the departments or boards of the city pursuant to the provisions of the first paragraph of that section, this is not a reasonable interpretation. First, if that is what the city council meant, it could have said it. Second, that interpretation makes the ordinance more objectionable. The first paragraph contains the words, “character or fitness.” To define a “fit” person as one who demonstrates “character or fitness” does not cure the problem of vagueness; it adds to it. Perhaps what the majority means is that the words “character or fitness” and “fit” or “proper” in section 101 — 5 refer to the provisions of section 104.1 — 4 which applies specifically to applications for motion picture theatre licenses. This is the interpretation raged by the city. Section 104.1 — 4 provides that an application shall be referred to the building commissioner, the bureau of fire prevention and the police superintendent and that each of these departments shall certify to the mayor whether the applicant is qualified to receive the license and whether the premises comply in every respect with the applicable provisions of the code relating to his department. Several provisions of the municipal code relate to building and fire prevention; presumably it is these code provisions that the building commissioner and bureau of fire prevention would apply to the applicant. However, the city has not informed this court what provisions of the code the police superintendent would look to in deciding whether the applicant was qualified. The city does not pretend that the provisions of section 104.1 — 4 refer only to the qualifications stated specifically in the remainder of chapter 104.1; on the contrary, it asserts in its brief that “clearly not all criteria which give substance to this provision [section 104.1 — 4] can be spelled out in precise detail in each particular licensing ordinance.” The majority opinion is unsound because in at least three respects the ordinances which relate to the granting of theatre licenses are too vague, broad and indefinite to satisfy first amendment standards. The first is the words “fit and proper person” used in the second paragraph of section 101 — 5. The second is the words “character or fitness of any applicant” used in the first paragraph of section 101 — 5. The third is the reference of the application pursuant to section 104.1 — 4 to the police superintendent without any provision in the code or any regulations to which the city has called attention to assist or guide the superintendent in determining whether the applicant is “qualified to receive the license.” I, therefore, believe that the recent conclusion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Grandco Corp. v. Rochford (7th Cir. 1976), 536 F.2d 197, that the guidelines set forth in the city ordinance were too uncertain to serve as the basis for licensing activity which is protected by the first amendment should be accepted by this court. Even assuming that the constitutionality of the ordinance could be saved by a limiting construction, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham (1969), 394 U.S. 147, 22 L. Ed. 2d 162,89 S. Ct. 935, mandates the reversal of the judgments of guilt. In Shuttlesworth, the defendant had been convicted of leading a march in 1963 in violation of a Birmingham, Alabama, ordinance which required prior approval from the City Commission as a condition for any parade on city streets. The ordinance permitted the Commission to refuse a parade permit if its members believed “the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be refused.” The Alabama Supreme Court upheld the conviction in 1967, interpreting the ordinance as authorizing nothing more than even-handed traffic regulation. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction. It noted that the Supreme Court of Alabama had “performed a remarkable job of plastic surgery upon the face of the ordinance” (394 U.S. 147, 153) and assumed that the ordinance as construed by that court in 1967 was valid. But, it stated that the marchers in 1963 could not reasonably be expected to have anticipated the 1967 construction, given the broad language of the ordinance and the history of its unconstitutional application by the Birmingham authorities. In this case, as in Shuttlesworth, the defendants could not reasonably have foreseen that such terms as “character and fitness” and “fit and proper” would be interpreted as merely applying to specific health, safety or police regulations. And, while the Chicago ordinance may not have been applied as arbitrarily as the Birmingham ordinance, it is significant that in City of Chicago v. Town Underground Theatre, Inc. (1973), 9 Ill. App. 3d 930, 293 N.E.2d 367, this court pointed out that no procedures had been promulgated by the city to be followed in investigating and deciding whether an application for a theatre license should be granted. The record in this case does not indicate that the Chicago Police Department has since that decision developed constitutionally permissible standards for passing on license applications.1 Counsel for the city asserted in the circuit court in this case that “[the] Police Department likewise are not unbridled, they are charged with good police procedure and police regulations that control the various applications.” But the record does not reveal what those regulations were. The city can, in the interest of public health and safety, license theatres through a properly drawn ordinance setting forth clear and specific guidelines for the issuing authority. Because the ordinance in question lacks such standards, our decision should be the same as that in Grandco.   The 1972 amendments, which became effective after Town Theatre was decided, provide for notice and prompt review of a denial of a license application, but this is no substitute for the type of narrow, certain and objective standards required to guide a licensing authority when “subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license.” Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham (1969), 394 U.S. 147,150-151, 22 L. Ed. 2d 162. 167. 89 S. Ct. 935.