Court Opinion

ID: 9748608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:07:48.798543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:37.573068
License: Public Domain

FORD ELLIOTT, J.,
concurring:
¶ 11 concur in the result reached by the majority. Although I agree that the trial court should be reversed, I arrive at this conclusion by traveling down a very different path of reasoning. I would find that appellees possess both standing and a reasonable expectation of privacy to pursue their claims.
¶ 2 I begin by reviewing the procedural posture of this case because it is pivotal to my analysis. Appellees filed motions to suppress evidence seized during a search of Black’s apartment. The police conducted the search pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant,3 which provided that the apartment could be searched only if a package searched pursuant to warrant no. 87969 contained cocaine or another controlled substance, and if, after being delivered to Black’s address, the package was taken inside by the occupants. (R.R. at 6a.)
¶ 3 The affidavit of probable cause supporting warrant no. 87969 stated that a confidential informant in California, who had in the past proven reliable in providing California police officers with tips leading to arrests, had apprised California Detective Peyton that the package, which was being shipped from California to a “Barbara Barsh” at Black’s address in Pennsylvania, contained cocaine. {Id. at 4a.) The affidavit further stated that the California police intercepted the package in California and found that it did, in fact, contain cocaine, and also provided that a Pennsylvania search of DMV and other records revealed that “Barbara Barsh” was probably a fictitious name. {Id.)
¶ 4 As a result of this affidavit, the Pennsylvania police obtained a warrant to search the package, which revealed the presence of a methamphetamine. (R.R. at 24a-25a.) Officer Donna Doran then delivered the package to Black’s apartment, leaving it between the front and screen *1261doors. After Diorio arrived at the apartment and moved the package inside, the police officers, acting pursuant to the anticipatory warrant, entered the apartment by force, having received no response to their “knock and announce.” The police found Black and Diorio sitting in the living room with various controlled substances and drug paraphernalia on the table in front of them and on their persons. The package was leaning against a wall near the front door. (Id. at 31a-33a.)
¶ 5 Following their arrest, Black and Diorio filed motions to suppress, challenging the search of the apartment based on the four corners of the two search warrants and also based on the police officers’ alleged failure to “knock and announce” before entering the apartment. (Id. at 8a-9a.) The challenge was grounded in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (Id.) The suppression court, having concluded that the search warrants were invalid, did not address the legality of the execution of the anticipatory warrant. (Trial court opinion, 10/13/99 at 7-8.)
¶ 6 In writing its opinion, the suppression court framed the issue as “whether evidence obtained in a warrantless search of a mail parcel in a foreign jurisdiction may provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant in this Commonwealth.” 4 (Trial court opinion, 10/13/99 at 4.) The court concluded that both the search of the package in Pennsylvania and the subsequent search of the apartment were the fruits of the poisonous tree: the warrantless search of the package in California. (Id. at 7, citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).)5 The suppression court then concluded that the illegal war-rantless search of the package in California could not provide the probable cause to support the Pennsylvania warrants. (Id.)
¶ 7 Procedurally, this case therefore involves a challenge to the affidavit of probable cause supporting a search of the package in Pennsylvania: according to ap-pellees, if that search was not supported by probable cause, then the anticipatory warrant flowing from that search was not supported by probable cause; therefore, the search of the apartment was illegal.
¶ 8 My disagreement with the majority’s resolution of the question before us is based in part on its application of Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983), to the facts of this case. In Sell, supra, our supreme court reaffirmed the automatic standing rule as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). Put simply, Jones conferred automatic standing on defendants charged with possessory offenses on the strength of the charge itself. The gravamen of the automatic standing rule was that charging a defendant with possession of contraband and precluding him from challenging the police conduct which led to the seizure unless he claimed ownership put the protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in conflict. The Sell court was called upon to re-examine the automatic standing rule because the Jones decision had been repudiated by the Supreme Court in favor of a threshold “reasonable expectation of privacy” test for a Fourth Amendment violation. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). As the Sell court observed:
The Rakas Court shifted the focus from ‘standing’ to the merits of the underlying claim. The Rakas Court held that the scope of the interest *1262protected by the Fourth Amendment is to be determined by ‘whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’ Rakas, supra 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430. The Court further declared that, to be considered ‘legitimate,’ an expectation of privacy must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others.
Id. at 143 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 430 n. 12. Sell, supra at 58, 470 A.2d at 468. Thus, the Sell court concluded:
We decline to undermine the clear language of Article I, section 8 by making the Fourth Amendment’s amorphous ‘legitimate expectation of privacy5 standard a part of our state guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. We do so not only because we find the United States Supreme Court’s analytical distinction between ‘standing’ and ‘threshold substantive question,’ see Rakas, supra 439 U.S. at 139 n. 7, 99 S.Ct. at 428 n. 7, unhelpful to our interpretation of Article I, section 8’s protection, but also because we believe the United States Supreme Court’s current use of the ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ concept needlessly detracts from the critical element of unreasonable governmental intrusion.
Sell, supra at 66, 470 A.2d at 468 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
¶ 9 In Commonwealth v. Peterson, 535 Pa. 492, 636 A.2d 615 (1993), our supreme court revisited the question of automatic standing in a case involving the warrant-less search and seizure of drugs from an abandoned building. The court determined that under Sell, supra, Peterson had automatic standing to challenge the search; however, he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises of an abandoned building. As the Peterson court stated:
However, having had his standing acknowledged, appellant is then required to establish that the challenge he has without question legitimately raised is itself legitimate. In order to do so, he must demonstrate that he held such a privacy interest which was actual, socie-tally sanctioned as reasonable, and justifiable in the place invaded that the war-rantless entry of the police violated his right under the Constitution of this Commonwealth, Article 1, Section 8, to be ‘secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures.’
Id. at 497, 636 A.2d at 617 (citation omitted). In short, Peterson’s automatic standing -did not relieve him of his eviden-tiary burden on the merits of his claim: that the warrantless entry into the' storefront by law enforcement officials violated a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy.6
*1263¶ 10 The majority agrees that Sell is still good law in this Commonwealth. What concerns me about the majority’s rationale, however, is that I believe it mirrors that of the Rakas court and not that of Sell. The majority, referencing the Peterson analysis and stating the appellees have automatic standing, then proceeds to couple appel-lees’ reasonable expectation of privacy with a requirement of some ownership or possessory interest in the package seized in the apartment. To wit: Appellees cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in something which they claim does not belong to them.7 This, I respectfully suggest, eliminates the very purpose of automatic standing. Rather, the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis would more appropriately be addressed to whether the police conduct was unreasonable because it violated a legitimate expectation of privacy in Black’s apartment.
¶ 11 To this end, I would analyze the case as follows: Both Pennsylvania searches at issue in this case are governed by Pennsylvania law, which, as indicated, confers automatic standing on a defendant accused of a possessory offense to move to suppress evidence introduced against him. Peterson, supra; Sell, supra. Thus, under the authority of Sell, appellees had automatic standing to challenge the search of Black’s apartment and seizure of drugs found therein because both appellees were found on the premises and both were charged with possession of drugs found in the apartment, including the package. Under Peterson’s analysis, appellees have also established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the evidence was seized because it is a private residence. Therefore we must go forward and address appellees’ claim that the warrant to search the apartment was invalid because the affidavit of probable cause supporting the warrant included evidence illegally obtained during the California search.
¶ 12 At a suppression hearing, a defendant who has standing and who has articulated a reasonable expectation of privacy, thereby indicating the necessity for a warrant, can always challenge the veracity of information contained in the affidavit of probable cause supporting the warrant. Commonwealth v. Miller, 513 Pa. 118, 127, 518 A.2d 1187, 1192 (1986); Commonwealth v. Hall, 451 Pa. 201, 302 A.2d 342 (1973); Commonwealth v. Mejia-Arias, 734 A.2d 870, 874 (Pa.Super.1999). “ ‘[T]he right to challenge the truthfulness of recitals in a warrant follows from the command of Aguilar-Spinelli8 that the magistrate make a “detached and objective determination” of probable cause.’ ” Miller, supra at 129, 518 A.2d at 1192, quoting Hall, supra at 205, 302 A.2d at 344. When *1264so challenged, the Commonwealth then bears the burden of producing evidence establishing the validity of the warrant by showing that the evidence underlying the affidavit of probable cause is reliable. Commonwealth v. Ryan, 268 Pa.Super. 259, 407 A.2d 1345, 1348 (1979), citing Hall, supra. See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(h).
¶ 13 In this case, appellees challenged the affidavit of probable cause as defective because the evidence relied upon was allegedly obtained in an unconstitutional manner, not because the affidavit contained unreliable information. As the majority correctly notes, Fourth Amendment protections, which are the only protections appellees invoked, are, however, personal and can only be asserted by one who has suffered the violation. (Majority opinion at 1259, citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998).) Additionally, Fourth Amendment violations do not necessarily render evidence unreliable merely because it was obtained as a result of the violation. Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 9.1, at 461 (2 nd ed.1992).
¶ 14 Professor LaFave explains the distinction between evidence seized illegally based on a constitutional violation and evidence that is unreliable as follows. A person may confess to a crime and implicate another in that crime as a result of a violation of the protections afforded by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The confession would therefore have been obtained illegally. The person implicated by the confession, who is subjected to an arrest or search based on the confession, will, however, lack standing to challenge the legality of the confession, obtained in violation of another’s constitutional rights. The person implicated by the confession may, however, raise his own Fourth Amendment claim that the warrant to arrest or search him is invalid because based on unreliable evidence if the police obtained the' confession by using physically or psychologically coercive tactics. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.1, at 461. See also id., § 9.1, at 462 (discussing Wong Sun, supra, in which the police'unlawfully entered Toy’s premises and illegally arrested him, after which Toy claimed his innocence but implicated Yee. The police then entered Yee’s premises and found drugs there, which Yee said he obtained from Toy and Wong Sun. The Supreme Court found that Toy had standing to object to the seizure of evidence from Yee because the illegal entry into Toy’s premises, followed by his arrest, led to the seizure of evidence from Yee. The Court found, however, that Wong Sun did not have standing because he could not object to an illegal search of another’s premises).
¶ 15 According to the majority, California follows federal law on the issue of standing. (Majority opinion at 1259-60 (citations omitted).) Furthermore, our supreme court recently held in a case such as this that the law of the foreign jurisdiction applies to determine the legality of a search. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 552 Pa. 570, 716 A.2d 1221, 1223 (1998). Under California and federal law, Barbara Barsh was the only person with standing to raise the legality of the California search of a package addressed to Barbara Barsh. If there is a standing question presented in this case, therefore, it is that under California law, appellees do not have standing to raise a violation of Barbara Barsh’s constitutional rights based on a search that occurred in California. This is distinct from appellees’ standing to challenge the conduct of the Philadelphia police in searching Black’s Philadelphia apartment and seizing evidence, including the package, therefrom.
¶ 16 The trial court found, however, that in addition to attacking the truthfulness of the facts recited in. an affidavit, our supreme court has also allowed a defendant to attack the legality of the search that led to the evidence supporting the affidavit of probable cause. See Sanchez, supra at 575, 716 A.2d at 1223 (“The result of a canine sniff constitutes admissible evidence in both California and Pennsylvania, and *1265can be used to support a search warrant in Pennsylvania so long as the sniff was conducted legally []”) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 245 Pa.Super. 457, 369 A.2d 493, 494 (1976) (“the use in this Commonwealth of information secured through a valid, legal, properly authorized wiretap in a foreign jurisdiction is not in contravention of the Pennsylvania anti-wiretapping statutes [which would not allow such a wiretap], and ... the evidence seized in Pennsylvania under such a warrant is admissible! ]”).
¶ 17 The issue of standing to challenge the legality of the foreign jurisdiction’s search did not, however, arise in Sanchez, supra, Bennett, supra, or Commonwealth v. Corbo, 295 Pa.Super. 42, 440 A.2d 1213 (1982), the cases upon which the Sanchez court relied. In Sanchez, supra, the package searched in California was addressed to one of the defendants. Sanchez, supra at 575, 716 A.2d at 1223 (appellant Sanchez was the person to whom the package was addressed). In Bennett, supra, the wiretap was conducted in New Jersey but included telephone calls received from and made to Bennett’s home in Pennsylvania. Bennett, 369 A.2d at 493. Finally, the Corbo court did not address the legality of the wiretap at issue in that case because the parties did not argue its illegality. Corbo, 440 A.2d at 1214.
¶ 18 Furthermore, the supreme court in Sanchez, supra, specifically limited its review solely to the conflict of laws question as to whether Pennsylvania or California law applied in evaluating the legality of a canine sniff. The canine sniff of the package in California was used to support the warrant to search the package in Pennsylvania. The court decided that “if the courts of a sister state determine that a canine sniff is not a search in that state, the propriety of a sniff initiated by that state’s officers and conducted within that state’s borders must be evaluated under the law of that state.” Id. at 578, 716 A.2d at 1225.
¶ 19 In remanding for further suppression proceedings, the Sanchez court specifically expressed no opinion “on whether appellants [Sanchez, the addressee of the package, and his two co-defendants who were present in the apartment at the time the search was conducted] had any reasonable expectation of privacy in the package sitting in a California Federal Express office.” Id. at 579 n. 4, 716 A.2d at 1225 n. 4. Sanchez cannot be relied upon for any other proposition than its narrow holding, and therefore is inapplicable to this case.
¶ 20 In conclusion, I would reverse the trial court because of its incorrect reliance on Sanchez to determine that the warrants issued in Pennsylvania were invalid because the search of the package in California was illegal. To the extent the majority finds that these appellees lacked standing to challenge the legality of that search, I would therefore agree. For me, however, it is beyond peradventure that appellees possessed standing and a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. This is sufficient to allow a testing of the probable cause to secure the warrants, and it is on the basis of this test that appellees’ claim must fail.
¶21 I therefore respectfully concur in the result reached by the majority.

. Our supreme court recently ratified the use of anticipatory search warrants in Commonwealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187, 754 A.2d 655, 2000 Pa. Lexis 1523 (2000).

. At the suppression hearing, the Pennsylvania police officer who spoke with the California police officer testified he assumed the California police had a warrant to search the package based on his prior frequent contacts with the California police, but he admitted he did not ask. (R.R. at 50a.) Because the Commonwealth bore the burden of producing evidence at the suppression hearing, Pa. R.Crim.P. 323(h), the trial court properly could have found that the search in California was conducted without a warrant.

. Wong Sun is a case decided under federal law.

. I would be less than candid if I did not concede that supreme court authority since and including Peterson has blurred the line between the Pennsylvania and federal standing rules. Peterson emphasized that although a defendant may have standing to file a motion to suppress, he must still establish a personal privacy interest in the place or thing seized as a condition precedent to any challenge of the reasonableness of the search and seizure. In effect, defendants charged with possessory offenses may file suppression motions challenging the seizure of the drugs they are charged with possessing; however, before they can succeed on the merits, they are required to claim an ownership • interest in the drugs in order to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in them. This would appear to be exactly what the majority has done and precisely what the Sell court rejected in its establishment of automatic standing. Based on the apparent confusion in this area and what appears to be a movement closer to the federal standard through recent cases, our supreme court may wish to re-examine the continuing vitality of the concept of automatic standing.

. The majority also relies upon statements made by appellees at the time of the search denying ownership of the package to decide that appellees abandoned the package. If I had to reach this issue, I would find the better view expressed by Professor LaFave.
If a defendant claims standing derived from his interest in the premises searched, he will not prevail if it appears that he had abandoned the premises prior to the time the search being objected to occurred. But under the modem expectation-of-privacy approach the abandonment question must be examined in terms of reasonable expectation flowing from conduct rather than in a technical, properly sense. In any event, abandonment must be distinguished from a mere disclaimer of a property interest made to the police prior to the search, which under the better view does not defeat standing. Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 9.1, at 463 (2d ed.1992) (emphasis added). Moreover, the whole purpose of automatic standing on a possessory charge is that a defendant does not have to claim ownership of the contraband. I believe we would be hard pressed to find very many defendants who claim ownership of illegal drugs during a search.

. Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).
The Supreme Court subsequently abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test in Illinois v. Gates; 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); however, the Gates test still requires that information contained in the affidavit be reliable under a totality of the circumstances.