Court Opinion

ID: 9369962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 15:02:41.474986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.305709
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                   )
                                    )
                                    )
     v.                             )     ID. No. 2103001425
                                    )
                                    )
JUSTIN CHAFFIER                     )

                        Submitted: December 19, 2022
                          Decided: January 17, 2023
                   Written Opinion Issued: February 9, 2023

                 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

             Upon Defendant Justin Chaffier’s Motion to Suppress,
                                 DENIED.

Jenna Milecki, Esquire, Jill Schroeder, Esquire, Deputy Attorneys General,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.

Erika B. LaCon, Esquire, John S. Edinger, Esquire, Tiffany A. Anders, Esquire,
Assistant Public Defenders, OFFICE OF DEFENSE SERVICES, Wilmington, Delaware,
for Mr. Chaffier.

WALLACE, J.
                    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        Justin Chaffier has been indicted for one count of first-degree murder for

allegedly causing the death of Nicole Crawford and one stalking count for his

conduct toward Ms. Crawford during the weeks leading up to her death.1

        On February 26, 2021, Ms. Crawford was pronounced dead at her home in

Newark, Delaware.2 Police had been investigating Mr. Chaffier for stalking her

during that month.3 After Ms. Crawford’s death, and in furtherance of the stalking

investigation, police obtained and executed search warrants on Mr. Chaffier’s car

and apartment. They also obtained and executed an arrest warrant for Mr. Chaffier.4

Mr. Chaffier was arrested at his Pennsylvania apartment and thereafter police began

their authorized searches.5

        When police interviewed Mr. Chaffier, he “admitted to following Nicole from

her place of employment, to blocking her [R]ing camera, to looking through her

windows and calling her six-year-old child to ask for Nicole’s location.”6

Additionally, Mr. Chaffier told them he was in a relationship with the decedent and

1
    D.I. 1.
2
    Mot. to Suppress, Ex. B (“Apartment Search Warrant”) ¶ 1, Sept. 16, 2022 (D.I. 25).
3
    Id. ¶¶ 2-3; see Mot. to Suppress ¶ 2.
4
    See Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A & Ex. B; Mot. to Suppress, Ex. D (“Cell Phone Search Warrant”)
¶¶ 28-30.
5
    Cell Phone Search Warrant ¶¶ 28-30.
6
    Id. ¶¶ 31-32.

                                              -2-
evidence of that relationship and his presence at her home would be found in his cell

phone.7 After that interview, police obtained additional warrants and executed

searches of Mr. Chaffier’s cell phone,8 iPad, laptop, and to retrieve certain data from

Google and Verizon.

       Mr. Chaffier initially issued a blanket challenge to all the search warrants

issued.    At the suppression hearing though, Mr. Chaffier clarified he is only

challenging the apartment, cell phone, laptop, Google, and Verizon warrants.

                              II. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

    A. MR. CHAFFIER’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

       Mr. Chaffier asks that the fruit of any search of his “electronic communication

devices and any evidence obtained as a result of the data collected be suppressed.”9

Mr. Chaffier’s prayer can be grouped thusly: (1) he seeks suppression of any

materials gathered by execution of the apartment search warrant; (2) he seeks

suppression of information gathered through the cell phone and laptop search

7
    Id. ¶¶ 31-34 (“Chaffier stated he was invited to the residence and the communication to verify
the same was saved on his cellular phone to include photographs and messages.”); id. ¶ 34
(“Chaffier kept stating that communication between he and Nicole was documented in his cellular
device.”).
8
    Notwithstanding that this device is more aptly described as a “smartphone” rather than a “cell
phone,” the Court herein uses the term set forth in the contested warrants and the parties’ papers.
See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 260 A.3d 602, 613 (Del. 2021) (“We use the word smartphone, as the
term ‘cell phone’ does not describe adequately the scope and intimacy of the information contained
in these devices.”).
9
    Mot. to Suppress at 2.

                                               -3-
warrants; and (3) he seeks to exclude anything obtained via the warrants issued to

Google and Verizon.

         Mr. Chaffier alleges the apartment search warrant was deficient because it

lacked particularity, was overbroad, and failed to establish probable cause.10

Concerning lack of particularity and overbreadth, Mr. Chaffier says the warrant “did

not limit the search as far as what information could be obtained, and it permitted an

exploratory rummaging through everything in the defendant’s residence.”11 As for

the alleged probable cause deficiency, Mr. Chaffier asserts the warrant “lack[ed] a

nexus between Stalking and what evidence would be found in the defendant’s

apartment or more specifically in his laptop, cellphones, and other electronic

communication devices.”12 And, he says, because the warrants do not include “any

reference to an allegation that Mr. Chaffier used any electronic devices to stalk or

harass Nicole Crawford” there was no connection between the crime and items to be

seized.13

         It follows therefore, Mr. Chaffier posits, that if the apartment search warrant

is invalid, then the cell phone and laptop search warrants—in part, because those

two items were discovered in the apartment and, in part, because the warrants are

10
     Id. ¶¶ 19-22.
11
     Id. ¶ 20.
12
     Id. ¶ 21.
13
     Id. ¶ 22.

                                           -4-
supported by other evidence found in the apartment—are also.14 But if they are not

invalid on that basis, then the evidence gathered from the cell phone and laptop

should be suppressed because, in Mr. Chaffier’s view, the warrants that authorized

those searches are invalid general warrants.15

           Last, Mr. Chaffier says that if the cell phone and laptop search warrants are

invalid, then the Google and Verizon data search warrants—which he argues rely

wholly on evidence found on the cell phone and laptop—fall as well.16

     B. THE STATE’S OPPOSITION

           The State maintains the warrants are all valid. Specifically, the State asserts

the apartment search warrant was not a general warrant because it specified certain

items to be searched for and seized and their connection to the alleged stalking.17

Additionally, the State argues the cell phone and laptop search warrants were limited

in both scope and duration, specific as to the area being searched, and supported by

probable cause.18

14
     Id. ¶ 23.
15
     Id.
16
   Id. (“Detective McNasby authored search warrants for Google, Wyze Surveillance, and
Verizon. Those warrants should additionally be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.”).
17
     Response to the Mot. to Suppress ¶¶ 14-22, Oct. 14, 2022 (D.I. 29).
18
    Id. ¶¶ 23-31. The State conceded that the March 25, 2021 laptop search warrant was a general
warrant but argues the second laptop search warrant (July 13, 2021) is valid and cured any potential
deficiency in the first. Id. ¶ 31.

                                                -5-
                               III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        On a motion to suppress contesting the validity of a search warrant, the

defendant shoulders the burden of establishing that the challenged search or seizure

was unlawful.19 And it is his burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that he is entitled to relief on the bases he argues.20

        Both the United States and Delaware Constitutions provide that a search

warrant may be issued only upon a showing of probable cause.21

        “It is well-settled that the Court must employ a ‘four-corners’ test to determine

whether an application for a warrant demonstrates probable cause.”22 Under that

test, a reviewing court must discern whether the supporting affidavit “set[s] forth

19
    State v. Sisson, 883 A.2d 868, 875 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005), aff’d, 903 A.2d 288 (Del. 2006);
cf. McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Del. 2002) (State bears the burden of demonstrating
the existence of an exception to the warrant requirement); Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560 (Del.
2001) (“Despite some arguable earlier confusion in the Delaware case law over which party bears
the burden of proof on a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search, the rule
in Delaware should now be clear. The State bears the burden of proof.” (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted)).
20
    Sisson, 883 A.2d at 875; see State v. Anderson, 2010 WL 4056130, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct.
14, 2010) (“The burden of proof on a motion to suppress is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974)
(“[T]he controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings” is “by a preponderance of the
evidence.” (citation omitted)).
21
    See U.S. CONST. amd. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); DEL. CONST. art. I,
§ 6 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
thing, shall issue without describing them as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.”).
22
     Sisson, 883 A.2d at 876 (citing Pierson v. State, 338 A.2d 571, 573 (Del. 1975)).

                                                -6-
sufficient facts on its face for a judicial officer to form a reasonable belief that an

offense has been committed and that seizable property would be found in a particular

place.”23 In addition to being supported by probable cause, a search warrant must

“be as particular as possible.”24 Specifically, “[t]he warrant must describe the things

to be searched with sufficient particularity and be no broader than the probable cause

on which it is based.”25

        The judicial officer who made the initial finding of probable cause is owed

great deference, and such a finding won’t be “invalidated by a hypertechnical, rather

than a common sense, interpretation” of the supporting affidavit.26                    And, the

reviewing court must view the application “as a whole and not on the basis of its

separate allegations.”27

        A supporting affidavit must “set forth sufficient facts to warrant a reasonable

[person] in concluding that a crime has been committed and that the property sought

to be seized would be found in a particular place.”28 To establish probable cause, “a

23
     Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
24
     Taylor, 260 A.3d at 613.
25
    Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 299 (Del. 2016) (citation omitted); see Taylor, 260 A.3d at
616 (rejecting warrant as not sufficiently limited because it “authorized a search of ‘any and all
data’ on the smartphones[,]” instead of “limit[ing it] to smartphone data tied specifically to the
probable cause supporting the warrant”).
26
   Cooper v. State, 228 A.3d 399, 404 (Del. 2020) (quoting Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 105, 111
(Del. 1984)).
27
     Jensen, 482 A.2d at 111 (citations omitted).
28
     Blount v. State, 511 A.2d 1030, 1032-33 (Del. 1986) (citation omitted).

                                                  -7-
nexus [must appear] between the items . . . sought and th[at] place to be searched.”29

And in the end, a valid search warrant must be particular, specifically identifying

“the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”30 The particularity

requirement prevents the issuance of general warrants that may be overly intrusive

and not narrowly tailored enough to their justifications.31

                                       IV. DISCUSSION

         Mr. Chaffier makes a four-corners challenge to the apartment, cell phone,

laptop, Google, and Verizon warrants asserting that one, the other, or each either

lacks sufficient supporting probable cause or is a general warrant (or dependent on

the fruit of a general warrant) and thus the evidence obtained therefrom must be

suppressed.32 For the reasons stated below the Court finds: first, the apartment

search warrant is valid; second, the warrants authorizing the search of the cell phone

and laptop are valid; and lastly, the Google and Verizon warrants are valid.

Accordingly, the evidence gathered via execution of those warrants will not be

suppressed.

     A. THE APARTMENT SEARCH WARRANT IS VALID.

         The apartment search warrant sought “[p]hotographs/video of interior/exterior

29
     Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 203 (Del. 1980) (citations omitted).
30
     Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 295-96 (quoting U.S. CONST. amd. IV).
31
     Id. at 299.
32
     Mot. to Suppress ¶¶ 19-29.

                                                -8-
of the property to be searched, any and all electronic communication devices to

include cellular phones and computers, any and all property belonging to the victim,

any and all documentation or evidence of the motive, planning, commission, flight,

conspiracy of a crime.”33

        Mr. Chaffier asserts the “any and all” language in the warrant “permitted an

exploratory rummaging through everything” in his apartment constituting a general

warrant.34 Citing to Buckham v. State,35 Mr. Chaffier asserts the warrant is invalid

and the evidence seized should be suppressed.36 In Buckham, the Supreme Court

found issue with “overbroad and insufficiently particular warrants” for electronic

devices because of the “unprecedented volume of private information”37 stored on

those devices which “permit the government access to ‘far more than the most

exhaustive search of a house.’”38

        Mr. Chaffier seems to suggest that since Buckham “any and all” has somehow

become a banned phrase in Delaware search warrants. It has not. As with most

questions of word usage, context is key. The phrase “any and all”—depending on

what it is describing—is not only permissible, but sometimes necessary in a warrant.

33
     Apartment Search Warrant at 1.
34
     Mot. to Suppress ¶ 20.
35
     185 A.3d 1 (Del. 2018).
36
     Mot. to Suppress ¶ 20.
37
     185 A.3d at 18 (citing Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 299 (Del. 2016)).
38
     Id. (quoting Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 299).

                                                -9-
The difference in the type of “place” to be searched and the “items” to be seized in

Buckham (and like cases) and those here makes the point.

        The contested search warrant here is not for electronic data, instead it is for

property within an apartment. That is, there is a well-defined physical space to be

searched in which “any and all” of certain specified physical items may be sought

out and seized. And, the warrant specifically lists what may be looked for and

seized—electronic communication devices,39 property of the victim (Ms. Crawford),

and evidence of “motive, planning, commission, flight, conspiracy of a crime.”40

There is no undue generality or overbreadth here.

        Mr. Chaffier points out that the face of this warrant, in one section, contains

the term “a crime” instead of specifying the crime of stalking. An “affidavit

supporting [a] search warrant must be ‘considered as a whole and not on the basis of

39
    At bottom, the police were looking for electronic files or digital evidence that could have been
on any of Mr. Chaffier’s devices. As is most often the case, it is impossible to know with
exactitude what devices might be found at a suspect’s abode. See United States v. Giberson, 527
F.3d 882, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a warrant describing particular documents
authorizes the seizure of a computer, where the searching agents reasonably believe that
documents specified in the warrant would be found stored in the computer); United States v. Lacy,
119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding “when a more precise description is not possible” a
blanket seizure is allowed (quoting United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1982)).
And it is equally impractical to do an on-site examination once they are found to exclude their
evidentiary value. See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 234 (3d Cir. 2011) (“the practical
realities of computer investigations preclude on-site searches. For example, a hard drive search
requires a ‘controlled environment.’ Computer searches are also time consuming and require
trained forensic investigators. In short, such on-site searches would be ‘fraught with difficulty and
risk’ and cannot be rushed by a cursory on-site search. All these reasons suggest that the seizure
of the six entire hard drives was reasonable.” (citations omitted)).
40
     Apartment Search Warrant at 1.

                                               -10-
separate allegations.’”41           Moreover, reviewing courts have “eschewed a

hypertechnical approach to the evaluation of [a] search warrant affidavit in favor of

a common-sense interpretation.”42 And here the very same page containing the

challenged wording specifies the crime being alleged and investigated as

“Stalking.”43 The insertion of “a crime” instead of “the crime of stalking” is the type

of hypertechnicality that will not invalidate a warrant.44

         Next, Mr. Chaffier argues there is no nexus between the crime alleged

(stalking) and the items sought.45 Specifically “absent from the search warrant is

any reference to an allegation that Mr. Chaffier used any electronic devices to stalk

or harass Nicole Crawford.”46 But, a witness to a February 20, 2021 incident

between Mr. Chaffier and Ms. Crawford told police that Mr. Chaffier “walked back

and forth across the property line looking in various doors and windows and

remained outside the home for several hours” and that the witness “observed

41
   Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 811 (Del. 2000) (quoting Gardner v. State, 567 A.2d 404, 409
(Del. 1989) (quoting Jensen, 482 A.2d at 111).
42
     Id. (citations omitted).
43
     Apartment Search Warrant at 1.
44
    See Smith v. State, 887 A.2d 470, 473 (Del. 2005) (“We review a probable cause determination
in the issuance of a search warrant with great deference, considering it as a whole and ‘not on the
basis of a hypertechnical analysis of its separate allegations.’”) (quoting Blount, 511 A.2d at 1034);
Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 297 (Del. 2006); State v. Dunning, 2019 WL 77145, at *4-6 (Del.
Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2019).
45
     Mot. to Suppress ¶ 21.
46
     Id. ¶ 22.

                                                -11-
[Mr. Chaffier] to be using a cell phone during the incident.”47 Additionally, police

spoke to another witness who stated Mr. Chaffier “continued to contact

[Ms. Crawford] and show up to her residence unannounced” after the relationship

ended.48 This included calling Ms. Crawford from “blocked numbers.”49 Last,

police spoke to members of Ms. Crawford’s family and friends who “reported

receiving suspicious messages, friend requests and phone calls from [Mr. Chaffier]

inquiring about [Ms. Crawford].”50

         No doubt the warrant’s averments well-support a fair probability that

Mr. Chaffier’s cell phone, laptop, and other electronic devices were the instruments

of his alleged stalking. And common sense dictates that those types of items are

likely to be found at one’s residence. So there is a nexus between the items to be

found in the apartment and the crime being investigated—stalking.

         Here, the affidavit of probable cause sufficiently detailed Mr. Chaffier’s

conduct and the related circumstances such that a reasonable person would conclude

that the crime of stalking had been committed and that relevant evidence would be

found in his apartment.

47
     Apartment Search Warrant ¶ 2.
48
     Id. ¶ 6.
49
    Id. (“Witness 4 stated that Nicole had blocked Justin on her phone and social media however
he continued to call her from blocked numbers.”).
50
    Id. ¶ 15; see also id. ¶ (“During this investigation your affiant was contacted my [sic] Nicole’s
family members who advised that Justin had also been calling Nicole’s six-year-old son asking for
his mother prior to her being deceased.”).

                                               -12-
        Accordingly, the apartment search warrant is valid.

     B. THE CELL PHONE AND LAPTOP SEARCH WARRANTS ARE VALID.

        Police obtained a separate warrant to search Mr. Chaffier’s phone. That

search warrant sought:

        Photographs of the blue Samsung Galaxy S10E cell phone taken by
        New Castle County Police personnel that was possessed by Justin
        Chaffier (WMN 05-11-1986); any and all incoming and outgoing
        phone calls made from this phone or any applications on this phone;
        any and all incoming and outgoing video phone calls or any
        applications with the ability to make incoming and outgoing video
        phone calls; any and all incoming and outgoing text messages or drafts
        of text messages; any and all incoming and outgoing data or records for
        any other form of communication found on this phone to include but
        not limited to social media applications; any and all GPS coordinates
        which may be associated with applications or content; any and all
        incoming and outgoing multi-media messages or drafts of multi-media
        messages; any and all internet history, searches, or stored data
        photographs and videos, internet searches, and WIFI connections; any
        and all call logs or contacts, any and all device identification data found
        on this phone collected from Justin Chaffier’s residence related to the
        cellular phone identified above on the following dates January 22, 2021
        at 0000(EST) through March 4, 2021 at 1100(EST); any and all
        documents or evidence pertaining to the planning and motive for the
        crime of Stalking Delaware Title 11/1312 F/G . . . .51

        Police also obtained a separate warrant to search Mr. Chaffier’s laptop. That

search warrant sought:

        Photographs of the black Lenovo laptop taken by New Castle County
        Police personnel that was possessed by Justin Chaffier (WMN 05-11-
        1986); a forensic examination for the digital contents and all attached
        storage devices of the black Lenovo laptop, specifically for address
        book & contact list, videos, pictures, internet and search history, emails,
51
     Cell Phone Search Warrant at 1 (underlining and bolding omitted).

                                              -13-
        SMS (text) messages, MMS (Media) messages, chats, incoming and
        outgoing data or records for any other form of communication found
        on this laptop to include but not limited to social media applications,
        any and all device identification data found on this laptop computer that
        was collected from Justin Chaffier’s residence, during the dates of
        January 22, 2021 at 0000(EST) through March 4, 2021 at 1100(EST);
        any and all digital documents or evidence pertaining to the planning
        and motive for the crime of Stalking Delaware Title 11/1312 F/G. . . .52

        First, Mr. Chaffier suggests there is no connection between the cell phone or

laptop and the crime of stalking.53 Not so. The natural read of the entirety of the

warrants and their supporting affidavits demonstrates a fair probability that both the

phone and computer were not only instruments of Mr. Chaffier’s alleged stalking

conduct but otherwise contained material “of an evidentiary nature pertaining to the

commission of a crime or crimes.”54

        After police arrested Mr. Chaffier and before police obtained the cell phone

and laptop search warrants, Mr. Chaffier “advised that he communicated with

[Ms. Crawford] through text messages, phone calls and social media.”55 This

52
     Mot. to Suppress, Ex. F at 1 (“Second Laptop Search Warrant”). The State has conceded the
first laptop search warrant (March 25, 2021) is a general warrant and does not intend to use any of
the evidence obtained from the execution of that warrant in its case. Response to the Mot. to
Suppress ¶ 31.
53
    Mot. to Suppress ¶ 26 (the warrants “lack[] a nexus between Stalking and what evidence would
be found by searching the defendant’s laptops and cellphones”).
54
     Turner v. State, 826 A.2d 289, 291 (Del. 2003) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 2305(5)).
55
   Cell Phone Search Warrant ¶ 33. The second laptop search warrant’s affidavit of probable
cause contains the same averments as the cell phone search warrant’s affidavit of probable cause
makes. See Second Laptop Search Warrant ¶ 33.

                                               -14-
included FaceTiming and calling the decedent’s six-year-old son.56 And in defense

to officers’ questioning concerning stalking, Mr. Chaffier asserted “that

communication between he and [Ms. Crawford] was documented in his cellular

device.”57

         Additionally, Mr. Chaffier told police that he was at Ms. Crawford’s residence

hours before she was found slain but told officers he had left her residence and

received texts from Ms. Crawford “throughout the night, pictures, confirmation for

their [upcoming] trip, and apology messages . . . .”58 So Mr. Chaffier, himself,

directly connects the dots between the devices and the alleged crime of stalking. It

is Mr. Chaffier who told investigators that relevant evidence could be found in his

electronic devices.

         Here, police were seeking evidence not just of criminal activity, but to confirm

information provided by Mr. Chaffier. Contrary to his contention, “a warrant may

be issued for anything of an evidentiary nature pertaining to the commission of a

crime or crimes.”59        The information collected from Mr. Chaffier’s electronic

devices would confirm or refute what he and others said of his contact with

Ms. Crawford.

56
     Cell Phone Search Warrant ¶ 33.
57
     Id. ¶ 34.
58
     Id. ¶ 35.
59
     Turner, 826 A.2d at 291 (cleaned up).

                                             -15-
        Mr. Chaffier further challenges that the temporal limit—six weeks between

January 22, 2021, and March 4, 2021—is unconstitutionally broad as it includes a

short span after Ms. Crawford died.60 And, he says, the search warrants are

unconstitutionally broad because they seek all messages, photographs, and data.61

        Yet again, Mr. Chaffier’s return to Buckham—which too involved a phone

search with a six-week parameter—is misplaced; notably because of the crimes

alleged. While Mr. Chaffier—like the Buckham defendant—was suspected of

murder, he was also being investigated separately for stalking Ms. Crawford before

the killing. That was clearly expressed in the warrant applications, as was the

connection of the items sought to that separate crime and its investigation.

        In Buckham, “many of the allegations in the warrant application [we]re too

vague and too general to connect [the] cell phone to the shooting.”62 Not so here.

The devices are the self-admitted instruments of (or contained evidence refuting)

Mr. Chaffier’s alleged stalking, so their content is valuable and directly relevant to

the investigation.

        And the temporal limit is equally directly relevant to the investigation. While

60
    Mot. to Suppress ¶¶ 24-25; id. ¶ 29 (“Ms. Crawford was deceased on February 26, 2021, yet
police sought to investigate Mr. Chaffier for stalking for another two weeks. Without showing
some connection between the devices and the crime of Stalking, there can be no probable cause to
believe anything that is being sought would be found within the devices.”).
61
     Id. ¶¶ 24-25.
62
     185 A.3d at 17.

                                             -16-
Mr. Chaffier asserts that the stalking activity itself could not have occurred after

Ms. Crawford’s demise, Mr. Chaffier claimed to officers that he didn’t learn of

Ms. Crawford’s death until March 3, 2021, when he heard the news from one of her

former colleagues.63       So Mr. Chaffier’s own recounting makes the temporal

parameters appropriate and specific.            Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude

Mr. Chaffier could have discussed his alleged crime or taken steps—digital and

other—to cover up that crime after Ms. Crawford had been killed.

        Again, a neutral and detached magistrate may draw reasonable inferences

from the factual allegations in the affidavit.64 The warrants’ applications plainly

draw out that the devices were instruments of Mr. Chaffier’s alleged stalking.65 And

given the nature of the crime of stalking in general and the specific allegations here,

obtaining evidence of Mr. Chaffier’s contacts with, communication with and about,

and his proximity to Ms. Crawford for the short span requested were relevant to

establishing, among other things: the nature of Mr. Chaffier and Ms. Crawford’s

relationship; and, any actions Mr. Chaffier may have taken to cover up his misdeeds.

        This is far from Buckham where the Court found the mere generalized notion

63
    Cell Phone Warrant ¶ 31 (“Chaffier advised that on 03-03-2021 he learned through a colleague
of Nicole’s, that she died.”).
64
   Sisson, 903 A.2d at 296 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263,
1270 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The issuing judge is entitled to go beyond the averred facts and draw upon
common sense in making reasonable inferences from those facts.” (citation omitted)).
65
     Cell Phone Warrant ¶¶ 31-36.

                                              -17-
that “criminals often communicate through cellular phones” an improper ground to

support a finding of probable cause.66              Here, the affidavit of probable cause

sufficiently details the surrounding events of Mr. Chaffier’s conduct such that a

reasonable person would conclude that a crime had been committed and that relevant

evidence would be found on his cell phone and laptop.

        Mr. Chaffier also complains that the cell phone and laptop search warrants

lacked particularity.67 But the search warrants themselves are specific as to what is

being searched and are distinguishable from Buckham and its progeny.68

Specifically, where “any and all” is used, that language is limited by a specific “area”

of the device to be searched.69 And the single use of “included but not limited to”

in each warrant permits a search beyond just “social media applications.”70 It is not

the broad “including but not limited to” description listing a dozen or so entries that

66
     185 A.3d at 17 (citation omitted).
67
     Mot. to Suppress ¶ 25.
68
    E.g., Taylor, 260 A.3d at 615 (“the Taylor warrant authorized ‘a top-to-bottom search’ of
‘[a]ny and all store[d] data’ of the digital contents of the devices. . . . [T]he Taylor warrant used
the open-ended language ‘including but not limited to’ to describe the places to be searched. The
Taylor search warrant allowed investigators to conduct an unconstitutional rummaging through all
of the contents of Taylor’s smartphones to find whatever they decided might be of interest to their
investigation.” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)).
69
    Id. at 615-16. See, e.g., Cell Phone Search Warrant at 1 (“any and all incoming and outgoing
phone calls made from this phone or any applications on this phone; any and all incoming and
outgoing video phone calls or any applications with the ability to make incoming and outgoing
video phone calls . . . .” (emphasis added));
70
   Cell Phone Search Warrant at 1 (“include but not limited to social media applications”);
Second Laptop Search Warrant at 1 (“include but not limited to social media applications”).

                                               -18-
our Supreme Court found problematic in Taylor v. State.71

        Accordingly, the cell phone and laptop search warrants are valid.

     C. THE GOOGLE AND VERIZON WARRANTS ARE VALID.

        Mr. Chaffier summarily maintains that the evidence obtained from Google

and Verizon should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, because the warrants

issued to those entities, in his view, impermissibly relied on fruit of other invalid

searches.72

        As the State conceded, the first laptop search warrant (March 25, 2021) could

be considered a general warrant.73 But the Verizon warrant was drafted and executed

before the first flawed laptop search warrant was drafted and executed. So, the

materials obtained from Verizon could in no way be deemed the fruit of that later

search.74 What’s more, as explained above, the cell phone search warrant was valid.

So any information or material Verizon provided via the warrant issued on it is not

the fruit of any poisonous tree.

        The Google Search Warrant is not as simple. That warrant was drafted after

71
    Taylor, 260 A.3d at 615; see Wheeler, 135 A.3d at 289 (finding invalid a warrant that listed
the areas of the phone to be searched “to include but not limited to: registry entries, pictures,
images, temporary internet files, internet history files, chat logs, writings, passwords, user names,
buddy names, screen names, email, connection logs, or other evidence.”).
72
    Mot. to Suppress ¶ 23 (“Detective McNasby authored search warrants for Google, Wyze
Surveillance, and Verizon. Those warrants should additionally be suppressed as fruits of the
poisonous tree.”).
73
     Response to Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 31.
74
     See Mot. to Suppress, Ex. C, Verizon Search Warrant.

                                               -19-
the first laptop search warrant was executed and references, in a single paragraph, a

product of that search.75 But excising76 that single paragraph leaves intact a search

warrant that relies on the evidence gathered from the cell phone and other warrants

the Court, above, found to be valid.77 Accordingly, the Google and Verizon search

warrants are valid.

75
    Mot. to Suppress, Ex. C, Google Search Warrant ¶ 64 (“Your affiant is aware that a search
warrant was also authored for the black Lenovo laptop that was collected from Chaffier’s
apartment. Your affiant reviewed the extraction report and observed multiple images for crime
scene investigative books, hydrochloric acid and chicken wire. It should be noted that these images
appeared to be photographs captured from the internet. It is possible that these photographs could
correlate with various internet searches conducted on electronic devices by Chaffier. Your affiant
is aware that if there are images associated with an internet search or activity it will generate an
image that will then be stored in the image section of the device or electronic.”).
76
    Franks v. State, 398 A.2d 783, 785 (Del. 1979) (“Excised of the alleged false paragraphs the
warrant affidavit contains sufficient uncontested allegations to establish probable cause . . . .”); see
also State v. Grossberg, 1998 WL 283491, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 1998) (finding excised
search warrant affidavit established probable cause).
77
     See, e.g., Mot. to Suppress, Ex. C, Google Search Warrant ¶ 35 (“On 03-23-2021 your affiant
received the extraction report back from Justin Chaffier’s cellular phone after a search warrant was
executed on same. While reviewing the extraction report your affiant located images, videos and
weblinks for Nicole Crawford’s Ring camera stored in Justin’s cellular phone. Justin further
utilized email to send the Ring links to his email account. Your affiant reviewed the Ring links
which contained video of NCCPD investigators to include your affiant conducting the initial
investigation at Nicole’s residence on 2-26-2021. Justin further had photographs of Nicole’s bank
card and personal information to include her work schedule and various usernames and passwords
of Nicole’s. Justin further had personal information stored in his device for another male Nicole
was seeing to include the male’s phone number and occupation.”); id. ¶ 50 (“Your affiant observed
an email sent from jmchaffier@gmail.com to jmchaffier@gmail.com. The email contained a Ring
web link. Your affiant reviewed the weblink and observed the video to be from the Ring camera
that was attached to Nicole Crawford’s residence. The video from Chaffier’s email captured your
affiant and Detective Sergeant Melvin exiting Nicole’s front door on 2-26-2021 when we were on
scene investigating her death. Nicole’s mother and several marked NCCPD patrol vehicles were
captured on the video as well. The date listed on the email stated 2-27-2021.”).

                                                 -20-
                                 V. CONCLUSION

      Each challenged warrant application, viewed as a whole, provided an ample

factual basis upon which a neutral judicial officer could find a fair probability that

evidence pertaining to the stalking investigation would be found in the given

“place.” Moreover, each warrant was sufficiently limited in spatial, material, and

temporal scope as to avoid being unconstitutionally general.

      Because Mr. Chaffier’s motion to suppress challenges the validity of certain

search warrants, and because the Court has found each such warrant to be valid,

Mr. Chaffier’s motion to suppress or exclude the evidence gathered via them is

DENIED.

      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                               __________________________
                                               Paul R. Wallace, Judge

                                        -21-