Court Opinion

ID: 9444752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:10:52.6872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:59.480767
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. It seems to me that the paramount public duty rests upon the carrier to render the safest, most adequate, economical and efficient service that lies reasonably within its power.1 *827It does not seem to me to be a “sound economic condition in transportation and among the several carriers” (see footnote 1, supra) that one carrier should be held bound by a contract to pay perpetually to another rents and taxes on a line of railroad, which by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission the renting carrier has been permitted to abandon and has abandoned.
Paragraph 18 of Section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 (18),2 authorizes the Commission to issue a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit the abandonment of all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof. After a full and fair hearing to which both the lessor and lessee carriers were parties, the Commission issued its certificate that,
“the present and future public convenience and necessity permit abandonment by the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company of operation under trackage rights over the line of the Illinois Central Railroad Company between Ruslor (Corinth), Miss., and Haleyville, Ala., * *. Provided, however, and this certificate is issued upon the express condition that the operation under trackage rights herein permitted to be abandoned may not be abandoned until operation is commenced under trackage rights over the line of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company described herein.”
Thereafter the Gulf, Mobile and Ohio commenced operation under trackage rights over the line of the Louisville & Nashville and abandoned operation under trackage rights of the line of Illinois Central.
The Commission disclaimed any jurisdiction to determine whether or not the rental contract between G. M. & O. and I. C. continued in force and effect, and left that task to the courts. Hence this suit.
Under Paragraph 18 of Section 1 of the Act (footnote 2, supra), the Commission had full jurisdiction to permit the abandonment of the line of railroad, “or the operation thereof,” in whole or in part, and to attach to its order such lawful condition as it saw fit. My brothers say that “ * * * the Commission found in effect that payment without use would not be an undue burden on G. M. & O.” I do not think that the Commission’s opinion is reasonably subject to any such construction, but if we differ as to the construction of its opinion, we *828cannot differ as to the meaning of its certificate issued pursuant to that opinion. That certificate, similar to the judgment of a court, should control in determining what action the Commission took. As appears from the pertinent part thereof, heretofore quoted,, it actually permitted abandonment of operation over the I. C. line conditioned only on the prior commencement of operation over the L & N line. It seems to me that when the Commission thus permitted abandonment of operation over the I. C. line, that order carried with it all of the burdens of operation, including the very substantial burden of its obligation to pay rental and taxes to I. C.
The weighing of public benefits against private injury could bé done only by the Commission, and on that question the Commission found:’ “That on the whole the benefit to the applicant and the public from the proposal will outweigh any injury which may be inflicted thereby on the protesting railroads.”
Under the majority decision, it is difficult, if not impossible, to discover any method by which a carrier may be relieved of its obligation under a perpetual lease of operation rights over another’s line short of bankruptcy, forced liquidation or dissolution. In the present case, the Commission found that the switch to the lines of the L & N'would effect some economy even if the G. M. & 0. had to continue its payment of rentals to I. C., though, of course, much greater, economy would be effected if such payments ceased. In a case where the economies effected were not so large, would the Commission be powerless to permit the abandonment of that part of the burden of operation? When G. M. & O.’s private contractual obligation to I. C. came to conflict with its public duty to the extent, as found by the Commission, that the benefit to the public outweighed “any injury which may be inflicted thereby on the protesting railroad,” (Emphasis supplied) it seems to me that the private obligation ceased to exist. See Munn v. People of Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125, 24 L.Ed. 77. I agree with the Court of Appeals of Kentucky that,
“ * * * while a railroad is a private corporation, yet it is a quasi public agency, and one contracting with it must have contemplated the fact that when public necessity and convenience required the abandonment of a particular part of its line, it would not be bound by a contract to operate that line in perpetuity.” Meacham v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 293 Ky. 642, 169 S.W.2d 830, 832.
See, also, Western Pacific R. Co. v. Nevada-California-Oregon Ry., D.C.S.D.Cal., 40 F.2d 731, 733. Surely by making a private contract for a perpetual lease, G. M. & O. and I. C. could not remove that burden of operation over I. C.’s line from the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. As said by Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court in Norman v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 307, 308, 55 S.Ct. 407, 416, 79 L.Ed. 885:
“Contracts may create rights of property, but, when contracts deal with a subject-matter which lies within the control of the Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties' cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them.”
It seems, to me that the holding of the majority implies a restrictive and unjustifiable construction of the Commission’s authority under Section 1(18), footnote 2, supra, contrary to the liberal construction required by the National Transportation Policy, footnote 1, supra.
Central New England Ry. Co. v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 279 U.S. 415, 49 S.Ct. 358, 73 L.Ed. 770, and Regents of University System of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586, 70 S.Ct. 370, 94 L.Ed. 363, appear to me to be clearly inapplicable to the facts of this case. In Central New England Ry. Co. v. Boston & Albany R. Co., supra, no permission was requested or granted for abandonment by New England of operations over the Boston & Albany line. Boston & Albany was not even a party to the proceeding before the Commission, nor was it given an opportunity to be heard. As to Regents of *829University System of Georgia v. Carroll, supra, it seems to me that the provisions for regulation of radio broadcasting embodied in the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., differ radically from those for the regulation of common carriers in the Interstate Commerce Act. See Federal Communications Comm. v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474, 642, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L.Ed. 869, 1037. Specifically, the Federal Communications Act contains no provision comparable to paragraph 18 of section 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act, footnote 2, supra, under the authority of which the Commission acted in this case. On the contrary, licensees for radio broadcasting need not renew their license, but may abandon operation without the consent of the Commission.
It seems to me, under the findings, order and certificate of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that upon G. M. & O.’s compliance therewith, any obligation of G. M. & 0. to I. C. was extinguished. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Rehearing denied: RIVES, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

. That is, I think, implicit in the “National Transportation Policy” which precedes Section 1 of the Transportation Act of 1940, and is copied in the note at the beginning of Title 49, Chapter 1, U.S.C.A. pocket supplement:
“ ‘It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, eco-normeal, and efficient service and foster *827sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions; — all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this Act shall he administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy.”' (Emphasis supplied.)

. “(18) Extension or abandonment of lines; certificate required. No carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall undertake the extension of its line of railroad, or the construction of a new line of railroad, or shall acquire or operate any line of railroad, or extension thereof, or shall engage in transportation under this chapter over or by means of such additional or extended line of railroad, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or construction and operation, of such additional or extended line of railroad, and no carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment.” (Emphasis supplied.) 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 (18).