Court Opinion

ID: 9939604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 18:15:14.660114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:29.374378
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00249-CV

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

              IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF
         MARK ANTHONY DUNCAN AND JAIME LYNN DUNCAN

                   On appeal from the 105th District Court
                         of Nueces County, Texas.

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
 Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina
              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

      Pro se appellant Mark Anthony Duncan appeals from a final divorce decree. By

four issues, which we have consolidated and reorganized, Mark argues the trial court

erred by: (1) failing to give “proper weight to evidence” showing that appellee Jaime Lynn

Duncan committed actual or constructive fraud or waste; (2) “not reconstituting the

estate,” (3) failing to uphold standing orders from Nueces County, and (4) failing to

distribute community property in a just and right manner. We affirm.
                                         I.      BACKGROUND

        On February 15, 2018, Mark filed an amended petition for divorce. The parties filed

numerous pleadings and motions.1 Throughout the proceedings, the trial court ordered

that both parties periodically withdraw certain amounts from their retirement account at

Principal Financial Group (PFG) “to protect the presumed community interest in” real

estate property, for community bills, and for attorney’s fees.

        On December 13, 2021, the trial court held a bench trial regarding the division of

assets and liabilities, and identified Mark’s and Jaime’s separate property and divided the

community property.2 Mark filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by operation of

law. This appeal followed.

                                        II.      WAIVED ISSUES

A.      Fraud and Waste Claim

        First, Mark argues that the trial court “failed to give proper weight to evidence

presented in trial that supported a fraud and waste claim on part of Jaime.” Specifically,

Mark complains: “Jaime deprived Mark of the true value of the community estate by

fraudulently creating documents to open secret accounts and by committing waste on the

        1 Some of these include: motions for establishment of monthly distribution from their retirement

account, responses, briefs in support, discovery motions and responses, motions for contempt, motions in
limine, motions for accounting, motions to compel, counterpetitions, motions for sanctions, motions for
snapback relief, petitions for enforcement of Nueces County District Court’s General Orders, motions for
accountings of funds and distribution, motions to quash discovery responses, motions for establishment of
monthly distribution, motions for distribution of funds, emergency motions for protective order, motions for
deposition subpoenas, and motions for recusal and disqualification.

         We note that throughout these proceedings, both parties were represented by numerous attorneys
at different stages of litigation. On multiple occasions, counsel for both parties would withdraw from
representation, and each party would obtain new counsel.

        2 At trial, Mark appeared with counsel while Jaime appeared pro se.

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community and holding complete disregard for her fiduciary duties,” and “Mark presented

overwhelming and undisputed evidence that proved Jaime removed and secreted money

from community property retirement accounts, sold a community property vehicle, had

another vehicle repossessed, and intentionally depreciated the value of the home.”

       Mark does not direct us to any portion in this voluminous record where we may

examine the evidence that he claims the trial court failed to “give proper weight.”3 See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring the appellant’s brief to contain citations to the record in

support of the contentions made). A bold assertion that there was “overwhelming

evidence” of fraud and waste will not suffice where appellant does not provide a single

record reference. See id.; Rendleman v. Clarke, 909 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism’d) (“The failure to cite to relevant portions of the trial court

record waives appellate review.”). We are not required to scour a voluminous record, such

as the record here, to find error. See Garrod Invs., Inc. v. Schlegel, 139 S.W.3d 759, 766

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, no pet.); see also Alvarado v. State, 912

S.W.2d 199, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“As an appellate court, it is not our task to pore

through hundreds of pages of record in an attempt to verify an appellant’s claims.”). We

therefore overrule Mark’s first issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also Dunn v. Bank-

Tec S., 134 S.W.3d 315, 328 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (refusing to scour a

voluminous record for evidence supporting the appellant’s claims); Lloyds v. Vega, No.

13-16-00090-CV, 2018 WL 1773304, at *13 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr.

12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same). We overrule Mark’s first issue.

       3 The record is over 2,000 pages, and Mark does not cite to it.

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B.     Reconstituted Estate Claim

       Second, Mark argues that the “trial court failed to reconstitute the estate.”

Specifically, Mark states that “[a]fter being presented with overwhelming evidence that

Jaime committed fraud and waste on the community, the trial court failed to reconstitute

the estate to the amount the estate was before Jaime committed fraud and waste.”

However, because Mark directs us to no evidence supporting a fraud and waste claim,

Mark’s contingent argument that the trial court failed to reconstitute the estate due to fraud

or waste must also fail. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.009 (requiring the trial court to divide

the value of the reconstituted estate in a just and right manner only if “the trier of fact

determines that a spouse has committed actual or constructive fraud on the community”);

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We overrule Mark’s second issue.

                                 III.   STANDING ORDERS

       By his third issue, Mark argues that the trial court abused its discretion “by not

adhering to Nueces County Standing Orders.” Mark generally asserts that “Jaime grossly

violated sections three and four of the Nueces County Standing Orders,” but Mark does

not explain how she did so “grossly violated these sections,” other than this bare

assertion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); McKellar v. Cervantes, 367 S.W.3d 478, 484 n.5

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (“Bare assertions of error, without argument or

authority, waive error.”). Instead, Mark specifically asserts that “[t]he trial court gave the

impression of being oblivious to having knowledge of Standing Orders when the trial court

questioned Mark’s attorney on rather [sic] or not an order was in place to prevent Jaime

from selling the vehicle.”

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         The Nueces County District Courts’ General Orders provide that the parties must

preserve property and the use of funds during a divorce case. See Nueces County District

Courts     General    Orders,   R.   3,   available   at   https://www.nuecesco.com/home/

showpublisheddocument/30728/638328107376970000 (last visited Jan. 5, 2024). The

orders further prohibit the parties from concealing or destroying any family records,

property records, or financial records. See id. R. 4.

         At trial, Walter Scott Turner, a certified public accountant practicing primarily in

forensic accounting, testified on behalf of Jaime. Turner stated that he traced Jaime’s

separate assets, evaluated Mark’s claims for reimbursement, determined the amount of

taxes Mark currently owed, identified the community assets, and determined what

liabilities were outstanding. Turner reviewed inventory, detailed withdrawal records from

different bank accounts, and reviewed the mingling of separate and community property

funds. He further testified regarding expenditures and pending balances.

         According to Turner, there was no evidence that would show Jaime committed

waste or actual or constructive fraud to support Mark’s claims. Turner testified regarding

numerous withdrawals from different accounts, and he provided several calculations and

explanations to the trial court regarding these expenditures. Turner explained that

portions of the community property funds were rolled over into another account when the

account was transferred to a new brokerage, and the remaining portions of the community

property funds were distributed to pay community living expenses. Turner stated that

“many of these [distributions] are court-ordered, others are just drawn for living

expenses.”

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       Additionally, Turner clarified that Mark was incorrect in his assertion that the entire

retirement account was community property: “It’s not. He’s ignoring the fact that Jaime

paid down $175,393 on the community debt for the homestead.” Turner explained that

Mark’s “math is incorrect” because it contained “multiple duplications of expenditures” that

had been accounted for, and thus, “there’s no basis for a claim for withdrawals.” The trial

court inquired whether Turner saw anything that would support Mark’s claim to

reconstitute the estate; Turner said he did not.

       Pursuant to the trial court’s request, Turner compared Mark’s and Jaime’s

inventories of community property, including the values for assets and liabilities. Turner

opined on which amounts were appropriate to be divided between the community, which

distributions were not recoverable, which assets were Jaime’s separate property, the

balances owed by each party, and the community’s sales and proceeds.

       Jaime similarly testified that her use of the community property funds was for the

payment of the community bills, living expenses, and attorney’s fees, in accordance with

the trial court’s orders and the standing orders. Mark did not refute Jaime’s testimony.

Thus, we conclude that Mark’s bare assertions that the trial court failed to adhere to the

Nueces County’s General Orders are meritless, and we overrule Mark’s third issue. See

Cervantes, 367 S.W.3d at 484 n.5.

                              IV.    JUST AND RIGHT DIVISION

       By his last issue, Mark argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

provide a just and right division of the community estate.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

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       A trial court must divide the community estate in a just and right manner. TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 7.001. To aid in its decision, a trial court may consider factors such as the

parties’ respective capacities and abilities, benefits that would have derived from

continuation of the marriage for the non-faulting party, business opportunities, education,

relative physical conditions, relative financial conditions and obligations, disparity of ages,

size of separate estates, and the nature of the property. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d

696, 699 (Tex. 1981). “[W]e consider every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial

court’s proper exercise of discretion in dividing the community estate.” Monroe v. Monroe,

358 S.W.3d 711, 719 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). The complaining party

has the burden of demonstrating that the division was so unjust it was a clear abuse of

discretion. See In re Marriage of Palacios, 358 S.W.3d 662, 663 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2009, pet. denied). “[I]t must be shown from the record that the division was so

disproportionate it constituted an abuse of discretion.” Monroe, 358 S.W.3d at 719.

B.     Discussion

       The trial court confirmed as Jaime’s separate property the Principal Investment

Plus Annuity (PIPA), which was held under her sole name. The trial court found “that there

has been a tracing” of a “separate payment” of $175,393 appellee made for the mortgage

and awarded a “reimbursement” to Jaime in that amount.

       From the community property, the trial court awarded Mark a work trailer, a Ford

F-150, and a Harley Davidson motorcycle. The trial court also awarded Mark

$40,727.50—one-half of the community net equity in the homestead—to be taken from

Jaime’s PIPA. The trial court further awarded Mark $34,554.00—one-half of the

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community property portion of the annuities and investments—to be withdrawn from

Jaime’s PIPA.

       From the community property, the trial court awarded Jaime possession of the

homestead, subject to the $40,727.50 cash payment due to Mark. Jaime was ordered to

pay an IRS debt in the amount of $32,498 and the balance due on a promissory note

executed by her and secured by a deed of trust on the homestead. Both parties were

ordered to pay fifty percent of the community’s debts.

       Mark complains that the trial court awarded Jaime $315,708 of the PIPA account

as Jaime’s separate property. He asserts that he “received 6.3% of the community estate”

while appellee “received 93.7% of the community estate.” We disagree. Here, the trial

court confirmed that the PIPA account was Jaime’s separate property; that is, the PIPA

account funds were not part of the community estate as Mark asserts. Turner explained

that the PIPA account was an “asset[] owned [by Jaime] prior to the date of the marriage.”

Turner informed the trial court that on December 31, 2007, “the date immediately prior to

the date of marriage,” the balance on the PIPA account was $315,707.4 At the time of the

divorce, the PIPA account had $397,000. According to Turner, “the difference between

the balance at the date of marriage and the current balance is $81,304. That is

community.” He further concluded that “[d]iscounted for taxes[,] the value of that

community portion is $69,108.” Therefore, Turner explained that the community interest

in the PIPA account was $69,108. Mark does not challenge this testimony, and Mark does

       4 In the final divorce decree, the trial court found that an informal marriage between the parties

commenced on January 1, 2008, and Mark does not challenge this fact.

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not explain how Turner’s assessment is incorrect.

       Instead, Mark re-urges his argument that “[h]ad the trial court reconstituted the

estate[,] the division of community property would have been exponentially higher.” As

previously stated, we decline to find that the trial court failed to reconstitute the estate.

Instead, the trial court awarded Mark $34,554 to be taken from Jaime’s PIPA; this is one-

half of $69,108, which Turner determined was the community’s interest in the PIPA.

Turner further explained that Jaime paid $175,393 from her separate property for the

homestead, and he provided the trial court with documentation verifying the same.

Accordingly, we conclude that Mark did not meet his burden of demonstrating that the

division was so unjust and disproportionate it was a clear abuse of discretion. See

Monroe, 358 S.W.3d at 719; In re Marriage of Palacios, 358 S.W.3d at 663. We overrule

Mark’s last issue.

                                    V.     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                JAIME TIJERINA
                                                                Justice

Delivered and filed on the
8th day of February, 2024.

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