Court Opinion

ID: 9403449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 13:04:33.637157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:07.201597
License: Public Domain

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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: June 21, 2023

                          S23A0253. PUGH v. THE STATE.

       MCMILLIAN, Justice.

       Appellant Philip Pugh entered a plea of guilty but mentally ill

to malice murder in connection with the shooting death of Vincent

Newsome. 1 On appeal, Pugh claims that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty but mentally ill plea for

three reasons. Pugh first argues that the trial court should have sua

sponte conducted a competency hearing at the time of his guilty plea

and that the failure to do so violated his procedural due process

rights. Pugh next argues that his substantive due process rights

       1Newsome was killed on March 1, 2014, and on June 11, 2014, a
Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Pugh for malice murder, felony murder
based on aggravated assault, aggravated assault of Newsome, aggravated
assault of Steve Carcana (a bystander who was struck by a bullet fragment),
and two counts of possession of a firearm or knife during the commission of a
felony.
were violated by the trial court’s acceptance of the plea because

Pugh was not competent to enter the plea and did not enter the plea

voluntarily. Lastly, Pugh argues that he received constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel in that plea counsel failed to request

a competency hearing. As explained below, we need not resolve

Pugh’s claims regarding his competency at the time of his guilty plea

hearing, because, given Pugh’s repeated assertions at the time of the

plea that he was being threatened and forced into entering the plea,

the State has failed to meet its burden to show that his plea was

knowing and voluntary. We therefore must reverse Pugh’s

conviction and remand the case for further proceedings.

     1.    In presenting its factual basis for the guilty plea, the

State proffered the following. On February 26, 2014, the Gwinnett

County Police Department received a report that Loraine Rowzie –

Pugh’s wife – had been the victim of a gang rape at a hotel five or

six months prior. It was not reported until her husband, Pugh, said

he saw a cell phone video of the gang rape. Pugh called the police

later that same day to identify one of the men in the video as “Vince.”

                                   2
     On March 1, 2014, Pugh drove from his home in Mississippi to

the hotel in Gwinnett County and asked for a man named Tyson

Henderson, the previous manager of the hotel, but Henderson was

not there. Pugh subsequently encountered and shot Newsome

several times, killing him, before driving back to Mississippi where

he was later arrested.

     The record shows that, following the indictment, initial trial

counsel raised a concern about Pugh’s mental state and history and

requested a mental evaluation. Dr. Tomina Schwenke evaluated

Pugh’s criminal responsibility and competency to stand trial and on

August 24, 2014, submitted her evaluations to the trial court. Dr.

Schwenke opined that “Pugh was able to distinguish those behaviors

that would be deemed wrong from those that are right at the time of

the alleged offenses. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest

that [Pugh] was suffering from a delusional compulsion at the time

of the offenses alleged.” Dr. Schwenke also found that “at the time

of the evaluation, [] Pugh was competent to stand trial.”

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      Then, in July 2016, Pugh’s plea counsel 2 moved for another

mental health examination because he did not agree with Dr.

Schwenke’s evaluation that Pugh was competent to stand trial, and

the trial court ordered that another evaluation be performed. The

evaluator tried once to go to the jail, but Pugh refused to cooperate

and fired his counsel over the phone. Then, Pugh said he wanted his

counsel back and that he would submit to an evaluation. So his

counsel and the evaluator went to the jail, but Pugh again refused

to cooperate and was unable to be evaluated.

      On April 17, 2017, the case was set to go to trial, but after

additional negotiation with the State and conversations with plea

counsel on the morning of the scheduled trial, Pugh pleaded guilty

but mentally ill. During the plea colloquy, Pugh responded “yes”

when asked if anyone had used any “force, threats, or promises”

causing him to plead guilty against his will. The trial court asked if

Pugh had experienced force, threats, or promises, and Pugh

      2After initial counsel, Pugh had a series of four or five different attorneys
leading up to the plea.
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responded that “[i]t was threats.” When the trial court asked who

made the threats, Pugh responded, “Gwinnett County Police.” The

trial court asked if police officers were making Pugh plead guilty

that day, and Pugh said that they “withheld evidence in my case and

then they threatened – they actually threatened to kill my family if

I didn’t – if I – if I don’t keep quiet.” The trial court then asked if

Pugh wanted to go forward with the plea. Pugh responded, “I have

no choice.” Both Pugh’s plea counsel and the trial court told Pugh

that he did have the choice of whether to go to trial. When asked if

Pugh committed the offense of murder of Newsome, Pugh responded

that he defended himself after Newsome tried to throw him over a

balcony. When asked if his decision to plead guilty was being made

freely and voluntarily, Pugh responded, “[U]nder the circumstances,

yes.” The district attorney then explained that “[y]our choices today

are plead guilty or have a trial. Which one do you want today?” Pugh

said, “I have no choice but to plead guilty, sir. Everything – all my

evidence and everything is missing. I have no choice but to plead.”

     The trial court subsequently followed up on the State’s

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questions about feeling threatened and asked, “Do you feel

threatened or are you just feeling the pressure?” Pugh responded, “I

feel threatened. They have threatened me about this and they gave

[an] address to my sister – to my sister’s – threatened to go shoot up

the house and everything, so I – ” When the trial court asked whom

Pugh was referring to, Pugh responded, “Some of the Gwinnett

County police deputies.” Then, the trial court asked whether anyone

threatened Pugh “this morning” to enter this plea, and he responded

no. The trial court asked no further questions about Pugh’s

statements that he had been threatened to enter the plea. Pugh

further said that he understood the purpose and significance of the

proceedings, his rights, and that he was waiving his right to have a

trial.

         During the plea colloquy, the State represented that there was

no evidence of threats by Gwinnett County police officers and that

despite Pugh’s consistent belief that his wife was raped by multiple

men, the State’s investigation found no evidence that a rape

occurred. But, related to competency, the State explained at the

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guilty plea hearing:

     Respectfully, I would suggest it’s an open question of
     whether or not the rape even occurred, but if it did, it
     happened at least six months prior to the actual murder.
     So if we were to have a trial, we believe the evidence
     would show this defendant was under some sort of
     delusion about the rape.

     And I’ll tell you, Judge, I listened to that audio of his
     accounting of what happened 50 times and it is so very
     compelling. I firmly believe this defendant, in his heart,
     knows that his wife was raped and it was that knowledge
     that drove him to revenge and drove him to murder
     Vincent Newsome.

     At the end of the guilty plea hearing, the trial court accepted

the plea of guilty but mentally ill and sentenced Pugh to serve life

in prison with the possibility of parole. In doing so, the trial court

noted:

     The Court finds that Mr. Pugh is entering his plea today
     with an understanding of what’s happening in the
     courtroom. He’s had an opportunity to speak to his
     attorney at length this morning and at other times while
     he’s been in the courthouse. Therefore, the Court finds
     that Mr. Pugh is entering his plea today freely,
     voluntarily, and intelligently. That will be the sentence of
     the court.

     Shortly after pleading guilty but mentally ill, Pugh wrote a

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letter to the trial court trying to withdraw the plea. The trial court

appointed appellate counsel, and on May 12, 2017, appellate counsel

moved to withdraw the plea. On March 28, 2018, the trial court held

a hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, during which Pugh

said he was scared of his plea counsel because his counsel knew the

man who raped his wife. Pugh also said that he had a “fear of death”

because “people at the Gwinnett Sheriff’s Department threatened

his family.” During this hearing, appellate counsel became

concerned about Pugh’s behavior and requested time to file written

argument. The trial court granted the motion, and on April 17, 2019,

appellate counsel submitted an amended motion to withdraw plea.

Another hearing was held on May 15, 2019, in which appellate

counsel requested a post-conviction competency evaluation, which

the trial court ordered.

     Dr. Amy Gambow conducted an evaluation in December 2019.

The evaluation found that Pugh “appeared guarded and disclosed

delusional and paranoid thought content . . . consistent with reports

he made to Gwinnett County Detention Center staff, Defense

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Counsel, and during Court transcripts.” She further found that

Pugh “did not appear to appreciate his current condition and

appeared unable to work with an attorney at this time,” “discussed

delusional thought content related to his case,” and was unlikely to

be able to assist in his defense. As such, it was her opinion that Pugh

was not competent at that time to stand trial and that he was not

competent at the time he entered his plea “based on Court

transcripts of [] Pugh expressing delusional beliefs related to his

case, which likely significantly impaired his appreciation of his

condition at the time he entered his plea. His delusional and

paranoid thought content at the time likely impacted his abilities to

make rational decisions and formulate his defense appropriately.”

     After Dr. Gambow conducted her evaluation, a final hearing on

the motion to withdraw guilty plea was held on April 25, 2022, in

which both plea counsel and Dr. Gambow testified. On September

21, 2022, the trial court 3 denied Pugh’s motion. After considering the

entire record, the plea hearing transcript, and applicable law, the

     3   In 2019, Pugh’s case was reassigned to a new judge.
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trial court found that there was sufficient evidence to show that

Pugh was competent and voluntarily entered his plea. As such, the

trial court found that Pugh’s procedural due process rights were not

violated by the trial court’s failure to order an additional competency

hearing sua sponte at the time of the entry of the guilty plea. The

trial court also determined that, because Pugh was competent at the

time of the plea hearing, his substantive due process rights were not

violated. Finally, on Pugh’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim,

the trial court found no prejudice because Pugh failed to show that,

had his plea counsel requested another competency hearing, it

would have produced a different result.

     2.   Pugh argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he was not competent at

the time he entered his plea and he did not enter the plea

voluntarily.

     The standard for reviewing a denial of a motion to withdraw a

guilty plea is well established. “After sentencing, a defendant may

withdraw his guilty plea only to correct a manifest injustice.” Hood

                                  10
v. State, 315 Ga. 809, 812 (1) (884 SE2d 901) (2023).

     The test for manifest injustice will by necessity vary from
     case to case, but it has been said that withdrawal is
     necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for instance, a
     defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the
     guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an
     understanding of the nature of the charges.

Id. (citation omitted). Among other things, before a defendant can

plead guilty, he must be found competent to stand trial and “a trial

court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights

is knowing and voluntary.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (II)

(B) (113 SCt 2680, 125 LE2d 321) (1993). The State bears the burden

on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to establish that the plea was

entered knowingly and voluntarily and “may meet this burden by

showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant

was cognizant of all the rights he was waiving and the possible

consequences of his plea, or by use of extrinsic evidence that

affirmatively shows the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.”

DeToma v. State, 296 Ga. 90, 91 (1) (765 SE2d 596) (2014) (citations

and punctuation omitted).

                                  11
      Pretermitting whether Pugh was competent when he entered

the guilty plea, the State has failed to meet its burden in proving

that the guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Pugh

stated affirmatively on the record multiple times that the police

“actually threatened to kill my family if I didn’t – if I – if I don’t keep

quiet” and that the police “threatened me about this and they gave

[an] address to my sister – to my sister’s – threatened to go shoot up

the house and everything.” Although the trial court and the State

asked Pugh to clarify several times whether Pugh felt that he was

threatened or was merely feeling pressure to enter the guilty plea,

Pugh never recanted his assertions that he was entering the plea

because he had been threatened.4

      Because the record at the plea hearing does not affirmatively

disclose that Pugh entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, we

      4We recognize the unusual circumstances of this case in which Pugh’s
claims of being threatened appear to have been unfounded, and Dr. Gambow
opined that those claims were delusions. However, it is the State’s burden to
show that Pugh knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea despite
Pugh’s asserted belief that he had been threatened, which the State has failed
to do.

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reverse the denial of the motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea

and remand for further proceedings. 5 See Brady v. United States,

397 U.S. 742 (90 SCt 1463, 25 LE2d 747) (1970) (“The requirement

that a plea of guilty must be intelligent and voluntary to be valid

has long been recognized. The new element added in Boykin was the

requirement that the record must affirmatively disclose that a

defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and

voluntarily.”); Boykin v. Ala., 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (89 SCt 1709, 23

LE2d 274) (1969) (reversing the Supreme Court of Alabama because

the record did not “disclose that the defendant voluntarily and

understandingly entered his pleas of guilty” and explaining that

“coercion, terror, inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats might

be the perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality.”); Winfrey v. State,

304 Ga. 94, 96 (I) (816 SE2d 613) (2018) (holding that trial court’s

participation in the plea was so significant and implicitly

     5 Because we reverse the denial of Pugh’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, we need not consider Pugh’s other claims with respect to this plea. See
Moon v. State, 312 Ga. 31, 50 (3) (860 SE2d 519) (2021) (declining to address
enumerations of error that are not likely to recur on remand).
                                     13
threatening to the defendant that it rendered his plea involuntary);

Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.7 (“The judge shall not accept a plea

of guilty or nolo contendere without first determining, on the record,

that the plea is voluntary.”).

     Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur.

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