Court Opinion

ID: 9739562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:17:39.045951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:23.512429
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: I dissent from the holding of the majority opinion that the defendant cannot be convicted of armed violence in this case. As noted in the opinion, section 33A — 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides: “A person commits armed violence when, while armed with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined by Illinois Law.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 33A — 2.) I believe that the statute means, and was intended by the legislature to mean, just what it says; that is, that a person commits armed violence if he commits any felony defined by Illinois law while armed with a dangerous weapon. Because of our holding in People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 261, the term “double enhancement” seems to have become a part of our vocabulary for discussing the crime of armed violence. I have no quarrel with the holding in Harón because, in that case, the underlying or predicate offense upon which the crime of armed violence was based (aggravated battery) would not have been a felony absent the use of a weapon. This court noted in that opinion that the aggravated-battery charge could have been based on section 12 — 4(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12— 4(a)), which does not involve the use of a weapon. However, the aggravated-battery count against Harón charged that he, in committing the offense, used a deadly weapon which, under section 12 — 4(b)(1), constituted aggravated battery. Thus the enhancement of the misdemeanor offense battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 3) to the felony of aggravated battery was based on the use of a deadly weapon. We held that the use of the same weapon could not also be the basis for the charge of armed violence. The term double enhancement is not appropriately used in referring to offenses under our statute except in the very limited sense as used in Harón. Our armed-violence statute is not a penalty-enhancement statute, but creates an offense separate and distinct from the underlying felony. This court, in Harón, recognized the distinction between penalty-enhancement statutes and statutes which create separate and distinct offenses, as our statute does. In Haron, the court discussed Busic v. United States (1980), 446 U.S. 398, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381, 100 S. Ct. 1747, In re Shull (1944), 23 Cal. 2d 745, 146 P.2d 417, and State v. Workman (1978), 90 Wash. 2d 443, 584 P.2d 382. These cases involved penalty-enhancement statutes and prohibited double enhancement of the penalty for the use of a weapon when the predicate offense involved the use of a weapon. In Harón, this court also quoted at length from Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder’s Court Judge (1979), 406 Mich. 374, 280 N.W.2d 793, which held that the Michigan statute was not a penalty-enhancement statute but created a separate offense for the carrying of a weapon during the commission of a felony. The Michigan court stated: “The Legislature has clearly expressed its judgment that carrying a firearm during any felony which may, but need not necessarily, involve the carrying of a firearm, entails a distinct social harm *** which deserves separate treatment. In order to deter the use of guns, the Legislature has chosen to create a separate crime.” 406 Mich. 374, 391, 280 N.W.2d 793, 796. Our armed-violence statute likewise clearly creates a separate and distinct offense in section 3 3A— 2 and provides for a separate and distinct penalty for that offense in section 33A — 3. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 33A — 2, 33A — 3.) These sections do not provide for an enhancement of the penalty provided for another offense, nor do these sections provide that the penalty for armed violence shall be served consecutively with the penalty for another offense. It is a separate offense with a separate penalty. In People v. Donaldson (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 164, 169, this court noted that the Michigan court in Wayne County Prosecutor held that the Michigan statute not only creates a separate crime but also provides that the sentence must be imposed in addition to the sentence for the underlying felony. Thus, under the Michigan statute, a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for both a predicate felony and also convicted and sentenced under the felony firearm statute. In Donaldson this court held that, under the Illinois statute, a defendant could not be sentenced for both the predicate felony and for armed violence, but sentence could be imposed only for the most serious offense (armed violence). Sentence could not in addition be imposed for the conviction of the predicate felony. Our appellate court, in People v. Viens (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 1017, in my opinion, properly construed our armed-violence statute. In that case the defendant was charged with aggravated kidnaping with a deadly weapon and he was also charged with armed violence. The court declined to follow Harón, noting that in the case it was considering the use of a weapon did not serve to enhance the underlying offense from a misdemeanor to a felony as had been the case in Harón. At most, the court stated, the use of the weapon only served to establish a more serious predicate felony (aggravated kidnaping) than would otherwise have been proved (kidnaping). In Viens, the court also distinguished our statute from penalty-enhancement statutes and pointed out that the statute in this State creates a separate crime with its own penalty. The court, in Viens, followed Donaldson and permitted the sentence to stand for armed violence, but vacated the conviction for the predicate felony, aggravated kidnaping. In our case, as in Viens, the underlying offense was not enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony by the use of a weapon. The underlying felony was attempted armed robbery. The defendant had attempted to commit a robbery while armed with a shotgun. This would constitute a Class 1 felony. If the defendant had not been armed, the attempted robbery would have constituted a Class 3 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 8 — 4; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 18 — 1, 18 — 2.) Since this felony was committed while armed with a dangerous weapon, defendant’s conduct also constituted armed violence. If the weapon is a category 1 weapon, as it was in this case, the offense is a Class X felony. The defendant’s conduct, under our statutes, constitutes two separate offenses, one of which, attempted armed robbery, is a Class 1 felony, and the other offense, armed violence while armed with a category 1 weapon, constitutes a Class X felony. Thus two alternatives are provided which may be available for plea-bargaining purposes, or for lenity considerations. See Busic v. United States (1980), 446 U.S. 398, 416, 64 L. Ed. 2d 381, 395, 100 S. Ct. 1747, 1758 (Stewart, J., dissenting). There is just ho reason for not following the clear language of the statute, which states that a person commits armed violence when, while armed with a dangerous weapon, “he commits any felony defined by Illinois law.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 33A — 2.) The statute does not say “any felony defined by Illinois law except those in which a dangerous weapon is used.” There is no constitutional impediment to giving effect to the plain language of the statute. Why then should this court read into this statute a limitation which is contrary to its plain language. If the legislature intended that armed violence could not be based upon a predicate felony committed while the defendant was armed, it could easily have so provided. The legislature knows how to provide for exceptions in a criminal statute. In defining the sentence for attempt, it excepted an attempt to commit the offense defined in section 33A — 2 (armed violence). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 8 — 4(c).) It did not make a similar exception as to the application of the armed-violence statute. Instead, the statute states that a person commits armed violence when, while armed with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined by Illinois law. I would hold that in this case attempted armed robbery can serve as a predicate felony for armed violence. As in Donaldson and Viens, I would vacate the conviction for the predicate felony and affirm the conviction and sentence for the more serious offense, armed violence. That is what both the trial court and the appellate court did in this case. I would therefore affirm both the circuit court of Du Page County and the appellate court.