Court Opinion

ID: 9657087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:13:21.806522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:08.328030
License: Public Domain

Lesinski, C. J.
Plaintiffs, tenants of a housing project in the city of River Rouge, sought a writ of mandamus below to compel defendant as mayor of that city to establish a board of tenant affairs pursuant to section 49 of the municipal housing *13facilities act, MCLA § 125.651, et seq. (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 5.3011, et seq.). Section 49 of the act, MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 125.699 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 5.3056 [3]), is a recent amendment (to the act) which, together with other recently added sections,1 creates boards of tenant affairs for cities with housing commissions and housing projects with the cooperation of the chief executives of the municipalities. From the trial court’s granting of the writ, defendant appeals as of right.
The title to the act, as amended by PA 1968, No 344, § 1, reads:
“An act to authorize any city, village or township to purchase, acquire, construct, maintain, operate, improve, extend and repair housing facilities; to eliminate housing conditions which are detrimental to the public peace, health, safety, morals or welfare; and for any such purposes to authorize any such city, village or township to create by a commission with power to effectuate said purposes, and to prescribe the powers and duties of such commission and of such city, village or township; and for any such purposes to authorize any such city, village or township to issue notes and revenue bonds; to require the issuance, sale, retirement and refunding of such notes and bonds; to regulate the rentals of such projects and the use of the revenues of the projects; to prescribe the manner of selecting tenants for such projects; to provide for condemnation of private property for such projects; to confer certain powers upon such cities, villages and townships in relation to such projects, including the power to receive aid and cooperation of the federal government; to provide for a referendum thereon; to create a board of tenant affairs in any city of 1,000,000 or over having a housing commission and *14operating 1 or more housing projects; to define the powers and duties of such board; to provide for the right of appeal from its determinations; and for other purposes.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 49 of the act, also added by PA 1968, No 344, provides:
“There is created a board of tenant affairs for each city, village or township having a housing commission and operating 1 or more housing projects as provided by this act.”
On appeal, defendant challenges the constitutional validity of § 49 in that the body of the act mandates the creation of a board of tenant affairs for housing project cities, villages, and townships without limitation as to population whereas the title of the act, as amended, indicates that such boards are to exist only for cities with populations of 1,000,000 or more.2 Const 1963, art 4, § 24 establishes:
“No law shall embrace more than one object which shall be expressed in its title.”
It is axiomatic that the body of an act must be reasonably harmonious with its title. McKellar v. Detroit (1885), 57 Mich 158. The purpose of the constitutional requirement is to make certain that the title of a legislative act must give notice to legislators, and others interested, of the object of the law, thereby assuring* them that only matters germane to the object expressed in the title will be enacted into law. Continental Motors Corporation v. Township of Muskegon (1965), 376 Mich 170, 179. See, also, Leininger v. Secretary of State (1947), 316 Mich 644; Regents of University of Michigan v. Pray (1933), 264 Mich 693; People v. *15Carroll (1936), 274 Mich 451; People v. Wohlford (1924), 226 Mich 166. The title of the act must be sufficiently broad to permit the enactment of the provisions found in the body of the legislation. People v. Wohlford, supra, p 168. The constitutional test to be applied is in Vernor v. Secretary of State (1914), 179 Mich 157, 160:
“What is the constitutional test? We think it is that a title must embrace the object of the act, and the body of the act must not be inconsistent with the title. The pertinent questions should be: Does the title of the act fairly indicate the purpose of the legislation? Is the title a fair index of the act? Does the title of the act fairly inform the legislators and the public of its purposes, as a whole?”
Undeniably, the title of the act, as amended, requiring the creation of boards in housing project cities of 1,000,000 or more, is more restrictive in scope than the body of the act which establishes a board for each city, village and township with a housing project.3 When the title of an act relates to designated municipal corporations and the body of the statute affects municipal corporations not specified by the title, the legislation may not be constitutionally applied to the local governments not indicated by the title. Wilcox v. Paddock (1887), 65 Mich 23; Hume v. Village of Fruitport (1928), 242 Mich 698.
We hold that where, as here, the body of the act is broader in scope than the limitations of the title of the act, the title shall prevail over the conflicting portion of the body of the act. See Arnold v. Ogle Construction Company (1952), 333 *16Mich. 652. As such we hold that defendant may not be required by virtue of § 49 to establish a board of tenant affairs.
A word is now due on plaintiffs’ contention that the above holding deprives plaintiffs of equal protection of law.4 US Const, Am 14; Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 2. The statute gives boards of tenant affairs broad powers to veto housing commission rules and to review denials of admissions to public housing, evictions, and rental increases. MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 125.702 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 5.3056[6]). Plaintiffs maintain that a construction of the act limiting § 49 of the act to cities with public housing commissions and public housing projects having populations of 1,000,000 or more unconstitutionally deprives them of the right to elect a board which could check arbitrary housing commission action.
Legislative classification by population will be upheld where there is a reasonable relationship between the restriction and population. Hayes v. Auditor General (1915), 184 Mich 39; Kates v. Reading (1931), 254 Mich 158; Chamski v. Wayne County Board of Auditors (1939), 288 Mich 238; Sullivan v. Graham (1953), 336 Mich 65. It has been held that the fact that legislation contains a population classification which limits the present application of the act to municipalities over 1,000,000 does not necessarily make the act local or special. Airport Community Schools v. State Board of Education (1969), 17 Mich App 574. Equal protection of the laws does not prevent a reasonable classification by legislative enactment and the ultimate decision as to the wisdom *17of such laws rests with the Legislature. Tribbett v. Village of Marcellus (1940), 294 Mich 607, 614.
We are unable to say that restriction of the act as expressed in the' title of the legislation is arbitrary. The Legislature could reasonably determine that tenants of public housing projects in large cities face considerably different problems than do tenants in smaller cities, such as to warrant classification. For example, tenants in large city public housing projects must compete with a greater number of tenants for individual attention. Tenants of such projects — because they live in the midst of huge urban areas — must cope with not only living in public housing but also living in large cities. Many such distinguishing features exist.
Nor do we think that Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County (1969), 383 Mich 10, requires a different result. There, legislation established a statewide compensation distribution program for county probation departments, but excepted existing departments in counties with populations of over 500,000. This exception was struck down by the Court as local legislation, principally because the distinction drawn was unreasonable. The Court noted that the function of probation officers is to rehabilitate criminals and since there is a greater need for such work in heavily populated areas, the legislative classification defied logic. Further, the act excepted departments “heretofore established” in counties of 500,000 which narrowed the exception, in effect, to Wayne County.
In the case before us, we see an act limited to large cities and we are of the opinion that many valid reasons may be advanced to justify that limitation. We do not read Wayne Circuit Judges as precedent for elevating the rights of small city public housing project tenants on an equal protection basis.
*18Reversed. No costs, a public question being involved.
O’Hara, J., concurred.

 MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 125.700 (Stat Ann § 5.3056[4]); MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 125.701 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 5.3056[5]).

 The city of Biver Bouge has a population of approximately 20,000.

 The Legislature itself has apparently recognized the defect in the title. HB 3721, introduced April 15, 1969, attempted to cure the imperfection by making title and body consistent by broadening the title. The bill was defeated.

 See, also, Midi Const 1963, art 4, § 29, as to the constitutional prohibition against special and local acts where a general act can be made applicable. Analyses of special and local legislation and legislation which is violative of the equal protection clause are substantially similar. See Walters v. Binder (Ky, 1968), 435 SW2d 464, 466.