Court Opinion

ID: 9544644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:58:32.468252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:21.283633
License: Public Domain

COGSWELL, District Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the final result reached by the majority. The defendant was properly and fully informed of his constitutional rights and he gave a knowing and intelligent waiver thereof. The judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
Although it is not necessary for the determination reached herein, the majority opinion holds that the interrogation of Sandoval was not “custodial interrogation” as defined in Escobedo and Miranda. With this conclusion I must dissent.
I agree that the “ * * * evil to be guarded against is the psychological coercion on a person to speak when confronted with official interrogation in a private, isolated, incommunicado, police-dominated atmosphere.”
This case was in the accusatory phase at the time of interrogation. Sandoval is a 21 year old, Navajo Indian, with five years of schooling. He was injured from the automobile accident. He was in a surrounding unfamiliar to him, i. e., the hospital. He was confronted with a uniformed officer and the prosecuting attorney of the county. Extensive and complete steps were taken by the officer, in this atmosphere, to inform Sandoval of his constitutional rights guaranteed by Miranda. There can be little question that if Sandoval had leaped from the bed and attempted to leave, he would have been detained.
A formal arrest was not made prior to interrogation, however, I do not understand that arrest is essential to placing an accused “in custody.” As stated in People v. Arnold, 66 Cal.2d 438, 58 Cal.Rptr. 115, 426 P.2d 515 (1967):
“In other words, if the formality of an arrest were a strict condition precedent to the advent of the accusatory stage, the police could, by delaying the arrest where the situation did not demand one, circumvent the accused’s right to counsel and nevertheless, subject him to tactics designed to elicit incriminating statements * * *. ” (emphasis added)
The majority decision may tend to give license to law enforcement officers to focus their investigation on a particular suspect; to carry out a process of interro*862gation in order to elicit incriminating statements; and yet be relieved of the sanctions of the Miranda decision because the defendant was isolated in a hospital rather than in the atmosphere of the local police station.
In this case it is my opinion that Sandoval’s freedom of movement was constructively restricted while in the accusatory stage, and the defendant was “in custody” when the interrogation took place. People v. Arnold, supra; State v. Carpenter, supra.