Court Opinion

ID: 9363083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 18:57:02.509026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:28.453240
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEFFREY REICHERT; GARY                No. 21-35530
MOYER, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly      D.C. No. 3:17-cv-
situated,                             05848-BHS

       Plaintiffs-Appellees,
                                        OPINION
 v.

RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.,
DBA Access Freedom, DBA
Rapid Financial Solutions;
CACHE VALLEY BANK,

       Defendants-Appellants,

and

KEEFE COMMISSARY
NETWORK, LLC, DBA Access
Corrections,

       Defendant.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Western District of Washington
       Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
2               REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.

             Argued and Submitted May 12, 2022
                      Portland, Oregon

                    Filed December 30, 2022

    Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Morgan Christen, Circuit
         Judges, and Frederic Block, * District Judge.

                       Per Curiam Opinion

                          SUMMARY **

                            Arbitration
    The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying
defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, under the Federal
Arbitration Act, of claims under the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act and Washington state law.
    Plaintiff Gary Moyer, who represents both a Washington
and a national class, was incarcerated three times in the
Kitsap County Jail. In each instance, the jail confiscated his
cash at booking and returned it to him in the form of a
prepaid debit card issued and serviced, respectively, by
defendants Cache Valley Bank and Rapid Investments, Inc.
(collectively, “Rapid”). Moyer was not provided an option
to receive his money in any other form. After his third
release, he used the card the day it was issued to him to

*
 The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
**
   This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
              REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.            3

withdraw the bulk of his balance from an ATM
machine. Moyer claimed that Rapid’s debit cards carried
fees that violated the EFTA and Washington state
law. Rapid sought arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
provision in a cardholder agreement.
    Rapid argued that the district court erred in determining
that Moyer’s retention and use of the release cards did not
demonstrate, as a matter of law, his intent to accept the terms
of the agreement, including the arbitration clause. Applying
Washington law, the panel disagreed. Explaining that
Washington law is clear that inaction in response to an offer
is not acceptance, the panel wrote that Moyer’s retention of
the release card, prior to use, cannot constitute assent to the
agreement. The panel next considered whether Moyer’s
subsequent use of the card to withdraw funds, while
remaining silent, constituted assent. The panel held that
because the money Moyer withdrew was his own, because
the card he was issued came pre-activated and there was no
other way to obtain immediate use of his own funds, and
because Rapid structured its fees to begin deducting after
three days regardless of use, Moyer’s decision to withdraw
his own money cannot reasonably be understood to manifest
assent to the contract. Because Moyer did not assent to the
agreement through either his receipt or use of the release
card, no contract was formed. The panel therefore affirmed
the district court’s order denying Rapid’s motion to compel
arbitration and remanded for further proceedings.
4             REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.

                         COUNSEL

George F. Verschelden (argued), Stinson LLP, Kansas City,
Missouri; Emily J. Harris, Corr Cronin Michelson
Baumgardner Fogg & Moore LLP, Seattle, Washington; for
Defendants-Appellants.
Chris R. Youtz (argued), Richard E. Spoonemore, and
Eleanor Hamburger, Sirianni Youtz Spoonemore
Hamburger PLLC, Seattle, Washington; Masimba
Mutamba, Palm Beach County Attorney’s Office, West
Palm Beach, Florida; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

                         OPINION

PER CURIAM:

    Plaintiff Gary Moyer was incarcerated in the Kitsap
County Jail three times. In each instance, the jail confiscated
his cash at booking and returned it to him upon release not
in cash or by check, but in the form of a prepaid debit or
“release” card issued and serviced, respectively, by
defendants Cache Valley Bank and Rapid Investments, Inc.
(collectively, “Rapid”). The cards, which Moyer did not
request and to which no alternative was offered, were
delivered to Moyer pre-activated, and in two of the three
instances began to charge maintenance fees before Moyer
conducted a single transaction. After his third release,
Moyer used the release card the day it was issued to him to
withdraw the bulk of his balance from an ATM machine.
    Moyer represents both a Washington class and a national
class. He claims that Rapid’s debit cards carry fees that
              REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.          5

violate the federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act and
Washington state law. Those claims have not yet been
adjudicated because Rapid moved to compel arbitration,
invoking an arbitration provision in its cardholder
agreement. We hold that Moyer did not agree to the
cardholder agreement or its mandatory arbitration clause.
Because acceptance is an issue of contract formation, it
requires judicial resolution. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s order denying Rapid’s motion to compel
arbitration.
                              I
    Moyer was incarcerated in the Kitsap County,
Washington jail in May and December 2017 and February
2018. In accord with Washington law, his cash was
confiscated by jail officers each time he was booked. Upon
his release, Moyer received a Rapid debit card, known as a
“release card,” with a balance of $14.62 in May 2017, $40
in December 2017, and $95.26 in February 2018. Moyer
was not provided an option to receive his money in any other
form. In February 2018, a guard specifically instructed
Moyer that if he wanted his money back, he needed to take
the card.
     Each release card had a sticker affixed to the front
stating: “This card has already been activated.” Text on the
back of the cards advised that “[b]y accepting and or using
this card, you agree to the Account Agreement.” Moyer
received the Account Agreement (“Agreement”) for the
February 2018 card; whether he also read it on the earlier
occasions is not clear.
    Rapid entered two substantially similar cardholder
agreements into evidence—one in use as of June 2016 and
one that went into effect in February 2018. The record is not
6             REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.

conclusive as to which of these agreements Moyer received
with his February 2018 card.
    Both versions of the Agreement begin with the following
terms of acceptance:
       This     Cardholder        Agreement        (this
       “Agreement”) sets forth the terms of your
       non-reloadable prepaid Card. Please read it
       carefully and retain it for your records. If you
       do not agree to these terms, do not use the
       Card and cancel it by calling Customer
       Service at 1-877-287-2448. Otherwise, your
       acceptance and/or use of the Card will be
       evidence of your agreement to these terms.

Both agreements also have a section governing
“Cancellation and Suspension,” but with slightly different
provisions. In the earlier (June 2016) Agreement, the
“Cancellation and Suspension” term states that the
cardholder “may cancel [the] Card by calling Customer
Service at 1-877-287-2448” and explains that if Rapid elects
to cancel or suspend card privileges “through no fault of [the
cardholder’s], [the cardholder] will be entitled to a refund of
the remaining balance without charge.” In a separate fee
schedule, closing the card with check disbursement is listed
as triggering a $10 fee.
    The later (February 2018) Agreement contains identical
language as to cancellation, but the fee for closing the
account with check disbursement is $0. That Agreement
also contains an additional “Consent” term absent in the
prior agreement: “Individuals who believe they have
received this card non-consensually will be entitled to full
refund of any fees charged to the card. Individuals can claim
              REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.          7

their full balance by visiting dailypay.me or calling the
number on the back of the card.” Neither Agreement
specifies the length of time required to close an account and
receive a disbursement check. The Agreement is clear that
cardholders will not receive interest “for any amount loaded
on the Card.”
    Both versions of the Agreement contain arbitration
provisions. Capitalized text at the beginning of the
document notes that the Agreement “REQUIRES
CERTAIN DISPUTES TO BE RESOLVED BY WAY OF
BINDING ARBITRATION, RATHER THAN BY JURY
TRIAL.” (Emphasis in original.) A later paragraph explains
that:
       any controversy that arises out of or is related
       to (a) the Card, (b) any service relating to the
       Card, or (c) this Agreement, whether based
       on statute, contract, tort or any other legal
       theory, in which the aggregate amount in
       controversy for all claimants exceeds
       $15,000, including interest and attorneys’
       fees, (any “Claim”) will be settled on an
       individual basis by binding arbitration under
       the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).

The arbitration provision further specifies: “Any dispute
regarding whether a particular controversy is subject to
arbitration will be decided by the arbitrator(s).”
    The Agreement details a $2.50 per week maintenance fee
the company deducts automatically “begin[ning] 3 calendar
days after the Card is issued.” ATM withdrawals incur a fee
of $2.95 per transaction. In May and December 2017,
maintenance fees were charged on the third calendar day
8             REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.

after the cards were issued. Moyer had not yet used either
card to withdraw funds. In February 2018, Moyer used the
card on the day of his release to withdraw $80 from an ATM,
incurring a $2.95 fee. Moyer was charged the first
“[p]eriodic maintenance fee” on that card three days later,
followed by additional weekly maintenance fees over the
following four weeks, exhausting his remaining $12 balance.
    The lawsuit leading to this appeal was filed as a putative
class action by Jeffrey Reichert. Like Moyer, Reichert
received a Rapid debit card upon his release from the Kitsap
County Jail. Unlike Moyer, he denied having received any
cardmember agreement with his card.
    Rapid moved to compel arbitration because the
classwide damages requested exceed the $15,000 threshold
contained in the arbitration agreement. Noting that Reichert
claimed not to have received the Agreement containing the
arbitration clause, the district court denied the motion.
Reichert then moved to certify a class. The district court
granted the motion but conditioned class certification on the
addition of a plaintiff who had received the Agreement.
Moyer was added as a named plaintiff to satisfy that
condition.
    Rapid moved to compel arbitration of Moyer’s claims.
The district court denied the motion “for the reasons recited
in the Court’s prior Order Denying Motion to Compel
Arbitration.” The court found that Moyer’s claims were
identical to Reichert’s “in all material respects.” Rapid
appealed, and another panel of this court held that it was
“unclear whether the district court properly considered all
relevant facts and circumstances specific to Moyer—
particularly because there was no declaration from Moyer in
the record.” Reichert v. Rapid Invs., Inc., 826 F. App’x 656,
              REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.           9

657 (9th Cir. 2020). Our court vacated the district court’s
order denying the motion to compel arbitration and
remanded the case, declining to “express any views on
whether a valid, enforceable agreement exists.” Id. at 658.
    On remand, the district court focused on whether Moyer
had accepted an offer to enter into the Agreement,
concluding that “Moyer’s use of the card did not constitute
assent to [the] contract.” The district court reasoned that
under Washington law, neither Moyer’s silence nor his
failure to cancel the card according to the terms of the
Agreement could be considered an acceptance.
   Based on that reasoning, the district court denied the
motion to compel arbitration. Rapid timely appealed.
                              II
                             A.
    “We review the district court’s decision on a motion to
compel arbitration de novo.” Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan
Mar., LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2011). “We also
review the validity and scope of an arbitration clause de
novo.” Id. “We review the factual findings underlying the
district court’s decision for clear error.” Id.
    The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that
arbitration clauses in commercial contracts are “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA is “a congressional declaration of a
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies
to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
10            REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.

    At the same time, the FAA “reflects the fundamental
principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.” Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
Accordingly, the FAA “does not require parties to arbitrate
when they have not agreed to do so,” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478 (1989), and a court may order a dispute to arbitration
only if, under the applicable principles of state contract law,
“the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that
dispute,” Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561
U.S. 287, 297 (2010) (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)) (original emphasis
omitted). Courts thus retain the responsibility to determine
the threshold issue of whether an enforceable contract exists.
See Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
925 F.2d 1136, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 1991).
    The type of objection to arbitration determines whether
the issue is for the arbitrator or the court. Questions
regarding the validity or enforceability of a contract, unless
they relate specifically to the arbitration clause, are for the
arbitrator to decide. See Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72;
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440,
445–46 (2006); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967). By contrast, “[i]t is . . .
well settled that where the dispute at issue concerns contract
formation, the dispute is generally for courts to decide.”
Granite Rock Co., 561 U.S. at 296; see also Kum Tat Ltd. v.
Linden Ox Pasture, LLC, 845 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“[C]hallenges to the very existence of the contract are, in
general, properly directed to the court.”). Moyer’s challenge
to the Agreement as a whole for lack of acceptance and
consideration—elements of contract formation—is thus a
matter to be determined by a court.
              REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.           11

    “In determining whether a valid arbitration agreement
exists, federal courts ‘apply ordinary state-law principles
that govern the formation of contracts.’” Nguyen v. Barnes
& Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
First Options, 514 U.S. at 944). The parties agree that
Washington law governs. Rapid, as the party seeking to
compel arbitration, must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the parties formed an agreement to arbitrate.
Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir.
2014).
                              B.
    The formation of a contract in Washington requires
mutual assent to sufficiently definite terms, as well as
consideration. Keystone Land & Dev. Co. v. Xerox Corp.,
94 P.3d 945, 949 (Wash. 2004) (en banc); see also Yakima
Cnty. (W. Valley) Fire Prot. Dist. No. 12 v. City of Yakima,
858 P.2d 245, 255 (Wash. 1993). Moyer argues that he did
not enter into a valid contract with Rapid in February 2018
when he received the Agreement because he did not assent
to any of its terms and, alternatively, because the contract
lacks consideration. We first consider assent. Like the
district court, we concentrate on the February 2018
transaction because in only that instance is it undisputed that
Moyer received an Agreement with the release card.
     Washington follows the objective manifestation theory
of contract, which “lays stress on the outward manifestation
of assent made by each party to the other.” City of Everett
v. Sumstad’s Est., 631 P.2d 366, 367 (Wash. 1981). Under
this approach, the court “impute[s] an intention
corresponding to the reasonable meaning of a person’s
words and acts.” Id. “The subjective intention of the parties
is irrelevant.” Id. Mutual assent is ordinarily a question of
12            REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.

fact but may be determined as a matter of law “if reasonable
minds could not differ.” P.E. Systems, LLC v. CPI Corp.,
289 P.3d 638, 643 (Wash. 2012). Rapid argues that the
district court erred in determining that Moyer’s retention and
use of the release cards did not demonstrate, as a matter of
law, his intent to accept the terms of the Agreement,
including the arbitration clause. We disagree.
     First, Moyer’s retention of the release card, prior to use,
cannot constitute assent to the Agreement. Washington law
is clear that inaction in response to an offer is not acceptance.
See Roethemeyer v. Milton, 33 P.2d 99, 101 (Wash. 1934)
(“The failure to reject an offer is not equivalent to assent.”).
The terms of the Agreement specify assent through
“acceptance and/or use” but the offer cannot abrogate
Washington law. “[E]ven though the offer states that silence
will be taken as consent, silence on the part of the offeree
cannot turn the offer into an agreement, as the offerer cannot
prescribe conditions so as to turn silence into acceptance.”
Id. at 102 (quoting Columbia Malting Co. v Clausen-
Flanagan Corp., 3 F.2d 547, 551 (2d Cir. 1924)); see also
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69, cmt. c (“The mere
fact that an offeror states that silence will constitute
acceptance does not deprive the offeree of his privilege to
remain silent without accepting.”).
    Nor was Moyer under a duty to act—the “exceptional”
circumstance in which silence or inaction may constitute
acceptance. Bybee Farms, LLC v. Snake River Sugar Co.,
625 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1083 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (citing the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69); see Roethemeyer,
33 P.2d at 101 (“Silence is not assent, unless there is a duty
to speak . . . .” (quoting Columbia Malting Co., 3 F.2d at
551)).    Such a duty may arise where the offeree
“encourage[s]” the offeror to view silence as acceptance. Id.
              REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.          13

A duty to reject an offer may also arise where state law
imposes a duty to act, a prior course of dealing between the
parties makes assent by silence reasonable or expected, or
the offeree retains a benefit “by failing to act.” Norcia v.
Samsung Telecomm. America, LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1285–
86 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying a similar California contract law
principle to hold that the purchaser of a phone did not have
a duty to “opt out” of an arbitration agreement to avoid
assent where no California law imposed a duty, no prior
course of dealing existed between the parties “that might
impose a duty on [the plaintiff] to act,” and the plaintiff
retained no benefit from failing to act); see also Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 69, cmt. a (noting two “exceptional”
cases in which silence may be taken as acceptance: (1)
“those where the offeree silently takes offered benefits” and
(2) when a party relies on the other party’s manifestation of
intention that silence may indicate acceptance).
    Here, Moyer did not encourage Rapid to consider his
silence to be acceptance. Moyer did not request or choose
the release card as the means to regain his money and had no
pre-contract communication with Rapid. Moyer also did not
engage in a prior course of dealings that would have imposed
on him a duty to act and did not retain a benefit simply by
leaving the jail with the card and the Agreement in hand.
Accordingly, no exceptional circumstances placed a duty on
Moyer to act affirmatively in response to Rapid’s offer.
Because Moyer’s receipt and retention of the release card did
not objectively manifest assent, no contract was formed at
the time Moyer exited the jail with the card or when he
retained the card prior to use.
    We next consider whether Moyer’s subsequent use of the
card to withdraw funds, while remaining silent, constituted
assent to those terms, including the arbitration provisions.
14           REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.

We hold that because the money Moyer withdrew was his
own, because the card he was issued came pre-activated and
there was no other way to obtain immediate use of his own
funds, and because Rapid structured its fees to begin
deducting after three days regardless of use, Moyer’s
decision to withdraw his own money cannot reasonably be
understood to manifest assent to the contract.
    Under Washington’s objective manifestation rule,
conduct may constitute acceptance when the “reasonable
meaning” of a person’s actions is to assent to the offer.
Plumbing Shop, Inc. v. Pitts, 408 P.2d 382, 384 (Wash.
1965). The reasonable meaning of a party’s actions depends
on the “outward manifestations and circumstances
surrounding the transaction.” Burnett v. Pagliacci Pizza,
Inc., 470 P.3d 486, 492 (Wash. 2020) (emphasis added); see
also Jacob’s Meadow Owners Ass’n v. Plateau 44 II, LLC,
162 P.3d 1153, 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that
“[t]he existence of mutual assent may be deduced from the
circumstances” including “the ordinary course of dealing
between the parties”). Commentary to the Restatement
similarly emphasizes the importance of context when
determining whether conduct constitutes assent:
       Like words, non-verbal conduct often has
       different meanings to different people.
       Indeed, the meaning of conduct not used as a
       conventional symbol is more uncertain and
       more dependent on its setting than are words.
       A wide variety of elements of the total
       situation may be relevant to the interpretation
       of such conduct.
              REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.         15

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19, cmt. a. Thus, the
circumstances surrounding an offer determine the meaning
that may be reasonably imputed to a party’s actions in
response.
    Turning to the circumstances of this offer, like other
individuals who have been released from jail or prison and
given prepaid debit cards, Moyer was presented with a
release card as the only way for him to receive his own
confiscated money. See e.g., Brown v. Stored Value Cards,
Inc., 953 F.3d 567, 573 (9th Cir. 2020); Pope v. EZ Card &
Kiosk LLC, No. 15-61046-CIV, 2015 WL 5308852, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2015); cf. Regan v. Stored Value Cards,
Inc., 85 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2015), aff’d, 608
F. App’x 895 (11th Cir. 2015). Additionally, in February
2018, as on the occasions in 2017, the card Moyer was issued
was given to him already activated and Rapid began to
deduct maintenance fees of $2.50 per week after three days
regardless of whether Moyer used the card. Indeed, when
Moyer was issued cards in May and December 2017, Rapid
charged maintenance fees before any withdrawal. These
fees significantly reduced the amount of Moyer’s funds that
he was able to reclaim from the jail. In December 2017, half
of the money deposited onto Moyer’s release card was
consumed by maintenance fees. In May 2017, fees reduced
the original $14.62 deposited to the card by one third.
    Finally, the ambiguity of the terms governing a
cardholder’s decision to request his balance through a check,
as opposed to withdrawal, further explains Moyer’s decision
to use the card to withdraw his funds. Neither Agreement
specified how long it would take to close the release card
account and receive a check.
16           REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.

    In sum, Moyer was presented with one option to retrieve
his own money right away—a withdrawal via an ATM. His
money would be reduced by significant increments each
week Moyer retained, but did not use, the card.
Withdrawing the money presented a more immediate way to
access the funds than any alternative presented in the fine
print Agreement. And Moyer was under no obligation to
follow an alternative process, having not assented to the
Agreement’s terms through retention of the card. Under
these circumstances, reasonable minds could not find that
Moyer objectively manifested assent to the terms of the
Agreement by using the card to obtain his own money. See
City of Everett, 631 P.2d at 367.
    Rapid argues that regardless of context, Moyer retained
a “benefit”—disbursement of funds through use of the
card—and therefore manifested assent by withdrawing
funds. When a party accepts a benefit or services from
another in circumstances in which it is clear the other party
expects compensation or has imposed particular terms, the
party has assented to those terms. See Jones v. Brisbin, 247
P.2d 891, 894 (Wash. 1952). Indeed, “[i]t is standard
contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to
stated conditions, and the offeree makes a decision to take
the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offer, the
taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms, which
accordingly become binding on the offeree.” Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004).
    In Washington, however, acceptance of a benefit does
not constitute assent unless the offeree has been presented a
“reasonable opportunity to reject [the] offered services.”
Jones, 247 P.2d at 894. The Restatement enunciates the
same requirement, stating that acceptance of an offer may be
inferred “[w]here an offeree takes the benefit of offered
              REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.           17

services with reasonable opportunity to reject them and
reason to know that they were offered with the expectation
of compensation.” Restatement (Second) of Contract §
69(1)(a) (emphasis added).
    An offeree has been provided with a reasonable
opportunity to reject services or a benefit when, for instance,
the services or benefit are provided over a period of time in
which communication between the parties is regular and
objection to or clarification of terms is possible. For
example, in Jones v. Brisbin, a builder solicited plans from
an architectural firm over a three-month period of
negotiations in which he provided sketches and other
detailed requests to the firm and met with the firm’s
representatives in person three or four times. Jones, 247
P.2d at 892. The Washington Supreme Court held that the
builder’s subsequent receipt and submission of fully
completed architectural plans to government officials was a
benefit the builder accepted after a reasonable opportunity to
reject and so constituted acceptance of a contract for
architectural services. Id. at 893–94. Hoglund v. Meeks
similarly affirmed a trial court’s determination that a
lawyer’s acceptance of another attorney’s work product
constituted assent where that attorney had been involved
throughout the case, and the attorneys had a long
professional relationship with fee-splitting agreements under
similar circumstance. 170 P.3d 37, 46–47 (Wash. Ct. App.
2007).
    Here, insofar as Moyer accepted a benefit, the lack of any
“reasonable opportunity” to reject the card services defeats
an inference of assent. Jones, 247 P.2d at 894. Unlike the
offerees in Jones or Hoglund, who affirmatively solicited
and negotiated the benefits they later accepted, Moyer did
not request that his money be delivered through the prepaid
18           REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.

release card and did not negotiate with Rapid in person, by
phone, or in writing. Jones, 247 P.2d at 892; Hoglund, 170
P.3d at 46–47. Nor did Moyer receive the alleged benefit
over a period of time comparable to the months and years
during which the parties interacted in Jones and Hoglund.
Rather, Rapid structured its card agreement such that
maintenance fees would begin after three days, drastically
shortening the time Moyer had to act before losing his own
money.
    A final critical factor that distinguishes this case from
Jones and Hoglund is that in those cases, rejection of
services would incur no penalty for the offeree—the offerees
faced no financial fees or loss of personal property in
rejecting the services at issue. Jones, 247 P.2d at 892;
Hoglund, 170 P.3d at 46–47. Moyer, by contrast, faced an
ambiguous cancellation provision with unclear expense and
timing, one that was undoubtedly more costly and time-
consuming than opting out of the card before it was issued,
an option Moyer was not provided. Instead, Moyer had three
options: (1) to abstain from using the card to reject
services—a total forfeit of his own money; (2) to cancel the
card and request his money—an option that would incur a
wait of at least several days without any access to funds; or
(3) to use the card, incurring withdrawal fees but recovering
the bulk of his funds. The financial penalties of “rejecting”
the benefit in this circumstance, coupled with a lack of
established communication with Rapid and a compressed
timeline in which to act, make the opportunity available to
Moyer to reject the benefit unreasonable, precluding an
inference of assent through his use of the card.
    Contrary to Rapid’s argument, these same distinctions
make cases emerging from the consumer credit card context
inapplicable here. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Ray, 162 P.3d
              REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.           19

1131, 1132–33 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); Schmidt v. Samsung
Elecs. Am., Inc., No. C16-1725-JCC, 2017 WL 2289035, at
*3 (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2017). We agree with the district
court that cases about consumer credit card disputes, in
which individuals take affirmative steps to order and apply
for cards, check boxes accepting terms and conditions, and
use the cards over a period of time (often years), do not
support the conclusion that Moyer accepted a benefit with
reasonable opportunity to reject services. See Regan, 85 F.
Supp. 3d at 1364 (rejecting the applicability of such
consumer credit card cases to a determination of contract
formation in the context of jail and prison prepaid debit
cards).
    Moreover, it is not clear that Moyer accepted a benefit.
In contrast to situations in which a party accepted services or
work product from another party, the money Moyer received
was his own. See Jones, 247 P.2d at 893–94 (holding that
the receipt and use of fully detailed architectural plans was a
benefit given in circumstances which would indicate the
benefit was given with expectation of compensation);
Hoglund, 170 P.3d at 46–47 (holding that substantial
evidence supported the trial court’s finding that retention of
attorney work-product created a reasonable expectation of
payment).
    The “benefit” of using prepaid debit cards is to allow the
Kitsap County Jail to avoid directly disbursing money to
people exiting incarceration. “For local governments,
handling inmates’ cash is expensive and time consuming.”
Brown, 953 F.3d at 569. For Rapid, the cards provide the
ability to levy significant maintenance and use fees. It would
be odd to assign the “benefit” of the release card to Moyer.
More accurately, the cost of administering the disbursement
of money Moyer was legally owed was effectively
20            REICHERT V. RAPID INVESTMENTS, INC.

transferred to him by the jail’s choice to use release cards.
Imposing that obligation on him is hardly a benefit.
    Because Moyer did not assent to the Agreement through
either his receipt or his use of the release card, no contract
was formed. We do not consider whether the contract fails
for lack of consideration.
                             III
    In sum, we hold that Moyer did not accept Rapid’s
cardmember agreement and the arbitration clause it
contained. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of
Rapid’s motion to compel arbitration and remand for further
proceedings.
     AFFIRMED.