Court Opinion

ID: 9564700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:05:41.301444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:37.235943
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice,
writing separately:
I write to explain, on behalf of a majority of the court, why this matter is being remanded.
On the record before us, it appears that Ms. Sosa received a copy of the arbitration agreement which clearly spelled out that she had fourteen days to revoke the agreement. The clause attached no conditions to her revocation. In other words, she could revoke for any reason or for no reason. If she did receive a copy of the agreement, as the signed agreement acknowledges, and was aware of a surgical complication immediately upon awakening from the anesthesia, any procedural unfairness in the initial signing of the agreement was subsequently cured. Under these facts, Ms. Sosa would have had fourteen days after becommg aware of her injury to revoke the arbitration agreement, during which time she would not have been forced to make a decision in a hurried, rushed, or anxious state. Because she knew that the surgery had not gone well, her decision to revoke or not would have been a meaningful choice.
Case law from other jurisdictions suggests that such revocation clauses work to cure the procedural irregularities that arise when medical forms are presented to patients shortly before surgery. See Morris v. Metriyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Mich.1984). Moreover, under the facts of this case, it is not clear that the fourteen-day revocation period was insufficient as a matter of law to cure the procedural irregularities surrounding the signing of the agreement. Cf Utah Code Ann. § 70C-5-102 (affording consumers three days in which to cancel door-to-door sales agreements).
As a result, unlike Justice Durham, we cannot say, on the record before us, that the whole transaction was tainted with procedural uneonscionability so as to render the entire agreement null and void. If, after remand, the trial court determines that Ms. Sosa knew she had been injured, that she had received a copy of the agreement which contained an easily understandable clause affording her fourteen days to revoke, and that there is no basis for finding that she was precluded from exercising that right within the fourteen-day period, the agreement to arbitrate should be enforced. However, if she did not know she had been injured, did not receive a copy of the agreement, or was otherwise precluded from exercising her *366right to withdraw from the agreement within fourteen days, then we would agree that Ms. Sosa should have her day in court.
HOWE and RUSSON, JJ., concur in Chief Justice ZIMMERMAN’S opinion.