Court Opinion

ID: 9914341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-30 00:02:00.387285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:20.982741
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/29/23 In re E.R. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    In re E.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
    Court Law.

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                              F085740

             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       (Super. Ct. No. JW144057-00)

                    v.
                                                                                          OPINION
    E.R.,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
            APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Wendy L.
Avila, Judge.
            Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
            Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Dina
Petrushenko, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*           Before Levy, Acting P. J., Poochigian, J. and Detjen, J.
                                    INTRODUCTION
       E.R., appellant, argues substantial evidence does not support the conclusion that
he committed assault with a semiautomatic firearm, personally used a firearm, and
personally caused great bodily injury. Appellant further argues he was incorrectly
sentenced pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (d)(1). The
People concede appellant’s sentence was in error; therefore we vacate the sentence and
remand the matter for resentencing. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
                               PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On October 25, 2022, the Kern County District Attorney’s office filed a juvenile
wardship petition against appellant. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).) The petition
charged appellant with one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (b))1 and alleged that appellant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (d)) and inflicted great bodily injury during the assault (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
       On January 10, 2023, following a jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found
all of the petition’s allegations true. On January 25, 2023, in a disposition hearing,
appellant was adjudged a ward of the court, granted probation, and was ordered
committed to the Kern Crossroads Facility. The court determined the maximum
confinement time was 14 years, less 96 days credit for time served.
       On February 10, 2023, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

1      Undesignated references to code are to the Penal Code.

                                              2.
                               STATEMENT OF FACTS
       On October 21, 2022, M.R. contacted a seller on a marketplace platform to
purchase a laptop. The same day, M.R. met the seller outside of M.R.’s workplace and
purchased the laptop for cash. Later that day, M.R. discovered the laptop did not work.
He tried to call the seller to have the seller refund his money, but M.R.’s calls went
unanswered.
       On October 22, 2022, M.R. was on his way home when he recognized the seller’s
red car from the day before. M.R. followed the car to a local market and parked several
parking spots away. M.R. approached the car from the back, took a photo, then started
taking video.
       M.R. approached the driver’s side door and saw the seller in the driver’s seat and
appellant in the passenger’s seat. M.R. told the seller the laptop did not work, but neither
the seller nor appellant responded. M.R. then reached into the car and took hold of the
steering wheel with one hand. The seller attempted to reverse the car out of the parking
spot and leave, but M.R. warned him that he was about to hit another vehicle. M.R. put
one hand on the driver’s side door and tried to open it. He saw both the seller’s hands
and the seller did not have a gun. M.R. did not see appellant’s hands.
       The seller shifted the car into drive and went forward, hitting the sidewalk. The
car stopped on the sidewalk, and M.R. heard a gunshot. He did not see a gun in either the
seller’s or appellant’s hands, but felt the bullet hit him. The bullet had entered M.R.’s
body to the right side of his stomach area and exited on the left side of his stomach area.
The entire altercation took between two and three minutes, from the moment M.R. saw
the seller’s car, to the moment he was shot.
       Kern County Sheriff’s deputy Rodney James was dispatched to the registered
address of the seller’s car. At the address, James located the red car in the driveway,
missing its license plate, with the seller and appellant inside. James ordered the seller

                                               3.
and appellant to exit the vehicle. The seller exited from the driver’s side and appellant
from the passenger’s side of the vehicle.
        A search of the red car revealed a spent silver shell casing in the passenger seat.
James also noticed a second car at the address, which was completely covered in dirt
except for the driver’s rear passenger door. The door’s handle had little to no dust on it,
as if someone had opened the door. A search of the second car revealed the red car’s
missing license plate and a firearm. The firearm was the same caliber as the shell casing
found in the red car, had been fired once, and contained both silver and brass bullets.
                                       DISCUSSION
   I.      Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Findings
        Appellant argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
conclusion that appellant was the shooter. We disagree.
        A. Legal Standard
        “The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of evidence in adult
criminal cases and juvenile cases .…” (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537,
540.) On appeal, this court “ ‘must determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could
have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) We “examine the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that
a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
        “All conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility are resolved in favor of
the verdict, drawing every reasonable inference the [fact finder] could draw from the
evidence. [Citation.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless ‘ “upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” ’

                                              4.
[Citation.] This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.”
(People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 226–227.)
       B. Analysis
       Appellant argues there was no evidence that he was the shooter. Appellant asserts
that there was no physical evidence, such as fingerprints, tying him to the gun, that it was
not his car, and that he had no motive to carry a gun or to shoot M.R.
       We disagree. M.R. testified that he saw the seller’s hands shortly before the
shooting and did not see the seller holding a gun. M.R. was standing directly by the
driver’s side door, with one hand on the door trying to open it. M.R. was speaking with
and looking at the seller from the moment the seller tried to back the car out of the
parking spot, until he was shot. Because M.R. was in a position to see the seller’s hands
the entire time, did not see the seller holding a gun, and was shot from inside the car, it is
reasonable to infer that appellant—the only other person in the car—was the shooter.
       Furthermore, the vehicle was moving immediately before M.R. was shot, with the
seller first driving backwards, then forwards and onto a sidewalk. When the seller was
reversing the car, M.R. was warning him that he was about to hit another vehicle. It is
reasonable to infer that the seller was preoccupied with operating the vehicle and
avoiding the vehicles around him and did not have an opportunity to locate and pull out a
gun, aim the gun at M.R., and shoot.
       More importantly, a silver-colored bullet casing was found in the passenger seat
where appellant was sitting. The bullet casing matched the caliber of the gun recovered
by deputies from the second vehicle. The gun had been fired once and contained both
silver and brass bullets. It is reasonable to infer, given the location of the bullet casing,
that the shooter was seated in the passenger seat. Because appellant was seated in the
passenger seat, M.R.’s testimony and the location of the bullet casing together constitute
substantial evidence that appellant was the shooter.

                                              5.
   II.      The Sentence Must Be Reduced to 13 Years
         Appellant further argues, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 726,
subdivision (d)(1), that the juvenile court should have sentenced him to 13 years. The
People concur, as do we.
         Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (d)(1) states “[i]f the minor
is removed from the physical custody of the minor’s parent or guardian as the result of an
order of wardship made pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code] [s]ection 602, the
order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in
excess of the middle term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult
convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” The method for selecting the term for the underlying
offense applies in selecting the term for an enhancement. (In re George M. (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 376, 381.)
         Section 245, subdivision (b) directs a sentence of three, six, or nine years for
assault with a semiautomatic firearm. Inflicting great bodily injury pursuant to
section 12022.7, subdivision (a) directs an additional sentence of three years. Finally,
personally using a firearm in the commission of the offense, pursuant to section 12022.5,
subdivisions (a) and (d), directs an additional sentence of three, four, or 10 years.
         With a middle term of six years for the assault with a semiautomatic firearm, a
term of three years for the great bodily injury enhancement, and the middle term of
four years for the personal use of a firearm enhancement, appellant should have been
sentenced to a maximum term of 13 years of confinement.
                                        DISPOSITION
         The sentence is vacated and the case remanded with instructions to resentence
appellant to a maximum term no greater than 13 years of confinement. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

                                               6.