Court Opinion

ID: 9792758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:36:02.165947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:45.095348
License: Public Domain

COATS, Judge,
dissenting.
In our system of justice, sentencing is primarily a trial court function. Nicholas v. State, 477 P.2d 447, 448-49 (Alaska 1970). A trial court judge is in a much better position to evaluate the defendant and the evidence. An appeals court, relying on a printed transcript and written briefs, is in a poor position to evaluate the offender and the offense. Appellate review of sentencing must therefore give trial courts broad deference in these areas.
Judge Weeks, who has had extensive experience as a prosecuting attorney, heard the evidence in two trials in this case. On the *1318record, it is difficult to tell exactly how Mrs. Hernandez injured the children. If she intentionally caused the injuries to the children, then I would agree with the majority of the court that the sentence Judge Weeks imposed was too lenient. If, however, Mrs. Hernandez recklessly caused the children’s injuries by attempting to supervise too many children, the sentence was appropriate. Many people came forward in support of Mrs. Hernandez at the sentencing hearing. Judge Weeks found that Mrs. Hernandez was a person of good will and nearly always provided good care for the children. As I read his findings, Judge Weeks found that Mrs. Hernandez did not act intentionally, but recklessly, while she was under great stress. Therefore, the sentence Judge Weeks imposed was not too lenient.
Because Mrs. Hernandez was a first-felony offender, Judge Weeks had a great deal of discretion in imposing sentence. State v. Jackson, 776 P.2d 320, 327 (Alaska App. 1989). The one-year sentence that Judge Weeks imposed is appropriate for a “typical offender committing a typical or moderately aggravated offense.” Id. at 326. The majority criticizes this sentence because Judge Weeks provided that Mrs. Hernandez could serve eight months of the sentence by performing community service. However, under AS 12.55.055(d) the legislature has provided that
The court may offer a defendant convicted of an offense the option of performing community work in lieu of a sentence of imprisonment. Substitution of community work shall be at a rate of eight hours for each day of imprisonment.
In this statute, the legislature appears to me to have given trial courts discretion to substitute community service for jail time.
In Jackson, we concluded that it was inappropriate in some cases to substitute community work for the entire period of imprisonment. Id. at 329. In that case, we concluded that Jackson’s offense required the court to impose at least a ninety-day jail term to properly emphasize the seriousness of the offense and community condemnation of the offender’s misconduct. Id. at 328. In other eases, we have concluded that, at a minimum, the court was required to impose a ninety-day period of actual incarceration in order to affirm these sentencing goals. State v. Hooper, 750 P.2d 840, 842 (Alaska App.1988); State v. Karnos, 696 P.2d 685, 687 (Alaska App.1985); State v. Doe, 647 P.2d 1107, 1111 n. 12 (Alaska App.1982). By imposing four months of actual incarceration as well as community service, Judge Weeks has met the requirements of the previous cases in sentencing Mrs. Hernandez. I see no reason, therefore, to criticize his decision to allow Mrs. Hernandez to substitute some community-work service for some of her period of imprisonment given the fact that he imposed four months of actual incarceration to emphasize the seriousness of the offense and community condemnation of the offense and the offender. It has become obvious that the State of Alaska has limited resources to imprison people. Clearly the top priority is to protect the public from repeat violent offenders. It seems to me that trial courts should be encouraged to consider alternatives to incarceration for first offenders, particularly those like Mrs. Hernandez who seem unlikely to reoffend if placed under proper probation controls.
I similarly would not criticize Judge Weeks’ use of a ten-year suspended imposition of sentence. By suspending imposition of sentence, Judge Weeks was able to place Mrs. Hernandez on probation for ten years, twice as long as he could have done under any other sentencing scheme. See AS 12.55.-090(e) and AS 12.55.085(a). This allowed Judge Weeks to control Mrs. Hernandez under extensive probation supervision for an extended period of time. In the event that Mrs. Hernandez’ probation was revoked, Judge Weeks would have had the authority to impose a sentence of up to ten years of incarceration. By suspending imposition of sentence, Judge Weeks was better able to ensure that Mrs. Hernandez would have no opportunity to reoffend.
In addition to the other penalties he imposed, Judge Weeks ordered Mrs. Hernandez to pay restitution totalling approximately $13,000 to the parents of the victims of her offenses. Judge Weeks found that Mrs. Hernandez had sufficient assets and earning ca-*1319paeity to pay this restitution. This restitution award should penalize Mrs. Hernandez while providing some relief to the victims of her crimes.
Accordingly, I conclude that the sentence Judge Weeks imposed was not clearly mistaken.