Court Opinion

ID: 9544283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:54:04.881308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:33.734507
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that the absent guardrail did not make the ramp area inherently or imminently dangerous as a matter of law. Because Blake has alleged significant facts of imminent danger, this question is properly left for the jury. See National Steel Erection v. Hinkle (1989), Ind.App., 541 N.E.2d 288, 298 (question of imminent danger for jury).
Several Indiana cases have concluded, as a matter of law, that an instrumentality was not imminently dangerous. These cases, however, did not involve an absent safety device. E.g. Hamilton v. Roger Sherman Architects (1991), Ind.App., 565 N.E.2d 1186, 1139 (pass-under countertop); Lynn v. Hart (1991), Ind.App., 565 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (slush-covered parking lot); Smider v. Bob Heinlin Concrete Construction Co. (1987), Ind.App., 506 N.E.2d 77, 82, trans. denied (swimming pool with faulty filtration).
An imminently dangerous instrumentality "is reasonably certain to place life or limb in peril." Snider, supra (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 921 (1968)). I cannot say as a matter of law that the absent guardrail was not reasonably certain to place I/N Tek's employees in peril, The guardrail was meant to protect I/N Tek's employees from precisely the danger that befell Blake.
In concluding that the area was not imminently dangerous as a matter of law, the Majority focuses on two factors: (1) Blake *1254tripped into the ramp area, and (2) he knew the rail was not installed. I find this unpersuasive. First, Blake's tripping in the area does not hurt his argument, rather, it supports a conclusion that a guardrail was necessary. Guardrails only aid those who are unsteady on their feet. Second, Blake's knowledge of the danger does not make the area less hazardous. An unguarded ledge is dangerous even to those who know it is there because people often trip through no fault of their own. This is not a case in which the "normal use of one's senses" would necessarily prevent injury. Cf. Hamilton, supra (plaintiff could have avoided injury by looking up before standing).
For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.