Court Opinion

ID: 9687551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:34:39.878835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:28.638610
License: Public Domain

STREIT, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to continue the trial of a case pending for almost three years. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 183(a) provides “[a] continuance may be allowed for any cause not growing out of the fault or negligence of the applicant, which satisfies the court that substantial justice will be more nearly obtained.” State v. Ware, 338 N.W.2d 707, 714 (Iowa 1983). A ruling denying a motion for a continuance is discretionary and calls for reversal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Teeters, 487 N.W.2d 346, 348 (Iowa 1992). A trial court has “very broad” discretion in ruling on a motion for a continuance. State v. Sieren, 253 Iowa 118, 121, 111 N.W.2d 249, 250 (1961). State v. LaGrange, 541 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa App.1995). Madison Silos, Division of Martin Marietta Corp. v. Wassom, 215 N.W.2d 494, 498 (Iowa 1974).
We have held:
This court will not find an abuse of discretion unless “such discretion is exercised on grounds or for such reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Hutchinson v. Smith Labs., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 139, 141 (Iowa 1986) (citations omitted). This discretion is abused if it is clear the judge has applied an improper standard, failed to follow established legal rules, or has based the decision on a record devoid of facts to support the decision, (citations omitted). Edson v. Chambers, 519 N.W.2d 832, 834 (Iowa App.1994)
For us to find an abuse of discretion in a trial court’s ruling, it must be shown by the complaining party the trial court’s action was unreasonable under the attendant circumstances. State v. Cott, 283 N.W.2d 324, 329 *396(Iowa 1979). Discretionary rulings, such as the one here, are presumptively correct and complainant has a heavy burden to overcome the presumption of regularity. Netteland v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 510 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Iowa App.1993). Ordinarily, an abuse is found to exist only where there is no support in the record for the trial judge’s determination. Rath v. Sholty, 199 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Iowa 1972).
In this case, in light of the persuasive reasons for a continuance advanced by defendants, the question of whether a continuance should have been granted is close. The trial court would not have abused its discretion if it had allowed a continuance. On the other hand, under principles enunciated in our pri- or decisions, we should not say the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a continuance was unreasonable under the attendant circumstances. Michael v. Harrison County Rural Elec. Co-op., 292 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Iowa 1980). There is support in the record for the trial court’s ruling.
In this case, plaintiff, on December 20, 1994, obtained a trial continuance based on discovery of a “significant closed head injury which was previously undiagnosed and untreated.” The trial was set for June 5, 1995 — almost three years after the filing of the case. Between December, 1994, and June, 1995, Ragan was examined and tested by Dr. Varner. Varner did not prepare a written report until April 24, 1995. Defendants’ attorney received this report four days later. Defendants deposed Varner May 9th, 1995 — almost a month before trial. Instead of arranging for an independent medical exam, defendants filed for a continuance. Defendants stated:
4.... Defendant will request that Plaintiff undergo independent medical evaluation and that there is insufficient time for such evaluation to be accomplished and to allow the parties to evaluate the results thereof based upon the present assignment for ... trial.
Defendants had almost five months since receiving information about the direction plaintiffs’ case was proceeding, six weeks since receiving a written medical report, and four weeks since the deposition of Dr. Var-ner, to arrange for an independent exam or to proffer a stratagem for discovery. They did not do this. The defendants did not take any of these opportunities to pursue discovery. At hearing on the motion, they did not offer any proposed medical examiners. The defendants did not say, “Judge, we’ve lined up a doctor to examine the plaintiff, but she can’t complete her work before the trial.” Instead, the trial court heard a fairly vague plea of not having enough time for an “evaluation to be accomplished and to allow the parties to evaluate the results.” When confronted with this ambiguous request, the court weighed it against the whiskers on this case, the likelihood of getting a trial rescheduled, and justice being denied by the lethargic procession to the courtroom. Many times a court, when confronted with the caliber of the legal talent in this case, is looking at a scheduling window of up to a year away. This case was facing dismissal under Iowa Rule of Civil' Procedure 215.1. The trial court, in ruling on the motion, considered the age of the case and the rather vague request for an independent exam.
The majority presumes unfair harm resulted from the denial of a continuance with the conclusion the prejudice of defendants’ proceeding to trial without responsive medical testimony “is obvious, and catastrophic.” With the defendants not proposing a specific doctor to perform the exam, it is speculative to estimate the prejudice from the denial of the motion. I agree with the' majority’s conclusion that a movant seeking a continuance should not have to establish the independent medical examination would have produced beneficial results at trial. However, the movant seeking a continuance should have a specific reason for asking for more time. More time to do what? Defendants did not offer a specific reason. The majority concludes the trial courts ruling “... chills the notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The trial judge is in a better position for this pronouncement:
Many trial continuances are sought on legitimate grounds. In spite of careful plans and diligent preparations, an unanticipated event will on occasion necessarily precipitate a continuance motion. It is far *397from unknown, on the other hand, for continuance motions to serve as a mere delaying tactic. We call upon our trial judges to do justice to those needing and deserving a continuance, while at the same time resolutely moving the trial assignment toward the speedy resolution of cases. The trial judge must sense whether a given continuance motion stems from a legitimate need, or from a wish to delay. From its closer vantage point, the trial court can better sort through these matters than an appellate court can.
State v. Teeters, 487 N.W.2d 346, 348 (Iowa 1992).
It is not for our court to point to the large verdict and conclude defendants obviously were deprived of a fair opportunity to prepare or present their case. Without defendants telhng the trial court, with some specificity, the proposed avenue of further discovery, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. This motion was close. There has not been a clear showing of an abuse of judicial discretion in the denial of the motion for a continuance of the trial. Michael v. Harrison County Rural Elec. Co-op., 292 N.W.2d 417, 419-420 (Iowa 1980).