Court Opinion

ID: 9460208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:44:32.278107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:31.491895
License: Public Domain

CHRISTENSEN, Senior District Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I am in general agreement with the majority opinion as it relates to the guardian ad litem problem and the invalidity of Provisos 1.1.1.4, 1.3.1.6, 1.3.1.5 and 1.3.1.1 of Rule 11.05, and Rule 11.06 of the appellant board.
*611I dissent, however, from those parts of the opinion holding that Rule 11.05, Proviso 1.1.1.3, is invalid for vagueness and overbreadth * and that certain language used in the Corn Cob Curtain was not “obscene as to minors” in the high school context and thus in contravention of Amended Rule 11.05, Proviso 1.1.1.1.
And I find myself in disagreement with the conclusion “that the occasional presence of earthy words in the Corn Cob Curtain cannot be found to be likely to cause substantial disruption of school activity or materially to impair the accomplishment of educational objectives”. The euphemisms employed to describe contents of the publication do not fully indicate the type of language and imagery that are given rein; whether constituting the predominant part, or merely an inescapably dominating part of any particular issue, it seems clear that expressions az’e used which in a high school, not to mention an elementary school would materially impair the accomplishment of educational objectives.
More likely obscene in these contexts are certain Corn Cob expressions than those involved in Papish v. University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 93 S. Ct. 1197, 35 L.Ed.2d 618 (1973), would be in the setting of a university. Hence, it may not be pz-esumptuous to suppose that v/hen a situation is evaluated corresponding to the one we have before us the majozúty of that court may be inclined to accept an extrapolation of the views expressed in the dissent of the Chief Justice to the effect that preclusion of the regulation of such material by school authorities would not protect values inherent in the First Amendment but would demean them (410 U.S. at p. 672, 93 S.Ct. 1197), and those of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined, that “insistence on equating, for constitutional purposes, the authority of the State to criminally punish with its authority to exercise even a modicum of control over the university [high school or elementary school] which it operates serves neither the Constitution nor public education well.” (410 U.S. at p. 677, 93 S.Ct. at p. 1202.)
That at oral argument “plaintiffs conceded that their case was limited to the application of the rules in high schools” does not seem to me a sufficient reason for our failure to hold as to elementary schools of all places that the trial court’s decision involved error. Appellees should not be pez’mitted to waive the contentions of appellants, who have argued here both overbreadth and invalidity of the injunction. To the extent hereinabove indicated, I am of the opinion that appellants are right on both scores. And to that limited extent it appears to me that until now this court, as well as the Supreme Court, has not committed itself to an irreconcilable view.

 No determinative difference is perceived between this rule and its rewording which the trial court thought “more apt to be constitutionally acceptable”. 349 F.Supp. at pp. 611-612.