Court Opinion

ID: 9722033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:14:53.850842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:30.113059
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting from the denial of the petitions for rehearing: I vote to allow the petitions for rehearing. I believe that the petitioners should be afforded another opportunity to present further argument on the specific legal and factual errors they believe this court has made in its decision. I am acutely sensitive to the future well-being of the young boy in the instant case and the trauma which may be visited on him by this court’s ruling. The lengthy period of time it has taken for his case to travel through the court system has exacerbated the complexity of the issues involved. Issues that form the basis of my vote to allow the petitions for rehearing include: the extent of the court’s duty to protect children when that protection may conflict with parental rights established by law; the propriety of the court’s disregarding laws designed to prevent the taking of a child from biological parents where the evidence of parental unfitness may be insufficient but where the best interests of the child call for such separation; whether the broad policy statement in the Adoption Act concerning the best interests of the child should be interpreted as predominant over the articulated requirements of the Act; and whether which, if any, of the courts involved in this case misapprehended, unduly emphasized, or attached inappropriate credibility to certain evidence presented at trial. Further argument on these matters would be helpful. I authored a concurring opinion in this case, joined in by two other justices, which analyzed the existing statutory, constitutional, and case law that applies to the case at bar. Irrespective of the court’s liking or agreement with that law, the court is duty-bound to follow that law. Under that law, parental unfitness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence before the court can proceed, in an adoption hearing,, to a consideration of any other issue. Whether use of the parental rights doctrine, rather than the best interest of the child doctrine, as a standard in child adoption proceedings is realistic is a policy matter for legislative — rather than judicial — consideration. If a child has lived in a particular home for a significant period of time, courts may desire to permit the child to remain in that home, notwithstanding any other factor. However, as indicated, the courts are required to follow the existing laws of this State regarding the termination of the biological parents’ interests. The authority to amend existing statutory provisions that may be improvident is vested in the legislature, not the courts. Notwithstanding these limitations, I believe that the petitioners should be permitted the opportunity, if they are able, to establish reasons why the judgment of the court was erroneous, under existing law. In my opinion, this court should grant the petitions for rehearing and carefully scrutinize the arguments presented, to eliminate the possibility that any material aspect of this appeal has been incorrectly decided. Therefore, I dissent from the denial of the petitions for rehearing. JUSTICE MILLER joins in this dissent.