Court Opinion

ID: 9570953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:27:48.929376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:09.224125
License: Public Domain

Scott, Justice
(dissenting).
I strongly dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse the trial court’s determination that the alleged activities of defendant Ells-worth were subject to state regulation under San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. ed. 2d 775 (1959). While it is clear that under the Garmon doctrine state courts may properly entertain actions involving coercion or violence on the part of a labor organization and individuals even if Federal labor relations statutes apply to the situation, the allegations in the appellant’s complaint, that “the defendants and each of them have been * * * threatening visitors and employees,” considered in the light most favorable to appellant would constitute unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act and would therefore be preempted by that act. Until appellant can be more specific in its complaint about the bomb threat or the bullet holes being fired into engineer Charles Engel’s car, which incidents were alleged in affidavits, we should not stretch the Garmon case to allow an action to proceed when it appears clearly preempted by Federal statutes.
This court should strictly construe the Garmon case and not allow state jurisdiction where the complaint merely makes sweeping attacks on various activities during labor organizing:
“* * * When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.” 359 U. S. 245, 79 S. Ct. 780, 3 L. ed. 2d 783.
The employees have a right to organize for the purpose of bargaining collectively. There is seldom a situation in this field where there are not charges and countercharges as there are in this case, whether true or not.
In Garmon, the court was faced with substantially similar activity to that alleged here, i. e., the exertion of pressures upon customers and suppliers to discontinue dealings with the respondents there. The court found the possibility that § 7 or § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act would encompass such activity existed and therefore displaced state court jurisdiction. Such conduct, the court further concluded, was not of such a nature as to invoke the exception of the “compelling state in*513terest.” 359 U. S. 247, 79 S. Ct. 781, 3 L. ed. 2d 784. Such reasoning is definitely applicable here.
Without present imminent threats to the public order, there seems no reason for joint jurisdiction and duplicate efforts involving the same allegations merely because the plaintiffs decided to bring such an action. It would seem a step backward to have the court, at this point in time, reenter the field of labor disputes of this type and dimension which have so long, and properly so, been preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. It seems unnecessary. I would sincerely suggest, from the standpoint of commonsense, that this matter be pursued under uniform Federal standards.
Mr. Justice Otis and Mr. Justice Knutson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.