Court Opinion

ID: 9811645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:26:45.144923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:48.624531
License: Public Domain

DAVID B. GAULTNEY, Justice,
concurring.
I concur. But respectfully I write separately because I question the rationale of Boyett and the need to strike the deadly weapon finding in this murder ease. See Boyett v. State, 692 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).
Any object used to cause death is a deadly weapon. See Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Vernon 2003)(“Deadly weapon” means “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.”). In a homicide involving a “shooting,” the instrumentality of death is a deadly weapon, because it is something that actually caused a death. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that an indictment charging the accused with causing death by use of any instrument is sufficient notice of the State’s intent to seek a deadly weapon finding. See Ex parte McKithan, 838 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (indictment alleging death caused by motor vehicle provided notice of intent to seek affirmative finding of use of deadly weapon in an involuntary manslaughter case) (citing Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d 525, 526-28 (Tex.Crim.App.1989)). Likewise, the Court of Criminal Appeals has said that anything actually used to cause the death of a human being is a deadly weapon for purpose of supporting a jury’s deadly weapon finding. See Tyra v. State, 897 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (approving deadly weapon finding in involuntary manslaughter case where a driver, by reason of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, caused the death of an individual). In contrast, Boyett unequivocally held that a jury’s finding — that the accused committed voluntary manslaughter “as alleged in the indictment” — could not be considered an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon where the indictment alleged that the accused caused the victim’s death “by shooting him with a gun.” Boyett, 692 S.W.2d at 517. If an indictment allegation provides sufficient notice of the State’s intent to seek an affirmative finding, and if the evidence will support an affirmative finding, why does that same indictment by reference in the jury’s verdict not function as an express deadly weapon finding? And, as here, where the jury finds a death was caused by shooting, how can the finding be anything other than that a deadly weapon was used? But Boyett holds otherwise. Id. at 517. As an intermediate appellate court we are bound by Boyett. Because murder is a “3g” offense, the deadly weapon finding may seem irrelevant. See Tex.Code *345CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g (Vernon 2003). But a court should not be required to strike the judgment’s deadly weapon finding when the indictment says the defendant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Pamela Dorsey by “shooting her,” and the jury found defendant guilty as charged in the indictment. It seems inconsistent with reason and the cited case law to do so. I believe the holding in Boyett should be reconsidered.