Court Opinion

ID: 9375004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 17:07:09.146139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.799230
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 ROBERT CASTRO                           :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 2239 EDA 2020

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2020
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004151-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                   FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2023

     Robert Castro appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after a

jury found him guilty of Possession of an Instrument of Crime (“PIC”), Simple

Assault, and Recklessly Endangering Another Person (“REAP”). The charges

were based on allegations Castro stabbed Hector Pagan. On appeal, Castro

claims the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the original

sentence was illegally increased. We find the weight of the evidence claim is

without merit, however, we remand to the trial court for resentencing.

     The essential factual background of this appeal is largely undisputed.

Castro was involved in an argument with the mother of his child, Lena Ladson,

regarding declaration of the child for tax purposes.      As the argument

escalated, Pagan, a friend who was staying with Lena Ladson, intervened in

the argument. A scuffle between Castro and Pagan ultimately ensued,
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resulting in Castro stabbing Pagan in the stomach and leg. The factual disputes

at trial revolved around how Castro obtained the knife and whether he was

the aggressor. See Appellant’s Brief, at 31 (“Indeed, the only defense raised

at trial was that Mr. Castro acted in justified self-defense with respect to all

charges. [Castro] testified that he stabbed [Pagan] and stipulated that serious

bodily injury resulted.”)

      Castro was arrested and charged with Aggravated Assault, Simple

Assault, PIC, and REAP. The jury found Castor not guilty of aggravated assault

and guilty of the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Castro to an

aggregate term of forty to eighty months of confinement. Following a motion

for reconsideration of sentence, Castro was resentenced to a new aggregate

term of thirty-six to eighty-four months of confinement.

      First, Castro argues that the guilty verdict was against the weight of the

evidence. It is well established, “the weight attributed to the evidence is a

matter exclusively for the fact finder, who is free to believe all, part, or none

of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 223 (Pa. Super. 2016). The

determination of whether to grant a new trial rests within the discretion of the

trial court to find that the jury verdict shocked the conscience. See id. The

trial court’s role “is to determine that, notwithstanding all of the facts, certain

facts are so clearly of greater weight, that to ignore them or to give them

equal weight with all of the facts is to deny justice.” Id. A mere conflict in the

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testimony or reassessment of the credibility of witnesses are not sufficient

foundation to grant a new trial. See id. “[T]he trial court's denial of a motion

for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable

of its rulings” because the appellate court’s review is extremely limited to

determining if the trial court abused its discretion in determining whether the

jury verdict shocked its conscience. Id. (citations omitted; brackets in

original).

      More specifically, on appeal, Castro claims that “[t]he jury’s acquittal of

Mr. Castro on the charge of aggravated assault could only have been premised

upon a belief that Mr. Castro acted justifiably in self-defense.” Appellants Brief,

Castro bases his appeal on the alleged inconsistency of the jury’s verdict, but

the United States Supreme Court has held that “[c]onsistency in the verdict is

not necessary.” Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932).

Pennsylvania courts agree that it is not considered a reversible mistake for a

jury to reach verdicts that are seemingly inconsistent. See Commonwealth

v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 120 (Pa. Super. 2017). Inconsistent verdicts are

allowed to stand "so long as the evidence is sufficient to support the

conviction." Commonwealth v. Miller, 35 A.3d 1206, 1208 (Pa. 2012).

      Courts have specifically addressed instances, like here, where a

defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault but found guilty of simple

assault: “[A]lthough simple assault is a lesser included offense in the crime of

aggravated assault, the verdict acquitting appellant of the greater inclusive

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offense does not conclusively establish that there was insufficient evidence to

support a conviction for the lesser offense.” Commonwealth v. Irvin, 393

A.2d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Super. 1978) (internal citations omitted). More recently,

this Court has found arguing that Castro’s argument “conflates two distinct

charges, each of which has separate elements and intent requirements.”

Commonwealth v. Lavalliere, 1056 EDA 2014, 2016 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Where verdicts have been alleged to be inconsistent, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court has “refuse[d] to inquire into or to speculate upon the nature

of the jury's deliberations or the rationale behind the jury's decision.” Miller,

35 A.3d at 1213. Therefore, our job is not to speculate as to why the jury

found Castro not guilty of aggravated assault; instead, we must determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion in not finding that the convictions

were so against the weight of the evidence as to shock the conscience.

      In that vein, the trial court explained that the verdict came down to an

assessment of the credibility of competing stories:

      Even considering [Castro’s] acquittal on Aggravated Assault and
      convictions on the remaining counts to be inconsistent, there is no
      appropriate basis for reversal on this ground. It was within the
      jury’s sole prerogative to convict [Castro] of Simple Assault, PIC,
      and REAP. The record demonstrates that although there were
      testimonial conflicts, the jury conceivably could have accepted
      witness testimony that provided sufficient evidence to support
      [Castro’s] convictions. [Pagan’s] testimony, if accepted as true,
      established that he was defending Lena Ladson from [Castro]
      when he was stabbed twice with a knife by [Castro.] Lena Ladson’s
      original statement given to Detective Lindsey, if accepted as true,
      established that she saw [Castro] holding a knife and stabbing
      [Pagan] in his ribs. [Castro’s] claim is thus without merit and no
      relief is due on this ground.

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Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/21, at 20.

      Our review of the record reveals the trial court’s summary of testimony

is accurate. Further, we can find no abuse of discretion in its conclusions.

While Castro and Pagan told different stories about the circumstances of their

scuffle, Pagan’s story was not beyond rational belief. As such, the jury was

entitled to credit it. Castro’s first issue on appeal merits no relief.

      Next, Castro claims that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial

court illegally increased his maximum sentence in granting his post-sentence

motion. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court agreed with Castro

and requested that we remand the case for resentencing:

      [Castro] first claims that the sentence this Court imposed on
      October 15, 2020[,] is illegal because this Court was without
      authority to impose an increased sentence because the
      Commonwealth did not file a post-sentence motion seeking
      modification of the sentence. In support of his claim, [Castro]
      states that the original aggregate sentence he received on
      September 23, 2020[,] was forty to eighty months of
      confinement, while the new aggregate sentence he received on
      October 15, 2020[,] was thirty-six to eighty-four months of
      confinement. This Court concurs with Appellant's claim that his
      new sentence is illegal.
      …

      [The trial court originally] sentenced [Castro] to an aggregate
      term of forty to eighty months of confinement, which include
      twenty to forty months of confinement for the Simple Assault
      charge. After [Castro] filed a post-sentence motion challenging
      that the sentence for Simple Assault charge exceeded the
      statutory maximum term of twenty-four months, [the trial court]
      resentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-six months to eighty-
      four months of confinement. This new sentencing scheme included
      a corrected sentence for the Simple Assault charge of twelve to
      twenty-four months of confinement. It also included a new

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      sentence of twenty-four to sixty months of confinement for the
      PIC charge, which marked an increase from the original sentence
      of twenty to forty months.

      [The trial court] was within its rights to increase [Castro’s]
      sentence on the PIC charge, as doing so was intended to preserve
      the integrity of the original aggregate sentence. At the
      resentencing hearing, both [the trial court] and [Castro’s] counsel
      understood the new sentence to be a small increase in [Castro’s]
      minimum term and a small decrease in [Castro’s] maximum
      term…. However, upon further review, [the trial court] finds that
      it mistakenly increased [Castro’s] maximum sentence from eighty
      months to eighty-four months, contrary to its understanding that
      [Castro’s] maximum sentence had decreased. … Accordingly, [the
      trial court] requests that this matter be remanded for
      resentencing.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/21, at 16-18.

      Moreover, the Commonwealth is not opposing Castro’s request for

resentencing. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 12.

      We agree that Castro’s maximum sentence was illegally increased and

hereby remand to the trial for resentencing. See Commonwealth v.

Nickens, 923 A.2d 469, 472 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that a sentencing

court may not increase a sentence where only the defendant has filed a post-

sentence motion to modify sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Fennell,

105 A.3d 13, 15 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding proper action in instance where

court imposed illegal sentence that alters entire sentencing scheme is to

vacate sentence and remand for resentencing).

      Convictions affirmed. Judgments of sentence vacated. Case remanded

for resentencing on all counts. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/24/2023

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