Court Opinion

ID: 9715201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:57:24.86012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:11.879878
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE PERLIN delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant has filed a petition seeking a rehearing, but we believe that oiir original decision reflects our consideration of all relevant matters. However, in an effort to argue that we have misapplied the law to the record in reaching our decision, defense counsel has made several statements which warrant our comment. Defendant first states that we have ignored the fact that plaintiff “used the prior property damage judgment as the basis for his motion for a directed finding on the issue of defendant’s liability.” As we noted in our original opinion, plaintiff filed his complaint in the instant case for personal injury and property damage on September 13,1974. Almost five years later, on May 24,1979, the second day of trial, defendant moved for a directed finding1 on the property damage issue based upon the fact that there had already been a judgment entered on June 3,1974, for damage to the plaintiff’s automobile and a satisfaction thereof filed on November 21, 1975. This was the first time defendant brought to the attention of plaintiff and the trial court the existence of the earlier action. Although almost five years had elapsed since the filing of the complaint in the instant case, defendant chose to remain silent until the second day of trial. Plaintiff, presumptively surprised, responded by likewise moving for a directed finding. The trial court denied both motions. The fact that plaintiff moved for a directed finding does not, in our opinion, alter the fact that defendant’s motion was untimely. Defendant, however, argues that plaintiff has “waived for purposes of appeal” the argument that defendant’s motion was untimely. In support of this argument defendant directs our attention to Crowe v. Public Building Com. (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 699, 370 N.E.2d 32, In re Leyden Fire Protection District (1972), 4 Ill. App. 3d 273, 280 N.E.2d 744, and Burdin v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 703,269 N.E.2d 340. In each of these cases the plaintiffs-appellants had failed to object at any time before the trial court to the form or substance of the motions to dismiss and were therefore barred from raising that issue for the first time on appeal as grounds for reversal. In the case at bar plaintiff is not the appellant and has not urged upon us any ground for reversal. Moreover, it is well settled that the judgment of the court below will be affirmed if it is justified in the law for any reason or ground appearing in the record regardless of whether the particular reasons given by the trial judge, or his specific findings, are correct or sound. (Stigler v. City of Chicago (1971) 48 Ill. 2d 20,268 N.E.2d 26; Continental Grain Co. v. FMC Corp. (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 819, 823, 327 N.E.2d 371.) We do not know which arguments were advanced by the parties in support of or in opposition to their respective motions, nor do we know upon which grounds the trial court relied in denying the motions. Defendant has not provided us with a transcript of the hearing on the motions, and the agreed-upon statement of facts reflects only that the motions were made and denied. The untimeliness of defendant’s motion to dismiss appears of record, and it was upon that ground which we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The petition further alleges that this court has “overlooked” section 143b of the Illinois Insurance Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 73, par. 755b.) We note that despite defendant’s failure to make reference to this provision in either his appellant’s brief or his reply brief, he now complains of our alleged oversight. Defendant also contends that we have misapprehended the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 1 et seq.) because our interpretation of section 48 “ignores Paragraph 46(3) thereof which states ‘[a] pleading may be amended at any time, before or after judgment, to conform the pleadings to the proofs.’ ” We again note that defendant made no reference to section 46(3) in either his appellant’s brief or in his reply brief. Moreover, defendant cites no authority for his contention that the standards which apply to section 46(3) are applicable also to section 48. Furthermore, defendant fails to suggest whose pleadings should be amended. As further assignment of error defendant argues that: “ the court has misapprehended the rule with respect to the necessity of filing a motion pursuant to Section 48 in this court. It was not necessary for the defendant to plead the existence of the prior judgment. Both of the judgments in the instant case were entered in the circuit court of Cook County. It was therefore completely unnecessary for defendant to bring the fact of the prior judgment to the court’s attention by means of a formal written motion of any kind. He did all that was required when he brouhgt [sic] the file on the property damage claim before the court. Banks [sic] United Insurance Co. of America, 1978,28 Ill. App. 3d 60; 328 N.E.2d 167; Whiting [sic] Sign Co. v. Montclare Lanes, 42 Ill. App. 3d 199, 355 N.E.2d 632.” Contrary to defendant’s assertions, in White Way Sign & Maintenance Co. v. Montclare Lanes, Inc., defendant Montclare Lanes did in fact file a motion to dismiss. The appellate court held that although the motion to dismiss was unsupported by affidavit, the attached certified copy of the trust agreement was sufficient. Banks v. United Insurance Company of America pertains only to section 46 and makes no mention of section 48. Defendant’s other contentions are likewise without substantiation. “The vigorous representation of a client can often tempt his attorney to hyperbole in order to make an argument more emphatic.” (People v. Camacho (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 943, 957,389 N.E.2d 1213.) In our opinion defense counsel has taken excessive liberties in commenting upon the integrity of this court. As the court stated in Camacho, at pages 957-58, defense counsel “has spread unsupported assignments of error across the public record in an overzealous effort to procure a rehearing. Such tactics serve neither defendants nor the interests of justice and cannot be condoned.” The petition for rehearing is denied. DOWNING and HARTMAN, JJ., concur.   Defendant also refers to this motion as a motion to dismiss.