Court Opinion

ID: 9713666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:19:47.248645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.820693
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell:
John Fee was attacked and beaten by Smith, and other pickets while he was leaving the Eagle Store after having made a purchase. A riot ensued. Smith and Tarpley, defendants, were convicted of an affray; and Truitt, Tarpley, Allen and Peay were convicted of aggravated assault and battery upon an officer, and of obstructing an officer in attempting to make an arrest. Defendants alleged that Fee attached one of them and they merely; defended themselves, and were in effect innocent bystanders; and they denied that they caused an affray or assaulted the officer or obstructed justice.
The defendants were hired and paid by Local No. 65, a union in the City of New York. Local No. 65 sent two of the defendants from New York, who, under their orders, recruited in Pittsburgh and employed two other defendants to picket the Eagle Store in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. The employes of the Eagle Store were not members of Local No. 65, but were members of the C.I.O. Union; and there was no strike nor labor or industrial dispute in the Eagle Store. According to the testimony of a witness who was an undercover investigator of communist activities for the F. B. I., defendant Truitt was a communist; and according to the testimony of another witness, Local No. 65 was thrown out of the C.I.O. because it was “communist dominated”. The majority opinion, in reversing the unanimous decision of the Superior Court which affirmed the rulings and judgment of the lower court, sustains the defendants’ contention that it was reversible error to permit the charge of communism to be injected into this trial.
*90The theory on which the majority opinion is predicated is apparent from the following quotation therefrom: “Whether defendants, or any of them, are members of the communist party or adhere to its doctrines is a matter entirely foreign to the issue of guilt or innocence on a charge of affray, assault and battery and obstructing an officer while attempting to make an arrest. Nor is such evidence relevant to indicate motive, . .* The majority also held that the question of whether Local Union No. 65 or the Progressive Party was “dominated by communists” or “communist dominated” was. hearsay and without the slightest probative or relevant value, even though it was admitted without objection. With this view I completely disagree.
Evidence tending to prove motive or design or plan or scheme of criminal conduct has always been admissible: Hester v. Com., 85 Pa. 139; McManus v. Com., 91 Pa. 57; Com. v. Fragassa, 278 Pa. 1, 122 A. 88; Com. v. Campolla, 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 379; Com. v. Chalfa, 313 Pa. 175, 178, 179, 169 A. 564; Com. v. De Petro, 350 Pa. 567, 572, 39 A. 2d 838; Com. v. Edwards, 318 Pa. 1, 178 A. 20. For example, it has been the established law of Pennsylvania for nearly one hundred years .that evidence of similar and related crimes are admissible (even in murder trials) to .prove motive or intent or design or a common scheme or plan: Com. v. Strantz, 328 Pa. 33, 195 A. 75; Com. v. Darcy, 362 Pa. 259, 66 A. 2d 663; Com. v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 198 A. 99; Com. v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 65 A. 2d 348; Com. v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 148, 160 A. 602; Com. v. Krolak, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 288, 290, 64 A. 2d 522; Com. v. Ransom, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 306, 82 A. 2d 547 (Approved in 369 Pa. 153, 85 A. 2d 125); 22 C.J.S. §688, page 1109.
*91In Com. v. Williams, 307 Pa., supra, this Court said (page 148) : “There are, however, many well recognized exceptions where the commission of another offense by the defendant may be received in evidence. Prior convictions can be admitted in evidence to show intent, scienter, motive, identity, plan, or the accused to he one of an organisation handed together to commit crimes of the sort charged, or that such prior conviction or criminal act formed a part of a chain, or was one of a sequence of acts, or became part of the history of the event on trial, or was part of the natural development of the facts; also to prove the mental condition when the defense was insanity, or to rebut the inference of mistake, or to show a guilty knowledge: Com. v. Coles, supra; Com. v. Cicere, 282 Pa. 492; Com. v. Dorst, 285 Pa. 232; Com. v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264. For these purposes prior convictions or criminal records may be brought out either on cross-examination or hy extrinsic testimony: Goersen v. Com., supra; Com. v. Coles, supra; Com. v. Weiss, 284 Pa. 105; Com. v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. 386; Wharton, Criminal Evidence (10th Edition) section 31. . . .”
While communism or membership in the Communist Party was not at the time of the trial a criminal offense in Pennsylvania, it is clear that the principle established by these cases is equally applicable to this case and permits the introduction of any evidence tending to prove motive, design, scheme or plan.
Commencing in 1934, some of us who studied communism have attempted to awaken America to the danger and menace of this worldwide revolutionary movement, which from the writings, the speeches, and the actions of its leaders is, beyond the peradventure of a doubt, the avowed mortal enemy of the United States. It is at long last recognized in this country first by the people and finally by some political leaders, some *92union leaders and some courts that a major policy and goal of the communist party is to undermine, overthrow and destroy our Government by sabotage, force and violence.* However, it is not as clearly realized that the plans, the policies and the tactics by which the communists attempt to achieve their great goal is to promote assaults and fightings, to instigate strikes and labor disputes, to cause riots, to arouse class, creed and color passions, and to oppose by every means including force, the police and other agents and employees of local, state and national government. Many patriotic Americans still remain naive and blind to the practices of and the methods employed by the communists, and their ofttimes unwitting agents or unsuspecting stooges, especially in cases arising out of picketing, strikes or labor disputes.
The jury could have found, and obviously did find, that the aggressors and the instigators of the fighting with Fee were the defendants; that three of them caused the affrays and the rioting; that four of them assaulted á policeman and obstructed justice; and that all of this is exactly in accordance with the pattern, the policies, the motives, the design and the most frequently used methods and tactics of the Communist Party, and its members, and its politically-naive agents and employes.
Why, then wasn't such evidence admissible to prove planning, motive and design?
*93In Hester v. Com., 85 Pa. 139, where the defendant was convicted of murder, evidence of the. policies of a secret organization known as the “Mollie Maguires”, of which defendant was a member, was held to be admissible in order to prove motive, scheme or plans. This Court said (page 156) : “Its purpose was to explain the relations existing between the conspirators, the reason, motive and opportunity for their combined action, and the nature of the tie that bound them together. .. . It was proposed to prove that, under its practical workings, the organization had come to be the means of procuring crimes of every grade to be perpetrated ...” A fortiori, in trials of affrays and assaulting an officer of the law, the plans and policies, the methods and practical 'workings of communists and the Communist Party, and of a communist dominated union (which imported and employed these pickets outside a store, in an important defense area, where no labor dispute was involved), should be admitted in order to prove reason and motive, the nature and tie that bound them together, the common scheme or plan to promote assaults and fights and to cause riots and to obstruct justice.
In McManus v. Com., 91 Pa. 57, 66; in Carroll v. Com., 84 Pa. 107; in Campbell v. Com., 84 Pa. 187, the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce evidence that defendant was a member of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, commonly known as “Mollie Maguires”, and the character and purposes of the Order, in order to show motive for the commission of the murder and to explain or indicate the relations existing between the various defendants, and to throw light upon acts which otherwise would have been inexplicable.
Similarly, in Com. v. Fragassa, 278 Pa. 1, 4, 122 A. 88, evidence was admitted to show that defendants were members of the Black Hand Society two years be*94fore the killing in question took place, as well as the objects and purposes of the Black Hand Society. The court admitted the evidence “for the purpose of showing the relationship between defendant and Daniele [a co-defendant] . . .”, and “. . . to show a motive for the crime. . . . and that its [the Black Hand Society’s] purpose included various unlawful objects, such as blowing up houses and killing and robbing.”
In Com. v. Krolak, 164 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, where the defendant was indicted for assault and battery and he asserted, as here, that he was attacked and acted in self-defense, the Commonwealth was permitted to adduce evidence tending to establish that he and his companions had been engaged in a series of unprovoked assaults and batteries.
In Com. v. Chalfa, 313 Pa., supra, evidence concerning deceased’s insurance was admissible to prove a motive for the killing by poison. Evidence with respect to defendant’s knowledge of poison, and to the poisoning of other people was likewise admitted to prove purpose, scheme, plan and intent.
In Com. v. Campolla, 28 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, defendant was indicted for assault and for demanding by menaces and force $15. with intent to steal the same. The Commonwealth was permitted to offer evidence that defendant had invited others to join the Mafia Society, which, it was well known, terrorized Italians for the purpose of extorting money from them under threats of death or severe bodily injury. The court in its opinion said (page 383): “The evidence was admissible upon the ground, also, that it directly tended to establish that the defendant was a member of an organization banded together to commit crimes of the kind charged . . .”
It is clear from these authorities that evidence was admissible to prove defendants were communists and *95were members of an organization banded together to commit crimes of the kind charged.
It may not be amiss to point out that evidence of communism is inadmissible in many criminal trials. For example, evidence that defendant is a communist, or a member of or employed by a communist dominated union would be highly prejudicial and inadmissible in a charge of adultery or rape, or assault and battery by automobile, or in the ordinary case of larceny, burglary or robbery (unless involved in or connected with government papers, secrets, war material, etc.)., because the commission of one of these crimes is not a part of the communist, doctrine, teachings or practices, and hence such evidence would not show motive or design.
The judgment of the Superior Court should be sustained for another reason. The defendants’ experienced counsel failed to make timely objection to the introduction of this evidence and failed to' move to strike it out, obviously feeling that it might help their case. It is conceded by the majority that “. . . the Eagle Store manager was permitted to testify without objection that Local Union 65 was ‘thrown out of the C. I. O. because they are communist dominated’that “Defendant Truitt, without objection, was cross-examined concerning his membership in the Progressive Party, and whether or not such political party was ‘dominated by communists’ ”; that defendant Smith was cross-examined about the communist influence in Local No. 65, which employed him to organize picketing, [He admitted it didn’t mean anything to him whether the officers were communists or not], with one objection towards the end of his cross-examination. The majority opinion holds that this objection to this one question was sufficient to cover and make inadmissible all the previous and subsequent questions by the District Attorney and all the Commonwealth’s direct evidence, as well as its objected-to rebuttal evidence by Cvetic “an *96undercover agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation .....that Truitt was an active communist, and . . . concerning Truitt’s communist activities”. On this point I again disagree with the view or conclusion of the majority.
I believe that considering the issue involved, the communism of defendants, if any existed, was not collateral, but was relevant, material and important to prove design, plan, scheme, motive and tactics — all of which flow from the fact of being a communist or from picketing for a “communist dominated” union; and in any event any rights defendants might have had to object to such testimony were deliberately waived.
Where irrelevant or hearsay or any incompetent testimony is elicited by questions which are not objected to, and no timely motion is made to strike such testimony from the record, the testimony is properly part of the record and its credibility and weight are matters for the jury; and its admissibility will not be reversed after verdict. Cf. Com. v. Brown, 264 Pa. 85, 107 A. 676; Forster v. Rogers Bros., 247 Pa. 54, 63, 93 A. 26; Pyle v. Finnessy, 275 Pa. 54, 57, 118 A. 568; Com. v. Woloszchuk, 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 470, 3 A. 2d 10; Com. v. Retacco, 82 Pa. Superior Ct. 79; Com. v. Hay, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 503.
In Com. v. Brown, 264 Pa., supra, where the defendant was charged and found guilty of murder, this Court held it was not reversible error for a district attorney to ask defendant whether he was a deserter from the army where it appeared that no objection was made at the time to the question, or until the court refused to permit defendant to give his reasons for deserting.
In Forster v. Rogers Bros., 247 Pa., supra, we said (page 63) : “This is the true rule: When irrelevant or *97incompetent testimony is elicited by questions which are not objected to at the time they are put, and the trial is permitted to proceed with this testimony upon the record, a refusal of a request to strike it out, made after the witness has left the stand, will not be reviewed; in such a case the only course is to ask that the jury be instructed to disregard the testimony, and a refusal of this request can be assigned for error.”
In Com. v. Woloszchuk, 133 Pa. Superior Ct., supra, the Court clearly and correctly stated the law as follows (page 473) : “It was the duty of the appellants to enter promptly their objections before an answer was given to the inquiry as to the prosecutrix’s reputation. ... If an objection is not entered promptly, the proper practice is to move at once, and before the witness leaves the stand, to strike out the testimony, and, if the court refuses to do so, take an exception: Commonwealth v. Hay, 80 Pa. Superior Ct. 503, 506; Commonwealth v. Brown, 264 Pa. 85, 107 A. 676. In failing to enter a timely objection, the defendants may be deemed to have been satisfied to have the questions asked. A reversal will not be granted where the record indicates an acquiescence by a defendant in the alleged erroneous introduction of evidence’. Commonwealth v. Emery, 273 Pa. 517, 117 A. 338. ... We said in Commonwealth v. Retacco & Retacco, 82 Pa. Superior Ct. 79, 80: ‘The answers were responsive to questions to which no objection had been made; after responsive replies are so received, it is, generally speaking, too late to avoid their effect.’ ”
The majority, I believe, are likewise incorrect when they say the Commonwealth’s evidence was inadmissible because communism was a collateral matter and hence no rebuttal testimony was admissible on this point. We said in Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 341 Pa. 209, 224, 19 A. 2d 288, “Wigmore [On Evidence, Third *98Edition, Volume 3] says in section 1003: ‘The only true test [of “collateralness”] is that laid down in Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 1 Exch. 99 Pellock, C.B.’ Could, the fact, as to which error is predicated, have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the contradiction?”
Under the “Mollie Maguires” and “Black Hand” and other cases hereinabove cited, it seems clear that membership in the Communist Party or communist activities or employment by a communist dominated union could properly have been shown in evidence for the purpose of proving motive, scheme, plan or design, independently of the contradiction of Truitt.
Furthermore, defendants are not helped by the fact that some of the evidence which was admitted without objection, was “hearsay”. The majority opinion overlooks the established principle of law that, as so aptly stated by Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Drew, in Harrah v. Montour Railroad Co., 321 Pa. 526, 528, 184 A. 666: “ 'Where evidence, incompetent as hearsay, is admitted without objection and is relevant and material to the fact in issue, the court may give it the value of direct evidence’: Poluski v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 286 Pa. 473, 476.” In Poluski v. Glen Alden Coal Co., we said (page 476) : “'A rule of evidence not invoked is waived’: Wigmore, vol. I, section 18. ‘Inadmissible evidence, including hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, is not a nullity or void of probative force, but is to be given its natural probative effect as if it was in law admissible: 10 R.C.L. 1008. This is true even in a criminal case’:”.
Appellants represented by experienced counsel made no motion to strike out any testimony; no request was made to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony; and no exception was taken to the charge of the court. Moreover, at the conclusion of the trial, in response to *99a question of the court as to whether he had anything to say, counsel for the defendants said: “. . . I have nothing to say with reference to the trial of the case. I am not quarreling with the trial of the case. To my mind it was just another case that was tried just like other cases, and outside of always being interested and trying to do the best I can for the defendants, I am satisfied with the verdict. I’m satisfied with the case as tried. The verdict, if it were tried today, the verdict would be just the same.” Counsel, after pleading for leniency, then asked each of the defendants if he would like to say something, and each of them replied “no”.
The trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses said that in his opinion “the defendants, . . . none of whom belong to the union in which they purported to represent, were gathered from [distant] points ... as members of the communist party, to foment trouble and to create strife and confusion”; and that “we are of the opinion that this ease was tried as the defendants wished to have it tried”. In confirmation of this later statement by the trial judge, the Superior Court said (169 Pa. Superior Ct., page 335) : “Trial counsel was satisfied to have appellants interrogated. relative to their alleged communistic connections and activities and their relation with Local 65.... At the argument before this Court, junior trial counsel for appellants stated to this Court that during the trial he had asked the senior trial counsel to object to the cross-examination relative to such communistic connections and activities on the part of appellants, and that the senior trial counsel said he would not object and that he wanted such testimony to go into the record.”
How then is it possible to reverse because of the alleged inadvertence of the court or the alleged carelessness of counsel when the case was tried in accordance with the deliberate and carefully planned strategy of the defense?
*100The easiest thing in the world for new or second choice counsel to do is to criticize nearly everything that an experienced or reputedly competent trial lawyer did or failed to do. Moreover, it is not, and I believe should not be, part of the function of a Judge to be an armchair strategist for the defense. A defendant, no matter how bad his criminal record may be; has the. mantle of innocence draped around his shoulders as soon as he is arrested; his crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; the jury must be unanimously convinced of his guilt; under the Courts’ decisions, he is protected against the police, against the Commonwealth’s witnesses, against the district attorney, against the trial judge; and now he is to be protected against the unsuccessful strategy, the assumed ignorance or stupidity or the imagined neglect of his experienced lawyer. On behalf of all law-abiding citizens, I protest against this trend in favor of the criminal ; I believe more thought and consideration, should, be given to protecting the rights of the decent-living people instead of the rights of violators of the law or hardened criminals.
In today’s chaotic, fluctuating and constantly changing world, psychology and tactics play an important part; A trial lawyer should be allowed to try his- client’s case as he believes best for the client, and it is he and not the succeeding counsel or the Court who has the right and the duty to decide the strategy; the psychology and the tactics of the trial. I am convinced that appellate lawyers and appellate judges should stop being “Monday morning grandstand quarterbacks”.
As so aptly said by President Judge Rhodes in his opinion in this case, 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 326, 335, 82 A. 2d 699: “Although present counsel may have tried the case differently,- this does not warrant a reversal or serve as a reason for a new trial. A. defendant is *101free to choose his counsel, and counsel must he left free to try the case as he thinks best. When a defendant is represented by competent counsel of his own choice, it ought to be an exceedingly rare case where an appellate court would declare it fundamental error for the trial court to receive evidence which was introduced without objection. On this occasion appellants’ counsel deliberately chose to try the case as he did, and he and his clients must abide by the result. Trial strategy and the conduct of the defense are matters which must be left largely to the judgment of trial counsel. United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, D.C.M.D. Pa. 97 F. Supp. 930; Com. ex rel. Darcy v. Claudy, 367 Pa. 130, 133, 79 A. 2d 785.” See to the same effect: Com. v. Thompson, 367 Pa. 102, 79 A. 2d 401.
The defendants themselves, trial counsel, trial Judge, Court en banc, and all the six sitting Judges of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found nothing prejudicial in the trial of this case. I agree with them.
I would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court which in turn unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court below.
Justice Ladner joins in this dissent.

 Italics throughout, ours.

 November 27, 1951, this Court for the first time “took judicial notice that the. communist party is a subversive organization which conspires to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence”: Milasinovich v. Serbian Progressive Club, Inc., 369 Pa. 26, 84 A. 2d 571. Cf. McAndrew v. Scranton R. P. Co., 364 Pa. 504, 513, 72 A. 2d 780. See also: Act of June 23, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C., section 141 et seq.; Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951).