Court Opinion

ID: 9674563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:30:39.378735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:28.180255
License: Public Domain

SPEARS, Justice,
concurring.
I concur for the same reason I concurred in Ex Parte Wilkins, 665 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex.1984) (Spears, J., concurring). I disagree with the majority’s holding that an oral order which is reduced to writing within a reasonable time can never satisfy the requirements of Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W. 2d 43, 44 (Tex.1967).
Ex Parte Padron, 565 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex.1978) established that one who is committed to jail for civil contempt should be able to find somewhere in the record the written order. That requirement was met in this case because the trial court’s oral permanent injunction was eventually reduced to writing. The relator was held in contempt for his actions during the “window” period between the time the oral order was handed down and reduced to writing.
The majority adds an inflexible requirement to Ex Parte Slavin by holding that conduct which occurs during this “window” period can never be punished with contempt. This added requirement is unrealistic. In the busy courtrooms of this state, direct, explicit orders are frequently announced from the bench, with the formal written orders to be prepared by the attorneys or the court shortly thereafter. Oral orders, which are specific enough to give proper notice under Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d at 44, should be obeyed by the parties and must be enforceable by contempt proceedings. The majority’s creation of this "window” period allows parties to violate otherwise valid court orders with impunity. As I stated in Ex Parte Wilkins, 665 S.W.2d at 761 (Spears, J., concurring), this “window” can have disastrous consequences, particularly in family law proceedings.
I would hold that oral orders must be reduced to writing within a reasonable time under Ex Parte Padrón, and must satisfy the notice and specificity requirements of Ex Parte Slavin. I would further hold that when an unambiguous, specific oral order is preserved in the record, and the party charged with contempt had actual notice of the order, the court can enforce it by contempt proceedings for a reasonable time until a written order can be signed. Ex Parte Wilkins, 665 S.W.2d at 762 (Spears, J., concurring).
*369Price had actual notice of the terms of the permanent injunction during the “window” period because the trial court merely continued the provisions of a prior written temporary restraining order. Additionally, seven days was not an unreasonable time to elapse before reducing an oral permanent injunction to writing in this case.
I concur in the result of this cause because the permanent injunction does not satisfy the notice and specificity requirements of Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d at 44. The court order upon which an order of contempt is based must spell out the details of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that a person will readily know exactly what duties or obligations are imposed on him. Id. A violation of a vague and uncertain court order cannot be punished by contempt. Ex Parte Reese, 701 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Tex.1986).
The section of the permanent injunction which was allegedly violated by Price provided that Price, the Progressive Voters League, and a number of other individuals would desist and refrain from:
2. Issuing, mailing, or in any way distributing political slate cards, announcements, recommendations or campaign materials of any kind in support for or in opposition to candidates for public office until such time as the Progressive Voters League and Jesse Jones, John Wiley Price, James Whitlow, Jean Swindell, Bill Forest and Frances Dirks shall fully comply with all the filing, reporting and disclosure provisions of Chapter 251, Sec. 251.001-251.019 of the Texas Election Code.
This provision is impermissibly vague and uncertain. It does not specify whether Price was enjoined in his capacity as a member of the Progressive Voters League, as a Dallas County commissioner, or as a private citizen. Moreover, this provision does not specifically limit the impermissible conduct to the dissemination materials relating to the Progressive Voters League. Accordingly, I would hold that the judgment of contempt is void for vagueness.