Court Opinion

ID: 9430713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:23.584857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:25.932908
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
An administrative assistant to the Vice President for Agriculture of the University of Tennessee conducted a hearing *800and determined that respondent’s proposed discharge was not racially motivated. The Court today correctly holds that 28 U. S. C. § 1738 does not require that this determination by an administrative assistant be given full faith and credit in subsequent federal litigation. The Court also correctly refuses to fashion a federal common-law rule of preclusion that would bar respondent from litigating his claim against the University under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I agree with these conclusions and therefore join Parts I, II, and III of the Court’s opinion.
In Part IV of its opinion, however, the Court concludes that the findings of the administrative assistant may bar respondent’s claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and other of the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Acts. Although its reading of the legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act persuades the Court that it should not interpose a judicially created bar to the cause of action authorized by that statute, it creates such a bar to claims authorized by the earlier Civil Rights Acts without even mentioning the concerns that prompted their enactment. As a consequence, the Court’s analysis is incomplete and ultimately unconvincing.
Preclusion of claims brought under the post-Civil War Acts does not advance the objectives typically associated with finality or federalism. In the employment setting which concerns us here, precluding civil rights claims based on the Reconstruction-era statutes fails to conserve the resources of either the litigants or the courts, because the complainant’s companion Title VII claim will still go to federal court under today’s decision.1 Nor does preclusion show respect for *801state administrative determinations, because litigants apprised of this decision will presumably forgo state administrative determinations for the same reason they currently forgo state judicial review of those determinations — to protect their entitlement to a federal forum. Cf. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496, 532-533 (1982) (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., dissenting) (intimating that litigation of unreviewed state administrative determinations in federal court is necessary to encourage exhaustion of state administrative remedies); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 136 (1981) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., concurring in judgment) (same); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 524, n. 2 (1977) (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (same).
In support of its view that preclusion is required, the Court relies on an analogy to its construction of the Wunderlich Act in United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U. S. 394 (1966). In my opinion, that analogy is seriously flawed. In Utah Construction, the Court held that in a dispute arising under a Government contract, factual findings by the Board of Contract Appeals were binding on the Court of Claims. In support of its dictum that the holding was “harmonious with general principles of collateral estoppel,” id., at 421, the Court relied on the fact that Congress had *802plainly intended the administrative findings in such proceedings to be conclusive.2
The relevant federal statute in this case is the 1871 Civil Rights Act, not the Wunderlich Act. Needless to say, there is nothing in the legislative history of the post-Civil War legislation remotely suggesting that Congress intended to give binding effect to unreviewed rulings by state administrators in litigation arising under that statute. Quite the contrary, as we explained in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 180 (1961):
“It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts *803because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.”
See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 238-239, 242 (1972). Cf. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 338 (1983). Due respect for the intent of the Congress that enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as revealed in the voluminous legislative history of that Act, should preclude the Court from creating a judge-made rule that bars access to the express legislative remedy enacted by Congress.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part IV of the Court’s opinion.

 “The difficulties that will be encountered with this schizophrenic approach [ruling that state administrative findings may establish preclusion as to the claims under these Civil Rights Acts, at the same time as the same issues are relitigated as to the Title VII claim] are obvious. A way out of these difficulties remains to be found. As to any issues that must be retried, with perhaps inconsistent results, it may prove better simply to retry the issues as to all statutory claims. Application of preclusion as to part of the case saves no effort, does not prevent the risk of inconsistent *801findings, and may distort the process of finding the issues. The opportunity for repose is substantially weakened by the remaining exposure to liability. Insistence on preclusion in these circumstances has little value, and more risk than it may be worth.” 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4471, p. 169 (Supp. 1985).
Moreover, in this case, and presumably in many other eases as well, even the § 1983 claim may be litigated in federal court, at least to the extent of determining whether the complainant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate before the state administrative tribunal. See ante, at 799, n. 8.

 The Court quoted with approval the following excerpt from the dissenting opinion of Judge Davis in the Court of Claims:
“‘This is the same general policy which nourishes the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The court is reluctant, however, to apply that principle to these administrative findings because of the nature and genesis of the boards. The Wunderlich Act, as applied in Bianchi, should dispel these doubts. The Supreme Court made it plain that Congress intended the boards (and like administrative representatives) to be the fact-finders within their contract area of competence, just as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board are the fact-finders for other purposes. In the light of Bianchi’s evaluation of the statutory policy, we should not squint to give a crabbed reading to the board’s authority where it has stayed within its sphere, but should accept it as the primary fact-finding tribunal whose factual determinations (in disputes under the contract) must be received, if valid, in the same way as those of other courts or of the independent administrative agencies. Under the more modern view, the findings of the latter, at least when acting in an adjudicatory capacity, are considered final, even in a suit not directly related to the administrative proceeding, unless there is some good reason for a new judicial inquiry into the same facts. See Davis, Administrative Law 566 (1951); Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F. 2d 622, 627 (4th Cir., 1955). The only reasons the majority now offers for a judicial re-trial of factual questions already determined by valid board findings are the same policy considerations which Congress and the Supreme Court have already discarded in the Wunderlich Act and the Bianchi opinion. [Utah Construction & Mining Co. v. United States,] 168 Ct. Cl. [522,] 541-542, 339 F. 2d [606,] 618 [1964].’” See 384 U. S., at 421, n. 18.