Court Opinion

ID: 9683248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:25:25.75429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.714830
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting part. I agree with the majority decision in all respects but one. I would dismiss the charges because of the lack of a speedy trial. We have said many times that Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 28, sets forth the outer limits of delay allowed in bringing a criminal defendant to trial. At the same time we have said we are bound by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) which defines the law regarding a speedy trial. It depends upon the length of delay, the reason for delay, the claim for a speedy trial, and prejudices that are caused by the absence of a speedy trial. We have never, to my knowledge, dismissed a case short of the term limits set forth in Rule 28 but I submit that this is a case for just that treatment. It fits all the criteria set forth in Barker v. Wingo, id. There is no doubt that three terms of court had elapsed. The State offered no reason for the delay. A docket entry of dubious value is the basis of the majority’s decision. Even if it is given credibility and an extra six months is granted to the State, the trial was not held soon enough. I do not know why the State delayed this case. It may have had a weak case, docket problems, administrative problems, or whatever, but there was no justification given. That can only mean that the charges ought to be dismissed. In Alexander v. State, 268 Ark. 384, 598 S.W. 2d 395 (1980), this court dismissed charges that had been pending less than seven months. The State should not be able to sit idly by expecting that their inaction will be approved. Mays, J., joints in this dissent.