Court Opinion

ID: 9940341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 00:02:14.020974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:47.073148
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/22/24; Certified for Publication 2/13/24 (order attached)

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                              FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION THREE

 TY WHITEHEAD,
         Plaintiff and Appellant,
 v.
 CITY OF OAKLAND,                                         A164483
         Defendant and Respondent.
                                                          (Alameda County
                                                          Super. Ct. No. RG18896233)

        Plaintiff Ty Whitehead sued defendant City of Oakland for injuries he
suffered after his bicycle hit a pothole during a training ride for the AIDS
LifeCycle fundraiser. Prior to the training ride, plaintiff signed an agreement
releasing the “owners/lessors of the course or facilities used in the Event”
from future liability. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding the release was enforceable. Plaintiff appeals, arguing
the release was invalid because it concerned a matter of public interest.
Plaintiff also contends the court erred by failing to address whether there
was a triable issue of fact as to defendant’s gross negligence. We affirm.
                      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        In March 2017, plaintiff participated in a group training ride for AIDS
LifeCycle, a multi-day group bicycle ride fundraiser from San Francisco to

                                                   1
Los Angeles. As plaintiff was injured during that ride, we describe the
nature of the AIDS LifeCycle training rides for context.
      The AIDS LifeCycle fundraiser advertises a training system to help its
participants build up and prepare for the long-distance ride to Los Angeles.
The training system features training ride leaders who select cycling routes
with specific start times and rest stops; these routes are posted on the AIDS
LifeCycle website, and participants reserve spots for their selected rides. The
training system is designed to ensure there are enough certified training ride
leaders to support the number of riders, and the leaders are responsible for
informing riders of the organization’s code of conduct and safety rules before
every ride. On longer training rides, a “support and gear” person follows the
riders by car to offer support. Training ride leaders are tasked with ensuring
participants sign waivers in order to participate in training rides.
      Training ride leaders must be “certified,” which involves a combination
of in-person classroom instruction by AIDS LifeCycle staff and outdoor
bicycling instruction. The instruction emphasizes safety and how to coach
riders on safety rules and practices. Training ride leaders must re-certify
every two years; re-certification requires additional classroom instruction and
participation in a minimum of about ten training rides to remain in “good
standing.”
      The route for the training ride at issue in this case was 50 miles long,
which would take roughly seven to eight hours to complete. About 41 people
were on the training ride with plaintiff. During the ride, plaintiff—an
experienced cyclist and a certified training ride leader himself (though not
the leader for this particular ride)—hit a pothole that was approximately one
to two inches deep, 18 inches across, and 14 inches long. Plaintiff flipped
over his bicycle handle bars, hit his head on pavement, and suffered injury.

                                       2
The accident occurred on Skyline Boulevard near the intersection at Grass
Valley Road.
      Prior to but on the same day as the training ride, plaintiff signed a
document entitled “AIDS/LifeCycle Training Ride GENERAL
INFORMATION AND RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY,
ASSUMPTION OF RISK, AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT” (hereafter “the
release”). The release contained the following assumption of risk provision:
“RISKS: ASSUMPTION OF RISK. I understand that the Event is
potentially a hazardous activity, and that accidents during the Event could
lead to serious injury, death and/or property damage, both to me and to
others. Risks associated with the Event may include, but are not limited to:
[¶] using public streets and facilities where hazards such as broken pavement
and road debris may exist; [¶] being struck by, or colliding with . . . road
debris; [¶] . . . ; [¶] negligence or carelessness of . . . owners/lessors of the
course or facility owners (which may include state and local governmental
entities); [¶] negligence or carelessness in the implementation or enforcement
of any rules, regulations or guidelines related to the Events and/or in the
selection, use, or maintenance of any equipment, course, competition, facility
or service related to the Events. [¶] I understand that the Event may expose
me to risks other than those listed above and that the risks may not be
reasonably foreseeable to me, [or the organizers]. In consideration for being
allowed to participate in the Event, I hereby assume all risks associated with
the Event, even those risks which are not reasonably foreseeable at this
time.” (Bullet points and underlining omitted.) The release expressly
defined the “Event” as including training rides leading up to the seven-day
ride from San Francisco to Los Angeles.

                                          3
      The release also included a waiver and release provision: “WAIVER
AND RELEASE. To the maximum extent permitted by law, I hereby
release, waive, forever discharge and covenant not to sue the Releasees . . . .
from all liabilities, claims, costs, expenses, damages, losses and obligations, of
any kind or nature . . . which may arise or result (either directly or indirectly)
from my participation in the Event.” The release went on: “For the
avoidance of doubt, the Released Liabilities include all bodily injury . . . I may
suffer which arises or results (either directly or indirectly) from my
participation in the Event, including through any negligence of the
Releasees.” As relevant here, the release defined “Releasees” as including
“the owners/lessors of the course or facilities used in the Event.” (Italics
added.)
      Additionally, the release expressly relinquished any rights under Civil
Code section 1542, which at the time provided: “A general release does not
extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or
her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her
must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.”
(Former Civ. Code, § 1542, amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 157, § 2, eff. Jan. 1,
2019.)
      Plaintiff filed this suit alleging that defendant failed to maintain and
repair Skyline Boulevard and that the location of the accident was in a
dangerous condition due to the pothole that plaintiff hit. Plaintiff’s complaint
alleged one cause of action for dangerous condition of public property (Gov.
Code, § 835 et seq.) and one cause of action for public employee or contractor
liability for a dangerous condition.
      Defendant’s first motion for summary judgment contended in part that
the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred plaintiff’s recovery. The trial

                                        4
court granted summary adjudication of the cause of action for public
employee liability because plaintiff had not sued any of defendant’s
employees. But the court denied summary judgment, concluding defendant
had not, as a matter of law, “negated the element of duty under the primary
assumption of risk doctrine.” The court, however, noted its ruling as to the
primary assumption of risk doctrine was “without prejudice” to defendant
renewing that argument in a future motion for summary judgment based on
the release. 1
      Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for summary adjudication of
defendant’s affirmative defenses of waiver and assumption of risk. Relying
on Tunkl v. Regents of University of Cal. (1963) 60 Cal.2d 92 (Tunkl), plaintiff
contended the release was void because it affected a matter of public interest,
i.e., the maintenance of safe public roads. Plaintiff also argued defendant
could not rely on the primary assumption of risk doctrine, because the alleged
dangerous condition affected all road users, not just recreational cyclists.
Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment contending plaintiff’s
claim was barred by the release, by plaintiff’s express assumption of risk, and
by the primary assumption of risk doctrine.
      The trial court denied plaintiff’s summary adjudication motion,
concluding plaintiff failed to demonstrate the release was contrary to public
policy and void as a matter of law. The court noted plaintiff erroneously
applied Tunkl to defendant’s “alleged failure to maintain a safe road and
repair the pothole, rather than the subject of the waiver and release, which is
the organized recreational group training ride.” The court also found

1      Defendant indicated it learned of plaintiff’s execution of the release
after filing its first summary judgment motion.

                                        5
summary adjudication improper because plaintiff failed to address the
portion of defendant’s defense based on express assumption of risk.
      By separate order, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff’s execution of the release
bars his claim for liability arising from a dangerous condition of public
property. Having so ruled, the court expressly declined to address the
parties’ contentions regarding the primary assumption of risk doctrine.
      After the trial court entered judgment dismissing the complaint with
prejudice, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, and defendant filed a notice of
cross-appeal.
                                  DISCUSSION
      A. The release of liability is enforceable
      Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
because the release he signed affected a public interest and was therefore
invalid.
      To resolve whether a release is invalid, “ ‘we conduct not only a de novo
examination of the moving and opposing papers to determine whether
[defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law [citation], but also
conduct a de novo examination of the release document. Where, as here, no
conflicting parol evidence is introduced concerning the interpretation of the
document, “construction of the instrument is a question of law, and the
appellate court will independently construe the writing.” ’ ” (YMCA of Metro.
L.A. v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 22, 26.)
      Civil Code section 1668 provides: “All contracts which have for their
object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own
fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of
law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”

                                         6
      In Tunkl, the California Supreme Court considered whether “a release
from liability for future negligence imposed as a condition for admission to a
charitable hospital” was enforceable under section 1668. (Tunkl, supra, 60
Cal.2d at p. 94.) Finding that the subject agreement between a hospital and
an entering patient affected the public interest, Tunkl concluded the release
included within the agreement was invalid. (Ibid.)
      In examining whether section 1668 invalidated the release, the Tunkl
court observed that judicial interpretations of Civil Code section 1668 were
consistent in holding that “the exculpatory provision [i.e., the release] may
stand only if it does not involve ‘the public interest.’ ” (Tunkl, supra, 60
Cal.2d at p. 96.) Noting that “[n]o definition of the concept of public interest
can be contained within the four corners of a formula,” the Supreme Court set
forth a “rough outline of that type of transaction in which exculpatory
provisions will be held invalid.” (Id. at p. 98, italics added.) In the high
court’s words, “the attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction
which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. [1] It concerns a
business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. [2] The
party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great
importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for
some members of the public. [3] The party holds himself out as willing to
perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for
any member coming within certain established standards. [4] As a result of
the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction,
the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining
strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. [5] In
exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public with a
standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision

                                        7
whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain
protection against negligence. [6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the
person or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller,
subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.” (Id. at pp. 98–
101, fns. omitted, italics added.)
      The Tunkl court explained the rationale for this rule as follows: “While
obviously no public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which
one party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would
otherwise have placed upon the other party, the [circumstances in which a
public interest is involved] pose a different situation. In this situation the
releasing party does not really acquiesce voluntarily in the contractual
shifting of the risk, nor can we be reasonably certain that he receives an
adequate consideration for the transfer. Since the service is one which each
member of the public, presently or potentially, may find essential to him, he
faces, despite his economic inability to do so, the prospect of a compulsory
assumption of the risk of another’s negligence.” (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at
p. 101, italics added.)
      Notably, in 2007 the Supreme Court observed that then-recent
appellate decisions had “concluded categorically that private agreements
made ‘in the recreational sports context’ releasing liability for future ordinary
negligence ‘do not implicate the public interest and therefore are not void as
against public policy.’ ” (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41
Cal.4th 747, 759–760 & fns. 12–17 (City of Santa Barbara), and cases cited;
Hass v. RhodyCo Productions (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 11, 29–30 (Hass), and
cases cited.) Particularly relevant here, Okura v. United States Cycling Fed’n
(1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1462 (Okura) “establishes that bicycle racing . . . is not
a matter sufficiently affected with the public interest so as to void clear and

                                        8
unambiguous exculpatory clauses.” (Buchan v. United States Cycling Fed’n
(1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 134, 152.)
      In Okura, the appellant was injured after hitting loose debris while
participating in a bicycle race on closed portions of the public streets in the
City of Hermosa Beach. (Okura, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1464–1465.)
The appellant sued the city and others, alleging negligence in the preparation
and maintenance of the course. (Id. at p. 1464.) The trial court granted
summary judgment against the appellant based on a release he signed that
“discharge[d] in advance the promoters, sponsors, . . . the officials, and any
involved municipalities or other public entities (and their respective agents
and employees), from and against any and all liability arising out of or
connected in any way with my participation in said event, even though that
liability may arise out of negligence or carelessness on the part of the persons
or entities mentioned above.” (Id. at p. 1465, italics added and omitted.)
      Okura affirmed the grant of summary judgment, finding the release
was not void as against public policy. (Okura, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 1465–1466, 1469.) After assessing each of the Tunkl factors, the court
concluded “[t]his situation does not present a transaction affecting the public
interest.” (Okura, at p. 1468.) As to the first Tunkl factor—whether the
exemption involves a transaction that concerns a business generally
considered suitable for public regulation—the court found the transaction
was “entry into a public bicycle race organized by private nonprofit
organizations” and “the organized racing of bicycles is not the subject of
public regulation.” (Okura, at p. 1466.) With regard to the second Tunkl
factor—whether the party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a
service of great public importance—the court stated: “The service provided
here was the organization and running of competitive bicycle races for

                                        9
members of the organizers and the public,” which “cannot be termed one that
‘is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public.’ ”
(Okura, at pp. 1466–1467.)
      As to the third Tunkl factor—whether the service was open to the
public—Okura indicated anyone with a bicycle and entrance fee could enter.
(Okura, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 1467.) With regard to the fourth and
fifth Tunkl factors—the essential nature of the service and the economic
setting of the transaction, and whether the exculpated party has a superior
bargaining power and confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract of exculpation—the court reiterated the service provided was a
leisure time activity that was not essential. (Okura, at p. 1468.) The court
stated, “The relative bargaining strengths of the parties does not come into
play absent a compelling public interest in the transaction.” (Ibid.) As for
the last Tunkl factor—whether the person or their property is placed under
another’s control—Okura noted there was no such release of control. (Okura,
at p. 1468.)
      This case is materially indistinguishable from Okura. At bottom,
plaintiff executed a release in exchange for entry into a recreational cycling
activity that was organized for fundraising purposes. In line with Okura and
the other decisions cited by the Supreme Court in City of Santa Barbara,
supra, 41 Cal.4th 747, we conclude the trial court properly found the release
valid and enforceable because the cycling event was a nonessential sports
activity that did not affect the public interest within the meaning of Civil
Code section 1668.
      Plaintiff argues that, for purposes of the Tunkl release analysis, the
focus should be on defendant’s provision and maintenance of public streets
and highways—and not on the activity or transaction for which the release

                                       10
was given, i.e., participation in the cycling fundraiser. Viewed in this
manner, the instant release affected the public interest in the provision and
maintenance of public roads. This reading of Tunkl, however, is off the mark
and unconvincing.
      Tunkl itself couched its analysis in terms of determining whether the
transaction for which the release was given is one that affects the public
interest. (See, e.g., Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 98, italics added [“the courts
have revealed a rough outline of that type of transaction in which exculpatory
provisions will be held invalid”]; id. at p. 101, italics added [“obviously no
public policy opposes private, voluntary transactions in which one party, for a
consideration, agrees to shoulder a risk which the law would otherwise have
placed upon the other party”]; id. at p. 102 [“The admission room of a hospital
contains no bargaining table where, as in a private business transaction, the
parties can debate the terms of their contract.”].)
      Likewise, in Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 662, the court held: “Under Tunkl . . . determining whether a
release of liability affects the public interest, and is thus void as a matter of
public policy, requires analysis of the transaction giving rise to the contract—
not the allegedly negligent conduct by the party invoking the release.” (Gavin
W., at p. 670, some italics added.) And more recently, the Supreme Court
said this: “Tunkl’s public interest analysis focuses upon the overall
transaction—with special emphasis upon the importance of the underlying
service or program, and the relative bargaining relationship of the parties—in
order to determine whether an agreement releasing future liability for
ordinary negligence is unenforceable.” (City of Santa Barbara, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 762, italics added.)

                                        11
      In this case, the overall transaction was plaintiff’s signing of a release
of liability so that he could participate in the AIDS LifeCycle fundraiser and
its organized training rides on defendant’s streets. We cannot, as plaintiff
urges, ignore this aspect of this case. Likewise, it cannot reasonably be
concluded that a cycling fundraiser is an essential service such that plaintiff
was robbed of his free will in deciding whether to sign the release. As Okura
explained, “People are not compelled to enter the event but are merely
invited to take part. If they desire to take part, they are required to sign the
entry and release form. The relative bargaining strengths of the parties does
not come into play absent a compelling public interest in the transaction.”
(Okura, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 1468; see Hass, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at
p. 31 [“half marathons are not an activity of great importance to the general
public and are certainly not a matter of necessity. No racer is required to
enter a particular event or to run it in any particular way.”].)
      Plaintiff contends “anomalous results” would result if “one who
provides a service that does not involve a public interest could require a
consumer to exempt from liability another who provides a service that does
involve such an interest.” “By parity of reasoning,” plaintiff asserts, “the
converse would also be true: a provider of a service that did not involve a
public interest would be entitled to enforce an exemption from liability in its
own contract but would be precluded from enforcing it if it was contained in
the contract of a provider of a service that did involve a public interest.”
(Italics omitted.) To the extent plaintiff offers anomalous hypothetical
situations to support his point, we are unpersuaded. We look only to the
facts before us, bearing in mind that “Tunkl’s public interest analysis focuses
upon the overall transaction.” (City of Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 762.)

                                        12
      Plaintiff contends Okura is factually distinguishable because it
involved a competitive race on a closed course, and both the organizers and
the City of Hermosa Beach were sued for alleged negligence in the
preparation and maintenance of the course. But plaintiff cannot escape the
Tunkl analysis by simply focusing on defendant’s allegedly negligent
maintenance of a public road and altogether ignoring that he signed the
release to participate in a recreational event. Indeed, he is suing defendant
for its allegedly negligent maintenance of a public road that was specifically
selected as part of the AIDS LifeCycle training system for group training
purposes. The release here expressly covered any negligence in the
maintenance of both the official course and the routes used for training
purposes. As defendant points out, there is no distinction between the bicycle
race in Okura and the organized cycling events here at issue on the critical
point that all the activities were recreational in nature and did not implicate
the public interest.
      Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, Lewis Operating Corp. v. Superior
Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 940 aligns with our application of the Tunkl
analysis. In Lewis Operating Corp., a residential apartment tenant sued his
landlord after suffering injury in the onsite exercise facility. (Lewis
Operating Corp., at pp. 943 & fn. 1, 946.) The tenant’s rental agreement
included a release governing the use of the on-site exercise facility. By
executing the rental agreement, the tenant agreed to the release. (Id. at
p. 943.) The Court of Appeal concluded summary judgment should have been
granted in favor of the landlord based on the plaintiff’s execution of the
release. (Id. at pp. 943–944.) While acknowledging that residential leases
affect the public interest, the court reasoned that providing the amenity of an
onsite exercise facility was outside the “basic, heavily regulated offering of a

                                       13
residential dwelling” and that “providing health club or exercise facility
services has repeatedly been held not to invoke the ‘public policy’ rule of
Tunkl.” (Id. at p. 946.) Lewis Operating Corp. plainly focused on the subject
of the contractual release, noting as we do here that Tunkl itself focused on
the “subject transaction” for which the release was given. (Ibid.)
         In sum, the trial court correctly concluded the release was enforceable. 2
         B. There was no triable issue of fact regarding gross negligence
         Plaintiff argues that even if the release is enforceable, the release could
not absolve defendant of liability for gross negligence, and the trial court
failed to address whether the evidence raised a triable issue of fact on this
topic.
         Defendant acknowledges that a release cannot absolve a party from
liability for gross negligence (City of Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
pp. 750–751), but it counters that plaintiff forfeited this claim by failing to
adequately raise it below. On this score, defendant contends plaintiff
presented no factual argument “explaining why or how [defendant’s] conduct
rises to the level of gross negligence.”
         “ ‘Generally, the rules relating to the scope of appellate review apply to
appellate review of summary judgments. [Citation.] An argument or theory
will . . . not be considered if it is raised for the first time on appeal.
[Citation.] . . . [P]ossible theories that were not fully developed or factually
presented to the trial court cannot create a ‘triable issue’ on appeal.’ ”

2     Our opinion is limited to the facts before us and should not be read as
opining on the validity of a release in other contexts, e.g., where an AIDS
LifeCycle participant is injured during a practice ride that is not part of the
AIDS LifeCycle training program or where an injured participant suffers
additional harm as a result of medical malpractice at a treating hospital.

                                           14
(DiCola v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th
666, 676.)
      “[O]rdinary negligence ‘consists of a failure to exercise the degree of
care in a given situation that a reasonable person under similar
circumstances would employ to protect others from harm.’ [Citation.]
‘ “[M]ere nonfeasance, such as the failure to discover a dangerous condition or
to perform a duty,” ’ amounts to ordinary negligence. [Citation.] However, to
support a theory of ‘ “[g]ross negligence,” ’ a plaintiff must allege facts
showing ‘either a “ ‘ “want of even scant care” ’ ” or “ ‘ “an extreme departure
from the ordinary standard of conduct.” ’ ” ’ ” (Anderson v. Fitness Internat.,
LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 867, 881 (Anderson).) “[I]n cases involving a
waiver of liability for future negligence, courts have held that conduct that
substantially or unreasonably increased the inherent risk of an activity or
actively concealed a known risk could amount to gross negligence, which
would not be barred by a release agreement. [Citation.] Evidence of conduct
that evinces an extreme departure from manufacturer’s safety directions or
an industry standard also could demonstrate gross negligence. [Citation.]
Conversely, conduct demonstrating the failure to guard against, or warn of, a
dangerous condition typically does not rise to the level of gross negligence.”
(Ibid.)
      Here, plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s motion for summary
judgment made multiple, if somewhat brief, references to gross negligence.
For example, the introduction to his opposition asserted defendant’s motion
should be denied because “the City increased the risk of harm to the public
(which cannot be assumed under primary assumption of the risk or with a
written waiver if the risk increases to the level of gross negligence, a question
of fact[)].” The opposition also included assertions that defendant cannot

                                        15
evade accountability through the release “for increasing the risk of harm that
rises to gross negligence (a question of fact),” and that defendant “increased
the risk of harm on Skyline in multiple ways: Installing the distracting and
dangerous ‘rumble strips’ trap just uphill from the pothole; Misprioritizing
and delaying repairs, exposing more people to more severe harm; and Poorly
maintaining the road based on ‘missing’ data that it never even tried to
obtain or provide warning to the public.” Plaintiff’s opposition also
referenced his motion for summary adjudication, where he cited to a portion
of Willhide-Michiulis v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, LLC (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 344 stating that “conduct that substantially or unreasonably
increased the inherent risk of an activity or actively concealed a known risk
could amount to gross negligence, which would not be barred by a release
agreement.”
      Notably, however, plaintiff’s opposition contained no clear argument as
to how defendant’s alleged deficiencies amounted to gross negligence. As the
trial court indicated when plaintiff mentioned gross negligence at the
summary judgment hearing, plaintiff had “merely float[ed]” the idea that
there was gross negligence, thus leaving the court to guess what exactly his
gross negligence theory was. The record bears this out. Although plaintiff
claimed defendant increased the risk of harm in several ways, he never
explained how defendant’s alleged conduct substantially or unreasonably
increased the risk in a way that amounts to gross negligence, much less
pointed to evidence of a substantial or unreasonable increase in risk.
      But even assuming plaintiff adequately raised the issue such that the
trial court erred in declining to address it, he fails to show grounds for
reversal. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)

                                        16
      Plaintiff points to evidence in the record that he claims shows “[t]he
City suspected it was missing data that would help prioritize repairing or
repaving bikeways yet failed to take steps to verify its data were complete or
obtain additional data.” Specifically, Jason Patton, a “Bicycle and Pedestrian
Program Manager” with defendant’s Department of Transportation, testified
during a deposition about a 2007 email he wrote wherein he said he
suspected “ ‘collisions involving pavement issues are significantly
underreported.’ ” When asked why he had suspected this, Patton explained
he has personally seen people fall off their bicycles and ride on, apparently
without reporting their fall. But Patton also stated that incidents involving
serious injury are most likely to have a police response and result in records
that come to defendant’s attention. Patton asserted it was much more
important to have the data defendant did have (i.e., serious injury data)
rather than data of all unreported falls like the ones he observed. When
asked if he had done anything to increase the accuracy of “collision data” on
Oakland bikeways, Patton stated, “We are not well positioned to improve the
accuracy of the data in that the police department creates it and the
California Highway Patrol processes it. We’re not able to change that data,
nor should we be changing it.” When asked if he had done anything to
capture more data, such as by asking local bicycle groups to report all
collisions, he responded he had not made any formal requests though he had
encouraged people involved in bicycle crashes to report them.
      Plaintiff also refers to a declaration by his expert, Shakir Shatnawi,
Ph.D., a civil engineer with training and education in transportation
engineering. According to Shatnawi, “a municipality that suspects it is
‘missing data’ that would help to prioritize repairing or repaving a bikeway
like Skyline [citation] should take steps [to] verify that its data are complete

                                       17
or obtain additional data. At a minimum, a City employee who suspects that
data are missing should report that concern to his or her supervisor so that
appropriate steps can be taken to address it, like conducting inspections.
Ignoring the fact that data are missing increases the risk of harm to road
users (motorists, bicyclists, etc.), because it delays repairing or repaving the
road. The longer that a pavement defect exists, the more dangerous it
becomes.”
      The evidence that a city employee suspected underreporting of data
concerning falls or collisions based on his personal observations does not
constitute evidence that data material to the issue of gross negligence
actually existed. Plaintiff’s theory is at best speculative and does not create a
triable issue as to whether defendant’s conduct marked an extreme departure
from the ordinary standard of conduct or whether it substantially or
unreasonably increased the inherent risk of an activity or actively concealed
a known risk. (See Anderson, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 881.)
      Plaintiff also points to portions of Shatnawi’s declarations opining that
the pavement in the area of plaintiff’s incident was in “major structural
distress and had failed”; the City knew or should have known there was a
risk of potholes on such a road and a high risk such potholes would present a
dangerous condition to bicyclists on Skyline; City personnel patched a pothole
in the area in September 2015; and at a minimum the City should have
returned to the area to inspect it regularly. Shatnawi also asserted that
“ ‘alligator cracking’ ”—which is “a series of interconnecting cracks caused by
fatigue failure of the asphalt concrete surface under repeated traffic
loading”—is considered “ ‘a major structural distress’ ” and that potholes
generally “ ‘are recorded as high severity alligator cracking.’ ”

                                        18
      Plaintiff fails to explain how this evidence supports a triable claim of
gross negligence. Shatnawi appears to say that whenever a street shows
signs of alligator cracking or there is a risk of potholes forming, a city should
inspect it regularly. But “conduct demonstrating the failure to guard against,
or warn of, a dangerous condition typically does not rise to the level of gross
negligence.” (Anderson, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 881.) Here, Shatnawi
offered no basis for a conclusion that defendant’s conduct exceeded such
ordinary negligence. Indeed, defendant’s evidence established without
contradiction that predicting the development of potholes from existing
cracking cannot be done reliably, and that defendant had never received any
complaint or notification of the pothole at issue.
      Finally, plaintiff argues there was evidence that defendant “increased
the risk of harm by misclassifying defects on Skyline.” For this he cites to the
portion of Kenneth Patton’s declaration explaining that service requests for
reports of potholes or defects in bicycle lanes are always assigned “priority 1”
(the most urgent priority for repair), while potholes or other defects in bicycle
routes are assigned a “priority 2”; and that priority 1 potholes are repaired
within 1 to 5 days, while priority 2 repairs are made within weeks. During
his deposition, Patton reviewed various service requests for potholes or
defects on Skyline Boulevard dating back to 2009. He could not explain why
“priority 3” (the least urgent priority for repair) was assigned to some of these
service requests, which indicated potential errors in the priority assignment
or perhaps initial misdescriptions of the issue.
      That mistakes may have been made in prioritizing service requests
does not assist plaintiff’s case. The evidence of misprioritization concerned a
mere handful of service requests, some of which were made many years
before the incident in question. Such evidence falls far short of establishing a

                                        19
triable issue that defendant’s conduct reflected an extreme departure from
the ordinary standard of conduct. Moreover, there is no evidence that these
select mistakes substantially or unreasonably increased the inherent risk of
the cycling activity at issue.
         In sum, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment based on
the release. In light of this conclusion, we need not and do not address the
dispute between the parties as to whether the doctrine of primary
assumption of risk forecloses plaintiff’s claim.
                                         DISPOSITION
         The judgment is affirmed. Defendant is entitled to costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)

                                            _________________________
                                            Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Petrou, J.

Whitehead v. City of Oakland (A164483)

                                             20
Filed 2/13/24
                          CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                              FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

    TY WHITEHEAD,
          Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                      A164483
    v.
    CITY OF OAKLAND,                                  (Alameda County
                                                      Super. Ct. No. RG18896233)
          Defendant and Respondent.

BY THE COURT: 3
         The written opinion which was filed on January 22, 2024, has now been
certified for publication pursuant to rule 8.1105(b) of the California Rules of
Court, and it is ordered published in the official reports.

Dated: 2/13/2024                                      _Tucher, P.J.___________________
                                                       Presiding Justice

3
         Tucher, P.J., Fujisaki, J., and Petrou, J.
                                                21
Trial Court:               Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge:               Hon. Richard L. Seabolt

Counsel:                   Law Office of Gerald Clausen, Gerald A. Clausen; The Veen
                             Firm P.C., Anthony L. Label and Steven A. Kronenberg,
                             for Plaintiff and Appellant

                           Barbara J. Parker, Oakland City Attorney, Maria Bee,
                             Chief Assistant City Attorney, Kevin P. McLaughlin,
                             Supervising Deputy City Attorney and Allison L. Ehlert,
                             Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent

Whitehead v. City of Oakland (A164483)

                                              22