Court Opinion

ID: 9624594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:10:45.413227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:01:27.100096
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting).
I most respectfully dissent. In my opinion the case of Watson v. Livingston, 154 S. C. 257, 151 S. E. 469, relied upon in the majority opinion, is not at all decisive or controlling here because the constitutional inhibitions and stat*198utory provisions which govern the decision of this case were not involved in the cited case.
Here the legislature had no power to authorize the City of Myrtle Beach to issue bonds, except in compliance with the applicable constitutional provisions, and the City of Myrtle Beach had no power to issue the bonds in the absence of substantial compliance with both the constitutional provisions and the statutory authority granted it by the legislature.
Article VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that
“no such debt shall be created without submitting the question as to the creation thereof to the qualified electors of such city or town, as provided in this Constitution for such special elections; * *
Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution reads, in part, as follows:
“In authorizing a special election in any incorporated city or town in this State for the purpose of bonding the same, the General Assembly shall prescribe as a condition precedent to the holding of said election a petition from a majority of the freeholders of said city or town as shown by its tax books, * *
Pursuant to the mandate set forth in Article II, Section 13, the general assembly enacted, inter alia, what is now Section 47-835 of the 1962 Code of Laws. This section provides for'a petition in accordance with the constitutional provisions and that,
“The petition shall set forth the amount of bonds sought to be issued and the purpose or purposes for which the proceeds thereof are to be expended * * *. The filing of such petition shall be a condition precedent to the holding of the election provided for by this article.” (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing section is a part of Article III, Chapter 9, Title 47 of the Code. The only section of the said Article III which gives any authority to the City of Myrtle Beach to hold the election is Section 47-837. This section provides *199that the municipal council shall order such an election if it finds, as prerequisite thereto, three things with respect to the petition of the freeholders, one of which is,
“That it seeks the issuance of bonds in an amount not prohibited by any constitutional limitation; * *
Since o;i the record before us the petition sought issuance of bonds in the exact amount of $500,000, which amount city council found to be prohibited by the constitutional limitation of 8%, I think it clearly follows that city council was then without any authority to order the election. It had no other petition before it and no authority under the Constitution or statutory law to order any such election.
Since I think, for the foregoing reasons, city council had no authority to order the election, the construction of the last sentence of the petition, with reference to retiring the bonds by levying an additional five mill tax on real property, becomes unnecessary.
I wish to point out, however, what I think is a matter of common knowledge. Petitions for signatures of freeholders, such as the one here involved, are usually prepared by someone on behalf of the municipality. I think both the constitutional and statutory provisions contemplate a petition which is at least reasonably free of ambiguity. Whether the signatures of the requisite number of freeholders could possibly have been obtained had the petition here set forth, in unambiguous language, the true facts is a matter of pure speculation and conjecture. For this additional reason, I think the judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
Brailsford, J., concurs.