Court Opinion

ID: 9931316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 19:04:11.283127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:14.278907
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/24 P. v. Rowen CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097641

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. 21CF05877)

           v.

 MARLEY PATRICK ROWEN,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Marley Patrick Rowen pled no contest to two sexual offenses against a
victim under the age of 14 years. Defendant appeals the judgment, arguing we should
reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing because counsel provided ineffective
assistance by (1) failing to raise childhood trauma as a mitigating circumstance and
(2) failing to correct the trial court’s misstatement of fact. We disagree and will affirm
the judgment.

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                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Defendant pled no contest to lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the
age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a))1 and to forcible lewd conduct with a child
under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court dismissed the remaining
charges and enhancements.
       The probation report contains the factual basis for defendant’s plea. Over the
course of almost two years, defendant sexually abused two of his minor grandchildren on
several occasions. The abuse started when the grandchildren were living with him.
       Defendant’s plea indicates he understood that he may still be required to serve the
maximum sentence of 18 years and the terms for both convictions may be sentenced
consecutively. The trial court indicated that defendant did not stipulate to the existence
of aggravating factors nor did a jury find any aggravating factors to be true. Defendant
stipulated that “there may be facts in mitigation or aggravation that are not yet plead or
proven in the police reports or probation report.” The probation report also referenced
defendant’s stipulation from the plea and indicated that the trial court could consider
aggravating factors at sentencing, which included, among other things, defendant’s two
prior misdemeanor sexual offense convictions.
       At sentencing, the trial court read and considered the probation report and
character letters submitted on defendant’s behalf and heard argument from both the
prosecutor and defense counsel. The prosecutor argued the trial court should sentence
defendant to the upper term because defendant had a prior history of sexual offenses,
abused a position of trust with the two victims, had the opportunity to participate in
treatment programs for sex offenders in the past, and defendant’s statements in the
probation report indicated that he blamed the victims who were minors at the time he

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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sexually abused them. Defense counsel argued the lower term was appropriate because
defendant came forward at an early stage, admitted guilt right away, sought
rehabilitation, and he was old.
       As facts in aggravation, the probation report indicated defendant groomed both
victims, took advantage of a position of trust, bound one of the victims during the
commission of the forcible lewd conduct count, and the victims were particularly
vulnerable. The probation report also noted those facts had not yet been pled or proven.
The trial court found that aggravating circumstances included prior convictions for sexual
misconduct that “indicated an increasing seriousness in nature.” At the hearing, the trial
court stated that one of defendant’s convictions occurred in 1997. Defendant’s previous
convictions for indecent exposure occurred in 1977 and lewd conduct in public in 2000.
The trial court also found defendant did not participate in sex offender therapy after his
1977 conviction.
       The trial court also considered mitigating circumstances, which included a “lack of
prior felony convictions, that he turned himself in to law enforcement, that he expressed
remorse, that he has engaged in positive civic activities over a long period of time, that he
admitted wrongdoing at an early stage[,] [¶] . . . [and that] he is aged.”
       The probation report contains a statement from defendant that, “ ‘Nothing like this
has ever happened to me in my life. I mean, there is some stuff that happened when I
was a little kid, but nothing like this.’ ” Defendant also stated in the report, “ ‘I have a
weakness in that area from when I was a kid. I believed women wanted to see me naked;
it’s why I did “exposure stuff.” ’ ”
       The report also correctly states the date of defendant’s conviction from 1977 and
defendant “confirmed his criminal history [was] accurate.” The trial court found “there
was a vague assertion of something occurring when the [d]efendant was a child” in the
probation report but “that vague reference is insufficient to support any findings
necessary under [section] 1170[, subdivision] (b)(6).”

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       After considering all of these factors, the trial court found the aggravating factors
did not outweigh the mitigating factors and found that the middle term, for both counts,
was the appropriate term. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years for the lewd
and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 years count and a consecutive
eight years for the forcible lewd conduct with a child under the age of 14 years count.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends on appeal that his counsel was ineffective because counsel
(1) failed to raise the mitigating circumstance that defendant experienced childhood
trauma and (2) failed to correct the trial court when it erroneously stated that one of
defendant’s 1977 prior misdemeanor convictions occurred in 1997. He argues that had
counsel raised these issues to the trial court it is reasonably probable that he would have
received a lower sentence. We are not persuaded by his arguments.
       Defendant bears the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms
and the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. (Id. at pp. 688, 691-692; People v.
Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) It is not enough to establish prejudice for a
defendant to propose that counsel’s performance had some “conceivable effect” on the
outcome; rather, the defendant must show a reasonable probability of a different result
but for counsel’s errors. (Strickland, at p. 693; see id. at p. 694.) Prejudice must be a
demonstrable reality established based on facts in the record, not simply speculation as to
the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel. (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d
883, 933; People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) A reviewing court
may reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without addressing both
components if a defendant makes an insufficient showing as to either prong. (Strickland,
at p. 697.) “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of

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sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”
(Ibid.)
          A. Mitigating Circumstances
          We need not determine whether counsel’s performance was ineffective because
defendant did not suffer any prejudice. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) created a
presumption in favor of the lower term if the trial court finds a defendant’s childhood
trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense. (People v. Tilley
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 777.) The trial court read and considered the probation
report and specifically stated that the “vague reference” to defendant’s childhood in the
report was not sufficient to make such a finding under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) to
sentence to defendant to the lower term.
          Defendant has not pointed to anything in the record that would demonstrate a
reasonable probability of a different outcome. (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466
U.S. at pp. 693-694.) Defendant makes no argument that he experienced childhood
trauma or what the alleged trauma was outside of his reference to the probation report,
which the trial court considered. Nor does defendant assert there was evidence of
childhood trauma the trial court failed to consider or that the alleged childhood trauma
was a contributing factor in the commission of the charged offenses. We cannot
conclude that it is reasonably probable the trial court would have imposed a lower term
sentence had counsel provided evidence of childhood trauma. Accordingly, defendant
has not met his burden of showing it is reasonably likely the trial court’s decision would
have been different absent the errors. (Id. at p. 696.)
          B. Trial Court Misstatement
          We also do not need to consider whether counsel was ineffective in failing to
correct the trial court’s misstatement of defendant’s prior conviction because defendant
has not demonstrated any prejudice.

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       Defendant has not met his burden to demonstrate there was a reasonable
probability of a different outcome at the sentencing hearing if his counsel had corrected
the trial court’s misstatement. Defendant merely advances a speculative and conclusory
argument that his counsel’s failure to correct the trial court’s misstatement had a
prejudicial effect, as it presumes the trial court had a genuine misunderstanding as to the
date of the prior conviction. The record does not support this conclusion.
       The probation report, which the trial court read and considered, accurately stated
the date of defendant’s previous 1977 conviction. Defendant also confirmed the accuracy
of his criminal history in the probation report. The trial court did not rely on its
misstatement in imposing the sentence, and the age of the prior conviction does not
negate its basis of finding that defendant’s sexual misconduct was increasing in
seriousness. Having read and considered the probation report containing the correct
information, there is nothing in the record that demonstrates the trial court had a genuine
misunderstanding as to the date of the prior conviction. Rather it appears likely the trial
court merely misspoke. We cannot conclude it is reasonably probable the trial court
would have imposed a lower sentence if counsel had corrected its misstatement.
Accordingly, defendant has not met his burden.

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                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                   /s/
                                                  WISEMAN, J.*

We concur:

 /s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

 /s/
MESIWALA, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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