Court Opinion

ID: 9482518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:52:37.161909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:02.597702
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion which states that we lack jurisdiction to review the substantive decisions of the Parole Commission. The majority cites Jones v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 903 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir.1990), in support of this statement. Jones is at odds, however, with prior decisions of this court holding that we review Parole Commission decisions for arbitrariness, capriciousness, or abuse of discretion. See Blue v. Lacy, 857 F.2d 479, 480-81 (8th Cir.1988) (per curiam); White v. United States Parole Comm’n, 856 F.2d 59, 60 (8th Cir.1988) (per curiam); Montgomery v. United States Parole Comm’n, 838 F.2d 299, 301 (8th Cir.1988) (per curiam); Perry v. United States Parole Comm’n, 831 F.2d 811, 812 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 1230, 99 L.Ed.2d 429 (1988). We are bound by these decisions until the court en banc holds otherwise, and Jones, a decision of a panel of this court, cannot overrule them. See Wright v. United States Parole Comm’n, 948 F.2d 433 (8th Cir.1991) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
Contrary to the assertion of the Jones panel, 903 F.2d at 1182, the question of the existence of our jurisdiction to review Parole Commission decisions did not remain open at the time Jones was decided, but had been implicitly decided each time this court reviewed a Parole Commission decision for abuse of discretion. Accordingly, only the court en banc can determine, contrary to our prior cases, that we lack jurisdiction to review the Parole Commission’s substantive decisions. See Brown v. First Nat’l Bank in Lenox, 844 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir.) (“[Ojne panel of this Court is not at liberty to overrule an opinion filed by another panel. Only the Court en banc may take such a step.”), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260, 109 S.Ct. 20, 101 L.Ed.2d 971 (1988). Moreover, where two panel opinions conflict, a subsequent panel must follow the earlier precedent. See, e.g., Johnson v. Moral, 843 F.2d 846, 847 (5th Cir. 1988).
As the majority concedes, however, we have jurisdiction to review Edmundson’s claim of double counting regardless of whether Jones’ holding binds this panel. In Caporale v. Gasele, 940 F.2d 305 (8th Cir.1991), the court cited Jones for the proposition that a “federal court is without jurisdiction to review the substantive decisions of the Parole Commission except when the Commission’s actions violate statutory, regulatory, or constitutional provisions.” Id. at 306 (citing Jones, 903 F.2d at 1183-85). The Caporale court also recognized that double counting violates the Parole Act, making such claims reviewable even after Jones. Id. at 307 (citing Briggs v. United States Parole Comm’n, 736 F.2d 446, 450 (8th Cir.1984)).
I agree that the parole guidelines consider only the fact, and not the nature of, a prior conviction in computing the salient factor score. The similarity of a prior conviction to the one for which a prisoner is currently incarcerated therefore may constitute good cause for concluding that he is a particularly poor parole risk. See, e.g., Brach v. Nelson, 472 F.Supp. 569, 574 (D.Conn.1979). Consideration of the nature of a prior conviction to justify departing from the parole guidelines thus does not constitute double counting.
Although I believe the tangential similarity of Edmundson’s sexual molestation conviction to his purchase of child pornography is, at best, marginally adequate to justify the magnitude of the departure in this case, the Commission’s decision is not arbi*515trary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that Edmundson’s double counting claim is without merit.