Court Opinion

ID: 9592358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:13:25.952118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:21.445887
License: Public Domain

Simmons, C. J.,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority hold that the attorney who drafted the will offered for probate is an incompetent witness, upon objection, to testify to any communication pertaining to the mental competency of the testator which arises out of his relationship with the testator as attorney and client. This conclusion is based upon section 25-1206, R. R. S. 1943, and In re Estate of Bayer, 116 Neb. 670, 218 N. W. 746.
The conclusion is not supported by our decision in the case of In re Estate of Bayer, supra, and it is contra to our opinion in Lennox v. Anderson, 140 Neb. 748, 1 N. W. 2d 912.
A decision to be a precedent should be one where there is a similarity in controlling facts and issues and then to the extent that the' decision relates itself to those facts and issues.
In the Bayer case an attorney was asked as to conversations and instructions received by him from a client as to the proposed disposition of property by will. The attorney did not draft the will offered for prohate. The opinion specifically limits the question presented to that fact situation. Here the attorney who drafted the will was called to testify as to the men*701tal competency of his client. The distinction is material. It lies in the reason for the rule of privileged communications as applied to an attorney. It is stated by Wigmore as follows: “It has already been noticed (ante, § 2309) that the fact of execution of a deed has commonly been declared to be without the privilege, partly because it was not a subject of communication at all, and partly because, if a communication, it was not impliedly a confidential one. On the other hand, the contents of the deed are generally within the privilege (ante, § 2308). No further examination of the principle as applied to deeds is here necessary.
“But for wills a special consideration comes into play. Here it can hardly be doubted that the execution and especially the contents are impliedly desired by the client to be kept secret during his lifetime, and are accordingly a part of his confidential communication. It must be assumed that during that period the attorney ought not to be called upon to disclose even the fact of a will’s execution, much less its tenor. But, on the other hand, this confidence is intended to be temporary only. That there may be such a qualification to the privilege is plain. That it appropriately explains the client’s relation with an attorney drafting a will seems almost equally clear.
“It follows, therefore, that after the testator’s death the attorney is at liberty to disclose all that affects the execution and tenor of the will.
“The only question could be as to communications tending to show the invalidity of the will, i. e. from which a circumstantial inference could be drawn that the testator was insane or was unduly influenced. It may be conceded that the testator would not wish the attorney to assist in any way the overthrow of the will. But the answer is that such' utterances were obviously not confidentially made with reference to the secrecy of the fact of insanity or undue influence, for the testator of course did not believe those facts to exist and *702therefore could not possibly be said to have communicated them.
“As to the tenor and execution of the will, it seems hardly open to dispute that they are the very facts which the testator expected and intended to be disclosed after his death; and, with this general intention covering the whole transaction, it is impossible to select a circumstance here or there (such as the absence of one witness in another room) and argue that the testator would have wanted it kept secret if he had known that it would tend to defeat his intended act. The confidence is not apportionable by a reference to what the testator might have intendéd had he known or reflected on certain facts which now bear against the will.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 2314, p. 610. See, 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, § 505, p. 283; 70 C. J., Witnesses, § 567 (15), p. 424; Annotation, 64 A. L. R. 185.
In Lennox v. Anderson, supra, we followed the reasoning and almost literally the language of these authorities and said: “When a person employs an attorney to have a will drawn and confides in the attorney as to the disposition of his property, it is the client’s desire that during his lifetime the will be kept a secret, and a confidential relation exists. The attorney is not privileged to give the will publicity in any form. This confidential communication is temporary. After the testator’s death, the attorney is at liberty to disclose all that affects the execution and contents of the will. The privilege has been waived by the testator, especially so when the scrivener of the will is a witness to it.” I call attention to the fact that in the Lennox opinion we quoted the exact statute that the Bayer case considered and upon which the majority rely here. In the Lennox case the will had been revoked and for that reason we held the proffered testimony was not admissible. This holding is clearly in accord with the Bayer case and illustrates the distinction here made.
Basically it is not a question of waiver but a ques*703tion of the point beyond which the privileged communication rule has no application. The reason for the rule terminating with the death of the client the rule itself should terminate.
An examination of the briefs in the Bayer case discloses that it was presented on the fact distinction that the attorney witness there had not drafted the will involved; that we decided the exact question submitted; and that the question here presented was not in anywise involved there.
I also call attention to the fact that section 25-1206, R. R. S. 1943, relied upon here, and in the Bayer case, was not involved in the amendment there discussed. The section properly construed is not a bar to the admissibility of the evidence here involved. The decision here made places us in a minority view class as to this question, as is shown by the authorities above cited.
The majority hold that there has been no waiver here. In view of the above authorities and our opinion in the Lennox case I do not consider that question is necessarily involved; nevertheless it should be explored.
The majority rely upon section 25-1201, R. R. S. 1943, and again the Bayer case as determining the question. To repeat — the claimed waiver there involved was that of the testimony of the lawyer who did not draft the will so it related to a confidential communication generally. The decision of course is related to this fact situation, so I submit the Bayer case is not controlling here.
Here, as in the Bayer case, section 25-1201, R. R. S. 1943, is relied upon. Much is said in the Bayer opinion about an amendment to this section. The majority refer to that amendment. A reading of the Bayer case leaves the impression that the amendment there relied upon was of recent origin, although a close examination of the opinion does not sustain that impression. The fact is that the amendment there relied upon was passed by the Territorial Legislature in 1866. R. S. *7041866, § 328, p. 449. So the section as it now exists has been the law since territorial days. The Bayer opinion also leaves the impression that the amendment was one specifically directed at this provision. The facts are that this amendment was in a complete revision of our code of substantive and adjective law.
The Code of Civil Procedure so adopted had in it some 1,100 sections. R. S. 1866, p. 394. To impart to the Legislature a particular intent as to this one section is carrying a good rule too far. This is particularly true in view of the provisions of section 1 of the Code (p. 394) that it “* * * shall be liberally construed, with a view to promote its object, and assist the parties in obtaining justice.” I am inclined to ask, does it assist the obtaining of justice to close the lips of the one witness who knows as much if not more than any other witness about the question at issue, to-wit, the mental competency of the testator at the time the will was executed?
The majority leave the impression that the amendment is of recent origin for they state: “Cases adopted since this statutory change was made which do not take cognizance thereof are not controlling precedents in determining the matter presented.” Of course that means any such case in all our 153 volumes of reported decisions. On that basis the majority put aside Parker v. Parker, 78 Neb. 535, 111 N. W. 119, and In re Estate of Gray, 88 Neb. 835, 130 N. W. 746, 33 L. R. A. N. S. 319, Ann. Cas. 1912B 1037.
We held in Parker v. Parker, supra, that “The provisions of the code against the disclosure of confidential communications may be waived by the party in whose favor' they were enacted, and the privilege of waiver extends to the personal representative of a deceased person.” That case involved the testimony of an attorney who prepared the will, as does the instant case. This holding was not a mere statement in discussing the issues, but rather it was the only point in the case *705deemed sufficiently important to mention in the syllabus.
In re Estate of Gray, supra, was a will contest where “The real controversy is between the heirs at law and the principal legatee.” In that case proponent offered the- testimony of a doctor to show the mental condition of testatrix where the information which enabled him to do so was acquired solely in his professional capacity. We there directly considered “eminent authority” that the privilege cannot be waived by “any one else.” We there considered and quoted from what is now section 25-1206, R. R. S. 1943. We there recognized that the courts were divided on the question. We followed Parker v. Parker, supra, and said: “Having held in the case last cited that the right to waive the statutory privilege extends to the personal representative of a deceased person, consistency and justice require a construction which permits an executor or a legatee to compel a physician to testify to the mental condition of his patient, when that question is involved in a contest with the heirs over the probate of the patient’s will. Though the courts of the country are divided on this question, the construction here announced has frequently been adopted under similar statutes.” We there kept in accord with the territorial legislative purpose to construe the act so as to “assist the parties in obtaining justice.” The majority now undertake to serve the “ends of justice” by granting a new trial and at the same time deny what we have heretofore held that “consistency and justice require.”
These two decisions have for 40 years remained unchallenged and unquestioned in our decisions.
Admittedly the Gray case did not involve subsection 3 of section 25-1201, R. R. S. 1943. I refer to it for three reasons. The majority have seen fit to consider it an authority and cast discredit upon it. It is important in that this court there puts its approval upon the holding in the Parker case and further that we there *706held that the privilege can be waived by someone other than the privileged person. The waiver provision cited and so construed in the Gray case is applicable also to the waiver provision here relied upon by the majority.
It cannot be assumed that the careful author of the Bayer opinion overlooked the Parker and Gray opinions for they are cited in the annotations of the statute from which he quoted. It. seems reasonable to assume that he did not deem them as in anywise in conflict with the opinion he was writing. Adopting a phrase often used by the author of the Bayer opinion “indeed” they were not mentioned therein because that question decided by those cases was not presented in the Bayer case.
It is quite apparent that the Bayer case was not intended to decide nor did it decide the issue presently presented and is not a precedent or authority for the position taken by the majority.
It is recognized that section 25-1201, R. R. S. 1943, provides that “The following persons shall be incompetent to testify * * *” and that the issue relates to the third subsection— “* * * an attorney concerning any communication made to him by his client in that relation or his advice thereon, without the client’s consent in open court or in writing produced in court.” However, both of these provisions were in the 1866 act under a chapter entitled “Competency of Witnesses.” § 328, p. 449, R. S. 1866. That act in a later section provided: “The prohibitions in the preceding sections do not apply to cases where the party in whose favor the respective provisions are enacted, waives the rights thereby conferred.” § 334, p. 450, R. S. 1866. (Emphasis supplied.)
I submit the Legislature did not have a particular distinction in mind in expressing what is in effect the same “prohibition.” But as to waiver the authorities state: “That an executor or administrator may exercise authority over all the interests of the estate left by the client, and yet may not incidentally have the *707right, in the interest of that estate, to waive the privilege of concealing confidential communications affecting it, would seem too inconsistent «to be maintained under any system of law. It has, indeed, seldom been maintained for the present privilege; but the denial of this waiver for another privilege, by some Courts (post, § 2391), demands here the more emphatic repudiation of such a fallacy * * *. This view is accepted with practical unanimity. It is further generally agreed that in testamentary contests the privilege is divisible, and may be waived by the executor, the administrator, the heir, the next of kin, or the legatee.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 2329, p. 634.
“The personal representative of the deceased may waive the privilege. One who is entrusted with the management of the deceased’s property may surely be trusted to protect the memory and reputation of the deceased, in so far as it is liable to injury by the disclosure of his physical condition when alive. It is incongruous to hold that the person who manages the litigation of the deceased’s property-interests has no power to waive rules of Evidence for the purpose of advancing those interests. The power of an heir may also be conceded, if we remember that the heir, first, is at least equally interested in preserving the ancestor’s reputation, and, secondly, has an equal moral claim to protect the deceased’s property-rights from unwarranted diminution. The futility, under the circumstances, of predicating any privilege is the more apparent when (as in the usual case) the issue turns üpon the fact of a testator’s sanity, which is so bruited publicly in the litigation that the pretense of preserving secrecy is a vain one * * *. Except in two or three jurisdictions, it is usually agreed that the deceased’s or a minor’s or an insane person’s representative (and probably also the heir) may waive the privilege.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 2391, p. 840. See, also, 70 C. J., Witnesses, *708§ 628 (2), p. 462. In both texts our opinion in the Parker case is cited.
Section 334, R.<s»S. 1866, above quoted, became section 25-1207, R. R. S. 1943, with this amendment added in 1925 (Laws 1925, c. 74, p. 235): “* * * and if a party to any action now pending, or hereafter brought, shall offer evidence with reference to his physical or mental condition, or the alleged cause thereof, or if the personal representative of a deceased person in any such action shall offer such evidence as to such deceased person, the right conferred by section 25-1206 shall be deemed to have been waived as to any physician or surgeon who shall have attended said party or said deceased person.” The language on its face leaves an inference that the Legislature intended to indicate a restriction on the waiver provisions except as to physicians or surgeons. The reference to “any action now pending” is the key to the meaning of this amendment. Culver v. Union P. R. R. Co., 112 Neb. 441, 199 N. W. 794, was filed July 18, 1924. A reading of this opinion clearly discloses that the 1925 amendment was the result of a legislative purpose to further remove the prohibitions of the statute in part in order to “assist the parties in obtaining justice.”
I would hold that the trial court did not err in overruling objections to the testimony of the attorney.
Messmore, J., joins in the dissent.