Court Opinion

ID: 9599224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:16:07.281526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:24.416490
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the police officer’s DVD recording of Dickerson’s conversations with his mother was properly admitted in evidence. Thus, I can only concur in the judgment of the majority opinion.
1. Dickerson’s status as a juvenile mandates the involvement of his mother in his questioning. OCGA § 15-11-47 (c).28 In these circumstances, the police should not be allowed, through the use of a hidden video camera and without notice to the juvenile or his parent, to secretly invade the privacy of the parent-child encounter which our law authorizes and makes an integral part of the interview with a juvenile suspect.
Although I recognize that the majority has correctly analyzed the general precedents involving jail house interrogations, conversations on public telephones, and the like, I do not find these precedents controlling in this case because the parent’s involvement is mandated by OCGA § 15-11-47 (c). Indeed, one of the criteria which must be considered before a juvenile’s statement is admissible in this State is “[wjhether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney.” (Emphasis omitted.) Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 230 (3) (282 SE2d 301) (1981); Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 (226 SE2d 922) (1976). Consultation with a parent is meaningless if the police may surreptitiously record the conversation between the parent and child and the prosecutor may then play the recording to the jury. Therefore, just as we would not *781countenance the recording of a conversation between a defendant and his attorney, we should not permit the recording of a conversation between a juvenile defendant and his parent in this context.
Decided June 25, 2008 —
Reconsideration denied July 17, 2008
Sharon L. Hopkins, for appellant.
2. Reversal is not required in this case, however, because any error in admitting the recordings in evidence was clearly harmless. “This court has recognized the general rule that in order to justify a new trial or reversal, the trial court’s ruling must be both erroneous and harmful to the appellant. The test for harmful error is whether it is highly probable that the error contributed to the judgment.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wright v. State, 226 Ga. App. 499, 500 (2) (486 SE2d 711) (1997); Phillips v. State, 241 Ga. App. 764, 767 (527 SE2d 604) (2000). In this instance, even though it is doubtful that the recording had any probative value, the contents of the recording, in fact, were not incriminating or legally prejudicial. This is underscored by the comments of Dickerson’s counsel that he did not want the DVD played, but if it were to be played, he wanted it played in its entirety. He further stated:
I anticipate, Judge, when the prosecutor rests and it’s time for me to go, I’m going to start with my client’s mother. So it’s not — this is not a big fight for me because I think the entirety of the DVD is going to be played whether it’s played before the prosecution rests or before I rest. It’s going to be played, so I’m not going to make a big deal out of stopping and starting.
Further, Dickerson’s appellate counsel acknowledged that the content of the recording was “redundant of more reliable sources properly admitted.” Under these circumstances, it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment. Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 (230 SE2d 869) (1976); Palmer v. State, 186 Ga. App. 892, 897 (3) (369 SE2d 38) (1988).
Therefore, even though the trial court erred by admitting the recording of Dickerson’s consultation with his mother, this error was harmless because it did not contribute to Dickerson’s convictions.
*782Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, for appellee.

 Notice; temporary detention or questioning. The person taking a child into custody shall promptly give notice thereof, together with a statement of the reason for taking the child into custody, to a parent, guardian, or other custodian and to the court. Any temporary detention or questioning of the child necessary to comply with this Code section shall conform to the procedures and conditions prescribed by this article and rules of court.