Court Opinion

ID: 9819437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:25:14.106901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:19.562924
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOFFMAN, dissenting: In reaching its conclusion, the majority professes: “We do not second-guess the trial court when it determines factual matters.” 303 Ill. App. 3d at 1057. Unfortunately, that is exactly what the majority has done in this case. Consequently, I dissent. The defendant testified that he told the assistant State’s Attorneys that he “wasn’t going to talk to anyone without an attorney present.” Accepting that testimony as true for the sake of analysis only, I still find no basis to suppress the defendant’s written statement. According to Detective Denman, after the defendant refused to talk to the assistant State’s Attorneys, the defendant initiated further discussion. Denman testified that the defendant stated “he was still interested in talking to me and my partner.” .The defendant’s testimony disputed Denman’s account. The trial judge believed Den-man. The majority asserts that “[t]he prosecution’s evidence concerning Anderson’s statements after he refused to talk to two assistant State’s Attorneys is not believable.” 303 Ill. App. 3d at 1056. Specifically, the majority finds that Denman’s testimony “makes no sense if we accept Anderson’s uncontradicted statement that he told the assistant State’s Attorneys he wanted a lawyer before he would say anything.” 303 111. App. 3d at 1057. I, however, am at a loss to understand why Detective Denman’s testimony is so patently unbelievable as to warrant invading the province of the trial court in resolving conflicts in testimony. Denman testified that the defendant told him that “he didn’t want to talk to the state because they put cases on him that he didn’t do.” Thus, Denman’s testimony supplied the defendant’s motive in refusing to talk to the assistant State’s Attorneys but agreeing to talk to the police. The exclusionary rule bars the use of a defendant’s statement obtained after the defendant invokes his right to counsel, “unless the State can establish (1) the accused initiated further discussions with the police; and (2) that he knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 350, 606 N.E.2d 1186 (1992); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884-85 (1981). After resolving the issue of credibility, the trial court in this case found that the defendant “initiated the interview after declining to speak to the assistant State’s Attorney.” To my mind, that puts the issue to rest. Credibility is a determination reserved to the trial court. Unlike the majority, I am unwilling to usurp its function in that regard. Consequently, I find no basis for the suppression of the defendant’s written statement. I would affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence as I find each of his assignments of error lacking in merit.