Court Opinion

ID: 9369351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 16:05:42.553392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.595620
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                               No. 22-1217
                          Filed February 8, 2023

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BARBARA DARLENE KOSCIELSKI
AND GERALD WILLIAM KOSCIELSKI

Upon the Petition of
BARBARA DARLENE KOSCIELSKI,
      Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning
GERALD WILLIAM KOSCIELSKI,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

     Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, James Ellefson,

Judge.

     A party in a marriage dissolution challenges the enforceability of a

prenuptial agreement. AFFIRMED.

     C. Aron Vaughn of Kaplan & Frese, LLP, Marshalltown, for appellant.

     James L. Sines of Ackley, Kopecky & Kingery, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

     Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
                                            2

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

          Barbara Koscielski appeals the portion of the district court dissolution

decree that found her prenuptial agreement with Gerald Koscielski to be

enforceable. She claims she did not enter into the agreement voluntarily and

knowingly.      She also contends the asset disclosure in the agreement was

inadequate. We find the agreement to be enforceable and affirm.

I.        Background Facts & Proceedings

          Barbara and Gerald married in July 4, 1991, in Las Vegas. At the time of

their marriage, Gerald was about forty-eight years old and Barbara was about forty-

five years old. The marriage was Gerald’s second and Barbara’s third marriage.1

Barbara filed a petition for dissolution on August 5, 2021.

          On June 27, 1991, seven days prior to their wedding and three-to-five days

prior to leaving for Las Vegas, Gerald called Barbara to his attorney’s office to sign

some papers.        Barbara was unaware what the papers were concerning but

assumed such related to the upcoming marriage. The parties had not discussed

the idea of a prenuptial agreement prior to the meeting. When she arrived, she

was presented with a four-page prenuptial agreement. The substance of the

agreement was that the parties would each keep the property they owned prior to

the marriage.      Gerald’s property at the time, as reported by the agreement,

included a time-share in a condominium at Lake Okoboji, life insurance, a 187-

acre farm, a vacant lot, and an apartment building. Barbara’s property included

household furniture, her pension and retirement fund, and life insurance. The

1    Both parties have adult children from prior marriages.
                                         3

agreement did not contain values for any of the property. At the time of the

dissolution, the primary asset the parties contested was the proceeds from the sale

of the 187-acre farm.2

       Barbara testified that she did not read the agreement prior to signing it. She

further testified that she asked if she should obtain her own attorney, but Gerald’s

attorney indicated she did not need to because the agreement would only be in

effect for two years. The written document did not include language concerning

such a time limitation. Barbara signed the agreement without consulting her own

attorney.3 The meeting lasted about ten-to-fifteen minutes.

       The district court found the prenuptial agreement was enforceable, entitling

Gerald to the proceeds from the farm sale. In reaching that conclusion, the court

expressly found Barbara’s testimony regarding what occurred in the lawyer’s office

lacked credibility. In particular, the court highlighted her changing story, the lack

of any textual provisions suggesting a time-limit on the contract’s enforceability,

and the fact that it occurred thirty years ago. Additionally, the court noted that

Barbara did not present any testimony or evidence that any of Gerald’s assets

were unknown to her at the time the prenuptial agreement was signed. The court

2The property sold on contract in 2017 for the pre-tax amount of $750,000.
3Barbara was represented by the same attorney for her two previous dissolution
of marriage cases, and the same attorney filed the petition in the instant action.
                                         4

did not give Gerald’s testimony concerning the prenuptial agreement any weight.4

Barbara appeals. 5

II.    Standard of Review

       We review equity proceedings de novo. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 561

N.W.2d 94, 96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). We give weight to the district court’s findings

regarding the credibility of witnesses because the court had the opportunity to view

their testimony firsthand. Id.

III.   Discussion

       Barbara challenges the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement.         In

particular, she claims she did not enter it knowingly and voluntarily. She also

asserts the disclosure of assets was inadequate.

       “As a general rule, prenuptial agreements are favored and should be

construed liberally to carry out the intentions of the parties.” Id. “[W]e construe

and treat antenuptial agreements in the same manner as we do ordinary

contracts.” In re Marriage of Christensen, 543 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa Ct. App.

1995). We review the enforceability of an agreement by viewing the circumstances

when the agreement was executed, not when a party seeks to enforce it.

Gonzalez, 561 N.W.2d at 96.

4 At the time of the trial, both parties—Barbara, then approximately seventy-six
years old, and Gerald, approximately eighty years old—were in extremely poor
health. Barbara was receiving twelve hours of medical treatment per day and
Gerald was living in a care facility. The district court noted in the decree, for
example, that during trial testimony, Gerald was unable to recall his wife’s first
name.
5 Gerald filed a cross-appeal. However, his briefing stated that he was dismissing

his cross-appeal.
                                           5

       Because the parties were married in 1991, the statutory amendments found

in Iowa Code chapter 596 (2021) are not applicable, as that chapter does not apply

to premarital agreements signed before January 1, 1992. See Iowa Code §

596.12.   The Iowa Supreme Court explained our approach to deciding the

enforceability of pre-chapter 596 prenuptial agreements as follows:

       The person challenging the agreement must prove its terms are
       unfair or the person’s waiver of rights was not knowing and voluntary.
       Applying the standard of our recent cases, we hold the terms of an
       agreement are fair when the provisions of the contract are mutual or
       the division of property is consistent with the financial condition of the
       parties at the time of execution. Of course, the affirmative defenses
       of fraud, duress and undue influence are also available to void a
       prenuptial agreement, as with any other contract.

In re Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa 1996), superseded by

statute on other grounds as recognized by In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d

506, 512 (Iowa 2008). The concept of fairness includes procedural fairness,

meaning the contract was “fairly, freely and understandingly entered into.” Id. at

314 (citation omitted).      Procedural fairness requires “a full disclosure or

independent knowledge of the nature and extent of the parties’ assets.” Id. at 315.

       Barbara first claims she did not enter into the contract knowingly and

voluntarily. In support of her claim, she contends she did not read the contract and

was told it would expire after two years, and she highlights the short time frame

between being presented the contract and her wedding.

       We conclude that Barbara entered into the agreement knowingly and

voluntarily. First, temporal proximity to the wedding is insufficient to invalidate a

prenuptial agreement. See id. at 318. Her busy schedule at the time does not

render the agreement involuntary—she still made the choice, absent any pressure
                                        6

by Gerald, to sign the agreement. In fact, Barbara was clear in her testimony that

she did not feel intimidated or pressured by Gerald or his attorney. Similarly, her

decision not to read the contract was her own, as was her decision not to seek an

attorney. Contrary to her contentions, seven days, even when busy with other

obligations, is ample time to seek an attorney to review the agreement. Compare

In re Marriage of Elam, No. 03-0221, 2004 WL 370247, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Feb. 27, 2004) (“Even if Ed had only seen the agreement the day prior to the

wedding, as he claims, such would be insufficient, standing alone, to invalidate

it.”), with In re Marriage of Maifield, No. 03-0326, 2004 WL 61108, at *2 (Iowa Ct.

App. Jan. 14, 2004) (finding an agreement that was “couched in legalistic terms

and would not necessarily be understandable to a lay person,” which was

presented the night before the wedding while the spouse was entertaining guests,

“provided no meaningful opportunity to seek counsel” and was therefore

unenforceable).

      We defer to the district court’s credibility assessment as it relates to

Barbara’s contention that she was told the agreement would only last two years.

See Gonzalez, 561 N.W.2d at 96. It is also well supported by the record. Barbara

acknowledged she gave different answers during her testimony at trial and her

deposition testimony as to the length of time she believed the agreement would be

enforced. A quick read of the short agreement would dispel any notion that it only

was enforceable for a short time. And the signing happened thirty years prior to

trial, making suspect a clear memory of what was said. Barbara entered the

agreement knowingly and voluntarily.
                                          7

       Barbara also contends the agreement is unenforceable because there was

not a full disclosure of assets. It is true that the agreement only listed the parties’

major assets without any attempt at placing a value on them. However, multiple

considerations lead us to decide the agreement was at least minimally adequate.

First, “[w]e have never required that a party have precise valuations of the other’s

assets; a general knowledge of the true nature and extent of the other’s property

is sufficient.” Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d at 317. Barbara testified that the property listed

in the agreement was accurate, and that she knew about Gerald’s farm, apartment,

vacant lot, and timeshare prior to signing the agreement. See In re Marriage of

Crawford, No. 04-0770, 2004 WL 2805269, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004)

(finding an asset disclosure adequate despite the omission of all values because

the party knew of the properties involved). Second, despite bearing the burden of

establishing the agreement’s unenforceability, Barbara did not identify any

property that should have been included in the agreement but was omitted. Based

on this record, we cannot say the asset disclosure was inadequate.

       We determine Barbara entered into the prenuptial agreement knowingly

and voluntarily.   We also determine the disclosure of assets was adequate.

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.

       AFFIRMED.