Court Opinion

ID: 9353721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 18:04:09.578573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:11:14.930988
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/11/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION EIGHT

 LAW OFFICE OF CARLOS R.                B315375
 PEREZ,
                                        (Los Angeles County
         Plaintiff and Appellant,       Super. Ct. No. 19STCP04238)

         v.

 WHITTIER UNION HIGH
 SCHOOL DISTRICT,

         Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
      Law Office of Carlos R. Perez, Carlos R. Perez and
Alejandra Gonzalez-Bedoy for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Law Offices of Eric Bathen, Eric Bathen and Richard D.
Brady for Defendant and Respondent.

                   _____________________________
       The primary issue in this case is whether Respondent
Whittier Union High School District (hereinafter Respondent or
the District) is required to reimburse Appellant Law Office of
Carlos R. Perez (hereinafter Appellant or Perez Firm) for the
“cost of work product” under California Elections Code section,
10010, subdivision (f) (The California Voting Rights Act).1
Appellant had sent Respondent a demand letter that resulted in
Respondent changing its at-large voting system to district-based
voting. This case turns on whether the trial court’s
determination that Appellant did not represent a “prospective
plaintiff” under section 10010 requires evidence limited to
identifying a person who has formally retained the lawyer, or
whether it also encompasses a law firm working on behalf of one
or more persons the law firm avers it will be able to name as a
plaintiff if the demand letter is unsuccessful. We conclude that
the trial court’s finding that Appellant did not represent a
prospective plaintiff is based on an overly restrictive
interpretation of the statute. We further conclude that the
“cost of work product” for which a prospective plaintiff is entitled
to reimbursement is not limited to out-of-pocket expenditures by
the prospective plaintiff, but also includes costs advanced by their
lawyer. We remand to the trial court to determine in the first
instance, in light of our decision, what costs are recoverable by
Perez Firm.
                          BACKGROUND
    1. The California Voting Rights Act
       The California Legislature passed the California Voting
Rights Act (codified as section 14027, hereinafter CVRA) to

1    All undesignated statutory references are to the Elections
Code unless otherwise noted.

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address at-large elections that tended to dilute the ability of
minority groups to elect candidates. The CVRA only applies to
at-large elections and was intended to address “ ‘ “the problem of
racial block voting, which is particularly harmful to a state like
California due to its diversity. . . .” ’ ” (See Sanchez v. City of
Modesto (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 660, 669.)
       Section 14027 provides that “[a]n at-large method of
election may not be imposed or applied in a manner that impairs
the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice or
its ability to influence the outcome of an election, as a result of
the dilution or the abridgement of the rights of voters who are
members of a protected class, as defined pursuant to section
14026.” When this happens, a trial court may order the
implementation of authorized appropriate remedies including
imposing district-based elections. (§ 14029.)
       The Legislature amended the Elections Code to create a
“safe harbor” procedure that would require a prospective CVRA
plaintiff to notify a political subdivision by way of a demand
letter before filing suit. (§ 10010.) Section 10010, subdivision
(e)(1) provides:
       “Before commencing an action to enforce Sections 14027
       and 14028, a prospective plaintiff shall send by certified
       mail a written notice to the clerk of the political subdivision
       against which the action would be brought asserting that
       the political subdivision’s method of conducting elections
       may violate the California Voting Rights Act of 2001.”
Section 10010, subdivision (e)(2) provides:
       “A prospective plaintiff shall not commence an action to
       enforce Sections 14027 and 14028 within 45 days of the

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      political subdivision’s receipt of the written notice described
      in paragraph (1).”
Finally, section 10010, subdivision (f)(1) provides:
      “If a political subdivision adopts an ordinance establishing
      district-based elections pursuant to subdivision (a), a
      prospective plaintiff who sent a written notice pursuant to
      paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) before the political
      subdivision passed its resolution of intention may, within
      30 days of the ordinance’s adoption, demand reimbursement
      for the cost of the work product generated to support the
      notice. A prospective plaintiff shall make the demand in
      writing and shall substantiate the demand with financial
      documentation, such as a detailed invoice for demography
      services. A political subdivision may request additional
      documentation if the provided documentation is insufficient
      to corroborate the claimed costs. A political subdivision
      shall reimburse a prospective plaintiff for reasonable costs
      claimed, or in an amount to which the parties mutually
      agree, within 45 days of receiving the written demand,
      except as provided in paragraph (2). In all cases, the
      amount of the reimbursement shall not exceed the cap
      described in paragraph (3).”
      Under section 10010, subdivision (f)(3), “[t]he amount of
reimbursement required by this section is capped at thirty
thousand dollars ($30,000) . . . .”
   2. Whittier Union High School District Converts to
      District-Based Voting in Response to Perez Firm’s
      Demand Letter
      On September 2, 2018, Appellant Perez Firm sent a letter
on behalf of local residents titled “Demand for Compliance with

                                 4
the California Voting Rights Act” that requested Respondent
Whittier Union High School District comply with the California
Voting Rights Act by converting from at-large method to district-
based voting for electing its board of trustees. Appellant provided
statistical evidence to support its claim that voting within
Whittier Union High School District “is racially polarized” and
unfairly disadvantages Latino voters. Appellant sent the letter
“By Email Only” to Martin Plourde, Superintendent, and the
Honorable Jeff Baird, Board Clerk, of Whittier Union High
School District.
       Under the “safe harbor” provision of section 10010,
subdivision (e)(3)(A)-(B), Respondent had 45 days to agree that it
would change from at-large to district-based elections. During
this period, no prospective plaintiff could bring a lawsuit under
the CVRA.
       On October 9, 2018, Respondent’s Trustees enacted
Resolution No. 1819-11 which provided that Respondent would
convert to district-based elections. After conducting public
hearings on how Respondent should draw its districts, on
February 19, 2019, Respondent officially adopted the resolution
changing its elections to a district-based system.
   3. Perez Firm Demands Reimbursement for Cost of
       Work Product
       After the district adopted the resolution, Appellant sent an
e-mail to Respondent’s counsel on March 5, 2019, requesting
payment for attorney’s fees and other costs associated with
generating the September 2, 2018 demand letter. Appellant
sought the statutory maximum of $30,000. The costs included
time spent by Appellant on communicating with its client
regarding the status of claims and case strategy, legal research,

                                5
meeting and communicating with expert demographer Jesus
Garcia, as well as costs of purchasing GIS Data and software
licenses.
       Respondent refused Appellant’s request on the basis that
section 10010 does not allow for attorney’s fees. Respondent,
however, was willing to consider whether Appellant was entitled
to $15,000 for the cost of demographer Jesus Garcia if Appellant
provided further documentation.
       Appellant produced an invoice from the demographer, a
check made payable to the demographer, and evidence of the
demographer’s expert analysis. Respondent continued to deny
payment on the basis that documentation was insufficient.
    4. Trial Court Denies Perez Firm’s Petition for Writ of
       Mandate and Motion for Attorney’s Fees
       On September 27, 2019, Appellant filed a petition for writ
of mandate to enforce Respondent’s obligation to pay Appellant’s
cost of work product under section 10010, subdivision (f). After
the parties appeared on September 23, 2020, the trial court
denied Appellant’s petition on the basis that there was no
evidence that a prospective plaintiff had incurred the costs and
fees of generating the demand letter.
       The trial court found that “Petitioner’s evidence supports a
finding he represented a likely plaintiff in litigation against
Respondent” and further agreed with Appellant that the
Elections Code does not require the prospective plaintiff to be
identified in the demand letter. Despite concluding that
“[t]here is no question the demand letter resulted in a change to
Respondent’s election system,” the trial court went on to
determine that “the evidence does not support a finding
Petitioner represented anyone at the time it sent the demand

                                 6
letter.” The trial court found that Appellant incurred a $15,000
expense for the demographer, but concluded that “the law firm
did not pass the cost onto a prospective plaintiff who paid the
expense and then was entitled to reimbursement.” (Italics
added.)
       Appellant made a subsequent motion for attorney’s fees
and costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The trial
court denied the motion without prejudice primarily on the basis
that Appellant was not a “prevailing party” under the statute
because Appellant “did not prevail on its petition and did not
obtain a favorable judgment” ordering Respondent to pay
Appellant $30,000.
       The trial court incorporated the above rulings into its final
judgment. Appellant timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       On appeal from a judgment denying a writ of mandate, we
review the trial court’s legal rulings de novo. (Oldham v. Kizer
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1057 [“[W]e are not bound by the
trial court’s determination of questions of law but may make our
own independent determinations”]; citing Evans v.
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bd. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 398, 407
[same].) Additionally, we conduct “de novo review of questions of
statutory construction.” (Western/California, Ltd. v. Dry Creek
Joint Elementary School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1479.)
       We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence. (Ford & Vlahos v. ITT Commercial Financial Corp.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 1220, 1235.) “[S]ubstantial evidence is not
synonymous with any evidence.” (Diego v. City of Los Angeles
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 338, 349 [“An inference may not be based

                                 7
on speculation or surmise”].) (See People v. Johnson (1980)
26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [“Evidence, to be ‘substantial’ must be
‘of ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature,
credible, and of solid value’ ”].)
II.    “Prospective Plaintiff” Includes Persons on Whose
       Behalf a Law Firm Represents it is Working and Will
       be Able to Name as a Plaintiff
       The trial court concluded that “the evidence does not
support a finding Petitioner represented anyone at the time it
sent the demand letter.” It appears this conclusion was based on
the trial court’s statutory interpretation of Section 10010 as
limiting “prospective plaintiff” to cases where there is evidence
identifying a named individual who has formally retained the
lawyer. The trial court did find that Appellant’s “evidence
supports a finding he represented a likely plaintiff in litigation.”
The trial court gave credence to Appellant’s declaration that he
identified as potential plaintiffs “no less than 4 community
leaders including [his] wife, Cecilia Perez . . . [and] community
activist and resident Margie Rodriguez and at least 2 others.”
The trial court concluded that Appellant “provided evidence
about which prospective plaintiffs might have filed the litigation
if Respondent did not comply with the demand it convert its
election system.” As such, the trial court’s statutory
interpretation was that Appellant’s representation of a “likely
plaintiff” fell short of the requirement that the costs be incurred
on behalf of a “prospective plaintiff.”
       Pursuant to our de novo review of the trial court’s statutory
interpretation, we believe the term “prospective plaintiff”
connotes a person who meets the criteria for being a plaintiff, and
whom the law firm anticipates is willing and able to take on the

                                 8
role of plaintiff if necessary. “Prospective” is a term of
anticipation, not certainty. The trial court’s factual finding Perez
Firm represented at least one “likely plaintiff” appears to
contradict the court’s implication that the firm would have had to
search for a client when it submitted the demand letter.
       This is not a case where a law firm dreamed up a legal
claim for a hypothetical client. Perez Firm presented evidence
that if it needed to go forward with litigation, it had several
people it expected would be available to serve as a plaintiff.
It presented the court with some of their names—one of them
was even the spouse of plaintiff’s counsel. Nothing more was
needed to properly characterize Perez Firm’s work as having
been done on behalf of a “prospective plaintiff.”
III. The CVRA Does Not Limit Recoverable Work
       Product Costs to Those Personally Paid by the
       Prospective Plaintiff
       As discussed above, the trial court concluded that
Appellant was not entitled to fees or costs because “Elections
Code section 10010, subdivision (f)(1) requires a prospective
plaintiff to have incurred expenses associated with the demand
letter. As noted by [the District], ‘reimbursement’ necessarily
means the prospective plaintiff has incurred costs related to the
demand letter. . . . [¶] Petitioner has made no showing a
‘prospective plaintiff’—whomever may have ended up bringing
the litigation—incurred any costs associated with the demand
letter. Thus, there is nothing for [the District] to reimburse to a
prospective plaintiff.” (Fn. omitted.) The trial court also
explicitly concluded that “[t]he law firm did not pass the cost onto
a prospective plaintiff who paid the expense and then was entitled
to reimbursement.” (Italics added.)

                                 9
       The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the
court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to
effectuate the purpose of the statute. (Select Base Materials, Inc.
v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 (Select Base).)
In determining the intent of the Legislature, we first examine the
words of the statute itself. (California Teachers Assn. v. San
Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698, 170.)
If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is
no need for statutory construction. (Lungren v. Deukmejian
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 (Lungren).)
       However, “the ‘plain meaning’ rule does not prohibit a court
from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute
comports with its purpose.” (Lungren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at
p. 735.) “ ‘We must select the construction that comports most
closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to
promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the
statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd
consequences.’ ” (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151.)
The legislative purpose “will not be sacrificed to a literal
construction” of any part of the statute. (Select Base, supra,
51 Cal.2d at p. 645.)
       We presume the Legislature was aware the allocation of
who pays costs, and when they are paid, is a matter of free
contract between attorney and client. Lawyers, including those
working on a contingency, may choose to absorb costs until the
litigation is concluded. Plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely take cases on
contingency, with courts awarding plaintiffs their attorney’s fees
even though the plaintiff was either never obligated to pay fees to
the attorney, or was entitled to defer payment of these fees until
after the litigation was concluded. In these situations, nothing

                                10
would be gained by requiring the lawyer to force the client to pay
the costs merely to obtain reimbursement for those costs.
       We agree with Appellant that requiring a prospective
plaintiff to pay costs to a law firm in order to be eligible for the
reimbursement the statute provides would turn the CVRA on its
head, given that it is, as the trial court recognized, a remedial
statute designed to equalize the voting power of disenfranchised
minority communities that traditionally lack socioeconomic
resources. (See Jauregui v. City of Palmdale (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 781, 807.) The Legislature adopted sections
14025 through 14032 to prevent an at-large electoral system from
diluting minority voting power, thereby impairing a protected
class from influencing the outcome of an election. (Jauregui,
at p. 807; see also Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1228–1229; Glaviano v. Sacramento City
Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 752 [statutory
language referring to “ ‘reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the
employee’ ” authorizes a fee award even where the employee did
not actually pay any fees].)
       Given the purpose of the CVRA, we see no reason the
Legislature would have intended to bar impoverished clients who
could not afford cost outlays from taking advantage of section
10010’s benefits. We believe the trial court erred in concluding
that reimbursement requires a prospective plaintiff to “incur”
the cost of work product by personally transferring the funds
from their wallet or bank account. (See Glaviano, supra, 22
Cal.App.5th at p. 752; Walent v. Commission on Professional
Competence etc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 745, 749 [Statutory
entitlement to “ ‘reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the
employee’ does not require that the employee actually pay, or

                                11
become obligated to personally pay, the fees at issue”].) Thus,
limiting work product reimbursement to costs a plaintiff was able
to afford, excluding costs advanced by counsel, would contravene
the intent and purpose behind CVRA’s financial encouragement
of meritorious demand letters.
                          DISPOSITION
       We reverse and remand so that the trial court may, in light
of our decision, determine the “cost of work product” recoverable
by Appellant. The trial court did not address whether attorney’s
fees are recoverable as the cost of work product, so we do not
reach that issue. Nor do we decide whether Appellant is
alternatively entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021.5, for demand letter work and/or
fees for bringing the petition for writ of mandate. Appellant may
present any such claims to the trial court for decision in light of
the court’s future decision on awarding the cost of work product.
Appellant is entitled to costs on appeal.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                      HARUTUNIAN, J.*
We Concur:

             GRIMES, Acting P. J.          WILEY, J.

*     Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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