Court Opinion

ID: 9925736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 21:04:00.10876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.044745
License: Public Domain

NOTICE
This Order was filed under          2024 IL App (4th) 230358-U                   FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                  January 22, 2024
not precedent except in the                                                     Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed    NOS. 4-23-0358, 4-23-0359 cons.            4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).                                                              Court, IL
                                  IN THE APPELLATE COURT

                                           OF ILLINOIS

                                       FOURTH DISTRICT

  In re ESTATE OF MILO O. MUNDORFF JR.,                      )      Appeal from the
  Deceased,                                                  )      Circuit Court of
                                                             )      Whiteside County.
  (Richard K. Mundorff,                                      )      Nos. 15CH71
                Petitioner-Appellant,                        )           17P147
                v.                                           )
  Christopher G. Campbell,                                   )      Honorable
                Respondent-Appellee).                        )      Patricia Ann Senneff,
                                                             )      Judge Presiding.

                  JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.
                  Justices Harris and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

 ¶1      Held: The trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence
               where it concluded that the decedent’s agent rebutted the presumption of undue
               influence with clear and convincing evidence that his personal use of funds in a
               joint checking account was fair and did not result from his undue influence over the
               decedent.

 ¶2               These consolidated appeals revolve around respondent Christopher G. Campbell’s

 personal use of funds in a joint checking account held with his grandfather, decedent Milo O.

 Mundorff Jr., beginning in 2005. It is undisputed that Christopher had been Milo’s agent since

 1999, although the parties dispute whether Christopher was acting pursuant to his agency authority

 when using the joint account. In 2015, petitioner Richard K. Mundorff, who is Milo’s son and

 Christopher’s uncle, filed a complaint for an accounting under the Illinois Power of Attorney Act
(755 ILCS 45/2-7 (West 2014)). After Milo passed away in 2017, Richard filed a petition for a

citation to recover assets on behalf of Milo’s estate under the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/16-

1 (West 2020)). In March 2023, the trial court held a consolidated trial and entered judgment

against Richard in both cases.

¶3             The parties raise several arguments that we group into three overarching issues:

(1) whether Christopher’s personal use of the funds is subject to the presumption of undue

influence or the conflicting presumption of donative intent, (2) whether the trial court erred in

admitting a 2015 document purporting to authorize Christopher’s personal use of the funds over

Richard’s objection that its admission violated the Dead Man’s Act (735 ILCS 5/8-201 (West

2022)), and (3) whether the court’s finding that Christopher rebutted the presumption of undue

influence with clear and convincing evidence of good faith is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. As explained further below, we affirm.

¶4                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶5             While the proceedings below have a long and complex procedural history, we limit

our discussion to the specific points argued by Richard, which focus on Christopher’s personal use

of funds in one joint checking account.

¶6             Milo executed a durable power of attorney in 1999, appointing Christopher as his

agent with general power, including power over Milo’s property and finances. On November 2,

2005, Milo opened a joint checking account with right of survivorship, naming Christopher as the

other joint holder of the account. On November 3, Milo executed a statutory short form power of

attorney for property (see 755 ILCS 45/3-3 (West 2004)), again naming Christopher as his agent

with general power over his property and finances, including power over financial institution

transactions and transactions involving retirement plans, Social Security, and employment and

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military service benefits. On November 4, Christopher signed the “Backup Withholding

Certifications” portion of the joint account paperwork as “Milo Mundorff by Christopher

Campbell, P.O.A.”

¶7              In 2007, Christopher took over the management of Milo’s finances from Milo’s

wife, who fell ill and later passed away. Each month, Milo had his retirement, Social Security, and

pension benefits deposited into the joint account. Christopher used those funds to pay all of Milo’s

monthly expenses, then used the residual funds to pay his own expenses. During the period at issue

in this case, Christopher spent $97,896.03 of the joint account funds on himself, primarily

payments to grocery stores, department stores, gas stations, banks, insurance companies, and the

secretary of state, among a variety of other recipients.

¶8              In February 2015, Milo executed a typewritten document purporting to authorize

this practice, retroactive to 2007, stating:

                         “I specifically require that all of my own expenses be paid first and kept up

                to date and current and that any amount beyond what is required to pay my monthly

                expenses be allocated for his personal use. I do have the stipulation that he not

                spend this money in a foolish manner. It must be used for things such as groceries,

                heating fuel, electric, paying down of any outstanding debt that would avoid any

                possible foreclosure, bankruptcy, or other default of credit.”

The document was signed by Milo and an unknown witness, but it was not notarized. Christopher

testified that he “presented” this document to Milo. The specific circumstances of its creation and

execution are unclear.

¶9              Later in 2015, Richard filed a complaint in Whiteside County case No. 15-CH-71,

seeking an accounting from Christopher of the amounts he received during his term as Milo’s

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agent. (The complaint does not make clear what standing Richard would have had to seek an

accounting with respect to the funds of Milo, who was then still living.) After Milo passed away

in 2017, Richard filed a petition as an “interested person” for a citation to recover assets on behalf

of Milo’s estate in Whiteside County case No. 17-P-147, seeking restoration of the funds to the

estate and reimbursement of Richard’s attorney’s fees and costs. See 755 ILCS 5/16-1 (West

2020).

¶ 10            In March 2023, the trial court held a consolidated trial at which Christopher was

the only witness. The administrator of Milo’s estate, attorney Lon Richey, appeared briefly to

inform the court that he was “philosophically aligned” with Richard, but the administrator did not

further participate in the trial.

¶ 11            Richard raised a standing objection to Christopher’s testimony on the grounds that

it violated the Dead Man’s Act, which generally disallows a person with a direct interest in a case

involving a deceased person’s estate from “testify[ing] on his or her own behalf to any

conversation with the deceased *** or to any event which took place in the presence of the

deceased,” except in circumstances not applicable here. 735 ILCS 5/8-201 (West 2022). The trial

court explained that it would hear Christopher’s testimony over Richard’s objection and then

address admissibility under the Dead Man’s Act in its written order.

¶ 12            Christopher authenticated the documentary evidence concerning the account and

testified that he always paid Milo’s bills from the account first and that there were no instances

where Milo’s bills were not paid. Christopher testified to the foundation for the 2015 document by

stating that he had witnessed Milo signing it, but also by stating that he recognized Milo’s signature

on the document. Richard objected to admission of the document on the bases of the Dead Man’s

Act and hearsay, though he did not specify that he had an objection to the foundation for admission

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of the document. The trial court admitted the 2015 document over Richard’s objection that it was

hearsay and its admission violated the Dead Man’s Act.

¶ 13           After the trial, the trial court filed an opinion and order containing its findings of

fact and conclusions of law. The court stated that it disregarded those portions of Christopher’s

testimony that it believed to be in violation of the Dead Man’s Act, without further explanation.

The court concluded that the 2015 document was admissible, specifically noting that “[n]o

objection was made by Richard to admission of the document on a foundational basis, only upon

application of the Act.” The court found, however, that even without considering the 2015

document, Christopher “ha[d] rebutted, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption of

undue influence and fraud and that his actions were in good faith.” The court entered judgment

against Richard in both cases.

¶ 14           This appeal followed.

¶ 15                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16           We group the parties’ arguments into three overarching issues: (1) whether

Christopher’s personal use of the funds is subject to the presumption of undue influence or the

conflicting presumption of donative intent, (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the 2015

document purporting to authorize Christopher’s personal use of the funds over Richard’s objection

that its admission violated the Dead Man’s Act, and (3) whether the court’s finding that

Christopher rebutted the presumption of undue influence with clear and convincing evidence of

good faith is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 17           As an overview, we note that there are at least four legal theories by which

Christopher could have become the owner of the funds in the joint account: (1) the deposits could

have constituted payments from Milo pursuant to a contract for Christopher’s services; (2) Milo’s

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deposits into the account could have been gifts to Christopher; (3) Milo’s deposits could have been

conditional gifts of the “net” deposit to Christopher, conditioned on payment of Milo’s expenses

(see In re Estate of McVicker, 39 Ill. App. 2d 389, 395 (1963) (“A donor’s express reservation of

dividends or interest from the principal of a gift does not impair its validity.”)); or (4) ownership

could have transferred to Christopher outright at the time of Milo’s death due to Christopher’s

status as a survivor beneficiary of the account.

¶ 18           In this case, Christopher does not argue the first theory (contract). Superficially, he

appears to argue the second theory (gift), but his position makes that impossible. Christopher

concedes that he was obligated to pay Milo’s expenses, which would be incompatible with the

contention that the deposits were an outright gift. We think Christopher’s position is perhaps best

viewed as the third theory, a conditional gift. We will, therefore, examine below the competing

presumptions applicable to the transactions in the context of a conditional gift.

¶ 19           We note, however, that neither party seems to have recognized the fourth theory in

which Christopher might obtain outright ownership of the joint account: survivorship. It appears

indisputable that, as of Milo’s death on July 28, 2017, Christopher became the account’s sole

owner. Konfrst v. Stehlik, 2014 IL App (1st) 132113, ¶ 12 (“Upon the death of a joint tenant, title

passes by operation of law to the survivor.”). Consequently, any funds which might be recovered

here would be for the benefit of the surviving account owner—Christopher—and not Milo’s estate.

See id. ( “[T]he entire property goes to the surviving tenant and cannot be inherited by another

through a will or as part of the decedent’s estate.”). Had the challenged transactions never occurred,

those funds would have remained in the account and would have become solely Christopher’s

property in 2017. If Christopher were ordered to repay these amounts into the joint account, it

would be a matter of moving the funds from one of Christopher’s pockets to another. This

                                                   -6-
conclusion raises questions about whether the estate and Richard were even proper parties here, or

whether they sustained any loss that could be compensated. Regardless, as discussed below, the

trial court’s judgment is sustainable under the analysis on which it relied.

¶ 20                       A. Presumptions Governing the Transactions

¶ 21           It is undisputed that Christopher became Milo’s agent with the execution of the

durable power of attorney in 1999 and remained Milo’s agent after the execution of the 2005 power

of attorney and until Milo’s death. The consequences of this appointment are well established:

                       “An individual holding a power of attorney is a fiduciary as a matter

               of law. [Citations.] Thus, an agent appointed under a power of attorney has

               a common-law fiduciary duty to the principal. [Citations.] The fiduciary

               relationship between the principal and agent begins at the time the power of

               attorney document is signed. [Citations.]

                       A presumption of fraud arises when a fiduciary benefits from a

               transaction involving the principal. [Citation.] Under a power of attorney

               for property, any conveyance of the principal’s property that either

               materially benefits the agent or is for the agent’s own use is presumed to be

               fraudulent. [Citation.] This rule applies to conveyances of the principal’s

               property by the agent to a third party on behalf of the principal and also to

               conveyances made by the principal directly to the agent. [Citation.] Once a

               fraudulent transaction has been alleged, the burden then shifts to the agent

               to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was fair and

               did not result from his undue influence over the principal. [Citation.]”

                                                -7-
               (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Estate of Shelton, 2017 IL 121199,

               ¶¶ 22-23.

¶ 22           Christopher contends that he did not owe Milo a fiduciary duty with respect to the

funds in the account because, when spending those funds, he was acting as a joint owner of the

account and not pursuant to the power of attorney. This contention is not entirely consistent with

the evidence, as Christopher signed account paperwork as “P.O.A.” In any event, the long line of

precedent recognized in Shelton holds that a fiduciary relationship was established with the signing

of the power of attorney for property in 1999. Id.; see, e.g., In re Guardianship of Spinnie, 2016

IL App (5th) 150564, ¶ 26 (“The [agent’s] duty was not limited only to transactions invoking her

power of attorney.”); but see In re Estate of Stahling, 2013 IL App (4th) 120271, ¶ 26 (finding

presumption of undue influence did not extend to property and financial transactions between

principal and agent when power of attorney was “limited solely to matters involving the principal’s

health care”). The supreme court reaffirmed this rule in a recent case, explaining that the principal

and agent in that case had a fiduciary relationship for purposes of the presumption of undue

influence even though the agent had never exercised the power of attorney before the challenged

transaction took place. In re Estate of Coffman, 2023 IL 128867, ¶ 62. Accordingly, the

presumption of undue influence applies to Christopher’s personal use of Milo’s property, which

here would extend to Milo’s deposit of funds into what was a joint account. See Shelton, 2017 IL

121199, ¶ 23; Spinnie, 2016 IL App (5th) 150564, ¶ 26.

¶ 23           Christopher argues that the presumption of donative intent should apply to Milo’s

depositing of funds into the account because it was opened as a joint account with the right of

survivorship. See Tummelson v. White, 2015 IL App (4th) 150151, ¶ 32 (“When a joint tenant of

a bank account deposits funds into the account, the presumption is that he or she does so with the

                                                -8-
intent to make a gift of those funds to the other joint tenant.”). The presumption of donative intent

can be overcome with clear and convincing evidence that a gift was not intended (In re Estate of

Gerulis, 2020 IL App (3d) 180734, ¶ 46), for instance if the account was merely a “convenience

account” intended to allow the agent to make transactions only as specified by the principal and

on his behalf (Tummelson, 2015 IL App (4th) 150151, ¶ 33).

¶ 24            As discussed above, Christopher’s argument does not entirely square with his own

testimony. He has never disputed that he was obligated to pay Milo’s expenses out of the joint

account. Consequently, as discussed above, Milo’s deposits into the account could potentially be,

at best, a conditional gift to Christopher. Even if the gift is conditional, it is necessary to determine

whether the deposits into the joint account create the presumption of a gift in light of the competing

presumption operating against a fiduciary. The parties understandably disagree as to how these

conflicting presumptions should be resolved, given that the presumption of undue influence would

have to be rebutted by Christopher and the presumption of donative intent would have to be

rebutted by Richard. Although Christopher does cite one case where this court held that the

presumption of donative intent prevailed (In re Estate of Copp, 132 Ill. App. 2d 974, 980 (1971)),

that holding has more recently been recognized as dicta that should not be followed (Gerulis, 2020

IL App (3d) 180734, ¶ 49). Instead, the established approach is to apply the presumption of undue

influence unless the fiduciary had no active involvement in the creation of the joint account and

“the ‘deposits made during the fiduciary relationship followed a procedure established prior to the

relationship,’ ” in which case the presumptions cancel each other and the case is simply decided

on the evidence of donative intent and undue influence. Id. ¶ 50 (quoting In re Estate of

DeJarnette, 286 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1089 (1997)).

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¶ 25           Although the parties dispute how active a role Christopher played in the opening of

the joint account in 2005, there is no question that he had been Milo’s agent since 1999 and that

the depositing of funds did not follow a procedure established before 1999. See id. ¶¶ 50-52. As

such, we find that the presumption of undue influence controlled and that Christopher was required

to rebut the presumption with clear and convincing evidence that Milo’s authorization of

Christopher’s personal use of the joint account funds “was fair and did not result from

[Christopher’s] undue influence over [Milo].” Shelton, 2017 IL 121199, ¶ 23; see In re Estate of

Rybolt, 258 Ill. App. 3d 886, 890 (1994) (“If the presumption of fraud can be offset by a

presumption of donative intent through joint tenancy with right of survivorship, then greed will

often win out.”).

¶ 26                            B. Admission of the 2015 Document

¶ 27           Richard argues that the trial court erred by admitting the 2015 document purporting

to authorize Christopher’s personal use of the residual funds over Richard’s objection that its

admission violated the Dead Man’s Act. “Application of the Dead Man’s Act is an evidentiary

matter and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Morrow v. Pappas, 2017 IL App (3d)

160393, ¶ 39. Furthermore, the erroneous admission of evidence under the Dead Man’s Act is

reversible error only if the party seeking reversal can show prejudice. In re Estate of Goffinet, 318

Ill. App. 3d 152, 156 (2001); see Ill. R. Evid. 103(a) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015) (stating the erroneous

admission of evidence is reversible only if “a substantial right of the [objecting] party is affected”).

¶ 28           A preliminary concern here is Richard’s standing to invoke the Dead Man’s Act at

all. Richard was a party as an individual to the accounting action. In the probate action, he

contended he was an “interested person” seeking a citation. Attorney Lon Richey, not Richard,

was appointed independent administrator of the estate. With Richard’s acquiescence, the

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administrator did not participate in the trial proceedings below. “It is the representative who is

entitled to raise the objection that an adverse party or interested person is incompetent to testify.”

In re Estate of Sewart, 274 Ill. App. 3d 298, 308 (1995). Because the estate representative never

invoked the Dead Man’s Act at trial, it is unclear what basis Richard would have for doing so.

¶ 29           Beyond standing to invoke the Dead Man’s Act, we must also understand precisely

what the statute prohibits: testimony regarding conversations and events which took place in the

presence of the decedent. 735 ILCS 5/8-201 (West 2022). The 2015 document itself does not

constitute testimony from Christopher at all. Richard lodged a general objection to Christopher’s

testimony concerning the circumstances of the creation of the 2015 document, but the trial court

found that he failed to specifically object to the adequacy of the foundation for admission of the

document.

¶ 30           On appeal, Richard more clearly articulates that the foundation for admission of the

document was Christopher’s testimony about its creation, but to avoid forfeiture of this argument

on appeal, Richard was required to make a timely and specific objection before the trial court. Ill.

R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015); see Fenton v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 111596,

¶ 36 (“[T]he party wishing to exclude evidence has the burden to properly inform the trial judge

as to the specific nature of its objection to the proffered testimony.”). The purpose of requiring

specificity is “ ‘to disclose the nature of the objection, inform the trial court as to the particular

frailty, and enable the party offering the objectionable testimony to confront the objection.’ ” Bafia

v. City International Trucks, Inc., 258 Ill. App. 3d 4, 8 (1994) (quoting Kapelski v. Alton &

Southern R.R., 36 Ill. App. 3d 37, 43 (1976)). Because a lack of proper foundation can be easily

remedied, “the objecting party must make the objection in order to allow an opportunity to correct

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it.” Id.; see People v. Korzenewski, 2012 IL App (4th) 101026, ¶ 7 (noting the importance of an

objection because a lack of foundation is easily cured).

¶ 31           We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Richard’s objections to

Christopher’s testimony did not specifically challenge the sufficiency of the foundation for the

2015 document. By failing to invite Christopher or the court to address this specific error during

the proceedings below, Richard has forfeited it on appeal. “ ‘A party cannot sit idly by while the

trial court undertakes a course of action and then allege error in that regard.’ ” Meeks v. Great

America, LLC, 2017 IL App (2d) 160655, ¶ 14 (quoting Tokar v. Crestwood Imports, Inc., 177 Ill.

App. 3d 422, 434 (1988)). Indeed, we have no way to know whether Christopher had other

evidence of authenticity that he could have introduced had he known his testimony would be

insufficient. See People v. Watts, 2022 IL App (4th) 210590, ¶ 81 (noting the low evidentiary bar

required for authentication).

¶ 32           Furthermore, even if the foundational challenge to admission of the 2015 document

were not forfeited, we would not find error in its admission. Putting aside Christopher’s testimony

about the circumstances of the document’s execution, he also testified that he recognized the

signature on the document as Milo’s. This is not testimony concerning a statement from Milo, nor

is it about an event which took place in Milo’s presence so much as a presumed byproduct of some

past event of signing. Even if Christopher had not witnessed Milo sign the document, Christopher

could still authenticate Milo’s signature by offering his own lay testimony that he could identify

it. Ill. R. Evid. 901(b)(2) (eff. Sept. 17, 2019); but see Oliver v. Oliver, 313 Ill. 612, 625 (1924)

(ruling that interested witness was incompetent to testify, but under a prior version of the statute

imposing blanket incompetence). Similarly, the trial court, as the trier of fact, could have found

the signature to be Milo’s by comparison with the other signature samples introduced into

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evidence. Ill. R. Evid. 901(b)(3) (eff. Sept. 17, 2019). There was an ample basis in the record for

admission of the 2015 document even without Christopher’s testimony about the circumstances of

its execution.

¶ 33             Finally, we note that in the conclusion sections of his briefs, Richard attempts to

reassert his argument that the 2015 document was also inadmissible hearsay; however, the written

admission of a decedent is not hearsay when offered against the decedent’s estate. In re Estate of

Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 405 (1998); see Ill. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015).

¶ 34                         C. The Trial Court’s Finding of Good Faith

¶ 35             As noted above, Christopher was obligated to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that his personal use of Milo’s funds was fair and did not result from undue influence.

Shelton, 2017 IL 121199, ¶ 23. When we review the trial court’s conclusion that the presumption

of undue influence has been rebutted, we defer to its findings of fact and reverse only if its

conclusion is against the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning “it is clearly evident from the

record that the opposite conclusion should have been reached or *** the ruling itself is arbitrary,

unreasonable, or not based on the evidence presented.” Spring Valley Nursing Center, L.P. v. Allen,

2012 IL App (3d) 110915, ¶ 14.

¶ 36             Richard acknowledges that we “ordinarily” apply the manifest weight standard, but

he raises the puzzling argument that our review should instead be de novo because “deference is

improper if it effectively vitiates a necessary burden of proof.” See Best v. Best, 358 Ill. App. 3d

1046, 1054 (2005), aff’d, 223 Ill. 2d 342 (2006). However, Best was not addressing our

well-established deference to the trial court’s findings of fact but deference to the trial court’s

discretion, which cannot sustain an evidentiary finding because discretion is not evidence. See id.

(citing In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 354-56 (2004)). Assuming Richard’s argument is that a trial

                                                - 13 -
court errs by disregarding a necessary burden of proof, the manifest weight standard accounts for

that possibility because a ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence when it is “arbitrary,

unreasonable, or not based on the evidence presented.” Spring Valley, 2012 IL App (3d) 110915,

¶ 14. Richard does not actually argue that the court’s ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable, or not

based on the evidence presented, nor do we find as much, so we will reverse “only if it is clearly

evident from the record that the opposite [of the trial court’s] conclusion should have been

reached.” Id.

¶ 37            Although Richard emphasizes that he did not have the burden of persuasion before

the trial court, he glosses over the fact that “an appellant has the burden of persuasion on appeal.”

Yamnitz v. William J. Diestelhorst Co., 251 Ill. App. 3d 244, 250 (1993); see Spring Valley, 2012

IL App (3d) 110915, ¶ 14 (“A trial court’s determination as to whether a presumption of fraud has

been overcome, made after an evidentiary hearing, is entitled to deference ***.”). Thus, while

Richard was free to introduce no rebuttal evidence at trial, he did so at his own peril, because he

is now armed with only the presumption of undue influence when attempting to persuade us that

the opposite of the court’s conclusion is clearly evident from this record.

¶ 38            Richard primarily focuses on the long-standing principle that the self-serving

testimony of a witness attempting to rebut the presumption of undue influence is subject to careful

scrutiny, even when it is admissible under the Dead Man’s Act. See In re Estate of Hinthorn, 116

Ill. App. 3d 37, 43 (1983) (citing In re Estate of Skinner, 111 Ill. App. 2d 267 (1969)). This does

not mean, however, that Christopher’s testimony was not evidence. This court has long held that

such testimony “will be carefully scrutinized as well as considered with all other evidence in the

case.” (Emphasis added.) In re Estate of Hackenbroch, 35 Ill. App. 2d 155, 162 (1962).

                                                - 14 -
¶ 39           We have no indication that the trial court failed to carefully scrutinize Christopher’s

testimony. For instance, Christopher testified that he never transacted business under the terms of

the power of attorney, but the court found otherwise because Christopher had signed the joint

account paperwork as “Milo Mundorff by Chris Campbell P.O.A.”

¶ 40           Moreover, the trial court was well aware when it heard Christopher’s testimony that

he had a significant financial interest in the outcome of the case, and it nevertheless concluded that

Christopher had met his burden of proof. The trial court’s evaluation of an interested witness’s

credibility “is subject to great deference,” and reviewing courts “will not substitute our judgment

on credibility matters[,] because the fact finder is in the best position to evaluate the conduct and

demeanor of the witnesses.” Samour, Inc. v. Board of Election Commissioners of the City of

Chicago, 224 Ill. 2d 530, 548 (2007).

¶ 41           At bottom, Richard’s argument is that Christopher’s testimony was “poor-quality

evidence” that the trial court should not have accepted and the rest of the evidence was tainted by

Christopher’s testimony and must fall along with it. However, self-serving testimony supported by

sufficient corroborative evidence can supply clear and convincing proof to rebut the presumption

of undue influence. Hackenbroch, 35 Ill. App. 2d at 162. While Richard decries the lack of

unbiased third-party testimony, he points to no requirement that the corroborative evidence must

take the form of third-party testimony, nor does he acknowledge that he introduced or failed to

object to much of the documentary evidence he now claims is tainted. Even then, he forfeited his

challenge to the authenticity of the 2015 document by failing to raise a specific objection, and he

has forfeited his remaining objections by failing to argue them on appeal.

                                                - 15 -
¶ 42           In addition to Christopher’s testimony and the documentary evidence, the trial court

placed significant weight on circumstantial evidence of the history of Milo and Chistopher’s

overall course of dealing, explaining:

               “[T]he evidence showed that Milo, who was never found to be incompetent,

               authorized these transactions as payment for the many services that Chris provided

               to Milo over the years. The Court recognizes that mental competency, alone, does

               not rebut the presumption of fraud. However, the evidence is unrefuted that Chris

               was the person who paid all of Milo’s personal expenses and those associated with

               [Milo’s] rental property, ran his errands, supervised his rental property, collected

               rents, arranged for repairs to the rental property, visited Milo, and attended to the

               myriad of details involved in managing another individual’s personal affairs.”

¶ 43           These findings are consistent with the evidence introduced at trial, which showed

that Milo took active steps to manage his estate, including establishing a family trust and executing

powers of attorney. In 2015, Milo executed a new will with the assistance of an attorney

recommended by his nursing home, increasing Christopher’s share of his estate from 50% to 55%.

Christopher’s log of expenses, which Richard himself introduced, showed that Christopher visited

Milo numerous times between 2011 and 2017. Milo never took any action to change the status

quo, even after Milo became aware of Richard’s 2015 lawsuit against Christopher for allegedly

mishandling Milo’s funds. The trial court reasonably inferred from these facts that Milo was aware

and approved of how his income was being used and continued to authorize Christopher’s personal

use of the excess funds in the joint account. The court further relied on the 2015 document to

bolster Christopher’s claim that Milo approved of the manner in which the joint account funds

were used.

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¶ 44          Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Christopher’s testimony, corroborated by

the documentary evidence and circumstantial evidence of good faith, won out over Richard’s case,

which consisted solely of the presumption of undue influence. It is not clearly evident from this

record that the court should have reached the opposite conclusion.

¶ 45                                  III. CONCLUSION

¶ 46          For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 47          Affirmed.

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