Court Opinion

ID: 9919292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 21:03:20.997847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:30.735794
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 221700-U
                                             No. 1-22-1700
                                                                                     Third Division
                                                                                   January 17, 2024

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
     limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
     ______________________________________________________________________________

                                         IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                     FIRST DISTRICT
     ______________________________________________________________________________

                                                    )   Appeal from the Circuit Court
     In re A.W., Zya.T., Zah.T., and Zay.S., Minors )   of Cook County.
                                                    )
     (The People of the State of Illinois,          )   Nos. 18 JA 00881
            Petitioner-Appellee,                    )          18 JA 00882
                                                    )          18 JA 00883
     v.                                             )          18 JA 00884
                                                    )
     S.T.,                                          )   The Honorable
            Respondent-Appellant).                  )   Andrea M. Buford,
                                                    )   Judge Presiding.
     ______________________________________________________________________________

                PRESIDING JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court.
                Justices Lampkin and Van Tine concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1         Held: The juvenile court’s adjudication orders are affirmed, where the evidence
                 demonstrated that the minors were abused and neglected, and any evidentiary error
                 was harmless. At the request of the parties, the cause is remanded for the limited
                 purpose of correcting a scrivener’s error contained in the adjudication orders.

¶2         After a hearing, minors A.W., Zya.T., Zah.T., and Zay.S. were adjudicated wards of the

       court due to abuse and neglect by their mother, respondent S.T. (respondent). On appeal,

       respondent challenges only the adjudication findings as to her older two children, A.W. and

       Zya.T., claiming that the juvenile court’s adjudication order relied on improperly-admitted
     No. 1-22-1700

        evidence and that, absent such evidence, the State did not establish that the children were

        abused or neglected. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the juvenile court’s adjudication

        order but, as requested by the parties, remand the cause for the limited purpose of correcting a

        scrivener’s error in its adjudication orders.

¶3                                           BACKGROUND

¶4          Respondent is the mother of four children: a daughter, A.W., who was nearly eight years

        old at the time of the incident giving rise to the instant proceedings; and three sons, five-year-

        old Zya.T., four-year-old Zah.T., and two-year-old Zay.S. Respondent was in a relationship

        with J.S., the father of her youngest son, at the time; the fathers of the other children were listed

        as “unknown” on the adjudication petitions and neither J.S. nor the fathers of her other children

        are parties to this appeal.

¶5          On September 11, 2018, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship asking for

        each minor to be adjudicated a ward of the court; the State also filed motions for temporary

        custody of each minor on the same day. In the adjudication petitions, the State alleged that

        each minor was neglected due to an injurious environment under section 2-3(1)(b) of the

        Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) and

        was abused with a substantial risk of physical injury under section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile

        Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 2016)). With respect to Zah.T. and Zay.S., the two

        youngest children, the State also alleged that each minor was neglected under section 2-3(1)(d)

        of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(d) (West 2016)), as he was a minor under age

        14 whose parent left him without supervision for an unreasonable period of time.

¶6          The facts underlying all claims were the same. According to the petitions, respondent had

        two prior indicated reports for “cuts, welts and bruises” and “inadequate supervision.”

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     No. 1-22-1700

        Respondent had also admitted to recent incidents of domestic violence with J.S. while the

        children were present and, on June 24, 2018, the two youngest children were found home alone

        following an incident of domestic violence. While J.S. denied domestic violence, he admitted

        to breaking respondent’s telephone. Following an initial investigation in February 2018, intact

        family services were offered, but respondent failed to participate in and/or complete the

        services, which included mental health treatment and domestic violence counseling.

¶7         On the same day, based on the allegations contained in the adjudication petitions, the

        juvenile court found probable cause that the minors were neglected, abused, and dependent

        and that immediate and urgent necessity existed to support their removal from the home. The

        court granted temporary custody of all four minors to the Department of Children and Family

        Services (DCFS) guardianship administrator.

¶8         The parties appeared before the juvenile court for an adjudication hearing on February 19,

        2021. Telanee Smith, a DCFS investigator, testified that she was assigned to investigate a “C

        Sequence” allegation of inadequate supervision on June 25, 2018. In the course of her

        investigation, she learned that respondent had a prior indicated report for cuts, welts, and

        bruises and abrasions. Smith spoke with respondent in the presence of an intact worker on the

        day she was assigned the case, and respondent reported to Smith that J.S. had been present

        inside respondent’s home and grew “upset” when she asked him to leave. The two had “a little

        tussel [sic],” and J.S. took her phone. Respondent left the home to stay with her sister. While

        she denied leaving the younger children—then ages two and four—home alone, respondent

        informed Smith that J.S. also left the home after the altercation, believing respondent had

        contacted the police. Respondent denied any history of domestic violence between her and J.S.,

        but told Smith that J.S. had “kicked down her door” three months earlier.

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       No. 1-22-1700

¶9             On the same day, Smith spoke with J.S., who admitted that he had been arguing with

           respondent and had taken, and broken, her phone; according to J.S., they were arguing about

           respondent’s failure to engage in services. J.S. further admitted to leaving the home after their

           argument, but Smith testified that both J.S. and respondent stated that the other was still in the

           home when they left. J.S. also denied a history of domestic violence between him and

           respondent.

¶ 10           The parties also stipulated to the testimony of Officer Emily Campbell, who would testify

           that she responded to a call at respondent’s home on or about June 22, 2018. When she arrived

           at the home, she discovered the two youngest children 1 unattended inside the residence.

¶ 11           As the final portion of its case in chief, the State sought to admit two exhibits into evidence.

           People’s Exhibit 1 was a sentencing order and criminal disposition sheet in a prior

           misdemeanor case against respondent. Respondent’s counsel objected to the admission of the

           exhibit, arguing that the documents were hearsay and did not fall within any exception to the

           hearsay rule, as the conviction was only for a misdemeanor. People’s Exhibit 2 consisted of

           the respondent’s records from One Hope United, the agency which provided intact family

           services. Respondent’s counsel again objected, contending that the documents contained an

           “improper delegation,” as they were not signed by the head of the agency but instead were

           signed by the head of “Intact Family Services.” The juvenile court overruled both objections

           and admitted the exhibits into evidence.

               1
                 As discussed further below, there are several places in the record, including in Officer
       Campbell’s stipulation and in the adjudication orders, in which the children at the home are identified as
       Zay.S. and Zya.T. The parties all agree, however, that it was Zay.S. and Zah.T., the two youngest
       children, who were discovered at home alone.
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       No. 1-22-1700

¶ 12         As noted, People’s Exhibit 1 was a sentencing order and criminal disposition sheet, which

          established that, in September 2018, respondent had been sentenced to 24 months of probation

          for endangering the life or health of a child, pursuant to section 12C-5(a) of the Criminal Code

          of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/12C-5(a) (West 2016)), as well as being ordered to attend anger

          management and parenting classes.

¶ 13         People’s Exhibit 2, the records from One Hope United, established that respondent’s case

          first came to the attention of DCFS in February 2018, when police responded to a call reporting

          a “ ‘commotion’ ” and expressing concern for a child. Zya.T., who was five years old at the

          time, was found to have “marks and welts” on his abdomen and back, which he reported were

          the result of respondent “hitting” him. Respondent was taken into custody, while Zya.T. was

          taken to the hospital to be evaluated; the other children did not have any visible marks or

          injuries. Zya.T.’s injuries were consistent with being struck with an object. In an interview

          with a DCFS worker, A.W. reported that Zya.T. had been “running around and fighting with

          their younger brother”; A.W. informed respondent of the misbehavior, as she had previously

          been punished for “not telling” when she remained silent. A.W. observed respondent strike

          Zya.T. with an extension cord, then respondent ordered Zah.T. to retrieve a belt and struck

          Zya.T. with the belt, as well. A.W. reported that respondent had struck her and her brothers in

          the past. In his interview with the DCFS worker, Zya.T. confirmed A.W.’s account, stating

          that he had been fighting with his brother when respondent became angry with him and began

          striking him with an extension cord and a belt. Zya.T. further reported that respondent had

          struck him and his siblings with a belt in the past.

¶ 14         Respondent did not present any evidence and, after hearing arguments from the parties, the

          juvenile court found that the State had met its burden of proving neglect due to an injurious

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       No. 1-22-1700

           environment with respect to all four minors, neglect due to being left home alone with respect

           to the two youngest minors, and abuse due to a substantial risk of physical injury with respect

           to all four minors. The juvenile court found that at the time of the incident, there was an open

           intact case and respondent had a prior indicated report. The juvenile court further found that

           respondent and J.S. had a history of domestic violence, although both denied it, and that both

           left the home after a dispute, leaving a two-year-old and a four-year-old child home alone.

           Accordingly, the juvenile court entered adjudication orders finding each minor neglected due

           to an injurious environment under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act and abused due

           to a substantial risk of physical injury under section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act, as

           “parents were involved in a dispute and left the home, leaving minors [Zah.T.] and [Zay.S.]

           alone. Mother has prior indicated report for cuts/welts/bruises.” The adjudication orders for

           Zya.T. and Zay.S. also included findings that each minor was neglected due to being a minor

           under age 14 who was left without supervision for an unreasonable period of time under section

           2-3(1)(d) of the Juvenile Court Act.

¶ 15           On September 28, 2022, after a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court entered

           dispositional order finding it in each minor’s best interest to make him or her a ward of the

           court and finding respondent unwilling and unable for some reason other than financial

           circumstances alone to care for, protect, train, and discipline the minors.2 We granted

           respondent leave to file a late notice of appeal, and this appeal follows.

               2
                 The court also found the minors’ fathers unwilling and unable for some reason other than
       financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train, or discipline them.
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       No. 1-22-1700

¶ 16                                            ANALYSIS

¶ 17         Prior to discussing respondent’s claims on appeal, we briefly address the timeliness of our

          decision. This case is designated as “accelerated” pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311

          (eff. July 1, 2018), and we are required to issue our decision within 150 days after the filing of

          the notice of appeal in such cases, except where good cause is shown. In this case, while the

          notice of appeal was filed in November 2022, multiple extensions of time were requested by

          the parties. Accordingly, we find good cause for issuing our decision after the 150-day

          deadline. See In re J.S., 2020 IL App (1st) 191119, ¶ 36 (finding good cause for issuing

          decision after deadline where there were extensions of time requested by the parties); In re

          Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, ¶ 69 (finding good cause for issuing decision after

          deadline where there were multiple extensions of time requested by the parties, among other

          procedural delays).

¶ 18         Turning to the merits of her appeal, respondent challenges only the adjudication findings

          as to her older two children, A.W. and Zya.T.; she does not challenge the findings as to the

          younger children, nor does she challenge the court’s dispositional order. “A proceeding for

          adjudication of wardship ‘represents a significant intrusion into the sanctity of the family which

          should not be undertaken lightly.’ ” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 463 (2004) (quoting In re

          Harpman, 134 Ill. App. 3d 393, 396-97 (1985)). It is the State’s burden to prove allegations of

          neglect or abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 17.

¶ 19         Generally, a reviewing court will reverse the juvenile court’s determination only if the

          factual findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the court abused its

          discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. In re Kamesha J., 364 Ill. App. 3d

          785, 795 (2006); see also In re Malik B.-N., 2012 IL App (1st) 121706, ¶ 56; In re J.C., 396

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       No. 1-22-1700

          Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1060 (2009); In re Gabriel E., 372 Ill. App. 3d 817, 828 (2007). As the

          juvenile court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the

          evidence, we will not overturn its findings “merely because the reviewing court may have

          reached a different decision.” In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 245, 257 (2001) (citing In re

          Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 994 (1998)).

¶ 20         In this case, respondent contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting the State’s

          exhibits into evidence at the adjudication hearing and that, without these exhibits, the evidence

          presented at the adjudication hearing was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings

          with respect to A.W. and Zya.T. The rules of evidence applicable to civil proceedings are

          applicable to proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2016).

          Here, respondent claims that both of the State’s exhibits constitute inadmissible hearsay and,

          therefore, the juvenile court erred in admitting them into evidence.

¶ 21         Hearsay is an out-of-court statement made by a declarant that is offered to prove the truth

          of the matter asserted. Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). Hearsay evidence is generally

          inadmissible in adjudicatory proceedings, unless an exception applies. In re Chance H., 2019

          IL App (1st) 180053, ¶ 49; In re Zariyah A., 2017 IL App (1st) 170971, ¶ 88.

¶ 22         The first exhibit challenged by respondent, People’s Exhibit 1, consisted of a sentencing

          order and criminal disposition sheet, which established that, in September 2018, respondent

          had been sentenced to 24 months of probation for endangering the life or health of a child, as

          well as being ordered to attend anger management and parenting classes. While certain

          judgments of conviction are admissible as hearsay exceptions, such judgments are limited to

          judgments “adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in

          excess of one year.” Ill. R. Evid. 803(22) (eff. Sept. 28, 2018). The crime of endangering the

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       No. 1-22-1700

          life or health of a child is a misdemeanor and so does not fall within this exception, as the State

          acknowledges in its brief. See 720 ILCS 5/12C-5(d) (West 2016). Consequently, People’s

          Exhibit 1 was erroneously admitted by the juvenile court. As explained below, however, the

          admission of such evidence was harmless, as there was no prejudice to respondent where the

          juvenile court did not rely on this document and there was sufficient evidence in the record to

          support the court’s findings even without the exhibit. See In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 237

          (1999) (even where juvenile court erroneously allowed certain witness testimony, such error

          did not prejudice the respondent where the evidence was sufficient to establish at least one

          ground of parental unfitness).

¶ 23         The second exhibit, People’s Exhibit 2, consisted of records from One Hope United, the

          agency providing intact services to respondent’s family. Section 2-18(4)(a) of the Juvenile

          Court Act provides that such documents are admissible in adjudicatory proceedings, so long

          as the juvenile court finds that the document was made in the regular course of business at the

          time of the events at issue, or within a reasonable time thereafter. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a)

          (West 2016). Section 2-18(4)(a) further provides:

                 “A certification by the head or responsible employee of the hospital or agency that the

                 writing, record, photograph or x-ray is the full and complete record of the condition,

                 act, transaction, occurrence or event and that it satisfied the conditions of this paragraph

                 shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained in such certification. A certification

                 by someone other than the head of the hospital or agency shall be accompanied by a

                 photocopy of a delegation of authority signed by both the head of the hospital or agency

                 and by such other employee. All other circumstances of the making of the

                 memorandum, record, photograph or x-ray, including lack of personal knowledge of

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       No. 1-22-1700

                 the maker, may be proved to affect the weight to be accorded such evidence, but shall

                 not affect its admissibility.” Id.

          In this case, respondent contends that People’s Exhibit 2 was inadmissible, as it did not contain

          an appropriate delegation of authority.

¶ 24         The certification contained in the record on appeal is signed by an individual identified as

          “Case Manager Assistant.” As the certification was signed by “someone other than the head of

          the hospital or agency,” it required a delegation of authority. Id. The delegation of authority

          form contained in the record on appeal is signed by an individual occupying the role of senior

          supervisor for the northern region of One Hope United, who is identified as the “head of intact

          family services,” and the case manager assistant signed an acceptance of the delegation of

          authority at the bottom of the page. Respondent claims that this delegation was insufficient, as

          the “head of intact family services” is not the “head of the hospital or agency” (id.) as required

          by section 2-18(4)(a). We do not find this argument persuasive.

¶ 25         As both the State and the minors’ counsel note, section 2-18(4)(a) does not define either

          the term “head” or “agency.” An “ ‘[a]gency’ ” is, however, defined in section 1-3 of the

          Juvenile Court Act as “a public or private child care facility legally authorized or licensed by

          this State for placement or institutional care or for both placement and institutional care.” 705

          ILCS 405/1-3(3) (West 2016). There is no dispute that One Hope United is considered an

          “agency” under the Juvenile Court Act. The question at issue, then, is whether the “head” of

          the relevant division of the larger organization may be considered the “head of the *** agency”

          (id. § 2-18(4)(a)) for purposes of section 2-18(4)(a). We believe it can.

¶ 26         Section 1-2 of the Juvenile Court Act instructs that, in all proceedings, “the court may

          direct the course thereof so as promptly to ascertain the jurisdictional facts and fully to gather

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       No. 1-22-1700

          information bearing upon the current condition and future welfare of persons subject to this

          [Juvenile Court] Act.” 705 ILCS 405/1-2(2) (West 2016). Accordingly, the Juvenile Court Act

          “shall be liberally construed to carry out the foregoing purpose and policy.” Id. § 1-2(4). Here,

          the delegation of authority was signed by the person responsible for intact family services for

          the northern region of One Hope United, and it is records for such services which were

          admitted into evidence at the hearing. We therefore can find no error in the juvenile court’s

          admission of these records pursuant to section 2-18(4)(a).

¶ 27         Moreover, even leaving aside the State’s exhibits, there was sufficient evidence to support

          the juvenile court’s findings of abuse and neglect. As noted, both minors were found (1) abused

          due to a substantial risk of physical injury under section 2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act

          and (2) neglected due to an injurious environment under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court

          Act. Under the Juvenile Court Act, an abused minor includes one whose parent or other person

          responsible for his welfare “creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such minor by other

          than accidental means which would be likely to cause death, disfigurement, impairment of

          emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function.” 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West

          2016). A neglected minor includes one “whose environment is injurious to his or her welfare.”

          Id. § 2-3(1)(b). While this term cannot be defined with particularity, “it includes the breach of

          a parent’s duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his or her children.” In re Z.L., 2021

          IL 126931, ¶ 89.

¶ 28         With respect to both of A.W. and Zya.T., the juvenile court found abuse and neglect where

          “parents were involved in a dispute and left the home, leaving minors [Zah.T.] and [Zay.S.]

          alone. Mother has prior indicated report for cuts/welts/bruises.” Under the theory of

          anticipatory neglect, the State seeks to protect “not only children who are the direct victims of

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       No. 1-22-1700

          neglect or abuse, but also those who have a probability to be subject to neglect or abuse because

          they reside, or in the future may reside, with an individual who has been found to have

          neglected or abused another child.” In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468. Accordingly, abuse of

          a sibling may be evidence of neglect based on an injurious environment. In re S.S., 313 Ill.

          App. 3d 121, 127 (2000); see also 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2016) (“proof of the abuse,

          neglect or dependency of one minor shall be admissible evidence of the issue of the abuse,

          neglect or dependency of any other minor for whom the respondent is responsible”).

¶ 29         In this case, the abuse and neglect findings with respect to the younger two children may

          be used to support similar findings for the older two children. While there is no per se rule that

          neglect of one child conclusively establishes the neglect of another child in the same household

          (see In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 468), here, such a finding is appropriate. All four children

          were living in the same home at the time, and respondent’s conduct occurred close in time to

          the filing of the petition for adjudication of wardship. Thus, this is not a case in which the

          previous abuse or neglect occurred long ago or had no connection with the minor’s current

          living situation. See, e.g., In re S.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 128 (past abuse occurred almost two

          years before the minor was born); In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18, 29-31 (1995) (past

          abuse occurred several years earlier, and there was no indication minors were abused or

          neglected). Here, respondent and J.S. had an altercation in the presence of young children,

          which was sufficiently heated to result in the breaking of a telephone and the calling of police,

          and both adults left the home, leaving a two-year-old child and a four-year old child unattended

          until they were discovered by police. Respondent also reported to the DCFS investigator that

          J.S. had “kicked down her door” three months earlier. Combined with the prior indicated report

          of cuts, welts, and bruises, the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the abuse and

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       No. 1-22-1700

          neglect of A.W. and Zya.T., even without the use of the State’s exhibits, and we therefore

          affirm the juvenile court’s findings.

¶ 30         As a final matter, as noted, the record on appeal demonstrates that there were inconsistent

          references throughout with respect to which children were left at home. The parties all agree

          that the children who were discovered unattended at respondent’s home were Zah.T. and

          Zay.S., the youngest two children. At times, however, the witnesses and the juvenile court

          referred to Zya.T., not Zah.T., as one of those children. Most problematically, this error occurs

          in the juvenile court’s adjudication orders. While this scrivener’s error does not prevent us

          from considering the merits of respondent’s appeal (see In re Marriage of Crecos, 2015 IL

          App (1st) 132756, ¶ 18), at the request of the parties, we nevertheless remand the matter to the

          juvenile court for the limited purpose of correcting the adjudication orders nunc pro tunc to

          reflect that it was Zah.T. and Zay.S. who were left at home, not Zya.T. and Zay.S.

¶ 31                                          CONCLUSION

¶ 32         The juvenile court’s adjudication orders finding A.W. and Zya.T. to be abused and

          neglected is affirmed, where the evidence was sufficient to establish abuse and neglect and any

          evidentiary error was harmless. The cause is remanded to the juvenile court for the limited

          purpose of correcting the adjudication orders to properly reflect the correct names of the minors

          discovered unattended at respondent’s residence.

¶ 33         Affirmed; cause remanded with instructions.

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