Court Opinion

ID: 9928803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:10:49.356059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:36.581214
License: Public Domain

J-A25010-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: ADOPTION OF J.C.S., A                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: L.W.P., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 555 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 10, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court
                          at No(s): No. 6 of 2019

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                             FILED: JANUARY 30, 2024

       L.W.P. (“Father”) appeals from the order terminating his parental rights

to his child, J.C.S., born in November 2017. We affirm.

       We glean the following from the certified record. T.S. (“Mother”) gave

birth to J.C.S. while she was incarcerated. She was not married to Father and

did not identify him as the father of J.C.S. Since Mother had to return to jail

and paternity had not been established, the Westmoreland County Children’s

Bureau (“WCCB”) sought and was granted emergency protective custody of

J.C.S. He was ultimately adjudicated dependent and placed in foster care.1

       On March 6, 2018, Father’s paternity was finally established, but Father

notified WCCB that he was not interested in reunification. During the ensuing

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 J.C.S. has remained in the same pre-adoptive foster home since his birth.
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year, Mother failed to progress sufficiently with her goals, and on February

27, 2019, WCCB filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother and

Father.

      Thereafter, Father changed his mind and indicated a desire to reunify

with J.C.S. Father met J.C.S. for the first time on April 17, 2019, when he

was approximately seventeen months old. WCCB agreed to a continuance of

the termination proceedings to allow Father the opportunity to meaningfully

engage in reunification services.    In accordance with that plan, Father

continued to have supervised visits with J.C.S., Father’s home was deemed

appropriate, and he had secure employment. WCCB determined that it had

no drug, alcohol, or mental health concerns for Father. Nonetheless, WCCB

had reservations about the prospects of reunification because Father did not

fully grasp Mother’s instability and how her mental health issues could affect

J.C.S. Critically, Father disobeyed court orders by allowing Mother to have

contact with J.C.S. during his visits and would become angry when he was

advised that such conduct was not permitted. Throughout the ensuing review

periods, Father’s “main deficiency was his continuous relationship with

Mother.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/10/23, at 10. While “Father recognized

that Mother’s behavior was problematic for [J.C.S., he] was steadfast that

Mother should remain in the child’s life.” Id. at 12 (cleaned up). On March

31, 2021, WCCB filed an amended petition to terminate Father’s parental

rights.

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       The orphans’ court held nine hearings over a period of sixteen months

on the petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father.2 Over

the course of the hearings, the court heard testimony from numerous

witnesses, including Dr. Neil Rosenblum, Dr. Aaron Keteles, and Father.

       Dr. Rosenblum conducted interactional evaluations of J.C.S. and his

foster parents in January and September 2020, and of J.C.S. and Father in

____________________________________________

2 Father appeared without counsel at the first hearing on October 7, 2021.
Therefore, the proceedings that day concerned only Mother, and the case
against Father began on December 2, 2021, by which time Father had secured
counsel.

Additionally, J.C.S. was represented at the hearings by Brett E. Fullem,
Esquire, as legal counsel and Rochelle L. Bosack, Esquire, as guardian ad litem
(“GAL”). We note that legal counsel declined to file a brief in this Court
because of J.C.S.’s age. Meanwhile, the GAL submitted a brief on J.C.S.’s
behalf, asking us to reverse the termination order because of the bond
between Father and J.C.S. Additionally, the GAL argued, without elaboration,
that “termination would sever his connection to his natural family’s heritage
and culture as well as his relationships with his half-siblings and full sibling.”
GAL’s brief at 10-11. In making this argument, the GAL does not address
J.C.S.’s bond with his foster family. Moreover, we note that Father does not
raise the issue of his cultural heritage or the relationship J.C.S. purportedly
shares with Father’s other children in support of his argument against
termination.

Finally, it bears mentioning that these proceedings have languished for an
unreasonable amount of time.           In that regard, the orphans’ court
acknowledged “the unacceptable amount of time it took to conclude the
hearing on the [t]ermination [p]etition[,]” which “unnecessarily delayed
permanency for [J.C.S.].”        Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/10/23, at 74.
Nonetheless, the court credited WCCB with offering services to Father, at his
request, before re-filing the termination petition. Id. at 74 n.1. For our part,
this Court regrettably had to delay disposition further to secure transcription
of some of the termination hearings.

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January 2020. He testified regarding the bond attachments J.C.S. had with

respect to his foster parents and Father.

      Dr. Keteles began supervising Father’s visits with J.C.S. in April 2022,

after Father had impermissibly allowed Mother to call J.C.S. during his

monitored visits. He provided testimony regarding the appropriateness of the

visits and Father’s interactions with J.C.S. Of relevance to the bond between

J.C.S. and Father, Dr. Keteles observed that J.C.S. is comfortable with Father

during visits and that he occasionally displays spontaneous affection towards

Father.

      Father attested over the course of the last two termination hearings

regarding, inter alia, his initial lack of involvement with J.C.S. He explained

that although he had signed paperwork to voluntarily terminate his parental

rights because he believed that doing so meant he was relinquishing his

parental rights to Mother, he revoked his signature once he learned that

Mother was not compliant with her WCCB services. Father described his visits

with J.C.S. and challenged the efficacy of Dr. Rosenblum’s assessment

because his evaluation occurred after that with the foster parents. Finally,

Father expressed his belief that Mother was ready to be reunified with J.C.S.

      Following the hearing, the orphans’ court entered an order terminating

Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b).

This timely appeal followed. Father complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and the

orphans’ court directed us to its April 10, 2023 opinion for the reasoning in

support of the termination order.     Father presents a single issue for our

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review:   “Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and convincing

evidence that the [WCCB] met its burden, under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?”

Father’s brief at 4.

      We begin with our well-settled standard of review.

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard
      employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to
      accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
      trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not
      require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences
      or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported,
      we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result
      merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
      different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only
      upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
      prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an
      error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
      decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized
      our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However,
      we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in
      order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported
      by competent evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings,

we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In

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re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation

omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption

Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed

by the needs and welfare of the child.

      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
      for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
      and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
      child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up).

      Termination is proper when the moving party proves grounds for

termination under any subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). In re

Adoption of T.B.B., supra at 395. Father does not contest that WCCB met

its burden pursuant to § 2511(a). Accordingly, we only look at § 2511(b),

which provides as follows:

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      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

      Of note, we “should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,

placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above

concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa.

2023) (cleaned up).      Moreover, this analysis “should not be applied

mechanically,” but “must be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein “the

court must determine each child’s specific needs.” Id. at 1105-06 (cleaned

up). Thus, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors that must be considered.

Id. at 1113 n.28. While the particular facts of each case dictates the factors

to be considered, our precedent indicates that relevant points of inquiry

include “intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.”       In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

      Our Supreme Court has mandated, however, that an evaluation

pursuant to § 2511(b) should consider the child’s bond with his or her parent.

See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). Specifically, we must render

“a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the

child[.]” In the Interest of K.T., supra at 1113. This evaluation involves

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consideration of the effect of severing the child’s bond with their parent. Id.

at 1109. In termination matters, “severance of a necessary and beneficial

relationship is the kind of loss that would predictably cause ‘extreme emotional

consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.” Id. at 1109-10 (quoting In

re E.M., supra at 484).     Our Supreme Court has distinguished, however,

“extreme emotional consequences” from a mere “adverse or detrimental

impact” in the termination context. Id. at 1111. Specifically, the High Court

has cautioned that Pennsylvania courts “must not truncate [their] analysis and

preclude severance based solely on evidence of an adverse or detrimental

impact to the child.” Id. at 1114 (cleaned up).

      Furthermore, “courts must not only consider the child’s bond with the

biological parent, but also examine the intangibles such as the love, comfort,

security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent.” Id. at

1111 (emphasis in original; cleaned up). Thus, we consider factors that arise

from the facts of each case, such as the child’s need for permanency and

length of time in foster care, whether the child is bonded with the foster

parents, and whether the foster home meets the child’s needs. Id. at 1113.

Overall, “bond, plus permanency, stability and all intangible factors may

contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of primary

importance in the [§] 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109 (cleaned up).

      In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts

must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d

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251, 269 (Pa. 2013). “Children are young for a scant number of years, and

we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.         When

courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted

children.” Id. A court cannot “toll the well-being and permanency” of a child

indefinitely in the hope that a parent “will summon the ability to handle the

responsibilities of parenting.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1007 (Pa.Super.

2008) (en banc) (citation omitted).

      Father maintains that the evidence established he had a bond with

J.C.S., and that his visits were “positive and appropriate.” Father’s brief at

14.   In support of his argument, he highlights the types of activities he

engaged in with J.C.S. during visits.    Id. at 15-16.    Relying solely on the

existence of this bond, Father concludes that “it is also clear that terminating

Father’s parental rights would destroy a necessary and beneficial relationship

for [J.C.S.]” Id. at 15.

      It appears that there is no dispute that J.C.S. and Father share a positive

relationship that has continued to develop over the course of their visits. The

orphans’ court acknowledged the bond between Father and J.C.S., but

nevertheless determined that given the particular circumstances of the case,

termination was proper under § 2511(b):

      While [J.C.S.] has consistently visited with Father, he has never
      lived with Father or stayed overnight at Father’s residence[,]
      which would allow the child to build a primary attachment to
      Father.   The foster parents have consistently and regularly
      provided for the child’s daily needs since his birth. As per Dr.
      Rosenblum’s testimony, the child feels the most secure with foster

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     parents and removing him from that home would be a traumatic
     event for the child that would likely cause regression in his
     development. . . .

            . . . When [J.C.S.] calls his foster parents “Mom” or “Dad,”
     he is corrected by either Mother or Father. Dr. Keteles overheard
     Father tell [J.C.S.] that he only has one mother and one father.
     Father has indicated that he would continue to correct [J.C.S.] if
     he said that he had two moms and two dads[.] . . .

           While Father has made continuous efforts towards
     reunification and clearly possesses appropriate parenting skills,
     the needs and welfare of the minor child support termination of
     Father’s parental rights. Father has not demonstrated the ability
     to keep the child away from Mother, even after hearing the
     WCCB’s various concerns for Mother’s mental health and the court
     orders which direct Mother’s visitation to be fully supervised.
     Father was adamant that he wanted Mother to be reunified with
     the child despite the fact that this desire is not currently in the
     best interests of the child. On August 24, 2022, Father told the
     caseworker that he would allow Mother to be around the child
     unsupervised if she was “sober-minded,” even though Father had
     heard numerous days of testimony in which service providers
     indicated that Mother’s parental deficits were not limited to her
     sobriety. . . .

            . . . Father also testified that he believes Mother’s mental
     health issues are a result of the WCCB’s involvement with the
     family and taking the child into custody directly after Mother gave
     birth. Father believes that visits with Mother and the child are
     usually very good and that the child has a strong bond to Mother,
     despite various testimony and reports indicating the opposite.
     Father’s intention to allow Mother around the child, regardless of
     if she is sober, evidences the fact that Father does not have a full
     understanding of Mother’s mental health and how this desire is
     not in the best interests of [J.C.S.]

           The child is extremely attached to his foster family. The
     caseworker observed the child in the foster home, where he
     appears happy and comfortable. The child seeks foster mother
     out for affection, comfort and validation. The child regularly sits
     in foster mother’s lap when providers are at the home and the
     child is often playing with his foster siblings. The child is
     particularly close to his foster sister, who[m] he often tries to

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     protect when service providers come to the foster home. Dr.
     Rosenblum witnessed the child assisting foster parents during the
     assessment and enjoying their company. Elaine Logan witnessed
     the child call the foster parents “Mommy” and “Daddy” at the age
     of 2 and 3 and he has continued to call the foster parents by those
     names. The child recognizes the foster home as his home and his
     safe place.

            . . . Dr. Rosenblum observed [J.C.S.] to be strongly and
     securely attached to his foster parents, as they provided him with
     reliable security, love and affection. There was ample evidence to
     support the conclusion that the child is part of a cohesive family
     unit within the foster home and he identifies his foster parents as
     his family.

            [J.C.S.] has grown up entirely in the foster home. He has
     never lived with Mother or Father. [He] has only had unsupervised
     visits with Father for a brief period of time . . . . The foster parents
     have attended to all of the child’s needs since birth and he is
     securely attached to the foster parents.             The child has an
     emotional connection to his foster parents and siblings. Removing
     the child from the foster home after he has remained there for his
     entire life would be detrimental to his development and emotional
     wellbeing.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/10/23, at 75-77 (cleaned up).

     Thus, in conducting the bond-effect analysis, the orphans’ court

determined that the specific circumstances of this case favored termination.

Upon review of the certified record, we wholly agree with the well-reasoned

opinion of the orphans’ court and discern no abuse of discretion in its

determination that termination of Father’s parental rights would not “cause

extreme emotional consequences or significant, irreparable harm.” In the

Interest of K.T., supra at 1109-10 (cleaned up).

     Order affirmed.

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FILED: 1/30/2024

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