Court Opinion

ID: 9392745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 21:03:43.122117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:48.269845
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/5/23 (unmodified opn. attached)
                                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION THREE

 WILLIAM THOMPSON et al.,

      Plaintiffs and Appellants,                          G060988

          v.                                              (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-01184633)

 TODD SPITZER et al.,                                     ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
                                                          AND DENYING PETITION
      Defendants and Respondents.                         FOR REHEARING; NO CHANGE
                                                          IN JUDGMENT

                 This court hereby orders that the opinion filed here on April 11, 2023, be
modified as follows:
                 1.       On page 16, last paragraph, delete last sentence and Isbell citation,
and add the following citation after the Petrillo citation: “Bearman v. Superior Court
(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 463, 473 [waiver of the right to privacy is “narrowly construed
and not lightly found”]”
                 2.       On page 18, delete last paragraph, beginning with “When evaluating
. . .” and replace with the following paragraph: “Based on the above allegations, we
cannot find at this stage in the proceedings that alleged misdemeanants are providing
knowing and voluntary waivers. In particular, plaintiffs’ allegations that alleged
misdemeanants are unaware of the purposes for which Bode may use their DNA and that
Bode may indefinitely keep their DNA raise additional concerns about the voluntariness
of their waivers. A DNA sample contains a trove of personal information. As Justice
Cuéllar explained in his dissent in Buza, “DNA samples contain a wealth of genetic
information, which would make an individual nervous about possible violations of his or
her privacy as long as the information remains in the state’s possession.” (Buza, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 719 (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) “That one’s DNA reveals much of a person’s
most private, closely guarded information is difficult to dispute.” (Id. at p. 720.) A DNA
sample can reveal “an arrestee’s entire genetic code—information that has the capacity to
reveal the individual’s race, biological sex, ethnic background, familial relationships,
behavioral characteristics, health status, genetic diseases, predisposition to certain traits,
and even the propensity to engage in violent or criminal behavior.” (Ibid.) A “DNA
profile . . . thus has the potential to reveal vast amounts of personal information about
those individuals, and to be used in ways starkly different relative to what justified the
scheme. [Citation.] One can scarcely imagine personal information that falls more
closely to the core of the ‘realm of guaranteed privacy’. . . .” (Ibid.)”
              3.      On page 19, delete first complete paragraph, and replace with the
following paragraphs: “Due to its complexity, a significant number of alleged
misdemeanants will likely be unaware of the information their DNA may reveal and how
that information may be exploited. And, as technology advances, DNA samples and
profiles will reveal far more extensive information than we currently know. (U.S. v.
Kriesel (9th Cir. 2007) 508 F.3d 941, 947-948; U.S. v. Kincade (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d
813, 842, fn. 3 (conc. opn. of Gould, J.).) Because of this gap in knowledge, a vaguely
worded DNA waiver can potentially conceal from alleged misdemeanants the persons
having access to their DNA and/or the different purposes for which their DNA might be
used. Here, based on the allegations and the contents of the waiver, alleged
misdemeanants are not sufficiently apprised of the ways their DNA may be exploited for
information now and in the future. Alleged misdemeanants are not informed that their
DNA samples will be sent to a third party. Nor are they told how the third party will
store their DNA information, how long it will retain their DNA information, or whether
the third party can disseminate their DNA to other third parties.

                                               2
              “County Defendants argue our Supreme Court has “rejected these
heightened privacy concerns specific to the collection of DNA,” that we quoted above
from Justice Cuéllar’s dissent. (Citing Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 689-690.) We
disagree. In Buza, the Supreme Court recognized that DNA collection involves
heightened privacy interests. It stated, “[w]e . . . are mindful of the heightened privacy
interests in the sensitive information that can be extracted from a person’s DNA” which
“implicate . . . the privacy rights enjoyed by all Californians under the explicit protection
of article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.” (Ibid.) However, the Supreme
Court found the intrusion to these privacy interests was not unreasonable given the DNA
Act’s safeguards. (Ibid.) This case involves different issues than Buza. Buza analyzed
whether mandatory DNA collection of arrested felons under the DNA Act was an
unreasonable search and seizure. (Id. at pp. 664-665, 691.) In contrast, this case involves
voluntary DNA collection from alleged misdemeanants. Our analysis does not focus on
the reasonableness of the OCDA’s conduct but on whether alleged misdemeanants are
given sufficient information to knowingly and voluntarily waive their DNA rights.
Within this context, alleged misdemeanants’ knowledge of the third parties having access
to their DNA and the purposes for which such persons could use their DNA is a relevant
concern.”
              4.     On page 19, delete last paragraph, beginning with “For a DNA
waiver . . .” and replace with the following paragraph: “As set forth above, based on the
allegations in the FAC, we find alleged misdemeanants were not given sufficient
information as to how their DNA would be maintained and used. At this point in the
proceeding, we need not set forth the exact requirements for the waiver. On remand, the
trial court must weigh the facts and competing interests to determine whether the waivers
are valid and, if not, how they are lacking.”

                                                3
                5.     On page 20, delete first full paragraph, beginning with “Alleged
misdemeanants must . . . ” and also delete last paragraph, beginning with “Based on the
allegations . . . .”
                6.     On page 21, delete last paragraph, beginning with “As to the first
element . . .” and replace with the following paragraph: “As to the first element, alleged
misdemeanants have a privacy interest in their DNA and genetic information. (Buza,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 689-690; Mason, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 381.) The second
and third elements are also met. Based on the allegations in the FAC, alleged
misdemeanants have a reasonable expectation that their DNA sample will not be
provided to third parties to be indefinitely held for unknown purposes. As to the third
element, the allegations that alleged misdemeanants’ DNA can be held indefinitely by a
third party for unknown uses without their informed consent is sufficient to state an
invasion of privacy claim. (See ibid.)”

                This modification does not change the judgment. The petition for rehearing
is DENIED.

                                                   MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, J.

MOTOIKE, J.

                                              4
Filed 4/11/23 (unmodified opinion)

                                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 WILLIAM THOMPSON et al.,

     Plaintiffs and Appellants,                     G060988

         v.                                         (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-01184633)

 TODD SPITZER et al.,                               OPINION

     Defendants and Respondents.

                 Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, William
D. Claster, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
                 O’Melveny & Myers, Michael G. Yoder, James G. Byrd, Jack V. Day,
Abigail Formella; UCI Law Civil Rights Litigation Clinic, Paul Hoffman, Melanie
Partow; UCI Law Criminal Justice Clinic, Eda Katharine Tinto; Schonbrun Seplow
Harris Hoffman & Zeldes and John Washington for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
                 Alyssa Martinez, Amelia Piazza, Shubhra Shivpuri and Claire Simonich for
Social Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
              Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox, Christina E. Dashe, Richard A. Crudo,
William H. Milliken and Junru Yu for Andrea Roth, Brandon L. Garrett and Yvette
Garcia Missri as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
              Summer Lacey, Peter Bibring, Tiffany M. Bailey; Nathan Freed Wessler,
Patrick Toomey and Laura Moraff for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of
Southern California and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
              Jennifer Lynch, Andrew Crocker and Saira Hussain for Electronic Frontier
Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
              Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Laura D. Knapp, D. Kevin Dunn, Rebecca
S. Leeds and Golnaz Zandieh, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents.

                                  *         *           *

              Plaintiffs William Thompson and Simon Cole (collectively, plaintiffs) are
professors at the University of California, Irvine, and taxpaying residents of Orange
County. They filed a taxpayer lawsuit under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a
against Todd Spitzer, in his capacity as the Orange County District Attorney (OCDA),
and the County of Orange (County; collectively, County defendants). Plaintiffs seek to
enjoin County defendants from operating an allegedly unconstitutional DNA collection
program (the OCDNA program) that authorizes County prosecutors to obtain DNA
samples from persons charged with misdemeanors (alleged misdemeanants).
Specifically, County prosecutors offer to drop or reduce charges or punishments in
exchange for alleged misdemeanants’ DNA, which the OCDA stores indefinitely in its
own databank (the OCDNA database). Plaintiffs claim the OCDNA program violates
alleged misdemeanants’ rights to privacy, counsel, and due process and violates the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

                                             2
              The trial court sustained County defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ first
amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend. It characterized plaintiffs’ claims as
facial challenges to the OCDNA program. It also noted that alleged misdemeanants were
required to sign waivers to participate in the program, in which they waived their rights to
privacy and counsel. These waivers, the court concluded, barred any facial challenges to
the OCDNA program. Plaintiffs appeal this ruling.
              We agree the court erred by sustaining the demurrer as to the claims based
on the right to privacy, the right to counsel, and due process. These claims assert both
facial and as-applied challenges to the OCDNA program. Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged the OCDNA program, as implemented by the OCDA, is unconstitutional. In
particular, they have pled the waivers obtained from alleged misdemeanants to participate
in the OCDNA program are not made knowingly or voluntarily.
              In contrast, plaintiffs’ unconstitutional conditions claim, as currently pled,
only makes a facial challenge to the OCDNA program. Plaintiffs contend the entire
practice of requiring a DNA sample as part of a plea bargain or negotiated dismissal is an
unconstitutional condition regardless of how waivers are obtained from alleged
misdemeanants. This is a facial challenge, not an as-applied claim. Plaintiffs have not
sufficiently alleged that including a DNA provision as part of a plea deal or negotiated
dismissal is facially unconstitutional.
              Finally, the parties dispute whether plaintiffs have taxpayer standing to
assert the above claims. Because plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged County defendants
are operating the OCDNA program unlawfully, we find they have taxpayer standing.
              For these reasons, we reverse the judgment entered following the court’s
demurrer ruling. On remand, the court shall enter a new order overruling the demurrer as
to the claims for violations of the right to privacy, the right to counsel, and due process,
and sustaining it as to the remaining claims.

                                                3
                                               I
                          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Statewide DNA Collection
                “In 2004, California voters passed Proposition 69 (. . . known as the DNA
Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act (DNA Act)) to expand
existing requirements for the collection of DNA identification information for law
enforcement purposes.” (People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 664 (Buza).) “For
decades before the DNA Act, California law had required the collection of biological
samples from individuals convicted of certain offenses. In 1983, the Legislature enacted
legislation requiring certain sex offenders to provide blood and saliva samples before
their release or discharge. [Citation.] In 1998, the Legislature enacted the DNA and
Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998 [citation], which required
the collection of DNA samples from persons convicted of certain felony offenses,
including certain sex offenses, homicide offenses, kidnapping, and felony assault or
battery.” (Id. at p. 665, italics added.)
                “When the California electorate voted to pass [the DNA Act] on the 2004
general election ballot . . . , it substantially expanded the scope of DNA sampling to
include individuals who are arrested for any felony offense, as well as those who have
been convicted of such an offense.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 665, italics added; Pen.
Code, § 296, subd. (a).) Similarly, the DNA Act amended California law to mandate
                        1

DNA collection from any person who commits a misdemeanor offense requiring registry
as a sex offender or arsonist. (§ 296, subd. (a)(3); Initiative Measure (Prop. 69, § III.3,
approved Nov. 2, 2004, eff. Nov. 3, 2004).) The DNA Act’s requirement to collect DNA
from persons arrested for serious crimes was generally found to be constitutional by our
Supreme Court in Buza by a four-to-three vote. (Buza, at p. 665.)

    All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1

                                              4
              DNA samples collected under California law are stored in a statewide
databank maintained by the Department of Justice. (§§ 295, subds. (g), (h), 295.1, subds.
(c) & (d).) The Department of Justice is authorized to forward its DNA samples to the
nationwide databank operated by United States Department of Justice under certain
conditions. (§ 296.1, subd. (a)(6)(B).)

B. The OCDNA Program
              The facts in this section are drawn from the allegations in the FAC, which
we accept as true when evaluating the demurrer at issue. (Olszewski v. Scripps Health
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 798, 806.)
              In 2007, the County’s Board of Supervisors approved Ordinance 07-003,
which authorized the OCDA to establish its own local DNA collection program – the
OCDNA program. Generally, the OCDNA program focuses on collecting DNA from
alleged misdemeanants who are not required to provide a DNA sample under the
statewide DNA collection program, i.e., persons charged with misdemeanors not
involving sexual offenses or arson (see § 296, subd. (a)(3)). In contrast with the
                                                             2

statewide program that mandates DNA collection for certain offenses, the OCDNA
program obtains DNA samples through a purportedly voluntary exchange process.
Specifically, OCDA prosecutors offer to drop charges or to reduce charges or
punishments in exchange for the alleged misdemeanant’s DNA sample.
              Alleged misdemeanants who participate in the OCDNA program are
required to sign a waiver form. The FAC cites a law review article – Andrea Roth, “Spit
and Acquit”: Prosecutors As Surveillance Entrepreneurs (2019) 107 Cal. L.Rev. 405,
457 (hereafter, Roth) – as the basis for plaintiffs’ knowledge of the waiver form’s

 Plaintiffs allege these deals are also offered to persons charged with low-level felonies,
2

who are offered the chance to plead guilty to misdemeanor charges in exchange for their
DNA. These persons are included within the defined term, “alleged misdemeanants.”

                                             5
contents. Roth’s law review article includes a sample waiver (ibid), that plaintiffs assert
the OCDA has provided to alleged misdemeanants.
              The first paragraph of the waiver states that alleged misdemeanants
“understand that the purpose of the [OCDNA] Program is to permit state and local law
enforcement agencies to collect, permanently retain, search and use the DNA samples
[the alleged misdemeanant is] providing to help solve crime accurately and expeditiously;
enhance public safety; identify missing and unidentified persons; and deter, solve and
prevent criminal conduct.” (Roth, supra, 107 Cal. L.Rev. at p. 457.) The next few
paragraphs notify alleged misdemeanants that (1) they will be providing their DNA
sample to the OCDA “for permanent retention with the understanding that [their] OCDA
DNA sample is a distinct and separate sample from the Department of Justice DNA
samples . . . collected for the State Database and Data Bank Program pursuant to [the
Penal Code],” and (2) their DNA sample “may be checked and/or searched against other
DNA . . . in any local, state, national or international law enforcement database(s) for law
enforcement purposes.” (Ibid.)
              The waiver also explains that by participating in the OCDNA program,
alleged misdemeanants will be waiving their right to (1) have their DNA sample removed
from the OCDNA database, (2) challenge the collection of their DNA sample in court,
(3) challenge the collection and retention of their DNA sample for forensic identification,
(4) a jury or court trial, (5) an attorney, where appropriate, and (6) their rights to
participate in various drug diversion programs, where applicable. (Roth, supra, 107 Cal.
L.Rev. at p. 457.)
              According to the FAC, alleged misdemeanants are typically “pressured”
into accepting these DNA deals without a full understanding of how their DNA will be
used or their right to counsel. For example, plaintiffs assert that “[i]ndividuals charged in
misdemeanor cases often arrive at their arraignment in court unfamiliar with criminal
court procedures and practices. At the misdemeanor arraignment, many individuals are

                                               6
called to speak with [a prosecutor] without understanding that they can speak with a
public defender and ask questions about their rights and their case. Oftentimes,
[prosecutors] will meet with alleged misdemeanants in the courthouse hallways to present
the deal. . . . On information and belief, when a [prosecutor] offers to dismiss the case if
the charged individual gives their DNA sample, many individuals feel pressured to accept
this offer and agree to do so without a full understanding of their rights and their ability
to speak to a public defender about the offer and their other options. Indeed, the offer is
presented in such a way that unrepresented alleged misdemeanants often perceive it as an
exploding offer that must be accepted at that time, or else the opportunity will be lost.
When presented with this offer, alleged misdemeanants oftentimes are not informed
about how their DNA will be used, how long it will be kept, or how it will be
disseminated so that they can make an informed decision. On information and belief,
individual [alleged misdemeanants] ‘agree’ to waive their rights and give up their DNA
because they do not understand their right to counsel, they do not understand how or
where their DNA will be disseminated, and they believe the offer will vanish if they wait
to accept it.”
                 Once alleged misdemeanants agree to participate in the OCDNA program,
their DNA samples are collected at sites operated by the OCDA, which are located in five
County courthouses. Once collected, the DNA samples are sent for analysis to an out-of-
state lab operated by Bode Cellmark Forensics, Inc. (Bode). After analyzing each
sample, Bode develops a DNA profile. It sends the resulting DNA profile to the OCDA,
which is then uploaded into the OCDNA database. It is unclear what Bode does with the
DNA samples after they are analyzed or whether Bode retains records of the DNA
profiles after they are sent to the OCDA. Plaintiffs allege it is “unknown how long Bode
keeps [alleged misdemeanants’] biological information, or if Bode stores or otherwise
disseminates this information.” Allegedly, “[t]he County’s contract with Bode explains
that there is no requirement that Bode destroy County residents’ DNA information upon

                                              7
the completion of testing. Individuals who forfeit their DNA are unaware of whether and
how Bode uses their personal DNA data . . . .”
              The DNA profiles stored in the OCDNA database are indefinitely retained.
Roughly 13,000 to 20,000 DNA samples are collected each year under the OCDNA
program. In 2018, there were about 182,000 DNA profiles in the OCDNA database.
And as of April 2019, the OCDNA database was larger than the DNA databases of 25
states. Despite the number of DNA profiles it has obtained, though, the OCDNA
program has apparently been an ineffective tool for combatting or solving crime. As of
2018, only 0.67 percent of the profiles within the OCDNA database had been matched to
DNA collected from crime scenes, and the vast majority of these matches were to
property or other nonviolent crimes.
                                       3

C. Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit
              In February 2021, plaintiffs filed this taxpayer lawsuit under Code of Civil
Procedure section 526a, challenging the constitutionality of the OCDNA program.
County defendants filed a demurrer to the initial complaint, which was sustained with
leave to amend. Plaintiffs then filed the FAC. Based on the above allegations, the FAC
sought injunctive relief and set forth claims for (1) violation of the right to privacy under
the state Constitution, (2) violation of the right to counsel under the federal and state
Constitutions, (3) violation of the right to due process under the federal and state

  Typically, a DNA sample is sent to a lab, which uses the sample to create a DNA
3

profile. (See Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 666-667.) Various types of DNA profiles can
be constructed from a DNA sample. A profile can be made of a person’s entire genome.
Narrower identification profiles can also be made using “‘noncoding’ DNA” that
supposedly has “no known association with any genetic trait, disease, or predisposition.”
(See ibid.; Roth, supra, 107 Cal. L.Rev. at pp. 413-414.) It is unclear from the FAC what
information can be gleaned from the DNA profiles in the OCDNA database. But, as
technology develops, DNA profiles supposedly limited to identification purposes may be
used for other purposes. (Ibid.)

                                              8
Constitutions, (4) violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and (5) ultra vires
violations (i.e., acting outside the scope of statutory authority). County defendants filed a
demurrer to the FAC, which the trial court sustained without leave to amend.
              In its ruling, although plaintiffs claimed they were making facial and as-
applied challenges to the OCDNA program, the court determined only a facial challenge
had been made and analyzed plaintiffs’ claims as such. It further expressed doubt that
plaintiffs, who had not participated in the OCDNA program, had standing to bring as-
applied challenges.
              In evaluating plaintiffs’ claims, the court found the waivers that alleged
misdemeanants were required to sign to participate in the OCDNA program barred any
facial challenge to the program based on violations of the rights to privacy and counsel.
It determined plaintiffs had the burden of showing the waivers were invalid, and their
allegations had not met that burden. Among other things, there was “no concrete
allegation of any alleged misdemeanant who had failed to understand the ramifications of
giving a sample.” Further, with respect to DNA samples provided under plea bargains,
the trial court noted that judges are obligated to ensure an alleged misdemeanant’s
waivers of rights are knowing and voluntary. (Citing People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th
164, 170.)
              The demurrer to the due process claim was sustained because it was largely
derivative of the privacy and right-to-counsel claims. While plaintiffs asserted an
alternative theory that the OCDNA program violated due process because it lacked
procedural safeguards, the court found this theory unsupported by authority.
              Plaintiffs’ remaining claims were also found to be deficient. As to the
unconstitutional conditions claim, the court explained that the constitutionality of the
DNA deals could not be resolved on a facial challenge. Rather, “whether a condition
passes [constitutional] muster is a close, case-by-case evaluation specific to each criminal

                                              9
defendant.” Finally, the ultra vires claim failed because the court determined the
OCDNA program was authorized by Government Code section 26500.5.
               The court subsequently entered judgment in favor of County defendants.
Plaintiffs appeal, challenging the demurrer rulings as to each cause of action except for
the ultra vires claim. As explained below, we reverse the court’s rulings as to the claims
based on the rights to privacy, counsel, and due process, but we affirm the court’s ruling
as to the unconstitutional conditions claim.

                                                II
                                        DISCUSSION
A. Review Standard
               “In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative
complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of
action under any legal theory. [Citation.] Where the demurrer was sustained without
leave to amend, we consider whether the plaintiff could cure the defect by an amendment.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving an amendment could cure the defect.” (T.H. v.
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.) “A demurrer must dispose
of an entire cause of action to be sustained.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont
General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) Thus, a court must overrule a demurrer
to a cause of action if it is based on at least one viable theory of liability.
               “‘In order to plead a cause of action, the complaint must contain a
“statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise
language.” [Citation.] While it is true that pleading conclusions of law does not fulfill
this requirement, it has long been recognized that “[t]he distinction between conclusions
of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree.
[Citations.] For example, the courts have permitted allegations which obviously included
conclusions of law and have termed them ‘ultimate facts’ or ‘conclusions of fact.’”

                                               10
[Citations.] What is important is that the complaint as a whole contain sufficient facts to
apprise the defendant of the basis upon which the plaintiff is seeking relief.’” (Doheny
Park Terrace Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
1076, 1098-1099.)
              Likewise, “‘[t]he particularity required in pleading facts depends on the
extent to which the defendant in fairness needs detailed information that can be
conveniently provided by the plaintiff; less particularity is required where the defendant
may be assumed to have knowledge of the facts equal to that possessed by the plaintiff.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] There is no need to require specificity in the pleadings because
‘modern discovery procedures necessarily affect the amount of detail that should be
required in a pleading.’” (Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 592, 608.)

B. Facial and As-applied Challenges
              Plaintiffs contend their lawsuit challenges the OCDNA program both on its
face and in its application, and the trial court erred by finding they had only made facial
challenges. We agree.
              “A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute or ordinance
considers only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular
circumstances of an individual. [Citation.] ‘“To support a determination of facial
unconstitutionality, voiding the statute as a whole, petitioners cannot prevail by
suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems may
possibly arise as to the particular application of the statute . . . . Rather, petitioners must
demonstrate that the act’s provisions inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict with
applicable constitutional prohibitions.”’” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th
1069, 1084 (Tobe).)

                                              11
              In contrast, “[a]n as applied challenge may seek (1) relief from a specific
application of a facially valid statute or ordinance to an individual or class of individuals
who are under allegedly impermissible present restraint or disability as a result of the
manner or circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been applied, or (2) an
injunction against future application of the statute or ordinance in the allegedly
impermissible manner it is shown to have been applied in the past. It contemplates
analysis of the facts of a particular case or cases to determine the circumstances in which
the statute or ordinance has been applied and to consider whether in those particular
circumstances the application deprived the individual to whom it was applied of a
protected right.” (Tobe, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1084.)
              Here, plaintiffs have made both facial and as-applied challenges to the
OCDNA program. As to the former, plaintiffs believe the entire practice of exchanging
DNA for dropped or reduced misdemeanor charges (other than certain sex or arson
offenses) is unconstitutional. Put differently, the OCDNA program is unconstitutional
even if plaintiffs are fully informed of the rights they will be waiving to participate in it
and voluntarily agree to waive them. For instance, defendants’ claim for unconstitutional
conditions alleges, “[s]eizing alleged misdemeanants’ DNA violates their rights,
including their right to privacy.” And it is unconstitutional to “require[e] misdemeanants
to waive these rights . . . in exchange for the removal or reduction of charges.”
              Even if the OCDNA program is facially valid, though, plaintiffs allege it is
being unconstitutionally implemented by the OCDA. For example, they claim alleged
misdemeanants are routinely coerced into signing waivers without understanding their
right to counsel and without being fully informed as to how their DNA will be used.
These allegations do not attack the OCDNA program in its entirety. Rather, they seek
relief from its unlawful applications, namely, the OCDA’s purported practice of coercing
alleged misdemeanants into involuntarily signing waivers they do not fully understand.
An as-applied challenge is the correct vehicle to attack the OCDA’s implementation of

                                              12
the OCDNA program and to enjoin future unlawful applications of it. (Tobe, supra,
9 Cal.4th at p. 1084.)

C. Taxpayer Standing
              Though plaintiffs have not participated in the OCDNA program, they were
taxpaying residents of the County during the relevant period. It is uncontested that they
have taxpayer standing to facially challenge the OCDNA program, but County
defendants appear to contend that plaintiffs cannot rely on taxpayer standing for their as-
applied challenges. We disagree.
              Taxpayer standing derives from Code of Civil Procedure section 526a,
subdivision (a). It provides, “[a]n action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing
any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a
local agency, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other
person, acting in its behalf, either by a resident therein, or by a corporation, who is
assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the
action, has paid, a tax that funds the defendant local agency . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 526a, subd. (a).)
              Code of Civil Procedure “[s]ection 526a provides a mechanism for
controlling illegal, injurious, or wasteful actions by [government] officials. That
mechanism, moreover, remains available even where the injury is insufficient to satisfy
general standing requirements under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 367.”
(Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1249.) As our Supreme Court
has explained, the purpose of taxpayer standing is to enable “‘“a large body of the
citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in the
courts because of the standing requirement.”’ [Citation.] In light of this purpose, it is
crucial that the statute provide a ‘“broad basis of relief.”’ [Citation.] Accordingly,
[courts have] construed section 526a liberally . . . in light of its remedial purpose.” (Id. at

                                              13
p. 1251.) “Cases that challenge the legality or constitutionality of governmental actions
fall squarely within the purview of section 526a.” (California DUI Lawyers Assn. v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1247, 1261 (California DUI
Lawyers).)
              County defendants appear to contend that only an individual that has been
harmed by the OCDNA program can make an as-applied challenge. To the extent they
are wrong on this point, they also argue plaintiffs must at least identify someone harmed
by the program. Because the FAC has not done so, they maintain plaintiffs have not
sufficiently alleged they have taxpayer standing to bring an as-applied challenge. These
arguments are unpersuasive.
              As to the first argument, taxpayer standing may be used to challenge
ordinances that are unconstitutional on their face or in their application. (Tobe, supra,
9 Cal.4th at p. 1086; see, e.g., California DUI Lawyers, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp.
1262-1263 [plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to bring facial and as-applied challenges to
an administrative hearing system].) Parties can use taxpayer standing to challenge a
program that has not directly harmed them. (White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 764–
765.) Indeed, such a party can maintain taxpayer standing even if there are other
potential plaintiffs that have suffered direct harm from the program that could file suit.
(California DUI Lawyers, at p. 1263.) Thus, for purposes of taxpayer standing, it does
not matter that plaintiffs have not participated in the OCDNA program. Likewise,
plaintiffs can still rely on taxpayer standing even though there are OCDNA program
participants that could potentially bring suit.
              As to the second argument, nothing in the text of the statute requires a
plaintiff to identify a person harmed by the program to maintain taxpayer standing, nor
are we aware of any case law to this effect. We refuse to adopt such a requirement, as it
would interfere with the goals of taxpayer standing. To illustrate, we modify an example
given by the American Civil Liberties Union in its amicus brief. Assume a group of

                                              14
taxpayers claimed their local sheriff’s department was operating a surveillance program.
The taxpayers did not assert the surveillance program itself was unconstitutional. Rather,
they claimed the program, as applied, unconstitutionally targeted certain ethnic groups.
Given the secretive nature of surveillance programs, it would likely be difficult to
identify any person that had been harmed by the program. Nearly all the people
unconstitutionally targeted by the program would be unaware they had been surveilled.
              Within this hypothetical, it would be unreasonable to preclude taxpayers
from challenging this surveillance program until they could identify a person harmed by
it. Doing so would also conflict with the broad remedial purpose of Code of Civil
Procedure section 526a, which is intended to promote “prompt action to ‘“prevent
irremediable public injury.”’” (Connerly v. Schwarzenegger (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th
739, 749; see Davis v. Fresno Unified School Dist. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 911, 930
[taxpayer standing is construed broadly to promote its remedial purpose].) Moreover,
where taxpayers are asserting an agency is generally applying a program
unconstitutionally, such as here, identifying a specific person or persons harmed by the
program would serve little practical purpose. The agency has already been made aware
of the alleged unconstitutionality of the program. Identifying a specific person harmed
by the program would not meaningfully contribute to the agency’s understanding of the
lawsuit.
              To clarify, we do not hold that taxpayer standing can always be used to
make as-applied challenges to government programs. For example, using the
hypothetical above, assume the taxpayers did not assert that the surveillance program
unconstitutionally targeted certain ethnic groups. Rather, they asserted the program had
unlawfully surveilled a single person without a warrant. Our ruling today would not
automatically grant standing to such taxpayers. Taxpayer standing may not be applicable
in cases involving abnormal applications of a program to a discrete person or a small
group of people. We need not decide this issue since it is immaterial here. Plaintiffs’ as-

                                            15
applied claims are not based on an aberrant application of the OCDNA program. Rather,
they claim the OCDNA program is generally being unlawfully implemented by the
OCDA. Taxpayer standing is appropriate for such a challenge.
              However, “[a] taxpayer action does not lie where the challenged
governmental conduct is legal.” (Lyons v. Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Office (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1503.) As such, plaintiffs only have taxpayer standing if they
have sufficiently alleged constitutional violations in the FAC. If their allegations are
insufficient to show constitutional violations have occurred, then plaintiffs do not have
taxpayer standing. Since we find below that plaintiffs have adequately alleged as-applied
constitutional violations, they have taxpayer standing to pursue these claims.

D. The Waiver
              The focal point of the trial court’s ruling was the waiver that alleged
misdemeanants are required to sign to participate in the OCDNA program. The court
found the waiver barred any facial challenges to the OCDNA program based on the right
to privacy and the right to counsel. Because plaintiffs’ due process claim was primarily
based on violations of these aforementioned rights, the court held it also failed. We find
plaintiffs have adequately alleged the waivers are invalid due to the manner in which they
are obtained. Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled the OCDNA program, as applied by the
OCDA, violates alleged misdemeanants’ rights to privacy, counsel, and due process.
              “‘Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right after
knowledge of the facts.’” (Lanigan v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1020,
1030.) “‘Waiver requires a voluntary act, knowingly done, with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. [Citation.] There must be actual or
constructive knowledge of the existence of the right to which the person is entitled.’”
(Kelly v. William Morrow & Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1625, 1635.) “A waiver of a
constitutional right is ‘not to be implied and is not lightly to be found.’” (Petrillo v. Bay

                                              16
Area Rapid Transit Dist. (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 798, 810.) Likewise, “waiver of
constitutional rights is not presumed [citations]; on the contrary, ‘“courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver” of fundamental constitutional rights.’” (Isbell v.
County of Sonoma (1978) 21 Cal.3d 61, 68-69.)
              Generally, the party claiming waiver has the burden of proving it by clear
and convincing evidence and “‘“doubtful cases will be decided against a waiver.”’”
(Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31.) Here, the trial court found
plaintiffs had the burden of showing the waivers were invalid because they had “made the
illegality of the waivers an element of their claims.” It clarified, plaintiffs’ “theory of
liability is ‘the County illegally takes defendants’ DNA because the waiver is illegal.’”
On appeal, the parties dispute which side has the burden on the waiver issue. We need
not decide. Even if plaintiffs have the burden, they have alleged sufficient facts showing
the waivers are invalid.

              1. Right to privacy
              Among other things, plaintiffs claim the waiver of privacy rights obtained
by the OCDA is invalid because alleged misdemeanants are not fully informed as to how
their DNA will be maintained and used. We agree.
              California’s Constitution contains an express right to privacy. (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 1.) One of its principal aims “is to limit the infringement upon personal privacy
arising from the government’s increasing collection and retention of data relating to all
facets of an individual’s life.” (White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 761.) In particular,
the constitutional right to privacy was intended to protect individuals from “the
accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased
surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary society.” (Id. at pp. 773-774.)
              “Courts have . . . recognized that DNA contains an extensive amount of
sensitive personal information beyond mere identifying information, and people therefore

                                              17
have a strong privacy interest in controlling the use of their DNA.” (County of San Diego
v. Mason (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 376, 381 (Mason).) These privacy “interests implicate
. . . the privacy rights enjoyed by all Californians under the explicit protection of article I,
section 1 of the California Constitution.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 689-690.) While
these privacy rights may be waived, “waivers of constitutional rights are not lightly
found.” (Heda v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 525, 530.)
              To participate in the OCDNA program, alleged misdemeanants are required
to waive certain rights pertaining to their DNA, including the right to challenge its
collection. (Roth, supra, 107 Cal. L.Rev. at p. 457.) According to the FAC, though,
alleged misdemeanants are not fully informed as to the parties that will possess their
DNA information or the potential purposes for which their DNA could be used. The
waiver only states alleged misdemeanants are providing DNA samples to the OCDA to
combat criminal activity and to identify missing and unidentified persons. (Ibid.)
Nothing in the waiver notifies alleged misdemeanants that their DNA samples will be
sent to a third party, Bode, for analysis. (Ibid.) Further, alleged misdemeanants are not
told by prosecutors how Bode will store their DNA information, how long Bode will
retain their DNA information, for what purposes Bode can use their DNA information, or
whether any other third party may possess or have access to their DNA. Nor is this
information publicly available. Plaintiffs also allege “[t]he County’s contract with Bode
explains that there is no requirement that Bode destroy [alleged misdemeanants’] DNA
information upon the completion of testing.”
              When evaluating a waiver of DNA rights, we must consider that a DNA
sample contains a trove of personal information. As Justice Cuéllar explained in his
dissent in Buza, “DNA samples contain a wealth of genetic information, which would
make an individual nervous about possible violations of his or her privacy as long as the
information remains in the state’s possession.” (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 719 (dis.
opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) “That one’s DNA reveals much of a person’s most private, closely

                                              18
guarded information is difficult to dispute.” (Id. at p. 720.) A DNA sample can reveal
“an arrestee’s entire genetic code—information that has the capacity to reveal the
individual’s race, biological sex, ethnic background, familial relationships, behavioral
characteristics, health status, genetic diseases, predisposition to certain traits, and even
the propensity to engage in violent or criminal behavior.” (Ibid.) A “DNA profile
. . . thus has the potential to reveal vast amounts of personal information about those
individuals, and to be used in ways starkly different relative to what justified the scheme.
[Citation.] One can scarcely imagine personal information that falls more closely to the
core of the ‘realm of guaranteed privacy’. . . .” (Ibid.)
              Due to its complexity, a significant number of alleged misdemeanants will
likely be unaware of the information their DNA may reveal and how that information
may be exploited. And, as technology advances, DNA samples and profiles will reveal
far more extensive information than we currently know. (U.S. v. Kriesel (9th Cir. 2007)
508 F.3d 941, 947-948; U.S. v. Kincade (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 813, 842, fn. 3 (conc.
opn. of Gould, J.).) These far-ranging privacy implications associated with DNA
differentiate a DNA waiver from other constitutional rights criminal defendants typically
waive when entering plea deals, such as the right to a jury trial, the right to counsel, or
the right to confront witnesses. When criminal defendants agree to waive any of these
trial or trial-related rights, it is reasonably clear what they are surrendering. DNA
waivers are not so straightforward. A vaguely worded DNA waiver can potentially
conceal from alleged misdemeanants the persons having access to their DNA and/or the
different purposes for which their DNA might be used. Because alleged misdemeanants
will typically be unaware of all the ways their DNA may be exploited for information,
now and in the future, it is imperative that a DNA waiver sufficiently apprises them of
the rights they will be giving up.
              For a DNA waiver to be knowing and voluntary, alleged misdemeanants
must be reasonably informed as to how their DNA sample, as well as the resulting DNA

                                              19
profile, will be stored and used. At a minimum, they must be notified of (1) whether a
third party will have possession of their DNA sample or DNA information, (2) how long
any third party will retain possession of their DNA sample or any other DNA
information, and (3) whether there are any limits (or lack of limits) as to how the OCDA
or third parties may use or distribute their DNA sample or DNA information. As to the
third point, this includes disclosures as to whether an alleged misdemeanant’s DNA can
be used by the OCDA or a third party to investigate whether a relative of an alleged
misdemeanant is potentially a suspect in a crime. (See Henry T. Greely et al., Family
Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin (2006) 34 Medicine
& Ethics L.J. 248, 250-254.) If the OCDA is unaware of how long a third party will
retain any DNA information or of any limits on the third party’s use or distribution of that
information, it must tell alleged misdemeanants it does not know.
              Alleged misdemeanants must be given a reasonable amount of information
regarding their DNA waiver so they have a baseline understanding as to how their DNA
will be maintained and used. At the same time, however, it is impractical to require the
OCDA to explain the many ways DNA can be exploited, especially considering the rapid
acceleration of DNA technology. The above disclosures attempt to strike an appropriate
balance between these interests. Without the above information, alleged misdemeanants
cannot make an informed waiver because they lack sufficient understanding of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences that may result from participating in the
OCDNA program. Specifically, they are unaware whether (1) third parties may possess
their DNA, (2) their DNA may be used for purposes unrelated to criminal investigation,
and/or (3) their DNA may be used to perform criminal investigations into their relatives.
While the above disclosures are far from comprehensive, they provide enough
information to alert alleged misdemeanants of these possibilities.
              Based on the allegations in the FAC, alleged misdemeanants are not being
given sufficient information to execute valid waivers to participate in the OCDNA

                                            20
program. While the waiver informs them that their DNA will be used for crime-solving
and identification purposes, it does not expressly limit the use of their DNA to such
purposes. Nor does it inform alleged misdemeanants that a third party will possess their
DNA, how long that third party will maintain possession, or of any limits on how the
third party may use their DNA. Nor does it inform alleged misdemeanants whether their
DNA can be used to criminally investigate their relatives. As such, we cannot conclude
at this point in the proceedings that alleged misdemeanants are providing valid waivers of
their right to privacy in their DNA.
              There is also some dispute as to whether plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged
that County defendants are violating alleged misdemeanants’ right to privacy. They
have. To state such a claim, plaintiffs “must establish each of the following: (1) a legally
protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances;
and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 39-40.) “Whether a legally
recognized privacy interest is present in a given case is a question of law to be decided by
the court. [Citations.] Whether plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
circumstances and whether defendant’s conduct constitutes a serious invasion of privacy
are mixed questions of law and fact. If the undisputed material facts show no reasonable
expectation of privacy or an insubstantial impact on privacy interests, the question of
invasion may be adjudicated as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 40.)
              As to the first element, alleged misdemeanants have a privacy interest in
their DNA and genetic information. (Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 689-690; Mason,
supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 381.) The second and third elements are also met. Alleged
misdemeanants have a reasonable expectation that their DNA sample will not be
provided to third parties. As set forth above, the waiver does not inform alleged
misdemeanants that their DNA sample will be sent to a third party for analysis. Nor are
alleged misdemeanants told how long the third party will retain their DNA information or

                                            21
the uses for which the third party can use such information. As to the third element, the
fact that alleged misdemeanants’ DNA can be held indefinitely by a third party for
unknown uses without their informed consent is sufficient to allege an invasion of
privacy. (See ibid.) At this stage, plaintiffs do not have to allege the third party used
their DNA for any particular purpose to establish a violation of their right to privacy.

              2. Right to counsel
              “[T]he right to counsel attaches . . . when judicial proceedings have
commenced.” (People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1352.) “[T]he typical California
criminal prosecution commences . . . no later than the point at which the prosecutor files
a criminal complaint.” (People v. Viray (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194-1195.)
Under the United States Constitution, the right to counsel is limited to misdemeanor cases
that lead to imprisonment. (Scott v. Illinois (1979) 440 U.S. 367, 373-374; People v.
Disandro (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 593, 600.) Under the California Constitution, though,
the right to counsel applies to all persons charged with misdemeanors. (Rodriguez v.
Municipal Court (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 521, 527.)
              Under both the federal and state Constitutions, a defendant is entitled to
counsel during pleading and plea bargaining. “The pleading—and plea bargaining—
stage of a criminal proceeding is a critical stage in the criminal process at which a
defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the federal and
California Constitutions.” (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 933; Lafler v. Cooper
(2012) 566 U.S. 156, 162.) County defendants acknowledge an alleged misdemeanant
that is unrepresented must waive their right to counsel before a prosecutor can speak with
them at arraignment. (Citing § 987, subd. (a); Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.8(b) & (c).)
We accept this concession as true for purposes of this appeal.
              In the FAC, plaintiffs contend most alleged misdemeanants are unfamiliar
with criminal court procedures. At their arraignment, they are called to speak with

                                             22
prosecutors without understanding that they can consult with a public defender. “[W]hen
a [prosecutor] offers to dismiss the case if the charged individual gives up their DNA
sample, many individuals feel pressured to accept this offer and agree to do so without a
full understanding of their rights and their ability to speak to a public defender about the
offer and their other options. . . . On information and belief, [alleged misdemeanants]
‘agree’ to waive their rights and give up their DNA because they do not understand their
right to counsel, they do not understand how or where their DNA will be disseminated,
and they believe the offer will vanish if they wait to accept it.”
              The FAC is vague as to when prosecutors are approaching alleged
misdemeanants. But, in their appellate briefs, plaintiffs clarify that (1) these deals are
allegedly offered to plaintiffs prior to the arraignment hearing, where the court would
have advised alleged misdemeanants of their right to counsel (§ 987, subd. (a)), and
(2) prosecutors are allegedly speaking with unrepresented alleged misdemeanants and
negotiating DNA deals with them before they have affirmatively waived their right to
counsel in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.8(b) and (c).
              “It is now settled that the guarantee of counsel [in the California
Constitution] extends to misdemeanor cases . . . that the defendant must be made fully
aware of his right to counsel; that the court must not only advise him of it, but must also
inform him that the court will provide an attorney if he cannot afford one; that these are
constitutional demands. [Citation.] In order to establish a waiver of counsel, the record
must show that the defendant was informed of his right to counsel or that he knew of his
right and intelligently and knowingly waived it.” (In re Render (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d
423, 425.) Accepting the FAC’s allegations as true, prosecutors are approaching alleged
misdemeanants prior to being advised by the court of their right to counsel, prior to
waiving their right to counsel, and before they fully understand their right to counsel.
Given these allegations, we cannot find alleged misdemeanants’ waivers of counsel are
being made voluntarily or with sufficient knowledge. (See ibid; Rules Prof. Conduct,

                                              23
rule 3.8(b) & (c); People v. Cummings (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 341, 345-346 [a waiver of
counsel is not lightly found, and courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver].) Indeed, as set forth above, County defendants admit such conduct, if true,
would be improper. County defendants contend that we must presume alleged
misdemeanants waived their right to counsel before being approached by prosecutors.
They rely on Evidence Code section 664, which states, “[i]t is presumed that official duty
has been regularly performed.” To the extent this statutory presumption applies, though,
plaintiffs can plead facts to overcome it. (Romero v. County of Santa Clara (1970) 3
Cal.App.3d 700, 703.) The above allegations are enough to overcome this presumption.
               Finally, the trial court found the waivers were presumptively valid because
“[w]hen a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial court is required to ensure that
the plea is knowing and voluntary.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170.)
Similarly, “in California, the prosecutor may not unilaterally abandon a prosecution
[citation]; only the court may dismiss a criminal charge.” (Steen v. Appellate Division of
Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1045, 1055.) Regardless of these judicial checks,
plaintiffs have alleged these violations are occurring. We must accept their allegations as
true for purposes of this demurrer. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
1068, 1078.)

               3. Due process
               Under the United States Constitution, “the strictures of due process apply
only to the threatened deprivation of liberty and property interests deserving the
protection of the federal and state Constitutions.” (Ryan v. California Interscholastic
Federation-San Diego Section (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1059.) Under the state
Constitution, plaintiffs must “identify a statutorily conferred benefit or interest of which
he or she has been deprived to trigger procedural due process.” (Id. at p. 1071.)

                                             24
              Here, among other things, plaintiffs claim alleged misdemeanants were
denied their constitutional right to a fair trial based on the above violations to their
privacy rights and their right to counsel. Since the trial court found these latter rights had
not been violated, it concluded plaintiffs had not shown that alleged misdemeanants were
deprived of any protected interest. So, it sustained County defendants’ demurrer to the
due process claim. Since we have reversed the trial court as to the privacy and right to
counsel claims, we find plaintiffs’ due process claim sufficiently alleges a deprivation of
a protected interest.
              County defendants also appear to argue that plaintiffs cannot assert
taxpayer standing based on due process violations to others, but this is inaccurate. (See,
e.g., California DUI Lawyers, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1251, 1258-1263 [attorney
association had taxpayer standing to allege due process violations committed by the
Department of Motor Vehicles].)

E. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
              “‘[T]he government may not deny a benefit to a person because he
exercises a constitutional right.’” (Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. (2013)
570 U.S. 595, 604.) “The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions limits the government’s
power to require one to surrender a constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary
benefit. [Citation.] When receipt of a public benefit is conditioned upon the waiver of a
constitutional right, the ‘“government bears a heavy burden of demonstrating the
practical necessity for the limitation.”’ [Citation.] ‘[H]owever well-informed and
voluntary that waiver, the governmental entity seeking to impose those conditions must
establish: (1) that the conditions reasonably relate to the purposes sought by the
legislation which confers the benefit; (2) that the value accruing to the public from
imposition of those conditions manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of
constitutional rights; and (3) that there are available no alternative means less subversive

                                              25
of constitutional right, narrowly drawn so as to correlate more closely with the purposes
contemplated by conferring the benefit.’” (San Diego County Water Authority v.
Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1158-
1159.)
              Unlike the three claims above, plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is solely a facial challenge to the entire OCDNA
program. Their claim is based on allegations that “[s]eizing alleged misdemeanants’
DNA violates their rights, including their right to privacy. By requiring misdemeanants
to waive these rights . . . in exchange for removal or reduction of charges, Defendants
impose an unconstitutional condition.” Rather than challenging the OCDA’s
implementation of the OCDNA program, this claim challenges the validity of the whole
scheme. We find the unconstitutional conditions claim, as pled, fails to state a cause of
action.
              “The plea bargaining process necessarily exerts pressure on defendants to
plead guilty and to abandon a series of fundamental rights, but we have repeatedly held
that the government ‘may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in
return for the plea.’ [Citation.] ‘While confronting a defendant with the risk of more
severe punishment clearly may have a “discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion
of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an inevitable”—and
permissible—“attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the
negotiation of pleas.”’” (U.S. v. Mezzanatto (1995) 513 U.S. 196, 209-210.) In
California, conditions in plea agreements “that impinge on constitutional rights . . . are
valid as long as ‘they are narrowly drawn to serve the important interests of public safety
and rehabilitation [citation] and if they are specifically tailored to the individual.’”
(Alhusainy v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 385, 390-391.) These same
considerations are relevant when considering negotiated dismissals. (See Hoines v.
Barney’s Club, Inc. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 603, 612.)

                                              26
              Based on the FAC’s allegations, we cannot find the OCDNA program
facially violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Under plaintiffs’ theory, taking
a DNA sample from an alleged misdemeanant will never outweigh the resulting
impairment of constitutional rights. But, as mentioned above, the constitutional rights to
privacy and counsel can generally be waived so long as the waivers are knowing and
voluntary. Further, their argument overlooks the vast differences in offenses that can be
charged as misdemeanors. For example, driving without a license or failure to appear in
court for a traffic violation may be charged as misdemeanors. (People v. Spence (2005)
125 Cal.App.4th 710, 718; People v. Foster (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 2.)
However, assault with a firearm is a so-called “wobbler” offense that can be charged as a
felony or misdemeanor. (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); In re Brandon T. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1491, 1495, fn. 4.) Similarly, assault with a deadly weapon and spousal battery may also
be charged as felonies or misdemeanors. (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 273.5, subd. (a)(1).)
              Our Supreme Court has held that DNA can be collected from defendants
that are “validly arrested on ‘probable cause to hold for a serious offense.’” (People v.
Buza, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 665.) Given the seriousness and potential violence associated
with certain misdemeanor offenses, requiring a DNA sample as a part of a plea deal or a
negotiated settlement may be sufficiently tailored to protect public safety in certain cases.
(See Alhusainy v. Superior Court, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 390-391.) Thus, based
on the current allegations, we cannot say the OCDNA program “‘“inevitably pose[s] a
present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional prohibitions.”’” (Tobe,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1084.)
              Plaintiffs have not made any argument as to how they might amend this
claim. However, we recognize that given the substance of County defendants’ demurrer
and the thrust of the trial court’s tentative ruling, they may not have had a meaningful
opportunity to do so. As such, we direct the court on remand to consider arguments from
plaintiffs as to whether they should be given leave to amend this claim.

                                             27
                                              III
                                       DISPOSITION
              The judgment is reversed. On remand, we direct the trial court to enter an
order overruling the demurrer as to the claims for violations of the right to privacy, the
right to counsel, and due process, and sustaining it as to the unconstitutional conditions
and ultra vires claims. Plaintiffs shall be given an opportunity to provide argument as to
whether they can amend their unconstitutional conditions claim, but they are denied leave
to amend as to their ultra vires claim since they abandoned this claim on appeal.
              Our ruling does not directly address the facial challenges plaintiffs have
made based on violations of the rights to privacy, counsel, and due process. We only find
plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged as-applied violations as to these rights; thus, these
claims survive demurrer. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp., supra, 148
Cal.App.4th at p. 119 [a demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action].) Our ruling
does not preclude County defendants from moving to strike these facial challenges. (See
PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-1683.) Nor does it
preclude plaintiffs from moving to amend the FAC to add allegations to support the facial
challenges based on the rights to privacy, counsel, and/or due process.

                                              28
              Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs on appeal.
                                                                  4

                                                   MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, J.

MOTOIKE, J.

  The request for judicial notice filed by County defendants is denied. The portion of the
4

Orange County Codified Ordinances is immaterial to our analysis. (Jordache
Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6
[declining to take judicial notice of materials not “necessary, helpful, or relevant”].) The
waiver form for which they seek judicial notice is substantially identical to the waiver
contained in Roth, supra, 107 Cal. L.Rev. at page 457, which we described above. (See
ibid.)

                                              29