Court Opinion

ID: 9955423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 16:01:02.133481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:41.053095
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6062     Document: 010111023376       Date Filed: 03/28/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 28, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  ACCELERATED, LLC,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                     Nos. 23-6062 & 23-6086
                                                      (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00258-HE)
  LMI II, LLC,                                                 (W.D. Okla.)

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Accelerated, LLC agreed to buy an aircraft from LMI II, LLC. But a pre-sale

 inspection indicated the aircraft’s engines were damaged beyond the manufacturer’s

 standards for operation. Although the parties agreed that LMI would initiate an

 insurance claim for engine damage, and LMI did so, Accelerated hesitated to close

 the sale. On the day of closing, LMI agreed to initiate another claim under a policy

 provision allowing reimbursement for temporary engines while the permanent

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-6062    Document: 010111023376         Date Filed: 03/28/2024      Page: 2

 engines were being repaired. After the sale, however, the manufacturer issued

 Technical Variances (TVs) allowing the aircraft to be operated without repairing the

 engines. Accelerated did not have the engines repaired and did not incur costs for

 temporary engines. As a result, LMI declined to tender to Accelerated the proceeds

 from the temporary-engines insurance claim.

       Accelerated sued, and both sides moved for summary judgment. The district

 court granted summary judgment to LMI and then awarded LMI its attorney’s fees.

 Accelerated now appeals from both the decision on the competing motions for

 summary judgment (No. 23-6062) and the award of fees (No. 23-6086). Exercising

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm in both appeals.

                                    BACKGROUND

       On October 14, 2021, Accelerated and LMI entered into an Aircraft Purchase

 and Sale Agreement (the Agreement). The Agreement provided Accelerated the right

 to conduct a complete pre-purchase inspection of the aircraft. Accelerated arranged

 for West Star Aviation to conduct an inspection.

       On October 25, Accelerated’s broker e-mailed LMI’s counsel. He noted the

 inspection, still in its early stages, had identified several areas of concern. On

 October 29, the parties executed an addendum to the Agreement (the First

 Addendum), in which Accelerated waived a complete pre-purchase inspection in

 exchange for a reduction in the purchase price. The First Addendum stated West Star

 would inspect the engines for foreign object damage (FOD), and LMI would be

 “responsible to initiate an insurance claim . . . for any airworthiness discrepancies

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 related to foreign object damage . . . discovered as part of such limited inspection.”

 Aplt. App. Vol. II at 76. LMI was insured under a business aircraft policy (the

 Policy) issued by AIG Aerospace Insurance Services, Inc. (AIG).

       On November 2, Accelerated’s counsel e-mailed LMI’s counsel that

 Accelerated “need[ed] to put this . . . deal on hold until we can determine the extent

 of the foreign object damage to both engines [and] what the repairs would look like.

 Then we will need to confirm insurance coverage before we can proceed to closing.”

 Id. at 131. Later that day, Accelerated’s counsel e-mailed that it would only be

 willing to move forward with closing if it could “get: (i) a report on the extent of the

 damage, (ii) [engine manufacturer] Rolls Royce to weigh in on the necessary repairs

 and (iii) AIG to confirm that the necessary repairs are covered.” Id. at 130.

       On November 3, West Star indicated that some of the engine damage exceeded

 specifications established by Rolls-Royce. LMI e-mailed Accelerated that it had

 initiated an insurance claim and proposed November 12 as a firm closing date.

 Accelerated was loath to proceed with the sale, replying to LMI on November 4 that

 it was “time to pull the plug on this deal.” Id. Vol. I at 166. On November 5, LMI

 sent a letter to Accelerated, reiterating it had initiated an insurance claim for FOD to

 the engines as agreed and stating Accelerated would be in default if it did not close

 the deal within five days.

       In the meantime, West Star had been in communication with Rolls-Royce. On

 November 4, Rolls-Royce confirmed to West Star that some of the damage was

 considered not acceptable, although it might be possible to issue TVs. On the same

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 day LMI sent its default letter to Accelerated, November 5, Rolls-Royce e-mailed

 West Star that “we are chasing our specialists continuously to accept the findings

 which exceed the . . . limits via TV. This is not completely confirmed yet but this is

 what we want to achieve.” Id. at 199. That same day, West Star confirmed to

 Rolls-Royce that it had submitted TV requests for the engines.

       On November 8, AIG confirmed the Policy covered LMI’s engine claim, and

 Accelerated e-mailed LMI that it was ready to move forward with the closing. The

 next day, however, the parties continued to negotiate. Beyond the engine claim that

 LMI already had initiated, AIG proposed a settlement under Coverage R of the

 Policy, entitled “Temporary Replacement Parts Rental Expense.”

       Coverage R provided up to $500,000 in coverage for “the cost of renting or

 leasing, installing, removing and transporting temporary replacement component

 part(s) that are necessary due to Physical Damage loss to which this policy applies.”

 Id. Vol. II at 105. Coverage R provided it “applie[d] only if you have made

 reasonable attempts to rent or lease component parts to replace the parts that are

 damaged” and “[t]he time required to repair the [aircraft] exceeds the Minimum

 Required Repair Period shown under this Coverage in the Declarations,” which was

 five days. Id. During the negotiations, Accelerated’s broker e-mailed cost

 projections to AIG indicating that the costs of rental engines would greatly exceed

 the $500,000 policy limit, and the time for repairs would last an estimated 70 days.

 The broker e-mailed both parties’ counsel on November 9 that he had spoken to

 AIG’s adjuster and “confirmed . . . that they don’t care and they will make the

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 statement to us tomorrow how the monies get spent or what is done with it, it does

 not have to go to rentals specifically, we can do with it as we please with no concern

 of insurance fraud.” Id. at 281.

       While the parties were negotiating, Rolls-Royce e-mailed West Star on

 November 9 that “[t]he stress specialist reviewed and accepted the reported findings

 on the . . . engines in the ‘as-is’ condition. The [TVs] are in work now. We are

 aiming to provide the TV’s [sic] on the requested date 12 NOV 2021.” Id. at 139.

       Closing was set for November 10. That day, the parties executed another

 addendum to the Policy (the Second Addendum). The Second Addendum provided:

               WHEREAS, Seller and Purchaser have agreed to have all funds
       received by Seller from Seller’s aircraft insurance company – AIG
       Aerospace (the “Insurance Company”) relating to the insurance settlement
       for the temporary engines, more specifically described as “Coverage R:
       Temporary Replacement Parts Rental Expense” to be paid directly to Seller
       (the “Insurance Payout”);

               WHEREAS, in lieu of the Purchase Price being reduced at Closing
       for the Insurance Payout, the Seller has agreed to transfer (the “Insurance
       Payout Transfer”) the Insurance Payout to Purchaser within 3 business
       days of receipt by Seller; and

              WHEREAS, in consideration for the benefit to Seller and all of its
       related entities of closing the sale of the Aircraft, Seller agrees to have its
       related company Select Management Resources, LLC (“Select
       Management”) guarantee the 1nsurance Payout Transfer.

             NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the mutual covenants and
       agreements contained in this Second Addendum, the sufficiency of which
       both Parties acknowledge, the Parties agree to amend the Agreement as
       follows:

              1.     The Seller agrees to do everything within its power to keep its
       insurance policy on the Aircraft active before, during and after the Closing
       and to cooperate with the Purchaser and the Insurance Company to cause

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        the payment of the Insurance Payout and all other claims relating to the
        Aircraft (wherever payable) to be made in a timely manner.

              2.     The Seller agrees to make the Insurance Payout Transfer to
        Purchaser within 3 business days of receipt by the Seller of the Insurance
        Payout.

               3.      Select Management agrees to guarantee the Insurance Payout
        Transfer so that if the Seller receives the Insurance Payout and fails to
        transfer the Insurance Payout to Purchaser within 3 business days, then
        Select Management shall be responsible to pay to Purchaser the amount of
        the Insurance Payout.

              4.     The Seller shall allow Buyer post-closing access to all
        information and reports from Rolls Royce and West Star regarding the
        engine damage and any engine repairs made.[1]

 Id. at 78.

        The sale closed as scheduled on November 10. On November 13, Rolls-Royce

 issued TVs for both engines. Rolls-Royce “concluded that the reported damage . . .

 can be accepted ‘as-is’ for further operation without any limitations. The

 recommendation given in this TV will not adversely affect the integrity and/or

 functionality of the component, system or the engine.” Id. at 167; see also id. at 168.

        AIG delivered a check for the Coverage R payout to LMI’s offices on or about

 November 17. On November 22, LMI informed Accelerated it had received the

 check. But LMI did not tender the insurance proceeds to Accelerated. According to

 LMI, Accelerated refused to provide it with reports regarding the engine damage and

 repairs. Allegedly this “caused LMI to become suspicious about the accuracy of the

        1
         LMI asserts this paragraph contains a scrivener’s error, and that the parties
 intended that the Buyer would allow the Seller post-closing access to information
 about repairs. Accelerated states that there is no scrivener’s error. This dispute,
 however, is not material to the resolution of the appeals.
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 information previously provided, i.e., the need for engine repairs and temporary

 engines.” Id. Vol. I at 133. LMI therefore “decided to retain the insurance proceeds

 until it could determine whether the factual basis for the Coverage R payment was

 legitimate.” Id. Subsequently, LMI learned “[t]he damage to the permanent engines

 did not require removal or repairs. As a result, there was never a need for temporary

 engines and thus never a need for the insurance claim to AIG under Coverage R of

 the Policy.” Id. LMI did not tender the Coverage R payment to Accelerated. Nor

 did its affiliate Select Management compensate Accelerated.

       Invoking diversity jurisdiction, Accelerated filed suit in the federal district

 court. It alleged LMI breached the Second Addendum by not tendering the $500,000

 payment and not having Select Management guarantee the payout, and it asserted

 alternative claims for promissory estoppel, money had and received, and unjust

 enrichment. Both parties moved for summary judgment: Accelerated argued LMI

 owed it the Coverage R proceeds, and LMI argued the Second Addendum was

 unenforceable due to mistake. LMI informed the district court that it intended to

 refund the payment to AIG if the district court ruled in its favor.

       The district court denied Accelerated’s motion and granted LMI’s motion. It

 held the Second Addendum was invalid because “there was not mutual agreement

 due to the existence of mutual mistake of fact.” Id. Vol. III at 107. “The undisputed

 facts make it clear that all parties (plus AIG) assumed that temporary replacement of

 the engines incident to their repair would be necessary.” Id. The court continued:

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       Their agreement for LMI to pay over the insurance proceeds to Accelerated
       was based on the assumption that temporary replacement of the engines
       would be required and that assumption was the basis for the insurance
       claim. There is nothing in the agreements to suggest that Accelerated
       should receive the payment regardless of whether a basis for insurance
       coverage was ultimately determined to exist.

 Id. at 107-08. After also rejecting Accelerated’s alternative equitable claims, the

 district court entered judgment in favor of LMI.

       LMI then moved for an award of attorney fees under an Oklahoma fee-shifting

 statue and a prevailing-party fee provision in the Agreement. Accelerated opposed

 LMI’s entitlement to fees under either the statute or the Agreement, but it did not

 dispute the reasonableness of the requested amount. The district court held that LMI

 was entitled to reasonable fees under both the statute and the Agreement and that its

 requested amount was reasonable. It therefore entered an order awarding LMI fees in

 the amount of $90,761.

       Accelerated timely appealed from both the final judgment and the order

 awarding fees. This court consolidated the two appeals for all procedural purposes.

                                     DISCUSSION

                                      No. 23-6062

       Appeal No. 23-6062 concerns the denial of summary judgment to Accelerated

 and grant of summary judgment to LMI.

 I.    Standards of Review

       “We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the

 same standard of review as the district court.” Rumsey Land Co. v. Res. Land

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 Holdings, LLC (In re Rumsey Land Co.), 944 F.3d 1259, 1270 (10th Cir. 2019)

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant

 shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We “view the

 evidence and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to

 the party opposing summary judgment.” In re Rumsey Land Co., 944 F.3d at 1271

 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where, as here, we are presented with

 cross-motions for summary judgment, we must view each motion separately, in the

 light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in

 that party’s favor.” Frank v. Lee, 84 F.4th 1119, 1136 (10th Cir. 2023), petition for

 cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 19, 2024) (No. 23-901) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 II.   Contract Claim

       The Agreement chose Oklahoma as the governing law and venue for any

 disputes. Because this is a diversity case, we “apply federal procedural law and state

 substantive law.” McAnulty v. Standard Ins. Co., 81 F.4th 1091, 1096 (10th Cir.

 2023). “[O]ur task is not to reach our own judgment regarding the substance of the

 common law, but simply to ascertain and apply the state law.” Kokins v. Teleflex,

 Inc., 621 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2010) (brackets and internal quotation marks

 omitted).

       In Oklahoma, the first element of breach of contract is “formation of a

 contract.” Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 488 P.3d 743, 748

 (Okla. 2021). The district court agreed with LMI that the Second Addendum did

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  not form a valid contract because of mutual mistake. We consider this issue first

  because it is dispositive of both motions for summary judgment.

        Under Oklahoma law, “[i]n order to have a valid contract there must be

  mutual consent, or a meeting of the minds.” Beck v. Reynolds, 903 P.2d 317, 319

  (Okla. 1995); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 51 (“The consent of the parties to a

  contract must be . . . [m]utual . . . .”). “When there is a mutual mistake of fact as to

  a material element of the contract, a meeting of the minds is absent.” Hampton v.

  Sur. Dev. Corp., 817 P.2d 1273, 1274 (Okla. 1991). “Consent is not mutual unless

  the parties all agree upon the same thing in the same sense.” Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 66;

  see also Beck, 903 P.2d at 319.

        Accelerated argues there was no mutual mistake because “the Aircraft’s

  engines have confirmed, documented FOD damage that (1) reduces the value of the

  Aircraft, and (2) must eventually be resolved/repaired.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 25.

  “Critically, just because there is some uncertainty involved regarding the ultimate

  scope and cost of repairs does not mean there was any mistake; rather, the Second

  Addendum correctly expresses the parties’ real contract.” Id. at 26.

        Oklahoma defines a mistake of fact as

        a mistake not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person
        making the mistake, and consisting in:

        1. An unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact past or present,
        material to the contract; or,

        2. Belief in the presence of a thing material to the contract, which does not
        exist, or in the past existence of such a thing, which has not existed.

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  Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 63. Other Oklahoma statutes also establish relevant principles of

  contractual interpretation. See id. § 163 (“A contract may be explained by reference

  to the circumstances under which it was made, and the matter to which it relates.”);

  id. § 164 (“However broad may be the terms of a contract, it extends only to those

  things concerning which it appears that the parties intended to contract”).

        The district court did not err in holding LMI was entitled to summary

  judgment. When viewed in the light most favorable to Accelerated, the record

  indicates that at the time of executing the Second Addendum, both Accelerated and

  LMI (not to mention AIG) believed that the FOD affected the engines’ airworthiness

  and that they would need to be repaired soon, not at some uncertain point in the

  future.2 See, e.g., Aplt. App. Vol. II at 282 (November 9, 2021, e-mail from

  Accelerated’s broker to AIG stating that Rolls Royce “is currently estimating a

  70 day turn time for shop visits” and relying on then-applicable fees (emphasis

  added)); id. at 121 (November 8, 2021, e-mail from AIG adjuster to both parties’

  counsel stating “engines that require repair from foreign ingestion in order to stay

  airworthy will be covered” (emphasis added)). That belief was a thing material to

        2
          When viewed in the light most favorable to LMI, a factfinder could conclude
  that Accelerated, through the inspection company it retained (West Star), knew
  before the closing that the FOD did not affect the engines’ airworthiness: on
  November 5, Rolls-Royce e-mailed West Star that it was evaluating whether it could
  issue the TVs, and on November 9, Rolls Royce e-mailed West Star that it planned to
  issue the TVs. But even if Accelerated did not hold a mistaken belief about an urgent
  need to repair the engines, the record indicates that LMI did. In Oklahoma, a
  unilateral mistake of fact also prevents a contract from being formed. See Watkins v.
  Grady Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 438 P.2d 491, 494-95 (Okla. 1968).
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  the Second Addendum. As it turned out, however, there was no immediate need to

  repair the engines. After the closing, Rolls-Royce issued the TVs and certified that

  the FOD did not affect the operation of the engines. And Accelerated did not seek to

  repair the permanent engines or install temporary engines. As such, the record shows

  the parties (and AIG) were mistaken that benefits were payable under Coverage R.

        Accelerated argues that LMI bore the risk of mistake because the parties

  agreed to allocate the risk to LMI.3 We do not find this contention persuasive. On

  this record, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Accelerated, it is

  impossible to conclude that LMI agreed to accept the risk of making an unfounded

  insurance claim. To be sure, the record contains a November 9 e-mail from

  Accelerated’s broker stating that he had spoken to AIG’s adjuster and “confirmed . . .

  that they don’t care and they will make the statement to us tomorrow how the monies

  get spent or what is done with it, it does not have to go to rentals specifically, we can

  do with it as we please with no concern of insurance fraud.” Aplt. App. Vol. II

  at 281. There is no evidence, however, that on the closing date AIG ever made “the

  statement” that would absolve the parties of responsibility for satisfying the

        3
           Accelerated makes several other arguments in this portion of its opening
  brief. In response to LMI’s assertion that Accelerated waived arguments by failing to
  raise them below, Accelerated adequately identifies where it argued that the parties
  agreed to allocate the risk to LMI. It does not show that it made the other legal
  arguments it now presents, and our review indicates it did not. Nor does Accelerated
  argue for plain error. We therefore consider only the assertion that the parties agreed
  to allocate the risk to LMI. See Jacks v. CMH Homes, Inc., 856 F.3d 1301, 1306
  (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that an appellant waives an argument if it fails to raise it in
  the district court and fails to argue for plain error on appeal).
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  conditions of Coverage R to receive payment. And although Accelerated points out

  that the adjuster’s affidavit submitted in this litigation does not dispute the broker’s

  November 9 e-mail, neither does it confirm it. Rather, the affidavit states, “AIG

  would not have paid the Temporary Engines Claim if AIG had been made aware at

  the time (a) that the FOD damage to the Aircraft’s permanent engines did not require

  removal and repair; and (b) that the installation of temporary engines on the Aircraft

  was therefore unnecessary.” Id. at 111.

         “Recission, not reformation, is the proper remedy when an apparent contract is

  made because of mutual mistake of fact even when the contract has been executed.”

  Beck, 903 P.2d at 319; see also Hampton, 817 P.2d at 1274-75 (“When a contract is

  executed under a mutual mistake of fact, a court can rescind the contract and restore

  the parties to the same positions as when the contract was executed.”). In this case,

  because the agreement was an addendum to the original contract, that means

  rescinding the Second Addendum and leaving the parties with the Agreement and the

  First Addendum. See Hampton, 817 P.2d at 1275 (rescinding addendum and leaving

  the parties with the original contract).

         For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of LMI’s motion for

  summary judgment and denial of Accelerated’s motion for summary judgment on the

  contract claim.

  III.   Equitable Claims

         As alternatives to its contract claim, Accelerated also brought claims for

  promissory estoppel, money had and received, and unjust enrichment. The district

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  court applied Oklahoma law to those claims, and the parties do not object to that

  decision.

        A.     Promissory Estoppel

        In Oklahoma, there are four elements of promissory estoppel: “(1) a clear and

  unambiguous promise, (2) foreseeability by the promisor that the promisee would

  rely upon it, (3) reasonable reliance upon the promise to the promisee’s detriment and

  (4) hardship or unfairness can be avoided only by the promise’s enforcement.”

  Russell v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Carter Cnty., 952 P.2d 492, 503 (Okla. 1997). The

  district court held that “[e]ven if the other elements of a promissory estoppel claim

  were assumed to be present, it is undisputed that Accelerated did not incur the

  expense of temporary engines/rentals and that it otherwise received the benefit of its

  bargain.” Aplt. App. Vol. III at 108.

        Accelerated argues that, regardless of whether it has incurred expenses for

  temporary engines, it did not otherwise receive the benefit of its bargain.

  Specifically, it claims it “lost the right/benefit of the complete Pre-purchase

  Inspection (which could reveal additional Aircraft damage) and the corresponding

  right/benefit to terminate the purchase (or renegotiate a lower purchase price).”

  Aplt. Opening Br. at 35 (footnotes omitted). But Accelerated waived the complete

  pre-purchase inspection as part of the First Addendum, not the Second Addendum.

  And Accelerated does not explain how, having executed the Agreement and the First

  Addendum, it could have terminated the purchase or even negotiated a lower

  purchase price without being in breach of contract. Accordingly, Accelerated has

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  failed to establish the district court erred in determining it did not show the

  detrimental reliance element of its promissory estoppel claim.

        B.     Money Had and Received

        “An action for money had and received arises when one has received money

  which in equity and good conscience should be paid to another.” Nicholson v. Stitt,

  508 P.3d 442, 447 (Okla. 2022). The district court held that “it would no doubt be

  inequitable for LMI to retain the $500,000. But the inequity arises relative to the

  competing interests of AIG, not those of Accelerated.” Aplt. App. Vol. III at 108.

        Accelerated argues that “there is no inequity vis-à-vis AIG because AIG

  received exactly what it was looking for in exchange for its knowing, voluntary

  payment of LMI’s insurance claim under Coverage R: a full release from its insured,

  LMI,” and that “had AIG believed its payment of the insurance proceeds to LMI to

  be inequitable and that the money should be returned to AIG, then AIG certainly

  would have joined this suit to assert its right to the return of its money.” Aplt.

  Opening Br. at 40. These assertions, however, rest on speculation rather than

  evidence.

        In Oklahoma, a claim for money had and received belongs to the owner of the

  money that the other party should not be allowed to retain. See Nicholson, 508 P.3d

  at 447 (“‘It is a well-settled principle of law that, if a party through mistake receives

  money to which he is not justly and legally entitled, and which he should not in good

  conscience retain, that the law regards him as a receiver and holder of the money for

  the use of the lawful owner, and raises an implied promise on his part to pay the

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  same, and, on his failure to do so, the owner may maintain an action against him

  therefor.’” (quoting Avery v. Abraham, 243 P. 728, 728-29 (Okla. 1926) (emphasis

  added)). The evidence shows that the requirements for payment under Coverage R

  were not met, and “AIG would not have paid the Temporary Engines Claim if AIG

  had been made aware at the time (a) that the FOD damage to the Aircraft’s permanent

  engines did not require removal and repair; and (b) that the installation of temporary

  engines on the Aircraft was therefore unnecessary,” Aplt. App. Vol. II at 111.

  Accelerated thus has failed to show it is entitled to the payment, and the district court

  did not err in holding that any inequity in LMI retaining the payment would arise

  relative to AIG, not Accelerated.

        C.     Unjust Enrichment

        “Unjust enrichment is a condition which results from the failure of a party to

  make restitution in circumstances where not to do so is inequitable, i.e., the party has

  money in its hands that, in equity and good conscience, it should not be allowed to

  retain.” Okla. Dep’t of Sec. ex rel. Faught v. Blair, 231 P.3d 645, 658 (Okla. 2010).

  “Oklahoma defines unjust enrichment as “(1) the unjust (2) retention of (3) a benefit

  received (4) at the expense of another.” Orthman v. Premiere Pediatrics, PLLC,

  __ P.3d __, 2024 WL 411480, at *8 (Okla. Civ. App. Jan. 5, 2024). The district court

  did not discuss the unjust enrichment claim.4

        4
          Accelerated asserts that the district court’s failure to discuss the claim
  “should end the appellate inquiry and mandate the reversal of the dismissal of this
  claim for this reason alone.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 37. We generally do not consider
  a claim in the first instance. See Evers v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 509 F.3d 1304,
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        Accelerated argues that it is entitled to the insurance proceeds because “it

  waived its right to the complete Pre-purchase Inspection (and corresponding right to

  terminate the purchase) and paid the Purchase Price in reliance on LMI’s promise to

  transfer the $500,000 Insurance Payout upon its receipt.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 37.

  Again, however, Accelerated waived its right to a complete pre-purchase inspection

  in the First Addendum, not the Second Addendum, and it has not shown how it could

  have refused to close the purchase without being in breach of contract. But in any

  event, the same principles apply here as discussed with regard to the claim for money

  had and received. Because the record shows the requirements of Coverage R were

  not met, if the insurance proceeds are being held by LMI at another’s expense, that

  other would be AIG rather than Accelerated. We therefore decline to reverse the

  grant of summary judgment in favor of LMI.

                                       No. 23-6086

        Appeal No. 23-6086 concerns the district court’s fee award to LMI.

  1310 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that “the better practice” is “leaving the matter to the
  district court in the first instance”). But our review is de novo, and “[w]e have
  discretion to affirm on any ground adequately supported by the record.” Elkins v.
  Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004). Here, we exercise our discretion to
  consider the unjust enrichment claim. The parties fully briefed the claim and had the
  opportunity to develop the factual record, and the resolution involves a matter of law.
  See id. And because the reason the district court gave for rejecting Accelerated’s
  claim for money had and received also applies to the unjust enrichment claim, there
  would be little point in remanding for further proceedings.

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Appellate Case: 23-6062     Document: 010111023376        Date Filed: 03/28/2024       Page: 18

  I.    Standards of Review

        The district court awarded fees under both Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 936(A) and the

  Agreement. Accelerated argues that neither § 936(A) nor the Agreement authorizes

  an award of attorney fees in this case. Because the appeal concerns only legal

  questions, our review is de novo. See Baker Hughes Servs. Int’l, LLC v. Joshi Techs.

  Int’l, Inc., 73 F.4th 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e review the district court’s

  grant of contractual attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion as to any factual

  determinations but de novo for the legal conclusions on which the district court based

  the award.”); Xlear, Inc. v. Focus Nutrition, LLC, 893 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir.

  2018) (“Although the overarching standard of review is for an abuse of discretion, we

  review the statutory interpretation or legal analysis that formed the basis of the award

  de novo.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).

  II.   Discussion

        As in the merits appeal, we apply Oklahoma law regarding awards of attorney

  fees. See Sundance Energy Okla., LLC v. Dan D. Drilling Corp., 836 F.3d 1271,

  1280 (10th Cir. 2016) (“In diversity cases, attorney’s fees are a substantive matter

  controlled by state law . . . .” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).

        “Oklahoma follows the American Rule as to the recovery of attorney fees.

  Generally, each litigant pays for their own legal representation, and our courts are

  without authority to assess attorney fees in the absence of a specific statute or

  contract allowing for their recovery.” Patel v. Tulsa Pain Consultants, Inc., 511 P.3d

  1059, 1061 (Okla. 2022). The district court identified both a statutory and a

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Appellate Case: 23-6062      Document: 010111023376          Date Filed: 03/28/2024     Page: 19

  contractual basis for awarding fees. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 936(A) provides that “[i]n

  any civil action to recover . . . on a[] . . . contract relating to the purchase or sale of

  goods, . . . unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject of

  the action, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be set by

  the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.” And the Agreement provides that “[i]n

  the event that a dispute arises out of or [is] in any way related to this Agreement, then

  the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs

  from the non-prevailing party.” Aplt. App. Vol. II at 45, ¶ 26.

         Accelerated’s arguments with regard to both grounds for the fee award are

  based on the contention that the parties’ dispute focused solely on the Second

  Addendum, rather than the Agreement.5 See Aplt. Opening Br. at 46 (arguing, with

  regard to § 936(A), that “neither Accelerated nor LMI sought to enforce the terms

  of the Agreement. Instead, Accelerated initiated this action to enforce the terms of

  the Second Addendum. The Second Addendum did not relate to the sale of the

  Aircraft . . . .”); id. at 47 (arguing, with regard to contractual fees, “[b]ecause this

  litigation did not involve ‘this Agreement’ an award of fees under ¶26 of the

  Agreement was improper”).

         5
          Accelerated also argues that under Oklahoma law, a party who rescinds a
  contract may not invoke a fee provision in the rescinded contract. LMI asserts that
  Accelerated did not make this argument before the district court. Accelerated does
  not show where it preserved the argument, and our review indicates it did not. Nor
  does Accelerated argue for plain error. We thus do not consider this issue.
  See Jacks, 856 F.3d at 1306.
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         These arguments are meritless because the Second Addendum was not a

  separate agreement, but instead was plainly an addendum “to that certain Aircraft

  Purchase and Sale Agreement dated October 14, 2021,” Aplt. App. Vol. II at 78.

  Under Oklahoma law, “[w]here several written instruments, though not executed at

  the same time, refer to the same subject-matter and on their face show that some were

  executed to carry out the intent of the others, all should be construed as one

  contract.” Davis v. Hastings, 261 P.2d 193, 195 (Okla. 1953) (internal quotation

  marks omitted); see also Strickland v. Am. Bakery & Confectionary Workers Union &

  Indus. Nat’l Welfare Fund, 527 P.2d 10, 13 (Okla. 1974) (stating this rule is “well

  established”). Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 158 codifies this rule: “Several contracts relating

  to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as parts of substantially one

  transaction, are to be taken together.”

         This litigation was a “civil action to recover” on the Agreement, as (albeit

  ineffectively) amended by the Second Addendum, and the Agreement was

  undoubtedly “a[] . . . contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods,” as required

  by § 936(A). Likewise, the Agreement makes available reasonable attorney fees and

  costs to a prevailing party in “a dispute [that] arises out of or [is] any way related to

  this Agreement.” Aplt. App. Vol. II at 45. This litigation arose out of or was related

  to the Agreement, as (albeit ineffectively) amended by the Second Addendum.

         For these reasons, the district court did not err in awarding LMI its reasonable

  attorney fees. On appeal, Accelerated does not challenge the amounts awarded.

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                                  CONCLUSION

        We affirm the judgments in both No. 23-6062 and No. 23-6086.

                                          Entered for the Court

                                          Gregory A. Phillips
                                          Circuit Judge

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