Court Opinion

ID: 9643167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:21:06.283328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:31.119883
License: Public Domain

CHASANOW, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Prior to consideration of this case by the Court of Special Appeals, this Court granted certiorari on *117its own motion in order to examine the important issue of the extent of judicial immunity, if any, that protects court-appointed agents. Instead of addressing this question, however, the majority goes to unprecedented lengths to avoid the issue and decides the case on a ground not raised by the parties to this appeal. Resolution of the case in this manner forces the court appointees now to defend multiple lawsuits, notwithstanding the fact that they may have judicial immunity from liability. I disagree both with the majority’s raising sua sponte the declaratory judgment issue and with the majority’s analysis of that issue.
I.
The question, as set forth in the parties’ briefs, on which the Court issued a writ of certiorari was:
“Did the Circuit Court err in declaring that Appellants were not entitled to common law judicial immunity when sued in their capacity as court appointed agents of the District Court, but were entitled to only such limited immunity as the District Court prescribed in the order appointing them?”
The Court should have limited its review to matters relevant to the resolution of this particular question. See Maryland Rule 8-131. Instead, the Court raises sua sponte an issue that was neither briefed nor argued by the parties: the validity of the declaratory judgment action itself. Significantly, there was no objection raised on appeal to the declaratory judgment as a method of resolution. Regardless of the Court’s impression of the propriety of this particular avenue of judicial review, therefore, the case should have been resolved—on the merits—in the form that it reached us.
Earlier cases demonstrate that this Court typically refrains from examining the validity of a declaratory judgment form of action if the issue is not raised by the parties. In Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 290 A.2d 530 (1972), for example, the Court observed: “It should be noted that the road travelled to obtain a ruling on the point of limitations is unusual, to say the *118least. * * * Nevertheless the declaratory judgment route was followed with the approval of both sides and the court ...; and we shall decide the case in the posture in which it reached us.” 265 Md. at 511-12, 290 A.2d at 532 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 463 A.2d 822 (1983), the Court noted: “Here, declaratory judgment was improper because the issue sought to be resolved could have been determined in the pending tort action. However, neither the petition for certiorari nor the conditional cross-petition raised the question. Thus, the issue is not before us at this time, though it may be raised on remand in light of our mandate.” 296 Md. at 449 n. 1, 463 A.2d at 824-25 n. 1 (citation omitted).
Haynie v. Gold Bond Bldg. Products, 306 Md. 644, 511 A.2d 40 (1986), represents the only exception to this established precedent. After concluding that a declaratory judgment action was improper, the Haynie Court “deeline[d] to decide the questions presented” and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the declaratory judgment action. 306 Md. at 654, 511 A.2d at 45. In explaining this action, however, the Haynie Court noted that it was unaware of the pendency of the tort action at the time that it granted the petition for certiorari. Haynie, 306 Md. at 649 n. 2, 511 A.2d at 42 n. 2 (“When we granted the petition, we did not have before us any of the circuit court record. The only attachment to the petition was the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, and the only attachment to [the opposition to the petition] was a portion of the West Virginia Code.”). The circumstances surrounding the action taken by the Court in Haynie, therefore, differ from the instant case where the Court suffered from no lack of information when it granted certiorari on its own motion. The Appellants’ brief clearly states that their attempts to be dismissed from the tort actions filed against them were unsuccessful. The memorandum and order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which was included in the record extract, states: “The ‘Court Agent,’ is seeking a Declaratory Judgment to resolve the existing litigation and prevent future suits from being filed against [them].” (Emphasis *119added). The Court thus had knowledge of the pendency of the other actions when it granted certiorari. Under these circumstances, resolution of the case sub judice should not turn on the issue of whether the declaratory judgment form of action is proper, particularly where the parties have not had an opportunity to be heard on the matter.
II.
Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that the propriety of the declaratory judgment were before the Court, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a declaratory judgment should not have been issued in this case.
The declaratory judgment form of action is particularly well suited to resolve the issue of immunity and has been used in Maryland for this purpose. See, e.g., American Structures v. City of Balto., 278 Md. 356, 364 A.2d 55 (1976) (immunity of municipality from liability under construction contract resolved in declaratory judgment action); Board v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 366 A.2d 360 (1976) (declaratory judgment action brought to decide issue of immunity of Board of Trustees of Howard County Community College from payment of sales tax). The majority nevertheless vacates the declaratory judgment, based on the principle that “where ... the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in [other] pending actions, it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment.” Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842, 849 (1975) (citing Watson, 265 Md. at 512 n. 1, 290 A.2d at 532 n. 1). As the majority acknowledges, however, the prohibition against declaratory judgments during the pendency of another proceeding involving the same issue is neither jurisdictional nor absolute. In some cases, the circumstances are such that a declaratory judgment is appropriate, notwithstanding the pendency of another suit. See, e.g., A.S. Abell Co. v. Sweeney, 274 Md. 715, 721, 337 A.2d 77, 81 (1975).
Assuming that the issue is even before the Court, therefore, the question is whether the judge’s decision that the circum*120stances of this case warranted a declaratory judgment amounts to an abuse of discretion. Rather than reviewing this case under an abuse of discretion standard, however, the majority appears simply to apply a rule of law, without regard to the particular considerations that prompted the circuit court to entertain the declaratory judgment action.
Interestingly, the propriety of the declaratory judgment action was, at one time, an issue in this case. Appellees responded to the initial complaint for a declaratory judgment by filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the issue of immunity already had been resolved in two other actions pending in the same court.1 In response to Appellees’ efforts to have the action dismissed, Appellants pointed out to the court that:
“[Wjith regard to the instant DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Action there are certain ‘special’ or unusual and compelling circumstances. These circumstances exist because the issue of the absolute Judicial Immunity of ‘Court Agents’ is not confined to the pending ‘Lead Paint Suits.’ A decision with regard to the immunity of ‘Court Agents’ ... will have far-reaching consequences. This is so because the Office of the City Solicitor and the District Court for Baltimore City rely heavily upon the use of ‘Court Agents’ in connection with such ‘Code Enforcement Actions.’ ”
Appellants also stressed that “[bjecause of the large number of properties and tenants involved ..., there is the strong likelihood that future ‘Lead Paint Suits’ will be brought”2 and suggested that resolution of the issue of immunity would conserve judicial resources.
The court denied Appellees’ motion to dismiss and ultimately issued the declaratory judgment that is presently under review by this Court. In allowing the declaratory judgment action to proceed, the court apparently recognized the validity *121of Appellants’ assertion that this case presents unusual circumstances. The memorandum that accompanies the declaratory judgment specifically references, in fact, Appellants’ contention that additional lawsuits likely will be filed in the future. This potentiality is an unusual circumstance and apparently contributed to the judge’s decision to issue a declaratory judgment.
The majority disposes of this unusual circumstance by concluding, without discussion, that the “ ‘fear of having to participate in a “multiplicity of suits,” cannot be the basis’ ” for a declaratory judgment. Majority Op. at 116, 699 A.2d at 430 (1997) (quoting State v. 91st Street Joint Venture, 330 Md. 620, 630, 625 A.2d 953, 958 (1993)). There is no indication, however, that Appellants’ mere “fear” of multiple lawsuits prompted the circuit court to issue a declaratory judgment. The significance that Appellants attached to the use of a declaratory judgment to forestall multiple lawsuits in the future was that it would operate to conserve judicial resources. Presumably, the court had judicial economy, not Appellants’ fear of multiple lawsuits, in mind when it issued the declaratory judgment. Surely, judicial economy is a valid reason for permitting a declaratory judgment where it otherwise might be prohibited.
Ironically, the rule upon which the majority relies is specifically aimed at the conservation of judicial resources. The general prohibition against declaratory judgments (if the same issue is pending in another action) ensures that parties do not “circumvent the policy against appeals from interlocutory orders and against piecemeal appeals.” Haynie, 306 Md. at 653, 511 A.2d at 44. If there were no such rule, courts conceivably would be overburdened with declaratory judgment actions concerning “each separate disputed issue in the [other pending] case.” Id.
Illustrative of this principle is 91st Street Joint Venture, supra. In 91st Street Joint Venture, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the town of Ocean City filed a request for an injunction against a hotel owner who had constructed a gazebo in alleged violation of city code require*122ments. 91st Street Joint Venture, 380 Md. at 623-24, 625 A.2d at 954-55. Instead of filing a responsive pleading, the hotel owner filed a declaratory judgment action in a different jurisdiction, claiming “in essence, that the applicable statutes do not prohibit the gazebo’s placement, that the regulations which purport to govern placement of the gazebo are void, and that the Ocean City ordinances were pre-empted by State law.” 91st Street Joint Venture, 330 Md. at 630, 625 A.2d at 957. Clearly, the issue in both actions was the same: the validity and applicability of the relevant statutes. If the declaratory judgment action were allowed to proceed, two courts would be considering precisely the same issue; this result is contrary to the principles of judicial economy and comity. For this reason, the declaratory judgment action was properly dismissed.
All of the cases upon which the majority relies involved situations analogous to that in 91st Street Joint Venture: a declaratory judgment action filed subsequent to the commencement of a tort action, resulting in the presentation of the same issue to two courts.3 None involved the scenario presented in the instant case: a declaratory judgment action filed subsequent to the commencement of multiple tort actions *123with a specific finding that additional tort actions will be filed in the future. The distinction between the two scenarios is critical to a determination of the propriety of the declaratory judgment action.
The grant of a declaratory judgment during the pendency of a single tort action results in multiple determinations of the same issue. In contrast, the grant of a declaratory judgment in the face of numerous present and future tort actions prevents multiple determinations and multiple appeals of the same issue, particularly where, as here, the pending tort actions are stayed until resolution of the declaratory judgment action. Under such “unique and compelling circumstances,” the prohibition against declaratory judgment actions should not apply.
Consideration of the consequences of the Court’s refusal to allow a declaratory judgment action illustrates this point. If a declaratory judgment action is allowed, Appellants must litigate the issue of their immunity only once. The outcome of the immunity question in the declaratory judgment action will control the issue in the tort actions such that Appellants, if successful in the declaratory judgment action, will be entitled to a dismissal from the pending tort actions. As the case currently stands, however, Appellants must defend multiple lawsuits and, presumably, will assert immunity as a defense in each of them. Appellants must bear the burden of defending these actions, notwithstanding the fact that on appeal of a final judgment in any one of the suits, it may be determined that they do have judicial immunity.
Appellees, on the other hand, would benefit from a declaratory judgment in that it possibly would put them on notice that they are suing improper parties. The absence of a declaratory judgment creates the possibility that Appellees will end up with judgments against individuals who are later deemed immune from liability. Appellees would undoubtedly prefer to know the status of Appellants’ immunity prior to expending the time, money, and effort required in proving multiple cases against them.
*124Finally, a declaratory judgment promotes judicial economy in that it removes the issue of immunity from the tort actions. If Appellants’ immunity is resolved by declaratory judgment, the question need not be further litigated in the three pending, and multiple future, tort actions. The interests of justice, as well as those of the parties to this case, are thus best served by permitting a declaratory judgment. For these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a declaratory judgment was improper in this case.

. This challenge to the declaratory judgment was abandoned on appeal.

. At least one additional lawsuit was filed against Appellants subsequent to their request for a declaratory judgment.

. See Haynie v. Gold Bond Bldg. Products, 306 Md. 644, 645-47, 511 A.2d 40, 40-41 (1986)(plaintiff filed tort action against employer to recover for injuries sustained in fighting fire, which was caused by allegedly defective machinery at production plant); Turnpike Farm v. Curran, 316 Md. 47, 48-49, 557 A.2d 225, 226 (1989)(tort action for damages based on malicious interference with business relationships was pending); St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. v. Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 190-91, 438 A.2d 282, 284 (1981) (tort suit filed against insurance company and one of its agents for injuries resulting from improper sexual advances made by agent toward female customer); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Marks Rentals, 288 Md. 428, 430-31, 418 A.2d 1187, 1188 (1980) (plaintiff filed tort action against employer of individual who was operating vehicle involved in an accident); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 399-400, 347 A.2d 842, 846 (1975) (actions seeking compensatory rind punitive damages filed against two individuals who had allegedly assaulted plaintiffs); A.S. Abell Co. v. Sweeney, 274 Md. 715, 716, 337 A.2d 77, 78-79 (1975)(action in assumpsit pending at time declaratory judgment filed); Grimm v. Co. Comm’rs of Wash. Co., 252 Md. 626, 628-29, 250 A.2d 866, 866-67 (1969)(criminal charges filed against party seeking declaratory judgment for violation of statute pertaining to fencing, burning, and stacking of automobiles).