Court Opinion

ID: 9383551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 17:03:11.565628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:46.177592
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                                  )
                                                    )
       v.                                           )      ID No. 1109011777
                                                    )
ANTHONY GORDON,                                     )
                                                    )
                      Defendant.                    )

                            Date Submitted: January 20, 2023
                             Date Decided: March 29, 2023

                                           ORDER

       Upon consideration of Defendant’s pro se “Motion to [D]ismiss Counts II and

III of Rape 2nd” (“Motion”),1 statutory and decisional law, and the record, IT

APPEARS THAT:

       (1)    On January 24, 2013, a jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of

Rape Second Degree and one count of Rape Fourth Degree for acts that occurred

when the victim was less than sixteen years old.2 On April 12, 2013, Defendant was

sentenced, effective January 24, 2013, as follows: for the first count of Rape Second

Degree (“IN 0549”), 10 years at Level V;3 for the second count of Rape Second

Degree (“IN 0550”), 10 years at Level V;4 and for Rape Fourth Degree, 15 years at

1
  D.I. 156.
2
  D.I. 33.
3
  Defendant received credit for 193 days previously served. See D.I. 43. The first 2 years of
Defendant’s sentence are a mandatory term of incarceration. See 11 Del. C. § 772(a)(1); 11 Del.
C. § 4205(b)(2).
4
  The first 2 years of Defendant’s sentence are a mandatory term of incarceration. See 11 Del. C.
§ 772(a)(1); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2).
Level V, suspended after 1 year for decreasing levels of supervision.5 On April 19,

2013, Defendant filed a direct appeal.6 The Supreme Court of Delaware filed a

Mandate affirming the judgment on December 31, 2013.7

        (2)    Since then, Defendant has filed numerous motions with this Court,

several of which raised the same issue he raises in the instant Motion. On November

10, 2020, he filed a “Motion to Dismiss Counts I, II, and III in the Indictment.”8 The

Court denied the motion on January 26, 2021, explaining that any alleged defects in

the language of the indictment must be raised prior to trial pursuant to Superior Court

Criminal Rule 12(b)(2).9 Defendant then filed a motion for reargument,10 which was

denied.11 On September 15, 2021, Defendant filed a “Motion for Insufficient

Charging to Dismiss Counts I, II, and III of the Indictment.”12 The Court denied the

motion on November 29, 2021, stating that, as explained in prior orders, the

indictment satisfies Superior Court Criminal Rule 7(c).13 Defendant appealed that

Order on December 28, 2021.14 On June 1, 2022, the Supreme Court of Delaware

5
  D.I. 43.
6
  D.I. 45.
7
  D.I. 63.
8
  D.I. 142.
9
  D.I. 143.
10
   D.I. 144.
11
   D.I. 145.
12
   D.I. 146.
13
   D.I. 148.
14
   D.I. 149.
                                          2
filed a Mandate affirming the judgment of the Superior Court.15 On September 8,

2022, Defendant again attempted to attack his indictment, arguing that his sentence

was illegal because the indictment “did not contain sufficient facts to differentiate

each count” and therefore violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.16 The Court denied

the motion on October 11, 2022, once again explaining that the indictment was

sufficient.17

        (3)       In the instant Motion, Defendant asks that the Court dismiss Count II

(IN 0550), and Count III which was dismissed as nolle prosequi prior to trial,18 of

his indictment.19 He first argues that the indictment “failed to specify the essential

and [sic] elements,” namely “what[,] if any[,] sexual act the Grand Jury had found

Gordon should stand trial for.”20 Next, Defendant argues that the Court misstated

the law and commented on the evidence when charging the jury with the second

element of Rape Second Degree.21

        (4)       At the outset, Count III was dismissed as nolle prosequi prior to trial,

therefore the Court will only address the Motion in relation to Count II of the

indictment.22

15
   D.I. 152.
16
   D.I. 154.
17
   D.I. 155.
18
   D.I. 33.
19
   D.I. 156.
20
   Id. at 1–9.
21
   Id. at 9–12.
22
   D.I. 33.
                                              3
       (5)    Superior Court Criminal Rule 12(b)(2) states that defenses and

objections based on defects in the indictment must be raised prior to trial. 23 Rule

7(c) states that the indictment “shall be a plain, concise and definite written

statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”24 “Generally, it is

sufficient that an indictment follows the language of the statute.” 25

       (6)    Both this Court and the Supreme Court of Delaware have already held

that Defendant’s objection to the indictment fails under Rule 12(b)(2) because it was

not raised prior to trial,26 and that it is sufficient under Rule 7(c).27 The indictment

states that Defendant “did intentionally engage in sexual intercourse . . . and the

intercourse occurred without her consent,” which mirrors the language of 11 Del. C.

§ 722(a)(1).28

       (7)    Defendant’s second argument concerning the jury instruction also

fails.29 When reviewing a jury instruction, it must be determined that the instruction

“correctly stated the law, and was not so confusing or inaccurate as to undermine

23
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 12(b)(2).
24
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 7(c).
25
   State v. Mumford, 2022 WL 2388396, at *8 (Del. Super. June 30, 2022).
26
   See D.I 143; D.I. 152.
27
   See D.I. 145; D.I. 148; D.I. 152; D.I. 154.
28
   Compare D.I. 5, with 11 Del. C. § 772(a)(1) (“A person is guilty of rape in the second degree
when the person [i]ntentionally engages in sexual intercourse with another person, and the
intercourse occurs without the victim’s consent.”).
29
   To the extent Defendant argues that the Court commented on the evidence, that argument fails
because the Court simply instructed the jury on the elements of Rape Second Degree, which is not
a comment on the evidence.
                                               4
either the jury's ability to reach a verdict or our confidence in their ability to do

so fairly under the circumstances.”30

       (8)     Here, the Court correctly stated the law. When charging the jury, the

Court explained that in order to find Defendant guilty of Rape Second Degree, the

jury must find that all three elements of the crime were established beyond a

reasonable doubt.31 As to the first element, the Court stated that the jury must find

that Defendant had sexual intercourse with the victim, and defined sexual

intercourse.32 As to the second element, the Court stated that the jury must find that

the victim had not yet reached her sixteenth birthday at the time of the incident.33

The Court also stated that not knowing the victim’s age or reasonably believing she

had reached her sixteenth birthday were not defenses.34 The Court then moved to

the third element, stating that the jury must find that Defendant intentionally engaged

30
   Comer v. State, 977 A.2d 334, 342–43 (Del. 2009) (holding that a jury instruction incorrectly
stating the agency theory of felony murder was an incorrect statement of the law and did not enable
the jury to perform its duty). Moreover, objections to jury instructions should be raised at trial.
See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 30; see also Gregory v. State, -- A.3d at --, 2023 WL 2379019, at *3 (Del.
Mar. 7, 2023) (“In other words, the defendant waives any objection to the jury instructions if not
made before the jury retires.”). Otherwise, such objections should be raised on appeal and are
reviewed for plain error. This issue was not raised on appeal. See Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346,
351 (Del. 2012). Neither the State nor Defendant picked up on the error when they reviewed the
draft jury instructions, and Defendant raised no objections to the jury instructions as read or as
written; the Court corrected the instruction immediately upon recognizing the error. See D.I. 53
at 80:12–90:13.
31
   See D.I. 53 at 80:12-15.
32
   See id. at 80:16-22.
33
   See id. at 81:2-7. The Court mistakenly started to read a part of the instruction that applied to
children that have not yet reached their twelfth birthday, immediately recognized its error, and
advised the jury that the sentence it started to read did not apply to this case. See id. at 81:8-9.
34
   See id. at 81:10-13.
                                                 5
in conduct constituting sexual intercourse.35 The printed instructions provided to the

jury correctly state the elements of Rape Second Degree.36

        (9)     The jury instructions, viewed in their entirety, contained an accurate

statement of the law and did not require the jury to reconcile contradicting statements

of law.37

        NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is

DENIED.

                                                              /s/ Jan R. Jurden
                                                        Jan R. Jurden, President Judge

Original to Prothonotary:

cc:     Abigail E. Rodgers, DAG
        Anthony Gordon (SBI# 00211789)

35
   See id. at 81:14-18.
36
   See D.I. 32. The Court specifically stated it would correct the error on the printed jury
instructions. D.I. 53 at 90:14-16; 91:16-20.
37
   See Howell v. State, 268 A.3d 754, 774–75 (Del. 2011) (citing Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis
de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1255–56 (Del. 2011)) (“No doubt, there are circumstances where a minor
flaw in a jury instruction that is not objected to in the trial court will not rise to the level of plain
error, when the instructions viewed in their entirety contain an accurate statement of the law. But
the general rule is that ‘a jury should not have to reconcile two contrary statements of the law.’”).
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