Court Opinion

ID: 9706536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:45:47.111977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:23.460045
License: Public Domain

On Petition foe Rehearing.
Draper, C. J.
The appellant’s original brief in this case points out that when count two of the affidavit was filed, charging armed robbery, the appellant was present by counsel. Moreover, the record shows the following entry under date of May 3, 1952:
“Comes now the State of Indiana by Frank H. Fairchild, prosecuting attorney and by Wilbur Grant, his deputy; defendant appears in person and by counsel, Robert Rutherford; State files Count Two of Affidavit to-wit: Armed Robbery, which is as follows:” Here followed the affidavit charging armed robbery.
Nevertheless, the appellant in his petition for rehearing now insists he was not present either in person or by counsel at the time count two was filed. “The record as embodied in a properly prepared and duly authenticated transcript imports absolute verity, and cannot be aided, varied, or contradicted by extrinsic evidence.” Elliott Appellate Procedure, §186; and see Flanagan, Wiltrout & Hamilton, §2292. However, there is actually some confusion in the record due to the fact that on May 3, 1952, there were two defendants in this case, one of them being one James Marshall who later entered a plea of guilty.
If the entry above referred to be construed as applying to Marshall, and not to the appellant, it would not change our conclusion in this case. The record discloses that the appellant appeared on several occasions by *57counsel subsequent to May 3, 1952, for various purposes. On October 14, 1952, the court gave its preliminary instructions to the jury pursuant to Rule 1-7A, wherein the court told the jury in the presence of the appellant and his two attorneys that the defendant was charged with robbery and with armed robbery, and the two counts of the affidavit were read. The applicable portions of the statutes defining those offenses were read, including the penalties that might be imposed on a conviction of those charges.
Although the appellant now represents that the first knowledge he had of the filing of the second count came during the opening statements to the jury which were made the following day, it is apparent that he and his attorneys must have learned and known thereof when the preliminary instructions were given, but no objection to the filing thereof was then or ever made, and the trial proceeded without objection.
It is well settled that if a party has knowledge of a matter which will frustrate the trial in the end, he must avail himself of the earliest opportunity to arrest the proceeding or he will be deemed to have waived his right to object when the end is reached. He will not be permitted to go on without objection, taking his chances of ultimate success, and afterwards go back and impeach the trial in case he is disappointed at the result. Miller, Jr. v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 578, 115 N. E. 2d 120, and authorities cited. We adhere to the belief that, no objection to the amendment of the affidavit having been made in the trial court, no question with regard thereto is presented.
Other allegations, assertions and accusations in appellant’s petition for rehearing, which was filed pro se, are not considered to be appropriate to a petition for rehearing and they are therefore-not discussed.
*58Petition for rehearing denied.
Gilkison, J., not participating.
Note. — Reported in 115 N. E. 2d 122.
Rehearing denied, 116 N. E. 2d 631.