Court Opinion

ID: 9531422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:10:42.411907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:26.824630
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
Kelley, J.
Appellant has filed a petition for rehearing, consisting of one typed petition unaccompanied by briefs or citation of authorities. We would be disinclined to expend our labors upon it were it not that our failure so to do might be misconstrued as lending weight to the weightless.
It is said in the petition that Section 6 of Chapter 99 of the Acts of 1931, the same being Section 48-4406 of Burns’ 1950 Replacement, “only applied in cases where waivers were signed” and that the present action was “brought to foreclose a public improvement lien.” While not so stated, the point attempted to be made is that in the instant case no bonds were issued and, therefore, the provisions of said Act of 1931 are inapplicable because confined to cases where bonds were issued.
The statute reads:
“If such city shall fail to collect any unpaid assessment, or installment thereof, when due, the owner of the bonds issued on account of said assessment, or in case no bonds have been issued then the per*659son to whom is due and owing the amount of such unpaid assessment for the performance of such work, shall have the right to proceed in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the lien of such assessment in the same manner as mortgages are foreclosed, recovering interest, penalty, costs and reasonable attorney fees, and to have the proceeds of the sale applied to his claim.” (Our emphasis).
The statute expressly provides that: “The provisions of this section shall apply to all assessments . . . made and confirmed prior to the going into effect of this act.” In Hastings v. Gault et al. (1940), 216 Ind. 315, 318, point 1, 25 N. E. 2d 232, the Supreme Court declared that “Section 6 of the act of 1931, supra (Section 48-4406, Burns’ Ind. St. 1933), provides new remedies for the enforcement and collection of assessments. . . .” and “The whole tenor of the act of 1931 clearly indicates an intention to revise and substitute new remedies, . . .” It seems apparent that appellant has misconceived the application of the section of the 1931 act above mentioned.
Appellant further opines that we held in our main opinion that “it was necessary to set out (in the brief) an exact copy of the assessment roll.” We do not recollect that we so held. We said that appellant “in his Condensed Recital of the Evidence, does not set forth either a copy of said Exhibit 1 or said certificate thereto or the substance of either:” (Our emphasis). Appellant continues that “in fact the substance of the same was set out in appellant’s brief, Pages 22 and 23.” Our reference to the designated pages of said brief discloses that the matter appellant refers to was contained in his motion for a new trial in the form of an objection in the trial court to the admission in evidence of said Exhibit 1. We see no error in our opinion in this particular.
*660It is also asserted in appellant’s petition that we erred in holding, in the primary opinion, that the Board of Public Works had jurisdiction to order the construction of the sidewalk without giving notice to the abutting property to construct the same under private contract. The original opinion determines this assertion of error but we direct attention to the fact that we noted therein that “We find no assignment of error or specification in the motion for new trial under which such proposal was raised or presented or to which it can be applied.” Appellant next complains' that we erred in remanding the cause with instructions for restatement of the conclusions of law and modification of the decree instead of ordering a new trial. We have reexamined our position with relation to matter urged and find no reason to change the same. Appellant has given us the benefit of no authority on the question.
Lastly, appellant states that we erred “in hot affording this appellant an opportunity for oral argument.” The record discloses no request or petition by appellant for oral argument. We refer counsel to the provision of Rule 2-21 of the Supreme Court.
The petition for a rehearing is denied.
Note. — Reported in 143 N. E. 2d 468.
Rehearing denied 145 N. E. 2d 19.