Court Opinion

ID: 9865402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 17:05:37.046557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:41.675517
License: Public Domain

SUPERIOR COURT
                                         OF THE
                                 STATE OF DELAWARE

VIVIAN L. MEDINILLA                                        LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
                  JUDGE                                    500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 10400
                                                                  WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3733
                                                                    TELEPHONE (302) 255-0626

                                  September 22, 2023

    Kenneth M. Roseman, Esquire                Nancy Chrissinger Cobb, Esquire
    1300 N. King Street                        Three Mill Road, Suite 301
    P.O. Box 1126                              Wilmington, DE 19806
    Wilmington, DE 19899

        Re:       Sobers Brooks v. Shannon Laird
                  Case No.: N21C-09-120 VLM

Dear Counsel:

       On August 22, 2023, this Court heard oral arguments on Defendant’s Motions
for Leave to Interplead a Portion of the Settlement/Judgment Proceeds 1 and Costs.2
For the reasons further stated below, as to the former motion, immediately after oral
arguments, that Motion was GRANTED, as it relates to a Florida judgment
regarding Plaintiff’s child support lien. As to the latter motion, this Court deferred
its decision. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion for Costs is also
GRANTED.

      On June 26, 2023, Defendant filed an Offer of Judgment 3 in the amount of
$320,000, which Plaintiff rejected.4 The parties also entered into a high/low
agreement of $250,000 and $1,250,000. 5 Trial began on July 10, 2023 and a jury
returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of

1
  D.I. 53.
2
  D.I. 54.
3
  D.I. 40.
4
  D.I. 54, ¶ 3.
5
  D.I. 53, ¶ 1.
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$15,000. 6 As a result of the jury’s verdict, the parties’ side high/low agreement now
obligates Defendant to pay Plaintiff $250,000.7

       Plaintiff has two sons to whom he owes child support. 8 Both children and the
children’s mothers (Floyd and Gayle) live in Florida.9 On June 26, 2023, counsel
for Floyd forwarded a copy of a judgment from the 11th Judicial Circuit Court of
Florida in the amount of $49,256.10 and told Defendant’s counsel “no disbursement
of settlement funds until this Priority Lien is satisfied.”10 On June 27, 2023, Floyd’s
counsel filed a Motion for Registration and Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment in
this Court (N23J-02394 Shakia Floyd v. Sobers Brooks).

        On July 24, 2023, Defendant filed her Motion for Leave to Interplead a
Portion of the Settlement/Judgment Proceeds,11 seeking leave to deposit $72,347.35
in this Court, which includes the above-mentioned child support figure ($49,256.10)
plus a “Purge Payment Owed” of $3,000.00, attorney’s fees in the amount of
$19,591.25, and court costs of $500.12 Defendant further asks the Court to issue an
order enjoining Plaintiff from executing the $15,000 judgment, and attorney’s fees
related to this Motion. 13 On July 26, 2023, Defendant also filed a Motion for Costs.14

       On August 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed one response to both motions and argues
no deductions should be taken from the agreed upon $250,000 because neither the
lien nor costs was negotiated nor included as a contractual provision of the high/low
agreement.15 He argues that this Court should not enforce a contractual provision
that does not exist. 16 The Court heard both Motions on August 22, 2023. The matter
is ripe for review.

6
  D.I. 52.
7
  D.I. 53, ¶ 5.
8
  D.I. 53, ¶ 5.
9
  Id., ¶ 2.
10
   Id., ¶ 3.
11
   D.I. 53.
12
   Id., ¶ 8.
13
   Id. at 4-5.
14
   D.I. 54.
15
   D.I. 58, at 2.
16
   Id. at 3.
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                                 CHILD SUPPORT LIEN

       Counsel for both sides admit having little knowledge regarding Family Court
matters related to child support. Yet both concede that the issue of Plaintiff’s child
support arrearages is not a surprise. Defendant received a notice of a child support
lien from the Florida Division of Child Support Services as to Floyd and provided a
copy of this notice to Plaintiff’s counsel on June 30, 2022. 17 Plaintiff’s sworn
interrogatory answers also reflect concessions that he owes child support to Gayle.18

       Fortunately, this is not a family law issue. Rather, the issue before this Court
is not whether Plaintiff has any obligation to address the child support arrearage but
whether Defendant is obligated to do so. The applicable law is therefore found under
11 Del. C. § 2215(g)(2)(b) that provides:

       Any person . . . making any payment or settlement in full or partial
       satisfaction of any claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or other action or
       suit after the receipt of the notice of lien is liable to the Director [of the
       Division of Child Support Services], as payee of the child support order,
       in an amount equal to the lesser of the payment or settlement or the
       child support arrears or retroactive support. The Director may enforce
       the child support lien in an action in the Family Court against any
       person, firm, or corporation, including an insurance carrier, making the
       payment or settlement. 19

       Defendant, having been placed on notice, may be liable for Floyd’s child-
support lien if she makes any payment in satisfaction of its obligation directly to
Plaintiff. Defendant’s request to interplead is appropriate both to shield her from the
potential of double or multiple liability and allow Plaintiff and Floyd to settle among
themselves the rights and claims to the interplead amounts deposited.

       For the reasons stated on the record, Defendant’s Motion for Leave to
Interplead a Portion of the Settlement/Judgment Proceeds is GRANTED, to require
Plaintiff and Shakia Floyd to interplead and settle between themselves. Plaintiff is
enjoined from executing the $15,000 Judgment entered against Defendant.

17
   D.I. 53, ¶ 2, Ex. B.
18
   Id., ¶ 4.
19
   11 Del. C. § 2215(g)(2)(b).
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                                  COSTS AND EXPERT FEES

      As to Defendant’s Motion for Costs, it is well-settled in Delaware that
Defendant is entitled to have her costs, including attorney’s fees and expert fees,
assessed against Plaintiff.20 Therefore, since Plaintiff received a verdict of $15,000
that was less than the Offer of Judgment of $320,000, under Superior Court Civil
Rules 54 and 68, Defendant seeks to deduct her costs, including her expert fees of
Drs. DiBenedetto and Brooks. Plaintiff objects to the deduction and asks the Court
to look instead to the high-low agreement. He contends no obligation is due where
the recovery of said costs was neither negotiated nor included as a contractual
provision of the high-low agreement.21 This Court disagrees.

       No authority has been presented in support of Plaintiff’s position except for a
Superior Court’s determination in Speidel v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc, 22 which is
unavailing. There, the relevant issue was whether plaintiffs were entitled to interest
related to an arbitrator’s decision after payment was delayed on that parties’ high-low
arbitration agreement. 23 That Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion because the
arbitration agreement made no provision for post-award interest and therefore the
plaintiffs were not entitled to the same. 24 Speidel is distinguishable.

       Speidel resolved through ADR with an agreement reached in lieu of trial and
did not implicate the Superior Court Civil Rules. Here, the parties reached a side
deal through the high-low agreement solely to minimize the parties’ risks of trial,
namely the result (i.e., the jury’s verdict.) And the agreement did just that where the
obligations under the high-low agreement were triggered by that verdict.

       Yet, more importantly, unlike Speidel, the jury’s verdict also triggered a
determination regarding cost allocation, established not by the high-low agreement
but rather by the election of the parties, as permitted by our rules. Before trial started,
the provisions of Superior Court’s Civil Rules 54 and 68 were in effect after
Defendant offered—and Plaintiff rejected—the Offer of Judgment of $320,000. So,

20
   See Del. Super. Ct. R. 68 (“At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins a party
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with
costs then accrued.”); see also Del. Super. Ct. R. 54 (stating that the costs include court reporter
fees, witness fees, expert witness fees, and attorney fees.).
21
   D.I. 58, at 2.
22
   Speidel v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2003 WL 21524694 (Del. Super. Ct. July 3, 2003).
23
   Id.
24
   Id.
                                                 4
when the parties elected to proceed to trial, both sides assumed the risks of so doing,
including that either might be obligated to incur their opponent’s costs and fees. And
although Plaintiff protected himself through this side high-low agreement to mitigate
his risks of trial, he failed to negotiate a release from the exposure he faced when he
rejected Defendant’s Offer of Judgment and the jury’s verdict ended up being less
than that offer.

       To accept Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant failed to negotiate a provision
to include these terms into the high-low agreement would require this Court to ignore
the civil rules and read more into their side agreement. In the absence of any
authority to suggest otherwise, Plaintiff fails to establish why the Court should reject
the application of the civil rules in his favor. He further fails to provide support for
why the Court should interpret the parties’ high-low agreement to be anything more
than one of risk aversion, not cost allocation. If either side sought to release the
other from the accrual of costs under Rule 68, then they could have so negotiated in
their side deal. Neither did. Accordingly, since Plaintiff rejected the Offer of
Judgment and the jury’s verdict was lower than that offer, Plaintiff is responsible for
costs and fees under the applicable civil rules.

       Plaintiff further challenges Dr. DiBenedetto’s expert fee. Under Delaware
Superior Court Civil Rule 54(d), the prevailing party is entitled to costs, unless the
Court directs otherwise. 25 Costs are awarded as a matter of judicial discretion.26
Under 10 Del. C. § 8906, the fees for experts testifying on deposition are taxed as
costs. The requested fee of $4,500 for Dr. DiBenedetto is not excessive, especially
where so much of his time in deposition was spent defending his expert fees on
cross-examination. Similarly, Dr. Brooks’ fee of $1500 is reasonable.

      Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Interplead a Portion of the
Settlement/Judgment Proceeds is GRANTED, and Defendant’s Motion for Costs is
GRANTED.

       IT SO ORDERED.
                                                         /s/ Vivian L. Medinilla
                                                         Vivian L. Medinilla
                                                         Judge

25
   Martin v. Nixon, 2022 WL 1123389, at *2 (Del. Super. Apr. 13, 2022) (citing Del. Super. Ct.
Civ. R. 54(d)).
26
   Burton v. Kyle, 2016 WL 1421272, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 24, 2016) (citing Donovan v. Del.
Water & Air Res. Comm’n, 358 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1976)).
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