Court Opinion

ID: 9848448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:19:53.583199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:18.274336
License: Public Domain

BROTHERTON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding. I believe we should follow the rule applied in the federal courts and the courts of many states that the venue privilege is personal to each defendant, and that if one defendant waives his venue objection this does not waive any objections to venue his codefendants may have. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Weber, 137 F.Supp. 684 (W.D.Pa.1955), Hines v. Dresser Indus., 137 Ill.App.3d 7, 91 Ill.Dec. 842, 846, 484 N.E.2d 401, 405 (1985). See generally 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3829 (1986). Although the same might not be true in an action in which venue was proper with respect to at least one defendant, upholding venue with respect to the petitioners in this case negates the reason for our venue provisions, i.e., convenience of the defendant. As the majority notes, the defendants in this case reside in a county adjacent to the one in which suit was filed, but the rule set out in the majority opinion is not confined to those facts. It allows institution of actions in locations with little or no connection with any defendant, as long as one defendant waives his venue objection.
Therefore, I note my dissent.