Court Opinion

ID: 9912893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-25 08:09:36.256871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:49.678853
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00185-CR
     ___________________________

    GORDON RAY LEWIS, Appellant

                      V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 355th District Court
          Hood County, Texas
        Trial Court No. CR12234

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
         MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ABATEMENT ORDER

      Appellant Gordon Ray Lewis appeals the denial of his motion for forensic

DNA testing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.05. Before we can address the

merits of his appeal, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear it.

To show the timeliness of his notice of appeal, Lewis relies on Rule 4.6 of the Texas

Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6. The record, however, does

not show whether Lewis complied with Rule 4.6. We abate the appeal and remand

the case to the trial court for it to conduct a hearing to determine (1) the earliest date

when Lewis or his attorney received notice or acquired actual knowledge that the trial

judge had signed the order denying Lewis’s DNA motion and (2) whether that date

was more than twenty days after the judge signed the order. See Tex. R. App. P.

4.6(b)(2). The trial court is further instructed to sign an order with its findings as

required by Rule 4.6(c). See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(c).

               I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND DISCUSSION

      Lewis is serving a life sentence for a capital murder committed in 2013. See

Lewis v. State, No. 02-13-00367-CR, 2014 WL 7204708, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Dec. 18, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

      Years later, in March 2022, Lewis filed a motion for forensic DNA testing

under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 64.01. On August 30, 2022, the trial court had a hearing on Lewis’s

motion, and on February 16, 2023, the trial court signed an order denying it.

                                            2
      Lewis then attempted to appeal the order denying his motion for DNA testing.

But in doing so, he missed the standard appellate deadlines for perfecting the appeal,

see Tex. R. App. P. 4.1(a), 26.2(a)(1), and the deadline for extending the time to perfect

the appeal, see Tex. R. App. P. 26.3. He relied, instead, on Rule 4.6 of the Texas Rules

of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6. As discussed below, after reviewing

the record, we are unable to tell if Lewis met Rule 4.6’s requirements.

      A. Rule 4.6

      In the context of an order denying a DNA motion, Rules 26.2(a)(2) and 26.3

are not the only means to determine when a notice of appeal must be filed. If neither

the defendant nor his attorney received notice of the order within twenty days of its

signing, the timetable begins to run “on the earliest date when the defendant or the

defendant’s attorney received notice or acquired actual knowledge of the signing.”

Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(a).1

             1. What a Rule 4.6 motion must contain

      Rule 4.6 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure addresses the procedure to

gain additional time to perfect an appeal:

      (1) A defendant’s motion for additional time must:

             (A) Be in writing and sworn;

             (B) State the defendant’s desire to appeal from the appealable order;

      1
       The rule has one caveat: “[I]n no event shall such periods begin more than 120
days after the day the trial judge signed the appealable order.” Id. We are not
concerned with this caveat.

                                             3
              (C) State the earliest date when the defendant or the defendant’s
              attorney received notice or acquired actual knowledge that the
              trial judge signed the appealable order; and

              (D) Be filed within 120 days of the signing of the appealable
              order.

Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b)(1)(A)–(D).

              2. Factual issues a Rule 4.6 motion must resolve

       Once a motion to gain additional time is filed, Rule 4.6 addresses what happens

next procedurally:

       (2) To establish the application of paragraph (a) of this rule, the
       defendant adversely affected must prove in the trial court:

              (A) The earliest date on which the defendant or the defendant’s
              attorney received notice or acquired actual knowledge that the
              trial judge signed the appealable order; and

              (B) That this date was more than twenty days after the signing of
              the appealable order.

Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b)(2)(A)–(B).

              3. Rule 4.6 anticipates an evidentiary hearing and requires a
              written order with factual findings

       As might be expected, a hearing is required to resolve the factual issues. And

after the hearing, the trial court must sign a written order with its factual findings:

       (c) The Court’s Order. After hearing the motion for additional time, the
       trial judge must sign a written order that determines the earliest date
       when the defendant or the defendant’s attorney received notice or
       acquired actual knowledge that the trial judge signed the appealable
       order and whether this date was more than twenty days after the judge
       signed the appealable order.

                                             4
Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(c).

      B. Lewis’s Rule 4.6 motion

      Lewis filed in the trial court on June 9, 2023, a motion for additional time to

file a notice of appeal under Rule 4.6 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and,

along with it, a notice of appeal. But what Rule 4.6 requires and what Lewis put in his

motion varied. Lewis’s motion complied with some of Rule 4.6’s provisions but did

not comply with others.

             1. Compliance

      The motion complied with Rule 4.6 in two respects. First, it stated that Lewis

wanted to appeal the denial of his DNA motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b)(1)(B).

Second, Lewis filed his motion within 120 days of the trial court’s February 16 order.

See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b)(1)(D).

             2. Noncompliance

      But the motion failed to comply with Rule 4.6 in two other respects. First, the

written motion was not sworn to. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b)(1)(A). Second, it did not

specify when he or his counsel had notice or actual knowledge of the February 16

order. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b)(1)(C). Instead, the motion presumed that Lewis’s

trial counsel (who had later been allowed to withdraw) received notice of the February

16 order “soon after that date.”

                                          5
             3. Unopposed

      The motion further asserted that it was unopposed: “The District Attorney

does not oppose the request for additional time.”2 As we shall see, the State’s

willingness not to oppose the motion impacted how the motion proceeded.

      C. Trial court’s order

      On June 30, the trial court granted Lewis’s motion for additional time and

ordered the notice of appeal filed. The order, in its entirety, provides,

      On this day the Motion for Additional Time to File Notice of Appeal
      came on to be considered. After consideration, the Motion is

             ...

             GRANTED, and the Clerk is ordered to file the Notice of
             Appeal.[3]

             1. No hearing

      Based on the order itself, the trial court did not appear to have held an

evidentiary hearing on Lewis’s Rule 4.6 motion. If there was an evidentiary hearing,

our record does not contain a reporter’s record of it.

      2
        The State’s willingness not to oppose Lewis’s motion effectively recognized his
right to appeal the denial of his DNA motion. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
64.05. A prosecutor’s “primary duty” is “to see that justice is done.” Id. art. 2.01.

    In the original order, the document provides the words “DENIED” and
      3

“GRANTED,” and “GRANTED” is circled.

                                            6
              2. No factual findings

       Either way—and more importantly—the trial court did not make the required

Rule 4.6(c) findings, i.e., it did not determine “the earliest date when the defendant or

the defendant’s attorney received notice or acquired actual knowledge that the trial

judge signed the appealable order and whether this date was more than twenty days

after the judge signed the appealable order.” See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(c).

       D. Jurisdiction

       To invoke our appellate jurisdiction, an appellant must file a timely notice of

appeal. Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Rodriguez v. State,

No. 04-23-00717-CR, 2023 WL 5603205, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 30,

2023, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Based on this

record, we cannot tell if Lewis’s notice of appeal is timely. When we identify a

concern about our jurisdiction, we must address that question sua sponte. Searls v.

State, No. 02-19-00136-CR, 2019 WL 4019678, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug.

27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, before assuming

jurisdiction, we must determine whether Lewis’s reliance on Rule 4.6 is justified.

                         II. RESOLUTION DISCUSSION

       On appeal, the State does not object to the form of Lewis’s motion for

additional time or to the form of the trial court’s order granting it. As noted in

Lewis’s Rule 4.6 motion, the State did not oppose the extension, so the State’s

position on appeal is consistent with its position before the trial court.

                                            7
      But parties may not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a court. See Ex parte

Derosier, No. 02-15-00100-CR, 2015 WL 6550557, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct.

29, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Ex parte Sledge,

391 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)), pet. ref’d, 490 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016). They cannot confer jurisdiction on a court by agreement. State v. Riewe,

13 S.W.3d 408, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 4

      Before we have jurisdiction, the record must establish that neither Lewis nor

his counsel had received notice or acquired actual knowledge of the signed order

denying Lewis’s DNA motion within twenty days after the trial court signed it. Tex.

R. App. P. 4.6(a). The trial court’s order granting Lewis’s motion does not resolve

these factual issues, as Rule 4.6(c) requires. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(c). But by

granting Lewis’s motion, the trial court implicitly found that Lewis met the factual

requirements.

      The trial court’s failure to comply with Rule 4.6(c) can be explained

procedurally. Because the State did not complain about the procedural defects in

Lewis’s motion, the trial court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing, or the trial

      4
        The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals later stated that the portion of Riewe that
asserted a defendant could not use Rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure to correct a jurisdictional defect in a notice of appeal was dicta and
declined to rely on it. See Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002); State v. Palmer, 469 S.W.3d 264, 266 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet.
ref’d).

                                           8
court’s order granting Lewis’s motion, all the procedural defects—and potentially all

the jurisdictional defects—went unchallenged.

          Yet this is not a situation where Lewis alleged facts that fell within Rule 4.6’s

scheme and where the State stipulated to those facts. This is a situation in which

(1) Lewis alleged that he did not know when his counsel received notice or had actual

knowledge of the trial court’s order, (2) Lewis never stated when he had notice or

actual knowledge of the order, and (3) nothing in the record sheds any additional light

on the subject. In short, the record does not support Lewis’s compliance with Rule

4.6(a).

          Nevertheless, at this juncture, we decline to dismiss Lewis’s appeal based on

          • his failure to file a sworn Rule 4.6 motion,

          • the absence of an evidentiary hearing at which Lewis showed when he and
            his counsel had notice or actual knowledge of the February 16 order, or

          • the trial court’s failure to make the necessary factual findings in its Rule 4.6
            order as required by Rule 4.6(c).

We explain why.

          When interpreting a text, we must presume that every word has been used for a

purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if

reasonably possible. State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). We

do not focus strictly on a discrete provision but, instead, look at other statutory

provisions as well to harmonize text and avoid conflicts. Id.

                                              9
       Other appellate rules favor giving an appellant the opportunity to correct errors

in a notice of appeal. Here are two examples: first, Rule 25.2(f) of the Texas Rules of

Appellate Procedure authorizes amending a defective notice of appeal, Tex. R. App.

P. 25.2(f), and second, Rule 37.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires

giving an appellant an opportunity to correct any defect in a notice of appeal “so that

it can be remedied, if possible.” Tex. R. App. P. 37.1.

       The appellate rules also recognize that counsel have not always been diligent

about notifying their clients that the trial court has ruled and about what their clients’

appellate options are. For example, Rule 48.4—adopted in 2007—requires defense

counsel to certify to an appellate court that counsel has sent a copy of the opinion to

the client and notified the client of the client’s right to file a pro se petition for

discretionary review. Tex. R. App. P. 48.4. A failure to notify the client might result

in a writ of habeas corpus seeking an out-of-time appeal based on ineffective

assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661, 663–64 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014); Ex parte Baldez, 510 S.W.3d 492, 496–97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014,

no pet.). 5

       Turning to Rule 4.6 itself and its wording, we note that procedural

requirements, even if mandatory, may be waived unless they are jurisdictional.

       5
        Rule 77.3 prohibits us from citing unpublished opinions of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals. Tex. R. App. P. 77.3. Accordingly, although numerous
unpublished opinions in which the court granted out-of-time appeals based on
ineffective assistance of counsel are available on Westlaw, we will not cite them. We
further note that many of them predate Rule 48.4’s adoption.

                                           10
Comptroller v. Landsfeld, 352 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet.

denied) (citing In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n (USAA), 307 S.W.3d 299, 307 (Tex. 2010)

(orig. proceeding)).     When determining whether a procedural requirement is

jurisdictional, we apply statutory interpretation principles. See id. (citing City of DeSoto

v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2009)). Our goal is to ascertain the drafters’ intent

by examining the statute’s plain language. Id. (citing City of DeSoto, 288 S.W.3d at 394);

see Hardin, 664 S.W.3d at 872 (“When we interpret statutes, we seek to effectuate the

collective intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation. In doing so,

we necessarily focus our attention on the literal text of the statute in question and

attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of the text . . . .” (footnote omitted)).

       Based on our review of Rule 4.6, some portions of it are jurisdictional while

other portions are procedural.

       Specifically, Subsection (a) sets out the jurisdictional requirements. See Tex. R.

App. P. 4.6(a). Both the defendant and his attorney must not have received notice or

had actual knowledge that the trial judge signed the order within twenty days after its

signing. Id. The parties cannot waive these requirements by agreement. See Riewe, 13

S.W.3d at 413.

       Turning to Subsection (b), it sets out the procedure for establishing the

jurisdictional requirements. See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(b). Because the requirement that

the written motion be sworn to appears in Subsection (b) (the procedural provision)

but is not required under Subsection (a) (the jurisdictional provision) or thereafter in

                                            11
Subsection (c) (the factual recitations required in the trial court’s order), we conclude

that the fact that the motion is not sworn to is a procedural requirement that can be

waived absent an objection. See Comptroller, 352 S.W.3d at 174. Here, the State waived

any defect in Lewis’s motion by not objecting. 6

      As for Subsection (c), it anticipates an evidentiary hearing and requires the trial

court to state in its order its findings regarding the dispositive jurisdictional facts

under Subsection (a). See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(c). Because there apparently was no

evidentiary hearing and because the order did not comply with Rule 4.6(c), the State

could have objected, but it did not. One of the purposes of an objection is to give

opposing counsel an opportunity to respond. See Williams v. State, 662 S.W.3d 452,

460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Here, Lewis was not given that opportunity. We

conclude that the failure to have a hearing and the error in the order are procedural

and, thus, waivable. See Comptroller, 352 S.W.3d at 174. By not objecting, the State

waived both defects. See id. This construction is consistent with Rules 25.2(f) and

37.1, both of which anticipate errors in notices of appeal and favor giving an appellant

an opportunity to correct those errors, if possible. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(f), 37.1.

      6
        Rule 4.6(b)(3) states that if an appellant’s motion complies with Rules 4.6(b)(1)
and (2), “the motion may serve as the defendant’s notice of appeal.” Tex. R. App. P.
4.6(b)(3). Rule 4.6(b)(3) thus provides both a reward for complying with Rules
4.6(b)(1) and (2) and a penalty for not complying with them—noncompliance means
the motion cannot double as the notice of appeal. Lewis, however, filed both a Rule
4.6 motion and, along with it, a notice of appeal. Lewis was not relying on his Rule
4.6 motion doubling as his notice of appeal.

                                           12
       Our construction of Rule 4.6 as having jurisdictional and procedural portions is

not without some potentially contrary authority. On the civil side, Rule 306a of the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is comparable to Rule 4.6. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a; see

also Tex. R. App. P. 4.2. And civil case law suggests that procedural defects are fatal

to a Rule 306a motion. See, e.g., In re Peña, No. 13-18-00627-CV, 2019 WL 943371, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The

purpose of a sworn motion is to . . . reinvoke a trial court’s jurisdiction for the limited

purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine the date on which the

party or its counsel first received notice or acquired knowledge of the judgment.”);

Trevino v. Hale, No. 07-02-0235-CV, 2002 WL 1291246, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

June 11, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“Without adhering to the

proper procedures and procurement of an order from the trial court finding the date

on which notice or actual knowledge was received, this [c]ourt cannot depart from the

original appellate timetable.”); Carrera v. Marsh, 847 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 1993, orig. proceeding) (op. on reh’g) (“An unverified motion to reinstate . . .

cannot operate to extend the appellate timetable . . . .”). We are not persuaded that

simply because a rule addresses jurisdiction, every aspect of the rule is necessarily

jurisdictional.   See Reid v. SSB Holdings, Inc., 506 S.W.3d 140, 148 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) (“There is no language in the statute that indicates that

the verification requirement is jurisdictional or providing that failure to verify the

complaint should result in dismissal.”); Comptroller, 352 S.W.3d at 177 (“The motion

                                            13
requirement means that a case may proceed against those governmental entities that

do not seek dismissal—in other words, that a county can waive a party’s

noncompliance. This confirms that compliance with the notice requirements is not

jurisdictional.” (quoting Roccaforte v. Jefferson Cnty., 341 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tex. 2011)).

       We decline to apply this harsh construction to Rule 4.6 when the State does not

oppose Lewis’s motion and when other provisions of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure contemplate giving Lewis an opportunity to cure—if possible—any defects

in his notice of appeal. We see no benefit in forcing Lewis to file a writ of habeas

corpus seeking an out-of-time appeal if the deficiencies can be corrected on direct

appeal.

       Although we conclude that the noted defects in Lewis’s Rule 4.6 motion and

proceedings are not necessarily fatal to his appeal, we are nevertheless not persuaded

that we have jurisdiction. Nor are we persuaded that we do not have jurisdiction.

       Even if the State is willing to waive an evidentiary hearing and the defect in the

trial court’s order, we are not—especially where, as here, the record does not support

the order and where Rule 4.6(c) specifically requires the trial court to make the factual

findings establishing our appellate jurisdiction. Lewis’s failure to insist on

       • a hearing and

       • an order complying with Rule 4.6(c),

and the State’s failure to object to

                                             14
        • the absence of a hearing and

        • the order’s not complying with Rule 4.6(c)

may have the effect of improperly conferring jurisdiction on us where no jurisdiction

otherwise exists. See Riewe, 13 S.W.3d at 413.

        Before assuming jurisdiction, we insist on a hearing and an order complying

with Rule 4.6(c). See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(c); Black v. Curtis, No. 07-23-00261-CV, 2023

WL 6932554, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 19, 2023, order) (per curiam) (applying

Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a). Before we can assume jurisdiction under Rule 4.6, the record

must show the earliest date when Lewis and his attorney received notice or otherwise

acquired actual knowledge that the trial judge had signed the February 16 order and

whether that date was more than twenty days after February 16. See Tex. R. App. P.

4.6(a), (c).

                                III. CONCLUSION

        Accordingly, we abate the appeal for the trial court to conduct within thirty

days of the date of this order a hearing to determine:

        • the earliest date when Lewis and his trial attorney received notice or
          acquired actual knowledge that the trial judge had signed the February 16,
          2023 order, and

        • whether this date was more than twenty days after the judge signed the
          February 16, 2023 order.

After conducting the hearing, the trial court “must sign a written order that

determines the earliest date when the defendant or the defendant’s attorney received

                                           15
notice or acquired actual knowledge that the trial judge signed the appealable order

and whether this date was more than twenty days after the judge signed the appealable

order.” See Tex. R. App. P. 4.6(c).

       Within forty days of the date of this order, a supplemental reporter’s record of

the abatement hearing and a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s

factual findings should be filed in our court.

       After we receive both the supplemental reporter’s record of the hearing and the

supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s order, the appeal will be

automatically reinstated. After the appeal is reinstated, we will determine whether we

have jurisdiction over it. See Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 884 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d) (stating that courts have jurisdiction to determine whether

they have jurisdiction).

                                                      /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                      Wade Birdwell
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: December 21, 2023

                                           16