Court Opinion

ID: 9397234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 19:05:35.938435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:22.495359
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 210277-U

                                                                            THIRD DIVISION
                                                                                May 24, 2023

                                       No. 1-21-0277

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         IN THE
                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

 CMG MORTGAGE, INC.,                                   )   Appeal from the Circuit Court of
                                                       )   Cook County.
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                            )
                                                       )
 v.                                                    )
                                                       )
 LANNY LUTZ, a.k.a. CHARLES LUTZ,                      )
 MICHAEL STOLLER, and WESLEY TERRACE                   )
 CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,                              )
                                                       )
        Defendants                                     )
                                                       )
 (Michael Stoller, Christopher Stoller, Leo Stoller,   )
 Defendants-Appellants;)                               )
                                                       )   No. 2019 CH 3920
                                                       )
 MICHAEL        STOLLER,           CHRISTOPHER         )
 STOLLER, et al.,                                      )
                                                       )
        Counterplantiffs-Appellants,                   )
                                                       )
 v.                                                    )
                                                       )
 CMG MORTGAGE, INC., CMG FINANCIAL,                    )
 CHRISTOPHER M. GEORGE, KIMBERLY                       )
 CALLAS, PETER GILBERT, CHARLIE ROGERS,                )
 SARA    REED,   ATTORNEYS,     AGENTS,                )
 ASSIGNEES JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10,                     )
                                                       )   Honorable Darryl B. Simko,
        Counterdefendants-Appellees.                   )   Judge, presiding.
No. 1-21-0277

       JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice McBride and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: This court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Dismissed.

¶2     Plaintiff CMG Mortgage, Inc. (CMG), filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint against

defendants Lanny Lutz (a.k.a. Charles Lutz), Michael Stoller, and Wesley Terrace Condominium

Association (the Association). Defendant Michael Stoller and Christopher Stoller (who asserted

he was an assignee of Lutz) filed an answer and counterclaimed that CMG lacked standing. CMG

filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim, which the trial court granted. Michael and Christopher

appeal that dismissal. For the following reasons, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

¶3                                      BACKGROUND

¶4     On March 26, 2019, CMG filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint against Lutz, Michael,

and the Association. CMG alleged that Lutz was the owner of the real property subject to the

mortgage and that Michael and the Association had either an interest in or a lien on the property.

The complaint further alleged that the loan underlying the mortgage was in default with no

payments having been made beginning in November 2018. CMG attached to its complaint a copy

of the mortgage, a copy of the note, and a copy of the assignment of the mortgage from MERS

(Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems) to CMG.

¶5     On January 15, 2020, Michael filed a purported answer and counterclaim to CMG’s

complaint. Michael’s answer and counterclaim added numerous additional parties, apparently

including various corporate officers of CMG as well as “John Does 1-10).” In addition to Michael,

Christopher Stoller was listed on this document as a defendant and counterplaintiff. In a footnote,

                                                2
No. 1-21-0277

Michael and Christopher asserted that Lutz gave Christopher an “assignment of claims and cause

of action” that purportedly allowed Christopher to “walk in the shoes of” Lutz. 1

¶6     With respect to the counterclaim, defendants asserted that CMG lacked standing to bring

the lawsuit. Defendants stated that CMG was not registered with the office of the Illinois Secretary

of State, nor was it the mortgage holder at the time it filed its complaint for foreclosure, so it

therefore had “no authority to bring a foreclosure lawsuit in this case.” Defendants further claimed

that MERS made an improper assignment of the mortgage to CMG.

¶7     On June 1, 2020, CMG filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim pursuant to section 2-

615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)).

¶8     On November 4, 2020, Christopher and Leo Stoller filed a motion to intervene “in this

cause.” Their motion stated that Michael, Christopher, and Leo were “the real part[ies] in interest”

because they were the owners of the property and not Lutz. Christopher and Leo further stated

that they were the “unknown occupants” referred to in CMG’s foreclosure complaint. They further

asked to be allowed to intervene to assert their “counter claimd [sic],” which they said was

“incorporated herein by reference.”

¶9     On January 13, 2021, the trial court granted Christopher and Leo’s motion to intervene.

The court directed them to answer or otherwise respond to the mortgage foreclosure complaint

within 30 days. The record on appeal does not indicate that Christopher and Leo filed an answer

or response; rather, they filed a response to CMG’s motion to dismiss Michael’s counterclaim on

February 16, 2021. CMG filed its reply on February 23, 2021, and Christopher and Leo filed a

motion to strike CMG’s reply two days later.

       1
          The footnote cited to “Exhibit 1,” but no such exhibit appears in the record on appeal.
Setting aside the validity of Christopher’s intervention, we refer to Michael, Christopher, and Leo
Stoller (whose name later appears in a separate motion, as discussed infra) collectively as
“defendants.”
                                                  3
No. 1-21-0277

¶ 10   On March 8, 2021, following a hearing, the trial court entered a written order granting

CMG’s motion to dismiss Michael’s counterclaim “as to all named counter-defendants.” The court

further denied Christopher and Leo’s motion to strike CMG’s reply in support of its motion to

dismiss. This appeal follows.

¶ 11                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 12   On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erroneously granted CMG’s motion to

dismiss the counterclaim, which alleged that CMG lacked standing. CMG initially responds that

we should dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In the alternative, CMG argues that we

should affirm the trial court’s dismissal because our precedent “firmly establishes” that standing

is not a separate and distinct cause of action. In further alternative, CMG contends that the trial

court correctly found that CMG had standing to pursue this mortgage foreclosure cause of action.

¶ 13   This court has an independent duty to consider its jurisdiction, regardless of whether the

parties have raised it. Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209,

213 (2009). When jurisdiction is lacking, we must dismiss the appeal. Uesco Industries, Inc. v.

Poolman of Wisconsin, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 112566, ¶ 73. We have no jurisdiction to review

nonfinal judgments or orders absent a supreme court rule that gives us that authority. EMC

Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL 113419, ¶ 9. A judgment or order is “final” if it disposes of the

rights of the parties, either on the entire case or on some definite and separate part of the

controversy. Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 502 (1997). In other

words, a final order terminates “the litigation between the parties on the merits of the cause, so

that, if affirmed, the trial court has only to proceed with execution of the judgment.” Kellerman

v. Crowe, 119 Ill. 2d 111, 115 (1987) (quoting Village of Niles v. Szczesny, 13 Ill. 2d 45, 48 (1958)).

                                                  4
No. 1-21-0277

¶ 14   In this case, the trial court’s order granting CMG’s motion to dismiss defendants’2

purported counterclaim did not resolve the underlying foreclosure cause of action; instead, it

merely rejected defendants’ claim that CMG lacked standing to pursue foreclosure. The sole cause

of action in this matter, CMG’s foreclosure action, remained pending and undecided. In other

words, the trial court’s order was not a final order because it did not dispose of the rights of the

parties, nor did it terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits, such that, if affirmed,

the court would need only to proceed with the execution of its judgment. See Dubina, 178 Ill. 2d

at 502; Kellerman, 119 Ill. 2d at 115; see also In re D.J.E., 319 Ill. App. 3d 489 (2001) (holding

that, where the father filed a motion to dismiss the grandparents’ petition for legal custody of their

grandson on the basis of standing, the trial court’s order denying the motion was not a final

appealable order). We thus lack jurisdiction.

¶ 15   Although there are certain exceptions to this rule, none of them apply here. Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016)) allows for appeal of a final

judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims only if the trial court has made an express

written finding that “there is no just reason to delay either enforcement or appeal” of its order. As

we have already held, however, the trial court’s order granting CMG’s motion to dismiss

defendants’ counterclaim was not a final order, so even the inclusion of Rule 304(a) language,

absent here, would not vest jurisdiction in this court. See North Community Bank v. 17011 S. Park

Ave., LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 133672, ¶ 26 (citing Eychaner v. Gross, 321 Ill. App. 3d 759, 783

(2001) (holding that appellate jurisdiction was lacking where the trial court order dismissing

counterclaims did not include Rule 304(a) language), rev’d on other grounds, 202 Ill. 2d 228

       2
         Although it is unclear whether (1) Christopher and Leo’s motion to intervene sought to
adopt Michael’s counterclaim and (2) the trial court’s order granting their motion would have
allowed it, for the sake of clarity we will nonetheless assume that Christopher and Leo adopted the
counterclaim.
                                                   5
No. 1-21-0277

(2002)). Moreover, generally where, as here, the trial court’s order dismissing defendants’

counterclaims was without prejudice, the order was nonfinal. See O’Hara v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Co., 137 Ill. App. 3d 131, 133 (1985).

¶ 16   Additionally, as the trial court found, defendants’ argument that CMG lacked standing was

not a counterclaim but rather, in substance, an “affirmative matter” that is properly raised in a

motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West

2020)) (see State ex rel. Leibowitz v. Family Vision Care, LLC, 2020 IL 124754, ¶ 30).

Nonetheless, even were we to construe this appeal as an appeal from the denial of a 2-619(a)(9)

motion, we would still be compelled to dismiss this appeal. “The denial of a motion to dismiss is

not a final and appealable order.” Cabinet Service Tile, Inc. v. Schroeder, 255 Ill. App. 3d 865,

868 (1993). Therefore, even on this additional basis, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss this

appeal. Because of our holding that we lack jurisdiction, we need not consider CMG’s alternate

grounds to affirm.

¶ 17   As a final matter, defendants contend, in a three-sentence paragraph, that the trial court

also erred in denying their combined motion to strike and for sanctions. Ordinarily, this claim

would be forfeited. See, e.g., Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); Parkway Bank & Trust

Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶ 10; Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st)

110287, ¶ 78. We note, however, that the denial of either a motion to strike or a motion for

sanctions is not a final order under the circumstances presented here. See Camp v. Chicago Transit

Authority, 82 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 1110 (1980) (“The denial of a motion to strike or dismiss of itself

is not a final appealable order.”); John G. Phillips & Associates v. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d 337, 340

(2001) (holding that “filing a Rule 137 motion is the functional equivalent of adding an additional

count to a complaint, or counter-claim, depending on which party files the motion”). We therefore

lack jurisdiction to consider this claim, as well.

                                                     6
No. 1-21-0277

¶ 18                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 19   The trial court’s (1) granting of CMG’s motion to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim and

(2) denial of defendants’ motion to strike and for sanctions were not final orders. Accordingly,

since we do not have jurisdiction to review this nonfinal order, we must dismiss this appeal.

¶ 20   Appeal dismissed.

                                                7