Court Opinion

ID: 9840266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 17:10:51.25689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:11:39.788045
License: Public Domain

J-S27022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 JOHN MICHAEL CROWLEY                    :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 940 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 3, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-35-CR-0002692-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                 FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2023

     John Michael Crowley appeals from the order denying his petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

     We glean the following facts from the certified record.      In August of

2016, Appellant was driving with his friend, using GPS technology on a

cellphone to assist with navigation. While travelling on a highway, Appellant

turned his vehicle around and proceeded southbound in a northbound lane.

He continued at a slow rate of speed in the wrong direction when an oncoming

car collided head-on with his vehicle.   The other driver sustained serious

injuries, including long-term memory loss, and the front half of both cars

sustained extensive damage.

     While being treated by paramedics at the scene, Appellant was

interviewed by a Pennsylvania State Police trooper. Appellant denied drinking
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alcohol and further claimed that he had been driving in the correct direction

and that his car had been hit from behind just prior to the head-on collision.

However, the damage and physical evidence were inconsistent with this

explanation, and the results of an ensuing blood test demonstrated that his

blood alcohol content was 0.149. Due to the foregoing, he was charged with

driving under the influence (“DUI”) and various other charges related to the

collision and his impaired driving.

       Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts each of

aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI, recklessly endangering another

person, and DUI, as well as one count each of reckless driving and driving on

a one-way roadway. The court imposed an aggregate term of 123 to 246

months of imprisonment, followed by four years of probation. Appellant filed

a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which the court denied. We quashed

his untimely appeal to this Court.

       Thereafter, Appellant timely filed his first PCRA petition with the

assistance of counsel.        Appellant asserted that his trial counsel, Alfonso

Gambone, Esquire, was ineffective for not presenting evidence taken from an

application on Appellant’s cellphone that purportedly would have shown that

his car was not travelling in the wrong direction on the highway when the

crash occurred. See PCRA Petition, 11/15/19, at 10-11.1

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s PCRA petition initially raised four claims, but he withdrew all
except one at the PCRA hearing. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 11/16/21, at 4.

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      The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the petition,

wherein Attorney Gambone, Appellant, and Appellant’s stepmother testified.

Ultimately, the court denied the petition, finding that trial counsel had a

reasonable basis for not introducing the requested evidence. See PCRA Court

Opinion, 6/2/22, at 7-8. This timely appeal followed, and both the PCRA court

and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents the following question for our review: “Did the PCRA

court err when it held that trial counsel’s decision to not present certain

evidence was ‘reasonable’ where the evidence was helpful to the defense,

corroborated by evidence the Commonwealth offered, and superior to the

doomed alternative strategy chosen by counsel?”          Appellant’s brief at 6

(cleaned up).

      This Court’s standard of review of a court’s denial of PCRA relief is as

follows:

      [A] trial court order granting or denying relief under the PCRA calls
      upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA court
      is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.
      The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
      support for the findings in the certified record.

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2021).                   Our

“scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence

of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”

Commonwealth v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 911 (Pa. 2021). This Court grants

“great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court.” Commonwealth

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v. Dozier, 208 A.3d 1101, 1103 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up). However,

“we afford no such deference to [the PCRA court’s] legal conclusions.” Id.

(cleaned up).

      It is well-settled that counsel is presumed to be effective, and Appellant

bears the burden of proving otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Johnson,

236 A.3d 63, 68 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc).        To prevail on a claim that

counsel was ineffective, Appellant must establish the following three

elements:

      (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
      basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) the
      petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with
      prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability
      that the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Id. (cleaned up). “A claim of ineffectiveness may be denied by a showing that

the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any of these prongs.” Commonwealth

v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007).           Further, “[w]e are not

required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any particular

order.” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa. 2019).

      Since the PCRA court found that Appellant failed to establish the

reasonable basis prong, it is on that prong that we focus. In that regard,

counsel is deemed effective if his actions were rationally “designed to

effectuate his client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 257 A.3d 1,

8 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up). As such, “if we conclude that the particular

course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and

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counsel’s assistance is deemed effective.” Commonwealth v. Mullen, 267

A.3d 507, 512 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up). Moreover, “[j]udicial scrutiny

of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential and the reasonableness

of counsel’s decisions cannot be based upon the distorting effects of

hindsight.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1094 (Pa.Super.

2019) (cleaned up).

      Appellant’s sole claim on appeal is that trial counsel was ineffective for

not proffering certain documents, namely screenshots from a GPS application

on Appellant’s cellphone indicating his location at the time surrounding the

accident. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 11/16/21, at 8. Appellant contends that

this evidence would have exculpated him, arguing that it proves he was not

travelling southbound in a northbound lane at the time of the accident. See

Appellant’s brief at 8. Furthermore, Appellant alleges that the screenshots

would have bolstered the testimony of the passenger in Appellant’s vehicle

that they had been struck from behind before being hit head-on.             Id.

Therefore, Appellant asserts that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for

declining to offer this allegedly exculpatory evidence. Id. at 13-14, 16.

      In rejecting this claim, the PCRA court determined that Attorney

Gambone articulated a reasonable basis at the PCRA hearing for his decision

eschewing presentation of the screenshots. See PCRA Court Opinion, 6/2/22,

at 7-8. There, counsel attested that the screenshots showed the direction

that Appellant’s vehicle travelled but did not show the precise position of the

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vehicle. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 11/16/21, at 11-13. Likewise, the evidence

did not establish the car’s exact position when it collided with the oncoming

driver. Id. at 19. Moreover, Attorney Gambone testified that he interviewed

multiple potential experts concerning the GPS evidence but could not find one

whom he found persuasive or competent enough to aid Appellant’s defense.

Id. at 16. Indeed, none of the experts whom he interviewed could interpret

the GPS data in a clear and meaningful manner, nor could an accident

reconstruction expert aid Appellant’s contention of how the accident occurred.

Id. at 14, 16-17.     Hence, due to the inconclusive nature of the GPS

screenshots, Attorney Gambone worried that introducing them would confuse

the jury and hurt his client’s chances of a successful verdict. Id. at 15-16.

      Based on the foregoing testimony, we conclude that the PCRA court did

not err in determining that Attorney Gambone had a reasonable basis not to

proffer the evidence that Appellant wished.     Attorney Gambone consulted

multiple experts who could not conclusively or persuasively explain the

meaning of the GPS screenshots.      Our Supreme Court has held that “[a]n

attorney will not be deemed ineffective for choosing not to present expert

testimony in support of a particular defense if an expert, after conducting a

reasonable evaluation, informed the attorney that he could not aid the

defense(s) at issue.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 624 (Pa.

2015) (cleaned up). Moreover, Attorney Gambone expressed concern that

introducing ambiguous evidence that did not even show the precise position

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of Appellant’s vehicle at the time surrounding the accident would confuse the

jury or even harm his client’s chances of a successful verdict. Therefore, he

declined to present the GPS screenshots and instead believed that his best

trial strategy entailed casting doubt on the Commonwealth’s witnesses and

evidence. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 11/16/21, at 14-15. “Because the strategy

actually pursued by trial counsel was reasonably designed to effectuate

Appellant’s interests, he has failed to demonstrate a lack of reasonable basis.”

Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 442 (Pa. 2011).

      In sum, Appellant has not proven that trial counsel was ineffective and

had no reasonable basis for his actions. Accordingly, we will not disturb the

order of the PCRA court, and no relief is due.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/15/2023

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