Court Opinion

ID: 9964638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 16:00:44.633728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.175647
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1023            Document: 010111040629   Date Filed: 04/30/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                             PUBLISH                            Tenth Circuit

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      April 30, 2024

                                                                            Christopher M. Wolpert
                                 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                             _________________________________

  DUKE BRADFORD; ARKANSAS
  VALLEY ADVENTURES, LLC, AKA
  AVA Rafting and Zipline; COLORADO
  RIVER OUTFITTERS ASSOCIATION,

         Plaintiffs - Appellants,

  v.                                                             No. 22-1023

  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; U.S.
  DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WAGE
  AND HOUR DIVISION; JOSEPH R.
  BIDEN, President of the United States;
  JULIE A. SU, U.S. Secretary of Labor;
  JESSICA LOOMAN, Acting
  Administrator,

         Defendants - Appellees.

  ------------------------------

  ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE;
  NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
  PROJECT; NATIONAL ABILITY
  CENTER; NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW
  CENTER; STATE OF ARIZONA;
  SERVICE EMPLOYEES
  INTERNATIONAL UNION; STATE OF
  ALABAMA; STATE OF ARKANSAS;
  STATE OF GEORGIA; STATE OF
  IDAHO; STATE OF INDIANA; STATE
  OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF
  MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF MISSOURI;

        
             Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Julie A. Su is substituted for
 Martin J. Walsh, former U.S. Secretary of Labor.
Appellate Case: 22-1023     Document: 010111040629        Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 2

  STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF
  NEBRASKA; STATE OF OKLAHOMA;
  STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA;
  PUBLIC CITIZEN; SAFARI CLUB
  INTERNATIONAL;
  COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF
  AMERICA; STATE OF ILLINOIS;
  STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF
  CONNECTICUT; STATE OF
  DELAWARE; DISTRICT OF
  COLUMBIA; STATE OF MAINE;
  STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF
  MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF
  MICHIGAN; STATE OF MINNESOTA;
  STATE OF NEVADA; STATE OF NEW
  JERSEY; STATE OF NEW MEXICO;
  STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF
  NORTH CAROLINA; STATE OF
  OREGON; STATE OF
  PENNSYLVANIA; STATE OF RHODE
  ISLAND; STATE OF VERMONT;
  STATE OF WASHINGTON,

        Amici Curiae.
                          _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of Colorado
                         (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-03283-PAB-STV)
                        _________________________________

 Caleb Kruckenberg, Pacific Legal Foundation, Arlington, Virginia (Michael A. Poon,
 Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California, and Steven M. Simpson, Institute for
 Justice, Arlington, Virginia, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

 Daniel Winik, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C.
 (Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; U.S. Department of
 Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C.; Cole Finegan, United States Attorney for the
 State of Colorado; and Mark B. Stern, Attorney, United States Department of Justice,
 Civil Division, Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

 Drew C. Ensign, Deputy Solicitor General (Kris Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, with
 him on the amici brief), Office of the Attorney General for the State of Arizona, Phoenix,

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 Arizona, filed on behalf of the States of Arizona, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho,
 Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South
 Carolina), for Amici Curiae.

 Jeremy E. Clare and Regina Lennox, Safari Club International, Washington, D.C., filed
 an amicus brief on behalf of Safari Club International in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

 Lucas C. Townsend, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C.; Dayna Zolle Hauser,
 Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Denver, Colorado and Ryan Azad, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher,
 San Francisco, California, filed an amicus brief on behalf of The National Ability Center
 in support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

 Nandan M. Joshi and Allison M. Zieve, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington,
 D.C., filed an amicus brief on behalf of Public Citizen in support of Defendants-
 Appellees.

 Sean A. Lev and JoAnn Kintz, Democracy Forward Foundation, Washington, D.C., filed
 an amicus brief on behalf of National Employment Law Project, Communications
 Workers of American, Service Employees International Union, National Women’s Law
 Center, and Economic Policy Institute in support of Defendants-Appellees.

 Sarah A. Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General, Kwame Raoul, Attorney General and Jane
 Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois,
 Chicago, Illinois, filed an amicus brief on behalf of the States of Illinois, California,
 Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
 Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
 Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington in support of
 Defendants-Appellees.
                           _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

 HOLMES, Chief Judge.
                    _________________________________

        Plaintiffs-Appellants Duke Bradford, Arkansas Valley Adventure (AVA), and

 the Colorado River Outfitters Association (CROA) appeal from the District of

 Colorado’s order denying their motion to preliminarily enjoin a Department of Labor

 (DOL) rule requiring federal contractors to pay their employees a $15.00 minimum

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 hourly wage. The DOL promulgated the rule pursuant to a directive in Executive

 Order (EO) 14,026, which President Biden issued on April 27, 2021. EO 14,026

 imposed the minimum wage requirement on most federal contractors, and it

 rescinded an exemption for recreational services outfitters that operate pursuant to

 permits on federal lands, which President Trump had adopted in EO 13,838.

 President Biden issued EO 14,026 pursuant to his authority under the Federal

 Property and Administrative Services Act (“FPASA”), 40 U.S.C. §§ 101–1315,

 which authorizes the President to “prescribe policies and directives that the President

 considers necessary to carry out” FPASA and that are “consistent with” FPASA, 40

 U.S.C. § 121(a). One purpose of FPASA is to “provide the Federal Government with

 an economical and efficient system for . . . [p]rocuring and supplying property and

 nonpersonal services.” 40 U.S.C. § 101(1).1

       Appellants argue that the district court erred in concluding that FPASA

 authorizes the minimum wage rule as applied to recreational services permittees

 because the government does not procure any services from them or supply anything

 to them. They also argue that the DOL acted arbitrarily and capriciously in

 promulgating the minimum wage rule without exempting recreational service

 permittees.

       1
              As discussed further infra, a “[n]onpersonal services contract means a
 contract under which the personnel rendering the services are not subject . . . to the
 supervision and control usually prevailing in relationships between the Government
 and its employees.” 48 C.F.R. § 37.101.
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       Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we affirm. We first

 conclude that Appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the

 merits that the DOL’s rule was issued without statutory authority. Specifically, the

 district court did not err in concluding that FPASA likely authorizes the minimum

 wage rule because the DOL’s rule permissibly regulates the supply of nonpersonal

 services and advances the statutory objectives of economy and efficiency.

 Furthermore, we hold that Appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of

 success on the merits that the DOL’s rule is arbitrary and capricious. In sum, we

 conclude that the district court did not err in denying Appellants’ motion for a

 preliminary injunction.

                                            I

                                            A

       On February 12, 2014, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,658,

 Establishing a Minimum Wage for Contractors, pursuant to his authority under

 FPASA. See 79 Fed. Reg. 9851 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.10).

 FPASA authorizes the President to “prescribe policies and directives that the

 President considers necessary to carry out” the Act and that are “consistent with” the

 Act. 40 U.S.C. § 121(a). The purpose of FPASA is to “provide the Federal

 Government with an economical and efficient system for,” inter alia, “[p]rocuring

 and supplying property and nonpersonal services.” 40 U.S.C. § 101(1).

       EO 13,658 directed executive departments and agencies, including the DOL, to

 include a clause in certain “new contracts, contract-like instruments, and

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 solicitations” specifying that the contractor will pay a minimum wage of $10.10 per

 hour. 79 Fed. Reg. at 9851. EO 13,658 reflected President Obama’s determination

 that “[r]aising the pay of low-wage workers increases their morale and the

 productivity and quality of their work, lowers turnover and its accompanying costs,

 and reduces supervisory costs.” Id.

       The order directed the Secretary of the DOL (the “Secretary”) to issue

 regulations implementing the order, and, pursuant to this authority, the order

 authorized the Secretary to define a “new contract or contract-like instrument.” Id. at

 9852–53.

       Following notice and comment, the DOL promulgated a final rule

 implementing EO 13,658. See Establishing a Minimum Wage for Contractors, 79

 Fed. Reg. 60,634 (Oct. 7, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 10). The rule defined

 a contract as “an agreement between two or more parties creating obligations that are

 enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law,” which includes “any . . . permits.” 79

 Fed. Reg. at 60,722. In response to public comments, the rule clarified that special

 use permits (SUPs) issued by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS), Commercial Use

 Authorizations (CUAs) issued by the National Park Service (NPS), and “outfitter and

 guide permit agreements” with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the U.S.

 Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), all qualified as contracts under EO 13,658. See

 id. at 60,652, 60,655.

       In 2018, pursuant to his authority under FPASA, President Trump issued EO

 13,838, Exemption From Executive Order 13658 for Recreational Services on

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 Federal Lands. See 83 Fed. Reg. 25,341 (May 25, 2018). EO 13,838 concluded that

 applying EO 13,658 to “outfitters and guides operating on Federal lands . . . does not

 promote economy and efficiency in making these services available to those” seeking

 to recreate on federal lands. Id. Because “[s]easonal recreational workers have

 irregular work schedules, a high incidence of overtime pay, and an unusually high

 turnover rate,” EO 13,838 reasoned that a minimum wage “threatens to raise

 significantly the cost of guided” services and “would generally entail large negative

 effects on hours worked,” thereby restricting access to recreation on Federal lands.

 Id. Therefore, EO 13,838 exempted from coverage under EO 13,658 “contracts or

 contract-like instruments entered into with the Federal Government in connection

 with seasonal recreational services or seasonal recreational equipment rental for the

 general public on Federal lands.” Id. However, the order specified that the

 “exemption shall not apply to lodging and food services associated with seasonal

 recreational services.” Id. The DOL thereafter promulgated a final rule that

 implemented EO 13,838. See Minimum Wage for Contractors, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,537

 (Sept. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 10).

       On April 27, 2021, President Biden issued EO 14,026, Increasing the

 Minimum Wage for Federal Contractors, again pursuant to his authority under

 FPASA. See 86 Fed. Reg. 22,835 (Apr. 27, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts.

 10, 23). Set to begin on January 30, 2022, EO 14,026 raised the minimum wage

 specified under EO 13,658 to $15 per hour. See id. at 22,835–37. The order

 reflected President Biden’s determination that “[r]aising the minimum wage enhances

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 worker productivity and generates higher-quality work by boosting workers’ health,

 morale, and effort; reducing absenteeism and turnover; and lowering supervisory and

 training costs.” Id. at 22,835.

        EO 14,026 also revoked EO 13,838, thereby eliminating the exemption from

 the minimum wage requirement for seasonal recreational service permittees. See id.

 at 22,836–37. As with EO 13,658, a contract falls within the scope of EO 14,026

 only if (1) workers’ wages under the contract “are governed by the Fair Labor

 Standards Act [(“FLSA”)], the Service Contract Act [(“SCA”)], or the Davis-Bacon

 Act [(“DBA”)], and (2) the contract is, as relevant here, “for services covered by the

 [SCA]” or is “entered into with the Federal Government in connection with Federal

 property or lands and related to offering services for . . . the general public.” Id. at

 22,837.

        Following notice and comment, the DOL promulgated a final rule that

 implemented EO 14,026. See Increasing the Minimum Wage for Federal

 Contractors, 86 Fed. Reg. 67,126 (Nov. 24, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts.

 10, 23). Responding to comments from “stakeholders in the outdoor recreational

 industries,” the rule clarified that, based on the DOL’s “understanding” of these

 businesses, the minimum wage requirement applies to special use permits issued by

 the Forest Service, “CUA[s] . . . with the NPS, and “outfitter and guide permit

 agreements with the BLM and USFWS.” Id. at 67,147–48. “The principal purpose

 of these legal instruments,” according to the DOL, “seems to be furnishing services

 through the use of service employees,” in which case they are covered under the SCA

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 and, thus, EO 14,026. Id. at 67,148. Alternatively, the DOL stated that Section

 8(a)(i)(D) of EO 14,026 covers these instruments as agreements “with the Federal

 Government in connection with Federal property or lands and related to offering

 services for . . . the general public.” Id. at 67,151.

        The DOL’s minimum wage rule also clarified that the FLSA’s overtime pay

 requirement of at least one and one-half times an employee’s normal rate, see 29

 U.S.C. § 207(a), applies under EO 14,026 to “holders of CUAs issued by the NPS,

 and permits issued by the Forest Service, BLM and USFWS.” 86 Fed. Reg. at

 67,152.

        Finally, in the rule, the DOL responded to comments asserting that, “unlike

 procurement contracts,” licenses or permits for the provision of recreational services

 on federal lands “do not contain a mechanism by which the holder of the instrument

 can ‘pass on’ potential costs related to operation of the Executive order to contracting

 agencies,” as well as comments asserting that the application of the minimum-wage

 requirement to “outfitter and guide permits would result in . . . business[es] needing

 to reduce employee work hours, reduce services, or increase prices.” Id.

 Specifically, in responding, the DOL “recognize[d] and acknowledge[d] that there

 may be particular challenges and constraints experienced by non-procurement

 contractors that do not exist under more traditional procurement contracts.” Id. But

 it “anticipate[d] that the economy and efficiency benefits of” a higher minimum wage

 would “substantially offset any potential adverse economic effects” by “reduc[ing]

 absenteeism and turnover in the workplace, improv[ing] employee morale and

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  productivity, reduc[ing] supervisory and training costs, . . . increas[ing] the quality of

  services provided to the Federal Government and the general public,” and

  ultimately—by virtue of that increased quality—“attract[ing] more customers and

  result[ing] in increased sales.” Id. at 67,152–53. Furthermore, the DOL reasoned

  that “[s]uch benefits may be realized even where the contractor has limited ability to

  transfer costs to the contracting agency or raise prices of the services that it offers.”

  Id. at 67,153.

                                              B

         Plaintiff-Appellant AVA provides guided outdoor excursions in Colorado, and

  Plaintiff-Appellant Duke Bradford owns and operates AVA. Aplts.’ App. at 13 ¶¶ 1,

  3 (Compl., filed Dec. 7, 2021). AVA conducts some of its tours on federal land

  pursuant to two government permits. Id. at 13 ¶ 4. One is a “Special Recreation

  Permit” from BLM that authorizes fishing trips in Colorado. Id. Another is a special

  use permit from USFS for operations in the White River National Forest. Id. For

  overnight trips, AVA pays guides a trip salary rather than an hourly wage. Id. at 14

  ¶ 6. If converted into an hourly rate, these salaries typically exceed $15 per hour.

  Id.; see also id. at 53 ¶ 5 (Decl. of Duke Bradford, filed Dec. 9. 2021). Accordingly,

  AVA pays its guides more than the minimum wage, which, in Colorado, is $12.56 per

  hour. Id. at 14 ¶ 6; see also id. at 170, Tr. 34:5–13 (Test. of Duke Bradford, Jan. 6,

  2022). However, many guides work more than 40 hours per week, and “AVA’s

  wages typically do not exceed the $15/hour threshold when including time-and-a-half

  overtime wages.” Id. at 14 ¶¶ 6–7. As such, AVA alleges that it would incur

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  compliance costs and increased labor costs should EO 14,026 go into effect and it

  was accordingly “required to pay overtime, based on a $15/hour minimum wage.”

  Id. at 14 ¶ 7; see id. at 155–58, Tr. 19:22–22:2.

        CROA is a trade association that represents the interests of its members, which

  consist of approximately fifty river-guide outfitters, including AVA. See id. at 55

  ¶¶ 3, 6 (Decl. of David Costlow, filed on Dec. 7, 2021); Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 11.

  Most of CROA’s members operate on federal lands under special use permits. See

  id. at 55 ¶ 3. Like AVA, CROA’s members typically pay their guides a flat fee on a

  per-trip basis. Id. at 55 ¶ 5. CROA alleges that “[i]ncreasing the wages for guides to

  $15/hour and paying overtime based on that wage would dramatically alter the wage

  structure for many of CROA’s members.” Id. at 56 ¶ 7. CROA expects that the new

  minimum wage requirement will cause labor costs to increase for its members, which

  will cause members to raise prices and eliminate trips. Id. at 56 ¶¶ 7–8.

                                              C

        Appellants filed a Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of

  Colorado on December 7, 2021, in which they challenged the DOL’s rule

  implementing EO 14,026 and sought declaratory relief. Id. at 11–13. In Count I,

  they asserted that FPASA did not authorize the DOL’s “rule,” and therefore the rule

  violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), as

  “agency action . . . in excess of statutory . . . authority.” Id. at 25–27 ¶¶ 51–59. In

  Count II, they asserted that the “rule” is “arbitrary and capricious,” in violation of

  Section 706(2)(A). Id. at 27–28 ¶¶ 60–65. And, in Count III, they asserted that

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  because FPASA did not authorize the “rule,” it violated the separation of powers, and

  even if FPASA did authorize the rule, the statute unconstitutionally delegated

  legislative power to the President and the DOL. Id. at 28–29 ¶¶ 66–77. Appellants

  then filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Id. at 31 (Mot. for Prelim. Injunc.,

  filed Dec. 9, 2021).

        After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Appellants’

  motion. Id. at 90, 136–37 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed Jan. 24, 2022). It first concluded

  that Mr. Bradford and AVA had Article III standing, but that CROA did not.2 Id. at

  101–05. The court then denied the Appellants’ motion because it concluded that

  Appellants failed to demonstrate a “likelihood of success on the merits” on each of

  their claims. Id. at 121, 130, 135–36. It did not reach any of the other factors

  governing preliminary injunctions. Id. at 135. Appellants filed a notice of

  interlocutory appeal on January 26, 2022, and on February 28, 2022, the district court

  denied their motion for an injunction pending appeal.

        2
                Appellees do not dispute that Mr. Bradford and AVA have standing.
  Because at least one appellant has standing, we may consider this appeal. See
  Massachusetts v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (“Only one of the
  petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider the petition for review.”).
  Appellants nevertheless argue in a footnote that the district court erred in concluding
  that CROA does not have Article III standing. See Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 13–14 n.1.
  However, “[a]rguments raised in a perfunctory manner, such as in a footnote, are
  waived.” United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
  And we have applied the waiver doctrine from Hardman where a plaintiff challenged
  in a footnote the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff lacked standing. See
  Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 793 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009).
  Accordingly, we conclude that Appellants waived their challenge concerning
  CROA’s standing on appeal.
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        Appellants also filed a motion for an injunction pending appeal with this

  Court, which a two-judge panel granted on February 17, 2022. See Bradford v. U.S.

  Dep’t of Lab., No. 22-1023, at *1 (10th Cir., filed Feb. 17, 2022) (unpublished)

  [hereinafter “Motions Panel Order”]. Specifically, the motions panel enjoined the

  rule “in the context of contracts or contract-like instruments entered into with the

  federal government in connection with seasonal recreational services or seasonal

  recreational equipment rental for the general public on federal lands.” Id. at 2. The

  rule had gone into effect on January 30, 2022, and, except as enjoined, remains in

  effect today.

                                             II

        Appellants raise two overarching arguments on appeal. First, Appellants claim

  that the district court erred in concluding that they are unlikely to succeed on the

  merits of their claim that the DOL’s minimum wage rule exceeded the authority

  granted under FPASA. See Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 16–38. Second, they argue that

  the district court erred in concluding that they are unlikely to succeed on the merits

  of their claim that the rule is arbitrary and capricious. See id. at 38–48. As such,

  Appellants claim that the district court erred in denying their motion for a

  preliminary injunction.

        After carefully considering the briefs and the parties’ oral arguments, we

  conclude that the district court correctly denied Appellants’ motion for a preliminary

  injunction. In reaching that conclusion, we first hold that Appellants have not shown

  a likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL’s rule was issued without statutory

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  authority. More specifically, the district court did not err in concluding that FPASA

  likely authorizes the minimum wage rule because the DOL’s rule permissibly

  regulates the supply of nonpersonal services and advances the statutory objectives of

  economy and efficiency. Furthermore, we hold that Appellants have not

  demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL’s rule is arbitrary

  and capricious. Accordingly, we uphold the district court’s order.

                                             III

        “We review the district court[’s] denial of a preliminary injunction for an

  abuse of discretion.” Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d

  1276, 1281 (10th Cir. 2016). “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial

  court bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no

  rational basis in the evidence for the ruling.” Wilderness Workshop v. U.S. Bureau of

  Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1220, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Utah Licensed

  Beverage Ass’n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2001)).

        To obtain a preliminary injunction, a “plaintiff must establish . . . (1) a

  substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits[,] (2) irreparable harm unless the

  injunction is issued[,] (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the

  preliminary injunction may cause the opposing party[,] and (4) that the injunction, if

  issued, will not adversely affect the public interest.” Diné, 839 F.3d at 1281 (quoting

  Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2002)). “[B]ecause a preliminary

  injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the [movant’s] right to relief must be clear and

  unequivocal.” Wilderness Workshop, 531 F.3d at 1224 (alterations in original)

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  (quoting Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256,

  1260 (10th Cir. 2004)). We “may affirm a district court decision ‘on any grounds for

  which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not

  relied upon by the district court.’” Dominion Video Satellite, 269 F.3d at 1157

  (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 n.6 (10th Cir.1994)).

                                            IV

                                            A

        Appellants first argue that FPASA “only empowers the President to control the

  ‘procur[ement] and supply[]’ of nonpersonal services by ‘the Federal Government.’”

  Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 18 (alterations in original) (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 101(1)).

  However, Appellants note that “the government does not supply the relevant

  recreational services” nor does it “procur[e] anything.” Id. Thus, Appellants assert

  that “[i]t makes no sense to adopt DOL’s view that the agency can regulate a

  company, like AVA, [which] neither procures nor supplies any nonpersonal services

  to the government, just because AVA later supplies nonpersonal services to its

  customers.” Id. at 19. Appellants thus contend that the DOL’s rule is not a

  permissible regulation under FPASA. In our view, however, Appellants’ argument is

  contrary to the plain text of FPASA.

        FPASA authorizes the President to “prescribe policies and directives that the

  President considers necessary to carry out” the Act and that are “consistent with” the

  Act. 40 U.S.C. § 121(a). “The purpose” of FPASA “is to provide the Federal

  Government with an economical and efficient system for . . . (1) [p]rocuring and

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  supplying property and nonpersonal services . . . (2) [u]sing available property[,] (3)

  [d]isposing of surplus property [, and] (4) [r]ecords management.” 40 U.S.C. § 101

  (emphasis added). Thus, as our precedent makes clear, the Act authorizes the

  President to issue “policies and directives” that are consistent with the statute’s

  purposes—including regulating the supply of nonpersonal services. See City of

  Albuquerque v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 379 F.3d 901, 914 (10th Cir. 2004)

  (concluding that “Congress chose to utilize a relatively broad delegation of authority

  in [FPASA]” but that Congress “did instruct the President’s exercise of authority

  should establish ‘an economical and efficient system for . . . the procurement and

  supply’ of property” (omission in original) (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 471 (2000), now

  codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. § 101)). Crucially, contrary to Appellants’

  assertions, § 101 of FPASA does not specify any particular entity that must receive

  the nonpersonal services to which it refers.

        FPASA defines “nonpersonal services” as “contractual services designated by

  the Administrator of General Services, other than personal and professional

  services.” 40 U.S.C. § 102(8). The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which

  heads of agencies—including the Administrator of General Services—promulgated

  pursuant to authority granted under FPASA, see 48 C.F.R. § 1.103(b); 40 U.S.C.

  § 121(c), explains the difference between “personal” and “nonpersonal” service

  contracts. See also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 604 n.11 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing

  FAR to delineate between “personal” and “nonpersonal” services contracts). “A

  personal services contract is characterized by the employer-employee relationship it

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  creates between the Government and the contractor’s personnel.” 48 C.F.R.

  § 37.104(a). By contrast, a “[n]onpersonal services contract means a contract under

  which the personnel rendering the services are not subject . . . to the supervision and

  control usually prevailing in relationships between the Government and its

  employees.” 48 C.F.R. § 37.101.

        Here, Appellants “supply[]” services, 40 U.S.C. § 101(1), through the guided

  tours they offer. And the government’s provision of federal permits to Appellants is

  a part of “an economical and efficient system” for supplying those nonpersonal

  services to the public. Id. Indeed, the DOL’s understanding of the contractual

  arrangement is that outfitters enter into agreements with the BLM, and “[t]he

  principal purpose of these legal instruments” is for the government to “furnish[]

  services through the use of service employees.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 67,148.

  Furthermore, the permits the government issues to the outfitters contain terms

  reflecting the government’s “concern[] with the ways in which outfitters supply

  recreational services to the public,” such as the need for outfitters to “use hardened

  trails within riparian areas” in order to avoid “damag[ing] the land.” Bradford v.

  U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 582 F. Supp. 3d 819, 834 (D. Colo. Jan. 24, 2022); see also

  Aplees.’ Suppl. App. at 4–5 (AVA Special Recreation Permit Stipulations, dated June

  16, 2014).

        Moreover, as Mr. Bradford testified, AVA’s permit with BLM prohibits AVA

  from representing that BLM provides the guiding services customers receive from

  AVA. See Aplts.’ App. at 148–49, Tr. 12:6–13:5 (Test. of Duke Bradford, dated Jan.

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  6, 2022); id. at 261 (BLM Special Recreation Permit, dated July 26, 2012). Thus, in

  terms of the relationship between the government and AVA, the permit qualifies as a

  “nonpersonal services contract,” as there is no direct employment relationship

  between BLM and AVA’s guides. 48 C.F.R. § 37.101. And § 101 of FPASA does

  not specify any particular entities that must receive the “nonpersonal services” to

  which it refers, thereby covering—as a textual matter—services Appellants supply to

  the public. 40 U.S.C. § 101. Stated another way, there is no explicit requirement in

  § 101 that the government itself directly supply the property or services under

  FPASA.

         Furthermore, Appellants’ interpretation—viz., that “supplying nonpersonal

  services” solely encompasses transactions in which a contractor provides services to

  the government—would render portions of FPASA superfluous. Aplts.’ Opening Br.

  at 19. As Appellees argue, “[w]hen a contractor provides goods or services directly

  to the federal government, the government is ‘procuring’ those goods or services.”

  Aplees.’ Resp. Br. at 17. If we interpret the statute such that a contractor is

  “supplying” services to the government when the government is simultaneously

  “procuring” those services, “supply[]” retains no meaning independent of

  “procur[e].” 40 U.S.C. § 101(1). Indeed, doing so would violate the canon requiring

  “that [a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so

  that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” Rubin v.

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  Islamic Republic of Iran, 583 U.S. 202, 213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

  Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)).3

        Thus, contrary to Appellants’ assertions, “supplying . . . nonpersonal services”

  appears to encompass transactions in which a contractor provides services to the

  public. 40 U.S.C. § 101. As such, Appellants—through the guided tours they offer

  to the public—“supply[]” “nonpersonal services” within the meaning of FPASA. Id.

  Consistent with the language of FPASA and our precedent, then, the President “may

  prescribe policies and directives” regulating the supply of these nonpersonal services.

  40 U.S.C. §§ 101, 121(a).4

        Accordingly, Appellants are unlikely to succeed on the merits in showing that

  the DOL’s rule is not a permissible regulation under FPASA. Stated another way,

        3
                To respond to this superfluity problem, Appellants offer a hypothetical
  involving campground services. They contend that the government may “supply”
  services by providing access to a federal campground while simultaneously
  “procuring” contractual services from a campground host. Aplts.’ Opening Br. at
  19–20; Aplts.’ Reply Br. at 11–12. But this example fails to account for the
  definition of “nonpersonal services.” See 40 U.S.C. § 102(8). If the government is
  “supplying” services directly by providing access to the campground, they are not
  supplying “nonpersonal services” because the services are not “contractual,” id., as
  they are not provided by a contractor.
        4
                 Appellants contend that, if our interpretation were correct, it would be
  “difficult to imagine any economic transaction that falls outside the statute’s reach.”
  Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 19. However, we note that the President’s authority extends
  only to entities that contract with the federal government—viz., the minimum wage
  rule applies to only those employees of a contracting entity who work on or in
  connection with a covered contract. See 86 Fed. Reg. at 22,835. As such, we are
  unpersuaded by Appellants’ rhetoric that the authority exercised here would
  encompass all “economic transaction[s].” Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 19.
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  there is a clear relationship between the statute conferring authority (i.e., FPASA)

  and the DOL’s rule.

                                             B

        Next, Appellants contend that the “DOL’s invocation of the Procurement Act

  cannot be justified.” Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 24. Specifically, Appellants assert

  that—under FPASA—the President’s authority is “limited to actions that he

  considers ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to provide the ‘prudent use’ of government

  resources ‘without wasting materials.’” Id. at 23. Here, however, Appellants claim

  that the net result of the DOL’s rule “will be more costs to the public, to non-

  procurement firms, and to the government—the opposite of a permitted action under

  [FPASA].” Id. at 24. Yet Appellants’ argument lacks merit.

        FPASA authorizes only “policies and directives that the President considers

  necessary” to “provide . . . an economical and efficient system for” procurement and

  supply. 40 U.S.C. §§ 101(1), 121(a); see also City of Albuquerque, 379 F.3d at 914;

  UAW-Lab. Emp. & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2003). To

  fall within the authority granted, orders issued under FPASA must have a

  “‘sufficiently close nexus’ to the values of [economy and efficiency].” Chao, 325

  F.3d at 366 (quoting Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Kahn, 618 F.2d

  784, 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); City of Albuquerque, 379 F.3d at 914 (concluding

  that an executive order under FPASA must be “sufficiently related” to “establish[ing]

  ‘an economical and efficient system’” for procurement and supply (quoting 40 U.S.C.

  § 471 (2000), currently codified at 40 U.S.C. § 101)).

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         Contrary to Appellants’ interpretation, however, “‘[e]conomy’ and ‘efficiency’

  are not narrow terms.” Kahn, 618 F.2d at 789. “[T]hey encompass those factors like

  price, quality, suitability, and availability of goods or services that are involved in all

  acquisition decisions.” Id. The standard is a “lenient” one, and courts have respected

  the President’s judgment as to how a given executive order is likely to advance the

  statute’s objectives. Chao, 325 F.3d at 367.

         Here, the DOL’s rule has a “sufficiently close nexus” to the values of economy

  and efficiency. Id. at 366 (quoting Kahn, 618 F.2d at 792). According to the

  government, the DOL’s rule “promotes economy and efficiency” by “enhanc[ing]

  worker productivity and generat[ing] higher-quality work by boosting workers’

  health, morale, and effort; reducing absenteeism and turnover; and lowering

  supervisory and training costs.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 22,835. Thus, even if the rule could

  plausibly increase costs for the government and the public, enhanced worker

  productivity and higher quality work—standing alone—are sufficient justifications to

  invoke FPASA. In other words, the President could consider the DOL’s minimum

  wage rule necessary to “provide . . . an economical and efficient system for”

  procurement and supply. 40 U.S.C. § 101.

         Indeed, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Chao supports our conclusion. There,

  the court upheld an executive order requiring federal contractors to notify employees

  of their rights not to join a union, on the basis of President Bush’s judgment that

  “[w]hen workers are better informed of their rights, . . . their productivity is

  enhanced.” Chao, 325 F.3d at 366. Chao reached this conclusion even though “[t]he

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  link may seem attenuated” and the order could have produced the “opposite effects or

  no effects at all.” Id. at 366–67. Accordingly, here, like in Chao, President Biden

  could have determined that the DOL’s rule advanced the statutory values of economy

  and efficiency by enhancing worker productivity, even if the rule could theoretically

  produce the opposite effects or no effects at all.

        Furthermore, we could also uphold the DOL’s rule under Appellants’ stringent

  interpretation of economy and efficiency—viz., the President must “show a ‘nexus

  between the wage and price standards and likely savings to the Government.’”

  Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 22 (quoting Kahn, 618 F.2d at 793). Here, the DOL

  “anticipates that the economy and efficiency benefits of [EO] 14[,]026 will offset

  potential costs.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 67,152. Specifically, it expects that “reduc[ing]

  absenteeism and turnover in the workplace, improv[ing] employee morale and

  productivity, [and] reduc[ing] supervisory and training costs” “will substantially

  offset any potential adverse economic effects.” Id. at 67,153. This analysis also

  applies to “permittees, licensees, and CUA holders”—such as AVA and other CROA

  members. Id. Admittedly, DOL concedes that permittees have a “limited ability to

  transfer costs to the contracting agency or raise prices of the services that [they]

  offer[],” which “may result in reduced profits in certain instances.” Id. at 67,153,

  67,206. However, DOL makes clear that such reduced profits will only occur when

  “none of the beneficial effects”—such as reduced absenteeism and improved

  productivity—“discussed in [DOL’s] analysis appl[ies].” Id. at 67,206. Thus, even

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  under Appellants’ interpretation, the DOL’s rule has a sufficiently close nexus to the

  values of economy and efficiency.

        Indeed, Kahn—i.e., the case that Appellants primarily rely upon to support

  their position—confirms our conclusion. There, the D.C. Circuit upheld an executive

  order issued under FPASA that required federal contractors to comply with certain

  wage and price controls to curb inflation. See Kahn, 618 F.2d at 785–86. The court

  acknowledged that the order could cause the government to award contracts to higher

  bidders that complied with the controls over lower bidders that did not. See id. at

  792–93. It nevertheless concluded that the order’s controls would promote economy

  and efficiency by reducing the overall rate of inflation in government contracting,

  which would “likely have the direct and immediate effect of holding down the

  Government’s procurement costs.” Id. Similarly, here, the DOL’s rule will cause the

  government to award federal permits to contractors that comply with the increased

  minimum wage requirements over those that do not. Yet we defer to DOL’s

  determination that such wage controls could promote economy and efficiency by

  reducing costs in the long-term.

        Accordingly, Appellants are unlikely to succeed on the merits in showing that

  the DOL’s rule lacks a sufficiently close nexus to the statutory objectives of economy

  and efficiency.

                                            C

        Finally, Appellants request that we read FPASA narrowly and “construe any

  uncertainty in” their favor. Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 27. Specifically, they claim that

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  FPASA (1) should not be read to displace other statutory schemes governing

  contractor wages, (2) should be read narrowly given its major economic impact, and

  (3) should be construed to avoid a non-delegation problem. See id. at 27–38. We

  address each argument in turn.

                                             1

        First, Appellants contend that a narrowing construction is appropriate given

  that other federal statutes explicitly impose a minimum wage for federal

  contractors—viz., the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA), the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts

  Act (PCA), and the Service Contract Act (SCA). See id. at 29. More specifically,

  Appellants assert that Congress spoke directly in the DBA, PCA, and SCA “to the

  issue of whether federal contractors should be required to pay a minimum wage.” Id.

  As such, they claim that “[i]t is ‘implausible’ that Congress meant to grant the

  President [through FPASA] the ‘implicit power to create an alternative to the explicit

  and detailed [] scheme’ that Congress set out in these statutes.” Id. at 30 (quoting

  New Mexico v. Dep’t of Interior, 854 F.3d 1207, 1226 (10th Cir. 2017)). We are

  unpersuaded.

        Appellants primarily rely on New Mexico v. Department of Interior to support

  their argument. In New Mexico, we addressed whether a regulation promulgated by

  the U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

  (IGRA) complied with the “explicit and detailed remedial scheme” outlined in the

  very same statute. 854 F.3d at 1226. The statutory scheme called for tribes and

  states to negotiate compacts permitting gaming on reservations, and it authorized

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  tribes to sue states in federal court when states failed to negotiate in good faith. See

  id. at 1211. If the court found that a state failed to negotiate in good faith, the statute

  then authorized the court to issue injunctive relief, after which the statute authorized

  the DOI to issue gaming procedures. See id. at 1212. But after Congress enacted the

  IGRA, the Supreme Court “made clear that a state can invoke sovereign immunity in

  response to such a suit.” Id. at 1211 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517

  U.S. 44, 47 (1996)). In response to the Court’s decision, DOI—pursuant to its

  alleged authority under the IGRA—issued a rule that prescribed the applicable

  gaming procedures for when a district court dismissed a tribe’s suit based on

  sovereign immunity. See id.

         New Mexico held that the DOI rule was unlawful because it deviated “in

  fundamental ways” from the “remedial scheme” Congress enacted in the IGRA. Id.

  at 1225–28. Specifically, we found “implausible the Secretary’s assertion of implicit

  power to create an alternative to the explicit and detailed remedial scheme that IGRA

  prescribes.” Id. at 1226.

         However, the present matter is distinguishable. In New Mexico, the agency

  claimed authority under a particular statute—the IGRA—to issue rules in an area

  where the very same statute created its own “explicit and detailed remedial scheme.”

  Id. Accordingly, we found it “implausible” that the IGRA would grant the agency

  “implicit power to create an alternative” procedure where the statute set out its own

  in such detail. Id. However, the DOL has claimed no such authority here.

  Specifically, it has not issued minimum wage rules under the authority of statutes

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  providing for their own statutory minimum wage schemes for federal contractors—

  i.e., the DBA, PCA, and SCA. Rather, it has issued minimum wage rules under a

  separate statute—FPASA—where the rules do not constitute an alternative regulatory

  scheme. Accordingly, New Mexico has virtually nothing to say about the propriety of

  the DOL’s action here.

        Furthermore, Appellants concede that the minimum wage rule issued pursuant

  to FPASA does not “conflict[]” with the DBA, PCA, and SCA, as those statutes set

  only minimum wage requirements—i.e., a floor below which wages are not allowed

  to fall. Aplts.’ Reply Br. at 15. Stated another way, the DBA, PCA, and SCA do not

  preclude the higher-wage requirement issued here. Thus, this is not a case where we

  must apply “the well-established principle that, when two statutes conflict, the

  ‘specific governs the general.’” R-S-C v. Sessions, 869 F.3d 1176, 1184 (10th Cir.

  2017) (emphasis added) (quoting Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21

  (2012)).

        Similarly, Appellants fail to support any claim that the later-enacted SCA

  (passed in 1965) displaces any authority to regulate contractor wages under FPASA

  (passed in 1949). “The later statute displaces the first only when the statute

  ‘expressly contradict[s] the original act’ or if such a construction ‘is absolutely

  necessary . . . in order that [the] words [of the later statute] shall have any meaning at

  all.’” Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

  (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548

  (1988)). Appellants make no such showing here.

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         Rather, Appellants contend that the issue is whether we should interpret

  FPASA to “broadly grant power over [federal contractor] wages” when it does not

  reference wages, and other statutes establish specific rules in this area. Aplts.’ Reply

  Br. at 15. But Appellants do not cite to any provision in these statutes foreclosing the

  authority to set higher minimum wage requirements. And Congress frequently sets

  minimum requirements while expecting that other entities will adopt more stringent

  regulations. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 261–63

  (1976) (holding that a provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA) authorized states to

  issue emissions regulations that are “more stringent” than national standards).

  Although states are often the actors that impose higher standards, the federal

  government does so too in certain circumstances, as envisioned in the Fair Labor

  Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (“No provision of this chapter . . . shall

  excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance

  establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this

  chapter.” (emphasis added)). Thus, contrary to Appellants’ assertions, there is no

  indication here that Congress intended for any of the minimum wage statutes to

  preclude the payment of higher wages to employees working on or in connection with

  covered contracts. Accordingly, we are unwilling to apply a narrowing construction

  on this basis.

                                             2

         Next, Appellants contend that “the Procurement Act must be read narrowly

  given its major economic impact.” Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 32 (bold-face font

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  omitted). Specifically, Appellants claim that the DOL’s rule “‘is economically

  significant,’ since it would result in direct costs to employers of ‘$1.7 billion per year

  over 10 years.’” Id. at 32–33 (quoting 86 Fed. Reg. at 67,194) (emphasis omitted).

  Given its economic significance, Appellants contend that we “must meet DOL’s rule

  ‘with a measure of skepticism,’ and look for a clear statement from Congress.” Id. at

  33 (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 573 U.S. 302, 304 (2014)).

  Appellants assert this is especially true given the DOL’s “reed-thin” statutory

  argument. Id. We are unpersuaded.

        Although courts generally “enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language

  according to its terms,” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251

  (2010), “[w]here the statute at issue is one that confers authority upon an

  administrative agency,” there are certain “‘extraordinary cases’ that . . . provide a

  ‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer such authority.”

  West Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022) (quoting Food &

  Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000)).

  In such cases, “the agency must . . . point to ‘clear congressional authorization’” for

  the proposed regulation. Id. at 723 (quoting Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 324).

        In this vein, the so-called Major Questions Doctrine applies where “an agency

  claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a

  significant portion of the American economy’” or make “decisions of vast ‘economic

  and political significance.’” Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brown & Williamson,

  529 U.S. at 159–60). In arguing that the Major Questions Doctrine applies,

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  Appellants focus on the economic effects of the broader minimum wage rule, which

  covers both non-procurement and procurement contractors. For the purposes of

  deciding this appeal, we will assume—without deciding—that Appellants framing of

  the specific “question” implicating the Major Questions Doctrine is correct.5

  Nonetheless, their argument is unavailing for four reasons.

        First, this is not a case in which the executive branch seeks to locate expansive

  authority in “modest words,” “vague terms or ancillary provisions.” Whitman v. Am.

  Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); see also West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 724

  (applying Major Questions Doctrine where the EPA claimed authority to

  “substantially restructure the American energy market” based on “an ‘ancillary

  provision[]’ of the [CAA],” which “was designed to function as a gap filler” (first

        5
                We note that Appellants’ framing of the specific “question” implicating
  the Major Questions Doctrine may not be correct. In particular, the primary issue
  presented on appeal is whether FPASA grants authority to regulate non-procurement
  recreational service permittees, such as AVA and other CROA members. Yet, in
  arguing the Major Questions Doctrine applies, Appellants shift their focus to the
  economic effects of the broader minimum wage rule. This appears to be in tension
  with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence—which focuses on the effects of the
  challenged action to determine whether it presents a purportedly “major” question.
  See Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 312–314; MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Tel. &
  Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1994). If we were instead to frame the “major”
  question as DOL’s authority to regulate non-procurement permittees, that would
  clearly not pose a question of “vast ‘economic and political significance.’” Util. Air,
  573 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160). However, because
  the Appellees do not challenge the Appellants’ framing of the question, we will
  assume that Appellants’ framing is correct for purposes of resolving this appeal. See,
  e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (“In our adversary system,
  in both civil and criminal cases, . . . . we rely on the parties to frame the issues for
  decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties
  present.”).
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  alteration in original) (quoting Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468)). Instead, as discussed

  supra, FPASA authorizes the President to “prescribe policies and directives that the

  President considers necessary to carry out this subtitle,” 40 U.S.C. § 121(a), which

  includes “provid[ing] the Federal Government with an economical and efficient

  system for . . . [p]rocuring and supplying property and nonpersonal services,” 40

  U.S.C. § 101(1). In employing such expansive language, “Congress chose to utilize a

  relatively broad delegation of authority in the Federal Property and Administrative

  Services Act of 1949.” City of Albuquerque, 379 F.3d at 914. Accordingly, the

  DOL’s interpretation of FPASA does not involve “hid[ing] elephants in mouseholes.”

  Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468.

        Second, Utility Air makes clear that the Supreme Court’s concern is with an

  “enormous and transformative expansion in . . . regulatory authority without clear

  congressional authorization.” 573 U.S. at 324. Here, however, EO 14,026 and the

  DOL’s rule do not exercise the government’s traditional “regulatory authority.” Id.

  Instead, they invoke the government’s proprietary authority. To be sure “[a]n

  exercise of proprietary authority can amount to a regulation if it seeks to regulate

  conduct unrelated to the government’s proprietary interests.” Georgia v. President of

  the U.S., 46 F.4th 1283, 1314 n.3 (11th Cir. 2022) (Anderson, J., concurring in part

  and dissenting in part); see also Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d

  28, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that an executive order “establish[ed] no condition

  that can be characterized as ‘regulatory’” because it did not “address . . . projects

  unrelated to those in which the Government has a proprietary interest”). But here,

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  the DOL’s rule relates to the government’s proprietary interest in the “economical

  and efficient” procurement of services. 40 U.S.C. § 101(1).

        “Like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the

  unrestricted power . . . to determine those with whom it will deal.” Perkins v. Luken

  Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940). Here, the challenged minimum-wage

  requirement does not apply to employers generally, or even to employees of covered

  employers who do not perform work on or in connection with federal contractors.

  Instead, the rule simply reflects the President’s management decision that the federal

  government will do business with companies only on terms he regards as promoting

  economy and efficiency. More specifically, the President has determined that he will

  issue permits—granting access to federal lands for the supply of guided tours—to

  outfitters that comply with the minimum wage rule, which he deems necessary to

  carry out the objectives of economy and efficiency. This exercise of proprietary

  authority is entirely within the bounds of the President’s authority. See NASA v.

  Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 148 (2011) (noting that when the government acts “in its

  capacity ‘as proprietor’ and manager of its ‘internal operation,’” it “has a much freer

  hand” than when it “exercise[s] its sovereign power ‘to regulate.’” (quoting Cafeteria

  & Rest. Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961))).

        Third, even assuming DOL is exercising significant regulatory authority, the

  Supreme Court has typically applied the Major Questions Doctrine where an “agency

  claim[ed] to discover” regulatory authority for the first time “in a long-extant

  statute.” Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 324; see id. (“When an agency claims to discover in a

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  long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the

  American economy,’ we typically greet its announcement with a measure of

  skepticism.” (citation omitted) (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159));

  Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. ----, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2023) (“The Secretary has

  never previously claimed powers of this magnitude under the HEROES Act.”).

        By contrast, over the decades since it was enacted, presidents have issued

  numerous executive orders under FPASA that regulate federal contractors to promote

  economy and efficiency in procurement and supply. Most relevant here, presidents

  during the past three administrations have issued executive orders under FPASA that

  imposed minimum wage requirements for federal contractors. See EO 13,658 (Feb.

  12, 2014), 79 Fed. Reg. 9851; EO 13,838 (May 25, 2018), 83 Fed. Reg. 25,341

  (amending EO 13,658 to exempt recreational service workers without otherwise

  revoking the minimum wage requirement and determining that the minimum wage

  requirement still applied to “lodging and food services associated with seasonal

  recreational services”); EO 14,026 (Apr. 27, 2021), 86 Fed. Reg. 22,835 (imposing

  an increased minimum wage for federal contractors and rescinding the exemption for

  recreational service workers).

        Furthermore, beyond the specific context of a minimum wage, presidents have

  issued—and courts have upheld—a wide range of orders under FPASA governing

  federal contractors and their workers, often without a direct connection to cost

  reduction. See, e.g., Chao, 325 F.3d at 362, 366–67 (upholding 2001 executive order

  requiring federal contractors to notify employees of certain labor rights); Kahn, 618

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  F.2d at 796 (upholding 1978 executive order regulating contractor prices and wages);

  Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa. v. Sec’y of Lab., 442 F.2d 159, 170–71 (3d Cir. 1971)

  (addressing 1969 executive order imposing affirmative action and non-discrimination

  requirements on certain federal contractors and concluding that FPASA authorized

  the order, partly because it helped prevent contractors from overcharging the

  government). These examples illustrate that unlike West Virginia, Utility Air, and

  Brown & Williamson, here the President did not “‘claim[] to discover in a long-extant

  statute an unheralded power’ representing a ‘transformative expansion in [its]

  regulatory authority.’” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 724 (second alteration in original)

  (quoting Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 324). Instead, consistent with longstanding historical

  practice, the President issued yet another executive order under FPASA that

  regulated federal contractors to promote economy and efficiency in procurement and

  supply.6

        6
                Kentucky is distinguishable for similar reasons. There, the Sixth Circuit
  applied the Major Questions Doctrine in holding that FPASA did not authorize an
  executive order requiring employees of federal contractors to become vaccinated
  against COVID-19. See Kentucky, 23 F.4th at 589, 604, 606–08. Without a clear
  statement from Congress, Kentucky refused to interpret FPASA as authorizing the
  President “to effect major changes in the administration of public health,” a “purpose
  never-before recognized.” Id. at 607. But Kentucky explicitly distinguished orders
  pertaining to “wage and price controls,” non-discrimination, and labor rights, which
  “ha[ve] a ‘close nexus’ to the ordinary hiring, firing, and management of labor.” Id.
  at 607–08 (quoting Kahn, 618 F.2d at 792). The court reasoned that “none of those
  [rationales] comes even close to [mandating] a medical procedure for one-fifth (or
  more) of our workforce,” which it deemed an unprecedented assertion of authority
  under FPASA. Id.

        Here, however, three presidential administrations have imposed a minimum
  wage rule under FPASA, and the rule falls far closer than a vaccine mandate to the
                                            33
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        Moreover, this is not a case in which the agency issuing the minimum wage

  rule lacks “expertise” in the relevant area of policymaking. See, e.g., King v.

  Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (“It is especially unlikely that Congress would

  have delegated [a decision regarding the availability of tax credits for use on health

  insurance exchanges] to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance

  policy of this sort.”); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 265–67 (2006). Clearly,

  DOL does not lack “expertise” in setting minimum wages for federal contractors.

  Indeed, Congress delegated this very responsibility to DOL in a related context. See

  Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 113 v. T&H Servs., 8 F.4th 950, 953–54 (10th Cir.

  2021) (discussing DOL’s role in determining a prevailing wage under the Davis-

  Bacon Act).

        Thus, given that this case differs markedly from those in which the Supreme

  Court applied the Major Questions Doctrine, we decline to apply that doctrine here.

                                             3

        Finally, Appellants argue that we must read FPASA narrowly to avoid the

  constitutional question of whether the statute impermissibly delegates legislative

  authority. See Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 34–38. More specifically, Appellants claim

  that “an interpretation of the Procurement Act that allowed the President to

  unilaterally displace existing minimum wage rules for employers who merely have a

  orders governing “management of labor,” such as “wage and price controls,” id. at
  607, that administrations have imposed since Congress enacted FPASA. As such, we
  think the rationale underlying Kentucky is inapplicable here.
                                             34
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  special use permit” would raise a nondelegation concern. Id. at 35 (emphasis

  omitted). We conclude that no such concerns arise here.

        “[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious

  constitutional problems,” we must “construe the statute to avoid such problems

  unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J.

  DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,

  575 (1988). Under the “nondelegation doctrine,” which is “rooted in the principle of

  separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government[,] . . .

  Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”

  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989). We therefore must interpret

  FPASA in a manner that does not “raise serious” questions under the nondelegation

  doctrine. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575.

        “[A] delegation is constitutional so long as Congress has set out an

  ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the delegee’s exercise of authority.” Gundy v. United

  States, 588 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (plurality opinion) (quoting J.W.

  Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). The Supreme

  Court “[has] ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the

  permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying

  the law.’” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia,

  J., dissenting)). It has struck down statutory provisions under the nondelegation

  doctrine “[o]nly twice in this country’s history[,] . . . in each case because ‘Congress

  had failed to articulate any policy or standard’ to confine discretion.” Gundy, 139 S.

                                             35
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  Ct. at 2129 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7); see also United States v. Rickett,

  535 F. App’x 668, 674–75 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “[b]etween 1789 and

  1935—a period spanning 146 years of constitutional history—the Supreme Court

  ‘never struck down a challenged statute on delegation grounds,’” and that it has done

  so only twice since, both times in 1935 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373)).7 And

  the Court has approved at least arguably broad delegations requiring agencies to

  regulate in the “public interest,” Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216

  (1943), to set prices that in an agency administrator’s “judgment will be generally

  fair and equitable,” Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 421–22, 427 (1944), and to

  set air quality standards that are “requisite to protect the public health,’” Whitman,

  531 U.S. at 472 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).

        Appellants’ nondelegation challenge is untenable under these precedents. For

  example, in Whitman, a provision of the CAA provided an intelligible principle by

  merely delegating authority to set air quality standards that, “in the judgment of the

  [EPA] Administrator” and in conformity with certain statutory criteria, “are requisite

  to protect the public health.” 531 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

  § 7409(b)(1)). The term “requisite” channeled agency discretion because the term

  authorized only actions taken to protect public health that are “sufficient, but not

  more than necessary.” Id. at 473. Similarly, FPASA only authorizes executive

        7
                 Recognizing that this unpublished decision is not binding on us, we rely
  on it for its persuasive value. See, e.g., United States v. Engles, 779 F.3d 1161, 1162
  n.1 (10th Cir. 2015).
                                             36
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  orders that “the President considers necessary” to promote an “economical” and

  “efficient” system for procuring and supplying goods and services. See City of

  Albuquerque, 379 F.3d at 914 n.6. These italicized terms likewise channel executive

  discretion because they encompass only actions that the President considers

  necessary to increase productivity or quality of service in procurement and supply

  with little or no waste.

         This analysis is also consistent with our precedent. In City of Albuquerque, a

  city brought a challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act arguing that the

  Department of Interior violated an executive order issued pursuant to FPASA by

  selecting office space in a manner that conflicted with procedures dictated under the

  order. See 379 F.3d at 904–05, 913. To establish prudential standing, the city had to

  demonstrate that it was “within the ‘zone of interests’ of a statute supporting standing

  under the [APA].” Id. at 913.8 Because neither the executive order nor FPASA

  provided an explicit right of action, the city needed to establish that the executive

  order had a “statutory foundation,” in which case “it is given the effect of a

  congressional statute.” Id. (quoting City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. United States

  Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1166 (9th Cir. 1997)).

         8
                 Since we decided City of Albuquerque, the Supreme Court has clarified
  that “the zone of interests test is not prudential in origin and is indeed not a standing
  inquiry at all.” Hill v. Warsewa, 947 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 2020). However,
  this clarification has no material relevance to our analysis here of Appellants’
  nondelegation challenge.

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        We concluded that FPASA “provide[d] a sufficient statutory foundation for

  [the executive order].” Id. at 914. As we explained, “Congress may delegate

  responsibility to the executive branch so long as Congress provides an ‘intelligible

  principle’ to guide the exercise of the power.” Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S.

  at 409). We recognized that Congress used “a relatively broad delegation of

  authority in [FPASA],” but we explained that Congress “instruct[ed] the President’s

  exercise of authority should establish ‘an economical and efficient system for . . . the

  procurement and supply’ of property.” Id. (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 471 (2000), currently

  codified at 40 U.S.C. § 101)). And we concluded that directions in the executive

  order “concerning the consideration of locations within [a] central business area are

  sufficiently related to [FPASA] to be a valid exercise of the Act’s delegated

  authority.” Id. In so holding, we recognized that FPASA provides an “intelligible

  principle” by only authorizing actions that promote economy and efficiency in

  procurement and supply. See id. at 914–15.9

        9
                 Appellants attempt to distinguish City of Albuquerque, claiming that we
  “upheld [FPASA] against a delegation challenge because the economy and efficiency
  limits meaningfully cabined the President’s authority.” Aplts.’ Reply Br. at 21. But
  City of Albuquerque found no delegation concern with an executive order governing
  office-site selection that had no obvious connection to cost reduction. See 379 F.3d
  at 905, 914–15 (addressing order requiring agencies to prioritize central business
  districts in selecting office space, without any mention of reducing costs).
  Appellants do not explain why FPASA “meaningfully cabined the President’s
  authority” in connection with that order but fails to do so in connection with the
  minimum wage rule. Aplts.’ Reply Br. at 21.

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         Thus, given the clear guidance of our precedent, we must conclude that the

  rule at issue here does not present any nondelegation concerns.

                                             ***

         Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that Appellants have not

  shown a likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL’s rule was issued without

  statutory authority. More specifically, the district court did not err in concluding that

  FPASA likely authorizes the minimum wage rule because the DOL’s rule permissibly

  regulates the supply of nonpersonal services and advances the statutory objectives of

  economy and efficiency.

                                              V

         Next, Appellants challenge the DOL’s minimum wage rule as arbitrary and

  capricious due to three purported defects in its rescission of the exemption for

  recreational services: first, because it failed to “consider[] alternatives” to rescinding

  the exemption; second, because it rescinded the exemption “without acknowledging

  the significant reliance interests at stake”; and third, because it failed to explain why

  it “disregarded its own prior conclusions” pertaining to the exemption. Aplts.’

  Opening Br. at 40. We reject each of these contentions in turn.

         We must “set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

  discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). A rule is

  “arbitrary and capricious if the agency . . . relied on factors . . . Congress has not

  intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,

  offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the

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  agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the

  product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

  Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). We may rely only on explanations “articulated by

  the agency itself.” Id. at 50.

        “Agencies are free to change their existing policies as long as they provide a

  reasoned explanation for the change.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S.

  211, 221 (2016). But “when an agency rescinds a prior policy[,] its reasoned analysis

  must consider the ‘alternative[s]’ that are ‘within the ambit of the existing [policy].’”

  Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. ----, 140 S. Ct.

  1891, 1913 (2020) (second and third alteration in original) (quoting State Farm, 463

  U.S. at 51). And the agency “must ‘be cognizant that longstanding policies may have

  engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.’” Id. (quoting

  Encino, 579 U.S. at 221–22).

        As a starting point, we note that the most fundamental difficulty with

  Appellants’ argument is that the rescission of the 2018 exemption could not have

  been an arbitrary and capricious exercise of agency discretion because the agency

  had no discretion to act otherwise. Specifically, the agency was compelled by the

  2021 executive order to rescind the 2018 executive order, which created the

  exemption. See 86 Fed. Reg. at 22,836–22,837. Indeed, as DOL explained, to

  maintain the exemption would have been “in clear derogation of both the letter and

  spirit” of the 2021 order. 86 Fed. Reg. at 67,154. And Appellants do not dispute that

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  the 2021 order required DOL to eliminate the exemption for recreational service and

  equipment providers.10

        As such, Appellants cannot be correct in stating that it was arbitrary and

  capricious for DOL not to consider alternatives to the rule it adopted or to

  acknowledge the significant reliance interests at stake. As noted above, the 2021

  executive order specifically rescinded the 2018 exemption and thus left DOL no

  discretion to consider maintaining it. Thus, it would have been futile for DOL to

  have considered comments advocating alternatives that it lacked discretion to adopt.

  In other words, to consider and adopt any such alternatives would require DOL to

  defy an executive order—which would clearly constitute an arbitrary and capricious

  agency action. See, e.g., Delgadillo v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1248 (D. Colo.

  2007) (“[A]n executive order dictates an agency’s policy unless or until Congress

  enacts a statutory policy.”); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (requiring courts to set aside

  agency actions that are “not in accordance with law”).

        Furthermore, Appellants mistakenly rely on Regents for their position that the

  APA required the DOL to consider exempting recreational service permittees, and

  any reliance interests the previous exemption engendered among such permittees—

  notwithstanding an executive order that explicitly rescinded the exemption. See

        10
                Appellants have not challenged the 2021 executive order, likely because
  they realize “the President is not an agency within the meaning of the” APA.
  Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). As such, we cannot review—
  under APA standards—whether the 2021 executive order itself adequately justified
  the policy change that it effected.
                                             41
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  Aplts. Opening Br. at 42, 46–47. In Regents, the Supreme Court reviewed the

  rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program by the

  Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. 140 S. Ct. at 1901. The Court held that the

  Acting Secretary’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because she “did not appear

  to appreciate the full scope of her discretion.” Id. at 1911. In particular, the Court

  concluded, the Acting Secretary failed to “consider[]” alternative means of winding

  down the DACA program. Id. at 1915.

         Here, however, the present matter differs from Regents in one critical respect.

  Specifically, unlike the Secretary in Regents, the DOL did not possess the relevant

  discretion; instead, Congress committed to the President himself, not to an agency,

  the determination of what “policies and directives” to “prescribe” for federal

  contracting. 40 U.S.C. § 121(a). Thus, Regents does not support Appellants’

  position. See 140 S. Ct. at 1910; cf. id. (emphasizing “an important constraint on [the

  Acting Secretary of DHS’s] decisionmaking authority—she was bound by the

  Attorney General’s legal determination”).

         Finally, Appellants contend that the DOL acted arbitrarily and capriciously in

  failing to explain why it “disregarded its own prior conclusions” as to the exemption

  for recreational services. Aplts.’ Opening Br. at 40. Specifically, they claim the

  DOL failed to engage “with President Trump’s findings that applying a minimum

  wage rule to outfitters and guides . . . would threaten ‘to raise significantly the cost of

  guided hikes and tours on Federal lands’ . . . and ‘would [negatively affect] . . . hours

  worked by recreational service workers.’” Id. (quoting 83 Fed. Reg. at 25,341).

                                              42
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  They also claim the DOL did not “acknowledge its own prior findings” that

  exempting permittees could lower their cost of business, “which ‘could incentivize

  small outfitters to enter the market,’ ‘incentivize existing outfitters to hire more

  guides’ . . . and provide ‘more affordable guided tours . . . [on] Federal lands.’” Id.

  at 40–41 (quoting 83 Fed. Reg. at 48,540).

        Again, we question whether the DOL was required to provide such an

  explanation—given that it had no discretion to act otherwise. But, in any event, the

  rule explicitly addressed “comments regarding the financial impact of [EO 14,026]”

  on “seasonal recreational businesses.” 86 Fed. Reg. at 67,152. These commenters

  represented that the minimum wage “would result in their business[es] needing to

  reduce employee work hours, reduce services, or increase prices,” thereby restricting

  access to services on federal lands. Id. In response to these comments, the DOL

  “recognize[d] and acknowledge[d] that there may be particular challenges and

  constraints experienced by non-procurement contractors,” including businesses

  offering services on federal lands pursuant to permits, “that do not exist under more

  traditional procurement contracts.” Id. One particular challenge the DOL recognized

  is that “[n]on-procurement . . . contractors cannot as directly pass [increased] costs”

  resulting from a higher minimum wage “along to the Federal Government in the form

  of an increased bid amount or similar charge for the next contract.” Id. at 67,206.

        Notwithstanding these challenges, the DOL “anticipate[d] that the economy

  and efficiency benefits of [EO] 14[,]026 will offset potential costs.” Id. at 67,152.

  The DOL emphasized, in particular, “that increasing the minimum wage . . . can

                                             43
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  reduce absenteeism and turnover in the workplace, improve employee morale and

  productivity, reduce supervisory and training costs, and increase the quality of

  services provided to the Federal Government and the general public.” Id. at 67,153.

  It also noted that “increased efficiency and quality of services” have the potential to

  “attract more customers and result in increased sales.” Id. The DOL recognized that,

  “[i]n limited cases,” an inability to pass labor-cost increases through to the Federal

  government “may result in reduced profits in certain instances,” but only “assuming

  that none of the beneficial effects . . . discussed [supra] apply.” Id. at 67,206.

  We conclude that the DOL’s detailed explanation clearly satisfies (assuming that it

  must do so) the requirement that, when an agency changes its policy, it must

  “‘display awareness that it is changing position’ and ‘show that there are good

  reasons for the new policy.’” Encino, 579 U.S. at 221 (quoting Fed. Commc’ns

  Comm’n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)). As such, we

  conclude that Appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the

  merits that the DOL’s rule is arbitrary and capricious.

                                             VI

        For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying

  Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction.11

        11
                Without objecting to Safari Club’s filing of its amicus brief, Appellees
  move to strike declarations filed with the brief because the declarations include
  evidence that was not submitted to the district court. See Aplees.’ Resp. to Safari
  Club Int’l [hereinafter “Aplees.’ Mtn. to Strike”] at 1 (citing Utah v. U.S. Dep’t of
  Interior, 535 F.3d 1184, 1195 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008)). However, the declarations
  Appellees move to strike simply support points made in Safari Club’s brief, and
                                             44
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  Appellees do not oppose the brief itself. Accordingly, we are hard pressed to see
  how Appellees are harmed by the filing of the declarations. Moreover, we accord no
  material significance to the declarations that goes beyond any that we attach to the
  averments of Safari Club’s brief. Therefore, at least under these unique
  circumstances, we do not see any legal impediment to our consideration of the
  “extra-record evidence” attached to Safari Club’s brief, insofar as it contains “matters
  relevant to the disposition of this case.” N.M. Oncology & Hematology Consultants,
  Ltd. v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 994 F.3d 1166, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 2021).
  Accordingly, we deny Appellees’ motion to strike.
Appellate Case: 22-1023      Document: 010111040629          Date Filed: 04/30/2024       Page: 46

  No. 22-1023, Bradford v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor
  EID, J., dissenting.

         Only Congress can wield legislative power. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Yet the law

  here, by lacking an intelligible principle, delegates just that to the President. The Federal

  Property and Administrative Services Act (“FPASA”) grants the President nearly

  unfettered power to create any policy he considers necessary to carry out nonpersonal

  services under the guise of economy and efficiency. In granting this power, Congress did

  not (1) require the President to conduct any preliminary factfinding or to respond to a

  specified situation. Nor did Congress (2) provide the President a standard that

  sufficiently guides his broad discretion. Accordingly, I would hold that the FPASA runs

  afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully

  dissent.1

                                               I.

         Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress must cabin its delegation of

  legislative authority to the President with an “intelligible principle.” Gundy v. United

  States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (plurality) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court

  has identified an intelligible principle as falling into either of the “two buckets” identified

         1
           Because I would hold the FPASA unconstitutional under the nondelegation
  doctrine, I also respectfully decline to join the majority on whether the Department of
  Labor’s conduct (1) exceeded the authority granted under the FPASA or (2) was
  arbitrary and capricious under the FPASA. See Maj. Op. at Parts IV–V. Given that I
  would hold that the FPASA is invalid in itself, I would go no further into how the
  Department of Labor used the invalid delegation of power. That said, I note that it
  would be hard to imagine any scenario where an agency rule exceeds the FPASA’s
  vast grant of power after the President uses “econom[y]” and “efficien[cy]” as the
  justifications of executive action. 40 U.S.C. § 101(1).
                                                    1
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  in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry

  Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935): “(1) whether the Congress has required any

  finding by the President in the exercise of the authority, and (2) whether the Congress has

  set up a standard for the President’s action.” Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC v. Su,

  79 F.4th 755, 773 (6th Cir. 2023) (Nalbandian, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks

  and citation omitted), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 30, 2024) (No. 23-819); see id. at

  769–76 (explaining the original meaning of Article I and over two centuries of Supreme

  Court precedent on the nondelegation doctrine).

         Under the first “bucket,” a law must contain a situational or fact-finding

  requirement. Panama Refin., 293 U.S. at 415 (considering “whether the Congress has

  required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to enact the

  prohibition”). In many cases, the Supreme Court has upheld laws if executive action can

  only come about as a response to certain situations. See, e.g., Opp Cotton Mills v. Adm’r

  of Wage & Hour Div. of Dep’t of Lab., 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941) (concerning a law

  conditioning the executive’s ability to fix minimum wages on “basic facts to be

  ascertained administratively” and on “factors to be considered in arriving at these

  determinations”); Radio Corp. of Am. v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 416 & n.5 (1951)

  (concerning a law requiring “a justifiable fact situation” before a commission could

  “promulgate standards for transmission of color television”).

         Under the second, a law must contain “a standard” limiting executive discretion.

  Panama Refin., 293 U.S. at 415 (considering “whether the Congress has set up a standard

  for the President’s action”). Some laws delegate to the executive the ability to “fill up the

                                                    2
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  details” in “general provisions.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).

  Even so, the Supreme Court has required that Congress provide a “sufficiently definite

  and precise” standard that can “enable Congress, the courts and the public to ascertain

  whether the [Executive official] . . . has conformed to those standards.” Yakus v. United

  States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944); see Opp Cotton Mills, 312 U.S. at 144. Only then

  could a court be confident of what “general policy” a delegee “must pursue” and the

  “boundaries of [his] authority.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality) (alteration in

  original) (citation omitted). Because if not—if “an absence of standards” makes it

  “impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been

  obeyed”—a nondelegation violation occurs. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426.

         Such permissible, testable standards have taken the form of mandatory “factors”

  that the executive must conform to in acting. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,

  374–76 (1989) (concerning a law requiring the Sentencing Commission to consider

  “seven factors,” a “specific tool” of the “guidelines system,” “three goals,” “four

  ‘purposes,’” and “prohibited” factors (citation omitted)); see, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite

  Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) (concerning a law requiring the executive

  to consider “criteria” before taking any action); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S.

  90, 105 (1946) (same); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 204, 225–26

  (1943) (same); Yakus, 321 U.S. at 419, 427 (same); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160,

  166–67 (1991) (same); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001)

  (same).

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         Lastly, the Supreme Court has noted that the more power a law delegates, the

  more the law must limit that delegation. Indeed, “the degree of agency discretion that is

  acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.”

  Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475; see Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43 (“To determine the

  character of the power given to the Courts by the Process Act, we must inquire into its

  extent.”); cf. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2125–30 (plurality) (stating that a narrow delegation

  that granted “only temporary authority” “was a stopgap, and nothing more”); Yakus, 321

  U.S. at 419, 426 (involving “temporary wartime” measures).

         The bottom line is that courts must examine statutes for an intelligible principle.

  That is because a law delegating power must have one to withstand Article I. As aptly

  summarized from “over two centuries worth of caselaw,” looking for an intelligible

  principle in turn “requires a court to analyze a statute for two things: (1) a fact-finding or

  situation that provokes executive action or (2) standards that sufficiently guide executive

  discretion—keeping in mind that the amount of detail governing executive discretion

  must correspond to the breadth of delegated power.” Allstates Refractory Contractors,

  LLC, 79 F.4th at 776 (Nalbandian, J., dissenting) (cleaned up).

                                              II.

         Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court have decided whether the FPASA

  violates the nondelegation doctrine. The FPASA provides that the President “may

  prescribe policies and directives that [he] considers necessary to carry out” the FPASA

  that are “consistent with” the FPASA. 40 U.S.C. § 121(a). Along those lines, a policy

  objective in the FPASA’s purpose statement seeks to: “provide the Federal Government

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  with an economical and efficient system for . . . [p]rocuring and supplying property and

  nonpersonal services.” Id. § 101(1) (emphases added).

         That is it. That is all the FPASA gives us—no floor of what specific situations

  must arise, no ceiling on what the President may find economical or efficient to do.

  Instead, the FPASA gives the President nearly unfettered power to regulate any

  nonpersonal service via any contract-like instrument, not limited to a permit like in this

  case. And with that permit or other instrument in hand, the President may do whatever he

  finds necessary to regulate entire industries in the name of what he believes to be

  economical and efficient. Such a broad delegation without limits cannot stand under

  Article I. Yet that is exactly the type of delegation we deal with today.

         I fully acknowledge that the Supreme Court’s body of caselaw for what makes an

  intelligible principle is “not demanding.” Big Time Vapes, Inc. v. FDA, 963 F.3d 436,

  442 (5th Cir. 2020) (Smith, J.) (quoting Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality)). But even

  under those standards, I would hold that the FPASA violates the nondelegation doctrine

  because it lacks an intelligible principle. That is because the FPASA provides no

  (1) fact-finding or situational requirement that prompts executive action. Nor does it

  provide a (2) standard that sufficiently guides the President’s discretion on what he finds

  economically or efficiently necessary. Especially when considering the broad scope of

  power that the FPASA delegates—the ability to regulate any industry of someone who

  has a contract-like instrument with the federal government—Congress did not sufficiently

  limit executive discretion.

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                                                A.

         My analysis on the first category of what makes an intelligible principle will be

  quick. That is because the FPASA does not require the President to conduct any fact-

  finding or wait for any situation to occur before he “may prescribe policies and directives

  that [he] considers necessary.” 40 U.S.C. § 121(a); see Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at

  541–42; Panama Refin., 293 U.S. at 417–18, 430. The FPASA provides no requirement

  to “obtain[] needed data,” no need to determine “the facts justifying” any changes. J.W.

  Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405 (1928); see Opp Cotton Mills,

  312 U.S. at 145 (finding an intelligible principle because, in addition to requiring the

  executive to consider certain “factors,” the law required “basic facts to be ascertained

  administratively”). Nor does the President need to wait till he can respond to “a

  justifiable fact situation.” Radio Corp. of Am., 341 U.S. at 416.

         In contrast, he “may prescribe policies or directives” he “considers necessary to

  carry out” the “[p]rocuring and supplying” of “nonpersonal services” or other “related

  functions.” 40 U.S.C. §§ 101(1), 121(a). When he “may” act lies solely within his own

  discretion, id. § 121(a), for he “may accept, modify, or reject them as he pleases.”

  Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 539. No threat to an “economical and efficient system” of

  any “function” related to “[p]rocuring and supplying . . . nonpersonal services” needs to

  arise before the President can do what he believes necessary. 40 U.S.C. § 101(1). And

  even if such a threat came about, the FPASA explains that the President “may,” not shall,

  “prescribe policies and directives.” Id. § 121(a). Thus, nothing requires the President to

  prescribe any policy or directive in response. Id.; see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

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  Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 112 (2012) (“The traditional, commonly

  repeated rule is that shall is mandatory and may is permissive[.]”). Thus, without

  anything occurring beforehand, the FPASA provides an open invite for the President to

  do whatever he “considers necessary” to regulate entire industries via a contract or a

  contract-like instrument, like the permit in this case. 40 U.S.C. § 121(a).

         The FPASA then does not have an intelligible principle under the first category, as

  it does not contain a fact-finding or situation requirement.

                                                B.

         Nor does the FPASA contain a sufficient standard. Given the broad delegation of

  power at issue here, the FPASA does not contain standards that sufficiently limit the

  President’s discretion. Indeed, we need only compare the statute here with those in other

  nondelegation cases to make that conclusion.

         I start with what the FPASA does have: Only two provisions may possibly serve

  as the basis for a standard. To begin, there is the provision delegating authority to the

  President. Section 121(a) of the FPASA makes it clear that the “President may prescribe

  policies and directives that the President considers necessary to carry out” the FPASA

  that are also “consistent with” the FPASA. Id. And working in conjunction with that

  provision, the FPASA also has a purpose statement containing a broad policy objective—

  a goal to provide the Federal Government with an “economical” and “efficient” system

  for activities, which include “[p]rocuring and supplying . . . nonpersonal services.” Id.

  § 101(1). Taken together, the President may do what he finds necessary to carry out the

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  FPASA as long as he thinks the federal government would have an economical or

  efficient system.

         That is not a standard. If Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry stand for

  anything, it is that a “general outline of policy,” Panama Refin., 293 U.S. at 417, or

  “statement of [] general aims,” Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541, cannot form an

  intelligible principle without additional limits. “[S]uch a preface of generalities as to

  permissible aims,” without more, is a “delegation of legislative power [] unknown to our

  law,” “utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”

  Id. at 537. And here, the FPASA provides nothing more.

         Appellees argue that the President is bound by the FPASA’s purpose statement,

  which states that he can only “provide the Federal Government with an economical and

  efficient system.” 40 U.S.C. § 101. Importantly, nowhere in the FPASA does it require

  that the President only make regulations that are “economical and efficient” by some

  objective standard. Id. Indeed, the FPASA ensures that the President need only take his

  own subjective opinion into account. Id.

         Again, the FPASA allows the President to take any measures “that the President

  considers necessary to carry out” the FPASA. Id. § 121(a) (emphasis added). This

  phrase places all discretion in the President’s hands, requiring nothing and no one else to

  constrain what he “considers necessary.” Id. (emphasis added). Along those lines,

  although the FPASA defines some terms, see id. § 102, the law does not define what

  “economical” and “efficient” mean, id. § 101. It instead leaves the defining to the

  President. See id. § 121(a).

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         What is worse, the FPASA also specifies that the “purpose” of the law “is to

  provide the Federal Government” with a “system.” Id. § 101. Critically, the FPASA

  does not serve anyone or anything else but the federal government. What seems

  “economical” and “efficient” is not just left to the President’s subjective opinion but is

  always in the federal government’s best interest because the FPASA does not require the

  President to consider how river rafters, a state, or any private citizen may view what is

  “economical” and “efficient.” Id. § 101. It only requires him to consider what he alone

  considers necessary to benefit himself or other parts of the federal government. Id.

  § 121(a).

         Accordingly, the FPASA provides no objective “criterion” that the President

  “must conform to,” Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co., 310 U.S. at 397–98, no mandatory or

  prohibited “factors” that he must consider when creating a policy or directive, Mistretta,

  488 U.S. at 375–76; cf. Touby, 500 U.S. at 167 (holding that the “multiple specific

  restrictions on the Attorney General’s discretion . . . satisfy the constitutional

  requirements of the nondelegation doctrine”). The lack of some objective basis to turn to

  means that practically speaking, nothing limits the “breadth of the [President’s]

  discretion” or narrows the “wide field of legislative possibilities” to which the FPASA

  can extend. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 538. Nothing requires him to use any basis

  for determining what he “may . . . consider[]” “economical” or “efficient.” 40 U.S.C.

  §§ 101, 121(a); see Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 431–32 (“To hold that he is free to

  select as he chooses from the many and various objects generally described in [a law’s

  purpose statements], and then to act without making any finding with respect to any

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  object that he does select, and the circumstances properly related to that object, would be

  in effect to make the conditions inoperative and to invest him with an uncontrolled

  legislative power.”).

         In a similar vein, simply looking to § 121(a), the policy or directive that the

  President takes need not actually be “necessary” by some objective means—means not

  otherwise specified in the FPASA. 40 U.S.C. § 121(a). The President need only

  subjectively “consider[]” a policy or directive “necessary.” Id. Again, the language here

  places all decision-making in the President’s hands.

         The majority equates the FPASA’s use of “necessary,” id., to the term “requisite”

  in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), and concludes that

  the use of a word like “necessary” creates an intelligible principle. I respectfully disagree

  with this proposition because the law at issue in Whitman remains inapposite for at least

  two reasons.

         First, the phrasing of the FPASA makes the term “necessary” give rather than limit

  power. That is because, again, the FPASA does not require that the President’s policies

  actually be necessary, only that he subjectively “considers [them] necessary” to do

  whatever he wants under the act. 40 U.S.C. § 121(a) (emphasis added).

         In contrast, the relevant language in Whitman pointed to “a discrete set of

  pollutants and [was] based on published air quality criteria that reflect the latest scientific

  knowledge,” under which the “EPA must establish uniform national standards at a level

  that is requisite to protect public health from the adverse effects of the pollutant in the

  ambient air.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473 (citation omitted) (emphases added). Reading

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  the phrases fully informs how to interpret the term “requisite.” Unlike the term

  “necessary” here, the term “requisite” is not based solely on some subjective opinion of

  the President, but rather on what “is requisite” or “sufficient, but not more than

  necessary” to protect public health from the adverse effects of pollutants. Id. (emphasis

  added).

           Keeping that in mind, the FPASA and Whitman’s uses of “necessary” and

  “requisite” are diametrically opposed: the FPASA seeks to give power to the President to

  do more by what he “considers” necessary (i.e., to “carry out the act”), whereas the law in

  Whitman seeks to limit power by objective means (i.e., at some “level” designed “to

  protect public health” “based on published air quality criteria that reflect the latest

  scientific knowledge”). Otherwise said, because of the FPASA’s subjectivity, the

  President does not have to do what “is requisite,” id., or what is “necessary” to cure or

  respond to any situation; he need only do what he “considers necessary.” Whereas,

  Whitman’s use of “requisite” is tethered to some objective means specified in the law

  there.

           Second, in any case, that the FPASA includes the word “necessary” is not enough

  in itself to create a standard. Against this point, the majority states that the Supreme

  Court has approved broad delegations requiring agencies to regulate in the “public

  interest,” to set prices that in an agency administrator’s “judgment will be generally fair

  and equitable,” and to set air quality standards that are “requisite to protect the public

  health.” Maj. Op. at 36 (citations omitted).

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         Importantly, I seek to clarify that although the Court has “over and over upheld

  even very broad delegations,” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality), “no Supreme Court

  case has found that the phrasing of a law”—such as the use of the word “necessary”—

  “alone creates an intelligible principle,” Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC, 79 F.4th

  at 782–83 (Nalbandian, J., dissenting). To date, every law with a broad phrase that the

  Supreme Court has looked at had other things that provided sufficient guidance on the

  “boundaries of [delegated] authority.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality) (citation

  omitted); see Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 216 (involving a law that required fact-

  finding “to correct the abuses disclosed by its investigation of chain broadcasting”);

  Yakus, 321 U.S. at 419, 427 (concerning a “temporary wartime measure” to fix prices

  while requiring the executive to consider factors such as “prices prevailing in a stated

  base period” and “fair and equitable” prices).

         Even the law in Whitman had other limits on the delegation that made it fall in line

  with the Supreme Court’s intelligible principle requirement. See 531 U.S. at 473

  (requiring the EPA to “base[]” its policy “on published air quality criteria that reflect the

  latest scientific knowledge”). Thus, the fact that the FPASA has the word “necessary”

  does not itself end the conversation of whether we have a nondelegation problem.

         In fact, we know that using a term like “necessary” is not sufficient just by looking

  at Schechter Poultry, which involved a law using nearly identical language to the

  FPASA. 295 U.S. at 523 & n.4 (“The President may . . . impose such conditions . . . as

  the President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy herein declared.”

  (emphasis added)). Thus, the use of the term “necessary,” with nothing else limiting the

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  President but general policy objectives, “in no way limit[s] the authority” vested in him.

  Id. at 539. The FPASA should then meet the same fate as the incredibly similar law in

  Schechter Poultry: we should deem it unconstitutional.

         Moreover, the only way that the FPASA limits the President is by his own accord,

  i.e., what he “considers necessary” as “consistent with” the FPASA. Certainly, the

  President can act within whatever subjective bounds he “considers necessary.” 40 U.S.C.

  § 121(a). Indeed, he might follow an internalized golden rule from Whitman, that he can

  only issue policies “sufficient, but not more than necessary” to carry out the FPASA. 531

  U.S. at 473.

         But that “very choice” to do so is a form of discretion that the Supreme Court has

  already identified as a nondelegation no-no. Id. (“The idea that an agency can cure an

  unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that

  power seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the

  power to exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had

  omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.”).

         In the end, the “absence of standards” over what exactly the President may

  consider necessary to do makes it “impossible . . . to ascertain whether the will of

  Congress has been obeyed.” Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426. No “boundaries of . . . authority”

  exist. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality) (quoting Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at

  105). In no way can we test what the President himself considers necessary. That the

  bounds of delegated authority are left unbound also explains why the majority cannot

  hold that the agency action here was unlawful under the FPASA or arbitrary or

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  capricious. Truly, it is hard to see how any court would be able to strike down a law

  under the FPASA. As such, I would hold that a “delegation of legislative authority

  trenching on the principle of separation of powers has occurred.” Skinner v. Mid-Am.

  Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218 (1989) (citation omitted).

         Even if the FPASA did have some sort of testable standard (it does not), it would

  fail to sufficiently guide the President’s discretion. Again, with great delegated power

  comes great specificity; that is, “the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies

  according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.” Whitman, 531 U.S. at

  475; see Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC, 79 F.4th at 787 (Nalbandian, J.,

  dissenting) (collecting cases). And as here, when the grant of power can “affect the

  entire national economy,” Congress “must provide substantial guidance.” Whitman, 531

  U.S. at 475.

         This case poses a good example of just how far the President’s authority under the

  FPASA can extend. Here, the Department of Labor set up a minimum-wage scheme over

  the river rafting industry, imposing additional requirements on river guides who are

  required to have a federal permit to operate their businesses in the first place. Minimum

  wages are one thing. Nothing stops the President from imposing whatever other

  requirements he “considers necessary” to complete his vision of “an economical and

  efficient system” for “nonpersonal services.” 40 U.S.C. §§ 101(1), 121(a).

         River rafters aside, nothing stops the President from regulating other types of

  federal permits in the guise of economy and efficiency. Indeed, permits for all sorts of

  activities with the federal government are all at risk, whether that be a permit for cutting

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  down a single Christmas tree in a national forest, a one-night stay on a federal campsite,

  or even a visit to the U.S. Capitol. Nothing stops the President; he may impose any

  conditions at any time as long as he considers the conditions necessary.

         The FPASA essentially allows the President to come in and change the terms of

  any contract or contract-like instrument at any time based on his subjective belief of what

  he “considers necessary” to carry out the FPASA if he thinks it “consistent with” the

  law’s broad policy objectives. Id. § 121(a). The FPASA does not only govern one

  industry, see, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 214 (involving just the radio industry),

  nor does it provide only “temporary authority,” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality); see

  Yakus, 321 U.S. at 419. Rather, the delegation broadly effects every nonpersonal service

  with the federal government, which spans industries of all kinds—import and export,

  aviation, broadcasting, you name it.

         Not to mention, “nonpersonal services” are but one subset of many “functions”

  over which the President can regulate. 40 U.S.C. § 101(1). The FPASA continues,

  stating that the President “may” similarly “prescribe policies and directives” for “related

  functions including contracting, inspection, storage, issue, setting specifications,

  identification and classification, transportation and traffic management, establishment of

  pools or systems for transportation of Government personnel and property by motor

  vehicle within specific areas, management of public utility services, repairing and

  converting, establishment of inventory levels, establishment of forms and procedures, and

  representation before federal and state regulatory bodies.” Id. The President can no

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  doubt abuse this language to regulate entire industries while claiming that he believes it

  “necessary” to carry out these broad “functions.” Id. at §§ 101(1), 121(a).

                                                  ***

         Given that the FPASA delegates the President the freedom to do as he pleases,

  Congress needed to confine the President’s authority in more detail. It did not.

  Consequently, not only does the FPASA not contain (1) a fact-finding or situational

  requirement to arise before executive action, but the FPASA also does not have (2) a

  sufficient standard that guides the President’s broad delegation. Therefore, the law

  contains no intelligible principle and thus violates the nondelegation doctrine.

                                                C.

         Appellees make several arguments in response. To start, they argue that this

  Circuit’s precedent “forecloses” any nondelegation concern. Aple. Br. at 36. And the

  majority takes the bait. Improperly, Appellees and the majority both point to this Court’s

  decision in City of Albuquerque v. U.S. Department of Interior, 379 F.3d 901 (10th Cir.

  2004), arguing that the case determined that the FPASA had an intelligible principle. Not

  so.

         City of Albuquerque concerned whether the FPASA provided “sufficient statutory

  foundation” for the issuance of an executive order, which could then serve as a “basis for

  standing under the Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. at 914–15. Even though the

  parties did not contest a nondelegation issue on appeal, this Court mentioned in passing

  that “Congress may delegate responsibility to the executive branch so long as Congress

  provides an ‘intelligible principle.’” Id. at 914 (citation omitted). Next, this Court went

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  on to say—while not coming down one way or another on the issue of a potential

  nondelegation violation—two things.

         First, we stated that Congress “chose to utilize a relatively broad delegation of

  authority,” instructing the President to establish “‘an economical and efficient system for

  . . . the procurement and supply’ of property.” Id. (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 101). And that

  was all. To be clear, this Court did not say anything about the FPASA’s constitutionality

  under Article I; this Court did not reach an issue not briefed on appeal. Second, given

  that broad delegation, this Court went on to say that the executive order was a “valid

  exercise of the [FPASA’s] delegated authority,” id.—a predictable outcome given how

  far-reaching the FPASA is.

         In all, this Court does not afford precedential weight to an opinion’s discussion

  that alludes to a constitutional doctrine (that was not before the Court) in the mix of

  determining another issue (that was). See, e.g., Thompson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 582 F.3d

  1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2009) (considering as dicta “statements and comments in an

  opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor

  essential to determination of the case in hand” (citation omitted)). As such, whether the

  FPASA violates the nondelegation doctrine is a matter of first impression in this

  Circuit—a matter that I would answer in the affirmative.

         Next, Appellees argue that the Constitution does not “deny[] to the Congress the

  necessary resources of flexibility and practicality . . . to perform its function.” Aple. Br.

  at 38 (quoting Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425). Rather, they assert that “in our increasingly

  complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,” the Supreme

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  Court has understood that “Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate

  power under broad general directives.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.

         Yes, that all holds true. But even so, Congress still has a responsibility to have an

  intelligible principle in its laws by, for instance, creating “sufficiently definite and

  precise” standards, Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426, that require or “prohibit[]” the President to

  base executive action on the consideration of specified “factors,” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at

  375–76 (citation omitted). And the FPASA did not provide a sufficient standard here

  besides allowing the President to prescribe policies by any means he “considers

  necessary.” 40 U.S.C. § 121(a); see supra Part II.B.

         Lastly, Appellees argue that even if more specific statutory guidance might be

  required in some circumstances, “it is not needed in a statute that addresses federal

  procurement of goods and services.” Aple. Br. at 38. But the cases they cite do not lend

  them support. To begin, the law here does not merely tell the executive to “expend[]”

  federal funds for specified purposes. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308,

  322 (1937). Next, the FPASA does not just reiterate that the President has the authority

  to “make a valid contract” between the federal government and someone else. Jessup v.

  United States, 106 U.S. 147, 152 (1882) (collecting cases).

         Here, the FPASA abdicates Congress’s law-making function, leaving the President

  to “prescribe” any “polic[y]” or “directive[]”—whether it be a minimum wage scheme or

  any other regulation—that he (and he alone) “considers necessary.” 40 U.S.C. § 121(a).

  Because of that, the FPASA diverges from “appropriations” laws that have “never

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  seriously been questioned.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 467 (1998)

  (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

         And nothing in this regulatory authority “governing private conduct” “implicate[s]

  the president’s inherent Article II authority.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2140 (Gorsuch, J.,

  dissenting); see Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC, 79 F.4th at 787 n.15 (Nalbandian,

  J., dissenting) (collecting cases on “powers that would seem to fall in the [e]xecutive’s

  job description, such as matters dealing with war and foreign exchange”). Try as they

  may, Appellees fail to show how “the broader body of law concerning the nondelegation

  doctrine” supports their position. Contra Aple. Br. at 38.

                                              III.

         For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

                                                      19