Court Opinion

ID: 9845489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:23:01.90555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:09.486818
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I believe that the trial court properly struck the answer of Hazel Mills7 based on failure to respond to plaintiff’s request for production of documents and, therefore, properly granted specific performance of the contract to sell realty, I respectfully dissent in *625part. Because I believe that a decision of the fraud claim is premature, I concur in the judgment only regarding that count.
Parker’s request for production of documents was filed and served with the complaint on Hazel Mills and sought production of “[t]he original (or a copy on which the notarial date is legible) of the Quitclaim Deed. . . .” Response or objection to the request was due within 45 days of date of service or October 23, 2000. Neither was filed. Parker’s motion for sanctions, based solely on the failure to produce this deed, was filed on November 13, 2000. Neither the original nor a copy with legible notarial seal was produced by Hazel Mills up to and including the date of the hearing on Parker’s motion for sanctions on January 16, 2001.
Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-37 (d) (1),
If a party . . . fails to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Code Section 9-11-34, after proper service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just; and, among others, it may take any action authorized under subparagraphs (b) (2) (A) through (b) (2) (C) of this Code section [OCGA § 9-11-37].
The latter subparagraph provides that such a failure authorizes “[a]n order . . . dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.”
Trial courts have broad discretion to control discovery, including the imposition of sanctions, and, absent a clear abuse of that discretion, a trial court’s exercise of it will not be reversed. Deep South Constr. v. Slack, 248 Ga. App. 183, 185 (1) (546 SE2d 302) (2001). Also, in making such a determination, the trial court sits as the trier of fact, and a finding by that court of wilful discovery abuse will be upheld if there is any evidence to support it. Cannon Air Transport Svcs. v. Stevens Aviation, 249 Ga. App. 514, 517 (4) (548 SE2d 485) (2001).
Here, no clear abuse has been shown.
Further, even without the issue of the failure to comply with discovery, I believe Parker was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of specific performance of the purchase and sale agreement entered into on May 10, 2000.
Hazel Mills argued below and here that there had been no fraud shown because it had not been proven that she could not convey “good and marketable title to said Property.”
Mills is correct that, as between Parker and herself, Urban Mills’ deed that was not recorded until after the purchase and sale agreement was entered into will not affect Parker’s right to take title. *626Corbin v. Shadburn, 49 Ga. App. 91 (3) (174 SE 259) (1934); see Manchester Motors v. Farmers &C. Bank, 91 Ga. App. 811, 814 (1) (87 SE2d 342) (1955). Therefore, the trial court’s grant of specific performance makes premature any consideration of the fraud claim.
Decided January 17, 2002
Reconsideration denied February 11, 2002.
King, Taylor & Stovall, James F. Stovall III, for appellant.
Shapiro, Fussell, Wedge, Smotherman, Martin & Price, Daniel I. MacIntyre TV, Samuel T. Brannan III, for appellee.

 A default judgment was entered against defendant Urban Mills, and he has not appealed. Urban Mills, through counsel in open court, acknowledged having failed to file an answer. See Aycock v. Calk, 228 Ga. App. 172, 173 (491 SE2d 383) (1997).