Court Opinion

ID: 9931610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 16:01:35.597016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:29.837342
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-4108     Document: 010110997600      Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 1
                                                          FILED
                                              United States Court of Appeals
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS     Tenth Circuit

                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     February 9, 2024
                          _______________________________________
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                        Clerk of Court
     RALAND J. BRUNSON,

          Plaintiff - Appellant,

     v.                                                    No. 23-4108
                                                 (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-00042-HCN)
     SONIA SOTOMAYOR, in her                                (D. Utah)
     official capacity as Justice of the
     Supreme Court of the United States;
     ELENA KAGAN, in her official
     capacity as Justice of the Supreme
     Court of the United States;
     KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, in
     her official capacity as Justice of
     the Supreme Court of the United
     States; JANE DOES 1-100,

          Defendants - Appellees.
                       _______________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _______________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                _______________________________________

 *
      Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have
 decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R.
 App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

       Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
 otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 23-4108   Document: 010110997600   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 2

       This appeal grew out of a disagreement over the outcome in a prior

 suit. In that suit, Mr. Raland Brunson challenged the outcome of the 2020

 presidential election. The district court dismissed the suit, we affirmed,

 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Mr. Brunson brought a second

 suit, which we now address. In the second suit, Mr. Brunson sued three

 Associate Justices of the Supreme Court (Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan,

 and Ketanji Brown Jackson) 1 in their official capacities for denying

 certiorari in the prior case. 2

       The second suit began in state court, and the three Justices removed

 the action to federal district court. The district court ordered dismissal,

 concluding that the Justices enjoyed sovereign immunity. We affirm.

       When an action is removed from state court, the federal court

 considers whether the state court had jurisdiction. If jurisdiction existed in

 state court, the federal court generally acquires jurisdiction if removal is

 otherwise appropriate. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 258

 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). We call this jurisdiction “derivative” because the

 federal court’s jurisdiction derives from the state court’s. See High

 1
       Mr. Brunson also sued 100 Jane Doe defendants, but they are not
 involved in this appeal.
 2
       Mr. Brunson claimed breach of contract, fraud, civil conspiracy, and
 intentional infliction of emotional distress.

                                        2
Appellate Case: 23-4108   Document: 010110997600    Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 3

 Lonesome Ranch, LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Cnty. of Garfield, 61

 F.4th 1225, 1239 (10th Cir. 2023).

       The district court concluded that the state court had lacked

 jurisdiction over Mr. Brunson’s second suit, reasoning that

       •      the official-capacity claims against the Justices were the
              equivalent of claims against the United States and

       •      the United States enjoys sovereign immunity.

 See Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan., 997 F.2d 774, 783 (10th Cir. 1993)

 (stating that an official capacity suit is a way of asserting a claim against

 the entity itself); Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988) (stating that

 the federal government enjoys immunity from suit absent a waiver).

 Because the official-capacity claims triggered the Justices’ sovereign

 immunity, the district court concluded that

       •      the state court lacked jurisdiction and

       •      the federal district court thus lacked derivative jurisdiction.

       In his reply brief, Mr. Brunson points out that derivative jurisdiction

 is not required for removals under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f).

 Section 1441 governs removal when federal jurisdiction is based on diverse

 citizenship or federal questions. But the three Justices removed the action

 under 28 § U.S.C. § 1442 because they were federal officers. For removals

 under § 1442, derivative jurisdiction is still required. High Lonesome

                                        3
Appellate Case: 23-4108   Document: 010110997600   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 4

 Ranch, LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Cnty. of Garfield, 61 F.4th 1225,

 1239–46 (10th Cir. 2023).

       Mr. Brunson argues that even if derivative jurisdiction had been

 required, the state court had jurisdiction because the doctrine of sovereign

 immunity violates the First Amendment’s right to petition for redress of

 grievances. We addressed the same argument in Christensen v. Ward, 916

 F.2d 1462, 1472–73 (10th Cir. 1990). There we rejected this argument,

 reasoning that the right to petition for redress of grievances “focuses on

 procedural impediments to the exercise of existing rights and does not

 prevent a court from holding that a plaintiff has no remedy at law for the

 injuries he may allege.” Id. at 1472.

       We’re bound by our precedent in Christensen, and this precedent

 requires us to recognize the federal government’s sovereign immunity. See

 In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Because the

 government’s sovereign immunity barred jurisdiction in state court, the

 federal district court lacked derivative jurisdiction. See High Lonesome

 Ranch, LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Cnty. of Garfield, 16 F.4th 1225,

 1240 (10th Cir. 2023) (“Because the state trial court never had jurisdiction

 over these crossclaims, upon the United States’ § 1442 removal, ‘the

 federal court acquire[d] none.’” (quoting Lambert Run Coal Co. v.

 Baltimore & O.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922))).

                                         4
Appellate Case: 23-4108   Document: 010110997600   Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 5

       Finally, Mr. Brunson states in his reply brief that a violation of the

 judicial oath vitiates the Associate Justices’ “immunity and jurisdictional

 claims.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 8. But Mr. Brunson doesn’t develop this

 statement into a distinct argument, and the reply brief would have been too

 late for that argument. See Nelson v. City of Albuquerque, 921 F.3d 925,

 931 (10th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the appellant had waived an

 argument by failing to develop it); Martin K. Eby Const. Co. v. OneBeacon

 Ins. Co., 777 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2015) (concluding that an

 appellant waited too long to make an argument by waiting until the reply

 brief).

       Because the state court lacked jurisdiction, we affirm the dismissal

 of the second suit.

                                        Entered for the Court

                                        Robert E. Bacharach
                                        Circuit Judge

                                        5