Court Opinion

ID: 9699959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:00:56.113555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:32.001427
License: Public Domain

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                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-6422

        KEVIN YOUNGER,

                            Plaintiff – Appellee,

                     v.

        TYRONE CROWDER,

                            Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
        Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. (1:16-cv-03269-RDB)

        Argued: October 25, 2022                                     Decided: August 24, 2023

        Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and Sherri A. LYDON, United
        States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Rushing and Judge Lydon joined.

        ARGUED: Robert A. Scott, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
        MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Allen Eisner Honick, FURMAN
        HONICK LAW, Owings Mills, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Brian E. Frosh,
        Attorney General, Ann M. Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General, Justin E. Fine, Assistant
        Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND,
        Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. David Daneman, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR &
        PRESTON, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
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        RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

               Kevin Younger was brutally beaten by three Maryland corrections officers because

        they believed he had taken part in an assault on another officer. He sued their warden,

        Tyrone Crowder, along with the officers who attacked him and their direct supervisors. A

        federal jury awarded Younger $700,000.

               Crowder appeals. He argues that this case should never have proceeded to trial

        because Younger failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before suing. He also

        believes the district court should have found that the evidence failed to support the jury’s

        verdict and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. We reject his arguments and affirm

        the district court. Younger was not required to exhaust because no administrative remedies

        were available, the evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and Crowder was not entitled to

        qualified immunity based on the facts found by the jury.

        I.     Background

               Younger was a pretrial detainee at Maryland Reception Diagnostic and

        Classification Center. Officer Alade Ganiyu worked at the Center. One day, in 2013, he

        was supervising inmates when one began acting insubordinate. Officer Ganiyu tried to

        handcuff him, but several other inmates came to his aid by restraining and beating Officer

        Ganiyu. The assault ended only when other officers arrived to break up the scrum. Officer

        Ganiyu suffered severe injuries, leading to an ambulance ride to the hospital. He identified

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        Younger as one of his assailants. 1 So Younger was placed in administrative segregation

        away from the Center’s general population.

               Word spread fast about the incident. Crowder learned of it that day. By the next

        morning, new officers starting their shift were told the news. This included Officers

        Richard Hanna, Jemiah Green, and Kwasi Ramsey. Those three officers got the names and

        locations of the inmates allegedly involved in the assault. 2 They proceeded to the Center’s

        armory, picked up handcuffs and pepper spray, and then marched throughout the Center

        brutally attacking each alleged assailant.

               The officers’ assaults were vicious. Younger’s lasted about four minutes. He

        testified that the officers entered his cell, threw him off the top bunk, and began striking

        him with handcuffs and kicking him. They slammed his head into the side of the toilet.

        And they left him lying in a pool of blood on his cell’s floor. When a medical alert for

        Younger came over the radio, the same attacking officers responded. They escorted

        Younger to the medical unit, ordering him to explain his injuries by writing “I fell off my

        bunk” on the medical report.

               1
                 Younger, however, testified that he tried to break up the assault by pulling one of
        the attacking inmates off Officer Ganiyu.
               2
                 How exactly the officers obtained this information was disputed at trial. Hanna
        claimed that Green and Ramsey approached him with a list of names and locations.
        Ramsey alleged that Lieutenant Dupree provided him with the information and said he
        wanted “blood for blood.” J.A. 999. Dupree, who was also a defendant, maintains that he
        neither said “blood for blood” nor provided the officers with the inmates’ names and
        locations. J.A. 1522, 1524.
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               Crowder learned about the attack on Younger the day it happened. Department

        standards of conduct required him to inform the Intelligence and Investigative Division

        within two hours of learning of the incident. 3 But he did not do so until the following

        evening. The Intelligence and Investigative Division investigated the assaults, ultimately

        issuing a report criticizing Crowder’s handling of Officer Ganiyu’s assault and its

        retaliatory fallout.

               Younger, for his part, attempted to file administrative grievances about the attack.

        It is unclear exactly how many grievances Younger filed. But we know that he started

        Maryland’s inmate grievance process about two months after the incident. That process

        has three levels. Younger engaged the first level by filing a request for administrative

        remedy with the warden. He also appealed to the final level, the Inmate Grievance Office.

        But it does not appear that Younger sought relief at the intermediate level, from the

        Commissioner of Corrections, as the Inmate Grievance Office dismissed his grievance for

        failing to appeal to the Commissioner.

               Having failed to get administrative relief, Younger sued Crowder, the officers who

        attacked him, and their direct supervisors, in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

        case was ultimately decided by a jury, which returned a verdict for Younger, awarding him

        $700,000 in damages. Crowder moved to set aside the verdict as a matter of law, but the

               The Intelligence and Investigative Division investigates criminal and professional
               3

        misconduct by correctional officers. Md. Corr. Servs. § 10-701(a)(3).
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        district court denied his motion. Crowder timely appealed that decision, and we have

        jurisdiction. 4 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

        II.      Discussion

                 Crowder challenges the district court’s denial of his post-trial motion for judgment

        as a matter of law. He first argues that Younger’s suit is barred because Younger did not

        exhaust his administrative remedies. He also claims that there was insufficient evidence

        to support the jury’s verdict and that, in any event, he was entitled to qualified immunity.

        We first address Crowder’s exhaustion argument, then his challenge to the sufficiency of

        the evidence, and finally his claim for qualified immunity. 5 Each of Crowder’s arguments

        fails.

                 A.    Exhaustion

                 We first address whether Younger was required to exhaust his administrative

        remedies before suing. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to exhaust all

        “available” administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action challenging the

                 Several other defendants appealed separately. We rejected each of their appeals
                 4

        in unpublished, per curiam decisions. See Younger v. Dupree, No. 21-6423, 2022 WL
        738610 (4th Cir. March 11, 2022); Younger v. Ramsey, 854 Fed. App’x 544 (4th Cir. 2021);
        Younger v. Green, 854 Fed. App’x 544 (4th Cir. 2021). The Supreme Court granted
        certiorari in Dupree’s appeal, Dupree v. Younger, 143 S. Ct. 645 (2023), and recently
        issued an opinion reversing and remanding that case to our court, Dupree v. Younger, 143
        S. Ct. 1382 (2023). We discuss this opinion in greater depth below, as it is also relevant to
        this appeal.

                 We address the sufficiency challenge before qualified immunity because when
                 5

        qualified immunity is asserted post-trial, “the defense must be evaluated in light of the
        character and quality of the evidence received in court.” Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180,
        184 (2011).
                                                          5
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        conditions of their confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with

        respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a

        prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

        remedies as are available are exhausted.”). Crowder contends that Younger failed to

        properly exhaust Maryland’s administrative remedies, and so his suit is barred.

               Before we address the merits of this argument, we must consider whether Crowder

        preserved it for appeal. 6    Crowder raised Younger’s purported failure to exhaust at

        summary judgment and on appeal, but not in a motion for judgment as a matter of law

        under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. In the past, that failure would have doomed his

        exhaustion argument, as our precedent in Varghese v. Honeywell International, Inc. held

        that issues resolved at summary judgment and not re-raised in a Rule 50 motion are

        forfeited on appeal. 424 F.3d 411, 420–23 (4th Cir. 2005). But the Supreme Court recently

        abrogated Varghese, in a case involving one of Crowder’s co-defendants no less. Dupree

        v. Younger, 143 S. Ct. 1382 (2023). In Dupree, the Court held that “purely legal issues”

        resolved at summary judgment are preserved for appeal despite a litigant’s failure to re-

        raise the issue in a Rule 50 motion. Id. at 1389. So we must decide whether the district

        court’s resolution of Crowder’s exhaustion argument presents a “purely legal issue.”

               Though the Supreme Court expressly declined to answer this question in Dupree, it

        did provide us with some guidance. It explained that a purely legal issue is one that “can

               6
                 Ordinarily, we will not consider issues that have not been preserved. See, e.g.,
        Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., 679 F.3d 146, 160–61 (4th Cir. 2012).
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        be resolved without reference to any disputed facts.” Id.; see also id. at 1390 (“[A] purely

        legal question is, by definition, one whose answer is independent of disputed facts . . . .”).

        While every case won’t be this easy, 7 we can resolve this case based solely on the Court’s

        guidance in Dupree.

               The district court rejected Crowder’s exhaustion argument “without reference to any

        disputed facts.” Dupree, 143 S. Ct. at 1389. How do we know? It told us. When it denied

        Crowder’s motion for summary judgment, it said: “The Court need not resolve disputes

        concerning Younger’s adherence to the [administrative] process.” J.A. 460. The disputes

        the district court was referring to were factual disputes about whether Younger properly

        filed grievances and proceeded through every step of Maryland’s system for administrative

        remedies. Cf. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at

        Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966 (2018) (explaining that factual disputes turn on

        “questions of who did what, when or where, how or why”).

               7
                 The Supreme Court has often noted the difficulty in distinguishing between
        questions of law and questions of fact. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288
        (1982) (noting the “vexing nature of the distinction”); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113
        (1985) (“[T]he appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from
        questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive.”); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,
        111 (1995) (calling the distinction “slippery”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385
        (2000) (“[O]ur pre-AEDPA efforts to distinguish questions of fact, questions of law, and
        ‘mixed questions’ . . . generated some not insubstantial differences of opinion as to which
        issues fell into which category of question . . . .”). Often, the Court focuses on practical
        considerations, such as who the proper decision maker is, or the need for judicial review
        of the question. See Miller, 474 U.S. at 113–14; Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct.
        1062, 1070 (2020). Perhaps because of this, some scholars argue that there is no
        epistemological difference between questions of law and questions of fact. See Ronald J.
        Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. L. Rev. 1769
        (2003). Thankfully, we need not confront these broader issues to resolve this case.
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               Instead, the district court denied summary judgment because it held that

        administrative remedies are unavailable when the Intelligence and Investigative Division

        is investigating the incident underlying an inmate’s grievance. J.A. 460. This holding is a

        legal conclusion, “independent of disputed facts.” Dupree, 143 S. Ct. at 1390. After all,

        neither party disputes that the Division investigated the attack on Younger. Thus, the

        district court’s resolution of Crowder’s exhaustion argument presents a purely legal issue

        under Dupree.

               Considering an alternate route that the district court could have taken makes this

        clearer. In response to Crowder’s motion for summary judgment, Younger argued, among

        other things, that administrative remedies were unavailable because prison officials

        confiscated his documents, failed to respond to grievances he did file, and erroneously told

        him that he preserved his claims. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 (2016). This

        argument turns on factual disputes—whether Younger’s claims are true. See Vill. at

        Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 966. So rather than denying summary judgment because of

        its legal conclusion—that an Intelligence and Investigative Division investigation renders

        administrative remedies unavailable—the district court could have denied summary

        judgment because factual disputes existed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (authorizing a court

        to grant summary judgment only if there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact”

        (emphasis added)); Dupree 143 S. Ct. at 1390 (describing a “two-track system of summary

        judgment” where courts sometimes deny a summary judgment motion because “the facts

        are genuinely in dispute and other times because the law does not support the movant’s

        position”). Had the district court taken this route, the parties would have had to resolve

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        these factual disputes at trial. And, in that case, the district court’s resolution of the

        exhaustion issue would not have been “purely legal.” Cf. Ortiz, 562 U.S. at 184–85, 190–

        92 (explaining that when factual disputes related to qualified immunity are resolved at trial,

        the defense must be re-asserted in a Rule 50 motion to be preserved for appeal). 8

               In essence, a straightforward reading of Dupree and the district court’s opinion show

        that the district court’s resolution of Crowder’s exhaustion argument presents a purely legal

        issue. As a result, Crowder was not required to re-raise this issue in a Rule 50 motion to

        preserve it for appeal. 9

               Turning to the merits, we disagree with Crowder. An inmate need only exhaust

        administrative remedies that are “available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Ross, 578 U.S.

        at 635–36. No administrative remedies were available to Younger, so he did not fail to

        properly exhaust.

               Understanding why requires familiarity with Maryland’s scheme for administrative

        remedies in its prisons. Maryland has a three-step process for reviewing inmate grievances.

               8
                 Comparing this alternative resolution to what the district court actually did shows
        that the district court effectively granted partial summary judgment to Younger. This also
        shows that the district court’s resolution of the exhaustion issue was “purely legal.” Cf.
        Owatonna Clinic—Mayo Health Sys. v. Med. Prot. Co., 639 F.3d 806, 809–11 (8th Cir.
        2011).
               9
                 We pause to note that Crowder might not have been able to re-raise exhaustion in
        a Rule 50 motion given the district court’s resolution of the issue. Rule 50 only authorizes
        a court to grant judgment as a matter of law “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue
        during a jury trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). Here, Crowder was not “fully heard” on the
        exhaustion issue during trial because the district court had held that the ongoing
        investigation excused an inmate from exhausting administrative remedies.
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        The first two steps of the process are known as the Administrative Remedy Procedure. 10

        An inmate initiates the Administrative Remedy Procedure by filing a request for

        administrative remedy with the warden. Md. Code Regs. §§ 12.02.28.05, 12.02.28.09,

        12.02.28.02(A)(14).    Assuming the complaint is neither frivolous nor procedurally

        deficient, the inmate is entitled to a response within 30 days.         See §§ 12.02.28.10,

        12.02.28.12. If the inmate is unsatisfied with the response or the remedy provided, he may

        appeal to the Commissioner of Corrections.          § 12.02.28.05(D)(2).    Appeal to the

        Commissioner ends the Administrative Remedy Procedure. If the Commissioner denies

        the appeal, the inmate can proceed to the third and final step of the process and appeal to

        the Inmate Grievance Office. § 12.07.01.05(B).

               Crowder’s argument is simple. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires “proper”

        exhaustion, which “demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical

        procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing

        some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,

        83, 90–91 (2006). Younger’s grievance was rejected by the Inmate Grievance Office on

        procedural grounds: The Office dismissed Younger’s grievance because he improperly

        failed to appeal the denial of his request to the Commissioner of Corrections. Thus,

        Crowder argues, Younger cannot be said to have “properly” exhausted and so his federal

        claim is barred.

               10
                  The procedure applies to “inmate complaints concerning conditions of
        confinement,” including the “[u]se of force.” Md. Code Regs. §§ 12.02.28.02(B)(1),
        12.02.28.04(A)(7).
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               Yet Crowder’s argument overlooks a critical word: available. The Act only

        requires an inmate to exhaust “available” remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). For an

        administrative remedy to qualify as “available,” it must be able to provide some type of

        relief. Ross, 578 U.S. at 642. So even if a remedy is technically on the books, it is not

        “available” if “it operates as a simple dead end” or if it is “so opaque that it becomes,

        practically speaking, incapable of use.” Id. at 643–44. Crowder might be right that

        Younger did not properly exhaust all administrative remedies. But for the claim to be

        barred, the remedies Younger did not exhaust must also have been available.

               They were not.     Under Maryland law, an inmate cannot successfully file an

        administrative grievance over an event that is the subject of an Intelligence and

        Investigative Division investigation. If they do, that grievance will automatically be

        dismissed as procedurally deficient. See Md. Code Regs. § 12.02.28.11(B). In theory, the

        inmate could appeal this automatic dismissal to the Commissioner of Corrections. See

        § 12.02.28.11(B)(2)(d). But that would be futile because the regulations demand the

        dismissal of such an appeal.      See § 12.02.28.15(C) (directing the Commissioner to

        summarily dismiss grievances when he agrees with the warden’s decision). And an

        intrepid inmate who appeals his loss before the Commissioner of Corrections to the Inmate

        Grievance Office while an investigation is pending would suffer the same fate. See Md.

        Corr. Servs. § 10-207 (authorizing the Office to summarily dismiss a grievance that is

        “wholly lacking in merit on its face”); Md. Code Regs. § 12.07.01.08(C) (requiring an

        inmate to show the Office that the underlying dismissal is “arbitrary and capricious” or

        “contrary to law”). So an inmate filing a grievance over an event that is being investigated

                                                        11
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        by the Intelligence and Investigative Division faces nothing but “dead end[s]” that are

        “practically speaking, incapable of use.” See Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44.

               It is true that, in some cases, the Office has granted relief to inmates whose

        grievances were dismissed because of an Intelligence and Investigative Division

        investigation. Indeed, another inmate who was also attacked by these guards in retaliation

        for the assault on Officer Ganiyu had his grievance heard by the Office and was awarded

        $5,000. But to even get to the Office, that inmate had to make two frivolous filings: one

        to the warden that was procedurally barred and one to the Commissioner asking him to

        overturn the warden’s indisputably correct dismissal. He then had to make a third frivolous

        filing to the Office, simply hoping it would ignore its own regulations. But there is no

        explanation for this under Maryland law. Perhaps the Office ignored its regulations as a

        matter of grace. Regardless, the Prison Litigation Reform Act does not force inmates to

        walk such a nonsensical and perplexing path to properly exhaust their available

        administrative remedies. See Ross, 578 U.S. at 647.          An administrative remedy is

        unavailable if an inmate’s only hope for relief is that officials act contrary to statute and

        regulation.

               Accordingly, when there is an Intelligence and Investigative Division investigation

        into an officer’s use of force, Maryland’s scheme for administrative remedies is

        unavailable. See id. When the underlying decision to dismiss a grievance as procedurally

        barred is rock solid, an inmate need not seek additional review of that decision in the hope

        that the reviewing bodies will act contrary to law. The Prison Litigation Reform Act does

        not require that inmates tilt at windmills before they can access federal court. It only

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        requires exhausting available remedies. Because no remedies were available to Younger,

        the exhaustion requirement does not bar his suit.

              B.      Sufficiency of the Evidence

              Crowder next argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

        But his argument runs headlong into the highly deferential standard of review with which

        we view sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges. See Burgess v. Goldstein, 997 F.3d 541,

        549 (4th Cir. 2021). Keeping that standard in mind, we must reject Crowder’s challenge,

        as there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Crowder

        violated Younger’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.

               “A court may award judgment as a matter of law only if there is no legally sufficient

        evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party.” Saunders v.

        Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 526 F.3d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 2008). So we must view the

        evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Younger, drawing “every

        legitimate inference” in his favor. Id. And we will uphold the jury’s verdict unless “the

        only conclusion a reasonable jury could have reached is one in favor of the moving party.”

        Id. (emphasis added).

               The jury sided with Younger, deciding that Crowder was deliberately indifferent to

        a substantial risk Younger would be harmed in violation of Younger’s Fourteenth

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        Amendment rights. 11 This means they found that Crowder consciously disregarded a

        serious risk that Younger would be beaten by officers in retaliation for his purported role

        in the attack on Officer Ganiyu. 12 See Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373–74, 376 (4th

        Cir. 1984) (holding that a warden is deliberately indifferent for failing to act despite

        knowing of serious risk that officers would physically retaliate against inmates by beating

        them and spraying them with high-pressure fire hoses). To set aside that verdict, Crowder

        must show that “no rational trier of fact” could agree with it. United States v. Mallory, 988

        F.3d 730, 736 (4th Cir. 2021) (“We can set aside the verdict only if ‘no rational trier of fact

        could have agreed with the jury.’” (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011)).

               Deliberate-indifference claims have both an objective and subjective element. Moss

        v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021). Younger must first show that he was

        exposed to an objectively “substantial risk of serious harm.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

               11
                  Younger was a pretrial detainee at the time of the attack. The constitutional rights
        of pretrial detainees are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth
        Amendment. See Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2021). But the precise
        scope of that protection is unclear. See id. So we look to Eighth Amendment precedent
        for guidance, as a pretrial detainee has at least as much protections as a convicted prisoner.
        See id.
               12
                   The jury held Crowder liable for violating Younger’s Fourteenth Amendment
        rights under a theory of supervisory liability. While supervisory liability is a well-
        established concept in our § 1983 jurisprudence, see, e.g., Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d
        214, 226–28 (4th Cir. 2014), the term is a misnomer, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
        677 (2009). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[i]n a § 1983 suit . . . each Government
        official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Id.
        So for the jury’s verdict to stand, there must be evidence that Crowder himself violated
        Younger’s constitutional rights. Cf. id. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable
        to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
        through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
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        U.S. 825, 834 (1994). He must then show that Crowder “subjectively recognized” and

        ignored this risk. See Moss, 19 F.4th at 624.

               The evidence reflects that Younger’s injuries qualify as objectively “serious harm.”

        When Younger was brought to the medical unit at the Center, he had a gash on his head

        and was “incoherent” from the pain. He received stitches for the head wound, spent several

        months receiving physical therapy, and ultimately required surgery on his right knee.

        We’ve held that similar evidence demonstrates “serious harm” for the objective element of

        a deliberate indifference claim. See Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 769–70

        (4th Cir. 2003). 13 So Younger’s injuries were objectively serious.

               And a reasonable jury could conclude there was a “substantial risk” that this “serious

        harm” would occur. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (“substantial risk of serious harm”).

        There is ample evidence that guards at the Center often physically retaliated against

        inmates. Officer Hanna testified that the Center was a “fighting institution” and that he

               13
                  At times we have suggested that showing a serious injury is necessary to establish
        the objective prong of a deliberate-indifference claim. Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340,
        346 & n.8 (4th Cir. 2014). But, in other cases, we have suggested that an “inmate need not
        show that she in fact suffered serious harm to prevail on this [substantial-risk-of-serious-
        harm] prong because ‘the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm.’” Thompson
        v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 107 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
        33–34 (1993)). And, at other times, we have suggested that a serious injury was sufficient
        to establish the objective prong of a deliberate-indifference claim. See, e.g., Makdessi v.
        Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015); Strickland v. Halsey, 638 Fed. App’x 179, 184
        (4th Cir. 2015). But the Supreme Court in Farmer asked whether a “substantial risk of
        serious harm” existed, not whether “serious harm” itself existed. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834;
        cf. Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating that the objective prong
        may be satisfied by a serious injury or substantial risk of such harm). As discussed,
        Younger did suffer serious harm. And, as we will see, there was evidence showing a
        substantial risk of that harm occurring. So we need not try to reconcile these cases.
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        had “seen officers go hand to hand with inmates, pop a cell and actually go and fight

        inmates.” He supported this claim with multiple examples. J.A. 1080 (another officer had

        Officer Hanna watch as he beat an inmate); J.A. 1079 (Officer Hanna broke an inmate’s

        fingers for inappropriately touching another officer); J.A. 1081 (Officer Hanna assaulted

        an inmate for spitting on him); J.A. 1117–18 (Officer Hanna threw a prisoner into a trash

        can). And Officer Hanna’s testimony was not the only evidence on this point. Other prison

        officials corroborated his account, often in relation to the very officers who beat Younger.

        See, e.g., J.A. 648–49 (detailing two instances when Officer Green assaulted inmates); J.A.

        866–67 (explaining that Officers Green and Ramsey engaged in a “pattern of assaults” in

        the months before the attack on Younger); J.A. 787 (Officer Ramsey accused of kicking

        inmate in face); J.A. 785 (an officer pepper sprayed an inmate who was locked in a cell).

               A reasonable jury could thus conclude that Younger faced a substantial risk that he

        would be seriously harmed by officers after Officer Ganiyu identified Younger as one of

        his assailants. Indeed, we held in Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984), that

        similar evidence established a substantial risk of harm. In Slakan, an inmate sued a warden

        and other prison officials after he was beaten and sprayed with a firehose in retaliation for

        slapping a guard on the shoulder. Id. at 371. The inmate put forth testimony of a guard

        that the practice of spraying inmates with firehoses “was widespread among the guards and

        seldom questioned by supervisors.” Id. at 374. Other evidence corroborated the guard’s

        testimony. Id. at 373–74. We concluded that this was sufficient evidence to establish a

        substantial risk of harm. See id. So, just as in Slakan, the objective element of Younger’s

        deliberate indifference claim is satisfied here.

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               But a substantial risk of serious harm, standing alone, isn’t enough to prevail. The

        record also must establish that Crowder had actual knowledge of this risk and that Crowder

        acted inappropriately despite that knowledge. See Koon v. North Carolina, 50 F.4th 398,

        406 (4th Cir. 2022). This knowledge can be established by circumstantial evidence, id. at

        407, such as when the risk of an attack was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or

        expressly noted by prison officials in the past” and “the circumstances suggest that the

        defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk.”

        Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842–43. In such a case, a reasonable jury could infer that the

        defendant-official had actual knowledge because he “must have known” about risk of

        attack. See id.

               Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Younger, a reasonable jury

        could conclude that Crowder “must have known” it was likely that Younger would be

        attacked. See id. The risk of officer assaults on inmates was “expressly noted by prison

        officials in the past” and brought to Crowder’s attention. See id. Several individuals

        testified at trial that they warned Crowder about the specific officers who assaulted

        Younger. J.A. 687–88, 690 (Assistant Warden Fisher warned Crowder that Officers Green

        and Ramsey were appearing in use of force reports concerningly often); J.A. 781–83

        (Captain Pere told Crowder that Officers Green and Ramsey needed additional use of force

        training); J.A. 526 (former warden Hinton warned Crowder that Officer Green was

        “trouble”). And Crowder reviewed all the use of force reports, over 90% of which involved

        Officers Green and Ramsey in the year predating the attack on Younger. As Younger’s

        expert, Donald Leach, testified, this was an “early warning sign[]” for Crowder. See J.A.

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        1138. In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Crowder had actual

        knowledge of the risk that Younger would be assaulted in retaliation for his role in the

        attack on Officer Ganiyu. 14 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842–43.

               A reasonable jury could have also concluded that Crowder was deliberately

        indifferent to this risk. Good-faith efforts to address a known risk can prevent a finding of

        deliberate indifference. Koon, 50 F.4th at 407. But Crowder made no effort at all to

        prevent the attack on Younger. 15 He did not transfer the inmates involved in the assault on

        Officer Ganiyu, despite an unwritten policy authorizing transfers in such situations. He

               14
                  There was also one piece of direct evidence establishing Crowder’s knowledge.
        Officer Hanna testified that at the roll call for night shift following the attack on Officer
        Ganiyu, Crowder asked the assembled officers “why do my inmates look like this and my
        officer looks like that.” J.A. 1107–08. Other evidence, however, overwhelmingly suggests
        that Crowder was not present for the night shift roll call. Younger does not rely on this
        evidence, and so neither do we, but we pause to note that this evidence raises an interesting
        question about the standard of review: Does “viewing the evidence in the light most
        favorable to” Younger require us to accept as true admissible hearsay testimony
        contradicted by documentary evidence and other testimony?
                 The common refrain when reviewing a Rule 50 motion is that we must “view all
        the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and draw all reasonable
        inferences in his or her favor.” Konkel v. Bob Evans Farms Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 279 (1999).
        But we also must be careful not to weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.
        Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). So what are we to do
        here? Since resolving this quandary is unnecessary to decide this case, we leave it for
        another day.
               15
                  Crowder testified that after learning of the attack on officer Ganiyu, he called his
        supervisor and she did not instruct him to take any action. But she testified that she did not
        recall this conversation. Because we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
        Younger, we must disregard Crowder’s testimony and assume the conversation did not
        occur. See Reeves, 533 U.S. at 151 (directing courts to “disregard all evidence favorable
        to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe” when reviewing a Rule 50(b)
        motion). So Crowder cannot use this purported phone call to avoid a finding of deliberate
        indifference.
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        failed to make clear to his subordinates that retaliation would not be tolerated, or to order

        that the inmates were not to be touched. See Slakan, 737 F.2d at 376 (highlighting “the

        need to provide clear guidance to frontline personnel on the permissible uses of force

        against defenseless inmates”); J.A. 1160 (testimony from Leach that a warden must make

        clear to line staff that “retaliation on any level was not going to be tolerated”). The bottom

        line is that the record, when viewed most favorably to Younger, establishes that Crowder

        did not try to mitigate the known risk to Younger’s safety.

               To recap, when the evidence is viewed most favorably to Younger, it establishes

        that there was a substantial risk that officers would beat Younger in retaliation for his role

        in the attack on Officer Ganiyu. The evidence also establishes that Crowder must have

        known about this risk, and—despite that knowledge—did nothing to prevent the retaliatory

        attack from occurring. That is deliberate indifference, and so there was a legally sufficient

        basis to support the jury’s verdict. 16 See Saunders, 526 F.3d at 147; Farmer, 511 U.S. at

        847.

               16
                   In past cases, we have sometimes used a three-factor test to establish supervisory
        liability. See, e.g., Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994); Wilkins, 751 F.3d at
        226. That test asks (1) whether “the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that
        his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of
        constitutional injury”; (2) whether “the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so
        inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged
        offensive practices”; and (3) whether “there was an affirmative causal link between the
        supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.”
        Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                Rather than walk through this three-factor gloss here, we ask the simpler question—
        and the one more in line with the Supreme Court’s statement that supervisors can only be
                (Continued)

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               C.     Qualified Immunity

               Crowder’s final argument is that even if he was deliberately indifferent, he is still

        entitled to qualified immunity. We reject this argument, as it was clearly established in

        2013 that a warden with Crowder’s knowledge, who did what Crowder did—i.e.,

        nothing—is deliberately indifferent in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17

               Qualified immunity “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who

        knowingly violate the law.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Malley v.

        Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). “To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must

        show ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right

        was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Cannon v. Vill. of Bald

        Head Island, 891 F.3d 489, 497 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,

        liable for their own misconduct in § 1983 suits, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677— of whether
        Crowder himself was deliberately indifferent. We need not, and do not, decide whether or
        how much of the three-factor test from Shaw conflicts with Iqbal because, for all the
        reasons discussed, there is sufficient evidence to uphold the jury’s verdict under Shaw’s
        test.
               17
                 We have effectively done away with the clearly established prong of qualified
        immunity for a subset of deliberate indifference cases. See Pfaller v. Amonte, 55 F.4th
        436, 445–48 (4th Cir. 2022) (discussing Thorpe v. Clarke, 37 F.4th 926 (4th Cir. 2022)).
        In such cases, we look only to see whether there was a constitutional violation. Id. at 448.
        Because Crowder is not entitled to qualified immunity under the “normal” two-prong
        approach, we need not decide whether his case falls within this subset.
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        735 (2011)).     A right is clearly established if existing precedent has placed the

        constitutional question beyond debate. 18 Mays, 992 F.3d at 301.

               Here, the qualified immunity question turns on the clearly established prong. The

        jury concluded that Crowder violated Younger’s constitutional rights. And as explained in

        the prior section, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. So the only

        question remaining is whether Crowder violated clearly established law.

               The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that courts should not examine clearly

        established law at too high a level of generality. 19 And while it’s true we require less

        specificity in Eighth Amendment context, even there we must define the right “in light of

        the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Cox v. Quinn, 828

        F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301

        (4th Cir. 2004)). Deliberate indifference is a multifaceted claim requiring significant risk,

        substantial harm, knowledge, and inaction.         So we define each facet of Younger’s

        deliberate-indifference claim in the “specific context” of this case when searching for

        clearly established law. Id.; see also Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (“The dispositive question

               18
                  When determining whether a right is clearly established, we look to cases from
        the Supreme Court, this Court of Appeals, and the highest court of the state in which the
        action arose. Thompson, 878 F.3d at 98.
               19
                   See, e.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (“This Court
        has repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”
        (cleaned up)); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (“Today, it is again necessary to
        reiterate the longstanding principle that clearly established law should not be defined at a
        high level of generality.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12
        (“We have repeatedly told courts not to define clearly established law at a high level of
        generality.” (cleaned up)).
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        is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. This inquiry

        must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

        proposition.” (cleaned up)). 20 Doing so frames the qualified immunity question as follows:

        Was it clearly established in 2013 that a warden violates an inmate’s Fourteenth

        Amendment rights when he knows—based on officers’ past behavior and warnings about

        officers’ excessive use of force—that his officers are likely to attack and seriously injure

        the inmate in retaliation for the inmate’s behavior, but does nothing to address that risk?

               It was. We held in 1984 that a warden was not entitled to qualified immunity when

        he was deliberately indifferent to his officers retaliating against inmates by beating them

        and spraying them with high-pressure fire hoses. Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373 n.1, 376. In

        Slakan, the warden knew that such prisoner abuse was likely because the practice was

        widespread and had been brought to the warden’s attention. Id. at 373–75. But he failed

        to act, and an inmate was sprayed with a firehose, tear gassed, and beaten into

        unconsciousness. Id. at 371, 376. We denied the warden qualified immunity because

        “explicit legal guideposts” showed his actions amounted to unconstitutional deliberate

        indifference. Id. at 376. In other words, by 1984, it was clearly established that a warden

               20
                  The district court failed to heed this requirement. It defined the right at issue as
        a prisoner’s “right to be protected from malicious attack . . . from the very officials tasked
        with ensuring their security.” J.A. 471 (quoting Thompson, 878 F.3d at 109). Not only
        does this define the right far too generally, but it also impermissibly defines the right based
        on case decided after the attack on Younger. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
        577, 589 (2018) (“To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear
        foundation in then-existing precedent.”). Despite this dual error, we affirm the district
        court’s denial of qualified immunity because, properly defining the right, Crowder violated
        clearly established law.
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        violates the Constitution if past practice warns him that his officers are likely to retaliate

        against and seriously injure an inmate and he does nothing about it. What was true in 1984

        was true in 2013. Slakan shows that it was clearly established in 2013 that Crowder’s

        inaction amounted to unconstitutional deliberate indifference.

                 Crowder seeks to avoid this conclusion by recasting the issue as a right to receive a

        transfer. Crowder argues that Younger is claiming a constitutional right to be transferred

        to another facility after participating in an attack on a corrections officer. He points to our

        caselaw to argue that there is no clearly established right to a transfer, and so claims that

        he must be afforded qualified immunity. See Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219 (4th Cir.

        2018).

                 Yet Crowder misses the forest for the trees. Younger is not alleging that he had a

        right to be transferred to another facility; rather, he is claiming a right to be free from prison

        officials who know he is at high risk of being assaulted by subordinates and who take no

        action to prevent it. While transferring Younger might have been enough to prevent

        Younger’s assault, it is not the only protective action Crowder could have taken. He could

        have, for example, issued an order that the inmates involved in the assault on Officer

        Ganiyu were not to be touched. See J.A. 1160 (testimony from Younger’s expert on the

        need to make sure officers know that retaliation will not be tolerated). Or he could have

        moved Officers Green and Ramsey to positions with little or no inmate contact. See J.A.

        523 (testimony from Hinton explaining that during her tenure as warden she transferred

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        Green to a position with less inmate contact). 21 By focusing solely on the right to a transfer,

        Crowder mischaracterizes Younger’s allegation and so misses the point: He did not have

        to order a transfer, but he did have to do something. He did nothing. And so he is not

        entitled to qualified immunity.

                                        *              *              *

               This case was properly tried before a jury because inmates cannot receive any relief

        through Maryland’s administrative grievance proceedings when the Intelligence and

        Investigative Division is investigating the subject matter of the grievance. And the jury’s

        role in trials is enshrined in the Seventh Amendment for good reason. Resolving factual

        disputes, weighing the evidence, and determining whom to believe is within its province.

        When a jury performs these functions, we will not disturb its conclusions based on a cold

        record unless those conclusions lack evidentiary support. Here, the evidence was sufficient

        to support the jury’s conclusions. And based on how the jury resolved these issues,

        Crowder’s conduct violated clearly established law. So the district court’s order is

                                                                                         AFFIRMED.

                We need not decide whether these actions would have been enough to satisfy
               21

        Crowder’s obligation. They are simply examples that were highlighted at trial.
                                                           24