Court Opinion

ID: 9672770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:59:54.329069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:18.217521
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, J.
(dissenting). The sole issue raised on appeal concerns the voluntariness of defendant’s confession. This issue was presented to the trial judge in the course of a pretrial evidentiary hearing held pursuant to People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965). The trial judge held that defendant’s confession was voluntary. This Court reviews such a holding by examining the whole record and making an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness. If, after such a review, we do not possess a definite and firm conviction that the trial judge erred, we will affirm. See People v McGillen #1, 392 Mich 251, 257; 220 NW2d 677 (1974).
Testimony at the Walker hearing revealed that defendant was questioned by Detective Dwain Dennis of the Ionia County Sheriffs Department and Detective Sergeant Kenneth Voet of the State Police. According to defendant, Detective Dennis told him that it would be easier for him if he confessed and that, if he would confess, he could go home. Defendant explained that he understood Detective Dennis to mean that he would not be charged with anything if he confessed.
Detective Dennis acknowledged that he had testified at the preliminary examination that he had told defendant that "things would go a lot easier on you if you’d just confess”. Both Detective Dennis and Detective Sergeant Voet testified that those were not the exact words used. Detective Sergeant Voet testified that the word "confess” was not used; however, Detective Dennis testified that his preliminary examination testimony fairly *816conveyed the thrust of what defendant was told. The detectives explained that they never told defendant that he would not be charged if he confessed. According to the detectives, they explained to defendant that they would be contacted by the presentence investigator for their recommendation, that their recommendation would be included in the presentence report and would carry some weight at sentencing, and that, if defendant told them what happened, a favorable recommendation could be made. If the detectives thought defendant lied to them, an unfavorable recommendation would be made.
The detectives’ testimony shows that they made representations to defendant which were inconsistent with a well-settled principle of the law of sentencing. A sentence may not be based even in part on the defendant’s refusal to admit guilt. People v Earegood, 383 Mich 82, 84-85; 173 NW2d 205 (1970); People v Yennior, 399 Mich 892 (1977), reversing 72 Mich App 35; 248 NW2d 680 (1976); People v Grable, 57 Mich App 184, 188-189; 225 NW2d 724 (1974); People v Travis, 85 Mich App 297, 303; 271 NW2d 208 (1978); People v Stubbs, 99 Mich App 643, 647; 298 NW2d 612 (1980); People v Rabb, 112 Mich App 430, 432; 316 NW2d 446 (1982); People v Pottruff, 116 Mich App 367, 378; 323 NW2d 402 (1982). Therefore, whether or not defendant confessed and whether or not the detectives thought any exculpatory statements made by defendant were truthful ought not to have carried any weight at sentencing.
In Hopt v Utah, 110 US 574, 584-585; 4 S Ct 202; 28 L Ed 262 (1884), the Court said:
"A confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the. most satisfactory character. * * *
*817* * *
"But the presumption, upon which weight is given to such evidence, namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made, either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in reference to the charge, deprive him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.”
The United States Supreme Court has held that the test of admissibility for confessions is whether the confession was made "freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort”. Wilson v United States, 162 US 613, 623; 16 S Ct 895; 40 L Ed 1090 (1896); Haynes v Washington, 373 US 503, 513; 83 S Ct 1336; 10 L Ed 2d 513 (1963). A confession is involuntary if "obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight”. Bram v United States, 168 US 532, 542-543; 18 S Ct 183; 42 L Ed 568 (1897); Shotwell Mfg Co v United States, 371 US 341, 347; 83 S Ct 448; 9 L Ed 2d 357 (1963); Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1, 7; 84 S Ct 1489; 12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964); Brady v United States, 397 US 742, 753; 90 S Ct 1463; 25 L Ed 2d 747 (1970); Hutto v Ross, 429 US 28, 30; 97 S Ct 202; 50 L Ed 2d 194 (1976). Michigan courts have long followed the same rule. Flagg v People, 40 Mich 706 (1879); People v Wolcott, 51 Mich 612; 17 NW 78 (1883); People v Cleveland, 251 Mich 542, 547; 232 NW 384 (1930); People v Pallister, 14 Mich App 139, 148; 165 NW2d 319 (1968). However, in People v Ewing (On Remand), 102 Mich App 81, 85-86; 300 NW2d 742 (1980), the Court held:
*818"A review of the Walker hearing record discloses that the investigating officer told defendant that he would do what he could to help and that things would go easier for defendant if he would cooperate and tell the truth. He also testified that it was normal practice for the presentence investigator to ask the police about a defendant’s cooperation, and so he told defendant that an accused’s cooperation is normally taken into consideration by the trial court during sentencing. We agree with the trial court that defendant’s statements were voluntary and were not induced by improper promises.”
The Ewing decision is not very persuasive because it contains no analysis of the large body of precedent dealing with this problem. Moreover, as has already been shown, to the extent that "cooperation” is used as a euphemism for "confession”, such "cooperation” is not a proper sentencing consideration. The Ewing Court failed to take this into account when it held that the officer’s promises to defendant were not improper.
Analysis of recent cases from other jurisdictions shows that confessions obtained by promises similar to those made here have been repeatedly held to be involuntary. See McLallen v Wyrick, 498 F Supp 137 (WD Mo, 1980) (defendant told that it would be better to make a statement than not to make one); Womack v State, 281 Ala 499; 205 So 2d 579 (1967) (defendant told that authorities would go lighter on him if he made a statement); S B v State, 614 P2d 786 (Alas, 1980) (officer indicated to defendant that a confession would lead to leniency); People v Jimenez, 21 Cal 3d 595; 147 Cal Rptr 172; 580 P2d 672 (1978) (officer told defendant that he would testify that defendant had talked about the case and that such testimony would cause the jury to be lenient in deciding whether to impose the death penalty); Bradley v State, 356 So 2d 849 (Fla App, 1978) (defendant told that inter*819rogating officer could get defendant a deal which would result in a lighter sentence); Robinson v State, 229 Ga 14; 189 SE2d 53 (1972) (defendant told that everybody asks how cooperative a suspect has been); People v Tanser, 75 Ill App 3d 482; 31 Ill Dec 414; 394 NE2d 616 (1979) (officers told defendant that they could only help him with his problem if he told them about it); State v Tardiff, 374 A2d 598 (Me, 1977) (defendant told that if he confessed he would be charged with one offense rather than three); Hargis v Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 3 Md App 76; 237 A2d 807 (1968) (defendant told that a confession would help him in the eyes of the judge); Commonwealth v Meehan, 377 Mass 552; 387 NE2d 527 (1979) (defendant told that a confession would help his defense); People v Dejesus, 63 App Div 2d 148; 407 NYS2d 5 (1978) (defendant told of potential life sentence and that the only way to help himself was to disclose the identity of his accomplice); State v Williams, 33 NC App 624; 235 SE2d 869 (1977) (officer promised to testify that defendant talked to him and was cooperative); Walker v State, 626 SW2d 777 (Tex Crim App, 1982) (officers and district attorneys promised defendant that if he confessed he would not receive a sentence greater than ten years and charges against his mother would be dropped); State v Persinger, 386 SE2d 261 (W Va, 1982) (officers promised to give a favorable recommendation to the presentence investigator). See also 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, §§558-565, pp 617-624, and the cases discussed therein.
In most of the cases involving arguably analogous facts in which the confessions have been held to have been voluntary, the statements made to the defendants are distinguishable from those pre*820sented here. Confessions have been held to have been voluntary where the interrogating officers merely told defendant that authorities would be informed of his cooperation, but where the officers did not tell defendant that this would lead to lenient treatment. United States v Frazier, 434 F2d 994 (CA 5, 1970); United States v Springer, 460 F2d 1344 (CA 7, 1972); United States v Curtis, 562 F2d 1153 (CA 9, 1977); United States v Ballard, 586 F2d 1060 (CA 5, 1978); Wallace v State, 290 Ala 201; 275 So 2d 634 (1973); State v Mullin, 286 So 2d 36 (Fla App, 1973); State v Williams, 358 So 2d 1094 (Fla App, 1978); Bova v State, 392 So 2d 950 (Fla App, 1980); Clayton v State, 156 Ga App 285; 274 SE2d 682 (1980); State v Forrester, 21 Wash App 855; 587 P2d 179 (1978). Often these cases have involved an express statement by the officers that no promises could be made. Wallace v State, supra; State v Mullin, supra; State v Williams, supra; Clayton v State, supra. Confessions have also been held to have been voluntary where the officers merely told defendant that it would be better to tell the truth, Harvey v State, 272 Ark 19; 611 SW2d 762 (1981); State v Tillery, 227 Kan 342; 606 P2d 1031 (1980); State v Theriault, 425 A2d 986 (Me, 1981), or where the officers merely gave defendant accurate information about potential charges and penalties, Turner v State, 407 NE2d 235 (Ind, 1980).
Here, however, according to their own testimony, the detectives told defendant that their favorable or unfavorable recommendation to the presentence investigator would make a difference at sentencing. This was a promise of leniency, not merely a promise to inform the authorities of defendant’s cooperation. According to the detectives, they told defendant to tell them the truth. *821However, when the detectives told defendant that the truth would lead to a favorable sentencing recommendation but that the detectives would make an unfavorable recommendation if they thought defendant lied, it was obvious that the detectives would only accept a confession as of the truth. Moreover, the information which, according to the detectives, they gave to defendant concerning the potential impact on sentencing of a confession was erroneous as a matter of law.
Even if the detectives’ account of what transpired is true, the detectives made improper promises to defendant. We must still examine all the circumstances surrounding the confession and determine whether defendant’s will was overborne. See Ashdown v Utah, 357 US 426; 78 S Ct 1354; 2 L Ed 2d 1443 (1958); Haynes v Washington, supra, and United States v Ferrara, 377 F2d 16 (CA 2, 1967). In Hopt v Utah, supra, the Court recognized that promises of leniency can deprive a defendant of the freedom of will necessary for a voluntary confession. The test stated in Bram v United States, supra, and subsequent cases also recognized that promises render a confession involuntary only if the confession is obtained by the promises.
The prosecution places considerable reliance on defendant’s signing of a form waiving his rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). The prosecution claims that in North Carolina v Butler, 441 US 369, 373; 99 S Ct 1755; 60 L Ed 2d 286 (1979), the Court stated that the execution of such a waiver is usually strong proof of voluntariness. Actually, the Butler Court stated merely that the execution of such a waiver is usually strong proof of a voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. Whether defendant’s confession was voluntary is a different ques*822tion than whether defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary. See Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 397-398; 98 S Ct 2408; 57 L Ed 2d 290 (1978).
At the time of his confession, this defendant was 17 years old and had not previously been arrested or interrogated by the police. The entire interrogation session took only slightly more than an hour and defendant apparently began his statement shortly after the promises at issue here were made. The promises at issue were obviously calculated by the detectives to induce a confession. Defendant himself testified that he confessed because he was afraid and because of the detectives’ promises of leniency. My review of the record leaves me with the definite and firm conviction that defendant’s will was overborne and that the confession was obtained by the detectives’ promises. In reaching this conclusion, I have followed the trial court by resolving all credibility conflicts in favor of the detectives. Defendant’s confession was involuntary.
I would reverse and remand.