Court Opinion

ID: 9896327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 21:09:21.56258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:42.209957
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                STATE OF LOUISIANA
                                  COURT OF APPEAL
                                    FIRST CIRCUIT

                                    2023 CA 0528

                                 VERNON ST. AMANT

                                        VERSUS

       CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILROAD, ABC INSURANCE COMPANY,
       ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY AND DEF INSURANCE
                                       COMPANY

4\                                              Judgment rendered:   NOV 0 9 2023

JEW                                On Appeal from the

                           Twenty -Third Judicial District Court
                            In and for the Parish of Ascension
                                    State of Louisiana
                                No. 130, 704 Division " D"

                     The Honorable Steven Tureau, Judge Presiding

 Hilary G. Gaudin                               Attorneys for Appellant
 Elizabeth M. Gaudin                            Vernon St. Amant
 Gretna, Louisiana

 Bradley R. Belsome                             Attorneys for Appellee
 Crystal E. Domreis                             Illinois Central Railroad Company
 Brodie G. Glenn
 Lance V. Licciardi, Jr.
 New Orleans, Louisiana

 Jeff Landry                                    Attorneys for Appellee

 Attorney General                               State of Louisiana, through the
 Barbara Pilat                                  Department of Transportation
 Assistant Attorney General                     and Development
 Baton Rouge, Louisiana
 and

 Jeannie C. Prudhomme
 Assistant Attorney General
 Lafayette, Louisiana

             BEFORE: WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND WOLFE, JJ.
HOLDRIDGE, J.

       Plaintiff, Vernon St. Amant, appeals from a trial court judgment granting a

motion for summary judgment in favor of a defendant, the State of Louisiana,

through    the   Department     of Transportation       and    Development ( DOTD),          and

dismissing his claims against it with prejudice.           For the reasons that follow, we

affirm.

                      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On February 5, 2021, Mr. St. Amant filed suit against Canadian National

Railroad, Illinois Central Railroad Company, and their unnamed insurers, seeking

to recover damages arising from an incident that allegedly occurred at a railroad

crossing on February 14, 2020. Mr. St. Amant alleged that, on that date, he was

driving a 2001 Mack dump truck over a railroad crossing on Louisiana Highway

22 in Darrow, Louisiana, when a piece of concrete " came up off the [ railroad]

crossing and struck [ the] [     undercarriage]     of the dump truck," injuring him and

damaging the truck. On February 11, 2021, Mr. St. Amant filed a motion to amend

his petition to add DOTD as a defendant, which the trial court granted.'                 Mr. St.

Amant alleged that the railroad companies were liable for their negligence in

failing to properly maintain the roadway, to clear debris from the railroad crossing,

to warn of the hazard they knew or should have known about, and for failing to

exercise reasonable care to keep the roadway safe and free of any hazardous
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conditions pursuant to La. R. S. 9: 2800. 6.            He also alleged that the railroad

companies were negligent in allowing a defective and unreasonable dangerous

  Mr. St. Amant named the State of Louisiana as a defendant, but the proper name for the
defendant is State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development. Mr.
St. Amant also added the City of Gonzales and the Parish of Ascension as defendants, but the
City of Gonzales was dismissed from the suit with prejudice, and the Parish of Ascension was
dismissed from the suit without prejudice.

2 Mr. St. Amant cited La. R.S. 9: 2800.6 as the basis of the railroad companies' duty to keep the
roadway safe and free from hazardous conditions, but that statute applies to a merchant' s duty to
keep aisles, passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condition.
                                                2
condition to exist on the roadway. In his amending petition, Mr. St. Amant alleged

that DOTD " may have also been responsible for the condition and/ or maintenance

of the railroad crossing."

         DOTD answered Mr. St. Amant' s petition and then on September 30, 2022,

filed a motion for summary judgment. In its summary judgment motion, DOTD

contended that it was not liable for the incident because it did not own, control, or

maintain the railroad tracks or the asphalt in between the tracks at the location of

the incident.

         Mr. St. Amant responded to the summary judgment motion, contending that

La. R.S. 48: 382, 48: 386( A), 45: 323, and 48: 21 impose a duty upon DOTD in some

instances to bear the primary responsibility for maintaining the road at a railroad

crossing.

         The trial court held a hearing on January 23, 2023, and granted the summary

judgment motion,     stating that DOTD established that it did not maintain, own,

design, or construct the railroad crossing.' The trial court then signed a judgment

on February 9,      2023,    granting DOTD' s motion for summary judgment and

dismissing the claims brought against it by Mr. St. Amant with prejudice.

         Mr. St. Amant appeals from the judgment, contending that the trial court

erred.

                               SUMMARY JUDGMENT

         Appellate courts review the granting of a summary judgment de novo using

the same criteria governing the trial court' s consideration of whether summary

judgment is appropriate, i.e.,   whether there is any genuine issue of material fact

and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See La. C. C. P.

 The hearing on the summary judgment motion was continued once from November 28, 2022,
until January 23, 2023, on Mr. St. Amant' s motion.
                                           3
art.   966( A)(3);   Lucas v. Maison Insurance Co., 2021- 1401 (            La. App.    1   Cir.

12122122), 358 So. 3d 76, 83- 84.

         The summary judgment procedure is expressly favored in the law and is

designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of non-domestic

civil actions.   See La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(2).    The purpose of a motion for summary

judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether

there is a genuine need for trial. Hines v. Garrett, 2004- 0806 ( La. 6125104), 876

So. 2d 764, 769 ( per       curiam).     After an adequate opportunity for discovery,

summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting

documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the

mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C. P. art. 966( A)(3).              The

only documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to the motion are

pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified

medical records, written stipulations, and admissions.        La. C. C.P. art. 966( A)(4). 4

         On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden of proof rests with the

mover.     See La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1);   Lucas, 358 So. 3d at 84.     If, however, the

mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the

court on the motion, the mover' s burden on the motion does not require that all

essential elements of the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense be negated.

Instead, after meeting its initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues

of material fact, the mover may point out to the court that there is an absence of

factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party' s claim,

action, or defense.      Thereafter, summary judgment shall be granted unless the

a The motion for summary judgment at issue in this appeal was filed and decided under La.
C. C. P. art. 966 prior to its amendment by 2023 La. Acts No. 317, §   1, and 2023 La. Acts No.
368, § 1, which became effective on August 1, 2023.

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adverse party can produce factual evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1);    Lucas, 358 So. 3d at 84.

       In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court' s role is not to

evaluate the weight of the evidence or to make a credibility determination, but

instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Collins v.

Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc., 2019- 0577 ( La.

App. 1 Cir. 2/ 21/ 20), 298 So. 3d 191, 194, writ denied, 2020- 00480 ( La. 6122120),

297 So. 3d 773.    A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery,

affects a litigant' s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute.

Hines, 876 So. 2d at 765.     A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons

could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, summary

judgment is appropriate.       Hines, 876 So. 2d at 765.      Any doubt as to a dispute

regarding a material issue of fact must be resolved against granting the motion and

in favor of a trial on the merits. Collins, 298 So. 3d at 195.

                               TORT LIABILITY LAW

       In determining whether the trial court erred in granting DOTD' s summary

judgment motion, this court must consider whether DOTD is liable pursuant to La.

R.S. 9: 2800, which sets forth the requirements for a public entity' s liability for a

defective thing within its custody or care.         See Broussard v. State ex rel. Office

of State Buildings, 2012- 1238 ( La. 4/ 5/ 13), 113 So. 3d 175, 181.          Under La. R.S.

9: 2800, in order to prove a public entity is liable for damages caused by a thing,

the plaintiff must establish: ( 1)   the public entity had custody or ownership of the

defective thing; ( 2) the defect created an unreasonable risk of harm; ( 3) the public

entity had actual or constructive notice of the defect; ( 4) the public entity failed to

take corrective action within a reasonable time; and ( 5)        causation.     Chambers v.

                                              5
Village of Moreauville, 2011- 898 ( La. 1124112),              85 So. 3d 593, 597. Failure to

meet any one of these statutory requirements will defeat a claim against the public

entity.    Himes v. State through Department of Transportation and Office of

Engineering, 2021- 0138 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 614121), 327 So. 3d 536, 539.

          In determining whether a thing is in one' s custody, courts should consider:

 1)   whether the person bears such a relationship as to have the right of direction

and control over the thing; and ( 2) what, if any, kind of benefit the person derives

from the thing.      See Rodrigue v. Baton Rouge River Center, 2015- 0703 ( La.

App. 1 Cir. 1119115), 2015 WL 6951410, * 3 ( unpublished).

                         SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE

          DOTD' S summary judgment motion was supported by an excerpt from Mr.

St. Amant' s deposition and the affidavit of William Shrewsberry, a licensed civil

engineer employed by DOTD.             Mr. St. Amant testified that when he crossed the

railroad tracks on Louisiana Highway 22, " the concrete popped up under the

truck."     Mr. St. Amant stated that he pulled over to see what had happened, and " a

big concrete was in the middle of the street." When asked if the piece of roadway

involved was from " in between the actual metal tracks," Mr. St. Amant replied

affirmatively.     He added, " In between -- in between the train --             the railroad, they

got ...    concrete pillars right there, and there was one in the middle of the railroad

tracks."

          Mr.   Shrewsberry   stated    in   his   affidavit   that   he   was    the   designated

representative      of   DOTD    for     purposes      of   DOTD' s        participation   in   the

administration of certain projects performed for purposes of the Federal Railroad

Safety Programs ( Highway/Rail Safety Program Projects) authorized by the

provisions of 23 U. S. C. A. §         130 et seq.      In his capacity as the designated

representative, Mr. Shrewsberry said that he had personal knowledge of and was

                                                   0
familiar    with the     Illinois Central Railroad Company crossing at Louisiana

Highway 22 in Darrow, Louisiana. According to Mr. Shrewsberry, DOTD owned

and maintained Louisiana Highway 22, including the asphalt paved approaches to

the railroad crossing, but it did not own or maintain the crossing. Mr. Shrewsberry

stated, "   Specifically, DOTD maintains the paved traffic lanes of [ Louisiana

Highway] 22 to a point approximately four (4) feet from the rail on each side of the

crossing...."       He affirmed that DOTD did not participate in " or play any role

whatsoever in" the design or construction of the crossing area.        Mr. Shrewsberry

added that DOTD had not " participated in or played any role whatsoever in the

construction, installation, or maintenance of railroad warning lights, visible alerts,

or audible alerts at the crossing."

       In opposition to the summary judgment motion, Mr. St. Amant attached

excerpts from Mr. Shrewsberry' s deposition.' In his deposition, Mr. Shrewsberry

testified that he did not know whether DOTD sent someone out to look at the

crossing after the incident.       Mr.   Shrewsberry also stated that DOTD did not

maintain the crossing involved in the incident.

                                         ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Mr. St. Amant contends that the trial court erred in granting the

summary judgment motion because DOTD' s evidence was not sufficient to prove

that it did not have a duty to maintain the railroad crossing, based on several state

statutes.   Mr. St. Amant cites La. R. S. 48: 382, 48: 386( A), and 48: 21 to support his

contention that DOTD owed him a duty to maintain the crossing.                Louisiana

Revised Statutes 48: 382 states, in pertinent part:

       A.    When an existing highway is intersected ... by a facility or
       utility used or to be used for the transportation of persons or
       commodities, as a railway ..., the owner of the facility or utility

s Mr. Shrewsberry' s name on the cover of the deposition excerpts is " William Curtis
Shrewsberry, Jr."
                                             7
          shall provide a means of crossing the highway which in the opinion of
          the chief engineer or his duly authorized representative is appropriate
          and adequate and shall provide for the subsequent maintenance
          and   replacement   of   the   crossing   in   accordance   with   current

          maintenance standards.

          B. When a highway is constructed across such an existing facility
          or utility, the agency constructing or causing the construction of
          the highway shall provide for the construction of an adequate and
          appropriate crossing and for the subsequent maintenance and
          replacement of the crossing in accordance with current maintenance
          standards.

          Emphasis added.)

As can be seen from the language of La. R. S. 48: 382, whether the railway

constructs a crossing over an existing highway or whether DOTD constructs a

highway over an existing crossing determines whether the railroad or DOTD is

responsible for maintaining the crossing.      Mr. St. Amant did not provide evidence

to show that DOTD constructed Louisiana Highway 22 over an existing railroad

crossing, which could lead to a duty to maintain the crossing pursuant to La. R.S.

48: 382( B).

          As stated earlier, Mr. St. Amant also relies on La. R.S. 48: 386( A), which

states:

          Whenever a highway crosses a railroad track at grade, and the grade
          crossing needs repair  and should, in the judgment of the chief
          engineer or his duly  authorized representative, be repaired, and if,
          after fifteen days' notice in writing, the railroad company whose
          tracks are crossed thereby fails to repair it, the department may make
          the repairs and maintain the crossing and charge the expenses thereof
          to the railroad company.

DOTD contends that La. R.S.         48: 386( A) provides that it may make repairs and

maintain a railroad crossing at the railroad' s expense where the railroad company

fails to repair it within fifteen days of notice of a deficiency.      Moreover, DOTD

correctly contends that La. R.S.         48: 386( A) does not require it to repair and
maintain a railroad crossing. Mr. St. Amant did not provide evidence to rebut Mr.

Shrewsberry' s statements in his affidavit that DOTD did not maintain the crossing.

      Mr. St. Amant also refers to La. R.S. 48: 21 as the basis of his contention that

DOTD had to maintain the crossing. Louisiana Revised Statutes 48: 21 states, in

pertinent part:

      A. The      functions of the department shall be to study, administer,
      construct, improve, maintain, repair, and regulate the use of public
      transportation    systems and to perform such other functions with
      regard to public highways,         roads,   and other transportation related

      facilities as may be conferred on the department by applicable law.

In interpreting the different statutes that Mr. St. Amant proposes control in this

case, we note the general rule of statutory construction, which is that a specific

statute controls over a broader, more general statute.       Burge v. State, 2010- 2229

 La. 2111111), 54 So. 3 d 1110, 1113.     While DOTD' s functions include the duty to

maintain and repair public highways and roads, the more specific statutes covering

railroad crossings apply in this case.

       In our de novo review of this matter, we initially consider that DOTD will

not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issues before the court on summary

judgment.    We find that through the exhibits attached to its motion for summary

judgment, DOTD established that it did not own, control, or maintain the railroad

tracks or the concrete or area in between the tracks at the location of this accident.

Thereafter, the burden shifted to Mr. St. Amant to show there were genuine issues

of material fact as to whether DOTD had any responsibility to maintain the railroad

crossing in question.     Mr. St. Amant did not then come forward with factual

support to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to DOTD' s custody, care, or

ownership of the crossing. In the excerpts from Mr. Shrewsberry' s deposition that

Mr. St. Amant submitted in opposition to the summary judgment motion, he stated

that DOTD did not maintain the railroad crossing that is the subject of this suit.

                                             0
Therefore, we find that DOTD is entitled to summary judgment.    Mr. St. Amant' s

contentions that the trial court erred in granting DOTD' s summary judgment have

no merit.

                                CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of February 9, 2023,

granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the State of Louisiana, through

the Department of Transportation and Development, and dismissing the claims

brought against it by Vernon St. Amant with prejudice.   Costs of this appeal are

assessed to Vernon St. Amant.

      JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

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