Court Opinion

ID: 9740131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:28:44.001185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.390691
License: Public Domain

CONOVER, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. There are factual disputes here present which must be resolved by a jury.
For instance, Ronald D. Poindexter (Poin-dexter) an occupant in the car following Eddie Witham that day testified in his deposition when Eddie stopped his car, it was straddling the white stop bar painted on the highway just before the railroad crossing. (Poindexter dep., p. 82). The railroad's brief concedes the stop bar was 18 to 20 feet from the crossing. On the other hand, Chester Clyborn, a passenger in Po-indexter's car, testified Eddie stopped on the tracks.
Next, the flasher question. The railroad has a statutory duty to maintain automatic warning signals, IND.CODE 8-6-7.7-4. When a crossing is extra hazardous, a railroad can be found negligent for failure to provide warnings and take safety precautions beyond those required by statute and without a Public Service Commission determination the crossing is extra hazardous. Wells v. Baltimore & Ohio RR Co. (1977), 173 Ind.App. 227, 363 N.E.2d 1001, 1003-1004; Stevens v. Norfolk & Western RR Co. (1976), 171 Ind.App. 334, 357 N.E.2d 1, 4. The question of whether a railroad crossing is extra hazardous should be left to the jury. Central Indiana RR Co. v. Anderson Banking Co. (1969), 252 Ind. 270, 247 N.E.2d 208, 211.
Here, the crossing flashers had been malfunctioning for many years. They often flashed when no train was in the area. In fact, Eddie saw the flashers malfune tioning the day before the accident, The *1206railroad had been specially notified of their malfunctioning 24 hours before the collision. One witness testified Eddie's exposure to the malfunctioning flashers modified his perception of their meaning and gave "him an indication that it was also likely that there was no train on this occasion." (Mortimer dep., p. 34-85). Another witness testified the flashing lights "were inadequate to give adequate notice to an oncoming motorist of the approach of a train." (Baerwald dep., p. 117). Mortimer also testified Eddie acted prudently and began to decelerate as he approached the crossing. (Mortimer dep., pp. 83-85).
There is also a factual dispute as to whether the view from the crossing was obstructed. On this subject, Mortimer testified
Well, I mentioned buildings. But closer to the crossing than that are trees, foliage, bushes, this sort of thing off to the right. It's important also to consider the sight restrictions to the south because the train could be coming from the south or from the north, and the driver after all doesn't know that during the approach. (Mortimer Dep., p. 60).
Next, there is a factual dispute as to whether the bell and whistle were being rung and blown as required by statute. Poindexter heard the train's whistle at the time of the crash or a second before it. Dooley, the engineer of the train, testified he began to sound his whistle 1500 feet from the crossing. A locomotive must ring its bell continuously within one quarter mile of a railroad crossing and blow its whistle at least 4 times within one quarter mile of a crossing. I.C. 8-6-4-1. Failure of a railroad to comply with these statutorily-prescribed duties constitutes negligence per se. Smith v. Chesapeake & Ohio RR Co. (1974), 160 Ind.App. 256, 311 N.E.2d 462, 469; Callahan v. New York Central RR Co. (1955), 125 Ind.App. 631, 125 N.E.2d 263, 268; Chicago & E.I.R. Co. v. Alexander (1955), 126 Ind.App. 75, 125 N.E.2d 171, 174.
In Lake Erie & W.R. Co. v. McFarren (1919), 188 Ind. 113, 122 N.E. 330, the railroad failed to ring its bell as the train approached a crossing. Plaintiff who had driven his team of horses onto the railroad crossing was struck by the oncoming train. Our Supreme Court found the question of contributory negligence was one for the jury. Justice Willoughby, writing for the majority, said
The case before us belongs to the class in which railroad companies are held responsible because they put the traveler off his guard and lure him into danger. The general rule upon this subject is thus stated by one of our textwriters: "Where a person is ignorant of the location of a crossing, or where the cireumstances are such as to mislead him as to the necessity for looking or listening for the approach of a train, he cannot as a matter of law be said to be guilty of negligence per se for neglecting to do so."
Id., 122 N.E. at 332.
A question of fact is created when a statutory violation may be the direct cause of an injury. Schneider v. Wilson, 521 N.E.2d 1341, 1345 (Ind.App.1988). The issue of causation is generally a question for the trier of fact, and is not answerable as a matter of law. Id. In all such cases the question of contributory negligence is one for the jury. Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Neubacher (1896), 16 Ind.App. 21, 43 N.E. 576, 581.
None of the factual disputes noted above may be resolved by the trial court on summary judgment. Only a jury may do so. This case, in my opinion, requires a jury trial.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a trial on the merits.