Court Opinion

ID: 9758377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:26:10.791663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:50.390626
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s thoughtful opinion because I cannot agree that the State is not bound by its indictment or information in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. The majority holds that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Cleat Bell and J. Bell are the same person because the State referred to the officer as J. Bell, even though the witness/complainant testified that his name was Cleat Bell.
“Everything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.” 1 The rules with respect to allegations in an indictment and the certainty required apply also to an information.2 It is well-settled that the purpose of a charging instrument is to give the defendant notice of the specific offense with which he is charged and to enable the court, upon conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment, and to enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any further prosecution for the same offense.3 A conviction can never rest upon conduct which is not a criminal offense, or in whole or in part upon conduct not alleged in an indictment or information.4
An essential element of the offense of resisting an arrest or search is that the actor “intentionally prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer ... from effecting an arrest, search, or transportation of the actor ... by using force against the peace officer.”5 An essential part of the investigation and preparation for trial, then, is learning whether the person named in the information is indeed a peace officer or whether it would be readily apparent that the complainant was a police officer.
Unlike the situation in Fuller v. State,6 there is no evidence that Officer J. Bell or Officer Cleat Bell is Appellant’s father. There is no evidence that the two or three men are related in any way, nor is there evidence that they knew each other before the offense date. The court reporter recorded the officer’s name as J. Cleat Bell, but we have no idea why, and the reporter’s record was not evidence considered by the jury in reaching its verdict. The prosecutor may have called J. Bell to the stand, but the record is silent as to whether the bailiff sought out the witness or whether some other person did. The record also does not tell us whether the bailiff or some other person simply called out for “Bell.” The rule had been invoked.
It is well-established law that what the lawyers say is not evidence. No one testified that Cleat Bell and J. Bell were the same person. I also note that Bell is a well-known name in law enforcement in *427this area. Officer John Bell is the name of an Arlington police officer who was shot after a bank robbery.7 It is also the name of an Arlington homicide detective (who may or may not be the same officer who was shot several years ago).8 Another Officer Bell was named in an opinion as a quick-thinking Hurst police officer.9 Additionally, Bell is not an unusual name. Many people named Bell are not connected with law enforcement.
If, as the majority argues, the name of the person who the State alleges is a peace officer is of no import, then why name anyone at all? The majority suggests that we should hold the evidence sufficient if the State got close to proving its case because it got the last name right. Is the State required only to prove that someone named Bell was a peace officer and that Appellant struck him? The State proved that Cleat Bell was a peace officer. The State did not prove that J. Bell was a peace officer. If it is sufficient to plead, as the majority suggests, that Appellant struck “some police officer,” then does it matter whether the proof shows one of his names is Bell or whether it is Bob Smith ar Sally Clark? The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the hypothetically correct jury charge as measured against the hypothetically correct indictment or information.10 Both the jury charge and the information refer only to J. Bell.
Contrary to the majority’s argument, a defendant does not have to show surprise when the State fails to prove its case. The defendant merely argues that the State failed to sustained the burden of proof that the State assumed. The defendant is not required to do anything to preserve a sufficiency claim in a criminal case.11
Because no evidence in the record reflects that J. Bell and Cleat Bell are two names for the same person, the information naming J. Bell as the complainant does not protect Appellant from again being placed in jeopardy of this same offense should Cleat Bell be named as the complainant in a later information.12 Nor is there any evidence that J. Bell is a police officer.
The majority in the case now before this court appears to shift the burden of proof *428from the State to Appellant, suggesting that Appellant failed to prove below that J. Bell and Cleat Bell were not the same person and failed to object when the prosecutor spoke of J. Bell. Or, perhaps, the majority is making a case for the civil concept of trial by consent. That is, because Appellant did not object when J. Bell became Cleat Bell, perhaps the majority contends that Appellant implicitly consented to a trial amendment of the information. Criminal law does not recognize trial by consent except when a defendant affirmatively waives indictment and consents to trial on information or when a defendant agrees to amendment of the charging information during trial.13 Such agreement must be clear and unambiguous and not the result of a failure to object.14 Consequently, Appellant could not have implicitly consented.
No evidence in the record shows that J. Bell and Cleat Bell are the same person or that J. Bell is a police officer; I therefore believe that we must hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. Because the majority does not, I must respectfully dissent.

. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.03 (Vernon 1989).

. Id. art. 21.23.

. Lehman v. State, 792 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); see Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 21.04, 21.11.

. Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 551 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 826, 117 S.Ct. 88, 136 L.Ed.2d 44 (1996), overruled on other grounds, Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (op. on reh'g), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119 S.Ct. 1466, 143 L.Ed.2d 550 (1999).

. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.03(a) (Vernon 2003).

. 73 S.W.3d 250, 251 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

. Gilbert v. State, 781 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988) ("He [Kenneth Wayne Dryden] shot Arlington Police Officer John Bell after a bank robbery in Arlington two and a half years ago.”), aff'd, 808 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

. See Henstenberg v. State, No. 02-05-00370-CR, 2007 WL 1441034 at *1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth May 17, 2007, no pet. h.).

. Carruth v. State, 762 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, no pet.) ("Officer Bell, who was also an off-duty Hurst police officer, pursued Goodspeed and arrested her.”).

. See Fuller, 73 S.W.3d at 260 (Womack, J., concurring) (“The court of appeals found it unclear whether Malik would use a hypothetically correct jury charge that was based on a hypothetically correct indictment or one that was based on the actual indictment.”); Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 235 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (Myers, J., concurring) ("By extending Malik to the context presented in this case, the majority appears to have created a 'hypothetically correct indictment' doctrine.”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1016, 121 S.Ct. 576, 148 L.Ed.2d 493 (2000).

. Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 488-89 (Tex.Crim.App.2004).

. Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 258 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (citing United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 430 n. 3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 325, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988), for the proposition that the "entire record, not just indictment, may be referred to in protecting against double jeopardy in event of subsequent prosecution”).

. See Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (orig. proceeding) (stating that "it is well settled that a valid indictment, or information if indictment is waived, is essential to the district court’s jurisdiction in a criminal case”); Weatherby v. State, 61 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd) (Dauphinot, J., concurring) ("There is no such thing as trial by consent in a criminal case.”).

. See Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561, 565-66 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) ("If approved, the amended photocopy of the original indictment need only be incorporated into the record under the direction of the court, pursuant to Article 28.11, with the knowledge and affirmative assent of the defense.”).