Court Opinion

ID: 9576572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:26:02.16547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:54.955951
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a plaintiff who seeks to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance in a divorce case may not also seek damages during the course of the divorce action against the person who received that conveyance, I respectfully dissent.
The majority bases its holding that Ms. Shah is precluded from asserting such a claim for damages on OCGA § 9-11-18 (b). That Code section, however, does not support that holding. Because Justice Gregory states the purpose of the rule in clear and straightforward fashion, I quote him in full:
Rule 18 (b) addresses a specific problem. It allows one to seek two remedies in a single action which would have required two separate actions in pre-CPA days. The example directly addressed in the rule, though the rule is broader than the example, is where a creditor seeks both a money judgment against a debtor and seeks to set aside a fraudulent conveyance the debtor made. Both remedies may be brought in one action though, of course, as the rule states, it is the substantive law which ultimately governs whether any relief is available.1
Thus, § 9-11-18 (b) merely expresses an intent to deviate from a pre-CPA practice of requiring two separate actions to assert two remedies, and was not meant as a limitation on a party’s ability to join claims under § 9-11-18 (a). Subsection (b) of § 9-11-18 is, in fact, but a variation of the liberal joinder provisions of § 9-11-18 (a), and the majority errs in construing it otherwise. To prevent Ms. Shah from seeking damages, the majority focuses on the language in subsection (b) that “ ‘the court shall grant relief only in accordance with the relative substantive rights of the parties.’ ”2 As Justice Gregory points out, however, this language merely stands for the proposition that the substantive law will govern whether a party can prevail on either of the two remedies that the statute expressly permits her to bring in one action, and not for the proposition that she may not assert but one of those claims.
In addition to the foregoing fundamental mistakes, the majority erroneously attaches significance to the fact that the appellant, Ashwin Shah, was added as a party after the original complaint was *653filed. OCGA § 9-11-18 (a) and (b), however, provide rules for determining when a claim may be added against a “party.” They do not limit their salutary effect to an “original party-defendant.” Besides, the appellant could just as easily have been an “original party-defendant” as he was an added party-defendant. Here, the appellant was a party to the case, and the rules of § 9-11-18 (a) and (b) unequivocally apply to him as a party.
Finally, although the majority acknowledges that the purpose of § 9-11-18 is “‘to facilitate the adjudication of the total dispute between the parties,’ ” the majority completely frustrates that purpose in the present case. The broad reach of § 9-11-18 (a) and (b) is illustrated by our holding in Cohen v. McLaughlin.3 In that case, an ex-husband sued his ex-wife and her new husband for allegedly conspiring to take his personal and business assets. The ex-husband also sued a lawyer that he alleged joined the conspiracy after his ex-wife had the lawyer appointed as a receiver for the ex-husband and his company. The lawyer, as a third-party plaintiff, then sued his insurance company as a third-party defendant, alleging (1) that the insurance company was liable for all the plaintiff’s claims against him, and (2) that the insurance company had wrongly refused to defend the action and that it was liable to him for litigation expenses and attorney fees stemming from the wrongful refusal to defend. The insurance company settled the case with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff dismissed the complaint against the lawyer. The lawyer continued to insist on his right to sue the insurance company for damages, but the trial court held that the lawyer could only assert a claim against the insurance company for its secondary liability on the plaintiff’s claim. Relying upon § 9-11-18 (a), this Court reversed, holding that a third-party plaintiff could assert a direct claim for damages against a third-party defendant even though that claim did not arise out of the same set of operative facts as the plaintiff’s original complaint.4
Despite the broad reach of § 9-11-18 (a) and (b) and the broad holding of Cohen, the majority today deprives divorce litigants of the right to join claims that is enjoyed by all other litigants in this State. The majority reaches this holding despite the clear mandate of the Civil Practice Act that the “joinder of parties and causes” apply to divorce and alimony cases.5
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority *654opinion. I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.
Decided March 15, 1999.
Fellows, Johnson & La Briola, Stephen T. La Briola, Henry M. Quillian III, Shawn M. Willette, James M. Kimbrough III, John C. Tyler, for appellant.
Shepherd & Johnston, Timothy N Shepherd, Lance N. Owen, for appellee.

 Gregory, Georgia Civil Practice, p. 351 (2d ed. 1997).

 Majority opinion at 650 (emphasis in majority opinion).

 250 Ga. 661 (301 SE2d 37) (1983).

 Id. at 662-663.

 OCGA § 9-11-81. Accord Ledford v. Bowers, 248 Ga. 804, 805-806 (286 SE2d 293) (1982).