Court Opinion

ID: 9711556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:34:24.846364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:05.892819
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). The United States Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids *340the use of evidence of a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda warnings silence by the prosecution for impeachment purposes. The basis for that decision is twofold. First, “every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested.” Id., 617. And secondly, in view of the implicit assurance inherent in the Miranda warnings that silence will carry no penalty, “it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.” Id., 618.
This court applied Doyle in State v. Cook, 174 Conn. 73, 381 A.2d 563 (1977), and ordered a new trial because “[o]n cross-examination, the state’s attorney asked the defendant why he had not furnished the state with his alibi at the time of his arrest or thereafter.” Id., 75. Those same circumstances exist in the present case and the result should be the same.
To comprehend the propriety of the harmless error rule with respect to a violation of constitutional dimensions, reference must be made to Mr. Justice White’s concurrence in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 182, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 45 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1975). Mr. Justice White noted that when a person under arrest is informed of his rights as Miranda requires, “it does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony. Id., 182-83.
*341It is axiomatic that when dealing with an intrusion into the constitutional rights of an accused, “the accused is not required to show that the constitutional error was harmful; rather, the state must show that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Aillon v. State, 173 Conn. 334, 339, 377 A.2d 1087 (1977); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). Indeed, for the state to eliminate such a possibility is not an easy task.
This case presents a situation clearly requiring a finding of reversible error. The alibi defense proffered by the defendant was undeniably assailed by the prosecutor’s repeated, impermissible references to the silence of the defendant. The harmful, cumulative effect of these references by the prosecutor is incalculable.1 The references to the defendant’s silence went to the heart of the defense; the implication was that the defense was fabricated. The references were hardly brief or isolated and the likelihood of prejudice may well assume the status of certainty.
Surely the state was aware of the defendant’s silence subsequent to his arrest and knew very well what the defendant’s answers on cross-examination would be, as well as the answers of its own witness, *342Officer Michael Savino, on direct examination. As noted in United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1976), “[t]he logical conclusion is that [the prosecutor’s] only purpose in putting the question was to bring before the jury the fact of the defendant’s silence.” The prosecution’s questions were directed at exposing the defendant’s silence for the purpose of casting doubt on his defense. Such conduct has been held to be contrary to the maintenance of a sound judicial process. See People v. Norris, 74 Mich. App. 361, 367, 253 N.W.2d 767 (1977).
The continued expansion of the harmless error rule will encourage prosecutors to get such evidence in, since they know that if they have a strong case such testimony will not be considered to be reversible error. See People v. Jablonshi, 38 Mich. App. 33, 39, 195 N.W.2d 777 (1972).
I therefore dissent and would order a new trial.

 It was the contention of the defense that the defendant was in the company of his wife and was nowhere near the seene of the alleged crimes. This alibi was initially asserted by Christine Briggs and corroborated by the defendant when he testified. The state, however, sought to impeach this testimony as to why subsequent to his arrest he had not provided the police with information of his whereabouts on June 8, 1977. The prosecutor posed eight questions to the defendant, all of which were directed towards what he said after his arrest. The essence of the defendant’s response to all of those questions was that he remained silent, asserting his privilege under the fifth amendment.