Court Opinion

ID: 9727206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:26:11.52415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:34.855778
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.
Defendants in these two consolidated cases appeal the civil suspension of their driver’s licenses. At issue is whether the district court in a civil suspension proceeding may consider the constitutionality of the underlying stop, and, if so, whether the stops in these two cases were lawful. We hold that a defendant in a civil suspension proceeding may challenge the reasonableness of the underlying stop pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h)(1), which permits the court to consider whether the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was driving while intoxicated. This inter*21pretation of § 1205(h)(1) is consistent with our belief that the exclusionary rule’s ban against the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence should extend to civil suspension proceedings to protect the core value of privacy embraced by Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. Examining the stops in the two cases before us, we conclude that defendant Steven Lussier was lawfully stopped for operating a motor vehicle with only one functioning taillight, but that defendant Robert Lussier was unlawfully stopped for operating a vehicle with only one functioning rear license plate light.
There is no dispute as to the facts in either case. Defendant Steven Lussier was stopped at 2:49 in the morning on June 28, 1998 by a police officer who observed that his passenger car’s right taillight was inoperable. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer noticed signs of intoxication and ultimately processed defendant for driving while intoxicated (DWI) after he failed to satisfactorily perform field dexterity tests. Defendant agreed to a breath test, which revealed a blood-alcohol concentration of .152.
At his civil suspension hearing, defendant argued that because Vermont statutory law requires only one functional taillight on passenger cars, the officer had no reasonable basis for stopping him. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that Vermont law requires that each and every taillight on a motor vehicle be in good operating condition. On appeal, defendant renews his argument that there was no reasonable basis for the stop of his vehicle because Vermont law requires only one functioning taillight.
In the second case, defendant Robert Lussier was stopped at 1:18 in the morning on November 29,1998 by a police officer who observed that one of the two white lights intended to illuminate his truck’s rear license plate was inoperable. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer noticed signs of intoxication and ultimately processed defendant for DWI after he was unable to perform field dexterity tests. Defendant agreed to a breath test, which revealed a blood-alcohol concentration of .140.
At the civil suspension hearing, defendant argued that because Vermont statutory law requires only one light to illuminate the rear license plate, the officer had no reasonable and articulable basis for stopping his truck. The district court concluded that the stop was justified by the inoperable plate light, and that in any event the issue concerning the validity of the stop was not one of the limited issues enumerated in § 1205(h) that may be raised in civil suspension proceedings. On appeal, defendant contends that there was no *22reasonable basis for stopping his truck because Vermont law does not require two functioning rear license plate lights, and his plate was adequately illuminated.
The parties in both cases requested and received permission to incorporate into their appeals the briefs in two other appeals pending before this Court, State v. Nickerson, 98-530 and State v. Rash, 98-531. The principal issue raised in those appeals is whether the exclusionary rule’s ban against the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence should be applied in civil suspension hearings.
I.
Before considering whether the stops in the instant cases were lawful, we must consider whether a defendant in a civil suspension hearing may challenge the reasonableness of the underlying stop.
A.
Under 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h)(l)-(5), the issues at a final civil suspension hearing are limited to the following:
(1) whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating, attempting to operate or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201 of this title;
(2) whether at the time of the request for the evidentiary test the officer informed the person of the person’s rights and the consequences of taking and refusing the test . . .;
(3) whether the person refused to permit the test;
(4) whether the test was taken and the test results indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more at the time of operation] . . ., whether the testing methods used were valid and reliable and whether the test results were accurate and accurately evaluated . . .;
(5) whether the requirements of section 1202 of this title [consent to taking of tests to determine blood alcohol content] were complied with.
According to the State, because the limited issues enumerated in § 1205(h) do not explicitly include whether reasonable grounds existed for the stop, the Legislature must not have intended to allow *23defendants in civil suspension proceedings to challenge the constitutionality of stops. See State v. Pollander, 167 Vt. 301, 308, 706 A.2d 1359, 1363 (1997) (Legislature intended to limit issues that may be presented in civil suspension hearings to those enumerated in statute). In the State’s view, the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that the defendant was driving while intoxicated, see § 1205(h)(1), may be satisfied solely on evidence of intoxication gathered after the stop — odor of alcohol, watery eyes, slurred speech, failure to perform dexterity tests, etc. — regardless of the lawfulness of the stop itself.
 We are not persuaded by the State’s argument. Our primary duty in construing a statute is to discern the intent of the Legislature by examining the language of the entire statute, along with its purpose, effects, and consequences. See Candido v. Polymers, Inc., 166 Vt. 15, 17, 687 A.2d 476, 478 (1996); State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275, 682 A.2d 943, 946 (1996). While the Legislature plainly intended to expedite the adjudication of civil license suspensions, see State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56, 61, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (1992), it was careful to ensure that all of the rights related to the taking of a blood or breath sample applied equally in both criminal and civil DUI proceedings. We find it unlikely that the Legislature intended to retain these statutorily created rights in civil suspension proceedings while stripping defendants in those proceedings of their constitutionally protected right to be free from unreasonable stops. Rather, we conclude that, in permitting defendants in a civil suspension proceeding to dispute whether the processing officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was driving while intoxicated, the Legislature assumed that a constitutional stop would be a necessary predicate to finding “reasonable grounds” for suspicion of DUI. Nothing in the language of § 1205 or the purpose behind the statute suggests that the Legislature intended otherwise.
Section 1205(h)(1) permits defendants in civil suspension proceedings to challenge whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to suspect a DWI violation. When a motor vehicle stop is based on an officer’s suspicion that the driver was intoxicated, the issue of whether the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect a DWI violation is logically extended to the question of whether there was a reasonable basis for the stop. It would make little sense, however, to allow defendants to challenge the legality of the underlying stop only in situations when the officer indicated that the stop was based on a suspicion that there had been a DWI violation. In determining the legality of a stop, courts do not attempt to divine the arresting *24officer’s actual subjective motivation for making the stop; rather, they consider from an objective standpoint whether, given all of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. See State v. Sutphin, 159 Vt. 9, 11, 614 A.2d 792, 793 (1992). It is conceivable that officers might stop individuals for minor vehicle violations based on a suspicion of DUI, perhaps because the individuals have a prior history of DUI in the community or because of other circumstances, such as the time of night or the location of the vehicle.1 The point is that the subjective motivation of the officer is not the basis for determining the legality of a stop, and thus the issue of whether a stop was legal should not be excluded from determining whether the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect a DUI violation, simply because the stop was ostensibly made on grounds other that DUI.
Hence, a rational interpretation of § 1205(h)(1) would permit defendants to challenge the reasonableness of the officer’s belief based on the fact that it was derived from an unlawful stop. The State seeks a more narrow interpretation, however, which would permit law enforcement officers to make random stops of vehicles for any or no reason at all in the hopes of detecting drunk drivers. Indeed, under the State’s interpretation of the statute, roadblocks could be set up without regard to the carefully considered strictures set forth in State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 571, 496 A.2d 442, 448 (1985), and adopted under Article 11 in State v. Record, 150 Vt. 84, 88, 90, 548 A.2d 422, *25425, 426 (1988). License suspensions could follow the unlawful police conduct as long as at any point after the stop the officer formed a reasonable belief that the defendant was intoxicated. We cannot conceive that the Legislature intended to insert into the civil suspension system all of the statutory rights concerning consent to evidentiary tests, see § 1205(h)(5), and at the same time to dispense with basic constitutional protections against unreasonable governmental intrusions. Accordingly, we decline the State’s invitation to attribute to the Legislature the intent to sanction unconstitutional police conduct in the context of civil suspension proceedings. See Williams v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 610 N.E.2d 1229, 1231 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1992) (in creating civil suspension system, legislature did not change DWI laws so as to abrogate drivers’ constitutional rights; lack of constitutional stop vitiates right to request compliance with implied consent law).
We recognize, as Justice Skoglund points out, that in creating the civil license suspension system ten years ago, the Legislature intended to fashion a speedy and summary proceeding that would protect the public by quickly removing potentially dangerous drivers from Vermont highways. See Pollander, 167 Vt. at 307-08, 706 A.2d at 1363; Strong, 158 Vt. at 61, 605 A.2d at 513. But Justice Skoglund’s concern that allowing defendants in civil suspension proceedings to challenge the constitutionality of stops will undermine the Legislature’s intent in this regard appears to be unfounded. Apparently, in the ten years since the creation of the civil suspension system, at least some of the trial courts in such proceedings have been considering the constitutionality of stops without undermining the system. See, e.g., State v. Flynn, 164 Vt. 637, 638, 674 A.2d 792, 793 (1996) (reversing district court’s ruling in civil suspension proceeding that underlying stop was unlawful). Yet, the State is not claiming that undue delay has resulted in the past from permitting defendants to challenge the constitutionality of stops in civil suspension proceedings.
Moreover, as noted, while the Legislature sought to avoid the significant delay that often occurs during the criminal DWI process, it was also careful to ensure that all of the statutory rights related to the taking of evidentiary tests applied in both proceedings, and that defendants could challenge civil suspensions based on issues concerning their statutory rights. Of all the issues litigated in civil suspension proceedings, perhaps the easiest and least time consuming is whether the stop was based on reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. In most cases, the State can meet its burden by submitting the investigating officer’s affidavit stating the reasons for the stop.
*26We also note that the licenses of repeat DWI offenders are suspended upon notice before the final hearing regardless of what issues are to be raised, see 23 V.S.A. § 1205(e)(2), and that a final suspension hearing in any case must occur within forty-two days of the alleged offense absent good cause or the consent of the defendant. See id. § 1205(h). Thus, we find no basis for the State’s dire warnings of delay that will result from allowing trial courts in civil suspension proceedings to consider the lawfulness of the underlying stop.
Relying primarily on State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 617 A.2d 140 (1992), Justice Skoglund states that our interpretation of § 1205(h)(1) will effectively preclude the State from relying on an officer’s affidavit in civil suspension proceedings, which will be transformed into full-blown trials requiring the presence of police officers serving as witnesses. See Justice Skoglund’s dissent, 171 Vt. at 47, 49, 757 A.2d at 1036, 1037. Justice Skoglund questions how our holding today comports with the analysis in Stearns. See id. at 49, 757 A.2d at 1037. Our holding is completely consistent with the analysis in Stearns.
In Stearns, the pro se defendant prevailed at a civil license suspension proceeding after the trial .court accepted his testimony — despite the contradictory affidavit of the arresting officer — that the officer had not given him a fair opportunity to take a breath test. See 159 Vt. at 267, 617 A.2d at 140. The defendant then argued that the State was collaterally estopped in the criminal DUI proceeding from relitigating whether he had refused a breath test. See id. at 268, 617 A.2d at 141. Reversing the trial court, this Court concluded that collateral estoppel did not apply because the State did not have a full and fair opportunity in the summary civil suspension proceeding to litigate the issue of whether the defendant had refused the test. See id. at 272, 617 A.2d at 143. We reasoned as follows:
It is one thing for the State to assume the risk that a defendant’s license will not be suspended because an officer’s affidavit, in the face of defendant’s live testimony, does not adequately convince the court. It is quite another thing if the risk includes the substantial chance that defendant also will avoid criminal responsibility. As the courts concluded in Ratliff and Moore, the effect would be that the State would be forced to try the criminal case, with live witnesses, in the civil suspension proceeding. Application of issue preclusion would nullify the summary suspension proceeding that the Legislature enacted.
*27Id. at 271-72, 617 A.2d at 143 (emphasis added). Our analysis relied heavily on the Oregon Supreme Court’s reasoning reaching the same holding — no collateral estoppel — in a case in which the hearing officer had entered judgment for the defendant in a civil suspension proceeding after concluding that the underlying police stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. See id. at 269, 617 A.2d at 141-42 (discussing and quoting extensively from State v. Ratliff, 744 P.2d 247, 250 (Or. 1987)).
Justice Skoglund suggests that our holding is inconsistent with the analysis-in Stearns because it precludes the State from relying on the arresting officer’s affidavit in civil suspension proceedings, and instead compels the State to try its entire criminal case, with live witnesses, in what was supposed to be a summary proceeding. See Justice Skoglund’s dissent, 171 Vt. at 47, 49, 757 A.2d at 1036, 1037. Such concerns apply equally to any issue, including any of those explicitly listed in § 1205(h), that a defendant might choose to raise in a civil suspension proceeding. Indeed, the issue that the defendant prevailed on in Stearns, notwithstanding the arresting officer’s affidavit, was whether he had refused to take a breath test — an issue that § 1205(h)(3) explicitly allows to be raised in civil license suspension proceedings.
Yet, we did not suggest in Stearns that allowing the defendant to counter the State’s affidavit with live testimony regarding that issue, or any other issue, would undermine the Legislature’s goal of expediting civil suspension proceedings. To the contrary, we stated that if the State chooses to rely solely on the arresting officer’s affidavit, it must assume the risk that the defendant’s license might not be suspended because of the defendant’s live testimony challenging that affidavit; however, we concluded that the State should not have to risk losing the criminal case because of how the issue was presented in the summary civil suspension proceeding. See Stearns, 159 Vt. at 271-72, 617 A.2d at 143. This reasoning is no less true when the defendant challenges the underlying stop in the civil suspension proceeding, as was the situation in Ratliff, the case upon which the Stearns analysis is based. In short, our law is settled regarding crossover estoppel in DUI civil and criminal proceedings, see Pollander, 167 Vt. at 304-07, 706 A.2d at 1360-62, and there is no evidence that the summary adjudication of civil license suspensions has been undermined, even though Vermont trial courts have in the past allowed defendants in such proceedings to challenge the constitutionality of the underlying stops.
*28Our conclusion that a constitutional stop is a necessary predicate for a finding that an officer had “reasonable grounds” to believe that a person was driving while intoxicated is supported by a significant number of cases in other jurisdictions, as discussed below. In many of those cases, courts construing statutes very similar to § 1205(h) have held that a lawful arrest, including a constitutional stop, is a prerequisite for an officer to have reasonable grounds to support a license suspension. Justice Skoglund attempts to distinguish some of the cases by pointing out that the statutes interpreted therein permitted the defendants to challenge the suspension of their licenses on the grounds that they were not “under arrest” when they were asked to submit to an evidentiary test. Justice Skoglund’s dissent, 171 Vt. at 48-49, 757 A.2d at 1036-37. Rather than undermine the support that these cases offer for our holding, the distinction only emphasizes the need to construe § 1205(h)(1) broadly to protect Vermont motorists from unwarranted governmental intrusions that are not based on articulable suspicion, let alone probable cause. Cf. Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 743 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Conn. 1999) (statute’s probable-cause-to-arrest requirement, coupled with provision for administrative hearing, afforded driver all constitutional protection to which he was entitled).
Here are some examples of cases that support our holding. In Watford v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 674 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996), the court examined a statute that permitted defendants in civil suspension proceedings to contest “‘[wjhether the law enforcement officer had reasonable ground to believe the arrested person was operating a vehicle . . . under the influence of alcohol . . . and whether the arrested person was in fact placed under arrest.’” (emphasis in opinion). The court held that “a lawful arrest, including a constitutional stop,” was required before a refusal to take a test could trigger a license suspension. Id.
In People v. Krueger, 567 N.E.2d 717, 721-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), the court also addressed the scope of suspension hearings under a statute similar to ours. Refusing to construe the statute in a manner that would authorize unconstitutional arrests or searches and allow license suspensions to be based on the fruits of unconstitutional police conduct, the court concluded that the statute implicitly required that arrests triggering license suspensions be lawful. See id. at 722; see also Gikas v. Zolin, 863 P.2d 745, 749 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (license suspension requires lawful arrest based on constitutional stop).
Similarly, in Pooler v. Motor Vehicles Division, 755 P.2d 701, 702-03 (Or. 1988) (en banc), the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that *29because the legislature implicitly intended to require valid DWI arrests, the scope of administrative suspension hearings permitted defendants to raise issues concerning the validity of the underlying stops. See id. Like the other courts, the Oregon court expressed concern that a contrary holding would allow police to stop drivers at random without reasonable suspicion in the hopes of identifying the occasional intoxicated motorist. See id. at 703. The court declined to attribute to the legislature an intent to condone such unconstitutional procedures. See id.
Additionally, in Brownsberger v. Department of Transportation, 460 N.W.2d 449, 450 (Iowa 1990), the Iowa Supreme Court examined a statute permitting motorists to reopen license revocation proceedings upon a finding in the later criminal proceeding that the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist was driving while intoxicated. Rejecting the State’s argument that the district court erred by equating a finding of “no reasonable grounds to stop” with the more general statutorily mandated finding of “no reasonable grounds to believe that the motorist had been driving while intoxicated,” the court concluded that the statute permitted the reopening of license revocation cases when the criminal court found no reasonable basis for the stop. See id. at 450-51.
Other courts construing statutes similar to § 1205(h)(1) have refused to allow defendants in civil suspension proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of the investigatory stop. See Fishbein, 743 A.2d at 1116-17 (5-2 decision); Powell v. Secretary of State, 614 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Me. 1992); Beavers v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 851 P.2d 432, 434-35 (Nev. 1993) (per curiam); Commonwealth v. Wysocki, 535 A.2d 77, 79-80 (Pa. 1987) (5-1 decision). For the most part, these decisions provide little rationale to support their construction of the statutes in question — other than emphasizing that drunk driving laws are intended to remove intoxicated drivers from the highways in an expedited fashion — and thus we do not find them persuasive. Rather, while we are mindful of the important public purpose of keeping intoxicated drivers off of our highways, we do not believe that the Legislature intended § 1205(h) to permit license suspensions to be based on unconstitutional stops. Cf. Pollander, 167 Vt. at 308, 706 A.2d at 1363 (because necessity defense emanates from common law rather than constitutional imperative, Legislature is free to determine whether defense is issue to be considered in civil suspension hearing).
Relying primarily on State v. District Court, 129 Vt. 212, 274 A.2d 685 (1971), Justice Skoglund states that it has been this Court’s *30“understanding” for nearly thirty years that “reasonable grounds” means “that the officer must have formed a reasonable basis to request a blood alcohol test from the person under investigation.” See Justice Skoglund’s dissent, 171 Vt. at 45, 757 A.2d at 1035. By construing § 1205(h)(1) to mean something other than what it explicitly states, Justice Skoglund does precisely what she suggests that this Court is doing — reading into the statute language that is not there. See id. at 46, 757 A.2d at 1035. More importantly, the issue before this Court is one of first impression, as recognized by the parties. This Court has never implied, let alone held, that in allowing defendants to challenge whether the law enforcement officer had “‘reasonable’ grounds to believe the person was operating ... a vehicle in violation of section 1201,” the Legislature intended to preclude defendants from challenging the reasonableness of the stop that led to DUI processing and prosecution. If anything, we have suggested the contrary by recognizing that “‘reasonableness’ hearings, although not criminal, seek a parallel sort of protection for operators against an arbitrary exercise of . . . police power.” See District Court, 129 Vt. at 215, 274 A.2d at 686.
B.
Our construction of § 1205(h)(1) is consistent with this Court’s view of the scope of the exclusionary rule. Evidence obtained as the result of constitutional violations by law enforcement officers may not be admitted at trial as a matter of state law because doing so “eviscerates our most sacred rights, impinges on individual privacy, perverts our judicial process, distorts any notion of fairness, and encourages official misconduct.” State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 452-53, 450 A.2d 336, 349 (1982). In determining the scope of the exclusionary rule, we have not rejected outright a cost-benefit analysis that balances the deterrent effect to be achieved by excluding unlawfully obtained evidence against the cost of excluding such evidence, but we have emphasized that the focus of any such analysis should be on the individual constitutional rights at stake. See State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171, 174, 598 A.2d 119, 121-22 (1991). Indeed, any empirical assessment indicating that the resulting costs and benefits weigh in favor of admitting unlawfully obtained evidence must be so persuasive as to negate the important rights at stake. See id. at 174-75, 598 A.2d at 122; cf. State v. Robinson, 165 Vt. 351, 353-55, 683 A.2d 1005, 1007-08 (1996) (because of unique nature of summary contempt, policies behind exclusionary rule do not require suppression of evidence obtained *31when contemnor is searched in preparation of incarceration following finding of criminal contempt).
Hence, in Oakes, we declined to adopt a “good faith” exception to the introduction of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal trials because we were unpersuaded by the cost-benefit analysis that the United States Supreme Court followed in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See 157 Vt. at 188, 598 A.2d at 126. Since then, the Supreme Court has continued to narrow the scope of the federal exclusionary rule based on questionable reasoning that has been subject to much criticism. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (exclusionary rule is not applicable in deportation proceedings); Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (exclusionary rule is not applicable in parole revocation hearings); see also 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.7(e), at 206-07 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing “extreme and fundamentally unsound” cost-benefit analysis utilized in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza).
While the Supreme Court continues to restrict the scope of the exclusionary rule, courts in other jurisdictions are divided on whether the exclusionary rule is applicable in civil license suspension proceedings. See Annotation, Admissibility, in Motor Vehicle License Suspension Proceedings, of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Search and Seizure, 23 A.L.R.5th 108, 123-29 (1994); LaFave, supra, at 199-200. Those courts declaring the exclusionary rule inapplicable in such proceedings reason that (1) applying the rule to summary license suspension proceedings would unnecessarily and unduly complicate those proceedings; (2) public interest demands that drunk drivers be removed from the highways; and (3) because the unlawfully obtained evidence has been or will be excluded from related criminal proceedings, there is little additional deterrent effect on police conduct that would result from excluding the evidence in the suspension proceedings. See Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 334-35 (Mo. 1999); Powell, 614 A.2d at 1306-07; Holte v. State Highway Comm’r, 436 N.W.2d 250, 252 (N.D. 1989).
We are not persuaded that any of these reasons compel the introduction of unlawfully obtained evidence in civil suspension proceedings. As noted above, the State has not provided us with either empirical evidence or sound argument suggesting that application of the exclusionary rule would seriously undermine the Legislature’s intent to create a speedy and summary civil suspension system.
As for the second reason, we recognize the importance of removing intoxicated drivers from Vermont’s highways, just as we recognize the *32importance of bringing to justice those persons that violate our criminal laws. But the public’s interest in having strict police control over persons driving on our highways may not be satisfied at the expense of our constitutional right to be free from unbridled government interference in our lives, see Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196, 199 (D.S.D. 1973), particularly considering that the State offers no empirical evidence suggesting that applying the exclusionary rule in civil suspension proceedings will have a deleterious effect on preventing the carnage caused by drunk drivers. If the State were permitted to obtain license suspensions based on evidence resulting from unconstitutional stops, the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion into their private affairs, as guaranteed under Article 11, would be seriously compromised.
Third, in our view, the exclusionary rule is just as necessary to deter unlawful police conduct in the context of civil suspension proceedings as it is in related criminal DWI proceedings. Generally, in both the criminal and civil components of DWI cases the State presents the same evidence from the same stop made by the same police officer. Further, in both the civil and criminal cases, license revocation is often the most long-lasting and significant sanction imposed on the defendants. See 23 V.S.A. §§ 1205(a), (m), 1206, 1208, 1210; Whisenhunt v. Department of Public Safety, 746 P.2d 1298, 1299 (Alaska 1987). The nationwide campaign against drunk driving has taught us, if nothing else, that the threat of criminal prosecution has little impact on keeping problem drinkers off of our highways. As a result, the focus of state legislatures and law enforcement agencies has been on removing intoxicated motorists from highways by suspending their licenses or otherwise preventing them from driving. Because the primary objective of DUI laws and law enforcement is to remove intoxicated drivers from our highways, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule would be weakened significantly if it were not applied in civil suspension proceedings. See Whisenhunt, 746 P.2d at 1299.
As noted, if the exclusionary rule were not applied in civil suspension proceedings, law enforcement officers could make investigatory stops based on hunches or stereotypical beliefs, or for any or no reason whatsoever, knowing that even if any evidence obtained from the stop were to be suppressed in criminal proceedings, license suspensions could still follow. Given the significance of obtaining license suspensions, allowing unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted in civil suspension proceedings could encourage disregard *33for the constitutional limits of a legal stop. See LaFave, supra, at 202-03 (highly relevant factors in determining whether to apply exclusionary rule in quasi-criminal proceedings are magnitude of consequences for individual involved and extent to which nonexclusion would encourage unlawful searches and seizures); cf. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-02 (1965) (exclusionary rule is applicable in forfeiture proceedings because they are quasi-criminal in character and can result in punishment even greater than in underlying criminal case).
In sum, notwithstanding that the license suspension system is civil in nature and does not demand all of the procedural safeguards required in criminal proceedings, see State v. O’Brien, 158 Vt. 275, 277, 609 A.2d 981, 982 (1992), we conclude that it is appropriate to apply the exclusionary rule in civil license suspension proceedings to protect the core value of privacy embraced in Article 11, to promote the public’s trust in the judicial system, and to assure that unlawful police conduct is not -encouraged. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1060 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (exclusionary rule enables “judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness” and assures public that “government [will] not profit from its lawless behavior”).
The essence of the Chief Justice’s remarks in his dissent is that the danger of drunk driving supersedes the right of Vermonters to be free from governmental intrusion into their private affairs. The Chief Justice accuses this Court of having done a “great disservice” to law enforcement officials by concluding that the potential risk of unlawful police conduct exceeds the actual risk of drunk driving. See 171 Vt. at 42-43, 757 A.2d at 1033. Nowhere in our decision do we make such a conclusion. Our holding has nothing to do with the likelihood of whether police officers will act in good faith or how often they will make illegal stops. Rather, we seek to provide an enforcement mechanism for constitutional rights that protect citizens against unlawful government intrusions. This Court’s enforcement of those rights does no more disservice to law enforcement officers than the existence of the rights themselves. Indeed, assuming the Chief Justice’s faith in law enforcement officials is well-founded, our holding will have no impact whatsoever on the prosecution of DUI civil suspensions.
It is the duty of this Court to see that constitutional rights are upheld. By precluding the introduction of evidence obtained as the result of constitutional violations, the exclusionary rule protects those “most sacred rights.” See Badger, 141 Vt. at 452-53, 450 A.2d at 349. *34We emphasized in Oakes that the focus of any cost-benefit analysis concerning application of the exclusionary rule should be on the individual constitutional rights at stake. See 157 Vt. at 174, 598 A.2d at 122. Yet, even though there is not the slightest indication that allowing defendants in DUI civil proceedings to challenge the constitutionality of police stops would have any impact on the proliferation of drunk drivers on our highways, the Chief Justice would hold that the risk of returning intoxicated drivers to the road outweighs any marginal benefits that result from the suppression of relevant and reliable evidence of intoxication in a civil suspension proceeding. We believe that there is more than marginal benefit in upholding the important constitutional right at stake here — the right of citizens to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into their private affairs.2
II.
Having determined that defendants in civil license suspension proceedings may challenge the constitutionality of the underlying stops, we now examine the bases for the investigatory stops that occurred in the two cases before us. As noted, the law is well-settled that police may stop a vehicle and briefly detain its occupants to investigate a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation is taking place. See Sutphin, 159 Vt. at 11-12, 614 A.2d at 793-94; State v. Boardman, 148 Vt. 229, 231, 531 A.2d 599, 601 (1987). Here, both stops resulted from what the officers believed to be motor vehicle violations pertaining to the proper operation of taillights.
There are four relevant statutes. The first, 23 V.S.A. § 1221, provides that a motor vehicle operated on a highway “shall be in good mechanical condition and shall be properly equipped.” The second, 23 V.S.A. § 4(37), refers to “tail lamps” in defining the terms “standard equipment” and “properly equipped.” The third, 23 V.S.A. § 1243(a), provides that a motor vehicle
*35shall also be equipped with at least two lighted head lamps of substantially the same intensity and with reflectors and lenses of a design approved by the commissioner of motor vehicles, and with a lighted tail or rear lamp of a design so approved. A motorcycle. . . [shall be] equipped with at least one lighted head lamp and at least one lighted tail or rear lamp .... A side car attached to such motorcycle. . . shall be equipped with a light on the right side of such side car visible from the front thereof.
The fourth, 23 V.S.A. § 1248, provides that:
A person shall not use on any motor vehicle a rear lamp, unless such lamp has been approved by the commissioner of motor vehicles, nor unless it shows a clear red light visible from the rear, and throws a clear white light over all parts of the rear number plate on such vehicle in such a manner that all numerals, letters and marks on such plate are clearly visible and legible for at least fifty feet from the rear of such vehicle.
A.
In the case of defendant Steven Lussier, the officer stopped him because one of his passenger car’s two taillights was not functioning. Focusing on the fact that §§ 1243 and 1248 refer to “a” taillight or rear lamp, defendant argues that the stop was unlawful because Vermont law requires only one functioning taillight.
We find no merit to this argument. Taillights are standard equipment designed and intended to illuminate the rear corners of motor vehicles automatically upon the simultaneous illumination of the vehicle’s headlights and upon application of the brake pedal. Taillights are part of the standard safety lighting equipment regularly installed by the manufacturer on all passenger vehicles to ensure that the corners of the vehicles are safely illuminated at night. Nothing in the above-quoted statutes negates these obvious facts, notwithstanding the Legislature’s use of the word “a” in §§ 1243 and 1248. See § 4(37) (employing plural “tail lamps” in defining terms “standard equipment” and “properly equipped”).
Section 1243 requires “at least two lighted head lamps of substantially the same intensity” for motor vehicles, but requires only “at least one lighted head lamp and at least one lighted tail or rear lamp” for motorcycles or mopeds. Rather than using the phrase “at least *36_” to designate the number of taillights required on motor vehicles, the section refers to “a” lighted tail or rear lamp of a design approved by the commissioner. Thus, when referring to taillights on motor vehicles, § 1243 focuses exclusively on design guidelines, not the required number of such lights.
Section 1243 requires that light designs, including taillight designs, be of a type approved by the commissioner of motor vehicles. Department of Motor Vehicle regulations state that “all lamps or lighting devices mounted on the exterior of a motor vehicle must be of a type approved by the commissioner of motor vehicles, or must meet the standards prescribed in 49 CFR 571.108.” 8 Code of Vermont Rules 14 050 022-78. There are no specific designs approved by the commissioner under the rules, but, not surprisingly, the cited federal regulations require two red taillamps on the rear of passenger cars, one on each side of the vertical centerline at the same height and as far apart as practicable. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.108, Tables I-IV at 300-03 (1998). Section 1243 may not have been artfully drafted, but its use of the indefinite article, in and of itself, does not demonstrate that the Legislature intended to require motor vehicles to display only one taillight. See Craw v. District Court, 150 Vt. 114, 119, 549 A.2d 1065, 1069 (1988) (presumption obtains against statutory construction that would lead to absurd results); In re A.C., 144 Vt. 37, 42, 470 A.2d 1191, 1194 (1984) (statutes are entitled to reasonable construction, but it is essential that interpretation not be such that will render statute ineffective or lead to irrational consequences).
As with § 1243, § 1248 is not intended to designate the number of taillights required on a motor vehicle, but rather to indicate how such lights should function. Nothing in that section, appropriately named “taillights,” suggests that a passenger vehicle need only have one functioning taillight. Because defendant’s passenger vehicle had only one functioning taillight and thus was not properly equipped, the arresting officer had a reasonable and articulable basis for stopping the vehicle to issue a citation or merely inform the operator of the problem.
B.
Our analysis in the second case is the same, but we reach the opposite conclusion. According to the police affidavit in that case, defendant Robert Lussier was stopped because one of the two white lights that was supposed to illuminate his truck’s rear license plate *37was not functioning. Under § 1248, a rear lamp must throw a clear white light over all parts of the rear license plate so that all of the plate’s numbers and letters are clearly visible from at least fifty feet. Here, the State presented no evidence that the numerals or letters on defendant’s rear plate were not illuminated to the degree required by § 1248. Nor does the State dispute defendant’s contentions that he had one functioning rear license plate light that illuminated the plate to the degree required by the statute.
Examining the federal regulations under our earlier analysis, we find that they require passenger vehicles to display only one rear white license plate lamp to illuminate the plate from the top or sides. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.108, Tables I-IV at 300-03. Because the undisputed evidence was that the rear license plate on defendant’s vehicle was properly illuminated, the State has failed to demonstrate a reasonable and articulable basis for the stop.

The judgment in the case of Steven Lussier is affirmed; the judgment in the case of Robert Lussier is reversed.

 The cases before us involve two brothers who both had prior DWI violations in the small community in which they lived, and who were both stopped in the wee hours of the morning for relatively minor motor vehicle violations. Of course, we cannot know the actual motivation of the arresting officers, and we do not mean to suggest that their motivation in these cases was other than that stated in their affidavits. We merely point out that the underlying motivation of the officer cannot be known, and therefore is not the focus of the court’s inquiry into whether the stop was legal.
The Chief Justice states that since the defendants in the instant cases each had a BAC exceeding .08 at the time that they were stopped, “one would have to suspend the laws of probability to believe — as the majority apparently does — that Vermont law enforcement officers are making investigatory stops of drivers ‘for any or no reason whatsoever.’” Chief Justice Amestoy’s dissent, 171 Vt. at 42, 757 A.2d at 1033. We fail to grasp the logic of this statement. The fact that the defendants turned out to have a BAC exceeding .08 tells us absolutely nothing about the basis of the stops involved or whether law enforcement officers in Vermont make unlawful stops on occasion. More importantly, we make no judgment as to the extent Vermont law enforcement officers make unlawful stops; rather, we decline to construe Vermont law in a manner that would strip Vermonters of their constitutional right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into their private affairs. See State v. Savva, 159 Vt. 75, 86, 616 A.2d 774, 780 (1991) (Article 11 protects everyone, particularly law-abiding citizens).

 Apparently, in the Chief Justice’s view, allowing police to briefly detain and question motorists for any or no reason at all would not be an affront to the constitutional privacy rights of Vermonters because investigatory stops are not as intrusive as searches or seizures. See Chief Justice Amestoy’s dissent, 171 Vt. at 41, 757 A.2d at 1031-32. This view ignores the reality that searches and seizures often begin with an investigatory stop. More importantly, both the Vermont Constitution and the United States Constitution require that police have, at minimum, a reasonable and articulable suspicion of wrongdoing before making even a brief, investigatory stop. See State v. Siergiey, 155 Vt. 78, 80-81, 582 A.2d 119, 121 (1990).