Court Opinion

ID: 9655693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:19:33.515117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:21.153611
License: Public Domain

Beasley, P.J.
(concurring). I concur in reversing and remanding for a new trial.
I do not, however, share the conclusion that the trial judge abused his discretion by the way he handled the prior similar sexual acts testimony. Defendant argues that the similar act testimony was improperly admitted. In People v Yeo,1 this Court analyzed the admissibility of prior bad acts under MRE 404(b) and stated:
"[T]his Court imposed three standards to establish a foundation for similar acts evidence: (1) substantial evidence that defendant perpetrated the bad act, (2) *581that the bad act be probative of defendant’s motive, intent, absence of mistake or design, scheme, plan or system in committing the charged offense, and (3) that the evidence be material to a finding of guilt for the charged offense. See also People v Richard Johnson, 99 Mich App 377; 297 NW2d 672 (1980).”
Defendant’s prior sexual assaults on the victim in this case were admissible. There was substantial evidence that defendant committed the other sexual assaults. The evidence was also probative of defendant’s scheme, plan, or system in committing the charged offense. The prior bad acts demonstrated defendant’s use of force or coercion which is a material element of criminal sexual conduct in the first and third degrees.2 Therefore, I would find that the similar acts testimony was admissible so long as the prosecution established the proper foundation.
Neither do I share the broad brush conclusion that from the "entire trial record” defendant was deprived of a fair trial by overzealous conduct of the prosecutor and by the trial court’s failure to control the prosecutor’s conduct and provide serious consideration of defendant’s attempts to fairly present his case. Imputation of reversible error should be specific.
1 do not agree that, in ruling upon defendant’s motion to suppress reference to a 1971 conviction for attempted rape for impeachment, the trial court erred by "not positively indicating and identifying its exercise of discretion” in denying the motion. In the context of the oral argument concerning defendant’s motion, I would hold the trial judge exercised his discretion. Failure to embark upon a dissertation of how he reached his conclu*582sion is not evidence of failure to exercise his discretion.
However, the assistant prosecutor’s cross-examination of Carol Hedglen, a neighbor who was called as a defense witness, was improper and highly prejudicial. While great latitude is given on cross-examination, the actions of the prosecutor in bringing before the jury the allegation that defendant told the witness that he had killed four people a long time ago, that he had written a book called "Jailhouse Blues”, that he said he carried a gun 24 hours a day, and that he was a hit man, far exceeded the scope of matters brought out on direct examination.
Thus, by her cross-examination of this witness, the prosecutor brought before the jury inflammatory matters not relevant or material to defendant’s guilt or innocence and which reached a level so as to constitute reversible error. The prosecutor called another neighbor as a rebuttal witness who testified as to collateral matters of a highly prejudicial nature.
Last, the sentence imposed by the trial court was obviously in violation of People v Tanner:3 Since this is a concurrence, I would not see any purpose in further comment regarding other details of the majority opinion. Consequently, I would concur in reversing for the reasons indicated in this opinion.

 103 Mich App 418, 425-426; 302 NW2d 883 (1981).

 MCL 750.520d(l)(b); MSA 28.788(4)(l)(b) and MCL 750.520b(l)(f)(ii); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(fXii).

 387 Mich 683, 690; 199 NW2d 202 (1972).