Court Opinion

ID: 9899269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 16:11:46.195196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:16.152467
License: Public Domain

#29859-a-MES
2023 S.D. 58

                         IN THE SUPREME COURT
                                 OF THE
                        STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

                                   ****

THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA,
Acting by and through the
Department of Transportation and the
South Dakota Transportation Commission,     Plaintiff and Appellee,

     v.

LEGACY LAND CO.,                            Defendant and Appellant.

                                   ****

                 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
                   THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
                 PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

                                   ****

                THE HONORABLE STACY VINBERG WICKRE
                               Judge

                                   ****

JEFFREY G. HURD
EMILY M. SMORAGIEWICZ of
Bangs, McCullen, Butler,
  Foye & Simmons, LLP
Rapid City, South Dakota                    Attorneys for defendant
                                            and appellant.

MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General

SHANE M. PULLMAN
Special Assistant Attorney General
South Dakota Department of Transportation
Pierre, South Dakota                        Attorneys for plaintiffs
                                            and appellees.

                                   ****

                                            CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
                                            OCTOBER 3, 2022
                                            OPINION FILED 11/15/23
#29859

SALTER, Justice

[¶1.]         As part of a highway improvement project, the South Dakota

Department of Transportation (DOT) constructed a median in the highway abutting

property owned by Legacy Land Company (Legacy). The median did not eliminate

access to the Legacy property, but it changed it. Vehicles could no longer make a

left turn directly into the Legacy property, and those leaving the Legacy property

could only turn right onto the highway. Legacy argued that the median effected a

taking and sought compensation, but the circuit court disagreed and granted the

DOT’s motion for summary judgment, which Legacy now appeals. We affirm.

                        Factual and Procedural History

[¶2.]         Legacy owns approximately 26.3 acres of undeveloped land on the

north side of Catron Boulevard 1 in Rapid City. Prior to 2010, Catron Boulevard

was a two-lane highway that permitted traffic coming from either direction to turn

into the Legacy property. Vehicles leaving the property could also turn left or right

onto the highway.

[¶3.]         In 2010, the DOT began a project to upgrade the highway by creating

two lanes of traffic going each direction separated by a median. Prior to the

highway expansion project, the DOT named Legacy in a petition seeking to

condemn a small portion of Legacy’s land for drainage in addition to obtaining a

temporary easement during construction, neither of which are directly related to

construction of the median.

1.      Catron Boulevard is also known as U.S. Highway 16B.

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[¶4.]        Once the median was completed, Legacy’s three shareholders noted the

impact it had upon access to their property. The median does not allow eastbound

traffic to immediately access the Legacy property by simply turning left. Instead,

motorists must change directions by turning around at median breaks located along

the divided highway. Those leaving the Legacy property are also impacted by the

presence of the median and may only turn right into the westbound lane of travel.

[¶5.]        The case generated little record activity for several years before 2016

when Legacy filed a motion seeking declaratory relief in which it alleged the DOT

“had caused compensable damages” and sought a declaration that the DOT’s

construction of the median constituted a taking under Article VI of the South

Dakota Constitution. The DOT disagreed and sought to resolve the issue by filing

the first of two motions for summary judgment. The circuit court denied this initial

summary judgment motion at a September 2016 hearing after concluding there

were disputed issues of material fact relating to the intended uses of the land. The

court did not address the motion for declaratory relief, and Legacy advised the court

that it did not intend to pursue the request for formal declaratory relief, given the

fact that the takings issue was being substantively litigated as part of the original

condemnation action.

[¶6.]        After the parties engaged in pretrial discovery, the DOT renewed its

request for summary judgment through a second motion in 2021. Citing the legal

standard set out in our cases, the DOT argued that the Catron Boulevard median

did not substantially impair Legacy’s right of access to its property. Along with its

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motion, the DOT filed a statement of undisputed material facts to which Legacy

responded.

[¶7.]           In an affidavit, Legacy shareholder Scott Nash stated that at the time

of construction, Legacy asked the DOT to install a median break in front of its

property, but the request was denied. Pursuant to access management guidelines

contained in administrative rules promulgated by the DOT, median breaks on an

expressway, such as Catron Boulevard, should be placed at half-mile increments.

ARSD 70:09:02, App. A. Under ordinary circumstances, the DOT would have

applied this rule and installed a median break corresponding roughly to the western

edge of the Legacy property, half a mile from the junction of Catron Boulevard and

Highway 79. However, in this instance, the DOT used its authority under the

administrative rules to vary from the standard access plan and install a median

break 610 feet east of the access approach to the Legacy property. In this location,

the median break provides direct access to both lanes of traffic for a number of state

facilities located on the south side of the highway, including a weigh station, a

South Dakota Highway Patrol building, and a South Dakota National Guard

installation.

[¶8.]           An aerial image on which the Legacy property is listed as “SITE”

provides a helpful illustration:

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[¶9.]          Mark Leiferman, Chief Road Design Engineer for the DOT, explained

in an affidavit that eastbound traffic could get to the Legacy property by proceeding

past it and making a U-turn at the median break 610 feet to the east. Vehicles

leaving the Legacy property wanting to travel east must first turn right and proceed

west before making a U-turn in the first median break 1,136 feet from the Legacy

property. Legacy acknowledges that these routes allow access for passenger

vehicles, but it claims these options are not reasonable for larger commercial

vehicles. 2

[¶10.]         Neither party disputed that these U-turns would not be possible for

semi tractor-trailers and other large commercial vehicles. For these, the DOT

contended that large eastbound commercial vehicles seeking access to Legacy’s

property could turn into the weigh station area and loop back through the median

2.       Legacy’s acknowledgement came in response to the DOT’s statement of
         undisputed material facts, though Legacy’s shareholders also reported
         difficulty navigating the U-turn with their personal vehicles, which include a
         large pickup and a sport utility vehicle.

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break for a total additional distance of less than half a mile. For a large commercial

vehicle leaving the Legacy property wishing to go east, the DOT cited a report by

Legacy’s expert, who stated that a semi tractor-trailer could reroute to the east by

turning at 5th Street and using existing streets.

[¶11.]       Legacy’s expert was a professional engineer named Brian Horan, who

stated that the construction of the median did “not provide reasonable access”

consistent with the zoned uses which allow for commercial and medium density

residential development. Horan also confirmed that the U-turn at the medians to

the east and west would be possible for passenger vehicles but not for larger

commercial vehicles. For larger vehicles moving eastbound, Horan noted they could

“travel to E. Minnesota St. to circulate off of Elk Vale Rd and back to the site

approximately 1.3 miles to the east.” Horan did not provide an exact additional

distance that larger vehicles would be required to travel when leaving the Legacy

property in order to head east, but he stated that it could be accessed by “circulating

through the grid of streets” likely through neighborhoods to the north.

[¶12.]       Horan also referenced plans for a future frontage road which he

sourced to a “Comprehensive Plan” that provided transportation recommendations

and was published by the City of Rapid City in 2014. Horan opined that “once

constructed, [the frontage road] would provide convenient opportunities to access

the site from either direction.” But Horan’s letter added, “[c]urrently no plans or

funding are available to construct these roadways and will likely be built coincident

with site development.” The location of the proposed frontage road is illustrated in

the following map:

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[¶13.]       The circuit court granted the DOT’s motion for summary judgment in a

written decision, concluding the construction of the median did not result in a

compensable taking. In the court’s view, the Catron Boulevard median did not

substantially impair access to the Legacy property even for large commercial

vehicles because there were other ways for these vehicles to access Legacy’s

property without having to make U-turns at the median breaks. Focusing

principally on aerial photographs, the court described an access route to the east of

Legacy’s property that was essentially the option described by the DOT.

[¶14.]       To the west, the circuit court noted, as Legacy’s expert had, that future

development plans contemplate an extension of a road, known as Stumer Road,

which would then serve as a frontage road for convenient access for future

commercial development on Legacy’s property.

[¶15.]       Legacy moved for reconsideration, arguing the circuit court determined

disputed facts when it concluded that the restrictions on access created by the

Catron Boulevard median were reasonable and did not substantially impair

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Legacy’s right of access. In particular, Legacy claimed there was “no undisputed

evidence” in the record regarding: 1) the specific alternate routes to Legacy’s

property; and 2) “what conditions surround[] any alternative access routes [that]

make them potentially reasonable or unreasonable.” The court denied Legacy’s

motion to reconsider.

[¶16.]       Legacy has appealed, arguing the court erred when it determined that

the DOT’s installation of the median did not substantially impair access to its

property and cause a compensable taking.

                              Analysis and Decision

[¶17.]       Our review of a circuit court’s determination of a summary judgment

motion is well established.

             A grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
             When conducting a de novo review, we give no deference to the
             circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment. When
             reviewing a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment, this
             Court only decides whether genuine issues of material fact exist
             and whether the law was correctly applied. We view the
             evidence most favorably to the nonmoving party and resolve
             reasonable doubts against the moving party.

Yankton Cnty. v. McAllister, 2022 S.D. 37, ¶ 15, 977 N.W.2d 327, 334 (citations

omitted).

[¶18.]       Additionally, and of particular importance in this case, “[t]he

nonmoving party . . . must present specific facts showing that a genuine, material

issue for trial exists.” Sacred Heart Health Servs., Inc. v. Yankton Cnty., 2020 S.D.

64, ¶ 11, 951 N.W.2d 544, 548 (quoting Zochert v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 2018 S.D.

84, ¶ 19, 921 N.W.2d 479, 486). “[T]he nonmoving party to a summary judgment

motion may not sit idly by where the moving party has established a prima facie

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case for granting the motion.” Kimball Inv. Land, Ltd. v. Chmela, 2000 S.D. 6, ¶ 17

n.3, 604 N.W.2d 289, 294 n.3.

[¶19.]       Article VI of the South Dakota Constitution provides that “[p]rivate

property shall not be taken for public use, or damaged, without just

compensation[.]” S.D. Const. art. VI, § 13. To resolve takings questions, we must

first decide “whether a recognized property right has been infringed by state

conduct.” Schliem v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 2016 S.D. 90, ¶ 13, 888 N.W.2d

217, 224. “[T]he determination whether a property interest was taken or damaged

for public use is a question of law for the court.” State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v.

Miller, 2016 S.D. 88, ¶ 43, 889 N.W.2d 141, 154; see also SDCL 31-19-4 (stating

that, in condemnation cases, “[t]he only issue that shall be tried by the jury upon

the petition shall be the amount of compensation to be paid for the property taken

or damaged.”); SDCL 21-35-15 (same).

[¶20.]       As it relates to the takings issue in this appeal, we have recognized

that “[a]ccess is a property interest.” Miller, 2016 S.D. 88, ¶ 42, 889 N.W.2d at 154.

But that is not to say that all restrictions upon access to property constitute a

taking:

             [A]n abutting landowner has a right of ingress and egress that
             pertains, not only to the part of the highway abutting the
             owner’s land, but extends sufficiently beyond his own premises
             as to insure him reasonable facilities for connection with those
             highways in which he has no special rights. However, the right
             of ingress and egress . . . [is] subject to reasonable regulations in
             the public interest and for the promotion of public convenience
             and necessity. Where there is no physical taking and the
             owner’s access to the highway on which he abuts is not
             unreasonably diminished or interfered with, his loss is due to
             diversion of traffic, a lawful exercise of the police power and
             there can be no recovery.

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Id. (cleaned up).

[¶21.]         Under the resulting rule, “[t]he right of access is infringed in the

constitutional sense only when it is destroyed or substantially impaired.” Schliem,

2016 S.D. 90, ¶ 17, 888 N.W.2d at 227. 3 “Substantial impairment of access is not

the same as diversion of traffic or mere circuity of travel. The difference is a matter

of degree and depends on the fact pattern in each case.” Miller, 2016 S.D. 88, ¶ 43,

889 N.W.2d at 154–55 (footnote omitted). As part of this case-by-case analysis, a

court may consider factors such as “the nature of the property involved, the

character of the access before and after governmental activity, and the location

(rural or urban).” Id. ¶ 44, 889 N.W.2d at 156. However, “[c]ourts uniformly agree

that a reduction in value resulting from ‘diversion of traffic’ is noncompensable, as

is ‘mere circuity of travel.’” Id. ¶ 43 n.3, 889 N.W.2d at 154. We have observed, in

this regard, that:

               Although [m]ost directional traffic regulations, by their very
               nature, involve mere diversion of traffic and circuity of travel,
               some may nevertheless result in a substantial impairment of
               access. For example, governmental activity that totally
               landlocks a parcel which previously had access is a taking of
               property. Likewise, substantial increases in circuity may be
               compensable.

Schliem, 2016 S.D. 90, ¶ 17, 888 N.W.2d at 227 (cleaned up).

3.       Consistent with the general view that takings determinations present
         questions for the court, we have held specifically that whether a landowner’s
         right of access has been substantially impaired is a question of law for the
         court to decide. Schliem, 2016 S.D. 90, ¶ 10, 888 N.W.2d at 222–23.
         Additionally, “the question whether replacement access is reasonable is
         synonymous with the question whether a landowner’s right of access has
         been substantially impaired.” Id. ¶ 10, 888 N.W.2d at 222.

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[¶22.]       Here, the circuit court correctly applied these substantive takings

principles and the summary judgment standard to conclude that the installation of

the Catron Boulevard median did not constitute a taking. Legacy’s access was not

eliminated, and some additional perspective concerning the impact of the median is

helpful, particularly in light of the dissent’s view.

[¶23.]       There are four potential access options involving Legacy’s lot—entry

from the east, entry from the west, exit to the east, and exit to the west. For half of

these, the undisputed material facts establish that the median and directional

control creates no impairment, substantial or otherwise. Entry from the east and

exit to the west are entirely unaffected by the median. And there is no argument

that access from the west and exit to the east are substantially impaired for any

other class of vehicles, besides the largest types of trucks and semi tractor-trailers.

[¶24.]       For these vehicles that are not able to execute a U-turn at the median

breaks, there are other routes to access the property that, while adding to the

circuity of travel, do not substantially impair access. For instance, semi tractor-

trailers traveling east can turn into the weigh station area to turn around and

proceed back west to the Legacy property, totaling less than a mile of circuity. But

even if this route were impractical, Legacy’s expert stated that vehicles from the

west could travel a separate route which adds about 1.3 miles.

[¶25.]       Larger vehicles leaving the Legacy property wishing to head east can

turn right and head west a short distance before turning on 5th Street and

navigating the streets to change directions back to the east. For this class of traffic,

Legacy has not supported its circuity of travel claim with specific facts that

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establish how far the additional travel to reroute back to the east would be. Its

expert explained only that larger vehicles could travel back east “through the grid of

streets accessed from 5th St.,” which the maps in the record confirm is a similar

additional distance to that of the vehicles attempting to access the property from

the west. Maps contained in the record also indicate that the 5th Street

intersection is less than a mile from Legacy’s property.

[¶26.]       In any event, it is not necessary for a court to identify the specific route

for larger vehicles in order to correctly assess the degree of relative impairment; it

is only necessary for a court to make a sustainable legal determination that other

available routes are not so onerous that there is substantial impairment of access.

And in this regard, the test for determining a compensable taking is not solely

restricted to circuity of travel for a particular class of vehicles. Here, the record

supports the circuit court’s determination that there are sufficient alternative

routes for larger vehicles to access and leave the Legacy property.

[¶27.]       Beyond these observations regarding access after the installation of

the median, our decisional law also directs the court to consider the nature of the

affected property in determining the question of substantial impairment. See

Miller, 2016 S.D. 88, ¶ 44, 889 N.W.2d at 156. Legacy steadfastly argues that its

property should be considered commercial in nature, citing the fact that it has

installed sewer and water infrastructure with future commercial development in

mind.

[¶28.]       But even accepting Legacy’s assertions in this regard does not detract

from the circuit court’s conclusion and Legacy’s acknowledgment that it has no

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immediate development plan for the property, which is currently an empty lot. 4

Legacy has not demonstrated the existence of disputed facts regarding the present

or future need for large vehicles to access the property. For instance, there is no

indication of how many or how frequently large vehicles need to access the

property. 5

[¶29.]         The most Legacy can claim is that its property holds the potential for

commercial development. When future development does occur, Legacy’s expert

opined, it would likely coincide with the extension of Stumer Road to a frontage

road that provides direct access to the Legacy property consistent with the City’s

2014 Comprehensive Plan. The circuit court reached the same conclusion.

[¶30.]         Though the circuit court determined that Legacy had no current

development plan, the court specifically acknowledged the potential for commercial

development at the Legacy site, noting that the City’s 2014 Comprehensive Plan

allows “substantial flexibility in the development to adapt to surrounding changes,

such as expansion of surrounding highways and roads.” These conclusions are

supported by the record.

4.       Legacy claims that it had previously submitted commercial development
         plans to the City of Rapid City. The record is not clear on when this
         development plan was submitted or its details, but Legacy’s attorney agreed
         with the assertion by counsel for the DOT at the summary judgment hearing
         that currently “there’s not a development plan filed with the city for future
         development of this property.”

5.       That is not to say that access to an undeveloped lot cannot be substantially
         impaired. We held in Hurley v. State that a highway project that eliminated
         access to an undeveloped lot could constitute a taking. 82 S.D. 156, 165, 143
         N.W.2d 722, 727 (1966). Here, however, access to Legacy’s property is most
         certainly not eliminated, and we do not view the result in Hurley to be
         controlling.

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[¶31.]       As it is presented here, Legacy’s assertion that it now cannot develop

the land to its full potential is essentially a valuation argument. However, our

decisions make clear that we cannot reach a valuation question unless and until

there is a determination that the State’s action resulted in a compensable taking or

damage claim. See Schliem, 2016 S.D. 90, ¶ 14, 888 N.W.2d at 224 (“[A] landowner

is not entitled to compensation under Article VI simply because he has suffered

some loss or his property has been devalued as a result of state action. ‘A property

right must be invaded before compensation is allowed.’” (quoting Darnall v. State,

79 S.D. 59, 70, 108 N.W.2d 201, 207 (1961))). Indeed, if we were to accept the

argument, Legacy could potentially receive compensation for restricted access it has

not needed to undeveloped land.

[¶32.]       Legacy’s principal and recurring argument is that there is “no

undisputed evidence” in the record regarding the reasonableness of the access

restriction created by the Catron Boulevard median. However, this view fails to

account for Legacy’s obligation as the non-moving party in a summary judgment

proceeding. Legacy may not, as indicated above, stand idly by in circumstances like

those present here where the DOT has presented undisputed facts to establish a

colorable claim that the presence of the Catron Boulevard median has not

substantially impaired Legacy’s access to its property.

[¶33.]       It is true, as Legacy argues, that the reasonableness of the restriction

implicates a fact-intensive inquiry relating to the substantial impairment

determination. But this does not necessarily preclude summary judgment or

require a trial. The contrary view operates on the incorrect premise that summary

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judgment is categorically never authorized for fact-intensive inquiries, such as the

taking/substantial impairment analysis here.

[¶34.]       Even inquiries which are factual in nature are amenable to summary

judgment where the material facts—the ones that matter to the outcome—are

undisputed. See SDCL 15-6-56(c) (Rule 56) (“The judgment sought shall be

rendered forthwith if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”); see also Davies v.

GPHC, LLC, 2022 S.D. 55, ¶ 28, 980 N.W.2d 251, 261 (noting that not “all factual

questions are disputed”). As indicated above, a non-moving party resisting

summary judgment on the basis that there are disputed issues of material fact must

“substantiate [its] allegations with sufficient probative evidence that would permit

a finding in [its] favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.”

Davies, 2022 S.D. 55, ¶ 29, 980 N.W.2d at 261 (quoting Stern Oil Co. v. Brown, 2012

S.D. 56, ¶ 8, 817 N.W.2d 395, 398). Indeed, the Rule 56 standard contemplates this

by instructing a court to examine “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,” for the

existence of disputed issues of material fact.

[¶35.]       We have previously applied the familiar and accepted Rule 56

standard and upheld a circuit court’s decision to grant the DOT’s motion for

summary judgment in another access-to-property case. In Schliem, we affirmed the

circuit court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the DOT even amid the

landowner’s argument contesting the reasonableness of access restrictions.

Schliem, 2016 S.D. 90, ¶¶ 9–10, 888 N.W.2d at 222. We observed that “[a]lthough

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the foregoing certainly establishes a dispute between the parties, it does not

establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. ¶ 10.

[¶36.]         Here, Legacy makes what it characterizes as a specific disputed fact

argument, in addition to its “absence of undisputed fact” claims. It points to its

expert’s opinion that the Catron Boulevard median did not allow for “reasonable

access” to Legacy’s property. But this is a disputed legal opinion, not a disputed

fact, and does not preclude summary judgment. See Seff v. Broward Cnty., Fla., 691

F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding a “legal opinion alone would not create a

factual dispute precluding summary judgment”). While we must view the evidence

in favor of the nonmoving party, we need not treat the opinions of reasonableness

offered by experts the same way because reasonableness is a legal conclusion to be

made by the court. Accord LP6 Claimants, LLC v. S.D. Dep’t of Tourism & State

Dev., 2020 S.D. 38, ¶ 12, 945 N.W.2d 911, 915 (“[W]hile the court must accept

allegations of fact as true when considering a motion to dismiss, the court is free to

ignore . . . sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”

(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

[¶37.]         Based upon the undisputed facts contained in the record, Legacy has

failed, as the non-moving party in this summary judgment proceeding, to

demonstrate the existence of disputed material facts relating to the circuit court’s

substantial impairment determination. 6

6.       Though we adopt no categorical rule in this case, we do note that other
         jurisdictions considering the question have concluded that the installation of
         medians is generally viewed as a noncompensable exercise of police power.
         See 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.02[8][b] (2022) (citing to 28
                                                             (continued . . .)
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[¶38.]        Finally, even if we were to determine that the median substantially

impaired Legacy’s access to its property, that would not end the analysis under the

circumstances of this case. As was explained in Miller:

              If the change in access amounts to substantial impairment and
              is caused by the physical taking of a landowner’s property, the
              landowner is entitled to compensation for the substantial
              impairment of access as an element of severance damages. If
              the change in access amounts to substantial impairment and is
              not caused by the State’s actual taking of the landowner’s
              property, then the landowner must demonstrate that he or she
              meets the requirements of an inverse-condemnation claimant: the
              landowner must also prove that the injury is peculiar to the
              landowner’s property and not of a kind suffered by the public as
              a whole.

2016 S.D. 88, ¶ 45, 889 N.W.2d at 156 (emphasis added).

[¶39.]        Here, Legacy has not demonstrated the existence of disputed material

facts on the question of whether the injury is peculiar to it and distinct from the

kind suffered by the public as a whole. Based upon the current record, it appears

all drivers and landowners along this particular portion of Catron Boulevard must

deal with the median. The kind of injury does not seem particular to Legacy.
________________________
(. . . continued)
         jurisdictions when stating, “The placement of a median, median strip, or
         medial area is a proper exercise of the police power and does not constitute a
         compensable taking under the power of eminent domain.”); see also State v.
         Dunn, 888 N.E.2d 858, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he construction of a
         median in a roadway that causes traffic traveling to and from an abutting
         property to travel a circuitous route does not constitute a compensable taking
         under Indiana eminent domain law.”); Hales v. City of Kansas City, 804 P.2d
         347, 350 (Kan. 1991) (“We conclude that limiting the landowners’ ingress and
         egress to lanes for southbound travel when they formerly had direct access to
         both the northbound and southbound lanes of traffic, whether by a median
         strip, one-way street, or no left turn, is a valid exercise of police power and is
         not compensable.”); Dale Props., LLC v. State, 638 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn.
         2002) (holding that the closure of a median crossover thereby limiting traffic
         access to the property to one direction was not compensable).

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Rather it is “different . . . merely in degree from that experienced by the general

public.” Schliem, 2016 S.D. 90, ¶ 19, 888 N.W.2d at 229 (ellipse in original). 7

                                      Conclusion

[¶40.]         The construction of the median for Catron Boulevard undoubtedly

affected the ease with which vehicles traveling east can access Legacy’s property.

However, the undisputed material facts do not support Legacy’s claim that the

median substantially impaired its right of access.

[¶41.]         We affirm.

[¶42.]         JENSEN, Chief Justice, and DEVANEY and MYREN, Justices, concur.

[¶43.]         KERN, Justice, dissents.

KERN, Justice (dissenting).

[¶44.]         I respectfully dissent from the majority’s view that the summary

judgment order should be affirmed. This eminent domain case should be remanded

for further evidentiary proceedings because there are disputed issues of material

fact regarding whether the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) median on

Highway 16B substantially impaired Legacy Land Company’s (Legacy) access to its

7.       In a separate argument, Legacy claims that the DOT acted unreasonably by
         deviating from the access management guidelines and locating the median
         break to the east of the Legacy property to accommodate access to the weigh
         station, the Highway Patrol, and the National Guard. However, the DOT’s
         administrative rules allow for deviation from its general guidance of median
         breaks at half-mile intervals. See ARSD 70:09:02:01 (stating that “[a]n
         engineering study of sight distance, corner clearance, operational efficiency,
         safety and adjacent land use may also be conducted by department personnel
         prior to granting access and may alter the criteria shown in the table”).
         Legacy is not seeking relief in the form of relocation of the median, and in
         any case, Legacy has not shown how noncompliance with the regulation
         entitles them to compensation through a takings claim.

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property. At this juncture, Legacy has also sufficiently demonstrated injury

separate and distinct from that of the general public because other nearby

properties are not similarly affected by the median. After hearing testimony from

both sides, the circuit court will be in a better position to rule on the highly fact-

intensive questions present here. Disposing of these issues on the basis of affidavits

and depositions results in a rush to judgment from an incomplete record with

several unresolved questions of fact.

[¶45.]       “Private property shall not be taken for public use, or damaged,

without just compensation.” S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13. Through this provision, the

South Dakota Constitution “provides greater protection for its citizens than the

United States Constitution because our Constitution requires that the government

compensate a property owner not only when a taking has occurred, but also when

private property has been damaged.” State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Miller, 2016

S.D. 88, ¶ 39, 889 N.W.2d 141, 153 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have

held that, where a court determines as a matter of law that the State has

substantially impaired access to a certain property, the plaintiff is “permitted to

present evidence of the impaired access as it relates to the fair market value of their

property after the taking.” Id. ¶ 43, 889 N.W.2d at 155. The question here,

however, is narrower: Whether the DOT was entitled to summary judgment that

the median on US Highway 16B did not substantially impair access to Legacy’s

property.

[¶46.]       According to our holding in Miller, courts should weigh substantial

impairment based on “the nature of the property involved, the character of the

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access before and after governmental activity, and the location (rural or urban).”

Id. ¶ 44, 889 N.W.2d at 156. In short, courts are required to “consider the unique

fact pattern in each case.” Id. Importantly, the majority declines to adopt any

categorical rule regarding medians, affirming Miller’s seminal holding that a

change in access can constitute a taking if there is substantial impairment and

peculiar injury to the plaintiff. See id. ¶ 45, 889 N.W.2d at 156.

[¶47.]       Turning to the specifics of this case, there are several unresolved

issues of material fact concerning reasonability of access, particularly for

commercial traffic, after construction of the median. In addition, both parties

heavily dispute how and to what extent Legacy’s future plans for the property are

impacted by the reduced access, a central component of the impairment analysis.

Summary judgment “should not be granted unless the moving party has established

the right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy.”

Hanson v. Big Stone Therapies, Inc., 2018 S.D. 60, ¶ 38, 916 N.W.2d 151, 161.

Although a nonmoving party “must present specific facts showing that a genuine,

material issue for trial exists,” Sacred Heart Health Servs., Inc. v. Yankton Cnty.,

2020 S.D. 64, ¶ 11, 951 N.W.2d 544, 548, courts should “view the evidence most

favorably to the nonmoving party and resolve reasonable doubts against the moving

party.” Yankton Cnty. v. McAllister, 2022 S.D. 37, ¶ 15, 977 N.W.2d 327, 334. The

contested facts present here should have been construed in favor of Legacy and

summary judgment denied.

[¶48.]       The circuit court suggested that eastbound vehicles seeking to enter

Legacy’s property should make a U-turn at a median break on Highway 16B with

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no stoplight. Vehicles unable to complete this maneuver, according to the court,

should turn into a weigh station area, follow a “loop” to turn around, cross 60 mph

oncoming traffic, pass through a median break while turning left, and then prepare

to promptly enter the property from the right lane. 8 The court also speculated that

Stumer Road “could provide[] potential future access to commercial development

on” Legacy’s property. As one further alternative, the majority identifies an

alternate route, initially proposed by Legacy’s expert, where eastbound large

vehicles would travel 1.3 miles, partially through residential areas, to access the

property entrance heading west. The majority suggests a similar route for large

vehicles wishing to depart to the east.

[¶49.]         Legacy’s complaint is not mere circuity of access. Rather, Legacy

argues that the alternate routes identified by the circuit court are not reasonable for

the intended commercial use of the property. Although extensive circuity can be a

sufficient condition for a finding of substantial impairment, other factors are

relevant as well, including “the nature of the property involved . . . and the location

(rural or urban).” Miller, 2016 S.D. 88, ¶ 44, 889 N.W.2d at 156.

[¶50.]         At this stage, a proper evaluation of the alternative entrance routes

referenced above is virtually impossible due to factual disputes and uncertainties in

the record. Even if eastbound small passenger vehicles are able to negotiate a U-

8.       The majority suggests “there is no argument that access from the west and
         exit to the east is substantially impaired for any other class of vehicles,
         besides the largest types of trucks and semi tractor-trailers.” Ante ¶ 23.
         However, at this stage, it is an open question whether requiring drivers to
         make the dangerous U-turn constitutes reasonable access, regardless of the
         size of the vehicle.

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turn into 60 mph oncoming traffic without a stoplight, both parties acknowledge

that this is not possible for many larger vehicles. The viability of the alternate

route through the weigh station is also not sufficiently supported by the record. It

is unclear whether a large commercial vehicle, such as a semi, would be able to turn

left through the median break after coming out of the weigh station and then

almost immediately turn into the property from the right lane. This route was not

proposed by the DOT below and there is insufficient testimony as to its feasibility.

[¶51.]         Furthermore, the suggested route down Stumer Road is purely

hypothetical. Substantial impairment should not be judged based on future access

points that may or may not come to fruition. Rather, courts should evaluate

impairment as of the time of the taking. Here, at the time the median was

constructed, Stumer Road did not provide access to Legacy’s property. There is also

no evidence that such development of Stumer Road was or is certainly impending. 9

Thus, this speculative access point should not be used to support a finding of no

substantial impairment.

[¶52.]         Factual assertions from Legacy’s experts also call into question the

reasonability of the proposed routes. Although the majority is correct that expert

opinions as to ultimate legal conclusions do not preclude summary judgement, it is

equally true that “the court must accept allegations of fact [from the nonmoving

party] as true when considering a motion to dismiss.” LP6 Claimants, LLC v. S.D.

9.       According to Scott Nash, the President of Legacy, the development of a
         frontage road such as Stumer hinges on an owner whose property
         “sandwich[es]” the Legacy property. Apparently, the owner “has not
         developed his properties to this day.”

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Dep’t of Tourism & State Dev., 2020 S.D. 38, ¶ 12, 945 N.W.2d 911, 915. Legacy’s

experts assert that, in order to access the property from the west:

              a heavy vehicle would be required to travel to E. Minnesota St.
              to circulate off of Elk Vale Rd. and back to the site
              approximately 1.3 miles to the east. Similarly, for vehicles
              leaving the property to head east, which represents a large
              percentage of site traffic due to traffic being oriented to the SD-
              79, a U-turn is not possible at the median break to the west and
              must be accomplished by circulating through the grid of streets
              accessed from 5th St.

The experts go on to note that:

              With these restrictions in place, the most convenient route
              would be through the connections and neighborhoods to the
              north . . . This is both undesirable to residents who live in the
              neighborhoods and would result in more traffic than the two-
              lane roadways would be able to manage. Additionally, heavy
              vehicle traffic is restricted along these roadways and these
              heavy vehicles would still have a lack of convenient access.

[¶53.]        Taking these statements of fact as true, it is unclear whether routing

heavy commercial traffic on the majority’s proposed 1.3-mile detour through

residential areas is even possible. While it is true that “it is not necessary for a

court to identify the specific route,” Ante ¶ 26, it is telling that the circuit court and

majority struggle to present any route that is not undermined by factual

ambiguities and disputes in the record. The majority attempts to sidestep this issue

by pointing out that the median does not prevent traffic from exiting to the west or

entering from the east. But this ignores Legacy’s factual assertion that “vehicles

leaving the property to head east . . . represents a large percentage of site traffic

[due] to traffic being oriented to [] SD-79.” This eastbound exiting traffic, in

addition to vehicles entering from the west, would have to follow the previously

described routes to exit or access the Legacy property.

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[¶54.]       The majority is correct that we “gauge[] substantial impairment to

access generally.” Ante ¶ 26. However, the facts proffered by Legacy, at the very

least, call into question whether departing commercial traffic can reach SD-79

through any of the routes proposed by the majority here or the circuit court below.

Without such access, which “represents a large portion of site traffic,” commercial

development becomes substantially more difficult, if not impossible. Legacy would

thus be deprived of the “highest, best and most profitable” uses of the property.

Because the median fundamentally alters Legacy’s access to Highway 16B and its

ability to develop the property to its fullest potential, it is inappropriate to conclude

at this stage that substantial impairment could not be demonstrated over the course

of further proceedings.

[¶55.]       The majority also errs by dismissing the possibility of eventual

commercial use of the property. The mere fact that no development plan is

currently on file with the City of Rapid City does not demonstrate that Legacy has

no plans to commercially develop the property. Sewer and water infrastructure has

already been installed to support future commercial development. Prior to the

installation of the median, Legacy met with Walmart developers about a possible

sale of the property. These discussions ended after the median reduced access.

Legacy has also previously submitted commercial development plans to the City.

According to Nash, “Legacy always intended to develop the property for commercial

use.”

[¶56.]       For purposes of summary judgment, we must accept these factual

allegations as true. Legacy clearly envisioned commercial development of the

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property and took affirmative steps in this direction. The effects of the median

should be judged against this intended use. Contrary to the majority’s assertion,

this is not a valuation argument since the inquiry focuses on how the State has

affected the use of a property, irrespective of any valuation changes. This use

analysis is directly related to the nature of the property, one of our impairment

factors. According to the facts proffered by Legacy, the median renders regular

commercial traffic to the property likely impossible. Since Legacy, on this record, is

unable to put the property to regular commercial use because of the median, it is

difficult to imagine what more would be needed for substantial impairment.

[¶57.]       Finally, the majority hedges, claiming that, even if there is substantial

impairment this “kind of injury does not seem particular to Legacy.” Ante ¶ 39. It

is not true that “all drivers and landowners along this particular portion of Catron

Boulevard must deal with the median.” Ante ¶ 39. Other nearby properties are

located next to median breaks that allow traffic to enter and exit in both directions.

Legacy is also uniquely affected because of its intended commercial use of the

property. Although drivers of eastbound small cars may be able to reach the

property through a U-turn, the record, viewed most favorably to Legacy,

demonstrates that regular access by large vehicles is likely not possible. Legacy

thus experiences a unique injury to its property.

[¶58.]       In conclusion, this case was not ripe for summary judgment given the

existence of material issues of fact regarding the impairment analysis. For the

foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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