Court Opinion

ID: 9702998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:36:36.394474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:44.786488
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
[1,7] The majority’s order denying the Commonwealth its right to proceed to trial against appellee Francis J. Lynch, a state senator, and appellee Stephen R. Wojdak, a former state representative, on criminal charges of bribery in official and political matters, attempted theft by extortion, attempted theft by deception and conspiracy, compels dissent. As was determined by the judge who heard the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, these charges, which were filed by the Attorney General of Pennsylvania in 1976 following the issuance of presentments by a special investigating grand jury, were amply supported by the Commonwealth’s evidence. That evidence showed that Lynch first agreed to accept from an intermediary a substantial sum of money—as much as $10,000—in exchange for a promise by Lynch to exercise his influence in order to obtain the admission of an applicant to the School of Dentistry of Temple University, a state-funded educational institution, and that Lynch then enlisted Wojdak’s aid to halt the normal flow of the admission by securing a “hold” on the Dental School’s letter of admission to the applicant.
*381I
Lynch and Wojdak were held for court on the above charges of political corruption after a preliminary hearing before Judge Gates (Lebanon County, specially presiding). The charges were later dismissed by Judge Lavelle (Schuylkill County, specially presiding), who, after argument on petitions for writs of habeas corpus, determined that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at the preliminary hearing failed to establish a prima facie case. A panel of the Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of the charges and a majority of this Court now affirms the dismissal of all but one of the charges brought against Lynch, conspiracy commit theft by deception, and the dismissal of all of the charges brought against Wojdak.1
The Commonwealth’s case against Lynch and Wojdak as presented at the preliminary hearing was based on the testimony of three witnesses, Dr. Goldenberg, the father of the applicant, Samuel Biener, a local politician, and Thomas Elliott, a lobbyist for the University and its Vice-President for Governmental Affairs. Dr. Goldenberg admitted at the preliminary hearing that he had agreed to pay Biener $15,-000 in cash upon the admission of his son to the Dental School. Biener admitted at the same hearing that he had approached Lynch concerning the agreement between himself and Dr. Goldenberg. He told of his conversation with Lynch concerning the status of the application of Dr. Goldenberg’s son, including a conversation in which Lynch revealed the existence of an effort to “stop” the letter of admission which the Dental School had independently decided to mail to the applicant. Elliott described in detail how *382he had been asked by Wojdak if the Dental School’s letter to Dr. Goldenberg’s son formally announcing the son’s admission could be “held,” the unique nature of that inquiry, and Wojdak’s reaction upon learning that the letter of admission had already been mailed. Because the opinion dismissing the charges fails to consider the full testimony of these witnesses, it is necessary to set forth this testimony, especially the testimony of Thomas Elliott, which not only implicated Wojdak in the scheme but also established the Commonwealth’s contention that Wojdak and Lynch had a shared criminal intent.
Dr. Goldenberg testified that he had made a number of efforts to secure his son’s admission to the Dental School after the fall of 1975, when his son had applied. Among the efforts was a promise to a Dr. Cook, an officer of the University’s Alumni Association whom Dr. Goldenberg described as very influential, that the Dental School would be the beneficiary of a substantial contribution from Dr. Goldenberg if his son should be admitted.
Sometime in the spring of 1976, while waiting to hear from the Dental School, Dr. Goldenberg'contacted Samuel Biener. According to Dr. Goldenberg, Biener represented that he “could help,” but that it would cost Dr. Goldenberg $15,000. Biener’s own testimony confirmed Dr. Golden-berg’s account: “I said you’ve got to have cash, no check and he asked me, you would protect me and I said you don’t give no money up until you get a letter of acceptance.”
Biener testified that he had contacted Lynch after advising Dr. Goldenberg of the cost of Biener’s help. Biener told Lynch, “I have got a boy that wants to get into dentistry and I can get Ten Thousand Dollars” ($5,000 less than the cost of Biener’s help as Biener had presented it to Dr. Goldenberg). Lynch then said that he would “get back” to Biener. A few weeks later, Lynch directed Biener to obtain a transcript of “the boy’s marks.”
Dr. Cook, the alumni association officer whose assistance Dr. Goldenberg had sought, unofficially advised Dr. Golden-berg on the morning of June 29,1976, that his son had been *383admitted to the Dental School and that an official letter of admission from the Dental School would be forthcoming. Dr. Goldenberg testified that shortly thereafter he was also advised of his son’s admission by Biener and told by Biener “to get the package ready.” According to Dr. Goldenberg, the receipt of the information regarding the admission from both sources had placed him in a “dilemma”: “Here I was obligated to give money to the school and also to give money to Mr. Biener and at this point, I didn’t know what to do.” That same evening Dr. Goldenberg called Biener to tell him of Dr. Cook’s independent efforts to assist his son’s admission. Dr. Goldenberg testified, “[Biener] swore to me that my son got in without any help, not even from him.... ” Nothing was said in that conversation regarding Dr. Golden-berg’s payment of money to Biener. According to Dr. Goldenberg, either the “next day or the second day,” Biener called Dr. Goldenberg and confirmed that the admission had occurred “without any help.” Biener told Goldenberg to “forget about it.”
Biener maintained that he learned of the admission of Dr. Goldenberg’s son during a telephone conversation with Dr. Goldenberg. According to Biener, in that same conversation Biener congratulated Dr. Goldenberg, told him to “forget about everything,” and then called Lynch and told him that “the boy got in on his own, you didn’t do nothing. Let’s forget about it. . ..” Lynch “didn’t say nothing on that particular call,” but called Biener back and said, “They are going to try and stop the letter.”
Two days later, on July 1,1976, Lynch called Biener again. Lynch advised Biener that “they couldn’t stop the letter.” In that same conversation, Lynch advised Biener to “stay away” from Dr. Goldenberg, and added, “You are going to get boxed in.”2
*384Thomas Elliott, the University’s lobbyist, testified that on June 30,1976, the day after Dr. Goldenberg had unofficially learned of his son’s admission and the day before Lynch’s statement that “they couldn’t stop the letter,” Wojdak had called Elliott, asking him to “check on a Dental School application” of a “Rosenberg,” who would have been admitted “in the last couple of days.” Elliott then placed a call to a Mr. Sullivan, a University official who handled dental school admissions. After checking school records, Sullivan told Elliott that no person named Rosenberg had been recently admitted. Elliott then called Wojdak, who asked Elliott to check again, this time to see if any person whose name ended in “-berg” had been admitted. Elliott did so, and Sullivan found the name “Goldenberg.” Elliott then called Wojdak, who asked Elliott if the letter of admission had gone out. After Elliott said that he would have to check, Wojdak requested, “If it has not gone out, could it be held for a day?”
Elliott followed up on Wojdak’s request by placing another call to Sullivan. Sullivan learned that the letter had already been signed and had been mailed. Elliott relayed this information to Wojdak, who said, “They are trying to go around me,” a statement of record by Wojdak which the opinion dismissing the charges of political corruption fails to consider.
On cross-examination, Elliott testified that he frequently received recommendations, expressions of interest, and inquiries as to the status of applications for admission, from “all segments of the community,” including Wojdak and other legislators. However, on redirect examination, he testified that he had never previously been asked to “hold” a letter of admission:
“Q. [(By the prosecuting attorney)]: In the course of your dealings as Vice-President of Governmental Affairs, would it be fair to say that you get hundreds or thousands of inquiries?
A. [(By Elliott)]: Yes.
Q. What was your position?
*385A. I was Undergraduate Director of Admissions.
Q. And in that position, you had often inquiries about [the] status of certain candidates, is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. In all of those dealings, all of the dealings you have had throughout the years, in both of those positions, did anyone ever ask you to see if a letter could be held up?
A. No.”
This testimony is also not considered by the opinion dismissing the charges.
II
The above testimony of record, far from supporting the assertion that Wojdak was unaware of Lynch’s scheme, amply supports the inference urged by the Commonwealth that Wojdak’s effort to have the letter “held” was undertaken pursuant to a plan with Lynch, whose objectives Wojdak shared. Elliott’s testimony established that on June 30, 1976, one day after Lynch had advised Samuel Biener that “they are going to try and stop the letter,” Elliott had received an inquiry from Wojdak regarding the possibility of having the formal letter of admission “held.” Clearly Wojdak was the “they” to whom Lynch had referred. In all of Elliott’s dealings with persons interested in the status of applications for admission, including Wojdak himself, Elliott had never previously been asked if he could hold a letter of admission. Elliott further testified that after he had informed Wojdak that the letter of admission could not be held, Wojdak made the statement that “they are trying to go around me.” Surely a factfinder could reasonably conclude on the evidence presented that the utterance of Wojdak was an expression of frustration over the fact that others had in fact circumvented his and Lynch’s scheme to exercise control over the admission of Andrew Goldenberg, a scheme which had fallen through despite Wojdak’s last-ditch effort to salvage it by “holding” the Dental School’s letter of admission.
*386In light of all the testimony, particularly the testimony of Thomas Elliott, there is no basis on the record for immunizing Wojdak from prosecution on the charge of conspiracy to commit theft by deception, the one charge brought against Lynch which is permitted to stand. The Commonwealth has presented evidence which would permit a factfinder to conclude that Wojdak was a participant in Lynch’s scheme, and the Commonwealth should thus be afforded an opportunity to establish the guilt of both Lynch and Wojdak at trial.
Similarly, when the conduct of Lynch is considered in conjunction, with that of Wojdak, it is clear that the Commonwealth has established a prima facie case against both defendants on the charges of attempted theft by extortion, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3923, and attempted theft by deception, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922. Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3923, “[a] person is guilty of theft [by extortion] if he .intentionally obtains or withholds property of another by threatening to: * * * (4) take or withhold action as an official or cause an official to take or withhold action. * * * ” Here, the testimony relating to the joint effort of Lynch and Wojdak to have the letter held would permit a factfinder to conclude that Lynch and Wojdak were laying the groundwork necessary to assure that Dr. Goldenberg would pay Biener, a “substantial step toward the commission of [theft by extortion],” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922, “[a] person is guilty of theft [by deception] if he intentionally obtains or withholds property of another by deception. A person deceives if he intentionally (1) creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind. ...” On the basis of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, a factfinder could reasonably conclude that during the alleged scheme, Lynch and Wojdak sought to create a false impression that the admission of Dr. Goldenberg’s son would flow from political influence, a false impression initially created by Lynch, who in fact did nothing to influence University officials, and subsequently reinforced by Wojdak, who unsuccessfully at*387tempted to have the Dental School’s letter of admission “held.”
There is also no basis on the record for the view expressed in the opinion dismissing the charges that the transaction between Dr. Goldenberg and Biener “[did] not amount to criminal conduct,” a premise employed by that opinion to defeat the charge of bribery in official and political matters, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701. The evidence at the preliminary hearing established that Dr. Goldenberg had agreed to pay Biener $15,000 in cash upon the admission of his son to the Dental School. Prom this evidence a factfinder could reasonably conclude that Dr. Goldenberg and Biener had agreed that Biener was to purchase the exercise of influence from whomever Biener saw fit to contact. A factfinder could also reasonably conclude that Lynch must have realized, upon being told by Biener that Biener could “get $10,000” from Dr. Goldenberg, that the $10,000 was intended not to be compensation for the services of Biener alone, but rather compensation for Biener plus “pecuniary benefit” for Lynch “as consideration for [his] recommendation. . .,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701, if he should make one.
Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701, “[a] person is guilty of bribery, a felony of the third degree, if he ... agrees to accept from another: (1) any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or other exercise of discretion as a public servant, party official, or voter by the recipient. . . . ” Here, after being told that Biener could “get $10,000” from the parent of an applicant, Lynch requested “the boy’s marks,” and never disclaimed an interest in the large sum of cash. Upon learning that Andrew Goldenberg had been admitted to the School of Dentistry “on his own,” Biener promptly contacted Lynch and charged Lynch with having “done nothing” to facilitate the admission, and told Lynch, “Let’s forget about it,” a proposal that their agreement be dropped. Once so confronted by Biener, Lynch made no effort to dispute Biener’s apparent understanding, but rather told Biener that “they are going to try and stop the letter.” From Wojdak’s subsequent conduct it *388may be fairly inferred that Lynch promptly enlisted the aid of Wojdak to “stop” the letter. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(b)(3) (accomplice liability). It is apparent that a factfinder could properly determine that these measures were Lynch’s means of rejecting Biener’s proposal to “forget about” the agreement which Biener had understood to exist, and Lynch’s further means of enabling him to perform pursuant to that same agreement.3
Ill
As in all other cases in which persons have been properly charged with having engaged in criminal conduct, here the Commonwealth is entitled to prove the guilt of Lynch and Wojdak on the charges of bribery in official and political matters, attempted theft by extortion, attempted theft by deception, and related counts of conspiracy at a trial, where Lynch and Wojdak would have the same opportunity to defend against the charges as do all other persons chárged with criminal conduct. Fair and even-handed administration of criminal justice permits nothing less.
*389Accordingly, the orders of the Superior Court should be reversed insofar as they affirm the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia dismissing the above charges, and the orders of the preliminary hearing judge holding Lynch and Wojdak for court on the above charges should be reinstated.
McDERMOTT, J., joins in this opinion.

. The Commonwealth also charged Lynch and Wojdak with official oppression, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5301, and speculating or wagering on official action or information (attempted and actual), 18 Pa.C.S. § 5302. Judge Gates dismissed the charges of official oppression at the close of the preliminary hearing, a ruling which the Commonwealth has not contested. As to the charges of speculating or wagering on official action or information, it cannot be said on this record that Lynch and Wojdak either attempted to rely or actually relied on “information to which [they had] access in [their] official capacity....” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5302.

. The parties stipulated that neither Lynch nor Wojdak had actually assisted in the admission of Dr. Goldenberg’s son. The parties also stipulated that Lynch and Wojdak were members of the General Assembly for the duration of the alleged scheme, and that they shared a Harrisburg apartment.

. The arrangement alleged between Biener and Lynch bears a curious resemblance to the arrangement alleged in United States v. Fineman, 434 F.Supp. 189 (E.D.Pa.1977), which was summarized as follows:
“On four occasions between September 1970 and March 1973 the defendant [ (Herbert Fineman, a former state representative) ] and [Martin] Abrams [(a committeeman from Philadelphia)] carried out a scheme or arrangement pursuant to which the parents of students wishing to enroll in certain graduate schools within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (two medical schools and a veterinary school, all of which received substantial financial support through legislative appropriations) were induced by Abrams to pay large sums of money (ranging from $11,000 to $15,000 per student) in order to influence favorable action upon their respective applications. Abrams did not tell the parents the identity of the person whose influence would thus be obtained. The defendant, through letters and otherwise, would recommend favorable action on the applications by the graduate school involved. After the student was accepted, most of the money collected by Abrams was turned over to the defendant and retained by him.”
434 F.Supp. at 192. The alleged conduct of Fineman was .held to have constituted bribery at common law, 434 F.Supp. at 194, and to be within the Crimes Code’s definition of bribery, id.