Court Opinion

ID: 9733475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:08:52.526282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:41.929510
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). Nickels was charged with "fraudulently and improperly” appropriating to his own personal use the sum of $320 withheld from Laurie Shelden’s wages at the rate of $40 per week for eight weeks "under the guise of income tax and social security withholding . . . .” This charge was based on allegations that Nickels had represented to Shelden that the money was being withheld for that purpose and that "contrary to the representations made to Laurie Shelden,” Nickels did not remit any portion of the funds withheld to the federal or state government or account to her therefor.
In finding that the misconduct alleged was established, the hearing panel said:
It is the finding of the Panel that there was a contract of employment in existence between the *264Respondent and Laurie Shelden pursuant to the ceta agreement in Exhibit I. It is further found that Ms. Shelden worked 40 hour weeks for the eight week period of her employment and was entitled to $140 ($3.50 per hour) per week and she [was] paid only $100 per week by Respondent. Panel found the testimony of the Respondent inherently incredible.
As to Count I the Panel finds the Respondent guilty of misconduct in withholding $320 at the rate of $40 per week as income tax and social security and that said retainment of funds has resulted in the appropriation fraudulently and improperly by the Respondent.
Therefore the Panel finds the Respondent guilty of professional misconduct and in violation of the GCR 953(2), (3), and (4), and Canon I DR [1-102(A)(1), (4), and (6)] of Professional Responsibility.
The attorney discipline board affirmed without filing a separate opinion or findings.
This Court similarly concludes that fraud was established on proof that Nickels "promised Shelden that she would be reimbursed after he talked to his accountant,” that "[h]e failed to do so,” and that he did not pay her the $320 until the conclusion of the hearing before the panel of the attorney discipline board.1 The Court continues that Nickels "represented that he was withholding money in order to pay the appropriate taxing authorities,” but he never did so. "[W]e believe that respondent’s representations and retention of funds constituted misconduct.”2
A promise may be characterized as a representation, but a breach of promise does not constitute misrepresentation or fraud unless the person making the representation knew when he made it *265"that it was false, or made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth . . . Hi-Way Motor Co v Int'l Harvester Co, 398 Mich 330, 336; 247 NW2d 813 (1976).
The hearing panel did not find that Nickels knew when he made the promise or representation to Shelden that it was false or that he made it recklessly.
The question whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Nickels had no intention of either accounting to Shelden or of paying the money withheld to the taxing authorities when he withheld the sums of $40 per week from her wages cannot properly be addressed unless or until the hearing panel finds that at those times he had no intention to do so.
It appears that Nickels may have violated federal and state law, but the misconduct charged and found was a fraudulent appropriation of funds belonging to Shelden. "An attorney may only be found guilty of misconduct as charged in the complaint.”3
I would vacate the decision of the attorney discipline board and remand to it for further proceedings which might include a further hearing and filing of further findings of fact.
I agree with the majority that a lawyer may be disciplined for activities which occur outside of an attorney-client relationship.4 I continue to adhere to the view that the limitations suggested by Justice Thomas G. Kavanagh are sound:
In deciding whether any discipline is justified, *266we should distinguish carefully between what a lawyer does as a lawyer and what he does as a private citizen. The very highest standards can properly be required of a lawyer in his professional conduct, but when he is not purporting to act as a lawyer, his private conduct must be publicly scandalous or indicate that he properly cannot be trusted to advise and. act for clients before it justifies public Bar discipline. [State Bar v Grossman, 390 Mich 157, 164; 211 NW2d 21 (1973) (Kavanagh, J., dissenting).]

 Ante, p 262.

 Ante, pp 262-263.

 State Bar Grievance Administrator v Jackson, 390 Mich 147, 155; 211 NW2d 38 (1973). Similarly, see State Bar Grievance Administrator v Freid, 388 Mich 711; 202 NW2d 692 (1972); State Bar Grievance Administrator v Corace, 390 Mich 419, 425; 213 NW2d 124 (1973).

 Ante, pp 259-260.