Court Opinion

ID: 9791905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:20:19.399878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.324265
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice,
with whom MATTHEWS, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting.
Central to the majority’s holding that the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees *1342should be sustained is its conclusion that it was unreasonable on Childs’ part to pursue his appeal as to the Tulins, given his opening briefs failure to argue the question to the superior court. My reading of the record persuades me that Childs did not abandon his claim that the Tulins individually had employed him. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s opinion.
Turning first to the “Statement of Points on Appeal,” the record discloses that Childs articulated the following specifications of error:
1. . The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board erred in concluding that the appellant was not an employee of appellees at the time of his injury.
2. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board erred in concluding that the appellant failed to satisfy his burden of proof in establishing the existence of an employment relationship between himself and one or all of the appellees.
These points are reiterated by Childs in the “Issues Presented For Review” section of his opening appellate brief to the superior court. In his formulation of the questions before the superior court, Childs stated that one of the issues was the following:
That the board had failed to recognize that regardless of a question whether a contract of employment with the subject lodge had been finalized, he undertook on behalf and for the appellees and during a negotiation period in reliance on finalization of employment various work efforts under the direction and supervision which a reasonable person would have understood to be in expectation of compensation.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, Childs does argue in his opening brief that Charles Tulin, acting on his own behalf, employed him:
Another question so raised was whether more plausibly, Childs was during relevant times an employee in the sense of workers’ compensation acts of Kalgin Island Lodge, Inc. or of Charles Tulin and his law firm individually.
At a subsequent point in his opening brief Childs elaborates upon this claim of Tulin’s individual liability:
Had the board made explicit findings then it may possibly appear that Charles Tulin in his capacity as practicing attorney at law and owner of the facilities did not act in his own name and for himself but with apparent agency for the corporation.1
I find it particularly telling that the ap-pellees themselves did not consider the issue of the Tulins’ individual liability abandoned. In this regard, appellees listed the following as the first “issue presented” in their appellate brief to the superior court:
There is uncontradicted evidence that no party ever intended for Donald Childs to be an employee for Charles Tulin Law Offices or Charles Tulin personally and thus the Board’s findings that Donald Childs was not an employee of the Appel-lees is supported by the evidence, and these findings are based on a correct interpretation of Alaska Workers’ Compensation Law.
Later in their appellate brief, the Tulins devote four pages of argumentation in support of their contention that “Donald Childs Vas never an employee of Charles Tulin Law Offices or Charles Tulin.” In his reply brief, Childs observes that Tulin “... seems to be constrained to admit that for a period of time Mr. Childs undertook or completed work assignments for Kalgin Lodge and/or Tulin ...”
*1343Given the foregoing, I do not believe that it can be reasonably inferred that Childs’ abandoned his claim that the Tulins individually were his employer. Thus, I conclude that the superior court had no basis for awarding attorney’s fees to the Tulins pursuant to Appellate Rule 508(e) and (g).

. In his opening brief, Childs makes the following additional argument as to Tulin's individual liability:
Certainly ... Child’s [sic] attending to obtain needed gasoline, his assistance and participating in pre-flighting a plane and the various activities, including a study of marketing methods with phone calls on behalf of the lodge ... cannot rationally indicate that Childs wanted to make a gift of his exertions whether important or not so important to the lodge or to Charles Tulin out of kindness of his heart. A reasonable attorney at law as Charles Tulin must have understood ... that he would not request work of a person like Mr. Childs without a total understanding that the work is for pay. An attorney does not need to be lectured about it that services rendered result in an obligation to compensate.