Court Opinion

ID: 9713541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:17:10.980809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:18.543002
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion the reasonableness of the appellant’s actions is a jury question. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the manner most favorable to the guilty verdict, the jury’s verdict is not manifestly contrary to the evidence presented at trial and consequently should not be overturned.
In its instruction to the jury the trial court gave three criteria against which Riley Housley’s conduct should be evaluated:
First, the killing must have been done in the belief that it was necessary to avert death or great bodily harm.
Second, the judgment of defendant as to the gravity of the peril to which he was exposed must have been reasonable, not in the clear light of calm consideration, but under the circumstances as they existed at the time of the event.

Third, defendant’s election to defend himself must have been such as a reasonable man would have made in light of the danger to be apprehended and the existence of any alternative way of avoiding the peril.

(Emphasis added.) The instruction correctly restates our law on self-defense as it was set out in State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 170 N.W.2d 104 (1969). The jury was required to apply the law of self-defense to the facts it found at trial.
It is not our function on appeal to give de novo review of the facts. As we have said:
[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence we do not try the facts anew. Our responsibility extends no further than to make a painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence, direct and circumstantial, viewed most favorably to support a finding of guilt is sufficient to permit the jury to reach that conclusion.
State v. Ellingson, 283 Minn. 208, 211, 167 N.W.2d 55, 57 (1969). Convictions challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence will be reversed only where the verdict is manifestly contrary to the evidence introduced at trial. See State v. Strimling, 265 N.W.2d 423 (Minn.1978); State v. Reichenberger, 289 Minn. 75, 182 N.W.2d 692 (1970).
*752The appellant would have us view the evidence in a manner most favorable to a finding of not guilty, which is precisely the opposite of what we are required to do. The respondent correctly notes that, on review, this court must assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved those for the defense. See, State v. Marsyla, 269 N.W.2d 2 (Minn.1978); State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 253 N.W.2d 378 (1977); State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898 (Minn.1977). There was considerable evidence presented at trial from which the jury might have concluded that the appellant’s actions were unreasonable under the circumstances. The state suggested a number of alternatives available to the appellant short of shooting Sergeant Mack. The majority dismisses these alternatives by saying that we are primarily concerned with the reasonableness of what the appellant did do, and not with what he might have done. However, the law of the case specifically required the jury to be concerned with “the existence of any alternative way of avoiding the peril,” see instruction, supra.
My reading of the record indicates that the jury could have viewed the evidence as follows: The appellant was awakened quite early in the process of the officers’ efforts to gain entry. He then heard the officers shout, “We are the police with a search warrant.” The appellant then heard breaking glass followed by several minutes of sledge hammering at his door. After the police gained entry, he heard another officer, Sergeant Berneck, yell again, “Police, search warrant.” Finally, the appellant, though myopic, had sufficient visual acuity to determine that the person he saw in the doorway was neither holding a gun nor raising a gun in a threatening manner.
Evidence was presented to support the above scenario, and I reiterate that it is our obligation to view the evidence most favorably to the finding of guilt. The jury had sufficient evidence before it to infer that the appellant should have done before the shooting that which he did immediately after; i.e., retreat to a point of safety, call the police and ask to see the officers’ badges. If the jury believed that the sound of breaking glass and sledge hammering awakened the appellant before he said he was awakened, ample opportunity existed for avoiding the peril by shouting, “Who is there?” or “Stop — I have a gun.” These are all reasonable inferences that the law of self-defense requires juries to consider when it evaluates reasonableness in light of the existence of any alternative means of avoiding the peril.
In conclusion, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to hold, as a matter of law, that the appellant’s decision to shoot first and ask questions later was reasonable. The obligation to choose reasonable alternatives to avoid peril where such alternatives are available is an integral part of the law of self-defense. This court has neither seen nor heard the witnesses in this case. We should not invade the province of the jury by taking the question of the reasonableness of the appellant’s conduct from their consideration. I would affirm.