Court Opinion

ID: 9582926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:32:49.980974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:45.571598
License: Public Domain

Andersen, J.
(concurring) — I generally agree with Justice DoUiver's concurring opinion, and in particular I agree with his statement that whether the language contained in an employee handbook is sufficiently definite to constitute a promise of specific treatment in a given situation is a question of law.
I write separately to express my concern that Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn.2d 657, 801 P.2d 222 (1990) is being cited by the majority for a broader application than is here at issue. The majority states:
Thus, to the extent St. Yves depends upon the "plain meaning rule", that parol evidence is inadmissible for purposes of interpreting a contract apparently unambiguous on its face, its reasoning was rejected in Berg.
Majority opinion, at 528.
*550In Berg, the written lease agreement was obviously ambiguous. In this case the employment relationship was certainly not a traditional integrated written contract. My concern is that the majority's broad characterization of Berg will upset the finality of unambiguous integrated written contracts and require every contract dispute to be determined by the trier of fact only after a full trial. In Berg, we clarified the law in Washington and reaffirmed the "context" rule, as declared by this court in 1944 in J.W. Seavey Hop Corp. v. Pollock, 20 Wn.2d 337, 348-49, 147 P.2d 310 (1944). Pollock clearly states:
May we say here that we are mindful of the general rule that parol evidence is not admissible for the purpose of adding to, modifying, or contradicting the terms of a written contract, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake. But, as stated in Olsen v. Nichols, 86 Wash. 185, 149 Pac. 668 [(1915)], parol evidence is admissible to show the situation of the parties and the circumstances under which a written instrument was executed, for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties and properly construing the writing. Such evidence, however, is admitted, not for the purpose of importing into a writing an intention not expressed therein, but with the view of elucidating the meaning of the words employed. Evidence of this character is admitted for the purpose of aiding in the interpretation of what is in the instrument, and not for the purpose of showing intention independent of the instrument. It is the duty of the court to declare the meaning of what is written, and not what was intended to be written. If the evidence goes no further than to show the situation of the parties and the circumstances under which the instrument was executed, then it is admissible.
(Italics mine.) Pollock, 20 Wn.2d at 348-49. See also Berg, 115 Wn.2d at 669.
When the case arises where a written integrated contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, I would hold that extrinsic evidence is not admissible. Certainty of contract depends on parties being bound to their clearly drafted written contracts.
Dolliver, J., concurs with Andersen, J.