Court Opinion

ID: 9905852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:06:51.022154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:56.430214
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 128474

                                         IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT
                                             OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                    (Docket No. 128474)

                 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant,
                         v. BRYAN N. BRUSAW, Appellee.

                              Opinion filed November 30, 2023.

        JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, and
     Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion.

        Justice O’Brien took no part in the decision.

                                          OPINION

¶1      At issue in this appeal is whether a motion for substitution of judge brought
     pursuant to section 114-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code)
     (725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) (West 2016)) is subject to the common-law rule holding that,
     when a motion is filed in the trial court but never ruled upon, it is presumed to have
     been abandoned or waived by the movant. The appellate court held that a motion
     brought pursuant to section 114-5(a) is not subject to the common-law rule. 2022
     IL App (3d) 190154-U. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the
     appellate court.

¶2                                    BACKGROUND

¶3       On September 6, 2017, defendant Bryan N. Brusaw was charged in the circuit
     court of Will County with aggravated driving under the influence and aggravated
     driving while his license was revoked after a police officer discovered him passed
     out in the driver’s seat of a parked van containing two open bottles of alcohol. Both
     charges were aggravated based on several prior convictions for similar conduct.

¶4      The same day he was charged, Brusaw requested a public defender, and one
     was appointed to represent him. The case was then assigned to Judge Sarah Jones,
     and a pretrial hearing date was set for October 25, 2017.

¶5       On October 5, 2017, Brusaw filed a pro se motion for substitution of Judge
     Jones pursuant to section 114-5(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) (West 2016)).
     This provision gives a defendant the right to an “automatic” substitution of a judge
     upon the timely filing of a proper written motion containing a good-faith allegation
     that the judge is prejudiced. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 214-15 (2004).

¶6       On October 11, 2017, Brusaw’s appointed attorney was present in Judge
     Jones’s courtroom and asked to call Brusaw’s case. Counsel explained to the judge
     that Brusaw had “filed his own motion” for substitution and that, because he had
     not written the words “in custody” on the motion, he had not been transported to
     the courthouse and was therefore not present. Counsel then asked that Brusaw’s
     motion be continued to the previously scheduled hearing date of October 25. Judge
     Jones granted the continuance with no further discussion. The October 25 hearing
     was subsequently moved to November, and during that hearing, no mention was
     made of the motion for substitution. Thereafter, neither Brusaw nor his attorney
     brought the motion for substitution to Judge Jones’s attention, and the judge never
     entered a ruling on the motion.

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¶7          On May 29, 2018, Brusaw and his attorney appeared before Judge Jones to
       execute a jury waiver. Brusaw was fully admonished regarding his right to a jury
       trial, acknowledged that he had consulted with his attorney, and was asked if he
       wished “to submit this case to the Court as a bench trial and waiv[e] his right to a
       jury trial.” Brusaw said that he did and signed a jury waiver. Brusaw’s attorney
       informed the judge that a trial date had previously been set for June 25, 2018, and
       stated that they were prepared to go to trial “any time that week your honor is
       available.”

¶8         A bench trial was subsequently held before Judge Jones, and Brusaw was found
       guilty of both charged offenses. Brusaw’s appointed attorney filed a posttrial
       motion to reconsider the verdict, arguing that the State had failed to prove Brusaw’s
       guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That motion was denied. Brusaw also filed a
       pro se motion for a new trial. That motion was struck by Judge Jones as
       unauthorized because Brusaw was still represented by counsel at the time the
       motion was filed. Brusaw’s appointed attorney then withdrew, and Brusaw retained
       private counsel. Brusaw’s new attorney filed an amended posttrial motion that also
       was denied. None of the three posttrial motions filed before Judge Jones mentioned
       the motion for substitution of judge or the fact that a ruling had never been obtained
       on the motion.

¶9         Following a sentencing hearing, Judge Jones sentenced Brusaw to a nine-year
       prison term for aggravated driving under the influence and an extended, six-year
       prison term for aggravated driving while his license was revoked, with the
       sentences to run concurrently. Brusaw spoke in allocution during the sentencing
       hearing and mentioned, in passing, his pro se motion for a new trial that had been
       struck by Judge Jones. He did not mention the motion for substitution of judge.

¶ 10       Brusaw appealed, raising two arguments. First, Brusaw contended that his
       convictions should be vacated because no ruling was ever entered on the motion
       for substitution of judge. Second, he maintained that the extended-term sentence he
       received for driving while his license was revoked was unauthorized and should be
       reduced to the maximum, nonextended term.

¶ 11      With one justice dissenting, the appellate court agreed with Brusaw’s first
       argument, reversed his convictions, and remanded the cause for further
       proceedings. 2022 IL App (3d) 190154-U. The appellate court acknowledged the

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       common-law rule holding that a motion that is not ruled upon by the trial court is
       presumed to have been abandoned or waived by the movant. The appellate court
       concluded, however, that the “plain language of section 114-5(a) of the Code”
       establishes that a motion for substitution brought pursuant to that provision “is not
       subject to the common abandonment principle that puts the onus on defendant to
       secure a ruling on his motion.” Id. ¶ 14. Instead, according to the appellate court,
       when a section 114-5(a) motion is not ruled upon, that “function[s] as a denial of
       the motion.” Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 12       Proceeding under the premise that the trial court had, in effect, “denied”
       Brusaw’s motion for substitution, the appellate court then rejected the State’s
       argument that the denial was proper because, at the time the motion was filed,
       Brusaw was represented by an attorney and the pro se motion was therefore
       unauthorized. Id. ¶ 17. The appellate court concluded that the right to substitution
       set forth in section 114-5(a) is “personal” to a defendant and thus exempt from the
       rule prohibiting a defendant from submitting pro se filings while represented by an
       attorney. Id. Therefore, according to the appellate court, that rule could not provide
       a basis for denying the substitution motion. Id.

¶ 13       The appellate court also rejected the State’s argument that Brusaw had forfeited
       any objection to the “denial” of the substitution motion because the issue had not
       been raised in a posttrial motion. Id. ¶ 15. The appellate court reasoned that any
       forfeiture should be overlooked because the question of whether the substitution
       motion was erroneously denied by the trial court “directly implicate[d]” Brusaw’s
       “constitutional right to an impartial trial.” Id.

¶ 14        Having rejected the State’s arguments, the appellate court concluded that the
       trial court committed reversible error when it, in effect, “denied” Brusaw’s motion
       for substitution and failed to transfer the cause to another judge. Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
       Because the appellate court reversed Brusaw’s convictions, it did not reach his
       argument concerning the alleged sentencing error. Id. ¶ 19.

¶ 15      We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff.
       Oct. 1, 2021).

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¶ 16                                            ANALYSIS

¶ 17        In general, a party filing a motion is responsible for obtaining a ruling from the
       trial court on the motion. People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 35 (1996); People v. Schmitt,
       131 Ill. 2d 128, 137 (1989); People v. Petrie, 2021 IL App (2d) 190213, ¶ 25;
       People v. Kelley, 237 Ill. App. 3d 829, 831 (1992). A movant’s “ ‘failure to obtain
       a ruling on a motion does not translate into a denial of the motion by the court.’ ”
       People v. Daniels, 2016 IL App (4th) 140131, ¶ 72 (quoting Rodriguez v. Illinois
       Prisoner Review Board, 376 Ill. App. 3d 429, 432 (2007)). Rather, if no ruling is
       obtained, the motion is presumed to have been abandoned or waived 1 by the
       movant, unless circumstances indicate otherwise. People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97,
       123 (1994); Petrie, 2021 IL App (2d) 190213; People v. Priest, 345 Ill. App. 3d
       660, 665 (2003); 60 C.J.S. Motions § 44 (August 2023 Update). Because a motion
       not ruled upon has been abandoned or waived, it presents “no question with
       reference thereto arising on review.” People v. Stewart, 412 Ill. 106, 108 (1952).
       This rule of abandonment or waiver serves an important function by ensuring that
       a movant, who is fully aware of the motion that was filed, cannot remain silent in
       the trial court and then, on appeal, “take advantage of his failure to have [the]
       motion passed upon.” People v. Hornaday, 400 Ill. 361, 365 (1948).

¶ 18       In this case, Brusaw’s motion for substitution was brought to the trial court’s
       attention but then, at defense counsel’s request, was continued to a later date.
       During the subsequent proceedings, neither Brusaw nor his attorney ever
       mentioned the motion, and no ruling was ever obtained on it. In the absence of any
       ruling, we must presume that Brusaw abandoned or waived the motion. See Redd,
       173 Ill. 2d at 35; Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d at 123; Schmitt, 131 Ill. 2d at 137; Stewart,
       412 Ill. at 108.

¶ 19       Further, nothing of record negates this presumption. To the contrary, Brusaw
       and his attorney had multiple opportunities to bring the motion to the trial court’s
       attention yet never did so. In particular, when Brusaw and his attorney appeared in

           1
             The term “waiver” rather than “forfeiture” is appropriate here because “[w]aiver is an
       intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, while forfeiture is the
       failure to make the timely assertion of a right.” People v. Brown, 2020 IL 125203, ¶ 25. A movant
       has knowledge of his or her own motion, and if no ruling is obtained on the motion, it is presumed
       to have been knowingly relinquished.

                                                     -5-
       person to waive a jury trial, they said nothing about the motion for substitution but,
       instead, stated they were prepared to go to trial before Judge Jones—the very judge
       named in the motion. By their actions, both Brusaw and his attorney abandoned or
       waived the motion for substitution. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 430, 434-
       35 (1957) (finding waiver under the predecessor statute to section 114-5(a) based
       on statements made to the trial court); People v. Bach, 74 Ill. App. 3d 893, 896
       (1979) (“defendant’s willingness to proceed to trial before a judge named in the
       motion for substitution constitutes a waiver”). Accordingly, in keeping with
       established case law, Brusaw would be foreclosed from raising any question
       regarding the motion for substitution on appeal. See Stewart, 412 Ill. at 108;
       Hornaday, 400 Ill. at 365.

¶ 20        Despite the foregoing, the appellate court nevertheless concluded that Brusaw
       could raise the motion for substitution of judge on appeal. The appellate court
       reached this result by finding that the common-law rule of abandonment or waiver
       is inapplicable to motions for substitution of judge brought pursuant to section 114-
       5(a). 2022 IL App (3d) 190154-U, ¶ 14. According to the appellate court, instead
       of resulting in abandonment or waiver by the movant, a trial court’s failure to rule
       on a section 114-5(a) motion “function[s] as a denial of the motion.” Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 21       In support of this conclusion, the appellate court pointed to the language of
       section 114-5(a). This provision states:

          “Within 10 days after a cause involving only one defendant has been placed on
          the trial call of a judge the defendant may move the court in writing for a
          substitution of that judge on the ground that such judge is so prejudiced against
          him that he cannot receive a fair trial. Upon the filing of such a motion the court
          shall proceed no further in the cause but shall transfer it to another judge not
          named in the motion. The defendant may name only one judge as prejudiced,
          pursuant to this subsection; provided, however, that in a case in which the
          offense charged is a Class X felony or may be punished by death or life
          imprisonment, the defendant may name two judges as prejudiced.” 725 ILCS
          5/114-5(a) (West 2016).

¶ 22       The appellate court emphasized the sentence in section 114-5(a) that states
       “ ‘Upon the filing of such a motion the court shall proceed no further in the cause
       but shall transfer it to another judge not named in the motion.’ ” 2022 IL App (3d)

                                               -6-
       190154-U, ¶ 14 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/114-5(a) (West 2016)). The court read this
       sentence as meaning that a motion filed under section 114-5(a) is “self-executing”
       or “automatic” in that, upon the receipt of such a motion, a trial court’s only task is
       to transfer the case to another judge. Id. And, according to the appellate court,
       because the trial court has nothing to rule on and is performing an essentially
       clerical function rather than a judicial one, the common-law rule of abandonment
       or waiver does not apply. Id. ¶ 12 n.1. We disagree.

¶ 23       Although motions brought pursuant to section 114-5(a) are often referred to as
       “automatic,” the use of that term refers only to the fact that no inquiry is made into
       the truth of the allegation of prejudice made by the defendant. See People ex rel.
       Baricevic v. Wharton, 136 Ill. 2d 423, 430-31 (1990). It does not mean there are no
       judicial determinations that must be made before the case may be transferred.

¶ 24        As this court has made clear, before a section 114-5(a) motion may be granted
       and the case transferred, the following requirements must be met: (1) the motion
       must be made within 10 days after the defendant’s case is placed on the judge’s
       trial call; (2) the motion must name only one judge unless the defendant is charged
       with a Class X felony, in which case he may name two judges; (3) the motion must
       be in writing; (4) the motion must allege the trial judge is prejudiced against the
       defendant such that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; and (5) the motion
       must be made before the trial judge makes any substantive ruling in the case. Evans,
       209 Ill. 2d at 215 (citing People v. McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d 481, 487-88 (1999)).

¶ 25       Reviewing these requirements is not simply a clerical function. For example,
       courts determine the timeliness of a section 114-5(a) motion by using the “ ‘charged
       with knowledge’ ” test. McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d at 490. Under this test, a motion is
       deemed timely if it is filed within 10 days of when a defendant could be “ ‘charged
       with knowledge’ ” that the judge has been assigned to his or her case. Id. This
       determination is case specific and requires the trial court to conduct an
       individualized judicial examination of the record. Id. Similarly, whether a
       substantive ruling has been made prior to the section 114-5(a) motion being filed
       also requires a judicial examination of the record in each case. See, e.g., People v.
       King, 2020 IL 123926, ¶ 31.

¶ 26        A section 114-5(a) motion requires judicial evaluation and a ruling from the
       trial court before it may be granted or denied. Because it is not a purely “automatic”

                                                -7-
       or “self-executing” action, such a motion cannot be exempt from the common-law
       rule of abandonment or waiver. See also, e.g., Harju v. Anderson, 225 P. 1100,
       1100-01 (Or. 1924) (concluding that the “mere filing” of a motion for substitution
       is insufficient to disqualify a judge when no request is made for a ruling on the
       motion).

¶ 27       Moreover, it would make little sense to exempt section 114-5(a) motions from
       the rule of abandonment or waiver. If the rule did not apply, a defendant could
       deliberately build error into the record by knowingly allowing the motion for
       substitution to remain unaddressed and then raising the absence of any ruling on
       the motion as a ground for reversal on appeal. The defendant could then be awarded
       a new trial on the basis that the judge who heard the case should not have done so,
       even if the defendant sought a trial before that same judge. We do not think the
       legislature intended such a result.

¶ 28       We hold that motions for substitution brought pursuant to section 114-5(a) are
       subject to the common-law rule of abandonment or waiver. Here, Brusaw never
       obtained a ruling on his motion for substitution, and nothing of record negates the
       presumption that the motion was abandoned or waived. Accordingly, “no question”
       (Stewart, 412 Ill. at 108) regarding the motion may be raised on review. The
       appellate court erred in holding to the contrary. We therefore reverse the judgment
       of the appellate court reversing Brusaw’s convictions.

¶ 29        Because we hold that Brusaw abandoned or waived any issue regarding the
       motion for substitution, we do not reach the State’s additional argument that, even
       if the absence of a ruling from the trial court is viewed as a “denial” of the motion,
       there was no error because the motion was an unauthorized, pro se filing. Nor do
       we reach the State’s argument that any objection to the trial court’s “denial” of the
       motion was forfeited.

¶ 30       Finally, Brusaw contends, as he did in the appellate court, that the trial court
       erred in imposing a six-year, extended-term sentence for his conviction of
       aggravated driving while his license was revoked. Brusaw notes that where, as here,
       a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses that are part of a continuing course of
       conduct, an extended-term sentence may be imposed only for those offenses that
       are within the most serious class. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 2016); People v.
       Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 83; People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 205-06 (1984).

                                               -8-
¶ 31       In this case, Brusaw received an extended-term sentence of six years’
       imprisonment for the offense of aggravated driving while his license was revoked,
       a Class 4 felony (625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3)(2) (West 2016)). He was also convicted,
       however, of aggravated driving under the influence, a Class X felony (id. § 11-
       501(a)(2), (d)(2)(E)). Brusaw contends, therefore, that his extended-term sentence
       for aggravated driving while his license was revoked was unauthorized and should
       be vacated and that the maximum nonextended term should instead be imposed.
       See Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 85.

¶ 32       The State, in response, concedes that error occurred. The State further agrees
       that the appropriate remedy is to vacate the extended-term sentence and impose the
       maximum nonextended term, which in this case is three years (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-
       45(a) (West 2016)).

¶ 33      We agree with Brusaw and accept the State’s concession of error. Accordingly,
       we vacate Brusaw’s sentence for aggravated driving while his license was revoked
       and remand this cause to the trial court with directions to enter a sentence of three
       years’ imprisonment for that offense. Brusaw’s sentence for aggravated driving
       under the influence is affirmed.

¶ 34                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 35      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed. The
       judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and vacated in part. The cause is
       remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter a sentence of three years’
       imprisonment for Brusaw’s conviction of aggravated driving while his license was
       revoked.

¶ 36      Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 37      Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.

¶ 38      Cause remanded with directions.

¶ 39      JUSTICE O’BRIEN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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