Court Opinion

ID: 9529487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:51:18.217227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:49.221241
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I join in the opinion written by Judge Coats. The Alaska Supreme Court, in keeping with standard 6-3.6 of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, has required trial courts to assure, by an on-the-record inquiry, that the accused understands the benefits of counsel and the dangers of self-representation before proceeding unrepresented to trial. See McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91-92 (Alaska 1974). In my view, the present case provides a good illustration of the wisdom of this requirement.
Here, the trial court did not expressly advise James of the benefits of counsel or of the dangers of self-representation. The court apparently assumed that, because James knew what he wanted, he must have had sufficient information to make an informed choice. It is far from clear, however, that James’ choice to proceed without counsel was an informed one. The strength of James’ determination to proceed unrepresented has little if anything to do with whether his determination reflected an informed choice. Many misinformed and uninformed people, mistakenly believing themselves to be adequately informed, hold strong views. Often, though certainly not always, such views can be changed by the giving of thorough and accurate advice.
In his dissent, Judge Singleton is willing to infer from James’ background that James had sufficient information concerning the benefits of counsel and the dangers of self-representation. The inference is a tenuous one, at best, since it assumes James’ ability to understand and appreciate the subtleties of his past representations by counsel. If James was the type of person who, as many do, paid more attention to results than to details, it is easy to see how he might have learned little from his past experience other than the fact that he had been repeatedly convicted when represented by counsel.
In stark contrast to the weak inference arising from James’ background is the record of his performance at trial in the present case. James was incapable of managing even the most rudimentary functions of self-representation. He did nothing in his own defense, until, halfway through the trial, “it became glaringly obvious” to him that, as he put it, “I don’t know what I’m doing.” Thus the record of what actually happened at trial convincingly establishes that James did not really understand either what he was giving up or what he was undertaking when he decided to proceed to trial pro se.1 Under the circumstances, I cannot readily assume that thorough and accurate advice concerning the benefits of *816counsel and the dangers of self-representation would have gone unheeded.

. There is no suggestion whatsoever in the record that James was dissembling when he represented to the court, midway through trial, that he was unable to assist himself. Nor is there anything to suggest that James was attempting to use his pro se status as a means of manipulating the proceedings in order to obtain a mistrial. Obviously, an entirely different question would be presented if this were the case. It is worth noting, in any event, that express, on-the-record advice concerning the benefits of counsel and the dangers of self-representation would ultimately provide the best protection against any such manipulative tactics.