Court Opinion

ID: 9735077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:59:57.630613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:09.208862
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Arterburn, J.
I must dissent from the majority opinion because I think it leads to an absurd result.
The appellants were charged by affidavits for the crime of theft and second degree burglary. The charges were filed in separate affidavits and subsequently consolidated and tried *279together before a jury. The verdict of the jury was guilty of each charge against each appellant.
The essential question on this appeal revolves around the arrest of the appellants and the contention that the subsequent search based on the arrest was illegal and that, therefore, the evidence obtained thereby was not admissible to sustain the convictions.
Officer John Bishop was cruising along DeLoss Street in the City of Indianapolis about 3:30 a.m. on January 16, 1968, when he received a radio message that a tavern in the 2500 block of Shelby Street had been broken into. Money and cigarettes were taken from a cigarette machine and liquor was taken from the tavern. Officer Bishop had the description of a short, stocky male being involved. About 4:00 a.m. the officer in the car saw the car driven and owned by appellant Paxton drive up and stop on the wrong side of the street, headed against traffic. At the time he found appellant Atherton in the car with the appellant Paxton and also a third person by the name of Silcox. The officer recognized both Atherton and Silcox. Officer Bishop saw, from the outside of Paxton’s automobile, a topcoat belonging to Paxton. He reached into the car, pulled out the coat and found that it had $38.30 in nickels and dimes in it. He took the coat to the patrol car and asked Paxton where he had gotten the money. Paxton said he had been playing a poker machine.
Officer Hutcheson, who arrived on the scene to assist Officer Bishop, stated that he was familiar with Mr. Silcox, having “run into him several times”. He further testified regarding the arrest:
“A. At that time, after we placed them under arrest, I got out of my car, normal procedure is to tow in the vehicle, and secure the property. I begin to check the car inside and outside. And on the outside of the car hanging out of the trunk was a wire. I, at that time did not know what was under—what was connected to this wire that was sticking out of the back of the trunk. So I went back to the car, the police car where the three subjects were sitting and ask them if *280anyone had the key to the trunk. Mr. Paxton stated that he did not have a key for the trunk. So I went back to the Oldsmobile, got into the car, as I checked in the back seat, I looked down over the back seat and I could see a beer case, an open beer case with cigarettes in it. At that time, I reached, down and pulled the rest of the flap, I could see part of a case, where there was a flap underneath the flap, so I pushed the flap back, and as I looked back into the trunk of the car, I saw some weapons, rifles, at that time I thought they were all rifles. So I pulled the rifles out. These rifles still had on them serial-er-tags, that was still on the weapon as if they—when you buy them you take them off. They still had the tags on them. And they had—I could see a number of cartons of cigarettes inside the cases, the beer cases inside the trunk of the car. At that time we called for a superior officer, in the meantime and a wrecker and I was in the car, all three subjects were very talkative, * * *”
Officer Bishop testified with reference to the overcoat containing a large amount of small change that was found in the car, as follows:
“Q. Which side of the front seat—where was this coat?
“A. It—I believe, it must have been where Paxton—in between Paxton and Atherton, that’s where it was when I picked it up. I don’t know if one of them had been sitting on it or not.
“Q. More toward the driver’s side than the other side?
“A. Yes sir.”
It will be remembered the officers were informed a cigarette machine had been broken into and money taken. We asked incidentally at this point, what was the duty of the officers with reference to this overcoat—give it back to the prisoners or examine it for deadly weapons or other contents?
Motions by both appellants were made to suppress the evidence obtained by the search. We note first that appellant Atherton has no standing to ask the suppression of the evidence obtained by the search of the automobile which he *281did not own or possess at the time, or control. 25 I. L. E., Search and Seizure, Sec. 5, p. 417.
In this case the arrest for traffic violation, namely, reckless driving on the wrong side of the street, was proper and legal. It was committed in view of Officer Bishop. The question then arises: At 4:00 a.m. in the morning, what was the duty of the officers with reference to the arrested parties and the car which the appellant possessed?
An officer making an arrest has a right to do those things reasonably necessary to protect himself, the prisoner, or any property in control of the prisoner at the time of the arrest. In this case it goes without saying the officers should not have abandoned the opened and unlocked automobile that was on the wrong side of the street at the time of the arrest. They had a duty to use prudence and good judgment in the protection of such property, as well as search it for any instruments or weapons that might be used in an attempt to escape or assault the officers. No argument is needed to sustain the proposition that proper conduct on the part of officers requires that they should not leave an automobile abandoned on a street if there is any reasonable alternative. From the very nature of the situation, the officers had to make some type of inspection of the vehicle. What they saw brought about a further investigation and search. In our judgment the official police officer had no alternative in this case except to retain these individuals in his custody at that time of night until a further investigation could be made.
We ask: What are the reasonable duties of an arresting officer with reference to vehicles in the custody of the persons arrested? Apparently the majority opinion would say: “Don’t look inside them, you might see something needing protection, such as coats, traveling cases, etc., or something needing further investigation. Don’t suspect them—just leave the car and its contents as they are found, on the wrong side of the street and a hazard to traffic at that time of night.” That *282is the gist of the issues in this case. The more recent interpretations given to the law of search and seizure are, in my opinion, making the courts appear ridiculous.
One of the officers found a wire protruding from the rear trunk of the car. When appellant Paxton had no key to open the trunk, the officer made an investigation from inside the car into the rear of the trunk, where he found cigarettes and guns.
“The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape. . ." Preston v. United States (1964), 376 U. S. 364, 367, 84 S. Ct. 881, 883, 11 L. Ed. 2d 777, 780.
This view was later espoused in Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U. S. 752, 762, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694:
“A similar analysis underlies the ‘search incident to arrest’ principle, and marks its proper extent. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”
This Court has previously held an automobile may be searched upon arrest of the driver for a traffic violation. In Neely v. State (1959), 240 Ind, 362, 164 N. E. 2d 110, the *283accused had run a stop sign. In searching the car, the police officers found narcotics to be present. We held such a search to be reasonably incident to a lawful arrest and could properly be made though accomplished without a search warrant.
It was stated in the case of Williams v. State (1966), 248 Ind. 66, 81, 222 N. E. 2d 397, 405, as follows:
“From their testimony, it is clear that the State Troopers made the arrest because they believed that the possession of such a large sum of money, carried in such casual fashion under the circumstances indicated that a crime had been committed by the appellant. Their belief was reinforced by the general appearance and behavior of the appellant and by the appearance and condition of the automobile which he was driving. Their belief was rapidly fortified by the appellant’s story that he won the money by gambling with a white woman in a nonexistent location. The conclusion drawn by the officers was a conclusion logically drawn from the circumstances. Had the officers failed to act, they would have been derelict in their duty to enforce the law.”
There was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of a valid arrest for reckless driving. The trial court did not err in overruling the appellants’ motions for a new trial. The search was reasonably incident to the valid arrest and was justifiable on the basis of protecting the arresting officers.
In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed.
Note.—Reported in 263 N. E. 2d 636.