Court Opinion

ID: 9424590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:12:04.863177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:51.316600
License: Public Domain

*657Mr. Justice Blackmun,
joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Harlan, and Mr. Justice Stewart.
I concur in the result as to petitioner Emma Perez and dissent as to petitioner Adolfo Perez.
I
The slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars.1 The country is fragmented about the current conflict in Southeast Asia, but I detect little genuine public concern about what takes place in our very midst and on our daily travel routes. See Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395, 401 (1971) (concurring opinion).
This being so, it is a matter of deep concern to me that today the Court lightly brushes aside and overrules two cases where it had upheld a representative attempt by the States to regulate traffic and where the Court had considered and rejected the very Supremacy Clause argument that it now discovers to be so persuasive.2
II
I think it is desirable to stress certain factual details. The facts, of course, are only alleged, but for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are to accept them as true. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964).
Arizona is a community property state. Adolfo and Emma Perez are husband and wife. They were resident citizens of Arizona at the time of the accident in Tucson in July 1965. Mr. Perez was driving an automobile registered in his name. He was alone. Mrs. Perez was not with him and had nothing to do with her husband’s *658operation of the car on that day. The automobile, however, was the property of the marital community.
Accompanying, and supposedly supportive of, the Perez complaint in the present suit, were affidavits of Mr. and Mrs. Perez. These affidavits asserted that the Perezes had four minor children ages 6 to 17; that Emma is a housewife and not otherwise gainfully employed; that Emma’s inability to drive has required their two older children, aged 17 and 14, to walk one and a half miles to high school and the third child, aged 9, one mile to elementary school, with consequent nosebleeding; that Emma’s inability to drive has caused inconvenience and financial injury; and that Adolfo’s inability to drive has caused inconvenience because he must rely on others for transportation or use public facilities or walk.
Ill
The Statutory Plan
Arizona has a comprehensive statutory plan for the regulation of vehicles upon its highways. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 28. Among the State’s efforts to assure responsibility in this area of increasing national concern are its Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators’ and Chauffeurs’ License Act (c. 4), its Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (c. 6), and its Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (c. 7).3
The challenged § 28-1163 (B) is a part of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. The Act’s provisions are not unfamiliar. There is imposed upon the Motor *659Vehicle Division Superintendent the duty to suspend the license of each operator, and the registration of each owner, of a motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury or death or property damage to any one person in excess of $100, except, among other situations, where proof of financial responsibility, as by the deposit of appropriate security or by the presence of a liability policy of stated minimum coverage, is afforded. §§28-1142 (Supp. 1970-1971), 28-1143, and 28-1167. The suspension, once imposed, remains until the required security is deposited or until one year has elapsed and no action for damages has been instituted. § 28-1144. If the registrant or operator fails, within 60 days, to satisfy an adverse motor vehicle final judgment, as defined in § 28-1102 (2) (Supp. 1970-1971), the court clerk has the duty to notify the Superintendent and the latter to suspend the license and registration of the judgment debtor. §§ 28-1161 (A) and 28-1162 (A). But if the judgment creditor consents in writing that the debtor be allowed to retain his license and registration, the Superintendent in his discretion may grant that privilege. § 28-1162 (B). Otherwise the suspension remains in effect until the judgment is satisfied. § 28-1163 (A). Payments of stated amounts are deemed to satisfy the judgment, §28-1164 (Supp. 1970-1971), and court-approved installment payment of the judgment will preserve the license and registration, § 28-1165.
IV
Adolfo Perez
Inasmuch as the case is before us on the motion of defendants below to dismiss the Perez complaint that alleged Adolfo's driving alone, the collision, and the judgment in favor of the Pinkertons, it is established, for present purposes, that the Pinkerton judgment was *660based on Adolfo’s negligence in driving the Perez vehicle.
Adolfo emphasizes, and I recognize, that under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution, Congress has possessed the power to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”; that, of course, this power, when exercised, as it has been since 1800, is “exclusive,” New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U. S. 656, 661 (1876), and “unrestricted and paramount,” International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261, 265 (1929); that one of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to “relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh . . . ,” Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 549, 554-555 (1915); and that a bankrupt by his discharge receives “a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt,” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 244 (1934).
From these general and accepted principles it is argued that § 28-1163 (B), with its insistence upon post-discharge payment as a condition for license and registration restoration, is violative of the Bankruptcy Act and, thus, of the Supremacy Clause.
As Mr. Perez acknowledges in his brief here, the argument is not new. It was raised with respect to a New York statute in Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U. S. 33 (1941), and was rejected there by a five-to-four vote:
“The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees *661and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process. . . .
“The penalty which § 94-b imposes for injury due to careless driving is not for the protection of the creditor merely, but to enforce a public policy that irresponsible drivers shall not, with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows. The scheme of the legislation would be frustrated if the reckless driver were permitted to escape its provisions by the simple expedient of voluntary bankruptcy, and, accordingly, the legislature declared that a discharge in bankruptcy should not interfere with the operation of the statute. Such legislation is not in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather it is an enforcement of permissible state policy touching highway safety.” 314 U. S., at 36-37.
Left specifically unanswered in that case, but acknowledged as a “serious question,” 314 U. S., at 38, was the claim that interim amendments of the statutes gave the creditor control over the initiation and duration of the suspension and thus violated the Bankruptcy Act. The dissenters, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, concluded that that constitutional issue “cannot be escaped . . . unless we are to overlook the realities of collection methods.” 314 U. S., at 43.
Nine years ago, the same argument again was advanced, this time with respect to Utah’s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, and again was rejected. Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U. S. 153, 158-174 (1962). There, Utah’s provisions relating to duration of suspension and restoration, more stringent than those of New York, were challenged. It was claimed that the statutes made the State a “collecting agent for the creditor rather than furthering an interest in highway safety,” *662and that suspension that could be perpetual “only renders the collection pressure more effective.” 369 U. S., at 169. There was a troublesome jurisdictional issue in the case, the decision as to which was later overruled, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 124-129 (1965), but on the merits the Court, by a five-to-three vote, sustained all the Utah statutes then under attack:4
“But the lesson Zavelo [v. Reeves, 227 U. S. 625 (1913)] and Spalding [v. New York ex rel. Backus, 4 How. 21 (1845)] teach is that the Bankruptcy Act does not forbid a State to attach any consequence whatsoever to a debt which has been discharged.
“The Utah Safety Responsibility Act leaves the bankrupt to some extent burdened by the discharged debt. Certainly some inroad is made on the consequences of bankruptcy if the creditor can exert pressure to recoup a discharged debt, or part of it, through the leverage of the State’s licensing and registration power. But the exercise of this power is deemed vital to the State’s well-being, and, from the point of view of its interests, is wholly unrelated to the considerations which propelled Congress to enact a national bankruptcy law. There are here overlapping interests which cannot be uncritically resolved by exclusive regard to the money consequences of enforcing a widely adopted measure for safeguarding life and safety.
“. . . At the heart of the matter are the complicated demands of our federalism.
“Are the differences between the Utah statute and *663that of New York so significant as to make a constitutionally decisive difference? A State may properly decide, as forty-five have done, that the prospect of a judgment that must be paid in order to regain driving privileges serves as a substantial deterrent to unsafe driving. We held in Reitz that it might impose this requirement despite a discharge, in order not to exempt some drivers from appropriate protection of public safety by easy refuge in bankruptcy. ... To whatever extent these provisions make it more probable that the debt will be paid despite the discharge, each no less reflects the State’s important deterrent interest. Congress had no thought of amending the Bankruptcy Act-when it adopted this law for the District of Columbia; we do not believe Utah’s identical statute conflicts with it either.
“Utah is not using its police power as a devious collecting agency under the pressure of organized creditors. Victims of careless car drivers are a wholly diffused group of shifting and uncertain composition, not even remotely united by a common financial interest. The Safety Responsibility Act is not an Act for the Relief of Mulcted Creditors. It is not directed to bankrupts as such. Though in a particular case a discharged bankrupt who wants to have his rightfully suspended license and registration restored may have to pay the amount of a discharged debt, or part of it, the bearing of the statute on the purposes served by bankruptcy legislation is essentially tangential.” 369 U. S., at 170-174 (footnotes omitted).
Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissented on the ground that Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-15 (1953), essentially identical to Arizona’s §28-1163 (B), *664operated to deny the judgment debtor the federal immunity given him by § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act and, hence, violated the Supremacy Clause. 369 U. S., at 182-185.
The Perezes in their brief, p. 7, acknowledge that the Arizona statutes challenged here “are not unlike the Utah ones discussed in Kesler.” Accordingly, Adolfo Perez is forced to urge that Reitz and the remaining portion of Kesler that bears upon the subject be overruled. The Court bows to that argument.
I am not prepared to overrule those two cases and to undermine their control over Adolfo Perez’ posture here. I would adhere to the rulings and I would hold that the States have an appropriate and legitimate concern with highway safety; that the means Arizona has adopted with respect to one in Adolfo’s position (that is, the driver whose negligence has caused harm to others and whose judgment debt based on that negligence remains unsatisfied) in its attempt to assure driving competence and care on the part of its licensees, as well as to protect others, is appropriate state legislation; and that the Arizona statute, like its Utah counterpart, despite the tangential effect upon bankruptcy, does not operate in derogation of the Bankruptcy Act or conflict with it to the extent it may rightly be said to violate the Supremacy Clause.
Other factors of significance are also to be noted:
1. The Court struggles to explain away the parallel District of Columbia situation installed by Congress itself. Section 40-464 of the D. C. Code Ann. (1967) in all pertinent parts is identical with Arizona’s § 28-1163 (B). The only difference is in the final word, namely, “article” in the Arizona statute and “chapter” in the District’s. The District of Columbia statute was enacted as § 48 of Pub. Law 365 of May 25, 1954, effective one year later, 68 Stat. 132. This is long after the Bankruptcy Act *665was placed on the books and, indeed, long after this Court’s decision in Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U. S. 467 (1925), that a personal injury judgment is a provable claim in bankruptcy. Surely, as the Court noted in Kesler, 369 U. S., at 173-174, “Congress had no thought of amending the Bankruptcy Act when it adopted this law for the District of Columbia.” See Lee v. England, 206 F. Supp. 957 (DC 1962). Congress must have regarded the two statutes as consistent and compatible, and cannot have thought otherwise for the last 35 years.5 If the statutes truly are in tension, then I would suppose that the later one, that is, § 40-464, would be the one to prevail. Gibson v. United States, 194 U. S. 182, 192 (1904). But, if so, we then have something less than the “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States” that Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution commands, for the law would be one way in Arizona (and, by the present overruling of Reitz and Kesler, in New York and in Utah) and the other way in the District of Columbia. Unfortunately, such is the dilemma in which the Court’s decision today leaves us.
2. Arizona’s § 28-1163 (B) also has its counterparts in the statutes of no less than 44 other States.6 It is, after *666all, or purports to be, a uniform Act. I suspect the Court’s decision today will astonish those members of the Congress who were responsible for the District of Columbia Code provision, and will equally astonish the legislatures of those 44 States that absorbed assurance from Reitz and Kesler that the provision withstands constitutional attack.
3. The Court rationalizes today’s decision by saying that Kesler went beyond Reitz and that the present case goes beyond Kesler, and that that is too much. It would justify this by noting the Arizona Supreme Court’s characterization of the Arizona statute as one for the protection of the public from financial hardship and by con-*667eluding, from this description, that the statute is not a public highway safety measure, but rather a financial one protective, I assume the implication is, of insurance companies. The Arizona court’s characterization of its statute, I must concede, is not a fortunate one. However, I doubt that that court, in evolving that description, had any idea of the consequences to be wrought by this Court’s decision today. I am not willing to say that the description in Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P. 2d 136 (1963), embraced the only purpose of the State’s legislation. Section 28-1163 (B) is a part of the State’s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act and does not constitute an isolated subchapter of that Act concerned only with financial well-being of the victims of drivers’ negligence. In any event, as the Court’s opinion makes clear, the decision today would be the same however the Arizona court had described its statute.
4. While stare decisis “is no immutable principle,” 7 as a glance at the Court’s decisions over the last 35 years, or over almost any period for that matter, will disclose, it seems to me that the principle does have particular validity and application in a situation such as the one confronting the Court in this case. Here is a statute concerning motor vehicle responsibility, a substantive matter peculiarly within the competence of the State rather than the National Government. Here is a serious and conscientious attempt by a State to legislate and do something about the problem that, in terms of death and bodily injury and adverse civilian effect, is so alarming. Here is a statute widely adopted by the several States and legitimately assumed by the lawmakers of those States to be consistent with the Bankruptcy Act, an assumption rooted in positive, albeit divided, decision *668by this Court, not once, but twice. And here is a statute the Congress itself, the very author of the Bankruptcy Act, obviously considered consistent therewith. I fear that the Court today makes stare decisis meaningless and downgrades it to the level of a tool to be used or cast aside as convenience dictates. I doubt if Justices Roberts, Stone, Reed, Frankfurter, Murphy, Warren, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, and Stewart, who constituted the respective majorities on the merits in Reitz and Kesler, were all that wrong.
5. Adolfo’s affidavit protestation of hardship goes no further than to assert a resulting reliance upon friends and neighbors or upon public transportation or upon walking to cover the seven miles from his home to his place of work; this is inconvenience, perhaps, even in this modern day when we are inclined to equate convenience with necessity and to eschew what prior generations routinely accepted as part of the day’s labor, but it falls far short of the “great harm” and “irreparable injury” that he otherwise asserts only in general and conclusory terms. Perez’ professed inconvenience stands vividly and starkly in contrast with his victims’ injuries. But as is so often the case, the victim, once damaged, is seemingly beyond concern. What seems to become important is the perpetrator’s inconvenience.
6. It is conceded that Arizona constitutionally could prescribe liability insurance as a condition precedent to the issuance of a license and registration.
V
Emma Perez
Emma Perez’ posture is entirely different. Except for possible emotional strain resulting from her husband’s predicament, she was in no way involved in the Pinkerton accident. She was not present when it occurred and no negligence or nonfeasance on her part contributed to it. *669Emma thus finds herself in a position where, having done no wrong, she nevertheless is deprived of her operator’s license. This comes about because the Perez vehicle concededly was community property under § 25-211 (A), and because, for some reason, the judgment was confessed as to her as well as against her husband. As one amicus brief describes it, Emma, a fault-free driver, “is without her license solely because she is the impecunious wife of an impecunious, negligent driver in a community property state.”
At this point a glance at the Arizona community property system perhaps is indicated. Emma Perez was a proper nominal defendant in the Pinkerton lawsuit, see Donato v. Fishburn, 90 Ariz. 210, 367 P. 2d 245 (1961), but she was not a necessary party there. First National Bank v. Reeves, 27 Ariz. 508, 517, 234 P. 556, 560 (1925); Bristol v. Moser, 55 Ariz. 185, 190-191, 99 P. 2d 706, 709 (1940). However, a judgment against a marital community based upon the husband’s tort committed without the wife’s knowledge or consent does not bind her separate property. Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 138, 185 P. 2d 304, 310 (1947). The judgment would, of course, bind the community property vehicle to the extent permitted by Arizona law. See § 33-1124.
In Arizona during coverture personal property may be disposed of only by the husband. § 25-211 (B). The community personalty is subject to the husband’s dominance in management and control. Mortensen v. Knight, 81 Ariz. 325, 334, 305 P. 2d 463, 469 (1956). The wife has no power to make contracts binding the common property. § 25-214 (A). Her power to contract is limited to necessaries for herself and the children. § 25-215. Thus, as the parties appear to agree, she could neither enter into a contract for the purchase of an automobile nor acquire insurance upon it except by use of her separate property.
*670The Court of Appeals ruled that Mrs. Perez’ posture, as the innocent wife who had no connection with the negligent conduct that led to the confession and entry of judgment, was, under the logic of Kesler and Reitz, “a distinction without a significant difference” even though “she had no alternative.” 421 F. 2d 619, 622-623. The court opined that the spouse can acquire an automobile with her separate funds and that negligent operation of it on separate business would then not call into question the liability of the other spouse. It described Emma’s legal status as “closely analogous” to that of the automobile owner who permits another person to drive, and it regarded as authority cases upholding a State’s right to revoke the owner’s license and registration after judgment had been entered against him and remains unsatisfied. The husband was described, under Arizona law, as the managing agent of the wife in the control of the community automobile, and “the driver’s licenses of both husband and wife are an integral part of the ball of wax, which is the basis of the Arizona community property laws.” The loss of her license “is the price an Arizona wife must pay for negligent driving by her husband of the community vehicle” when the resulting judgment is not paid. 421 F. 2d, at 624.
For what it is worth, Emma’s affidavit is far more persuasive of hardship than Adolfo’s. She relates the family automobile to the children and their medical needs and to family purchasing at distant discount stores. But I need not, and would not, decide her case on the representations in her affidavit.
I conclude that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, in its application to Emma Perez and her operator’s license, does not comport with the purpose and policy of the Bankruptcy Act and that it effects a result at odds with the Supremacy Clause. Emma’s subordinate *671position with respect to the community’s personal property, and her complete lack of connection with the Pinkerton accident and with the negligence that occasioned it, are strange accompaniments for the deprival of her operator’s license. The nexus to the state police power, claimed to exist because of her marriage to the negligent Adolfo and the community property character of the accident vehicle, is, for me, elusive and unconvincing. The argument based on Arizona’s appropriate concern with highway safety, that prompts me to adhere to the Reitz-Kesler rationale for Adolfo, is drained of all force and persuasion when applied to the innocent Emma. Despite the underlying community property legal theory, Emma had an incident of ownership in the family automobile only because it was acquired during coverture. She had no “control” over Adolfo’s use of the vehicle and she could not forbid his use as she might have been able to do were it her separate property. Thus, the state purpose in deterring the reckless driver and his unsafe driving has only undeserved punitive application to Emma. She is personally penalized not only with respect to the operation of the Perez car but also with respect to any automobile.
I therefore would hold that under these circumstances the State’s action, under § 28-1163 (B), in withholding from Emma her operator’s license is not, within the language of Reitz, an appropriate means for Arizona “to insure competence and care on the part of [Emma] and to protect others” using the highways, 314 U. S., at 36, and that it interferes with the paramount federal interest in her bankruptcy discharge and violates the Supremacy Clause.
[For Appendix to opinion of Blackmun, J., see post, p. 672.]

*672

 See Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 672.

 The petitioners urge upon us only the Supremacy Clause.

 In 1943 some of the motor vehicle uniform laws were “withdrawn from active promulgation pending further study” by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 9B U. L. A. Table III, xix, xxii, xxiii. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s detailed review of the development of state legislation and of the uniform laws in this field in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U. S. 153, 158-168 (1962).

 Mr. Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in part, would have upheld the Utah statutes other than that “which gives to a creditor the discretion of determining if and when driving privileges may be restored by the State . . . 369 U. S., at 179-182.

 Public Law 365 replaced the Act of May 3, 1935, 49 Stat. 166, known as the Owners’ Financial Responsibility Act of the District of Columbia. Section 3 of the earlier Act provided, 49 Stat. 167, that a judgment’s discharge in bankruptcy, as distinguished from other discharge, would not relieve the judgment debtor from suspension.

 Ala. Code, Tit. 36, § 74 (55) (Supp. 1969); Alaska Stat. § 28.20.350 (1962); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1457 (1957); Cal. Vehicle Code § 16372 (1960); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-7-25 (2) (Supp. 1965); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §14-131 (1966); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 21, §2943 (1953); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §287-17 (1968); Idaho Code §49-1514 (1967); Ill. Ann. Stat., e. 95 1/2, §7-310 (1971); Iowa Code § 321A.14 (2) (1971); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-744 (b) (1964); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 187.420 (1962); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. *666§32:893 (1963); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 29, § 783 (6) (1964) (10 years); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 66 1/2, §7-315 (1970); Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.513 (b) (Supp. 1956); Minn. Stat. § 170.33, subd. 5 (1967); Miss. Code Ann. § 8285-14 (b) (1942); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 303.110 (1959); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 53-431 (1961); Neb. Rev. Stat. §60-519 (1968); Nev. Rev. Stat. §485.303 (1968); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §268:9 (1966); N. J. Stat. Ann. §39:6-35 (Supp. 1971); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 6L-24r-78 (1960); N. Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 337 (c) (1970); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.14 (Supp. 1969); N. D. Cent. Code §39-16.1-04 (5) (Supp. 1969); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4509.43 (Supp. 1970); OMa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 47, § 7-315 (1962); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 75, § 1414 (1960); R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 31-32-15 (1969); S. C. Code Ann. § 46-748 (Supp. 1960); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 32-35-58 (1967); Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-1236 (1968); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 6701h, § 14 (b) (1969); Utah Code Ann. § 41-12-15 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 23, § 802 (b) (1967); Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-444 (a) (4) (Supp. 1970) (15 years); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 46.29.380 (1967); W. Va. Code Ann. § 17D-U-6 (1966); Wis. Stat. § 344.26 (2) (1967) [cf. Zywicke v. Brogli, 24 Wis. 2d 685, 130 N. W. 2d 180 (1964)]; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §31-299 (1967).
See also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 324.131 (1968) and Op. Atty. Gen. 059-200 (1959); Ga. Code Ann. § 92A-605 (e) (3) (Supp. 1970); Ind. Ann. Stat. §47-1049 (1965) and Op. Atty. Gen. 1936, p. 272; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 90, § 22A (Supp. 1971); Ore. Rev. Stat. §486.211 (5) (1967).

 Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S., at 133.