Court Opinion

ID: 9897275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:33.67005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:08.814305
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                Sep 28 2023, 9:21 am

                                                                                     CLERK
                                                                                 Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                    Court of Appeals
                                                                                      and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
      C. Matthew Zentz
      Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                 IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      In re the Adoption of E.S.J.                              September 28, 2023
      (Minor Child)                                             Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                23A-AD-1161
      H.M.B. and J.T.J.,
                                                                Interlocutory Appeal from the
      Appellants-Petitioners,                                   Marion Superior Court
              v.                                                The Honorable Ryan Gardner,
                                                                Judge
      B.J.,                                                     Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                49D10-2304-AD-16045
      Appellee-Respondent

                                        Opinion by Judge Crone
                                     Judges Brown and Felix concur.

      Crone, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   H.M.B. (Mother) and J.T.J. (Stepfather) (collectively Appellants) bring this

      interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order granting the petition to transfer

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1161 | September 28, 2023                         Page 1 of 7
      venue filed by B.J. (Father). Appellants argue that the trial court abused its

      discretion in granting transfer. We agree and therefore reverse.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On April 19, 2023, Appellants filed a verified petition for Stepfather’s adoption

      of E.S.J. (Child), a minor under the age of eighteen, in Marion County, where

      Appellants’ attorney maintains an office. Appellants and Child reside in

      Johnson County. In their adoption petition, Appellants alleged that Father’s

      consent to the adoption was not necessary under Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-

      8(a) because Father had abandoned or deserted Child for at least six months

      immediately preceding the date of the filing of the adoption petition and

      because Father had, without just cause, failed to have any meaningful

      communication with and provide support for Child for more than one year.

[3]   On April 26, 2023, Father filed a verified objection to adoption. On May 10,

      2023, Father filed a petition to transfer venue to Johnson County. Father

      alleged that Appellants filed a petition for Stepfather’s adoption of Child in

      Johnson County on October 11, 2021, that the trial court ruled Father’s consent

      was necessary, and that the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on

      December 1, 2022. 1 Father also alleged that Appellants were forum shopping,

      that Marion County is not a preferred venue, that E.S.J. and Mother reside in

      1
       The Johnson County adoption was filed under cause number 41D01-2110-AD-83. This Court’s decision
      affirming the trial court’s ruling is In re Adoption of E.S.J., No. 22A-AD-1033, 2022 WL 17347889, at *7 (Ind.
      Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2022).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1161 | September 28, 2023                             Page 2 of 7
      Johnson County, and that, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 75(A), the preferred

      venue is Johnson County.

[4]   On May 16, 2023, the trial court issued its order granting transfer. This appeal

      ensued.

      Discussion and Decision
[5]   “We review a trial court’s order on a motion to transfer venue for an abuse of

      discretion.” Muneer v. Muneer, 951 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)

      (quoting Comm’r of Labor v. An Island, LLC, 948 N.E.2d 1189, 1190 (Ind. Ct.

      App. 2011), trans. denied). The trial court abuses its discretion when its “decision

      is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before [it],

      or when [it] has misinterpreted the law.” Id.

[6]   Here, Father did not file an appellee’s brief, and, in such a case, we “need not

      develop an argument for [Father] but instead will reverse the trial court’s

      judgment if [Appellants’] brief presents a case of prima facie error.” In re

      Adoption of E.B., 163 N.E.3d 931, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation and

      quotation marks omitted). Prima facie error means “at first sight, on first

      appearance, or on the face of it.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct.

      App. 2014). “Still, we are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the

      record to determine whether reversal is required.” Id.

[7]   Appellants assert that Marion County is a preferred venue pursuant to Indiana

      Trial Rule 75(A) and Indiana Code Section 31-19-2-2, and therefore the trial

      court abused its discretion by transferring the case. “Interpretation of our trial
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1161 | September 28, 2023      Page 3 of 7
      rules is a question of law that we review de novo.” Morrison v. Vasquez, 124

      N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019). “Our objective in construing their meaning is to

      give effect to the intent underlying the rule.” In re Paternity of V.A., 10 N.E.3d

      61, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Questions of statutory interpretation are also

      questions of law that we review de novo. Strozewski v. Strozewski, 36 N.E.3d 497,

      499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “When we interpret the statute, we attempt to

      determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Id. “We first

      determine whether the statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its

      face.” Id. “If it is, we will not interpret the statute, but will hold the statute to its

      clear and plain meaning.” Id.

[8]   Indiana Trial Rule 75(A) governs venue and specifies,

              [U]pon the filing of a pleading or a motion to dismiss allowed by
              Rule 12(B)(3), the [trial] court … shall order the case transferred
              to a county … selected by the party first properly filing such
              motion or pleadings if the court determines that the county …
              where the action was filed does not meet preferred venue
              requirements [and the] county selected has preferred venue[.]

      Rule 75(A) then lists ten categories that are considered preferred venue. Trial

      Rule 75(A) “does not create a priority among [the categories] establishing

      preferred venue.” Strozewski, 36 N.E.3d at 500. “Preferred venue may lie in

      more than one county, and if an action is filed in a county of preferred venue,

      change of venue cannot be granted.” Id. One category of preferred venue is “the

      county where a claim in the plaintiff’s complaint may be commenced under any

      statute recognizing or creating a special or general remedy or proceeding.” Ind.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1161 | September 28, 2023          Page 4 of 7
      Trial Rule 75(A)(8). We have held that “Subsection (8) adopts special venue

      statutes into the regulatory scheme of T.R. 75.” MacLeod v. Guardianship of

      Hunter, 671 N.E.2d 177, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied (1997).

      “Subsection (8) retains the ‘statutory’ venue as an alternative venue, thereby

      avoiding any conflict.” Id. (quoting In re Trust of Johnson, 469 N.E.2d 768, 772

      (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), trans. denied (1985)).

[9]   Adoption proceedings are governed by Indiana Code Article 31-19. With regard

      to filing an adoption petition, Indiana Code Section 31-19-2-2 provides as

      follows:

               (a) Except as provided in subsection (b),[ 2] an individual who
               seeks to adopt a child less than eighteen (18) years of age must, by
               attorney of record, file a petition for adoption with the clerk of
               the court having probate jurisdiction in the county in which:

                        (1) the petitioner for adoption resides;

                        (2) a licensed child placing agency or governmental agency
                        having custody of the child is located;

                        (3) the attorney maintains an office; or

                        (4) the child resides.

      2
        Subsection (b) permits the filing of an adoption petition in any court having probate jurisdiction if either the
      written consent from each individual whose consent is required or a certified order terminating the parental
      rights of each parent is filed with the adoption petition.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1161 | September 28, 2023                                Page 5 of 7
                ….

                (c) The county in which the petition for adoption may be filed is
                a matter of venue and not jurisdiction.

       (Emphases added).3

[10]   Appellants contend that Section 31-19-2-2 is a special venue statute to which

       Trial Rule 75(A)(8) applies and therefore establishes preferred venue in an

       adoption proceeding. In support, they cite Muneer, 951 N.E.2d 241. That case

       involved the filing of a petition for a protective order under Indiana Code

       Section 34-26-5-4(b). The petitioner filed her petition in her county of residence,

       and the trial court denied the respondent’s petition to transfer venue. In

       affirming the trial court’s denial, the Muneer court concluded,

                Indiana Code section 34-26-5-4(b) requires that a petition for an
                order for protection be filed in 1) the county in which the
                petitioner resides; 2) the county in which the respondent resides;
                or 3) the county in which the domestic or family violence
                occurred. The Act therefore is a special venue statute to which
                Trial Rule 75(A)(8) applies. Accordingly, pursuant to Trial Rule
                75(A)(8), preferred venue lies in any county where an action
                under the Act may be commenced.

       951 N.E.2d at 243-44 (citations omitted).

       3
        In 2021, the legislature made an intentional policy decision to amend the statute to include the county
       where the petitioner’s attorney maintains an office. Ind. Pub. Law 203-2021 § 3 (eff. July 1, 2021).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1161 | September 28, 2023                             Page 6 of 7
[11]   Here, like the statute at issue in Muneer, Section 31-19-2-2 dictates where an

       adoption petition is to be filed. We conclude that Section 31-19-2-2 is a special

       venue statute to which Trial Rule 75(A)(8) applies. 4 Thus, preferred venue lies

       in any county where the petition is to be filed under Section 31-19-2-2.

       Appellants filed their adoption petition in the county where their attorney

       maintains an office in compliance with Section 31-19-2-2. As that is a county of

       preferred venue pursuant to Trial Rule 75(A)(8), change of venue may not be

       granted. We conclude that Appellants have made a prima facie showing that

       the trial court abused its discretion in granting Father’s petition to transfer

       venue. Therefore, we reverse.

[12]   Reversed.

       Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.

       4
         We note that in In re Adoption of Z.D., 878 N.E.2d 495, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), the court found that
       “[S]ection 31-19-2-2 describes where venue is proper for adoption petition proceedings, but does not provide
       where venue is preferred.” In re Adoption of W.M., 55 N.E.3d 386, 388-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied,
       relied on Z.D. to conclude that filing in a venue listed in Section 31-19-2-2 did not convey exclusive
       jurisdiction to that court. However, these cases involved jurisdictional disputes and vastly different factual
       circumstances than those here, were issued before Section 31-19-2-2 was amended to provide that an
       adoption petition “must” be filed in the locations listed, and did not discuss Trial Rule 75(A)(8).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1161 | September 28, 2023                              Page 7 of 7