Court Opinion

ID: 9944492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 17:10:12.169247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:02:45.377492
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DALE WOODARD                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 680 WDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 30, 2023
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-56-CR-0000164-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                        FILED: February 26, 2024

       Dale Woodard appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following

his conviction of indecent exposure. Upon careful review, we affirm the

conviction; however, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for

resentencing.

       On April 1, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information against

Woodard charging him with one count each of involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse, indecent assault, and indecent exposure1 related to conduct

perpetrated against a juvenile relative. In an open plea agreement entered on

October 14, 2022, Woodard was permitted to plead guilty to indecent

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123, 3126, and 3127.
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exposure. Subsequently, the Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining

charges.

       Sentencing was scheduled for December 27, 2022, and a presentence

report (“PSI”) was ordered and prepared. Prior to the sentencing hearing,

Woodard objected to the computation of his prior record score (“PRS”) as

presented in the PSI. The trial court continued sentencing to allow Woodard

to compile documents and address the calculation of his PRS based upon out-

of-state prior offenses.2 Woodard proceeded to sentencing on March 30, 2023,

and received a sentence of twenty-one to sixty months of incarceration. He

then filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. This timely

appeal followed.3

       Woodard presents three legal arguments for our review: whether the

trial court erred in calculating his PRS for sentencing purposes; whether the

trial court abused its discretion by inaccurately stating, without sufficient

evidence, that he is a sexually violent predator (“SVP”); and whether the trial

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, Woodard sought to acquire court documents from New
Hampshire for convictions from 1998 and 2005.

3 We note with extreme displeasure the Commonwealth’s failure to file an
appellee’s brief. “An appellee is required to file a brief that at minimum must
contain ‘a summary of argument and the complete argument for appellee.’”
Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 835 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting
Pa.R.A.P. 2112). In Pappas, the panel referred to the Commonwealth’s failure
to file a proper appellee’s brief as “unacceptable.” Id. We echo that opinion
and remind the Commonwealth of its obligation to file an appellee’s brief in
future appeals.

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court abused its discretion by relying on inappropriate factors in fashioning

Woodard’s sentence. See Appellant’s Brief, at 14, 36, 38.

     Woodard’s first issue contends that the trial court erred when it utilized

a Repeat Felon (RFEL) category for his prior record score, when in fact it

should have been a “2”. Id. at 2.

     “It is well-settled that a challenge to the calculation of a [PRS] goes to

the discretionary aspects, not legality, of sentencing.” Commonwealth v.

Shreffler, 249 A.3d 575, 583 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). There is

no absolute right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence. See

Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather,

where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, the

appeal should be considered a petition for allowance of appeal. See

Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super. 2007).

     As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa.

Super. 2010):

     An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
     must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

           We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
           whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
           see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
           properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
           reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
           720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
           Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
           substantial question that the sentence appealed from
           is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
           Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

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Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation and brackets omitted).

      Where an appellant fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) and the

Commonwealth objects, the issue raised by the appellant is waived for

purposes of review. See Commonwealth v. Farmer, 758 A.2d 173, 182 (Pa.

Super. 2000). However, a failure to include the Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement

does not automatically waive an appellant’s argument; rather, we only are

precluded from reaching the merits of the claim when the Commonwealth

lodges an objection to the omission of the statement. See Commonwealth

v. Roser, 914 A.2d 447, 457 (Pa. Super. 2006). See also Commonwealth

v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 964 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that if the appellant

fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P 2119(f), the Superior Court may entertain a

discretionary sentencing claim if the Commonwealth does not object to the

appellant’s failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)). Almost every published

decision by the Superior Court has held that the issue is not waived when the

Commonwealth fails to object to the omission of the Rule 2119(f) statement.

      Herein, the first two requirements of the four-part test are met because

Woodard brought a timely appeal and raised the challenge in his post-

sentence motion. However, Woodard failed to include in his appellate brief the

necessary separate concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance

of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Nevertheless, because the

Commonwealth did not file an advocate’s brief in this matter, it has failed to

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object to this error by Woodard. Therefore, we will not consider the issue to

be waived due to Woodard’s omission of the Rule 2119(f) statement.

      Accordingly, we next determine whether Woodard raises a substantial

question requiring us to review the discretionary aspects of the sentence

imposed by the trial court.

      Woodard argues that the trial court erroneously calculated his PRS. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 8-10, 14-36. We have previously held that a claim that a

trial court miscalculated an appellant’s PRS score raises a substantial question.

See Commonwealth v. Spenny, 128 A.3d 234, 242 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Consequently, because Woodard has raised a substantial question, we will

address the merits of his claim.

      Our standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. As such, we

acknowledge that sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a

manifest abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d

1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006). An abuse of discretion occurs where “the

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for

reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly

unreasonable decision.” Commonwealth v. Blount, 207 A.3d 925, 934-35

(Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      We now consider Woodard’s argument that the trial court improperly

determined that his PRS was RFEL. See Appellant’s Brief, at 14-36.

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Essentially, Woodard claims that the trial court incorrectly calculated his PRS

based upon several prior out-of-state offenses. Specifically, he contends that

the four New Hampshire crimes for which he was sentenced in August 1998

should combine to a maximum of two PRS points. He also posits that the New

Hampshire crime for which he was sentenced in August 2005 is the equivalent

of a third-degree misdemeanor in Pennsylvania and not the equivalent of a

second-degree felony under Pennsylvania law.4

       When sentencing a defendant convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, the

trial court must consider the sentencing guidelines for each conviction, which

requires the court to establish the offense gravity score and the defendant’s

PRS. See Commonwealth v. Spenny, 128 A.3d 234, 242 (Pa. Super. 2015).

       The [PRS] is based on the number and type of prior convictions
       the defendant has on his or her criminal record. 204 Pa. Code §
       303.4(a). Each prior conviction is given a point value ranging
       between one and four points. See generally 204 Pa. Code §§
       303.7, 303.15. Sections 303.7 and 303.15 set forth the point
       value for every Pennsylvania criminal offense, but generally
       speaking (with some exceptions not relevant here), first-degree
       felony (“F1”) convictions are either three- or four-point offenses,
       F2 convictions are two-point offenses and F3 convictions are one-
       point offenses.

____________________________________________

4 As a result of the sentencing court’s use of a second-degree felony equivalent

for the August 2005 conviction, two (2) points were added to Woodard’s prior
record score. If the trial court had used a third-degree misdemeanor, no
points would have been added to the prior record score. See 204 Pa. Code §§
303.7(a)(3), (5).

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Id. Essentially, “[a] defendant who has prior convictions of F1s and F2s that

total six or more points is separately classified as a RFEL, which further

increases the guideline sentence.” Id. (citations omitted).

      In addition, we are mindful of the following:

            If a defendant was sentenced for a single conviction at a
      prior judicial proceeding, that conviction is counted in the
      calculation of a defendant’s [PRS]. If a defendant was sentenced
      for multiple convictions at a single sentencing proceeding, the
      most serious offense is included in the [PRS] calculation, as is any
      other offense for which the defendant received consecutive
      sentences. Prior convictions for which the trial court ordered the
      sentences to run concurrently with the most serious offense at a
      single judicial sentencing proceeding are not included in the
      calculation of the [PRS].

Id. (citations omitted). The guidelines do not impose any restriction on the

computation of a PRS based on convictions arising from separate judicial

proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 165 (Pa. Super.

2011).

      Our sentencing guidelines provide that, for defendants who have out-

of-state convictions, those offenses are to be scored as “a conviction for the

current equivalent Pennsylvania offense.” 204 Pa. Code § 303.8(f)(1). In

addition, we observe:

      … [When] determining the Pennsylvania equivalent statute for a
      prior, out-of-state conviction for [PRS] purposes, courts must
      identify the elements of the foreign conviction and on that basis
      alone, identify the Pennsylvania statute that is substantially
      identical in nature and definition to the out-of-state offense.
      [Therefore,] we must compare the elements of the foreign offense
      in terms of classification of the conduct proscribed, its definition
      of the offense, and the requirements for culpability to determine
      the Pennsylvania equivalent offense.

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Spenny, 128 A.3d at 250 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Implicit in

this analysis is the understanding that we will consider the out-of-state statute

in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. See Commonwealth

v. Vandyke 157 A.3d 535, 541 (Pa. Super. 2017).

       We further observe that “[o]nce the court conducts an analysis of the

elements of the foreign offense and finds the Pennsylvania offense that ‘is

substantially identical in nature and definition’ to the out-of-state statute, the

underlying record of the foreign offense may need to be considered for grading

purposes.” Spenny, 128 A.3d at 250 (citations omitted). However, if “there

is no current equivalent Pennsylvania offense, [we must] determine the

current equivalent Pennsylvania grade of the offense based on the maximum

sentence permitted, and then apply §303.8(d)(2).”5 204 Pa. Code §

303.8(f)(3).

       Here, the sentencing court was faced with a difficult job in assessing

Woodard’s prior record score from out-of-state jurisdictions. In addressing this

calculation, the trial court did not elaborate on its analysis of Woodard’s out-

of-state convictions in compiling Woodard’s PRS for the sentencing guidelines.

See Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at 1. Rather, in its written opinion, the court

____________________________________________

5 Section 303.8(d)(2) provides if no current Pennsylvania equivalent offense

exists and the grading of the conviction is unknown, felonies shall be graded
as a felony 3 and misdemeanors as other misdemeanor offenses, as identified
in § 303.7(a)(5). See 204 Pa. Code 303.8(d)(2).

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referenced two documents as support for its conclusion that Woodard’s PRS is

RFEL and offered no additional explanation other than its adoption of the two

referenced documents. Specifically, the trial court stated, “[T]his [c]ourt

based its March 30, 2023 sentencing order on the information contained in

the [PSI,] which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit ‘A’, and

the information contained in Prior Record Score Calculation Memorandum,

dated March 8, 2023 . . . which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as

Exhibit ‘B’.” Id.

      The Prior Record Score Calculation Memorandum notes that “[t]his

officer was able to determine the Pennsylvania equivalent under [section

303.8](f)(1) and did not find it necessary to resort to section [303.8](f)(3) …

.” Id. at Exhibit B. While not specifically noted within the memorandum, the

probation department, and by reliance, the trial court, believed the equivalent

to New Hampshire’s Felonious Sexual Assault crime is Pennsylvania’s indecent

assault statute and the equivalent to New Hampshire’s Aggravated Felonious

Sexual Assault crime is Pennsylvania’s aggravated indecent assault statute,

based upon the copies of the New Hampshire statutes attached as exhibits to

the memorandum.

      However, our review of the record establishes that the elements of the

New Hampshire statutes at issue, NH Rev. Stat. § 632-A:3 Felonious Sexual

Assault and NH Rev. Stat. § 632-A:2 Aggravated Felonious Sexual Assault, do

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not match our indecent assault statute nor our aggravated indecent assault

statute. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3125, 3126.

       First, at case 219-1997-CR-00115, Woodard was convicted of § 632-

A:3, Felonious Sexual Assault. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/23, Exhibit B

(New Hampshire Case Summary for 219-1997-CR-00115); Defendant’s

Memorandum on Sentencing, Exhibit A, at 1.6 The trial court and Woodard

both compared § 632-A:3 to Pennsylvania’s indecent assault statute. In full,

§ 632-A:3 provides:

       A person is guilty of a class B felony if such person:

       I. Subjects a person to sexual contact and causes serious personal
       injury to the victim under any of the circumstances named in RSA
       632-A:2; or

       II. Engages in sexual penetration with a person, other than his
       legal spouse, who is 13 years of age or older and under 16 years
       of age where the age difference between the actor and the other
       person is 4 years or more; or

       III. Engages in sexual contact with a person other than his legal
       spouse who is under 13 years of age.

       IV. (a) Engages in sexual contact with the person, or causes the
       person to engage in sexual contact on himself or herself in the
       presence of the actor, when the actor is in a position of authority
       over the person and uses that authority to coerce the victim to
       submit under any of the following circumstances:

              (1) When the actor has direct supervisory or
              disciplinary authority over the victim by virtue of the
              victim being incarcerated in a correctional institution,

____________________________________________

6 Pagination provided.

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            the secure psychiatric unit, or juvenile detention
            facility where the actor is employed; or

            (2) When the actor is a probation or parole officer or
            a juvenile probation and parole officer who has direct
            supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim
            while the victim is on parole or probation or under
            juvenile probation.

           (b) Consent of the victim under any of the circumstances
     set forth in this paragraph shall not be considered a defense.

            (c) For the purpose of this paragraph, “sexual contact”
     means the intentional touching of the person’s sexual or intimate
     parts, including genitalia, anus, breasts, and buttocks, where such
     contact, or the causing of such contact, can reasonably be
     construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or
     gratification of the person in the position of authority, or the
     humiliation of the person being touched.

NH Rev. Stat. § 632-A:3. We cannot be more specific, as nothing provided to

this Court indicates what subsection of § 632-A:3 Woodard pled guilty to in

case 219-1997-CR-00115. The indecent assault statute in Pennsylvania

provides:

     (a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of indecent assault if the
     person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the
     complainant to have indecent contact with the person or
     intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with
     seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual
     desire in the person or the complainant and:

            (1) the person does so without the complainant’s consent;

            (2) the person does so by forcible compulsion;

          (3) the person does so by threat of forcible compulsion that
     would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution;

           (4) the complainant is unconscious or the person knows that
     the complainant is unaware that the indecent contact is occurring;

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            (5) the person has substantially impaired the complainant’s
      power to appraise or control his or her conduct by administering
      or employing, without the knowledge of the complainant, drugs,
      intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing
      resistance;

           (6) the complainant suffers from a mental disability which
      renders the complainant incapable of consent;

            (7) the complainant is less than 13 years of age; or

           (8) the complainant is less than 16 years of age and the
      person is four or more years older than the complainant and the
      complainant and the person are not married to each other.

      (b) Grading.—Indecent assault shall be graded as follows:

           (1) An offense under subsection (a)(1) or (8) is a
      misdemeanor of the second degree.

            (2) An offense under subsection (a)(2), (3), (4), (5) or (6)
      is a misdemeanor of the first degree.

             (3) An offense under subsection (a)(7) is a misdemeanor of
      the first degree unless any of the following apply, in which case it
      is a felony of the third degree:

            (i) It is a second or subsequent offense.

            (ii) There has been a course of conduct of indecent
            assault by the person.

            (iii) The indecent assault was committed by touching
            the complainant’s sexual or intimate parts with sexual
            or intimate parts of the person.

            (iv) The indecent assault is committed by touching the
            person’s sexual or intimate parts with the
            complainant’s sexual or intimate parts.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3126. It is clear that there are different elements in each statute.

Without knowing what subsection Woodard pled guilty to, we cannot find that

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there is an equivalent statute in Pennsylvania. As such, we now look at the

maximum sentence permitted to determine what the equivalent grade is in

Pennsylvania. See 204 Pa. Code 303.8(f)(3).

       New Hampshire lists Felonious Sexual Assault as a “class B felony.” NH

Rev. Stat. § 632-A:3. Class B felonies have a maximum sentence of 7 years.

See NH Rev. Stat. §§ 651:2(II)(b), 625:9(III)(a)(2). Therefore, sentences for

class B felonies are equivalent to those for Pennsylvania’s felony of the third

degree. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3).

       Next, we look at New Hampshire’s Aggravated Felonious Sexual Assault

found at § 632-A:2:7

       I. A person is guilty of the felony of aggravated felonious sexual
       assault if such person engages in sexual penetration with another
       person under any of the following circumstances:

             (a) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual
       application of physical force, physical violence or superior physical
       strength.

              (b) When the victim is physically helpless to resist.

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7 Woodard argues in its brief to this Court that he was sentenced on all four

cases in 1998 to Felonious Sexual Assault under § 632-A:3. See Appellant’s
Brief at 16-17. However, our review of the record shows a discrepancy
between the case summaries and the sentencing orders. Compare Trial Court
Opinion, 7/10/23, Exhibit B (New Hampshire case summaries for 219-1997-
CR-00116, 00117, and 00118) (listing the charge as “Felonious Sexual
Assault” and the statute as “632-A:3.”); with Defendant’s Memorandum on
Sentencing, Exhibit A, at 8, 13, 20 (wherein the sentencing orders indicate
the offense as “Felonious Sexual Assault,” but the statute as “632-A:2.”)
(pagination added for ease of reference).

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           (c) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by
     threatening to use physical violence or superior physical strength
     on the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the
     present ability to execute these threats.

           (d) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by
     threatening to retaliate against the victim, or any other person,
     and the victim believes that the actor has the ability to execute
     these threats in the future.

            (e) When the victim submits under circumstances involving
     false imprisonment, kidnapping or extortion.

           (f) When the actor, without the prior knowledge or consent
     of the victim, administers or has knowledge of another person
     administering to the victim any intoxicating substance which
     mentally incapacitates the victim.

            (g) When the actor provides therapy, medical treatment or
     examination of the victim and in the course of that therapeutic or
     treating relationship or within one year of termination of that
     therapeutic or treating relationship:

           (1) Acts in a manner or for purposes which are not
           professionally recognized as ethical or acceptable; or

           (2) Uses this position as such provider to coerce the
           victim to submit.

           (h) When, except as between legally married spouses, the
     victim is mentally defective and the actor knows or has reason to
     know that the victim is mentally defective.

           (i) When the actor through concealment or by the element
     of surprise is able to cause sexual penetration with the victim
     before the victim has an adequate chance to flee or resist.

           (j) When, except as between legally married spouses, the
     victim is 13 years of age or older and under 16 years of age and:

           (1) the actor is a member of the same household as
           the victim; or

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           (2) the actor is related by blood or affinity to the
           victim.

           (k) When, except as between legally married spouses, the
     victim is 13 years of age or older and under 18 years of age and
     the actor is in a position of authority over the victim and uses this
     authority to coerce the victim to submit.

           (l) When the victim is less than 13 years of age.

           (m) When at the time of the sexual assault, the victim
     indicates by speech or conduct that there is not freely given
     consent to performance of the sexual act.

           (n) When the actor is in a position of authority over the
     victim and uses this authority to coerce the victim to submit under
     any of the following circumstances:

           (1) When the actor has direct supervisory or
           disciplinary authority over the victim by virtue of the
           victim being incarcerated in a correctional institution,
           the secure psychiatric unit, or juvenile detention
           facility where the actor is employed; or

           (2) When the actor is a probation or parole officer or
           a juvenile probation and parole officer who has direct
           supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim
           while the victim is on parole or probation or under
           juvenile probation.

     Consent of the victim under any of the circumstances set forth in
     subparagraph (n) shall not be considered a defense.

     II. A person is guilty of aggravated felonious sexual assault
     without penetration when he intentionally touches whether
     directly, through clothing, or otherwise, the genitalia of a person
     under the age of 13 under circumstances that can be reasonably
     construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or
     gratification.

     III. A person is guilty of aggravated felonious sexual assault when
     such person engages in a pattern of sexual assault against another
     person, not the actor's legal spouse, who is less than 16 years of
     age. The mental state applicable to the underlying acts of sexual

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       assault need not be shown with respect to the element of
       engaging in a pattern of sexual assault.

       IV. A person is guilty of aggravated felonious sexual assault when
       such person engages in sexual penetration as defined in RSA 632-
       A:1, V with another person under 18 years of age whom such
       person knows to be his or her ancestor, descendant, brother or
       sister of the whole or half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece.
       The relationships referred to herein include blood relationships
       without regard to legitimacy, stepchildren, and relationships of
       parent and child by adoption.

NH Rev. Stat. § 632-A:2. Again, we cannot be more specific than referencing

the entire statute, as none of the records provided to this Court indicate what

subsection was the basis of Woodard’s plea.

       The trial court found that the equivalent offense in Pennsylvania is

aggravated indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125, and graded the equivalent

offense as a felony of the first degree.8 It is possible that Woodard pled guilty

under § 632-A:2(II) as quoted above, which does not require penetration.

See NH Rev. Stat. §632-A:2(II). As such, the elements of § 632-A:2 are not

the equivalent of aggravated indecent assault, which requires “penetration,

however slight.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a). Without knowing which subsection was

____________________________________________

8 Notably, the adult probation department, and the trial court, must have
relied upon Woodard’s provided documents to create the equivalent offense
of aggravated indecent assault graded as a felony of the first degree. The only
way to grade aggravated indecent assault as a felony of the first degree is if
the victim is under 13 years of age. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(b), (c). The case
summaries which the adult probation department relied on do not include any
facts regarding the conviction. However, Woodard provided the indictments,
which do include the age of the victim.

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the basis of Woodard’s plea, we cannot agree that there is a Pennsylvania

equivalent offense.

       As explained above, New Hampshire has a traditional breakdown of the

grading of offenses and the maximums allowed. See NH Rev. Stat. §§ 651:2,

625:9. However, aggravated felonious sexual assault has its own penalty. See

NH Rev. Stat. § 632-A:10-a. The maximum term for aggravated felonious

sexual assault is 20 years.9 Id. The Pennsylvania equivalent is a felony of the

first degree. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1).

       Finally, we turn to Woodard’s 2005 New Hampshire conviction in the 7th

Circuit District Division of Rochester at case number 471-2005-CR-03950. The

New Hampshire case summary on the matter indicates a conviction under NH

Rev Stat § 651-B:5, which at the time of the conviction was titled “Change of

Name/Alias/Address; Duty to Inform” and was graded as a “Class A

Misdemeanor.” See Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/23, at Exhibit B (New Hampshire

Case Summary for 471-2005-CR-039050). The trial court believed the

equivalent Pennsylvania offense is found at 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1, failure to

comply with registration requirements. Section 4915.1, unless certain

exceptions are present, is graded as a felony of the second degree. On the

____________________________________________

9 Although not relevant here, New Hampshire does provide for a higher
sentence for second or subsequent offenses. See NH Rev. Stat. § 632-A:10-
a(II).

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sentencing guideline form, the sentencing court listed this crime as a Felony

2 offense, which added two (2) points to the prior record score.

      Pennsylvania’s   failure   to   comply   with   registration   requirements

demands the defendant “knowingly fail” to comply with his or her sexual

offender registration requirements. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a). New

Hampshire’s revised statute § 651-B:5 does not specifically enumerate the

mens rea required. Woodard argues that the penalties statute found at § 651-

B:9 provides the mens rea as “negligently fails to comply” because the case

summary lists the charge as a misdemeanor. See Appellant’s Brief, at 29. Our

review of that statute, however, shows that Woodard relies upon the current

version of § 651-B:9. The prior version of NH Rev. Stat. § 651-B:9 (eff. Jan.

1, 2006) required the defendant to “knowingly fail to comply” to classify the

crime as a misdemeanor. Id.

      This is a prime example of why it is imperative that the courts compare

the statute in effect at the time of conviction to Pennsylvania’s current

equivalent offense. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to compare the

statutes in effect at the time of Woodard’s convictions in New Hampshire with

Pennsylvania’s equivalents. If there is no Pennsylvania equivalent, the trial

court is directed to follow the rules laid out above and at 204 Pa. Code § 303.8,

and the applicable case law.

      Unfortunately, there were significant errors in both the PSI and

probation officer’s memorandum in evaluating Woodard’s out-of-state

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convictions for purposes of calculating his PRS. We are unable to determine if

the sentencing court properly applied a PRS of RFEL because of the

misapplication of the law for determining the Pennsylvania equivalent statutes

for Woodard’s prior, out-of-state convictions.

        Clearly, Woodard has an extensive record of crimes related to sexual

assault, which justifiably was a major concern to the sentencing court. In light

of Woodard’s prior record, as well as his current conviction of another sex

offence, we agree that the sentencing court may decide to sentence within,

above or below the guidelines. However, because of the errors noted above,

we are constrained to vacate Woodard’s judgment of sentence and to remand

for the trial court to determine Woodard’s PRS and for resentencing and

establishment of a record that justifies the PRS and the guideline sentencing

form.

        Concerning Woodard’s remaining two issues, wherein he raises

additional challenges to the discretionary aspects of his sentence, we will not

address those issues because we are remanding for resentencing.

        Conviction affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for

resentencing consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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DATE: 02/26/2024

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