Court Opinion

ID: 4281158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2018-06-05 09:48:21.204793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:42.394263
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                                            05-18-00647-CV
                                                                                  FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                            DALLAS, TEXAS
                                                                                          6/4/2018 10:40 AM
                                                                                                 LISA MATZ
                                                                                                     CLERK

                                    No. ___________________

                                     In the Court of Appeals                FILED IN
                                 Fifth District of Texas at Dallas   5th COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                         DALLAS, TEXAS
                                                                     6/4/2018 10:40:22 AM
                                                                           LISA MATZ
                                                                             Clerk

                                      In re JOHN CALCE
                                            Relator

             Original Proceeding from the 44th Judicial District Court
                              Dallas County, Texas
                   Hon. Bonnie Lee Goldstein, Presiding Judge
                             Cause No. DC-16-07706

                    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

    James D. Shields                                P. Michael Jung
    David A. Shields                                David N. Kitner
                                                    Jadd F. Masso
    SHIELDS LEGAL GROUP
                                                    Chase J. Potter
    16301 Quorum Drive
    Suite 250B                                      CLARK HILL STRASBURGER
    Addison, Texas 75001                            901 Main Street, Suite 6000
    (972) 788-2040                                  Dallas, Texas 75202
    (972) 788-4332 (facsimile)                      (214) 651-4300
                                                    (214) 651-4330 (facsimile)

                                      Attorneys for Relator

                                  Oral Argument Requested

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118
                                 Identities of Parties and Counsel

                         Party                                Counsel

John Calce                                       P. Michael Jung
                                                 David N. Kitner
         Relator                                 Jadd F. Masso
                                                 Chase J. Potter
                                                 CLARK HILL STRASBURGER
                                                 901 Main Street, Suite 6000
                                                 Dallas, Texas 75202

                                                 James D. Shields
                                                 David A. Shields
                                                 SHIELDS LEGAL GROUP
                                                 16301 Quorum Drive
                                                 Suite 250B
                                                 Addison, Texas 75001
                                                 (972) 788-2040
                                                 (972) 788-4332 (facsimile)

Hon. Bonnie Lee Goldstein
44th Judicial District Court
600 Commerce Street
Dallas, Texas 75202

         Respondent

Centurion Logistics, LLC                         Mark E. Torian
                                                 Darren P. Nicholson
         Real Party in Interest
                                                 SAYLES WERBNER, P.C.
                                                 4400 Renaissance Tower
                                                 1201 Elm Street
                                                 Dallas, Texas 75270

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118                  2
                                          Table of Contents

Identities of Parties and Counsel.............................................................. 2

Table of Contents ...................................................................................... 3

Index of Authorities................................................................................... 5

Statement of the Case ............................................................................... 9

Statement of Jurisdiction ........................................................................ 10

Introduction ............................................................................................. 11

Issue Presented ....................................................................................... 12

Statement of Facts .................................................................................. 13

Summary of the Argument ..................................................................... 18

Argument ................................................................................................. 19

I.       Standard for Mandamus Relief...................................................... 19

II.      Calce has a clear and immediate right to reimbursement and
         advancement of his defense costs. ................................................. 20

         A.        The right to advancement or reimbursement of
                   expenses and the right to indemnification are separate
                   and distinct legal concepts. ................................................... 21

         B.        Centurion Logistics cannot rely on its own allegations
                   to deny Calce’s right to advancement and
                   reimbursement of defense costs. ........................................... 26

         C.        Calce’s contractual right to advancement and
                   reimbursement is unambiguous and mandatory. ................ 29

                   1.        The terms of the Company Agreement are
                             unambiguous. ............................................................... 29

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118                         3
                   2.        Section 6.2 of the Agreement requires Centurion
                             Logistics to immediately reimburse Calce the
                             expenses he pays or incurs in defending himself. ....... 30

                   3.        Calce’s reimbursable expenses include his
                             attorneys’ fees............................................................... 33

         D.        Summary judgment is the appropriate—and only
                   meaningful—mechanism for Calce to exercise his right
                   to advancement and reimbursement of defense costs. ......... 34

III.     Mandamus is warranted. ............................................................... 35

Prayer ...................................................................................................... 36

Certification ............................................................................................. 37

Certificate Of Compliance ....................................................................... 37

Certificate of Service ............................................................................... 38

Declaration Regarding Evidence ............................................................ 39

Appendix

       A. Plaintiff’s Original Petition

       B. John Calce’s First Amended Counterclaim Against Centurion
          Logistics LLC and Centurion Pecos Terminal LLC

       C. John Calce’s Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
          Regarding Counterclaim Against Centurion Logistics LLC

       D. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition

       E. Order Denying John Calce’s Amended Motion for Partial Sum-
          mary Judgment Regarding Counterclaim Againt Centurion Lo-
          gistics LLC

       F. Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 8.104

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118                          4
                                  Index of Authorities

CASES
Arch Ins. Co. v. U.S. Youth Soccer Ass’n,
    No. 05-12-00596-CV, 2014 WL 2941372,
    2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 5068 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    May 12, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) .................................................... 23

El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc.,
    389 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2012) ............................................................. 29

Evans v. Davis,
   No. 14-12-01053-CV, 2013 WL 6095723,
   2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 14122 (Tex. App.—Houston
   [14th Dist.] Nov. 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) ................................ 23

Heine v. Bank of Oswego,
    144 F. Supp. 3d 1198 (D. Or. 2015) ................................................. 33

Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank,
    939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996) ............................................................. 30

Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen,
   888 A.2d 204 (Del. 2005) ............................................................ 22, 25

Huie v. DeShazo,
    922 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. 1996) ....................................................... 19, 35

In re Aguilar,
     344 S.W.3d 41 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011,
     orig. proceeding) ....................................................................... passim

In re AIU Ins.,
     148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2014) ............................................................. 20

In re Coppola,
     535 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 2017) ............................................................. 20

In re Dickason,
     987 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1998) ............................................................. 20

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118                   5
In re Essex Ins.,
     450 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. 2014) ....................................................... 19, 20

In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc.,
     275 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. 2008) ....................................................... 20, 35

In re Nationwide Ins.,
     494 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. 2016) ....................................................... 19, 35

In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
     148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) ....................................................... 20, 35

In re State Farm Lloyds,
     520 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. 2018) ............................................................. 19

Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin,
      455 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2006) ............................................................ 25

James River Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Kehoe,
   674 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2009)................................................ 27

Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,
   908 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1990),
   rev’d on other grounds,
   500 U.S. 90 (1991) ............................................................................ 25

Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P.,
   438 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2014) ........................................................... 29, 30

Morgan v. Grace,
   Civ. A. No. 20430, 2003 WL 22461916,
   2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113 (Del Ch. Oct. 29, 2003) ........................... 34

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn.
    v. CBI Indus. Inc.,
    907 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1995) ............................................................. 30

Neurobehaviorial Assocs., P.A. v. Cypress
   Creek Hosp., Inc.,
   995 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. App.—Houston
   [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) ................................................................... 25

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118                   6
Peterson v. Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co.,
    No. 05-15-00678-CV, 2016 WL 3448067,
    2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6586 (Tex. App.—Dallas
    June 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) ............................................. 29, 30

PopCap Games, Inc. v. MumboJumbo, LLC,
   350 S.W.3d 699 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) ................... 29

Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.,
   C.A. No. 19467, 2002 Del. Ch.
   LEXIS 69 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002) ............................................ 28, 35

Sacks v. Haden,
    266 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. 2008) ............................................................. 30
Walker v. Packer,
   827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) ............................................................. 19

STATUTES
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.02-1 ................................................................ 24

Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 8.001(3)(B) ......................................................... 34

Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 8.104................................................................... 24

Texas Government Code Section 22.221(a) and (b)(1) ........................... 10

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Andrew J. Morrow, Jr., Appendix: Task Force Report,
   Oregon Revised Model Business Corporation Act,
   30 Willamette L. Rev. 407 (1994) .................................................... 33

Richard A. Rossman, et al., A Primer of Advancement
    of Defense Costs: The Rights and Duties of Officers
    and Corporations,
    85 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 29 (2007) .................................................. 22

Stephen A. Radin, “Sinners Who Find Religion”: Advancement
    of Litigation Expenses to Corporate Officials

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118                  7
       Accused of Wrongdoing,
       25 Rev. Litig. 251 (2006) .................................................................. 25

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118                    8
                                 Statement of the Case

Underlying Proceeding                 Suit by Centurion Logistics LLC against
                                      Relator John Calce, a manager of the
                                      LLC, and others alleging breach of fiduci-
                                      ary duty and related claims relating to a
                                      development project. (MR.1-23, 867-903.)
                                      Calce sought to require Centurion Logis-
                                      tics to reimburse his defense costs in this
                                      case as required by its Company Agree-
                                      ment. (MR.322-36.) The trial court denied
                                      Calce’s motion. (MR.904-05.)

Respondent                            Hon. Bonnie Lee Goldstein
                                      44th Judicial District Court
                                      Dallas County, Texas

Respondent’s Actions                  Refusing to enforce contractual provision
                                      requiring Centurion Logistics to reim-
                                      burse Calce’s defense-related expenses in
                                      this case as they are incurred.

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118             9
                                 Statement of Jurisdiction

         This Court has jurisdiction under Texas Government Code Section

22.221(a) and (b)(1), which authorizes this Court to “issue all writs of

mandamus, agreeable to the principles of law regulating those writs,

against: (1) a judge of a district or county court in the court of appeals

district.”

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118              10
                                 Introduction

         The right of a party to have defense costs advanced or reimbursed

during ongoing litigation is a right that will be lost forever if not en-

forced during the pending litigation. In re Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d 41, 55

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, orig. proceeding).

         In this case, Relator John Calce is entitled to reimbursement of

his defense costs paid or incurred in this case—as they are paid or in-

curred. Real Party in Interest Centurion Logistics does not contest that

Calce is an “Indemnified Person” or that this suit is a “Proceeding” for

purposes of the Company Agreement, thus triggering Centurion Logis-

tics obligation to reimburse Calce’s ongoing defense expenses.

         Calce’s right to advancement or reimbursement of his defense ex-

penses is separate and distinct from any right he may have to indemni-

fication from Centurion Logistics. Indemnification, like Calce’s potential

obligation to repay any funds advanced to him for his defense, will be

determined when this case is adjudicated on its merits.

         Mandamus is necessary to vindicate Calce’s right to advancement

of defense costs. Appellate relief will be illusory because, by that point,

Calce will have been completely deprived of the benefit of the right.

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118       11
                                 Issue Presented

         Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to enforce Cen-

turion Logistics’ contractual obligation to reimburse Relator John Calce

his defense costs as paid or incurred during the course of this litigation?

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118         12
                                 Statement of Facts

The Parties

         Relator John Calce is a manager of Plaintiff and Real Party in In-

terest Centurion Logistics LLC. (MR.4, 338, 353, 872.)

         Centurion Logistics was formed by Calce and others to pursue a

project to purchase real property in Reeves County, Texas. (MR.4-5,

872.)

The Lawsuit

         In June 2016, Centurion Logistics brought this suit against Calce

and several other defendants relating to an alleged railway-terminal

development project. (MR.1-23.) Centurion Logistics generally claims

that Calce and the other defendants caused Centurion Logistics to lose

its interest in certain property, thus depriving it of the opportunity to

construct a railway terminal for crude oil on that property. (Id.)

         Against Calce, Centurion Logistics asserts claims for (1) breach of

fiduciary duty as a manager of the company, (2) unjust enrichment, and

(3) aiding and abetting fraudulent concealment. (MR.12-13, 15-17, 18-

19.) Centurion Logistics later amended its petition, adding claims

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118          13
against Calce for theft liability, tortious interference with contract,

fraudulent inducement, and promissory estoppel. (MR.894-97.)

         Since answering in this case, Calce has incurred, and continues to

incur, significant expenses in defending against the claims that have

been brought against him. (See MR.338.)

Calce’s Right to Immediate Reimbursement of Defense Costs

         It is undisputed that Calce is a manager of Centurion Logistics.

(MR.4, 782.) Calce is, as a result, an “Indemnified Person” under Centu-

rion Logistics’ Company Agreement. (Company Agreement § 1.1,

MR.346.)

         Section 6.2 of the Company Agreement requires Centurion Logis-

tics to reimburse “Indemnified Persons,” such as Calce, for expenses

paid or incurred in defending himself in any “Proceeding”:

                   To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law,
                   and subject to Section 6.3, [Centurion Logistics]
                   indemnifies and holds harmless each Indemnified
                   Person from and against any Damages arising
                   from any Proceeding relating to the conduct of
                   [Centurion Logistics’] business or to any act or
                   omission by such Indemnified Person within the
                   scope of the Indemnified Person’s authority in the
                   course of [Centurion Logistics’] business or for
                   any misconduct or negligence on the part of any
                   other person that is an employee or agent of
                   [Centurion Logistics]. An Indemnified Person’s

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118            14
                   expenses paid or incurred in defending itself
                   against any Proceeding shall be reimbursed
                   as paid or incurred. The right to indemnifica-
                   tion conferred in this Article VI is not exclusive of
                   any other right that any person may have or
                   hereafter acquire under any statute, agreement,
                   vote of Members, or otherwise.

(Company Agreement § 6.2, MR.357 (emphasis added).) Such reim-

bursement is to be made as the expenses are paid or incurred. (Id.)

         “Proceeding” is defined as “(a) any threatened, pending, or com-

pleted action or other proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administra-

tive, arbitrative, or investigative; (b) an appeal of any such proceeding,

and (c) any inquiry or investigation that could lead to any such proceed-

ing.” (Company Agreement § 1.1, MR.347.) Centurion Logistics does not

dispute that this case is a “Proceeding” as defined by the Company

Agreement. (MR.392.)

         In the event an Indemnified Person is later determined not to be

entitled to any expense-reimbursement payments made, the Indemni-

fied Person is required to repay such amounts to Centurion Logistics.

(Company Agreement § 6.3(c), MR.357-58.)

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118              15
Centurion Logistics’ Refusal to Reimburse Calce’s Costs

         In August 2017, Calce requested that Centurion Logistics, pursu-

ant to Section 6.2 of the Agreement, (1) reimburse Calce the expenses

he had incurred as of July 31, 2017, plus an additional $50,000 to be

applied to future expenses as they are incurred, and (2) agree to reim-

burse Calce the additional expenses, in excess of such $50,000 ad-

vancement, that he pays or incurs in his defense of the suit as such ex-

penses are paid or incurred. (MR.388-89.).

         Calce’s requested stated: “Pursuant to Section 6.3 of the [Compa-

ny] Agreement, Mr. Calce hereby affirms that it is his good faith belief

that he has met the standard of conduct necessary for indemnification

under Section 6.3.” (MR.389.) The request also provides that “Mr. Calce

further agrees to repay any amount that is paid or reimbursed by Cen-

turion Logistics, pursuant to Section 6.2, if it is determined by a court of

competent jurisdiction that Mr. Calce did not meet the aforementioned

standard or if indemnification is otherwise determined to be prohibited

by law.” (Id.)

         Centurion Logistics denied Calce’s request for reimbursement.

(MR.391-93.) Despite denying the request, however, Centurion Logistics

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118       16
conceded that Calce is an “Indemnified Person” and that this litigation

is a “Proceeding” as those terms are defined in the Company Agree-

ment. (MR.392.) To date, Centurion Logistics has not reimbursed Calce

any amount for the expenses he has paid and incurred in defending

himself against the claims brought against him in this case. (MR.338.)

Procedural Background

         Calce filed a counterclaim asserting his right to immediate reim-

bursement of his defense costs. (MR.24-172, 173-321.) To compel com-

pliance with Centurion Logistics’ reimbursement obligation, Calce filed

a motion for partial summary judgment. (MR.322-405.) By that motion,

Calce sought a declaration that Centurion Logistics is required to reim-

burse his expenses, including attorney’s fees, paid or incurred in defend-

ing himself in this case. (MR.334.) The motion also sought to require

Centurion Logistics to reimburse future expenses within 10 days of Cal-

ce’s submission of such expenses to Centurion Logistics. (Id.) On

May 21, 2018, the trial court denied Calce’s motion. (MR.904-05.)

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118       17
                                 Summary of the Argument

         Centurion Logistics’ Company Agreement provides that, as a

manager, Relator John Calce is entitled to reimbursement of his costs of

defense in any “Proceeding.” Centurion Logistics admits that this case

is a “Proceeding.” As a result, Calce is contractually entitled to reim-

bursement of any expenses he pays or incurs in defending himself in

this lawsuit, including attorney’s fees, as they are paid or incurred.

         Calce’s right to reimbursement of defense costs is separate and

distinct from any right he may have to indemnification from Centurion

Logistics. Calce’s right to ongoing reimbursement of his expenses dur-

ing the course of this case is supported by the Company Agreement,

Texas case law, and the Texas Business & Organizations Code.

         The trial court’s refusal to enforce Centurion Logistics’ obligation

to advance Calce his defense costs has the effect of permanently depriv-

ing Calce of the benefit of this substantive right. By the time this case

proceeds to trial and an appeal becomes available, the issue will be

moot. Accordingly, mandamus relief is necessary. In re Aguilar, 344
S.W.3d 41, 55 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, orig. proceeding).

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118             18
                                 Argument

I.       Standard for Mandamus Relief

         Mandamus relief is warranted to correct a clear abuse of discre-

tion when there is no adequate appellate remedy. In re State Farm

Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Tex. 2018).

         When deciding legal principles, a trial court has no discretion to

misinterpret or misapply the law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,

840 (Tex. 1992). Thus a failure to correctly analyze or apply the law

constitutes an abuse of discretion. In re Nationwide Ins., 494 S.W.3d
708, 712 (Tex. 2016). A trial court’s erroneous legal conclusion is an

abuse of discretion even if the law is unsettled. Huie v. DeShazo, 922
S.W.2d 920, 927-28 (Tex. 1996).

         Determining whether an appellate remedy is adequate involves

balancing “practical and prudential” considerations, such as the inevi-

tability of reversal, the impairment of important substantive and proce-

dural rights, the opportunity to give direction and guidance on the law

that would otherwise be lost, and the waste of judicial resources on the

proceeding. See In re Essex Ins., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014); In re

Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008); In re Prudential

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118        19
Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The adequacy of an

appeal depends on the facts of each case. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc.,

275 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tex. 2008). An appellate remedy is inadequate

when the benefits of mandamus review are outweighed by the detri-

ments. In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tex. 2017); In re Essex, 450
S.W.3d at 528; In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136.

         If a trial court’s refusal to grant particular relief renders the sub-

ject matter of an appeal illusory, the party seeking relief has no ade-

quate remedy by appeal. See, e.g., In re AIU Ins., 148 S.W.3d 109, 115-

17 (Tex. 2014) (granting mandamus to enforce forum-selection clause; to

do otherwise would defeat the purpose of the clause); In re Dickason,

987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (granting mandamus to prevent retrial

because appeal after second trial would be pointless). Appeal following a

trial is inadequate if the very act of proceeding to trial would defeat the

substantive right at issue. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 465.

II.      Calce has a clear and immediate right to advancement of
         his defense costs.

         Centurion Logistics’ Company Agreement requires it to reimburse

the defense expenses of “Indemnified Persons” as they are paid or in-

curred during the course of a “Proceeding.” (Company Agreement § 6.2,

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118         20
MR.357.) Centurion Logistics does not dispute that Calce is an “Indem-

nified Person” and that this suit is a “Proceeding.” (MR.392.)

         By his motion, Calce sought only to establish his right to ad-

vancement of defense costs, not his right to indemnification. These

rights are often conflated, but they are distinct concepts with different

standards. At this point in the litigation, Calce does not seek to estab-

lish that he is entitled to indemnification from Centurion Logistics.

However, because Calce’s right to advancement of defense costs is clear,

and because that right will be irretrievably lost if not enforced pendente

lite, the trial court was obligated to order Centurion Logistics to reim-

burse and advance those costs.

         A.        The right to advancement of defense costs and the
                   right to indemnification are separate and distinct
                   concepts.

         To adequately demonstrate Calce’s entitlement to the relief re-

quested, it is important to contrast the difference between the right to

advancement or reimbursement of expenses, on the one hand, and the

right to indemnification for such expenses, on the other.

         “Advancement” generally refers to the right of a director or officer

of a company to receive an advance for expenses that he or she incurs in

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118          21
a legal proceeding before its final disposition. Richard A. Rossman, et

al., A Primer of Advancement of Defense Costs: The Rights and Duties of

Officers and Corporations, 85 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 29, 53 (2007). “Alt-

hough the right to indemnification and advancement are correlative,

they are separate and distinct legal actions.” In re Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d
46 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, orig. proceeding) (quoting Homestore, Inc.

v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 212 (Del. 2005)). For instance, an individual ul-

timately determined ineligible for indemnification may still be entitled

to advancement of defense costs before the right to indemnification is

decided. See Rossman, 85 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. at 53.

         These concepts were extensively analyzed in In re Aguilar, which

is strikingly similar to the present case. In that case, Aguilar and an-

other individual formed Perspectiva Group, Inc. Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at

44. Aguilar was an officer and director of Perspectiva. Perspectiva sued

Aguilar alleging that he had breached his fiduciary duties to the com-

pany and engaged in a conspiracy. Perspectiva later added claims ac-

cusing Aguilar and his daughter of forming a company that competed

with Perspectiva, similar to the allegations made here by Centurion Lo-

gistics against Calce. As the lawsuit proceeded, Aguilar’s attorney—

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118       22
pursuant to Perspectiva’s bylaws1—sent Perspectiva’s attorney a letter

requesting that Perspectiva advance Aguilar’s defense costs, including

attorneys’ fees. Id. Perspectiva, like Centurion Logistics, denied Agui-

lar’s advancement 2 request. See id. at 45. The trial court denied Agui-

lar’s motion to require Perspectiva to advance or reimburse his defense

costs. Id. The court of appeals conditionally granted Aguilar’s petition

for a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to (1) vacate its order

denying Aguilar’s motion regarding advancement and (2) enter an order

granting the motion. Id. at 56.

         In analyzing the issue, the Aguilar court first noted that Article

2.02-1 of the Texas Business Corporation Act expressly allowed Texas

corporations to advance litigation expenses to its directors and that the

1 The advancement provision in Aguilar was contained in the company’s bylaws, ra-
ther than a contract among the parties, but the distinction makes no difference. “In
construing the bylaws, [courts] apply the rules that govern the interpretation of
contracts.” Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 49; see also Arch Ins. Co. v. U.S. Youth Soccer
Ass’n, No. 05-12-00596-CV, 2014 WL 2941372, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 5068, at *13
(Tex.     App.—Dallas      May     12,     2014,     no     pet.)   (mem.      op.);
 v. Davis, No. 14-12-01053-CV, 2013 WL 6095723, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 14122, at
*9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 19, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
2 The Aguilar case discusses “advancement” of expenses and the Centurion Logistics
Company Agreement uses the term “reimbursement” of expenses as paid or in-
curred, but in practice the concepts are the same. Both refer to the right of a party
to have defense costs paid or reimbursed by another as they are incurred, rather
than waiting until the conclusion of litigation.

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118           23
applicable section of Perspectiva’s bylaws was nearly identical to the

statutory language. Id. at 45-46. Article 2.02-1 of the Business Corpora-

tion Act is now Section 8.104 of the Business Organizations Code. See

Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 8.104. 3 As in Aguilar, the language of Section 6.2

of Centurion Logistics’ Company Agreement is consistent with the lan-

guage of Section 8.104. Compare Company Agreement § 6.2 (MR.357)

with Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 8.104.

         The Aguilar court discussed the lack of Texas case law addressing

the right to advancement or reimbursement of defense costs: “There are

no Texas cases concerning advancement under the Business Corpora-

tion Act or the Business Organizations Code. But the courts of Dela-

ware have addressed advancement on numerous occasions.” Aguilar,

3The prior and current statutes are the same in all material respects. Compare Tex.
Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.02-1 with Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 8.104.

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118          24
344 S.W.3d at 46. It is common for Texas courts to look to Delaware law

for guidance regarding unsettled/undeveloped areas of corporate law. 4

         The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that “‘[a]dvancement

is an especially important corollary to indemnification’ because it pro-

vides corporate officials with immediate interim relief from the burden

of paying for a defense.” See Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 46 (quoting Home-

store, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005)). “Although the right

to indemnification and advancement are correlative, they are separate

and distinct legal actions.” Id. (quoting Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212).

Perhaps most importantly, “[t]he right to advancement is not depend-

ent on the right to indemnification.” Id. (citing Homestore, 888 A.2d at

212) (emphasis added).

4 “Delaware has been described as ‘the Mother Court of corporate law.’” Aguilar,
344 S.W.3d at 47 (citing Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343
(7th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 500 U.S. 90 (1991)). “Courts throughout the
country look to Delaware for guidance on matters of corporate law.” Id. (citing Neu-
robehaviorial Assocs., P.A. v. Cypress Creek Hosp., Inc., 995 S.W.2d 326, 332 n.12
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (turning to Delaware corporate law
for guidance regarding “winding-up” because there were no Texas cases addressing
the issue)). “The law of advancement, in particular, is ‘a Delaware specialty.’” Id.
(citing Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 455 F.3d 749, 750 (7th Cir. 2006)). “To the
limited extent that there is law [regarding advancement] outside Delaware, it is the
same as the law in Delaware.” Id. (quoting Stephen A. Radin, “Sinners Who Find
Religion”: Advancement of Litigation Expenses to Corporate Officials Accused of
Wrongdoing, 25 Rev. Litig. 251, 271 (2006)).

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118            25
         The distinction between advancement and indemnification is vi-

tally important to the determination of Calce’s immediate right to de-

fense costs because it demonstrates that Calce’s alleged conduct, com-

plained of by Centurion Logistics in this case, is irrelevant to his right

to immediate reimbursement of defense costs.

         B.        Centurion Logistics cannot rely on its own allegations
                   to deny Calce’s right to advancement of defense costs.

         In denying Calce’s request for reimbursement, Centurion Logistics

relied at least in part on its own allegations in this case—specifically

that Calce (1) was not acting “within the scope of [his] authority in

course of the Company’s business” and (2) was engaging in “intentional

misconduct” and a “knowing violation of law.” (MR.391-92.) These are

mere allegations for which Centurion Logistics bears the burden of

proof. Centurion Logistics may not simply assume the role of accuser

and fact-finder in denying Calce’s contractual rights. More importantly,

these allegations are irrelevant to the determination of whether Calce is

entitled to advancement and reimbursement of his defense costs.

         In Aguilar, Perspectiva similarly denied Aguilar’s request for ad-

vancement on the basis that Aguilar purportedly had unclean hands

due to his alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. See Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d
9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118          26
at 46. The Aguilar court explained that “[u]nder Delaware law, ad-

vancement is allowed even when the official seeking advancement is be-

ing sued by the corporation that must advance the litigation expenses”;

“Delaware case law is replete with insider trading cases in which execu-

tives’ expenses are advanced despite allegations of defrauding the cor-

poration or its stockholders of millions of dollars.” Id. at 47 (citing

James River Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Kehoe, 674 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (E.D.

Va. 2009)). The Aguilar court further noted that “[a]dvancement claims

are frequently granted when, as in this case, the corporation is suing an

official for breach of fiduciary duty.” Id.

         The same situation exists here: Calce is being sued for breach of

fiduciary duty. (MR.12-13, 886-87.) As a matter of law, Centurion Logis-

tics “cannot defend against the advancement claim on the ground that it

now believes the fiduciary [Calce] to have been unfaithful because it is

in those very cases that the right to advancement attaches most

strongly.” Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 47 (citing Kehoe, 674 F. Supp. 2d at

750) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). As the Delaware

Court of Chancery has explained, to rule otherwise would render such

protections for corporate officers largely meaningless:

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118        27
                   It is not uncommon for corporate directors, offic-
                   ers, and employees to be sued for breach of the fi-
                   duciary duty of loyalty [i.e., exactly what Calce is
                   being sued for here], and to have to defend claims
                   that they took official action for the primary pur-
                   pose of diverting corporate resources to their own
                   pocketbooks . . . . Therefore, it is highly problem-
                   atic to make the advancement right of such offi-
                   cials dependent on the motivation ascribed to
                   their conduct by the suing parties. To do so would
                   be to largely vitiate the protections afforded by
                   [statutory] and contractual advancement rights.

Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., C.A. No. 19467, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69,

at *15-16 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002); see also Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 48

(rejecting proposition that “the entitlement to advancement hinges on

proof that the director did not violate his fiduciary duties”).

         Calce’s alleged conduct is irrelevant for purposes of determining

whether Calce is entitled to advancement and reimbursement of his de-

fense costs. See Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 48 (citing Reddy, 2002 Del. Ch.

LEXIS 69, at *28-29) (providing that any other result “would turn every

advancement case into a trial on the merits of the underlying claims of

official misconduct.”)). Rather, the determinative question is whether

the terms of the Company Agreement afford Calce the right to ad-

vancement and reimbursement of his defense costs. The answer is un-

questionably “yes.”

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118             28
         C.        Calce’s contractual right to advancement and reim-
                   bursement is unambiguous and mandatory.

                   1.        The terms of the Company Agreement are unam-
                             biguous.

         The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of

law for the court. See Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438
S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2014). Likewise, “[t]he question of whether a contract

is ambiguous is one of law for the court.” Peterson v. Farmers Tex. Cnty.

Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-15-00678-CV, 2016 WL 3448067, 2016 Tex. App.

LEXIS 6586, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1983)). A contract is

not ambiguous if, like the Company Agreement, “the contract’s lan-

guage can be given a certain or definite meaning.” Id. (citing El Paso

Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 389 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Tex.

2012)). The mere fact that the “parties advance different interpretations

of a contract does not necessarily mean that the contract is ambiguous.”

PopCap Games, Inc. v. MumboJumbo, LLC, 350 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied).

         “In construing a written contract, the primary concern of the court

is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the in-

strument.” Moayedi, 438 S.W.3d at 7 (emphasis added). “Absent a find-

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118             29
ing of ambiguity, a court must interpret the meaning and intent of a

contract from the four corners of the document without the aid of ex-

trinsic evidence.” Peterson, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6586, at *9; see also

Sacks v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450-51 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Nat’l Un-

ion Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn. v. CBI Indus. Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517,

520 (Tex. 1995)) (providing that “[o]nly where a contract is ambiguous

may a court consider the parties’ interpretation and ‘admit extraneous

evidence to determine the true meaning of the instrument’”). Moreover,

“[u]nless the agreement shows the parties used a term in a technical or

different sense, the terms are given their plain, ordinary, and generally

accepted meaning.” Moayedi, 438 S.W.3d at 7 (citing Heritage Res., Inc.

v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996)). The relevant terms

of the Company Agreement are unambiguous and entitle Calce to ad-

vancement and reimbursement of his defense costs.

                   2.        Section 6.2 of the Agreement requires Centurion
                             Logistics to immediately reimburse Calce the ex-
                             penses he pays or incurs in defending himself.

         It is undisputed that Calce—as a manager of Centurion Logis-

tics—is an “Indemnified Person” under the Company Agreement.

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118              30
(MR.4, 872.) It is further undisputed that this lawsuit constitutes a

“Proceeding” under the Company Agreement. (MR.347, 392, 404.)

         Section 6.2 of the Company Agreement provides that “[a]n Indem-

nified Person’s expenses paid or incurred in defending [himself] against

any Proceeding shall be reimbursed as paid or incurred.” (MR. 357

(emphasis added).) There are no qualifications or conditions to Calce’s

express right to advancement and reimbursement of defense costs. 5

         The Aguilar court—after noting that the term “shall” is generally

construed to be mandatory—held that Perspectiva had a mandatory du-

ty under the applicable section of its bylaws (which is strikingly similar

5 To the extent any preconditions exist, they have been met. Section 6.3(c) of the
Company Agreement provides that “[t]he Company [Centurion Logistics] may re-
quire, as a condition to the payment of any amounts pursuant to Section 6.2, that
the Indemnified Person provide to the Company (i) a written affirmation by the In-
demnified Person of the person’s good faith belief that the person has met the
standard of conduct necessary for indemnification under this Section 6.3; and (ii) a
written undertaking by or on behalf of the Indemnified Person to repay the amount
paid or reimbursed if the person has not met that standard or if indemnification is
otherwise prohibited by law.” (Company Agreement § 6.3(c), MR.357-58.) Calce has
already provided the prescribed written affirmation and has agreed in writing to
repay any amount that he is reimbursed by Centurion Logistics if it is ultimately
determined that he was not entitled to such payments. (MR.389.)

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118          31
to the language of Section 6.2)6 to advance Aguilar’s defense costs. See

Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 51. Centurion Logistics is likewise required un-

der Section 6.2 of the Company Agreement to reimburse Calce the ex-

penses he pays or incurs in defending himself in this lawsuit as such

expenses are paid or incurred.

         In contrast, Calce’s right to indemnification is more limited: Calce

is only entitled to indemnification for “[d]amages arising from any Pro-

ceeding relating to the conduct of [Centurion Logistics’] business or to

any act or omission by such Indemnified Person within the scope of the

Indemnified Person’s authority in the course of [Centurion Logistics’]

business.” (Company Agreement § 6.2, MR.357.) Section 6.3 of the

Company Agreement similarly allows Centurion Logistics to avoid lia-

bility and its duty of indemnification if the Indemnified Person is found

liable for certain specified wrongs. (Id. § 6.3(a).) Such determinations,

unlike Calce’s right to advancement of defense costs during litigation,

are dependent on the ultimate resolution of claims asserted against

6 The pertinent section of Perspectiva’s bylaws provided: “Reasonable expenses in-
curred by a person who was, is, or threatened to be made a named defendant or re-
spondent in a Proceeding shall be paid or reimbursed by the Corporation.” Aguilar,
344 S.W.3d at 44.

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118         32
Calce. For example, at the conclusion of this case, if it is determined

that Calce’s alleged actions did not relate to Centurion Logistics’ busi-

ness, he will not be entitled to indemnity and he may be required to re-

pay the amounts advanced to him under Section 6.2. (Id. § 6.3(c).)

         Requiring a company’s director or officer to prove their right to in-

demnification as a condition for the advancement of legal fees is imprac-

tical and imposes burdens that would often thwart the purpose of provi-

sions requiring the advancement of expenses. Heine v. Bank of Oswego,

144 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1207 (D. Or. 2015) (citing Andrew J. Morrow, Jr.,

Appendix: Task Force Report, Oregon Revised Model Business Corpora-

tion Act, 30 Willamette L. Rev. 407, 464 (1994)).

                   3.        Calce’s reimbursable expenses include his
                             attorneys’ fees.

         The Aguilar court rejected the argument that “reasonable expens-

es” of defense should not include attorneys’ fees. Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at

51-52. The Aguilar court explained that to exclude attorney’s fees “ren-

ders [the provision] insignificant and practically useless” because “[t]he

purpose of advancement is to relieve corporate officials from the burden

of paying the significant on-going expenses involved in litigation” and

that “[t]he burden of litigation comes from attorney’s fees, not copying

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118              33
costs.” Id. at 51-52 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This rea-

soning is equally applicable here. Moreover, Section 8.001 of the Busi-

ness Organizations Code defines the term “expenses” to include “rea-

sonable attorney’s fees.” See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 8.001(3)(B). Accord-

ingly, Calce’s right to advancement of “expenses” includes the attorneys’

fees he pays or incurs in his defense of this lawsuit.

         D.        Summary judgment was the appropriate vehicle for
                   Calce to establish his right to advancement of defense
                   costs.

         The Aguilar court held that summary judgment is the appropriate

procedural vehicle to seek advancement of defense costs. See Aguilar,
344 S.W.3d at 52-53. As the court explained, “By its very nature, ad-

vancement of expenses can occur only during the course of the trial

court proceedings.” Id. at 55 (citing Morgan v. Grace, Civ. A. No. 20430,

2003 WL 22461916, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *4 (Del Ch. Oct. 29,

2003) (“The value of the right to advancement is that it is granted or

denied while the underlying action is pending.”)). “It is indemnification

of expenses that occurs at the conclusion of the case.” Id. Because Calce

only seeks reimbursement of his defense costs as this case progresses,

his claim is ripe for adjudication. Indeed, the only appropriate time for

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118          34
such determination is now. Calce’s advancement claim will be moot at

the conclusion of the case. See id.

III. Mandamus is necessary.

         The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to require Centu-

rion Logistics to reimburse Calce’s defenses costs as he incurs them.

The determination of Calce’s right to advancement under the unambig-

uous terms of the Company Agreement is a pure question of law. As a

result, the trial court’s error in interpreting the Company Agreement is

an abuse of discretion which mandamus may be employed to remedy. In

re Nationwide Ins., 494 S.W.3d at 712; Huie, 922 S.W.2d at 927-28.

         Calce will have no adequate remedy by appeal because, as the

Aguilar court recognized, his claim will be moot by then. Aguilar, 344
S.W.3d at 55 (citing Reddy, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, 2002 WL 1358761

at *9). As the Texas Supreme Court has explained, the “most frequent

use . . . of mandamus relief involves cases in which the very act of pro-

ceeding to trial—regardless of the outcome—would defeat the substan-

tive right involved.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 465. In such

cases, mandamus is not only proper, it is necessary. In re Prudential,
148 S.W.3d at 138.

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118        35
                                        Prayer

         For the reasons set forth above, Relator John Calce respectfully

prays:

         (1)       that the Court grant a writ of mandamus and compel the
                   trial court to (a) vacate its order denying Calce’s Amended
                   Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Counter-
                   claim Against Centurion Logistics LLC and (b) render an or-
                   der granting that motion; and

         (2)       for such other and further relief to which he may be entitled
                   at law or in equity.

                                      Respectfully submitted,

                                      /s/ Jadd F. Masso
                                      P. Michael Jung
                                      Texas Bar No. 11054600
                                      michael.jung@clarkhillstrasburger.com
                                      David N. Kitner
                                      Texas Bar No. 11541500
                                      david.kitner@clarkhillstrasburger.com
                                      Jadd F. Masso
                                      Texas Bar No. 24041411
                                      jadd.masso@clarkhillstrasburger.com
                                      Chase J. Potter
                                      Texas Bar No. 24088245
                                      chase.potter@clarkhillstrasburger.com

                                      CLARK HILL STRASBURGER
                                      901 Main Street, Suite 6000
                                      Dallas, Texas 75202
                                      (214) 651-4300
                                      (214) 651-4330 (facsimile)

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118            36
                                        James D. Shields
                                        Texas Bar No. 18260400
                                        jshields@shieldslegal.com
                                        David A. Shields
                                        Texas Bar No. 24083838
                                        dshields@shieldslegal.com

                                        SHIELDS LEGAL GROUP
                                        16301 Quorum Drive, Suite 250B
                                        Addison, Texas 75001
                                        (972) 788-2040
                                        (972) 788-4332 (facsimile)

                                        Attorneys for Relator

                                       Certification

     I hereby certify that I have reviewed this petition and have con-
cluded that every factual statement made in the petition is supported
by competent evidence included in the appendix or the record.

                                        /s/ Jadd F. Masso
                                        Jadd F. Masso

                                 Certificate Of Compliance

    In accordance with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4, I hereby certify that this
document contains 4,995 words.

                                        /s/ Jadd F. Masso
                                        Jadd F. Masso

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118              37
                                 Certificate of Service

     I hereby certify that this document has been served on the follow-
ing via electronic service through the eFileTexas.gov electronic filing
system on June 4, 2018:

         Mark E. Torian
         mtorian@swtriallaw.com
         Darren P. Nicholson
         dnicholson@swtriallaw.com

         Sayles Werbner, P.C.
         4400 Renaissance Tower
         1201 Elm Street
         Dallas, Texas 75270

                                      /s/ Jadd F. Masso
                                      Jadd F. Masso

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118            38
                                 Declaration Regarding Evidence

STATE OF TEXAS                               §
                                             §
COUNTY OF DALLAS                             §

     My name is Chase J. Potter. My date of birth is May 12, 1986. My
address is 901 Main Street, Suite 6000, Dallas, Texas 75202.

         I hereby declare under penalty of perjury as follows:

      1.  I am over eighteen years of age and am fully competent to
make this declaration. I am an attorney licensed by the Supreme Court
of Texas and am counsel for Relator in this proceeding and the trial
court.

     2.   The factual statements contained within this declaration are
within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

      3.    The trial court rendered its order at issue in this Petition for
Writ of Mandamus based on the papers on file in this case and the ar-
guments of the attorneys. No testimony was received at any hearing
that led to the entry of the orders.

         Executed in Dallas County, Texas, on June 4, 2018.

                                                      /s/ Chase J. Potter
                                                      Chase J. Potter
                                                      Declarant

9997597.7/SP/38371/0105/060118                   39
                                     No. ___________________

                                      In the Court of Appeals
                                  Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

                                       In re JOHN CALCE
                                             Relator

  APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

         Date               Document                                   Record

  A. 6/26/16                Plaintiff’s Original Petition              001-023

  B. 11/22/17               John Calce’s First Amended Counterclaim    173-185
                            Against Centurion Logistics LLC and
                            Centurion Pecos Terminal LLC (excerpt)

  C. 11/22/17               John Calce’s Amended Motion for Partial    322-393
                            Summary Judgment Regarding
                            Counterclaim Against Centurion Logistics
                            LLC

  D. 5/2/18                 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition        867-903

  E. 5/21/18                Order Denying John Calce’s Amended         904-905
                            Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
                            Regarding Counterclaim Against Centurion
                            Logistics LLC

  F.                        Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 8.104

10000281.1/SP/38371/0105/060218
                                  Declaration of Chase J. Potter

STATE OF TEXAS                                §
                                              §
COUNTY OF DALLAS                              §

     My name is Chase J. Potter. My date of birth is May 12, 1986. My
address is 901 Main Street, Suite 6000, Dallas, Texas 75202.

         I hereby declare under penalty of perjury as follows:

      1.   I am over eighteen years of age and am fully competent to
make this declaration. I am an attorney licensed by the Supreme Court
of Texas and am counsel for Relator John Calce in this case.

     2.   The factual statements contained within this instrument are
within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

     3.    The copies of the pleadings, motions, and other documents
included in this Appendix to Petition for Writ of Mandamus are true
and correct copies of these documents as filed in the trial court.

         Executed in Dallas County, Texas, on June 4, 2018.

                                                   /s/ Chase J. Potter
                                                   Chase J. Potter
                                                   Declarant

10000281.1/SP/38371/0105/060118
                                                                                                               FILED
                                                                                                   DALLAS COUNTY
 7 CT-ATTY                                                                                     6/27/2016 11:01:53 AM
                                                                                                      FELICIA PITRE
                                                                                                    DISTRICT CLERK

                                           DC-16-07706                                        Freeney Anita
                                CAUSE NO. -

CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC,                     §               IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
individually and derivatively on behalf of   §
CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC,                §
a Texas Limited Liability Company,           §               DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
                                             §
                          Plaintiffs         §
                                             §
vs.                                          §
                                             §
JAMES BALLENGEE, BALLENGEE                   §
INTERESTS, LLC, JOHN CALCE,                  §
STAMPEDE TX ENERGY, LLC,                     §
CENTURION MIDSTREAM GROUP, LLC,              §
CENTURION TERMINALS, LLC                     §
                                             §
                          Defendants,        §           B-44TH
                                             §                      JUDICIAL DISTRICT
and CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL                 §
LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company       §
                                             §
                          Nominal Defendant. §

                              PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION

           Plaintiff Centurion Logistics LLC (“Centurion Logistics”) files this Original Petition

individually and derivatively on behalf of Centurion Pecos Terminals LLC (“Centurion Pecos”)

against James Ballengee (“Ballengee”), Ballengee Interests, LLC (“Ballengee Interests”), John

Calce (“Calce”), Stampede TX Energy, LLC (“Stampede”), Centurion Midstream Group, LLC

(“Centurion Midstream”), and Centurion Terminals, LLC (“Centurion Terminals”), bringing

claims directly and derivatively on behalf of Centurion Pecos LLC for: breach of fiduciary duty,

aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, money had and received (unjust enrichment),

fraudulent concealment, aiding and abetting fraudulent concealment, and declaratory judgment.

Accordingly, Plaintiff would respectfully show the Court as follows:

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                         Page 1 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                     MR.001
                                                   I.

                                 DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

           1.   Pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 190.1-190.6, Plaintiff hereby

 designates that discovery will be conducted under Level 3. Pursuant to Rule 47 of the Texas

 Rules of Civil Procedure, at this time, Plaintiffs seek monetary relief, exclusively in the form of

 interest, costs, and attorneys’ incurred or to be incurred in excess of $1,000,000.

                                                   II.

                                              PARTIES

           2.   Plaintiff Centurion Logistics is a Texas limited liability company, with its

principal office in Dallas, Texas. Centurion Logistics is a member and manager of Centurion

Pecos.      The members of Centurion Logistics are: Marc Marrocco (“Marrocco”), Antonio

Albanese (“Albanese”), and TXC Energy LLC, an affiliate of Calce.

           3.   Nominal Defendant Centurion Pecos is a Texas limited liability company, with its

principal office in Dallas, Texas. The current member and manager of Centurion Pecos is

Centurion Logistics. Stampede was a member and manager of Centurion Pecos until June 13,

2016. Centurion Pecos may be served through service on its registered agent, John Calce, at

15851 Dallas North Parkway, Suite 650, Addison, TX 75001.

           4.   Defendant Ballengee is an individual residing in Dallas County, Texas. He may

be personally served at 3838 Oak Lawn Avenue, Suite 1150, Dallas, Texas 75219 or wherever he

may be found. Ballengee is a member and manager of Defendant Ballengee Interests.

           5.   Defendant Ballengee Interests is a Louisiana limited liability company. Ballengee

is a managing member of Ballengee Interests. Ballengee Interests may be served by serving its

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                           Page 2 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                       MR.002
Texas registered agent, National Registered Agents, Inc., at 1999 Bryan St., Suite 900, Dallas,

Texas 75201.

           6.     Defendant Calce is an individual residing at 5601 Preakness Lane, Plano, TX

75093. He may be served at this residence or wherever he may be found. .

           7.     Defendant Stampede is a Texas limited liability company, with its principal place

of business in Dallas, Texas. Stampede was a manager and member of Centurion Pecos, but was

removed as a manager and member on June 13, 2016. Stampede may be served, by serving its

registered agent, Blumberg Excelsior Corporate Services, Inc., at 814 San Jacinto Boulevard,

Suite 303, Austin, TX 78701.

           8.     Defendant Centurion Midstream is a Texas limited liability company, formed on

October 20, 2015, with its principal place of business in Dallas County, Texas. Calce is the

manager of Centurion Midstream. Centurion Midstream may be served, by serving its registered

agent, John Calce, at 15851 Dallas North Parkway, Suite 650, Addison, TX 75001.

           9.     Defendant Centurion Terminals is a Texas limited liability company, with a

principal place of business in Dallas County, Texas. By information and belief, Centurion

Terminals is an entity controlled by Defendant Calce. The manager of Centurion Terminals is

58C, LLC, a Texas limited liability company, whose manager is LV III, LLC, whose manager is

Calce. 1 Centurion Terminals may be served, by serving its registered agent, John Calce, at

15851 Dallas North Parkway, Suite 650, Addison, TX 75001.

1
 The repeated use of the number 58 in these entities is evidence that they are the creation of Calce: Calce is very
proud of having lettered as an offensive lineman on a Football Championship Subdivision team, where his jersey
number was 58.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                                           Page 3 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                                       MR.003
                                                III.

                                 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

           10.   This Court has jurisdiction over this case because the amount in controversy is in

excess of the Court’s minimum jurisdictional limits. Moreover, Defendants have engaged in

sufficient conduct in the State of Texas to confer jurisdiction over them.         The Court has

jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because a substantial portion of the events

giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in Dallas County, Texas.

           11.   Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas, pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code Sections 15.002-15.007, because it is the county where all or a substantial part of

the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred as detailed in the following paragraphs.

                                                 IV.

                                     BACKGROUND FACTS

A.         Creation of Centurion Logistics and Centurion Pecos

           12.   Several years ago, Marrocco and Albanese were looking for ways to use their

expertise in real estate to invest in projects related to the booming oil and gas industry. During

their investigations, Marrocco became better acquainted with Calce, who worked in the oil and

gas industry, and whom Albanese happened to know from outside his business dealings. After

some investigation, Marrocco, Albanese and Calce decided to pursue a project to purchase real

estate and to develop a railway terminal for the shipping of crude oil. In order to pursue that

project, Marrocco, Albanese and Calce formed Centurion Logistics on September 16, 2013.

Centurion Logistics is manager-managed and its managers are Marrocco, Albanese and Calce.

Under the company agreement of Centurion Logistics, a majority of the managers are required to

take any action.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                          Page 4 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                      MR.004
           13    Calce concluded that the geology in the area surrounding Pecos, Texas made it

likely that there would be significant demand for a crude shipping terminal there. Albanese used

his connections to obtain the interest of a possible anchor tenant who might want to ship

hydraulic-fracturing sand through a terminal in that area, as a way to build Centurion Logistics’

credibility with oil companies and the railroad. Marrocco identified, and placed under contract,

an approximately 177-acre parcel in Reeves County, Texas (the “First Parcel”) to use for the

terminal, and obtained a contract for Centurion Logistics to purchase it.

           14.   In order to obtain funds to purchase the First Parcel, Calce, Marrocco and

Albanese discussed bringing an equity partner into the Pecos project to contribute cash. Calce

offered two potential investors from the oil and gas industry with whom he was acquainted.

Because Marrocco had already begun to hear rumors that Calce had a reputation for self-dealing,

Marrocco proposed that Centurion Logistics work with the investor to whom he believed Calce

had fewer ties, namely Ballengee. Additionally, Ballengee’s company was already trucking

crude oil in the vicinity. Centurion Logistics and a predecessor of Stampede (which was an

ostensibly unrelated entity Ballengee used as a conduit for his investment, in order to conceal

any activities that might appear to compete with his current business) formed Centurion Pecos,

on September 11, 2014, and Centurion Logistics assigned to Centurion Pecos the contract to

purchase the First Parcel.

           15.   Ballengee agreed to contribute cash to Centurion Pecos, in order to purchase the

First Parcel without any liens or encumbrances. Shortly before the closing of the sale of the First

Parcel, however, Ballengee announced to Centurion Logistics that he would not simply

contribute cash, as he had represented, but would require that Centurion Pecos grant a deed of

trust to Texas Capital Bank (“TCB”), to secure payment of the loan that Ballengee would use to

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                          Page 5 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                      MR.005
fund his contribution. Because Centurion Logistics had no other way to fund the purchase of the

First Parcel before the required closing date, and because the seller was already threatening to

sell to another purchaser, Centurion Logistics had no choice but to grant the deed of trust

Ballengee demanded, and the proceeds of the loan by TCB to Ballengee Interests were

contributed by Ballengee, through Stampede’s predecessor, and used to purchase the First Parcel

on September 19, 2014.

           16.   Centurion Logistics has since learned that Ballengee’s purpose in having

Centurion Pecos grant a deed of trust to TCB, was to create a mechanism by which Ballengee

could cause the property to be removed from Centurion Pecos through foreclosure; Ballengee

had more than adequate cash to fund the purchase of the First Parcel without taking a loan from

TCB.

           17.   Centurion Logistics determined that the terminal project could be expanded by

acquiring an approximately 300-acre parcel adjacent to the First Parcel (the “Second Parcel”).

Marrocco obtained a contract for an entity he controlled, in order to purchase the Second Parcel.

Marrocco was increasingly concerned about Calce’s reputation for underhandedness, and, as a

condition to assigning the purchase agreement to Centurion Pecos, insisted that Centurion

Logistics and Stampede amend and restate the company agreement of Centurion Pecos, in order

to remove Calce as the sole manager of Centurion Pecos, as of November, 2014.

           18.   Under the amended and restated company agreement of Centurion Pecos,

Centurion Logistics and Stampede were the members and managers of Centurion Pecos.

Centurion Pecos is manager-managed, and, under the amended and restated company agreement,

any action requires the consent of all managers.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                        Page 6 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                    MR.006
           19.   Again, at the closing of the Second Parcel, Ballengee insisted that Centurion

Pecos grant a deed of trust to the Second Parcel to TCB to secure a loan to Ballengee, rather than

fulfilling his representation to make a contribution of cash to purchase the Second Parcel without

liens or encumbrances. Again, Ballengee’s purpose, in causing Centurion Pecos to grant a deed

of trust, was to create a mechanism to remove the Second Parcel from Centurion Pecos. The

purchase of the Second Parcel closed on August 21, 2015. The First Parcel and the Second Parcel

are collectively referred to as the “Reeves County Property”.

           20.   Again, Ballengee did not provide the funds for the Second Parcel directly to

Centurion Pecos. Rather, he funneled the funds through Stampede because his participation in

the Centurion Pecos venture was circumscribed by a non-compete agreement related to one of

his previous businesses.

           21.   Both deeds of trust, granted at the closings of the Reeves County Property,

contain a cross-collateralization clause pledging the Reeves County Property as collateral for all

obligations of Ballengee Interests to TCB, even obligations not involving Centurion Pecos.

Purportedly, Calce signed both deeds of trust in his capacity as manager of Centurion Pecos,

although he was not a manager of Centurion Pecos at the time he signed the deed of trust to the

Second Parcel, and had no other authority to sign the second deed of trust for Centurion Pecos.

B.         Defendants’ Fraudulent Scheme Unfolds

           22.   In late 2015, Calce began communicating to Marrocco that Calce and Ballengee

wanted to bring other participants into the project, and wanted Marrocco and Albanese to take a

more passive role and a reduced share of the profits. In particular, Calce expressed a desire to

force Albanese out as a manager of Centurion Logistics, and to require Albanese to sell his

membership interest in Centurion Logistics for less than its fair value. Calce threatened that if

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                         Page 7 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                     MR.007
Marrocco did not cooperate in removing Albanese from Centurion Logistics, Calce and

Ballengee would conspire to exclude Marrocco from participation in the terminal project, as

well; namely by removing the Reeves County Property from Centurion Pecos through

foreclosure. Marrocco refused to participate in removing Albanese from Centurion Logistics.

Calce and Ballengee subsequently asked for a meeting with Marrocco to negotiate a fair price for

Marrocco’s interest in Centurion Logistics, but the proposal proved to be a ruse to trick

Marrocco into attending an uncalled meeting of the managers of Centurion Pecos to approve an

“assignment and assumption agreement” with Ballengee Interests. Marrocco refused to attend

the meeting.

           23.   The actions of Ballengee and Calce demonstrate a scheme to move the Reeves

County Property out of Centurion Pecos and into an entity in which Marrocco and Albanese have

no interest, in order to deprive Marrocco and Albanese of their interests in the terminal project.

In addition to his affiliation with Centurion Logistics, Calce is President of Centurion

Midstream, an entity unrelated to either Centurion Logistics or Centurion Pecos. Centurion

Midstream, or another entity affiliated with Calce, has attempted to negotiate directly with Union

Pacific Railroad (“Union Pacific”) for the establishment of rail service to the Reeves County

Property, initially holding itself out as owning or representing the owner of the property and,

after Centurion Logistics notified Union Pacific that Centurion Midstream had no affiliation with

Centurion Pecos, by telling Union Pacific that Marrocco and Centurion Logistics were no longer

involved in the project, and that Centurion Midstream would own the Reeves County Property

“within a few weeks.”      On its website, Centurion Midstream claims to own the property

purchased by Centurion Pecos and purports to be creating a terminal at Pecos, Texas. Calce, as

President of Centurion Midstream, receives a salary and other benefits.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                         Page 8 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                     MR.008
           24.   In furtherance of this scheme, Calce, Ballengee and/or Stampede have, in addition

to the deeds of trust executed at the closings of the Reeves County Property, created a number of

unauthorized and/or fraudulent documents purporting to pledge the Reeves County Property or

create obligations of Centurion Pecos. These unauthorized transactions and documents were not

only concealed from Plaintiff, but, on information and belief have been created recently and

backdated.

           25.   In a transaction unrelated to the purchase of the Reeves County Property,

Ballengee Interests granted a promissory note to TCB dated January 6, 2015 for a line of credit

in the amount of $750,000. In order to secure the note, Calce executed a deed of trust to the First

Parcel, purportedly on behalf of Centurion Pecos as its manager. The January 6, 2015 deed of

trust also contained a cross-collateralization clause pledging the First Parcel as collateral for all

obligations of Ballengee Interests to TCB, even obligations not involving Centurion Pecos.

Calce was not a manager of Centurion Pecos in January, 2015, and had no other authority to sign

the January 6, 2015 deed of trust. The proceeds of the line of credit were not used for any

purpose related to the business of Centurion Pecos. Upon information and belief, they were

largely used to fund a different terminal project in Brownsville, Texas, owned by Calce.

Centurion Logistics was unaware of the January 6, 2015 deed of trust, and only discovered it

during a record search of Reeves County conducted in May 2016.

           26.   In October, 2015, around the time Calce began expressing a desire to remove

Albanese from Centurion Logistics, and shortly after Centurion Midstream was formed,

Ballengee Interests extended the term of the note to TCB, and filed an extension of the deed of

trust on the First Parcel to secure the note. Again, that extension was signed by Calce, as

manager of Centurion Pecos, although he was not a manager of Centurion Pecos at the time, and

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                            Page 9 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                        MR.009
had no other authority to act on behalf of Centurion Pecos. Centurion Logistics and Centurion

Pecos were not aware of the extension of the deed of trust on the First Parcel, and only

discovered it during a record search of Reeves County conducted in May 2016. Ballengee’s and

Calce’s purpose in extending the deed of trust was to preserve the Ballengee Interests note as a

means to remove the First Parcel from Centurion Pecos.

           27.   In April 2016, without authority to act for Centurion Pecos, Stampede and Calce

created documents that purported to obligate Centurion Pecos to assume Ballengee Interests’

obligations under the notes from Ballengee Interests to TCB used to obtain the funds contributed

to purchase the Reeves County Property, and to grant Ballengee Interests a deed of trust to

secure the assumption. Centurion Pecos was unaware of these documents or the purported

unauthorized assumption until it received a “notice of default” dated April 28, 2016 from

Ballengee Interests for its purported failure to make interest payments under the assumption

agreement. Neither Centurion Pecos nor Centurion Logistics has ever been provided with copies

of the purported assumption agreement and deed of trust.

           28.   In addition, Calce created a note, dated on or about November 15, 2015,

purporting to obligate Centurion Pecos to make payments to Centurion Terminals, another entity

controlled by Calce. Centurion Pecos first learned of this note in a demand letter dated May 27,

2016. No note of this description was ever authorized by Centurion Pecos, and neither Centurion

Logistics nor Centurion Pecos has ever seen this purported note.

           29.   Ballengee Interests and Calce also created fraudulent notes by Centurion Pecos to

Ballengee Interests, dated September 16, 2014 and August 17, 2015. Centurion Pecos first

learned of these notes in demand letters dated May 25, 2016. Neither Centurion Logistics nor

Centurion Pecos has ever seen these purported notes.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                        Page 10 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                     MR.010
           30.   In furtherance of their scheme, Defendants are now threatening to use the

unauthorized and fraudulent documents to foreclose on the Reeves County Property. Centurion

Pecos has received letters from Ballengee Interests and Centurion Terminals demanding payment

of purported obligations that Centurion Pecos never, in fact, agreed to assume.

C.         Stampede’s Violations of the Company Agreement

           31.   Section 10 of the First Amended and Restated Company Agreement of Centurion

Pecos Terminal LLC (“Company Agreement”) sets forth the conditions under which a member

may transfer its membership interest. Section 10.4 states that a transfer shall not be permitted

unless:

                 [t]he transferor and transferee have delivered to the Company any
                 documents that the Board of Managers request to confirm that the
                 transfer satisfies the requirements of this Agreement to give effect
                 to the transfer, and to confirm the transferee’s agreement to be
                 bound by this Agreement as Assignee.

           32.   Pursuant to Section 10.1(a) of the Company Agreement, “transfer” includes “a

transfer by merger or other business combination.” Stampede’s predecessor, Stampede Energy,

LLC, a Louisiana limited liability company (“Stampede Louisiana”) was a member of Centurion

Pecos at the time that the Company Agreement was adopted. On January 20, 2016, Stampede

Louisiana was converted to Stampede. Stampede then engaged in mergers with Stampede

Energy, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company on March 2, 2016, and with Centurion

Brownsville Terminal, LLC, a Texas limited liability company, on February 4, 2016.

           33.   On April 30, 2016 and again on May 4, 2016, Centurion Logistics expressly

requested that Stampede and Centurion Brownsville Terminal, LLC provide the information

required by Section 10.4 of the Company Agreement. Stampede and Centurion Brownsville

Terminal, LLC failed and refused to provide the information required by the Company

Agreement.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                           Page 11 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                        MR.011
D.         Centurion Pecos Votes to Expel Stampede as Member and Manager

           34.   In order to address Stampede’s violations of the Company Agreement, Centurion

Logistics, on behalf of Centurion Pecos, on May 31, 2016, called a meeting of managers and

members of Centurion Pecos, which was held on June 13, 2016. At the meeting, Centurion

Logistics moved to remove Stampede as a member of Centurion Pecos based on Stampede’s

prohibited transfer of its membership interest. Because the motion involved removing Stampede

as a member, Stampede was an interested manager and not eligible to vote. Centurion Logistics,

the only manager eligible to vote on the motion, voted to remove Stampede as a member.

           35.   Subsequently, a meeting of the members of Centurion Pecos met to determine

whether Stampede should be removed as a manager because it had transferred its membership

interest in a prohibited transfer and engaged in other wrongful conduct that materially affected

the business of Centurion Pecos and its members, and had also engaged in conduct that had made

it not reasonably practicable to carry on the company business with Stampede. Centurion

Logistics, the only remaining member, voted to remove Stampede as a manager of Centurion

Pecos.

                                                  V.

                                      CAUSES OF ACTION

A.         First Cause of Action: Breach of Fiduciary Duty as to Calce

           36.   Plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in

the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                           Page 12 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                        MR.012
           37.   As a manager of Centurion Logistics, Calce had a duty of loyalty to the company.

The duty of loyalty requires Calce to act in good faith and not allow personal interests to take

precedence over the interests of Centurion Logistics.

           38.   Calce also had a duty to disclose all important information concerning any

transaction, including any matters that might influence them to act in a manner prejudicial to

Centurion Logistics.

           39.   In violation of his fiduciary duties, Calce colluded with Stampede, Ballengee and

Ballengee Interests to engage in a series of fraudulent transactions which were contrary to the

interests of Centurion Pecos and Centurion Logistics. This pattern of misconduct is intended to

further Defendants’ plan, namely, to remove the Reeves County Property from Centurion Pecos

for use in their competing development, and to deprive Centurion Logistics of its share of any

profits from the terminal project. The entire scheme is an egregious breach of Calce’s duty of

loyalty and full disclosure.

           40.   By secretly encumbering Centurion Pecos’ assets, Calce has damaged the ability

of Centurion Logistics to conduct business and impaired the value of those assets.

           41.   Calce’s breaches of fiduciary duty proximately caused Centurion Logistics to

suffered damage and Calce has obtained benefits, which Calce should be required to forfeit. The

benefits Calce should be required to forfeit also include any remuneration he has received from

Centurion Midstream.

           42.   Calce’s breaches of fiduciary duty were intentional and, accordingly, Centurion

Logistics seeks, and should recover, exemplary damages against Calce.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                        Page 13 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                     MR.013
B.         Second Cause of Action: Breach of Fiduciary Duty as to Stampede

           43.   Plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in

the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

           44,   As a manager of Centurion Pecos, Stampede owed Centurion Pecos a duty of

loyalty. Further, Stampede owed Centurion Pecos a duty of candor, including a duty to disclose

information concerning its role in any transaction that would prejudice the interests of Centurion

Pecos.

           45.   Stampede violated its fiduciary duty by covertly engaging in a pattern of

transactions designed to deprive Centurion Pecos of the Reeves County Property, as well as

Centurion Pecos’ interest in the terminal project.

           46.   By secretly encumbering Centurion Pecos’ assets, Stampede has damaged the

ability of Centurion Pecos to conduct business and has impaired the value of those assets.

           47.   Stampede’s breaches of fiduciary duty have proximately caused Centurion Pecos

to suffer damage and Stampede has obtained benefits which Stampede should be required to

forfeit.

           48.   Stampede’s breaches of fiduciary duty were intentional and, accordingly,

Centurion Pecos seeks, and should recover, exemplary damages against Stampede.

C.         Third Cause of Action: Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty

           49.   Plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in

the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

           50.   Centurion Midstream and Centurion Terminals assisted with, encouraged and

participated in breaches of fiduciary duty by Calce and Stampede. As set forth above, Calce and

Stampede had fiduciary duties of loyalty to Centurion Logistics and to Centurion Pecos and

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                           Page 14 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                        MR.014
fiduciary duties to disclose any transactions that would be prejudicial to the chief objectives of

Centurion Logistics and Centurion Pecos.

           51.   Centurion Logistics and Centurion Pecos were created chiefly to purchase the

Reeves County Property and to develop a railway terminal in order to transport petroleum and

petroleum products. Rather than pursue these objectives with loyalty fiduciaries owe, Calce

assisted in the creation of Centurion Midstream to thwart the efforts of Centurion Logistics and

Centurion Pecos and to compete with these companies. Based on the content of the Centurion

Midstream website, Centurion Midstream is covertly assisting Calce in his plan to take over the

Reeves County Property, and to build the railway terminal for his own benefit and for the benefit

of Centurion Midstream.

           52.   Based on its affiliation with Calce, Centurion Terminals was aware that Calce was

not authorized to undertake any obligation to Centurion Terminals on behalf of Centurion Pecos.

Nonetheless, Centurion Terminals entered into the note and has threatened to enforce it.

           53.   The breaches of fiduciary duty of Calce and Stampede, committed with the

assistance of Centurion Midstream and Centurion Terminals, proximately caused Plaintiff to

suffer actual damages in an amount exceeding the minimum jurisdiction of the Court.

           54.   As Centurion Midstream’s and Centurion Terminals’ participation in the breaches

of fiduciary duty were intentional and exemplary damages are recoverable for the breaches of

fiduciary duty, Plaintiff prays for exemplary damages against Centurion Midstream and

Centurion Terminals.

D.         Fourth Cause of Action: Money Had and Received (Unjust Enrichment)

           55.   Plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in

the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                           Page 15 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                        MR.015
           56.   A claim for money had and received arises when the defendant obtains money or

a benefit that in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff. It is an equitable doctrine

applied to prevent unjust enrichment. A cause of action for money had and received is not based

on wrongdoing but, instead, looks only to the justice of the case and inquires whether the

defendant has received money that rightfully belongs to another. A claim for money had and

received is based upon the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

           57.   Further, where a defendant obtains a benefit from the plaintiff by fraud, duress, or

taking undue advantage, the plaintiff may recover money or property under the theory of unjust

enrichment.

           58.   Ballengee and Ballengee Interests colluded with Calce to encumber property of

Centurion Pecos to secure debts of Ballengee Interests, including the notes to purchase the

Reeves County Property and the $750,000 line of credit.

           59.   Ballengee and Ballengee Interests have, therefore, been unjustly enriched by

pledges of property to secure Ballengee Interests’ debt, including the $750,000 line of credit, and

unauthorized assumption of the Ballengee Interests’ obligations to TCB. Indeed, pursuant to the

cross-collateralization clauses, the deeds of trust pledged the Reeves County Property to secure

all Ballengee Interests’ debts to TCB, not merely those related to Centurion Pecos. Defendants

Ballengee and Ballengee Interests should be required to disgorge and to turn over to Centurion

Pecos any benefits obtained through these transactions.

           60.   By information and belief, Calce has received a salary and other benefits from

Centurion Midstream, in exchange for effectuating his and Ballengee’s plan, namely, to

fraudulently obtain ownership of the Reeves County Property. This remuneration constitutes

unjust enrichment.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                           Page 16 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                        MR.016
           61.   Centurion Midstream has developed, or plans to develop, a railway terminal in

competition with the terminal planned by Centurion Pecos. In so doing, Centurion Midstream,

through its aiding and abetting of breaches of fiduciary duty, has obtained, or will obtain in the

future, money that rightfully belongs to Centurion Pecos. These funds should be disgorged and

transferred to Centurion Pecos.

           62.   Centurion Midstream has been—and will be—unjustly enriched by its

interference with Plaintiff’s efforts to secure the Reeves County Property and develop the Pecos

terminal.

           63.   In obtaining these benefits, Defendants have acted with fraud and malice.

Accordingly, Plaintiff prays that these Defendants be found liable for exemplary damages.

E.         Fourth Cause of Action: Fraudulent Concealment

           64.   Plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in

the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

           65.   Ballengee and Ballengee Interests represented to Centurion Pecos that it would

make a capital contribution by purchasing the Reeves County Property on behalf of Centurion

Pecos. At the 11th hour, Ballengee and Ballengee Interests demanded that Centurion Pecos agree

to deeds of trust on the Reeves County Property. Ballengee and Ballengee Interests did not

disclose that the purpose of this demand was to eventually force a foreclosure on the Reeves

County Property in order to cut off Centurion Pecos’ interest in the terminal project.

           66.   Centurion Pecos justifiably relied on Ballengee’s and Ballengee Interests’

professions that their purpose was to invest in, and to promote, the Centurion Pecos terminal

project.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                            Page 17 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                         MR.017
           67.   Ballengee’s and Ballengee Interests’ failure to disclose their true intentions has

injured Centurion Logistics and Centurion Pecos, in that Defendants are now attempting to use

the TCB deeds of trust, as well as false and unauthorized documents, to complete their scheme to

obtain the Reeves County Property for the competing entity, Centurion Midstream.

           68.   The wrongful fraudulent acts and omissions have proximately caused Centurion

Logistics and Centurion Pecos to suffer damages. Because Defendants’ wrongful fraudulent acts

and omissions were conducted with intent, Plaintiff seeks both actual and exemplary damages.

F.         Fifth Cause of Action: Aiding and Abetting Fraudulent Concealment

           69.   Plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in

the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

           70.   Defendants Calce and Stampede provided knowing and intentional assistance to

the fraud committed by Ballengee and Ballengee Interests. Calce and Stampede were aware of

the fraudulent scheme and Stampede allowed itself to be used as a conduit through which

Ballengee Interests made its payments for the Reeves County Property. As fiduciaries, Calce

and Stampede had a heightened duty to disclose Ballengee’s true intent, but they remained silent.

Indeed, they actively furthered the scheme through their participation in the creation of false and

unauthorized transactions and the creation of fraudulent documents.

           71.   Calce’s and Stampede’s assistance and encouragement constituted a substantial

factor in causing the fraud.      Without their participation, it is unlikely that Ballengee and

Ballengee Interests could have attempted the scheme, given the limitations imposed on

Ballengee by the non-compete agreement. Moreover, these Defendants, through a series of

threatening communications, continue to push the fraudulent plan.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                           Page 18 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                        MR.018
           72.   Calce’s and Stampede’s participation in the fraudulent scheme has proximately

caused Centurion Logistics and Centurion Pecos to suffer damages. Because these Defendants’

participation in the wrongful fraudulent scheme was conducted with knowledge and intent,

Plaintiff seeks both actual and exemplary damages.

G.         Sixth Cause of Action: Declaratory Judgment

           73.   Plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in

the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

           74.   A justiciable controversy exists between Centurion Pecos and Stampede regarding

the status, rights, obligations and legal relations between Centurion Pecos and Stampede in

connection with the Company Agreement. The justiciable controversy concerns the right of

members and managers of Centurion Pecos to expel Stampede as a member and manager.

           75.   Pursuant to the terms of the Company Agreement, transfer of membership

interests is prohibited unless certain conditions were met.         Among the conditions is the

obligation of the transferor and transferee to provide information to assure that the transfer

comported with the Company Agreement and the transferee agreed to be bound by the Company

Agreement. Transfer of a membership interest includes any transfer by merger or business

combination.

           76.   Stampede or its predecessor transferred of its membership interest within the

definitions of the Company Agreement through one or more of three business transactions. First,

Stampede Energy, LLC, a Louisiana limited liability company, converted to Stampede. Second,

Stampede merged with Stampede Energy, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company. Third,

Stampede divided into two entities, Stampede and Centurion Brownsville Terminal, LLC, a

Texas limited liability company.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                           Page 19 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                        MR.019
           77.   Subsequently, both the transferor and transferee companies expressly refused to

provide information about the transactions, as required by the Company Agreement, for any

transfer of a membership interest to be permitted. Centurion Pecos duly called a meeting of the

managers and members of Centurion Pecos in order to discuss Stampede’s violations and its

removal as a member and manager.

           78.   At the June 13, 2016 meeting, Centurion Logistics, as manager of Centurion

Pecos, voted to remove Stampede as a member of Centurion Pecos. As the party whose removal

was at issue, Stampede was an interested manager excluded from voting.               Accordingly,

Stampede was removed as a member of Centurion Pecos.

           79.   Following the June 13, 2016 managers meeting, a meeting of members was held

to determine whether Stampede should be removed as a manager of Centurion Pecos for cause.

Centurion Logistics, the only remaining member, voted to expel Stampede, based on its

prohibited transfer of membership interest, as well as its other misconduct, as set forth in this

Petition.

           80.   In accordance with Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.001, et seq., Plaintiff seeks

a declaratory judgment against Defendant Stampede, wherein the Court declares that following:

           (a)   The June 13, 2016 meeting was a valid meeting under the Company
                 Agreement;

           (b)   The removal of Stampede as a member of Centurion Pecos was a valid,
                 binding and enforceable action of the managers of Centurion Pecos;

           (c)   The removal of Stampede as a manager of Centurion Pecos was a valid,
                 binding and enforceable action of the members of Centurion Pecos.

           81.   In addition, there is a real and justiciable controversy between Centurion Pecos,

on the one hand, and Ballengee, Ballengee Interests, and Centurion Terminals, on the other hand,

concerning the enforceability of certain financial obligations that Defendants purport were

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                        Page 20 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                     MR.020
entered into on behalf of Centurion Pecos. As set forth above, Calce, without authority to act for

Centurion Pecos, and in violation of his fiduciary duties, created documents purporting to

obligate Centurion Pecos to pay the notes that Ballengee Interests entered into with TCB and to

make other payments to Ballengee Interests. Similarly, Calce, again without the authority to act

for Centurion Pecos, and in violation of his fiduciary duties, apparently created a promissory

note in favor of Centurion Terminals, purportedly obligating Centurion Pecos to make certain

payments to Centurion Terminals.

           82.   In accordance with Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.001, et seq., Plaintiff seeks

a declaratory judgment against Defendants Ballengee, Ballengee Interests, and Centurion

Terminals, wherein the Court declares the following:

           (a)   Any assumption agreement purported to exist between Ballengee
                 Interests and Centurion Pecos is invalid, void and unenforceable;

           (b)   Any agreement that purports to create an obligation of Centurion Pecos to
                 Ballengee Interests is invalid, void and unenforceable;

           (c)   Any promissory note or other documents purported to create obligations
                 between Centurion Pecos to Centurion Terminals is invalid, void and
                 unenforceable.

           83.   In addition and cumulative of other relief sought herein, Plaintiff is entitled to

declaratory judgment concerning the status of Stampede under the Company Agreement and the

enforceability of certain financial obligations that Calce, without authority, and in violation of

his fiduciary duties, purported to create on behalf of Centurion Pecos.

                                               VI.

                               ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

           84.   Plaintiff hereby restates and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in

the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                           Page 21 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                        MR.021
           85.   As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff was forced to retain the legal counsel

of Shamoun & Norman, LLP (“S&N”) to bring this lawsuit. Plaintiff retained the services of

S&N to prosecute these claims and agreed to pay S&N its usual, customary and reasonable

attorneys’ fees. Such action and payment is necessary for the enforcement of Plaintiff’s rights.

           86.   Plaintiff seeks the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs that it incurs in

prosecuting the above-stated claims pursuant to Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code, or any other applicable law.

                                                 VII.

                                  CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

           87.   All conditions precedent to Plaintiff’s right to obtain the relief requested herein

have been performed or have occurred.

                                                VIII.

                                              PRAYER

           WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Centurion Logistics LLC, individually and on behalf of

Centurion Pecos Terminal LLC, respectfully requests that upon final trial of this cause the Court

enter judgment against James Ballengee, Ballengee Interests, LLC, John Calce, Stampede TX

Energy, LLC, Centurion Midstream Group, LLC and Centurion Terminals, LLC as follows:

           A.    Against all Defendants and in favor of Plaintiff for the amount of actual damages

sustained by Plaintiff;

           B.    Against all Defendants and in favor of Plaintiff for the disgorgement of unjust

enrichment and money had and received;

           C.    Entering a declaratory judgment concerning the status of Stampede under the

Company Agreement and the enforceability of certain financial obligations that Calce, without

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                           Page 22 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                        MR.022
authority, and in violation of his fiduciary duties, purported to enter into on behalf of Centurion

Pecos;

           D.   Awarding to Plaintiff the costs and disbursements of the action, including

reasonable attorneys’ fees, accountants’ and experts’ fees, costs, and expenses; and

        E.      Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper, at law
or in equity.

                                                     Respectfully Submitted,

                                                             /s/ C. Gregory Shamoun
                                                     C. GREGORY SHAMOUN
                                                     State Bar No. 18089650
                                                     J. BLAIR NORRIS
                                                     State Bar No. 24014515
                                                     SHAMOUN & NORMAN, LLP
                                                     1755 Wittington Place, Suite 200
                                                     Dallas, Texas 75234
                                                     Phone: (214) 987-1745
                                                     Fax: (214) 521-9033
                                                     Email: g@snlegal.com
                                                     Email: bn@snlegal.com

                                                     ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION                                                          Page 23 of 23
307338_1

                                                                                                       MR.023
                                                                                                                 FILED
                                                                                                     DALLAS COUNTY
                                                                                                    11/22/2017 1:55 PM
                                                                                                        FELICIA PITRE
                                                                                                     DISTRICT CLERK

                                                                                             Marissa Pittman
                                        CAUSE NO. DC-16-07706

CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC,                               §      IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
individually and derivatively on behalf of             §
CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC,                          §
a Texas Limited Liability Company,                     §
                                                       §
           Plaintiffs,                                 §
                                                       §
v.                                                     §
                                                       §
JAMES BALLENGEE, BALLENGEE                             §
INTERESTS, LLC, JOHN CALCE,                            §      DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
STAMPEDE TX ENERGY, LLC,                               §
CENTURION MIDSTREAM GROUP,                             §
LLC, CENTURION TERMINALS, LLC                          §
                                                       §
           Defendants,                                 §
                                                       §
and CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL                           §
LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company                 §
                                                       §
           Nominal Defendant.                          §      44th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

          DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED
             COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND
                      CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC

           John Calce (“Counter-Plaintiff” or “Calce”) files his First Amended Counterclaim

complaining of Centurion Logistics LLC (“Centurion Logistics”) and Centurion Pecos Terminal

LLC (“Centurion Pecos”) (collectively, “Counter-Defendants”) and, in support thereof, would

respectfully show the Court as follows:

                                                 I.
                                          DISCOVERY LEVEL

           1.         Discovery in this matter is to be conducted under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure

190.4 (Level 3).

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                              PAGE 1
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                        MR.173
                                                 II.
                                           MONETARY RELIEF

           2.         Calce seeks both monetary and non-monetary relief. The monetary relief sought

by Calce is, at this time, over $100,000 but not more than $200,000. But the monetary relief

sought by Calce continues to increase as he is required to incur additional expenses in defending

himself against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit.

                                                    III.
                                                  PARTIES

           3.         Plaintiff Calce is an individual residing in Collin County, Texas.

           4.         Counter-Defendant Centurion Logistics is a limited liability company organized

under the laws of the State of Texas with its principal place of business in Dallas, Dallas County,

Texas. Centurion Logistics has made an appearance in this matter.

           5.         Counter-Defendant Centurion Pecos is a limited liability company organized

under the laws of the State of Texas with its principal place of business in Dallas, Dallas County,

Texas. Centurion Pecos has made an appearance in this matter through Centurion Logistics

bringing claims against Calce and the other Defendants derivatively on behalf of Centurion

Pecos.

                                                 IV.
                                       JURISDICTION AND VENUE

           6.         This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the amount in controversy

exceeds the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court.

           7.         Calce asserts that Dallas County is not a proper venue for this lawsuit pursuant to

Section 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The bases for such assertion are

set forth in Calce’s Motion to Transfer Venue. The Motion to Transfer Venue has been denied

and is an interlocutory order.

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                                  PAGE 2
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                            MR.174
                                                V.
                                       FACTUAL BACKGROUND

           8.         On June 27, 2016, Centurion Logistics, individually and derivatively on behalf of

Centurion Pecos, filed its Original Petition complaining of Calce and the other Defendants.

Centurion Logistics has brought claims against Calce for (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) unjust

enrichment; and (3) aiding and abetting fraudulent concealment.

           9.         Plaintiff generally claims that Calce and the other Defendants carried out a

scheme that resulted in Centurion Pecos and Centurion Logistics losing their interest in the

Reeves County Property, thereby allegedly depriving such entities of the opportunity to construct

a railway terminal for the shipping of crude oil on the Reeves County Property. 1 Among other

things, Plaintiff alleges that Calce breached the fiduciary duties that he allegedly owed Centurion

Logistics as a manager of the company. See Pl.’s Orig. Pet. ¶¶ 36 – 42. Plaintiff further claims

that Calce took various allegedly unauthorized acts on behalf of Centurion Pecos. See id. ¶ 24.

           10.        On September 20, 2016, Calce filed his Motion to Transfer Venue and Brief in

Support Thereof and, Subject Thereto, Original Answer (the “Original Answer”). Since the time

of filing his Original Answer, Calce has incurred significant expenses in defending against the

claims that have been brought against him in the lawsuit.

CALCE’S RIGHT TO INDEMNIFICATION/IMMEDIATE REIMBURSEMENT                         OF   EXPENSES   FROM
CENTURION LOGISTICS

           11.        Calce is a manager of Centurion Logistics.        Section 1.1 of the Company

Agreement of Centurion Logistics (the “Logistics Agreement”) defines an “Indemnified Person”

as follows:

1
 The term “Reeves County Property,” when used herein, should be understood to have the same meaning
as the term is used and defined in Plaintiff’s Original Petition.

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                                 PAGE 3
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                          MR.175
           “Indemnified Person” means (a) a Member or Assignee; (b) a Manager; (c) a
           Liquidator (if any); (d) any Affiliate of the Company, a Member or Assignee, a
           Manager, or a Liquidator; and (e) any governing person, officer, employee, agent,
           or owner of the Company, a Member or Assignee, a Manager, a Liquidator, or
           any Affiliate of any of the foregoing. A person is an Indemnified Person whether
           or not such person has the status required to be an Indemnified Person at the time
           any Proceeding is made or maintained as described in Article VI or at the time
           any amendment to this Agreement is proposed under Section 15.1.

See Section 1.1 of the Logistics Agreement (emphasis added). A true and correct copy of the

Logistics Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Calce, as a manager of the company, is

therefore an “Indemnified Person” under the Agreement. See id.

           12.        Section 6.2 of the Logistics Agreement is entitled “Indemnification by Company”

and provides as follows:

           To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, and subject to Section 6.3,
           [Centurion Logistics] indemnifies and holds harmless each Indemnified Person
           from and against any Damages arising from any Proceeding relating to the
           conduct of [Centurion Logistics’] business or to any act or omission by such
           Indemnified Person within the scope of the Indemnified Person’s authority in the
           course of [Centurion Logistics’] business or for any misconduct or negligence on
           the part of any other person that is an employee or agent of [Centurion Logistics].
           An Indemnified Person’s expenses paid or incurred in defending itself against
           any Proceeding shall be reimbursed as paid or incurred. The right to
           indemnification conferred in this Article VI is not exclusive of any other right that
           any person may have or hereafter acquire under any statute, agreement, vote of
           Members, or otherwise.

See Ex. A § 6.2 (emphasis added).              Accordingly, pursuant to Section 6.2, Calce—as an

Indemnified Person—is entitled to immediate reimbursement of “expenses paid or incurred in

defending [himself] against any Proceeding.” See id.

           13.        Section 1.1 of the Agreement defines “Proceeding” as follows: “(a) any

threatened, pending, or completed action or other proceeding, whether civil, criminal,

administrative, arbitrative, or investigative; (b) an appeal of any such proceeding, and (c) any

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                                   PAGE 4
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                            MR.176
inquiry or investigation that could lead to any such proceeding.” See Ex. A § 1.1. This Lawsuit

clearly constitutes a “Proceeding” under the Logistics Agreement.

           14.        Under the terms of the Logistics Agreement, Centurion Logistics is required to

reimburse Calce for any and all expenses paid or incurred by Calce in defending himself in this

lawsuit—as such expenses are paid or incurred. If it is ultimately determined that Calce is not

entitled to such payments, the Logistics Agreement expressly provides Centurion Logistics with

an appropriate remedy. See Ex. A § 6.3(c) (providing that “[a]ny payments made to or on behalf

of a person who is later determined not to be entitled to such payments shall be repaid by the

person to [Centurion Logistics].”).

CENTURION LOGISTICS’ REFUSAL TO REIMBURSE CALCE’S DEFENSE COSTS

           15.        On August 22, 2017, Calce—through his counsel—requested that Centurion

Logistics, pursuant to Section 6.2 of the Agreement, (1) reimburse Calce the full amount of

expenses that he had been invoiced as of July 31, 2017, plus an additional $50,000 to be applied

to future expenses as they are incurred; and (2) agree to reimburse Calce the additional expenses,

in excess of such $50,000 advancement, that he pays or incurs in his defense of the Lawsuit as

such expenses are paid or incurred (referred to hereinafter as the “Reimbursement Request”).

           16.        The Reimbursement Request provides that, “[p]ursuant to Section 6.3 of the

Agreement, Mr. Calce hereby affirms that it is his good faith belief that he has met the standard

of conduct necessary for indemnification under Section 6.3.” The Reimbursement Request also

provides that “Mr. Calce further agrees to repay any amount that is paid or reimbursed by

Centurion Logistics, pursuant to Section 6.2, if it is determined by a court of competent

jurisdiction that Mr. Calce did not meet the aforementioned standard or if indemnification is

otherwise determined to be prohibited by law.”

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                             PAGE 5
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                       MR.177
           17.        Centurion Logistics denied Calce’s request for reimbursement.       To date,

Centurion Logistics has not reimbursed Calce any amount for the expenses he has paid and

incurred in defending himself against the claims brought against him in the Lawsuit.

CALCE’S RIGHT TO INDEMNIFICATION/IMMEDIATE REIMBURSEMENT                     OF   EXPENSES     FROM
CENTURION PECOS

           18.        When Centurion Pecos was initially formed, Calce was the sole manager of the

company. See the Company Agreement of Centurion Pecos (the “Pecos Original Agreement”),

which is dated effective September 12, 2014, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto

as Exhibit B. Calce was also appointed as the president of Centurion Pecos. Such appointment

was effective as of September 11, 2014.

           19.        In November 2014, the First Amended and Restated Company Agreement of

Centurion Pecos (the “Pecos Amended Agreement”) was executed. A true and correct copy of

the Pecos Amended Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit C. The First Amended and Restated

Company Agreement removed Calce as a manager of Centurion Pecos, but Calce remained the

duly appointed president of the company.

           20.        Section 1.1 of both the Pecos Original Agreement and the Pecos Amended

Agreement defines an “Indemnified Person” as follows:

           “Indemnified Person” means (a) a Member or Assignee; (b) a Manager; (c) a
           Liquidator (if any); (d) any Affiliate of the Company, a Member or Assignee, a
           Manager, or a Liquidator; and (e) any governing person, officer, employee,
           agent, or owner of the [Centurion Pecos], a Member or Assignee, a Manager, a
           Liquidator, or any Affiliate of any of the foregoing. A person is an Indemnified
           Person whether or not such person has the status required to be an Indemnified
           Person at the time any Proceeding is made or maintained as described in Article
           VI or at the time any amendment to this Agreement is proposed under Section
           15.1, provided such person had the status required to be an Indemnified Person at
           the time of the relevant actions referenced in the Proceeding.

See Ex. B § 1.1 (emphasis added); see also Ex. C § 1.1 (emphasis added).

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                               PAGE 6
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                        MR.178
           21.        Moreover, Section 6.2 of both the Pecos Original Agreement and the Pecos

Amended Agreement is entitled “Indemnification by Company” and provides as follows:

           To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law and subject to Section 6.3,
           [Centurion Pecos] indemnifies and holds harmless each Indemnified Person from
           and against any Damages arising from any Proceeding relating to the conduct of
           [Centurion Pecos’] business or to any act or omission by such Indemnified
           Person, including any act or omission constituting negligence, within the scope of
           the Indemnified Person’s authority in the course of [Centurion Pecos’] business or
           for any misconduct or negligence on the part of any other person that is an
           employee or agent of [Centurion Pecos]. An Indemnified Person’s expenses
           paid or incurred in defending itself against any Proceeding shall be reimbursed
           as paid or incurred. The right to indemnification conferred in this Article VI is
           not exclusive of any other right that any person may have or hereafter acquire
           under any statute, vote of Members, or otherwise.

See Ex. B § 6.2 (emphasis added); see also Ex. C § 6.2 (emphasis added).

           22.        Like the Logistics Agreement, the terms of the Pecos Original Agreement and the

Pecos Amended Agreement require Centurion Pecos to reimburse Calce for any and all expenses

paid or incurred by Calce in defending himself in this lawsuit, as such expenses are paid or

incurred. Furthermore, also like the Logistics Agreement, both the Pecos Original Agreement

and the Pecos Amended Agreement provide Centurion Pecos with an adequate remedy if it is

ultimately determined that Calce is not entitled to such payments. See Exs. B and C § 6.3(c)

(providing that “[a]ny payments made to or on behalf of a person who is later determined not to

be entitled to such payments shall be repaid by the person to [Centurion Pecos].”).

           23.        To date, Centurion Pecos has not reimbursed Calce any amount for the expenses

that he has paid and incurred in defending himself against the claims brought against him in this

lawsuit.

           24.        The Pecos Amended Agreement identifies Centurion Logistics and Defendant

Stampede TX Energy, LLC (“Stampede”) as the only members of Centurion Pecos. Pursuant to

the Pecos Amended Agreement, Stampede is the majority-in-interest member holding a 60%

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                                PAGE 7
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                         MR.179
membership interest in Centurion Pecos, and Centurion Logistics holds the remaining 40%

membership interest.

           25.        Stampede—on behalf of Centurion Pecos—has already agreed that Centurion

Pecos will reimburse Calce for the amount of expenses that he has paid or incurred (or will pay

and incur) in defending himself against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit. But

Centurion Logistics claims that Stampede was removed as a manager of Centurion Pecos on June

13, 2016. Stampede disputes the propriety of the alleged removal and does not recognize same.

Accordingly, Calce’s claim for contractual indemnification and reimbursement/advancement of

defense costs against Centurion Pecos is significantly intertwined with and dependent upon the

outcome of the competing declaratory judgment claims of Stampede and Centurion Logistics

regarding which entity has control of Centurion Pecos.

                                                  VI.
                                           CAUSES OF ACTION

                                 COUNT 1: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

           26.        Calce restates and incorporates the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

           27.        As shown by the facts set forth above, Calce is entitled to indemnification from

Centurion Logistics and Centurion Pecos pursuant to the terms of such entities’ own company

agreements. Calce is further entitled to reimbursement of the expenses he has paid and incurred

(and those that he will pay and incur in the future), as such expenses are paid and incurred, in

defending himself against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit.

           28.        Calce therefore seeks a judicial determination that:

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                               PAGE 8
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                         MR.180
           (a)        Centurion Logistics is required to reimburse Calce the expenses, including but not

                      limited to attorneys’ fees, that he has paid or incurred to date in defending himself

                      against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit;

           (b)        Centurion Logistics is required to reimburse Calce the expenses, including but not

                      limited to attorneys’ fees, that he pays or incurs in the future in defending himself

                      against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit;

           (c)        In the unlikely event that any liability be found on the part of Calce, Centurion

                      Logistics is required to indemnify Calce and hold him harmless from any

                      damages that relate to either (i) the business of Centurion Logistics and/or (ii) any

                      alleged acts or omissions that were purportedly taken or made by Calce in his

                      capacity as a manager of Centurion Logistics (not including any damages arising

                      from any conduct set forth in Section 6.3(a)(i)-(iv) of the Logistics Agreement);

           (d)        Centurion Pecos is required to reimburse Calce the expenses, including but not

                      limited to attorneys’ fees, that he has paid or incurred to date in defending himself

                      against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit;

           (e)        Centurion Pecos is required to reimburse Calce the expenses, including but not

                      limited to attorneys’ fees, that he pays or incurs in the future in defending himself

                      against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit; and

           (f)        In the unlikely event that any liability be found on the part of Calce, Centurion

                      Pecos is required to indemnify Calce and hold him harmless from any damages

                      that relate to either (i) the business of Centurion Pecos and/or (ii) any alleged acts

                      or omissions that were purportedly taken or made by Calce in his capacity as a

                      manager of Centurion Pecos (not including any damages arising from any conduct

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                                     PAGE 9
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                               MR.181
                      set forth in Section 6.3(a)(i)-(iv) of the Pecos Original Agreement and Pecos

                      Amended Agreement).

                 COUNT 2: BREACH OF CONTRACT (CENTURION LOGISTICS)

           29.        Calce restates and incorporates the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

           30.        The Logistics Agreement constitutes a valid and enforceable contract. Centurion

Logistics breached the Logistics Agreement by failing to reimburse Calce the amount of

expenses he has paid and incurred in defending himself against the claims brought against him in

this lawsuit. Calce performed, tendered performance of, or was excused from performing any of

his obligations under the Logistics Agreement.

           31.        As a result of Centurion Logistics’ breach, Calce has suffered actual damages.

Calce is entitled to recover such damages from Centurion Logistics.

                     COUNT 3: BREACH OF CONTRACT (CENTURION PECOS)

           32.        Calce restates and incorporates the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

           33.        The Pecos Original Agreement and the Pecos Amended Agreement constitute

valid and enforceable contracts. Centurion Pecos breached the Pecos Original Agreement and

the Pecos Amended Agreement by failing to reimburse Calce the amount of expenses he has paid

and incurred in defending himself against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit. Calce

performed, tendered performance of, or was excused from performing any of his obligations

under the Pecos Original Agreement and the Pecos Amended Agreement.

           34.        As a result of Centurion Pecos’ breach, Calce has suffered actual damages. Calce

is entitled to recover such damages from Centurion Pecos.

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                              PAGE 10
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                         MR.182
                                                 VII.
                                            ATTORNEYS’ FEES

           35.        Calce restates and incorporates the allegations contained in the preceding

paragraphs.

           36.        Pursuant to Section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Calce

seeks an award of his reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in prosecuting

his declaratory judgment claim and for any appeal.

           37.        Calce is further entitled to and hereby requests judgment for his reasonable and

necessary attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing this counterclaim and for any appeal pursuant to

Section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Calce either has or will present

his claim to Plaintiff or to a duly authorized agent of Plaintiff in accordance with Section 38.002

of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

                                               VIII.
                                       CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

           38.        All conditions precedent to maintaining this action have occurred and been

satisfied or have been excused or waived.

                                                     IX.
                                                   PRAYER

           Counter-Plaintiff John Calce requests that, upon final hearing, Calce have judgment

against Counter-Defendants Centurion Logistics LLC and Centurion Pecos Terminal LLC as

follows:

           1.         A declaration that Centurion Logistics is required to reimburse Calce the
                      expenses, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, that he has paid or incurred
                      to date in defending himself against the claims brought against him in this
                      lawsuit;

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                                  PAGE 11
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                             MR.183
           2.         A declaration that Centurion Logistics is required to reimburse Calce the
                      expenses, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, that he pays or incurs in the
                      future in defending himself against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit;

           3.         A declaration that, in the unlikely event that any liability be found on the part of
                      Calce, Centurion Logistics is required to indemnify Calce and hold him harmless
                      from any damages that relate to either (i) the business of Centurion Logistics
                      and/or (ii) any alleged acts or omissions that were purportedly taken or made by
                      Calce in his capacity as a manager of Centurion Logistics (not including any
                      damages arising from any conduct set forth in Section 6.3(a)(i)-(iv) of the
                      Logistics Agreement);

           4.         A declaration that Centurion Pecos is required to reimburse Calce the expenses,
                      including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, that he has paid or incurred to date in
                      defending himself against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit;

           5.         A declaration that Centurion Pecos is required to reimburse Calce the expenses,
                      including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, that he pays or incurs in the future in
                      defending himself against the claims brought against him in this lawsuit;

           6.         A declaration that, in the unlikely event that any liability be found on the part of
                      Calce, Centurion Pecos is required to indemnify Calce and hold him harmless
                      from any damages that relate to either (i) the business of Centurion Pecos and/or
                      (ii) any alleged acts or omissions that were purportedly taken or made by Calce in
                      his capacity as a manager of Centurion Pecos (not including any damages arising
                      from any conduct set forth in Section 6.3(a)(i)-(iv) of the Pecos Original
                      Agreement and Pecos Amended Agreement);

           7.         Judgment against Centurion Logistics for the amount of expenses, including
                      attorneys’ fees, paid or incurred by Calce in defending himself against the claims
                      brought against him in this lawsuit;

           8.         Judgment against Centurion Pecos for the amount of expenses, including
                      attorneys’ fees, paid or incurred by Calce in defending himself against the claims
                      brought against him in this lawsuit;

           9.         Judgment against Counter-Defendants for Calce’s reasonable and necessary
                      attorneys’ fees incurred in pursuing this counterclaim;

           10.        Judgment against Counter-Defendants for pre- and post-judgment interest as
                      provided by law;

           11.        Judgment against Counter-Defendants for Calce’s costs of suit; and

           12.        Such other and further relief to which Calce may be justly entitled.

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                                   PAGE 12
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                              MR.184
                                          Respectfully submitted,

                                          /s/ David N. Kitner
                                          DAVID N. KITNER
                                          State Bar No. 11541500
                                          david.kitner@strasburger.com
                                          CHASE J. POTTER
                                          State Bar No. 24088245
                                          chase.potter@strasburger.com
                                          STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP
                                          901 Main Street, Suite 6000
                                          Dallas, TX 75202-3794
                                          (214) 651-4300
                                          (214) 651-4330 Fax

                                          ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS
                                          JOHN CALCE, CENTURION MIDSTREAM
                                          GROUP, LLC, CENTURION TERMINALS,
                                          LLC, AND STAMPEDE TX ENERGY, LLC

                                 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

        The undersigned counsel certifies that on the 22nd day of November, 2017, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing was forwarded to all known counsel in compliance with the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                          /s/ Chase J. Potter
                                          Chase J. Potter

DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF JOHN CALCE’S FIRST AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC AND CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC                     PAGE 13
9513752.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                MR.185
                                                                                                                  FILED
                                                                                                      DALLAS COUNTY
                                                                                                     11/22/2017 2:31 PM
                                                                                                         FELICIA PITRE
                                                                                                      DISTRICT CLERK

                                    CAUSE NO. DC-16-07706

CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC,                            §      IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
individually and derivatively on behalf of          §
CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC,                       §
a Texas Limited Liability Company,                  §
                                                    §
           Plaintiffs,                              §
                                                    §
v.                                                  §
                                                    §
JAMES BALLENGEE, BALLENGEE                          §
INTERESTS, LLC, JOHN CALCE,                         §      DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
STAMPEDE TX ENERGY, LLC,                            §
CENTURION MIDSTREAM GROUP,                          §
LLC, CENTURION TERMINALS, LLC                       §
                                                    §
           Defendants,                              §
                                                    §
and CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL                        §
LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company              §
                                                    §
           Nominal Defendant.                       §      44th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

     JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
       REGARDING COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

           Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff John Calce (“Calce”) files this Amended Motion for

Summary Judgment regarding his Counterclaim against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Centurion

Logistics LLC (“Centurion Logistics”) and, in support thereof, would respectfully show the

Court as follows: 1

                                        BASIS FOR MOTION

           Calce is a manager of Centurion Logistics. Calce is therefore contractually entitled—

pursuant to Section 6.2 of the Company Agreement of Centurion Logistics (the “Agreement”)—

1
 This Motion amends and replaces Calce’s previously filed motion for partial summary judgment entitled
“John Calce’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Indemnification Claim Against
Centurion Logistics LLC,” which was filed on October 6, 2017.

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                   PAGE 1
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                         MR.322
to advancement/reimbursement from the company of any expenses he pays or incurs in

defending himself in this lawsuit (as such expenses are paid or incurred). 2 Importantly, Calce’s

right to advancement/reimbursement of defense costs, which is the sole issue addressed by this

Motion, is separate and distinct from any right to indemnification.                    Calce’s right to

reimbursement is supported by the Agreement, Texas case law, and the Texas Business &

Organizations Code (the “TBOC”). For these reasons, and as more fully set forth below, Calce

is entitled—as a matter of law—to the relief requested herein. 3

                                           STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Lawsuit

           1.         On June 27, 2016, Centurion Logistics, individually and derivatively on behalf of

Centurion Pecos Terminal LLC (“Centurion Pecos”), filed its Original Petition complaining of

Calce and the other Defendants (the “Lawsuit”). See generally Pl.’s Orig. Pet. Centurion

Logistics brought claims against Calce for (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) unjust enrichment;

and (3) aiding and abetting fraudulent concealment. See id. ¶¶ 36 – 42, 60, 69 – 72. 4

           2.         Centurion Logistics claims that Calce and the other Defendants carried out a

scheme that resulted in Centurion Pecos and Centurion Logistics losing their interest in the

2
    A true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A-1.
3
  In this Motion, Calce only seeks a declaration that he is entitled to advancement/reimbursement from
Centurion Logistics for his past and future defense costs and a judgment that Centurion Logistics
breached the Agreement. Calce will move for a judgment for his actual defense costs at a later date.
4
  Centurion Logistics has sought leave to file its First Amended Petition. As of the date of this filing,
leave has not been granted. Centurion Logistics’ First Amended Petition includes the following causes of
action against Calce: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) aiding and abetting
fraud/fraudulent inducement; (4) violation of the Texas Theft Liability Act; (5) tortious interference with
contract; (6) fraudulent inducement; and (7) promissory estoppel. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File
Amended Petition.

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                       PAGE 2
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                              MR.323
Reeves County Property 5, thereby allegedly depriving such entities of the opportunity to

construct a railway terminal for the shipping of crude oil from such property. See generally Pl.’s

Orig. Pet. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that Calce breached the fiduciary duties that he

owed Centurion Logistics as a manager of the company. See id. ¶¶ 36 – 42. 6

           3.         On September 20, 2016, Calce filed his Motion to Transfer Venue and Brief in

Support Thereof and, Subject Thereto, Original Answer (the “Original Answer”). Since the

filing of his Original Answer, Calce has incurred, and continues to incur, significant expenses in

defending against the claims that have been brought against him in the Lawsuit.

Calce’s Contractual Right to Immediate Reimbursement of Defense Costs

           4.         Calce is a manager of Centurion Logistics. See Pl.’s Orig. Pet. ¶ 12. Section 1.1

of the Company Agreement of Centurion Logistics (the “Agreement”) defines an “Indemnified

Person” as follows:

           “Indemnified Person” means (a) a Member or Assignee; (b) a Manager; (c) a
           Liquidator (if any); (d) any Affiliate of the Company, a Member or Assignee, a
           Manager, or a Liquidator; and (e) any governing person, officer, employee, agent,
           or owner of the Company, a Member or Assignee, a Manager, a Liquidator, or
           any Affiliate of any of the foregoing. A person is an Indemnified Person whether
           or not such person has the status required to be an Indemnified Person at the time
           any Proceeding is made or maintained as described in Article VI or at the time
           any amendment to this Agreement is proposed under Section 15.1.

See Ex. A-1 § 1.1 (emphasis added). Calce, as a manager of the company, is therefore an

“Indemnified Person” under the Agreement. See id.

           5.         Section 6.2 of the Agreement provides as follows:

5
 The term “Reeves County Property,” when used herein, should be understood to have the same meaning
as the term is used and defined in Plaintiff’s Original Petition.
6
  Centurion Logistics makes the same allegations in the First Amended Petition that it has sought leave to
file. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition, Ex. A, ¶¶ 52 – 58.

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                       PAGE 3
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                             MR.324
           To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, and subject to Section 6.3,
           [Centurion Logistics] indemnifies and holds harmless each Indemnified Person
           from and against any Damages arising from any Proceeding relating to the
           conduct of [Centurion Logistics’] business or to any act or omission by such
           Indemnified Person within the scope of the Indemnified Person’s authority in the
           course of [Centurion Logistics’] business or for any misconduct or negligence on
           the part of any other person that is an employee or agent of [Centurion Logistics].
           An Indemnified Person’s expenses paid or incurred in defending itself against
           any Proceeding shall be reimbursed as paid or incurred. The right to
           indemnification conferred in this Article VI is not exclusive of any other right that
           any person may have or hereafter acquire under any statute, agreement, vote of
           Members, or otherwise.

See Ex. A-1 § 6.2 (emphasis added). Accordingly, pursuant to Section 6.2, Calce—as an

Indemnified Person—is entitled to immediate reimbursement of “expenses paid or incurred in

defending [himself] against any Proceeding.” See id.

           6.         Section 1.1 of the Agreement defines “Proceeding” as follows: “(a) any

threatened, pending, or completed action or other proceeding, whether civil, criminal,

administrative, arbitrative, or investigative; (b) an appeal of any such proceeding, and (c) any

inquiry or investigation that could lead to any such proceeding.” See Ex. A-1 § 1.1. This

Lawsuit clearly constitutes a “Proceeding” under the Agreement, which Plaintiff does not

dispute. See infra.

           7.         Section 6.3(c) of the Agreement provides the following remedy for Centurion

Logistics if it is ultimately determined—pursuant to a final judgment of a court of competent

jurisdiction—that Calce is not entitled to advancement/reimbursement under Section 6.2:

           Any payments made to or on behalf of a person who is later determined not to be
           entitled to such payments shall be repaid by the person to the Company. The
           Company may require as a condition to the payment of any amounts pursuant to
           Section 6.2, that the Indemnified Person provide to the Company (i) a written
           affirmation by the Indemnified Person of the person’s good faith belief that the
           person has met the standard of conduct necessary for indemnification under this
           Section 6.3; and (ii) a written undertaking by or on behalf of the Indemnified

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                       PAGE 4
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                            MR.325
           Person to repay the amount paid or reimbursed if the person has not met that
           standard or if indemnification is otherwise prohibited by law.

See Ex. A-1 § 6.3(c) (emphasis added).

Centurion Logistics’ Refusal to Reimburse Calce’s Defense Costs

           8.         On August 22, 2017, Calce—through his counsel—requested that Centurion

Logistics, pursuant to Section 6.2 of the Agreement, (1) reimburse Calce the full amount of

expenses that he had been invoiced as of July 31, 2017, plus an additional $50,000 to be applied

to future expenses as they are incurred; and (2) agree to reimburse Calce the additional expenses,

in excess of such $50,000 advancement, that he pays or incurs in his defense of the Lawsuit as

such expenses are paid or incurred. See the August 22, 2017, letter, a true and correct copy of

which is attached hereto as Exhibit B (referred to hereinafter as the “Reimbursement Request”). 7

           9.         The Reimbursement Request provides that, “[p]ursuant to Section 6.3 of the

Agreement, Mr. Calce hereby affirms that it is his good faith belief that he has met the standard

of conduct necessary for indemnification under Section 6.3.”                See Ex. B at 2.         The

Reimbursement Request also provides that “Mr. Calce further agrees to repay any amount that is

paid or reimbursed by Centurion Logistics, pursuant to Section 6.2, if it is determined by a court

of competent jurisdiction that Mr. Calce did not meet the aforementioned standard or if

indemnification is otherwise determined to be prohibited by law.” See id.

           10.        Centurion Logistics denied Calce’s request for reimbursement.       See letter of

September 5, 2017, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C (referred to

hereinafter as the “Reimbursement Denial”). Despite denying the request, Centurion Logistics

conceded that Calce is an “Indemnified Person” and that this litigation is a “Proceeding” as those

7
 The Agreement was attached as Exhibit A to the Reimbursement Request. The Agreement has been
omitted as an attachment to the Reimbursement Request since it is attached as Exhibit A-1 to this Motion.

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                      PAGE 5
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                            MR.326
terms are defined in the Agreement. See Ex. C at 2. To date, Centurion Logistics has not

reimbursed Calce any amount for the expenses he has paid and incurred in defending himself

against the claims brought against him in the Lawsuit. See the Declaration of John Calce, a true

and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, ¶ 4.

                                   ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

           This Motion only addresses Calce’s right to advancement/reimbursement of defense

costs—not his right to indemnification. These rights are often improperly conflated, but they are

distinct concepts with completely different standards. Calce does not contend that he is entitled

to indemnification—as a matter of law—from Centurion Logistics at this point in the litigation.

However, his right to advancement/reimbursement of defense costs is clear and appropriate for

determination at the summary judgment stage. In order to adequately demonstrate Calce’s

entitlement to the relief requested herein, it is important to first contrast the difference between

the right to advancement/reimbursement and the right to indemnification. These concepts are

extensively analyzed in In re Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d 41 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, orig.

proceeding) (referred to herein as “Aguilar”).

A.         The right to advancement/reimbursement of expenses and the right to
           indemnification are separate and distinct legal concepts.

           Aguilar is strikingly similar to the present case. Aguilar and another individual formed

Perspectiva Group, Inc. (“Perspectiva”). See Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 44. Aguilar was an officer

and director of Perspectiva. See id. Perspectiva filed suit against Aguilar and certain Perspectiva

employees alleging that Aguilar had breached his fiduciary duties to the company and engaged in

a conspiracy. See id. Perspectiva later filed a second suit against Aguilar and others, which was

eventually consolidated with the first suit into one cause, accusing Aguilar and his daughter of

forming a company that competed with Perspectiva (similar to the allegations in the current

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                 PAGE 6
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                       MR.327
case). See id. During the pendency of the consolidated lawsuit, Aguilar’s attorney—pursuant to

Perspectiva’s bylaws—sent Perspectiva’s attorney a letter requesting that Perspectiva advance

Aguilar’s defense costs, including attorneys’ fees (which is exactly what Calce has requested

here).             See           id.   Perspectiva—like   Centurion    Logistics—denied     Aguilar’s

advancement/reimbursement request. See id. at 45. The trial court denied Aguilar’s motion

requesting advancement/reimbursement of defense costs.                See id.   The appellate court

conditionally granted Aguilar’s petition for a writ of mandamus and provided that the writ would

issue if the trial court refused to (1) vacate its order denying Aguilar’s motion regarding

advancement; and (2) enter an order granting the motion. See id. at 56.

           In analyzing the issue, the Aguilar appellate court first stated that Article 2.02-1 of the

Texas Business Corporation Act expressly allowed Texas corporations to advance litigation

expenses to its directors. See id. at 45. The Aguilar court further noted that the applicable

section of Perspectiva’s bylaws was nearly identical to the statutory language regarding

advancement/reimbursement of expenses. See id. at 45 – 46. Article 2.02-1 of the Texas

Business Corporation Act is the predecessor to Section 8.104 of the TBOC. See TEX. BUS.

ORGS. CODE § 8.104. 8 Similarly, here, Section 6.2 is consistent with the statutory language set

forth in Section 8.104 of the TBOC. See Ex. A-1 § 6.2; see also TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 8.104.

           The Aguilar court next turned to the lack of Texas case law addressing the right to

advancement/reimbursement of defense costs: “There are no Texas cases concerning

advancement under the Business Corporation Act or the Business Organizations Code. But the

courts of Delaware have addressed advancement on numerous occasions.” Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d

at 46.       It is common for Texas courts to look to Delaware law for guidance regarding

8
 The prior and current statutes are essentially the same in all material respects. Compare TEX. BUS.
CORP. ACT ART. 2.02-1 with TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 8.104.

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                   PAGE 7
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                         MR.328
unsettled/undeveloped areas of corporate law. 9 The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that

“‘[a]dvancement is an especially important corollary to indemnification’ because it provides

corporate officials with immediate interim relief from the burden of paying for a defense.” See

Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 46 (quoting Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. Supr.

2005)).       “Although the right to indemnification and advancement are correlative, they are

separate and distinct legal actions.” Id. (quoting Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212). Perhaps most

importantly, “[t]he right to advancement is not dependent on the right to indemnification.” Id.

(citing Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212) (emphasis added). This concept is vitally important to the

determination of this Motion, because it demonstrates that Calce’s alleged conduct is completely

irrelevant to his right to immediate advancement/reimbursement of his defense costs.

B.         Centurion Logistics cannot rely on its own allegations to deny Calce’s right to
           advancement/reimbursement of defense costs.

           The Reimbursement Denial states that Centurion Logistics denied Calce’s request for

reimbursement/advancement, at least in part, on the basis of Centurion Logistics’ allegations in

the Lawsuit—specifically that Calce (1) was not acting “within the scope of [his] authority in

course of the Company’s business”; and (2) was engaging in “intentional misconduct” and a

“knowing violation of law.” See Ex. C. These are mere allegations for which Centurion

Logistics has the burden of proof. Centurion Logistics does not get to assume the role of accuser

9
  “Delaware has been described as ‘the Mother Court of corporate law.’” Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 47
(citing Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds,
500 U.S. 90 (1991)). “Courts throughout the country look to Delaware for guidance on matters of
corporate law.” Id. (citing Neurobehaviorial Assocs., P.A. v. Cypress Creek Hosp., Inc., 995 S.W.2d 326,
332 n. 12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (turning to Delaware corporate law for guidance
regarding “winding-up” because there was no Texas cases addressing the issue)). “The law of
advancement, in particular, is ‘a Delaware specialty.’” Id. (citing Int’l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 455
F.3d 749, 750 (7th Cir. 2006)). “To the limited extent that there is law [regarding advancement] outside
Delaware, it is the same as the law in Delaware.” Id. (quoting Stephen A. Radin, “Sinners Who Find
Religion”: Advancement of Litigation Expenses to Corporate Officials Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 Rev.
Litig. 251, 271 (2006)).

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                       PAGE 8
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                              MR.329
and fact-finder.           More importantly, these allegations are irrelevant to the determination of

whether Calce is entitled to advancement/reimbursement of his defense costs.

           In Aguilar, Perspectiva similarly denied Aguilar’s request for advancement on the basis

that Aguilar purportedly had unclean hands due to the alleged breaches of his fiduciary duties.

See Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 46.               The Aguilar court stated that “[u]nder Delaware law,

advancement is allowed even when the official seeking advancement is being sued by the

corporation that must advance the litigation expenses” as “Delaware case law is replete with

insider trading cases in which executives’ expenses are advanced despite allegations of

defrauding the corporation or its stockholders of millions of dollars.” Id. at 47 (citing James

River Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Kehoe, 674 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (E.D. Va. 2009)). The Aguilar court

further provided that “[a]dvancement claims are frequently granted when, as in this case, the

corporation is suing an official for breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. That is the exact situation

here—i.e., Calce is being sued for breach of fiduciary duty. See Pl.’s Orig. Pet. ¶¶ 36 – 42. “The

corporation [Centurion Logistics] cannot defend against the advancement claim on the ground

that it now believes the fiduciary [Calce] to have been unfaithful because it is in those very cases

that the right to advancement attaches most strongly.” Id. (citing Kehoe, 674 F. Supp. 2d at

750) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). The Delaware Court of Chancery perhaps

put it best stating:

           It is not uncommon for corporate directors, officers, and employees to be sued for
           breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty [exactly what Calce is being sued for here],
           and to have to defend claims that they took official action for the primary purpose
           of diverting corporate resources to their own pocketbooks . . . . Therefore, it is
           highly problematic to make the advancement right of such officials dependent on
           the motivation ascribed to their conduct by the suing parties. To do so would be
           to largely vitiate the protections afforded by [statutory] and contractual
           advancement rights.

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                      PAGE 9
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                           MR.330
Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. CIV.A.19467, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, at *15 – 16 (Del.

Ch. June 18, 2002); see also Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 48 (expressly rejecting proposition that “the

entitlement to advancement hinges on proof that the director did not violate his fiduciary

duties.”).

           Calce’s alleged conduct is completely irrelevant for purposes of this Motion and the

determination of whether Calce is entitled to advancement/reimbursement of his defense costs.

See Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 48 (citing Reddy, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, at *28 – 29) (providing

that any other result “would turn every advancement case into a trial on the merits of the

underlying claims of official misconduct.”)). Rather, the determinative question is whether the

terms of the Agreement afford Calce the right to advancement/reimbursement of his defense

costs. The answer is unquestionably yes.

C.         Calce’s contractual right to advancement/reimbursement is unambiguous and
           mandatory.

           1.         The terms of the Agreement are unambiguous and its interpretation is a
                      question of law for the Court.

           The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court. See

Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. 2014) (citing MCI Telecomms.

Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tex. 1999)). Likewise, “[t]he question of

whether a contract is ambiguous is one of law for the court.” Peterson v. Farmers Tex. Cnty.

Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05-15-00678-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6586, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas

June 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1983)). A

contract is not ambiguous if, like the Agreement here, “the contract’s language can be given a

certain or definite meaning.” Id. (citing El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 389
S.W.3d 802, 806 (Tex. 2012)). The mere fact that the “parties advance different interpretations

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                             PAGE 10
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                    MR.331
of a contract does not necessarily mean that the contract is ambiguous.” PopCap Games, Inc. v.

MumboJumbo, LLC, 350 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied).

           “In construing a written contract, the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the true

intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument.” Moayedi, 438 S.W.3d at 7 (emphasis

added). “Absent a finding of ambiguity, a court must interpret the meaning and intent of a

contract from the four corners of the document without the aid of extrinsic evidence.” Peterson,

2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6586, at *9; see also Sacks v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450-51 (Tex.

2008) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn. v. CBI Indus. Inc., 907 S.W.2d
517, 520 (Tex. 1995)) (providing that “[o]nly where a contract is ambiguous may a court

consider the parties’ interpretation and ‘admit extraneous evidence to determine the true meaning

of the instrument’”). Moreover, “[u]nless the agreement shows the parties used a term in a

technical or different sense, the terms are given their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted

meaning.” Moayedi, 438 S.W.3d at 7 (citing Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d
118, 121 (Tex. 1996)). The relevant terms of the Agreement are unambiguous and entitle Calce

to indemnification.

           2.         Section 6.2 of the Agreement clearly requires Centurion Logistics to
                      immediately reimburse Calce the expenses he pays or incurs in defending
                      himself in the Lawsuit.

           It is undisputed that Calce—as a manager of Centurion Logistics—is an “Indemnified

Person” under the Agreement. See Pl.’s Orig. Pet. ¶ 12; see also Ex. A-1 § 1.1; Ex. C at 2. It is

further undisputed that the Lawsuit constitutes a “Proceeding” as defined in Section 1.1 of the

Agreement. See Ex. A-1 § 1.1; see also Ex. C at 2. Section 6.2 of the Agreement provides that

“[a]n Indemnified Person’s [e.g., Calce] expenses paid or incurred in defending [himself] against

any Proceeding [e.g., this Lawsuit] shall be reimbursed as paid or incurred.” See Ex. A-1 § 6.2

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                   PAGE 11
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                          MR.332
(emphasis added). There are no qualifications and/or conditions to Calce’s express right to

advancement/reimbursement of defense costs. 10

           The Aguilar court—after noting that the term “shall” is generally construed to be

mandatory—held that Perspectiva had a mandatory duty, under the applicable section of its

bylaws (which is strikingly similar to the language of Section 6.2), to advance Aguilar’s defense

costs. See Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 51. 11 Similarly, Centurion Logistics is required, pursuant to

Section 6.2 of the Agreement, to reimburse Calce the expenses he pays or incurs in defending

himself in the Lawsuit—as such expenses are paid or incurred.

           3.         Calce’s reimbursable expenses include his attorneys’ fees.

           The Aguilar court expressly rejected Perspectiva’s argument that the undefined term

“reasonable expenses” does not include attorneys’ fees. See Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 51 – 52. In

support of its holding, the Aguilar court stated that “Perspectiva’s interpretation renders [the

relevant section of Perspectiva’s bylaws] insignificant and practically useless.” Id. at 51. The

Aguilar court further provided that “[t]he purpose of advancement is to relieve corporate officials

from the burden of paying the significant on-going expenses involved in litigation” and that

“[t]he burden of litigation comes from attorney’s fees, not copying costs.” Id. at 51 – 52

(internal quotations and citations omitted). This reasoning is equally applicable here. Moreover,

10
   Section 6.3(c) of the Agreement does provide that “[t]he Company [Centurion Logistics] may require,
as a condition to the payment of any amounts pursuant to Section 6.2, that the Indemnified Person provide
to the Company (i) a written affirmation by the Indemnified Person of the person’s good faith belief that
the person has met the standard of conduct necessary for indemnification under this Section 6.3; and (ii) a
written undertaking by or on behalf of the Indemnified Person to repay the amount paid or reimbursed if
the person has not met that standard or if indemnification is otherwise prohibited by law.” See Ex. A-1 §
6.3. Calce has already agreed in writing to repay any amount that he is reimbursed by Centurion
Logistics if it is ultimately determined that he was not entitled to such payments. See Ex. B at 2.
11
  The pertinent section of Perspectiva’s bylaws provided as follows: “[r]easonable expenses incurred by a
person who was, is, or threatened to be made a named defendant or respondent in a Proceeding shall be
paid or reimbursed by the Corporation . . . .” See Aguilar, 344 S.W.3d at 44.

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                      PAGE 12
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                              MR.333
Section 8.001 of the TBOC defines the term “expenses” to include “reasonable attorney’s fees.”

See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 8.001(3)(B).                    It is therefore clear that Calce’s right to

advancement/reimbursement of “expenses” includes the attorneys’ fees he pays or incurs in his

defense of this Lawsuit.

D.         Summary Judgment is the appropriate—and only meaningful—mechanism for
           Calce to exercise his right to advancement/reimbursement of defense costs.

           The Aguilar court made clear that a summary judgment motion is an appropriate

procedural vehicle for seeking advancement/reimbursement of defense costs. See Aguilar, 344
S.W.3d at 52 – 53. More importantly, the Aguilar court stated that “[b]y its very nature,

advancement of expenses can occur only during the course of the trial court proceedings.” Id. at

55 (citing Morgan v. Grace, No. Civ.A. 20430, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *4 (Del Ch. Oct.

29, 2003) (providing that “[t]he value of the right to advancement is that it is granted or denied

while the underlying action is pending.”)). “It is indemnification of expenses that occurs at the

conclusion of the case.” Id. Therefore, Calce’s right to advancement/reimbursement of defense

costs is ripe.             The only appropriate time for such determination is now.                Calce’s

advancement/reimbursement claim will be effectively moot at the conclusion of the case. See id.

                                                 CONCLUSION

           For these reasons, Calce requests that the Court grant his Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment against Centurion Logistics and enter the following judgment:

           a)         A declaration that Centurion Logistics is required to reimburse Calce the
                      expenses, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, that he has paid or incurred
                      to date in defending himself against the claims brought against him in the
                      Lawsuit;

           b)         A declaration that Centurion Logistics is required to reimburse Calce the
                      expenses, including but not limited to attorneys’ fees, that he pays or incurs in the
                      future in defending himself against the claims brought against him in the Lawsuit
                      within ten (10) days of Calce submitting such expenses to Centurion Logistics;

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                       PAGE 13
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                              MR.334
           c)         Judgment that Centurion Logistics breached the Agreement by failing to
                      reimburse Calce the amount of expenses, including but not limited to attorneys’
                      fees, that he has paid or incurred to date in defending himself against the claims
                      brought against him in the Lawsuit; 12 and

           d)         Such other and further relief to which Calce may be justly entitled.

                                                    Respectfully submitted,

                                                    /s/ David N. Kitner
                                                    DAVID N. KITNER
                                                    State Bar No. 11541500
                                                    david.kitner@strasburger.com
                                                    CHASE J. POTTER
                                                    State Bar No. 24088245
                                                    chase.potter@strasburger.com
                                                    STRASBURGER & PRICE, LLP
                                                    901 Main Street, Suite 6000
                                                    Dallas, TX 75202-3794
                                                    (214) 651-4300
                                                    (214) 651-4330 Fax

                                                    ATTORNEYS FOR JOHN CALCE,
                                                    CENTURION MIDSTREAM GROUP, LLC,
                                                    CENTURION TERMINALS, LLC, AND
                                                    STAMPEDE TX ENERGY, LLC

12
   Calce’s First Amended Counterclaim against Centurion Logistics—like his Original Counterclaim—
includes claims for declaratory relief and breach of contract. See Calce’s First Am. Counterclaim. For
the reasons set forth herein, Calce is entitled to summary judgment on his breach of contract claim, in
addition to his claim for declaratory relief. To succeed on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must
show: “(1) a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the
contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach.” Marquis
Acquisitions, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 409 S.W.3d 808, 813 – 814 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).
The arguments set forth above and summary judgment evidence conclusively establish all such elements
as a matter of law: (1) the Agreement is a valid contract; (2) Calce submitted his written undertaking
(without even being requested to do so by Centurion Logistics); (3) Centurion Logistics breached Section
6.2 of the Agreement by denying Calce’s request for advancement/reimbursement of defense costs; and
(4) Calce has suffered and continues to suffer the harm of significant, unreimbursed defense costs.

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                                    PAGE 14
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                            MR.335
                                 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

        The undersigned counsel certifies that on the 22nd day of November, 2017, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing was forwarded to all known counsel in compliance with the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                          /s/ Chase J. Potter
                                          Chase J. Potter

JOHN CALCE’S AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC                                         PAGE 15
9516179.1/SP/38371/0105/112217

                                                                                                MR.336
EXHIBIT A

            MR.337
                                       CAUSE NO. DC-16-07706

CENTURION LOGISTICS LLC,                              §      IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
individually and derivatively on behalf of            §
CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL LLC,                         §
a Texas Limited Liability Company,                    §
                                                      §
          Plaintiffs,                                 §
                                                      §
v.                                                    §
                                                      §
JAMES BALLENGEE, BALLENGEE                            §
INTERESTS, LLC, JOHN CALCE,                           §      DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
STAMPEDE TX ENERGY, LLC,                              §
CENTURION MIDSTREAM GROUP,                            §
LLC, CENTURION TERMINALS, LLC                         §
                                                      §
          Defendants,                                 §
                                                      §
and CENTURION PECOS TERMINAL                          §
LLC, a Texas Limited Liability Company                §
                                                      §
          Nominal Defendant.                          §      44th JUDICIAL DISTRICT

                                  DECLARATION OF JOHN CALCE

          1.         My name is John Calce. I have personal knowledge of every statement made

herein, and they are all true and correct.

          2.         I am a manager of Centurion Logistics LLC (“Centurion Logistics”). I have been

a manager of Centurion Logistics since the date the company was formed.

          3.         Attached hereto as Exhibit A-1 is a true and correct copy of the Company

Agreement of Centurion Logistics.

          4.         To date, Centurion Logistics has not reimbursed me any amount for the expenses

that I have paid or incurred in defending myself against the claims that have been brought against

me in the above-entitled lawsuit.

DECLARATION OF JOHN CALCE                                                                   PAGE 1
9389432.1/SP/38371/0105/100517

                                                                                                      MR.338
Dallas

         MR.339
EXHIBIT A-1

              MR.340
                       COMPANY AGREEMENT

                                   OF

                        Centurion Logistics LLC

                    a Texas Limited Liability Company

                       Effective September 16, 20 B

THE MEMBEnSlllP INTERESTS REPRESENTED BY THIS AGREEMENT HAVE
NOT BEEN REGISTERED lJNDF,R ANY SECURITU:s LAWS AND MAY NOT BE
SOLD,   PLEDGED   OR    OTHRIHVISE  TRANSEi'muu;:o  ABSENT   SlJCH
IU:GISTRATION OR AN EXEMPTION THEREFROM.         THE TRANSFER OF
MF.MBF:RSHIP INTERESTS IS FURTHER RESTRICTED BY ARTICLI( X OF THIS
AGREF:MENT.

                                                        I 1508~~'2 2/1 2120 14

                                                                                 MR.341
                                                     TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                                                              Page

1\llTICljl·~ 1 DEFl'N l'flONS .................................................................,......................................... t
     1.1.             J)etined Tcrn1s ......................................................................................................... I
      1.1.            LJsage ....................................................................................................................... 4

ARTICLE JI ORGANlZATIONAL MATTERS ...................................................................... 5
  2.1.     Forn1ation .. .............................................................................................................. 5
  2.2.     Na1ne ....................................................................................................................... 5
  2.3.     Registered Office and Agent; Principal Office ....................................................... 5
  2.4.     ·1·crn1 ....................................................... ... ,............................................................. 5
  2.5.      Purposes ............................................................................................... .................... 5
  2.6.     Po\vcrs ..................................................................................................................... 5
  2. 7.    Co1npany Property ................................................................................................... 5
  2.8.     lnitial IV1cn1bers ....................................................................................................... 6
  2.9      Options to Acquire Additional Units ....................................................................... 6
  2.10     Consent of lvf anagers ............................................................................................... 6
  2.1 l.   Status of Managers and Members ....... .................................................................... 6
  2.12.     Unit C:crtificatcs ...................................................................................................... 6
  2.13.    No State Law Partnership .............................. .......................................................... 6

ARTICLE III CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS; CAt•tTAL ACCOUNTS .............................. 6
  3.1 .    Initial Capital Contributions .................................................................................... 6
  3.2.     Additional Capital Contributions ............................................................................ 6
     3.3.             Capital Accounts ........... .............. ................................................................... ..... .... 7
     3.4.             No Right to Return of or Interest on Capital Account ............................................ 7
     3.5.             Ivlen1bcr Loans ........................................... .............................................................. 7
     3.6.             I\1etnber Notes ......................................................................................................... 7

ARTICLE IV ALJ,OCATIONS AND DISTRIBUTIONS ....................................................... 8
  4. 1.   A!location of Profit or Loss ..................................................................................... 8
  4.2.    Distributions of Distributable Cash ......................................................................... 8
  4.3.    \Vithholding ............................................................................................................. 8
  4.4.    Limitation on Distributions ..................................................................................... 8
  4.5.    No Right to Partition or Distribtttions in Kind ........................................................ 9

ARTICLE V 1'i·l1\NAG 1~1\lf EN,.r .................................................................................................... 9
  5. I.   Management and Control of Company Business ................................... ................. 9
  5.2.    Delegation of Authority ........................................................................................ . l 0
  5.3.    Limitations on Manager Authority ........................................................................ l 0
  5.4.    Reliance ................................................................................................................. 10
  5.5.    Compens,\tion and Expenses of Members and Managers ..................................... I0
  5.6.    Standards of Manager and Member Conduct ........................................................ I0
CO\IP.\'\\ Allowing
paragraphs of this Section:

                 (i)      the transfer is approved by all of the Managers:

              (ii)     if the Member is a corporation, the transfer is to a member of the
        Member's affiliated group (as defined in l.R.C. Section I S04(a)) ~

                {iii) if the Member is a trustee of one or more employee benefit plans. the
       transfer is to a co-trustee or a successor trustee to such plans; or

               (iv)    if the Member is an individual, the transfer is to the Member's estate,
       testamentary trust. or legal representative as a result of the Member's death or
       adjudication of incapacity in managing its person or affairs, or the transfer is to a member
       of the Member's family, directly or in trust.

       (b)    Upon a Permitted Transfer by a Member of all of its Membership Interest. the
Member ceases to be a Member as of the effective date of the transfer determined accqrding to
Section 10.4.

       (c)     For purposes of Section 10.2(a)(iv), a Member's family means the iV[ember"s
spouse (excluding a former spouse), children, grandchildren, parents. and grnndparents. A
person's legally adopted child is treated as his child.

CmlP,\ :\ \' AGREDlt:'.'11' Of C.::'in RIO:-; LOGISTICS LLC                                   E::XlllUll' A
                                                                                      l J':'OS48v2 ~i l 2/20l~

                                                                                                                 MR.362
         l0.3. Conditions to Permitted Transfers of Membership Interests. Without limiting the
Managers ' authority to withhold approval for the transfer of a Membership Interest. a transfer
shall not be a Permitted Transfer unless the Managers determine that all of the following
condit.ions are satisfied:

        (a)     The transfer complies with all applicable laws, including any applicable secmities
laws.

       (b)     The transfer will not cause the Company to be treated as other than a partt1ershlp
for United States federal income tax purposes.

       (c)   The transfor will not cause the Company to be subject to regulation under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.

        (d)    The transfer will not cause any assets of the Company to be deemed "plan assets"
undel' the employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

       (e)     The transfer will not result in a termination of the Company ander I.R.C , Section
708, unless the Managers determine that such termination will not have an adverse impact on the
Members.

        (t)    The transfer will not cause the application of the tax-exempt use property rules of
l.R.C. Sections l68(g)(l )(B) and l68(h) to the Company ot its Members. unless the Managers
determine that such rules will not have an adverse impact on the Membe1·s.

       (g)    The transferor and transferee have delivered to the Company any documents that
the Managers request to confirm that the transfer satisfies the requirements of this Agreement, to
give effect to the transfer, and to confirm the transferee's agreement to be bound by this
Agreement as an Assignee.

      (h)      It requested by the Managers, the Company has received a transfer fee in an
amount determined by the Managers to be sufficient to reimburse the Company for the estimated
expenses likely to be incurred by the Company in connection with such transfer.

        10.4.   Effective Date; Distributions.

        (a)      A Permitted Transfer of a Membership Interest is effective as of the first day of
the calendar month following the calendar month during ' vhich the Managers receive notice of
such transfer (in such form and manner as the Managers tnay require) unless the Managers
determine that the transfer should be effective as of an earlier or later date (for example, on any
date the transfer is etlective as a matter of state law. or where the notice of transte1· specifies that
the transfer is to be effective on a future date).

                                                                                               'E:rnmrr A
                                                                                        I t5Q848\'1 211 2!2014

                                                                                                                 MR.363
        (b)     Distributions with respect to a transferred Membership Interest that are made
before the effective date of the transfer shall be paid to the transferor, and distributions made
after such date shaH be paid to the Assignee.

        (c)     Effective as of the effective date of a transfer of a Membership Interest. the
lvlanagers shall amend Exhibit A to reflect the reduction in the transferor's Percentage Interest
and to reflect the Assignee·s Percentage Interest.

        (d)    Neither the Company nor the Managers have any liability for making allocations
and distributions to the Members determined in accordance with this Section l 0.4, whether ol'
not the Company or the Managers have knowledge of any transfer of any Membership Interest.

       10.5. Transfcror·s Obligations. The transferor of a Membership Interest who ceases to
be a Member continues to be obligated with respect to its Membership Interest or its status as a
former Member as provided In the Code and applicable law.

         10.6.    Assignee·s Rights and Obligations.

        Unless an Assignee becomes a Member pursuant to Article Xl, such Assignee shall not
be entitled to any of the rights granted to a Member, other tha11 the rights to receive allocations of
profits and losses and distributions as if such Assignee were a Member, to transfer the
Assignee's Membership Interest (subject to the conditions of this Article X), and to receive
reports and information as specified in Aiticle VII. An Assignee of a Membership Interest shall
succeed to the Capital Contribution of the transferor to the extent of the Membership Interest
transferred. An Assignee is bound by this Agreement ii:respcctive of whether the Assignee has
signed or otherwise adopted this Agreement. An Assignee's Membership Interest may be
redeemed at the option of the Managers as provided in Sectio1112.J..

         10.7. Effect and Consequences of Prohibited Transfer.

       (a)     Except as otherwise required by law. the Company and the Managers shall treat a
Prohibited Transfer as void and shall recognize the transferor as continuing to be the owner of
the Membership Interest purported to be transferred. If the Company ·is required by law to
recognize a Prohibited Transfer. the transferee shall be treated as an Assignee with respect to the
Membership 1nterest transferred and may not be treated as a Member with respect to the
Membership Interest transforred unless admitted as a Me1nber iu accordance with Article XI.

         (b)      The Company may remove the transferor and Assignee with respect to a
Prohibited Transfer as provided in Article XII.

         (c)     The transferor and transferee with respect to a Prohibited Transfer shall be jointly
and severally liable to the Company for. and shall indemnify and hold the Company harmless
against, any expense. liability, or loss incurred by the Company (including reasonable legal fees
and expenses) as a result of such 1ransfer. their removal and liquidation of their Membership
lntei-ests (if applicable). and the efforts to enforce the indemnity granted in this Section lO. 7(c}.

CmlPA ~ \' AGltEl:: '.\n; ~T o.· CE'."TrJUO'\ LOGISTICS   LLC                                 EXlllBl'I' A
                                                                                       1150848\·2 2/12120 \4
                                                                                                               MR.364
       I 0.8.     Agreements of Spouse; Sole Management Community Property.

       (a)    Execution of Spousal .loinder and Consent. The spouse of each Member shall
execute and deltver to the Comp1my a Spo~usal Joinder and Consent in the form of Exhibit B.

       ( b)       Agreements of Spouse. The spouse of each Member agrees that:

                  (i)    this Agreement is entirely fair, just and equitable and in his or her best
      interest;

               (ii)   the covenants made in this Agreement are binding on such spouse
      individually and that such spouse is bound by this Agreement. including insofar as any
      interest such spouse may have now or hereafter in any Membership Interest by reason of
      the community property laws of the State of Texas or any other state, or otherwise;

               (iii)   whenever. pui'stmnt to the terms of this Agreement, such Member does, or
      is required to, in any manner transfer, pledge, or encumber his or her Membership
      Interest, or any interest in such Membership Interest, to the Company 01· any other person,
      such transfer, pledge, or encumbrance shall include the community property interest. if
      any, of such spouse in such Membership Interest so transferred, pledged, or encmnbercd:
      and
              (iv)    in the event of the death of such spouse, any interest such spouse may
      have now or hereafter in any Membership Interest which constitutes community property
      should pass to such Member and, accordingly, such spouse shall will and bequeath such
      spouse's entire community property interest, if any, in such Membership Interest to such
      Member.
       (c)     Sole Management Community Property. Each Member who is a natural person
and his or her spouse agree that such Member's Membership Interest, whether presently mvned
or hereafter acquired. is, if such Membership Interest is community property. community
property subject to the sole management. control, and disposition of such Member.

                                       ARTICLE XI
                                ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

       11.1. Substituted Members. An Assignee of a Membership Interest shall be admitted as
a Substituted Member with respect to such Membership Intel'est on the date on which all of the
following conditions are satisfied:

       (a)        The Managers have approved in \\>Titing the admission of the Substituted Member.

       {b)        The Assignee has delivered to the Company any agreements and other docutnents
that the Managers request to confinn such Assignee as a Member in the Company and such
Assignee·s agreement to be bound by this Agreement as a Member.

                                                                                               E:XllllJIT A
                                                                                     I 1:'()8+8v2 2i l 2/20 I~

                                                                                                                 MR.365
       \C)      lf requested by the Managers. the Company has received an admission kc in an
amount determined by the Managers to be sufficient to reimburse the Company for the estimated
expenses likely to be incmrcther than in liquidation of a Member's Membership interest.
          the amount of such adjustment shall be treated as an item of gain (if the adjustment
          increases the basis of the asset) or loss (if the adjustment decreases the basis of1he asset)
          frum the disposition of the asset and shall he taken into account for purposes or
          computing r-..;et Profit or Net Loss.

        "'Nonrecourse Deductions'' has the mea11ing set forth in Tr~usury Regulations Section
I. 704-?(b)( l) and shall be determined according to the provisions of lre(lsttry Regulations
Section 1. 704-2( c ).

          '"Nonrecourse Liabilitv·· has the meaning set forlh in Treasury Regulations Section I .704-
2(b)(3).

C0'.\11' ..\:\Y AGIH:E:m :\ T OF Cl·:\ n 'RI(>:'• UHi ISTI( ·s LLC
                                                               P.\GI: A·3

                                                                                                          MR.380
          '"Partner i'id.

        Mr. Calce is an Indemnified Person under the Agreement. See Ex. A § 1.1. Moreover,
the Lawsuit constitutes a Proceeding under the Agreement. See id. Centurion Logistics is
therefore required to reimburse Mr. Calce the expenses he pays or incurs in defending himself in
the Lawsuit, including attorneys’ fees, as such expenses are paid or incurred.

        As of July 31, 2017, Mr. Calce had been billed a total of $114,440.99 in expenses related
to his defense of the Lawsuit. Mr. Calce hereby demands that, on or before August 28, 2017,
Centurion Logistics (1) reimburse him the full amount of expenses that he has been invoiced
($114,440.99) plus an additional $50,000 that will be applied to future expenses as they are
incurred; and (2) agree to reimburse Mr. Calce the additional expenses, in excess of the

9253092.2/SP/38371/0105/082217

                                                                                                    MR.388
additional $50,000 referenced above, that he pays or incurs in his defense of the Lawsuit as such
expenses are paid or incurred.

        Pursuant to Section 6.3 of the Agreement, Mr. Calce hereby affirms that it is his good
faith belief that he has met the standard of conduct necessary for indemnification under Section
6.3. Mr. Calce further agrees to repay any amount that is paid or reimbursed by Centurion
Logistics, pursuant to Section 6.2, if it is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that Mr.
Calce did not meet the aforementioned standard or if indemnification is otherwise determined to
be prohibited by law.

         If you would like to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact me.

                                                       Sincerely,

                                                       Chase J. Potter

9253092.2/SP/38371/0105/082217

                                                                                                        MR.389
EXHIBIT C

            MR.390
                                                                                         
    *5(*25<6+$0281                                                                0HPEHURIWKH6WDWH%DURI
     J#VQOHJDOFRP                                                                     7H[DV_1HZKLV@ DXWKRULW\ LQ WKH FRXUVH RI WKH &RPSDQ\¶V EXVLQHVV  ´ WKH
&RPSDQ\GRHVQRWLQGHPQLI\&DOFHIURPDQ\DFWRURPLVVLRQWKDWLVQRWZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRIKLV
DXWKRULW\ RU LQ WKH FRXUVH RI WKH &RPSDQ\¶V EXVLQHVV 0RUHRYHU WKH &RPSDQ\ $JUHHPHQW
VSHFLILFDOO\H[FOXGHV³LQWHQWLRQDOPLVFRQGXFWRUDNQRZLQJYLRODWLRQRIODZ´IURPWKHVFRSHRI
&HQWXULRQ/RJLVWLFV¶LQGHPQLILFDWLRQREOLJDWLRQV
          
          ,QWKHSUHVHQW FDVHDVVWDWHGLQ 3ODLQWLII¶V2ULJLQDO 3HWLWLRQWKH³3HWLWLRQ´WKHDFWLYH
SOHDGLQJRQILOHLQWKH/LWLJDWLRQ&HQWXULRQ/RJLVWLFVDOOHJHVWKDW&DOFHVLJQHGDGHHGRIWUXVWLQ
KLVFDSDFLW\DVPDQDJHURI&HQWXULRQ3HFRVWRVHFXUHDSURPLVVRU\QRWHIRU%DOOHQJH,QWHUHVWV
//& DQG ODWHU VLJQHG DQ H[WHQVLRQ RI WKDW VDPH QRWH DV D PDQDJHU RI &HQWXULRQ 3HFRV
2EYLRXVO\&DOFHZDVQHLWKHUDFWLQJQRUSXUSRUWLQJWRDFW³ZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRI>KLV@DXWKRULW\LQ
FRXUVHRIWKH&RPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVV´DQGZDVHQJDJLQJLQ³LQWHQWLRQDOPLVFRQGXFW´DQG³NQRZLQJ

  &RPSDQ\$JUHHPHQW6HFWLRQ

  &RPSDQ\$JUHHPHQW6HFWLRQD

  3HWLWLRQ

                                                                                                                   MR.391
0U.LWQHU
6HSWHPEHU
3DJHRI
                                                      
YLRODWLRQRIODZ´$FFRUGLQJO\&HQWXULRQ/RJLVWLFVPXVWGHQ\&DOFH¶VLQGHPQLILFDWLRQUHTXHVW
DVWROLDELOLW\DULVLQJIURPWKLVFRQGXFW
         
         7KH 3HWLWLRQ DOVR DOOHJHV WKDW &DOFH DORQJ ZLWK 6WDPSHGH ³SXUSRUWHG WR REOLJDWH
&HQWXULRQ 3HFRV WR DVVXPH %DOOHQJHH ,QWHUHVWV¶ REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU WKH QRWHV IURP %DOOHQJHH
,QWHUHVVWVWR7&%´&DOFHZDVQHLWKHUDFWLQJQRUSXUSRUWLQJWRDFW³ZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRI>KLV@
DXWKRULW\LQFRXUVHRIWKH&RPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVV´DQGZDVHQJDJLQJLQ³LQWHQWLRQDOPLVFRQGXFW´
DQG ³NQRZLQJ YLRODWLRQ RI ODZ´ $FFRUGLQJO\ &HQWXULRQ /RJLVWLFV PXVW GHQ\ &DOFH¶V
LQGHPQLILFDWLRQUHTXHVWDVWROLDELOLW\DULVLQJIURPWKLVFRQGXFW
         
         )XUWKHU WKH 3HWLWLRQ DOOHJHV WKDW ³&DOFH FUHDWHG D QRWH    SXUSRUWLQJ WR REOLJDWH
&HQWXULRQ3HFRVWRPDNHSD\PHQWVWR&HQWULRQ7HUPLQDOV´$VEHIRUH&DOFHZDVQHLWKHUDFWLQJ
QRUSXUSRUWLQJWRDFW³ZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRI>KLV@DXWKRULW\LQFRXUVHRIWKH&RPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVV´
DQGZDVHQJDJHGLQ³LQWHQWLRQDOPLVFRQGXFW´DQGD³NQRZLQJYLRODWLRQRIODZ´$FFRUGLQJO\
&HQWXULRQ /RJLVWLFV PXVW GHQ\ &DOFH¶V LQGHPQLILFDWLRQ UHTXHVW DV WR OLDELOLW\ DULVLQJ IURP WKLV
FRQGXFW
         
         )LQDOO\ WKH 3HWLWLRQ DOOHJHV WKDW &DOFH DORQJ ZLWK %DOOHQJHH ,QWHUHVWV ³FUHDWHG
IUDXGXOHQWQRWHVE\&HQWXUULRQ3HFRVWR%DOOHQJHH,QWHUHVWV´ $VEHIRUH&DOFHZDVQHLWKHU
DFWLQJ QRU SXUSRUWLQJ WR DFW ³ZLWKLQ WKH VFRSH RI >KLV@ DXWKRULW\ LQ FRXUVH RI WKH &RPSDQ\¶V
EXVLQHVV´ DQG ZDV HQJDJLQJ LQ ³LQWHQWLRQDO PLVFRQGXFW´ DQG ³NQRZLQJ YLRODWLRQ RI ODZ´
$FFRUGLQJO\ &HQWXULRQ /RJLVWLFV PXVW GHQ\ &DOFH¶V LQGHPQLILFDWLRQ UHTXHVW DV WR OLDELOLW\
DULVLQJIURPWKLVFRQGXFW
         
          Business Organizations Code > Title 1 General
Provisions (Chs. 1 — 12) > Chapter 8 Indemnification and Insurance (Subchs. A — D) > Subchapter C
Permissive Indemnification and Advancement of Expenses (§§ 8.101 — 8.150)

Sec. 8.104. Advancement of Expenses to Present Governing Persons or Delegates.

   (a) An enterprise may pay or reimburse reasonable expenses incurred by a present governing person or
   delegate who was, is, or is threatened to be made a respondent in a proceeding in advance of the final
   disposition of the proceeding without making the determinations required under Section 8.101(a) after the
   enterprise receives:
           (1) a written affirmation by the person of the person’s good faith belief that the person has met
           the standard of conduct necessary for indemnification under this chapter; and
           (2) a written undertaking by or on behalf of the person to repay the amount paid or reimbursed if
           the final determination is that the person has not met that standard or that indemnification is
           prohibited by Section 8.102.
   (b) A provision in the governing documents of the enterprise, a resolution of the owners, members, or
   governing authority, or an agreement that requires the payment or reimbursement permitted under this
   section authorizes that payment or reimbursement after the enterprise receives an affirmation and
   undertaking described by Subsection (a).
   (c) The written undertaking required by Subsection (a)(2) must be an unlimited general obligation of the
   person but need not be secured and may be accepted by the enterprise without regard to the person’s
   ability to make repayment.
   (d) With respect to a limited partnership, a vote of a majority-in-interest of the limited partners in a vote
   that excludes the interest held by each general partner who is not disinterested and independent
   constitutes an authorization under Subsection (b). For purposes of this subsection, “majority-in-interest”
   means, with respect to limited partners, limited partners who own more than 50 percent of the current
   percentage or other interest in the profits of the partnership that is owned by all of the limited partners.

History

Enacted by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 182 (H.B. 1156), § 1, effective January 1, 2006; am. Acts 2005, 79th
Leg., ch. 64 (H.B. 1319), §§ 23, 24, effective January 1, 2006; am. Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 688 (H.B. 1737), §
42, effective September 1, 2007; am. Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 139 (S.B. 748), § 6, effective September 1,
2011.
                                           Tex. Business Organizations Code § 8.104

Texas Statutes & Codes Annotated by LexisNexis®
Copyright © 2018 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.

  End of Document

                                                                                      Page 2 of 2