Court Opinion

ID: 9715953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:21:14.297144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:40.143907
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I believe plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law in the event he is discharged by Illinois Power in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Illinois courts have never before recognized a right to injunctive relief in retaliatory discharge cases, but have awarded plaintiffs monetary damages. I think money damages can adequately compensate plaintiff for loss of his employment rights and benefits and that he therefore has an adequate remedy at law, precluding injunctive relief. The majority, relying on U-Haul Co. v. Hindahl (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 572, 413 N.E.2d 187, and Eagle Books, Inc. v. Jones (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 407, 474 N.E.2d 444, holds that plaintiff will suffer irreparable damages if the injunction is denied because violation of his protectable interest not to be discharged in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act is sufficient to establish irreparable injury. However, in both those cases, irreparable injury was not presumed, as the majority concludes, but was found to exist because the damages plaintiffs did suffer, specifically loss of future business, were not capable of adequate computation. Thus, the plaintiffs had no adequate remedy at law and would have been irreparably injured by the denial of an injunction. In the instant case, plaintiff’s damages are capable of adequate computation. Courts have long compensated for loss of employment rights and benefits and have had no trouble doing so. If, after hearing the merits of plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge action, the court determines that plaintiff has established his case, plaintiff can be adequately and fully compensated in money damages for his loss of employment benefits. The majority argues that plaintiff cannot be compensated monetarily for his loss of “self-worth and personal identity” and his loss of “meaning and dignity” in his life. I believe that an award of punitive damages, allowable in retaliatory discharge cases, goes a long way toward compensating for these “losses.” In any event, such “damages” are speculative and proof of a speculative possibility of injury is not sufficient to justify an injunction. In re Marriage of Strauss (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 424, 429, 539 N.E.2d 808, 812. Finally, the majority argues that no adequate legal remedy exists because the public policy against discharging employees for exercising their rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act cannot be fully protected simply through actions for money damages. Allowing awards of punitive damages adequately protects the public policy. Indeed, punitive damages are awarded for that specific purpose. Because plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, I dissent.