Court Opinion

ID: 9682302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:09:10.81007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.656369
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO TRANSFER TO SUPREME COURT
PER CURIAM.
Counsel for respondent, in a motion for rehearing or, in the alternative, to transfer this case to the Supreme Court of Missouri, cite several statutes not heretofore cited either to respondent or to us. These statutes, say counsel for respondent, are in direct conflict with our opinion.
Were this case before us on appeal from a judgment denying relief on the third-party petition, we would not be obliged to consider these newly cited statutes, as an appellate court, on appeal from a judgment denying relief, will not consider the question of liability on a basis not presented in the trial court. Moore v. Riley, 487 S.W.2d 555, 558-59[2] (Mo.1972). However, the case is before us as an original proceeding in prohibition, presenting the question whether respondent should be forbidden from proceeding further against the Commission in the underlying case. Therefore, any statute exposing the Commission to liability to Lewis or National Oil under the third-party petition must be considered.
The first newly cited statute is C.C.S. H.B. 354, Laws 1983, pp. 284-85, effective September 28, 1983 (“the 1983 Act”),7 which repealed § 34.260, RSMo 1978, and enacted in lieu thereof one new section carrying the same number. The new section, codified as § 34.260, RSMo Cum.Supp. 1983, is set out marginally.8
*893The origin of § 34.260, RSMo 1978, was H.B. 353, Laws 1973, pp. 108-09 (“the 1973 Act”), which contained sections numbered 1 through 4. Those sections, respectively, became codified as §§ 34.260, 34.265, 34.-270 and 34.275, RSMo Cum.Supp.1975. They are set out marginally.9
It is evident that the purpose of the 1973 Act was to authorize the State to provide, at public expense, liability insurance coverage for State employees while they were operating State-owned motor vehicles and vessels in the course of their employment.10 Indeed, the title of the 1973 *894Act was: “An Act relating to motor vehicle and marine liability insurance for state employees operating state owned vehicles and vessels.” The title of an act is necessarily a part thereof and is to be considered in construing the act. Bullington v. State, 459 S.W.2d 334, 341[3] (Mo.1970); A.J. Meyer & Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W.2d 184, 189[4] (1941). Title, in this context, means the title as enacted by the General Assembly, not the catchwords prefixed by the Revisor of Statutes which are not a part of the title in a constitutional sense. Bullington, 459 S.W.2d at 341[3]; Ex parte Lockhart, 350 Mo. 1220, 171 S.W.2d 660, 663[5] (banc 1943).
It was unnecessary, of course, to provide insurance protection for the State against tort liability in 1973 because, at that time, the State was shielded from such liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Jones, 557 S.W.2d at 226; Bush, 46 S.W.2d at 857[1]. It is manifest from § 34.275, RSMo Cum.Supp.197511 (a part of the 1973 Act), that the General Assembly, in enacting the 1973 Act, had no intention of waiving or abrogating the State’s sovereign immunity from tort liability.
Sections 34.260, 34.265 and 34.270, RSMo Cum.Supp.1975, were amended in 1976 by H.B. 1528, Laws 1976, pp. 602-04, which added State-owned aircraft to the vehicles for which liability insurance was to be procured, and added members of the Missouri national guard “or agents in the course of their employment” to the employees to be covered. Section 34.275, RSMo Cum.Supp. 1975, was not amended by the 1976 legislation. The 1976 legislation did, however, contain a new section defining the terms “aircraft,” “motor vehicle,” and “state-controlled.” That section became codified as § 34.272, RSMo Supp.1976.
After 1976, no changes were made in §§ 34.260 through 34.275 until the 1983 Act,12 which, as explained earlier, changed § 34.260. That section was the only one affected by the 1983 Act. The other sections (34.265, 34.270, 34.272 and 34.275) remained intact. Section 34.275, it will be remembered, is the section that provides that nothing in §§ 34.260 to 34.275 is intended to nor shall be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity or the acknowledgment or creation of any liability on the part of the State for personal injury, death or property damage.
Admittedly, that portion of the 1983 Act13 beginning with the fourth sentence and continuing to the end of the Act, while mysteriously worded and difficult to fathom, is nonetheless arguably subject to interpretation as an unconditional waiver of sovereign immunity in the instances specified in subsections “(1)” and “(2)” of § 537.600, RSMo 1978. We cannot ignore, however, that § 34.275, RSMo 1978, ostensibly remained undisturbed by the 1983 Act.
It could be maintained, of course, that § 34.275, RSMo 1978, to the extent that it may be in conflict with the 1983 Act, was repealed by implication by the latter. It has been held that where there are two legislative acts on one subject and they are repugnant in any of their provisions, the later act, without any repealing laws, operates to the extent of the repugnancy to repeal the earlier. City of Kirkwood v. Allen, 399 S.W.2d 30, 34[1] (Mo. banc 1966).
Be that as it may, we need not ponder the effect of the 1983 Act on § 34.275, RSMo 1978, or on §§ 537.60014 and 537.-610,15 RSMo 1978. That is because the 1983 Act took effect, as already noted, on September 28, 1983. The third-party petition alleges that the collision that caused the death of the plaintiffs’ son occurred March 4, 1983, and counsel for respondent *895concede that the cause of action that Lewis and National Oil seek to maintain against the Commission in the third-party petition “accrued” at the time of the collision, a date more than 6 months prior to the effective date of the 1983 Act. Consequently, whether the third-party petition states a cause of action against the Commission is to be determined by §§ 537.600 and 537.-610, RSMo 1978, as construed by Bartley, and without regard to the 1983 Act.
Counsel for respondent argue otherwise, insisting that the 1983 Act “was a message from the legislature to the Supreme Court that the decision of the majority in Bartley was incorrect,” and that the dissenting opinion correctly interpreted §§ 537.600 and 537.610, RSMo 1978. Therefore, say counsel for respondent, we should reject Bartley and follow the General Assembly’s “construction” of §§ 537.600 and 537.610 as set forth in the 1983 Act. Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is, according to counsel for respondent, accorded great weight in construing that statute.
The argument of counsel for respondent overlooks the fact that §§ 537.600 and 537.610, RSMo 1978, had been construed by Bartley prior to the effective date of the 1983 Act. It has been held that the judicial construction of a statute by a court of last resort becomes as much a part of the statute as the text itself. Eberle v. Koplar, 85 S.W.2d 919, 923[7] (Mo.App.1935). Thus, after the decision in Bartley and absent amendment by the General Assembly or a different construction by subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri, §§ 537.600 and 537.610, RSMo 1978, meant what Bartley said they meant.
That being so, and bearing in mind that the claim that Lewis and National Oil seek to assert against the Commission “accrued” before the effective date of the 1983 Act, the only way that the 1983 Act could possibly aid Lewis and National Oil would be if the 1983 Act were applied retroactively.
Statutes are generally presumed to operate prospectively unless the legislative intent that they be given retroactive operation clearly appears from the express language of the act or by necessary or unavoidable implication. Department of Social Services v. Villa Capri Homes, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 327, 332[2] (Mo. banc 1985); Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 81, 34[3] (Mo. banc 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1094, 103 S.Ct. 711, 74 L.Ed.2d 942 (1983). We find neither express language nor necessary or unavoidable implication in the 1983 Act that it was meant to operate retroactively. Accordingly, we reject the contention of counsel for respondent that the 1983 Act should be applied retroactively.
Having done that, we need not consider whether retroactive application of the 1983 Act would offend Mo. Const, art. I, § 13 (1945), which provides:
“That no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.”
We likewise need not determine whether, or to what extent, the 1983 Act, when it became effective, changed Bartley’s construction of §§ 537.600 and 537.610, RSMo 1978, as any such change at that time would not have impaired the sovereign immunity that had shielded the State from tort liability for a claim that had “accrued” on March 4, 1983.
The premise of counsel for respondent that the 1983 Act compels a different result than the one reached in our opinion is, for the foregoing reasons, without merit.
We now turn our attention to other legislative activity that took place in 1983. Counsel for respondent cite S.B. 275, Laws 1983, pp. 378-80 (hereafter referred to as “S.B. 275”), which repealed both versions of § 105.710 appearing in RSMo Supp.1982 and enacted in lieu thereof four new sections (§§ 105.711,105.716,105.721 and 105.-726). H.B. 275, among other things, created a “State Legal Expense Fund” to replace the Tort Defense Fund, and provided that moneys therein would be available, in certain circumstances, for payment of claims or judgments against the State or *896any agency thereof “pursuant to section 537.600, RSMo,” and for payment of claims or judgments against any officer or employee of the State and members of the Missouri national guard based on conduct arising out of and performed in connection with official duties on behalf of the State.
H.B. 275 took effect September 28, 1983. We have carefully studied H.B. 275 and the statutes it replaced, and we have found nothing suggesting that H.B. 275 should be applied retroactively to alter the effect of Bartley’s construction of §§ 537.600 and 537.610, RSMo 1978. Inasmuch as the claim sought to be asserted against the Commission by the third-party petition “accrued” on March 4, 1983, we need not consider what impact, if any, H.B. 275 had on Bartley’s construction of §§ 537.600 and 537.610 when H.B. 275 took effect September 28, 1983.
For the same reasons that we earlier held that the 1983 Act did not compel a different result than the one in our opinion, we likewise hold that H.B. 275 compels no different result.
The final statute cited by counsel for respondent in the post-opinion motion is H.C.S.S.B. 323, enacted at the First Regular Session of the Eighty-third General Assembly. That legislation (“the 1985 Act”) became effective September 28, 1985, 29 days after our opinion was filed.
The 1985 Act repealed § 537.600, RSMo 1978,16 and enacted in lieu thereof a new section carrying the same number. The new section contains everything that appeared in the repealed section and, in addition, some provisions that did not appear in the repealed section. The new section is set out marginally, the new provisions identified by italics.17
Counsel for respondent assert that the 1985 Act makes it “absolutely certain” that sovereign immunity is waived as to all injuries caused by a dangerous condition of a public entity’s property, irrespective of whether the public entity is covered by liability insurance. Therefore, say counsel for respondent, if the 1985 Act applies retroactively to an accident that occurred March 4, 1983 (the date of the collision that caused the death of the plaintiffs’ son), it is unnecessary for Lewis and National Oil to allege in their third-party petition that the Commission has liability insurance or a *897self-insurance plan to indemnify it against a judgment for the plaintiffs or Lewis or National Oil. Consequently, according to counsel for respondent, the only issue this Court needs to decide is whether the 1985 Act applies retroactively to March 4, 1983.
Insisting that the General Assembly intended the 1985 Act to operate retroactively, counsel for respondent point to the segment of the 1985 Act providing that in an action based on the negligent, defective or dangerous design of a highway or road designed and constructed prior to September 12,1977, the public entity has a defense whenever it can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged negligent, defective or dangerous design reasonably complied with highway and road design standards generally accepted at the time the road or highway was designed and constructed. For convenience, we henceforth refer to this defense as “the design standards defense.”
Counsel for respondent remind us that September 12, 1977, was the date the Supreme Court of Missouri decided Jones, 557 S.W.2d 225, which, as noted earlier, abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity prospectively as to all tort claims arising on or after August 15, 1978. Counsel for respondent argue that the only logical reason for the General Assembly to provide the design standards defense in the 1985 Act is that the General Assembly intended to waive the State’s sovereign immunity from and after September 12, 1977, as to all situations described in the 1985 Act, and the General Assembly correspondingly granted the State the design standards defense to “compensate” for the absence of sovereign immunity from and after September 12, 1977. Counsel for respondent maintain that if the 1985 Act is not retroactive, there would be no waiver of the Commission’s sovereign immunity prior to September 28, 1985, and thus no need for the design standards defense before that date.
The argument, while superficially sound, is, upon closer examination, unconvincing.
We must remember, as explained earlier, that statutes are generally presumed to operate prospectively unless the legislative intent that they be given retroactive operation clearly appears from the express language of the act or by necessary or unavoidable implication. Department of Social Services, 684 S.W.2d at 332[2]; Lincoln Credit Co., 636 S.W.2d at 34[3]. There is, of course, no express language in the 1985 Act providing that it operate retroactively. Therefore, we must presume that it was intended to operate prospectively unless the contrary clearly appears by necessary or unavoidable implication. For the reasons that follow, we find no such implication.
After Jones, the first legislative action by the General Assembly regarding sovereign immunity was the 1978 Act, which restored sovereign immunity as it had existed prior to September 12, 1977 (the date of Jones), subject to the limited exceptions specifically carved out in the 1978 Act. Nothing in the 1978 Act provided that the exceptions therein were to apply retroactively to September 12, 1977, and it was squarely held in Christophel v. Parkway School District, 600 S.W.2d 61, 62[3] (Mo.App.1980), that a school district was immune from liability and suit for personal injuries allegedly sustained on its premises on February 20, 1978, a date after Jones but prior to the effective date of the 1978 Act. In reaching that result, Christophel noted the language in Jones, 557 S.W.2d at 231, which made the abrogation of sovereign immunity there prospective “[i]n order that an orderly transition be made, that adequate financial planning take place, that governmental units have time to adjust their practices and that the legislature be afforded an opportunity to consider the subject in general....” Christophel, 600 S.W.2d at 62.
Were we to accept the argument of counsel for respondent, we would be holding that the General Assembly, in enacting the 1985 Act, intended to waive sovereign immunity (in the instances therein specified) —insurance or not — retroactively to September 12, 1977, even though the General Assembly, in the 1978 Act, did not make the exceptions to sovereign immunity in that Act retroactive to September 12, 1977. *898If the General Assembly, in 1978, did not intend to make the exceptions to sovereign immunity in the 1978 Act retroactive to September 12, 1977, we fail to see how it can be unavoidably implied in the 1985 Act —7 years after the 1978 Act — that the General Assembly intended to make the exceptions to sovereign immunity in the 1985 Act retroactive to September 12, 1977, a date more than 8 years prior to the effective date of the 1985 Act. To apply the 1985 Act retroactively would offend the policy expressed in Jones that any change in sovereign immunity should be prospective so that an orderly transition can be made, adequate financial planning can take place, and governmental units can have time to adjust their practices.
Moreover, applying the 1985 Act retroactively to September 12, 1977, as urged by counsel for respondent, would result in public entities such as the school district in Christophel being retroactively stripped of the defense of sovereign immunity in regard to claims like the one in that case (which occurred after Jones but before the effective date of the 1978 Act), a bizarre denouement inasmuch as the 5-year statute of limitations, § 516.120(4), RSMo 1978, applicable to such actions, Farwig v. City of St. Louis, 499 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Mo.1973); Farthing v. Sams, 296 Mo. 442, 247 S.W. 111 (1922), would have already run — unless tolled — before the 1985 Act became law.
Embracing the position advocated by counsel for respondent would also mean that public entities such as the Commission, which understood the 1978 Act to say that sovereign immunity was waived only in the two situations expressly provided in subsections “(1)” and “(2)” of § 537.600, RSMo 1978, and, even in those two instances, only to the extent that the public entity had liability insurance or a self-insurance plan for such purposes (the interpretation reached in Bartley in 1983), and which consequently elected not to provide liability insurance or adopt a self-insurance plan, would, as of September 28, 1985, be retroactively exposed to liability for any uninsured claim on which the statute of limitations had not run.
We cannot reasonably infer that the General Assembly intended to create such havoc. Bearing in mind that the 1985 Act was passed at the legislative session that ended June 30, 1985, and that it took effect, as noted earlier, on September 28, 1985, we believe the more logical assumption is that the General Assembly intended the 1985 Act to operate only prospectively, thereby affording the State and its departments and agencies the interval between the passage of the Act and its effective date to prepare for the changes occasioned by the Act before it became law. Accordingly, we reject the contention of counsel for respondent that the General Assembly meant the 1985 Act to apply retroactively. That makes it unnecessary to consider the constitutional implications (Mo. Const, art. I, § 13 (1945)) of retroactive application, and we forgo that task.
The motion for rehearing or, in the alternative, to transfer this case to the Supreme Court of Missouri, is denied'.

. The 1983 Act was enacted at the First Regular Session of the Eighty-second General Assembly which adjourned June 30, 1983. Under Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 29 (1945, amended 1970), the 1983 Act took effect 90 days after adjournment.

. Section 34.260, RSMo Cum.Supp.1983 ("the 1983 Act”), provides:
"The commissioner of administration may procure on the basis of competitive bids under the provisions of this chapter, motor vehicle, aircraft, and marine liability insurance covering the operation of state-controlled motor vehicles, aircraft, and marine vessels by state employees, members of the Missouri national guard, or agents in the course of their employment, military duties, or the scope of their agency, or for dangerous conditions of property as defined in section 537.600, RSMo; provided, however, that in lieu of procuring insurance to cover such risks, the commissioner may determine that the state shall self-insure against all or any portion of such risks. Each department and agency of state government coming within the provisions of sections 34.260 to 34.275 shall provide the commissioner with such information regarding the risks to be insured as he deems necessary. Sections 34.260 to 34.275 shall not apply to the departments and agencies which, on September 28, 1973, provided motor vehicle liability insurance for their employees who oper*893ate state-controlled motor vehicles, aircraft, or marine vessels in the course of their employment, military duties, or scope of their agency. The procurement of liability insurance or the adoption of a plan of self-insurance by the commissioner of administration shall not limit the express waiver of sovereign immunity in all cases within such situations specified therein whether or not the public entity was functioning in a governmental or proprietary capacity or whether or not the public entity is: (1) covered by liability insurance or a self-insurance plan or (2) uninsured. In the other situations specified in this section, and in such other situations of tort liability for which insurance or a self-insurance plan is obtained or provided, sovereign immunity is waived to the maximum amount of, and for the purposes covered by, such policy of insurance or self-insurance plan, provided that sovereign immunity in instances other than those specified in subdivisions (1) and (2) of section 537.600, RSMo, shall be retained in the event the public entity elects not to procure insurance or to implement a self-insurance plan under the provisions of sections 537.620 to 537.650, RSMo."

. Section 34.260, RSMo Cum.Supp.1975, provided:
“The state purchasing agent shall procure on the basis of competitive bids under the provisions of chapter 34, motor vehicle and marine liability insurance covering the operation of state-owned vehicles and vessels by state employees in the course of their employment. Each department and agency of state government coming within the provisions of sections 34.260 to 34.275 shall provide the state purchasing agent with the information necessary to procure the insurance, and the cost of the insurance for each department and agency shall be paid out of the appropriations to the department or agency. Sections 34.260 to 34.275 shall not apply to the departments and agencies which, on September 28, 1973, provide motor vehicle liability insurance for employees who drive state-owned motor vehicles in the course of their employment.” Section 34.265, RSMo Cum.Supp.1975, provided:
“Motor vehicle or marine liability insurance acquired pursuant to sections 34.260 to 34.275 shall provide blanket coverage for state employees while operating state-owned motor vehicles or vessels on state business or in the course of their employment subject to the following limits exclusive of interest and costs:
(1) Not less than twenty-five thousand dollars because of bodily injury to, or the death of, one person in any one accident;
(2) Subject to the limit in subdivision (1), not less than fifty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to, or death of, two or more persons in any one accident; and
(3) Not less than five thousand dollars because of injury to, or destruction of, property of others in any one accident.”
Section 34.270, RSMo Cum.Supp.1975, provided:
“Insurance acquired pursuant to sections 34.260 to 34.275 shall be issued by an insurance company or association authorized to transact business in this state and shall by its terms provide adequate insurance for the employee under standard policy provisions approved by the state division of insurance for the coverage specified in sections 34.260 to 34.275 for any damages caused by reason of death, personal injury, or property damage resulting from the negligent operation of a state-owned motor vehicle or vessel on state business or within the course of his employment."
Section 34.275, RSMo Cum.Supp.1975, provided:
"Nothing in sections 34.260 to 34.275 is intended to nor shall it be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity or the acknowledgment or creation of any liability on the part of the state for personal injury, death, or property damage.”

. Section 34.260, RSMo Cum.Supp.1975, indicated that even before the 1973 Act became effective — it took effect September 28, 1973— there were State departments and agencies that provided motor vehicle liability insurance for employees who drove State-owned motor vehicles in the course of their employment. The Commission was given statutory authority to provide such insurance for its employees in 1971. H.B. 60, Laws 1971, pp. 287-88 (now codified as § 226.092, RSMo 1978) provided: "The State Highway Commission is authorized, when considered by it to be in the public interest, to acquire and to pay for, as part compensation to the employee involved, liability insurance covering the operation of state-owned vehicles involved in the performance of opera*894tions of the Commission. The immunity in tort actions of the State and the State Highway Commission shall not be in any way affected by this act.”

. Section 34.275, RSMo Cum.Supp.1975, is the last statute appearing in footnote 9, supra.

. Footnote 8, supra.

. Footnote 8, supra.

. Footnote 4, supra.

. Footnote 5, supra.

. Footnote 4, supra.

. Section 537.600, as it appears in the 1985 Act, reads:
“1. Such sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law in this state prior to September 12, 1977, except to the extent waived, abrogated or modified by statutes in effect prior to that date, shall remain in full force and effect; except that, the immunity of the public entity from liability and suit for compensatory damages for negligent acts or omissions is hereby expressly waived in the following instances:
(1) Injuries directly resulting from the negligent acts or omissions by public employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles or motorized vehicles within the course of their employment;
(2) Injuries caused by the condition of a public'entity’s property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the course of his employment created the dangerous condition or a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. In any action under this subdivision wherein a plaintiff alleges that he was damaged by the negligent, defective or dangerous design of a highway or road, which was designed and constructed prior to September 12, 1977, the public entity shall be entitled to a defense which shall be a complete bar to recovery whenever the public entity can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged negligent, defective, or dangerous design reasonably complied with highway and road design standards generally accepted at the time the road or highway was designed and constructed.

2. The express waiver of sovereign immunity in the instances specified in subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection 1 of this section are absolute waivers of sovereign immunity in all cases within such situations whether or not the public entity was functioning in a governmental or proprietary capacity and whether or not the public entity is covered by a liability insurance for tort."