Court Opinion

ID: 9685423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:37:02.137052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:05.768528
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
I concur.
ISSUE I
Appellant, throughout the thread of her brief and her showing at circuit court level, would have this Court “go behind” an appeal which was dismissed with prejudice over five years ago. This cannot be. By abandoning her appeal, she abandoned all arguments with it. Furthermore, Appellant is trying to renege on her stipulation because she elected to not pursue her ap*374peal, opting for a sum certain of alimony for five years.
ISSUE II
This brings us to the question of determining whether or not further alimony is to be awarded appellant based on present circumstances of the parties. Evidence, in form of affidavits of the parties, disclosed the financial condition of both parties as of the Summer of 1987, plus all property holdings of the parties at that time.
The trial court considered the various cases set forth in the majority opinion, which is obvious from its memorandum opinion and ultimate judgment herein. His Honor decided to simply make the parties comply with their stipulation. Lest the equitable aspect of this case be overlooked, I feel it is my duty to point out that Appellant has an annual salary of approximately $13,000; she has health insurance provided; she receives benefits as a former military dependent which include medical coverage, hospitalization coverage, commissary privileges, and post-exchange privileges. During the Summer of 1987, she possessed/owned $20,000 in certificates of deposit. She further possessed a one-half interest in a recreational cabin in the Black Hills. She also had a reversionary interest in an 80-acre farm in the State of Illinois. She lives with her mother in Illinois, paying nominal rent, the same rent as she was paying back in 1982. In 1982, she was a bookkeeper at Ace Hardware in Kankakee, Illinois, and she still is so employed, although her salary has increased. According to the circumstances before the trial court, Appellant kept her assets substantially intact after the divorce. No one doubts that she has excellent health. She is able to make a living in life without benefit of an alimony award.* On the other hand, the retired minister’s assets had dissipated since 1982. He lost his equity in a home in Columbus, Nebraska, and he owes between $55,000 and $60,000 via a mortgage to a bank. There is no equity in this home. His housing allowance was no different, monetarily, in 1982 than in the Summer of 1987. The trial court was faced with the fact that the minister’s assets diminished and this obviously influenced the trial court to discontinue alimony. When the trial court reviewed the affidavits on file, it was noted that Appellant was again presenting, essentially, the same state of facts as presented in the 1982-1983 litigation.
Appellant seeks relief upon facts and claims which previously were decided. This she cannot do. Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Felco Jewel Indus., Inc., 336 N.W.2d 153 (S.D.1983).
As for this appeal from an order which declines a further modification of an alimony award, our scope of review is abuse of discretion. Moore v. Moore, 354 N.W.2d 732 (S.D.1984). None exists.
I believe that it is my duty to point out that this minister of the Gospel should not be portrayed as a man with an unbenevo-lent heart, in that (a) the parties originally arrived at a property settlement agreement and alimony to be paid, (b) the minister kept his share of the bargain, (c) at the time of the settlement, each party received approximately $19,000 in liquid assets, and (d) each party received fifty percent of all property including the assets of the marital home, which was sold. Therefore, as she has been treated justly in the law ab initio, I join the majority’s opinion.

 For collection of writings of this author on alimony for nearly a decade, see Baltzer v. Baltzer, 422 N.W.2d 584, 589-91 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., concurring specially). See also Straub v. Straub, 381 N.W.2d 260, 262 (S.D.1986), for reasonableness of needs and that amount which the ex-husband can and ought to pay as criteria (citing Grant v. Grant, 5 S.D. 17, 57 N.W. 1130 (1894)).