Court Opinion

ID: 9586212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:08:17.774155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:25:30.204091
License: Public Domain

Ingram, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment of the court in this case *169because the record reveals that both parties signed the option. This shows assent by both parties to the terms of the option and created an obligation on the part of the optionee to pay the consideration recited in the option which was acknowledged by the parties. In my view, this case is controlled by Blount v. Lynch, 24 Ga. App. 217 (100 SE 644), holding that: "An option contract for the sale of land is not subject to attack because of inadequacy of the consideration named in it; nor is it necessarily rendered unenforceable by failure to pay the consideration named.”
The option consideration involved in Blount was $1 and the option agreement was signed and sealed by both parties. As these same circumstances appear in the present case, I consider the ruling in the first division of Blount to be decisive here.
However, if the option agreement had not been signed by the optionee and he failed to pay the recited consideration for the option, I believe a good argument can be made that the optionor could lawfully withdraw the option before it was assented to by the optionee. The rules governing other contracts apply to an option and before it can be regarded as a contract there must be an agreement on its terms and conditions. See Jones v. Vereen, 52 Ga. App. 157, 158 (182 SE 627). "Where a consideration is paid for the option, however, the party making the offer cannot lawfully withdraw it. If the offer is in writing, for a valuable consideration, and time is given within which it shall stand open for acceptance, such option, during the time specified, is irrevocable.” Black v. Maddox, 104 Ga. 157, 162 (30 SE 723).
There was consideration contracted to be paid in the present case since the optionee assented to the terms of the option by signing it. Therefore, I concur in the court’s opinion and judgment in this case.
See Morris v. Johnson, 219 Ga. 81, 85 (132 SE2d 45), dealing with a failure to pay the recited consideration in a deed, where this court held that, "[T]he mere fact that such [consideration] was not actually paid does not render void the conveyance but creates a liability upon the purchaser which may be enforced in an action at law.” This has long been the rule in Georgia with respect *170to real estate instruments as noted in Morris, supra. Therefore, under the salutary doctrine of stare decisis, I agree the rationale of this rule should be applied to the option involved under the facts of this case.