Court Opinion

ID: 9849186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:35:53.937213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:05.708327
License: Public Domain

Head, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially. I concur in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Mobley, to the effect that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the request as to wilful and wanton negligence. The request to charge was not a proper request, and it would have been reversible error, in my opinion., for the court to have charged the request in the language thereof.
I concur in the judgment of reversal, however, for an entirely different reason from that stated in the opinion of the majority. The plaintiff had pleaded, and the evidence amply authorized a -finding, that, at the time of the collision in which the plaintiff’s son was killed, the employee of the defendant company, John Albert Smith, was operating the truck of the defendant in violation of Rule 10 of the Public Service Commission which provides as follows: “No driver shall go on duty while under the influence
of, nor drink while on duty, any alcoholic beverage or liquor, whatever its alcoholic content, nor shall he knowingly be permitted to do so.” In his charge to the jury the trial judge nowhere gave this rule, but charged that “The plaintiff contends that John Albert Smith, the driver of the Woodside truck violated the rule of the Georgia Public Service Commission with respect to drinking alcoholic beverages. If you find such alleged act has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence against John Albert .Smith, then I charge you that this would be negligence per se; etc.” This charge within itself was inadequate and incomplete, in that the rule of the Public Service Commission was not given in -charge,- and there was no proper guide for the jury in determining whether or not the rule had been violated, since, in the absence of proper instructions, the jury could have understood .that, in order to violate the rule, of the Public Service Commission, the drinking of alcoholic beverages would have to occur after the defendant’s driver had entered upon his employment, and such is not the law.
The injury, however, was compounded by the subsequent charge of the court. The court further charged with reference to the consumption of alcoholic beverages by the defendant’s driver, *448and concluded this charge with the following language: “In other words, before any one would be entitled to recover against the defendant on the ground of driving under the influence, gentlemen, it would be necessary to show that he was less capable of operating a car than he would have been if he had not done the drinking.” This charge is in direct conflict with the rule of the Public Service Commission. It had the effect in the present case of completely withdrawing from the jury Rule 10 of the Public Service Commission, and the jury was left without any proper guide as to when the rule of the Public Service Commission would apply and when the general rule of law of this State would apply. Jurors, however honest, intelligent, and capable, are not required, nor can they be expected, to select from contradictory charges that which should properly be applied under the facts of a given case. I therefore concur in the judgment of reversal, but not for the reason stated in the opinion of the majority.