Court Opinion

ID: 9870607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 20:03:30.442757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:50:08.923608
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/26/23 P. v. Love CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                    B319568

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. BA492005)
           v.

 TRENSES LOVE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gustavo N. Sztraicher, Judge. Affirmed.
      Larenda R. Delaini, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant and appellant Trenses Love was convicted by a
jury of one count of felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 29800, subd. (a)).1 On appeal from the judgment, defendant
claims two evidentiary errors were made during his trial. He
contends the court erred by (1) admitting a redacted copy of a
certified California Law Enforcement Telecommunications
System (CLETS) rap sheet from the Department of Justice and
(2) allowing the prosecutor to impeach him with a 14-year-old
felony conviction. He also challenges the constitutionality of his
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm following
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (November 3, 2021,
No. 20-843) ___ U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387]
(Bruen). We disagree and affirm the judgment.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    Prosecution Evidence
      On December 13, 2020, defendant called 911 to report a
dispute he was having with his landlord. During his 911 call,
defendant stated two people were standing in front of him. He
added, “One has a sidearm [and] one has a can of mace[,] and I
have a firearm in my backpack.”
      Los Angeles Police Department Officer Victor Abarca
responded to the apartment complex and contacted defendant,
who was wearing a backpack. After hearing defendant had been
carrying a firearm in his backpack, Officer Abarca took the
backpack with defendant’s cooperation and placed it in his patrol
car. Officer Abarca settled the landlord-tenant dispute, retrieved
defendant’s backpack, and asked defendant if he could search it.

1     Subsequent references to statutes are to the Penal Code.

                                  2
With defendant’s consent, Officer Abarca opened the backpack
and found a loaded .40-caliber semiautomatic firearm.2
       Maria Carranza, a legal office support assistant with the
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office, testified she had
requested and received from the Department of Corrections a
certified copy of defendant’s 969b packet.3 Carranza also
obtained a certified CLETS rap sheet from the Department of
Justice, which provided a “criminal history record” for defendant.
       Based on defendant’s 969b packet, Carranza testified that
defendant had suffered a prior felony conviction in August 2005
for possession of cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11351.5). Based on the CLETS rap sheet, Carranza confirmed
defendant’s prior conviction in 2005 and the date of defendant’s
arrest in this case: December 13, 2020.

B.   Defense Evidence
     Before discussing the facts of this case, defendant testified
he had previously been convicted of theft by access card (§ 484g)
on September 30, 2008. He then testified that between January
and March 2020, the mother of defendant’s youngest daughter
made “some murder-suicide threats and threatened to hurt

2     The firearm had seven live rounds in the magazine but did not
have a round in the chamber.
3      Section 969b provides: “For the purpose of establishing prima
facie evidence of the fact that a person being tried for a crime or public
offense under the laws of this State has been convicted of an act
punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, . . . and has served a
term therefor in any penal institution, . . . the records or copies of
records of any state penitentiary, . . . when such records or copies
thereof have been certified by the official custodian of such records,
may be introduced as such evidence.”

                                    3
herself and hurt [his] child” with an unregistered firearm. At a
family gathering on March 7, 2020, defendant took the firearm
and placed it in his backpack. Defendant returned home and
called the police to report the threatening statements and “how
[he] got the firearm and that [he] had it.” When officers
responded to his home, defendant tried to relinquish the firearm
to the police. The officers told defendant to “hold onto it” until
someone reported it missing. Defendant did not inform the
officers he was a convicted felon or that the firearm was not
registered to him. Not knowing “what to do” with it, defendant
left the firearm in his apartment, “out of reach, [and] out of
mind.” Defendant made no attempt to surrender the firearm
between March and December 2020.
       Defendant testified that before police responded to the
landlord-tenant incident on December 13, 2020, defendant’s
landlord and three other people bagged up his belongings and
threw them out of defendant’s apartment. The items thrown
outside included defendant’s backpack and the .40-caliber firearm
inside it. Fearful the firearm would fall into the wrong hands,
defendant grabbed his backpack knowing what was inside.
       On cross-examination, defendant admitted his backpack
contained the firearm, some of his mail, and a phone charger that
he used every day. As a convicted felon, defendant knew he was
legally prohibited from possessing a firearm.

C.    Affirmative Defenses and Verdict
      For the charged offense of felon in possession of a firearm,
the jury was instructed that it could only convict defendant upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) possessed a firearm;
(2) knew that he possessed the firearm; and (3) previously was

                                4
convicted of a felony. However, if defendant proved “the defense
of momentary or transitory possession,” the “possession was not
unlawful.”
       For momentary possession, defendant was required to
prove (1) he possessed the firearm “only for a momentary or
transitory period”; (2) he possessed the firearm to abandon,
dispose, or destroy it; and (3) he did not intend to prevent law
enforcement from seizing the firearm. (CALCRIM No. 2510.) For
justified possession, defendant was required to prove (1) he found
the firearm or took it “from a person who was committing a crime
against” him; (2) he possessed the firearm “no longer than was
necessary to deliver or transport” it to law enforcement for
disposal; and (3) if he was transporting the firearm, he gave prior
notice to law enforcement he would be delivering it for disposal.
(Ibid.)
       By general verdict, the jury found defendant guilty of felon
in possession of a firearm.

                          DISCUSSION
A.     Claims of Evidentiary Error
       Defendant raises two claims of error under Evidence Code
section 352. He contends (1) the court erroneously admitted a
redacted copy of the CLETS rap sheet, and (2) the court should
have precluded his impeachment with a 14-year-old felony
conviction. Under section 352, the trial court has discretion to
exclude otherwise admissible evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” A trial court’s exercise of discretion

                                5
under section 352 will not be disturbed unless it is shown that it
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Jones
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 304.) As we shall discuss, we find no
abuse of discretion in the court’s rulings.

       1.     Relevant Proceedings
       During Carranza’s testimony, the prosecution sought to
introduce a 969b packet certified by the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation summarizing “a chronological
history that explains the movement of [defendant as an]
inmate . . . .” Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel
objected to the packet as irrelevant. Finding the packet relevant
to defendant’s prior conviction, the court overruled the objection
but cautioned the prosecutor not to draw attention to defendant’s
time served in prison. Upon accepting the court’s ruling, the
prosecutor stated he intended to introduce a CLETS rap sheet,
which listed the date of arrest in this case, “for the purpose of
identification.” Defense counsel objected, “[I]t’s 352 and
unnecessary.” The court overruled the objection but noted,
“[W]e’ll make every attempt to avoid highlighting or showing the
jury that the defendant served time in prison because it does
seem more prejudicial than probative.” The prosecutor stated he
was amenable to redacting both the 969b packet and CLETS rap
sheet.
       Carranza testified the 969b packet contained a certified
abstract of judgment for defendant’s felony conviction on
August 16, 2005, for possession of cocaine base for sale (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11351.5). When the prosecutor inquired about
another abstract of judgment, defense counsel objected. At a
sidebar conference, counsel objected to the prosecutor’s question:

                                 6
“[Y]our honor already ruled that . . . one conviction was going to
suffice, and I thought that the prosecution was going to introduce
the theft conviction” from 2005. Counsel also raised “352 grounds
because it’s one conviction on a slew of convictions.” The court
sustained the objection under Evidence Code section 352, finding
the evidence was “all basically the same type of proof.” The court
added, “[I]t doesn’t really add anything to the People’s case but,
rather, might prejudice the defense. So [the] People will be
permitted to introduce one felony conviction.”
       Following the sidebar, Carranza testified she had obtained
a CLETS rap sheet from the Department of Justice. After the
prosecutor marked the certified rap sheet as an exhibit, the court
excused the jury for the day. Remaining on the record, the
parties entered into a stipulation addressing “the necessary
redactions” they had discussed previously. The parties stipulated
“that, for the purpose of . . . creating the agreed-upon and
stipulated redactions,” the prosecutor would take the 969b packet
and CLETS rap sheet out of the courtroom and substitute
redacted versions in place of the versions previously submitted as
exhibits.
       Before continuing witness testimony the following day, the
court accepted the prosecutor’s redacted versions of the
969b packet and CLETS rap sheet. It also admonished counsel
that “if the redactions are obvious, I’m going to just advise
counsel to be wary about not implying . . . in any way that the
redactions mean anything.”
       At the conclusion of the People’s case-in-chief, the
prosecutor moved to admit exhibits he had marked during trial.
Defense counsel agreed to admitting all marked exhibits except

                                7
the CLETS rap sheet, which he argued was lacking in
foundation. The court overruled the objection.
        Before defendant’s case-in-chief, defense counsel inquired:
“[I]f [defendant] were to testify, I’d ask for an indicat[ion] as to
what, if any, priors would be allowed.” In response, the
prosecutor identified three prior convictions: (1) the conviction on
August 16, 2005, for possession of cocaine base for sale (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11351.5), previously admitted for substantive proof
in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief; (2) a conviction on February 14,
2008, for possession of cocaine base for sale (ibid.); and (3) a
conviction on September 30, 2008, for theft by access card
(§ 484g).4 Defense counsel objected to the latter two convictions
“as to age . . . and also under 352 grounds.” The court overruled
the objection in part. While it found admission of the February
2008 conviction to be cumulative in light of the 2005 conviction
for the same offense, the court found the September 2008
conviction for theft by access card relevant to defendant’s
truthfulness. It further found that the probative value of the
theft conviction outweighed the prejudice it might cause.
        In his direct examination, defendant acknowledged his
prior convictions in 2005 for “possession for sales of cocaine” and
in 2008 for “theft by access card.” Following this testimony, the

4      Section 484g provides, inter alia, that any “person who, with the
intent to defraud, (a) uses, for the purpose of obtaining money, goods,
services, or anything else of value, an access card or access card
account information that has been altered, obtained, or retained in
violation of Section 484e or 484f, or an access card which he or she
knows is forged, expired, or revoked, or (b) obtains money, goods,
services, or anything else of value by representing without the consent
of the cardholder that he or she is the holder of an access card and the
card has not in fact been issued, is guilty of theft.”

                                   8
prosecutor did not attempt to impeach defendant with a prior
conviction(s).

       2.    Admission of the Redacted Rap Sheet
       Defendant mounts a two-pronged attack on the admission
of the redacted version of the CLETS rap sheet. He contends
(1) the rap sheet was cumulative of the 969b packet, and (2) the
error was prejudicial because the redactions themselves
“informed the jury” he had a lengthy criminal history.
       As to his first argument, defendant concedes the
prosecution bore the burden of proving he had been convicted of a
felony as an element of possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). To meet its burden, the prosecution may
introduce “several types of evidence,” including certified copies of
prison records (§ 969b) and CLETS rap sheets (Evid. Code,
§§ 1280, 1530–1531). (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106,
112, 116 (Martinez); People v. Brucker (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 230,
241.)
       Despite its admissibility, defendant contends the CLETS
rap sheet was cumulative to the previously admitted 969b packet.
While we agree Evidence Code section 352 allows the court to
limit the introduction of cumulative evidence or repetitive
questioning of witnesses (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408,
439), the CLETS rap sheet was also offered to establish
defendant’s identity in this case. “The plain meaning of
cumulative as ‘repetitive’ or ‘additional’ [citations] obviously
implies in this context that other evidence on the point at issue
has already been introduced.” (People v. Filson (1994) 22
Cal.App.4th 1841, 1850, disapproved on another ground in People
v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434.)

                                 9
       Here, when the trial court issued its ruling, the prosecutor
had not introduced any evidence demonstrating the date of
defendant’s arrest in this case. By associating defendant’s name
and personal information with the date of arrest in this case and
a prior conviction, the CLETS rap sheet was highly probative on
defendant’s identity. The evidence tended to prove that the same
person arrested for felon in possession of a firearm in this case
also suffered a prior conviction in 2005. (See Martinez, supra, 22
Cal.4th at p. 118 [“the justifications for limiting proof of the
substance of a prior conviction do not apply to proof of the matter
at issue here, i.e., the identity of the person who served prison
terms for the prior convictions”]; Monroy v. City of Los Angeles
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 248, 267 [“virtually identical evidence
may not be cumulative if there is significance to the evidentiary
weight to be given”].) This issue having yet to be proved by other
competent evidence, the CLETS rap sheet cannot be construed as
cumulative.
       Defendant’s second argument is that the jury considered
the redactions appearing in the CLETS rap sheet “for the
improper purpose of determining that [he] is the type of person
who would engage in criminal activity.” Defendant not only
failed to object on this ground at trial, but his counsel stipulated
to the redacted version. “Under the circumstances, he may not
now be heard to complain, because ‘when a party enters into a
voluntary stipulation, he generally is precluded from taking an
appeal claiming defects in the stipulation.’ [Citations.]” (People
v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328; see also People v.
Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 186 [“‘It is, of course, “the general
rule”’—to which we find no exception here—‘“that questions
relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on

                                10
appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the
trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal”’”]; Evid.
Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Even on the merits, defendant cannot
base his claim of error on speculation or conjecture as to what the
jury might have understood the redactions to mean. (See People
v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 585 [“the purported prejudice . . .
cannot be based on mere speculation and conjecture”].) Thus, the
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a redacted copy of
defendant’s rap sheet.

      3.     Impeachment with Prior Conviction
      Defendant also challenges the trial court’s ruling regarding
the admissibility of his prior conviction in 2008 for purposes of
impeachment. In light of the court’s rulings, and in an apparent
attempt to preempt any impeachment during cross-examination,
defendant admitted he had suffered the prior conviction during
his case-in-chief. He now contends the trial court erred under
Evidence Code section 352 by permitting impeachment with his
2008 conviction. We disagree.
      “No witness including a defendant who elects to testify in
his own behalf is entitled to a false aura of veracity.” (People v.
Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 453 (Beagle), abrogated on another
ground by People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190–1191;
accord, People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 932 (Clark).) “For
the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be
shown . . . that he has been convicted of a felony.” (Evid. Code,
§ 788.) But “when [Evidence Code] sections 788 and 352 are read
together they clearly provide discretion to the trial judge to
exclude evidence of prior felony convictions when their probative

                                11
value on credibility is outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice.”
(Beagle, supra, at p. 453.)
       In exercising its discretion under Evidence Code
section 352, a trial court should consider several factors, “namely,
(1) whether the prior conviction reflects on honesty and integrity;
(2) whether it is near or remote in time; (3) whether it was
suffered for the same or substantially similar conduct for which
the witness-accused is on trial; and, (4) finally, what effect
admission would have on the defendant’s decision to testify.”
(People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 307.) These factors are
not “rigid standards” that must be applied but are merely
suggested factors to be considered. (Ibid.; accord, Beagle, supra,
6 Cal.3d at p. 453.) “Because this discretion is broad, ‘a
reviewing court ordinarily will uphold the trial court’s exercise of
discretion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372,
407.)
       We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s consideration
of these factors. Defendant recognizes all but one factor favor
admission of his prior conviction. He admits his prior conviction
for theft by access card (§ 484g) is a crime bearing on his honesty
and integrity. (See People v. Carkhum-Murphy (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 289, 297; People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284,
297.) His prior conviction was for substantially dissimilar
conduct and did not affect his decision to testify. (See People v.
Fries (1979) 24 Cal.3d 222, 230 [risk of undue prejudice occurs
when the prior conviction “is similar or identical to the crime
charged”]; People v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 926 [last
factor “has no application in this case because defendant actually
took the stand”].)

                                12
       Defendant contends the court should have excluded his
prior conviction, suffered “nearly 14 years before [his] trial for the
instant offense,” because it was too remote in time. Though we
agree defendant’s 14-year-old conviction could be characterized as
remote, the possibility another court might have excluded the
prior conviction due to its remoteness “reveals nothing more than
that a reasonable difference of opinion was possible.” (People v.
Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 654.) We cannot say the court abused
its discretion in reaching a different result, given that other
factors weighed in favor of admission. (Accord, ibid. [upholding
exclusion of 22-year-old prior conviction as remote even though
“another court might have concluded otherwise”]; People v.
Johnson (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1570, 1574–1575, 1577 [10-year-
old conviction not too remote]; People v. DeCosse (1986) 183
Cal.App.3d 404, 411–412 [12-year-old conviction not too remote].)
       When issuing its ruling in this case, the court carefully
limited the number and class of crimes that could be used for
impeachment. The court’s ruling reveals its concern with the
prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence and its probative
value. “It also shows that the court engaged in a weighing
process in deciding which prior felony conviction to admit and in
what manner to admit it.” (People v. Little (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 1364, 1379.) In view of the court’s ruling, we discern
no abuse in the court’s exercise of discretion.

      4.    Prejudice
      Despite our conclusions above, and assuming the court
erred in both respects, we further conclude any error was
harmless. Error in the admission of prior crimes evidence under
Evidence Code section 352 is reviewed under People v. Watson

                                 13
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, which mandates reversal for
evidentiary error on a showing by defendant that it was
reasonably probable a result more favorable to him would have
resulted had the evidence not been admitted. (People v. Cudjo
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701,
750.)
       Defendant never denied the factual basis on which his
conviction in this case was based. Instead, he admitted to
(1) possessing the firearm found in his backpack; (2) knowing he
possessed the firearm; and (3) suffering prior convictions in 2005
and 2008. Defendant has acknowledged both at trial and in this
appeal that these facts prove his culpability for felon in
possession of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. (Accord,
Clark, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 958.)
       Defendant contends the erroneous rulings impaired his
credibility by implying he “is the type of person who would
engage in criminal activity.” We do not agree.
       Even accepting defendant’s testimony as true, that
testimony failed to establish findings for his affirmative defenses.
Defendant never offered evidence tending to prove justified
possession based on taking the firearm from his daughter’s
mother for crimes she was committing against him. (§ 29850,
subd. (a)(1) [justified possession requires taking a firearm “from a
person who was committing a crime against the person who
found or took the firearm”].) Nor did defendant offer evidence
tending to prove momentary possession; in fact, defendant
admitted he possessed the firearm for more than nine months.
(§ 29850, subd. (a)(2) [momentary possession requires possession
“no longer than was necessary to deliver or transport the firearm
to a law enforcement agency”]; see People v. Hurtado (1996) 47

                                14
Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [“as a matter of law, defendant’s [two-day]
possession of the firearm cannot be characterized as
momentary”].)
      In addition, the jury was instructed on the limited use of
defendant’s prior convictions. They were given CALCRIM
No. 2510, which provided the jury could consider any prior
conviction only in deciding whether the third element of the
instant crime was proved “or for the limited purpose of
evaluating the credibility of the witness testimony.” Absent any
evidence to the contrary, we presume the jury followed this
instruction. (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 192.) Thus,
assuming any error in admitting the prior conviction evidence, we
discern no prejudice.

B.     Conviction for Unlawful Possession by a Felon is
       Constitutional
       Finally, defendant contends his conviction for felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) violates the Second
Amendment of the United States Constitution as recently
discussed in Bruen, supra, ___ U.S. ___, [142 S.Ct. 2111, 213
L.Ed.2d 387].
       Our colleagues in Division Eight and the Fourth Appellate
District rejected this argument, finding section 29800
constitutionally valid in view of Bruen. We adopt the reasoning
set forth in these cases and also conclude that the “statute is
constitutional.” (People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307, 317
[recognizing “the Second Amendment has boundaries,” including
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons”]; accord, People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469,
474–479 [defendant’s “challenges to the constitutionality of

                                15
section 29800(a)(1) and section 30305(a)(1) under the Second
Amendment fail under the first step of Bruen’s analytical
framework”].)

                         DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed.

                                         MORI. J

We concur:

             COLLINS, Acting P. J.

             ZUKIN, J.

                               16