Court Opinion

ID: 9855191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:20:48.845889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:43.234636
License: Public Domain

Holbrook, P. J.
(dissenting). On December 20, 1963, plaintiff slipped and fell as she was walking along a public sidewalk in the city of Bay City. She brought this action against the city to recover damages for injuries sustained in her fall. Plaintiff testified that the accident occurred at the corner of Washington and 10th streets. Her daughter, who was with her at the time of the accident','-'testified that the two of them were walking south on Washington and crossed 10th and as plaintiff stepped up onto the southwest curb she slipped and fell. After the fall they noticed that there was ice under the snow onto which plaintiff had stepped.
*754The director of community development for the city, who was formerly the head of the public works department, testified that between 1950 and the date of the accident no repairs were made to the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. That sidewalk was repaired, however, in March, 1964. He further testified that neither he nor anyone at his direction ever made a measurement of the amount of the deflection between the curb and the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. He did state, however, that in a case where the curb was 2-3/8 inches higher than the adjacent sidewalk he would order it to be repaired. One of the reasons for the repair would be that water would collect behind the curb if the sidewalk sloped down toward it.
One of plaintiff’s neighbors who had moved into the neighborhood about 10 months before the accident testified that she had many occasions to walk, pushing her son in a stroller, on the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. She stated that the sidewalk was in the same condition all the time she lived in the neighborhood. At the corner of 10th and Washington there was a recess in the sidewalk so that the wheels of her stroller would catch on the curb and she would have to lift the stroller up over the curb. When it rained, water would gather in the recess. This witness’ testimony as to the condition of the sidewalk was corroborated by her mother.
An investigator employed by plaintiff’s attorney’s law firm testified that he measured the sidewalk on the corner where plaintiff fell. He measured the recess between the sidewalk and the top edge of the curb — on one side it was 2-3/8 inches and on the other 1-3/4 inches.
At the close of the proofs, defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, of no cause of action, was granted and plaintiff appeals.

*755
Did the trial court commit error in granting defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of no cause of action against plaintiff ¶

In granting defendant’s motion for a directed verdict the trial court stated:
“Nowhere was there any testimony about any tripping, any stumbling, any sliding into a depression, just slipping on a slippery spot. There was no indication of any hole in which she [plaintiff] slipped or depression into which she slipped or any protrusion over which she stumbled. It is true that the testimony showed that and the exhibits did show it was somewhere in the area of 2-3/8ths inches deflection between the top of the curb and the sidewalk. The proofs also showed by Mrs. Pappas’ testimony and that of her daughter that this was completely covered over with ice and snow.”
In Hopson v. City of Detroit (1926), 235 Mich 248 (48 ALR 1150), Mr. Justice Wiest stated in a similar factual case, pp 249, 250, 252, 253:
“Plaintiff testified that the walk had sunk in the center, and the cement was broken and had disintegrated; that the hole was about four inches deep and had existed for two years at least, and she knew that rainwater settled in the depression and ice formed there in the winter; that she never measured the depth of the depression and did not know exactly the depth thereof, but it might have been two inches deep, and that it was more than one inch deep. A witness for plaintiff thought the depression was three or four inches deep, because she had stepped in the depression and the water went over her - rubbers and she judged ‘a rubber is about three or four inches high,’ but the depression might have been less than three or four inches deep, and might have been two inches deep, but was more than an inch and a half deep. * * *
*756“In Newton v. City of Worcester (1899), 174 Mass 181 (54 NE 521), the court pointed out the reason why the plaintiff in the case at bar may not maintain this suit. It was there said:
“ ‘We think the proper and only reasonable interpretation of the statute is, that wherever ice or snow is the sole proximate cause of the accident, there shall be no liability, but where at the time of the accident there is any other defect to which, as a proximate cause, the accident is in part attributable, there may be a liability notwithstanding the fact that it also may be attributable in part to ice or snow. This other defect, however, is not a proximate cause within the meaning of this rule, simply because it causes the accumulation of the ice or snow. In considering whether, “at the time of the accident, the way is otherwise reasonably safe and convenient,” the attention is to be directed to the actual physical condition of the way for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is at that time any other danger to the steps of the traveler than that arising from the presence of ice or snow; if there be no other danger, then for the time being the way is “otherwise reasonably safe and convenient.” ’
“The ice filled the depression, except a thin layer of water at the top, leaving no hole or trap into which plaintiff could step or catch her foot. Under the evidence and holdings of this court, the verdict should have been directed for defendant at the close of plaintiff’s proofs. Plaintiff made no case.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The case of Navarre v. City of Benton Harbor (1901), 126 Mich 618, is not applicable because the facts are not analogous, i.e., in that case there was a defect other than the natural accumulation of ice and snow which was a proximate cause of the accident. Likewise, the case of Rex v. Village of Lochmoor (1934), 268 Mich 159, is not applicable because the facts are not analogous, i.e., the village failed *757to maintain a sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition for public travel and to provide guard rails at tbe approach to a bridge; the sidewalk was slippery by reason of the accumulation of wet clay and dirt and the sidewalk sloped downward to low ground and toward a precipitous drop to the water. This condition continued for more than 30 days prior to the injury.
After a review of the entire record, it is my conclusion that the trial court herein properly granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of no cause of action against plaintiff.
I would therefore affirm with costs to defendantappellee.