Court Opinion

ID: 9674572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:30:43.946245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:28.200641
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The probative evidence in this cause is as follows:
Joyce Taylor, custodian of the records of the Texas House of Representatives, testified and identified State’s Exhibit # 1, showing a request from appellant for $1,200.00 worth of postage stamps. The request was received in the House on May 25, 1970, at which time appellant was a member of the Texas House of Representatives.1
Frederick Scott testified that on May 25, 1970, he was Postmaster and property manager of the Texas House of Representatives. He stated that on that date packages containing $1,200.00 worth of stamps were mailed to appellant. The packages were placed in the mail on the afternoon of May 25, 1970, and were mailed 3rd class postage.
C. T. Davis, Postmaster of Amarillo, identified State’s exhibits which showed *429that the packages mailed to appellant were picked up on May 27 and May 28, 1970, by Nancy Cox.
Mrs. Cox, who at that time worked for appellant, testified that on May 27 and May 28, 1970, she signed for these packages.
The State’s next witness was Ronnie Roberts, a salesman for Plains Chevrolet in Amarillo. He stated that on May 25, 1970, he had occasion to meet appellant; appellant approached him at the Chevrolet company and stated that he would like to buy a used pickup. Roberts testified that he eventually completed a transaction with appellant and filled out a sales sheet. Roberts stated that “sometime during the date of the fifth and twenty-fifth, 1970, Mr. Knapp did say that he wanted to purchase this vehicle, and he wanted to know if we could take a trade of stamps for the vehicle, and I told him that I would have to take this to a superior, but would he bring the stamps and that we would see if we could get the deal okayed.”
The remainder of Roberts’ testimony is crucial and we quote from the record: (Questioning by Mr. Smith, the prosecutor)
“Now, I can truthfully not say whether the man had the stamps with him at this time, or whether he left the dealership and brought the stamps back.
“Q Can you say for certain whether it was Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday?
“A No, sir, I cannot. The only record I have of the deal is on the 5th and 25th, 1970. I have no personal data reflecting the date in any other way.
“Q Well, anyway, did he eventually bring you some stamps ?
“A Yes, sir, he did bring the stamps out, and if my memory is correct, he brought the stamps out in a cigar box. To what denomination these stamps were, I don’t remember, but I do know that they were just rolls of stamps, and Mr. Knapp and I went to either the Assistant Truck Manager or the Truck Manager. I do not remember which of these men actually took the stamps.
“All I know is that Mr. Knapp was given the vehicle and he was told at that time that if the Post Office would take these stamps, that we could change them into either the postage machine, which we do use, or cash, that we would make the trade, and it was kind of a credit pending thing.”
On cross-examination, Roberts stated:
“Q You are holding there in your hand —actually, that is a copy of what you referred to as a deal sheet?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q It has a date at the top righthand corner of 5-25-70?
“A Yes, that is correct.
“Q And it has a date at the bottom righthand corner of 5-25-70 ?
“A Yes, that is correct.
“Q Can you tell the jury what day that deal sheet was filled out ?
“A 5-25-70.”
* * * (Cross-Examination continued)
“Q Can you tell the Jury what day Mr. Knapp brought you those postage stamps ?
“A The only record I have, sir, is the 5th — 25th, 1970.
“Q And that is it? As far as you recall, that is the only day that you had any dealings, at all, with Walter Knapp. Is that correct ?
“A That is true, yes, sir.”
* * * (Cross-Examination continued)
*430“Q About what time of the day, if you will tell this Jury, that Mr. Knapp brought these stamps to you there in Randall County, Texas at the Chevrolet Truck Sales?
“A Mr. Bagley, I really can’t recall the exact time that Mr. Knapp brought the stamps, but I think, to the best of my knowledge, it was after twelve noon of the Sth and 25th, 1970.”
On re-direct, Roberts stated:
“Q But are you testifying under oath that it was Monday, the 25th ?
“A No, sir, I am not. I am saying that whatever day the fifth and the twenty-fifth of 1970 was, this was when the transaction took place.
“Q Insofar as your records are concerned ?
“A Yes, sir, and I am strictly going by record.
“Q Could it have been Wednesday or Thursday rather than Monday ?
“MR. ARCHER [Defense Counsel] : Your Honor, we object to that. This is the State’s own witness, and we object to any attempt to lead him or pose an argumentary type—
“THE COURT: Objection overruled.
“MR. ARCHER: Note our exception.2
“Q (By Mr. Smith) [Prosecutor] The question was can you tell this Jury under oath precisely what day of the week it was ?
“MR. ARCHER: Your Honor, we object to that as being repetitious.
“THE COURT: Objection overruled.
“MR. ARCHER: Note our exception.
“A The only thing I can tell the people on the Jury is that from my records, which I am holding in my —a copy in my hand, this deal took place on the 5th and 25th of 1970. The only record — or the only thing that I have seen was a calendar that did say that the 5th and 25th of 1970 was on a Monday, and I do not have any other record to my knowledge that I could tell you differently.”
The examination of the witness continued:
“Questions by Mr. Bagley [Defense Counsel]:
“Q Regardless of what day of the week the 25th of May of 1970 was, that was the only day you saw Walter Knapp, and that was the day he brought the stamps to you. Isn’t that correct?
“A Yes, sir, this is correct.
“MR. BAGLEY: I have nothing further, Your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
“Questions by Mr. Smith [Prosecutor]:
“Q Now, Mr. Roberts, are you sure this was the only time you saw him?
******
“A Yes, sir, I am sure. I knew who Mr. Knapp was from the publicity of his different offices that he had held, and I had been living in Amarillo about a year when this transaction was made. I knew who Mr. Knapp was, but I was not a personal friend, and to the best of my knowledge, this was the only time that I have ever seen Mr. Knapp in the Plains Chevrolet *431Dealership; or around on this date was the only time.
“Q But you saw him more than one time in relation with the deal with the truck? Haven’t you testified to that?
“A I saw him more than one time on this day, but I truthfully can only say that this day was — if this 5th and 25th is correct, then this is the only time that I saw Mr. Knapp.”
Bill Gilliland, the general manager of Plains Chevrolet in Amarillo, testified that his records reflected that the transaction with appellant was consummated on May 28, 1970, the day when his company actually received the credit on their postage meter. He later clarified this statement by stating that finalization of the deal was made on the day that the stamps were taken to the post office. He further testified that he had never spoken to appellant in his life and he could not tell when the stamps actually came into the possession of the dealership, only that the dealership received credit for them on May 28, 1970.3
Charles Conley, an employee of Plains Chevrolet, testified and stated that he was given some stamps and asked to take them down to the post office to see if he could exchange them for money. He stated that he was unable to make such arrangements, but he was able to get credit for the stamps on the automobile company’s postage metering machine. The only date specified by Conley was “May of 1970.”
Charlie Lanford, an Amarillo postal employee, testified that on May 28, 1970, he gave credit to Plains Chevrolet’s postage meter in the amount of $1,230.00, in exchange for postage stamps.
At this point, the State introduced exhibits showing that appellant requested 6000 envelopes during the 1970 legislative session.
The State was then allowed to introduce four exhibits which were records showing requests from appellant for stamps from the House of Representative Contingent Expense Office. These exhibits indicate that appellant requested the following amounts of stamps: On January 16, 1970, $600.00; on August 14, 1970, $900.00; on December 10, 1970, $3000.00; and on December 16, 1970, $3000.00.
Appellant vigorously argues that the court committed error in allowing the introduction of these exhibits. Appellant contends that they were irrelevant and could only serve to prejudice the jury against him. I agree that error was committed in allowing the entirety of this evidence to be introduced.
The record reflects that when the exhibits were first presented to the court, at a very early stage of the proceedings, defense counsel objected to all exhibits showing appellant’s stamp requests except the May 25, 1970, request for $1,200.00 worth of stamps.
The State countered:
“MR. SMITH: Your Honor, we think that the objection is well taken, in part, and we would restrict our offer as to the items dated January 16, 1970 and May 25, 1970.
“Certainly the stamps drawn prior to the date alleged in the indictment would be relevant, and I think we can connect up at least part of those stamps with the transaction.
“Certainly, we couldn’t connect up stamps that he drew subsequent to the transaction, and we concede that that is a proper objection, so we restrict our of*432fer to the first two items, and with the consent of the defense counsel, we will so alter our exhibit. (emphasis supplied)
“THE COURT: Do you have any objection, then, to the two ?
“MR. ARCHER: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: At this time, Mr. Smith, I am going to sustain the objection, realizing full well that the one prior to May 25th may become relevant by the development of the testimony, but at this time, with this first witness, I am just going to sustain the objection, and allow just the May 25th into evidence, and this does not preclude, if you feel it is relevant at a later date, it will be submitted.”
Shortly thereafter, on cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Mrs. Taylor, the custodian of the records of the House, as to whether or not she could discern whether State’s exhibit #1 (the request of May 25, 1970, for $1,200.00 worth of stamps) might actually reflect a reimbursement. She stated that she did not know. At this point, the State again moved to introduce the other four stamp request exhibits. The trial judge allowed into evidence the $600.00 request of January 16, 1970, the only one of the four exhibits which predated the alleged offense of May 25, 1970.
Near the close of the trial, the State introduced the previously mentioned exhibits showing appellant’s requests for 6000 envelopes during 1970. The prosecutor defended such evidence, stating:
“Your Honor, we think they are admissible because on the face of the tickets, they show the procurement of envelopes, and certainly there is nothing sinister or inflammatory about the procurement of envelopes, but when the envelope quantity is matched with the stamp quantity requisition during same period, it shows such a discrepancy that we think it is a circumstance which tends to show misappropriation of the stamps.”
The judge admitted the evidence, and, in the absence of any request by the State, reversed his previous ruling and allowed ,the remaining three stamp requests to be admitted. Appellant called upon the State and the court to explain the reason why these exhibits, previously ruled inadmissible, were now being allowed into evidence. The prosecutor stated:
“We feel they are admissible in that they come within the Statute of Limitations that are the subject matter of the indictment. They come within the Statute of Limitations; they are anterior to the presentment of the indictment in Court, and under Section 4.59 of the Blanch (sic) Annotated Penal Code, they are admissible.”4
The trial judge agreed, stating:
“ . . . the ruling of the Court will be that since this is a theft indictment, that any evidence which is material and relevant within the Statute of Limitations, which is anterior to the presentment of the indictment, will be admissible, and I will at this time rule that exhibits lb, c and d are admissible.”
Appellant timely objected to this ruling. I have carefully examined the authorities cited us by the State. Branch’s Annotated Penal Code, Sec. 459, states:
“The State is not bound by the date alleged and may prove that the offense was committed before, on, or after the date alleged, if the date proven be a date anterior to the presentment of the indictment or information and not so remote as to be barred by limitation.”
*433I adhere to this theory completely. For example, in Neal v. State, 374 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.Crim.App.1964), the indictment alleged June 16, 1962, as the date of the offense. Evidence reflected that the murder was committed on June 20, 1962. This Court held that no fatal variance existed and the judgment was affirmed.5
In the present case, the State’s entire case was based upon the theory that the alleged offense took place in May, 1970, when appellant allegedly misappropriated $1,200.00 worth of stamps to purchase a used pickup.6 In its brief, the State argues that those other requests for stamps were “corpus delicti” of the offense. We are referred to McClelland v. State, 390 S.W.2d 777 (Tex.Cr.App.1965) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 928, 86 S.Ct. 307, 15 L.Ed.2d 340 (1965). This was a bribery case wherein the State showed numerous transactions from December 2, 1960, through May, 1962. The indictment alleged that the offense occurred on December 2, 1960. This Court admitted evidence of these other transactions, stating:
“We are not here dealing with extraneous offenses, but we are dealing with one offense involving many transactions.” (Emphasis supplied)
It is conceivable that, under such a theory, the January 16, 1970, request of $600.00 worth of stamps might have properly been admitted had it been sufficiently connected up with the offense alleged.7 However, it is beyond my comprehension as to how the post-May, 1970, requests could serve as “corpus delicti” of the offense. As noted, the State concedes that their theory is that appellant misappropriated $1,200.00 worth of stamps in May, 1970, in purchasing a used pickup. All evidence showed that the transaction was completed by May 28, 1970. Under the McClelland rule, supra, the “one offense” was completed at this point. The showing of the post-transaction stamp requests was error and could only serve to prejudice the jury against appellant. The accused in a criminal case can be convicted, if at all, only by evidence that shows that he is guilty of the offense charged. Newman v. State, 485 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); 2 C. McCormick & R. Ray, Texas Evidence, § 1521 (2d ed. 1956); see Perez v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 639, 310 S.W.2d 334 (1958). Further, as the State concedes, the requests were not admissible as extraneous offenses; i.e., no “offenses” were shown, merely requests for stamps from a member of the Texas House of Representatives.
The State cites a long line of authorities, urging that it was incumbent on the appellant, if he wanted the court to limit the jury’s consideration of the various transactions, to request the court to have the State elect as to which of the group of stamps it would rely upon for conviction. The authorities which the State refers us to, including Bradshaw v. State, 32 Tex.Cr.R. 381, 23 S.W. 892 (1893); Walker v. State, 72 S.W. 401 (Tex.Cr.App.1903); Stringer v. State, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 641, 10 S.W.2d 721 (1928); and Sheppard v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 608, 229 S.W.2d 630 (1950), stand for the proposition that, where more than one offense on which conviction might be predicated has been proven by the State, the accused is entitled to an election by the State when it is requested. I do not take issue with this principle of law. *434Rather, I conclude that it has absolutely no application to the present cause. No more than one, if any, offense was proven by the State. Cf. Shaw v. State, 479 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). Further, the present conviction could not possibly have been predicated upon any one of the extraneous stamp requests shown.8
The only remaining consideration, therefore, is whether or not the conviction can be supported by the May 25, 1970, request for $1,200.00 worth of stamps. The appellant and State agree that on May 25, 1970, $1,200.00 worth of stamps was mailed from Austin and sent to appellant in Amarillo. The stamps were picked up at the post office by appellant’s secretary on May 27 and May 28, 1970. The transaction with Plains Chevrolet was “finalized” on May 28, when the Chevrolet company received credit on their postage meter machine.
The only person who testified as to any direct dealings with appellant was Ronnie Roberts. He stated that on May 25, 1970, he did see appellant more than one time that day, but that was the only day he ever dealt with appellant. Roberts testified that appellant brought the stamps to him in a cigar box, and Roberts subsequently turned the stamps over to a supervisor. No other evidence established a specific date as to when the $1,200.00 worth of stamps was received at the automobile dealership. Appellant did not testify.
The jury was charged on the law of circumstantial evidence. The charge recites that:
“ . . .in order to warrant a conviction of a crime on circumstantial evidence, each fact necessary to the conclusion sought to be established must be proved by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; all the facts, that is, the facts necessary to the conclusion, must be consistent with each other and with the main fact sought to be proved; and the circumstances, taken together, must be of a conclusive nature, leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion, and producing, in effect, a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused, Walter Knapp, and no other person, committed the offense charged.
[The circumstances] must exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis except that the defendant committed the offense . . . ” 9
If any testimony had been presented which in any way might have contradicted Roberts’ testimony that the stamps were received by Plains Chevrolet on May 25, 1970, then, conceivably, the jury could have resolved the conflict and chosen to accept or reject any part or all of the testimony of any witness. Edmiston v. State, 489 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) ; Angle v. State, 486 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). For example, if evidence'had been presented that the $1,200.00 worth of stamps arrived in Amarillo on May 27 and 28 and, on the 28th or 29th, were taken to Plains Chevrolet and traded for the pickup, then the jury would at least have had a circumstantial basis for finding the appellant guilty of the offense charged in the indictment.
However, in fact, the jury had before it only evidence that the stamps were delivered to Plains Chevrolet on May 25, 1970, the same day the $1,200.00 worth of stamps was mailed from Austin. The State, by its own uncontradicted evidence, thus proved the impossibility of the offense alleged.
*435The unmistakable impression left by-reading the record in the present case is that sometime, somewhere, appellant misappropriated State postage stamps and is perhaps guilty of “something.”10 Fortunately, our system of criminal justice demands a higher standard than that, but unfortunately the majority is adopting the lower standard of “he must be guilty of something, so we will affirm.” The State undertook to prove that in May of 1970 appellant misappropriated $1,200.00 worth of postage stamps and purchased a used pickup. The State failed to sustain its burden of proof in this cause. Appellant’s motion for an instructed verdict should have been granted, as the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
Further, I reiterate my conclusion that it was reversible error to admit the post-May, 1970, requests for stamps. This error was compounded by the State’s argument. See n. 10, supra.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause.
ONION, P. J., joins in this dissent.

. House Simple Resolution Number 41 was introduced, showing the authorization to expend funds previously appropriated by the House, such funds to be spent to pay for the actual and necessary expenses incurred by the members of the House of Representatives, up to eight hundred and seventy-five dollars per month; a provision was included so that amounts not used in a single month could be carried forward for future use, so long as the amount used did not exceed the monthly allowable times the number of months of the interim.

. See Wall v. State, 417 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).

. The sales sheet, dated 5-25-70, reflects the following notation:

The salesman Roberts testified that though he filled out the sales sheet, he did not write the above information.

. The State never contended that the exhibits were admissible under the theory of extraneous offenses. It is axiomatic that no evidence of extraneous offenses should be offered unless the State is prepared to prove that the accused committed them. Tomlinson v. State, 422 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).

. Section 459 of Branch’s Ann.P.O. does not mean that the State may prove “some” offense, which is not alleged in the indictment, or an offense “similar” to that alleged in the indictment, so long as it is within the statute of limitations and is a date anterior to the indictment.

. The State concedes in its brief: “It was the theory of the State that the appellant appropriated twelve hundred dollars worth of State stamps to his own use by purchasing a pickup truck with them.”

.The State never produced evidence that appellant received the stamps made in these four requests or that such requests were illegal; nor was there any showing as to how the stamps were appropriated, or misappropriated. The State apparently relied solely upon evi*dence of the $1,200.00 request for stamps on May 25, 1970.

. As earlier stated, the State’s entire basis of prosecution was based on the theory that in May of 1970 appellant misappropriated $1,-200.00 worth of postage stamps and purchased a used pickup. The only extraneous request which pre-dated the alleged offense was in January of 1970, when $600.00 worth of stamps was requested. Further, any one of the post-offense requests obviously could not support a conviction in this cause. See also, n. 4, supra.

. Appellant also challenges the correctness of this charge. I am not here addressing that issue.

. In argument, the prosecutor stated:
“Now Mr. Knapp was grabbing his any way he could, and I think you believe that because the same month that he went out of office, he got six thousand more dollars worth of your money in stamps, because that was the only thing he could grab as he was leaving.
“Over a twelve month period, he took out of this Contingency Fund eighty-seven hundred dollars worth of six cent stamps. That is one hundred and forty-five thousand pieces of mail; one hundred and forty-five thousand pieces of mail. During the same period, he got six thousand envelopes.
* * * * *
“That comes, of course, to eleven thousand one hundred dollars, which is more than the ten thousand four hundred dollars they allowed him, but he wasn’t using any of that for business. He was grabbing those stamps because they are negotiable. He found they were negotiable at the Plains Chevrolet Company when he bought the pickup, so in August, he goes back and gets nine hundred dollars more stamps, and in December, he gets six thousand dollars more the month he goes out of office. Reasonable doubt?”