Court Opinion

ID: 9949257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-10 08:16:15.548411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:16.652220
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion filed March 5, 2024.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-23-00234-CV

                   GUADALUPE RODRIGUEZ, Appellant

                                       V.
  ACADEMY, LTD. D/B/A ACADEMY SPORTS + OUTDOORS, Appellee

                  On Appeal from the 353rd District Court
                           Travis County, Texas
                  Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-22-003147

                                OPINION

      Appellant Guadalupe Rodriguez appeals the trial court’s summary judgment
dismissing his claims against appellee Academy, Ltd. Academy sold a handgun to
Rodriguez’s daughter, who within hours used it to take her life by suicide.
Rodriguez sued Academy for negligence, and the trial court granted summary
judgment for Academy. Because we agree that at least one of the grounds raised in
Academy’s summary-judgment motion is meritorious, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
                                       Background

       On a night in June 2021, Rodriguez’s 29-year-old daughter, Kristina,
purchased a firearm and ammunition from an Austin-area Academy sporting goods
store. Later that night, while sitting alone in her parked car in a lot adjacent to the
Academy store, Kristina used the gun and ammunition to commit suicide.

       According to the investigating officer’s police report, Rodriguez told the
officer that Kristina “had a history of suicide, hospitalization, and was prescribed
Xanax.” Rodriguez “didn’t understand how she could’ve purchased a handgun
given her mental health history at that time of night.” Rodriguez wanted to know
if anyone had reviewed Academy’s surveillance camera footage and whether
Kristina displayed any signs of intoxication at the time she purchased the gun. One
of Academy’s employees “reviewed the cameras” and said that Kristina “entered
into the business alone and walked in normally before 10:00 PM.”1                        The
investigating officer spoke to the Academy employee who sold Kristina the gun;
that employee said that Kristina “seemed in good spirits and said she planned to
visit her family the following day and go to the gun range with her father on his
birthday.” The police report also referenced a “dating disturbance” from the prior
month, in which Kristina’s partner “called and stated Kristina was feeling suicidal
but when officers made contact with her, she stated she was not suicidal.”

       Rodriguez sued Academy, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and
negligence per se. Academy moved for traditional summary judgment on two
grounds: (1) the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”)
barred Rodriguez’s claims, see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-03,2 and (2) suicide is

       1
         At the time of the summary-judgment proceedings, the surveillance video was no longer
available. Rodriguez has not alleged spoliation in this case.
       2
         PLCAA prohibits, with six enumerated exceptions, a civil action against manufacturers
and sellers of qualified products, such as firearms and ammunition, for damages resulting from
                                              2
an affirmative defense to Rodriguez’s claims under Texas law, see Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 93.001.

       Rodriguez argued in response that PLCAA does not apply because
Kristina’s use of the firearm was not criminal or unlawful; but, even if the act
applies, statutory exceptions allow his claims to proceed. He also argued that
Academy could not conclusively establish the affirmative defense of suicide. The
trial court granted Academy’s motion and dismissed Rodriguez’s claims with
prejudice without stating any specific basis for its ruling.

       Rodriguez appeals.3

                                   Standard of Review

       Our review of a summary judgment is de novo. Valence Operating Co. v.
Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Because the trial court’s summary
judgment does not specify the ground or grounds on which it was granted, we
uphold the court’s judgment if properly supported by any ground asserted in the
motion. See Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989). When reviewing
a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and
we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s
favor. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 661.

       To be entitled to traditional summary judgment, a movant must establish
there is no genuine issue of material fact so that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.       Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp
Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). A defendant who
the criminal or unlawful misuse of the qualified products.        See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902(a),
7903(5)(A).
       3
         The Supreme Court of Texas ordered the Third Court of Appeals to transfer this case to
our court. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 73.001. We are unaware of any conflict between Third Court
of Appeals precedent and that of this court on any relevant issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.

                                              3
conclusively negates a single essential element of a cause of action or conclusively
establishes an affirmative defense is entitled to summary judgment on that claim.
Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508-09 (Tex. 2010). Once the
movant produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts to
the nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Walker
v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996). Evidence is conclusive only if
reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions. City of Keller v. Wilson,
168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005).

                                     Analysis

      Rodriguez presents four issues for review: (1) PLCAA does not apply; (2) if
PLCAA applies, exceptions allow Rodriguez’s claims to proceed; (3) the trial court
erred by refusing discovery; and (4) the affirmative defense of suicide does not bar
Rodriguez’s suit. Because Academy’s second ground for summary judgment is
dispositive, we resolve this appeal based on Academy’s state law affirmative
defense of suicide.   Before addressing that issue, however, we first consider
Rodriguez’s discovery complaint.

A.    Rodriguez’s Motion to Compel Discovery

      In his third issue, Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred by refusing to
compel certain discovery. Before Academy filed its summary-judgment motion,
Rodriguez served requests for production on Academy. Academy objected to each
request on the same ground—that it could not be compelled to respond to
discovery because PLCAA rendered it immune from this suit. Notwithstanding its
objections, Academy produced a copy of the firearms transaction record
documenting Kristina’s purchase, a copy of Academy’s federal firearms license,
and a copy of the Austin Police Department (“APD”) offense report pertaining to
Kristina’s death. On November 23, 2022, Rodriguez filed a motion to compel
                                         4
Academy’s discovery responses.        Our record does not include any notice of
hearing or submission related to Rodriguez’s motion to compel.

      On December 12, 2022, approximately three weeks after Rodriguez filed his
motion to compel, Academy filed its motion for summary judgment. Rodriguez
timely filed a summary-judgment response.            Before he filed his response,
Rodriguez had not obtained a ruling on his motion to compel or, it appears, set it
for hearing.    In the section of his summary-judgment response addressing
Academy’s suicide defense under section 93.001, Rodriguez generally referenced
discovery in a single sentence.      He said, “[w]ithout being allowed to further
explore these matters by deposing Academy’s salespeople, Plaintiff is precluded
from effectively preparing his case.” He did not, however, file a motion for
continuance or attach an affidavit under rule 166a(g) explaining that he could not,
for the reasons stated in the affidavit, present at that time facts essential to justify
his opposition to that part of the summary-judgment motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
166a(g). Rodriguez attached evidence to his response and argued the merits of
Academy’s suicide defense.

      On January 4, 2023, the court held a hearing on Academy’s summary-
judgment motion. The reporter’s record from that hearing is contained the record
on appeal. At the hearing’s outset, the court remarked that Rodriguez’s motion to
compel was pending but proceeded to hear argument on the summary-judgment
merits. During the argument, Rodriguez’s counsel stated that he needed to conduct
more discovery to determine what Academy “did or did not know.”

      On February 13, 2023, the trial court signed an order granting Academy’s
motion for summary judgment. In that order, the court denied Rodriguez’s motion
to compel as moot.

                                           5
       When a party contends that it has not had an adequate opportunity for
discovery before a summary-judgment hearing, it must file either an affidavit
explaining the need for further discovery or a verified motion for continuance.
Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996). The trial
court may order a continuance of a summary-judgment hearing “to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had” if it
appears “from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition.” Tex. R.
Civ. P. 166a(g). Because Rodriguez did not file a verified motion for continuance
or an affidavit explaining that he could not, due to Academy’s discovery
objections, present facts essential to oppose summary judgment on Academy’s
suicide defense, we conclude he waived his appellate discovery complaint. See
Daniels v. Bertolino, No. 03-14-00671-CV, 2015 WL 4909929, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Austin Aug. 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Yoon v. State, No. 03-11-00722-CV,
2012 WL 5974071, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 20, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(party waived right to complain of trial court’s refusal to grant additional time
before rendering summary judgment when party did not file affidavit or verified
motion for continuance explaining need for additional discovery); Mark Prods.
U.S., Inc. v. InterFirst Bank Houston, N.A., 737 S.W.2d 389, 396 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied) (holding that because appellant did not file
motion for continuance for summary-judgment hearing so that trial court could rule
on appellant’s motion to compel, complaint on appeal was waived).4

       4
          Rodriguez asserts that he asked the trial court for a continuance but no motion for
continuance is contained in the clerk’s record or referenced in his summary-judgment response.
During the summary-judgment hearing, Rodriguez said that he needed to conduct more
discovery from Academy’s store employees. Construing counsel’s statements during the hearing
as a request for a continuance, we again note that no affidavit was filed, which is a prerequisite to
a continuance under rule 166a(g). Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g).

                                                 6
      Rodriguez argues that a motion for continuance, although prescribed by the
rules of procedure, was unnecessary in this case. Citing to Ford Motor Co. v.
Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2009), Rodriguez contends that a motion for
continuance would have been futile. In Castillo, the parties entered a settlement
agreement.    Id. at 659.    Ford then sought permission to obtain discovery
implicating the validity of the settlement agreement, which the trial court denied.
Id. at 659-60. Castillo moved for summary judgment to enforce the settlement
agreement. Id. at 660. Ford’s response renewed its request for discovery, but the
trial court granted summary judgment for Castillo. Id. Ford appealed, but the
court of appeals held that, among other things, Ford waived any error regarding the
trial court’s denial of its discovery request because it did not comply with rule
166a(g), requiring an affidavit explaining the need for further discovery or a
verified motion for continuance. Id. at 661-62.

      The supreme court reversed. Noting that the trial court “had already ruled
that discovery was not going to be allowed,” the court reasoned that a continuance
would have served no purpose other than to delay the proceedings. Id. at 662-63.
Thus, Ford’s summary-judgment response, in light of its prior filings and the trial
court’s rulings, sufficiently preserved Ford’s complaint that the trial court
improperly denied it the opportunity to conduct discovery. Id. at 662-63.

      Our circumstances are distinguishable.      Although Rodriguez moved to
compel discovery from Academy before Academy filed its summary-judgment
motion, the trial court did not rule on the motion to compel before it granted
summary judgment. At the time Academy moved for summary judgment, in
contrast to Castillo, there was no order denying the motion to compel on which
Rodriguez could have based an argument that moving for a continuance of the
summary-judgment hearing would have been futile. The fact that a motion to

                                         7
compel discovery was pending at the time Rodriguez’s summary-judgment
response was due is not adequate to preserve his appellate complaint; an affidavit
or verified motion for continuance was required. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(g).

       Rodriguez did not comply with the requirements of rule 166a(g).
Accordingly, he did not preserve his appellate issue that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to compel discovery. We overrule his third issue.

B.     Affirmative Defense

       Academy sought traditional summary judgment based on the suicide
affirmative defense contained in Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code section
93.001. That section states, in relevant part, that it is an affirmative defense to a
civil action for damages for personal injury or death:

       that the plaintiff, at the time the cause of action arose, was . . .
       committing or attempting to commit suicide, and the plaintiff’s
       conduct in committing or attempting to commit suicide was the sole
       cause of the damages sustained; provided, however, if the suicide or
       attempted suicide was caused in whole or in part by a failure on the
       part of any defendant to comply with an applicable legal standard,
       then such suicide or attempted suicide shall not be a defense.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 93.001(a)(2). Because Rodriguez alleges that his
damages resulted from the wrongful death of his daughter, his claims are subject to
this affirmative defense. See Bracy v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 02-06-00223-
CV, 2007 WL 1228642, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 26, 2007, no pet.)
(mem. op.); see also Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex.
1992) (“Defenses that could have been raised against a claim by the injured person
may also be raised against the same claim asserted by the person’s heirs and
estate.”).

                                          8
      Academy is not entitled to judgment under section 93.001(a)(2) if its failure
to comply with an applicable legal standard was a cause of Kristina’s suicide. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 93.001(a)(2); Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 12
(Tex. 1994); Rubio v. Martinez, Nos. 13-10-00351-CV, 13-10-00352-CV, 2011
WL 3241905, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 28, 2011, no pet.)
(mem. op); Bracy, 2007 WL 1228642, at *3; Galindo v. Dean, 69 S.W.3d 623,
625-26 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.).

      The record establishes conclusively that Kristina died by suicide. Rodriguez
alleged as much, and this fact is confirmed by the APD offense report, attached to
Academy’s motion.

      Academy proved that it did not violate any applicable legal standard that
proximately caused Kristina’s death and that her suicide was the sole cause of her
death. Rodriguez alleged that Academy violated section 922(d)(3)-(4) of the Gun
Control Act of 1968, which states that it is “unlawful for any person to sell . . . any
firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe that such person . . . is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled
substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
802)); [or] has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to
any mental institution at 16 years of age or older.” See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), (4).5

      Academy presented evidence that it did not violate either cited provision of
section 922. Academy established that it is a federally licensed firearms dealer and
held a valid federal firearms license and that Kristina completed and signed a
firearms transaction record required by the federal bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”). In completing and signing the ATF form,
Kristina represented that she was not “addicted to marijuana or any depressant,
      5
          See Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.).

                                                 9
stimulant, narcotic drug, or any other controlled substance” and that she had never
“been committed to a mental institution.” She also certified that her answers were
“true, correct, and complete” and that she had read and understood the notices,
instructions, and definitions on the ATF form. Academy presented evidence that
the National Criminal Instant Background Check System instructed Academy that
it could “Proceed” with the transaction.

      Rodriguez also alleged that Academy breached the standard of ordinary care
applicable to firearms sellers. Academy presented evidence disproving a violation
of this standard as well. The police report indicated that Kristina entered the
business alone and walked in normally before 10:00 p.m. The Academy employee
who sold Kristina the gun described her as being in “good spirits” during the sale,
and she told him she planned to visit her family the following day and go to the
gun range with her father on his birthday.

      We conclude that Academy met its initial summary-judgment burden by
establishing that Kristina’s suicide was the sole cause of the damages sustained
because Academy complied with the applicable legal standards alleged by
Rodriguez. See Rubio, 2011 WL 3241905, at *4; Bracy, 2007 WL 1228642, at *3.

      The burden shifted to Rodriguez as the nonmovant to bring forth evidence
that raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Academy failed to comply
with an applicable legal standard and that its failure to comply caused in whole or
in part the damages. See Rubio, 2011 WL 3241905, at *3; Bracy, 2007 WL
1228642, at *3. Rodriguez argued in his summary-judgment response that Kristina
was “addicted to psychotropic medications, primarily Xanax, a controlled
substance, and lithium” and that she “had been involuntarily institutionalized at
least twice during her lifetime.” Rodriguez relied on the affidavit of Andrew
Khachikian, Kristina’s fiancé.    Khachikian attested that Kristina took “heavy

                                           10
medications for mental diagnoses” and “was involuntarily admitted to Ascension
Shoal Creek psychiatric hospital by Austin Police” in 2019. He believed that
Kristina “showed typical signs of severe mental distress,” was “unable to make
sound decisions,” and “was clearly not in her right mind” on the day of her death.
Khachikian was unaware of Kristina’s plan to go to Academy and did not
accompany her to the store. Khachikian did not testify that he tried to stop Kristina
from leaving their apartment.

      Rodriguez contends that Academy generally “should have been put on
notice that the purchaser could foreseeably pose a threat to herself or others.”
Rodriguez posits that, “[a]t a minimum, there is conflicting testimony between
Academy’s employee who stated that Ms. Rodriguez was ‘in good spirits’ and her
ex-fiancé who maintains that she was ‘clearly not in her right mind’ before she left
the apartment to head to Academy, a fact which was unknown to him at the time.”

      Assuming the truth of Khachikian’s statements, his affidavit does not raise a
fact issue that Academy failed to act as a firearms seller of ordinary prudence.
Khachikian’s affidavit does not establish that Academy knew or should have
known that Kristina posed a threat to herself or others. Khachikian, who was not
present when Kristina purchased the gun, provided no facts detailing Kristina’s
actions, words, or conduct that would indicate to a reasonable person that she was
exhibiting “typical signs of several mental distress” when she purchased the
firearm. See LMB, Ltd. v. Moreno, 201 S.W.3d 686, 688-89 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam) (affidavit did not set out specific facts from which jury could reasonably
infer defendant’s knowledge or imputed knowledge; conclusory statements are not
competent evidence); Gifford v. Kelley, No. 10-09-00380-CV, 2010 WL 1797624,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco May 5, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); Rodriguez v.
Spencer, 902 S.W.2d 37, 45 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.);

                                         11
accord also Harris v. Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 557 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no pet.) (albeit in jury context, testimony that plaintiff
was “mentally confused and needed care and treatment” did not “clearly and
positively establish that the hospital knew or should have known that [the plaintiff]
would likely take radical steps to escape from the psychiatric ward or attempt to
inflict injury upon himself”).

      Nor does Khachikian’s affidavit constitute evidence that Academy knew or
had reasonable cause to believe that Kristina was an unlawful or addictive drug
user or had been committed to a mental institution when she was 16 or older. See
Peek v. Oshman’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1989, writ denied) (testimony that gun-purchaser appeared, to another
customer, to be nervous or in a hurry did not raise a genuine issue of fact whether
seller’s personnel sold any firearm or ammunition knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe that purchaser had been adjudicated as a mental defective); see
also LMB, Ltd., 201 S.W.3d at 688-89; Gifford, 2010 WL 1797624, at *3.

      We conclude that Academy established conclusively the affirmative defense
under section 93.001(a)(2), and Rodriguez did not raise a genuine issue of material
fact that the suicide was caused in whole or in part by a failure on Academy’s part
to comply with an applicable legal standard. See Rubio, 2011 WL 3241905, at *4;
Bracy, 2007 WL 1228642, at *1; Galindo, 69 S.W.3d at 628.

      Accordingly, section 93.001’s affirmative defense bars Rodriguez’s claims.
We overrule Rodriguez’s fourth issue, and we do not reach his first two issues
challenging summary judgment on the basis of PLCAA.

                                         12
                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment.

                                      /s/    Kevin Jewell
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Jewell.

                                        13