Court Opinion

ID: 9579658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:57:12.487395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:39.260872
License: Public Domain

Quillian, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the judgment of reversal for the sole reason that, as shown in each part of the petition, that is, the original petition and several counts added by way of amendment, there was no consideration for the deed, the validity of which is discussed in the majority opinion. A consideration is essential to the validity of a deed; to deliver an instrument described as a deed but having no consideration, with greatest solemnity, is to perform a vain act; for, the paper is not a legal document, is incomplete and the delivery, in such circumstances, can not be for the purpose of giving it effect. In my opinion, the delivery of the *97deed was not for any other reason disclosed by the record insufficient or ineffectual. Hence, I concur only with the judgment rendered in Division 2 (d).
I dissent from the conclusion reached in Divisions 1 and 2 (b) of the majority opinion that the petition did not show that the deed attacked was without consideration and all that is said in those divisions. The rule frequently referred to in the opinions of this court is that the consideration of a deed may be inquired into where it is merely recited in a deed, but where the consideration of a deed stated in the instrument is a covenant, that is one of the express terms of the deed, it can not, in the guise of inquiring into the same under the provisions of Code § 29-110, be proved by parol evidence to be of a different nature, enlarged or diminished. Wellmaker v. Wheatley, 123 Ga. 201 (2) (51 SE 436); Young v. Young, 150 Ga. 515 (1) (104 SE 149). The rule is not applicable, however, when the evidence is offered to show a total want or failure of the consideration for which the deed is made. Pittman v. Pittman, 196 Ga. 397, 405-406 (26 SE2d 764); Toney v. Toney, 196 Ga. 666 (3) (27 SE2d 296). As held in the Toney case: “A deed that recites on its face a consideration of $10 ‘and other valuable consideration in hand paid’ at the time of its execution is not a voluntary conveyance, but presumptively is valid as based on an actual valuable consideration. Thus, on a petition by the grantors for cancellation and other equitable relief, attacking such a deed as without consideration, while an inquiry into the actual consideration is not precluded, the burden is on the grantors to show that none in fact existed.” Moreover, “it matters not whether a fraudulent intention existed at the time the conveyance was made. ‘Constructive trusts are such as are raised by equity in respect of property which had been acquired by fraud, or where, though acquired originally without fraud, it is against equity that it should be retained by him who holds it.’ O’Neal v. O’Neal, 176 Ga. 418 (2) (168 SE 262); 26 RCL 1232, § 78; 3 Scott on Trusts, 2317, § 462.2.” Pittman v. Pittman, 196 Ga. 397, 405, supra.
In the present case, however, the consideration of the deed attacked is stated in the deed as a mere recital. So, under any *98view of the law, between the parties to the deed, the defendant grantee and the plaintiff who stands in the stead of her deceased husband, the grantor, inquiry may be made as to the consideration of the deed. Stonecypher v. Ga. Power Co., 183 Ga. 498, 504 (3) (189 SE 13); Toney v. Toney, 196 Ga. 666, supra.
With all deference to my learned colleagues, the cases cited in the majority opinion which hold that where the consideration of a deed is not paid, unless the grantee be insolvent, the remedy of the grantor is to recover the amount of the consideration expressed in the deed and the mere failure to pay the actual consideration as agreed by the terms of the deed is not a ground upon which the conveyance may be canceled, Nathans v. Arkwright, 66 Ga. 179 (1-a); Harry v. Griffin, 210 Ga. 133 (1) (78 SE2d 37), has not the slightest relation to a situation in which there is, as alleged by the petition in the instant case, no consideration for the deed. It seems obvious to me that the collection of the consideration of a deed that had none can not be accomplished.
It should be remembered that the petition contains the allegations:
Original petition, Par. 5. "That irrespective of the manner in which defendant acquired possession of said deed, the same is null, void and of no effect because no consideration was paid by the defendant to the plaintiff’s deceased husband for the land. Said deed recites One Dollar and Other Valuable Considerations as having been paid by defendant to plaintiff’s deceased husband. The defendant states that she has paid for the property a large sum of money and made this statement to plaintiff’s attorneys but she refuses to show the check with which she made the payment or produce any receipt to show payment and plaintiff alleges that the defendant did not pay the valuable consideration referred to in said deed, and paid absolutely nothing for the property, and because said deed is wholly and completely without any consideration whatsoever, it is null, void and of no effect.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Count B, Par. 5 (d). “That after plaintiff’s deceased husband signed such deed, he went back to the defendant’s apartment and they resumed their discussion as to the amount of the purchase *99price. At no time did. they ever agree on a price for such land, nor did they set the purchase price. Being unable to agree on price, they decided to discuss the price in the future. They never held any further discussions because plaintiff’s husband died a short time thereafter, and before they ever agreed on such consideration to be paid for such property.”
Count 8, Par. 2. “That said deed is wholly without consideration, in that the defendant did not pay the plaintiff any sum of money whatsoever for said land and no consideration of any description ever passed between plaintiff’s deceased husband and the defendant, and because said deed is wholly without consideration it is null and void and should be canceled.”
The original petition and each of the counts to which there is reference, under a familiar rule of pleading, stands as a separate unit of pleadings, as individual and segregated from other parts of the petition as different petitions concerning the same subject matter, none of the averments of any count being made a part of another by reference. But, in my opinion, the total want of consideration for the deed is made to plainly appear in the original petition and each of the counts, parts of which are quoted above. So, I am firm in the opinion that the allegations of the petition sufficiently showed there was no consideration for the deed we consider in the present case. The want of such consideration is, under the statutes of this State and the previous holdings of this court, cause to cancel the deed. The cases of other jurisdictions, where the statutory law and the interpretation of statutes is different from ours, furnish no valid basis of a contrary view from that expressed here. The majority opinion in the case sub judice, though that of scholarly Justices equally as conscientious as I in the expression of their conclusions, is not in line with the well settled rule, so vital in the enforcement of sacred property rights, that, as simply stated in Code § 29-101, a consideration is essential to a deed.
There is no statute of the State or holding of this court which relegates the grantor to the remedy of seeking to recover the consideration stated in the deed where in fact there was no actual consideration for the same. To rule that in any event, as the court has in this case, that the collection of consideration ex*100pressed in the deed is the grantor’s only remedy, when in fact there was no consideration, is in effect to completely nullify the rule that permits inquiry into the consideration of deeds. There is no logical reason to inquire into the want of consideration in a deed, if the only remedy the grantor has is to collect the consideration expressed in the deed, although the recitation as to the consideration be false.