Court Opinion

ID: 9552125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:05:01.006075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:40.382331
License: Public Domain

RUSSON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from Chief Justice Zimmerman’s conclusion that the defendants in this ease are not entitled to an allocation of fault between defendants and the unknown assailant.
The guiding principle of our comparative fault statute is that “[n]o defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the 'proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under section 78-27-39.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38(3) (emphasis added). To determine fault consistent with this guiding principle, the fact finder must be able to allocate fault among all the defendants who contributed to the plaintiffs injuries.
Chief Justice Zimmerman has concluded that the unknown assailant is not a defendant in this case and therefore cannot be attributed fault under section 78-27-39. I disagree. Section 78-27-41, which provides for the joinder of defendants for the purpose of proportioning fault, provides:
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation, may join as a defendant, in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any person ■ other than a person immune from suit who may have caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having determined their respective proportions of fault.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41(1) (1996) (emphasis added).
Chief Justice Zimmerman states that this section “indicates a legislative intent that defendants wishing to have their fault compared with nonparties join such nonparties under section 78-27-41 or bear the burden if such people cannot be joined.” The Chief Justice, however, ignores the language of this section providing for joinder by the plaintiff and overlooks the fact that the plaintiff in this case has indeed joined the unknown assailant as a defendant. In paragraph 15 of her complaint, plaintiff names
Defendant “I”, “J”, and “K”, those other persons, corporations, or other entities whose negligence or other wrongful conduct contributed to the injuries and damages suffered by the Plaintiff Lois Field, whose true and correct names and identities are otherwise unknown to Plaintiff Lois Field, but which will be substituted by amendment when ascertained.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the unknown assailant is clearly a “defendant,” which the comparative negligence statute defines as “a person ... who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(1).
According to rule 9(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, when a .party does not know the name of an adverse party, she may state that fact in the pleadings and “such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.” Utah R. Civ. P. 9(a)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, this plaintiff has complied with section 78-27-41, as well as with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in joining the assailant as a “defendant.” It is irrelevant that the assailant’s true identity is not known, that he has not been served with process, and that judgment may not be entered against him. Pursuant to section 78-27-41, the assailant qualifies as “any person ... who may have caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought,” and he therefore qualifies as a “defendant” for the purpose of determining respective proportions of fault.
This case is not one in which the defendant has conjured up a third-party “phantom” wrongdoer whose existence is at issue. All parties here agree that plaintiff was attacked and injured by an unknown assailant. Thus, the fact finder must not only consider, but *1090must also allocate to the intentional tortfea-sor who undisputedly injured plaintiff, his respective proportion of fault for causing those injuries. Only then can the fact finder fairly and honestly determine the proportion of fault attributable to the other defendants in this case and satisfy section 78-27-39.1

. Chief Justice Zimmerman points out in a footnote that our opinion in S.H. v. Bistryski, 923 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1996), allowed fault to be attributed to the ' ‘nonparty” mother of a minor who had been bitten by a dog and that we did not consider the second part of section 77-27-38(4)(a), which permits attribution of fault to only three classes of persons.
While the Chief Justice correctly notes that we did not consider the second part of section 77-27-38(4)(a), he labels the mother a "nonparty,” thereby implying that the mother was not properly considered for purposes of proportioning fault. However, the statute defines "person seeking recovery” as "any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal representative." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(4) (emphasis added). Because the mother was authorized to act as the child’s legal representative and bring suit on the child's behalf, the mother qualified as a “person seeking recovery” under the statute. As such, she could be attributed her proportion of fault under the statute. Therefore, the result in Bistryski would be the same under the approach in this dissent.