Court Opinion

ID: 9578494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:45:46.520847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:58.417255
License: Public Domain

GREENE, Judge.
Triangle Laboratories, Inc. (Defendant) appeals a judgment filed 11 February 2000 awarding summary judgment (the judgment) in favor of ARE-100/800/801 Capitola, LLC (Plaintiff). Plaintiff cross-assigns error to an order filed 6 April 2000 staying execution of the judgment pending disposition of the appeal of the judgment.
*214On 14 June 1995, Defendant, as tenant, entered into a lease agreement with ATP Properties Limited Partnership, J. Allen Yager and wife, Hilda Yager, as landlords (the Lease), to lease property located at 801 Capitola Drive, Durham (the Property).1 The Lease provided Defendant would use the Property for “general office, laboratory, research and development purposes.”
Pursuant to the Lease, Defendant was to pay a monthly minimum rent on a square foot basis “without demand and without counterclaim, deduction^] or set-off,. . . payable on or before the first day of each calendar month.” An “[e]vent of [d]efault” under the Lease included Defendant’s failure “to pay any rent including additional rent within 3 business days after notice of its failure to do so from [Plaintiff] provided [Plaintiff] shall not be required to so notify [Defendant] for such failure mofe than three times in any twelve month period.” Upon the occurrence of an “[e]vent of [d]efault,” Plaintiff had the right, by written notice to Defendant to: re-enter the Property and remove Defendant and its belongings from the Property; terminate the Lease; or terminate Defendant’s possession of the Property. If the term of the Lease was not specifically terminated in writing, the parties were to assume Plaintiff had “elected to terminate possession only, without terminating the term.” If Plaintiff chose to only terminate possession of the Property, Defendant’s “obligations to pay rent or any other sums due for the remainder of the Lease” remained unaffected.
The Lease obligated Plaintiff to: furnish the Property “hot and cold water, electricity for normal general office use, [and] removal of trash from site dumpsters”; maintain and repair “the roof and structural portions” of the Property; replace “any complete mechanical system” if the components could not be replaced or repaired by Defendant; and “replace or to make any and all repairs to any mechanical system.” If Plaintiff defaulted or failed to perform its obligations under the Lease, Defendant was to notify Plaintiff and give Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to cure the default. If Plaintiff failed to cure the default, Defendant had the option of expending reasonable sums to cure Plaintiff’s default and “offset such sums against the payment of rent.”
The Lease was amended on 10 February 1997 to allow Defendant an opportunity to correct a default for failure to pay rent. The amend*215ment to the Lease provided Defendant was to pay Plaintiff $179,825.56 for failure to pay rent. In a letter dated 27 July 1999, Plaintiff informed Defendant that pursuant to the Lease, Defendant was in default by failing to pay the monthly rent and related charges. Plaintiff requested Defendant “remit immediate payment in the amount of $59,705.54” and if payment was not received in accordance with the Lease, Plaintiff would “immediately initiate curative remedies under the Lease and the law.” In a letter dated 13 October 1999, Plaintiff informed Defendant that Plaintiff had not “received payment of rent obligations due under the terms of the Lease for October 1999 and other rents dating back over 150 days.” Plaintiff requested Defendant immediately cure the default and remit payment in the amount of $178,950.90 or Plaintiff would “immediately initiate curative remedies under the Lease and the law.” In a letter dated 10 November 1999, Plaintiff again informed Defendant that Plaintiff had “not received payment of rent obligations due under the terms of the Lease for November 1999 and other rents dating back over 150 days.” Plaintiff requested Defendant remit payment in the amount of $236,172.80 or Plaintiff would “immediately initiate curative remedies under the Lease and the law.”
On 30 November 1999, Plaintiff filed a complaint for summary ejectment of Defendant. Plaintiff stated Defendant breached the Lease by failing to “pay rent within three business days after three demands” upon Defendant within one year. On 13 December 1999, a Durham County magistrate ordered Defendant be removed from the Property and Plaintiff be put in possession of the Property. On 23 December 1999, Defendant appealed de novo to the district court for a jury trial. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on 24 January 2000. In the sworn affidavit of J. Ronald Hass (Hass), CEO and President of Defendant, Defendant admitted it had not paid rent because Defendant felt it was being overcharged and Plaintiff was not fulfilling its obligations under the Lease. The trial court granted Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on 11 February 2000, concluding the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the summary ejectment and Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
On 10 March 2000, Defendant moved the trial court to stay execution of the judgment pending disposition of appeal to this Court. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to stay execution of the judgment on 6 April 2000, and found as fact that Defendant had made monthly rental payments to Plaintiff since 23 December 1999. The *216trial court imposed the following conditions on Defendant pending disposition of appeal:
(1) that Defendant shall commit no waste upon the [Property] . . . ; (2) that Defendant shall continue to make monthly rental payments to Plaintiff in the amount of $48,130.07, to be paid to the Clerk of Durham County Superior Court, on or before the 6th day of each month henceforth through and including July[] 2000; (3) that between July 6, 2000 and August 1, 2000, Defendant shall obtain a surety for the purpose of posting a bond equal to double the sum of $240,000 which would be the amount of rent due on the remainder of the [L]ease which expires on December 31, 2000, or in the alternative, Defendant may comply with this condition by posting $240,000 with the Clerk of Superior Court on or before August 1, 2000.
The issues are whether: (I) a district court has subject matter jurisdiction with regard to the summary ejectment of a commercial tenant; (II) genuine issues of material fact exist concerning Defendant’s failure to pay rent pursuant to the Lease; and (III) Plaintiffs letter indicating it would “initiate curative remedies” terminated Defendant’s leasehold estate.
I
Defendant argues the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because Chapter 42, Article 3 of the North Carolina General Statutes applies to residential tenants, and, thus, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.
A trial court conducting a summary ejectment proceeding obtains its jurisdiction from N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26 and in order to have such jurisdiction, there must be a landlord-tenant relationship and one of the three statutory violations in section 42-26 must have occurred. Hayes v. Turner, 98 N.C. App. 461, 454, 391 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1990). Chapter 42, Article 2A of the North Carolina General Statutes provides limitations on ejectment of residential tenants. See N.C.G.S. § 42-25.6 (1999). Article 3, however, has been applied to summary ejectment of commercial tenants. See Holly Farms Foods, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 114 N.C. App. 412, 414, 442 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1994); see also Chrisalis Properties, Inc. v. Separate Quarters, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 81, 84, 398 S.E.2d 628, 631-32 (1990), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 570, 403 S.E.2d 509 (1991).
*217In this case, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the summary ejectment proceedings. Defendant is a commercial tenant and Plaintiff is the landlord. In addition, one of three statutory violations listed in section 42-26 has occurred: Defendant failed to pay rent. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction in this summary judgment action.
II
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of fact existed concerning Plaintiff’s overcharge for late fees, damages to Defendant’s business, and Plaintiff’s constructive eviction of Defendant. We disagree.2
A motion for summary judgment is properly granted “where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Johnson v. Trustees of Durham Technical Community College, 139 N.C. App. 676, 680, 535 S.E.2d 357, 361, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 265,-S.E.2d-(2000).

Overcharge of late fees

In this case, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Defendant, see Wrenn v. Byrd, 120 N.C. App. 761, 763, 464 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1995) (must view evidence in light most favorable to non-moving party on motion for summary judgment), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 666, 467 S.E.2d 738 (1996), reveals no genuine issue of fact as to Defendant’s failure to timely pay rent. Defendant argues there is a dispute about the amount of the late charge Plaintiff assessed Defendant; Defendant, however, does not deny it has failed to pay rent. Indeed, Hass, in his affidavit, admits Defendant had failed to pay rent. Accordingly, whether or not Plaintiff has assessed Defendant an incorrect late fee goes to the amount of money Defendant owes to Plaintiff and not to whether Defendant has failed to pay rent.

Plaintiff’s failure to make repairs

Additionally, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s failure to make repairs to the Property entitles Defendant to an offset on the amount of rent. *218The Lease requires that in order for Defendant to be entitled to an offset, Defendant must expend reasonable sums to cure Plaintiffs default. In this case, Defendant has not shown it expended any monies to repair the Property. In any event, even if Defendant had expended monies to repair the property, this would offset a portion of the rent and does not address Defendant’s failure to pay rent or to notify Plaintiff of the offset. Accordingly, Plaintiffs failure to make certain repairs does not alleviate Defendant of its obligation to pay rent, thus, no genuine issue of fact exists as to Defendant’s default under the Lease.3

Constructive eviction

Defendant next argues a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff constructively evicted Defendant by Plaintiff’s failure to make repairs. A tenant, who seeks to establish constructive eviction, “has the burden of showing ... he abandoned the premises within a reasonable time after the landlord’s wrongful act.” K&S Enters. v. Kennedy Office Supply Co., Inc., 135 N.C. App. 260, 266, 520 S.E.2d 122, 126 (1999), affirmed, 351 N.C. 470, 527 S.E.2d 644 (2000). In this case, Defendant has failed to show he abandoned the Property. Indeed, Defendant sought to remain in possession of the Property pending disposition of this case before this Court. Thus, as Defendant did not abandon the Property, Defendant cannot withhold rental payments and claim constructive eviction. See Thompson v. Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687, 690, 173 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1970) (“it would be grossly unjust to permit a tenant to continue in possession of premises and shield himself from payment of rent by reason of alleged wrongful acts of the landlord”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 85 N.C. App. 362, 368, 355 S.E.2d 189,193 (1987). Accordingly, there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning Defendant’s failure to pay rent.
Ill
Defendant finally argues that the trial court erred in granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to terminate Defendant’s estate. We agree.
North Carolina General Statutes permit a landlord to seek summary ejectment when “the tenant. . . has done or omitted any act by *219which, according to the stipulations of the lease, his estate has ceased.” N.C.G.S. § 42-26(2) (1999). Under section 42-26(2), a breach of a lease cannot be made the basis for summary ejectment unless the lease provides for termination upon such a breach or reserves the right of reentry for such a breach. Stanley v. Harvey, 90 N.C. App. 535, 537, 369 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1988). When the termination of a lease depends upon notice, “the notice must be given in strict compliance with the contract as to both time and contents.” Id. at 539, 369 S.E.2d at 385.
In this case, the Lease provides that if Defendant defaulted, Plaintiff had the option, by written notice to Defendant, to re-enter the Property, terminate the Lease, or terminate Defendant’s possession of the property. Plaintiffs written notices to Defendant merely indicate Plaintiff will “initiate curative remedies under the Lease and the law.” None of Plaintiffs three notices of default to Defendant, state that Plaintiff intends to re-enter the Property, terminate the Lease, or terminate Defendant’s possession of the Property as required by the Lease. Also, Plaintiff’s letters to Defendant did not provide clear and unequivocal notice to Defendant that Plaintiff was terminating Defendant’s estate. Plaintiff, therefore, had no authority under the Lease to proceed with the summary ejectment proceeding without Defendant’s estate ceasing. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.4
Plaintiff cross-assigns error to the trial court’s order staying execution of the judgment pending appeal. Plaintiff’s arguments concerning its cross-assignment of error are reasons the trial court erred in staying execution of the judgment and those reasons do not provide “an alternative basis in law for supporting” the judgment. The proper method to raise these arguments would have been a cross-appeal. See Williams v. N.C. Dept. of Economic and Community Development, 119 N.C. App. 535, 539, 458 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1995); see also N.C.R. App. P. 10(d). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s failure to appeal the trial court’s order waives this Court’s consideration of the matter on appeal. Id.
*220Reversed.
Judge McGEE concurs.
Judge CAMPBELL concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.

. Plaintiff is the successor in interest to ATP Properties Limited Partnership, J. Allen Yager and Hilda Yager with respect to the Lease.

. Defendant also argues that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether it is actually in default on the rental payments in light of North Carolina’s Residential Rental Agreements Act, codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 42, Article 5. The Residential Rental Agreements Act, however, only applies to dwellings used for residential purposes. See N.C.G.S. § 42-38 (1999); see also N.C.G.S. § 42-40(2) (1999). Thus, Defendant, as a commercial tenant, is not protected by the Residential Rental Agreements Act.

. We note the Lease also requires Defendant to pay rent “without demand and without counterclaim, deduction!,] or set-off.”

. Plaintiff argues because it did not specifically terminate the Lease, its notices to Defendant were to be construed as terminating Defendant’s possession. Plaintiff, however, had several options provided by the Lease upon default by Defendant. All of these options required Plaintiff to provide Defendant with written notice of Plaintiff’s option. As Plaintiff’s notices did not indicate which option it was exercising, Plaintiffs notices are insufficient to terminate Defendant’s estate.