Court Opinion

ID: 9595574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:41:53.526902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:28.952377
License: Public Domain

TOBRINER, J.
I dissent.
The critical issue in this case—a very narrow issue—is whether a superior court, in reviewing a school board decision not to reemploy a probationary teacher, must utilize its independent judgment in evaluat*829ing disputed facts, or alternatively, must uphold the factual determinations of the school board so long as such determinations are supported by substantial evidence. Under this court’s decisions in Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 [93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242] and Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28 [112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29], the resolution of this issue turns on whether the school board’s decision not to reemploy a probationary teacher substantially affects a “fundamental, vested right” of the teacher. No one questions the “fundamental” nature of the probationary teacher’s right in this context;1 rather, the controversy in this case relates solely to the issue of whether the probationary teacher enjoys a “vested” right within the meaning of Bixby and Strumsky.
The majority conclude that the probationary teacher enjoys no such “vested” right, relying heavily on the dictionary meaning of “probationary” and on the supposition that a contrary conclusion would obliterate all distinctions between permanent and probationary teachers in this state. As I shall explain, however, the majority’s analysis fails to take proper cognizance of the fact that the Legislature has explicitly provided probationary teachers with a statutory right to be reemployed unless terminated “for cause”; this statutory provision, in itself, establishes the “vested” nature of the probationary teacher’s interest in reemployment. Moreover, as I further explain, the majority’s suggestion that such a conclusion would eliminate the distinctions between permanent and probationary teachers simply reflects a fundamental misconception of the scope of the Bixby-Strumsky doctrine.
As the majority properly recognize, analysis of the question at issue here must necessarily begin with this court’s decision in Bixby v. Pierno, supra, 4 Cal.3d 130. In Bixby, we articulated the distinction between *830“vested” and “nonvested” rights by reference to the differential treatment that traditionally has been accorded an applicant who has been denied a license, as distinguished from a license holder whose license has been revoked. Observing that “[c]ourts are relatively ill-equipped to determine [in the first instance] whether an individual would be qualified ... to practice a particular profession or trade,” we recognized that “courts uphold [an agency’s initial determination whether an individual qualifies to enter a profession or trade] unless it lacks substantial evidentiary support or infringes upon the applicant’s statutory or constitutional rights.” (Id., at p. 146.) On the other hand, we emphasized that “[o]nce the agency has initially exercised its expertise and détermined that an individual fulfills the requirements to practice his profession, the agency’s subsequent revocation of the license calls for an independent judgment review of the facts underlying any such administrative decision.” (Id.)
In the instant case, of course, the probationary teacher whose rights are at issue is in no sense analogous to a mere applicant for a license. Such a teacher has already obtained his teaching credential (see Ed. Code, § 13200 et seq.) and moreover, has already been found tentatively acceptable by the local school district which has hired him. Most significantly, such a probationary teacher enjoys much more than just a subjective “hope” or “expectancy” that he will be reemployed by the school district; instead, he possesses a statutory right to reemployment which may be lost only if the local school board finds proper “cause” not to reemploy him.
Thus, the critical factor in this case is the mandate of section 13443, subdivision (d) of the Education Code, which provides in relevant part that “[t]he governing board’s determination not to reemploy a probationary employee for the ensuing school year shall be for cause only.” (Italics added.) Although the section goes on to provide that the governing board has the final word as to whether a given “cause” is sufficiently serious to warrant non-reemployment, the provision also stipulates that “the cause shall relate solely to the welfare of the school and the pupils thereof.” Accordingly, so long as a probationary teacher conducts himself so as to provide no “cause” “relating to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof’ for non-reemployment, the teacher retains a statutory right to reemployment. This statutory right, though subject to divestment upon a finding of “cause,” constitutes a “vested” right within the meaning of Bixby. (See Young v. Governing Board (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 769 [115 Cal.Rptr. 456].)
*831The numerous cases upholding the “vested” nature of statutory retirement benefits confirm this conclusion. (See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., supra, 11 Cal.3d 28, 45, Kern v. City of Long Beach (1947) 29 Cal.2d 848, 853 [179 P.2d 799]; Dryden v. Board of Pension Commrs. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 575, 579 [59 P.2d 104]; O’Dea v. Cook (1917) 176 Cal. 659, 661-662 [169 P. 366].) As these cases recognize, although an’ employee’s right to retirement benefits may be lost by the occurrence of a condition subsequent (such as the lawful termination of employment before maturity), the right to such statutory benefits vests upon the initial acceptance of employment; in similar fashion, although a probationary teacher’s right to reemployment may be lost by the occurrence of a condition subsequent (a finding of “cause” for non-reemployment), the statutory right vests upon the probationary teacher’s acceptance of employment. As in the retirement benefit cases, judicial review of factual determinations of the local administrative bodies must be exercised pursuant to the “independent judgment” standard. (See Strumsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 45-46.)2
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority make two fundamental errors. First, the majority suggest that since plaintiff is a “probationary” teacher, it follows from the dictionary definition of “probationary” that he has no “vested” rights under Bixby or Strumsky. The defect in this reasoning is rather patent, for it simply ignores the fact that in this state “probationary” teacher is a term of art, a term used to describe a class of teachers whose rights have been defined in a complex body of legislative enactments. (See Ed. Code, §§ 13333, 13335, 13336.5, 13442, 13443, 13443.5, 13443.6, 13444.5.) Thus, while the term “probationary employee” might normally connote an employee with no legally protected rights to reemployment, this is simply not true of “probationary” teachers in California. Instead, such probationary teachers have been accorded numerous procedural and substantive rights, including statutory protection from termination without “cause.” These specific statu*832toiy enactments, of course, must take precedence over Webster’s New International Dictionary.
Second, the majority also err in suggesting that recognition of a probationary teacher’s “vested” right under Bixby-Strumsky will obliterate any distinction between probationary and permanent teachers. As I explain, this suggestion simply reflects a basic misconception of the nature of the Bixby-Strumsky doctrine.
Under the present legislative scheme, while a school board may only refuse to reemploy a probationary teacher “for cause,” once lawful “cause” relating to the welfare of the schools or pupils is shown, the school board is the final arbiter in determining whether such cause is sufficient to warrant non-reemploythent. The application of the “independent judgment” standard of review contemplated by Bixby-Strumsky would not alter this legislative scheme; the school board woiild retain ultimate judgment on the “sufficiency” of the cause, unencumbered by judicial second-guessing. Under Bixby and Strumsky, trial courts would exercise their independent judgment only with reference to the disputed factual issues in the record, i.e., whether or not the charges brought against the teacher were true or not; if the court found that the charges were true and related to the welfare of the school or pupils, the court would be obliged to uphold the district’s decision not to reemploy the teacher. Thus, school boards would retain the substantial discretion they now enjoy in deciding whether or not a given “cause” is. sufficient to warrant not reemploying a probationary teacher.
By contrast, a school board’s authority to terminate a permanent, tenured teacher is much more limited. Dismissal is permitted only for certain statutorily enumerated causes. (See Ed. Code, § 13403.) Moreover, as noted by the majority {ante, p. 822) in reviewing the dismissal of a permanent teacher, courts may determine whether the charged conduct is sufficiently serious to warrant dismissal, or alternatively, whether some lesser sanction is appropriate. That would not be the case with respect to the reemployment of probationary teachers.
Thus, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, a decision recognizing the “vested” nature of a probationary teacher’s right under Bixby and Strumsky would not eliminate the existing distinctions between probationary and permanent teachers.
*833The majority’s decision to deny probationary teachers the limited protection they are entitled to under Bixby and Strumsky is particularly unfortunate in light of the fact that, in today’s job market, a local school board’s decision not to re employ a probationary teacher is effectively equivalent to a revocation of that teacher’s credential. It is no secret, of course, that there presently exists a nationwide surplus of qualified elementary and secondary school teachers over the number of available teaching positions, or that this problem is particularly acute in California.3 Consequently, it is extremely unlikely that any teacher, once terminated for cause, will be rehired in the foreseeable future over the countless applicants whose records do not bear the blemish of an earlier dismissal. Given the critical importance of such a decision to a young teacher’s career, the need for the minimal safeguard provided by the “independent judgment” standard is manifest.
In sum, the Legislature has enacted a specific provision protecting a probationary teacher from losing his job in the absence of a showing of cause; this statute provides the probationary teacher with a “vested” interest in reemployment, requiring a trial judge to exercise “independent judgment” when reviewing the factual basis of a school board’s decision not to reemploy the teacher. The majority reach a contrary conclusion only by ignoring the effect of the governing legislative provision and by misconstruing the nature of the “independent judgment” doctrine.
I would reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court for reconsideration in light of the “independent judgment” standard of review.
Wright, C. J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.

In Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 144-145 [93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242], we said: “In determining whether the right is fundamental the courts do not alone weigh the economic aspect of it, but the effect of it in human terms and the importance of it to the individual in the life situation. This approach finds its application in such an instance as the opportunity to continue the practice of one’s trade or profession. . . .” (See, e.g., Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67 [64 Cal.Rptr. 785, 435 P.2d 553] (physician); Tringham v. State Board of Education (1958) 50 Cal.2d 507, 508 [326 P.2d 850] (credentialed teacher); Val Strough Chevrolet Co. v. Bright (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 855, 860 [75 Cal.Rptr. 363] (automobile dealer); Arenstein v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 179, 186-187 [71 Cal.Rptr. 357] (pharmacist); McPherson v. Real Estate Commissioner (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 751 [329 P.2d 12] (realtor).) In Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390, 399 [67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045, 43 S.Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446], the United States Supreme Court listed the right of the individual “to engage in any of the common occupations of life” as one of the fundamental liberties of the individual.

The decisions in Griggs v. Board of Trustees (1964) 61 Cal.2d 93 [37 Cal.Rptr. 194, 389 P.2d 722], and Bekiaris v. Board of Education (1972) 6 Cal.3d 575 [100 Cal.Rptr. 16, 493 P.2d 480], relied upon by the majority, did not involve the issue before us. The court in Griggs held “where the cause for dismissal found by the board can reasonably be said to relate to the ‘welfare of the schools and pupils thereof,’ the reviewing court may not consider whether the facts found are sufficiently serious to justify dismissal.” (Id, at p. 96.) In Bekiaris the court stated that “it remains for the court to determine as a matter of law whether such cause [for dismissal] relates to the welfare of the school and its pupils and is therefore adequate under the provisions of section 13443 to justify dismissal.” (Id., at p. 589; italics in the original.) Obviously any reference in these cases to the standard of review as to' factual findings must be read in the light of the subsequent ruling in Strumsky.

See generally Comment, The Scope of Judicial Review of Probationary Teacher Dismissal in California: Critique and Proposal (1974) 21 UCLA L.Rev. 1257, 1279-1280 and footnote 104. This article cites a recent National Education Association report which found teachers facing the worst job market since the depression and predicted a nationwide surplus of more than 100,000 annually by 1976.