Court Opinion

ID: 9589252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:42:55.799113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:24.978408
License: Public Domain

Townsend, J.,
concurring specially. I cannot agree with the decision in this case holding that the courts of Georgia are without jurisdiction of the subject matter for the reason that exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the National Labor Relations Board under 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. The case is here on demurrer, and, under the allegations of the petition, the N. L. R. B. has no jurisdiction of the action for the reason that it does not appear *862that “the activity of the employer defendant constitutes what is defined as ‘affecting commerce/ ” as set out on page 4 of the majority opinion. The term “affecting commerce” means intei'state commerce only. J. L. Brandeis & Sons v. N. L. R. B., 142 Fed. 2d 977; Continental Oil Co. v. N. L. R. B., 113 Fed. 2d 473; N. L. R. B. v. Gleuk Brewing Co., 144 Fed. 2d 847; Pueblo Gas & Fuel Co. v. N. L. R. B., 118 Fed. 2d 304. Nothing in this petition shows that the employer is either engaged in interstate commerce or that its intrastate business is of such a character as to affect interstate commerce, and there is accordingly no reason to suppose that the N. L. R. B. would have any jurisdiction. If, under facts not appearing from this petition, it has exclusive jurisdiction of the matter, then the defendants’ remedy would have been to file a plea to the jurisdiction.
Accordingly, I think that the petition shows jurisdiction in the State court, and that the demurrer must be decided on its merits. The petition alleged that the plaintiff was employed by Merritt-Chapman & Scott “by and at the direction of the Union”, and was paid up until the date of his discharge. He seeks, in addition to exemplary damages and attorney fees, a decree of court that the defendants issue him a union book “entitling him to work on union jobs,” plus damages equal to his previous weekly salary up to the date of trial, or, in the alternative, damages equal to 21 years of full employment in the amount of $242,697 for work as a pipefitter.
Since it is not alleged that any contract of employment existed other than a contract at the will of the parties, there is no cause of action for breach of contract of employment under Code § 66-101, or for procuring the breach of a contract under Code § 106-1207. Nor is the remedy of specific performance sought against the union officials to compel them to comply with their contract, if one existed, to give the plaintiff a union card; and the plaintiff, by bringing this case on writ of error to this court rather than the Supreme Court, shows his abandonment of any attempt to seek a decree authorizing specific performance and thus obtaining the relief of being issued a union card. Insofar as it is sought to recover wages from the time of the discharge to the time of trial, the action is not sustainable because the plaintiff shows no contract entitling him to such wages, nor does he *863show that the wages have been earned. Insofar as the petition seeks damages for loss of wages for 21 years in the future, based on the theory that deprivation of a union card will proximately result in such loss to the plaintiff, the action is not sustainable because Code (Ann. Supp.) § 54-903 provides as follows: “No individual shall be required as a condition of employment, or of continuance of employment, to pay any fee, assessment, or other sum of money whatsoever to a labor organization.” It appears from the petition that, to procure a union card, it is necessary to pay certain fees and assessments to a labor organization. The petition alleges no facts tending to show that the plaintiff’s deprivation of a union card upon payment of these fees and assessments would result in the illegal deprivation of future employment, and this petition specifically states that the alleged right of action here is not based upon the act of 1947 (Ga. L. 1947, p. 616 et seq.), of which the above cited Code section is a part. Cf. Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 541 (67 S. E. 2d 767), an action for damages for loss of employment due to union interference with non-union personnel, where it was held that, in the absence of contract, damages could not be recovered against the employer, either under the 1947 act or under general law.
As to the remaining defendants, the action for damages fails because it is not shown that, in view of Code (Ann. Supp.) § 54-903, supra, the union card is a condition precedent to gainful employment. It is alleged only that the plaintiff, by paying certain sums demanded by officials of the Union, was entitled to union membership; and that the fraudulent act of these officials in refusing him a union book (the symbol of such right of membership) deprived him of his “right to work on union jobs.” Under these allegations, it is a condition precedent to the plaintiff’s right to redress from the courts to seek first redress within the framework of the unincorporated union association in which he seeks to obtain the emblements of membership; and the petition sets out no cause of action against the Union officials in their representative capacity for the reason that no such redress was sought within the framework of the Union. Union Fraternal League v. Johnston, 124 Ga. 902 (53 S. E. 241); Holmes v. Brown, 146 Ga. 402, 405 (91 S. E. 408); Bowden v. Kennedy, 186 Ga. 174, 179 (197 S. E. 325). No fraud is alleged against *864these defendants other than acts as officials, agents, and representatives of the Union in which membership is sought. Accordingly, the trial court properly sustained the general demurrers of the employers and also of the individual Union officials who are defendants herein.