Court Opinion

ID: 9498710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:26:01.285295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:01.483277
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority concludes the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for imposing a sentence of twelve months and one day. It further concludes the district court made insufficient fact findings to evaluate the nature of the offense conduct. Because the sentencing transcript reveals the district court fully considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors and was fully aware of the relevant conduct at the time of sentencing, I respectfully dissent.
As noted by the majority, the sole issue before this court is whether the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors. I believe it was, and contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, the district court followed our accepted procedures for calculating a reasonable sentence. See e.g., United States v. Winters, 416 F.3d 856, 859 (8th Cir.2005).
The majority first expresses concern because the district court described the offense as “extremely serious,” yet made no mention of the victim as part of its § 3553(a) analysis. This assertion is simply wrong. The transcript of the sentencing hearing reveals the district court fully considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, as well as the victim. The court described Myers’ conduct as “kicking people in the head with steel-toed boots or a gun,” and characterized it as “violent activity ... driven by alcohol.” Sent. Tr. at 7. When the court questioned Myers, it asked: “And where did you learn such activity? This wasn’t in the Marines, I hope, was it, to beat up people like you did this victim?” Sent. Tr. at 14. Later, as the district court was preparing to impose its sentence, it expressly stated it had “considered the nature of the circumstances of the present offense, including the victim in this case ... the seriousness of the offense, which I consider extremely serious — any time you involve guns and beating up human beings, it’s a serious offense.” Sent. Tr. at 17. These excerpts make it readily apparent the seriousness of offense and impact on the victim were expressly considered, and our cases require no further showing to demonstrate these § 3553(a) factors were taken into account. We have repeatedly stated: “Nothing in § 3553(a) ... requires ‘robotic incantations’ that each statutory factor has been considered.” United States v. Lamo-reaux, 422 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). Nor do we “require a district court to categorically rehearse each of the section 3553(a) factors on the record when it imposes sentence so long as it is clear that they were considered.” United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 *420(8th Cir.2006); see also United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.2005) (“The relevant inquiry is not whether the district court quoted or cited § 3553(a); it is whether the district court actually considered the § 3553(a) factors.”); United States v. Thompson, 408 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (affirming an upward departure where the district court simply stated it had “ ‘considered all the factors set forth at’ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”). My review of this record leads me to the unmistakable conclusion the district court was keenly aware of its duty to consider the offense and the victim, and did so.
Next, the majority concludes the only factor considered by the district court “that weighs toward a more lenient sentence is Myers’ lack of criminal history,” and that standing alone was insufficient to justify the court’s sentence. Once again, I respectfully disagree.
The district court gave careful consideration to the complete history and all the characteristics of the defendant. In addition to Myers’ lack of criminal history, the sentencing transcript reveals he served honorably for ten years in the United States Marine Corps. Prior to his offense, he had been consistently employed, was working toward a criminal justice degree, and had made arrangements for future employment in the event he was not incarcerated. The record reflects the district court considered Myers’ difficulties with alcohol, the steps he had taken to overcome his alcohol dependency, and his need for further rehabilitation. Finally, the court was aware Myers was married with two young children. After explicitly considering these additional characteristics, the need for deterrence, and the guidelines, the court concluded: “I don’t think that I can give you probation because it would not be in keeping with the statute or in my sense of what’s a fair sentence. On the other hand, I think it’s clear that you need rehabilitation, and while you may have a good start, it’s only that, a start, and there are other sentences available to me.” Sent. Tr. at 17. In the end, the district court concluded the appropriate sentence was twelve months and one day. Based on the district court’s careful consideration of the circumstances surrounding this case, and its thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, I cannot say the sentence imposed was unreasonable.
Finally, the majority asserts we must remand for further fact finding because the district court failed to resolve the conflicting accounts of the offense as recounted by Myers and other witnesses and set forth in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). I disagree.
A PSR is not evidence. United States v. Poor Bear, 359 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2004). “If the defendant objects to any of the factual allegations contained therein on an issue on which the government has the burden of proof ... the government must present evidence at the sentencing hearing to prove the existence of the disputed facts.” Id. Facts which have not been so proved may not be relied on by the district court at sentencing. Id. Here, Myers steadfastly denied any suggestion he ever intended to rob or murder the victim. Thus, the onus was on the government, if it believed it could prove Myers’ planned to murder the victim, to present evidence of such intent. It chose not to. At the sentencing hearing the government specifically stated there were no factual disputes for the court to resolve. Because the government did not present any evidence and expressly waived any claim of a relevant factual dispute, it may not now complain that otherwise relevant conduct was not taken into account at sentencing.
*421The district court correctly recognized it was prohibited from relying on the disputed information contained in the PSR. Moreover, it was not obliged to ferret out the evidence necessary to resolve the dispute — a dispute the government failed to advance. Accordingly, no error occurred and remand is unnecessary. See United States v. Hudson, 129 F.3d 994, 995 (8th Cir.1997) (holding when the government failed to present sufficient evidence at sentencing, the record would not be reopened at resentencing).
For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent.