Court Opinion

ID: 9755043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:22:12.50968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:01.823998
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
CONCURRING IN PART, CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART.
I concur with the Majority Opinion except for two issues. As to the dismissal of the appellants’ claims against Alan Coleman, Jeremy Ellis, Matthew Barnett, Michael Alonso, James O’Nan and Toby Nace, I respectfully dissent. I believe there is a genuine issue as to a material fact concerning whether each of these students knew that Carneal intended to shoot someone at Heath High School on or about December 1, 1997, and whether each student either gave substantial assistance to Carneal or encouraged him to shoot people at the school. As to the dismissal of the appellants’ claims against the school teachers as individuals, I concur with the result of the dismissal. However, I choose to write separately concerning the applicability of official immunity to these teachers.
I will first address the dismissal of the claims against the six students who allegedly conspired with Carneal to carry out the school shootings. The Majority Opinion correctly sets forth various aspects of the law related to the appellants’ claims against these students, but I believe further discussion is helpful to gain a clearer understanding of this area of the law. None of the cases cited by the Majority in its discussion of civil conspiracy involve a claim against an aider and abetter for his conduct in assisting or encouraging another person to commit an assault126 and/or battery.127
The appellants’ cause of action is far from novel; it has been recognized for centuries.128 In Kentucky, as early as 1821 the former Court of Appeals in Met-calfe v. Conner,129 discussed the appropriate jury instructions in “an action of trespass, assault and battery” where the plaintiff alleged that a group of defendants “seized him, wrested the axe from him, and forced him out of the door; that some of the defendants, while they were out of the house, took him by the collar and choked him, and that others had him by the arms, holding them behind him.”130 The Court reversed the trial verdict due to various errors in the instructions including the instructions’ failure to provide that “the intention with *912which to act is done [is not a] matter of law to be decided by the court, but [a] matter of fact to be left to the jury.”131 In Sodusky v. McGee,132 the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for damages “in an action of assault and battery” against multiple defendants where “there was evidence tending to prove that a combined and preconcerted attack was made on the [plaintiff].”133 The Court ruled that the trial court’s “instructions are all conformable to the law.” Among those instructions was an instruction “that all the appellants, who counseled, abetted or arranged)134 in producing the assault, were equally guilty with those who struck” [emphasis original].135 In Bird v. Lynn,136 the Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict in an “action of trespass, assault and battery” against three defendants on the basis of improper jury instructions. In remanding the case for a new trial, the Court of Appeals stated that the plaintiff must prove that the defendants “knowingly and intentionally encouraged the trespass[.]”137 In Ryan v. Quinn,138 the Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in an action for assault and battery which alleged that various defendants “had previously combined and conspired with the other defendants, and aided and abetted them by remaining in the presence when the assault was committed, and protecting the other defendants from interference while committing the assault.”139 In reversing and remanding for a new trial, the Court of Appeals held one of the jury instructions to be “erroneous in using the word ‘approved’ ”.140 The Court stated:
If Ryan incited, procured, or encouraged the other men to beat Quinn, he is responsible; but he is not responsible because in his heart he may have approved of it. A man is not responsible for a beating inflicted by another because he thinks the punishment deserved, or is secretly pleased to see it go on. He is only responsible when he incites or procures it, or aids in its commission. Blue v. Christ, 4 Ill.App. 851[351]; Lister v. McKee, 79 Ill.App. 210; Himes[Hilmes] v. Stroebel, 59 Wis. 74, 17 N.W. 539; True v. Com., 90 Ky. 651, 14 S.W. 684; Omer v. Com., 95 Ky. 353, 25 S.W. 594.
In Eustler v. Hughes,141 a case alleging conspiracy to commit arson, the Court of Appeals stated:
A conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful purpose is proved more often than otherwise by forging a chain of isolated statements or acts of the conspirators *913which of themselves would establish nothing culpatory. It is proving the charge by circumstances from which the joint assent of the minds of two or more of the parties to the unlawful enterprise may be reasonably inferred. Addison v. Wilson, 238 Ky. 143, 37 S.W.2d 7 [1931].
In Addison, supra, a case alleging fraud and misrepresentation, the Court of Appeals stated:
A conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence, by the acts or declarations of the conspirators, or by the cumulative effect of concerted action of the several parties concerned. 5 R.C.L., sec. 53, p. 1103; 12 C.J. sec. 231, p. 638.
In State v. Ripley, 31 Me. 386, it was said:
“It is often, that the intentions of a wrongdoer are ascertained entirely by acts done, which are the natural effects of unlawful designs; the acts and circumstances which accompany them, showing the connection between the acts, and the motives which produced them, are generally the most convincing evidence which can be adduced.”
When individuals associate themselves together in an unlawful enterprise, any act done in pursuance of the conspiracy by any of the conspirators is in legal contemplation the act of all. Metcalfe v. Conner, Litt.Sel.Cas. 497, 12 Am. Dec. 340[, 16 Ky. 497],
The mind of each being intent upon a common object and the energy of each being enlisted in a common purpose, each is the agent of all the others, and the acts done and words spoken during the existence of the enterprise are therefore the acts and words of each and all. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen ([89]Mass.) 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705; U.S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat., 460, 6 L.Ed. 693; Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 23 L.Ed. 286; Logan v. U.S., 144 U.S. 263, 12 S.Ct. 617, 36 L.Ed. 429; Page v. Parker, 43 N.H. 363, 80 Am. Dec. 172.142
Thus, under established Kentucky case law a person is hable for the damages suffered by a tort victim if he knowingly aids143 or abets144 another person in committing the tort. This doctrine of law is uniformly accepted across the United States.145
*914As stated at 6 Am.Jur.2d Assault and Battery § 108, p. 93 (1999): “Civil liability for assault and battery is not limited to the direct perpetrator of the act charged; it extends to any person who by any means encourages or incites the act or aids and abets it.... In order to hold a defendant liable for another’s act of shooting the plaintiff, the factfinder must find that the defendant knew, or should reasonably have known, that the other person intended to commit the act. A finding that a defendant acted in concert with a companion can be supported by circumstantial evidence.”
I will now review the record below to determine whether the appellants have presented sufficient evidence to defeat the appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The bulk of the evidence relied upon by the appellants to support their tort claims against the co-conspirators is in the form of statements made by Michael Carneal to Mark Hayden, a McCracken County Depu*915ty Sheriff, Dr. Dewey G. Cornell, a clinical and forensic psychologist, and Dr. Diane Schetky, a board certified forensic psychiatrist. The Majority has held that these various statements by Michael Carneal are hearsay and are not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule. While the appellants have failed to argue the one exception that clearly applies, for the purpose of summary judgment, we must evaluate the evidence under the correct rules of law. Since this case has not gone to trial but is before us on a summary judgment, our standard of review requires us to determine whether the appellees were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Obviously, that standard requires the application of the correct law which we must assume the trial court would apply at an actual trial.
The applicable rule of evidence, which is not discussed by the trial court, the parties or the Majority Opinion, is KRE 801A(a)(l). This rule of evidence provides that “[a] statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is examined concerning the statement, with a foundation laid as required by KRE 613, and the statement is ... [ijnconsistent with the declarant’s testimony.” This rule of evidence codified the landmark ruling by the former Court of Appeals in Jett v. Commonwealth.146 As Professor Lawson writes:, “The legislative history of KRE 801A(a)(l) leaves no doubt that the intent of the General Assembly and Supreme Court was to codify the Jett Rule as it had developed in the case law.”147 The “Jett Rule” “held that prior inconsistent statements may be used for substantive as well as impeachment purposes, and thereby created an important new exception to the hearsay rule.”148 In Grider Hill Dock, Inc. v. Sloan,149 the Jett Rule was extended to civil cases; and in Wise v. Commonwealth,150 it was applied to a “forgetful” witness.
In Wise, two women, who were friends of the defendant, had given police statements which implicated Wise in two assaults. At trial, the two women claimed to have had a lapse of memory. This Court noted that the two women were “obviously hostile witnesses!,]” and that “the sum of the testimony presented by them at trial was, T don’t remember.’ ” In affirming the trial court’s admission of the two witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, this Court stated “that when a witness has testified about some of the facts in a case, the jury is entitled to know what else the witness has said about the case, so long as it is relevant to the merits of the case as distinguished from mere collateral issues.” This Court reiterated the rule of evidence from Jett “that any out-of-court statement made by a witness which is material and relevant to the issues in the case may be received as substantive evidence through testimony of another witness.”151
Professor Lawson in his highly respected treatise points out that “[i]t is clear that the Jett exception requires neither a written record of the prior statement nor an admission by the declarant that the statement was made; in fact, the prior inconsistent statement in Jett itself was oral and was disavowed by the declarant from the *916witness stand.”152 Furthermore, Justice Cooper in writing for our Supreme Court in Thurman v. Commonwealth,153 stated: “Under KRE 801A(a)(l), which codified the holding in Jett v. Commonwealth, supra, any prior inconsistent statement of a witness is admissible for substantive purposes. Thus, even if the Commonwealth’s ‘primary purpose’ in calling Loretta Smith as a witness had been to impeach her with her prior inconsistent statements, the evidence contained in those statements was not ‘otherwise inadmissible’ ”.
In Di Carlo v. United States,154 an often-cited opinion involving the admissibility of prior inconsistent, out-of-court statements made by a witness, Judge Learned Hand eloquently wrote:
[Gilmore] told the same story as Patti-tueci up to the point of the attack, when as we have said she declared that she could not identify the defendants. The prosecution, plainly surprised by this volte face, then began to cross-examine her straitly, and brought out from her contradictory statements, made not only before the grand jury, but on other occasions. Her actual evidence before the grand jury was not introduced. The latitude to be allowed in the examination of a witness, who has been called and proves recalcitrant, is wholly within the discretion of the trial judge. Nothing is more unfair than to confine a party under such circumstances to neutral questions. Not only may the questions extend to cross-examination, but, if necessary to bring out the truth, it is entirely proper to inquire of such a witness whether he has not made contradictory statements as other times. He is present before the jury, and they may gather the truth from his whole conduct of contradictory answers he may have made at other times.
The possibility that the jury may accept as the truth the earlier statements in preference to those made upon the stand is indeed real, but we find no difficulty in it. If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in court. There is no mythical necessity that the case must be decided only in accordance with the truth of words uttered under oath in court [citations omitted].
In summary, under the Jett Rule, as codified at KRE 801A(a)(l), the appellants may call Michael Carneal as a witness; and pursuant to KRE 613, they may ask him about any prior inconsistent statements he has made that are relevant to the school shootings. Furthermore, the appellants may call as a witness any person to whom Michael Carneal has made a prior, inconsistent statement that is relevant to the school shootings. To the extent they are relevant, these out-of-court, prior inconsistent statements must be admitted into evidence by the trial court as substantive evidence in support of the appellants’ claims.155
*917Once these numerous prior inconsistent statements by Michael Carneal are considered as substantive evidence, I believe it is clear that the trial court erred by dismissing the appellants’ tort claims against the alleged co-conspirators by granting summary judgments. There are many genuine issues as to material facts which make summary judgment on these claims improper. In the interest of brevity, I will list only some of these factual disputes.
On December 4, 1997, when Deputy Hayden was transporting Carneal back to the detention facility following an interview with law enforcement authorities, Carneal talked to Deputy Hayden about the school shootings. On December 5, 1997, Deputy Hayden prepared a written report concerning what Carneal had told him. On September 20, 1999, Deputy Hayden gave a deposition in this case and confirmed his written report. Some of the statements that Carneal made to Deputy Hayden which would be admissible as pri- or inconsistent statements and which raise genuine issues of material fact include: (1) whether Michael Carneal, Toby Nace, James O’Nan, Matthew Barnett, Michael Alonso, and another boy whose name Deputy Hayden did not know, planned on Wednesday, November 26, 1997, the day before the Thanksgiving school break, to carry out the shootings at Heath High School on Monday, December 1, 1997; (2) whether the school-shooting plan included *918a plan for Carneal to start shooting so as to cause a distraction so the other boys could pick up their guns and go to their predetermined points; (3) whether on November 26, 1997, Carneal told these five boys that he would take the guns from Nace’s house and that “there’s enough for all of us”; (4) whether Carneal told these five boys what kinds of guns were available and whether O’Nan requested a shotgun so he could hide it under his trench-coat because he thought it would be cool to have it under his trenchcoat and to whip it out; (5) whether Carneal told these five boys that he wanted to use a pistol; (6) whether Barnett asked Carneal which gun he was going to get and whether Carneal explained to Barnett how all the guns looked and worked, and whether Barnett then requested the other pistol; (7) whether Nace requested to use a knife; (8) whether Barnett asked Carneal when the school shooting was going to happen and Carneal told him, “Monday is the big day”; (9) whether Nace cooperated with Carneal on November 26, 1997, and showed Car-neal the guns they would need for the school shooting at Nace’s father’s outbuilding and whether Nace showed Carneal where his father hid the key to the gun cabinet; (10) whether Carneal took numerous guns and earplugs to school on December 1, 1997, because the other five boys were supposed to help him with the shooting; (11) whether on the morning of December 1, 1997, in the school’s lobby Carneal opened his backpack and showed Barnett a pistol, and whether Barnett asked Carneal if he was going to use it and Carneal replied, “you ain’t shittin’”; (12) whether Barnett asked Carneal when the shooting was going to happen and Carneal said it would happen after the prayer group broke up and Barnett said for Car-neal to get moving because the group was about finished and Carneal at that point put in his earplugs; (13) whether these five boys were with Carneal when he started shooting, but betrayed him and ran off; (14) whether Carneal lied to the police during some interviews because he did not want to get the other five boys in trouble; and (15) whether O’Nan was Carneal’s leader and whether Carneal shot the students because he listened to O’Nan talk about kidnapping and killing babies and because O’Nan was always bugging him about the school shooting.
As part of his defense to the criminal charges brought against him, Michael Car-neal hired Dr. Dewey G. Cornell, a clinical and forensic psychologist, to perform a psychological evaluation. Some of the statements that Carneal made to Dr. Cornell which would be admissible as prior inconsistent statements and which raise genuine issues of material fact include: (1) whether Carneal felt like he could never be successful or popular with his peers and turned to a group of students who were regarded as the outcasts or “freaks” of the school, including O’Nan, Barnett, Jeremy Ellis and Alan Coleman; (2) whether O’Nan, Barnett, Ellis and Coleman, who were juniors and seniors and older than the freshman Carneal, had status in the eyes of Carneal; (3) whether O’Nan, who was a rebellious young man who espoused anti-Christian attitudes and claimed to be knowledgeable about occult practices and was feared by some students, was attractive to Carneal because O’Nan had an aura of mystery and power; (4) whether Car-neal regarded O’Nan as the leader of his new group of friends and whether he turned to O’Nan as a role model; (5) whether Carneal was eager to please and be accepted by O’Nan, Barnett, Ellis and Coleman and whether he engaged in unconventional and even illegal behavior in order to be accepted; (6) whether O’Nan, Barnett, Ellis and Coleman took advantage of Carneal’s vulnerability and manipulated *919him by encouraging him to do things for them such as stealing several one hundred dollar bills from his father and giving them stolen money and other stolen property; (7) whether Carneal felt pleased with himself when his illegal actions made a favorable impression on O’Nan, Barnett, Ellis and Coleman and when O’Nan let him wear his trenchcoat at a party; (8) whether O’Nan, Barnett, Ellis, Coleman, Nace and Alonso assisted Carneal in planning the school shootings by discussing various schemes for using guns to take over the school including taking over the school office and firing at students in the hallway; (9) whether during one of the planning discussions Carneal volunteered to obtain the guns for the boys and whether O’Nan, as the leader, accepted Carneal’s offer and on several occasions reminded him that he was supposed to obtain the guns for the group of boys; (10) whether Carneal stole his father’s handgun, took it to school, showed it to O’Nan for his approval, but the handgun was rejected by O’Nan because he wanted a shotgun; (11) whether Nace tapped on his father’s gun cabinet and told Carneal that these guns were the kind they needed to “do the school thing”; (12) whether Carneal stole a handgun and ammunition from Nace’s residence on Tuesday, November 25, 1997, and took them to Alonso’s residence where Carneal and Alonso shot at a rubber ball for target practice; (13) whether at school on Wednesday, November 26, 1997, Carneal, O’Nan, Barnett and Ellis discussed which gun each boy would use in the school shootings on Monday, December 1, 1997; (14) whether O’Nan told Carneal he wanted to use a shotgun so he could pull it out of his trenchcoat like he had seen a character do in a movie; (15) whether Carneal took some rifles and shotguns he had stolen from Nace’s gun cabinet on Thursday, November 27, 1997, Thanksgiving Day, to Alonso’s residence and left the guns with Alonso; (16) whether Carneal felt encouraged by O’Nan and the other boys to bring the various guns to school on December 1, 1997, because they knew he was bringing the guns to school and that he planned to use them for the school shootings; (17) whether Carneal intended and expected to distribute the guns to O’Nan, Ellis, Barnett and Coleman at school on December 1, 1997, to assist him in the school shootings; (18) whether Carneal feels an obligation to protect the other boys, who he considers to be his friends, from getting into trouble and has lied to various authorities about their involvement in the school shootings; (19) whether Carneal found O’Nan’s and this group of boys’ idea of shooting students and taking over the school compelling; (20) whether Carneal committed the school shootings in order to impress and please O’Nan and the other boys; and (21) whether Carneal was substantially influenced in shooting the students at school by the encouragement and direction of O’Nan, Barnett, Ellis, Coleman, Nace and Alonso.
Michael Carneal was also evaluated for his defense to the criminal charges by Dr. Diana Schetky, a board certified forensic psychiatrist. Some of the statements that Carneal made to Dr. Schetky which would be admissible as prior inconsistent statements and which raise genuine issues of material fact include: (1) whether in committing the school shootings Carneal was easily led and significantly influenced and encouraged by a group of students whose approval he desperately sought and whom he is still trying to protect; (2) whether Nace knew that the latch to the back window of his father’s garage, where the guns that Carneal stole were stored, was left unlatched; (3) whether Nace gave Carneal several sets of earplugs before the school shootings; and (4) whether on the morning of December 1, 1997, before the *920shootings when Carneal arrived at school with the guns wrapped in a blanket O’Nan made the statement, “Notice the sound when it hits the ground, it sounds like guns.”
In addition to these statements by Car-neal which support a finding of civil conspiracy in the school shootings, various statements by other witnesses which also raise genuine issues of material fact include: (1) whether Michael Alonso, by accepting delivery from Carneal of three rifles or shotguns and a lunch pail filled with ammunition on Saturday, November 29, 1997, and hiding the weapons in his bedroom, either gave substantial assistance or encouragement to Carneal in carrying out the school shootings; (2) whether Alonso, by assisting Carneal the week before the school shootings in target practice with the .22 caliber pistol that was used in shooting the victims, either gave substantial assistance or encouragement to Carneal in carrying out the school shootings;156 and (3) whether Toby Nace was standing next to Carneal in the school lobby before the shootings and whether Nace put earplugs in his ears immediately before Carneal began shooting.157
Thus, I am of the opinion that the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing the appellants’ claims against Alan Coleman, Jeremy Ellis, Matthew Barnett, Michael Alonso, James O’Nan and Toby Nace should be reversed as the record reveals many genuine issues of material fact concerning the liability of each of these defendants in aiding and abetting Michael Car-neal in carrying out the shootings at Heath High School on December 1,1997.
As to the appellant’s claims against the teachers, I concur in the result of the dismissal, but I cannot accept the Majority Opinion’s characterization of the teacher’s duties as discretionary. I believe that pursuant to Yanero the teachers herein had a duty to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent teacher engaged in supervision of students of like age would exercise under similar circumstances. Like the coaches in Yanero, I believe the performance of that duty herein was a ministerial function, rather than a discretionary function. The ministerial function herein is similar to the ministerial function in Yanero in that both involved the enforcement of known rules that were intended for the protection of the students. Obviously, the school had rules prohibiting a student from bringing a weapon to school and from harming another student. I believe pursuant to Yanero that under some circumstances a teacher could be held individually liable for his or her negligence in breaching his or her duty to enforce a school rule prohibiting a student from harming another student. However, in this case, I believe the appellants have failed to adequately plead a claim for relief with a sufficient factual basis to support a negligence action against any of the teachers. My position on this issue differs from the Majority Opinion in that the Majority concludes that due to the discretionary nature of the teachers’ actions that they owed no duty to the injured students; I conclude that the teachers’ actions were ministerial in nature and thus they owed the injured students a duty, but the plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege sufficient facts to support their claims that the teachers breached that duty.

. "[A]n assault is a demonstration of an unlawful intent by one person to inflict immediate injury or offensive contact on the person of another then present." 6 Am.Jur.2d Assault and Battery § 1, p. 10 (1999).

. "A battery is a wrongful or offensive physical contact with another through the intentional contact by the tortfeasor and without the consent of the victim, the unpermitted application of trauma by one person upon the body of another person.” 6 Am.Jur.2d Assault and Battery § 3, p. 13 (1999).

. The torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment have been "designated as 'classic’ intentional torts because they are of ancient origin and, in modern times, are routinely categorized in texts and case books as intentional torts.” Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory o f Intentional Tort, 19 Hofstra L.Rev. 447, 450, n. 16 (1990).

. 16 Ky. 370 (1821).

. Id. at 371.

. Id. at 372.

. 28 Ky. 621 (1831).

. Id. at 621.

. Id. at 626.

. The Court stated:
The only objection which has been made to them is, that the word arranged in the last was improper and delusive.
It was certainly inappropriate; but used, as it was, in connection with the other expressions, and with the facts proved, its import was clear, and its effect could not have been illegal or delusive [emphasis original].

. 49 Ky. 422 (1850).

. Trespass is used here broadly to include the "[djoing of unlawful act or of lawful act in an unlawful manner to injury of another's person or property.” Black's Law Dictionary p. 1674 (4th ed. 1968).

. 71 S.W. 872 (1903).

. Id. at 873.

. Id. at 876.

. 267 Ky. 200, 101 S.W.2d 917 (1937).

. Id. at 152.

. “Aid” is "[t]o support, help, assist or strengthen.” Black’s Law Dictionary p. 91 (4th ed. 1968).

. "Abet" is "[t]o encourage, incite ... command, procure, or counseI[J" Black’s Law Dictionary p. 17 (4th ed.1968).

. Just a few of the cases from other jurisdictions addressing this issue include:
(1)Brown v. Perkins, 83 Mass. 89, 1 Allen 89 (1861) cited in Hilmes v. Stroebel, 59 Wis. 74, 17 N.W. 539 (1883),
"Any person who is present at the commission of a trespass, encouraging or exciting the same by words, gestures, looks, or signs, or who in any way or by any means countenances or approves the same, is in law deemed to be an aider and abettor, and liable as principal; and proof that a person is present at the commission of a trespass, without disapproving or opposing it, is evidence from which, in connection with other circumstances, it is competent for the jury to infer that he assented thereto, lent to it his countenance and approval, and was thereby aiding and abetting the same.”
(2) Rush v. Farmerville, 156 La. 857, 101 So. 243 (1924) (citing Kernan v. Humble, 51 La. Ann. 389, 25 So. 431 (1899)),
When a tort is perpetrated through the instrumentality of a combination or conspiracy, the party wronged and injured may look beyond the actual participants in committing the injury, and join with them, as defendants, all who co-operated in, advised, or assisted in the accomplishment of the common design, for cotrespassers are bound in solido.
(3) Francis v. Kane, Tex.App., 246 S.W.2d 279 (1951),
In the case of Walker v. Kellar, Tex.Civ.App., 226 S.W. 796, 800, writ refused, the court *914held that in order for a person to be liable for damages as a principal in an unlawful assault, "He must have given aid or encouragement of some kind to the actual participants.” 52 Am.Jur. 450, paragraph 111, says in part: "On the theory that the act of one is the act of all, the rule of joint and several liability of tort-feasors prevails where the tort-feasors act in conceit or unit of action.” The same volume, page 454, paragraph 114, further says: "One who commands, directs, advises, encourages, procures, instigates, promotes, controls, aids, or abets a wrongful act by another has been regarded as being as responsible as the one who commits the act, so as to impose liability upon the former to the same extent as if he had performed the act himself.”
(4) Keel v. Hainline, Okla., 331 P.2d 397 (1958),
It is immaterial whether defendant Keel aided, abetted or encouraged defendant Jennings in throwing the eraser in such a manner as to injure Burge, or not, since it is virtually undisputed that defendant Keel aided, abetted or encouraged the wrongful activity of throwing wooden erasers at other persons, which resulted in the injury to Burge. In this connection see Selby v. Lindstrom, 59 Okl. 227, 158 P. 1127; Williams v. Townsend, 15 Kan. 563, 27 Pac.States Rep. 424; 4 Am.Jur. 127, Assault and Battery, sec. 4; 52 Am.Jur. 455, Torts, sec. 116.
(5) Ayer v. Robinson, 163 Cal.App.2d 424, 329 P.2d 546 (1958),
A party injured by an unjustified assault may recover damages not only from the actual assailant, but from any other person who aids, abets, counsels or encourages the assault. (Turner v. Whittel, 2 Cal.App.2d 585, 589 [38 P.2d 835]; Boyajian v. Balian, 7 Cal.App.2d 174, 176 [46 P.2d 199].) Whether appellant aided and abetted his son in administering a severe beating to plaintiff was a question of fact to be resolved by the court. Although the evidence was in conflict, the court could conclude from the testimony of plaintiff and his witnesses that appellant urged and encouraged his son to attack plaintiff. This testimony if believed, sufficiently supports the challenged finding.
(6)Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, Comment on Clause (b):
d. Advice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tor-tious it has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical assistance. If the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is responsible for the consequences of the other’s act.
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The assistance of or participation by the defendant may be so slight that he is not liable for the act of the other. In determining this, the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the other and his state of mind are all considered. (See Illustration 9). Likewise, although a person who encourages another to commit a tor-tious act may be responsible for other acts by the other (see Illustration 10), ordinarily he is not liable for other acts that, although done in connection with the intended tor-tious act, were not foreseeable by him. (See Illustration 11). In determining liability, the factors are the same as those used in determining the existence of legal causa*915tion when there has been negligence (see § 442) or recklessness. (See § 501).

. Ky., 436 S.W.2d 788 (1969).

. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.10, p. 373 (3d ed., 1993).

. Id.

. Ky., 448 S.W.2d 373 (1969).

. Ky.App., 600 S.W.2d 470 (1978).

. Id. at 472.

. The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook at 375-76.

. Ky., 975 S.W.2d 888, 893-94 (1998).

. 6 F.2d 364, 367-68 (2nd Cir.1925) cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706, 45 S.Ct. 640, 69 L.Ed. 1168 (1925).

. Any argument that these prior inconsistent statements by Carneal are inadmissible because they fail to meet the requirements of KRE 801A(b)(5), concerning a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, is misplaced. The prior inconsistent statement exception to the hearsay rule as provided for at KRE 801A(a)(l) is a separate rule of evidence and is not dependent upon any qualifying requirements under KRE 801A(b)(5). As our Supreme Court noted in. Thurman, supra, *917“any prior inconsistent statement of a witness is admissible for substantive purposes” [emphasis added]. The use of a prior inconsistent statement by a co-conspirator as substantive evidence even when it would not meet the requirements of KRE 801 A(b)(5) is well established. See Andrea G. Nadel, J.D., Annotation, Prior Inconsistent Statements As Evidence, 30 A.L.R.4& 414, 446 (1984); 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 831 (1994)(''There are alternative methods for the introduction of a statement which is inadmissible under the coconspirator exception. Such a statement may be offered for a nonhearsay use, to impeach the testimony of a coconspirator on the stand as a witness for the defense, on the grounds that the defendant waived the hearsay objection by using hearsay statements otherwise inadmissible under the coconspirator exception during the presentation of his case, under other hearsay exceptions, such as the exception for declarations against interest, or a statement of a declarant's then-existing mental, emotional, and physical condition” [footnotes omitted].); Rowe v. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc., Mo., 699 S.W.2d 423 (1985)(The insurance company refused to pay proceeds to insured because it believed he conspired to commit arson. At trial, the insurance company should have been allowed to cross-examine its own witness, Carroll, and to ask him for substantive evidence purposes whether he had told a police officer that he had overheard the insured tell another man that he was going to burn his car to collect insurance proceeds. The insurance company should have also been allowed to question the police officer about Carroll’s prior inconsistent statements.); Miranda v. State of Nevada, 101 Nev. 562, 707 P.2d 1121, 1124 (1985)("Although Miranda failed to make this argument either at trial or in his briefs on appeal, to the extent that Fernando's out-of-court statements to police were inconsistent with his trial testimony, they were independently admissible as substantive evidence under NRS 51.035(2)(a), the statutory exception to the hearsay rule which permits the introduction of prior inconsistent statements made by a testifying witness.” Fernando was a co-conspirator who had made statements to the police during the murder investigation which led to charges against Miranda.); Fletcher v. State, Ind., 442 N.E.2d 990 (1982)(Prior inconsistent, out-of-court statements given to police by two co-conspirators as part of a murder and robbery investigation were admissible as substantive evidence when the two co-conspirators changed their stories at trial.); People v. Young, 170 Ill.App.3d 969, 120 Ill.Dec. 800, 524 N.E.2d 982 (1988)(In murder and robbery trial, the prior inconsistent, out-of-court statements by a co-conspirator were admissible as substantive evidence when witness changed his story at trial.); and Lockhart v. State, 169 Ga.App. 931, 315 S.E.2d 455 (1984)(In a burglary case, a co-conspirator’s prior inconsistent statement given to police as part of the investigation was admissible as substantive evidence).

. Michael Alonso in his deposition admitted to accepting and hiding the weapons and to taking target practice with Carneal.

. This eyewitness account was given by Heath High School student Janalea Yar-brough in her deposition.