Court Opinion

ID: 9755593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:43:47.348107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:09.390131
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion By
Justice MOSELEY.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion addressing the merits of this interlocutory appeal. As an officer of the Court, counsel for William Ray Powell (plaintiff below and appellee in this case) has indicated to the Court that her client, Powell, is dead. Further, she has indicated she has attempted to ascertain and contact Powell’s next-of-kin (without success), and she does not represent any heir or personal representative of Powell’s estate.
Powell no longer has standing to pursue the causes of action he asserted below. Rather, the claim or claims he asserted are now owned by Powell’s “heirs, legal representatives, and estate.... ” Tex. Civ. Piiac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 71.021(b) (Vernon 1997). No party acting on behalf of any of these persons or entities has appeared in *92the ease, either below or before this Court. Powell himself is no longer before the Court for obvious reasons. Thus, it appears there is no party plaintiff over which this Court (or the trial court, for that matter) has personal jurisdiction.
Further, counsel for DISD admitted at oral argument he did not know whether any heir or personal representative was seeking to pursue Powell’s claims. Under these circumstances, we are not even sure if a dispute continues to exist about the circumstances under which Powell left DISD’s employment; thus, we do not know if we have subject-matter jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Const. art. II, sec. 1; Valley Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 33 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex.2000) (per curiam) (no jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions).
Recognizing the above facts present a problem, the majority cites to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.1(a)(1), which states in relevant part:
If a party to a civil case dies after the trial court renders judgment but before the case has been finally disposed of on appeal, the appeal may be perfected, and the appellate court will proceed to adjudicate the appeal as if all parties were alive. The appellate court’s judgment will have the same force and effect as if rendered when all parties were living.
The majority states: “‘While the rules do not specifically address interlocutory appeals, we construe rule 7.1(a)(1) to apply to interlocutory appeals.” I disagree.
Rule 7.1(a)(1) recognizes the jurisdictional conundrum that can arise when a party dies during the pendency of an appeal from a judgment, not an interlocutory order. I would decline to extend the rule from applying to judgments, which have some degree of definiteness, to claims or choses in action, which are inherently more nebulous, imprecise, and subject to more disputes as to their scope and ownership. Although an argument for judicial efficiency can be made in support of construing rule 7.1(a)(1) to include interlocutory appeals, judicial efficiency does not authorize a court to act without jurisdiction.
Further, the circumstances of this case do not compel an expansive construction of rule 7.1(a)(1), as the rules of civil procedure provide another, more appropriate, resolution. Rather than reach the merits of DISD’s interlocutory appeal, I would: (1) abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of following the procedures set forth in Texas Rule of Civil Procedurel51;1 and (2) treat the appeal as closed for administrative purposes unless this Court receives a motion to reinstate the interlocutory appeal, accompanied by a supplemental clerk’s record indicating that a party has substituted into the case as a successor to the claims asserted by Powell below. If such a motion is not received, there is no further dispute for us to address and the appeal is, in fact, moot; if such a motion is received, we could then reinstate the appeal, making the substituting party a party to the appeal, and (after allowing any additional re-briefing), address the merits of DISD’s arguments.

. Under those procedures, the trial court would allow a reasonable time period for another to appear and file a suggestion of death. TexR. Civ. P. 151. If no appearance and suggestion of death is made within a reasonable time, the trial court would issue a writ of scire facias requiring Powell's heirs or personal representative to appear and prosecute the suit. Id. If none did so, the trial court could dismiss the suit on DISD's motion. Id.