Court Opinion

ID: 9726300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:42:07.739687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:25.731514
License: Public Domain

*195Gerrard, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion that Shelter’s definition of “use” as “operation and maintenance” does not violate existing Nebraska public policy applicable to uninsured motorist insurance. While Shelter’s definition of use does not expressly violate the current public policy (such as it is) embodied in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-6408 (Reissue 2004), Shelter’s insurance policy has exposed a loophole in Nebraska law that, until closed by the Legislature, will leave many Nebraskans at the mercy of uninsured motorists.
The problem is created by Nebraska’s omnibus statute for motor vehicle insurance, which does not provide the same protection that is provided to motorists in nearly every other state. Like most states, Nebraska requires motor vehicles to be covered by some form of financial security, usually liability insurance.1 And like most states, Nebraska has a statute specifying the coverage necessary to meet that requirement.2
But in most states, the omnibus statute sets minimum standards for both the amount of coverage and the scope of that coverage.3 In other words, the policy must provide coverage up to a monetary limit, must cover a certain range of injuries, and most pertinent to this case, must include particular people as “insured.”4 In nearly every state, an omnibus statute requires a policy to insure any motor vehicle owned by the insured and any other person using that vehicle with permission of the insured against loss from liability for damages “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use” of the vehicle.5 In a few other states, *196statutes more specifically address whether liability coverage must extend to passengers and who must be provided with uninsured motorist protection.6 Florida, for example, has specified in commendable detail the coverage that compulsory automobile liability insurance should provide, including coverage for passengers and permissive users and the particular benefits to which an insured is minimally entitled.7
By contrast, Nebraska’s omnibus statute, § 60-310, only establishes monetary limits for a policy. It does not require a motorist’s liability insurance to cover any particular range of persons or injuries. Nebraska’s insurance requirement can be satisfied by evidence of an “automobile liability policy,” which only requires insurance “protecting other persons from *197damages for liability on account of accidents” in the amount of $25,000 or $50,000, depending on the injury.8 Because Nebraska’s peculiar omnibus statute does not specify the scope of insurance coverage Nebraska motorists must carry, Shelter was left free to define “use” in a way that is inconsistent with the well-established meaning of the word and in a way that would not have met the minimum standards required nearly everywhere else.
Nebraska law does require that policies certified as “proof of financial responsibility” insure the named insured and permissive users “against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicle.”9 But that statute only extends to policies intended to provide the “proof of financial responsibility” that must be filed by persons subject to the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,10 whose licenses have been suspended or revoked for reasons such as an unsecured accident, an unsatisfied judgment, or a criminal conviction. It does not apply to policies not certified for that purpose,11 and Nebraska’s compulsory financial responsibility law can be satisfied by either “proof of financial responsibility” or the lesser showing of “evidence of insurance” explained above.12 When the Legislature passed 1995 Neb. Laws, L.B. 37, enacting the predecessor to § 60-310, it may have intended to require the same insurance coverage for all motorists. But the statutes as currently written do not accomplish that.
It is clear from the record in this case that Shelter’s policy was intended to comply with Nebraska’s compulsory insurance statutes. If Nebraska had an omnibus statute imposing the *198requirements found to be minimally acceptable in nearly every other state, Jones, as a passenger, would have been engaged in permissive “use” of the vehicle within the well-established meaning of the word and would have been an “insured” for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage.13 The result in this case is a direct consequence of that defect in Nebraska’s motor vehicle liability insurance statutes.
Fourteen years ago, several members of this court characterized Nebraska statutes on liability insurance coverage for motor vehicles as “a series of intermittent skin grafts on an amorphous body of law with the anatomical deficiency of no backbone,” concluding that the deficiencies in the statutes “produc[ed] a public misperception and the mirage of mandatory insurance coverage.”14 While the situation now is not as unfortunate as it was then, unless there is further improvement, Nebraska’s omnibus statute cannot achieve its remedial purpose of protecting the public.15 And the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Coverage Act16 will not serve its purpose of protecting the public from negligent, financially irresponsible motorists17 so long as innocent passengers can be effectively excluded from its benefits.
It is a fact of life in the insurance industry that consumers have little if any leverage when purchasing insurance policies18 and that consumers unaware of or unschooled in the vagaries of insurance contracts may be misled into believing they have purchased coverage when in reality they have not.19 It is for *199these reasons that the legislatures in nearly every state have enacted statutory schemes that serve the purpose of providing compensation for innocent victims of automobile accidents and protecting named insureds, permittees, and injured persons.20 Nebraska’s Legislature would be well advised to follow their example. For the moment, however, I am constrained to concur in the properly reasoned judgment of the court.
Heavican, C.J., joins in this concurrence.

 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-387 (Cum. Supp. 2006).

 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-310 (Cum. Supp. 2006).

 See, generally, 8 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance 3d § 111:22 (2004); 1 Irvin E. Schermer and William J. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance § 3:9 (4th ed. 2004).

 See id.

 See id. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 28.22.101 (2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-4009 (2004); Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.1 (West Cum. Supp. 2007); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-4-620 (West 2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38a-335 (West 2000); Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 2118(a) (2005); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.736(1) (West Cum. Supp. 2007); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 431:10C-301(b) *196(2005); Idaho Code Ann. § 49-1212 (Cum. Supp. 2007); Ind. Code Ann. § 9-25-2-3 (LexisNexis 2004); Iowa Code Ann. § 321.1(24B) (West Cum. Supp. 2007); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-3107 (2001); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.39-020 (LexisNexis 2006); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:900(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2007); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A, § 1605 (1996 & Cum. Supp. 2004); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § 34A (West 2001); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 500.3101 et seq. (West 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2007); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 65B.49 (West Cum. Supp. 2007); Miss. Code Ann. § 63-15-30 (Cum. Supp. 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 303.190 (West 2003); Mont. Code Ann. § 61-6-103 (2005); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 485.3091 (2005); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 259:61 (Cum. Supp. 2006); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:6B-1 (West Cum. Supp. 2007); N.M. Stat. § 66-5-205.3 (2006); N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 311 (McKinney 2005); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21 (2005); N.D. Cent. Code § 39-16.1-11 (Supp. 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4509.01(K) (LexisNexis 2003); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 7-600 (West 2007); Or. Rev. Stat. § 806.080 (2005); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1702 (West 2006); R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-47-2 (2002); S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-140 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 2006); S.D. Codified Laws § 32-35-70 (2004); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-12-102 and 55-12-122 (2004); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 601.071 et seq. (Vernon 1999); Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304 (2005); Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-472 (2005); W. Va. Code Ann. § 17D-4-2 (LexisNexis 2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-405 (2007).

 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 33-7-11 (Supp. 2006) (uninsured motorist coverage for permissive users); Md. Code Ann. Ins. § 19-505 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); Md. Code Ann. Transp. § 17-103 (LexisNexis 2006) (specifying coverage for permissive users); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 632.32 (West 2004) (uninsured motorist coverage for permissive users; no passenger exclusions).

 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.736(1).

 See § 60-310.

 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-534 (Reissue 2004). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-346 (Cum. Supp. 2006).

 Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 60, art. 5 (Reissue 2004 & Cum. Supp. 2006).

 See, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hildebrand, 243 Neb. 743, 502 N.W.2d 469 (1993); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 182 Neb. 805, 157 N.W.2d 399 (1968).

 See § 60-387.

 See Protective Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cornelius, 176 Neb. 75, 125 N.W.2d 179 (1963).

 Hildebrand, supra note 11, 243 Neb. at 757, 502 N.W.2d at 477 (Shanahan, J., concurring; White, Fahrnbruch, and Lanphier, JJ., join).

 See Cornelius, supra note 13.

 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-6401 et seq. (Reissue 2004).

 Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Conn, 262 Neb. 147, 629 N.W.2d 494 (2001).

 See Hildebrand, supra note 11 (Shanahan, J., concurring).

 See Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Action Elec. Co., 256 Neb. 691, 593 N.W.2d 275 (1999).

 See 8 Russ & Segalla, supra note 3.