Court Opinion

ID: 9627095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:33:46.527176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:37.054014
License: Public Domain

ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
Our lead opinion holds that public assistance funds disbursed to medical service providers are not immune to attachment under I.C. § 56-223. In a petition for rehearing, the appellants now argue that we have improperly placed a narrowing interpretation upon a statute that has no need for judicial construction because its language is plain and unambiguous. The appellants contend that I.C. § 56-223, when read in pari materia with other statutes relating to public assistance, creates a broad exemption against attachment of funds, without distinguishing between those disbursed directly to public assistance recipients and those disbursed to service providers.
It is true, of course, that I.C. § 56-223 refers simply to “public assistance” without specifically including or excluding funds paid to service providers. At I.C. § 56-201(e), however, we find that “public assistance” is defined as “general assistance, old-age assistance, aid to the blind, aid to dependent children, aid to the disabled, and medical assistance____” These categories of assistance are described, in turn, as awards to certain eligible classes of persons. For example, I.C. § 56-209b provides as follows:
*591Medical assistance shall be awarded to persons who are recipients of old-age assistance, aid to dependent children, aid to the blind, aid to the disabled, and such persons as mandated by title XIX of the Social Security Act____ [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, when I.C. § 56-223 is read in pari materia with other related statutes, it is not literally clear — as appellants assert— that immunity from attachment goes beyond “public assistance” disbursed to needy persons and includes funds disbursed to third-party service providers.
Because the scope of I.C. § 56-223 is in doubt, we again conclude that the statute invites judicial construction. As our lead opinion explains, we view the underlying legislative policy as one of protecting individuals receiving public assistance, rather than of protecting service providers from their creditors. This interpretation comports with common sense. It would be unsound to suggest that the statute applies to money received by service providers from persons on public assistance; by parity of reasoning, it would be unsound to hold that the statute applies to such payments when made directly by the state on behalf of those persons.
Finally, we note that the federal Social Security Act does not require that payments to service providers be immunized against transfer, assignment, execution or attachment. Indeed, one of the cases cited by our lead opinion, Matter of Missionary Baptist Foundation, 796 F.2d 752 (5th Cir.1986), holds that a state statute providing such broad immunity would be contrary to the intent of Congress because it would impair the ability of service providers to obtain commercial financing and, therefore, might impair the availability of services to needy individuals.
Accordingly, we adhere to the result announced in our lead opinion. The petition for rehearing is denied.