Court Opinion

ID: 9599852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:21:53.215391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:34.806679
License: Public Domain

Lockett, J.,
concurring and dissenting: I concur with the majority that: (1) under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) it is possible to bring suit in Kansas to recover damages for injuries occurring in this state which resulted from negligent conduct outside the state; and (2) in an action for recovery of damages for injuries sustained in Kansas which were the result of a breach of a duty in another state, the liability of the defendant is to be determined by the laws of this state.
I cannot agree with the majority’s denial of a right of action to persons injured in person, property or means of support, by an intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication of any person, against the person illegally selling or furnishing the liquor which caused the intoxication in whole or in part. In reaching this conclusion, the majority, by denying that a cause of action exists, misapplies the common law, the legislature’s acts and prior decisions of this court.
The majority, citing State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951), and 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors § 553, states, “At common law, and apart from statute, no redress existed against persons selling, giving, or furnishing intoxicating liquor for resulting injuries or damages due to the acts of intoxicated persons, whether on the theory that the dispensing of the liquor constituted a direct wrong or constituted actionable negligence.” The Am. Jur. 2d citation actually states, “At common law it is not a tort to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to ordinary able-bodied men, and it has been frequently held that in the absence of statute, there can be no cause of action against one furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication of the person so furnished. The reason usually given for this rule is that the drinking of the liquor, not the furnishing of it, is the proximate cause of the injury. . . . [0]ne cannot become intoxicated by reason of liquor furnished him if he does not drink it.”
*643When the driver, Shirley, was furnished intoxicating liquor in this case he was not an able-bodied man. He was a minor. There is a statute in Kansas, as well as a similar one in Missouri, which prohibits the sale or furnishing of intoxicating liquor to a minor. K.S.A. 41-715. Clearly the common law is not a bar to Ling’s action against the vendor who illegally furnished intoxicating liquor not to an able-bodied man, but to a minor.
The common law of England is the basic component of the common law adopted in the United States. Even if the common law is as the majority states, the courts of this country are not required to adhere to the decisions of the English common law courts unless such law is adopted by the state courts or by legislative enactment in aid of the general statutes.
Constitutional or statutory provisions in most states expressly declare the common law to be in force. The 1868 General Statutes of the State of Kansas, ch. 119, sec. 3 (now K.S.A. 77-109) provided that the common law shall remain in force in aid of the general statutes. The common law has been continuously incorporated into our law by our legislature to fill the voids in law where the constitution is silent or the legislature and the courts have failed to act.
When our legislature adopted the rule that the common law was to remain in force in aid of the general statutes, it recognized that the common law was modified by our constitution and can be modified by the legislature when it enacts new laws or repeals old laws. The legislature also recognized that the common law can be modified by the courts when rendering judicial decisions and when the conditions and wants of the people require action (K.S.A. 77-109).
The courts of this state have never maintained that the common law is static and must be used to maintain the status quo. Like the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of this state, the common law grows as it is applied to new situations or as a need arises. The common law is judge-made and judge-applied. It is not to be followed blindly and can be changed when conditions and circumstances require if the prior law is unjust or has become bad public policy. In the past, this court has expanded the common law to meet the requirements of a modern society. It would be unfortunate to our economy and our developing , society if we should cease to engage in the *644common-law tradition of judicial expansion which adapts the law to the ever-changing needs and demands of a dynamic society.
The general principle of negligence law is that every person owes a duty to avoid creating situations which pose an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Negligence exists where the duty owed by one person to another is breached. Further, if recovery is to be obtained for such negligence, the injured party must show: (1) a causal connection between the duty breached and the injury received; and (2) that the person was damaged by that negligence. Durflinger v. Artiles, 234 Kan. 484, 488, 673 P.2d 86 (1983).
In 1974, we recognized that an action exists against one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another. Dawson v. Associates Financial Services Co., 215 Kan. 814, 820, 529 P.2d 104 (1974). In McCart v. Muir, 230 Kan. 618, 641 P.2d 384 (1982), we determined that parents who knowingly and negligently furnish a car to their son, who by reason of age, experience, mental condition, or known habits of recklessness, is incapable of operating a vehicle with ordinary care, are responsible for the injuries caused by their negligent entrustment of the automobile to their son. In Balagna v. Shawnee County, 233 Kan. 1068, 668 P.2d 157 (1983), there was evidence that an architect-engineer had actual knowledge of safety standards contained in a construction contract and had actual knowledge that the prescribed safety precautions were not being followed by the contractor. We imposed a duty upon the architect-engineer to take reasonable action to prevent injury to the contractor’s employees. In Durflinger v. Artiles, 234 Kan. 484, where a state hospital physician, as part of his employment, participated in a hospital team which recommended that a committed patient be discharged because he was no longer dangerous to himself or others, we imposed a duty upon that physician to use reasonable and ordinary care and discretion in making the recommendation to release the patient. The duty imposed to protect was a duty owed to both the patient and the public. In each of these cases where this court imposed a duty for a negligent act, the defendants did not purposefully violate a law.
We have recognized there is a distinction between “negligence” and “negligence per se.” Negligence must be found by *645the jury from the evidence, while “negligence per se” results from a violation of law or ordinance. Kansas follows the rule that a breach of duty imposed by law or ordinance is negligence per se, and liability in damages can be predicated on violation of that law where that breach is the proximate cause of the injury or damages or substantially contributes to the injury. Kendrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Rld. Co., 182 Kan. 249, 260, 320 P.2d 1061 (1958).
The majority states that a breach of a duty imposed by law or ordinance is negligence per se, unless the legislature clearly did not intend to impose civil liability for the breach. It states that K.S.A. 41-715, which prohibits the dispensing of alcoholic liquors to certain classes of persons, was intended by the legislature to regulate the sale of liquor and was not intended to impose civil liability. It concludes that K.S.A. 41-715, while imposing criminal penalties for a violation of the statute, is merely a portion of a comprehensive act to regulate the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages and, therefore, not a basis for negligence per se.
Does the majority suggest that such is true of all similar acts passed by the legislature or is it limited only to this act? Consider Chapter 8, “Automobiles and Other Vehicles,” which is a comprehensive act to regulate the licensing, sale and use of automobiles. Is not the same true of Chapter 8 as is true of Chapter 41, that while it contains certain provisions for licensing, other sections provide criminal sanctions for violation of those sections? The majority would imply that an individual who, while driving an automobile, intentionally and illegally proceeded into a controlled intersection and struck another vehicle is not required to bear the responsibility for any damage caused.
The legislature did not create a civil- cause of action in favor of those injured as a result of a violation of the traffic laws. Does this legislative silence mean that the legislature did not intend for such violations of the traffic laws to be interpreted to impose civil liability, that a violation of the traffic laws is not negligence per se because the legislature remained silent? Rarely does the legislature specifically create a civil cause of action in favor of those injured as a result of a violation of a law.
K.S.A. 41-715 is not a licensing statute enacted by the legislature to regulate who may sell liquor. Chapter 41 of the statutes, *646which is entitled “Intoxicating Liquors and Beverages,” contains several sections which regulate the issuance of a license. K.S.A. 41-715, however, does not appear in a licensing article of Chapter 41. It appears in Article 7, which is entitled “Certain Prohibited Acts and Penalties.” A violator of 41-715 may, in addition to receiving a fine not to exceed $200.00, receive a sentence not to exceed 30 days or both a fine and imprisonment in the discretion' of the court. Any person violating 41-715 is deemed guilty of a misdemeanor by the statute.
The majority is either failing to overrule prior case law or ignoring it. In Arredondo v. Duckwall Stores, Inc., 227 Kan. 842, 610 P.2d 1107 (1980), this court determined that for public safety reasons, K.S.A. 21-4209 prohibits minors, habitual drunkards, narcotics addicts and felons from obtaining explosives or detonating substances. It was the public policy of the act that the party whose conduct violates the act must bear the responsibility for the damage caused. The defendant, in violation of the statute, sold gunpowder to a sixteen-year-old boy who used the gunpowder to reload some shells. The boy was injured when his shotgun misfired. The minor predicated his successful action against the seller of the gunpowder upon the theory that actionable negligence occurs when one breaches a duty imposed by a criminal statute and the breach results in an injury of the type intended to be prevented.
K.S.A. 41-715 forbids the sale of alcoholic liquor to a minor, any person who is incapacitated or any person who is physically or mentally incapacitated by the consumption of liquor. The statute establishes a criminal penalty for such sales. The purpose of 41-715 is to prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages to those individuals who are unlikely to be able to handle alcohol. These individuals not only need protection from their own acts, but society needs protection from them.
Are we required to take legislative silence as to civil liability for alcohol vendors who violate a statute as an expression of legislative intent? Why has the majority suddenly determined that legislative silence is action? Prior to the legislature’s repeal of the dram shop act in G.S. 1949, 41-1106, the legislature knew that this court had stated that where there is a breach of a duty imposed by law and injury occurs as a result of the breach, the injured party is entitled to compensation. If the legislature *647wishes to exempt a specific class of violators from liability for damages which they cause by their negligence, then the legislature should speak. The court should not legislate an exemption. There is no more persuasive evidence of the legislature’s intention than a statute undertaken by the legislature to give expression to that intention. Where legislative enactments in the past have contained no express provision that their violation shall result in tort liability, and no implication to that effect, this court has adopted the requirements of that enactment as a standard of conduct necessary to protect certain individuals or society as a whole.
Section 18 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Kansas provides that all persons who suffer injuries to their person, reputation or property have a remedy by due course of law. In addition to our constitution, the legislature is aware of the principle of negligence law that every person is under a duty to avoid creating situations which impose an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Many times we have stated that a breach of a duty imposed by law or ordinance constitutes negligence per se and where injury occurs as a result of the breach, the injured party is entitled to compensation. Cognizant of our past actions, the legislature may well consider that when a judge-made common-law rule has become obsolete, anachronistic and oppressive, the court is responsible for change.
The majority states that the issue presented is whether this court should judicially enact a “dram shop” law imposing civil liability upon liquor vendors who violate 41-715. The real issue is whether this court should follow our previous case law which determined that public policy requires, where a party’s conduct violates a penal statute, that party must bear the responsibility for the damage caused as a result of the violation.
A statute is an expression of policy arising out of specific situations and addressed to the attainment of a particular aim of the legislature. The majority should not rewrite the statute. It should neither enlarge it nor contract it. The majority should take the statute as it finds it. This it has failed to do.
Prager and Miller, JJ., join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.
*648APPENDIX
Following is a brief summary of the present status of the civil liability of liquor vendors in all jurisdictions.
1. ALABAMA Dram shop act (Ala. Code § 6-5-71 [1975]). No common-law vendor liability. DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So.2d 733 (Ala. 1979).
2. ALASKA No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981); and Morris v. Farley Enterprises, Inc., 661 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1983).
3. ARIZONA No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983); and Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 667 P.2d 213 (1983), overruling earlier Arizona cases adhering to nonliability rule.
4. ARKANSAS No statutory vendor liability. No common-law liability. Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965).
5. CALIFORNIA Prevailing common-law vendor liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication abrogated in 1978 by Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25602 (West 1985 Supp.) and Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (West 1985).
6. COLORADO No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Kerby v. Flamingo Club, 35 Colo. App. 127, 532 P.2d 975 (1974).
7. CONNECTICUT Dram shop act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-102 [1985]). No common-law vendor liability. Nelson v. Steffens, 170 Conn. 356, 365 A.2d 1174 (1976); and Slicer v. Quigley, 180 Conn. 252, 429 A.2d 855 (1980).
8. DELAWARE No statutory vendor liability. No common-law liability. Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554 (Del. 1981).
9. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
10. FLORIDA Prevailing common-law vendor liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication. Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963); and Prevatt v. McClennan, 201 So.2d 780 (Fla. Dist. App. 1967), limited in 1981 by Fla. Stat. § 768.125 (1983).
11. GEORGIA Dram shop act (Ga. Code § 3-3-22 [1982]). No common-law liability. Keaton v. Kroger Co., 143 Ga. App. 23, 237 S.E.2d 443 (1977).
*64912. HAWAII No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Ono v. Applegate, 62 Hawaii 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980).
13. IDAHO No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980), overruling earlier Idaho case adhering to nonliability rule.
14. ILLINOIS Dram shop act (Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 43, ¶ 135 [Smith-Hurd 1984 Supp.]). No common-law vendor liability. Demchuk v. Duplancich, 92 Ill. 2d 1, 440 N.E.2d 112 (1982); and Thompson v. Trickle, 114 Ill. App. 3d 930, 449 N.E.2d 910 (1983).
15. INDIANA No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966).
16. IOWA Dram shop act (Iowa Code Ann. § 123.92 [West 1984 Supp.]). Common-law vendor liability. Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984).
17. KANSAS No statutory vendor liability. No common-law liability.
18. KENTUCKY No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968).
19. LOUISIANA No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Thrasher v. Leggett, 373 So.2d 494 (La. 1979).
20. MAINE Dram shop act (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2002 [1983]). Status of common-law liability not confirmed.
21. MARYLAND No statutory vendor liability. No common-law liability. Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494 (1981); and Fisher v. O’Connor's, Inc., 53 Md. App. 338, 452 A.2d 1313 (1982).
22. MASSACHUSETTS No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); and Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon’s Liquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 430 (1983).
23. MICHIGAN Dram shop act (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.993 [Callaghan 1984 Supp.]). Common-law vendor liability. Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973).
24. MINNESOTA Dram shop act (Minn. Stat. § 340.95 [1984]). Common-law liability. Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973). Recently, Minnesota Supreme Court refused to extend liability to a social host. Holmquist v. Miller, No. C7-83-1919 (5/3/85).
25. MISSISSIPPI No statutory vendor liability. Common-law *650liability. Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So.2d 213 (Miss. 1979).
26. MISSOURI No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. App. 1980); and Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. App. 1983).
27. MONTANA No statutory vendor liability. No common-law liability. Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979); Folda v. City of Bozeman, 177 Mont. 537, 582 P.2d 767 (1978); and Swartzenberger v. Billings Labor Temple Assn., 179 Mont. 145, 586 P.2d 712 (1978). But see Deeds v. United States, 306 F.Supp. 348 (D.Mont. 1969).
28. NEBRASKA No statutory vendor liability. No common-law liability. Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).
29. NEVADA No statutory vendor liability. No common-law liability. Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969).
30. NEW HAMPSHIRE No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965).
31. NEW JERSEY No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability established in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959), recently extended to social hosts, Kelly v. Gwinnett, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
32. NEW MEXICO No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982); MRC Properties, Inc. v. Gries, 98 N.M. 710, 652 P.2d 732 (1982); and Porter v. Ortiz, 100 N.M. 58, 665 P.2d 1149 (Ct. App. 1983), overruling earlier New Mexico cases adhering to nonliability rule.
33. NEW YORK Dram shop act (N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 11-101 [McKinney 1984 Supp.]). Common-law liability. Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc.2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965).
34. NORTH CAROLINA Dram shop act (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18B-121 et seq. [1983]). Common-law liability. Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C.App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191 (1983).
35. NORTH DAKOTA Dram shop act (N.D. Cent. Code § 5-01-06 [1983 Supp.]). No common-law liability. Thoring v. Bottonsek, 350 N.W.2d 586 (N.D. 1984).
*65136. OHIO Dram shop act (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4399.01 [Page 1982]). Common-law vendor liability. Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St.2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973).
37. OKLAHOMA Has not ruled on subject.
38. OREGON Prevailing common-law vendor liability. Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977) limited in 1979 by Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.950 et seq. (1983).
39. PENNSYLVANIA No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
40. RHODE ISLAND Dram shop act (R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-11-1 [1976])-. Status of common-law not confirmed.
41. SOUTH CAROLINA Has not ruled on subject.
42. SOUTH DAKOTA No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D. 1982), overruling earlier South Dakota case adhering to nonliability rule.
43. TENNESSEE No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1964).
44. TEXAS Has not ruled on subject.
45. UTAH Dram shop act (Utah Code Ann. § 32-11-1 [1983 Supp.]). Status of common-law liability not confirmed.
46. VERMONT Has not ruled on subject.
47. VIRGINIA Has not ruled on subject.
48. WASHINGTON No statutory vendorliability. Common-law liability. See, e.g., Callan v. O’Neil, 20 Wash. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978); and Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 678 P.2d 1295 (1984).
49. WISCONSIN No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis.2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984), overruling earlier Wisconsin cases adhering to non-liability rule. Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d_, 366 N.W. 2d 857 (1985), Wisconsin Supreme Court imposes liability on social host who served liquor to a minor.
50. WEST VIRGINIA Has not ruled on subject.
51. WYOMING No statutory vendor liability. Common-law liability. McClellan v. Tottenhoff 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983), overruling earlier Wyoming cases adhering to nonliability rule.