Court Opinion

ID: 9783533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:48:22.807054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:25.180230
License: Public Domain

Justice BENDER
dissents.
The majority holds that a recantation "can justify a new trial only to the extent that it not only impeaches the prior testimony but does so by contradicting it with a different and more credible account." Maj. op. at 708. Such a conclusion overstates our precedent. The appropriate standard that should be applied here is that newly discovered impeachment evidence is sufficient to justify a new trial when it, taken together with all of the other evidence for and against the defendant, is of such consequence that it probably would result in an acquittal on retrial. In this case, the parties agree that there was no evidence other than the victim's trial testimony to support the defendant's conviction. The trial court found that the victim's trial testimony had "substantial credibility issues." - Given this set of cireumstances, I conclude that the addition of the victim's recantation would bolster the defense argument for reasonable doubt and probably result in an acquittal on retrial. In my view, justice requires that the defendant receive a new trial. Hence, I respectfully dissent.
Post-trial recantation evidence should be viewed with skepticism. Blass v. People, 79 Colo. 555, 557-58, 247 P. 177, 178 (1926). For this reason, evidence serving "merely" to impeach or to cast doubt upon a witness's testimony is an inadequate ground for a new trial. People v. Scheidt, 187 Colo. 20, 22, 528 P.2d 232, 238 (1974); Digiallonardo v. People, 175 Colo. 560, 567, 488 P.2d 1109, 1113 (1971). The majority states that new impeachment evidence can justify a new trial only when it is of such significance that it would probably bring about an acquittal before a new jury. Maj. op. at 707 (citing Whipp v. People, 78 Colo. 134, 141, 241 P. 534, 537 (1925)). While I agree with this reading of our case law, I disagree with the majority's further statement that unless a witness's recantation is more believable than her trial testimony, it falls into a subset of impeachment evidence that would not here, and perhaps could not ever, bring about an acquittal. Maj. op. at 708-09. This holding fails to account for cases in which the newly discovered impeachment evidence adds more support to an already viable defense case for reasonable doubt. In these cases, perhaps rare, the new evidence does much more than cast doubt upon a witness's credibility-it clearly could and probably would change the outcome of the case.
The facts of this case demonstrate how a witness recantation that is found no more believable than the initial trial testimony can nonetheless result in a probable acquittal. The parties agree that the jury's verdict came down to whether it believed the victim's trial testimony. Citing the jury's decision to convict the defendant on certain counts, but acquit him on others, the trial court concluded that some of the victim's trial testimony was "at least unpersuasive if not unbelievable," and that she had "substantial credibility issues." The victim's subsequent recantation provides an even greater basis to doubt the veracity of her initial testimony. Because virtually no evidence other than the victim's trial testimony supported the defendant's conviction, her full recantation of all the evidence implicating the defendant necessitates the conclusion that an acquittal-or finding by the jury of reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt-is at least probable.
While our cases state that "mere impeachment" cannot justify a new trial, I believe this statement expresses the idea that impeachment evidence may be insignificant or highly significant to the outcome of a case depending on the nature of the impeachment and the particular facts of the case. In those cases where the impeachment strikes at the heart of the conviction, there may exist a sufficient basis for a new trial. See Miller v. People, 92 Colo. 481, 489-90, 22 P.2d 626, 630 (1933) (endorsing the rule "that newly discovered impeaching evidence would not warrant a new trial, unless it clearly appears that it would probably change the result in case of a new trial") (internal quotations omitted). Such a reading is consistent with People v. Gutierrez, 622 P.2d 547 (Colo.1981), where we enumerated the modern standard for mo*711tions for new trials based on newly discovered evidence. There, we framed the relevant inquiry as, whether, "[blased on review of all the available evidence," the new evidence would probably produce an acquittal. Id. at 560. While the trial judge may apply her own experience in weighing the objective be-lHevability of the witness's recantation, she must do so by evaluating the probable impact of the recantation on the prosecution's case as a whole.
The majority relies upon People v. Schneider, 25 P.3d 755 (Colo.2001), for the proposition that a trial court must be "reasonably satisfied" that a reasonable person would probably believe the witness's new version of the events in order to grant a new trial. Maj. op. at 707-08. This reliance is misplaced. In Schneider, we examined the trial court's responsibility to evaluate a witness's credibility when a defendant requests to withdraw a guilty plea on the basis of a recantation. 25 P.3d at 761-62. A person who "voluntarily and knowingly enters a guilty plea accepting responsibility for the charges is properly held to a higher burden in demonstrating to the court that newly discovered evidence should allow him to withdraw that plea" Id. at 761. In addition to requiring that a defendant seeking to vacate a guilty plea demonstrate that the new evidence probably would result in an acquittal, we also required that the trial court determine that the charges filed against the defendant were "actually false and unfounded." Id. at 762. Accordingly, we required that a trial court be "reasonably satisfied" that the earlier accusations were untrue. Id.
In contrast to the guilty plea cireum-stances in Schneider, Gutierrez requires that the trial court need only find that the recantation, when considered with all the other evidence, will generate enough doubt to probably produce an acquittal. 622 P.2d at 560. In the cireumstances of a conviction after a trial, the trial court need not be reasonably satisfied that the trial testimony is untrue, or even probably untrue. Even if the trial court had found the victim's recantation less credible than her trial testimony, it would not necessarily mean that an acquittal was not probable. See State v. McCallum, 208 Wis.2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707, 711 (1997) ("It does not necessarily follow that a finding [that a recantation is] 'less credible must lead to a conclusion of 'no reasonable probability of a different outcome." Less credible is far from incredible.").
The majority's new test for recantations is also problematic because it overlooks the weight we are required to give to prior inconsistent statements as compared to other forms of impeachment." Although a witness's recantation has the effect of impeaching her prior testimony, the evidence here-a complete repudiation of her previous testimony implicating the defendant-constitutes a pri- or inconsistent statement which is admissible as substantive evidence. § 16-10-201, C.R.S. (2008) (prior inconsistent statements made at trial are admitted as substantive evidence); see also People v. Tomey, 969 P.2d 785, 787 (Colo.App.1998) (noting that a hearsay statement allegedly made by the victim to an inmate that was inconsistent with the vietim's former testimony would be admitted on retrial as substantive evidence under section 16-10-201, C.R.S.). As the Tenth Cireuit has explained, "when a witness recants his testimony, presumably he will testify to the new version at a new trial. Thus, the recantation is substantive evidence." United States v. Ramsey, 726 F.2d 601, 604 (10th Cir.1984). Hence, I conclude that a recantation, depending on the cireumstances and nature of the recantation and corroborating evidence, may constitute much more than "mere" impeachment.
In sum, I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant a new trial based on the victim's recantation. The trial court found that the jury's verdict came down to whether it believed the alleged victim's testimony. The trial court found that some of the victim's allegations generated reasonable doubt in the jury's mind. The victim's subsequent recantation provides an even greater basis to doubt the truthfulness of the initial allegations which the jury believed. The victim's suspect initial testimony, when coupled with the lack of corroborative evidence in this case, demonstrates that this key witness's recantation *712would probably bring about an acquittal. Thus, justice requires a new trial.
Lastly, I note that what the trial court meant when it stated that the newly discovered evidence must produce a "complete acquittal" at a new trial is not relevant to the decision in this case. Nonetheless, the majority suggests in dicta that the defendant may have waived the right to challenge this order on the grounds that the trial court misconstrued the correct legal standard because the defendant did not seek timely clarification as to what the trial court meant by the term "complete acquittal." Maj. op. at 709. This statement appears without citation support, and my research disclosed no Colorado case requiring defense counsel to seek clarification of a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial before challenging it on appeal.
For these reasons, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice MULLARKEY and Justice MARTINEZ join in this dissent.