Court Opinion

ID: 9882393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:09:10.147224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:17.387516
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hayes, 2023-Ohio-3319.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                              :     APPEAL NOS. C-220529
                                                               C-220530
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :     TRIAL NOS. 21CRB-21996
                                                               21TRC-27922 B, C, D
                                             :
   VS.
                                             :        O P I N I O N.

 DARYLE HAYES,                               :

         Defendant-Appellant.                :

Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed in Part, and Reversed and Appellant
                             Discharged in Part

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 20, 2023

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting
Attorney, and Ashton Tucker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David Hoffmann,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CROUSE, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Daryle Hayes appeals the judgments of the

Hamilton County Municipal Court convicting him of several traffic offenses, including

possession of an open container, improper passing, driving without a seat belt, and a

traffic light violation. On appeal, he argues that these convictions were not supported

by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the

reasons that follow, we reverse Hayes’s convictions for improper passing and driving

without a seat belt, but we affirm the court’s judgments in all other respects.

                     I. Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶2}    Following a traffic stop on December 9, 2021, Hayes was charged with

operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”) under R.C.

4511.19(A)(1)(a), weaving under Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-76, driving without a

seat belt under R.C. 4513.263, a traffic light violation under Cincinnati Municipal Code

506-40, and possession of an open container under R.C. 4301.62.

       {¶3}    A jury trial commenced in July 2022 on the OVI charge, and the other

traffic charges were tried to the bench. At trial, the city presented testimony from

Cincinnati Police Officer Olivia Zick that she and fellow Cincinnati Police Officer

Samuel Bailey were working an off-duty detail in a marked police vehicle when they

saw Hayes, who was driving a Ford F150 truck, run through a red light at the

intersection of Martin Luther King Drive (“MLK”) and Dixmyth Avenue. According to

Officer Zick, the light had just switched over and was “solid red” when Hayes entered

the intersection. Officer Bailey likewise testified that he witnessed Hayes run the red

light, stating that the light “was on solid red for quite a bit before he drove through it.”

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶4}   The officers followed Hayes as he drove westbound on MLK, and Officer

Zick stated that he was “weaving in and out of the marked lines trying to go around

cars.” He did so more than once, but less than five times. Officer Bailey testified

similarly, stating that Hayes “weaved in and out of lanes without using turn signals

and went around a vehicle as well.”

       {¶5}   The officers stopped Hayes once he turned from MLK onto Central

Parkway. According to Officer Zick, they waited to pull Hayes over until he reached a

safe place for them to do so, and she did not witness him commit any traffic infractions

when turning onto Central Parkway or while being pulled officer. Officer Zick

approached Hayes’s vehicle on the passenger side. Upon opening the door, she noticed

a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage, that Hayes’s eyes were bloodshot, and that his

speech was slurred. Officer Zick testified that Hayes was not wearing a seat belt when

he was pulled over. Suspecting that Hayes was intoxicated, Officer Zick asked him to

exit from the vehicle. After a brief struggle, Hayes got out of the car and was

handcuffed. According to Officer Zick, Hayes was not offered field-sobriety tests

because he was being combative and the tests presented a safety issue, as the officers

did not want to remove his handcuffs after struggling to cuff him in the first instance.

After Hayes was placed in the squad car, his vehicle was searched.

       {¶6}   Officer Bailey testified that he found a half-empty, 375 milliliter bottle

of Lawrence Diluted Vodka, two empty vodka bottles of a similar size, and two empty

bottles of wine behind the driver’s seat in a black plastic bag, along with an empty

bottle of juice, a cigar wrapper, and other trash. According to Officer Bailey, the half-

empty bottle contained “a clear liquid that would be consistent with vodka.” He

additionally stated that “As I was searching the truck, you can just smell the strong

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle itself,” although he conceded that he was

unaware if any of the bottles of alcohol had leaked or spilled in the vehicle. Officer

Bailey did not testify that he smelled the liquid in the bottle or that a lab test

determined that it was alcohol, and on cross-examination he agreed that the liquid

inside the bottle was also consistent with water.

       {¶7}   After waiting approximately 45 minutes for a tow truck to arrive, Hayes

was transported to the police station. Cincinnati Police Officer Kevin Tommer testified

that, once at the station, Hayes was offered, and refused to take, a breath test.

       {¶8}   Hayes testified that he suffers from bipolar disorder, depression,

paranoia, posttraumatic stress disorder, insomnia, and anxiety, and that he manages

these disorders with medication that prevents him from drinking alcohol. Hayes

denied drinking alcohol prior to the traffic stop and stated that he had last drunk

alcohol several weeks before this incident. He testified that his jaw bone had been

previously shattered, that he was missing six teeth, and that his reconstructed jaw

interferes with his mouth function. His counsel argued during closing argument that

these issues were the reason for his slurred speech.

       {¶9}   Hayes explained that he earns money doing waste removal, recycling

bottles, and moving large items for people and businesses. He asserted that when he

was pulled over, he was on his way home after cleaning up the parking lots of two

businesses in Avondale, and that the bottles found in his truck were left over from a

prior clean-up job. Hayes testified that the odor of an alcoholic beverage came from

the nature of his work, explaining that “I’m always stinking. That’s what comes with

the trash.” With respect to the traffic violations that he was charged with, Hayes denied

running a red light or swerving in traffic. He further insisted that he had been wearing

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

his seat belt while driving, explaining that he had taken off the seat belt to remove his

wallet from his pocket.

       {¶10} The jury found Hayes not guilty of OVI. For its part, the trial court found

Hayes guilty of driving without a seat belt, the traffic light violation, possession of an

open container, and improper passing under Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-70.1

Hayes now appeals.
                                II. Law and Analysis

       {¶11} In a single assignment of error, Hayes argues that his convictions were

based on insufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶12} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court asks

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a

rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 166 Ohio St.3d 85, 2021-Ohio-3311, 182 N.E.3d 1161,

¶ 16. In doing so, the court “asks whether the evidence against a defendant, if believed,

supports the conviction.” (Emphasis sic.) Id.

       {¶13} A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument, on the other hand,

“challenges the believability of the evidence.” State v. Staley, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos.

C-200270, C-200271, and C-200272, 2021-Ohio-3086, ¶ 10. When undertaking such

review, we sit as a “thirteenth juror.” State v. Green, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190280,

2020-Ohio-4370, ¶ 9, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 388, 678 N.E.2d

541 (1997). We must review the entire record, weigh the evidence, consider the

credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way

and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id.

1 Although  Hayes was ticketed for weaving under Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-76, he was
convicted of improper passing under Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-70.
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                            Possession of an Open Container

       {¶14} Hayes was found guilty of possession of an open container under R.C.

4301.62. He contends that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence

because the city presented no evidence, other than the label on the half-full bottle

found in his truck, that the liquid inside the bottle was vodka. He argues that

additional evidence was necessary to establish that the liquid was alcohol, such as a

lab test or testimony about the smell of the liquid. The city contends that testimony

about the smell of alcohol in the vehicle itself, along with testimony that the liquid

inside the bottle was consistent with vodka, was sufficient.

       {¶15} R.C. 4301.62 provides in relevant part that:

       No person shall have in the person’s possession an opened container of

       beer or intoxicating liquor in any of the following circumstances:

                                       *   *   *

       (4) Except as provided in division (D) or (E) of this section, while

       operating or being a passenger in or on a motor vehicle on any street,

       highway, or other public or private property open to the public for

       purposes of vehicular travel or parking;

       (5) Except as provided in division (D) or (E) of this section, while being

       in or on a stationary motor vehicle on any street, highway, or other

       public or private property open to the public for purposes of vehicular

       travel or parking.

R.C. 4301.62(B).

       {¶16} Intoxicating liquor is defined in R.C. 4301.01(A)(1) as including “all

liquids and compounds, other than beer, containing one-half of one per cent or more

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

of alcohol by volume which are fit to use for beverage purposes, from whatever source

and by whatever process produced.” Whereas beer “includes all beverages brewed or

fermented wholly or in part from malt products and containing one-half of one per

cent or more of alcohol by volume.” R.C. 4301.01(B)(2).

       {¶17} Ohio case law on this issue is sparse. While courts generally require

some additional proof besides the label on the bottle or can that the contents are an

intoxicating liquor, they do not require a lab test of the alcohol volume. In In re

Howman, 5th Dist. Ashland No. CA-1059, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 946, 4 (Mar. 8,

1994), the Fifth District held that the absence of evidence as to the specific alcohol

content of the tequila that the minor admitted drinking was irrelevant in an underage-

consumption case, given the “overwhelming” evidence that the minor was intoxicated,

including the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on the individual, paired with vomit

found on the minor’s clothing and her inability to stand or walk without assistance.

Also instructive is City of Cleveland v. Large, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 70825, 1997

Ohio App. LEXIS 497, 1 (Feb.13, 1997), where the defendant was convicted of violating

an administrative code regulation for possessing, displaying, and consuming an

alcoholic beverage in a state park. Large was arrested after an officer on bike patrol

saw him seated in his car drinking from a Busch beer can and also noticed several

other unopened cans on the seat of the car. The defendant argued on appeal that the

state failed to prove that he had consumed an alcoholic beverage because the state had

not submitted the contents of the can for scientific testing. Id. at 3. The Eighth District

rejected this argument, holding that “any rational trier of fact could find that the

contents of the Busch beer can were alcoholic based upon Officer Mawcomb’s

testimony that he noticed unopened cans next to appellant on the seat and poured the

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

contents of the can out on to the ground, giving him an opportunity to observe the

contents of the can.” Id. at 4. Compare State v. Poulton, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 13 CAA

07 0052, 2014-Ohio-2602, ¶ 88-89 (evidence that defendant gave a bottle of

Yuengling lager to a minor, without any evidence that the liquid was beer, was

insufficient to sustain a conviction for furnishing beer to a minor). Courts have applied

similar reasoning in open-container cases outside of Ohio as well. For instance,

testimony that a beverage smells like liquor or beer is routinely deemed sufficient to

support an open-container conviction. See People v. Angell, 184 Ill.App.3d 712, 717-

18, 133 Ill.Dec. 240, 540 N.E.2d 1106 (1989) (police officer’s testimony that the liquid

in the cans was beer based on its smell was sufficient to support open-container

conviction); Derosiers v. District of Columbia, 19 A.3d 796, 801 (D.C.2011) (officer’s

testimony that liquid in a glass jar smelled like vodka, combined with circumstantial

evidence that the appellant had recently been drinking, was sufficient proof that the

beverage contained the statutorily proscribed amount of alcohol); State v. Fuller,

2009 Kan.App.Unpub. LEXIS 585, 8 (July 24, 2009) (holding that evidence was

sufficient to support an open-container conviction where the bottle had a Barton

Vodka label, was one-quarter full, and the “bottle smelled of vodka”); Workman v.

United States, 96 A.3d 678, 681 (D.C.2014) (holding that an opened bottle of tequila

with a label indicating an alcohol content of 40 percent, without testimony about its

smell or taste, was insufficient to prove the contents of the bottle were an alcoholic

beverage); B.B. v. State, 117 So.3d 442, 444 (Fla.App.2013) (holding that the “State’s

case lacked any evidence identifying the substance inside” a can that was alleged to

contain alcohol, despite the clear labeling on the can, when the defendant was not

breathalyzed, and the liquid was not smelled or tested).

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶18} Similarly, signs of an individual’s intoxication, namely an odor

emanating from their person or car, can also be sufficient to support a conviction for

possession of an open container. See United States v. Eiland, E.D.Tenn. No. 3:17-PO-

8, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66486, 12-13 (May 2, 2017) (holding that the government had

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed open containers of

alcohol where testimony established that the car smelled like an alcoholic beverage,

spilled beer was on the floorboard, and partially consumed beers were found in a soft-

sided cooler); People v. Hughes, 2019 Ill.App.Unpub. LEXIS 1245, 8 (June 28, 2019)

(testimony that defendant slurred his words, had bloodshot, watery eyes, and smelled

of alcohol was sufficient to demonstrate that a half-full bottle of Don Julio tequila was,

without smelling or testing, an alcoholic beverage); Walters v. State, 757 S.W.2d 41,

44 (Tex.App.1988) (evidence that appellant was intoxicated and smelled of an

alcoholic beverage, and that the liquid inside the Budweiser was cold was sufficient to

support an open-container conviction); State v. Hoque, 269 N.C.App. 347, 357, 837

S.E.2d 464 (2020) (an open-container conviction was based on sufficient evidence

where the officer testified that an opened bottle of New Amsterdam vodka was found

between the defendant’s legs while he was seated in the driver’s seat of a running car,

that defendant smelled of alcohol, and that defendant had slurred speech along with

red, watery, glassy, and bloodshot eyes); Kalb v. State, 276 Ga.App. 394, 395, 623

S.E.2d 230 (2005) (the defendant’s statement to police that he drank a beer while

driving, combined with an empty can of beer, was sufficient to support a conviction

for possession of an open container).

       {¶19} Hayes asserts that the only evidence that the bottle found in his truck

contained an “intoxicating liquor” was Officer Bailey’s testimony that the bottle

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

contained “a clear liquid that would be consistent with vodka” and the label of the

bottle itself, which read “Lawrence Diluted Vodka.” However, there was also testimony

from both officers that Hayes had “a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage” on both his

person and in his car, that his speech was slurred, and that his eyes were bloodshot.

This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the city, was sufficient to support

a conviction for possession of an open container. See Jones, 166 Ohio St.3d 85, 2021-

Ohio-3311, 182 N.E.3d 1161, at ¶ 16. Moreover, while Hayes had alternative

explanations for his appearance, behavior, and odor, the court chose to believe the

testimony of the officers, and the record does not demonstrate that, in so doing, the

court clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. See Green, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-190280, 2020-Ohio-4370, at ¶ 9.

        {¶20} Hayes’s conviction for possession of an open container was therefore

supported by the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence.

                                          Improper Passing

        {¶21} We next turn to Hayes’s conviction for improper passing. As noted

earlier in this opinion, while Hayes was ticketed for weaving under Cincinnati

Municipal Code 506-76, he was convicted of improper passing under Cincinnati

Municipal Code 506-70. Neither party addresses this inconsistency.2 While Hayes

acknowledges that the conviction was for improper passing, he does not set forth the

elements of the offense or explain how the evidence is lacking with respect to those

elements. Rather, his argument focuses on the fact that his weaving was not

2 We note that the ticket was handwritten and the “76” on the ticket could easily be misread as “70.”

Thus, this seems to be a data entry issue on the court’s journal entry. The B charge in the case
numbered 21/TRC/27922 states “Improper Passing” in violation of Cincinnati Municipal Code
506-70 and in handing down the conviction and sentence, the trial court only referred to this charge
as the “B charge.”
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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

documented and that when the officers activated their recording system, he was

driving normally.

        {¶22} The city argues that “[t]he Cincinnati Municipal Code codifies ‘improper

passing’ as weaving under CMC 506-76.” However, as stated above, while Hayes was

charged with violating Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-76, he was convicted of

violating Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-70, which is improper passing. It is this

court’s task when reviewing for sufficiency to determine whether the evidence is

sufficient to support the conviction.

        {¶23} Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-70 is titled “Passing in Opposite

Direction,” and it provides that “Operators of vehicles proceeding in opposite

directions shall pass each other to the right, and upon roadways having width for not

more than one line of traffic in each direction each operator shall give to the other one-

half or as nearly one-half of the main traveled portion of the roadway as is reasonably

possible.”

        {¶24} The testimony from Officer Zick at trial was that MLK had two lanes of

traffic in each direction. She stated that Hayes weaved in and out of marked lines while

trying to go around other cars. Officer Bailey similarly testified that Hayes “weaved in

and out of lanes without using turn signals and went around a vehicle as well.” While

this evidence would likely be sufficient for a weaving conviction under Cincinnati

Municipal Code 506-76,3 the same is not true for an improper passing conviction

under Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-70.

3 Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-76, which codifies the offense of weaving, provides that “No

person shall drive a vehicle upon any highway in a weaving or zigzag course, unless such irregular
course is made necessary by traffic exigencies.”
                                               11
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶25} In fact, there was no evidence presented about Hayes driving in a

manner that violated Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-70, as this statute imposes a duty

on drivers to drive upon the right half of the roadway, and to yield half the roadway to

oncoming traffic. See, e.g., State v. DeWalt, 7th Dist. Carroll No. 08 CA 852, 2009-

Ohio-5283, ¶ 34 (holding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant crossed

the center line of the road and collided with a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction

for defendant’s conviction under R.C. 4511.26, the state-law equivalent to Cincinnati

Municipal Code 506-70). The evidence presented established that Hayes passed, or

weaved around, cars traveling in the same direction as his vehicle, rather than passing

a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction, as is required for a conviction under

Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-70. We therefore hold that Hayes’s conviction for

improper passing was based on insufficient evidence.

                                Driving Without a Seat Belt

       {¶26} Hayes was convicted of violating R.C. 4513.263(B)(1), which provides

that “[n]o person shall * * * [o]perate an automobile on any street or highway unless

that person is wearing all of the available elements of a properly adjusted occupant

restraining device.” He argues that Officer Zick’s testimony that he was not wearing a

seat belt when she approached him after initiating the traffic stop was not sufficient to

support his conviction. The city agrees and concedes that Hayes’s conviction for a

violation of R.C. 4513.263 was not supported by sufficient evidence.

       {¶27} Evidence that a driver was unbuckled during the traffic stop, without

more, is not enough to prove a violation of the statute. State v. Harrison, 161 Ohio

App.3d 573, 2005-Ohio-2983, 831 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 27-46 (5th Dist.); State v. Gregg, 6th

Dist. Huron No. H-06-030, 2007-Ohio-4611, ¶ 14 (“a motorist cannot be convicted of

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

failing to wear a seat belt unless the officer observes the motorist not wearing the seat

belt while the car is in motion and before the stop”).

        {¶28} Here, the only evidence supporting Hayes’s conviction for driving

without a seat belt was Officer Zick’s testimony that he was not wearing a seat belt

when she approached him. No evidence was presented that Hayes operated the vehicle

without wearing his seatbelt. His conviction for driving without a seat belt was

therefore based on insufficient evidence.

                                  Traffic Light Violation

        {¶29} We last consider Hayes’s conviction for running a red light under

Cincinnati Municipal Code 506-40. His argument concerning this conviction

primarily challenges the manifest weight of the evidence, rather than its sufficiency,

as he contends that the officers’ testimony in support of his conviction was not worthy

of belief.

        {¶30} Both Officer Zick and Officer Bailey testified that Hayes was traveling

westbound on MLK and ran a red light at the Dixmyth Avenue intersection. Hayes,

however, points to Officer Bailey’s statements on a body-worn camera video that was

admitted at trial that the infraction took place at the intersection of Hopple, rather

than MLK, and Dixmyth. Hayes also asserts that the officers’ testimony differed about

how long the light had been red prior to him entering the intersection. Officer Zick

testified that the light was solid red when he entered the intersection, but that it had

“just switched over.” Officer Bailey, however, testified that the light had been “solid

red for quite a bit before he drove through it.” Hayes testified that he did not run the

red light at all.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶31} The only true inconsistency raised by Hayes is Officer Bailey’s comment

on the body-worn camera about the relevant intersection. But even if this, as well as

the other alleged inconsistencies regarding the length of time that the light was red are

considered, they “merely raise peripheral credibility determinations that the trial

court could resolve based on the totality of the evidence.” State v. Scott, 2022-Ohio-

3020, 195 N.E.3d 244, ¶ 27 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Stiver, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos.

C-210228 and C-210229, 2021-Ohio-3713, ¶ 10.

       {¶32} The trial court was entitled to reject Hayes’s testimony that he did not

run the red light and to believe the officers’ testimony on that point, and the record

does not demonstrate that, in so doing, the court clearly lost its way and created a

manifest miscarriage of justice. See Green, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190280, 2020-

Ohio-4370, at ¶ 9. Hayes’s conviction for a traffic light violation was supported by

sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                   III. Conclusion

       {¶33} Hayes’s assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part.

In the appeal numbered C-220529, his convictions in the trial court cases numbered

21TRC-27922B and 21TRC-27922C for improper passing and driving without a seat

belt are reversed as they were based on insufficient evidence and he is discharged on

those counts. The judgments of the trial court are otherwise affirmed.

          Judgments affirmed in part, and reversed and appellant discharged in part.

ZAYAS and WINKLER, JJ., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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