Court Opinion

ID: 9693556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:49:37.875639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:48.404138
License: Public Domain

Parskey, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I cannot agree with the majority opinion’s holding that Connecticut law requires the trial court, when requested, to instruct the jury on the motive of a complaining witness to falsify testimony. The court’s decision states a general rule, for all cases, requiring such an instruction which places the credibility of a victim on a par with that of a self-confessed accomplice.
The majority opinion’s approach is strikingly similar to that in State v. Ruth, 181 Conn. 187, 196, 435 A.2d 3 (1980), which concluded that an analagous instruction was required by Connecticut law on the interest of a testifying accomplice. In State v. Ruth, supra, where an instruction commenting on the witnesses’ credibility was requested by the defendant, the witnesses in question were self-confessed accomplices to the crime. Id., 195. Here Williams, who was the victim of the burglary and the attempted robbery, was not charged with *216nor did he confess to any crime. The complainant was implicated only by the defendant’s alibi, which the jury were free to and did in fact reject.
The majority opinion concedes that the instruction requested could have been refused if the court so instructed in substance, but the majority fails to address why the court’s instruction to consider the interests of all the witnesses in the outcome didn’t satisfy the defendant’s request. The jury were well aware of the fact that the complainant Williams had previously been convicted of an offense similar to that alleged by the defendant as a defense to the charges against him in this case. As stated by the majority opinion, the defendant was permitted to exercise a broad right of cross-examination as to any motive Williams might have had to falsify his testimony, including the possible motive to justify his use of a gun by claiming that he was compelled to protect himself against the defendant and the defendant’s companions. In addition, the trial court, in its instructions on the credibility of witnesses stated that: “You should consider any possible bias or prejudice that witness might have, whether for or against the State or the accused. The interest or lack of interest of that witness, of whatever sort, in the outcome of the trial. . . . Now, there also has been some evidence here with respect to prior convictions of felonies, as has been pointed out to you Mr. Williams had a prior conviction, and Mr. Cooper had several convictions.” The court then instructed the jury that evidence of the prior convictions was admitted for the sole purpose of assessing the credibility of both the defendant Cooper and the complainant Williams. Together, the testimony elicited on cross-examination and the court’s instructions on the *217credibility of witnesses in general, which noted that a witness may have an interest in the outcome of the case, were sufficient to alert the jury to any motive Williams might have had to falsify his testimony. I would therefore hold, in accordance with the decisions of other jurisdictions which have decided the point, that the decision to give or to refuse an instruction assessing the credibility of a particular witness who is not an accomplice to the crime rests within the discretion of the trial court, and that refusal to give such an instruction will not constitute reversible error on appeal unless the party claiming it shows that the trial court under the circumstances abused its discretion. United States v. Hill, 470 F.2d 361, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Land v. People, 171 Colo. 114, 117-18, 465 P.2d 124 (1970); State v. Boetger, 96 Idaho 535, 537, 531 P.2d 1180 (1975); State v. Green, 511 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Mo. 1974).
The reasons for this approach are plain. The common-law rule disqualifying as witnesses those interested in the outcome of the case has been universally abandoned; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) §§ 575-576; in an effort to permit the jury as the trier of fact to hear all relevant testimony and to determine for themselves the credibility of each witness and the weight to be accorded his or her testimony. McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) §§ 61, 65. Connecticut has long since abandoned the rule in criminal as well as in civil cases. General Statutes §52-145; Banks v. Watrous, 136 Conn. 597, 599, 73 A.2d 329 (1950); State v. Buxton, 79 Conn. 477, 478, 65 A. 957 (1907). To require the court to single out witnesses upon request for comment upon their interest in the outcome of the case as a motive to falsify their testimony would not only constitute *218regression in the progress achieved in permitting the jury to identify and weigh snch motives for themselves, bnt would also, in many circumstances, frustrate the efforts of the trial judge to deliver evenly balanced instructions to the jury to consider the interest in the outcome of all the witnesses, testifying for both sides. In some circumstances, to require such an instruction would invade the province of the jury which has repeatedly been held by this court to be the sole body to determine the credibility of witnesses. State v. Staples, 175 Conn. 398, 407, 399 A.2d 1269 (1978).
To hold that an instruction on a complainant’s motive to falsify, when requested, must be given would create particularly difficult problems in a prosecution for sexual assault where the credibility of the complaining witness has traditionally been and continues to be in doubt among jurors at the outset. As have other courts, I must disapprove of any decision which would require a cautionary instruction by the court on a rape victim’s motive as a complaining witness to falsify testimony; Land v. People, supra, 117-18; Williamson v. State 338 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. App. 1976); State v. Smoot, 99 Idaho 855, 863, 590 P.2d 1001 (1978); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 392 N.E.2d 1213, 1218-19 (Mass. App. 1979); State v. Just, 602 P.2d 957, 964-65 (Mont. 1979); Lopez v. State, 544 P.2d 855, 864-65 (Wyo. 1976); yet under the reasoning of the majority opinion, in cases where the defendant claimed that the victim could herself1 be subject to prosecution depending only upon the veracity of her *219account of the criminal transaction involved, the defendant’s claim would require such an instruction.
Other recent cases which have confronted the issue outside the realm of sexual assault have consistently upheld the denial of instructions which would single out a particular witness to analyze his or her interest in the outcome of the case and motive to falsify testimony. These cases have held that the trial court’s conventional instruction to consider the interest of any and all of the witnesses is sufficient and, in some cases, approaches the outer limits of the trial court’s incursion into the credibility of witnesses. Huske v. Anchorage, 585 P.2d 504, 504-505 (Alaska 1978); State v. Cookus, 115 Ariz. 99, 104, 563 P.2d 898 (1977); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 368 N.E.2d 829, 829-30 (Mass. App. 1977); White v. State, 375 So. 2d 220, 221-22 (Miss. 1979); State v. Richardson, 243 S.E.2d 918, 920 (N.C. App. 1978); Northern v. State, 541 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tenn. App. 1976); State v. Huff, 76 Wash. 2d 577, 581, 458 P.2d 180 (1969); Channel v. State, 592 P.2d 1145, 1152 (Wyo. 1979); see also 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trial § 861. The credibility of witnesses continues to be the sole province of the jury.
For these reasons I would hold that the instruction requested is not required in every case, but is instead within the trial court’s discretion to give where it is warranted in light of the testimony elicited on cross-examination, counsels’ closing arguments, and other factors such as the nature and intensity of the witness’ interest in the outcome. I would find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in refusing to give the instruction requested in this case.
In this opinion Bogdaxski, J., concurred.

TJse of the feminine gender here is not without recognition that males as well as females are often victims of sexual assault. Use of the feminine gender merely reflects the typical sexual assault situation with which the court is confronted.