Court Opinion

ID: 9385474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 20:02:27.073958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.227148
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/6/23 P. v. Souter CA1/5

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
            Plaintiff and Respondent,
 v.                                                                A161941
 PAUL JOSEPH SOUTER,                                               (San Mateo County
            Defendant and Appellant.                               Super. Ct. No. 16SF009515A)

 THE PEOPLE,
            Plaintiff and Respondent,                              A162047
 v.                                                                (San Mateo County
 SHELBY LYNNE LUJAN,                                               Super. Ct. No. 16SF009515B)
            Defendant and Appellant.

      In these consolidated appeals, Shelby Lynne Lujan and
Paul Joseph Souter appeal after a jury convicted them each of
criminally negligent animal cruelty (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (b))
involving the death of Lujan’s dog.1 The trial court suspended
imposition of sentence, placed both Lujan and Souter on two
years’ probation, and ordered them to serve (respectively) 90 days
and eight months in county jail.

        1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                                1
       Lujan and Souter raise numerous arguments, including
insufficiency of the evidence; clerical error; evidentiary challenges
(and related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); and that
recent changes in the law require us to vacate certain imposed
fees. We agree only in part and modify the orders of probation to
strike the probation supervision and jurisdiction transfer fees. In
all other respects, we affirm.2

                           BACKGROUND

                                  A.

       Section 597, subdivision (b), provides (in relevant part):
“[W]hoever, having the charge or custody of any animal, either as
owner or otherwise, subjects any animal to needless suffering, or
inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the animal, or in any manner
abuses any animal, . . . is, for each offense, guilty of a crime.” In
other words, “criminal liability under section 597(b) may be
imposed on a person who has custody of, or is responsible for
providing care to, an animal and commits an act or omission
proscribed by that subdivision that recklessly exposes the animal
to a high risk of death” or great bodily injury. (People v. Riazati
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 514, 531 (Riazati), italics omitted.)

                                  B.

      In 2015, Lujan adopted a small breed puppy named
Sprocket. Sprocket primarily lived with Lujan in a room she
rented in San Bruno.

     In January 2016, Lujan and Sprocket traveled to New
Mexico, where Lujan was raised. While there, Lujan began

      2  Souter also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (In re
Souter (Sept. 16, 2022, A166115)), which raises the same
ineffective assistance of counsel arguments that he raises on
appeal. We deferred the question of whether to issue an order to
show cause pending this appeal. By separate order, we deny the
habeas petition.
                                  2
dating Souter and, in April 2016, Souter and his dog (Athena)
joined Lujan and Sprocket in her room in San Bruno.

        On April 19, Souter was caring for Sprocket while Lujan
was at school, when Souter texted Lujan, “ ‘Your dog got burned
with hot water cause I was trying to make tea and tripped over
Athena and spilt the hot water on the floor where your dog was
laying.’ ” Lujan responded, “ ‘My poor baby!’ ” and asked if
Sprocket was in pain. Souter texted back: “ ‘I feel bad for him.
[¶] . . . [¶] . . . I’m sorry babe. He will walk but he is just laying
down but yeah he looks like it hurts.’ ” Souter also sent Lujan a
photograph that showed Sprocket’s bright pink underside.

       Heather P., who worked as a veterinary technician for a
local veterinary hospital, remembered speaking to a man on the
phone (in April 2016) who said he “accidentally spilled hot water
on his dog” and wanted to know if he could treat the burns at
home. She told the man that most burns are easily infected, said
that he should have the dog examined by a veterinarian, and
provided him with information for an emergency veterinary
clinic. The man repeatedly asked if he could treat the dog’s
wounds with burn cream, but Heather told him that doing so was
not recommended and that he should take the dog to a
veterinarian.

                                  C.

       Two days later, on April 21, Lujan and Souter exchanged
text messages wherein Souter admitted he was still feeding and
disciplining Sprocket. Souter returned to New Mexico three days
later, on April 24.

     The next day, Lujan texted him two photos of Sprocket,
which showed extensive blistering and pus on Sprocket’s
underside. They also exchanged the following text messages:

      “Souter: [Were] they like that before the bath it might be
skin coming off from healing.
                                   3
     “Lujan: Well he was laying down and when I checked on
him he was like all wet there as if he was sweating. So I took
him potty and then wanted to wash him off . . . [¶] . . . [¶]

      “Lujan: Some of them looked like they opened up so they
are not full of liquid . . . it’s like open skin so I wanted to be sure
they were clean.

      “Souter: Well pop one and see I guess.

      “Souter: Oh it might just be the healing. What [does] the
skin under it look.

      “Lujan: Just like a raw open wound.”

      Lujan next texted Souter a photo that showed a tissue with
puss on it. They then texted the following:

      “Lujan: That’s what color it is though . . . it doesn’t smell
and there is nothing puffy or red around the skin.

      “Souter: Well then it [is probably] just the healing process
most likely just realized moved the skin from the ones that are
open and keep it clean.

      “Lujan: Okay thanks my love.

     “Lujan: Should I put peroxide on it or just the spray we
bought.

       “Souter: Put peroxide and if he curled with you or was you
sweet on him so you need to leave him in the cage.” Lujan agreed
and told Souter that Sprocket had fallen off the bed in the middle
of the night.

       The next day (April 26), Souter asked how Sprocket was
doing. Lujan replied, “ ‘Well he won’t do simple things like trying
to jump out of the tub or seats in the car. And he won’t lift his leg
to pee at all. He tried today but it was his left leg and he fell
over. . . . [¶] . . . And he has stopped going into his crate. He
couldn’t lift his leg up so we went and laid in Athena’s crate.’ ”
                                   4
Souter said, “ ‘It might be how the burns also it is going to be a
little tight for him he won’t be able to move fully [until] it is
healed and he is able to stretch the tissue out cause all he has
been doing is laying down. And not working any muscles or
eating so he is getting weak.’ ” Lujan responded, “ ‘I gave him the
other can of wet food that I had and he ate about half of it. But
he is pretty much refusing hard foods.’ ” Lujan said, “ ‘I may have
to take him in’ ” but also attributed Sprocket’s lack of appetite to
a bad tooth. However, Souter said, “ ‘It might be hard for him to
eat you can feel how much weight he [lost he] is [probably]
[wea]k.’ ”

       Later in the conversation, Souter instructs Lujan to “ ‘feed
him regular amounts of food and start to mix hard food with the
wet food and he will gain his weight back.’ ” He also noted that
“ ‘[Sprocket] doesn’t move around so he is losing muscle mass
[because] his body is focused on healing . . . right now.’ ” Lujan
admits, “ ‘Okay, I’m just super worried about him. I just don’t
want him to be ill from something else thinking it’s just him
healing from the burn.’ ” Souter responds, “ ‘Well you do what
you want but I am just saying after feeling him he is just skinny
and weak.’ ”

       On April 27, Lujan noted that “ ‘all Sprocket does is lay
around,’ ” that she had seen him with his tail out from between
his legs “ ‘for the first time in forever,’ ” and that his “ ‘blisters are
like self [popping] and then [scabbing] over but before they scab
he is all sticky.’ ” Lujan also sent Souter another photo of
Sprocket’s abdomen, which was now black. Lujan said, “ ‘It looks
much better dried out,’ ” and Souter replied that “ ‘he looks like
he [is] healing nicely.’ ”

      On April 29, Lujan texted Souter to tell him that Sprocket
was “ ‘healing really well’ ” but also sent him a photo that showed
the dog sleeping in an awkward position that avoided contact
between his burns and the dog bed.

                                    5
       On April 30, Lujan texted Souter to tell him that Sprocket
had an accident indoors and “ ‘had blood in his poop.’ ” Souter
suggested that she watch him at home and wait to see if there
was more blood the next day. When Lujan said she was
“ ‘freaking out’ ” and going to call her vet in the morning, Souter
added, “Well you can call an emergency vet if you want answers
now but all vet[s] do is tell you to bring them in.”

      Later that same night, Lujan told Souter that she was
purchasing medical scissors and peroxide and that she planned to
cut Sprocket’s “ ‘dead’ ” skin off. She also commented that “ ‘the
puss from the blisters stinks so bad’ ” and sent photographs that
showed open wounds on Sprocket’s hind legs. After they
discussed cutting off Sprocket’s skin, she sent a photo of
Sprocket’s hind legs with the skin removed—which showed raw
exposed wounds. She acknowledged removing the skin was
painful for Sprocket and said, “That is so hard to do on my own!!!”

       On May 1, Lujan told Souter that Sprocket could not stand
up, his feces were “ ‘black and runny,’ ” that Sprocket had not
eaten on his own in two days, and that he was like a “ ‘limp
noodle.’ ” When she texted Souter to tell him that she was taking
Sprocket to the emergency vet, Souter asked if she was mad at
him. Lujan replied, “ ‘No I’m not mad at you I’m more mad at
myself. If I had just brought him in maybe it would not be so
bad.’ ”

                                 D.

      The treating veterinarian (Dr. Eric Barchas) testified that
Sprocket was in “very, very poor condition” and “extremely
emaciated”—having lost roughly one-third of his body weight—
when he arrived at the clinic. At this point, there was no chance
that Sprocket would survive.

      Dr. Barchas described Sprocket as having suffered third
degree burns to large (and symmetrical) portions of the underside

                                 6
of his body, including his footpads, legs, genitals, belly, and his
chest. Sprocket could not maintain a normal body temperature,
was dehydrated, and was in both hypovolemic shock and septic
shock. He was not fully conscious and did not have the strength
to stand or to roll over. Much of Sprocket’s skin was black, which
indicated it was dead and would not heal. Sprocket emitted a
“very strong odor of infection.” He was also shedding his
intestinal lining, which contributed to the foul smell.

      Dr. Barchas first administered pain medication because
Sprocket was in obvious “agonizing pain”, as evidenced by his
continuous whimpering and flinching when the burned areas
were touched. Dr. Barchas discussed Sprocket’s grave prognosis
and suffering with Lujan. He also recommended euthanasia,
which she declined.

      Dr. Barchas attempted to treat Sprocket with intravenous
pain medication and antibiotics. But Sprocket died—when his
heart stopped—about five hours after arriving at the clinic. Dr.
Barchas, who is a mandatory reporter, reported his suspicion
that Sprocket did not receive appropriate care to the Peninsula
Humane Society.

      Three weeks after Sprocket’s death, an investigator with
the Peninsula Humane Society (Christina Hanley) interviewed
Lujan. Lujan insisted that both she and Souter were there when
Sprocket was accidentally burned and that they followed a
veterinarian’s suggestion that Sprocket could be treated at
home—by keeping his burns clean and dry with gauze and burn
cream.

       Specifically, Lujan told Hanley that Souter had called two
or three veterinarians in the San Bruno area for advice and that
some of the receptionists he spoke to had advised him to bring
Sprocket in “immediately” while others said Sprocket could be
treated at home. Lujan admitted that Sprocket started losing “a
lot of weight” almost immediately after he was burned.
                                 7
      Hanley also briefly interviewed Souter (twice), but neither
interview was recorded. Souter’s account was the same as
Lujan’s, except that he stated not a single veterinarian advised
him to bring Sprocket in for examination. Souter could not
provide names for any of the veterinarians or hospitals he called.

       Lujan was reinterviewed and confronted with the fact that
every veterinarian’s office that investigators spoke to said that
they would never tell someone to treat a burned dog at home. In
fact, the receptionists Hanley spoke to explained that they were
forbidden from giving medical advice over the phone. Lujan
continued to maintain that she was present when Sprocket was
burned. She also denied smelling any odor on Sprocket after the
burns.

                                E.

       Veterinarian Dr. Melinda Merck testified, as an expert
witness on veterinary medicine and forensic science, that third
degree burns are always serious injuries (and sometimes fatal)
for dogs. An owner should bring a burned animal to the vet as
soon as possible because burns cause immense pain and require
the administration of pain medication, antibiotics, antianxiety
medication, and sometimes anesthesia. An animal is at greatest
risk for developing severe complications, such as septic shock,
five to seven days after a serious burn.

       Dr. Merck testified that the home treatment Lujan and
Souter provided—removing Sprocket’s dead skin, touching his
burns, bathing him, and applying antiseptic—would have been
very painful and contributed to Sprocket’s shock, infection, and
fluid loss.

                                F.

       Souter’s phone records showed that he made three phone
calls to veterinary hospitals on April 19. The calls lasted
approximately two, three, and five minutes, respectively.
                                 8
      By the time of trial, Lujan and Souter were no longer
dating. Lujan testified that, on April 19, Souter was caring for
Sprocket while she was at school. After learning of the burns,
she spoke to Souter over the phone and decided he would call
veterinarians for advice. She admitted lying to Hanley (on three
separate occasions) about being present at the time Sprocket was
burned. She lied because she thought no one would otherwise
believe that Souter accidentally burned Sprocket.

      Lujan and Souter bought first aid supplies to treat
Sprocket at home. They did so because she understood that only
one veterinarian advised Souter to bring Sprocket into the
hospital; all the others advised treating him at home. She
believed Souter because, having been around farm animals her
whole life in New Mexico, she was accustomed to calling a
veterinarian and then following instructions at home.

       Lujan did not take Sprocket to the vet sooner because she
did not know he was in pain and thought he was healing.
Although she knew that burns could lead to infection, she was
not concerned about Sprocket’s blackened skin, his popping
blisters, or his raw, open wounds and did not believe Sprocket
was in pain. Lujan testified that Sprocket did not begin
whimpering until she brought him to the vet on May 1. She
attributed the fact that Sprocket stopped eating dry food to a bad
tooth. Alternatively, she thought it meant that he was healing.
However, she admitting knowing Sprocket was in pain when he
could not lift his leg to urinate.

      Two character witnesses testified that Lujan was good with
animals. One of the veterinarians, who evaluated Sprocket on
the day he died (but after his wounds had been dressed and
cleaned), testified that he did not remember a particularly strong
odor. He described Lujan as distraught, worried, and panicked.

                                9
                                G.

       A jury convicted both Lujan and Souter on one count each
of criminally negligent animal cruelty (§ 597, subd. (b); count
two). The jury was unable to reach a verdict on count one—for
purposeful and malicious animal cruelty (§ 597, subd. (a))—which
was charged only against Souter.

      At sentencing, the court denied defense motions to reduce
both felony convictions to misdemeanors (§ 17). The court
suspended imposition of sentence and placed both Lujan and
Souter on two years’ felony probation, on the condition that they
serve 90 days and eight months (respectively) in county jail.
Among other fines and fees, the trial court imposed a probation
supervision fee (of up to $100 per month) and a jurisdictional
transfer fee ($600).

                           DISCUSSION

                                A.

      Lujan argues that insufficient evidence supports her
conviction because there is no substantial evidence that she
caused great bodily injury or death to Sprocket. We disagree.

                                1.

       When faced with a substantial evidence challenge, we
“must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson
(1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; accord, Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443
U.S. 307, 318-319.) We do not reweigh the evidence, resolve
conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate witness credibility.
(People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) The same standard of
review applies to cases in which the People rely mainly on

                                10
circumstantial evidence. (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th
500, 507.)

                                 2.

        Lujan insists that she cannot be convicted of violating
section 597, subdivision (b), because she did not cause Sprocket’s
great bodily injury or death. In support of her argument, Lujan
notes that it is undisputed Souter inflicted Sprocket’s third
degree burns and asserts that Sprocket’s death was thereafter
inevitable. In her view, nothing she did (or failed to do) had any
effect.

      Lujan misconceives the relevant inquiry. The question is
not whether she caused Sprocket’s burns or his death. The
animal cruelty statute, like the child endangerment statute (§
273a), does not require any actual harm or injury be caused by
the defendant’s acts or omissions. (See People v. Valdez (2002) 27
Cal.4th 778, 784; Riazati, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.)
Instead, in a needless suffering case (like this one), the relevant
inquiry is whether the defendant’s acts or omissions recklessly
exposed the animal to a high risk of death or great bodily injury.
(§ 597, subd. (b); Riazati, at p. 531; People v. Brunette (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 268, 284.)

                                 3.

      Here, substantial evidence supports the jury’s implicit
finding that Lujan’s grossly negligent acts or omissions created a
high risk of Sprocket’s death or great bodily injury. Sprocket died
from septic shock caused by an untreated infection from his
burns. And a jury could reasonably infer from the prosecution’s
evidence that Lujan’s acts and omissions contributed to his
death.

      First, it is undisputed that Lujan deprived Sprocket of
veterinary care for almost two weeks after he was burned. And
although Dr. Merck testified that severe burns can be life
                                11
threatening, Dr. Merck did not testify that, based on her review
of the medical records, photographs, and text messages,
Sprocket’s case was hopeless from the time of his initial burns,
that he would have necessarily been euthanized if initially
brought in for veterinary care sooner, or that Souter’s act or
omissions alone created a high risk of great bodily injury or
death.3 Rather, Dr. Merck testified about numerous treatment
options—such as surgical debridement, pain and antianxiety
medication, intravenous and topical antibiotics, and intravenous
fluids—that would have been offered to a dog who came in for
medical attention shortly after being burned.

       Dr. Merck also testified that, while euthanasia may be
initially considered in severe burn cases, survival depends on
burn severity, how much of the body is affected, and the animal’s
general health before the burns were suffered. In contrast, Dr.
Barchas testified Sprocket had no chance of survival when he
was brought in (on May 1).

       Second, Dr. Merck also testified that Lujan’s admitted acts
of “home treatment”—including removing Sprocket’s dead skin,
touching his burns, bathing him, and applying antiseptic—would
have all been very painful for Sprocket and contributed to his
risk of shock, dehydration, and infection (all of which can be
fatal). Lujan may not have caused the burns, but the jury could

      3 Nor does the evidence conclusively establish that, had
Lujan brought Sprocket to the vet earlier, she would have (as she
now asserts) simply euthanized Sprocket because treating him
would have been too expensive given his likely prognosis at the
time. In 2016, Lujan was both a full-time student and working
part-time. Her monthly income fluctuated between $800 and
$1,200. However, Lujan testified that she borrowed $2,000 from
her mother—to begin treatment on May 1—despite Sprocket’s
grave prognosis and Dr. Barchas’s recommendation that Sprocket
be euthanized.

                                12
reasonably infer that her acts and omissions made his injuries
worse and increased the risk he would die.

      Substantial evidence supports the jury’s implicit finding
that Lujan’s acts or omissions exposed Sprocket to a high risk of
death or great bodily injury.

                                 B.

      Souter contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by stipulating to an element of the offense—that
Sprocket was in Souter’s care between April 19 and April 24.
(See § 597, subd. (b) [“whoever, having the charge or custody of
any animal, either as owner or otherwise, subjects any animal to
needless suffering, or inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the
animal, or in any manner abuses any animal, . . . is, for each
offense, guilty of a crime”], italics added.) We disagree.

                                 1.

       Under both the United States and California Constitutions,
a criminal defendant has the right to the effective assistance of
counsel. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 684-686
(Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215
(Ledesma).) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show (1) counsel’s performance was so deficient
that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, under
prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance
was prejudicial, rendering the results of the trial unreliable or
fundamentally unfair. (Strickland, supra, at pp. 688, 692;
Ledesma, supra, at pp. 216-217.)

       “[W]e begin with the presumption that counsel’s actions fall
within the broad range of reasonableness, and afford ‘great
deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.’ ” (People v. Mickel
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.) “ ‘ “[[I]f] the record on appeal sheds no
light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and
                                 13
failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation,” the claim on appeal must be rejected.’
[Citations.] A claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is
more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding.”
(People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)

      Generally, prejudice must also be affirmatively
demonstrated. (Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 217.) Prejudice
is shown when there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s ineffective representation, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p.
694.) A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. (In re Hardy (2007) 41
Cal.4th 977, 1018.)

                                 2.

      At trial, Souter’s counsel stipulated that “Souter was
present in San Bruno providing care for Sprocket with [Lujan]
until about April 24th, 2016, at which time he returned to his
home in New Mexico.”

      The stipulation was first discussed, during argument on in
limine motions, when Souter disputed the admissibility of a
series of texts (between him and Lujan)—specifically texts dated
April 12, April 14, and April 21.

       On April 21 (after Sprocket had been burned), Souter
texted Lujan, “ ‘Your fucking dog bit me again when I was trying
to feed him.’ ” She replied, “ ‘Well babe Athena bit me and you
both when we were doing that. Spank him.’ ” Souter texted
back, “ ‘Yeah I did but he keeps drawing blood.’ ” The prosecutor
argued these texts were relevant because they showed, among
other things, that Souter was caring for Sprocket—as required
under section 597, subdivision (b)—after he was burned.

      Souter’s counsel then offered to stipulate that Souter was
caring for Sprocket up until the time he returned to New Mexico.
                                14
Specifically, Souter’s counsel stated: “I don’t think this text is
necessary to establish that. That’s a fact that’s not really in
dispute, as far as, you know, a point in time after Sprocket was
injured. Both Mr. Souter and Miss Lujan both had periods of
time that they were caring for the dog different periods of time,
and I think that’s something we can address via stipulation.
That’s pretty easy to determine.” (Italics added.) Understanding
that the parties would work out a stipulation, the trial court
ruled that the three April 21 messages were inadmissible.

      Despite this pretrial ruling, the court later admitted the
April 21 text messages. Before the text messages in People’s
Exhibit Six were admitted, Souter’s counsel expressed concern
that the April 21 messages were included. However, the court
(mistakenly) expressed its belief that, in ruling on pretrial
motions, it had only excluded text messages from April 14. The
prosecutor agreed with the trial court’s understanding and
Souter’s counsel said, “All right. I’ll accept it.”

      After Hanley concluded her testimony—including reading
the entirety of People’s Exhibit Six to the jury, Souter’s counsel
stipulated that “Souter was present in San Bruno providing care
for Sprocket with [Lujan] until about April 24th, 2016, at which
time he returned to his home in New Mexico.”

                                 3.

       Souter insists that we cannot defer to his trial counsel’s
tactical decision to so stipulate because counsel failed to
successfully exclude the April 21 text messages. We disagree.

       Although he does not challenge admission of the April 21
texts themselves, Souter’s argument is premised on the false
assumption that the only tactical reason for defense counsel to
enter the stipulation was to exclude the April 21 messages. But
his trial counsel also candidly admitted that there was no dispute

                                 15
that Souter was responsible for Sprocket’s care between the time
Sprocket was burned and when Souter returned to New Mexico.

       That conclusion is supported by the text messages in
People’s Exhibit Six and by Lujan’s testimony. Lujan testified
that Souter was responsible for caring for Sprocket when she was
in school, which included April 19, April 20, and April 21. And,
in his messages, Souter admits that he was caring for and
disciplining Sprocket, in the relevant time period, while Lujan
was absent. Even after Souter returned to New Mexico, the
messages indicate he was directing the home treatment of
Sprocket’s burns. Thus, the record supports the People’s
argument that trial counsel decided to stipulate to the care
element because it would allow defense counsel to maintain
credibility with the jury—by not pressing weak arguments. (See
People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 308 [the decision to
stipulate is a tactical one which “can serve the salutary goals of
expediting and simplifying proceedings, thus reducing the chance
for confusion”].)

       It is not our role to second guess the wisdom of such a
tactic. (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 520.) Here, the
tactic may well have been successful—as the jury failed to reach
a verdict on count one (purposeful and malicious animal cruelty).
And our high court has repeatedly rejected similar ineffective
assistance claims based on a defense counsel’s decision to concede
elements of a crime or even guilt altogether. (People v. Freeman
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th
1027, 1060-1061 [“good trial tactics often demand complete
candor with the jury, and . . . in light of the weight of the
evidence incriminating a defendant, an attorney may be more
realistic and effective by avoiding sweeping declarations of his or
her client’s innocence”].) Souter cannot meet his burden to show
affirmative evidence that no rational tactical purpose supported
defense counsel’s stipulation decision.

                                16
      In any event, Souter cannot demonstrate prejudice because
the text messages (and Lujan’s testimony) showed
overwhelmingly that Souter was responsible for Sprocket’s care
between April 19 and April 24.

                                4.

       In his opening brief, Souter also suggests (obliquely and
without citation to authority) that defense counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the word “charge”
in section 597, subdivision (b), means something more than
“care.” In Souter’s view, a caregiver must also take financial
responsibility for an animal or have ultimate decision-making
authority to have the animal in their charge. We need not
address this forfeited argument. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules
8.204(a)(1)(B) & 8.360(a); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764,
793 [reviewing courts may disregard points missing cogent legal
argument]; Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35
Cal.4th 747, 761, fn. 4, [arguments raised for the first time in
reply brief are forfeited].)

      In any event, Souter’s belatedly raised argument is without
merit. The plain meaning of “having the charge” in this context
is having supervision or caregiving responsibility. (Merriam-
Webster’s Online Dict. at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/charge [noun definitions 3a and 3b, as of
April 6, 2023].) And, by using the phrase “whoever, having the
charge or custody of any animal, either as owner or otherwise,”
the Legislature made clear that, contrary to Souter’s assertion, it
did not wish to limit criminal liability to those with financial
responsibility for an animal. (§ 597, subd. (b), italics added; cf.
People v. Cochran (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 826, 832 [having “ ‘care
or custody’ [of a child (as required by section 273a) does] not
imply a familial relationship but only a willingness to assume
duties correspondent to the role of a caregiver”].)

                                17
                                 C.

       Souter also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise a hearsay objection to portions of Hanley’s
testimony. We conclude that defense counsel had a reasonable
tactical reason not to object and that Souter cannot show
prejudice.

                                 1.

       During the prosecutor’s direct examination and Lujan’s
cross examination, Hanley repeatedly testified (without objection
from Souter’s counsel) that (with one exception) all the veterinary
clinics contacted by Hanley and another investigator said that
they did not recall a call about a burned dog and that they would
not advise the owner of a burned dog (over the phone) to treat the
dog at home without seeing a veterinarian. With respect to the
exception, Hanley testified that Heather P. “recalled a man, who
she described in his early to mid 20s, calling in describing an
accidental burn, and she told him that the dog needed to be
brought in immediately.”

      The recordings of Hanley’s second and third interviews of
Lujan include similar statements (made by Hanley)—that all the
contacted veterinary offices said that they would advise a pet
owner to immediately bring in a burned dog and would not give
medical advice over the phone.

                                 2.

      We assume (without deciding) that a hearsay objection
would have properly been sustained. Nonetheless, we agree with
the People that Souter cannot meet his burden to show there
could be no rational tactical purpose for counsel’s failure to
object.

                                 18
       “Competent counsel may forgo even a valid objection for
tactical reasons.” (People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463,
506; accord, People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 985.)

       Here, the record suggests that Souter’s counsel may have
reasonably elected to withhold objections to Hanley’s recitation of
others’ out of court statements because it was less damaging than
live witness testimony to the same effect. (See People v.
Campbell, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 506.) Remember that the
substance of this evidence (regardless of its source) contradicts
Souter’s prior statement to Hanley—that none of the veterinary
clinics he contacted told him Sprocket needed to be seen by a vet.
Thus, Souter’s defense counsel may have rationally concluded
that the hearsay evidence was less damaging to Souter’s
credibility.

       Souter offers no response to the People’s argument on this
point. Having failed to rebut the presumption that his trial
counsel elected not to object for a rational tactical reason, Souter
fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

      In any event, Souter also fails to carry his burden to
demonstrate prejudice. Hanley’s testimony regarding the results
of her calls to other veterinary clinics was largely cumulative.
Both Heather P. and another veterinary clinic’s customer service
representative testified that they are trained to refrain from
giving medical advice over the phone. Heather P. testified that
she specifically remembered the April 2016 phone call and that
she told the male caller burns were easily infected and required
immediate veterinary care. And one of Souter’s own text
messages stated that “ ‘all vet[s] do is tell you to bring them in.’ ”

       On this record, it is not reasonably probable Souter would
have achieved a more favorable result but for trial counsel’s
failure to object.

                                  19
                                D.

      Next, both Souter and Lujan insist that the trial court
erred by admitting an inadmissible legal conclusion from Dr.
Barchas. We conclude any error was harmless.

                                1.

       Prior to trial, Souter and Lujan moved to exclude testimony
expressing opinions on their guilt, on whether a crime had been
committed, or on the definitions of the charged crimes. Although
the trial court agreed that opinions on guilt or innocence were
inadmissible, the trial court denied the motion (without
prejudice) as insufficiently specific. It admonished defendants’
counsel to object if or when an objectionable question was posed.

       During cross-examination of Sprocket’s treating
veterinarian, Lujan’s counsel asked Dr. Barchas if Lujan’s
demeanor caused him to delay his report of suspected animal
cruelty. Dr. Barchas answered, “The reason I reported the
incident is because she told me that it had been a week since the
injuries were sustained and that was compatible with what I was
seeing on my patient, and I considered that to be gross negligence
and animal abuse to let an animal suffer in extreme agony for a
week without seeking veterinary care.” (Italics added.) At this
point, Souter’s counsel objected (without identifying grounds for
his objection) and moved to strike Dr. Barchas’s testimony. The
trial court overruled the objection.

                                2.

      We assume (without deciding) that the motion in limine
and Souter’s unidentified objection were sufficient to preserve
both defendants’ current challenge to Dr. Barchas’s testimony.

      We also assume (for the sake of argument) that Souter and
Lujan are correct that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing Dr. Barchas to invade the jury’s province—by opining on

                                20
the ultimate question of whether Lujan’s (and implicitly Souter’s)
failure to obtain earlier veterinary care was grossly negligent.
Nonetheless, we conclude any error was harmless.

      The evidence overwhelmingly supports a finding that both
Souter and Lujan were grossly negligent in failing to obtain
veterinary care for Sprocket and instead subjecting him to home
treatment. With respect to Souter, the photograph he took of
Sprocket’s burned skin, on April 19, demonstrates that Sprocket
was seriously injured. Souter also admitted (in the text messages
he sent that day) knowing as much. And Souter admitted in his
text messages that he knew, before leaving on April 24, Sprocket
was in pain, had lost a lot of weight, and was lethargic. Lujan
also admitted knowing as much then and through May 1.

       In yet another text message, Souter admitted that “ ‘all
vet[s] do is tell you to bring them in.’ ” This, of course, jibes with
veterinary technician Heather P.’s testimony that she advised a
caller—presumably Souter—that a vet should examine the dog,
that burns are easily infected, and that the dog should not be
treated at home. Considering Souter’s texts, Heather P.’s
testimony, and Lujan’s statements about the advice he received
on April 19, the evidence was overwhelming that Souter knew
Sprocket needed to be examined by a veterinarian but later lied
about it. Lujan’s text messages and statements to Hanley show
that Lujan also knew that Sprocket needed veterinary care before
he received it and that her inaction made things worse.

      The crux of the defense theory was that Souter and Lujan
mistakenly but reasonably believed Sprocket was healing and
that Sprocket was not in pain. Even if we acknowledge that
there is some evidence to support defendants’ claim that they
subjectively believed (between April 19 and April 31) that
Sprocket was healing on his own, without veterinary care, that
does not make this a close case. The jury was correctly instructed
that the required mental state for a violation of section 597,

                                 21
subdivision (b), is gross negligence, which is judged by an
objective standard of reasonableness. (People v. Speegle (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 1405, 1411.) The defendant’s conduct “must be such
a gross departure from the reasonably prudent that it amounts to
reckless indifference with actual or imputed knowledge of the
consequences.” (Id. at pp. 1414-1415, fn. 7.)

       The defense theory is not credible considering the text
messages and photographs showing defendants’ awareness of
Sprocket’s serious injuries (as well as his lethargic and weak
condition) both before and after April 24, along with the evidence
showing their knowledge that veterinary care was needed for
such serious injuries. Consideration of the record as a whole
leads inescapably to the conclusion that it was grossly negligent
to fail to take Sprocket to the vet—despite his obviously serious
injuries and deteriorating condition—and to instead bathe him,
pop his blisters, and cut off his skin to reveal “ ‘raw open
wound[s].’ ”

       On this record, defendants cannot demonstrate prejudice by
pointing to the length of jury deliberations (three days) and
request for a readback of testimony. (See People v. Johnson
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 752-753; People v. Houston (2005) 130
Cal.App.4th 279, 301 [four days of jury deliberations and
requests for read back of witness testimony demonstrated only
jury’s diligence].) On the question of defendants’ gross
negligence, this was not a close case. It is not reasonably
probable that, had Dr. Barchas’s isolated comment been
excluded, a juror would have found reasonable doubt existed as to
defendants’ gross negligence.

                                E.

      Next, Souter and Lujan argue, and the People concede, that
we must strike their probation supervision fees (up to $100 per
month) pursuant to the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 1869
((2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2020, ch. 92). We agree.
                                22
       After Lujan’s and Souter’s sentencing hearing, Assembly
Bill No. 1869 repealed the statute, as of July 1, 2021, that
authorized collection of the probation supervision fee and a fee for
“processing a jurisdictional transfer pursuant to Section 1203.9”
(former § 1203.1b, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2014, ch. 468, §
1). (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 47; People v. Clark (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 248, 252.) The Legislature also enacted section
1465.9, which provides that the balance of any costs imposed by a
court “pursuant to Section . . . 1203.1b . . . as [that] section[] read
on June 30, 2021, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and
any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.”
(§ 1465.9, subd. (a), italics added.) Accordingly, we are required
to strike the monthly probation supervision fee. (Ibid.; People v.
Lopez-Vinck (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 945, 953-954, & fn. 8; Clark,
supra, at pp. 259-260.)

       We agree with Souter that we must also strike a
jurisdictional transfer fee ($600), which was imposed pursuant to
former sections 1203.1b and 1203.9 and subsequently eliminated
by the passage of both Assembly Bill No. 1869 and Assembly Bill
No. 177. (§ 1465.9, subd. (b), as amended by Stats 2021, ch. 257,
§ 35 [“On and after January 1, 2022 the balance of any court-
imposed costs pursuant to Section . . . 1203.9 . . . , as [it] read on
December 31, 2021, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and
any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated”],
italics added.)

      Because the plain language of section 1465.9 compels it, we
also direct the trial court to strike the probation transfer fee
imposed under former sections 1203.1b and 1203.9. (§ 1465.9,
subds. (a)-(b); cf. People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609,
625-627; People v. Clark, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 259-260.)

                                  23
                                F.

       Lujan also argues that the written probation order must be
modified to reflect only the probations conditions orally
pronounced by the trial court. However, the parties now agree
this issue is moot because Lujan’s probation has terminated. We
do not address the matter further because it is moot. (People v.
Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, fn. 5.)

                          DISPOSITION

      The orders of probation are modified to strike the probation
supervision fee and the probation transfer fee. As so modified,
the judgments are affirmed.

                                24
                                         ______________________
                                         BURNS, J.

We concur:

____________________________
JACKSON, P.J.

____________________________
LANGHORNE, J.*

A161941/A162047

     * Judge of the Napa County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

                               25