Court Opinion

ID: 9778189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:54:46.877529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:04.428149
License: Public Domain

GRIFFIN, Justice
(dissenting).
I agree with the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals on the point that the evidence of previous convictions of a felony was admissible against the defendant Compton for impeachment and was to be considered by the trier of facts as affecting Compton’s credibility.
The case of Boon v. Weathered’s Administrator, 23 Tex. 675 (1895) did not involve the admissibility of a conviction of a felony, but dealt with questions of a witness' general reputation and a charge of the trial court instructing the jury not to believe such witness’ testimony.
It must be kept in mind that the question before us is whether a conviction of a felony of the witness (who in our case is the defendant who had testified in this cause) may be proved as bearing upon the credibility of such witness.
An analysis of the cases on this point is found in Kennedy v. International-Great Northern Ry. Co. (Tex.Com. of App., 1928), 1 S.W.2d 581. In that case the distinction between a charge of a felony and a conviction of a felony is pointed out. The conviction there involved was of a felony theft, which clearly involves moral turpitude.
*644In the quotation from Dean Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, § 926, shown in the majority opinion, a very significant omission of the test is made. The omitted part reads:
“* * * in the first place, conviction of a crime is everywhere allowed to be used as affecting credibility of character, and while distinctions are sometimes made as to the grade of the crime, little effort is made to employ those crimes which directly involve lack of honesty.”
Again Dean Wigmore, § 980, says;
“It has therefore been universally acknowledged that proof of a crime by record of a judgment of conviction may be made, not because an exception is carved out of the rule, but because the reason of the rule does not apply.”
In that same paragraph on page 538, Dean Wigmore says;
“What crimes are relevant to indicate bad character as to credibility? There are here three answers possible on principle;
“(a) Whatever offences were formerly treated as disqualifying one entirely as a witness shall now be treated as available for impeachment. This is the commonest solution, and has come about usually by express proviso in the statutory abolition of the former disqualification ;
“(b) If in a given jurisdiction general bad character is allowable for impeachment, then any offence will serve to indicate such bad character; [this rule does not apply in Texas.]
“(c) If character for veracity alone is allowable for impeachment, then only such specific offences may be used as indicate a lack of veracity-character.” [All emphasis in quotation that of Wigmore.]
The reasoning of the majority is not consistent with either of Dean Wigmore’s three subdivisions.
Most writers on the subject agree that being convicted of an “infamous crime” was the basis of the common law bar to such witnesses being permitted to testify. According to (a) above by Dean Wigmore, a common law disqualification is the basis for. allowing impeachment of a witness convicted of a crime.
We have cases in Texas stating what is an infamous crime. All agree that a crime which may be punished by confinement in the penitentiary is an infamous crime. In Texas a “felony” is defined by statute (Art. 47, Penal Code, State of Texas) as one for which confinement in the penitentiary may be assessed as punishment. The majority recognizes that a conviction of a felony, prior to 1925, disqualified a witness from testifying in Texas.
At common law whether or not the crime was an infamous one was determined by the nature of the crime and not by the punishment assessed. But this rule has since been expressly disapproved, the modern test being whether the offense is one for which the statute authorizes the court to award an infamous punishment, and not the nature of the criminal act, or whether the punishment awarded is an infamous one.
“With respect to what punishments are considered infamous the courts are agreed that an offense which is punishable by imprisonment in a prison or penitentiary is infamous.” Note in 24 A.L.R. 1004, following the case of United States of America v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 42 S.Ct. 368, 66 L.Ed. 700 (1922).
Another reason why we should not follow the majority opinion is that such ruling is directly contrary to the well-recognized holding of our Court of Criminal Appeals as shown in numerous cases. Among some of the more recent see: Mauldin v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 405, 308 S.W.2d 36; Ward-*645rope v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 305, 340 S.W.2d 498; Parker v. State, 83 Tex.Cr.R. 77, 201 S.W. 173.
It has heretofore been the policy of this Court to agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decisions whenever reasonably possible to do so. There is no need to add confusion to the law of evidence by our having a rule of evidence contrary to the one long established in the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Another good reason why the rule in this case should not be as declared in the majority opinion is that the determination of what constitutes a conviction of a felony is much more simple than the determination of what offenses involve moral turpitude. Various judges will have various ideas on this question and there being no existing body of judicial decisions defining with exactitude what offenses involve “moral turpitude,” we will again have uncertainty.
Dean McCormick in his “Evidence” Hornbook Series, West Publishing Company, pp. 90-91, points out the uncertainty that results from the requirement that conviction for a crime must involve “moral turpitude” to be admissible as impeachment of a witness. He then says: “Moreover, it seems that shifting the burden to the judge’s discretion is inexpedient since only in a minority of cases will the judge have adequate information upon which to exercise such discretion. A clear, certain rule like the English one is preferable, despite its somewhat arbitrary character(Emphasis added.) The English rule makes conviction of “any felony” admissible for impeachment.
Another reason for not agreeing with the majority opinion is that it represents the prevailing view of only a very few jurisdictions. By far the majority of the states permit proof of conviction of a felony to impeach a witness.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
HAMILTON, J., joins in this dissent.