Court Opinion

ID: 9443424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:19:38.131593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:28.792770
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
The court sua sponte by order of July 1, 1952, granted a rehearing in this case. Since then the Government has filed a memorandum consenting that the case be remanded to the District Court for a new trial and counsel for the appellant agrees to that course.
The trial judge submitted to the jury the question whether the appellant was guilty of first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, or not guilty by reason of self-defense. For present purposes we need say only that it was entirely proper on the conflicting evidence for the trial judge to submit to the jury the issue of first or second degree murder. As he said, the facts were for the jury to decide, not for the court. As he also said, the jury were obligated “to take the law as the court gives it. * * * ”
As pointed out by Judge Fahy in his dissent of May 8, 1952, the trial judge in giving the law to the jury did not state accurately the difference between first and second degree murder or remove the confusion which the jury evidenced in that regard. It is therefore impossible to say that the verdict is a true reflection in law of the jury’s view of the facts. In their view of the facts the verdict might have been second degree murder had that crime been accurately defined and the difference between it and first degree clarified. The matter being a vital one the judgment necessarily must be reversed.
The defect in the instructions which is the turning point of our decision was not called to the attention of the trial court at any stage of the proceedings. But it is dhe well settled duty of an appellate court to correct such prejudicial error, particularly in a capital case, even though not pointed out in the trial court. Patten v. United States, 1914, 42 App.D.C. 239; Burge v. United States, 1906, 26 App.D.C. 524. See, also, Collazo v. United States, 1952, 90 U.S.App.D.C. —, 196 F.2d 573, and Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P., 18 U.S.C.A.
*945On the other questions the court adheres to the opinion of May 8, 1952, written by Judge Clark.
Judgment heretofore entered herein vacated, judgment of the District Court reversed, and case remanded to the District Court for new trial or other proceedings consistent with the opinion of this court.