Court Opinion

ID: 9677588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:55:52.488844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:56.953628
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion By
Chief Justice LAMBERT, Justice KELLER, and Justice STUMBO.
I. INTRODUCTION
We respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the Court of Appeals decision denying the Roman Cath-ohc Diocese of Lexington’s (“Diocese’s”) petition for extraordinary relief. In our opinion, the terminal flaw in the majority opinion’s analysis is its rebanee upon an unsubstantiated assumption that the trial court’s failure to seal the stricken portions of the First Amended Complaint “could endanger ... the Diocese’s right to a fair trial.”1 Although the trial court conducted a hearing at which the Diocese could have introduced evidence to support its claim of prejudice,2 the Diocese did nothing more than assert that the trial court’s failure to seal the stricken portions of this record would prevent it from receiving a fair trial. In fact, the trial court explicitly declined to make the finding3 upon which today’s majority primarily relies, and in so doing, referenced case law holding that courts do not presume impairment of a litigant’s entitlement to a fair trial whenever publicity surrounds litigation, because even “pervasive, adverse publicity does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.”4 In fact, in case after case, courts have discovered that, despite widespread negative publicity, they can fill a jury box with fair and impartial jurors who have not formed an opinion as to the merits of the case.5 *736Thus, regardless of whether the trial court properly recognized its inherent authority to seal its own records, the only argument 6 that the Diocese raised in the trial court in support of its motion to seal was considered by the trial court, and rejected, because the Diocese offered no evidence upon which the trial court could conclude that mere publication of the stricken allegations could “preclude a fair trial.”7 Accordingly, we find no basis for the majority’s conclusions that: (1) this alleged risk to the Diocese’s right to a fair trial satisfies the procedural requirements for the extraordinary relief requested; and (2) that we should “remand”8 this matter to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion by balancing the common law right of access against other unspecified considerations.
II. ANALYSIS
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
Although we agree with the majority that the Diocese “must satisfy the usual and strict requirements for justifying relief by prohibition or mandamus,”9 we disagree with the result reached by the majority because a proper application of those requirements leads (in our minds, inexorably) to the conclusion that we need not, and in fact cannot, reach the merits of the Diocese’s petition. With regard to the requirement that the Diocese demonstrate *737that it has no adequate remedy by appeal, the majority: (1) erroneously states that the trial court “determined” that the stricken allegations were “impertinent and scandalous”; and (2) concludes, without any citation to authority, that post hoc appellate procedures afford the Diocese no adequate remedy because publication of the stricken allegations could affect the Diocese’s right to a fair trial. In fact, while the trial court’s written order notes that the stricken allegations would be “impertinent and scandalous if untrue ” (emphasis added), the trial court recognized that it had no basis to determine the veracity of those allegations10 and thus the trial court’s order identifies only the allegations’ alleged immateriality as a basis for its ruling. In addition, the majority’s conclusion — which, contrary to all authority on the question, appears to treat the pretrial publicity claim as a fait accompli— ignores both: (1) the fact that there is no evidence in this record to support the notion that publication of the stricken allegations would prejudice the Diocese’s right to a fair trial in a manner that could not be remedied through extensive voir dire,11 a change of venue, or other means;12 and (2) the intersection of its Part VII conelusion that subsequent actions by the Courier-Journal have “diminished the force of the argument in favor of sealing the material”13 and its Part II conclusion that a “real possibility” exists that access would impair the Diocese’s right to a fair trial. More significantly, however, we find no authority that supports the majority’s suggestion that appellate procedures are inadequate to address due process concerns involving pretrial publicity. To the contrary, we believe the majority has overlooked Bentley v. Moore,14 in which our predecessor held that a criminal defendant seeking extraordinary relief to prohibit a trial court from trying him in a jurisdiction where the defendant maintained he could not receive a fair trial had an adequate remedy through appeal and thus was not entitled to a writ.15 As such, we see no basis for the majority’s conclusion that traditional appellate procedures are inadequate, and that reason, standing alone, supports the denial of extraordinary relief.
However, the inappropriateness of extraordinary relief is further demonstrated by the lengths to which the majority goes to justify extraordinary relief despite the Diocese’s complete failure to demonstrate that a great and irreparable injury will *738result if relief is not granted. In fact, the majority admits that the Diocese cannot demonstrate irreparable injury, and instead argues that, because this case involves “important issues concerning the inherent authority of the trial courts of the Commonwealth,”16 the Court is free to consider the merits of the petition under Bender v. Eaton’s17 exception to the normal requirements for writs. That exception, however, requires the Court to conclude both “a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration.” 18 Although the majority quotes this exact language — and observes that Bender itself emphasized the conjunction between the two conditions — the majority only addresses the second condition, and gives no indication of what “substantial miscarriage of justice” it believes will result in this case if relief is not granted. It thus appears that, in order to justify reaching the merits of this action, the majority has applied a new, and less-stringent, exception to the “irreparable injury” requirement than the one set forth in Bender v. Eaton⅛ and in so doing, has, in effect, deleted the “irreparable injury” requirement entirely.
The “no adequate remedy by appeal” and “great and irreparable injury” procedural requirements serve an important function — they reserve extraordinary relief for extraordinary cases.19 As the Diocese has failed to meet either requirement for the relief it seeks, the Court of Appeals properly denied the Diocese’s petition. Accordingly, we would affirm the Court of Appeals on this basis without reaching the merits of the action. Because the majority reaches a different conclusion as to the Diocese’s entitlement to a writ of mandamus, however, we will briefly outline our views regarding the relief granted by the majority.
B. TRIAL COURT DISCRETION
We disagree with the majority’s decision to remand this matter to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion and determine whether or not to seal the stricken allegations. The majority devotes a good deal of attention, in our opinion needlessly, to the nature of the right of access to court records and the process by which trial courts should weigh competing claims in the exercise of their discretionary control over records. While this analysis would be relevant if the matter before the Court involved a properly-presented allegation that the trial court should seal the record because of privacy interests,20 the Diocese’s argument to the trial court rested exclusively upon concerns over its ability to receive a fair trial. And, regardless of the source of the right of access to court records, no one disputes the fact that this right is not absolute.21 In fact, when the news media’s right of access irreconcilably conflicts with and jeopardizes a litigant’s right to a fair trial, we would go further than the majority and hold that no balancing is necessary because the right to a fair *739trial trumps the right to access.22 The only relevant question in our minds is whether a right of access to particular material actually conflicts with the right to a fair trial, and in making this determination, rights of access enjoy a presumption in their favor.23 While we would take issue with the majority opinion’s suggestion that trial courts should engage in a patently-outcome-determinative balancing analysis that allows the trial court to determine the “worth” of the right of access to particular material before placing it on the scale next to competing concerns, we need not do so here. Under the facts of this case, the size or importance of the presumption in favor of access is irrelevant because the Diocese introduced no evidence to support its prejudice claim, and conjecture alone cannot overcome any presumption in favor of access,24 regardless of how the majority wishes the trial court to conceptualize it.
In order to overcome the presumption in favor of access to court records, the party opposing access must demonstrate by substantial evidence, and the trial court must determine, “that there is a substantial probability that the right ... to a fair trial ... will be otherwise irreparably damaged.”25 Such a determination requires specific, on-the-record findings,26 that, much like the decision to issue a “gag order,” should follow careful consideration of alternative means of protecting a litigant’s right to a fair trial:
The court should consider, among other factors, the nature and extent of the publicity, including whether the information would be available at trial, [and] whether the evidence is already generally known to the public ....
If the trial court determines that there is a reasonable likelihood of material prejudice, it should consider prophylactic measures .... Less restrictive measures include: (1) extensive voir dire; (2) continuance of the trial; (3) sequestration of the jury; (4) change of venue; and (5) explicit jury instructions and admonitions. Each of these alternatives must be considered prior to rejecting them as inadequate.27
Here, the Diocese had the burden of proving that its right to a fair trial would *740be irreparably damaged if the trial court permitted access to the stricken allegations. Quite simply, the Diocese failed to meet its burden. In fact, the Diocese did nothing more than “cry wolf’ and certainly made no effort to compare the relative efficacy of alternative measures of preserving its right to a fair trial. As a result, the trial court appropriately declined to find that access to these documents would impair the Diocese’s right to a fair trial. Accordingly, as was the case in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., there is no need to remand this case to the trial court.28 The Diocese articulated only one basis for sealing the record — an alleged risk of impairment to its right to a fair trial — and that reason is unsupported by the record. Thus, regardless of whether the trial court recognized its discretion, the trial court had no basis to seal the record. While the majority faults the Court of Appeals for basing its denial of relief on the fact that Judge Noble would have had to abuse her discretion to seal this record, we find this reasoning not only incontrovertible, but also a strong basis for denying extraordinary relief in this case. Unlike the majority, we see no reason to afford the Diocese another bite at an apple that it failed to even nibble upon at its previous opportunity.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

. Majority Opinion at 92 S.W.3d 724, 729.

. A review of cases in which criminal defendants have challenged venue because of concerns about negative pretrial publicity reveals that evidence in support of such a claim could come in the form of polling results and expert testimony, see Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 412, 415 (1994), McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 694, 702 (1987), or from supporting affidavits and/or lay witnesses, see Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 473 S.W.2d 829, 831 (1971); Harness v. Commonwealth, Ky., 475 S.W.2d 485, 488 (1972).

. Near the conclusion of the trial court’s hearing on the Diocese's motion to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint and seal the record, the trial court stated: "I would probably [find that a failure to seal the record would interfere with her ability to conduct a fair and impartial trial], if that law hadn't been worn threadbare, and it doesn’t hold water. There are too many cases out there that say that the mere possibility that releasing something to the press might make it difficult to get a jury ... is not sufficient.” (emphasis added).

. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2800, 49 L.Ed.2d 683, 695 (1976).

. See Foster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 670, 675 (1992) (a much-publicized quintuple-murder case — from the same county as this underlying action — in which the trial court was able to seat an impartial jury despite the fact that "[a]ll potential jurors had heard or read about the case.”).

. In its original action in the Court of Appeals, the Diocese raised, for the first time, the issue of whether access to the stricken allegations could impact the privacy interests of innocent third parties, and the Diocese repeats those arguments in its appeal to this Court. Of course, we do not permit advocates "to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court.” Kennedy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1977). And, thus, the Diocese’s “appellate innovation” does not justify the issuance of a writ returning this matter to the trial court for the consideration of issues not originally presented to that court. In addition, the asserted privacy interest claims provide a poor rationale for restricting the right of access in this case for at least three clear reasons: (1) those claims not only lack uniqueness for the reasons conceded in the Majority Opinion’s discussion of the mootness issue; (2) these private interests will also likely be inevitably disclosed during the presentation of evidence at trial if the trial court concludes that those allegations are probative of a "pattern or practice” of misconduct; and (3) the majority of these allegedly "private” interests involve material gleaned from public records.

. Kordenbrock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 384, 387 (1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S.Ct. 2260, 90 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986), habeas granted, in part, on other grounds, Kor-deribrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 499 U.S. 970, 111 S.Ct. 1608, 113 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991). See also Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713, 716 (1991).

. While the majority's conclusion indicates that the relief it grants is to "reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Fayette Circuit Court to reconsider — consistent with this opinion — the Dioceses’ motion to seal the stricken allegations,” Majority Opinion, supra note 1 at 735, we do not believe that a remand of this case to the Fayette Circuit Court is procedurally possible. To "remand” is ”[t]o send (a case or claim) back to the court or tribunal from which it came for some further action.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1296 (7th ed.1999) (emphasis added). As the action presently before the court — 2002-SC-0659-MR—began as an original action in the Court of Appeals, we cannot "remand” that action to the Fayette Circuit Court because it has never been in that court. What this Court can do, and what we presume the majority intends to do, is remand this case to the Court of Appeals with instructions for it to grant a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to reconsider the motion to seal. In the interests of consistency, however, we will use the majority's “remand” language in this dissenting opinion.

. Majority Opinion, supra note 1 at 728.

. The transcript of the tried court's hearing on the Diocese’s motion to strike further supports our interpretation of the trial court's order:
Judge Noble: I’m going to direct Mr. Tread-way to—
Mr. Famularo: To file a second — that names the plaintiffs, that strikes the scandalous and strikes the damages in punitive?
Mr. Treadway: She didn’t say it was scandalous just immaterial.
Judge Noble: No, I didn't say that, I just said it was immaterial. I’m not going to make the judgment one way or another about the quality of it.

. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 15, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2743, 92 L.Ed.2d 1, 14 (1986) (’’[Tjhis risk of prejudice does not automatically justify refusing public access .... Through voir dire, cumbersome as it is in some instances, a court can identify those jurors whose prior knowledge of the case would disable them from rendering an impartial verdict.”).

. See infra note 27 and surrounding text.

. Majority Opinion, supra note 1 at 734.

. Ky., 239 S.W.2d 237 (1951).

. Id. at 238. See also Fish v. Benton, 138 Ky. 644, 128 S.W. 1067 (1910) and Manning v. Baxter, 281 Ky. 659, 136 S.W.2d 1074 (1940) (both holding that a writ will not issue to prohibit a change of venue in a criminal case where there is an adequate remedy by appeal).

. Majority Opinion., supra note 1 at 729.

. Ky., 343 S.W.2d 799 (1961).

. Id. at 801 (emphasis in original).

. Garrard Co. Bd. Of Education v. Jackson, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 686, 689 (2000).

. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co. v. Peers, Ky., 747 S.W.2d 125, 130 (1988).

. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1312, 55 L.Ed.2d 570, 580 (1978).

. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir.1975) ("[Wjhen irreconcilable conflicts do arise, the right to a fair trial ..., must take precedence _”), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 3201, 49 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1976).

. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., supra note 21 at 435 U.S. at 602, 98 S.Ct. at 1314, 55 L.Ed.2d at 582 ("Also on respondent’s side is the presumption — however gauged- — in favor of public access to judicial records.”).

. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, supra note 11 at 478 U.S. at 15, 106 S.Ct. at 2743, 92 L.Ed.2d at 14 ("The ... right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant of that right.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir.1982) ("Where there is a clash between the common law right of access and a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial, a court may deny access, but only on the basis of articulable facts known to the court, not on the basis of unsupported hypothesis or conjecture." (emphasis added)).

. Ashland Pub. Co. v. Asbury, Ky.App., 612 S.W.2d 749, 753 (1980).

. In Re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2nd Cir.1987) ("[D]ocuments may be sealed if ‘specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.... Broad and general findings by the trial court, however, are not sufficient to justify closure.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)).

. James v. Hines, Ky.App., 63 S.W.3d 602, 607 (1998) (citations omitted).

. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., supra note 21 at 435 U.S. at 611 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. at 1319, n. 20, 55 L.Ed.2d at 588 n. 20 ("The task of balancing the various elements we have identified as part of the common-law right of access to judicial records should have been undertaken by the courts below in the first instance. We need not remand for that purpose, however, because the outcome is readily apparent from what has been said above.” citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826-27, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975)).