Court Opinion

ID: 9549228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:15:00.095496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:00.667521
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
dissenting.
While agreeing with the majority’s ruling on the first point, namely, the admissibility of the testimony *705of Betty Windom, I strongly disagree with its ruling on the second assignment of error. Contrary to the majority, I find the challenged evidence was not relevant to or logically probative of any issue in the case. Its admission for the stated purpose would, in my opinion, be reversible error.
Moreover, that the complainant might have told third parties that she is or was a prostitute, or that she had once said that she would commit any type of sexual act for $100, does not tend to prove that she was not humiliated by being forced to submit to sodomy, nor does it tend to rebut her explanation for delaying reporting the alleged crime. The logic that a person who would perform a sexual act voluntarily on the one hand would not be humiliated if compelled to do it is patently false. It has long been settled that even an admitted prostitute can be the victim of a rape.
In my view, admitting this evidence would be purely a red herring. It would have the effect of diverting the jury’s attention to a wholly collateral issue, namely, whether or not the complainant was humiliated by the alleged act. That issue has no bearing whatsoever on any issue in the case, which is of course the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
A similar issue arose in the early Oregon case of Leverich v. Frank, 6 Or 212 (1876). Plaintiff Leverich brought an action for slander, claiming that defendant had called her a thief. To show that plaintiff’s moral character was bad, and to show that she was not worthy of belief as a witness, defendant offered in evidence a letter written by plaintiff to a man, claiming that it tended to show that the plaintiff was unchaste. The court held that character cannot, as claimed by defendant and under the statute, be shown by particular wrongful acts.1
*706Second, under ORS 163.475(2),
" * * * evidence of the sexual character or sexual reputation of the complainant is not admissible for any purpose, and reference to the sexual character or sexual reputation of the complainant shall not be made in the presence of the jury.”
Evidence that this complainant was a prostitute or that she had once said somewhere that she would commit any type of sexual act with a man for $100, is in actuality "evidence of sexual character and reputation,” ORS 163.475(3), rather than sexual conduct, and hence is barred by the above provision. As used in subsection (3), the term "sexual conduct” means specific acts.
In the final analysis, the sole function of the challenged evidence would be to blacken complainant’s character and to show that she is an immoral woman. Leverich v. Frank, supra. It is akin to the state’s showing prior bad acts of a criminal defendant in order to prove him guilty of the crime for which he is now on trial. Such evidence is almost always inadmissible. See State v. Manrique, 271 Or 201, 531 P2d 239 (1975); State v. Hockings, 29 Or App 139, 562 P2d 587, rev den 279 Or 301 (1977), cert den 434 US 1049 (1978). By the same reasoning, the challenged evidence of the sexual character and reputation of this complainant is clearly inadmissible here.
*707Finally, the theory of the defense at the first trial was alibi — that he was not the man who committed the assault. When defendant does not claim consent or lack of forcible compulsion, evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual conduct is beside the point and inadmissible. Unlike in State v. Jalo, 27 Or App 845, 557 P2d 1359 (1976), rev den (1977), neither motive nor bias is an issue in the case at bar. See ORS 163.475(5), which permits evidence of the challenged type to show such things as motive, bias, etc.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Buttler, Gillette and Roberts, JJ, join in this dissenting opinion.

 The court further observed:
" * * * Character and reputation are not synonymous terms. Character is what a man or woman is morally, while reputation is what *706he or she is reputed to be. Yet reputation is the estimate which the community has of a person’s character; and it is the belief that moral character is wanting in an individual that renders him unworthy of belief. That is to say, that reputation is evidence of character, and if the reputation is bad for truth, or reputation is bad in other respects affecting the moral character, then the jury may infer that the character is bad and the witness not reliable. General character has always been proved by proving general reputation. * * * [Cjharacter can be attacked or supported by proof of general reputation, and particular facts cannot be proven to affect the character of the witness, for the reason that a person is supposed to be able at all times to support his general character by evidence in its support, but is not supposed to be at all times and without notice ready to disprove or explain certain particular acts.” Leverich v. Frank, 6 Or at 220.