Court Opinion

ID: 9527845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:34:49.955351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:14.961012
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE WEBER,
dissenting:
The opinion of the majority, while perhaps defensible on technical legal grounds, fails completely to respect the will of the voters of Montana. The plaintiffs have not shown that the voters were materially misled under any of the issues raised here. I conclude that upholding the people’s vote is at least as defensible as the majority’s opinion, on legal grounds. It is decisively preferable as an expression of this Court’s role in the initiative process.
I first set forth some basic principles on amendment of our Montana Constitution by the initiative process. These basic principles are applicable to all issues before the Court. In their 1972 Constitution, the people of Montana reserved all political power to themselves. Mont. Const. Article II, Section 1 states:
“All political power is vested in and derived from the people. All government of right originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole.”
By the 1972 Constitution the people of Montana have retained the *100exclusive right of governing themselves and have also retained the right to alter the Constitution. Mont. Const. Article II, Section 2 states:
“The people have the exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent state. They may alter or abolish the constitution and form of government whenever they deem it necessary.”
By a provision which was not included in the 1889 Constitution, the 1972 Constitution provides that the people may propose constitutional amendments by initiative, stating in Mont. Const. Article XIV, Section 9:
“(1) The people may also propose constitutional amendments by initiative. Petitions including the full text of the proposed amendment shall be signed by at least ten percent of the qualified electors of the state. That number shall include at least ten percent of the qualified electors in each of two-fifths of the legislative districts.
“(2) The petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state. If the petitions are found to have been signed by the required number of electors, the secretary of state shall cause the amendment to be published as provided by law twice each month for two months previous to the next regular state-wide election,
“(3) At that election, the proposed amendment shall be submitted to the qualified electors for approval or rejection. If approved by a majority voting thereon, it shall become a part of the constitution effective the first day of July following its approval, unless the amendment provides otherwise.”
These provisions emphasize the desire of the people to be able to amend the Constitution by initiative without being required to go through any of the three branches of government, and in particular the judicial branch. In considering the present initiative, this Court should carefully honor the basic rights retained by Montana’s citizens. These rights include the right of the people to alter or abolish the 1972 Constitution — a reserved power of unlimited breadth. The present initiative was approved by a clear majority of the electorate. This amendment by initiative vote of the people should be invalidated only if we conclude there is a reasonable probability that a substantial part of the electorate were misled in casting their votes in favor of the Initiative. In considering the issues I also keep in mind that we now have multi-faceted means of communication with the electorate, which include not only publication in newspapers, *101but also both television and radio, all of which were extensively used in the months preceding the vote on the present Initiative.
The majority has invalidated the Initiative ballot on the basis of two errors. The first is an error in printing the text of the Initiative in the 1986 Voter Information Pamphlets. Sections 13-27-401 through 410, MCA, set forth the requirement and procedure for the secretary of state to prepare and distribute to Montana voters information pamphlets on ballot issues at the next election. These include requirements that for each ballot issue the pamphlets must contain the title, fiscal statement, and complete text, as well as the form in which the issue will appear on the ballot, and arguments and rebuttal arguments submitted by proponents and opponents. As the majority has pointed out, there was an error in the printing of the full text of CI-30 in the voter information pamphlets prepared for the 1986 general election. The error was in subsection (2), where the words “this full” were printed this full, instead of thisHFull. The voter information pamphlet does not explain what is meant by the underlining and interlineation. However, underlining is commonly used to designate material which is being added; interlineating to designate material deleted. The error in printing indicates that the amendment adds, rather than deletes, the words “this full” from Mont. Const. Article II, Section 16.
The error was discovered on October 23, 1986. The Secretary of State points out that this was after his office had sent the pamphlets to the counties and the counties had distributed the pamphlets to the voters. The Secretary of State took what he argues was the only possible corrective action at that late date: he issued a news release which explained that an error had occurred in the voter information pamphlets, and described that error. Nevertheless, the majority holds that the error misled the voters on a critical aspect of CI-30.
The text of the Initiative as misprinted in the voter information pamphlets was only a part of the information contained in the same pamphlets. The pamphlets also contained extensive printed arguments by both proponents and opponents of the measure. A voter reading the pamphlet would have understood that the opponents were opposing the elimination of the words “this full” from the constitutional provision. The majority also fails to consider the publication by the Secretary of State describing the error in the voter pamphlets, and the wide discussion of this Initiative in the printed media, the radio and television, as well as the debate as reported in the media. Without question this Initiative generated a widespread *102media discussion which continued for months prior to the election date.
The plaintiffs chose to bring this declaratory judgment action in this Court rather than proceeding in district court. As a result, neither side has had the opportunity to produce evidence of the effect of the error upon the vote of the electorate. Plaintiffs contend that because the proponents cannot prove that the error had no effect on the vote, the election must be invalidated. Since the plaintiffs chose this forum where no such evidence could be presented, I have some difficulty attaching validity to this contention.
I have attempted to consider all of the foregoing factors, and to keep in mind carefully the rights of the people to amend their Constitution by the initiative process. I recognize that the error in the voter information pamphlets is significant and presents a difficult issue. However, based upon the nature of the error and the wide availability of accurate information regarding the Initiative through all forms of media, I conclude that the error is not a proper basis for invalidating the election. I cannot conclude there is a reasonable probability that a substantial part of the electorate was misled by the error. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I conclude that the electorate of Montana has the capacity to analyze the issue raised by the Initiative and to reach an accurate decision on the vote to be cast notwithstanding the error in the voter information pamphlet. I would hold that the error in printing the text did not invalidate the election.
The second reason used by the majority to invalidate the election on CI-30 is publication in each county of summary language instead of the entire text of the Initiative. Article XIV, Section 9(2) of the Montana Constitution provides, in relevant part:
“. . .the secretary of state shall cause the amendment to be published as provided by law twice each month for two months previous to the next regular state-wide election.”
The majority holds that this constitutional provision requires the Secretary of State to publish the full text of the amendment. The legislature obviously disagreed, because it adopted the following statutory provisions for publication in Section 13-27-311(2), MCA:
“The secretary of state may arrange for newspaper, radio, or television publication of proposed constitutional amendments in each county. A summary of the amendment as provided by the attorney general, as described in 13-27-312 or 13-27-315, would suffice for the *103publication required by this section and should be made at least twice each month for 2 months previous to the election.”
The majority holds that this statute is unconstitutional because it does not require the full text of the amendment to be published and instead allows a summary of the amendment as provided by the Attorney General. It has not been explained why this issue was not raised in the plaintiffs’ initial appearance before this Court in October 1986.
The official transcript of Montana’s 1972 Constitutional Convention (Con Con) does not answer the question of intent conclusively; there is no statement of the collective view of the delegates. The discussion of this section centered around whether publication must be in newspapers or whether it could be through other media, such as television. In amending the section to allow publication other than in newspapers, the word “full” was deleted from the text of the section before “amendment shall be published.” The Con Con transcript contains no explanation of that deletion.
The majority cites State v. Tooker (1894), 15 Mont. 8, 37 P. 840, as controlling on this issue. In that case, a constitutional amendment was published for two weeks before the election, instead of “published in full in at least one newspaper in each county (if such there be), for three months previous to the next general election . . . “ as required by Montana’s 1889 Constitution, Article 19, Section 9. This Court stated that:
“The method for amendment is provided by the solemnity of the constitutional enactment, and another method of amendment has been attempted to be invoked. We can see no other result but that such attempt is nugatory, and of absolutely no avail.”
Tooker, 37 P. at 844.
It is important to note that the 1889 Constitution required publication in full of the constitutional amendment for three months, while publication in Tooker was only made for two weeks. The 1889 constitutional provision sets forth the considered judgment of the people that a century ago it was essential to publish a constitutional amendment in full and for a period of three months previous to an election. That was a clearly understandable and reasonable requirement during a period of time in which newspaper publication was the only reasonable means of publication other than word of mouth. The present age of mass electronic communication presents an entirely different situation. The present constitutional provision does not require the amendment to be published “in full”. In addition, *104the 1972 constitutional provision provides that the amendment is to be published “as provided by law”. Clearly the people recognized by this provision that it was appropriate for the legislature to provide the manner of publication. The legislature did so in Section 13-27-311, MCA, and provided that the summary of the amendment would suffice. I therefore conclude that Tooker is not controlling in the present case.
After having studied the text of Mont. Const. Article XIV, Section 9(2) and the transcript of the discussion at the Con Con, I conclude that allowing publication of the statement of purpose instead of the text of the Initiative does not exceed the discretion given to the legislature in providing for publication of proposed amendments. I would therefore conclude that Section 13-27-311(2), MCA, is not unconstitutional. I find no indication that a substantial part of the electorate was misled, and conclude that publication of the statement of purpose instead of the text of the Initiative is not cause to void the election.
The majority has not addressed the three other issues which the plaintiffs raised. I will, therefore, discuss them only briefly. First, plaintiffs argue that the Initiative is unconstitutional because it proposes more than one amendment in a single ballot. That argument fails under the established test of whether the amendment effects and carries out one general object or purpose connected with one subject. State v. Cooney (1924), 70 Mont. 355, 366, 225 P. 1007, 1011. Here, the Initiative alters only one paragraph of our Constitution and covers one general subject. To require that each word or phrase changed in this Initiative be submitted separately to the voters would be an exultation of form over substance.
The plaintiffs also argue that the Initiative would violate the doctrine of separation of powers by transferring judicial power to the legislature. Mont. Const. Article III, Section 1 prohibits one branch of government from exercising any power belonging to one of the other branches except as the Constitution permits. There is no prohibition of the people shifting a power belonging to one branch to another branch. I conclude that the Initiative does not violate the constitutional provision on separation of powers.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the Initiative is unlawful or unconstitutional because the Attorney General’s statements of purpose and implication are untrue, misleading, and prejudicial. The standard of review of the adequacy of the statements was set forth in State ex *105rel. Wenzel v. Murray (1978), 178 Mont. 441, 448, 585 P.2d 633, 637-38:
. . as long as the Attorney General in his explanatory statement uses ‘ordinary plain language,’ explains the general purpose of the issues submitted, in language that is true and impartial, and not argumentative or likely to create prejudice either for or against the issue, he has followed the law . . . His discretion as to the choice of language ... is entirely his.”
Here, the Attorney General was faced with an amendment to a constitutional provision with uncertain legal implications, stemming from this Court’s non-unanimous decisions in White and Pfost. He was limited, under Section 13-27-312, MCA, to a statement of 100 words to explain the purpose of the measure and 25 words for the statement of implication. Such statements cannot capture all ramifications of the Initiative. The Initiative itself is short enough to be easily read, giving the statements a more limited function than they would have with a longer initiative. Balancing all of these factors, I would conclude that the Attorney General’s statements explain the general purpose of the amendment in ordinary plain language in a sufficient manner to meet the requirements of Section 13-27-312(4), MCA, and to maintain the neutrality of the government.
Because I conclude that none of the issues raised by plaintiffs require that the results of the November 1986 election on CI-30 be declared void, I would deny the application for declaratory judgment.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and MR. JUSTICE GULBRANDSON concur in the foregoing dissent.