Court Opinion

ID: 9517806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:33:35.505627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:08.515170
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, specially concurring: I do not agree with the view of the majority that the flight instruction was properly given. It is fundamental that no instruction should be given which is not reasonably supported by the evidence, or which is not based on some theory logically deductible from some portion of the evidence. 14A Ill. L. & Pr. Criminal Law, §702 (1968). In People v. Craven, 54 Ill. 2d 419, 299 N.E.2d 1, the principal case relied upon by the majority, the State’s case-in-chief showed that the defendant ran from the scene of thé crime after shooting the victim. The defendant testified in his own behalf that while he lay on the sidewalk, he heard a shot and someone urging him to “get out of here.” Defendant also testified that he was frightened. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that a flight instruction, similar to the one involved here, was properly given. The court stated that the jury could weigh against the circumstance of flight, if believed, the explanation of defendant that he was frightened and injured during the events and that he left the scene for those reasons. The court recognized that the Illinois Judicial Conference Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases had previously recommended that no instruction on flight be given. Nevertheless, the court pointed to its approval of substantially identical instructions in an earlier case, People v. Burris, 49 Ill. 2d 98, 273 N.E.2d 605. Cf. People v. Barnes, 2 Ill. App. 3d 461, 276 N.E.2d 509; People v. Weller, 123 Ill. App. 2d 421, 258 N.E.2d 806. In Burris, the court held, without ruling on the propriety of giving a flight instruction, that such a charge could not have reasonably affected the verdict, under the circumstances there present. In People v. Herbert, 361 Ill. 64, 196 N.E. 821, the Illinois Supreme Court commented on the giving of a similar flight instruction and found it to be reversible error because the evidence did not justify its being given. The court approved the following definition of flight in criminal law: “ ‘[T]he evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention, or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The term signifies, in legal parlance, not merely a leaving, but a leaving or concealment under a consciousness of guilt and for the purpose of evading arrest. Such consciousness and purpose is that which gives to the act of leaving its real incriminating character.’ ” 361 Ill. 64, 73-74. In People v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 279 N.E.2d 765, the court, relying on Herbert, held that the giving of a flight instruction constituted reversible error since the evidence did not warrant such an instruction. In Brown, the State knew and the trial court was aware from the testimony at pretrial motions that defendant continued to live at his home, worked at his regular occupation and voluntarily telephoned the police when he learned he was wanted for questioning. The court stated that, other than leaving the scene of the crime, there was no testimony that defendant concealed himself, fled the jurisdiction or evaded arrest. In People v. Zertuche, 5 Ill. App. 3d 303, 282 N.E.2d 201, the court held that the giving of a flight instruction was error, and the court reversed the conviction. In Zertuche, there was a dispute in the evidence as to whether the defendant left the scene of the crime either running or walking. The court stated that on the basis of this evidence the instruction should not have been given because the concept of flight embodies more than just leaving the scene of the crime. The defendant must be attempting to avoid arrest or detention. See also People v. Cox, 74 Ill. App. 2d 342, 220 N.E.2d 7, where the evidence showed that the defendant fled during a car chase but the giving of a flight instruction was held reversible error, since the record did not show that the defendant knew or should have known he was a suspect, and therefore no showing of consciousness of guilt was made with respect to defendant’s apparent act of flight. In People v. Weisberg, 396 Ill. 412, 71 N.E.2d 671, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 826, 91 L. Ed. 1842, 67 S. Ct. 1318, the Illinois Supreme Court held that where the defendant has killed a man allegedly in self-defense and then leaves the scene of the shooting, going to a hotel in which he lives and enroute disposes of a weapon, there is not sufficient evidence to justify the giving of a flight instruction. The court stated that the most natural evidence of flight would be if the defendant were to go in a different direction than toward his home. The court rejected the People’s contention that it is the duty of the defendant, whether guilty or innocent, to either remain upon the scene of the homicide or to surrender to a policeman. The court said that the instruction should not have been given, but held that it could not have reasonably affected the verdict, since any jury could distinguish between going home and fleeing to escape arrest. In People v. Johnson, 75 Ill. App. 2d 231, 220 N.E.2d 261, the court, relying on Weisberg, held that the giving of a flight instruction was error because there was no evidentiary basis for the instruction. The evidence disclosed that the defendant left the scene of the crime and was apprehended an hour to an hour and one-half later at his apartment. The court held that the giving of this instruction was not reversible error, since the case did not turn upon a close factual basis or upon the existence or nonexistence of flight. In People v. Haygood, 60 Ill. App. 2d 70, 208 N.E.2d 373, the defendant was arrested in a tavern four and one-half weeks after the occurrence of the crime with which he was charged. The arresting officer testified that he went into the tavern after receiving information from a telephone call; when he approached the man who fitted defendant’s description and asked for his name, he was given a name different than Haygood. The People contended that this evidence supplied a sufficient evidentiary basis for the giving of a flight instruction. The record disclosed that defendant had left the scene of the crime, but there was no evidence that he left in haste, that he went into hiding or that the police were searching for him and that he could not be found in his usual place of abode. The court distinguished Herbert on the basis of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt and because of the fictititous name given by him when arrested. The court stated that the assumption of a fictitious name would be an indication of flight, since it discloses the intention to conceal one’s identity and to evade arrest. But, said the court, since the instruction given was phrased in terms of flight, similar to the one used in the instant appeal, the evidence did not support such an instruction since it showed only the assumption of a fictitious name. Nevertheless, the court held the giving of the instruction harmless error because of the clear evidence of defendant’s guilt. Flight instructions have been approved where the defendant has left the jurisdiction under an assumed name (People v. Ortega, 5 Ill. 2d 79, 125 N.E.2d 481, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 967, 99 L. Ed. 1288, 75 S. Ct. 902), evaded capture (People v. Bucnis, 405 Ill. 568, 92 N.E.2d 158), left his home to reside with a friend (People v. Keyes, 117 Ill. App. 2d 471, 253 N.E.2d 539), or hid in a closet in another person’s home (People v. Lofton, 64 Ill. App. 2d 238, 212 N.E.2d 705). Where the defendant is running from pursuing police, the purpose is generally to. evade arrest, and flight instructions have been approved on this basis. People v. Agnello, 22 Ill. 2d 352, 176 N.E.2d 788, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 957; People v. Dukes, 12 Ill. 2d 334, 146 N.E.2d 14; People v. Hurley, 100 Ill. App. 2d 167, 241 N.E.2d 318. Hurley, relied upon by the majority, is distinguishable since the instant appeal does not involve a defendant running from pursuing police. Flight embodies two distinct kinds of conduct, namely, departure and concealment, both of which have been lumped together and treated alike. Evidence that the defendant has left the scene of a crime under a consciousness of guilt may support the giving of a flight instruction, similar to the one given in the instant appeal. But, such an instruction should not be given when, for example, the evidence shows that the defendant has assumed a fictitious name. People v. Hay good, 60 Ill. App. 2d 70, 208 N.E.2d 373. Although the assumption of a fictitious name may disclose an intention to conceal one’s identity for the purpose of evading arrest, it does not show that the defendant has fled immediately after the commission of the crime and remained away until taken into custody. Evidence of departure thus differs from evidence of concealment; appropriate instructions should be patterned to reflect this distinction. Similar standards apply in determining whether the evidence supports the giving of a “flight” instruction. But, before such an instruction may be given, it must reflect the nature of the evidence of flight, whether departure or concealment. Instructions not based on adequate evidence of flight may not be prejudicial if there is clear evidence of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Haygood, 60 Ill. App. 2d 70, 208 N.E.2d 373, or if they reasonably could not have affected the verdict. People v. Weisberg, 396 Ill. 412, 71 N.E.2d 671, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 826, 91 L. Ed. 1842, 67 S. Ct. 1318. The evidence must support the giving of a flight instruction. The evidence in the instant appeal discloses that the flight relates to the defendant’s act of leaving the scene of the crime. The following factors must be present in order to supply an evidentiary basis for a flight instruction based on the defendant’s departure from the scene of the crime: (1) The defendant must leave the scene of the crime; (2) The defendant must know or have reason to know that a crime has been committed and that he is or may be suspected of committing that crime, People v. Harris, 23 Ill. 2d 270, 178 N.E.2d 291; People v. Herbert 361 Ill. 64, 196 N.E.821; People v. Griffin, 23 Ill. App. 3d 461, 318 N.E.2d 671; People v. Cox, 74 Ill. App. 2d 342, 220 N.E.2d 7; and (3) the defendant’s act of departure must be for the purpose of evading arrest. People v. Burris, 49 Ill. 2d 98, 273 N.E.2d 605; People v. Herbert, 361 Ill. 64, 196 N.E. 821; People v. Zertuche, 5 Ill. App. 3d 303, 282 N.E.2d 201. Once these factors are present, a flight instruction, based on the defendant’s departure, may be given. From the evidence of flight, the jury may then infer consciousness of guilt and consider this circumstance in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The majority concedes that the concept of flight embodies more than simply leaving the scene of the crime. Yet, the evidence shows no more than that. The evidence does not show that defendant’s act of leaving the scene was done for the purpose of evading arrest. Apparently, the majority attempts to bridge this .gap by pointing to the evidence that defendant knew the police were looking for him at least two weeks before his arrest. But the majority does not connect the defendant’s knowledge with his departure from the scene — a connection necessary in order to establish that the flight was for the purpose of evading arrest. In fact, the record discloses that the defendant did not know the police were looking for him until more than two months after he left the scene of the crime. Under these circumstances, I believe the defendant’s knowledge cannot be considered in conjunction with his departure from the scene, in order to reasonably justify the inference that his purpose was to evade arrest. A flight instruction would have been properly given if the defendant had learned he was a suspect for this crime either during or immediately after its commission, or while engaged in departing from the scene. Here, the connection is much too remote to permit the jury to infer consciousness of guilt. It is well-settled in Illinois that evidence of flight can be used to infer guilt. Nevertheless, the weakness of such an inference has long been pointed out. As early as 1896, in Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511, 40 L. Ed. 1051, 1056, 16 S. Ct. 864, the United States Supreme Court stated: “ [I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that ‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are bold as a lion.’ Innocent men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury, — not necessarily because they fear that the jury will not protect them, but because they do not wish their names to appear in connection with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or because they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of defending themselves. ° ° *” The weakness of the inference raised by evidence of flight requires that trial judges should be reluctant to give such an instruction unless the evidence provides a sufficient basis. Departure from the scene after a crime has been committed, of itself, does not warrant an inference of guilt. For departure to take on the legal significance of flight, there must be circumstances present and unexplained which, in conjunction with the leaving, reasonably justify an inference that it was done with a consciousness of guilt and pursuant to an effort to avoid an accusation based on that guilt. State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. 209, 203 A.2d 177, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 990, 15 L. Ed. 2d 477, 86 S. Ct. 564. Although I believe the instruction was error, I concur with the majority that it was harmless error, and the cause does not require reversal for a new trial.