Court Opinion

ID: 9709406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:46:51.716008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:48.508438
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 57. (dissenting). Today the majority announces the discovery of an evi-dentiary privilege previously unheard of in this state. Although unrecognized to date by the bench, bar, or legal scholars, the majority claims that this privilege really has been in existence for the last 25 years. Because the majority ignores the requirement for express legal authority to create such an evidentiary privilege, needlessly discards precedent, and wastes an opportunity to meaningfully address the continuing *100problem of incivility in the discovery process, I respectfully dissent.
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A.
¶ 58. The majority first missteps because it ignores the requirement for definite legal authority to create an evidentiary privilege. Prior to 1973 a court was reluctant to adopt or expand privileges unless such action was a transcendent public good. See, e.g., State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis. 2d 699, 706, 193 N.W.2d 851 (1972); see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). After 1973, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 905.01 this court lost that ability in its entirety. Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 204, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977). It is statutorily prohibited from creating new privileges. Davison, 75 Wis. 2d at 202-04; State v. Beno, 110 Wis. 2d 40, 46-47, 327 N.W.2d 712 (Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1983).
¶ 59. As the majority correctly notes, Wis. Stat. § 905.01 recognizes three types of privileges: (1) those explicitly created by statute; (2) those "inherent or implicit" in explicit statutes; and (3) those required by the federal or state constitutions. Most certainly, there is no express "expert witness privilege" in the statutes of this state, or in any constitutional provision.1 The majority recognizes as much. However, the majority contends that a solitary sentence in § 907.06(1) *101preventing a court from appointing an expert witness to a case unless that witness consents to act is an explicit statute which implicitly or inherently creates a broad expert privilege under § 905.01. Majority op. at 85-86.2 That sentence provides as follows: "An expert witness shall not be appointed by the judge unless the expert "witness consents to act."
¶ 60. This is a slender reed on which to place such great weight. I am unconvinced that a rather tangential sentence in a statute discussing the relationship between an expert and the court can be extrapolated to also regulate conduct between a party and an expert. Read in its entirety Wis. Stat. § 907.06 says little about a court compelling an expert to testify and absolutely nothing about a party compelling an expert to testify.
¶ 61. Yet, without citation to any authority and with only two sentences of analysis to justify its result, *102the majority leaps from the solitary sentence in Wis. Stat. § 907.06(1) to the conclusion that a witness has a legal privilege to refuse to provide expert testimony. What the majority opinion lacks in legal authority and analysis, it attempts to make up with the bald assertion that "[a]ny other result would. . .fly in the face of logic." Majority op. at 86. I submit that such a result "fl[ies] in the face" of the rule of law that privileges are to be strictly construed.
¶ 62. Moreover, to reach its conclusion the majority necessarily rides roughshod over a basic presumption in this area of law: In the face of silence or confusion regarding the existence of a privilege, the party must testify. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 874 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ("The administration of justice requires testimony of all persons unless reasons are established to the contrary."). In a conflict between testimony and privilege, a "tie" goes to testimony. As the majority itself succinctly states, "Privileges are the exception, not the rule." Majority op. at 85. There is no statute that duplicates the restrictions Wis. Stat. § 907.06 places on a court to a party. The exercise of such creative license in this area defies the statutory and case law prohibition from creating new evidentiary privileges.
¶ 63. Undeterred by this prohibition, the majority advances its discovery of this evidentiary privilege based on a rationale heretofore unrelied upon by any other jurisdiction in this country. I can find no other court that has bought the argument the majority today advances.3 For example, the court in Kaufman v. Edel-*103stein, 539 F.2d 811, 818 (2d. Cir. 1976), concluded that Federal Rule 706(a), which contains essentially the same sentence as Wis. Stat. § 907.06, applied only to court compulsion and not to party compulsion of an expert witness. The court stated
[t]he situation of the court appointed expert who is expected to delve deeply into the problem and arrive at an informed and unbiased opinion differs utterly from that of an expert called by a party to state what facts he may know and what opinion he may know and what opinion he may have formed without being asked to make any further investigation. If any inference is to be drawn from the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is thus against the claim of privilege by an expert, not for it.
Id. Similarly the court in Wright, 547 F. Supp. at 874-75, drew a sharp distinction between expert testimony compelled by a court and that compelled by a party — namely that Rule 706(a) prohibited the former but, in its silence, allowed the latter. Id. at 874. See also *104Snyder v. American Motors Corp., 115 F.R.D. 211, 213 (Ariz. 1987) (noting that expert's claim of privilege is incorrect).4
¶ 64. The contrast between the majority's opinion and the decisions from these other jurisdictions is striking. No other jurisdiction supports the majority's rationale for discovery of this privilege. Equally striking is the contrast between today's announced discovery of an evidentiary privilege and the legal pedigree of other evidentiary privileges in this state. No other privilege in this state has as obscure an origin as the stealthy expert witness privilege of the majority that lay dormant for the past 25 years.
¶ 65. The creation and modification of the "great" privileges spans the course of centuries. Privileges are glaciers moving — inching, bit by bit — along the surface of the Anglo-American legal tradition. For example, the attorney-client privilege dates back almost to the time of Shakespeare when testimony at trial first came into practice. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); 8 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2290. The "modern" spousal privilege came into existence in the middle *105part of the nineteenth century. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 (1980); 8 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2333. Where the common law was silent, legislatures acted to create the privileges we commonly recognize today. See 3 Weinstein's Federal Evidence, § 514.11 (noting that three-fourths of states adopted physician-patient privilege since New York passed such legislation in 1828); 8 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2394 (noting that priest-penitent privilege is largely a legislative creature of the early twentieth century). But see Michael J. Mazza, Comment, Should Clergy Hold the Priest Penitent Privilege?, 82Marq. L. Rev. 171,175-82 (1998) (discussing commentators arguing that priest-penitent privilege extends perhaps to the sixteenth century).
¶ 66. Such privileges have evolved in our Anglo-American legal tradition and have been expressly codified in our rules of evidence. Likewise, evidentiary privileges of a more recent vintage come with express statutory codification.5 Not so with the majority's expert witness privilege. If I understand the majority's reasoning, this privilege has existed since the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1973 as both Wis. Stat. § 905.01 and § 907.06 were enacted at that time. The unusual circumstances surrounding the recognition of this privilege, when compared with every other privilege ever known in this state, assures me that the majority is mistaken in its new discovery.
*106B.
¶ 67. For the sake of argument, however, I will assume that the majority is correct that the alchemy between Wis. Stat. § 905.01 and § 907.06 somehow has created an expert witness privilege. If this were so, I still would most certainly not conclude that somehow this alchemy overruled Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909).6
¶ 68. While there is nothing remarkable about this court's overruling of its prior case law, at least we normally explain why we are doing so. See, e.g., State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) (overruling Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980)); State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 257, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996) (overruling State v. Howard, 176 Wis. 2d 921, 501 N.W.2d 9 (1993)). Here, the majority claims that it did not overrule Philler for, lo and behold, the legislature's enactment of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence overruled Philler. Thus, the majority asserts that both the overruling oí Philler and *107the creation of an expert privilege were results occasioned by legislative enactments of 1973.
¶ 69. Until today's announcement by the majority of the overruling of Philler, neither the bench nor the bar have been aware of Philler's demise. Since 1973, courts have continued to cite it with approval. See, e.g., Payment of Witness Fees in State v. Huisman, 167 Wis. 2d 168, 172-73 n.2, 482 N.W.2d 665 (Ct. App. 1992); Secura Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp., 156 Wis. 2d 730, 735, 457 N.W.2d 549 (Ct. App. 1990).
¶ 70. This continued reference subsequent to 1973 undermines the majority's assertion that the enactment of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence overruled Philler. As I noted above, it is the majority's prerogative to overrule cases, but it ought to at least admit its actions and explain its rationale. The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence did not overrule Philler-, the majority did.
¶ 71. Likewise, the existence of the evidentiary expert witness privilege has gone unnoticed by legal scholars. In a review of the treatises on Wisconsin evidence, there is no reference to the existence of such an expert privilege in this state. See Thomas H. Barland & Thomas D. Bell, The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence (State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books, 1998); Daniel Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence (West 1998); Ralph Adam Fine, Fine's Wisconsin Evidence (But-terworth, 1997). The alchemy between Wis. Stat. § 905.01 and § 907.06 did not create an evidentiary expert privilege; the majority did.
C.
¶ 72. Assuming that the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence created an expert witness privilege and *108assuming that Philler was overruled in the process, I still cannot understand why the majority, faced with the choice of two qualified privileges, chose the qualified privilege outlined in Mason v. Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 236 (Iowa 1983), over Philler. Rather, faced with such a choice I believe that Philler is the far superior rule.
¶ 73. Philler s premise is simple: The administration of justice requires witnesses — be they "expert" or "lay" — to testify as to what they know. However, Philler makes equally clear that this duty does not extend so far as to require a witness to affirmatively undertake any additional preparation, for "study, reflection, etc., is not the function of the ordinary witness." Id. at 215. The duty requires witnesses only to provide information that they already possess and does not require witnesses to supplement their existing knowledge.
¶ 74. In contrast to the Philler rule's articulated and identified basis in law, the Mason rule appears to have been the result of Solomonic wisdom unconcerned with ascertaining the basis in either statutory enactments or common law traditions. Mason, 340 N.W.2d at 242 (stating that the court chose to "take a middle ground" between an absolute privilege and no privilege); id. at 243 (Larson, J., dissenting) ("[The Mason] result does not proceed from a recognition of an established 'expert witness' privilege, because there is none."). Even if the Mason rule's legal foundation was more recognizable, it nonetheless creates considerable difficulties in practice that serve to protract and increase the costs of litigation.
¶ 75. This case reflects that concern. As I read the majority opinion, the Alts would not be completely prevented from deposing Dr. Acosta. Because Acosta *109was Dawn Alt's treating physician and wrote her discharge summary, the majority opinion allows the Alts to compel him to testify about his observations and the facts surrounding those events. What the majority opinion does not allow the Alts to do is compel Acosta's expert opinion as a physician.
¶ 76. While on paper the majority's distinction between "transaction" testimony and "expert" testimony, see Reed v. Fetherston, 785 F. Supp. 1352, 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1992), appears clear, in practice I think that it is not so clear. In many cases, the two types of testimony will inevitably spill one into the other and in the process create an inseparable mixture. Under the rule of the majority, courts and parties will be asked to unmix the mixture — a task that may be difficult and inexact.
¶ 77. In contrast, the Philler rule is far easier for courts and parties to follow and therefore has the result of reducing the expense and delay of litigation to parties and reducing the burden of oversight on courts. Under Philler a witness must answer a question if he or she has the knowledge to do so. There is no gamesmanship of trying to categorize a question as either transaction or expert testimony so as to either compel or protect an answer. Rather, if a witness has an answer to a question, he or she must give it.7
*110D.
¶ 78. Finally, assuming that the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence created an expert witness privilege, assuming that Philler was overruled in the process, and even assuming that I could adopt the Mason rule, I still could not join the majority's mandate in this case reversing the court of appeals. In comparing the facts of this case with those in Mason I conclude that the court of appeals must be affirmed.
¶ 79. For all the abstract talk about compelling expert witnesses to testify, we cannot lose sight of one simple fact: Acosta was significantly involved in this case prior to the Alts' attempt to depose him. This appeal is not based on the Alts' attempt to compel an uninvolved expert to testify but rather is about the Alts' attempt to obtain the full testimony of a witness substantially involved in the events both leading up to and following after the alleged negligence.
¶ 80. Acosta's involvement in Dawn Alt's care distinguishes this case from Mason and, even under Mason's rule, necessitates an affirmance of the court of appeals. In Mason, the plaintiffs attempted to compel the testimony of a professor whose entire connection with the case consisted of a solitary conversation, with one of the defendant doctors. Mason, 340 N.W.2d at 238.
¶ 81. In deciding that the plaintiffs could not compel Mason to testify, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that "generally an expert witness, absent some other connection with [the] litigation, is free to decide whether or not he wished to provide opinion testimony for a party." Id. at 242 (emphasis added). This "unrelat-edness requirement" was hardly an after-thought on the part of the Mason court. Id. at 240 (citing Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 823 (2d Cir. 1976) (Gurfein, *111J., concurring)); id. at 242 ("In contrast to factual witnesses who possess knowledge which is unique and many times irreplaceable, expert testimony is not based on any singular personal knowledge of the disputed events."). Based on my reading of the emphasis the Mason court placed on the facts of that case, I conclude that were the Mason court faced with these facts, it would have reached a different result than today's majority.
¶ 82. Moreover, even the jurisdictions that have adopted an absolute privilege have overwhelmingly done so in cases where the expert was wholly unrelated to the litigation. See, e.g., Gilly v. City of New York, 508 N.E.2d 901, 902 (N.Y. 1987); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327 N.E.2d 819, 827 (Mass. 1975); Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe, 72 N.E.2d 165, 166 (N.Y. 1947); Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118, 123 (Cal. App. 1959). See also Shurpit v. Brah, 30 Wis. 2d 388, 397-98, 141 N.W.2d 266 (1966).
¶ 88. In contrast, the majority opinion takes us into relatively uncharted waters. Under its opinion expert witnesses are not only given a nearly impenetrable shield of protection against unwillingly rendering their opinions when they are unrelated to the litigation, but are also given that same protection when they are deeply involved with factual details that lie at the heart of the litigation. This sets neither the correct nor proper course.
I — I I — H
¶ 84. Finally, I address the issue of sanctions and the continuing problem of incivility in the legal profession, especially as it manifests itself in the discovery process. This court has commented recently on the perceived decline in civility and how this decline increases *112costs to the parties, adds to the burdens of already burdened courts, and depreciates the opinion of the legal profession in the eyes of the general public. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Deloitte & Touche, 176 Wis. 2d 935, 945-46, 501 N.W.2d 15 (1993); Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 281-82, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991).
¶ 85. To the extent that perception meets reality this court must find itself on the front lines of this struggle, doing what it can to fashion zealous but civil advocacy. See State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis. 2d 94, 103, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990) (opinion of Bablitch, J.). Yet the majority wastes this opportunity to meaningfully address the continuing problem of incivility.
¶ 86. I note at the outset that although the majority opinion says much about the evidentiary "privilege" of expert witnesses and the extent of that privilege, it incorrectly assumes that privilege was ever asserted in the circuit court. The majority opinion announces that "a substantiated assertion of privilege is substantial justification for failing to comply with an order to provide or permit discovery." Majority op. at 94. Here there was no substantiated assertion of an evidentiary expert witness privilege.
¶ 87. This case already has a long history without ever having gone to trial. The alleged negligence underlying this case occurred in October of 1989. Over nine years later, the case has yet to go to trial. In the intervening years, the discovery disputes between the Alts and the defendants — and between the Alts and Acosta — have taken on a life of their own. This case has generated a score of circuit court rulings, two occasions of sanctions, two appeals to the court of appeals, and *113now a supreme court opinion all before any evidence has been put before a finder of fact.
¶ 88. Yet no mention of the word "privilege" can be found in the transcripts of Acosta's depositions, or at the motion hearings, or in the memoranda to the circuit court. It appears that the majority has failed its own test of requiring a "substantiated assertion" of privilege. Because the word is nowhere to be found in the voluminous record on the issues of discovery and sanctions in the circuit court, it can hardly be maintained that there was a "substantiated assertion" of an evi-dentiary privilege. The majority's conclusion that there was substantial justification for failing to comply with a discovery order is based on a foundation not "substantiated" by this circuit court record.
¶ 89. Our concern on this appeal, of course, only focuses on Acosta's second deposition and its aftermath. Even with this narrow focus, the tenor of the entire litigation is apparent.
¶ 90. At his second deposition, Acosta's new attorney, George Burnett, objected and instructed his client not to answer the questions when the Alts' attorney probed issues relating to statements Acosta made on the discharge summary. This was essentially the same issue that halted Acosta's first deposition, was essentially the same issue that the circuit court concluded should have been answered at the first deposition, and was essentially the same issue that played a part in the circuit court's award of sanctions after Acosta's first deposition. Moreover, at the time that Burnett objected during the second deposition, one of the plaintiffs' attorneys specifically read aloud the circuit court's decision indicating that this line of ques*114tioning was permissible.8 Nevertheless, Burnett persisted in his refusal to allow Acosta to testify about these matters.
¶ 91. We have on numerous occasions reiterated that a circuit court is given substantial discretion to award sanctions in part because that court is in a significantly superior position to appreciate the conduct of the parties. See Standard Theatres, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 747, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984). That is especially evident in a convoluted case such as this one. Yet, though the path was littered with motions, affidavits, briefs, orders, and opinions, the circuit court was able to succinctly state what occurred — or more accurately, what did not occur — during Acosta's second deposition: "Dr. Acosta should have answered the questions once. He now should have answered the questions twice."
¶ 92. We have in the past said that "[t]he authority to impose sanctions is essential if circuit courts are to enforce their orders and ensure prompt disposition of lawsuits." Chevron, 176 Wis. 2d at 946. See also Aspen Services, Inc. v. IT Corp., 220 Wis. 2d 491, 497-99, 583 N.W.2d 849 (Ct. App. 1998). Apparently, the circuit court believed that we meant what we wrote. It is unfortunate that the majority opinion *115undermines that belief. The majority "caution[s] attorneys" that its "holding. . .is not a license to assert unsubstantiated privileges." Majority op. at 95. Considering that the majority rewards just such action in this case where the record reflects no substantiated assertion of privilege, its warning rings hollow.
HH HH HH
¶ 93. In sum, the majority's attempt to mask its creation of an evidentiary expert witness privilege as merely a construction of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence is unpersuasive. There was no evidentiary expert witness privilege at common law and nothing in the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence has altered that fact. Moreover, the majority needlessly discards applicable precedent, asserting that its overruling is the handiwork of the legislature. Unfortunately, the discarded precedent is both in principle and practice superior to the rule the majority instead adopts. Finally, the majority wastes an opportunity to meaningfully address the continuing problem of incivility in the discovery process. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 94. I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion.

 Even if Wis. Stat. § 905.01 recognized privileges "available at common law" the majority's action today would have been no less contrary to the statute. An expert witness privilege did not exist at common law. 23 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence, § 5431, p. 825 — 26 (1980).

 The majority fails to offer any discussion, let alone rationale, for its interpretation of the phrase "inherent or implicit." According to the Judicial Council's notes on Wis. Stat. § 905.01, the phrase "inherent or implicit" was inserted, not to give a court some device with which to "interpret" additional privileges. Rather, the notes strongly suggest that the phrase was inserted solely to protect the "work-product privilege" — a privilege the court created prior to 1973 in State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967). Judicial Council Committee Notes, Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R101 (1973).
This latter interpretation is consistent with the tenor of the rule: new privileges are not to be created except by legislation or Supreme Court rule. Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 205-06, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977). Wisconsin Stat. § 905.01 is not a license for courts to create, modify, or expand privileges; that task must be accomplished by legislative or rule-making action.

 While some courts have adopted an expert witness privilege, I can find none that have done so on the statutory basis articulated by the majority. Two of the three cases the majority cites as recognizing "absolute" expert privileges were decided *103prior to any codification akin to Wis. Stat. § 907.06. See People v. Thorpe, 72 N.E.2d 165 (N.Y. 1947); Stanton v. Rushmore, 169 A. 721 (N.J. 1934). Thus, these opinions did not attempt to tie the expert privilege to some statutory provision, but rather looked to the common law to ascertain the "better rule." See, e.g., Thorpe, 72 N.E.2d at 166. The court in the third absolute privilege case, Ondis v. Pion, 497 A.2d 13 (R.I. 1985), also did not attempt to tie its decision to any statutory provision. Instead it noted that it would not "lightly depart" from a 1959 decision in which it adopted the absolute privilege. Id. at 18. Additionally, in Mason v. Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 236 (Iowa 1983), the Iowa case the majority finds so persuasive, the court did not explicitly indicate where the "qualified" privilege emanated from, only saying that it was reviewing a trial court's discretionary act. Id. at 241-43.

While no court, aside from the majority, has concluded that a rule prohibiting a court from compelling expert testimony also by implication prohibits a party from compelling expert testimony, some courts have been willing to quash a subpoena duces tecum as being overly burdensome on the expert. See, e.g., Snyder v. American Motors Corp., 115 F.R.D. 211, 214-16 (Ariz. 1987); Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding district court's quashing of the subpoena). However, as will be seen shortly, in the overwhelming number of cases where an expert was relieved of his or her duty to testify for any reason, that expert was not intimately involved with the facts precipitating the litigation. See Janet Fairchild, Right of Independent Expert to Refuse to Testify as to Expert Opinion, 50 A.L.R.4th 680, § 6(d), p. 693-95.

 See, e.g., 1987 Act 355, § 68 (creating "mediation" privilege at Wis. Stat. § 905.035); § 8, ch. 319, Laws of 1979 (creating "polygraph" privilege at Wis. Stat. § 905.065).

 Because the majority treats Philler as creating a qualified privilege, for the sake of refuting its argument I will treat Phil-ler likewise. However, I do not consider Philler's holding to constitute a privilege. First, the word "privilege" is not used at all in the opinion, a sharp contrast from other privilege cases. Second, Philler stands for the simple proposition that "every [person] owes a duty to attend and testify to the material facts that he [or she] knows." Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 214, 120 N.W. 829 (1909). Philler treats all testimony alike. If a witness has information, he or she must testify. Philler's holding that an expert witness cannot be compelled to do additional work is the same as saying that he or she need not obtain additional information so as to make themselves knowledgeable.

 As Philler recognized, this rule may well be of limited benefit to a party seeking to compel testimony from an expert witness because in many situations, an expert will not be able to give an answer absent review and study. Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 215-16, 120 N.W. 829 (1909). Nevertheless, Philler is in theory and in practice superior to Mason.

 The Alt's attorney read the following from the circuit court's order:
Therefore [the discharge summary] is an entirely appropriate area of inquiry. Dr. Acosta's deposition shows that Attorney Grimstad effectively precluded Plaintiffs' counsel from exploring the basis of the doctor's opinion relating to a material issue in this action. Evidence objected to at a deposition shall be taken subject to objections. . . .The opinion of Dawn Alt's primary treating physician during her pregnancy and during her hospitalization following Cody's birth, which is contained in the discharge summary, is highly relevant.