Court Opinion

ID: 9564181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:55:40.824703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:15.790939
License: Public Domain

CHRISTOFFERSEN, District Judge
(dissenting):
The defendant was charged with a violation of U.C.A., 1953, 32-4-22, a third degree felony, and on the day of trial the State moved to reduce the offense charged in the Information to an attempted violation of *1293U.C.A., 1953,32-4-22, a class A misdemean- or. The defendant was found guilty by the trial court on a stipulated set of facts.
Section 32-4-22, U.C.A., 1953 provides:
(1) No licensee under this act or any dealer in, manufacturer, distiller or agent or representative thereof of intoxicating liquor shall make any contribution, either directly or indirectly, to any candidate for political office or to any political party.
The defendant was employed as a representative of Old Mr. Boston, a liquor distillery. On May 28, 1976, the defendant at a fund raising party for Governor Matheson, upon suggestion from someone there, contributed $50.00 to the campaign fund of Governor Matheson. This was later returned.
The majority opinion concludes that the defendant’s conduct does not constitute the crime contemplated by the involved section of the code nor did his conduct constitute a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. The fact is the defendant is a representative of a liquor licensee under the code and that he directly made a contribution to a candidate for political office. It is urged by the majority that the State has not met its burden of proof in showing these actions meet the minimum requirements of criminal conduct necessary to establish his guilt.
U.C.A., 1953, 76-2-101 provides:
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and: (1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence with respect to each element of the offense as the definition of the offense requires.
Elements of the offense are (1) that you be a liquor licensee or a dealer in, manufacturer, distiller or agent or representative thereof; (2) that you either directly or indirectly make a contribution to any candidate for political office. Defendant certainly knew he was an agent of a liquor licensee; he certainly, intentionally and knowingly made the contribution. The fact that Governor Matheson later discovered he had received money from a liquor agent for a liquor licensee doesn’t affect his conduct or intent at the time the contribution was made, nor does the fact that the defendant states he didn’t know of the existence of the statute causing this to be a violation negate his intent to do what he did. U.C.A., 1953, 76-2-304 provides:
(1) Unless other provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor’s reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
The trial court may well have found on the basis of the stipulated facts that when the defendant gave his contribution and was asked to sign a roster so that the campaign would know to whom to credit the offering, he declined, indicating he was willing to make the contribution but did not want a public record of it. But even so the above statute provides that ignorance of the statute is no defense to the crime except under certain conditions. Those conditions being written interpretations of the law or official statements of the law by authorized administrative agency. This does not exist in this case.
Therefore, it is the opinion of this writer that the defendant not only attempted to commit the violation, he succeeded in doing so and would, therefore, uphold the ruling of the trial court.
*1294STEWART, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Judge CHRISTOFFERSEN.
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., having disqualified themselves, do not participate herein.