Court Opinion

ID: 9638671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:49:58.431592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:08.561378
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority of this Court, after finding that the appellant timely and properly voiced his objection to the lack of a lawful arrest warrant, and that the State failed in its burden to produce one, see Dasek v. State, 467 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Haynes v. State, 468 S.W.2d 375 (Tex.Cr. App.1971); cf. Gentry v. State, 640 S.W.2d 899, 905-907 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (Teague, J. dissenting opinion), holds that “Appellant’s objection to validity of his arrest should have been sustained.” The majority then proceeds to discuss the admissibility of the appellant’s confession that was obtained subsequent to the appellant’s arrest, and sustains the admission into evidence of the confession at appellant’s trial.
Cited but not discussed in the majority opinion is the Supreme Court decision of Taylor v. Alabama, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982), which was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States after the Waco Court of Appeals handed down its decision in this cause. The Supreme Court of the United States, on facts less favorable than here, held in Taylor v. Alabama, Id., that intervening events in that cause did not sufficiently break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the giving of the confession by Omar Taylor, the defendant in that cause; thus, the intervening events and circumstances did not cure the illegality of the initial arrest.
The facts of Taylor v. Alabama, Id., as set out in the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Alabama, see Taylor v. State, 399 So.2d 881 (Ala.1981), reflect that a robbery occurred at a grocery store located in Montgomery, Alabama. A suspect in the robbery, who was then incarcerated, informed the police that the defendant, Omar Taylor, was involved in the robbery. Police officers, acting on the “tip” from the incarcerated individual, arrested the defendant without a warrant. The defendant was told by the arresting officers why he was arrested. After being placed in a patrol vehicle, the defendant was given a legal warning. After arrival at the station house, the defendant was again given a legal warning. He was thereafter fingerprinted, questioned, and placed in a lineup. Police officers also told the defendant that his fingerprints matched unknown prints found on some items that had been handled by one of the participants in the robbery at the grocery store. A corporeal type lineup, held for purposes of identifying one or more of the robbers, proved unsuccessful. Based upon the fingerprint identification, a warrant for the defendant’s arrest was obtained from a magistrate. The defendant was thereafter permitted to visit with his girlfriend and her male companion. Shortly thereafter, the defendant signed a waiver-of-rights form and executed a written confession. The Alabama Supreme Court, in holding that the confession was admissible, relied upon Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. *39356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972). In Johnson v. Louisiana, Id., the Supreme Court had held that where, prior to a lineup, the defendant was brought before a committing magistrate who advised him of his rights and set bail, the line-up was “sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint” of an illegal arrest. Id. at 365, 92 S.Ct. at 1626. The Alabama Supreme Court held in Taylor v. State, supra, that the finding of probable cause which led to the issuance of the arrest warrant by a magistrate, “separated the arrest and confession of Omar Taylor [and] it would seem that the taint has been purged here as it was in Johnson,” Taylor v. State, 399 So.2d at 885 (Ala.Sup.Ct.1981), and sustained the admission of the confession into evidence.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, ruled in Taylor v. Alabama, supra, that Omar Taylor’s confession was inadmissible as evidence and should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial. The Supreme Court first pointed out in its opinion, relying upon Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), that if a written confession was obtained subsequent to an illegal arrest, the confession was inadmissible as evidence and should be excluded “unless intervening events break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession so that the confession is ‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.’ ” Factors used in making this determination are: “the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” 457 U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2667, 73 L.Ed.2d at 319. The Supreme Court also went to great pains to point out that giving the Miranda legal warning after an illegal arrest will not, standing alone, be sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. Further, as to the time gap between the arrest and the giving of the confession, which was a mere six hours, the Supreme Court held: “However, a difference of a few hours is not significant where, as here, petitioner was in police custody, unrepresented by counsel, and he was questioned on several occasions, fingerprinted, and subjected to a lineup.” 457 U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2668, 73 L.Ed.2d at 320. The fact that the defendant had visited with his girlfriend and her male companion prior to giving the confession was also held to be an insufficient intervening event to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. The fact that the police, after concluding that the defendant’s fingerprints matched unknown prints found on items handled by one of the participants of the robbery at the grocery store, obtained a warrant from a magistrate before obtaining the confession was held to be “irrelevant to whether the confession was the fruit of the illegal arrest.” 457 U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2669, 73 L.Ed.2d at 321. As to flagrancy of police conduct, the Supreme Court stated: “The fact that the police did not physically abuse petitioner, or that the confession they obtained may have been ‘voluntary’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, does not cure the illegality of the initial arrest.” The prosecution in Taylor v. Alabama, supra, also argued that the police officers in that cause had acted in “good faith.” The Supreme Court made short shrift of that assertion by stating the following: “To date, we have not recognized such an exception, and we decline to do so here.” The Supreme Court then held: “In sum, petitioner’s confession was the fruit of his illegal arrest...”
The majority of this Court, after “examining the circumstances surrounding acquisition of a written confession from appellant in the light of his being in jail on an arrest not shown to be lawful,” concludes that “the taint of the presumptively illegal arrest of appellant at the Me Lennan County Jail, though not purged alone by Miranda warnings . .. was removed by the time and circumstances under which the confession was ultimately given.” The majority further concludes, without clearly delineating just exactly what purged the taint of the illegal arrest in this instance, that appellant’s “confession was not tainted by exploitation of an illegal arrest and that the *40trial court did not err in admitting it into evidence.”
Appellant’s counsel on appeal admits in her appellate brief that the confession was not obtained by coercion. She states the following: “However, appellant is not, by this ground of error, advancing the claim that his confession was coerced or that he was denied counsel. Rather he asserts that his statement was made as the result of confinement pursuant to the Lampasas County arrest warrant [which the majority in this cause holds cannot be used to establish the legality of the appellant’s arrest] and his protracted contact with the Me Len-nan County personnel without benefit of consultation with family or attorney...” As I read this statement, counsel is contending that the appellant is relying solely on the failure of the State to establish intervening events and circumstances to remove the taint, of the initial illegal arrest, before the confession became admissible as evidence at appellant’s trial.
On the other hand, the State argues that if there was an illegal arrest, the taint was purged because “appellant received his Miranda warnings not once, but numerous times prior to his signing the confession”; “the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession was distant, the arrest on the Lampasas warrant having occurred in the early evening of January 80 ... and the confession being made sometime after 11:50 P.M. on the next date... Between the time of his initial contact with Officer Torres and his confession, appellant spent the night in jail, agreed to and took a polygraph examination away from the jail ..., and after returning to the Sheriff’s Office, appellant informed Torres that ‘he had something to tell [Torres] ... Appellant was allowed to rest and eat prior to the interview which led to the confession... Before taking the statement, appellant was again warned by a magistrate ... the record is replete with evidence of Deputy Torres’s good faith, showing no evidence of wilful or a negligent deprivation of appellant’s rights ... the impropriety of the arrest was not obvious, was not made for the purpose of obtaining a statement, was not exploited in any way to that end, was not without apparent justification, was not made as part of a dragnet operation or upon a pretext. Appellant was in no way misled as to the purpose of the arrest, nor was he subjected to continuous interrogation, threats, confusion, fright or surprise. No unacceptable police activity occurred ... the facts of the case show that the confession was ‘purged of the primary taint’, if any...”
I find that the State’s argument, without mentioning the decision, patterns itself after the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama in Taylor v. State, supra, which of course was the decision the Supreme Court of the United States reversed in Taylor v. Alabama, supra.
Interestingly, neither the appellant in his brief in support of the petition for discretionary review nor the State in its appellate brief nor in its response to the appellant’s petition for discretionary review mentions or discusses Taylor v. Alabama, supra. As previously noted, the majority cites, but does not discuss Taylor v. Alabama, supra.
My reading of Taylor v. Alabama, supra, leads me to the conclusion that if there has been an illegal arrest, then it is incumbent upon the prosecution to present sufficient intervening events or circumstances that will cause a severance of any causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession, so that the confession is “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint,” Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2667, 73 L.Ed.2d at 319, before the confession will be lawfully admissible. The giving of Miranda warnings to a person illegally arrested is insufficient to purge the taint. Taylor v. Alabama, supra; Brown v. Illinois, supra. In sum, where an appellate court is relying upon the intervening events and circumstances factor, as this Court is doing in this instance to sustain the admissibility of the confession, there must not be a causal connection between the confession and the illegal arrest. “It should be quite obvious that, once events are set in motion, there is, in terms of causation alone, no *41place to stop. The event without millions of causes is simply inconceivable; and causation alone can provide no clue of any kind to singling out those which are to be held legally responsible.” Prosser, Handbook Of The Law Of Torts, 4th Edition (1971), at 239.
In my view, the majority opinion simply does not square up with Taylor v. Alabama, supra, and, if anything, is in conflict therewith. I must ask the majority: what significant intervening event or events or circumstances, totally unrelated and unconnected with the illegal arrest, occurred in this cause prior to the giving of the confession, that establishes that the confession is “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint”? Neither the Miranda warnings that were given nor the good faith of the police will, by the explicit wording of Taylor v. Alabama, supra, get the job done.
I find that the majority, to support its holding that there were sufficient intervening circumstances, is left with the following events and circumstances: (1) After appellant was arrested and booked into the McLennan County Jail, Torres asked the appellant if he would object to taking a polygraph examination the next day; (2) the next day appellant took a polygraph examination but apparently was deceptive in his answers to questions asked by the operator, resulting in further non-testing questioning; (3) appellant was thereafter returned to the county jail, where Torres told him that he “probably would [want to talk to him some more],” with appellant responding that “he had something to tell [Torres] anyway.” (4) Torres did not initiate any questioning at that time, suggesting instead “that appellant first eat and refresh himself.” (5) No questioning of appellant occurred until later that night. (6) Without being summoned by the appellant, at a rather late hour, Torres went to appellant’s cell, got the appellant and took him downstairs, where appellant thereafter gave a written confession. From these facts, the majority erroneously concludes that the written confession was validly obtained.
A careful observation of the above, in light of what the Supreme Court stated in Taylor v. Alabama, supra, will quickly cause any good faith or good intentions of Torres to dissipate and be without any legal meaning. Furthermore, Torres’ concern about appellant’s cleanliness and lack of nourishment reflects nothing more on the part of Torres than, before he addressed the appellant later near midnight, he did not want an unclean and hungry prisoner on his hands before attempting to obtain a confession from appellant, as such might have interfered with his “hope that something would turn up.” 457 U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2668, 73 L.Ed.2d at 319-320.
I have concluded that the majority, to sustain the admission into evidence of the appellant’s confession, is really left with the bit about the polygraph examination as a sufficient intervening event and circumstance to purge the taint, but fails to explain how the taking of the polygraph examination, which reflected that appellant was deceptive in his answers to questions asked, could possibly have contributed to his ability to consider carefully and objectively his options and to exercise his free will in giving the written confession. The Supreme Court remarked in Taylor v. Alabama, supra, when it disposed of the prosecuting attorney’s contention that the defendant’s visit with his girlfriend and her male companion attenuated the taint: “If any [favorable] inference could be drawn [from that visit], it would be that this visit had just the opposite effect.” 457 U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 2668, 73 L.Ed.2d at 320. Can less be said about appellant’s visit with the polygraph machine?
If one strips the decisions of the Supreme Court, which are concerned with the admissibility of a confession where there has been an illegal arrest, of all their complicated ritualisms surrounded by elaborate trappings, I believe they will agree with me that a valid confession cannot be obtained by the police, with the possible exceptions of (1) where the defendant has been literally forced from the station house, but there*42after beats on the front door crying to be let back in so he can give the police a written confession or (2) where the police tell the defendant to leave the station house, but he refuses to leave the station house premises until he has been allowed to give a written confession. If either of those events occur, then maybe, just maybe, a confession that flows from an illegal arrest will be admissible. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Perhaps the Supreme Court of the United States is unaware of how unsatisfactory its decisions are in this area of the law. However, I find that to continue to play the invisible-negative game of when such a confession is admissible, i.e., we will tell you what is wrong, but we will not tell you what should have been done, is totally unfair to members of police departments, as well as members of the Bench and Bar, and appellate courts. Hopefully, counsel for appellant will pursue this cause to the Supreme Court for a more definitive ruling in this area of the law, and the Supreme Court will expressly state what it has for so long implicitly held.
The majority has made an effort to sustain the admissibility of the appellant’s confession. To such effort, I salute the majority. To its holding, however, which I believe will be short-lived in light of Taylor v. Alabama, supra, I respectfully dissent.
MILLER, J., joins.