Court Opinion

ID: 9927176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:05:18.473381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:03.667121
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 19, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                   Court of Appeals

                     NO. 2022-CA-0038-MR

THOMAS MAGINNIS                                      APPELLANT

           APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
v.          HONORABLE GINA K. CALVERT, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 17-CI-500728

NINAMARY BUBA,
F/K/A NINAMARY B. MAGINNIS                            APPELLEE

AND

                     NO. 2022-CA-0903-MR

NINAMARY BUBA,
F/K/A NINAMARY B. MAGINNIS                           APPELLANT

           APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
v.          HONORABLE GINA K. CALVERT, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 17-CI-500728

THOMAS MAGINNIS                                       APPELLEE
AND

                              NO. 2022-CA-1239-MR

THOMAS MAGINNIS                                                      APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
v.               HONORABLE GINA K. CALVERT, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 17-CI-500728

NINAMARY BUBA,
F/K/A NINAMARY B. MAGINNIS                                             APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: These consolidated appeals arise from post-judgment orders

of the Jefferson Family Court involving matters relating to the dissolution of the

marriage between Thomas Maginnis (“Maginnis”) and Ninamary Buba f/k/a

Ninamary B. Maginnis (“Buba”). The first two appeals address matters that were

the subject of this Court’s order of remand in the prior appeal. Buba challenges the

Family Court’s calculation of marital goodwill attributable to the marital business.

Maginnis argues that the Family Court relied on improper methods to calculate his

                                         -2-
income for maintenance purposes and abused its discretion by failing to make the

reduction of his maintenance obligation retroactive. We find no error or abuse of

discretion in any of these matters.

             In the third appeal, Maginnis challenges several rulings relating to

matters that arose while the prior appeal was pending. He argues that the Family

Court acted outside of its jurisdiction by allowing Buba to purchase the marital

residence and abused its discretion by denying his request for reimbursement of

mortgage payments he made prior to Buba’s refinancing of the residence. We

likewise find no error or abuse of discretion in these matters. Hence, we affirm in

all three appeals.

             I.      Factual and Procedural History

             The underlying facts of this action were set forth in detail in the prior

appeal. For purposes of this appeal, the following facts are relevant. Maginnis and

Buba were married in 1986 and separated in 2017. In 1994, the parties started a

business called Chimney Master. Maginnis performed the manual labor as a

chimney sweep, and Buba performed some other tasks, such as bookkeeping. At

the time of trial, Chimney Master had one other employee.

             When the matter came to a bench trial in 2019, one of the primary

issues concerned the valuation of Chimney Master and division of its marital

interest. In her pretrial disclosure, Buba identified Chris Johnson, a certified public

                                          -3-
accountant (“CPA”), to testify regarding his valuation of Chimney Master. Her

pretrial disclosure stated that Johnson would testify as to the financial standing and

earning potential of Chimney Master based on his analysis of the business and

financial records from 2015 and 2016, the business’s well-being, and current

earnings potential. Johnson was expected to testify that Chimney Master is a going

concern with excellent future income potential, but that he believed that not all

invoice amounts for those years are accounted for in the operating bank account,

totaling $45,000.

             At trial, Johnson’s testimony was largely consistent with his written

report but differed in one important respect regarding the “enterprise value” as

opposed to the “total value” of Chimney Master. In Johnson’s written report, he

concluded Chimney Master’s “enterprise value” was $284,141, but in his

testimony, he concluded Chimney Master’s “total value” was $284,414. In

Johnson’s testimony and in his written report, he consistently stated that 70% of

Chimney Master’s value was personal goodwill (deemed “personal attributes” in

the report) and 30% was enterprise goodwill (deemed “enterprise attributes” in the

report). However, during his testimony he clarified that the 30% “enterprise

value” of Chimney Master calculated out to about $85,000 of the total value of

$284,414.

                                         -4-
                In his pre-trial disclosure, Maginnis identified C.P.A. Melissa DeArk

as an expert concerning the business valuation of Chimney Masters. However, his

disclosure did not specify DeArk’s actual opinion. Consequently, when Maginnis

attempted to call DeArk at trial as a “rebuttal witness,” the Family Court refused to

allow her testimony.

                In its post-trial order, the Family Court divided the marital property.

Based on Johnson’s $284,141 valuation of Chimney Master, the Family Court

awarded Chimney Master to Maginnis and ordered him to pay Buba half its value -

$142,070. The Family Court noted that “transferable goodwill” was a factor in

determining a business’s value, but it nonetheless did not make any findings

regarding Chimney Master’s goodwill. In its order denying Thomas’s CR1 59.05

motion, the Family Court stated that there was no evidence that a chimney-sweep

business generated any personal goodwill.

                The Family Court further concluded that Buba was entitled to

maintenance, noting her disability and lack of other resources. In determining

Maginnis’s income, the Court took the average of the reported gross receipts on his

2015, 2016, and 2017 tax returns. The Family Court also pointed to the testimony

that Maginnis receives cash payments that he does not report, and that Chimney

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                            -5-
Master directly pays some of his expenses. Consequently, the Family Court found

Maginnis’s average annual income to be $160,308, against expenses of $2,075 per

month. Based on its other findings concerning Buba’s income and expenses, the

Family Court ordered Maginnis to pay Buba maintenance in the amount of $3,300

per month.

             In addition, the Family Court calculated the marital interest in the

residence. The Court found that the residence had a total equity of $74,924,

subject to Maginnis’s non-marital interest of $42,886. Consequently, the Family

Court directed that the property be sold. Maginnis would be entitled to the first

$42,886 of the sale proceeds, and the parties would equally divide the remaining

sale proceeds. Finally, the Family Court directed Maginnis to pay maintenance to

Buba in the amount of $3,300 per month.

             Maginnis appealed from the Family Court’s division of the marital

interest in Chimney Master. The prior panel of this Court affirmed the Family

Court’s exclusion of DeArk’s testimony. However, the panel reversed the Family

Court’s calculation of the marital value of Chimney Master, holding as follows:

                   Thomas’s [Maginnis’s] next argument is that the
             family court’s valuation of Chimney Master is fatally
             flawed because it ignores the analysis in Johnson’s report
             and testimony that 30% of Chimney Master’s value was
             due to enterprise goodwill, a marital asset, and 70% of
             Chimney Master’s value was due to personal goodwill, a
             nonmarital asset. Pursuant to Gaskill v. Robbins, 282
             S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2009), there is a distinction between

                                         -6-
enterprise goodwill, which is a marital asset and can be
divided in a dissolution, and personal goodwill, which is
nonmarital. We agree with Thomas that the judgment
must be vacated on this basis.

       “The valuation of a business is complicated, often
speculative or assumptive, and at best subjective . . . .
Nonetheless, when a business is established during a
marriage and is thus marital property, the trial court is
required to fix a value and divide it between the
spouses.” Id. at 311 (paragraph break omitted). As it
pertains to this case, quoting approvingly from Yoon v.
Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265, 1268-70 (Ind. 1999) (citations
and quotation marks omitted), Gaskill instructed family
courts to allocate personal and enterprise goodwill when
valuing and dividing a business:

             Goodwill in a professional practice
      may be attributable to the business
      enterprise itself by virtue of its existing
      arrangements with suppliers, customers or
      others, and its anticipated future customer
      base due to factors attributable to the
      business. It may also be attributable to the
      individual owner’s personal skill, training or
      reputation. This distinction is sometimes
      reflected in the use of the term “enterprise
      goodwill,” as opposed to “personal
      goodwill.”

             Enterprise goodwill is based on the
      intangible, but generally marketable,
      existence in a business of established
      relations with employees, customers and
      suppliers . . . . Enterprise goodwill is an
      asset of the business and accordingly is
      property that is divisible in a dissolution to
      the extent that it inheres in the business,
      independent of any single individual’s

                            -7-
      personal efforts and will outlast any person’s
      involvement in the business . . . .

             In contrast, the goodwill that depends
      on the continued presence of a particular
      individual is a personal asset, and any value
      that attaches to a business as a result of this
      “personal goodwill” represents nothing more
      than the future earning capacity of the
      individual and is not divisible . . . .

      ....

              In sum, to the extent a business or
      profession has goodwill (or has a value in
      excess of its net assets) it is a factual issue to
      what extent, if any, that goodwill is personal
      to the owner or employee and to what extent
      it is enterprise goodwill and therefore
      divisible property.

Gaskill, 282 S.W.3d at 314.

       Gaskill does not explicitly state that all business
valuations henceforth must contain an enterprise versus
personal goodwill analysis. Nonetheless, we reject
Ninamary’s [Buba’s] argument that the goodwill analysis
in Gaskill was not mandatory here. First, as Gaskill
recognized, Kentucky law had already recognized that
“goodwill is a factor to be considered in arriving at the
value of a business[.]” Id. at 312. Second, the family
court in Gaskill did not engage in an enterprise versus
personal goodwill analysis in dividing the medical
practice – indeed, there was no Kentucky law at the time
authorizing it to do so. Nonetheless, our Supreme Court
found the family court erred by failing to conduct that
analysis, explaining: “If the value of goodwill can be
reasonably determined at all, the amount of enterprise
goodwill, which is all that can be considered as marital
property, can be determined. Therefore the trial court

                             -8-
erred in failing to consider personal and enterprise
goodwill.” Id. at 315 (paragraph break omitted). If it
was error to not conduct an analysis which was not
authorized under Kentucky law, it must be error to fail to
conduct the analysis after the law has been settled.

       Ninamary [Buba] also argues that Gaskill is
inapplicable here because it dealt with valuing a
professional business, unlike Chimney Master.
Ninamary’s [Buba’s] argument places her in the unusual
position of asking us to affirm the family court’s decision
to ignore her own expert’s unrebutted testimony.
Unfortunately, the parties have not cited, nor have we
independently located, any binding authority definitively
addressing whether Gaskill applies to valuing
professional and nonprofessional business entities alike.

        However, there is no explicit indication in Gaskill
that it was intended to only apply to valuing professional
businesses. Indeed, the Indiana Supreme Court’s
decision in Yoon, which our Supreme Court quoted at
length and deemed “compelling” repeatedly refers to
valuing “a business or practice” or “a self-employed
business or professional practice” or “a business or
profession[.]” Gaskill, 282 S.W.3d at 313-14 (quoting
Yoon, 711 N.E.2d at 1268-70). Moreover, the practical
effect of Ninamary’s [Buba’s] argument would be to
permit family courts to ignore goodwill testimony when
valuing nonprofessional businesses.

       Rabe v. Rabe, No. 2011-CA-001972-MR, 2015
WL 3505232 (Ky. App. May 29, 2015) (unpublished),
discussed by the parties, is – in addition to being
unpublished and therefore not binding – materially
distinguishable. Unlike the case at hand, in Rabe “no
testimony was offered suggesting that any of the
business’s goodwill was personal.” Id. at *3. When
valuing a business, ignoring unrebutted goodwill
evidence is not the same as failing to sua sponte create
and assign personal goodwill to a business. In short,

                            -9-
though the issue may more often arise when valuing a
professional entity, we conclude Gaskill also applies to
valuing nonprofessional entities.

       We are left here with the question of whether the
family court erred by accepting Johnson’s overall
valuation while ignoring his component conclusion that
only thirty percent of its value is marital (enterprise
goodwill). Precedent has long held that a family court’s
valuation will be affirmed if it “reasonably approximated
the [entity’s] net value[,]” Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56,
59 (Ky. App. 1990), and falls “within the range of the
competent testimony[,]” Roberts v. Roberts, 587 S.W.2d
281, 283 (Ky. App. 1979).

      A finder of fact does not have to accept blindly the
valuation testimony and conclusions of an expert, even if
they are unrebutted. Cf. 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and
Opinion Evidence § 245 (2021). However, the finder of
fact must provide a legitimate explanation for rejecting
uncontradicted evidence or it will be reversed as acting in
an arbitrary and unsupported manner. Kroger Limited
Partnership I v. Boyle County Property Valuation
Administrator, 610 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Ky. App. 2020).

       The family court incorrectly indicated there was no
goodwill evidence for it to consider and justified its
division based on this faulty understanding of the
evidence. The family court cannot be deemed to have
reasonably approximated the marital value of Chimney
Master when it failed to address unrebutted evidence of
the entity’s enterprise versus personal goodwill. Ignoring
Johnson’s goodwill conclusions led to a roughly
$200,000 increase in the marital portion of Chimney
Master’s value. Therefore, we vacate the family court’s
valuation of Chimney Master and remand with
instructions to address Johnson’s goodwill conclusions
by either: (1) accepting them and apportioning the value
of Chimney Master in accordance therewith, or (2)

                           -10-
             rejecting them, and providing a sufficient explanation for
             so doing.

Maginnis v. Maginnis, No. 2019-CA-1090-MR, 2021 WL 2483877, at *5-7 (Ky.

App. Jun. 18, 2021) (unpublished), discretionary review denied (Jan. 11, 2022).

             In light of its decision to vacate and remand the holding concerning

the division of marital property, the prior panel also directed the Family Court to

re-evaluate its maintenance award to Buba. Id. at *7. The Court further noted that

the Family Court failed to set out how it calculated Maginnis’s net income. Thus,

this Court held that “on remand the family court must ensure its findings are

supported by substantial evidence and its mathematical computations are

sufficiently explained.” Id. at *8.

             On remand, the Family Court advised the parties that it would review

the trial recording to render its new decision. On June 29, 2022, the Family Court

entered its findings on the remanded issues. With respect to its calculation of

Chimney Master’s enterprise and personal goodwill, the Family Court found as

follows:

                    Ninamary [Buba] testified that she and Thomas
             [Maginnis] started the business together. She testified
             [that] she managed the business’s collection efforts,
             handled the marketing, and performed other secretarial
             functions throughout the marriage until she was
             diagnosed with cancer. She acknowledged that Thomas
             [Maginnis] handled the client relations, labor, and the
             business’s accounting outside of collections. Thomas
             [Maginnis] testified that Ninamary [Buba] was a stay-at-

                                        -11-
home mother and primarily raised the parties’ minor
children in the business’s early years. He acknowledged
she managed some of the collection accounts, and that
her contributions in the home allowed him to work full-
time outside the home.

        Ninamary’s [Buba’s] expert witness, Chris
Johnson, CPA, testified he used a cash flow analysis
approach to value Chimney Masters at $284,414. He
extrapolated Chimney Master’s earning potential over ten
years, then discounted it for present value. He also stated
he reviewed the company’s 2017 draft tax return, which
reflected a higher gross income and supported his
calculation that the business would continue to increase
in revenue. He based the bulk of his valuation on the
company’s 2015 and 2016 tax returns, customer invoices,
bank statements, assets, and accounts receivable. He
noted that he found discrepancies in Chimney Master’s
total invoiced amount and total income reported, which
he testified reflected that Chimney Masters may not
report all of its cash payments. However, on cross
examination, he admitted that may be partially due to the
business’s inability to collect all outstanding invoiced
accounts. Thomas’ [Maginnis’s] testimony was that he is
not able to collect payment on all jobs performed. He
testified his valuation did not deduct the business’s
liabilities because they were so egregiously comingled
with personal debts.

       Ultimately, he assigned a personal goodwill value
of seventy percent (70%) and an enterprise goodwill
value of thirty percent (30%). He attributed Thomas’s
[Maginnis’s] skills as a chimney sweep, his reputation in
the community, his health and age, to personal goodwill.
He attributed the business’s branding, its name, its repeat
clients, and its one employee to enterprise goodwill.
While Mr. Johnson’s testimony did not provide ample
examples, his report, which was admitted into evidence
listed several applicable categories and rated each
category on a scale of one to five in importance and zero

                           -12-
                to five in existence within the company, which
                adequately supported his goodwill calculations. Thomas
                [Maginnis] also testified to his skill level, the type of
                work he performed, the impact gas fireplaces have taken
                on his business, and the personal relationships he has
                with the 1099 workers[2] he utilizes for bigger jobs.
                Thomas’s [Maginnis’s] testimony supported Mr.
                Johnson’s goodwill calculations.

                      Thus, the Court accepts Mr. Johnson’s valuation of
                $284,414, and divides the marital portion of that
                valuation, i.e., the enterprise goodwill of $85,324.3
                Thomas [Maginnis] shall pay Ninamary [Buba] $42,662,
                which is half of the business’s marital value. Thomas
                [Maginnis] is awarded Chimney Masters.

                With respect to the maintenance award, the Family Court noted that

Buba has been unable to work since 2017. Buba’s illness and actions taken by

Maginnis have harmed her ability to earn money as an attorney. She earns

approximately $479 per month in residual income from her legal practice, plus

$1,529 in Social Security Disability, for a total income of $2,008 per month.

Against this income, Buba reported reasonable expenses of $5,189, leaving a

shortfall of $3,182.

                The Family Court next addressed the conflicting evidence concerning

Maginnis’s income, ultimately adopting the amount set forth on his 2017 tax return

2
 A “1099 worker” refers to an independent contractor or other self-employed worker who
completes particular jobs or assignments but is not an employee of the company. The name
derives from IRS Form 1099, on which payments to such workers are reported.
3
    Enterprise value was 30% of $284,414, which equals $85,324.

                                              -13-
- $107,200 per year or $8,933 per month. The Family Court also noted the

evidence that Chimney Master pays many of his personal expenses, leaving him

with monthly expenses of $2,075 per month. Thus, the Family Court found that

Maginnis has a surplus of $6,858 per month. Based on these calculations and the

adjusted allocation of marital property, the Family Court directed Maginnis to pay

maintenance to Buba in the amount of $3,100 per month. Both parties separately

appealed from this order. Additional facts will be set forth below as necessary.

              II.   Appeal No. 2022-CA-0903-MR

              In her appeal, Buba challenges the Family Court’s calculation of the

enterprise and personal goodwill business attributable to Chimney Master.

Because this Court previously remanded the matter for additional findings on this

question, the Family Court must strictly follow the mandate given in that case.

Buckley v. Wilson, 177 S.W.3d 778, 781 (Ky. 2005). In a subsequent appeal

following a retrial after remand, this Court’s role is limited to whether the Trial

Court properly construed and applied the mandate. Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d

847, 849 (Ky. 1982). We review that question de novo. See Univ. Med. Ctr., Inc.

v. Beglin, 432 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Ky. App. 2014). But where the Family Court has

complied with this Court’s mandate for remand, its factual findings will only be

disturbed if clearly erroneous. CR 52.01; Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425

(Ky. 1982).

                                         -14-
             Buba complains that the Family Court’s allocation of goodwill was

not in accordance with the holding of Gaskill v. Robbins, supra. She maintains

that the Family Court’s 2019 judgment properly concluded that Chimney Master

has no personal goodwill. However, this Court’s prior opinion held otherwise,

specifically holding that the goodwill analysis in Gaskill is applicable to

professional and non-professional businesses alike. Right or wrong, that holding is

now law of the case, and is binding on all parties, the Family Court, and this Court

on subsequent appeal. Williamson v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Ky.

1989) (citing Martin v. Frasure, 352 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Ky. 1961)). Consequently,

the Family Court could not simply ignore Johnson’s uncontested testimony about

the personal goodwill attributable to the value of Chimney Master.

             The Family Court clearly complied with this Court’s directive on

remand. The Family Court noted Johnson’s uncontested testimony assigning 70%

of the business’s value to personal goodwill and 30% to enterprise goodwill. The

Family Court also pointed out that Johnson gave specific reasons for these

assignments – most notably Maginnis’s skills as a chimney sweep, his reputation in

the community, his health, and age. In compliance with this Court’s mandate, the

Family Court found no basis to reject his uncontested testimony. Although Buba

points to other testimony that may have afforded a basis to reach a different result,

we cannot say that the Family Court was compelled to reject Johnson’s testimony.

                                         -15-
Therefore, we will not disturb the Family Court’s judgment dividing the marital

equity of Chimney Master.

                III.   Appeal 2022-CA-1239-MR

                In his first appeal, Maginnis argues that the Family Court abused its

discretion in awarding maintenance to Buba. We review the Family Court’s

determination of maintenance for abuse of discretion in accordance with the

standards set forth in KRS4 403.200. Stipp v. St. Charles, 291 S.W.3d 720, 727

(Ky. App. 2009). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s

decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581

(Ky. 2000). More specifically, a court abuses the discretion afforded it when “(1)

its decision rests on an error of law . . . or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2)

its decision . . . cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.”

Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 915 n.11 (Ky. 2004) (cleaned up).

                KRS 403.200 sets out a two-part test to award maintenance. First, the

Family Court must first find that the spouse seeking maintenance lacks sufficient

property, including marital property, to provide for her reasonable needs. KRS

403.200(1)(a). Second, the Family Court must find that the spouse is unable to

support herself through appropriate employment according to the standard of living

4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -16-
established during the marriage. KRS 403.200(1)(b). Once that two-part

determination is made, the Trial Court considers various factors in setting the

“just” amount and duration of maintenance. KRS 403.200(2). Maginnis does not

challenge the Family Court’s findings under the first part of the statute.

             Rather, Maginnis argues that the Family Court relied on improper

methods to calculate his income, thus reaching an incorrect conclusion regarding

his ability to meet his own needs while also meeting Buba’s needs. KRS

403.200(2)(f). Maginnis focuses on the Family Court’s reliance on the gross

receipts reported on his 2017 tax returns. He contends that the use of gross

receipts substantially overstates his actual income. Maginnis also argues that the

Family Court improperly considered Buba’s allegations that he collected

unreported cash payments from the business.

             We find no error or abuse of discretion. In our prior opinion, this

Court directed the Family Court to explain how it calculated Maginnis’s income

for maintenance purposes. On remand, the Family Court noted that there was very

little definitive evidence on that issue. Maginnis does not dispute that Chimney

Master pays some of his personal expenses directly. The Family Court found

Maginnis’s testimony regarding the invoice discrepancies to be not credible. The

Family Court found that the gross receipts reported on the 2017 tax returns were

likely conservative, but still less than what Johnson estimated Maginnis’s earning

                                         -17-
potential to be. The Family Court further found that Maginnis has a surplus of

$6,858 per month in excess of his reasonable expenses, and he is therefore able to

pay maintenance to Buba. Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the

Family Court clearly erred by adopting that amount as Maginnis’s income.

            Maginnis also contends that the Family Court abused its discretion

when it refused to modify maintenance retroactively to the date of the 2019 decree.

He asserts that Buba was unjustly enriched by the Family Court’s failure to make

the modified award retroactive. The Family Court has discretion to grant a

retroactive award of maintenance from the filing of the motion to the entry of

judgment. Mudd v. Mudd, 903 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Ky. App. 1995). However, the

maintenance statutes generally contemplate prospective relief. Pursley v. Pursley,

144 S.W.3d 820, 828-29 (Ky. 2004). Thus, retroactive relief is usually appropriate

only when circumstances delay a case from being submitted for decision. Mudd,

903 S.W.2d at 534 (citing Ullman v. Ullman, 302 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Ky. 1957)).

            Such circumstances are not present in this case. In its prior opinion,

this Court did not hold that the Family Court abused its discretion by awarding

maintenance in the 2019 judgment. Rather, the prior panel merely held that the

award must be reconsidered in light of the more specific findings regarding

Maginnis’s income and the new division of marital property. The Family Court’s

findings in its 2022 judgment marginally reduced Buba’s maintenance award based

                                        -18-
on these new findings. But the Family Court’s determination was based mainly on

new or more detailed evidence concerning the parties’ income in 2019.

Furthermore, in its October 7, 2022, order denying Maginnis’s CR 59.05 motion,

the Family Court explained that the reduction in maintenance was caused by

Maginnis’s failure to produce accurate and reliable income documentation. We

conclude the Family Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to modify

maintenance retroactively. See Higbee v. Higbee, 89 S.W.3d 409, 410 (Ky. 2002).

             IV.   Appeal No. 2022-CA-0038-MR

             Finally, Maginnis appeals from several post-judgment orders relating

to the marital residence. Some additional facts and procedural history are

necessary at this point. As discussed above, the Family Court’s 2019 judgment

calculated the equity in the residence, awarded Maginnis his non-marital interest,

directed the sale of the residence, and ordered that the proceeds of the sale be

divided accordingly. However, that sale never occurred.

             After entry of the judgment on April 10, 2019, Buba filed a CR 59.05

motion asking the Family Court to vacate its ruling that the residence be sold,

stating that she “lacked the stamina, mental and emotional strength, or physical

ability to relocate.” The Family Court denied the motion on July 2, 2019. Neither

party appealed from this portion of the judgment.

                                         -19-
             Nevertheless, the parties were unable to agree on how to list the

residence for sale. On August 1, 2019, Maginnis filed a motion to compel sale of

the residence. Buba responded that she was taking the necessary steps, but the

property required extensive repairs. Buba also filed a motion to hold Maginnis in

contempt because he deducted the mortgage payments from his maintenance

payments. Maginnis then requested a “clarification” of the April 10, 2019,

judgment concerning his responsibility for the mortgage payments. Maginnis also

requested orders directing Buba to reimburse him for mortgage payments made

and to cease any further repairs of the property. The parties continued to have

disputes over the choice of a real estate agent.

             In an order entered on July 22, 2020, the Family Court held that

Maginnis was not entitled to deduct the mortgage payments from maintenance.

However, the Family Court directed that, rather than listing the property for sale,

Buba should be permitted to buy Maginnis’s interest. Therefore, the Court

directed Buba to start making the mortgage payments and gave her 90 days to seek

refinancing of the property. The Family Court’s order also stated that, if Buba did

not refinance the property within that time, the property shall be listed for sale.

The Family Court then passed the remaining motions for a later hearing.

             On August 3, 2020, Buba filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the

July 22, 2020, order to allow her more time to refinance. The Family Court denied

                                         -20-
the motion on September 28, 2020. That order was designated as final and

appealable pursuant to CR 54.02.

             Thereafter, the remaining motions came before the Family Court at a

hearing on October 1, 2020. Thereafter, on October 8, 2020, the Family Court

issued an order addressing those matters. In pertinent part, the Family Court first

held that, under the April 10, 2019, judgment, Maginnis remained responsible for

the mortgage payments until the property was sold. In addition, the Family Court

noted that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic stimulus, the mortgage payment was in

forbearance through much of 2020. Consequently, the Family Court concluded

that Maginnis was not entitled to deduct the mortgage payments from his

maintenance obligation and was not entitled to reimbursement of his mortgage

payments. The Family Court’s order did not address either refinancing or listing

the property for sale.

             On October 13, 2020, Buba moved the Family Court for an additional

90 days to secure refinancing of the property. In the alternative, she requested an

order directing Maginnis to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the property to her.

On October 16, 2020, Maginnis filed motions under CR 59.05, 60.01, and 60.02 to

vacate the October 8, 2020, order with respect to the denial of his request for

reimbursement of the mortgage payments.

                                        -21-
             On October 26, 2020, the Family Court entered an order directing

Maginnis to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the residence to Buba within seven

days. Maginnis signed the quitclaim deed on November 2, 2020, and Buba

recorded the deed on November 10. Buba refinanced the property near the end of

November 2020.

             On December 8, 2021, the Family Court entered an Order denying

Maginnis’s October 16, 2020, motions. Among other things, the Family Court

concluded that Maginnis’s motion to compel the sale of the residence was moot

because the property had already been transferred and refinanced. The Family

Court also denied Maginnis’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate the October 8,

2020, order denying his request for reimbursement of mortgage payments. The

Family Court designated this order as final and appealable pursuant to CR 54.02.

Maginnis filed his notice of appeal from this order on January 5, 2022.

             Maginnis argues that the Family Court acted outside its particular-

case jurisdiction when it altered the terms of its July 22, 2020, order giving Buba

90 days to obtain refinancing of the property. He correctly notes that the Family

Court denied Buba’s motion to allow her more time to refinance on September 28,

2020. Because CR 59.05 provides that a final judgment may be altered, amended,

or vacated only within ten days after entry of the final judgment, Maginnis

contends that the Family Court acted outside of its particular-case jurisdiction

                                        -22-
when it subsequently allowed her additional time to refinance and ordered him to

quitclaim the property. We disagree.

             Even if the Family Court acted outside its particular-case jurisdiction,

that issue may be waived if not timely raised. Goodlett v. Brittain, 544 S.W.3d

656, 660 (Ky. App. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717,

724-25 (Ky. 2013)). Here, Maginnis did not raise any objection to the refinancing

other than it was beyond the 90 days allowed in the July 22, 2022, order. He did

not appeal or seek a writ from the order requiring him to sign the quitclaim deed.

As noted above, the property was transferred to Buba in November of 2020.

             Moreover, while the September 28, 2022, order included finality

language, it was not a final and appealable order. Specifically, neither the July 22,

2022, order nor the September 28, 2022, order conclusively determined the rights

of the parties in regard to that particular phase of the proceeding. Francis v.

Crounse Corp., 98 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Ky. App. 2002) (citing Hale v. Deaton, 528

S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1975)). The July 22, 2022, order merely commanded the

property to be listed for sale if Buba failed to secure financing within the

prescribed time. The September 28, 2022, order denied Buba’s request for

additional time for refinancing. Under both orders, matters concerning that sale

were reserved for later adjudication. Consequently, the Family Court retained the

                                         -23-
authority to allow Buba to purchase the property as part of its continuing

jurisdiction to enforce its orders.

             As directed in the prior judgments, the property was sold and the

proceeds divided. Maginnis does not ask this Court to vacate the transfer to Buba

and direct the Family Court to order a sale of the property. Morgan v. Getter, 441

S.W.3d 94, 98-99 (Ky. 2014). In addition, Maginnis does not claim that he did not

receive his allotted share of the sale proceeds. Thus, the matter is now moot.

             Separately, Maginnis argues that the Family Court erred by denying

his motion for reimbursement of mortgage payments that he made between the

April 10, 2019, judgment and the July 22, 2022, order directing Buba to assume

the mortgage payments until the property was sold. The Family Court repeatedly

denied Maginnis’s motion for reimbursement, concluding that he waived the issue

by voluntarily making payments on the mortgage after the April 10, 2019,

judgment and by failing to raise the issue until nearly a year later. We agree with

Maginnis that he adequately reserved this issue in his October 16, 2020, motion.

             However, this merely returns us to the underlying question – was

Maginnis entitled to reimbursement of mortgage payments made between the April

10, 2019, judgment and the July 22, 2020, order directing Buba to assume

responsibility for the payments? Maginnis argues that Buba has been unjustly

enriched by these payments. Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine that serves

                                        -24-
as a basis of restitution to prevent one person from keeping money or benefits

belonging to another. Haeberle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 769 S.W.2d

64, 67 (Ky. App. 1989) (citing Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Glasscock, 270 Ky.

750, 110 S.W.2d 681 (1937)). “There are three elements that a party must meet in

order to prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment: (1) benefit conferred upon

defendant at plaintiff’s expense; (2) a resulting appreciation of benefit by

defendant; and (3) inequitable retention of benefit without payment for its value.”

Collins v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., 399 S.W.3d 449, 455 (Ky. App. 2012).

             As the Family Court recognized in its October 8, 2020, order,

Maginnis did not show any compelling grounds for reimbursement. The mortgage

was originally in Maginnis’s sole name. Since the April 10, 2019, judgment did

not address assignment of the mortgage, he was ultimately responsible for the

payments until the property was sold. Maginnis unilaterally elected to withhold

the mortgage payments from Buba’s maintenance. But he did not elect to seek a

credit for those payments until well into 2020. Furthermore, both parties were

responsible for the delays in listing the property for sale in 2019, and the COVID-

19 pandemic created additional obstacles to listing the property. And as the

Family Court noted, the mortgage was in forbearance through much of 2020.

             Arguably, Maginnis showed that his mortgage payments conferred a

benefit. But since the property was to be sold, that benefit accrued to both parties.

                                         -25-
Had the property been sold to a third party as planned, Maginnis would not have a

right to any additional proceeds because he never requested that relief. Therefore,

the fact that Buba ultimately obtained the benefit of those payments was not

inequitable. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the Family Court did not

abuse its discretion by denying his request for reimbursement or an offset for those

payments.

             Finally, Maginnis raises several issues relating to the Family Court’s

rulings on his discovery motions. Buba responds that these discovery issues relate

to the issue of temporary maintenance, which is not appealable. Maginnis states

that he is not appealing the issue of temporary maintenance, but he does not

identify what those discovery matters concerned. Maginnis merely asserts that

“[h]e is merely challenging the propriety of the [Family Court’s] demonstratable

bias by allowing one party to conduct discovery while prohibiting the other party

from the same.”

             The orders at issue specifically related to discovery of records

concerning Maginnis’s income and Buba’s ability to work. Furthermore, the

orders referenced Buba’s claim for pendente lite maintenance. This Court could

only grant potential relief on these discovery issues by remanding the temporary

maintenance issues for further proceedings. But as this Court’s motion panel

recognized, temporary maintenance orders are interlocutory in nature and generally

                                        -26-
are not subject to appeal. Atkisson v. Atkisson, 298 S.W.3d 858, 864 (Ky. App.

2009). Maginnis does not request any other relief, such as recusal of the Trial

Judge due to bias. Since the subject of the discovery orders is beyond the

jurisdiction of this Court, we decline to address the issue further.

             V.     Conclusion

             Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the Jefferson Family Court in all

three appeals.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-                BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-
 APPELLEE:                                  APPELLANT:

 Allison S. Russell                         Robert Frederick Smith
 Shanna R. Ballinger                        Louisville, Kentucky
 Louisville, Kentucky

                                         -27-