Court Opinion

ID: 9917244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 19:00:41.027561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:59.403578
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 11 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERIC FRANCISCO VALENCIA,                        No. 22-1687
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A200-157-127
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted January 8, 2024**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: CHRISTEN and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,*** Judge.

      Eric Francisco Valencia (“Francisco Valencia”), a native and citizen of

Mexico, illegally entered the United States around 2000. On March 6, 2020, he

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
was convicted of attempted robbery in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 2111 and

6642 and was sentenced to 16 months in prison. In removal proceedings, Francisco

Valencia requested relief in the forms of withholding of removal and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).3 An immigration judge (“IJ”)

denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) issued a final order of

removal and dismissed Francisco Valencia’s appeal. Francisco Valencia petitions

for review of the BIA’s final order of removal. Exercising jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252, we dismiss in part, and deny in part, the petition for review.

        1.     In reviewing the agency’s particularly serious crime determination,

we are limited to determining whether the agency applied the correct legal

standard. See Flores-Vega v. Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2019). “Where, as

here, the BIA has reviewed the IJ’s decision and incorporated portions of it as its

own, we treat the incorporated parts of the IJ’s decision as the BIA’s.” Molina-

Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the agency applied

the correct legal standard, we lack jurisdiction to consider whether it erred in

1
 Cal. Penal Code § 211 provides: “Robbery is the felonious taking of personal
property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”
2
 Cal. Penal Code § 664 provides: “Every person who attempts to commit any
crime, but fails, or is prevented or intercepted in its perpetration, shall be punished
where no provision is made by law for the punishment of those attempts . . . .”
3
    He also requested asylum but later conceded that he was ineligible for asylum.
finding that Francisco Valencia’s attempted robbery conviction constituted a

“particularly serious crime.”4 See Flores-Vega, 932 F.3d at 884. We determine

our jurisdiction de novo. Guerrier v. Garland, 18 F.4th 304, 308 (9th Cir. 2021).

      Here, the agency applied the standard set forth in Matter of Frentescu, 18 I.

& N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982). See also Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1127

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247). The IJ

stated that the seriousness of a crime is judged by looking at factors such as “the

nature of conviction, the circumstances underlying the conviction, the type of

sentence imposed, and, most importantly, whether the type and circumstances of

the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.” Applying that

standard, the agency determined that Francisco Valencia committed a particularly

serious crime based on “the elements of the crime (a forcible taking from the

person of another), the sentence (16 months), and the injuries to the victim (the

security guard who attempted to stop him from stealing the bottle of alcohol).”

      On appeal, Francisco Valencia does not appear to argue that the agency

misapplied the legal standard. His argument primarily consists of a single

paragraph:

         Without diminishing the seriousness of the crime, [Francisco
         Valencia] was intoxicated at the time of the incident. Unfortunately,

4
  A noncitizen who has been convicted of a particularly serious crime is statutorily
ineligible for withholding of removal under both 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) and
under CAT, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2).
           the intoxication adversely altered his behavior. He does not have
           other similar incidents where he has assaulted another individual. It
           was an unfortunate incident that got out of hand. [He] did not have
           a similar incident after being convicted of this crime.5

         Because we cannot discern from this series of statements any challenge to

the correctness of the legal standard that the agency applied, we lack jurisdiction.6

5
    Francisco Valencia’s opening brief also states:

           Regarding the incident that led to his conviction, [Francisco
           Valencia] testified: “I was pretty much, I was in this like area where
           there’s a lot of bars and I was walking through there and I wasn’t in
           the right state of mind and I thought it would be easy to just hop over
           the bar counter and grab a bottle of alcohol because there was nobody
           there. And I reached for the bottle and then I like came back over
           and the security guard saw me, and he told me to stop and I didn’t
           stop and I don’t know, like just freaked out and I threw a bottle at
           him and that was it. . . .”
6
  Even assuming that this paragraph could be construed as a legal challenge to the
agency’s particularly serious crime finding, Francisco Valencia still has failed to
establish that the agency committed any legal error in its determination. See, e.g.,
Flores-Vega, 932 F.3d at 884 (“[W]e review whether ‘the agency relied on the
appropriate factors and proper evidence to reach [its] conclusion.’” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072,
1077 (9th Cir. 2015))). First, Francisco Valencia cites no case law that suggests
that the IJ was required to consider more than the crime at issue or consider factors
such as Francisco Valencia’s rehabilitation or how he was adversely affected by
intoxication. Second, Francisco Valencia’s claim that “the intoxication adversely
altered his behavior” was not before the IJ. Last, the IJ stated that “[t]here has
been no evidence offered with regard to potential rehabilitation, although not a
significant factor to [the] analysis.” In fact, after his conviction for attempted
robbery, Francisco Valencia was arrested and convicted of felony vandalism and
petty theft, for which he was sentenced to 16 months in prison and 208 days in jail,
respectively. Francisco Valencia’s criminal record directly contradicts his claim of
rehabilitation.
      2.     The agency did not err in determining that Francisco Valencia was not

eligible for deferral of removal under CAT.7 We review factual findings under the

deferential “substantial evidence” standard. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

478, 481 (1992). Francisco Valencia “must demonstrate that he would be subject

to a ‘particularized threat of torture.’” Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 936 (9th Cir. 2004)).

      Here, the BIA reasoned:

The [IJ] found no past torture in part because the domestic abuse that [Francisco

Valencia] suffered at the hands of his father was not instigated by, consented to, or

acquiesced to, by the government. When the police were notified of the domestic

abuse, an arrest warrant was issued for the perpetrator, who fled, resulting in the

perpetrator having no further physical contact with the family. The [IJ] also found

no particularized threat of future torture due to domestic abuse because [Francisco

Valencia] does not know where his father is and, even if [Francisco Valencia] were

to encounter him on return to Mexico, more than 20 years later, his father would be

unlikely to recognize him and would be unlikely to be able to inflict harm on him,

because he is no longer a child.

7
  Conviction of a particularly serious crime does not bar a petitioner from seeking
deferral of removal (as opposed to withholding of removal) under CAT. See 8
C.F.R. § 1208.17; Flores-Vega, 932 F.3d at 884 (“The only immigration relief
available to a noncitizen convicted of a ‘particularly serious crime’ is deferral of
removal under CAT . . . .”).
      On appeal, Francisco Valencia does not appear to challenge these findings.

Instead, he points to the following: (1) the most recent Mexico Country Report

states that many crimes in Mexico were either unreported or not investigated; (2)

there were reports that some government agents were complicit with international

organized criminal gangs, and prosecution and conviction rates were low; and (3)

he believes that the Mexican government is unable and refuses to protect its

population. But this evidence fails to show that any of these potential harms are

particularized. See Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2021)

(“[S]peculative fear of torture is insufficient to satisfy the ‘more likely than not’

standard.”).

      PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART.8

8
 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The
motion to stay removal (Dkt. 2) is otherwise denied.