Court Opinion

ID: 9764308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:18:34.790769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:55.679837
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Bevilacqua, dissenting in part.
I do not agree with my Brother Paolino’s interpretation of G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) §27-7-2.1. The plain language of §27-7-2.1 provides that no automobile policy may be issued in this state “unless coverage is provided * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles * * * .” It is clear that the statute is person oriented rather than vehicle oriented.
The majority of jurisdictions have held that the Legislature, in adopting uninsured motorist statutes, intended to protect innocent insured motorists who suffer damages as a result of automobile collisions involving financially irresponsible drivers. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v. Reaves, 292 Ala. 218, 292 So. 2d 95 (1974); Nygaard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 301 Minn. 10, 221 N.W.2d 151 (1974); Lowery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 285 So. 2d 767 *745(Miss. 1973); Beck v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 73 N.J. 185, 373 A.2d 654 (1977). These jurisdictions have reasoned that uninsured motorist coverage should be provided to all insureds within the provisions of a policy without regard to the particular vehicle occupied at the time of the injury. I agree with this construction.
In Aldcroft v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 106 R.I. 311, 259 A.2d 408 (1969), this court, concluding that §27-7-2.1 affords personal protection to uninsured motorists, stated:
“The legislature, in our opinion, enacted this statute [§27-7-2.1] for the purpose of providing, as a matter of public policy, protection of the named insured in policies to be issued for protection against financial loss resulting from the operation of uninsured motor vehicles.” Id. at 321, 259 A.2d at 415.
In the case at bar, exclusionary clause (p) of the York policy precludes coverage for the insured if he or she is injured while occupying an uninsured vehicle owned by the named insured. To the extent that this exclusion attempts to abrogate the intent of §27-7-2.1, it is invalid. This court has repeatedly voided contract clauses in uninsured motorist policies on the grounds that such provisions violate public policy as enunciated by the Legislature. Poulos v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 119 R.I. 409, 379 A.2d 362 (1977); Pickering v. American Employers Insurance Co., 109 R.I. 143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971).
For the above reasons, I adopt the view espoused by the majority of jurisdictions. Accordingly, I believe that the trial justice was correct in finding that exclusion (p) in defendant York’s policy is contrary to the public policy of this state as enunciated in §27-7-2.1 and, therefore, nugatory.