Court Opinion

ID: 9494107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:29:30.458905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:13.404472
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur in the majority’s holding that Defendant Harris lacks standing to assert a Fourth Amendment challenge, there are two bases upon which I believe the evidence should have been suppressed with respect to Defendant Taylor. First, the affidavit in support of the search warrant was insufficient because it was a bare-bones affidavit that did not show probable cause. Second, any probable cause that could have existed at the outset was vitiated by the police officer’s knowledge of *296irrefutable evidence that there were no longer any drugs on the premises. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
Although the majority finds that probable cause existed under this Court’s weakened probable cause requirements of its en banc opinion in United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 531 U.S. 907, 121 S.Ct. 251, 148 L.Ed.2d 181 (2000), I am unpersuaded. The affidavit in support of the warrant in this case, restated in its entirety in the majority opinion, is a classic example of an inadequate affidavit. The affiant in Allen at least was able to identify the suspect who was known by his nickname or alias, “Red Dog.” In the instant case, the affidavit did not provide any information to the magistrate regarding the identity of the suspect, known as “Fat Boy,” and merely referred to him as “John Doe.” There was no other information contained in the affidavit sufficient to provide the magistrate issuing the warrant even a minimal degree of particularity.
In United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372 (1996), we reversed the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, finding that the affidavit used to obtain a warrant to search the defendant’s residence for marijuana, believed to be held there in a quantity suitable for distribution, was insufficient. The informant in that case provided a tip based on hearsay and was sent into the defendant’s home with $100 to make a controlled buy. The informant made a successful buy of a half-ounce of marijuana from the defendant. The informant then told the police, without foundation, that he believed the defendant was growing marijuana at his home. The officers prepared an affidavit indicating that the informant was known to be reliable because he provided information about drug activity in the past and had observed marijuana in the defendant’s home. The informant was unnamed in the affidavit, but his identity was revealed to the magistrate through sworn testimony. In finding that no probable cause existed to issue the warrant, the Court noted that there was no reason to believe that any of the drugs previously observed by the informant would be on the premises at the time of a search. Crucial to this point was the fact that the affidavit failed to mention the quantity of drugs observed or that the drugs were present for purposes of distribution. Id. at 1378. In addition, there was no mention in the affidavit of the controlled buy, making impossible an inference of ongoing or continuing drug sales.
Similarly, in the case at bar the issuing magistrate had no reason to presume that evidence of wrongdoing would be on the premises at the time of the execution of a search warrant. The informant merely stated that he had seen drugs, including crack cocaine, on the premises within the past 72 hours. The affidavit contained no mention, precise or otherwise, of the quantity of drugs observed. In fact, the affidavit did not even allege that there was a quantity of drugs still on the premises or that they were being held there for sale. As far as the magistrate knew, the drugs observed were the same drugs purchased by the informant. In addition, the confidential informant failed to state why he believed this suspect resided at or was in control of the premises in question.
Even when supplemented by the detective’s oral testimony before the issuing magistrate regarding the controlled buys, the affidavit still fails to establish probable cause to believe that evidence of wrongdoing would be discovered on the premises. While at least two controlled buys at the residence resulted in the purchase of controlled substances, these transactions *297took place approximately two months apart. There is no indication that the detective’s testimony before the magistrate discussed the unexplained time gap between these two purchases. Instead of indicating ongoing drug sales, these two transactions seem' to indicate sporadic drug activity that could just as easily have taken place outside of the residence, especially absent some allegation or evidence that drugs were being held at the premises for sale. Even more troubling is the detective’s subsequent testimony that the controlled buys were not monitored by the police in any way. The detective admitted that he had not informed the magistrate of this fact either in the affidavit or through testimony. In fact, the detective even admitted that he was not able to verify whether the confidential informant had actually entered the premises for which the search warrant was later obtained. These facts fall woefully short of establishing any legitimate corroborative effort.
Affidavits must be judged based on the totality of “the circumstances” and answer “the commonsense, practical question [of] whether there is ‘probable cause’ to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 627 (1983). “As presented, the combined boilerplate language and [oral testimony] provide few, if any, particularized facts of an incriminating nature and little more than conclusory statements of affiant’s belief that probable cause existed regarding criminal activity.” Weaver, 99 F.3d at 1379. I therefore believe a proper analysis would not lead to a finding of probable cause.
II.
Although the affidavit and supporting testimony fail to establish probable cause even under Allen, I believe that any probable cause that may have existed at the time the warrant was issued was subsequently vitiated by the third controlled buy that yielded no contraband and the additional evidence known to the detective pri- or to the search.1 The detective was notified by his own confidential informant that no drugs were present at the time of the third attempted buy. In addition, the confidential informant told the detective that the suspect, “Fat Boy,” would be leaving in a few minutes and further that drugs might not be found on the premises over the weekend. The informant provided no indication as to when “Fat Boy” would return to the premises. There was therefore ho evidence that drugs would be brought back onto the premises. Faced with an unsuccessful buy, information that no drugs were present, and the fact that the suspect was leaving the premises, the detective called off the planned search. The detective and the other officers were therefore left to speculate as to whether and when drugs would actually be brought back onto the premises. At this critical juncture, whatever probable cause arguably existed had simply eviscerated. Yet four days later, the officers executed the then-outdated warrant without attempting to reestablish probable cause by personally surveilling the residence, having the informant watch the residence, or taking other measures to determine whether there was some ongoing or recurring criminal activity.
The majority contends that the failed controlled buy attempt had no bearing on the existence of probable cause at the time *298the warrant was executed. In support of its holding, the majority cites this Court’s decision in United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257 (6th Cir.1998), in which we considered whether an officer made deliberately or recklessly false statements by omitting certain facts from an affidavit. We eventually upheld the search warrant, declining to even consider whether absent those errors the warrant would have still provided probable cause. But that case is distinguishable on several grounds, for we are presented here with a case that is virtually the factual antonym of Charles.
First, there was a high degree of independent corroboration in Charles as evidenced by an undercover buy made at the defendant’s residence by a known informant accompanied by an undercover law enforcement officer. Id. at 260. During this undercover buy, the defendant showed the officer and the informant a certain amount of cocaine base, which they negotiated to purchase. But the officer later realized that the defendant had only given them half of the amount of drugs that they were shown. In addition, the informant had indicated that the defendant was a bulk cocaine dealer, thereby raising the inference that there were still some drugs on the premises. While making the undercover buy, the officer saw three firearms on the premises as well as the same customized Buick station wagon that the informant had previously indicated the suspect drove. Over the next few weeks, the officer made several unsuccessful attempts to purchase drugs from the defendant. However, the Court found that these attempts w’ere unsuccessful because the officer was concerned for his safety. Moreover, the officer claimed that during one of those unsuccessful attempts the defendant actually admitted to possessing cocaine.
Due to this and other corroborative evidence, the Court held that “[although under some circumstances a material omission may invalidate an otherwise valid search warrant, ... [the officer’s omission of the unsuccessful controlled buy attempts] was not material in this case.” Id. at 264 (citing United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 568 (6th Cir.1993)). However, in the case at bar, the detective’s failure to inform the magistrate of the change in circumstances was material to the question of whether there would be any drugs on the premises at all. There was virtually no corroboration at the time the warrant was issued, much less any additional corroboration once the detective learned that drugs might not be found on the premises. Absent the type of facts at play in Charles, there was no reason to believe that evidence of wrongdoing would be found on the premises during a subsequent search. I therefore believe that a well-informed magistrate, given all of the facts known immediately prior to the search, would not have found probable cause to issue a search warrant.2
*299As the majority points out, the confidential informant in the case at bar did not tell the detective that “Fat Boy” no longer lived at the premises. But it is equally clear that there was no basis to believe that drugs would be on the premises at the time of the subsequent search. Instead, the officers had to guess that drugs would be present. We should be loathe to allow law enforcement officers to rely upon a warrant based on out-dated information in the face of irrefutable evidence calling into question the entire basis for the issuance of the warrant.
III.
For the same reasons articulated above, I believe that the good faith exception recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), would not save the fruits of this otherwise illegal search. The legality of the search could not be sustained by the detective’s good faith belief that the search was proper, because at the time the warrant was executed the detective had been advised, and had every reason to believe, that there were no illegal drugs on the premises.
The affidavit in support of the warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. After obtaining the warrant, the detective was told by his own informant that there were no drugs on the premises in question and was advised to wait a few days before executing the warrant in the hope that drugs might be brought back onto the premises. “Because probable cause to search is concerned with facts relating to a presently existing condition, ... there arises the unique problem of whether the probable cause which once existed has grown stale.” United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 923 (6th Cir.1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). In Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 53 S.Ct. 138, 77 L.Ed. 260 (1932), the Supreme Court held that whether information contained in an affidavit is stale “must be determined by the circumstances of each case.” Id. at 210-11, 53 S.Ct. 138. Based upon the facts of the instant case, the information contained in the affidavit and in the detective’s oral statements to the magistrate, particularly concerning the information regarding two successful controlled buys and the presence of drugs, was undoubtedly stale.3
Inasmuch as “the existence of probable cause is a function of the inherent nature of the crime,” United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir.1995) (quotations omitted), the fact that the suspect was accused of selling rocks of easily portable and destructible cocaine base on a sporadic basis makes the existence of probable cause all the more implausible. As mentioned earlier, nothing about the affidavit or the detective’s testimony before the *300magistrate indicated that there were ongoing drug sales on the premises so as to forgive the detective’s knowledge that drugs were no longer on the premises. Contra United States v. Word, 806 F.2d 658, 662 (6th Cir.1986) (holding that an affidavit containing stale information established probable cause in light of evidence that the crime was “of a continuing nature”).
This Court has held that “[w]here recent information corroborates otherwise stale information, probable cause may be found.” United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1381-82 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting Emery v. Holmes, 824 F.2d 143, 149 (1st Cir.1987) (internal quotations omitted)). But in the instant case, no additional information corroborated the informant’s tip. Instead, the most recent information actually eviscerated any potential for probable cause. Contra Spikes, 158 F.3d at 924 (finding that probable cause still existed because recent events indicating an increased level of criminal activity refreshed the otherwise stale information).
The law enforcement officers therefore had no basis for a good faith belief that drugs were on the premises at the time they executed the warrant. When or whether drugs would again be on the premises was, in the absence of some additional information, a matter of pure conjecture. A reasonably well-trained officer would not rely on such speculative guesswork, especially when contemplating entering a residence, the place in which citizens have the most widely recognized expectation of privacy.
Regardless of what the detective considered to be his instinctive feeling, he could not have in good faith believed that probable cause existed simply because he informed the magistrate of the informant’s name and the two successful controlled buys in the past. Under Tennessee law, issuing magistrates may not consider evidence outside the four corners of the affidavit in making a probable cause determination. See State v. Moon, 841 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (“[I]n Tennessee, probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant must appear in the affidavit and judicial review of the existence of probable cause will not include looking to other evidence provided to or known by the issuing magistrate or possessed by the affiant.”). A reasonably well-trained Tennessee law enforcement officer should be expected to know this much. Although this Court may still consider oral statements even if state courts are precluded from doing so,4 the fact that Tennessee law precluded the issuing magistrate from considering the detective’s oral statements would make any reliance on the magistrate’s knowledge of such statements objectively unreasonable.
For these reasons, the good faith exception would not apply to save the fruits of what I believe to be an illegal search. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. Although the majority claims that this issue was waived, I do not believe this to be the case. Instead, the issue addressed in this section was necessarily involved in the challenge to the issuance of the warrant.

. The majority also cites a district court case from another circuit, United States v. Sugar, 606 F.Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), to support its holding. Needless to say, we are not bound by the decision of that court. Moreover, that case is easily distinguishable. In Sugar, the district court held that the affiant’s failure to inform the issuing magistrate of an unsuccessful attempt to obtain drugs from the suspects did not detract from the allegations of criminal activity. But probable cause was not vitiated by the omission in that case because the other information available to the magistrate established a practice of some years, continuing in nature, of violating laws regulating the distribution of controlled substances outside the scope of medical practice. Id. at 1150. However, in the case at bar we are not confronted with allegations that regularly recurring criminal activity had been ongoing for several years; nor are we faced with a situation where the controlled substances were legally possessed in a place of business and expected to be on the premises at any given time.

. Although the staleness doctrine is usually discussed in the temporal sense, time is not the only factor that can lead to staleness of information. This Court has previously held that in determining whether information contained in an affidavit for a search warrant is stale, the length of time between the events listed in the affidavit and the application for the warrant, while relevant, is not dispositive:
Instead of measuring staleness solely by counting the days on a calendar, courts must also concern themselves with the following variables: the character of the crime (chance encounter in the night or regenerating conspiracy?), the criminal (nomadic or entrenched?), the thing to be seized (perishable and easily transferable or of enduring utility to its holder?), the place to be searched (mere criminal forum of convenience or secure operational base?),....
Spikes, 158 F.3d at 923 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960); United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1434 (6th Cir.1994):
[I]n federal court, [the exclusionary] rule only requires the court to exclude evidence seized in violation of the Federal Constitution. A state may impose a rule for searches and seizures that is more restrictive than the Fourth Amendment; that is, the state may exclude evidence in state trials that would not be excluded by application of the Fourth Amendment alone. However, the state rule does not have to be applied in federal court.