Court Opinion

ID: 9697228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:08:58.285064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:30.029757
License: Public Domain

POLLOCK, J.,
dissenting.
The dispositive issue is whether plaintiff, Eagle Fire Insurance Company (Eagle Fire), instituted this action against defendant, First Indemnity of America Insurance Company (First Indemnity), within the one-year period required by First Indemnity’s performance bond. First Indemnity furnished the bond to a general contractor, Olsen & Hassold, Inc. (Olsen), to guaranty Olsen’s payment to subcontractors such as Eagle Fire.
*366The bond bars an action commenced one year after Olsen ceased work. I accept the premise that Olsen’s responsibilities “included not only the furnishing of workers but also the supervision of the tradesmen and the storing of debris.” Eagle Fire v. First Indemnity Ins., 280 N.J.Super. 430, 438, 655 A.2d 939 (App.Div.1995). The jury found that Olsen ceased work before May 23, 1990. Over a year later, Eagle Fire commenced this action on May 23, 1991. A straightforward interpretation of the bond leads to the conclusion that the action is time-barred.
To circumvent the one-year period of limitations, Eagle Fire urges that work done by Olsen’s contractors constitutes Olsen’s work for the purpose of determining the time within which Eagle Fire may sue First Indemnity. Eagle Fire also asserts that the presence of trailers leased by Olsen after it otherwise ceased work likewise constitutes Olsen’s work. The majority adopts both arguments. I respectfully dissent.
In its instructions to the jury the Law Division stated that “ T further instruct you that the work done by subcontractors of Olsen & Hassold, does not constitute work by Olsen & Hassold themselves and therefore the presence or absence of such subcontractors at the site after May 23rd, 1990 is not relevant.’ ” Id. at 440, 655 A.2d 939 (quoting trial court’s instructions to jury). The Appellate Division affirmed that instruction and directed entry of a judgment of no cause for action in favor of defendant. Id. at 444, 655 A.2d 939. I would affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the Appellate Division.
After a general contractor has itself stopped work, I would not impute to it the work of unsupervised subcontractors that remain on the job. “Any work a subcontractor performs after the original contractor’s obligations have ended should not extend the surety’s liability, since it is the conduct of the original contractor to which the bond relates.” W.F. Hayward v. Transamerica Ins., 16 Cal.App.4th. 1101, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 471-72 (1993).
I likewise agree with the lower courts that after Olsen ceased work, the presence on the work site of trailers that Olsen had *367rented is equally irrelevant. The date on which a lessor repossesses a general contractor’s trailers from a work site should not determine the time to sue under that contractor’s surety bond.
I dissent.
For reversal and remandment — Justices HANDLER,
O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 5.
Dissenting — Justice POLLOCK — 1.