Court Opinion

ID: 9402186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:07:52.35554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.234114
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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                                                   RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2023
                                                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2021-SC-0446-MR

ANTHONY BEASLEY                                                      APPELLANT

               ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V.            HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE
                           NO. 18-CR-002674

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                  AFFIRMING

      At Appellant Anthony Beasley’s (Beasley) trial for killing Bob White

(White), the court allowed into evidence statements that the child of the victim

made to a police officer within minutes of White being shot. The child was not

available as a witness and the statements, recorded on the officer’s body

camera, were played for the jury. The jury found Beasley guilty of murder and

tampering with physical evidence. On appeal, Beasley raises three issues, the

primary issue being whether the child’s statements were testimonial and thus,

Beasley’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right was violated. We

conclude the child’s excited utterances were not made with the primary

purpose of creating evidence for Beasley’s prosecution and the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by allowing the statements into evidence. We also

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing into
evidence a cell phone video or by allowing the Commonwealth to amend the

indictment on the morning of trial. Accordingly, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit

Court’s judgment convicting Beasley of murder and tampering with physical

evidence and sentencing Beasley to twenty-five years in prison.

                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On September 6, 2018, Beasley shot and killed White. Beasley admitted

shooting White when the officers responded to the scene. He was indicted by a

Jefferson County grand jury for committing murder and tampering with

physical evidence. At trial, Beasley’s defense to the murder charge was self-

protection. The jury heard testimony about Beasley and White’s relationship

and White’s criminal history.

      In January 2018, Beasley and his roommate moved into an apartment on

Winkler Avenue. White and his son, Zion, moved into the same apartment

house three to four months later. Beasley and his roommate lived on the first

floor, White and Zion lived on the second floor. Zion referred to Beasley as his

“uncle.”

      Beasley and White had known each other since elementary school.

Beasley described White as a friend, but also described their relationship to be

like Jekyll and Hyde, friends one minute and fighting the next. White was

entering Beasley’s apartment when no one was home, items were missing, and

White taunted them. White also took over Beasley’s porch. White would

entertain people on the porch and hassle people coming and going from

Beasley’s apartment. In the three months prior to the shooting, things had

                                        2
gotten unbearable for Beasley and his roommate, and Beasley began to avoid

being around White. Beasley had told White that he was no longer welcome in

his apartment. Beasley testified that he feared for his life when White was

around and that White was constantly being threatening.

      According to Beasley, on the day of the shooting, ten-year-old Zion had

been at Beasley’s apartment since getting home from school. White came to

Beasley’s apartment that evening even though he no longer had permission to

visit; and White had friends waiting outside for him on Beasley’s porch. By

Beasley’s account, White sent and Zion went to the second-floor apartment to

make a pallet for bed and to go to sleep.

      Beasley testified that he and White got into a fight, and everything

happened fast. White pushed Beasley, and Beasley pushed him back. An

ashtray tipped over and White stumbled. As White reached into his waistband

for his gun and charged Beasley, Beasley pulled his gun from his pocket,

closed his eyes and shot.

      The medical examiner testified that the entrance of the bullet was most

consistent with the gun muzzle being against the skin when it was fired. The

bullet entered over the right front scalp and exited over the left ear; it was a

right to left, downward, and front to back trajectory. Beasley maintained that

White charged him and stated that he did not deliberately place the gun on

White’s head. He testified that he did not want anyone to die but he had no

choice but to shoot.

      After shooting White, Beasley sat down on the floor beside him. Beasley

                                         3
put the gun on the floor. Zion came into the living room, touched his dad’s

head, grabbed his phone, and ran out. Beasley told Zion to run to the

neighbor’s house and call the police.

      After Zion ran off, two men, White’s friends who were waiting on the

porch, came in and took White’s gun. The men also took Beasley’s gun, but

left the magazine behind. The men left when they heard the sirens.

      The first officer arrived at Beasley’s apartment building within a minute

of the 911 call. This officer and his partner entered Beasley’s apartment

through the unlocked, wide open back door. They, along with the third officer

on the scene, observed White on the living room floor with a gunshot wound to

his head and Beasley sitting beside him. An empty gun magazine was on the

floor close to Beasley. A shell casing was found by a door. Both the casing and

the magazine were .380 caliber. The .380 caliber weapon was never recovered.

As captured by the officers’ body cameras, a football game was on the

television.

      Beasley was taken into custody. Beasley made multiple statements that

it was his house, White broke into his house, and he was just protecting

himself. He also made the statement that he did not know the name of the

person who broke into his home. When the Commonwealth questioned him

about that statement at trial, Beasley testified that he was frantic and in shock

when he answered the officers’ questions. At police headquarters, photographs

of a red mark on Beasley’s arm were also taken. According to the police

                                        4
officer’s testimony, no other physical signs of injury were observed on Beasley’s

body.

        In regard to the reason for the fight, Beasley’s jail mate testified on behalf

of the Commonwealth. The jail mate stated that he had law books and

Beasley, considering defenses to the murder charge, talked with him about his

case. The jail mate testified that Beasley told him that he had shot White after

they argued about White being in Beasley’s apartment, bringing Beasley’s

brother into their drug dealings, and Beasley’s brother coming over to the

apartment house. The jail mate also testified that Beasley told him that after

the shooting two men came into the apartment to clean up what had

happened.

        Other key evidence introduced by the Commonwealth was Zion’s

statements to his neighbor right after the shooting1 and Zion’s statements to

the officer whose interaction with Zion began within three to five minutes after

the shooting.

        Zion ran to a house three doors down. There, neighbors who knew Zion,

Cynthia and her daughter, were on the back porch of their home and they

heard Zion screaming as he ran up, holding a cell phone, “He just shot my

daddy. He just shot my daddy.” Zion told them that his uncle shot his daddy

       1 While Beasley objected to the introduction of Zion’s statements through the

neighbor’s testimony at trial, he concedes the statements were excited utterances. He
suggests, however, that if the excited utterances to the neighbor were considered by
the trial court when deciding the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to introduce Zion’s
statements to Officer Fischer, the trial court might have concluded that Zion’s
statements to the officer were not excited utterances.

                                           5
in the head, that his daddy was on the floor and that there was blood

everywhere. Zion had blood on his hands. Zion also said that he tried to pick

his daddy up when he did not wake up. At some point, Zion told them that the

cell phone belonged to his father. Cynthia took Zion in the house and tried to

calm him while her daughter called 911. The call was made at 10:39 p.m. and

within a minute, officers were arriving at the scene of the shooting.

      Zion passed out at the neighbor’s house. The daughter opened the door

and yelled for police to come help. Officer Fischer arrived. When Officer

Fischer’s body camera footage was played for the jury, the jury heard Zion

repeatedly exclaim, “He shot my daddy in his head,” and “He shot my daddy for

no reason.” Zion also made statements describing the shooting, indicating that

he was an eyewitness, and contrary to Beasley’s self-protection defense.

Beasley maintained that Zion was not present when he shot White and that he

would not shoot White in front of Zion.

      Beasley was convicted of murder and tampering with physical evidence.

The jury recommended a twenty-five-year sentence for murder and a five-year

sentence for tampering with physical evidence, to run concurrently for a total

of twenty-five years. The trial court sentenced Beasley accordingly.

      Beasley brings three issues on appeal. Each is addressed in turn.

                                   ANALYSIS

I.    The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Zion’s
      statements to a police officer to be admitted into evidence.

      Beasley’s first claim is that his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause

right was violated when the trial court allowed Zion’s excited utterances into

                                          6
evidence. He claims the excited utterances were testimonial and therefore

inadmissible. We review this claim of error under an abuse of discretion

standard.2 A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.3

      Zion was not available to testify at trial.4 The Commonwealth moved in

limine to introduce Zion’s statements captured on the officer’s body camera.

Defense counsel objected.5

      As described above, officers arrived at the scene of the shooting within a

minute of the 911 call. When Officer Fischer arrived, multiple police cars were

parked on the street and Officer Fischer was directed to the neighboring house.

An encapsulation of the eight-minute interaction between Officer Fischer and

Zion captured on the body camera footage is presented below.

      As a preface, when interacting with Officer Fischer, Zion often spoke in a

rushed excited manner, was crying and hyperventilating on-and-off, and Zion

remained on the floor during most of his interaction with Officer Fischer.

Throughout their interaction, the officer tried to calm Zion and regulate his

breathing. Zion’s unprompted, often repeated statements like, “He shot my

      2   Lewis v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 26, 31 (Ky. 2015).
      3   Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
      4 There is no dispute that Zion was unavailable at trial and Beasley had no
prior opportunity to cross-examine him.
      5 In addition to objecting during the pretrial hearing to the statements being

introduced into evidence, defense counsel objected again during trial. When the
Commonwealth cross-examined Beasley about Zion’s statements which portrayed the
shooting differently than Beasley, defense counsel argued that the Confrontation
Clause was violated because he could not cross-examine Zion on his inconsistent
statements.

                                          7
daddy in his head,” “He shot my daddy for no reason,” “Why did he shoot my

daddy for no reason?” and “My daddy’s dead,” are not presented to the same

extent as their actual occurrence. Officer Fisher testified that his main

purpose when questioning Zion was to develop pertinent suspect information

for officers at the scene of the shooting.

       After Officer Fischer determined Zion was not shot and was not hurt, he

initially asked Zion questions about the shooter. During the period when he

asked Zion questions about the shooter’s whereabouts and appearance, if he

heard them, Officer Fischer did not address Zion’s unprompted responses,

responses often occurring at the same time Officer Fischer was relaying

information over his radio. Officer Fischer focused his efforts on getting Zion to

answer his questions, often repeating his questions. Zion’s statements

describing the shooting are in bold typeface.

   •   As the officer approached the house, Zion can be heard saying excitedly,
       “He’s been shot. He’s been shot. My daddy, he’s been shot.”

   •   Upon the officer’s arrival, he asked Zion whether he was hurt. Zion
       responded to the question and without prompting stated, “He shot him in
       his head . . . . He shot my daddy in his head.”6

   •   The officer asked Zion who shot his dad and Zion responded, “My uncle.”
       “He had a purple gun . . . .”

   •   As the officer radioed that Zion stated that his uncle shot the victim in
       the head, Zion continued, “My daddy was just laying down on the floor . .
       . .”

   •   The officer asked Zion where his uncle went. Zion stated his uncle was
       in the house with his daddy. The officer radioed that the uncle may still

      6 An ellipsis indicates a portion of Zion’s statement which was unclear given the

background noise or Zion’s excited speech.

                                           8
       be in the house. The officer also requested EMS because Zion
       complained of stomach pains.

   •   When the officer asked again whether his uncle was in the house, Zion
       continued, “My daddy said stop playing, he said stop pointing the

       gun at my, my uncle kept pointing the gun at his head and then he
       shot him.”7

   •   The officer asked what his uncle was wearing. Zion responded that he
       was wearing a wife beater and purple shorts. As the officer radioed that
       information, Zion continued, “He shot him and I was like noooo. My
       daddy’s dead. My daddy’s dead.”

   •   The officer asked Zion if his uncle was a big guy, if he had an afro like
       Zion, and if he had any tattoos. At the same time, Zion continued “My
       daddy was laying down on the floor . . . . He shot my daddy in his head
       for no reason. He’s the only one I got in my life and he shot him. I got
       blood on my hands.”

   •   Zion was screaming and hyperventilating and the officer worked to calm
       Zion and his breathing, and asked the others to leave the room. The
       officer assured Zion that others were helping his father. The officer told
       Zion, “We are going to take care of your daddy, but I need you to be
       okay.” After the officer assured Zion that “we are going to help [your
       dad],” Zion stated, “Please help him.”

   •   The officer asked, “What happened? Why did your uncle shoot him?”
       Zion responded: “My daddy was just laying down watching the
       football game. My uncle kept pointing a gun at him and then . . .
       bam, and I just looked at my daddy and blood was just leaking out of
       him like nooo. He shot my daddy for no reason.”

   •   The officer again assured Zion that people were helping his father.

   •   Zion stated, “I tried to get my daddy to get up but he wouldn’t get up.”

       7 With this being an unprompted response, Beasley complains that this

statement was improperly admitted into evidence because the Commonwealth
interpreted the statement for the jury. He also makes this complaint in regard to
Zion’s other statement describing the shooting (the other statement in bold, below)
and one other unprompted statement in which Zion describes what happened after the
shooting (italicized statement, below). This unpreserved complaint is addressed below.

                                          9
   •   Zion wanted to go and check on his father, but the officer assured him
       that people were helping his dad, that he needed to stay there, and again
       worked to calm Zion.

   •   Zion asked the officer questions about his dad’s condition and what was
       happening. Zion then asked excitedly, “What are they going to do with
       my uncle? Are they going to take him to jail?” The officer responded,
       “They might. Possibly.” Zion then stated excitedly, “Shooting him in his

       head, that’s jail time.8 That’s the only one I got in my life. That’s the
       only one I got in my life.” The officer then asked who else lived in the
       house with Zion and Zion described how he and his dad lived on one
       floor and his uncle lived downstairs.

   •   Zion then stated, “He shot my daddy in his head and . . . check my daddy
       to see if he was okay, he said he was okay, that’s what Spotty,9 Spotty . .
       . on his head.”10

   •   The officer asked what kind of gun was used. Zion described it as a baby
       gun; like a .38; small, black and purple.

   •   The officer asked Zion if he saw what his uncle did with the gun. Zion
       answered that he said, “Aw, shit,” and then he laid the gun down.

   •   The officer asked Zion if it was then that he ran to the neighbor’s house
       and if he saw where his uncle went. As EMS arrived, the officer
       explained to Zion that a lot would be happening that night, that people
       would probably be coming to talk with him, and explained that the EMS
       medics were there to help him.

   •   Zion continued to repeat, “He shot my daddy for no reason,” and cried
       out for his father. The officer described Zion’s emotional distress; his
       hyperventilation, and his stomach pain to the EMS medics. As the
       officer was describing that Zion had blood on his hands, thought to be

       8According to evidence presented at trial, White was a convicted felon who
spent time in jail.
       9   Spotty is Beasley’s nickname.
       10Addressed below, Beasley complains that during his cross-examination, the
Commonwealth interpreted this statement to the jury. Beasley asserts that after
Zion’s statement, “He shot my daddy in his head,” the rest of the statement is
inaudible.

                                           10
      from his father, Zion excitedly stated that the blood came from his
      daddy’s head, that it was leaking out of his head.

      During the pretrial hearing, the Commonwealth and defense counsel

agreed that Zion’s statements were excited utterances. However, counsel

disagreed as to whether the statements violated the Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause. The Commonwealth emphasized that Zion’s statements

were not testimonial because they were to aid the officers in an ongoing

emergency. Defense counsel countered that when Officer Fischer arrived at the

neighbor’s house, Beasley was already detained and therefore, there was no

ongoing emergency, and consequently, none of Zion’s statements were

admissible because they were testimonial. Beasley maintains that argument

on appeal to a certain extent.

      While Beasley suggests that Zion’s statements were testimonial because

Zion was telling the officer about past events and although it was not a formal

interrogation, the officer was asking questions and had his body camera on to

record, he primarily argues that there was not an ongoing emergency when the

officer arrived and that the purpose of the officer’s questions was to investigate

the crime. Thus, Beasley argues that Zion’s statements were testimonial and

should have been excluded from evidence. Nevertheless, Beasley appears

willing to concede that the officer perceived that there was an ongoing

emergency when he first arrived. Beasley argues at the very least, the trial

court should have excluded the statements from the body camera after the

officer got the preliminary information.

                                        11
      More specifically, Beasley contends there was no longer an ongoing

emergency or a threatening situation once the officer determined that Zion was

not physically hurt as a result of the shooting, and received answers to

questions to help identify the shooter, such as what he was wearing and his

whereabouts. Beasley argues that after that point, the officer’s questions were

aimed toward investigation. Beasley asserts that the circumstances of this

case present a situation in which nontestimonial statements turned into

testimonial statements, and as recognized by the United States Supreme Court

in Davis v. Washington11 and Michigan v. Bryant,12 such testimonial statements

are not admissible into evidence. He argues that the statements to questions

like “What happened? Why did your uncle shoot your daddy?” are testimonial.

      The Commonwealth argues that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it found that Zion’s statements were nontestimonial as all of

the statements admitted at trial occurred during an ongoing emergency focused

on ending a threatening situation. The Commonwealth further argues that

that even if the trial court erred in admitting Zion’s statements, the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

      In general, a declarant’s out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth

of the matter asserted, is not admissible into evidence.13 However, there is an

exception under Kentucky Rules of Evidence which allows hearsay which

      11   547 U.S. 813 (2006).
      12   562 U.S. 344 (2011).
      13   KRE (Kentucky Rule of Evidence) 801; KRE 802.

                                         12
qualifies as an excited utterances to be admitted into evidence.14 An excited

utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while

the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or

condition.”15 Here, the question on appeal is not whether Zion’s statements

were excited utterances.16 The question is whether, despite being excited

utterances which may be admitted under the hearsay rules, the admission of

the statements violated Beasley’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right

to be confronted with the witness against him. “An excited utterance cannot be

introduced into evidence if it is determined to violate the Confrontation Clause

because it is a testimonial statement.”17

      Sixth Amendment precedent establishes that nontestimonial statements

may be admitted into evidence without violation of the Confrontation Clause,

but testimonial statements may not, unless the accused had a prior

opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable witness.18 Crawford v.

Washington and its progeny, which includes companion cases Davis v.

Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, and Michigan v. Bryant, elaborate on what

constitutes a testimonial statement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.19

      14   KRE 803. This exception applies even when the declarant is available as a
witness.
      15   Id.
      16 Although Beasley’s brief suggests that is an issue this Court may consider,
Beasley conceded that the statements were excited utterances at the trial court level.
      17   Hartsfield v. Commonwealth, 277 S.W.3d 239, 245 (Ky. 2009).
      18   See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
      19   See Fisher v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2021).

                                           13
      In Crawford, the Court explained that the text of the Confrontation

Clause applies to “witnesses” against the accused, meaning those who “bear

testimony.”20 The Court defined “testimony” as typically “a solemn declaration

or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”21

Crawford instructed that a testimonial statement “applies at a minimum to

prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former

trial; and to police interrogations.”22 Crawford resolved that the statements of a

witness to a stabbing which were given during an interrogation at the police

station were testimonial statements.

      Davis and Hammon dealt with statements by victims of domestic abuse

and the Supreme Court was tasked with determining “when statements made

to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene are

‘testimonial.’”23 In Davis, the victim’s statements to a 911 emergency operator

were not testimonial, whereas in Hammon, the victim’s statements to police in

an affidavit were testimonial.24 When reaching those conclusions, the Court

applied a primary purpose test, explaining:

      Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
      interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
      primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
      to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
      circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
      emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to

      20   541 U.S at 51.
      21   Id.
      22   Id. at 68.
      23   547 U.S. at 817.
      24   Id. at 828-30.

                                       14
      establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
      prosecution.25

      Davis, however, explains that whether an ongoing emergency exists is

simply one factor for consideration in determining whether statements are

made for the purpose of “bearing testimony.” Other instructive factors for

determining whether a statement is testimonial include: (1) whether the events

spoken about were actually happening, or were past events; (2) whether what

was asked and answered was for the purpose of resolving the situation, rather

than simply learning what had happened in the past; and, (4) finally, the level

of formality in the interview.26

      But furthermore, the point of Beasley’s primary argument, Davis also

explained that when dealing with an emergency, circumstances may change,

such that “a conversation which begins as an interrogation to determine the

need for emergency assistance [may] ‘evolve into testimonial statements,’ once

that purpose has been achieved.”27 Bryant addressed the concept of evolving

emergencies as well, stating:

      This evolution may occur if, for example, a declarant provides
      police with information that makes clear that what appeared to be
      an emergency is not or is no longer an emergency or that what
      appeared to be a public threat is actually a private dispute. It
      could also occur if a perpetrator is disarmed, surrenders, is
      apprehended, or, as in Davis, flees with little prospect of posing a
      threat to the public.28

      25   Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
      26   Hartsfield, 277 S.W.3d at 244 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827).
      27   Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
      28   562 U.S. at 365.

                                            15
      While Beasley’s focus is on Davis’ and Bryant’s point that statements

may evolve from nontestimonial to testimonial, the Commonwealth cites Bryant

for its clarification of Davis and further explanation of the nature of the

analysis undertaken to determine whether a declarant’s statements are

testimonial for Sixth Amendment purposes. While focus is often placed on the

officer’s primary purpose of the interrogation, Bryant, further expounding on

the primary purpose test, emphasizes that ultimately, the question is whether

the primary purpose of the conversation was to “creat[e] an out-of-court

substitute for trial testimony,”29 and the basis for answering that question is

an objective assessment of “all of the relevant circumstances,”30 and that

includes an assessment of the declarant’s purpose when making statements.31

      “In addition to the circumstances in which an encounter occurs, the

statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators provide

objective evidence of the primary purpose of the interrogation.”32 “In many

instances, the primary purpose of the interrogation will be most accurately

ascertained by looking to the contents of both the questions and the

answers.”33 Furthermore “[t]he identity of an interrogator, and the content and

tenor of his questions,” can illuminate the “primary purpose of the

      29   Id. at 358.
      30   Id. at 369.
      31   Id. at 367.
      32   Id. (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827).
      33   Id. at 367–68.

                                              16
interrogation.”34 The Court, however, also recognized that an interrogator may

have mixed motives.35

      The Court also explained that declarants “are also likely to have mixed

motives when they make statements to the police.”36 For example, “[d]uring an

ongoing emergency, a victim is most likely to want the threat to her . . . to end,

but that does not necessarily mean that the victim wants or envisions

prosecution of the assailant. A victim may want the attacker to be

incapacitated temporarily or rehabilitated.”37

      Alternatively, a severely injured victim may have no purpose at all
      in answering questions posed; the answers may be simply
      reflexive. The victim’s injuries could be so debilitating as to
      prevent her from thinking sufficiently clearly to understand
      whether her statements are for the purpose of addressing an
      ongoing emergency or for the purpose of future prosecution.
      Taking into account a victim’s injuries does not transform this
      objective inquiry into a subjective one. The inquiry is still objective
      because it focuses on the understanding and purpose of a
      reasonable victim in the circumstances of the actual victim—
      circumstances that prominently include the victim’s physical
      state.38

      In sum then, the medical and associated mental “condition of the victim

is important to the primary purpose inquiry to the extent that it sheds light on

the ability of the victim to have any purpose at all in responding to police

      34 Id. at 369 (noting that on this point, the majority agreed with Scalia, J.,

dissenting).
      35   Id. at 368.
      36   Id.
      37   Id.
      38   Id. at 368–69 (internal note omitted).

                                             17
questions and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be

a testimonial one.”39

      Bryant also explained that “there may be other circumstances, aside from

ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary

purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony [and that] [i]n

making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay . . . will

be relevant.”40 Therefore, even if an officer asks questions after an emergency

is over, the circumstances of the case may indicate that the primary purpose of

the questions was not to gain information in anticipation of prosecution.

      “When a court must determine whether the Confrontation Clause bars

the admission of a statement at trial, it should determine the ‘primary purpose

of the interrogation’ by objectively evaluating the statements and actions of the

parties to the encounter, in light of the circumstances in which the

interrogation occurs.”41 Here, applying the Davis factors and considering the

totality of the circumstances, the trial court concluded Zion’s statements were

not testimonial:

      First, the [shooting] occurred immediately prior to the officer’s
      interaction with Zion and thus involved events that had only
      recently occurred. Second, at the time of the conversation Zion
      remained highly agitated, was still screaming, and still had the
      victim’s blood on his hand. In addition, the officer believed the
      shooter remained at large. The apparent purpose of his inquiries
      was to determine whether Zion himself needed medical attention
      and to determine the location of the shooter, as evidenced by the

      39   Id. at 364–65.
      40   Id. at 358–59.
      41   Id. at 370.

                                        18
      officer’s simultaneous radio transmission of each of Zion’s
      statements. Thus, the situation involved an ongoing emergency
      and the purpose of the officer’s inquiries was to resolve that
      emergency rather than to conduct an investigation in anticipation
      of prosecution.
             Finally, the interaction was decidedly informal, occurring
      while Zion was screaming on the floor of a bedroom in a
      neighboring home immediately following the shooting of his father
      and with the victim’s blood still on his hands.

      Beasley argues that the emergency was over by the point the officer

asked, “What happened? Why did your uncle shoot your daddy?” Even if that

were so, the circumstances of this case do not lead to a conclusion that Zion’s

statements were testimonial.

      Beginning with the officer, it is evident that the officer’s concerns when

entering the neighbor’s home were Zion’s welfare and then the safety of the

public and other officers. The officer acted urgently and his evident primary

purpose was collecting information to resolve what he believed was an ongoing

emergency.

      While we acknowledge that an officer may have mixed motives as he asks

questions,42 the officer’s interaction with Zion and the tenor of the challenged

questions do not indicate that he was asking Zion questions in anticipation of

prosecution, but rather, after gathering initial information about the shooter,

he was empathetically engaging with a highly emotional ten-year-old who knew

      42 See also Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 249 (2015) (“Courts must evaluate
challenged statements in context, and part of that context is the questioner's identity.
Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and
prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than
statements given to law enforcement officers.” (internal citations omitted)).

                                           19
his father had been shot and who suspected his father was dead. Nevertheless,

the other circumstances of this case, including Zion’s actions and undisputed

excited utterances, lead to the conclusion that Zion’s incriminating statements

were not solemn declarations made to “creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for

trial testimony.”

      As the neighbor’s testimony and the video reveal, Zion was excitedly

proclaiming to all that his uncle shot his father and that he shot his father for

no reason, and made other unprompted statements regarding events at the

scene of the shooting. Bryant’s discussion of a victim’s purpose, or lack

thereof, when answering an officer’s questions,43 and its recognition that other

circumstances aside from ongoing emergencies may result in an officer

procuring a statement without the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court

substitute for trial testimony are particularly relevant in this case. When

reviewing the encounter between Zion and the officer, objectively, there is no

indication that the officer asked or Zion answered the questions “What

happened? Why did your uncle shoot your dad?” with the primary purpose of

Zion’s statements being used at trial to convict Beasley. Consequently, we

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Zion’s

statements into evidence.

      43 See also Clark, 576 U.S. at 246-48 (recognizing that young children may not
have an understanding of prosecution and concluding in that case, the 3–year–old
child did not intend his statements to be a substitute for trial testimony).

                                         20
         As noted above, Beasley also suggests that there was another way he was

substantially prejudiced by Zion’s statements being admitted into evidence.

Beasley asserts that during his cross-examination by the Commonwealth, the

prosecution took three of Zion’s more difficult to hear statements and offered

its own interpretation of what was being said by Zion. Beasley complains

about Zion’s two statements describing the shooting and one statement about

what happened afterward. While Beasley argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by allowing the jury to hear the prosecution’s version of inaudible or

indistinct portions of Zion’s statements, this complaint was not made when the

video was played during trial and the Commonwealth made the statements

which Beasley views as improper “interpretation” statements. This argument is

unpreserved, and Beasley does not request palpable error review. Thus, we

decline to address this argument.44

II.      The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a cell phone
         video to be admitted into evidence.

         Beasley’s second claim is that the trial court erred by allowing the

Commonwealth to introduce into evidence an irrelevant and highly prejudicial

video.

         Defense counsel objected to the admission of a cell phone video recorded

about two and one-half weeks before Beasley shot White. The video showed

Beasley, White and Zion on the porch, listening to rap music and cussing. The

      44 Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky. 2008) (“Absent

extreme circumstances amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate
court will not engage in palpable error review pursuant to RCr 10.26 unless such a
request is made and briefed by the appellant.”).
                                          21
Commonwealth argued that it was relevant based upon Beasley’s anticipated

defenses that he did not know the intruder or that he acted in self-defense.

The Commonwealth argued that the video not only established that Beasley

knew White, like a previously entered photo, but that Beasley did not fear

White. Defense counsel argued that the video was needless, cumulative

evidence because it was undisputed that Beasley and White were friends and

Commonwealth had already entered a photo of the two taken the day of the

shooting; prejudicial because it cast Beasley in an unfavorable light; and not

relevant because the video did not show peacefulness on the part of White, the

type of evidence which would be proper to counteract the defense’s

presentation of evidence of White’s aggression and assaultive behavior.

Concluding that the evidence was relevant, the trial court performed the KRE

403 balancing analysis, concluded that the type of music and language used by

Beasley and White were not unduly prejudicial, and overruled the objection.

      On appellate review, a trial court’s evidentiary ruling will not be

overturned absent an abuse of discretion.45 Further, “in reviewing the trial

judge’s balancing under KRE 403, the appellate court must view the evidence

in the light most favorable to its proponent, giving the evidence its maximum

reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.”46

      45   Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000).
      46 McLemore v. Commonwealth, 590 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Major

v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700, 707 (Ky. 2005)).

                                          22
      All relevant evidence is admissible unless an exception applies.47

Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”48 Relevant

evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by

the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,

or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.”49

            What is contemplated as “unfairly” or “unduly” prejudicial is
      evidence that is harmful beyond its natural probative force:

      “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if . . . it ‘appeals to the jury’s
      sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to
      punish,’ or otherwise ‘may cause a jury to base its decision on
      something other than the established propositions in the case.’”50

      Upon review, it is evident that the video was relevant to (1) the

truthfulness of Beasley’s statements that he did not know White, and (2) the

nature, longevity, and closeness of Beasley’s relationship to White. With regard

to giving the video its maximum reasonable probative force, with the video

showing that Beasley and White were not just casual acquaintances, it allowed

the jury to weigh Beasley’s credibility when he asserted to police officers that

he did not know the man he had shot. It also showed that Beasley spent time

      47   KRE 402.
      48   KRE 401.
      49   KRE 403.
      50 McLemore, 590 S.W.3d at 234 (quoting Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky

Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.10[4][b] (4th ed. 2003) (internal citations omitted)).

                                          23
with White and had no fear of White a few weeks earlier. While Beasley argues

that his lack of fear in the video does not prove that he was not afraid at the

time of the shooting, we agree with the Commonwealth that this argument goes

to the weight that the jury should give to the video, not its admissibility.

      With regard to giving the video its minimum reasonable prejudicial value,

the video showed Beasley and White hanging out, singing along to a song

playing in the background and neither Beasley or White direct any profane or

rough language in a threatening way toward anyone. Upon review, we cannot

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when determining that in

context, the language used did not rise to the level of arousing the jury’s sense

of horror, provoking the jury’s instinct to punish, or causing the jury to base its

decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.

      To the extent the video was evidence which overlapped with the

previously entered photo, we have previously stated that “‘[n]ot all evidence

that is duplicative is therefore cumulative, and evidence should not be

excluded on this ground merely because it overlaps with other evidence.’

Multiple witnesses bring multiple viewpoints and ‘testimony from multiple

sources about the same event is likely to differ in ways that are helpful to the

factfinder.’”51 Furthermore, based upon the foregoing conclusions, even if the

video did not show White’s peacefulness, it was otherwise admissible. In sum,

      51    Doneghy v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 95, 109 (Ky. 2013) (internal citations
omitted).

                                           24
we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the

Commonwealth to admit the video into evidence.

III.   The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the
       Commonwealth to amend the indictment.

       Beasley’s last claim is that the trial court abused its discretion when it

allowed the Commonwealth to amend the indictment52 on the first day of trial.

       Beasley was indicted under a principal theory as to both murder and

tampering with physical evidence. On the morning of the first day of trial, the

Commonwealth moved to amend the indictment to add complicity to both

charges. Defense counsel objected. The trial court granted the

Commonwealth’s motion.

       In accordance with RCr 6.16, the trial court may permit an indictment

“to be amended any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different

offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.

If justice requires, however, the court shall grant the defendant a continuance

when such an amendment is permitted.” The Commonwealth’s factual basis

for the amendments was that when the officers arrived at the scene, the

murder weapon was gone, whether Beasley hid the gun or someone else helped

him hide the gun, and the same person or a different person may have helped

Beasley with the murder. Because the charges were essentially the same,

either Beasley was acting alone or in complicity with another, the trial court

overruled defense counsel’s objection.

       52   Herp v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Ky. 2016).

                                          25
      Beasley complains that the Commonwealth declined to name the

suspected complicitor or provide any information about how the complicity

came about. While recognizing that this Court has traditionally found an

allegation of guilt based upon complicity theory to not be an additional or

different offense from an allegation of guilt under the principal theory,53 citing

Wolbrecht v. Commonwealth,54 Beasley argues that he was severely prejudiced

because he was totally unprepared on the issue raised by the amended

indictment. He states there was no proffer made that there was evidence to

support the amendment.

      The circumstances in Wolbrecht are distinguishable from this case.

      In Wolbrecht, the original indictment alleged that the three
      defendants were guilty of murdering the victim either as principals
      or by engaging in a conspiracy with each other as a result of which
      one (1) of the defendants shot the victim. Half way through trial,
      the Commonwealth made “a dramatic, 180 degree turn in the case”
      by amending the indictment to include a charge that an unknown
      trigger man may have actually shot the victim.55

Such a dramatic change in the Commonwealth’s theory of the case constituted

“unfair surprise” and a “cavalier disregard of a person’s right to be free from

unsubstantiated criminal charges.”56 Amending the indictment in this case to

include complicity charges is not comparable to the amendment in Wolbrecht.

      53   Commonwealth v. Combs, 316 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Ky. 2010).
      54   955 S.W.2d 533, 536-37 (Ky. 1997).
      55  Commonwealth v. McKenzie, 214 S.W.3d 306, 308 (Ky. 2007) (internal
citations omitted).
      56   Id. (citation omitted).

                                          26
      With the question ultimately being whether Beasley’s substantial rights

were prejudiced, citing McKenzie, the Commonwealth counters that there was

no such prejudice because Beasley had adequate notice of the evidence against

him. In McKenzie, this Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the

trial court’s amendment. We stated that the defendant “suffered no unfair

surprise and was not misled as a result of the original indictment being

amended at the close of the Commonwealth’s case in chief to include a charge

that the underlying offense was committed by complicity.”57 We concluded that

the Commonwealth fairly informed the defendant of its intentions and the

defendant was free to “have developed its strategy accordingly.”58

      Here, the amendment was made on the first day of trial, before the jury

was seated, providing ample time for the defense to adjust its case. The

Commonwealth explained the requested amendments based upon evidence all

known to Beasley. Because the amendment only added complicity offenses,

the defense did not have to prepare any new or different evidence when the trial

court permitted the amendment. Based upon the circumstances of this case,

we cannot find that Beasley’s substantial rights were prejudiced and conclude

that the trial did not abuse its discretion when granting amendment of the

indictment.

      57   Id. at 309.
      58   Id. (citing Wolbrecht, 955 S.W.2d at 537).

                                            27
                                   CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court’s judgment is

affirmed.

        VanMeter, C.J.; Conley, Keller, Lambert, Nickell and Thompson, JJ.,

sitting. All concur. Bisig, J., not sitting.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Jennifer Leigh Wade
Assistant Public Advocate

Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Bryan Morrow
Assistant Attorney General

Jenna Marie Lorence
Assistant Attorney General

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