Court Opinion

ID: 9442969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:05:39.985059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:18.555413
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. The petitioner has raised several questions before this court which have been discussed in the majority opinion. On most of these issues I am in complete accord with the majority, but in at least one essential respect my views are not in accord with those of the majority.
The petitioner first contends that the effect of the Board’s order is to substitute its discretion for that o-f the company in the hiring of the petitioner’s’ employees. This the petitioner alleges is not the purpose of the Act as the United States Supreme Court said in N. L. R. B. v. Jones. & Laughlin Steel Corp., 1937, 301 U.S. 1, at page 45, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893. If the Board’s finding, that Kohen was not taken back because of his testimony in the representation proceeding, is supported by substantial evidence pursuant to Section 10(e) of the Act, the petitioner’s position in this regard is untenable. The evidence before the Board was undoubtedly conflicting in regard to the reasons why the company would not hire Kohen as an agent after his dismissal as an assistant district manager. In view of the recent decision in the United States Supreme Court in Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 1951, 71 S.Ct. 456 at pages 465-466, we are not prepared to set the findings of the Board aside in regard to the reasons why Kohen was not hired. We “cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is [not] substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes * * I would accept, therefore, the Board’s finding that the reason the company refused to employ Kohen as an agent was that he gave testimony under the Act. To this extent I concur with the majority opinion.
The company contended below that Kohen was not an “employee” within the meaning of Section 8(a)(4) and the Board found that Kohen was an “employee” within the Act. The company earnestly contends before this court that Kohen is not an employee, and I do not consider it essential to express an opinion on this point as it is not essential to this decision.
Section 8 specifies what Acts shall constitute an unfair labor practice for an employer. Section 8(a) (3) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer — “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis*487courage membership in any labor organization * *
The Board expressly found that Section 8(a)(3) had not been violated since the Union was not a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. Subsection (a) (3) is the only part of Section 8 which deals with the hiring of employees. This subsection declares that it is an unfair labor practice to encourage of discourage membership in a labor organization, not by just any means, but “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment * * * or condition of employment”. Suffice it to say that under the subsection the encouraging or discouraging must be practiced by the means specified to constitute an unfair labor practice.
Section 8(a)(4) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this sub-chapter.”
This subsection makes it an unfair labor practice to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for two specific reasons. The first reason is that the employee has filed charges under this sub-chapter and the second that the employee has given testimony under this subchapter. Obviously, as in subsection (a)(3) of Section 8, the unfair labor practice must be accomplished by the specified means.
The Board found that the company refused to hire Kohen because he gave testimony under this subchapter. To bring this alleged violation within the wording of Section 8(a) (4) the Board found it necessary to say that a refusal to hire is included in the term “otherwise discriminate.”
This construction of Section 8(a) (4) which is urged by the Board I cannot adopt. If taken out of context the term “otherwise discriminate” can easily be construed as all inclusive. Any discrimination, however slight and in whatever regard, would suffice, but such an interpretation would nullify the effect of “to discharge.” To discharge certainly would be discrimination when the latter word is given its broad general meaning. It would appear wholly illogical to attribute such a broad definition to the word discriminate here. On the one hand it destroys the effect of “to discharge”. On the other it overlooks the fact that Congress expressly included both hiring and firing in the preceding subsection and did not do so in subsection (a) (4) of Section 8.
“To discharge” sets the tone of this provision and the meaning of the term “otherwise discriminate” must stand in relation to it. For example, the term “otherwise discriminate” I think should include threats to discharge in the event an employee has testified or filed charges under this sub-chapter. Similarly this term would include and prevent an employee from being suspended or having his pay reduced for having filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter.
What constitutes an unfair labor practice is limited by the terms of the Act. The Act does not state anywhere that a prospective employee may not be denied employment because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter. The only relief afforded one who seeks employment is where there is discrimination to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. [Section 8(a)(3)],
Consequently I feel that the Board erred in deciding that the petitioner committed an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act, and I am of the opinion that the Board’s decision should be reversed.