Court Opinion

ID: 9587579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:23:51.637621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:09.525574
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in Division 3 of the majority opinion, that the initial traffic stop was not valid, but would limit the opinion to that topic because it controls the outcome of the case.
I disagree with the dissent’s statement that no question regarding the propriety of the initial stop is before us. Berry moved to suppress, in part, on the grounds that “[t]he police had no articulable suspicion for the stop.” The trial court ruled on this issue stating that the stop was valid because Berry “did not have a state-issued tag.” The principle underlying waiver of an argument is that the movant may have waived an argument if he has not given the court an opportunity to rule on the issue. See Morgan v. Kiff, 230 Ga. 277 (196 SE2d 445) (1973), overruled on separate grounds, Jacobs v. Hopper, 238 Ga. 461, 463 (233 SE2d 169) (1977). Because the trial court did in fact rule on the issue, it clearly had the opportunity. Berry enumerated as error the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. And the validity of the initial stop is part of the analysis of whether an officer’s subsequent questioning and detention are justified. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 682 (105 SC 1568, 84 LE2d 605) (1985); Smith v. State, 216 Ga. App. 453, 454 (454 SE2d 635) (1995).
I fully concur in the majority opinion’s conclusion that the initial stop was not valid under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” A traffic stop is reasonable where the police have “probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred,” Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (116 SC 1769, 135 LE2d 89) (1996), or reasonable suspicion that the car’s occupants are involved in criminal activity. United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221 (105 SC 675, 83 LE2d 604) (1985). Here, the arresting officer had neither.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (99 SC 1391, 59 LE2d 660) (1979), is instructive. There, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional random stops of individual cars for the purposes of checking *889the driver’s license and the car’s registration, holding:
except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 663. The same reasoning applies here. A South Carolina dealer tag, which is not required to show the expiration date, standing alone, does not provide an articulable suspicion that the tag has expired. State v. Butler, 343 S.C. 198, 201-206 (539 SE2d 414, 416-418) (App. 2000). And, there is no testimony in the record in this case about the tag to suggest that it was not validly and properly displayed or that it looked old, torn, or faded.
Relying on Prouse, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment prohibited South Carolina officers from stopping cars solely on the basis of having a South Carolina dealer tag. Id. As stated in Butler: “We cannot sanction the random stop of any and every car bearing a temporary tag, leaving in the hands of law enforcement officers the freedom to detain whomever they desire without having to justify why they chose to stop one motorist over another.” Butler, 343 S.C. at 204.31 Two other states have reached similar results. See State v. Childs, 242 Neb. 426 (495 NW2d 475) (1993); State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59 (463 NE2d 1237) (1984).
Similarly, the officer’s knowledge that dealer tags are sometimes used by car thieves on stolen cars is not reasonable suspicion that Berry was driving a stolen car. Thieves sometimes steal cars with regular license plates on them, but no one would suggest it would be permissible to allow the police to stop every car with a legitimate license plate in order to check to see whether the car may have been stolen.
However, having determined that the stop was invalid, we need go no further. If the initial stop is invalid, none of the fruits of the stop are admissible. Accord State v. Jones, 214 Ga. App. 593 (448 SE2d 496) (1994). We need not reach the question of whether the continued detention and investigation were warranted.
Lastly, I would note that in addition to Watson v. State, 190 Ga. App. 696 (379 SE2d 817) (1989), it is also necessary to overrule *890Burtts v. State, 211 Ga. App. 840 (440 SE2d 727) (1994), to the extent that it authorizes stops on this basis alone.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews, Presiding Judge Johnson, Presiding Judge Smith, and Judge Ellington join in this special concurrence.

 The fact that under South Carolina law no expiration date need be shown on the tag makes Butler more applicable to our decision, not less so.