Court Opinion

ID: 9912622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 21:00:32.170538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:13.805301
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4727      Doc: 31         Filed: 12/21/2023     Pg: 1 of 3

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4727

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        MALIK SHROPSHIRE,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:15-cr-00025-FDW-1)

        Submitted: December 19, 2023                                Decided: December 21, 2023

        Before HARRIS, QUATTLEBAUM, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Charles R. Brewer, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King,
        United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               In 2016, Malik Shropshire pleaded guilty to conspiracy to impede the Internal

        Revenue Service, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and making false statements on a loan

        application, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1014. The district court sentenced Shropshire

        to 51 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. After

        Shropshire was released onto supervision, his probation officer filed a petition and

        amended petitions seeking revocation of his supervised release based on several violations

        of the conditions of his supervised release, including new criminal conduct. Pursuant to a

        plea agreement with the Government, Shropshire pleaded guilty to the new criminal

        charges that formed the basis of two of the charged supervised release violations, and

        admitted to committing four violations of his supervised release. The district court

        therefore revoked Shropshire’s supervised release and sentenced him, below the advisory

        Sentencing Guidelines policy statement range, to 28 months of imprisonment, with no

        period of supervised release to follow. Shropshire appeals, arguing that the petitions

        seeking revocation of his supervised release erroneously cited a nonexistent count of

        conviction—“Count 7”—and thus improperly calculated the Guidelines policy statement

        range, and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise this issue

        before the district court. Finding no error, we affirm.

               “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

        supervised release. [We] will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory

        maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436

        (4th Cir. 2020). To determine whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we

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        “first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id.

        “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains

        the chosen sentence after considering the Chapter Seven policy statement range and

        application [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors.” Id. With respect to Shropshire’s

        claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance, “[u]nless an attorney’s ineffectiveness

        conclusively appears on the face of the record, such claims are not addressed on direct

        appeal.” United States v. Faulls, 812 F.3d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 2016).

               Shropshire’s claims on appeal are based on an erroneous reading of the supervised

        release revocation petitions. The petitions properly cited the statutes of Shropshire’s

        underlying conviction, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1014; in the indictment to which Shropshire

        pleaded guilty, the offense of making false statements on a loan application was charged in

        Count 7. Moreover, the petitions further properly calculated the policy statement range

        and statutory maximum terms for the violations of Shropshire’s supervised release based

        on these convictions. We therefore conclude that the district court did not commit

        procedural error in sentencing Shropshire for his supervised release violations and counsel

        did not render ineffective assistance for failing to raising a meritless challenge to the

        revocation petitions.

               Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

        this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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