Court Opinion

ID: 9381200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 13:07:11.869263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.721074
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Davis, 2023-Ohio-910.]

STATE OF OHIO                      )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                   )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                   )

STATE OF OHIO                                           C.A. Nos.      30202
                                                                       30212
        Appellant                                                      30213

        v.

DAQUAN M. DAVIS                                         APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                        ENTERED IN THE
        Appellee                                        COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                        COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
                                                        CASE Nos. CR 2013-12-3484-A
                                                                   CR 2014-06-1723-B
                                                                   CR 2014-09-2832

                                  DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 22, 2023

        SUTTON, Presiding Judge.

        {¶1}     Plaintiff-Appellant, State of Ohio, appeals from the judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court reverses.

                                                   I.

                                           Relevant Background

        {¶2}     In State v. Davis, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27725, 27726, 27727, 2016-Ohio-1521, ¶

2-5, this Court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as follows:

        [Mr. Davis’s] convictions resulted from guilty pleas entered in three cases. On
        January 12, 2014, an indictment was filed in Summit C.P. No. CR-2013-12-3484
        charging [Mr. Davis] with numerous crimes involving drug trafficking, felonious
        assault, and resisting arrest. [Mr. Davis] was assigned counsel and he pled not
        guilty. While that case was pending, [Mr. Davis] was released on bond and capias
        warrants were issued twice for his failure to appear at pretrials. Also while this case
        was pending, [Mr. Davis] was indicted in two other cases. On June 26, 2014, an
        indictment was filed in Summit C.P. No. CR-2014-06-1723 charging [Mr. Davis]
                                           2

with three counts involving drug possession. On October 2, 2014, an indictment
was filed in Summit C.P. No. CR-2014-09-2832 charging [Mr. Davis] with
numerous counts involving drug trafficking, felonious assault, and resisting arrest.
These cases resulted from criminal acts committed while [Mr.] Davis was out on
bond in the first case.

These three cases were consolidated for a single trial. On October 20, 2014, [Mr.
Davis’s] newly retained counsel entered a notice of appearance, replacing
appointed counsel. On November 19, 2014, counsel filed a motion to continue the
December 18, 2014 trial date. The trial court denied the motion on December 1,
2014. [Mr. Davis’s] counsel then filed a motion to sever, which the trial court
indicated was still under consideration at the last pretrial conference. On December
17, 2014, the day before trial, [Mr. Davis] agreed to retract his former not guilty
pleas and pled guilty to amended charges in the three cases as part of a plea
agreement offered by the [S]tate. Specifically, in CR-2013-12-3484, [Mr. Davis]
pled guilty to one first-degree felony count of drug trafficking, a violation of R.C.
2925.03(A) and (C)(4); one first-degree felony count of felonious assault, a
violation R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); one third-degree felony count of failure to comply
with the order or signal of a police officer, a violation of R.C. 2921.13(F); one fifth-
degree felony count of drug possession, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(6);
one fifth-degree felony count of receiving stolen property, a violation of
R.C.2913.51(A); and one second-degree misdemeanor count of resisting arrest, a
violation of R.C. 2921.33(A).

In CR-2014-06-1723, [Mr. Davis] pled guilty to one fifth-degree felony count of
deception to obtain a dangerous drug, a violation of R.C. 2925.22. Finally, in CR-
2014-09-2832, [Mr. Davis] pled guilty to one second-degree felony count of drug
trafficking, a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A) and (C)(6); one third-degree felony
count of failure to obey the order or signal of a police officer, a violation of R.C.
2921.31(B); and one second-degree misdemeanor count of resisting arrest, a
violation of R.C. 2921.33(A). As part of a plea agreement multiple charges were
dismissed in each case. [Mr. Davis] received an aggregate prison sentence of 14
years, 6 months.

[Mr. Davis’s] counsel filed a brief in compliance with [Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967)], asserting that, after a review of the record, she was unable to find
any issues that might support an appeal. See Anders at 744. Counsel identified a
possible issue with allied offenses, but explained that two offenses in two cases-
resisting arrest and failure to obey the order or signal of a police officer-were not
allied in these cases as they resulted from different conduct. [Mr. Davis] filed a pro
se document in response wherein he argued, without specifically setting forth an
assignment of error, that the trial court should have granted a continuance.
                                                     3

        {¶3}      Subsequent to this Court’s independent review of the record and proceedings, we

affirmed Mr. Davis’s convictions and sentence, explaining:

        A review of the plea hearing transcript reveals that [Mr. Davis] was satisfied with
        his attorney’s representation and never indicated any compulsion brought about by
        the denial of his motion for continuance. In fact, he indicated he wanted to take
        responsibility for his actions. Nothing in the record indicates that [Mr. Davis] did
        not voluntarily enter[] his pleas in these cases. [Mr. Davis] claims that during a
        pretrial his attorney stated that he was unprepared for trial, but this appears nowhere
        in the record. There is nothing to support the argument made in [Mr. Davis’s] brief
        that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance.

Id. at ¶ 9.

        {¶4}      Following his direct appeal, Mr. Davis filed several pro se motions challenging his

guilty plea and length of sentence. The trial court denied all motions. Mr. Davis then hired counsel

to file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and, after a hearing on the matter, the trial court

granted Mr. Davis’s motion.

        {¶5}      The State now appeals raising a sole assignment of error for our review.1

                                                    II.

                                     ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
        ALLOWED [MR.] DAVIS TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEAS.

        {¶6}      In its sole assignment of error, the State argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

consider Mr. Davis’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because Mr. Davis’s convictions and

sentence had already been affirmed on appeal by this Court. We agree.

        {¶7}      The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court

of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97 (1978), determined a trial court loses jurisdiction over a

        1
            Mr. Davis did not file an appellee’s merit brief in this matter.
                                                  4

case when an appeal is taken and, absent a remand, does not regain jurisdiction subsequent to the

court of appeal’s decision. Further, the Special Prosecutors Court explained, even though the trial

court retains jurisdiction over issues not inconsistent with the jurisdiction of the court of appeals,

the granting of a motion to withdraw is “inconsistent with the judgment of the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals

affirming the trial court’s conviction premised upon the guilty plea.” Id.

       {¶8}    Additionally, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated Crim.R. 32.1 does not

independently “vest jurisdiction in the trial court to maintain and determine a motion to withdraw

the guilty plea subsequent to an appeal and an affirmance by the appellate court.” Id. Moreover

“[r]es judicata bars the assertion of claims against a valid, final judgment of conviction that have

been raised or could have been raised on appeal.” State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-

Ohio-3831, ¶ 59, citing State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus.

Thus, after a defendant’s convictions have been affirmed on appeal, a trial court has “no authority

to consider [a] motion to withdraw his guilty plea, let alone grant him a new trial.” Ketterer at ¶

62.

       {¶9}    Here, Mr. Davis filed a direct appeal, in compliance with Anders, supra, wherein

his counsel brought to light a possible issue with allied offenses. Additionally, Mr. Davis filed a

pro se document wherein he challenged the trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance. This

Court independently reviewed the record and, in so doing, concluded “there are no appealable,

non-frivolous issues in this case.” Davis, 2016-Ohio-1521, at ¶ 10. The alleged issues Mr. Davis

now raises regarding the trial court’s use of the word “required” instead of “mandatory” in

addressing his maximum sentence during his plea colloquy could have been filed in his direct

appeal. Therefore, pursuant to Special Prosecutors and Ketterer, the trial court lost jurisdiction to
                                                 5

consider Mr. Davis’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas after this Court affirmed his convictions.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Mr. Davis’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

       {¶10} Accordingly, the State’s sole assignment of error is sustained.

                                                III.

       {¶11} The State’s sole assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this decision.

                                                                                Judgment reversed;
                                                                                   cause remanded.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellee.

                                                       BETTY SUTTON
                                                       FOR THE COURT
                                         6

HENSAL, J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant.

ALAN M. MEDVICK, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.