Court Opinion

ID: 9402231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 16:11:02.689276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.451569
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                               STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                COURT OF APPEAL

                                  FIRST CIRCUIT

                                  2022 KA 1314

                               STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                    VERSUS

                               DEMARIO G. WARREN

                                DATE OFJUDGMENT.       JUN 151023

 ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY- SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
               PARISH OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
                       NUMBER 16 CR6 132566, DIVISION E

                    HONORABLE WILLIAM H. BURRIS, JUDGE

Warren LeDoux Montgomery                  Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney                         State of Louisiana
J. Bryant Clark, Jr.
Matthew Caplan
Assistant District Attorneys
Covington, Louisiana

Luke Lancaster
Assistant District Attorney
Franklinton, Louisiana

Gwendolyn Brown                           Counsel for Defendant -Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana                    Demario Warren

                 BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND RESTER, JJ.

Disposition: HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
    CHUTZ, J

             Defendant, Demario Warren, was charged with second- degree murder (count

    1)   and two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm ( counts 2 &                    3).   He was

    found guilty of the responsive offense of manslaughter on count one and guilty as
    charged on the two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm. The defendant was

    adjudicated a fourth -felony habitual offender. For the manslaughter conviction, the

    trial court imposed an enhanced sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of

    parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.              For each conviction of aggravated

    assault with a firearm, the trial court sentenced the defendant to ten years

    imprisonment at hard labor. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
             On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions and sentences for the two

counts of aggravated assault with a firearm. Because the defendant was convicted

of manslaughter by a non -unanimous verdict,'                    we vacated that conviction and

sentence, as well as the habitual offender adjudication. The matter was remanded

to the trial court.        See State v. Warren, 2019- 1410 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 7124120),

2020 WL 4250839 (unpublished).

            While the defendant' s retrial on count one was pending, the State filed new

habitual offender bills of information to enhance the sentences on the defendant' s

two convictions for aggravated assault with a firearm.                 Following a hearing, he was

adjudicated a fourth -felony habitual offender on those convictions, and the trial

court vacated the previous sentences and imposed an enhanced sentence of life

imprisonment at hard labor on each conviction.                   See La. R. S. 15: 529. 1 ( A)( 4)( b); 2

State v. Shaw, 2006- 2467 ( La. 11/ 27/ 07), 969 So.2d 1233,                       1245 ( there is no

1
         See Ramos v. Louisiana, _   U. S. _,   140 S. Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed. 2d 583 ( 2020).

z This was the provision in effect at the time the defendant committed the instant offenses in
May 2016. Thereafter, La. R.S. 15: 529. 1( A)(4)( b) was amended and redesignated as La. R.S.
15: 529. 1( A)(4)( c) by 2017 La. Acts, Nos. 257 and 282, §§ 1- 2, effective November 1, 2017.
Under La. R.S. 15: 529. 1( K)( 1), the court shall apply the Habitual Offender Law in effect on the
date the defendant' s offense was committed.

                                                      2
prohibition against enhancing sentences under the Habitual Offender Law for more

than one conviction obtained on the same date).               The defendant filed a counseled

and a pro se motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.                              The

defendant now appeals his sentences. We affirm.

            ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS ONE AND TWO

         In his two related assignments of error, the defendant argues (                 1)   the State

engaged in prosecutorial vindictiveness in belatedly filing habitual offender bills of

information following his successful appeal,                and (   2)   the trial court erred in

increasing his sentences without cause.

         A vindictive prosecution is one in which the prosecutor seeks to punish the

defendant for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right and thereby
violates a defendant' s Fifth Amendment right to due process.                    United States v.

Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 ( 1982); State

v. Wesley, 49,438 ( La. App. 2d Cir. 2/ 26/ 15),            161 So. 3d 1039, 1043,            writ not

considered, 2015- 1096 ( La. 3114116), 188 So. 3d 1065. A defendant has the burden

of   proving    the   affirmative     defense       of   prosecutorial     vindictiveness         by    a

preponderance of the evidence.        Wesley, 161 So. 3d at 1043.

         The discretion to charge a defendant under the habitual offender law lies

with the district attorney. State v. Carter, 610 So. 2d 972, 975 ( La. App.                      1st Cir.

1992); see La. R.S. 15: 529. 1.     A defendant may be charged as a habitual offender at

any time,    even   after conviction    and    sentence.     La. R.S.      15: 529. 1( D)( 1)(   a).    A

district attorney has great discretionary power to file a habitual offender bill under

La. R.S.    15: 529. 1( D), just as he has the initial unlimited power to prosecute

 whom, when, and how" he chooses.             State v. Doirthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1279 ( La.

1993).     His use of the habitual offender laws simply provides an ancillary

sentencing factor designed to serve important and legitimate societal purposes.

Furthermore,    the   mere use      of the habitual        offender law will          not     create    a

                                                3
presumption      of prosecutorial   vindictiveness.     The events in the         course   of

prosecution will create a presumption of vindictiveness only when, to a reasonable

mind, the filing of the habitual offender bill can be explained only by a desire to
deter or punish the defendant' s exercise of legal rights. State v. Orange, 2002-

0711 (   La. App. 1st Cir. 4111103), 845 So.2d 570, 578, writs denied, 2003- 1352 ( La.

5121/ 04), 874 So. 2d 161 &   2003- 21.95 ( La. 712! 04), 877 So.2d 137.

         We   find no prosecutorial    vindictiveness   in the   instant matter.       The

circumstances do not demonstrate the defendant was punished for the exercise of

any legal right.     His conviction and sentence for manslaughter were vacated

pursuant to Ramos, and the matter was remanded to the trial            court.     The State

chose to retry the defendant on that charge.             Regardless,   on   the    previous

manslaughter conviction, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information in

order to enhance the sentence for that conviction to life imprisonment. Prior to the

manslaughter conviction and enhanced sentence being vacated, the State did not

choose to enhance the defendant' s sentences for aggravated assault with a firearm.

The State had no reason to do so since it had obtained a life sentence with the

enhancement of the manslaughter sentence.

         Once this court vacated the life sentence on the manslaughter conviction

because of a Ramos issue, the State sought to enhance the defendant' s sentences

for aggravated assault with a firearm to ensure the defendant would be sentenced to

life as a fourth -felony habitual offender, as it had always intended.          This action

reflected prosecutorial discretion rather than vindictiveness.         See Carter, 610

So. 2d at 975. Moreover, even if we were to conclude the prosecution' s subsequent

filing of new habitual offender bills of information created a presumption of

vindictiveness, the State had legitimate objective reasons for proceeding with the

habitual offender charges.    Specifically, the defendant did, in fact, commit the prior

felonies for which he was convicted and which served as the basis for the habitual

                                            2
offender proceedings.     See Wesley, 161 So.3d at 1045.

        The defendant also argues on appeal that the same trial court that imposed

the original enhanced life sentence also imposed the instant enhanced life

sentences and, thus, the presumption of vindictiveness should apply.    In support of

this proposition, the defendant cites to several cases, including State v. Dauzart,
2007- 15 (   La. App. 5th Cir. 5115107), 960 So.2d 1079 and North Carolina v.

Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 ( 1969), overruled in      art by,

Alabama v. Smith, 490 U. S. 794, 109 S. Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 ( 1989).

        Generally, if a convicted defendant is successful in having his conviction

overturned on appeal and is subsequently re -tried and convicted, the trial court may
not then impose a more severe sentence. A defendant may not be punished for

seeking appellate redress.    If a trial court imposes a more severe sentence on a

defendant when he is convicted following a successful appeal,        the trial court' s

reasons for the increased sentence must affirmatively appear in the record.
Otherwise, there is a presumption of vindictiveness. The purpose behind this rule

is to   prevent defendants     from being penalized for having exercised         their

constitutional rights.   However, the presumption of vindictiveness is inapplicable

where different judges have imposed the different sentences against the defendant,

because a sentence " increase"   cannot truly be said to have taken place.   Dauzart,

960 So. 2d at 1086.

        The defendant' s reliance on Dauzart and Pearce is misplaced.        The same

trial court presided over the defendant' s original trial and sentencing and the

instant proceedings.     Notwithstanding, the cases cited by the defendant indicate

that a presumption of vindictiveness is triggered when the same trial court imposes

a more severe sentence on a defendant after a new trial. Neither of these factors is

present in the instant matter.    There has been no imposition of a more severe

sentence on the defendant and there has been no new sentence imposed on him

                                          5
after a new trial.    Upon remand, the trial court again adjudicated the defendant a

fourth -felony habitual offender and sentenced him to a life sentence for each

aggravated assault with a firearm conviction.          The new enhanced sentences for

these convictions were not more severe than the enhanced life sentence imposed

for the defendant' s manslaughter conviction. Further, the new enhanced sentences

were not imposed after a new trial, since the defendant' s new trial on count one

had not been held at the time of the new habitual offender hearing and sentencing.
Moreover, the trial court had no discretion in imposing mandatory enhanced life
sentences under the Habitual Offender Law.'

       The defendant has failed to produce any evidence of vindictiveness on the

part of either the prosecution or the trial court.     While the defendant' s arguments

seem to focus more on prosecutor ial vindictiveness, he has provided no factual

basis for such a claim.       Moreover, the defendant' s claims as to the trial court' s

vindictiveness in imposing a harsher sentence on remand is not supported by the
record.   See Orange, 845 So. 2d at 579- 80.

       These assignments of error are without merit.

       HABITUAL           OFFENDER          ADJUDICATIONS          AND      SENTENCES
AFFIRMED,

3 The trial court specifically found there were no reasons to deviate from the mandatory life
sentences pursuant to Dorthey. ( R. 441- 42).

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