Court Opinion

ID: 9898062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:12.630129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:53.025516
License: Public Domain

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           THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

         STARKIST COMPANY,                                 No. 82725-1-I

                              Appellant,                   DIVISION ONE

                       v.                                  PUBLISHED OPINION

         THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,

                              Respondent,

         and

         DONGWON INDUSTRIES CO. LTD.,
         AND CHRISTOPHER LISCHEWSKI,

                              Defendants.

                 ANDRUS, C.J. — StarKist Company appeals a summary judgment order

          holding it jointly and severally liable for the harm it and its competitors, Chicken of

          the Sea and Bumble Bee Foods, caused consumers when they conspired to fix

          the prices of packaged tuna in violation of RCW 19.86.030.

                 We reverse the summary judgment order—not because, as StarKist

          contends, it can be liable only for its own profits gained through the conspiracy, but

          because RCW 19.86.080 does not mandate joint and several liability. The statute

          instead confers discretion on the trial court to determine what judgment “may be

          necessary” to restore to consumers the money acquired by an unlawful conspiracy.
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          No. 82725-1-I/2

          The trial court may impute to one conspirator the actions of all coconspirators and,

          as a result, may order StarKist to pay an amount equal to the conspiracy’s gains if

          the court deems it necessary to do so.

                 But the State of Washington settled with coconspirators Chicken of the Sea,

          and Bumble Bee’s chief executive officer, Christopher Lischewski, for a fraction of

          these alleged consumer losses. And StarKist contends it was an insignificant

          player in the overall price-fixing scheme. We therefore reverse the summary

          judgment order imposing joint and several liability on StarKist “for the harm caused

          by its co-conspirators Bumble Bee and Chicken of the Sea” and remand for the

          trial court to enter findings of fact to justify any restitution it orders StarKist to pay

          under RCW 19.86.080.

                                                  FACTS

                 In 2016, Chicken of the Sea International (COSI) disclosed to federal

          investigators that it had conspired with competitors, including StarKist and Bumble

          Bee, to fix prices on packaged tuna products. Following these disclosures, Bumble

          Bee and StarKist were charged with and pleaded guilty in federal court to

          conspiring to fix prices with competitors in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act,

          15 U.S.C. § 1. Both companies admitted that from November 2011 until December

          2013, they “participated in a conspiracy among major packaged-seafood-

          producing firms, the primary purpose of which was to fix, raise, and maintain the

          prices of packaged seafood sold in the United States.”

                 In March 2020, the State of Washington, through the Attorney General,

          brought an antitrust lawsuit against Chicken of the Sea, seeking an injunction,

          damages, restitution, and other relief under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA)
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          No. 82725-1-I/3

          for this price-fixing conspiracy. Soon thereafter, Chicken of the Sea entered into

          a consent decree in which it agreed to pay $500,000 to the State of Washington in

          exchange for a release of liability.

                 On June 2, 2020, the State of Washington brought a similar antitrust lawsuit

          against StarKist, StarKist’s parent company, Dongwon Industries Co. Ltd., and

          Bumble Bee Foods LLC’s former chief executive officer, Christopher Lischewski,

          alleging these defendants had engaged in a conspiracy in restraint of trade with

          Chicken of the Sea.

                 In October 2020, the State entered into a consent decree with Lischewski

          in which he agreed to pay $100,000 to the State of Washington to compensate

          consumers allegedly harmed by the conspiracy.

                 In February 2021, the trial court held StarKist liable as a matter of law under

          RCW 19.86.030 for engaging in a price-fixing conspiracy during the period

          specified in its federal guilty plea.

                 On March 9, 2021, the State disclosed the report of its expert economist,

          Dr. David Sunding, who opined that the price-fixing scheme between StarKist,

          Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee caused Washington consumers to overpay

          for packaged tuna by a total of $11,981,526. Sunding attributed $1,074,589 of the

          total losses to StarKist’s sales.

                 The State then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to hold

          StarKist “jointly and severally liable for the actions of its co-conspirators.” The trial

          court granted the motion, concluding that StarKist “is jointly and severally liable for

          the harm caused by its co-conspirators Bumble Bee and Chicken of the Sea as a

          result of the price-fixing conspiracy from at least November 2011 continuing
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          No. 82725-1-I/4

          through . . . December 2013.” StarKist sought and we granted discretionary review

          of this order.

                                                ANALYSIS

                 StarKist contends the trial court erred in imposing joint and several liability

          as a matter of law, arguing that the tort principle of joint and several liability cannot

          apply to an equitable action for restitution under RCW 19.86.080. We conclude

          that RCW 19.86.080(2) and (3) give the trial court broad discretion to determine

          what judgment “may be necessary” to restore to consumers monies acquired by

          an unlawful conspiracy. The trial court may impute to one conspirator the actions

          of all coconspirators and, as a result, may order StarKist to pay an amount equal

          to all consumer losses from the entire conspiracy if the court deems it necessary

          to do so. But we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment order because RCW

          19.86.080 does not mandate joint and several liability, as the trial court’s order

          implies.

                                           Standard of Review

                 We review a summary judgment order de novo. Seattle Events v. State, 22

          Wn. App. 2d 640, 648-49, 512 P.3d 926 (2022). Statutory interpretation of the

          CPA presents an issue of law that this court also reviews de novo. State v. LG

          Elecs., 186 Wn.2d 1, 7, 375 P.3d 636 (2016).

                                   Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade

                 RCW 19.86.030 declares unlawful “[e]very contract, combination, in the

          form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.”

          Conspiring with competitors to fix prices is a per se illegal restraint of trade under

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          No. 82725-1-I/5

          the Sherman Antitrust Act, 1 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,

          551 U.S. 877, 886, 127 S. Ct. 2705, 168 L. Ed. 2d 623 (2007), and a violation of

          the CPA. 2 See Murray Pub. Co., Inc. v. Malmquist, 66 Wn. App. 318, 325, 832

          P.2d 493 (1992) (“RCW 19.86.030 is essentially identical to section 1 of the

          Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.”)

                  The trial court held StarKist liable under this statute and StarKist does not

          challenge this ruling. There is no dispute that from November 2011 until December

          2013, StarKist engaged in an unlawful conspiracy with Chicken of the Sea and

          Bumble Bee to fix the price of packaged tuna in Washington.

                  The CPA provides two methods for enforcing RCW 19.86.030.                           RCW

          19.86.090 authorizes any person injured in their business or property by a violation

          of RCW 19.86.030 to bring a civil action for “actual damages” and to seek treble

          damages. It also authorizes the State, when injured directly or indirectly by a

          violation of the act, to sue for its actual damages. LG Elecs., 186 Wn.2d at 8.

                  RCW 19.86.080, the statute at issue here, authorizes the attorney general

          to bring an enforcement action “in the name of the state, or as parens patriae on

          behalf of persons residing in the state” for injunctive relief. 3 In addition, under RCW

          19.86.080(2) and (3), the court has “broad, discretionary authority to order

          1 15 U.S.C. § 1.
          2 The legislature patterned the CPA’s antitrust provisions after federal antitrust analogues and

          federal court decisions interpreting substantive violations of the Sherman Act guide Washington
          courts in constructing the state law. RCW 19.86.920 (in interpreting CPA, courts to be guided by
          final decisions of federal courts and final orders of Federal Trade Commission interpreting federal
          statutes dealing with same or similar matters).
          3 An action by the State of Washington for injunctive relief and restitution under RCW 19.86.080 is

          not subject to the CPA’s four-year statute of limitations, RCW 19.86.120, because that provision by
          its plain language applies only to “claims for damages.” LG Elects., 186 Wn.2d at 9. Nor is the
          State subject to the general statute of limitations of RCW 4.16.160 because actions brought in the
          name of the state are excluded from that statute. Id. at 15.
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          No. 82725-1-I/6

          restitution.” State v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt., LLC, 16 Wn. App. 2d 664,

          686, 482 P.3d 925 (2021). The statute provides:

                       (2) The court may make such additional orders or judgments
                 as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any moneys
                 or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by
                 means of any act herein prohibited or declared to be unlawful.

                        (3) Upon a violation of RCW 19.86.030, 19.86.040, 19.86.050,
                 or 19.86.060, the court may also make such additional orders or
                 judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest
                 any moneys or property, real or personal, which may have been
                 acquired, regardless of whether such person purchased or
                 transacted for goods or services directly with the defendant or
                 indirectly through resellers. The court shall exclude from the amount
                 of monetary relief awarded in an action pursuant to this subsection
                 any amount that duplicates amounts that have been awarded for the
                 same violation. The court should consider consolidation or
                 coordination with other related actions, to the extent practicable, to
                 avoid duplicate recovery.

          RCW 19.86.080; see also LG Elecs., 186 Wn.2d at 17 (Supreme Court described

          the attorney general’s claims under RCW 19.86.080(2) and (3) as “restitution

          claims”); State v. Ralph Williams’ North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wn.2d

          298, 321, 553 P.2d 423 (1976) (when the attorney general proves a defendant has

          acquired possession of property of a customer unlawfully, the court can order

          restitution).

                 When the attorney general seeks a restitution award under RCW

          19.86.080(2) or (3), it is not required to prove causation or injury. State v. CLA

          Estate Services, Inc., No. 82529-1-I, slip op. at 23 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2022). 4

          And the court may calculate restitution based on the amount of illegal gains rather

          than net damages sustained by consumers. Id. at 24.

          4 https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/825291.pdf

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          No. 82725-1-I/7

                                Scope of Restitution under RCW 19.86.080

                 In this appeal, StarKist argues that any restitution award must be limited to

          the illegal gains StarKist itself enjoyed and cannot extend to the illegal gains

          realized by its coconspirators. It contends that the tort concept of “joint and several

          liability” is a principle applicable only to claims for actual damages under RCW

          19.86.090 and cannot apply to RCW 19.86.080’s equitable restitution remedy.

                 Our analysis of RCW 19.86.080 begins with examining the statute de novo

          to determine the legislature’s intent. State v. Hawkins, No. 100060-0, slip op. at

          13 (Wash. Oct. 27, 2022). 5 We discern legislative intent “from the plain language

          enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the

          context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions,

          amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Ass’n of

          Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs. v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 182 Wn.2d 342,

          350, 340 P.3d 849 (2015) (citing Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146

          Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). We read each provision of a statute together

          with its related provisions to determine the legislative intent underlying the entire

          statutory scheme. In re Estate of Kerr, 134 Wn.2d 328, 343, 949 P.2d 810 (1998).

                 Based on these principles of statutory construction, we reject StarKist’s

          argument that it cannot be held liable for unlawful gains realized by the conspiracy

          under RCW 19.86.080 for three reasons.                 First, the plain language of RCW

          19.86.080 does not limit restitution to monies acquired by a single coconspirator.

          Second, although neither RCW 19.86.090 nor 19.86.080 explicitly refers to the

          5 https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1000600.pdf

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          No. 82725-1-I/8

          common law principles of joint and several liability, these statutory provisions must

          be read together with RCW 19.86.030, the provision outlawing conspiracies in

          restraint of trade. Under well-established Washington common law, a conspiracy

          is a single enterprise for which all coconspirators are responsible. Finally, federal

          antitrust case law does not require a different result.

                 1. Plain Text of RCW 19.86.080

                 StarKist first contends that RCW 19.86.080 limits its liability to profits it

          acquired from the conspiracy. But the plain text of RCW 19.86.080 does not

          support any such limitation.

                 RCW 19.86.080(2) states that “[t]he court may make such additional orders

          or judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any moneys

          or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of any act

          herein prohibited or declared to be unlawful.” The “prohibited” or “unlawful” acts

          referred to in this paragraph are the acts explicitly outlawed by other provisions of

          the CPA, including RCW 19.86.030 prohibiting conspiracies in restraint of trade.

          The court may thus order a party participating in an unlawful conspiracy to pay

          “any moneys . . . which may have been acquired” by the conspiracy.

                 Neither RCW 19.86.080(2) nor .080(3) says restitution must be limited to

          any moneys which the defendant may have acquired from their participation in the

          conspiracy. We will not add words to a statute where the legislature has chosen

          not to include them. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526,

          243 P.3d 1283 (2010).

                 StarKist directs our attention to a reference to “the defendant” in RCW

          19.86.080(3). That provision now reads:
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          No. 82725-1-I/9

                      Upon a violation of RCW 19.86.030 . . . the court may also make
                      such additional orders or judgments as may be necessary to
                      restore to any person in interest any moneys or property, real or
                      personal, which may have been acquired, regardless of whether
                      such person purchased or transacted for goods or services
                      directly with the defendant or indirectly through resellers. The
                      court shall exclude from the amount of monetary relief awarded
                      in an action pursuant to this subsection any amount that
                      duplicates amounts that have been awarded for the same
                      violation. The court should consider consolidation or coordination
                      with other related actions, to the extent practicable, to avoid
                      duplicate recovery.

          (Emphasis added.) StarKist contends that “the natural reading of this clause is

          that restitution is limited to the recovery of property that is ‘acquired’ by the

          ‘defendant,’ regardless of whether the defendant acquires it by transacting directly

          with consumers, or indirectly through resellers.” We disagree with this reading.

                  The legislature added subparagraph (3) to RCW 19.86.080 in 2007, not as

          a way of restricting the scope of restitution that a court could order, but as a way

          to expand the class of customers on whose behalf the Attorney General could bring

          suit. The Final Bill Report for Substitute Senate Bill 5228 explained:

                  The Attorney General may bring an action to restrain a person from
                  violating the CPA. An action by the Attorney General may seek to
                  prevent violations of the act and may seek relief for persons injured
                  by violation of the CPA. As a result of a federal court ruling, 6 a
                  question has arisen as to whether the Attorney General is authorized
                  to bring an action for a CPA violation on behalf of persons who are
                  “indirect purchasers” of goods or services. . . .

                  Many states have enacted laws that allow an indirect purchaser to
                  bring a suit directly, while others allow such suits only when brought
                  by the Attorney General on behalf of the indirect purchasers.
                  Washington has not enacted either type of law. However, based in

          6 The final House Bill Report on SSB 5228 identified the case as Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431

          U.S. 720, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 52 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1977), in which the United States Supreme Court held
          that under federal antitrust law, indirect purchasers could not bring an action for damages, but left
          open the possibility that states enacting their own laws could allow indirect purchasers to sue for
          unfair business practices. See H.B. REP. ON SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5228, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
          2007), available at 5228-S BRH APH 07.pdf (wa.gov).
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                 part on the state court of appeals decision in Blewett v. Abbott
                 Laboratories, 86 Wn. App. 782 (1997), the state Attorney General
                 has brought suits on behalf of indirect purchasers under the common
                 law doctrine of parens patriae . . . . The Attorney General reports,
                 however, that in at least one multi-state case, a federal judge has
                 rejected the Attorney General’s attempts to sue on behalf of indirect
                 purchasers.

          FINAL B. REP. ON SUBSTITUTE S.B. 5228, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007). 7 The

          addition of RCW 19.86.080(3) was thus intended to give the court the authority to

          order restoration for any injured party “regardless of whether the injury was the

          result of a direct or indirect purchase of goods or services” from the defendant. Id.

          The amendment expanded the consumers protected by the statute; it did not

          restrict the amount of restitution the court could order against any particular

          defendant.

                 RCW 19.86.080 is a grant of “broad, discretionary authority” to courts to

          order restitution. State v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns. Mgmt., LLC, 16 Wn. App.2d

          664, 686, 482 P.3d 925 (2021).            In State v. Ralph Williams’ N. W. Chrysler

          Plymouth, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 265, 277-78, 510 P.2d 233 (1973), our Supreme Court

          affirmed a liberal construction of the restitution provision, as required by RCW

          19.86.920, and “decline[d] to limit the traditional equity powers of the court.”

          StarKist’s restrictive interpretation of RCW 19.86.080 conflicts with RCW

          19.86.920 and our case law liberally interpreting the restitution provision of the

          CPA.

                 2. Common Law of Conspiracy

          7 Available at 5228-S.FBR.pdf (wa.gov).

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                 SkarKist’s interpretation is also unpersuasive because it fails to address the

          common law of conspiracy. The word “conspiracy” in RCW 19.86.030 is not

          defined in the CPA. But this legal term has a well-understood legal meaning and

          we assign a familiar legal term in a statute its familiar legal meaning. Floeting v.

          Group Health Cooperative, 200 Wn. App. 758, 764, 403 P.3d 559 (2017).

                 A conspiracy is “a combination of two or more persons to commit a criminal

          or unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means.” Sears v.

          Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of Am., 8 Wn.2d 447,

          452, 112 P.2d 850 (1941) (quoting Eyak River Packing Co. v. Huglen, 143 Wash.

          229, 234, 255 P. 123 (1927)). Under Washington common law, “[e]very person

          who enters into a conspiracy, no matter whether at its beginning or at a later stage

          of its progress, is in law a party to every act of the conspirators, and is liable for all

          of the acts done in pursuance of the conspiracy in the same manner that they

          would be had they been a party to all of the wrongful acts.” Id. We presume the

          legislature enacted the CPA “with full knowledge of existing laws.” Maziar v. Dep’t

          of Corr., 183 Wn.2d 84, 88, 349 P.3d 826 (2015) (quoting Thurston County v.

          Gorton, 85 Wn.2d 133, 138, 530 P.2d 309 (1975)).

                 We can find no basis for limiting the application of this conspiracy case law

          to cases in which the plaintiff seeks monetary damages under RCW 19.86.090,

          rather than equitable relief under RCW 19.86.080. In Washington, all distinctions

          between actions at law and actions in equity have been abolished. Hotchkin v.

          McNaught-Collins Imp. Co., 102 Wash. 161, 165, 172 P. 864 (1918). The nature

          of one’s claim may govern whether there is a right to a jury trial, Brown v. Safeway

          Stores, Inc., 94 Wn.2d 359, 365, 617 P.2d 704 (1980) (constitutional right to jury
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          trial applies to civil actions purely legal in nature and not to actions purely equitable

          in nature), but does not preclude a court from holding one conspirator liable for the

          actions of its coconspirators.

                 Our Supreme Court has applied conspiracy concepts in cases brought in

          equity. In Lyle v. Haskins, 24 Wn.2d 883, 168 P.2d 797 (1946), the purchasers of

          a sawmill, Lyle and Nelson, sought to enjoin the sellers, the Haskins, and another

          couple, the Johnsons, from operating a competing sawmill based on their

          conspiracy to violate a noncompetition agreement, to which the Haskins had

          agreed. The court, noting that the case had been brought in equity, affirmed an

          injunction for the purchasers, finding the evidence sufficient to support the

          conclusion that the seller violated the restrictive covenant in the sales agreement

          and “that Harold Haskins and [his] wife entered into a conspiracy with [several

          people] to violate the restrictive covenant, and that Johnson and [Haskins’ son,

          Robert] were aiding, abetting, conspiring and confederating with Harold Haskins in

          the violation of such covenant.” Id. at 899. Citing 11 Am. Jur. § 45, our Supreme

          Court stated that “the liability of the conspirators is joint and several.” Id. at 900. It

          held that Johnson, “entering into the conspiracy after it was formed . . . became

          liable for all acts committed by any of the other parties, either before or after their

          entrance, in furtherance of the common design.” Id.

                 Also instructive is Newton Ins. Agency & Brokerage, Inc. v. Caledonian Ins.

          Grp, Inc., 114 Wn. App. 151, 52 P.3d 30 (2002). In that case, an insurance agency

          brought suit against a competitor for tortious interference and civil conspiracy after

          the competitor hired its former employee, with whom it had a noncompetition

          agreement.     The agency obtained an arbitration award against the former
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          employee for lost revenue based on the employee’s diversion of insurance

          business to the competitor.            Id. at 157.       The court of appeals held that the

          competitor, as a coconspirator of the former employee, was collaterally estopped

          from relitigating the amount of damages assessed by an arbitrator against the

          former employee, despite the fact the competitor had not participated as a party in

          the arbitration. Id. at 161. Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine. Weaver v.

          City of Everett, 194 Wn.2d 464, 472, 450 P.3d 177 (2019). Yet, this court had no

          difficulties in invoking that doctrine to impute liability of one conspirator to another.

                  Because we presume the legislature knows the law in the area in which it

          is legislating, we will not construe a statute in derogation of that common law

          absent an express legislative intent to change the law. Wynn v. Earin, 163 Wn.2d

          361, 371, 181 P.3d 806 (2008). We have no such expression of legislative intent

          here. We therefore conclude that when the legislature made conspiracies in

          restraint of trade unlawful and gave courts the authority to restore monies acquired

          through such a conspiracy, that authority included the pre-existing power under

          common law to hold one conspirator liable for all of the acts done in pursuance of

          the conspiracy, even if they were not a party to all of the wrongful acts. 8

                  3. Federal Antitrust Case Law

                  StarKist finally contends that requiring it to pay restitution based on the

          actions of its coconspirators is inconsistent with federal antitrust law.                       RCW

          8 StarKist also contends the State should be judicially estopped from arguing that StarKist’s liability

          is joint and several based on the State’s characterization of its claim as equitable when it moved to
          strike StarKist’s jury demand. StarKist contends that this argument is “flatly inconsistent with its
          argument now that the court should apply the tort doctrine of joint and several liability based on
          antitrust law.” StarKist’s argument is based on the erroneous premise that a trial court cannot, in
          equity, order one conspirator to pay restitution for profits realized by a coconspirator. The State’s
          arguments are not inconsistent and judicial estoppel does not apply.
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          No. 82725-1-I/14

          19.86.920 does provide that we should look to federal antitrust case law in

          interpreting the CPA:

                        The legislature hereby declares that the purpose of this act is
                    to complement the body of federal law governing restraints of
                    trade, unfair competition and unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent
                    acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair and
                    honest competition. It is the intent of the legislature that, in
                    construing this act, the courts be guided by final decisions of the
                    federal courts and final orders of the federal trade commission
                    interpreting the various federal statutes dealing with the same or
                    similar matters . . . . To this end this act shall be liberally construed
                    that its beneficial purposes may be served.

          (Emphasis added.) But we may also decline to follow federal law where the

          language and structure of the CPA departs from otherwise analogous federal

          statutes. L.G. Elecs., 186 Wn.2d at 10 (Supreme Court refuses to interpret statute

          of limitations provision in CPA similarly to statute of limitations in Clayton Act, 15

          U.S.C. § 15c, because the provisions were not parallel).

                 StarKist relies on Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443, 137 S. Ct. 1626,

          198 L. Ed. 2d 73 (2017), to argue that requiring it to pay for the actions of

          coconspirators is impermissible. In Honeycutt, after a hardware store owner and

          his brother, the sales manager, were convicted of conspiring to distribute iodine

          used to manufacture methamphetamine, the Sixth Circuit held that the brothers,

          as coconspirators, could be held jointly and severally liable for “any proceeds of

          the conspiracy.” 137 S. Ct. at 1631. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that

          the language of the applicable statute did not authorize a defendant to be held

          jointly and severally liable for property that anyone other than the defendant

          derived from the crime. Id. at 1630. The holding in Honeycutt was based on the

          language of the federal criminal forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853, that clearly

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          limited forfeiture to “proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the

          result of such violation.” 21 U.S.C. § 853 (emphasis added). There is no similar

          limiting language in either RCW 19.86.080(2) or (3).

                 StarKist also asks us to follow Liu v. SEC, __ U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 207

          L. Ed. 2d 401 (2020). In that case, the Securities and Exchange Commission

          (SEC) brought a civil enforcement action against developers of a cancer treatment

          center, alleging they engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign nationals investing

          in their center in violation of the Securities Act of 1933, § 77a et seq. and the

          Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. Id. at 1941-42. The

          SEC sought disgorgement of the total amount of money the developers had raised

          from investors under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5), which authorizes federal courts to

          grant “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of

          investors.” Id. at 1940. The district court rejected the developers’ arguments that

          the disgorgement award should be reduced by their legitimate business expenses.

          It entered an order making the developers jointly and severally liable for the gross

          amount the developers had raised from investors. Id. at 1942.

                 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 15 U.S.C. §

          78u(d)(5) authorized the SEC to seek disgorgement “beyond a defendant’s net

          profits from wrongdoing.” Id. It determined that the “equitable relief” allowable

          under the statute was limited to the wrongdoer’s net profits after deducting

          legitimate business expenses. Id. at 1946.

                 In dicta, the court addressed, but did not decide, whether joint and several

          liability was appropriate. Id. at 1947. It noted that while joint and several liability

          “sometimes [seems] at odds with the common-law rule requiring individual liability
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          for wrongful profits,” the common law also permitted liability for “partners engaged

          in concerted wrongdoing.” Id. at 1949 (citing Ambler v. Whipple, 87 U.S. 546, 20

          Wall. 54, 22 L. Ed. 403 (1874)). It went on to state:

                 The historic profits remedy thus allows some flexibility to impose
                 collective liability. Given the wide spectrum of relationships between
                 participants and beneficiaries of unlawful schemes—from equally
                 culpable codefendants to more remote, unrelated tipper-tippee
                 arrangements—the Court need not wade into all the circumstances
                 where an equitable profits remedy might be punitive when applied to
                 multiple individuals.

          Id. It noted that the defendants were married and both were involved in the

          businesses that misappropriated investor funds. Id. It chose to “leave it to the

          Ninth Circuit on remand to determine whether the facts are such that petitioners

          can, consistent with equitable principles, be found liable for profits as partners in

          wrongdoing or whether individual liability is required.” Id.

                 Lui does not advance StarKist’s argument on appeal. First, the Supreme

          Court discussion regarding joint and several liability is dicta. Second, the court

          explicitly recognized that “partners” can, under certain circumstances, be held

          jointly and severally liable for the actions of other partners. To the extent Lui

          applies here, it is consistent with Washington common law on conspiracy liability.

                 Referencing Lui’s discussion regarding partnership liability, StarKist argues

          that the State did not allege or prove that it was in a legal partnership with COSI

          or Bumble Bee. This argument misreads Lui. The court’s reference to “partners

          in wrongdoing” can hardly be understood as a requirement of an actual legal

          partnership. Amber v. Whipple, the case cited by the Liu court for the principle that

          partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing are jointly and severally liable,

          contained no such pleading or proof requirement.          The Amber court simply
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          recognized that participants in a fraudulent patent scheme would be liable for “the

          profits realized by them, or either of them, from the use or sale, or otherwise,

          arising from said patents.” 87 U.S. at 559. Lui does not require the existence of a

          legal partnership as a precondition to joint and several liability.

                 StarKist’s argument has the additional flaw of disregarding both federal and

          Washington cases describing a conspiracy as “a partnership in a criminal

          purpose.” United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S. Ct. 124, 54 L. Ed. 1168

          (1910); State v. Dent, 123 Wn.2d 467, 475, 869 P.2d 392 (1994). It is undisputed

          that StarKist conspired with Bumble Bee and COSI in a price fixing scheme—

          StarKist pleaded guilty in federal court to being a member of this conspiracy. To

          the extent Lui requires the existence of a “partnership,” the State has established

          the existence of such a partnership here as a matter of law.

                 We conclude that RCW 19.86.080 gives the trial court the authority to hold

          StarKist liable for the actions of its coconspirators but it does not mandate such a

          result. The trial court has the discretion to decide that StarKist should be liable for

          the full amount of the conspiracy’s illegal gains but it also has the discretion to tie

          StarKist’s liability to the extent of its participation in the common enterprise.

                                       Summary Judgment Order

                 The summary judgment order, however, did not represent an exercise of

          the trial court’s discretion under RCW 19.86.080. Instead, the trial court held

          StarKist liable for the conspiracy’s profits without explaining its rationale for

          exercising its discretion in this manner and appears to have rendered this ruling as

          a matter of law. The failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion.

          Bowcutt v. Delta North Star Corp., 95 Wn. App. 311, 320, 976 P.2d 643 (1999).
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          We therefore reverse the summary judgment order and remand to the trial court to

          allow it to determine, in the exercise of discretion, the amount of restitution it deems

          necessary under RCW 19.86.080.

                 Reversed.

          WE CONCUR:

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