Court Opinion

ID: 9668589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:18:54.0969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.234096
License: Public Domain

DENTON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I have no particular disagreement with the test to be applied under Article 3716 which was followed by the majority opinion, but I am convinced the test has been misapplied. In my opinion the trial court correctly ruled that the testimony offered by the two appellants was inadmissible under Art. 3716. Both were parties to this suit seeking to set aside the will of their deceased father. It was their purpose to establish that their father lacked testamentary capacity, and that his will was procured by undue influence on the part of appellee.
According to the statement of facts, Mrs. Roberts was not allowed to testify in response to three questions propounded by her attorney: (1) to tell the relationship that existed between the deceased and his granddaughter; (2) whether or not deceased was a heavy drinker; (3) whether deceased was a good father and husband. Mrs. Roberts’ sister, Lubelle Bush Byrd, also a party hereto, was not permitted to testify concerning a visit by deceased to Mrs. Byrd’s home in Port Arthur. Appel-lee’s objections to this testimony offered was sustained on the ground that it violated Art. 3716. In my opinion all of this testimony constituted transactions with the decedent within the meaning of the statute. *341Under the circumstances here, the trial ■court correctly excluded such testimony. Holland v. Nimitz, 111 Tex. 419, 232 S.W. 298, 299 (opinion adopted). The Commis•sion of Appeals in Holland v. Nimitz, supra, discussed the statute as follows:
“The object of the statute was to prohibit the interested heirs and legal representatives from testifying to any facts, or opinions, based upon observations, arising out of any transaction with the decedent which the decedent ■could, if living, contradict or explain. Death having sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law, for reasons founded upon public policy, seals the lips of the other.”
In developing their bills of exception aft■er the above proposed testimony was excluded, both witnesses proceeded to testify to other matters such as why they did not visit their father during his last illness; their failure to attend his funeral; and ■their failure to send him Christmas and Birthday cards. Although this testimony was offered only during the time the bills ■of exception were perfected, it was simply .a case of the witness justifying or explaining transactions with the deceased, and would not be subjects that could be testified to under the circumstances here. It is to be noted that the trial court instructed the jury in its charge relative to the law pertaining to interested parties testifying to any transactions or conversations with a ■deceased person. Jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. This instruction properly explained the absence of ■testimony by the appellants pertaining to these matters.
Appellants further complain of the action of the trial court in sustaining certain spe•cial exceptions to their pleadings. One allegation which was stricken was one which asserted the estate of the deceased consisted .almost entirely of separate property received by him by gift or devise. Even •though the pleading was stricken, appellants did offer evidence which established the fact that the land in controversy had been in deceased’s family for many years. Appellants are not now in a position to complain of the trial court’s action in sustaining the pleadings referred to when this evidence was before the jury.
Appellants further complain of the trial court’s action in sustaining special exceptions concerning allegations of previous marriages of appellee, and the contention her marriage just prior to the one to the deceased was void. I fail to see how these matters are material to the ultimate issues to be decided in the instant case. In addition, these matters were not before the county court in the original probate proceeding. It is well settled that on an appeal from the probate court to the district court only such issues as were presented in the probate court can be determined by the district court. Magee v. Magee, (Tex.Civ.App.) 272 S.W. 252 (writ dismissed); In the Matter of the Estate of Martin, Deceased (Tex.Civ.App.) 284 S.W.2d 279 (refused n. r. e.). The contention that appel-lee’s marriage to one W. W. Spears was void is a collateral attack on that judgment. We find nothing in this record to support such an attack.
I also disagree with the majority opinion in its holding that the trial court’s instruction complained of constituted reversible error. The instruction was a correct statement of the law. Even though it may have been better practice to have eliminated the instruction, I do not think it can be said that appellants were prejudiced thereby. It does not seem that the instruction would have informed the jury of the effect of their answers. As stated by Chief Justice Hickman in Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex. 498, 271 S.W.2d 85, 87:
“The spirit of our practice of submitting cases on special issues would be violated if jurors were informed either by the court or by counsel of the effect of their answers, but where the effect is so obvious that any juror with ordinary intelligence would know its effect, *342neither the letter nor the spirit of the rule is violated by a charge which assumes such knowledge.”
No juror would have been of the opinion that a person could dispose of his property by will without having the testamentary capacity to do so, and by one who was unduly influenced. See also Finck Cigar Co. v. Campbell, 134 Tex. 250, 133 S.W.2d 759; Lloyds Casualty Co. of New York v. Grilliett (Tex.Civ.App.) 64 S.W.2d 1005 (error refused). In my opinion the instruction given should not cause a reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.