Court Opinion

ID: 9897319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:06.278839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:05.887744
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Aug 11 2023, 8:41 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Talisha Griffin                                            Theodore E. Rokita
Marion County Public Defender Agency                       Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Samuel J. Dayton
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

K.W.,                                                      August 11, 2023
Appellant-Respondent,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-JV-3063
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Ryan Gardener,
Appellee-Petitioner                                        Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           49D10-2202-JD-001585

                                 Opinion by Judge May
                        Chief Judge Altice and Judge Foley concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023                              Page 1 of 18
[1]   K.W. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent child for committing an act that,

      if committed by an adult, would be Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession

      of a firearm. 1 He presents multiple issues for our review, which we consolidate

      and restate as:

                 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
                 the gun and magazine found on K.W. because Officer Khalid
                 Brooks’s investigatory stop and pat down of K.W. violated the
                 Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
                 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution; and

                 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
                 the gun and magazine found on K.W. because the State did not
                 establish a sufficient chain of custody.

      We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On February 27, 2022, the Lawrence Police Department responded to a 911

      call reporting a domestic disturbance. When Officer Brooks arrived on the

      scene, the woman who made the call advised Officer Brooks that her ex-

      boyfriend “had forced his way into her apartment . . . and assaulted her . . .

      [and] attempted to prevent her from calling 9-1-1[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 8.) The

      woman told Officer Brooks that her ex-boyfriend’s name was Steven Rodes and

      she had a protective order against him. She described Rodes as a “heavy set

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-47-4-6.5.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023        Page 2 of 18
      black male wearing black shirt and uh, or black hoodie and black jeans - or

      black uh, sweatpants.” (Id. at 43-4.)

[3]   Officer Brooks proceeded to canvas the area because he knew “the suspect had

      left on foot without a vehicle.” (Id. at 44.) While canvassing, Officer Brooks

      observed a “black male matching the description that [he] was given[,]” (id.),

      who was later identified as K.W. Officer Brooks slowed his police vehicle, and

      after he passed K.W., he saw K.W. “abruptly cross the street behind [his]

      vehicle.” (Id.) Officer Brooks lost sight of K.W. but then saw him in a nearby

      park, sitting at a picnic table in a gazebo.

[4]   Officer Brooks parked his police vehicle, exited the vehicle, and began walking

      toward the gazebo. As he walked, he reported over his radio that he believed

      K.W. was Rodes because K.W. was a “black male, 5’11”, heavy set, black

      hoodie, black sweatpants with white stripes on them[.]” (Ex. 1 at 23:39-23:45.)

      As he entered the gazebo, Officer Brooks yelled, “Steven?” (Id. at 23:47.)

      K.W., who was seated at the picnic table looking at his phone, did not respond.

      Officer Brooks again yelled, “Steven?” (Id. at 23:49.) K.W. again did not

      respond.

[5]   Officer Brooks asked K.W., “What’s your name?” (Ex. 1 at 23:50-:51.) K.W.

      responded 2 and Officer Brooks said, “You said it’s [K.]?” (Id. at 23:52-:53.)

      Officer Brooks then asked K.W., “you got an ID on you or anything?” (Id. at

      2
          K.W.’s response is not audible from Officer Brooks’s bodycam.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023      Page 3 of 18
      23:55.) K.W. answered in the negative, and Officer Brooks told K.W. to “stand

      up will ya.” (Id. at 23:56) (errors in original). Officer Brooks asked K.W.,

      “You got any weapons on you?” (Id. at 23:57-8.) K.W. indicated he was

      carrying a weapon. Officer Brooks “positioned [himself] next to [K.W.], and

      told [K.W.] to turn around and I asked him where the weapon was, and [K.W.]

      motioned towards his um, hoodie – waist band area ’cause I was behind him at

      that point.” (Tr. Vol. II at 47) (errors in original). Officer Brooks retrieved a

      gun and a magazine containing ammunition. Officer Brooks put K.W. under

      arrest and confirmed that he was not Rodes but instead was K.W.

[6]   Based thereon, the State filed a petition alleging K.W. was a delinquent child

      for committing an act that, if committed by an adult, would be Class A

      misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm and Class A misdemeanor

      carrying a handgun without a license. 3 K.W. remained in his parents’ care

      during the pendency of the proceedings. On November 2, 2022, K.W. filed a

      motion to suppress the gun and magazine found as part of his arrest. He argued

      Officer Brooks’s stop of K.W. violated his rights against unreasonable search

      and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

      and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. On the same day K.W.

      3
          Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1(e) (2017).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023        Page 4 of 18
      filed that motion, the trial court held a hearing on it, denied the motion, and

      proceeded to the fact-finding hearing.

[7]   During the fact-finding hearing, Officer Brooks testified about the events

      leading up to K.W.’s arrest:

              [Officer Brooks:] Um, after seeing his behavior uh, reaction to
              the stimuli of my police car, my presence, and after contacting
              my partner, I went to the next intersection, made a U-turn, um,
              was hoping to see the suspect still walking up the street, just on
              the other side of the street. I didn’t see him at all. So, I assumed
              the next closest place would be the park that he could be at. So,
              that’s when I pulled into the um, parking lot and saw the suspect
              sitting under the gazebo.

              [State:] Um, and um, what did you do after you saw him at the
              gazebo?

              [Officer Brooks]: Uh, I let my partner know that I’m gonna try to
              make contact with the person- or the suspect matching the
              description given. Um, so I approached the suspect, asked him if
              his name was Steven who- which was the name of the suspect
              that I was looking for. Um, suspect responded with huh, and I
              repeated myself.

              [State:] Um, what happened after that?

              [Officer Brooks:] Uh, after he said no his name’s [K.W.].

                                                     *****

              [State:] Um, so uh, after you had asked him his name what
              happened next?

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023        Page 5 of 18
               [Officer Brooks:] So, I was approaching him um, I raised my
               voice to ask him what his name was- or ask him if he was Steven,
               and he said huh, and I’m still approaching him. I asked again
               and he said no and as I’m still getting roughly 10 foot away from
               him, knowing that I’m closing this distance between him and
               myself, that’s when I asked if he had any weapons on him, due to
               the fact of he may be a suspect that’s wanted for domestic
               battery, invasion of privacy, and that active warrant.

               [State:] Okay. Um, so um, how did he respond to that?

               [Officer Brooks:] He said yes, he does have a weapon on him[.]

      (Tr. Vol. II at 45-6.) Officer Brooks testified he then searched K.W. and found

      a gun and a magazine. At the end of the fact-finding hearing, the trial court

      entered a true finding as to dangerous possession of a firearm, which would be

      a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. On November 30, 2022, the

      trial court held the dispositional hearing and closed the case without ordering

      any services for K.W. or his family.

      Discussion and Decision
[8]   K.W. challenges the admission of the gun and magazine found on him. 4 He

      first contends Officer Brooks did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a

      4
        In his reply brief, K.W. argues the State on appeal used Officer Brooks’s testimony from the pre-trial
      hearing on K.W.’s motion to suppress in error because, at the end of the pre-trial suppression hearing, the
      trial court denied the State’s request to incorporate Officer Brooks’s pre-trial testimony because some of it
      was hearsay. However, any error in the State’s use of this testimony is harmless because Officer Brooks’s
      testimony during K.W.’s fact-finding hearing was substantially the same as that presented at the pre-trial
      hearing on K.W.’s motion to suppress. See Warren v. State, 182 N.E.3d 925, 934 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023                                 Page 6 of 18
      Terry 5 stop and thus the search violated his Fourth Amendment and Article 1,

      Section 11 rights. When these issues were argued as part of a motion to

      suppress and revived during trial, they are appropriately framed on appeal as

      challenges to the admission of evidence. See Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d

      584, 586-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining issue is appropriately framed as

      challenge to admission of evidence at trial when defendant objected at trial and

      appeals from a completed trial, even though defendant filed a pre-trial motion

      to suppress). K.W. also argues the trial court abused its discretion when it

      admitted the gun found on K.W. because the State did not present sufficient

      evidence of the gun’s chain of custody.

[9]   Generally, we review a trial court’s decision on the admission of evidence for

      an abuse of discretion. Mack v. State, 23 N.E.3d 742, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),

      trans. denied. “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against

      the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court

      misapplies the law.” Id. However, the constitutionality of a search or seizure is

      a matter of law that we review de novo. Holloway v. State, 69 N.E.3d 924, 929

      (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. When making such a determination, we

      “consider the foundational evidence from the trial as well as the evidence from

      (holding officer’s testimony that he initially believed brown substance found in defendant’s house was heroin
      constituted harmless error because “we are satisfied that there is no substantial likelihood that the challenged
      evidence contributed to the jury’s verdict”).
      5
          Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1869 (1968).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023                                 Page 7 of 18
       the motion to suppress hearing which is not in direct conflict with the trial

       testimony.” Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

       1. Terry Stop

       1.1 Fourth Amendment

[10]   K.W. argues Officer Brooks did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him and

       perform a pat down. The Fourth Amendment to the United Stated

       Constitution provides:

               The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
               papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
               shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
               probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
               particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
               or things to be seized.

       “The Amendment protects citizens from search or seizure absent a warrant

       supported by probable cause.” Tigner v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1064, 1068 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2020). However, there are several exceptions to the warrant requirement,

       and the State bears the burden of proving at trial that one of those exceptions

       applies before it may admit evidence collected during a warrantless seizure. Id.

[11]   One exception to the warrant requirement is the so-called Terry stop, which is

       “a brief investigatory stop falling short of traditional arrest.” Clark v. State, 994

       N.E.2d 252, 263 (Ind. 2013). Such a stop “permits an officer to stop and briefly

       detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has reasonable suspicion

       supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot[,] even if the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023          Page 8 of 18
       officer lacks probable cause.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The

       reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied when “the facts known to the

       officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would

       cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred

       or is about to occur.” Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2002). It “entails something more than an inchoate and unparticularized

       suspicion or hunch but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a

       preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “[A] set of individually innocent facts,

       when observed in conjunction, can be sufficient to create reasonable suspicion

       of criminal activity.” Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind. 2003). “What

       constitutes reasonable suspicion is determined on a case-by-case basis, and the

       totality of the circumstances is considered.” Polson v. State, 49 N.E.3d 186, 190

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We must strike a balance between the interests of public

       safety and an individual’s right to be free of arbitrary law enforcement

       interference. Id.

[12]   Here, Officer Brooks walked toward K.W. in a park gazebo for two reasons.

       First, K.W. “abruptly cross[ed] the street” after seeing Officer Brooks’s police

       car. (Tr. Vol. II at 44.) Second, K.W. matched the description of the suspect

       Officer Brooks was given, that is, a “black male, 5’11”, heavy set, black hoodie,

       black sweatpants with white stripes on them[.]” (Ex. 1 at 23:39-23:45.) After

       he made initial contact with K.W., Officer Brooks conducted a pat down search

       of K.W. for officer safety because K.W. matched the general description of his

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023        Page 9 of 18
       suspect, who had a warrant out for his arrest and allegedly had committed

       domestic battery, and because K.W. admitted being in possession of a weapon.

[13]   In his brief, K.W. takes each individual part of Officer Brooks’s proffered facts

       to support reasonable suspicion and attempts to argue each fact, standing alone,

       is not sufficient to prompt a Terry stop. First, regarding K.W.’s act of crossing

       the street when he saw Officer Brooks’s car, K.W. argues, based on Tumblin v.

       State, 664 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), that walking in a high crime

       area and turning around and walking in the opposite direction once one sees a

       police car does not create reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

       However, in Tumblin, unlike here, those two factors – walking in a high crime

       area and turning away – were the only factors the officer used to justify his stop

       of Tumblin. Here K.W. not only crossed the street when he saw Officer

       Brooks’s police vehicle, but he matched the general description of the suspect

       that police sought.

[14]   Second, regarding Officer Brooks’s testimony that K.W. matched the

       description of the suspect in the domestic violence investigation, K.W. argues,

       based on our holding in Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 307-8 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2000), that Officer Brooks could not initiate an investigatory stop of K.W.

       because “a defendant’s color of skin, which matches the suspect’s, alone is not

       sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a Terry

       stop.” (Br. of Appellant at 14) (formatting in original). However, Officer

       Brooks did not stop K.W. based solely on his skin color – K.W. was a heavy-set

       black male around 5’11” wearing a black sweatshirt and black sweatpants,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023       Page 10 of 18
       which fit the general description of the suspect for whom Officer Brooks was

       looking based on the victim’s description of her attacker. 6 Thus, as our

       appellate courts have long held, Officer Brooks had reasonable suspicion to

       conduct a Terry stop. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 710 N.E.2d 925, 927-8 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1999) (police had reasonable suspicion to stop Johnson because he fit the

       description of the suspect and was “within the perimeter which the police had

       established”).

[15]   Moreover, Officer Brooks had reasonable suspicion to search K.W. for

       weapons. As part of a valid Terry stop, an officer is also entitled to take

       reasonable steps to ensure his own safety. Smith v. State, 121 N.E.3d 669, 675

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. This includes conducting “a limited search

       of the individual’s outer clothing for weapons if the officer reasonably believes

       that the individual is armed and dangerous.” Patterson v. State, 958 N.E.2d 478,

       482-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Here, Officer Brooks testified K.W. matched

       Rodes’s description, Rodes had an outstanding warrant, and Rodes allegedly

       had perpetrated a domestic battery. Further, when Officer Brooks, as part of

       the investigatory stop, asked K.W. if he had any weapons, K.W. answered in

       the affirmative. 7 Therefore, based on the totality of those circumstances, Officer

       6
        K.W. contends he did not match the description of the suspect because he was not wearing a red, white,
       and blue Tommy Hilfiger jacket. However, as we consider only the facts most favorable to the trial court’s
       decision, K.W.’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of
       witnesses, which we will not do. See Marcum v. State, 843 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (appellate
       court will not reweigh evidence and considers conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling).
       7
         K.W. also argues his statement in the affirmative to Officer Brooks’s inquiry regarding K.W.’s possession of
       a weapon violates K.W.’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. However, Fifth Amendment

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023                               Page 11 of 18
       Brooks had sufficient reasonable suspicion to search K.W. for weapons as part

       of the Terry stop. 8 See, e.g., Richey v. State, 210 N.E.3d 329, 340 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2023) (officer’s pat down of Richey did not violate his Fourth Amendment

       rights because Richey disclosed he possessed a gun prior to the officer’s search

       and thus “a search was necessary to ensure [the officer’s] safety”), reh’g denied.

       1.2 Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution
[16]   While the language of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution mirrors

       the Fourth Amendment, we interpret Article 1, Section 11 independently.

       Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 941 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2468

       (2021). Under the Indiana Constitution, we assess the reasonableness of a

       search or seizure by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Id. While

       other considerations may impact our analysis, we balance three factors when

       rights are not implicated unless a suspect is subject to a custodial interrogation. Crabtree, 152 N.E.2d at 696.
       As we have held Officer Brooks discovered the weapon during a Terry stop, we need not consider K.W.’s
       argument regarding the Fifth Amendment.
       8
         K.W. also argues Officer Brooks did not have probable cause to put K.W.’s arms behind his back before
       frisking him and doing so illegally detained K.W. He argues the stop should not have progressed that far
       because K.W. did not match the description of the suspect. However, as we have discussed multiple times in
       this opinion, Officer Brooks testified about why K.W. matched the suspect’s description. As we consider
       only the facts most favorable to the trial court’s decision, K.W.’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh
       the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we will not do. See Marcum, 843 N.E.2d at 547
       (appellate court will not reweigh evidence and considers conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial
       court’s ruling).
       Further, K.W. argues Officer Brooks did not have reasonable suspicion that K.W. had committed a crime
       based on our Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Pinner v. State, 74 N.E.3d 226, 231 (Ind. 2017). In Pinner,
       the informant did not indicate Pinner was engaged in any criminal activity outside of the possession of a
       firearm and thus our Indiana Supreme Court held stopping Pinner based on the suspicion that Pinner
       possessed a firearm, without more, violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 233-4. Here, there was not a tip
       that K.W. possessed a weapon. Instead, K.W. matched the description of a suspect for whom there was an
       active warrant and who may have been involved in a domestic battery incident. Thus, Pinner is not relevant.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023                                Page 12 of 18
       examining the reasonableness of a search or seizure: “1) the degree of concern,

       suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion

       the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities,

       and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356,

       361 (Ind. 2005).

[17]   Regarding the first Litchfield factor, K.W. concedes “Officer Brooks had a high

       degree of suspicion that a violation occurred based on the report from the

       witness.” (Br. of Appellant at 20.) However, K.W. contends that degree of

       suspicion as it related directly to K.W. was minimal because “he relied on the

       fact K.W. was black, crossed the street to go to the park, and was in the area he

       was investigating to conduct an investigatory stop.” (Id.) K.W. misconstrues

       the facts. Officer Brooks did not stop K.W. because he was black – K.W. fit the

       general description of the suspect including general height, weight, race, and

       clothing.

[18]   Second, while it is possible K.W. coincidentally crossed the street to go to the

       park at the same time Officer Brooks turned on the road, the facts most

       favorable to the trial court’s decision are that K.W. crossed the street after he

       saw Officer Brooks in an effort to avoid Officer Brooks. As we consider only

       the facts most favorable to the trial court’s decision, K.W.’s argument is an

       invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses,

       which we will not do. See Marcum, 843 N.E.2d at 547 (appellate court will not

       reweigh evidence and considers conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial

       court’s ruling).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023       Page 13 of 18
[19]   To summarize as to the first Litchfield factor, Officer Brooks had a high degree

       of suspicion that prompted a pat down search. K.W. matched the description

       of the suspect for whom Officer Brooks was looking, who had an active warrant

       for his arrest, and who allegedly had committed domestic battery.

       Additionally, K.W. admitted he was carrying a gun. Thus, the first Litchfield

       factor weighs in the State’s favor.

[20]   Regarding the second Litchfield factor, K.W. argues Officer Brooks’s “intrusion

       on K.W.’s ordinary activities was high” because “K.W. was minding his own

       business, sitting under a gazebo at a park.” (Br. of Appellant at 20.) However,

       Officer Brooks’s initial query regarding K.W.’s name occurred some distance

       away from K.W., far enough away that Officer Brooks had to yell and some of

       K.W.’s answers are inaudible in Exhibit 1. As it pertains to the pat down

       search, Officer Brooks merely reached into the front pocket of K.W.’s

       sweatshirt where K.W. indicated he was storing a weapon. Therefore, we

       conclude Officer Brooks’s level of intrusion was minimal. See, e.g., Moore v.

       State, 49 N.E.3d 1095, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (officer’s degree of intrusion

       was low when he asked defendant questions in a public place), reh’g denied,

       trans. denied. The second Litchfield factor weighs in the State’s favor.

[21]   Finally, regarding the third Litchfield factor, K.W. concedes “[t]he extent of law

       enforcement needs in investigating the domestic disturbance was high.” (Br. of

       Appellant at 20.) However, he argues Officer Brooks did not have reasonable

       suspicion to stop K.W. because K.W. did not fit the general description of the

       suspect. As we explained in an earlier part of the analysis, we consider only the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023        Page 14 of 18
       facts most favorable to the trial court’s decision, and K.W.’s argument is an

       invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses,

       which we will not do. See Marcum, 843 N.E.2d at 547 (appellate court will not

       reweigh evidence and considers conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial

       court’s ruling).

[22]   Because all of the Litchfield factors support the reasonableness of Officer

       Brooks’s initial Terry stop and pat down of K.W., we conclude the stop did not

       violate K.W.’s rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

       See State v. Crager, 113 N.E.3d 657, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (officer’s degree of

       suspicion was high based on active arrest warrant, level of intrusion was “not

       high” because locked compartment in Crager’s backpack was easily accessible

       and opened with a key, and extent of law enforcement needs were high because

       officer was concerned about his safety; thus, based on the totality of the

       circumstances, the search was lawful), trans. denied.

       2. Chain of Custody
[23]   K.W. argues the State did not present evidence of a proper chain of custody of

       the gun and magazine found on K.W. Our standard of review of chain of

       custody claims is well-settled:

               An adequate foundation establishing a continuous chain of
               custody is established if the State accounts for the evidence at
               each stage from its acquisition, to its testing, and to its
               introduction at trial. Under the chain of custody doctrine, an
               adequate foundation is laid when the continuous whereabouts of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023      Page 15 of 18
        an exhibit is shown from the time it came into the possession of
        the police.

        To establish a proper chain of custody, the State must give
        reasonable assurances that the evidence remained in an
        undisturbed condition. However, the State need not establish a
        perfect chain of custody, and once the State strongly suggests the
        exact whereabouts of the evidence, any gaps go to the weight of
        the evidence and not to admissibility. Moreover, there is a
        presumption of regularity in the handling of evidence by officers,
        and there is a presumption that officers exercise due care in
        handling their duties. To mount a successful challenge to the
        chain of custody, one must present evidence that does more than
        raise a mere possibility that the evidence may have been
        tampered with.

Espinoza v. State, 859 N.E.2d 375, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations

and quotations omitted). The extent of foundation the State must lay depends

on whether the item to be admitted is fungible or nonfungible. Dudley v. State,

480 N.E.2d 881, 898 (Ind. 1985). “For fungible items, such as blood and drugs,

an adequate foundation is laid when the whereabouts of an exhibit is shown

from the time it came into the possession of the police.” Mateo v. State, 981

N.E.2d 59, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. For fungible items, the State

lays a proper foundation when “a witness is able to identify the item, . . . the

item is relevant to the disposition of the case[,] . . . [and the State] provid[es] a

reasonable assurance that the evidence was undisturbed as it passed from the

custody of one person to the next.” Id. at 66-7. “If the State presented evidence

that strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence at all times, that is

sufficient.” Id. at 67. In contrast, for “nonfungible items like guns and vehicles,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023         Page 16 of 18
       the State need only show that the item is what it is purported to be and that it is

       in a substantially unchanged state” from when it was initially collected by

       police. Id.

[24]   K.W. argues the State did not present evidence “that strongly suggests the exact

       whereabouts of [the gun] at all times.” (Br. of Appellant at 36.) However, a

       gun is a nonfungible item, so the State is not required to prove the gun’s exact

       whereabouts. Mateo, 981 N.E.2d at 67. At trial, the State offered the gun and

       magazine found on K.W. into evidence. Officer Brooks testified the items

       offered into evidence were

               the handgun itself um, the magazine, the bullets that were
               contained within the magazine, and a laser that- which I
               removed from the handgun because there [were] no identifiable
               serial numbers on the weapon as there are on most weapons with
               that um, model. So, I had to remove the laser at the bottom to try
               to find a serial number and there also was not one there.

       (Tr. Vol. II at 49.) Officer Brooks also testified the gun was a “3D printed

       weapon.” (Id. at 48.) Officer Brooks answered in the affirmative that the items

       “appear[ed] to be in the same or substantially similar condition as when [he]

       retrieved them.” (Id. at 49.) Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

       when it admitted the gun and magazine because the State presented evidence

       that those items were the same items Officer Brooks retrieved from K.W. on the

       day of the incident and they were in the same or substantially similar condition

       as they were on the day of the incident. See Price v. State, 619 N.E.2d 582, 583

       (Ind. 1993) (trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the gun

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023      Page 17 of 18
       used to commit a murder because the officer who retrieved it testified it was the

       gun that was turned over to police at the time of the crime).

       Conclusion
[25]   Officer Brooks’s stop and subsequent pat down of K.W. did not violate K.W.’s

       rights against unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment or

       Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Additionally, the trial court

       did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the gun and magazine found on

       K.W. because Officer Brooks testified the items were the gun and magazine he

       retrieved from K.W. on the day of the incident and they were in the same or

       substantially similar condition as they were the day of the incident.

       Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s admission of the gun and magazine and

       its adjudication of K.W. as a delinquent child.

[26]   Affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JV-3063 | August 11, 2023     Page 18 of 18