Court Opinion

ID: 9940729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 11:12:44.756467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:42.416470
License: Public Domain

In The
                                   Court of Appeals
                          Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                           No. 07-23-00389-CV

                                JST CONCRETE, LLC, APPELLANT

                                                     V.

             CURT GREGORY, INC., D/B/A GREGORY ELECTRIC, APPELLEE

                             On Appeal from the 237th District Court
                                    Lubbock County, Texas
              Trial Court No. DC-2023-CV-0271, Honorable J. Phillip Hays, Presiding

                                           February 9, 2024
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
                        Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

        In this restricted appeal, Appellant, JST Concrete, LLC, challenges the district

court’s default judgment taken against it and in favor of Appellee Curt Gregory, Inc., d/b/a

Gregory Electric. We reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.1

         1 In a restricted appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within six months after the judgment was

signed. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c). Here the judgment was signed April 27, 2023, and JST’s notice of appeal
was filed on October 26, 2023. Courts have interpreted Rule 26.1(c)’s period to mean six calendar months.
See Ex parte K.K., No. 02-17-00158-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1921, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar.
15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 312.011(7) (“‘Month’ means a calendar month.”).
                                      Background

       Gregory sued JST on a sworn account. Gregory’s original petition instructed that

JST

       may be served with process by serving the registered agent of said
       company, Grant N. Wilson at the following address . . . . Service of said
       Defendant as described above can be effected by certified mail, return
       receipt requested.

On March 3, 2023, the district clerk issued citation to JST, with Grant N. Wilson shown as

its registered agent.

       JST filed no answer.    On April 26, 2023, Gregory filed a motion for default

judgment. Attached to the motion was the “affidavit of service-certified mail” of Ryan

Crumley, a private process server. In the affidavit, Crumley averred he mailed citation

and plaintiff’s original petition to JST on March 7, 2023, and received a signed return

receipt on March 15, 2023. Attached to Crumley’s affidavit was a photocopy of a return

receipt addressed to “JST Concrete, LLC c/o Grant N. Wilson” and bearing the signature

of “Dakota” with the designation “agent.”

       The next day, April 27, 2023, the trial court rendered judgment by default against

JST, awarding Gregory money damages and attorney’s fees.           JST filed a notice of

restricted appeal on October 26, 2023.

                                         Analysis

       JST argues the default judgment should be reversed because the record fails to

demonstrate strict compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure concerning

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issuance, service, and return of citation.2 Gregory filed a notice stating “it no longer

wishe[d] to contest [JST’s] demand that the default judgment granted by the trial court be

set aside.” We agree with JST that the default judgment is infirm and should be set aside.

        To prevail on a restricted appeal, the appellant must prove: (1) it filed notice of the

restricted appeal within six months after the judgment was signed; (2) it was a party to

the underlying lawsuit; (3) it did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment

complained of, and did not timely file any post-judgment motions or requests for findings

of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. TEX.

R. APP. P. 30 (restricted appeal); Pike-Grant v. Grant, 447 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. 2014)

(citing Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004)); Cervantes v.

Travis Tiles Sales, Inc., No. 07-16-00011-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 694, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo Jan. 24, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). The face of the record, for this

purpose, consists of all the papers on file in the appeal. See Norman Commc’ns v. Tex.

Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (writ of error review). The

record shows JST satisfied the first three requirements for prevailing on a restricted

appeal. We therefore determine whether error is apparent on the face of the record.3

        Although JST was to be served via Wilson, its registered agent, the return receipt

shows that Wilson did not accept service; “Dakota” did. “When the citation was served

by . . . certified mail . . . the return by the officer or authorized person must also contain

the return receipt with the addressee’s signature.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 107(c); see Gibson v.

        2 See Primate Constr. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam) (“For well over a

century, this court has required that strict compliance with the rules for service of citation affirmatively
appear on the record in order for a default judgment to withstand direct attack.”).
        3 We review this legal question de novo.   LEJ Dev. Corp. v. Sw. Bank, 407 S.W.3d 863, 866 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.).
                                                     3
Zo-Vac, Inc., No. 04-03-00884-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 362 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Jan. 19, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding error apparent on face of record in restricted

appeal of default judgment where record showed process was served by certified mail

sent to “‘Gregory J. Gibson dba Stony’s Trucking’” but return receipt was signed by “‘J.

Horner’” and record did not establish J. Horner was defendant’s agent for service of

process). We conclude the requirement of Rule 107(c) was not satisfied.

       Moreover, the record also shows that proof of service was not on file for ten days

before the trial court signed the default judgment. Rule 107 further provides, “No default

judgment shall be granted in any cause until proof of service as provided by this rule . . .

shall have been on file with the clerk of the court ten days, exclusive of the day of filing

and the day of judgment.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 107(h); see Livanos v. Livanos, 333 S.W.3d

868, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“The return or proof of service

must affirmatively reveal that it has been in the district clerk’s office for the required ten

days, and, if not, the default judgment rendered is void.”).           Thus, Rule 107(h)’s

requirement was not satisfied.

                                        Conclusion

       We conclude the face of the record affirmatively establishes JST was not served

in strict compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The judgment of the trial

court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings. See TEX. R. APP. P.

43.2(d).

                                                         Lawrence M. Doss
                                                             Justice
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