Court Opinion

ID: 9389591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 20:11:44.284088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:28.681904
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   April 25, 2023
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                              EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                              SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                      OF WEST VIRGINIA

In re K.H.-1

No. 22-0502 (Wood County 22-JA-25)

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Mother K.H.-21 appeals the Circuit Court of Wood County’s May 20, 2022,
order terminating her parental rights to K.H.-1.2 Upon our review, we determine that oral argument
is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        The proceedings below commenced in February of 2022, when the DHHR removed the
child from the father’s home after the father’s arrest for domestic violence. At that time, Child
Protective Services (“CPS”) observed the child’s “upper teeth [were] . . . blackened from what
appeared to be lack of dental care.” Additionally, the investigation revealed that the father abused
methamphetamine in the home. As to petitioner, the DHHR alleged that she contacted the father
in January of 2022 and directed him to “come get this [expletive] kid,” referring to K.H.-1. CPS
then discovered that petitioner resided with her mother, whose parental rights to other children had
previously been terminated.

       Petitioner initially failed to appear for her preliminary hearing because she claimed she
“could not make it to court for weather related matters.” As such, the preliminary hearing was
continued to a later date. However, petitioner failed to appear for the rescheduled preliminary
hearing. Petitioner was represented by counsel at both hearings.

        Petitioner appeared for the April 2022 adjudicatory hearing remotely because she claimed
that her car was being repaired. Petitioner requested a continuance, which the court denied. The
court ultimately adjudicated petitioner of neglecting the child.

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Eric K. Powell. The West Virginia Department of Health
and Human Resources (“DHHR”) appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and
Assistant Attorney General Katica Ribel. Keith White appears as the child’s guardian ad litem.
       2
         We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e). Additionally, because the child and petitioner share the same initials, we
will refer to them as K.H.-1 and K.H.-2, respectively.

                                                  1
        The court then held a dispositional hearing in May of 2022. Petitioner did not appear, but
was represented by counsel, who indicated that he did not “believe she was going to appear here
today.” Counsel admitted that petitioner was aware of the hearing. Counsel explained that “things
have come up since this case and [petitioner] is overwhelmed and she is not going to be here
today.” Counsel then moved to continue the dispositional hearing to allow petitioner the
opportunity to appear. The court noted that this was “the third time that [petitioner] . . . failed t[o]
appear for court in person,” and proceeded to disposition. Ultimately, the court terminated
petitioner’s parental rights to the child.3 It is from the dispositional order that petitioner appeals.4

         On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re
Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Petitioner argues that it was error to deny her a
continuance in order to secure her attendance at the dispositional hearing. However, we have
explained that “[w]hether a party should be granted a continuance for fairness reasons is a matter
left to the discretion of the circuit court, and a reviewing court plays a limited and restricted role
in overseeing the circuit court’s exercise of that discretion.” In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196
W. Va. 223, 235, 470 S.E.2d 177, 189 (1996) (citation omitted). Further, “[w]hen a circuit court
rejects a civil litigant’s request for a continuance because the party is unable to attend, the court
must articulate reasons for taking that action, and those reasons must be plausible.” Id. As we
explained, there are “four salient factors that appellate courts consider when reviewing denials of
requests for a continuance.” Id. These include “diligence in [the moving party’s] efforts to be
present and to ready [their] defense prior to the date set for the hearing”; “how likely it is that the
need for a continuance could have been met if the continuance had been granted”; “the extent to
which granting the continuance would have inconvenienced or been contrary to the interests of the
circuit court, the witnesses, and the other litigants, including the public interest in the prompt
disposition of these types of proceedings”; and, finally, “the extent to which [the moving party]
might have suffered harm as a result of the circuit court’s denial.” Id.

        Upon our review of these factors, we find that petitioner cannot demonstrate that the circuit
court abused its discretion. Simply put, the record demonstrates that petitioner failed to appear in
person for a single hearing and that she willfully chose not to attend the dispositional hearing
because she was “overwhelmed.” As such, it is clear that petitioner displayed no diligence to be
present and to ready her defense. This is further evidenced by the fact that counsel admitted that
there was no evidence to present in support of petitioner’s pending motion for an improvement
period. Additionally, the record shows that it was unlikely that the need for a continuance could
have been met if granted. The best that petitioner’s counsel could offer was that petitioner “may
get over it” and eventually appear for hearings. This is insufficient to justify a continuance.

       3
           Petitioner does not challenge the termination of her parental rights on appeal.
       4
        The father’s parental rights were also terminated. The permanency plan for the child is
adoption in the current placement.

                                                   2
         Next, the record shows that granting a continuance would have been an inconvenience to
all involved, especially the child, as petitioner had yet to participate in person and provided no
indication that she would attend in person if granted a continuance. On appeal, petitioner attacks
this factor most vigorously, arguing that the overall proceedings were pending only for a short
time and that permanency for the child would not have been delayed because the father was granted
an improvement period. We do not find these arguments compelling, however, given the
egregiousness of petitioner’s absence. Despite recognizing that this hearing could result in the
termination of her parental rights to the child, petitioner simply chose not to attend for vague and
ill-defined reasons. Finally, we are similarly unpersuaded by petitioner’s argument that she
suffered harm as a result of the denial of her motion to continue. While it cannot be ignored that
petitioner’s rights were terminated following this hearing, it is clear from the record that petitioner
had made no real effort to participate in the proceedings. While petitioner notes that the DHHR
was not opposed to an improvement period for her and the circuit court found that she “really had
a chance to be granted an improvement period,” it was her continued willful refusal to participate
that resulted in her harm, not the denial of the motion to continue. As such, she is entitled to no
relief.

       For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its May
20, 2022, order is hereby affirmed.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

ISSUED: April 25, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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