Court Opinion

ID: 9709009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:37:52.860291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:45.373992
License: Public Domain

NEBEKER, Associate Judge,
concurring in the result:
The majority of this court holds that the Zoning Commission need not zone in accordance with a comprehensive plan until such a plan is — if ever — adopted by the District of Columbia Council. The majority’s opinion is based upon two supporting predicates. First, the Zoning Commission should zone “on a uniform and comprehensive basis,” Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Zoning Commission, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 238, 477 F.2d 402, 407 (1973) (Georgetown II). Second, the Zoning Commission should proceed to make zoning decisions independently under the philosophy of Home Rule. The error in each proposition is readily revealed by reference to the express mandate of Congress that Zoning Commission decisions must be based upon a standard more precise than the Commission’s own amorphous notions of comprehensiveness. With the majority’s rationale, therefore, resting upon faulty supports, I must disagree with the court, while concurring in the result.
Former section 5-414 of the D.C.Code provided, “[zoning] regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan . . . .” Act of June 20, 1938, 52 Stat. 797, ch. 534, § 2. This section was derived from the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1926 and reprinted in ALI Model Land Development Code at 210-21 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968). The requirement that zoning be done “in accordance with a comprehensive plan” was included in this Standard Act, in the words of one of its principle drafters, because it is “comprehensiveness which puts the ‘reason’ into ‘reasonableness’ ” in the zoning process. Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 834, 845 (1925).
By forcing local legislators to establish . goals and to articulate a framework within which individual zoning decisions must *1043be made, the comprehensive plan provides a means for balancing and integrating public needs and individual property rights while providing “coherence and discipline in the pursuit of goals of public welfare which the whole municipal, regulatory process is supposed to serve.” [Comment, Zoning Planning and the Scope of Judicial Review in Virginia, 25 Am.U.L.Rev. 497, 498 (1976), quoting Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 1154 (1955).]
A comprehensive plan, moreover, would provide a standard by which we, as a reviewing court, might judge the conformance of individual zoning decisions to the legislative goals and policies. Without such a standard, we are left to review each decision in a vacuum and to give to each a presumption of quasi-legislative validity, which should rightly inhere only in formally approved declarations of zoning policy.
In 1952, Congress created the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) “as the central planning agency for the Federal and District Governments . . . .” Act of July 19, 1952, 66 Stat. 782, ch. 494, § 1 (formerly codified at D.C.Code 1978, § 1— 1002(a)). The congressional intent in establishing the NCPC was “to secure comprehensive planning for the physical development of the National Capital and its environs . • . . .” Id. (formerly codified at D.C.Code 1973, § l-1001(a)). After the NCPC developed such a plan, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in its Georgetown II decision, held that the product of the NCPC’s “comprehensive planning” efforts was not the “comprehensive plan” in accordance with which the Zoning Commission was required to zone. The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion by noting that the predecessor to the NCPC was in existence before the zoning enabling legislation was enacted and that “[tjhere is, no indication in the history of the 1938 Zoning Act . that Congress had any intention” of binding the Zoning Commission to the NCPC plans. 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 238 n.16, 477 F.2d at 407 n.16. Therefore, the court held, the zoning decisions of the Zoning Commission — not those of the NCPC — were “entitled to a presumption of validity.” Id. at 238, 477 F.2d at 407.
That this decision was supported only by an absence of express Congressional intent and that it was anti-thetical to the requirement that the Zoning Commission zone “in accordance with a comprehensive plan,” including a framework for a standard for review, is, however, of no great moment. Georgetown II was never binding upon this court, M.A.P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 (1971) (en banc). More importantly, however, that decision has been legislatively overruled.
Congress, well aware (as the majority concedes) of the Georgetown II decision, recently enacted a new scheme of zoning and planning for the District. Under this scheme, the Zoning Commission is no longer required to zone “in accordance with a comprehensive plan” as long as its decisions are “not be inconsistent with the comprehensive plan for the National Capital . . . .” D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 5-414 (emphasis added). Two changes made in this legislation are pertinent. First, upon review of zoning decisions, consistency with the comprehensive plan need not be shown: the burden rests upon the party attempting to show an inconsistency between the decision of the Zoning Commission and the comprehensive plan. Second, the change from the indefinite to the definite article modifying “comprehensive plan” doubtlessly means that Congress intended that there exist a comprehensive plan, against which the propriety of a zoning decision might be tested, rather than the ephemeral and unreviewa-ble concepts presently employed.
The comprehensive plan now mandated by Congress has two components: First, those elements of the plan bearing on primarily federal concerns, which are to be developed and adopted by the NCPC, and second, those elements of the plan affecting purely District interests, which are to be prepared by the Mayor, approved by the Council, and submitted to the NCPC for adoption. D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 1-*10441004(a) and —1002(a)(3), respectively. The District elements of the plan, however, would become effective only if the NCPC does not certify within sixty days that the District elements will have a “negative impact on the interests or functions of the Federal Establishment in the National Capital.” D.C.Code 1973, § l-1002(a)(4)(A). Thus, Congress attempted to insure that the District, in spite of its new Home Rule powers, would not encroach upon legitimate federal interests and functions. Compare D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-1002(a)(4)(A) with § 1 — 1004(a) (lack of agreement between NCPC and the National Capital Regional Planning Council does not effect comprehensive plan).
The majority today turns the Congres-sionally enacted scheme on its head. Arguing that the overriding Congressional intent was to invest the District Government with maximal powers of Home Rule, the majority holds, in effect, that the federal interests, represented by NCPC, shall have no power to veto District incursions. This result is achieved by granting the Zoning Commission the power to continue to “zone on a uniform and comprehensive basis” until the District elements of the plan are developed and implemented — which may well never occur.
Zoning decisions made in the absence of a comprehensive plan can bring about the existence of an entirely new, de facto “comprehensive plan” which has not been submitted by the Mayor to the Council, approved by the Council, nor submitted by the Council to NCPC. Moreover, such a scheme would not be subject to NCPC veto for its negative impact upon federal interests. (The “comment and review” powers of NCPC under D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 5-417(a)(2), are not as great as the NCPC veto power under D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-1002(a)(4)(A).) Finally, as previously noted, such a shadowy standard does not provide a useable backdrop against which the advisability of zoning decisions may be ascertained.
The majority’s decision arises out of what it perceives to be a dilemma. The current (“Red Book”) NCPC plan is, admittedly, incomplete. The Mayor and the Council have not yet made any headway in developing the District elements of the comprehensive plan. Since Congress has provided no guidance as to what plan, if any, governs pending adoption of the new comprehensive plan, the majority reasons that the court cannot call a halt to all zoning until the District decides to adopt its elements of the plan. The proper resolution, the majority concludes, is to allow the Zoning Commission to continue until new standards are adopted.
I am not certain that a zoning moratorium would not serve the very useful purpose of assuring prompt compliance with the Congressional mandate that the District adopt a comprehensive plan so that the Commission’s adoption (and our review) of zoning decisions would be informed by definite legislative expressions of policy. But such a course would be somewhat drastic. A reasonable alternative, which is both proper and feasible, is found within the covers of the Red Book plan itself. This method of resolving the majority’s dilemma is merely the realization of the new Congressional directive of conformance to the zoning plan.
Congress did, as the majority notes, give the District a wealth of new powers under the Home Rule legislation. Among these powers is one which was eagerly sought: the power to control land use without conformance to the Red Book plan insofar as that plan might affect purely District interests. Congress, therefore, gave the District the power to adopt District elements of the plan, subject only to veto by NCPC where a District element has a negative impact upon federal interests. But the District’s power to control its own destiny through this process does not mean that it may, by failing to exercise this power, let devolve upon the Zoning Commission the same or even greater powers. Had this been the congressional intent, Congress, knowing well the existence of the NCPC (Red Book) plan, could have directed that the District and NCPC develop a new plan, staying the mandate of *1045section 5-414 until that plan had been developed. Instead, it allowed the District ample time between December 24,1973, the enactment date of the Home Rule legislation, and July 1,1974, the effective date of the planning provisions, to begin the development of the District elements of the plan. It also permitted another six months (until January 2, 1975) for the District to propose to NCPC any District elements which might, because of impending development (like that along the Georgetown waterfront), be necessary to its zoning powers. Congress, in my view, gave the District the power to zone to its own preferences if only it would express them in a meaningful (i. e., responsible, legislative) way. But where the District has not done so, I find no hint that Congress intended to permit the Home Rule powers to devolve upon the Zoning Commission by default. The only alternative is the comprehensive plan which the District has not, by legislative act, altered: the Red Book plan.
Even where the District has not exercised its Home Rule powers to modify the Red Book plan, however, Congress permitted the Zoning Commission to continue to zone, for the Commission is not permitted to zone only when the zoning decision is “in accordance with” the Red Book plan. Such a power would be limited by the incompleteness of the Red Book plan. Rather, the Commission may continue to zone as long as its decisions are not inconsistent with the Red Book plan. Where the plan is silent, the Commission is free to zone in accordance with its own conceptions. Where the plan is vague, ambivalent or ambiguous, it would be difficult to prove inconsistence between it and a zoning decision. More importantly for the instant case, the Zoning Commission is, I would hold, under no obligation to take affirmative steps to conform existing zoning maps and regulations to the Red Book plan — as long as it does nothing to create nonconformance. That is enough to decide this case.
The appellant commenced the instant case on January 2, 1975, the effective date of present code section 5 — 414, by requesting mandatory and injunctive relief to require rezoning of the Georgetown waterfront, alleging that, as a result of the new code provision against inconsistency, the Zoning Commission was under an affirmative duty to undo what it had done prior thereto and that the construction then (and now) in progress under the new zoning should be enjoined. Appellants rely, in part, upon the statement in Capitol Hill Restoration Society v. Zoning Commission, D.C.App., 380 A.2d 174, 177 n.2 (1977), that “[ojrdinarily the court is to apply the law existing at the time of its decision.” The Red Book plan, therefore, it is argued, mandates the invalidation of the Zoning Commission decisions which, although adopted before section 5-414 became effective, are now inconsistent with that plan.
But appellants’ arguments are not decisive. First, with respect to the request for mandatory relief, it does not appear that appellants, after the effective date of section 5-414, petitioned the Commission for a new rulemaking proceeding by which the zoning maps might have been amended to provide consistency with the Red Book plan. See D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-1505(b). Thus, appellants appear to have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Yet even assuming exhaustion of administrative remedies, this court lacks the power to mandate that the Commission “promulgate,” amend, or repeal any rule pursuant to a petition therefor . ... D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1 — 1505(b).
Second, and more importantly, the rule that “[ojrdinarily, a court is to apply the law existing at the time of its decision” is inapplicable to the facts of the instant case. The rule was recently applied in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 76-77, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), where the Court denied private injunctive relief as to possible future violations of a federal law because new legislation, enacted after the trial court’s decision, made it clear that private remedies were unavailable to those litigants. Thus, the intervening law was applied to deny injunctive relief for violations which had not yet occurred. Similarly, the rule applies, where the intervening legislation *1046merely states what the law should have been at the time of decision, so that it is retroactively applied. Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974) (equitable award of attorney’s fees by District Court vindicated by subsequent legislation specifically permitting such award).
Application of the rule to the facts of Capitol Hill Restoration Society did not exceed these bounds, for its application did not “result in manifest injustice” (Bradley, supra at 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006) to the party seeking application of the prior law — i. e., the Commission, whose decision was affirmed. In the instant case, on the other hand, the Commission’s decision was made prior to the effective date of the law (section 5-414) which appellants would have us apply in order to invalidate the Commission’s decision — an application which would cause irreparable harm to the intervenors here, whose reliance upon the prior decision at that time led to the expenditure of massive amounts of time, energy and money in their construction projects. At least in the context of appellants’ invocations of our equitable powers, there is every reason to apply the law as it existed at the time of the Commission’s decision.
Finally, a word needs to be said concerning the applicability of Georgetown II to the instant case. Georgetown II is the only extant judicial interpretation of the meaning of the former Congressional mandate that the Commission zone “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.” Although I believe that case to have been incorrectly decided, and although I abhor the effort to apply the reasoning of that case to the new Congressional mandate that the Commission’s decisions “not be inconsistent with” the Red Book plan, equitable considerations must temper my view. Intervenors relied upon Georgetown II. To cause them to uproot at this time would be inequitable. Nevertheless, in light of the new Congressional mandate that a particular comprehensive plan be developed and followed, the Georgetown II interpretation of the former Congressional mandate should be discarded in the future.
In light of the most recent Congressional mandate that the Zoning Commission’s decision “not be inconsistent” with the comprehensive zoning plan, i. e., the Red Book plan, I conclude that until the District of Columbia, through its Mayor and Council submits its zoning proposals to the NCPC for review, the District’s Zoning Commission is to defer in the resolution of zoning matters to the Red Book plan. The Zoning Commission should not be permitted, as the majority would allow, to disregard a Congressional mandate on the pretense of exercising their Home Rule powers. Due to equitable considerations, I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I must diametrically differ with the rationale employed in reaching that decision.