Court Opinion

ID: 9693263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:33:40.693414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:43.567968
License: Public Domain

Hays, C. J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent.
Plaintiff’s petition alleges two specific acts of negligence: (1) Failing to guard or barricade the drop off into the basement. (2) Failing to warn plaintiff of the dangerous condition inside the doorway. Both were submitted to the jury.
Assigned error No. 1 concerns the instruction dealing with specification No. 1. It is appellant’s contention that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the duty an owner of premises owes -to an invitee thereon, relative to the safe condition of said premises, and left the jury without a guide as to such duty.
Actionable negligence is the breach of a duty owing by a defendant to a plaintiff, and where there is no duty there is no *1197negligence. It is fundamental that in a law action tried to a jury it is the responsibility of the trial court to correctly instruct the jury as to the law applicable to each issue submitted. In a negligence action the court must, for each act of negligence submitted, inform the jury as to the legal duty of the defendant, a violation of which is alleged and for which a recovery is sought. Jakeway v. Allen, 226 Iowa 13, 282 N.W. 374; Harrington v. Fortman, 233 Iowa 92, 8 N.W.2d 713; 60 A. L. R. 102.
As to defendant’s failure to guard or barricade the drop off into the basement the trial court gave but one Instruction, No. 10. So far as material, it states, “* * * the owner * * * of a building * * * who * * * invites others to enter therein * * * is bound to tose reasonable care, under the circumstances, for the safety of others who are in their rightful places. * * * the defendant accordingly owed the plaintiff the duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care, under the circumstances of this case, for plaintiff’s safety.” (Italics mine.) This instruction was given by the court instead of plaintiff’s requested Instruction No. 1, which was as follows: “the owner * * * owes an active affirmative duty * * * to use reasonable, ordinary care to heep such buildings * * * in a reasonably safe condition so as not to unreasonably or unnecessarily expose such persons to danger. # * * the defendant accordingly owed the plaintiff the duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care to heep his premises in a reasonably safe condition so as not to unreasonably or unnecessarily expose the plaintiff to danger.” (Italics mine.)
In LaSell v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 233 Iowa 929, 11 N.W.2d 36, an instruction, exactly like the requested one here, was approved as correctly stating the duty resting upon ' an owner of premises to an invitee thereon. The majority opinion states, “Instruction No. 10 was a proper and sufficient statement of the law.” I contend that it is not.
The majority opinion seeks to distinguish the LaSell case, supra, by saying that there we were defining the duty owed by an owner of a completed building, and that a much heavier burden of care is cast upon the owner of a completed building than is the case where the building is under construction, as in the instant ease, citing six cases from six other jurisdictions. Four of the cases cited involve a master-servant relationship *1198between plaintiff and defendant; one is an action against a contractor repairing a building by a tenant in the building, for using undue force, thus causing plaster to fall from the ceiling; and the other involves injury to a painter who went into a building under construction, for the purpose of estimating a paint job. They largely turn upon the assumption of risk theory and under such circumstances perhaps the majority opinion’s statement that a different duty exists where the building is under construction may be sound. It is not however, in my judgment, sound when applied to the instant case.
It is the generally accepted rule that an owner of premises has a duty to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition where invitees are involved.
In Upp v. Darner, 150 Iowa 403, 407, 130 N.W. 409, 410, 32 L. R. A., N. S., 743, Ann. Cas. 1912D 574, it is said: “Thus one is under no duty to keep his premises in a safe condition for the visits of trespassers. But, if he expressly or by implication invites others to come upon his premises, it is his duty to be reasonably sure that he is not inviting them into a place of danger, and to this end he must exercise ordinary care and prudence to render the premises reasonably safe for the visit.”
Martin v. Des Moines Edison Light Co., 131 Iowa 724, 106 N.W. 359, involves an employer-employee relationship in the construction of a building. The court told the jury (page 729) it was the “ 'duty of the defendant to furnish the deceased a reasonably safe place to work’ ”, and in the same instruction said the duty incumbent on the defendant was to use the reasonable care and diligence which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the circumstances. It was contended that plaintiff was employed in a work of alteration of the building and that a different rule pertained than where the building is completed. This court said (pag*es 731, 732 of 131 Iowa) : “If we understand the proposition of counsel, it does not state the law. * * * But the duty of the master not to expose the servant to any injury which may be reasonably anticipated and guarded against remains the same.”
See also Foley v. Cudahy Packing Co., 119 Iowa 246, 93 N.W. 284. A fortiori at least a similar duty exists as to a non-employee invitee.
*1199In Steele v. Grahl-Peterson Co., 135 Iowa 418, 422, 109 N.W. 882, 883, it is said: “It is true, the relation of master and servant did not exist, nor was there, in the ordinary sense of the word, any contract relation or obligation between the parties, yet, we regard it very clear that defendants did owe to the plaintiff as the servant of the subcontractor and to all other persons rightfully employed on the premises, the duty of exercising reasonable care to avoid exposing them to injury on account of cmy defective or dangerous conditions existing m such premises. * * * For the purposes of this ease * * * defendants, as principal contractors * * * stood in the same position of responsibility as if they were the owners.” (Italics mine.)
See also 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, sections 96, 97 and 102; 65 C. J. S., Negligence, sections 45b and 46; Noyes v. Des Moines Club, 178 Iowa 815, 160 N.W. 215; Reuter v. Iowa Trust & Savings Bank, 244 Iowa 939, 57 N.W.2d 225.
I think it may be said that whether the building in question be completed or under construction an owner thereof owed a duty, of some nature, as to the safe condition thereof, to an invitee in said building. A violation of that duty would constitute actionable negligence. Before a jury could possibly pass upon a defendant’s liability it would have to be advised as to the extent of that duty.
If Instruction No. 10 is “a proper and sufficient statement of the law”, as is said in the majority opinion, the duty which defendant owed to plaintiff must be found in the words “under the circumstances.” What do these words mean? The opinion says “the ‘circumstances of the case’ were of course those surrounding the accident happening in the building under construction. * * * and what the defendant did either to guard against a mishap * * * or to warn him of the danger thereof.” The circumstances are that plaintiff, an invitee, fell into an •open unguarded stair well, as to which he had not been warned, defendant stating “Nothing was said between me and John Hicks about this stair well, I did not have any idea that he did not know that the stair well was there.” If the instant instruction is a correct statement of the law as applied to the instant case, it must be accepted as a correct instruction to give in case of a completed building such as was involved in the *1200LaSell ease, supra. The words “under the circumstances” would be equally enlightening to the jury there as here. Assume a negligence case wherein a plaintiff alleges defendant, in operating his automobile, failed to give one half of the highway by turning to the right on meeting plaintiff’s car. The jury is told that defendant would be liable if he failed to drive his car in a careful and ordinary manner under the circumstances of the case. In my judgment, under the opinion, such an instruction must be deemed a proper and sufficient statement of the law, yet I doubt that this court would so say.
The majority opinion seeks to strengthen its position by saying that the sufficiency of an instruction must be determined when read in connection with all the other instructions in the case and specifically refers to Instructions No. 8 and 11. Instruction No. 11 clearly deals with the duty of the owner to warn as to hidden dangers, specification of Negligence No. 2, .and deals with an entirely different duty. Instruction No. 8 concerns contributory negligence of the plaintiff. It says, “* * * he (plaintiff) had a right to assume that the premises were in a reasonably safe condition under the circumstances * * Whether this instruction, in the light of Instruction No. 10, is correct is not involved as no error is assigned thereon. However, I submit that the words “under the circumstances” must be the yardstick governing the extent of plaintiff’s right to “assume the premises were in a reasonably safe condition”, that is, defendant’s duty in regard thereto. In my opinion, Instruction No. 8 adds nothing to Instruction No. 10 and I am not sure that it does not further muddy already muddied water.
Error is also assigned as to Instruction No. 5. This instruction concerns the meaning of the term “preponderance of the evidence.” Instructions Nos. 2, 4 and 16 deal with that term and amply and correctly cover the matter. Instruction No. 5, while correct as an abstract legal proposition, singles out and directs attention to the only real conflict in the testimony. I think there is considerable merit to appellant’s objection that it unduly emphasizes that particular phase of the case. While perhaps not reversible error, it seems to me that if such a legal proposition is to be stated, it should be done as part of the general instruction *1201instead of being singled out by a special instruction as was done here. See Evans v. Holsinger, 242 Iowa 990, 48 N.W.2d 250, 28 A. L. R.2d 1434.
I would reverse and remand.
Wennerstrum and Peterson, JJ., join in this dissent.