Court Opinion

ID: 9828824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:45:54.872879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:53.527610
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The statement in the opinion that appellant made the affidavit of publication was corrected in another portion of the opinion, when it was stated that the affidavit was made by the “manager and publisher of the Daily Light.” Moore did not make it; but it is significant that when one of his associates on the paper desired to make an affidavit in regard to the publication that he should seek the administrator of the Barnard estate before whom to make it.
The return and the deed fail to show that the lots were sold separately. While the return gives the price of some of the lots, the deed indicates a sale in bulk. The return shows affirmatively that six lots in Lubbock and Campbell’s addition were sold in bulk for $12.75.
[19] The return shows affirmatively that the first publication did not appear in the newspaper not less than 20 days before the sale of the property. The first publication appeared on November 14, 1906, and the sale occurred on December 4th. It is clear that the first publication did not appear full 20 days immediately preceding the day of sale. It would require the whole of the day of sale to make the 20 days required, because the day of the first publication is not computed. Exclusive of November 14th, there were 16 days in November, and it would require full 4 days in December to get the statutory time of “not less than twenty days immediately preceding the day of sale.” Jackson v. Dowdy, 29 S. W. 693; Hill v. Faison, 27 Tex. 428; Simpson v. Mitchell, 47 Tex. 572; Stepheson v. Railroad, 42 Tex. 162. In the cited case of Hill v. Faison the first publication was on November 13th, the second, November 20th, and the third, November 27th, and judgment was rendered on December 4th. The similarity in dates to those in this case is remarkable. The court said: “In cases like the present the statute requires the citation to be published at least 3 successive weeks before the return day. We think this provision of the statute is not complied with by a publication in 3 successive issues of a *579weekly newspaper, unless the 'full term of three weeks, or 21 days, elapses between the day when the citation is first published and the day on which the judgment is rendered, exclusive of the first day of publication and also of the return day of the writ.” Applying that rule to this case and only 19 days had elapsed from the first publication to the day of the sale.
[20] Again, the constable’s return recites the publication of the notice, but the deed recites only notice of sale by posting; and it' is held that in a conflict between the sheriff’s deed and his return the recitals in the deed always control. Holmes v. Buckner, 67 Tex. 107, 2 S. W. 452.
[21, 22] The attack upon the sale by appellees was a direct, and not a collateral, attack. They did not attack the judgment, but offered to pay it off, and they made a direct attack upon the sale under which appellant, who claimed to own the judgment, asserted title to the land. Weaver v. Nugent, 72 Tex. 272, 10 S. W. 458, 13 Am. St. Rep. 792; McCampbell v. Durst, 73 Tex. 410, 11 S. W. 380. The judgment having been rendered in a justice’s court, the suit to set it aside was properly brought in the district court. Miller v. Koertge, 70 Tex. 162, 7 S. W. 691, 8 Am. St. Rep. 587.
In the cited case of Weaver v. Nugent, the purchaser at an execution sale instituted an action of trespass to try title to the land, and the judgment debtors set up the invalidity of the sale, arising from irregularities on the part of the sheriff. The land was worth from $3,000 to $6,000, and was purchased by the plaintiff for $10. The court held that the cross-action was a direct attack on the sale. The ease of Taul v. Wright, cited in our original opinion, is quoted and approved, and it was said: “Where, as in this case, there is a practical confiscation of the property under the guise of an execution sale, it is likely the jury would scrutinize the testimony in an effort to account for the cause of such a sacrifice. Naturally, before allowing the plaintiff to hold the property without the payment of more than a nominal consideration, they would, under the charge, consider all the circumstances preceding and at the sale, the fact that no levy was pointed out by the county attorney, the haste in making the levy, the failure to demand payment or a levy, the fact that the defendants in execution did have some personal property in the county liable to seizure (much more than enough to satisfy the costs), the ignorance of the defendants in execution interested in the sale of the levy and of the sale; and the jury might reasonably have been satisfied, notwithstanding the deeds by the defendants in execution to their brother, that the gross inadequacy or absence of more than a nominal consideration was to a great extent occasioned by the irregularities. It may even be held in such a case the party holding
should show an exact compliance with the; law; that is, not deciding that the mere assertion of the claim is unconscienüous, we hold that, where there is practically no consideration, the proceedings must at least be regular in order to pass title.” In that case the plaintiff sought to excuse the miserable sum paid for the land on the ground that the true owners had conveyed it to another; in this case it is sought to be excused on the ground of debts owed by appellees. The Supreme Court disregarded the excuse in the ease cited; we set it aside in this. A tender of the sum paid for the land was made in that case; a tender of the full amount of the judgment was made in this case. The court speaks of the haste in making the levy, but it could have been no greater than in this case. The judgment was' obtained by appellant on September 4, 1906, and an execution was issued on November 12th, on the same day the levy was made, and on December 4th the sale was attempted. Taken with the evidences of fraud, the irregularities connected with the sale, the gross inadequacy of price, the refusal of the tender of the full amount of the judgment, this case is a much stronger one for setting aside the sale than the case of Weaver v. Nugent. See, also, Irvin v. Ferguson, 83 Tex. 496, 18 S. W. 820; Crosby v. Bannowsky, 95 Tex. 449, 68 S. W. 47.
The case of McCampbell v. Durst, herein cited, is authority for the proposition that the cross-action of these appellees was a direct, and not a collateral, action. The court said: “The obvious purpose of this suit was to cancel the deeds which were executed in pursuance of the proceedings in the probate court, and to remove from plaintiff’s title the cloud cast thereon by the deeds or any other claim of appellant to the land. These proceedings in the probate court and every order and decree relating to the land in controversy are specifically set out in the petition, and it is averred of each and all of them that they are fraudulent and void. These proceedings constitute a part of appellant’s claim and eventuated in the deeds, against both of which relief is directly sought by this suit. We think the suit is not collateral, but a direct proceeding to vacate the deeds, which may be done if the facts alleged be true, although the orders in probate stand.” To the same effect are Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Tex. 593, 86 Am. Dec. 657; Chamblee v. Tarbox, 27 Tex. 139, 84 Am. Dec. 614; Owen v. Navasota, 44 Tex. 517; Cravens v. Wilson, 48 [Tex. 324, and Moore v. Snowball, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 495, 82 S. W. 330; same case, 98 Tex. 16, 81 S. W. 5, 66 L. R. A. 745, 107 Am. St. Rep. 596. In the last-cited case the Supreme Court held: “A defendant, when sued in trespass to try title, may plead not guilty, thus making the issue of title, and may also plead specially such a right as that which plaintiffs here set up; but when he does so *580he, in substance, asserts in* reconvention a different cause of action against tbe plaintiff from that which plaintiff asserts against him.”
In the case of Leeper v. O’Donohue, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 531, 45 S. W. 327, the notice of sale was not given 20 days before the sale, and it was held “that the inadequacy of the price at which the property was bid in, coupled with the failure to give 20 days’ notice of the sale to the defendants, was sufficient to require that the sale should be vacated.” A writ of error was refused by the Supreme Court.
The cases cited by appellant as holding that an attack by a cross-action of a sale under execution in a suit between the execution purchaser and the defendants in execution is a collateral attack do not so hold. In the case of Smith v. Perkins, 81 Tex. 152, 16 S. W. 805, 26 Am. St. Rep. 794, it was held that the attack was collateral because all persons concerned were not made parties, and it is held that if they had been the cross-action would have been a direct attack on the sale. In this ease the owner of the Judgment, the only party interested, besides the defendants in the original suit, were parties.The case of Brooks v. Powell, 29 S. W. 809, is based on the same proposition. The case of Estey v. Williams, 133 S. W. 470, cited by appellant, has no applicability to this case. In this ease the cause of action was assigned to appellant by Walling nearly two years before the judgment was obtained, and appellant was the real plaintiff in the justice’s court of Walling v. Allardyce.
While we conclude that the assignments seeking to raise a question as to lots not claimed by appellees, and for which they did not obtain judgment, should not be considered, i still this court adjudges that appellees take nothing as to any lots except those claimed in their cross-action, and with this amendment of our former judgment the motion for rehearing is overruled.