Court Opinion

ID: 9897558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:07.220513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:53.185608
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                 APPELLATE DIVISION
                                 DOCKET NO. A-3616-20

IN THE MATTER OF
PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION                   APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
OF COMPRESSOR STATION
                                               August 31, 2023
(CS327), OFFICE BUILDING
                                            APPELLATE DIVISION
AND APPURTENANT
STRUCTURES, HIGHLANDS
APPLICABILITY
DETERMINATION, PROGRAM
INTEREST NO.: 1615-17-0004.2
(APD200001).
____________________________

         Argued February 8, 2023 – Decided August 31, 2023

         Before Judges Accurso, Firko and Natali.

         On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
         Environmental Protection.

         Daniel Greenhouse argued the cause for appellants
         Food & Water Watch, New Jersey Highlands
         Coalition, and Sierra Club (Eastern Environmental
         Law Center, attorneys; Daniel Greenhouse and
         William D. Bittinger, on the briefs).

         Jason Brandon Kane, Deputy Attorney General,
         argued the cause for respondent New Jersey
         Department of Environmental Protection (Matthew J.
         Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
         Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jason Brandon
         Kane, on the brief).
            Richard G. Scott argued the cause for respondent
            Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC (Rutter &
            Roy, LLP, attorneys; Richard G. Scott, Christine A.
            Roy, and Monica N. Stahl, on the brief).

      The opinion of the court was delivered by

ACCURSO, P.J.A.D.

      The sole question addressed on this appeal, one we've not had to decide

before, is one of statutory interpretation. 1 The Department of Environmental

Protection issued a Highlands Applicability Determination (HAD) to

Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC exempting construction of a new

compressor station in the Highlands Preservation Area from permitting review

under N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11) (Exemption 11). Exemption 11 relieves a

public utility from having to obtain a Highlands Preservation Area Approval

for "routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation,

reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or

1
  Although the appellant in In re New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, Program
Interest No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. 223, 237 (App. Div. 2013), argued the
Highlands Applicability Determination challenged in that case did not
encompass a routine upgrade, and the DEP argued "the Legislature intended
the word 'routine' to modify 'maintenance and operations' and not the other
exempted activities," we found no need to resolve the question. We
determined in that case "that, even if the exemption is interpreted as requiring
that an upgrade be 'routine,'" the utility line upgrade at issue there could fairly
be characterized as a routine one. Ibid. We do not find the case instructive
here.

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                                         2
systems," so long as "the activity is consistent with the goals and purposes of"

the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act, N.J.S.A. 13:20-1 to -35.

The Department issued the HAD without a determination as to whether the

new compressor station qualifies as a "routine upgrade" to Tennessee's existing

gas pipeline system because the DEP maintains "routine" in Exemption 11

modifies only "maintenance and operations" and does not modify "upgrade." 2

      Appellants Food & Water Watch, New Jersey Highlands Coalition, and

Sierra Club have appealed the HAD, 3 contending we should apply the doctrine

of noscitur a sociis, "an ancient maxim of statutory construction that the

meaning of words may be indicated and controlled by those with which they

are associated," Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 220 (1970), and find "the

2
  The HAD also refers to Exemption 11 in the Highlands Act Rules, which, as
to the issue that concerns us, simply parrots the language of the statute. See
N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)(11).
3
  Appellants initially failed to name Tennessee as a party. Tennessee filed a
motion to intervene as of right, which we denied, and a motion for
reconsideration and for permissive intervention, which we also denied. The
Supreme Court granted Tennessee's motion for leave to appeal those orders
and held "[b]ased on the role Tennessee played in obtaining this administrative
relief from the NJDEP, Tennessee is an 'interested party' under Rule 2:5-1(d)
[now Rule 2:5-1(b)(3)] and should have been included as a party in the Notice
of Appeal and served accordingly." In re Proposed Constr. of Compressor
Station (CS327), 250 N.J. 365, 368 (2022). The Court remanded the case to us
"to permit appellants to file an amended Notice of Appeal and Case
Information Statement that names Tennessee as an interested party pursuant to
Rule 2:5-1[(b)(3)]." Ibid. Tennessee has since participated as a party
"defendant" in this appeal.

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                                        3
word 'routine' not only modifies 'maintenance and operations' but also

'upgrade.'" We agree with appellants the language of Exemption 11 and its

statutory context, as well as the history of the Highlands Act, all point to the

Legislature having intended to exempt only routine upgrades to a public

utility's lines, rights of way or systems in the Preservation Area from the

strictures of the statute.

      Tennessee, however, only ever contended before the agency that its

proposed new compressor station in the Preservation Area is an "upgrade" to

its pipeline system. And although counsel for the DEP asserted at oral

argument the project could qualify as a "routine upgrade" entitling Tennessee

to a HAD under Exemption 11, there is nothing in the agency record to

indicate the Department ever considered the question, much less decided it.

See In re Petition of Elizabethtown Water Co., 107 N.J. 440, 460 (App. Div.

1987) (noting "[t]he grounds upon which an administrative order must be

judged are those upon which the record discloses that the action was based"

(quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943))).

We thus vacate the HAD and remand for the DEP to consider whether

Tennessee's proposed compressor station qualifies as a "routine upgrade" to its

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                                        4
pipeline system, entitling it to a HAD under our construction of the language

of Exemption 11. 4

      We sketch only so much of the facts and procedural history as necessary

to put our decision in context. Tennessee is a federally regulated natural -gas

company that owns and operates a natural gas transmission system stretching

northeastward from the Gulf states to New England. As part of its "East 300

Upgrade Project," Tennessee intends to install new compressor units in two

existing compressor stations 5 along its "300 Line," one in Pennsylvania and

one in Sussex County, and to construct a new station and appurtenant facilities

in West Milford, in Tennessee's existing right-of-way on the site of a former

quarry.

      The new station would house a 19,000 hp-rated electric motor-driven

compressor unit and connect to Tennessee's 300 Line pipeline just south of the

4
  We do not consider whether Tennessee qualifies as a public utility for
purposes of qualifying for Exemption 11 as appellants only challenged
Tennessee's status in their reply brief. See Borough of Berlin v. Remington &
Vernick Eng'rs, 337 N.J. Super. 590, 596 (App. Div. 2001).
5
  Tennessee asserts that "[c]ompressor stations, also known as pumping
stations, compress natural gas by raising the pressure to 'push' gas through the
pipeline." It explains the gas in the pipeline "enters a series of scrubbers and
strainers, is compressed by the compressor, cooled and then continues through
the pipeline until it is delivered to a customer or reaches the next compressor
station."

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                                        5
station on the same site. 6 Tennessee contends the East 300 Upgrade Project is

necessary to "increase the capacity" of its existing pipeline system and "to

respond to the request of" Consolidated Edison for 115,000 dekatherms per

day of firm transportation capacity for its customers in Westchester Count y.

      Because the proposed West Milford compressor station is located within

the Highlands Preservation Area, the nearly 398,000-acre tract of the

Highlands Region "subjected to stringent water and natural resource protection

6
  In addition to the compressor building, Tennessee plans to construct a new
3,500-square-foot office building with potable water and a septic system,
including a 1,000-gallon holding tank for waste, as well as a new 925-square-
foot electrical building to house the variable frequency drive and motor control
center for its compressor unit. Tennessee also plans to install the following
auxiliary equipment:

            (1) an electric motor ventilation system; (2) vent
            silencers; (3) gas coolers; (4) a lube oil cooler and
            piping; (5) filter separators; (6) an auxiliary building
            fitted with automation control panels; (7) an air
            compressor; (8) a 375-kilowatt emergency generator;
            (9) domestic fuel gas skid; (10) pipeline liquids
            storage tank; (11) building heaters; (12) mainline
            valve piping; and (13) suction, discharge, and vent
            piping.

Tennessee will also be building its own 69-kilovolt electrical substation on the
site and constructing an electrical conduit from that electric substation to
connect to an electric transmission line to be constructed by Orange and
Rockland Utilities along Burnt Meadow Road, which borders the site.
Tennessee estimates the cost of its East 300 Upgrade Project will be $246
million. The West Milford compressor station is estimated to make up nearly
$108 million of those costs.

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                                        6
standards, policies, planning, and regulation," N.J.S.A. 13:20-2; DEP

Highlands Water Protection & Planning Act Guidance, State of N.J.,

https://www.nj.gov/dep/highlands/faq_info.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2023),

Tennessee submitted a HAD application to the DEP, seeking a determination

that construction of its proposed West Milford station is exempt from the

Highlands Act, and thus it was not required to obtain a Highlands Preservation

Area Approval from the DEP for the project.

      Appellants submitted public comments opposing Tennessee's

application, asserting construction of the West Milford compressor station was

"not routine maintenance or an upgrade of utility lines or systems, but a

massive expansion of operations in the protected Highlands Region." They

contended Tennessee was "building a new facility to push more gas through

pipelines that go to New York" having "no public benefit for the people of"

New Jersey.

      The Highlands Council, which the DEP routinely consults when

considering a HAD application, submitted a letter to the Department stating

the Council had reviewed Tennessee's application and found construction of

the compressor station "consistent with the goals of the Highlands Act." The

Council noted Tennessee had sufficiently "avoided and minimized impacts to

Highlands resources" by repurposing a "historically disturbed" former quarry

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                                       7
from which "[c]ritical wildlife habitat areas are disconnected and non-

functional," and that it did not object to the DEP issuing Tennessee an

exemption for the project.

      The DEP determined construction of the West Milford compressor

station "meets the definition of 'Major Highlands Development'" under

N.J.A.C. 7:38-1.4, but the project was not "regulated by the Highlands Act"

because it qualified for Exemption 11 and was consistent with the Water

Quality Management Plan rules. 7 N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.4(a) and (e). In issuing the

HAD, the Department did not state which one of the activities listed in

Exemption 11 applied. 8

7
   Appellants have also contended on appeal that the "DEP's determination that
the proposed project is consistent with the [Water Quality Management Plan]
is arbitrary and capricious" because the Department failed to "view the totality
of the proposed project." Because we agree with appellants' first point that the
Department has misinterpreted Exemption 11, necessitating a remand to the
agency, we do not reach their second point.
8
  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the agency that
regulates Tennessee's facilities, rates, and types of service, subsequently
granted Tennessee's application for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity, finding Tennessee's plan "to install 300 feet of 36-inch-diameter unit
piping and 1,400 feet of 42-inch-diameter suction and discharge piping
connecting the compressor station to Tennessee's 300 Line" would "enable
Tennessee to provide up to 115,000 [dekatherms] per day of firm
transportation service, which constitutes 100% of the project's capacity, to
ConEd," which had demonstrated "that natural gas demand in its service
territories is exceeding its available firm natural gas interstate pipeline
capacity and that additional transportation capacity is needed to serve its

                                                                          A-3616-20
                                       8
      As with any case in which we are called to interpret a statute, our "goal

is to divine and effectuate the Legislature's intent." Perez v. Zagami, LLC,

218 N.J. 202, 209 (2014) (quoting State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 263 (2013)).

As "[t]here is no more persuasive evidence of legislative intent than the words

by which the Legislature undertook to express its purpose," id. at 209-10, we

look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the "words their ordinary

meaning absent any direction from the Legislature to the contrary," TAC

Assocs. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 202 N.J. 533, 541 (2010), "and read them

in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a

whole," DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005).

____________________
existing and new customers." Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 179 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,041,
at ¶ 17 (2022). See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c).

      FERC denied Food & Water Watch's applications to stay construction
pending appeal, Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 181 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,051 (2022), and
Food & Water Watch's challenge to FERC's approval of the project remains
pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 179
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,041, appeal filed, Nos. 22-1214 & 22-1315 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13,
2022).

        Appellants did not apply for a stay in this case, and we understand
construction of the West Milford station is proceeding — at Tennessee's own
risk, of course. See In re Request for Proposals #17DPP00144, 454 N.J.
Super. 527, 575 (App. Div. 2018) (declaring nonconforming bidder "proceeded
at its own risk" in assuming performance under the contract "in light of the
significant, challenged deviation in its bid").

                                                                            A-3616-20
                                         9
      "If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then [the]

interpretive process is over," and the court's job is done. TAC Assocs., 202

N.J. at 541 (alteration in original) (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police &

Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007)). But if the language is

ambiguous and susceptible "to more than one plausible interpretation,"

DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492, we turn to extrinsic aids to "effectuate the

legislative intent in light of the language used and the objects sought to be

achieved," Merin v. Maglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 435 (1992) (quoting State v.

Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 514 (1980)).

      Our Supreme Court has long "adhere[d] to the canon of statutory

construction that 'the general intention of a statute will control the

interpretation of its parts.'" Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor v. Mercedes-

Benz of N. Am., Inc., 99 N.J. 402, 414 (1985) (quoting State v. Bander,

56 N.J. 196, 201 (1970)). Although we ordinarily accord substantial deference

to an agency's interpretation of a statute the agency is charged with enforcing,

no deference is required when "an agency's statutory interpretation is contrary

to the statutory language, or if the agency's interpretation undermines the

Legislature's intent." 9 In re N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. AFSCME, Council 73, 150 N.J.

9
  The DEP asserts that since Exemption 11 "was codified in DEP's rules, DEP
has consistently interpreted the word 'routine' in Exemption #11 as only

                                                                              A-3616-20
                                        10
331, 351 (1997). "Clear legislative intent cannot be trumped by countervailing

administrative practices." Ibid.

      In enacting the Highlands Act in 2004, the Legislature initiated an

ambitious undertaking to protect the water and natural resources of the New

Jersey Highlands, a nearly 800,000-acre area in the northwest part of the State

"covering portions of 88 municipalities in seven counties," which provides

clean drinking water to more than half the State's residents, against the

environmental degradations of sprawl development. N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.

Finding the then-existing land use and environmental regulation system

inadequate to protect the region's resources, the Legislature mandated a

comprehensive approach to land use planning, "complemented by increased

standards more protective of the environment," to include identification of "a

preservation area of exceptional natural resource value" for which the DEP

would adopt "stringent standards governing major development." Ibid. It is

thus beyond cavil that the Highlands Act represents "a comprehensive policy
____________________
modifying 'maintenance and operations'" (citing 38 N.J.R. 5011(a) (Dec. 4,
2006) (response to comments 3 and 4)). That response, however, does not
reflect the interpretation claimed, noting only "the exemption for the routine
maintenance and operations of public utility lines at N.J.A.C. 7:38-2.3(a)11."
38 N.J.R. 5011(a) (response to comments 3 and 4). There is no mention of
"upgrade." Ibid. As far as we are aware, the only time the Department has
asserted "routine" does not modify "upgrade" was in Conditional Highlands
Applicability Determination, Program Interest No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. at
233.

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                                       11
designed to protect environmental interests," exemptions from which are to be

strictly construed. See M. Alfieri Co. v. State, Dep't of Env't Prot. & Energy,

269 N.J. Super. 545, 554 (App. Div. 1994).

      The nub of the parties' dispute is whether an "upgrade of public utility

lines, rights of way, or systems" must be "routine" in order to exempt the

utility from the permitting requirements of the Highlands Act under Exemption

11 — which exempts entirely from all provisions of the Act and "any rules or

regulations" adopted by the DEP pursuant to it:

            the routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation,
            preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of
            public utility lines, rights of way, or systems, by a
            public utility, provided that the activity is consistent
            with the goals and purposes of this act.

            [N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11).]

Neither "routine" nor "upgrade" is defined in the statute.

      Appellants argue the attributive adjective "routine" modifies each noun

in the list, including "upgrade." They contend their interpretation is supported

by the absence of a semicolon after "maintenance and operations," which

would indicate the Legislature's intent to separate "routine maintenance and

operations" from the other activities in the Exemption, and by the interpretive

maxim "noscitur a sociis" — literally: "it is known from its associates." Isetts

v. Borough of Roseland, 364 N.J. Super. 247, 257 n.4 (App. Div. 2003). They

                                                                             A-3616-20
                                       12
also contend limiting the entire list of activities in the exemption to those of a

routine nature best aligns with DEP's charge to implement "stringent standards

governing major development," N.J.S.A. 13:20-2, in the Preservation Area and

the goal of the regional master plan to "prohibit or limit to the maximum

extent possible construction or development which is incompatible with

preservation of this unique area," N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b)(9).

      The DEP and Tennessee counter that "routine" modifies only

"maintenance and operations" as "'routine maintenance and operations' is set

off from the rest of the list by a comma," and the disjunctive "or" before

"upgrade" "signifies that each phrase is 'distinct and separate from each

other,'" (quoting State v. N.T., 461 N.J. Super. 566, 571 (App. Div. 2019)).

They argue "[t]he plain language of the exemption makes clear that upgrades

to existing utility systems, provided that those upgrades are consistent with the

goals and purposes of the Highlands Act, are exempt from the Highlands Act,

NJDEP's implementing rules, and the Highlands Regional Master Plan." The

DEP and Tennessee contend theirs "is the only interpretation that makes

sense," because if "routine" modified "upgrade," then it would also modify

"rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, [and] repair," which "would make

no sense and thus would be an absurd interpretation."

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                                        13
      Unfortunately, we do not find the "plain language" of Exemption 11

plain enough to resolve the parties' dispute. To the contrary, we find the

language plainly susceptible to more than one interpretation. See DiProspero,

183 N.J. at 494. And although both sides present plausible constructions, we

do not find them equally plausible. In our view, appellants have by far the

better argument that the Legislature intended to limit the statutory exemption

afforded public utilities to "routine" upgrades of their "lines, rights of way, or

systems" in the Preservation Area in the same manner it does every other

activity listed, that is "maintenance and operations, rehabilitation,

preservation, reconstruction, [and] repair." N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11).

      Although we think appellants have the better grammatical analysis, that

is that the attributive adjective, otherwise known as the "prepositive modifier,"

"routine" modifies each noun in the list of exempt activities, 10 we do not "pin

10
   Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner in their book Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts, 147 (2012), refer to this in their discussion of
"Syntactic Canons" as the "Series-Qualifier Canon," that is "[w]hen there is a
straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a
series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire
series." Among the examples they provide is this one: "[f]orcibly assaults,
resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with — held, that forcibly
modifies each verb in the list," id. at 148 (citing Long v. United States, 199
F.2d 717, 719 (4th Cir. 1952), in which the court determined "[t]he use of the
adverb 'forcibly' before the first of the string of verbs, with the disjunctive
conjunction used only between the last two of them, shows quite plainly that
the adverb is to be interpreted as modifying them all").

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                                        14
heavy interpretive import" on the Legislature's choice of a comma over a

semicolon here, Perez, 218 N.J. at 210; see 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D.

Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.15 at 345

(7th ed. 2007) ("Punctuation is a most fallible standard by which to interpret a

writing." (quoting Ewing's Lessee v. Burnet, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 41, 54

(1837))).11 Instead, we are guided by two interpretive principles — that

"exception[s] to the provisions of a comprehensive statutory scheme. . . . are to

be strictly but reasonably construed, consistent with the manifest reason and

purpose of the law," Serv. Armament Co. v. Hyland, 70 N.J. 550, 558-59

(1976), and that "whatever the rule of [statutory] construction, it is subordinate

to the goal of effectuating the legislative plan as it may be gathered from the

enactment read in full light of its history, purpose, and context." Chasin v.

Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418, 426-27 (1999) (alteration in original)

(quoting State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 9 (1995)). Both point unerringly to the

same result here.

11
   We have no quarrel with State v. N.T., 461 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div.
2019), the case relied on by the DEP and Tennessee, but find it inapplicable
here. In N.T., we held that portion of the expungement statute barring
expungement of the records of a conviction for "[e]ndangering the welfare of a
child by engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the
morals of the child, or causing the child other harm," N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2,
referred to distinct harms based on the "comma and the word 'or.'" 461 N.J.
Super. at 571. The case did not address the treatment of an attributive
adjective to a series of nouns in a list, the issue we address here.

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                                       15
      No party disputes the manifest purpose of the Highlands Act is to reduce

"the environmental impacts of sprawl development" in the Highlands Region

by subjecting "major development" in the Preservation Area, which all agree

the West Milford compressor station indisputably is, "to stringent water and

natural resource protection standards, policies, planning, and regulation."

N.J.S.A. 13:20-2. One of the primary goals of the regional master plan for the

Preservation Area is to "prohibit or limit to the maximum extent possible

construction or development which is incompatible with preservation."

N.J.S.A. 13:20-10(b)(9). Because the Legislature plainly intended to subject

major development in the Preservation Area to stringent regulation, we are

compelled to interpret exemptions from the Act narrowly. See M. Alfieri, 269

N.J. Super. at 554.

      The main problem with the DEP and Tennessee's analysis from our

perspective is that it is myopically focused on sentence structure, which we

view as inconclusive, with no substantive analysis of the language of the

exemption in light of the "history, purpose, and context" of the Highlands Act.

Chasin, 159 N.J. at 427 (quoting Haliski, 140 N.J. at 9). That is, they fail to

analyze or consider the meaning of "upgrade" with reference to the Act or to

the other words with which it is associated in the exemption — those from

which it should naturally gather meaning. See Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co.,

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                                       16
367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). Looking at the statute from that perspective reveals

that failing to allow "routine" to modify "upgrade" makes "upgrade" the odd

item out in the list of "maintenance and operations, rehabilitation,

preservation, reconstruction, repair, or upgrade," leaving "upgrade" alone with

no implied limiting principle. N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11).

      As in a verbal reasoning test that asks which item in a list of apple,

orange, cheese, and chalk is unlike the others, "upgrade" without the modifier

"routine" is unlike every other activity in the list of exemptions. An electric

utility might, for example, "upgrade" its transmission lines by moving from

aluminum and steel conductor cores to carbon fiber or "upgrade" a coal-fired

plant by replacing it with a nuclear reactor. Both would readily qualify as

"upgrades," although they are obviously of a vastly different character. To

understand the sense in which the Legislature used "upgrade," we need to look

to its statutory context, and particularly to the words "with which [it is]

associated." Germann, 55 N.J. at 220.

      The maxim noscitur a sociis, explained by the United States Supreme

Court to mean "a word is known by the company it keeps," Jarecki, 367 U.S. at

307, "while not an absolute rule, serves as 'a helpful guide in ascertaining the

intended scope of associated words or phrases,'" Isetts, 364 N.J. Super. at 257

(quoting Germann, 55 N.J. at 221). As other courts have noted, the maxim is

                                                                              A-3616-20
                                        17
"wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid

the giving of unintended breadth" to acts of the Legislature. Ibid. (quoting

Jarecki, 367 U.S. at 307). Its application is particularly appropriate here, as

we are construing the words of "an exemption from a comprehensive policy

designed to protect environmental interests," M. Alfieri, 269 N.J. Super. at

554, which we are bound to interpret narrowly. The canon cautions us to take

care against interpreting "upgrade" in a way that would give it a broad scope

unintended by the Legislature.

      Applying it here by allowing "routine" to modify "upgrade" makes

upgrade consistent with the other activities included in the exemption. It

removes "upgrade" from the status of an outlier and makes it consonant with

"maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation, reconstruction, [and]

repair," N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11), powerful evidence in our view of the

Legislature's intended scope of the word. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 195 ("When several nouns or verbs or

adjectives or adverbs — any words — are associated in a context suggesting

that the words have something in common, they should be assigned a

permissible meaning that makes them similar.").12 Harkening back to our

12
  Scalia and Garner include noscitur a sociis in their discussion of
"Contextual Canons," referring to it as the "associated-words canon," that is

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                                        18
electric utility example, allowing "routine" to modify "upgrade" would plainly

differentiate the upgrade of the transmission wires from the upgrade of the

coal-fired plant, although we do not mean to suggest an opinion on whether

either would be appropriate for the Preservation Area.

      In that regard, we reject the Department and Tennessee's contention that

the limiting principle the Legislature imposed on the activities included in

Exemption 11, including "upgrade," is not that they qualify as "routine," b ut

that all must be consistent with the goals and purposes of the Highlands Act.

      The Legislature has, to be sure, required the entire list of activities

included in Exemption 11 to be "consistent with the goals and purposes" of the

Highlands Act, N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(11), but that is the case regardless of

whether "routine" modifies every activity listed or only "maintenance and

operations." Because any activity undertaken by a public utility in the

Preservation Area with regard to its "lines, rights of way, or systems" must be

"consistent with the goals and purposes" of the Highlands Act in order to be

____________________
"[a]ssociated words bear on one another's meaning." Scalia & Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 195.

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exempt from the Act's requirements, ibid., the proviso does not speak to the

question of whether the Legislature intended "routine" to modify "upgrade." 13

      We fail to grasp — and neither the Department nor Tennessee explains

— why "routine" modifying every listed activity, that is to read the statute to

exempt only routine maintenance and operations, routine rehabilitation, routine

preservation, routine reconstruction, routine repair, and routine upgrade,

"would make no sense and thus would be an absurd interpretation," as they

assert.

      "Routine" is plainly intended to serve as a statutory limiting principle of

the enumerated activities a utility may undertake in the Preservation Area with

regard to its lines, rights of way, and systems without the DEP engaging in a

permitting review. And although all the activities included in the list other

than "upgrade" have implied limitations, "maintenance and operations" being

13
   That point is easily illustrated by again considering our electric utility
example and the issue before us. It is obvious a nuclear power plant would not
be a "routine" upgrade of a coal-fired plant or consistent with the goals and
purposes of the Highlands Act. It is considerably less clear, at least on this
record, whether the construction of a new compressor station in the
Preservation Area, which the Department deemed "consistent with the goals
and purposes of the Highlands Act," a determination we do not reach, could
also qualify as a "routine" upgrade of Tennessee's gas pipeline system. The
questions are simply independent of one another.

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the most obvious, 14 we do not find it absurd, or indeed even odd, for the

Legislature to have exempted only routine rehabilitation, preservation,

reconstruction, repair and upgrades from the permitting requirements of the

Act in the same manner it exempted only routine maintenance and operations,

given the Legislature's avowed goal to subject "major development" in the

Preservation Area "to stringent water and natural resource protection

standards, policies, planning, and regulation." N.J.S.A. 13:20-2. In no way

could the interpretation be regarded as one leading to an "absurd" result

consistent with our case law. See, e.g., Robson v. Rodriquez, 26 N.J. 517,

528-29 (1958) (holding it "absurd" to interpret the Unsatisfied Claim and

Judgment Fund Law to deny an uninsured person recovery from the Fund but

allow her personal representative to recover if the uninsured person died

before filing suit, even from a cause unrelated to the accident).

      The Court has instructed "[t]he true meaning and intention of legislation

must be derived from the whole and not from any single component part," lest

14
   Indeed, reading "routine" to modify only "maintenance and operations" is
much closer to an "absurd" interpretation of the statute. Of all the activities on
the list, "maintenance and operations" most clearly implies "routine" activity,
resulting in use of the modifier adding nothing to its meaning. See Long, 199
F.2d at 719. In interpreting a statute, we, of course, "endeavor to give
meaning to all words and to avoid an interpretation that reduces specific
language to mere surplusage." DKM Residential Props. Corp. v. Twp. of
Montgomery, 182 N.J. 296, 307 (2005).

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"distortion . . . result." Denbo v. Twp. of Moorestown, 23 N.J. 476, 481

(1957). It reminds that "[i]n enacting legislation the lawmakers are deemed to

have had a definite purpose in mind, and to have included the component parts

of the enactment to accomplish that purpose." Ibid.

      The Legislature announced its purpose in enacting the Highlands Act in

ringing tones, declaring the Highlands' "exceptional natural resources" in the

form of clean drinking water, "clean air, contiguous forest lands, wetlands,

pristine watersheds, and habitat for fauna and flora" were "at serious risk of

being fragmented and consumed by unplanned development," and "because of

[the Highlands'] vital link to the future of the State's drinking water supplies

and other key natural resources," it was essential "that the State should take

action to delineate within the New Jersey Highlands a preservation area . . .

where stringent protection policies should be implemented." N.J.S.A. 13:20-2.

      Guided by the Legislature's express declaration "that it is in the public

interest of all the citizens of the State" that the Preservation Area be subject

"to stringent water and natural resource protection standards, policies,

planning, and regulation," ibid., we cannot accept the Department and

Tennessee's position that the Legislature intended Exemption 11 for "the

routine maintenance and operations, rehabilitation, preservation,

reconstruction, repair, or upgrade of public utility lines, rights of way, or

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systems" in the Preservation Area to exempt any upgrade a utility might

propose and, specifically, to exempt Tennessee's construction of a new

compressor station and appurtenant facilities, including its own electric

substation, at a cost of over $100 million with no showing it constituted only a

"routine upgrade" 15 of its gas pipeline system. Neither the language and

structure of the Exemption nor the history and purpose of the Highlands Act

support that result.

      We accordingly vacate the HAD issued to Tennessee and remand the

matter to the Department for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

opinion, including but not limited to consideration of whether Tennessee's

proposed compressor station can qualify as a "routine upgrade" to its pipeline

system. We do not retain jurisdiction.

      Vacated and remanded.

15
   The parties dispute the meaning of a "routine upgrade" and whether it
relates to a utility's "need to expand" existing utility services, as perhaps
implied in Conditional Highlands Applicability Determination, Program
Interest No. 435434, 433 N.J. Super. at 237, or whether it is instead related to
"whether the project is a 'system' upgrade" in accordance with Exemption 11
and the DEP's rules, requiring assessment of "environmental impacts." As we
are not bound by the decision of another panel of this court, Brundage v. Est.
of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 593 (2008), and the issue is not squarely before us,
we express no opinion on this point, deeming it a question for the Department
in the first instance.

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