Court Opinion

ID: 9910383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 16:03:35.661075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:30.485700
License: Public Domain

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                        STATE OF FLORIDA
                       _____________________________

                              Case No. 6D23-1415
                     Lower Tribunal No. 2018-DR-011064-O
                       _____________________________

                              LOUIS ROMAN OROSCO,

                                    Appellant,
                                         v.

               MIGUEL A. RODRIGUEZ and BRITTANY NICOLE DIEHL,

                                    Appellees.
                       _____________________________

                Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County.
                           Diana M. Tennis, Judge.

                                December 15, 2023

STARGEL, J.

      Appellant, Louis Orosco, appeals the Final Judgment of Paternity adjudicating

Miguel Rodriguez, Appellee, to be the legal father of the minor child, M.A.R., and

denying the counterpetition filed jointly by Orosco and Brittany Diehl, the mother.1

We conclude that because a paternity test revealed Rodriguez was not M.A.R.’s

      1
       This case was transferred from the Fifth District Court of Appeal to this
Court on January 1, 2023.
biological father, he lacked standing to challenge the presumption of legitimacy

created by Orosco’s marriage to Diehl. Consequently, we reverse.

                                    Background

      Orosco married Diehl in 2008. Diehl conceived a child in late 2012, and

M.A.R. was born in 2013. At the time of conception, Diehl and Orosco had been

separated for several years with Orosco living out of state; yet, neither one had filed

for divorce. During one of Orosco’s trips to Florida to visit with Diehl’s older child,

he and Diehl engaged in sexual intercourse. At that time, Diehl was also in a casual,

sexual relationship with Rodriguez, and Rodriguez was unaware of Diehl’s “one-

night stand” with Orosco. Once she determined she was pregnant, Diehl informed

Rodriguez he was the father of the child. Diehl told Orosco that he was not the

father, and he believed her because he and Diehl had engaged in unprotected sex

during the course of their marriage without conceiving a child. Orosco also believed

he was divorced from Diehl as he executed “divorce papers” upon her request and

delivered them to her sometime prior to 2013, but he was unaware Diehl did not

initiate divorce proceedings. Rodriguez mistakenly believed that Diehl and Orosco

were divorced as well. At the time of birth, Rodriguez signed M.A.R.’s birth

certificate and acknowledged paternity. Diehl indicated on the birth certificate

application that she was a single woman even though she was still married to Orosco.

      At some point, the relationship between Diehl and Rodriguez broke down,

and Rodriguez filed a Petition to Determine Paternity on or about August 22, 2018.

                                          2
A paternity test was conducted shortly thereafter, and the results ruled out Rodriguez

as the father of M.A.R.      Subsequently, Diehl filed a Motion for Joinder of

Indispensable Party seeking to add Orosco as a party respondent, claiming she was

married to Orosco at the time of conception and the birth of M.A.R. and that he is

the legal father. A joint Counterpetition to Determine Paternity and for Related

Relief was filed by Diehl and Orosco after a paternity test was conducted and

confirmed Orosco as the biological father of M.A.R. Following a trial in the matter,

the lower court found there were competing presumptions, and the best interests of

the child would be served by establishing paternity in favor of Rodriguez under

section 742.10, Florida Statutes (2018). As such, a final judgment was entered

finding Rodriguez is M.A.R.’s legal father, and Diehl and Orosco’s counterpetition

was denied. This appeal follows.

                                      Analysis

      Whether Rodriguez has standing to challenge paternity is reviewed under the

de novo standard. See Ransom v. Grant-Van Brocklin, 326 So. 3d 164, 166 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2021) (“Standing is a pure question of law and therefore must be reviewed de

novo.” (citing Sanchez v. Century Everglades, LLC, 946 So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2006))). Further, a trial court’s interpretation and application of a statute is

                                          3
reviewed de novo. McGovern v. Clark, 298 So. 3d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020)

(citing B.Y. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 887 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004)).

      The trial court found there were competing presumptions of paternity—a

presumption in favor of Rodriguez pursuant to section 742.10, and a common law

presumption of legitimacy in favor of Orosco as a result of his continuing marriage

to Diehl. Finding that Rodriguez was the only meaningful father the child has ever

known, the trial court determined that the best interests of the child would be served

by establishing him as the child’s legal father.

      Section 742.10, titled “Establishment of paternity for children born out of

wedlock,” reads, in pertinent part as follows:

             If an adjudicatory proceeding was not held, a notarized
             voluntary acknowledgment of paternity or voluntary
             acknowledgment of paternity, which is witnessed by two
             individuals and signed under penalty of perjury as
             specified by s. 92.525(2), creates a rebuttable
             presumption, as defined by s. 90.304, of paternity and is
             subject to the right of any signatory to rescind the
             acknowledgment within 60 days after the date the
             acknowledgment was signed or the date of an
             administrative or judicial proceeding relating to the child,
             including a proceeding to establish a support order, in
             which the signatory is a party, whichever is earlier.

                    ....

             After the 60-day period referred to in subsection (1), a
             signed voluntary acknowledgment of paternity shall
             constitute an establishment of paternity and may be
             challenged in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or
             material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the
             challenger, and under which the legal responsibilities,

                                          4
             including child support obligations of any signatory
             arising from the acknowledgment may not be suspended
             during the challenge, except upon a finding of good cause
             by the court.

§ 742.10(1), (4) (emphasis added). Although Rodriguez signed the birth certificate

and voluntarily acknowledged paternity at the time the child was born in 2013, Diehl

was still married to Orosco. A statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning

when its language is clear and unambiguous. Maloy v. Seminole Cnty., 264 So. 3d

370, 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). The first sentence of section 742.10 states “this

chapter provides the primary jurisdiction and procedures for the determination of

paternity for children born out of wedlock.” (emphasis added). M.A.R. was not born

out of wedlock.2

      Even though it was undisputed that Orosco and Diehl were still married, the

trial court found that the marriage between Diehl and Orosco was “the least intact

marriage possible, short of filing for a divorce.” However, section 742.10 does not

carve out an exception that would apply to children born during a damaged or failing

marriage. Simply put, “[a]n intact marriage has been described as ‘the existence of

a marriage without the pendency of divorce proceedings.’” Nevitt v. Bonomo, 53 So.

      2
         Section 382.013(2)(a), Florida Statutes, requires “the name of the husband
shall be entered on the birth certificate as the father of the child, unless paternity has
been determined otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction.” This was not done
because Diehl, either fraudulently or mistakenly, represented herself on the birth
certificate application as a single woman. While the trial court found Diehl
fraudulently represented herself as a single woman, whether it was a mistake or fraud
does not change the analysis here.

                                            5
3d 1078, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Lander v. Smith, 906 So. 2d 1130, 1134

(Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). There were no divorce proceedings pending between Diehl

and Orosco at that time; therefore the marriage was intact. Although both Orosco

and Rodriguez may have believed Diehl was divorced from Orosco, the fact remains

that she was not. As such, section 742.10 is inapplicable, and a presumption of

legitimacy exists as a result of Orosco and Diehl’s marriage.

      Still, a child’s biological father has standing to rebut the presumption of

legitimacy when he has manifested a substantial and continuing concern for the

welfare of the child, and the presumption is overcome when there is a clear and

compelling reason based primarily on the child’s best interests. Simmonds v.

Perkins, 247 So. 3d 397, 398 (Fla. 2018); see also Kendrick v. Everheart, 390 So.

2d 53, 61 (Fla. 1980). The distinction here is that Rodriguez is not M.A.R.’s

biological father; consequently, there is no established pathway for him to make a

claim for paternity. See, e.g., Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 59-61 (Fla. 2d DCA

2015) (“[T]hose who claim parentage on some basis other than biology or legal

status do not have the same rights, including the right to visitation, as the biological

or legal parents. . . . [I]f the definition of a parent is to be expanded to fit facts such

as those in this appeal . . . then a policy change of this magnitude must be instituted

by the legislature, not the courts.”); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla.

4th DCA 1999) (holding that a “psychological parent” did not have standing to seek

judicial intervention for custody or visitation).

                                            6
      Orosco, as the mother’s husband, was established as the child’s legal father

without the need for any adjudication of the fact of fatherhood. See Simmonds, 247

So. 3d at 402 (“Indeed, the presumption [of legitimacy] still serves at least one

important function that it served at common law: giving children born to intact

marriages legal fathers without the need for any adjudication of the fact of

fatherhood.” (citing G.F.C. v. S.G., 686 So. 2d 1382, 1384-85 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997))).

Pursuant to section 742.12(4), in any proceeding to establish paternity, “[i]f the test

results show the alleged father cannot be the biological father, the case shall be

dismissed with prejudice.” After being ruled out as the biological father of M.A.R.,

Rodriguez no longer had standing to pursue this paternity action and the case should

have been dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

SMITH and BROWNLEE, JJ., concur.

Andrew T. Windle, of The Windle Family Law Firm, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.

Joy R. Knight, of The Joy Law Firm, LLC, Winter Park, for Appellee, Miguel A.
Rodriguez.

No Appearance for Appellee, Brittany Nicole Diehl.

 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
             AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

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