Court Opinion

ID: 9851424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:12:25.413638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:55.708664
License: Public Domain

KAUS, J.*
I respectfully dissent. Petitioner is being made the scapegoat for the twin plagues of judicial overload and backlog—evils that were apparently well entrenched when Shakespeare had Hamlet deplore “the law’s delay.”
The situation which prevailed in Fresno at the relevant times is dramatically described by the majority. Its opinion also recognizes that it would be unreasonable to discipline a competent judge whose workload or temporary disability made prompt decision of all matters submitted to him impossible. It further notes, correctly, that while delay may well bring the judicial office into disrepute, individual judges must not be held responsible “when that *486delay is the product of an overburdened and underfunded court.” Finally— with one possible caveat—the majority goes out of its way to note that petitioner worked as hard as he could, which, it seems, was a good deal harder than the public had a right to expect of even the most conscientious public servant.
Why then is petitioner being disciplined?1
The majority chides petitioner for not assigning priorities to the submitted cases—a practice which, it surmises, would have minimized the impact of delay. Having apparently reviewed all 14 cases, the majority is able to cite only one—No. 12, O. v. O.—as a simple case which a system of priorities would have promoted to the head of the line. The fact is that O. v. O. was third from last to be submitted and was decided ahead of three cases which had been submitted earlier. (See majority opn., fn. 4.) Apparently it was considered on a priority basis.2 Nowhere is there any suggestion that all 14 cases would have been disposed of sooner had petitioner used a different set of priorities.
The only other criticism voiced by the majority is that petitioner, in spite of physical and emotional difficulties, did not seek relief, “even to the extent of withdrawing temporarily or permanently from the functions of his office.” (Ante, p. 485.) Applied to this case, it is difficult to take this reprimand seriously. The record fairly reeks with petitioner’s efforts to seek relief. As far as “withdrawing” from the functions of his office is concerned, there is nothing in the record to suggest that such drastic action would have done anything for the 14 cases under consideration except to cause further delay. In any event, is a judge who does the best he can under trying personal conditions to be disciplined for not choosing the perfect moment to grant himself a leave of absence or to retire?
As the majority recognizes, unlike justices of the Court of Appeal who can look to rule 22.5 of the California Rules of Court for guidance in *487applying the “90 day rule,” trial court judges currently have no rule to consult in determining how to deal with the problems resulting from an understaffed bench and an overcrowded docket. Although the adoption of an explicit schedule of priorities—which the majority suggests—may well be a sensible approach, before today’s decision no authority made it clear that the failure to establish such a schedule would itself be grounds for discipline. Trial judges—no less than other mortals—need to know what rules apply and should not be disciplined for failing to follow rules before they are promulgated.
I dissent.
Reynoso, J., concurred.

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

I am particularly shocked that the majority has opted for public censure rather than private admonishment. I realize that in spite of the procedures adopted by us in Gubler v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1985) 37 Cal.3d 27, 62 [207 Cal.Rptr. 171, 688 P.2d 551], private admonishment is private in name only. Nevertheless, its imposition obviously implies a lesser degree of culpability than public censure.

In criticizing petitioner for not giving “precedence to resubmitted cases over cases tried subsequent to the original submission” of the older cases (ante, p. 484), the majority loses sight of the fact that petitioner did request “chambers time” to work on the earlier submitted cases, but that because of the court’s criminal caseload deadlines the presiding judge was not able to afford petitioner the time that was needed but instead assigned him to hear more current cases.