Court Opinion

ID: 9855246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:21:34.199928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:19.704212
License: Public Domain

Judge Wynn
concurring.
I agree with part III of the majority opinion, and concur in the result of the majority opinion reversing and remanding for a new trial. I disagree, however, with part I of the majority opinion, and I write separately to address this issue since it is likely to recur on retrial.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 412(b) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution unless such behavior:
(3) Is evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely resembling the defendant’s version of the alleged encounter with the complainant as to tend to prove that such complainant consented to the act or acts charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the complainant consented ....
Rule 412(b)(3) allows admission of evidence of a pattern of behavior by the complainant which closely resembles the defendant’s version of the encounter, and tends to prove that the acts were consensual. Mr. Ginyard proffered the testimony of Oscar Mitchell and Melvin Wardrick that the complainant offered them sexual favors in exchange for crack cocaine. The majority upheld the trial court’s *36exclusion of this evidence on the ground that it was not evidence of a pattern of distinctive behavior. I disagree with this conclusion.
I believe that this case is controlled by State v. Shoffner, 62 N.C. App. 245, 302 S.E.2d 830 (1983). In Shoffner, this Court reversed the trial court’s exclusion of evidence that “[t]he prosecuting witness modus operandi was to accost men at clubs, parties (public places) and make sexual advances by putting her hands ‘all over their bodies.’ ” Id. at 248, 302 S.E.2d at 833.
Similarly, the evidence offered by Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Wardrick, if believed, shows that the complainant’s modus operandi is to offer men sexual favors in exchange for crack cocaine. This evidence is admissible to show either that the complainant consented to the acts charged, or acted in such a manner that the defendant reasonably believed that the complainant consented.
The majority’s reading of Rule 412(b)(3) and our case law interpreting it places a nearly impossible burden on defendants seeking to introduce evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior on the part of the complainant which is distinctive and closely resembles the defendant’s version of the encounter. Under the majority’s rationale, a defendant would be required to offer an unclear but significant number of prior acts in order to establish a pattern. The witnesses of such acts will often be difficult, if not impossible, to find. Under my understanding of Rule 412(b)(3), the more distinctive the alleged behavior of the complainant, the fewer the number of instances necessary to prove that a pattern exists. The majority relies upon State v. Rhinehart, 68 N.C. App. 615, 316 S.E.2d 118 (1984) for the proposition that the defendant must set forth more than a “few isolated instances” of sexual conduct to establish a pattern. Clearly, the complainant’s alleged actions in the instant case were more distinctive than those of the complainant in Rhinehart. In Rhinehart, the evidence indicated that the complainant had consensual sex with a former boyfriend earner that evening, and danced and talked with the defendant before the assault. This is hardly a distinctive pattern. In contrast, proffered witnesses in the instant case alleged that the complainant traded sex for crack cocaine. This behavior is far more distinctive, and far more suggestive of a pattern than the behavior in Rhinehart.