Court Opinion

ID: 9384566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 13:10:03.93731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.320289
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Huff, Fulton and White
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued by videoconference

              RONNY L. JERNIGAN
                                                                               MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.      Record No. 0259-22-1                                        JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
                                                                                     APRIL 4, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                              FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
                                                James C. Lewis, Judge

                                Kristin Paulding (7 Cities Law, on brief), for appellant.

                                David A. Mick, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                                Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                      On September 1, 2021, in the City of Virginia Beach Circuit Court (the “trial court”), Ronny

              L. Jernigan (“appellant”) was convicted of forcible sodomy, robbery, and abduction with intent to

              defile for the November 6, 1992 attack on D.M.1 He now appeals those convictions to this Court.

              He first assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based on the

              Commonwealth’s 26-year delay in indicting him. He also contends that the trial court erred in

              denying his motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of his constitutional right to a speedy

              trial during a year-and-four-month delay from April 2020 to August 2021. Finally, he argues there

              was insufficient evidence to convict him of forcible sodomy, robbery, and abduction with intent to

              defile. Finding no error, this Court affirms each of appellant’s convictions.

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
                      1
                          Initials are used to protect the privacy of the victim.
                                            BACKGROUND

        This Court views “the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

prevailing party at trial” and “accord[s] the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly

deducible from the evidence.” Morrisette v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 386, 389 (2002).

        On November 6, 1992, around 7:30 p.m., D.M. was leaving a Video Express in Virginia

Beach when a man approached her from behind and put a knife to her throat. He ordered her into

the passenger seat of her car, and he sat in the driver’s seat. He then drove to a church parking lot

where he ordered D.M. to take off her clothes and perform fellatio on him. After he ejaculated, he

commanded D.M.—still unclothed—to exit the car and lie face down on the pavement as he drove

off in her car.

        She quickly ran to a nearby house, and the occupants called the police. The police escorted

D.M. to the hospital where a doctor and nurse used a physical evidence recovery kit (“PERK”)2 to

collect foreign DNA from D.M.’s lips and lip area. D.M. described her attacker as a 5’10” white

male with a medium muscular build, possibly a mustache and scruffy beard, and a tattoo depicting

flowers or a snake on his right forearm. She admitted, however, that she did not closely study her

attacker because he ordered her not to look and she feared for her life.

        Police found D.M.’s stolen car later that night, and a forensic specialist recovered

fingerprints. Upon receipt of her car from the police, D.M. discovered that the clothes she had worn

during the attack were still in the car, so she turned them over to the police. Miriam Vanty, a

forensic biologist, tested the foreign DNA from both the clothes and the PERK using the only

available technique at the time: restriction fragment length polymorphism. This technique requires

        2
          To collect DNA using a PERK, a doctor and nurse will first examine then swab the
victim’s body. Each swab is placed in a labeled tube and preserved individually. The hospital
staff places the swabs in the PERK box and seals the box upon completion. After sealing the
PERK, the staff gives it to law enforcement who keep it refrigerated.
                                              -2-
significantly more DNA than the polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”) technique typically used

today. Vanty could not develop a foreign DNA profile from the small amount of recovered DNA.

Officers then returned D.M.’s clothes to her.

        The detective assigned to the case, Detective David Ford, developed a list of eight or nine

suspects. Ford investigated appellant as one of those suspects based on a Crime Solvers tip that

appellant matched the attacker’s description. When talking to appellant the day after the assault,

Ford noted that appellant did in fact fit D.M.’s description because he had a stocky, muscular build,

a mustache, and tattoos. However, appellant’s tattoos were on his left arm rather than the right, and

he was 5’5” rather than 5’10”.

        During Ford’s questioning, appellant admitted to having rented from the Video Express in

the past and driving by the Video Express around 2:30 p.m. on the day of the attack to pick up a

check from his employer. Appellant claimed he was at church that night. Ford never confirmed

this alibi. In the fall of 1993, Ford asked appellant to provide a DNA sample, but appellant

declined. Shortly thereafter, Ford transferred to the narcotics division, leaving the case to be

reassigned.

        The case went cold until 2016 when Detective Angela Murphy reopened it. Although many

pieces of evidence were missing upon reopening the case,3 the PERK had been preserved, so

        3
          The following pieces of evidence could not be found in 2016: the crime scene search
report, D.M.’s clothing worn on the night of the attack, which had been returned to her, a lab
request for the clothes, a news release of the attack, the latent fingerprint sheet, a pawn sheet
tracking any items sold by a different suspect named David Holmes, D.M.’s written statement,
Holmes’s written statement, the outcome of a photo lineup including Holmes, a transcript of
D.M.’s taped statement, a credit card receipt from Big Lots of a purchase subsequent to the
attack made with D.M.’s stolen credit card, a copy of D.M.’s driver’s license, the receipts from
Video Express, and Ford’s investigative notes. Appellant only identified this evidence as being
lost between the offense and reopening the case. He does not point to any evidence that was lost
after his indictment.

                                                 -3-
Murphy sent the kit to be tested with the new PCR technology.4 Vanty could now develop a DNA

profile separate from D.M.’s to compare against suspects’ DNA. Based on the new DNA evidence,

Murphy eliminated two previous suspects before testing appellant’s DNA in February of 2017.

        After comparing the foreign DNA profile to appellant’s, appellant could not “be eliminated

as a contributor of the DNA.” When the DNA from the lip sample and lip area sample were run

separately, the odds of randomly selecting a matching DNA profile was “1 in 5.4 billion in the

Caucasian population.” When the samples from the lip and lip area were run together, the

probability of randomly selecting a matching DNA profile increased to 1 in 7.2 billion5 among all

ethnic populations.

        The Commonwealth indicted appellant on April 3, 2017, and arrested him on February 26,

2018. The initial trial date was set for April 25, 2018. From April 25, 2018, to April 28, 2020,

appellant moved to continue the case at least six times and caused the trial to be rescheduled on

other occasions. Appellant requested his first continuance because he had been diagnosed with

pre-Alzheimer’s disease and was waiting for results from a court-ordered mental health evaluation.

Between the last motion to continue on January 13, 2020, and the rescheduled trial date of April 28,

2020, the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States.

        The Virginia Supreme Court issued its first COVID-19 emergency order on March 16,

2020, restricting “jury trials, subject to a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.” Order Declaring a

Judicial Emergency in Response to COVID-19 Emergency, 1 (Va. Mar. 16, 2020).6 The Court then

        4
            PCR amplifies DNA so that a profile can be developed from an extremely small sample.
        5
         The odds were actually greater than one in 7.2 billion, but the laboratory capped the
odds at the world’s population at the time of the test.

       Further references to the Supreme Court’s first order and ensuing orders are to
        6

“emergency order” or “EDO of [date].” See EDO of Apr. 22, 2020, at 1 (referring to the
Supreme Court’s first three orders “collectively . . . as the ‘Emergency Declaration Orders’”).
                                               -4-
twice extended this judicial emergency through May 17, 2020, overriding appellant’s scheduled trial

date. See EDO of Apr. 22, 2020, at 1.

        Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court pushed appellant’s case from April 28,

2020, to May 19, 2020. But on May 6, the Supreme Court suspended all criminal jury trials until

June 7, 2020. See EDO of May 6, 2020, at 5. So, on May 18, the parties agreed to a new trial date

of October 27, 2020.

        The trial court received approval to restart jury trials on September 28, 2020, in accordance

with the Supreme Court’s June 22 emergency order. See EDO of June 22, 2020, at 5-6.

Unfortunately, the trial court closed October 26 to October 30, 2020, because of a COVID-19

outbreak. The court consequently rescheduled appellant’s trial for May 17, 2021. But when there

were not enough jury slots on May 17, the parties agreed to continue the case to August 30, 2021.

        Appellant filed a motion to dismiss on May 13, 2021, asserting that the Commonwealth had

violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. He alleged that the delay starting April 28, 2020,

was presumptively too long and that it prejudiced him because his health declined and witnesses’

memories faded. The court denied the motion but gave appellant priority on the docket for August

30.

        Appellant’s jury trial began on August 30, 2021. D.M. testified and could recount the

events that occurred on the night of the attack, but she had trouble remembering certain details, such

as the attacker’s statements during the drive to the parking lot and the name of the Video Express.

After three days, the jury found appellant guilty of one count of forcible sodomy, one count of

robbery, and one count of abduction with intent to defile. He received three life sentences.

                                               ANALYSIS

        Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss because the

Commonwealth violated his due process rights by waiting 26 years to indict him and also violated

                                                  -5-
his constitutional right to a speedy trial by delaying his trial during the pandemic. He finally alleges

that the trial court erred in failing to set aside the verdict because of insufficient evidence to prove

he was D.M.’s attacker. This Court affirms the trial court’s judgment and upholds appellant’s

convictions.

                                        I. Pre-Indictment Delay

        Appellant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss because

the 26-year pre-indictment delay violated his due process rights. This Court reviews such

constitutional issues de novo. Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 119 (2005). “[T]he Court is

bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact unless they are plainly wrong or without

evidence to support them.” McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198 (1997) (en banc).

        “[T]o gain dismissal of criminal charges because of pre-arrest or pre-indictment delay, a

defendant must establish that ‘(1) the prosecutor intentionally delayed indicting [the defendant] to

gain a tactical advantage and (2) the defendant incurred actual prejudice as a result of the delay.’”

Morrisette, 264 Va. at 393 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Amuny, 767 F.2d

1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1985)). “The defendant bears the burden of proving both actual prejudice and

improper purpose.” Id. Therefore, if the defendant does not demonstrate that the prosecution

intentionally delayed indictment to gain a tactical advantage, this Court need not reach the question

of whether the defendant incurred actual prejudice. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App.

704, 712 (2006).

        Here, appellant contends that the Commonwealth gained a tactical advantage by letting the

case go cold in the 1990s to allow DNA technology to advance. Appellant argues that Detective

Ford intentionally failed to verify appellant’s alibi, obtain a search warrant for appellant’s DNA,

compare appellant’s fingerprints to those found in the car, and show appellant’s tattoos to D.M.

during the investigation in the 1990s. That way, when DNA technology did develop, any other

                                                   -6-
circumstantial evidence about appellant’s whereabouts on November 6, 1992, would have

disappeared.

        Appellant’s argument is unconvincing. The Commonwealth could not know that DNA

technology would advance to the point that the small amount of DNA evidence recovered from the

PERK would become useful. The Commonwealth is not so prescient. The evidence instead

suggests that Ford investigated several suspects, including appellant, but never gathered enough

evidence to make an arrest. When Ford transferred to a different division, no one else continued

investigating the case, leaving it unsolved. The Commonwealth did not intentionally delay in

indicting appellant; it merely could not indict until it had sufficient evidence. That sufficient

evidence came in 2016 with the advancement of DNA technology.

        Because appellant failed to establish intentional delay, this Court does not address whether

appellant suffered actual prejudice. This Court affirms the trial court’s judgment in denying

appellant’s motion to dismiss for intentional pre-indictment delay.

                                    II. Constitutional Speedy Trial

        Next, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss because

the delays during the pandemic violated his constitutional right7 to a speedy trial under both the

United States and Virginia Constitutions. Appellant does not challenge the delays from February

28, 2018, to April 28, 2020, which came at his request, but instead challenges only those delays

from April 28, 2020, to August 30, 2021.

        Constitutional speedy-trial challenges “present questions of law reviewed de novo on

appeal.” Ali v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 16, 33 (2022). “To the extent such review involves

        7
          Appellant alleges only a constitutional violation, not a violation of his statutory speedy
trial right under Code § 19.2-243.
                                                -7-
underlying factual findings, those findings may not be disturbed unless ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘without

evidence to support them.’” Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 2, 7 (2016)).

        The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “Virginia’s constitutional

speedy trial right is coextensive with the federal right,” so the two claims may be analyzed as one.

Ali, 75 Va. App. at 34. This Court must balance four factors: (1) the “[l]ength of delay,” (2) “the

reason for the delay,” (3) “the defendant’s assertion of his right,” (4) “and prejudice to the

defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). “On appeal, a defendant must establish

that ‘on balance,’ the factors ‘weigh in his favor.’” Ali, 75 Va. App. at 35 (quoting United States v.

Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 148 (4th Cir. 1995)).

                                 A. Barker’s Four Speedy Trial Factors

                                           1. Length of Delay

        “The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism.” Barker, 407 U.S. at

530. “If the ensuing ‘delay . . . [was] “so protracted as to be presumptively prejudicial,” the first

factor . . . necessitates inquiry in the other factors that go into the balance.’” Miller v.

Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 625, 632-33 (1999) (first and second alterations in original) (quoting

Beacham v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 124, 131 (1990)). “It is well established that delay

‘approach[ing] one year’ is ‘presumptively prejudicial’ and requires further review.” Ali, 75

Va. App. at 35 (alteration in original) (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1

(1992)). “The delay is calculated from the time of arrest.” Id.

        Here, appellant challenges only the delay from April 28, 2020, to August 30, 2021—a time

span of approximately 1 year and 4 months, or 489 days. Because the length of this delay is

presumptively prejudicial, it triggers a full analysis of the other Barker factors.

                                                   -8-
                                        2. Reason for the Delay

        Under the second factor—reason for the delay—a court must determine two things: first,

what delay is attributable to the Commonwealth, and second, if any Commonwealth delay is

justifiable. Beacham, 10 Va. App. at 131-32. A continuance is attributable to the defendant if he

requests it or agrees to it. See, e.g., Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009) (requested

continuance); Arnold v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 218, 223 (1994) (agreed to a continuance).

        After attributing delay either to the Commonwealth or the defendant, the court must

determine if any Commonwealth delay is justifiable. Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 763, 767

(1978). There are three categories of delay—deliberate, negligent, and valid—and each is weighted

differently. A deliberate delay “to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the

government.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. A negligent delay, “such as . . . overcrowded courts[,]

should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate

responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.”

Id. “Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.”

Id.

        Certain routine delays8 are attributable to the Commonwealth in the “ordinary course of the

administration of justice.” Ali, 75 Va. App. at 37. When delay in the ordinary course of the

administration of justice is not caused “intentionally or negligently,” it is justified as “valid and

unavoidable.” Id. at 45. This Court has also determined that “delay due to the pandemic [i]s valid,

unavoidable, and outside the Commonwealth’s control.” Id. Thus, both delays in the ordinary

course of the administration of justice and delays caused by the pandemic are fully justified.

        8
          This type of delay would include, for example, the time between a defendant’s arrest
and first court appearance. See generally Ali, 75 Va. App. at 37.
                                                -9-
                                      a. Apportionment of Delay

        Here, appellant contends that the Commonwealth delayed his trial for an extra year and four

months during the pandemic. From March 16, 2020, to May 6, 2020, the Supreme Court limited

jury trials but did not stop them outright. Because jury trials could still be held from April 28 to

May 6, this eight-day period is attributable to the Commonwealth in the ordinary course.

        The Supreme Court halted all jury trials on May 6. The Commonwealth could not be

expected to hold jury trials in contravention of the Supreme Court’s orders, so delays during this

prohibition period are attributable to the Commonwealth due to the pandemic. In this case,

appellant did not agree to the 12-day delay from May 6, 2020, to May 18, 2020, so it is attributable

to the Commonwealth rather than to appellant.

        On May 18, appellant agreed to reschedule the trial until October 27, 2020. Accordingly—

even though the trial court received approval of its jury trial resumption plan on September 28,

2020—the 162-day period from May 18 to October 27 is attributable to appellant.9

        The trial court closed the week of October 27 because of a COVID-19 outbreak, so it

rescheduled appellant’s case to the next available trial date of May 17, 2021. The 202-day period

between those dates is attributable to the Commonwealth due to the pandemic. See id. at 41

(distinguishing between delays in the ordinary course and those due to the pandemic when

attributing delays to the Commonwealth). On May 17, 2021, the parties agreed to continue the case

to August 30. Because appellant agreed to this 105-day delay, it is attributable to him rather than

the Commonwealth.

        9
         If appellant had not agreed to this continuance, the period from May 6, 2020, to
September 18, 2020, would be attributable to the Commonwealth due to the pandemic, and the
period from September 18, 2020, to October 27, 2020, would be attributable to the
Commonwealth in the ordinary course.
                                               - 10 -
        In sum, out of the 489-day delay from April 28, 2020, to August 30, 2021, 267 days are

attributable to appellant, 8 days are attributable to the Commonwealth in the ordinary course, and

214 days are attributable to the Commonwealth due to the pandemic.

                       b. Justification for Delay Attributed to Commonwealth

        Of the 222 days attributable to the Commonwealth, all are fully justified.

        Delay in the ordinary course of administration of justice is typically valid and justified if not

caused intentionally or negligently. Id. at 45. Here, there is no evidence or allegation that the

Commonwealth intentionally delayed appellant’s trial to gain some sort of tactical advantage or

prevent appellant from preparing his case. There also is nothing to suggest that the Commonwealth

acted negligently. The period of delay attributable to the Commonwealth for delay in the ordinary

course is only eight days. This short length of time suggests that the Commonwealth attempted to

promptly hold appellant’s trial when not precluded from doing so by the pandemic and therefore

was not negligent.

        Because preventing the “‘spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling

[governmental] interest,’” the delays due to the pandemic are also justified. Id. at 43 (alteration in

original) (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67-68 (2020) (per

curiam)). The Commonwealth did not act improperly by promoting the health and safety of judicial

personnel, who could have been exposed to COVID-19 if trials continued during the height of the

pandemic or the local breakout in October 2021.

        For these reasons, all delays attributable to the Commonwealth are justified. None count in

favor of appellant.

                                        3. Assertion of the Right

        “The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right . . . is entitled to strong evidentiary

weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.” Barker, 407 U.S. at

                                                  - 11 -
531-32. A defendant’s assertion weighs less in his favor if the Commonwealth tries him soon after

he asserts his right to a speedy trial. See Shavin v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 256, 270 (1993).

Similarly, a defendant’s assertion “deserves less weight than that to which it would have been

entitled if he had raised it . . . at a time before the pandemic severely limited the possibility that he

could be tried promptly.” Ali, 75 Va. App. at 46.

         Rather than asserting his right to a speedy trial soon after the COVID-19 pandemic began,

appellant waited until May 13, 2021. Although the trial court had received approval to resume jury

trials in September 2020, the pandemic continued to affect daily life and judicial administration well

into 2021. Appellant’s assertion deserves less weight because he acted over a year after the

Supreme Court’s first emergency order.

         Additionally, appellant agreed to continue the case to August 30, 2021, after he asserted his

right to a speedy trial. A defendant seriously impaired by delay likely would not have agreed to

wait three more months to have his case heard. Furthermore, the trial court responded to his

assertion by giving the case priority on the docket for August. And he was indeed tried August 30,

2021, after the court prioritized his case.

         Given those considerations, appellant’s assertion of his right does not weigh heavily in his

favor.

                                     4. Prejudice to the Defendant

         Appellant claims the post-indictment delay prejudiced him because the delay took a toll on

his health as he was already 64 years old when it began. Appellant also claims that the delays

prejudiced him because, with each passing year, witnesses’ memories faded. He points to M.D.’s

lapses of memory during her testimony as an example.

         The constitutional speedy trial right protects three main interests: “(i) to prevent oppressive

pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the

                                                  - 12 -
possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Harris v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 576, 586 (1999)

(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). “Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a

defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id. (quoting

Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).

        “[I]f the Commonwealth bears no fault in the delay and proceeds ‘with reasonable

diligence,’ then the defendant’s ‘speedy trial claim w[ill] fail . . . as a matter of course however great

the delay, so long as [the defendant cannot] show specific prejudice.’” Ali, 75 Va. App. at 47

(second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656). “To prove

specific prejudice under the third interest (limiting the possibility of impairing the defense), a

defendant must show ‘in what specific manner’ factors such as missing witnesses, missing

evidence, or improved access to counsel ‘would have [impaired or] aided the defense.’” Id. at 49

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Medina, 918 F.3d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 2019)). To

show specific prejudice for the first two interests, appellant “must establish a particularly prolonged

or restrictive period of incarceration or a level of anxiety exceeding that faced by others awaiting

trial.” Id. at 48.

        As to the third interest—preventing impairment of the defense—appellant has not

articulated specifically how the delay impaired his defense. He primarily argues that witnesses’

memories faded over the year and four months of pandemic delay yet cites only to M.D.’s

testimony.

        Appellant fails to show that M.D.’s memory faded during the year and four months of

pandemic delay rather than the 26-year delay between the offense and arrest. He also does not

explain any specific way in which M.D.’s lapses in her memory impaired his defense. He merely

claims that her inability to remember certain details demonstrates how other witnesses similarly

must have forgotten details over the period of delay. However, he has not identified any witnesses

                                                  - 13 -
who would have testified on his behalf in 2020 but could not in 2021 because of either a faded

memory or an unavailability to testify.

          Furthermore, appellant fails to specify evidence that either he or the Commonwealth lost

from April 28, 2020, to August 30, 2021.10 Nor has appellant explained how his failing health and

pre-Alzheimer’s diagnosis prejudiced him in preparing his defense. Appellant does not claim that

his declining health during this period prevented him from consulting with legal counsel.

          Just as with impairment of the defense, appellant must show specific prejudice under the

first two claims of oppressive pre-trial incarceration and increased anxiety and concern. Appellant

fails to explain with particularity how his declining health or the lapses in witnesses’ memories

prejudiced him. Therefore, appellant fails to establish any specific prejudice under this fourth

factor.

                                          B. Overall Assessment

          The delay from April 28, 2020, to August 30, 2021, a total of 489 days, is presumptively

prejudicial under the first Barker factor, triggering an analysis of the other three factors. “None of

the factors is either ‘necessary or sufficient’ to finding a violation.” Id. at 35 (quoting Kelley v.

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 540, 544 (1994)). Rather, “they are related factors that ‘must be

considered together with . . . other [relevant] circumstances.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting

Kelley, 17 Va. App. at 544). In weighing the factors together, this Court holds that appellant’s

constitutional speedy trial right was not violated.

          Of the 489-day delay, 222 days are attributable to the Commonwealth: of these, 8 days are

attributable in the ordinary course and 214 days are attributable due to the pandemic. The delays in

          10
          While the evidence missing from the file upon reopening the case may be relevant to
appellant’s first and third assignments of error, the missing evidence is not relevant to appellant’s
claim of prejudice because the Commonwealth lost the evidence before the post-indictment
delays began.
                                                - 14 -
the ordinary course of administration of justice are fully justified because appellant offers no

evidence that the Commonwealth intentionally or negligently caused them. And the 214 days of

delay due to the pandemic are fully justified because of an overriding concern for public health.

This factor weighs against appellant’s claims because it leaves no unjustified Commonwealth

delays.

          Nor does the third Barker factor weigh in favor of appellant. He did not assert his right until

May 13, 2021—over a year after the Supreme Court’s first emergency order in response to the

COVID-19 pandemic—when the trial court was unable to try him quickly due to public health

concerns. Even so, the trial court responded to appellant’s assertion by prioritizing his trial at the

next available trial date of August 30, 2021. Given appellant’s delayed assertion and the trial

court’s prompt response, this factor does not weigh in favor of appellant. Appellant’s assertion is

even less convincing when considering that he agreed to continue the case after invoking his right to

a speedy trial.

          Finally, appellant has not shown specific prejudice under the fourth Barker factor.

Appellant fails to mention specific witnesses he would have called but could no longer call because

of faded memories or intervening deaths during the delay. Although he points to M.D.’s testimony

as evidence that other witnesses’ memories must have faded too, he has not established that her

memory faded during the period of delay in question or that her lapses in memory prejudiced his

defense in any way. Nor does he allege with specificity how his declining health over the pandemic

delay prejudiced him either by preventing him from preparing his defense or by contributing to

oppressive incarceration and anxiety.

          When taken together, none of the factors weigh in favor of appellant, so this Court holds that

appellant’s right to a constitutional speedy trial was not violated.

                                                  - 15 -
                                   III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

        Finally, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to set aside

the verdict because there was insufficient evidence to prove his identity as the one who committed

forcible sodomy, robbery, and abduction with intent to defile.

        “On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘the judgment of the trial court is presumed

correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’”

Ingram v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 59, 76 (2021) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296

Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “The question on appeal, is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Yoder v.

Commonwealth, 298 Va. 180, 182 (2019)).

        Appellant argues that no reasonable trier of fact could have identified him as M.D.’s attacker

based on the evidence presented. He points to the fact that the Commonwealth lost all evidence

except the PERK, so the jury had to decide his innocence or guilt without a full picture of the facts,

including a potential alibi defense. He also emphasizes that M.D. never identified him as her

attacker; rather, the Commonwealth primarily relied on DNA evidence to place him at the scene of

the crime. He alleges this evidence is insufficient to establish his identity as M.D.’s attacker.

        This Court does not agree. Here, a jury could reasonably find that appellant was guilty

based on the DNA evidence. When the two foreign DNA samples were run separately, the odds of

finding a matching DNA profile were “1 in 5.4 billion in the Caucasian population.” When the two

foreign DNA samples were run together, the odds of finding a matching DNA profile were 1 out of

the world’s population, which at the time was 7.2 billion.

        Although appellant was 5’5” rather than 5’10” and his tattoos were on the left arm rather

than his right, M.D. feared for her life and abstained from studying her attacker’s appearance after

he warned her not to look. Moreover, appellant matched M.D.’s eyewitness description closely

                                                 - 16 -
enough to warrant a citizen to provide law enforcement with a Crime Solvers tip that appellant fit

the attacker’s description. A reasonable jury could consider and resolve the slight inconsistencies

between M.D.’s description and appellant’s appearance in light of the DNA evidence and still

determine that appellant was M.D.’s attacker. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 388, 395

(2008) (explaining that the standard of review for insufficiency claims “gives full play to the

responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony” (quoting Kelly v.

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257-58 (2003) (en banc)). This Court accordingly affirms the

trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside the verdict.

                                              CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms appellant’s convictions of forcible sodomy,

robbery, and abduction with intent to defile.

                                                                                                 Affirmed.

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