Court Opinion

ID: 9757843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:01:18.108436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:44.836897
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, Judge,
dissenting:
While the careful analysis reflected by the opinion of the learned auditing judge is quite persuasive and the opinion of my eminent colleagues on this court is most compelling, I most respectfully dissent.
The auditing judge correctly found the ultimate sale price of $60,000,000.00 was $14,972,448.62 more than the value of the offer that a majority of the beneficiaries had agreed to accept. A study of the record leads me to the further conclusions:
That Christopher G. Kellogg, one of the beneficiaries, after a majority of the beneficiaries had found the original agreement acceptable, promptly retained counsel for assistance in an intensive campaign to thwart completion . of the original agreement.
That Christopher G. Kellogg was vigorously represented and served well in that effort by all the counsel who represented him, namely, Palmer K. Schreibert, Morton P. Rome and Edwin P. Rome.
*185That the opposition of Christopher G. Kellogg to the original agreement was the catalyst for the quite substantial one-third increase in the sale price.
I would have determined, therefore, that the estate was responsible for the payment of such counsel fees as are due Morton P. Rome and Edwin P. Rome. The majority discusses quite thoroughly the policy exception that when the effort of a litigant or lawyer creates a fund for the benefit of many, counsel fees may be recovered from that fund. That principle is but one factor in my determination. A further factor is a general notion of fairness that such fees are here more appropriately paid by the fund than by the individual whose caution and prompt retention of able counsel effected the considerable increase in the fund.