Court Opinion

ID: 9773037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:35:25.361312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.796820
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The first question posed by the Court need not be answered since the second disposes of the cause. See Lewis v. State, 711 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). But since it is, I find a different answer.
Without any doubt Duncan v. Evans, 658 S.W.2d 38 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), says exactly what the majority opinion paraphrases. However, nearly every statement of law of any significance in an appellate opinion must be considered in context of the issue was being decided and that which is not implicated. In Duncan v. Evans, supra, this Court framed an issue it felt called on to address, viz:
“What authority is available to the courts of appeals to enforce the responsibility of appointed appellate counsel for an indigent appellant to insure the filing of an appellate brief.”
Id., at 39. Patently, nothing said in Duncan touches Article 40.09, § 7 or meaning and application of the 1979 and 1981 amendments to it. See post. Indeed, every case cited in headnote [3] at page 40 was decided before those amendments were made — so also the decisions of this Court cited by the majority in this cause.
Facially, Article 40.09, § 7, V.A.C.C.P., expressly grants the trial court jurisdiction power and authority to supplement the record even after an initial appellate record has been filed in an appellate court. At issue is whether grant of authority by specific language of Article 40.09, § 7 is nullified by general language of Article 44.11, given the fact that no time limitation is included in Article 40.09, § 7 which purports to restrict supplementation to a period prior to filing any part of a record in an appellate court. A review of germane legislative developments and judicial reaction *517to illuminate reasons then given lead me to sustain the view of the court of appeals conceming authority of trial court in this respect.
As enacted in 1965 and extant in 1979, Article 44.11, V.A.C.C.P., read in pertinent part:
“Upon the appellate record being filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals, all further proceedings in the trial court, except as to bond as provided in Article 44.04 and the proceedings in Article 40.09, shall be suspended and arrested until the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is received by the trial court. * * ” 1
During that period of some fourteen years, in its relation to Article 40.09 proceedings, the underscored exception in Article 44.11 proved to be an enigma. Taken literally it meant that though an appellate record has been filed in the Court a trial court may continue to exercise authority and powers to conduct proceedings under several sections of Article 40.09. Yet, according to §§ 12 and 13 of Article 40.09, the clerk of the trial court was not to transmit to this Court the record and appellate briefs filed in the trial court until the trial judge had considered and refused to grant defendant a new trial based on appellate briefs. As demonstrated in the margin, the Court never took literally the Arti-ele 44.11 exception for proceedings under Article 40.09.2
In sum, the Court deemed proper filing an appellate record to be the event that terminated power and authority in the trial court to conduct further proceedings under Article 40.09. Phillips v. State, 429 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). Its rulings in that respect are consistent with former article 828, admitting no exceptions to effect of appeal suspending authority of trial court, e.g., Murray v. State, 116 Tex.Cr.R. 178, 31 S.W.2d 1075, 1076 (1930), and with the general rule in our criminal jurisprudence. See Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex.1972).
In one particular, however, the Court encountered some difficulty. A “proceeding” contemplated by Article 40.09 was and is “Approval of the record” prescribed by § 7. As recently noticed, the Court gave uneven treatment to propriety of its accepting “a supplemental transcript prepared to have the record speak the truth after the trial court has lost jurisdiction of the case.” Armstead v. State, 677 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1984). Note that every decision cited therein to demonstrate the point had been delivered before 1979.3 We may *518reasonably infer that some of those opinions caught a legislative eye.
By Acts 1979, 66th Leg., Ch. 324, p. 731, § 1, the Legislature amended § 7, Article 40.09, supra. The caption to S.B. No. 439 stated in part, viz:
“An Act relating to the procedure to be followed by the trial court whenever the record is supplemented or modified in any respect in order that it may speak the truth ...”
The content of the bill was confined to that single matter. Changes actually made are twofold: first, between the second and third sentences of former Article 40.09, there was inserted a new sentence (underscored below) and, second, the word “such” (bracketed herein) was deleted from the first clause of the next sentence, so that in pertinent part revised § 7 read:
“Notice of completion of the record shall be made by the clerk of the court by certified mail to the parties or their respective counsel. If neither files and presents to the court in writing any objection to the record, within fifteen days after the mailing of such notice and if the court has no objection to the record, he shall approve the same. If the trial court deems that a supplemental record or any other modification of the record be necessary to make the record speak the truth, for any reason, with or without objections from the state or the defendant, and whether on the court’s own motion or the motion of either party or by order of the Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant and the state shall be notified by certified mail of same and given five days from receipt of notice for objections to stick modification or supplementation. If [such] objection be made, or if the court fails to approve the record within five days after the expiration of such fifteen-day period, the court shall set the matter down for hearing, and, after hearing, shall enter such orders as may be appropriate to cause the record to speak the truth and the findings and adjudications in such orders, if supported by evidence, shall be final.... Such proceeding shall be included in the record, and the entire record approved by the court.”
Finally, by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., Ch. 291, p. 804, § 108, in § 7 “the court of appeals or” was inserted just before “the Court of Criminal Appeals.” In the same Act, § 129 amended Article 44.11, supra, to include “the court of appeals,” to delete “and the proceedings in Article 44.09” and changed “judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals” to read “mandate of the appellate court.”
Therefore, when the 1981 Act became effective, § 7 of Article 40.09 still retained provisions for “the procedure to be followed by the trial court whenever the record is supplemented or modified in any respect in order that it may speak the truth,” and Article 44.11 no longer prescribed an exception for “proceedings in Article 40.09.”
The problem thus presented is whether those two seemingly inconsistent developments in the same legislative act may be harmonized so that effect is given to each. See Code Construction Act, Article 5429b-2, § 3.05(b), V.A.C.S. Among courts of appeals there are divergent views and this Court has yet directly to resolve the problem authoritatively.4
*519Though awkwardly framed and placed, there can be no doubt about the clear in-tendment of the Legislature in making those 1979 amendments to § 7: to grant trial courts jurisdiction, power and authority to supplement or modify appellate records “to make the record speak the truth” pursuant to the procedure therein prescribed.5 The grant was reaffirmed in 1981 when § 7 was amended and, as amended, then reenacted. Merely that the exception provided in Article 44.11 for 40.-09 proceedings was deleted is not sufficient to overcome clear legislative intendment of § 7, particularly if coexistence of both in the same legislative act may reasonably be justified.
The injunction of Article 44.11 begins to operate when “the appellate record” is filed in an appellate court. The key is thus a correct understanding of meaning of the term “the appellate record.” Article 44.11 does not provide a definition, but Article 40.09 does.
Under § 1 after the clerk of the trial court has made and prepared a true copy of the matter designated by the parties and, whether designated or not, the other matter prescribed therein and has assembled the matter so prepared, it constitutes “the record on appeal” — subject, however, to approval by the trial court pursuant to § 7.
After the clerk has completed the record and notified the parties, § 7 provides several separate and distinct procedures to gain approval by the trial court, including the one in question. If at the outset there is no objection, the trial court will approve the record assembled by the clerk; if there is timely objection or if the court fails timely to approve the record a hearing is required for the court to enter such orders needed “to cause the record to speak the truth.” Also, without being restricted to a given time, “[i]f the trial court deems that a supplemental record or any other modification of the record be necessary to make the record speak the truth, for any reason,” the parties are notified and given five days to make objections “to such modification or supplementation” and if there is objection then the matter will be heard and then the court shall enter orders “to cause the record to speak the truth.”
In either event the proceeding shall be included in the record and “the entire record [shall be] approved by the court,” § 7. Thus the “entire record” may consist of that which the clerk has assembled and without objection the trial court has timely approved, or it may consist of that and in addition thereto but made separately and apart therefrom any supplement or modification also approved by the trial court. Tex.Cr.App. Rule 102, and see Forms 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Appendix.
For purposes of Article 40.09, then, “the record on appeal” is “the entire record approved by the court.” Importing that definition into Article 44.11 means that the trial court is not enjoined from conducting proceedings in accordance with § 7, and we should so hold.6
*520As the majority sees the matter, because an appellate court has power and authority to order a trial court to supplement an appellate record, it may accept a supplemental record and thereby cure “error” by a trial court in making an “invalid supplement,” rendering it “harmless.” However, it does not identify or explain any “harm” in the first place. Since the whole idea is “to make the record speak the truth,” how is it that a party may be harmed?
Nevertheless, I agree with the ultimate disposition and, therefore, join the judgment of the Court.
MILLER, J., joins.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. The following decisions are illustrative of failure of the Court to give the exception its literal application: trial court "had control of the record until it had been filed with [the Court]," Brock v. State, 449 S.W.2d 471, 472, n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), and before appellate record had been approved in the trial court or filed here or if transmitted prematurely and returned to trial court, trial judge had authority to grant a motion to dismiss appeal, e.g., Tucker v. State, 416 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Brill v. State, 408 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Cr.App.1966); Rangel v. State, 408 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), to enter a nunc pro tunc order correcting judgment and sentence to truly reflect the offense for which defendant was convicted, Perkins v. State, 505 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Resnick v. State, 574 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), but order granting new trial rendered by trial court pursuant to Article 40.09 after the record was filed in this Court was void because the trial court then “had no jurisdiction to grant a new trial," Page v. State, 532 S.W.2d 341, 342, n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

.The cases cited are Davis v. State, 499 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Lynch v. State, 502 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Schroeder v. State, 543 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Guzman v. State, 521 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
Davis came to be regarded as an aberration that "strain[edj the construction of our statutes," Guzman, supra, at 272. Lynch made what seems now to be a dubious distinction between “supplemental material representing] a finding, conclusion or order by the trial judge himself’ in exercise of some necessary power, and material sought to be added to the record by a party who failed timely to utilize provisions of § 7 in the trial court. Lynch, supra, at 741-742. At page 384, Shroeder purports to be required by Guzman, but the latter made clear that its situation “is clearly distinguishable from those cases involving an attempt to file a supplemental transcript once the trial court has lost jurisdiction and the appeal is pending before this Court,”
*518Guzman, supra, at 272. Accord: Almand v. State, 536 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
Suffice to say that neither these cases nor other contemporaneous decisions produced any "brightline" rule. Adhering to the general rule, the Court tended to deny supplementation of appellate records except in a most compelling circumstance, such as presented in Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699, 706, 720 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).

. See, e.g., Deaton v. State, 642 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th] 1982), no PDR; Jones v. State, 644 S.W.2d 546, 548-549 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1982), PDR refused, 646 S.W.2d 449 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); James v. State, 660 S.W.2d 146, 147-148 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1983) no PDR; Cano v. State, 663 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex.App.1983), no PDR; Armstead v. State, 677 S.W.2d 266, 268-269 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1984), PDR refused, 692 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985). See generally Duncan v. Evans, 653 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Tex.Cr.App.1983): "Because of the jurisdic*519tional hurdle imposed by Article 44.11, V.A.C. C.P., when the appellate record is filed in the Court of Appeals, the trial court is without authority to act further except as to bond pursuant to Article 44.04, V.A.C.C.P.” See also Ex parte Drewery, 677 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex.Cr.App.1984): "Finally, unchanged, except for deletion of Art. 40.09, supra, by the 1981 amendments, was Art. 44.11, supra, which provides for jurisdiction in the trial court until such time as the appellate record is filed with the Court of Appeals ..."

. At the fifth annual Texas College of the Judiciary held in November 1979 new judges were instructed about the principal amendment, viz;
"By recent amendment, the trial court is empowered to supplement or modify the record on its own motion, on motion of either party, or by order of the Court of Criminal Appeals to make the record speak the truth. If such is done, the parties must be notified by certified mail and given five days from receipt of notice to object to the modification or supplementation. Notice of final approval of the record by the Court shall be made upon the parties by the clerk. Art. 40.09, Sec. 8 Cep"
Judge James Kyle Allen, "Selected Post-trial Proceedings," Bench Manual, Texas Center for the Judiciary (1979).

. Any fear that such a holding will "permit a trial court to disrupt appellate consideration of a case by constantly supplementing the record until an opinion or mandate issued" should be allayed by experience on the civil side. For *520years Rule 428, T.R.Civ.P., has under similarly prescribed circumstances authorized "the trial court, either before or after the record has been transmitted to the appellate court [to] direct a supplemental record to be certified and transmitted by the clerk of the trial court or the official court reporter supplying such omitted material.” The purpose of the rule is "to make the record on appeal speak the truth," Murray v. Murray, 350 S.W.2d 593, 600 (Tex.Civ.App.— Dallas 1961) no writ history, but see Tucker v. Boyd, 156 Tex. 262, 293 S.W.2d 841, 843 (1956).
Moreover, this Court obviously does not harbor any such concern. Rule 40(b)(2) coupled with Rule 55(b), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which we have just promulgated to govern criminal cases and criminal law matters, have the same effect as Rule 428, supra. Accordingly much of what we do in this cause today is practically an academic exercise.