Court Opinion

ID: 9631957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:56:58.172111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:04.905260
License: Public Domain

DEITS, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the city’s amendment of its Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal Plan was quasi-judicial in nature and that LUBA must review the decision to determine if the city complied with applicable quasi-judicial procedures. I would hold that the city’s decision was legislative in nature and, accordingly, that proper procedures were followed. I therefore dissent.
The standards for determining whether the city’s decision is legislative or quasi-judicial are set forth in Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers v. Benton Co. Bd. of Comm., 287 Or 591, 601 P2d 769 (1979). The dispute in this case concerns the application of those standards. One of the characteristics of a quasi-judicial decision identified in Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers is that the process is bound to result in a decision. The majority concludes, although that is one of a number of relevant considerations to be balanced in deciding if a decision is legislative or quasi-judicial, it is not necessary that the process be bound to result in a decision in order for the process to be characterized as quasi-judicial. I disagree.
I interpret Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers as establishing two basic requirements in order for a decision to be characterized as quasi-judicial: (1) The process must be bound to result in a decision; and (2) the decision must involve applying preexisting criteria to concrete facts. The opinion explains in some detail the application of the second requirement, noting that the fact that preexisting criteria exist for a decision does *54not necessarily require that an adjudicative process be followed and explaining further considerations in determining whether the decision requires an adjudicative process. However, nowhere in Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers or in subsequent decisions applying its standards has it been said that the first factor, that the process must be bound to result in a decision, is not required for a decision to be quasi-judicial.1
In addition to the fact that the language of Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers requires that conclusion, the requirement is a logical one. The underlying rationale for distinguishing between legislative and quasi-judicial decisions on the basis of whether the process is bound to result in a decision is that that is the basic distinction between the activities of a court and of a legislature. A legislature is never required to make a decision. A court is always required to take some action on a case, even if that action is only to dismiss it.
In the present case, it is agreed that the process was not bound to result in a decision. Therefore, I would hold that the decision was legislative.2 This is not to say that in a case, such as this, where important individual and community interests are involved, it would be inappropriate for a local government to use procedural safeguards such as notice, prior reports and public hearings to insure the protection of these important interests in the legislative process. In this case, the city did use such procedures. Petitioners were given notice and an opportunity to be heard before both the Planning Commission and the City Council. I would affirm.

 In both Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers and 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco Co., 80 Or App 532, 712 P2d 1034, rev allowed 302 Or 299 (1986), the courts, before concluding that the decisions were quasi-judicial, concluded that the process was bound to result in a decision.

 The conclusion that the city’s amendment of its Urban Renewal Plan was a legislative act is also supported by the provisions of ORS 457.220 that “any substantial change made in the Urban Renewal Plan shall, before being carried out, be approved in the same manner as the original plan.” (Emphasis supplied.)