Court Opinion

ID: 9881514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 00:00:40.060443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:16:01.375465
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-11163        Document: 00516916785             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/02/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                 October 2, 2023
                                       No. 22-11163                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Jessica Murillo,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   City of Granbury,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:21-CV-744
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
      Jessica Murillo appeals the district court’s grant of the City of Granbury’s
   motion for summary judgment for her FMLA retaliation claim. For the
   reasons set forth below, we REVERSE and REMAND on that ground for
   further proceedings.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-11163        Document: 00516916785             Page: 2      Date Filed: 10/02/2023

                                         No. 22-11163

                        I.    Factual & Procedural Background
       Murillo became an employee of Granbury in 2017, and eventually began
   working in its public works department. In 2020, against the backdrop of the
   COVID-19 pandemic and Congress’s expansion of Family and Medical
   Leave Act (“FMLA”) protected leave access, 1 Murillo reached out to Tracie
   Sorrells, Granbury’s human resources coordinator, and secured permission
   to take twelve weeks of FMLA leave because Murillo had lost childcare.
   Sorrells retroactively set the start date for Murillo’s leave to be April 1, 2020,
   and while Murillo’s return date was not filled out on her leave form, she
   understood her return date to be in late June 2020.
       Reviewing the facts most favorable to the non-movant, we note that
   during her FMLA leave, a number of Granbury employees communicated
   with Murillo.       For instance, one of Murillo’s coworkers called her,
   purportedly at the behest of Rick Crownover, the head of the public works
   department, to inform Murillo that she needed to return to work. In addition,
   a different coworker periodically visited Murillo at her home to ask when she
   would be returning to work.            Separately, during this period Granbury
   maintained a policy requiring employees to check in with their supervisors.
   In accordance with this policy, in early June 2020 Murillo reached out via

           _____________________
           1
             In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed the Families First
   Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”), see Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020),
   which included the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act (“EFMLEA”),
   see FFCRA §§ 3101 et seq. The EFMLEA temporarily expanded certain employees’ ability
   to take leave under the FMLA based on an assortment of COVID-related reasons. See
   FFCRA § 3102(a). Most relevant here, “the EFMLEA expanded protected leave to
   employees who were unable to work or telework because their child’s school or place of
   care closed due to COVID-19, or their childcare provider was unavailable due to the same.”
   Clement v. Surgical Clinic, PLLC, No. 22-5801, 2023 WL 3035231, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 21,
   2023). The FFCRA expired at the end of 2020. See FFCRA § 5109.

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   email to Crownover, who responded, “Jessica, [a]re you coming back to
   work?”
          Murillo subsequently called Crownover to follow up on this email.
   According to Murillo, during this call Crownover was angry with her and
   demanded that Murillo, who felt threatened during this conversation, return
   to work before the end of her FMLA leave because he needed immediate
   assistance. In contrast, per Crownover, during this call Murillo inquired as
   to whether she could work part-time or take unpaid leave, to which
   Crownover responded that these were not options. Crownover also stated
   that Murillo informed him during this call that she did not intend to return to
   work; Murillo disputes this contention.
          Murillo then reached out to, and eventually spoke with, Sorrells to
   complain of Crownover’s behavior.          Sorrells disagreed with Murillo’s
   characterization of the Crownover call and assured Murillo that nobody was
   threatening her job. Sorrells also informed Murillo that her FMLA leave was
   set to expire on June 23, 2020, and that she was expected to return to work
   on June 24. Murillo later acknowledged that she knew she was expected to
   return on June 24.
          On June 22, Murillo asked Sorrells whether she could use her vacation
   time to extend her leave and Sorrells informed her that this would not be
   possible. Murillo responded, asking to use accumulated vacation time or,
   alternatively, for an explanation for why the use of such time wouldn’t be
   permitted. Nobody from Granbury responded to this inquiry. Then, on June
   24, minutes after Murillo’s work shift was to start, Crownover informed
   Sorrells that “Jessica [was] not [t]here,” to which Sorrells responded,
   “Great! I was hoping she wouldn’t come in. Let’s term [sic] her.”
   Granbury terminated Murillo that day. In the termination letter, Granbury
   stated that it terminated Murillo because she failed to return to work after her

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   FMLA leave period had expired, which Granbury considered to be “job
   abandonment.” Per Crownover, there had been no issues with Murillo’s job
   performance prior to her FMLA leave, and Murillo was not normally late to
   work.
           Granbury has a personnel manual that “provide[s] guidelines for
   management and employees regarding employment matters.” As defined in
   the manual, “job abandonment” is a “[f]ailure to report to work without
   notification for 3 consecutive days.” The manual also includes a progressive
   discipline policy that outlines graduated responses to non-egregious
   employee misconduct but provides for termination upon the first instance of
   sufficiently serious misconduct. Crownover confirmed in his testimony that,
   under these policies, an employee ordinarily would not be terminated
   immediately for a single unexcused absence. Crownover also testified that,
   in the case of such an unexpected absence, he would ordinarily try to contact
   the employee or her emergency contacts.
           Murillo sued Granbury in June 2021. 2 Murillo then submitted a first
   amended complaint against Granbury, alleging that Granbury (1) retaliated
   against Murillo for using FMLA-protected leave; (2) violated Murillo’s
   Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process by
   terminating Murillo’s employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
   retaliating against her for being a working mother; and (3) conspiring to
   interfere with Murillo’s civil rights. Granbury moved to dismiss Murillo’s
   first amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c),
   and the district court denied this motion without prejudice.

           _____________________
           2
             Murillo also initially filed suit against a number of Granbury employees, though
   the parties later stipulated to, and the district court granted, the dismissal of these other
   defendants.

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                                    No. 22-11163

          Granbury then moved for summary judgment, which Murillo
   opposed. The district court granted Granbury’s motion, reasoning that
   (1) Murillo’s FMLA retaliation claim failed because she was no longer on
   FMLA leave when she was terminated; (2) Murillo’s § 1983 claims failed due
   to Murillo’s inability to identify a constitutional violation, or a policymaker
   responsible for an unconstitutional policy; and (3) Murillo’s conspiracy claim
   failed given the absence of the type of agreement between multiple people
   necessary for conspiracy.     The district court accordingly entered final
   judgment. Murillo timely appealed.
                    II.     Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
          The district court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C.
   § 1331. We in turn have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
   § 1291.
          We apply de novo review to a district court’s grant of a motion for
   summary judgment. Kerstetter v. Pac. Sci. Co., 210 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir.
   2000) (quotation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the
   movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
   movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
   “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a
   reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Austin v.
   Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quotation
   omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
   movant. Id. at 328–29.

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                                       III.      Discussion
           On appeal, Murillo challenges the district court’s grant of Granbury’s
   motion for summary judgment on her FMLA retaliation claim. 3 Under the
   FMLA, employees are protected “from retaliation or discrimination for
   exercising their rights under the FMLA.” Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth. of
   Harris Cnty., 446 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 2006).
           FMLA retaliation claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas 4
   burden-shifting framework. Wheat v. Fla. Par. Juv. Just. Comm’n, 811 F.3d
   702, 705 (5th Cir. 2016). Under that framework, the employee must first
   establish a prima facie retaliation case by demonstrating that she: (1) “was
   protected under the FMLA;” (2) “suffered an adverse employment action;”
   and (3) “was treated less favorably than an employee who had not requested
   leave under the FMLA or the adverse decision was made because [s]he
   sought protection under the FMLA.” Mauder, 446 F.3d at 583; see also
   Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 527 (5th Cir. 2021). “This final
   element requires proof of a causal link.” Campos, 10 F.4th at 527. If the
   employee demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the
   employer to present legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the adverse action.
   Id. at 521, 528. “If the employer submits such reasons, the burden shifts back
   to the employee to show that those reasons are pretextual.” Id. at 521.

           _____________________
           3
             Murillo initially averred that the district court’s errors apply to FMLA retaliation
   and interference claims. However, Murillo later clarified that her references to Granbury’s
   purported interferences were in service of her retaliation claim. Therefore, our analysis is
   limited to Murillo’s claim of retaliation under the FMLA. Given the lack of an appeal as to
   the other grounds, we leave in place the § 1983 and conspiracy summary judgment
   decisions.
           4
               McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

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          In this case, the district court agreed with Granbury that “Murillo was
   not engaged in a protected activity because she was fired after her FMLA
   leave had expired,” and, as such, Murillo failed to establish a prima facie case.
   However, as we have previously explained, an employee can still establish an
   FMLA retaliation claim even if the adverse employment action takes place
   after the end of FMLA leave. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277
   F.3d 757, 768–69 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The FMLA’s protection against
   retaliation is not limited to periods in which an employee is on FMLA leave,
   but encompasses the employer’s conduct both during and after the
   employee’s FMLA leave.” (emphasis added)), abrogated on other grounds by
   Wheat, 811 F.3d 702; Campos, 10 F.4th at 527–28. This is made clear by the
   fact that temporal proximity between the end of FMLA leave and an adverse
   employment action can substantiate a causal connection for purposes of
   establishing a prima facie case. See Mauder, 446 F.3d at 583.
          Here, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Murillo,
   see Austin, 864 F.3d at 328–29, we conclude that Murillo satisfied her prima
   facie burden. Neither party disputes that Granbury allowed Murillo to go on
   FMLA leave, which demonstrates that Murillo was “qualified for FMLA
   leave” and satisfies the first prong.      See Campos, 10 F.4th at 527–28.
   Murillo’s termination constitutes an adverse employment action that
   satisfies the second prong. See id. at 528. Finally, Granbury terminated
   Murillo the day after Murillo’s FMLA leave expired, and indeed minutes into
   the start of her work-shift on the first day she was supposed to return while
   commenting on how glad they were to terminate her. This “degree of
   temporal proximity” clearly “support[s] a causal connection for purposes of
   a prima facie case.” See id. (“Here, the adverse employment action occurred
   approximately one month after [appellant’s] FMLA leave expired, and we
   conclude that a month is close enough in time to create a causal
   connection.”).

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           The burden thus shifts to Granbury to offer legitimate, nonretaliatory
   reasons for Murillo’s termination. See id. Granbury stated that it fired
   Murillo because she failed to report to work on the day after her FMLA leave
   ended and therefore had abandoned her job. Of course, this position is not
   consistent with their own personnel manual, so it seems questionable.
   Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that this reason is legitimate, Murillo
   has sufficiently raised a factual issue regarding whether it is pretextual. See
   id. at 521. Sorrells stated she was “hoping” Murillo would not return to work
   and suggested firing Murillo just nine minutes after Murillo’s shift started.
   Murillo was terminated later that day. This reaction runs contrary to the
   progressive discipline policy in Granbury’s personnel manual, 5 particularly
   given that Murillo had no previous job performance issues and was not
   normally late to work. Murillo’s sudden termination also conflicts with the
   ordinary reaction to unexpected absences, wherein Crownover would have
   first attempted to contact Murillo or her emergency contacts.                         Such
   deviations can be evidence of pretext. See, e.g., Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell
   Varco, L.P., 793 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hen an employer opts to
   have a disciplinary system that involves warnings, failure to follow that
   system may give rise to inferences of pretext.”).
           Further, Murillo’s failure to show up for work on one day does not
   meet the Granbury personnel manual’s definition of “job abandonment,”
   which requires three consecutive days of unexplained absence. 6 Murillo also
           _____________________
           5
             Granbury’s assertion that the personnel manual does not provide Murillo a right
   to progressive discipline is inapposite. Rather, Granbury’s decision to terminate Murillo
   in a way that did not align with its progressive discipline policy may suggest that Murillo
   was terminated as retaliation for taking FMLA leave, in violation of the FMLA. See
   Mauder, 446 F.3d at 580; Goudeau v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 793 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Cir.
   2015).
           6
           Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted to be setting a rule for all cases that
   an employee who does not show up for work after her FMLA leave expires and is fired

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   presented evidence that Granbury wanted her to return to work before her
   leave was over, which she would not do. Viewed in the light most favorable
   to Murillo, these facts could lead a reasonable jury to find that Granbury’s
   proffered reason for terminating Murillo was pretextual. See Austin, 964 F.3d
   at 328–29.
           We therefore conclude that the district court erred in determining that
   Murillo failed to satisfy her prima facie burden. Furthermore, a genuine issue
   of material fact exists, at a minimum, regarding whether Granbury’s reason
   for terminating Murillo was not pretextual. Accordingly, we conclude the
   district court erred in granting summary judgment on Murillo’s FMLA
   retaliation claim and REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings
   consistent with this opinion.

           _____________________
   because of that unexcused absence can successfully bring an FMLA retaliation claim solely
   on the basis of that termination. The specific facts in this case as detailed above support
   Murillo’s arguments about causal link and pretext. Thus, this case is decided on the
   specifics of these facts.

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