Court Opinion

ID: 9735121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:02:26.884008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:55.400542
License: Public Domain

VERNIERO, J.,
dissenting.
To the extent that the Court holds that an employee may not be lawfully discharged for blowing the whistle on a supervisor by lodging a CEPA complaint outside of the employer’s chain-of-command structure, I fully agree. CEPA would make little sense if it required conscientious employees to disclose alleged wrongdoing to the wrongdoer, especially when the wrongdoer is the employee’s immediate boss.
However, that is not this case. Plaintiff twice broke the chain of command prior to her discharge. The first time, on July 2, 1996, she sent a memorandum entitled “Variety of Peeky Problems” to Donald Moore, then her department director. That memorandum contained no explanation of why plaintiff bypassed the normal procedure, which required that the memorandum be sent to her immediate supervisor, Sally Simpson. In fact, it did *104not reference Simpson at all. Jennifer Miers, then plaintiffs intermediate supervisor, returned the memorandum to plaintiff with this note: “Dear Barb, This should first go to Sally [Simpson] — then Sally should bring it to me and then I’ll bring it to Don [Moore].”
The second time, just three days later, on July 5, 1996, plaintiff bypassed Simpson by resubmitting her- list of complaints directly to Miers. In that memorandum, plaintiff explained the breach of protocol by stating: “I see no reason to submit these through Sally, since they are areas over which she has very little input or control.” Nowhere in that second memorandum does plaintiff state that Simpson is a wrongdoer or responsible for any of the matters about which plaintiff is complaining.
It was only at her deposition, well after her discharge and the commencement of this suit, that plaintiff identified Simpson for the first time as “the worst offender on our shift.” That statement, made during the course of litigation, is a bare allegation unsupported by plaintiffs earlier memoranda. Stated differently, the record contains no foundational fact to support the proposition that plaintiff bypassed Simpson because the supervisor was specifically engaged in wrongdoing. Cf. Caputo v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 300 N.J.Super. 498, 506, 693 A.2d 494 (App.Div.) (upholding directed verdict because “considering the absence of any corroboration of plaintiffs own self-serving testimony, a reasonable jury could not have found for plaintiff ... ”), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 463, 700 A.2d 876 (1997).
I do not believe that CEPA was intended to abrogate this Court’s sound instruction “that when the evidence ‘is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,’ the trial court should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.” Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995) (citation omitted). Moreover, “an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleading ... [to show] that there is a genuine issue for trial.” R. 4:46-5.
*105Nor do I believe that CEPA was intended to inoculate employees who are insubordinate or poor performers. According to defendant’s personnel records, plaintiff had to be directed “on numerous occasions” to return to her unit to finish dispensing medications to inmates. By fair inference, she was not doing her job, at least in the minds of her supervisors. In a prison setting, failure to do one’s job, especially the failure to administer proper medical care to inmates, can have dire consequences.
I agree with the Appellate Division that:
[P]laintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to establish her termination was a result of her complaining about CHS [defendant] violations, and not due to her refusal to follow instructions from Miers regarding the submission of said complaints and for her refusal to follow orders in the dispensing of medication.
[T]he record contains sufficient evidence of plaintiffs poor job performance, both prior to and after CHS’s takeover. Plaintiff, in her deposition testimony, admitted numerous disciplinary actions taken against her while she was an employee of the State, including a ten-day suspension for insubordination. In addition, plaintiffs testimony outlining her views regarding the dispensing of medication to an inmate without the inmate having filled out the co-pay form supports the June 30, 1996 observations by Simpson about plaintiffs expectation of inmates and her interpersonal skills. When asked whether she believed inmates should be cut off from their medication for not having completed the co-pay form, plaintiff responded:
A: Absolutely.
Q: What happens to the inmate that gets cut off from the medication and gets sick and dies?
A: Same thing that happens to me if I don’t call my physician and ask for a refill, I don’t get it.
We recently observed that “[t]he overriding policy of ... CEPA ... is to protect society at large.” Cedeno v. Montclair State Unir., 163 N.J. 473, 478, 750 A.2d 73 (2000). I fail to see how society is protected by shielding a nurse who expresses a willingness to cut off medication to persons under her care. In my view, the Legislature did not intend CEPA for that purpose. Instead, it is the refusal to administer medicines to inmates that may be contrary to law. See N.J.S.A. 30:7E-5 (“[N]o inmate shall be denied ... prescription or nonprescription drugs or medicine ... because that inmate is unable to reimburse the State or county for the costs of those services, drugs or medicines.”).
*106The Court should not hold that, for the first time during the course of litigation, a litigant may add to or revise her own earlier memoranda and thereby create a triable issue of fact to survive summary judgment. The lower courts had a good sense of this suit and we should accept their findings. Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 541, 666 A.2d 146 (observing that we should “encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves”).
I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in the opinion below.
Chief Justice PORITZ joins in this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justice VERNIERO — 2.
For reversal and remandment — Justices O’HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG and LaVECCHIA — 5.