Court Opinion

ID: 9633971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:10:03.838166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:32.281025
License: Public Domain

McGREGOR, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial judge committed clear and manifest error in admitting testimony about defendant’s confessions and that admitting such testimony constitutes reversible error. In my view, the majority’s conclusions depend upon a review of the record that takes all facts in the light most favorable to overturning defendant’s convictions and that substitutes this court’s factual findings for those of the trial judge. Both these approaches contravene established principles. See State v. Lucas, 146 Ariz. 597, 607, 708 P.2d 81, 91 (1985) (this court reviews trial court’s ruling on admissibility of confessions for clear and manifest error); State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 596, 882 P.2d 593, 613 (1992) (this court must take all facts in light most favorable to affirming defendant’s convictions), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084, 113 S.Ct. 1058, 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993).
The trial judge’s findings support his decision to admit testimony about defendant’s confessions if we apply any of three accepted legal analyses. The trial judge applied the appropriate legal test by considering the .totality of circumstances to determine whether defendant’s confessions were voluntary. Included within that general legal test are two more specific analyses that apply to the facts of this case. The first more specific analysis involves the principle that threats by law enforcement personnel render an admission inadmissible only if the defendant relied upon the threats, i.e., if the threats caused the defendant to confess. The second more specific analysis, which provides another means to test the causal relationship between threat and confession, considers whether a break between the allegedly coercive activities and the confession was sufficient to dispel any coercive effect and thereby render the admission voluntary. Applying any of those analyses, I would conclude that the trial judge’s findings support his holding that defendant’s confessions during the evening interview were not causally related to any improper police conduct and the trial judge therefore did not commit clear and manifest error in finding the statements admissible.
I.
To place events in proper perspective, I believe a short summary of the various proceedings will be helpful. I restate the facts revealed by the record, taken in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions.
Chronology
Mesa police officer Reichert arrested defendant, who was seen running from the scene of the last armed robbery and who was driving a tan station wagon at the time of his arrest, at approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 20, 1991. The officer explained defendant’s Miranda rights to him, after which defendant said he knew the station wagon must have been stolen. The police transported defendant to the police station, where he arrived at approximately 3:00 a.m. Defendant remained in a holding cell, which included a bench on which he could lie down, until 12:45 p.m. At trial, defendant testified that the Mesa police station was “too cold” to allow him to sleep during that summer night. During that time period, according to defendant, the police served him “some meal, but, you know, I wasn’t in the mood for eating.”
Detectives Sehoch and Adams conducted two interviews with defendant on June 20, 1991, both of which were tape recorded. The afternoon interview involved two sessions, separated by a break of five to fifteen minutes. The first portion of the afternoon interview lasted from 12:45 p.m. until approximately 1:50 p.m. This court has neither a tape recording nor a transcript of that session. At the start of the first session, Detective Schoch repeated standard Miranda warnings. The parties agree, and the majority recognizes, that defendant admitted theft of the station wagon during that portion of the afternoon interview. The second portion of the afternoon interview lasted from 2:05 p.m. until 3:00 p.m. During that portion, *590defendant accepted a soda and a muffin from the officers. Defendant made no inculpatory statements during the second portion of the afternoon interview.
The evening interview, for which this court has neither a recording nor a transcript, began at 6:16 p.m. At the start of the evening interview, defendant again received Miranda warnings. During that interview, he admitted the two automobile thefts and three armed robberies. The interview lasted for approximately forty-five minutes, the last twenty minutes of which were consumed when the detectives drove defendant to the location at which he said he discarded the clothing he wore in the armed robberies committed on June 20,1991.
Between the afternoon and evening interviews, several events transpired. At approximately 5:00 p.m., defendant made his initial appearance before a judge on the theft charges. Defendant testified at trial that the trial judge again explained his right to counsel and to remain silent. Defendant spoke with his probation officer after his initial appearance. He later asked to speak again with the detectives. Three-and-one-quarter hours after the afternoon interview ended, defendant’s evening interview began.
Two crucial facts are central to the analysis of this case and deserve emphasis. All the questions and comments on which the majority relies to determine that defendant’s confessions were involuntary occurred during the second portion of the afternoon interview, during which defendant made no admissions. All the inculpatory statements that the majority would exclude occurred during the evening interview, when no allegedly coercive police activity took place.
Exclusionary Hearing
In response to defendant’s motion to suppress testimony about his confessions, the trial judge conducted a voluntariness hearing. Only Detective Schoch testified at the hearing. During the hearing, the trial judge listened to a portion of the tape recording of the second portion of the afternoon interview and admitted the recording into evidence. At the close of the hearing, defense counsel indicated that he did not intend to question the admissibility of defendant’s statement in the first interview that he knew the station wagon was stolen. The trial judge then made his initial findings, including (1) the interviews were custodial interrogations; (2) defendant was not in any way mistreated and was free to move around the interview room; (3) the detectives explained and defendant understood his rights; (4) defendant agreed to provide information without any real hesitancy; (5) the questioning took place in a noncoercive manner, without promises or threats of any kind being made, at least until the first break; (6) defendant clearly was not overcome as a result of police coercion, at least until the point that reference may have been made to cooperation; (7) during the evening interview, the detectives clearly admonished defendant that the interview would end if he wanted an attorney; (8) defendant was lucid, not overtired, and not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The trial judge then indicated that he wished to further consider the effects of the alleged promises or threats.
The trial judge subsequently made additional findings, based upon his review of the interview transcript and tape recording, his consideration of the demeanor of Detective Schoch, and his attention to “the tone of voice, demeanor and all the facts and the totality of the circumstances that surrounded the interrogation of Mr. Strayhand at the Mesa police department____” The trial judge found that, “under the totality of circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that the defendant’s will was overborne or overcome by the heavy-handedness of the police, by any promises implied or express, or that it was a result of threats.” Accordingly, the trial judge ruled that testimony about all defendant’s statements to the police was admissible, stating that the jury independently would assess whether the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.
Trial Testimony
At trial, Detectives Schoch and Adams testified about the interviews and the circumstances surrounding defendant’s confessions, as did defendant. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
*591You must not consider any statements made by the defendant to a law enforcement officer unless you determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made the statements voluntarily.
A defendant’s statement was not voluntary if it resulted from the defendant’s will being overcome by a law enforcement officer’s use of any sort of violence, coercion, or threats or by any direct or implied promise, however slight.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.
II.
The central question in this appeal is not whether the detectives threatened defendant during the afternoon interview.5 The central question is whether, even assuming misconduct occurred, the trial judge clearly and manifestly erred in concluding that the police misconduct during the afternoon interview did not result in defendant’s will being overborne and did not cause him to confess during the evening interview. I would not find the circumstances upon which the majority relies sufficient to compel a finding that defendant’s confessions were involuntary.
A.
“Confessions are presumed to be involuntary.” State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 164, 800 P.2d 1260, 1272 (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 929, 111 S.Ct. 2044, 114 L.Ed.2d 129 (1991). In determining whether a confession is voluntary, the trial court must determine whether the state has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a confession presumed to be involuntary was voluntarily and freely given. Id. In considering the voluntariness of a confession, no single factor is determinative; the trial court must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession. Id. This court reviews the trial court’s determination for clear and manifest error. Lucas, 146 Ariz. at 607, 708 P.2d at 91.
Determining the voluntariness of a confession is by necessity an intensely factual inquiry. The trial court must decide (1) whether the police engaged in improper coercive activity and (2) whether that improper coercive activity was causally related to the confession, i.e., whether the interrogee’s will was overborne as a result of the coercion. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166, 107 S.Ct. 515, 521, 98 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (noting need to “recognize the essential link between coercive activity of the State, on one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant, on the other”). Threatening to inform the court and prosecutor that an interrogee refused to cooperate is improper. United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 n. 2 (9th Cir.1988). Such improper tactics, however, do not alone render a confession involuntary. Utah v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1993). The court also must find that the confession was causally related to the threat. Id.
Because we look to the totality of circumstances, the range of factors we can consider is broad. See State v. Steelman, 120 Ariz. 301, 311, 585 P.2d 1213, 1223 (1978) (finding later statements were not derivative of earlier inadmissible statements). To complete its inquiry, the trial court should consider both the characteristics of the interrogee and the details of the interrogation. United States v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.1992). The trial judge in this case conducted such an inquiry.
B.
1.
The record shows that the trial judge considered those characteristics of defendant relevant to a determination of whether his confession was voluntary. The trial judge expressly found that defendant was lucid and not overtired, and the transcript shows that defendant understood the questions and re*592sponded appropriately. See Steelman, 120 Ariz. at 311, 585 P.2d at 1223. The record also shows that defendant consumed a soda and a muffin before the evening interview. See State v. Lundstrom, 157 Ariz. 485, 488, 759 P.2d 631, 634 (App.1988) (noting that accommodation of physical needs supported finding of voluntariness), vacated in part, 161 Ariz. 141, 776 P.2d 1067 (1989). Defendant understood that he had a right not to speak and that he was a suspect in the thefts and armed robberies. See Steelman, 120 Ariz. at 311, 585 P.2d at 1223. Further, this was not defendant’s first contact with the police, and he expressed his understanding that the detectives wanted to elicit a confession that they could use against him. See Utah v. Miller, 829 P.2d 132, 134-35 (Utah Ct.App.) (discussing defendant’s familiarity with legal system and interrogation as factors in totality of circumstances to consider when determining voluntariness of confession), cert. denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
Moreover, the fact that defendant made no admissions during the interview in which the allegedly improper conduct occurred lends substantial support to the trial judge’s conclusion that defendant’s later statements did not result from police coercion. See Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 165, 800 P.2d at 1273. Throughout the afternoon interview, defendant maintained his innocence. As the supreme court noted in Amaya-Ruiz, a defendant who steadfastly denies criminal activity is not one whose will has been overborne by investigative authorities. Id. Simply put, no matter how inept or egregious, threats simply cannot render a confession involuntary if the threats have no impact on a defendant’s activity and do not cause that defendant to confess.
2.
I find even less support in the record for the majority’s assertion that the trial judge erred in finding the evening confessions were voluntary when I consider the context of the interviews. Defendant had been in custody less than sixteen hours when he confessed and had been free to rest during most of that time. The police did nothing improper by holding defendant in custody, and nothing in the record suggests that the police improperly delayed the interrogation. See Lundstrom, 157 Ariz. at 488, 759 P.2d at 634. The police also provided defendant with basic amenities; during his detention, defendant was permitted to rest, offered a meal, and consumed snacks. See id. The detectives did not subject defendant to late-night or non-stop interrogation. See Steelman, 120 Ariz. at 311, 585 P.2d at 1223. The detectives did not interrogate defendant until the early afternoon. Before the afternoon interview, the detectives advised defendant of his rights. See id. (noting that interrogee should be aware of right to refuse to give statement). The trial judge expressly found that the detectives conducted the interviews in a noncoercive manner. Moreover, the afternoon interrogation lasted less than two hours and included a five to fifteen minute break. See State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 603, 886 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1994) (citing State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 524, 809 P.2d 944, 949, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1014, 112 S.Ct. 660, 116 L.Ed.2d 751 (1991) for proposition that “one- and-a-half-hour to two-hour interview” was not extraordinary). During the ensuing three-hour break, discussed in greater detail below, defendant appeared before a judge and spoke with his probation officer. The trial judge specifically found that the time between interviews lapsed “without pressure, without defendant being reminded.” After that time without pressure, defendant, not the detectives, initiated the evening interview. See Steelman, 120 Ariz. at 311, 585 P.2d at 1223.
3.
Because this case involves a definite break between the coercive activity and the confessions, the impact of the break deserves careful consideration. The test to determine whether a confession separated in time from challenged activity is voluntary remains a “totality of circumstances” test. Steelman, 120 Ariz. at 311, 585 P.2d at 1223. The primary focus, as the majority recognizes, is whether the break in the stream of events is sufficient to separate the confessions from the coercive activity. See Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 1340, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967).
*593The majority passes lightly over the impact of the break in proceedings, stating, “Contrary to another of the trial judge’s conclusions, nothing that occurred after the threats dispelled their effect.” Supra at 581, 911 P.2d at 587. The majority then cites to three factors considered in Clewis to determine whether the break in the stream of events insulated the confessions from prior activities and concludes that “[a]ll of these factors militate in the Defendant’s favor.” Id. The majority’s analysis, however, fails to consider the facts specific to this case.
In Steelman, an Arizona case much closer factually to this case than is Clewis, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the defendant’s confession did not derive from an earlier inadmissible statement. The Steelman court defined appropriate factors to consider, including whether a definite break occurred between the improper conduct and the defendant’s confession, whether the defendant knew he had a right not to make a statement, whether non-stop interrogation occurred, and whether the defendant was overwhelmed and confused. See Steelman, 120 Ariz. at 311, 585 P.2d at 1223. When those factors are applied to this record, and this trial judge’s findings are examined, the results militate in favor of finding defendant’s confessions voluntary.
This trial judge was well aware that a definite break occurred between the “coercive” interview and the confessions. In fact, the break that followed the afternoon interview actually lasted longer than the interview itself. The trial judge found that defendant understood his right not to make a statement and that non-stop interrogation did not occur. He expressly found that defendant was not overwhelmed or confused. Applying the Steelman factors provides no support for the majority’s conclusion that the trial judge erred. Moreover, other factors present in this case and not in Steelman provide additional support for the trial judge’s conclusion. The trial judge also knew that, between the two sessions, defendant made his initial appearance before a judge who again advised him of his rights. The majority, without reference to the record, dismisses the importance of defendant’s initial appearance at which he was advised of his right to counsel and to remain silent by a neutral judge. I would not discount the importance of this basic procedure. As the Eleventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals has recognized, an appearance before a neutral magistrate can dispel the taint of prior inadmissible confessions. United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1476 (11th Cir.) (holding confession to magistrate was admissible despite taint of prior inadmissible confessions), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 964, 113 S.Ct. 436, 121 L.Ed.2d 356 (1992). Mendozar-Cecelia noted that the appearance did not resemble interrogation and was not coercive. This record is void of any suggestion that the initial appearance resembled interrogation or was coercive.
The trial judge also noted that the detectives renewed Miranda warnings at the start of the evening interview and clearly explained defendant’s right to end the interview if he desired counsel. The majority discounts the importance of this information, stating, “The detectives recited the litany of rights and then ran roughshod over them.” Supra at 586, 911 P.2d at 592. Again, the record does not support the majority’s factual conclusion.6 Notably, Detective Schoch’s response to defendant’s comment wondering whether he should have a lawyer went well beyond a pro forma recitation of his right to counsel.7 Defendant does not even assert *594that he did not understand his Miranda rights, and the trial judge expressly found that he did understand those rights. A defendant’s awareness of the right to remain silent and of the right to counsel are crucial considerations in determining voluntariness. See Steelman, 120 Ariz. at 311, 585 P.2d at 1223. Given these facts, I cannot agree -with the majority’s assumption that the Miranda warnings were meaningless.
To support its conclusion that the break in proceedings did not sufficiently dispel any coercive effect, the majority cites State v. Emery, 131 Ariz. 493, 642 P.2d 838 (1982). The facts of that ease, however, differ significantly from this case. In Emery, our supreme court considered a situation in which the police disregarded a defendant’s unequivocal invocation of his right to have an attorney present during interrogation. After the defendant asserted his right to have counsel present, the police allegedly discontinued questioning the defendant. The police, however, remained in the room with the defendant and discussed the death penalty and the gas chamber. Ultimately, the defendant “waived” his prior invocation of the right to counsel and made incriminating statements. The trial court admitted the statements, and the defendant appealed that ruling.
Emery held that the defendant’s waiver was involuntary because the officers’ discussion was the “functional equivalent of interrogation” that continued uninterrupted after the defendant invoked his right to counsel. 131 Ariz. at 502, 642 P.2d at 847. Here, unlike Emery, we have no “functional equivalent of interrogation” following an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel or the right to remain silent. See State v. Tapia, 159 Ariz. 284, 288, 767 P.2d 5, 9 (1988) (noting Emery addressed narrow issue of conversations following interrogee’s invocation of right to counsel). Rather, we consider a situation in which a long, definite break occurred between defendant’s comment and his later admissions.
More analogous to this situation are the decisions in Utah v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890 (Utah 1993) and Utah v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989). In Strain, the Utah Supreme Court, referring to Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), recognized that any promise or threat, however slight, renders a confession involuntary and inadmissible. 779 P.2d at 227. Strain went on to conclude, however, that the totality of circumstances test prevents application of such a rule even when the police threaten a defendant unless the threats induce the defendant to confess. Id.
In Strain, the defendant steadfastly maintained his innocence during three hours of interrogation. The following morning, the same officer interrogated the defendant. During the second interrogation, despite the officer’s improper threats and promises, the defendant continued to maintain his innocence. That evening, the same officer interrogated the defendant for a third time, and the defendant confessed.
The Utah court recognized that the threats and promises were improper but noted that “[t]here is no testimony of defendant as to what considerations prompted his confession. As earlier stated, while coercive threats and promises were made to him, he also made statements which indicate that the improper statements of the officers did not induce him to confess.” Because the trial court had not determined whether the threats and promises induced the defendant to confess, the appellate court remanded the matter to the trial court. Id.; see also Mabe, 864 P.2d at 893 (trial court did not err in finding that passage of time dispelled coercive effect of threats).
Here, assuming the officers’ statements were threats, defendant similarly resisted the threats when made and maintained his innocence until a subsequent interrogation that defendant initiated later the same day. Unlike Strain, however, this record reveals that the trial judge did consider the impact of the alleged threats even though defendant chose not to testify at the voluntariness hearing and found that the confession did not result from any threat. Moreover, defendant testified at trial and despite the majority’s char*595acterization to the contrary, the jury obviously did not regard defendant’s testimony as leading to the “inescapable conclusion” that threats induced him to confess. Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that the trial judge clearly and manifestly erred in finding that the officers’ threats and promises did not induce defendant to confess.
For those reasons, I would conclude that, even if the officers’ statements during the afternoon interview had some coercive effect, events between the afternoon and evening interviews sufficiently dispelled the coercive effect to justify the trial judge’s ruling that defendant’s confessions at the evening interview were voluntary.
4.
In sum, the totality of circumstances revealed by this record does not justify the majority’s statement that the “cause and effect [between the threats and the confessions] are obvious____” Rather, the totality of circumstances reveals the contrary. An experienced trial judge applied the correct legal test and considered appropriate factors. The judge considered whether defendant’s confessions were voluntary under the totality of circumstances. See Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 164, 800 P.2d at 1272. The trial judge evaluated the police conduct objectively to determine whether the confessions were coerced. See State v. Conde, 174 Ariz. 30, 35, 846 P.2d 843, 848 (App.1992). In addition, the trial judge considered the voluntariness issue “in light of what the police should perceive from the objective manifestations of the subject’s physical or mental condition.” Id. (quoting State v. Carrillo, 156 Ariz. 125, 137, 750 P.2d 883, 895 (1988)). The judge appropriately analyzed voluntariness under A.R.S. section 13-3988 (1989) which directs the trial judge to consider certain factors in addition to police coercion.8
Given the trial judge’s findings, all of which find support in the record, I cannot agree with the majority that the trial judge committed clear and manifest error in ruling that the state proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant’s confessions during the evening interview were voluntary and therefore admissible in evidence.
C.
The majority opinion also fails to address adequately the lack of evidence that defendant relied upon the alleged threats. Again assuming that the officers made improper threats, the trial judge did not err because defendant failed even to assert at the voluntariness hearing that he relied upon such threats in confessing.
The law in Arizona is clear. A confession induced by threats or promises is involuntary
if two requirements are met: first, there must be an express or implied promise, and second, the defendant must rely on the promise in making the confession.
Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 165, 800 P.2d at 1273.
The majority dismisses the reliance element of Amayar-Ruiz, saying, “We view Amayar-Ruiz as nothing more than a restatement of the rule that a court must look to all of the circumstances surrounding a confession or confessions in determining whether the Defendant’s will was overborne.” Supra at 582, 911 P.2d at 588. Because our su*596preme court has enumerated two elements of a challenge to the voluntariness of a confession because of police promises or threats, I am inclined to view the second element as more than mere surplusage. Moreover, I conclude that applying the reliance requirement provides a separate basis for upholding the decision of the trial judge.
This case is analogous to State v. Ross in which “nothing in the record suggests that [the defendant] relied upon [the officers’] words or even thought he would have a chance at a lighter sentence.” 180 Ariz. at 603-04, 886 P.2d at 1359-60. Contrary to the majority’s characterization, this is not a situation in which a defendant merely failed to “explicitly state” at the voluntariness hearing that he relied on the officers’ statements. This is a situation in which defendant made no claim at all that he relied on the officers’ alleged threats or promises.
The majority relies on a long passage from defendant’s trial testimony to bolster its view that defendant’s confessions resulted from his reliance on promises and threats. I regard that testimony as insufficient to find clear error in the trial judge’s order admitting defendant’s confessions for two reasons.
First, in determining whether the trial judge erred in finding the confessions voluntary, this court should not consider information presented only at trial and then undertake what amounts to a de novo review. Rather, this court must review the trial judge’s ruling based on the evidence presented at the voluntariness hearing. See West Virginia v. Farley, 192 W.Va. 247, 452 S.E.2d 50, 56-57 (1994).
West Virginia appears to be the only court that has addressed this issue expressly. In Farley, the defendant moved to suppress evidence of his confession. At the suppression hearing, the officers who secured the confession testified but the defendant did not. The defendant testified at trial but did not renew his motion to suppress and the trial court did not revisit its ruling. On appeal, the defendant attempted to use his trial testimony to establish that the trial court erred in finding his confession admissible. The West Virginia Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause the defendant did not renew his motion to suppress at trial, specifically after he testified, he is now foreclosed from using trial testimony to challenge the trial court’s ruling.” Id., 452 S.E.2d at 57. The Farley decision recognizes that, in determining voluntariness, the trial court’s decision often reflects the court’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court, not this court, is in the best position to make that determination. See id. We expect our trial judges to evaluate carefully the demean- or and credibility of witnesses; we do not expect them to predict what, if any, additional testimony either party will present at trial.
This defendant’s situation is analogous to that of the defendant in Farley. This court, therefore, should consider the trial judge’s ruling on the motion to suppress based on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. See id. When we limit our review to the evidence presented at the voluntariness hearing, the record contains nothing to suggest reliance.
I do not think it sufficient to say, as does the majority, that “even in the absence of an explicit statement by the Defendant at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he confessed because the detectives persisted in questioning him and threatened him, that conclusion is inescapable on this record Supra at 582, 911 P.2d at 588 (emphasis added). The conclusion is anything but “inescapable.” To the contrary, I find nothing in the record that suggests that the trial judge clearly and manifestly erred in finding that defendant did not succumb to improper police coercion.
In addition, defendant’s self-serving trial testimony does not create a fundamental error. Whether defendant relied on the alleged promises and threats depends upon which witness the trier of fact believed. The trial judge instructed the jury that it could consider defendant’s statements to law enforcement personnel only if he made the statements voluntarily. In this case, as in all others, the jury was “the ultimate arbiter of voluntariness, and [was] free, in effect, [to] disagree with the judge, and reject the confession.” State v. Gretzler, 126 Ariz. 60, 84, 612 P.2d 1023, 1047 (1980) (quotations omit*597ted). Through his trial testimony, defendant needed to convince the jury, not this court, that his confessions were involuntary. We assume the jury followed the law as given by the trial judge. The jury, therefore, either found the statements voluntary or convicted defendant on the basis of other evidence. This court should not substitute its opinion for that of the jury.
For the foregoing reasons, I would conclude that the record provides no basis for vacating the trial judge’s order admitting defendant’s confessions because the record of the voluntariness hearing provides no support for finding that defendant relied upon the alleged threats.
D.
I also reject defendant’s allegation that his confessions were involuntary because the officers lied about the evidence. The majority treats the officers’ actions as a “part of the mix” for determining whether the confessions were involuntary. Regardless of the “mix” of facts, the basic question remains whether the police conduct overcame defendant’s will. The record here did not require the trial judge to make such a finding.
Law enforcement inherently encourages police to use some trickery in their work, which courts tolerate if “the games do not overcome a suspect’s will and induce a confession not truly voluntary.” Carrillo, 156 Ariz. at 136, 750 P.2d at 894. When police lie to induce a confession, the confession is involuntary only if the evidence shows “that the defendant’s will was overborne or that the confession was false or unreliable.” Tapia, 159 Ariz. at 289, 767 P.2d at 10.
In particular, unless a defendant’s will is overborne, a confession is not involuntary if a police officer lies to the defendant about a fingerprint match and a witness identification. See Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1067-69 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 2584, 132 L.Ed.2d 833 (1995). The police officer in Ledbetter, Detective McMillan, showed the defendant
two enlarged photographs of a latent fingerprint that the officer claimed had been recovered from the victim’s van, and a fingerprint that had allegedly been obtained from Ledbetter, together with a chart indicating that a fingerprint expert had made a “14 point comparison” between the latent and the identified fingerprints. In fact, the fingerprints were not Ledbetter’s and no expert had made any such comparison....
Detective McMillan also falsely told Ledbetter that the female victim and two other witnesses had identified him from a photographic array. In fact, no witness had identified him____
Finally, McMillan told Ledbetter that the victim was waiting outside the interview room, prepared to identify her assailant. In fact, [the victim] was not at the police station. Instead, McMillan set up a female dispatcher to stand in front of a two-way mirror that could be seen from the interview room. The office lights were turned on and the blinds on the mirror were opened so that Ledbetter would see, from his vantage point inside the interview room, a woman’s silhouette appearing at the window. McMillan left the interview room and returned approximately fifteen minutes later. He told Ledbetter that the victim had observed him through a mirror, that she had made a positive identification, and that she was sure that Ledbetter was the person who abducted her. At that point, Ledbetter “broke down in tears and started crying, said he was sorry for the way it happened, the way it had taken place, that he wanted to come clean and he wanted to make a new start for himself.”
at 1066.
Here, the police trickery did not rise to the level of the police trickery in Ledbetter. Further, unlike the defendant in Ledbetter, this defendant did not break down after the police lies. Rather, defendant continued to maintain his innocence until a second interview after a court appearance and a three-hour cooling off period. Further, the evidence does not show that the confessions were false or otherwise unreliable. To the contrary, the evidence ultimately placed defendant at the scene because his fingerprints were on the vehicle and an eyewitness did identify him.
*598I would not find clear or manifest error in the trial judge’s conclusion that defendant voluntarily confessed despite the officers’ untrue statements about the fingerprints and the eyewitness identification.
E.
The majority also finds defendant’s confessions involuntary because the police failed to honor defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent. The majority’s characterization of the record as showing a “flagrant refusal of the officers to honor the repeated requests to remain silent” relies upon a considerable overstatement of the record.9 As noted above, defendant made no confessions during the afternoon session after his comments allegedly invoking his right to be silent.
Assuming that defendant adequately invoked this right,10 the facts of record certainly permitted the trial judge to find that defendant later withdrew his assertion. The evening interview, during which defendant admitted the armed robberies, began at defendant’s request. Detective Schoch again informed defendant of his right to an attorney and to remain silent, and defendant indicated he wished to speak with the officers. Unlike the detectives in Emery, the officers here did not conduct the functional equivalent of interrogation after the break; no pressure had been brought to bear on defendant during the break and the officers did nothing to encourage him to initiate the second interview. See Emery, 131 Ariz. at 502-03, 642 P.2d at 847-48. For those reasons, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant’s confessions were rendered involuntary by the officers’ failure to honor his invocation of the right to remain silent.
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that the record provides no basis for vacating the trial judge’s order admitting defendant’s confessions because the record of the voluntariness hearing provides no support for finding that defendant relied on the alleged promises and threats.
III.
The majority next finds that the trial judge erred in refusing to give a “mere presence” jury instruction. I again must disagree.
This court will not reverse a conviction based on a trial court’s ruling on a jury instruction unless this court can reasonably suppose that the instructions, when taken as a whole, would mislead the jurors. See State v. Schrock, 149 Ariz. 433, 440, 719 P.2d 1049, 1056 (1986); See State v. Shields, 26 Ariz. App. 121, 123, 546 P.2d 846, 848 (1976). The trial court does not err in refusing to give instructions that are not correct statements of the law, do not fit the facts of the particular case, or are covered adequately by other instructions. State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 74, 673 P.2d 1, 12 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892, 105 S.Ct. 267, 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Hedlund v. Sheldon, 173 Ariz. 143, 840 P.2d 1008 (1992). Further, failure to give a particular *599jury instruction is not fatal if the instructions, when read as a whole, adequately set forth the law. State v. Poland, 144 Ariz. 388, 403, 698 P.2d 183, 198, cert. granted, 474 U.S. 816, 106 S.Ct. 60, 88 L.Ed.2d 49 (1985), aff'd, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986).
In Shields, the defendant appealed the trial court’s refusal to give a “mere presence” instruction. 26 Ariz.App. at 123, 546 P.2d at 848. When police responded to a silent alarm from a clothing store, they apprehended the defendant as he was running away from the store. On appeal, Shields found no reversible error. “The [trial] court instructed the jury on the prosecution’s burden of proof, the defendant’s presumption of innocence and on all the elements necessary to find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged. Either as a principle or as an accessory.” Id. Shields went on to note that “mere presence” really was a matter for defense counsel to cover in argument, not for the trial court to cover in jury instructions. Id.
Here, defendant testified that he merely was a passenger in the Chevrolet Blazer and that a friend, Dee, was the person who drove the vehicle and who robbed the Whataburger on June 20, 1991. The trial judge denied defendant’s request for the “mere presence” instruction because defendant was not charged with accomplice liability, and the state did not present evidence of accomplice liability. The only issue for the jury was one of identity. The jury believed that either defendant or someone else committed the crimes. The trial judge, therefore, found that the “mere presence” instruction was unnecessary.
The trial judge recognized that defendant could argue “mere presence” as a defense, but that absent a charge of accomplice liability, it did not need to instruct the jury on “mere presence.” Because the instructions, when read as a whole, were a correct statement of the law, adequately set forth the law, and fit the facts of defendant’s case, I believe that the trial judge did not err in refusing to give a “mere presence” instruction.
IV.
I concur with the majority’s holding that the photographic lineup was not unduly suggestive.
V.
Because I find no instance of reversible error and after reviewing the entire record, no fundamental error, I would affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.

. Although the majority describes in some detail those instances it regards as promises and characterizes as critical the "fact” "that the detectives also made promises and threats that caused the Defendant to confess,” the majority also recognizes that the "promises” described were "arguably permissible.” The majority then relies upon the alleged threats to conclude defendant’s confessions were involuntary. I therefore will not address the "promises” made to defendant, which were nothing more than permissible offers to propose leniency.

. I also do not agree with the majority that defendant unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent during the afternoon interview. See supra note 5.

. At the beginning of the evening interview, the following exchange occurred between one officer and defendant:
Officer: I just want you to understand your rights. You have the right to have an attorney here. You don't have to answer questions about the events we're going to talk about. And you do understand that. I have told you, your parole officer told you, the judge has told you. Do you understand this.
Defendant: I do. I just wonder if it's to my best behalf to have one here.
Officer: Okay. Well, you do have a right to have one here before we question you. If you want one here, we’ll end the interview. If you don’t want one here, we’ll continue with the interview as is. But you do have a *594right to have one here. And it’s up to you to make a decision.
Defendant: Okay. I guess I will just answer your questions.

. A.R.S. section 13-3988.B states that:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including but not limited to the following:
1. The time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment.
2. Whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession.
3. Whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him.
4. Whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel.
5. Whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. The presence or absence of any of the factors indicated in paragraphs 1 through 5 of this subsection which are taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.

. The Arizona Supreme Court has established that the police must terminate an interrogation when the defendant unequivocally invokes Miranda rights. The police may continue the interrogation if the defendant's invocation of Miranda is merely equivocal. State v. Eastlack, 180 Ariz. 243, 250, 883 P.2d 999, 1006 (1994) (analyzing Davis v. U.S., — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)). Here, none of defendant’s statements constitutes an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent. In my view, defendant made only one statement that, at best, qualifies as an equivocal invocation. The majority makes much of defendant’s assertions that "that’s all I know man” and "I don’t want to hear nothing else man.” I am not persuaded that these statements are even equivocal, much less unequivocal, invocations of the right to remain silent. Defendant’s statement, "Well get me outta here man. I’m going back to fucking jail. That's all ... ” appears to be more reflective of defendant's evaluation of his own situation than an invocation of a right to remain silent. Defendant's statement that "I’m not going to talk worth a shit anyway so it doesn’t matter to me” is at most puzzling and does not come close to invoking a constitutional right to remain silent.

. Factually, this case lies between the lines drawn in State v. Bravo, 158 Ariz. 364, 762 P.2d 1318 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1039, 109 S.Ct. 1942, 104 L.Ed.2d 413 (1989) and State v. Zimmerman, 166 Ariz. 325, 802 P.2d 1024 (App. 1990). Whether defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent was equivocal presents a close question. Because the question is close, I would find no clear and manifest error in the decision of the trial judge, who heard the tape recording of the statement in question.