Court Opinion

ID: 9598154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:06:06.317761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:40.968792
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Justice,
with whom EASTAUGH, Justice, joins,
dissenting.
I dissent from this opinion because it muddles the law of confessions and suppresses a statement that, by our traditional test, is voluntary.
Today’s .opinion announces that “threat-induced” confessions must now be considered “presumptively involuntary absent evidence affirmatively indicating that the suspect’s will was not overcome by the threats.”1 The court takes this rule from article I, section 9, of the Alaska Constitution with scarcely a glance to see whether it finds support in the text, context, or history of this constitutional provision.2
In fact this new rule finds little support in our constitution or jurisprudence. We have consistently viewed the Alaska Constitution *1049as protecting against involuntary confessions to the same extent as the federal constitution.3 Until now we have resisted adopting more stringent “per se” rules for confessions.4
In Stobaugh v. State, we expressly declined to hold that a confession induced by a promise should be deemed involuntary as a matter of law.5 Refusing to read “wooden literalness”6 into the United States Supreme Court’s admonition in Bram v. United States that confessions not be “extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,”7 we found three reasons to reject a per se rule excluding confessions obtained by promissory inducements:
First, the facts of Bram do not require such a per se rule. Second, subsequent cases demonstrate that factual nuances may be very important in determining vol-untariness. Third, the probable loss of reliable and probative confessions that would result from rigid adherence to a per se rule militates in favor of examining all the circumstances surrounding a promise-induced confession.[8]
Thus, we opted to adhere to the traditional test of voluntariness, which simply determines from the totality of the circumstances whether the police overbore the defendant’s free will.9
Though Stobaugh considered only confessions induced by promises, the three reasons it gives for rejecting a per se rule apply with equal force to confessions induced by threats. First, here, as in Stobaugh, “the facts of Bram do not require such a per se rule.”10 The court’s decision today pinpoints a valid distinction between threats and promises — a distinction missed by the court of appeals: threats are generally more coercive than promises.11 But this hardly requires a rule that would exempt all threats from the traditional voluntariness analysis and categorically declare threat-induced statements to be involuntary.
Second, with promises and threats alike, “factual nuances may be very important in determining voluntariness.”12 There are limitless forms of threats, and they can occur under an infinite variety of circumstances; often the difference between a threat and a promise is a matter of subtle interpretation.13 *1050Many settings can be imagined in which a particular threat — -just like a promise — would have no realistic tendency to overbear a particular person’s will. And nothing in the generally more coercive nature of threats makes the coercive effect of a specific threat inherently more difficult to gauge on a case-by-case basis than the coercive effect of a promise.
Third, for both promises and threats, “the probable loss of reliable and probative confessions that would result from rigid adherence to a per se rule militates in favor of examining all the circumstances surrounding a ... confession.”14 The reasoning in Sto-baugh thus refutes the per se rule that the court adopts in this case.
The court nevertheless cites three cases as favoring its decision to immunize threats from analysis under the traditional voluntariness test:15 United States v. Tingle,16 United States v. Harrison,17 and State v. Stray-hand.18 But none of thése cases supports the court’s “woodenly literal” presumption. They all involve blatantly coercive custodial interrogation and are distinguishable on their facts.19 Here, by contrast, we have a brief, *1051non-custodial interrogation that would be unremarkable but for a single, passing mention of getting “hammered.”
A second point of distinction between Beavers’s case and the three cases relied on by the court is that none of these cases categorically condemns all potentially threatening comments uttered during an interrogation. Each ease involved overt or thinly veiled threats of reprisal for the accused’s exercise of the constitutional right to silence; this particular type of threat — the threat that a defendant may “be made to suffer for his silence” — is the only type these cases condemn as without “legitimate purpose.”20
There can be no plausible claim of any such threat in this case. Beavers could not have understood the trooper’s reference to getting “hammered” as a threat of reprisal for exercising his right to remain silent. When the comment occurred, Beavers had already abandoned his right to silence and was freely talking to the police about himself and his friends. He had been repeatedly told — and by all ■ indications fully understood — that he was free to stop talking and leave at any time. In context, then, if the trooper’s remark about getting “hammered threatened any reprisal, the only reprisal it threatened was for lying' — it anticipated Beavers’s willingness to keep talking and warned him in realistic terms of the consequences that he was likely to face if he actively misrepresented the facts: “[I]f you’re telling me the truth, -... I’ll know that you’re telling me the truth. This is important, okay? But, if you’re, if you try and hide-it from me you’re really going to get hammered.”
The final, and perhaps most crucial, point distinguishing this ease from Tingle, Harrison, and Strayhand is that none of those cases applies an artificial “presumption of involuntariness” like the constitutional presumption this court creates today. Although these cases all roundly condemn threats of reprisal for exercising the constitutional right to silence, they do not pretend that such threats automatically render confessions invalid; to the contrary, each case carefully and faithfully adheres to the traditional law of confessions, determining, from the totality of the circumstances, that the police actually overbore the defendant’s free will.21
*1052If anything, these cases illustrate that we add nothing to the law when we conclude that “[t]hreat-induced confessions should be considered presumptively involuntary absent evidence affirmatively indicating' that the suspect’s will was not overcome by the threats.”22 As the court in Strayhand declared, existing law already presumes that every confession is involuntary: “All confessions are presumed to be involuntary, and the state bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that any confession is voluntary and freely given.”23 This court’s opinion acknowledges as much and further recognizes that under Alaska law “[w]hen the accused is a juvenile, the state assumes a particularly heavy burden of proof.”24
Thus, at best, the court creates a supérfluous layer of presumption that distracts attention from the critical question: did Beavers voluntarily confess? At worst, the court creates a new presumptive test of voluntariness that bypasses the traditional, totality of the circumstances determination.
The court’s insistence on affirmative evidence of voluntariness is troubling and will surely confound judges, practitioners, and police officers. If the court means by “affirmative evidence” only that, because all threats are potentially coercive and this case involves a threat, the state has failed to meet its heavy burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance under the totality of the circumstances, then the presumption serves no purpose. A straightforward application of the conventional totality of the circumstances test would yield the same conclusion.
But the court seems to mean something more since, its decision reversing the court of appeals relies on the absence of “affirmative indications” of voluntariness and appears to stop short of independently reviewing the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the police actually “hammered” Beavers into an involuntary confession.
Yet there is no dispute here about the circumstances surrounding Beavers’s confession, and the confession itself is entirely recorded. Short of an admission by Beavers that he confessed voluntarily, it is hard to conceive of any other “affirmative” evidence of voluntariness that the state might have presented. This situation is not unusual: the police currently record almost all interrogations. If a full recording of the confession does not suffice to dispel the presumption of involuntariness and require voluntariness to be determined under the totality of the circumstances, then the court’s per se rule is something more than a conventional presumption:25 it is essentially a blanket rule *1053suppressing all confessions in interrogations that involve an arguable threat.
This of course would be the functional equivalent of Bram's now universally disavowed “woodenly literal” prohibition.26 I doubt that the court actually has such a rule in mind. But if the court means to land somewhere between the conventional test and Bram, its intended target is uncertain; it fashions a rule that will be misinterpreted and misapplied. And the price of this uncertainty will be paid in the needless suppression of voluntary confessions.
In my view, the present case provides a good example. Two troopers subjected Beavers to a brief, matter-of-fact interrogation. Beavers was not in custody. Though only sixteen years old, he had a regular job and was contacted at his place of employment. When asked if he would mind accompanying the troopers to the station to “talk where it’s a little quieter,” Beavers had the assertiveness and presence of mind to respond, “I prefer if we, like, talked here.” The troopers immediately honored his request. It seems apparent, then, that Beavers was capable of understanding that he had control over his own situation and had good reason to think that the troopers would not ignore his choices.
Once the interview began, Trooper Graham immediately reassured Beavers that he was not under arrest and was free to go at any time. Beavers understood. He freely discussed his knowledge of some recent burglaries, truthfully denying any involvement. In the course of this discussion, Trooper Graham reminded Beavers, “Like I told you, you’re not under arrest, you’re free to go. Ah you know, I’m not holding you here.” Beavers continued to answer questions.
Trooper Graham soon shifted the discussion to a recent robbery, exhorting Beavers to tell him the truth; in the midst of this exhortation, the trooper uttered the “hammering” threat:
GERRY GRAHAM: Okay. Well I know you’re telling the truth because it’s the same stuff we’ve already been told. I, but I have to confirm it. I mean, there’s stuff I know and stuff I don’t know. That’s how I we do an interview. And, if you’re telling me the truth, you’ll be telling me stuff that I already know and I’ll know that you’re telling me the truth. This is important, okay? It, it’s very important. I know that when you’re young, you do some stupid stuff, make a, make a wrong turn somewhere, okay. And, and you do some crazy stuff, okay? But, if you’re, if you try and hide it from me you’re really going to get hammered. I mean it’s, you gotta come out and tell me the truth on this stuff, okay? I know some stuff that you’re into and we’re going to have to talk about that, okay?
Beavers hardly seemed cowed by the prospect of “hammering.” In response to Trooper Graham’s ensuing question, “I know some stuff that you’re into and we’re going to have to talk about that, okay?” Beavers answered, “Alright.” The trooper followed up by asking, “Do you understand that?” Beavers responded, “Not really. Like what kind of stuff?” Trooper Graham answered that he was talking about the MAPCO robbery.
At that juncture, the trooper showed Beavers a photo lineup, asking him if he knew what it was. The lineup included photographs of Beavers and his friend, Danny. After making sure that Beavers recognized his own photograph and understood the significance of the lineup, Trooper Graham promised to help Beavers if he told the truth. Beavers immediately got the message and confessed:
GERRY GRAHAM: Do you know what these are?
TIM BEAVERS: Mug shots?
GG: Photo line ups, man. Who’s that?
TB: Me.
GG: Who’s that?
TB: Danny?
GG: Do you know what these are used for?
TB: (Inaudible)
*1054GG: That’s right. You walk up to a victim and you say, “See anybody in here you recognize?” and they go (smack) “I recognize this person, this person was there. This person was one of the guys that robbed me.” Now if you want to lie to me and get in more trouble, that’s fine, okay? That’s your decision. This is the only chance I can help you. You’re young, you need tó get this cleaned up now, okay? You want to tell me the truth?
TB: I was there.
My review of the record, including the transcript and audio tape of Beavers’s interrogation, persuades me that Trooper 'Graham’s brief mention of “hammering” did nothing to induce Beavers’s confession and failed even to come close to overbearing his will. It seems to me that Beavers understood his position and had full control of his situation until Trooper Graham displayed the photo lineup. Beavers incorrectly .assumed that he had been identified in. the lineup, and this triggered his confession. Beavers did not confess for fear of being hammered but for fear of having been nailed. His choice was one motivated by self-interest, not panic.
If anything in the interrogation overbore Beavers’s free will, it was Trooper Graham’s use of the photo lineup to create the false impression that Beavers had been identified, coupled with the trooper’s simultaneous offer to help Beavers if he told the truth. Yet these tactics — ruses and promises of assistance — fall within the generally accepted range of proper interrogation.27 And Beavers does not challenge this aspect of his interrogation.
Yet by relying on an artificial presumption of involuntariness, the court assigns conclusive significance to a mild and passively phrased threat that seemingly had no bearing on Beavers’s free will. The court fails even to acknowledge as “affirmative indications that the trooper’s threats ... were ineffective”28 the permissible and potentially far more powerful psychological tactics that immediately preceded Beavers’s confession. Because the court’s newly adopted presumption obscures' its inquiry into voluntariness and leads it to suppress a valid and reliable confession, I dissent from its decision reversing the court of appeals.

. Op. at 1048.

. Although "we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitution,” we generally do so only "if we find such fundamental rights and privileges to be within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional language and to be necessary for the ldnd of civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heritage.” Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970). Cf. State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 758 n. 8 (Alaska App.1995) (citing Abood v. League of Women Voters, 743 P.2d 333, 340-43 (Alaska 1987); State v. Wassillie, 606 P.2d 1279, 1281-82 (Alaska 1980); Annas v. State, 726 P.2d 552, 556 n. 3 (Alaska App.1986); State v. Dankworth, 672 P.2d 148, 151 (Alaska App.1983)) (observing that a provision of the Alaska Constitution will be interpreted to provide greater protection than a corresponding provision of the federal constitution only if there is “something in the text, context, or history of the Alaska Constitution that justifies this divergent interpretation”).

. See, e.g., State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska 1987); Stobaugh v. State, 614 P.2d 767, 771-72 (Alaska 1980); Troyer v. State, 614 P.2d 313, 318 (Alaska 1980); Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 413 and n. 6 (Alaska 1979); cf. Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 719-20 (Alaska 1979); Cole v. State, 923 P.2d 820, 822-23 (Alaska App.1996).

. See, e.g., Stobaugh, 614 P.2d at 772 ("We therefore reject a per se rule which would condemn any incriminating statement obtained by means of a promissory inducement.”); Ridgely, 732 P.2d at 556 (noting, in reversing a finding of involuntariness, that the mere fact of minority did not automatically preclude a voluntary waiver).
In this regard, the court’s reliance on Webb v. State, 756 P.2d 293, 297 (Alaska 1988), is unpersuasive. See Op. at 1045. Webb did not involve the voluntariness of a confession; it dealt with the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver — an area of the law in which adherence to bright-line rules is the norm and deterrence to ensure police compliance with these bright lines is the primary goal. By contrast, in cases involving involuntary confessions, where the primary goal is to enforce "the strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are sacrificed where ... the government ... wrings a confession out of an accused against his will,” the norm has long been a case-specific inquiiy to determine actual voluntariness. See Cole v. State, 923 P.2d at 829-30 & n. 16 (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964)).

. 614 P.2d at 771-72.

. Stobaugh, 614 P.2d at 771-72 (quoting United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir.1967)).

. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897).

. Stobaugh, 614 P.2d at 772 (citing United States v. Williams, 447 F.Supp. 631, 636-37 (D.Del.1978)).

. Stobaugh, 614 P.2d at 772.

. Id.

. Op. at 1046-1047.

. Stobaugh, 614 P.2d at 772.

. For example, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), the Supreme Court noted, “[w]e have held inadmissible even a confession secured by so mild a whip as the refusal, under certain circumstances, to *1050allow a suspect to call his wife until he confessed.”. Should it make any difference, under the same circumstances, that the police rephrased tire threat as a promise to allow the suspect to call if he confessed?

. Stobaugh, 614 P.2d at 772.

. Op. at 1046-1048.

. 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.1981).

. 34 F.3d 886 (9th Cir.1994).

. 184 Ariz. 571, 911 P.2d 577 (App.1995).

. In each case, interrogation occurred in a particularly coercive setting; the accused either attempted tq remain silent while under interrogation or adamantly denied guilt; and the police bluntly threatened harsher punishment unless the accused surrendered the right to silence. These factual distinctions deserve emphasis to demonstrate the extent to which the "threat" in this case differs from the kinds of threats that other courts have condemned.
The court in Tingle described the interrogation as follows:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was notified of the "robbery." FBI Special Agents Sibley and Ayers arrived at the credit union, spoke to the local police officer, and escorted Tingle to their automobile parked in front of the credit union in order to speak with her privately.
Tingle sat in the back seat of the automobile with Sibley while Ayers sat in the front seat. The interrogation which followed lasted for approximately one hour. Tingle repeated to the special agents what she had told the local officer. Sibley gave Tingle a standard. FBI Advice of Rights form and asked her to read it aloud. Tingle read the form, indicated that she understood her rights and was willing to answer questions, and signed the written waiver.
Sibley then accused Tingle of lying. He told her that he believed she and her boyfriend had staged the robbery. Tingle denied her involvement. At that point, both agents were firmly convinced that Tingle had staged the “robbery” because of what they viewed as its amateurish commission. Sibley began to explain to Tingle the advantages of cooperating in an effort to get her to tell the truth. He enumerated the crimes of which she might be guilty. He told her that she faced a twenty year sentence for bank robbery, twenty-five years if it was armed robbery, five years for conspiracy, five years for lying to a federal agent, and an additional potential penalty of five years if Tingle were to lie to a grand jury. Tingle repeatedly maintained her innocence.
Sibley explained that it would be in Tingle's best interest to cooperate. There was some discussion about Tingle's release on her own recognizance during court proceedings. Sib-ley stated that he would inform the prosecutor if Tingle were to cooperate, or would alternatively inform the prosecutor that she was "stubborn or hard-headed” if she refused. Sibley suggested that it was quite possible that he had been told by Tingle's boyfriend that she was the one responsible for the entire planning and execution of the staged robbery.
At the beginning of the interrogation Sibley had determined that Tingle was the mother of a-two-year-old child. In an effort to obtain a confession, Sibley told her either that she ■would not see the child for a while if she went to prison or that she might not see the child for a while if she went to prison. His purpose was to make it clear to her that she had "a lot at stake.”
During Sibley's interrogation Tingle began to sob. She was noticeably shaking. She continued to cry for at least ten minutes.
Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1333-34 (footnotes omitted).
In Harrison, the accused
heard noises outside her house. Upon opening her front door, she discovered approximately fifteen federal agents with their guns drawn. The agents searched the house and arrested Harrison and [her companion] Marshall.
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[T]he agents advised Harrison of her rights. She replied that she understood those rights. *1051After a brief silence, an agent told Harrison that he had documents showing that she was involved in money laundering. He said that the government had seized packages of drugs that had been mailed to Marshall and could determine whether her fingerprints were on the packages. The agent informed her that she might be facing up to twenty years in prison. He asked her whether she thought it would be better if the judge were told that she had cooperated or had not cooperated. Harrison responded that it would be better if she talked to the agents and they told the judge that she had cooperated. She then gave a statement to the agents.
Harrison, 34 F.3d at 890.
And in Strayhand, the defendant, who had been arrested and jailed on suspicion of robbery, was removed from jail and subjected to a lengthy interrogation at the police station. Strayhand repeatedly refused to make a statement and asked to be taken back to jail, but the police continued the interrogation, repeatedly threatening to ask for an increased sentence if Strayhand refused to cooperate. The interrogation ultimately ended with the following statement to Strayhand: "I’m going to go ahead and file cases and I get to go in and say you were uncooperative and didn’t want to help me so I've got it made. Makes me real easy here. But it's never too late.
" Strayhand later confessed. Strayhand, 911 P.2d at 581-84.

. Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1336 n. 5. See also Harrison, 34 F.3d at 891 (quoting Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1336 n. .5); Strayhand, 911 P.2d at 586 ("A defendant should not be penalized for exercising his rights.”).

. The Tingle court-noted:
When we consider the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the psychological coercion brought to bear upon Tingle produced her confession. We hold, therefore, that Tingle’s confession was not "the product of a rational intellect and a free will” and was involuntary.
Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1337 (footnote omitted). Similarly, in Harrison:
While none of the agents made explicit threats, subtle psychological coercion can effectively overbear a suspect's free will.
... Harrison broke her silence only after the agent asked whether she thought it preferable if the judge were informed that she had cooperated or not cooperated. The first thing she said was that she thought it would be better if she talked to the agents and they informed the judge that she had cooperated.
"[T]he Fifth Amendment guarantees ... the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for silence." The agent's question was improper. *1052The government cannot meet its burden of proving that Harrison decided of her own free will to give a statement.
Harrison, 34 F.3d at 892 (internal citations omitted). Finally, in Strayhand, the court found that it
must look to all of the circumstances surrounding a confession or confessions in determining whether the Defendant's will was overborne. Here, even in the absence of an explicit statement by the Defendant at the hearing on the motion to suppress 'that he confessed because the detectives persisted in questioning him and threatened him, that conclusion is inescapable on this record. The State had the burden of proof on this point, and it came forward with nothing to suggest anything but that the detectives’ impermissible tactics bore fruit.
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Keeping in mind that the question of whether a confession is voluntary must be decided upon tire totality of circumstances, we believe that the flagrant refusal of the officers to honor the Defendant’s repeated requests to remain silent had a significant effect on procuring his confession. The detectives recited the litany of rights and then ran roughshod over them. This is coercive in itself. Further, had the officers honored the Defendant’s request, the dialogue which led to and included the threats would never have taken place.
Strayhand, 911 P.2d at 588, 592.

. Op. at 1048.

. Strayhand, 911 P.2d at 585.

. Op. at 1044.

. Under Alaska Evidence Rule 303, a presumption directed against the state in a criminal case ordinarily is “treated in the same manner as a presumption in a civil case under Rule 301.”
Under Evidence Rule 301 a presumption in a civil action normally "imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion.”

. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 595 A.2d 980, 981 (D.C.1991) (recognizing that the Bram test “under current precedent does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession").

. See, e.g., Cole v. State, 923 P.2d at 820, 831 (Alaska App.1996) ("[I]t is now well established that the Constitution does not altogether forbid the police from making promises or offering inducements to a suspect under interrogation.”); Sovalik v. State, 612 P.2d 1003, 1007 n. 4 (Alaska 1980) ("[T]he use of trickery does not per se render a confession involuntary and most authorities hold that confessions produced by trickery are admissible so long as the device employed would have no tendency to produce an untruthful confession.”).

. Op. at 1048.