Court Opinion

ID: 9581952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:20:45.45157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:21.297503
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COMPTON, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO and JUSTICE KEENAN
join, dissenting.
In 1984, the reconvened annexation court, in a written order, made a substantive ruling interpreting the 1978 annexation decree. In the December 1984 order, the annexation court implicitly decided that the Town retained some discretion, under the annexation decree, in deciding whether to grant requests for extensions of sewer service to the specific lots involved in this controversy.
The 1984 ruling, which ought to preclude mandamus relief in this case, arose against the following background. The pertinent part of the 1978 annexation decree provided that the Town “shall proceed to construct interceptor and collector sanitary sewer lines in the areas herein decreed to be annexed ... as soon as they become reasonably necessary and it becomes economically feasible so to do to serve the residents of the annexed area or any industrial concerns which locate therein but said improvements . . . shall be completed within five years from the effective date of annexation.” The deadline was later extended from five to seven years.
In 1983, an engineer engaged by the Town designed a sewer system for the annexed area. The proposed plan provided for pump stations ordered by the annexation court, and trunk lines that would make sewer service available to the entire annexed area, including the Industrial Park Corporation property. The Corporation objected to the plan because it did not provide for construction of sewer lines to each individual lot within its property.
In July 1984, then counsel for the Industrial Park Corporation wrote the Town’s attorney stating they were “still in a disagreement” over the meaning of the 1978 annexation order. The Cor*588poration’s attorney stated a belief that the order required “that the sewer and water lines are to be extended to the lot lines” of the Corporation’s property and that “we will need an interpretation of this difference of opinion by the Court.”
Thus, in November 1984 the Industrial Park Corporation and others filed in the court below a “Motion to Compel Compliance with Previous Orders of This Court and for Temporary Restraining Order.” Asking that the annexation court be reconvened, the Corporation alleged that the annexation decree as well as “the applicable statutes, rules and regulations of the Town . . . would require that the Town . . . extend the sewer lines to the property lines of each individual petitioner and to the lot lines of each lot within the . . . Industrial Park.” The motion further alleged that the Town’s plans “fail to provide collector lines to all the individual lots in the Industrial Park.” The Corporation also asserted that the Town’s proposed plan violated the terms of the annexation decree.
The Corporation sought an injunction against the Town and sought a decree requiring the Town to construct collector lines to the Corporation’s individual lots. The Corporation asked the reconvened court to “review the entire annexation proceedings and the compliance therewith by the Town.”
The annexation court reconvened on December 13, 1984 to consider the Corporation’s motion. After hearing evidence and argument of counsel, the court entered a written order on December 28, 1984.
As pertinent, the order provided that “the Town’s revised plans of May, 1984 for the sewage extension . . . are in substantial compliance” with the 1978 annexation decree. The order further provided that the “prayer for an injunction will be denied.” The Industrial Park Corporation did not appeal this order.
“Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary act.” Cooper v. Haas, 210 Va. 279, 281, 170 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1969). And, the extraordinary remedy of mandamus may be employed only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought.
Manifestly, the decision upon whether or when to extend additional sanitary sewer lines to the individual lots within Industrial Park Corporation’s property involves the exercise of discretion that properly is reserved to the collective judgment of the Town’s Council. The underlying purpose of that portion of the 1978 de*589cree dealing with sewer construction was generally to require extension of sewer service to residents who needed and who could utilize the service. Nowhere was there a specific mandate to extend collection lines to each discrete lot or parcel of land without regard to need for and use of the lines. In 1984 the reconvened court agreed with this interpretation and denied the relief sought by the Corporation, finding that the Town’s proposed plan for sewer construction amounted to “substantial compliance” with the 1978 decree and its deadline.
Certainly, the Industrial Park Corporation has demonstrated no clear right to the relief sought. Therefore, I would hold that mandamus does not lie, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and enter final judgment in favor of the Town.