Court Opinion

ID: 9470683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:13:07.942842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:03.021711
License: Public Domain

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:
Whirlpool Corporation (Whirlpool) appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict for Calvin Coolidge Greene (Greene) in his suit alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. The issue for our consideration is whether Greene filed a charge of discrimination within 180 *129days of his alleged unlawful discharge as required under § 626(d) of the ADEA, as amended. The district court held that a timely charge had been filed. We disagree, and therefore, reverse the judgment below.
I.
Greene was discharged from his job with Whirlpool on October 31, 1977. Approximately two weeks later, on either November 17 or 18, 1977, Greene went to the Charlotte, North Carolina office of the United States Department of Labor (DOL),1 where he spoke with DOL employee Bob Smith. Greene testified at trial that he told Smith, “that I had worked for the Whirlpool Corporation all these years and that my performance had been okay, as far as I could determine; that the only reason I could see that they discharged me was discriminating on age because I was six weeks past 55.” Greene further testified that Smith told him he would be sent a booklet which explained discrimination cases, and then Smith stated “if you find out enough information on it [Greene’s alleged discriminatory discharge] you get back with us.” Greene acknowledged that he received and read the booklet mailed to him which contained the ADEA, as amended, including the requirement that a charge of discrimination must be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice.
In October, 1979, after his former supervisor, Spagnuolo, had obtained a $51,977 jury verdict against Whirlpool for age discrimination,2 Greene returned to the DOL. He spoke with another DOL employee about filing an age discrimination suit against Whirlpool. However, the DOL files do not reveal any charge filed by Greene against Whirlpool or show any correspondence between the DOL and Greene, other than a record showing that Greene was mailed a copy of the ADEA in November, 1977.
On October 26, 1979, Greene instituted this age discrimination suit. Whirlpool’s main defense was that Greene had not filed a charge with the DOL within 180 days after his alleged unlawful discharge, as required by the statute. The district court, however, was not persuaded by this contention and concluded that Greene had filed a timely charge during his first visit to the DOL in November, 1977, and had thereby sufficiently complied with the 180-day notice requirement of § 626(d). Moreover, the district court found that Whirlpool, from 1977 through 1979, had failed to post the required ADEA informational notices on its premises in Charlotte, North Carolina, including the requirement that a charge be filed within 180 days. The district court, therefore, concluded that even if Greene’s 1977 visit to the DOL did not meet the charge requirement of the statute, circumstances warranted tolling the 180-day filing period until September, 1979, when Greene retained an attorney and acquired actual knowledge of his rights. Further, the district court held that Greene’s visit to the DOL in October, 1979, represented a second timely filing of a charge.
The jury thereafter returned a verdict for Greene. In addition, the district court awarded Greene liquidated damages, costs and attorneys’ fees and ordered Whirlpool to reinstate Greene to a position equal to the one from which he had been discharged. From the judgment entered in favor of Greene, Whirlpool appeals.
II.
On appeal, the pivotal inquiry is whether the lower court correctly determined that Greene filed a charge alleging unlawful discrimination with the DOL within 180 days of his discharge. Greene contends that he filed an oral charge of discrimination dur*130ing his first visit to the DOL. In contrast, Whirlpool asserts that Greene’s conversation with Smith came far short of being a charge, and that even if it did constitute a charge, it was not in writing as required by § 626(d); and that therefore, this action must be dismissed. We agree with Whirlpool.
The express language of § 626(d) of the ADEA, as amended in 1978, requires the filing of a charge. This section reads, in pertinent part:
(d) No civil action may be commenced under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Secretary. Such a charge shall be filed—
(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred....
In the present case, Greene, on his initial visit to the DOL merely mentioned to Smith, a DOL employee, that he thought he had been discriminated against because of his age. Obviously, Smith did not believe that Greene charged Whirlpool with discrimination because he told him to return if he obtained information that Whirlpool had discharged him because of his age. Moreover, Greene himself could not have believed that he filed a charge at that time or he would not have returned to the DOL in October, 1979. Hence, Greene’s initial visit to the DOL was simply a request for information concerning age discrimination and nothing more.
Important to our consideration is the underlying purpose of § 626(d), and the legislative history is instructive in this regard. Prior to 1978, § 626(d) required that a “notice of intent to sue” be filed with the DOL. In 1978, this provision was amended to require that a “charge alleging unlawful discrimination” be filed with the DOL.3 In approving this amendment, the Conference Committee reported:
This change in language is not intended to alter the basic purpose of the notice requirement, which is to provide the Department with sufficient information so that it may notify prospective defendants and to provide the Secretary with an opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices through informal methods of conciliation.
H.R. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2 Sess. 12, reprinted in [1978] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 504, 534. In the present case, because the Secretary had no knowledge of Greene’s allegation of discrimination against Whirlpool, no opportunity existed for any informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion, as required by § 626(b), before the initiation of the suit. This is patently contrary to the purpose of the notice requirement.
Furthermore, although § 626(d) does not specify that a charge must be in writing, the Conference Committee’s report is again enlightening. It states: “The conferees intend that the ‘charge’ requirement will be satisifed by the filing of a written statement which identifies the potential defendant and generally describes the action believed to be discriminatory.” Id. (emphasis added). We find, as did the Second Circuit, in Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1006, 99 S.Ct. 621, 58 L.Ed.2d 683 (1978), when considering the earlier version of the statute, that § 626(d), by requiring a charge to be filed, implies that it must be written. We therefore conclude that a written charge alleging unlawful discrimination must be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred in order to comply with § 626(d) of the ADEA, as amended.
We recognize that the 180-day provision of § 626(d) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit in federal court, and may under exceptional circumstances be tolled or waived. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1981). Nevertheless, we do not agree with the district court that the 180-day time period for filing a charge was *131tolled by Whirlpool’s failure to post the required ADEA informational notices on its premises. The evidence clearly reveals that from Greene’s first visit to the DOL in November, 1977, he acquired actual knowledge of the fact that a charge alleging discrimination must be filed with the DOL within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. Therefore, under these circumstances, there is nothing to warrant the tolling of the usual 180-day filing requirement.
III.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that Greene’s failure to comply with § 626(d) is a bar to maintaining this action. Therefore, the other issues raised by Whirlpool on appeal need not be addressed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court.
REVERSED.

. In 1977, when Greene was required to file a charge, the DOL was the enforcing agency for the ADEA. However, on July 1, 1979, the responsibility for enforcement of the ADEA was transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1979), reprinted in [1978] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 9795.

. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corporation, 467 F.Supp. 364 (W.D.N.C.1979), aff'd in part, rev’d in part 641 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir.1981).

. This amended version is effective “with respect to civil actions brought after the date of enactment of this act [April 6, 1978].” Public Law 95-256, Section 4(b)(2). Therefore, it is applicable to the instant case, which was filed on October 26, 1979.