Court Opinion

ID: 9603655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:08:37.087789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:45.666969
License: Public Domain

*777Alexander, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I do so because, in my judgment, the trial court correctly determined that the agreement between Nelson and McGoldrick was unconscionable and, therefore, void and unenforceable. Furthermore, I am satisfied that we should affirm the trial court for an additional reason that it did not rely upon — the contract was illegal. I will, hereafter, discuss each of my reasons for this dissent.
I
If the contract between Nelson and McGoldrick is not substantively unconscionable, it is hard to imagine one that is. In my opinion, a contract where a party agrees to secure property, the location of which is already known to that party, in return for a promise from the rightful owner of the property to pay the first party approximately $25,000, that agreement is "shocking to the conscience”, "monstrously harsh”, "exceedingly calloused”, or whatever other term that has ever been used in case law to describe an unconscionable contract. To my way of thinking, the underlying nature of this contract is not less unconscionable simply because Nelson routinely does this sort of a thing as a business and calls himself an "heir finder” or "heir hunter”. The plain fact is that when Nelson entered into this contract with McGoldrick, he already knew where the Panorama stock was located and that it would be an easy task to obtain it for her. That being the case, the amount of compensation provided for in the agreement was so far beyond what can be termed reasonable that it can only be described as an outrageous fee.
This fee agreement cannot be equated to a contingent fee agreement between an attorney and a client, where a reasonable fee can only be earned if the attorney performs services in order to obtain a favorable result for the client. Here Nelson knew that McGoldrick’s stock was at Panorama’s headquarters. The only real work that Nelson had to do was to obtain McGoldrick’s agreement to pay him an exorbitant fee.
*778It is significant that fees for those who seek compensation from persons whose lost property is in the hands of the State Department of Revenue are limited to 5 percent of the value of the property returned to the owner. RCW 63.29.350. While I agree with the majority that the aforementioned statute does not control what is an appropriate fee here, it is, at least, a measuring rod against which the fee that is sought here can be measured. The fee here, which was 50 percent of the value of the property, so far dwarfs the fees that are permitted by statute in that similar situation, it cries out that the agreement is substantively unconscionable.
II
As the majority points out, Washington courts will not enforce contracts which grow out of illegal acts. In my judgment, this contract should not be enforced because it allows Nelson to extort a reward for obtaining McGoldrick’s property for her. Although, as I have noted above, the trial court did not conclude on summary judgment that the contract was illegal, our review of a summary judgment ruling is de novo and the trial judge can be affirmed on any alternate ground within the pleadings and proof. Carey v. Reeve, 56 Wn. App. 18, 23, 781 P.2d 904 (1989).
It is extortion for a person to knowingly attempt to obtain money from another person by "threat”. RCW 9A.56.110. A "threat”, according to RCW 9A.04.110(25)(g), means to communicate the intent to withhold information from another with regard to that other person’s legal claim. In essence, Nelson threatened to not tell McGoldrick where her property was unless she paid him $25,000. That is extortion, and it is not made less so because Nelson and McGoldrick negotiated the fee and memorialized their "negotiating” to a writing.
III
I am disappointed, after all, that this court has put its imprimatur on this very seedy arrangement. I am concerned that the majority’s opinion can only serve to encourage persons to withhold information from property owners about their lost property as a sort of ransom in order to extract a *779reward. In spite of the majority’s opinion, I can only hope that most people will not be motivated to take the low road in such circumstances, but, rather, will be inclined to assist property owners locate their property. Hopefully, a grateful property owner will be motivated to voluntarily pay a reasonable reward to a finder of lost property. If, however, a reward is not forthcoming, virtue will have to suffice as the finder’s reward.
Reconsideration denied June 21, 1994.
Affirmed at 127 Wn.2d 124.