Court Opinion

ID: 9964806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 21:01:00.232875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:43.306247
License: Public Domain

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                                               PUBLISHED

                                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                      FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1981

        In re: BESTWALL, LLC,

                                 Debtor.
        ------------------------------

        PATRICIA BLAIR, as personal representative for the Estate of Lee Blair; VIOLET
        BUTLER, as personal representative for the Estate of Ralph Butler; BETTY JEAN
        CAMILLERI, as personal representative for the Estate of Terrence Camilleri;
        CHERYL D. WOOTER, as personal representative for the Estate of William Cutler;
        KIMBERLY PLANT, as special administrator of the Estate of Sheryl Evans;
        MARIA FONS, as personal representative for the Estate of Miguel Fons; JOHN
        GUZMAN, as personal representative of the Estate of Joe Guzman;
        CHRISTOPHER NELSON, as personal representative for the Estate of Roger
        Nelson; MELISSA TAYLOR, as personal representative for the Estate of Donald
        Taylor; THE LAW FIRM OF MAUNE, RAICHLE, HARTLEY, FRENCH &
        MUDD, LLC,
                         Claimants – Appellants,

                       v.

        BESTWALL, LLC,

                               Debtor – Appellee.

                                               No. 22-1984

        In re: BESTWALL, LLC,

                                 Debtor.
        ----------------------------
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        PATRICIA BLAIR, as personal representative for the Estate of Lee Blair; VIOLET
        BUTLER, as personal representative for the Estate of Ralph Butler; BETTY JEAN
        CAMILLERI, as personal representative for the Estate of Terrence Camilleri;
        CHERYL D. WOOTER, as personal representative for the Estate of William Cutler;
        KIMBERLY PLANT, as special administrator of the Estate of Sheryl Evans;
        MARIA FONS, as personal representative for the Estate of Miguel Fons; JOHN
        GUZMAN, as personal representative of the Estate of Joe Guzman; CHRISTOPHER
        NELSON, as personal representative for the Estate of Roger Nelson; MELISSA
        TAYLOR, as personal representative for the Estate of Donald Taylor; THE LAW
        FIRM OF MAUNE, RAICHLE, HARTLEY, FRENCH & MUDD, LLC,

                            Claimants – Appellants,

                     v.

        BESTWALL, LLC,

                            Debtor – Appellee.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
        at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:21-cv-00503-RJC; 3:21-cv-
        00510-RJC)

        Argued: September 22, 2023                                      Decided: April 29, 2024

        Before WILKINSON, KING, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge
        Wilkinson joined. Judge King wrote a dissenting opinion.

        ARGUED: Natalia Lynn Talbot, WALDREP WALL BABCOCK & BAILEY PLLC,
        Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellants. C. Kevin Marshall, JONES DAY,
        Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas W. Waldrep, Jr., Jennifer B.
        Lyday, Ciara L. Rogers, Diana Johnson, WALDREP WALL BABCOCK & BAILEY
        PLLC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellants. Gregory M. Gordon, Dallas,
        Texas, Megan Lacy Owen, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C.; Garland S. Cassada, Richard
        C. Worf, Jr., Charlotte, North Carolina, Preetha Suresh Rini, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW
        & HINSON, P.A., for Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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        RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

               A party to litigation may not immediately appeal a civil contempt order. Instead,

        the sanctioned party must wait until final judgment to appeal. In bankruptcy, the same rule

        applies, except the relevant final judgment may be a decree ending the entire case or a

        decree ending a discrete proceeding within the bankruptcy case.

               In the two orders underlying these appeals, the bankruptcy court held Appellants in

        contempt and sanctioned them for defying a discovery order. Because the contempt and

        sanctions orders do not terminate a procedural unit separate from the remaining bankruptcy

        case, they are not final appealable orders. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment

        dismissing the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

                                                        I.

               Bestwall, LLC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in November 2017 in the United

        States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina. To resolve current

        and future asbestos-related claims against it, Bestwall sought to develop a reorganization

        plan establishing a trust to pay those claims under 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). The parties in the

        bankruptcy case have been unable to agree to the terms of a reorganization plan. One of

        the chief points of contention is the extent of Bestwall’s current and future asbestos-related

        liabilities, which will inform the trust funding amount. Bestwall has sought discovery in

        aid of estimating those liabilities.

               In 2020, Bestwall moved to require all persons with pending mesothelioma claims

        against it to complete a personal injury questionnaire providing information about their

        claims. Various individual claimants objected to the request, as did the Official Committee

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        of Asbestos Claimants, whose duty is to represent the interests of current asbestos

        claimants in the bankruptcy case. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court found the proposed

        questionnaire “relevant to estimation of the asbestos liability of the Debtor and the

        negotiation, formulation, and confirmation of a section 524(g) plan of reorganization that

        will be accepted by at least 75% of current asbestos claimants who vote on the plan.” J.A.

        789. The court therefore granted Bestwall’s motion and ordered all current mesothelioma

        claimants to complete the questionnaire (“PIQ Order”). In its order, the court “retain[ed]

        exclusive jurisdiction to interpret, apply, and enforce th[e] [o]rder,” and instructed “[a]ny

        person who [sought] relief from any provision of th[e] [o]rder” to do so by motion in the

        bankruptcy court. J.A. 800.

               The Committee and several individual claimants attempted to appeal the PIQ Order

        to the district court. That court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that

        the PIQ Order was not a final appealable order and the issue did not warrant leave of court

        for interlocutory review. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3). The Committee also sought a

        stay of the PIQ Order in the bankruptcy court, which was denied.

               Undeterred, certain claimants subject to the PIQ Order sued Bestwall in federal

        district court in Illinois seeking an injunction to prevent it from enforcing the PIQ Order.

        The complaint was signed by counsel from the law firm of Maune, Raichle, Hartley, French

        & Mudd, LLC, which serves as counsel to a Committee member and other individual

        claimants in the bankruptcy case, as well as special counsel to the Committee concerning

        medical science matters related to the estimation hearing. In response, Bestwall moved in

        the bankruptcy court to enforce the PIQ Order.

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               The bankruptcy court granted the motion, held a hearing, and found nearly all the

        Illinois plaintiffs, along with Maune Raichle, in contempt for violating the PIQ Order.

        However, the court declined to impose sanctions, preferring to offer the parties an

        opportunity to purge their contempt by dismissing the Illinois suit. Most of the Illinois

        plaintiffs, still represented by Maune Raichle, nevertheless continued to prosecute the

        Illinois lawsuit, which the district court for the Southern District of Illinois ultimately

        dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The bankruptcy court subsequently held a hearing and

        sanctioned those Illinois plaintiffs and Maune Raichle jointly and severally in the amount

        of $402,817.70 for fees and expenses Bestwall incurred in defending the Illinois lawsuit

        and enforcing the PIQ Order.

               The Illinois plaintiffs and Maune Raichle—Appellants here—appealed both the

        contempt order and the sanctions order to the district court. That court concluded that

        neither order was final and dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.

        § 158(a)(1). Appellants sought review in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).

                                                    II.

               Considering the question de novo, we agree with the district court that the contempt

        and sanctions orders are nonfinal, interlocutory decisions. The district court therefore

        properly dismissed both appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

               We begin with principles that no party disputes. In normal civil litigation, a party

        to continuing proceedings “may not immediately appeal a civil-contempt order” or

        attendant sanctions but must await final judgment to appeal. United States v. Myers, 593

        F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936)); see

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        also Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 517 F.2d 1348, 1349 (4th Cir. 1975)

        (“[A] party to a suit may not review upon appeal an order fining . . . him for civil contempt

        except in connection with appeal from a final judgment in the main action.” (internal

        quotation marks omitted)); 15B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice

        & Procedure § 3917 (2d ed., Apr. 2023 update) (calling this rule “well entrenched”). This

        rule applies to Appellants, who are current claimants against Bestwall in the ongoing

        bankruptcy case and counsel that is jointly and severally liable with claimants for the

        contempt sanctions. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (identifying a “creditor” as a “party in

        interest”); Algeran, Inc. v. Advance Ross Corp., 759 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985)

        (“Where, as here, the sanctions are imposed against both client and counsel, jointly, there

        is such a congruence of interest that the attorneys must await final judgment in order to

        appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puig, 106 F.3d

        165, 167–168 (7th Cir. 1997) (same). 1

               Bestwall’s bankruptcy case is ongoing. No final decree ending the case has been

        rendered. In normal civil litigation, that would typically end the inquiry and an appellate

               1
                 Although no party disputes these principles, our colleague in dissent does. The
        dissent argues that Maune Raichle is entitled to immediately appeal, but none of the cases
        cited by the dissent address a situation where, as here, parties to the ongoing litigation are
        held jointly and severally liable with their counsel for contempt sanctions. See Dissenting
        Op. 16. We do not disagree with the dissent that contempt sanctions solely against a
        nonparty are immediately appealable, as are criminal contempt sanctions and contempt
        sanctions after a final decree. See Dissenting Op. 18 (citing Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217
        (1932); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); and 15B
        Federal Practice & Procedure § 3917). But none of those circumstances is present here.
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        court would dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Myers, 593

        F.3d at 348 (dismissing for lack of appellate jurisdiction).

               But the statute governing bankruptcy appeals authorizes appeals from final

        judgments, orders, and decrees entered in bankruptcy “cases and proceedings.” 28 U.S.C.

        § 158(a) (emphasis added). “[T]o be appealable, the challenged bankruptcy decision does

        not have to end the entire bankruptcy case; it just has to end a proceeding inside the case.”

        Kiviti v. Bhatt, 80 F.4th 520, 529 (4th Cir. 2023). As the Supreme Court has explained, a

        “bankruptcy case involves ‘an aggregation of individual controversies,’ many of which

        would exist as stand-alone lawsuits but for the bankrupt status of the debtor.” Bullard v.

        Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015) (quoting 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 5.08[1][b],

        p. 5–42 (16th ed. 2014)). Accordingly, “Congress made orders in bankruptcy cases

        immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger

        bankruptcy case.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 587 (2020)

        (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted); see also In re Comput. Learning

        Ctrs., Inc., 407 F.3d 656, 660 (4th Cir. 2005); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994,

        1009 (4th Cir. 1986).

               For example, an adversary proceeding is a separate “proceeding” for purposes of

        bankruptcy finality. Kiviti, 80 F.4th at 529. An adversary proceeding resembles a “stand-

        alone lawsuit[] brought inside the bankruptcy,” with its “own complaint, filing fee,

        motions, subset of parties, docket number[], and judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks

        omitted). The relevant procedural unit is the entire adversary proceeding, not one of the

        many decisions made within it; “an order only partially ending the adversary proceeding is

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        not [final and appealable].” Id. Similarly, an order denying Chapter 13 plan confirmation

        is not immediately appealable because the relevant proceeding in that context is the “entire

        process” of “attempting to arrive at an approved plan that would allow the bankruptcy to

        move forward.” Bullard, 575 U.S. at 502. That process “terminates only when a plan is

        confirmed or—if the debtor fails to offer any confirmable plan—when the case is

        dismissed.” Id. And as a final example, adjudication of a creditor’s motion for relief from

        the automatic stay is “a discrete procedural unit” within the bankruptcy case that is

        “anterior to, and separate from, claim-resolution proceedings” and “yields a final,

        appealable order when the bankruptcy court unreservedly grants or denies relief.” Ritzen

        Grp., 140 S. Ct. at 586, 589.

               Appellants contend that the contempt and sanctions orders were final decisions in a

        discrete “proceeding” within Bestwall’s bankruptcy case and therefore the district court

        erred by dismissing their appeals for lack of jurisdiction. 2 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). We

        disagree.

               The contempt and sanctions orders did not “terminate[] a procedural unit separate

        from the remaining [bankruptcy] case,” nor did they follow any ruling that did so. Ritzen

        Grp., 140 S. Ct. at 591. The bankruptcy court imposed sanctions on Appellants to

        compensate Bestwall for Appellants’ contempt of the PIQ Order. The PIQ Order, which

        required Appellants to submit discovery in aid of estimating Bestwall’s asbestos liability,

               2
                 District courts also may review certain interlocutory orders and grant leave to
        review “other interlocutory orders and decrees.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), (3). Neither of
        those bases for the district court’s appellate jurisdiction is at issue here.
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        was issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2004—the “basic discovery

        device in bankruptcy cases.” 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 2004.01[1]. As a general rule,

        discovery orders aren’t final and appealable; they are part of resolving a larger dispute. See

        In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing a “‘discovery ruling’” as a

        “‘clearly interlocutory decision’” (quoting FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Invs. Mortg. Ins. Co.,

        498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991))); In re Coleman Craten, LLC, 15 Fed. App. 184, 184 (4th Cir.

        2001) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of appeal from Rule 2004 order as interlocutory);

        In re Royce Homes LP, 466 B.R. 81, 89 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (noting “extensive case law

        holding bankruptcy discovery orders to be interlocutory”). Likewise, the PIQ Order is a

        step toward gathering the information necessary to estimate Bestwall’s asbestos liability.

        That discovery order did not “finally dispose of [a] discrete dispute[]” within the

        bankruptcy case. Ritzen Grp., 140 S. Ct. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted). And

        enforcement of that discovery order through contempt similarly did not “terminate[] a

        procedural unit separate from the remaining case.” Id. at 591; cf. In re Teknek, LLC, 512

        F.3d 342, 344–345 (7th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that “an order holding a party in civil

        contempt” for withholding information during a Rule 2004 examination is not an

        appealable final decision).

               Appellants say the bankruptcy court’s orders “resolved discrete disputes regarding”

        whether Appellants “violated the PIQ Order by filing the Illinois Lawsuit” and “whether

        sanctions were warranted, and if so, the amount thereof.” Opening Br. 17. But that

        “define[s] the pertinent proceeding so narrowly that the requirement of finality would do

        little work as a meaningful constraint on the availability of appellate review.” Bullard, 575

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        U.S. at 504. If we accepted Appellants’ formulation of finality, every ruling to enforce a

        discovery order—and, likely, every discovery order itself—would be an appealable final

        decision supposedly terminating a bankruptcy “proceeding.” See Ritzen Grp., 140 S. Ct.

        at 591 (“[T]he issue of appealability should be determined for the entire category to which

        a claim belongs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That characterization conflicts with

        reality. Imagine the district court reviewed the contempt and sanctions orders—even the

        PIQ Order itself—and ruled in Appellants’ favor. Bestwall could then attempt to gather

        the same information for its estimation proceeding by means of a different discovery tool.

        And if Appellants refused to comply with that discovery order and were sanctioned for

        contempt, they could appeal again. Far from ending the parties’ dispute, “each climb up

        the appellate ladder and slide down the chute” would only prolong resolution of the

        underlying matter for which the information is being sought in the first place. Bullard, 575

        U.S. at 504. Such a result is at odds with the reason for a rule of finality. See id. It also

        reveals that the relevant dispute for finality purposes is larger than the contempt and

        sanctions orders themselves.

               Appellants rely on In re Stasz, 387 B.R. 271 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008), in which a

        bankruptcy appellate panel held that Rule 2004 contempt and sanctions orders were final

        and appealable. Id. at 272. We do not find Stasz persuasive.

               First, it is in tension with subsequent Supreme Court caselaw. The Stasz panel

        primarily reasoned that, because a motion for contempt is a “contested matter” under the

        Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, an order resolving the motion “has the status of a

        judgment” and therefore must be a final appealable order. Id. at 275; see also Fed. R.

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        Bankr. P. 9014, 9020. Bullard, however, expressly refuted that logic. 575 U.S. at 505. As

        the Supreme Court explained, “the list of contested matters is endless and covers all sorts

        of minor disagreements” that the “concept of finality cannot stretch to cover.” Id. (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               Second, the Stasz panel applied a capacious finality standard different from that used

        in “an adversary proceeding or a civil action outside bankruptcy” because it worried that

        the sanctions order otherwise could never be appealed, since “the culmination of the

        bankruptcy case does not result in a final judgment.” 387 B.R. at 276. But review is not

        as elusive as the panel believed. As discussed, a party can appeal from a final order in the

        relevant “proceeding” or case. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). And several mechanisms for

        interlocutory review exist to resolve questions “important enough that [they] should be

        addressed immediately.” Bullard, 575 U.S. at 508. These include seeking leave for

        interlocutory review in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), requesting

        certification to the court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and obtaining certification

        to a court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2). See Bullard, 575 U.S. at 508–509.

               Finally, Appellants cite decisions in which other bankruptcy appellate panels have

        concluded that contempt and sanctions orders imposed for violation of certain orders

        resolving core proceedings were appealable. See In re Fatsis, 405 B.R. 1, 5–6 (B.A.P. 1st

        Cir. 2009) (contempt and sanctions orders imposed for violating plan confirmation order);

        In re Webb, 472 B.R. 665 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (same for violating

        automatic stay); In re Nelson, No. BAP WW-15-1416, 2016 WL 7321196, at *1 (B.A.P.

        9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2016) (same for violating discharge injunction); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)

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        (illustrative list of core proceedings). Whether those contempt sanctions followed a final

        judgment, order, or decree in a “proceeding” presents a different question from the one

        raised here, regarding sanctions for violating a discovery order in a continuing bankruptcy

        case. See, e.g., Bullard, 575 U.S. at 502 (confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan terminates a

        “proceeding” for purposes of appellate review).         We therefore find those decisions

        inapposite.

                                                     III.

               In sum, Appellants have not appealed from a final decision in a bankruptcy “case”

        or “proceeding.”    The civil contempt and sanctions orders entered against them for

        violating a discovery order are interlocutory and cannot be immediately appealed as of

        right. The district court therefore correctly dismissed these appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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        KING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

               The issue in these appeals is whether the district court in North Carolina possessed

        appellate jurisdiction under § 158(a) of Title 28 to review a final contempt order of a North

        Carolina bankruptcy judge that has severely sanctioned practicing Illinois attorneys and

        their clients as contemnors. To my chagrin, my fellow panelists have ruled that the district

        court lacks jurisdiction to review those contempt and sanctions orders. I disagree, however,

        and explain herein.

                                                      A.

               It is important to first identify the court orders at issue. In March 2021, a bankruptcy

        judge in the Western District of North Carolina entered a discovery order on behalf of the

        debtor in the proceedings, Bestwall, LLC, to obtain information that Bestwall wanted to

        use in connection with personal injury claims initiated against its parent, Georgia-Pacific,

        LLC, by mesothelioma asbestos plaintiffs in thousands of asbestos cases around the United

        States. 1 A few months later, in June 2021, several of the mesothelioma plaintiffs with

        personal injury lawsuits already pending in Illinois state court (the “Illinois Claimants”)

        filed a separate civil action in the Southern District of Illinois, seeking injunctive relief

        against the North Carolina bankruptcy judge’s discovery order. In response, Bestwall

        requested the North Carolina bankruptcy judge to enter an order ruling that the Illinois

        Claimants and their lawyers had violated the discovery order by suing in Illinois and

               1
                   Bestwall is a corporate subsidiary of Georgia-Pacific, LLC. The relationship
        between Bestwall and Georgia-Pacific, along with how Georgia-Pacific has shifted its
        liability for an untold number of asbestos related claims onto Bestwall, are discussed in our
        2023 decision in In re Bestwall LLC, 71 F.4th 168 (4th Cir. 2023).
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        directing them to “show cause why they should not be held in contempt.” See J.A. 1049.

        The bankruptcy judge granted the motion, and it then scheduled a show cause hearing on

        the contempt issue.

               After conducting the show cause hearing, the bankruptcy judge ruled that the Illinois

        Claimants and their lawyers — the law firm of Maune, Raichle, Hartley, French & Mudd,

        LLC (“Maune Raichle”) — were in contempt of the bankruptcy judge’s discovery order

        and entered an order to that effect on August 18, 2021 (the “Contempt Order”). See J.A.

        1373. The Contempt Order recited that the Illinois lawsuit violated the bankruptcy judges’s

        discovery order and ruled that the Illinois Claimants and their lawyers at Maune Raichle

        were subject to contempt citations under the court’s inherent power “to enforce its own

        orders.” Id. at 1371-73.

               The Illinois Claimants and Maune Raichle were then given an opportunity to purge

        their contempt by dismissing the Illinois lawsuit. They declined to dismiss, however, and

        persisted in asserting that they were legally entitled to challenge the discovery order in

        Illinois, maintaining that the discovery order was fatally flawed, legally and

        constitutionally. The question of possible contempt sanctions against the Illinois Claimants

        and Maune Raichle was left by the bankruptcy judge for a later day.

               On September 23, 2021, after conducting another hearing, the bankruptcy judge

        ruled that the contempt had not been purged and held the Illinois Claimants and Maune

        Raichle jointly and severally liable for sanctions, which were assessed in the sum of

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        approximately $402,000 (the “Sanctions Order”). See J.A. 1525. 2 The Illinois Claimants

        and Maune Raichle then appealed the Contempt Order and the Sanctions Order

        (collectively, the “Contempt and Sanctions Orders”) to the district court in the Western

        District of North Carolina. 3 That court dismissed both appeals for lack of appellate

        jurisdiction. See J.A. 3055, 3062. Notices of appeal from the dismissals were timely filed

        and these appeals followed.

                                                     B.

               As detailed above, neither of these appeals are from the North Carolina discovery

        order — both these appeals are from the Contempt and Sanctions Orders. As recognized

        by the Supreme Court, and by our Court as well, a nonparty is generally entitled to appeal

        a final contempt order, before the conclusion of related litigation. See United States

        Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988) (“The

               2
                The bankruptcy judge calculated the sanctions amount by aggregating the fees and
        expenses detailed by Bestwall’s counsel, which included the law firms of Jones Day,
        Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A., and King & Spalding LLP, along with an economic
        consulting firm called Bates White, LLC. The bankruptcy judge reduced the law firms’
        proposed fees to some extent, due to expense and time entries that were ambiguous or
        duplicative.
               3
                  In their appeals to the district court, the Illinois Claimants and Maune Raichle
        presented more than fifteen assertions of error, including claims related to personal
        jurisdiction; the service, notice, and applicability of the discovery order; due process; and
        other issues involving the propriety of their Illinois lawsuit. See J.A. 45-46. The merits of
        these assertions were never addressed or resolved by the district court.
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        right of a nonparty to appeal an adjudication of contempt cannot be questioned.”); In re

        Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2014). 4

               The practicing lawyers and law firms representing thousands of personal injury

        plaintiffs — like Maune Raichle — are not parties in Bestwall’s bankruptcy proceedings.

        Their clients’ injury claims have been stayed by the Bestwall bankruptcy, however, and

        effectively moved from Illinois state courts to a North Carolina bankruptcy judge. And the

        lawyers and their firms remain nonparties, even after being deemed contemnors. See Trade

        Well International v. United Central Bank, 778 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2015) (ruling that

        attorney for plaintiff is nonparty to litigation); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 332 n.10 (8th

        Cir. 1977) (“Here, the contemnors are not parties in the underlying action and the orders

        of contempt are appealable. We do not accept the argument that the relationship between

        the law firms and the parties somehow transformed the firms into de facto parties”).

        Consistent with the foregoing, Maune Raichle is entitled to appeal the Contempt and

        Sanctions Orders, and the district court erred in ruling otherwise.

                                                     C.

               I recognize, of course, that these appeals are not governed by the rules that most

        lawyers generally deal with. Indeed, these appeals are from contempt proceedings before

        a bankruptcy judge and implicate the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Importantly,

               4
                  It seems settled that a contempt order is not final if the question of sanctions is
        postponed. See United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 406 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 2005);
        Matter of United States Abatement Corp., 39 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Fugazy
        Express, Inc., 982 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1992). Here, the Contempt and Sanctions Orders
        are final. The sanctions have been assessed and are being challenged in this appeal.
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        however, § 158(a) is even more generous with respect to appellate review than the

        generally applicable final judgment rule codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Section 158(a)

        provides, in relevant part, as follows:

               The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals
               . . . from final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges
               entered in cases and proceedings.

        See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has ruled, pursuant to

        § 158(a), that “Congress made orders in bankruptcy cases immediately appealable if they

        finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger bankruptcy case.” See Ritzen Group,

        Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 39 (2020) (cleaned up). That controlling

        decision from our highest Court pairs with our recognition that “[t]he concept of finality in

        bankruptcy cases has traditionally been applied in a more pragmatic and less technical

        way.” See In re Computer Learning Centers, Inc., 407 F.3d 656, 660 (4th Cir. 2005)

        (internal quotation marks omitted).

               My friends in the majority resist the applicable breadth and coverage of § 158(a),

        asserting that the Contempt and Sanctions Orders “did not terminate a procedural unit

        separate from the remaining bankruptcy case.” See supra at 8 (internal quotations marks

        omitted).   The Contempt and Sanctions Orders, however, finally disposed of the

        bankruptcy judge’s contempt proceedings against the Illinois Claimants and Maune

        Raichle, which arose from a very discrete and precise dispute in the Bestwall bankruptcy.

        The Contempt and Sanctions Orders are therefore appealable under § 158(a).

               I will explain that straightforward position. When Bestwall moved to enforce the

        discovery order while simultaneously requesting a contempt hearing, a discrete procedural

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        sequence commenced. The sole purpose of the contempt proceedings was to assess

        whether the Illinois Claimants and the lawyers at Maune Raichle were contemnors. There

        were then at least two hearings conducted by a North Carolina bankruptcy judge in the

        contempt proceedings, involving the very same subset of parties and nonparties. And those

        hearings resulted in the Contempt and Sanctions Orders, which “alter[ed] the status quo

        and fixe[d] the rights and obligations” stemming therefrom. See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank,

        575 U.S. 496 (2015). It is therefore clear on this record that the proceedings that resulted

        in the Contempt and Sanctions Orders were a discrete dispute process resolved within the

        vast Bestwall bankruptcy case.

               I am not alone in this view. The Supreme Court is my primary ally because it has

        recognized that contempt proceedings have a life of their own, independent of the

        underlying lawsuit where they arose. See Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 221 (1932)

        (ruling by Supreme Court that contempt decree is appealable because it “finally adjudicated

        the rights asserted by it”); see also Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic

        Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 378 (1985); 15B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

        Practice & Procedure § 3917 (2d ed.) (explaining — consistent with Supreme Court

        precedent — that “contempt proceedings against a nonparty are intrinsically separate” from

        the underlying litigation). And the intrinsically separate nature of contempt proceedings

        has not been ignored in the context of § 158(a). See In re Stasz, 387 B.R. 271 (B.A.P. 9th

        Cir. 2008) (ruling in bankruptcy case that final contempt order was immediately appealable

        under § 158(a), because it was “a final order that ended the particular contested matter,”

        and if such an order were not appealable, “it is unclear when the order would become final

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        and appealable [because] . . . the culmination of the bankruptcy case does not result in a

        final judgment.”); see also In re Nelson, 2016 WL 7321196 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2016).

                                                    D.

              Finally, I will respond briefly to the majority’s invocation of finality concerns —

        see supra at 9-10. Although finality is a lofty goal, a pragmatic approach to the issue of

        finality is always “essential to the achievement of the just, speedy, and inexpensive

        determination of every action: the touchstones of federal procedure.” Brown Shoe Co. v.

        United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore

        should not champion finality to the detriment of the practical and sweeping consequences

        imposed by the Contempt and Sanctions Orders. And the inability of practicing lawyers to

        appeal the Contempt and Sanctions Orders will have serious ramifications, which will be

        starkly exacerbated by the protracted nature of bankruptcy proceedings.

              This situation is a perfect example. In 2017, Bestwall initiated these bankruptcy

        proceedings in the Western District of North Carolina. The scale and importance of

        Bestwall’s bankruptcy have resulted in substantial delays — seven years already — which

        will continue. If the Illinois Claimants and Maune Raichle cannot appeal now, they will

        be branded as contemnors for the indefinite future, and they will carry with them at least

        $402,000 of sanctions for contempt of court, plus interest. And if these Contempt and

        Sanctions Orders hold up, the Illinois Claimants may pursue an untold number of

        malpractice claims against their own lawyers to avoid this newfound financial liability.

               Aside from potential litigation issues, the Contempt and Sanctions Orders will

        impact the law firm’s reputation and the potential careers of its several lawyers. Any

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        lawyer representing and serving the Illinois Claimants risks additional sanctions by ethics

        committees, and also by courts that issue law licenses. Indeed, in Illinois — and in most

        other jurisdictions — lawyers held in contempt of court are on a tragic path towards

        grievous professional consequences, including disbarment. See In re Weston, 442 N.E.2d

        236, 240 (Ill. 1982); see also Matter of Jafree, 741 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1984)

        (recognizing that “disbarment was one of three sanctions imposed on the [attorney] for his

        contempt”). I emphasize that other ethical considerations are at play, including that all

        lawyers have the unrelenting responsibility to “zealously assert” the rights of their clients.

        See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT PREAMBLE (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).                           That

        responsibility could well encompass the pursuit by Maune Raichle of the Illinois lawsuit

        on behalf of their clients, the Illinois Claimants. And the situation they faced may have

        been more appropriate for a contested court proceeding in Illinois rather than for contempt

        proceedings in a North Carolina bankruptcy court.

               Multiple additional hardships will result. These Contempt and Sanctions Orders

        will severely strain attorney-client relationships. Maune Raichle — as would any law firm

        in its position — will probably face ethical dilemmas. For example, settlement offers could

        well include proposals regarding contempt sanctions that Maune Raichle sees as favorable.

        But its clients, the Illinois Claimants — comprised mostly of representatives of estates of

        deceased American citizens impacted by Georgia-Pacific’s asbestos-laden products — will

        not view any such offers with favor.

               The foregoing recitation demands, in my view, that the lawyers at Maune Raichle

        be treated better, and that they and the Illinois Claimants be accorded a prompt appellate

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        review of the propriety of the Contempt and Sanctions Orders. Our failure to accord them

        that appeal is misguided and unjustified.

               For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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