Court Opinion

ID: 9761248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:35:57.351095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.975331
License: Public Domain

OPINION
DOUGLAS, Judge.
The appeal is from an order in a habeas corpus proceeding remanding appellant to custody for extradition to the State of Louisiana.
The executive warrant of the Governor of Texas was introduced. It recites that the appellant “ * * * stands charged by Information, Supporting Affidavit, Warrant before the proper authorities, with the crime of armed robbery contrary to L.R.S. 14:27. * * *” The warrant being regular on its face made a prima facie case for extradition. Ex parte Starks, Tex.Cr.App., 464 S.W.2d 837.
It is contended that the supporting papers do not show that she was charged with a crime in the State of Louisiana, since it is presumed that the laws there are the same as those in Texas.
The appellant introduced some of the supporting papers including the application for requisition which recites that she was charged “with violating R.S. 14:27(64), relative to attempted armed robbery * * The information alleges that she, while armed with a revolver, attempted to commit a robbery upon David A. Walsdorf.
Ex parte Burns, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 533, 322 S.W.2d 289, is relied upon by the appellant. There this Court noted that the supporting papers showed a charge of “an attempt to commit sodomy” and held that this did not charge an offense under the laws of Texas, and in the absence of a showing that such was a violation of the laws of the demanding state he could not be extradited.
We upheld the extradition proceedings where one was charged with “the Crime of Issuing a No Funds Check” where it was contended that there was no such offense in Texas in Ex parte Carroll, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 462, 351 S.W.2d 228. There it was insisted that our Article 567b, Section la, V.A.P.C., made it an offense to give a check without sufficient funds with intent to defraud and’ that the Kansas complaint was insufficient for extradition because it did not allege with intent to defraud.
It is concluded that the allegations in the information in the instant case are sufficient to substantially charge the appellant with assault with intent to rob. Article 1163 and Article 1165, V.A.P.C.
The fact that the executive warrant recites that the appellant stood charged with armed robbery does not vitiate the proceedings. The information shows that the appellant was substantially charged with the lesser included offense of robbery by assault. In Texas, a robbery by assault can be prosecuted under an indictment charging robbery with firearms. Tomlin v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 207, 233 S.W.2d 303. There is no material variance between the executive warrant and the information.
The contention that an application for requisition must be signed by the attorney general of the demanding state because Article 51.13, Section 23, Subdivision 1, V. A.C.C.P., reads “state’s attorney” is without merit. We have held that such an application may be signed by a deputy county attorney, Ex parte Peterson, Tex.Cr.App., 409 S.W.2d 851; a county attorney, Ex parte York, Tex.Cr.App., 417 S.W.2d 411, and an assistant district attorney, Ex parte Sutton, Tex.Cr.App., 455 S.W.2d 274.
In the instant case the requisition was signed by a district attorney.
Next, it is contended that the information shows the offense occurred in 1964 and that the prosecution would be barred by the Louisiana statute of limitations. The record contains bond forfeiture *686proceedings and shows the appellant to have resided in California and in Texas.
Limitations are a matter of defense and must be asserted on the trial by the defendant in criminal cases. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of the City of New York, 245 U.S. 128, 38 S.Ct. 41, 62 L.Ed. 193 (1917).
In Ex parte Horsley, Tex.Cr.App., 460 S.W.2d 906, it was contended that extradition should be denied, because Horsley had been denied a speedy trial. This Court held that this was a factual matter for the demanding state to decide along with the interpretation of its laws. See Ex parte Watson, Tex.Cr.App., 455 S.W.2d 300.
The contention that the statement in the requisition that the State of Louisiana would not be responsible for any expense in the extradition proceedings has no bearing on the legality of the extradition proceedings. Whether the demanding state or its political subdivisions pay the expense is for them to decide. Our statutes provide that the commissioners court of the county where the offense is alleged to have been committed or where the prosecution is pending may pay such expenses. Article 51.13, Section 24, V.A.C.C.P.
Lastly, it is contended that since the affidavit in support of the information was made after the information was filed, there is no affidavit in support of the information under Article 51.13, Section 3, V.A.C.C.P.
We have held that an information together with an affidavit sworn to subsequently to the date of the information is sufficient to authorize extradition. Ex parte Collins, Tex.Cr.App., 468 S.W.2d 409; Ex parte Drennan, Tex.Cr.App., 461 S.W.2d 420; Ex parte Peairs, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 243, 283 S.W.2d 755.
The judgment remanding appellant to custody is affirmed.