Court Opinion

ID: 9958953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 14:11:59.876446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:08.098992
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Aldrin Gratts                                 :
                                              :
       v.                                     : No. 1324 C.D. 2020
                                              :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania                  :
Department of Transportation,                 :
Bureau of Driver Licensing,                   :
                  Appellant                   : Submitted: March 8, 2024

BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                                      FILED: April 10, 2024

       The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau
of Driver Licensing (DOT) appeals from the December 1, 2020 Order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (Trial Court), which sustained the appeal of
Aldrin Gratts (Licensee) from the one-year suspension of his operating privilege
imposed by DOT under Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §
1547(b)(1)(i),1 commonly known as the Implied Consent Law, due to his refusal to
submit to chemical testing following his arrest for DUI. Because we conclude that
the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Licensee’s statutory appeal, we vacate

       1
           Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Implied Consent Law states:

       If any person placed under arrest for a violation of [S]ection 3802 [of the Vehicle
       Code (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance
       (DUI)), 75 Pa. C.S. § 3802,] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses
       to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer,
       [DOT] shall suspend the operating privilege of the person . . . for a period of 12
       months.

75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i).
the Trial Court’s Order and direct DOT to reinstate the one-year suspension of
Licensee’s operating privilege.2

                                      Background
       On July 6, 2019, DOT issued a Notice of Suspension to Licensee, informing
him that his operating privilege would be suspended for a period of one year,
effective August 10, 2019, due to his refusal to submit to chemical testing on June
7, 2019. On August 5, 2019, Licensee filed a statutory appeal with the Trial Court.
       On October 10, 2019, the Trial Court entered the following Order:

       [U]pon agreement of the parties, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND
       DECREED the above-captioned license suspension appeal is
       WITHDRAWN. The suspension is to become effective April 7, 2020
       [,] provided there are no active or pending sanctions on [Licensee’s]
       driving record and [Licensee] does not incur any other operating
       privilege sanctions between the date of this Order and the effective date
       of the suspension.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 22a (emphasis added).
       Consistent with the parties’ agreement, on October 25, 2019, DOT issued an
Additional Notice of Suspension to Licensee, informing him that his operating
privilege would be suspended for a period of one year, effective April 7, 2020, due
to his refusal to submit to chemical testing on June 7, 2019.
       On January 7, 2020, a jury trial commenced on Licensee’s underlying criminal
DUI charges. On January 8, 2020, the jury acquitted Licensee of one DUI count,
but was deadlocked on the second DUI count, resulting in a mistrial on the second
count. The Commonwealth subsequently nolle prossed the second DUI count.

       2
          By Order entered September 11, 2023, this Court precluded Licensee from filing an
appellate brief due to his failure to comply with the Court’s briefing schedule.

                                            2
      Six months later, on July 14, 2020, Licensee filed with the Trial Court a
Petition for Permission to File Nunc Pro Tunc Appeal (Petition), seeking to appeal
from DOT’s October 25, 2019 Additional Notice of Suspension. In his Petition,
Licensee averred that he previously filed a timely appeal of the original suspension;
he agreed to withdraw that appeal in exchange for a six-month deferral of his
suspension; and due to “unexpected” testimony during the criminal trial
corroborating his claim of an “anxiety attack” at the time of his arrest, he should be
permitted to appeal the present suspension nunc pro tunc. R.R. at 4a-5a. Licensee
also averred that his appeal was untimely because he lost his job due to the DUI
charges and “used up all of his available financial resources to pay attorney fees and
other expenses associated with [the criminal] trial.” Id. at 5a. Finally, Licensee
averred that although he was “never guilty of the crime of DUI, nor any other crime,”
he “suffered significant financial harm, as well as irreparable harm to his reputation”
because of the criminal charges. Id. According to Licensee, “[t]he allowance of a
[n]unc [p]ro [t]unc appeal would, at least in part, begin to remedy” these alleged
wrongs. Id. at 6a.
      The Trial Court held a hearing on the Petition on August 10, 2020. At the
hearing, Licensee’s counsel argued in support of a nunc pro tunc appeal as follows:

      [N]ew information that I received would include that [Pennsylvania
      State Police] Trooper [Michael J.] Tracy had previously told me that he
      had . . . a dash cam[era] video of the event, which would support all of
      his assertions going into trial. That [video] never materialized. It was
      not presented as evidence at trial. . . .

             Perhaps, more importantly, . . . during jury deliberations I
      actually witnessed [Licensee] having an anxiety attack. He held it
      together throughout his testimony, but while we were waiting for the
      jury to deliberate and reach a verdict, I actually witnessed what happens
      to him when his anxiety flairs up. It’s a physical reaction, gasping. He

                                          3
      actually wound up with a little bit of saliva on his tie because he
      couldn’t control his breathing. I’m not really around people that have
      anxiety. Had I known that was his sort of reaction to that, I might have
      been more aggressive with the appeal. . . .

R.R. at 9a (emphasis added). Licensee’s counsel further argued:

      [Licensee] was never guilty of the crime of DUI or any other crime.
      He’s already suffered significant financial harm, as well as harm to his
      reputation, and his inability to legally drive a vehicle further impairs his
      ability to earn an income or to enjoy the kind of life that most non-guilty
      people enjoy.

             So, Judge, if you’re willing to grant this nunc pro tunc and allow
      us to appeal the refusal [of chemical testing] based on his anxiety at the
      time, I believe, the interest of equity and justice would be served.

Id. (emphasis added).
      At the conclusion of the hearing, the Trial Court granted Licensee’s Petition,
concluding as follows:

      I’ve considered all the submissions, and while I realize there’s no[]
      claim of fraud, as such, there is overall a set of extraordinary
      circumstances where . . . Trooper [Tracy], presumably in good faith,
      made an assertion that there will be a video of everything, which failed
      to materialize, and that resulted in an extraordinary burden on
      [Licensee] to have to defend himself to the nines in matters that were
      ultimately determined in his favor; and in light of the overall
      circumstances, I believe, this does present the kind of extraordinary
      grounds on which [Licensee] should be granted nunc pro tunc relief to
      file an appeal.

R.R. at 10a (emphasis added); see id. at 24a.

                                           4
       On November 9, 2020, the Trial Court held a de novo hearing on the merits
of Licensee’s statutory appeal. Following the hearing, on December 1, 2020, the
Trial Court sustained Licensee’s appeal. DOT now appeals from that decision.3
                                           Analysis
       Before this Court, DOT asserts that the Trial Court erred in permitting
Licensee to proceed with a nunc pro tunc statutory appeal. DOT asserts that
Licensee failed to establish that his untimely appeal was the result of extraordinary
circumstances involving fraud or an administrative breakdown and, therefore, the
Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of his appeal. We agree.
                                          1. Waiver
       Preliminarily, we observe that although DOT addresses the timeliness issue
in its appellate brief, it failed to include the issue in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement
of Errors Complained of on Appeal (1925(b) Statement). Ordinarily, the failure to
raise a particular issue in a 1925(b) Statement results in waiver of the issue on appeal.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not
raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph . . . are waived.”).
However, questions of subject matter jurisdiction are non-waivable and may be
raised at any time, even on appeal, by the parties or by the court sua sponte.
Williamson v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 129 A.3d 597, 601 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2015); see also Alexander v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing,
880 A.2d 552, 556 (Pa. 2005) (“[DOT] correctly notes that subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any stage in the litigation;
therefore, we will address this issue notwithstanding [DOT’s] failure to raise it

       3
         Where the trial court permits an untimely appeal to proceed nunc pro tunc, our review is
limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law.
Lajevic v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 718 A.2d 371, 372 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).

                                                5
sooner.”). The timeliness of Licensee’s statutory appeal implicates the Trial Court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. See Williamson, 129 A.3d at 601 (“[A]ppeals filed
beyond the 30-day appeal period are untimely and deprive the trial court of subject
matter jurisdiction over the appeals.”). Therefore, we conclude that DOT has not
waived this issue by failing to include it in its 1925(b) Statement.
                              2. Nunc Pro Tunc Appeal
       A licensee has 30 days from the mailing date of DOT’s notice of suspension
to file a timely appeal with the trial court. Section 5571(b) and 5572 of the Judicial
Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 5571(b), 5572. Here, DOT’s Additional Notice of Suspension
bore a “mail date” of October 25, 2019, so Licensee had 30 days from that date, or
until November 25, 2019, to file a timely appeal.4 It is undisputed that Licensee’s
appeal, filed on July 14, 2020, was untimely, as it was filed almost eight months
beyond the 30-day deadline.
       “[S]tatutory appeal periods are mandatory and may not be extended as a
matter of grace or mere indulgence.” Hudson v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 830 A.2d 594, 598-99 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Nonetheless, a court may
allow an appeal nunc pro tunc where the untimely filing was caused by
“extraordinary circumstances involving fraud or a breakdown in the court’s
operations through a default of its officers which has resulted in injury to the
appealing party.” Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Lang, 610 A.2d
1076, 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (emphasis added). Leave to appeal nunc pro tunc
may also be granted when the appeal is filed late due to non-negligent circumstances
on the part of the appellant or his counsel. See Cook v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Rev., 671 A.2d 1130, 1132 (Pa. 1996). Our Supreme Court has clarified, however,

       4
         Because the thirtieth day fell on a Sunday, Licensee had until Monday, November 25,
2019, to file a timely appeal.

                                             6
that the exception for “non-negligent circumstances is meant to apply only in unique
and compelling cases in which the appellant has clearly established that he
attempted to file an appeal, but unforeseeable and unavoidable events precluded him
from actually doing so.” Criss v. Wise, 781 A.2d 1156, 1160 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis
added).
      Before the Trial Court, Licensee maintained that he should be permitted to
appeal nunc pro tunc due to “unexpected” evidence that arose during his criminal
trial, as well as the favorable outcome of the criminal trial. See R.R. at 5a-6a. It is
well established, however, that “a licensee’s guilt or innocence on the related
criminal charges has no bearing on [civil] license suspension proceedings.” Zwibel
v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 832 A.2d 599, 605 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2003) (emphasis added); see also Fetherman v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 167 A.3d 846, 854 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (“A license suspension stemming
from a refusal to submit to chemical testing is a separate administrative proceeding
from a criminal DUI proceeding arising out of the same incident. It is not a crime
to refuse chemical testing under [the] Implied Consent Law.”) (emphasis added);
Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Lefever, 533 A.2d 501, 503 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1987) (“Regardless of the disposition of the criminal charge, the
suspension resulting from a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol level test is an
independent civil proceeding.”) (emphasis added).
      In granting Licensee’s Petition, the Trial Court found that Trooper Tracy’s
failure to produce the dash camera video during the criminal trial placed an
“extraordinary burden on [Licensee] to have to defend himself to the nines in matters
that were ultimately determined in his favor.” R.R. at 10a. However, the basis of
Licensee’s operating privilege suspension was his refusal to submit to chemical

                                          7
testing at the time of his arrest under the Implied Consent Law, which was not at
issue in the criminal proceedings. See Fetherman, 167 A.3d at 854.5
       Licensee also argued that the Trial Court should permit his untimely appeal
because he lost his job due to the DUI charges and expended significant financial
resources on the criminal trial. However, financial hardship is not a proper basis for
granting a nunc pro tunc appeal. See Carney v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.,
181 A.3d 1286, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (“The pressure of life events is . . .
insufficient to excuse an untimely [statutory] appeal.”); see also Jones v. Dep’t of
Transp., Bureau of Motor Vehicles (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 95 C.D. 2020, filed Feb. 19,
2021), slip op. at 11 (holding that “[a]lthough [the licensee] experienced financial
hardship,” “this does not constitute fraud or administrative or judicial breakdown as
related to []DOT that meets the standard contemplated under nunc pro tunc relief”);
Rabe v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1785 C.D. 2013, filed
Feb. 24, 2014) (denying nunc pro tunc relief to a claimant who was dealing with
financial stress and multiple pending court cases during the statutory appeal period).6
Rather, Licensee was required to establish “extraordinary circumstances involving
fraud or a breakdown in the court’s operations through a default of its officers,”
Lang, 610 A.2d at 1077, which he failed to do.

       5
          To support a license suspension under the Implied Consent Law, DOT must prove that
the licensee: (1) was arrested for a violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle Code by a police officer
with reasonable grounds to believe that he was driving, operating, or in actual physical control of
the movement of a vehicle while under the influence; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test
of his blood or breath; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was specifically warned that a refusal would
result in the suspension of his operating privilege. Garlick v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 176 A.3d 1030, 1035 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (en banc).

       6
         We may cite unreported panel decisions as persuasive authority pursuant to Section
414(a) of our Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                                  8
                                          Conclusion
       We conclude that Licensee failed to establish extraordinary circumstances
involving fraud or a breakdown in the court’s operations justifying an appeal nunc
pro tunc. Licensee also failed to establish that he attempted to file a timely appeal,
but unforeseeable and unavoidable events prevented him from doing so. As such,
the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of his untimely appeal.7
Accordingly, we vacate the Trial Court’s Order and direct DOT to reinstate the one-
year suspension of Licensee’s operating privilege.

                                              ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

       7
         In light of our conclusion that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Licensee’s
statutory appeal, we do not reach DOT’s remaining issues on the merits of the underlying license
suspension.

                                                 9
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Aldrin Gratts                           :
                                        :
      v.                                : No. 1324 C.D. 2020
                                        :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania            :
Department of Transportation,           :
Bureau of Driver Licensing,             :
                  Appellant             :

                                       ORDER

      AND NOW, this 10th day of April, 2024, the December 1, 2020 Order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County is hereby VACATED.                The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing is hereby DIRECTED TO REINSTATE the one-year suspension of
Aldrin Gratts’s operating privilege.

                                        ELLEN CEISLER, Judge