Court Opinion

ID: 9417421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:14:53.883459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.305311
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan
concurring.
I concur in the opinion just delivered by Mr. Justice Field, and will add'- a few suggestions in support of the conclusion reached by the court.
It is contended, on behalf of the railroad company, that if it used ordinary care in the selection of the employe to whose negligence the plaintiff’s injuries are attributed, it is protected from liability by section 1130 of the Dakota code, even if such -culpable employé had superior or controlling authority over the injured employé, and even if the injuries were caused by the defective condition of the appliances and machinery provided by the.company through its agents for the use of the employé so injured. For — it is argued — the words “the same general business” in that section embrace "every branch or department of the. common employer’s business, • and no . distinction is ..therein made between employés in respect of grades or the ’. nature of the particular service rendered by them. Even if that were admitted to be a proper construction of section 1130, .standing by itself, the inquiry still arises as to the object of section 1131, .which declares that the employer “ must, in all oases, indemnify his employé for losses caused by the former’s want of ordinary care.” The latter section was plainly intended to cover ■ cases not provided for in the preceding sec*657tion. If one section applies to corporations, the other equally applies to them. . The two sections must be construed together. And so construed, it is manifest that, while the statute establishes the rule that the employer is not bound to indemnify his employé “ for losses suffered by the latter in consequence of the ordinary-risks of the business in which he is employed, nor in consequence of the negligence of another person, employed by the same employer in the same general business,” it; ajso, with.equal distinctness, declares two exceptions to that rule: 1. "Where the employer- has neglected to use ordinary care in the selection of the employé whose negligence caused the losses in question. 2. Where the'losses were- caused by the-' employ er’sr own want of ordinary care. The latter exception is as explicitly declared as -is the former, and cannot, be ignored or nullified by construction.
"What case is more distinctly within "section 1131 than, one where, a railroad company" fails to appoint some one to provide and maintain machinery and appliances safe and suitable for use by its employés, or where its a^ent or employé, appointed-to that duty, does not exercise ordinary care in its- discharge'? Such an agent or employé is, of necessity, the representative of the corporation, and his- want of ordinary care, in respect of such matters, is negligence upon the part of the corporation itself. It cannot, in reference to those matters, whatever it may, be permitted to do in reference' to other matters connected with its business, “ interpose between it and the servant who has been injured, without fault on his part, the personal .responsibility of an agent.” That is clearly shown in the opinion of. the court. Between an agent;; charged with the performance • of the company’s duty to prove and maintain safe and suitable appliances and machinery, and the employés who use them, the relation of fellow-servants does not exist. The want of ordinary care upon his part, is, in the' language of section 1131, ' and according to the weight of judicial authority, a want of ordinary care upon the part of the corporation itself. This case, therefore, comes within that section.
Mr. Justice Blatchford, with whom concurred Mr. Justice *658Bradley, Mr. Justice Matthews, and Mr. Justice Gray, dissenting.
Mr. Justice Bradley, Mr. Justice Matthews, Mr. Justice Gray and myself are unable to concur in the judgment of the court in this case.
The Civil Code of Dakota (sections 6 and 2129), provides as follows:
' “Sec. 6. In this Territory there is no common law, in any case where the law is declared by the Codes.”
“ Sec. 2129. The rule of the common law, that statutes in .'derogation thereof are to b,e strictly construed, has no application to this Code. This Cpde-, establishes the law of this. Territory respecting the subjects to which it relates; and its provisions' are to be liberally construed, with a view to effect ■its objects and to promote justice.”
The rules of the common law are, therefore, not applicable, in Dakota, in any case where the statute law is declared in the •.Civil Code, on the subject, and that statute law is not to be construed- strictly, but liberally, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.
■Now, what, is the statute law of Dakota on the subject involved in this case? It is-found in sections 1129, 1130 and 1131 of the Civil Code, as follows:
"Sec. 1129. An employer must indemnify his employé, except as prescribed in the next section, for all that he necessarily expends or loses in direct consequence of the discharge of his duties as such, or of his ■ obedience to the directions of the employer, even though unlawful, unless- the employé, at the time of obeying such directions, believed them to be unlawful.
“Sec. 1130. An employer is-not bound to indemnify his employé for losses suffered by the latter in consequence of the ordinary risks of the business in which he is employed, nor in consequence of the negligence of another person employed by the same employer in the same general business, unless he has neglected to use ordinary care in the selection of the culpable.employé.
“ Sec. 1131. An employer must, in all cases, indemnify his employé for .losses caused by the former’s want of ordinary care.”
These provisions are very clear. The language used in sec*659tion 1130, “another person employed by the same employer.in the same general business,” indicates that, in the view of the three sections of the Code in question, a co-employé is another; person employed with, the employé, by the same employer, in the same general business. Therefore, wherever the word “ employé ” is used in any one of the three sections, it means a person who may be such a co-employé.
By section 1129, the railroad company is not bound' to indemnify Herbert, except as prescribed in section 1130, for what he necessarily expended or lost by discharging the duty he did, in reference to the freight cars. What is prescribed in section 1130 is this: The company is not bound to indemnify Herbert for what he so lost in consequence of the negligepce of his co-employés in the same general business, unless the company neglected ordinary care in the selection of such coemployés. No want of care in such selection is alleged, and the action is sought to be maintained, and the verdict for the plaintiff tíiay have been rendered, not on the neglect of the corporation itself to provide and maintain suitable cars, brakes, draw-bars, and bumpers, but on the neglect of inferior employés of the corporation to keep them in repair. This is clearly shown by the refusal of the Court to .instruct the jury, • as requested by. the defendant, that the plaintiff could not recover by “ reason of any acts of negligence on the part of any - other persons employed by the defendant in the same general. business with the plaintiff,” and that “this would include the-yard-master and car-repairer; ” and by the fact, that, on the contrary, it instructed them, that “the negligence of those entrusted by the corporation with the power and duty of procuring or keeping in repair such machinery is, in law, the negligence of the corporation.”
It is sought to destroy the application of sections 1129 and 1130 to this case, by invoking the rule set forth in section 1131, that “ an employer' must, in all cases, indemnify his employé for losses caused by the former’s want of ordinary care,” and by saying, that, in this case, the company did not exercise ordinary care, because the co-employés of Herbert were guilty of .the negligence which caused his injury. But that is the very *660case provided for by section 1130; and the doctrine of the court comes to this, in Dakota, that even though a railroad'corporation, acting by its board of directors, exercises ordinary care in the.selection of its employés, and provides adequate and competent machinery, outfit and appliances, and prescribes proper rules and regulations for their use, ahd has no knowledge or notice of 'any defects in them, and no circumstances-■exist sufficient to charge it with such knowledge or notice, it is guilty of .want of ordinary care, within section 1131, towards án employé who is injured by the negligence of his co-emplo’yés in the! same general business, by the mere fact of the happening of such injury through such negligence, although Section 1130 distinctly declares, that, in such a case, the employer shall not be liable to the injured employé.
It is a rule for.the -construction of statutory provisions, especially those embraced in the same statute, that all must be construed so that all shall have effect, .if possible. There is ample scope for the application of section 1131, by limiting it tó cases not embraced within section 1130. Otherwise, no force is given to section 1130.
The failure to give proper effect to section 1130 is the more marked, because," with one exception, the only authorities cited’ in the opinion of the court, to sustain its views, are cases decided' where the common law prevails, and not where such statutory provisions as those in Dakota exist — provisions which declare that the common law is abrogated as to the subject-matter of the controversy in this suit.
Sections 4, 1969, 1970, and 1971, of the Civil Code of California, are the same, respectively, as sections 2129, 1129,1130, and 1131, of the Civil Code of Dakota. But there is nothing in the case of Beeson v. Green Mountain Gold Mining Co., 57 Cal. 20, cited in the opinion of the majority of the court, which sanctions the view that the yard-master or the car-repairer in the'present case was not “ a person employed in the same general business ” with Herbert, within the meaning of such a statute.
Considering the case to be governed by the. local statute, we express no opinion upon the question whether the instructions given to the jury accorded with the rules of the common law.