Court Opinion

ID: 9399741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 13:12:54.700766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:03.404091
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 45

                  SUPREME COURT          OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2018AP2005-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:        State of Wisconsin,
                                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                       Garland Dean Barnes,
                                 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

                          REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                          Reported at 397 Wis. 2d 241,959 N.W.2d 75
                                     (2021 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         June 6, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         October 3, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Douglas
   JUDGE:              Kelly J. Thimm

JUSTICES:
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a
unanimous Court. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which ROGGENSACK, J., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Cole Daniel Ruby and Martinez & Ruby, LLP, Baraboo.
There was an oral argument by Cole Daniel Ruby.

       For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by
John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general, with whom on the
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument by John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general.
                                                                         2023 WI 45
                                                                 NOTICE
                                                   This opinion is subject to further
                                                   editing and modification.   The final
                                                   version will appear in the bound
                                                   volume of the official reports.
No.    2018AP2005-CR
(L.C. No.   2013CF118)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                             :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

            Plaintiff-Respondent,                                     FILED
      v.                                                          JUN 6, 2023
Garland Dean Barnes,                                                Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                 Clerk of Supreme Court
            Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a
unanimous Court. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which ROGGENSACK, J., joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                  Affirmed.

      ¶1    REBECCA      GRASSL    BRADLEY,   J.     This     case     raises      two

issues.     The first concerns the right of a criminal defendant to

be confronted with the witnesses against him under the Sixth

Amendment    to   the     United    States    Constitution.            The     second

concerns harmless error.

      ¶2       Garland Dean Barnes was charged with delivering more

than 50 grams of methamphetamine.             As a discovery sanction, the
circuit court prohibited Agent Duane Clauer from testifying at
                                                                      No.   2018AP2005-CR

the trial.1        During the trial, the State asked another officer

about Clauer's observations during a "controlled buy," i.e., a

police setup to catch someone selling drugs.                          Barnes objected,

arguing the testimony would be hearsay.                         The State responded

that it was not seeking to introduce hearsay because it was not

planning     to    use   the   testimony        for    the    truth    of   the    matter

asserted.      Instead, the State claimed the testimony would show

why this other officer thought Barnes had sold meth (i.e., the

other officer's state of mind).                   The court overruled Barnes's

objection.        The jury found him guilty.                A judgment of conviction

was entered, and Barnes sought postconviction relief, arguing

his confrontation right had been violated.                         The circuit court

denied      relief.      Barnes    appealed,          and    the   court    of    appeals

affirmed the circuit court's denial, reasoning the testimony was

not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.                                State v.

Barnes, No. 2018AP2005-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶33, 35 (Wis.

Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2021) (per curiam).                    The court of appeals also

indicated that if an error occurred, it was harmless.                            Id., ¶35
n.7.

       ¶3     We assume without deciding that Barnes's confrontation

right was violated; however, we hold the error was harmless.

Among other considerations, the evidence of Barnes's guilt was

overwhelming.            Accordingly,       "the       guilty      verdict       actually

rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."

       The Honorable
       1                       Kelly   J.       Thimm,      Douglas    County     Circuit
Court, presided.

                                            2
                                                                          No.    2018AP2005-CR

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).                                We therefore

affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

                                       I.    BACKGROUND

       ¶4        Charles    Marciniak,         a       police   informant,      told   police

that       a    man   he   knew   as    "Dean"——later           identified      as   Barnes——

offered to sell him meth.2                   Marciniak also explained Barnes was

able to make the sale that same day.                        An email from an assistant

district attorney explained that Marciniak faced serious felony

charges and received a favorable sentencing recommendation for

participating in multiple controlled buys.                          Marciniak testified

he did not receive any promise from the State before he decided

to participate in the buys.

       ¶5        In response, Sergeant Franz Winterscheidt assembled a

team to catch Barnes selling meth to Marciniak.                            In addition to

Winterscheidt, the team included two officers who testified at

the trial, Investigator Jason Tanski and Sergeant James Madden.

The team also consisted of other officers who did not testify,

including Agent Clauer.
       ¶6        Police first recorded four phone conversations between

Marciniak and Barnes.             The recordings took place in the presence

of police and were played for the jury.

       ¶7        At about 5:20 p.m., Marciniak called Barnes.                          Barnes

said       he   was   a    mere   "40       minutes      away."     The    controlled     buy

occurred around 6:15 p.m., rendering events between this call

and the buy temporally proximate.

       2   Marciniak had prior criminal convictions.

                                                   3
                                                                     No.         2018AP2005-CR

       ¶8     Barnes called Marciniak about 15 minutes later, and

the two discussed where to meet.                       Barnes suggested "my little

spot,"      but    Marciniak    did    not       know    what    that       meant.        When

Marciniak     questioned       Barnes,    Barnes        mentioned       a    "motel,"      but

Marciniak remained confused.               Marciniak testified that the two

had generally met in the parking lot of a bar.                          The two did not

explicitly agree to meet at a particular location during the

phone calls, but Marciniak advised police the controlled buy

would take place in the bar parking lot.                       Sergeant Winterscheidt

testified, based on his training and experience, that the call

involved "coded talk for the arrangement of a drug transaction."

       ¶9     The     recording   of     the      third     call    picked          up    only

Marciniak's         voice.      Sergeant         Winterscheidt,         who       was     with

Marciniak during the call, explained that he could hear two

voices,      but    only     Marciniak's         was    recorded    because          another

officer plugged an earbud into the wrong audio jack.                                    In the

recording, Marciniak said:             "Hello.          Two?     Alright.         I'll take

'em.     You're gonna have to -- you're gonna have to run up again
then maybe.         You might have to see me sooner than next weekend.

What's that?          Right on.       Well then, 4?              Alright.          Do that.

Alright.      Bye."

       ¶10    Marciniak's      dialogue      in    the    recording         of    the    third

call is consistent with Sergeant Winterscheidt's testimony as

well as Marciniak's.            Winterscheidt identified the other voice

as Barnes's.         Winterscheidt testified the conversation was about

"the quantity of meth[] that was expected to be delivered,"
although Winterscheidt admitted on cross-examination that he had
                                             4
                                                                No.     2018AP2005-CR

trouble hearing Barnes's "specific words[.]"                    After the call

ended,     but     while     the     recording      device     was      still    on,

Winterscheidt said, "I need that other 1800."                         Winterscheidt

explained   Marciniak        initially     "believed"      Barnes    would    sell   3

ounces of meth for $1,800 an ounce, so Winterscheidt knew more

money would be needed after the third call.

     ¶11    Marciniak explained that during the third call Barnes

offered to sell two ounces of meth.               Marciniak responded that he

would like more to avoid having to meet again soon.                    Barnes then

proposed four ounces.          Marciniak agreed and planned to purchase

four ounces for $1,800 an ounce, for a total price of $7,200.

Marciniak        testified     he    had       initially     informed        Sergeant

Winterscheidt that he was not sure how much he could buy but

expected about three ounces, so Winterscheidt knew he needed

more money after the call.               Importantly, the exact amount of

drugs to be sold was not agreed upon until shortly before the

controlled buy.           Barnes placed a fourth call to Marciniak to

tell him, "I'm probably gonna be there 7, 8 minutes."
     ¶12    Sergeant Winterscheidt testified that police prepared

Marciniak for the controlled buy.                 Police thoroughly searched

Marciniak's person——except for his private areas——and his truck,

looking for currency and contraband.3              Marciniak testified police

patted   him      down,    checked   inside      his   socks    and    shoes,    and

     3 Sergeant Winterscheidt personally searched Marciniak. Who
searched Marciniak's vehicle is unclear from the record, but
multiple officers and Marciniak testified it was in fact
searched.

                                           5
                                                                 No.    2018AP2005-CR

searched his truck.            Finding neither currency nor contraband,

police fitted Marciniak with a recording device and sent him to

the bar parking lot with $7,200 in marked bills inside a white

plastic bag.         Officers followed "within viewing distance."

      ¶13     According to Marciniak, he entered the parking lot in

his truck and parked next to Barnes's truck, with the driver's-

side doors facing each other.              Marciniak testified he threw the

bag of money into Barnes's truck, and then Barnes threw back a

black box.       Marciniak noticed Barnes's girlfriend, Bobbi Reed,

in   Barnes's    truck.        Marciniak       testified   he   was    "one-hundred

percent" certain that Barnes, not Reed, tossed the box.

      ¶14     Police watched from a distance.                Investigator Tanski

testified he could see Marciniak's parked truck and watched as

another truck approached.             The officer noted the vehicles parked

with both driver's-side doors facing one another and the other

truck left "relatively fast," although he could not see the

actual transaction from his angle.                  Sergeant Madden explained

the buy occurred "very quick."                  The testimony of the various
officers    indicates        some    officers    arrived    shortly     before   the

controlled buy and others shortly after.

      ¶15     The controlled buy was not videotaped, and the audio

picked   up     by    the    recording     device    Marciniak     wore    was   not

introduced.           Sergeant      Winterscheidt    noted      that   "we've    had

investigators          spotted      conducting      video       surveillance      on

controlled buys.            It makes it difficult."          He explained video

cameras are used "selectively" in controlled buys.                         In this
case, officers did not know where the buy was going to take
                                           6
                                                                       No.    2018AP2005-CR

place      until    part     way   through       "the    process       of    forming     the

team[.]"           Under    the    circumstances,         Winterscheidt         testified

police did not have time to set up covert video surveillance.

Investigator        Tanski    confirmed,         "the   location       was    set     during

those phone calls.           So it was a very short time from one of the

last       phone    calls    to    where     the       location      was     determined."

Sergeant Madden also explained that because the buy happened on

a Sunday, "[i]t was hard to find investigators to come in,"

which       seems    to     have    contributed         to    the      lack    of      video

surveillance.

       ¶16    Sergeant       Winterscheidt         testified         that     after      the

controlled buy, he received a radio call from an unidentified

officer      informing       him   that    "it     went      down,     deal    is     done."

Thereafter,         Winterscheidt     gave       the    order     to    arrest      Barnes.

Barnes noticed police were approaching and fled in his truck.

After a short car chase, police cornered Barnes's vehicle.                               The

$7,200 was found sitting near the center console, still in the

white plastic bag.            Police also found thousands of dollars in
unmarked cash on Barnes's person and in his vehicle.                                  Police

searched Reed and found meth and heroin.

       ¶17    Sergeant       Winterscheidt         testified         that     about     five

minutes after arresting Barnes, police met with Marciniak at a

predetermined location.4            For a brief period, police did not have

a visual on Marciniak; however, Winterscheidt testified that "as

       Investigator Tanski estimated between 5 and 10 minutes
       4

passed.

                                             7
                                                             No.     2018AP2005-CR

far as [Marciniak] knew, [police] were directly behind him[.]"

Officers probably would have maintained surveillance but for the

need    to   divert   attention    from    Marciniak    to    Barnes      as    he

attempted to flee.        Marciniak testified he did not leave his

truck or meet with anyone between the time of the controlled buy

and his later meeting with police.

       ¶18   Sergeant Winterscheidt       then recovered the black box

from    Marciniak's    truck.      Winterscheidt       testified        the    box

contained four ounces of meth.           When Sergeant Winterscheidt was

asked why he was so confident that Marciniak did not get the

black    box    during    the     five-minute    period,           Winterscheidt

explained:

       There's no way to know [with] 100 percent assurance
       that he didn't receive meth[] from an alien that
       descended from the sky.         It is –– given the
       circumstances and the time frame of which we did
       respond to . . . Marciniak's location, I don't believe
       that he could have received meth[] from any other
       source other than . . . Barnes.
Similarly,     Investigator     Tanski    testified    the     box      was    not

"crumpled or mangled" and did not have any creases that would

indicate it had been "bent or shoved into any type of nook or

cranny[.]"

       ¶19   The State charged Barnes with delivering more than 50

grams of meth.        Shortly before trial, Barnes moved to exclude

Agent Clauer's testimony because the State had only recently

listed him as a witness and provided Clauer's reports.                         The

reports indicate Clauer observed the transaction.                   The circuit
court granted the motion.

                                     8
                                                                          No.     2018AP2005-CR

       ¶20       The    trial     lasted      two    days.         Barnes       attacked     the

thoroughness of the investigation while cross-examining Sergeant

Winterscheidt.            Specifically, he suggested Marciniak may have

been the seller and Barnes the buyer, not the other way around

as police thought.              Barnes's questioning indicated concern that

police did not videotape the controlled buy.                                During closing

argument, Barnes maintained he was trying to purchase meth for

his drug-addicted girlfriend, not sell it.                             He asserted he was

tricked by Marciniak, who framed him to curry favor with police.

Barnes's girlfriend, Reed, did not testify.5

       ¶21       On    redirect    examination,          the      State     asked    Sergeant

Winterscheidt, "[a]re you aware of any specific officers who saw

the transaction that . . . Marciniak described to you where he

tossed in the buy money and [Barnes] tossed in the black box?"

Barnes did not object.              Winterscheidt replied, "[y]es."

       ¶22       The    State     then       asked    which       officer       observed     the

controlled buy.           Barnes objected, arguing the testimony would be

hearsay.         The circuit court overruled the objection, agreeing
with       the   State     that    the       testimony      would      establish     Sergeant

Winterscheidt's "state of mind" (i.e., why he thought Barnes,

and not Marciniak, was the seller).                            The State repeated the

question,         worded     slightly          differently:             "Sergeant,         which

investigator           saw . . . Marciniak           toss    in    a   white     plastic     bag

and . . . Barnes           toss    in    a    black    box? . . .         What      agent    saw

       The State wanted to call Reed to the stand, but the
       5

circuit court prohibited Reed from testifying as a discovery
sanction.

                                                9
                                                   No.   2018AP2005-CR

that?"       Winterscheidt   responded,   "[i]t   was . . . [Agent]

Clauer."6

     ¶23    Barnes recalled Sergeant Winterscheidt, and in an odd

turn, solicited testimony about Agent Clauer's observations:

     Q. [W]as there a continuous officer present watching
        this entire transaction?

     A. I don't know what you mean by continuous officer
        present watching . . . Marciniak or watching the
        controlled buy.

     Q. I thought you testified yesterday that there were
        police eyes on the transaction at all times.      Do
        you remember saying that or words to that effect?

     A. That's what I was under the impression of.

     Q. Okay.   I didn't ask you what you were under the
        impression of.    I asked you whether or not there
        were eyes always on the suspect. . . . You didn't
        have   video   cameras   but   you  testified   that
        there . . . [were] a bunch of cops running around
        and   other    officers    watching  this    alleged
        transaction. Do you remember that?

     A. I remember testifying that . . . [Agent] Clauer ––
        that   I  learned . . . Clauer  had  observed  the
        transaction.

     Q. So is it your testimony that there was or was not
        constant visual surveillance of the alleged buy?

     A. I don't know that there was constant visual
        surveillance at all times of the events leading up
        to the buy and the hand-to-hand transaction. I was
        only given information that . . . Clauer actually
        observed the hand transaction.

     6 The circuit court indicated it would be willing to give a
jury instruction to inform the jury it should not use Sergeant
Winterscheidt's testimony that Agent Clauer observed the
controlled buy for the truth of the matter asserted. Barnes did
not request such an instruction, so one was not given.

                                 10
                                                                       No.     2018AP2005-CR

     ¶24     After Barnes was convicted, he moved for a new trial.

Among    other     points,       he   argued        the    circuit     court       erred    in

admitting Sergeant Winterscheidt's testimony that Agent Clauer

observed     the   controlled         buy.         The    court     denied    the    motion,

reiterating        its     conclusion              that      the      testimony        "went

to . . . Winterscheidt's              state    of        mind[.]"      The     court       also

reasoned     if    an    error    occurred,         the     error    was     not    "of    the

significance that would need the [c]ourt to order a new trial.

I think [the alleged error was] minor in the context of this

long –– it wasn't a long trial, but it was two days."                                        It

emphasized that "[t]here were a number of witnesses.                               There was

a lot of testimony for even being two days."

     ¶25     Barnes later filed a motion for postconviction relief,

arguing, among other things, that his confrontation right was

violated.7          He    asserted:                "The     reason     for     [Sergeant]

Winterscheidt's actions (moving in to arrest Barnes) was amply

explained by other evidence[.]"                    Barnes maintained "[t]here was

absolutely no need for [Winterscheidt] to take it a step further
and explain that one officer claimed to have observed the hand-

to-hand [transfer] and that Barnes produced the meth."                                     The

circuit court denied the motion.

     ¶26     Barnes appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the

circuit    court's        denial.             Barnes,        No. 2018AP2005-CR,             ¶33

     7 At trial, Barnes objected on hearsay grounds but did not
make a confrontation objection.   The State has not argued that
Barnes forfeited his confrontation objection, so we do not
address the issue.

                                              11
                                                                             No.     2018AP2005-CR

(citation omitted).                 The court of appeals noted that "[t]he

testimony had the convenient effect for the State of rebutting

some    of     Barnes's    attempts           to    impugn        the        quality     of     the

investigation."           Id.         Applying       a    discretionary             standard     of

review, the court of appeals determined "the circuit court could

[still] reasonably conclude that the testimony was not being

offered to show that [Agent] Clauer had, in fact, observed the

transaction but, rather, to show why [Sergeant Winterscheidt]

had    taken     subsequent          investigative         steps."             Id.     (citation

omitted).       Because the court of appeals decided the testimony

was not hearsay, it concluded Barnes's confrontation right had

not    been    violated.            Id.,    ¶35.         The    court    of        appeals    also

indicated that if an error occurred, it was harmless.                                   Id., ¶35

n.7.     Barnes    filed        a    petition       for    review,       which       this     court

granted in part, confining the parties to Barnes's confrontation

right claim and hearsay argument.

                            II.       STANDARD OF REVIEW

       ¶27    Barnes argues his confrontation right was violated.
As framed by the parties, the crux of the issue is whether

Sergeant       Winterscheidt's             testimony      regarding           Agent     Clauer's

observations       constituted             "hearsay,"          i.e.,     an        "out-of-court

statement[] offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted."         See    State        v.     Hanson,          2019     WI     63,     ¶19,     387

Wis. 2d 233, 928 N.W.2d 607 (quoting United States v. Tolliver,

454 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2006)).                       We assume without deciding

that    Barnes's    confrontation             right       was    violated.             Appellate
courts often decide cases on "the narrowest possible grounds"——
                                               12
                                                                    No.    2018AP2005-CR

in this case, harmless error.                 See Barland v. Eau Claire County,

216 Wis. 2d 560, 566 n.2, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998) (citing State v.

Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989)).

      ¶28    The State argues that even if Barnes's confrontation

right   were   violated,      the     error        was   harmless.        Under   well-

established    precedent,      such       a    violation    "does    not    result   in

automatic reversal" and "is subject to harmless error analysis."

See State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶41, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 834

N.W.2d 362 (citations omitted).                    Whether an error was harmless

is a question of law, subject to our independent review.                          State

v.   Magett,   2014    WI    67,    ¶29,       355   Wis. 2d 617,     850    N.W.2d 42

(citing Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶43, 341 Wis. 2d 668, 816

N.W.2d 191).

                                   III.       ANALYSIS

      ¶29    An error is harmless if "the guilty verdict actually

rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error."

Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279.            The "overall strength of the State's

case"   is   often    an    important         consideration.        Deadwiller,      350
Wis. 2d 138, ¶41 (quoting State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶46, 343

Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270).                 Other considerations include "the

frequency of the error" and the "nature of the defense[.]"                           Id.

(quoting Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶46).

      ¶30    The evidence against Barnes was overwhelming.                     See id.

The State argues, "[t]he problem with Barnes's argument is that

it assumes the jury would have questioned who delivered drugs to

whom had Sergeant Winterscheidt not testified that Agent Clauer
witnessed the transaction.                Given the strength of the State's
                                              13
                                                                   No.    2018AP2005-CR

case, there is simply no chance that would have happened."                             We

agree.

       ¶31   The recorded phone conversations before the controlled

buy significantly strengthen the State's case.                      The third call

is particularly incriminating.                    While Barnes's voice cannot be

heard in it, Sergeant Winterscheidt confirmed Barnes was in fact

speaking.        Marciniak's         recorded      dialogue    leaves    little    doubt

that   he    was    acting      as    a    prospective    buyer,    not     a   seller.

Marciniak was asked a question, to which he responded, "[t]wo?

Alright.        I'll take 'em."           As the State notes, "[i]f Marciniak

were dealing to Barnes as suggested, in what context would he

tell Barnes that he would take two of something?                         Two dollars?

Two of some item in a trade?"                 Applying common sense, Marciniak

responded to an offer to sell something.                        As the conversation

continued,       Marciniak      stated,      "[y]ou're    gonna    have    to    run   up

again then maybe.          You might have to see me sooner than next

weekend.        What's    that?           Right   on.    Well    then,    4?"     These

comments similarly make little sense if they were coming from a
seller.      If Marciniak were selling to Barnes, Marciniak probably

would not tell Barnes they would need to meet again; rather,

Barnes would dictate when he needed to buy more drugs.

       ¶32   Sergeant Winterscheidt emphasized the phone calls were

like     many    others    he     had      heard     before.      Despite       Barnes's

argument, nothing in the calls caused Winterscheidt any concern.

In particular, Winterscheidt explained the second call involved

"coded talk for the arrangement of a drug transaction."

                                             14
                                                                 No.   2018AP2005-CR

    ¶33     After the phone calls, police searched Marciniak and

his truck before the controlled buy to ensure he did not have

currency or contraband.           Winterscheidt described the searches as

thorough,       and    Marciniak's    testimony    was    consistent     with   that

description.           After the searches, police gave Marciniak $7,200

in marked bills.            Police and Marciniak then went to the buy

location.        Barnes was indisputably present.             Shortly after the

sale, Barnes fled from police and was ultimately apprehended

with the marked bills in addition to thousands of dollars of

unmarked cash——an unusual amount for an ordinary person to carry

but not uncommon for a drug dealer.                 Marciniak had four ounces

of meth in a black box.               The box did not appear to have been

hidden.

    ¶34     Marciniak was with police before the controlled buy

and police met with Marciniak shortly after arresting Barnes,

minimizing any chance that Marciniak could have obtained the

black     box     at     some   point    after    the     searches.       Sergeant

Winterscheidt testified Marciniak was out of sight for a mere
five minutes.          This fact is especially important considering all

of the evidence indicates the quantity of meth to be sold was

not known until shortly before the buy.                 If Marciniak set Barnes

up, Marciniak either guessed correctly that the deal would be

for four ounces or found and placed this exact amount of meth

into the        box within an especially short timeframe.                  Neither

possibility is probable.

    ¶35     As        the   circuit     court    noted,    the   error    occurred
infrequently during a two-day trial with "a lot" of testimony
                                          15
                                                                       No.    2018AP2005-CR

from multiple witnesses.                 See id.        As the State argues, the

error happened twice at most——once during the State's re-direct

examination        and      once         when      Barnes        recalled          Sergeant

Winterscheidt.         The extent to which Barnes can complain about

the second mention of Agent Clauer's observations is obviously

questionable       considering       he    is     the    one     who     solicited      the

testimony.

      ¶36      Finally, the "nature of the defense" was weak.                           See

id.      Read as a whole, the record does not support Barnes's

closing argument that Marciniak set him up and he was merely

trying to purchase meth for his girlfriend.                      While Barnes had no

duty to prove his innocence, the weakness of the defense theory

bears     on    whether    the     error        actually    impacted         the   trial's

outcome.       Barnes provided little evidence to support his theory

or to otherwise counter the State's strong case.

                                   IV.    CONCLUSION

      ¶37      Assuming    an    error      occurred,       we    conclude         it   was

harmless.        The     State   produced        overwhelming      evidence        against
Barnes.        Additionally,       the     error     occurred      infrequently         and

Barnes's defense did little to counter the State's case.                                The

guilty verdict rendered in this trial was unattributable to the

error.

      By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is

affirmed.

                                            16
     No.   2018AP2005-CR

17
                                                         No.    2018AP2005-CR.akz

    ¶38    ANNETTE    KINGSLAND       ZIEGLER,   C.J.    (concurring).          I

join the majority opinion and agree that Barnes' conviction is

valid because, assuming error occurred, the error was harmless.

I write separately to offer an alternative ground for upholding

Barnes' conviction.      The conviction is valid because the circuit

court did not err in admitting the challenged statements of

Sergeant Winterscheidt.            His statements of what other officers

told him were properly admitted because they were not offered

for the truth of the matter asserted and, therefore, were not

hearsay.     They were      offered as relevant evidence to explain

Sergeant Winterscheidt's order to stop Barnes as part of law

enforcement's      investigation       of   Barnes'   involvement      in    drug

trafficking.    Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

                         I.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

    ¶39    Barnes' conviction arose out of a controlled drug buy

that was facilitated by a confidential police informant, Charles

Marciniak.     Police provided Marciniak with a white plastic bag

containing $7,200 in marked bills to use in buying drugs from
Barnes.    On the scheduled day, Marciniak and Barnes, who had

prearranged a meeting in the Temple Bar parking lot, parked

their   vehicles    going     in   opposite   directions,      such   that   both

driver's side windows were up against one another.

    1  The majority opinion capably sets out the factual
background that led to Barnes' conviction. Therefore, I relate
only those facts necessary to understanding the legal principles
that form the basis for this concurrence.

                                        1
                                                          No.   2018AP2005-CR.akz

       ¶40    Marciniak, who had a serious felony conviction and was

awaiting sentence, was to bring $7,200 to the tavern parking

lot.       Barnes was to bring methamphetamine ("meth").

       ¶41    Marciniak testified that he threw the white plastic

bag of marked bills into Barnes' truck and Barnes then threw

back a black box containing meth.               That transfer was not video

recorded,       but      other   investigators      visually    observed     the

transaction        and     relayed   to       Sergeant   Winterscheidt       that

Investigator Clauer said he saw the transfer of drugs for money.

Sergeant Winterscheidt then gave the order to stop Barnes.

       ¶42    A transcript of a portion of the trial bears on why

law    enforcement        pursued    Barnes.        Sergeant     Winterscheidt

testified that an unnamed officer told him that Investigator

Clauer had observed the sale.2

            Q. As you drove over to the Temple Bar, what do
       you recall happening?

            A. I remember arriving just as the transaction
       had been completed.    Mr. Marciniak was driving away
       from the meet location and heard on the radio that the
       transaction had taken place so I gave the order to
       take down the suspect.

       . . . .

            Q. Are you aware of any specific officers that
       observed the transaction?

              A.   Yes.

              Q.   Who was that?

                 [DEFENSE    COUNSEL]: Objection                as      to
       foundation, Your Honor, and hearsay.

       Investigator Clauer was prohibited from testifying during
       2

the trial because of a prosecution discovery violation.

                                          2
                                                       No.   2018AP2005-CR.akz

. . . .

          [STATE]: He opened the door when he asked
about did any investigators videotape this.

          THE COURT: He opened the door but how does
that respond to -– it might make it relevant but how
does it make it not hearsay?

          [STATE]: Again, it goes to the officer's
state of mind at the time.     I could lay further
foundation for what he did after he was informed of
seeing the transaction occur.

          THE COURT: Okay, overruled then.                     You can
lay foundation. Can you repeat the question?

     Q. When officers surrounded the Temple Bar, were
there officers who were able to maintain video -–
excuse me, visual surveillance?

          [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:           Objection,       Your    Honor.
He wasn't there after.

          THE    COURT:    If     he   knows,     he     doesn't     so
overruled.

     A.   Yes.

     Q. You know that there were officers who had
visual surveillance on the parking lot at that time?

     A. Yes,    through   our    radio   communications
responding to that I was aware that officers had
reported they were in a position at the Temple Bar.

     Q. How did     you    know     that   the    transaction        had
been completed?

     A. Other investigators observing the transaction
notified me by radio.

     Q. Okay.      Do     you   recall     what   they       said,   if
anything?

     A. I believe the words were something like, it
went down, deal is done. Something like that.

     Q.   Do you know who radioed that to you?

                                3
                                                      No.   2018AP2005-CR.akz

     A.    I don't recall specifically who radioed that
to me.

     Q. Okay. Are you aware of any specific officers
who saw the transaction that Chip Marciniak described
to you where he tossed in the buy money and Garland
tossed in the black box?

     A.    Yes.

     Q.    Who?

     A.    It was –-

          [DEFENSE     COUNSEL]:         Objection,    Your    Honor,
this is hearsay.

           THE COURT:      [State]?

          [STATE]: Again, it goes to officer's state
of mind from them getting told that the transaction
was done is when officers then moved in to position to
stop Garland Barnes.

          THE     COURT:      I'm       going   to    overrule     the
objection.

. . . .

     Q. Sergeant,    which  investigator                 saw  Chip
Marciniak toss in a white plastic bag                  and Garland
Barnes toss in a black box?

          [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:             Objection, hearsay, lack
of foundation.

           THE COURT:      [State], regarding hearsay?

           [STATE]:     Again, goes to the officer's state
of mind.

          THE COURT: So you're not asserting it for
the truth of the matter?

           [STATE]:     No.

          THE COURT: Then if               it's not asserted for
the truth of the matter, I'm               going to overrule the
objection.   It's going to the            state [of] mind of the
officer. If [defense counsel]             wants –- if you want to

                                    4
                                                                   No.   2018AP2005-CR.akz

    get a jury instruction on that substantively, I will
    certainly give it. Go ahead, [State].

             Q.    What agent saw that?

             A.    It was DCI Investigator Duane Clauer.

         Q. With that information were you then given the
    code word that the transaction was completed?

         A. Yeah, it wasn't a code word.       It was just
    common language to let us know the deal was done.

         Q. Once you                knew     the    deal     was     done,     what
    happened next?

         A. After the transaction took place, I was just
    arriving on the scene.     Mr. Barnes backed into the
    front of sergeant Madden's vehicle and then proceeded
    out of the parking lot eastbound on Broadway Street.

         Q. Were you eventually able to stop him after
    some time?

             A.    Yes.
                           II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW

    ¶43      The issue is whether the circuit court's admission of

Sergeant     Winterscheidt's          statement       that    Investigator          Clauer

observed the drug sale violated Barnes' right of confrontation.

"[W]hether        to   admit   or     deny       evidence    rests       in   the     sound

discretion of the circuit court, which we will not overturn

absent an erroneous exercise of discretion."                             State v. Novy,

2013 WI 23, ¶21, 346 Wis. 2d 289, 827 N.W.2d 610.                             We review

whether    the     admission     of   Sergeant       Winterscheidt's          statements

violated Barnes' confrontation right independently as a question

of law.      State v. Reinwand, 2019 WI 25, ¶17, 385 Wis. 2d 700,

924 N.W.2d 184.

                                             5
                                                                   No.       2018AP2005-CR.akz

                                     III.    ANALYSIS

       ¶44     Barnes claims Sergeant Winterscheidt's statement that

Investigator Clauer saw the drug sale take place violated his

right of confrontation.              The right of confrontation arises from

the    Sixth    Amendment       of    the    United       States      Constitution         and

Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.3

       ¶45     Under      the        Confrontation             Clause,         out-of-court

statements       that     are    both   hearsay          and    testimonial          are   not

admissible against a criminal defendant unless the witness is

unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to

cross-examine the witness.              Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

59 (2004).        It is undisputed that Barnes did not have a prior

opportunity to cross-examine Investigator Clauer.

       ¶46     Relevant to deciding this case is the hearsay prong of

Crawford.         In     Crawford,      the       Supreme       Court    explained         the

Confrontation        Clause     "does       not    bar    the    use     of     testimonial

statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the

matter       asserted."         Crawford,         541    U.S.    at     60     n.9    (citing
Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).                              By definition,

when an out-of-court statement is not offered to prove the truth

of the matters asserted, it is not hearsay.                       "[A] crucial aspect

of    the    Sixth     Amendment     right        to    confrontation,         pursuant     to

Crawford, is that it 'only covers hearsay, i.e., out-of-court

       "'We
       3     generally   apply United  States  Supreme   Court
precedents when interpreting' the Sixth Amendment and the
analogous Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution."
State v. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, ¶15, 376 Wis. 2d 300, 897
N.W.2d 363 (quoting State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶13, 299
Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518).

                                              6
                                                                          No.    2018AP2005-CR.akz

statements "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted."'"             State v. Hanson, 2019 WI 63, ¶19, 387 Wis. 2d 233,

928 N.W.2d 607 (quoting United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660,

666 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin

Practice Series:             Wisconsin Evidence                 § 801.302 (4th          ed. 2017)

("[O]ut-of-court statements may be offered to prove innumerable

relevant        propositions            apart            from      the        truth      of     any

matters . . . .").

       ¶47     Hearsay        is   defined          by     statute        and     addressed      in

numerous        court        opinions.                  Wisconsin        Stat.        § 908.01(3)

provides:       "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."                                         When a

statement      that        might   be     described         as     hearsay       encompasses     an

additional statement that also might be described as hearsay,

each statement is addressed separately to determine if it is

employed for the truth of the matter asserted.                                  Boyer v. State,

91    Wis. 2d 647,           661-62,      284           N.W.2d 30       (1979);       Wis.    Stat.
§ 908.05 ("Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under

the    hearsay       rule     if    each       part       of     the    combined        statements

conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in this

chapter.").          "There is no question that where a particular state

of    mind    of     a    person   is     a    relevant         fact,    declarations         which

indicate       its       existence      are     admissible . . . ."                   Bridges    v.

State, 247 Wis. 350, 365, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945) (explaining that

"[t]he       hearsay       rule    does       not       operate,       even     apart    from   its
exceptions, to render inadmissible every statement repeated by a

                                                    7
                                                                          No.    2018AP2005-CR.akz

witness as made by another person.                       In some instances, the fact

that a statement was made, rather than the facts asserted in the

statement, is material").

       ¶48   As a result, "the Confrontation Clause only prohibits

the    introduction        of    testimonial           hearsay,      and        hearsay        is,    by

definition,        an   out      of    court      statement       that          is    'offered        in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.'"                                       State v.

Thomas, 2023 WI 9, ¶61, 405 Wis. 2d 654, 985 N.W.2d 87.

       ¶49   Here,      Sergeant           Winterscheidt's           state           of   mind       was

relevant because he was the officer in charge of the ongoing

drug    trafficking        investigation.               It     was    for       him       to    decide

whether to order that officers pursue Barnes.                                   He so ordered,

not because of the truth of an unnamed officer's telling him

that    Clauer      saw       Barnes       sell        drugs,    but        because            it    was

Winterscheidt's responsibility as part of the investigative plan

once   he    was    told      that     the    sale      had    occurred.              Investigator

Clauer's     statement          to    other       officers      also      was        part      of    the

investigation wherein he had the role of keeping Marciniak in
view   and    passing         along    what       he   thought       he    saw.           Also,      the

defense that Barnes was the buyer, not the seller, was first

mentioned in Barnes' counsel's closing argument at trial.                                             It

followed a long and effective cross-examination wherein Barnes'

counsel had attempted to show that law enforcement was sloppy in

its planning and execution of the investigation of this case.

There is nothing in the record to imply that law enforcement was

concerned     about        who       was    the       seller    at     the       time       Sergeant
Winterscheidt           was      told        the        transaction             had       occurred.

                                                  8
                                                                      No.    2018AP2005-CR.akz

Accordingly, Sergeant Winterscheidt would have ordered officers

to pursue Barnes even if what Clauer thought he saw was not

correct.

      ¶50     As    we    explained       in        Hanson,    "The    question        is    not

whether the evidence might be inadmissible hearsay if it is

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; rather, the

question is whether the evidence is offered for a legitimate

reason      other    than    for    the        truth    of     the    matter        asserted."

Hanson,     387     Wis. 2d 233,      ¶25.           Furthermore,          "when    the    State

offers a statement for a proper non-hearsay purpose . . . it is

neither      hearsay        (evidence          law)      nor     testimonial          hearsay

(confrontation        law)."       Id.,        ¶26    (quoting       Blinka,       supra    ¶46,

§ 802.302).         The evidence at issue in this case was used for a

purpose other than the truth of its contents.                          See, e.g., United

States v. Eberhart, 434 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2006) (testimony

is not for its truth where it is offered "as an explanation of

why the investigation proceeded as it did").

      ¶51     This    distinction       was         brought    out     at    Barnes'       trial
where the prosecutor asserted that she was not offering Sergeant

Winterscheidt's           testimony       about         what     he        was     told     that

Investigator Clauer had observed for the truth of the matter

asserted.           But   rather,     it        was     offered       to     show    Sergeant

Winterscheidt's state of mind about why he took subsequent steps

in   this    drug     trafficking      investigation.                 In    permitting       the

testimony, the circuit court explained, "It's going to the state

of mind of the officer.               If [defense counsel] wants -– if you
want to get a jury instruction on that substantively, I will

                                                9
                                                                No.   2018AP2005-CR.akz

certainly give it."          Barnes did not ask for the jury instruction

that the circuit court offered.

      ¶52    In sum, the testimony that Investigator Clauer saw the

sale occur is relevant to Sergeant Winterscheidt's state of mind

because it caused him to order Barnes be pursued and stopped as

part of his investigation of drug trafficking.                          When Sergeant

Winterscheidt gave the order, "officers then moved into position

to   stop    Garland    Barnes."           It    did     not   matter     whether    the

statement     was     true    or    not.         What    mattered     was     that   the

investigative plan called for Sergeant Winterscheidt to order

that Barnes be stopped when he was told that Investigator Clauer

saw the sale occur.           "[E]vidence is not hearsay when it is used

only to prove that a prior statement was made and not to prove

the truth of the statement."                    Anderson v. United States, 417

U.S. 211, 220 n.8 (1974).                Here, the prior statement was that

Investigator Clauer saw the sale occur.                    It is relevant because

it   caused    Sergeant       Winterscheidt         to    order     law     enforcement

personnel to move forward with their prior plan.                          It does not
matter      whether     the     statement         he     received       was    correct.

Therefore, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its

discretion in admitting the testimony, which was offered for a

permissible purpose.          Reinwand, 385 Wis. 2d 700, ¶35.

                                   IV.   CONCLUSION

      ¶53    Barnes' conviction is valid because the circuit court

did not err in admitting the challenged statements of Sergeant

Winterscheidt.        His statements of what other officers told him
were properly admitted because they were not offered for the

                                           10
                                                           No.   2018AP2005-CR.akz

truth of the matter asserted and, therefore, were not hearsay.

They   were    offered   as   relevant     evidence   to     explain    Sergeant

Winterscheidt's      order     to   stop     Barnes     as       part   of    law

enforcement's      investigation    of     Barnes'    involvement       in   drug

trafficking.

       ¶54    For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

       ¶55    I am authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE

ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence.

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    No.   2018AP2005-CR.akz

1