Court Opinion

ID: 9850481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:58:02.461062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:37.929899
License: Public Domain

Pannkll, Judge,
dissenting. A judgment was entered on the verdict in the present case on October 19, 1965. A motion for new trial was filed and a judgment overruling the motion for new trial was entered on March 11, 1966. Within the time allowed the movant entered an appeal to this court on the judgment rendered on the verdict. The enumerations of error complain that the trial court erred in overruling the motion for 'new trial for various reasons.
It is my opinion that where an appeal is entered on a judgment rendered on a verdict and the only enumerations of error are those on the judgment overruling a motion for new trial, which latter judgment was entered several months subsequent to the judgment appealed from, such alleged error cannot be considered by this court.
Prior to the Act of 1953 (Ga. L. 1953, Nov. Sess., p. 440 et seq.) intermediate rulings of the court were excepted to pendente lite. This Act (Section (7) (a), p. 453; Code Ann. § 6-905) abolished such exceptions and, by amending Code § 6-701, in Section (7) (b) thereof, made provision for assigning-error on antecedent rulings made in the progress of the case *722which affected the final result of the case in a bill of exception based on the final judgment. Section 2 of the Act of 1957 (Ga. L. 1957, pp. 224, 230) added an additional provision to Code § 6-701 in part as follows: “Where a bill of exceptions is permissible, all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are assigned as error, and which may affect the proceedings below, shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court.” The Supreme Court in Burnham v. Wilkerson, 217 Ga. 657, 659 (124 SE2d 389) interpreted these Acts and the provision of the Act of 1957 above quoted and said “the quoted clause of the 1957 Act was simply intended to allow all such rulings as were formerly the subject of exceptions pendente lite to be brought to the appellate courts together with exceptions to the final judgment entered in the case.” It appears therefore that at this point in the history of our appellate procedure, judgments, rulings, and orders of the trial judge occurring subsequently to the judgment upon which the bill of exceptions was based could not be considered by the appellate courts. We have now converted to a procedure involving “appeals” rather than writs of error or bills of exception. The present law (the Appellate Practice Act of 1965, as amended) provides that where an appeal is taken from the final judgment or other judgment authorized under the Act “all judgments, rulings or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal, and which may affect the proceedings below, shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court, without regard to the appealability of such judgment, ruling, or order standing alone, and without regard to whether the judgment, ruling, or order appealed from was final, or was appeal-able by some other express provision of law.” The only difference is in the words “raised on appeal” in the present law and the words “assigned as error” in the prior law. I see no substantial difference between these two terms when considered within the context in which they are used. Under the old law, rulings “assigned as error” could only be considered if they preceded the judgment appealed from. Under the present law, judgments, rulings, or orders “raised on appeal” can only be considered when such judgment, ruling, or order *723precedes the judgment appealed from. There is nothing in the Appellate Practice Act of 1965, as amended, which discloses any legislative intent to make judgments, rulings, or orders of the trial judge occurring subsequently to the judgment appealed from the subject matter of review on such appeal. The judgment of the trial judge should, therefore, be affirmed.
There is no disagreement between myself and the majority as to the ruling in the first headnote and some of the rulings in the corresponding division of the opinion. I agree that the enumerations of error are sufficiently definite. I agree that the motion for new trial tolled the time for filing the appeal. My only disagreement is that the court is passing upon alleged error in overruling a motion for new trial, committed by the trial judge subsequently to the judgment appealed from.