Court Opinion

ID: 9848280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:15:50.700019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:11.062907
License: Public Domain

OPINION
MAGNUSON, Chief Justice.
In the early morning hours of June 2, 2005, a young white man entered three homes in Mound, Minnesota. In each home, the burglar choked a female victim in her bed before running away. Police arrested appellant Jeffrey Brian Alphonse Stein later that day. Appellant was charged with three counts of first-degree burglary, MinmStat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2008). The jury found appellant guilty of one count of first-degree burglary, but failed to reach a verdict on the other two counts. The court of appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction. We granted review on the single issue of “whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict” of guilty on one count of first-degree burglary. Because we conclude that the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that appellant is guilty of the charged offense and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt, we affirm.
During the evening of June 1, 2005, several people gathered for a party at the home of brothers J.B. and M.B. In addition to J.B. and M.B., J.K. and appellant attended the party. Appellant’s brother P.S. gave appellant a ride to the party because appellant did not have a car. P.S. testified that appellant was wearing jean shorts and a black T-shirt over a white undershirt.
On the way to the party, appellant and his brother stopped at a Wells Fargo Bank so appellant could use the ATM. Surveillance video obtained from Wells Fargo showed appellant wearing a black crew-neck T-shirt with a small white tag on the bottom of the shirt above his left leg and a breast pocket on the left side. The video also showed appellant wearing a tan baseball hat and jeans. No undershirt was visible in the surveillance video. Bank records confirmed that appellant made a balance inquiry on his bank account at 10:08 p.m.
J.B. testified that appellant arrived at the party around 9:30 or 10 p.m. and wore a black Dickies work shirt. A.N., who also attended the party, testified that appellant wore jeans and a dark blue or black shirt. J.K. testified that appellant wore blue jeans and a black shirt to the party. M.B. testified that appellant wore a button-up shirt and jeans. Appellant drank beer and smoked cigarettes at the party.
According to testimony from both J.B. and his girlfriend, at some point between midnight and 2 a.m., the couple went to bed for the night. They did not get up until around 9 a.m. M.B. testified that he and appellant talked in M.B.’s basement bedroom during the party. M.B. further testified that appellant stayed in M.B.’s room until M.B. fell asleep around 4 or 4:30 a.m.
According to J.K., around 3:30 a.m., J.K., A.N., S.S., and appellant left the party in J.K’s truck. First, J.K. dropped off A.N. and S.S. at S.S.’s home. According to J.K., he dropped appellant off on a street corner about 50 feet away from S.S.’s home because J.K. did not wish to drive across town to appellant’s home. J.K. testified that after dropping off appellant, he drove home and went to bed.
In the early morning hours of July 2, 2005, P.B. woke up in her bed to a strange *712noise. She saw an unidentified man in her bedroom crouched down holding something in his hand. The intruder jumped on P.B.’s bed, put something over P.B.’s face, and began choking her. P.B. yelled for her son to call 911. P.B.’s son called the police, who received the call at 3:59 a.m. After P.B. forced the intruder off of her, the burglar ran down the stairs and out of the house. P.B. described the intruder as a young, lean, white male wearing a light-colored baseball hat and shorts that were dark plaid.
The police arrived at P.B.’s home within 2 minutes of receiving the 911 call. P.B. told a police officer that the intruder had run into the woods adjacent to P.B.’s house. The police called for other officers to set up a perimeter around the area of P.B.’s home. While the police were interviewing P.B., they received a call reporting a second home invasion.
J.B., who lived approximately a quarter-mile from P.B.’s house, woke up in her home to a loud noise. J.B.’s 11-year-old daughter told J.B. that a man had entered her room and choked her. After observing red marks on her daughter’s neck, J.B. called the police. The police received J.B.’s call at 4:17 a.m. J.B.’s daughter testified that the intruder was a white teenage man wearing jean shorts with visible blue plaid boxer shorts underneath. J.B.’s daughter also testified that the intruder was shirtless.
After receiving the second call, the police drove to J.B.’s home. On the way, the police widened the perimeter to include the area around J.B.’s home.
Officer Andy Lamers of the New Hope Police Department K-9 unit also arrived at J.B.’s home, where Officer Lamers and his dog tried to track the intruder. Officer Lamers’ dog followed a scent until the dog eventually lost the trail.
Around 5:00 a.m., D.B. woke up at home to a strange man in her bed. D.B. lived approximately three-quarters of a mile from J.B.’s home. The intruder straddled D.B. in her bed, choked her, and punched her in the face several times. D.B. fought back, attempting to strike the intruder in the head and eventually knocking the intruder off her bed by kicking him in the torso. D.B. then jumped off her bed and grabbed the intruder by the shirt. The intruder “pulled himself out of his shirt” leaving the shirt in D.B.’s hand. D.B. chased the man, who exited through a sliding glass door on the lower level of her house. She locked the door, and then ran upstairs to check the locks on the other doors. From upstairs, she saw the man return to the door he had exited and try to get back in. She yelled at him to go away. Eventually the intruder fled. D.B. saw the intruder jump over her fence and run away between two neighbors’ houses.
D.B. testified that her attacker was a white male in his late teens or early twenties, wearing pants with boxer shorts sticking out of his pants. D.B. also testified that the intruder’s breath smelled of cigarettes. Police later recovered a hair from D.B.’s bed. The police concluded that the hair was not appellant’s. The intruder’s shirt recovered at D.B.’s house was a black Dickies crew neck T-shirt with a left breast pocket and a small, white Dickies tag on the lower front left of the shirt.
The K-9 unit tracked a scent trail from a location near D.B.’s home to the shoreline of a nearby lake. An officer thought he saw someone swimming in the lake.
Around 6:10 a.m., a Mound resident living north of the lake and a few blocks from the first victim’s home opened the blinds in her home and saw an unidentified man approaching her house. The resident testified that the man appeared to be in his late teens or early twenties, and was wear*713ing no shirt, wet jeans with plaid boxers visible, and a baseball hat. The resident called 911.
Around 6:30 a.m., a Minnetrista resident observed a man running outside her home. According to the resident, the man was wearing a baseball cap and loose shorts with darker underwear exposed. The resident thought the sight of the man running outside her home was unusual, but did not call the police until the resident’s son informed her that police were conducting a manhunt in the area.
At approximately 7 a.m., a third resident testified that he saw a young, shirtless white man run across his yard. Appellant’s home is only a few blocks away from the home of the third resident.
On June 2, 2005, appellant lived with his brothers R.S. and J.S. at their house in Mound. Appellant usually slept on the couch. R.S. testified that on the morning of June 2, 2005, he got up at 5:30 a.m. and left for work around 6:15 or 6:30 a.m. R.S. did not see appellant that morning. J.S. testified that he got up around 6 a.m. and left for work around 6:15 a.m. on June 2, 2005. J.S. also did not see appellant that morning.
Police interviewed J.B., the host of the gathering appellant attended the previous night, on the morning of June 2, 2005. J.B. matched the physical description of the burglar and agreed to speak to the police. Based on Detective Dan Niccum’s conversation with J.B., police went to appellant’s workplace to speak to appellant.
Detective Niccum arrived at appellant’s workplace at about 11:15 a.m. on June 2, 2005. Niccum observed scratches on appellant’s body. Photos taken of appellant showed scratches on his neck, torso, back, arms, and legs. Appellant told Detective Niccum that he (appellant) wore a white T-shirt on June 1, 2005, and was at home on the couch when the assaults took place. Police later searched appellant’s home but found no wet clothing or other evidence linking appellant to the crimes.
The State conducted a DNA analysis of the black T-shirt recovered at victim D.B.’s house. The State’s DNA expert testified that the DNA profile generated from the T-shirt showed a mixture of DNA from two or more individuals, but with the “predominate profile” in the mixture matching the known DNA sample taken from appellant. The State’s expert estimated the probability of a random person’s DNA profile matching the predominate profile found on the shirt at one in 58 trillion. Appellant’s DNA expert interpreted the same data and concluded that the probability of a random match was one in 644,000.
The State charged appellant with three counts of first-degree burglary, MinmStat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c) (2008).1 The jury found appellant guilty of one count of first-degree burglary for the incident involving D.B. (the victim who ripped the shirt off of the intruder), but failed to reach a verdict on the two counts relating to the other burglary incidents. Appellant was sentenced to 48 months in prison. The court of appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction, *714concluding that that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction for burglary. See State v. Stein, No. A06-1848, 2008 WL 318603, at *5 (Minn.App. Feb.5, 2008). We granted review on the single issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding appellant guilty of first-degree burglary.2
When reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we “ascertain[ ] whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476 (Minn.2004). In reviewing a jury verdict, “we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn.1998).
A conviction based on circumstantial evidence receives stricter scrutiny than a conviction based on direct evidence. State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn.1988). In addition to the analysis we apply in direct evidence cases, the court also considers whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved support a rational hypothesis other than guilt. “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn.2002).
Even in cases based on circumstantial evidence, however, we have recognized that “the jury is in the best position to evaluate the evidence!,]” and we “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn.1998).
To successfully challenge a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, a defendant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than his guilt. However, possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.
Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 206 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Appellant argues that on appeal in a circumstantial case, the court must examine all of the evidence introduced at trial, and in effect re-weigh that evidence as part of our review. This is not what we do. Our cases have long distinguished between a review of the “circumstances proved” based on the factual evidence, and the inferences to be drawn from those circumstances. For example, in State v. Johnson, we said:
The primary rule of evidence in a criminal case is that, in order to convict the accused, the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt, and the test is whether or not there is evidence sufficient to justify the jury in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Various secondary rules relating to circumstantial evidence have been stated by the courts. Perhaps the most generally used rule is that all the circumstances proved must be consistent *715with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt. By the term “circumstances proved” is not meant every circumstance as to which there may be some testimony in the case, but only such circumstances as the jury finds proved by the evidence. There may well be in any case testimony on behalf of the defendant as to inconsistent facts and circumstances, not conclusively proved, and which the jury may have a right to and do reject as not proved. Followed to its logical conclusion, the secondary rule stated reverts back to the reasonable doubt rule. For, if any one or more circumstances found proved are inconsistent with guilt, or consistent with innocence, then a reasonable doubt as to guilt arises.
173 Minn. 543, 545-46, 217 N.W. 683, 684 (1928) (citation omitted).
In State v. Scharmer, 501 N.W.2d 620, 622 (Minn.1993), we conducted a “detailed review of the evidence,” and found it insufficient to convict. The State had presented evidence that two burglaries took place, that two witnesses saw the burglar exit the store that was robbed (but could not identify the defendant at trial), that a police dog followed the defendant’s scent to a location 100 yards from a grain elevator, that the officer then drove the remaining distance to that grain elevator, where the defendant was found lying down, and that a crowbar and a glove were found near the defendant in the grain elevator. Id. at 620-21. Because none of the physical evidence introduced at trial was ever linked to the defendant, “who fit the description given by the eyewitnesses primarily because of the color of his skin[,] [pjroof of the facts was left more to conjecture and speculation than to reasonable inferences.” Id. at 621-22. We reversed the conviction because “[t]he evidence did not form a complete chain leading so directly to appellant’s guilt as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.” Id. See also State v. Swain, 269 N.W.2d 707, 713 (Minn.1978) (holding that evidence that defendant had threatened the victim 10 months before the murder, that the murderer had attacked from behind, and that there were repeated blows to the victim’s head, was insufficient as a matter of law to show premeditation).
Scharmer and similar decisions have been read by some, including appellant here, as standing for the proposition that appellate courts can and should independently examine all of the evidence in the record — as well as the inferences drawn from that evidence — in evaluating sufficiency in circumstantial evidence cases, and should not draw inferences only from the circumstances proved. But as we noted 90 years ago in State v. Johnson, we do not reverse convictions simply because the defendant can point to facts in the record that arguably support a rational inference other than guilt. We consider the inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, which do not include “every circumstance as to which there may be some testimony in the case, but only such circumstances as the jury finds proved by the evidence.” 173 Minn. 543, 545, 217 N.W. 683, 684 (1928). Indeed, we reaffirm today that “[t]here may well be in any case testimony on behalf of the defendant as to inconsistent facts and circumstances, not conclusively proved, and which the jury may have a right to and do reject as not proved.” Id. Where the jury has rejected conflicting facts and circumstances, we do not draw competing inferences from those facts on appeal.
This does not mean, however, that we ignore our traditional rule of stricter scrutiny in circumstantial cases. Although we *716start from the premise that even in circumstantial cases we give deference to the fact finder’s weighing of conflicting evidence, when we review the inferences that might be drawn from the facts found, we look through a different lens.
In assessing the inferences drawn from the circumstances proved, the inquiry is not simply whether the inferences leading to guilt are reasonable. Although that must be true in order to convict, it must also be true that there are no other reasonable, rational inferences that are inconsistent with guilt. In circumstantial evidence cases, we give no deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences; this is so because our inquiry addresses not only the reasonableness of the inferences made by the fact finder, but also the reasonableness of other possible inferences that the fact finder may not have drawn. Because we give no deference to inferences not made (i.e., alternative inferences that the fact finder chose to reject), we examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with innocence. See, e.g., State v. Gorman, 219 Minn. 162, 167-69, 17 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (1944) (affirming a murder conviction in a case with “no substantial dispute as to the facts and circumstances” by holding that the jury’s inferential conclusion that the victim’s injuries “could not have been caused by [a fall]” “but only by a blow with an instrument” was “amply sustained by the record.... ”).
Thus, our analysis begins by deferring to the jury’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence regarding directly proven facts. We then focus on whether those circumstances proved complete the link between the defendant and guilt. For example, in State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 431-32 (Minn.1989), another murder case, we began our analysis by listing the “circumstances” accepted by the jury that were “consistent with the hypothesis of guilt.” These included “the facts that the body of the victim was found in the vicinity of the [defendant’s] apartment; [the defendant] was seen speaking to [the victim] earlier in the day; and his bedspread was found near the victim.” Id. We concluded that these circumstances proved did not support a reasonable inference of guilt, and did not “exclude other rational inferences. ...” Id. at 431.
Our concurring colleagues assert that Webb “might have had a different result” under our analysis. According to the concurrence, our “reformulated rule ... would have resolved ownership of the bedspread for the State as implicit in the verdict and disregarded other evidence in conflict with the verdict.” But our analysis is not “reformulated.” The court in Webb in fact did, albeit reluctantly, resolve ownership of the bedspread — as well as the defendant’s speaking to the victim earlier in the day, another point where direct evidence was in conflict — in favor of the State. Id. at 431 n. 2 (“Although we must accept the evidence in a light most favorable to the conviction, we note again our grave doubts about the reliability of the evidence on these points.” (emphasis added)). Webb’s conviction was reversed not because the court preferred its own weighing of the direct evidence, but because the inferences drawn from the circumstances proved did not point unerringly to guilt. Id. at 431.
Likewise, in Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 467 (Minn.2004), we held that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the defendant’s conviction for masterminding a murder committed by someone else. As we noted, in order to prevail in its prosecution, the State needed to prove that the defendant had ordered *717the killing. Id. at 477. Although such an inference was, on the record, permissible, it was not compelled. Id. A rational hypothesis other than guilt was supported by the circumstances proved. Id. at 478. Notably, however, we accepted all of the circumstances which were necessary to the jury’s verdict of guilt, only to find those circumstances insufficient. Id. at 477-78.
And where the circumstances proved are adequate, we have upheld convictions despite the existence of conflicting evidence. In State v. Colbert, 716 N.W.2d 647 (Minn.2006), we considered a case similar to this case. There, the defendant argued that inconsistent witness descriptions of the car driven and the clothing worn by the shooter, the implausibility of a witness’ story regarding the shooting, and the narrow timeframe between the defendant being at one location and at another, warranted his exoneration. Id. at 653. Defendant argued that even if the evidence was “technically sufficient,” it left too many unanswered questions to support a conviction. Id. We rejected that argument. “Viewing the evidence as a whole in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the evidence leads so directly to [defendant’s] guilt as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than guilt.” Id. at 654. In reaching that conclusion, we noted that although the defendant’s version of the events, if believed, might give rise to different inferences, “the jury was free to, and evidently did, reject [defendant’s] version of these events.” Id.
In State v. Scanlon, 719 N.W.2d 674, 687-88 (Minn.2006), we affirmed a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, restating the analytical framework of Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430-31, and State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 547-49 (Minn.1994). And in State v. Hughes, we stated that “[c]ir-cumstantial evidence receives ‘the same weight as any other evidence so long as the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.’ ” 749 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Minn.2008) (quoting State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn.2005) (emphasis added)). We specifically rejected defendant’s argument that Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d at 465, and State v. Swain, 269 N.W.2d 707 (Minn.1978), required some higher quantum of proof in circumstantial evidence cases. We then examined the circumstances proved with respect to planning activity, motive, and the nature of the killing to determine whether they supported an inference of premeditation. Hughes, 749 N.W.2d at 313-15. As to each of these premeditation factors, we found that the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the circumstances proved led to only one conclusion — the defendant’s guilt. See id. at 315 (“[T]he circumstantial evidence established beyond all reasonable doubt that appellant premeditated the murder.”).
Most recently, in State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849 (Minn.2008), we held the evidence sufficient to support a murder conviction. In a purely circumstantial case, we rejected the defendant’s argument that another person killed the victim, reasoning that the defendant’s hypothesis was unreasonable in light of the circumstances proved:
The evidence, however, proved that the DNA found under [the victim’s] fingernails and the semen found on her body belonged to Tscheu. And while it is theoretically possible that someone else was involved in a struggle with [the victim], there is no physical evidence in the record to provide reasonable support for this hypothesis.
Id. at 860-61. Thus, we concluded that the circumstances proved did not reason*718ably support the defendant’s alternative hypothesis.
Applying the analytical framework established by our prior cases, our first task is to identify the circumstances proved. Taken in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence in the record shows that appellant was in the area in question at the time of the burglaries; his clothing, including a black Dickies T-shirt, and general physical description matched the descriptions provided by the victims; the DNA taken from the black Dickies T-shirt matched a sample provided by appellant; the Dickies T-shirt retrieved from D.B.’s home matched the black T-shirt worn by appellant in the ATM surveillance video; the trail established by the K-9 units and the suspicious-person sightings led from the scene of the third burglary to an area near appellant’s home; appellant was not seen sleeping on the couch when his brothers left for work; and detectives observed numerous scratches on appellant’s chest and neck that same morning.
In laying out these factual circumstances, we defer, consistent with our standard of review, to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State. For example, we assume that the jury did not credit the testimony that appellant wore a white shirt or a button-up shirt to the party because this testimony is directly contradicted by other witnesses who testified that appellant wore a black shirt. In addition, we assume that the jury did not believe testimony that appellant was at home on the couch when the burglary occurred, because this testimony was inconsistent with the testimony of appellant’s brothers, and irreconcilable with the result reached by the jury. Cf. Colbert, 716 N.W.2d at 653.
Because the State did not present any direct evidence that appellant committed the burglary, our analysis proceeds to a second stage: we determine whether reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. See State v. Hatfield, 639 N.W.2d 372, 376-78 (Minn.2002).
Appellant hypothesizes that J.B., M.B., J.K., or someone else entirely committed the burglary. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether the circumstances proved support a reasonable hypothesis that J.B., M.B., J.K., or another man committed the burglary.
J.B. shares many of the physical characteristics of appellant, and was initially a suspect in the burglaries. However, the circumstances proved do not reasonably support the hypothesis that J.B. committed the burglaries. For example, both J.B. and his girlfriend testified that, at some point between midnight and 2 a.m., J.B. and his girlfriend went to bed for the night. They did not get up until around 9 a.m. In addition, the State’s DNA expert concluded that J.B.’s DNA was not on the black shirt recovered by police. Thus, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances proved establish that J.B. was sleeping at home when the burglaries occurred. Once those facts are accepted as true, no reasonable inference can be drawn that J.B. was the burglar.
Appellant runs into the same problem with respect to his theory that M.B. or J.K. committed the burglaries. M.B. testified that he fell asleep around 4 or 4:30 a.m. In addition, J.K. testified that he drove home and went to bed after dropping appellant off on a street corner around 3:30 a.m. The circumstances proved establish that M.B. and J.K. were asleep at the time of the burglary. Again, *719once these facts are accepted as true, no reasonable inference can be drawn that either M.B. or J.K. was the burglar.
The circumstances in this case also include the uncontroverted facts that: none of the witnesses identified appellant in court as the burglar; appellant had no scratches around his eyes; appellant showed no bruises on his knuckles, face, chest or torso; the hair found in D.B.’s bed did not belong to appellant; and no wet clothing was discovered at appellant’s home. However, none of these facts are inconsistent with guilt, nor do they establish a coherent alternative hypothesis that would explain how appellant’s DNA ended up on the intruder’s shirt, a shirt that matched the shirt worn by appellant in the ATM video. As we have stated: “Inconsistencies in the state’s case or possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Minn.1995). Based on our independent review of the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, we conclude that they do not support a rational hypothesis other than guilt.
In sum, none of the gaps in the State’s circumstantial case identified by appellant support a reasonable inference that anyone but appellant committed the burglary. Appellant’s theory that J.B., M.B., or J.K. committed the burglary directly conflicts with evidence presented by the State— evidence we assume the jury believed. Further, appellant’s theory that another person committed the burglary is not reasonable in light of the inculpatory evidence presented by the State. Thus, we conclude that the evidence presented at appellant’s trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Affirmed.
Concurring, ANDERSON, PAUL H., and MEYER, JJ.
Concurring, MEYER, PAGE, and ANDERSON, PAUL H., JJ.
Took no part, DIETZEN, J.

. Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c), provides that:
Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in the building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits burglary in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $35,000, or both, if:
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(c) the burglar assaults a person within the building or on the building’s appurtenant property.

. We confine our review to the single burglary for which the jury found appellant guilty. Because we did not grant review on the issue of whether the district court should have granted appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the two remaining burglary counts, we decline to address the issue.