Court Opinion

ID: 9731841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:59:42.542881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:21.572259
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice
(dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court’s refusal to given an instruction on first-degree manslaughter was proper. To justify the refusal of the trial court to give the requested instruction, the majority determines that the legislature intended that first-degree manslaughter be charged only where the underlying crime is a misdemeanor or a *537crime against property. The plain language of the statutes themselves belies this interpretation. The contrary intent of the legislature is also made clear by the Advisory Committee note to Minn.Stat. § 609.20, subd. 2, which reads as follows:
It will be noted that the term “crime” is used in Clause (2) of § 609.20 rather than “misdemeanor or gross misdemean- or.” The intention is to permit the jury leeway to convict of manslaughter rather than murder in those cases when death is charged to have resulted from the commission of a felony under §§ 609.185 and 609.195.
This court must give careful consideration to Advisory Committee Comments to the Criminal Code in ascertaining legislative intent when doubts exist as to the proper construction of a statute. See State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 399—400, 141 N.W.2d 517, 521-22 (1966). The Minnesota Jury Instruction Guide for criminal cases, prepared by the Minnesota District Judges Association, quotes the Advisory Committee note in its comment to CRIMJIG 11.18 on first-degree manslaughter and indicates that, since no standard is set forth in the statutes for differentiation, trial court judges should not attempt to differentiate them but should merely give the instructions for each crime. 10 Minn. Practice 100 (1977). By its interpretation, the majority creates a distinction between Minn.Stat. §§ 609.195(2) and 609.20(2) which the legislature expressly did not intend, and which is contrary to past practice since these statutes were enacted in 1963.
That neither statute delineates a criterion on which the jury could rely in determining whether the defendant had committed a felony against the person or a crime may be unwise; but where the legislative intent is clear, this court may not judge the wisdom of its enactments but must give effect to that legislative intention. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1978); Hughes v. Patrick and Associates, 300 Minn. 387, 220 N.W.2d 347 (1974).
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965), on which the majority relies, is clearly distinguishable from this case. The Sansone court cited Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 76 S.Ct. 685, 100 L.Ed. 1013 (1956), as authority for its holding that a lesser included offense instruction is not proper where, on the evidence presented, the factual issues to be resolved by the jury are the same as to both the lesser and greater offenses. In Berra, the defendant, charged with a felony, requested an instruction on a lesser included misdemeanor. The facts necessary to prove both the felony and the misdemeanor were identical, so that if instruction on both crimes were given, the jury would be allowed to choose the crime and, therefore, the sentence which the defendant would receive. The Supreme Court decided that, since there was no statutory provision giving the jury the right to determine the punishment to be imposed after the determination of guilt, the lesser included offense instruction should not be given. 351 U.S. at 135, 76 S.Ct. at 688. See Sansone, 380 U.S. at 350 n. 6, 85 S.Ct. at 1009 n. 6. The instant case is distinguishable from Sansone and Berra because here the legislature has made a clear statement that both instructions are to be given.
Nor is our holding in Leinweber appropriately applied to this case, where the facts supporting a conviction for both crimes are virtually identical. The evidence reasonably supports a conviction of either crime. If it is true that there is no rational basis on which a jury could find defendant not guilty of third-degree murder, it is also true that there is no rational basis on which a jury could find defendant not guilty of first-degree manslaughter. Leinweber is not helpful in this kind of case.
Application of the familiar rule of construction that the legislature is presumed not to intend absurd or unconstitutional results is inappropriate. Where the legislative intent is not ambiguous, no presumptions need be applied. Furthermore, the constitutionality of the statutes was not challenged. That question must await a proper case for decision.
*538In the instant case, the evidence justified conviction of either offense, and the legislature intended that instructions on both offenses be given. Under these circumstances, failure to submit the instruction on first-degree manslaughter was error. Pursuant to Minn.R.Crim.P. 29.02, subd. 13, and Minn. Stat. § 611.02 (1978), I would reduce the defendant’s conviction to first-degree manslaughter and remand for resentencing by the trial court. ■