Court Opinion

ID: 9654498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:23:25.73044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:08.246688
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 84. (dissenting). I dissent. Although I agree with many portions of the majority opinion, I disagree with the majority's conclusions in four respects. First, there is substantial evidence in the record that the circuit court judge delineated the factors influencing his decision to admit the other acts evidence. As such, this court's review of the admission of other acts evidence is limited to determining whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. Second, the other acts evidence is significantly similar to the charged offenses in several respects and is therefore probative of the defendant's intent or absence of accident in the present case. Third, the probative value of the other acts evidence is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice to the defendant. Fourth, the jury instruction given on other acts evidence was not so overly broad that it significantly diminished any cautionary effect.
¶ 85. The majority correctly states that "[t]he applicable standard for reviewing a circuit court's admission of other acts evidence is whether the court exercised appropriate discretion." Majority op. at 780. The majority also correctly states that a circuit court's evidentiary ruling will be sustained provided the cir*796cuit court considers the relevant facts, applies the appropriate standard of law, and uses a demonstrative rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion. See Majority op. at 781. In the present case, the circuit court engaged in a thorough discussion of: (1) the facts surrounding the July 24, 1992, incident and the evidence in the present case; (2) the application of Wis. Stat. §§ 904.04(2) and 904.03 under the circumstances; and (3) the probative value of the other acts evidence, including the conclusion that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by any prejudicial effect.
¶ 86. In addressing the State's request to admit evidence of the July 24,1992, incident, the circuit court made the following detailed analysis of the facts:
In terms of, first of all, the elements, there's an allegation that the defendant at that time was intoxicated and verbally abusive. I should note, in terms of the intoxication element in the instant case, the facts allege that the complaining witness and the defendant ended up at [an establishment]. . .and the defendant began to drink....
[T]he Court is not going to speculate as to whether [the defendant] was either under some order not to drink or was — had a drinking situation in which he had been committed from the drinking. Whatever it was, that was an issue, and the Court will accept, for purposes of prior acts, that drinking was some kind of a problem for the defendant. [In the present case] the officer had indicated that, in the preliminary, that the [defendant] appeared in the [complainant's] bedroom, that he had been drinking.
*797And [the officer in the present case] reported that [the complainant] said that [the defendant] and she had been out. . .and when he became too intoxicated, she left him; and he becomes hostile and violent when he drinks alcohol....
This prior act on July 24, 1992, with reference to that, the officer from the Burlington Police Department was dispatched in the city of Burlington to a domestic disturbance in progress. And, upon arrival, he indicated that he located' a female standing by a van crying and obviously upset; and that was [the neighbor] indicating that the man later identified as [the defendant] had been at the address causing trouble between [the defendant] and his ex-wife. ... And she indicated that [the defendant] had been verbally abusive and refused to leave upon request.
And then the officer interviewed [the] ex-wife, apparently, of the defendant; and she indicated that the defendant was seated on the porch and had recently arrived at her home and refused to leave, and that the defendant was intoxicated and verbally abusive to her and to her children and [her neighbor], and that [her neighbor's] husband was also present.
And the officer approached the defendant, asked him his name. The defendant told the officers his last name was Sullivan and then said that was all he was going to tell me.
The ex-wife [] indicated that the defendant had approached — she had approached the defendant while in the driveway of the home when he arrived. An argument ensued. She stated that [the defendant] began yelling at her; in the process of doing this, called her [derogatory names], and that he was going to take her in the backyard and beat her up.
*798In light of the similarities in the two instances, the circuit court concluded that "it would seem appropriate on those issues, that under 904.04, that so much of the July 24,1992 incident, as I've discussed, be admitted as a prior act."
¶ 87. The circuit court also made a determination on the record that the probative value of the evidence of the July 24, 1992, incident was not substantially outweighed by any unfairly prejudicial effect.
[The] Court believes that while the information is obviously prejudicial to the defendant, that it is not unfairly prejudicial, in that the issue before the Court is his actions on the night in question. And in as much as there has been a recantation, the Court believes that it is appropriate for the State to be able to, under 904.04, to establish the defendant's intent in the absence of accident. . . . The Court believes that while the acts are similar, for which they must be in order to qualify under 904.04, that they do not unfairly prejudice the defendant.
¶ 88. Although the circuit court determined that the evidence was prejudicial, it concluded that it was not unfairly prejudicial. This is an accurate analysis since under Wis. Stat. § 904.03 the probative value of the other acts evidence is appropriately "weighed against the danger of misleading the jury and unfair prejudice, not prejudice." State v. Grande, 169 Wis. 2d 422, 434, 485 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 1992).
¶ 89. These excerpts from the record evince the circuit court's extensive analysis in finding the other acts evidence admissible. Our review involves an analysis of whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting th e evidence of the incident involving the defendant and his ex-wife. See State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983). *799"The question on appeal is not whether this court, ruling initially on the admissibility of the evidence, would have permitted it to come in, but whether the trial court exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance with the facts of record." State v. Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d 459, 464, 273 N.W.2d 225 (1979) (citing McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).
¶ 90. The cases cited by the majority for the proposition that this court's review should be independent are factually distinguishable from the present case. For example, in McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 282, the circuit court judge failed to provide any reason why a nine year near-maximum sentence for a non-violent crime (forging a $50 check) was appropriate where the defendant was a first offender. In that case, the judge "very well and properly stated his reasons why probation was not appropriate, but gave no reason for the sentence he did impose."1 Id. (emphasis supplied).
¶ 91. Similarly, in Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343, this court independently reviewed the record where the circuit court "had not explicitly engaged in the balancing test required by sec. 904.03, Stats., nor had the [circuit] court articulated clearly the reasons for admitting the [other acts] evidence." The circuit court's entire discussion of the evidence in Pharr was as follows: "I think that the evidence of [the shooting] would be admissible for reasons [the prosecution] stated. Evidence of any *800armed robbery of any bank would appear to me to be highly prejudicial and would appear to me to be inadmissible." Id. at 339.
¶ 92. In the present case, the circuit court made an in-depth analysis of the facts surrounding the July 24, 1992, incident and determined that the evidence would be properly admitted to show the defendant's intent and absence of accident under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).2 The circuit court also considered the prejudicial effect of the evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.03, and concluded that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice.
¶ 93. The majority states that the incident on July 24, 1992, "relates to a consequential fact in this case, namely the defendant's intent or absence of accident." Majority op. at 794. However, the majority concludes that "[t]he other acts evidence is dissimilar enough from the incident upon which the charged offenses were based that the evidence is not probative of the defendant's intent or absence of accident." Id.
¶ 94. The majority concedes "that many circumstances of the two incidents are similar." Majority op. at 788. These similarities include the defendant's intoxication, the defendant being at the homes of women with whom he had a romantic relationship, the defendant insisting on speaking with the women, the women refusing to speak with the defendant, the defendant physically threatening the women and becoming verbally abusive, the women asking him to leave their residence and the defendant refusing, and the women contacting law enforcement officers for assistance. These numerous similarities evince that the other acts evidence of the incident on July 24,1992, *801is probative of the defendant's intent or absence of accident in the present case. The evidence is particularly relevant to the defendant's absence of accident regarding the battery charge since the complainant recanted her story and claimed that the bodily harm resulted from an accident. The defendant's physical threats and verbal abuse, intoxication, and refusal to leave his ex-wife's home under circumstances significantly similar to the present case make it more probable that the intoxicated defendant intended to physically threaten and batter the complainant.
¶ 95. The majority's main concern with the other acts evidence appears to be the fact that the prior incident did not involve any bodily harm to the defendant's ex-wife. Thus, the majority concludes that the prior act makes it no more probable that the defendant physically assaulted the complainant in the present case. Although the other acts evidence is probative to the battery charge in any event, the majority's conclusion fails to recognize that the defendant was facing charges on three separate counts — battery, false imprisonment, intimidation of a victim — all of which require intent as an element of the offense and only one of which requires the element of bodily harm.3
¶ 96. The defendant's intoxicated state, physical threats, and refusal to leave his ex-wife's residence on a prior occasion make it more probable that the intoxicated defendant threatened the complainant, refused to leave the complainant's residence and intentionally *802refused to let her leave. Moreover, the defendant's intoxication and repeated threats and verbal abuse of his ex-wife on July 24, 1992, make it more probable that the defendant intentionally prevented the complainant from calling law enforcement officers to report that the defendant caused her bodily harm and refused to let her leave her residence. The complainant was able to escape her residence and report the incident only after the defendant had fallen asleep.4
¶ 97. The majority also fails to consider that not only did the circuit court undertake a thorough analysis of the particular incident that was ultimately admitted as other acts evidence, but the circuit court carefully considered and denied several other instances of prior acts that the State sought to introduce.5 More importantly, the circuit court undertook *803such a detailed analysis of the July 24, 1992, incident that it went so far as to prohibit the State from presenting to the jury certain portions of the incident that were not similar to the present case.6
¶ 98. In addition to the thorough analysis of the other acts evidence, the circuit court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury that the evidence of the July 24, 1992, incident was probative only of the defendant's motive, intent, knowledge, absence of mistake or accident, and credibility. See WI JI — Criminal 275. Although the use of the evidence in the present case is only permissible to prove defendant's intent or absence of accident, the circuit court's instruction was not so "broad that its cautionary effect was significantly diminished." Majority op. at 791.
¶ 99. In State v. Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d 247, 378 N.W.2d 272 (1985), the circuit court admitted other acts evidence under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) for the purpose of showing the defendant's motive, intent, preparation or plan. Accordingly, the cautionary *804instruction given to the jury in Fishnick stated that the other acts evidence was admitted to show motive, intent, preparation or plan. See id. at 260. On appeal, this court determined that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting the evidence because the evidence was relevant for purposes of motive and identity. See id. However, this court determined that the evidence was inadmissible to show plan, preparation, or intent to do the act. Although the jury instruction in Fishnick was broad, this court upheld the admission of the evidence concluding that "[t]he jury was properly instructed that the evidence was introduced on the issue of motive." Id. at 261.
¶ 100. Furthermore, in State v. Roberson, 157 Wis. 2d 447, 459 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 464 N.W.2d 424 (Wis., Oct. 16, 1990), the court of appeals upheld the circuit court's admission of other acts evidence. In admitting the evidence, the circuit court instructed the jury that the other act was admissible because it was relevant to the issue of the defendant's alleged plan. See id. at 452. The court of appeals concluded that the evidence was not admissible to show the defendant's plan, but that it was admissible to show the defendant's intent. See id. at 454. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, stating that" [although the trial court articulated the wrong reason for admission of the [other acts] evidence, we will affirm if the ruling is proper on other grounds." Id. at 453-54.
¶ 101. I agree with the majority that the vitality of Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) and Whitty should be reaffirmed. See Majority op. at 775. Whitty states that other acts evidence should be used sparingly and only when reasonably necessary. See Whitty, 34 Wis. 2d at 297. However, a determination of admissibility must *805be made on a case-by-case basis, using a detailed analysis of the facts. There is neither a presumption of exclusion nor a presumption of admission regarding other acts evidence. See State v. Speer, 176 Wis. 2d 1101, 1114, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993). If the evidence is relevant for an admissible purpose under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), it will be admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See id. at 1115.
¶ 102. In the present case, the circuit court articulated its reasons why the July 24, 1992, incident was probative to show the defendant's intent or absence of accident and applied the proper Wis. Stat. § 904.03 analysis. The circuit court considered the relevant facts, applied the appropriate standard of law, and demonstrated a rational process in reaching the conclusion to admit the other acts evidence. The other acts evidence had definite probative value on the issues of intent and absence of accident. That probative value was not substantially outweighed by the dangers set forth in Wis. Stat. § 904.03, such as unfair prejudice. There was no erroneous exercise of discretion by the circuit court judge in allowing the other acts evidence to be presented to the jury. Furthermore, consistent with our prior decisions, the cautionary instruction given was appropriate, since the jury was instructed that the evidence was admitted for the purposes of showing the defendant's intent and absence of accident.
¶ 103. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 104. I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. STEINMETZ and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this dissent.

 The circuit court's only discussion of the sentence imposed consisted of the following: "I intend to follow the recommendation of the Probation Department, and I will not grant probation in this case. I'm prepared to make disposition thereon. The laws of society apply to every member thereof, whether in a nichey type attitude he considers himself to be above them or not." Mc Cleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 268, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).

 The circuit court also admitted the other act evidence to show motive, knowledge, and witness credibility.

 The counts for which the defendant was charged that include intent as an element of the crime are battery contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1); false imprisonment contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.30; and intimidation of a victim contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.44(1). The defendant was also charged with disorderly conduct contrary to Wis. Stat. § 947.01.

 Although the complainant's claim of accident was specifically directed at the battery charge, the proffered other acts evidence is relevant to the defendant's intent as well as absence of accident. As stated, intent is an element of the battery charge, the false imprisonment charge, and the intimidation of a victim charge.

 The majority opinion finds it relevant that the State's other acts evidence "involves only one other incident, not a series of incidents." See Majority op. at 788. A single instance of other acts evidence is not per se inadmissible. See State v. Roberson, 157 Wis. 2d 447, 455 n.1, 459 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 464 N.W.2d 424 (Wis., Oct 16, 1990). Several other incidents were preferred as evidence; however, the circuit court denied the State's request to admit other acts evidence of incidents that occurred on July 26,1992 (defendant's telephone calls to neighbor verbally abusing and threatening the neighbor and defendant's ex-wife); September 7, 1992 (defendant's telephone calls to ex-wife threatening her and her male friend); September 8, 1992 (defendant was intoxicated and creating a disturbance at a local tavern, and defendant threw items and *803pulled the phone out of the wall); September 10, 1992 (defendant threatening ex-wife's divorce attorney at the attorney's office); September 11, 1992 (defendant abusivé and intoxicated at ex-wife's divorce attorney's office, resulting in defendant's arrest); February 4, 1993 (defendant's verbally abusive and threatening telephone calls to ex-wife); June 2,1993 (defendant contacting ex-wife in spite of bond conditions ordering no contact); August 11, 1993 (defendant's contact with ex-wife in violation of court orders).

 There was evidence in the police report from the July 24, 1992, incident that the neighbor believed the defendant had a weapon in his van at that time, that the defendant recklessly handled weapons, and that the defendant bought and resold a number of guns. The circuit court denied admission of any testimony referencing a weapon, stating "[t]he Court does not believe that that testimony is similar or relevant."