Court Opinion

ID: 9964226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 14:10:38.54517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:14.556622
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3035-22

LISA M. MOORE,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL D. TERRELL,

          Defendant-Respondent.

                   Submitted April 8, 2024 – Decided April 29, 2024

                   Before Judges Marczyk and Chase.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County,
                   Docket No. FD-16-1666-02.

                   Law Office of Harriet Elaine Raghnal, attorneys for
                   appellant (Harriet Elaine Raghnal and April Celeste
                   Bauknight, on the brief).

                   Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM
       Plaintiff Lisa Moore appeals from the trial court's May 4, 2023 order

entered in favor of defendant Terrell Michael denying her motion for

reimbursement of college tuition expenses, medical expenses, and health

insurance coverage costs associated with the parties' daughter. We affirm in

part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

                                        I.

       In June 2002, defendant was determined to be the father of the parties'

daughter, who was born in 2001, based on the results of DNA testing.1 At that

time, the court also entered an initial child support order and further directed

that defendant was responsible for fifty-seven percent of extraordinary medical

expenses. The parties next appeared in court in November 2007 where the

court denied plaintiff's request to increase child support but ordered defendant

to enroll his daughter on his employer-provided medical insurance plan.

       In January 2023, defendant moved to emancipate his daughter. 2 Plaintiff

in turn filed a cross-motion requesting:        (1) a change of venue, (2)

1
  The parties were never married. Their daughter is the only child of plaintiff
and defendant.
2
    The parties' daughter graduated college in May 2022.

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reimbursement for medical expenses, (3) imposition of penalties for defendant

failing to provide medical insurance or reimbursements for costs to provide

such insurance, (4) reimbursement for college expenses, and (5) modification

of the existing order to not terminate child support until arrearages were paid.

        At the hearing, plaintiff did not oppose defendant's emancipation

application. Rather, plaintiff focused on defendant's obligation to reimburse

her for medical expenses, insurance premiums, and contributions to their

daughter's college expenses.3 Plaintiff explained as their daughter prepared to

go to college, the parties applied for student loans, but both were denied.

Plaintiff's husband and her mother-in-law eventually assisted in securing

Parent Plus Loans for tuition. The loans ultimately amounted to $138,066,

which plaintiff's husband and her mother-in-law are obligated to pay off. 4

3
    As addressed below, the court did not address the motion to change venue.
4
    Plaintiff stated:

               I went around begging people and I finally got my
               husband to agree and my mother-in-law. So, their
               names are actually the ones on the Parent Plus Loan and
               they only did it with the assumption that [defendant]
               and I would pay back the loan and [defendant and I]
               would cover each [fifty] percent of it. So, . . . the
               majority of the college expenses is this Parent Plus
               Loan.

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Plaintiff acknowledges there was no written agreement between the parties for

the payment of the loans but asserted defendant orally agreed to share in the

repayment. Plaintiff further claims the text messages between the parties

evidences this agreement.

      Notably, plaintiff stated defendant made payments on the loans while her

daughter was in school. Moreover, she started to apply defendant's child

support payments to the loans.5 Defendant recounted he did not know about

the loan until after it was issued, and no one asked him how much he could

afford. However, defendant later acknowledged he "agreed" to pay $100 per

month on the loan, which turned out not to be enough for plaintiff. At the time

of the hearing, defendant had paid over $3,000 towards the loans.

      Both parties also discussed their respective involvement in their

daughter's college selection process. While she did not attend the college

defendant had recommended, the school she attended was apparently less

expensive. Defendant was aware his daughter would be attending college, and,

in fact, he visited at least one college with her. Moreover, although there may

be a dispute as to what agreement, if any, the parties reached regarding

5
  Plaintiff's text messages suggest defendant was paying approximately $7,600
per year in child support.
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defendant's contribution to his daughter's college tuition, he was aware that

plaintiff, with the assistance of family members, had taken out loans for her.

      Plaintiff stated she did not go to court earlier to obtain an order requiring

defendant to contribute towards tuition because she proceeded with the

understanding the parties had an oral agreement, and defendant was, at least,

making partial payments when their daughter was in college. Defendant stated

in one of the text messages that he was going to "continue to send the money

for the [P]arent [P]lus [L]oan."

      Plaintiff also discussed various medical expenses for her daughter,

dating back to 2006, and medical insurance premiums not paid by defendant.

She requested that defendant be responsible for fifty-seven percent of the

medical expenses and insurance premiums, consistent with the prior orders.

      On April 28, 2023, the trial court granted the emancipation motion and

terminated defendant's child support obligation as of May 2022, when his

daughter graduated college. Additionally, on May 4, 2023, the court denied

plaintiff's application for reimbursement of tuition costs. It further denied

plaintiff's request for uncovered medical expenses and health insurance costs.

      Regarding the college expenses, the court determined that defendant

was only "periodically" involved in conversations concerning his daughter's

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plans to enter college. Additionally, the court found plaintiff did not discuss

"any aspects" of the request for tuition assistance with defendant and only

requested "contribution through the courts after the loans were obtained and

the child completed her college education."              Regarding defendant's

participation in the college enrollment process, the judge determined: "There

were no proofs provided reflecting the consultation with [d]efendant regarding

the university in which the child would enroll."         The court also found

defendant's payments towards his daughter's tuition while she was enrolled in

college was not indicative of "an agreement to cover half of the child's college

tuition."6

       The court enumerated the Newburgh v. Arrigo 7 factors in its decision,

but did not conduct a plenary hearing, request financial information from the

parties, or analyze the factors. Instead, the court denied plaintiff's application

for contribution towards college expenses because there was no "consultation"

between the parties.

6
  The court also expressed skepticism during the hearing, noting it did not find
anything to warrant relief, as there was no written agreement or court order
requiring defendant to pay half of the tuition costs and characterized the
application as "out of time essentially."
7
    Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 545 (1982).
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      Regarding plaintiff's motion for medical expenses and insurance costs,

the court denied the requests based upon the doctrine of laches. The court was

concerned that plaintiff filed the application in January 2023, yet requested

reimbursement for medical costs dating back to 2006—more than sixteen

years earlier. The judge explained, "[p]laintiff had the ability to file an

application for reimbursement of uncovered medical expenses and health

insurance costs much closer to the time when the expenses were incurred."

The court opined that laches barred any relief because the delay was

unreasonable. This appeal followed.

                                       II.

      Our review of Family Part orders is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154

N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We will not disturb the factual findings made if they are

supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record.       MacKinnon v.

MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007). "Appellate courts accord particular

deference to the Family Part because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise'

in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013)

(quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). "Only when the trial court's conclusions are

so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should we interfere . . . ." Gnall v.

Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.

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                                       7
E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). "We will reverse only if we find . . . trial

judge[s] clearly abused [their] discretion . . . ." Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super.

61, 72 (App. Div. 2012). However, "all legal issues are reviewed de novo."

Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017).

                                        A.

      Plaintiff argues the trial court's failure to find the parties had an oral

agreement regarding the repayment of the loan constituted a reversible error.

She argues defendant clearly agreed to pay for their daughter's college

expenses through text messages and acted in accordance with the agreement

for four years while she was in college. She further argues the parties had an

oral agreement. Plaintiff cites to the fact that both her and defendant attempted

to secure loans, along with defendant's conduct in paying portions of the loans

while their daughter was still in school, as evidence of defendant's agreement

to be partially responsible for the remainder of the loans once she graduated.

Plaintiff contends the judge erred in failing to review the records and not

finding defendant had, in fact, agreed to assist in repaying the loans.

Additionally, plaintiff relies on Harrington v. Harrington for the proposition

that "to be enforceable, matrimonial agreements, as any other agreements, need

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not necessarily be reduced to writing or placed on the record." 281 N.J. Super.

39, 46 (App. Div. 1995).

      Plaintiff further contends the trial court erred when it failed to schedule

a plenary hearing where submissions showed there was a genuine and

substantial factual dispute between the parties. Plaintiff notes while defendant

claimed he was not part of the college selection process, he acknowledged he

was advised about his daughter's college selection, and he was involved in

taking her to visit a college. Plaintiff asserts the college defendant wanted

their daughter to attend was more expensive than the college where she

ultimately enrolled. Moreover, plaintiff notes the court stated on the record

there were "conflicting versions" of the obligation to pay back the student loans

but did not conduct a plenary hearing.

      We generally defer to the family court in its decision whether or not to

grant a plenary hearing. Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 123 (App. Div.

2012); see also Costa v. Costa, 440 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2015) (holding

that we apply an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's determination

regarding the need for a plenary hearing). "[I]t is only where the affidavits

show that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, and that the [family]

judge determines that a plenary hearing would be helpful in deciding such

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factual issues, that a plenary hearing is required." Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. at

123 (quoting Shaw v. Shaw, 138 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App. Div. 1976)).

      A plenary hearing is necessary "'when the submissions show there is a

genuine and substantial factual dispute[,]' which the trial court must resolve."

Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 217 (App. Div. 2015) (alteration

in original) (quoting Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div.

2007)). Where the need for a plenary hearing is not as obvious, the movant

must make a prima facie showing that the plenary hearing is necessary. Hand,

391 N.J. Super. at 106.

      Here, the trial court misapplied its discretion in not conducting a plenary

hearing. Because a plenary hearing is necessary when the submissions show a

genuine and substantial factual dispute, and the court recognized there were

"conflicting versions" about plaintiff's and defendant's obligation to pay the

Parent Plus Loan, a full hearing should have been conducted. There were

various disputes at the hearing, including defendant's involvement in the

college search process, whether the parties had an agreement for the repayment

of the loans, and the significance of defendant's payments toward the loans

while their daughter was in college.

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                                       10
      The court did not conduct a full plenary hearing.       Rather, the court

conducted something akin to a summary proceeding and entertained oral

argument from the parties as to their respective positions about what

agreements, if any, were reached with respect to defendant's obligation to

contribute to their daughter's college tuition. There was no formal testimony,

cross-examination, or introduction of evidence. Moreover, the court did not

make clear credibility findings and appeared to base its decision, in part, on

the fact there was no written agreement or court order requiring defendant to

make college contributions. The court did not squarely address whether the

parties had entered into an oral contract for the payment of college expenses.

      The court noted that while defendant was making regular payments

toward the loan, it did not consider those amounts ($100 per month) as

evidence he agreed to pay half of his daughter's college expenses. While this

may not be evidence of an agreement to pay half of the college expenses, it

may indicate an agreement to contribute to the overall total once she graduated.

That is, why was defendant paying anything toward the loan if there was no

agreement? Furthermore, how does the court reconcile defendant's statement

he "agreed" to certain payments?      How long did he agree to make such

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                                      11
payments, and what was the understanding between the parties when defendant

stopped paying child support?

       Defendant's text messages and statements at the hearing indicate he was

contributing—above and beyond his child support obligation payments—

towards the Parent Plus Loans. How long defendant "agreed" to make these

payments, and whether they would increase when he stopped paying child

support, is not clear. The court must address these issues on remand.

       Accordingly, we are constrained to remand for a hearing to address what,

if any, agreement was entered into between the parties regarding their

daughter's college expenses. If the court determines there was in fact some

agreement, the court need not address Gac8 and Newburgh, but it should

enforce the contract. On the other hand, if the court determines the parties did

not enter into a binding agreement for the payment of college tuition, the court

must conduct a plenary hearing addressing Gac and Newburgh as discussed

below.

                                       B.

       Plaintiff next asserts the court committed reversible error by failing to

consider the Newburgh factors to determine if, and how much, defendant

8
    Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535 (2006).
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                                       12
should contribute towards college expenses. She argues that unlike the facts

in Gac, where the Court determined the father was not responsible for

contributing to the minor child's college expenses, defendant here had a

relationship with his daughter, had taken her on college visits, and

acknowledged it was important to him that she attend college. Moreover,

defendant attempted to apply for a loan for her tuition.       Therefore, he

participated to some extent in the college process and was aware of her need

to secure loans.

      In Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, we noted that where the parties had an

agreement regarding how college expenses should be divided, the trial court

need not apply the factors in Newburgh. 445 N.J. Super. 574, 591 (App. Div.

2016). Rather, the court should enforce the agreement as written. See Quinn

v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 35-36 (2016) (Cf. Gac, 186 N.J. at 544-45 (addressing

college expenses in the absence of an agreement); Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 534

(discussing factors to be considered where there was no agreement regarding

college expenses)). However, absent an enforceable agreement apportioning

child support and college costs, "a trial court should balance the statutory

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                                    13
criteria of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)[9] and the Newburgh factors, as well as any

other relevant circumstances, to reach a fair and just decision whether and, if

so, in what amount, a parent or parents must contribute to a child's educational

expenses." Gac, 186 N.J. at 543. Under Newburgh, a court must consider:

             (1) whether the parent, if still living with the child,
             would have contributed toward the costs of the
             requested higher education; (2) the effect of the

9
    N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides:

             a.     In determining the amount to be paid by a parent
             for support of the child and the period during which the
             duty of support is owed, the court in those cases not
             governed by court rule shall consider, but not be limited
             to, the following factors:
             (1) Needs of the child;
             (2) Standard of living and economic circumstances
             of each parent;
             (3) All sources of income and assets of each parent;
             (4) Earning ability of each parent, including
             educational background, training, employment skills,
             work experience, custodial responsibility for children
             including the cost of providing child care and the length
             of time and cost of each parent to obtain training or
             experience for appropriate employment;
             (5) Need and capacity of the child for education,
             including higher education;
             (6) Age and health of the child and each parent;
             (7) Income, assets and earning ability of the child;
             (8) Responsibility of the parents for the court-
             ordered support of others;
             (9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of each child and
             parent; and
             (10) Any other factors the court may deem relevant.
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            background, values and goals of the parent on the
            reasonableness of the expectation of the child for
            higher education; (3) the amount of the contribution
            sought by the child for the cost of higher education;
            (4) the ability of the parent to pay that cost; (5) the
            relationship of the requested contribution to the kind
            of school or course of study sought by the child; (6)
            the financial resources of both parents; (7) the
            commitment to and aptitude of the child for the
            requested education; (8) the financial resources of the
            child, including assets owned individually or held in
            custodianship or trust; (9) the ability of the child to
            earn income during the school year or on vacation;
            (10) the availability of financial aid in the form of
            college grants and loans; (11) the child's relationship
            to the paying parent, including mutual affection and
            shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental
            advice and guidance; and (12) the relationship of the
            education requested to any prior training and to the
            overall long-range goals of the child.

            [88 N.J. at 545.]

      In Gac, the Supreme Court noted that "the factors set forth in Newburgh

. . . contemplate that a parent or child seeking contribution towards the

expenses of higher education will make the request before the educational

expenses are incurred." 186 N.J. at 546. As such, "[t]he failure to do so will

weigh heavily against the grant of a future application." Id. at 547. In Gac,

the father paid child support while the child was in college, and the mother did

not request college expense contribution until after graduation. Id. at 539. The

Court concluded that "those facts are significant and tip the scale in favor of

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                                      15
denial of plaintiff's request for contribution." Id. at 547. Subsequently, in

Gotlib v. Gotlib, we applied the Gac holding and concluded that, when the

motion is brought after the expenses are incurred, thereby excluding the parent

from the decision-making process, splitting college expenses in half between

the parties without addressing the Newburgh factors was "not sustainable."

399 N.J. Super. 295, 310 (App. Div. 2008).

      Here, if the trial court on remand determines there was no agreement

between the parties to pay for college expenses, it should analyze this case

pursuant to Gac and Newburgh. Although the Newburgh factors are referenced

in the court's opinion, there was no specific analysis of the factors because the

court determined a plenary hearing was not necessary. On remand, those

factors should be addressed if appropriate to do so under Gac and if the court

determines there was no contract entered into between the parties that

controlled defendant's obligation with respect to the payment of college

expenses. Following a full hearing, the court will be in a better position to

meaningfully analyze these factors.

      The court must develop a full record and consider testimony on the issue

of the consultation between the parties and defendant's involvement in the

college search process.    As with the issue regarding whether there was a

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                                      16
contract between the parties, a plenary hearing is necessary to resolve the

factual disagreements between the parties, including when the educational

decisions were made and the efforts made to involve defendant in the decision-

making process.     Moreover, the court did not have access to the parties'

financial information, and a plenary hearing will provide the court an

opportunity to consider this information in the context of analyzing the

Newburgh factors.

                                       C.

      Plaintiff also claims the trial court wrongfully applied the legal concept

of laches when denying her entire request for contribution for her unreimbursed

medical and insurance expenses. Plaintiff argues defendant "was aware of his

court ordered contribution to unreimbursed medical expenses and health

insurance coverage." Because the court entered a subsequent order in 2007

that mandated defendant to pay for fifty-seven percent of medical expenses,

plaintiff contends defendant's failure to comply does not result in "harm and

inequity" for him, even though she waited to petition for reimbursement many

years after the expenses accrued.

      "Laches is an equitable doctrine which penalizes knowing inaction by a

party with a legal right from enforcing that right after passage of such a period

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of time that prejudice has resulted to the other parent[] so that it would be

inequitable to enforce the right." L.V. v. R.S., 347 N.J. Super. 33, 39 (App.

Div. 2002). "The key ingredients" to the applicability of laches "are knowledge

and delay by one party[,]" coupled with a detrimental "change of position by

the other [party]." Ibid. Thus, factors considered in determining whether to

apply laches include "'[t]he length of delay, reasons for delay, and changing

conditions of either or both parties during the delay.'" Ibid. (quoting Lavin v.

Bd. of Educ. of City of Hackensack, 90 N.J. 145, 152 (1982)). "While laches

does not arise from delay alone," inequity "more often than not, will turn on

whether a party has been misled to his harm by the delay." Ibid. (quoting

Lavin, 90 N.J. at 153).

      However, "unlike the periods prescribed by the statute of limitations,"

the constraints of laches "are not fixed" but are flexible enough to accomplish

mutual fairness and equity in a given case. Lavin, 90 N.J. at 151. "[W]hether

laches should be applied depends upon the facts of the particular case and is a

matter within the sound discretion of the trial court." Mancini v. Twp. of

Teaneck, 179 N.J. 425, 436 (2012) (quoting Garrett v. Gen. Motors Corp., 844

F.2d 559, 562 (8th Cir. 1988)).

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                                      18
      Here, the child support agreement, dated June 26, 2002, made defendant

liable for fifty-seven percent of their daughter's medical expenses. Plaintiff

requests that defendant reimburse her for various medical expenses for their

daughter, some of which date back to 2006. The trial court, in a written

decision, explained:

            In the current case, [p]laintiff filed this application [on
            January 1, 2023] and presented evidence of uncovered
            medical expenses dating back to [August 30, 2006], a
            difference of more than sixteen . . . years. Plaintiff
            also presented evidence of health insurance coverage
            costs dating back to [August 10, 2001] which was
            more than twenty-two . . . years before filing the
            instant application.      Regarding health insurance
            coverage costs, [p]laintiff provided a 2007 court order
            for [d]efendant to enroll the child through his
            employer medical insurance plan. Plaintiff testified
            that between 2014 and 2019, [d]efendant had not
            covered the costs as previously ordered. Plaintiff had
            the ability to file an application for reimbursement of
            uncovered medical expenses and health insurance
            costs much closer to the time when the expenses were
            incurred.

      We generally agree the court did not misapply its discretion on the laches

issue except as noted below. Plaintiff waited an excessive amount of time to

petition the court for defendant to reimburse her for certain of the medical

expenses and insurance coverage costs. She was aware she could return to

court as evidenced by her text messages to defendant regarding the college

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tuition issue, where she notes that if they cannot agree, she would go back to

court. For some unknown reason, she never returned to court until defendant

moved for emancipation. We would note, however, that certain of the expenses

are from as recent as 2019, when the parties' daughter was beginning college.

We conclude that on remand plaintiff may seek to recover any medical or

insurance-related expenses on or after 2019, but no earlier. While it would be

prejudicial to require defendant to reimburse plaintiff for medical expenses

from when their daughter was very young, it is not unreasonable to require him

to pay for the more recent bills from her college years. We therefore affirm in

part and vacate in part the trial court's decision concerning the medical

expenses and insurance costs.

                                      D.

      Lastly, plaintiff argues the trial court committed reversible error by

failing to address her motion to change venue. She advised the court that she

now resides in Bergen County, and no longer in Passaic County, where the

matter was being heard. Defendant lives in Georgia.

      Rule 4:3-3(a) provides:

            [A] change of venue may be ordered . . . if there is a
            substantial doubt that a fair and impartial trial can be
            had in the county where venue is laid[,] for the
            convenience of parties and witnesses in the interest of

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                                      20
            justice [or] in Family Part post-judgment motions, if
            both parties reside outside the county of original venue
            and application is made to the court by either party to
            change venue to a county where one of the parties now
            resides.

The word "may" indicates the court has discretion to grant or deny the motion

depending on the particular circumstances. See also State v. Collins, 2 N.J.

406, 411 (1949) ("Motions for a change of venue . . . are addressed to the sound

discretion of the court.").

      Here, the trial court did not address plaintiff's motion to change venue.

On remand the court shall consider the motion following its decision on the

other substantive matters noted above.

                                       E.

      Although we recognize the time the trial court expended in this matter,

on remand, we direct a different judge to try this case. Pellicer v. St. Barnabas

Hosp., 200 N.J. 22, 59-60 (2009) (citing Entress v. Entress, 376 N.J. Super.

125, 133 (App. Div. 2005) (remanding to different judge "to avoid the

appearance of bias or prejudice based upon the judge's prior involvement") ).

To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments, we are satisfied

they are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

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      Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

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