Court Opinion

ID: 9587547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:23:33.069044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:52.959153
License: Public Domain

SILAK, Justice,
dissenting.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that application of the overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine”, and that “[i]t has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort. Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). The Court went on to say:
[A]t the very least, ... facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and ... its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from “pure speech” toward conduct and that conduct — even if expressive — falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded,’’ may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect — at best a prediction— cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917. “Measuring the substantiality of a statute’s overbreadth apparently requires, inter alia, a rough balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications____ [A]n over-breadth challenger has a duty to provide the court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid applications the statute permits.” Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22, 30 (1st Cir.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1063, 98 S.Ct. 1236, 55 L.Ed.2d 763.
In light of the above standards, the preme Court determined that the statute at issue in Broadrick was not substantially overbroad, and “whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-ease analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.” Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16, 93 S.Ct. at 2917. I would apply the same standards to reach the same result in this case. I.C. § 36-1510(l)(c) prohibits persons from entering or remaining in areas where animals may be taken with the intent to interfere with the lawful taking or pursuit of wildlife. This provision does not prohibit “pure speech”, but conduct which is within the scope of *860otherwise valid criminal laws. Casey has not provided the court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid applications which I.C. § 36-1510(l)(c) permits, and I am unpersuaded that the overbreadth of this statute is substantial in light of the number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications. Although I.C. § 36-1510(l)(c) may deter protected speech or expressive conduct to some unknown extent, it does not do so to the point where that effect justifies invalidating the provision on its face. I would, rather, give I.C. § 36-1510(l)(c) a limiting construction so as to proscribe entering or remaining “in any area where any animal may be taken with the intent to [physically] interfere with the lawful taking or pursuit of wildlife.” This would effectually eliminate those applications of the statute which might potentially implicate first amendment freedoms, while preserving those applications which further the legitimate purposes of the statute.
Accordingly, I would affirm Casey’s conviction under I.C. § 36 — 1510(l)(c). Casey was not engaged in any form of constitutionally protected speech or expression in waving her arms and screaming at the chukars, and therefore application of I.C. § 36-1510(l)(c) does not infringe on Casey’s constitutional rights under the facts of this case. Whatever overbreadth may exist in I.C. § 36-1510(l)(c) should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be constitutionally applied.