Court Opinion

ID: 9383671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 22:02:38.256349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.372027
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/30/23 Young v. Schultz CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 JACALYN A. YOUNG et al.,
                                                                        A165581
           Plaintiffs and Appellants,
 v.                                                                     (Sonoma County
 RONALD J. SCHULTZ,                                                     Super. Ct. No. SCV-269601)
           Defendant and Respondent.

         Jacalyn Young joined the board of her homeowner’s association and
became its president during a tumultuous time. Several association
members — including Ronald Schultz — questioned whether Young was
qualified to lead the association through the crisis, and they sought more
information about her and the board’s oversight of association finances.
Frustrated by Young’s failure to promptly address these concerns, Schultz
performed a public records search; he learned that Young and two friends —
Diane Lynn and Mary Anne Burwell — (collectively, plaintiffs) appeared to
be running several “internet churches” without parishioners out of Young’s
home. He suspected plaintiffs were engaged in “possible fraud and/or money
laundering” and that under the circumstances, it was “risky and foolish” to
allow Young to manage the association’s finances. He wrote plaintiffs,
threatening to release information about their affiliation with the religious

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organizations unless Young resigned from the board, and he intimated
governmental authorities would “want to talk” with plaintiffs “once the word
is out.”
       Young did not resign. Instead, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Schultz
for extortion and other claims. The trial court granted Schultz’s special
motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; undesignated statutory references
are to this code). First, the court concluded plaintiffs’ claims arose out of
protected activity and Schultz’s conduct did not come within the narrow
statutory exception for conduct that is illegal as a matter of law. Second, it
determined plaintiffs failed to establish a probability of prevailing on their
claims. We affirm.
                                BACKGROUND
       Young is the president of The Temple of Life, Inc. (church), a self-
described “human charitable foundation” to which she has donated over $1.4
million. Lynn is the church’s chief financial officer; until her death, Burwell
was its secretary.1 The church and two other charitable organizations — The
Temple of Metaphysical Science and the Temple of Freedom — are registered
for service of process at Young’s residence in the Woodlands, a residential
community in Santa Rosa comprised of 27 townhomes. Young and Lynn live
near each other in the Woodlands, and they are members of the Woodlands

       1Burwell died during the pendency of this appeal. We grant Young’s
March 13, 2023 motion to substitute as Burwell’s successor in interest.
(§ 377.31; In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1152–1153.)
We do not describe or consider evidence excluded by the trial court, including
the majority of plaintiffs’ declarations filed in opposition to the special motion
to strike. Plaintiffs have not challenged the court’s evidentiary rulings,
which “ ‘effectively gutted [their] arguments of any evidentiary support.’ ”
(Villanueva v. City of Colton (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1196.) We omit
references to other litigation arising out of this incident.

                                        2
Owners Association (HOA). Schultz and his wife live in the Woodlands; they
too are HOA members.
      In March 2021, the HOA was in disarray. The president of its board
of directors unexpectedly resigned shortly after the board hired a new
property manager to manage HOA finances. Then Young joined the board;
two weeks later, she became its president. On April 12 — the first day of her
presidency — the board fired the property manager. The board started to
manage HOA finances itself, and it decided homeowners would begin using
a web-based service (the company) to pay monthly dues. The board notified
homeowners of these developments; it assured them HOA funds were “safe”
despite acknowledging the board did not know how much HOA money was in
the former property manager’s possession.
      In mid-April 2021, Schultz sent two emails to the board requesting
information about the company and suggesting the HOA was negligent for
failing to provide homeowners with the company’s terms of service. Around
that same time, Schultz’s wife emailed the board a list of questions about the
HOA’s accounting procedures — such as who paid the bills and generated
monthly financial reports — and noted that as a former board treasurer, she
was “very concerned” about these issues. The next day, Schultz’s wife sent
another email to the board criticizing Young’s failure to respond to her
questions. Eventually, Young promised to answer the questions at an
upcoming board meeting.
      On the evening of April 19, 2021, Schultz emailed Young. He accused
the board of failing to understand internet security principles and neglecting
to implement internal accounting controls. Schultz also demanded
information on Young’s background and her qualifications to serve as board
president. He asked, “Since you are going to have virtually total control of an

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unsecured accounting system that contains tens of thousands of dollars and
generat[es] over $13,000 each month, are you willing to allow a criminal
background check? [¶] During the past thirty-odd years, this association has
gone through many property managers and each transition has always been
seamless, without anxiety. [¶] I’m sorry you have decided to take us down
a different path.”
      Two days later — on April 21, 2021 — Schultz emailed a letter to
Young. The email’s subject line was “For the Good of All, I Urge You Resign
From the Board.” The letter stated:
      “As President for the churches ‘The Temple of Life’, ‘The Temple of
Metaphysical Science’, and ‘Temple of Freedom’, I am writing this letter to
you [to] urge you to resign as a board member of The Woodlands Association
by 5:00 PM April 22, 2021. [¶] From my experience as CEO of Netfilter
Technologies (1998-2002), a software company specializing in Internet
security, the three churches you and Diane Lynn . . . presently run out of The
Woodlands, generating tax-free income without any parishioners except
yourselves is an obvious ‘red flag’ for possible fraud and/or money laundering.
Clearly, having you as a Woodlands Board member having direct access to
tens of thousands of dollars in our bank account and the $13,000 monthly
dues is both risky and foolish. [¶] To save my fellow homeowners the
embarrassment of having to confront their lack of common sense of choosing
you as their President, I’m giving you the opportunity to leave the board ‘for
personal reasons.’ If you resign (via email to the board with a cc to me) prior
to 5:00 PM tomorrow, I and my trusted cohorts are willing to hold this
information confidential.”
      The letter continued: “If you do not resign prior to 5PM, the
information will be released to the full membership. While I have no proof

                                       4
that your church activities are illegal, I get the strangest feeling (once the
word is out) the IRS and the State of California Department of Corporations
will want to talk to you and Ms. Lynn. [¶] Frankly, this is also a fun New
York Times story: Two elderly ladies, running multiple churches out of
a condominium complex that has generated tax-free profit under everyone’s
radar for twenty years. [¶] In any case, it’s your call.” The email attached
a three-page document — labeled “RAW DATA ” — containing information
Schultz had gathered and stating Young and Lynn were operating churches
out of their homes that “appear to generate substantial tax-free income from
unknown sources with no parishioners.”
      That same day, Schultz hand-delivered similar letters — also
accompanied by “RAW DATA” — to Lynn and Burwell “in the hopes” they
would urge Young to resign from the board. In his letter to Lynn, Schultz
stated he was “sorry” about her sister’s “passing . . . she appeared to be a fine
person.”
      The next day, Young emailed the HOA. In her email — which attached
the letters — she complained Schultz wanted her to resign so “he can
undermine the new-found openness and cooperation between the
homeowners and the board . . . . He appears . . . frustrated and angry that
I will not violate the Davis-Stirling law and answer questions outside of
a board meeting.” She suggested Schultz was “getting close to blackmail,”
and she urged homeowners to read “his ultimatum” and decide for
themselves. Young stated she did “not care who is on the board, as long as
the conditions improve here at the Woodlands.” She also described her
professional background, acknowledged serving as a board member for
“a church foundation,” and insisted she had “nothing to hide.” She stated the
activities of her “human charitable foundation” were “conducted with the

                                        5
utmost of integrity and by government rules.” Finally, she noted Schultz had
promised not to expose her “human charitable work” if she resigned, but she
questioned how one could expose “public information.”
      Two days later — and in response to questions from homeowners —
Young sent another email to the HOA. She provided additional detail
regarding her work history, clarified her involvement with the church, and
noted the board had put “processes, procedures, and safeguards in place so
that owners can be assured their money is safe, . . . and that all the
outstanding Woodlands bills are paid.” She noted the board had placed
information on certain HOA expenditures on the company’s website to
provide “more transparency into the finances than by any other prior Board,”
and she promised to explain the safeguards at the next board meeting. She
also asserted the company’s website was secure. At a May 2021 meeting, the
board described the property management transitions, provided an overview
of HOA finances, and explained the company’s security features.
      This litigation followed. In October 2021, plaintiffs filed a complaint
against Schultz alleging claims for libel, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, “Menace (Extortion),” and conspiracy. The complaint acknowledged
the HOA was in a state of turmoil when Young became president, and that
Schultz wrote the letters after the board announced it would investigate “how
the HOA found itself in such poor financial and structural condition.”
According to the complaint, Schultz wrote the letters “to threaten and coerce
Young into immediately resigning” from the board, so that he “could
presumably install himself or someone sympathetic to his views in the office.”
The complaint further alleged the letters falsely stated the church was
a nonoperational front for Young “to steal and launder money” and that
“Schultz twisted the facts of Young’s involvement and status of her church, in

                                        6
order to fabricate the false light that she is ‘using three churches’ to steal and
launder money from ‘three non-operational non-profit organizations.’ ”
      As relevant here, the libel cause of action alleged the letters falsely
accused plaintiffs of “committing the crimes of financial fraud and money
laundering” and charged them with “improper and immoral conduct” and
“dishonesty.”2 The letters — which were seen by all HOA members — caused
plaintiffs to suffer “loss of . . . reputation, shame, mortification, and hurt
feelings.” The “Menace (Extortion)” claim alleged Schultz threatened to
expose their “possible fraud and/or money laundering” to the HOA,
governmental authorities, and the New York Times unless Young resigned
from the board, and that Young disclosed the letters to “protect her integrity
and reputation” as board president. The complaint further alleged the letters
damaged Young and Lynn’s character and caused unspecified “damage” to
Burwell. Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action
alleged Schultz’s threat to expose them was intentional, malicious, and
calculated to cause emotional and physical harm. Finally, plaintiffs’
conspiracy cause of action alleged Schultz conspired with his “cohorts . . . to
prepare and send the letters of extortion.” The complaint attached the
correspondence from Schultz and his wife.
      Schultz filed a special motion to strike. (§ 425.16.) He argued the
letters concerned Young’s fitness to serve as board president and to control
HOA finances, and that issues pertaining to HOA governance come within
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), which protects speech on an issue of public
interest. He also insisted plaintiffs’ claims arose from the letters, and that

      2 Young and Lynn alleged the letters addressed to them were libelous
on their face. (See Edward v. Ellis (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 780, 790
[describing libel per se].)

                                         7
they could not establish a probability of prevailing. In supporting
declarations, Schultz stated “a dispute arose among the HOA membership
following Ms. Young’s decision to terminate” the property manager and “self-
manage all HOA finances.” The HOA’s financial welfare — and Young’s
qualifications to serve as board president and manage HOA finances — were
of concern to him and other HOA members, but when he and other members
asked her to address these concerns at HOA meetings, she refused.
      Schultz wrote the letters because he felt he “had no other recourse to
address [his] concerns and the concerns of other HOA members.” He
obtained the information about plaintiffs by conducting a public records
search with assistance from municipal employees. He did not “seek any
money, property, or anything else of value” from plaintiffs, and he had no
desire to serve as board president — a “voluntary and unpaid position.”
Finally, Schultz noted an attorney for the HOA accused him of committing
a “civil tort,” and “[n]ot realizing [his] actions may possibly be illegal, [he]
immediately erased all the ‘RAW DATA’ information” from his computer to
ensure “no one could possibly have access to the material in the future.” His
wife and three other HOA members offered declarations describing their
concerns upon learning Young — who was “virtually unknown” to them —
would have control over large sums of HOA money. These neighbors had
“accounting questions,” and they encouraged Schulz and his wife to “find
answers.”
      Over plaintiffs’ opposition, the trial court granted the special motion to
strike. First, it determined the letters were protected under section 425.16
because a homeowner’s association fulfills “a quasi-governmental function for
subsets of society,” and the qualifications of association board members were
thus a matter of public interest. The court also found the letters advanced

                                         8
Schultz’s “intent to have a public discussion of the alleged issues, and as such
represented protected activity.” Rejecting plaintiffs’ argument to the
contrary, the court determined Schultz’s conduct did not fall within an
exception to section 425.16 as the letters did “not constitute extortion as
a matter of law.” Extortion, the court explained, requires a defendant to
seek consideration, and plaintiffs neither alleged anything of value nor
“established that the HOA Presidency has value.”
      Second, the trial court concluded plaintiffs could not show a probability
of prevailing on their claim for libel because the letters contained statements
of opinion, and no probability of prevailing on their cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress because Schultz’s threat to disclose
“otherwise public information, while perhaps unscrupulous,” did not shock
the conscience. The court also found plaintiffs failed to show a probability of
success on their civil extortion claim as they failed to allege — or offer
evidence tending to show — Schultz requested or received “something of
value as a result of his alleged threats.” Finally, the court concluded
plaintiffs’ conspiracy cause of action had no possibility of success in the
absence of a viable tort claim.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Section 425.16 provides a procedure for weeding out meritless claims
arising from protected speech activity. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376,
384; Flickinger v. Finwall (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 822, 831–832 (Flickinger).)
Under the statute, the defendant has the burden to establish the challenged
claim arises from protected activity. (Flickinger, at p. 832.) If the defendant
makes this showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate
a probability of prevailing on the merits. (Ibid.) We independently review
the trial court’s order on the special motion to strike, considering the

                                        9
pleadings and admissible evidence submitted in support of — and in defense
to — the claims. (Flickinger, at p. 831; Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.)
                                         I.
      We begin by considering whether plaintiffs’ claims arise from acts in
furtherance of Schultz’s right of petition or free speech under section 425.16,
subdivision (e). As relevant here, an act in furtherance of a person’s right of
petition or free speech includes any conduct “in connection with a public issue
or an issue of public interest.” (Id., subd. (e)(4).) The term “public interest”
includes “not only governmental matters, but also private conduct that
impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in
a manner similar to that of a governmental entity.” (Damon v. Ocean Hills
Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479.) It is well settled
a “homeowners association board is in effect ‘a quasi-government entity
paralleling in almost every case the powers, duties, and responsibilities of
a municipal government.’ ” (Id. at p. 475.) Because a “ ‘homeowners
association functions as a second municipal government’ ” (id. at p. 479),
numerous courts have held disputes pertaining to association governance are
matters of “public interest” within the meaning of section 425.16. (See, e.g.,
Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Assn. of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 119, 131–132 [collecting cases].)
      When — as here — the matter is of interest only to a limited portion of
the public, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) is satisfied if the protected
activity occurs “ ‘in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute or
discussion, such that it warrants protection by a statute that embodies the
public policy of encouraging participation in matters of public significance.’ ”
(Ruiz v. Harbor View Community Assn. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1468;

                                        10
FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 140 [context is
relevant when evaluating whether speech is protected under subd. (e)(4)].)
Here, Schultz suspected plaintiffs may have engaged in fraud or money
laundering, and he questioned whether Young was fit to serve as board
president. These concerns were of interest to the entire HOA membership,
a definable portion of the public. (Ruiz, at p. 1468.) Indeed, several HOA
members shared Schultz’s apprehension about the wisdom of allowing Young
to control large sums of HOA money while the HOA was in financial and
structural disarray, and they urged Schultz to “find answers.” Thus, when
Schultz wrote the letters, there was an ongoing discussion regarding the
manner in which the HOA would be governed. Moreover, the record
demonstrates the letters furthered the discourse on this matter — in
response to the letters, Young communicated with the HOA about her
qualifications and outlined steps the board was taking to increase financial
oversight. (Ruiz, at p. 1469; FilmOn.com Inc., at p. 151; Damon v. Ocean
Hills Journalism Club, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 479.)
      As it is undisputed all of plaintiffs’ causes of action arise out of the
letters, we conclude the gravamen of their claims concern matters of “public
interest” under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). (Country Side Villas
Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1117–1118; Damon v.
Ocean Hills Journalism Club, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 479–480.) In
urging us to reach a contrary conclusion, plaintiffs briefly assert there was
no public debate or dispute. We find this argument unpersuasive for the
reasons discussed above and for the additional reason that it relies on
evidence excluded by the trial court. (Villanueva v. City of Colton, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1195–1196.) Nor are we persuaded by plaintiffs’
reliance on Donovan v. Dan Murphy Foundation (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th

                                        11
1500. There, the board of a charitable foundation removed a member who
raised concerns about the foundation’s financial oversight and governance.
(Id. at pp. 1502–1503.) Donovan held the vote to remove the board member
did not come within section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) because defendants
“presented no evidence of widespread public interest in the financial
oversight or governance” of the foundation. (Donovan, at pp. 1508–1509.)
The removal of the board member was, Donovan explained, akin to a private
disagreement between an employer and its employee. (Id. at p. 1509.)
Donovan is distinguishable. Here, the HOA is a quasi-governmental entity,
not a private foundation, and Schultz offered evidence demonstrating the
letters raised issues of interest to the HOA.
      Plaintiffs also contend their complaint does not arise out of protected
activity because Schultz engaged in extortion, which is not constitutionally
protected. (See Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005 (Geragos);
Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 328 (Flatley).) True, section 425.16
does not protect speech or petitioning activity that is “ ‘illegal as a matter of
law’ ” — including criminal extortion. (Flickinger, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at
p. 832.) But this exception — known as the Flatley exception — applies only
in narrow circumstances when either the evidence conclusively establishes,
or the defendant concedes, illegality as a matter of law. (Flickinger, at
p. 832.) “The mere fact the plaintiff alleges the defendant engaged in
unlawful conduct does not cause the conduct to lose its protection” under the
statute. (San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State University
Research Foundation (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 76, 82.) Instead, the plaintiff
must conclusively prove illegality (Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th
357, 385); if there is any factual dispute regarding “ ‘the legitimacy of the
defendant’s conduct, it cannot be resolved within the first step’ ” of a special

                                        12
motion to strike. (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424
(Vasquez).)
      Penal Code section 518 prohibits extortion, defined as obtaining
property or other consideration — anything of value — from another person
with that person’s consent by wrongful use of force or fear. (See Geragos,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1022; CALCRIM No. 1830 [listing elements].)
As relevant here, wrongful use of fear includes threatening to accuse a person
“of a crime,” or threatening to expose, or to impute to the person, a “disgrace,
or crime.” (Pen. Code, § 519, subds. (2), (3).) Penal Code section 523 — which
prohibits extortion by threatening letter — provides that a “person who,
with intent to extort property or other consideration from another, sends
or delivers to any person any letter or other writing . . . expressing or
implying . . . any threat” specified in Penal Code section 519 may be punished
in the same manner as if such money or property were actually obtained by
means of the threat. (Pen. Code § 523, subd. (a); see Geragos, at p. 1022.)
Penal Code section 524 criminalizes attempted extortion. (People v. Sales
(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 741, 748–749.)
      Extortion often involves a threat to perform an act specified in Penal
Code section 519 “ ‘coupled with a demand for money.’ ” (Flatley, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 326.) Flatley is the seminal case. There, attorney Mauro
sent a renowned entertainer a demand letter claiming the entertainer had
raped his client; in subsequent telephone calls with the entertainer’s
attorneys, Mauro threatened to sue the entertainer, to report him to federal
and local authorities, and to destroy his career unless the entertainer paid
seven figures to settle the alleged rape claims. (Id. at pp. 305, 307–311.)
Thereafter, the entertainer sued Mauro for civil extortion and other claims;

                                       13
Mauro filed a special motion to strike, insisting the letter was a prelitigation
settlement offer protected by section 425.16. (Flatley, at p. 305.)
      In upholding the denial of the special motion to strike, the California
Supreme Court concluded the letter and phone calls “constituted criminal
extortion as a matter of law.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 305, 333.)
As the Flatley court explained, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated
Mauro’s threats to publicly accuse the entertainer of rape, and to report and
publicly accuse him of violating the law — unless the entertainer paid at
least $1 million to Mauro’s client, a percentage of which would go to Mauro —
constituted extortion in contravention of Penal Code sections 518, 519, and
523. (Flatley, at pp. 329–332.) Flatley emphasized its conclusion was “based
on the specific and extreme circumstances of this case” and cautioned its
opinion “should not be read to imply that rude, aggressive, or even belligerent
prelitigation negotiations . . . that may include threats to file a lawsuit,
report criminal behavior to authorities or publicize allegations of wrongdoing,
necessarily constitute extortion.” (Id. at p. 332, fn. 16.)
      Applying Flatley, courts have held letters threatening to report a party
to governmental authorities, to accuse a party of a crime, or to expose the
party to public disgrace constitute extortion as a matter of law “when the
threat is linked to a monetary demand.” (Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi &
Lee, LLP (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 506, 520; Stenehjem v. Sareen (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1420, fn. 12, 1421–1423 [e-mail threatened to expose
former employee to federal authorities unless employee settled former
employer’s defamation claims]; Mendoza v. Hamzeh (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
799, 806 [threatening to report plaintiff to law enforcement agencies and
disclose alleged wrongdoing to plaintiff’s customers if he did not pay damages
exceeding $75,000].)

                                        14
      With this framework in mind, we turn to the circumstances of this case.
We assume for the sake of argument that Schultz’s threat to release
information about plaintiffs’ association with the churches — together with
intimating the disclosure would garner interest from governmental
authorities and a prominent newspaper — constituted a threat to accuse
plaintiffs of a crime or to expose or connect them to a disgrace or crime. But
unlike Flatley and its progeny, Schultz’s threat was not coupled with
a demand for money. Thus, to establish the first prong of the Flatley
exception, plaintiffs had the burden to offer uncontroverted evidence
conclusively showing Schultz intended to use fear to obtain property or other
consideration — something of value — from plaintiffs. (See Pen. Code,
§§ 518, subd. (b); 523, subd. (a); CALCRIM No. 1831 [listing elements of
extortion by threatening letter].)
      Plaintiffs do not contend Young’s right to continued board service
constitutes “property” for purposes of extortion. (See Galeotti v. International
Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 3 (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 850, 859,
862 [broadly defining property to include intangible benefits and prerogatives
capable of possession or disposition, among them the right to continued
employment].) Issues do not have a life of their own — if they are not raised,
they are forfeited — and we express no opinion on this question. (Estate of
Jones (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 948, 955 & fn. 1.) Instead, plaintiffs assert the
board presidency is consideration — a “thing of value” — under Penal Code
section 518. The statute does not define “value.” At plaintiffs’ urging, we
look to the dictionary definition. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines
“value” as “the monetary worth of something,” or “relative worth, utility, or
importance.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2023)  [as of Mar. 30, 2023].) The parties have not

                                      15
cited — and our research has not disclosed — California authority holding
volunteer service on a nonprofit board has value for purposes of extortion.3
In any event, we need not decide this issue because, even if we accept the
theoretical premise that Young’s board presidency could qualify as
consideration within the meaning of Penal Code section 518, plaintiffs have
not satisfied their burden to offer uncontroverted and conclusive evidence the
presidency has value.
      For example, there’s no evidence that the board presidency
has “monetary worth.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online, supra,
 [as of Mar. 30, 2023].)
Nor is there any conclusive evidence on the presidency’s “relative worth,
utility, or importance” — e.g., evidence enumerating the president’s powers
or describing the presidency’s utility. (Ibid.) Likewise, there are no
declarations explicitly attesting to the presidency’s importance to HOA
members or opining it has intrinsic value. To the extent there are inferences
of value to be drawn from unspecified circumstantial evidence in the record,
those inferences do not prove illegality as a matter of law. (Vasquez, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 424.)
      On the other hand, Schultz testified he did not “seek any money,
property, or anything else of value” from plaintiffs, and he stated did not

      3 Plaintiffs rely on federal court cases interpreting the phrase “thing
of value” in 18 United States Code section 876, subdivision (d) — which
prohibits mailing threatening communications — to include “intangible
objectives” (United States v. Scott (9th Cir. 1989) 884 F.2d 1163, 1166) such
as the right to testify in a criminal case. (United States v. Nilsen (11th Cir.
1992) 967 F.2d 539, 542–543.) We are not bound by these interpretations of
federal law; moreover, these cases do not assist plaintiffs because, as we
discuss below, there is no uncontested and conclusive evidence anyone
derived an intangible objective or benefit from Young’s board presidency.

                                       16
want to serve as board president — a “voluntary and unpaid position.” He
also offered evidence that Young “did not care who [was] on the board.” On
this record, plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden to conclusively establish
Schultz committed extortion as a matter of law by intending to use fear to
obtain something of value from them. (Geragos, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1025 [competing declarations created disputed factual issue]; Seltzer v.
Barnes (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 953, 967 [factual dispute precluded
application of Flatley exception].) This simply is not “one of those rare cases
in which there is uncontroverted and uncontested evidence” establishing
extortion “as a matter of law.” (Cross v. Cooper, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th
at p. 386.)
      Plaintiffs also contend the Flatley exception applies because Schultz
conceded his conduct was illegal. We disagree. In his special motion to
strike, Schultz disputed the extortion allegations, and he denied seeking
anything of value from plaintiffs. (Vasquez, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 424.)
Ignoring this evidence, plaintiffs insist Schultz conceded the illegality of his
conduct when he acknowledged having “no proof” their church-related
activities were “illegal.” This comment is not a concession because a claim for
extortion does not “turn on whether the conduct threatened to be exposed is
true.” (People v. Umana (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 625, 638; Mendoza v.
Hamzeh, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 805.) Plaintiffs also rely on Schultz’s
admission that his act of delivering the letters “may possibly be illegal.”
But Schultz made this remark in response to an accusation that he had
committed a tort; considered in context, his qualified language describing
the accusation is not a concession his conduct was illegal.
      In sum, we conclude plaintiffs’ complaint arises out of protected
petitioning activity and plaintiffs have not established Schultz’s acts are

                                       17
illegal as a matter of law. “This state of the case forecloses a resolution at the
first step of the [special motion to strike] inquiry.” (Vasquez, supra, 1 Cal.5th
at p. 424.)
                                        II.
      We turn to the second step of the special motion to strike analysis —
whether plaintiffs have demonstrated a probability of prevailing on their
claims. Here, our task is to determine whether plaintiffs have stated legally
sufficient claims and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain
judgment in their favor. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 788.) To satisfy this burden, plaintiffs must offer “competent admissible
evidence.” (Id. at pp. 788, 795 [“properly submitted admissible evidence
should be considered”].) We accept as true plaintiffs’ evidence, and we
evaluate Schultz’s evidence only to determine if it defeats plaintiffs’ claims as
a matter of law. (Id. at p. 795.) Although we resolve “conflicts and inferences
in the record” in plaintiffs’ favor, we do not consider “speculative inferences
not supported by the evidence proffered.” (Ibid., citing Sweetwater Union
High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 949.)
      The trial court determined plaintiffs could not show a probability of
prevailing on any of their causes of action. It first concluded plaintiffs failed
to show a probability of success on their claim for libel because Schultz’s
statement that their church-related behavior raised an “obvious ‘red flag’ for
possible fraud and/or money laundering” was a statement of opinion. Libel
requires the publication of an “unprivileged written communication about the
plaintiff that is false, defamatory, and has a natural tendency to injure.”
(Edward v. Ellis, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 790.) “ ‘A statement is not
defamatory unless it can reasonably be viewed as declaring or implying

                                        18
a provably false factual assertion.’ [Citations.] Whether a statement
declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact is generally a question
of law to be decided by a court.” (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 893, 909–910 (Bishop).) In making this determination,
courts consider the totality of the circumstances, “looking first to the
language of the statement and whether it was understood in a defamatory
sense, and then considering the context in which the statement was made,”
and “ ‘whether the reasonable or “average” reader would so interpret the
material.’ ” (Edward, at pp. 790–791.)
      In a passing reference, plaintiffs fault the trial court for improperly
weighing the evidence, and they characterize Schultz’s comment as an
“affirmative accusation” rather than an opinion. Plaintiffs, however, do not
identify the evidence they claim was erroneously weighed, and they do not
conduct the nuanced analysis required to evaluate whether the court erred in
concluding the letters contained statements of opinion. (Melaleuca v. Clark
(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1354 [distinction between fact and opinion
“ ‘is frequently a difficult one’ ”].) Moreover, plaintiffs do not describe the
difference between libel per se and traditional libel (see Bartholomew v.
YouTube, LLC (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1217, 1226–1228) or meaningfully
engage with any of the elements of a libel cause of action — for example, they
do not point to evidence in the record that Schultz’s statement was false
(Bishop, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 911) and they do not explain how
Schultz’s act of writing each individual plaintiff constitutes “publication” in
this context (see Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645).
      It is a fundamental rule of appellate procedure that the appellant is
required to convince us — by developing an argument and supporting it with
analysis and record citations — “that the trial court committed reversible

                                        19
error.” (Bishop, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 910; Jameson v. Desta (2018)
5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) Plaintiffs have not done that here, and by failing to
do so, they have forfeited their challenge to the court’s ruling with respect to
their libel cause of action. (Bishop, at p. 910.) We are not obligated to make
or develop arguments for the parties; we disregard conclusory arguments
unsupported by pertinent legal authority or cogent analysis. (Hernandez v.
First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.)
      The trial court next concluded plaintiffs failed to show a probability of
prevailing on their intentional infliction of intentional distress claim because
Schultz’s conduct did not shock the conscience. We agree. As relevant here,
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof of
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) “Conduct is
considered outrageous when it is ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that
usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ ” (Belen v. Ryan Seacrest
Productions, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1164.) “Liability for
intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” ’ ”
(Hughes, at p. 1051.)
      Schultz’s threat to reveal otherwise public information about plaintiffs’
association with the churches, together with his suggestion that plaintiffs
may have committed fraud or money laundering was not — as a matter of
law — so extreme and outrageous that it exceeded all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community. (See Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1109.) In the absence of aggravating circumstances,
insulting a person’s character, implying they may have committed a crime, or

                                        20
threatening to sue them are “not so egregiously outside the realm of civilized
conduct” so as to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1119, 1129
[referring to plaintiff as a senile liar]; Barker v. Fox & Associates (2015)
240 Cal.App.4th 333, 342, 356 [blaming caregiver for injuring elderly patient
and implying caregiver was a subpar employee]; Cochran v. Cochran (1998)
65 Cal.App.4th 488, 495 [threats to initiate litigation]; compare Siam v.
Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1582 [making a knowingly false
report of child abuse to law enforcement was sufficient to establish
probability of prevailing on claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress].)4 Instead of grappling with these cases — or citing authority to the
contrary — plaintiffs merely repeat their assertion that the trial court
“improperly weighed the evidence” in determining they failed to establish
a likelihood of success; again, however, plaintiffs fail to identify the evidence
they claim the court improperly weighed.
      The trial court also determined plaintiffs failed to establish a
probability of prevailing on their cause of action for civil extortion because
they offered no evidence Schultz requested or received something of value
from them. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Fuhrman v.
California Satellite Systems (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 408 (Fuhrman), which
held civil extortion — whether labeled as a claim for extortion, menace, or

      4 Threats of physical harm may give rise to an intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim (Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006)
145 Cal.App.4th 790, 809), but there is no admissible evidence plaintiffs
perceived Schultz’s comment about Lynn’s deceased sister as a death threat.
Plaintiffs cannot rely on the complaint’s conclusory allegations to meet their
burden of demonstrating a probability of success on their cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Barker v. Fox & Associates,
supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 350–351.)

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duress — is “a cause of action for the recovery of money obtained by the
wrongful threat of criminal or civil prosecution. [Citations.] It is essentially
a cause of action for moneys obtained by duress, a form of fraud.” (Id. at
p. 426, disapproved on another point as stated in Silberg v. Anderson (1990)
50 Cal.3d 205, 219.) Fuhrman held the complaint failed to state a claim
for civil extortion because it did not allege the plaintiff paid “the money
defendants demanded.” (Fuhrman, at p. 426; see also Chan v. Lund (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1171 [to establish extortion, the “ ‘wrongful use of
force or fear must be the operating or controlling cause compelling the
victim’s consent to surrender the thing to the extortionist’ ”].) In defending
the court’s ruling, Schultz cites Fuhrman, and he reasons “a civil cause of
action for extortion requires actual damages, i.e., the payment of money.”
      Plaintiffs do not contend Fuhrman is incorrectly decided, nor do they
urge us to depart from its holding. Indeed, they do not discuss Fuhrman at
all. Their cursory briefing is patently insufficient to establish the trial court
erred by concluding they did not state a probability of prevailing on their
cause of action for “Menace (Extortion).”5 (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc.,
supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277; Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90 [treating appellants’ failure to respond to an
argument in respondent’s brief as an implicit concession of the argument’s
validity].) Rather than providing reasoned argument disputing the validity
of the court’s ruling or refuting the arguments raised by Schultz, plaintiffs

      5 At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs conceded monetary
consideration is an element of a claim for civil extortion. Plaintiffs do
not argue California law recognizes tort claims for extortion by letter or
attempted extortion, and they do not contend a cause of action for civil
extortion has the same elements as the crime of extortion. Thus, we have no
occasion to consider these questions.

                                        22
state — in conclusory fashion in their opening brief — that they “can
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on their cause of action for menace
(extortion),” and they recite the definition of menace. (Capitalization
omitted.) We deem this argument abandoned because plaintiffs have not
explained how the evidence they submitted in opposition to the special
motion to strike satisfies their burden to make a prima facie factual showing
sufficient to sustain judgment in their favor on this claim. (Monster Energy
Co. v. Schechter, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 788 [describing burden at second step
of special motion to strike inquiry]; Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Assn.
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 604, 616 [plaintiff provided “almost no discussion
of the allegations of her complaint or the evidence accompanying her
opposition”].)
      Finally, the trial court determined plaintiffs failed to show a probability
of prevailing on their conspiracy cause of action. In their opening brief,
plaintiffs do not challenge this conclusion and we decline to consider their
argument — raised in their reply brief — regarding the likelihood of success
on that claim. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 277–278.)
      In sum, we conclude the trial court properly granted Schultz’s special
motion to strike because plaintiffs’ complaint arises out of protected
petitioning activity, and they failed to show a probability of prevailing on
their claims.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order granting Schultz’s special motion to strike is affirmed.
Schultz is entitled to attorney fees and costs — including those incurred in
this appeal — in an amount to be determined by the trial court. (§ 425.16,
subd. (c)(1); Flickinger, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 840–841.)

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                                 _________________________
                                 Rodríguez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

A165581

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