Court Opinion

ID: 9897228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:58.25725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:40.200559
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Nov 13 2023, 9:35 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew E. Dumas                                         ELIZABETH STONER
Hostetter & Associates                                   Rebecca J. Berfanger
Brownsburg, Indiana                                      RJ Berfanger Law LLC
                                                         Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                         Katherine E. Flood
                                                         Flood Family Law, LLC
                                                         Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Mark Stoner,                                             November 13, 2023
Appellant,                                               Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                         23A-DC-1185
        v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                         Court
Julia M. Stoner and Elizabeth G.                         The Honorable Alicia A. Gooden,
Stoner,                                                  Judge
Appellees.                                               Trial Court Cause No.
                                                         49D14-2103-DC-1898

                                Opinion by Judge Brown
                            Judges Vaidik and Bradford concur.

Brown, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1185 | November 13, 2023                           Page 1 of 9
[1]   Mark Stoner (“Grandfather”) appeals the trial court’s order dismissing his

      petition for grandparent visitation. We reverse and remand.

      Facts and Procedural History

[2]   In September 2021, the trial court entered a decree dissolving the marriage of

      Julia Stoner and Zachary Stoner (together, “Parents”) and incorporating their

      marital settlement agreement.1 The settlement agreement provided there was

      one child born of the marriage, S.S. Section 2.01 of the agreement provided

      Parents “shall share joint legal custody of the child.” Appellant’s Appendix

      Volume II at 25. Section 2.01 also provided:

              To ensure more responsible parenting and to promote the healthy
              adjustment and growth of their child, [Parents] agree that they each
              should recognize and address the child’s basic needs:

                                                        *****

              h.       To develop and maintain meaningful relationships with other
                       significant adults (grandparents, stepparents and other
                       relatives) as long as these relationships do not interfere with or
                       replace the child’s primary relationships with the parents.

      Id. at 25-26. Section 2.02 provided Parents “shall share joint and equal physical

      custody of the child.” Id. at 26.

      1
       The decree stated the parties were “Petitioner, Julia M. Stoner (‘Julia’)” and “Respondent, whose legal
      name is currently Zachary Stoner (‘Elizabeth’).” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 20.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1185 | November 13, 2023                             Page 2 of 9
[3]   On September 15, 2022, Grandfather filed a motion to intervene and a petition

      “to establish grandparent’s visitation pursuant to IC 31-17-5” (the

      “Grandparent Visitation Act” or “GVA”). Id. at 43. Grandfather stated he “is

      the father of Zachary Stoner n/k/a Elizabeth Stoner, as such he is the paternal

      grandfather of the child,” requested an order providing him with reasonable

      visitation with S.S., and claimed “[t]his is in the best interests of the child” and

      he “has had significant care of and contact with his grandson since birth.” Id.

      The court granted the motion to intervene. On September 29, 2022, the court

      issued an Order Amending Caption which ordered “[t]hat Caption herein is

      hereby amended to reflect Respondent’s legal name, Elizabeth G. Stoner” and

      “shall be changed on Odyssey.” Id. at 49.

[4]   On May 4, 2023, the court held a hearing. Counsel for Julia argued

      Grandfather did not have standing to seek grandparent visitation. Counsel

      referred to Matter of E.H., 121 N.E.3d 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), and argued

      “our position is that because both parents in this case continue to share joint

      legal custody, they are both custodial parents, both have the right to determine

      the upbringing of their child and that it would not be proper for grandfather

      who is the parent of a custodial parent to be awarded any grandparent visitation

      due to a lack of standing.” Transcript Volume II at 7. Counsel for Elizabeth

      “agree[d] with that analysis.” Id. Counsel for Grandfather argued Parents were

      “reading language into the statute that isn’t there” and E.H. did not apply. Id.

      at 9. He argued “the old version of the [GVA] did provide that a grandparent

      whose own child is the custodial parent can’t seek the visitation” and “[t]hat’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1185 | November 13, 2023       Page 3 of 9
      not what the act says anymore.” Id. at 11. The trial court entered a written

      order providing:

              1.      Petitioner [Julia] and Respondent [Elizabeth] are joint
                      custodians who share joint legal and physical custody of the
                      minor child.

              2.      Respondent [Elizabeth] is the child of the Paternal
                      Grandfather, who is requesting visitation.

              3.      Both parents object to Grandfather’s petition and request for
                      visitation.

              4.      The Court finds that In re Matter of E.H., 121 NE3rd 594
                      (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) is directly on point in this matter.

              5.      The Court finds that the [GVA] was not intended to apply
                      where the grandparent seeks visitation over the objection of a
                      custodial parent who is their own child.

              6.      The Court finds that Grandfather lacks standing to pursue a
                      request for GP visitation under the [GVA], and the Court
                      dismisses the petition.

      Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 17.

      Discussion

[5]   Grandfather maintains that he “has the ‘right to seek visitation’ of his grandson

      pursuant to the GVA, specifically I.C. § 31-17-5-1.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. He

      argues that E.H. does not support the dismissal of his petition, E.H. relies on

      caselaw interpreting a prior version of the GVA, and “[n]o longer does the

      GVA make any kind of distinction between custodial parent and noncustodial

      parent.” Id. at 9-10. He also argues E.H. involved adopted children and notes

      the language of Parents’ marital settlement agreement.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1185 | November 13, 2023       Page 4 of 9
[6]   We note that Parents have not filed appellees’ briefs. When an appellee fails to

      submit a brief, we do not undertake the burden of developing arguments, and

      we apply a less stringent standard of review, that is, we may reverse if the

      appellant establishes prima facie error. Bixler v. Delano, 185 N.E.3d 875, 877

      (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Prima facie is defined as “at first sight, on first

      appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. at 877-878 (citing Graziani v. D & R Const.,

      39 N.E.3d 688, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)). This rule was established so that we

      might be relieved of the burden of controverting the arguments advanced in

      favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee. Id. at 878.

[7]   When interpreting a statute, we begin by reading its words in their plain and

      ordinary meaning, taking into account the structure of the statute as a whole.

      Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 237 (Ind. 2023). Mindful of what the

      statute says and does not say, we aim to avoid interpretations that depend on

      selective reading of individual words that lead to irrational and disharmonizing

      results. Id. We presume the legislature intended for the statutory language to

      be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute’s underlying policy

      and goals. Id. Ultimately, our goal is to determine and give effect to the

      legislature’s intent. Id.

[8]   Ind. Code § 31-17-5-1 provides:

              (a)     A child’s grandparent may seek visitation rights if:

                      (1)      the child’s parent is deceased;

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1185 | November 13, 2023       Page 5 of 9
                       (2)      the marriage of the child’s parents has been dissolved in
                                Indiana; or

                       (3)      subject to subsection (b), the child was born out of
                                wedlock.

               (b)     A court may not grant visitation rights to a paternal
                       grandparent of a child who is born out of wedlock under
                       subsection (a)(3) if the child’s father has not established
                       paternity in relation to the child.

[9]    Ind. Code § 31-9-2-13 provides that “‘Child’, for purposes of . . . IC 31-17,

       means a child or children of both parties to the marriage” and “[t]he term

       includes . . . (1) Children born out of wedlock to the parties. (2) Children born

       or adopted during the marriage of the parties.” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-77 provides:

       “‘Maternal or paternal grandparent’, for purposes of IC 31-17-5, includes: (1)

       the adoptive parent of the child’s parent; (2) the parent of the child’s adoptive

       parent; and (3) the parent of the child’s parent.”

[10]   Here, S.S. is a child under Ind. Code § 31-9-2-13, and Grandfather is the parent

       of S.S.’s parent, Elizabeth, under Ind. Code § 31-9-2-77. Moreover, the

       marriage of Parents has been dissolved in Indiana. Accordingly, Grandfather

       “may seek visitation rights” as referenced in Ind. Code § 31-17-5-1(a)(2).

[11]   Further, we find that E.H. does not require dismissal of Grandfather’s petition.

       In that case, the parental rights of the children’s biological parents were

       terminated, and Paul Bobby Hernandez, the children’s biological maternal

       uncle, and his significant other adopted the children. 121 N.E.3d at 595.

       Hernandez and his significant other were not married. Id. The children’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1185 | November 13, 2023           Page 6 of 9
       biological maternal grandparents filed petitions for grandparent visitation. Id.

       The trial court found that, because Hernandez and his significant other were

       not married when they adopted the children, the children were “technically . . .

       ‘born’ out of wedlock” and thus the biological maternal grandparents were able

       to seek grandparent visitation. Id. at 596. On appeal, this Court found there

       was a difference between being born out of wedlock and being adopted by an

       unmarried person, a decree of adoption severs the parent and child relationship,

       an adoption is not a birth, and the biological maternal grandparents could not

       seek grandparent visitation. Id. at 597. Here, as previously stated, Grandfather

       may seek visitation as referenced in Ind. Code § 31-17-5-1(a)(2) where the

       marriage of the child’s parents has been dissolved in Indiana, and he need not

       rely on subsection (3) of the statute related to visitation where a child is born

       out of wedlock.

[12]   To the extent E.H. cites Lockhart v. Lockhart, 603 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1992), and states “the GVA was intended to apply only when the parent who is

       not their child is the custodial parent,” E.H., 121 N.E.3d at 598, the court in

       Lockhart discussed a statute which provided “[a] court may not grant visitation

       under this chapter after May 9, 1989 to a grandparent who is the parent of a

       person: (1) who is not deceased; and (2) who has been awarded custody of the

       grandchild.” Lockhart, 603 N.E.2d at 865 (citing Ind. Code § 31-1-11.7-2 2).

       2
        Subsequently amended by Pub. Law No. 229-1993, § 1, and repealed by Pub. Law No. 1-1997, § 157 (eff.
       July 1, 1997).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1185 | November 13, 2023                        Page 7 of 9
       However, the legislature amended Ind. Code § 31-1-11.7-2 in 1993, eliminating

       the language precluding a court from granting visitation to a grandparent who is

       the parent of a person who has been awarded custody of the grandchild, see

       Pub. Law No. 229-1993, § 1, and later repealed the statute in 1997 when it

       enacted Ind. Code § 31-17-5-1, the current statute. See Pub. Law No. 1-1997, §

       157 (eff. July 1, 1997) (revoking Ind. Code § 31-1-11.7-2), and § 9 (eff. July 1,

       1997) (adding Ind. Code § 31-17-5-1). The current statute, Ind. Code § 31-17-5-

       1, does not preclude a grandparent from seeking visitation with a child where

       the custodian of the child is the grandparent’s child. 3

[13]   We also observe the trial court incorporated Parents’ marital settlement

       agreement into its dissolution decree and Section 2.01 of the agreement

       provides that Parents “agree that they should recognize and address the child’s

       basic needs . . . [t]o develop and maintain meaningful relationships with other

       significant adults (grandparents . . . ) as long as these relationships do not

       interfere with or replace the child’s primary relationships with the parents.”

       Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 25-26.

       3
        See Daugherty v. Ritter, 646 N.E.2d 66, 66-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (noting grandparents had standing to seek
       visitation of their grandchild under the GVA where the grandchild lived with her mother, who was the
       grandparents’ child), adopted by 652 N.E.2d 502 (Ind. 1995); Moses v. Cober, 641 N.E.2d 668, 671 (Ind. Ct.
       App. 1994) (noting the legislature’s amendment to the GVA in 1993 eliminating the language precluding a
       court from granting visitation to a grandparent who is the parent of a person who has been awarded custody
       of the grandchild), abrogated on other grounds by Daugherty, 652 N.E.2d 502 (Ind. 1995).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1185 | November 13, 2023                             Page 8 of 9
[14]   We conclude that Grandfather has established prima facie error and that he

       may seek visitation rights with S.S. under the GVA. We reverse and remand

       for further proceedings on Grandfather’s petition.

[15]   Reversed and remanded.

       Vaidik, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1185 | November 13, 2023   Page 9 of 9