Court Opinion

ID: 9714057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:29:42.102768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.931461
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam
{on motion for rehearing). The appellants have moved for rehearing and have pointed out that in its original opinion in this case the court referred to the duty of an employer under the safe-place statute and then added, “He is not an insurer.” In their motion for rehearing, the appellants have cited two cases in which this court has previously stated that the employer is an insurer under the safe-place statute and a number of cases in which we have stated that the statute imposes upon an employer “an absolute duty.”
Because of an apparent inconsistency between the statement of the court in the original opinion and in prior opinions, this memorandum is being filed.
The two cases cited by the appellants where this court has described the employer’s duty under the safe-place statute, sec. 101.06, as that of an insurer are Van de Zande v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (1919), 168 Wis. 628, 170 N. W. 259, and Kendzewski v. Wausau S. F. Co. (1914), 156 Wis. 452, 146 N. W. 516. On the other hand, in at least the following cases, this court has said that an employer is not an insurer under the safe-place statute. Raim v. Ventura (1962), 16 Wis. (2d) 67, 71, 113 N. W. (2d) 827; Zehren v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (1960), 11 Wis. (2d) 539, 543, 105 N. W. (2d) 563; Rosenthal v. Farmers Store Co. (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 224, 227, 102 N. W. (2d) 222; Powless v. Milwaukee County (1959), 6 Wis. (2d) 78, 81, 94 N. W. (2d) 187; Paluch v. Baldwin Plywood & Veneer Co. (1957), 1 Wis. (2d) 427, 432, 85 N. W. (2d) 373; Boutin v. Cardinal Theatre Co. (1954), 267 Wis. 199, 204, 64 N. W. (2d) 848; Hipke v. Industrial Comm. (1952), 261 Wis. 226, 233, 52 N. W. (2d) 401; Northwestern C. & S. Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1927), 194 Wis. 337, 341, 216 N. W. 485. See also Manitowoc Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1956), 273 Wis. 293, 297, 77 N. W. (2d) 693.
*170bAn examination of Kendzewski v. Wausau S. F. Co., supra, 156 Wis. 452, reveals that that case did not involve the safe-place statute and therefore does not support the proposition that the safe-place statute makes the employer an insurer. The statute involved in the Kendzewski Case was sec. 1636-81, Stats. 1911. The statute which is now the safe-place statute, sec. 101.06, was then sec. 2394-48, Stats. 1911. The distinction between the two statutes was discussed in Olson v. Whitney Bros. Co. (1915), 160 Wis. 606, 150 N. W. 959. It was there noted (supra, p. 609) that sec. 1636-81, Stats. 1911, was repealed by ch. 588, Laws of 1913. That statute prohibited an employer in certain kinds of labor from furnishing scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, or other mechanical contrivances that were “unsafe, unsuitable or improper.” The statute did not define the words “unsafe, unsuitable or improper.” This court noted {supra, p. 609) that the statute was construed by applying to the words “unsafe, unsuitable or improper” their usual meaning, and so it was held that if an unsafe appliance of the kind mentioned was furnished and an accident to an employee resulted while engaged in the labor specified in the statute, the employer was liable unless he could show assumption of risk or contributory negligence or both. It mattered not that he might himself be free from negligence. In that sense, then, he was an absolute insurer of the safety of the appliance.
Sec. 1636-81, Stats. 1911, should be contrasted with the safe-place statute. Sec. 2394-48, Stats. 1911, said that the employer shall furnish a safe place of employment, but another statute went on to define the word “safe” to mean “such freedom from danger to the life, health or safety of employes or frequenters as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit.” Sec. 2394-41 (11), Stats. 1911. The court went on to note in the Olson Case, supra, at page 610, that under the safe-place statute the duty is measured by such safety as the nature of the employment will reason*170cably permit, but under sec. 1636-81, Stats. 1911, the prohibition against an unsafe appliance was absolute. The conclusion seems clear that while the duty of the employer under sec. 1636-81, Stats. 1911, could accurately be described as that of an insurer, it does not follow that the duty of an employer under the safe-place statute is also that of an insurer. This is but to emphasize the fact that sec. 1636-81 could reasonably be construed as imposing a form of absolute liability (i.e., creating the duty of an insurer as to the employer). On the other hand, sec. 2394-48 contains the concept of reasonableness which is inimical to the imposition of absolute liability.
The other case cited by the appellants in support of their proposition that an employer under the safe-place statute is an insurer is the case of Van de Zande v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (1919), 168 Wis. 628, 170 N. W. 259. An examination of that case indicates that the court may have been relying on language in the Kendsewski Case, supra, which referred to the employer’s duty as that of an insurer. In the Van de Zande Case, at page 631, the court stated that under the safe-place statute, the master is not an insurer of the safety of the employee, but only such as to the safety of the place or process.
We believe that there is no absolute liability in the sense of liability without fault imposed on the employer by the safe-place statute. It is not helpful or meaningful to describe the employer’s duty under the safe-place statute in terms of his being an insurer. The safe-place statute imposes no absolute liability.
To avoid further difficulty in the future, we think it is the better course to withdraw the language in the Van de Zande Case, supra, and other cases, in which we have described the duty of the employer under the safe-place statute in terms of his being an insurer. We thus adhere to the numerous cases cited above where we have said that the employer under the safe-place statute is not an insurer.
*170dThe second major contention of the appellants is that the employer under the safe-place statute has an “absolute duty,” and they cite numerous cases to that effect. There is no dispute on the proposition that this court has on numerous occasions stated (and correctly so) that the duty of the employer under the safe-place statute is “an absolute duty.” We believe that the appellants may be laboring under the assumption that the “absolute duty” language in the cases cited by the appellants connotes the idea that the employer has imposed upon him by the statute “absolute liability.” This is simply not the correct view of the liability of the employer under the statute.
In Langos v. Menasha Paper Co. (1914), 156 Wis. 418, 145 N. W. 1081, the court said that the safe-place statute imposes an absolute duty upon the employer to make the place of employment as free from danger as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit, and in the absence of contributory negligence the liability of the employer follows as a matter of course if this duty is not performed and injury results to the employee because it is not performed.
The duty is to make the place of employment as free from danger as the nature of the employment will “reasonably permit.” The concept of reasonableness is still a part of the definition of the duty of the employer under the safe-place statute. However, we reaffirm what we have often said to the effect that the statute imposes a higher duty .on the employer than that under the common law. Under the common law, the employer had only the duty of ordinary care, whereas under the safe-place statute he has a duty to make the place of employment as safe as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit. This is clearly a higher standard than ordinary care.
It should be emphasized that while it is a higher standard than ordinary care, the standard of care under the safe-place *170estatute does not create a duty as to the employer to indemnify anyone hurt on the premises — i.e., absolute liability. We have frequently said that the mere fact that an accident happens does not prove that the place was not safe. E.g., Heckel v. Standard Gateway Theater (1938), 229 Wis. 80, 85, 281 N. W. 640.
It is the nature of the place which determines the degree of the duty. Powless v. Milwaukee County (1959), 6 Wis. (2d) 78, 81, 94 N. W. (2d) 187. We pointed out in the Powless Case that the owner’s duty under the statute to provide a safe place for frequenters is an absolute one, but the term “safe” is relative, not absolute, and what is a safe place depends on the facts and conditions of each place. The point is simply that the statute recognizes a “rule of reason.” Olson v. Whitney Bros. Co. (1915), 160 Wis. 606, 610, 150 N. W. 959. We said in the Olson Case, supra, at page 610, that the statute does not impose upon an employer an impossibility or an unreasonable burden.
Normally the question of whether the safe-place statute is complied with or violated is a question for the trier of fact. Zehren v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (1960), 11 Wis. (2d) 539, 544, 105 N. W. (2d) 563. Here the jury found that the defendants complied with the statute, and there is no basis to disturb that finding.
Motion for rehearing denied, without costs.