Court Opinion

ID: 9919619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 20:00:39.299581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.847956
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 _____________

                                       No. 21-1209
                                      _____________

                                   JUAN RAMON ABREU,
                                            Petitioner

                                             v.

              ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                            ______________

                     On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the
                            Board of Immigration Appeals
                                   No. A077-030-517
                          Immigration Judge: Jason L. Pope
                                   ______________

                                   Argued on July 13, 2023

               Before: PHIPPS, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

                            (Opinion filed: January 18, 2024)

Christopher R. Healy [Argued]
Kaitlin L. O’Donnell
Troutman Pepper
Two Logan Square
18th and Arch Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19103
          Counsel for Petitioner
Brian M. Boynton
Holly M. Smith
Anne Donohue [Argued]
Stefanie N. Hennes
David Schor
Christin M. Whitacre
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
       Counsel for Respondent

                                ______________________

                                       OPINION
                                ______________________

McKEE, Circuit Judge

       Juan Ramon Abreu seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of

his application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture.1 An

Immigration Judge denied Abreu’s application because he found the likelihood that

Abreu would be tortured to be “speculative” and because he found that local police in the

Dominican Republic would make efforts to protect Abreu from torture. The BIA affirmed

on both bases. However, the IJ and BIA failed to consider evidence of explicit death

threats received by Abreu and also failed to explain how the evidence supports their

conclusion that local police would protect Abreu. Because of these errors, we will grant

Abreu’s petition for review and remand for further proceedings.


  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
  We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).

                                             2
                                               I.
       Where the BIA affirms and partially reiterates the IJ’s conclusions, we review

both the BIA’s and the IJ’s opinions.2 We review legal determinations de novo and

factual findings for substantial evidence.3 In the immigration context, we set aside the

agency’s findings only if a “reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

the contrary” after reviewing the record as a whole.4

       To obtain deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, an applicant

must prove that it is “more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” 5

An act constitutes “torture” only if it is inflicted “by, or at the instigation of, or with the

consent or acquiescence of” the government of the country to which the applicant will be

removed.6

       The IJ concluded that Abreu’s fear of future torture was too “speculative.”7 The IJ

reasoned that a substantial amount of time had transpired since Abreu’s family members

were threatened or assaulted in the Dominican Republic. The IJ also reasoned that there

was insufficient evidence connecting the anonymous threats Abreu received and the

assaults he suffered in 2018 to the persecutors whom Abreu fears. And while the IJ noted

that individuals in the Dominican Republic had communicated threats against Abreu to

2
  Saban-Cach v. Att’y Gen., 58 F.4th 716, 724 n.23 (2023) (quoting Blanco v. Att’y Gen.,
967 F.3d 304, 310 (3d Cir. 2020)).
3
  Id.
4
  Alexander-Mendoza v. Att’y Gen., 55 F.4th 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted).
5
  8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
6
  8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
7
  A.R. 86.

                                                3
Abreu’s friend, Espinar, the IJ reasoned that these threats were merely “veiled” and

“speculative.”8 The BIA affirmed these findings.

       The fundamental problem with the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusions, however, is that

the IJ appears to have failed to consider evidence that Abreu received explicit death

threats from Tito in 2018. In his affidavit, Abreu averred that Tito sent him text messages

“warning . . . that if [Abreu] ever return[ed] to the Dominican Republic [he would] be

killed.”9 Abreu also submitted an affidavit from Espinar in which Espinar averred that he

(Espinar) had encountered Tito in the Dominican Republic, that Tito had said he was

“going to kill [Abreu],” and that Tito had shown Espinar a gun while declaring that he

would use that specific gun to kill Abreu.10 On their face, these two affidavits reflect

specific and serious threats to Abreu’s life. But neither the BIA’s nor IJ’s opinion

discusses either Tito’s text messages or his interaction with Espinar. In fact, neither

opinion even mentions Tito.

       The BIA seems to have believed that the IJ at least reviewed Espinar’s affidavit,

noting that the IJ considered “the letter provided by the respondent’s friend from the

Dominican Republic.”11 But we see no support for that belief in the IJ’s opinion. The IJ’s

opinion refers generally to “statements regarding the conversations that [Espinar] had

with people within the Dominican Republic” that involved “veiled” and “speculative

8
  A.R. 87.
9
  A.R. 247.
10
   A.R. 354.
11
   A.R. 4.

                                              4
threats” against Abreu.12 But this portion of the IJ’s opinion cannot refer to the threat

reflected in Espinar’s affidavit because that threat was neither “veiled” nor “speculative.”

There is nothing “veiled” about threatening to kill someone while brandishing the gun

that will be used to commit the killing. And Tito’s promise to kill Abreu—which he made

while demonstrating that he had the means and motive to follow through—left little to

speculation.

       Perhaps the IJ and BIA believed that the evidence of Tito’s explicit threats should

not be credited or should be disregarded for some other reason. But if that is the case,

then the IJ and BIA must explain why.13 Absent such an explanation, we can assume only

that the IJ simply ignored this evidence, which precludes us from finding that the IJ’s and

the BIA’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.14

       The government nevertheless argues that we should affirm even though the IJ

failed to consider evidence of Tito’s explicit threats because the BIA also held that

government officials would not acquiesce in Abreu’s torture. We disagree for at least two

reasons.15

12
   A.R. 87.
13
   Quinteros v. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that the IJ and
BIA may not ignore evidence, and “if evidence is to be disregarded, we need to know
why” (brackets omitted)) (quoting Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017)).
14
   Id. (“[T]he agency ‘may not ignore evidence favorable to the alien’”) (quoting Huang
v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2010)).
15
   Judge Phipps does not join the analysis as to the second acquiescence rationale.

                                              5
         First, because the IJ and BIA failed to consider whether Tito was likely to attempt

to torture Abreu, they necessarily failed to consider how the Dominican government

would respond if Tito were to attempt to torture or kill Abreu.

         Second, to the extent the IJ and BIA concluded that the local authorities would

protect Abreu from the persecutors he fears—Tito or otherwise—this conclusion is

unsupported by substantial evidence, at least as it is presented in the IJ’s and BIA’s

opinions.

         The IJ concluded that local authorities would not turn a blind eye to Abreu’s

torture because local police were “receptive” to Abreu’s family’s complaints in 2008,

“investigated” those complaints, and protected Abreu’s family for a fee.16 However, there

is no evidence that the police did anything to investigate the threats Abreu’s family

received in 2008. The only record evidence that could potentially reflect investigative

efforts is the police report summarizing the threats. But it appears that this police report

was prepared only after Abreu’s daughter asked the police for an update on the case in

2018—ten years after the threats were made. The only other evidence of a police

response is that the police assigned personnel to protect Abreu’s family for one week

after the threats were made. But this protection had to be paid for, as both the IJ and BIA

noted. A payment to secure protection from the police seems like a bribe. If this payment

16
     A.R. 87.

                                              6
was a bribe, then, as a matter of law, the protection it purchased cannot support the IJ’s

and BIA’s finding that the authorities would be willing to protect Abreu.17

       The Government argues that the price Abreu’s brother paid the police for

protection was not a bribe but a fee for additional services that go beyond the ordinary

duties of the Dominican police. But since it appears that the police did nothing else in

2008 in response to Abreu’s family’s complaint, the Government’s interpretation of the

fee-for-protection arrangement is difficult to accept. Further, Abreu has credibly testified

that he cannot afford to pay for protection in any event. It is therefore difficult to see how

the availability of protection for a fee would support a finding that the local police would

protect Abreu.

       There may be other reasons to believe the police would attempt to protect Abreu

from torture or a fatal assault. Absent further explanation by the IJ and BIA, however, we

cannot find that the BIA’s conclusion that the local police would protect Abreu is

supported by substantial evidence.18

17
   Cf. Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We have said before and
underscore here that whether an alien might succeed in escaping persecution or torture
through bribery is an irrational and altogether improper consideration in deciding a claim
for asylum or other relief.”) (first citing Oyekunle v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 715, 717 (7th
Cir. 2007) and then citing Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 555 (7th Cir. 2006)).
18
   See Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[B]ecause the BIA ignored
overwhelming probative evidence produced . . . its findings were not reasonably
grounded in the record and thus we accord no deference to the BIA’s decision . . . we find
that the BIA’s determination was not based on substantial evidence.”).

                                              7
                                            III.

      For these reasons, we will grant the petition for review and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                             8