Court Opinion

ID: 9753834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:31:56.509235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:43.469897
License: Public Domain

Eyan, J.
(concurring). The fundamental question before the court is whether a marriage was validly solemnized in accordance with the requirements of § 46-3.1 The parties had applied for, and secured, a marriage license in accordance with the provisions of § 46-5 (Eev. 1958) and if both of them *600had been present with the priest as a witness on November 22, 1960, there could be no question as to the validity of the marriage. This, however, was not the fact. The majority opinion holds that the mere signing of the marriage license by the priest while the defendant was present but during the absence of the plaintiff prevented solemnization for the purposes of § 46-3 and, on the facts of this case, precluded the parties from acquiring a valid marital status. I agree that this is a proper legal conclusion.
Of major importance in the plaintiff’s case was that portion of § 46-3 which provides that “all marriages solemnized according to the forms and usages of any religious denomination in this state shall be valid.” For the purpose of establishing that a marriage was thus solemnized according to the forms and usages of the Catholic Church, and for that purpose only, an expert on canon law called by the plaintiff testified in considerable detail on the doctrine of the Catholic Church with reference to marriage and divorce. The findings of the trial court recited in the majority opinion describe the canonical law of the Catholic Church with reference to these matters. “Canon Law is the collected body of laws, rules and regulations enacted by the Roman Catholic Church concerning its constitution, its spiritual and temporal administration and the ecclesiastical government and discipline of the Catholic religious community. Just as the Catholic Church is a religious society distinct in its purpose from secular society, so Canon Law is distinct from the civil law. The former is concerned with the spiritual and moral welfare of the community, having as its final end the eternal salvation of souls; the latter treats temporal and secular interests, the preservation of peace and order, and the economic, social, political and *601cultural life of the community. Canon Law includes only the law which the church has made for itself through its own legislative organs. The laws made by the state concerning the church and its institutions are not part of the Canon Law unless the church has adopted them and inserted them in its own legal system.” In re Soeder, 7 Ohio App. 2d 271, 300, 220 N.E. 2d 547.
The findings express the beliefs and doctrine of the Catholic Church from a religious viewpoint only. They do not express the position of the church as to the civil effects of divorce. The majority opinion failed to recognize this as evidenced by the following statement: “Were this court to accord legal effect to his [the priest’s] acts, it would be in the curious — and unconstitutional — position of supplanting state power with ecclesiastical power. Obviously, even if canon law should deny the authority of the state to dissolve a marriage, religious doctrine, could not nullify the decrees of our courts. U.S. Const., amend. 1, 14.” There is no finding which even suggests such a claim and nothing whatever to justify this statement. The Catholic Church does deny the right of the state from a religious viewpoint to dissolve a marriage as does the doctrine of other religious denominations. In any event, this is the exercise of a constitutional right as to a religious belief. The question in this case is not one, as suggested in the majority opinion, of supplanting state power with ecclesiastical power, nor does the record disclose any claim that canon law denies the civil effect of a divorce decree in a state court on a Catholic marriage or that religious doctrine can nullify the decrees of our courts. Statements of this kind suggesting a question of constitutional dimensions are gratuitous, unjustified and completely erroneous.
*602There are two basic errors on which this mistaken statement is predicated: First, the findings of fact based on the canon law of the church relate only to the position of the church from a religious viewpoint and each of the findings in question so indicates. Second, the majority opinion erroneously equates the religious beliefs of the Eoman Catholic Church with the church’s position as to the civil effects of divorce. The testimony of the expert on canon law, which has been completely ignored in the majority opinion, makes this crystal clear. He said: “The position of the Eoman Catholic church is that the state has no right to dissolve marriages, Eoman Catholic marriages or any marriages. The Catholic church does not deny the right of the State of Connecticut to require a marriage ceremony in order to create a marriage relationship between two Catholics who were formerly married to each other and were civilly divorced if it is in good order for the common good. In other words, the Church realizes that for the good order of society, it is necessary that the state interject itself with regard to recording of marriages, blood types'and things like that. This is for health purposes or civil purposes in regard to the children that might result. The Church doesn’t deny the right of the State to require a ceremony following a divorce. She acknowledges the fact that licenses are necessary.”
It is traditional that this court has always used every effort to avoid any misrepresentation of the religious views of any religious denomination. It is regrettable that the tradition was not followed by the majority opinion in the present case.
I concur in the result.

 “[General Statutes] See. 46-3. who may join persons in marriage. All judges and justices of the peace may join persons in marriage in any town and county in the state and all ordained or licensed clergymen belonging to this state or any other state so long as they continue in the work of the ministry may join persons in marriage and all marriages attempted to be celebrated by any other person shall be void; but all marriages solemnized according to the forms and usages of any religious denomination in this state . . . shall be valid.”