Court Opinion

ID: 9838869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 16:01:05.966661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:20.330495
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11671    Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 09/08/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11671
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       DIANELIN M. VERGARA,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-22964-KMW
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11671

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Dianelin Vergara appeals the district court’s order aﬃrming
       the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for
       disability insurance beneﬁts (“DIB”) and supplemental security in-
       come (“SSI”). No reversible error has been shown; we aﬃrm.
                                            I.
              When -- as in this case -- an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
       denies an application for beneﬁts and the Appeals Council denies
       review, we review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s ﬁnal
       decision. See Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001).
              Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to
       whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether
       the correct legal standards were applied. See Buckwalter v. Acting
       Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021). “Substantial
       evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
       reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclu-
       sion.” Id. We review de novo the ALJ’s application of the law. See
       id. “We review de novo the district court’s determination as to
       whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.”
       Id.
             A person who applies for Social Security DIB or for SSI ben-
       eﬁts must ﬁrst prove that she is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§
       404.1512(a), 416.912(a). The Social Security Regulations outline a
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       22-11671               Opinion of the Court                        3

       ﬁve-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a
       claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
       The ALJ must evaluate (1) whether the claimant engaged in sub-
       stantial gainful work; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impair-
       ment; (3) whether the severe impairment meets or equals an im-
       pairment in the Listings of Impairments; (4) whether the claimant
       has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past
       relevant work; and (5) whether, in the light of the claimant’s RFC,
       age, education, and work experience, there exist other jobs in the
       national economy the claimant can perform. Id.
              Vergara ﬁled an application for DIB and for SSI in February
       2018. Vergara alleged that she was unable to work due to her disa-
       bling mental conditions. Following a hearing, the ALJ denied Ver-
       gara’s application.
              Applying the ﬁve-step evaluation process, the ALJ found that
       Vergara suﬀered from three severe impairments: bipolar disorder,
       posttraumatic stress disorder, and anxiety disorder. The ALJ, how-
       ever, determined that Vergara had no impairment or combination
       of impairments that met or medically equaled an impairment in
       the Listing of Impairments.
              The ALJ next determined that Vergara had the RFC to “per-
       form a full range of work at all exertional levels” and that Vergara
       was able to “perform simple, routine tasks,” “make simple work
       related decisions,” and interact occasionally with coworkers and su-
       pervisors but not with the public. Considering Vergara’s age, edu-
       cation, work experience, and RFC -- together with testimony of the
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                   22-11671

       vocational expert -- the ALJ determined that Vergara could perform
       her past relevant work as a cleaner or housekeeper. Accordingly,
       the ALJ concluded that Vergara was not disabled.
              Vergara administratively appealed the ALJ’s decision to the
       Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied Vergara’s request
       for review. The district court aﬃrmed.
                                            II.
              On appeal, Vergara argues chieﬂy that the ALJ erred in con-
       sidering the opinion of Vergara’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Jorge.
       Vergara contends that the ALJ discounted Dr. Jorge’s medical opin-
       ion without articulating adequately the degree to which the ALJ
       was persuaded by Dr. Jorge’s opinion. Vergara also argues that --
       because Dr. Jorge’s medical opinion was supported by substantial
       evidence in the record -- the ALJ failed to establish “good cause” for
       discounting Dr. Jorge’s opinion.
                As an initial matter, we reject -- as relying on an outdated
       standard -- Vergara’s argument that the ALJ failed to demonstrate
       “good cause” for discounting Dr. Jorge’s opinion. For claims ﬁled
       before 27 March 2017, the ALJ was required to give “substantial or
       considerable weight” to the medical opinion of a treating physician
       absent a showing of “good cause” and was required to “state with
       particularity” the weight given to each medical opinion. See Win-
       schel v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
       20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d)).
             In 2017, the Commissioner promulgated new regulations
       governing the consideration of medical opinions for purposes of
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       22-11671              Opinion of the Court                        5

       reviewing applications for SSI and for DIB. See 20 C.F.R. §§
       404.1520c, 416.920c. Under the new regulations, an ALJ is to give
       no deference or “speciﬁc evidentiary weight, including controlling
       weight,” to a treating physician’s opinion. See id. §§ 404.1520c(a),
       416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ evaluates the persuasiveness of a
       medical opinion by considering speciﬁed factors, the most im-
       portant of which are the supportability of the medical opinion and
       the opinion’s consistency with other record evidence. See id. §§
       404.1520c(a), (b)(2), 416.920c(a), (b)(2). The ALJ then articulates
       how the supportability and consistency of a medical opinion were
       considered in making a determination about disability. See id. §§
       404.1520c(b), 416.920c(b). Because Vergara ﬁled her application in
       February 2018, her claims are governed by the new regulations. See
       id. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c (providing that the new regulations apply
       to claims ﬁled on or after 27 March 2017).
              Here, the ALJ followed properly the applicable regulations
       in evaluating Dr. Jorge’s medical opinion. The ALJ gave no special
       deference or controlling weight to Dr. Jorge’s opinion. Instead, the
       ALJ evaluated the persuasiveness of Dr. Jorge’s opinion, focusing
       on the supportability and consistency of Dr. Jorge’s opinion with
       the other record evidence.
             The ALJ explained that Dr. Jorge’s opinion about the severity
       of Vergara’s mental functional limitations was inconsistent with
       the overall record. In particular, the ALJ described the ways in
       which Dr. Jorge’s opinion conﬂicted with this record evidence: (1)
       the diﬀerent opinions of two state agency psychological
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11671

       consultants; (2) the kind and intensity of treatment Vergara had re-
       ceived; (3) evidence that Vergara’s condition improved with con-
       sistent treatment and recommended psychotherapy; (4) Vergara’s
       mental status examinations; (5) Vergara’s reported activities of
       daily living; and (6) a third-party function report completed by Ver-
       gara’s brother. The ALJ explained further that Dr. Jorge’s opinion
       was unsupported by her own treatment notes.
              The ALJ articulated adequately his reasons for discounting
       Dr. Jorge’s opinion. Under the applicable regulations, the ALJ had
       no obligation to state the weight given -- or the degree of persua-
       siveness assigned -- to Dr. Jorge’s opinion.
               Vergara disputes the ALJ’s stated reasons and argues that Dr.
       Jorge’s opinion is consistent with other evidence in the record. But
       the question before us on appeal is limited to whether the ALJ’s
       decision -- not Dr. Jorge’s opinion -- is supported by substantial ev-
       idence. That Dr. Jorge’s opinion might be consistent with some
       record evidence is not enough to overturn the ALJ’s decision. Un-
       der our limited standard of review, “[w]e will aﬃrm the Commis-
       sioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if
       the preponderance of the evidence weighs against it.” See Buckwal-
       ter, 5 F.4th at 1320. We cannot “decide the facts anew, make credi-
       bility determinations, or reweigh the evidence.” See id.
              Vergara also contends that -- because the ALJ erred in failing
       to assess properly Dr. Jorge’s opinion -- the ALJ’s RFC assessment
       is unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
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       22-11671                   Opinion of the Court                                7

               Contrary to Vergara’s assertion, the ALJ considered Dr.
       Jorge’s opinion and articulated adequately the reasons for ﬁnding
       Dr. Jorge’s opinion unpersuasive. In assessing Vergara’s RFC, the
       ALJ considered the entire record, including Vergara’s application
       and hearing testimony, the opinions of the state agency consult-
       ants, Dr. Jorge’s opinion, Vergara’s mental status examinations and
       medical records, and a third-party function report. In the light of
       that evidence, the ALJ concluded that Vergara had no exertional
       limitations, could perform simple routine tasks, could make simple
       work-related decisions, and could interact with coworkers and su-
       pervisors but not with the public. The ALJ’s RFC ﬁnding is sup-
       ported by substantial evidence in the record and comports with
       SSR 96-8p. See SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474, 34,477 ( July 2, 1996)
       (providing that, in assessing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must con-
       sider all pertinent evidence in the record, including medical history,
       medical signs and laboratory ﬁndings, eﬀects of treatment, activi-
       ties of daily living, lay evidence, recorded observations and medical
       source statements, eﬀects of symptoms, evidence from attempts to
       work, need for a structured living environment, and work evalua-
       tions).
             Substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s denial of
       DIB and SSI beneﬁts; we aﬃrm.*

       * Vergara’s reliance on our decisions in Simon v. Comm’r., Soc. Sec. Admin., 7
       F.4th 1094 (11th Cir. 2021), Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245 (11th
       Cir. 2019), and Castro v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 783 F. App’x 948 (11th Cir.
       2019), is misplaced. Most important, each of these decisions involved
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       8                         Opinion of the Court                      22-11671

              AFFIRMED.

       applications for disability benefits filed before 27 March 2017 and, thus, con-
       sidered opinion evidence under the treating-physician old rule: a rule inappli-
       cable to Vergara’s case. Further -- unlike in Schink, where the ALJ concluded
       that the claimant’s bipolar disorder was no severe impairment based on evi-
       dence that the claimant’s condition improved with treatment -- the ALJ here
       concluded that Vergara’s bipolar disorder constituted a severe impairment.
       See Schink, 935 F.3d at 1267-68.