Court Opinion

ID: 9518325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:49:56.014446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:28.687265
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Achor, J.
The appellee, in its petition for rehearing, asserts that this court erred in its opinion and decision of March 9, 1961, in which opinion this court both accepted transfer from the Appellate Court and discussed the case upon the merits of the issues involved.
The appellee, in alleging error on the part of this court, first cites the fact that the Appellate Court con-*689eluded that there was sufficient evidence before the court to sustain an instruction to the court based upon the specific allegation of negligence in plaintiff’s (appel-lee’s) complaint, to-wit:
“That the defendant was then and there careless and negligent in that it failed to maintain at right angles at such crossing any sign of warning containing the words ‘DANGER’; ‘RAILROAD CROSSING’; ‘TWO’ (designating a multiple track).”
Appellee then asserts that this court, in determining there was no evidence to support an instruction upon this issue, was obliged to and erroneously did search the record in order to arrive at this conclusion since the opinion of the Appellate Court held there was sufficient evidence upon this particular question to present an issue of fact to the jury. Furthermore, appellee asserts that in searching the record on the question of the evidence and in basing its opinion thereon, this court went beyond its authority because it went outside the issues presented by the petition to transfer.
Apparently appellee’s misapprehension in the matter is the result of the fact that this court after accepting transfer of the case did not limit its discussion to the issues presented by the petition to transfer. The opinion does not deal specifically with the issue presented by the petition to transfer as such, but merely discusses that issue in conjunction with other errors committed by the trial court. Therefore, a brief statement directed specifically to the issue of transfer from the Appellate Court seems appropriate.
As heretofore stated, one of the acts of negligence specifically alleged in the appellee’s complaint was as follows:
*690“That the defendant was then and there careless and negligent in that it failed to maintain at right angles at such crossing any sign of warning containing the words ‘DANGER’; ‘RAILROAD CROSSING’; ‘TWO’ (designating a multiple track)
The error in the opinion of the Appellate Court and asserted as grounds for transfer to this court, was the fact that the opinion of the Appellate Court held that because appellant in the argument portion of his brief asserted not only that there was no evidence to support the allegation, but further argued the point that the only evidence on that subject showed that there was a sign of that character, it therefore became the burden of the appellant to establish the facts regarding “its location, its position, was it visible, was it at right angles so it could be seen and read by the highway traveler, and was it a proper sign.” The decision of the Appellate Court is predicated upon the fact that appellant failed to include within the briefs a recital of the evidence upon these subjects and to argue this issue in the argument portion of its brief. It was not necessary that appellant do so.
Appellee’s complaint denied the existence of any crossing sign, which it specifically undertook to describe. Appellant, in its brief, stated that there was no evidence whatever as to the non-existence of such a sign, and this fact is tacitly admitted by the opinion of the Appellate Court. Under these circumstances, it was error for the Appellate Court to impose upon appellant the burden of proving the exact location, position or visibility of the sign as a condition to the withdrawal of the specific allegation in appellee’s complaint which denied the existence of any sign. These were not the issues presented by the specific allegation in the appellee’s com*691plaint, and the fact that there may or may not have been evidence in the record upon these subjects which were not presented by the complaint did not as stated in the opinion of the Appellate Court, justify the refusal of the trial court to withdraw the issue as to the nonexistence of a crossing sign in the absence of any support thereof. This question having been raised by appellant’s brief is not subject to the objection that we have searched the record to reverse.
Transfer to this court was accepted because of the enunciation of the erroneous principles of law contained in the opinion of the Appellate Court, as heretofore discussed. Having accepted transfer of the case this court is obliged to consider the case as if it were originally presented to this court on appeal. Under such circumstances its consideration of the case is not limited to the issues presented by the petition to transfer. Burns’ Ann. St., §4-215 (1946 Repl.). Southern Ry. Co. v. Ingle (1946), 117 Ind. App. 229, 69 N. E. 2d 746; Kraus v. Lehman (1908), 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714, 84 N. E. 769; Payne v. Terre Haute, etc. R. Co. (1902), 157 Ind. 616, 62 N. E. 472.
Furthermore, this court having accepted transfer from the Appellate Court, its consideration of the case is not limited nor is it required to accept the facts as stated in the opinion of the Appellate Court. Riverside Coal Co. v. No. Indianapolis, etc. Works (1923), 194 Ind. 176, 139 N. E. 674, 142 N. E. 377.
For the reasons above stated, petition for rehearing is denied.
Landis, C. J., Arterburn, Bobbitt and Jackson, JJ., concur.
Note. — Reported in 172 N. E. 2d 670. Rehearing denied 175 N. E. 2d 137.