Court Opinion

ID: 9867230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 15:32:42.927195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:34.185343
License: Public Domain

Gray, J.
I concur with Earl, J., in his opinion that the act of 1873 was unconstitutional and void, in that it failed to comply with section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution. But I am further of the opinion, assuming" that the act of 1873 was valid, and that there was an acceptance of and a valid compliance with its conditions, and that there was a waiver of causes of forfeiture by the passage of the act of 1886, that the latter act was in violation of the provisions of the constitutional amendment, which went into effect on January 1, 1875. By that amendment the legislature was inhibited from passing a private or local bill, granting to any corporation the right to lay down railroad tracks, or any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever. The act of 1886, under which the appellant claims to have acquired its present rights, cannot, in my view of what it grants, be upheld as legislation, which merely regulates the exercise of powers formerly granted to and possessed by an existing corporation. It went far beyond that. It was, in fact, a new grant of sub*112stantive rights, in addition to and differing from what might have been claimed under the act of 1873. By the act of 1873 the company would have had the right to construct a railway in tubes, which should not occupy a greater space than thirty-one feet in width, by eighteen feet in height, exterior measurements. The company could not have approached within two feet of the curb line, nor within eighteen feet of the building line. These restrictions must be deemed to be important limitations and wholesome provisions, designed for the protection of the rights of the abutting property owners and to secure to the public the rightful enjoyment of the streets as such. By the act of 1886 they would possess the right to excavate for their railways a space of forty-four feet, inside measurements, in width and without any limitation as to depth. They might construct railways, without the use of tubes or tunnels, and use any motive power, which would not permit of the emission of smoke, gas or cinders.
I think we have here a pretty wide departure from the rights and powers to.be enjoyed under the act of 1873. The pneumatic tube, of a diameter of fifty-four inches, for the transportation of packages and merchandise, authorized under the -original charter of 1868, and which was transmuted by the act of 1873 into a tubular passenger and freight railway, has now wholly disappeared, and in its place appears a scheme for what amounts to a complete occupation of the street for railway purposes; except so far as it leaves a roof over the excavation to take the place of the street surface. This grant of a right to excavate the street, to an extent practically unlimited, and the permission to abandon tubes and to construct railways in the excavation, are matters of grant too serious in their nature and consequences, under the circumstances of the case, to be passed over as in mere regulation of an existing franchise. To allow such legislation is, in my opinion, to nullify the beneficial and protective objects aimed at by the constitutional amendment of 1875.
Under the guise of an amendment, there was a legislative grant to this company of franchises and privileges beyond *113any naturally following upon, or flowing from those granted under the act of 1873; not in harmony with the spirit of that grant, and, of necessity, exclusive in their nature. It, therefore, fell within the prohibition of the constitutional amendment. When the People have, by amending the Constitution, restricted the powers of their representatives in the legislature to pass private or local bills, which grant the right to lay down railroad tracks, or any exclusive privileges or franchises to a corporation, the courts should see to it that the constitutional limitation is not evaded, under the pretense of an amendment of the charter. They should scrutinize the legislative act complained of; not with the idea of seeking the way to a construction adverse to its constitutionality, but rather to uphold it, if possible. But if the scrutiny reveals a real and serious violation of the constitutional provisions, they must condemn the act as invalid.
It is said, however, that a scope of action is offered for the legislature, with respect to corporations already in the possession of corporate rights, acquired under statutes passed before the adoption of the constitutional amendment. As a general proposition this is true. Conceding to the legislature its full measure of authority to legislate, under the general grant of power by the Constitution of the state, we hold that such authority., when now exercised by a private bill in behalf of a corporation, cannot, under the guise of measures for the regulation of the exercise of the corporate powers and franchises, be upheld by the court, when, by a practical construction, the act permits what the amendment to the Constitution prohibits. A regulation of these powers and franchises, when the act touches them so as to alter thém, means their restriction, rather than their enlargement. If enlargement of powers may be sometimes consistent with the constitutional limitations, it may not go to the extent of trenching on the territory of private and public rights, over which the Constitution was plainly intended to operate in its limitations. When enlargement of corporate powers becomes indistinguishable from a grant of new substan*114tive rights, within the-.purview of the section in question, then the mischief is accomplished, to prevent which the constitutional amendment was designed.
In the Matter of the Gilbert Elevated, Railway Company (70 N. Y. 361), Church, Ch. J., in discussing the changes of structure, etc., made by the commissioners under the provisions of the Rapid Transit Act, said the changes -were restrictive in their character. “ By the charter the whole .street was to be covered by the structure; by the conditions imposed only a portion of some streets could be occupied.” And he says, in that connection: “I cannot accede to the proposition that any change in the structure and in the manner .of occupying the streets, however restrictive upon the company, •or beneficial to the public in the use of the streets, constitutes a •fresh grant of the right to lay down railroad tracks. It is a misnomer to call such restrictions grants of any right whatever. As well might the cutting down of a fee to a life estate be termed a grant of land.” Again he says: “ No exclusive right •or franchise was granted to the respondent corporation upon .any construction of the clause. Every substantial right existed before the passage of the act, and the conditions imposed, .embracing changes of structure and manner of occupying .streets, should be regarded as restrictive of existing rights, and mot grants of rights or franchises within the constitutional -.sense. * * * This series of amendments designed to restrict the powers of the legislature in matters of detail, under general phrases and undefined words, is experimental in this state. They must be sustained and applied by a rational and practical construction, so as to subserve the purposes intended, .and prevent the evils designed to be remedied; but not, by an artificial and technical construction, to extend their application -to cases never contemplated.”
I think the meaning of the decision is clear. If the legislative act operates upon a charter in the direction of a regulation, an adjustment, or a restriction of powers possessed, it could not be objectionable. Within its reserved powers the legislature may, at all times, amend or alter the charter, but the *115constitutional amendment will not permit it by a private bill to make any new grant of rights, comprehended within those specified by the amendment. I do not think that it can be said, in the present case, that every substantial right given by the act of 1886 existed previously.
For the reasons I have briefly given, I think the act of 1886 practically gave to this corporation a right to lay down railroad tracks, which it could not have exercised under the act of 1813, and, also, gave what are practically exclusive privileges. I think it contravened the Constitution, in the letter and in the spirit, and is, therefore, void.
All concur with Earl, J.; Ruger, Ch. J., Danforth and Peckham, JJ., concur with Gray, J.
Judgment affirmed.