Court Opinion

ID: 9393440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 14:02:30.613412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.374390
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 276
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION III
                                       No. E-22-203

KATHERN RUSH
                            APPELLANT        Opinion Delivered   May 10, 2023

V.                                           APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD
                                             OF REVIEW
                                             [NO. 21-BR-5001]
DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES, AND
PEOPLEREADY, INC.                            AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN
                      APPELLEES              PART

                             KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

       Appellant Kathern Rush appeals from an order issued by the Arkansas Board of

Review (the Board) on April 11, 2022, requiring her to repay $14,384 in overpaid

unemployment benefits in favor of appellee, Division of Workforce Services (DWS). We

affirm in part and remand for further findings in part for the same reasons as we previously

addressed in Carman v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 51, 660 S.W.3d 852.

       Appellant had been previously employed with a temporary help firm, PeopleReady,

Inc. After she filed for benefits, she received regular and extended state benefits; Federal

Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) benefits pursuant to the CARES Act,

codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9023; and lost-wage-assistance (LWA) benefits pursuant to the federal

Stafford Act and 44 C.F.R. § 206.120 (2021). On June 15, 2021, DWS mailed a notice of

agency determination to appellant, finding that appellant had not been eligible for benefits.
It stated that Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2021) provides

that an individual working as a temporary employee will be deemed to have voluntarily quit

employment and will be disqualified under this subsection if, upon conclusion of his latest

assignment, the temporary employee, without good cause, failed to contact the temporary

help firm for reassignment, provided that the employer advised the temporary employee at

the time of hire that he must report for reassignment upon conclusion of each assignment

and that unemployment benefits may be denied for failure to do so. DWS found that at the

conclusion of her latest assignment, appellant failed to contact the temporary help firm for

reassignment; that she was advised at the time of her hire that she must report for

reassignment at the conclusion of each assignment; and that she failed to show good cause

for not contacting the temporary help firm for reassignment. Appellant ultimately failed to

timely appeal from that determination.

       After DWS had determined that appellant was ineligible for the benefits she received,

DWS mailed a notice of nonfraud overpayment determination on July 30, 2021, stating that

appellant was required to repay $14,384 in the overpaid benefits she received pursuant to

Arkansas Code Annotated Section 11-10-532(b) (Supp. 2021). According to the “Review

Claim Transactions” form provided in this matter, appellant received $3,584 in regular and

extended state benefits; $9,000 in FPUC benefits; and $1,800 in LWA benefits. Thus,

appellant was paid $14,384 in total benefits before it was determined that she was ineligible.

       Appellant timely filed her appeal to the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal), and she was

afforded a telephone hearing on September 21, 2021, in which she argued she should not

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have to repay the benefits she received.    The Tribunal mailed a written decision on

September 22, 2021, affirming DWS’s determination that appellant must repay the overpaid

benefits because “[the overpayment] cannot be considered a direct result of an error by the

Division.”

       Appellant appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Board. The Board affirmed and

mailed its written decision on April 11, 2022. Quoting Arkansas Code Annotated section

11-10-532(b)(2)(A), the Board explained that repayment may be waived if “the overpayment

was received as a direct result of an error by the Division of Workforce Services and that its

recovery would be against equity and good conscience.” The Board found that appellant was

liable to repay benefits and stated that “[a]s the overpayment was not received as a direct

result of an error by the Division, an equity and good conscience review is not necessary.”

This appeal followed.

       On appeal of an unemployment-compensation case, we review the evidence and all

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s

findings. Jones v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 341, 581 S.W.3d 516. The Board’s findings of fact

are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. Appellate review is

limited to determining whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision based on the

evidence before it, even if there is evidence on which the Board might have reached a

different decision. Higgins v. Dir., 2016 Ark. App. 449, 503 S.W.3d 833. The credibility of

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witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony are matters to be resolved by the

Board. Id.

       We note that Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-532(b)(2) has been amended

multiple times over the years. Before October 1, 2019, DWS could not waive repayment

“unless the director finds that the overpayment was received without fault on the part of the

recipient and that its recovery would be against equity and good conscience.” See Act 453 of

2019 (emphasis added). This language changed effective October 1, 2019, and the statute

was amended to state the following:

           (b)(1) If the director finds that a person has received an amount as benefits under
       this chapter to which he or she was not entitled by reasons other than fraud, willful
       misrepresentation, or willful nondisclosure of facts, the person is liable to repay the
       amount to the Unemployment Compensation Fund.

           (2)(A) In lieu of requiring the repayment, the director may recover the amount by
       deduction of any future benefits payable to the person under this chapter unless the
       director finds that the overpayment was received as a direct result of an error by the Division
       of Workforce Services and that its recovery would be against equity and good conscience.

          (B) As used in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, “direct result of an error by the
       Division of Workforce Services” does not include overpayments established under an
       appeal reversal as a result of the successful appeal of a denial of benefits.

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532 (emphasis added). In other words, instead of the inquiry being

first whether the claimant was at fault, our legislature requires (1) that the overpayment must

be the direct result of an error by the Division and (2) that requiring the claimant to repay

would be against equity and good conscience. Although we note that the statute has recently

been amended to revert back to state that DWS “may recover the amount [of any

overpayment] by deduction of any future benefits payable to the person under this chapter

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unless the director finds that the overpayment was received without fault on the part of the

recipient and that its recovery would be against equity and good conscience,” this

amendment was not effective until March 6, 2023. Act 197 of 2023. As such, we must

follow the statute in effect from October 1, 2019, through March 5, 2023, that required the

overpayment of state benefits to first be received as a direct result of an error by DWS to

waive repayment.

       The Board concluded here that the overpayments were not received as a direct result

of an error by DWS, and substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings in this regard.

As such, we must affirm the decision requiring appellant to repay the $3,584 in state

unemployment benefits because appellant failed to satisfy the first prong of the state

unemployment-waiver analysis. See Jewell v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 109, 661 S.W.3d 729, 731.

       However, we must look to federal law to determine whether the FPUC and LWA

benefits must be repaid. See Carman, supra. 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2) sets out the following

requirements regarding FPUC funds:

       (2) Repayment

       In the case of individuals who have received amounts of Federal Pandemic
       Unemployment Compensation or Mixed Earner Unemployment Compensation to
       which they were not entitled, the State shall require such individuals to repay the
       amounts of such Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation or Mixed Earner
       Unemployment Compensation to the State agency, except that the State agency may
       waive such repayment if it determines that—

          (A) the payment of such Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation or
          Mixed Earner Unemployment Compensation was without fault on the part of any
          such individual; and

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            (B) such repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience.

(Emphasis added.) Notably, there is no requirement for a finding that the overpayment was

a result of DWS error, but the statute does require a determination that the payment was

without fault on the part of the worker.

       On the other hand, 44 C.F.R. § 206.120(f)(5) does not provide any guidance

regarding the repayment of LWA benefits other than stating that “[t]he State is responsible

for recovering assistance awards from applicants obtained fraudulently, expended for

unauthorized items or services, expended for items for which assistance is received from

other means, and awards made in error.” (Emphasis added.) In the absence of such guidance,

we apply the federal requirements as stated above for FPUC benefits, another similar federal

program that provided additional unemployment benefits.

       Here, the Board failed make any findings regarding the federal-waiver analysis.

Whether sufficient findings of fact have been made is a threshold question in an appeal from

an administrative board. Pillow v. Dir., 2022 Ark. App. 341. If adequate findings of fact are

not made on the issue presented, we remand to the Board for it to provide findings of fact

and conclusions of law upon which to perform proper appellate review. Id. A conclusory

statement by the Board that does not detail or analyze the facts upon which it is based is not

sufficient. Id. Therefore, we must remand for further findings as to whether appellant was

first at fault and second whether repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience

before requiring appellant to repay the $9,000 in FPUC benefits and $1,800 in LWA

benefits.

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       Thus, in conclusion, we affirm the decision requiring appellant to repay the $3,584

in state unemployment benefits, and we remand for further findings to determine whether

the appellant is required to repay the $9,000 in FPUC benefits and $1,800 in LWA benefits

for reasons set forth herein.

       Affirmed in part; remanded in part.

       VIRDEN and THYER, JJ., agree.

       Kathern Rush, pro se appellant.

       Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.

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