Court Opinion

ID: 9772339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:03.487463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:06.627577
License: Public Domain

J-S27016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 GREGORY SEWELL                          :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 1497 MDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Dated September 26, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-67-CR-0004395-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                 FILED: AUGUST 29, 2023

      Gregory Sewell appeals from the order that denied his motion to dismiss

based upon double jeopardy pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. In this Court,

Brian McNeil, Esquire, has filed a petition to withdraw as Appellant’s counsel

and brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We deny counsel’s

petition and order new briefing.

      On April 2, 2021, Appellant, driving with a suspended license, struck a

vehicle operated by Sandra Ramirez and left the scene without exchanging

information or rendering aid. By complaint filed June 29, 2021, at CP-67-CR-

4501-2021, Appellant was charged with accidents involving death or personal

injury, duty to give information and render aid, duties at stop sign, drivers

required to be licensed, and unlawful activities. This prosecution terminated
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when Appellant pled guilty on August 25, 2022, to driving while operating

privilege is suspended.

       The Commonwealth initiated the instant case on August 10, 2021. In

the accompanying affidavit of probable cause, the prosecution asserted that,

in investigating Ms. Ramirez’s emergency call made on the date of the

collision, Hanover Police Officer Zachariah Lloyd ultimately identified Appellant

as the driver of the other vehicle. After obtaining Appellant’s insurance policy

information, Officer Lloyd discovered that on June 15, 2021, Appellant

informed his insurance adjuster in a recorded call that Appellant had been the

victim of the hit-and-run by a speeding police vehicle and that he had waited

at the scene for more than half an hour after calling the police who never

arrived. Accordingly, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with insurance

fraud pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4117(2).1

       Appellant promptly filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy

grounds, asserting that the instant, second prosecution arose from the same

criminal episode as the first one that culminated in his guilty plea such that it

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1 That statute makes it an offense if one:

       Knowingly and with the intent to defraud any insurer or self-
       insured, presents or causes to be presented to any insurer or self-
       insured any statement forming a part of, or in support of, a claim
       that contains any false, incomplete or misleading information
       concerning any fact or thing material to the claim.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4117(2).

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was subject to the compulsory joinder statute codified at 18 Pa.C.S. § 110.

After a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss on

September 26, 2022. This timely appeal followed, and both Appellant and the

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

       As noted, in this Court counsel filed both an Anders brief and a petition

seeking leave to withdraw as counsel.            Consequently, the following legal

principles guide our review:

              Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders
       must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious
       examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly
       frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth
       issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any
       other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation
       thereof.

              Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders
       petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the
       right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional
       points worthy of this Court’s attention.

              If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical
       requirements of Anders, this Court will deny the petition to
       withdraw and remand the case with appropriate instructions (e.g.,
       directing counsel either to comply with Anders or file an
       advocate’s brief on Appellant’s behalf). By contrast, if counsel’s
       petition and brief satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our own
       review of the appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous. If the
       appeal is frivolous, we will grant the withdrawal petition and affirm
       the judgment of sentence. However, if there are non-frivolous
       issues, we will deny the petition and remand for the filing of an
       advocate’s brief.

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2 As we discuss infra, we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal as it

is from an immediately-appealable collateral order.

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Commonwealth v. Cook, 175 A.3d 345, 348 (Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned up).

Our Supreme Court has further detailed counsel’s duties as follows:

       [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s
       petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the
       procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer
       to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports
       the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
       frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the
       appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
       record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have
       led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, supra at 361.

       Based upon our examination of counsel’s petition to withdraw and

Anders brief, we conclude that counsel has complied with the technical

requirements set forth above.3 As required by Santiago, counsel set forth a

history of the case, referred to issues that arguably support the appeal, stated

his conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, and cited case law. See Anders

brief at 11-19. Therefore, we now go on “‘to make a full examination of the

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal

is in fact wholly frivolous.’” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246,

1249 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Santiago, supra at 354 n.5).

       Counsel identified the following issues arguably supporting this appeal,

which we have re-ordered for ease of disposition:

       [1.] Whether remand is required for compliance with Rule 587
       because the lower court did not make specific findings of fact or a
       finding as to frivolousness when it denied [Appellant]’s motion.
____________________________________________

3 Appellant did not file a response to counsel’s petition.

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      [2.] Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant]’s
      motion to dismiss pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 because the
      current prosecution arose from the same criminal episode as the
      former prosecution and would not have been possible without it,
      and there is a logical and temporal relationship between the two
      cases.

      [3.] Whether the previous version of 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 should
      control because applying the current version denies [Appellant]
      his ex post facto protections.

Anders brief at 4 (cleaned up).

      We begin with a review of the law applicable to a claim that a subsequent

prosecution is barred on double jeopardy grounds because it was subject to

compulsory joinder.    “The question of whether a defendant’s constitutional

right against double jeopardy would be infringed by a successive prosecution

is a question of law. When presented with a question of pure law, our standard

of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.

Gross, 232 A.3d 819, 834-35 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc) (cleaned up).

      Whether the instant prosecution is barred by Appellant’s former

prosecution for different offenses is governed by § 110, which, as amended in

2022, provides in pertinent part as follows:

      Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of
      the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different
      facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following
      circumstances:

         (1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
         conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to
         when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same
         offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:

            ....

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              (ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from
              the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the
              appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the
              commencement of the first trial and occurred within the
              same judicial district as the former prosecution unless the
              court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense
              or the offense of which the defendant was formerly
              convicted or acquitted was a summary offense or a
              summary traffic offense[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 110.4

       This Court has explained that, “a criminal episode is an occurrence or

connected series of occurrences and developments which may be viewed as

distinctive and apart although part of a larger or more comprehensive series.”

Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 220 A.3d 1096, 1100 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(cleaned up). “In making such a determination, one must consider the logical

relationship between the acts, i.e., whether there is a substantial duplication

of issues of law and fact, and whether the acts are temporally related.” Id.

(cleaned up). For example, “[t]wo separate offenses may constitute the same

criminal episode if one offense is a necessary step toward the accomplishment

of a given criminal objective or if additional offenses occur because of an

attempt to secure the benefit of a previous offense or conceal its commission.”

Commonwealth v. Perillo, 626 A.2d 163, 166 (Pa.Super. 1993). However,

____________________________________________

4 The version of § 110 in effect when Appellant allegedly filed a fraudulent
insurance claim and was charged in the second prosecution was identical to
the current version but for subsection (1)(ii), which did not in the prior version
include the phrase “or the offense of which the defendant was formerly
convicted or acquitted was a summary offense or a summary traffic offense.”
See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 (effective August 27, 2002, to July 10, 2022).

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“a mere de minimis duplication of factual and legal issues is insufficient to

establish a logical relationship between offenses. Rather what is required is a

substantial duplication of issues of law and fact.”        Commonwealth v.

Schmidt, 919 A.2d 241, 247 (Pa.Super. 2007) (cleaned up).

      Procedurally, claims that a prosecution would violate double jeopardy

are governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(b) as follows:

      (1) A motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds shall state
      specifically and with particularity the basis for the claim of double
      jeopardy and the facts that support the claim.

      (2) A hearing on the motion shall be scheduled in accordance with
      Rule 577 (Procedures Following Filing of Motion). The hearing
      shall be conducted on the record in open court.

      (3) At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge shall enter on the
      record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law and
      shall issue an order granting or denying the motion.

      (4) In a case in which the judge denies the motion, the findings
      of fact shall include a specific finding as to frivolousness.

      (5) If the judge makes a finding that the motion is frivolous, the
      judge shall advise the defendant on the record that a defendant
      has a right to file a petition for review of that determination
      pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311(a)(3) within 30 days of the order
      denying the motion.

      (6) If the judge denies the motion but does not find it frivolous,
      the judge shall advise the defendant on the record that the denial
      is immediately appealable as a collateral order.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(b).

      With these principles in mind, we turn to the questions identified by

counsel. Counsel’s first issue concerns the fact that the trial court failed to

make a finding as to frivolousness as required by Rule 587(b)(4), and whether

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remand for compliance with the Rule is necessary. In the trial court’s Rule

1925(a) opinion, it acknowledged the oversight, stated that it did not find the

motion to be frivolous, and urges this Court to proceed with the appeal. See

Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/23, at 8-9. We readily agree with counsel that there

is no merit to a claim that this case must be remanded for a frivolousness

finding. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santiago, 270 A.3d 512, 516 n.2

(Pa.Super. 2022) (observing that, where the trial court makes no finding that

the motion is frivolous, the order denying the motion is immediately

appealable as a collateral order).

      The last two issues identified by counsel implicate the merits of

Appellant’s motion to dismiss. In his motion, Appellant had argued that § 110

barred the instant prosecution because the first prosecution resulted in a

conviction, the current charges arose from the same criminal episode, the

prosecutor was aware of all charges when the first prosecution commenced,

and all the charges arose in York County. See Motion to Dismiss, 8/29/22, at

¶ 10. Appellant maintained that it was a single criminal episode because it

involves the same April 2, 2021 accident, and the facts and witnesses are the

same, such that “separate trials would involve substantial duplication and

waste of judicial resources.” Id. at ¶ 9-10.

      The trial court ruled that the instant prosecution was not part of the

same criminal episode as the earlier prosecution related to his hit-and-run

vehicle collision. The court explained its reasoning as follows:

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            In looking at the temporal sequence of events, the incidents
     and complaint dates are not the same. In the first case, the
     incident date is listed as April 2, 2021. This second case before
     this court has an incident date of June 15, 2021. That means a
     total of seventy-four days, almost two and a half months, elapsed
     between the two incidents. . . . Therefore, the temporal sequence
     leans towards two separate incidents and not one criminal
     episode.

            The logical relationship between the two cases does overlap.
     As the District Attorney’s Office was investigating the first case,
     that investigation led to the charges in the second case. As the
     first case involved charges surrounding a hit-and-run, the District
     Attorney’s Office investigated the accident further and discovered
     that [Appellant] allegedly lied on a recorded phone call to his
     insurance adjuster. Although the second event of the alleged
     fraud stems from the initial hit-and-run incident, that simply
     creates a “de minimus” connection.

           While there are some common issues of fact, there are no
     common issues of law. [Appellant] plead guilty to a summary
     charge of driving while operating privilege is suspended in the first
     case on August 25, 2022, while the current case is graded as a
     felony. . . . To prove its case for false/fraudulent insurance claim,
     the Commonwealth needs to show that [Appellant] “knowingly
     and with the intent to defraud any insurer” filed “ a claim that
     contains any false, incomplete or misleading information
     concerning any fact or thing material to the claim.” There is no
     overlap in the elements of the law because the first case
     [Appellant] plead guilty to driving a motor vehicle while his license
     was suspended, revoked, or cancelled and before those driving
     rights were restored. These factors also lead the court to find the
     incidents were not one criminal episode.

     . . . In this case, the Commonwealth stated the second case has
     a different affiant, David Jay of the District Attorney’s Office, than
     it had for the first case. The victims are different in each case
     because the first victim would be the person in the other vehicle
     and then the insurance company would be the victim for this
     second case. A key witness for the second case would be the
     insurance adjuster, who would likely not have been a key witness
     for the first case. . . .

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                In analyzing the totality of the circumstances in this case,
         this court finds that there were two separate criminal episodes.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/23, at 4-6 (cleaned up).

         In his Anders brief, counsel contends that the answer is simpler than

that.    Counsel notes that, pursuant to the current version of § 110(1), a

second prosecution involving the same criminal episode is not barred if “the

offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted was a

summary offense or a summary traffic offense.”          18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii).

Here, the offense of which Appellant was convicted in the first case was a

summary offense. “Accordingly, where [§] 110 exempts the instant scenario

from its protections under its own terms, counsel has concluded that further

pursuit of this issue in this appeal would lack arguable merit.” Anders brief

at 14.

         Counsel acknowledges that, as we noted above, the summary-offense

exception was added to § 110 after Appellant committed his summary offense

and allegedly committed insurance fraud. However, counsel asserts that there

is no impediment to applying the current version of § 110 to resolve

Appellant’s motion filed after the effective date of the amendment because it

does none of the things that constitute an ex post facto violation. Id. at 16.

Specifically, the amendment to § 110 did not: “(1) criminalize conduct that

was previously not criminal; (2) aggravate the severity of a criminal law; (3)

increase the punishment for a crime; or (4) alter the rules of evidence, thus

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allowing less or different evidence to suffice for a conviction.”   Id. (some

parentheses added).

      We do not agree with counsel that the motion to dismiss is so obviously

meritless to classify this appeal as wholly frivolous.     As this Court has

observed:

      Our system of appellate review is based upon the notion that an
      adversarial process will best advance the interests of the parties
      and the development of the law. In this process, each side is
      expected to make its best argument(s) and the appellate court
      decides which argument is of greater merit. It appears that unless
      a position is without question defeated by existing caselaw, an
      appointed counsel should advance the best argument he/she is
      capable of constructing and allow the appellate court to make the
      ultimate determination that the argument lacks merit. It may be
      that counsel believes that the argument advanced is unlikely to
      ultimately prevail. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the
      appeal is wholly frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1231 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(cleaned up).

      First, there is no caselaw to defeat an argument that the amendment to

§ 110(1)(ii) is not applicable in the instant case. The express exclusion of

summary offenses as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same criminal

episode took effect on July 10, 2022, which post-dated the filing of the second

prosecution. It appears that a good faith argument can be made that the

change in the law “impair[ed] rights [Appellant] possessed when he acted,”

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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 732 A.2d 639, 643 (Pa.Super. 1999), namely

the right not to face a second prosecution for the same conduct.5

       Second, the question of whether the second prosecution stemmed from

the same criminal episode, which is the issue the trial court regarded as non-

frivolous in urging this appeal to proceed as one from a collateral order, is also

not squarely defeated by existing precedent. Indeed, it appears that counsel

opted to forgo presenting advocacy on this front not because he deemed the

issue unarguable, but because he thought the amended statute rendered it

moot. See Anders brief at 13.

       Accordingly, while the issues identified by counsel may not ultimately

prevail, the available arguments are not so clearly devoid of merit to warrant

classifying this appeal as wholly frivolous and relieving counsel of his duty to

advocate for his client.      Therefore, we deny counsel’s petition for leave to

withdraw and order counsel to file an advocate’s brief within sixty days of the

date of this memorandum. The Commonwealth may file a brief in response

within thirty days thereafter. The parties should address both which version

of § 110(1)(ii) applies to our de novo review of the legal issue before us, and

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5 Notably, the Commonwealth in its letter brief expressly disagreed with
counsel’s evaluation, asserting that the statutory amendment is irrelevant and
that the motion was properly denied because “the clear separation between
the act of insurance fraud and the act of driving under suspension was already
a sufficient separation . . . even without the amendment[.]” Commonwealth’s
Letter in Lieu of Brief at 2.

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whether either the nature of the first prosecution or the existence of a single

or multiple criminal episodes sustains the trial court’s ruling.

      Application of Brian McNeil, Esquire, to withdraw as counsel denied.

New briefs ordered. Panel jurisdiction retained.

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