Court Opinion

ID: 9579866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:59:23.302525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:50.947541
License: Public Domain

*33DEITS, J., dissenting.
Because I disagree with the “subjective” test adopted by the majority, I dissent. I believe that the better test is the “objective” test, which focuses on whether a reasonable person in the patient’s position would have submitted to the medical procedure or treatment if fully and adequately apprised of the risks.
The question of whether a medical practitioner’s failure to disclose material information caused the patient to consent is difficult. It is asked only when the purpose for informed consent — allowing the individual, no matter what fears, superstitions, apprehensions or beliefs may be held, to make decisions, no matter how reasonable or unreasonable, concerning the medical treatment to be received — has not been achieved. It requires the factfinder to look backward in an attempt to determine if consent would have been given had the missing information been disclosed. No matter whether the “objective” or “subjective” standard is used, the result is unsatisfactory. The patient’s ability to decide the course of treatment is irrevocably lost.
The majority adopts the “subjective” standard after discussing what it views as major flaws in the “objective” standard. The majority concludes that it “is circular to say both that a fact can be material to a reasonable person’s decision and that the person would have made the same decision whether or not he was aware of the fact.” 84 Or App at 31. A fact is material if a reasonable person would consider it significant “in deciding whether or not to undergo the proposed therapy.” Holland v. Srs. of St. Joseph, Seely, 270 Or 129, 137, 522 P2d 208, 526 P2d 577 (1974). A fact not disclosed could be significant in that a reasonable patient would seriously weigh it in determining whether to undergo the treatment, yet still ultimately choose to submit to the treatment.
The majority also concludes that the most fundamental problem with the objective test is that
“the jury should resolve a question of causation on the basis of a hypothetical effect that a hypothetical defendant’s act is likely to have on a hypothetical plaintiff, rather than basing its decision on whether the actual defendant’s act was the cause of harm to the actual plaintiff.” 84 Or App at 31.
*34Unfortunately, the subjective test presents the same problem in that the question of whether the particular patient would have refused the treatment had the risks been known is also purely hypothetical. There is the strong likelihood that the plaintiffs assessment of whether consent would have been given will be skewed because of the bitterness and disillusionment caused by the damage which occurred.
It is my opinion that the “objective” standard provides the fairest and most accurate assessment of whether the failure to disclose caused the patient to consent. As acknowledged in the authority relied upon by the majority, most jurisdictions that have considered the issue have also so concluded. This standard focuses on what a reasonable person would have done with full information. However, under the objective standard the patient’s thoughts about consent are not disregarded. Because the test requires the factfinder to determine whether a reasonable person in the patient’s position or circumstance would have consented, the patient’s fears, apprehensions, superstitions, beliefs, and other individual circumstances are relevant, but not controlling.
Because the “objective” test is the preferable method of determining whether the failure to disclose caused consent, the instruction that was given was correct. I would affirm.