Court Opinion

ID: 9529942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:43.256392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.577614
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN, specially concurring: Although I agree in principle with the result reached by the majority here, I am not in accord with certain aspects of its reasoning in rejecting defendants’ contention that they should have been allowed to examine plaintiff’s economist to show that his computations did not include deductions for income" taxes and personal expenses. During cross-examination, after the economist had answered that his estimates of future loss of earnings were gross figures, defendants’ attorney started to ask him another question, as follows: “Q. And that does not take — .” At this point, plaintiff’s counsel asked for and was granted a hearing in chambers, where he stated an objection to any questions concerning income taxes. He argued that Hall v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77, prohibited any such references, and defendants’ counsel then stated he would demonstrate, through the witness, that the income figures to which he had testified “are simply gross earnings” and that they were “totally devoid of any references to taxes or expenses.” At that point, the court sustained the objection and, thereafter, defense counsel made no further reference to income taxes—either during the trial or in his argument to the jury. The measure of damages under the Wrongful Death Act is the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries occasioned by the death. (Flynn v. Vancil (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237. See also Scully v. Otis Elevator Co. (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 185, 275 N.E.2d 905.) Pecuniary loss has traditionally been held to consist of the value of the sum of monetary contributions and personal services the deceased would have provided. (Scully; O’Fallon Coal & Mining Co. v. Laquet (1902), 198 Ill. 125, 64 N.E. 767.) In this regard, we note that the Pattern Jury Instruction for damages in death actions, IPI-Civil No. 36.01, lists eight factors to be considered by juries in determining pecuniary loss. Among them are the amounts decedent customarily contributed in the past to his next of kin and what he spent for customary personal expenses. There is no question that decedent here, prior to his death, could not have made contributions of that which would have been paid in taxes or for his personal expenses, and it appears to me that pecuniary loss must necessarily be a net amount determined after deductions for those items. Hall, relied upon by plaintiff, is not controlling of the issue here. It held in a personal injury action that a jury should not be informed that its damage award would not be subject to income tax and, while the application of Hall prohibits informing a jury in either a death or a personal injury action that the amount of its award of damages would not be taxable, it does not hold that defendant in a death action may not develop the fact that pecuniary loss was a net amount to be determined after deductions for taxes and personal expenses. No Illinois court has decided this question, but it has been passed upon in Federal cases. In Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1975), an FELA damage award of $335,000 was set aside because evidence of the amount of personal income tax that would have been paid had decedent lived was refused. The court stated: “[W]e believe it altogether right and proper that in cases wherein the annual gross income is such that future taxes would have a substantial effect, evidence of the decedent’s past and future tax liability should be admitted if a reasonably fair and accurate estimate of his lost future income is to be assured.” (529 F.2d 284,291.) The Boxberger court also said that the exclusion of any evidence of future income taxes seriously prejudiced defendants, because the award substantially exceeded what the beneficiaries would have received had decedent lived “due to overcompensation in the form of pretax dollars that the survivors would never have received had the accident not occurred.” (529 F.2d 284, 295.) Additionally, the Boxberger court rejected an argument that to permit a deduction for tax liability would involve too much speculation and uncertainty, stating: “[T]oday’s sophisticated jurors surely have had some personal experience in determining their own tax liability, and in today’s tax-conscious society we are confident that our juries and judges, with the aid of such competent expert testimony as may be received, are equal to the task and the responsibility.” 529 F.2d 284, 293. In Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044, 19 L. Ed. 2d 836, 88 S. Ct. 788, which involved an action under the Death on the High Seas Act for the death of a passenger in an airplane crash, the trial court, in a bench trial, computed pecuniary loss to the next of kin on the basis of decedent’s probable future earnings, without any deduction for income taxes on those earnings. The court of appeals stated: “The deceased’s beneficiaries could not logically and reasonably have expected to receive the money he would have paid in such taxes had he lived. Only the net income would have been available for their support. And there can be no pecuniary loss of income which would not have been available for contribution.” (379 F.2d 893, 896.) Thus, it is my thought that defendants should have been allowed to cross-examine the economist to develop the fact that his computations included no deductions for income taxes and personal expenses. I disagree also with the majority’s holding that defendants failed to preserve this issue for appeal because no offer of proof was made by defendants after the trial court’s adverse ruling. An offer of proof is unnecessary when the trial court understands the objection and character of evidence but will not admit the evidence (Schusler v. Fletcher (1966), 74 Ill. App. 2d 249, 219 N.E.2d 588), or where the question and the circumstances surrounding it are sufficient to indicate the problem and the admissibility of the evidence (Creighton v. Elgin (1944), 387 Ill. 592, 56 N.E.2d 825; Ryan v. McEvoy (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 562, 315 N.E.2d 38; Mack v. Davis (1966), 76 Ill. App. 2d 88, 221 N.E.2d 121). Here, the in-chambers colloquy reveals the court and the parties were well aware of the fact that defendants were seeking to show that the computations of the economist did not consider income taxes and personal expenses. Under such circumstances, an offer of proof to repeat what was already known was not required. Creighton; Schusler. It is my belief that Harris v. Algonquin Ready Mix, Inc., relied upon by the majority in its opinion and by plaintiff in its brief here, is not controlling on this question. In Harris, plaintiff was injured when a crane came in contact with overhead high-tension wires and, when a witness was asked about a prior crane contact with wires, an objection was sustained. In the ensuing discussion in chambers, no statement or offer of proof was made as to whether the prior touching had occurred under conditions substantially similar to those in the second contact and, in the absence thereof, the court held that no appealable issue remained. In the instant case, however, the discussion in chambers disclosed to the court exacdy what it was that defendant wanted to show. Finally, I express my disagreement with the holding of the majority that evidence of the effect of taxes on deceased’s projected earnings “would be inadmissible because it did not have a ‘significant impact’ on the computation of damages while deceased’s salary was in the lower range of the lower income scale.” While it is correct, as stated by the majority, that McWeeney and Cox support this concept, it is noted that in Cox, a death action, there was testimony as to projected future earnings of from $15,655 to $20,608 per year, and the court held that the impact of income tax involving such earnings had a significant and substantial effect in the computation of probable future contributions. In McWeeney, an injury action, plaintiffs yearly income was $4,800—on which he would have paid $773 in income tax. The majority of the court upheld the refusal of an instruction that the jury, in determining future loss of earnings, should consider only plaintiffs net income after deducting income taxes, because the amount of the tax would not have significant impact on the award of damages. The majority also stated, however, that there may be cases of large potential earnings where failure to consider the income tax factor would produce an improper result. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Lumbard rejected the “significant impact” concept, stating: “I submit that if the factor is relevant in any case it is relevant in every case. It can hardly be seriously argued that an item of $773 over McWeeney’s life expectancy of 29 years, or about $22,000 before discount, is so insubstantial that a trial court may choose to disregard it.” 282 F.2d 34, 43. In the instant case, the economist testified to future loss of earnings, reduced to present cash value, of $393,000 to $611,000. With a 37-year life work expectancy, this would indicate projected earnings of from $10,700 to $16,500 per year—which, even in the light of the reasoning of either McWeeney or Cox, would have significant impact on the computation of future contributions. For the reasons stated, it is my opinion that the trial court erred in not permitting defendants to develop the fact that the computations of plaintiff’s economist did not include income taxes and expenses. However, I agree with the majority that defendants have not shown this error to be prejudicial. Error is generally not reversible without a showing of prejudice (Tipsword v. Melrose (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 301 N.E.2d 614; Adamaitis v. Hesser (1965), 56 Ill. App. 2d 349, 206 N.E.2d 311), and to entitle a party to a reversal of a judgment, he must show that the error has, or presumably has, resulted in an injury to him. O’Fallon Coal and Mining Co.; Atz v. Goss (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 878, 316 N.E.2d 29; Harrison v. Rapach (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 915, 271 N.E.2d 399; 3 Ill. L. & Prac. Appeal and Error § 802 (1953). In the matter before us, not only has there been no showing of such injury but, as a matter of fact, defendants have made no assertion that they were prejudiced. They argue only that the court committed plain error, but they cite no authorities in support of this position. From our examination of the record, we do not believe that the error was prejudicial to the extent that reversal is required. Initially, we note that the refusal to allow defendants to show that the economist did not consider deductions for income tax in his computations went only to the question of damages, so that if there was any prejudice therefrom, it would be reflected in the jury’s award. In this regard, it is significant that defendants have made no assertion that the award was excessive, and we cannot say that it was, in view of the fact that deceased was only 25 years of age with a life expectancy of 45.6 years and a working life of 37 years and because there was unrebutted testimony of a demonstrated loss of earnings reduced to cash value of from $333,900 to $611,400. Even if testimony as to deductions of income tax had been permitted, there would remain a substantial amount of future loss of earnings which, when considered with the value of the services deceased would have rendered during his life expectancy and the value of his 35 hours of conscious pain and suffering resulting from bums over 89% of his body—of which 80% went through all layers of skin, would indicate a substantial recovery was justified. In any event, the record discloses that defendants produced no witness who testified as to damages or contradicted plaintiff’s evidence in that regard. Neither do defendants contend that the error resulted in an excessive verdict; nor do defendants suggest that an inference of excessiveness should be drawn from the nature of the error. In view thereof, we believe that defendants have not satisfied the required showing of prejudice to entitle them to a reversal. I would modify the opinion to bring it into accord with the above comments; otherwise, I concur in affirming the judgment of the trial court.