Court Opinion

ID: 9384014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 16:08:37.141378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.840935
License: Public Domain

J-S02004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 THERESA A. MACKO                        :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 THOMAS R. CALORE                        :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :    No. 1112 MDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered June 2, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
                     Civil Division at No(s): 2022-04638

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED: MARCH 31, 2023

      Thomas Calore appeals the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas’

order granting the petition for protection from abuse (“PFA”) filed by Calore’s

sister, Theresa Macko. Calore primarily argues the trial court erred by

concluding his actions rose to the level of “abuse” contemplated by the PFA

Act (“PFAA”), 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 6101 et seq. We affirm.

      Calore and Macko are siblings and live across the street from each other.

Calore believed Macko stole his firearm. Macko filed a PFA petition against

Calore, alleging Calore had been targeting her with frequent harassing texts

and phone calls and calling police to her house. Macko further asserted that

Calore’s abusive behavior had been escalating. She averred that the police

recommended she file a PFA petition against Calore. The trial court issued a

temporary PFA order. It then held a hearing on the petition on June 2, 2022.
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      Macko, proceeding pro se, testified at the hearing. She recounted that

Calore has struggled for years with alcohol and mental health issues. See

N.T., 6/2/2022, at 3. She testified that, in recent months, Calore had been

sending “late night texts, phone calls, threats, [and engaging in] stalking

behaviors, harassing behaviors.” Id. at 4. According to Macko, Calore’s

behavior had been escalating since his communications were “accompanied

by anger and threats, violence.” Id. He told Macko “you’ll be done; you’ll be

sorry.” Id. at 8. She maintained Calore had informed her he had 20 security

cameras aimed at Macko’s house, and she had seen him point cameras

towards her home. See id. at 9. According to Macko, Calore and his girlfriend

spy on the family. See id. at 9-10.

      Macko testified that she did not take Calore’s firearm, as alleged by

Calore. However, Macko testified Calore continued to bring up the firearm and

her “fear [was] that when he does find his firearm, he will use it; and he will

kill me.” Id. at 8. She testified she also feared for the safety of her five children

and her husband. See id. at 9.

      Macko also called one of the parties’ sisters, Pennsylvania State Trooper

Marie Calore, to testify at the hearing. Trooper Calore corroborated Macko’s

testimony that Calore had exhibited harassing behaviors towards Macko,

including sending her multiple text messages. She also testified that Calore

had been hostile towards Macko for a long time but his behavior was escalating

in intensity, and because of that, along with the cameras and the repeated

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reference to his firearm, she feared for her sister’s safety. See id. at 39, 43.

Macko’s husband testified about the screaming phone calls Calore had made

and that Calore informed a police officer he had 20 security cameras aimed at

Macko’s home. See id. at 48-49, 50-51.

      Calore testified at the hearing as well. According to Calore, he has never

threatened Macko with bodily harm and although he does have security

cameras at his house, they are not pointed at Macko’s house. Calore’s

girlfriend testified it is Macko who has threatened Calore.

      Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting Macko’s

petition and filed a final PFA order against Calore. Calore appealed, and the

trial court ordered Calore to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In its Rule

1925(a) opinion, the trial court specifically indicated that it had found the

testimony of Macko and her witnesses to be credible. In contrast, the court

specifically found the testimony of Calore and his girlfriend to not be credible.

The court concluded that it had properly entered the PFA order against Calore.

Calore raises the following two issues on appeal:

       I.   Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding
            that [Macko] established by a preponderance of the
            evidence that “abuse” occurred as defined under 23 Pa.
            C.S.[A.] § 6102(a)(2) [and (a)](5).

      II.   Whether the trial court’s decision in granting [Macko] a final
            [PFA] order is against the weight of the evidence based on
            the testimony and lack of evidence presented by [Macko] at
            [the hearing].

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (trial court’s answers omitted).

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      When an appellant challenges the granting of a PFA petition, as Calore

does here, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions to see whether the trial

court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. See K.B. v. Tinsley,

208 A.3d 123, 127 (Pa. Super. 2019). If the appellant’s claim specifically

alleges the evidence was not sufficient to support the PFA order, we review

the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner to determine whether

the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s conclusion by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Karch v. Karch, 885 A.2d 535, 537 (Pa.

Super. 2005). We defer to the credibility determinations of the trial court as

to witnesses who appeared before it. See id.

      The purpose of the PFAA is to protect victims of domestic violence from

those who perpetrate abuse, with the primary goal being the prevention of

abuse. See K.B., 208 A.3d at 127. The PFAA defines “abuse,” in relevant part,

as the “occurrence of one or more of the following acts[:]”

      (2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily
      injury;

                                      ***

      (5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly
      committing acts toward another person, including following the
      person, without proper authority, under circumstances which
      place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(2), (a)(5).

      “In the context of a PFA case, the court’s objective is to determine

whether the victim is in reasonable fear of bodily injury. The intent of the

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alleged abuser is of no moment.” K.B., 208 A.3d at 128 (citations omitted).

Given the PFAA’s goal of preventing abuse, a victim does not have to wait for

physical or sexual abuse to occur for the Act to apply. See id.

      Here, the trial court granted Macko’s PFA petition pursuant to both

Sections 6102 (a)(2) and (a)(5) of the PFAA. Although a trial court may grant

a PFA petition under more than one subsection of Section 6102(a), see Karch

885 A.2d at 539, the PFAA is clear that the court need only find that the

petitioner has established that one of the acts constituting “abuse” under the

Act applies, see 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 6102(a).

      We focus on the trial court’s conclusion that Macko presented sufficient

evidence to establish Calore’s conduct “place[d Macko] in reasonable fear of

imminent serious bodily injury” which constitutes “abuse” under Section

6102(a)(2). Calore essentially argues in his two issues that the trial court

erred by reaching this conclusion because he never threatened Macko with

bodily injury, and because Macko did not provide evidence of the threatening

texts she testified Calore sent to her or any evidence that she and Calore had

a history of an abusive relationship. This claim is without merit.

      In rejecting Calore’s claim, the trial court explained:

            The testimony of [Macko] and her witnesses [which the
      court specifically credited] established by a preponderance of the
      evidence that [Calore] engaged in a course of conduct by angry
      and loud yelling and texts on multiple occasions which were
      threatening. These outbursts coupled with [Calore’s] continual
      reference to his alleged missing gun provided a reasonable fear of
      imminent serious bodily injury which meets the statutory
      requirement under subsection (2) of the [PFAA]. [Calore] made

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      statements as “you’re done, you’ll be done” and “you’ll be sorry”
      as well as his reference in a text that he “won’t stand down”; all
      provide a reasonable basis for [Macko] to believe she was in fear
      of imminent serious bodily injury. She was not required to wait
      until [Calore] found his gun and killed her.

                                      ***

            As the fact finder, the court was able to perceive that
      [Macko] justifiably felt that she was in imminent fear of serious
      bodily injury.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/2022, at 7.

      We add that Macko also specifically testified that she was afraid that

when Calore found his gun, he would use it to kill her. Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to Macko, and deferring to the trial court’s explicit

credibility findings, we do not find any error in the court’s finding that there

was sufficient evidence to enter a PFA order under Section 6102(a)(2) of the

PFAA, and Calore’s arguments to the contrary do not persuade us otherwise.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/31/2023

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