Court Opinion

ID: 9928440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 19:03:11.298264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:30.705677
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/31/24 P. v. Vue CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084811
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. F13909890)
                    v.

    BEE VUE,                                                                              OPINION
           Appellant and Defendant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. David
Andrew Gottlieb, Judge.
         Patrick J. Hoynoski, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant and
Defendant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and DeSantos, J.
                                    INTRODUCTION
       Appellant Bee Vue contends on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney failed to ask the court to dismiss appellant’s firearm
enhancement in light of Senate Bill No. 81 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721,
§ 1) (Senate Bill 81). We reject appellant’s claim and affirm the judgment.
                              PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       On October 18, 2013, appellant was charged in a complaint with murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a),1 count 1), alleging that appellant personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) which caused death to the victim (Edgar
Garcia) (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person
(§ 29820, subd. (b), count 2). It was further alleged that appellant had a prior strike
conviction as a juvenile (§ 245, subd. (b), §§ 667, subds. (b)−(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)−(d)).
       On May 12, 2022, appellant entered into a plea agreement where he pled guilty to
second degree murder (§ 187, count 1) and admitted that he personally used a firearm that
resulted in great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and that he had a prior
strike conviction. As part of the plea agreement, the trial court indicated it would strike
the prior strike conviction and that he would be sentenced to 15 years to life for second
degree murder and 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, for an aggregate
sentence of 40 years to life in state prison. Appellant indicated that he understood the
implications of his plea agreement, including the indicated sentence, had time to speak
with his attorney, and accepted this plea agreement.
                                 FACTUAL SUMMARY
       Appellant shot Garcia as a result of an altercation because appellant felt he and his
friends were being disrespected. Appellant’s sister said appellant confessed to her that he

1      Hereinafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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shot someone and admitted she rode with appellant to Oklahoma to avoid capture. Later,
appellant confessed to police that he was the person who shot Garcia. Appellant
explained that Garcia had “ ‘mad mugged’ ” him and he felt disrespected. Appellant
confronted Garcia. As Garcia was opening a gate to enter a yard, appellant shot Garcia
three times and left. Appellant admitted he fled to Oklahoma to avoid arrest. While in
Oklahoma, appellant was convicted and sentenced to prison for first degree
manslaughter.

                                      DISCUSSION

I.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
       Appellant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
trial counsel failed to argue that his section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
enhancement should be dismissed pursuant to Senate Bill 81. The People disagree
contending appellant fails to demonstrate his counsel did not have good tactical reasons
for his decision not to raise this argument. We agree with the People and reject
appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
       A.     Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
       Appellant was sentenced on June 13, 2022. At sentencing, appellant addressed the
court apologizing to Garcia’s family, expressing remorse and regret and accepting justice
for what he did. The defense attorney had no further comments.
       The court observed in appellant “a recognition of the wrongs that you have created
in this⸻in this life and some desire to make changes and that’s always, I think,
important.” As for sentencing, the court stated it “recognizes that I have discretion to
strike your prior strike in 2008, and the [c]ourt is going to do so with some reluctance.
The prior offense was very serious. I think people were lucky that nobody was killed as a
result of that prior incident in 2008. You engaged in reckless and⸻reckless and violent
behavior. It was probably motivated by gang undertones and you served a lengthy

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commitment, not only to the DJJ, but also served some time at the California Department
of Corrections as a result of that.”
       The trial court considered appellant’s youthfulness at the time that the offense
occurred, and gave considerable weight to his remorsefulness and acceptance of
responsibility. The court expressed that “outside of striking [appellant’s] prior strike,
every other factor engaged in this case is aggravating. The [c]ourt is going to sentence
you for a violation of … [s]ection 187[, subdivision] (a)(2) to the term of 15 years to life,
it being a⸻without malice aforethought. It will be a 15 year⸻15-year-to-life
commitment for violating … [section] 187.”
       “As to the enhancement under [section] 12022.53[, subdivision] (d), the [c]ourt
certainly recognizes under the newest case law⸻I should probably cite it for the record,
if I can find it. I think it’s Tirado, Tirado. I think it’s T-I-R-A-D-O. If that ends up not
being the case at all, then I’ll put it on the minute order later, but I believe it’s Tirado. So
under the Tirado case, the [c]ourt recognizes that I do have discretion under⸻yes, it is
Tirado. I’ve got it right. And that’s People versus Jose Tirado. It’s a January of 2022
case. The [c]ourt does have the power to strike enhancements and also the power to
substitute lesser enhancements when it deems it appropriate to do so. [(Italics added.)]
       “The [c]ourt also recognizes the more recent case of People versus Christopher
Martinez, that’s at 78 Cal.App.5th 317, and that’s a May 5th case. And in that case, the
[c]ourt sets forth the various different considerations that the [c]ourt should engage in
analyzing when determining whether or not to reduce a [section] 12022.53
[, subdivision] (d). The [c]ourt recognizes the ability to do so and recognizes the
conditions under which it should do so and does not find that those conditions are
applicable in this case, particularly in light of the fact that the [c]ourt has stricken
[appellant]’s prior strike conviction. So the enhancement in this case under
[section] 12022.53[, subdivision] (d) will be 25-years-to-life making the total
indeterminate term of 40-years-to-life.” (Italics added.)

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       B.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show
his counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 (Strickland).) The appellant must
show his counsel’s performance was deficient under an objective standard of professional
competency and that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error, a more
favorable determination would have resulted. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619,
703; Strickland, at p. 687; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217−218 [it is
insufficient that counsel’s errors had “some conceivable effect” on the outcome].)
       An appellant must specifically identify the acts or omissions of counsel that did
not result from reasonable professional assistance and did not constitute sound trial
strategy. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689.) A reviewing court gives deference to
counsel’s performance and presumes that counsel’s conduct falls within the range of
reasonable professional assistance. (Ibid.; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 215−216.)
The Supreme Court provides for deferential treatment because “[i]t is all too tempting for
an appellant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence,
and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.”
(Strickland, at p. 689.)
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385 to provide the
trial court with discretion to dismiss enhancements in furtherance of justice. (People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 290.) Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides
that “[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited
by any initiative statute.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1); Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) provides as follows: “In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the

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appellant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are
present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other
serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) One of the mitigating circumstances
listed under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) is: “The application of an enhancement
could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be
dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
       C.      Analysis
       Appellant argues that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he
failed to ask the court to dismiss the firearm enhancement under Senate Bill 81.
Specifically, appellant contends that because the application of the firearm enhancement
resulted in a sentence of over 20 years, “the court was required to dismiss the
enhancement unless it found that doing so would endanger public safety.” As such,
appellant argues that a reasonably competent attorney would have raised the issue
because it was “[a]t least arguably meritorious.” Appellant claims that the cases cited by
the trial court predate Senate Bill 81 and demonstrate it was unaware of its new limited
discretion under Senate Bill 81. He argues there is no satisfactory explanation for
counsel’s failure to ask the trial court to dismiss the enhancement under the newly
amended section 1385. Further, appellant argues there is a reasonable probability that
had counsel raised the issue at sentencing, the trial court would have not imposed the
enhancement.
       First, appellant fails to demonstrate his counsel’s representation “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688.) On
appeal, we defer “to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions” and presume “counsel acted
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57

                                             6.
Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “Rarely is ineffective assistance of counsel established on appeal
since the record usually sheds no light on counsel’s reasons for action or inaction.”
(People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 736.) On this record, we cannot conclude
there is no reasonable explanation for trial counsel’s failure to request dismissal of the
firearm enhancement under Senate Bill 81.
       It is reasonable that counsel believed it would be futile to ask the court to strike the
firearm enhancement under Senate Bill 81. (See People v. Prince (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324,
387, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Hinks (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 1157, 1161−1165 [“Counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing
to make motions or objections that counsel reasonably determines would be futile.”];
People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587 [“Counsel is not required to proffer futile
objections.”].) Appellant was already facing a sentence of over 20 years due to the
murder conviction’s sentence of 15 years to life. Therefore, it is unclear whether section
1385, subdivision (c) is triggered since it is not due to the firearm enhancement alone that
makes the sentence potentially over 20 years. Additionally, it is reasonable trial counsel
believed the court would find that “dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety.” (See § 1358, subd. (c)(2)(C).) Appellant is an admitted gang member, had a
prior juvenile strike conviction and was on probation for possession of a firearm when he
committed the murder with little provocation. Appellant fled the state and picked up a
manslaughter charge. Probation concluded appellant “is a violently reckless, self-
admitted gang member, whose actions have clearly demonstrated he is far too dangerous
to reside amongst society.” As such, the record supports a conclusion that dismissal of
the firearm enhancement would endanger public safety. And it is reasonable that trial
counsel determined a request to dismiss the firearm enhancement would be futile.
       Additionally, appellant was benefiting from a plea bargain and it is reasonable that
trial counsel did not want to disrupt the agreement. Appellant accepted a plea agreement
where he agreed to plead guilty to murder and admit the firearm enhancement in

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exchange for the trial court’s indicated sentence which would strike the prior strike
conviction and reduce his sentence from 55 years to life down to 40 years to life. The
record is silent as to what counsel had discussed with appellant or the court before
entering into the plea agreement and whether or not the implications of Senate Bill 81
had already been addressed. However, if appellant sought to withdraw the plea
agreement he would be facing 55 years to life. Considering the evidence against
appellant, which includes appellant’s confession to police that he shot Garcia, it is not
unreasonable that trial counsel chose to not ask for dismissal of the firearm enhancement
under Senate Bill 81 and instead submitted on the plea agreement and the court’s
indicated sentence.
       Where “the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act
in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be
rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168,
207.) As such, we cannot say that “ ‘ “there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation” ’ ” for trial counsel’s decision not to raise the Senate Bill 81 issue. (People
v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.) Appellant fails to show his trial counsel’s
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” (See Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688.)
       Second, appellant has not shown prejudice. “Absent evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the trial court knew the law, and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10
Cal.5th 983, 1042.) Here, the amendment to section 1385 took effect over six months
before the trial court sentenced appellant. The record does not mention Senate Bill 81 but
demonstrates the court was aware of the new changes to its discretion to dismiss the
firearm enhancement. As appellant notes, the cases cited by the court do not pertain
specifically to Senate Bill 81, but it does not necessarily mean the court was unaware of
the new law. The record shows the court recognized that under the newest case law it

                                             8.
had discretion to strike the firearm enhancement but stated it was not inclined to do so
considering the court had already stricken appellant’s prior strike conviction. Since there
is no evidence the court was unaware of its discretion under Senate Bill 81, we must
presume the court made its decision to impose the firearm enhancement with full
knowledge of the newly amended section 1385, subdivision (c). (See Ramirez, at
p. 1042.)
       Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, the trial court could have reasonably
concluded that dismissal of the firearm enhancement would endanger public safety.
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C); People v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 296.)
Consequently, we cannot conclude that had appellant’s counsel raised a challenge to the
firearm enhancement under Senate Bill 81 a more favorable determination would have
resulted. (See People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 703.) Accordingly, appellant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is denied.
                                         DISPOSITION
       We affirm the judgment.

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