Court Opinion

ID: 9718197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:18:34.020386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:57.903204
License: Public Domain

*50Dissenting Opinion
Hunter, J.
I must respectfully but vigorously dissent from the majority and concurring opinions for the reason that the majority of the Court fails to support with relevant authority its conclusion that the entry by police into the dwelling in question was constitutionally permissible.
The record, when viewed most favorably to the State, indicates that appellant and two others were charged with breaking into the Johnson Oil Company in Columbus, Indiana, early on the morning of June 19, 1966. Two witnesses who were parked in a Cummins Diesel Co. parking lot across the street testified that they saw three young men run from the Johnson Oil Company property that morning carrying a typewriter, saw them go around to the rear of a house next to the parking lot, and saw them emerge a short time later without the typewriter. Shortly thereafter, these witnesses saw the same three persons disappear behind the house again. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the police had any information placing the burglars inside the house in question. Within a few minutes, police were called to the scene and, upon learning that three persons had been acting suspiciously around the nearby house, decided to carry the investigation to the house. A knock on the front door by the officers produced no response. After stationing one officer at the front, they proceeded around to the rear of the house where a screen-enclosed porch blocked the way to the permanent weather door of the house. The testimony of the police officers who testified at trial establishes without question that the officers passed through a screen door onto the screen-enclosed porch without hesitation, and without knocking, and began knocking on the permanent back door of the house. At about this time, before entry into the house proper, and before any arrest was made, one of the officers on the porch saw a typewriter sitting in a partially open closet on the porch. Thereafter, the officers entered the house and arrested appellant *51and his co-defendants, who were feigning sleep. At no time before the entry did the officers identify themselves or state the purpose for their presence. The house was the residence of the appellant’s parents.
At the time the police entered the house, they had neither a search warrant nor a warrant for arrest.
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the typewriter from evidence, which motion was overruled by the trial court. The typewriter was subsequently admitted into evidence at trial over appellant’s objection. Upon this appeal, appellant’s principal contention is that the typewriter was procured by the police as the result of an unlawful search and seizure, and that the trial court committed prejudicial error in overruling his motion to suppress the typewriter, in admitting it into evidence, and in failing to grant appellant’s motion for new trial alleging error thereon.
The State of Indiana, in an attempt to rebut this argument, contends that the typewriter was not procured by a search because the term “search” implies prying into hidden places for that which is concealed, and that in the present case the typewriter was not in a hidden place but was in plain view of the officers as they entered the house. With this argument, however, the State wholly fails to grapple with the central question involved in this case. For at the time the typewriter was discovered, the police had not been given permission to enter the screen-enclosed porch, had no warrant of any kind, and no arrest had, been made, nor was one in progress. And even if the entry onto the porch did not constitute a search, it seems that the same privacy was invaded as if the entry and subsequent conduct by police were given the label of a search.
Therefore, the essential question to be determined in this case is whether the police officers, without a warrant for either search or arrest were justified in entering upon the screen-enclosed porch where the typewriter was found, and *52if they were not, what effect should this have upon admissibility of the typewriter into evidence.
The majority opinion fails to recognize that it is the illegality of the entry in this case that makes the search invalid, not the fact that the search occurred before the arrest.
For purposes of orderly discussion, the problem will be dealt with in two parts: first, where entry by law officers is for the purpose of conducting a search, and second, where entry is made for the purpose of making an arrest.
I
Ordinarily, either a warrant or consent is required to allow officers to enter upon and search a private dwelling and its curtilage. Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco (1967), 87 S. Ct. 1727. A search without a warrant and without consent can survive constitutional inhibition only upon a showing that the surrounding facts brought it within one of the recognized exceptions. Stoner v. California (1964), 376 U. S. 483. Generally, these exceptions are:
(a) Search of immediate surroundings incident to a lawful arrest. Carroll v. United States (1925), 367 U. S. 132.
(b) Entry under emergency circumstances, such as to prevent disappearance of a movable vehicle, to present commission of a violent crime, to prevent imminent destruction removal or concealment of the property to be seized. United States v. Jeffers (1951), 342 U. S. 48; McDonald v. United States (1948), 335 U. S. 451; United States v. Barone, 330 F. 2d 543, (2d Cir. 1964); Wilson v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 454, 217 N. E. 2d 147.
It appears clear from a survey of the cases that when evidence concerning defendant’s activities is observed by officers upon private property, in the course of conduct amounting to an interference with defendant’s right to privacy, such-evidence is inadmissible absent a warrant, a proper consent, or an emergency situation demanding immediate entry. McDonald v. United States, supra; People v. Terrell (1967), 277 *53N. Y. S. 2d 926; Polk v. United States, 291 F. 2d 230 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Brock v. United States, 223 F. 2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955).
It has been consistently held for many years that outbuildings on the grounds surrounding a dwelling are within the “curtilage” of the dwelling apd are protected from intrusion by the 4th amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by the Constitution of Indiana, Art. I, § 11. Walker v. United States, 225 F. 2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955) (a barn, 70 to 80 yards from the dwelling); Taylor v. United States (1931), 286 U. S. 1 (a metal garage adjacent to the dwelling house) ; Walker v. United States, 125 F. 2d 395 (5th Cir. 1942) (a shed consisting of a chicken house and garage) ; Idol v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 307, 119 N. E. 2d 428 (garage of fraternity house in Indianapolis) ; People v. Terrell (1967), supra, (a fire escape) ; Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F. 2d 310 (1st Cir. 1965) (a barn) See also: U. S. v. Mullin, 329 F. 2d 296 (4th Cir. 1964) (a smokehouse).
From this survey of cases, it seems unavoidable that a screen-enclosed porch connected to the dwelling itself cannot be entered for purposes of conducting a search without a search warrant unless consent is given or an emergency exists. And if such entry is made, the occupant’s right to privacy is invaded and evidence resulting from such invasion is inadmissible in a court of law. This nation’s high regard for the right of every individual to privacy is undeniable. In District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13 (CCA., D. C. 1949), in which the argument was put forth that the protection against unreasonable search and seizure applied only to protection against unreasonable search and seizure applied only to protect the criminal against self-incrimination, the court, in addition to eloquently explaining the basis of the right of privacy, clearly states that it is the right of every man:
“The basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not protection against self-incrimination; it was the common-law right of a man to privacy in his home, a right *54which is one of the indispensable ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization. It was firmly established in the common law as one of the bright features of the Anglo-Saxon contributions to human progress. It was not related to crime or to suspicion of crime. It belonged to all men, not merely to criminals, real or suspected. So much is clear from any examination of history, whether slight or exhaustive . . .
The Fourth Amendment did not confer a right upon the people. It was a precautionary statement of a lack of federal governmental power, coupled with a rigidly restricted permission to invade the existing right. The right guaranteed was a right already belonging to the people. The reason for the search warrant clause was that public interest required that personal privacy be invadable for the detection of crime, and the Amendment provided the sole and only permissible process by which the right of privacy could be invaded. To view the Amendment as a limitation upon an otherwise unlimited right to search is to invert completely the true posture of rights and the limitations thereon.” 178 F. 2d at 16.
There is no indication in the record of this case that the officers were faced with any emergency which would justify their entry to make a search without first obtaining a warrant.
On the other hand, the officers had witnesses giving them probable cause .to arrest the defendants and could easily have acquired warrants for that purpose or for the purpose of conducting a search of the house in question.
As noted above, we do not disagree with the majority’s assertion that a search made incidental to a lawful arrest is valid, even though made without a warrant. But the entry made by law enforcement officers into the dwelling in each of the state court cases cited by the majority opinion to support this proposition was either a valid, proper entry under the circumstances, or was not dealt with by the court.
In People v. Vice (1956), 147 Cal. App. 2d 269, 305 P. 2d 270, the question of the validity of the conduct of the police in entering an apartment without either a search or arrest warrant was not discussed. However, it must be realized that *55in that case the police had direct information that the suspect was present in the apartment and also that the contraband involved was heroin, which is easily destroyed or disposed of. Therefore, the police entry in that case was justified as an emergency measure.
In People v. Hughes (1960), 183 Cal. App. 2d 107, 6 Cal. Rptr. 643, the police were admitted to the home of appellant by appellant’s wife. It was on the basis of consent that such entry to search was valid.
In Knight v. State (1926), 171 Ark. 882, 286 S. W. 1013, one officer entered the defendant’s premises and searched the lower level while another officer went in search of appellant. After appellant was brought back to the house, an illegal still was discovered on the second level of the dwelling. Nothing was found which the state attempted to use as evidence until the appellant was present. However, the court fails to deal with the issue of the lawfulness of sheriff’s entry into and presence in the house.
In Gray v. State (1960), 207 Tenn. 39, 336 S. W. 2d 22, appellant was charged with possession of untaxed intoxicating liquors. He raised the question of illegal search and seizure due to entry by State Police into a dwelling house without any warrant. In that case the officers in question observed persons carrying and drinking from jugs of liquid, observed persons around the house flee at the sight of law enforcement officers, and saw many people coming and going at the house. In view of the disposable nature of alcoholic beverages and the warning the occupants of the house had, as well as the apparently public use being made of the house, both the emergency exception and the fact that no one’s privacy was violated result in the conclusion that no unlawful entry occurred in that case.
On the basis of the foregoing, the screen-enclosed porch involved qualifies as a constitutionally protected area, and it should be held that the officers in this case were not justi*56fled intering to conduct a search since there was no emergency justifying their failure to obtain a warrant.
II
The Indiana General Assembly has set a very clear policy relative to the authority of officers of the law to enter a dwelling house without permission for the purpose of carrying out a warrant for arrest. Ind. Anno. Stat. § 9-1009 (1956 Repl.) provides:
“To make an arrest in criminal actions the officer "may break open any outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house or any other building or inclosure to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he be refused admittance.” (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court of the United States, in cases involving its supervisory power over lower federal courts, recently interpreted a similar federal statute in the identical manner, as follows in Sabbath v. United States (1968), 320 U. S. 219, 88 S. Ct. 1755:
“The statute here involved, 18 USC § 3109, deals with the entry of federal officers into a dwelling in terms only in regard to the execution of a search warrant. This Court has held, however, that the validity of such an entry of a federal officer to effect an arrest without a warrant ‘must be tested by criteria identical to those embodied in’ that statute. Miller v. United States (1958), 357 U. S. 301; Wong-Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U. S. 471.”
We are in full agreement with the concurring opinion’s statement that the Sabbath and Miller cases, cited, supra, are not controlling precedent for this State. On the other hand, the decisions of the highest court in this nation, when so clearly well-reasoned and analogous, should not be so lightly dismissed. They can provide for us wise and helpful guidance in solving the very difficult question which confronts this Court.
*57In Miller v. United States, supra, the history of statutes such as Ind. Anno. Stat. § 9-1009, supra, is examined in depth and at one point, our statute is cited as requiring the same standard of conduct as is required of federal officers. Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, states in the majority opinion:
“From earliest days, the common law drastically limited the authority of law officers to break the door of a house to effect an arrest. Such action invades the precious interest of privacy summed up in the ancient adage that a man’s house is his castle. As early as the 13th Year-book of Edward IY (1461-1483), at folio 9, there is a recorded holding that it was unlawful for the sheriff to break the doors of a man’s house to arrest him in a civil suit in debt or trespass, for the arrest was then only for the private interest of a party. Remarks attributed to William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, on the occasion of debate in Parliament on the searches incident to the enforcement of an excise on cider, eloquently expressed the principle:
“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter— all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!”
But the common law recognized some authority in law officers to break the door of a dwelling to arrest for felony. The common-law authorities differ, however, as to the circumstances in which this was the case. Hawkins says: “where one lies under a probable Suspicion only, and is not indicted, it seems the better Opinion at this Day, That no one can justify the Breaking open Doors in Order to apprehend him.” 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, c. 14, § 7 (1762) ; see also Foster, Crown Law, 321 (2d ed. 1776). Coke appears to have been of the same view, and to have thought that the breaking of a house was limited to cases in which a writ, now our warrant, had issued. Co. 4th Inst. 177. On the other hand, Hale says that “A man, that arrests upon suspicion of felony, may break open doors, if the party refuse upon demand to open them. ...” 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 583 (1736).
Whatever the circumstances under which breaking a door to arrest for felony might be lawful, however, the *58breaking was unlawful where the officer failed first to state his authority and purpose for demanding admission. The requirement was pronounced in 1603 in Semayne’s Case, 5 Coke 91, 11 ERC 629, 77 Eng. Reprint 194: “In all cases where the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party’s house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K(ing)’s process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
The requirement stated in Semayne’s Case still obtains. It is reflected in 18 USC § 3109, in the statutes of a large number of States, (citing, inter alia, Ind. Anno. Stat. § 9-1009, supra) and in the American Law Institute’s proposed Code of Criminal Procedure, § 28.” 357 U. S. 306-09.
If more latitude were allowed when no warrant is obtained, than is allowed when one is obtained, the wise approach for law enforcement agencies would be never to seek issuance of an arrest warrant. With this in view the rule has been developed that although it is generally recognized that an officer may break doors to enter a private dwelling without a warrant in order to make an arrest upon probable cause; before such doors are broken without a warrant, there must be a necessity for doing so, and the officer must give notice of Ms authority and purpose to make an arrest, and demand and he refused admittance unless such matters are already understood, or the peril would be increased. Accarino v. United States, 179 F. 2d 456 (D. C. Cir., 1949) ; Miller v. United States, supra; Fisher, Laws of Arrest § § 120-27.
There are other circumstances which have been held to justify an officer’s failure to announce his authority and purpose, and his failure to demand entry before breaking open the doors of a dwelling; for instance, where there is grave danger to the officers, when a delay might frustrate the opportunity to arrest, or when advance notice is likely to result in destruction of important evidence. Miller v. United States, supra; People v. Maddox (1956), 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P. 2d 6, cert. den. 352 U. S. 858, 77 S. Ct. 81; Fisher, Laws of *59Arrest, supra. In our judgment, however, no such exception or emergency is present in this case unless this Court is prepared to adopt an exception for “almost-fresh-pursuit.”
The concurring opinion refers to the facts in this case as presenting a situation of “fresh pursuit,” and concludes therefrom that the officers were justified in entering the house in question here without consent and without a warrant. In support of this proposition, the recent case of Warden v. Hayden (1967), 387 U. S. 294 is relied upon. However, the facts of that case clearly demonstrate what constitutes “fresh pursuit,” and likewise demonstrate that there is no basis for invoking the “fresh pursuit” exception in the present case. In Hayden, two cab drivers followed a man fleeing the scene of an armed robbery, and saw him enter a private home. One of the drivers then radioed this information to his dispatcher, who relayed it to the police. Within minutes, the police arrived, knocked on the door and, after asking to search the house, were admitted without objection by the defendant’s wife.
In approving this entry by police, the Supreme Court of the United States held that under the circumstances, the exigencies of the situation made the course taken by police imperative. It will be noted that the “exigencies of the situation” were two in number. First, the police knew they were dealing with an armed suspect and; Second, the police knew with certainty that the suspect was in the house because he had been followed there, had been seen entering there by way of the front door and had not emerged. Furthermore, the Supreme Court notes that the state post-conviction .court had found that the defendant’s wife “gave the policemen permission to enter the home.”
It is clear from the Hayden case that the court based its approval of the entry upon the fact that the suspect was known to be armed and had actually been followed to the residence, had been seen entering, and had not left. Im*60mediately after approving the entry the Court sets out the basis for its decision:
“The police were informed that an armed robbery had taken place, and that the suspect had entered 2111 Cocoa Lane less than five minutes before they reached it. They acted reasonably when they entered the house and began to search for a man of the description they had been given and for weapons which he had used in the robbery or might use against them. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could have insured that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to affect an escape.” 387 U. S. at 298-99.
“Fresh pursuit,” therefore, is clearly limited in Hayden to situations in which the suspect is seen entering the building, and is accompanied in Hayden by the fact that the suspect was known to be armed and dangerous. Indeed, the emergency stressed by the Court in its opinion is not the “fresh pursuit” concept, which, in itself, does not necessarily present an emergency, but that fact that the officers and others were pursuing an armed man who “gravely” endangered their lives or the lives of others.
The case presently before the court fails to measure up to the facts in the Hayden case in either respect. First, there was no “fresh pursuit” here since the police did not know, nor were they told, that the suspects were seen entering the home in question here. Furthermore, they had no indication that the suspects were armed, and they did not demonstrate any fear of such a possibility in approaching and entering the house. Warden v. Hayden, supra, is, therefore, totally inapplicable to the case presently before us.
The concurring opinion cites the Indiana case of Schreiber v. State (1928), 201 Ind. 37, 164 N. E. 258 for the proposition that law enforcement officers do not violate § 9-1009, supra, *61by breaking down the outer door where they reasonably believe that the door has been locked by the suspect to slow the police in their entry. In that case, however, the police first acquired a search warrant. Then, upon arriving at the place to be searched, they knocked and announced themselves before entering. Furthermore, in the case at bar, the door entered was not locked, and the police had no reason to believe it was locked. The Schreiber case, therefore, likewise wholly fails to support the position taken by the concurring opinion.
In Stearsman et al. v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 149, 143 N. E. 2d 81, which is cited in the majority opinion to justify the police entry in this case, the question of the legality of the entry into the house was not dealt with. The case seemed to turn only on whether or not the arrests made there were made with probable cause. Since there was probable cause, the court said, the search that took place following the arrest was proper. There are three reasons that the Stearsman case cannot be cited to support as legal an unconsented to and unannounced entry by police under the guise of “probable cause” only:
(1) There is evidence in the record of the Stearsman case indicating the police were admitted to the home voluntarily after asking permission.
(2) The record in Stearsman also indicates the police announced themselves and their purpose before entering and
(3) the entry made by the police in the Stearsman case was based partly upon the fact that the officer in charge had heard some mechanical sawing going on in the house which could have led to the belief that evidence was being destroyed or altered, since the stolen property included a locked metal box.
In Henderson v. State (1955), 235 Ind. 132, 131 N. E. 2d 326, also cited by the majority, the police entered appellant’s apartment without a warrant of any kind and without consent after receiving a report that gun shots had been fired there. It should be elementary that it is the very nature of a *62firearm to cause injury or destruction when it is used by one person against another. And when used successfully, an immediate and serious emergency arises. Under the rulings hereinbefore cited relative to emergency entry to search, it is clear that the entry by police in the Henderson case is to be justified upon emergency grounds, and no other. The case certainly gives no support to the proposition that the police may enter any dwelling without a warrant if they have reasonable grounds to believe a felony has been committed and the felon is in that dwelling. In Henderson, and in every case of entry without warrant and without consent, more is required, even though the loose language of some of our former opinions would not seem to so state the rule.
As to the force required to qualify an entry as a “breaking,” it is well-recognized that even though an entry is not forcibly accomplished, it may amount to the legal equivalent of a “breaking” where a closed door is opened and passed through without permission. Ker v. California, (1963), 374 U. S. 23, 38; Munoz v. United States, 325 F. 2d 23 (9th Cir., 1963), Fisher, Laws of Arrest, § 120. Whether or not a door was locked should be of no consequence in determining whether a “breaking” has occurred. The right to privacy is governed by more than the fortuitous circumstance of an unlocked door. An entry, to be peaceful, must be permissive, and not merely one which does not result in a breaking of parts of the house. Sabbath v. United States, supra; Keiningham v. United States, 287 F. 2d 126, 130 (D. C. Cir., 1960) ; cited with approval, Ker v. California, supra.
The limitations placed upon an officer’s right to break doors to accomplish an arrest without a warrant, and the reasons for those limitations, were well summarized in Accarino v. United States, supra:
“A court is reluctant to suppress evidence which, if obtained in lawful fashion, would have been of compelling importance to a prosecution for felony. But there is no other course by which the court can insist upon compliance *63by police officers with, the requirements of law in respect to arrests and searches . . . The applicable rule of law is not difficult to understand. It rests, to be sure, upon the exercise of reasonably sound judgment in appraising the necessities of the moment; but, as we have just said, so does almost every other duty of the police. Unless the necessities of the moment require that the officer break down a door, he cannot do so without a warrant; and if in reasonable comtemplation there is opportunity to get a warrant, or the arrest could as well be made by some other method, the outer door to a dwelling cannot be broken to make an arrest without a warrant. The right to break open a door to make an arrest requires something more than the mere right to arrest. If nothing additional were required, a man’s right of privacy in his home would be no more than his rights on the street; and the right to arrest without a warrant would be precisely the same as the right to arrest with a warrant. The law is otherwise.” 179 F. 2d at 464.
Another case that bears directly upon the issue of entry without a warrant is Work v. United States, 243 F. 2d 660, (D. C. Cir. 1957). In that case, two federal law enforcement officers went to appellant’s residence after allegedly receiving information that a young girl known to them to be a prostitute and narcotics addict was using narcotics there. They obtained no warrant for arrest or search, and after knocking on the door and receiving no answer, they opened the door and stepped in a few steps. At that moment, appellant walked by them, went out the door and appeared to deposit something in a trash can, but the officers saw nothing in her hand. Shortly thereafter, one of the officers found a phial of pills in the trash can. At trial appellant moved to suppress the phial and its contents, but the trial .court overruled her motion. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals said:
“However well intentioned, the entry into the home without a warrant of any kind was not under ‘exceptional circumstances’ dispensing with the necessity for a warrant. (Citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10.) Accord*64ingly, it was the beginning of an unreasonable search.” 243 F. 2d at 661.
Later in the opinion the Court of Appeals stated:
“We need not decide whether the officers would have obtained the phial independently of their illegal entry since the circumstances show that the seizure was a direct consequence of the search which began with the entry which did occur. An imaginary case postulated upon what might have happened if there had been no illegal entry is not before us.” 243 F. 2d at 662.
In the case presently before us, there is no indication that “the necessities of the moment” were so urgent as to excuse the police from their duty to acquire a warrant before attempting to enter the back porch. It is undeniable, on the other hand, that the search and seizure which occurred grew directly out of the unlawful police entry. Work v. United States, supra. There were as least five officers present at the scene of the arrest, and at least one officer was covering the front door at the time others were entering through the rear. The possibility of escape was minimal. Nor would it appear that the officers present believed there was any immediate threat of danger or other emergency, inasmuch as they knocked on the front door first; apparently without fear of impending violence. Indeed, they had no reason to believe the suspects were armed, even if they were in the house.
Furthermore, assuming without conceding that “the necessities of the moment” demanded immediate entry and arrest without a warrant, no circumstance appears which would excuse the officers from first announcing their authority and purpose and demanding admittance, as are required by our statute where a door is broken open with a warrant. Ind. Anno. Stat. §9-1009 (1956 Repl.), supra.
The net effect of today’s majority and concurring opinions is to hold that whenever the police have probable cause to believe that a felon is present in a private residence, whether or not any emergency exists, and even though they are not in *65fresh pursuit, they may enter such private residence without acquiring a warrant and in violation of the minimal statutory requirements set down by our state legislature for execution of a warrant, once one is acquired.
The main opinion adopts the rule today that the police shall always have a right to enter and arrest without a warrant by decreeing almost fresh pursuit as the basis for probable cause to enter, and would therefore justify the invalid entry sans “emergency situations,” or the “exigencies of the moment.”
The concuring opinion would also erroneously withhold the “right of privacy” and refuse to even grudgingly extend that right on the same erroneous theory of almost fresh pursuit by characterizing the facts in the instant case as “fresh pursuit.”
Both the main and concurring opinions seem to pose the inevitable questions: (1) under what circumstances is a peace officer required to obtain a warrant for arrest or search? and (2) And under what circumstances is a peace officer required to comply with the terms of Ind. Anno. Stat. § 9-1009, supra?
And both opinions answer both questions with one word:— Never. The next question this Court should answer is: Where-from comes its authority to repeal the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States?
It is contended by appellee State of Indiana that appellant had no standing to claim his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Article 1, § 11 of the Constitution of Indiana is practically a reiteration of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. To this date, however, the courts of this State have limited the application of the Indiana provision to much more narrow confines. The Indiana view has been that even if law enforcement officers conduct a search in violation of the privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, a defendant cannot raise any question as to the *66legality of such search unless such defendant controls, owns, possesses or claims some interest in the property searched. Wilson v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 454, 217 N. E. 2d 147; Minton v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 307, 214 N. E. 2d 380; May v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 523, 112 N. E. 2d 439; Tyler v. State (1931), 202 Ind. 559, 177 N. E. 197. The view of these cases, in essence, is that the right to object to an unreasonable search or seizure is personal to the one who owns, controls or claims an interest in the property.
It is difficult to understand why this Court has persisted so long in its narrow interpretation of the scope of the right of privacy and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. As long ago as 1951, in the case of United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 the Supreme Court of the United States squarely met the question of whether the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States applied to persons other than those who own, possess, control or claim some interest in the premises searched.
In that case, defendant had stored contraband narcotics in a hotel room without the knowledge of the occupants, his aunts, who had permitted him to use the room. Without a search or arrest warrant, law enforcement officers gained access to the room in the absence of the defendant and the occupants, and after searching it, seized the narcotics. The seized narcotics were introduced at defendant’s trial after his pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence had been denied. In reversing the conviction, Mr. Justice Clark speaking for the court said:
“To hold that this search and seizure were lawful as to the respondent would permit a quibbling distinction to overturn a principle which was designed to protect a fundamental right. The respondent unquestionably had standing to object to the seizure made without warrant or arrest unless the contraband nature of the narcotics seized precluded his assertion, for purposes of the exclusionary rule, of a property interest therein.” 342 U. S. at 52.
*67The Court then rejected the view that the fact that the goods were contraband prevented application of the exclusionary rule. In 1960, the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed the language of United States v. Jeffers, supra, when it stated in Jones v. United States (1960), 362 U. S. 257:
“We are persuaded . . . that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical . . . No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him.” 362 U. S. at 266-67. (Our emphasis.)
The persuasiveness of the position of the Supreme Court of the United States on this point of law is unavoidable. Moreover, in view of these and other decisions of the highest court in our nation, this Court is no longer free to apply its narrow view that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is personal to he who owns, controls, or claims some interest in the premises. In 1949 the Supreme Court stated expressly that the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is applicable to the states as a matter of due process of law. Const, of U. S., Amend. 14. In Wolf v. Colorado (1949), 388 U. S. 25, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, stated:
“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police — which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment — is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in ‘the concept of ordered liberty’ and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause.” 388 U. S. at 27-28.
Then in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U. S. 643 the same Supreme Court took the final step and held that evidence seized in *68violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is inadmissible in State criminal prosecutions.
Therefore it is clear that even if it were concluded that Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Indiana protects only-one who owns, controls or claims an interest in the premises searched, a point which we do not concede, the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States requires that the appellant in the .case at bar be recognized as having standing to claim the privilege.
Appellant is the emancipated son of the owner of the house where he was arrested and where the typewriter was found. The testimony of appellant’s father demonstrates that appellant frequently used the house and was freely permitted to do so. Therefore, appellant falls clearly into the category of persons who may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jeffers, supra; Jones v. United States, supra.
Under the authorities above referred to, this Court should also hold that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is equally broad under Article I, § 11 of the Constitution of Indiana and that appellant therefore falls within the class of persons entitled to claim the right under Indiana’s own Constitution. Such constitutional privileges and protections should not be reluctantly extended nor arbitrarily withheld by the courts of this State.
The right to privacy is a far greater matter than a mere academic subtlety. The right to be free from arbitrary intrusions by governmental officials into dwelling houses is deeply rooted in this nation’s system of government by law, and is to be regarded as one of our country’s most precious achievements. It is based upon a belief built into our state and federal constitutions that there is something sacred and inviolable in the individual and in the private residence.
Daily life in our complex society is marked by constant *69and harassing intrusions from both the governmental and non-governmental sectors, which gravely decrease the ability of any man to protect himself and his family from unjustified investigations into their most personal affairs. To eliminate the requirement that law enforcement officers obtain judicial sanction before entering a residence without the consent of the occupants would constitute a significant step backward in the American search for a system of “ordered liberty” which emphasizes the importance and integrity of individual rights.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion of the law regarding the propriety of entry into a dwelling house by law enforcement officers, without consent, without a warrant for search or arrest, without announcing their authority and purpose and demanding entry, and absent a substantial emergency, it is clear that appellant’s motion to suppress the typewriter from the evidence should have been sustained. Entry by police into a screen-enclosed porch by opening a closed door thereto without either consent or sufficient legal process and in the absence of the showing of an emergency necessitating such an entry is an invasion of the constitutional right to privacy and cannot be condoned. Therefore, when the discovery of evidence, sought to be used against the appellant, is inextricably bound up with such an illegal entry and unlawful arrest, such evidence should be excluded from consideration in order that the courts might protect the higher right of every, citizen of this State to some semblance of personal privacy.
In summation, since, in this case, the arrest of the appellant was invalid by reason of the unlawful entry into the house by the officers, we believe the seizure of the typewriter in question here was violative of Art. I, § 11 of the Constitution of Indiana and the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Constitutional rights should not be grudgingly extended nor arbitrarily withheld in the false name of stricter law *70enforcement. Cook v. State (1951), 231 Ind. 695, 97 N. E. 2d 625. The law enforcement agencies of this State are fully capable of performing their functions within the bounds of our State and Federal constitutions. And when they fail to do so, it is not the function of this Court to manufacture fictional excuses for them. This case should be reversed.
Jackson, J., concurs.