Court Opinion

ID: 9729692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:46:26.365858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.525606
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.,
With great respect, I dissent.
The majority opinion, as with the argument for the plaintiff and the holding of the trial court, is an exercise in semantics. The words of the exclusionary clause of the insurance policy are analyzed at length with the apparent intent of finding some obscure meaning which will support a determination of ambiguity. But the analysis is not convincing. The language of the exclusion is clear and permits but one conclusion: that the policy by its definite and clear terms did not cover the injury sustained by the insured.
*850I. The rules governing the proper determination of this case are well settled. If the language used in the policy is ambiguous, if it permits of more than one interpretation, it must be construed against the insurer. So the search for something which might be construed as ambiguity is pursued. I cannot agree that it is found.
The construction of a written contract that is unambiguous is for the court rather than for the finder of facts. Daggett v. Nebraska-Eastern Express, 252 Iowa 341, 351, 107 N.W.2d 102, 108; Marty v. Champlin Refining Co., 240 Iowa 325, 335, 36 N.W.2d 360, 365.
Also there is no contention but that if the trial court has misconceived the law, or has found facts for which there is no substantial support in the record, we should reverse. Alsco Iowa, Inc., v. Jackson, 254 Iowa 837, 839, 840, 118 N.W.2d 565, 567; Cleary v. Wolin, 244 Iowa 956, 957, 58 N.W.2d 830.
II. The majority seem to contend that because the trial court found ambiguity as a fact, we are bound thereby. Without doubt, if differing reasonable inferences may be drawn, even from undisputed facts, this is the rule. So in Allied Mutual Casualty Co. v. Dahl, 255 Iowa 208, 122 N.W.2d 270, the material question concerned an employee who had been hired to pass out political handbills at a public gathering. When the original employment was finished, the employee and others who had worked there were asked if they wished to hand out the bills at another location some distance away. They agreed, and were offered a ride in a truck to the scene of the new activity. While so riding the defendant was injured. We held it was a fact question whether he was still engaged in his occupation, or whether the ride was a mere gratuity not connected therewith. It was not a matter of construction of a contract, such as we have here. Kingpin, Inc., v. Hillcrest Development, Minn., 126 N.W.2d 435, cited by the majority, involved the question whether there was an operation of a general food market within the terms of a covenant in a deed. The gist of the case is quoted: “It is our opinion under the record here that there was evidence from which the trial court could find — as it did — that neither Lorraine nor Capitol Meats operated a general food market * * The determination was *851that there was evidence supporting the fact findings of the trial court. The case has no bearing on our question here.
III. Indeed, after all the arguments and contentions over the use and meaning of words are ended — in fact, before they begin — the question before us is a simple one: Was the exclusionary clause ambiguous? It states in plain terms that the insurance did not apply to “bodily injury sustained in the course of his occupation by any person while engaged (1) in duties incident to the operation, loading or unloading of * * * a * * * commercial automobile.” The trial court, and the majority, rely here upon the settled rule that the question is whether the decedent, as a reasonably prudent layman, would have understood that this exclusion would prevent recovery under the facts which developed. Authorities are cited.
With the cases I have no dispute. But I am convinced no reasonable layman could have misunderstood the language used. Only a lawyer could find anything ambiguous about it; and the strained and involved attempts to make words mean what they plainly do not is proof that ambiguity is lacking.
The pertinent question is, was the decedent engaged in duties incident to the operation of a commercial automobile ? It is not disputed that the milk truck was such an automobile; and the trial court in its opinion said: “* * * the uncontroverted evidence shows that the deceased Gary Wilson was at the time of-death an employee of the Borden Company in the operation of a milk delivery truck; * * Only two questions can arise: was the decedent engaged in the operation of the truck as he ran beside it attempting to get control, and, perhaps more particularly, was he engaged in duties incident to its operation at that time?
As to whether he was operating the truck, the point is settled by our decision in Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa 958, 90 N.W.2d 41. There we have a situation much more remote from active operation of the motor vehicle than the one before us. The driver of the car had left it parked, with the plaintiff and others already in it as passengers, while she went across the street to assist another, an elderly woman, to cross and to enter the automobile. As the new passenger entered the car, and while *852the driver was still standing beside it, the vehicle started, ran down a hill and injured the plaintiff. We held the defendant was nevertheless operating the car at the time. Compare the .instant situation, where the driver, the decedent, was also outside the car but was running beside it attempting to enter it and gain control.
In Horst v. Holtzen, supra, at pages 969 to 971 inclusive of 249 Iowa, pages 47, 48 of 90 N.W.2d, are cited a considerable number of authorities which hold that a motor vehicle is operated even when standing. It is possible to conceive of situations in which the question of operating might be factual; but as the un-controverted record here shows, the decedent had parked or at least stopped the truck, it immediately started to coast down the hill, and he, also immediately, ran after and beside it to correct his initial mistake.
IV. Actually, the question here is a somewhat narrower one than the operation of the truck. The exclusion clause is based upon the engagement in duties incidental to the operation. The majority seizes upon what it asserts are varied meanings of the words “duties” and “incident”.
It must be obvious that if we are to hold that the use of a word which has different uses as defined by dictionaries makes a contract ambiguous, it would be impossible to draw a written agreement which would not have that defect. There is hardly a word to be found in the lexicons which is not possible of varied uses. Thus the definition of the word “the”, perhaps the most commonly used in the English language, requires one and one-half columns of fine print in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. .And if an attempt were to be made to specify the meaning of any given word by writing such intended meaning in the contract, it would be necessary to use other words, which in turn would have several uses and meanings. The whole context must be considered in determining the meaning of the words used rather than by splitting hairs to produce an ambiguity which does not fairly exist.
A part of the operation of the truck, a duty incident to its operation, was to stop and park it properly and safely, when making his deliveries. I do not apprehend this can be seriously *853debated. Safe parking of the vehicle was surely a duty incident to its operation. So, when he stopped on the occasion which resulted in his death, his duty was to leave the truck safely parked while he made his delivery. As he started away, he found he had not performed this duty; the machine was starting to slide back down the incline. He attempted to remedy his first failure to park securely and safely, by running to the truck to gain control and stop it; without doubt, to see that it was properly parked. Unfortunately his act resulted in a fatal accident; but it is still obvious that he was performing a duty incident to the operation of the truck. If we are to say that because his attempt resulted in his death, which was no part of his duty, he was not engaged in a duty incident to operation we have begged the question. ' Automobile accidents are rarely intentional; they result from some mistake, or miscalculation, or misfortune; but the driver was still operating; he was attempting to perform some duty incident to operation. That he may have performed it poorly, or met with dire calamity in his attempt, is entirely beside the point.
' I can see no ambiguity in the exclusionary clause, and no support for the decision of the trial court or the majority opinion. I would reverse, with directions to dismiss plaintiff’s cause of action.
SNell, Moore and Stuart, JJ., join in this dissent.