Court Opinion

ID: 9696915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:01:30.299555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:27.630161
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent because I believe that the Majority Opinion in this case is incorrect in its application of the law.
*159The initial problem posed by this case is the fact that because the Respondent is no longer in office as of the date of this decision today, our jurisdiction over these disciplinary proceedings may be susceptible to attack. In order to dispel any confusion over this issue, I wish to underscore at the outset the fact that this Court possesses continuing and plenary jurisdiction which cannot be foreclosed prior to our final decision in a case. Our authority to conduct judicial proceedings and impose punishment, moreover, flows directly from our State Constitution.1 It does not depend, as the Majority argues, on the authority of cases from either sister states or other decisions which, in any event, are distinguishable on the facts. There is no need, therefore, to reach beyond our own Constitution to find a basis of continuing jurisdiction. In sum, this tribunal continues to have constitutional jurisdiction inspite of any intervening acts which result in a judge leaving office. Once the discretionary punishment of removal is selected by this Court as appropriate under the facts of a case, of course, perpetual banishment under Article 5, Section 18(e), results automatically by operation of the Constitution.
Because of these arguments, the Majority decision is badly flawed in two other respects. On the one hand, I presume that it is the intent of the Majority to fix the date of removal from office as some date prior to the natural termination of Respondent’s term, while he was still in office.2 In that case, it is obvious that the Respondent’s *160judicial decisions taken subsequent to that date of removal may linger under a pall of suspicion regarding their validity. This could easily result in additional damage to judicial integrity through collateral attacks. Of course, we are empowered fully to set any removal date, but the consequences of our choice should not result in foolishness.
On the other hand, the Majority compounds its own problems even further by interpreting Respondent’s retention election loss as a removal from office. The truth, on the contrary, is that following Respondent’s rejection at the polls, he completed his full term, was not removed during his tenure, and is fully eligible to run in the future in a contested election, unless and until this Court imposes the punishment of removal from office. The loss of a retention election cannot be equated with removal from office in any case. Under the Majority’s definition, that would mean that all losers of retention elections could be considered as being removed from office by the electorate, and arguably subject to the same type of sanction. Is this the intent of the Majority’s argument? The electors of Philadelphia County chose not to return Respondent to office; they did not remove Respondent from office.
In place of futile and confusing efforts to find a date of removal in some past act, the Majority opinion would have been more consistent and jurisdictionally accurate had it simply stated that its decision to remove Respondent from office was legally effective as of a date, nunc pro tunc, while Respondent occupied the office. In that fashion, this Court then could decide that its jurisdiction oyer the disciplinary proceeding was continuing and not at an end until the date of the final order regardless of any intervening election, or resignation, or even death. This would have resolved the conundrum of the validity of Respondent’s subsequent decisions and rendered irrelevant the vexatious issue of the retention election loss.
*161Because I am convinced that this Court possesses such undisputed authority to retain jurisdiction, I find no merit in the Majority’s inconsistencies on the subject of removal. A gap will always exist between the actions of the Board and a final order issued by this Court. Judges will continue to hold office and hand down decisions during this period, and the very problems addressed by this case will be re-created in the future.
In the context of the present case, this Court should decide that its final order is the last legal step which divests the judge of authority, even though such order may act in a nunc pro tunc fashion. As for future cases, I strongly recommend the use of our recently adopted administrative solution3 in the form of a temporary suspension with pay, imposed by this Court, to take effect on the date we select. The errant judge would be prevented thereby from sitting on the bench pending a final order by this tribunal.
It is beyond dispute that Respondent committed egregious errors of judicial behavior in violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct. It is equally clear that appropriate discipline is necessary in order to provide adequate assurances to the public that judicial misbehavior is, in fact, being dealt with in a firm manner. Where a member of the Pennsylvania Judiciary has been derelict in the performance of positive duties, there can be no alternative to the application of proper sanctions in order to protect the integrity of the courts and the rule of law. As Mr. Justice Stewart wrote in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 1546, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977), “There could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a State’s interest in the quality of its judiciary.” This Court, as well, has diligently reaffirmed its intention not to be remiss in its administrative duties regarding the inferior courts. In re Franciscus, 471 Pa. 53, 369 A.2d 1190 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870, 98 S.Ct. 212, 54 L.Ed.2d 148 (1977).
*162Like my brethren, I, too, have labored long and hard faced with a labyrinthian transcript which intermingles fact with fiction, reality with phantasma, and innuendos with credible evidence. This is a war story replete with gory details of lawyers often conducting themselves in a hateful, vengeful, and deceitful manner. I find a judge who genuinely agonized over the spectacle taking place before him, finally succumbing to the bludgeoning grip of human passion by violating the sworn duty and honor of his office. I find a judge who allowed himself to be Stampeded into thoughtless reaction by presiding over litigation in which he had fatefully implicated himself as a witness, and then entered an illegal verdict as well. Finally, I am not unmindful of the severe chastisement this judge has received in public fora. This is a judge who, up to this point, possessed a distinguished record of judicial service to the citizens of this Commonwealth.
I know that we have given serious consideration to the other side of the rule of judicial integrity. For while we are charged to protect the public’s confidence in the honesty of the judicial process, we must not blind ourselves to the fact that such integrity also derives from a “just and proper” treatment of those who man the judicial ramparts. They, too, have a right to expect balanced punishment even when they fail as dramaticaly as has the Respondent in this case. Integrity in the law comes from many sources, including the knowledge of our sitting judges that their long and competent labors in the vineyard will not be totally sacrificed when they fall.
Under the aggregate facts of this case, I see a judge who used his judicial power in a vengeful manner. By his own conduct he has plunged himself into the depths of judicial oblivion. Despite his prior unblemished record on the bench, and his unassailable reputation as a practicing member of the bar, both of which should receive great weight as we ponder his fate, we are obliged to consider the abuse of raw judicial power exercised by Respondent which will spawn inexorable complexities in the future.
*163For these reasons, the law and my conscience leave me no alternative but to concur in the result reached by the majority and order Respondent’s removal from office. I would make such removal effective as of December 30, 1985.

. Article 5, Section 1; Article 5, Section 10(a). In addition, this Court is imbued with inherent supervisory and administrative power over the inferior courts and judicial officers. In re Franciscus, 471 Pa. 53, 369 A.2d 1190 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870, 98 S.Ct. 212, 54 L.Ed.2d 148 (1977); Carpentertown Coal and Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948).

. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Nix expresses a view that "If this Court accepts a recommendation of removal, the effective date is obviously as of the date of the decision of this Court,” (p. 153-155) and “There is no question that the Order entered today speaks from this date.” (p. 153-155). I am mindful that wills speak as of the date of death. Not Orders of Court which can be effective some specific date in the past (nunc pro tunc orders), the date of entry, or some specific date in the future.
*160If the Majority is of the same view as Chief Justice Nix that the removal of Judge Snyder is effective the date of the decision of this Court, I am then at a loss to understand how we can, today, remove a person from an office he no longer occupies.

. Rule 24, No. 113 JIRB Docket, eff. 12/5/86.