Court Opinion

ID: 9882496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:41.361817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:02.539414
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Wireman v. Wireman, 2023-Ohio-3007.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                         THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              ALLEN COUNTY

RENAE N. WIREMAN NKA
MIKOLAJCZAK,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,                           CASE NO. 1-22-72

        v.

SCOTT A. WIREMAN,                                      OPINION

        DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

                 Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
                           Domestic Relations Division
                         Trial Court No. DR 2019 0017

                                   Judgment Affirmed

                          Date of Decision: August 28, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        John H. Cousins, IV for Appellant

        Andrea M. Bayer for Appellee
Case No. 1-22-72

WALDICK, J.

        {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Renae Wireman n.k.a. Mikolajczak (“Renae”),

appeals the November 17, 2022 judgment of the Allen County Court of Common

Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, in which the trial court modified the parties’

shared parenting plan, decided upon a school placement for the parties’ two minor

children, and ordered Renae to pay child support to Scott.

        {¶2} For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                    Procedural Background and Relevant Facts

        {¶3} The parties, Renae and Scott, were married in Tennessee in April of

2015. Their son, “C.W.”, was born later in 2015 and their daughter, “H.W.”, was

born in 2017. On April 10, 2020, pursuant to a negotiated agreement, the parties’

marriage was terminated by a decree of divorce. At that time, the parties entered

into an agreed shared parenting plan (“SPP”) that was approved and adopted by the

trial court.

        {¶4} In relevant part, the SPP provided that the children were to reside with

Renae, with Scott having parenting time from Thursday evening until Saturday

morning one week and from Thursday evening until Monday morning the following

week, on an ongoing basis. The SPP designated Renae as the residential parent for

any time the children were in her custody and Scott was designated the residential

parent for any time the children were in his custody.

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       {¶5} With regard to child support, the SPP provided that Scott was to pay

Renae $250.00 per month per child, for a total of $510.00 per month including

administrative fees.

       {¶6} With regard to school placement, the SPP provided:

       Mother and Father will make efforts to reach an agreement as to where
       the children will attend school; and the Court will have/retain
       continuing jurisdiction to decide where the children will attend school
       if the parties cannot agree to the same; and if the parties cannot reach
       an agreement regarding the school placement of the children, then
       either party or both parties may file the appropriate motion with the
       Court for the Court to decide the school placement of the children.

(Docket No. 79, Exh. B).

       {¶7} The SPP further provided that the parties’ older child, C.W., reaching

kindergarten age would constitute a change in circumstances as required for a

modification of the SPP pursuant to R.C. 3109.04, and it noted that either party

could then file a motion to modify parenting time, school district, child support, and

income tax dependency exemptions.

       {¶8} In February of 2020, approximately two months prior to the divorce

being finalized and also prior to the parties entering into the agreed SPP that was

incorporated into the final decree of divorce, Renae moved herself and the two

children from the Lima, Ohio area to Perrysburg, Ohio, where Renae rented a home

and began a new job in Toledo, Ohio with Husky/Cenovus, who had also been

Renae’s employer in Lima. The job in Toledo was a two-year contract-position,

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and was not believed to be a permanent position at the time Renae changed

employment and moved in February of 2020.

       {¶9} On November 5, 2020, Renae filed a motion to reallocate parental rights

and responsibilities. In that motion, Renae requested that the SPP be terminated,

that she be granted sole custody of the children, that she be designated the sole

residential parent subject to Scott having parenting time, and that Scott be ordered

to pay child support pursuant to the child support guidelines. On that same date,

Renae also filed several other motions, which were ultimately resolved by

agreement and which are not at issue in this appeal.

       {¶10} On December 18, 2020, Scott filed a number of responses to the

various motions filed by Renae on November 5, 2020. Then, on March 1, 2021,

Scott filed a motion for modification of the SPP. In his motion, Scott asserted that

the school placement issue was ripe for review as C.W. would be starting

kindergarten in the 2021-2022 school year. Scott’s motion asserted that, contrary

to what was testified to at the time of the divorce, Renae appeared to have no

intention of returning to Allen County from Perrysburg. Scott further asserted that

Renae had been denying him participation in decision-making about the children’s

lives. Scott’s motion asserted that if Renae did not intend to relocate back to Allen

County, then it would be in the children’s best interest for them to primarily reside

with Scott in Allen County and attend school in the Bath Local School District.

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Alternatively, Scott’s motion proposed that if Renae did relocate back to Allen

County, then it would be in the children’s best interest to spend an equal amount of

time with each parent.

       {¶11} An evidentiary hearing on the parties’ custody-related motions was

held over the course of six different dates in 2021: June 21, 2021, August 2, 2021,

August 18, 2021, September 27, 2021, September 29, 2021, and December 17,

2021. Renae called seven witnesses and also testified on her own behalf. Scott also

called seven witnesses and testified on his own behalf.

       {¶12} On August 19, 2021, while the multi-part evidentiary hearing was

ongoing, the trial court issued a temporary order naming Renae as the residential

parent for school placement purposes and ordering that the children be enrolled in

school in Perrysburg for purposes of C.W. starting kindergarten. On August 20,

2021, the trial court issued a follow-up temporary order, in which the basis for the

August 19th temporary order was expanded upon and in which Scott’s parenting

time was modified to every weekend, from after school on Friday until Sunday at

5:00 p.m.

       {¶13} On October 28, 2022, the trial court filed a decision detailing the

evidence presented in the multi-day hearing, making numerous findings of fact, and

ultimately determining that, based on the totality of the evidence, it was in the best

interest of the children to maintain a shared parenting relationship with the parties.

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The trial court therefore specifically found that the children should attend the Bath

Local School District so long as one parent continues to reside in the district or the

children are open enrolled there, or until the parties mutually agree to a different

school district where the children would qualify for attendance. As to parenting

time, the trial court found that if Renae were to relocate to Findlay, Ohio or any

other residence within 30-minutes of the Bath school district, then the parties should

engage in week-to-week shared parenting, with the weekly exchange of the children

occurring on Sundays at 6:00 p.m. Alternatively, in the event Renae did not relocate

within those geographical limits, the trial court determined that the children should

reside primarily with Scott during the school year, with Renae having parenting time

every Wednesday after school and also on the first, second, and fourth full weekends

of each month, from Friday after school until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Additionally, if

Renae did not relocate within the geographic proximity described, then the trial

court found that that parties should engage in week-to-week shared parenting during

the summertime, with the exchange occurring every Sunday at 6:00 p.m.

       {¶14} In that October 28, 2022 decision, the trial court then went on to make

rather extensive findings relating to child support and, after finding Scott to be

under-employed by choice, imputed an annual income of $100,000.00 to Scott.

Based on Scott’s imputed annual income of $100,000.00 and Renae’s established

annual income of $137,700.00, the trial court determined that, commencing on

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January 1, 2023, Renae should pay child support to Scott in the monthly amount of

$95.13 per child, for a total of $194.07 per month, including processing fees.

       {¶15} On November 17, 2022, the trial court filed its entry of judgment on

those issues, which incorporated by reference the findings of fact made in the

October 28, 2022 decision, as well as the orders from that decision regarding school

placement, the modification to the shared parenting plan, and the updated child

support order.

       {¶16} On December 1, 2022, Renae filed the instant appeal, in which she

raises two assignments of error for our review.

                            First Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred, abused its discretion, and ruled against the
       manifest weight of the evidence in modifying the shared parenting
       plan and arbitrarily reversing its prior order of school placement.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court abused its discretion in redesignating appellant as
       the obligor for child support purposes.

                             First Assignment of Error

       {¶17} In the first assignment of error, Renae argues that the trial court erred

when it modified the parties’ shared parenting plan and determined that it was in the

children’s best interest to attend school in the Bath Local School District in Lima,

Ohio. Renae asserts that the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

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Case No. 1-22-72

       {¶18} The manifest-weight standard in a civil case is the same as it is in a

criminal matter. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 17.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained:

       Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater
       amount of credible evidence, offered * * * to support one side of the
       issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the [trier of fact] that
       the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict
       [or decision], if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall
       find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which
       is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of
       mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.” (Emphasis
       sic.)

Id. at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541

(1997).

       {¶19} An appellate court reviews a domestic relations court’s decision

regarding parental rights for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Davis v. Flickinger,

77 Ohio St.3d 415, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). An abuse of discretion means that the

trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v.

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). “The reason for this

standard of review is that the trial judge has the best opportunity to view the

demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something that does not translate

well on the written page.” Davis, supra, at 418. The Supreme Court of Ohio has

stated that this reason for the standard of review “is even more crucial in a child

custody case.” Id. at 419.

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Case No. 1-22-72

      {¶20} “R.C. 3109.04 establishes the process for allocating parental rights

and responsibilities between the parents of a minor child.” Bruns v. Green, 163

Ohio St.3d 43, 2020-Ohio-4787, ¶ 8.

      {¶21} R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) provides as follows:

      In determining the best interest of a child pursuant to this section,
      whether on an original decree allocating parental rights and
      responsibilities for the care of children or a modification of a decree
      allocating those rights and responsibilities, the court shall consider all
      relevant factors, including, but not limited to:

      (a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;

      (b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to
      division (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and concerns
      as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning
      the child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the
      court;

      (c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s
      parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
      the child’s best interest;

      (d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and
      community;

      (e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the
      situation;

      (f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved
      parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights;

      (g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support
      payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that parent
      pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an obligor;

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          (h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either
          parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any
          criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an
          abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in
          which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected
          child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the
          abusive or neglectful act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether
          either parent or any member of the household of either parent
          previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of
          section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense
          involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense
          was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the
          current proceeding; whether either parent or any member of the
          household of either parent previously has been convicted of or
          pleaded guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the time of the
          commission of the offense was a member of the family or household
          that is the subject of the current proceeding and caused physical harm
          to the victim in the commission of the offense; and whether there is
          reason to believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in
          a child being an abused child or a neglected child;

          (i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a
          shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the
          other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of
          the court;

          (j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning
          to establish a residence, outside this state.

          {¶22} Additionally, when determining whether shared parenting is in the

best interest of the child, the trial court must consider R.C. 3109.04(F)(2), which

states:

          In determining whether shared parenting is in the best interest of the
          children, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but
          not limited to, the factors enumerated in division (F)(1) of this section,
          the factors enumerated in section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, and
          all of the following factors:

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       (a) The ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions
       jointly, with respect to the children;

       (b) The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love,
       affection, and contact between the child and the other parent;

       (c) Any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, other
       domestic violence, or parental kidnapping by either parent;

       (d) The geographic proximity of the parents to each other, as the
       proximity relates to the practical considerations of shared parenting;

       (e) The recommendation of the guardian ad litem of the child, if the
       child has a guardian ad litem.

       {¶23} Finally, R.C. 3109.04 provides that, “[w]hen allocating parental rights

and responsibilities for the care of children, the court shall not give preference to a

parent because of that parent’s financial status or condition.”

       {¶24} In the instant case, Renae specifically argues in the first assignment of

error that the trial court abused its discretion and imposed a “relocation penalty” on

Renae; that the trial court improperly disallowed testimony about the children’s

adjustment to the temporary parenting schedule in place at the time of the hearing;

that the trial court made several findings unsupported by the record; and that the

trial court ignored or did not give appropriate weight to evidence about the

children’s adjustment to the Perrysburg area.

       {¶25} In response to those arguments, we note first that the record does not

support Renae’s claim that she was penalized for relocating to Perrysburg just prior

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to the time of the divorce. While the trial court ultimately modified the SPP in a

manner contrary to the result sought by Renae, that does not equate to a “penalty.”

       {¶26} Secondly, we find no merit to Renae’s claim that the trial court

improperly prohibited testimony about the children’s adjustment to the temporary

parenting schedule in place at the time of the hearing. A trial court has broad

discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence and an appellate court should

not disturb the exercise of such discretion without a showing of material prejudice.

See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-46, 2020-Ohio-1644,

¶ 36. Here, the trial court did not disallow evidence about the children’s adjustment

to the temporary parenting schedule but, rather, questioning on cross-exam about

why Scott was asking for a parenting schedule for Renae that differed from what

Scott had under the trial court’s temporary orders. In prohibiting that line of

questioning, the trial court noted that it was the court who imposed the temporary

schedule upon the parties while the modification motions were pending and

therefore found that it would be unfair to permit inquiry of Scott as to why Scott

was asking for a schedule different than that. We do not find that ruling to be an

abuse of discretion.

       {¶27} Renae argues next that the trial court made several findings

unsupported by the record. In its decision, the trial court set forth a detailed

summary of the evidence adduced at the hearing and reached numerous factual

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conclusions on the basis of that evidence. Our review of the record indicates that the

trial court’s summary of the evidence is accurate and that the factual conclusions

reached by the court are reasonable inferences fully supported by the record.

       {¶28} Finally, Renae claims that the trial court’s decision was against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Renae sought a termination of the original shared

parenting plan with sole custody for herself and weekend visitation for Scott. Renae

desired the children attend school in the Perrysburg School District where she had

been living for a short time. On the other hand, Scott requested a continuation of

shared parenting but with a school placement in Allen County where Scott lives and

where Renae had lived until she voluntarily relocated to Perrysburg. The children

were not interviewed, due to their young ages.

       {¶29} The record establishes that both parties clearly love their children and

that the children love both parents, have a good relationship with both parents, and

are well-adjusted at both homes. The children also interact well and have a good

relationship with Renae’s boyfriend, now husband, and his young son. The children

also have a significant and very close relationship with numerous members of

Scott’s family and extended family, all of whom are based in Allen County.

       {¶30} Renae testified that her new job in the Toledo area permitted her to

work from home several days per week, at a salary over that which she earned at

her prior job in Allen County. However, Scott also testified that he had modified

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his work schedule, worked in many instances from home, and made it a point to

typically not schedule work projects during his parenting time with the children.

       {¶31} Since moving to Perrysburg, Renae had enrolled the children in

several sports programs and other activities in that area that the children seemed to

enjoy. However, the driving distance to Perrysburg from Allen County, along with

the cost of gasoline, made it prohibitive for Scott to attend the children’s practices

and games with any regularity.

       {¶32} There was extensive evidence establishing that the relationship

between Renae and Scott is quite contentious although, since the time of their

divorce, the parties had been able to communicate fairly civilly about the children

by using the OurFamilyWizard messaging program. However, the record also

established an ongoing tendency on Renae’s part to unilaterally make nearly all

decisions regarding the children, and then to simply inform Scott of those decisions,

as opposed to the parties first attempting to communicate and cooperate in making

such decisions, as required under the original SPP.

       {¶33} Ultimately, we are mindful that custody issues are some of the most

difficult and agonizing decisions a trial court must make. Davis v. Flickinger, 77

Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). In this case, the trial court heard

extensive testimony from the parties and witnesses for both parties, and the trial

court was in the best position to judge the credibility of those witnesses. Our review

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of the record indicates that the trial court engaged in a detailed analysis of all

required factors, and the trial court’s findings with regard to those factors were

amply supported by the testimony and other evidence adduced at the hearing.

Competent, credible evidence supports the custody and school placement decisions

made by the trial court and those decisions are not against the weight of the

evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in that regard.

        {¶34} The first assignment of error is overruled.

                            Second Assignment of Error

        {¶35} In the second assignment of error, Renae argues that the trial court

erred in ordering that she pay child support.

        {¶36} With regard to child support, the original SPP provided that Scott was

to pay Renae $250.00 per month per child, for a total of $510.00 per month including

administrative fees. However, as part of the trial court’s November 17, 2022

decision modifying the SPP, the trial court ordered that Renae pay child support to

Scott in the amount of $95.13 per child, for a total of $194.07 per month including

fees.

        {¶37} “‘It is well established that a trial court’s decision regarding child

support obligations falls within the discretion of the trial court and will not be

disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.’” Graham v. Graham, 3d

Dist. Union No. 14-19-18, 2020-Ohio-1435, ¶ 11, quoting Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio

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St.3d 386, 390, 686 N.E.2d 1108 (1997). As we noted above, an abuse of discretion

is a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore, supra.

       {¶38} In this case, Renae contends that the child support modification was

an abuse of discretion because Scott did not request support, because Scott

“declined” child support at the hearing, and because the trial court “provided no

valid basis for its decision.”

       {¶39} Renae’s argument is based primarily on the fact that Scott testified

during the hearing that he was not was specifically asking that Renae be ordered to

pay child support. However, Renae’s assertion on appeal that Scott “declined” child

support is inaccurate. The record reflects that Scott testified child support would

“be nice” given the “money situation”, before going on to say that his priority was

the children and that money had nothing to do with it. (12/17/21 Tr., 24-25).

       {¶40} More importantly, pursuant to R.C. 3119.24(A)(1):

       A court that issues a shared parenting order in accordance with section
       3109.04 of the Revised Code shall order an amount of child support
       to be paid under the child support order that is calculated in
       accordance with the [R.C. 3119.021] schedule and with the [R.C.
       3119.022] worksheet, except that, if that amount would be unjust or
       inappropriate to the children or either parent and therefore not in the
       best interest of the child because of the extraordinary circumstances
       of the parents or because of any other factors or criteria set forth in
       section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, the court may deviate from that
       amount. (Emphasis added.)

       {¶41} Thus, because there was a modification of the shared parenting plan,

it was necessary pursuant to R.C. 3119.24 for the trial court to review the existing

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child support order and enter a new order. A trial court is obligated to follow the

mandatory procedures outlined in R.C. 3119.24(A)(1), “regardless of whether the

parties have reached an agreement on their own regarding child support.” Warner

v. Warner 3d Dist. Union No. 14-03-10, 2003-Ohio-5132, ¶ 13.

       {¶42} Finally, Renae does not assert, much less establish, that the trial

court’s child support calculation was erroneous under the guidelines, nor does she

argue that circumstances existed that would permit deviation from the guidelines.

       {¶43} For all of those reasons, we cannot find that the trial court abused its

discretion with regard to the child support order.

       {¶44} The second assignment of error is overruled.

                                    Conclusion

       {¶45} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas,

Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

/jlr

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