Court Opinion

ID: 9569825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:17:50.963061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:07.527504
License: Public Domain

*47WYNN, Judge
dissenting.
Because I believe that the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain appellant’s petition regardless of whether it was characterized as a petition for modification or a petition for removing a trustee, I respectfully dissent. In my view, the General Assembly, in enacting Section 36A-125.4(a), expressly created an alternative mechanism for beneficiaries to remove a trustee: namely, removal without cause. The majority fails to reach this conclusion on the basis of two arguments premised respectively on a canon of statutory construction and our State’s perceived reverence for a decedent’s testamentary intentions. For the reasons stated herein, I believe these two arguments are without substance.
First, the majority holds that “because [Section] 36A-23.1 specifically governs removal of a testamentary trustee, while [Section] 36A-125.4 refers in general terms to ‘modification,’ that [Section] 36A-23.1 grants the Clerk of Superior Court exclusive jurisdiction over” the case sub judice. As noted by the majority, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36A-23.1 provides that an “interested person” can petition the Superior Court Clerk to remove a testamentary trustee for cause. Although the majority apparently recognizes that, on its face, the provisions N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36A-125.4(a) provide an alternative mechanism of removing a trustee, the majority concludes that the specifically applicable provisions of Section 36A-23.1 control the generally applicable provisions of Section 36A-125.4(a).
Although the majority’s first argument relies upon “well established principles of statutory construction,” the majority does not adhere to a canon of statutory construction, often repeated by our Supreme Court, that “statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia and harmonized, if possible, to give effect to each.” Brisson v. Kathy A. Santoriello, M.D., P.A., 351 N.C. 589, 595, 528 S.E.2d 568, 571 (2000); Board of Adjust. v. Town of Swansboro, 334 N.C. 421, 427, 432 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1993). Accordingly, this Court should first attempt to harmonize statutes dealing with the same subject matter before limiting the expanse of one to accommodate another.
In the case sub judice, although Sections 36A-23.1 and 36A-125.4 deal with the same subject matter, the statutes provide distinct procedures and requirements for judicially addressing that subject matter. As previously noted, under Section 36A-23.1 any “interested person” can bring an action before the Superior Court Clerk to *48remove a testamentary trustee for cause. Pursuant to Section 36A-125.4, however, “if all beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust consent, they may compel modification or termination of the trust in a proceeding before the superior court.” (emphasis supplied). Thus, under Section 36A-23.1, removal of a trustee is premised on any interested person showing cause, whereas in Section 36A-125.4 modification or termination of a trust, and the lesser included decision to remove a trustee, is contingent upon the consent of all beneficiaries. Consequently, Sections 36A-23.1 and 36A-125.4 are easily harmonized by recognizing that Section 36A-125.4 provides a method of removing a trustee without cause.
Second, the majority states that a statute which would “permit removal of the trustee selected by the [testator], simply upon the consent of the beneficiaries [] with no showing of [cause], would gut. . . the common law rule of respect for the testator’s intent.” Despite the majority’s concern for the testator’s intent, the General Assembly, in enacting Section 36A-125.4, created an unambiguous and unequivocal power, where all the beneficiaries to an irrevocable trust may by consent, terminate the entire trust. Most assuredly, termination of an irrevocable trust is the ultimate frustration of the testator’s intent. Nonetheless, the General Assembly has bestowed this power upon consenting beneficiaries. It follows that the mere frustration of the testator’s intent is not a sound basis upon which to prevent removal of a trustee under Section 36A-125.4.
As this is an issue of first impression, and I do not agree with the majority’s holding, I respectfully dissent.