Court Opinion

ID: 9386074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 13:11:06.637827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:01.065863
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
PUBLISHED

            Present: Judges Humphreys, Huff and AtLee
            Argued by videoconference

            CLIFTON HALEY HARPER, JR.
                                                                                   OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 0453-22-4                                    JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
                                                                                  APRIL 11, 2023
            COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY
                                              Michael E. Levy, Judge

                             Gowri Janakiramanan, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

                             Lindsay M. Brooker, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                             Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                   Following a bench trial in the Stafford County Circuit Court, Clifton Haley Harper, Jr.

            appeals his convictions on the charges of inducing false testimony, Code § 18.2-436, and felony

            failure to appear, Code § 19.2-128(B). He argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial was

            insufficient to prove that K.M.1 testified falsely at Harper’s bond hearing, that he induced K.M.’s

            testimony, and that he willfully failed to appear for his trial on June 6, 2018.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                   “[U]pon appellate review, the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom

            must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the trial court.”

            Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003). “Viewing the record through this

            evidentiary prism requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the

            Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and

                   1
                       We refer to this witness by her initials to protect her privacy.
all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 711, 714

(2010) (quoting Cooper v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 558, 562 (2009)).

                                       I. Physical Assault

       On December 29, 2017, Stafford County Sheriff’s Deputy N.C. Potter responded to a call

at America’s Best Value Inn in Stafford County. As he approached the hotel in his cruiser, he

observed a woman running towards the hotel’s front office, wearing nothing but a towel on a

very cold evening. She appeared frantic and scared. Deputy Potter spoke with the woman,

whom he identified as K.M., and took her written statement. She wrote,

               Tossed me against the wall, dragged me by my hair. My eye is
               semi-swollen and black either, and in parenthesis I said either
               smacked or punched me, forced me to take my clothes off and
               shower, wouldn’t let me leave the room when I wanted to leave,
               grabbed me by neck and threw me on the bed, breathing was hard.

Deputy Potter also took photographs of K.M., which show swelling to her face and swelling and

bruising on her arm.

       Deputy Potter also spoke with Harper, who appeared agitated and aggressive. Harper

told Deputy Potter that he and K.M. had a verbal argument over some damage to her vehicle. He

said he did not hit K.M. but he repeatedly stated that he did not let her leave the room when she

wanted to, and he held her by the shoulder and would not let her leave “because he didn’t want to

make this something bigger than it was.” He added that he took her clothes off and made her

shower with him. Deputy Potter obtained a warrant for Harper’s arrest and an emergency

protective order (“EPO”) which he served on Harper. The EPO stated that Harper shall have “no

contact of any kind with [K.M.].”

                                           II. Jail Calls

       In spite of the EPO, Harper made phone calls to K.M. from the jail in the early morning

hours on December 30, 2017. Relevant statements from the calls include:

                                               -2-
First jail call:

                   Harper:   I thought you was going to cooperate with me so I
                             won’t get locked up.

                   Harper:   You know I wouldn’t be locked up right now if you
                             didn’t run out the door with your freakin’ towel on,
                             right?

                   K.M.:     I wasn’t the one that called the cops.

                   Harper:   I know. You didn’t have to tell them everything
                             that happened either, though.

                   K.M.:     I don’t want to see you in jail. Like, I’m not that
                             type of female.

                   Harper:   You put me in here. You put me in here.

                   K.M.:     You gave me a bruise on my eye. That wasn’t
                             necessary.

                   Harper:   You know when I get this court date and
                             everything, if anything, the only way that [will] get
                             me out of it is if you either don’t show up or come
                             to court and say he hasn’t been doin’ it.

                   Harper:   You know I’m going to get big time for this shit,
                             right?

                   K.M.:     I’m not going to show up to court.

                   Harper:   This is going to be even worse [than the last
                             time] . . . they’re trying to get me for . . . a whole
                             rack of shit, keeping you hostage and strangling
                             you, and all this extra shit.

                   Harper:   You know how much time they going to give me
                             for that shit?

                   Harper:   You told the officer everything what happened; you
                             suppose to tell them it’s alright . . . so I could come
                             back in the room with you. . . . Now I’m stuck in
                             here all of New Years.

                   Harper:   You did just get me locked up. If you would have
                             told the feds that everything was fine. . . . They

                                               -3-
                         would have just let me go. . . . But you had to tell
                         them the whole story.

               K.M.:     What happens if I don’t go to court? . . . Do they
                         just drop it?

               Harper:   I don’t know . . . I’m pretty sure they should.

               Harper:   You’re my girl and shit . . . but we don’t get each
                         other locked up.

Second jail call:

               Harper:   I ain’t gonna lie, I’m in here crying cause of you,
                         like I love you, I know yes, we do go through a lot
                         of shit, but I’m just like, you know what I mean, I
                         thought you would have my back through that shit
                         too because I wouldn’t be in here right now if you
                         had just get off the brakes, just like there ain’t
                         nothing wrong with me, we ain’t having nothing,
                         just as simple as arguing like everybody else is, you
                         know what I mean, and I wouldn’t have to go
                         through this shit.

               Harper:   You know they trying to charge me with three
                         different charges against you, right?

               K.M.:     You know I’m not going to go to court. You
                         know . . . I don’t want to do anything to make you
                         end up going to jail for this.

               Harper:   Even though all that shit happened . . . I’m sorry for
                         everything and you know I love you.

               K.M.:     I love you.

               K.M.:     You gotta see what you do too.

               Harper:   You can’t talk over me either.

               Harper:   I don’t even do much. I just throw you.

               K.M.:     I don’t want it to get worse. I don’t want the
                         arguments to get worse. I don’t want the bruises to
                         get worse.

               K.M.:     I felt like it was wrong for you to put your hands on
                         me the way you did today.
                                          -4-
               Harper:        You did disrespect me. You started yapping over
                              me.

               K.M.:          You just keep putting your hands on me.

               Harper:        Well, you did just get me locked up, so I still got a
                              lot of thinking about that too.

               K.M.:          I still love you . . . but it’s not healthy.

               Harper:        Well, if anything, the best thing you probably can
                              do is probably not show up to court or show up to
                              court and tell them nothing happened.

               K.M.:          I was just planning on not going. . . . But I was
                              going to look into it more and just find out what
                              would be the best.

Also in this call, K.M. recalled that Harper pushed her against the wall, and Harper replied,

“because you had an attitude.” She told him nothing she did justified him pushing her against

the wall.

                                    III. Pre-trial Proceedings

       On January 23, 2018, K.M. appeared in the circuit court to testify on Harper’s behalf at

his bond hearing. K.M. swore an oath before the court to testify to “the truth, the whole truth,

and nothing but the truth . . . .” When asked by Harper’s counsel if Harper strangled her on

December 29, 2017, K.M. answered, “No. I wanted to go against that statement.” Prompted to

explain, she stated,

               I wanted to go against it and I understand that after the incident
               they were insisting on me to take forensic pictures and all that, I
               didn’t find it necessary. It was pretty much him just stopping me
               from stepping out of our hotel room because I was in a very irate
               state, and I was planning on driving going to some parking lot or
               something and he did not want a scene to be caused, I didn’t either,
               honestly. But we were both not meeting ends and we just kept
               going back and forth, and that’s pretty much how it all happened.

                                                 -5-
She also stated,

               I don’t think he should be getting punished when it didn’t go down
               as him just attacking me, he didn’t. We were just arguing, and it
               got to the point where he was holding me down so I wouldn’t go
               out and start yelling and make a scene outside, but it wasn’t
               anything I can say I was injured or physically affected in a
               permanent way, or anything like that.

       On cross-examination, the Commonwealth’s attorney asked K.M. whether she was

honest with the police on December 29, 2017. K.M. replied, “Honestly, I feel like I wasn’t. I

feel like my statements were completely incorrect.” To clarify, the Commonwealth’s attorney

asked, “[A]re you saying that you lied to the police?” K.M. answered, “Yes. Pretty much my

statements were incorrect. I should have been more specific. I should have written it down in I

guess a more essay format. I was nervous, my adrenaline was pumping, I wasn’t thinking

straight, and my statements were completely absurd and incorrect.” She added, “That’s why I’m

mainly here today to go against them.” Finally, the Commonwealth’s attorney showed K.M. the

written statement that she gave to Deputy Potter on December 29. K.M. confirmed, that was the

statement she was saying was false.

       On March 5, 2018, the grand jury indicted Harper on charges of abduction, misdemeanor

domestic assault and battery, and inducing false testimony. On March 20, 2018, as reflected in

the circuit court’s order, Harper appeared in circuit court for arraignment. He signed an

“Acknowledgment of Advise of Rights” [sic] and pleaded not guilty to the indictments in open

court. The circuit court order reads,

               [A]fter being advised by the Court and his attorney of his right to a
               trial by a jury, the accused knowingly and voluntarily waived trial
               by a jury with which waiver the Attorney for the Commonwealth
               did not concur.
                        Whereupon, this case is set for a trial, with a jury, as
               requested by the Commonwealth on June 6, 2018, at 10:00 a.m.

                                               -6-
Also on March 20, Harper signed his recognizance form, which stated, “I, the Defendant, as a

condition of my release from custody, by signing this form, promise to appear in court on the

date and time noted above.” The date and time noted on the form are “June 6, 2018 at 9:00 a.m.”

       On June 6, 2018, the circuit court’s order reflects that Harper did not appear for the jury

trial “as previously ordered on March 20, 2018 . . . .” The court ordered a capias for Harper’s

arrest. On July 2, 2018, the grand jury issued a direct indictment against Harper for felony

failure to appear. Harper did not return to court on the capias until April 9, 2021.

                                             IV. Trial

       At the bench trial, the circuit court heard the testimony of Deputy Potter regarding the

events he witnessed on December 29, 2017, recited supra. K.M. also testified for the

Commonwealth. K.M. testified that on December 29, she and Harper were in a romantic

relationship and they were living together in a room at America’s Best hotel. She woke up

suddenly remembering that she had forgotten about some car repairs that she needed to take care

of that day. She did not know why this upset Harper, “but it eventually led to him pushing

[K.M.] off of the bed and [K.M.] hitting the wall.” Although her memory was imprecise due to

the passage of time, she recalled that Harper “smacked or punched” her and that she ended up

with a black eye. She testified that Harper ripped her clothes and she “eventually ended up

taking a shower.” After that she was upset and was trying to leave.

       She continued, describing that she ran in a towel, in the middle of the night, to the front

desk of the hotel where the manager called the police. She recalled being scared and needing

help, and she did not know what to do. She also remembered writing a statement at the time

these events occurred. The Commonwealth presented K.M.’s written statement to her and she

affirmed that the statement was “true and accurate, to the best of [her] ability, when [she] gave it

to law enforcement.” She added that there are certain bullet points of the statement that she does

                                                -7-
not remember because she “just can’t recall that far back.” But, she continued, “I do recall that I

wrote the statement down in full honesty.” K.M. read the statement into evidence, recited supra.

         The circuit court then admitted into evidence the jail calls from Harper to K.M. recorded

on December 30, 2017, at 1:27 a.m. and 1:43 a.m. The Commonwealth played portions of the

calls for the court, recited in part supra. Next, the Commonwealth introduced the transcript from

Harper’s bond hearing, including K.M.’s testimony at that hearing. At trial, K.M. testified that

she did not remember what she testified to at the bond hearing, but she was “pretty sure it was all

to be on Clifton’s side.” The Commonwealth asked K.M., “Would it be fair to say that it was

different than what you had just testified about what happened on the evening of December 29th,

2017?” K.M. replied, “Yes, it was.” When asked, “Today, when you testified about what he did

to you on December 29th, 2017, was that the truth?” K.M. answered, “Everything I’m saying

today is the truth.” Finally, asked, “On January 23rd, 2018, did the conversations with [Harper]

play into any aspect of why you came to Court and testified on his behalf?” K.M. responded,

“Yes, it contributed.”

         On cross-examination, K.M. testified that she did not recall specific statements that she

made at Harper’s bond hearing in 2018, but that she knew “it was definitely to get him out of

jail.” When asked by defense counsel, “is it your testimony here today that you lied to the

Stafford County Circuit Court on January 23rd, 2018?” K.M. replied, “Yeah.” The questioning

continued, “And did you lie because Mr. Harper asked you to?” K.M. answered, “Yeah.”

Defense counsel added, “Even though you told him back in December of 2017 that you were

going to have done it anyway?” K.M. said, “Yeah. I lied because he told me to, and I was on his

side, and I just had this mentality that he was a good person and that I wanted to be with

him . . . .”

                                                -8-
       At the conclusion of witness testimony, the Commonwealth requested that the circuit

court take judicial notice that on June 6, 2018, in the Stafford County Circuit Court, several

charges against Harper were set for a jury trial and he did not appear on that date. The circuit

court responded, “I do see Judge Willis’s order of June 6, 2018 reflecting that Mr. Harper was

not present and that the capias was issued for the failure to appear, and a bondsman show cause

issued as well.” The Commonwealth rested at that point.

       Harper’s counsel moved to strike the evidence on the charge of inducing false testimony.

Counsel argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove inducement because during the jail call

Harper told K.M. “the best thing you can probably do is probably not show up to Court,” or

“show up and tell them that nothing happened.” But, counsel argued, K.M. did show up in court,

and she never testified that “nothing had happened.” Harper’s counsel recited much of K.M.’s

bond hearing testimony, then emphasized that “at no point does [K.M.] ever say nothing

happened.” The court denied the motion to strike.

       The defense offered no evidence and renewed its motion to strike. Relevant to this

appeal, Harper’s counsel argued that the circuit court should strike the evidence on the felony

failure to appear charge because the Commonwealth failed to prove that Harper’s failure to

appear was “willful.” Harper’s counsel also renewed its motion to strike the evidence on the

inducing false testimony charge, arguing that K.M. did not lie to the court at the bond hearing,

she did not disavow her statements made to law enforcement on the night of the offense, and she

never said “nothing happened” or “he didn’t touch me.” Defense counsel also argued that

Harper’s statements to K.M. on the jail calls did not amount to inducement—“He doesn’t

threaten her, he doesn’t coerce her, beyond telling her that he loves her, he doesn’t offer her any

consideration in exchange for her testimony.” The circuit court denied the motions to strike and

                                                -9-
found Harper guilty of inducing false testimony and felony failure to appear, among other

charges.

                                             ANALYSIS

       Harper argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove (1) that K.M. falsely testified at

Harper’s bond hearing, (2) that K.M.’s testimony at the bond hearing was given upon Harper’s

inducement, and (3) that Harper willfully failed to appear in court for his trial.

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support

it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting

Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the

relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting

Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the

conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion

might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72

Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

                                         I. False Testimony

       Code § 18.2-436 provides,

               If any person procure or induce another to commit perjury or to
               give false testimony under oath in violation of any provision of this
               article, he shall be punished as prescribed in § 18.2-434.

               In any prosecution under this section, it shall be sufficient to prove
               that the person alleged to have given false testimony shall have
               been procured, induced, counselled or advised to give such
               testimony by the party charged.
                                                - 10 -
       Code § 18.2-434 provides, “If any person to whom an oath is lawfully administered on

any occasion willfully swears falsely on such occasion touching any material matter or thing, . . .

he is guilty of perjury, punishable as a Class 5 felony.” On an indictment for subornation of

perjury, it is not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove that the person giving false testimony

under oath has been convicted of perjury, but the Commonwealth must prove that the person

committed perjury. Mundy v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1049, 1062 (1933). The perjury elements

the Commonwealth must prove, as provided in Code § 18.2-434, are: “(1) that an oath was

lawfully administered; (2) that the [person] willfully swore falsely; and (3) that the facts to which

he falsely swore were material to a proper matter of inquiry.” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va.

502, 513 (2017) (quoting Mendez v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 97, 102 (1979)).

       Harper does not contest the first and third elements of perjury2; his argument is that K.M.

made no false statement, therefore his conviction cannot stand. He asserts that K.M. claimed to

have made false statements on two different occasions: at the bond hearing she claimed to have

lied to the law enforcement officer on December 29, 2017, and at trial she claims to have lied at

the bond hearing. However, he argues “it is evident from the actual words that she spoke [at the

bond hearing] that she never had been untruthful about the actual facts of the case.” We are

unpersuaded by Harper’s efforts to dissect K.M.’s testimony while ignoring admitted and

corroborated false statements.

       2
         K.M.’s bond hearing testimony was material to whether Harper should have been
admitted to bail because her testimony related to the issue before the court of whether Harper’s
liberty would constitute an unreasonable danger to family or household members or the public.
Code § 19.2-120(A)(2); see Sheard v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 227, 232 (1991) (finding
defendant’s bond hearing testimony material to issues before the court, including future
appearance and threat to society, and that testimony, being false, supported her perjury
conviction). Furthermore, K.M.’s bond hearing testimony was also material to the “weight of the
evidence” against Harper, a mandatory consideration of a judicial officer in determining the issue
of bail. Code § 19.2-120(B); see Jeffrey v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, ___ (Mar. 14,
2023) (en banc) (“Virginia Criminal Procedure requires a judicial officer to consider the ‘weight
of the evidence’ as a relevant factor to determining pre-trial release on bail.”).
                                                - 11 -
       “Falsity is the main ingredient of the crime of perjury . . . .” Fitch v. Commonwealth, 92

Va. 824, 834 (1896). The Code of Virginia “has never expressly required corroboration to

sustain a perjury conviction, [yet] from an early date, our courts have imposed a corroboration

requirement.” Keffer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 545, 547 (1991) (first citing Schwartz v.

Commonwealth, 68 Va. 1025, 1027 (1876); and then citing Ronald N. Boyce & Rollin M.

Perkins, Criminal Law 523-24 (3d ed. 1982) (rule is universal requiring two independent

witnesses or one witness with corroborating circumstances for perjury conviction)). “[T]he

‘nature of the corroboration’ necessary to substantiate the testimony of a single witness in a

perjury prosecution has never been specifically delineated.” Stewart v. Commonwealth, 22

Va. App. 117, 120 (1996). The corroborating evidence “must be of a strong character, and not

merely corroborative in slight particulars.” Id. (quoting Schwartz, 68 Va. at 1027). “[I]t need

not be equal in weight to the testimony of a second witness. Rather, the corroborating evidence

must confirm the single witness’ testimony in a manner strong enough ‘to turn the scale and

overcome the oath of the [perjurer] and the legal presumption of his innocence.’” Id. (quoting

Keffer, 12 Va. App. at 548).

       In this case, K.M. is the single witness who testified to the falsity of her own prior

testimony under oath. At Harper’s trial on inducing false testimony, K.M. testified that her

testimony at the bond hearing was false. K.M. testified at the bond hearing that her statements to

the police on December 29, 2017, were “completely absurd and incorrect” and that she wanted to

“go against them”; she affirmed that they were false. Also at the bond hearing, K.M. stated that

she and Harper were mutually arguing, it was not just him attacking her, and he was just trying to

keep her from stepping out of the room in a frantic state and making a scene.

       At Harper’s trial, K.M. testified that she wrote the statement for the police on December

29, 2017, “in full honesty” and affirmed that it was “true and accurate.” She testified that she

                                               - 12 -
was living with Harper in the hotel room when Harper became upset with her and pushed her off

the bed and into the wall, hit her in the face and gave her a black eye. After that she was upset

and “didn’t want to be there,” so she ran to the front desk dressed only in a towel on a December

night. The front desk attendant called the police. K.M. testified that she was “scared” and

“needed help.” She read her statement to the police into evidence, where she stated that Harper

“smacked or punched” her, forced her to take her clothes off and shower, would not let her leave

the room when she wanted to, grabbed her by the neck, and breathing was hard.

       Substantial evidence corroborates that K.M. testified falsely at the bond hearing. Deputy

Potter testified at trial to the events he witnessed on the night of the offense, including that K.M.

ran towards him in a towel on a cold night in a frantic and scared demeanor and that he took

K.M.’s written statement at the scene regarding Harper’s physical assault upon her. The

Commonwealth introduced photographs Deputy Potter took showing K.M.’s. bruising and

swelling after Harper’s physical assault.

       The jail calls further corroborate the falsity of K.M.’s bond hearing testimony. During

the jail calls Harper admitted his physical aggression against K.M., saying “I just throw you,”

and K.M. recalled the fight in the hotel room including that he bruised her eye, pushed her

against the wall, and keeps getting physical with her. She said in the second call that she felt like

it was wrong for him to put his hands on her the way he did that day.

       Considering this evidence, a rational fact finder could conclude that K.M.’s bond hearing

testimony that their argument was only a mutual disagreement, that Harper was trying to help

K.M. by preventing her from causing a scene, and that her statement to the police was “absurd

and incorrect,” was materially false testimony.

                                                - 13 -
                                          II. Inducement

       Harper argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that K.M.’s testimony at the

bond hearing was given upon his inducement. He asserts that he imposed no external pressure or

coercion on K.M. beyond merely suggesting a course of action—that she not show up to court or

show up and tell them nothing happened. Because K.M. did not follow through “in the manner

he recommended,” he argues, the “causal connection” between his statements to her on the jail

calls and her testimony at the bond hearing was lacking.

       Code § 18.2-436 includes that “it shall be sufficient to prove that the person alleged to

have given false testimony shall have been procured, induced, counselled or advised to give such

testimony by the party charged.” (Emphasis added). In this case, the grand jury indictment

stated that Harper “did procure or induce another to commit perjury or to give false testimony

under oath, in violation of §§ 18.2-436; 18.2-10 of the Code of Virginia (1950) as amended.” At

trial, the circuit court stated, “we will stick with what’s in the indictment, procured or induced

another person to give false testimony under oath.”

       “The definition of ‘procure’ includes ‘to bring about by scheming and plotting,’ and ‘to

prevail upon to do something indicated: INDUCE.’” Dietz v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 123, 133

(2017) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1809 (1993)). “The term

‘induce’ means ‘[t]o lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion or influence.’”

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 760 (2011) (alteration in original)

(quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 1269 (2d ed. 1945)).

       During the jail calls Harper repeatedly blamed K.M. for the fact that he was in jail. He

told her that she should not have told the officer everything that happened and that she should

have said everything was “fine.” Harper told her to not show up to court, or to show up and tell

them nothing happened and “he hasn’t been doin’ it.” Thereafter, K.M. did show up to court for

                                                - 14 -
Harper’s bond hearing to testify for him and she “went against” the statements she gave to the

officer on the night of the physical assault. Under oath, she testified that her statements to the

officer on the night of the physical assault were false and absurd. She said, “it didn’t go down as

him just attacking me, he didn’t,” and she said she wasn’t “injured or physically affected in a

permanent way.”

       Reasonable inferences flow from the jail calls that Harper was manipulative and abusive

towards K.M. K.M. testified at Harper’s trial that her bond hearing testimony regarding the

events of December 29, 2017, was “all to be on [Harper’s] side” and “to get him out of jail” and

that she lied to the circuit court at the bond hearing because Harper told her to. After hearing the

jail calls and K.M.’s testimony, a rational trier of fact could find that Harper’s statements

induced K.M. to testify falsely at his bond hearing.

                                       III. Failure to Appear

       Finally, Harper argues that the circuit court “erred in finding the Commonwealth’s

evidence was sufficient to prove that [he] willfully failed to appear for his court date on June 6,

2018.” His argument on appeal is that “the Commonwealth did not seek to introduce evidence of

notice, and the trial court made no attempt to ascertain that notice was provided.”

       Code § 19.2-128(B) provides, “Any person (i) charged with a felony offense . . . who

willfully fails to appear before any court as required shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.” In the

circuit court, Harper did not raise the argument he now raises on appeal, that the Commonwealth

failed to prove that he had notice of his trial date. Rather, below he only asserted generally that

the Commonwealth did not prove his willful failure to appear.3 In response to Harper’s

       3
         Specifically, defense counsel stated, “the mere fact of his nonappearance, Your Honor, I
believe the case law tells us that absent any other evidence—the Commonwealth still needs to
demonstrate that there was a willful failure to appear at that time, and they have made no effort
to do that.”
                                                - 15 -
willfulness argument, the circuit court did not address notice, having no reason to do so given the

stated assertion, but rather responded to the argument that was made:

               I’m not sure how you would ever show willfulness unless you have
               some sort of a person to testify of the fact that he said specifically
               he was not coming. The capias for the failure to appear was issued
               in 2018, and not served until March of 2021, and that does fill in
               some of the gap with respect to the issue of willfulness to the
               extent that’s a gap that needs to be filled in.

Defense counsel made no further argument in response despite the court giving her an

opportunity to do so.

       Rule 5A:18 states, “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for

reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling . . . .”

The grounds for the objection must be stated with specificity. McDuffie v. Commonwealth, 49

Va. App. 170, 177 (2006). “The prevailing purpose behind this rule is ‘to enable the trial court

to prevent error, to cure alleged error with prompt and decisive instruction . . . .’” Id. (quoting

Harward v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 468, 474 (1988)). “Not just any objection will do. It

must be both specific and timely—so that the trial judge would know the particular point being

made in time to do something about it.” Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019)

(quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 351, 356 (2011)).

       We have said that “[t]he language of Code § 19.2-128(B) is plain and unambiguous, and

does not include timely notice as an element of felony failure to appear—only willful failure to

appear.” Chavez, 69 Va. App. at 157. “[F]ar from being an element of the offense of felony

failure to appear, proof of timely notice simply provides a prima facie basis for finding that the

element of willful failure to appear has been proven; that is, timely notice is but one mechanism

for proving willfulness.” Id. at 159 (footnote omitted). Here, the circuit court found Harper’s

years of avoiding apprehension as evidence that he willfully failed to appear. Had defense

counsel raised the Commonwealth’s failure to prove notice below, the circuit court could have
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addressed the alleged error. For these reasons, we will not address the alleged error of the circuit

court in accordance with Rule 5A:18.

                                          CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

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