Court Opinion

ID: 9446606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:59:29.114588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:43.037266
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
In New York, as well as elsewhere, the extent of one’s duty to refrain from negligent conduct is measured by the scope of the risk which such conduct foreseeably entails. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253. And this law is the same for manufacturers as for other members of society. Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App.Div. 114, 243 N.Y.S. 496, 499, affirmed 255 N.Y. 624, 175 N.E. 341; Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 268 App.Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460, 463, affirmed 294 N.Y. 680, 60 N.E .2d 839; Liedeker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 249 App.Div. 835, 292 N.Y.S. 541, affirmed 274 N.Y. 631, 10 N.E.2d 586. The Cam-po and Inman decisions did not shift the basic inquiry as to the reasonable foreseeability of the danger to a sterile definitional quibble over whether the injury was caused by a “latent” or a “patent” defect.
Since the majority concede that Mac-Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, is still a correct statement of New York law, I am puzzled by their suggestion that the Campo decision sweepingly relieved manufacturers from liability for defects or dangers discoverable by a reasonable inspection. The theory on which plaintiff recovered in MacPherson was that the defect in the automobile wheel was one which the defendant could have discovered by a reasonable inspection. Obviously the basic inquiry in MacPherson and all such cases is what dangers the manufacturer foresaw or reasonably should have foreseen to users of its product. See Crist v. Art Metal Works, supra, 230 App.Div. 114, 243 N.Y.S. 496; Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., supra, 268 App.Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460; Liedeker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 249 App.Div. 835, 292 N.Y.S. 541. Indeed the Campo opinion itself heavily stresses this: “ * * * entirely lacking is any *294allegation of fact indicating that defendants foresaw or should reasonably have foreseen a danger to one using the machine for its intended purpose. As we have observed, those omissions are fatal.” 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804. ,
Here we have both the allegation and the proof of the fact^ absent in the Cam-po case. The plaintiff has shown a general industry practice of installing safety devices to avoid; precisely the accident which caused the death of plaintiff’s decedent; surely this indicates, prima facie at least, that defendant should reasonably have foreseen a danger to persons using its machines, and should have foreseen that many such operators do not realize this danger. And hence the case is for the jury, not the judge, to decide.
Nor can the result in this case be upheld on the basis of a concession of counsel upon which the majority so heavily rely. As I read the response of plaintiff’s counsel to the court’s questions, I think it clear that he did not concede that the dan'ger was known, only that the parts of the earth mover which by their improper design created a danger were themselves visible and apparent.1 And even if counsel’s answers might conceivably be pressed further, I believe it unjust to do so; they should be read as making the proper and obvious concession that the facts showed, but not one entirely improper on the record. As Campo and Inman repeatedly state, it is knowledge of the danger itself — here that the bucket of the earth mover might drop when least expected, even while the motor of the machine is turned off — which is significant.2 We cannot rule as a matter of law from the evidence below or from judicial notice that this danger in defendant’s machine was either generally known or even known to plaintiff’s decedent.
In the Campo and Inman decisions the New York Court of Appeals expressed its feeling that only the legislature, and not the relatively free speculation of a jury, should impose on an entire industry a duty to install all possible safety devices. But it is quite a different matter merely to permit a jury to hold a manufacturer to such standards as have been overwhelmingly and voluntarily adopted by his industry. See Stevens v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 151 Kan. 638, 100 P.2d 723, cited with approval and followed in the Campo opinion. While only the legislature ought sweepingly to change general safety practices, it is ill suited to fulfill the task of bringing every errant manufacturer into line. I do not think the New York Court of Appeals meant to shunt this responsibility off to that body. Here again I believe we are applying state law more rigidly than would the state courts themselves. Hence I think it error that the judge refused to submit the case to the jury.

, « * * * the presence of a latent defect or a danger not generally known is precedent to the manufacturer’s liability. * * * Entirely lacking, to paraphrase what we said in the Campo case, supra, 301 N.Y. 468, 471, 95 N.E.2d 802, is any suggestion that the structure possessed a latent defect or an unknown danger.” Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 145, 143 N.E. 2d 895, 899. “In short, in the present case, we have nothing that is related to, or stems from, the existence of a latent fault or hidden danger in either design or construction.” Id., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 146, 143 N.E.2d 895, 900. See also Henry v. Crook, 202 App.Div. 19, 195 N.Y.S. 642; Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App.Div. 114, 243 N.Y.S. 496.