Court Opinion

ID: 9466772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:27:17.882092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:57.080657
License: Public Domain

*931NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe the information set forth in the affidavit and warrant was insufficient for a neutral and detached magistrate to find probable cause justifying a search of defendant’s home for firearms, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The principles stated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), must guide this Court’s determination of the constitutionality of the search warrant. Aguilar holds that the magistrate issuing a search warrant must be informed of the underlying circumstances leading police officers to believe that a search would be fruitful and that an informant was credible. Id. at 114, 84 S.Ct. at 1513. The majority’s decision eviscerates the rule in Aguilar and as a consequence, reinterprets the probability standard of the Fourth Amendment into a standard of plausibility or possibility.1
Aguilar requires an affidavit to disclose circumstances or facts to support a belief that evidence of crime will probably be found in the place to be searched.
The information presented to the magistrate in this case simply states:
One Carroll Runyon [a subsequently indicted co-defendant] who was with said James “Hoss” Diamond and John Chafin, before and after the commission of said crimes, states that John Chafins [sic] procured said rifles from said dwelling house before the commission of said crimes, and believes that the rifles are now located in and at said dwelling house.
It is indisputable that the only circumstance or fact proffered to aid in the magistrate’s determination of probable cause was that the rifles allegedly were obtained from Chafin’s home six days prior to the shooting incident and the search of his home. The affidavit and warrant are void of any facts or circumstances to make probable a belief that the rifles were stored at Chafin’s home at the time the warrant was issued. Neither the affidavit nor the warrant provides details of the informant’s activities with Chafin subsequent to the shooting incident or immediately prior to the search. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 575 and 579, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2078, 2080, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1970); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267-268, 80 S.Ct. 725, 734-735, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); United States v. Hatfield, 599 F.2d 759, 760 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Barone, 584 F.2d 118, 119-120 (6th Cir. 1978).
The majority is quite correct to point out that United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), requires that:
Affidavits ... be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts, in common sense and realistic fashion . [and], the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.
Id. at 108-109, 85 S.Ct. at 746.
See also United States v. Hatfield, 599 F.2d 759, 761 (6th Cir. 1979). However, this is not a “doubtful or marginal case” in which a magistrate’s review has fulfilled the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Giacalore, 541 F.2d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 1976).
Indeed, Ventresca reaffirms this Court’s duty to scrutinize an affidavit for its adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s requirements set forth in Aguilar:
This is not to say that probable cause can be made out by affidavits which are purely conclusory, stating only the affiant’s or informer’s belief that probable cause exists . . . Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.
308 U.S. at 108, 85 S.Ct. at 746.
I would apply these well settled principles to hold that the information presented to the magistrate was grossly inadequate and *932utterly lacking in factual specificity to support a finding of probable cause.
II.
Aguilar also requires the disclosure to the magistrate of circumstances upon which the affiant concluded the informant was credible or his information reliable. 378 U.S. at 114, 84 S.Ct. at 1513. The majority relies upon United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2081, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971), for the proposition that a “declaration against penal interest is a reason to accept as truthful a statement of . an informant.” Assuming arguendo that the holding of Harris is as the majority states,2 they concede the facts of this case do not fall within the holding of Harris. They state “here it cannot fairly be said that the informant, Runyon, admitted ail the ingredients of the crime of attempted murder.” (emphasis added). However, the informant did not admit to any of the ingredients of the crime of attempted murder or any other crime. Runyon merely states he was in the company of the principals of the crime before and after they allegedly committed the attempted murder.
An examination of the facts in prior decisions demonstrates the insignificance of the informant’s “admission” in this case. In Harris, a search warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit which stated, in part:
This person has personal knowledge of and has purchased illicit whiskey from within the residence described, for a period of more than 2 years, and most recently within the past two weeks.
403 U.S. at 575, 91 S.Ct. at 2078. Harris quotes from the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. United States, where the affiant revealed:
The source of the information goes on to relate that on many occasions the source of information has gone to said apartment and purchased narcotic drugs from the above mentioned persons and the narcotics were secrated [sic] in the above mentioned places. Id. 362 U.S. at 267-268, n. 2, 80 S.Ct. 725.
Id. at 578, 91 S.Ct. at 2079.
Recent decisions in this Circuit parallel the above-cited Supreme Court decisions requiring an informant to admit to a crime as an indicia of his credibility. This informant in Barone, supra, admitted to having received $10,000 to travel to Columbia, South America to purchase cocaine, which he did. In Armour v. Salisbury, 492 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1972), the informant admitted to having purchased narcotics at the home to be searched. The majority extends the holding of Harris, and the decisions of this Circuit in Barone and Armour to situations in which an informant reveals his suspicion that a crime might be committed.
III.
The majority’s decision adheres to the admonishment in Ventresca to interpret affidavits in a “common sense” manner. Apparently, the majority is motivated by a fear that “a grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting.” 380 U.S. at 108, 85 S.Ct. at 746. However, police officers act at their peril by failing to submit to a judicial officer evidence to support a finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant. The decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), stated the basic constitutional rule:
Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specified, established and well-developed exceptions.
Id. at 357, 88 S.Ct. at 514. Therefore, the majority should not be deterred from apply*933ing Aguilar by a fear that police officers will conduct warrantless searches.
Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case for a new trial.

. The Fourth Amendment provides: “No warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause.”

. The precedential value of the holding in United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-85, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2081-2083, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1970), that an admission of crime is itself a sufficient indicia of credibility is questionable. Harris was decided by a vote of 5 — 4. However, Justice Stewart did not concur in Section III of Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the majority, which discussed this issue.