Court Opinion

ID: 9899739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 16:10:30.888052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:47.877395
License: Public Domain

J-A21030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                             :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                             :
              v.                             :
                                             :
                                             :
 FRANCISCO ELISAUL MORILLO                   :
                                             :
                     Appellant               :   No. 65 EDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 2, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-09-CR-0001239-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                          FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2023

      Appellant, Francisco Elisaul Morillo, appeals pro se from the December

2, 2022 order that denied his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-46. He challenges the effectiveness of

PCRA counsel’s assistance. After review, we affirm.

      On June 23, 2021, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to

Possession    With   Intent   to   Deliver   (“PWID”)   and   Criminal   Use   of

Communication Facility after he attempted to sell two kilograms of fentanyl to

a confidential informant. On the same day, he was sentenced to an aggregate

term of 3½ to 8 years’ incarceration. Appellant did not file any post-sentence

motions or a direct appeal.

      On April 13, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se Motion for Reconsideration of

RRR Incentive Act Eligibility. The court considered this filing to be an initial

PCRA petition, appointed Patrick J. McMenamin, Esq. (“PCRA counsel”), and
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ordered PCRA counsel to file an amended PCRA petition. On October 5, 2022,

PCRA counsel filed a Turner/Finley1 no merit letter and a motion to withdraw

as counsel.

       On November 9, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice

of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant

did not file a response.        On December 2, 2022, the PCRA court denied

Appellant’s PCRA petition and granted counsel’s withdrawal.

       Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

       In his pro se brief to this Court, Appellant raises the following issues for

our review:

       1. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for filing a Finley no-merit letter
          and then stating that he had later filed an amended PCRA
          petition with issues of merit and then failing neither to file the
          amended PCRA petition nor a response to the PCRA court’s
          notice of intent to dismiss that led to the dismissal of the PCRA
          petition based on the Finley letter and a failure to file the Rule
          907 response?

       2. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for filing a Finley no-merit letter
          that failed to adequately establish an issue of merit that plea
          counsel failed to inform Appellant that his plea of guilt would
____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

2 Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) Statement on    January 3, 2023, raising ten
separate claims of error. On March 3, 2023, Appellant filed an untimely
supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement without permission from the PCRA
court.   All the issues raised in Appellant’s supplemental Rule 1925(b)
statement are waived. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 900 A.2d 936, 939
(Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that untimely supplemental statements, filed
without leave of court, did not preserve those issues for appeal).

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         result in automatic deportation from the United States which
         issue would have also precluded the PCRA court from accepting
         the Finley no-merit letter?

      3. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for failing to raise an issue of
         merit that plea counsel was ineffective for allowing Appellant
         to enter a plea of guilt when there existed a meritorious
         suppression issue that would have resulted in the suppression
         of the totality of the evidence of guilt?

Appellant’s Br. at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

      We review an order denying a petition for collateral relief to determine

whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the evidence of record and

free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014).

“This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the

record contains any support for those findings.”        Commonwealth v.

Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      To prevail on a petition for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence

resulted from one or more of the circumstances enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9543(a)(2). These circumstances include ineffectiveness of counsel, which

“so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of

guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

      The   law   presumes   counsel   has   rendered   effective   assistance.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[T]he

burden of demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Id. To

satisfy this burden, the appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no

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reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) there

is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding

would have been different absent counsel’s error.             Commonwealth v.

Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). Failure to satisfy any prong of the

test will result in rejection of the appellant’s claim. Id.

        To establish the prejudice prong, the petitioner must prove a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the relevant proceedings would have been

different but for counsel’s action or inaction. Commonwealth v. Busanet,

54 A.3d 35, 46 (Pa. 2012).         Importantly, “counsel cannot be deemed

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.” Fears, 86 A.3d at 804.

        Notably, “[t]he PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without

a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine issues

concerning any material fact, the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction

collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose would be served by further

proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Holt, 175 A.3d 1014, 1017-18 (Pa. Super.

2017). “To obtain a reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition

without a hearing, an appellant must show that he or she raised a genuine

issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief,

or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.” Id. at

1018.

        In his first issue, Appellant avers that PCRA counsel was ineffective

because he filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter instead of an amended PCRA

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petition and failed to file a response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice after

advising Appellant that he would.        Appellant’s Br. at 14.       Appellant

acknowledges that he received the Turner/Finley no-merit letter as well as

the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice to dismiss. Id. Appellant avers that a day

after he received the Rule 907 notice to dismiss, he also received a letter from

PCRA counsel explaining to Appellant that counsel had filed an amended PCRA

petition on his behalf, that the PCRA court had issued a Rule 907 notice to

dismiss because there were no meritorious issues raised, and advising

Appellant that he should not file a pro se response to avoid “hybrid” pleadings.

Id. at 15. Appellant argues that he failed to file a pro se response to the

court’s Rule 907 notice because of PCRA counsel’s letter. Id. at 17.

      Where an appellant raises a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness for

the first time on appeal, this Court has “the ability to grant or deny relief on

straightforward claims, as well as the power to remand to the PCRA court for

the development of the record.” Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381,

403 (Pa. 2021). We will remand, “however, where there are material facts at

issue concerning claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is not

plainly unavailable as a matter of law[.]” Id. at 402 (citation omitted). “To

be entitled to a remand, [an appellant] must provide more than mere

boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness.     That is, he must

establish that there are issues of material facts concerning claims challenging

counsel’s stewardship and that relief may be available.” Commonwealth v.

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Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1006 (Pa. 2022). Additionally, we are mindful of the

“general rule” that “a lawyer should not be held ineffective without first having

an opportunity to address the accusation in some fashion.” Commonwealth

v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 895 (Pa. 2010), overruled on other grounds by

Bradley, 261 A.3d 381.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court characterized counsel’s

letter in question as a form letter that was “plainly sent in error” to Appellant.

Trial Ct. Op., filed 4/13/23, at 15. To support this finding, the PCRA court

emphasized that Appellant had previously received the Turner/Finley no

merit letter that 1) advised Appellant that PCRA counsel had reviewed

Appellant’s claims and found them to lack merit, and 2) that if the PCRA court

issued a Rule 907 notice to dismiss, Appellant could file a pro se response or

hire privately retained counsel to respond.        Id. at 16.    The PCRA court

concluded that, based on the Turner/Finley no merit letter, Appellant

already knew that PCRA counsel would not be filing a response if the court

issued a Rule 907 notice. Id.

      In considering Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim, the PCRA court found

that Appellant failed to demonstrate how PCRA counsel’s clerical error

prejudiced Appellant. The court opined:

      [A]lthough [Appellant] argues ineffective assistance of counsel for
      failure to file an amended petition or that PCRA Counsel’s conduct
      somehow caused Petitioner to forego a response to the [Rule 907]
      notice of intent to dismiss, [Appellant] fails to identify a single new
      or different claim that he would have raised via an amended

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      petition or response to the notice of intent to dismiss. In this
      regard, [Appellant] fails to demonstrate how he suffered any
      actual prejudice as a result of any purported reliance upon the
      November 10, 2022 PCRA counsel letter.

Trial Ct. Op. at 17 (some capitalization omitted).

      Likewise in his brief to this court, Appellant fails to identify what, if any,

claims of error he would have raised in his response to the court’s Rule 907

notice to dismiss.   While we are troubled that PCRA counsel would send a

letter to Appellant in error, Appellant must demonstrate actual prejudice, i.e.,

that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged

proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s error.            Boilerplate

assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness do not establish actual prejudice

and, thus, do not warrant a remand.         Appellant has failed to demonstrate

prejudice and, therefore, is not entitled to relief.

      In his second and third issues, Appellant avers that PCRA counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise that plea counsel was ineffective for 1) failing to

inform Appellant that his plea of guilt would result in automatic deportation

from the United States and 2) for allowing Appellant to plead guilty when there

was a meritorious suppression of evidence issue.            Appellant’s Br. at 4.

Appellant failed to preserve either of these issues in his Rule 1925(b)

statement and, therefore, they are waived. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues

not included in the [s]tatement . . .are waived.”); Parrish, 273 A.3d at 1002

(Pa. 2022) (explaining that an appellant can raise a claim of ineffective

assistance of PCRA counsel for the first time on appeal at the first opportunity

to do so, and can preserve that claim in a Rule 1925(b) statement).

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      In conclusion, the PCRA court’s decision to deny PCRA relief is supported

by the evidence of record and free of legal error.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 11/17/2023

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