Court Opinion

ID: 9689016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:16:29.852531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:26.960165
License: Public Domain

Justice Campbell
concurred:
"[T]he encouragement of criminals to induce them to commit crimes in order to get up a prosecution against them, is scandalous and reprehensible.” Id., 223.
More recently, we renounced the subjective view of entrapment espoused by the United States Supreme Court and adopted the objective test defined in Mr. Justice Stewart’s dissent in United States v Russell, 411 US 423; 93 S Ct 1637; 36 L Ed 2d 366 (1973), Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Sherman v United States, 356 US 369; 78 S Ct 819; 2 L Ed 2d 848 (1958), and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in Sorrells v United States, 287 US 435; 53 S Ct 210; 77 L Ed 413 (1932). People v Turner, 390 Mich 7, 22; 210 NW2d 336 (1973); People v D’Angelo, supra, p 172.
Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinion in Russell, supra, pp 440-441, succinctly distinguishes the subjective test from the objective test as follows:
"In Sorrells v United States, supra, and Sherman v United States, supra, the Court took what might be called a 'subjective’ approach to the defense of entrapment. In that view, the defense is predicated on an unexpressed intent of Congress to exclude from its criminal statutes the prosecution and conviction of persons, 'otherwise innocent,’ who have been lured to the commission of the prohibited act through the Government’s instigation. Sorrells v United States, supra, at 448. The key phrase in this formulation is 'otherwise innocent,’ for the entrapment defense is available under this approach only to those who would not have com*389mitted the crime but for the Government’s inducements. Thus, the subjective approach focuses on the conduct and propensities of the particular defendant in each individual case: if he is 'otherwise innocent,’ he may avail himself of the defense; but if he had the 'predisposition’ to commit the crime, or if the 'criminal design’ originated with him, then — regardless of the nature and extent of the Government’s participation— there has been no entrapment. Id., at 451. And, in the absence of a conclusive showing one way or the other, the question of the defendant’s 'predisposition’ to the crime is a question of fact for the jury. The Court today adheres to this approach.
"The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, in the Sorrells case, and that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Douglas, Harlan and Brennan, in the Sherman case, took a different view of the entrapment defense. In their concept, the defense is not grounded on some unexpressed intent of Congress to exclude from punishment under its statutes those otherwise innocent persons tempted into crime by the Government, but rather on the belief that 'the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced.’ Sherman v United States, supra, at 380. Thus, the focus of this approach is not on the propensities and predisposition of a specific defendant, but on 'whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power.’ Id., at 382. Phrased another way, the question is whether— regardless of the predisposition to crime of the particular defendant involved — the governmental agents have acted in such a way as is likely to instigate or create a criminal offense.”
The trial judge in the instant case did not properly apply the objective test of entrapment. While he considered the conduct of the police officers, he also attached undue significance to the propensities of the defendant: "They did not need to encourage him. His only hesitancy was in accumulat*390ing enough business to make it worthwhile.” This was error, for in the words of Mr. Justice Roberts:
"The applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government’s own agents. No other issue, no comparison of equities as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any place in the enforcement of this overruling principle of public policy.” Sorrells, supra, p 459.
The police officer in the instant case sought out the defendant and asked to purchase narcotics from him. The officer gave the defendant some money, and they agreed to meet several days later. When the defendant did not show up at the meeting place, the officer again sought him out, not once but twice. When the defendant said he had not purchased the narcotics because he did not have a ride, the officer offered him transportation. A week later two undercover police officers drove the defendant from Oscoda to Detroit, gave him money to purchase more narcotics than previously requested, waited while he purchased the narcotics, and drove him back to Oscoda. After arriving in Oscoda and transferring the narcotics to the police officers, the defendant was arrested.
We hold that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law. The police officers impermissibly manufactured or instigated a crime. This is exactly the governmental activity that is sought to be prevented by the policy against entrapment.
F
White argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer had him testify at his preliminary examination and told *391him the judge would dismiss the charge if presented with any evidence that White did not commit the offense. White claims he provided the judge with such evidence on his lawyer’s instruction to "deviate” from the truth. He further asserts that all lawyers who handle criminal cases know that a defendant should never testify at his own preliminary examination because if the prosecutor’s evidence is sufficient to establish probable cause it is unlikely that the charge will be dismissed based on the defendant’s testimony. White’s supporting affidavit sufficiently establishes his right to an evidentiary hearing on whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance which depends on facts not of record may not, however, be raised for the first time on appeal. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
We reverse the defendant’s conviction of attempted delivery of heroin. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s conviction of perjury without prejudice to his filing a motion seeking post-conviction relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Levin, Fitzgerald, and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.
Williams, J. (concurring except for Part E). My brother Kavanagh has written an exemplary opinion with which I wholly concur except for Part E. With my brother Moody and the trial judge, I believe there was no entrapment.
Coleman, C.J., concurred with Williams, J.