Court Opinion

ID: 9572938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:46:01.280835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:45.993875
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting. I dissent from the ruling in division 2 of the opinion and the judgment of affirmance for the very same reason I did in Sylvania Electric Products v. Electrical Wholesalers, 198 Ga. 870 (33 SE2d 5), which dissent this court later adopted as its- ruling in Rivers v. Cole *113Corporation, 209 Ga. 406 (73 SE2d 196), in that it is not necessary for the claim or demand to be disputed or undisputed, or liquidated or unliquidated, under the interpretations of our statutory law (Code § 20-1204). As ruled in the Rivers case, no dispute is necessary, for when a creditor receives a less sum in satisfaction of a greater, which he accepts, the contract is executed, and he can not treat it as a nullity and recover the balance. The charge complained of is error, not only in that it fails to point out that the amount of the debt need not be in dispute or liquidated, but the charge is not authorized by the alleged evidence of an “express agreement” or “distinct understanding” which would allegedly make it a jury question as to whether or not there was such understanding as ruled by the majority. The offer of the check with the condition that it be in full satisfaction of the debt and the retention of the check and appropriation of its proceeds by the creditor constitute the contract. The creditor can not accept the check and repudiate the condition, and his acceptance automatically constitutes, as a matter of law, an executed accord and satisfaction. As I stated in my dissent in the Sylvania case, supra: “Had the creditor, while in the very act of appropriating the proceeds of the check, loudly declared his disagreement with the terms upon which the tender was made, and such declarations had been communicated to the debtor, under the controlling decisions of this court he would nevertheless and despite such declarations have been held as a matter of law to* have agreed to all of the conditions attached to the tender.” The law nowhere makes a distinction between the type of agreement essential to an accord and satisfaction of a disputed or unliquidated claim and the type of agreement necessary for the same purpose where the claim is liquidated. The acceptance of a conditional offer or tender within itself constitutes an agreement in contemplation of Code § 20-1204, and it was clearly error to instruct the jury that it was a question for the members thereof to determine whether or not there was a “distinct understanding between the parties” that any check was paid, received, and retained in full discharge of the alleged debt. The charge was erroneous, confusing, misleading, and not sound law, and the court committed harmful error re*114quiring the grant of a new trial in thus instructing the jury to find more than the law demands. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Grice concurs in this dissent.