Court Opinion

ID: 9586886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:16:10.849733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:54.998271
License: Public Domain

Townsend, J.
(dissenting). As to the first division of the opinion, I dissent because I believe that ground 1 of the amended motion for a new trial requires a reversal. Therein it is set out that the trial court charged the jury as follows: “Now, in this case, the State relies on what is known—it relies in part on what is known as the testimony of an accomplice.” Thereupon the trial court proceeded to charge the jury in substance Code § 38-121, which provides for the requirement of corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice. It is contended in the amended motion for a new trial that this charge was error in that it amounted to the expression of an opinion by the trial judge in his charge to the jury that a witness for the state was an accomplice of the defendant, Fred Hamby, and denied the jury the right to determine whether or not such witness was such an accomplice; that therefore said charge amounted to an expression of opinion by the trial judge in his charge to the jury that Fred Hamby participated in the crime of which he was charged and for which he was on trial, with the State’s witness; that all this was a violation of Code § 81-1104 which forbids the trial court to express an opinion as to what has been proved or as to the guilt of the accused in a criminal case and which requires the appellate courts of this State to reverse the case for a new trial where such error is assigned. The case here, therefore, should turn solely on the question of whether or not the trial judge expressed such an opinion when he charged the jury that “in this case the State relies on what is known as the testimony of an accomplice.” From the record it appears that Robert Junior Chambers was jointly indicted with the defendant. It further appears that Robert Junior Chambers was the principal witness for the State. He admitted in his testimony that he burned the buildings in question. He swore that the defendant procured him to do so. All this was denied by the defendant. Thus an issue for the determination of the jury was made as to whether or not Robert Junior Chambers was an accomplice of the defendant. The charge of the court, in my opinion, does *14not leave this question for the determination of the jury. On the other hand, it is my opinion that the judge in no uncertain terms informed the jury that Robert Junior Chambers was an accomplice of the defendant when he told the jury that “in this case, the State relies on what is known as the testimony of an accomplice.”
The following charges have been held reversible error: “The witness, ‘having been convicted, is an accomplice as a matter of law.’” Sellers v. State, 41 Ga. App. 572 (153 S. E. 782). “ 'One of the witnesses testified in this case to having worked at this still for this defendant, and that, under the law, constitutes what is known as an accomplice.’ ” Demonia v. State, 69 Ga. App. 862 (27 S. E. 2d, 101). “ T charge you as a matter of law that the codefendant, L. C. Moffett, a witness for the State, is an accomplice so far as your consideration of his testimony is concerned.’ ” Middleton v. State, 72 Ga. App. 818 (35 S. E. 2d, 317). “ 'Charles McDonald of course admits he is an accomplice. He has filed a plea to this crime; and he being an accomplice in the case of a partner with the defendant, and having admitted to have been there, you would not be authorized to convict James Pope Kryder on the testimony of McDonald alone.’ ” Kryder v. State, 57 Ga. App. 200 (194 S. E. 890). “ T believe it is admitted in this case that Tommy Lyons was an accomplice.’ ” Golden v. State, 45 Ga. App. 501 (165 S. E. 299). “ ‘Now, you are to determine, gentlemen, whether or not he is an accomplice. He denies having anything to do with the commission of■ this offense himself; he states that he had nothing to do with it, and was not an accomplice.’ ” Suddeth v. State, 112 Ga. 407 (37 S. E. 747).
In Demonia v. State, supra, it is held as follows: “Section 81-1104 of the Code makes it reversible error for a trial judge to intimate or express in his charge to the jury his opinion as to what has or has not been proved. Hence, on the trial of a person accused of distilling spirituous and alcoholic liquors, it was reversible error to charge, ‘Gentlemen of the Jury, one of the witnesses testified in this case to having worked at this still for this defendant, and that, under the law, constitutes what is known as an accomplice.’ This was an expression of an opinion that the witness referred to was an accomplice of the defendant.”
*15Cited in support of the majority opinion that the charge is not erroneous are the cases of Cantrell v. State, 141 Ga. 98 (5), and Wells v. State, 194 Ga. 74. In the Cantrell case the court charged the jury in part on the subject of the corroboration of an accomplice as follows: “ 'I do not charge you that there is or there is not testimony of an accomplice in this case. I simply give you the rule; and if there is any testimony that has been delivered in the case from an accomplice, why then you apply these rules that the court gives you in charge to that testimony.’ ” In the Cantrell case the court left it to the jury whether or not the State’s witness was an accomplice. In the Demonia case the court did not leave that question to the jury. In the instant case the court did not leave that question to the jury. In Wells v. State, supra, the court charged the jury as follows: “ T charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that if any witness in this case has been indicted for the offense of murder with reference to the homicide of Willie Lee Wells, either as principal or as an accessory, then and in that event he would be an accomplice. If you should find from the evidence that the witness was an accomplice, then I charge you in this case that Freddie Hooks, alias Tony McBrown, is an accomplice; then before you would be authorized to convict . . the defendant upon the testimony of such witness alone, if you find from the evidence that such witness was. an accomplice.’ ” Had error been assigned on this excerpt from the charge on the ground that it amóunted to an expression of opinion in violation of Code § 81-1104, I believe the Supreme Court would have held the same to be erroneous. However, the objection to this excerpt in the Weils case was that it was injurious and misleading for the court in one place to instruct that Freddie Hooks was an accomplice and in other places to instruct that it would be left to the jury to determine whether or not Freddie Hooks was an accomplice. The Supreme Court there merely held that the charge complained of was not subject to this criticism. The majority opinion states that “the court in effect charged that the State relies on a certain rule of law and stated that rule of law in the abstract but did not apply it to any person or witness concretely. The court simply said in effect that where or if there is any testimony in a felony case by an accomplice—not necessarily in the instant felony case, *16but in any felony case—the jury should apply the rule of law charged to that testimony.” It is also stated in the majority opinion that “The judge, in the excerpt here referred to, was classifying the testimony relied upon in part by the State as being a class of testimony known or called accomplice’s testimony. He was not classifying the particular witness delivering it as an accomplice. He did not call the name of any witness in connection with such testimony. He did not state what any witness had testified. He was merely charging an abstract rule of law as it related abstractly to the testimony of any accomplice in any given case, which rule of law he said the State relied upon in the instant case.” All that of course depends upon what is meant by the language “in this case, the State relies on what is known as the testimony of an accomplice.” It appearing that Robert Junior Chambers was the only witness for the State who contended by his testimony that he committed the crime for which the defendant was on trial and that the defendant procured him to do so, I think it unnecessary for the court to call his name in order to make the excerpt consitute a violation of Code § 81-1104. It is my opinion that when the trial judge said “in this case”, he was not talking abstractly about any case, but was talking about the case on trial. It is my opinion that when he said “the State relies on what is known as the testimony of an accomplice” he there in effect told the jury that Robert Junior Chambers was an accomplice of Fred Hamby, the defendant. He may have meant to classify testimony rather than the witness, as stated in the majority opinion. It may not have been his intention to classify any particular witness. However, I think he nevertheless did classify Robert Junior Chambers as the accomplice of Fred Hamby and accordingly the excerpt is error as amounting to an expression of an opinion by the trial court in violation of Code § 81-1104.
I am authorized to say that Felton, J., concurs in this dissent.