Court Opinion

ID: 9464205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:27:34.28237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:30.758131
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Under the evidence introduced to support a conviction on count I, appellant Nelson was entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of possession. Count I charged the appellant with aiding and abetting distribution. To be sure, this offense does not necessarily include possession, and this court has so held in this case. I believe the court has erred, however, in its inflexible determination that possession never constitutes an essential element in the charge of aiding and abetting distribution.
The Government’s case on count I sought to establish that Nelson aided and abetted one Henry Van Burén in the distribution of heroin on October 28, 1976, by acting as a link in a chain of distribution: The source, Van Burén, passed the narcotic substance to Nelson; Nelson briefly possessed the contraband and then passed it on to government informant Adams, and Adams then transferred it to DEA agent Campion. Nelson’s witness, however, testified that Adams and Nelson jointly possessed the heroin, but Adams acted as the sole distributor.
Based on this evidence, the jury could plausibly convict appellant of possession and acquit him of aiding and abetting distribution. Instead, the jury faced an all or nothing dilemma; acquit, or convict on the only instructed charge, aiding and abetting distribution.
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the danger of placing a jury in this equivocal situation in Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-1998, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973). Although discussing the construction of the Major Crimes Act (now 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242), the Court stated in reference to the criminal defendant’s claim to a lesser included offense instruction:
True, if the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction — in this context or any other — precisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury’s practice will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. [Emphasis in original.]
Significantly, in its discussion of the lesser included offense doctrine, the Court stressed a jury’s rational approach to an offense based upon the evidence, stating:
Although the lesser included offense doctrine developed at common law to assist the prosecution in cases where the evidence failed to establish some element of the offense originally charged, it is now beyond dispute that the defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater. [Id. at 208, 93 S.Ct. at 1995 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).]
In count I, possession became an integral part of the Government’s proof of aiding and abetting. In my view, it was the quality of possession that differentiated the greater offense, aiding and abetting distribution, from the lesser, mere possession. In such circumstances, the jury should have been given the choice of convicting appellant of the lesser offense.
*933As to count II, no evidence surfaced separating appellant’s possession of the heroin from its distribution. Thus, appellant cannot satisfy the fourth requirement of Thompson that “the proof of the element or elements differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense[.]” United States v. Thompson, 492 F.2d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 1974). Thus, no lesser offense instruction was warranted.
The appellant has been sentenced to ten years concurrent on each count but the concurrent sentence rule probably ought not to be applied in this case. United States v. Holder, 560 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lindsay, 552 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1977). Accordingly, I would vacate the conviction on count I and remand for resentencing.