Court Opinion

ID: 9847661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:04:18.92306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:25.623796
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Judge,
dissenting.
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 644 S.E.2d 201 (2007), and the appellate rules'it emphasizes, I believe the Court should hear this case on its merits and impose monetary sanctions on appellant rather than dismissing the case. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The Supreme Court in Hart “disavow[s]” this Court’s application of the holding in Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transportation, 359 N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360 (2005) (per curiam), which mandated restraint of this Court’s use of Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure and led to our dismissing many cases on the basis of rules violations. As the majority in this case correctly states, Hart emphasizes that Rule 2 is to be used only on rare occasions in which a “fundamental purpose” of the rules is at stake, and authorizes this Court to exercise its discretion to suspend or alter the rules only when doing so works “toward the greater objective of the rules.”
More importantly, though, Hart reminds this Court that exercising our discretion to overlook rules violations pursuant to Rule 2 is not our only option when confronted with those violations. When violations occur, per Rule 2, this Court may “suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of any of [the] rules,” which is to say this Court may simply ignore the rules violations by suspending the rules’ requirements (hence the rule’s title, “Suspension of rules”). N.C.R. App. Proc. Rule 2.
In addition, however, per Rule 25(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court may also acknowledge those rules violations and sanction the parties or attorneys (hence that rule’s title, “Penalties for failure to comply with rules”). Rule 25(b) provides *397an alternative to Rule 2 by authorizing this Court to impose certain sanctions against parties or attorneys when they fail to comply with the rules. See N.C.R. App. Proc. 25(b) (“A court of the appellate division may, on its own initiative or motion of a party, impose a sanction against a party or attorney or both when the court determines that such party or attorney or both substantially failed to comply with these appellate rules.”). The rule provides that the Court may impose any of the sanctions listed in Rule 34: dismissal of the appeal; monetary damages, consisting of “single or double costs,” “damages occasioned by delay,” or “reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney fees”; or “any other sanction deemed just and proper.” N.C.R. App. P. 34(b).
Dismissal of an appeal is clearly the most severe of the penalties this Court is authorized \to mete out, and as such its use should be reserved for cases where no other sanctions are appropriate. The fact that the appellate rules specifically empower this Court to exercise any of a number of options when faced with rules violations shows that we are intended to weigh the severity and extent of those violations and impose sanctions accordingly. Indeed, before trial courts can impose the sanction of dismissal, they are required to consider lesser sanctions. See, e.g., Goss v. Battle, 111 N.C. App. 173, 176, 432 S.E.2d 156, 158 (1993). Doling out dismissals for basic rules violations without consideration of their type or degree is a too simplistic method of enforcing the appellate rules and ignores the discretion those rules give this Court.
Further, such rigid uniformity in granting dismissals when violations occur can result in great damage to both parties and attorneys. Dismissal is a drastic remedy that not only cuts off the rights of parties to have their appeals heard and the possibility for parties to obtain relief, but also exposes the offending attorney to a malpractice suit even where the appeal, if heard, would not have been successful. In addition, many times these violations arise from the small-firm or solo practitioner who does not have a large appellate practice and thus is not as familiar with the rules of appellate procedure as an attorney at a larger firm; blanket dismissals for less serious rules violations will discourage those attorneys from bringing appeals and may result in their being forced to discontinue any appellate practice. As such, when rules violations do not impede an evaluation of the case on the merits, the appropriate remedy should not be dismissal, but rather the imposition of monetary sanctions.
*398In this case, the rules violations listed by the majority are entirely correct. However, I believe that the greater purpose of the rules of appellate procedure can be better served by hearing the merits of this case and imposing monetary sanctions on the attorneys or parties. The violations here are of some of the more technical points of the rules — failure to reference the record or transcript in assignment of errors, failure to state the standard of review, etc. — and do not taint the substance of appellant’s arguments or require this Court to create arguments for appellant.
The majority also notes that in this case, as in many others brought to this Court recently, it was the opposing party who called the Court’s attention to the rules violations and moved the Court to dismiss the suit. In many such instances, the opposing party might not have made such a motion had this Court not incorrectly applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Viar. In such situations, the offending attorney’s response should be to file a motion to amend his brief and correct those violations. Allowing these motions, if timely made and appropriate in changes, is in the interest of judicial economy as well as fairness. It also promotes the professional courtesy and collegiality this Court should be encouraging among members of the legal profession.
For these reasons, rather than dismissing the case for its rules violations, I would hear the case on its merits and impose monetary sanctions on the attorneys or parties for those violations.