Court Opinion

ID: 9915405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 15:04:19.90768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:15.322470
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                      SANDRA PEREZ CARBONELL,

                                Appellant,

                                       v.

           CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,

                                    Appellee.

                              No. 2D22-495

                             January 5, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Emily A.
Peacock, Judge.

Jeremy D. Bailie of Weber, Crabb & Wein, P.A., St. Petersburg, for
Appellant.

Edgardo Ferreyra and Daniel S. Weinger of Luks, Santaniello, Petrillo,
Cohen & Peterfriend, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.

LaROSE, Judge.

     Citizens Property Insurance Corporation insured Sandra Perez
Carbonell's house. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Citizens in a
sinkhole case. It found that Ms. Carbonell's house suffered no structural
damage caused by sinkhole activity. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R.
App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). She takes issue with evidentiary rulings made by
the trial court. Because Ms. Carbonell has not shown that the trial court
abused its discretion, we affirm.
                                  Background
      Citizens issued an all-risk homeowner's insurance policy to Ms.
Carbonell. The policy covered "sinkhole loss." The policy defined a
"sinkhole loss" as "structural damage" caused by "sinkhole activity."
      Ms. Carbonell reported possible sinkhole activity to Citizens. See
§ 627.706(2)(i), Fla. Stat. (2017) (" 'Sinkhole activity' means settlement or
systematic weakening of the earth supporting the covered building only if
the settlement or systematic weakening results from contemporaneous
movement or raveling of soils, sediments, or rock materials into
subterranean voids created by the effect of water on a limestone or
similar rock formation."). Ms. Carbonell observed cracks in her driveway
and noticed that the ground was sinking from the driveway leading to her
front steps. She further recounted that
      the back door doesn't open. . . . And what was mentioned
      also about my washer/dryer. It's stackable, and it's leaning
      on the pantry, and it bangs and shakes sometimes against
      the pantry. There's cracked tiles in the front porch. The
      laminate that was put down after the tile was removed is
      separating. There's cracks on the walls, cracks in the
      driveway.
      Citizens hired a forensic engineering firm to determine whether a
sinkhole loss occurred. See § 627.706(2)(j) (" 'Sinkhole loss' means
structural damage to the covered building, including the foundation,
caused by sinkhole activity.").
      The engineering firm found that the damage observed by Ms.
Carbonell "was not structural damage as defined by Chapter 627.706 of
the Florida Statute [sic]." See § 627.706(2)(k) (setting forth a five-part
definition of "structural damage"). Accordingly, the engineering firm
concluded that Ms. Carbonell's house did not sustain structural damage
caused by sinkhole activity.

                                      2
     Citizens denied coverage. It explained that "[b]ecause [Ms.
Carbonell's] home has not been structurally damaged, there is no
Sinkhole Loss and no coverage available under [the] policy." Relying on
the engineering firm's report, Citizens advised her that an alternative
combination of factors caused the damage to the house, including
"differential vertical movement," "material expansion," and "type and/or
quality of construction methods."
     Ms. Carbonell sued Citizens. She sought a declaration that
sinkhole activity caused structural damage to her house and that her
policy covered the damage.
     We recount those portions of the three-day trial necessary to
evaluate Ms. Carbonell's appellate arguments.
     Ms. Carbonell called Barry Smith, a licensed professional engineer,
as a witness. He testified that Ms. Carbonell's house suffered structural
damage under two parts of the five-part statutory definition. See
§ 627.706(2)(k)1, 2. Mr. Smith concluded that the piers supporting the
home experienced "vertical movement" and "the house itself [was]
moving" downward into the soil:
     It certainly appeared that the foundation was significantly
     moving downward because the soils weren't holding the
     foundation adequately. So, the foundation was moving. That
     was allowing the next piece, which is these wood-frame
     girders and rim joists to move, that was allowing the floor
     joists to move and the overall condition resulted in the house
     itself moving.
See § 627.706(2)(k)2 (defining "structural damage" as including
"[f]oundation displacement or deflection in excess of acceptable variances
as defined in ACI 318-95 or the Florida Building Code, which results in
settlement-related damage to the primary structural members or primary
structural systems that prevents those members or systems from

                                     3
supporting the loads and forces they were designed to support to the
extent that stresses in those primary structural members or primary
structural systems exceeds one and one-third the nominal strength
allowed under the Florida Building Code for new buildings of similar
structure, purpose, or location"). Mr. Smith explained that the house's
floor was uneven, with portions experiencing "large scale sloping." Mr.
Smith expressed concern that where sloping occurred near the
foundation piers, the foundation was shifting due to "movement or
settlement [of the] piers." See § 627.706(2)(k)1 (describing "structural
damage" as including "[i]nterior floor displacement or deflection in excess
of acceptable variances . . . which results in settlement-related damage to
the interior such that the interior building structure or members become
unfit for service or represents a safety hazard as defined within the
Florida Building Code").
      James Funderburk testified next for Ms. Carbonell. He is a
licensed engineer and geologist. He testified that he found "damage or
sinking." He described a "vertical process" in which ground movement
(or settlement) caused foundation movement leading to damage of the
house's supporting structures. He concluded that "sinkhole activity is
the only peril or geological hazard present to account for settlement of
the [home]."
      John Edwards testified for Citizens. He is a licensed professional
engineer. He testified about settlement of the foundation. Based on his
multiple site inspections and review of competing engineering reports, he
"conclu[ded] that there is no[ settlement damage] that [he] can identify."
When discussing the photographs he had taken of Ms. Carbonell's
house, Mr. Edwards testified that "all of this is just in great shape. . . . .
[T]his is all in very good shape and not indicative of any settlement

                                       4
damage that [he] could identify." When asked whether the photographs
and his review of "any data [he] had to look at" indicated settlement at
Ms. Carbonell's home, Mr. Edwards testified:
           There's [sic] not signs of settlement due to the
     foundation giving way. There's obviously—this could be
     considered settlement if we're talking about a floor, but this is
     not supported by the foundation or the piers that support the
     house. So everything I saw relative to these piers and the
     girders that sit upon them are not settling to any degree that I
     can observe.
     During cross-examination, Ms. Carbonell sought to elicit Mr.
Edwards' opinion on sinkhole activity. For instance, Ms. Carbonell
queried Mr. Edwards as to whether "there's sinkhole activity in . . .
Boring B-3?" Citizens promptly objected, arguing that the question
"[wa]s far outside the scope of what was asked on direct." The trial court
sustained the objection. Further on cross-examination, Mr. Edwards
attempted to decouple "settlement" and "structural damage." He
explained that the latter does not automatically follow the former:
     Q: I mean, if there was evidence to you that the concrete
     piers had vertically moved downward, you would have to say
     there's settlement then at that point, right?
     A: I would say there may be settlement. That would be
     different than saying there's structural damage caused by
     settlement. But, yeah, if I had seen a pier that is separated
     from the girder, I would say that it has settled. Whether or
     not that qualified as structural damage would be another
     question.
     Following Mr. Edwards' redirect examination by Citizens, Ms.
Carbonell sought to recross Mr. Edwards about the presence of sinkhole
activity. In pertinent part, she argued:
           Yeah. So, Your Honor, for the record, I'm going to ask
     for an opportunity to recross Mr. Edwards. You know, what I
     tried to establish in my original cross is, you're a geotechnical
     guy, you're looking at the soils, you're trying to figure out if
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     the house settled, you admit that there's loose soils at the
     property.
            And I tried to get into, you know, sinkhole activity being
     a component of that, things you're going to look at. The data
     I tried to show him being a component of what he saw, and I
     wasn't allowed to get into that.
            And then Mr. Edwards just now started telling the jury
     that, yes, as part of his analysis he reviewed the SPT Borings.
     He specifically mentioned the SPT borings, which were the
     ones I tried to show him and wasn't allowed to. And he
     mentioned the soil densities, and he just talked about the
     soils that are supporting this house are—are fine and he
     doesn't see anything problematic. Well, now I should have
     the opportunity to show him something problematic.
     Citizens retorted that it "never opened any type of door to sinkhole
activity whatsoever. On cross-examination when I objected, he asked
him whether there was sinkhole activity. That's what I objected to."
Citizens explained that Mr. Edwards' direct examination concerned
whether the house's foundation was properly supported considering the
type and composition of soils around the foundation:
     [D]uring the cross-examination [Ms. Carbonell] asked whether
     [Mr. Edwards] had considered any of the other soil conditions.
           So I made it clear that [Mr. Edwards] reviewed all of the
     data. He didn't provide any opinion whatsoever whether
     there's sinkhole activity or there's not sinkhole activity. What
     he said is: I reviewed all of the data, and I believe that the
     soils are—they can support the house, whatever and so on.
     We could have it read back.
            But we never talked about sinkhole activity. We never
     delved into the boring itself as to what it means, how do you
     interpret this, and if you see this, doesn't that mean this.
     None of that. Just did you review the data. I did. And you
     still believe that this soil—or these soils could support the
     home. I do.
           ....

                                     6
             So that's all he's working in, is whether or not this
       foundation system is properly supported. He's not here to
       talk about sinkhole activity, evaluate what's going on down
       below. I asked him about these soils around the foundation.
       We never left the foundation area.
            ....
             The mere fact that he said that he reviewed all of the
       data doesn't somehow negate that there was—that never any
       type of testimony whatsoever related to what the conclusions
       or what the sinkhole activity component of their case.
       The trial court declined Ms. Carbonell's entreaty to recross-examine
Mr. Edwards about sinkhole activity. It explained "that's just not been a
part of any of the [direct-examination] testimony." The trial court allowed
Ms. Carbonell to proffer Mr. Edwards' testimony.
       Mr. Edwards' proffered testimony was unequivocal. Citizens never
asked him to opine on the presence or absence of sinkhole activity. In
fact, Mr. Edwards explained that he had no information to form such an
opinion.
       Following the proffer, the trial court remained steadfast: "He
doesn't have an opinion. He's not comfortable. So I'm not going to let it
go."
       Citizens next called Tom Fisher, a structural engineer, to testify.
Mr. Fisher detailed his structural analysis of Ms. Carbonell's house. He
determined "that structural damage according to [section 627.706(2)(k)'s]
definition was not occurring at the Carbonell residence." Citizens
questioned Mr. Fisher about the cause of any damage to the home, and
the remedy:
       Q: To the extent that there is damage at the home, was it
       caused by something within the structure above the ground?
       A: Yes. Everything that's associated with this is above
       ground.

                                      7
     Q: And do you believe that the fix that needs to be done at
     this house is something that can be done by just working on
     that flooring area above the ground?
     A: Yes. The fix would be a very common procedure for this
     type of house.
On cross-examination, Mr. Fisher agreed that "there's been some damage
to some structural components of th[e] home"; however, "[i]t's not related
to anything below ground." The settlement he did see on the property
did not affect the home itself, and "[t]he statutes require that I evaluate
the house itself, the main structure."
     Citizens rested its case after Mr. Fisher's testimony. Ms. Carbonell
sought to present the deposition testimony of Robert Brown as rebuttal
evidence:
     I was planning on reading in the deposition of Robert Brown.
     Mr. Brown was the engineer from Envista that originally
     investigated this loss [for Citizens]. Mr. Brown's testimony
     and opinion is completely different than what Mr. Fisher just
     told this jury. He flat—he flat said the deviations in this floor
     elevation survey are the result of downward differential
     movement of the foundation pier system because of the soils
     not supporting it.
            ....
           So there were representations made by Citizens through
     the denial letters, and the reports, and information they sent
     her, that your home has settled. The foundation piers of your
     home have moved, and that has caused the damage to your
     house, but we're denying that because we don't pay for earth
     movement or sinking. They put that in the denial letter. It's
     an affirmative defense in the case, and it's contradictory to
     the evidence that they present here.
Among other things, Citizens responded that Mr. Brown's deposition
testimony was cumulative. "[B]oth of [Ms. Carbonell's] experts have
already testified that these . . . piers have either sank or settled or moved
or whatever. So reading this in is, number one, cumulative." The trial

                                      8
court agreed and prevented Ms. Carbonell from reading Mr. Brown's
deposition into the record.
     The jury returned a verdict for Citizens. On the interrogatory
verdict form, the jury found that although Ms. Carbonell had proven that
her house suffered a physical loss, Citizens demonstrated that her house
suffered no structural damage.
                                 Discussion
I.   Evidentiary Rulings
     Ms. Carbonell contends that the trial court made two erroneous
evidentiary rulings that thwarted her ability to fully present her case. We
review these claims for an abuse of discretion.1 See Knight v. GTE Fed.
Credit Union, 310 So. 3d 959, 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) ("A trial court's
ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion."). "This standard of review affords the trial court considerable
leeway . . . ." Hassenplug v. Hassenplug, 346 So. 3d 149, 152 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2022) ("[I]f reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the
action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and
there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. The discretionary
ruling of the trial [court] should be disturbed only when [its] decision
fails to satisfy this test of reasonableness." (second and third alterations
in original) (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.
1980))).

     1 Following return of the jury's verdict, Ms. Carbonell filed a timely

motion for new trial. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(b) ("A motion for new trial
or for rehearing must be served not later than 15 days after the return of
the verdict in a jury action . . . ."). In moving for a new trial, Ms.
Carbonell made the same arguments that she now raises on appeal. We
review the trial court's denial of a motion for new trial under the same
abuse of discretion standard. See Southwin, Inc. v. Verde, 806 So. 2d
586, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
                                      9
     (a)   Limited cross-examination of Mr. Edwards
     Ms. Carbonell claims that the trial court improperly limited her
cross-examination of Mr. Edwards. According to her, the trial court
prevented her from soliciting his opinion about sinkhole activity at her
house. She contends that Mr. Edwards' proffered testimony "was
squarely within the parameters of his testimony on direct examination."
     Ms. Carbonell tells us that "[t]he primary issue in this case is
whether there is sinkhole activity at the property that caused structural
damage to the property." She claims that "[p]reventing the jury from
hearing about the presence of sinkhole activity significantly undercut
[her] ability to rebut the testimony of Citizens' expert witnesses." This
argument cannot win the day.
     Insofar as Ms. Carbonell suggests that the jury heard no evidence
that there was sinkhole activity at the house, the record reports the
opposite. Ms. Carbonell's two experts testified that there was damaging
sinkhole activity at the house.
     During its direct examination of Mr. Edwards, Citizens never asked
about sinkhole activity. Thus, Ms. Carbonell's attempt to cross-examine
Mr. Edwards about sinkhole activity exceeded the scope of direct
examination.
           Although a trial court possesses wide latitude in
     allowing cross-examination, such latitude is not without
     restrictions. Questions on cross-examination must relate
     either to credibility or to matters elicited on direct testimony.
     Cross-examination is not a vehicle to present defensive
     evidence. If a party wishes to place before the trier of fact
     testimony beyond the adverse witness' direct testimony, other
     than matters of credibility, the witness must be called in that
     party's case.

                                     10
Music v. Hebb, 744 So. 2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citation
omitted). If she wished to query Mr. Edwards on his opinion, she should
have called him in her case. For whatever reason, she did not do so.
     Critically, Ms. Carbonell failed to demonstrate that Mr. Edwards
was qualified to offer an expert opinion about sinkhole activity. See
Chavez v. State, 12 So. 3d 199, 205 (Fla. 2009) (observing that one of the
preliminary determinations which must be made before admitting expert
testimony is "whether the witness is adequately qualified to express an
opinion on the matter"). During his proffer, Mr. Edwards unequivocally
testified that Citizens never asked him to provide an opinion on sinkhole
activity. He admitted that Citizens had not provided him with any
information to formulate such an opinion. See Charles W. Ehrhardt,
Ehrhardt's Florida Evidence § 702.1 (2023 ed.) ("A witness may only
testify as an expert in the areas of his or her expertise. It is not enough
that the witness is qualified in some general way. The witness must
possess special knowledge about the discrete subject about which an
opinion is expressed.").
     Mr. Edwards had no basis upon which to opine about sinkhole
activity at the house. See § 90.704, Fla. Stat. (2017) ("The facts or data
upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by, or made known to, the expert at or before the trial.");
Daniels v. State, 4 So. 3d 745, 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ("An expert's
opinion is admissible if it is 'based on valid underlying data which has a
proper factual basis.' " (quoting Carnival Corp. v. Stowers, 834 So. 2d
386, 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003))). Consequently, the trial court properly
excluded Mr. Edwards from opining on the presence or absence of
sinkhole activity. See, e.g., Lubkey v. Compuvac Sys., Inc., 857 So. 2d
966, 968 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (observing that in an attorney's fee hearing,

                                     11
"[t]he expert's opinion, lacking any factual foundation, was not
competent proof"); Martin v. Story, 97 So. 2d 343, 346–47 (Fla. 2d DCA
1957) (holding that opinion based on incomplete information was not
admissible); Dozier v. Hodges, 849 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
(concluding that the trial court correctly excluded officer's estimate of
speed even though the expert had been qualified as an expert because he
had testified in his deposition that "he took no measurements, made no
calculations, and had no factual basis for his opinion"); Young-Chin v.
City of Homestead, 597 So. 2d 879, 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) ("It has
always been the rule that an expert opinion is inadmissible where it is
apparent that the opinion is based on insufficient data." (quoting Husky
Indus., Inc. v. Black, 434 So. 2d 988, 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983))); cf.
Jordan v. State, 694 So. 2d 708, 715–17 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing a witness to testify to matters
beyond her area of expertise).
     (b) Denial of rebuttal evidence from Robert Brown's deposition
     Ms. Carbonell asserts that the trial court erroneously denied her
request to offer Mr. Brown's deposition testimony. Ms. Carbonell asserts
that Mr. Brown's deposition testimony was noncumulative and would
have demonstrated the presence of sinkhole activity at her house.
     In her initial brief, Ms. Carbonell tells us that
     [n]ot only did [her] retained expert[s] testify in support of her
     position . . . . But . . . Citizens' own expert[, Mr. Brown,], retained
     as required by Florida law, investigated the property, and
     determined there was downward movement of the soil under the
     driveway and under the foundation of the home that caused
     damage to the home.
In other words, Ms. Carbonell argues that although she presented
evidence "in support of her position," she wanted Mr. Brown, "Citizen's
own expert," to testify to the same. Tacitly, Ms. Carbonell concedes that

                                     12
his deposition testimony would be cumulative. Cf. Gutierrez v. Vargas,
239 So. 3d 615, 625 (Fla. 2018) ("While two proposed witnesses of the
same medical specialty might indicate the possibility of cumulative
evidence, the real question is whether they will testify to cumulative
opinions based on the same facts." (emphasis omitted) (quoting Delgardo
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 731 So. 2d 11, 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999))).
      Ms. Carbonell offered Mr. Brown's deposition to prove two points:
(1) "that there was downward movement of the soil under the driveway
and under the foundation of the home that caused damage to the home"
and (2) that "the observed cracking in the interior wall and ceiling
finishes . . . was the result of differential vertical movement of the
underlying soil supporting [concrete masonry unit (CMU)] pier
foundations." Of course, her experts testified that "the foundation was
significantly moving downward because the soils weren't holding the
foundation adequately," and that there "was movement or settlement [of
the] piers, I'm talking about moving downward into the – into the earth;
so, vertical movement." Contrary to Ms. Carbonell's position, the trial
court did not prevent the jury from hearing that "there was downward
movement of the soil under the driveway and under the foundation of the
home that caused damage to the home." See Morgan v. State, 415 So. 2d
6, 10–11 (Fla. 1982) ("When the court errs in disallowing certain evidence
or a question or series of questions on cross examination but
substantially the same matters sought to be presented or elicited are
brought before the jury through other testimony of the same or another
witness, the error is harmless.").
      Seemingly, Ms. Carbonell wanted to argue to the jury that Citizen's
own expert's conclusions supported her position. Be that as it may, the
trial court retains "broad discretion regarding the admissibility of

                                     13
rebuttal testimony." Castillo v. Bush, 902 So. 2d 317, 324 (Fla. 5th DCA
2005). Indeed, "[t]rial courts have broad discretion to admit rebuttal
testimony, and 'a trial court abuses that discretion when it limits non-
cumulative rebuttal that goes to the heart of the principal defense.' "
Gutierrez, 239 So. 3d at 626 (quoting Mendez v. John Caddell Constr. Co.,
700 So. 2d 439, 440–41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)).
      On this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding Mr. Brown's cumulative rebuttal evidence. See
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203.
II.   Harmful error
      Ms. Carbonell maintains that "the exclusion of [the above-
referenced] testimony was harmful" and a new trial should be granted.
Essentially, she claims that the alleged errors were not harmless.
      "An appellate court may 'set aside or reverse a judgment, or grant a
new trial on the basis of [improperly] admitted or excluded evidence' only
'when a substantial right of the party [appealing] is adversely affected.' "
Fla. Inst. for Neurological Rehab., Inc. v. Marshall, 943 So. 2d 976, 978-79
(Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting § 90.104(1), Fla. Stat.
(2006)). However, having concluded that the trial court's evidentiary
rulings were proper, there is no error, harmful or otherwise. See Pelham
v. Walker, 135 So. 3d 1114, 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (explaining that a
trial court's erroneous evidentiary ruling "must be harmful in order to
warrant reversal").
                                Conclusion
      We affirm the judgment in favor of Citizens.
      Affirmed.

KHOUZAM and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.

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Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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