Court Opinion

ID: 9427112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:19:46.146956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:04.938203
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
Experience teaches us that most people formally charged with crime are guilty; yet we presume innocence until the trial is over. Experience also justifies the inference that most people who remain silent in, the face of serious accusation have something to hide and are therefore probably guilty; yet we forbid trial judges or juries to draw that inference. The presumption of innocence and the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause impose a significant cost on the prosecutor who must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without the aid of his testimony. That cost is justified *343by the paramount importance of protecting a small minority of accused persons — those who are actually innocent — from wrongful conviction.
The Fifth Amendment itself is predicated on the assumption that there are innocent persons who might be found guilty if they could be compelled to testify at their own trials.1 Every trial lawyer knows that some truthful denials of guilt may be considered incredible by a jury — either because of their inherent improbability or because their explanation, under cross-examination, will reveal unfavorable facts about the witness or his associates. The Constitution therefore gives the defendant and his lawyer the absolute right to decide that the accused shall not become a witness against himself. Even if the judge is convinced that the defendant's testimony would exonerate him, and even if he is motivated only by a desire to protect the defendant from the risk of an erroneous convic*344tion, the judge has no power to override counsel’s judgment about what is in his client’s best interest.2
The Constitution wisely commits the critical decision of whether the defendant shall take the stand to the defendant and his lawyer, rather than the judge, for at least two reasons. First, they have greater access to information bearing on the decision than the judge can normally have. Second, they are motivated solely by concern for the defendant’s interests; the judge inevitably is concerned with society’s interest in convicting the guilty as well as protecting the innocent. The choice, therefore, to testify or not to testify is for the defendant and his lawyer, not the judge, to make. The Constitution commands that the decision be made free of any compulsion by the State.
In Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, the Court held that fair and accurate comment by the trial judge on the defendant’s failure to take the witness stand was a form of compulsion forbidden by the Constitution.3 By making silence “costly,” the Court ruled, the trial judge’s comments had an effect similar in kind, though not in degree, to a contempt ruling or a thumbscrew. Id., at 614. Of course, a defendant’s silence at his own trial is “almost certain to prejudice the defense no matter what else happens in the courtroom”; 4 for the jury will probably draw an unfavorable inference despite instructions to the contrary. Although this “cost” can never be eliminated, Griffin stands for the proposition that the government may not add unnecessarily to the risk taken by a defendant who stands mute. Reasonable men may differ *345about the wisdom of that holding.5 But if it is still the law, this conviction should be overturned.
In some trials, the defendant’s silence will be like “the sun . . . shining with full blaze on the open eye.” State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 301 (1871). But in other trials — perhaps when the whole story has been told by other witnesses or when the prosecutor’s case is especially weak — the jury may not focus on the defendant’s failure to testify. For the judge or prosecutor to call it to' the jury’s attention has an undeniably adverse effect on the defendant. Even if jurors try faithfully to obey their instructions, the connection between silence and guilt is often too direct and too natural to be resisted. When the jurors have in fact overlooked it, telling them to ignore the defendant’s silence is like telling them not to think of a white bear.
The Court thinks it “would be strange indeed to conclude that this cautionary instruction violates the very constitutional provision it is intended to protect.” Ante, at 339. Unless the same words mean different things in different mouths, this holding also applies to statements made by the prosecutor in his closing argument. Yet I wonder if the Court would find petitioner’s argument as strange if the pros*346ecutor, or even the judge, had given the instruction three or four times, in slightly different form, just to make sure the jury knew that silence, like killing Caesar, is consistent with honor.®
*347It is unrealistic to assume that instructions on the right to silence always have a benign effect.7 At times the instruction will make the defendant’s silence costly indeed. So long as Griffin is good law, the State must have a strong reason for ignoring the defendant’s request that the instruction not be given. Remarkably, the Court fails to identify any reason for overriding the defendant’s choice.8 Eliminating the instruction on request costs the State nothing, other than the advantage of calling attention to the defendant’s silence. A defendant may waive his Fifth Amendment right to silence, and a judge who thinks his decision unwise may not overrule it. The defendant should also be able to waive, without leave of court, his lesser right to an instruction about his Fifth *348Amendment right to silence.9 Many state courts have accepted this conclusion by ruling that no self-incrimination instruction should be given over the defendant’s objection.10 An ungrudging application of Griffin requires that we do the same.
I respectfully dissent.
Mr. Justice Marshall joins this opinion, with the exception of the first paragraph and footnote 5.

 “But the act was framed with a due regard also to those who might prefer to-rely upon the presumption of innocence which the law gives to every one, and not wish to be witnesses. It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged against him,, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It is not every one, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand. The statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who from the causes mentioned might refuse to ask to be a witness, particularly when they may have been in some degree compromised by their association with others, declares that the failure of the defendant in a criminal action to request to be a witness shall not create any presumption against him.” Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60, 66.
The Court was there referring to the statutory prohibition against comment on the failure of the accused to testify. But, as we stated in Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 613-614: “If the words ‘Fifth Amendment’ are substituted for ‘act’ and for ‘statute,’ the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is reflected.”

 Moreover, there are defendants who prefer to risk a finding of guilt rather than being required to incriminate others whom they either love or fear.

 Griffin was decided over the dissent of Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice White. I cannot believe that any Member of the Griffin majority would join today’s opinion.

 United States v. Davis, 437 F. 2d 928, 933 (CA7 1971).

 The Court today cites the same scholarly materials, prepared in the 1930’s and 1940’s, that Mr. Justice Stewart cited in his dissent in Griffin. Compare ante, at 337 n. 5 with 380 U. S., at 622 nn. 6-8. The list could have been much longer. In fact, the roster of scholars and judges with reservations about expanding the Fifth Amendment privilege reads like an honor roll of the legal profession. See, e. g., Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 Harv. L. Rev. 71, 75-88 (1891); Corwin, The Supreme Court’s Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 207 (1930); Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 1014 (1934); Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For Constitutional Change, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 671 (1968); W. Schaefer, The Suspect and Society 59-76 (1967); Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 677 (1966).

 Cf. W. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. II :
“Here, under leave of Brutus and the rest (For Brutus is an honourable man;
So are they all, all honourable men)
Come I to speak in Caesar’s funeral.
He was my friend, faithful and just to me:
But Brutus says he was ambitious;
And Brutus is an honourable man.
He hath brought many captives home to Rome,
Whose ransoms did the general coffers fill:
Did this in Caesar seem ambitious?
When that the poor have cried, Caesar hath wept:
Ambition should be made of sterner stuff:
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious;
And Brutus is an honourable man.
You all did see that on the Lupercal I thrice presented him a kingly crown,
Which he did thrice refuse: was this ambition?
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious;
And, sure, he is an honourable man.”
For the sake of comparison, here is a charge actually given in one reported case:
“ 'I recall that the defendant, even though he offered evidence, he did not take the stand and testify in his own behalf. Now, I make mention of that fact for this purpose. I have told you that he had no responsibility to offer any evidence, had a right to but no responsibility to; that he owed you no duty to offer any evidence; that the State had the whole burden and has the whole burden of proof throughout this ease. Now that being so, he had an absolute right under the law to try his lawsuit in the fashion that he decided that it ought to be tried. He had a right to offer no evidence. If he offered any, he had a right to remain off the stand. You can’t punish any man for exercising a lawful right. So I give emphasis to this fact: The fact that the defendant did not testify does not permit you to speculate about why he did not. I have told you why he did not. He has exercised a lawful right. You may not taire the position during *347your deliberations did he have something he didn’t want us to know. He has exercised the lawful right and you may not hold it against him to any extent the fact that he did not testify. You must deal with what you have before you in this evidence and you may not hold against the defendant a’taE the fact that he did not testify.’ ” State v. Caron, 288 N. C. 467, 471-472, 219 S. E. 2d 68, 71 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U. S. 971.

 Deciding when the instruction will do more harm than good is not an easy task. But the same may be said of deciding whether to take the stand at all.

 How far the Court deviates from the course charted in Griffin may be seen by comparing its reasoning to the analysis in an earlier case that followed Griffin more faithfully. In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, state law required the defendant to be the first defense witness if he wanted to testify at all. Since defendants may not be sequestered like other witnesses, this rule was the only way to prevent opportunistic defendants from shading their testimony to match that of other defense witnesses. Despite the substantial state interest in avoiding perjury, this Court struck down the rule, relying on Griffin. 406 U. S., at 611. The Brooks court thought that a defendant who planned to take the stand only if his case was weak, but who could not judge its weakness in advance, might be imnecessarEy compelled to testify under the Tennessee law. In Brooks, the State had a good reason for it's action; here the State has none. In Brooks, the compulsive force of the rule was speculative at best; here it is direct and plain. If today we are true to Griffin, as the Court asserts, then Brooks was surely wrong.

 It is true that Learned Hand thought it absurd to find a violation of the Fifth Amendment when an instruction of this sort was given over the defendant’s objection. Ante, at 341 n. 12. See Becher v. United States, 5 F. 2d 45, 49 (CA2 1924). But Judge Hand did not foresee Griffin, just as he did not foresee developments that were nearer at hand. In United States v. Bruno, 105 F. 2d 921 (CA2 1939), for example, he joined an opinion affirming a conviction even though the trial judge had refused to instruct the jury not to penalize the defendants for remaining silent. This Court granted certiorari and reversed. 308 U. S. 287. Now that Griffin has been decided, the more significant portion of Judge Hand’s statement is his belief that "[i]t is no doubt better if a defendant requests no charge upon the subject, for the trial judge to say nothing about it.” 5 F. 2d, at 49.

 See People v. Hampton, 394 Mich. 437, 231 N. W. 2d 654 (1975); Gross v. State, 261 Ind. 489, 306 N. E. 2d 371 (1974); State v. White, 285 A. 2d 832 (Me. 1972); Villines v. State, 492 P. 2d 343 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Kimball, 176 N. W. 2d 864 (Iowa 1970); Russell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S. W. 2d 213 (1966); People v. Horrigan, 253 Cal. App. 2d 519, 61 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1967); People v. Molano, 253 Cal. App. 2d 841, 61 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1967). See also United States v. Smith, 392 F. 2d 302 (CA4 1968).