Court Opinion

ID: 9377599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 15:02:03.283528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:15.143211
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 141
                    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                          DIVISION I
                                         No. CR-22-278

                                                  Opinion Delivered March   8, 2023

JIMMY STANDRIDGE                           APPEAL FROM THE MILLER
                                 APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                           [NO. 46CR-20-453]
V.
                                                  HONORABLE L. WREN AUTREY,
STATE OF ARKANSAS                                 JUDGE
                                    APPELLEE
                                                  AFFIRMED

                                   MIKE MURPHY, Judge

        Jimmy Standridge appeals the verdict of a Miller County jury convicting him of four

 counts of rape and six counts of sexual assault and sentencing him to 220 years in the

 Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, Standridge argues that the evidence does

 not support the conviction and that the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing the

 State to lead a witness. We affirm.

        The following evidence as presented at trial support the verdict. Standridge and

 Amanda Fryer were divorced for a second time in 2015. Standridge had primary custody of

 their daughter, the victim, MC. MC was about eight in 2015 and fifteen at the time of the

 trial. At trial, MC testified that over the three years following the divorce, her father would

 initiate sex and sexual acts with her with some frequency. From roughly the age of nine to

 twelve, if she stayed at her father’s house, she would usually sleep in bed with him. She
testified about the first time he touched her sexually. They were lying in his bed, and he

touched her outside her underwear; then, he put his hand inside her underwear and

progressed to moving his fingers “in and out” of her vagina.

       She testified about the first time he had sex with her, shortly after her birthday. She

testified how he had taken her to his bedroom, undressed her, positioned her on her

stomach, had penetrative intercourse with her, and ejaculated on her back. She testified that

it hurt. Another time, when she was about ten, they were going to bed, and he positioned

her on her “hands and knees,” got behind her, and put his penis in her vagina. She described

it as “going in and out.” He ejaculated on the bed. She testified similarly about another

occasion when she was on her back, and he ejaculated on her stomach. MC testified that “it

happened a bunch.” She said that when this was happening, she usually felt scared, like she

couldn’t move. Physically, she said that “sometimes it hurt and sometimes it didn’t.” On

“more [times] than [she could] count,” he had touched her outside her underwear “in the

front” and “just rub it and stuff.” She said that “sometimes it felt good; sometimes it didn’t.”

       She said that Standridge also put his penis in her mouth. When asked to elaborate,

she explained “[h]e was usually sitting on the bed, and I would be like on the ground on my

knees, like in between his legs.” He would make her get on her knees. He would ejaculate in

her mouth, and she would spit it out. She testified about a time that they were in the shower

together and “he made me get on my knees and he put his penis in my mouth.” That time

she explained that he pushed her head up and down.

       MC testified that Standridge told her that if she ever told “he would slit my throat or

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take me to the woods and leave my dead body.” When she was around twelve, she tried

telling the school counselor. The counselor suggested calling the father to school to talk it

through. MC refused to attend the meeting. MC testified that later that day, once she was

home, Standridge “started beating [her] and yelling and cussing and screaming . . . he’d

already, you know, been drinking.” She said he was mad that she’d told the counselor. He

wanted to have sex, so they did, but she “didn’t do it right,” which set him off more. He held

a gun to her throat and told her he would shoot her throat so she couldn’t talk.

       MC eventually told her mother about the sexual abuse. Fryer called law enforcement,

and an interview with the Children’s Advocacy Center was set up. MC, who was fourteen or

fifteen by then, did not tell the interviewer everything in that interview, but she did disclose

the extent of the sexual abuse in a later interview with the prosecutor.

       Fryer, MC’s mother, testified about her relationship with Standridge, and how he was

violent and controlling toward her and violent toward MC’s brother, MC2. She said that

Standridge would still shower with MC2 even when he was twelve or thirteen. She said that

Standridge was a little too physical with MC, rubbing, patting, and constantly having her in

his lap. She testified how MC became more withdrawn as she got older, and she started

cutting herself. MC told Fryer that she had been touched inappropriately, prompting Fryer

to call the child-abuse hotline. MC2 testified about the mental and physical abuse he

experienced from his father. Looking back, he said that he realized some things were not

normal like being “forced to shower with him” until he was twelve or thirteen and “forced

to sleep in the same bed with him.” MC2 testified that Standridge would sometimes have an

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erection when they were sleeping together, and he could feel it pressing into his back or leg.

       Christa Neal (an expert in child sexual abuse forensic interviewing), Kayla Berry (a

detective with the Texarkana police), and Laurie Stephens (the supervisor for the Crimes

Against Children Division of the Arkansas State Police) also testified for the State.

       Additionally of note, throughout MC’s testimony, she was difficult to hear. This was

due, in part, to her crying and to her not being close enough to the microphone or speaking

clearly. On numerous occasions the prosecutor repeated portions of MC’s testimony before

asking the next question. After several questions in this manner, Standridge’s counsel

objected to the leading nature of the exchanges. The court was sensitive to the objection and

agreed that MC needed to speak louder, but it overruled the objection, reasoning that the

prosecutor was just helping make the testimony understandable.

       At the close of the State’s case, Standridge moved for a directed verdict, stating that

the State had failed to prove each element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The

court denied the motion. The motion was renewed at the close of all the evidence and again

denied. The jury ultimately convicted Standridge, and Standridge now appeals. On appeal,

he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of his objection to the leading

nature of portions of the State’s direct examination of MC.

       Standridge first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing challenges to

the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether substantial evidence, direct or

circumstantial, supports the verdict. Ralston v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 175, 573 S.W.3d 607.

Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty to compel a conclusion without resort

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to suspicion or conjecture. Id. On review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the State and only consider evidence that supports the verdict. Hillman v. State, 2019 Ark.

App. 89, at 2, 569 S.W.3d 372, 374.

       To convict Standridge of rape, the State had to prove that he “engage[d] in sexual

intercourse or deviate sexual activity with” MC, “who was less than [14] years of age.” Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2021). Sexual intercourse means the penetration,

however slight, of the labia majora by a penis. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(10) (Supp. 2021).

Deviate sexual activity “means any act of sexual gratification involving the penetration,

however slight, of the [] mouth of a person by the penis of another person [] or of the labia

majora [] of one person by any body member [] manipulated by another person.” Ark. Code

Ann. § 5-14-101(1)(A)–(B). A person commits second-degree sexual assault if he is eighteen

years of age or older and engages in sexual contact with someone who is less than fourteen

years old. “Sexual contact” is defined as “any act of sexual gratification involving the

touching, directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, buttocks, or anus of a person or

the breast of a female.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(9).

       Standridge argues that there was no evidence presented to substantiate the rape claims

by MC. He contends that there was no evidence of injury or a sexual-assault examination

performed. He points out that MC changed her story from the first time she told it. However,

a rape victim’s testimony may constitute substantial evidence to sustain a conviction of rape,

even when the victim is a child. Brown v. State, 374 Ark. 341, 343, 288 S.W.3d 226, 228–29

(2008). The rape victim’s testimony need not be corroborated nor is scientific evidence

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required, and the victim’s testimony describing penetration is enough for a conviction. Id.

The principle that a victim’s uncorroborated testimony constitutes substantial evidence to

support a guilty verdict is likewise true with respect to sexual offenses other than rape. Id. To

the extent that Standridge attempts to attack MC’s credibility, it was the jury’s duty to weigh

her testimony against any inconsistence evidence or conflicting testimony. Ralston v State,

2019 Ark. App. 175, at 14–15, 573 S.W.3d 607, 617. Accordingly, substantial evidence

supports the convictions for rape and sexual assault.

       Standridge next alleges the circuit court abused its discretion when it allowed the

State to continue leading the witness over defense counsel objection. Several times during

MC’s testimony, she was difficult to hear or understand. The prosecutor would repeat what

she said, then ask the next question. After doing this for a bit, defense objected. At the

sidebar conference, the court acknowledged it was sensitive to the defense’s position but

ultimately decided to allow it to continue because MC was occasionally difficult to hear, and

the prosecutor was helping ensure the witness’s testimony was understandable. The court

did ask the witness to speak up.

       Under Rule 611(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, leading questions should not

be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop her

testimony. The rule does not completely bar leading questions on direct but gives the circuit

court discretion to permit leading questions to develop a witness’s testimony; we will not

reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Chase v. State, 334 Ark.

274, 284, 973 S.W.2d 791, 796 (1998). Here, the court did not abuse its discretion to allow

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the prosecutor to occasionally repeat the statements provided by the witness. The repetition

did not suggest an answer or insert a detail that should have originated from the victim.

Further, MC was distressed, weeping, and occasionally reluctant to testify. Given this,

allowing the prosecution some leeway with its method of questioning was not a manifest

abuse of discretion. Leading a child witness to elicit the truth is allowed because of (1) the

seriousness of the crime, (2) the natural embarrassment of the witness about the incident,

(3) the child’s fear of being in a courtroom full of people, (4) the necessity of testimony from

a victim, (5) threats toward victims from those perpetrators, and (6) the need to avoid the

possibility that an accused might escape punishment for a serious offense merely because of

the victim’s reluctance to testify. Wingfield v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 111, at 5–6, 572 S.W.3d

434, 438–39.

       Affirmed.

       VIRDEN and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

       David L. Dunagin, for appellant.

       Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Clayton P. Orr, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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