Court Opinion

ID: 9572666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:43:32.368019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:46.435660
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
concurring in result:
This appeal cannot be treated as impervious to attack for jurisdictional infirmity so long as our pronouncement in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v. Smith1 stands as viable precedent. Because Minnesota impermissibly restricts the trial court’s statutory term-time vacation power and should hence be overruled, I concur in the court’s refusal to dismiss this appeal. Were I today writing for the court, I would expressly withdraw Minnesota from the body of efficacious case law.
I.
THE FACTS
Judgment was rendered May 27, 1980. Some sixteen (16) days later, on June 12, appellant moved the trial court to “reconsider” its decision. His motion was heard and denied July 1. The appeal was lodged July 81.
II.
THE ISSUE
The issue presented by appellee’s dismissal motion is whether the trial court’s statutory term-time power under 12 O.S.1971 § 1031.1 may be invoked — by motion filed more than ten (10) days but less than thirty (30) days after judgment — on grounds that were available for timely assertion in a new-trial motion under 12 O.S.1971 § 653. For the reasons to be stated, my answer to this question is in the affirmative.
III.
THE CLAIMED JURISDICTIONAL FLAW
Appellee claims this appeal was not timely brought. For dismissal she relies on Min*475nesota and urges that under that decision any request for relief from a judgment— whatever its given name or title — if brought more than ten (10) days after judgment,2 even though filed within thirty (30) days of its rendition,3 is a belated new-trial motion4 which does not extend the thirty-day limit for commencing an appeal in this court,5 unless the ground specified in the “delayed” request for relief is one that (a) is authorized by § 10316 and (b) could not have been invoked by a timely new-trial motion.
When the May 27 judgment was rendered, the time allowed appellant for filing his brief below had not yet expired. While appellee concedes that premature rendition of judgment does constitute a valid vacation ground authorized by § 1031(3),7 she urges that the irregularity charged here was in existence and known to appellant in time to move for a new trial under § 653. In short, appellee contends that because the June 12 motion was rested on a ground which should have been asserted earlier, it constituted a belated new-trial request that will not extend appeal time. According to appellee, the thirty-day time for commencement of an appeal began to run from May 27 — the judgment date — and not from July 1 when reconsideration motion was denied.
The tenor of appellee’s argument for dismissal doubtless mirrors a widely-held belief among the trial bench and bar that Minnesota condemns — as belated and ineffective new-trial motions — all those term-time 8 attempts at judgment vacation which rest either on unspecified grounds or on those that were available for inclusion in a timely new-trial motion. My own view of Minnesota tends to be the same as that of the trial bench and bar. See footnote 3, Morgan, Delayed Attacks on Final Judgments, 33 Okla.L.Rev. 45 [1980].
IV.
MINNESOTA IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICTS CODIFIED TERM-TIME VACATION POWER
The provisions of § 1031.1 are declaratory of the common law. They codify the Anglo-American concept of control which trial judges are allowed to retain over judgments for a limited time following their rendition. The power so reposed in the trial bench is entirely unrestricted by both the § 1031 grounds for vacation and by the § 653 time limit for filing a new trial motion.9 Failure timely to invoke § 653 relief has never been a bar to the exercise of term-time vacation power.10 The post-*476judgment remedies available to a defeated litigant via a new-trial motion under § 653 and via vacation efforts under § 1031.1 are indeed separate and distinct, though con-cededly overlapping and cumulative. Each may be invoked independently of the other. Minnesota impermissibly abridges the trial court’s codified term-time vacation power by limiting its invokability, availability and exercise solely to those specified § 1031 grounds which were not available for inclusion in a new-trial motion.11
V.
SUMMARY
Trial court’s term-time vacation power— exercisable even after the expiration of 30 days following rendition of judgment if timely invoked within the statutory period 12 — is statutory and may not be abridged by case law. Every adverse disposition of a term-time vacation proceeding may be appealed by the aggrieved party independently of an appeal from the judgment.13 When both decisions are appealed, each is entitled to review. The line of demarcation between a tardy, and hence ineffective, new-trial motion that does not extend appeal time and a bona fide term-time motion to vacate is indeed tenuous. While it is difficult to articulate where the exact legal boundary lies, it is certain that — wherever its location — it is not parallel to the Minnesota-evolved parameters.14
I would treat Minnesota as an incorrect exposition of § 1031.1 term-time power sweep and deny appellee’s motion to dismiss.

. Okl., 581 P.2d 31 [1978],

. The terms of 12 O.S.1971 § 653 require that a new-trial motion be filed within ten (10) days of the day judgment is rendered.

. The provisions of 12 O.S.1971 § 1031.1 authorize the trial court “of its own initiative or on motion...” to “correct, open, modify or vacate” judgments within thirty (30) days of their rendition.

. A motion for new trial, which is filed after the expiration of ten days following the decision, is treated as ineffective. Timeplan Corporation v. O'Connor, Okl., 461 P.2d 935 [1969],

. A civil appeal must be brought not later than thirty (30) days after the reviewable decision is rendered. 12 O.S.1971 § 990.

. 12 O.S.1971 § 1031.

. 12 O.S.1971 § 1031(3) provides that: “The District Court shall have power to vacate or modify its own judgments ...*** Third. For ... irregularity in obtaining a judgment...” 12 O.S.1971 § 1032 prescribes a three-month time limit for filing a motion to vacate judgment rendered before the action regularly stood for decision. See Morgan, Delayed Attacks on Final Judgments, 33 Okla.L.Rev. 737, 751 [1980],

. As used here, “term time” means a thirty-day period immediately after judgment is rendered. 12 O.S.1971 § 1031.1. Orthopedic Clinic v. Jennings, Okl., 481 P.2d 139 [1971]; Southeastern, Inc. v. Doty, Okl., 481 P.2d 144 [1971].

. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 176 Okl. 94, 54 P.2d 1032, 1033 [1936]; Southeastern, Inc. v. Doty, supra note 8.

. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Avery, 205 Okl. 274, 237 P.2d 433, 437 [1951]; In Re Baptist General Convention of Oklahoma, 201 Okl. 215, 203 P.2d 885, 886-887 [1949],
Term-time power may be exercised on the court’s own motion. A new-trial motion was not a prerequisite to the exercise of term-time vacation power even when a new-trial motion was a precondition to the review of errors *476occurring during the trial. See discussion in Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Company, Okl., 394 P.2d 515, 518 [1964]. New-trial motions need no longer be filed to secure appellate review. 12 O.S.1971 § 991(a).

. See note in 31 Okla.L.Rev. 1013 [1978],

. Orthopedic Clinic v. Jennings, supra note 8.

. 12 O.S.1971 § 952(2); Southeastern, Inc. v. Doty, supra note 8 at 147; see also, Matter of Estate of Burkhart v. Wabaunsee, Okl., 594 P.2d 361, 363 [1979],

.Reduced to an all-inclusive, one-sentence verbal formula, the at-times elusive teaching of Minnesota is generally perceived to be that a timely new-trial motion must state grounds that comport with § 651, while a motion filed more than ten (10), but not more than, thirty (30) days after judgment is ineffective both as term-time motion to vacate and as belated new-trial motion unless it rest on some ground authorized in § 1031 which was unavailable for timely inclusion in a new-trial motion. Morgan, Delayed Attacks on Final Judgments, 33 Okla.L.Rev. 45 [1980], footnote 3.