Court Opinion

ID: 9795496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:30:10.039111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:09.594865
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority's construction of the previous version of the Fair Campaign Practices Act, as well as its imposition of a fine on the Treasurer in this case; and because I fear that even though the FCPA has been substantially rewritten, the majority's construction will have a significant, deleterious impact on the public's right to be informed by its elected officials about the merits of pending ballot issues, I respectfully dissent.
Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the applicable version of section 117 proscribed contributions-in-kind, and even if it had, I do not believe that directing an elected official's staff to help him develop and articulate a policy position (especially one that involves matters of official concern to his office) could constitute a contribution-in-kind to an issue committee within the meaning of the Act. With regard to the imposition of civil penalties, both the ALJ and the majority plainly misinterpret, or simply ignore, the statute's reservation of such sanctions for those who intentionally violate the provisions of the Act. Finally, because I understand the authorization to expend up to $50 of public money to include only the actual expenditure of public funds to articulate and disseminate a policy-maker's opinion, contributions-in-kind, had they actually been proseribed by section 117, I do not believe would have been even partially permitted by such an authorization.
Until 1997, the restrictions placed on government offices by section 117 (then designated section 116) applied to "any election before the electorate" and expressly stated that none of the designated entities could "expend any public moneys from any source, *1014or make any contributions in kind." § 1-45-l16(1)(a)(D), C.R.S.1978 (Supp.1996). With the repeal and readoption of the Act by initiative in the general election of 1996, the types of elections and issues included in the ban were delineated with greater particularity, and the term "contributions in kind" was replaced by "contributions." § 1-45-117(1)(a)(T), 1 C.R.S. (1987). Both before the amendment and at the time of the press-releases at issue here (and, in fact, until the adoption of Colo. Const. Art. XXVIII in the election of 2002), both of these terms-"contribution" and "contribution in kind"-were separate statutory terms of art. See § 1-45-108(4), (4.5), 1 C.R.S. (2002). "Contribution in kind" was not subsumed as a subset of "contribution," and as the majority itself points out, see maj. op. at 1012, personal services were defined by the statute as a "contribution in kind," not as a "contribution."
To the extent that an elected official himself (rather than the governmental entity) could possibly be considered to personally compensate his staff; and to the extent that assisting the elected official in formulating a position could possibly be considered a gift to an issue committee, see section 1-45-103(4.5)(a), 1 C.R.S. (2000)(defining contributions in kind to include personal services attributable to the person making compensation therefor), directing one's staff as the Treasurer did in this case would therefore still not have been proscribed by the FCPA. While a public official who orders the use of public resources for purposes other than those for which they are authorized may run afoul of other prohibitions against misusing or embezzling public property, he certainly does not violate the provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act by directing his staff to assist him. Even the majority apparently does not accuse the Treasurer of misappropriating government funds.
I therefore do not agree that the Treasurer's conduct was prohibited by the PCPA at all, but if it were, it nevertheless would not have been subject to a fine. Sanctions for violation of section 117 were provided by section 113 at all times pertinent to the Treasurer's conduct in this case. A civil penalty of double the amount contributed was limited to "any person who intentionally violates any provision of this article relating to contribution limits." § 1-45-118(2), 1 C.R.S. (2002).
While it is arguable that these penalties were reserved for violations of section 1-45-105.3, entitled "Contribution Limits," and setting out specific amounts of the "combined total of contributions and contributions in kind" permitted for various elections, it is at least clear that the Act reserved the imposition of civil penalties for intentional violations of its provisions. The term "intentionally," which is used by the statute to define both criminal and civil penalties, is limited to a conscious objective to cause the specific result proscribed by the statute. See § 18-1-501(5), C.R.S. (2004). Unlike the typical criminal or proscriptive statute, in which a person is prohibited from intentionally committing particular acts or conduct, sanctions for campaign violations are expressly restricted to intentional violations of the Act itself.
Although ignorance of the law may not be a defense, fines for violation of the Act are therefore expressly limited to persons who not only know they are expending, but also intend to expend, public money or make contributions in a way that is prohibited by the Act. Especially in light of the Treasurer's protestations that he did not believe he was expending more than $50 of public money, the ALJ's finding that he intentionally had his staff assist him and intentionally issued the press releases was clearly inadequate to support a fine for intentionally violating the Act.
Finally, since (as the majority also points out) directing a governmental official's staff cannot constitute an expenditure of public moneys within the contemplation of section 117(1)(a)(I), 1 C.R.S. (2002), see maj. op. at 1012, I consider it equally incapable of falling within the statutory authorization to "expend not more than fifty dollars of public moneys in the form of letters, telephone calls, or other activities incidental to expressing [a policy-making employee's] opinion on any such issue," as contemplated by section 117(1)(a)(II). By its use of specific examples, the statute clearly contemplates allowing only the costs expended in reducing the official's opinion to a form that can be dissemi*1015nated and the costs of actually disseminating it. Were this authorization to include the fair value of time spent by salaried governmental officers in formulating the opinion, the Treasurer should perhaps be most offended by the Administrative Law Judge's failure to include the value of the Treasurer's own time and effort in the calculus.1
Apart from the liberties taken by the majority with the language of the FCPA itself, it is difficult to imagine the General Assembly intending the unseemly (if not downright silly) minute counting exercise attempted by the ALJ to determine the fair market value of the Treasurer's staffs time. Perhaps more importantly, however, the attempt by both the ALJ and the majority to distinguish proper from eriminally sanctionable use of an elected official's staff, based on whether the staff communicates its findings to him in the form of an intermediate internal memo or in the form of the ultimate press release, can only serve to dissuade open communication with the public about the very matters concerning which the official was elected to deal. Ironically, 'the intricacies of Amendment 23, about which the Treasurer was making dire economic predictions, in retrospect exemplifies the kind of ballot issue as to which full public knowledge would seem to be essential.
In response to the majority's conclusion that the FCPA applied to the Treasurer's conduct and that none of its provisions immunized his press releases from the limitations of the Act, see maj. op. at 1000, there is no question that it applied to his conduct, but I consider it perfectly clear that the FCPA has always permitted an elected official to express his opinion on any issue and that he could spend up to $50 of public money in doing so. Because the ALJ found that the Treasurer spent only about $17 in actual production and distribution costs, and because I do not believe the use of the Treasurer's staff as he did was prohibited by the FCPA, I respectfully dissent.

. Interestingly, in support of its distinction between the Treasurer's time and that of his staff, the majority relies only upon an order of a trial court of another jurisdiction, having no prece-dential value even in its own jurisdiction, not construing the FCPA at all.