Court Opinion

ID: 9779672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:33:02.713803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:37.814286
License: Public Domain

Cowin, J.
(dissenting, with whom Spina, J., joins). I cannot agree with the court’s conclusion that Shawn Drumgold was granted relief on “grounds [that] tend to establish [his] innocence,” G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii), a requirement of the Massachusetts Erroneous Convictions Law, G. L. c. 258D (statute). Thus, I respectfully dissent from today’s decision.
The Massachusetts Legislature adopted the statute to provide a cause of action against the Commonwealth for certain “erroneous felony conviction[s] resulting in incarceration.” G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (A). To that end, the Legislature granted eligibility for relief to a limited class of persons for whom certain indicia of actual innocence were present. G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B). Specifically, the Legislature limited eligibility to those claimants who receive a gubernatorial pardon that “expressly states in writing [the Governor’s] belief in the individual’s innocence,” and to those claimants who are granted judicial relief on “grounds [that] tend to establish the innocence of the individual” (emphasis supplied). G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) (i), (ii).
In interpreting the statute, we give weight to the words that the Legislature has chosen. The statute emphasizes as a condition of eligibility the defendant’s “innocence,” not once but twice. The Legislature is presumably aware of the important distinction between grounds tending to establish innocence and those tending to support dismissal, acquittal, or reversal of a criminal charge on other grounds. See Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977) (“We derive the words’ usual and accepted meanings from sources presumably known to the statute’s enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions”). This court has discussed the distinction between a showing of innocence and a showing of other grounds for relief in the context of legal malpractice. See Glenn *380v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699, 704-705 (1991) (distinguishing criminal defendant’s ability to forestall conviction on ground of violation of constitutional or statutory rights from defendant’s ability to establish his innocence). Indeed, the plea by which a defendant gives notice that he will contest criminal charges is never “innocent.” It is always “not guilty,” and the distinction between the terms is well known.
It is with this understanding of the statute’s eligibility requirements that we analyze the Superior Court judge’s order granting the Commonwealth’s motion for a new trial.1 The Commonwealth’s memorandum in support of its motion, filed at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on Drumgold’s motion for a new trial, stated that evidence introduced at that hearing “establish[ed] that [Drumgold] did not receive a fair trial.” The judge’s decision echoed this focus on the adequacy of the trial, concluding that “this defendant was denied some of his constitutional rights to which he was entitled. One of those very important rights was the right to a fair trial.” That by itself does not suggest that Drumgold did not commit the acts charged, i.e., the ruling does not “tend to establish [his] innocence.” It means only that the determination of guilt came about by means of a proceeding that was flawed. Accordingly, the eligibility requirements of the statute have not been satisfied.
The court reads into the judge’s decision an “[i]mplicit” recognition that Drumgold’s impeachment evidence as to Ricky Evans and Mary Alexander was probative of Drumgold’s whereabouts at the time of the crime, and thus of his innocence. See ante at 378. The judge could hardly have been more explicit in dispelling any such inference:
“I want to emphasize that nothing in this ruling in any way should be construed as a specific finding or determination by this [c]ourt as to any grounds advanced by the defendant in his motion for a new trial, . . . nor should this ruling in allowing this motion in any way be taken as *381any finding or determination about this defendant’s guilt or innocence . . . .”
Rather, the proper conclusion to be drawn from the judge’s decision to grant the Commonwealth’s motion is precisely the one provided by the judge herself, namely, that the nondisclosure of the new information had denied Drumgold his constitutional rights, among them the right to a fair trial.
The court also looks beyond the grounds on which judicial relief was granted to the underlying “facts and circumstances,” ante at 378, which it concludes are probative of Drumgold’s innocence. The court finds support for such a review of the evidence in the construction of the statute’s eligibility provision in Guzman v. Commonwealth, ante 354 (2010) (Guzman), also decided today, in which the court holds that claimants are eligible to bring suit where there are “grounds resting upon facts and circumstances probative of the proposition that the claimant did not commit the crime.” Id. at 362, quoting Guzman v. Commonwealth, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 477 (2009). That construction extends the statute far beyond its text: whereas the statute grants eligibility to those who receive judicial relief “on grounds [that] tend to establish . . . innocence” (emphasis supplied), G. L. c. 258D, § 1 (B) (ii), the court in Guzman provides eligibility to those granted relief on “grounds resting upon facts and circumstances” tending to establish innocence (emphasis supplied), Guzman, supra. In basing eligibility on an independent review of the underlying facts, the court ignores the Legislature’s decision to condition eligibility on the grounds on which the judge based her relief. Nothing in the court’s parsing of statutory text in Guzman establishes a basis for inserting this independent review of the “facts and circumstances” into a construction of the statute.
The present case illustrates the distinction between grounds for judicial relief and underlying facts. The judicial relief in this case was the vacating of Drumgold’s conviction. The grounds for that relief were the violations of his constitutional rights at trial. The facts and circumstances on which those grounds rest include new information that could impeach the testimony of two trial witnesses. Whatever conclusion the court may reach on its own regarding the likelihood of Drumgold’s innocence *382based on those facts and circumstances, no conclusion that tended to establish his innocence was incorporated into the grounds for relief by the motion judge. As such, it does not form a basis for eligibility pursuant to the language of the statute.
Even if the court’s approach were permissible under the statute, the court’s decision would remain problematic. The court reasons that, because new information pertaining to Evans and Alexander “might well have changed the jury’s credibility calculation” as to those witnesses, ante at 378, it might in turn have influenced the jury’s view of Drumgold’s claimed alibi,2 see id. The court concludes on that basis that the judge’s order provided relief on grounds tending to establish innocence. Id. I do not agree. The grounds for relief must do more than tend to change the jury’s credibility calculations or the verdict they might reach. The grounds for relief must tend to establish that the defendant actually did not commit the offense charged. It is not enough for the court to conjecture a series of inferential steps that a jury might take as a result of the new information if, in the final analysis, it would generate a verdict of not guilty but fall short of tending to establish that the defendant is not, in fact, a wrongdoer.
The Legislature’s purpose in adopting this statute was to compensate certain erroneously incarcerated persons because they did not commit the offenses with which they were charged. The statute’s relevant eligibility requirement accordingly limits suit to those whose relief is based on grounds tending to establish such actual innocence. As the court’s decision today is not faithful to that purpose, I cannot join in it.

because the ruling was delivered from the bench on November 6, 2003, prior to the effective date of the statute of December 30, 2004, see G. L. c. 258D, the judge could not have had the statute in mind when granting the new trial.

If the new evidence changed the jury’s view of Drumgold’s alibi, that may create only a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. It does not necessarily establish his innocence.