Court Opinion

ID: 9709701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:53:13.506735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.971732
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I cannot agree with the majority that the jury was improperly instructed on the elements of attempted murder, and therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The instructions given in this case are not "substantially identical" to those given in Brown v. State (1992), Ind.App., 587 N.E.2d 693, as asserted by the majority. In fact, they differ in one important respect. The instructions given in this case are all correct. They were taken directly from our statutes defining murder, attempt, knowingly, and intentionally.
See IND.CODE § 85-42-1-1(1) (1991 Supp.); IND.CODE § 35-41-5-1 (1988 Ed.); IND.CODE § 35-41-2-2(a) & (b) (1988 Ed.). Therefore, there was no error in these instructions, much less fundamental error.
The instruction given by the Court in Brown, supra, providing the elements that the State must prove to convict defendant of attempted murder, excluded the specific intent to kill element. The instruction simply told the jury that it could convict defendant if the State proved that "[the Defendant 1. Knowingly 2. Engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step to accomplish 3. The crime of Murder." There was no such erroneous instruction given in this case.
Likewise, this case differs from Smith v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 355, and Abdul-Wadood v. State (1988), Ind., 521 N.E.2d 1299, in which the jury was not *13informed of the specific intent to commit murder.
The jury in this case was informed that the State had to prove the defendant acted with intent to kill. Then, it was informed as to what attempt meant. While it certainly would be better practice to have an additional instruction combining these two definitions to set out all the elements the State must prove for attempted murder, the absence of such an instruction is not error. The jury was advised of the elements that the State had to prove; therefore, no error is present.
The appellant also raised the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for attempted murder. The intent to commit murder may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in manner reasonably likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Allen v. State (1991), Ind., 575 N.E.2d 615, 616. Here, the evidence showed that appellant pulled a gun when Jackson was attempting to shut the door to the apartment and that he then jammed the gun between the door and the frame. The evidence also showed that, while Jackson was at the door, appellant fired two shots inside the apartment, the first shot hitting the ceiling only because Jackson had pushed appellant's arm in that direction. Clearly, appellant's acts constituted substantial evidence from which the jury could infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant intended to kill Jackson.
Therefore, I vote to affirm appellant's attempted murder conviction. Since the trial court failed to specify whether the habitual offender determination enhances the sentence on Count I, attempted murder, a Class A felony, or on Count II, criminal recklessness, a Class D felony, I would remand this cause for such specification by the trial court.
I concur with the majority in all other respects.