Court Opinion

ID: 9865092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:23:27.348556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:17.173207
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Holland
dissenting.
The effect of the majority opinion is to overrule the case of Lipschits v. People, 25 Colo. 261, 53 Pac. 1111. On the questions here involved, there is such a conflict between the opinion here and the one in the Lipschitz case above cited, that both cannot stand as to these questions; one opinion or the other is correct, both cannot be. If the present pronouncement is to become the law, it should therein state that the former opinion is overruled. The purpose of opinions of this court is to determine litigation before it, and chart the future course for the determination of similar issues.
The majority opinion says “the indictment contained three counts intended respectively to charge * * *, conspiracies to commit, grand larceny, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement.” It might have been so intended, but the information does not so charge. Indictments should not have to be nourished on the manna of good intentions, but should come into being, supported by specific elements which will sustain. The accused, presumably innocent at the outset, is entitled, as a constitutional right, to be confronted with a statement of facts making up- the charge. It is from such a statement alone, that the court can determine whether the facts as stated, if established, are sufficient in law to sustain a conviction. If facts are supplanted by conclusions of the pleader, and the request of accused for a bill of particulars, as here, is denied and he is forced to submit to trial unadvised of the nature of *395the accusation, the dilemma of an innocent man, as he then stands, is apparent as well as tragic.
Defendants were acquitted on the first count, which supposedly charged a conspiracy to commit grand larceny of the one hundred thousand dollars. The same money, and same transactions were involved in the second count, and on this count, intendedly charging' a conspiracy to commit larceny as bailee, both were convicted. Note that they were absolved of larceny and in the same proceeding convicted. Larceny is just larceny, in whatever count it is to be found, and is made up of the same elements at all times and places. If there has to be a perversion of this salutary rule to make it fit the case at bar, so that accused may be found guilty of larceny as bailee, he first had to become a bailee, and who is this mythical bailee, now alluded to? "Where did he come from? And how did he become bailee? Was the money, affirmatively alleged to belong to and be in the possession of the insurance company, ever shown to be the subject matter of a bailment? For the answer, search the indictment. The search will prove futile. But if the accused must be a bailee in order to sustain a conviction, it has to be assumed that he was a bailee, and that apparently was done at the trial, and here, if the majority opinion is to stand. For good measure, it appears that it further was assumed that all this was “with intent to steal,” for those words, so necessary, and so easy to use, were overlooked by the pleader. If this now is to be the law, then we are entering a deplorable era, when men may he assumed into the meshes of criminal prosecutions, and perchance the penitentiary. Answer me this, does the second count of the indictment, in any wise show a delivery of the money by the insurance company to accused, to be held by him according to the purpose for which it was delivered, then to be returned after that purpose was accomplished? The answer must be no, yet instruction No. 7, given by the court so defined a bailment. There must be a bailor and a bailee to constitute a bailment, but here *396we have an assumed one without either, notwithstanding which two men are convicted as bailees in a bailment that just did not exist, if the indictment is to be construed as written. A conspiracy is charged, but it is not a crime to conspire, unless it is to commit either a common-law, or a statutory named crime. If not so designated in the charge, then all the necessary ingredients of the crime must be made to appear. Neither are here present, and therefore the motion to quash on these points alone, should have been sustained.
I now consider the third count, which is equally, if not more vulnerable and insufficient. The pleader, probably in doubt as to whether an assumed bailee could survive, must have thought, in his confusion, that it could be assumed that the accused was a banker, or an officer or servant of the bank, because, to such, his pleading would nearly apply, if the money had been alleged to have been in accused’s possession. But not so. He alleged it to be property “belonging to and in possession of said * * insurance company. ’ ’ Let us consider the provisions of our embezzlement statute, section 6734, O. L. 1921, pertinent parts of which are:
“Embezzlement — What constitutes. * * * If any officer, agent, clerk or servant of any incorporated company * * * embezzles or fraudulently converts to his own use * * * without the consent of his company, * * any money * * * which has come into his possession or under his care in any manner whatsoever, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny and punished accordingly; * * *.
“If any banker * * * Ms servant or agent, or any officer, agent or servant of any bank * * * fraudulently converts to his own use * * * with intent so to do * * * money * * * belonging to and in the possession of such bank * * * shall, whether intrusted with the custody thereof or not, be deemed guilty of larceny * * * ”
Does it require a critical analysis of this statute to *397determine what the necessary elements of embezzlement by an officer, agent, clerk or servant of an incorporated company, must be; namely, that it is of money or other property that has come into Ms possession, or under his care, and which must be converted without the consent of Ms companyf Are such necessary statutory elements alleged in the third count of the indictment? For answer, search the indictment. Where was the money? Not in the possession or care of accused, according to the allegations of this count of the indictment, but unquestionably in the possession of the insurance company, and there is a noticeable silence as to the lack of consent on the part of the company. These missing elements were called to the attention of the trial court by various motions without avail, yet by instruction No. 8, it correctly defined embezzlement and included these elements. Can it be the law, that an indictment need be only a symposium of generalities from which any crime or set of facts may be assumed? I cannot so believe.
In conclusion, how about the status of Helser? He was acquitted and convicted of conspiracy to commit larceny, and then by a verdict on the third count, there is a finding that he, in the same transaction, and under identical circumstances did not steal the money at all, as theft is defined by the larceny statute, but instead he embezzled it, when it never had become the subject of embezzlement because not coming into his possession.
I am not here concerned about the guilt or innocence of the accused, but I am gravely concerned as to how men are to be tried, be they guilty or innocent, and as to their right to a fair trial, if the pronouncement of the majority is permitted to stand, when the way is open for such under sufficient indictments drawn according to approved forms of long standing. Plainly stated, there is no just excuse for the otherwise possible prejudice to the rights of accused.
Mr. Justice Hilliard concurs in this opinion.