Court Opinion

ID: 9538949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:44:22.123852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:17.977281
License: Public Domain

KRUCKER, Judge
(dissenting).
I must dissent. I agree with the opinion of my colleagues with the exception of that portion dealing with polygraph tests. The majority 'opinion, as written, does somewhat emphasize that there was a question of failure by appellant to comply with the policy procedures pertaining to proof of loss. However, both sides concede that there was no failure to comply with the policy procedures pertaining to proof of loss.
I strongly feel that all of the testimony concerning the polygraph tests was inadmissible and highly prejudicial, particularly when no test was given and appellee obtained an answer before the jury that appellant had refused to take the test.
*369It is true, and everyone agrees, that evidence or reference to a polygraph test is inadmissible, except by stipulation, and the cases cited in the majority opinion sustain this position.1 The majority opinion turns on the question of waiver by not properly objecting, but it is clear from the quoted testimony in the majority opinion that the objection was overruled. I concede, as stated in State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d 603 (1969), that the case was allowed to go to the jury after reference to a polygraph test. However, in Bowen it was clearly stated that reference to a polygraph test is inadmissible for any reason, and the court instructed the jury to disregard such testimony and struck it from the record.
It is difficult for me to see how a motion to strike the testimony from the record or disregard the testimony could be made when the objection to the testimony was overruled.
In the case before us, the majority places great emphasis on the manner in which the objection was made. I agree that counsel’s objection was not very strong, but the objection was made and overruled and counsel could not ask that the testimony be stricken. All of the testimony concerning the polygraph test was brought out by the attorney for the appel-lee. After the testimony was in and the objection to it had been overruled, the damaging testimony was elicited by appel-lee’s counsel. Appellant’s counsel, on redirect examination, attempted to explain the testimony that had already been received, but, as he stated in oral argument to this court, he did not want to overemphasize this aspect of the case before the jury.
The sole basis of the majority opinion on this point turns on whether or not the objections were properly or timely made. As noted in Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 12, specific objections must be made and the court cannot err by overruling such objections unless the evidence is, on its face, specifically inadmissible for any purpose. I think it is the rule that the admission of prejudicial evidence must result in reversal although no proper objection is made. I 'further believe that the objection made by counsel, that the evidence (referring to the polygraph test) had no pertinency or materiality, was sufficient, particularly in view of the fact that all such evidence, in the absence of stipulation, was immaterial for any purpose. Any objection going to such testimony should be ample. As Mr. Udall further states:
“Where an objection to a certain class of evidence is distinctly made and overruled, counsel need not risk the displeasure of the court and juries by repeated objections to the same class of evidence.”' Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 12' at 28.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial.

. I do not contend that testimony regarding a polygraph test is fundamental error because our Supreme Court has held that it is admissible by stipulation and fundamental error cannot be stipulated to.