Court Opinion

ID: 9623295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:31:00.986506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:18.683249
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) provides that, after a delinquency petition has been filed, the juvenile
court shall fix a time for hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the petition. In the event the child is not in deten*298tion, the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon which shall be not later than 60 days from the date of the filing of the petition.
In this case, R. D. F., who was not in detention, moved to dismiss the delinquency petition that had been filed against him, urging a noncompliance with OCGA § 15-11-26 (a). The juvenile court granted R. D. F.’s motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed, “[s]ince the 60-day limit of OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) is jurisdictional and must be strictly observed. . . .” In the Interest of R. D. F., 216 Ga. App. 563, 564 (455 SE2d 77) (1995). Certiorari was granted and a majority of this Court now reverses the Court of Appeals. I concur in that judgment of reversal. However, my analysis of why the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed differs from that of the majority.
I agree with Division 1, wherein the majority holds that the only mandate of OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) is that the juvenile court “fix” the hearing on the delinquency petition for a date which is within the applicable ten- or sixty-day period. “[T]he adjudicatory hearing must be set for a time not later than that prescribed by the statute.” Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., 237 Ga. 406, 408 (229 SE2d 66) (1976). Once a timely hearing has been set, however, there is no further statutory requirement that the hearing actually be held on the date that was set. “[I]f a hearing is set within the statutory time limit, the court may in its discretion grant a continuance.” Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., supra at 408. Thus, in order to comply with OCGA § 15-11-26 (a), the juvenile court need only perform the administrative act of setting a timely hearing on the delinquency petition and, consequently, the juvenile court’s non-compliance therewith can be demonstrated only by its failure to perform that administrative act.
I also agree with that portion of Division 2 holding that there is no distinction between cases involving juveniles who are in detention and those who are not and that both sentences of OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) must, therefore, be construed consistently. However, I do not agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion in Division 2 that both sentences of the statute are to be construed as establishing a mandatory juvenile court procedure. Although Sanchez does support that conclusion, I believe that, in this regard, Sanchez was wrongly decided.
In support of its holding that the juvenile court’s compliance with OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) is mandatory, this Court in Sanchez cited with approval four Court of Appeals cases. Under the rationale of those cases, OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) establishes a mandatory procedure because it functions in juvenile proceedings as the procedural equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute and, where our General *299Assembly “has defined the right to speedy trial . . . , then the time limits must be strictly complied with. . . . [T]he only available remedy for one denied his . . . right to a speedy trial is dismissal.” J. B. H. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199, 203 (1) (228 SE2d 189) (1976). However, the obvious focus of a criminal speedy trial statute is upon the timeliness of the criminal trial itself and, as previously discussed, OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) clearly does not purport to require that the hearing on the delinquency petition actually be held within any specified time. That statute requires only that the hearing be “fixed” for a date within the applicable ten- or sixty-day period. Compare OCGA § 17-7-170 (b) (mandating that a criminal defendant be “tried when the demand is made or at the next succeeding regular term thereafter. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)) There is, of course, a fundamental distinction between a requirement that the juvenile court merely set a hearing for a date within a specified time period and a requirement that the juvenile court actually conduct a hearing on a date within a specified time period. Thus, OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) is not analogous to a criminal speedy trial statute and the very premise of those opinions of the Court of Appeals with which Sanchez expressed agreement that the statute establishes a mandatory procedure is, therefore, erroneous. It follows that the issue for resolution is whether the juvenile court’s compliance with OCGA § 15-11-26 (a), which requires only that a hearing be “fixed” for, rather than held by, a specified date, is nevertheless as mandatory as a state or superior court’s compliance with the non-analogous criminal speedy trial provisions of OCGA § 17-7-170.
In resolving this issue, the applicable rule of statutory construction is that language which mandates the doing of a thing within a specified time,
when not accompanied by any negative words restraining the doing of the thing afterward, will generally be construed as merely directory and not as a limitation of authority, and this is especially so where no injury appeared to have resulted from the fact that the thing was done after the time limited by the plain wording of the Act. [Cits.]
Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733, 739 (1) (187 SE2d 835) (1972). In OCGA § 15-11-26 (a), there are no “negative words” which prohibit the juvenile court from setting the hearing for a date beyond the ten- or sixty-day period. Compare OCGA § 17-7-170 (b) (mandating that the criminal defendant “shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation. . . .”). A juvenile whose hearing is set for a date beyond the ten- or sixty-day period is not injured by that non-compliance with OCGA § 15-11-26 (a), *300since the juvenile is otherwise fully protected by the constitutional right to a speedy trial. “ ‘The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards. . . .’ ” J. B. H. v. State of Ga., supra at 203 (1). However, unless and until the General Assembly enacts a speedy trial statute applicable in this state’s juvenile proceedings, juveniles are limited to invoking their constitutional right to a speedy trial. In my opinion, Sanchez erroneously accepted the Court of Appeals’ construction of OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) as the juvenile court equivalent of such a state criminal speedy tried statute and, based upon that premise, Sanchez erroneously concluded that the statute establishes a mandatory procedure.
Although Division 2 of the majority opinion accepts Sanchez’s conclusion that OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) establishes a mandatory juvenile court procedure, the majority ultimately rejects the premise upon which that conclusion was based. In Division 3, the majority concludes that OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) is not the functional equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute so that a non-compliance therewith results in a dismissal with prejudice and disapproves “any interpretation of Sanchez to the contrary.” However, Sanchez’s conclusion that OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) establishes a mandatory juvenile court procedure is based upon the premise that that statute is the functional equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute. As the cases cited with approval in Sanchez implicitly hold, when OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) is construed as the juvenile court equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute, it is both jurisdictional and mandatory and a non-compliance therewith mandates a dismissal with prejudice. J. B. H. v. State of Ga., supra at 203 (1) (citing Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434 (93 SC 2260, 37 LE2d 56) (1973)); E. S. v. State of Ga., 134 Ga. App. 724 (1) (215 SE2d 732) (1975) (citing OCGA § 17-7-170). Compare Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., supra at 411 (holding that a non-compliance with the provisions of OCGA §§ 15-11-19 (a) and 15-11-21 (c) will result in a dismissal without prejudice). Unlike the majority, I believe that the disapproved of the premise upon which Sanchez proceeded must necessarily result in a disapproval of Sanchez’s conclusion. Having rejected Sanchez’s premise that OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) is the functional equivalent of a criminal speedy trial statute, I also would reject Sanchez’s conclusion that compliance with that statute is mandatory. The procedural requirement of OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) that a hearing on a delinquency petition merely be set for, rather than actually held by, a date within a specified time period is non-jurisdictional and directory.
Accordingly, I would hold that it is immaterial whether R. D. F.’s hearing was set for a date within the 60-day time period established by OCGA § 15-11-26 (a). The statutory requirement that the hearing be set for a date within that 60-day time period is directory, rather *301than mandatory. A non-compliance with the directory statutory time limits established by OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) affords R. D. F. no relief whatsoever. See Barton v. Atkinson, supra; Middleton v. Moody, 216 Ga. 237, 240 (2) (115 SE2d 567) (1960); O’Neal v. Spencer, 203 Ga. 588 (2) (47 SE2d 646) (1948). R. D. F.’s sole remedy for an alleged failure to afford him a timely hearing on his delinquency petition is a motion to dismiss predicated upon his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Decided January 29, 1996 —
Reconsideration denied March 1, 1996.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Carl P. Greenberg, Bradley J. Boyd, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
Wilma E. Espy, for appellee.
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (87 SC 1428, 18 LE2d 527) [(1967)] required that in appropriate situations the same constitutional standards apply to juveniles as to adults. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) [(1972)] the Supreme Court adopted a four-factor test for adjudging whether or not the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. These four factors apply to adult criminal defendants in Georgia. [Cit.]
J. B. H. v. State of Ga., supra at 203 (1). Since there is no contention that those four factors are present here, R. D. F.’s motion to dismiss should have been denied. For this reason, I concur in the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the grant of R. D. F.’s motion to dismiss.