Court Opinion

ID: 9465490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:47:48.381814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:12.482502
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part):
I concur in so much of Judge Lumbard’s thorough opinion as affirms the convictions of Zvonko and Julienne Busic,1 and denies the Government’s cross-appeal concerning Julienne’s sentence. I am unable to concur in Judge Lumbard’s conclusion that judicial and prosecutorial interruptions of the summations on behalf of Petar Matanic and Frane Pesut constitute reversible error. *35While some, if not many, of the trial court’s comments could have been either reserved until defense counsel completed their summations or omitted altogether, I do not believe that the district judge clearly abused his discretion in controlling the summations involved in this case. Moreover, given the context in which the interruptions occurred — during the lengthy summations of eminently qualified counsel following a six-week trial at which appellants’ guilt was overwhelmingly established — such interruptions did not deny appellants either effective assistance of counsel or a fair trial. Since Judge Timbers joins me on this point, all of the convictions are affirmed.
As pointed out by Judge Lumbard, the prosecutor made his summation virtually without interruption; defense counsel reserved their many objections and comments until the Government’s summation was completed. It is unfortunate that the Government did not accord the defendants the same courtesy during their summations. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged at the outset that the trial judge intervened in the summations of defense counsel with some frequency after not doing so with the prosecutor. Nonetheless, a thorough reading of the summations leaves us with the firm conclusion that defendants were not denied a fair trial or the effective assistance of counsel.
Pesut’s counsel, Mr. Rochman, spoke for approximately two hours, sporadically interrupted by the court on 18 occasions. Two thirds of those interruptions occurred during the last third of the summation and several involved the court’s clearly justifiable concern with either the length of summations or an inability to understand counsel. In light of the five and one-half hours allotted to the Government to sum up with respect to four defendants, it surely was not unreasonable to attempt to limit the summation of each defendant to two hours. On three other occasions, the court seemingly corrected counsel’s innocent misstatement of the law, and two of these times Rochman apologized to the court. Unlike Judge Lumbard, we consider such interruptions to be justified. Moreover, none of the interruptions could be classified as lengthy since the total of the court’s remarks constituted less than five pages out of Rochman’s 90-page summation.2 Nor were the exchanges acerbic.3 Finally, and most importantly, none of the interjections clearly prejudiced appellant by indicating the judge’s disbelief in the defendant’s version of the hijacking or by appreciably impeding the fluid and persuasive flow of Rochman’s summation.4
Mr. Bergman’s summation on behalf of Matanic followed the Rochman summation. As the evening advanced, the atmosphere became less than placid, and some of the turbulence was undoubtedly due to Bergman. Thus, the following colloquy occurred when Bergman attempted to drive home to the jury their preeminent right to decide the question of guilt or innocence:
Mr. Bergman: Your decision is supreme. You are like the ancient kings. And nobody, not Judge Bartels—
The Court: Just leave me out of this. I am not—
Mr. Bergman: I will bring in the President of the United States .
*36Similarly, the following exchange took place as counsel for the appellants pressed the court to grant a motion:
Mr. Rochman: My motion—
Mr. Bergman: Your Honor,—
The Court: No.
Mr. Bergman: Yes, yes, yes.
These examples indicate that Bergman was at least partially to blame for whatever curtness the trial court may have exhibited toward him at this point in the proceeding.
This is not to say that we believe that the trial court so forsook its role of impartial tribunal or so interfered with Bergman’s clearly effective summation as to require reversal. Careful analysis of the record reflects that at least ten of the forty-odd interruptions of Bergman’s three-hour summation were appropriate technical queries by the court as to what had been said, which defendant Bergman was representing, or how much longer Bergman intended to speak. Also clearly justified were eight other interruptions necessitated by Bergman’s improper attribution of statements or actions to the Government.5 Similarly, in several other instances, the trial court properly corrected or clarified Bergman’s summation as regards the evidence adduced at trial.6 The majority of the remaining interruptions were perhaps unnecessary but clearly harmless objections to defense counsel’s rhetorical excesses. As with Rochman, Bergman continued his summation without hesitation despite relatively numerous interruptions, and on several occasions he even capitalized on the court’s intervention.
Since we agree with Judge Lumbard that appellants’ other challenges to the trial court’s conduct have no merit, the narrow issue before us is whether the summations described in detail above were so hindered by the trial court’s interruptions as to have abridged appellants’ constitutional rights. We are cited to no case, and we have been unable to locate any, in which a trial court’s supervision of summations has alone been held to constitute a denial of effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court’s decision in Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975), is not on point since that case involved a state statute which allowed the trial judge to eliminate summations completely in non-jury cases. Indeed, we think that Herring supports our conclusion here since the Court specifically emphasized the broad discretion to be accorded the trial court’s control over closing arguments. Id. at 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550.7 We do not say that a district court could never violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by effectively denying him a summation through an excessive series of patently unwarranted interruptions of his closing argument. But this was hardly the case here. Pesut’s and Matanic’s *37counsel gave two- and three-hour summations respectively, albeit intermittently interrupted by the district judge. As demonstrated above, such interjections were often well-warranted, and were individually and cumulatively harmless, especially considering the supplemental instructions given by the court the morning after Bergman’s summation.8
Similarly, we are convinced that appellants received a fair trial. Appellants were unquestionably able to present a full defense during this fiercely litigated six-week trial. While we would not hesitate to overturn a conviction based upon a trial in which the district judge had exhibited partisanship, see United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726, 735-38 (2d Cir. 1973), we do not think that this occurred here. The trial judge understandably grew somewhat irritable as the long day of summations progressed. While we do not condone such behavior, there is no indication that appellants, who were convicted on overwhelming evidence, were substantially prejudiced. Indeed, as we previously noted, the jury acquitted appellants Matanic and Pesut on the most serious count. Moreover, whatever negative impression might arguably have been conveyed to the jurors by the court’s questions and comments during summation was certainly erased by the court’s subsequent comments to the jury. See note 8 supra. Given all of these circumstances and viewing the trial from “cover to cover,” see United States v. Sclafani, 487 F.2d 245, 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023, 94 S.Ct. 445, 38 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), we find no reversible error.

. I agree with Judge Lumbard that Julienne Busic, whom the authorities had reasonable cause to believe was a hijacker, had no constitutionally protected expectation of privacy regarding her bag, which was left behind at the scene of the crime. I therefore find it unnecessary to determine whether there was consent to the search or whether the seizure of the bag by foreign officials acting in their own country insulated the later search by federal agents from the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

. Indeed, the longest commentary by the judge was a reminder to Schlam, the prosecutor, to refrain from objecting until the defendants had concluded their closing arguments.

. As already indicated, see note 2 supra, the district judge warned Schlam, albeit seemingly without effect, to refrain from objecting. Several other times, the trial court merely asked for clarification of whether there was a factual basis for counsel’s argument. Counsel was able to quickly assure the court of the accuracy of the details presented to the jury and continue on with his argument, and on one such occasion the trial judge apologized for his interruption.

. That the jury, which convicted the Busies on all counts, acquitted Matanic and Pesut of the charge involving air piracy resulting in death is perhaps indicative of the persuasiveness of both Rochman and Bergman, and also undermines appellants’ claim that the jury was prejudiced against them because of the trial judge’s actions during the trial generally and the summation specifically.

. Once, Bergman misleadingly purported to state the Government’s reliance on a particular witness and twice he understated the importance of this case to the Government. Two other interruptions cut off Bergman’s baseless attempts to suggest that the Government had withheld evidence from the jury. The last three interruptions in this category were prompted by Bergman’s improper characterization of Schlam’s statements at trial.

. It is arguable that the district court on a few occasions incorrectly challenged the evidentiary basis of counsel’s argument. However, Bergman was usually able to quickly reformulate his statement and proceed with his argument. Moreover, subsequent to Bergman’s argument, the judge specifically instructed the jury on at least two occasions that certain of his interruptions were unjustified and that counsel had been correct in his assertions. See, e. g., note 8 infra.

. The other ineffective assistance of counsel cases cited by Judge Lumbard are also distinguishable. Thus, the trial court in United States v. Sawyer, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 443 F.2d 712 (1971), erred by precluding defense counsel from making an undisputed legal point essential to the defense in his closing argument. However, this erroneous supervision of the summation, which was clearly far more prejudicial than any of the interruptions here, was held to be harmless error. Similarly inapposite are Matthews v. United States, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 449 F.2d 985 (1971); United States v. Hammonds, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 425 F.2d 597 (1970); and Johns v. Smyth, 176 F.Supp. 949 (E.D.Va.1959), since those decisions concerned the completely inadequate performance of counsel at trial including the failure to give a closing argument altogether or the rendering of such perfunctory and apologetic summations as to have grossly prejudiced their clients.

. After telling counsel that, “9:30,1 think, without dinner was too much. I don’t think we ought to repeat that performance,” the court instructed the jury as follows:
Ladies and Gentlemen, last night I interrupted Mr. Bergman several times in his summation. As you know, a summation is a review of the evidence and arguments that may be made upon the evidence. If there is no evidence to support the arguments, of course, then they are improper.
I made the interruption because, according to my recollections, some of these arguments had no basis in the evidence, but it was my recollection that I was acting upon and I could be wrong. It’s your recollection of the evidence that counts, not mine. You’re going to decide the facts, not I. I want to make that clear so that the interruptions would be understood.
I checked this morning and I found one of my interruptions was not justified. You recall that Mr. Bergman stated, I think, and as an argument that Mr. Matanic was really on the plane, his actions on the plane were for protection of the passengers. There was some evidence that he felt that he was coerced and that there would be disaster if he didn’t follow Zvonko Busic’s orders. From there on he made that argument.
There was evidence, some evidence, to support that argument. It’s up to you to accept argument and give it such consideration as you feel proper or reject it, but the interruption was unjustified. That’s because my recollection was faulty and that brings us back to the point about the principle that your recollection is going to count, not mine.
The transcript is not up. I will look at it before we close today and see if I made some other errors, but one must remember the purpose of summation and also the fact that any of those interruptions must not be considered as any reprimand of Mr. Bergman because it’s the duty of the defense counsel to argue as strenuously as he can for his client, and sometimes, he, too, makes a mistake in that he thinks there’s evidence to support his arguments.
The real point is that the result of this is predicated on whether Petar Matanic had any intent in hijacking the plane and predicated upon that basis — of course, if he did not have intent to hijack the plane, then, of course, that must be an acquittal, but that depends upon the evidence, again, which is your recollection of the evidence and not the Court’s recollection of the evidence. I simply want to clarify that so we understand the reason for the interruptions and the real issue involved.