Court Opinion

ID: 9669796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:09:28.181915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:00.329722
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). While I agree with the majority’s recitation of the standard of review for determining whether the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, I cannot agree with its application of that standard to the facts of this case. In particular, the majority recognizes that “a reviewing court ‘must consider not whether there was any evidence to support the conviction but whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Ante at 723, quoting People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513-514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). While paying lip service to this standard, the majority sustains defendant’s conviction on thin circumstantial evidence, while at the same time downplaying powerfully exculpatory evidence weighing in defendant’s favor. Because I believe the majority’s analysis is untenable, I respectfully dissent.
Certainly, there is some evidence in the record that points to defendant as the perpetrator. Defendant was seen near the scene of the crime, had scratches on his arms, a cut above his eye, and was sweating profusely. He also inquired about the victim’s presence and possible departure, asked a co-worker what hall he would buff first, and perhaps tried to steer another youth away from the crime scene. Finally, his palm prints were found at the scene of the crime and blood samples matching the victim’s blood type were *735found on Ms clothes (despite the fact that the clothes were soaked in bleach).
However, the inquiry in tMs case is not whether there was any evidence to sustain a verdict; rather, the inquiry is whether “there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (emphasis added). In the context of tMs case, I do not believe these facts can persuade a rational juror of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution presented no direct evidence implicating defendant in the crime.1 Indeed, the most significant physical evidence indicated that defendant was not the assailant. The victim was found with her belt off and her pants positioned in a manner suggesting a sexual assault, yet semen taken from the victim’s body did not come from the defendant or the victim’s husband.2 Also significant is the fact that the victim died in a room that locked automatically (meaning that she let her assailant in, or that he had a key), and that there were other hand- and fingerprints in the area that did not match those of the defendant. Moreover, the murder took place in a facility that *736housed over one hundred boys plus staff in close quarters. However, defendant was apparently the only focus of the police investigation.
Given this evidence weighing in defendant’s favor, I also find it regrettable that the Court, in granting leave to appeal in this case, limited its consideration to whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s conviction. In his application for leave to appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in excluding testimony from a co-worker that the decedent had told her that she feared being “set up” by other staff members to get hurt and that she feared for her safety because of certain actions of residents of the facility-3 He argued that the statements were admissible under MRE 803(3),4 the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, because they were relevant to whether the decedent would have opened the locked door for a resident of the facility.
The evidence of the victim’s state of mind on the very day of the murder showing that she was concerned that the staff might be setting her up to get hurt, that she was fearful and wanted to leave her job, and that she felt that she could become a target of the youths who had confided in her because they could turn on her, all was material to the defendant’s *737theory that someone else, either a staff member or a resident, was the killer. It was also relevant to refute the prosecution’s theory that the defendant was the only one the evidence showed had the opportunity to kill the victim because it suggested that if she was afraid of the residents, she would not have opened the door to one of them.5
Given the thinness of the prosecution’s proofs without this evidence, I think the additional testimony of the decedent’s co-worker casts further doubt on defendant’s guilt. I believe a reviewing court should look at all the evidence against a defendant in a given case to determine if that evidence is sufficient for a rational juror to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt. While the reviewing court must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that does not mean that it must ignore exculpatory evidence weighing in the defendant’s favor. Here, however, by limiting the issue on appeal, the Court leaves out an important piece of the puzzle.
In sum, I agree with the majority that there is some evidence that points to defendant’s guilt. Even so, the prosecutor’s case was entirely circumstantial, and the threads of proof are quite thin. Moreover, there is also significant exculpatory evidence weighing in defendant’s favor. Thus, I believe that even a rational juror who suspected that defendant was guilty would at least be required to confess a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would reverse defendant’s conviction.
Kelly, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 While the prosecution did produce some evidence indicating that defendant had blood on his clothes, that evidence only indicated broad possibilities that the blood was actually that of the victim.

 The majority takes some solace in the prosecution’s expert testimony acknowledging “the possibility that either man could have been the source [of the sperm].” Ante at 729. While the expert witness did testify that it was possible that the victim’s body chemistry had broken down the particular enzyme that would link the sperm to defendant, she clearly did not believe that such a breakdown had actually occurred in this case. Thus, the only expert testimony that the jury heard regarding the sperm was that it did not belong to this defendant. It is inconceivable how any rational juror could conclude, on the basis of this testimony, that defendant was actually the source of the semen found in the decedent beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, even the prosecutor did not bother to advance such a theory of the case. Rather, he argued that the death was a result of an attempted, but unsuccessful, sexual assault.

 The defendant was not one of the persons she told her co-worker that she feared.

 MRE 803(3) provides:
Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of a declarant’s will.

 Indeed, the excluded evidence tends to suggest that the assailant was either somebody the victim was comfortable with or somebody who possessed a key to the room, such as a staff member.