Court Opinion

ID: 9836762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:14:58.916459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.790362
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(concurring in the result):
FACTS
When cross-examining appellant, the prosecutor asked on numerous occasions whether the other witnesses were lying. On only one occasion did defense counsel deem it necessary to interpose an objection, and then the objection was only as to vagueness regarding “lying,” which was sustained -by the judge. The issue in this case centers around that cross-examination.
ANALYSIS
Issue I is a simple question on its face, but an extremely complex matter when analyzed. First, there is the constitutional issue of whether cross-examination which asks a criminal defendant to state that prosecution witnesses are lying infringes upon the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against compelled testimony. I find no constitutional violation in this case.
I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
There are at least two interpretations of the Fifth Amendment prohibition. The first is that it gives an individual the “unfettered” right to exercise his own free will to speak. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). The second recognizes that it only prohibits compulsion and coercion. See Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law 141-43 (1993).
The Fifth Amendment firmly states that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. A person who voluntarily testifies gives up this Fifth Amendment protection. There are several Supreme Court cases which illustrate this waiver principle.
The Amendment does not say that if the witness is questioned pretrial, or I would suggest at trial, he or she cannot be questioned concerning his or her non-verbal communication. A party should be able to ask about circumstances and inferences from circumstances that the jurors could draw upon if left to their own conclusions. If silence “[f]rom time immemorial” may be evidence of guilt, as it was in State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 217 (1867), certainly the timing of silence may or may not be the same. While the Supreme Court has remarked on the inviolability of the human personality, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964), the Court has also recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply if an individual has been given immunity to protect the individual from having a properly seized diary admitted *21in evidence against him. In the end, the Fifth Amendment protects against compulsion and coercion. When and if to testify is a decision to be made by the accused and his or her attorney.
The lesson that one can draw from years of precedents is that the Supreme Court seeks only to eliminate coerced confessions. Coercion is not present here. If coercion were present, it could be detected by the factfinder. Here, appellant did not exercise his constitutional privilege of silence either during the pretrial stages of the case or at trial itself. Thus, even under the most protective view, that is protecting the exercise of free will, there can be no violation of the Fifth Amendment or Article 31, UCMJ, 10 USC § 831, in this cross-examination. As we have recognized in United States v. Solis, 46 MJ 31 (1997), there are two choices: remain silent or tell the truth. Here, appellant sought to take a third road. Once he did, it was not only proper to comment on the improper conduct, but also the burden was on the Government to prove that conduct beyond reasonable doubt.
II. GRIFFIN TO MITCHELL
In 1965 the Supreme Court held that prosecutorial or judicial comment on the defendant’s refusal to testify violated his Fifth Amendment privilege. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). To invite a factfinder to draw an inference adverse to a defendant, solely on account of the defendant’s assertion of a constitutional right (refusal to testify), impermissably burdens the free exercise of the right.1
One year later in Miranda, supra at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, the Court extended this right to “custodial interrogation” by law enforcement officials. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). However, statements made after proper warnings in response to police interrogation could be used against a suspect at trial as part of the prosecution’s case. Similarly, the Court has held that a testifying defendant could be cross-examined about his pretrial silence when there properly have been no prior rights’ warnings, including informing the defendant of the right to remain silent. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); see also Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982).
In 1980 the High Court held that a defendant who chooses to make a statement after appropriate warnings may be impeached at trial with the content of that pretrial statement and will not be able to assert that any inconsistency or omission was a partial invocation of his right under the Fifth Amendment. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980); see also Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926) (a defendant who did not testify at his first trial but did testify at the second trial can be cross-examined concerning his failure to testify at the prior trial on the same charge).
In Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999), the Court, in a 5—4 opinion, declined to retreat from Griffin and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), and held that Mitchell retained the privilege against compelled self-incrimination at her sentencing hearing even though she had pled guilty. Justice Scalia authored the dissent, rejecting the extension of what the author found to be historically flawed logic in Griffin to the penalty phase of a trial. 526 U.S. at 332, 119 S.Ct. 1307. The dissent argued that exercising one’s constitutional rights and privileges should not require someone to ignore logical inferences that might flow therefrom. Id. at 341, 119 S.Ct. 1307.
III. PORTUONDO V. AGARD
A year later, in Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000), the Supreme Court in a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Scalia held that there was no constitutional violation for the prosecutor to argue that the accused, even though required to be present at trial under state *22law, testified last so he could tailor his testimony.
Justice Scalia noted that the defendant’s “argument boils down to a request ... [to] extend ... the rationale of Griffin.” The Court declined to accept this invitation. Id., 120 S.Ct. at 1123. Justice Scalia placed the burden on a defendant who claims a constitutional violation to show historically that the comments made in this case were not appropriate. He remarked:
Lacking any historical support for the constitutional rights that he asserts, respondent must rely entirely upon our opinion in Griffin. That ease is a poor analogue, however, for several reasons. What we prohibited the prosecutor from urging the jury to do in Griffin was something the jury is not permitted to do. The defendant’s right to hold the prosecution to proving its case without his assistance is not to be impaired by the jury’s counting the defendant’s silence at trial against him — -and upon request the court must instruct the jury to that effect____
Id. at 1124 (emphasis in original).
He also noted that the jury could consider that appellant was tailoring his testimony; thus, it would be natural to question the defendant about it. “By contrast, it is natural and irresistible for a jury, in evaluating the relative credibility of a defendant who testifies last, to have in mind and weigh in the balance of fact that he heard the testimony of all those who preceded him.” (Emphasis in original.) The jury should not be required to “blot[ ] out from its mind the fact that before giving the testimony the defendant had been sitting there listening to the other witnesses.” Id. at 1124. Justice Scalia noted: “The dissent seeks to place us in the position of defending the proposition that inferences that the jury is free to make are inferences that the prosecutor must be free to invite.” He goes on: “Similarly, the dissent seeks to place us in the position of defending the proposition that it is more natural to infer tailoring from presence than to infer guilt from silence.” He continued that “[t]he quite different point we do make is that inferring opportunity to tailor from presence is inevitable, and prohibiting that inference (while simultaneously asking the jury to evaluate the veracity of the defendant’s testimony) is demanding the impossible — producing the other alternative respect in which this case differs from Griffin.” Id., n. 1 (emphasis in original).
The Portuondo majority rejected the argument that Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 92 S.Ct. 1891, 32 L.Ed.2d 358 (1972), was to the contrary. 120 S.Ct. at 1125-26. There the Court found it to be unconstitutional to require the defendant to testify first. The Court also rejected the argument that the questions and argument “were impermissible because they were ‘generic’ ” and not “based upon any specific indication of tailoring.” Id. at 1126.
Justice Scalia remarked that the majority was ruling on a constitutional question and not on what is “a matter of sound trial practice.” He would leave for another day the question of what judicial instructions would be best under these circumstances. Id. at 1127 n. 4.
Justice Ginsburg dissented and asserted that the “Court of Appeals took a carefully restrained and moderate position in this case.” Id. at 1130. She said:
A prosecutor who wishes at any stage of a trial to accuse a defendant of tailoring specific elements of his testimony to fit with particular testimony given by other witnesses would, under the decision of the Court of Appeals, have leave to do so. Moreover, on cross-examination, a prosecutor would be free to challenge a defendant’s overall credibility by pointing out that the defendant had the opportunity to tailor his testimony in general.... Thus, the decision below would rein in a prosecutor solely in situations where there was no particular reason to believe that tailoring has occurred and where the defendant has no opportunity to rebut the accusation.
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If accused on cross-examination of having tailored their testimony, those defendants might display signals of untrustworthiness that it is the province of the jury to detect *23and interpret. But when a generic argument is offered on summation, it cannot in the slightest degree distinguish the guilty from the innocent. It undermines all defendants equally and therefore does not help answer the question that is the essence of a trial’s search for truth: Is this particular defendant lying to cover his guilt or truthfully narrating his innocence?'
In addition to its incapacity to serve the individualized truth-finding function of trials, a generic tailoring argument launched on summation entails the simple unfairness of preventing a defendant from answering the charge.... A prosecutor who can withhold a tailoring accusation until summation can avert such a rebuttal.
Id. at 1130-31 (citation omitted).
Under either the majority or dissenting views in Portuondo, there was no violation of Jenkins’ Fifth Amendment right in this ease.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
There is a cluster of rights that exists in the Sixth Amendment, including the right to know “the nature and cause of the accusation,” the right of confrontation, and the right of compulsory process. These rights center on the right to a fair trial, truth seeking, and the presumption of innocence. The right of confrontation is the Public Trial Clause that protects both defendants and the public at large. The key purpose of the Confrontation Clause — to discourage deliberate perjury by prosecution witnesses and to allow a defendant to hear witnesses’ stories — may help an innocent defendant to determine why a witness is mistaken. In this respect, the Confrontation Clause amplifies the theme of knowing the “nature and cause of the accusation.”
The Confrontation Clause allows the defendant not only to hear the witness’ story, but also to question and cross-examine on what the witness has said. Because the Confrontation Clause focuses on truth finding, it has as its neighbor the Compulsory Process Clause.
The Supreme Court has stated “the Confrontation Clause’s very mission” is promoting “the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials.” Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985), quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970).
While the Clauses seem clear on their face, sometimes their interpretation and logic are not always so clear.
One of the reasons the defendant is present is to hear the witnesses and determine whether they are mistaken. Certainly, the jury is going to contrast what the witnesses are saying and contrast their testimony with that of the defendant who takes the witness stand. While the prosecutor may not use silence against the defendant, this does not mean the defendant who is there to question the witnesses cannot be asked about it.
It also should be noted that the Supreme Court has indicated: “The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness[.]” Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895).
Under the Compulsory Process Clause the witness can be brought in and questioned against his or her will, but that does not mean that the prosecution may not pit the witness against the defendant who eventually decides to testify. One of the major purposes of the Sixth Amendment is to deter and detect perjury and other frauds that are perpetrated upon the trier of fact.
However, this is not a Sixth Amendment case at all. This is a case about an accused electing to testify and about a prosecutor confronting, through cross-examination, that accused to ensure the integrity of the fact-finding process. This is exactly what a trial is all about.
Trial counsel never asked appellant whether he had doctored up his testimony after listening to all of the witnesses that had gone before him. What the prosecutor did through her questioning of the accused was analogous to commenting on the testimony of others and the reasonable inferences that a *24factfinder could draw from that testimony. As the case of People v. Buckey, 424 Mich. 1, 378 N.W.2d 432 (1985), shows, a prosecutor can always comment on testimony, draw inferences from it, and argue that any witness, including the defendant, is not worthy of belief, which means they’re lying.
Here the court members sat through all of the testimony from the government and defense witnesses. Testimony from the government witnesses was diametrically opposed to that given by appellant. The only logical inference that could be drawn at this stage of the trial was that somebody was not telling the truth, ie., was prevaricating. The fact that somebody was lying is not only a reasonable inference, but it is the only logical inference. Accordingly, asking the accused who is telling the truth cannot possibly violate any constitutional norm or disparage the accused for exercising one of his constitutional rights.
The most troubling aspect of this case is the lower court’s finding that the type of cross-examination used by the prosecutor, asking appellant on several occasions whether the other government witnesses were “lying” when they testified in the Government’s case, and asking appellant on three other occasions if the witnesses made their testimony up, was improper. The lower court held that “[c]ross-examination which compels an accused to state that prosecution witnesses are lying is improper impeachment and opinion testimony. As such it was inadmissible under Military Rule of Evidence 402.” The lower court cited Floyd v. Meachum, 907 F.2d 347, 354-55 (2d Cir.1990), as authority for this proposition. 50 MJ at 580.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has misread that case. In Floyd, the crux of the prosecutor’s misconduct was to use “repeated references to the Fifth Amendment” to draw attention to the accused’s election not to testify. 907 F.2d at 353. More to the point, the prosecutor in Floyd “characterized” the defendant, “who did not testify, as a liar literally dozens of times” throughout her summations. Id. at 354 (emphasis added). Finally, the prosecutor’s arguments attempted somehow to use Floyd’s pretrial statements to dilute her burden to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 354.
I am satisfied that there was no error in trial counsel’s asking this appellant, albeit repetitiously, whether the Government’s witnesses were liars. All she was doing is asking him if he really meant what he was saying.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
The majority decides this case on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, and having adopted the rationale of United States v. Richter, 826 F.2d 206 (1987), applies Richter’s principles to this case. I find it unnecessary to adopt Richter.
In Richter, the Second Circuit held that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask the defendant on cross-examination to testify whether the police officers who previously testified were lying. Even though the questioning permitted the defendant to brand the agent’s “testimony as either a lie or a mistake,” and despite the absence of objection, the Second Circuit found the impropriety to constitute reversible error. The court found prejudice in the following facts: (1) the prosecutor called a second FBI agent in rebuttal to corroborate testimony which the defendant had branded as a lie; (2) the prosecutor made misstatements in his summation which “emphasiz[ed] the improper nature of the questions he had forced [the defendant] to answer”; (3) the prosecutor misled the jury by suggesting that guilt hinged on the truthfulness of the FBI agents; (4) prosecutors generally have been cautioned by that Circuit “to avoid” arguing “that, if the defendant is innocent, government agents must be lying.” 826 F.2d at 208-09.
In United States v. Gaind, 31 F.3d 73 (1994), the Second Circuit indicated it did “not regard Richter as controlling the decision of this case.” Id. at 77. The court distinguished Richter based on the “significant difference” between asking the defendant whether the witness was lying or whether the witness was simply mistaken, a distinction recognized in Richter, and the fact that the witnesses whose testimony were in issue, were not law enforcement agents.
*25It is quite clear that “the Second Circuit has been very reluctant to expand the scope of the Richter decision beyond its narrow and specific facts.” United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1523 (10th Cir.1995). In Williamson, the court noted that the prosecutor did not “call a rebuttal witness to emphasize the cross-examination of the defendant.” In the end, the Tenth Circuit did not have to rule on Richter. In essence, Richter was the Second Circuit’s continuing to show its frustration with possible sanctions against prosecutors. See The Second Circuit Reacts to Prosecutorial Misconduct, 49 Brooklyn L.Rev. 1245 (1983).
In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974), the Supreme Court said that, to justify reversal, it is not enough that the prosecutor’s remarks or conduct were improper; the relevant question is whether the prosecutor’s comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” The Court has emphasized in numerous cases that it would not readily overturn a conviction based on a prosecutor’s comments alone. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505-07, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983)(Court should not reverse a conviction when the Government’s case is overwhelming). Based on the judge’s instructions, any misstatement by the prosecutor would have little impact on the jury. United States v. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.1996).
While prosecutors should avoid making unfair and improper comments, they can recognize what is readily apparent to the jurors. United States v. Warren, 13 MJ 278 (CMA 1982).
ISSUE II — Facts
Trial counsel opened her sentencing argument by stating that “honor” and “trust” are Marine values and by contrasting appellant as a “thief’ and a “liar.” No objection was lodged that the argument improperly invited the members to punish appellant for perjury and no limiting instructions were requested.
Notwithstanding the absence of a request, the military judge gave the following instruction during his sentencing instructions:
No person, including the accused, has a right to seek to alter or affect the outcome of a court-martial by false testimony. You’re instructed that you may consider this issue only within certain constraints. First, this factor should play no role whatsoever in your determination of an appropriate sentence unless you conclude that the accused did lie under oath to the court. Second, such lies must have been in your view willful and material before they can be considered in your deliberations.
Finally, you may consider this factor insofar as you conclude that it, along with all other circumstances in the case, bears upon the likelihood that the accused can be rehabilitated.
You may not mete out additional punishment for the false testimony itself.
There was no objection to this instruction as given. Thus, in the absence of plain error, any objection to improper argument was waived. RCM 1001(g). In any event I find no error in trial counsel’s sentencing argument in this case, especially in light of the military judge’s limiting instructions following argument. If, as the majority seems to find, there was any impropriety in trial counsel’s sentencing argument, it certainly does not rise to the level of plain error. See United States v. Powell, 49 MJ 460 (1998).

. 380 U.S. 609, 612, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965).