Court Opinion

ID: 9688601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:57:49.988066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:39.947206
License: Public Domain

LARSON, Justice.
On October 30, 1967, Lee L. Cole was charged with uttering and drawing a forged instrument in violation of section 718.2 of the 1966 Code. Pursuant to indictment and a written plea of guilty to the charge, she was sentenced to a term of not more than ten years in the Women’s Re*604formatory at Rockwell City, Iowa, on March 8, 1968. However, the sentence was suspended and she was granted probation during good behavior under the supervision of the probation officers of the Iowa State Board of Parole, as provided for in section 247.20 of the 1966 Code, “subject to revocation under the provisions of 247.26 of the 1966 Code of Iowa.”
On December 10, 1968, she was sentenced by the same judge to a term of not more than five years in the Women’s Reformatory after she was found guilty of the crime of grand larceny in violation of section 709.1 of the 1966 Code, and this sentence was ordered to run concurrently with the ten year sentence previously imposed. In pronouncing sentence, pursuant to a hearing on the matter of the probation granted Lee L. Cole on December 10, 1968, the respondent judge found “That the defendant was convicted by jury trial in the Polk County District Court on the 25th day of November, 1968, Criminal No. 55150, and the defendant failed to appear for sentencing and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest and that said probation should be revoked and the defendant required to serve her sentence originally imposed.” The judge then ordered “the probation granted to the defendant on the 8th day of March 1968, be now revoked * * and that mittimus issue.”
Defendant appealed to this court on December 20, 1968, but pursuant to her petition for a writ of certiorari on May 21, 1969, hearing was had on June 4, 1969, and on June 9, 1969, three members of this court dismissed the appeal and granted the writ as prayed.
On June 24, 1969, Judge Holliday made a return on the writ.
Generally, the issues before us are whether a suspended sentence with probation, revoked without notice and hearing, is a violation of the due process clause of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, and whether an attorney representing the parolee at the time of revocation must be present in court.
Plaintiff Lee L. Cole states the sole issues present here are: (1) Is section 247.-26 of the Iowa Code 1966 unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution? (2) Was plaintiff entitled to a notice and hearing on the revocation of her sentence suspension under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? (3) Was it necessary that plaintiff have the assistance of counsel at the time her suspended sentence was revoked, pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?
As we view it, the controlling issue in this case is one previously considered by this court but to date has not been passed upon directly by the Supreme Court of the United States. Curtis v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1164, 1167, 131 N.W.2d 1, 3, and citations. But see McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 89 S.Ct. 32, 21 L.Ed.2d 2 (1968). Contending to the contrary, counsel for the plaintiff asserts that the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967), are controlling and that by virtue of that decision and the reasoning therein the plaintiff must be released from custody pending a full hearing on her sentence suspension revocation. We do not agree.
I. In the absence of statutory provisions for notice and hearing on the revocation of sentence suspension or probation, a previously convicted and sentenced person has no right to such a notice or hearing prior to revocation. Curtis v. Bennett, supra, 256 Iowa 1164, 131 N.W.2d 1; State v. Rath, 258 Iowa 568, 139 N.W.2d 468; Pagano v. Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294, 232 N. W. 798; Lint v. Bennett, 251 Iowa 1193, 104 N.W.2d 564, and citations; Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.1968); Curtis v. Bennett, 351 F.2d 931 (8th Cir.1965); annotation 29 A.L.R.2d 1074; Wil-*605liams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir.1968); Lawson v. Coiner, 291 F.Supp. 79 (D.C.1968); United States v. Brierly, 288 F.Supp. 401 (D.C.1968); Holder v. United States, 285 F.Supp. 380 (D.C.1968); Sammons v. United States, 285 F.Supp. 100 (D.C.1968); Sorensen v. Young, 282 F. Supp. 1009 (D.C.1968); Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624 (1969).
There are no statutory provisions in this jurisdiction for the granting of notice and hearing on the revocation of a suspended sentence. The contrary is set out in section 247.26 of the 1966 Code of Iowa, which provides: “A suspension of a sentence by the court as herein provided may be revoked at any time, -without notice, by the court or judge, and the defendant committed in obedience to such judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It must be remembered this is not the case of a sentence deferment. Admittedly, such a case would raise the constitutional issue of whether defendant was represented by counsel at a critical period in the trial. Here the trial had been completed. Defendant had been furnished or had counsel representing her at all proceedings prior to and including sentencing. As to the crime charged against her, defendant had had her full day in court.
In Curtis v. Bennett, supra, 256 Iowa 1164, 1167, 131 N.W.2d 1, 3, we considered the question of revocation of probation or suspension of sentences without notice and hearing and had this to say thereon: “Iowa is among the majority of states which have consistently held that under statutes relating to revocation of probation or suspension of sentence which contain no express provision for notice and hearing, such a revocation without notice and hearing does not constitute a denial of due process. (Citations) In Pagano v. Bechly, supra (211 Iowa 1294, 232 N.W. 798), it was the claim of plaintiff that he had vested rights by reason of his parole of which he could not be deprived under the constitution without notice and an opportunity to be heard, but this court said on page 1298 of 211 Iowa, page 800 of 232 N.W.: ‘Being a matter of grace and forbearance on the part of the sovereign, the defendant acquired no vested rights, and therefore, under the statutory provisions [same as now], he would not be entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard.’ ” Thus, if the court believed it made a mistake in the suspension and concluded the sentence best be served as pronounced pursuant to conviction, that was sufficient.
In Bennett, we fully discussed the holding by most courts that conditional liberty after conviction is an act of grace or clemency extended by the trial court which conferred no vested rights to liberty on the convict, but which could be withdrawn at the discretion of the granting authority, that the convict accepted that liberty under those conditions and is bound by them. We noted that this view, as well as the view that such suspensions create a vested right in the convict, were fully discussed in Anderson v. Alexander, Warden, 191 Or. 409, 229 P.2d 633, 230 P.2d 770, 29 A.L.R. 2d 1051. Our view here that no rights vested in the convict was specifically approved in Curtis v. Bennett, supra, 351 F. 2d 931.
In the recent case of State v. Rath, 258 Iowa 568, 139 N.W.2d 468, we reaffirmed our position in Pagano v. Bechly, supra, Lint v. Bennett, supra, and Curtis v. Bennett, supra, and held the granting of a bench parole under section 247.20 is a matter of grace and forbearance on the part of the sovereign, that defendant acquired no vested rights thereunder, and that whatever rights defendant acquired by reason of the parole are necessarily limited and controlled by the provisions of section 247.26 of the Code. Therein we pointed out that when the defendant did not object to the suspension of his sentence, it remained unexecuted during the suspension and could only be satisfied by serving the imprisonment imposed, unless remitted by death or some other conclusive authority, *606citing Bennett v. Bradley, 216 Iowa 1267, 1271, 249 N.W. 651, 652.
In Lint v. Bennett, supra, 251 Iowa 1193, 104 N.W.2d 564, we held a revocation without notice and hearing valid when it appeared a suspended sentence imposed on conviction for assault with intent to commit a felony was revoked when defendant was subsequently convicted of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. There the suspension was also revoked under the provisions of section 247.26 of the Code. We reaffirm our position in Pagano v. Bechly, supra, and its reasoning, where we said: “In other words, the ultimate outcome of these sections of the statute (247.20 and 247.26) which necessarily become a part of the judgment entry, amounts to this: The court says to the defendant, T will suspend your sentence during good behavior, but reserve the power to revoke this suspension of sentence and parole at any time I may see fit without notice to you.’ ” And when it appeared to the court that defendant had been subsequently convicted of another crime, it rightfully revoked the previous suspension without a hearing or notice. There, as here, plaintiff did not allege the trial court acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or without any information in revoking the parole.
It would unduly extend this opinion to discuss the other cases from this jurisdiction which uphold the power of the court to revoke a suspended sentence of one convicted of a crime without prior notice and hearing, and unless it appears the United States Supreme Court has preempted this area of the law and held that one previously convicted and sentenced for a crime and has received a bench parole acquires vested rights of which he cannot be deprived without notice, hearing and legal representation, we shall adhere to that position.
II. The general rule on pardon revocations is stated in 67 C.J.S. Pardons § 23, page 619, as follows:
“A parolee has no constitutional right to a hearing on the question of revoking his parole; and, in the absence of a statutory provision for notice and hearing, a parole may be revoked without such notice and hearing, whether authority to revoke is vested in the governor, the court or judge granting the parole, the board of parole, prison commissioners, or an adult authority.”
In 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 568, p. 536, it is stated: “A hearing is not necessary where probation was accepted under an order reserving an unqualified right of revocation.” Also, in § 567, p. 535; “When a statute specifies the procedure to be followed in revoking probation, the law requires no more than compliance with the statute.”
In 29 A.L.R.2d 1074, 1077, 1078, a split in authority concerning notice and hearing was recognized and the author noted that if they are requisite to a valid revocation of probation, it was generally considered to be a question of statutory construction. It was there concluded: “The view that there is no constitutional basis for notice and hearing as a requisite to revocation of conditional liberty of a convicted person appears to be the sounder and more logical view.”
It should be noted that most courts that have considered the question of whether the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel applies to parole and probation revocation proceedings not involving deferred sentencing in light of the Mem-pa case have held that it is not applicable. For other cases involving probation revocation, see United States v. Brierly, 288 F. Supp. 401; Holder v. United States, supra, 285 F.Supp. 380; Sammons v. United States, supra, 285 F.Supp. 100; John v. State, (N.D.), 160 N.W.2d 37; Petition of DuBois, (Nev.), 445 P.2d 354. For cases involving the revocation of parole, see Williams v. Patterson, supra, 389 F.2d 374; Rose v. Haskins, supra, 388 F.2d 91; Lawson v. Coiner, supra, 291 F.Supp. 79; Sor*607enson v. Young, supra, 282 F.Supp. 1009; Hutchison v. Patterson, D.C., 267 F.Supp. 433; Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 453 P.2d 35; People v. Omell, 15 Mich.App. 154, 166 N.W.2d 279; Beal v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624; Riggins v. Rhay, 450 P.2d 806.
We also note even in the federal parole system, where Congress has provided for a hearing in parole revocation proceedings, the hearing is limited and does not approach a judicial proceeding. It is a new and separate proceeding, only semi-criminal at best. Hyser v. Reed, 115 U.S.App. D.C. 254, 318 F.2d 225 (1963).
In Rose v. Haskins, supra, 388 F.2d 91, 95, it is stated: “The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the privilege of a probationer is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution, but ‘comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose.’ In the absence of statutory provision, the probationer is not entitled to a hearing on revocation”, citing Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492, 493, 55 S.Ct. 818, 819, 79 L.Ed. 1566; Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 53 S.Ct. 154, 77 L. Ed. 266, and United States ex rel. Harris v. Ragen, 177 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.).
III. Plaintiff maintains under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution due process of law extends to notice, hearing and counsel in probation revocation hearings regardless of state court characterization of the proceedings, citing Mempa v. Rhay, supra, 389 U. S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336; Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, and other federal decisions. We have carefully examined these authorities and do not find them applicable here or persuasive of the issue before us. As we have already noted, the federal constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court only require that counsel be furnished the accused during a critical period in his trial, and none apply to subconviction proceedings. It is not disputed that defendant is entitled to counsel at the time of arrest (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977), at the time of arraignment (Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114), and at the time of trial (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799), or at the time of the plea by the court (Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363, 89 L.Ed. 398). He is also entitled to counsel at the time of sentencing (Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690), and in taking an appeal (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891). However, we are cited no Supreme Court authority for the proposition that the person standing convicted and sentenced be entitled to counsel when a suspended sentence is revoked by the court. Nowhere do we find the phrase “at every stage of a criminal proceeding” extended to revocation proceedings subsequent to a suspended sentence.
It is true, one who is given his liberty on condition stands to lose something when the suspension is revoked, but this is not a continuation of his criminal trial. His freedom is a matter of grace, not of right, and he accepts this freedom with the understanding that it may be revoked without cause and that he has no vested rights in that freedom which require protection by counsel.
In Mempa v. Rhay, supra, relied upon by both parties, Mempa was sentenced upon a plea of guilty for “joyriding.” The sentence was not then pronounced but was deferred as provided by statute in the State of Washington. On the ground that Mem-pa had thereafter been involved in a burglary, the State asked revocation of his probation. At the hearing Mempa was not represented by counsel, but acknowledged his involvement in the alleged burglary. The court thereupon revoked the probation and sentenced Mempa to a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. Six years later Mempa sought a writ of habeas corpus in the state courts claiming he had been de*608nied the right to counsel at the proceeding in which his probation had been revoked and he had been sentenced. His petition was denied. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court it was held the Sixth Amendment as applied through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that counsel be afforded to a felon defendant in the post-trial proceeding for revocation of his probation and imposition of deferred sentencing.
It was pointed out therein that sentencing is a critical stage in a criminal case and that counsel’s presence in necessary to ensure that the conviction and sentence are not based on misinformation or a misreading of court records. In the State of Washington the judge and prosecutor are required to recommend the length of time to be served under an imposed maximum term, and the marshaling of these facts was held to require the aid of counsel. The services of counsel at the deferred sentencing stage were deemed necessary to ensure that certain rights, such as that of appeal, are reasonably asserted. The court there noted, while ordinarily appeals from a plea of guilty are less frequent than those following a trial on the merits, the incidence of improperly obtaining guilty pleas is not so slight as to be capable of being characterized as de minimus.
It was concluded under the Washington procedure providing for a deferred sentencing coupled with probation provisions, “a lawyer must be afforded at this proceeding whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing.” It was assumed that counsel appointed for the purpose of the trial or guilty plea would not be unduly burdened by being requested to follow through at the deferred sentencing stage of the proceeding.
There has been considerable dispute as to the meaning of the words of Mr. Justice Marshall referred to above. In the recent West Virginia- case of State ex rel. Riffle v. Thorn, 168 S.E.2d 810, the Supreme Court of that state held the due process clauses of the constitutions of the United States and of that state guarantee to one indicted for a felony counsel at every stage of his trial, at least from the date of his arraignment until final judgment is entered. It concluded the probation of a petitioner previously sentenced was validly revoked at a summary hearing without the benefit of counsel, and stated it was the view of the majority of that court that Justice Marshall in Mempa, by the language used, meant, “when probation is revoked and the defendant is for the first time sentenced to the penitentiary that he must have a lawyer whatever the label that is placed upon the hearing.” It was not the view of the majority that Justice Marshall meant to state that a lawyer must be afforded a prisoner in a revocation of probation hearing where the prisoner has theretofore been sentenced with his attorney present. The minority felt there was no valid difference or distinction between the revocation before or after sentence has been imposed, a view that we find unacceptable. It was pointed out by the majority that Justice Marshall was speaking of a part of the trial yet unconcluded, when he said, “appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a. criminal accused may be affected” and that such a proceeding had been concluded by conviction and sentence imposed. We agree with that view and are satisfied the holding in Mempa relates only to proceedings yet unconcluded in the trial and does not refer to proceedings to revoke a suspension of sentence after it has been pronounced.'
All doubt as to the meaning of the phrase in Mempa that “a lawyer must be afforded at this proceeding whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing” appears to have been resolved by the Supreme Court itself when it said in McConnell v. Rhay, supra, 393 U.S. 2, 89 S.Ct. 32, 21 L.Ed.2d 2: “As we said in Mempa, ‘the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, intro*609ducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the defendant to present his case as to sentence is apparent.’ * * * The right to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, be treated like the right to counsel at other stages of adjudication.” (Emphasis supplied.)
As further sustaining our view, see Rose v. Haskins, supra, 388 F.2d 91, 95, which considered the constitutional rights the plaintiff claims were violated when his parole was revoked without notice and hearing. It was stated therein: “Under Ohio law the ‘trusty’ and ‘parolee’ have privileges, not rights, until they have served their sentences. The Parole Commission may declare a prisoner, who has been paroled, a violator when in its judgment he has violated the conditions of his parole. The Commission has exercised its judgment in this case. It declared Rose a parole violator. It was not required to provide a hearing. None was requested.” The court then concluded: “The constitutional rights of Rose, which he claims were violated, apply prior to conviction. They are not applicable to a convicted felon whose convictions and sentences are valid and unassailable, and whose sentences have not been served. A state prisoner does not have a constitutional right to a hearing on a state parole revocation.”
IV. Probation in this state is generally a device after conviction and sentence to help the convicted party rehabilitate himself. He has had his day in court and only by grace is he not confined in an institution. Efforts have been made to facilitate the suspension of sentences and probation on good behavior, and to encumber this desirable practice with extended rights to notice, hearing and appointment of counsel before revocation can be exercised would certainly deter the use of this statutory provision and might eliminate the good to be derived by liberal sentence suspensions and probationary grants. The legislature in its wisdom should decide the pros and cons of providing counsel and hearings on probations and suspensions of sentences and the possible effect upon court or board use of such suspensions and grants. Arguments in favor of granting such rights to convicted persons in this area should be addressed to it, not to the court.
V. Having decided the respondent judge did not exceed his proper jurisdiction or otherwise act illegally in revoking plaintiff’s probation and suspended sentence on December 10, 1968, the writ of certiorari previously granted must be and it is annulled.
Writ annulled.
All Justices concur except RAWLINGS, MASON and BECKER, JTJT., who dissent.