Court Opinion

ID: 9378314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 22:03:07.445746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:20.173567
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 200253-U
                                           No. 1-20-0253
                                     Order filed March 9, 2023
                                                                                    Fourth Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                              IN THE
                               APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                         FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,             ) Appeal from the
                                                  ) Circuit Court of
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                       ) Cook County.
                                                  )
     v.                                           ) No. 18 DV 40828
                                                  )
 ALBERT SANDOVAL,                                 ) Honorable Paula
                                                  ) M. Daleo,
        Defendant-Appellant.                      ) Judge, presiding.

       JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for obstructing a peace officer over his contention that
              the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Albert Sandoval was found guilty of obstructing a peace

officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)(2) (West 2018)) and sentenced to a jail term of two days considered

served. On appeal, defendant contends he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because
No. 1-20-0253

the State did not establish that his noncompliance with the police officer materially obstructed or

impeded the officer’s duties. We affirm.

¶ 3 Defendant was charged by complaint with one count of domestic battery and one count of

obstructing a peace officer. The State nol-prossed the domestic battery count and proceeded solely

on the count for obstructing a peace officer.

¶ 4 At trial, Brookfield police officer Burrell testified that at approximately 10 a.m. on July 10,

2018, he, Officer Harrison, and Sergeant Nicholas Hahn responded to a domestic disturbance call

on Blanchan Avenue in Brookfield. 1 Through open windows in the front of the residence, Burrell

heard a man and woman arguing. Burrell knocked on the front and rear doors multiple times.

¶ 5 Eventually, defendant answered the door and officers informed him that they were investigating

a domestic disturbance. Defendant stated that “he didn’t know who would have made the call

because he was the only person at the residence at that time.” Burrell asked multiple times whether

someone else was in the residence, which defendant repeatedly denied. Burrell instructed

defendant that he could face charges if he were lying, and detained defendant on the porch so that

he would not leave the scene. Harrison and Hahn entered the residence to determine whether

anyone inside needed medical aid. Burrell agreed that the standard practice for police responding

to a domestic dispute is to confirm that nobody is injured inside the location.

¶ 6 On cross-examination, Burrell stated that he did not believe defendant’s assertion that he was

alone in the house. That statement affected the investigation because the officers then had to listen

to a recording of the 911 call in order to verify that multiple people were heard at the residence.

Burrell and the other officers then removed defendant from the doorway, placed him on

       1
           Officer Burrell’s and Officer Harrison’s first names do not appear in the record on appeal.

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No. 1-20-0253

the porch, handcuffed him, and entered the house to search for other inhabitants. Defendant did not

“pull away” when they handcuffed him and sat when instructed.

¶ 7 On redirect examination, Burrell testified that he asked defendant to move from the doorway,

but he did not comply.

¶ 8 Hahn testified that he arrived at the scene of the domestic dispute while two officers were on

the front porch “attempting to make contact with” the inhabitants. Defendant answered the door

less than two minutes after Hahn arrived, and stated that he was the only person inside the residence

and was unsure why the police were there. The officers advised defendant that they needed to

check on everyone inside the residence as standard procedure. Hahn then entered the house without

a warrant to check whether anyone had been a victim or a witness of a crime. Hahn found two

young men in a basement bedroom and a woman in an upstairs bedroom underneath a blanket on

the bed.

¶ 9 In closing, defense counsel argued that the evidence did not establish that defendant obstructed

the officers, who would have searched the house for potential victims regardless of what defendant

said. Defense counsel argued that defendant did not impede the investigation, but passively resisted

by standing in his own doorway without preventing the officers from entering the house.

¶ 10 The court found defendant guilty of obstructing a peace officer. In ruling, the court commented

that the officers responded to a domestic disturbance call, and thus had a duty to investigate.

According to the court, defendant lied to the officers and then refused to move from the doorway

so the officers could search the house, an action defendant was “not entitled” to take.

The court did not believe the circumstances allowed defendant to deny the officers entry to his

house.

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No. 1-20-0253

¶ 11 Defense counsel filed a “Motion to Reconsider Finding of Guilty,” arguing, inter alia, that no

evidence showed defendant knowingly lied to the officers regarding whether he knew other people

were in the house where the State failed to establish that the officers heard defendant’s voice upon

approaching the house. Defense counsel additionally argued that defendant had a constitutional

right to refuse to consent to the officers’ entry and search of his home.

¶ 12 The court denied defendant’s motion after a hearing wherein both parties argued extensively

and the court questioned defense counsel at length about his arguments. In ruling, the court

commented that the police needed to enter the house, defendant impeded their investigation, and

therefore defendant obstructed the performance of their duties.

¶ 13 After a hearing, the court sentenced defendant to a jail term of two days considered served.

The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence.

¶ 14 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to establish that his noncompliance with

Burrell materially obstructed or impeded Burrell’s duties.

¶ 15 The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67. The trier of fact resolves conflicts in the testimony,

weighs the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. People v.

Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. Accordingly, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of

the trier of fact on the weight of the evidence or credibility of witnesses. Id. A reviewing court

must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution (People v.

Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004)) and will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is

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No. 1-20-0253

“unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s

guilt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009).

¶ 16 To sustain defendant’s conviction for obstructing a peace officer, the State had to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly obstructed the performance of “one known to

[defendant] to be a peace officer *** within his or her official capacity.” 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)(2)

(West 2018). Providing false information to a police officer may constitute obstruction where the

false information is “made in relation to an authorized act within the officer’s official capacity and

if the false information actually impeded an act the officer was authorized to perform.” People v.

Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 35. Defendant only challenges the State’s evidence that he

obstructed Officer Burrell’s performance.

¶ 17 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and allowing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the State, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that

defendant obstructed Burrell’s wellness check of defendant’s home. The evidence showed that

defendant repeatedly lied to Burrell about whether anyone else was at home, which caused the

officers to review the 911 recording to verify that they could hear multiple individuals on the phone

call. Then, Burrell asked defendant to move from the doorway so that they could enter the house,

but defendant did not comply. The officers had to detain him in order to perform the wellness

check of the inhabitants of the house. This evidence, taken together, was sufficient to prove

defendant guilty of obstructing a peace officer.

¶ 18 Defendant nevertheless argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence that his initial

refusal to move from the doorway hindered Burrell’s investigation; rather, according to defendant,

Burrell and the other officers performed their duties after detaining defendant and their safety was

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No. 1-20-0253

never at issue. Defendant argues that the delay was “extraordinarily brief,” and insufficient to

justify his conviction for obstructing a peace officer.

¶ 19 We disagree. Defendant refused to leave the doorway, even after the police officers informed

him of their reasons for being at his house, namely, to ensure that nobody in the house was injured.

Officers had to remove defendant from the doorway and detain him in order to perform their duties.

The officers had to perform those additional acts before they could enter the house in order to

ensure that nobody inside was injured.

¶ 20 Defendant contends that the officers were never in danger, but that fact was unknown to the

officers when they spoke to defendant at the door. See People v. Shenault, 2014 IL App (2d)

130211, ¶ 22 (conduct which places an officer’s safety at risk can qualify as obstruction). “[T]he

trier of fact is not required to accept any possible explanation compatible with the defendant’s

innocence and elevate it to the status of reasonable doubt.” People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d

213, 229 (2009). It is a reasonable inference that if the officers were investigating a domestic

disturbance in the house, a person inside could have been seriously injured or become violent

toward the officers. See Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280. The trial court, thus, could reasonably

find that defendant lying to the officers, compounded with his failure to leave the doorway,

impeded the officers in performing their duties. The evidence was not “unreasonable, improbable,

or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d at 281.

¶ 21   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 22   Affirmed.

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