Court Opinion

ID: 9774512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:22:39.492833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:09.356258
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK,
Presiding Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in judgment only.
Article 18.20, Section 3(b), V.A.C.C.P., provides in part that “only the judge of competent jurisdiction for the administrative judicial district in which the proposed interception will be made may act on an application for authorization to intercept wire or oral communications.” The critical language regarding the proper judge to issue the intercept order is “in which the proposed interception will be made.” (Emphasis added.) At the time the judge signed the intercept order in this case the term “intercept” was defined as “the aural acquisition of the contents of a wire or oral communication through the use of an electronic, mechanical or other device.” 1981 Tex.Sess.Laws 729, ch. 275, sec. 1 (now see Article 18.20, Section 1(3), V.A.C.C.P.). Substituting the definition of “intercept” for the word “interception” in Section 3(b) that section provides that only the judge “in" the district where the “contents ” of the communication will be “aural[ly] acquired]” (i.e. heard) is authorized to issue the order. No other meaning is diseerna-ble.
Indeed, most case law construing the federal counterpart1 to our wiretapping *188statute interprets the term “aural acquisition” — as it relates to which judge has authorization to issue intercept orders — to mean where the communication is actually heard or where it is recorded. For example, in Evans v. State, 252 Ga. 312, 314 S.E.2d 421, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826, 105 S.Ct. 106, 83 L.Ed.2d 50 (1984), the Fulton County Superior Court judge authorized several wiretaps. Some of these taps were located outside of Fulton County. The calls, however, were all monitored by a surveillance team in Fulton County. Defendants argued that the judge lacked jurisdiction to authorize wiretaps on telephones located outside of Fulton County. The Georgia Supreme Court, interpreting and applying Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, determined that the “aural acquisition” occurred where authorities heard the conversations. Specifically, the Court determined: “It is undisputed that the only oral aural acquisition of the defendant’s communication occurred in the Atlanta Judicial Circuit (Fulton County) where the judge authorizing the investigative warrants was sitting. We therefore find that federal law authorized issuance of these warrants by the Fulton Superior Court judge.” 314 S.E.2d at 426.
Thereafter, the defendants in Evans filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, again arguing that the Fulton County judge lacked jurisdiction to authorize the wire taps. The Federal District Court rejected the arguments, holding that the location of the “listening post” determined which judge was authorized by the statute to issue the warrants. The district court concluded that the “interceptions ... occurred not where the tapped telephone calls were mechanically interfered with (something which occurred with respect to twenty-three telephones located outside of Fulton County, as well as eighteen telephones located in Fulton County) but where the contents of the telephone calls — the conversations — were heard or aurally acquired.” Adams v. Stynchcombe, Cause No. C84-2312A, slip op. at pp. 8-10, (N.D. Ga., delivered March 5, 1985)2 (emphasis in the original) affirmed on other grounds sub nom., Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.1986).
The same conclusions made by the Georgia Supreme Court and the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia were made by the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Adding to the rationale employed in the Georgia cases, the New York District Court reasoned:
“The logic of the [Georgia] cases is illustrated by a comparison with pen registers. For the very reason that a pen register does not hear sound and therefore does not accomplish an ‘interception’ of wire communications as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4), the use of pen registers as a device to monitor and record the numbers dialed from a particular telephone was not governed by Title III. See United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165-67, 98 S.Ct. 364 [368-70], 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977). It is the capacity of the wiretap to hear and to disclose the contents (the Court emphasized ‘the aural acquisition of the contents’, id. at 166 [369] (italics in the original)) of the communication which brought it under Title III, and which supports the logic of recognizing the jurisdiction of the court at the place where the wiretap is overheard or monitored.” United States v. Rodriguez, 734 F.Supp. 116, 121 (S.D.N.Y.1990).
See also Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 388 (6th Cir.1977) and the cases cited therein.
The only case contrary to the above cited cases is United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d *1891519 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829, 109 S.Ct. 82, 102 L.Ed.2d 58 (1988) (a case decided after enactment of the Texas Statute and after the intercept order was signed in this case). The majority’s reliance upon Nelson, however, is extremely questionable.
In Nelson the court was concerned with the same issue that is before us; however, unlike the State in the case before us, the government there argued that “interception” referred to the acquisition of a communication as well as the “initial acquisition by a [recording] device and the hearing of the communication by the person or persons responsible for the recording.” The panel of judges in Nelson agreed with the government’s arguments and held that “the term ‘intercept’ as it relates to ‘aural acquisitions’ refers to the place where a communication is initially obtained regardless of where the communication is ultimately heard.” 837 F.2d at 1527. It is clear, however, that the language relied upon by the government was taken out of context from United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir.1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823, 97 S.Ct. 74, 50 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976). Moreover, the language utilized by the government was contrary to other observations made by the Turk court.
The issue in Turk was whether “action of the officers in listening to the cassette tape seized from [a third party’s] car constituted an impermissible ‘interception’ of Turk’s oral communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).” Turk, 526 F.2d at 657. The Turk court held that the initial recording of the conversation was an “interception” but that this initial interception was not violative of Title III since one of the parties to the conversation had consented to the recording. 526 F.2d at 657 citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). Thus, the only issue was whether each replaying of a prior recording constituted an “interception” as defined in Title III. The Turk court determined that each replaying was not an interception because “ ‘aural acquisition’ is accomplished only when two steps are completed — the initial acquisition by the device and the hearing of the communication by the person or persons responsible.” 526 F.2d at 658. In short, the Turk opinion determined that Title III envisioned a “contemporaneous acquisition” of the communication and, as such, each replaying of the prior recording was not violative of the Act. See Id. The court in no way sought to determine which judge could issue intercept orders. More importantly, the Turk Court wrote (and the Nelson court ignored) the following:
“We believe that a[n] ... interpretation ... which would exclude from the definition of ‘intercept’ the replaying of a previously recorded conversation has a much firmer basis in the language of § 2510(4) and in logic, and corresponds with the legislative history. The words ‘acquisition ... through the use of any device’ suggests that the central concern is with the activity engaged in at the time of the oral communication which causes such communication to be overheard by uninvited listeners. If a person secrets a recorder in a room and thereby records a conversation between two others, an ‘acquisition’ occurs at the time the recording is made.” 526 F.2d at 658 (emphasis added).
Thus, accepting Turk as a legal basis for its holding, the Nelson court was wrong— not only did the opinion take language out of context, it ignored other language clearly contrary to its holding contained within the Turk opinion.3 By merely accepting Nelson as legal basis for its holding today, the majority in the case before us, perpetuates the wrongs made in Nelson.
Considering the costs involved in wiretapping, see Dix, Texas Electronic Surveillance, 7 Thur. Marshall L.R. 105 (1981), it *190is expected that electronic surveillance will occur in only limited, large scale operations where these operations would be most likely to cross district boundaries. It appears that the central concern of the Legislature in establishing territorial restrictions was to centralize law enforcement. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 571-575, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 1854-56, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 (1974); Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.1986). Today the majority thwarts that purpose by mandating that in those cases where wiretapping crosses district lines other law enforcement personnel along with other judges must be made a part of the operations. See and cf., Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d at 1499. The majority rejects the obvious legislative intent and purpose (along with the better reasoned case law and the plain meaning of the statute) because, taking into account that a listening post can be established anywhere in the State, “law enforcement officials would be free to ‘shop’ for a sympathetic judge from which to obtain an intercept order.” 810 S.W.2d at 184. In other words, the majority rejects a common sense reading of the Texas statute and the legislative goal of centralization because it believes Texas law enforcement personnel would be apt to forum shop. Because I am unwilling to imply bad faith on the part of Texas law enforcement officials, I am unable to accept the majority’s only justification to reject the Legislature’s clear intent to place authority for issuance of the intercept order in the judge “in” the district where the “contents” of the communication will be “auraljly] acquired].”4
In summary, I agree with the holdings of the Georgia and New York cases, along with the Waco Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case. The holdings in these cases are aptly supported by better reasoning and sounder logic than that employed by the majority in the case before us. Consequently, I dissent to the majority’s holding that the judge located in the district where the listening device is to be attached is authorized to issue the intercept order under Article 18.20, Section 3(b), V.A.C.C.P.
I concur only in the judgment to affirm the convictions.

. See Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act codified as 18 U.S.C. *188§§ 2510-2521. It is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that when the Legislature adopts a "foreign” statute it also adopts the construction of that statute by the foreign jurisdiction occurring prior to the Texas enactment. Hansen v. Blackmon, 169 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex.Civ.App.1943); State v. Klein, 154 Tex.Crim. 31, 224 S.W.2d 250, 253 (1949).

. The District Court’s opinion was not published. Most of the opinion, however, is reproduced in United States v. Rodriguez, 734 F.Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.1990) which adopted the Adams’ holding.

. It is obvious that the Nelson panel was not completely satisfied with this holding since it additionally supported affirmance of the conviction on a determination that the defendant's claims "did not implicate Congress’s core concerns in passing Title III.” Nelson, 837 F.2d at 1527, citing Adams v. Lankford, 788 F.2d 1493, 1498-90 (11th Cir.1986). (A strange holding since Adams involved whether an issue was cognizable in federal habeas review and Nelson involved the same issue in the case before us.)

. It is incredible that the majority attempts to justify its conclusions by reference to the Bill Analysis. The Bill Analysis to Article 18.20, V.A.C.C.P., states that the purpose of Section 3(b) is to "provide for the designation by the presiding judge of the court of Criminal Appeals of one district from each judicial district to hear applications for electronic surveillance within that district.” (Emphasis added.) Considering that "surveillance” is a “watching over,” see Random House Dictionary, p. 1916 (2nd Ed. 1987); Webster’s Third International Dictionary, p. 2302 (1969), clearly then, the Legislature intended that the issuing judge be the one “within the district where authorities would be "watching over” or listening to the conversations.