Court Opinion

ID: 9566295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:36:19.510019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:39.243692
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring dubitante.
I vote a reluctant concurrence in this case. The majority opinion relies mainly on State v. Brooks, 194 Ga. App. 465 (390 SE2d 673) (1990). In the latter case, appellant was initially arrested and charged with speeding, DUI, and driving with a suspended license. This is much stronger than in the instant case under consideration where the initial arrest or charge was driving while the license was suspended. The drug charges came later. The defendant was acquitted as to the charge on which he was first arrested, that is, driving while the license was suspended. I am reluctant to equate the two charges but concur nevertheless, although doubtfully.
“Rather than concurring only in the judgment (J/O), rendering this case a ‘physical precedent only’ under our Rule 35 (b) and a well qualified and worthy candidate for ‘not to be reported’ under Rule 37 (b), I vote here the seldom used but preferable, concurring vote of ‘dubitante’. The latter word in Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, published by West, means: ‘Term is affixed to the name of a judge, in the reports, to signify that he doubted the decision rendered/ See several of many cases where judges of our Georgia Appellate Courts have concurred dubitante: Brandon v. Pritchett, 126 Ga. 286, 290 (55 SE 241) (1906); Stevens v. Stevens, 227 Ga. 410, 414 (181 SE2d 34) (1971); Studstill v. American Oil Co., 126 Ga. App. 722, 727 (191 SE2d 538) (1972); Jordan v. Fowler, 104 Ga. App. 824, 829 (123 SE2d 334) (1961). While I consider dubitante a weak concurrence, but nevertheless a full concurrence, in the case, it also has three laudable attributes and admirable advantages over the much used, presently popular J/O vote. (A) The case is a binding precedent under Rule 35 (b); (B) should always be reported under Rule 37 (a); and (C) usually *230provides the parties in the case, bench, bar, and public in general specific reasons for the reservations held by the judge. On the other hand, a J/O vote is like high blood pressure, a ‘case crippler’ sub silentio without explanation to anyone, a handy but deadly veto weapon or widget for busy judges. It has been said that voting dubitante is holding one’s nose while voting to concur, while the J/O is really a dissent as to all, but sometimes limited to less than all, comments and discussions in the case except the ‘judgment’ rendered.” Floyd v. State, 187 Ga. App. 27, 28 (369 SE2d 316) (1988). Compare “Concurrence in Judgment without Opinion” (J/O) and “Reluctant Concurrence.” Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Opinions (West Pub. Co. 1977), §§ 115; 116, p. 223. The former is a J/O vote under our Court Rule 35 (b), while the latter reluctant concurrence is the same as concurring dubitante.
Decided July 3, 1990.
R. Avon Buice, for appellant.
Carl A. Veline, Jr., Solicitor, for appellee.