Court Opinion

ID: 9943378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 15:14:53.717679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:58.265148
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals
                            NO. 2023-CA-0274-MR

KELSEY WITT                                                        APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 21-CI-006086

XHALE SALON AND SPA,
ASSUMED NAME OF PLAN B, LLC                                          APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Kelsey Witt (“Kelsey”), seeks reversal of the

Jefferson Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment to the Appellee, Xhale

Salon and Spa, an assumed name of Plan B, LLC (“Xhale”). Kelsey sued Xhale

alleging she was touched inappropriately by a massage therapist, Adrian Sims

(“Sims”), during a massage session at Xhale.
             Kelsey claimed Xhale was negligent in hiring and retaining Sims.

Kelsey also believes that Xhale was negligent based on violation of statutes

requiring a Kentucky license for a massage therapist and prohibiting advertising

for services by persons not licensed. Kelsey also asserted Xhale’s vicarious

liability for Sims’ actions.

             In granting summary judgment to Xhale, the circuit court found Sims

to be an indispensable party not named by Kelsey, and thus the court could not

grant complete relief to the parties involved. Related to the indispensable party

issue, the circuit court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations to add

Sims as a defendant had expired. Finally, the court determined any intentionally

tortious actions by Sims were an unforeseeable, superseding cause, relieving Xhale

of any liability. Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we affirm the

result reached by the circuit court but do so for reasons other than those relied upon

by the circuit court.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             Xhale is a salon and spa located in the Galt House Hotel in Louisville.

Xhale provides services of a typical salon, including hair styling, as well as spa

services, such as facials and full-body massages. Xhale retains both employees

and independent contractors to perform the various services in the spa.

                                          -2-
            On October 2, 2021, Kelsey and her husband, Aaron Witt (“Aaron”),

decided to celebrate their anniversary. They checked into the Galt House as

overnight guests. Kelsey and Aaron scheduled a “couple’s massage” at Xhale for

4:45 PM. Sims and Tonya Hubbard (“Hubbard”) were the massage therapists

assigned to perform the Witts’ massages in the same room. Sims was to massage

Kelsey, and Hubbard was to massage Aaron. Kelsey claims that, during her

massage, Sims “placed his hands, several times, on [Kelsey’s] genitals and genital

region.” Kelsey alleges this touching occurred around 6:00 PM.

            Aaron approached the front desk of the Galt House around 7:00 PM

and filed an incident report. Hotel security officers Luke Geraghty (“Geraghty”)

and Keion Biggers (“Biggers”) met the Witts in their hotel room. Kelsey reported

that “the worker who was giving her massage was a man named Adrian[.]” Kelsey

said “he had been massaging both of her legs when he went higher and touched her

private area.” After taking Kelsey’s statement of events, Geraghty and Biggers

provided the Witts with the telephone number of the Louisville Metro Police

Department (“LMPD”).

            Geraghty and Galt House front desk manager Moses Turk went to

Xhale and met with its manager, Tiffany Abell (“Abell”). Abell advised them she

was aware of the incident. Abell stated Sims “admitted going close and touching

                                        -3-
the private area by accident.” Abell further said Sims immediately apologized to

Kelsey and informed Abell of the matter.

               Around 10 PM, Kelsey filed an Incident/Investigation Report with the

Louisville Metro Police Department (“LMPD”) alleging third-degree sexual abuse,

although the record contains no evidence of charges ever being brought. Kelsey

reported to LMPD that “the masseuse then began massaging her upper thigh and

then began to touch her vagina.” She went on to say she “assumed it was an

accident, but the masseuse continued to touch her on the vagina approximately 4-5

times” and that “he began massaging more aggressive[ly] when he was touching

her vagina.”

               Kelsey and her husband checked out of the Galt House the following

morning on October 3, 2021. Upon checking out, the Witts made no mention of

the previous night’s incident. Their entire stay was “comped” by the Galt House.

The Witts did not pay for the hotel stay or the massage.

               Prior to filing her Complaint, Kelsey’s attorney sent a letter dated

October 12, 2021, to Xhale regarding the incident on October 2. The letter

asserted Kelsey “was assaulted by an Xhale employee named Adrian.” The letter

asked for a response from Xhale within seven days or Kelsey would file suit. On

October 20, counsel for Xhale replied to Kelsey’s letter. Xhale’s counsel stated the

                                           -4-
name of the massage therapist in question was Adrian Sims, and that Sims was an

independent contractor.

             Kelsey filed her Complaint on October 25, 2021. She named Xhale as

a defendant, but not Sims. Despite the prior disclosure of Sims’ name, the

Complaint referenced Sims as a massage therapist known only as “Adrian.”

Kelsey alleged Sims’ conduct to be negligent, grossly negligent, reckless, and/or

deliberate. As previously indicated, Kelsey sought liability against Xhale only and

through multiple theories.

            The parties conducted discovery. During the discovery process,

Kelsey was provided with Sims’ full name, address, social security number, and

birthday. Kelsey filed an Amended Complaint on March 8, 2022. The Amended

Complaint added a negligence per se claim against Xhale. The Amended

Complaint once again only referred to Sims as a massage therapist “known only as

‘Adrian.’” The Amended Complaint still did not name Sims as a defendant.

             Xhale filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on October 15, 2022.

In support of its Motion, Xhale argued the following: 1) Kelsey failed to name an

indispensable party (Sims) as a defendant, and that the one-year statute of

limitations to do so had expired; 2) the alleged assault by Sims was an intervening,

                                         -5-
superseding criminal act that relieved Xhale of liability; and 3) Kelsey signed a

waiver of liability prior to receiving the massage.1

               Oral arguments on Xhale’s Motion were held on January 23, 2023.

By Order entered on January 31, 2023, the circuit court granted the Motion and

dismissed Kelsey’s Amended Complaint. The circuit court ruled that the alleged

sexual assault was an intervening, superseding action relieving Xhale of liability.

The circuit court also ruled the failure of Xhale to verify Sims’ licensure did not

constitute a negligent act that Xhale could have reasonably foreseen would have

led to the alleged sexual assault of Kelsey.

              Finally, the circuit court ruled Sims was an indispensable party to the

action, and that Kelsey had failed to name him as a defendant within the one-year

statute of limitations. The court found it unnecessary to address the parties’

argument pertaining to whether Sims’ relationship with Xhale was that of

employee or independent contractor. This appeal followed.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

               “The standard of review of a trial court’s granting of summary

judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine

issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as

1
 The circuit court did not address the effect of the waiver. We also find it unnecessary as we
have found no negligence to which the waiver might have applied.

                                               -6-
a matter of law. Summary judgment is proper when it appears that it would be

impossible for the adverse party to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment

in its favor.” Andrew v. Begley, 203 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Ky. App. 2006) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). “Because summary judgment involves

only legal questions and the existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an

appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision and will review the issue

de novo.” Jenkins v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680, 688 (Ky. App. 2007). This Court may

sustain the summary judgment for any reason supported by the record and is not

confined to the conclusions reached by the circuit court. Kentucky Farm Bur. Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Gray, 814 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Ky. App. 1991).

                                     ANALYSIS

             To evaluate whether summary judgment was proper we must evaluate

every claim asserted and see whether any evidence could support the claim. We

recognize overlapping questions which must be considered in this case. First, was

the touching by Sims intentional or accidental? This difference determines for

what tort Sims and thus Xhale may be liable. Second, was Sims an independent

contractor or an employee of Xhale? This status impacts vicarious liability as well

as the potential for a claim of negligence in hiring or training. There are also

questions of Xhale’s direct negligence liability for alleged violations of statutes.

                                          -7-
The answers to all these questions also determine whether Sims was an

indispensable party.

             Kelsey’s primary assertion is that Sims intentionally assaulted her.

By the time summary judgment was granted, Kelsey had all but abandoned any

claim of accidental touching as is evidenced by the jury instructions she tendered.

We should still examine this claim as it was made in the pleadings.

             We then start with the possibility that the touching was accidental or

negligent. There is no such thing as an accidental or negligent battery. A battery

requires intentional touching. A sexual assault is a battery, and a battery “is an

intentional tort; it is not committed by a negligent act.” Vitale v. Henchey, 24

S.W.3d 651, 656 (Ky. 2000) (footnotes omitted). If Sims’ touching of Kelsey’s

genitals was accidental during the massage, there is no sexual assault.

             Kentucky allows recovery for negligent infliction of emotional

distress. To prove this tort, Kelsey would first have to establish negligent actions

by Sims. In the context of a massage, she would have to show that the

unintentional touching breached the standard of care provided by massage

therapists. Due to the nature of massage, which often involves touching near

sensitive areas, that may have been quite difficult to do, and there was no effort to

do so in this case.

                                         -8-
             Even if Kelsey could establish negligence in the touching itself, she

could not establish negligent infliction of emotional distress. This tort requires

more than the expected level of emotional response to an unwanted touching. The

law requires expert proof of severe emotional impact of the negligence. See

Keeney v. Osbourne, 399 S.W.3d 1, 17-18 (Ky. 2012). In her deposition just prior

to the granting of summary judgment, Kelsey admitted that she had seen no

psychiatrist, psychologist, counselor, minister, or any kind of medical provider

because of this event.

             We leave behind any issue of liability if Sims’ actions were accidental

or negligent. So, the question becomes what liability there can be if Kelsey could

prove Sims intentionally sexually assaulted her. Of course, Sims could be held

accountable, but he was never sued. We next look at potential liability of Xhale

for this sexual assault, whether that liability could be vicarious or direct.

             Whether Sims was an employee, or an independent contractor impacts

that determination. “[A] principal is vicariously liable for damages caused by torts

of commission or omission of an agent or subagent, other than an independent

contractor, acting on behalf of and pursuant to the authority of the principal.”

Williams v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 113 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Ky. 2003). An

individual is the agent of another if the principal has the power or responsibility to

control the method, manner, and details of the agent’s work. Nazar v. Branham,

                                          -9-
291 S.W.3d 599, 606-07 (Ky. 2009). “As a general rule, an employer is not liable

for the torts of an independent contractor in the performance of his job.” Miles

Farm Supply v. Ellis, 878 S.W.2d 803, 804 (Ky. 1994).

              Kelsey asserts that Sims was Xhale’s employee for whom Xhale is

vicariously liable, as opposed to an independent contractor for whom Xhale has no

vicarious liability. The circuit court did not address whether Sims’s relationship

with Xhale was that of an employee or independent contractor. Whether Sims is

an employee or independent contractor may be a matter of law based on the

undisputed circumstances of record. See Everett v. Edelin, 672 S.W.3d 196 (Ky.

App. 2023).

              The traditional common law factors used to determine whether a

worker is an employee, or an independent contractor, are outlined in Restatement

(Second) of Agency § 220(2). 672 S.W.3d at 201. These factors are:

              (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may

              exercise over the details of the work;

              (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct

              occupation or business;

              (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,

              the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a

              specialist without supervision;

                                         -10-
             (d) the skill required in the particular occupation;

             (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the

             instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the

             work;

             (f) the length of time for which the person is employed;

             (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;

             (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the

             employer;

             (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of

             master and servant; and

             (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.

Id. “No one of the aforementioned factors is determinative, and each case where it

must be determined whether an individual is an employee or independent

contractor should be resolved on its own facts.” Id.

             Factor (a) of the analysis considers the extent of control which, by the

agreement, the master exercises over the details of the work. Xhale has a set list of

optional massage services, and there is no evidence that Sims was allowed to

perform services outside this set list. Further, Abell was in charge of making the

schedule for all therapists, including Sims. Abell stated guests were assigned to

massage therapists by order, and that there was no difference in assigning guests to

                                         -11-
Sims, whom Xhale considered to be an independent contractor, and assigning

guests to Xhale employees. Abell testified Sims could not accept payment for the

performance of a massage without the payment being processed through the Xhale

cash register. Abell testified she was not sure why Sims was characterized as an

independent contractor. Factor (a) leans towards Sims’ being an employee of

Xhale.

             Factor (b) asks whether the one employed is engaged in a distinct

occupation or business. Sims was engaged in an occupation – that of massage

therapist, but massage therapy was the same business in which Xhale was engaged.

Factor (b) leans towards Sims’ being an employee of Xhale.

             Factor (c) considers the kind of occupation, with reference to whether,

in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a

specialist without supervision. There is no indication in the record whether

massage therapists in the Louisville area work under the direction of an employer

or without supervision. It may be that massage therapists are often retained as

independent contractors. If so, a level of independence is to be expected and

documented, which is not apparent in this record. No conclusive information is

offered on this point, and we will consider factor (c) as neutral.

             Factor (d) considers the skill required in the particular occupation.

Comment i. of Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) states, “Unskilled labor

                                         -12-
is usually performed by those customarily regarded as servants.” Massage therapy

in Kentucky is clearly considered skilled labor as KRS2 309.350, et seq., outlines

the professional and licensing requirements to perform massage therapy. Factor

(d) may lean towards Sims’ being an independent contractor.

                Factor (e) asks whether the employer or the workman supplies the

instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work.

Abell testified Xhale provided the necessary materials for Sims to perform

massages, including the table, towels, blankets, lotion, etc. There is no conflicting

evidence to this assertation. Factor (e) leans towards Sims’ being an employee of

Xhale.

                Factor (f) considers the length of time for which the person is

employed. Sims had been hired for approximately nine months and had performed

approximately 600 massages before the incident on October 2, 2021. Sims was

clearly hired to frequently perform massages for Xhale, and not as a limited

engagement; therefore, factor (f) leans towards Sims’ being an employee of Xhale.

                Factor (g) considers the method of payment to the worker, whether by

the time or by the job. Comment j. of Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2)

considers payment by the job to be indicative of an independent contractor. There

is no evidence in the record of how Sims was paid, so this factor is neutral.

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -13-
             Factor (h) considers whether the work is a part of the regular business

of the employer. Sims was performing massage therapy services for Xhale, a salon

in which massage therapy is a core part of the business. Xhale advertises it

provides massage therapy. Factor (h) leans towards Sims’ being an employee of

Xhale.

             Factor (i) asks whether the parties believe they are creating the

relationship of master and servant. Both Abell and Xhale owner, Melissa Happell

(“Happell”), testified they subjectively thought they were engaging Sims as an

independent contractor. Factor (i) leans towards Sims’ being an independent

contractor, although we emphasize that simply saying someone is an independent

contractor does not make it so.

             Factor (j) asks whether the principal is or is not in business. The

principal, Xhale, is a business entity licensed in the state of Kentucky to provide

salon services, including massage therapy. Factor (j) leans towards Sims’ being an

employee of Xhale.

             Considering the above factors, we believe Sims could be considered

as Xhale’s employee, rather than an independent contractor. Yet we recognize

there is probably more information about the details of the arrangement than what

is in this record that may have led to the opposing conclusion. We do not wish to

establish in this case any bright line rule for the use of independent contractors by

                                         -14-
massage providers. If that is desired, the foregoing factors must be considered and

addressed by the parties. But for our further analysis we will assume Sims was an

employee, the conclusion most beneficial to Kelsey’s case. We now analyze

Kelsey’s vicarious liability claim.

             Kelsey argues Xhale is liable for the actions of Sims under the

doctrine of respondeat superior, a form of vicarious liability. This doctrine

provides the legal rationale for holding a master responsible for a tort committed

by his servant, his employee. Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Ky. 2005).

This doctrine states that, where a master acts through the agency of another, the

master himself is acting and thus is responsible for acts of his agent. Brooks v.

Grams, Inc., 289 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Ky. App. 2008). “[W]hen an agent fails in any

duty which he owes to a third party or the public generally, the principal is

responsible for the failure.” Smith v. Smith, 333 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. 1960).

Liability of the master depends on whether the servant was guilty of negligence in

performing the master’s work and whether the master had the right or power to

control the servant in the performance of the act which caused the injury. Horne v.

Hall, 246 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Ky. 1951).

             “[A] master is liable for the negligent acts or omissions of his servant

while acting as such and within the scope of his employment.” Horne, supra, at

443 (emphasis added). As we have eliminated the potential of Sims’ liability for

                                        -15-
any negligent act, we must look at Kelsey’s claim of intentional conduct – a sexual

assault.

             An employer’s vicarious liability is limited to its employees’ actions

committed in the scope of the employment. An employee committing sexual

assault against a client would not be an action committed in the scope of the

employment. “[A]n employer is not vicariously liable for an intentional tort of an

employee not actuated by a purpose to serve the employer but motivated, as here,

solely by a desire to satisfy the employee’s own sexual proclivities.” Am. Gen.

Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Ky. 2002). There is no vicarious

liability for Xhale in this case. We can now move on to the direct negligence

claims against Xhale.

             Kelsey argues Xhale is liable for its negligent hiring, training, and

supervision of Sims. Kentucky has not recognized negligence in hiring

independent contractors. See Miles, supra. If Sims were an independent

contractor, this claim must fail. With Sims as an employee, “[T]he established law

in this Commonwealth recognizes that an employer can be held liable when its

failure to exercise ordinary care in hiring or retaining an employee creates a

foreseeable risk of harm to a third person.” Oakley v. Flor-Shin, Inc., 964 S.W.2d

438, 442 (Ky. App. 1998) (summary judgment precluded as there was a genuine

issue of fact whether floor cleaning company was negligent in hiring an employee

                                         -16-
who sexually assaulted a co-worker). The distinction between vicarious liability

and a negligent hiring or retention claim is that vicarious liability is based upon the

employer/employee relationship and imposes strict liability, whereas negligent

hiring or retention focuses on the direct negligence of the employer which

permitted an otherwise avoidable circumstance to occur. Feltner v. PJ Operations,

LLC, 568 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. App. 2018).

              The elements for the tort of negligent hiring or retention are as

follows: (1) the employer knew or reasonably should have known that an

employee was unfit for the job for which he was employed; and (2) the employee’s

placement or retention at that job created an unreasonable risk of harm to the

plaintiff. Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 733 (Ky. 2009)

(citation omitted).

              As part of her negligent hiring claim, Kelsey argues Xhale was aware

Sims did not have a license to practice message therapy in Kentucky at the time he

was hired in March 2021, and in October 2021, when he was assigned to Kelsey’s

massage. Kelsey contends Sims was practicing massage therapy at Xhale without

a valid Kentucky license in violation of KRS 309.353(1).3 Consequently, Kelsey

believes Xhale’s advertisements were in violation of KRS 309.353(3) by

3
  No person shall practice massage therapy or hold himself or herself out to be a massage
therapist unless the person meets the educational and licensing requirements of KRS 309.358 and
309.360 and holds a valid license that has not been suspended or revoked.

                                             -17-
inaccurately representing Sims as a licensed massage therapist by omission of the

fact that he was not.

             Sims was hired by Xhale in March 2021. Sims was interviewed by

Abell, and he was ultimately approved by Happell. Abell testified Sims advised

her that he was in the process of transferring his massage therapy license from

Kansas to Kentucky, so she allowed him to perform massages on clients.

According to the Kentucky Board of Licensure for Massage Therapy, Sims never

applied for a Kentucky license. Abell stated she probably would not have allowed

Sims to perform a massage on Kelsey had she known Sims never applied for a

Kentucky license.

             While it is arguable Xhale should have known Sims was unlicensed,

Kelsey cannot satisfy the foreseeability requirement necessary to maintain the

negligent hiring claim. “Foreseeable risks are determined in part on what the

defendant knew at the time of the alleged negligence.” Pathways, Inc. v.

Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 90 (Ky. 2003).

             Xhale conducted a criminal background check on Sims, which came

back clear. Consequently, there was no information for Xhale to have reasonably

foreseen Sims would commit a sexual assault on Kelsey. Kelsey offered no

evidence of prior indications of sexual assault concerns that Xhale might have

discovered through other investigation.

                                          -18-
             According to Happell, Sims performed 600 massages at Xhale before

the events of October 2, 2021, and he had no prior complaints about his services.

Since Sims had for so long adequately and so frequently performed his job duties,

Xhale could not have reasonably foreseen Sims’ alleged intentional assault on the

date of the incident. The circuit court properly dismissed Kelsey’s negligent hiring

claim.

             The issue of Sims’ licensure is also part of Kelsey’s negligence per se

claim. This claim may have applied whether Sims was an employee or an

independent contractor because it does not require an employee status. The

common law doctrine of negligence per se is a negligence claim with a statutory

standard of care, instead of a common law standard of care. Young v. Carran, 289

S.W.3d 586, 588-89 (Ky. App. 2008).

             KRS 446.070 codifies the concept of negligence per se in Kentucky:

“A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender

such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or

forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” This statute creates a private right of

action for a person damaged by another person’s violation of any statute that is

penal in nature and provides no civil remedy, if the person damaged is within the

class of persons the statute intended to be protected. Hargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d

36, 40 (Ky. 2005).

                                         -19-
             The negligence per se claim fails as a matter of law as Xhale’s failure

to ensure Sims’ licensure would not have prevented an unwanted touching. This

touching was not “by reason of” the statutory violation. There must be a causative

effect. It may be true that if Xhale knew Sims was not licensed, then it would not

have hired Sims. But this is “but-for” causation or cause-in-fact. This does not

satisfy the requirement of proximate causation. See Lewis v. B & R Corporation,

56 S.W.3d 432 (Ky. App. 2001).

             “Failure to comply with the terms of a statute is negligence per se.

However, in an action for damages, the violation of the statute must be the

proximate cause of the injury to permit recovery.” Est. of Wheeler v. Veal Realtors

& Auctioneers, Inc., 997 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Ky. App. 1999). Kelsey failed to show

causation between Sims’ lack of a Kentucky license and Sims’ allegedly having

improperly touched her without her consent.

             The circuit court correctly found “the failure of Xhale Salon to verify

Adrian Sims’s licensure status does not constitute a negligent act that Xhale Salon

could have reasonably foreseen would lead to the alleged sexual assault of

Plaintiff.” Our courts have previously rejected the notion that license status alone

is evidence of negligence. See Rentschler v. Lewis, 33 S.W.3d 518 (Ky. 2000) (in

action for personal injuries sustained in motor vehicle collision, prima facie

                                        -20-
negligence instruction was not warranted, on basis that defendant’s driver’s license

was under suspension, as evidence of suspension was irrelevant).

             We have found no Kentucky case which addresses the specific facts

found here. But at least one jurisdiction has been called upon to consider this

argument about a lack of a valid license of a massage therapist. In Tomsic v.

Marriot International, Inc., 739 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. App. 2013), a plaintiff sexually

assaulted by a massage therapist at a hotel claimed negligence because of allowing

massages by an unlicensed person. “The fact that Marriott allowed Sumner to give

massages before he obtained his business license is irrelevant to whether it knew or

should have known that Sumner had any propensities to inflict harm.” Id. at 531.

            This again recognizes a requirement for a negligence claim that the act

is a proximate cause of the harm. The lack of a license does not make it

foreseeable to Xhale that there was any propensity for violence on the part of Sims,

including a risk of sexual assault. In any event, Kelsey could not establish

actionable negligence by Xhale in the circumstances presented in this case. It is

for this reason we must affirm the summary judgment. Finally, we will take some

time to address the issue of whether Sims was an indispensable party.

                                        -21-
                Kelsey argues the circuit court erred in its determination that Sims

was an indispensable party. CR4 19.01 outlines the process of joining necessary

parties to an action:

                       A person who is subject to service of process,
                either personal or constructive, shall be joined as a party
                in the action if (a) in his absence complete relief cannot
                be accorded among those already parties, or (b) he claims
                an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
                situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
                may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
                to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
                already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
                double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
                reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so
                joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If
                he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may
                be made a defendant, or, in a proper case an involuntary
                plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his
                joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he
                shall be dismissed from the action.

CR 19.02 sets forth factors in determining whether a party unable to be joined is

“indispensable” to maintaining an action:

                If a person as described in Rule 19.01 cannot be made a
                party, the court shall determine whether in equity and
                good conscience the action should proceed among the
                parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent
                person being thus regarded as indispens[a]ble. The
                factors to be considered by the court include: (a) to what
                extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might
                be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (b) the
                extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment,
                by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice

4
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           -22-
               can be lessened or avoided; (c) whether a judgment
               rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; (d)
               whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the
               action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

               The circuit court ruled Sims was an indispensable party to the action

as it could not grant complete relief among the two parties, Kelsey and Xhale. The

court further reasoned that a jury trial without Sims as a named defendant “would

result in a jury verdict that is inconsistent with the facts of this case.” The court

reckoned it impossible for a jury to apportion fault without the presence of Sims as

a party. The court concluded any jury decision would be inadequate under the law.

               If we look first at vicarious liability, Sims was not an indispensable

party. There are several vicarious liability or negligent hiring cases that proceeded

without the subject employee as a defendant. Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc., supra;5

Carberry v. Golden Hawk Transp. Co., 402 S.W.3d 556 (Ky. 2013);6 Cohen v.

Alliant Enterprises, Inc. 60 S.W.3d 536 (Ky. 2001).7

               If the question became evaluation of Sims’ liability as compared to

negligence by Xhale, then apportionment may have been called for. If Kelsey

5
  A psychiatric hospital employee alleged to have raped a patient was not named as a defendant
in the patient’s negligent hiring claim against the hospital. The employee was added later by the
hospital as a third-party defendant, but he was dismissed prior to trial.
6
 Assault victim assaulted by truck driver brought action against driver’s employer, but not the
driver himself.
7
 Vicarious liability suit against principal allowed to proceed despite the agent escaping liability
by virtue of the statute of limitations.

                                               -23-
failed to name Sims as a party, apportionment may have been accomplished by

another party bringing Sims into the case just for that purpose. See Dix &

Associates Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1990). Even if

the direct claim against Sims was barred by the statute of limitations,

apportionment could have occurred. See Prudential life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 696

S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1985). Sims was not an indispensable party.

                                   CONCLUSION

             If Sims was an independent contractor, Xhale had no vicarious

liability for his negligent acts. As an employee, Sims could create vicarious

liability for his negligent acts, but not for intentional tortious acts, which by their

nature are not within the scope of the employment.

             Xhale could have its own liability for an intentional act by Sims if

such harm was foreseeable due to negligence in hiring or retaining Sims. Although

couched in terms of superseding and intervening cause, the circuit court correctly

ruled that the alleged sexual assault did not result in liability for Xhale, but the

actual reason is that Xhale could not have foreseen a sexual assault from what it

knew about Sims at the time of the assault. The circuit court was correct in ruling

that the failure of Xhale to verify Sims’ licensure alone did not sustain a

negligence claim. Lack of a Kentucky license did not make a sexual assault

                                          -24-
foreseeable. Summary judgment was proper. The Jefferson Circuit Court is

AFFIRMED.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                   BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Casey A. Krill                         Paul R. Schurman, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky                   Makenzie Ackermann
                                       Louisville, Kentucky

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