Court Opinion

ID: 9482871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:03:25.061596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:15.647605
License: Public Domain

ROSZKOWSKI, Senior District Judge,
dissenting:
I would affirm the decision of the National Labor Relations Board and, therefore, respectfully dissent from the decision of this court.
In an unlawful discrimination case such as this one, the general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has the initial burden of showing that the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse action against the employee. Once this burden is met, a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3)) will be found unless the employer demonstrates, as an affirmative defense, that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected conduct. These principles were set forth in N.L.R.B. v. Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899, 904 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 1612, 71 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982), and approved in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400, 402-403, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2473, 2474-75, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983).
*719The Wright Line principles apply to all cases where the finding of a violation turns on employer motivation, including both “dual motive” cases and “pretext” cases. In a “dual motive” case, the adverse action is based partly on lawful and partly on unlawful grounds. The employer will prevail if, and only if, it shows that the lawful grounds alone would have led to the same action. In a “pretext” case, on the other hand, the asserted lawful grounds for the adverse action either did not exist or were not relied upon at all. The lawful grounds alone would not have led to the adverse action, and a formal finding to that effect is not required. N.L.R.B. v. Industrial Erectors, Inc., 712 F.2d 1131, 1136 (7th Cir.1983).
In determining the factual issue of motivation, the Board may consider both direct and circumstantial evidence. N.L.R.B. v. Industrial Erectors, Inc., 712 F.2d 1131, 1137 (7th Cir.1983). The Board’s factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The reviewing Court “may [not] displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the [C]ourt would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo. ” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). See, also, N.L.R.B. v. Dorothy Shamrock Coal Co., 833 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir.1987).
Factors to be considered in determining the issue of motivation include, among others, evidence of hostility toward unionization combined with knowledge of the discharged employee’s union activity; timing of the allegedly discriminatory action; and implausible or shifting explanations. N.L.R.B. v. Industrial Erectors, Inc., 712 F.2d 1131, 1137 (7th Cir.1983). Evidence that other employees who engaged in the same or similar conduct did not receive similar discipline is also significant. N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country LP Gas Service Co., 687 F.2d 187, 192 (7th Cir.1982); Gossen Co. v. N.L.R.B., 719 F.2d 1354, 1360 (7th Cir.1983).
In this case, evidence of hostility toward unionization is clear as is Kaczmarek’s union activity. In fact,- no other employee matched his level of activity in support of the union’s organizational campaign. The timing of the disciplinary actions against Kaczmarek, beginning immediately after the Union’s election victory, is also significant as are the company’s shifting explanations for his discharge. When the company initially disciplined Kaczmarek and then discharged him, it did not refer to any incidents occurring before the Board election. However, before the National Labor Relations Board and, subsequently, before the court it asserted additional reasons for the discharge.
I also find the stated reason given for discharging Kaczmarek less than convincing. The company asserts that “the company has a well-established rule which prohibits employees from directing profanity at their supervisors.” The specific language alleged to have been used was “Why the fuck can’t I smoke here?” and “You guys ought to get your shit together.” It seems to me that such language is commonplace in an industrial setting such as the one here. Furthermore, there is a serious question as to whether the language was even directed at Kaczmarek’s supervisor. The language certainly was not threatening, and seems to have been a comment on the situation, rather than any type of threat directed to the supervisor.
Based on a complete hearing of the case, the Board found that the disciplinary action the company took was discriminatorily motivated and, therefore, could not justify the discharge of Kaczmarek. These findings were based in part on credibility resolutions by the Administrative Law Judge, which the Board adopted. It is settled that “[cjredibility determinations ... are to be made by the AU and the Board, and will not be overturned by a reviewing court absent extraordinary circumstances.... Moreover, explicit credibility findings are unnecessary when the AU implicitly resolves conflicts in testimony as evidence (sic) by findings of fact which are supported by the record as a whole.” N.L.R.B. v. Berger Transfer & Storage *720Co., 678 F.2d 679, 687 (7th Cir.1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The company has not shown extraordinary circumstances that would warrant overturning the credibility resolutions here.
This court has repeatedly held that the decision of the agency empowered to administer the Act is to be afforded great deference.1 Taking all of these factors into consideration and being mindful of the standard of review in such cases, I would uphold the decision of the N.L.R.B.

. In N.L.R.B. v. Dorothy Shamrock Coal Co., 833 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir.1987), Judge Bauer recently set forth the standard of review as follows:
Our task is to determine if the judgment of the NLRB if supported by substantial evidence on the record as [a] whole. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); see, e.g., Kankakee-Iroquois County Employers' Ass’n. v. N.L.R.B., 825 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir.1987); N.L.R.B. v. American Printers and Lithographers, 820 F.2d 878, 884 (7th Cir.1987). We must defer to the expertise of the Board and will not displace its reasonable inferences even where a plenary review of the record might yield a different result. NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260, 88 S.Ct. 988, 991, 19 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1968): NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 405, 82 S.Ct. 853, 854, 7 L.Ed.2d 829 (1962). Moreover, we "must accept the Board’s credibility findings unless the party challenging [those determinations] establishes- [that] ‘exceptional circumstances'" justify a different result. NLRB v. Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc., 787 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting NLRB v. Harrison Steel Castings Co., 728 F.2d 831, 836 n. 9 (7th Cir.1984)); NLRB v. Berger Transfer & Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679, 687 (7th Cir.1982).