Court Opinion

ID: 9713638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:19:11.637132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.706360
License: Public Domain

On Motion 'for Rehearing
Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.1
CAYTON, Chief Judge.
Appellee filed a motion for rehearing and pursuant to our order oral argument has been had thereon.
Appellee’s first contention is that there was no landlord-tenant relationship 'between him and his cooperative. He claims that the real agreement between the parties was evidenced by the antecedent contract of purchase. We cannot agree that this is so. As we said in our opinion, “we must look to the transaction as a whole, to the writings between the parties, to the circumstances under which they were made, and to the matters wiith which they deal, and thereby determine the intent of the parties and the status they created.” We repeat that while defendant’s right to possession was based initially on 'his purchase agreement, the terms of his occupancy were more directly specified in the proprietary lease he signed. That lease cannot be read out of the case. It .is true, as we said in the opinion and as has been said in other cases there cited, that as between such a lessee and a tenant in possession who refuses to yield the apartment to him, he would have a right to sue for possession. Thus as between him and such an outside person, he has “most of the attributes of an owner.” Hicks v. Bigelow, D.C.Mun.App., 55 A.2d 924, 926. But as between his fellow cooperative members and himself his right to possession is by no means absolute or interminable. His right to continuing possession depends upon his continuing performance under his contract and lease. And the right o-f the cooperative to terminate the lease for bis default is clearly reserved. As we have said, even in New York where some courts have treated such a relationship as in effect á partnership it has been clearly recognized that a cooperative has the right to terminate a lease upon the purchase tenant’s default. Tompkins v. Hale, 172 Misc. 1071, 15 N.Y.S.2d 854, affirmed 259 App.Div. 860, 20 N.Y.S.2d 398.
We must adhere to our previous ruling that there was a default under the lease and that by reason of such default the cooperative had a right to sue for and recover possession.
Appellee says that the appellant (the suing cooperative) did not prove that he had defaulted in the payment of rent according to the terms of the lease and that “obligations other than rent” were included in the monthly payments, and that under our decision the trial court is “precluded from granting a motion by appellee for redemption of his lost rights.” In this respect appellee is crying before he is hurt. What we said was, “Defendant may still wish to redeem his lost rights by bringing his payments up-to-date. I'f so we assume that the trial court would entertain ail appropriate motion filed by him, accompanied by a tender of all payments in arrears together with interest and costs. See Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v. Service Parking Corp., D.C.Mun.App., 54 A.2d 144.”- We did not dictate or even suggest how the trial court was to compute the amount of “payments in arrears.” Appellee will have full opportunity to satisfy the trial court that part of plaintiff’s claim of rent in arrears is not justified under the lease or otherwise. But it iis difficult to understand the claim he now advances that he is not in arrears when there was no question throughout the trial that he had made only two monthly payments of $90 each and had *61paid nothing for the three months from September 17, 1950 to December 17, 1950. (On the argument of this motion before us, it was conceded that though he remained in possession, he has paid nothing during the ensuing twelve months.)
Appellee now complains that under our decision he has lost his right to prosecute his counterclaim for rent overcharges under the rent act or to assert an “equitable defense based on the same claim.” The short answer is that such result, if it exists, has been brought about by appellee’s own inaction. The trial court disallowed plaintiff’s claim ifor possession and also entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on defendant’s counterclaim. Plaintiff appealed; 'but defendant filed no cross-appeal from the disallowance of his counterclaim. Nor did he file a brief in this court. Hence it was entirely accurate to say, as we did, “He also ifiled a counterclaim for overcharges of rent but such claiim was disallowed and is not involved on this appeal.” Even if we now had the power to do so, we see no reason to reinstate a counterclaim, the dis-allowance of which has not been contested by cross-appeal and was never mentioned in this court until raised for the first time on motion for rehearing.
Appellee holds up to us the “catastrophic consequences to the many other cooperative projects which in recent years have been established in this jurisdiction.” He also says that other cooperative members will lose their right to maintain similar defenses. There is no reason for such apprehension. Under the decision we have rendered, no cooperative-lessee or member has lost any of his rights by way of defense or otherwise. If any such party be sued for possession, there is nothing in the opinion we have rendered which' will prevent him from asserting any “equitable defenses” or other proper defenses by way of counterclaim, recoupment or otherwise, so long as they are asserted in due time and are within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. See Psarakis v. Dukane, Inc., D.C.Mun.App., 84 A.2d 543. And certainly we have said nothing which would preclude such a party from taking any appropriate action in the United States District Court if the subject matter falls within that jurisdiction. All we .have said in this connection is that because this appellee noted no-cross-appeal from the judgment disallowing his counterclaim, such counterclaim was not involved on the appeal before us. We think our iformer opinion should stand.