Court Opinion

ID: 9782858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:25:37.075498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:15.418871
License: Public Domain

Spina, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom Ireland, J., joins). The only aspect of the court’s opinion with which I disagree is the question of impoundment. While the Probate and Family Court judge’s order impounding the entire case was overbroad, I would not have disturbed that order because no party raised the issue on appeal, and no third person has sought leave to intervene seeking access to the record in this case. See Rule 10 of the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure 875 (LexisNexis 2010-2011) (“A party or any interested third person . . . may, by motion supported by affidavit, seek to modify or terminate an order of impoundment”). Impoundment is an interlocutory order. See Republican Co. v. Appeals Court, 442 Mass. 218, 223-224 (2004). As such, it is open to challenge at any time, whether that be here, when the case is on appeal, or in the trial court at any other time. There has been no challenge to the impoundment order.
The materials that originally were sought to be impounded were provided during the discovery phase of this case. Generally, such materials are not judicial records and may be impounded per se. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 30 (1984). Massachusetts applies the factors set forth in Mass. R. Civ. P. 26 (c), as amended, 423 Mass. 1401 (1996), which include protection from “annoyance” or “embarrassment,” to these materials. See Rule 1 of the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure, supra at 872. If impounded materials are used at trial, they become judicial records to which the public has a strong common-law right of access. Such records may be impounded “for good cause.” Rule 7 of the Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure, supra at 874.
Third parties who are not before the court and who are not responsible for the initiation of the underlying litigation may have privacy rights sufficiently compelling to justify impoundment of their financial records and their identity. See In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 477-478 (6th Cir. *3981983). See also In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 496 U.S. 931 (1990). The husband’s employer has such rights.
In this case, the husband’s employer filed a motion for impoundment supported by affidavit.1 The employer indicated it is a private company that has a financial relationship with its partners that is strictly confidential and unavailable to the public. It further stated that maintaining this confidentiality, as well as the confidentiality of its financial information, its compensation and benefits structure, and its financial relationship with its partners, including the husband, is critical to its success as a business, its recruitment strategies, and its competitive advantage over its publicly traded competitors. It also indicated that its partners, except the managing partners, do not know the levels of compensation of other partners, which is essential to the maintenance of internal collegiality and meritocracy. The court appears to recognize the validity of the employer’s claims because it did not vacate the entire impoundment order. Instead, it lifted the order as to information it considers “necessary to the resolution in the case.” Ante at 362 n.l.
The court’s opinion in this case does not depend on a discussion of specific financial figures, or, for that matter, disclosure of specific details of the employer’s partnership agreement. The issues on appeal could have been discussed in a meaningful manner without revealing impounded details. The latter category is particularly troublesome because it is that information, namely, the method by which a partner’s income is calculated, which lies at the heart of the employer’s privacy interest. The order vacating the impoundment order not only has a profound impact on the employer’s business model of keeping partner finances confidential, but it will likely have adverse effects on the employer’s competitive advantage over publicly traded rivals, recruitment of new employees, and collegiality and meritocracy of the partnership. The court’s discussion of specific valuation of the employer itself, for purposes of a divorce case, is unnecessary in this case, and it may pose serious consequences to the employer’s business, as well as the security of its employees and their *399families. This is particularly questionable where we have said that the methodology used to determine valuation and adopted by the judge was clearly erroneous. Ante at 386-390.
The employer has, in my view, a significant privacy interest in this information that outweighs the public’s interest in its inspection. It is, essentially, an innocent nonparty with a reputation to protect, and it is difficult to imagine a more compelling case. Through no fault of its own, it has been denied several options, including termination of the husband’s interest in the company, in order to prevent disclosure. I would not have vacated the impoundment order, disclosed any financial figures, or disclosed terms of the partnership agreement (except generally), or disclosed the name of the husband’s employer. I respectfully dissent from that aspect of the court’s decision.

The employer also had submitted a proposed order of impoundment of confidential documents and confidential information. The judge did not sign the proposed order, but instead impounded the entire case.