Court Opinion

ID: 9628098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:07:34.948879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:57.661277
License: Public Domain

TURSI, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Whether a specific “due on sale” clause is an unreasonable restraint on alienation is a fact question to be determined by the surrounding circumstances. Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
The plaintiffs in their complaint alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had suffered no jeopardy in its security, that the defendant had waived its rights to acceleration and that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the sale was not enjoined.
The record shows that the appellant has continually accepted payment on the note, before and after service of notice of acceleration. I would hold such acceptance to constitute a waiver of the due on sale clause. See Colorado Ken worth Corp. v. Whitworth, 144 Colo. 541, 357 P.2d 626 (1960).
The trial court found, on the basis of the record, that it could not determine the invocation of the due on sale clause in this case to be a reasonable restraint on alienation, and therefore, the plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing in the final determination were viable. Further, the trial court properly found that if the plaintiffs prevailed at trial but the property had been sold, they would suffer irreparable harm. See Kane v. Porter, 77 Colo. 257, 235 P. 561 (1925).
There being nothing in the record to indicate that the findings of fact by the trial court are clearly erroneous, I would therefore affirm the holding of the trial court. See Broncucia v. McGee, 173 Colo. 22, 475 P.2d 336 (1970).