Court Opinion

ID: 9676602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:28:29.745651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:49.747890
License: Public Domain

*415BAKER, Justice,
dissenting.
I find myself in disagreement with the majority in this case and respectfully dissent. The majority holds that Evergreen waived its reliance upon the other three grounds for recovery asserted in its pleadings against the appellants. The majority asserts waiver by Evergreen on the basis that Evergreen failed to present in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as alternate grounds for recovery upon unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and unconscionable retention of funds; and further holds that Evergreen waived its reliance on these grounds of recovery because of Evergreen’s failure to comply with the provisions of TEX.R.CIV.P. 324(c) and TEX.R.APP.P. 74(f). The majority argues that under relevant authority the appellate court is not required to make an independent search of the record for evidence supporting a litigant’s position under a particular point of error, and concludes that the rules do not require the court to read through the entire record to determine whether the allegations of the appellee have any validity; and hold that Evergreen’s brief cannot be given a liberal construction and decline to consider Evergreen’s counterpoints as cross-points. Although authority cited by the majority does support the proposition that an appellate court is not required to search the record and that there is no “duty” to search the record, such authority does not prohibit search in the interest of liberally construing the briefs of the parties to arrive at a just and equitable decision. Accordingly, my review of the record under this attitude reveals the following:
The sale of a one-acre tract of land and the disposition of its proceeds is the subject matter of the controversy between Prince Hall and Evergreen. The undisputed facts as revealed by a search of the record shows that Evergreen, through its trustees, in 1968 received title to a one-acre tract of land located in Carrollton, Dallas County, Texas. Evergreen continuously has held title to this one-acre tract of land in its name as a lodge and Prince Hall, at no time material to the controversy had any title to the property. The constitution of Prince Hall, to which Evergreen was subordinate, required any sale of the property to be approved by the Grand Master of Prince Hall. In August 1983, Evergreen entered into a contract of sale for the one-acre tract of land. On September 14,1983, a meeting was held, the purpose of which was to elect three new trustees to represent Evergreen in the transfer of the property to the purchaser at closing. Lawrence Anderson, Deputy Director of the Prince Hall, was present at this meeting. Ruben White, the Grand Master of Prince Hall, testified that Lawrence Anderson was his district director by appointment, and represented him as Grand Master of Prince Hall when Anderson was sent to do something. Anderson was present at the meeting of the Evergreen members of the behest of White. During the course of this meeting Anderson told the membership of Evergreen present “if they had a square and constituted lodge, that the money would go to Evergreen 171.” Thereafter, on September 16, 1983, the sale was closed. The three trustees elected by the Evergreen membership at the September 14 meeting were there at the closing together with Ruben White and Lawrence Anderson representing Prince Hall. At the closing, the check for the net sale proceeds, in the sum of $139,378.84 [the title company issuing the check made the same payable to “Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge of Texas and Jurisdiction, and Evergreen Lodge No. 171, Free and Accepted Masons”] was endorsed by the three trustees of Evergreen to Prince Hall. Ruben White testified he took possession of this check, went to Fort Worth, and deposited same in the account of Prince Hall.
It is undisputed from the time the contract of sale was signed, and through the closing date of September 16, 1983, that Evergreen was a lodge whose charter had not been forfeited; and, in effect, was a functioning lodge within the rules, regulations and constitution of the fraternal organization. Thereafter, demand for return of the proceeds from the sale of the property was made on behalf of the Evergreen Lodge by its attorney. Prince Hall refused *416and this litigation ensued. Evergreen sued for recovery of the funds and in its second amended petition alleged four separate grounds for recovery: (1) fraud or misrepresentation, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) constructive trust, and (4) unconscionable action.
At trial the court submitted four issues to the jury. Issue number one inquired, “Did the authorized representative of the Grand Lodge (Prince Hall) knowingly represent to the trustees of Evergreen Lodge that Evergreen Lodge would receive the proceeds from the sale of the property in question?” To this issue the jury answered, “No.” The remaining three issues were conditioned upon a “Yes” answer to the first issue. Prince Hall thereafter moved for judgment on the verdict and Evergreen moved the court to disregard the jury’s answer to said special issue and for judgment non obstante veredicto. The court granted Evergreen’s motion and entered judgment in favor of Evergreen against Prince Hall.
On appeal, Prince Hall argued that it should have been awarded judgment for the funds in its possession based upon the jury’s answer to special issue number one, and that it was error for the court to grant Evergreen’s motion to disregard the jury’s answer to that issue and for entry of judgment in Evergreen’s favor non obstante veredicto. The majority holds that the record contains evidence of probative value to support the jury’s finding that the authorized representative of the Grand Lodge did not knowingly represent to the trustees of Evergreen that Evergreen would receive the proceeds from the sale of the property. The majority concludes and so holds that the trial court should have granted Prince Hall’s motion for judgment on the verdict and render judgment that Evergreen take nothing against the Grand Lodge. I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority.
Evergreen, responding to the points of error raised by Prince Hall by arguing that as a matter of law any one of the four grounds for recovery had been established by the uncontroverted evidence and the court was within its authority and discretion to disregard the jury’s answer to the special issue and to award judgment for the sale proceeds to Evergreen. Evergreen contends that where a judgment may rest on more than one ground, the party aggrieved must find error on each such ground, or the failure to do so will constitute a waiver of the right to complain of the ruling to which no error was assigned. In my opinion, the position taken by Evergreen is correct under the circumstances of this case.
The judgment in this case does not recite the grounds or the reasons that the same was granted for Evergreen. The judgment could have been granted by the court non obstante veredicto on a finding of the court as a matter of law that the evidence, undisputed, established that the representation of who would get the money was made, or could have been granted on the fact that the appellant, Prince Hall, was unjustly enriched by receiving the proceeds from the sale, or that the appellant, Prince Hall, held the same in constructive trust for the benefit of Evergreen, or that the retention of the funds by Prince Hall was unconscionable under the facts.
If an independent ground of recovery on which no issue was submitted or requested was conclusively established by the evidence and was uncontroverted, then such ground is not waived by the party asserting same, even though it was not submitted to the jury. See First American Life Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 400 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.). If a jury verdict, together with such findings as are required by the undisputed evidence, would not have supported a judgment for a party in the trial court, then the trial court’s action in granting a judgment non obstante veredicto for the other party should be sustained on appeal. Thermo Products v. Chilton I.S.D., 647 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Tex.App.—Waco 1983, writ ref’d n.r. e.).
On appeal Prince Hall assigned error only with respect to the theory of recovery under fraud. No assignments of error are found with respect to the other three inde*417pendent grounds of recovery alleged by Evergreen. Because of the undisputed and uncontroverted facts, the judgment awarded by the court to Evergreen on its motions could have been based upon one of the three alternate independent grounds of recovery alleged by Evergreen. Accordingly, where a judgment rests upon more than one ground, the failure of Prince Hall to assign error as to each ground constitutes a waiver of the right to complain of the ruling for which no error was assigned. Gillette v. Achterberg, 159 Tex. 591, 325 S.W.2d 384, 385 (1959); Hixon v. Pride of Texas Distr. Co., 683 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, no writ); and Bailey v. Rogers, 631 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex.App.—Austin 1982, no writ). Prince Hall also contended on appeal that it was necessary for Evergreen to actually file a motion for instructed verdict as a prerequisite for the court considering and passing upon a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. We find the law to be contrary to Prince Hall’s position on this point. See Jackson v. City of Dallas, 443 S.W.2d 771, 775 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1969), rev’d on other grounds, 450 S.W.2d 62 (Tex.1970).
We would hold that the points of error asserted by Prince Hall be overruled and that the judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of Evergreen be affirmed for the reasons set forth above.
LAGARDE and DEVANY, JJ., join in this opinion.