Court Opinion

ID: 9754871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:17:12.124232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:00.198645
License: Public Domain

Sghrbiber, J.,
dissenting. Today the Court1 holds that a public employer, which has discharged an employee-at-will after investigation disclosed the employee’s misconduct, must conduct a Fourteenth Amendment due process hearing to reconsider its decision. By unduly stretching the fabric of a civil service regulation, it manufactures a deprivation of “liberty” and concludes that the employee is entitled to a pretermination due process hearing though he may be discharged at will and without cause. It is obvious that this holding will create yet another procedural tool with which a litigious employee can frustrate a public employer’s efforts to discharge him. When the State, as it has done here, affords a non-civil service employee an opportunity to participate with counsel in an inquiry into an incident that would provide fair ground' for discharge, concludes that discharge is warranted and then effects the discharge with the utmost discretion, we should hesitate to invoke the concept of “liberty” as justification for requiring further proceedings. A weighing of both the public and private interests that are implicated *184in this case compels, in my view, the conclusion that plaintiff has received all the process that was due.

I

Sergeant Nicholas Nicoletta and Police Officer Raymond Russomanno, who were both employed by the North Jersey District Water Supply Commission as officers of the Wanaque Reservoir Police Eorce, engaged in a physical altercation on March 20, 1974 at police headquarters. Both filed complaints with the Municipal Court of Wanaque Borough. The Commission suspended them indefinitely without pay on March 26, 1974 and proceeded to investigate the matter by holding a hearing on April 10, 1974.
A memorandum notice had been sent to Nicoletta, Rus-somanno and the Police Chief George Destito advising them to appear on that date “to confer on complaints and that you did not follow requests of Chief George Destito.” Present at the meeting were the defendant and his attorney, and Russomanno and his attorney. Nicoletta was the first witness. After being sworn, he was initially questioned on direct examination by his attorney with respect to the incident on March 20 and its cause and then examined by the Commissioners and Commission counsel. Russomanno’s testimony was then taken and the same procedure was followed.
Both parties were told that the Commission proposed to interrogate at a later date each person present at the time of the incident. Neither counsel requested to be in attendance at the interrogation. The Commission met again on April 16, 1974 and heard six police officers and the chief. The general investigative nature of the proceedings during both days is demonstrated by substantial questioning by the Commissioners on such matters as the instructions and training given to new police officers, training in handling of guns, and requests for constructive suggestions to improve the department.
The Commission formally convened on May 9, 1974. The minutes reflect that Nicoletta’s counsel had requested that *185his client be given permission to resign, and, after being advised that the Commission would accept a resignation and after consulting with Nicoletta, then reported that Nicoletta was unwilling to resign. Thereupon the Commission adopted a resolution which, without detailing the reasons, stated that the defendant’s employment was terminated as of March 27, 1974 “for good cause shown.”
On September 27, 1974, three-and-a-half months later, Nicoletta’s counsel wrote to the Commission charging his removal was unlawful and demanding reinstatement with back pay. He asserted that Nicoletta had not received a complaint “specifying the charges against him, nor was he afforded a full and fair hearing on the charges.” When the Commission refused to reinstate the defendant, this action was instituted. The relief sought was reinstatement, reimbursement with back pay and “such other relief as the court may deem just and proper.” The Appellate Division initially remanded the matter to the Commission to make findings of fact. It was in response to that order that the Commission for the first time publicly detailed the factual findings in support of its conclusion of “good cause.”

II

Federal constitutional due process is triggered when a person is deprived of “property” or “liberty.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). As an employee of the North Jersey District Water Supply 'Commission in the capacity of an officer of the Wanaque Reservoir Police Force, Nicoletta was employed at will and was not subject to civil service. N. J. S. A. 58:5-6. He had no statutory or contractual entitlement to the job. Accordingly, he had no “property” interest in the employment. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, supra; Sims v. Fox, 505 F. 2d 857 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. den. 421 U. S. 1011, 95 S. Ct. 2415, 44 L. Ed. 2d 678 (1975). Cf. Arnett *186v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 181, 94 S. Ct. 1633, 1657, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15, 48 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part) (employee who holds job at pleasure of employer has no “property interest”) .
Uor was his “liberty” interest impaired. The principles •of Bishop v. Wood, supra, govern us here. There a policeman, whose employment was held to be at will and who was discharged without a hearing, instituted an action contending he had a constitutional right to a hearing. During pretrial discovery he was advised of the grounds for his dismissal. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that he was deprived of “liberty” in that the stigma of the discharge, the reasons being allegedly false, might severely damage his reputation in the community. Mr. Justice Stevens explained that:
In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, we recognized that the nonretention of an untenured college teacher might make him somewhat less attractive to other employers, but nevertheless concluded that it would stretch the concept too far “to suggest that a person is deprived of ‘liberty’ when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another.” Id., at 575, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548. This sama conclusion applies to the dnscha/rffe of a public employee whose position is terminable at the will of the employer when there is mo public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge.
In this case the asserted reasons for the City Manager’s decision were communicated orally to the petitioner in private and also were stated in writing in answer to interrogatories after this litigation commenced. Since the former communication was not made public, it cannot properly form the basis for a claim that petitioner’s interest in his “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity” was thereby impaired. And since the latter communication was made in the course of a judicial proceeding which did not commence until after petitioner had suffered the injury for which he seeks redress, it surely cannot provide retroactive support for his claim. A contrary evaluation of either explanation would penalize forthright and truthful communication between employer and employee in the former instance, and between litigants in the latter. [Id. at 348-349, 96 S. Ct. at 2079, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 692 (emphasis supplied)]
The majority concedes that under Bishop v. Wood a public employee whose employment is terminable at will and *187who is discharged is not deprived of ‘liberty” when no public disclosure of the reasons is made. See also Gentile v. Walton, 562 F. 2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977). Furthermore, subsequent disclosure of those reasons in a judicial proceeding cannot support a claim of ‘liberty” deprivation. This is so irrespective of the adverse impact on job opportunity. Mr. Justice Brennan in a dissenting opinion in Bishop v. Wood acknowledged this result. He said the majority held
that a State may tell an employee that he is being fired for some nonderogatory reason, and then turn around and inform prospective employers that the employee was in fact discharged for a stigmatizing reason that will effectively preclude future employment. [Id. at 351-352, 96 S. Ct. at 2081, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 694]
See “The Supreme Court 1975 Term,” 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 101 (1976), which agrees with this analysis.
It is also possible to construe Bishop v. Wood to hold that, when the employee compels public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge, he cannot then complain of any resulting stigma. He cannot protest receipt of that which he sought, public disclosure of the grounds of the discharge. Although Nicoletta was given a hearing and police officer Bishop was not, in both cases there was no public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge. In both, the detailed factual bases were disclosed in the course of subsequent judicial proceedings, Nicoletta’s in response to an order of the Appellate Division and Bishop’s in answer to interrogatories. Nico-letta’s status was identical to that of Bishop, a public employee whose position was terminable at will and who was entitled to a statement of reasons for his discharge.
Nicoletta’s discharge, the majority alleges, exposes him “to potential disqualification from further public employment” which constitutes the deprivation of his constitutional liberty. This position relies exclusively upon a civil service regulation, N. J. A. C. 4:1-8.14. That regulation reads as follows:
*188(a) The Chief Examiner and Secretary shall take the following actions for any cause listed in subsection (b) of this Section or for any other good cause:
1. Reject the application of a person for admission to an examination ;
2. Refuse to test an applicant;
3. Refuse to place the name of a person on the employment list;
4. Refuse to certify the name of an eligible person; or
5. Remove from the employment list the name of an eligible person.
(b) Any of the following shall constitute good cause for such action by the Chief Examiner and Secretary against any prospective employee who:
1. Lacks the established qualification requirements for the positions or employment for which he applies;
2. By law, is ineligible for appointment or employment in the position ;
3. Is physically or mentally unfit to perform effectively the duties of the position;
4. Is addicted to the excessive use of drugs, narcotics or intoxicating beverages;
5. Has been convicted of any crime or other unlawful offense or has committed any act involving moral turpitude or infamous or disgraceful conduct;
6. Has been removed or has resigned not in good standing or has resigned in lieu of removal from the public service, or whose record of employment, public or private, has been unsatisfactory for any reason which casts substantial doubt upon the person’s capacity to perform satisfactorily the duties of the position for which the application has been filed or the test held;
7. Has made a false statement of any material fact or attempted any deception or fraud in any Civil Service application, examination or in any information submitted to secure eligibility or appointment; or
8. Refuses to execute any oath prescribed by law.
(c) The Chief Examiner and Secretary may admit to an examination and subsequently, with the concurrence of the appointing authority, certify as eligible for employment any person who is ineligible under paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of subsection (b) of this Section, but who has been rehabilitated to the extent that such employment would not be against the public interest. In accordance with N. J. S. A. 40A: 14^122 and 40A:14r-9 this exception shall not apply to police and fire positions, nor shall this exception extend to local government service situations when such exception is specifically precluded by law.
*189(d) No person suffering a physical defect due to injury incurred in the armed services shall be discriminated against because of such defect unless the Commission considers the defect incapacitating.
(e) The rejection of an application or other action against any person, under this rule, shall not be effective until the person is notified in writing of such action, together with the reasons therefor.
It must be observed that under subsection (b) 6 of the regulation, upon which the majority relies, removal from public service applies only to permanent employees in the classified civil service. Obviously, “removal from the public service” refers only to individuals who are governmental employees. The regulations define an “employee” as a person holding a position in the classified service. N. J. A. G. 4:1-2.1. Furthermore, the word “removal” means “separation from employment for cause.” N. J. A. G. 4:1-2.1.
Reading subsection (b) 6 to refer to employees in the classified service who have been discharged for cause is consonant with the only regulation which expressly governs removal, N. J. A. C. 4:1-16.8(a).2 This regulation, set forth verbatim in the footnote, identifies removal with permanent employees in the classified service and not with government employees having any other status. Provisional or temporary employees in classified service may be “terminated” at any time at the discretion of the appointing authority. N. J. 4. G. 4:1-16.8(b). No reference is made to governmental *190employees who are not in the classified service. When consideration is then given to the various statutory provisions providing for dismissal of state civil service employees, N. J. 8. A. 11:15-2, 11:15 — 3, 11:15-4, and 11:15-6,3 it is clear that when the regulation refers to an individual who has been “removed * * * from the public service,” reference is being made only to those who held classified civil service positions.
The all-embracing scope given to the regulation by the majority will disserve the interests of those government employees who are not in the classified service. They will now bo subject to the disqualification of future employment upon discharge from their positions irrespective of the reasons for the discharge.
In the absence of that regulation, as I understand the majority opinion, Nicoletta would not be entitled to a “due process” hearing before the North Jersey District Water Supply Commission for reconsideration of his dismissal. The underlying assumption is that the civil service regulation triggers and causes impairment of Nicoletta’s future job possibilities for public employment. Put another way, deprivation of Nicoletta’s legitimate rights to apply and be certified for a civil service position stems from the promulgation of the civil service regulation.
As Mr. Justice Stewart stated in Board of Regents v. Roth, it is the invocation by the State of a regulation which would bar the individual from all other public employment which implicates the freedom to take advantage of other public employment. 408 U. S. at 573, 92 S. Ct. at 2707, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 559. Whether the civil service regulation is invalid as beyond statutory authority (see N. J. S. A. 11: *1919-6) or as applied in any particular case are matters properly to be decided in a direct attack on the agency’s regulation or upon appeal from its decision. The validity of regulation N. J. A. C. 4:1-8.14 and its future applications should not be treated as a diminishment of the North Jersey District Water Supply Commission’s authority to discharge an at-will employee who is not in the classified civil service.
Several aspects of the Commission’s regulation and its application bring into focus the fact that the defendant’s discharge of Nicoletta has not affected his “liberty.” First, although Nicoletta’s discharge does not constitute a “removal,” another clause in N. J. A. C. 4:1-8.14(b) 6 allows the Chief Examiner and Secretary of the Civil Service Commission to reject an applicant “whose record of employment, public or private, has been unsatisfactory for any reason which casts substantial doubt upon the person’s capacity to perform satisfactorily the duties of the position for which the application has been filed * * Though the majority has not relied upon this provision, it might arguably bear on plaintiff’s eligibility for some civil service positions. The effect of his unsatisfactory job performance would be the same even if his employment had been in the private sector. If he had been working for a private security guard company and had been discharged because of an unwarranted altercation, he would now be subject to the same disability. His right to apply for a civil service position is identical with that of any other person in the private sector, and his prior status as a public employee entitles him to no more. It is not the discharge from a state position in and of itself but rather the subsequent action of the Civil Service Commission which could be said to affect Nicoletta’s liberty.
Second, the regulation provides not only that the employment prohibition may be relaxed, N. J. A. C. 4:l-8.14(c), but also that an aggrieved person has a right to review of an adverse ruling or determination of the Chief Examiner and Secretary. N. J. A. C. 4:1-8.15(a). Insofar as the proceedings before the Civil Service Commission are con*192cerned, lie would be entitled to a hearing to demonstrate why he should not be disqualified. Cunningham v. Department of Civil Service, 69 N. J. 13 (1975). Furthermore, judicial review of its decision as a safeguard against any arbitrary or unreasonable action would be available. Thus, if an individual were discharged for an insignificant reason or one which is not related to performance of the prospective position, he would in all probability be entitled to take the civil service examination or be placed on the employment list.
Third, the speculative possibility that Nicoletta might apply for classified public employment and be rejected in the future does not establish a sufficiently grievous harm to constitute a deprivation of liberty. That this is so follows from recognition of the fact that discharge from any employment will almost always have some impact on prospective future employment. Yet such an effect has not been deemed sufficient to constitute an impairment of one’s liberty. Bishop v. Wood, supra.
Under federal constitutional due process principles, Nico-letta, an at-will employee, was not entitled even to the hearing which he received. Public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge was made only in compliance with a court order, and therefore he was not entitled to a hearing to clear his name. Further, the thesis that Nicoletta’s discharge per se forecloses his future public employment prospects is, as we have seen, based on the mistaken assumption that the term “removal” in the civil service regulation, N. J. A. C. 4:1-8.14, applies to non-civil service public employees-at-will. Finally, if the Civil Service Commission were to treat Nicoletta unjustly or unfairly in the future, his recourse against that body would be clear.

Ill

The remedy projected by the majority is a “pretermination” hearing at which the employer may, nunc pro tunc, reconsider the firing. By holding that before an at-will em*193ployee may be discharged he is entitled to a specification of charges and a full due process evidentiary hearing, the majority elevates Nicoletta’s status to at least that of a public employee who has a property right to his job. When a liberty interest is implicated, the only purpose of a hearing is to give the employee an opportunity to clear his name.
In Codd v. Velger, 429 U. S. 624, 97 S. Ct. 882, 51 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1977), a New York City policeman in a probationary status was discharged without a hearing. He asserted he had been entitled to a hearing due to the stigmatizing effect of certain material in his personnel file and his later dismissal from another position when that material was disclosed to his subsequent employer. The Supreme Court in denying the right to a hearing wrote:
Assuming all of the other elements necessary to make out a claim of stigmatization under Roth and Bishop, the remedy mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is “an opportunity to refute the charge.” 408 U. S. at 573, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548. “The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name,” id., at 573 n. 12.
* # «5? * * *
* * * [T]he hearing required where a nontenured employee has been stigmatized in the course of a decision to terminate his employment is solely “to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name.” [429 U. S. at 627, 97 S. Ct. at 884, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 96] 4
*194In Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, the Supreme Court held that a federal employee who could not be discharged absent cause was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing before suspension without pay. The Court also pointed out that when, as here,
[t]he purpose of the hearing * * * is to provide the person “an opportunity to clear his name,” a hearing afforded by administrative appeal procedures after the actual dismissal is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. [416 U. S. at 157, 94 S. Ct. at 1646, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 35 (emphasis supplied)]
Williams v. Civil Service Commission, 66 N. J. 152 (1974), upon which the majority relies, is consistent with Codd v. Velger, supra. There the purpose of the evidentiary post-termination hearing was “to clear any damage to his reputation” and not to compel the public employer to reconsider its decision.
To grant a pretermination constitutional due process hearing at which the employer must reconsider its action in discharging the employee is incompatible with the authority to discharge and will prove administratively unduly burdensome. After completion of an investigation, it now appears that a formal complaint and specification of charges will have to be drawn and served. Then a full hearing will have to be held which will probably necessitate the testimony again of all witnesses. There will then follow findings of fact and conclusions, presumably subject to judicial review, all of which will serve no useful function in view of the small probability that the employer will change its mind and the broad discretionary authority to discharge without cause. Cf. Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School District, 492 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974) (untenured teacher not constitutionally protected against arbitrary discharge). The holding today will enable every employee-at-will to demand a pretermination hearing merely by alleging that a proposed discharge will adversely affect employment opportunities.

*195
IV

The New Jersey Constitution does not require a contrary result. Although Article I, par. 1 affirms the right to enjoy “liberty,” it is well settled that, in the absence of a contract, statute or violation of an individual’s exercise of a constitutional right,5 an at-will employee may be discharged for any reason.6 In Zimmerman v. Bd. of Ed. of Newark, 38 N. J. 65 (1962), cert. den. 371 U. S. 956, 83 S. Ct. 508, 9 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1963), we said the governmental employing ■ unit may exercise the right “as it sees fit” to discharge such an employee. 38 N. J. at 71. We recognized the same principle recently in English v. College of Medicine and Dentistry of N. J., 73 N. J. 20, 23 (1977), in which we reiterated that a discharge of an at-will employee need not be for just cause.
In Chief Justice Weintraub’s concurring opinion in Zimmerman v. Bd. of Ed. of Newark, supra, he raised, without deciding, the question whether the governmental employee could be discharged for any reason or no reason. 38 N. J. at 80. A corollary to this question arose in Donaldson v. Bd., of Ed. of No. Wildwood, 65 N. J. 236 (1974), where Justice Jacobs held for a majority of the Court that the failure to> state the reasons for refusal to rehire a non-tenure teacher was arbitrary and, as a matter of elemental fairness, a statement of reasons must be given. Id. at 245. He assumed that there was no federal constitutional right to a statement of reasons (unless the discharge was predicated on an impermissible constitutional ground). He placed substantial re*196liance upon Monks v. N. J. State Parole Board, 58 N. J. 238 (1971), a case holding that a prisoner is entitled to a statement of reasons in connection with denial of his parole application as a matter of basic fairness. However, there the Legislature had provided for parole if “there is reasonable probability” that the prisoner will assume his proper place in society. 58 N. J. at 242-243. Further, the nature of the interest, the right to be released from prison, involved an outright deprivation of “liberty.” In Donaldson Justice Jacobs, unquestionably recognizing these differences, referred to the constitutional authority to review administrative actions and the necessity of administrative agencies to particularize their- findings to prevent arbitrary action. 65 N. J. at 243-244. His conclusions were bottomed on the findings that on request a teacher should be given the reasons for non-retention because of the value of constructive criticism to the teacher, and, incidentally, that the statement could serve as a “discipline on the board itself against arbitrary or abusive exercise of its discretionary powers.” Id. at 245. Donaldson does not hold that the reasons for nonretention must constitute just cause. There is no inconsistency between the need to state the reasons upon request for a nonretention or discharge of an at-will employee and the power to exercise the discretion to terminate the employee status.
AYhen, of course, the discharged employee demands the particulars, then he cannot complain about the stigma or its impact on future employment opportunities. It is clear that disclosures of the grounds of plaintiff’s discharge were compelled by his litigation. Furthermore, if the employing unit is forced to state the reasons because of judicial fiat, no sound 'basis justifies a different result. The extension of the Donaldson doctrine to require a hearing accompanied with the' full panoply of constitutional due process rights is not warranted.

*197
V

The majority contends that the notice of the hearing did not satisfy due process requirements, but the notice was not intended to serve that purpose. The Commission’s notice of the hearing referred to a conference on “complaints” and the failure to “follow requests of Chief George Destito.” It must be remembered that at this stage the Commission was only conducting an investigation. It could not reasonably have been required to set forth specific charges against both Nico-letta and Russomanno. When its letter went out notifying them of a hearing on April 10, 1974, the Commission was not prepared to make charges against either man.
Furthermore, Nicoletta sustained no prejudice procedurally in any manner and he asserts none. It is self-evident from the record that he knew precisely why the meeting was called. Nicoletta testified first under the direction of his attorney. The direct examination covered the important misconduct issues. No objections were made to any questions throughout the proceedings on the basis that they were beyond the scope of the noticed subject matter or on any other ground. Though advised that other witnesses to the fracas would be called at a later time, he did not object and he made no request to be present. When asked whether anyone else should be called, he suggested the names of five witnesses. Four of these testified. Neither Nicoletta nor his counsel ever asserted that the notice was inadequate, that they desired to be present at the second meeting, or that they might desire to cross-examine each witness, a most unlikely event since Russomanno had not been asked one question on cross-examination.
A review of the record discloses that Nicoletta had been angered at Russomanno for repeating a charge Nicoletta had made about another officer, Scheuer, to Scheuer. When Nico-letta, who was coming off his shift at 7:00 a.m. on March 19, 1974, encountered Russomanno at headquarters, he twice attacked Russomanno, threatened to kill him, and twice had *198to be forcibly pulled off him. Nicoletta then directed those present not to report the incident. After Eussomanno filed a criminal complaint in the Borough of Wanaque, Nicoletta on the advice of his counsel, who believed it was an appropriate protective measure, filed a counter complaint. Six witnesses independently agreed that Nicoletta was the aggressor. Several heard his threat to Eussomanno that “I’ll kill you.” Nicoletta did not deny that he was the aggressor, admitted that he was on top of Eussomanno and was pulled away, did not deny making the threat, and did not dispute the fact that he had instructed those present not to report the affair. All agreed that the police force morale had improved after Nicoletta’s suspension. During the course of the hearing Nicoletta complained that neither the Chief of Police nor the officers had any respect for him. He conceded that he had had frequent problems with the Chief and other officers in the 14 months he had been employed on the force. The evidence is so overwhelming in support of the Commission’s actions, it is difficult to comprehend how Nicoletta suffered any harm. Certainly, it cannot be contended that the Commission’s action was arbitrary or capricious.

VI

Neither constitutional due process nor fundamental fairness required more than affording Nicoletta the opportunity to explain what had occurred. He had no federal or state constitutional right to a hearing. At most he was entitled, at his request, to a statement of the reasons for his discharge, and compliance with that request did not entitle him to a due process hearing. What Nicoletta seeks is reinstatement and back pay, not another hearing with a parade of witnesses to reiterate the facts underlying the discharge. To require a pretermination constitutional due process hearing under these circumstances, where the Commission had the conceded right to discharge with or without cause, can serve no useful purpose.
I would affirm.
*199Justice Sullivan and Justice 'Clifford join in this opinion.
For reversal — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Pashman and Handler — 4.
For affirmance — Justices Sullivan, Clifford and Schrm-ber — 3.

TIie concurring opinion argues that Nieoletta could not be discharged except for cause and that the rehearing should be held to determine if cause exists. Under its analysis, judicial review would be available to prevent a discharge for an arbitrary or capricious reason. See Pashman, J., concurring, 77 N. J. at 182. The Chief Justice’s opinion, on the other hand, holds that the purpose of the hearing before the North Jersey District Water Supply Commission is solely “to attempt to dislodge the specter of possible Civil Service debarment from further public employment” and that the Commission can exercise an apparently uncontrolled “basic discretion.” Id. at 168,

This provision reads as follows:
4 :1-16.8 Removal
(a) A permanent employee in the classified service may not be removed except for just cause upon written charges. Notice of the removal shall be sent to the employee on the form prescribed by the Civil Service Commission and a copy of said notice shall be sent to the Civil Service Department at the same time.
(b) A provisional or temporary employee may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the appointing authority. A provisional or temporary employee who has been terminated shall have no right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission.-

Chapter 15 of tlie Civil Service Act is entitled “Suspension; Demotion; Removal.” Bach of the cited sections refers to “removal” of classified civil servants. Removal must be based on cause, N. J. 8. A. 11:15-3, and is accompanied by procedural safeguards, including a hearing.

The Court carefully distinguished nontenured employment from parole revocation, another instance raising liberty interest claims. It noted that in the latter case a hearing must address two distinct considerations — first, whether the parolee committed the violation with which he is charged, and second, whether if he did commit the act his parole should under the circumstances be revoked. The Court then stated that in the employment case “the contemplated hearing does not embrace any determination analogous to the ‘second step’ of the parole revocation proceeding, which would in effect be a determination of whether or not, conceding that the report were true, the employee was properly refused re-employment.” 429 U. S. at 627-628, 97 S. Ct. at 884, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 96-97.

See Winston v. Bd. of Ed. of So. Plainfield, 64 N. J. 582 (1974) and cases cited therein at 587. See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 598, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2698, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570, 578 (1972) ; Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977).

I understand the plurality agrees with this proposition, holding that “termination need not be predicated on just cause * * 77 H. J. at 154, and that the Commission has an “uncontrolled discretion” in deciding to discharge an at-will employee. Id. at 168-169.