Court Opinion

ID: 9654808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:51:45.990888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:13.674341
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Presiding Judge
(dissenting).
The majority opinion says the jury could have found that by accelerating to avoid the police pursuit, the defendant was aiding in the attempted disposition of the property and so was exercising dominion over the stolen property and hence can be convicted of breaking into the Daley residence and stealing the property. The case cited in support of this proposition, State v. Webb (Mo.Sup.) 382 S.W.2d 601, seems to me to involve facts which were much stronger against the defendant than anything which appears in the present case. In the Webb case, not only was the stolen property found in a closet in the kitchen and under the bed in the bedroom in defendant’s residence, but there was testimony that defendant was seen carrying cartons containing the stolen property into his house.
As the majority opinion says, the jury in the present case could find the stolen property was in the physical possession of the passenger but it could hardly have been thrown out the window on the passenger’s side by defendant, who was driving and being pursued by the police. Defendant should not have tried to run away from the police and it may be he was guilty of giving the passenger aid in an effort to escape, but the fact that defendant was driving and in control of the car does not make him responsible for or in constructive possession of whatever his passenger may have had or thrown out of the car. Suppose the passenger had thrown out a small package of marijuana? Would defendant be guilty of possession, which is a crime under our statutes? Suppose the police found stolen property in the passen*356ger’s pockets? Would that support a conviction of defendant in this case? Suppose defendant had not speeded up when the police pursued them but his passenger nevertheless threw objects out of the car? In my opinion we are stretching to the breaking point the constructive possession theory in affirming this burglary and stealing conviction where the possession element with respect to defendant rests entirely on the way in which he drove. The circumstantial evidence here is consistent with defendant, a former convicted felon, not wanting to be apprehended by the police in company with a man who was in possession of stolen property, even though defendant was not involved in the burglary and stealing. The other circumstantial evidence in the case does not point so clearly and satisfactorily to guilt as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence before us does not overcome the presumption of innocence; it does not rise above suspicion and the fact the jury rejected the explanation tendered in defendant’s behalf is not the equivalent of proof to the contrary, State v. Taylor (Mo.Sup.) 422 S.W.2d 633.
I respectfully dissent and would reverse.