Court Opinion

ID: 9639880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:50:39.434452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:50.033388
License: Public Domain

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I am not in disagreement with my associates on the principles of law which apply in this case. It is recognized without exception that a state which first obtains jurisdiction and control of a prisoner may retain the exclusive control of him until its sentence and judgment have been completely executed. It may not be compelled by writ of habeas corpus or otherwise to surrender him to another sovereign for any purpose, either conditionally or absolutely. As stated in the majority opinion, by comity between states, one sovereign may recognize a request from another for the delivery of one in its custody. That comity is not restricted, however, to requests for temporary possession of a prisoner. It extends to all requests. Nor can it be said that under the rule of comity a request from one sovereign to another, whether for the temporary or absolute custody of the prisoner, is generally granted. Many elements enter into a consideration of such a request, such as the desperate character of the prisoner, the sentence he is serving, the crime with which he is charged in the other jurisdiction, and the severity of the sentence that would be imposed there as compared with the present sentence. The most, then, *658that is required under the rule of comity is that the rquest be given respectful consideration. No presumption, therefore, flows from the rule of comity as to the character of the surrender of possession of the prisoner or what the parties had in mind regarding the same.
Oklahoma could then have delivered petitioner to respondent for the purpose of prosecution, upon condition, however, that he be returned at the conclusion of the trial to finish his state sentence, or it could have delivered him upon condition that if convicted he serve his federal sentence and then be returned, or it could have delivered him unconditionally. Our province is to determine what was done. In resolving this question, we must first consider the request or the writ itself, the response of the state thereto and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. We must not wander off into the realm of speculation or draw inferences of what ordinarily might follow in such cases. Oklahoma having the right to deny the request in toto, on condition, or grant it absolutely, no inference can be drawn as to what it intended, other than that which reasonably flows from the nature of the request and its response thereto.
Let us then look to the writ itself. What did the federal court ask of the state ? The title of the writ, “Ad Prosequendum”, or, for the purpose of prosecution, is of no help. I cannot agree with the statement of the majority that “the writ here was issued in accordance with A form, no doubt traditionally used for the purpose of acquiring temporary jurisdiction * * *.” It finds no support in the record. I doubt if a traditional form of writ can be found or employed because of the very nature of the writ itself. The form in each instance must depend upon the nature of the request addressed to the sovereign.
What the federal court said was: “By this writ I am asking the following of you * * *.” Then it commanded the warden to deliver the prisoner to the marshal for prosecution in the federal court. Had the writ stopped there, it might be fairly implied that it was understood that the prisoner was to be returned. But had that been the intent, or had it been thought necessary to clarify the intent, it could have been done by language substantially as follows: “To be returned to the state at the conclusion thereof to complete his state sentence.” Such a provision is generally found in'a writ'where the federal court holds that the surrender was only conditional. I know of no case where the court has held otherwise on a writ that was absolute on its face.. Such a provision was included in the writ we considered 'in Rohr v. Hudspeth, 101 Cir., 105 F.2d 747, and that opinion recognizes that the' decision might be otherwise on a writ absolute on its face.
But this writ did not stop here. It commanded the marshal when he possessed the prisoner not to return him to the state penitentiary but to hold him subject to the further orders of the court. This language was inept and entirely inappropriate in a writ which requested the temporary possession of a prisoner and contemplated that the marshal should return him to the place from whence'he came. Here there is no limitation upon what the future orders of the court might be. It could, as it did, sentence him and command the marshal to confine him in the federal penitentiary. So it appears that, looking at the writ itself, it does not ask for a conditional delivery of the prisoner, but asks for his delivery under such conditions as would entitle the court to retain absolute custody and control of him. The warden of the state penitentiary must be presumed to have known that this was the purport of the writ. Fie could have refused to grant it or could have insisted that it be clarified and that a provision be inserted therein which would require the return of the prisoner to the state penitentiary before he surrendered possession of him. But instead he delivered the prisoner over to the marshal under a writ absolute on its face and which purports to give the federal court authority to exercise absolute and exclusive control over the prisoner thereafter. It must be presumed, then, that he consented thereto. Whether the warden had authority to relinquish custody of the petitioner, either conditionally or absolutely, is beside the point. That might be pertinent if a conflict had arisen thereafter between the two sovereigns over the custody of the petitioner. The lack of legal authority in the warden to surrender absolute possession of the petitioner would not warrant the marshal of the federal court to return him to the state penitentiary unless directed to do so by the federal judge.
After imposing sentence, the journal entry of judgment provided that the prisoner be committed to the custody of the *659attorney general for imprisonment on his federal sentence. When was he to be delivered to the attorney general? At the conclusion of the state sentence? The answer must be no. It was the court’s duty to fix not only the length of the sentence, but also the time when it began. A sentence by a federal judge may not be left suspended in mi’dair. The judge could not impose a sentence to commence at some indefinite time in the future. McPike & Zerbst, D.C., 21 F.Supp. 961. 18 U.S.C.A. § 709a, contemplates that the sentence begins to run from the time the marshal receives the commitment, .which is the order to execute the sentence. And we should so hold unless there is something in the sentence or order of commitment clearly indicating the contrary.
The judgment provided that a certified copy of the judgment be delivered to the marshal as his commitment. Had the mar-, shal been in doubt as to what he should do with the prisoner under the commitment and had he sought legal advice from his legal adviser, the district attorney, and forgetting that the prisoner came from a state prison, is there any doubt but what the district attorney would have advised him that it was his duty under the commitment to forthwith deliver the prisoner to the institution selected by the attorney general for the execution of the sentence? It is manifest to me that if we consider the writ and the judgment and the commitment of the court, the only conclusion we can draw therefrom is that the writ under which the federal court asked for the possession of the prisoner, asked for his absolute possession ; that the warden of the state penitentiary delivered the possession of the prisoner under this broad and expansive request, and the only presumption that flows from his conduct is that he surrendered absolute possession of the prisoner, if the federal court saw fit to exercise its jurisdiction to that extent.
The writ of habeas corpus is a shield that guards and protects the constitutional liberties of the American citizen. Through it we inquire to see whether fundamental rights have been violated. Its function or use should not be construed or. employed so narrowly as to defeat the salutary purpose it serves in our system of government. All matters or proceedings seeking to restrain one of his liberty should be strictly construed against- the government and in favor of the citizen. While an action of habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, it is most generally employed in criminal proceedings. While to me there is no doubt as to the nature or meaning of the request. addressed to the State of Oklahoma, as I glean it from the four corners of the writ, nor as to the judgment and commitment of the federal court, whatever presumption need be indulged in, in construing the effect of the writ and the judgment and commitment of the court should be liberally construed in favor of the petitioner.
In my view, the principles announced in McPike v. Zerbst, supra; Smith v. Swope, 9 Cir., 91 F.2d 260; Albori v. United States, 9 Cir., 67 F.2d 4, are controlling, and should determine the question under cdiisideration. For these reasons, I am forced to respectfully dissent.