Court Opinion

ID: 9927291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 18:03:02.523762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:13.231206
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/26/24 P. v. Hernandez CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E080980

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIF1701765)

 RAUL HERNANDEZ,                                                         OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Thomas E. Kelly, Judge.

(Retired judge of the Santa Cruz Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to

art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Dismissed.

         Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Andrew

Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Raul Hernandez pled guilty to multiple counts of robbery and was sentenced to 30

years eight months in prison. The trial court granted Hernandez 2,083 days of actual

custody credit and 366 days of good time conduct credit. Upon being notified by the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) that Hernandez may

have been sentenced to more time than authorized by law, the court revised Hernandez’s

sentence but awarded no additional custody credits for the time between his original

sentencing and his resentencing. Hernandez appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by

failing to award him additional custody credits for that time. Because Hernandez did not

first present the custody credits claim in the trial court, and he raises no other issues on

appeal, we lack jurisdiction and therefore dismiss the appeal.

                                      BACKGROUND

       Hernandez pled guilty to five counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; unlabeled

statutory references are to this code) and admitted personal use of a firearm as to one

count (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). He also admitted a prior strike conviction under the three

strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2).) The trial court

sentenced Hernandez to 30 years eight months in state prison. His sentence consisted of

the upper term of five years on the first robbery count, doubled to 10 years under the

three strikes law, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement and two years eight months

for each of the remaining robbery counts. The court granted 2,083 days of presentence

custody credit for actual time and 366 days of good time conduct credits, for a total of

2,449 days of presentence custody credit.

                                               2
       Thereafter, the CDCR informed the trial court that Hernandez should have been

sentenced to two years (instead of two years eight months) on each of the four

subordinate robbery counts. The CDCR requested that the court review its file.

       In response to the correspondence from the CDCR, the court imposed a new 28-

year term consisting of the five-year upper term for the first robbery count, doubled to 10

years for the prior strike, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement and two years for

each of the remaining robbery counts. The resentencing minute order does not mention

custody credits. The amended abstract of judgment reflects only the credits that were

awarded at the original sentencing: 2,083 days of actual time and 366 days of conduct

credits.

                                      DISCUSSION

       Hernandez argues that the trial court erred by failing to recalculate his custody

credits at the resentencing hearing. He contends that he should have been awarded an

additional 305 days of custody credit for his time in prison between his sentencing

hearings, for a total of 2,388 days of actual custody time (plus the 366 days of conduct

credits). The People do not deny that Hernandez is entitled to the additional 305 days of

credit, but they argue that the appeal must be dismissed under section 1237.1. Hernandez

argues that section 1237.1 does not bar his appeal, because that section “expressly applies

to presentence credits only” and “does not apply to post-sentence credits.” We agree

with the People.

       If a defendant is imprisoned and later resentenced, “the sentencing court must

recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has

                                             3
already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally

committed and delivered to prison custody.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20,

29, 37 (Buckhalter).) However, under section 1237.1, “[n]o appeal shall be taken by the

defendant from a judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the calculation of

presentence custody credits, unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court

at the time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after sentencing, the

defendant first makes a motion for correction of the record in the trial court, which may

be made informally in writing. The trial court retains jurisdiction after a notice of appeal

has been filed to correct any error in the calculation of presentence custody credits upon

the defendant’s request for correction.”

       Hernandez cites Buckhalter in support of his argument that custody time between

initial sentencing and resentencing is properly characterized as “post-sentence prison

custody and not presentence jail custody.” In Buckhalter, the appellant argued that as a

result of his sentencing remand, his original “sentence was vacated in all respects, and his

status became as though he had never been sentenced. Therefore, he reason[ed], all his

time in custody until [his] resentencing was presentence custody,” making him eligible

for “all actual-time and good behavior credit available to a presentence detainee.”

(Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 28.) The court considered whether the defendant was

entitled to “earn good behavior credits under the formula specifically applicable to

persons detained in a local facility, or under equivalent circumstances elsewhere, ‘prior to

the imposition of sentence’ for a felony” or whether the defendant could earn credits

“only under the so-called worktime system separately applicable to convicted felons

                                               4
serving their sentences in prison.” (Id. at p. 23) The court concluded that “a convicted

felon once sentenced, committed, and delivered to prison is not restored to presentence

status, for purposes of the sentence-credit statutes, by virtue of a limited appellate

remand for correction of sentencing errors.” (Ibid., italics added.) The court also held

that when “an appellate remand results in modification of a felony sentence during the

term of imprisonment, the trial court must calculate the actual time the defendant has

already served and credit that time against the ‘subsequent sentence.’ (§ 2900.1.)”

(Ibid.)

          Section 1237.1 is not the type of sentence-credit statute that was at issue in

Buckhalter. Section 1237.1 codified “‘developing case law requiring defendants to seek

correction of clerical or mathematical error in calculation of presentence custody credits

in the trial court to prevent misuse of appellate process for ministerial purpose’

[Citation].” (People v. Delgado (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 761, 765.) Thus, section 1237.1

prohibits an appeal that presents nothing more than “an error in ‘doing the math’ or . . .

an apparent oversight in an award of credits.” (Id. at p. 766.)

          When the CDCR notified the trial court of the error in Hernandez’s sentence, the

court resentenced Hernandez but neglected to recalculate his custody credits. That is the

only error that Hernandez seeks to correct on appeal, and it is precisely the type of

oversight to which section 1237.1 applies. In section 1237.1, “presentence custody”

refers to any time spent in custody before imposition of the sentence against which the

time is to be credited. Hernandez is entitled to credit for all of his time in custody, but he

must first seek relief in the trial court if he has no other issue to raise on appeal.

                                                 5
(§ 1237.1.) Hernandez has not done that. Consequently, we lack jurisdiction and must

dismiss his appeal.

                                   DISPOSITION

      The appeal is dismissed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                            MENETREZ
                                                                                       J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                      P. J.

RAPHAEL
                         J.

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