Court Opinion

ID: 9758190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:15:10.001037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:47.750912
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Pomeboy:
Two basic errors in today’s decision compel my dissent. First, in entertaining petitioner’s claim that his confession is inadmissible under Futch and Dutton, the majority departs from the rules governing issues presentable on appeals nunc pro tuno which we laid down in Commonwealth v. Faison, 437 Pa. 432, 264 A. 2d 394 (1970). Second, in holding that guilty pleas which follow an inadmissible confession will be invalidated if they were primarily motivated by the confession, the Court appears to overrule, sub silentio, without benefit of briefs or argument on the question, a large part of our still recent decision in Commonwealth v. Marsh, 440 Pa. 590, 271 A. 2d 481 (1970). I believe the trial court was correct and that its judgments of sentence should be affirmed without a remand.
*87I.
In Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A. 2d 417 (1972), we promulgated a rule excluding from evidence confessions extracted during and causally related to a period of unnecessary delay prior to arraignment. Since tbe filing of briefs in the present case, Futch has been made retroactive (over my dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Eagen) to January 1, 1965, the effective date of former Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 116(a). Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 547 (1973). This rule, requiring prompt arraignment of all persons arrested, was in effect at the time of appellant’s arrest and confession. However, it does not follow that he may avail himself of the Futch exclusionary rule on this appeal nunc pro tunc.
In Commonwealth v. Faison, supra, we held that an appellant whose appeal is taken nunc pro tunc can raise only those issues properly preserved at trial, and those issues involving alleged deprivations of constitutional rights subsequently announced but retroactively applied. Wayman did not preserve an “unnecessary delay” issue at trial; indeed, he never once mentioned it.1 As to the second category of issues, while it is *88true that Futch is a subsequently announced, retroactively applied rule, it is not a constitutionally based rule. Rather, it was promulgated in the exercise of our supervisory powers, paralleling the McNabb-Mallory rule in the federal courts.2
The reason that subsequently announced but retroactively applied constitutional rights are available on a direct appeal nunc pro tunc is that such issues can be made the subject of a PCHA petition, and it is inefficient to require two proceedings where one would suffice. PCHA proceedings, however, are limited to issues of constitutional dimension,3 and Futch would therefore be unavailable to a PCHA petitioner.4 It follows *89that it is equally unavailable to an appellant proceeding nunc pro time and who did not timely preserve the issue below. I note that the McNabb-Mallory rule is unavailable for precisely that reason on federal collateral attack on a federal conviction.5
Even were we to extend the scope of PCHA relief to “fundamental” trial errors not of constitutional dimension, appellant should not prevail, for violation of the Futch exclusionary rule is clearly not “fundamental” error. The Futch rule is prophylactic, not remedial. It is designed to ensure that in future all prisoners will be promptly arraigned after arrest. Where a confession is shown to have been coerced, the rule is superfluous. It comes into play in precisely those situations where the confession is voluntary and otherwise free from unconstitutional taint. Thus the admission at trial of a confession in all respects valid but obtained during a period of unnecessary delay detracts not a whit from the fairness of the trial proceedings. Indeed, since the deterrent function of the Futch rule will hardly be advanced by its application to facts occurring five years before its announcement, there is no jurisprudential purpose to be served by extending the benefit of the rule to Wayman, much less any fundamental error in admitting Ms confession.
*90In sum, the necessity for judicial finality which is wisely recognized in the Post Conviction Hearing Act also applies to appeals mmc pro time, subject to the exceptions noted in Commonwealth v. Faison, supra. I see no justification for the Court to ignore that salutary formulation of appellate justiciability.
II.
Even assuming that the majority is correct in reaching the merits of Wayman’s Futeh claim, he is in my judgment entitled to no relief.
The first burglary charge brought against Wayman (No. 20B) was for a crime not touched upon in his confession and at the scene of which he was apprehended redhanded. To this he pleaded guilty.6
The next indictments (Nos. 7A, 7B, 7C, 7D, 7E and 10) charged separate burglaries which were encompassed by the challenged confession. Wayman moved to suppress his statement and after that motion was heard and denied, pleaded not guilty at No. 7E and went to trial before a jury. He was convicted. He then pleaded guilty to the remaining five indictments (Nos. 7A through 7D, inclusive, and 10). At no time has he moved the lower court to allow withdrawal of his guilty pleas.7
*91The legal issue which is now before us is easy to state: What must an appellant such as Wayman show in order to avoid guilty pleas when those pleas are alleged to be in some manner causally related to the presence in the hands of the prosecutor of illegally obtained evidence? We answered this question in Commonwealth v. Marsh, supra, in which we adopted the federal standards announced in the so-called “Brady trilogy” of the United States Supreme Court cases.8 We said in Marsh: “The United States Supreme Court [in McMann and Parker, supra note 8] held that a defendant must demonstrate all of the following to successfully collaterally attack a plea of guilty on such grounds: (1) an involuntary pretrial confession (or presumably any other constitutionally infirm incriminating evidence) ; (2) that the guilty plea was primarily motivated by such evidence; and, (3) that defendant was incompetently advised by counsel to plead guilty, in the circumstances, rather than stand trial. . . .
“We recognize that we could fix more exacting standards . . . for our courts to follow in determining the validity of conviction resulting from guilty pleas, and some of our previous decisions may have been so *92interpreted, but we intend to adhere to the rulings in McMann, supra, and Parker, supra.” 440 Pa. at 593-94. This statement of the law has been consistently followed in our subsequent decisions.9
I note that the first two of these requirements, as recited in Marsh, constitutes a restatement of the preMarsh law in Pennsylvania to which the Court today reverts: a guilty plea is avoided by showing a link of “but for” causation between the illegally obtained evidence and the plea.10 The third requirement of Marsh— *93that the plea shall have been entered on incompetent advice of counsel—was adopted from McMann v. Richardson, the trilogy case in which the role of counsel is most fully explicated. It should be noted, however, that the requirement appears in Brady and Parker as well, and that Marsh is in fact supported not only by McMann but by the principles of all three cases. This last requirement is completely overlooked by the majority.
I for one believe that a guilty plea, not withdrawn before sentencing, entered in accordance with the rules and decisions regarding guilty pleas,11 and competently *94advised by counsel, should be in practical effect final. I recognize, of course, that this Court has an independent power to depart from the federal constitutional law as announced by the Supreme Court of the United States and to require procedures more favorable to the defendant as a matter of state law. When as here that Court bas dealt with the subject extensively, I think this Court owes it to its constituency to explain why a different rule should obtain in Pennsylvania. That obligation is not discharged by the conclusory discussion of today’s opinion.
*95III.
Examining Wayman’s guilty pleas in the light of Marsh, we can dispose of this case without a remand. The record before us is adequate to resolve the only question which we need to reach: whether or not “defendant was incompetently advised by counsel to plead guilty, in the circumstances, rather than stand trial.” Commonwealth v. Marsh, supra, 440 Pa. at 593.
Wayman’s attorney moved to suppress the confession on the only arguable ground then open to him: failure to give Miranda warnings. He cannot be faulted for not raising the Futch issue; attorneys do not act incompetently merely because they fail to foresee a change in the law five years in the offing. Having presented a suppression motion on his client’s behalf which turned on factual issues (whether Miranda warnings had been given), and having seen those factual issues resolved adversely to his client on the strength of substantial evidence, Wayman’s attorney was acting reasonably in suggesting a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 449 Pa. 345, 296 A. 2d 823 (1972). I would affirm all of appellant Wayman’s judgments of sentence.
Mr. Chief Justice Jones joins in this dissenting opinion.

 Wayman’s attack on his confession at the suppression hearing, at trial, and in post-trial motions, was that it was coerced by improper police conduct and in violation of the Miranda, requirements as to warnings of his constitutional rights. The Futch issue was introduced for the first time in the Superior Court.
In Commonwealth v. Slavik, 449 Fa. 424, 297 A. 2d 920 (1972), we held that a criminal defendant whose challenge to the validity of his guilty plea had been rejected on direct appeal could not attack the plea a second time in a PCHA petition, even though he advanced a different legal theory. We there said: “A defendant is not entitled to relitigate the validity of his plea every time he offers a new theory or argument which he had not previously advanced. To hold otherwise would virtually emasculate Section 4(a) of the *88PCHA, defeat its very objective, and permit constant and repetitive relitigation of issues already finally decided on their merits.” 449 Pa. 431. To turn Slavik on its head, and argue from it, as the majority does in its footnote 1, supra, that if an appellant’s case has not been litigated on appeal he may base his claim on any legal or factual theory, irrespective of whether the arguments were made at trial, is to fly in the face of reason and precedent. “It is a well known axiom that appellate courts will not review issues and arguments not raised in the court below.” Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Rundle, 420 Pa. 127, 131, 216 A. 2d 57, cert. den., 384 U.S. 966 (1966); see also Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 260 A. 2d 773 (1970); Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 432 Pa. 571, 248 A. 2d 295 (1968); Commonwealth v. Payton, 431 Pa. 105, 244 A. 2d 644 (1968). Among other considerations, to act otherwise is to deprive ourselves of the benefit of the trial court’s initial judgment on the question.
In Slavik we said: “It is evident that the orderly administration of justice requires that a criminal controversy, like any other litigation, some day come to an end.” 449 Pa. 432. The majority today seriously undermines this well considered judicial policy.

 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S. Ct. 1356, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479 (1957).

 See Commonwealth v. Smulek, 446 Pa. 277, 284 A. 2d 763 (1971); Commonwealth v. Lowery, 438 Pa. 89, 263 A. 2d 332 (1970); Commonwealth v. Musser, 437 Pa. 131, 262 A. 2d 678 (1970).

 But see Commonwealth v. Richardson, 433 Pa. 195, 249 A. 2d 307 (1969). In that case we reached the merits of a PCHA peti*89tioner’s claim under Commonwealth v. McIntyre, 417 Pa. 415, 208 A. 2d 257 (1965), a case decided alter the final adjudication of petitioner’s direct appeal. In so doing, I think we erred. Although the Richardson opinion treats the McIntyre issue as one of due process, the exclusionary rule of that case is based, like the Futch rule, on our supervisory powers.

 See, e.g., Runge v. United States, 427 F. 2d 122 (10th Cir. 1970); Semet v. United States, 369 F. 2d 90 (10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Morin, 265 F. 2d 241 (3d Cir. 1959); C. A. Wright, 1 Federal Practice and Procedure §73, at 78 (1969). On the general unavailability of non-constitutional claims on federal habeas corpus, see Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 67 S. Ct. 1588, 91 L. Ed. 1982 (1947).

 The opinion of the Court appears to remand to enable the lower court to determine if this plea at No. 20B, among others, was primarily motivated by the presence in the hands of the prosecutor of Wayman’s confession. I am at a loss to understand how it could be that appellant pleaded guilty to one crime because the police had a confession relating to other crimes, especially in view of the fact that he was caught at the scene and thus had no defenses. It would seem obvious that the plea was solely motivated by the impossibility of contesting the matter.

 Withdrawal of a plea of guilty is possible for “any fair and just reason” before sentencing, Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 299 A. 2d 268 (1973) (or, perhaps, for any reason, Common*91wealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 307 A. 2d 880 (1973)). After sentencing, a plea may be withdrawn to prevent the occurrence of “manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. Starr, 450 Pa. 485, 301 A. 2d 592 (1973). Appellant does not evoke the principle of either class of plea withdrawal case.

 The “trilogy” consists of the following three cases: Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 25 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1970). Also relevant is North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), in which the Supreme Court, relying on Brady, supra, rejected the contention that a guilty plea is invalid because primarily motivated by a desire to avoid the death penalty. The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement based on the trilogy is Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 41 U.S.L.W. 4486 (1973).

 Commonwealth v. Marsh, supra, has been followed on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dennis, 451 Pa. 340, 304 A. 2d 111 (1973); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 449 Pa. 345, 296 A. 2d 823 (1972); Commonwealth v. Hollenbaugh, 449 Pa. 6, 295 A. 2d 78 (1972); Commonwealth v. Yuknavich, 448 Pa. 502, 295 A. 2d 290 (1972); Commonwealth v. Lofton, 448 Pa. 184, 292 A. 2d 327 (1972); Commonwealth v. LaCourt, 448 Pa. 86, 292 A. 2d 377 (1972); Commonwealth v. Reagen, 447 Pa. 186, 290 A. 2d 241 (1972); Commonwealth v. White, 446 Pa. 378, 288 A. 2d 759 (1972); Commonwealth v. Rakus, 445 Pa. 509, 285 A. 2d 98 (1971); Commonwealth v. Moroz, 444 Pa. 493, 281 A. 2d 842 (1971); Commonwealth v. Myers, 444 Pa. 465, 282 A. 2d 347 (1971); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 443 Pa. 305, 279 A. 2d 26 (1971); Commonwealth v. Brown, 443 Pa. 21, 275 A. 2d 332 (1971); Commonwealth v. Lundy, 443 Pa. 8, 275 A. 2d 101 (1971); Commonwealth v. Ward, 442 Pa. 351, 275 A. 2d 92 (1971); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 441 Pa. 255, 272 A. 2d 182 (1971); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 440 Pa. 598, 269 A. 2d 449 (1970). All of these decisions are invalidated to some extent by the action the Court takes today in the case at bar.

 The “but for” cases in Pennsylvania prior to Marsh were Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306, 237 A. 2d 172 (1968); Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 229 A. 2d 922 (1967).
As a test of voluntariness, this standard is if anything more generous to defendants who have pleaded guilty than is federal constitutional law. In Brady, supra, the defendant alleged that his guilty plea was induced by an unconstitutional statutory provision under which only a jury could impose the death penality. The Court replied:
“. . . [E]ven if we assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty except for the death penalty provision . . ., this assumption *93merely identifies the penalty provision as a ‘but for’ cause of his plea. That the statute caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act. . . . The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be essentially that defined by Judge Tuttle of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
“ ‘ [A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g., bribes).’ 242 F. 2d at page 115.” 397 U.S. at 750, 755, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 757, 760.
In the present case, the record shows Wayman being informed of all procedural rights (of which he, incidentally, was already aware, having just been convicted in a jury tidal of one count of burglary) ; it shows him acknowledging, after detailed questioning by the Court, that he committed all the several burglaries charged, and finally, it shows Wayman telling the Court that he “just want(s) to get it over with.” I think it clear that, judged apart from the performance of counsel, Wayman’s guilty pleas satisfied the minimum federal constitutional standard of voluntariness set out in Brady.

 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), requires that the record made at the time of acceptance of a guilty plea affirmatively disclose that the plea is the voluntary and in*94telligent act of the defendant. This Court in Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A. 2d 196 (1968), imposed the same requirement on the lower courts of this State at an earlier date. Our rule of procedure, Pa. R. Crim. P. 319, as amended on March 28, 1973, charges Pennsylvania judges not to accept a guilty plea “unless [the court] determines after inquiry of the defendant that the plea is voluntarily and understandingly tendered.” The commentary to that Rule lists minimum inquiries to be made and information to be given the defendant. In addition, we have obliged trial courts to ascertain that there exists a factual basis for the plea. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 450 Pa. 417, 299 A. 2d 209 (1973). And finally our trial courts are positively barred from accepting pleas from defendants who are unable to say that they committed the acts with which they stand charged. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 440 Pa. 199, 269 A. 2d 709 (1970); Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A. 2d 294 (1969).
As the Supreme Court said in Brady, “[we] would have doubts about this case if [plea bargaining] increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves. But our view is to the contrary and is based on our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of the defendant’s admissions that they committed the crimes with which they are charged.” 397 U.S. at 758, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 762.
Under this standard and as it is applied in Pennsylvania, it is, as a practical matter, difficult to have a guilty plea accepted where the defendant is not in fact guilty.