Court Opinion

ID: 9856112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:38:20.040617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:03.293688
License: Public Domain

BROTHERTON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
In this case the Appeal Board found that the appellant’s hearing loss occurred prior to 1980. Evidence supporting this conclusion included a doctor’s diagnosis of hearing loss in 1975 and the fact that the appellant originally worked as a loading machine operator, cutting machine operator, and jackhammer operator, all involving great amounts of constant noise. The last four to five years with Eastern Coal were spent as a radio dispatcher, a relatively quiet job. The only evidence of a hazard was the appellant’s statement that the radio occasionally made a high-pitched buzz.
The majority of this Court overturned this decision by the Appeal Board. In doing so, they had to avoid an oft quoted, but little respected rule of law, that the findings of fact by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court unless they are clearly wrong. See, e.g., Prince v. State Comp. Comm., 123 W.Va. 67, 70, 13 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1941); W.Va.Code § 23-5-4a (1985). It is obvious from the facts in this case that the appellant’s deafness, if it resulted from his occupation, was caused by the earlier jobs using noisy heavy equipment. An occasional squelch by the radio did little, if anything, to worsen his condition. Therefore, instead of addressing the ease as one where this Court was overturning the Board on an issue of fact, the majority pretended to decide a legal issue.
The Appeal Board concluded that the appellant “failed to establish by proper and satisfactory proof that he was exposed to hazards of occupational disease” within the requisite filing period. Under the foregoing principles, we find this legal conclusion of the Board to be wrong. *613The evidence in this case clearly demonstrates that the appellant was exposed to unusual and excessive noise trauma in the work area.
See Maj. opin. at p. 612. (emphasis added.)
It was always my understanding that deciding what the evidence demonstrates is deciding issues of fact, not law. The majority improperly classified an issue of fact as an issue of law.
I,therefore, respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice NEELY joins me in this dissent.