Court Opinion

ID: 9384946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 17:01:15.388773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.790394
License: Public Domain

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                                                                [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                 No. 21-10600
                          ____________________

        ROSENDO PONCE FLORES,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                          ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A077-460-794
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 21-10600

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and HULL and MARCUS,
        Circuit Judges.
        HULL, Circuit Judge:
               Rosendo Ponce Flores petitions for review of the Board of
        Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) order (1) affirming the Immigration
        Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for cancellation of removal
        and dismissing his appeal, and (2) denying his motion to reopen and
        remand his removal proceedings. Ponce Flores, a citizen of
        Mexico, conceded removability. This petition is about only his
        application for cancellation of his removal. The main grounds for
        both his appeal to the BIA and his motion to reopen were Ponce
        Flores’s claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance and
        denied him constitutional due process as to his cancellation-of-
        removal application.
                After review and with the benefit of oral argument, we
        conclude as to the denial of Ponce Flores’s application that:
        (1) cancellation of removal is a purely discretionary form of relief
        from removal; (2) Ponce Flores does not have a constitutionally
        protected liberty interest in that purely discretionary relief; and
        (3) therefore, Ponce Flores’s constitutional due process claim is
        meritless, and we lack jurisdiction to entertain it under the
        Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C.
        § 1252(a)(2)(D). To the extent Ponce Flores is challenging the BIA’s
        affirmance of the IJ’s determination that Ponce Flores has not
        satisfied the hardship requirement for eligibility for cancellation of
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                       3

        removal under INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), we also
        lack jurisdiction to review that factual finding.
               As to Ponce Flores’s ineffective assistance claims in his
        motion to reopen and remand, we conclude that: (1) Ponce Flores
        cannot establish a constitutional due process violation based on the
        BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen because he does not have a
        protected liberty interest in either discretionary cancellation of
        removal or in the granting of a motion to reopen; (2) the BIA
        properly followed its legal precedent in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. &
        N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988); and (3) to the extent Ponce Flores’s
        challenge to the denial of his motion to reopen rests on an
        argument that the BIA erred in ruling that he had not demonstrated
        that but for his counsel’s deficiencies he would have proved the
        requisite hardship, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this claim.
                               I. BACKGROUND
        A.    Ponce Flores’s Unlawful Entry
               Ponce Flores, a native and citizen of Mexico, first entered
        the United States in either 1995 or 1996. In 1999, Ponce Flores was
        arrested on charges of alien smuggling after he and two other aliens
        crossed the border in Laredo, Texas. Ultimately, Ponce Flores pled
        guilty to unlawfully entering the United States, in violation of 8
        U.S.C. § 1325. Ponce Flores was removed to Mexico, but placed
        on five years’ probation without supervision and with the special
        condition that he did not return or attempt to return to the United
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  21-10600

        States. While in Mexico, Ponce Flores met and married Lizet
        Cornejo.
               In 2004, Ponce Flores unlawfully re-entered the United
        States in Arizona without inspection. He and his wife settled in
        Naples, Florida, where he works.
              Ponce Flores and his wife have two daughters who were
        born in Naples and are U.S. citizens. Born in 2004, their oldest
        daughter, Nancy, was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder
        and expressive language disorder. Born in 2012, their younger
        daughter, Stephanie, does not have special needs.
        B.     Initiation of Removal Proceedings in 2016
               In October 2016, Ponce Flores was arrested for domestic
        battery of his wife, although charges were never filed. He also had
        two traffic infractions for driving without a license and driving on
        a suspended license, but adjudication for both offenses was
        withheld.
               In November 2016, the Department of Homeland Security
        served Ponce Flores with a notice to appear that charged him with
        removability on two grounds: (1) under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8
        U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United States
        without having been admitted or paroled; and (2) under INA
        § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as an alien not in
        possession of a valid entry document at the time of admission. At
        an initial hearing in November 2016, Ponce Flores conceded
        removability as charged.
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                        5

              Sometime in 2017, Lizet Cornejo and her daughters moved
        to Dallas, Texas. Ponce Flores remained in Naples, Florida. In
        Texas, his daughter Nancy began attending a school with a special
        program for autism.
        C.    Application for Cancellation of Removal in 2018
               Later, Ponce Flores retained attorney Matus Varga to
        represent him. In January 2018, attorney Varga filed Ponce Flores’s
        application for cancellation of removal pursuant to INA
        § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). That application claimed that
        Ponce Flores’s removal would result in exceptional and extremely
        unusual hardship to his U.S.-citizen daughter Nancy because of her
        autism.
               Attorney Varga filed multiple documents, such as:
        (1) documents about Nancy’s medical and educational needs;
        (2) medical records and reports from her doctors; (3) records from
        her elementary school in Florida and her middle school in Texas
        indicating she received special education services; (4) Ponce
        Flores’s tax returns for 2008 and 2011 to 2016; (5) notarized
        character letters from friends; and (6) a notarized letter from Lizet
        Cornejo, stating that Nancy did not understand her father’s
        absence and suffered every day waiting for his return.
               At his 2018 merits hearing, Ponce Flores testified that he
        remained in Florida for his job and flew to Texas once a month to
        see his family. Ponce Flores admitted, however, that he was
        arrested for (1) alien smuggling and convicted of illegal reentry and
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-10600

        (2) domestic abuse but those charges were dismissed. He also
        admitted that his family had received government assistance for
        Nancy’s therapy and health insurance. Contrary to his testimony,
        Ponce Flores’s application had indicated that he was never arrested
        or convicted of an offense and that no member of his family,
        including his children, received public assistance.
        D.    IJ’s Denial of Cancellation of Removal
               In July 2018, the IJ’s decision denied Ponce Flores’s
        application for cancellation of removal. The IJ found that Ponce
        Flores’s testimony lacked credibility due to (1) inconsistencies
        between his hearing testimony and the information in his
        application and (2) his failure to provide corroborating evidence for
        key aspects of his testimony.
               The IJ denied Ponce Flores’s application because he failed to
        establish three of the four statutory requirements for eligibility for
        discretionary cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
        Under § 1229b(b)(1), the Attorney General “may cancel removal”
        of an alien “who is inadmissible or deportable” if he satisfies these
        four requirements for eligibility: (1) he has been continuously
        present in the United States for at least ten years; (2) he has been a
        “person of good moral character” during that period; (3) he has not
        been convicted of any specified criminal offenses; and (4) his
        “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
        hardship” to a qualifying relative who is a U.S. citizen or lawful
        permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D). The IJ found
        Ponce Flores failed to establish these three requirements for
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                         7

        eligibility: his continuous physical presence, his good moral
        character, or that his U.S.-citizen children will face exceptional and
        extremely unusual hardship as a result of his removal. Because the
        BIA focused on only the missing hardship requirement, we do too.
               As to the hardship requirement for eligibility, the IJ
        acknowledged that Nancy’s autism was serious and lifelong. The
        IJ concluded, however, that Ponce Flores failed to establish
        (1) Nancy was currently enrolled in a special school or program in
        Texas, (2) the kind of relationship Ponce Flores had with Nancy
        given that she lived in Texas, (3) what financial assistance he
        provided her, (4) whether Nancy received subsidized medical
        assistance, and (5) whether Lizet Cornejo could work or had other
        means of support. The IJ stressed that Ponce Flores had not
        submitted corroborating documentation, such as affidavits from
        his wife or others, transportation receipts, wire transfers, or bank
        statements.
        E.    BIA Appeal and Motion to Reopen Based on Ineffective
              Assistance
               After retaining new counsel, Ponce Flores appealed the IJ’s
        denial to the BIA. Ponce Flores’s appeal challenged the IJ’s findings
        that Ponce Flores (1) lacked credibility; (2) had not shown ten years
        of continuous physical presence; and (3) had not established the
        requisite hardship to his daughter Nancy. Ponce Flores contended
        that but for counsel’s ineffective assistance, the IJ would not have
        made these findings.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   21-10600

               Ponce Flores also moved to remand and reopen his
        cancellation-of-removal application due to attorney Varga’s
        ineffective assistance. 1   Ponce Flores contended that the
        inconsistencies and missing evidence were a direct result of Varga’s
        failures to consult with Ponce Flores before completing and
        submitting his application, to communicate with and prepare
        Ponce Flores for his hearing, and to obtain and submit evidence to
        support Ponce Flores’s application.
               Ponce Flores attached to his motion new evidence,
        including (1) medical and educational reports and evaluations
        confirming Nancy’s learning disabilities and her continued
        placement in special education programs in Texas; (2) records
        indicating Ponce Flores’s financial support for and involvement
        with his family in Texas; (3) documents about his monthly flights
        to Dallas; (4) his declaration summarizing his agreement with
        Varga and Varga’s deficient actions; (5) documents showing that
        Ponce Flores notified Varga of allegations of ineffective assistance
        and Varga responded to those allegations; and (6) evidence that
        Ponce Flores filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance
        Committee in New York, where Varga was admitted to practice
        law. Before the BIA, Ponce Flores argued: (1) his evidence
        complied with the BIA’s procedural requirements for ineffective

        1 Ponce Flores styled his motion as a “Motion to Remand Proceedings Due
        To Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.” He requested that the BIA “remand”
        his case.
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        21-10600                  Opinion of the Court                              9

        assistance claims set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637
        (BIA 1988), and (2) he had shown the requisite prejudice to reopen
        his application for cancellation of removal.
        F.     BIA Decision Affirming IJ and Denying Motion to Reopen
                In January 2021, the BIA dismissed Ponce Flores’s appeal of
        the IJ’s decision and denied his motion to reopen and remand his
        application for cancellation of removal for further consideration.2
               As to Ponce Flores’s ineffective assistance claim, the BIA
        concluded that (1) he had “identified deficiencies in his
        representation by former attorneys,” but (2) he had not shown
        prejudice “as a result of his former attorneys’ alleged
        ineffectiveness so as to have affected the outcome of these
        proceedings.” As to the IJ’s hardship finding, the BIA “presum[ed]
        without deciding” that Ponce Flores was credible, considered his

        2 Although Ponce Flores styled his motion as a motion to remand, his motion
        relied on new evidence of both attorney Varga’s ineffective assistance and
        Ponce Flores’s eligibility for cancellation of removal and sought additional
        proceedings to consider the new eligibility evidence. The BIA treated Ponce
        Flores’s motion as a “motion to reopen and remand.” See Chacku v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 555 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]f a motion to remand seeks to
        introduce evidence that has not previously been presented, it is generally
        treated as a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).” (quotation marks
        omitted)); Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992) (“[W]here a
        motion to remand is really in the nature of a motion to reopen . . . , it must
        comply with the substantive requirements for such motions.”). Further,
        where “a motion to remand seeks additional proceedings to introduce
        additional evidence, we apply the same standard of review as a motion to
        reopen.” Sow v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 949 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2020).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court               21-10600

        new evidence, and reviewed de novo the IJ’s hardship finding.
        After doing so, the BIA determined that Ponce Flores did not
        establish that his removal would result in exceptional and unusual
        hardship to his qualifying U.S.-citizen daughters. Ponce Flores thus
        had not shown his eligibility for cancellation of removal.
               The BIA noted Ponce Flores’s hearing testimony that he had
        lived apart from his family for over a year, that he supported them
        financially and visited monthly, and that his daughters would
        remain in the United States with their mother even if Ponce Flores
        was removed to Mexico. The BIA concluded Ponce Flores had
        “established that his eldest daughter suffers from severe autism,”
        but stressed that Ponce Flores testified she was covered by state-
        funded health insurance in Texas. The BIA determined that “the
        record does not suggest she will lose that coverage or access to
        medication, treatment, or educational accommodations” upon
        Ponce Flores’s removal.
               The BIA also acknowledged that if Ponce Flores were
        removed, his daughters would likely suffer emotional hardship and
        would not have the “same standard of living in the United States.”
        Even considering all the hardship evidence and factors
        cumulatively, the BIA determined that Ponce Flores had “not
        demonstrated the requisite exceptional and extremely unusual
        hardship” to his daughters that was needed to establish eligibility
        for cancellation of removal. The BIA denied his motion to reopen
        and remand. The BIA declined to “reach whether [Ponce Flores]
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                       11

        satisfied the other statutory requirements” for eligibility for
        cancellation of removal.
               Ponce Flores timely filed a petition for review. In his
        petition, Ponce Flores argues that his former counsel’s ineffective
        assistance caused the IJ’s denial of his application for cancellation
        of removal and denied him constitutional due process. He also
        contends the BIA abused its discretion when it denied his motion
        to reopen and remand based on his former counsel’s ineffective
        assistance.
               IV. BIA DECISION AFFIRMING IJ’S DENIAL OF
                      CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL
        A.    Standard of Review
               We review only the BIA’s decision as the final agency
        decision except to the extent the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision. Ayala
        v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941, 947-48 (11th Cir. 2010). We review
        questions of law de novo. Id. at 948. We review our own subject
        matter jurisdiction de novo. Blanc v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 996 F.3d
        1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2021).
        B.    Jurisdiction
               Congress has restricted our jurisdiction over certain
        immigration matters. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), this Court
        lacks jurisdiction “to review . . . any judgment regarding the
        granting of relief under section . . . 1229b” for cancellation of
        removal. INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). This
        provision deprives us of jurisdiction “to review facts found as part
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 21-10600

        of discretionary-relief proceedings.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. ___,
        142 S. Ct. 1614, 1627 (2022), aff’g sub nom. Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). This jurisdictional bar
        includes the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” factual
        finding under § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Flores-Alonso v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        36 F.4th 1095, 1099-1100 (11th Cir. 2022) (explaining that we can
        only review “any legal error with respect to the application of the
        law to those facts established in the BIA’s decision”).
               Notwithstanding § 1252(a)(2)(B)’s jurisdictional bar, we
        retain jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims and questions
        of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Patel, 971 F.3d at 1262. However,
        “a party may not dress up a claim with legal or constitutional
        clothing to invoke our jurisdiction.” Patel, 971 F.3d at 1272. “Such
        a claim must be colorable.” Id. We have said that for a claim to be
        “colorable,” it must be “non-frivolous,” see Alvarez Acosta v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 524 F.3d 1191, 1197 (11th Cir. 2008), and “have some
        possible validity,” Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 1281, 1284 n.2
        (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “[W]here a
        constitutional claim has no merit[,] we do not have jurisdiction.”
        Arias, 482 F.3d at 1284 (cleaned up).
        C.     Constitutional Due Process Claim Based on Ineffective
               Assistance
               Here, Ponce Flores argues that but for his attorney Varga’s
        deficient performance, he would have successfully carried his
        burden to prove his eligibility for cancellation of removal and
        therefore he was deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to due
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                       13

        process of law. We lack jurisdiction to review Ponce Flores’s
        constitutional due process claim because it is wholly without merit
        and therefore not colorable.
               As we recognized in Mejia Rodriguez, when an alien retains
        counsel, an alien has a right to effective assistance of that counsel
        in the underlying removal proceedings. Mejia Rodriguez v. Reno,
        178 F.3d 1139, 1146 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Gbaya v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 342 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2003). This is because a
        removal “proceeding implicates an alien’s liberty interest, which is
        protected by the Due Process Clause.” Mejia Rodriguez, 178 F.3d
        at 1146. This is Mejia Rodriguez’s first principle.
               In contrast, “the failure to receive relief that is purely
        discretionary in nature does not amount to a deprivation of a
        liberty interest” and thus cannot deprive an alien of due process
        under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1146-48. This is Mejia
        Rodriguez’s second principle.
               Specifically, in Mejia Rodriguez, this Court concluded that
        an alien is not deprived of due process where his counsel’s deficient
        performance prevented the alien from being eligible for
        discretionary relief from deportation. Id. at 1148. The alien in
        Mejia Rodriguez, much like Ponce Flores here, did not contest his
        grounds for deportation. Id. at 1146. Instead, Mejia Rodriguez
        sought a suspension of his deportation, an earlier form of
        discretionary relief that was the precursor to the cancellation of
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                       21-10600

        removal that Ponce Flores now seeks. 3 Id. at 1145-46. Mejia
        Rodriguez argued that but for his attorney’s ineffective assistance
        during his deportation proceedings, “he would have been eligible
        for suspension of deportation.” Id. at 1146.
               This Court concluded that Mejia Rodriguez was not
        deprived of due process under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1148.
        The Court explained that because suspension of deportation was
        “an act of grace” committed to the “unfettered discretion” of the
        Attorney General, “even if an alien meets the statutory
        requirements for eligibility . . . , the alien [was] not in any way
        entitled to this exceptional remedy.” Id. at 1147 (quotation marks
        omitted). In fact, the “alien’s actual chances of receiving such
        discretionary relief are too speculative, and too far beyond the
        capability of judicial review, to conclude that the alien has actually
        suffered prejudice from being ineligible for suspension of
        deportation.” Id. at 1148 (stating “this Court cannot predict the
        subjective and fact-intensive judgments that the Attorney General

        3 Suspension of deportation had very similar eligibility requirements,
        including continuous physical presence in the United States for a period of
        years, good moral character, and an “exceptional and extremely unusual
        hardship” to a qualifying relative who was a U.S. citizen. Mejia Rodriguez,
        178 F.3d at 1141 n.2 (quotation marks omitted). In 1996, the Illegal
        Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act repealed the provision
        authorizing suspension of deportation and replaced it with a provision
        authorizing cancellation of removal. Id. at 1142 n.3; see also Pub. L. No. 104-
        208, div. C, tit. III, subtit. A, §§ 304, 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-575, 3009-616
        (Sept. 30, 1996).
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                      15

        would make in deciding whether to grant extraordinary relief, such
        as the suspension of deportation”).
               Consequently, this Court in Mejia Rodriguez held that “an
        attorney’s deficient representation does not deprive an alien of due
        process if the deficient representation merely prevents the alien
        from being eligible for suspension of deportation.” Id. Since Mejia
        Rodriguez, this Court has continued to apply this general rule to
        other forms of discretionary relief, including cancellation of
        removal. See, e.g., Alhuay v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 661 F.3d 534, 548-49
        (11th Cir. 2011) (holding absence of interpreter at hearing on
        applications for waiver of removability and cancellation of removal
        did not violate due process given alien had “no cognizable due
        process interest because those forms of relief are discretionary”);
        Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (holding alien’s due process claim based on BIA’s application of a
        former regulation could not prevail because he had “no
        constitutionally protected interest either in the granting of his
        motions [to reopen or for reconsideration] or in adjustment of
        status,” all discretionary forms of relief); Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of
        U.S., 329 F.3d 1217, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding alien’s due
        process claim based on counsel’s ineffective assistance in preparing
        application for waiver of excludability lacked merit because such
        waiver, “while guided by interpretive decisions, remains a purely
        discretionary form of relief”); Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 261 F.3d
        1244, 1247-51 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that alien’s due process
        claim based on retroactive application of an amended statute that
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                21-10600

        effectively foreclosed cancellation of removal failed because he
        “ha[d] no constitutionally-protected right to discretionary relief
        from removal”).
               Here, Ponce Flores sought cancellation of removal, a form
        of relief from removal that, like its predecessor suspension of
        deportation, is purely discretionary. See INA § 240A(b); 8 U.S.C.
        § 1229b(b) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal . . . .”
        (emphasis added)); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct.
        754, 759 (2021) (explaining that while an alien facing removal may
        ask the Attorney General for cancellation, establishing the
        statutory requirements “still yields no guarantees; it only renders
        an alien eligible to have his removal order cancelled” and that the
        Attorney General has discretion “to grant or withhold that relief”).
        As such, under our precedent, Ponce Flores does not have a
        constitutionally protected liberty interest in obtaining cancellation
        of removal. See Mejia Rodriguez, 178 F.3d at 1148. Thus, Ponce
        Flores cannot show that his former counsel’s deficient performance
        deprived him of liberty without due process.
               Ponce Flores, nonetheless, argues that this Court has
        “consistently reviewed due process claims based on ineffective
        assistance of counsel in connection with discretionary
        applications,” suggesting Mejia Rodriguez has been undermined.
        In this regard, Ponce Flores cites these four decisions: (1) Dakane
        v. United States Attorney General, 399 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2005),
        (2) Sow v. United States Attorney General, 949 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir.
        2020), (3) Frech v. United States Attorney General, 491 F.3d 1277
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                        17

        (11th Cir. 2007), and (4) Ali v. United States Attorney General, 643
        F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2011). We review each decision below.
                For starters, none of these decisions held that an alien has a
        constitutionally protected liberty interest in purely discretionary
        relief from a removal order, such as cancellation of removal. None
        of these found a constitutional due process violation. Rather, to
        the extent the decisions review ineffective assistance claims, they
        did so in the context of a motion to reopen and based on an alien’s
        statutory right to have counsel present at the alien’s expense.
                Let’s begin with Dakane. Our Court in Dakane stated: “The
        sole issue before us in this appeal is whether Dakane was required
        to demonstrate in his motion to reopen that his counsel’s
        ineffective assistance prejudiced his removal proceedings.” 399
        F.3d at 1272. Our holding in Dakane was that: (1) “a petitioner
        claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for
        reconsideration must also show prejudice”; (2) “[p]rejudice exists
        when the performance of counsel is so inadequate that there is a
        reasonable probability that but for the attorney’s error, the
        outcome of the proceedings would have been different”; and
        (3) the BIA had not erred in determining Dakane failed to show
        prejudice. Id. at 1274-75.
               We recognize that Dakane in dicta also stated “[i]t is well
        established in this Circuit that an alien in civil deportation
        proceedings . . . has the constitutional right under the Fifth
        Amendment Due Process Clause right to a fundamentally fair
        hearing to effective assistance of counsel where counsel has been
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                 21-10600

        obtained,” citing Gbaya v. United States Attorney General, 342
        F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2003). Id. at 1273.
               Dakane, however, added a clarifying footnote six to its
        Gbaya cite that points out (1) Dakane is an inadmissible alien; and
        (2) “inadmissible aliens such as Dakane have traditionally not been
        able to claim constitutional due process protections in exclusion
        proceedings”; but (3) “they are ensured a fundamentally fair
        hearing through statutory protections provided for by Congress”;
        and (4) “Congress has long recognized the importance of counsel
        in immigration proceedings as evidenced by the statutory right to
        presence of counsel under § 1362 of the INA.” Id. at 1273 n.6
        (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The Dakane Court
        then cited with approval Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 132
        (3d Cir. 2001), in which the Third Circuit concluded that an
        excludable alien facing exclusion enjoys a statutory right under
        § 1362 to assistance of counsel at his expense and this is necessarily
        a right to effective assistance of that counsel. Dakane, 399 F.3d at
        1273 n.6; see also Flores-Panameno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d
        1036, 1040 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Gbaya for the principle that
        “8 U.S.C. § 1362 provides that aliens have the right to retain private
        counsel in their removal proceedings” and thus “the right to
        effective assistance of counsel” so retained).
              Our point is that Dakane does not undermine Mejia
        Rodriguez’s holding that aliens do not have a constitutionally
        protected liberty interest in discretionary relief from removal and
        do not have a constitutional due process right to effective assistance
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        21-10600                  Opinion of the Court                             19

        of counsel in connection with discretionary applications. Instead,
        Dakane involved a statutory protection. While Ponce Flores elides
        this distinction, it is a critical one. Our Court has not permitted a
        constitutional due process claim based on the denial of
        discretionary relief like cancellation of removal. So Ponce Flores’s
        argument that he can raise a constitutional due process claim based
        on ineffective assistance of counsel fails.4
                Ponce Flores’s citation to Sow fares no better. Sow
        presented himself at the Mexico border, seeking asylum for his fear
        of returning to Guinea. Sow, 949 F.3d at 1314. After a merits
        hearing where Sow was represented by counsel, the IJ denied his
        asylum application. Id. at 1314-16. The IJ stated that Sow “should,
        in fact, be given asylum based upon past persecution,” if it were not
        for the evidentiary issues that Sow’s attorney had allegedly

        4 Notably too, Gbaya cites Mejia Rodriguez, and Gbaya states only that, “It is
        well established that ‘[a]liens enjoy the right to the effective assistance of
        counsel in deportation proceedings.’” 342 F.3d at 1221 (quoting Mejia
        Rodriguez, 178 F.3d at 1146) (alteration in original). While both Dakane and
        Gbaya quote this first principle in Mejia Rodriguez, those decisions do not
        quote the equally well established second principle in Mejia Rodriguez about
        discretionary relief like cancellation of removal at issue here. Indeed, the
        quotes in both Dakane and Gbaya reference deportation, not discretionary
        relief from deportation.
                In any event, Dakane and Gbaya involve applications for asylum,
        which is different from other forms of discretionary relief. We need not reach
        and thus do not opine on what constitutional due process rights a petitioner
        may have in connection with an asylum application.
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                 21-10600

        disregarded. Id. at 1319. Sow, represented by new counsel,
        appealed to the BIA and filed a motion to remand based on
        ineffective counsel, which the BIA denied. Id. at 1316-17. In Sow,
        this Court reviewed only whether the BIA had abused its discretion
        in denying a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance,
        concluding that it had. See id. at 1313 (quotation marks omitted).
              Our Court in Sow did not need to speculate as to whether
        the outcome may have been different if counsel had performed
        adequately because “[t]he IJ’s uniquely direct statement
        confirm[ed] that it would have.” Id. at 1319. Sow did not address,
        or even mention, whether the alien had a constitutionally
        protected liberty interest in discretionary relief from removal.
              Ponce Flores also cites Ali, which involved a discretionary
        waiver under INA § 237(a)(1)(H), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). 643
        F.3d at 1327. The alien claimed that his counsel’s decision to
        concede removability was ineffective assistance. Id. at 1329-30.
        The ineffective assistance alleged in Ali was not in connection with
        his waiver application. Ali does not undermine Mejia Rodriguez’s
        holding that an alien has no liberty interest in a purely discretionary
        form of relief.
               Ponce Flores’s last case, Frech, is equally inapposite. The
        alien in Frech sought adjustment of status under § 202 of the
        Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997,
        a mandatory form of relief if the eligibility requirements are met.
        491 F.3d at 1278-79 & n.1. Frech did not address either
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                        21

        discretionary relief from removal or a claim of ineffective assistance
        of counsel.
                The alien in Frech challenged the IJ’s denial of his motion
        for a change of venue from Miami to Houston. Id. at 1279. Frech’s
        home, business, retained attorney, and witnesses were in Houston.
        Id. at 1279-80. After the IJ denied the venue motion, Frech’s Texas
        counsel moved to withdraw and the IJ granted that motion. Id. at
        1280. At the merits hearing in Miami, Frech appeared pro se, and
        the IJ denied adjustment of status and the relief Frech sought based
        on hardship to his family. Id. The BIA affirmed. Id.
               In his petition for review, Frech argued the denial of his
        venue motion denied him constitutional due process because it
        deprived him of his right to be represented by the counsel of his
        choice and the ability to present evidence. Id. at 1281-82. Our
        Court stated that the deprivation of an alien’s right to counsel of
        his choice in removal proceedings “would, under certain
        circumstances, constitute a due process violation.” Id. at 1282
        (emphasis added). Yet our Court skipped over what those
        circumstances might be and whether they were met. This Court
        denied Frech’s petition because he “ha[d] not shown that he was
        substantially prejudiced by any due process violation.” Id.
        (explaining Frech had not shown the dismissal of his attorney in
        Texas “was related to the location of the hearing” or that he had
        “sought a continuance thereafter for the purpose of obtaining
        another attorney” in Florida).
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        22                       Opinion of the Court                    21-10600

               Nothing in Frech (or Dakane, Sow, or Ali) undermines Mejia
        Rodriguez and our subsequent decisions squarely holding that an
        alien does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
        purely discretionary forms of relief like cancellation of removal.5
               Because Ponce Flores’s constitutional due process claim—
        even if based on ineffective assistance—is meritless, it is not
        colorable. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
        § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review the BIA’s denial of Ponce Flores’s
        application for cancellation of removal. See Acosta Alvarez, 524
        F.3d at 1197; Arias, 482 F.3d at 1284 n.2. 6
        D.     Hardship Requirement
               Although not raised as a separate argument, Ponce Flores’s
        petition does assert that the BIA erred in finding that, even
        assuming he was credible, “he did not establish the requisite
        hardship to his daughters.” Ponce Flores claims “the BIA failed to
        consider all hardship factors in the aggregate,” which he contends
        violated Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I & N. Dec. 56, 63-64 (BIA
        2001).

        5 While we take time to review these cases cited by Ponce Flores, we point
        out Mejia Rodriguez was decided in 1999, and these decisions came later.
        Under our prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by Mejia Rodriguez. See
        Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1300 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001).
        6 Later on, we discuss Ponce Flores’s motion to reopen filed before the BIA
        and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the BIA’s precedent in
        Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                      23

                To the extent Ponce Flores is challenging the BIA’s decision
        affirming the IJ’s hardship determination, we lack jurisdiction to
        review this issue. Under our binding precedent, this Court lacks
        jurisdiction to review the denial of cancellation of removal
        grounded on the fact-based finding that the alien failed to show
        exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying
        relative.     See Patel, 971 F.3d at 1279 (“[A]ll eligibility
        determinations for the five enumerated categories of discretionary
        relief are barred from review.”); Flores-Alonso, 36 F.4th at 1100.
               Further, in Flores-Alonso, this Court held that an argument
        like the one Ponce Flores makes here—that the BIA failed to
        consider all the hardship factors in the aggregate “in the way that
        Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga instructs it to do, even though it cited
        the proper legal standard”—does not present a legal question this
        Court has jurisdiction to review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 36
        F.4th at 1100. “As long as the BIA cites and proceeds to apply the
        proper legal standard, . . . we cannot make legal error out of an
        inherently subjective determination of whether an applicant’s
        relatives will experience exceptional and extremely unusual
        hardship.” Id.
               In Ponce Flores’s appeal, the BIA cited Matter of Monreal-
        Aguinaga, among other BIA precedents pertaining to the showing
        of hardship, and explicitly stated it had “consider[ed] all of the
        hardship factors in this case cumulatively, including the hardships
        that may result from the medical, economic, and emotional
        factors.” Hence, as to the hardship requirement for eligibility,
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        24                        Opinion of the Court                     21-10600

        Ponce Flores has not raised a legal question that we have
        jurisdiction to review. 7
             V. BIA’S DECISION DENYING MOTION TO REOPEN
                CANCELLATION-OF-REMOVAL APPLICATION
               Ponce Flores argues that the BIA abused its discretion in
        denying his motion to reopen and remand based on attorney
        Varga’s ineffective assistance before the IJ. Ponce Flores contends
        the BIA (1) failed to follow its own precedent in Lozada, and (2)
        erred in determining he had not shown prejudice as a result of that
        ineffective assistance. Ponce Flores also seeks to revisit his
        constitutional due process claims and the BIA’s hardship
        determination in denying his motion to reopen.
               “The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen . . . is
        within the discretion of the BIA, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and we have
        recognized that this discretion is very broad.” Scheerer, 513 F.3d
        at 1253 (quotation marks omitted). “The BIA may deny a motion

        7 Ponce Flores also argues the IJ erred in finding he did not establish
        continuous physical presence because the deficient notice to appear did not
        trigger the “stop-time rule” and the IJ’s adverse credibility finding is not
        supported by substantial evidence. The BIA, however, explicitly declined to
        reach these other grounds that the IJ found warranted denial of Ponce Flores’s
        application, and “[w]e do not consider issues that were not reached by the
        BIA.” See Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016). In
        addition, because Ponce Flores’s failure to satisfy the requisite hardship
        element is alone sufficient to deny his application, we also need not address
        these other grounds.
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        21-10600                Opinion of the Court                         25

        to reopen, if the alien fails to establish a prima facie case” of
        eligibility for relief. Butalova v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 768 F.3d 1179, 1182
        (11th Cir. 2014). The movant “bears a heavy burden” in showing
        that reopening is warranted because “motions to reopen are
        disfavored, especially in removal proceedings.” Zhang v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 572 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2009).
        A.     Standard of Review
               We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen removal
        proceedings for an abuse of discretion. Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568
        F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). “Our review is limited to
        determining whether the BIA exercised its discretion in an arbitrary
        or capricious manner.” Id. “The BIA abuses its discretion when it
        misapplies the law in reaching its decision.” Ferreira v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 714 F.3d 1240, 1243 (11th Cir. 2013). We review de novo our
        own subject matter jurisdiction. Blanc, 996 F.3d at 1277.
        B.     Jurisdiction
             “Generally, we have jurisdiction to review the denial of a
        motion to reopen.” Butalova, 768 F.3d at 1182.
               However, when direct review of the underlying order is
        barred by one of the INA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions, we
        also lack “jurisdiction to entertain an attack on that order mounted
        through” a motion to reopen. Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 334 F.3d
        1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)’s
        criminal-alien bar deprived this Court of jurisdiction to review the
        denial of a motion to reopen based on a state court’s nunc pro tunc
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        26                     Opinion of the Court               21-10600

        order modifying the alien’s sentence); see also Butalova, 768 F.3d
        at 1183-84 (concluding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) deprived this
        Court of jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to
        reopen seeking discretionary relief as a battered spouse under 8
        U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)); Guzman-Munoz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 733
        F.3d 1311, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding 8 U.S.C.
        § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) deprived this Court of jurisdiction to review the
        BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen seeking discretionary special
        cancellation of removal as the battered spouse of a Cuban national
        under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)).
              Guzman-Munoz is particularly instructive because it
        addressed a motion to reopen proceedings in which the alien, like
        Ponce Flores, unsuccessfully sought discretionary cancellation of
        removal under § 1229b(b) and then filed a motion to reopen with
        the BIA. 733 F.3d at 1312. The alien in Guzman-Munoz sought
        special cancellation of removal as a battered spouse under
        § 1229b(b)(2), rather than regular cancellation of removal under
        § 1229b(b)(1). Id. As in Ponce Flores’s case, review of the
        underlying order denying Guzman-Munoz’s application was
        barred by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). See id. at 1313. Under these
        circumstances, this Court concluded it also lacked jurisdiction to
        review the BIA’s denial of Guzman-Munoz’s motion to reopen her
        cancellation of removal proceedings and dismissed her petition. Id.
        at 1314.
              In doing so, we stressed that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips this
        Court of jurisdiction to review “judgments ‘regarding the granting
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                        27

        of relief under section . . . 1229b.’” Id. at 1313 (emphasis added)
        (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)).          We reasoned that
        “§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not speak in terms of final orders, prima
        facie cases, or motions to reopen. Instead, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) simply
        bars review of discretionary agency judgments granting or denying
        relief under § 1229b.” Id. at 1313-14 (emphasis added). To hold
        otherwise would permit an “end-run” whereby petitioners “would
        be able to obtain appellate-court jurisdiction simply by raising
        § 1229b arguments on motions to reopen.” Id. at 1314.
               Finally, although we noted that we “retain[ed] jurisdiction
        to review constitutional challenges” under § 1252(a)(2)(D),
        Guzman-Munoz had “raise[d] no such challenge.” Id. Applying
        these principles, we examine the extent to which we have
        jurisdiction to consider Ponce Flores’s challenge to the denial of his
        motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance.
        C.    Constitutional Due Process Claims
               To the extent Ponce Flores contends the BIA abused its
        discretion in denying his motion to reopen because his counsel’s
        ineffective assistance deprived him of constitutional due process
        under the Fifth Amendment, we lack jurisdiction to review this
        claim mounted through a motion to reopen for the same reasons
        we cannot review this claim directly. Because Ponce Flores has no
        protected liberty interest in discretionary cancellation of removal,
        his Fifth Amendment due process claim is not colorable for
        purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). See supra Section IV.C. To
        hold otherwise would permit an end-run around the jurisdiction-
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        28                     Opinion of the Court                21-10600

        stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and (a)(2)(D),
        which together bar us from reviewing any judgment regarding the
        granting of cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b), except where
        a colorable constitutional claim is presented. See Guzman-Munoz,
        733 F.3d at 1314.
               To the extent Ponce Flores contends the BIA’s own denial
        of his motion to reopen itself deprived him of constitutional due
        process, that claim also lacks merit. An alien cannot establish a
        Fifth Amendment due process violation based on the BIA’s denial
        of a motion to reopen because an alien in those circumstances has
        no constitutionally protected liberty interest in the granting of a
        motion to reopen. See Scheerer, 513 F.3d at 1253 (“Because
        Scheerer has no constitutionally protected interest either in the
        granting of his motions [to reopen and to reconsider] or in
        adjustment of status, he cannot establish a due process violation
        based on the BIA’s decisions.”); Butalova, 768 F.3d at 1183 (“An
        alien, however, does not have a constitutionally protected interest
        in discretionary forms of relief, such as the granting of a motion to
        reopen.”).
               Having determined Ponce Flores’s ineffective assistance
        claim raises no colorable due process violation that we can review,
        we consider whether his ineffective assistance claim otherwise
        presents a reviewable legal question.
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        21-10600                 Opinion of the Court                          29

        D.     Ineffective Assistance Claim Under Matter of Lozada
               Examination of our jurisdiction over an ineffective
        assistance claim requires some background about that type of
        claim. Under § 1362, Ponce Flores has a right to counsel at his own
        expense and therefore is entitled to effective assistance of the
        counsel he retains. Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1273 (citing 8 U.S.C.
        § 1362). 8 The BIA permits an alien to seek to reopen removal
        proceedings based on a claim of ineffective assistance of his
        retained counsel. Id.; Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638-39.
        To do so, the BIA requires the alien to meet three procedural
        requirements and show prejudice resulting from counsel’s
        deficiencies. Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639-40; Gbaya,
        342 F.3d at 1223 (“The BIA does not abuse its discretion by filtering
        ineffective assistance of counsel claims through the screening
        requirements of Lozada . . . .”).
               Procedurally, Lozada requires that an ineffective assistance
        claim be supported by: (1) an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts
        about the agreement with former counsel about actions to be taken
        and former counsel’s representations in that regard; (2) evidence
        that former counsel was informed of the allegations and provided
        an opportunity to respond and of former counsel’s response, if any;
        and (3) evidence as to whether the alien filed a complaint against

        8 While Dakane involved an inadmissible alien, § 1362 does not distinguish
        between inadmissible and removable aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
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        30                      Opinion of the Court                 21-10600

        former counsel with the appropriate disciplinary authorities. 19 I.
        & N. Dec. at 639.
               “[I]n addition to substantial, if not exact, compliance with
        the procedural requirements of Lozada, a petitioner claiming
        ineffective assistance of counsel . . . must also show prejudice.”
        Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1274 & n.7 (citing Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N.
        Dec. at 640). Under Lozada’s prejudice component, “[p]rejudice
        exists when the performance of counsel is so inadequate that there
        is a reasonable probability that but for the attorney’s error, the
        outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Id. at
        1274.
                With this background, our threshold question is whether we
        have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of Ponce Flores’s
        ineffective assistance claim. Ponce Flores argues he raises these
        two reviewable legal questions: (1) the BIA erred in suggesting he
        failed to comply with Lozada’s procedural requirements, when in
        fact he fully complied; and (2) the BIA erred in its Lozada prejudice
        determination.
                As to the procedural requirements, the BIA cited the proper
        legal standard for ineffective assistance claims from its own Lozada.
        Although the proper legal standard is a reviewable legal question,
        we cannot make a legal error out of a BIA factual determination
        that the evidence did or did not satisfy Lozada’s three procedural
        requirements. See Alvarez Acosta, 524 F.3d at 1196-97. Whether
        in fact Ponce Flores’s particular evidence was sufficient to satisfy or
        substantially comply with the BIA’s Lozada procedural
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                      31

        requirements does not present a legal question that this Court has
        jurisdiction to review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
               Alternatively, and in any event, the BIA did not find that
        Ponce Flores failed to comply with Lozada’s procedural
        requirements. The BIA instead concluded that “even if [it] were to
        find [Ponce Flores] had complied with the Lozada requirements,
        [Ponce Flores] must also establish he suffered prejudice as a result
        of his former attorneys’ alleged ineffectiveness.” The BIA then
        found that Ponce Flores had “identified deficiencies in his
        representation by former attorneys,” but concluded he had not
        shown he suffered prejudice as a result. In short, there is no merit
        to Ponce Flores’s claim that the BIA committed legal error with
        respect to Lozada’s three procedural requirements.
               As for the BIA’s prejudice determination, the BIA presumed
        Ponce Flores’s credibility and reviewed all the evidence, including
        his new evidence, de novo. The BIA then determined he “ha[d]
        not demonstrated that but for the deficiency in his prior counsels’
        representation, he would have met his burden of proof to
        demonstrate the requisite hardship to his qualifying relative
        children.” As a result, Ponce Flores had not demonstrated he
        “suffered prejudice as a result of his former attorneys’ alleged
        ineffectiveness so as to have affected the outcome of these
        proceedings.”
              In other words, the BIA’s analysis of Lozada’s prejudice
        prong was commensurate with its de novo hardship
        determination. Stated another way, the BIA reviewed de novo all
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        32                     Opinion of the Court                21-10600

        of Ponce Flores’s new evidence and made its own determination
        that this new evidence still would not satisfy Ponce Flores’s burden
        to show the requisite hardship to his daughters under
        § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
               As already discussed, under Flores-Alonso we lack
        jurisdiction to review directly the BIA’s hardship determination
        under § 1229b(b)(1)(D). 36 F.4th at 1099-1100. Therefore, we are
        also barred by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) from reviewing a challenge to the
        BIA’s hardship determination made in denying a motion to reopen.
        See Guzman-Munoz, 733 F.3d at 1314. The question then
        becomes, do we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s prejudice
        determination under Lozada when it turned on the BIA’s de novo
        hardship determination based on Ponce Flores’s new evidence?
               Of course, whether the BIA applied the correct prejudice
        standard is a legal question we retain jurisdiction to review under
        § 1252(a)(2)(D). In this case, there is no dispute that the BIA
        correctly stated the prejudice standard from Lozada. The BIA
        accepted all of Ponce Flores’s evidence and determined it would
        not have affected “the outcome of these proceedings.” Because the
        BIA applied the proper legal standards, it did not abuse its
        discretion. See Ferreira, 714 F.3d at 1243.
                Ponce Flores’s argument isolates the BIA’s finding that he
        failed to meet his burden of proof as to hardship. He claims the
        BIA abused its discretion because his new evidence established the
        requisite hardship and that the outcome of his proceedings would
        have been different. The first problem for Ponce Flores is that his
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        21-10600               Opinion of the Court                       33

        “argument that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to weigh an
        alien’s factual scenario presents a ‘garden-variety abuse of
        discretion argument—which can be made by virtually every alien
        subject to a final removal order—[and] does not amount to a legal
        question under § 1252(a)(2)(D).’” Butalova, 768 F.3d at 1183
        (alteration in original) (quoting Alvarez Acosta, 524 F.3d at 1196-
        97).
               The second problem for Ponce Flores’s particular case is that
        whether an alien carries his burden to show the requisite hardship
        under § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is a factual finding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
        deprives us of jurisdiction to review. See Flores-Alonso, 36 F.4th
        at 1099-1100. And, because the BIA’s denial of Ponce Flores’s
        ineffective assistance claim raised in his motion to reopen rested
        solely upon, and was commensurate with, the BIA’s fact-based
        hardship determination, we conclude § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) deprives us
        of jurisdiction to review the BIA’s prejudice determination under
        the circumstances of this case.
               Ponce Flores relies on Sow, where the alien’s motion to
        remand was based on ineffective assistance, and we reviewed the
        BIA’s prejudice determination and reversed. See Sow, 949 F.3d at
        1318-19 (concluding “Sow established that counsel’s deficiencies
        prejudiced his case” and that “the unique facts of Sow’s case present
        the rare situation where we must find that the BIA was arbitrary
        and capricious in exercising its discretion” in denying his motion to
        remand).
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        34                     Opinion of the Court                 21-10600

               Sow does not help Ponce Flores because there was no
        § 1229b(b)(1) hardship determination at the heart of the BIA’s
        ruling in that case. The relief Sow sought was asylum, which is
        specifically exempted from the jurisdiction-stripping provision at
        issue here. Id. at 1314. Specifically, § 1252(a)(2)(B) deprives courts
        of jurisdiction to review “any other decision or action” by the
        Attorney General that the INA specifies is in the Attorney General’s
        discretion “other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a),”
        which is the asylum statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). There
        was no jurisdiction-stripping provision in Sow to bar this Court’s
        review of the BIA’s prejudice determination.
                In sum, to the extent Ponce Flores’s challenge to the denial
        of his motion to reopen rests on an argument that the BIA erred in
        ruling that he had not demonstrated that but for his counsel’s
        deficient performance, he would have proved the requisite
        hardship under § 1229b(b)(1)(D), we lack jurisdiction to entertain
        this claim under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
             PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN
        PART.