Court Opinion

ID: 9912350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 06:05:37.369545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:38.912498
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

OMOLARA O. JAIYEOLA,                                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       December 21, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                      No. 364963
                                                                       Kent Circuit Court
GANIYU A. JAIYEOLA,                                                    LC No. 22-002281-DM

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and RICK and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this contested divorce, defendant, Ganiyu A. Jaiyeola, appeals by right the judgment of
divorce. On appeal, defendant argues on his own behalf that the trial court erred in numerous
respects. He maintains that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him; that the trial
court should not have held the trial after he informed it that he would be unable to attend; that the
trial court improperly considered evidence admitted in violation of MRE 408; that the trial court
abused its discretion when it refused to order plaintiff, Omolara O. Jaiyeola, to undergo a
psychological examination; and that the trial court violated his right to due process in various ways.
We conclude that defendant has not identified any errors that warrant relief. Accordingly, we
affirm.

                                         I. BASIC FACTS

       Plaintiff met defendant in their homeland, Nigeria. She was 53 years of age as of
January 2023. Defendant was about 68 years of age. Plaintiff and defendant formally married in
Nigeria in February 2007. They emigrated to the United States in 2009 and became citizens in
2017. Plaintiff and defendant have three boys.

        Plaintiff worked as a nurse’s aide and supported the family when they first came to the
United States. She has since earned a Bachelor’s degree in nursing, but she has not been able to
pass the nursing examination.

       Plaintiff testified that defendant became aggressive and disrespectful with her over the last
few years before the divorce. Defendant informed her on a Thursday that he had taken a job with

                                                 -1-
Apple in California. He moved to California on the next Monday in February 2022. Defendant
also told her that he would be taking the two youngest children to live with him. After defendant
informed her of these things, plaintiff decided to divorce defendant.

      Defendant testified at a hearing that he had a Ph.D. in Material Science. He took the job
with Apple, and his new salary was $195,000 a year. He also earned a $60,000 bonus.

        Plaintiff sued for divorce in March 2022. The trial court held a one-day trial in
January 2023. Defendant did not show for the trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court
orally stated its findings and determinations. In relevant part, the trial court determined that it was
in the children’s best interests to award plaintiff sole legal and physical custody. The trial court
entered a judgment of divorce, a uniform child support order, and a uniform spousal support order
in February 2023.

       Defendant appeals from the judgement of divorce. We affirm.

                                 II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

                                   A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Defendant first argues that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him
because it began conducting hearings even before he answered plaintiff’s complaint. We review
de novo whether a trial court had personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Yoost v Caspari, 295
Mich App 209, 219; 813 NW2d 783 (2012).

                                           B. ANALYSIS

        Before it could exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant, defendant had to have been
served with process sufficient to give him fair notice of the divorce proceedings, and there had to
be sufficient contacts with this state to make it permissible for the state to extend its judicial power
over him. See Fitzwater v Fitzwater, 97 Mich App 92, 97; 294 NW2d 249 (1980). The evidence
showed that defendant maintained a domicile in this state while married to plaintiff before moving
to California. Defendant also admitted that he returned to that domicile on trips from California.
That relationship was sufficient to warrant the exercise of long-arm personal jurisdiction. See
MCL 600.705(7). Accordingly, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over defendant once
defendant was served with the summons and complaint. See Lowe v Lowe, 107 Mich App 325,
328-329; 309 NW2d 254 (1981).

         There was also record evidence that a process server served defendant with plaintiff’s
summons and complaint during one of defendant’s visits to Michigan. Although defendant’s son
answered the door, the process server indicated that defendant appeared at the top of some stairs,
and after the process server asked him if he was defendant, defendant stated that he was refusing
the papers and yelled at his son not to accept the papers. The process server then identified the
documents as court papers, dropped them on the floor, and informed defendant that he had been
served. The trial court did not rule on the adequacy of this service. The service was sufficient to
assert personal jurisdiction over defendant, however, because the process server had adequate
assurances that defendant was the person to be served, he identified the documents as court papers,
he left the papers within defendant’s control, and he informed defendant that he had been served.

                                                  -2-
See Barclay v Crown Bldg and Dev, Inc, 241 Mich App 639, 646-650; 617 NW2d 373 (2000)
(holding that the party served does not have to accept service of process—it is enough that the
process server leaves the summons and complaint in the party’s control after identifying the
documents).

        In any event, defendant specifically stipulated that the trial court had personal jurisdiction
over him for “all issues in this divorce case” when he signed the order setting aside his default.
By stipulating to entry of an order setting aside the default with the agreement that the court had
personal jurisdiction, defendant made a general appearance that waived any purported defect in
the service of process. See Ragnone v Wirsing, 141 Mich App 263, 265; 367 NW2d 369 (1985)
(stating that a party makes a general appearance when he or she demonstrates knowledge of the
proceedings and expresses an intent to appear). Contrary to defendant’s contention, the filing of
an answer is not the only manner for making a general appearance. See id.

       In sum, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over defendant.

                                        III. DUE PROCESS

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        We next address defendant’s claim that the trial court deprived him of due process in
various ways. We review de novo whether a party received due process of law. See Reed v Reed,
265 Mich App 131, 157; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). We review de novo the proper interpretation of
law. See Martin v Martin, 331 Mich App 224, 244; 952 NW2d 530 (2020). We review for an
abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision whether to adjourn a trial. See Pugno v Blue Harvest
Farms LLC, 326 Mich App 1, 27; 930 NW2d 393 (2018). A trial court abuses its discretion when
its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. Id.

                                          B. ANALYSIS

         On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court denied him due process by refusing to
adjourn trial after he gave the court notice that he would not be attending. Due process generally
requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker. See Souden v
Souden, 303 Mich App 406, 413; 844 NW2d 151 (2013). The record demonstrates that defendant
knew about the trial date and chose not to attend. Nevertheless, he argues that the trial court’s
failure to adjourn the trial date deprived him of due process. Accordingly, the relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to adjourn the trial.

       Defendant was not automatically entitled to adjourn the trial. Rather, he had to request the
adjournment by motion and had to demonstrate good cause for the adjournment. See
MCR 2.503(B)(1); Pugno, 326 Mich App at 28. Good cause means a legally sufficient or
substantial reason for acting. See In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 10-11; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).

        On January 4, 2023, the trial court entered an amended scheduling order setting the trial
for January 9, 2023. The trial court had already notified the parties of that date, however, on the
record at the hearing held in October 2022. Accordingly, defendant had months to prepare for trial
and to make his travel plans.

                                                 -3-
        Defendant prepared and signed a motion to adjourn the trial on January 6, 2023. He relied
on a declaration of a weather emergency in California that the state issued on January 4, 2023. He
then mailed the motion to the circuit court, but it did not arrive in Michigan and get entered by the
circuit court’s clerk until after the trial court had already started to hear testimony.

        Defendant did not send his motion to adjourn on the date the state of California declared a
weather emergency, but instead waited two days to send it. He first e-mailed the trial court’s clerk,
who responded that he needed to seek relief by motion. In his motion, he did not present any
evidence concerning the actual weather conditions in his area and did not identify whether, or in
what way, the weather conditions made it unsafe for him to travel. He did not identify the mode
of travel that he had planned to use. Additionally, he did not establish that the state of emergency
persisted from January 4 through January 9, 2023, such that he could not make a timely appearance
through alternate means. Indeed, he did not even seek to participate remotely. Rather, he merely
informed the court that he would not be appearing, with the apparent expectation that the court
would adjourn to accommodate him. Defendant not only made an untimely motion to adjourn, he
also failed to support his motion and establish good cause to adjourn. See MCR 2.503(B)(1).
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to adjourn the trial when
defendant did not appear. See Pugno, 326 Mich App at 27.

        Under these circumstances, the decision to proceed did not deprive defendant of
due process. The trial court gave defendant ample opportunity to be timely heard at various
hearings and through his documentary submissions before trial; it was defendant’s obligation to
establish good cause to adjourn or, in the absence of good cause, to make arrangements to appear.
See In re Estate of Adams, 257 Mich App 230, 234; 667 NW2d 904 (2003) (noting that due process
can be served through documentary submissions). Defendant’s failure to meet the requirements
of the court rules—even though he represented himself—cannot serve to establish error on appeal.
See Baird v Baird, 368 Mich 536, 539; 118 NW2d 427 (1962) (stating that a party who appears
pro se in a divorce will be held to the same standards as would be required of a member of the bar
and that any errors or omissions by the pro se party cannot be made the basis of an appeal).

        Defendant also claims that it was a violation of due process for the trial court to enter a
judgment of divorce that had been prepared by plaintiff and without considering defendant’s
objection to plaintiff’s motion to enter a judgment of divorce. The trial court resolved all the issues
involving the divorce in its oral decision from the bench after trial. Thereafter, plaintiff had the
authority to prepare a proposed final judgment and to ask the trial court to settle the judgment by
determining whether the proposed judgment corresponded with the court’s oral pronouncement;
indeed, plaintiff had an obligation to do so within 21 days. See MCR 3.211(F). That was precisely
what happened in this case, and there was nothing improper about it.

        Defendant objected to entry of the judgment, but he did not identify any discrepancies
between the trial court’s oral pronouncements and the proposed judgment. Instead, he identified
what he believed were errors in the trial court’s findings and conclusions of law, which were not
an appropriate basis for challenging settlement of the judgment. Because defendant’s challenge
to the request to enter the proposed judgment did not relate to whether the proposed judgment
accurately reflected the trial court’s oral decision, there was no need to hold a hearing on his
objections. See Cameron v Dep’t of State Police, 139 Mich App 199, 202; 361 NW2d 765 (1984)
(recognizing that due process does not require a hearing for every dispute). The trial court’s

                                                 -4-
decision to cancel the scheduled hearing was not error and did not deprive defendant of
due process. The trial court afforded defendant all the process that was due under the
circumstances. See Souden, 303 Mich App at 413.

                                           IV. MRE 408

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence in violation of
MRE 408. We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Mitchell
v Kalamazoo Anesthesiology, PC, 321 Mich App 144, 153; 908 NW2d 319 (2017). We review
de novo a trial court’s interpretation and application of the rules of evidence. Id. at 154.

                                          B. ANALYSIS

        In his statement of the questions presented, defendant claims that the trial court erred when
it considered evidence in violation of MRE 408. Defendant did not, however, address this claim
of error in an independent section of his brief. Also, there was no discussion regarding the basis
of the trial court’s decision. We have no obligation to review a claim of error when the
complaining party does not address the basis for the trial court’s decision. Derderian v Genesys
Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 381; 689 NW2d 145 (2004). Consequently, we conclude
that defendant abandoned this claim on appeal. See id. In any event, the trial court properly
applied the law to the evidence at issue.

        When the trial court held its first evidentiary hearing to address whether to order temporary
spousal support, defendant argued that the trial court could not properly consider his current salary
because he submitted the documentation establishing his salary as part of negotiations to settle the
case. Plaintiff’s lawyer indicated that defendant did send the documentation in a series of e-mails,
which included settlement negotiations. She also thought that he sent them to comply with her
subpoena. Defendant admitted that he submitted the same documents “much later” in compliance
with the subpoena. The court determined that it did not matter when the documents were submitted
so long as they were submitted to fulfill a subpoena. Later during that same hearing, defendant
refused to testify about the documents evidencing his income. The trial court overruled his
objection under MRE 408. The court explained that MRE 408 specifically provided that it did not
bar evidence that was otherwise discoverable, and it determined that his financial records were
discoverable.

         Under MRE 408, statements made in settlement negotiations are inadmissible to prove
liability but they may be introduced for other reasons such as to show bias or reasons for the delay.
The rule also bars evidence of “conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations.”
MRE 408. See Gorman v Soble, 120 Mich App 831, 842; 328 NW2d 119 (1982) (stating that
MRE 408 only bars evidence introduced to prove liability for, or the invalidity of, a claim—it does
not bar admission of the evidence for other purposes). The rule does not preclude the admission
of evidence when the evidence would otherwise have been discoverable: “This rule does not
require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the
course of compromise negotiations.” MRE 408. Accordingly, the mere fact that defendant

                                                -5-
submitted his financial information with an e-mail involving negotiations to compromise did not
forever bar the evidence from admission at an evidentiary hearing or trial.

        Defendant had an obligation to disclose his income and assets to opposing counsel even
without a subpoena because the case involved both child support and spousal support. See
MCR 2.302(A)(1); MCR 3.206(C)(2). As such, the financial information was plainly subject to
discovery, and MRE 408 did not bar its admission as evidence to prove his income. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it overruled defendant’s objection to the admission of evidence
concerning his salary and compensation. See Mitchell, 321 Mich App at 153-154. Defendant’s
arguments concerning the proper application of MRE 408 were and are completely meritless.

                             V. PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS

                                   A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Defendant also complains that the trial court erred when it denied his repeated attempts to
get the court to order plaintiff to undergo a psychological evaluation. He also argues that the trial
court behaved vindictively when it ordered him to undergo a psychological evaluation after trial
even though plaintiff never requested that he undergo an examination. We review a trial court’s
decision whether to order a party to undergo a psychological evaluation for an abuse of discretion.
See Siwik v Siwik, 89 Mich App 603, 609; 280 NW2d 610 (1979).

                                           B. ANALYSIS

      A trial court presiding over a custody dispute has the discretion to order the parties to
undergo a psychological examination for use in resolving the custody dispute. See
MCL 722.27(1)(d); MCR 2.311(A); Siwik, 89 Mich App at 609.

        In the trial court, defendant repeatedly asked the court to order his wife to undergo a
psychological examination. In support of his request, he alleged that plaintiff exhibited behaviors
that he felt warranted such an order. He related that plaintiff had been arrested for assaulting one
of the children, she left the children alone at night on one occasion, she did not adequately respond
to one child’s basketball injury, she left home without telling defendant where she was going, she
took the youngest child on a trip out of state without his permission, she did not take him to doctor’s
appointments, and she was violent with him when he was cutting one of the children’s hair, among
other claims involving domestic matters.

        The trial court heard evidence about plaintiff’s trip out of state and determined that plaintiff
did nothing wrong. The court also heard testimony that plaintiff ordinarily arranged childcare for
the boys when she worked, but that she was forced to leave them alone for a short time when
defendant left for California with too little warning. The court also heard testimony that plaintiff
did get her son examined for his basketball injury, which was a minor injury for which an x-ray
was negative, and defendant nevertheless insisted on obtaining an expensive and unnecessary MRI
scan. The court also learned that plaintiff refused to take defendant to an elective surgery that he
scheduled because defendant scheduled it on the same day as plaintiff’s clinical exam, which was
required for her degree and which she scheduled at the start of her semester. The court also heard
testimony about the tax return dispute, and plaintiff presented to the court that she had pleaded
guilty to disorderly conduct after a third party called the police when she publicly disciplined her

                                                  -6-
child for stealing candy. Consequently, the trial court was well aware that defendant’s accusations
against his wife were self-serving and exaggerated.

         In addition, none of the claims implicated plaintiff’s mental health. Rather, each assertion
involved personal disputes between plaintiff and defendant that evidenced the deteriorated state of
their relations more than either parties’ mental health. Finally, the court concluded that defendant
had been abusing the legal process by filing motion after to motion to punish plaintiff for suing for
divorce. The trial court determined that it would not be helpful to order plaintiff to undergo a
psychological evaluation on the basis of the record before it; and we conclude that the trial court’s
decision fell within the range of principled outcomes. See Loutts v Loutts, 298 Mich App 21, 26;
826 NW2d 152 (2012).

       Defendant also asserts in a one-paragraph claim of error that the trial court should not have
ordered him to undergo a psychological examination. He argues that plaintiff did not move for an
examination and that to order one would be evidence of the court’s vindictiveness towards him.

        When making its findings of fact and stating its conclusions of law at trial, the trial court
noted that plaintiff had expressed concerns about defendant’s mental health during her testimony.
The trial court stated that it did not “disagree with those concerns.” The court explained that
defendant had repeatedly tried to subject plaintiff to a psychological evaluation with no basis other
than evidence that she did not want to be married to him anymore. The court stated that
defendant’s behavior throughout the litigation had, however, made it “very concerned about his
mental stability and wellbeing.” For that reason, it stated that it would order defendant to undergo
a psychological examination. The trial court indicated that it would condition future modification
of the parenting-time schedule on defendant’s compliance. The trial court’s oral ruling was
correctly reflected in the judgment of divorce.

        The record showed that defendant emotionally and verbally abused plaintiff. He also
alienated his children and engaged in a scorched-earth litigation strategy. Examined as a whole,
the record supported the trial court’s decision to order defendant to undergo a psychological
examination to ensure that any future expansion of defendant’s parenting time did not place the
children in danger of emotional, mental, or physical harm. Consequently, defendant has not shown
that the trial court abused its discretion by including such a provision in the judgment of divorce
on its own initiative. See id.

                            VI. ADDITIONAL CLAIMS OF ERROR

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Defendant has also asserted various claims of error that do not fit within any of his
statements of the questions presented. Although he waived the claims of error by failing to present
them under separate statements of the questions presented, see English v Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Mich, 263 Mich App 449, 459; 688 NW2d 523 (2004), we will briefly address each claim.

        Some of defendant’s claims involve the trial court’s award of custody. Appellate review
of the trial court’s custody decision is limited: “all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall
be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of
evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.”

                                                 -7-
MCL 722.28. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the evidence clearly preponderates in
the opposite direction. See Pennington v Pennington, 329 Mich App 562, 570; 944 NW2d 131
(2019). We review the trial court’s custody decision for an abuse of discretion. Shulick v Richards,
273 Mich App 320, 323; 729 NW2d 533 (2006). We will conclude that a trial court abused its
discretion in a custody dispute only when the trial court’s exercise of discretion is so palpably and
grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or
the exercise of passion or bias.” Geering v King, 320 Mich App 182, 188; 906 NW2d 214 (2017).
A trial court commits a clear legal error when it incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law.
Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 664-665; 811 NW2d 501 (2011).

         For claims of error involving something other than custody, we review de novo whether
the trial court properly interpreted and applied the relevant law. Redmond v Heller, 332 Mich App
415, 438; 957 NW2d 357 (2020). We review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error. Loutts,
298 Mich App at 31-32. A finding is clearly erroneous when we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that the trial court was mistaken. Id. We review a trial court’s decision on matters
committed to its discretion—such as whether to award spousal support or impute income—for an
abuse of discretion. See id. at 25-26.

                                       B. CUSTODY ISSUES

        Defendant argues that the trial court erred in several respects when it awarded sole legal
and physical custody of the children to plaintiff. He first maintains that the trial court erred because
it did not hold a hearing to determine custody and did not consider the children’s best interests.
Defendant’s argument is not persuasive.

        The trial court held a trial that encompassed the issues of custody and parenting time. After
hearing the evidence, the trial court made detailed findings on the custodial environment and the
best-interest factors. On the basis of the evidence, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt
that it was in the children’s best interests to award plaintiff sole legal and physical custody.
Accordingly, it is evident that the trial court held a hearing and decided the children’s best interests.

        To the extent that defendant’s claim of error might refer to the trial court’s initial decision
to award plaintiff temporary sole physical and legal custody of the children, defendant has not
established that the court’s initial decision amounted to error that warrants any relief. The trial
court had the authority to enter a temporary custody order at the outset of the divorce case. See
MCR 3.207(A). Plaintiff requested temporary custody and supported her request in a verified
motion with sufficient facts to support the relief requested. See MCR 3.207(C)(1). Concerning
child custody, plaintiff alleged that defendant had, in effect, abandoned his children by moving to
California and was no longer in the position to provide them with care and custody. The trial court
held a hearing on the request for a temporary order, and defendant had the opportunity to be heard
on the motion. He did not dispute that he lived in California and could not provide for the
children’s daily custody needs. He merely asserted that the children should be moved to
California. The trial court considered the situation and chose to enter a temporary order governing
custody pending the trial, but without holding an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Thompson v
Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 358-359; 683 NW2d 250 (2004) (noting that the trial court had
entered a temporary order governing custody pending trial, but stating that ordinarily a trial court
cannot resolve a custody dispute without holding an evidentiary hearing).

                                                  -8-
        Assuming that the trial court had to hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings on the
best-interest factors before entering its temporary order, see Daly v Ward, 501 Mich 897; 901
NW2d 897 (2017), any error would not warrant relief. The trial court ultimately held a full trial
on the issue of custody and found that it was in the children’s best interests to award plaintiff sole
legal and physical custody. In making that decision, the court not only found that plaintiff
established that custody with her was in the children’s best interests by clear and convincing
evidence; it also found that plaintiff had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that it was in the
children’s best interests. Given that finding, any error in the decision to enter a temporary order
on custody pending trial was clearly harmless and would not warrant revisiting the trial court’s
custody determination after trial. See Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 889; 526 NW2d 889
(1994) (stating that a case must be redetermined by the trial court unless the error was harmless).

        Defendant also restates his claim that the trial court should have ordered plaintiff to
undergo a psychological examination before deciding custody. As already stated, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s request for such an order.

        Defendant next complains that, when deciding custody, the trial court ignored the evidence
that plaintiff pleaded guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct arising from her use of corporal
punishment on a child some years earlier. At trial, the court stated that there was no evidence
whether either party had a criminal record even though the trial court had been made aware of
defendant’s claims about plaintiff during earlier proceedings. The trial court made its decision on
the basis of the evidence before it at trial; defendant chose not appear and did not present his
evidence. On the record before it, the trial court’s finding that plaintiff did not have a relevant
criminal record and that Factor (f), see MCL 722.23(f), favored plaintiff was not contrary to the
great weight of the evidence. See Pennington, 329 Mich App at 570.

         Defendant additionally complains that the trial court erred when it failed to consider that
plaintiff violated a court order by taking the youngest child on a trip out of state. The trial court
earlier resolved the dispute and determined that she had not violated the order because defendant
gave his permission for her to do so, which satisfied the court’s order. Nevertheless, the trial
court did address that event under its discussion of Factor (j), see MCL 722.23(j). It specifically
found that defendant gave his permission and then changed his mind as part of an effort to control
plaintiff. The court further found that defendant would not facilitate and encourage a relationship
between the boys and their mother. Indeed, the trial court’s findings under Factor (j) were clearly
erroneous. See id.

        Defendant further argues that the trial court should have considered the evidence that
plaintiff deprived the youngest child of his medicine for 12 days. There was no evidence at trial
that plaintiff ever deprived the child of medication. Therefore, the trial court did not err by failing
to address that claim.

         In a section with the heading “Parenting Time,” defendant argues that the trial court should
have awarded him sole legal and physical custody of the children because, in his view, plaintiff
has mental-health problems, such as being suicidal and having bipolar disorder, and the children
are at risk in her care. There was no record evidence to support these accusations. Accordingly,
defendant has not shown that the trial court erred in any respect by failing to consider defendant’s
unsupported accusations.

                                                 -9-
                                       C. CHILD SUPPORT

       Defendant next faults the trial court for calculating child support without imputing
additional income to plaintiff. More specifically, defendant contends that plaintiff should have
been earning more given her degrees in nursing.

         The trial court may impute income to plaintiff if there were evidence that she had the actual
ability and likelihood of earning more. See Ghidotti v Barber, 459 Mich 189, 191-192; 586 NW2d
883 (1998). There was, however, no evidence presented at trial that she had been underearning.
The evidence showed how much plaintiff had been earning as a nursing aide and the hours were
limited because of her children’s care needs. Although plaintiff had obtained a degree in nursing,
she had not yet been able to pass her licensing examination. On the evidence before the trial court
at trial, there was no basis for imputing additional income to plaintiff. See id. Defendant’s
complaint to the contrary is not well-taken.

        Defendant again asserts that the trial court could not use the evidence from his employer
to calculate his income because that evidence was inadmissible under MRE 408. This argument
is meritless.

        Finally, defendant claims that the trial court denied him due process when it corrected an
error in the child support order involving who would insure the children without commenting on
his request that plaintiff submit certain financial information. In asserting this claim, defendant
has not discussed the proceedings that led to plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment premised
on mistake, does not discuss his response, does not state why the additional information was
needed, and does not identify how the error affected him. Additionally, no law relevant to this has
been identified.

       It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert
       an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for
       his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for
       authority either to sustain or reject his position. [Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182,
       203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959).]

Defendant abandoned this claim on appeal. See id.

                                     D. SPOUSAL SUPPORT

         Defendant also challenges the trial court’s decision to award spousal support. He asserts
that we should reverse the trial court’s initial decision to order temporary spousal support because
the trial court did not hold a hearing regarding spousal support and did not consider the relevant
factors for awarding support.

        Contrary to the defendant’s assertions, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to
consider spousal support in June 2022. At the hearing, the trial court identified the relevant criteria
for an award of spousal support and made specific findings on those factors. The trial then did the
same thing after hearing the evidence presented at trial on January 9, 2023. Defendant’s claim that
the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing and did not consider the relevant factors is a
patent misrepresentation of the record.

                                                 -10-
       He then reasserts his mistaken belief that the trial court could not consider his actual income
because the evidence of his income was inadmissible under MRE 408, and he restates his
unsupported position that plaintiff had been underearning. As already discussed, these claims are
meritless.

        Finally, defendant maintains that the trial court should not have awarded plaintiff spousal
support because—according to him—plaintiff was not a good spouse. He cites evidence that
plaintiff refused to take him to the hospital on one occasion, refused to take him for appointments
such as eye surgery on another occasion, and even filed separate tax returns. The past relations of
the parties is an appropriate factor for a trial court to consider when determining whether to
exercise its discretion to award spousal support, but the overriding purpose of a support order is to
balance the parties’ incomes and needs so that neither will be impoverished by the divorce. See
Loutts, 298 Mich App at 31-32. Although there was record evidence for some of these assertions,
plaintiff did not present evidence of these events at trial. Additionally, the trial court directly
addressed the past relations of the parties when determining whether an award was appropriate
and found that defendant had treated plaintiff unkindly, which the court characterized as an
“understatement”, and further found that he had engaged in a “scorched-earth policy” against her
during the divorce. Defendant has not shown that the trial court’s assessment of this factor was
clearly erroneous; he also has not demonstrated that the trial court’s decision to award spousal
support fell outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. See id. at 25-26.

                                      E. ATTORNEY FEES

        Defendant also claims that the trial court erred when it ordered him to pay plaintiff’s
attorney fees in June 2022 without requiring plaintiff’s lawyer to support her request with an
itemized billing. He also states that plaintiff’s lawyer was not worthy of attorney fees because she
violated the rules of professional ethics by seeking the admission of evidence contrary to
MRE 408. Defendant’s claims are meritless.

        The trial court ordered defendant to make an advance to plaintiff to help plaintiff pay her
attorney fees during litigation of the divorce. Accordingly, it is unclear how plaintiff’s lawyer
could have provided an itemized billing for services not yet rendered. In any event, the record
suggests that as of the trial date defendant still had not complied with the order to pay. MCR
3.206(D)(1). Moreover, the trial court specifically addressed the issue of attorney fees at trial and
found that, not only did plaintiff not have the ability to pay her attorney fees, but also that
defendant’s misconduct warranted an award. MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a), (b). The court then instructed
plaintiff’s lawyer to file an itemized bill with the court and to serve that bill on defendant. The
trial court then held a hearing in June 2022 and entered an order awarding plaintiff more than
$21,000 in attorney fees after complying with the steps outlined in Pirgu v United Servs Auto
Ass’n, 499 Mich 269; 884 NW2d 257 (2016).1 Consequently, any alleged error in the original

1
 Defendant appealed that award, but this Court dismissed that appeal for want of progress. See
Jaiyeola v Jaiyeola, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 19, 2023 (Docket
No. 365443).

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award was harmless because the trial court corrected the award to reflect plaintiff’s actual
reasonable attorney fees for the entire litigation after trial. See MCR 2.613(A).

                                    F. PROPERTY DIVISION

        Defendant next challenges the trial court’s division of property. He claims that the trial
court erred when it found that the two lots in Nigeria were marital property. Specifically, he claims
that he purchased the properties with money that belonged to him alone. He makes a similar
assertion about the furniture from the apartment in Michigan. Plaintiff testified at trial and
suggested that the lots and furniture were marital property subject to division. There was no
evidence to contradict her. Accordingly, defendant has not shown that the trial court clearly erred
when it found that the lots and furniture were marital property subject to division. See Loutts, 298
Mich App at 31-32.

        Defendant also states that the trial court should not have awarded plaintiff any portion of
his signing bonus because—according to him—she is undeserving of the funds. In support of this
claim of error, defendant restates his litany of complaints about plaintiff as a spouse. By failing to
offer any meaningful analysis of the law and facts, defendant abandoned this claim of error. See
Mitcham, 355 Mich at 203.

        He next argues that the trial court erred when it equalized the value of the parties’ vehicles.
He reasons that the court should not have awarded plaintiff $1,000 to offset the disparity in the
value of their vehicles because he spent money on the vehicle ultimately awarded to plaintiff.
Defendant’s argument has nothing to do with the value of the two vehicles awarded to the parties
and whether one was worth more than the other. Defendant abandoned this claim also by failing
to offer any meaningful discussion of the law and facts applicable to a property division. See id.

        Additionally, defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it awarded plaintiff
$1,205 to equalize their tax returns. Defendant maintains that the parties were not married in 2001,
so plaintiff would not be entitled to any portion of that tax return. His argument hinges on an
obvious typo in the judgment of divorce. The trial court found that defendant kept a larger portion
of the marital tax return from 2021—not 2001—and found that defendant should pay $1,205 to
plaintiff to equalize the returns. Defendant does not contest the amount of that equalizing payment;
rather he relies solely on the typo in the judgment of divorce to argue that the court had no authority
to equalize a tax return from 2001. Any error in the identification of the relevant date, however,
does not warrant changing the amount of the equalization found by the trial court. See MCR
2.613(A).

                              G. JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION

        For his final claim of error, defendant argues that the trial judge should have been
disqualified for bias or prejudice. Defendant notes that he moved to disqualify the trial judge, but
both the trial judge and the circuit court’s chief judge denied his request. Nevertheless, he asserts
that the trial judge must have been biased against him. In support of his claim, he refers to his
claim that the trial court deprived him of due process and relied on plaintiff’s attorney to draft the
judgment of divorce.

                                                 -12-
        As already discussed, defendant has not shown that he was deprived of due process at any
point during the litigation. It was also entirely proper for the trial court to instruct plaintiff’s lawyer
to draft a judgment of divorce in accord with the court’s rulings from the bench. See
MCR 3.211(F). Moreover, even if the trial court had erred in its application of procedures or the
court rules, those errors would not establish grounds for disqualifying the trial judge. See In re
MKK, 286 Mich App 546, 566-567; 781 NW2d 132 (2009). The record showed that the trial judge
treated defendant with respect throughout the proceedings and showed remarkable restraint when
dealing with his misuse of motion practice and his bullying tactics.

                                         VII. CONCLUSION

        After careful review of all defendant’s claims of error, we conclude that defendant has not
identified any errors that warrant relief.

        Affirmed. As the prevailing party, plaintiff may tax her costs. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                                 /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                                 /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                                 /s/ Noah P. Hood

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