Court Opinion

ID: 9590271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:53:21.440241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:06.028924
License: Public Domain

Opinion
BENTON, J.
The question presented in this appeal is whether the commission erred in concluding that the evidence did not establish an injury by accident arising out of employment.
The testimony by Merrill J. Kemp established that he was working on a trestle thirty feet above the ground. Before attempting to remove a blanket covering a concrete column, Kemp crawled over the top of the column and bent down to hook his lanyard to the safety belt. He described the occurrence as follows:
I reached down and I hooked [a cable] and I came across and I reached fully down, and then I started feeling a numb*362ness in my right hand. . . . When I reached down to hook up I started to go down the side and at that point in time was when it started. . . .
Upon this testimony and the medical evidence the deputy commissioner found that Kemp suffered an injury by accident that aggravated a pre-existing physical condition. However, the commission, with a dissent, citing Richmond Memorial Hospital v. Crane, 222 Va. 283, 278 S.E.2d 877 (1981), reversed the deputy commissioner and held that Kemp was not exerting himself and thus failed to establish an accident arising out of employment. We reverse.
“[I]n order to show that he has suffered an ‘injury by accident’ arising out of ordinary exertion, a claimant must prove an ‘identifiable incident that occurs at some reasonably definite time,’ which is the cause of ‘an obvious sudden mechanical or structural change in the body.’ ” Lane Co. v. Saunders, 229 Va. 196, 199, 326 S.E.2d 702, 703 (1985)(quoting VEPCO v. Cogbill, 223 Va. 354, 356, 288 S.E.2d 485, 486 (1982)); see also Bradley v. Philip Morris, U.S.A., 1 Va. App. 141, 144, 336 S.E.2d 515, 516 (1985). There is no dispute concerning the existence of the identifiable incident and sudden mechanical or structural change in the body. The issue to be resolved is whether the evidence established a causal connection between the incident and the bodily change.
The commission erred in relying on Crane to support its conclusion that an injury by accident was not proved. The factual circumstances of this case are not sufficiently similar to Crane to justify invoking its legal principles. In Crane, the claimant was taking an uneventful walk “along a level, clean, unobstructed and well-lighted corridor,” 222 Va. at 285-86, 278 S.E.2d at 879, when she “felt something snap” in her right leg. Id. at 284, 278 S.E.2d at 878. “Nothing in her work environment contributed to her injury.” Id. at 286, 278 S.E.2d at 878.
In contrast, Kemp was working thirty feet above the ground in a fully extended position as he reached down to attach his lanyard to a safety line and first felt a numbness in his hand. The evidence is definite and undisputed that Kemp was performing a work-related task when the injury occurred. Moreover, the deputy commissioner had the only opportunity to observe Kemp and Kemp’s depiction of how the incident occurred. The factual situation of *363this case was one from which the deputy commissioner concluded and “from which the rational mind could conclude that the work environment was to some degree a contributing cause of the injury.” Id. at 286, 278 S.E.2d at 879; see also Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hosey, 208 Va. 568, 571, 159 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1968). The cause and eifect relationship between Kemp’s job related task and the immediate onset of symptoms is apparent.
“A risk is incidental to the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what the employee has to do in fulfilling his contract of service.” Hosey, 208 Va. at 572, 159 S.E.2d at 635; see also Johnson v. Chesterfield County, 5 Va. App. 15, 359 S.E.2d 833 (1987). “To constitute injury by accident it is not necessary that there should be an extraordinary occurrance in or about the work engaged in.” Derby v. Swift & Co., 188 Va. 336, 344, 49 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1948). The evidence is sufficient to establish an injury by accident “even though the degree of exertion is usual and ordinary and ‘the workman had some predisposing physical weakness.’ ” Id. at 343, 49 S.E.2d at 420 (quoting Guay v. Brown Co., 83 N.H. 392, 395, 142 A. 697, 699 (1928)).
The commission made no finding that contradicted the deputy commissioner’s finding that the incident described by Kemp aggravated his preexisting condition. Dr. Foer’s medical reports, cited in the commission decision, unequivocally established that Kemp’s muscle strain injury was the result of an aggravation of his preexisting condition (a neurovascular compression syndrome of the thoracic outlet). “When an injury sustained in an industrial accident accelerates or aggravates a preexisting condition . . . disability resulting therefrom is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Ohio Valley Construction Co. v. Jackson, 230 Va. 56, 58, 334 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1985); see also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Money, 174 Va. 50, 55-56, 4 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1939); Russell Loungewear v. Gray, 2 Va. App. 90, 95, 341 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1986). “ ‘[T]he employer takes the employee as he is and if the employee is suffering some physical infirmity, which is aggravated by an industrial accident, the employer is responsible for the end result of such accident.’ ” McDaniel v. Colonial Mechanical Corp., 3 Va. App. 408, 414, 350 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1986)(quoting Hawkins v. Lane Co., 49 O.I.C. 144, 147 (1967)). Even if the accident would not have been sufficient to cause the injury in the absence of a preexisting disease, that fact *364will not provide the employer with a defense. Pendleton v. Flippo Construction Co., 1 Va. App. 381, 384, 339 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1986). Once exertion from employment is shown to have resulted in sudden, obvious injury to the employee, the disability is compensable, regardless of a predisposing physical weakness or condition. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. McGlothlin, 2 Va. App. 294, 298, 343 S.E.2d 94, 96-97 (1986).
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the commission and remand this appeal for entry of an award consistent with the holding herein.

Reversed and remanded.

Coleman, J., concurred.