Court Opinion

ID: 9634294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:14.984742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:00.411530
License: Public Domain

RUIZ, Associate Judge.
On March 18,1994, Clyde Brooks obtained his first criminal conviction when a Superior Court judge presiding in landlord-tenant *217court summarily held him in contempt because of his conduct and demeanor in court. Prior to adjudicating Mr. Brooks guilty and sentencing him to ten days in jail, the trial court neither appointed Mr. Brooks a lawyer, advised him of any pending charges, afforded him an opportunity to present a defense, nor permitted him to allocute in mitigation of his sentence. This procedure, we hold, did not comport with this court’s interpretation of the District of Columbia Superior Court rules governing contempt proceedings. We also find that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction for contempt.
I. The Faots
On March 15, 1994, Mr. Brooks and Carol Thomas were ordered to pay the rent on their apartment into a court registry pursuant to their landlord’s action for eviction in Home Realty, Inc. v. Carol Thomas and Clyde Brooks, Sr., landlord and tenant matter no. LT-7057-94. The first payment was due just three days later, on March 18,1994, with monthly payments due on the fifth of each month thereafter. Having inadequate funds, Mr. Brooks and Ms. Thomas sought assistance from the D.C. Law Students in Court program, which directed them to various charities which, in turn, given at least two weeks’ notice, might have been able to help the couple make its rent payments.
By March 18, 1994, it was apparent that the couple would need to seek an enlargement of time in which to make the payment into the court registry. Appearing in court without a lawyer, the couple first consulted with Ann Marie Hay, a supervisor at the D.C. Law Students in Court program. Responding to the couple’s concern about the payment deadline, Ms. Hay approached the attorney for the landlord, who apparently acknowledged the tenants’ request for an enlargement of time but did not consent to it. Thereafter, the matter was called, and following Mr. Brooks’s explanation of the couple’s current difficulties, the landlord’s attorney stated in open court that the landlord opposed any extension of the rent payment deadline.
Mr. Brooks believed, either through his own unfamiliarity with legal proceedings or by the inadvertent indications of Ms. Hay, that the landlord would agree to the enlargement of time. The transcript suggests that as the landlord’s attorney was announcing his position, Mr. Brooks undertook some gesticulation which caused the trial judge to interrupt the landlord’s attorney for the purpose of reminding Mr. Brooks, “Sir!_ You’re in a court of law. We’re courteous to each other.” Mr. Brooks voiced his acquiescence with the court’s directive to be courteous, but responded that he “didn’t say anything to” the landlord’s attorney. Once the landlord’s attorney was finished setting out his opposition to the additional time, the trial judge stated that she would hear from Mr. Brooks “very briefly” on the issue.
Mr. Brooks was clearly upset about what he felt had been the landlord’s unexpected reversal. Mr. Brooks twice tided to start a response, but was interrupted each time by the judge’s admonition to compose himself and to be calm. After promising that he had calmed down, Mr. Brooks explained his understanding that the landlord had consented to an extension. At the invitation of the court, Ms. Hay stated that Mr. Brooks misunderstood the situation and that she had not told him that the landlord’s attorney would agree to his motion.1 Mr. Brooks, at this point, believed that the landlord’s attorney had “tricked” him into thinking the extension was unopposed, and said as much by exclaiming, “That was a trick!” This led the judge to announce she would pass the case, in order to allow Mr. Brooks “to calm down.”
When the case was recalled following the disposition of another matter, Mr. Brooks twice apologized for his agitation, an apology which the judge appeared to accept. The trial judge then granted the couple’s request for an enlargement of time, and directed a warning to Mr. Brooks that if he were to return to court “with that kind of attitude, *218this Court will hold you in contempt and I will throw you into jail.” Mr. Brooks was denied any other opportunity to speak in the proceedings, except to thank the court for its ruling.
As he was leaving the courtroom and a new case was being called, the judge overheard Mr. Brooks say that the landlord’s management “need[s] to fix some of that shit in that apartment.” At this comment, the judge turned from the proceedings she was conducting and announced to Mr. Brooks that “it’s clear you don’t understand.” Mr. Brooks obliquely responded “I understood, Your Honor. You have no say so. That’s what I understand.” Mr. Brooks was then stopped as he was leaving the courtroom, and a United States Marshal was called. The trial judge, within two minutes, held Mr. Brooks in contempt of court and sentenced him to ten days in jail. The entire contempt proceeding follows:
THE COURT: Mr. Brooks, please state your name.
MR. BROOKS: Clyde Edward Brooks, Sr., Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very well. And, our record will reflect that Ms. Thomas is present. This does not concern Ms. Thomas. The Court had Mr. • Brooks before her on two occasions, just about three occasions, this morning. The Court spoke with Mr. Brooks with respect to his conduct in the courtroom. The Court told Mr. Brooks that she would speak to him about the case in a calm manner. The Court warned Mr. Brooks that his demeanor was not proper for these proceeds [sic]. The Court had to call Mr. Brooks back into the courtroom because he used offensive and derogatory language in the courtroom. The Court explained to that Mr. Brooks, that was not appropriate. Mr. Brooks apologized to the Court. The Court made her ruling, in Mr. Brooks’ favor, that was opposed by the plaintiff. Mr. Brooks left the courtroom and, again, used derogatory language. Sir, don’t say anything! The Court noted that the Court had to call this matter three times. It has certainly prevented the administration of justice. Others have had to sit in this courtroom to wait for their cases to be called. The Court has to take immediate action. And, if she doesn’t take immediate action, this calendar will not move. The Court is gonna summarily hold Mr. Brooks in contempt of court. He will be required to serve ten days in jail. You may take him, Marshal.
MR. BROOKS: Oh, man!
[LANDLORD’S ATTORNEY]: Thank you, Your Honor.
MS. THOMAS: So—
THE CLERK: You’re free to leave.
MS. THOMAS: Okay.
Four days after the hearing, the trial judge issued an Order of Contempt (appended hereto) in which she set forth the certification of facts upon which she relied to base her finding of contempt of court. Mr. Brooks petitioned both the trial court and this court on an emergency basis for a stay of the judge’s order of commitment pending an appeal of his conviction.2 Both requests were denied. Mr. Brooks then filed with this court a new emergency motion for release pending appeal, or in the alternative for rehearing en banc of his1 motion for a stay. This court denied both motions on the day they were filed.
For reasons that follow, we hold that the decision to employ a summary contempt proceeding under Rule 42(a) was inappropriate under the circumstances of this ease and that the contempt conviction is substantively deficient, in that the elements of criminal contempt were not met. We first identify the standard of our review. Second, we address the propriety of employing a summary contempt procedure in this case. Finally, we will turn to the question whether the evidence on the record supports Mr. Brooks’s conviction.
*219II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary criminal contempt proceedings in which the trial judge was at once prosecutor, fact finder, and sole witness, require this court to undertake de novo review.3 See In re Kraut, 580 A.2d 1305, 1311 (D.C.1990) (noting that “because of the inherent danger in one person’s performing the potentially conflicting roles of prosecutor, judge, and jury,” this court needs a clear record “on which to review [a judgej’s performance”); In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416, 422, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 371, 112 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990) (“The provision for de novo appellate review of summary contempt convictions is a fail-safe mechanism for assuring that the contempt power is not abused.”). This is the standard we apply in evaluating the contempt proceedings against due process requirements.
We must also determine whether the trial court properly proceeded under District of Columbia Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a), governing summary contempt proceedings, or should have proceeded under Rule 42(b), governing nonsummary contempt proceedings. The government states, without support from this court’s precedents, that a trial court’s decision that summary procedures were necessary is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See In re Holloway, 302 U.S.App. D.C. 12, 18, 995 F.2d 1080, 1088 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1030, 114 S.Ct. 1537, 128 L.Ed.2d 190 (1994). Our decisions, however, have clearly and consistently invoked a full and independent review of the record, because the applicability of particular court rules is a legal and not a factual or discretionary question. See, e.g., Bethard v. District of Columbia, 650 A.2d 651, 654-55 (D.C.1994); McCormick v. United States, 635 A.2d 347, 348-51 (D.C.1993); Swisher v. United States, 572 A.2d 85, 90-94 (D.C.1990); In re Rosen, 315 A.2d 151, 152-53 (D.C.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 964, 95 S.Ct. 224, 42 L.Ed.2d 178 (1974).4
Finally, we consider whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for criminal contempt. This inquiry entails questions of fact and questions of law. The trial court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless “shown to be without eviden-tiary support or plainly wrong.” Bethard, supra, 650 A.2d at 654. The question whether those acts constitute the crime of contempt, however, is a question of law that we independently review. See In re Gorfkle, 444 A.2d 934, 940 (D.C.1982) (judging appellant’s actions to be noncontumacious without deference to the trial court’s determination of that issue). “We review an appellant’s contemptuous acts ‘in fight of the surrounding circumstances,’ ” Bethard, supra, 650 A.2d at 653 (quoting In re Ellis, 264 A.2d 300, 301 (D.C.1970)), gleaning those circumstances from the trial transcript, the contemporaneous recording of the proceedings, and the *220trial court’s Rule 42(a) certification. In re Brown, 320 A.2d 92, 92-95 (D.C.1974) (independently reviewing the record); In re Gates, 248 A.2d 671, 672-74 (D.C.1968) (employing both the transcript and the Rule 42(a) certification, the latter only to the extent uncontested by the appellant); see also Warrick v. United States, 528 A.2d 438, 443-44 (D.C.1987) (Warrick I) (reversing conviction where trial court inadequately supplemented the record).5
This plenary review allows this court to consider on the one hand, whether the trial court’s account of the disruptions Mr. Brooks allegedly created is supported by the record, and on the other hand, whether even if true, the facts as certified by the trial court met the elements of criminal contempt. We review the court’s certification to determine whether (1) the record supports each finding of fact in the certification, and (2) the supported facts in the certification are sufficient to constitute criminal contempt. Kraut, supra, 580 A.2d at 1311-12, 1313-14; Warrick I, supra, 528 A.2d at 443-44. We may not uphold a conviction of criminal contempt on grounds other than those cited by the trial court in its contempt certification. Kraut, supra, 580 A.2d at 1313-14. We will also reverse a conviction for contempt if we find that there is not adequate record support for any certified fact, if that fact was part of an aggregate of facts upon which the trial judge based his or her contempt ruling. See, e.g., In re L.G., 639 A.2d 603, 606-07 (D.C.1994); Kraut, supra, 580 A.2d at 1313-14. This is so even where individual acts for which there was evidentiary support could have independently sustained a contempt conviction, but the trial court relied on the aggregate in citing the individual for contempt. L.G., supra, 639 A.2d at 606-07.
III. The Contempt Power
The ability of trial judges to hold individuals in contempt of court is well-established and fundamental to an orderly system of justice. See generally Bloom, v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202-06, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1482-84, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 390, 394, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303, 9 S.Ct. 77, 79, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888); see also Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 95 (Schwelb, J., concurring). “ ‘The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court,’ ” not deriving from statute, but arising from the need to enforce compliance with the administration of the law. Terry, supra, 128 U.S. at 303, 9 S.Ct. at 79 (quoting In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 257 (1859)). Rule 42 governs contempt proceedings in D.C. Superior Court; Rule 42(a) provides for summary contempt proceedings and Rule 42(b) provides for nonsummary contempt proceedings.
Where the affront to the court is a direct and visible one, Rule 42(a) allows a judge to punish a contemnor summarily “if the judge certifies that the judge saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the Court.” Direct contempt, which is an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, was traditionally punishable without the ordinary dictates of due process accorded those charged with other crimes. “There is a long history upholding summary adjudication including imprisonment for con-tempts ‘committed in the face of the court.’ ” Pitts v. State, 421 A.2d 901, 905 (Del.1980) *221(quoting 2 G. Sharswood, Blackstone’s Commentaries, Book IV, ch. 20, p. 286 (1895) and citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267-72, 68 S.Ct. 499, 504-07, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); Cooke, supra, 267 U.S. at 534-35, 45 S.Ct. at 394; Terry, supra, 128 U.S. at 291-96, 9 5.Ct. at 78 (additional citations omitted)). It is generally accepted that summary contempt is a necessary and proper course to preserve the order essential to the functioning of the courts. Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 95 (Schwelb, J., concurring). “The pith of this rather extraordinary power to punish without the formalities required by the Bill of Rights for the prosecution of ... crimes generally, is that the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing with obstructions to it.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954).6
It is a long-settled principle that “ ‘[s]ummary punishment always, and rightly, is regarded with disfavor.’ ” Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 498, 94 S.Ct. at 2703 (quoting Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8, 72 S.Ct. 451, 454, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952) (alteration in original)). Observing this principle, the United States Supreme Court established a requirement restricting the application of Rule 42(a) that supplements the requirement that the judge certify that she saw or heard the contumacious act and that it was committed in her presence: the conduct complained of must be “so outrageous and disruptive” that it threatens the conduct of business in the courtroom and will not abate without immediate action. See McCormick, supra, 635 A.2d at 348, 350 (citing Offutt, supra, 348 U.S. at 14, 75 S.Ct. at 13); Cooke, supra, 267 U.S. at 534, 45 S.Ct. at 394; Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 96 (Schwelb, J., concurring). Summary contempt should be directed only at conduct that “pose[s] such an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court, and such a flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge that, were it not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority would follow.” Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 91 (citing Cooke, supra, 267 U.S. at 536, 45 S.Ct. at 394-95). In essence, summary contempt under Rule 42(a) is restricted to those situations where, quite literally, the court’s business cannot proceed unless punishment is imposed on a party whose contumacious acts are actively preventing the administration of justice. McCormick, supra, 635 A.2d at 350. Summary proceedings under Rule 42(a) are thus “reserved for ‘exceptional circumstances,’ ” id. (citation omitted), and “should be exercised sparingly.” War-rick I, supra, 528 A.2d at 443.
As the court’s certification states, at the time that Mr. Brooks made the statement that finally led the court to hold him in contempt, his case was over, and Mr. Brooks was leaving or had already left the courtroom. See McCormick, supra, 635 A.2d at 350 (reversing Rule 42(a) conviction where contumacious act occurred as sentencing hearing was concluded); Warrick I, supra, 528 A.2d at 443 (same). Mr. Brooks’s departure disrupted no proceedings — indeed, the court heard and disposed of another L & T case prior to tending to the allegedly emergent Brooks contempt matter. See Taylor v. Hayes, supra, 418 U.S. at 498-99, 94 S.Ct. at 2703 (noting that the assertion that summary contempt was necessary “to preserve order and enable [the court] to proceed with its business” is difficult to sustain where trial court delayed summary contempt proceeding until the conclusion of the allegedly disrupted trial) (alteration in original).
Mr. Brooks’s conduct, primarily a comment made incidental to and at the conclu*222sion of his L & T matter, was essentially different from conduct that impedes or addresses itself to an active proceeding. Compare Offutt, supra, 348 U.S. at 16-17 & nn. 2, 3, 75 S.Ct. at 14-15 & nn. 2, 3. Our cases upholding the use of summary contempt have consistently involved conduct that was so disruptive, or contrary to the court’s orders, that the proceedings in which the contemnor was supposed to participate could not move forward without the court imposing some form of punishment, usually a fine. See, e.g., In re (W. Edward) Thompson, 454 A.2d 1324, 1328 (D.C.1982) (upholding fines of $300 and $200 imposed for repeated violations of court’s restriction of the scope of trial evidence); In re (Raymond B.) Thompson, 419 A.2d 993, 995 (D.C.1980) (affirming in part and reversing in part three $100 fines for failing to appear in court); In re Gregory, 387 A.2d 720, 723 (D.C.1978) (upholding a $100 fine and a suspended sentence for failing to appear); In re Schaeffer, 370 A.2d 1362, 1363-64 (D.C.1977) (upholding $100 fine for failing to appear); Gates, supra, 248 A.2d at 677 (upholding two fines of $50 imposed for refusal to respond to questions court posed at arraignment); see also Jessup v. Clark, 490 F.2d 1068, 1071 (3d Cir.1973) (“[N]eed of immediate action to restore order to an ongoing proceeding is a prerequisite, both constitutionally and under Rule 42(a), to use of the summary contempt power.”).7 Because there was no actual disruption to his own case or to any other case pending in L & T court occasioned by Mr. Brooks’s statement as he was leaving the courtroom, Mr. Brooks’s case did not present any exceptional circumstances warranting the use of summary contempt under Rule 42(a).
The summary contempt rule is intended to preserve the ability of the court to conduct its business, Warrick I, supra, 528 A.2d at 443, and should be invoked only where a party has interfered with judges’ “efforts to maintain an orderly system of justice and to keep abreast of their calendars.” Rosen, supra, 315 A.2d at 153; Gates, supra, 248 A.2d at 677. The trial court in this case, apparently recognizing the requirement that an alleged contemnor being prosecuted under Rule 42(a) actively disrupt ongoing proceedings, characterized Mr. Brooks’s conduct as interfering with the court’s calendar. See supra at [218] (“And, if [the court] doesn’t take immediate action, this calendar will not move.”) This assertion, however, is clearly erroneous. Like the appellant in Warrick I, whose summary contempt conviction we reversed, Mr. Brooks’s alleged contumacious act occurred after the proceedings involving his case, “to all intents and purposes, had already ended.” 528 A.2d at 443. Not only was Mr. Brooks no longer participating in any proceedings before the court when the court decided to hold him in contempt; the judge continued to hear other L & T matters both before and after he made the remark that prompted the judge to hold him in contempt. Under these circumstances, we hold that whatever disruption Mr. Brooks might have caused, did not rise to the level of “exceptional circumstances” that would justify using the generally disfavored summary contempt procedure.
Following Supreme Court guidance, this court has required that a judge offended by an act perceived as contumacious explore and reject all less restrictive alternatives to summary contempt prior to proceeding under Rule 42(a). Bethard, supra, 650 A.2d at 655 n. 12; Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 94; see also United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1808, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975) (“[O]nly the ‘least possible power adequate to the end proposed’ should be used in contempt cases.”) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)). The government states that the trial court did in fact seek alternatives to summary contempt, by telling Mr. Brooks that he should collect himself and “stopping the proceedings to allow” him to do so. We find the government’s reasoning on this point unpersuasive.
*223Although warning a putative eon-temnor not to commit the acts later complained of may sometimes be an effective way for a trial judge to try to prevent, or diminish, the occurrence of the act itself, it does not meet this court’s repeated requirement that, when faced with contumacious behavior that has already occurred, trial judges contemplating holding the actor in contempt must “explore alternatives to summarily holding [an individual] in contempt.” McCormick, supra, 635 A.2d at 349; see also Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 94. What we intended by that directive is that trial courts faced with the necessity to institute contempt proceedings, after the commission of the offensive act, resort to the summary contempt procedures of Rule 42(a) only when the procedures of Rule 42(b) are insufficiently swift and forceful to alleviate an urgent need for the restoration of court order so that the court’s business may continue. McCormick, supra, 635 A.2d at 349-50. In this case, proceedings under Rule 42(b) would have preserved the court’s effective operations while protecting Mr. Brooks’s essential rights under the Due Process Clause. Because Mi'. Brooks was no longer participating in or disrupting proceedings when he made what was to be his final statement, he was entitled to show cause, under Rule 42(b), why he should not be held in contempt with the full panoply of rights accorded ordinary putative contemnors. Id. at 348, 350-51. Because procedures pursuant to Rule 42(b), including immediate in-court issuance of an order to show cause at a later hearing, would have more than adequately vindicated the court’s authority in this case, the judge erred in proceeding to summary contempt under Rule 42(a).
IV. Suffioiency of the Evidenoe
The error in proceeding under summary contempt would normally require a remand. We decline to remand this ease, however because we hold that the evidence was insufficient that Mr. Brooks acted contumaciously. In order to convict, the trial court must conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alleged contemnor committed a contumacious act with a wrongful state of mind. Gorfkle, supra, 444 A.2d at 939. There remains at this juncture a question whether Mr. Brooks violated an order of the court— explicit or implicit — or committed another contumacious act. Additionally, there is a substantial doubt whether Mr. Brooks had the state of mind required for the conviction to stand.
Our finding that the evidence was insufficient has two bases. First, the certification provided by the trial court is insufficient as a matter of law to conclude that Mr. Brooks committed the acts in question with the requisite mens rea. Second, based on our review of the evidence in this case we conclude that some of the facts contained in the certification that were relied upon by the trial court are not supported by the record. L.G., supra, 639 A.2d at 605-07.
To be convicted of criminal contempt under D.C.Code § 11-944 (1995), a defendant must engage in either willful disobedience of a court order causing an obstruction of justice, (W. Edward) Thompson, supra, 454 A.2d at 1326 (citations omitted), or contemptuous conduct committed in the presence of the court, Warrick v. U.S., 528 A.2d 438, 443 (D.C.1987). This court has reversed convictions of contempt where, as here, the contemnors’ actions could not adequately be considered willful or with the intent to disrespect the court. See, e.g., Kraut, supra, 580 A.2d at 1314; Gorfkle, supra, 444 A.2d at 941; In re Schwartz, 391 A.2d 278, 281 (D.C.1978); In re Brown, 320 A.2d 92, 94-95 (D.C.1974); see also Sykes v. United States, 144 U.S.App. D.C. 53, 55, 444 F.2d 928, 930 (D.C.Cir.1971). Assuming for the moment that the facts found in the court’s Rule 42(a) certification are supportable by the evidence, they are not sufficient to constitute contempt of court. Cf. Offutt, supra, 348 U.S. at 14, 75 S.Ct. at 13 (noting that the summary contempt power “entrusted to a judge [should be] wholly unrelated to his personal sensibilities, be they tender or rugged”).
First, Mr. Brooks did not violate an order of the court. In its certification reciting the instances of Mr. Brooks’s alleged misconduct, the trial court first states that Mr. Brooks undertook to “lean over [the landlord’s attor*224ney] and move his hands in a threatening manner.” While the exact interpretation of that assertion by the court is discussed more fully in the following paragraphs, it cannot be controverted that at the time that he allegedly engaged in this gesticulation, Mr. Brooks had been warned of nothing. See L.G., supra, 689 A.2d at 606 n. 6 (refusing to endorse trial court’s conclusion that first unwarned act of misconduct in a succession of similar warned acts can constitute violation of a court order); (Raymond B.) Thompson, supra, 419 A.2d at 996 (“One cannot be contemptuous of a court order if he has no knowledge of it.”). Focussing, then, on the period following the court’s first warning “to calm down,” the trial court’s essential claim is that Mr\ Brooks failed to conduct himself with sufficient calm. The court's directive to be calm, however, is vague, and a failure to conform therewith raises serious questions of fairness. Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (striking the application of a statute on grounds of unconstitutional vagueness). Unlike a court’s admonition to appear for court, Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 86-87, return to court, Brown, supra, 320 A.2d at 93, stop talking, Irby, supra, 342 A.2d at 40, avoid certain subject matter on direct examination or in argument, (W. Edward) Thompson, supra, 454 A.2d at 1325-26, file a particular pleading, Kraut, supra, 580 A.2d at 1307-08, stop banging a fist on counsel table, Ellis, supra, 264 A.2d at 302, or respond to a question asked, Gates, supra, 248 A.2d at 672-74, the trial judge’s directive to Mr. Brooks that he should calm down and that he should be courteous, presumably during the pendency of his court proceeding, insufficiently put him on notice that his expression of anger, which took place as he was exiting the well of the court, could result in a period of incarceration. The trial court’s admonition to Mr. Brooks lacked the clarity and certainty that are required of a court order before this court can agree that Mr. Brooks willfully violated it. Bethard, supra, 650 A.2d at 653-54.
Second, assuming that even if there was no violation of an express court order, Mr. Brooks’ conduct nonetheless was disrespectful of the court or disrupted its proceedings, the court’s certification is legally insufficient because it fails to make any finding of fact regarding the required element of willfulness. Bethard, supra, 650 A.2d at 653-54 (“We note that the court, in its Order of Contempt, see Appendix, does not attribute willfulness to any of appellant’s disruptive behavior in the courtroom while he awaited the calling of his case.”). The trial court never found that Mr. Brooks intended to disrespect the court, violate an order, or disrupt the proceedings in which he was participating. Gorfkle, supra, 444 A.2d at 940; Schwartz, supra, 391 A.2d at 282. Under the circumstances of this case, the requisite intent cannot be fairly inferred. Bethard, supra, 650 A.2d at 654; In re Foshee, 358 A.2d 332, 334 (D.C.1976).
According to the trial court, Mr. Brooks allegedly spoke in a “loud manner” when responding to the court, and used “profanity and inflammatory language” as he was leaving the courtroom. Neither of these alleged infractions is sufficient to suggest the necessary mens rea. There is no indication that Mr. Brooks intended to speak or thought he was speaking in a loud manner or knew that speaking in a loud manner alone would violate the court’s order to be courteous or otherwise show disrespect for the court. Although Mr. Brooks was clearly agitated during the proceedings, when given the opportunity to speak, Mr. Brooks apologized— “profusely,” according to the trial court — for his inability to contain himself fully. Mr. Brooks used no words in the course of his presentation that could be construed “in light of the surrounding circumstances” as disrespectful. Bethard, supra, 650 A.2d at 653 (quoting Ellis, supra, 264 A.2d at 301). The inflammatory language complained of was used exclusively when his case was recessed. There is no evidence in the court’s certification that supports the conclusion that Mr. Brooks knew or had reason to know that comments made after the conclusion of his proceedings could violate the court’s admonition that the parties ought to be calm and courteous to each other while in a court of law.
The trial court also failed to indicate that Mr. Brooks intended to direct any of his *225contumacious comments to the court or, with the exception of the hand gestures, even to the opposing party. “[T]he record as it appears before us is devoid of evidence that [the appellant’s] comment showed such ‘flagrant disrespect for the court’ as to merit a conviction for criminal contempt.” Warrick 1, supra, 528 A.2d at 444 (quoting Schwartz, supra, 391 A.2d at 282) (reversing conviction where the appellant stated to the judge after sentencing that “[t]he day will come for your judgment”). Mr. Brooks’s comment, referring to the landlord and his representatives in the third person, indicates that Mr. Brooks’s anger was being expressed either to Ms. Thomas, his wife, or to Ms. Hay, the supervisor at the Law Students in Court program whose representations had apparently upset him. Mr. Brooks thus limited his outbursts to times when he might have thought his conduct fell outside the court’s jurisdiction. Mr. Brooks had no reason to want his pi’oceedings disrupted, in that it was he who had initiated them by seeking the enlargement of time. There is no indication that he intended to disrupt other proceedings being heai’d in L & T court that day. From the facts described in the court’s certification, we cannot say with fair assurance that any evidence exists upon which a reasonable mind could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Brooks had the requisite “wrongful state of mind.” Gorfkle, supra, 444 A.2d at 939.
In addition to determining that the trial court’s certification was legally insufficient to support a conviction of contempt, we are concerned that certain facts in the certification are not supported by the evidence in the record.8
In particular, the trial court’s finding that Mr. Brooks engaged in threatening hand motions, first articulated in the written certification produced some four days after the incident, did not state how Mr. Brooks’s hand gestures threatened the landlord’s attorney, or what the gestures appeared to convey, thereby rendering the conduct ambiguous from its description. McCormick, supra, 635 A.2d at 351; see also Daniels, supra, 570 A.2d at 423 (“The need for reliability was heightened in this case, because the [contem-nor’s] objectionable conduct was nonverbal, and the record does not so easily lend itself to validating the judge’s factual findings.”). There is no evidence in the record that the landlord’s attorney felt threatened, or even noticed, the hand gesture in question.
This court has held with reference to an ambiguous statement that it is the obligation of the trial court, through its Rule 42(a) certification, to “demonstrate, by describing [the appellant’s] tone of voice or accompanying conduct, for example, that the comment was indeed threatening or sinister.” Warned I, supra, 528 A.2d at 444; McCormick, supra, 635 A.2d at 351. The trial court failed to meet this requirement with respect to the hand gesture. From the available transcript, we are unable to discern support for the court’s concluso’ry description of Mr. Brooks’s gesticulation. We thus conclude as a legal matter that the court’s finding of a threatening hand gesture “lacks evidentiary support.” L.G., supra, 639 A.2d at 606.
It is well-established that where this court is unable to find adequate support for some of the facts relied upon in a trial judge’s Rule 42(a) certification, the conviction cannot stand regardless of whether the facts that are supported in the record could independently satisfy the elements of contempt. Id. at 606-07; Kraut, supra, 580 A.2d at 1313-14 (quoting Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 1230, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974) (per curiam) (the court's question on review “is not upon what evidence the trial judge could find petitioner guilty but upon what evidence the trial judge did find petitioner guilty”)). This court has never addressed, and does not now, whether the use of profanity alone, assuming the.neces*226sary intent and obstruction of justice, can meet the elements of contempt.9 L.G., supra, 689 A.2d at 606 n. 5 (citations omitted). Mr. Brooks does not and could not contest that he used profanity on March 18. Nevertheless, because the trial court based its certification on several other facts, in order for the contempt conviction to stand, all the facts must be supported by the evidence. In this case, they were not.
Considering the absence of a clear order proscribing Mr. Brooks’s behavior, and the lack of evidence to support either that Mr. Brooks intended to disrespect the court or the opposing party, we cannot say that in this case the trial court has provided adequate support for the conclusion that Mr. Brooks acted contumaciously. Thus, we reverse Mr. Brooks’s conviction without remand. Kraut, supra, 580 A.2d at 1313-14.
V. Conclusion
“Summary contempt, especially summary criminal contempt, is not a power lightly to be exercised.” United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 321, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1809, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring). This case does not represent the first time this court has had to reverse a summary contempt conviction after a sentence had already been served. See, e.g., Bethard, supra, 650 A.2d at 655. We expect that this opinion, read in conjunction with other recent cases such as McCormick, supra, provides clearer guidelines to assist judges in the decision whether to conduct contempt proceedings summarily, under Rule 42(a), or pursuant to the more traditional safeguards used in non-summary proceedings, pursuant to Rule 42(b). The risk that contemnors may be forced to serve their full sentences prior to obtaining full appellate review of their summary contempt convictions creates a great obligation on trial judges not to act precipitously in vindicating them authority. See Cooke, supra, 267 U.S. at 539, 45 S.Ct. at 396.
Mr. Brooks’s conviction is hereby

Reversed.

APPENDIX

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS BRANCH
United States of America v. Clyde Brooks, Sr.
SP 625-94

ORDER OF CONTEMPT

Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 42(a), “criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that she saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court.” This Order of Contempt so certifies and further complies with Criminal Rule 42(a).
On March 18, 1994, defendant Brooks appeared before the court in the matter of Home Realty, Inc. v. Carol Thomas and Clyde Brooks, Sr., L & T No. 7057-94. During proceedings in Case Number 7057-94, the court held the defendant in summary contempt of court for the following reasons:
1. Mr. Brooks was before the court requesting a two (2) week extension of time to make payment of a $200.00 Protective Order imposed by the Court on March 14, 1994.1 Mr. Brooks along with Ms. Thomas represented that they had been told by D.C. Law Students in Court that the plaintiff would agree to a two week continuance if the Court agreed to permit such a continuance.
*2272. The plaintiff, Home Realty, represented by Mr. David Lietz, voiced opposition to the defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time. During plaintiffs representations, the Court observed Mr. Brooks stand extremely close to Mr. Lietz, lean over him and move his hands in a threatening manner. Mr. Brooks [sic] entire demeanor was intimidating.
3. After observing the change in Mr. Brooks [sic] demeanor, the Court was forced to interrupt the representations of plaintiffs counsel in order to instruct Mr. Brooks to calm down. The Court instructed Mr. Brooks that he was in a court of law and that parties have to be courteous to one another.
4. The Court asked for representations by the supervisor of the D.C. Law Students in Court Program, Ms. Anne-Marie Hay.2 Ms. Hay indicated that she had spoken to Mr. Brooks and Ms. Thomas and that she had advised them to seek an extension of time to satisfy the Court’s protective order. Ms. Hay stated that she did not at any time tell Mr. Brooks and Ms. Thomas that plaintiffs counsel had agreed not to oppose a request for extension of time.
5. Upon hearing the representations made by Ms. Hay, Mr. Brooks became irate and started speaking in a loud manner. The court again reminded Mr. Brooks that he was in a Court of law and warned him that he must conduct himself accordingly. The Court told Mr. Brooks and the other parties that she would rule on the defendants’ motion but that she was going to briefly pass the matter in order to give Mr. Brooks an opportunity to calm down and compose himself.
6. As the parties were leaving the well of the Court, Mr. Brooks, speaking in an extremely loud tone and using profanity and inflammatory language, expressed his dissatisfaction with the representations made by Ms. Hay. The Court immediately halted the proceeding in progress and ordered Mr. Brooks and all parties involved in this case to return to the courtroom.
7. The case of Home Realty, Inc. v. Carol Thomas and Clyde Brooks, Sr., was promptly recalled and the Court reprimanded Mr. Brooks for his behavior. The Court told Mr. Brooks that his actions were contemptuous and that his conduct had interrupted the administration of justice. The Court, again, instructed Mr. Brooks to calm down.
8. Mr. Brooks profusely apologized to the Court for his behavior and indicated that he had calmed down and was ready to proceed. Plaintiffs counsel again expressed his opposition to an extension of time for defendants to satisfy the Court’s protective order.
9. The Court granted Mr. Brooks and Ms. Thomas’ Motion for an Extension of Time and ordered the parties to return to court on March 29, 1994. The Court warned Mr. Brooks that if he returned to court on March 29, 1994, with the same attitude and demeanor that the had displayed in the instant proceedings, the Court would hold him in contempt and sentence him to a period of incarceration. The Court then asked Mr. Brooks if he understood her warning. Mr. Brooks indicated that he did understand. The parties were excused and the courtroom clerk called the next matter on the judge’s calendar.
10. Again, as the parties were leaving the well of the court, Mr. Brooks speaking in a loud tone and using profanity and inflammatory language, expressed his dissatisfaction with the proceeding and with the conditions of the apartment in question. Mr. Brooks yelled out “they need to fix some of that shit in the apartment.”
11. The Court immediately halted its proceedings and called to Mr. Brooks. The Court told Mr. Brooks that he apparently did not understand her warning, to which Mr. Brooks replied, “Oh I understand your hon- or, you have no say so in this matter, that’s what I understand^”] Mr. Brooks then continued to walk out of the courtroom, at which point the Court instructed the courtroom *228clerk to call the U.S. Marshal Service. The U.S. Marshal Services responded to the courtroom and the matter of Home Realty v. Thomas and Brooks was recalled.
12. After making findings of fact as to the aforementioned incidents, the Court held Mr. Brooks in Contempt of Court. The Court found defendant’s conduct and demeanor to be an affront to the Court and to the administration of justice. The Court found that defendant’s conduct was such an affront to the Court that the Court had to interrupt its other proceedings on two occasions. Finally, the Court found that defendant’s conduct stopped the administration of justice with respect to his own case on at least three occasions.
The Court’s authority to hold a person in contempt is conferred upon it by 18 U.S.C. Section 402 and D.C.Code Section 11-944.
The aforementioned incidents unquestionably rose to the level of criminal contempt. The sentence imposed by the court was 10 days and entered of record and delivered to contemnor on March 18,1994.
In sum, given the nature of the defendant’s conduct, his demeanor in the courtroom throughout the day and his repeated disregard of the Court’s warnings, it is clear that defendant’s conduct was contemptuous and an affront to the Court and to the administration of justice,
THEREFORE, it is this 22nd day of March, 1994,
ORDERED, that the defendant be held in summary contempt of court and sentenced to a term of 10 days.
SO ORDERED.
/a/ Kaye K. Christian
Kaye K. Christian
Associate Judge
(Signed in Chambers)

. Ms. Hay did add that Mr. Brooks and Ms. Thomas would be consulting more fully with student counsel on the eviction matter the following Monday, but that an attorney-client conference on this day had not been possible because Mr. Brooks and Ms. Thomas were on their way to pick up their children from a half-day at school.

. After Mr. Brooks sought counsel from the District of Columbia Public Defender Service, he moved the trial court six days after his incarceration to release him pending resolution of an appeal to this court. The trial judge denied that request, but modified Mr. Brooks's sentence to authorize work release during the service of his sentence. It appears, however, that the Department of Corrections never effectuated that modified order, and Mr. Brooks remained fully detained for the entire ten-day period.

. Because the judge witnessed the disputed event, our review is different from cases where the trial court finds facts based upon evidence presented. We ordinarily defer to the trial judge where there are witnesses at the proceedings whose demeanor or credibility the trial court had the unique opportunity to assess. Here, Mr. Brooks's credibility was not at issue; he did not deny using the profanity. The question here was whether Mr. Brooks's actions and comments should have been interpreted as so disruptive of the court’s calendar as to warrant a ten-day jail sentence. The sole witness against Mr. Brooks in this regard was the trial judge herself, whose participation in the events leading up to the contempt finding gives this court a heightened obligation independently to evaluate the appellant's conduct. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954) ("[Jjudges also are human, and may, in a human way, quite unwittingly identify offense to self with obstruction to law.1').

. This court did use an abuse of discretion standard in one case reviewing the summary contempt conviction under Rule 42(a) of a criminal defendant when that defendant failed to heed the court’s repeated warning not to speak unless given permission. Irby v. United States, 342 A.2d 33, 41 (D.C.1975). It is not clear, however, what is intended by the court’s use of "abuse of discretion” in that context; it is not, for example, apparent from the opinion whether the issue on appeal was a challenge to the court’s proceeding under Rule 42(a) or was a challenge to the court's conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to convict. We additionally note that there is no suggestion in the Irby opinion that the trial court in that case issued a Rule 42(a) certification, thus casting doubt on the pertinence of that decision to this case.

. The government contends that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must view "the evidence presented at trial 'in the light most favorable to the government.’ ” Brief of Appellee at 7 (citing Parks v. United States, 627 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1993); Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987)). We note that because of the extremely summary nature of the proceedings, the government was not a party to the action in the trial court. Compare Bethard, supra, 650 A.2d at 654 (appeal from Rule 42(a) proceeding in which the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel participated). We thus assume that the government's proposal is that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to conviction. The rule requiring that the evidence be viewed in favor of the government, or in this case, conviction, results from our deference to the factfinder on issues of fact after an adversarial proceeding. For reasons set forth in this opinion, the procedure by which Mr. Brooks was convicted, where the court permitted no confrontation, defense, or allocution, could scarcely be termed an adversarial "trial" in the sense traditionally given by our Constitution. Thus, in these circumstances, there is no reason to indulge a view of the evidence favoring conviction. We adopt a neutral stance in'evaluating the. evidence of record.

. Nonsummary contempt proceedings pursuant to Rule 42(b) are designed to address either conduct occurring outside the presence of the court, or conduct in the presence of the court where either no exigency exists or where the court lacks information sufficient to adjudicate the alleged contempt. This rule requires notice of the offense charged, which provides an opportunity to prepare and present a defense. Although Rule 42(b) does not so provide by its terms, proceedings under that section have been held to require the assistance of counsel and an opportunity to allocute at sentencing. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 498-99, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2703, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 504, 92 S.Ct. 582, 587, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972); Oliver, supra, 333 U.S. at 273, 275, 68 S.Ct. at 507, 508-09; Cooke, supra, 267 U.S. at 538, 45 S.Ct. at 395; In re Wiggins, 359 A.2d 579, 581 & n. 5 (D.C.1976). In this case, the trial court proceeded against Mr. Brooks summarily under Rule 42(a).

. The use of summary contempt proceedings to fine absent persons, including attorneys, has been sharply criticized as inappropriate because the reason underlying the absence will almost always be outside of the immediate knowledge of the court. Swisher, supra, 572 A.2d at 97-100 (Schwelb, J., concurring).

. Similar problems arise from the court's repeated claim that it had to call Mr. Brooks's case three times. Mr. Brooks, who had a live case in L & T court, was entitled to have his case called at least once on March 18, 1994. The necessity for the first recall of the case was brought about by the court’s instruction to Mr. Brooks to calm down and compose himself which, from the record, it appears he had already done. The second recall of the case was the court’s summary contempt action against Mr. Brooks, not part of the L & T proceeding. This last recall therefore does not qualify as evidence of Mr. Brooks's disruption of the court's L & T proceedings.

. There is, as we have discussed, no basis to conclude that Mr. Brooks either had the requisite state of mind or impeded the administration of justice in court.

. Ms. Thomas and Mr. Brooks entered into a praecipe with their landlord Home Realty, Inc., whereby Ms. Thomas and Mr. Brooks agreed to make regular monthly rent payments commending in April. The court entered a protective order requiring Ms. Thomas and Mr. Brooks to make a $200.00 payment by March 18, 1994.

. Ms. Thomas and Mr. Brooks appeared pro se. Law Students in Court was asked to make representations only after Mr. Brooks indicated that plaintiff’s counsel had given his consent to defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time.