Court Opinion

ID: 9384960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 17:07:33.517536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.860216
License: Public Domain

J-S40039-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellee              :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
 JANICE LIND                             :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :        No. 927 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 17, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006458-2017

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellee              :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
 JANICE LIND                             :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :        No. 928 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 17, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006459-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED APRIL 5, 2023

     Appellant, Janice Lind, appeals from the order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed her first petition

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

     The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as follows:
J-S40039-22

       Appellant had been charged with the systematic sexual
       abuse of two of her minor biological children, her only son
       and eldest of three daughters, committed in concert and
       independently with her husband, the children’s biological
       father. Charges [were] not brought against Appellant for
       the sexual abuse of her two younger daughters who had also
       been reported as similarly abused per their siblings. The
       biological father of the children who had also participated in
       the sexual abuse, however, had died before the authorities
       learned of the crimes. The abuse of these children had
       occurred between 2011 and 2013, inside the home where
       Appellant and the father had resided together with their
       minor children, who had ranged under eight years to
       approximately eighteen months…. All children had been
       removed from this residence by the City of Philadelphia
       Department of Human Services due to [uninhabitable]
       conditions in the home and reported narcotics abuse of both
       parents before any information was [conveyed] concerning
       sexual and physical abuse.

       The eldest daughter, who was 12 years old when she
       testified at trial, had reported being repeatedly sexually
       abused by both of her parents, particularly when she was
       six or seven years old. She stated in summary that she and
       her brother were often abused in Appellant’s bedroom.
       Appellant had played pornographic movies on the television.
       Appellant directed the eldest daughter and son to mimic the
       sexual acts portrayed on the television. She had directed
       them to touch each other’s private parts. This child recalled
       that Appellant had touched her front private parts and put
       “burning powder” on her front private parts. She testified
       that her father had touched her private parts in concert with
       Appellant. Appellant had put the father’s private part into
       her eldest daughter’s private part.      She testified that
       Appellant had been laughing while the sexual activity was
       occurring.

       The son was 10 years old when he testified. He recalled
       frequent instances when Appellant had ordered all four
       children to enter her bedroom when his father was in the
       bedroom only to be subjected to myriad forms of abuse. He
       reported that Appellant had touched his front and rear
       private parts. The father inserted his front private part into
       the son’s back private part. He said that Appellant had

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       watched this activity. The son said that Appellant had
       touched and performed sexual acts on all three of his sisters
       including a time when the youngest was just a baby. As to
       the second oldest sister, he said that Appellant had touched
       her back part while the father touched her front part. He
       recalled that his father had put his private part into the
       eldest daughter’s private part.

                                *    *    *

       Christopher Li, social worker for the Department of Human
       Services, testified that as the initial intake responder, he
       had conducted minimal fact interviews with the son and the
       eldest daughter. The interviews were “minimal” so as not
       to re-traumatize the children. The son reported to him
       [and] said that he remembered being brought into his
       parents’ bedroom, forced to watch pornographic movies,
       forced to perform oral sex on his father and forced to engage
       in sexual activities with his parents and sisters who at that
       time ranged in ages from six or seven to less than two years
       old. The eldest daughter also said that she had to do “stuff”
       with her parents and siblings. Mr. Li then referred the case
       to the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance, an agency tasked
       with interviewing children who suffered sexual abuse.

       Michelle Kline, a forensic interview specialist with the
       Philadelphia Children’s Alliance, testified that she
       interviewed the four children separately. Videotapes of the
       interviews were shown to the jury.             The videotape
       recordings depicted each of the two named victims credible
       separate reporting of long-term penetrating sexual abuse
       committed by both of their biological parents in response to
       non-confrontational and nonsuggestive questions posed by
       the Child Alliance forensic interview specialist.

       It was stipulated at trial that when the third oldest child had
       been interviewed by the Department of Human Services,
       she did not disclose sexual abuse. It was also stipulated
       that Appellant was born [in] December … 1975. The
       respective dates of birth of each of Appellant’s four
       biological children including the listed victims were entered
       by way of stipulation as well. Appellant’s brother, John Lind,
       testified that Appellant had a reputation as being a peaceful
       and nonviolent citizen.

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          Appellant testified, without any presented emotional affect,
          at trial that her four biological children had never even
          entered the bedroom that she had shared with her now
          deceased husband who was each child’s biological father.
          She calmly denied playing any pornographic videos. She
          denied sexually abusing her son and eldest daughter. She
          denied witnessing any sexual abuse from the children’s
          father. She claimed to have no idea why the children had
          accused her. She had also claimed that her home had been
          quite suitable for habitation for her family that had also
          included her disabled mother.

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed 7/13/22, at 1-4) (quoting Trial Court Opinion, filed

1/10/19, at 2-7) (internal record citations omitted).

       Following trial, a jury found Appellant guilty of multiple offenses at two

different docket numbers.1 On May 18, 2018, the court imposed an aggregate

sentence of forty-four (44) to eighty-eight (88) years’ imprisonment. This

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 1, 2019, and our Supreme

Court denied Appellant’s petitions for allowance of appeal on February 4,

2020. See Commonwealth v. Lind, 221 A.3d 233 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeals

denied, 657 Pa. 92, 224 A.3d 364 (2020) and 657 Pa. 96, 224 A.3d 365

(2020).

       On December 11, 2020, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition

listing both underlying docket numbers. In it, Appellant raised bald assertions

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth charged Appellant with crimes against her son at CP-
51-CR-0006458-2017. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with crimes
against her daughter at CP-51-CR-0006459-2017.        The cases were
consolidated for trial.

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of 1) actual innocence; 2) unfair trial; and 3) ineffective assistance of all prior

counsel. The court appointed counsel (“first PCRA counsel”), who filed a “no-

merit” letter on June 11, 2021. First PCRA counsel concluded that Appellant

was not entitled to relief based upon any of her bald assertions of error.

Further, first PCRA counsel opined that Appellant possessed “no valid claims

for relief” under the PCRA.          (No-Merit Letter, filed 6/11/21, at 3)

(unnumbered).

      On August 24, 2021, the court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its

intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant did

not respond to the Rule 907 notice, and the court dismissed the PCRA petition

on September 30, 2021.       In the docket entry memorializing the dismissal

order, the court also noted that first PCRA counsel would continue to represent

Appellant during the appeal period. Despite this directive, first PCRA counsel

filed a motion to withdraw on October 1, 2021.

      The court permitted first PCRA counsel to withdraw on November 18,

2021. That same day, the court observed that first PCRA counsel had failed

to file a timely notice of appeal on Appellant’s behalf. Consequently, the court

appointed current counsel, and it directed first PCRA counsel to pass

information about the case to current counsel. Thereafter, current counsel

filed identical petitions seeking reinstatement of Appellant’s right to appeal

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from the September 30, 2021 order nunc pro tunc.2               The court granted

Appellant’s petitions on January 12, 2022. Further, the court vacated its prior

order denying PCRA relief “to permit current … counsel additional time and

opportunity to independently review the trial record.” (Order, filed 1/12/22,

at 1).

         Following a status hearing, the court entered a new order denying PCRA

relief on March 17, 2022. Appellant timely filed separate notices of appeal at

each underlying docket number on March 31, 2022. On April 11, 2022, the

court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed her Rule 1925(b) statement

on April 14, 2022. On May 11, 2022, this Court consolidated the appeals sua

sponte.

         Appellant now raises the following issues for this Court’s review:

            Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant’s]
            petition for … collateral relief pursuant to the [PCRA] without
            affording her an evidentiary hearing since [Appellant’s]
            conviction and sentence resulted from the ineffective
            assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the
            particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
            process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
            could have taken place?

            Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant’s]
            petition for … collateral relief pursuant to the [PCRA] without
            affording her an evidentiary hearing since, under the totality
____________________________________________

2Specifically, current counsel filed the petition at CP-51-CR-0006459-2017 on
November 22, 2021. Current counsel filed the petition at CP-51-CR-0006458-
2017 on December 2, 2021. Although the petitions are identical, it is unclear
why counsel filed the petitions on different dates.

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         of circumstances, there are genuine issues concerning
         material facts and legitimate purposes would be served by
         such hearing?

         Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant’s]
         petition for … collateral relief pursuant to the [PCRA] without
         affording her an evidentiary hearing since [Appellant’s]
         petition makes out a prima facie case warranting such
         hearing where under the totality of circumstances, trial
         counsel provided ineffective assistance that lacked any
         reasonable basis which prejudiced [Appellant]?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6-7).

      “Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under

the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “The

PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them, and we

review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater,

256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d

386 (2021).

      Appellant’s issues are related, and we address them together. Appellant

argues that the Commonwealth presented trial testimony from Michelle Kline,

the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance employee who conducted forensic

interviews with the victims. Appellant complains that the Commonwealth did

not offer Ms. Kline as an expert in any field; rather, she testified as a lay

person. Among other things, Appellant insists that Ms. Kline’s testimony was

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inadmissible because: 1) she offered an expert opinion; 2) she provided

improper testimony about the children’s demeanor and behavior; and 3) she

offered expert testimony on the concept of “gradual disclosure” of abuse.3

Even if the court accepted Ms. Kline as an expert, Appellant maintains her

testimony would still have been inadmissible; “given her background in social

work, she cannot testify why a sexual assault victim may or may not react in

a particular manner because [she is] not an expert in Rape Trauma

Syndrome.” (Appellant’s Brief at 26).

       Appellant cites 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920 for the proposition that a party must

present an expert to “testify to facts and opinions regarding specific types of

victim responses and victim behaviors.” (Id. at 27) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

5920(b)(2)). Appellant emphasizes that Ms. Kline “is no expert in the behavior

of sexual assault victims given her qualifications; her sole responsibility as a

forensic examiner is to listen to what children have to say in their own words.”

(Id. at 29). Appellant claims that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for

failing to object to Ms. Kline’s testimony “given the prejudice it creates in

____________________________________________

3 Appellant also argues that Ms. Kline testified about a report that she did not
prepare. We observe, however, that the prosecutor presented Ms. Kline with
exhibit C-5, which was the interview reports Ms. Kline prepared for each of
the victims. The prosecutor asked Ms. Kline, “Did you create those or does
somebody else create those?” (N.T. Trial, 2/28/18, at 50). Ms. Kline
responded, “I didn’t create the actual document, but I put the information into
the document.” (Id.) When viewed in context, Ms. Kline’s testimony reveals
that she completed reports about the interviews by inputting information into
an already-existing document. Thus, the record belies Appellant’s assertion
that Ms. Kline improperly testified about the reports.

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explaining … away the delay in reporting this alleged crime.” (Id.) Further,

Appellant argues that trial counsel’s failure to object caused Appellant to suffer

prejudice. Appellant concludes that the PCRA court should have conducted an

evidentiary hearing to evaluate this claim further.          We agree that an

evidentiary hearing is necessary, albeit for slightly different reasons than

those advanced by Appellant.

      “Counsel   is   presumed    to   have   rendered    effective   assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

         [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
         defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
         ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
         of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
         process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
         could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
         prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
         claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
         reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
         and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
         a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
         proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).     The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

      “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis

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for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175,

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524,

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers,

847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

      “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his

client’s interests.”   Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

         The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
         basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
         counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
         alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
         potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be
         considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
         interests.   We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
         comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
         have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

      “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

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proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).              “[A] criminal

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3,

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).

       In this case, current counsel is Appellant’s third attorney.4 Therefore,

Appellant must now present a “layered” claim of ineffective assistance,

referring to both trial counsel and first PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness.

          [W]here, such as here, a petitioner must “layer” claims of
          ineffective assistance of counsel, [she] “must plead in [her]
          PCRA petition that [her] prior counsel, whose alleged
          ineffectiveness is at issue, was ineffective for failing to raise
          the claim that the counsel who preceded him was ineffective
          in taking or omitting some action.” The petitioner must
          further “present argument, in briefs or other court
          memoranda, on the three prongs of the [the
          ineffectiveness] test as to each relevant layer of
          representation.”

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 651 Pa. 359, 379-80, 205 A.3d 274, 286

(2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 589, 832 A.2d

1014, 1023 (2003)).

          As a corollary to the layered pleading rule adopted in McGill,
          it is necessary that a PCRA petitioner have the ability to
          amend [her] petition in order to properly plead, and attempt
          to prove, layered claims where dismissal of the petition is
____________________________________________

4 Trial counsel represented Appellant at trial and throughout the remainder of
the direct appeal process. Thereafter, first PCRA counsel and current counsel
represented Appellant during collateral review.

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         imminent on grounds that such claims were not adequately
         pled.    Indeed, our cases have recognized as much.
         Furthermore, the ability to amend, in turn, flows from the
         guarantee embodied in our Rules of Criminal Procedure that
         a PCRA court will give a petitioner adequate notice of its
         intention to dismiss [the] petition and the attendant reasons
         therefor. In cases where a petitioner has not been afforded
         the opportunity to amend [her] layered pleadings, a remand
         from this Court is appropriate unless a petitioner has not
         satisfied [her pleading] burden in relation to the underlying
         claim.

Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 525-26, 913 A.2d 220, 233-34

(2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 954, 128 S.Ct. 384, 169 L.Ed.2d 270 (2007)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Commonwealth

v. Tedford, 598 Pa. 639, 661, 960 A.2d 1, 13 (2008) (stating remand is not

necessary where petitioner has not carried ineffectiveness pleading burden in

relation to underlying claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness; even if petitioner

were able to craft perfectly layered argument in support of claim with respect

to subsequent counsel, petitioner’s claim would not warrant relief).

      Related to the subject of remand, “[i]t is not an appellate court’s

function to engage in fact-finding.” Commonwealth v. Shaw, ___ Pa. ___,

___, 247 A.3d 1008, 1017 (2021) (quoting BouSamra v. Excela Health, 653

Pa. 365, 386-87, 210 A.3d 967, 979-80 (2019)).           The PCRA court is “the

appropriate—and, indeed, the only—forum for the evidentiary and factual

development” of PCRA claims. Id. (quoting Commonwealth Koehler, 658

Pa. 658, 695, 229 A.3d 915, 937 (2020)). Recently, in Commonwealth v.

Bradley, ___ Pa. ___, 261 A.3d 381 (2021), our Supreme Court

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acknowledged that remand might be proper in certain cases where

ineffectiveness claims are raised on appeal in the first instance:

          In some instances, the record before the appellate court will
          be sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
          ineffectiveness claims.    However, in other cases, the
          appellate court may need to remand to the PCRA court for
          further development of the record and for the PCRA court to
          consider such claims as an initial matter. Consistent with
          our prior case law, to advance a request for remand, a
          petition would be required to provide more than mere
          boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness …;
          however, where there are material facts at issue concerning
          [claims challenging counsel’s stewardship] and relief is not
          plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should
          be afforded[.]

Bradley, supra at ___, 261 A.3d at 402 (internal citations, footnote, and

quotation marks omitted).

       Additionally, Section 5920 governs expert testimony regarding victims’

responses to sexual violence:

          §   5920.   Expert          testimony         in   certain   criminal
                proceedings

                                       *       *    *

              (b)    Qualifications and use of experts.—

             (1) In a criminal proceeding subject to this section,[5]
          a witness may be qualified by the court as an expert if the
          witness has specialized knowledge beyond that possessed
          by the average layperson based on the witness’s experience
          with, or specialized training or education in, criminal justice,
          behavioral sciences or victim services issues, related to
____________________________________________

5 Section 5920 applied to the criminal proceedings for Appellant’s underlying
offenses, which included unlawful contact with a minor and conspiracy to
commit rape of a child. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920(a)(2).

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        sexual violence or domestic violence, that will assist the trier
        of fact in understanding the dynamics of sexual violence or
        domestic violence, victim responses to sexual violence or
        domestic violence and the impact of sexual violence or
        domestic violence on victims during and after being
        assaulted.

           (2) If qualified as an expert, the witness may testify to
        facts and opinions regarding specific types of victim
        responses and victim behaviors.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920(b)(1), (2).

     Instantly, Appellant’s brief on appeal presents arguments that are

limited to an examination of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Montalvo,

supra. We will examine these arguments to determine whether Appellant

satisfied her pleading burden in relation to the underlying claim such that

remand might be appropriate.        See Tedford, supra; Carson, supra.

Appellant emphasizes the following testimony from Ms. Kline regarding the

concept of gradual disclosure:

        [PROSECUTOR:]        Okay. I wanted to ask you, based on
        your training and experience, can you describe the concept
        of gradual disclosure?

        [WITNESS:]              Sure. So the gradual, so we call it the
        gradual nature of the disclosure process. So kids don’t
        typically give all of the information about what might have
        happened to them all at one time. They don’t kind of just
        send out all of the information to someone who asks them
        what might have happened. Kids might give a little bit of
        detail about what happened, wait to see how someone
        responds. They might wait to see how a caregiver responds
        or what they say or do or what might happen to them after
        they disclose that little bit of information, and then over time
        they might disclose more.

        Another aspect of that is that kids might disclose different

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           information depending on who they’re talking to. They
           might say some information to a caregiver. They might give
           more or less information to someone else that they might
           not know. So that might change over time as well.

(N.T. Trial, 2/28/18, at 50-51).

       Ms. Kline’s testimony makes clear that the concept of gradual disclosure

is a type of victim response or behavior. In evaluating Ms. Kline’s testimony

under Section 5920, we emphasize that a witness may testify to facts

regarding specific types of victim responses and behaviors “if qualified as an

expert.”    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920(b)(2) (emphasis added).         Because the

Commonwealth did not ask the court to qualify Ms. Kline as an expert, there

appears to be arguable merit to Appellant’s claim that Ms. Kline provided some

improper testimony.6 See Smith, supra.

       As for the remaining prongs of the test for ineffectiveness, the record is

silent as to any reasonable strategic basis for trial counsel’s inaction. Further,

the PCRA court did not have the opportunity to assess prejudice in the first

instance. See Shaw, supra at ___, 247 A.3d at 1017 (holding petitioner did

____________________________________________

6 This interpretation of the statute is supported by recent case law from this
Court, which determined that a forensic interviewer’s opinion testimony on
the tendency of child victims to under-disclose incidents of sexual abuse “by
disclosing a ‘little bit’ at a time” is subject to expert witness qualification
requirements during sexual assault prosecutions. See Commonwealth v.
Williams, 274 A.3d 722, 732 (Pa.Super. 2022), appeal denied, 2023 WL
109376 (Pa. Jan. 5, 2023) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by
permitting PCA supervisor to give expert testimony that it is common for child
victims to under-disclose sexual abuse to PCA interviewers, where PCA
supervisor was not qualified as expert to provide such testimony).

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not waive challenge to stewardship of PCRA counsel and observing that

Superior Court should have provided PCRA court with opportunity to assess

prejudice in first instance).

      Our review of Appellant’s brief, the relevant case law, and the existing

record leads us to conclude that Appellant has advanced a proper argument

regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to object to Ms. Kline’s

testimony. See Tedford, supra; Carson, supra. Nevertheless, Appellant

has not advanced a corresponding, layered claim regarding first PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to challenge trial counsel’s inaction.

Pursuant to Bradley, the current appeal was the right time to challenge first

PCRA counsel’s effectiveness. See Bradley, supra at ___, 261 A.3d at 401

(holding that “that a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief,

and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal”).

Absent more, we are left with a situation that arguably requires “further

development of the record” in some regards, as well as an opportunity “for

the PCRA court to consider [the new ineffectiveness] claims as an initial

matter.” Id. at ___, 261 A.3d at 402.

      Mindful of the Bradley Court’s mandate “to preserve an enforceable

right to effective PCRA counsel,” we conclude that the most prudent course of

action is to vacate the order denying PCRA relief and remand this case for

further proceedings. Id. at ___, 261 A.3d at 405. See also McGill, supra

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at 591, 832 A.2d at 1024 (articulating “a general preference toward

remanding cases currently pending in the PCRA appellate pipeline where the

PCRA petitioner has not pled and/or presented a layered ineffectiveness claim

in a manner sufficient to obtain merits review”).       Upon remand, current

counsel should file an amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf, wherein

counsel more fully develops the ineffectiveness claims suggested from the

current appeal. Thereafter, the court should conduct an evidentiary hearing

to address the potential ineffectiveness of all prior counsel.

      Order vacated; case remanded with instructions.            Jurisdiction is

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/05/2023

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