Court Opinion

ID: 9696766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:57:52.73945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:26.689467
License: Public Domain

NEBEKER, Associate Judge
(dissenting):
Despite our protracted deliberations and efforts for agreement which have now produced the majority opinion, I am constrained promptly to express my dissent. Clearly, as in a criminal case, the issue of probable cause is a question of law for the court to determine when there are no material issues of fact. There are, in my view and with all deference to the majority, no material issues of fact on the question of probable cause reflected in this record. The effort by the majority to demonstrate factual *776conflicts and then elevate them to the level of materiality results, I suggest, from a failure of objective legal analysis. I concede this is a sympathetic case when one views all the facts in retrospect. The unfortunate condition of Mr. Devercelli, unknown to the arresting officer, has nothing to do with the legality of his arrest and I am confident it had considerable, improper influence with the jury on the issue of probable cause and its award of excessive damages. I trust this decision will not confuse the well-established law in both this jurisdiction 1 and in Virginia 2 on the role of the court in questions of this kind. It is clear to me that this decision reflects an a priori approach to the facts of record to which this holding most certainly should be confined.
A determination of probable cause cannot be colored by facts not known or reasonably apparent to the officer making the apprehension. The court must view the situation through the eyes of the officer. Prieto v. May Department Stores Co., D.C.App., 216 A.2d 577 (1966). In doing so, these are the facts. Mr. Devercelli gave all the appearance of a most desperate shoplifter. The majority concedes this. His explanation to the female security officer of the reason for his appearance does not dispel the high degree of suspicion already apparent, for such “explanations” are easily fabricated.3 But in any event, this attempt to divert the suspicion, which even Mr. Devercelli recognized by explaining his condition to the female security officer, cannot, on this record, be imputed to the arresting officer. In selecting ties and then shirts, Mr. Devercelli next proceeded in a manner quite consistent with an effort by a thief to conceal the items. He dropped or caused to fall to the floor other small items (cuff links, located a short distance away from the stack of shirts). In recovering these items, and while in a stooped or crouched position, he placed other items in the bag. It is important to note that he could have overtly placed the items in the bag as he selected them. Instead, knowing he was behaving suspiciously, he undertook what reasonably appeared to be a familiar effort to conceal his actions. He “dropped” items to the floor and then, while seemingly retrieving them, dropped other items, and, in the ensuing confusion, placed small and large items in the bag. Little wonder the arresting officer acted at that point. It must be remembered we are here dealing with an offense called willful concealment, not larceny. It is thus irrelevant whether Dever-celli attempted to leave the store or the specific area without paying for the items concealed in the bag. Neither is it relevant that the bag was given Devercelli by a store employee, nor what he considered the purpose for the bag. Shopping bags are usually available within department stores for use by customers, and unfortunately they are also available to a thief.
I respectfully submit that the conflict in testimony regarding Mr. Devercelli’s movements in the store is immaterial. The majority’s concession that it “is not surprising that the suspicions of appellant’s detectives were aroused” and that they could have “displayed more restraint and attempted to acquire more information” is astounding in view of their holding. I assume the majority is importing into this area of law a concept of a limited “seizure” of the person as in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1967). They would seemingly permit the suspect to be stopped and questioned in full view *777and hearing of other customers. I can think of no faster way to produce embarrassment and a damage suit for slander and false arrest.
As to the majority’s view that the cases cited by appellant contained additional circumstances to support probable cause, I believe a careful reading of those cases will show they support appellant’s assertion that probable cause did exist. Delp v. Zapp’s Drug and Variety Stores, 238 Or. 538, 395 P.2d 137 (Or.1964), pertained to a statute which required, unlike the Virginia statute here in question, the additional element of taking “with intent to convert to his own use without paying the price.” Clearly then, in order to establish probable cause it was necessary under the Oregon statute to wait until the suspect had proceeded past the check-out counter. This additional element, however, would not be required under the Virginia statute to establish probable cause and is not constitutionally required, for probable cause always requires less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cooke v. J. J. Newberry & Co., 96 N.J.Super. 9, 232 A.2d 425 (1967), pertains to a New Jersey statute that indeed contained a presumption that concealment of the merchandise in the store was prima facie evidence of intent to convert to the use of the taker without paying the purchase price. A careful reading of Cooke will show that the court did not question the probable cause for the arrest, nor did it purport to establish a minimum level for probable cause as the majority implies. The New Jersey statute clearly states that mere concealment of the merchandise would create probable cause. Finally, Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 11 Cal.App.2d 430, 54 P.2d 24 (1936), expressly supports this view by holding: In spite of the majority’s statement to the contrary, the court did not hold that the additional circumstance of proceeding through the check-out counter without paying was necessary to constitute probable cause.
The undisputed evidence shows reasonable and probable cause for the detention. Johnson had seen the respondent pick up the candy and conceal it in his pocket. . . . [Id. at 431, 54 P.2d at 25.]
My disagreement with the majority opinion does not end with the matters just discussed for even on the assumption that there were material issues of fact respecting probable cause to be resolved by the jury, it is clear that such issues were not presented to the jury under proper instructions. The law is clear, at least since Chapman v. Anderson, 55 App.D.C. 165, 3 F.2d 336 (1925), where it was said:
[If] there is disputed testimony, which should be heard by the jury in determining . . . whether the prosecutor had probable cause, it certainly should be submitted to them under instructions by the court which state such facts, embraced within the record, as would constitute probable cause. . . . [A]nd it devolves upon the court to instruct the jury as to whether certain facts, if, proven, amount to probable cause. . . . [Id. at 169, 3 F.2d at 340; emphasis supplied.]
We have just recently reaffirmed this rule in Clarke v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 311 A.2d 508 (decided Nov. 21, 1973), and there recognized that the court ultimately determines probable cause as a legal matter. Id., at 511, quoting from Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 44 S.Ct. 52, 68 L.Ed. 146 (1923). In the instant case the trial judge, after defining probable cause in terms of reasonable grounds, proceeded in substance to tell the jury that the surrounding circumstances must be such that a reasonable and prudent person would conclude there was probable cause for charging the plaintiff with the crime of willfully concealing the merchandise. This instruction is clearly inadequate and reversible error.4 Moreover, there was no attempt to define or limit what sur*778rounding circumstances were relevant to probable cause. The jury was, thus, left free on this question to consider irrelevant and inflammatory factors such as Devercel-li’s unknown malady and his innocent state of mind. The majority fails to perceive that the jury, in addition to determining credibility, also concluded there was no probable cause. The jury should never have been permitted to arrive at this conclusion outside of its fact-finding function. Rather, assuming existence of a jury issue, it should have been instructed that if certain facts are found by it to be true then perforce the question of probable cause is resolved in favor of Mr. Devercelli. Accordingly, the question of jury determination of probable cause in this case is so permeated with error that there is no way to preserve the verdict as it relates to that question.
Since the facts apparent to the arresting officer were, in my view, sufficient to justify the apprehension, I would reverse with directions to enter judgment for appellant on count one (false arrest) as well as count three (insulting words). I would, however, award a new trial on so much of the false arrest count as fairly asserted continued, unwarranted detention of Mr. De-vercelli after his innocence became reasonably apparent and on so much of count two (assault and battery) as fairly asserted an assault subsequent to the arrest and search —that is, the alleged actions of appellant’s agents in attempting to obtain a release by show of armed force. Those aspects of the case, if proved, are beyond the privilege granted by the Virginia statute (Va.Code 1950, § 18.1-127).
My colleagues remand the case for consideration of appellant’s “allegations regarding the effect, if any, of passion or prejudice on the size of the verdict.” As to punitive damages, they find sufficient evidence of malice only from “[h]is testimony . that he [Devercelli] was told repeatedly by the store detectives he could not leave until he signed a release and that if he refused to sign he would go- to jail . . . ” Majority opinion at 774. On the other hand, they acknowledge that the detectives’ suspicions were reasonably aroused by Devercelli’s actions and appearance. It, therefore, is inescapable to me that the $50,000 punitive damages award under the false imprisonment count must be vacated by this court as unsupported by evidence of malice (see F.B.C. Stores, Inc. v. Duncan, 198 S.E.2d 595 (Va.1973) (No. 8175, decided Aug. 30, 1973). At the very least the trial judge should, on remand, recognize the cause of the excessive award in ruling on the motion for new trial.
Before REILLY, Chief Judge, and KELLY, FICKLING, KERN, GALLAGHER, NEBEKER, PAIR, YEAGLEY and HARRIS, Judges.

. Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 25 L.Ed. 116 (1879); Smith v. Tucker, D.C.App., 304 A.2d 303 (1973); Prieto v. May Department Stores Co., D.C.App., 216 A.2d 577 (1966); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Gault, D.C.Mun.App., 175 A.2d 795 (1961); Brooking v. Lemon, D.C.Mun.App., 96 A.2d 849 (1953); Chapman v. Anderson, 55 App.D.C. 165, 3 F.2d 336 (1925).

. Brodie v. Huck, 187 Va. 485, 47 S.E.2d 310 (1948); Munger v. Cox, 146 Va. 574, 131 S.E. 841 (1926); Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Klaff, 123 Va. 260, 96 S.E. 244 (1918).

. See Smith v. Tucker, supra note 1; Shaw v. May Department Stores Co., D.C.App., 268 A.2d 607 (1970).

. It was hardly incumbent on appellant, as my colleagues view it, to object to or attempt to correct this portion of the charge since it took specific exception to giving the question to the jury in the first instance.