Court Opinion

ID: 9743998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:51:50.54657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.079921
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: It appears that the decisional law supports the holding of the majority opinion. However, I have a gnawing curiosity as to what Cartegena’s testimony would have revealed. If this were not a capital case, I would be content to follow the law as stated in the opinion. Since this case does involve a penalty of death, we should have the benefit of all information available. I therefore dissent. Section 106 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 106—1) provides that the court, on motion of the State, may order that any material witness be released from all liability to be prosecuted or punished on account of any testimony he may be compelled to produce. When this court remanded this case (115 Ill. 2d 238) for an evidentiary hearing on the section 2—1401 petition (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2—1401), it was my hope that if Cartegena asserted his fifth amendment privilege at the evidentiary hearing, the State would move to grant him immunity. For some reason the State refused to do so. Instead of affirming the trial court’s denial of the section 2 — 1401 petition, I would favor remanding this cause to the trial court, with directions that if the State does not move to grant Cartegena immunity, the defendant’s sentence of death be vacated and that he be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. If immunity were to be granted, the court could then evaluate the testimony given under the grant of immunity and determine its sufficiency for the purpose of determining whether a new trial is warranted. JUSTICE CLARK joins in this dissent.