Court Opinion

ID: 9738795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:02:50.171537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.487355
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE LINN, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding: (1) that defendant, John Creach, was arrested without probable cause;1 (2) that Creach’s inculpatory statements, as well as certain other evidence presented against him, must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree; and (3) that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the affirmative defense of compulsion with regard to defendant Ruppert. I The majority correctly concludes that defendant Creach was placed under arrest by Evanston police officers at the Magnolia Street location. (See, e.g., People v. Pruitt (1967), 79 Ill. App. 2d 209, 216-17, 223 N.E.2d 537, 541-42.) The constitutional validity of his arrest focuses upon whether the police officers had probable cause to believe Creach had committed an offense. Henry v. United States (1959), 361 U.S. 98, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 80 S. Ct. 168; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 107—2(c); People v. Wright (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 523, 309 N.E.2d 537. At the conclusion of lengthy hearings on the motions to suppress, the trial court found that the Evanston police officers did have probable cause to arrest Creach.2 This finding may be disturbed on appeal only if it is “manifestly erroneous.” (People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501, 505, 304 N.E.2d 280, 282.) It must also be remembered that Creach had the burden of proving that his arrest was based on less than probable cause. (People v. Ross (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 857, 377 N.E.2d 230.) I cannot conclude that Creach met this burden or that the trial court’s finding is manifestly erroneous. Probable cause to arrest refers to that quantum of information which would lead a reasonable and prudent police officer to believe the defendant probably committed an offense. (People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 342 N.E.2d 356.) This information need not be sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 79 S. Ct. 329), nor must it be sufficient to prove guilt is more probable than not. All that is necessary, is that the information, upon which the arrest is based, constitute reasonable grounds for believing that guilt is more than a mere possibility.3  Probable cause should be viewed from the vantage point of a police officer’s training and experience, and “must be judged on the basis of [his] responsibility to prevent crime and to catch criminals.” (People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 277, 342 N.E.2d 356, 358.) As our supreme court recently stated in People v. Blitz (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 287, 292-93, 369 N.E.2d 1238, 2140-41, quoting from United States v. Davis (D.C. Cir. 1972), 458 F.2d 819, 821: “Probable cause does not emanate from an antiseptic courtroom, a sterile library or a sacrosanct adytum, nor is it a pristine ‘philosophical concept existing in a vacuum,’ Bell v. United States, 102 U.S. App. D.C. 383, 386, 254 F.2d 82, 85 (1958), but rather it requires a pragmatic analysis of ‘everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949). It is to be viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer on the scene at the time of the arrest guided by his experience and training. Jackson v. United States, 112 U.S. App. D.C. 260, 302 F.2d 194 (1962). It is ‘a plastic concept whose existence depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.’ Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S. App. D.C. 354, 357, 389 F.2d 305, 308 (1967). See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, supra, 379 U.S. [89] at 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, [13 L. Ed. 2d 142]; Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S. at 175-176, 69 S. Ct. 1302. Because of the kaleidoscopic myriad that goes into the probable cause mix ‘seldom does a decision in one case handily dispose of the next.’ Hinton v. United States, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 388, 391, 424 F.2d 876, 879 (1969). It is however the totality of these facts and circumstances which is the relevant consideration. Davis v. United States, 133 U.S. App. D.C. 172, 173, 409 F.2d 458, 459 (1969); Dixon v. United States, 111 U.S. App. D.C. 305, 306, 296 F.2d 427, 428 (1961). Viewed singly these factors may not be dispositive, yet when viewed in unison the puzzle may fit.” A well-trained professional utilizes the unique talent and experience gained through his work. The professional police investigator is no exception. He will apply his skill and technical knowledge in carefully analyzing and evaluating all available data relating to the criminal activity which is the subject of his inquiry. The police investigator’s experience-honed power of analytical conceptualization often “glues” together stray pieces of a particularly difficult puzzle, thereby giving rise to a reasonable probability that the crime involved was committed by a known suspect. When the court applies legal standards to the probable cause issue presented by a particular case, it must remain aware of and give due deference to the police investigator’s professionalism and experience and also his ability to decipher meaning from what may superficially appear to be innocent facts and circumstances. Furthermore, since many of the situations which law enforcement officers confront are more or less ambiguous, courts, by necessity, permit them broad discretion in determining whether probable cause to arrest does exist. Brinegar v. United States (1949), 338 U.S. 160, 176, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1891, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311; People v. Wright (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 523, 529, 309 N.E.2d 537, 540; see, e.g., People v. Coleman (1978), 63 Ill. App. 3d 814, 380 N.E.2d 829. In this case, the Evanston police officers possessed the following information at the time they arrested defendant Creach: Delores Irion’s body was found in Evanston at approximately 7 a.m. on September 25, 1973. She had been shot three times with a .25-caliber automatic pistol, twice in the head and once in the back, and also stabbed 12 times, in the back, chest, abdomen and knee. An empty box for a .25-caliber automatic pistol was found in Delores Irion’s apartment. The apartment had been locked with a key when the police reached it. Despite having rained heavily the night before, Delores Irion’s clothing was dry, suggesting she had been killed sometime after midnight. The victim’s automobile, a 1966 Cadillac, was missing. The police were informed that John Creach, the son of Mrs. Dolly Moore, the victim’s next door neighbor, had been living with Ms. Irion for the past month. During this time, Creach had been driving Delores Irion’s automobile. Mrs. Moore informed police that Creach had called her from Ohio. Creach told his mother he had Delores Irion’s 1966 Cadillac and had last seen her alive at 1:30 a.m., the morning of September 25, when he had left for Ohio in her car. Creach was in Ohio with a friend named Tom. When Creach was informed by his mother of Delores Irion’s death, he told her he would drive back to Chicago right away. No explanation was offered as to why Creach had suddenly taken the victim’s automobile and left for Ohio at 1:30 a.m. The police department’s investigation indicated that Creach was the last person to see Delores Irion alive. Although these factors viewed individually may not be dispositive of the probable cause issue, their sum total dictates only one conclusion: the Evanston police officers had a reasonable basis for their belief that Creach probably murdered Delores Irion. Consequently, their arrest of Creach was legally justified. It must be borne in mind that probability is the touchstone, not certainty. Based upon this information, I readily conclude that the trial court’s finding of probable cause was proper. The majority questions whether certain factors listed above may properly be considered in our review of the probable cause to arrest issue. Although not revealed at the motion to suppress hearing, it was later disclosed at trial that the Evanston police department had obtained the following information, prior to arresting Creach: (1) Delores Irion had been shot with a .25-caliber pistol; (2) a box for a .25-caliber pistol had been found in her apartment; and (3) the apartment was locked with a key when the police reached it. According to the majority, the two arresting officers were not personally aware of this information when they took Creach into custody. I believe that even without this information the police officers had probable cause to arrest Creach. Additionally, although this information was not presented at the motion to suppress hearing, it may properly be considered by us in reviewing defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in finding probable cause to arrest did exist. People v. Braden (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 516, 216 N.E.2d 808; People v. Glanton (1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 124, 338 N.E.2d 30. The fact the arresting officers may not have had this information within their personal knowledge, at the time Creach was taken into custody, is irrelevant. Probable cause must be evaluated on the basis of the collective information possessed by the law enforcement agency or particular investigative unit involved, rather than solely upon the information possessed by the officers who actually make the arrest. (People v. Parks (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 232, 269 N.E.2d 484, cert. denied (1972), 404 U.S. 1020, 30 L. Ed. 2d 669, 92 S. Ct. 692; People v. Beard (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 725, 342 N.E.2d 343; United States v. Stratton (8th Cir. 1972), 453 F.2d 36, cert. denied (1972), 405 U.S. 1069, 31 L. Ed. 2d 800, 92 S. Ct. 1515; Smith v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1966), 358 F.2d 833.) As one court stated: “Defendant argues that because the arresting officer did not have sufficient knowledge or information to establish probable cause, the arrest was illegal. This is not the correct test. The test is whether the law-enforcement agency as a corporate body possessed sufficient information to establish probable cause. (Citations.) In this case probable cause was established by all (the) information possessed by the police as a unit and therefore the arrest was lawful.” State v. Stark (1970), 288 Minn. 286, 290-91, 179 N.W.2d 597, 600, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 930, 91 S. Ct. 1529, 28 L. Ed. 2d 864; accord, Johnson v. State (1977), 75 Wis.2d 344, 249 N.W.2d 593. The record in this case discloses that several officers of the Evanston police department were working in close concert with one another in investigating Delores Irion’s murder. The record also demonstrates that information was freely exchanged among these officers during the course of that investigation. Consequently, in light of the above principle, the knowledge of each officer involved in the investigation should be imputed to the rest. Nevertheless, the majority holds unpersuasively that the above principle is not applicable to this case: “[The] ordinary presumption that for purposes of probable cause the knowledge of one officer is imputed to the others involved in the cause [citation], does not apply here, for at the motion to suppress hearing Officer Glanz [one of the arresting officers] was specifically asked whether the knowledge he had described at that hearing was all the information on the case that he [personally] possessed concerning the involvement of defendant Creach, and he stated that it was.” Glanz’s statement, however, does not contradict and the majority does not challenge, the testimony later adduced at trial that additional information, at the time of Creach’s arrest, was possessed by other police officers involved in the investigation. Indeed, Glanz’s statement does not even indicate that the other arresting officer, Birkenheier, was ignorant of this additional information. In any event, the above principle correctly demonstrates that the arresting officers need not have been personally aware of all the information possessed by their investigative agency as a unit. Therefore, I fail to understand how Glanz’s statement — which merely indicates that he, and possibly his partner, were not personally aware of additional information possessed by other police officers involved in the investigation — renders this principle inapplicable. Viewing the total circumstances from the vantage point of a police officer’s training and experience, I am of the opinion that there was a reasonable basis for the belief that Creach probably murdered Delores Irion. I would, therefore, conclude that his arrest was based upon probable cause, and that the inculpatory statements, as well as the other evidence attributable to his arrest, were properly admitted. II Creach contends that even if probable cause did exist, the Evanston police lacked authority to arrest him in Chicago. I disagree. The common law rule limited the authority of police officers to the territorial boundaries of the municipality. (People v. Carnivale (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 57, 329 N.E.2d 193.) This rule was later modified by sections 7 — 4— 7 and 7 — 4—8 of the Illinois Municipal Code: “The territory which is embraced within the corporate limits of adjoining municipalities within any county in this State shall be a police district.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 7—4—7. “The police of any municipality in such a police district may go into any part of the district to suppress a riot, to preserve the peace, and to protect the lives, rights, and property of citizens. For these purposes the mayor of any municipality in the district, and the chiefs of police therein, shall use the police forces under their control anywhere in the district.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 7—4—8.4  We take judicial notice that Chicago and Evanston are adjoining municipalities within the same county, and, therefore, are part of the same police district. (See People v. Lawson (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 767, 345 N.E.2d 41.) The question presented is whether the arrest of Creach in Chicago, was within the extraterritorial power bestowed on the Evanston police by section 7—4—8. The Evanston police were investigating the brutal and savage murder of Delores Irion, a Chicago female resident, whose dead body was found within the municipal boundaries of Evanston. The serious nature of this crime posed a very real threat to the physical safety of the other residents within the police district. The concern generated by this vicious crime was evidenced by the manpower immediately assigned to the case by the Evanston police department. Early in its investigation, the Evanston police acquired reasonable grounds to believe that defendant, Creach, had murdered Delores Irion. They also had reason to believe that Creach had fled to Ohio following the culmination of his act. Creach’s mother informed them that when her son had called from Ohio and was informed of Delores Irion’s murder, he volunteered to return to Chicago “right away.” Creach was expected to return to Chicago the night of September 25. He did not show. In the early morning hours of September 26, Officers Glanz and Birkenheier were patrolling the Chicago neighborhood where Creach and the victim had lived in search of Delores Irion’s automobile. At approximately 9:30 a.m., they spotted Creach walking down the street toward his mother’s home. In my view, the arrest of Creach at this time was necessary “to preserve the peace, and to protect the lives, [and] rights, * * * of citizens.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 24, par. 7—4—8.) It would have been absurd and dangerous for the Evanston police officers, under the facts presented by this case, to have dropped everything, and awaited the arrival of a Chicago police officer before placing Creach under arrest. I would, therefore, conclude that the Evanston police had authority to arrest Creach in Chicago. Ill The majority holds that the trial court erred, with regard to defendant Ruppert, in refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of compulsion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, pars. 7—11, 7—14). I disagree. Confusion has been generated with regard to the quantum of evidence which must be introduced to raise the issue of an affirmative defense (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 3—2), and, thereby, to warrant the submission of an instruction to the jury on that defense. Most cases indicate that a jury instruction on an affirmative defense is warranted even though only slight evidence is presented in support thereof. (See, e.g., People v. Looney (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 404, 361 N.E.2d 18.) The State contends, however, that in People v. Redmond (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 328, 320 N.E.2d 321, the Illinois Supreme Court intimated a stricter standard: that a jury instruction on an affirmative defense should be submitted only where the evidence presented in support thereof is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. While I have serious reservations with regard to the State’s broad interpretation of Redmond, I find it unnecessary to determine which standard is applicable to this case. For, in my view, the evidence presented was insufficient, under either standard, to warrant submitting an instruction to the jury on the defense of compulsion. The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that Ruppert and Creach had planned to steal money from Delores Irion, Creach’s girlfriend, and then drive to Ohio in her car. Ruppert waited in Delores Irion’s Cadillac while Creach entered the victim’s apartment. When Creach returned a short time later he told Ruppert Ms. Irion had caught him trying to steal some of her money. Creach then returned to the apartment and emerged with a .25-caliber pistol he had taken from the victim. Creach went back to the apartment yet a third time, and returned with Delores Irion. In finding that an instruction on compulsion was warranted, the majority relies on the following evidence: “[Wjhen Irion and Creach came out of the apartment, Irion told Ruppert to leave the car, and he complied. But then Creach told him to get back in; after first refusing, Ruppert finally got back in when Creach repeatedly told him to do so. In Ruppert’s statement he also recalled that after Irion’s throat had been cut and he had given her a rag, Creach made them both get back in the car. And after Creach had shot and apparentiy killed Irion, he again told Ruppert to get back in the car, and Ruppert complied. Finally, it was part of Ruppert’s statement that on the way to Ohio, Creach kept the gun out on the front seat of the car.” This evidence merely indicates that Creach was the leader of the two men with regard to the armed robbery and murder scenario. There is no evidence to support Ruppert’s claim that his conduct was compelled under threat of death or great bodily harm. Creach never threatened Ruppert, verbally, physically, or even by implication, with the .25-caliber pistol. Furthermore, Ruppert never mentioned in or out of court that he participated in the armed robbery and murder of Delores Irion because he feared Creach. Considering the fact that Ruppert admitted he had intended to rob Delores Irion all along, that Ruppert waited in the victim’s car for Creach to return, knowing Creach was armed with a dangerous weapon, and that there was no testimony, or evidence whatsoever from which it could be inferred, that Ruppert was in fear for his own safety, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of compulsion. There was no evidence to support such a defense. Accordingly, for the reasons stated and to the extent noted, I dissent.   Since I agree with the majority that the Evanston police officers lacked probable cause to arrest defendant, Ruppert, I will not discuss that aspect of the case in this dissent.    The majority contends that on a subsequent “motion to reconsider” the trial court recanted its holding and found that the Evanston police officers did not have probable cause to arrest Creach. I cannot agree. A reading of the motion to reconsider, the memorandum of law submitted in support thereof, and the corresponding arguments of counsel demonstrates that neither defendant requested a reconsideration of the trial court’s earlier finding that probable cause to arrest did exist. Rather, in light of what were then recent cases, each defendant asked the trial court to reconsider its earlier finding that the Evanston police officers did have jurisdiction to arrest them in Chicago. Despite the statements of the trial court quoted by the majority, in my view, the trial court’s denial of the motion to reconsider left intact its earlier holding which denied the defendants’ motions to suppress and found that probable cause and jurisdiction to arrest did exist.    “ ‘The substance of all the definitions’ of probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.' (Citations.)” (Brinegar v. United States (1949), 338 U.S. 160, 175, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310.) “The test is essentially one of reasonableness.” People v. Payne (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 378, 380, 286 N.E.2d 35, 36.    The court’s statement in People v. Clark (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 240, 242-43, 360 N.E.2d 1160, 1162-63, that the “hot” pursuit theory is the only exception to the common law rule limiting a police officer’s authority to the boundaries of his own municipality, is clearly erroneous.