Court Opinion

ID: 9560570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:51:28.82361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:00.011052
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. 1. The present case is not a motion to set aside a judgment but is a separate complaint or petition setting forth valid grounds for vacating the judgment rendered in the absence of any notice to the defendant that the trial on the question of damages would be had, and is thus not controlled by provision of Section 60 (d) of the Civil Practice Act.
2. Williams v. Linn, 108 Ga. App. 629 (133 SE2d 892) and Barber v. Canal Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 738 (168 SE2d 868) are controlling in the present case and this is true of Williams v. Linn, even though it was decided prior to the Civil Practice Act, as they were based upon Rule 25 of the Superior Courts (Code of 1933 §24-3324), now Rule 43 (Code Ann. § 24-3343), which is still in existence, unrepealed. Paragraph (c) of Section 40 of the Civil Practice Act provides: "The courts shall provide for the placing of actions upon the calendar (1) without request of the parties but upon notice to the parties, or (2) upon request of the party and notice to the other parties. Except for cause cases shall be placed upon the calendar in chronological order in accordance with filing dates. Precedence shall be given to actions entitled thereto by any statute.” The present case had not even been placed upon the trial calendar, and before it could be placed thereon the defendant was entitled to the notice required, and there is no requirement of the law that the defendant must notify the court that it desires to be notified, or that it desires the case be placed upon the calendar, under Section 40 of the CPA. He is not complaining that the trial judge would not set the case for trial, he is complaining because the trial court did, without notice.
The majority rely completely upon Paragraph (a) of Sec*854tion 5 of the Civil Practice Act, which reads as follows: "the failure of a party to file pleadings in an action shall be deemed to be a waiver by him of all notices, including notices of time and place of trial. . .” The defendant here was not required to file any pleadings in the case in order to introduce evidence, question witnesses, select a jury and contest the amount of damages. See Williams v. Linn, 108 Ga. App. 629, supra. Section 5 of the Civil Practice Act and the proviso above quoted apply only to one who fails to file pleadings which are required by the Act to be filed in order to be entitled to participate at the time and place of the trial. Insofar as the damages are concerned, the defendant is by law entitled to attend the trial, introduce evidence as to damages, help select a jury and examine witnesses, even though he has filed no pleading denying liability in the case or contesting liability. And he is entitled to attend such trial and have notice thereof and is not required to notify the court, as contended by the majority.
Since Section 5 (a) of the Civil Practice Act does not apply as a waiver of a right of notice to trial, as to that portion of the case for which no pleadings are required by defendant, such as contesting the amount of damages, there is no inconsistency in the court rule in the Barber case and Section 5 (a) of the Civil Practice Act. Nor is the rule of court in this case requiring the plaintiff to give 30 days notice to the clerk if plaintiff desired his case set down for trial inconsistent with any statute. See in this connection, Seifert v. Holt, 82 Ga. 757 (1) (9 SE 843).