Court Opinion

ID: 9558260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:05:34.447956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:31.675135
License: Public Domain

Scholfield, A.C.J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part)—I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion except that portion setting aside the finding of bad faith.
I must dissent, however, from the conclusion that the trial court's finding of bad faith is not supported by substantial evidence. Bad faith is a mixed question of both fact and law. The trial court, in making this finding, referred to the conduct of Lorig and Niemi from and after February 1980, during which time, without conferring with Heron, they worked together to frustrate Heron's management efforts for the apparent purpose of removing Heron as a general partner and ultimately from any further participation in the partnership. This conduct occurred after the value of the partnership property had increased substantially.
*790The relation existing between copartners is one requiring the exercise of the utmost good faith. Each partner is a trustee for all, and no individual or group may take an unconscionable advantage of another.
Danich v. Culjak, 190 Wash. 79, 87, 66 P.2d 860 (1937).
When courts speak of liability for bad faith or the duty to use good faith, they are usually referring to the same obligation. Generally speaking in the context of these cases, good faith means being faithful to one's duty or obligation; bad faith means being recreant thereto.
Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wn. App. 167, 173, 473 P.2d 193 (1970).
The trial court's finding of bad faith is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
Reconsideration denied September 11, 1985.