Court Opinion

ID: 9780777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:52:45.451877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:13.478130
License: Public Domain

Per curiam.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court pursuant to the report and recommendation of a special master, Andrew C. Hall, appointed pursuant to Bar Rule 4-106 (e). The special master recommends rejecting the petition for voluntary discipline filed by Respondent Robert Douglas Ortman (State Bar No. 554911) (in which Ortman sought a public reprimand) and suspending Ortman for 12 months for his violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, see Bar Rule 4-102 (d). We agree.
The record shows that on May 28, 2010, Ortman, who has been a member of the Bar since 1999, entered a guilty plea in the Superior Court of Cobb County, Georgia under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 (91 SC 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1970) to one felony count of aggravated battery. He was sentenced under the First Offender Act to 12 months probation, along with various conditions including anger management evaluation and treatment, a fine of $1,000 and restitution to the victim of $450. Although the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) is disbarment and although disbarment is considered the typical level of discipline imposed in cases like this one involving violent felonies, see In the Matter of Collins, 263 Ga. 185 (429 SE2d 908) (1993), we recognize that in arriving at the punishment to be imposed, disciplinary cases must be largely governed by their own particular facts. See In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36) (1981). Moreover, we have never foreclosed the possibility that a lesser punishment than disbarment might be appropriate where the circumstances and mitigating factors are sufficient to justify a lesser penalty. This appears to be such a case inasmuch as Ortman, who had various physical conditions that led him to be particularly sensitive to his physical safety, presented evidence sufficient to show that his conduct arguably was not a premeditated effort to harm the victim, but rather a reflexive response to a perceived danger to his person and that despite his honest belief in his innocence, he took the first-offender, Alford plea because certain circumstances made him unsure of whether he would prevail at trial; the plea offer was a good deal with no jail time; and he wanted to avoid being separated from his wife and young child.
“The primary purpose of a disciplinary action is to protect the public from attorneys who are not qualified to practice law due to *131incompetence or unprofessional conduct,” see In the Matter of Brooks, 264 Ga. 583 (449 SE2d 87) (1994), but this Court is also concerned generally about the public’s confidence in the profession. In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga. 865 (621 SE2d 750) (2005). Having reviewed the record in this case, we accept the special master’s findings that Ortman violated Rule 8.4 (a) (2) of Bar Rule 4-102 (d), and we agree that by so doing, Ortman violated a duty owed to the public and the legal profession not to engage in illegal conduct. We find in aggravation that while not required to admit criminal culpability, given his Alford plea, Ortman has nonetheless refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct inasmuch as he has not expressed any remorse or recognition for the serious injury that he caused both to his victim and to the profession of law generally. In mitigation, however, we note that Ortman has no prior disciplinary history; that he presented evidence of good character and reputation; and that this appears to be an isolated incident in which no harm came to any of Ortman’s clients. Therefore, given the specific circumstances of this case, we find disbarment unwarranted and instead, order Ortman suspended from the practice of law for a period of 12 months from the date of this opinion. He is reminded of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (c).

Twelve-month suspension.

All the Justices concur.