Court Opinion

ID: 9375341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 16:00:52.836255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:57.994751
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40712         Document: 00516655084             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/24/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                                             FILED
                                                                                      February 24, 2023
                                        No. 21-40712
                                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                             Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Muhamed Pathe Bah,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:20-CR-433-1

   Before Higginbotham, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Muhammed Bah pled guilty to one count of armed bank robbery while
   endangering another’s life by the use of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
   § 2113(a) & (d), and one count of using, carrying, and discharging a firearm
   in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
   Bah now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the district court’s reasoning
   in imposing 300 months and life in prison, respectively. We AFFIRM.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-40712        Document: 00516655084             Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/24/2023

                                         No. 21-40712

                                               I.
                                              A.
           On the morning of June 26, 2020, a then-unidentified individual
   robbed Texas Regional Bank in Harlingen, Texas. The robber arrived at the
   bank on a bicycle, placed a black backpack on the counter, and approached
   and shot a bank teller in the head, causing serious but non-fatal injury. The
   robber then approached a second teller and demanded: “[g]ive me the
   money.” The second teller complied, placing money into the backpack. The
   robber then exited the bank “and rode away on a bicycle.” Upon the robber’s
   exit, the second teller called 911 while caring for the first teller.
           Police apprehended Bah shortly thereafter. Officers identified him as
   “matching the description” put forward by eyewitnesses. The officers patted
   Bah down and found a .22 caliber revolver in his pocket, which contained 9
   intact rounds and one fired casing. Bah’s hands also tested positive for
   gunshot residue. Finally, Bah possessed a black backpack containing “several
   banded stacks of U.S. currency.”
           Bah gave a statement after being read his Miranda rights detailing
   many of the facts of the robbery, including confessing to owning the pistol
   and bringing it into the bank, though Bah “did not recall shooting the pistol
   while inside the bank.”1 Bah consented to a search of his apartment, which
   revealed 138 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, an unlocked cell phone, and
   a receipt for the ammunition as well as a weapon. Eight days after the offense,
   Bah pled guilty without a plea agreement.

           1
             The Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) does not state when Bah was read his Miranda
   rights or when exactly this statement was provided. However, as neither Party contests the
   statement or its validity, we need not harp on this subtle blind spot.

                                               2
Case: 21-40712         Document: 00516655084                Page: 3       Date Filed: 02/24/2023

                                           No. 21-40712

           In March 2021, Bah had a competency examination with a forensic
   psychiatrist and was found competent to stand trial. The examiner stated that
   Bah “does not show any evidence of intellectual disability.” Detailed infra,
   Bah had a history of schizophrenia, but the examiner said that “[u]nlike
   individuals with schizophrenia,” Bah exhibited a “speech pattern [that] is
   clear and logical, he does not suffer from hallucinations or delusions, he is
   able to argue his point clearly, he understands the charges against him, and
   he is not requiring psychotropic medications.” Months later, Bah
   participated in a presentence investigation interview during which he
   accepted responsibility for the instant offense, concurred with the factual
   summary, and declined to offer additional information.
           In August 2021, the Probation Office put forward a PSR. Shortly
   thereafter, the Government filed notice of an intent to request an upward
   variance. According to the final PSR, Count One yielded an offense level of
   24; Count Two carried a statutory minimum sentence of ten years. Probation
   assessed a Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months and 120 months for Counts
   One and Two, respectively, to run consecutively. Probation recommended
   consecutive sentences of 63 months and 120 months.
           The PSR also provided Bah’s personal and criminal histories before
   the robbery.2 According to his sister, Bah “was diagnosed with minor

           2
              Per the PSR, Bah’s mental health struggles are sourced to discussions with Bah’s
   sister, as “[m]edical records have been requested and are pending receipt.” The Record
   on Appeal does not include any additional medical records either party may have received
   since the PSR’s drafting. However, neither party objected to this fact prior to Bah’s
   sentencing or at the sentencing hearing, and the district court adopted the PSR. We
   therefore credit this recitation of facts. See United States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 230 (5th
   Cir. 2012) (holding that a district court may adopt the facts in a PSR “without further
   inquiry if those facts have an adequate evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability
   and [a party] does not present rebuttal evidence or otherwise demonstrate that the

                                                  3
Case: 21-40712        Document: 00516655084              Page: 4      Date Filed: 02/24/2023

                                         No. 21-40712

   schizophrenia in 2019” at age 17 and “had been receiving medical
   treatment” for this diagnosis at the Behavioral Health Center in Charlotte,
   North Carolina. As part of this treatment, Bah “had been in in-patient
   treatment for 18 months” at the same facility in 2020 following a series of
   “psychosis episodes.” While in treatment, Bah “was receiving his
   medication and began feeling better,” but upon being released, he “stopped
   taking his medication and his mental health began to decline.” The PSR also
   noted that Bah had a moderate criminal history, comprising four minor prior
   convictions.3
                                               B.
           The district court adopted the PSR without objection by Bah. After a
   few housekeeping matters,4 the Parties made their cases, the Government
   elaborating that it intended to seek an upward variance of sentences of 25
   years for each Count to run consecutively, the statutory maximum term for
   Count I and an above-Guidelines term for Count II. During the entirety of
   the Parties’ sentencing arguments, the district court engaged with either
   party only once, “interject[ing] . . . just for the clarity of the record” as to the
   specific upward variance the Government sought. After argument, the
   district court spoke twice more: first to assist a victim in delivering her victim
   witness statement, and then to ask Bah if he wished to address the court. Bah
   declined. The district court then said:

   information in the PSR is unreliable” (quoting United States v. Trujillo, 502 F.3d 353, 357
   (5th Cir. 2007))).
           3
             The convictions are: (1) a 2018 conviction for assaulting a government employee,
   resulting in a 60-day imprisonment; (2) a 2017 speeding violation; (3) a 2017 seatbelt
   violation; and (4) a 2018 conviction for driving without a license.
           4
             These include correcting an opacity in the PSR, admitting evidence in keeping
   with the local rules, and deciding upon the procedure for the sentencing hearing itself.

                                               4
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                                      No. 21-40712

          The court will now proceed with sentencing.

          As to Count One, pursuant to 3553(a)(1), the nature and
          circumstance of the offense and history and characteristics of
          the defendant, [the] court is going to grant an upward variance.

          As to Count Two, pursuant to 3553(a)(1), the nature and
          circumstance of the offense and history and characteristics of
          the defendant, the court is also going to grant an upward
          variance.

          As to Count One, the court hereby sentences the defendant to
          300 months with the Bureau of Prisons with five years of
          supervised release.

          As to Count Two, the court -- the court is going to sentence the
          defendant to life in prison. I’m not sure if supervised release is
          applicable, but the court will also assess five years of supervised
          release.

          ...

          [T]hese terms are to run concurrently.5

          Following this announcement, the district court read the “terms of
   supervised release into the record,” permitted defense counsel to “make a
   record with [] Bah” regarding his understanding of the sentence, and
   solicited Bah’s preference on placement. The hearing then concluded.
                                           II.
          “Where a defendant preserves a procedural sentencing error . . . by
   objecting before the district court, we review the sentencing court’s factual

          5
             The language omitted via ellipses is a minor, irrelevant colloquy with the
   Probation Officer.

                                            5
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                                             No. 21-40712

   findings for clear error and its interpretation or application of the guidelines
   de novo.”6 But “if the defendant failed to object to a procedural error, we
   review only for plain error.”7
           To establish plain error, a criminal defendant must demonstrate: (1)
   “an error that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned”; (2)
   that is “plain—that is to say, clear or obvious”; and (3) “affected the
   defendant’s substantial rights.”8 Upon making this threefold showing, an
   appellate court “should exercise its discretion to correct the forfeited error if
   the error ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
   judicial proceedings.’”9 In other words, “granting relief under plain error
   review is discretionary rather than mandatory.”10
                                                  III.
                                                   A.
           In Gall v. United States, “[t]he Supreme Court [] explained that a
   sentencing judge commits procedural error when [the judge] ‘fail[s] to
   adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any
   deviation from the Guidelines range.’”11 And “because ‘the law requiring

           6
                United States v. Randall, 924 F.3d 790, 795 (5th Cir. 2019).
           7
           United States v. Coto-Mendoza, 986 F.3d 583, 585 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct.
   207 (2021); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(b).
           8
                Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 194 (2016).
           9
                Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).
           10
                United States v. Seale, 600 F.3d 473, 488 (5th Cir. 2010).
           11
              United States v. Fraga, 704 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 2013) (final alteration in
   original) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).

                                                   6
Case: 21-40712            Document: 00516655084              Page: 7      Date Filed: 02/24/2023

                                             No. 21-40712

   courts to explain sentences is clear,’”12 for the sake of the first two prongs of
   the plain error standard, we need only ask if the district court committed
   error insofar as it failed to sufficiently explain the reason for the sentence
   imposed.
           Rules regarding the requisite length and detail of a district court’s
   explanation are necessarily elusive because, as the Supreme Court reminded:
   “[t]he appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to
   write, what to say, depends upon circumstances.”13 “Sometimes the
   circumstances will call for a brief explanation; sometimes they will call for a
   lengthier explanation.”14 Elusiveness notwithstanding, this Court is guided
   by two rules of thumb: (1) a “district court must give a more detailed
   explanation for a non-Guidelines sentence”15 such that “a major departure
   should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one”;16
   and, (2) at the same time, a district “court . . . need not engage in ‘robotic
   incantations that each statutory factor has been considered.’”17
                                                  B.
           Here, the record shows that the district court heard Bah’s admission
   of guilt and his agreement that the facts contained in the Factual Basis were
   correct. Bah also declined to allocute. As well, there is no doubt that the court

           12
           United States v. Chon, 713 F.3d 812, 824 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
   Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 2009)).
           13
                Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
           14
                Id. at 357.
           15
                United States v. Churchwell, 807 F.3d 107, 122 (5th Cir. 2015).
           16
                Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
           17
            United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States
   v. Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2005)).

                                                   7
Case: 21-40712           Document: 00516655084              Page: 8      Date Filed: 02/24/2023

                                            No. 21-40712

   was presented with the Parties’ arguments, both in written form and
   thereafter orally at the sentencing hearing. The court also received written
   victim impact statements, again recounted at sentencing. Taken together, the
   district court was intimately familiar with the harrowing facts of the case and
   the Parties arguments’ based thereupon, so it is therefore “apparent from the
   record how and why the district [judge] selected the . . . sentence.”18
           As in United States v. Coca-Ortiz, “the district court indicated that the
   . . . sentence was appropriate based on [] considerations under 18 U.S.C.
   § 3553(a)[.]”19 Specifically, the district judge tied his sentencing decision to:
   1) the nature of the offense; and 2) Bah’s history and characteristics. Even if
   those factors are slightly more generalized, they do assist our appellate
   review, distant though it be. In sum, “[t]his is not a case where the sentencing
   judge ‘did not mention any § 3553 factors at all’ and ‘did not give any reasons
   for its sentence beyond a bare recitation of the Guidelines calculation.’”20 As
   we have previously made clear, “there is no error when ‘examining the full
   sentencing record reveals the district court’s reasons for the chosen sentence
   and allows for effective review by this court.’”21 “The law requires no
   more.”22

           18
                United States v. Segura, 444 F. App’x 717, 718 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (per
   curiam).
           19
             801 F. App’x 285, 286 (5th Cir.) (unpublished) (per curiam), cert. denied, 141 S.
   Ct. 607 (2020).
           20
                Fraga, 704 F.3d at 439 (quoting Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d at 362–63).
           21
             United States v. Key, 599 F.3d 469, 474 (5th Cir. 2010) (alteration omitted)
   (quoting United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647, 658 (5th Cir. 2008)).
           22
             United States v. Osorio-Abundiz, 303 F. App’x 239, 240 (5th Cir. 2008)
   (unpublished) (per curiam).

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Case: 21-40712   Document: 00516655084      Page: 9   Date Filed: 02/24/2023

                             No. 21-40712

                               ****
         We AFFIRM.

                                  9