Court Opinion

ID: 9602785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:59:58.691859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:31:21.727071
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, Justice
(dissenting).
The doctrine that a party may not challenge the constitutionality of a statute if he has accepted benefits conferred by the statute, is an application of the equitable doctrine of estoppel. This court has many times recognized the general rule that estoppel will not be invoked against the government or its agencies except where manifest justice requires its application. Common School Dist. No. 61 v. Bank & Trust Co., 50 Idaho 711, 4 P.2d 342; Lloyd Crystal Post No. 20 v. Jefferson County, 72 Idaho 158, 237 P.2d 348.
The generalizations from the opinions of the courts cited are stated by the annotator in' 1 A.L.R.2d as follows:
“As a general rule the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied against the public, the United States government, or the state governments, where the application of that doctrine would encroach upon the sovereignty of the government and interfere with the proper discharge of governmental duties, and with the functioning of the government, or curtail the exercise of its police power, or where the application of the doctrine would frustrate the purpose of the laws of the United States or thwart its public policy; or where thé officials on whose conduct or acts estoppel is sought to be predicated, acted wholly beyond their power and authority, were guilty of illegal or fraudulent acts, or of unauthorized admissions, conduct or statements; or where the public revenues are involved.” Pages1 340 and 341.
“Although the doctrine of estoppel may be more readily applied to subordinate governmental agencies than to the government and state itself, yet it will not be applied to municipal corporations with the same strictness as to private individuals and private corporations; particularly in matters wholly ultra vires of the municipality, in matters involving or affecting its governmental or public functions or the taxing or police power, or in matters wholly beyond the powers of the officers or agents whose act or conduct is relied upon as forming the basis of estoppel against the municipality; or to require the municipality or its officers to do an act expressly forbidden by law.” Pages 349-351.
*44The general rule has been, and still is, firmly adhered to in. most jurisdictions where the estoppel sought to be invoked would be detrimental to the public interest, the public morals, or against public policy, or where it would obstruct free exercise of the police power. Cameron v. International Alliance T.S.E., 118 N.J.Eq. 11, 176 A. 692, 97 A.L.R. 594; Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413, 88 A.L.R. 1481; Palmer v. Board of Education, etc., 276 N.Y. 222, 11 N.E.2d 887; Greenlund v. Fenner, 127 Misc. 295, 216 N.Y.S. 357; Gibbs v. Bergh, 51 S.D. 432, 214 N.W. 838; City of Baton Rouge v. Baton Rouge Waterworks Co., 5 Cir., 30 F.2d 895; Craig v. Board of Education, etc., 173 Misc. 969, 19 N.Y.S.2d 293; Fitzsimmons v. Rauch, 195 Okl. 529, 159 P.2d 264; Fifth Church of Christ, etc., v. W. F. Pigg & Son, 109 Colo. 103, 122 P.2d 887; Ex parte Gray, 74 Okl.Cr. 200, 124 P.2d 430; State v. Loveless, 62 Nev. 17, 136 P.2d 236; People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111, 61 A.L.R. 793.
“The company urges as a separate ground for estoppel the fact that the county has retained the benefits of the asserted agreement. All of the California cases hold, however, that receipt of benefits by the governmental body is insufficient to raise an estoppel where, as here, the transaction is unauthorized by law and contrary to public policy.” San Diego County v. California Water & Telephone Co., 30 Cal.2d 817, 186 P.2d 124, at page 132, 175 A.L.R. 747, and cases cited.
“The acceptance of benefits by a municipality under a contract entered into in violation of statute or contrary to public policy, cannot be made the basis of liability by estoppel.” Johnson County Savings Bank v. Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 N.W. 705, 237 N.W. 507, 84 A.L.R. 926.
In Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614, 141 A.L.R. 1136, the Missouri court said: “No one may waive the public interest” or the constitutional policy of the state.
The public policy of the state can have no higher sanction or source than the constitution adopted by vote of the people. Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609; 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 139; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §§ 1 and 2.
The constitutional provision banning lotteries fixes the public policy of this state beyond the power of the legislature to modify or otherwise declare. By recognizing slot machines as within the inhibition, this court in effect finds that the legislature in the enactment of the licensing law violated this positive constitutional prohibition and attémpted to authorize the cities of the state to license lotteries contrary to the constitutionally established public policy of the state. . In State ex rel. Anderson v. Garden City, Idaho, 265 P.2d 328, we have branded the operation of slot machines as a *45public moral nuisance. Thus the court recognizes the interdiction of these machines as a constitutional dedication of the police power of the state to their eradication in the interest of public welfare and public morals. It is utterly inconsistent with that conclusion to allow the state to assert an estoppel against the City of Gooding, and thus to deny, delay and obstruct the police power of the state and the protection of the public welfare and public morals. The law attempting to authorize these lotteries was enacted in 1947. It is common knowledge that slot machines have been operated in great numbers all over the state these past six years. During that time no case reached this court to determine the constitutionality of the licensing act, and the constitutionally expressed will of the people was held for naught. Suppose the Garden City case had not been brought. Then the effect of the estoppel in this case would be to continue to an indefinite date this disregard for the express command which the people wrote in their constitution, that the state, and all its officers and its courts, protect them from these public moral nuisances. Thus estoppel, born of equity, is perverted to serve the ends of inequity and injustice.
This court has many times espoused the principles here contended for. “ * * * equity cannot and will not interpose its power to relieve any one against the violation of express constitutional prohibitions.” Village of Heyburn v. Security Savings & Trust Co., 55 Idaho 732, 49 P.2d 258, 266. In Yellow Cab Taxi Service v. Twin Falls, 68 Idaho 145, 190 P.2d 681, and in Boise City v. Sinsel, 72 Idaho 329, 241 P.2d 173, we held estoppel would not be applied to prevent a municipality from exercising its police power. In Hillman v. City of Pocatello, 74 Idaho 69, 256 P.2d 1072, we held that a property owner who accepted benefits under a city ordinance was not thereby estopped to challenge the ordinance. We have also held that the obligation of a contract will not be allowed to contravene public policy. Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 833, and in Lloyd Crystal Post No. 20 v. Jefferson County, 72 Idaho 158, 237 P.2d 348, 350, where Mr. Justice Thomas said, if the contract be “one where no power exists for its execution or it is expressly and directly prohibited by constitutional or statutory enactment, estoppel can never be invoked in aid of such a contract”. In Pepple v. Headrick, 64 Idaho 132, 128 P.2d 757, 762, we held that the acceptance of benefits did not estop the licensing authority from confiscating and destroying gambling machines, in the words of Mr. Justice Ailshie: “The payment of taxes on, or licensing of, a gambling machine or device, furnishes no defense or justification for its operation in violation of the anti-gambling laws.” And he might have added; “or the anti-lottery provision of the constitution.” Here the majority in effect overrule that holding.
The rule that where the parties are in pari delicto the law will not grant relief to *46either, but will leave them where it finds them, should be accorded full recognition and application in this case. The majority recognizes that both the state and City of Gooding are particeps criminis and in pari delicto, but refuse to apply the rule because of the. alleged estoppel. In other words, because it would be inequitable to the state to allow the city to keep proceeds of the unlawful transaction. The . truth of the matter is that the state is the more culpable of the two. The state is the author of the unconstitutional .act.. Whereas the city did pnly what the state represented to it that it could do.. There is no ground for the intervention, of equity.on the side of the state. Paramount considerations of public policy, public welfare, public morals,, and a due regard, for the police power of the state, would,comp el a different result.
t On authority of the Garden City case the judgment should be affirmed.