Court Opinion

ID: 9536717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:05:43.970183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:06.197132
License: Public Domain

SHENK, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the affirmance of the judgment as to Parcel 1 but I dissent from the reversal of the judgment as to Parcel 2. Assuming that it was error to instruct the jury to disregard the portion of witness Harrington’s testimony concerning the importance of the lease in determining market value, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice. The terms of the lease were fully described by other witnesses and therefore they were otherwise before the jury.
Furthermore, the record indicates that the lease was made for the purpose of extracting an award in excess of the true market value of the parcel, and that it in fact had no proper bearing on true market value. It is conceded that the lease was executed only 26 days before the condemnation proceeding was brought and only 20 days before the Highway Commission adopted a resolution determining that public interest and necessity required the condemnation of the parcels. ■ Witnesses for both sides agreed that at the time the lease was entered into it was common knowledge that the state was planning to make improvements on the parcels and that their acquisition was necessary to the project. The record also discloses substantial evidence that four or five months before the lease was entered into the state gave written notice to both the planning commission and the city council of the city in which Parcel 2 was situated that it intended to acquire the land; that the state’s intention to acquire Parcel 2 was a matter of common knowledge well before the lease was entered into and the construction of the garage was begun; that at the request of the defendant the zone location of Parcel 2 was changed from residential to commercial after the state’s intention to acquire the parcel had become commonly known; that the construction on the parcel continued to the very day when the condemnation action was filed despite the fact that it was known before that time that the state intended to acquire the parcel; that *644the chances that the lessees’ business would succeed were not good; that the lessees were poor credit risks, and that the $500 monthly rent was out of proportion to the value of the parcel and to the amount of business the lessees could be expected to carry on. Under the foregoing circumstances, the exclusion of Harrington’s testimony concerning the lease, even if error, was not prejudicial. The requirement of just compensation does not contemplate an enhanced award brought about by unconscionable tactics.