Court Opinion

ID: 9775339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:54:39.964151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:25.292863
License: Public Domain

Judge GRAHAM
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
*540I conclude that an award by the court in condemnation proceedings includes prejudgment interest because it is part of the "award by the court in the proceedings" as specified by section 88-1-122(1.5). The City contends that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Andersen Mahon under section 38-1-122(1.5) because any prejudgment interest awarded under section 38-1-116 should not be considered as part of "the award by the court."
The majority concludes that the legislature intended to limit awards of attorney fees to relatively egregious cases where the condemning agency has not offered fair value to the property owner. Thus, for the majority, the award by the court specified in section 88-1-122(1.5) means only the court's award for the actual value of the property. I conclude, in contrast, that the law is meant to fully compensate the owner for the loss the owner suffered by the taking.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Ryals v. St. Mary-Corwin Reg'l Med. Ctr., 10 P.3d 654, 659 (Colo.2000). Our goal in such interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 197 P.3d 261, 262 (Colo.App.2008). If a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, then we need not look beyond the plain language, Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/HealthONE, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 591 (Colo.2004), and "we must apply the statute as written," In re 2000-2001 Dist. Grand Jury, 97 P.3d 921, 924 (Colo.2004) (citing Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 914 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Colo.1996)). Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 327 (Colo.2004); see also § 2-4-208(1)(c), (d), (g), C.R.8.2009 ("If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the general assembly, may consider among other matters: ... [tThe legislative history, if any ... [and] [tlhe legislative declaration or purpose."). A statute should be interpreted as a whole, giving effect to all its parts. Zab, Inc. v. Berenergy Corp., 136 P.3d 252, 255 (Colo.2006); San Miguel Valley Corp., 197 P.3d at 262.
In addition, the constitutional protection against the taking of private property by government without due process imposes on the condemning governmental entity a requirement of strict compliance with and interpretation of the pertinent condemnation statutes. Thus, while eminent domain statutes are strictly construed against the government, they must be liberally construed in favor of property owners. Platte River Power Auth. v. Nelson, 775 P.2d 82, 83 (Colo.App.1989).
Section 88-1-122(1.5) provides a statutory basis for compensating property owners for the attorney fees they incur in challenging the valuation assigned to their condemned property. That subsection provides in pertinent part:
In connection with proceedings for the acquisition or condemnation of property in which the award determined by the court exceeds ten thousand dollars, in addition to any compensation awarded to the owner in an eminent domain proceeding, the condemning authority shall reimburse the owner whose property is being acquired or condemned for all of the owner's reasonable attorney fees incurred by the owner where the award by the court in the proceedings equals or exceeds one hundred thirty percent of the last written offer given to the property owner prior to the filing of the condemnation action.
(Emphasis added.)
The majority concludes that "the award by the court" includes only the commissioner's award of $1,542,294 and not the prejudgment interest awarded under section 38-1-116.
Pursuant to section 38-1-116, the court
shall forthwith cause the report of the commissioners or the verdict of the jury to be entered upon the records of the court, and, where possession of the property has been previously taken by the petitioner pursuant to section 88-1-105(6), it shall add to the amount of any such award interest at the rate established pursuant to section 5-12-106(2), C.R.S., on and after the date of such possession until the date such award of the commissioners or ver*541dict of the jury is filed with the clerk of the court.
(Emphasis added.)
"The use of the word 'shall creates a presumption that a stated requirement is mandatory." EZ Bldg. Components Mfg., LLC v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 74 P.3d 516, 518 (Colo.App.2003). Thus, where, as here, possession of the property has been previously taken by the petitioner pursuant to section 38-1-105(6), C.R.S.2009, the court is required pursuant to section 38-1-116 to add interest to the "award of the commissioners" or the jury verdict from the "date of such possession until the date such award of the commissioners or verdict of the jury is filed with the clerk of the court." See Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188, 1200 (Colo.App.1999) (section 38-1-116 "directs a court to award prejudgment interest only if possession of the property has been previously taken by a condemning authority pursuant to § 38-1-105(6)"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo.2001).
Accordingly, the court's "award" under section 38-1-122(1.5) necessarily includes the commissioner's or jury's award plus any prejudgment interest added to that amount pursuant to section 38-1-116. To conclude that the court's "award" under section 38-1I-122(1.5) does not include prejudgment interest is to ignore the dictate of the legislature set forth in section 88-1-116.
Furthermore, section 88-1-122(1.5) was enacted many years after section 38-1-116. We presume that the General Assembly was aware of the statutory provision with respect to adding prejudgment interest to the commissioners' award or jury's award. See People v. Santisteven, 868 P.2d 415, 418 (Colo.App.1993). Had the General Assembly intended that "the award by the court" consist only of the award of the commissioners or jury, and not any prejudgment interest awarded under section 38-1-116, we assume such language could have been included in section 38-1-122(1.5). In other words, the General Assembly could easily have used the language, "the award by the commission or jury " instead of "the award by the court," or expressly stated that "the award by the court" does not include prejudgment interest. It did not do so. Nor is such an intent evidenced by the language of the statute.
Instead, the statute clearly indicates that the threshold for attorneys fees is based upon the court's final judgment which is the actual award rendered by the court. "Award" is defined as "[al final judgment or decision." Black's Law Dictionary 147 (8th ed. 2004). Therefore, "the award by the court" is synonymous with the "judgment of the court."
Finally, when I read the statutes together as a whole, I have no difficulty in determining that the General Assembly deemed it fair to make prejudgment interest part of the court's award in order to fully compensate the property owner for the loss of their property. In doing so, the provisions of seetion 38-1-116 simply make sure that interest is not awarded on money which has already been tendered to the property owner. However, the section does require that prejudgment interest be attached to the award by the commission or the jury so that the final award by the court will provide the product to compare against the 130% threshold specified in section 88-1-122(1.5).