Court Opinion

ID: 9556809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 18:01:18.201506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:18.707736
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11317    Document: 33-1     Date Filed: 08/18/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11317
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       STEVE ANTHONY RICHARDS,

                                                  Defendant- Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 9:23-cr-80005-AMC-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11317     Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 08/18/2023    Page: 2 of 6

       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-11317

       Before GRANT, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Steve Anthony Richards appeals his sentence of 12 months
       in prison for attempted illegal re-entry after deportation or re-
       moval. We affirm.
                                        I.
               Richards argues that the district court violated his proce-
       dural due process rights by considering information from a presen-
       tence investigation report (PSR) prepared in 2000 for his prior ille-
       gal re-entry case. He notes that the report from the earlier case—
       like all such reports—was confidential and could not be accessed
       by the parties without a court order, and he contends that the court
       should have notified him in advance that it would take the older
       report into account at sentencing.
               To the extent that Richards argues that the district court
       should not have reviewed materials from his prior federal criminal
       case in preparation for sentencing, we disagree. By statute, district
       courts may consider any “information concerning the background,
       character, and conduct” of the defendant for sentencing purposes,
       without limitation. 18 U.S.C. § 3661. A PSR from a prior similar
       offense is a readily available source of such information, and the
       district court did not err by reviewing it.
            We are likewise unpersuaded by Richards’s argument that
       due process required the district court to notify him before
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       23-11317               Opinion of the Court                          3

       sentencing that it would consider the PSR from his prior case. The
       only precedent Richards cites in support of his argument states that
       as a matter of “[s]ound practice,” “judges in all cases should make
       sure that the information provided to the parties in advance of the
       hearing, and in the hearing itself, has given them an adequate op-
       portunity to confront and debate the relevant issues.” Irizarry v.
       United States, 553 U.S. 708, 715 (2008). Richards had that oppor-
       tunity here. The probation officer notified him before sentencing
       (by addendum to the 2023 PSR) that information from the 2000
       PSR was used in the report prepared for his current case. The pro-
       bation officer’s addendum also notified Richards that the circum-
       stances of his prior offenses would be relevant to the court’s deter-
       mination of his sentence, explaining that “if reliable information in-
       dicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially
       underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history
       or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, an
       upward departure may be warranted.”
               At sentencing, the district court notified Richards that it had
       read the 2000 PSR. When defense counsel objected that she had
       not been given a copy of the earlier report, the court provided a
       copy and took a break so that counsel could review the report with
       Richards. After the break, counsel confirmed that she had had an
       opportunity to review the report, and neither she nor Richards
       raised any further objections to it. To the contrary, counsel argued
       that the 2000 PSR corroborated Richards’s position that his prior
       illegal re-entry stemmed in part from his youth and lack of famili-
       arity with his country of citizenship (Jamaica) at the time.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11317

              Richards was provided adequate notice that information
       from the 2000 PSR would be relevant at sentencing, and he was
       given an opportunity to review and rebut, object to, or explain the
       information before the district court imposed its sentence. Due
       process was satisfied.
                                        II.
              Richards also argues that his 12-month sentence was
       substantively unreasonable. He contends that his 20-year-old non-
       violent drug and immigration offenses did not justify the upward
       variance from the Guidelines range of zero to six months in prison.
       He also argues that the district court failed to consider the reason
       for his attempted illegal reentry—his concern for the safety of his
       adult daughter, who is an American citizen—as a mitigating factor.
              We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence un-
       der a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
       552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The defendant bears the burden of estab-
       lishing that his sentence is unreasonable based on the facts of the
       case and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. United States v.
       Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). Those factors include
       (among others) the nature and circumstances of the oﬀense, the
       defendant’s history and characteristics, and the need for the sen-
       tence imposed to reﬂect the seriousness of the oﬀense, promote
       respect for the law, provide just punishment, and aﬀord adequate
       deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). An above-Guidelines sentence
       carries no presumption of unreasonableness, though we may con-
       sider the extent of the variance in determining whether a sentence
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       23-11317               Opinion of the Court                         5

       was reasonable. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We will vacate the sentence
       imposed only if “we are left with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction
       that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
       weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
       outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of
       the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010)
       (en banc) (quotation omitted).
              That is not the case here. The district court considered Rich-
       ards’s arguments, including his family ties in the United States, his
       reasons for re-entering the country, and the length of time since his
       prior oﬀenses. But it also considered that Richards had been re-
       moved from the United States twice before, and that his second
       removal in 2004 stemmed from a prior illegal re-entry conviction.
       Despite receiving a sentence of 46 months in prison for his ﬁrst il-
       legal re-entry oﬀense, Richards nonetheless attempted to commit
       the same crime again. The court explained that an upward vari-
       ance to 12 months—far below the statutory maximum sentence of
       20 years—was necessary and appropriate to deter Richards from
       reoﬀending, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
       punishment. See United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th
       Cir. 2016) (noting that a sentence well below the statutory maxi-
       mum is an indicator of reasonableness). The court’s conclusion
       was easily within its “considerable discretion” to decide whether
       and how much to vary outside the Guidelines range. Id.
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       6                   Opinion of the Court               23-11317

                                    III.
             The 12-month sentence imposed by the district court was
       procedurally and substantively reasonable. We therefore aﬃrm.
             AFFIRMED.