Court Opinion

ID: 9371669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 17:09:36.052852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:29.410295
License: Public Domain

J-S37045-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 MARSHONE LAMAR STEELE                  :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 434 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 6, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-15-CR-0004254-2019

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 MARSHONE LAMAR STEELE                  :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 435 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 6, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-15-CR-0004255-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                      FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2023

     Appellant, Marshone Lamar Steele, appeals from a judgment of

sentence entered January 6, 2022 in the Criminal Division of the Court of

Common Pleas of Chester County. In this direct appeal, Appellant's counsel

filed a petition for leave to withdraw and an accompanying brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v.

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We conclude that Appellant's counsel
J-S37045-22

complied     with    the   procedural       requirements       necessary    to   withdraw.

Furthermore, after independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the

appeal is wholly frivolous. Therefore, we grant counsel's petition to withdraw

and affirm the judgment of sentence.

        At the conclusion of a consolidated trial on September 10, 2021, a jury

found    Appellant    guilty   of    the    following   offenses     at   docket    number

CR-4254-2019 (“4254-2019”): involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a

child (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b)), unlawful contact with minor – sexual offenses

(18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1)), indecent assault – person less than 13 years of

age (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7)), corruption of minors – defendant age 18 or

above (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii)), and endangering the welfare of

children – parent/guardian/other             commits       offense        (18      Pa.C.S.A.

§ 4304(a)(1)). The charges filed at docket number 4254-2019 arose from a

sexual assault Appellant perpetrated against his daughter, M.A. Similarly, at

docket number CR-4255-2019 (“4255-2019”), the jury found Appellant guilty

of the following offenses:          three counts of rape of a child (18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 3121(c)), three counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child

(18     Pa.C.S.A.    § 3123(b)),      three    counts     of    unlawful    contact    with

minor – sexual offenses (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1)), aggravated indecent

assault of a child (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b)), indecent assault – person less

than    13   years    of   age      (18    Pa.C.S.A.    § 3126(a)(7)),      corruption    of

minors – defendant age 18 or above (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii)), and

endangering the welfare of children – parent/guardian/other commits offense

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(18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1)). The charges filed at docket number 4255-2019

arose from sexual assaults in which Appellant targeted his other daughter,

B.P.   At sentencing on January 6, 2022, the court imposed an aggregate

punishment of 85-170 years in prison.1 No post-sentence motions were filed.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on February 7, 2022.2 See 1 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 1908 (providing that were, as here, the last day of an appeal period falls on

Saturday, Saturday and Sunday are to be omitted from the computation of a

filing deadline).

       To prove the charges filed at 4254-2019, the Commonwealth presented

the testimony of M.A., who stated that, when she was five years of age,

Appellant penetrated her genitals with his penis. To prove the charges lodged

at 4255-2019, the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of B.P., who

confirmed that, when she was between six and 10 years of age, Appellant

engaged in digital, oral, and penile penetration of her genitalia and her mouth.

The Commonwealth buttressed B.P.’s testimony with that of mandatory

reporters Amanda Cavitt, a guidance counselor, and Dr. Brigette Miles, the
____________________________________________

1 The trial court also found that Appellant met the criteria for classification as
a sexually violent predator. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10 et seq.

2 Direct appeal counsel was appointed on February 4, 2022. In addition, the
trial court issued an order, on February 7, 2022, directing Appellant to file and
serve a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). After extension, appellate counsel filed a declaration of
intent to file an Anders brief pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). In the Anders
brief filed with this Court, counsel avers that Appellant did not communicate
with him in writing but simply alleged via telephone that the convictions were
improper and that the sentence imposed by the trial court was unduly harsh.
See Anders Brief at 7 and 15.

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principal, at the King’s Highway Elementary School in Coatsville, Pennsylvania

where B.P. was a student.

      On August 17, 2022, counsel filed an Anders brief with this Court,

together with a petition to withdraw as counsel. We begin our analysis by

considering   whether   counsel   has   fulfilled   the   necessary   procedural

requirements for withdrawing as counsel. See Commonwealth v. Flowers,

113 A.3d 1246, 1248–1249 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

      “In order to withdraw from appellate representation pursuant to

Anders, certain procedural and substantive requirements must be met.”

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 176 A.3d 355, 358 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Procedurally, counsel must,

      petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making
      a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
      determined that the appeal would be frivolous; furnish a copy of
      the brief to the defendant; and, advise the defendant that he or
      she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional
      arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court's
      attention.

Id. at 359.

      Substantively, counsel must file an Anders brief, in which counsel: (1)

provides a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the

record; (2) refers to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably

supports the appeal; (3) sets forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is

frivolous; and (4) states counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is

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frivolous.   Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 118 A.3d 415, 419–420 (Pa.

Super. 2015), quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

      In this case, counsel has complied with Anders' procedural and

substantive requirements.    “Therefore, we now have the responsibility ‘to

make a full examination of the proceedings and make an independent

judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.’”

Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881, 886 (Pa. Super. 2016), quoting

Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1248.

      The Anders brief develops only a single claim, which asks us to consider

whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdicts finding Appellant

guilty of engaging in sexual assaults against his daughters, B.P. and M.A.

      Our standard of review regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is as

follows:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is
      whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the [factfinder] to find every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may
      not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of
      the [factfinder].   In addition, we note that the facts and
      circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
      preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
      defendant's guilt may be resolved by the [factfinder] unless the
      evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
      probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
      circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
      proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
      means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
      the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
      evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier
      of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the

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      weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
      of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1014–1015 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(citations omitted).

      After careful review of the notes of testimony introduced at Appellant’s

trial, together with prevailing statutory and decisional law setting forth the

elements of each offense of conviction, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient to convict Appellant of each of the sex offenses committed against

his daughters, B.P. and M.A.      As such, a challenge to the sufficiency of

evidence in this case would be frivolous.

      Next, the Anders brief alludes to possible challenges to the weight of

the evidence and the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence. Appellate

counsel concedes, however, that neither of these claims was properly

preserved for appellate review before the trial court. See Anders Brief at 28.

      We have examined the pertinent caselaw addressing such claims under

the circumstances present in this case. Our decisions establish that, “when

direct appeal counsel has filed an Anders brief and [requests] permission to

withdraw from representation, this Court may overlook [waiver-causing

procedural errors committed by direct appeal/Anders counsel after a notice

of appeal has been filed] to ensure that Anders counsel has not overlooked

non-frivolous issues.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 231, 1011, 1016 (Pa. Super.

2020) (emphasis added). This Court cannot, however, address issues that

were not properly preserved in the trial court. Id. “[T]he mere filing of an

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Anders brief and petition to withdraw will not serve to resuscitate claims that

were already waived upon the filing of the notice of appeal.”           Id., citing

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal”).

        Turning to Appellant’s weight claim, we note that a weight challenge

must be preserved either in a post-sentence motion, a written motion before

sentencing, or orally prior to sentencing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3);

see also id., cmt. (providing that “[t]he purpose of this rule is to make it

clear that a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be raised with the

trial judge or it will be waived.”). A failure to present a weight claim to the

trial   court   via   one   of   the   prescribed   methods   constitutes   waiver.

Commonwealth v. Burkett, 830 A.2d 1034, 1037 (Pa. Super. 2003);

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 713 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding

that a claim challenging the weight of the evidence cannot be raised for the

first time on appeal). Direct appeal counsel concedes that any challenge to

the weight of the evidence is waived because neither trial counsel nor

Appellant preserved such an objection in the trial court. Our review of the

docket confirms counsel’s representation. Thus, any challenge to the weight

of the evidence in this case would be frivolous since such a claim was not

properly preserved.

        Concerning Appellant’s purported challenge to the discretionary aspects

of his sentence, it is well settled that there is no absolute right to appeal the

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discretionary aspects of a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894

A.2d 800, 805 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, where an appellant challenges the

discretionary aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a petition

for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163

(Pa. Super. 2007). As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d

162 (Pa. Super. 2010):

      An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
      must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

        We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
        appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
        902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
        at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
        sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's
        brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether
        there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed
        from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
        Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Id. at 170 (citation and brackets omitted).

      Our review of the record confirms that Appellant did not meet the second

requirement because he did not challenge the discretionary aspects of his

sentence in an appropriate post-sentence motion or at the time of sentencing.

This Court has held that the failure to preserve a discretionary sentencing

claim with the trial court in a timely post-sentence motion results in waiver,

even when appellate counsel petitions for withdrawal in the context of

Anders. See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa. Super.

2013) (en banc) (noting, where direct appeal counsel filed an Anders brief,

that “Absent [a timely post-sentence motion or claim raised during

                                      -8-
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sentencing], an objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.”).

Consequently,    we    conclude    that    Appellant’s   discretionary   sentencing

challenge is waived and, as such, the claim is frivolous because it is

unreviewable on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d

285, 291 (Pa. Super. 2008) (when an issue is waived, “pursuing th[e] matter

on direct appeal is frivolous”).

      We have independently reviewed the submissions of the parties,

together with the certified record, and are unable to discern any claims that

are non-frivolous.    Accordingly, we grant counsel's application to withdraw

and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

      Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/16/2023

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