Court Opinion

ID: 9672621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:58:04.277759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:17.503087
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. McFaddin, Associate Justice (dissenting). I respectfully but vigorously dissent from the Majority Opinion; and here, in headnote style, are the reasons for my dissent: I. The plea of former jeopardy, or double jeopardy, is premature in this case and should not be sustained. Former jeopardy can only be pleaded when the State attempts to bring the defendants to trial again. II. Since the plea of former jeopardy is premature in this case, there is no occasion for this Court to now consider any of the other matters urged by the appellants. III. But, if the other matters are considered, I am firmly of the opinion that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a mistrial. Now, I elaborate: On April 18,1963, the defendants were jointly placed on trial for forgery. In the course of that trial one of the defendants introduced evidence of insanity; and there was evidence that the other defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged offense. On April 22, 1963, the second day of the trial, because the insanity matter was brought into the case, the Trial Court declared a mistrial and sent both of the defendants to the State Hospital for examination under the provisions of Ark. Stat. Ann. §43-1301 (Supp. 1961). Then on April 25, 1963, the defendants moved that the charges against them be dismissed on the grounds: (a) that Ark. Stat. Ann. §43-1301 was unconstitutional; and (b) that the defendants had been placed in jeopardy “and to subject them to another trial would cause them to be placed in double jeopardy. ” The Court overruled the motion to dismiss; and from that order there is this appeal. The Majority is now holding that the Trial Court should have dismissed all charges against these defendants, for here is the concluding language of the Majority Opinion: “In accordance with the reasoning herein expressed, the court’s order overruling the motion to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy is reversed, cancelled, and set aside, and this cause is remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to enter an order dismissing Case No. 8255 against these appellants. It is so ordered.” Just because the trial was not completed, the defendants are now to be discharged as free of the charged offense, when there is testimony that one of them was insane and that the other defendant was intoxicated.1 The Majority reasons to its said conclusion on the theory of former jeopardy, or double jeopardy, as it is sometimes called. I have always understood that the plea of former jeopardy was a plea that was made by a defendant when he was brought to trial the second time, and related to the fact that he had been placed in jeopardy in a previous trial.2  The point I emphasize is, that it is not until an attempt may be made to bring these defendants to trial a second time that the plea of former jeopardy can be made. In the case at bar there is no definite showing that the State will ever endeavor to try either of these defendants on the charge for which this mistrial was declared. The result of the examination at the State Hospital, or any one of a number of subsequently occurring events, may convince the Prosecuting Attorney of the futility of further prosecution; but, at all events, former jeopardy cannot be pleaded until the State attempts a second trial; so I think the plea of former jeopardy is premature in the present staté of this record. I would dismiss the present appeal of the appellants. The Majority seeks to justify the plea of double jeopardy in the present case by quoting some, but not all, of the language in Jones v. State, 230 Ark. 18, 320 S. W. 2d 645. A brief review of the Jones ease will show the great difference in the factual situation between that case and the case at bar. In the Jones case, Jones was placed on trial, and a mistrial declared on October 9, 1957, over Jones’ opposition.3 He did not attempt to appeal from such mistrial. Later, on April 1, 1958, when the Prosecuting Attorney called the case against Jones for setting for trial, Jones then (six months after the first trial and when he was about to be retried) pleaded former jeopardy. The Trial Court denied the plea of former jeopardy and Jones appealed from the refusal of that plea made in April 1958. We held that the refusal of the plea of former jeopardy in April 1958 was appealable, saying, as quoted in the Majority Opinion, that the plea of former jeopardy should be decided4 before the defendant was forced into a long trial. It was in regard to the appeal in April 1958, in advance of the complete retrial, that the language was used in the Jones case which is quoted in the Majority Opinion in the case at bar. The point that I am making is that it is not until an attempt is made to bring the defendant to trial a second time that the plea of former jeopardy can be made. We have an Arkansas case that sheds considerable light on the situation. It is the case of Carson v. State, 198 Ark. 102, 128 S. W. 2d 373. In that case Carson was charged with first degree murder, and when brought to trial in September 1938 he pleaded insanity, and the jury returned a verdict that he was insane at the time of the trial. The Trial Court decided that the question should not have been submitted to the jury; so the Trial Court, on its own motion, declared a mistrial and sent the defendant to the State Hospital for examination. Now notice that even after the jury brought in its verdict, the Court set the verdict aside and declared a mistrial and sent the defendant to the State Hospital. Two months láter, when the hospital reported the defendant sane, the defendant was again brought to trial and he pleaded double jeopardy, and pointed out that a jury had been impanelled, a jury verdict rendered, the jury verdict set aside, the Court had declared a mistrial, and had committed the defendant. This Court said the plea of double jeopardy could not be sustained; and here is the wording of the Majority Opinion: “ It is finally argued that the court erred in refusing his plea of former jeopardy. At the first trial, the court submitted three issues: (1) Whether appellant was guilty of some degree of murder; (2) whether he was insane at the time the crime, was alleged to have been committed; and (3) whether he was insane at the time of trial. The jury found him insane at the time of trial and nothing more, and thereafter the court declared a mistrial. This was not sufficient to support the plea of former jeopardy. The rule is stated in 15 Am. Jur., p. 51, as follows: ‘ One found by the jury to be insane at time of trial cannot plead former jeopardy when arraigned a second time on the same charge, although the jury at the same time returned a verdict of guilty which was set aside by the court.’ Our statute, §3881 of Pope’s Digest, is persuasive to this same effect.” In keeping with the holding of this Court in the case of Carson v. State, supra, I maintain: (a) that not only could the plea of double jeopardy not be made at the time that it was made in the case at bar; but (b) that it would not be a good plea at any time under the facts in this case. I submit the Carson case as full authority for my position. Finally, I maintain that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in the case at bar in declaring the mistrial and in ordering the defendants committed to the State Hospital for examination; and I entirely dissent from that part of the Majority Opinion which says that there was no “overruling necessity.” For each and all of the reasons herein stated I respectfully but vigorously dissent from the Majority holding in the case at bar.  Muse, in his confession and in his testimony, stated both he and Cody were intoxicated. Cody did not testify.    For a discussion of former or double jeopardy see 15 Am. Jur. p. 38 et seq., “Criminal Law” §359 et seq.; and see also 22 C.J.S. p. 614 et seq., “Criminal Law” §238 et seq.; and on when the plea of former jeopardy can be made, see 22 C.J.S. p. 1244 et seq., “Criminal Law” §440 et seq.   The Jones opinion recites, on page 20 of the Arkansas Report: “The Court declared a mistrial on October 9. 1957; but did not rule on the jeopardy plea at that time. Then, on April 1, 1958, the following occurred in Court: ...”   This was in accordance with the general rule, as contained in 14 Am. Jur. p. 958, “Criminal Law” §382: “The better practice seems to be to try and determine a plea of former jeopardy before commencing the trial on the merits for, if the plea, is sustained, the defendant goes free and there can be no trial.”