Court Opinion

ID: 9373611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:11.016918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.538117
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     CHASE M. LENTZ,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                          SF-1221-15-0688-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                       DATE: June 30, 2022
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Chase M. Lentz, Fresno, California, pro se.

           Christine Foley and Kevin Mack, Sacramento, California, for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                               Member Limon recused himself and
                       did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                         FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     found jurisdiction over some of the claims he raised in this individual right of
     action (IRA) appeal, denied the appellant’s request for corrective action over

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     those claims, and dismissed the appellant’s remaining claims for lack of
     jurisdiction.       The initial decision also dismissed the appellant’s claim of
     involuntary retirement under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Generally, we
     grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affe cted the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed.        See
     title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and, except
     as expressly MODIFIED by this Final Order to find that the administrative judge
     improperly applied collateral estoppel to bar the appellant’s claim that his
     resignation was involuntary, the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that his
     February 5, 2014 protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the proposed
     14-day suspension under the knowledge-timing test, and the appellant did not
     prove that his November 18, 2014 disclosure was protect ed, we AFFIRM the
     initial decision.

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2         On May 15, 2014, the agency issued the appellant a letter of reprimand
     (LOR) based on charges of acting outside the scope of his authority and conduct
     unbecoming. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 68. On November 13, 2014, the
     agency again charged him with acting outside the scope of his authority and
     conduct unbecoming, and proposed a 14-day suspension.             Id. at 49.    In a
                                                                                            3

     February 10, 2015 decision letter, the deciding official sustained both charges
     underlying the proposed suspension. IAF, Tab 6 at 31. The suspension penalty
     was to be effective February 15, 2015.            Id.   On February 11, 2015, the
     appellant notified the agency that he was resigning from his position, effective
     February 13, 2015. Id. at 24. He indicated that his resignation was the result of a
     hostile work environment. Id.
¶3         The appellant filed an IRA appeal alleging that the agency retaliated
     against him for whistleblowing activity by issuing the LOR, by suspending him
     effective February 15, 2015, and by harassing him and constructively discharging
     him effective February 13, 2015, the effective date of his resignation. 2
     IAF, Tab 1.    The administrative judge dismissed the appellant’s constructive
     discharge/involuntary retirement claim under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
     IAF, Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID) at 5-8. The administrative judge also found
     that the Board has jurisdiction over a portion of the appeal pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
     § 1221, but he denied the appellant’s request for corrective action for those
     claims. The administrative judge dismissed the remaining portion of the appeal
     for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 8-32.
¶4         Specifically, the administrative judge found that the app ellant exhausted his
     administrative remedy before the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), and
     established jurisdiction over the following disclosures: (1) an October 23, 2013
     statement concerning removing a literary quotation from the appellant’s work
     space; (2) a February 5, 2014 allegation that the appellant’s supervisor made false

     2
       The appellant previously filed an appeal alleging that his resignation was involuntary,
     which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant filed a petition for review
     which the Board denied, affirming the initial decision. Lentz v. Department of the
     Interior, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0363-I-1, Final Order (Jan. 11, 2016).
     The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s decision and
     remanded the appeal for further consideration of the appellant’s claims, which the
     Board will adjudicate in a separate appeal. Lentz v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
     876 F.3d 1380, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Lentz v. Department of the Interior,
     MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0363-R-1.
                                                                                          4

     statements and withheld facts, which resulted in disciplinary action being taken
     against the appellant; and (3) the appellant’s November 18, 2014 statement that
     his supervisor was trying to coerce and intimidate him into not using his sick or
     Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) leave. ID at 10; IAF, Tab 1.
     The administrative judge also found that the appellant exhausted his remedy
     before OSC regarding his claim that the agency retaliated against him for his
     equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity. ID at 10; IAF, Tab 1.
¶5        The administrative judge further found that the appellant exhausted his
     remedy before OSC regarding his claim that, in reprisal for his protected acti vity,
     the agency (1) issued him an LOR, (2) proposed his suspension, and (3) harassed
     him. ID at 10. However, the administrative judge found that the appellant did
     not exhaust his remedy before OSC concerning his claims that the agency both
     constructively and actually suspended him. Id. Additionally, the administrative
     judge found that the appellant failed to prove that he exhausted his remedy with
     OSC regarding numerous other disclosures 3 the appellant identified in his appeal.
     Finally, the administrative judge found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the
     appellant’s claim of reprisal for filing an EEO complaint.                ID at 31-32.
     Accordingly, the administrative judge dismissed the appellant’s involuntary
     resignation claim pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, he denied
     corrective action for claims over which the Board has jurisdiction, and he
     dismissed the remaining claims for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 32.
¶6        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initi al decision. 4 Petition
     for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

     3
       The administrative judge identified these alphabetically as disclosures (a) – (t).
     ID at 11-14.
     4
        The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s determination that he is
     collaterally estopped from arguing that his resignation amounted to a constructive
     discharge. Based on the court’s decision in Lentz v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
     876 F.3d 1380, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2017), which held that collateral estoppel could not
     apply to the appellant’s constructive discharge claim, we agree. Thus, we modify the
                                                                                           5

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW 5
¶7         To establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, an appellant must
     establish that he exhausted his OSC remedies and nonfrivolously allege that:
     (1) he made a protected disclosure; and (2) the disclosure was a contributing
     factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action. Yunus v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
     Sherman v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 644, ¶ 7 (2015).
     A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the
     matter at issue. 6 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). An allegation generally will be considered
     nonfrivolous when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an
     allegation that is more than conclusory, plausible on its face, and material to the
     legal issues in the appeal. Id. Vague, conclusory, unsupported, and pro forma
     allegations of alleged wrongdoing do not meet the nonfrivolous pleading standard
     needed to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal.                   El v.
     Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6 (2015), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 921
     (Fed. Cir. 2016).

     initial decision to vacate its finding that the appellant is collaterally estopped from
     arguing that his resignation was a constructive discharge. Nevertheless, we need not
     determine whether the appellant proved that his alleged involuntary resignation
     constituted a personnel action because, even assuming that the appellant met that
     burden, and as set forth more fully below, he has not shown that his disclosures were
     protected. See Parikh v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 197, ¶ 7 (2011)
     (holding that the Board may resolve the merits issues in an IRA appeal in any order it
     deems most efficient); but see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2) (permitting a finding on whether
     the agency met its clear and convincing evidence burden only after a finding has been
     made that a protected disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action).
     5
      We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
     and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
     6
       The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit clarified that, in whistle blower
     cases, the nonfrivolous allegation standard is “analogous to the ‘well-pleaded complaint
     rule’ used to evaluate federal question jurisdiction in federal court.” Hessami v. Merit
     Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
                                                                                        6

¶8         To satisfy the contributing factor criterion at the jurisdictional stage of the
      case, the appellant need only raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact of, or
      the content of, the protected disclosure was one factor that tended to affect a
      personnel action in any way. Sherman, 122 M.S.P.R. 644, ¶ 8.
¶9         After establishing the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, the appellant
      then must establish a prima facie case of whistleblowing retaliation by proving by
      preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure that was a contributing
      factor in a personnel action taken against him.     5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Lu v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (2015). The appellant
      has a right to a hearing to meet this burden. Peterson v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 8 (2011). If the appellant makes out a prima facie
      case, then the agency must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would
      have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected disclosure.
      5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Lu, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7.

      The Appellant’s Disclosures
            The appellant alleged that he notified three individuals that someone’s
            removing a paper copy of a literary quote from his work space was an act
            of censorship and violated his right to free speech.
¶10        The appellant contended that on October 23, 2013, he noti fied three
      individuals that someone removed a copy of a literary quotation from his work
      space and that this constituted an act of censorship and violated his right to free
      speech. The record reflects that the appellant had the following quotation printed
      on a piece of paper and taped to the back of his work chair: “they smashed up
      things and creatures and then retreated back into their money or their vast
      carelessness or whatever it was that kept them together, and let other people clean
      up the mess that they had made.” IAF, Tab 21 at 56. It is undisputed that the
      appellant’s supervisor removed the quote from his chair sometime in
      October 2013.   Id. at 55.    The administrative judge found that the appellant
      exhausted his remedy before OSC regarding this disclosure and that it constituted
                                                                                             7

      a nonfrivolous allegation that he made a disclosure protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8). 7 ID at 14.
¶11         The administrative judge then apparently assumed without making a finding
      that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that this disclosure was a contributing
      factor, as the administrative judge found further that the appellant failed to prove
      by preponderant evidence that a reasonable person would believe this disclosure
      evidenced a violation by his supervisor of any law, rule, or regulation.
      ID at 14-18. To the extent the appellant argued that he believed his supervisor ’s
      actions in removing the paper violated his First Amendment right to free speech,
      the administrative judge found that no reasonable person could believe that the
      appellant’s quotation amounted to speech on a matter of public concern.
      Thus, the administrative judge found that no reasonable person could believe the
      appellant was disclosing either a violation of his right to free speech under the
      First Amendment, or of any other law, rule or regulation. 8 ID at 17.
¶12         Regarding the appellant’s assertion that removing the paper quote amounted
      to his supervisor’s denying him due process, the administrative judge found that
      the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that he reasonably
      believed that he had a protected property interest in the piece of paper containing
      the literary quotation.     Additionally, the administrative judge found that the
      appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that he had a protected

      7
        In light of our analysis below, we have not addressed whether the a dministrative
      judge’s finding—that the appellant’s claim that the October 23, 2013 notification
      constituted a nonfrivolous allegation that he made a protected disclosure—was correct.
      8
        Although the administrative judge failed to make a jurisdictional contributing factor
      determination on this disclosure prior to addressing whether the appellant proved by
      preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure, the administrative judge
      correctly found that the appellant’s disclosure was not protected. Thus, any error by the
      administrative judge does not warrant reversal. An adjudicatory error that is not
      prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversing an initial
      decision. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984).
                                                                                             8

      property interest in the literary quote, or that his supervisor’s actions constituted
      an abuse of discretion. ID at 18.
¶13         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge ’s decision
      addressed only the free speech element, and that the administrative judge failed to
      address the taking of his property and his Fifth Amendment right to due process.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. The appellant asserts that the fact that the agency’s Bureau
      of Land Management State Human Resources Office ordered the literary quote
      returned to him shows that he has a property interest in it. Id. at 8.
¶14         However, contrary to the appellant’s assertions, the administrative judge
      addressed the appellant’s due process argument and correctly found that the
      appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that he reasonably believed
      that he had a protected property interest in the piece of paper taped t o the back of
      his chair. ID at 18.
¶15         Similarly, while the appellant does not specifically argue that the
      administrative judge failed to address his abuse of authority argument concerning
      this disclosure, the initial decision shows that the administrative ju dge thoroughly
      addressed this argument and found that the appellant failed to prove by
      preponderant evidence that his supervisor’s actions constituted an abuse of
      authority. Id. We have reviewed the administrative judge’s determination and we
      find no basis upon which to disturb it. Id.

            The appellant alleged that he disclosed that his supervisor withheld facts
            and made false statements about him, resulting in disciplinary action taken
            against him.
¶16         The   appellant   argued      that   he   made   a   protected     disclosure   on
      February 5, 2014, when he notified the field manager that his supervisor was
      withholding facts and making false statements regarding her knowledge of the
      goat grazing program and authorization.          IAF, Tab 3 at 21, Tab 18 at 77.
      The administrative judge found that the appellant’s assertion constituted a
      nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure, and that the appellant
                                                                                              9

      nonfrivolously alleged that his disclosure to the field manager was a contributing
      factor in her decision to issue the LOR. ID at 14-15. The administrative judge
      found further that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that he
      reasonably believed he made a protected disclosure to the field manager regarding
      the goat grazing. Specifically, the administrative judge found that the appellant
      failed to prove by preponderant evidence that a reasonable person, with
      knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the
      appellant, would conclude that the appellant’s supervisor committed a violation
      of a law, rule, or regulation, or an abuse of authority.                Additionally, the
      administrative judge found that the appellant knew the proper process for
      approving goat grazing permits and that he failed to prove by preponderant
      evidence    that   he   reasonably   believed    that   during    the     relevant   time,
      December 2014, his supervisor had given him verbal authorization to sign the
      goat grazing permit at issue. ID at 20-26.
¶17         However, the administrative judge also found that the appellant did not
      show that this claimed disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s
      issuing the proposed suspension notice. ID at 15. Specifically, the administrative
      judge found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that the deciding
      official,   who    became   the   appellant’s   supervisor   on    August      25,   2014
      (new supervisor), knew about the appellant’s February 5, 2014 disclosure to the
      field manager prior to her issuing the notice of proposed suspension. ID at 15.
¶18         On review, the appellant contends that his new supervisor knew about his
      February 5, 2014 disclosure prior to her issuing the notice of proposed suspension
      on November 13, 2014, and that the administrative judge erred by finding that he
      had not shown that the disclosure was a contributing factor. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.
      The appellant asserts that, prior to issuing the notice, the new supervisor had
      access to the LOR, which was in his personnel file, and that his disclosure was
      identified in the LOR when it alleged that he had “demonstrated conduct
      unbecoming when you accused your supervisor of not only lying to me, but also
                                                                                        10

      willfully deceiving me.”     PFR File, Tab 1 at 6.       In addition, the appellant
      contends that the LOR is mentioned throughout the suspension proposal notice.
      Id. He asserts further that, because the field manager and the new supervisor
      discussed the proposed suspension, the new supervisor also had constructive
      knowledge of his disclosure. Id.
¶19         An appellant’s nonfrivolous allegation that the personnel action occurred
      within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the
      protected activity was a contributing factor in that action is sufficient to meet the
      knowledge-timing test, and satisfies the appellant’s burden to nonfrivolously
      allege that his protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel
      action. Carney v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 7 (2014).
      Therefore, if the appellant has alleged that the supervisors were aware of his
      disclosures prior to the agency’s decision to propose his suspension he will have
      made allegations of fact that, if proven, could establish a prima facie case of
      Board jurisdiction. Id., ¶¶ 7-11.
¶20         Upon reviewing the record, we find that it supports the appellant’s
      assertions.   Specifically, the proposed suspension referred to the LOR which
      relied on the conversation wherein the alleged disclosure occurred. IAF, Tab 6
      at 49, 51, 56-58. Further, the proposed suspension indicated that it was based on
      the same misconduct cited in the LOR, stated that “a search of your personnel
      record found” the LOR, and quoted the LOR. IAF, Tab 6 at 59, 62, 64-66.
¶21         Based upon the record evidence, we cannot conclude that the proposing
      official contemplated the proposed suspension, initiated the proposal notice, or
      issued the proposal notice prior to learning of the appellant ’s February 5, 2014
      disclosure to the field manager.    See, e.g., Fickie v. Department of the Army,
      86 M.S.P.R. 525, ¶ 9 (2000) (finding that an action              that was merely
      “contemplated and in preparation” prior to a disclosure can serve as the predicate
      personnel action in an IRA appeal). Thus, under the knowledge/timing test, we
      find that the decision to propose the appellant’s suspension was made after the
                                                                                       11

      new supervisor learned of the appellant’s February 5, 2014 disclosure and that it
      may have had some effect on her decision to propose his suspension. Carey v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 93 M.S.P.R. 676, ¶ 10 (2003) (finding that an
      appellant need only prove that the fact or content of the disclosure was one of the
      factors that tended to affect the personnel action in any way). Accordingly, even
      though the proposing official was not the appellant’s supervisor at the time of the
      disclosure, we find that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that his
      protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the proposed suspension under
      the knowledge/timing test. We thus vacate the administrative judge’s finding that
      the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that his February 5, 2014 disclosure
      was a contributing factor in the decision to propose his suspension under 5 U.S.C.
      § 1221(e)(l).
¶22         Nevertheless, even though we find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that the February 5, 2014 disclosure was a contributing factor in the
      notice of proposed suspension, we reach the same ultimate finding as did the
      administrative judge, namely that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant
      evidence that this disclosure constituted a protected disclosure. Specifically, the
      administrative judge found that the appellant: (1) previously had followed the
      process to obtain the necessary approval for the goat grazing program; (2) did not
      obtain the required supervisors’ signatures for the authorization at issue here; and
      (3) was not credible in claiming that he requested and received prior verbal
      authorization and was contradicted by the written record.            ID at 24-25.
      Additionally, the administrative judge found the appellant ’s alleged disclosure
      both vague and conclusory because he failed to provide the details of the
      conversation in which he allegedly received verbal authorization. Thus, while the
      administrative judge erred by not finding that the February 5, 2014 disclosure was
      a contributing factor in the proposed suspension, we agree with him that the
      appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that he made a disclosure to
      the field manager on February 5, 2014, that a reasonable person, with knowledge
                                                                                               12

      of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the appellant, would
      believe evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation or an abuse of autho rity
      by the appellant’s supervisor.

               The appellant alleged that he made a protected disclosure that his
               supervisor tried to coerce and intimidate him into not using his FMLA
               leave.
¶23        Concerning this November 18, 2014 disclosure, the administrative judge
      found that the appellant exhausted his remedy bef ore OSC, and that the
      appellant’s allegations constituted a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected
      disclosure. ID at 9-10, 14-15. However, the administrative judge found further
      that this disclosure could not have been a contributing factor in the agency’s
      issuing the LOR or its notice of proposed 14-day suspension.                   ID at 16.
      The administrative judge noted that the appellant never returned to work after
      November 14, 2014, prior to his resignation; thus his alleged disclosure after that
      date could not have been a contributing factor to a hostile work environment due
      to harassment.
¶24        On      review,       the    appellant   challenges   the   administrative    judge’s
      determination that his alleged disclosure after he permanently left t he agency
      could not have been a contributing factor to a hostile work environment due to
      harassment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. As the administrative judge correctly found,
      however, the appellant’s alleged disclosure on or after November 18, 2014,
      could not have been a contributing factor in the agency’s earlier issuance of the
      May 15, 2014 LOR, or the November 13, 2014 notice of a proposed 14 -day
      suspension.     Rumsey v. Department of Justice, 120 M.S.P.R. 259, ¶ 27 (2013)
      (finding that disclosures made after the agency took the personnel action at issue
      cannot have been a contributing factor). Furthermore, only agency actions that,
      individually or collectively, have practical and significant effects on the overall
      nature    and    quality     of    an   employee’s   working     conditions,   duties,   or
      responsibilities will be found to constitute a personnel action covered by 5 U.S.C.
                                                                                        13

      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17,
      ¶ 16. Thus, we find no merit to the appellant’s claims in this regard.
¶25         Moreover, the appellant has not proven that this disclosure is protected.
      The appellant asserted that his supervisor tried to coerce and intimidate him into
      not using his sick or FMLA leave in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 6385(a), which
      provides that an employee shall not directly or indirectly intimidate, threaten, or
      coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any other employee for the
      purpose of interfering with the employee’s exercise of any rights relating to
      FMLA leave. IAF, Tab 15 at 21-22. More specifically, the appellant contended
      that the proposing official informed him in a November 18, 2014 FMLA letter
      that the FMLA “entitles eligible employees to take up to twelve workweeks of
      unpaid leave (LWOP) in a 12-month period,” with the word “unpaid” underlined
      and in bold typeface, and that this emphasis incorrectly “impl[ied] that [he] will
      only be entitled to unpaid leave.” IAF, Tab 3 at 36 -37. He also claimed that the
      letter indicated that he could substitute paid leave to which he was entitled for the
      unpaid leave “upon [the supervisor’s] approval,” and that th is latter language was
      “meant to make me feel that I have less entitlement to leave than I actually do.”
      Id. at 37. The appellant also noted that the letter instructed him to provide the
      agency with a completed Form WH-380, Certification of Health Care Provider,
      and that this was “another attempt to coerce and intimidate me” because agencies
      may request such medical certification, but are not required to do so.            Id.
      Finally, the appellant addressed the letter’s statement that a failure to provide
      adequate medical documentation to support an absence may result in a placement
      on absence without leave (AWOL), which may result in disciplinary action.
      Id. at 38. The appellant asserted that this statement “is intimidating and coercing
      me by emphasizing AWOL and disciplinary action, but leaving out that I may
      request that the provisional leave be charged as leave without pay or charged to
      annual and/or sick leave.”     Id.   The agency approved FMLA leave for the
      appellant on November 25, 2014, one week later. IAF, Tab 18 at 27.
                                                                                        14

¶26         The record does not appear to include a copy of the agency’s
      November 18, 2014 FMLA letter. However, even assuming that the appellant has
      accurately characterized the agency’s statements in that letter, they merely reflect
      and are consistent with the legal and regulatory requirements relating to FMLA
      leave and the fact that AWOL can lead to disciplinary action.            See 5 U.S.C.
      §§ 6382(c)-(d), 6383; 5 C.F.R. §§ 630.1203(a), .1206; see also Adams v.
      Department of Labor, 112 M.S.P.R. 288, ¶ 8 (2009) (holding that a sustained
      charge of AWOL is inherently connected to the efficiency of the service).
      Under these circumstances, the appellant has not proven that a reasonable p erson,
      with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by him,
      would believe that these statements evidenced a violation of law, rule, or
      regulation, such as section 6385(a), an abuse of authority by the appellant’s
      supervisor, or any of the other situations detailed under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
      Thus, we agree with the administrative judge’s determination that the appellant
      was not entitled to corrective action as to this purported disclosure.

      Exhaustion of Claims before OSC
¶27         In response to the administrative judge’s determination that the appellant
      failed to exhaust some of his claims before OSC, the appellant asserts on review
      that OSC’s letter dated May 16, 2016, states, “You also allege that the negative
      references are retaliation . . . . Because OSC previously made a determination to
      close an earlier complaint involving all but the most recent allegations involving
      negative references, OSC’s current review only involved the allegedly retaliatory
      negative references.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 28. Thus, the appellant argues that the
      administrative judge erred in determining that he did not exhaust his remedies
      before OSC.
¶28         It appears from the       appellant’s OSC complaint and with OSC’s
      May 16, 2016 letter that the appellant may have exhausted his remedies with OSC
      regarding some, or all 20, of the disclosures which the administrative judge found
      that he had not exhausted. Having found evidence that the appellant exhausted
                                                                                            15

      his OSC remedies with at least some of the 20 disclosures, we would ordinarily
      remand this appeal to determine jurisdiction on those claims, and if appropriate, a
      hearing on the merits. Kukoyi v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 111 M.S.P.R.
      404, ¶ 19 (2009), overruled on other grounds by Mason v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 26 n. 7 (2011). Nevertheless, we find
      remand unnecessary in this appeal. Courts have the inherent authority, in the
      interest of judicial efficiency, to dismiss an action because of the pendency of
      another action, so long as an identity of issues exists and the controlling issues in
      the dismissed action will be determined in another lawsuit.          Kinler v. General
      Services Administration, 44 M.S.P.R. 262, 263 (1990). In most cases of judicial
      efficiency, we would dismiss the subsequent appeal and the prior a ppeal would be
      adjudicated. Id.; O’Leary v. Office of Personnel Management, 90 M.S.P.R. 124,
      ¶ 7 (2001).
¶29         However, we are dismissing the appellant’s claims in this appeal, which the
      administrative judge found were not exhausted, so that these claims can be
      considered in the appellant’s subsequent appeal that was filed with the Board’s
      Western Regional Office. The subsequent appeal was docketed as an IRA appeal,
      in which the appellant challenges the numerous disclosures which were found to
      be not exhausted before OSC in this appeal, and he alleges the agency took the
      action partly in response to his protected disclosures. Lentz v. Department of the
                                                               9
      Interior, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-21-0497-W-2.               The appellant has included

      9
        This separate IRA appeal before the Board’s Western Regional Office was originally
      docketed as MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-16-0681-W-1. The appeal was refiled and
      dismissed without prejudice multiple times. See MSPB Docket Nos. SF-1221-16-0681-
      W-1 through SF-1221-16-0681-W-9. When the appeal was refiled a ninth time, due to
      technical limitations of the Board’s software, it was assigned a new docket number,
      MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-21-0497-W-1, and was again dismissed without prejudice
      and then refiled. On March 8, 2022, the Board’s Western Regional Office issued an
      initial decision in MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-21-0497-W-2, dismissing the appeal
      without prejudice to be automatically refiled within 15 calendar days of the first of the
      following to occur: (1) the date of issuance of a Board opinion in SF-1221-15-0688-
      W-1; or (2) September 5, 2022. See MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-21-0497-W-2, Initial
                                                                                           16

      the same OSC documentation that he submitted in this appeal, and he included
      evidence that he submitted a new filing with OSC in December 2015.
      PFR File, Tab    1;   Lentz   v.   Department    of   the   Interior,    MSPB    Docket
      No. SF-1221-16-0681-W-1.
¶30         We find that the two appeals share an identity of issues. We also find that
      the controlling issue of the present appeal—whether the appellant has made a
      nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction for an IRA appeal and if so whether the
      agency took the personnel action in reprisal for his disclosures —also will be
      determined by the Board’s Western Regional Office. Because the appeal before
      the Board’s Western Regional Office addresses the same issues currently before
      us, we deny the portions of the appellant’s petition for review concerning the
      disclosures over which the administrative judge found that the appellant had not
      exhausted his remedy with OSC, and dismiss those portions in the in terest of
      justice.

      The Appellant’s Remaining Arguments
¶31         Finally, the appellant reasserts his version of the various incidents and he
      contends that the administrative judge ignored his evidence and arguments
      throughout the initial decision. 10 PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-16.            For example, the
      appellant argues that the administrative judge relied on inconsist ent statements by
      the appellant’s supervisor concerning the proper authorization for grazing and he
      asserts that the administrative judge erred by not addressing his claim that he had
      received verbal authorization, and that even so, no authorization was required

      Decision (Mar. 8, 2022). After the issuance of this decision, the Board’s Western
      Regional Office shall refile the appeal as MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-21-0497-W-3.
      10
         The appellant asserts on review that the administrative judge left out the agency’s
      characterizing the charges as malicious and intentional in the LOR, and he contends that
      the administrative judge changed the agency’s burden of proof by failing to require the
      agency to prove these elements.         PFR, Tab 1 at 4; IAF, Tab 28 at 45 -46.
      However, because the merits of the underlying adverse actions are not before the Board
      in this appeal, the administrative judge did not determine the merits of the charged
      misconduct, and we have not considered these arguments on review.
                                                                                        17

      because he had the authority to acquire services within the micro purchase
      amount. Id. at 9-10. In this connection, the appellant also reasserts his clai m that
      he was acting under the assumption that he had appropriate National
      Environmental Policy Act 11 documentation and authorization to conduct the goat
      vegetation management project, and that his actions were not malicious and
      intentional.    Id. at 14.   The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s
      credibility determinations regarding his supervisor and the testimony concerning
      a meeting he had with her, and he asserts that the administrative judge ’s finding
      that he did not have a “reasonable belief” that his supervisor authorized the
      project is “conclusory and unsupported” by the evidence he submitted.
      Id. at 12-13.    Similarly, the appellant challenges the administrative judge ’s
      finding that his disclosure concerning the interns was vague and conclus ory and
      thus not protected. Id. at 15.
¶32         We have considered these arguments, as well as the appellant’s many other
      arguments on review concerning the administrative judge ’s weighing of the
      evidence. However, we discern no reason to reweigh the evidence or substitute
      our assessment of the record evidence for that of the administrative judge.
      See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no
      reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the
      evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned
      conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services , 33 M.S.P.R.
      357, 359 (1987) (same). Accordingly, we find that the appellant has provided no
      basis upon which to reverse the initial decision.

      11
        The National Environmental Policy Act sets forth a procedural process for analyzing
      proposed Federal actions. IAF, Tab 6 at 68.
                                                                                          18

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 12
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.       5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.          You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                   5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit    your    petition   to   the    court    at   the
following address:

12
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                    19

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney n or warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
                                                                                20

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
                                                                                     21

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or a ny court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 13 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

13
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           22

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.