Court Opinion

ID: 9704756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:45:23.480342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:05.076256
License: Public Domain

Abrams, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom Liacos, C.J., joins). I agree with the court that the judge erred in his method of determining damages and that *494the matter should be remanded to the trial court. I dissent from the court’s determination that it should depart from its traditional role of reviewing for errors of law and become the fact finder as to the time period for the assessment of damages. “We defer to the trial court’s special role as the primary fact finder in our judicial system; such obligatory deference is embodied in the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review.” Kendall v. Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 625 (1992). “ [I]t is the duty of this court to examine the evidence and to decide the case on its own judgment, giving due weight to the findings of the judge, which will not be reversed on oral testimony unless plainly wrong.” Seder v. Gibbs, 333 Mass. 445, 446 (1956). Where, as here, the judge misapplied the law governing damages, the usual remedy is a remand to the trial court for a determination of damages based on correct principles of law. See Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 397 Mass. 525, 536 (1986).
The court states, “We think that six months fairly represents the outside period for which damages should be awarded.” Ante at 491. The court bases this conclusion on the fact that “[s]ix months was an adequate time within which to adjust to the departures.” Supra at 492 n.6. The court does not suggest that six months was the only proper date to use in assessing damages. That should be a matter of evidence and fact-finding. “[Ajppellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de nova.” First Pa. Mortgage Trust v. Dorchester Sav. Bank, 395 Mass. 614, 621 (1985). Rapp v. Barry, 398 Mass. 1004, 1005 (1986). Therefore, I would remand this matter for further proceedings “to the tribunal charged with the task of factfinding in the first instance.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). The retirement of the original trial judge is irrelevant. I think it a grave error for this court to act both as an appellate court and as the trial court.