Court Opinion

ID: 9660554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:15:50.716684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:20.450977
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. I disagree with the majority opinion on Issue III and Issue IX raised by Appellant. First, it is my opinion that the trial court erred in allowing the medical examiner to testify that Rhonda Allen was pregnant when she was murdered.
*210Introducing evidence of Ms. Allen’s pregnancy was irrelevant since there was no correlation between this evidence and her death. KRE 402 provides that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.
The medical examiner’s testimony was introduced during the guilt phase of the trial. During this phase, the jury’s role is to evaluate the relevant facts concerning guilt or innocence and the intent of the accused. Knowledge that Ms. Allen was pregnant would not enhance the jury’s ability to make that determination when there was no evidence offered to suggest that the accused knew Ms. Allen was pregnant and that his knowledge contributed to his acts. This Court observed in Chumbler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 905 S.W.2d 488, 496 (1995) that “[wjhere the value of evidence for a legitimate purpose is slight and the jury’s probable misuse of the evidence for an incompetent purpose is great, the evidence may be excluded altogether” (quoting Nugent v. Commonwealth, Ky., 639 S.W.2d 761, 764 (1982)). It is a reasonable presumption that this information would characterize Appellant as the murderer of a mother and her unborn child and that such a characterization would have an undue prejudicial effect.
Additionally, KRE 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The probative value of the medical examiner’s testimony as to Ms. Allen’s pregnancy did not outweigh the potential for undue prejudice to Appellant. The testimony was not offered to satisfy the Commonwealth’s burden. Accordingly, the testimony was inadmissible.
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s belief, no error is harmless when the effect is undue prejudice. It is therefore my opinion that the trial court erred by allowing the medical examiner to testify that Ms. Allen was pregnant at the time of her murder.
Secondly, it is my opinion that the trial court erred by allowing the inclusion of Penalty Instruction 7 that may be interpreted to contend that death is the first option for the jury to consider. Such an interpretation may result in the inquiry of a dissenting juror’s reasonable doubt about why death should not be imposed.
Contrary to the reasoning of the majority, I believe that the second sentence of Penalty Instruction 7, “if upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, you shall instead fix his punishment at a sentence of imprisonment,” implies that death is the first option. It is a reasonable presumption that the jury may have erroneously interpreted Penalty Instruction 7 to mean that it was to impose death unless it had a reasonable doubt that the death penalty should be imposed.
To eliminate the potential for erroneous interpretation, it is my opinion that the sentence of death should be vacated and a new sentencing hearing held, at which time Penalty Instruction 7 would be omitted.
JOHNSTONE, J., joins this dissent as to Issue IX.