Court Opinion

ID: 9559697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:33:55.346181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:33.607075
License: Public Domain

*859Durham, J.
(dissenting) — The majority unnecessarily invalidates Kittitas County's tax on ski lift tickets. By taking language out of context and misplacing emphasis, the majority interprets RCW 36.38.010 in a manner which is clearly at odds with the intent of the Legislature. Therefore, I dissent.
RCW 36.38.010 grants authority to any county to levy a tax of not more than 1 cent on 20 cents "to be paid for county purposes by persons who pay an admission charge to any place". The dispute before us centers on the definition of "admission charge", which states:
As used in this chapter, the term "admission charge" includes a charge made for season tickets or subscriptions, a cover charge, or a charge made for use of seats and tables, reserved or otherwise, and other similar accommodations; a charge made for food and refreshments in any place where any free entertainment, recreation, or amusement is provided; a charge made for rental or use of equipment or facilities for purpose of recreation or amusement, and where the rental of the equipment or facilities is necessary to the enjoyment of a privilege for which a general admission is charged, the combined charges shall be considered as the admission charge. . . .
(Italics mine.) RCW 36.38.010.
The statute should be interpreted tq_authorize a tax on ski lift charges because such charges are "made for rental or use of equipment or facilities for purpose of recreation or amusement". The majority, however, contends that the definition authorizes a tax only upon satisfaction of two conditions: the rental must be for recreational purposes, and the rental must be necessary to the enjoyment of a privilege for which a general admission fee is charged. Majority, at 855. Since no admission is charged for entry to Ski Acres, and the facility may be enjoyed without the use of the lifts, the majority concludes that the statutory definition of "admission charge" does not include the ski lift tickets. Majority, at 856.
The County's interpretation makes more sense. The final clause of the definition, emphasized above, provides for two *860distinct circumstances. First, equipment and facility rentals may be taxed. Second, if the rental is in addition to a general admission charge, both may be taxed together. Applying this interpretation, I would hold that the County has the statutory authority to tax ski lift tickets.
Support for this interpretation is found in established rules of statutoiy construction. Statutes should be construed so that no language is superfluous. Stone v. Chelan Cy. Sheriff's Dep't, 110 Wn.2d 806, 810, 756 P.2d 736 (1988). The majority's interpretation gives no effect to the statutory language before the comma; only the phrases following the "and" are deemed to have legal impact. Read as a whole, it is clear that the Legislature intended the statute to be read in the disjunctive, as a list of independent situations.
To read the clause as stating two conditions defies common sense. The language used in the statute is the most awkward way imaginable to state the two postulated conditions. If the Legislature wished to express the conditions as set forth in the majority, I am certain that it would have found a clearer way to do so. Such a strained interpretation cannot be justified by appeal to a rule of strict construction.
In addition, the majority argues that the Legislature "evidenced an intent to authorize counties to tax 'persons who pay an admission charge to any place . . ..'" Majority, at 856. This contention is belied by the remainder of the very definition in question, omitted by the majority. Majority, at 855. The Legislature defined "admission charge" to include other categories which would not be considered "to any place". For example, the Legislature quite plainly and unambiguously stated that an admission tax could be levied on food and beverage charges anywhere that free entertainment was provided. RCW 36.38.010. Nothing is said about a general admission. The majority attempts to justify its interpretation by referring to improbable hypotheticals: admission taxes charged on videocassettes, or car and boat rentals. Majority, at 858. This argument is specious; it exaggerates the consequences attributable to a tax on ski lifts.
*861The majority's concluding argument rests on the "plain and ordinary meaning of the term 'admission'Majority, at 858. This is irrelevant. This case deals solely with the proper interpretation of the definition of "admission charge". Statutes are construed so as to give words their plain and ordinary meaning only if no contrary direction is specified by the Legislature. In re Estate of Little, 106 Wn.2d 269, 283, 721 P.2d 950 (1986); Hewson Constr., Inc. v. Reintree Corp., 101 Wn.2d 819, 826, 685 P.2d 1062 (1984). Our Legislature expressly included equipment rentals within its statutory definition. Resort to the ordinary meaning is inappropriate.
I would reverse the trial court, and hold that the ordinance was authorized by statute.
Dore, C.J., and Dolliver, J., concur with Durham, J.