Court Opinion

ID: 9728605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:12:27.698435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:28.243307
License: Public Domain

N. J. Kaufman, J.
(dissenting). The opinion of my colleagues would deny defendant credit for the jail time he accumulated under a probationary order. Precedent exists for this approach as illustrated by People v Jaynes, 23 Mich App 360; 178 NW2d 558 (1970), People v Westman, 53 Mich App 662, 666; 220 NW2d 169 (1974), People v Lacy, 54 Mich App 471; 221 NW2d 199 (1974).
After many days of agonizing over this question, however, I find myself disagreeing with the majority’s decision as well as the rationale of the aforementioned cases.
The majority position is supported by the following statutory provisions which are based upon a *7151927 Public Act. MCL 771.3; MSA 28.1133 provides:
"As a condition of probation, the court may require the probationer to be imprisoned in the county jail * * * for not more than 6 months.”
MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134 states:
"It is the intent of the legislature that the granting of probation to the one convicted shall be a matter of grace. * * * In case such probation order is terminated or revoked the court may proceed to sentence such probationer in the same manner and to the same penalty as it might have done if such probation order had never been made.”
Although I recognize the mandate set forth in these statutes, I also note that precedent does exist for a more expansive approach to affording a criminal defendant credit for accumulated jail time. In People v Stange, 91 Mich App 596; 283 NW2d 806 (1979), the Court allowed a defendant credit for time he spent at a drug rehabilitation center prior to sentencing. The Stange Court cited MCL 769.11(b); MSA 28.1083(2) in support. It provides:
"Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in imposing sentence shall speciñcally grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing(Emphasis added.)
This statute, adopted by the Legislature long after the probation statute via a Public Act of 1963, represents a sounder, more equitable ap*716proach. Such a crediting statute is remedial in nature, and, as such, deserves liberal construction in order to effectuate the legislative purpose. Brinson v Genesee Circuit Judge, 403 Mich 676; 272 NW2d 513 (1978). It is my considered opinion that the Legislature intended the crediting statute to apply to the factual situation herein.
In the case at bar, defendant was given four years of probation, the first six months of which were to be served in the county jail. After this probationary jail term was served, defendant was arrested for violating the terms of his probation. A probation revocation hearing was held and, ultimately, defendant was sentenced to serve 32 to 48 months in prison, with no credit given for time served under the probationary order.
I find this result unacceptable. Strict application of the crediting statute mandates a different result. Defendant was found guilty of violating his probation. He was sentenced as if he never had been placed on probation, as required by MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134, supra. The crediting statute, supra, provides that a person convicted of a crime who accumulates jail time prior to sentencing shall be given credit against the sentence for accumulated jail time. Defendant’s jail time was accumulated prior to his probation violation sentencing. Therefore, defendant should be given credit for the accumulated jail time. To hold contrary would require blindfolding ourselves to the realities of the situation. The original probationary order can be looked upon as a deferred sentence. Defendant was never truly "sentenced” then, yet he served approximately six months jail time prior to violating his probation. Ignoring this accumulated time runs afoul of the crediting statute, supra.
*717Moreover, defendant was given a 32 to 48 month sentence for violating his probation. Thus, the highest minimum sentence allowable was meted out. Indirectly tacking on an additional six months to this penalty by denying defendant credit for the jail time he accumulated under the probationary order would, in my opinion, constitute a type of double punishment.1

 The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy protects not only against a second trial for the same offense, but also "against multiple punishments for the same offense”. See North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711; 89 S Ct 2072; 23 L Ed 2d 656 (1969), and Whalen v United States, — US —; 100 S Ct 1432; 63 L Ed 2d 715 (1980).