Court Opinion

ID: 9964717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 17:11:49.596203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:40.074937
License: Public Domain

J-S08005-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    DALE KELLER                                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ALEXIS HAAG                                :   No. 1137 MDA 2023

                   Appeal from the Order Entered July 5, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Civil Division at
                             No(s): CV-2017-01022

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                FILED: APRIL 30, 2024

       Appellant, Dale Keller, appeals from the order entered on July 5, 2023,

sustaining preliminary objections filed by Alexis Haag (Haag). We affirm.

       We briefly set forth the facts and procedural history of this case, as

gleaned from the certified record, as follows. On June 1, 2017, Appellant filed

a praecipe for a writ of summons against Haag.1 On August 2, 2017, Appellant

filed a praecipe to reissue the writ of summons. Thereafter, no docket activity

appears in the certified record for approximately five years and four months.

On December 22, 2022, Haag filed counseled preliminary objections to the

writ of summons, arguing that Appellant made no attempt to serve her. By

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1  According to Haag, “[t]his suit ar[ose] from an automobile accident that
occurred in Northumberland County, Pennsylvania on June 1, 2015.” Haag’s
Preliminary Objections, 12/22/2022, at ¶1.
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order entered on April 20, 2023, the trial court scheduled a proceeding for

July 5, 2023. When the proceeding concluded, the court directed the parties

to file briefs addressing Haag’s preliminary objections.      Appellant did not

appear before the court and did not file a brief in opposition to Hagg’s

preliminary objections.       By order entered on July 5, 2023, the trial court

sustained Haag’s preliminary objections, finding:

       [No attempt was made by Appellant] to [] reissue [the writ and]
       effectuate service thereof, since August 2, 2017, and there is no
       indication that service was even attempted; here, there was no
       excuse being offered except COVID-19, but that [was] insufficient
       as civil court was operational at all times. [Appellant] has not met
       the [service] requirements of Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d 882
       (Pa. 1976); [s]ee also Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial
       Authority, 511 A.2d 757 (Pa. 1986).

Trial Court Order, 7/5/2023, at *1. This timely appeal resulted.2

       On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

       Whether the trial court abused its discretion and misapplied the
       law when it sustained [Haag’s] preliminary objections, without a
       factual record, regarding [Appellant’s] unintentional lack of
       service of the writ even though [Haag] was aware of the claim,
       and [Appellant’s] carrier, continued to negotiate with [Appellant]
       over the years, and [Haag] did not suffer any prejudice
       whatsoever, by the delay in service?

____________________________________________

2 On August 4, 2023, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On August 18, 2023,
the trial court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied
on September 1, 2023. Therein, Appellant claimed only that Haag “waived
[her] Lamp v. Heyman argument by not raising it for more than 5 years after
[Appellant filed] the [w]rit and continu[ed] settlement discussions in the
meantime.” Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/1/2023, at ¶1. On September 9,
2023, the trial court issued a statement in lieu of a formal opinion.

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Appellant’s Brief at 7 (numerical and superfluous capitalization omitted).

      Appellant argues, in sum:

      Under Pennsylvania law, a defendant can file preliminary
      objections on the basis of improper service if a plaintiff does not
      timely serve the writ. A court can dismiss the writ for lack of
      service or improper service if service is not effectuated within 30
      days of filing the complaint. This rule [was] established to prevent
      plaintiff[s] from abusively filing [an] action but not notifying the
      defendant.      However, before dismissing the complaint, the
      defendant must be prejudiced by the delay in service. Here,
      [Appellant] did not serve the writ at the time it was filed.
      However, [Haag] was on notice of the claim, continued to
      negotiate through her insurer, and she did not suffer any
      prejudice, whatsoever in the delay of serving the writ. Since
      [Haag] did not suffer any prejudice, and she did not even argue
      that [she] was prejudiced in her preliminary objections, the [trial]
      court erred in sustaining the preliminary objections and dismissing
      [Appellant’s] writ. Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial
      court and overrule [Haag’s] preliminary objections.

Id. at 8.

      This Court recently determined:

      In considering a trial court's order sustaining preliminary
      objections for improper service of process,

            our standard of review ... is to determine whether the trial
            court committed an error of law. When considering the
            appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the
            appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial
            court. When considering preliminary objections, all material
            facts set forth in the challenged pleadings are admitted as
            true, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible
            therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the dismissal
            of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in
            which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be
            unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right
            to relief.

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     Bellan v. Penn Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 271 A.3d 506, 509 (Pa.
     Super. 2022), appeal denied, 283 A.3d 793 (Pa. 2022) (citation
     omitted).

     Rule 1028(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
     permits a party to raise preliminary objections based on “improper
     form or service of a writ of summons or a complaint.” Pa.R.C.P.
     1028(a)(1). This includes failure to properly serve a complaint in
     compliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure for
     service of original process. McCreesh v. City of Philadelphia,
     888 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa. 2005).

     This Court has stated: “[s]ervice of process is a mechanism by
     which a court obtains jurisdiction of a defendant, and therefore,
     the rules concerning service of process must be strictly followed.
     Thus, improper service is not merely a procedural defect that can
     be ignored when a defendant subsequently learns of the action
     against him or her.” Lerner v. Lerner, 954 A.2d 1229, 1237 (Pa.
     Super. 2008) (quoting Cintas Corp. v. Lee's Cleaning Services,
     Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. 1997)).

     Rule 401 provides that “original process shall be served within the
     Commonwealth within 30 days after the issuance of the writ or
     the filing of the complaint.” Pa.R.C.P. 401(a). If the plaintiff is
     unable to serve the defendant within this time, he/she may file a
     praecipe for reissuance of the writ or reinstatement of the
     complaint in order to continue its validity. Pa.R.C.P. 401(b). “So
     long as the plaintiff files [the] writ or complaint before the
     expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to [the] cause of
     action, the original filing, as well as any subsequent reissuances
     or reinstatements, tolls the statute of limitations.” Gussom v.
     Teagle, 247 A.3d 1046, 1048 (Pa. 2022).

     Recently, in Gussom, our Supreme Court assimilated [the
     holdings in] several major cases addressing the dismissal of a
     complaint for lack of service[,] including Lamp v. Heyman, 366
     A.2d 882 (Pa. 1976), Farinacci v. Beaver Co. Indus. Dev.
     Auth., 511 A.2d 757 (Pa. 1986) and McCreesh, supra. The
     Court articulated the following standard:

        In sum, Lamp and its progeny require a plaintiff to make a
        good-faith effort in diligently and timely serving process on
        a defendant. When a defendant presents a factual dispute
        as to whether a plaintiff fulfilled this duty, the plaintiff
        carries an evidentiary burden to demonstrate that she met
        her good-faith mandate. If a plaintiff presents credible

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        evidence that she made this attempt at service, then she
        fulfills her requirement to prove good faith. If a plaintiff
        does not present such evidence, then she has failed to
        satisfy her evidentiary burden, regardless of whether her
        actions (or inaction) were intentional, unintentional, or
        otherwise. However, pursuant to McCreesh, a trial court
        should not punish a plaintiff by dismissing her complaint
        where she is able to establish that her improper but diligent
        attempts at service resulted in the defendant receiving
        actual notice of the commencement of the action, unless the
        plaintiff's failure to serve process properly evinced an intent
        to stall the judicial machinery or otherwise prejudiced the
        defendant.

     Gussom, 247 A.3d at 1057 (emphasis added). It is within the
     sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether a
     good-faith effort to effectuate notice was made. Id. at 1048.

                          *           *            *

     “[A]n appellate court is limited to considering only the materials
     in the certified record when resolving an issue .... [U]nder the
     Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, any document which
     is not part of the officially certified record is deemed
     non-existent.” [Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa.
     Super. 2006).]

                          *           *            *

        The emphasis on the certified record is necessary because,
        unless the trial court certifies a document as part of the
        official record, the appellate judiciary has no way of knowing
        whether that piece of evidence was duly presented to the
        trial court or whether it was produced for the first time on
        appeal and improperly inserted into the reproduced record.
        Simply put, if a document is not in the certified record, the
        Superior Court may not consider it.

     Id. at 6-7.

                                     -5-
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Barry v. Nationwide & Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2023 WL 7550795, at

*2–5 (Pa. Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision).3

       Here, the trial court determined that there was “nothing in the record to

suggest that there had been settlement discussions” either “by way of a

response to the preliminary objections or any testimony” and “[o]ne cannot

simply make [] bald factual assertions for the first time in [his Rule] 1925(b)

statement.”     Trial Court Statement In Lieu of Opinion, 9/19/2022, at *2

(unpaginated). Moreover, the trial court determined:

       [Haag’s] preliminary objections included a notice to plead thereto
       within twenty days after service upon [Appellant]. There was no
       response. An order was issued directing the filing of briefs by both
       parties; however, [Appellant] did not file a brief. At argument
       held before the court (which was not requested to be on the
       record, and no testimony under oath was presented), counsel for
       [Appellant] only raised an argument as to the COVID-19
       pandemic.[4] This was specious since the court maintained its
       ability to process civil filings and service of pleadings[, despite the
       ongoing pandemic].

                               *               *      *

       Over five years have elapsed without any reasonable excuse to
       effectuate service of the writ.

____________________________________________

3    Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), Superior Court non-precedential decisions
filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive value.

4  Appellant does not currently argue that the COVID-19 pandemic impeded
his ability to serve Haag and we find this aspect of Appellant’s argument
abandoned and, therefore, waived. See Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d
1014, 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding waiver where McGill abandoned claim on
appeal).

                                           -6-
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Id. at *1; see also id. at *2 (“In the case at bar the context is not days but

years without explanation of any good faith effort to move the case forward.”).

       Here, initially we note that our review is confined to the evidence

contained in the certified record. Upon review, the certified record contains

Appellant’s June 1, 2017 praecipe for the original writ of summons and his

August 2, 2017 praecipe for reissuance of the writ. In addition, the record

includes Haag’s preliminary objections filed on December 22, 2022, the trial

court’s July 5, 2023 order sustaining Hagg’s preliminary objections, and the

subsequent filings pertaining to this appeal.           While the trial court held

argument on the preliminary objections, there is no indication that the

proceeding was transcribed and there are no notes of testimony from that

proceeding in the certified record.5       As such, from our review of the certified

record as set forth above, there is no record evidence that the parties were

____________________________________________

5   Appellant suggests that the trial court erred “by not developing a record.”
Appellant’s Brief at 10. Because Appellant did not raise this issue before the
trial court or in his Rule 1925(b) statement, he cannot raise this aspect of his
claim for the first time on appeal and we find it waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
(“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.”). Moreover, our Supreme Court has stated that “the
absence of notes [of testimony] does not generate some instantaneous,
meritorious claim for relief. Instead, if the initially missing notes matter, it
becomes a circumstance the appellant or his counsel needs to respond to by,
for example, ordering notes counsel failed to order earlier; or seeking an order
of court to have ordered notes promptly transcribed, or otherwise made
available; or, where notes cannot be secured, to take steps to have an
equivalent picture of the proceeding generated.” Commonwealth v. Lesko,
15 A.3d 345, 410-411 (Pa. 2011), citing Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a) (appellant shall
request necessary transcripts for appeal); Pa.R.A.P. 1923 (statement in the
absence of transcript); Pa.R.A.P. 1924 (agreed upon statement of the record).

                                           -7-
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engaged in negotiations and we therefore flatly reject Appellant’s contention

in this regard.   Moreover, there is no evidence that Appellant made any

attempt at service and, thus, failed to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proving

good faith regardless of whether his inaction was intentional, unintentional, or

otherwise.     There is also no record evidence of improper, but diligent,

attempts at service or Haag’s actual notice of the commencement of the

action.   Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we will not disturb the

sound exercise of discretion by the trial court in determining that there was

no good-faith effort to effectuate notice. Therefore, we hold that the trial

court did not err in sustaining Haag’s preliminary objections.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/30/2024

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