Court Opinion

ID: 9664668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:24:54.56878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:08.409005
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Justice,
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part:
Although I concur with the majority’s analysis and resolution of the other issues, I respectfully dissent from its view of certain elements of evidence often referred to as the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), which provide explanations for the otherwise inconsistent conduct of abused children and, thus properly assists the jury in making determinations as to whether such inconsistent conduct is an indicator of untruthfulness or is conduct commonly experienced with abused children. I speak, here, of delayed reporting and recantation, as well as their presentment with demeanors that at first blush, *617appear inconsistent with their allegations of abuse.
Like the overwhelming majority of other states, I believe that such evidence, when not used impermissibly to establish the abuse but, rather, as a viable tool to explain the sometimes confusing and commonly misunderstood behavioral patterns of children who may have been subjected to abuse, should be admissible.
CSAAS “first came to light in an article published in 1983 that described five (5) characteristics commonly observed in sexually abused children: (1) secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and (5) retraction [or recantation].” Elisabeth Trainor, J.D., Admissibility Of Expert Testimony On Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (Csaas) In Criminal Case, 85 A.L.R. 5th 595 (2001).
There are six (6) categories of social science expert testimony that have developed and have regularly been proffered to support child witnesses in sexual abuse cases. The first category is “rehabilitative” testimony offered to explain the puzzling conduct of the child victim to meet a defense attack on the child’s credibility. These behaviors have been termed as CSAAS. The second category is syndrome evidence, including CSAAS evidence, of supposed typical child victim behavior proffered, not to explain unusual conduct of the child, but to prove affirmatively that sexual abuse has occurred. The third category is a spin-off of the second with the expert testifying to typical behaviors of a child victim specifically related to the child victim in the case. The fourth is expert testimony that the child has in fact been abused, and the fifth is testimony that the child is credible. The final category involves profile testimony on the actual sexual offender or alleged perpetrator of the abuse.
(citing State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554, 617 A.2d 1196 (1993)).
This Court has dealt with all categories in one form or another, with a multitude of reasons for their rejection. See Kurtz v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 409, 413, 414 (Ky.2005) (habit and profile characteristics of perpetrators); Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 571, 572 (Ky.2002) (delayed reporting denied as habit evidence); Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 691-696 (Ky.1996) (considered psychiatric rebuttal evidence explaining in general terms child victims’ recantation); Hall v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 321, 322, 323 (Ky.1993) (psychiatric testimony that child was sexually abused and was telling the truth); Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612, 613, 614 (Ky.1992) (testimony on abuse and delayed disclosure invaded province of jury); Dyer v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 647, 652-654 (Ky.1991) (overruled on other grounds by Baker v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 54 (Ky.1998)) (perpetrator profile); Brown v. Commonwealth, 812 S.W.2d 502, 503, 504 (Ky.1991) (overruled on other grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky.1997)) (use of CSAAS to prove abuse and child’s subsequent behavior); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 930, 932, 933 (Ky.1989) (use of CSAAS for determination of guilt and perpetrator profile); Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Ky.1987) (recantation); Lantrip v. Commonwealth, 713 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Ky.1986) (use of CSAAS to prove abuse); Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139, 140, 141 (Ky.1985) (use of CSAAS as proof of abuse and perpetrator profile). Although we have come close, see Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 690, we have yet to recognize the validity of CSAAS evidence of the first category of use (rehabili*618tation) when only offered “to explain the puzzling conduct of the child victim to meet a defense attack on the child’s credibility.” TrainoR, admissibility Of Expert Testimony On Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (Csaas) In Criminal Case, supra. I believe it’s time we did.
“In general our reasons have been the lack of diagnostic reliability, the lack of general acceptance within the discipline from which such testimony emanates, and the overwhelmingly persuasive nature of such testimony effectively dominating the decision-making process, uniquely the function of the jury.” Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 691. Interestingly enough, the closest we have come was our consideration of the commonality of recantation by abuse victims as analyzed in Newkirk, where the Court split 4-3. Id. at 696.
In Newkirk, the trial court allowed expert testimony regarding recantation “for the limited purpose of rebutting any attack on [the victim’s] credibility based upon the recantation of her allegations of her abuse, by explaining in general terms why an alleged victim might recant.” Id. at 697. Moreover, the evidence was admitted subject to a limiting admonition by the court; “[t]his witness is being called to testify for the limited purpose of explaining the psychological dynamics surrounding a recantation following an accusation of the sexual abuse. This evidence is not offered for the purpose of proving whether [the victim] was or was not sexually abused.” Id. Recantation, delayed reporting, and inconsistent demeanors of child victims, all involve puzzling conduct of the child and, therefore, support a defense attack on the child’s credibility. As was noted by the dissent in Newkirk:
Kentucky remains as one of the few jurisdictions that still rejects all testimony regarding the phenomenon clinically identified and demonstrated as the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome[,] which provides jurors a psychological explanation for certain behavior in small children following sexual abuse. Such testimony is necessary because these children often exhibit conduct that is inconsistent with the jurors’ life experiences or understanding of human nature in children.
Id. at 696 (Graves, J., dissenting). As the dissent also pointed out, “the recantation symptom is widely accepted and confirmed by credible studies at renowned research institutions by well credentialed experts.” Id.
“Permitting [an] appellant to impeach the child victim’s credibility on the basis of a previous recantation [, a delayed reporting of the incident or his demeanor,] without also allowing the Commonwealth to present testimony explaining the phenomenon of recantation gives the alleged perpetrator an unfair advantage to exploit the process of how some child sexual abuse victims respond to abuse.” Id. at 698. (Barry Willett, Special Justice, dissenting).
As Special Justice Willett noted, in New-kirk:
When a jury of lay adults, hearing the horrible details in a typical child sexual abuse case, is confronted with a child victim recanting his or her previous allegations of sexual abuse, it is understandable that they would tend to apply an adult standard to the child victim’s behavior in an effort to understand what motivates the victim to recant his or her allegations. The reality of child sexual abuse is that children respond differently than do adults to both the abuse and the process of disclosing the abuse to the proper authorities.
Id. at 698-99. Moreover, as noted in Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So.2d 206, 213 (La.1994):
Adults frequently have preconceived ideas about how a traumatized person will react after infliction of the trauma. *619The child victim of sexual abuse does not react to the situation according to adult concepts of self-determinism with autonomous, rational choices. In fact, their behavioral patterns vastly differ from adult expectations.
For these reasons, most states allow CSAAS “rehabilitative” testimony offered to explain the puzzling conduct of the victim in order to meet the defense’s attack on the victim’s credibility. See United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir.1997) (“[T]estimony had significant probative value in that it rehabilitated (without vouching for) the victim’s credibility after she was cross-examined about the reasons she delayed reporting and about the inconsistencies in her testimony.”); United States v. Two Elk, 536 F.3d 890, 903, 904 (8th Cir.2008) (“In child sexual abuse cases, ‘a qualified expert can inform the jury of characteristics in sexually abused children.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir.2008)); Sexton v. State, 529 So.2d 1041, 1049 (Ala.Crim.App.1988) (“The necessity for expert testimony increases if there are certain inferences made by the defense (such as the implication that the child’s delay in reporting the abuse indicates fabrication), or certain unusual behavior of the child witness which should not be allowed to go unre-butted when there exists a recognized phenomenon which may explain it.”) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923) (internal citation omitted)); Bostic v. State, 772 P.2d 1089, 1096 (Alaska Ct.App.1989) reversed on other grounds by Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1991) (“[Ejxpert testimony generally describing characteristic behavior of sexually abused children could serve a legitimate purpose when offered to negate a claim or inference that the complaining witness’ behavior in a given case was inconsistent with a truthful accusation of sexual abuse.”); State v. Rojas, 177 Ariz. 454, 868 P.2d 1037, 1042 (1993) (“[Ejxpert testimony that helps jurors evaluate victims’ credibility and explains why victims of sexual abuse may behave inconsistently is admissible.”); People v. Sandoval, 164 Cal.App.4th 994, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 634, 639 (2008) (“Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.”); People v. Mintz, 165 P.3d 829, 831 (Colo.Ct.App.2007) (“An expert may testify as to the typical demeanor and behavioral traits displayed by a sexually abused child.”); State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359, 556 A.2d 112, 122 (1989) (“[Tjhe overwhelming majority of courts have held that, where the defendant has sought to impeach the testimony of the minor victim based on inconsistencies, partial disclosures, or recantations relating to the alleged incidents, the state may present expert opinion evidence that such behavior by minor sexual abuse victims is common.”); Wittrock v. State, 630 A.2d 1103 (table) 1993 WL 307616, 2 (Del.Super.Ct.1993) (unpublished opinion) (“Expert testimony is admissible in such instances since it assists the trier of fact to evaluate the psychological dynamics and behavior patterns of alleged victims not within a layperson’s common experience while also permitting the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the victim’s and other witness’ testimony”); Mindombe v. United States, 795 A.2d 39, 46 (D.C.2002) (“[Ejxpert testimony is admissible in cases where the government successfully proffers that the facts and evidence to be presented at trial are likely to be inconsistent with a lay juror’s expectations as to how a child sexual abuse victim should respond to such a traumatizing event.”); Ward v. State, 519 So.2d 1082, 1084 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) (“The court determined that the testimony *620would be helpful to the jury but prohibited the witness from commenting on the truthfulness of the child.”); McCoy v. State, 278 Ga.App. 492, 629 S.E.2d 493, 494 (2006) (“Since ‘[l]aymen would not understand this syndrome without expert testimony, nor would they be likely to believe that a child who denied a sexual assault, or who was reluctant to discuss an assault, in fact had been assaulted,’ the trial court did not err in permitting the expert witness to testify.” (internal citation omitted)); State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 652, 799 P.2d 48, 49 (1990)' (“Thus, while expert testimony explaining ‘seemingly bizarre’ behavior of child sex abuse victims is helpful to the jury and should be admitted, conclusory opinions that abuse did occur and that the child victim’s report of abuse is truthful and believable is of no assistance to the jury, and therefore, should not be admitted.”); People v. Hodor, 341 Ill.App.3d 853, 275 Ill.Dec. 353, 792 N.E.2d 828, 860 (2003) (proper for witness to testify “concerning behavioral patterns typically manifested by victims of sexual abuse, or whether victim’s behavior was consistent with recognized syndromes.”); Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 499 (Ind.1995) (Rehabilitative aspects of CSAAS “merely informs jurors that commonly held assumptions are not necessarily accurate and allows [the jury] to fairly judge credibility.” (internal citation omitted)); State v. Seevanhsa, 495 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa Ct. App.1992) (witness properly “testified on matters which explained relevant mental and psychological symptoms present in sexually abused children.”); State v. Reed, 191 P.3d 341, 347 (Kan.Ct.App. 2008) (Witness “only gave her expert opinion as to why a hypothetical child might recant an initial allegation of sexual abuse. [Witness] did not render an opinion about [the child’s] credibility.”); Gatch, 635 So.2d at 215 (“Understanding that secrecy and that delayed, conflicted and unconvincing disclosure are the norm and that immediate disclosure is atypical, in civil actions, the child victim’s delayed or partial disclosure will not be countenanced, in law or equity, to victimize the child a second time.”); Commonwealth v. Deloney, 59 Mass.App.Ct. 47, 794 N.E.2d 613, 620 (2003) (“It is within the trial judge’s discretion, subject to proper limiting instructions, to admit expert testimony on the general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children.”); State v. McCoy, 400 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Minn.Ct. App.1987) (testimony on the typical behavioral characteristics of victim of child abuse was admissible); Hall v. State, 611 So.2d 915, 919 (Miss.1992) (“[T]estimony by an expert as to certain behavior common to sexually abused children is proper.”); State v. Price, 165 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Mo.Ct.App.2005) (“General profile testimony describes a generalization of behaviors and other characteristics commonly found in victims of sexual abuse which is usually admissible.”); State v. Geyman, 224 Mont. 194, 729 P.2d 475, 479 (1986) (“We hold that expert testimony is admissible for the purpose of helping the jury to assess the credibility of a child sexual assault victim.”); State v. Roenfeldt, 241 Neb. 30, 486 N.W.2d 197, 204 (1992) (“The reasoning for a rule allowing an expert to testify about sexual abuse in generalities ... is that ‘[f]ew jurors have sufficient familiarity with child sexual abuse to understand the dynamics of a sexually abusive relationship,’ and ‘the behavior exhibited by sexually abused children is often contrary to what most adults would expect.’ ”) quoting People v. Nelson, 203 Ill.App.3d 1038, 149 Ill.Dec. 161, 561 N.E.2d 439, 442 (1990) (internal citation omitted); Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 570, 688 P.2d 326, 327 (1984) (“It would be useful to the jury to know ... it is not uncommon for them to deny the act ever happened.”); J.Q., 130 N.J. at 580, 617 A.2d 1196 (“The court must also *621explain to the jury that the expert’s testimony is not intended to address the ultimate question of whether the victim’s molestation claims are true and must admonish the jury not to use the testimony for that purpose.”); People v. Carroll, 95 N.Y.2d 375, 718 N.Y.S.2d 10, 740 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 (2000) (“We have long held that expert testimony regarding [the] abused child syndrome or similar conditions may be admitted to explain behavior of a victim that might appear unusual or that jurors may not be expected to understand.”); State v. Richardson, 112 N.C.App. 58, 65, 434 S.E.2d 657, 662 (1993) (“[T]estimony given in this case describing general symptoms and characteristics of sexually abused children to explain the victims’ behavior is not error.”); State v. Stowers, 81 Ohio St.3d 260, 690 N.E.2d 881, 883 (1998) (“An expert witness’s testimony that the behavior of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse is consistent with behavior observed in sexually abused children is admissible under the Ohio Rules of Evidence.”); Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655, 659 (Okla.Crim.App.1991) (“Numerous courts have allowed an expert to testify in rebuttal to explain delay in reporting as well as why a child recants.”); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220-21 (1983) (“If a qualified expert offers to give testimony on whether the reaction of one child is similar to the reaction of most victims of familial child abuse, and if believed this would assist the jury in deciding whether a rape occurred, it may be admitted.”); Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 348 Pa.Super. 368, 502 A.2d 253, 257 (1985) disapproved by Commonwealth v. Davis, 518 Pa. 77, 541 A.2d 315, 317 (1988) (“In other words, so long as the expert does not render an opinion on the accuracy of the victim’s recitation of facts, his or her general testimony on the dynamics of sexual abuse does not prejudice the jury.”); State v. Edelman, 593 N.W.2d 419, 423 (S.D.1999) (“[W]e are also persuaded by the rationale of other courts who have allowed CSAAS testimony by an expert within proper limits.”); Gonzales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 406, 417 (Tex.App.1999) (“Expert witness testimony that a child victim exhibits elements or characteristics that have been empirically shown to be common among sexually abused children is relevant and admissible.”); State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366, 534 A.2d 184, 187 (1987) (“Given the demonstrated usefulness that such evidence can have in assisting the jury to assess the credibility of the complaining child witness, we join the majority of courts that have concluded that it is within the trial court’s discretion to admit such evidence in appropriate circumstances.”); State v. Huntington, 216 Wis.2d 671, 697, 575 N.W.2d 268 (1998) (testimony of expert concerning victim’s delay in reporting and conflicting assertions was not inadmissible comment on victim’s credibility); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 978 (Wyo.1988) (Evidence “helped to explain why the victim did not immediately flee the scene and report the incident to her parents or the authorities.”).
The expert testimony on why victims might recant or delay reporting [or initially omit some of the details,] is [only] being offered to rebut attacks on the victim’s credibility. So long as the expert limits the testimony to general characteristics that would explain delays in reporting, recantations, and omission of details, the testimony will not substitute [the expert’s] estimation of credibility for that of the jury. Rather, it is to provide a scientific perspective for the jury according to which it can evaluate the complainant’s testimony for itself.
State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116, 1130 (La.1993) (citing Goldstein, Credibility And Incredibility-. The Psychiatric Examination Of The Complaining Witness, 137 Am.J.Psychia. 1238,1240(1980)).
*622Thus, as Special Justice Willett noted in his dissenting opinion in Newkirk, 937 SW.2d at 700:
Expert testimony explaining the phenomenon of recantation [, delayed reporting and omission of details] by some victims of child sexual abuse should be admissible for the limited purpose of rebutting an attack on the child victim’s credibility.... Any such testimony should be preceded by a limiting instruction to the effect that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s sexual abuse allegation is true.
In this case, during cross-examination, the child victim’s credibility was attacked on the revelation at trial of new details of the events which had never before been revealed to the police or social workers. Thereafter, the Commonwealth called Ms. Brown, the Director of Clinical Service for the Purchase Area Sexual Assault Center, who addressed the commonality of a child giving more details about the abuse following counseling. She was called to the stand again in rebuttal to address further issues created by the defense concerning that the child had delayed reporting the incident and appeared to be a “happy” child. Ms. Brown explained that this is not at all unusual, and is sometimes typical. On the other hand, on cross-examination, she admitted that just because a child appears happy does not mean she has been sexually abused. Clearly, Appellant’s attack on the child victim’s demeanor, initial omission of details and delayed reporting was intended to suggest fabrication according to one’s usual life experiences. However, in cases of sexual abuse, established and acceptable scientific studies have shown that these events and appearances are common in children who are sexually abused. Thus, as knowledge of the commonality of these events in these situations “will assist the trier fact to understand the evidence [and] to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, [should be able to] testify thereto.” KRE 702.
For these reasons, we should now break with precedent, joining the majority of jurisdictions in allowing the introduction of such evidence for rehabilitation purposes only and with an accompanying admonition limiting the use to such purpose. It is for this reason that I dissent from the majority’s opinion on this issue.