Court Opinion

ID: 9726760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:07:12.676216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:30.504818
License: Public Domain

BEACH, J.
I dissent.
There is no quarrel with one principle common to State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge (1973) 10 Cal.3d 94 [109 Cal.Rptr. 811, 514 P.2d 123], Spargur v. Park (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 469 [180 Cal.Rptr. 257] and the case at bench. That principle is simply that there can be two separate and independent acts which may concur to cause an accident or occurrence from which injury results. Partridge and Spargur simply recognize that where one concurring act is clearly independent, or can be shown to be independent, of the second concur*1040ring act, liability can be predicated upon one act as an independent tort (Spargur) or upon both acts as joint torts (Partridge). I respectfully suggest that the majority opinion unduly focuses on this aspect. But that is not the issue to be resolved here.
The issue at bench is not whether two acts are separable; but whether, even if separable for one purpose or under one legal principle, idea or theory, they may yet be considered to be caused by or arise out of or be born of a larger or inclusive condition, act, circumstance or state of facts, which can be described in such a way as to be understood by reasonable, common sense, fair-minded persons.
At bench, under the definition of the exclusions in the homeowner’s policy, it is clear that Mahnken’s act of dragging, the injured plaintiff was not “independent of and unrelated to his use of the vehicle” whether that act is examined by the use of technical, legal definitions or ordinary English language understood by common sense lay persons.
The homeowner’s insurance policy in this case contains the following provision:
“This Policy Does Not Apply:
“1. Under Coverage E — Personal Liability and Coverage
“F. — -Medical Payments to Others:
“(a) To Bodily Injury or Property Damage Arising Out of the Ownership, Maintenance, Operation, Use, Loading or Unloading of: ...
“(b) Any Motor Vehicle Owned or Operated by, or Rented or Loaned to Any Insured; ...”
The language does not say that the policy excludes only that part of injuries attributable solely to or during the operation of the vehicle. Instead, the language is intentionally broader. It describes (for purposes of exclusion) injury which arises out of the use of the motor vehicle. It is established beyond dispute that this designates injury caused not only while the vehicle is moving or being operated, but even that which may result after the vehicle is at rest. (United Services Automobile Assn. v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 765 [111 Cal.Rptr. *1041595]; National Indemnity Co. v. Farmers Home Mutual Ins. Co. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 102 [157 Cal.Rptr. 98].)
At bench, the dragging and physical injury alleged therefrom arose out of the operation of a vehicle. The vehicular accident placed plaintiff on the ground, a condition crying for rescue. Peril begets rescue. The concern in this case is not whether rescue is or may be in legal theory a separate and independent act for other legal discussions of causation, but whether it is so related to the vehicular accident as to be recognizable as arising out of the accident. In my view rescue requires someone in peril, a “victim.” Here, the rescue resulted from the operation of the vehicle. The rescue may be separable from driving the vehicle but the results of both are included in the greater circle of circumstance or condition which is defined as arising from operation of a vehicle.
By contrast, the separate and independent act giving rise to liability in Partridge was a “nonauto related act,” i.e., the filing of the trigger on the gun. That act had nothing to do with the operation of a vehicle. The significance of that feature was emphasized by the Partridge court by its repeated use throughout the opinion of the expression “a nonauto related act.” The act of filing the trigger mechanism created an extreme risk of harm totally independent of and certainly not arising from the operation of a vehicle. As such it was unmistakably outside of the circle or ambit of conduct defined in the vehicular operation exclusion of the gun owner’s homeowner’s policy. As a result, the homeowner’s policy was held to provide coverage for the injury which occurred when the gun discharged.
The basis and reasons for declaring the injury covered by the homeowner’s policy in Partridge are not present here. No gun or second instrumentality proximately caused the injury other than the vehicle itself. The conduct of Mahnken, the driver, in attempting to extract the plaintiff from the scene of the vehicle collision was an act separate only in the fact that it followed the original collision. But his conduct cannot be dissociated from the use of a vehicle. Conduct which is dependent upon and related to the use of the vehicle cannot be deemed an independent act of a homeowner under the homeowner’s coverage at bench. (National Indemnity Co. v. Farmers Home Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 95 Cal.App.3d 102; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Camara (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 48 [133 Cal.Rptr. 600].)
*1042What this court said in National Indemnity, supra, in arriving at a result different from that which the majority now reaches, applies here. There, this court said: “There is a complete absence of conduct on the part of the insured which is independent of and unrelated to the ‘use’ of the vehicle. The conduct of the insured which contributed to the injury simply cannot be dissociated from the use of the vehicle. Nor did the injury, insofar as the insured is concerned, involve an instrumentality other than the vehicle itself.” (National Indemnity v. Farmers Home Mutual, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d 102, 109.)
I would affirm.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 9, 1982. Beach J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 22, 1982. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.