Court Opinion

ID: 9910355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:13:15.11227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:25.279438
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 76

                  SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP2166-D

COMPLETE TITLE:        In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
                       Against Matthew T. Luening, Attorney at Law:

                       Office of Lawyer Regulation,
                                 Complainant,
                            v.
                       Matthew T. Luening,
                                 Respondent.

                           DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LUENING

OPINION FILED:         December 15, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:
   COUNTY:
   JUDGE:

JUSTICES:
Per curiam.

ATTORNEYS:
                                                                          2023 WI 76
                                                                  NOTICE
                                                    This opinion is subject to further
                                                    editing and modification.   The final
                                                    version will appear in the bound
                                                    volume of the official reports.
No.    2020AP2166-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN                              :             IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Matthew T. Luening, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,
                                                                       FILED
           Complainant,                                           DEC 15, 2023

      v.                                                           Samuel A. Christensen
                                                                  Clerk of Supreme Court

Matthew T. Luening,

           Respondent.

      ATTORNEY    disciplinary       proceeding.             Attorney's        license

suspended.

      ¶1   PER    CURIAM.     This     matter       returns       to     the     court

following remand to Referee James J. Winiarski.

      ¶2   Attorney Matthew Luening was admitted to practice law

in    Wisconsin   in   2010    and    practices         in    Milwaukee.            His

disciplinary      history     consists    of        two      consensual         public
                                                            No.     2020AP2166-D

reprimands.        Public Reprimand of Matthew T. Luening, No. 2017-3;1

Public Reprimand of Matthew T. Luening, No. 2017-10.2

       ¶3     On December 29, 2020, the Office of Lawyer Regulation

(OLR)      filed   a   complaint   against   Attorney    Luening,     alleging

twelve counts of misconduct.          Seven of those counts arose out of

Attorney      Luening's    practice   before   an    immigration     tribunal.

Attorney Winiarski was appointed referee.               During the pendency

of the case, the referee granted summary judgment in favor of

OLR on one count of misconduct, and OLR dismissed one count.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the referee issued a report

finding that OLR met its burden of proof with respect to six of

the counts of misconduct alleged in the complaint, including

three of the immigration-based counts.              The referee recommended

a six-month suspension of Attorney Luening's license to practice

law.

       ¶4     Attorney Luening appealed, arguing that a six-month

suspension was excessive.          The OLR cross-appealed, arguing that

the referee erred in finding that OLR failed to meet its burden
of proof on one of the alleged counts of misconduct and that a

six- month suspension was inadequate.

       ¶5     In advance of oral argument, the court learned that on

the same day it filed the complaint against Attorney Luening,

       Electronic
       1                    copy           available           at
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/6a7e2925573043408b558b4b0a75
2f7f6b1d1933.continue?action=detail&detailOffset=1.

       Electronic
       2                    copy           available           at
https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/6a7e2925573043408b558b4b0a75
2f7f6b1d1933.continue?action=detail&detailOffset=0.

                                       2
                                                                  No.    2020AP2166-D

OLR filed a complaint in another case involving an attorney's

immigration practice.           The complaint filed in the other case

cited both the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct alleged

to have been violated as well as the rules promulgated by the

Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), as set forth in 8

C.F.R. § 1003.102.

       ¶6    On    February     24,    2023,     we   ordered   the     first      seven

counts alleged in the complaint in this proceeding, all of which

arose out of Attorney Luening's representation of clients before

an immigration tribunal, dismissed because those counts should

have been pleaded under the rules promulgated by EOIR rather

than   under      Wisconsin's       Rules   of    Professional      Conduct.           We

remanded the matter to the referee for a recommendation on the

appropriate sanction for the remaining non-immigration related

counts      of    misconduct     found      by    the    referee.       See     In     re

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Luening, 2023 WI 12, 406 Wis.

2d 1, 985 N.W.2d 773. (Luening I).

       ¶7    On    remand,    the     referee    asked    the   parties       to     file
briefs on the sanction issue.                   Both parties advocated for a

suspension not to exceed 60 days.                On May 10, 2023, the referee

issued a Report Following Remand in which he concluded that a

60-day suspension of Attorney Luening's license to practice law

in Wisconsin would be an appropriate sanction for the remaining

counts      of    misconduct.         The   referee      also   recommended          that

Attorney Luening should be responsible for 25% of the costs in

this case, which would be $8,639.22.

                                            3
                                                                       No.     2020AP2166-D

    ¶8        Since no appeal was filed from the Referee's Report

Following Remand, we review the report pursuant to Supreme Court

Rule (SCR) 22.17(2).3             After careful review of the matter, and

noting the unique circumstances of this case, we agree that

Attorney Luening's non-immigration related misconduct warrants a

60-day suspension.          We also agree that Attorney Luening should

be assessed 25% of the costs of this proceeding.

    ¶9        Three    of        the     non-immigration          based       counts       of

misconduct     alleged      in    OLR's    complaint        arose     out    of   Attorney

Luening's representation of L.S.                     L.S. is from Kenya but has

spent considerable time in the Milwaukee area. In 2013, L.S. was

living   in    the    Milwaukee         area       with   her    husband.         She    had

previously used Attorney Luening's legal services in efforts to

secure   a    green    card       for    her       son.     As   a    result      of    that

representation, Attorney Luening and L.S. became close friends.

    ¶10       L.S.    and   her        husband      returned     to   Kenya       in    2013.

L.S.'s husband was in the military.                       He passed away while the

couple was in Kenya, and L.S. applied for military benefits as a
result of his death.             When L.S. ran into problems securing the

benefits, she asked Attorney Luening, who was in Milwaukee, for

help.    Attorney Luening and L.S. communicated via Skype, email,

and written correspondence.                 Attorney Luening agreed to help

    3  SCR 22.17(2) provides: "If no appeal is filed timely, the
supreme court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject
or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or remand the
matter to the referee for additional findings; and determine and
impose appropriate discipline.    The court, on its own motion,
may order the parties to file briefs in the matter."

                                               4
                                                                    No.      2020AP2166-D

L.S. obtain the military benefits.              There was no discussion of

legal fees and no written fee contract.                   Attorney Luening said

he had no intention of charging his friend for his help.

    ¶11    In order to secure the military death benefits, L.S.

executed   a    Wisconsin      General      Durable    Power      of      Attorney    on

October 25, 2016 while she was in Kenya.                  The power of attorney

was a general grant of many powers to the named agent, Attorney

Luening, and it gave Attorney Luening powers over L.S.'s banking

and other financial transactions.               The power of attorney also

included powers to resolve the military benefits issue.

    ¶12    In        his   communications          with      authorities          while

attempting      to    secure     military    benefits       for     L.S.,      Attorney

Luening referred to L.S. as his client.

    ¶13    In March 2018, Attorney Luening received notice that

L.S. would receive the death benefits.                      In a March 18, 2018

letter to L.S., Attorney Luening said he was happy they were

able to deal successfully with the military.                   He also said, "My

representation as your attorney is now ended, as I see it."
    ¶14    In April 2018, L.S. sent Attorney Luening a check for

$3,000 accompanied by a note in which L.S. said the money was to

thank   Attorney       Luening    for    helping      her    with      the     military

benefits issue.        Attorney Luening sent L.S. a handwritten letter

that month in which he discussed his financial problems.                           In a

May 4, 2018 letter to Attorney Luening, L.S. said:

    I received your mssge (sic) and note Babe. I can help
    you. I can lend you $25,000 if you need it. You can
    deposit payments when I come over.

                                         5
                                                                           No.    2020AP2166-D

    ¶15     No    further       communication             occurred     between        L.S.   and

Attorney Luening about a loan agreement or about the terms of a

loan such as the type of disbursement that would be made or the

repayment of interest.

    ¶16     In June 2018, using the power of attorney L.S. had

signed,    Attorney       Luening       began       making     electronic        withdrawals

from L.S.'s checking account and transferring the funds to his

bank account for his own personal use.                        He did not provide L.S.

notice of the electronic withdrawals.

    ¶17     Between June 28, 2018 and January 2, 2019, Attorney

Luening    stated       that     he     made        thirteen       withdrawals        totaling

$23,600.        L.S.     said     the      number      and     total    amounts        of    the

withdrawals was greater.

    ¶18     L.S.       returned       to   Milwaukee         from    Kenya       in   February

2019.     Between January 28, 2019 and February 8, 2019, Attorney

Luening    withdrew       an    additional           $7,200    from     L.S.'s        checking

account    to    cover    the     expense       of    her     hotels,      food,      security

deposit at her Milwaukee apartment, cell phone, and for expenses
Attorney Luening and his staff incurred taking L.S. shopping,

looking for apartments, taking her to visit friends in town, and

making    trips    back    and    forth        to    his     office.       L.S.       knew   and

approved of those withdrawals.

    ¶19     On    or    about     February          22,    2019,    L.S.    paid      Attorney

Luening $10,000 in attorney's fees for his representation in the

military benefits matter.               Attorney Luening did not provide L.S.

with any billing statements for his work in representing her in
that matter.
                                               6
                                                           No.   2020AP2166-D

    ¶20    Beginning in June 2019, Attorney Luening began making

payments, via electronic deposits and cashier's checks, to L.S.

as repayment for the purported loan.            As of March 10, 2020,

Attorney   Luening   had   repaid   L.S.   $33,000.   Attorney      Luening

considered the purported loan amount to be $23,600 and interest

to be $9,400.

    ¶21    The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of

misconduct   with    respect   to   Attorney   Luening's    dealings    with

L.S.:

    Count 8:     By failing to communicate to [L.S.] in
    writing the scope of his representation or the basis
    or rate of his fee or expenses for which [L.S.] would
    be   responsible,  [Attorney]  Luening  violated  SCR
    20:1.5(b)(1). 4

    Count 9: Having formerly represented [L.S.], by using
    his knowledge of [L.S.]'s funds in the . . . checking
    account to the disadvantage of [L.S.], [Attorney]
    Luening violated SCR 20:1.9(c)(1).5

    4  SCR   20:1.5(b)(1)  provides:      "The   scope  of   the
representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for
which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to
the client in writing, before or within a reasonable time after
commencing the representation, except when the lawyer will
charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate
as in the past. If it is reasonably foreseeable that the total
cost of representation to the client, including attorney's fees,
will be $1000 or less, the communication may be oral or in
writing. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses
shall also be communicated in writing to the client."
    5  SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) provides:    "A lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm
has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as these rules would
permit or require with respect to a client, or when the
information has become generally known."

                                     7
                                                                            No.     2020AP2166-D

      Count 10: By misappropriating [L.S.]'s funds for his
      own personal use, [Attorney] Luening violated SCR
      20:8.4(c).6
      ¶22      The last two non-immigration related counts alleged in

OLR's complaint arose out of Attorney Luening's practicing law

while his license was suspended.

      ¶23      On April 5, 2019, the Wisconsin Board of Bar Examiners

(BBE)     sent      a    Notice      of      Noncompliance         to    Attorney        Luening

advising him that he had until June 4, 2019 to complete his

2017-2018           mandatory         continuing         legal           education          (CLE)
requirements         and      informing       him    that     if    he     did     not    become

compliant, his law license would be automatically suspended on

June 5, 2019.            The notice also stated that the CLE report and

any unpaid late fee must be received no later than June 4, 2019

in    order      for     him    to    remain        eligible       to    practice        law    in

Wisconsin.

      ¶24      Attorney Luening acknowledged that he received notice

prior     to   June      5,     2019.         Although       he    timely     obtained         the

necessary CLE credits and filed a CLE report showing compliance,

he failed to pay the late fee by June 4, 2019.
      ¶25      On    June      5,    2019,    BBE    suspended          Attorney     Luening's

Wisconsin      law       license      for     noncompliance         with     the     2017-2018

mandatory CLE requirements because the late fee had not been

paid.     The BBE sent a memorandum to the clerk of this court and

all     judges      of     courts     of     record     in     Wisconsin          listing      the

      6SCR 20:8.4(c) provides:  "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation."

                                                8
                                                                   No.     2020AP2166-D

attorneys who were suspended as of that date for failure to

comply with CLE requirements.                  Attorney Luening's name was on

the list.    The BBE also mailed Attorney Luening a notice on that

date informing him that his law license had been suspended.

    ¶26     Due to the suspension of his Wisconsin law license,

Attorney Luening was not eligible to practice in any United

States   immigration    court,       per       8   C.F.R.   §   1292.1.      Attorney

Luening continued to practice law and represent clients on June

5, 6, and 7, primarily in criminal and immigration matters,

including appearing in court and by phone, as well as filing

motions.    He did not inform any of the courts presiding over

those matters of his suspension.

    ¶27     When Attorney Luening learned that he had failed to

pay the late fee, he stopped practicing law and took immediate

action to remedy the situation.                    On June 10, 2019, Attorney

Luening filed a petition for reinstatement with BBE in which he

reported     compliance       with         the      2017-2018      mandatory        CLE

requirements, identified the instances in which he had practiced
law during the period of suspension, and verified that he had

paid the $200 reinstatement fee.

    ¶28     On   June   10,    2019,        Attorney        Luening's     license    to

practice law was reinstated.

    ¶29     The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of

misconduct with respect to Attorney Luening's practice of law

while suspended:

    Count 11:    By appearing on behalf of clients and
    filing motions on behalf of clients in circuit court

                                           9
                                                 No.   2020AP2166-D

    while subject to a CLE suspension, [Attorney] Luening
    violated SCR 31.10(1)7 and SCR 22.26(2)8, enforceable
    via SCR 20:8.4(f).9

    Count 12:     By appearing on behalf of clients in
    immigration court while he was not eligible to
    practice law in immigration court, [Attorney] Luening
    violated SCR 20:5.5(a)(1).10

    7  SCR 31.10(1) provides: "If a lawyer fails to comply with
the attendance requirement of SCR 31.02, fails to comply with
the reporting requirement of SCR 31.03(1), or fails to pay the
late fee under SCR 31.03(2), the board shall serve a notice of
noncompliance on the lawyer. This notice shall advise the lawyer
that the lawyer’s state bar membership shall be automatically
suspended for failing to file evidence of compliance or to pay
the late fee within 60 days after service of the notice. The
board shall certify the names of all lawyers so suspended under
this rule to the clerk of the supreme court, all supreme court
justices, all court of appeals and circuit court judges, all
circuit court commissioners appointed under SCR 75.02(1) in this
state, all circuit court clerks, all juvenile court clerks, all
registers in probate, the executive director of the state bar of
Wisconsin, the Wisconsin State Public Defender’s Office, and the
clerks of the federal district courts in Wisconsin. A lawyer
shall not engage in the practice of law in Wisconsin while his
or her state bar membership is suspended under this rule."
    8  SCR 22.26(2) provides:    "An attorney whose license to
practice law is suspended or revoked or who is suspended from
the practice of law may not engage in this state in the practice
of law or in any law work activity customarily done by law
students, law clerks, or other paralegal personnel, except that
the attorney may engage in law related work in this state for a
commercial employer itself not engaged in the practice of law."
    9  SCR 20:8.4(f) provides:  "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of
lawyers."
    10 SCR 5.5(a)(1) provides: "A lawyer shall not practice law
in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the
legal profession in that jurisdiction except that a lawyer
admitted to practice in Wisconsin does not violate this rule by
conduct in another jurisdiction that is permitted in Wisconsin
under SCR 20:5.5 (c) and (d) for lawyers not admitted in
Wisconsin."

                               10
                                                          No.   2020AP2166-D

    ¶30   OLR dismissed Count 12 during the pendency of this

action.

    ¶31   In his Report Following Remand, the referee found that

OLR had met its burden of proof as to Counts 8, 10, and 11 of

the complaint.

    ¶32   With   respect   to   the   counts   relating    to   L.S.,   the

referee noted that Attorney Luening was successful in securing

military benefits for L.S.      The referee also noted that in the

letter Attorney Luening wrote to L.S. confirming that successful

outcome, Attorney Luening made no request for any legal fees.

The referee said, "Much later, and upon her return from Kenya to

Milwaukee in 2019, [L.S.] voluntarily gave [Attorney] Luening a

$10,000 payment.   There was no bill issued by [Attorney] Luening

in relation to the $10,000 payment and it apparently was an

amount [L.S.] came up with on her own to show her appreciation

for [Attorney] Luening's services."      The referee went on to say:

    Count 8 of the complaint alleges that [Attorney]
    Luening failed to communicate to [L.S.] in writing the
    scope of his representation or the basis or the rate
    for his fee. Despite the fact that [Attorney] Luening
    never had any intention of charging his friend for his
    legal services, [Attorney] Luening was a lawyer and
    did perform legal services for [L.S.] without any
    discussion or written agreement in relation to the
    cost of his legal services.    There should have been
    some discussion or writing between [Attorney] Luening
    and [L.S.] in relation to the cost of such legal
    services.   If [Attorney] Luening did not intend to
    charge her anything for his legal services, that
    should have been conveyed to [L.S.] at the beginning
    of the representation.      While I find [Attorney]
    Luening's gratuitous thinking in relation to his close
    friend, [L.S.], to be a friendship gesture, as a
    lawyer, he was still required to convey intended

                                  11
                                                                       No.      2020AP2166-D

       charges or lack thereof to [L.S.]    His failure to do
       so is a violation of SCR 20:1.5(b)(1). His gratuitous
       and friendship goals are more of a mitigating factor
       to be considered by me in recommending appropriate
       discipline for this violation of the rules.
       ¶33    In finding that OLR failed to meet its burden of proof

with respect to Count 9 of the complaint, the referee said that

the evidence showed that L.S. "knew perfectly well that the

power    of   attorney     allowed    [Attorney]         Luening       access      to    her

[bank] account and she benefitted from his continuing access to

her     accounts."        The     referee       said    L.S.    testified          at    the
evidentiary     hearing     that     she    thought      the    proceeds         from    the

military      benefits    claim    were     being      deposited       into      her    bank

accounts;     she    thought    additional       benefits       were      due    her;    the

power of attorney she gave to Attorney Luening was not only to

obtain the military benefits but also to have him help her with

the     military     benefits     after     they       were    deposited         into    her

accounts; and she never revoked the power of attorney.                                   The

referee also noted that L.S. testified that she never arranged

for her bank statements to be forwarded to her in Kenya; she

knew    the   statements    were     being      sent     to    her   old       address    in

Milwaukee; and she had no way to access her bank account other

than through Attorney Luening.

       ¶34    The referee rejected OLR's claim that Attorney Luening

used    his   knowledge    of     L.S.'s    bank       accounts      as    a    result    of

"formerly" representing her in obtaining the military benefits.

Rather, the referee said:

       The representation of [L.S.] by [Attorney] Luening and
       the use of the power of attorney was continuous at

                                           12
                                                                    No.    2020AP2166-D

      [L.S.]'s directions to [Attorney] Luening.      [L.S.]
      knew that [Attorney] Luening continued to have the
      power of attorney and she made use of the power by
      directing   [Attorney] Luening   to  conduct   certain
      transactions with the [bank] accounts.    [L.S.] knew
      she had given [Attorney] Luening the general durable
      power of attorney and that it remained in effect even
      after some of the military benefits had been received
      as     a     result    of     [Attorney]     Luening's
      efforts. . . . [L.S.] benefitted from and directed
      further use of the power of attorney by [Attorney]
      Luening.
      ¶35 The referee found that the evidence showed a close

personal relationship between L.S. and Attorney Luening while

she was residing in Kenya, with considerable communications of a

personal    nature.        The       referee    said      after   Attorney      Luening

indicated     he     was    experiencing            financial      problems,      L.S.

responded, "I can help you. I can lend you $25,000 if you need

it.   You can deposit payments when I come over."                         The referee

found Attorney Luening's testimony that he believed L.S. was

offering him a loan up to $25,000 that he could repay when she

returned    to     Milwaukee     a    plausible      interpretation        of   L.S.'s

statement to him.       By contrast, the referee said the language of
the communication did not support L.S.'s claim that she meant

she would consider making a loan to Attorney Luening when she

returned to Milwaukee.           The referee said although L.S. claimed

she did not have any money to make the loan when she sent her

communication to Attorney Luening, "She knew the military death

benefits were going into her [bank] accounts" and "she knew

perfectly well that she had given [Attorney Luening] a power of

attorney    that    gave   him       access    to   the    . . . accounts."         The
referee also said, "While there is some nominal disputes as to

                                          13
                                                               No.     2020AP2166-D

the exact amounts removed by [Attorney] Luening from [L.S.]'s

accounts,     all   of   the    money    removed     has   been      returned   by

[Attorney] Luening to [L.S.] and OLR does not claim . . . any

additional      amount   is    still    owed    by   [Attorney]      Luening    in

relation to the loans."

       ¶36   The referee found that OLR met its burden of proof

with respect to Count 10 of the complaint, and he found that

Attorney Luening did violate SCR 20:8.4(c) by removing money

from   L.S.'s    accounts.       However,      the   referee   rejected     OLR's

contention that Attorney Luening planned to use L.S.'s power of

attorney to "misappropriate" her funds. The referee said:

       [Attorney] Luening did not make gifts to himself using
       the power of attorney.      He made loan payments to
       himself which he believed [L.S.] had offered to him.
       There is no evidence that [Attorney] Luening ever
       suggested the loan amounts were gifts. . . .

       [L.S.] was a nurse and thus highly educated. . . .
       While I have found [Attorney] Luening, as a lawyer,
       should have further clarified the loan offer from a
       client, [L.S.] needs to take responsibility for the
       language she used.   Also, her claim that she did not
       realize [Attorney] Luening had the ability to transfer
       money from her account lacks credibility, given that
       she was the one who actually gave such power to him in
       the power of attorney she prepared and signed.
       ¶37   Finally, with respect to Attorney Luening's practicing

law while suspended, the referee noted that he had previously

granted OLR's motion for summary judgment on Count 11, and the

referee described Attorney Luening's failure to pay the late

fees to BBE "an oversight . . . and not a deliberate act of

defiance."

                                        14
                                                               No.   2020AP2166-D

      ¶38   Turning to the appropriate level of discipline for the

three counts of misconduct, the referee noted that courts should

consider:    (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer's mental state;

(3)   the   potential    or   actual   injury     caused   by    the   lawyer's

conduct;    and   (4)   the   existence     of   aggravating    or   mitigating

factors.    In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grogan, 2011 WI

7, ¶15 n.9, 331 Wis. 2d 341, 795 N.W.2d 745 (recognizing the ABA

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, as amended in 1992, as

a guidepost).

      ¶39   The referee noted that Attorney Luening's two public

reprimands did not adequately demonstrate to Attorney Luening

the need to scrupulously comply with Supreme Court Rules.                    The

referee also noted that this court has recognized the need for

progressive discipline in attorney disciplinary cases.                    In re

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, ¶27,

296 Wis. 2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 501.

      ¶40   With respect to the two counts involving L.S., the

referee said Attorney Luening believed L.S. was offering him a
loan of up to $25,000, and although he should have clarified and

documented the loan offer, Attorney Luening did not outright

steal L.S.'s money.      The referee said:

      [Attorney Luening] was fully aware that [L.S.] would
      learn of the loans upon her return to Milwaukee.
      Also, he actually arranged for bank statements to be
      sent to her upon her return to Milwaukee. He did not
      try to hide the loan amounts he received.   He repaid
      the loans and he claims with interest.      While the
      evidence in regard to the repayments of the loans was
      not clear, OLR does not argue in its post-hearing
      briefs that any amount remains due.      Nonetheless,

                                       15
                                                                  No.   2020AP2166-D

       [Attorney] Luening should have known that he needed to
       confirm [L.S.]'s willingness to make the loan and he
       should have kept her inform[ed] of the amounts he was
       taking from her account. In essence, both [L.S.] and
       [Attorney] Luening were sloppy in how both of them
       approached the loan.   However, [Attorney] Luening was
       the professional attorney who should have realized the
       need to further document the situation.
       ¶41    The referee went on to say:

       While I have found that [Attorney] Luening should have
       had a fee agreement or at least something in writing
       when he began helping [L.S.] obtain the military
       benefits due her as a result of her husband's death,
       it is clear from the evidence that [Attorney] Luening
       did not intend to charge her anything for his legal
       services.   While OLR suggests in their briefs some
       sort of evil motive and intent to ultimately charge
       [L.S.] for the services, I did not find anything of
       the sort in the evidence. . . . I do not see this as a
       classic case where a lawyer simply did not provide a
       fee contract to a client. . . . There certainly are
       mitigating circumstances to be taken into account in
       both the fee contract and loan counts.
       ¶42    The referee concluded that a 60-day suspension was an

appropriate sanction for Attorney Luening's misconduct.

       ¶43    As to the assessment of costs, the referee noted that

this   court's     general    policy    is   to    impose   all    costs   upon   a
finding of misconduct.           SCR 22.24(1m).       The referee noted that

OLR's complaint alleged twelve counts of misconduct, while the

referee was tasked with recommending an appropriate sanction for

only   three     of   those   counts.        The    referee   noted      that   SCR

22.24(1m) sets forth the factors to be considered in assessing

costs.       The referee said:

       I believe the two most important factors in relation
       to the assessment of costs in this case are that
       [Attorney] Luening has previously received two public
       reprimands,   each  involving   multiple  violations.

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                                                                           No.        2020AP2166-D

      However, I cannot ignore the fact that the respondent
      has only been found responsible on three of twelve
      counts.    Seven of the original 12 counts were
      improperly charged.    While mathematical equality is
      not always required, I believe the respondent should
      be responsible for 25% of the costs in this case.
      ¶44    This court will adopt a referee's findings of fact

unless    they        are    clearly     erroneous.          Conclusions            of   law   are

reviewed de novo.                 See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against

Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.                                     The

court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of
the   referee's             recommendations.             See       In     re        Disciplinary

Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660

N.W.2d 686.

      ¶45    We        adopt       the    referee's          findings          of     fact     and

conclusions of law and find that Attorney Luening violated the

Supreme Court Rules as alleged in Counts 8, 10, and 11 of the

complaint.        After careful consideration, we also agree with the

referee that a 60-day suspension of Attorney Luening's license

to practice law in Wisconsin is an appropriate sanction for his

misconduct, and we agree with the referee's recommendation on

the imposition of costs.

      ¶46        We    frequently        say    that    since      no    two        disciplinary

cases are precisely the same, there is no standard sanction for

any particular misconduct.                We find, however, that the counts of

misconduct       found       by    the   referee       in    this       case    are      somewhat

similar     to    the       misconduct         at    issue    in    In    re        Disciplinary

Proceedings Against Toran, 2018 WI 26, 380 Wis. 2d 531, 909

                                                17
                                                                   No.   2020AP2166-D

N.W.2d 411 and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bartz,

2015 WI 61, 362 Wis. 2d 752, 864 N.W.2d 881.

      ¶47   In    Bartz,    we    imposed    a    60-day    suspension      for    five

counts of professional misconduct that included a violation of

SCR 20:8.4(c) that was more egregious than the violation that

occurred    in    the    instant     case    since    Attorney       Bartz,       after

settling a personal injury claim, disbursed monies held in trust

to himself, leaving no funds in trust attributable to his client

or the client's medical provider.                Attorney Bartz's disciplinary

history consisted of a consensual private reprimand.                     In Toran,

we imposed a 60-day suspension for three counts of misconduct

that included failing to enter into a written fee agreement with

a client and failing to return an advanced payment of fees when

the   attorney     did     not    complete   the     work    for    which     he    was

retained.        Attorney Toran's disciplinary history consisted of

two   consensual         public     reprimands,       a     consensual        private

reprimand, and a six-month suspension.

      ¶48   Here, the referee found Attorney Luening's failure to
pay the late fee associated with his lack of timely compliance

with mandatory CLE requirements to be an oversight.                         Although

Attorney Luening practiced law for several days after his law

license was suspended, as soon as he learned he had not paid the

late fee, he ceased practicing law and took immediate steps to

correct his error.          Although his practice of law during those

few days is a violation of the rules of professional misconduct,

standing alone it would not warrant a license suspension.

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                                                                No.        2020AP2166-D

       ¶49   Attorney    Luening's      misconduct     related        to     L.S.    is

obviously more serious.          Even if Attorney Luening did not intend

to charge his friend for assisting her in obtaining military

benefits following the death of her husband, as an attorney he

had the obligation to clearly communicate with L.S. regarding

the    issue   of     fees.      The    fact   that    Attorney       Luening       was

successful in obtaining an award of the military benefits does

not relieve him of his responsibilities under SCR 20:1.5(b)(1).

       ¶50   Attorney Luening's transfer of funds from L.S.'s bank

account after she told him, "I can lend you $25,000 if you need

it," is his most serious transgression.                As the referee noted,

Attorney Luening was serving as L.S.'s agent under the power of

attorney and was acting as a fiduciary for her.                 As an attorney,

he should have recognized the need to clarify the terms of the

loan   offer    he    believed    she   had    made.     It    is     significant,

however,       that the referee, who was in the best position to

judge witness credibility, found Attorney Luening's testimony

about the loan to be credible, and he found parts of L.S.'s
testimony about the loan to be less than credible.                          We agree

with the referee that while both L.S. and Attorney Luening were

sloppy in how they approached the loan, as both an attorney and

as L.S.'s fiduciary, Attorney Luening bore the responsibility of

clarifying      and    documenting      the    terms   of     the     loan     before

transferring any funds from L.S.'s account to his own.

       ¶51   The referee is correct that we generally adhere to the

concept of progressive discipline.              This is Attorney Luening's
third disciplinary proceeding.           The referee is also correct that
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                                                                  No.    2020AP2166-D

Attorney Luening's two previous public reprimands apparently did

not impress upon him the need to strictly adhere to the rules of

professional conduct.        We concur with the referee's conclusion

that a 60-day suspension of Attorney Luening's law license is an

appropriate sanction.

    ¶52    We   turn   now   to   the    issue      of   costs.         The   referee

recommends that Attorney Luening be responsible for 25% of the

costs.    As the referee noted, upon a finding of misconduct, our

general policy is to impose all costs of the proceeding upon the

respondent.     See SCR 22.24(1m).           In appropriate cases, the court

may, in the exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount of

costs.    In exercising its discretion regarding the assessment of

costs, the court considers the statement of costs, any objection

and reply, the recommendation of the referee, and (a) the number

of counts charged, contested, and proven; (b) the nature of the

misconduct; (c) the level of discipline sought by the parties

and recommended by the referee; (d) the respondent's cooperation

with the disciplinary process; (e) prior discipline, if any; and
(f) other relevant circumstances.             Id.

    ¶53    The pre-appellate costs of this proceeding, prior to

October 24, 2022 when this court asked the parties to advise

whether SCR 20:8.5(b)11 required that the counts of misconduct

    11 SCR 20:8.5(b) provides: "Choice of law. In the exercise
of the disciplinary authority of this state, the Rules of
Professional Conduct to be applied shall be as follows:

     (1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before
a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal
sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and

                                        20
                                                               No.    2020AP2166-D

arising   out   of    Attorney    Luening's      representation       of   clients

before an immigration tribunal should have been pleaded under

EOIR   rules,   are    $34,556.88.          In   addition,    OLR's    appellate

counsel fees are $4,207.00.            Twelve counts of misconduct were

charged in OLR's complaint.           Three were proven.       In their post-

remand    briefs,     the   parties     agreed     that   a   suspension       not

exceeding 60 days would be appropriate, and the referee agreed

with their assessment.           As noted, this is Attorney Luening's

third disciplinary proceeding.

       (2) for any other conduct,

            (i) if the lawyer is admitted to the bar of only this
       state, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of this
       state.

            (ii) if the lawyer is admitted to the bars of this
       state and another jurisdiction, the rules to be applied
       shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which
       the lawyer principally practices, except that if particular
       conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another
       jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to the bar,
       the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that
       conduct.

            (iii) if the lawyer is admitted to the bar in another
       jurisdiction and is providing legal services in this state

                                                                     (Continued)

       as allowed under these rules, the rules to be applied shall
       be the rules of this state.

     (c) A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the
lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in
which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of
the lawyer's conduct will occur."

                                       21
                                                                     No.        2020AP2166-D

      ¶54   Recognizing that its charging decisions                        resulted in

substantial additional costs——as well as the dismissal of seven

out of the originally pleaded twelve counts of misconduct——OLR

urges the court to assess 50% of the pre-appellate costs against

Attorney Luening.       In support of its recommendation, OLR points

to Attorney Luening's two previous public reprimands.                              It also

asserts, "most of the work that OLR performed would have taken

place     regardless   of     the    number       of     counts     charged."           OLR

recommends that the court assess 50% of the costs incurred prior

to October 24, 2022, or $17,278.44.                      For the period beginning

October 24, 2022, OLR recommends that the court assess no costs

since it concedes those amounts arose directly from the charging

decision that this court held was improper.

      ¶55    Upon consideration of the factors set forth in SCR

22.24(1m), along with the unique circumstances of this case, we

adopt the referee's recommendation to impose 25% of the pre-

October 24, 2022 costs, or $8,639.22.                     Of the twelve counts of

misconduct alleged in OLR's complaint, only three were proven.
One count was dismissed by OLR, and this court dismissed the

seven immigration-based counts due to OLR's failure to plead

them under the rules promulgated by EOIR.                      If OLR's complaint

had     contained   only    the     five        counts    unrelated        to     Attorney

Luening's     practice      before     an         immigration       tribunal,          this

proceeding    would    have   been    greatly          simplified    and        the   costs

would likely have been a fraction of their actual amount.                             While

the referee is correct that costs should not be assessed based
on "mathematical equality," we conclude that requiring Attorney
                                           22
                                                                      No.    2020AP2166-D

Luening to pay 25% of the pre-October 24, 2022 costs would be

equitable based on the unique circumstances presented here.

       ¶56    We note that while it may appear that by dismissing

the seven counts of misconduct arising out of the representation

of clients before an immigration tribunal and reducing the costs

of   the     proceeding      by    75%,   Attorney        Luening    is     getting   off

lightly, that is not the case.                As we noted in Luening I, OLR's

failure       to    plead     the     seven        immigration-based         counts     of

misconduct         under    EOIR    rules,        while   simultaneously       pleading

immigration-based          counts    against       another    attorney       under    EOIR

rules,       threatened      to     undermine        confidence      in     Wisconsin's

attorney regulatory system given OLR's disparate treatment of

two similarly situated attorneys.                   Luening I, 2023 WI 12, ¶20.

We concluded that the appropriate remedy for OLR's decision not

to   prosecute       Attorney       Luening's       immigration-based        misconduct

counts under EOIR rules was dismissal of those counts.                                Id.,

¶22.

       ¶57    The suspension of an attorney's license to practice
law, even for a brief period of time, is a significant sanction.

The attorney is deprived of his livelihood during the period of

suspension.         He is required to notify all clients and courts

before which he practices of the suspension.                        The court's order

of suspension is published and may have an adverse impact on the

attorney's ability to attract future clients.                        In short, a 60-

day suspension is not a de minimus sanction, and we find it is

the appropriate sanction under the unique facts of this case.

                                             23
                                                           No.        2020AP2166-D

    ¶58   As   to   the   75%   reduction   in   costs,   since        the   vast

majority of the costs incurred in this matter arose out of OLR's

prosecution of, and Attorney Luening's vigorous defense against,

the seven immigration-based counts of misconduct that this court

dismissed, Attorney Luening should be relieved of having to pay

the costs associated with OLR's significant error in pleading.

    ¶59   In   closing,    we   note     again   that   this     is     Attorney

Luening's third disciplinary proceeding.          We remind him that the

court may impose progressively severe sanctions when an attorney

engages in a pattern of misconduct.              We impose the sanction

recommended by the referee in this matter with the expectation

that Attorney Luening will not commit future misconduct that

would   subject     him    to    additional,       potentially          harsher,

discipline.

    ¶60   IT IS ORDERED that the license of Matthew T. Luening

to practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of 60

days, effective January 26, 2024.

    ¶61   IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, Matthew T. Luening shall pay to the Office of

Lawyer Regulation costs in the amount of $8,639.22.

    ¶62   IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Matthew T. Luening shall

comply with the requirements of           SCR 22.26 pertaining to the

duties of a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin

has been suspended.

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