Court Opinion

ID: 9897316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:04.340132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:44.236751
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Aug 11 2023, 10:16 am

                                                                                  CLERK
                                                                              Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                 Court of Appeals
                                                                                   and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jimmy Gurulé                                               Theodore E. Rokita
Elliot Slosar                                              Attorney General of Indiana
Admitted Pro Hac Vice
                                                           Kelly A. Loy
Exoneration Justice Clinic                                 Deputy Attorney General
Notre Dame Law School
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana
South Bend, Indiana
Elliot Slosar
The Exoneration Project
Chicago, Illinois
Robert Hochman
Minje Shin
Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Sidley Austin LLP
Chicago, Illinois
Mark A. Bates
Highland, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Leon Tyson,                                                August 11, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-PC-143
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo,
Appellee-Respondent.                                       Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           20D03-1807-PC-37

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                            Page 1 of 34
                                            Opinion by Judge Pyle

                                    Judges Crone and Bradford concur.

      Pyle, Judge.

      Statement of the Case

[1]   A jury convicted Leon Tyson (“Tyson”) of murder in 2017. This Court affirmed

      Tyson’s conviction on direct appeal. See Tyson v. State, No. 20A03-1704-CR-789,

      2017 WL 5761227 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2017), trans. denied. In 2018, Tyson

      filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In May 2021, Tyson, represented by

      attorneys Jimmy Gurulé (“Attorney Gurulé”) and Elliot Slosar (“Attorney

      Slosar”), filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief.1 Also, in May 2021,

      Tyson filed a motion for a change of judge pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule

      1(4)(b).2 The post-conviction court denied Tyson’s change of judge motion, and

      1
        At the outset, in full transparency, we note that Attorney Gurulé, who is affiliated with Notre Dame Law
      School’s Exoneration Justice Clinic (“the Clinic”), filed Tyson’s appellate brief on September 8, 2022. On
      November 16, 2022, Attorney Gurulé gave a presentation to several judges on this Court. During this
      presentation, Attorney Gurulé spoke about the Clinic. He also spoke about one of the Clinic’s cases, Royer v.
      State, 166 N.E.3d 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). In Royer, this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s order
      that granted Royer’s successive petition for post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence and
      Brady violations and vacated Royer’s murder conviction. Id. at 405. In Tyson’s appellate brief, Attorney
      Gurulé cites Royer in support of his argument that the post-conviction court erred in denying Tyson’s motion
      for a change of judge. We note that none of the judges on this panel of Tyson’s appeal attended Attorney
      Gurulé’s presentation or discussed the Royer case with any of the judges who attended the presentation.
      2
        Although Tyson’s motion was titled a motion for recusal, we note that Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) does
      not include the term recusal. Rather, Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) uses the terms change of judge. We will,
      therefore, refer to Tyson’s motion as a motion for a change of judge.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                                Page 2 of 34
      this interlocutory appeal concerns only the post-conviction court’s denial of that

      motion.3 Tyson specifically argues that the post-conviction court clearly erred

      when it denied his motion for a change of judge. Concluding that the post-

      conviction court did not clearly err, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial

      of Tyson’s change of judge motion.4

[2]   We affirm.

      Issue

               Whether the post-conviction court clearly erred when it denied
               Tyson’s motion for a change of judge.

      3
       We express no opinion on the merits of Tyson’s post-conviction relief petition, which is pending before the
      post-conviction court.
      4
        We note that Attorney Gurulé is also representing Pink Robinson (“Robinson”) and Iris Seabolt
      (“Seabolt”), two other petitioners who are appealing the post-conviction court’s denial of their change of
      judge motions. Robinson’s appeal was originally filed under Cause Number 22A-PC-1102, and Seabolt’s
      appeal was originally filed under Cause Number 22A-PC-208. In May 2022, this Court’s motions panel
      granted Attorney Gurulé’s motion to consolidate these two appeals with Tyson’s appeal.
      Thereafter, in February 2023, Attorney Gurulé initiated an appeal for Reginald Dillard (“Dillard”), a fourth
      post-conviction petitioner who is appealing the post-conviction court’s denial of his change of judge motion.
      Dillard’s appeal was originally filed under Cause Number 23A-PC-261. The following month, March 2023,
      this Court’s motions panel granted Attorney Gurulé’s motion to consolidate Dillard’s appeal into Tyson’s
      appeal.
      However, it is well-established that we have the inherent authority to reconsider a ruling by the motions
      panel while an appeal remains pending. Beasley v. State, 192 N.E.3d 1026, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans.
      denied. Here, we have determined that a de-consolidation of these four appeals is necessary. Accordingly, we
      have returned each one to its original appellate cause number and will decide each appeal on its own merits.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                                 Page 3 of 34
      Facts
[3]   In May 2021, Tyson, represented by Attorneys Gurulé and Slosar, filed a 117-

      page amended petition for post-conviction relief. In the introduction section of

      his amended petition, Tyson argued as follows:

              An epidemic exists in Elkhart, Indiana where innocent people are
              wrongfully convicted as a result of police misconduct, false and
              fabricated testimony, and the widespread failure to disclose
              material exculpatory evidence. Tragically, these unjust
              convictions often take decades to unravel, leaving innocent men
              and women to languish in prison for crimes they did not
              commit[.] The wrongful conviction of Petitioner, Leon Tyson,
              bears many of the common characteristics of Elkhart’s other
              known wrongful conviction cases: police misconduct; the
              fabrication of evidence; eyewitness misidentification; and the
              withholding of material exculpatory evidence. The newly
              discovered evidence discussed below demonstrates that Leon
              Tyson is wrongfully convicted, entitled to a new trial, and
              deserves to be Elkhart’s next exoneree.

      (App. Vol. 2 at 33-34) (emphasis in the original).

[4]   Further, in this petition, Tyson argued that he was entitled to post-conviction

      relief because:

              (1) he [was] actually innocent, and ha[d] located new evidence
              materially relevant to his innocence that he could not with
              reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at trial [“(the
              first post-conviction claim)”]; (2) he ha[d] new evidence
              demonstrating misconduct by Elkhart police officers under Brady
              v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), materially affecting his
              substantial rights [(“the second post-conviction claim”)]; and (3)
              he [had] received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
              Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and Martinez v.
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023         Page 4 of 34
              Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) that [fell] below an objective standard of
              reasonableness and prejudiced Mr. Tyson in a significant way
              [(“the third post-conviction claim”)].

      (App. Vol. 2 at 118) (footnote omitted). According to Tyson, “[e]ach ground

      provide[d] an independent basis for [the post-conviction court] to grant [Tyson]

      a new trial.” (App. Vol. 2 at 118).

[5]   Also, in May 2021, Tyson filed a motion for a change of judge pursuant to

      Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b). Tyson specifically argued that the post-

      conviction court should grant his motion because the post-conviction court had

      been a deputy prosecutor in the Elkhart County Prosecutor’s Office from 1998

      until 2002 (“the first recusal claim”). According to Tyson, “[b]ased upon this

      Court’s prior employment at the Elkhart County Prosecutor’s Office – during

      the period of time that [Tyson] w[ould] present evidence of systemic

      prosecutorial and police misconduct – there [was] a reasonable question as to

      whether this Court c[ould] be impartial in determining whether police or

      prosecutorial misconduct resulted in Mr. Tyson’s wrongful conviction.” (App.

      Vol. 2 at 148).

[6]   Tyson further argued that the post-conviction court should grant his motion for

      a change of judge because the post-conviction court’s order in a prior unrelated

      case involving Andrew Royer (“Royer”) had shown that the post-conviction

      court had “formed an opinion on the merits of [Royer’s] pending claims

      without hearing evidence.” (App. Vol. 2 at 152). Therefore, according to

      Tyson, “[t]he same logic [held] true here, where . . . Tyson argues that the same

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023        Page 5 of 34
      systemic failures caused his wrongful conviction.” (App. Vol. 2 at 152). Tyson

      further argued that because the post-conviction court had ultimately granted

      Royer’s motion for a change of judge, the post-conviction court should grant

      Tyson’s motion for a change of judge as well.

[7]   At this point, for a better understanding of Tyson’s argument and the post-

      conviction court’s response to this argument in its order denying Tyson’s

      motion for a change of judge, we find it helpful to review the facts and history

      of Royer’s case. A jury convicted Royer of murdering Helen Sailor (“Sailor”)

      in 2005. In 2006, this Court affirmed Royer’s conviction. Royer v. State, No.

      20A03-0601-CR-14, 2006 WL 1634766 (Ind. Ct. App. May 31, 2006). In 2007,

      Royer filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court

      denied after a hearing. This Court affirmed the denial. Royer v. State, No.

      20A04-1106-PC-325, 2011 WL 6595351 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2011).

[8]   A few years later, in June 2013, Royer, represented by Attorney Slosar, filed a

      motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B).

      Immediately after filing this motion, Attorney Slosar and Royer’s family

      members gathered in front of the prosecutor’s office for a press conference.

      During the press conference, Attorney Slosar stated there was a “‘systemic

      failure’ and an ‘epidemic’ in Elkhart County where people [were] wrongfully

      convicted because of police corruption, uninspiring defense counsel and an

      overzealous prosecutor.” (App. Vol. 3 at 57). Attorney Slosar also stated that

      “these factors contributed to Andrew Royer being convicted of a murder that he

      is absolutely innocent of.” (App. Vol. 3 at 57). In addition, Attorney Slosar

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023        Page 6 of 34
      stated that “we have proven that [Royer’s] conviction was an absolute fraud

      and the conviction was based on intentional misconduct.” (App. Vol. 3 at 57).

      Attorney Slosar further referred to the pending Trial Rule 60(B) motion as an

      appeal and released videotapes of witnesses that would be testifying at the

      hearing on Royer’s motion.

[9]   Following the press conference, the State filed a motion for an emergency

      hearing and a request for an injunction. In support of its motion, the State

      attached two newspaper articles from the South Bend Tribune. The headline

      for one of the articles, which is dated June 13, 2018, is “Mentally disabled man

      says shoddy policing, false statements led to Elkhart murder conviction.” (No.

      20D03-0309-MR-155, Chronological Case Summary, June 19, 2018 entry).

      The headline for the other article, which is dated June 14, 2018, is “Attorney of

      Andrew Royer blasts Elkhart police for ‘miscarriage of justice.’” (No. 20D03-

      0309-MR-155, Chronological Case Summary, June 19, 2018 entry). Royer filed

      a response to the State’s motion. Following a hearing, the trial court judge in

      Royer’s case, who is the post-conviction court judge in Tyson’s case, issued an

      order that provides, in relevant part, as follows:

               9.      Additionally, Slosar contends that he made no statements
                       that violate Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.6, as only
                       information contained in the public record was stated at
                       the press conference, along with matters he has a
                       constitutional right to say on behalf of Royer. The Court
                       carefully reviewed the State’s Motion, as well as Royer’s
                       Response, along with the various attachments referencing
                       news articles about the conference. Particularly troubling
                       to the Court were Slosar’s statements at the subject press

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023             Page 7 of 34
                    conference characterizing “‘systemic failure’ and an
                    ‘epidemic’ in Elkhart County where people are wrongfully
                    convicted because of police corruption, uninspiring
                    defense counsel and an overzealous prosecutor.” Slosar
                    went on to say that “these factors contributed to Andrew
                    Royer being wrongfully convicted of a murder that he is
                    absolutely innocent of.” Slosar also stated that “we have
                    proven that his conviction was an absolute fraud and the
                    conviction was based on intentional misconduct.”
                    Additionally, videos of proposed witnesses were released
                    and Slosar inaccurately referred to the pending Trial Rule
                    60(B) Motion filed in this Court as an “appeal.”

           10.      The Indiana Supreme Court in In re: Litz[,] 721 N.E.2d 258
                    (Ind. 1999) addressed behavior such as [Slosar’s] and held
                    that Litz’s publication of a letter in several local newspapers
                    which state[d] his client committed no crime, criticized the
                    prosecutor’s decision to retry the case, and mentioned his
                    client had passed a lie detector test constituted a violation
                    of Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(a).[5]

           11.      In sum, Slosar’s comments and statements are beyond the
                    scope of the exceptions stated in Ind. Professional Conduct
                    Rule 3.6(b) as to what a lawyer who is participating in
                    litigation of a matter may state.[6] The statements are highly

5
    Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a) provides as follows:

           A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a
           matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably
           should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a
           substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.

6
    Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(b) provides as follows:

           Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:

           (1)      the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the
                    identity of the persons involved;
           (2)      information contained in the public record;

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                                       Page 8 of 34
                 inflammatory, defamatory, inaccurately state the law as it
                 exists at this time with respect to Royer’s conviction, and
                 draw legal conclusions about matters not yet adjudicated.
                 Slosar’s actions go beyond simply summarizing evidence
                 that is a matter of public record. Further, any alleged “new
                 evidence” must be heard in accordance with the judicial
                 process before any legal conclusions may be reached.
                 Essentially, the extrajudicial statements made by Slosar at
                 the public press conference, and which were reported in the
                 media, do exactly what the Rule prohibits - forming public
                 opinion that has a substantial likelihood of materially
                 prejudicing the adjudicative proceedings pending in this
                 Court.

                                  *        *        *         *        *

        13.      Here, the Court finds that the statements Slosar made at
                 the public press conference held on June 13, 2018, violated
                 Ind. Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a) in that they were
                 extrajudicial statements that Slosar knew or reasonably
                 should have known would be disseminated by means of
                 public communication and would have a substantial
                 likelihood of prejudicing the adjudicative proceeding that
                 is pending in this matter, specifically, his Trial Rule 60(B)
                 Motion.

        (3)      that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
        (4)      the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
        (5)      a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;
        (6)      a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is
                 reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an
                 individual or to the public interest; and
        (7)      in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
                 (i)       identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
                 (ii)      if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid
                           in apprehension of that person;
                 (iii)     the fact, time and place of arrest; and
                 (iv)      the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the
                           length of the investigation.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                                Page 9 of 34
           14.      While the Court clearly recognizes Slosar’s First
                    Amendment right to free expression, as noted by the
                    Indiana Supreme Court in the Commentary to Ind.
                    Professional Rule of Conduct 3.6,[7] that right must be
                    balanced with the right to fair and impartial legal
                    proceedings, which may entail some restriction of the
                    information that may be disseminated about a party prior
                    to and during those proceedings. Ind. Professional Rule of
                    Conduct 3.6 does not curtail free speech except to the
                    extent necessary to protect the corresponding right to fair
                    proceedings. This is the basis upon [which] the Court is
                    acting.

           15.      For all these reasons, Slosar is hereby enjoined from
                    making extrajudicial commentary and statements to the
                    extent explained in Ind. Professional Rule of Conduct 3.6
                    on the matter that is pending before this court. Failure to
                    comply with this Order will be deemed willful failure to
                    comply with Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 and is
                    subject to appropriate sanctions.

7
    The commentary to Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

           It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and
           safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily
           entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior
           to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result
           would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic
           decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital
           societal interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having
           legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to
           know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a
           legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general
           public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct
           significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                                       Page 10 of 34
       (App. Vol. 3 at 56-59). Also, in the order, the trial court noted that Attorney

       Slosar had argued that Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 had not

       applied to this case because no trial had been pending. The trial court

       responded that it disagreed with Attorney Slosar’s over[-]simplification of the

       intent of the rule and found that “the clear and express language of paragraph

       (a) is that dissemination of extrajudicial statements that will have a likelihood of

       materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding (Emphasis added) is

       prohibited. Indeed, that language, as well as “legal proceedings” is used

       throughout the Rule, the Commentary, and in case law.” (App. Vol. 3 at 56).

[10]   In August 2018, Royer filed a motion to withdraw, without prejudice, his Trial

       Rule 60(B) motion, which the trial court granted. In May 2019, Royer filed a

       motion for permission to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief,

       which this Court granted. Royer then filed a successive petition for post-

       conviction relief and a motion for change of judge. The post-conviction court

       judge, who had issued the order finding that Attorney Slosar had violated

       Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a), granted Royer’s motion for a

       change of judge.

[11]   Royer’s case was subsequently assigned to Kosciusko Superior Court Judge Joe

       V. Sutton (“Judge Sutton”), who held a four-day hearing on Royer’s successive

       petition for post-conviction relief in October and November 2019. Following

       the hearing, Judge Sutton issued a fifty-five-page order granting Royer’s

       successive petition for post-conviction relief and vacating Royer’s murder

       conviction based on newly discovered evidence and Brady violations.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023         Page 11 of 34
[12]   Judge Sutton specifically found newly discovered evidence that Elkhart County

       Forensic Specialist Dennis Chapman (“Forensic Specialist Chapman”) had not

       been qualified to conduct the latent fingerprint comparisons that he had made

       in Royer’s case.8 Judge Sutton noted that then-Elkhart County Chief Deputy

       Prosecutor Vicki Becker (“Deputy Prosecutor Becker”)9 had been responsible

       for meeting with Forensic Specialist Chapman and preparing him to testify.

       However, Judge Sutton found that Deputy Prosecutor Becker had not been

       provided with Forensic Specialist Chapman’s resume and had not been told

       that he was not qualified to conduct comparisons of latent prints. Judge Sutton

       further found that Forensic Specialist Chapman had “misled [Deputy

       Prosecutor] Becker into believing that he was qualified to conduct the type of

       latent print comparisons that [had] exist[ed]” in the case. (App. Vol. 3 at 69).

       Judge Sutton also found a Brady violation because Forensic Specialist

       Chapman’s lack of qualifications had not been disclosed to the defense.

[13]   Judge Sutton further found newly discovered evidence that Detective Carl

       Conway (‘Detective Conway”), the lead investigator in the Sailor homicide had

       been removed from the homicide unit before Royer’s trial. The reason for

       Detective Conway’s removal was a misrepresentation that he had made to an

       8
        In 2012, the Elkhart County Sheriff’s Department disciplined Forensic Specialist Chapman for his role in
       Royer’s case. Forensic Specialist Champman retired in 2013.
       9
           Vicki Becker is currently the elected Elkhart County Prosecutor.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                             Page 12 of 34
       attorney regarding one of the attorney’s clients.10 Based upon this

       misrepresentation, Detective Conway’s supervisors had concerns about the

       impact that his misrepresentations would have on future homicide

       investigations and his credibility at trials if called to testify. However, Detective

       Conway’s removal from the homicide unit had not been disclosed to Royer

       before trial. Judge Sutton further found a Brady violation because the Elkhart

       Police Department had not disclosed Detective Conway’s removal to the

       defense.

[14]   In addition, Judge Sutton found newly discovered evidence that Detective

       Conway had threatened a critical witness in Royer’s case and promised her

       $2,000 to falsely testify against Royer at trial. Judge Sutton further found that

       the witness’ recantation of her trial testimony at the post-conviction hearing and

       her explanation for how her statement had been crafted were both credible. In

       addition, Judge Sutton found a Brady violation because the coercion of the

       witness and the fabrication of her testimony had not been disclosed to the

       defense.

       10
         Judge Sutton further explained that Detective Conway’s appeal of his removal from the homicide unit had
       been summarily denied. In addition, Detective Conway had later been removed from the sex-crimes unit.
       According to Judge Sutton, during that removal process, Detective Conway had “made a complaint to
       [Deputy Prosecutor Becker]. A disciplinary proceeding ensued that resulted in an agreement between
       [Detective] Conway and the Elkhart Police Department. As part of that agreement, the Elkhart Police
       Department agreed to withdraw any allegations alleging or suggesting that ‘he caused the Office of the
       Prosecuting Attorney to lose faith in the Elkhart Police Department or to question its ability to supervise its
       detectives, investigate sex crimes or to perform any other form of police activities.’ In exchange, Detective
       Conway accepted a written reprimand.” (App. Vol. 3 at 83-84 n.7).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                                 Page 13 of 34
[15]   Judge Sutton further found newly discovered evidence that Royer’s two audio-

       recorded statements obtained on September 3 and September 4, 2003, which

       totaled approximately sixty-one minutes, were unreliable and involuntary.

       Judge Sutton specifically noted that Detective Conway had interrogated Royer

       for approximately seven and one-half hours and that there was newly

       discovered evidence that Detective Conway had a reputation for obtaining

       confessions from every suspect that he had interrogated while assigned to the

       homicide unit. In addition, Judge Sutton found newly discovered evidence that

       Detective Conway’s ability to obtain confessions had not been a direct result of

       his internal interrogation training at the Elkhart Police Department. Judge

       Sutton further found newly discovered evidence that the Elkhart Police

       Department had not provided Detective Conway with any meaningful training

       on how to conduct interrogations, including how to interrogate a suspect such

       as Royer, who suffered from a mental disability. Judge Sutton also found that

       although Detective Conway had been aware of Royer’s mental disability,

       Detective Conway did not use any protections to safeguard against the

       possibility of Royer giving false and unreliable statements. Judge Sutton

       specifically pointed out that although another member of the homicide unit had

       told Detective Conway that the Elkhart Housing Authority had documentation

       revealing that Royer was severely disabled and had the mind of a child, Royer

       had not been permitted to have a lawyer, counselor, or family members present

       for his interrogations on September 3 and 4.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023      Page 14 of 34
[16]   In addition, Judge Sutton found newly discovered evidence that Royer had not

       knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights because Detective

       Conway had not properly taken the time to advise Royer of these rights. Judge

       Sutton also found newly discovered evidence that Detective Conway had

       “repeatedly provided information about the homicide to Mr. Royer throughout

       the unrecorded two-day interrogation sessions.” (App. Vol. 3 at 101). In

       addition, Judge Sutton found newly discovered evidence that although

       Detective Conway revealed at the successive post-conviction hearing that

       Royer’s “mental well-being [had] broke[n] down[]” during the interrogations,

       Detective Conway had taken Royer’s recorded statement and placed him under

       arrest. (App. Vol. 3 at 103). Royer had been “in such a state of confusion that

       Detective Conway had to remind him that he [had given] a confession and was

       under arrest.” (App. Vol. 3 at 103).

[17]   Judge Sutton also found newly discovered evidence that the Elkhart Police

       Department’s investigation into Royer’s statements corroborated their

       unreliability. (App. Vol. 3 at 104). Specifically, Detective Conway

       acknowledged that he was only able to corroborate the following two basic

       pieces of information from all of Royer’s statements: (1) Royer knew the other

       person who had been charged with killing Sailor; and (2) Royer lived in the

       same building as Sailor. Further, many of the details in Royer’s recorded

       statements conflicted with the physical evidence.

[18]   Based on these extensive findings, including newly discovered evidence and

       Brady violations, Judge Sutton vacated Royer’s murder conviction after

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023       Page 15 of 34
       concluding that he was entitled to a new trial. We note that although Judge

       Sutton found several Brady violations, Judge Sutton’s order does not specifically

       state that Deputy Prosecutor Becker or any other prosecutor had known about

       Detective Conway’s misconduct or had purposely withheld evidence from the

       defense.11

[19]   On appeal, we affirmed Judge Sutton’s grant of Royer’s successive petition for

       post-conviction relief and vacation of Royer’s murder conviction. Royer, 166

       N.E.3d at 380. We specifically highlighted instances of Detective Conway’s

       misconduct and concluded that Royer had not received a fair trial. Like Judge

       Sutton, we did not state that Deputy Prosecutor Becker or any other prosecutor

       had known about Detective Conway’s misconduct or had purposely withheld

       evidence from the defense.

[20]   We now return to the facts in Tyson’s appeal. In June 2021, Tyson filed a

       supplement to his motion for a change of judge, wherein he advised the post-

       conviction court that he had recently filed a 267-page petition for post-

       conviction relief on behalf of “another victim of the Elkhart epidemic[.]” (App.

       Vol. 3 at 207). The State subsequently filed a response to Tyson’s initial motion

       for a change of judge. Also, in June 2021, the post-conviction court held a

       hearing on Tyson’s motion for a change of judge. In September 2021, the post-

       11
         “For Brady purposes, the prosecutor is charged with knowledge of information known by the police even if
       the prosecutor herself is unaware of the information.” Royer, 166 N.E.3d at 400.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                            Page 16 of 34
conviction court issued a ten-page order denying Tyson’s motion for a change

of judge. This order provides, in relevant part, as follows:

        20.      In the instant case, [Tyson’s] conclusory allegation that
                 this Court cannot be impartial in considering [his] post
                 conviction allegations of police and prosecutorial
                 misconduct simply because the presiding Judge worked as
                 a Deputy Prosecutor over twenty (20) years ago does not
                 support a finding of bias. The facts attendant to the instant
                 case occurred in 2015, thirteen (13) years after the end of
                 the presiding Judge’s tenure as a Deputy Prosecutor.
                 Moreover, even if this Judge may have once worked
                 alongside current elected Prosecutor Vickie Becker is of no
                 consequence. There is no evidence that any special,
                 enduring or extrajudicial relationship exists between Ms.
                 Becker and the Honorable Judge. Finally, [Tyson]’s
                 contention that this Court’s impartiality is questionable
                 based on this Judges’ theoretical relationships with law
                 enforcement personnel in general twenty (20) years ago,
                 does not taint the Court’s ability to determine credibility.
                 [Tyson]’s claim in this regard is not supported by any
                 corroborative detail or examples, and is based purely on
                 speculation.

        21.      [Tyson] also alleges that this Court’s findings in the case
                 of State v. Andrew Royer in Cause No. 20D03-0309-MR-
                 0155, regarding the conduct of attorney Elliot Slosar, one
                 of [Tyson]’s counsel, and the ultimate entry of an
                 injunction against Mr. Slosar, calls into question the ability
                 of the presiding Judge to remain unbiased and impartial in
                 the instant case. Specifically, [Tyson] complains that
                 because this Court previously found comments and
                 allegations made by Mr. Slosar to be “defamatory,” the
                 Court formed opinions on the merits of Royer’s case.
                 Therefore, [Tyson] argues that this Judge is duly biased
                 and unfit to preside over the current post conviction case

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023           Page 17 of 34
                 in which [Tyson] raises similar allegations. However,
                 [Tyson] misstates the issue addressed by the Court in
                 Royer by stating that the Court found that the allegations
                 of “systemic” failure in Elkhart County leading to
                 wrongful convictions were false; and, that Royer’s counsel
                 knowingly or recklessly made false statements about the
                 causes of Royer’s convictions. [Tyson] further averred
                 that this Court reached these conclusions without hearing
                 the testimony of a single witness or considering any
                 evidence in the Royer case.

        22.      A review of the actual Order entered on July 3, 2018
                 clearly shows that [Tyson]’s characterization of the
                 proceedings in Royer is wrong. That matter came on for
                 hearing on the State’s Motion for Emergency Hearing and
                 Request for Injunction based on Mr. Slosar holding a press
                 conference outside the Prosecutor’s Office in downtown
                 Elkhart, Indiana, during which Mr. Slosar made a number
                 of comments and allegations about Royer’s then pending
                 Ind. Trial Rule 60(B) motion. Specifically, at the time the
                 Court issued its July 3, 2018 Order, the statements made
                 by Mr. Slosar to the press characterized “‘systemic failure’
                 and an ‘epidemic’ in Elkhart County where people are
                 wrongfully convicted because of police corruption,
                 uninspiring defense counsel and an overzealous
                 prosecutor.” Slosar went on to say that “these factors
                 contributed to Andrew Royer being wrongfully convicted
                 of murder that he is absolutely innocent of.” Slosar also
                 stated that “we have proven that his conviction was an
                 absolute fraud based on intentional misconduct.” The
                 Court found Slosar’s statements to be beyond the scope of
                 the exceptions stated in Ind. Professional Conduct Rule
                 3.6(b), as well as inflammatory and defamatory as they
                 inaccurately stated the law as it existed at that time with
                 respect to Royer’s conviction, and inappropriately drew
                 legal conclusions about matters that had not yet been
                 adjudicated. (Court’s July 3, 2018 Order).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023          Page 18 of 34
        23.      To the contrary, the Court carefully reviewed the Motion
                 before it and Royer’s Response, along with numerous
                 attachments; therefore, the Court did consider evidence
                 and testimony relevant to the Motion before it. Royer’s
                 60(B) Motion was not before the Court; the State’s Motion
                 for an Emergency Injunction was. Royer’s 60(B) Motion
                 was pending, and as established by the case history in
                 FN l above, nothing had been proven, and there was no
                 ruling on the merits of that Motion; therefore, Mr. Slosar’s
                 statements to the public and media were blatantly
                 inappropriate and false. In his Motion for Recusal,
                 [Tyson] is attempting to frame the issues addressed in
                 the Court’s July 3, 2018 Order in the Royer case nearly
                 three (3) years ago to serve his own purpose in the instant
                 case. However, the facts surrounding the Court’s finding
                 and entry of an injunction in the Royer case are in no way
                 present, relevant or even similar to the instant case and
                 that argument is without merit.

        24.      [Tyson]’s attempts to cite Andrew Royer’s subsequent
                 successful post conviction action decided in 2021 as
                 evidence that counsel’s statements in 2018 were true and
                 an absolute defense to the Judge’s characterization of
                 attorney Slosar’s comments as defamatory also fail.
                 Although [Tyson] is correct that Andrew Royer
                 ultimately prevailed on his post conviction action, that fact
                 was not established when this Court ruled in the 2018
                 injunction matter and that case has absolutely no bearing
                 on the instant case. Relying on the Court’s previous ruling
                 as evidence of personal bias on the part of the presiding
                 Judge is misplaced as doing so erroneously treats the
                 Court’s finding that counsel violated Ind. Rule of
                 Professional Conduct 3.6(a) as pertaining to substantive
                 issues in Royer’s post conviction case. Clearly, the Court’s
                 Order of July 3, 2018 does not support a rational inference of
                 personal bias toward [Petitioner] Leon Tyson. The injunction
                 in the Royer case was issued on a very narrow set of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023            Page 19 of 34
                 circumstances, and the impetus behind the Order was to
                 prevent conclusions from being reached prematurely
                 without a full adjudication on the evidence, to ensure the
                 integrity of the litigation and to circumscribe maneuvers
                 that might prejudice the pending adjudicative proceedings.
                 It cannot be said that an objective person with knowledge
                 of those circumstances would doubt the impartiality of the
                 judge in the instant case.

        25.      Andrew Royer’s success in his post conviction case also
                 has no bearing on the instant case simply because
                 [Tyson] is again claiming the same alleged “systemic
                 failure.” There is no factual connection between Royer
                 and the instant case at all, let alone a connection
                 warranting recusal of the presiding Judge. In fact, Royer’s
                 success on his individual post conviction petition does not
                 unequivocally demonstrate the presence of what
                 [Tyson] frames as “systemic” misconduct in Elkhart
                 County. Rather, the Indiana Court of Appeals in State v.
                 Royer, 166 N.E.3d 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) addressed
                 misconduct regarding the behaviors of one detective
                 insofar as Royer’s case. Id at 404, n. 20.

        26.      [Tyson] further suggests that simply because this Court
                 ultimately recused in the post conviction case involving
                 Andrew Royer, it must reach the same conclusion here.
                 While the Court nonetheless did recuse itself from hearing
                 Royer’s post conviction case on the merits in order to cure
                 any lingering concerns in that case, that ruling does not
                 dictate how the Court must handle future post conviction
                 cases, including this one.

                                   *        *       *        *      *

        28.      For all the herein stated reasons, this Court concludes that
                 [Tyson] has not met his burden of overcoming the

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023          Page 20 of 34
                        presumption that this Judge is unbiased and unprejudiced
                        with respect to [Tyson]’s pending post conviction
                        proceeding.

       (App. Vol. 4 at 6-11) (emphasis added).

[21]   Three weeks later, Tyson filed a motion for reconsideration, wherein he argued

       that the post-conviction court’s “appalling misreading of the Royer case

       show[ed] its inability to impartially consider [Tyson]’s claims[]” and that the

       post-conviction court’s “claim that Royer ha[d] ‘absolutely no bearing’ on this

       case [was] baseless.” (App. Vol. 4 at 16, 18). In October 2021, the post-

       conviction court denied Tyson’s motion for reconsideration.

[22]   In December 2021, the post-conviction court certified its order for interlocutory

       appeal. In its certification order, the post-conviction court stated as follows:

               As to [Tyson]’s allegation that the Orders he requests this Court
               to certify involve substantial questions of law, [Tyson] most
               disrespectfully avers that this Court has “ignored a clear
               obligation to recuse, misapplied the governing law, and failed to
               address several of Mr. Tyson’s arguments.” To the contrary, the
               Court’s Order denying [Tyson’s] Motion for Recusal is a very
               detailed ten (10) page Order in which the Court took great care to
               research and address each of [Tyson]’s arguments. The Court
               believes that it did appropriately apply well-settled law regarding
               recusal in determining that recusal in the instant case is not
               warranted. In this regard, it is the opinion of this Court that no
               substantial question of law exists.

               Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court believes that
               substantial questions of law do exist as to the appropriateness of
               [Tyson] repeatedly raising and relying on matters outside this

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023         Page 21 of 34
               case, whether [Tyson] has incorrectly interpreted and applied
               previous Orders issued by this Court in an unrelated case, and
               whether [Tyson] had drawn conclusions not based on evidence in
               this case in support of his position that this Court harbors bias
               and prejudice against him; and, therefore, is unable to render an
               impartial decision in his post conviction proceedings. With
               respect to these matters, the Court finds that early resolution
               would promote a more orderly disposition of the case and
               promote judicial economy and resources. While this appeal will
               by no means resolve the pending post-conviction litigation, it will
               resolve the important threshold issue of judicial recusal before the
               case proceeds on the merits.

       (No. 20D03-1807-PC-37, Chronological Case Summary, December 27, 2021

       entry). In February 2022, this Court accepted jurisdiction over Tyson’s

       interlocutory appeal.

[23]   One month later, in March 2022, Tyson filed in this Court a verified motion

       pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 37 to stay the appeal and remand the case

       to the post-conviction court. In his motion, Tyson claimed that he had newly

       discovered evidence, which revealed that the post-conviction court had been

       married from 1992 until 2003 to Stephen Cappelletti (“Cappelletti”), who had

       been an Elkhart Police Department reserve police officer from 1983 through

       1994. Tyson advised this Court that he planned to file a renewed motion for a

       change of judge based on this newly discovered evidence. In April 2022, this

       Court granted Tyson’s motion to stay and remand. In our order, we stated that

       “[w]ithin thirty-five (35) days of the date of this order, the [post-conviction]

       court is ordered to hold a hearing, if necessary” and issue a ruling on Tyson’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023         Page 22 of 34
       renewed motion for a change of judge. (No. 22A-PC-143, Chronological Case

       Summary, April 4, 2022 entry).

[24]   In April 2022, Tyson filed, in the post-conviction court, a renewed motion for a

       change of judge pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b). In his

       twenty-four-page motion, Tyson argued that this Court had “ordered [the post-

       conviction] court to reconsider its obligation to recuse in light of this new

       evidence.” (App. Vol. 6 at 74). Tyson also argued that an evidentiary hearing

       was necessary [because] . . . [the post-conviction court]’s failure to disclose its

       marriage to Mr. Cappelletti raise[d] significant questions as to whether this

       [post-conviction] Court ha[d] failed to disclose other information relevant to

       recusal[.]” (App. Vol. 6 at 75). Tyson further argued that the post-conviction

       court had a “clear obligation” to disclose its prior marriage to Mr. Cappelletti to

       Mr. Tyson and that “[r]ecusal [was] necessary because [the post-conviction]

       Court’s marriage to Mr. Cappelletti – and his involvement in police misconduct

       – place[d] this Court’s orders in a far more disturbing light.” (App. Vol. 6 at 90,

       91).

[25]   The State filed a reply to Tyson’s renewed motion for a change of judge. The

       post-conviction court initially scheduled a May 2022 hearing for Tyson’s

       renewed change of judge motion. However, at the end of April 2022, the post-

       conviction court entered an order denying Tyson’s motion without a hearing.

       In this order, the post-conviction court explained that after having thoroughly

       reviewed the record in the case, the post-conviction court had determined that

       an evidentiary hearing was “not only unnecessary, but also was not mandated.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023          Page 23 of 34
       (No. 20D03-1807-PC-37, Chronological Case Summary, April 29, 2022 entry).

       The post-conviction court specifically explained, in relevant part, as follows:

               The Court of Appeals directed this Court to hold a hearing, if
               necessary, and issue a ruling on Appellant’s Renewed Motion
               for Recusal. (Emphasis added). Just as counsel for [Tyson] has
               previously and consistently drawn legal conclusions and
               misinterpreted this Court’s orders, counsel once again ‘puts
               words in the mouth’ of the Indiana Court of Appeals that are not
               there, to-wit: [Tyson], by counsel informed this Court in his
               Renewed Motion that a hearing was necessary, which is not
               Tyson’s call at all. Then, after the Court accommodated counsel
               by setting a one-hour hearing for relevant argument only in this
               case as well as in Seabolt v. State, Cause No. 20D03-2106-PC-
               000019, counsel informed the Court that the Indiana Court of
               Appeals meant to say in its Order . . . that an evidentiary hearing
               was mandated[.]

               The specifically stated purpose of the remand in this case was for
               this Court to consider and issue a ruling on [Tyson]’s Renewed
               Motion for Recusal, not to reconsider its prior rulings[.]
               Moreover, nowhere in the Court of Appeals Order remanding
               this cause is this Court directed to reconsider its ‘obligation to
               recuse’ as suggested by [Tyson]. The Court’s ruling at this time is
               strictly limited to the alleged “newly discovered evidence” in
               [Tyson]’s Renewed Motion for Recusal. The Court’s prior Order
               of September 8, 2021 denying [Tyson]’s Motion to Recuse and
               October 4, 2021 Order denying [Tyson]’s Motion to Reconsider
               are affirmed and incorporated in their entirety herein.

       (No. 20D03-1807-PC-37, Chronological Case Summary, April 29, 2022 entry).

       (emphasis in the original).

[26]   Regarding the substance of Tyson’s renewed recusal motion, the post-

       conviction court stated as follows:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023        Page 24 of 34
        In his Renewed Motion for Recusal, [Tyson] alleges that this
        Court must recuse in the pending post conviction case because
        the Judge was married to an Elkhart Police Department reserve
        officer, Stephen Cappelletti (“Cappelletti”), from June 6, 1992
        through April 15, 2003, and that Cappelletti had close ties to a
        group of officers who framed [Tyson] and was involved in police
        misconduct similar to that alleged in [Tyson]’s Post Conviction
        Relief Petition. Cappelletti was with the Elkhart Police
        Department part time from 1983-1994; therefore, during most of
        that time, this Judge was not married to him. Also, any direct
        allegation of misconduct by Cappelletti as espoused by Tyson in
        his Renewed Motion allegedly occurred in 1989, prior to the
        marriage. Cappelletti did not work at the Elkhart Police
        Department at any time when an investigation would have
        ensued in [Tyson]’s case. Cappelletti’s employment with the
        Elkhart Police Department ended in 1994. Tyson was charged
        with the offense of Murder on December 7, 2015, and was
        convicted on January 26, 2017. That Cappelletti was involved in
        any investigation of [Tyson]’s case between 1994 and 2003 and
        would have shared information with this Court about a murder
        that did not occur until June 20, 2015 is not only incredulous, but
        impossible. Moreover, this Judge had been divorced from
        Cappelletti for over twelve (12) years when [Tyson] was charged
        and had no contact with him thereafter. Further, to suggest that
        any of the activities or attitudes [Tyson] avers Cappelletti and/or
        his associates engaged in or believed somehow means that this
        Court must also condone such activities and harbor such beliefs
        based on the marriage many years earlier is entirely without
        merit. Even if Cappelletti remained friends with former Elkhart
        Police Officers, that does not implicate this Court. Contrary to
        [Tyson]’s contention, the Judge’s former marriage does not
        provide “corroborative detail” that this Court cannot impartially
        assess the credibility of witnesses who may be associated with
        police officers in general and their alleged misconduct.
        Moreover, [Tyson] has failed to demonstrate how this Court’s ex-
        husband bears any nexus to [Tyson]’s post-conviction matter.
        Other than a shared employment status many years ago with

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023        Page 25 of 34
        individuals accused of wrongdoing who may or may not testify
        in this case, there is no connection at all. [Tyson] has not shown
        that this Judge was witness to or adheres to anything that would
        compr[om]ise his post conviction case[.]

        In the instant case, there is no evidence that this Court’s former
        marriage to an Elkhart Police Department reserve officer in any
        way ever swayed the Judge’s decision making or does so today
        nineteen (19) years post-divorce. Cappelletti stopped working for
        the Elkhart Police Department in 1994, twenty-one (21) years
        prior to [Tyson]’s offense. It is unlikely that Cappelletti himself
        obtained any information about [Tyson]’s case, let alone
        imparted such knowledge to this Court. This Judge has no
        knowledge derived from extrajudicial sources stemming from her
        marital relationship with Cappelletti about [Tyson]’s case that
        could demonstrate personal prejudice or bias against [Tyson] in
        this post conviction proceeding. [Tyson] has failed to draw any
        valid connection between his case, Cappelletti and this Court
        other than self serving commentary that Cappelletti may be a
        critical witness to a pattern and practice of alleged police
        misconduct at the Elkhart Police Department. [Tyson], however,
        has not articulated any meaningful argument as to how
        Cappelletti, a reserve Elkhart Police Department officer until
        1994, constitutes a critical witness to [Tyson]’s 2017 conviction.
        [Tyson] makes a final claim that this Court had an obligation to
        disclose her past marriage to Cappelletti under Rule 2.11 Code of
        Judicial Conduct, n.5. Honestly, why it would cross the mind of
        the Court to disclose that she was once married to a man who
        served as a reserve Elkhart Police Department officer for
        approximately two (2) years while they were married and whom
        the Court divorced some nineteen (19) years ago is wholly
        untenable. This was not information that this Judge should be
        expected to believe the parties or their lawyers might reasonably
        consider relevant to a motion for disqualification. [Tyson]’s
        argument in this regard is not persuasive and recusal is not
        required.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023        Page 26 of 34
       (No. 20D03-1807-PC-37, Chronological Case Summary, April 29, 2022 entry).

       Based on the foregoing, the post-conviction court denied Tyson’s renewed

       motion for a change of judge. In May 2022, Tyson filed a motion for

       reconsideration, which the post-conviction court denied.

[27]   Also in May 2022, Tyson filed in this Court a status report regarding the change

       of judge proceedings before the post-conviction court, wherein Tyson advised

       this Court that he intended to proceed with his interlocutory appeal. Tyson also

       asked this Court to consolidate his case with Iris Seabolt v. State, No. 22A-PC-

       00208 and Pink Robinson v. State, No.20C01-2012-PC-00041. Tyson argued that

       this Court should consolidate the cases “due to a significant overlap in factual

       and legal issues.” (No. 22A-PC-143, Chronological Case Summary, May 17,

       2022 entry). This Court’s motions panel granted Tyson’s motion to consolidate

       the three cases, which, as explained above, we have de-consolidated.

[28]   Tyson now appeals the denial of his motion for a change of judge in his post-

       conviction case.

                                                    Decision
[29]   Tyson argues that the post-conviction court clearly erred when it denied his

       motion for a change of judge. We disagree.

[30]   At the outset, we note that the law is well-settled that “adjudication by an

       impartial tribunal is one of the fundamental requirements of due process

       imposed on the courts of this state by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal

       constitution.” Matthews v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1250, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023       Page 27 of 34
       (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927)), trans. denied. Judges are

       presumed impartial and unbiased. Matthews, 64 N.E.3d at 1253. “‘[T]he law

       will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to

       administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that

       presumption and idea.’” Matthews, 64 N.E.3d at 1253 (quoting 3 William

       Blackstone, Commentaries *361)).

[31]   In post-conviction cases, parties seeking to overcome the presumption of

       judicial impartiality must move for a change of judge under Post-Conviction

       Rule 1(4)(b). That rule provides, in relevant part, as follows:

               Within ten (10) days of filing a petition for post-conviction relief
               under this rule, the petitioner may request a change of judge by
               filing an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice
               against the petitioner. The petitioner’s affidavit shall state the facts
               and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists,
               and shall be accompanied by a certificate from the attorney of
               record that the attorney in good faith believes that the historical
               facts recited in the affidavit are true. A change of judge shall be
               granted if the historical facts cited in the affidavit support a
               rational inference of bias or prejudice.

       (Emphasis added).

[32]   This rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts

       recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a

       rational inference of bias or prejudice. Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899, 939 (Ind.

       2009). A change of judge is neither automatic nor discretionary but calls for a

       legal determination by the post-conviction court. Id. We presume that the post-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023             Page 28 of 34
       conviction court is not biased against a party and disqualification is not required

       under the rule unless the judge holds a “personal bias or prejudice.” Id.

       (quoting P.-C.R. 1(4)(b)). Typically, a bias is personal if it stems from an

       extrajudicial source, which means a source separate from the evidence and

       argument presented at the proceedings. Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 939. “Such bias

       or prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has

       expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy before [her].” L.G. v.

       S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 (Ind. 2018).

[33]   “Further, Indiana courts credit judges with the ability to remain objective

       notwithstanding their having been exposed to information which might tend to

       prejudice lay persons.” Id. In addition, “[a] showing of prejudice sufficient to

       support a motion for a change of judge must be established from personal,

       individual attacks on a defendant’s character, or otherwise.” Miller v. State, 106

       N.E.3d 1067, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Stated differently, “a

       motion for a change of judge should be granted only if the evidence reveals such

       a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make a fair judgment

       impossible.” State v. Shackleford, 922 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)

       (cleaned up), trans. denied.

[34]   The ruling on a motion for change of judge is reviewed under the clearly

       erroneous standard. Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 433 (Ind. 2003).

       Reversal will require a showing which leaves us with a definite and firm

       conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023        Page 29 of 34
[35]   We restate Tyson’s first argument as whether the post-conviction court clearly

       erred in denying his motion for change of judge because the post-conviction

       court’s 2018 order in the unrelated Royer case finding that Attorney Slosar had

       violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a) supports a rational inference of

       bias or prejudice against Tyson.12 “Prior judicial rulings generally do not

       support a rational inference of prejudice.” Voss v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1211, 1217

       (Ind. 2006). “Adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge from past

       proceedings with respect to a particular party are generally not sufficient

       reasons to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice.” Id. Although the

       mere assertion that certain adverse rulings by a judge constitute bias and

       prejudice does not establish the requisite showing, there may be circumstances

       in which a rational inference of bias or prejudice may be established if a judge’s

       order is sufficiently egregious. Id.

[36]   Here, however, we find nothing egregious in the July 2018 order that the trial

       court judge, who is the post-conviction court judge in Tyson’s case, issued in

       12
          We note that Tyson asserts that in Royer, 166 N.E.3d at 380, this Court found systemic police and
       prosecutorial misconduct in Elkhart. We did not. Specifically, we find no language in our opinion in Royer
       to support such an interpretation. Rather, our review of our opinion in Royer reveals that the newly
       discovered evidence related primarily to the horrific conduct of one Elkhart Police Department detective.
       Tyson also asserts that in its July 2018 order in the Royer case, the post-conviction court found that there was
       no systemic police or prosecutorial misconduct in Elkhart. It did not. The post-conviction court’s order in
       the Royer case solely addressed the statements that Attorney Slosar made at a press conference after he had
       filed in Royer’s case a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). Specifically, the
       post-conviction court found that Attorney Slosar’s statements violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a)
       because Attorney Slosar knew or reasonably should have known that these statements would be disseminated
       by means of public communication and would have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing the adjudicative
       proceeding that was pending in the matter.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                                 Page 30 of 34
       the unrelated Royer case. Rather, the trial court simply concluded that

       Attorney Slosar’s press conference statements regarding systemic police

       misconduct in Elkhart, which he had made before the adjudication of Royer’s

       Trial Rule 60(B) motion, violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a). Further,

       and more importantly, the trial court’s July 2018 order does not mention Tyson

       or anything about Tyson’s case, which occurred ten years after Royer’s case. In

       sum, we find nothing in the Royer order that supports a rational inference of

       bias or prejudice against Tyson.13

[37]   We restate Tyson’s second argument as whether the post-conviction court

       clearly erred in denying Tyson’s motion for a change of judge because the post-

       conviction court’s 1998-2002 tenure as a deputy prosecutor supports a rational

       inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson. In Calvert v. State, 498 N.E.2d 105,

       107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), this Court concluded “that a trial judge must

       disqualify [her]self from a proceeding in which [s]he has actively served as an

       attorney for one of the parties regardless of whether actual bias or prejudice

       exists.” Here, there is no allegation that the post-conviction court judge actively

       13
           We further note that Tyson’s argument that the post-conviction court should have granted his motion for
       a change of judge because it granted the motion for a change of judge in the Royer case is unavailing.
       Specifically, the fact that the post-conviction court granted a motion for a change of judge in Royer’s case
       “appears to us to evidence the fact that [the post-conviction court judge] would conduct herself as an
       unbiased jurist in applying the law to the particular facts of a case.” Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.
       1993) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion for a change of judge where the petitioner argued that the
       adverse publicity that the post-conviction court received as a result of granting an unrelated petition for post-
       conviction relief would cause the post-conviction court to be biased against granting post-conviction relief in
       petitioner’s case), cert. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-143| August 11, 2023                                  Page 31 of 34
       served as a deputy prosecutor on Tyson’s case. Indeed, this would have been

       an impossibility because the post-conviction court judge left the prosecutor’s

       office in 2002, thirteen years before the State charged Tyson with murder in

       2015 and twenty-one years before Tyson’s upcoming hearing on his post-

       conviction petition. Given the remoteness in time of the post-conviction court’s

       tenure in the Elkhart County Prosecutor’s Office in relation to the charges

       against Tyson and his upcoming post-conviction hearing, Tyson has failed to

       show the post-conviction court’s 1998-2002 tenure as a deputy prosecutor

       supports a rational inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson. See Bloomington

       Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that

       the proximity in time of the historical facts alleged in the affidavit to the matter

       concerning the motion for a change of judge is a relevant inquiry).

[38]   Lastly, we restate Tyson’s third argument as whether the post-conviction court

       clearly erred in denying Tyson’s motion for a change of judge because the post-

       conviction court judge’s 1992-2003 marriage to Cappelletti supports a rational

       inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson. We note that the post-conviction

       court judge’s marriage to Cappelletti ended ten years before the State charged

       Tyson with murder and twenty years before Cappelletti’s potential testimony in

       Tyson’s post-conviction case. Tyson’s affidavit does not allege that any

       relationship existed between Cappelletti and the post-conviction court judge

       after their marriage had been dissolved. Indeed, in her order denying Tyson’s

       motion for a change of judge, the post-conviction court judge specifically noted

       that she had not had contact with Cappelletti since their marriage had been

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       dissolved in 2003. Given the remoteness in time of the post-conviction court

       judge’s marriage to Cappelletti to the charges against Tyson and his upcoming

       post-conviction hearing, Tyson has failed to show that this prior marriage

       supports a rational inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson. See Bloomington

       Magazine, 961 N.E. 2d at 66. See also McKinney v. State, 873 N.E.2d 630, 640

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that where the personal relationship between

       the trial court judge and her former employee, who was the murder victim’s

       mother, had ended twenty years before the defendant’s trial and the defendant

       had not alleged any facts suggesting that any relationship existed between the

       two after that employment had been terminated, the trial court did not clearly

       err in denying defendant’s motion for a change of judge), trans. denied.

       Conclusion
[39]   In sum, the recited historical facts on which Tyson based his motion for a

       change of judge simply do not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice

       against Tyson as contemplated by Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b). We further

       note that the post-conviction court has neither expressed an opinion on the

       merits of Tyson’s case nor attacked his character. Accordingly, because we are

       not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, we

       conclude that the post-conviction court did not clearly err in denying Tyson’s

       motion for a change of judge. See Garland, 788 N.E.2d at 433. We, therefore,

       affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Tyson’s motion. See Pruitt, 903

       N.E.2d at 939 (explaining that where Pruitt’s post-conviction court judge was

       the same judge who had presided over his trial and where Pruitt’s affidavit in

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       support of his motion for a change of judge had shown no historical facts that

       had demonstrated personal bias on the part of the post-conviction court judge,

       Pruitt had been provided with a full and fair post-conviction relief hearing

       before an impartial judge).

[40]   Affirmed.

       Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

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