Court Opinion

ID: 9790123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:46:27.866286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:26.377756
License: Public Domain

TURSI, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The order which we review here contains the following findings of fact:
“[Kohler] had been employed by the respondent since January 31, 1972. For a number of years, he was classified as a crusher superintendent where he supervised the operation of one stone crusher. For approximately three months proceeding [sic] his death, he was a general crusher superintendent, having supervisory responsibility over crushers located in Craig, Colorado; Shiprock, New Mexico; and Gallop, New Mexico. It was unanimously agreed by all witnesses that the decedent was an intense person who was dedicated to his job and took his responsibilities seriously. He was a perfectionist and a ‘company man.’ His working hours and working days both as a crusher superintendent and as a general crusher superintendent, were set by the work that needed to be done. Both before and after his promotion to general crusher superintendent, his work week was consistently more than 40 hours and his working days were consistently more than five days a week. It was commonplace for the decedent to be on the telephone in the evening hours engaged in company business.
“The crusher in Craig, Colorado, was set up May 15, 1979. The operation had daily problems with size of material being crushed which would cause frequent shutdowns of the crusher. The job at Craig was running above estimated cost and was, therefore, losing money. The frequent crusher shutdowns were contributing to the loss. There was no evidence that the decedent was censored [sic] or otherwise blamed for these problems. In the week preceeding [sic] his death, the decedent was in Craig for part of the week. On Friday, July 13, he returned to Cortez with Mr. Gene Cox who is the superintendent of operations for the respondent employer. They engaged in company business until approximately *10077:30 P.M., at which time the decedent advised Mr. Cox that he would, on Saturday, July 14, go to Shiprock and oversee the operation of the crusher since the crusher superintendent was ill. On the evening of July 13, the decedent had his dinner and complained of a sore throat. He was vomiting rather heavily but did have several telephone conversations concerning business activities. He was experiencing chest discomfort. On the morning of July 14, he did go to Shiprock and arrived at the location of the crusher operation. Shortly thereafter, he left to get some water for the crew and later was found in the vehicle parked beside the road. Death followed after he was transferred to the hospital.” (emphasis added)
The cause of death was found to be a heart attack. An award of compensation was denied based on the following conclusions:
“In determining whether there was unusual exertion, which is a question of fact, the exertion in question is measured against the work history of the decedent, and the claimant must show that the causative exertion was more than the exertion attendant upon the discharge of the decedent’s normal duties. From the above finding of fact, [it is concluded] that ‘the decedent’s employment, both as a crusher superintendent and a general crusher superintendent, was chronically stressful. Therefore, with respect to decedent, the benchmark measuring unusual exertion was at the moderately stressful level and only acute stress would be unusual exertion.” (emphasis added)
The Workmen’s Compensation Act must be liberally construed to accomplish its beneficent social and protective purposes. Claimants in re Death of Hampton v. Director Division of Labor, 31 Colo.App. 141, 500 P.2d 1186 (1972). Further, in enacting a statute, it must be presumed that a just and reasonable result is intended. Section 2-4-201(l)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1980 Repl.Vol.). Mountain Mobile Mix v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883 (Colo.1983).
Pursuant to § 8-41-108(2.5), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Cum.Supp.), a claimant must show by competent evidence that the subject heart attack was proximately caused by unusual exertion arising out of and within the course of the employment. To construe this statute so as to preclude recovery based on continuous unusual exertion by a highly dedicated and devoted employee, because that employee always exerts himself beyond that required in the discharge of his duties, does violence not only to the plain language of the statute, but also to the long recognized rule that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is to be liberally construed to accomplish its humanitarian purposes of assisting injured workers and their families. See Claimants In re Death of Garner v. Vanadium Corp., 194 Colo. 358, 572 P.2d 1205 (1977).
The majority’s reliance on Denver v. Industrial Commission, 195 Colo. 431, 579 P.2d 80 (1978) is misplaced. In both that case and Beaudoin Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 626 P.2d 711 (Colo.App.1980), the rule quoted by the majority was fashioned so as to cover exertion by an employee in the performance of acts not considered unusual for employees similarly engaged. Here, however, the employee’s work pattern was, in and of itself, one of unusual exertion, and therefore, his heart attack constituted a compensable injury if causation is established by competent evidence. Denver v. Industrial Commission, supra, which adopts the rule that evidence of job related stress may support an award for a heart attack, does not preclude recovery if the job stress associated with unusual exertion is chronic rather than acute.
I would therefore set aside the order making no award and remand the cause to the Commission with directions to make findings, using objective standards, of whether decedent was in fact unusually exerting himself and whether there was job related stress associated therewith which was the cause of the heart attack.