Court Opinion

ID: 9723746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:29:42.511033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:51.488624
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion on the self-defense question, I do not agree with its conclusion on the one-act, one-crime question. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. The majority’s analysis is straightforward enough, and it begins with the following premise: “[i]t is common sense that the legislature would provide greater punishment for crimes it deems more serious.” 213 Ill. 2d at 228. From here, the majority notes that aggravated battery with a firearm is a Class X felony with a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years, while second degree murder is a Class 1 felony with a sentencing range of 4 to 20 years. 213 Ill. 2d at 228. Then, looking no further than the respective ranges’ minimum and maximum sentences, the majority deduces that second degree murder is, as a matter of law and in all cases, the less serious offense. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the relative seriousness of two offenses is simply a function of the upper and lower limits of their respective sentencing classifications, as this approach wholly ignores what falls in between. More specifically, the majority ignores the fact that, in crafting this state’s sentencing scheme, the legislature built in a great deal of overlap between different sentencing classes, leaving to the sentencing court the task of defining the appropriate punishment in a given case. The offenses at issue in this case provide a perfect illustration. As far as the legislature is concerned, an aggravated battery with a firearm might justify as little as 6 years in prison or as many as 30 years in prison, depending upon the facts of the particular case. Likewise, as far as the legislature is concerned, a second degree murder might justify as little as 4 years in prison or as many as 20 years in prison, depending upon the facts of the particular case. Thus, in creating these two offenses, the legislature specifically allowed for the possibility that, in a particular case, a second degree murder might be more serious and therefore command a greater sentence than an aggravated battery with a firearm. Given this reality, it is simply impossible to say categorically, as the majority does, that all aggravated batteries are more serious than all second degree murders as a matter of law. Indeed, had the legislature felt this way, it would have created mutually exclusive sentencing ranges, with the maximum sentence for second degree murder falling somewhere below the minimum limit for aggravated battery with a firearm. But this is not what the legislature did. On the contrary, it created broad and largely overlapping sentencing ranges, leaving it to the trial court’s discretion to evaluate and ascertain the seriousness of these and other offenses on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, I would look to the sentences actually imposed in a given case when identifying the most serious offense. Significantly, Duszkewycz does not foreclose this result. In Duszkewycz, the defendant was convicted of rape and incest, based upon the same act. At that time, rape was punishable by a prison term of one year to life, with sentence to be set by the jury. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 38, par. 490. Incest, in turn, was punishable by a prison term of 1 to 20 years, with sentence to be set by the court. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 38, par. 374. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years for the rape and 20 years for the incest. On appeal, this court held that, because both convictions arose from the same act, only the conviction for the greater offense could stand. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d at 261. The court then explained: “The relative gravity of the two offenses involved in the single act in this case can not depend upon the sentences actually imposed, on the rape charge by the jury and on the charge of incest by the judge. A touchstone more reliable than the subjective reaction of different tribunals to the same facts is required, and we therefore turn to the appraisal made by the General Assembly.” Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d at 261. After looking to the respective sentencing ranges, the court stated: “It is clear that the General Assembly has regarded rape as the more serious of the two offenses involved in this case.” Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d at 262. Accordingly, the court vacated the 20-year sentence for incest and affirmed the 5-year sentence for rape. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d at 263. Incredibly, the majority finds “no hint” that the decision in Duszkewycz was influenced by the fact that “two tribunals affected the sentences.” 213 Ill. 2d at 228. With respect to my colleagues in the majority, might such a “hint” not be found in the passage set out above, which is also set out in the majority opinion? 213 Ill. 2d at 227. In the first sentence of this passage, the court explains that “[t]he relative gravity of the two offenses involved in the single act in this case can not depend upon the sentences actually imposed, on the rape charge by the jury and on the charge of incest by the judge.” (Emphasis added.) Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d at 261. This sentence seems to be saying that, while the sentences actually imposed might ordinarily be the standard by which the relative seriousness of multiple offenses is governed, that standard is inapplicable where different tribunals impose the relevant sentences. Why else would the court have limited its holding to “the two offenses involved *** in this case”? Conversely, if the majority is correct, and Duszkewycz “stand[s] for the proposition that the legislature determines the relative gravity of all offenses” (emphasis added) (213 Ill. 2d at 228), would not the court in Duszkewycz have stated that “[t]he relative gravity of the two offenses in all cases can not depend upon the sentences actually imposed”? By explicitly limiting its impact to the “two offenses involved *** in this case,” Duszkewycz implies that looking to legislative classifications rather than the sentences actually imposed is the exception, not the rule. The second sentence of the quoted passage only underscores this interpretation: “A touchstone more reliable than the subjective reaction of different tribunals to the same facts is required, and we therefore turn to the appraisal made by the General Assembly.” Duszkewycz, 27 Ill. 2d at 261. The placement of “therefore” in this sentence confirms that the court in Duszkewycz turned to legislative classifications only because a touchstone more reliable than the subjective reaction of different tribunals to the same facts was required. This, of course, begs the question: Is it also necessary to turn to legislative classifications when a touchstone more reliable than the subjective reaction of different tribunals is not required? Although Duszkewycz does not expressly say, the above passage strongly suggests that it is not. At the very least, Duszkewycz is not nearly as dispositive of the question presented as the majority seems to believe, and the State’s argument that Duszkewycz is distinguishable from the present case is well taken. The bottom line is that, in this case, the trial court clearly believed that this particular second degree murder was more serious than this particular aggravated battery with a firearm. The legislature specifically allowed for this result, and I see no compelling reason to set it aside. I therefore dissent on this point.