Court Opinion

ID: 9664800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:30:07.586491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.191188
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
First, it defies common sense to permit the jury to conclude that, had this machine been designed with a kill switch, such a device would not have been removed sometime during the roller machine’s thirty years of use.1
*645Second, in my view, this case points up the need to limit or redirect the cause of action we first espoused in Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. banc 1977), else the parameters of recovery for a defective product design will be skewed too far to the protection of the user or consumer. Cf. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 Tex.L.Rev. 81 (1973) (general articulation of policies undergirding limitations on product liability). I continue to maintain “a court should strive for fairness ‘in assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages.’ ” Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 491, 500 (Mo. banc 1986) (Donnelly, J., dissenting) (quoting J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 10 (1971)). To this end, I would give conceptual content to “unreasonably dangerous”, Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 378 (Mo. banc 1986) notwithstanding.2
Courts have grappled with the “unreasonably dangerous” component in design defect cases because section 402A was “drafted at a time when manufacturing defects were perceived as the primary sources of causes of action in strict liability.” P. Sherman, Products Liability for the General Practitioner § 7.16, p. 222 (1981). Determining at what point a “reasonably dangerous product design” becomes one “unreasonably dangerous” also is complicated by abstract and speculative notions of what could have been done to a product to make it “not unreasonably dangerous”. For the majority, when that focal point is reached is left to the fact-finder’s prerogative. This renders irrelevant the question whether the designer is legally responsible and merely invites, for all we know, an arbitrary jury determination.
It must be remembered that to speak of reasonableness is to speak of shades or degrees of status. The concept always has suggested balancing rather than static observation. Cf. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum.L.Rev. 1531, 1540 (1973).3 Taken as true, I would adopt the following nonexclusive list of factors to apply in defective design cases to determine whether, as a matter of law, a claimed danger in a product’s design is unreasonable, emphasizing that the focus is on the product itself:
1. What is the product’s utility to the general public? 4
2. What is the likelihood that the product, as designed, will cause injury?5
3. Are there less unsafe alternative designs available? 6
4. Can alternative designs be pursued without impairing the product’s usefulness, *646with respect to function, or feasibility, reference cost?7
5. Is the claimed danger open and obvious to the user of the product, or is the dangerous character of the product widely regarded by the general public?8
6. If the product has been modified after leaving the manufacturer, did such modifications increase the likelihood of injury?9
I would reverse and remand for consideration of the submissibility question in light of the above.

. The appeals court noted the modifications to the roller:
The evidence revealed that the operator’s seat and guard rail were removed and a tool box substituted for the operator’s seat; the original engine had been replaced with a more powerful engine, which resulted in the control panels being moved from in front of the operator to the exterior right side of the machine; the operator's steel platform floor had been cut away, exposing the back roller; the automatic cleaning system was not work*645ing, which required the operator to perform pedal or manual roller cleaning either with the operator’s foot on the roller while the roller was moving or with his hand while positioned on the ground; and, the emergency brake once broken had not been repaired.
740 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Mo.App. [E.D.], 1987).

. That this may be a " 'hook in a transcendental lure that will snag an appellate court’", Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d at 378 (citations omitted), can be no worse than appellate review without clear choice of standard, as this conjures a fishing excursion with rod and reel but no line.

. Professor John Wade has observed that "a coherent analysis in design defect cases requires a balancing process. An absolute test for liability is not feasible unless one seeks to impose an insurer’s liability.” Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 Vand.L.Rev. 551, 570 (1980); compare Azzarello v. Black Bros., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) (manufacturer the guarantor of product’s safety).

. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.LJ. 825, 837 (1973).

. This will be recognized as a derivative of Judge Learned Hand’s much-cited formulation in Conway v. O’Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 623 (2d Cir.1940), rev’d on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492, 61 S.Ct. 634, 85 L.Ed.2d 969 (1941), whether “the cost of injuries [a product] will cause, discounted by the probability that they will occur, exceeds the cost of eliminating the risky features.” Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 Tex.L.Rev. at 92 (citing Conway). See also Wade, supra note 4 at 837.

. See Wade, supra note 4, at 837.

. Id.

. Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 343, 347-48 (Mo.1964); see also Wade, supra note 4, at 842-43; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (1965). Circumstances underlying a cause may point up "patent perils” inherent in a product or its use; these circumstances need not amount to an assumption of risk to be "material to the issue whether a product is ‘unreasonably dangerous.’ ” McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 672 F.2d 652, 663 (8th Cir.1982). This follows from the common sense notion that one who purchases or uses a product presenting open and obvious dangers doubtless has entertained whether the risk of harm is outweighed by the benefits of use or purchase, and concluded that it is. Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir.1985).

. In my view, this suggested component is equally pertinent to the "unreasonably dangerous” determination as the "open and obvious" inquiry noted above. Modifications not amounting to "substantial change” as characterized in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment p (1965) still may be relevant to the larger question. It should be recognized that, while it may be fair to require the manufacturer to conduct "an open-ended evaluative task that requires him to anticipate every injury that any use of his product might cause", Holford, supra note 5 at 84, it is patently unfair to require him to anticipate risk-incrementing alterations effected once the product has been sold. If the subsequent modifications become an efficient cause of injury, this should enter the equation.