Court Opinion

ID: 9670110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:14:48.125794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:02.608423
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(concurring). This court has held that the prohibition against double jeopardy found in sec. 8, art. I, *463Wis. Const., does not bar review of errors prejudicial to the state resulting in accused’s acquittal or dismissal. This is clear from the statement appearing in State v. Witte (1943), 243 Wis. 423, 430, 10 N. W. (2d) 117: “To say that a defendant has been twice placed in jeopardy because he is required to stand a second trial when the first trial was not according to the law of the jurisdiction in which he was tried is contrary to sound reasoning.” Neither the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy nor public policy requires that a restrictive meaning be accorded the phrase “upon questions of law arising upon the trial” appearing in sec. 958.12 (1) (d), Stats., so as to defeat the right of the state, with permission of the trial judge, to review of alleged errors of law, procedural or substantive, resulting in accused’s acquittal or dismissal of the action.
Where the trial judge sitting without a jury makes a final determination which frees the accused, such determination occurs “upon the trial;” in fact it is part of the trial. Therefore, I disagree with the court’s language in State v. Evjue (1949), 254 Wis. 581, 591, 37 N. W. (2d) 50, which implies that error by the trial court sitting without a jury must occur prior to its ultimate determination of acquittal in order to be reviewable under sec. 958.12 (1) (d), Stats.
If a trial judge, sitting without a jury in a criminal case, splits his. final determination of acquittal by (1) stating reasons of law in a memorandum opinion why the accused must be acquitted, and (2) thereafter entering judgment of acquittal, such reasons of law, which form the basis for acquittal, are reviewable under sec. 958.12 (1) (d), Stats. This situation is illustrated by State v. Herwig, ante, p. 442, 117 N. W. (2d) 335. There the trial judge by memorandum opinion held unconstitutional an administrative rule having the effect of a criminal statute, under which defendant was prosecuted, and thereafter entered a judgment of acquittal.
*464Similarly, assume that the instant appeal involved a memorandum opinion by the trial judge in which he found that defendant Gecht must be acquitted because the state failed to meet its burden of proof under sec. 66.054 (8a) (c), Stats., which the court interpreted to require proof of intent to violate and prior notification by the state to defendant that his method of payment violates the statute. Assume further that such a memorandum opinion was'followed by a separate judgment of acquittal. Under these assumed facts, I am confident that a majority of this court would uphold the right of the state to review of the trial court’s interpretation of the statute.
If the trial court, in its ultimate judgment of acquittal, states as the sole basis for the acquittal the fact that there are reasons of law, which compel the result, the state should not be precluded from having a right to have a review of the correctness of these reasons of law assigned by the trial court. However, any intimation in the reasons assigned for acquittal that the trial court is also making a factual determination of not guilty would destroy such right of review because jeopardy would have attached.
Thus the controlling factor is not whether the alleged error of law sought to be reviewed by the state occurs prior to the actual acquittal, but whether the determination of acquittal is subject to the interpretation or inference that it is at least in part grounded upon a factual determination equivalent to a jury’s verdict of not guilty. In case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant and jeopardy should be held to have attached, if the record is free from error prejudicial to the state up to the time of the trial court’s ultimate determination.
Therefore, I join in the opinion of the court by Mr. Justice Wilkie because of the ambiguity in the trial court’s final determination. It contains a statement to the effect *465that, on the facts presented, the trial court grants acquittal on the merits.