Court Opinion

ID: 9647509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:38:38.769286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:50.251084
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
concurring:
I join in the opinion of the court and write separately only to comment upon that part of it which sets forth the standard of review for determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred.
The majority acting with ample precedent, cites this court’s decision in Fee v. Fee, 344 Pa.Super. 276, 279, 496 A.2d 793, 794 (1985), which in turn cites Boni v. Boni, 302 Pa.Super. 102, 109, 448 A.2d 547, 550 (1982), for the proposition that “[a]n abuse of discretion is not ‘merely an error of judgment.’ ” The problem is that “not merely an error of judgment” may be read to practically foreclose appellate review. I take the phrase to mean that although the reviewing court might exercise its judgment in a different manner, if the record supports the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court must leave the judgment undisturbed. However, the oft repeated maxim is too easily recast and can take on what I believe to be an unintended meaning. See Straub v. Tyahla, 274 Pa.Super. 411, 414, *90418 A.2d 472, 474 (1980) (“an abuse of discretion is merely an error of judgment”). So fortified, an abuse of discretion standard becomes one in which a reviewing court must tolerate what it concludes to be a finding of error of judgment. While it is true that in applying the abuse of discretion standard on appeal the reviewing court must view the lower court’s exercise of judgment in a less critical and more reluctant manner than ordinarily, it would not seem to admit of countenancing a decision which makes an error of judgment particularly in a matter such as the present which involves support of children.