Court Opinion

ID: 9670792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:26:18.97136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:06.544409
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
dissenting.
I must dissent. In the first instance, it seems to me that the majority overlooks a most basic tenet of contract law, namely, that any ambiguity in a contract will be construed against the *785drafter and be given the construction the other party would be fairly justified in giving it. See Brockley v. Lozier Corp., 241 Neb. 449, 488 N.W.2d 556 (1992). No one claims there is any ambiguity (latent, patent, or of any other description) in the portion of the document drafted by the defendant-appellee employer, Union Pacific Railroad Company. Rather, the purported ambiguity resides in the portion of the document drafted by the plaintiff-appellant employee, Tommy E. Plambeck. Thus, if the claimed ambiguity actually existed, it would have to be construed against the employee.
But a review of the relevant rules demonstrates that there is no ambiguity. It must be borne in mind that the fact that the parties to a document have or suggest opposing interpretations does not necessarily, or by itself, compel a conclusion that the document is ambiguous. Baker’s Supermarkets v. Feldman, 243 Neb. 684, 502 N.W.2d 428 (1993). Quite the contrary, a contract must receive a reasonable construction so as to give effect to the intention of the parties and carry out, rather than defeat, the inherent purpose for which it was executed. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Blanco, 181 Neb. 562, 149 N.W.2d 516 (1967). Moreover, a contract must be construed as a whole, and, if possible, effect must be given to every part thereof. Baker’s Supermarkets, supra.
The termination is the reason the employee received $16,000 and signed the contract. That being so, it cannot reasonably be contended that the employee reserved the right to challenge the termination of his employment even if the termination arose out of the condition of his health. Thus, the reservation of “any other claims available related to his health” cannot reasonably be said to refer to health conditions resulting in the termination of employment, but to other health claims, such as might arise because the employee was exposed to some delayed-action disease-producing agent or as might arise from a health condition unknown at the time the contract was executed. Known health claims which the employee intended exempted from the general terms of the agreement should have been specifically itemized by him, as he did the then-pending lawsuit.
It seems to me the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law *786of contracts as we had heretofore declared it to be. Since the majority opinion does not directly overrule any of our prior cases, what the law may be at the moment is, regrettably, anyone’s guess.
Hastings, C. J., joins in this dissent.