Court Opinion

ID: 9948189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 17:13:16.889687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:18.391584
License: Public Domain

No. 156                March 6, 2024                      349

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 CITY OF CORNELIUS,
        City of Forest Grove, City of Grants Pass,
  City of Happy Valley, City of Hillsboro, City of Keizer,
 City of Medford, City of Oregon City, City of Sherwood,
 City of Springfield, City of Troutdale, City of Tualatin,
          City of Wood Village, Marion County,
           Oregon Home Builders Association,
        Oregon Business & Industry Association,
Oregon Realtors, and Oregon Trucking Associations, Inc.,
                        Petitioners,
                             v.
      DEPARTMENT OF LAND CONSERVATION
               AND DEVELOPMENT and
 the Land Conservation and Development Commission,
                       Respondents.
               A180037 (Control), A180153

   Argued and submitted July 12, 2023.
   David O. Bechtold argued the cause for petitioners City
of Cornelius, City of Forest Grove, City of Grants Pass,
City of Happy Valley, City of Hillsboro, City of Keizer, City
of Medford, City of Oregon City, City of Sherwood, City of
Springfield, City of Troutdale, City of Tualatin, City of Wood
Village, and Marion County. Also on the briefs were Greg A.
Hibbard and Northwest Resource Law PLLC.
  J. Aaron Landau argued the cause for petitioners Oregon
Home Builders Association, Oregon Business & Industry
Association, Oregon Realtors, and Oregon Trucking
Associations, Inc. Also on the briefs were Julian Marrs and
Harrang Long P.C.
   Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondents. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
350        City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

  Stephen L. Madkour and Thomas A. Carr filed the brief
amici curiae for Clackamas County and Washington County.
  Steven G. Liday filed the brief amicus curiae for the
League of Oregon Cities. Also on the brief were William L.
Rasmussen and Miller Nash LLP.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  ORTEGA, P. J.
   OAR 660-012-0830(1)(c) and OAR 660-012-0920(7)(c)
held invalid; otherwise, CFEC rules held valid.
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                                                 351

           ORTEGA, P. J.
          This consolidated proceeding involves rule chal-
lenges under ORS 183.400 asserted by two sets of
petitioners—13 Oregon cities and Marion County (city peti-
tioners), and Oregon Home Builders Association, Oregon
Business & Industry Association, Oregon Realtors, and
Oregon Trucking Associations, Inc. (industry petitioners)
(collectively, petitioners).1 Petitioners challenge the valid-
ity of an entire package of 89 administrative rules, some
of which are new rules and some of which are amend-
ments to existing rules, adopted by the Land Conservation
and Development Commission (LCDC). That package of
89 rules is known as the Climate-Friendly and Equitable
Communities rules (CFEC rules). Petitioners raise vari-
ous challenges, arguing both that LCDC failed to comply
with applicable rulemaking procedures and that LCDC
exceeded its statutory authority in enacting the CFEC
rules. Petitioners argue that those deficiencies require that
we invalidate the entire package of CFEC rules. We reject
those omnibus challenges as explained below. Alternatively,
city petitioners bring individual challenges to two of the
CFEC rules—OAR 660-012-0830(1)(c) and OAR 660-012-
0920(7)(c). We agree with city petitioners as to those two
rules. LCDC did not provide sufficient notice of the subject
matter of OAR 660-012-0830(1)(c) and LCDC exceeded its
statutory authority in enacting OAR 660-012-0920(7)(c). As
a result, we hold those two rules invalid, but otherwise hold
that the remaining CFEC rules are valid.
        The CFEC rules represent the culmination of a
process that started in 2020 after then-Governor Brown
issued Executive Order 20-04, directing state agencies
to take action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. After
working with the Department of Land Conservation and
Development (DLCD) to define the scope of rulemaking,
LCDC initiated the rulemaking process in September 2020

     1
       Clackamas County and Washington County filed an amici brief in support
of city petitioners’ challenge to LCDC’s statutory authority to enact the rules. We
do not address that brief in our opinion because it raises issues that we cannot
consider in a rule challenge under ORS 183.400. The League of Oregon Cities
filed an amicus brief also in support of city petitioners’ challenge to LCDC’s stat-
utory authority. We discuss that briefing in our analysis of that issue.
352         City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

with a rulemaking charge to DLCD to draft rules. Also, a
Rulemaking Advisory Committee met several times to dis-
cuss draft rules and policy approaches. On February 24,
2022, LCDC filed its “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” (the
notice) with the Secretary of State. On May 19, 2022, LCDC
adopted temporary rules. Finally, on July 21, 2022, LCDC
adopted the permanent CFEC rules, which are at issue in
this proceeding and which took the place of the temporary
rules.
         The CFEC rules amend three existing divisions in
the LCDC rules—housing, OAR 660-008, transportation
planning, OAR 660-012, and metropolitan greenhouse gas
reduction targets, OAR 660-044. In broad terms, the CFEC
rules require communities to update their local land use
and transportation system plans to allow for greater res-
idential density, reduce the amount of land that must be
reserved for parking, achieve a reduction in residents’ vehi-
cle travel miles, and provide infrastructure for electric vehi-
cles, among other things. In addition, cities, and some coun-
ties, within metropolitan areas in the state are required to
designate “climate-friendly areas,” and to adopt plans and
regulations designed to meet the requirements for those
areas, including identifying gaps in existing pedestrian and
bicycle networks and proposing projects to fill those gaps.
The CFEC rules also include provisions that are intended to
improve equity for traditionally underserved communities
relative to transportation and land use planning.
          Before setting out petitioners’ challenges, we first
describe our scope of review under ORS 183.400. We may
declare a rule invalid only if we determine that the rule
“[v]iolates constitutional provisions,” “[e]xceeds the stat-
utory authority of the agency,” or “[w]as adopted without
compliance with applicable rulemaking procedures.” ORS
183.400(4). Petitioners contend both that LCDC exceeded its
statutory authority and that it did not comply with applica-
ble rulemaking procedures. In addressing those challenges,
we are limited to examining “[t]he rule under review,” “[t]he
statutory provisions authorizing the rule,” and “[c]opies of
all documents necessary to demonstrate compliance with
applicable rulemaking procedures.” ORS 183.400(3). We
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                              353

begin by addressing the procedural challenges. Planned
Parenthood Assn. v. Dept. of Human Res., 297 Or 562, 565,
687 P2d 785 (1984) (stating that procedural challenges
should be addressed before challenges to the agency’s scope
of authority for the rule).
             I. PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES
A.   Procedural Challenges under ORS 183.335
         We first address petitioners’ challenges under ORS
183.335, which includes city petitioners’ assignments of
error 3 and 4 and industry petitioners’ assignments of error
1 and 2. ORS 183.335 is part of the Oregon Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) and sets out the notice and comment
procedures for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of admin-
istrative rules and, more specifically to petitioners’ chal-
lenges, ORS 183.335(2)(b) sets out in eight subparagraphs
what the agency “shall include with the notice of intended
action.” Petitioners raise various challenges, arguing that
LCDC’s rulemaking notice was inadequate and requires
that we invalidate the CFEC rules. We review whether
LCDC substantially complied with the requirements of ORS
183.335. ORS 183.335(11)(a) (“[A] rule is not valid unless
adopted in substantial compliance with the provisions of
this section[.]”).
        1.   Industry petitioners’ first assignment of error
         In their first assignment of error, industry petition-
ers argue that LCDC was required to issue a new notice
under ORS 183.335 before repealing the temporary rules
and adopting the permanent CFEC rules. They assert two
distinct arguments in support of their position.
         Industry petitioners first assert that the notice
requirement in ORS 183.335 applies to the repeal or adoption
of any rule—including a temporary one—and that LCDC’s
notice applied to the temporary rules only, so that LCDC
failed to issue a notice for the permanent CFEC rules. We
reject that argument because it does not comport with the
record or attempt to grapple with all the applicable sections
of ORS 183.335.
354             City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

          For their argument, industry petitioners solely point
to ORS 183.335(1), which provides that, “[p]rior to the adop-
tion, amendment or repeal of any rule, the agency shall give
notice of its intended action[.]” However, LCDC adopted the
temporary rules pursuant to ORS 183.335(5), and not pur-
suant to the notice that LCDC issued under ORS 183.335(1),
which is the notice LCDC relied on for the permanent CFEC
rules.2 Under ORS 183.335(6)(a), a temporary rule “may be
effective for a period of not longer than 180 days” and “does
not preclude the subsequent adoption of an identical rule
under subsections (1) to (4) of this section.” Industry peti-
tioners do not address the effect of ORS 183.335(5) or (6) on
their argument and we will not make their argument for
them. See, e.g., Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern
Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 700-01 n 2, 64 P3d 1193, adh’d to as
clarified on recons, 187 Or App 472, 68 P3d 259 (2003) (“[I]t
is not this court’s function to speculate as to what a party’s
argument might be. Nor is it our proper function to make or
develop a party’s argument when that party has not endeav-
ored to do so itself.”). Thus, we reject industry petitioners’
first argument supporting its contention that LCDC could
not adopt the permanent CFEC rules without issuing a new
notice.
      In the alternative, industry petitioners argue that
LCDC was still required to issue a new notice for the permanent

   2
     ORS 183.335(5)(a) provides:
        “(5) Notwithstanding subsections (1) to (4) of this section, an agency
   may adopt, amend or suspend a rule without prior notice or hearing or upon
   any abbreviated notice and hearing that it finds practicable, if the agency
   prepares:
        “(a) A statement of its findings that its failure to act promptly will result
   in serious prejudice to the public interest or the interest of the parties con-
   cerned and the specific reasons for its findings of prejudice;
        “(b) A citation of the statutory or other legal authority relied upon and
   bearing upon the promulgation of the rule;
        “(c) A statement of the need for the rule and a statement of how the rule
   is intended to meet the need;
        “(d) A list of the principal documents, reports or studies, if any, prepared
   by or relied upon by the agency in considering the need for and in preparing
   the rule, and a statement of the location at which those documents are avail-
   able for public inspection; and
        “(e) For an agency specified in ORS 183.530, a housing cost impact state-
   ment as defined in ORS 183.534.”
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                              355

rules because of the substantive differences between the
permanent CFEC rules and the proposed draft rules
included in the notice. In making that argument, industry
petitioners point to four rules (out of the 89 CFEC rules) as
examples of rules they argue were substantively changed
from the noticed version—OAR 660-012-0135, OAR 660-
012-0310, OAR 660-012-0315, and OAR 660-012-0330—but
also acknowledge that changes to other CFEC rules were
minor. Nonetheless, industry petitioners assert that the
CFEC rules as a whole are invalid because of the substan-
tial departures.
         Responding to industry petitioners’ alternative
argument, LCDC asserts that the notice was sufficient
because the permanent CFEC rules as a whole covered the
same subjects as the draft rules in the notice, as provided in
Bassett v. Fish and Wildlife Comm., 27 Or App 639, 556 P2d
1382 (1976). LCDC further argues that, because industry
petitioners have not demonstrated that Bassett is “plainly
wrong,” we should adhere to it. LCDC further observes that
the rules singled out as examples by industry petitioners,
although differing in detail, still address the same subjects.
          We are not persuaded that the CFEC rules are
wholly invalid because LCDC did not issue a new notice.
“Whether a notice of proposed rulemaking substantially
complies with the requirements of ORS 183.335 must be
measured against the purpose of the notice.” Oregon Funeral
Directors v. Mortuary and Cemetery Bd., 132 Or App 318,
323, 888 P2d 104 (1995). The purpose of the notice is to pro-
vide “the subject matter and purpose of the intended action
in sufficient detail to inform a person that the person’s inter-
ests may be affected[.]” ORS 183.335(2)(a)(B); see also Oregon
Funeral Directors, 132 Or App at 323 (quoting the same pur-
pose from the then-current version of ORS 183.335(2)(a));
Assn. of Oregon Loggers v. Dept. of Ins. and Finance, 130
Or App 594, 596, 883 P2d 859 (1994) (“The purpose of the
notice of rulemaking is to alert interested persons that the
agency’s proposed action may have some effect on them.”).
Also, as relevant to industry petitioners’ argument, we have
explained:
356          City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

       “The purpose of the notice requirement for rulemaking
   is twofold. It serves to inform the interested public about
   intended agency action. It triggers the opportunity for an
   agency to receive the benefit of the thinking of the public
   on the matters being considered. The notice requirement
   contemplates that an agency may often desire to alter a
   proposed rule after receiving public comment. To require,
   as petitioner would apparently have us do, that any mod-
   ification of a proposed rule after hearing necessitates still
   another notice and another hearing would produce an
   unwieldy procedure and also might well result in either
   hearing after hearing or an agency reluctant to change a
   single word of its original proposals no matter how persua-
   sive the arguments for change offered at the hearing.”
Bassett, 27 Or App at 642. As such, in Bassett, we concluded
that, although the adopted rules differed from the proposed
rules, the notice was still adequate because the adopted
rules did not cover a subject not specified in the notice. Id.;
cf. Watson v. OSP, 90 Or App 85, 88, 750 P2d 1188 (1988)
(agency did not comply with ORS 183.335(2) as provided in
Bassett because the notice “was not broad enough to encom-
pass the subject matter of the disputed rules”). We adhere to
Bassett as industry petitioners have not demonstrated that
the decision is “plainly wrong,” State v. Civil, 283 Or App
395, 406, 388 P3d 1185 (2017), and conclude that LCDC sub-
stantially complied with ORS 183.335.
         LCDC’s notice provided in the opening statement of
need:
   “On March 10, 2020, Governor Kate Brown issued Executive
   Order 20-04, directing agencies to reduce climate pollution.
   The Land Conservation and Development Commission is
   working on updating Oregon’s Transportation Planning
   Rules and related administrative rules in response to
   this order. The Department of Land Conservation and
   Development (DLCD) initiated the Climate-Friendly and
   Equitable Communities (CFEC) rulemaking in September
   2020.
   “The rulemaking will significantly impact Oregon’s rules
   regarding transportation and housing planning, particu-
   larly in the eight areas with populations over 50,000 people
   (Albany, Bend, Corvallis, Eugene/Springfield, Grants Pass,
   Medford/Ashland, Portland metro, Salem/Keizer). Some of
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                                 357

   the rules will also apply to and/or impact communities out-
   side of these areas.”
In other sections of the notice, LCDC detailed that the rule
changes were extensive, would affect most Oregon residents,
would require new equity analyses, reflected an increased
focus on climate pollution reduction, would require metro-
politan areas to establish “climate-friendly areas,” and iden-
tified that the transportation rules would be “significantly
altered and expanded” and described the major new require-
ments for transportation system plans. The notice further
provided a summary of the subject matter of each proposed
rule and rule amendment, which was placed before the text
of the proposed rule. Industry petitioners have not identified
how the permanent CFEC rules on the whole fall outside
of the subject matter covered in the notice. As to the four
out of 89 CFEC rules that industry petitioners single out as
examples, they still do not identify how those rules are not
covered by the subject matter of the notice.
        Accordingly, we conclude that LCDC substantially
complied with ORS 183.335 when it relied on its notice for
the permanent CFEC rules, although those rules differed
from the draft rules in the notice.
         2. City petitioners’ fourth assignment of error
        In their fourth assignment of error, city petitioners
also argue that a substantial departure in the CFEC rules
from the draft rules required LCDC to issue a new notice.
However, instead of challenging the CFEC rules as a whole
on that basis, city petitioners focus on one rule—OAR 660-
012-0830(1)(c)—which provides:
       “(1) Cities and counties shall review and may authorize
   certain proposed facilities to be included as a planned proj-
   ect or unconstrained project in any part of the local compre-
   hensive plan, including the transportation system plan.
      “* * * * *
      “(c) To retain a proposed facility that is included in an
   existing acknowledged plan adopted as provided in OAR
   660-012-0015, a city or county shall review that facility
   under this rule at the time of a major update to its trans-
   portation system plan.”
358          City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

Subparagraph (1)(c) was not part of the draft rules in the
notice and was first included in the CFEC rules in the final
packet presented to LCDC for adoption. That part of the
rule expanded the analysis required by the rule to apply not
just to newly proposed projects but also to existing planned
projects. City petitioners argue that the expansion of the
analysis by that addition to the rule was a change in subject
matter that necessitated that LCDC provide a new notice
for the rule and allow a new public comment period.
         LCDC responds that including OAR 660-012-
0830(1)(c) did not change the rule such that it covers a sub-
ject not specified in the notice, because it still covers the
same subject of “roadway projects.”
         We first reject LCDC’s characterization of the sub-
ject matter of the rule that was in the notice, because it was
not left so broad or vague. The specific subject matter iden-
tified for OAR 660-012-0830 in the notice was that “[t]his
rule provides for how local governments must review and
authorize certain street and highway projects before add-
ing them to a local transportation system plan.” That sub-
ject matter summary does not suggest that the rule would
apply to existing planned projects; it specified that the rule
applies to projects “before adding them to a local transporta-
tion system plan.” (Emphasis added.) That identified subject
matter would not have alerted the public that the rule could
require that the enhanced review would apply to projects
that had already been included in an acknowledged plan. In
addition, in the fiscal impact statement, the notice provided:
      “OAR 660-012-0830 outlines a significant change in the
   review of transportation facilities that could increase cli-
   mate pollution. The process is intended to encourage local
   governments to identify, review, assess, and potentially
   implement alternatives to these types of facilities.”
Nothing in that specific mention of the rule, or elsewhere
in the sections of the notice that applied to all the CFEC
rules, suggested that LCDC would be considering extending
the new analysis required by OAR 660-012-0830 to projects
already included in acknowledged plans. Unlike in Bassett,
the adopted rule does cover a subject matter not specified
in the notice and LCDC did not substantially comply with
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                             359

the notice requirements of ORS 183.335 with respect to that
rule.
           As a result, we hold that OAR 660-012-0830(1)(c) is
invalid.
           3. Industry petitioners’ second assignment of error
           and city petitioners’ third assignment of error
         Both industry petitioners and city petitioners also
challenge the adequacy of particular sections of LCDC’s
notice, which are required by ORS 183.335. We address each
of those sections in turn.
             a. Citations of legal authority
         Under ORS 183.335(2)(b)(A) and (B), the notice
must include “[a] citation of the statutory or other legal
authority relied upon and bearing upon the promulgation
of the rule” and “[a] citation of the statute or other law the
rule is intended to implement.” Here, in the notice under
each proposed rule or rule amendment, LCDC listed ORS
197.040 as the statutory authority. Some of the rules that
were amended also listed various other statutes within ORS
chapter 197, and other chapters, as the statutes being imple-
mented. However, the proposed rules that were new rules
cited only to ORS 197.040 as the statute being implemented.
         Petitioners argue that those citations in the notice
are inadequate and render the CFEC rules invalid. City
petitioners assert that LCDC made no effort to comply
with the citation requirements and that ORS 197.040 is an
insufficient statutory basis because LCDC made no effort
to identity its substantive source of authority for the CFEC
rules. Industry petitioners also argue that the citations are
inadequate, arguing that LCDC’s citations do not “serve the
purpose of informing the public of what statutory policy the
agency intends to carry out or ‘implement’ though its pro-
posed rule.” Industry petitioners argue that, if citing only
to general rulemaking authority were sufficient, requir-
ing citations in the notice would be rendered meaningless.
Rather, they assert, because the citation requirement uses
the word “authority” it must mean that the agency must
360         City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

identify the substantive legislative policy that supports the
agency’s authority to enact the rule.
         LCDC responds that a citation to ORS 197.040 was
sufficient because that statute empowers LCDC to “adopt
rules that it considers necessary to carry out ORS chapters
195, 196, 197 and 197A.” ORS 197.040(1)(b). That citation,
LCDC argues, provided notice that it was relying on and
implementing the broad authority that the legislature dele-
gated to it to carry out those ORS chapters. LCDC asserts
that nothing in ORS 183.335(2)(b)(A) and (B) require an
agency to identify the exact legislative policy that supports
the agency’s statutory authority to enact the rule; rather, it
is a requirement that an agency identify the authority that
the agency is relying on.
         As previously stated, “[w]hether a notice of proposed
rulemaking substantially complies with the requirements of
ORS 183.335 must be measured against the purpose of the
notice.” Oregon Funeral Directors, 132 Or App at 323. We
have not previously addressed the purpose of the citation
requirement and, thus, we must discern the legislature’s
intent in including that requirement. State v. Gaines, 346
Or 160, 171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (explaining that the “par-
amount goal” of statutory interpretation is “discerning the
legislature’s intent”). In doing so here, we begin and end with
the text and context of the provision. Id. at 171, 173 (holding
that text and context “must be given primary weight in the
analysis” and “[w]hen the text of a statute is truly capable of
having only one meaning, no weight can be given to legisla-
tive history that suggests—or even confirms—that legisla-
tors intended something different”).
         From the text of ORS 183.335(2)(b)(A) and (B), we
discern that the purpose of providing citations is to inform
the interested public of the authority that the agency is rely-
ing on, that the agency believes bears upon the rule, and
that the agency intends to implement. See ORS 183.335(2)(b)
(A) (requiring the agency to include in the notice “[a] citation
of the statutory or other legal authority relied upon and bear-
ing upon the promulgation of the rule” (emphases added));
ORS 183.335(2)(b)(B) (requiring the agency to include in
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                                                 361

the notice “[a] citation of the statute or other law the rule is
intended to implement” (emphasis added)).
          The context also supports our reading. The over-
all legislative purpose for the information required by ORS
183.335(2)(b) is to provide sufficient detail so that persons can
discern if their interest is affected by the proposed rulemak-
ing and have sufficient information needed to respond to the
agency. See Freemont Lumber Co. v. Energy Facility Siting
Council, 325 Or 256, 261-62, 936 P2d 968 (1997) (explain-
ing that the 1977 amendments were “adopted in response
to concerns that, because the then-abbreviated APA notice
provisions provided insufficient information about the
agency’s reasons for proposing the rule, interested persons
often were unable to submit data and arguments that were
responsive to the agency’s concerns in proposing the rule
or rule change” (emphasis added)).3 As the Supreme Court
explained with respect to the statement of need in ORS
183.335(2)(b)(C), that legislative purpose is not disserved
“simply because that statement is premised on an erroneous
perception of law or fact. Indeed, a statement’s usefulness
may lie precisely in the fact that it brings the agency’s mis-
taken legal or factual premises to light[.]” Id. at 262. While
we agree with petitioners that ORS 183.335(2)(b)(B)’s refer-
ence to the law the agency intends to implement is a refer-
ence to the substantive law an agency intends to implement,
and not just a reference to its general rulemaking authority,
    3
       The citation requirement found in ORS 183.335(2)(b)(A) was originally
enacted in 1977 and was required to be a part of the agency’s statement of need.
Or Laws 1977, ch 161, § 1 (requiring the statement to include “[t]he legal author-
ity of any jurisdiction relied upon and bearing upon the promulgation of the
rule”). That requirement was moved to its own paragraph in 1979, with the word-
ing amended to that which appears in the statute today. Or Laws 1979, ch 593,
§ 11. See also David B. Frohnmayer, The Oregon Administrative Procedure Act: An
Essay on State Administrative Rulemaking Procedure Reform, 58 Or L Rev 411,
463-67 (1980) (describing history).
    The additional citation requirement found in ORS 183.335(2)(b)(B) was added
by the legislature in 1993 and was enacted without amendment. Or Laws 1993,
ch 729, § 3; House Bill (HB) 2262 (1993), introduced. As with the citation provision
in ORS 183.335(2)(b)(A), the legislative history supports our conclusion that the
purpose of requiring an agency to provide a citation of law it intended to imple-
ment was to provide information on what substantive law the agency thinks it is
implementing. See Testimony, House Committee on Rules and Reorganization,
HB 2262, Jan 27, 1993, Ex A (comments of William Funk, member of Secretary of
State Administrative Rules Advisory Committee); Testimony, Senate Judiciary
Committee, HB 2262 July 23, 1993, Ex F (comments of William Funk).
362         City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

its purpose is nonetheless to give the public information on
the agency’s thinking as a procedural matter and does not
require the agency to be correct about that authority in the
notice.
          Here, LCDC cited to ORS 197.040, which confers
broad rulemaking and policy-setting authority on LCDC.
ORS 197.040(1)(b) (authorizing LCDC to “adopt rules that
it considers necessary to carry out ORS chapters 195, 196,
197 and 197A”); ORS 197.040(1)(c)(A) (authorizing LCDC to
“[a]dopt by rule * * * or by goal * * * any statewide land use
policies that it considers necessary to carry out ORS chapters
195, 196, 197 and 197A”). As a matter of substance directly
bearing on the CFEC rules, ORS 197.040(2)(c) also requires
LCDC to “[p]repare statewide planning guidelines.”
        In addition, LCDC provided that it was intending to
carry out the policy stated in Executive Order 20-04, a copy
of which was made available with the notice. The notice fur-
ther explained, particularly in the fiscal impact statement,
what specific policies the CFEC rules were intended to imple-
ment in furtherance of the broad goals stated in that order.
The notice also provided in the text of proposed OAR 660-
012-000 that the rules in that division implemented Land
Use Planning Goal 12, among other goals, and in the text of
proposed OAR 660-044-000 that the rules in that division
implemented Land Use Planning Goal 12 (Transportation)
and the stated goal in ORS 468A.205 to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. Nothing in ORS 183.335 requires all citations
to be appended to each individual draft rule; rather, ORS
183.335 requires that the citations appear in the notice.
        Based on those citations, we conclude that LCDC
provided notice of the citations to statutes or other law that
it was relying on, that it believed bore on the CFEC rules,
and that it was intending to implement. From a view of
assessing the adequacy of the procedure used by LCDC, we
conclude that those citations substantially complied with
the requirements in ORS 183.335(2)(b)(A) and (B).
           b.   Statement of need
         Under ORS 183.335(2)(b)(C), the notice must include
“[a] statement of the need for the rule and a statement of
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                                363

how the rule is intended to meet the need.” The Supreme
Court has explained that “[t]he ‘need’ contemplated by ORS
183.335(2)(b)(C) is a need that the rule-proposing agency
perceives.” Freemont Lumber Co., 325 Or at 262 (emphasis in
original).
        Here, LCDC provided the following “statement of
need” in the notice:
   “On March 10, 2020, Governor Kate Brown issued Executive
   Order 20-04, directing agencies to reduce climate pollution.
   The Land Conservation and Development Commission is
   working on updating Oregon’s Transportation Planning
   Rules and related administrative rules in response to
   this order. The Department of Land Conservation and
   Development (DLCD) initiated the Climate-Friendly and
   Equitable Communities (CFEC) rulemaking in September
   2020.
   “The rulemaking will significantly impact Oregon’s rules
   regarding transportation and housing planning, particu-
   larly in the eight areas with populations over 50,000 people
   (Albany, Bend, Corvallis, Eugene/Springfield, Grants Pass,
   Medford/Ashland, Portland metro, Salem/Keizer). Some of
   the rules will also apply to and/or impact communities out-
   side of these areas.”
         Petitioners argue that LCDC’s statement of need is
inadequate because it does not contain the required detail
of why any of the extensive and technical rules were needed
and omits altogether the second requirement—how the rule
is intended to meet the need.
         We decline to read the notice so narrowly. Our task
is to determine if the notice, as a whole, substantially com-
plied with ORS 183.335(2)(b)(C). See Fremont Lumber Co.,
325 Or at 262 (considering the entirety of the notice—
including the provision of the draft rule—in determining
whether the agency’s position was sufficiently clear to serve
the purposes of ORS 183.335(2)(b)(C)). Although the part
of the notice titled “statement of need” only identifies why
the rulemaking was undertaken, the rest of the notice more
than adequately explains the perceived agency need for the
proposed rules and how the proposed rules are intended to
meet that need. Petitioners do not address any other part
364             City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

of the notice or attempt to explain why we cannot consider
the rest of the notice in determining whether LCDC sub-
stantially complied with the procedural requirements of
ORS 183.335(2)(b)(C). Accordingly, we reject petitioners’
argument that LCDC’s statement of need is procedurally
inadequate.
               c.   Fiscal impact statement
          Under ORS 183.335(2)(b)(E), the notice must include
a fiscal impact statement, which requires:
        “A statement of fiscal impact identifying state agencies,
    units of local government and the public that may be eco-
    nomically affected by the adoption, amendment or repeal
    of the rule and an estimate of that economic impact on
    state agencies, units of local government and the public. In
    considering the economic effect of the proposed action on
    the public, the agency shall utilize available information
    to project any significant economic effect of that action on
    businesses which shall include a cost of compliance effect
    on small businesses affected. For an agency specified in
    ORS 183.530 [which includes LCDC], the statement of fis-
    cal impact shall also include a housing cost impact state-
    ment as described in ORS 183.534[.]” 4

    4
       “Economic effect” is defined by statute to mean “the economic impact on
affected businesses by and the cost of compliance, if any, with a rule for busi-
nesses, including but not limited to the costs of equipment, supplies, labor and
administration.” ORS 183.310(3). “Small business” is defined to mean “a corpora-
tion, partnership, sole proprietorship or other legal entity formed for the purpose
of making a profit, which is independently owned and operated from all other
businesses and which has 50 or fewer employees.” ORS 183.310(10)(a).
           In addition, ORS 183.336 provides:
         “(1) The statement of cost of compliance effect on small businesses
    required by ORS 183.335(2)(b)(E) must include:
         “(a) An estimate of the number of small businesses subject to the pro-
    posed rule and identification of the types of businesses and industries with
    small businesses subject to the proposed rule;
         “(b) A brief description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping and
    other administrative activities required for compliance with the proposed
    rule, including costs of professional services;
         “(c) An identification of equipment, supplies, labor and increased admin-
    istration required for compliance with the proposed rule; and
         “(d) A description of the manner in which the agency proposing the rule
    involved small businesses in the development of the rule.
         “(2) An agency shall utilize available information in complying with the
    requirements of this section.”
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                                             365

         We first address city petitioners’ arguments, which
are solely focused on the fiscal impact statement relative to
local governments. They argue that LCDC’s statement “is
nothing more than a performative gesture that contains no
meaningful information” and operates to “lull the reader
into thinking that the [CFEC] Rules will not have major
financial impacts.” City petitioners assert that the state-
ment does not provide an indication of the scale of costs
to local governments to comply with the rule, nor does it
explain why LCDC could not calculate likely costs.
         The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of
the fiscal impact statement is to “protect[ ] against arbitrary
and inadequately informed governmental conduct.” Dika
v. Dept. of Ins. and Finance, 312 Or 106, 109, 817 P2d 287
(1991). We also have explained the analysis we will under-
take in reviewing a fiscal impact statement:
       “The analysis of ORS 183.335(2)(b)(E) in Dika and sub-
   sequent cases reduces to two requirements: First, the state-
   ment must identify which entities are to be affected by enact-
   ment of the rules. Second, it must give the affected entities
   enough information to evaluate their position so that they
   might participate meaningfully in the rule adoption process
   or, if that information is not available, it must so state.”
Independent Contractors Research Institute v. DAS, 207
Or App 78, 87, 139 P3d 995, rev den, 341 Or 579 (2006); see
also Oregon Cable Telecommunications v. Dept. of Rev., 237
Or App 628, 637-38, 240 P3d 1122 (2010) (“[T]he agency
must either provide a quantifiable estimate of that impact or
articulate reasons why no such estimate is possible, ‘such as
those that might be related to the inadequacy of “available
information[.]” ’ ” (quoting Dika, 312 Or at 110)). With that
understanding, we reject city petitioners’ challenge, which is
solely directed at LCDC’s failure to put any type of numeri-
cal value on the cost of local government compliance with the
proposed rules, because LCDC’s notice met the requirements
as explained in the case law.
        In the fiscal impact statement,5 LCDC described the
source of likely increases in costs for local governments with
    5
      LCDC’s notice included a lengthy fiscal impact statement. Consequently, we
only discuss that statement in a summary fashion in this opinion. The statement
366             City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

respect to complying with each group of rules—housing,
transportation, and greenhouse gas reduction targets.
Then, with respect to each, LCDC explained that it could
not quantify the costs because they would greatly vary
between individual jurisdictions based on a number of fac-
tors, including “previous planning efforts,” “historic devel-
opment patterns,” “demographic patterns,” “characteristics
of projected housing demand,” and “transportation system
characteristics and needs.” LCDC also explained that costs
would vary based on how a local government chose to comply
with the rules, whether it conducted the analysis internally
or hired external consultants, how much public outreach is
conducted, and local code amendment processes.
         Although no scope of cost was estimated by LCDC,
its fiscal impact statement did identify what would cause
costs to the local governments and many of the factors
that would influence the scope of those costs. Rather than
“lull” a reader into thinking there were no major costs, as
asserted by city petitioners, the statement did the opposite
and alerted the reader that there could be significant costs
of compliance for local governments. In addition, the factors
identified by LCDC as influencing the scope of costs are fac-
tors within the knowledge of the individual jurisdictions;
that is, they were not being hidden by LCDC in the notice.
“If the statement, when considered with the other informa-
tion, is sufficient to notify persons who might be economi-
cally affected to evaluate their positions, then the purpose
of providing protection against arbitrary and inadequately
publicized governmental conduct has been met.” Oregon
Funeral Directors, 132 Or App at 323. Here, we conclude that
the purpose of the fiscal impact statement relative to local
governments has been met.
         Industry petitioners make similar arguments, but
instead focus on the fiscal impact statement relative to
Oregon businesses. They argue that the statement did not
give any meaningful information about the effect of the
rules on businesses. In particular, industry petitioners point
out that no cost impact was offered for businesses dedicated
included separate discussion of potential costs of compliance and other fiscal
impacts relative to each of the three divisions—division 8, housing, division 12,
transportation, and division 44, greenhouse gas reduction targets.
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                            367

to building, remodeling, and selling single-family detached
homes, a type of housing that will be effectively precluded
in climate-friendly areas, or an estimate of the fiscal effect
on freight and commercial trucking and the businesses that
rely on them. Industry petitioners argue that LCDC had
to do more than discuss cost of compliance; it was required
to address any significant effect of the rules on businesses.
Industry petitioners also point out that LCDC failed to
include information required by ORS 183.336(1)(d).
         We address industry petitioners’ last argument first
and agree that LCDC did not include anywhere in the notice
“[a] description of the manner in which the agency proposing
the rule involved small businesses in the development of the
rule,” ORS 183.336(1)(d). That description is required in the
“statement of cost of compliance effect on small businesses
required by ORS 183.335(2)(b)(E).” Here, however, LCDC
did not identify any cost of compliance effect on small busi-
nesses, and industry petitioners have not identified any, as
the proposed rules are directed at government entities and
not small businesses. As a result, we do not perceive how
LCDC’s failure to describe the involvement of small busi-
ness, if any, could render the notice legally inadequate, and
industry petitioners have not offered such an explanation.
Thus, we reject that argument as a basis on which to inval-
idate the CFEC rules.
         Turning to industry petitioners’ main argument,
LCDC’s fiscal impact statement made several observations
relative to businesses. With respect to housing, the statement
did not identify any economic impact on businesses, but the
housing impact statement did state that “[t]he proposed rule
changes will impact portions of the housing market, and as
a result may have an impact on the cost of developing hous-
ing and home pricing (rents/purchase prices).” That section
recognized that single family homes will be precluded in
climate-friendly areas. The fiscal statement provided, with
respect to transportation and greenhouse gas reduction tar-
get rules, that businesses “may be impacted by changes over
time in transportation infrastructure,” which could affect
business ability to meet business needs, and that costs will
increase in new construction to meet new requirements for
368          City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

electric vehicle infrastructure and surface parking lots. In
particular, LCDC recognized that freight traffic would be
affected by increased congestion in denser areas, although
it noted that, if vehicle mile reduction goals were met, there
would be reduced congestion. The statement also explained
that the impact on freight businesses depended upon the
success of the rule changes and “is likely to vary substan-
tively at the jurisdictional level” and further that, “[t]he
impact on individual businesses is expected to be highly
variable depending upon the nature of their operations and
transportation requirements.”
         We again conclude that LCDC substantially com-
plied with ORS 183.335 in the fiscal impact statement rel-
ative to businesses, because LCDC satisfied the purpose “of
providing protection against arbitrary and inadequately
publicized governmental conduct.” Oregon Funeral Directors,
132 Or App at 323. The primary difficulty we have with
industry petitioners’ arguments is that they are in effect
asserting that LCDC had to identify and quantify highly
speculative economic impacts, including ones that may not
be significant. However, ORS 183.335(2)(b)(E) tasked LCDC
to “utilize available information to project any significant
economic effect of that action on businesses[.]” As to that
charge, LCDC identified anticipated significant economic
effects on industry groups related to housing, transporta-
tion, and construction and identified specific rule changes
that might economically impact those groups. LCDC also
explained why it could not be more precise in its analysis
given the number of factors that would influence the imple-
mentation of the rules in each jurisdiction. As such, LCDC
alerted potentially affected businesses to the potential eco-
nomic effects of the proposed rules on them, and along with
the rest of the notice (which included a full set of draft rules),
provided sufficient information for such businesses to assess
their own position and meaningfully participate in the rule
adoption process.
         In sum, we reject city petitioners’ third assignment
of error and industry petitioners’ second assignment of error,
because LCDC substantially complied with the require-
ments in ORS 183.335 for its notice of proposed rulemaking.
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                                  369

B.    Procedural Challenges under ORS chapter 197
         In their first and second assignments of error, city
petitioners bring two additional procedural challenges to
LCDC’s rulemaking based on ORS 197.040(1)(b) and ORS
197.047. We address each of those statutes in turn.
          1.   ORS 197.040(1)(b)
         The legislature gave LCDC general rulemaking
authority under ORS 197.040(1). The portion of that statute
at issue in city petitioners’ first assignment of error is ORS
197.040(1)(b), which provides that LCDC:
        “(b) In accordance with the provisions of ORS chapter
     183, adopt rules that it considers necessary to carry out
     ORS chapters 195, 196, 197 and 197A. Except as provided
     in subsection (3) of this section, in designing its adminis-
     trative requirements, the commission shall:
        “(A) Allow for the diverse administrative and plan-
     ning capabilities of local governments;
        “(B) Consider the variation in conditions and needs
     in different regions of the state and encourage regional
     approaches to resolving land use problems;
         “(C) Assess what economic and property interests will
     be, or are likely to be, affected by the proposed rule;
        “(D) Assess the likely degree of economic impact on
     identified property and economic interests; and
        “(E) Assess whether alternative actions are available
     that would achieve the underlying lawful governmental
     objective and would have a lesser economic impact.”
Additionally, ORS 197.040(3) provides, “The requirements
of subsection (1)(b) of this section shall not be interpreted as
requiring an assessment for each lot or parcel that could be
affected by the proposed rule.”
        City petitioners assert that ORS 197.040(1)(b)(A)
through (E) set out rulemaking procedures that LCDC is
required to follow and that LCDC did not do so with respect
to the CFEC rules. LCDC denies that ORS 197.040(1)(b) is an
applicable rulemaking procedure. We, however, agree with
370         City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

city petitioners that ORS 197.040(1)(b) sets out rulemaking
procedures that apply to LCDC.
           Under ORS 183.400(4)(c), we will declare a rule
invalid if it “[w]as adopted without compliance with appli-
cable rulemaking procedures.” The reference to “applicable
rulemaking procedures” includes those procedures con-
tained in ORS chapter 183, as well as any other rulemaking
procedure that the legislature has imposed on the agency in
other statutes. Western States Petroleum Assn. v. EQC, 296
Or App 298, 307-08, 439 P3d 459 (2019). In Western States
Petroleum Assn., we concluded that “rulemaking” is a legal
term of art that means “ ‘the process used by an administra-
tive agency to formulate, amend, or repeal a rule or regula-
tion.’ ” Id. at 309 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1530 (10th
ed 2014)). We further concluded that “procedure” means “ ‘a
particular way of doing or of going about the accomplish-
ment of something.’ ” Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary 1807 (unabridged ed 2002)). Applying those defi-
nitions, we ultimately concluded that ORS 468A.266(5),
which required The Environmental Quality Commission
(EQC) to evaluate certain factors “in adopting rules under
this section,” is a rulemaking procedure.
         Applying that reasoning here, we also must con-
clude that ORS 197.040(1)(b) is a rulemaking procedure,
because it requires LCDC to assess and consider certain
factors “in designing its administrative requirements.” We
find unpersuasive the distinctions that LCDC tries to draw
from the legislature’s use of the word “designing” as opposed
to the word “adopting.” Here, the operative wording appears
immediately after the sentence directing LCDC to adopt
rules in accordance with ORS chapter 183; it is clear from
the text and context that the legislature was referring to
the adoption of such rules when it directed LCDC to assess
and consider particular factors in “designing its adminis-
trative requirements.” See Gaines, 346 Or at 171 (holding
that text and context “must be given primary weight in the
analysis”). Accordingly, we turn to the substance of city peti-
tioners’ challenge.
       City petitioners assert that LCDC failed to comply
with ORS 197.040(1)(b) because it did not prepare “formal”
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                                                 371

written assessments for the factors in subparagraphs (C)
through (E) that LCDC was required to “assess.”6 They
assert that such formal assessments were necessary because
ORS 197.070 states that LCDC “shall keep on file and avail-
able for public inspection the assessments prepared pursu-
ant to ORS 197.040 and 197.230.” Additionally, city petition-
ers argue that LCDC was required to make formal findings
with regard to the factors in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
Because there are not such assessments or findings reflected
in the record, city petitioners argue that the CFEC rules are
invalid. In so arguing, they assert that informal discussions
cannot meet the requirements in ORS 197.040(1)(b) and
assert that the “assessment of administrative rule require-
ments” prepared by DLCD is insufficient, is only an attempt
to “paper over” LCDC’s failure, and cannot be relied on by
LCDC because the statutory requirements apply to LCDC
and not DLCD. City petitioners also assert that the fiscal
impact statement provided in the notice cannot be used to
satisfy ORS 197.040(1)(b). Finally, city petitioners also find
fault with LCDC’s formal adoption of the rules because it
did not make specific findings related to ORS 197.040(1)(b).
         LCDC responds that ORS 197.040(1)(b) does not
require LCDC to make specific findings before adoption of
rules, and asserts that it did engage in the required consid-
erations and assessments.
         We first note that, under our scope of review, we
may
    “consider only whether the documents indicate that [LCDC]
    engaged in any evaluation of the statutorily mandated fac-
    tors in adopting the [CFEC rules]. We do not examine the
    agency’s thinking process, consider how it weighed any cri-
    teria, or attempt a substantive consideration of whether the
    agency made an appropriate policy choice given a particu-
    lar statutory mandate.”
Western States Petroleum Assn., 296 Or App at 310. In addi-
tion, in determining what ORS 197.040(1)(b) requires LCDC
    6
      We note that it is not clear that LCDC enacted all of the CFEC rules pur-
suant to its authority under ORS 197.040(1)(b), as opposed to its authority under
ORS 197.040(1)(c)(A) to set statewide land use policy, which does not contain the
same requirements. However, LCDC does not assert that as a basis on which to
reject city petitioners’ first assignment of error, so we do not address it further.
372         City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

to do, we apply our usual statutory interpretation method-
ology to determine the legislature’s intent. Gaines, 346 Or
at 171.
         We first reject city petitioners’ assertion that LCDC
had to make formal findings with regard to any of the fac-
tors in ORS 197.040(1)(b). Nothing in the text or context
of that statute suggests that LCDC had to make any such
findings. As LCDC points out, when the legislature intends
for LCDC to make findings it knows how to say so directly.
Compare ORS 197.230(1)(d) (requiring LCDC to “[m]ake a
finding of statewide need for the adoption of any new goal or
the amendment of any existing goal”) with ORS 197.230(1)(a)
(requiring LCDC to “assess” three factors in “preparing,
adopting and amending goals and guidelines”) and ORS
197.230(1)(b), (c) (requiring LCDC to “consider” and “give
consideration to” listed factors in “preparing, adopting and
amending goals and guidelines”).
        We also reject city petitioners’ assertion that ORS
197.040(1)(b)(C) through (E) require some sort of formal,
written assessment. Again, nothing in the text or context
includes such a requirement or provides any particular
form that the assessment must take. ORS 197.070 merely
requires that such assessments be made publicly available;
it also does not place requirements on what form those
assessments must take.
         Turning to whether LCDC met the procedural
requirements of ORS 197.040(1)(b), we conclude that the
documents in the rulemaking record demonstrate that
LCDC complied with those procedures. DLCD prepared an
“assessment of administrative rule requirements” for LCDC
to consider, which was included in the packet discussing
and recommending adoption of the CFEC rules. That doc-
ument addressed each factor in ORS 197.040(1)(b)(A) to (E)
and described how the rulemaking process had met those
requirements. That document demonstrates that LCDC
addressed each of the factors “in designing” the CFEC rules.
We conclude that the fiscal impact statement in the notice,
in addition to meeting the requirements in ORS 183.335,
satisfies the requirements that LCDC “[a]ssess what eco-
nomic and property interests will be, or are likely to be,
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                              373

affected by the proposed rule,” ORS 197.040(1)(b)(C), and
“[a]ssess the likely degree of economic impact on identified
property and economic interests,” ORS 197.040(1)(b)(D). We
find unpersuasive city petitioners’ assertions that DLCD’s
assessment and the fiscal impact statement are insufficient,
because those arguments are primarily concerned with the
substance of LCDC’s evaluation and not LCDC’s procedural
compliance. As noted above, in determining whether the doc-
uments demonstrate that LCDC complied with procedural
requirements, “[w]e do not examine the agency’s thinking
process, consider how it weighed any criteria, or attempt a
substantive consideration of whether the agency made an
appropriate policy choice given a particular statutory man-
date.” Western States Petroleum Assn., 296 Or App at 310.
         We also reject city petitioners’ argument that
DLCD’s assessment is inadequate because it was prepared
by DLCD. It was prepared by DLCD as part of the packet
of documents for LCDC to consider at the hearing to adopt
the CFEC Rules. That packet described the rulemaking pro-
cess and how it complied with all rulemaking procedures,
including those in ORS 197.040. In adopting the CFEC
rules, LCDC was necessarily relying on those documents.
See Western States Petroleum Assn., 296 Or App at 312 (“[I]t
is irrelevant that DEQ initially did the evaluation and then
presented that evaluation to EQC for its consideration. EQC
unquestionably may rely on evaluations and material ini-
tially compiled by DEQ.”). Because ORS 197.040(1)(b) did
not require formal findings by LCDC, that is sufficient.
         We are not persuaded by city petitioners’ argu-
ments and conclude that LCDC complied with the statutory
requirements in ORS 197.040(1)(b)(A) though (E) “in design-
ing” the CFEC rules.
        2. ORS 197.047
        In their second assignment of error, city petitioners
argue that LCDC failed to comply with the notice require-
ments in ORS 197.047. That statute provides, in part:
       “(2) At least 90 days prior to the final public hear-
   ing on a proposed new or amended administrative rule
   of the Land Conservation and Development Commission
374            City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

   described in subsection (10) of this section, the Department
   of Land Conservation and Development shall cause the
   notice set forth in subsection (3) of this section to be mailed
   to every affected local government that exercises land use
   planning authority under ORS 197.175.
      “* * * * *
      “(10) The provisions of this section apply to all statutes
   and administrative rules of the Land Conservation and
   Development Commission that limit or prohibit otherwise
   permissible land uses or cause a local government to rezone
   property. For purposes of this section, property is rezoned
   when the statute or administrative rule causes a local gov-
   ernment to:
      “(a) Change the base zoning classification of the prop-
   erty; or
      “(b) Adopt or amend an ordinance in a manner that
   limits or prohibits land uses previously allowed in the
   affected zone.”
        City petitioners argue that this statute applies
because the CFEC rules “forc[e] local governments to enact
(through zoning changes) numerous land use limitations.”
In particular, city petitioners point to the rules relating to
climate-friendly areas, which they argue require cities in
metropolitan areas to study and then zone those areas con-
sistent with many requirements, including requirements
that “make it essentially impossible to build detached single-
family homes.”
         Our fundamental problem with city petitioners’
argument is that they seek to invalidate all 89 of the CFEC
rules without identifying which of those rules they assert
implicate the notice required by ORS 197.047. Although in
their discussion of the climate-friendly area rules city peti-
tioners cite to specific rules, at no point do city petitioners
request that we only invalidate those specific rules. Even if
those cited rules had the effect that city petitioners attri-
bute to them, it cannot be the case that every single one of
the CFEC rules requires rezoning or prohibits previously
allowed uses. City petitioners do not explain why a failure
to provide a required notice for a small subset of the CFEC
rules would operate to invalidate all of the CFEC rules.
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                             375

         With respect to OAR 660-012-0310, OAR 660-012-
0315, and OAR 660-012-0320, which city petitioners iden-
tify in their argument, we do not agree that those rules on
their face trigger the notice requirements of ORS 197.047, as
set out in ORS 197.047(10). The face of those rules as written
does not have those effects or require local governments to
take those actions. In a rule challenge, we are limited to the
face of the rules and cannot consider the effect such rules
might have in a particular application. ORS 183.400(3).
        As a result, we reject city petitioners’ second assign-
ment of error.
     II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY CHALLENGES
         Both city petitioners and industry petitioners chal-
lenge LCDC’s statutory authority to enact the CFEC rules
in their entirety. In addition, city petitioners challenge one
rule in particular—OAR 660-012-0920(7)(c)—as beyond
the statutory authority of LCDC. In addressing a challenge
to statutory authority, “[t]he record on review * * * consists
of two things only: the wording of the rule itself (read in
context) and the statutory provisions authorizing the rule.”
Wolf v. Oregon Lottery Commission, 344 Or 345, 355, 182
P3d 180 (2008) (citing ORS 183.400(3)). An agency “exceeds
the statutory authority of the agency” if the rule “depart[s]
from a legal standard expressed or implied in the particular
law being administered, or contravene[s] some other appli-
cable statute.” Planned Parenthood Assn., 297 Or at 565. We
address each of petitioners’ assignments of error challeng-
ing LCDC’s statutory authority in turn.
A.   Industry Petitioners’ Third Assignment of Error
         In asserting that LCDC does not have statutory
authority for enacting the CFEC rules, industry petitioners
specifically argue that there is no expressed statutory pol-
icy in any of the statutes cited by LCDC in the permanent
rules that authorize the CFEC rules. In so arguing, indus-
try petitioners do not discuss the text of any of the CFEC
rules and only point to a few rules as examples. Because,
unlike city petitioners’ argument as addressed below, indus-
try petitioners explicitly argue that all of the CFEC rules
376         City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

exceed LCDC’s authority, we proceed to address those broad
arguments, as far as they go.
        We first note that industry petitioners do not argue
that the CFEC rules exceed LCDC’s general rulemaking
authority set out in ORS 197.040. The legislature has con-
ferred on LCDC broad authority to “adopt rules that it con-
siders necessary to carry out ORS chapters 195, 196, 197
and 197A,” ORS 197.040(1)(b), and to “[a]dopt by rule in
accordance with ORS chapter 183 * * * any statewide land
use policies that it considers necessary to carry out ORS
chapters 195, 196, 197 and 197A,” ORS 197.040(1)(c)(A). As
articulated by the Supreme Court:
       “The legislature created LCDC to ensure consistent and
   comprehensive land use planning and to promote coordi-
   nated statewide land conservation and development. ORS
   197.005. To accomplish those purposes, the legislature
   invested LCDC with broad policy-making and regulatory
   authority. It directed LCDC to set goals and standards for
   land use and declined to set the land use planning goals
   itself.”
Lane County v. LCDC, 325 Or 569, 581, 942 P2d 278 (1997).
Under that broad authority, LCDC can adopt rules within
its purview as long as the rules are consistent with the gen-
eral legislative policy; that is, the rule must be within the
range of discretion allowed by the legislative policy. Planned
Parenthood Assn., 297 Or at 573 (“To the extent that the
rule departs from the statutory policy directive, it ‘exceeds
the statutory authority of the agency’ within the meaning of
those words in ORS 183.400(4)(b).”).
         It is not obvious that the CFEC rules contravene
some expressed legislative policy or law, and industry peti-
tioners do not point to any such policy or law. Rather, indus-
try petitioners assert that LCDC must point to a specific
expressed legislative policy that authorized its particular
rulemaking effort here. However, that is not the correct
frame for our task given the broad authority the legislature
has conferred on LCDC to implement the broad policy goals
in ORS chapter 197. The question is whether the CFEC
rules are within LCDC’s discretion that the legislature
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                                              377

has allowed by the more general policy in the statutes.7
See, e.g., 1000 Friends v. LCDC, 292 Or 735, 744, 642 P2d
1158 (1982) (reviewing whether it was within LCDC’s del-
egated authority to adopt a particular land use planning
goal by “inquiring into the policies which underlie the legis-
lation”); Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or
217, 229, 621 P2d 547 (1980) (“The discretionary function
of the agency is to make the choice and the review function
of the court is to see that the agency’s decision is within
the range of discretion allowed by the more general policy of
the statute.”); Free Oregon, Inc. v. Oregon Health Authority,
329 Or App 460, 467-68, 541 P3d 897 (2023) (rejecting the
argument that statutes had to confer specific authority
with respect to vaccines because “the legislature opted to
grant OHA ‘full power in the control of communicable dis-
eases,’ without restricting the methods available to OHA”).
That question, however, is not one that industry petitioners
confront, and we do not think they could confront it in the
vague, omnibus fashion in which they have chosen to bring
their argument.
         We decline to offer more extended discussion with
respect to industry petitioners’ third assignment of error.
We note that industry petitioners make broad statements
that do not engage with the text of any of the rules and
they have not asked for us to invalidate only specific rules
as beyond LCDC’s statutory authority. However, under
ORS 183.400(4), we are statutorily precluded from invali-
dating a rule unless it “[v]iolates constitutional provisions,”
“[e]xceeds the statutory authority of the agency,” or “[w]as
adopted without compliance with applicable rulemaking
procedures.” ORS 183.400(4) (“The court shall declare the
rule invalid only if it finds that the rule * * *.” (Emphasis
added.)). We are not at liberty to do what industry petition-
ers request and invalidate the entire package of CFEC rules
based on broad arguments that do not engage with the text
     7
       We note that the legislature has expressed several general policies within
ORS chapter 197 that touch on the subject matter of the CFEC rules, includ-
ing ORS 197.005 (legislative findings), ORS 197.010 (declaring legislative policy
for land use), ORS 197.012 (encouraging compact urban development), and ORS
197.712 (directing LCDC to implement policies and requirements as to what is
included in comprehensive plans). LCDC relies on both ORS 197.012 and ORS
197.712 for the CFEC rules.
378          City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

of any rule and appear to actually pertain to only some
unnamed subset of those rules. We are restricted to deter-
mining whether a rule, on its face, exceeds LCDC’s statu-
tory authority—generalized arguments about rules’ pur-
ported effects on a jurisdiction do not suffice. See, e.g., Free
Oregon, Inc., 329 Or App at 473 (“As we have mentioned, the
scope of our review is limited to an evaluation of whether
the rules, on their face, conflict with ORS 431.180. We are
not called upon, and are not permitted within this proceed-
ing, to evaluate the extent to which a particular application
of the rules might contravene ORS 431.180[.]”). Nor will we
dig into the text of particular rules called out as examples
to determine if any of them should be invalidated for lack
of authority when industry petitioners have not endeavored
to do that for themselves and have not asked for that relief.
Beall Transport Equip. Co., 186 Or App at 700-01 n 2 (“[I]t
is not this court’s function to speculate as to what a party’s
argument might be. Nor is it our proper function to make or
develop a party’s argument when that party has not endeav-
ored to do so itself.”); cf. Corcoran v. Board of Nursing, 197
Or App 517, 527-28, 107 P3d 627 (2005) (holding that an
omnibus challenge to agency’s findings of fact in a final
order will be rejected as unreviewable).
          We reject industry petitioners’ third assignment of
error.
B.    City Petitioners’ Fifth Assignment of Error
         City petitioners make a different argument from
that of the industry petitioners. They assert that the land
use statutes set out a clear policy directive that delegates
responsibilities between local governments and LCDC, with
LCDC “to remain at a high level, providing goals and objec-
tives where needed, but not meddling in how land use plan-
ning is done at the local level.” They argue that the CFEC
rules violate that policy by micromanaging decisions that
are to be left at the local level. City petitioners acknowledge
that not all of the CFEC rules exceed the authority of LCDC
to set objectives but argue that LCDC should have to do the
work of separating out the valid from the invalid rules on
remand, because it is LCDC’s burden to demonstrate statu-
tory authority.
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                             379

         In support of city petitioners’ position, amicus the
League of Oregon Cities (League) filed a brief, arguing that
LCDC has no authority to adopt the CFEC rules because
(1) the CFEC rules violate legislative policy for local govern-
ment control over land use planning, (2) no statute expressly
or implicitly authorized adoption of the CFEC rules, (3) the
CFEC rules contravene statewide land use planning goals,
and (4) the CFEC rules implement an executive order and
not statewide land use planning goals.
         We reject city petitioners’ and the League’s argu-
ments for much the same reasons that we rejected the argu-
ments of industry petitioners. Both city petitioners and the
League primarily assert that the CFEC rules invade the
local land use province of local governments and that LCDC
is restricted to setting broad objectives and goals. First,
we are unpersuaded by their arguments that LCDC is as
limited as they assert. Second, and more importantly, none
of their arguments provide a basis on which we can invali-
date all of the CFEC rules. Neither city petitioners nor the
League engage with the actual text of the rules, nor do they
identify any particular rules that are beyond LCDC’s stat-
utory authority, continuously arguing that we must invali-
date all of the rules. As we explain above, we cannot inval-
idate any particular rule unless on the face of that rule it
exceeds LCDC’s statutory authority. See ORS 183.400(3), (4).
In the absence of argument about the actual text of a chal-
lenged rule and why it exceeds, on its face rather than based
on its asserted effect, LCDC’s broad delegative authority to
implement legislative policy expressed in ORS chapter 197,
we do not discern a route to invalidating any of the CFEC
rules.
C. City Petitioners’ Sixth Assignment of Error
         In their final assignment of error, city petitioners
argue that LCDC exceeded its statutory enforcement author-
ity in enacting OAR 660-012-0920(7)(c). OAR 660-012-0920
is a new rule in the transportation division that directs
LCDC to hold compliance hearings. Under OAR 660-012-
0920, LCDC may hold compliance hearings if a city, county,
or Metro has, among other things, “[f]ailed to comply with
380         City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

a requirement in this division,” OAR 660-012-0920(2)(d).
Following such a hearing, ORS 660-012-0920(7) provides:
     “(7) If the commission finds a city, a county, or Metro
  out of compliance with the requirements of this division,
  the commission may use any authority granted to the com-
  mission, including but not limited to the actions below.
      “(a) Issue an order to remand a report with spe-
  cific directions for changes necessary to comply with this
  division;
     “(b) Issue an enforcement order as provided in ORS
  197.319 through 197.335;
      “(c) Issue an order to invalidate the acknowledgement
  of local transportation system plans that are not consistent
  with an approved Land Use and Transportation Scenario
  Plan; and
     “(d) Provide notice to the Oregon Department of
  Transportation and the United States Department of
  Transportation of the lack of compliance with state plan-
  ning requirements.”
         City petitioners argue that LCDC does not have
statutory enforcement authority to invalidate an acknowl-
edged transportation system plan (TSP), which is the action
listed in OAR 660-012-0920(7)(c). They argue that LCDC
has a minor role in post-acknowledgement of plans and that
nothing in ORS chapter 197 gives LCDC the authority to
unilaterally change the local law that is an acknowledged
land use plan. Instead, city petitioners assert, LCDC has a
more limited statutory enforcement authority as provided in
ORS 197.319 to 197.353.
        LCDC responds that OAR 660-012-0920(7)(c) must
be viewed in context, noting that that section only applies
when the TSP is “not consistent with an approved Land
Use and Transportation Scenario Plan.” A Land Use and
Transportation Scenario Plan (scenario plan) is a plan that
the CFEC rules now require of local governments beyond
the Portland Metro area. OAR 660-044-0110 - 660-044-
0130. The scenario plan is a document that certain local
governments must prepare and submit to LCDC for review.
OAR 660-044-0120. Once the scenario plan is approved,
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                                 381

local governments must amend comprehensive plans, land
use regulations, and TSPs to be consistent with the scenario
plan and can only adopt amendments that are consistent
with the scenario plan. OAR 660-044-130.
         Given that context, LCDC argues that OAR 660-
012-0920(7)(c) is just one enforcement option if a local TSP
is inconsistent with the scenario plan. LCDC notes that
the only way that would happen is if a local government
obtained approval for a scenario plan but then declined to
amend the TSP for consistency, as required by the rules.
LCDC argues that it would not be changing local law by
invalidating an inconsistent TSP, but that it would instead
be ensuring that the inconsistent TSP did not continue to be
in effect after approval of the scenario plan. LCDC argues
that the enforcement authority in OAR 660-012-0920(7)(c)
is “reasonably related” to ORS 197.320, which authorizes
LCDC to issue orders to local governments. It asserts that
the rule “fills the gap” that could arise if a local government
obtains approval of a scenario plan and then fails to amend
the TSP.
        We agree with city petitioners. Unlike other topics
in ORS chapter 197, the statutes governing LCDC’s enforce-
ment authority are specific, and OAR 660-012-0920(7)(c) is
not consistent with them. Planned Parenthood Assn., 297 Or
at 565 (An agency exceeds its statutory authority if the rule
“depart[s] from a legal standard expressed or implied in the
particular law being administered, or contravene[s] some
other applicable statute.”). In particular the statute relied
on by LCDC, ORS 197.320, provides:
       “The Land Conservation and Development Commission
   shall issue an order requiring a local government, state
   agency or special district to take action necessary to bring
   its comprehensive plan, land use regulation, limited land
   use decisions or other land use decisions or actions into
   compliance with the goals, acknowledged comprehensive
   plan provisions, land use regulations or housing produc-
   tion strategy if the commission has good cause to believe
   [setting out 13 types of noncompliance].”
That statute authorizes LCDC to order local governments,
among others, to take actions to come into compliance.
382            City of Cornelius v. Dept. of Land Conservation

Further, ORS 197.335(1) sets out what such an order must
contain, which includes:
     “(c) The corrective action decided upon by [LCDC],
  including the specific requirements, with which the local
  government, state agency or special district must comply.
  In the case of a pattern or practice of decision-making that
  violates an acknowledged comprehensive plan or land use
  regulation, the commission may require revisions to the
  comprehensive plan, land use regulations or local proce-
  dures which the commission believes are necessary to cor-
  rect the pattern or practice.”
ORS 197.335 also sets out additional enforcement author-
ity for LCDC that can help to ensure local government
compliance:
      “(3)(a) If the commission finds that in the interim
  period during which a local government, state agency or
  special district would be bringing itself into compliance
  with the commission’s order under ORS 197.320 or subsec-
  tion (2) of this section it would be contrary to the public
  interest in the conservation or sound development of land
  to allow the continuation of some or all categories of land
  use decisions or limited land use decisions, it shall, as part
  of its order, limit, prohibit or require the approval by the
  local government of applications for subdivisions, partitions,
  building permits, limited land use decisions or land use deci-
  sions until the plan, land use regulation or subsequent land
  use decisions and limited land use decisions are brought
  into compliance. The commission may issue an order that
  requires review of local decisions by a hearings officer or
  the Department of Land Conservation and Development
  before the local decision becomes final.
      “* * * * *
     “(4) As part of its order under ORS 197.320 or sub-
  section (2) of this section, the commission may withhold
  grant funds from the local government to which the order is
  directed. As part of an order issued under this section, the
  commission may notify the officer responsible for disburs-
  ing state-shared revenues to withhold that portion of state-
  shared revenues to which the local government is entitled
  under ORS 221.770, 323.455, 366.762 and 366.800 and ORS
  chapter 471 which represents the amount of state planning
Cite as 331 Or App 349 (2024)                                383

  grant moneys previously provided the local government by
  the commission. * * *
     “(5)(a) As part of its order under this section, the com-
  mission may notify the officer responsible for disbursing
  funds from any grant or loan made by a state agency to with-
  hold such funds from a special district to which the order is
  directed. The officer responsible for disbursing funds shall
  withhold funds as outlined in this section and shall release
  funds to the special district or department when notified to
  do so by the commission.
     “* * * * *
      “(6) The commission may institute actions or proceed-
  ings for legal or equitable remedies in the Circuit Court
  for Marion County or in the circuit court for the county to
  which the commission’s order is directed or within which
  all or a portion of the applicable city is located to enforce
  compliance with the provisions of any order issued under
  this section or to restrain violations thereof. Such actions
  or proceedings may be instituted without the necessity
  of prior agency notice, hearing and order on an alleged
  violation.”
(Emphases added.) Those statutes expressly contemplate
that the local government must take the corrective action
ordered by LCDC; that is, it is the local government that
must bring itself into compliance. What LCDC can do is
include in its order the actions prescribed in ORS 197.335
to pressure the local government to comply. Those statues
do not authorize LCDC to revoke an acknowledgement of
a TSP, which is part of a local government’s acknowledged
comprehensive plan, OAR 660-012-0015(4). And we do not
agree with LCDC that such revocation is reasonably related
to an order directing the local government to take actions
necessary to come into compliance. As a result, we conclude
that OAR 660-012-0920(7)(c) exceeds LCDC’s statutory
authority and is invalid.
        OAR 660-012-0830(1)(c) and OAR 660-012-0920(7)(c)
held invalid; otherwise, CFEC rules held valid.