Court Opinion

ID: 9605843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:42:28.402115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:25.192020
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting) :
Three propositions combine to persuade me' that the decision of the Board of County Commissioners should not be voided on procedural grounds. (In view of the disposition of this case, consideration of the merits of their decision rejecting construction of the condominium is not reached.)
First: A requirement that a tribunal, performing judicial functions, “shall” act within a stated time is usually considered to be directory rather than mandatory; and before a negation of jurisdiction is justified because of delay in making a decision, prejudice to the party complaining must be shown.1 Relating to that *730proposition, there is an abundance of cases dealing with whether the word “shall” should be construed as absolutely mandatory, or as merely directory. On examining them it will be seen that there can be no doubt that the true meaning and intent should be determined from the context and the purpose in which the word is used. This is illustrated in the case of Escoe v. Zerbst,2 on which the main opinion relies in part. The court stated:
“shall” . . . , it is the language of command, a test significant, though not controlling. (Citations omitted.) Doubt, however, is dispelled when we pass from words alone to a view of the ends and aims.3 (Emphasis added.)
In applying that fundamental rule of construction, the courts have seen a significant difference between the necessity of compliance with prescribed time limitations by the parties as between themselves, as distinguished from limitations upon the tribunal in rendering its judgment.4 With respect to the latter, in considering the purposes of such statutes or ordinances, the courts have generally interpreted such requirements simply as regulations for the orderly and convenient conduct of public business, and not as a condition precedent to the validity of the acts done; and have therefore held quite uniformly that failure of strict compliance with these requirements does not deprive the tribunal of jurisdiction.5 This should be especially so when the delay is of relatively short duration (as it was here) and thus more likely due to inadvertence than to intentional failure or neglect of responsibilities for a substantial period of time.
Second: The decision of the County Commission was in fact announced within seven work days after the hearing. It was held on Thursday, March 8, 1973; and the decision was made on Monday, March 19. Therefore, if the non-work days, Saturdays and Sundays, are excluded, the decision was actually made on the seventh work day. Since the Ordinances of Salt Lake County provide no definition for this computation of time, this action by the County Commission could properly be regarded as a not unreasonable operational construction of the ordinance which allows seven days in which to make the decision.
Third, and finally: Such delay as occurred, from Thursday to Monday, was purely a procedural irregularity from which no one was or could be in any way adversely affected. From anything I have been able to discover, where there has been a short delay in a decision by such a tribunal, in the absence of any shpwing of prejudice to the parties in interest, the authorities have invariably declined to set aside such an order or judgment.6

. Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Utah 106, 53 P. 983; Sperisen v. Heynemann, 149 Cal.App.2d 228, 308 P.2d 436; Cullen v. Building Inspector of No. Attleborough, 353 Mass. 671, 234 N.E. 2d 727; Koehn v. State Board of Equalization, etc., 166 Cal.App.2d 109, 333 P.2d 125 (1959); Peak v. Industrial Accident Commission, 82 Cal.App.2d 526, 187 P.2d 905. *730In the interest of brevity these citations are limited to an illustration of the wide variety of tribunals to which this rule has been applied.

. 295 U.S. 490, 493, 55 S.Ct. 818, 820, 79 L.Ed. 1566.

. See also Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 528, 534, 50 S.Ot. 385, 74 L.Ed. 1016 to the same effect.

. Davidson v. Board of Education of City of Pikeville, 225 Ky. 165, 7 S.W.2d 1056.

. Cullen v. Building Inspector No. Attleborough, supra, footnote 1.

. See footnote 1 above, particularly Sperisen v. Heynemann.