Court Opinion

ID: 9773406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:44:53.078093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:53.464384
License: Public Domain

*840THOMAS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that an expert witness’ testimony that a child witness is telling the truth is inadmissible. I cannot join, however, in the majority’s decision to exclude testimony from an expert that the complainant has been abused or that the complainant exhibits the same behavioral characteristics as those exhibited by sexually abused children. Although the majority recognizes that expert testimony is not inadmissible on the ground that it invades the province of the jury, it harks back to that rule to prohibit the expert’s testimony in this case.
In appellant’s fifth and seventh points of error, he complains of the witness’ statements that the complainant is telling an experience she actually had rather than imagining the incident. The majority sustains the points of error for two reasons. First, credibility of witnesses is solely within the province of the jury. Second, no person can be qualified as an expert in discerning veracity. I do not dispute that the determination of credibility is vested in the jury. Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 184, 88 L.Ed.2d 153 (1985). However, I cannot agree that this is a reason to prohibit such testimony. The law is clear that an expert’s testimony is not inadmissible solely because it invades the province of the jury. Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212, 218-19 (Tex.Crim.App.1972); TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 704.
I agree with the majority’s second rationale. The expert’s opinion on truth and credibility of the witness is inadmissible because the opinion exceeds the scope of the witness’ expertise. The foremost criterion for the admissibility of an expert’s testimony is that he is competent and qualified to testify on the matter. Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928, 99 S.Ct. 1264, 59 L.Ed.2d 484 (1979), set aside on other grounds, Ex parte Chambers, 688 S.W.2d 483 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864, 106 S.Ct. 181, 88 L.Ed.2d 150 (1985); Hopkins, 480 S.W.2d at 219. The State has, understandably, failed to meet its burden to establish the witness’ qualifications in the area of truthseeking. No expert witness is qualified to ascertain credibility. For this reason, I join the majority in sustaining points of error five and seven.
In points of error three and four, appellant contends that the following testimony was improperly admitted:
PROSECUTION: Does [the complainant] exhibit classic characteristics that you have seen, in your experience, of a child who has been sexually abused?
DEFENSE: Your Honor, we renew the objection on the ... basis [that such testimony would invade the province of the jury].
THE COURT: I’m going to allow that one. Overruled.
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PROSECUTION: [I]n [the complainant’s] case, does she exhibit the same characteristics as you have seen in other cases where you have found that the claim was true?
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WITNESS WHITE: Yes.
In point of error six, appellant complains of the following testimony:
PROSECUTION: In your opinion, has [the complainant] been sexually abused?
DEFENSE: Your Honor, we’ll object. This question again invades the province of the jury. That’s their — These twelve people have the obligation to decide whether the [complainant’s] allegation is true....
THE COURT: I’m going to overrule you on that. She can answer.
WITNESS WHITE: Yes, [the complainant] was abused, in my opinion.
The majority holds that both of the recited colloquies were inadmissible. Again, the majority gives two reasons for its opinion. First, the testimony invades the province of the jury; and second, the testimony allows the jury to infer that the complainant is telling the truth.
Again, I must point out that “invading the province of the jury” is no longer a valid reason for excluding testimony. TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 704. The majority re*841fines this argument somewhat. According to the majority — and I do not dispute it— the expert could properly testify as to the general behavioral characteristics of child sexual abuse victims as a class. The expert could also recite her personal observations of the complainant’s behavior. The majority holds that the error lies in the expert’s synthesizing this information to opine that the complainant exhibits the characteristics common to sexually abused children, leading to the expert’s conclusion that the child has been abused. I cannot agree with this analysis.
The majority acknowledges that the jury could properly draw a comparison between the behavior of the complainant and the behavior of abused children to conclude that the complainant was abused. The United States Supreme Court has said, “If the jury may make up its mind about future dangerousness unaided by psychiatric testimony, jurors should not be barred from hearing the views of the State’s psychiatrists along with opposing views of the defendant’s doctors.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898-99, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3397, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983). Thus, the fact that the jury is able to synthesize evidence unaided by the expert does not serve as grounds for excluding the expert’s testimony.
Further, in allowing psychiatric opinion testimony, the Court of Criminal Appeals has analogized to the opinion testimony of a fingerprint expert:
To hold that a fingerprint expert may testify only as to the facts (which are themselves, in reality, opinions), namely, that one set of fingerprints exhibits the same technical characteristics as another set, but that he may not state his opinion that the two sets were the same, or that they were made by the same person would indeed be an absurdity. Such a holding would mean that he could testify only that certain patterns in one set were identical with those in the other set, but could not opine that both sets were the same, or that the defendant’s fingerprints were the same as those in the records. Yet if the invasion of the province of the jury rule is followed, such a result would clearly be required, for his opinion that the sets were the same would be an opinion regarding an ultimate issue.
Hopkins, 480 S.W.2d at 220. Under the majority’s holding, the fingerprint expert would again be limited to testimony of technical characteristics without expressing an opinion. Hopkins will not allow such a result.
The second, and principal, reason the majority finds the expert’s testimony in this case offensive appears to be that the jury could infer from the expert’s testimony that the complainant is telling the truth, or that the witness believes the complainant. It is true that if the jurors believed the expert’s testimony they would be more likely to believe the victim’s account. The evidence should not be excluded purely for that reason. Much expert — and lay — testimony will tend to show that another witness either is or is not telling the truth.
For example, a fingerprint expert’s testimony that the defendant’s fingerprints match those found on the murder weapon will tend to make unbelievable the defendant’s averments that he had never seen the gun before. A physician’s opinion that injuries to a child were the result of a beating casts doubts on the veracity of a defendant who claims the child was injured falling out of bed. A police officer’s statement that, in his opinion, the defendant was intoxicated appears to make untruthful the driver’s testimony that he only had one beer. An expert’s testimony that a fire was of an incendiary origin would tend to impinge upon the veracity of a defendant’s claim of natural causes. Yet, such testimony is admissible in a criminal prosecution. Miller v. State, 472 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) (fingerprint evidence); Austin v. State, 375 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.Crim.App.1964) (medical testimony as to cause of death); Smithhart v. State, 503 S.W.2d 283 (Tex.Crim.App.1973) (intoxication opinion evidence); Burrow v. State, 481 S.W.2d 895 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (opinion as to cause of fire).
*842I would hold that the expert witness’ testimony that the complainant exhibits behavioral characteristics common to sexually abused children and that, in her opinion, the child has been sexually abused, was admissible. Consequently, I would overrule points of error three, four and six.
Having sustained appellant’s fifth and seventh points of error, holding that certain testimony was erroneously admitted, I must determine whether such error requires us to reverse appellant’s conviction. Rule 81 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates that “the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” TEX.R.APP.P. 81(b)(2). See also Green v. State, 727 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The admission of improper evidence puts the burden on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction. Foster v. State, 687 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, pet. ref'd).
To determine whether the evidence contributed to the conviction, I ask whether the “minds of an average jury” would have found the State’s case less persuasive had the testimony been excluded. Bird v. State, 692 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1238, 89 L.Ed.2d 346 (1986) (citing Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972)). See also Beck v. State, 712 S.W.2d 745, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Ranson v. State, 707 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). In this case, the State’s proof consisted of the complainant’s testimony and her outcry statement to her mother. Appellant testified, denying that he touched the complainant in an improper manner. Thus, the primary issue facing the jury was the credibility of the complainant and of appellant. There was no physical evidence that the incident occurred and no eye witness. The eight-year-old complainant’s testimony was significantly bolstered by the expert witness’ statement that she believed the complainant was telling the truth. I would hold that the average jury would have found the State’s case less persuasive in the absence of the expert’s testimony. Thus, I concur in the reversal of the judgment.