Court Opinion

ID: 9712166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:47:57.548788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:14.063113
License: Public Domain

RUIZ, Associate Judge,
concurring:
The requirements and purpose of the “knock and announce” statute are satisfied if, after knocking and announcing, and al*578lowing sufficient time for an occupant of the residence to open the door, police officers seeking to execute a search warrant reasonably believe that they have been denied entry. See D.C.Code § 23-524(a) (2001) (incorporating requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 that an officer be “refused admittance” after giving notice of authority and purpose). I agree with the majority’s analysis that the police could reasonably come to that conclusion on the facts of this case.
I also agree with the majority that in this case the police did not have the requisite “concrete, particularized evidence” of the presence of weapons and a “realistic possibility” that they may have been used against them to constitute exigent circumstances excusing compliance with the statute. Poole v. United States, 630 A.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C.1993). We have held that the presence of weapons alone is insufficient, see id., as it would exempt an entire category of search warrants — those seeking weapons — -from the statutory requirement. See Moore v. United States, 748 A.2d 915, 918 (D.C.2000); see also United States v. Bonner, 277 U.S.App. D.C. 271, 281 n. 3, 874 F.2d 822, 831 n. 3 (1989) (Wald, J., dissenting) (noting that in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3109 Congress was “acutely aware” that it applied to search warrants for weapons).
The majority opines, however, that the suspicion that there were weapons in the hojise — though insufficient by itself to excuse compliance with the statute — nonetheless could have been taken into account by the police in shortening the time they needed to wait before breaking down the door. I disagree that this is relevant to the statute’s requirements to knock, announce and wait. The manner in which the police have announced their presence and purpose, and the passage of enough time so that the occupants can hear and respond to the summons, are relevant to whether the police have constructively been denied entry, thereby satisfying the statute. The presence of weapons, though surely important to the question of police safety, sheds no light on whether there has been a denial of entry. To mix the two confuses distinct inquiries and could result in half measures for occupants and half measures for police.
Our legal rulings should place incentives consistent with the important Fourth Amendment rights of the individual that Congress intended to safeguard by requiring that officers knock, announce and wait before breaking the door. Thus, we require “concrete, particularized evidence” of a real safety risk or other exigent circumstance to excuse compliance with the statute. Inclusion of a generalized safety concern in evaluating whether there has been a constructive refusal to admit dilutes the evidentiary standard we have established to ensure that there is a reasonably-based government interest countervailing full compliance with the statute. Moreover, police should be encouraged to knock and announce their presence and wait to be admitted or refused entry whenever possible. In some cases, announcement of police presence in force may well decrease the possibility of violence and enhance officer safety. A sudden forced entry, particularly into a small space during the day when people are expected to be up and about, runs an increased risk of injury to innocent occupants of the premises being searched.1 If officers choose some form of announcement and wait, even if insufficient to fully satisfy the statute, in situations *579where there is the requisite evidence of exigent circumstances, there is no risk that their voluntary compliance efforts will frustrate police investigative work because seized evidence will not be suppressed as the police were not required to have complied with the statute at all. Thus, there is no need for an in-between measure. For these reasons, I disagree in part with the majority’s opinion.

. In this case, the premises to be searched was a small residential apartment. Officer Hicks testified that he knew that the apartment was occupied by the family of a friend of the appellant, including four children.