Court Opinion

ID: 9745517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:06:01.041685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:02.251434
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MURPHY, dissenting: I agree that the practice of documenting and preserving every communication between the jury and the court is a wise one. At times it may be practical and necessary to proceed without a court reporter, especially for minor or administrative communications, but if that does occur, the substance of the communication should be made part of the record as soon as practicable. However, unlike the majority, I believe that the trial court’s actions did not rise to the level of meriting reversal. I respectfully dissent and would affirm defendant’s conviction. First, I would not invoke the plain-error exception to the waiver rule. See People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 164 (1997); 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). In People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81 (1998), our supreme court held that even though the defendant did not object to the trial court’s ex parte communications with the jury or include the issue in his post-trial motion, “we have determined that application of the waiver rule is less rigid where the basis for the objection is the trial court’s conduct.” Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 161; People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996); People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 455 (1990); People v. Comage, 303 Ill. App. 3d 269, 272 (1999). Where the trial court chose to discuss the jury notes outside of defendant’s and the court reporter’s presence, and the trial court sent the bailiff to relay his message to the jury, the trial court’s conduct is clearly the basis of defendant’s argument on appeal. Therefore, I would hold that the waiver rule does not apply. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 161; Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 85; Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d at 455; Comage, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 272. Since the waiver rule is inapplicable, there is no need to invoke the plain-error exception to the waiver rule, and the analysis should focus on whether defendant suffered prejudice. A jury verdict will not be set aside where it is apparent that no harm or prejudice resulted from the communication. People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 460 (1995). The key question in determining prejudice is whether defendant’s presence could have had any effect on the communication. People v. Blalock, 239 Ill. App. 3d 830, 841 (1993); People v. King, 165 Ill. App. 3d 464, 471-72 (1988). In Kliner, for example, the defendant argued that he was harmed by the trial judge’s ex parte communication with the jury because he was denied the opportunity to make suggestions regarding the appropriate response to jury notes. Our supreme court analyzed the substance of the trial court’s responses to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 163-66. See also Comage, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 272; People v. Stropoli, 146 Ill. App. 3d 667 (1986) (no prejudice when the trial court answered two questions outside the defendant’s and his counsel’s presence because the judge correctly and appropriately responded to the jury’s questions). In its first and fifth notes, the jury requested the stipulation and transcripts of Daily’s and O’Carroll’s testimony. It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to allow or refuse a request by the jury to review testimony in a criminal case. People v. Pierce, 56 Ill. 2d 361, 364 (1974). Transcripts of testimony may be made available to the jury if the court believes that the transcripts will be helpful to jurors. People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 93 (1989). “[When] the jury itself requests the opportunity to examine transcripts of the testimony, the trial court must assume that the jury believes that such review would be helpful.” People v. Modrowski, 296 Ill. App. 3d 735, 747 (1998). The jury had already heard Daily’s and O’Carroll’s trial testimony. Furthermore, the agreed statement of facts provides that the trial court’s response was to send these materials to the jury after discussions with counsel. Significantly, defendant does not contend on appeal that the trial court erred when it provided these materials to the jury. The trial court’s responses to the jury’s requests to the first and fifth notes were within its discretion and, therefore, defendant did not suffer any prejudice. See Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 164. In their second note, the jurors stated that they were “deadlocked 8-4 and it appears that no one is willing to change their mind.” After giving counsel for both sides opportunities for suggestions, the trial court sent a note back to the jury to “keep on deliberating with an open mind.” The jurors sent a third note at 3:50 p.m. stating that they were deadlocked 7 to 5. “Based on the evidence presented, this jury feels it cannot [sic] a decision in this case.” At 4:10 p.m., before a response to the third note was returned to the jury, a fourth note was sent out providing, “We are deadlock [sic] still at 7-5. Based on evidence presented, this jury does not feel it can reach a decision.” The trial court did not send a written response. Instead, it instructed its bailiff to inform the jury to continue deliberating. Whether a jury should continue to deliberate after it has indicated that it is hopelessly deadlocked is also within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Harris, 294 Ill. App. 3d 561, 568 (1998). “An instruction to a deadlocked jury is improper if it hastens a verdict, coerces a juror to make a determination in conflict with the juror’s views, or otherwise interferes in deliberations such that a defendant is prejudiced.” People v. Kegley, 227 Ill. App. 3d 48, 57 (1992). However, a trial court has a duty to provide guidance to a jury that is not hopelessly deadlocked. Kegley, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 57. In addition, where the trial court receives an unsolicited statement regarding the numerical division of the jurors, it is not error to order the jury to continue its deliberations. People v. Iozzo, 195 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1086 (1990). Here, the judge’s written response to the jury’s second note was to continue deliberating with an open mind, and in response to third and fourth notes, the trial court told the bailiff to instruct the jury to continue deliberating. Defendant does not argue that the court’s responses coerced a verdict or otherwise interfered with the jury’s deliberations. Defendant does not explain what would have occurred if he had been present. Instead, he claims generally that his presence would have contributed to the fairness of the procedure. Our supreme court rejected a similar argument in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 622-23 (2001), where the defendant was not present when the jury sent five notes during deliberations. The defendant claimed that his constitutional right was violated because he could have had some input into the nature of the communication with the jury. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d at 621-22. The court held, however, that the defendant’s “ ‘argument is based on broad principles and is not adapted to the specifics of this case.’ [Citation.]” Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d at 622. As in Hickey, here there is nothing in the record indicating that defendant’s presence would have contributed to the fairness of the procedure. See Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d at 622-23; People v. Lee, 303 Ill. App. 3d 356, 368 (1999) (any error would be harmless because “we would be required to speculate as to what action defendant or his counsel would have urged with respect to the notes”); People v. Hernandez, 229 Ill. App. 3d 546, 553 (1992) (rejecting defendant’s speculation that if he had been present for discussion regarding jury question, his attorney might have objected to the judge’s proposed response). As for the sheriffs communication with the jurors, the majority relies in part on the fact that defendant was only convicted after that communication, while they continued to deliberate after the jury receiving the judge’s written responses to their first two notes. However, the majority disregards that in the time between the bailiff s communication with them and their verdict, the jury also requested and received a transcript of O’Carroll’s testimony. Having heard the trial testimony and received the stipulation and transcripts of Daily’s and O’Carroll’s testimony, the jury reached its decision and convicted defendant. Furthermore, I disagree that the evidence was sufficiently close to merit review under the first prong of the plain-error rule. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). Officers Edward Langle and John O’Carroll both testified that defendant jumped from the backseat of the car and began running. As Langle secured the car, O’Carroll chased defendant and saw him throw the gun into the gutter, under a van. O’Carroll testified that after defendant was apprehended, he returned to the van and recovered the gun. Officer Demarko Daily corroborated that defendant was running southbound on Lawndale and that O’Carroll found a gun under a van. Langle did not see O’Carroll when he found the gun but noticed that O’Carroll returned to their squad car with a gun. The majority relies on defense witness Arlena Jones’ testimony that the gun was her boyfriend’s and that defendant never ran from the police that night; however, it is significant that she was a close family friend of defendant whom she had known for 10 years. The majority notes on this point that the jury, as trier of fact, was responsible for observing the witnesses, assessing their credibility, and determining the weight to be given their testimony. I note that after observing Jones, assessing her credibility, and determining the weight to be given her testimony, the jury apparently did not believe her, as it chose to convict defendant. The majority also relies on O’Carroll’s statement that he recovered the gun from underneath a van on 15th Street, while Daily and Langle testified that the van was on Lawndale. Where the gun was thrown, according to the officers’ testimony, was near an intersection, and Daily underscored that he saw the gun “on the corner of 15th and Lawndale.” Accordingly, I do not read the same import into the testimony as the majority. In addition, although the majority’s analysis relies on the jury’s deadlock notes, the jury votes changed from 8 to 4 to 7 to 5 within 50 minutes, and the second 7 to 5 note simply reiterated the note of 20 minutes before, since the jury had not yet received a response from the court. See People v. Vasquez, 368 Ill. App. 3d 241, 252 (2006) (where two officers saw the defendant take possession of a loaded gun, and the only witness who challenged the testimony was the defendant’s half brother, who had a close personal relationship with him, “[t]he mere fact that the jury indicated in one note that it could not reach a decision does not render the evidence closely balanced”); People v. Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d 530, 543 (2003) (the jury being undecided for four hours was not sufficient to make the evidence close for plain-error purposes). Therefore, under these circumstances, I do not believe that the jury’s notes rendered the evidence closely balanced. To the extent that the majority relies on the second prong of the plain-error rule, I reiterate my above analysis as to the trial court’s responses to the jury notes. Furthermore, this court has expressed doubt as to whether Illinois categorically presumes prejudice when there is outside contact with a juror. People v. Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d 382, 405 (2007). Ward noted that the Supreme Court appears to have departed from its position in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 98 L. Ed. 654, 74 S. Ct. 450 (1954) (see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 522, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1780 (1993); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78, 85, 102 S. Ct. 940, 945 (1982)). In addition, since People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 460 (1998), was decided, “our supreme court appeared to shift toward a more fact-intensive, case-specific analysis in People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227 (2004).” Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 404. Ward concluded based on Williams, “Illinois no longer appears to categorically presume prejudice when there is outside contact with a juror.” Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 405. In addition, defendant cited several federal cases in support of his argument that prejudice must be presumed when a trial court uses a bailiff as a medium for communicating with the jury. Not only do these cases involve habeas corpus petitions, but they are also factually distinguishable. In United States ex rel. Tobe v. Bensinger, 492 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1974), after the jury reached a verdict, defense counsel discovered that three inquiries made of the court, all involving the possibility of reaching a nonunanimous verdict, never reached the court. Affidavits established that the jury asked the bailiff several times what would happen if they reached a nonunanimous verdict, and the bailiff, without the trial court’s knowledge, told them “over and over again in one form or another that ‘You must reach a decision.’ ” Tobe, 492 F.2d at 237-38. Here, there are no allegations of juror coercion. Furthermore, unlike the Tobe bailiff, here the bailiff communicated to the jury not only with the trial court’s knowledge, but at its direction. In Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2004), the deliberating jury sent a note to the judge asking where the defendant lived, the distance between his home and the location of the crime, and the time that he arrived home on the night in question. Without conferring with any attorneys, the trial court responded via a bailiff either that there was no evidence in the record regarding this question or that their questions could not be answered. Unlike here, where the jury’s notes indicated that it was deadlocked, the bailiff in Moore responded to factual questions about the case, which went to the very heart of the defendant’s alibi defense. Furthermore, the Moore bailiffs answer was incorrect because the defendant presented testimony as to when he arrived home as part of his alibi defense. Further exacerbating the incorrect response in Moore was the fact that the jurors were not permitted to take notes during the trial and that the trial court instructed them that they would not be allowed to ask any more questions. In addition, unlike the court in Moore, here, the trial court consulted with counsel before responding to the jury’s questions. Finally, while an attorney cannot waive a defendant’s presence (People v. Lofton, 194 Ill. 2d 40, 66 (2000)), it is significant that, unlike People v. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217 (1994), defendant’s attorneys were present during discussions on both the jury notes and the decision to send the bailiff instead of giving a written response. See People v. Smith, 321 Ill. App. 3d 523, 528-29 (2001) (“Where the defendant or his attorney had knowledge of the court’s communication with the jury at the approximate time of the jury’s inquiry, plain error has not been found”). I agree that the trial court should have provided a written note to the jury instead of sending the sheriff to tell them to continue deliberating. It also should have made a record of the discussions on the jury notes. However, where both of defendant’s attorneys were present for all of the discussions, the evidence is not closely balanced, the judge’s responses to the jury notes were correct, and any presumption as to prejudice for outside contact with a jury has been called into question, the trial court’s actions did not merit reversal. Therefore, I would affirm defendant’s conviction.