Court Opinion

ID: 9782487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:51:50.942361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:03.274252
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
I do not share the Majority’s view that the trial court’s remedial response to Vaughn’s refusal to abide by the court’s instructions was reversible error, and therefore respectfully dissent.
The Majority notes that Vaughn had flip-flopped (the trial court termed it “flimflamming” or “flimflamming back and forth”) on several occasions about his intention to represent himself at trial. Transcript at 11, 342, respectively. Indeed, a review of the record reveals that Vaughn originally was represented by counsel before deciding to proceed pro se some months before trial. About a week before trial was to commence, he changed his mind again and requested counsel. Counsel was appointed. On the Friday before trial was to commence on Monday, Vaughn submitted another motion to proceed pro se. The court addressed that motion at the outset of proceedings on Monday and even at that late date, *490Vaughn continued to vacillate back and forth as to whether he would represent himself. As they discussed the motion, Vaughn changed course and indicated he had once again decided to accept the public defender’s services. Then he changed his mind abruptly at the end of the same discussion and again expressed a preference to proceed pro se. After the court recited the customary warnings about the perils of self-representation and they were about to proceed to jury selection, Vaughn again began vacillating and asked for a moment to confer with counsel. After a ten-minute discussion between the two, Vaughn changed his mind again and decided to proceed to trial represented by counsel.
That lasted until the jury was impaneled and opening statements were finished. When the court asked Vaughn’s attorney if he was ready to proceed, counsel responded:
We are not, Your Honor, there are matters that need to be addressed. ... After speaking with my client here, apparently he is entertaining notions of going pro se. So I know we have been back and forth with that before, but I think it is my duty to advise the Court.
Id. at 54-55. After the court and Vaughn discussed the matter, Vaughn again expressed a desire to proceed pro se. The court denied this request, stating:
The defendant’s request to proceed pro say [sic] is denied because the defendant has not made an unequivocal decision to proceed pro se and in fact, he changes his mind on a repetitive basis. The Court does not know what his motivations for doing that are, however, it is my personal feeling and belief, having done this for a number of years, involved in the criminal justice system that if I allowed him to proceed pro se today, tomorrow he will come in and tell me that he wants his lawyer back. Also, in his motion filed October 31, he did not make an unequivocal motion to proceed pro se, because in that motion, he indicated that he wanted somebody to help him with jury selection. Bring in the jury.
Id. at 66. When the judge returned to the courtroom following a lunch break on the second day of trial, he found in his chair a written motion to proceed pro se that, unbeknownst to defense counsel, had been placed there by Vaughn. The motion, which the trial court read into the record, detailed the grounds for Vaughn’s request, as follows:
Comes now the defendant, Kenneth Vaughn, and motions this Honorable Court of Lake County to allow him to proceed pro se. I know that I pulled out my last motion, but I didn’t know what I know now. Maurice Burge, a witness in this case, was going to testify on my behalf and says that my public defender, Noah Holcomb, approached him prior to the start of my jury selection and tried to persuade him to leave. Mr. Burge states that Mr. Holcomb called him “crazy” and tried to tell him not to testify on my behalf because of past events. Mr. Burge testified against me in 2006, he was the victim of the crime I was convicted on [sic]. He says Mr. Holcomb told him he shouldn’t testify for me because I tried to kill him. Mr. Holcomb also got into verbal disagreement with me because I asked him why he didn’t give an opening statement and he told me, “I’m not paying him, so I can’t tell him how to fight this case”. I really do mean this when I say I’m not comfortable with Mr. Holcomb being my attorney. Please grant me this Motion as a citizen of the United States. I have the right to cross examine any and every witness that the State may won’t [sic] to *491have present to testify against me and I elect to act on that right, because it’s not a privilege, it’s a right that I have. Sorry for the inconvenience, but I won’t [sic] to finish this trial on my on [sic].
Id. at 147-48. After the trial court denied Vaughn’s motion, defense counsel pointed out to the court that among the materials Vaughn brought to court, he had placed a white envelope marked, “Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission” that Vaughn “refused to let [counsel] pick up from the table.” Id. at 157. To counsel, the implication was obvious.
At this point it would be helpful to expand upon the source of Vaughn’s displeasure with his appointed counsel, at least the displeasure that was manifest approximately one week before trial and continued through trial. Vaughn alluded to the problem in his lunchtime motion to proceed pro se, i.e., potential witness Maurice Burge. Vaughn denied involvement in the robbery from which his charges stemmed. To bolster his denial, he proposed to call Burge, who Vaughn claimed would provide what amounted to alibi evidence. That is, Burge would testify that he had personally briefly spoken to Vaughn at 9 or 9:30 a.m.3 on the day of the robbery. The evidence revealed that the robbery occurred approximately 10 minutes later, from 9:39 to 9:43 a.m. The record does not reveal where Burge’s supposed encounter with Vaughn took place, but presumably it was in close enough proximity to the site of the robbery that it did not conclusively establish that Vaughn could not have been at the scene of the robbery some ten minutes later.
But that may not have been the only problem with Burge’s testimony, according to attorney Holcomb.4 As indicated in Vaughn’s lunchtime motion to proceed pro se, Vaughn first became acquainted with Burge when Burge was the victim of a previous crime of which Vaughn eventually was convicted. Defense counsel believed that Burge’s testimony would be more harmful than beneficial for Vaughn, perhaps because of the possibility that the prior conviction might come to the jury’s attention through Burge’s testimony. In any event, in defense counsel’s judgment, Burge’s testimony would serve no useful purpose, i.e., “[n]ow when I talked with Mr. Burge on Monday, Mr. Burge has indicated on, I think four other occasions [he] had nothing of any significance to add to this case that ... would have helped Mr. Vaughn in this case.” Id. at 395.
It is against this factual backdrop that we must consider the actions of which Vaughn now complains. In concluding that the trial court essentially over-reacted (i.e., “[t]hese restraints went far beyond what was necessary to maintain order,” op. at 488) the Majority states that the provocation “was only one incident by Vaughn.” Id. I believe this mischaracterizes what *492occurred. First, as set out in detail above, Vaughn had from the outset of trial, and indeed before, vacillated back and forth on the question of whether to proceed pro se. He had done so ostensibly because he stubbornly clung to the notion that (1) Burge would testify on his behalf and (2) such testimony would be relevant and helpful to his case. This was a running theme throughout the trial. Second, this “one incident” was in fact comprised of several successive, blatant refusals by Vaughn to adhere to the court’s commands to stop talking. Considering all that had gone on the previous three days, the court reasonably could have believed that further commands to stop talking would also go unheeded.
A trial court has the right, and indeed the duty, “to manage the proceedings and take responsible steps to ensure that proper discipline and order exist in the courtroom.” Mengon v. State, 505 N.E.2d 788, 792 (Ind.1987). To accomplish this, the court may go so far as to order that a defendant be shackled and gagged. See Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind, 2001). The Majority rejects Avant v. State, 528 N.E.2d 74 (Ind.1988) as guiding authority in this case, largely, it seems, because the Avant defendant’s trial misconduct was open and persistent — i.e., it was more egregious. I agree that the Avant defendant was more brazen than Vaughn about his intention to disrupt the proceedings and he did it more often. I am not ready, however, to say that the principles enunciated in Avant for dealing with non-cooperative or disruptive defendants are limited in application only to situations where, compared to the Avant defendant, a defendant displays equal or greater recalcitrance. Rather, I interpret it to mean that a trial court is permitted to go so far as tape the defendant’s mouth shut if the situation warrants it. I understand that the Supreme Court cautioned that the use of tape was an extreme measure that, though justified on the facts of Avant, would not be routinely acceptable. I believe Vaughn’s misconduct was not nearly as egregious as was the Avant defendant’s, but neither was the trial court’s remedial action in the instant case as severe. In fact, I believe the trial court’s response in the instant case was appropriate and therefore sanctioned by Avant.
Not only did Vaughn ignore repeated orders to stop talking,5 but it appears the trial court also was justifiably concerned that Vaughn was about to make statements that might cause a mistrial. To prevent that, and to maintain order, the court decided that Vaughn need to be silenced immediately — and reasonably so, in my view. Could the court have chosen a less “extreme” means of doing so? First and foremost, we cannot ignore the context in which this situation arose. The Majority describes it as “only one incident by *493Vaughn.” Op. at 488. I suppose this is true in a technical sense, but to view this incident in isolation is to ignore all that led up to it, as described in detail above. Isolated from its context in this fashion, our evaluation of the trial court’s decision is hamstrung by a lack of perspective. For instance, absent a consideration of that context, we cannot accurately determine the likelihood that Vaughn would have continued to disregard the trial court’s directives and would have said something that would result in a mistrial. Taking into consideration all that had occurred up to that point, it appears to me that Vaughn was determined to say what he was going to say,6 and he no longer recognized the trial court’s authority to limit his testimony. Thus, the trial court was left with only two choices: force Vaughn to stop talking or force the jury to stop listening. As to the latter, it is not clear to me how the trial court could accomplish it even if it were so inclined, at least not in a manner befitting the standards of decorum appropriate to the proceedings. This left only one option — to physically prevent Vaughn from speaking.
Ultimately, the Majority decides that clamping a hand over Vaughn’s mouth and restraining him “marked [him] ... as a dangerous person and suggested that his guilt was a foregone conclusion.” Op. at 489. It seems far more likely that the jury would conclude the restraints were placed there for a different reason — the actual reason, i.e., Vaughn refused to obey the court’s orders to stop talking. Surely restraints do not carry the stigma of guilt when the jury has seen first-hand that they were placed there as a result of the defendant’s courtroom behavior. This is especially so where the defendant was restrained only briefly and the jury was advised by the trial court that the restraints had been removed after “[t]he Court ... explained the expectations of what is has for the defendant[.]” Transcript at 346. I cannot see how the stigma of guilt would arise with respect to the underlying charge under these circumstances.
I find one other implication of the Majority’s ruling troubling. Certain of Vaughn’s actions both before and during trial led both the trial court7 and defense counsel8 to believe that he may have been attempting all along to cause a mistrial. Those opinions were not without basis in the record. One of our sister courts has observed that “[t]he administration of criminal justice is not to be delivered into the hands of those who gain only from its subversion.” State v. Guy, 82 N.M. 483, 483 P.2d 1323 (N.M.Ct.App.1971). To the *494extent there was any prejudice to Vaughn as a result of the actions undertaken to compel his silence, he brought it on himself, perhaps purposely. Whether purposeful or not, he should not be permitted to gain from his willful disregard of the trial court’s commands. I would affirm the trial court in all respects.

. Evidently, Burge originally told an investigator from the Public Defender's office that the two met at 9 a.m., but Burge told Vaughn's counsel that he (Burge) "had seen [Vaughn] about 9:30 [on the morning of the robbery] and then they parted.” Id. at 245.

. I note also that trial commenced on Monday, continued on Wednesday, and concluded on Thursday. Vaughn asked Burge to attend on Monday, and Burge obliged. By the end of the day, however, the trial had proceeded only to the point of opening statements. As set out previously, Vaughn had indicated that he wanted to call Burge as a witness. As this was the first time the State had heard of Burge, the State served him with subpoena on Monday to appear the following morning for deposition. Burge did not appear. Apparently, Vaughn thereafter spoke with Burge on Tuesday and then again on Wednesday, and asked him on both occasions to attend trial the following day. Vaughn claimed Burge indicated both times that he would attend the next day, but Burge failed to do so.

. As the Majority notes, the trial court indicated that the bailiff's actions were necessary because Vaughn answered a question in a manner that was "non responsive” [sic]”. Transcript at 346. The Majority quotes this language in stating its conclusion that the remedial measures ordered by the trial court were out of proportion to Vaughn's conduct, viz., clamping a hand over the defendant's mouth was too heavy-handed a remedy for merely providing a nonresponsive answer. It must be remembered, however, that the trial court’s description of the precipitating incident that is quoted by the Majority was part of the very brief remarks addressed to the jury by the trial court upon the jury’s return to the courtroom following the incident. No doubt, the trial court was understandably motivated to downplay the incident to minimize any prejudicial impact it might have on the jury. In any event, I believe that the description, "provided a nonresponsive answer” sanitizes the nature of Vaughn’s behavior in this instance, especially for purposes of considering the proportionality of the trial court’s response.

. Indeed, this was explicitly a basis for the trial court restraining Vaughn as it did. When explaining its denial of Vaughn’s motion for mistrial, the court stated,
I told him to be quiet or something to that effect and thereafter, I think I might have even told him to shut up. But at least on two occasions I believe that I had tried to stop the proceedings to bring them back into order. At the point that it became clear to me that the defendant was not going to stop talking, I called the court staff in.
Transcript at 388.

. After the jury was removed following the courtroom incident under discussion, the court stated to Vaughn: "I think you're trying to intentionally cause a mistrial, Mr. Vaughn. And you have been since the beginning. I have been patient with you, but I am not going to let you make a mockery out [of] this system, which is exactly what you’re trying to do.” Id. at 339.

.When discussing the motion to proceed pro se submitted during trial, defense counsel stated: ”1 still have my job to do and I have my professional reputation to uphold. So it will not bother me one way or the other. What I surmise here is Mr. Vaughn is doing his best to create reversible error here[.]” Id. at 159.