Court Opinion

ID: 9387997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 16:08:08.814939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.878823
License: Public Domain

J-S33019-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    DAVID OLSON                                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    LEHIGH UNIVERSITY                          :
                                               :
                       Appellee                :      No. 1118 EDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered March 30, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
                  Civil Division at No(s): C-48-CV-2018-07261

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                  FILED APRIL 19, 2023

       Appellant, David Olson, appeals from the order entered in the

Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary

judgment in favor of Appellee, Lehigh University, in this Pennsylvania

Whistleblower Law action.1 We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

December 27, 2018, Appellant filed a complaint alleging wrongful termination

by Appellee in violation of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law.       Appellant

alleged that Appellee hired him on August 16, 2017, as the Director of

Employer Relations. Appellant’s offer of employment contained a six-month

provisional period to demonstrate acceptable performance.         In December

____________________________________________

1Act of December 12, 1986, P.L. 1559, §§ 1–8, codified at 43 P.S. §§ 1421–
1428.
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2017, Appellant began compiling data on a tiering program for employers and

discovered that while his data reflected 8,000 jobs had been posted in the fall

of 2017, Appellee had represented that it posted more than 21,000 jobs in

that time, counting the same job postings multiple times.         Specifically,

Appellant alleged that Appellee was counting re-postings of the same jobs as

“new” postings and counting different departments within the same employer

as different employers to inflate Appellee’s on-campus interview figures.

Appellant reported these discrepancies to his supervisor, Lori Kennedy, in

December 2017.      Appellant alleged that Ms. Kennedy rejected the data

because it was in the wrong template.      Appellant further claimed that Ms.

Kennedy’s attitude toward him changed after he reported the discrepancies.

      On February 13, 2018, prior to the end of the provisional employment

period, Appellee terminated Appellant’s employment, citing Appellant’s

alleged failure to make behavioral changes, concerns over interactions with

the team, and a failure to adhere to office protocol, as its reasons for

Appellant’s termination.

      Appellant further alleged that the reasons Appellee stated as grounds

for Appellant’s termination were pretextual.      Appellant maintained that

Appellee terminated his employment because he reported a wrongdoing.

Specifically, Appellant averred that Appellee’s misreporting in the figures

relating to job postings and on-campus interviews violated the Pennsylvania

Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”). Appellant

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alleged that Ms. Kennedy’s actions in failing to rectify the reported figures,

and in firing Appellant for having reported the error constitute a violation of

the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law.

      On January 11, 2021, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment.

Specifically, Appellee claimed that Appellant did not make a good faith report

of wrongdoing or waste, and that Appellant failed to establish a causal

connection between his report of wrongdoing and his termination. The court

heard argument on the motion for summary judgment on March 15, 2022.

On March 30, 2022, the court granted Appellee’s motion for summary

judgment and dismissed Appellant’s complaint with prejudice. Appellant filed

a timely notice of appeal on April 20, 2022. On April 22, 2022, the court

ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied on May 11, 2022.

      Appellant raises the following questions on appeal:

         1. The [trial] court applied the wrong causation analysis and
         standard to Appellant’s prima facie case.

            A. Did the [trial] court fail to apply the correct
            standard of proof and burden of proof for a case
            centered on the Pennsylvania Whistleblower law?

            B. Did the [trial] court fail to correctly apply the proper
            causation framework to Appellant’s prima facie case
            analysis?

            C. Did the [trial] court fail to properly apply the
            McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792[,
            93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668] (1973) causation
            standard to Appellant’s prima facie case regarding the

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              causation element?

              D. Did the [trial] court fail to consider Appellant[’]s
              circumstantial evidence of pretext as a whole and in
              context related to the prima facie causation analysis
              and burden of Appellant related to same?

         2. The [trial] court improperly applied the summary
         judgment standard in view of the record in this case.

              A. Did the [trial] court err when it weighed the
              evidence and/or made credibility determinations,
              resolving disputes in favor of [Appellee] and/or not
              weighing the evidence and all inferences therefrom in
              the manner most favorable to Appellant, at the
              summary judgment phase?

         3. …Appellant sufficiently established the other non-
         causation elements of his case for purposes of overcoming
         summary judgment.

              A. Did Appellant[] establish all the other (non-
              causation) elements of his Whistleblower case,
              sufficiently to overcome a summary judgment
              motion?

              B. With regard to the Whistleblower Law, does the
              Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer
              Protection law constitute a Pennsylvania statute and
              state the policy of Pennsylvania?

(Appellant’s Brief at 7-10) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Our Supreme Court has clarified our role on appellate review in this case

as follows:

         On appellate review, an appellate court may reverse a grant
         of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or
         an abuse of discretion. But the issue as to whether there
         are no genuine issues as to any material fact presents a
         question of law, and therefore, on that question our
         standard of review is de novo. This means we need not
         defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunals. To

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        the extent that this Court must resolve a question of law,
        we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the
        context of the entire record.

Valley National Bank v. Marchiano, 221 A.3d 1220, 1222 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294, 307, 997 A.2d 1152,

1159 (2010)). Our scope of review is plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa.

407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct.

2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002).

     In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment,

        [W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing
        all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists
        a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the
        light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts
        as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must
        be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is
        no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that
        the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
        law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the
        existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be
        resolved against the moving party.

        Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly
        implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of
        action.    Summary judgment is proper if, after the
        completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including
        the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will
        bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce
        evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense
        which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted
        to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine
        issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the
        cause of action or defense, which could be established by
        additional discovery or expert report and the moving party
        is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary
        judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports
        summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are
        undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to

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         make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.

         Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s
         conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.

Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in its analysis

regarding whether Appellant presented a prima facie case of a violation of the

Whistleblower Law.     Appellant asserts the court should have applied the

pretext standard set forth in McDonnell-Douglas for determining causation.

Appellant insists that under this standard, his burden was only to show

evidence that the protected reporting was the likely reason for his termination.

Appellant claims the trial court ignored the broad circumstantial evidence of

pretext, and instead focused on its interpretation of the statements from his

supervisor. Appellant concludes summary judgment was inappropriate, and

this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

      “The Whistleblower Law provides protection for employees of a public

employer who report a violation or suspected violation of state law.” Greco

v. Myers Coach Lines, Inc., 199 A.3d 426, 430-31 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal

denied, 652 Pa. 309, 208 A.3d 462 (2019) (quoting Bailets v. Pennsylvania

Tpk. Comm’n, 633 Pa. 1, 13, 123 A.3d 300, 307 (2015)). Specifically, the

law provides:

         No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise
         discriminate or retaliate against an employee regarding the
         employee’s…privileges of employment because the

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        employee…makes a good faith report or is about to report,
        verbally or in writing, to the employer or appropriate
        authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste by a public
        body or an instance of waste by any other employer as
        defined in this act.

43 P.S. § 1423(a).

     To prove a violation of the Whistleblower Law, an employee “must show

by a preponderance of the evidence that, prior to the alleged reprisal, the

employee…had reported or was about to report in good faith, verbally or in

writing, an instance of wrongdoing or waste to the employer or an appropriate

authority.” 43 P.S. § 1424(b). “[A]n employer may defend a whistleblower

claim if it ‘proves by a preponderance of the evidence’ that it fired the

employee for ‘separate and legitimate reasons, which are not merely

pretextual.’” Greco, supra at 431 (quoting 43 P.S. § 1424(c)).

     Instantly, the trial court explained that the McDonnell-Douglas

burden-shifting test is not applicable in the context of a Whistleblower Law

complaint. (See Trial Court Opinion, 5/17/22, at 2). The court noted that the

McDonnell-Douglas test applies in cases of employment discrimination

based on race, sex, or disability, and no such claim was made in this case.

The court stated that in ruling upon the motion for summary judgment it

applied the test set forth in Golaschevsky v. Commonwealth, Department

of Environmental Protection, 554 Pa. 157, 720 A.2d 757 (1998), and

Evans v. Thomas Jefferson University, 81 A.3d 1062 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2013),

which the court explained are applicable in the context of Whistleblower Law

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claims.2

       In Golaschevsky, supra, our Supreme Court considered whether an

employee demonstrated a causal connection sufficient to establish a prima

facie case of retaliatory discharge under the Whistleblower Law. There, the

Court explained:

           [T]o make out a prima facie case of retaliatory termination
           pursuant to the Whistleblower Law, a plaintiff must “show
           by concrete facts or surrounding circumstances that the
           report [of wrongdoing or waste] led to [the plaintiff’s]
           dismissal, such as that there was specific direction or
           information received not to file the report or [that] there
           would be adverse consequences because the report was
           filed.” [Gray v. Hafer, 651 A.2d 221, 225 (Pa.Cmwlth.
           1994), affirmed per curiam, 542 Pa. 607, 669 A.2d 335
           (1995)].

Golaschevsky, supra at 163, 720 A.2d at 759. Applying that standard, the

Court found that the appellant did not present sufficient evidence to establish

a causal connection because he did not “allege that his supervisors threatened

to fire him or to impose any other adverse consequences because of his report,

nor does he establish any other ‘concrete facts’ to connect the report with the

dismissal.” Id. The Court rejected the appellant’s reliance “solely on vague

and inconclusive circumstantial evidence” holding that without concrete

evidence showing a causal connection between his report and his subsequent

termination, he cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge

____________________________________________

2We may look to the Commonwealth Court’s decisions for guidance, albeit not
as binding precedent. Greco, supra at 432 (citing Ford v. Ford, 878 A.2d
894, 900 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

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pursuant to the Whistleblower Law. Id. at 162-63, 720 A.2d at 759. See

also Evans, supra (applying Golaschevsky and requiring that causal

connection must be demonstrated by concrete facts that report of wrongdoing

led to dismissal).

      More recently, in Bailets, supra, our Supreme Court explained that to

obtain relief on a Whistleblower Law claim, an individual must establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that he made a report of wrongdoing to the

employer, and that he was fired due to these reports. Bailets, supra at 14,

123 A.3d at 308. Relying on Golaschevsky, supra and Gray, supra, our

Supreme Court reiterated that the individual presenting such claim:

         has to show by concrete facts or surrounding circumstances
         that the report [of wrongdoing or waste] led to his dismissal,
         such as that there was specific direction or information he
         received not to file the report or there would be adverse
         consequences because the report was filed.

Bailets, supra at 14, 123 A.3d at 308 (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

      Here, we see no error in the court’s application of the “concrete facts”

standard in evaluating the instant Whistleblower Law violation claim. See id.;

Golaschevsky, supra; Evans, supra. Although Appellant disagrees with the

trial court’s application of the “concrete facts” standard, he has failed to cite

any cases that apply the McDonnell-Douglas standard in evaluating

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violations of the Whistleblower Law.3              Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue

merits no relief.

       For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s remaining issues.

Appellant argues that he sufficiently established the causation element of his

claim.    Appellant insists he presented adequate evidence that Appellee’s

stated reasons for his termination were pretextual, and its actual motivation

for terminating Appellant’s employment was in retaliation for Appellant

reporting Appellee’s wrongdoing.               Appellant contends that Appellee’s

misreported data constituted a violation of the UTPCPL, which prohibits unfair

methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Appellant

concludes the court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee,

and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

       “To prove a cause of action for wrongful discharge under the

Whistleblower Law, the plaintiff must show both a protected report of

wrongdoing or waste and a causal connection between that report and the

discharge.” Evans, supra at 1064. A “wrongdoing” is defined as:

          A violation which is not of a merely technical or minimal
          nature of a Federal or State statute or regulation, of a
          political subdivision ordinance or regulation or of a code of
          conduct or ethics designed to protect the interest of the
          public or the employer.

____________________________________________

3  Appellant alleges that Golaschevsky, supra, and Gray, supra,
incorporated the McDonnell-Douglas standard; however, in neither case
does our Supreme Court discuss McDonnell-Douglas.

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43 P.S. § 1422.

      To prove a violation of the Whistleblower Law, an individual “must

demonstrate [he] made a report of some action by [his] employer or its agent,

which, if proven, would constitute a violation of a law or regulation. Moreover,

the report must be of an actual violation, not a potential or contemplated

violation.” Greco, supra at 434.

      Furthermore,

         The causal connection that the Whistleblower Law requires
         must be demonstrated by concrete facts or surrounding
         circumstances that the report of wrongdoing or waste led to
         the plaintiff’s dismissal, such as that there was specific
         direction or information received not to file the report or that
         there would be adverse consequences because the report
         was filed. … The burden shifts to the defendant to show a
         separate and legitimate reason for its actions only where
         plaintiff has satisfied the threshold showing of a causal
         connection.      [V]ague and inconclusive circumstantial
         evidence is insufficient to satisfy that threshold burden to
         show a causal connection and shift the burden to the
         defendant to justify its actions.

Evans, supra at 1070 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      In Golaschevsky, supra, the appellant claimed that he reported

copyright violations to his supervisor, which “touched off a series of retaliatory

actions, including negative performance evaluations, lack of cooperation from

fellow employees and supervisors, withholding of information regarding

computer    software,   and,   ultimately,    termination   of   [the   a]ppellant’s

employment.”      Golaschevsky, supra at 163, 720 A.2d at 759-60.

Nevertheless, the Court noted that this evidence was simply the appellant’s

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perception of how others treated him after the report. The Court explained

the appellant had failed to allege that “his supervisors threatened to fire him

or to impose any other adverse consequences because of his report, nor does

he establish any other ‘concrete facts’ to connect the report with the

dismissal.” Id. at 163, 720 A.2d at 759. In the absence of “concrete evidence

tending to show a causal connection between his report of alleged copyright

violations and his subsequent termination,” the Court decided the appellant

could not establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge pursuant to the

Whistleblower Law and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the appellee.

Id. at 164, 720 A.2d at 760.

      In Evans, supra, the Commonwealth Court considered whether the

appellant had shown a causal connection between her report of her supervisor

violating a policy on administrating methadone to patients and the appellant’s

discharge less than a year later, for alleged “rude, intimidating, discourteous

and unprofessional behavior.” Evans, supra at 1067. There, the appellant

argued that she could show a causal connection between the report and her

discharge despite a lack of direct evidence based on the fact that the warnings

for her conduct toward patients and coworkers occurred after the report,

where she received a rating of “outstanding” in her review prior to the report

but a lower rating of “effective” in her review a few months after the report,

and based on the appellant’s complaints that her supervisor treated her

differently and in a hostile manner after the report. Id. at 1070. The Evans

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Court noted that “[i]n a Whistleblower Law action, the mere fact that the

discharge occurred a few months after a report of wrongdoing and that the

first formal negative actions by the employer occurred after the report are not

enough to show a causal connection.” Id. at 1070–71 (citing Golaschevsky,

supra at 163-64, 720 A.2d at 759-60). Ultimately, the Court decided that

the appellant had not established a causal connection between the report and

her discharge, and therefore the burden did not shift to the appellee to justify

its actions. Thus, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the summary judgment

entered in favor of the appellee.

      Here, the trial court found that Appellant established the first element

of his prima facie case, proving that he made a good faith report of wrongdoing

or waste.   The court concluded that Appellant’s report that Appellee “was

improperly calculating and thereby inflating to a marked degree the number

of job postings and OCI opportunities ostensibly made available to Lehigh

students through its Office of Career & Professional Development…amounted

to ‘wrongdoing’ within the meaning of the Whistleblower Law insofar as it

violates the [UTPCPL].” (Trial Court Opinion, 3/30/22, at 5) (record citation

omitted).

      The court then considered whether Appellant brought forth sufficient

evidence to support the second element—concrete evidence of a causal

connection between the report of wrongdoing and the adverse employment

action. The court found that Appellant did not meet his burden, and explained

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its determination as follows:

         Having considered the record offered by [Appellant], we find
         that [Appellant] has failed to bring forth sufficient evidence
         to support this second element. Rather, the record on this
         issue consists merely of vague circumstantial evidence, e.g.
         [Appellant’s] subjective contention that his supervisor, Ms.
         Kennedy, “did not like the fact that the data was revealing
         inaccurate reporting, and the relationship changed after
         that,” and that “all of a sudden things got cold with [his]
         supervisor[.]” (Deposition of [Appellant], 5/25/21, 106,
         229).     As uncomfortable as a perceived shift in the
         relationship between [Appellant] and Ms. Kennedy may
         have been for [Appellant], same does not amount to
         evidence of a causal connection between [Appellant’s]
         report and his eventual dismissal.          Furthermore, Ms.
         Kennedy’s alleged statement that [Appellee] “cannot use
         your numbers[…]that are half what they were last year” in
         no way amounts to a specific direction to [Appellant] not to
         report his data or that there would be adverse consequences
         for [Appellant] because he made such a report. Id. at 73.
         In fact, same does not even amount to an acknowledgement
         that [Appellant’s] understanding of the data was accurate
         or that the University had been utilizing inaccurate data. As
         [Appellant] testified at his deposition, “I recall Lori
         [Kennedy] wanting me to talk to Marcia and Rich[,] to try to
         understand how they reported OCI the prior year. Because
         the numbers, as I had stated earlier, were about half what
         they were published the prior year. So Lori asked me to talk
         to Marcia and Rich. […] So they would do it in some other
         way. I don’t know exactly how they did it, except that they
         did include different divisions.” Id. at 123, 125. None of
         the testimony offered by [Appellant] nor any of the other
         testimony or exhibits offered in opposition to the motion
         amounted to prima facie evidence of a causal connection
         between his reports to his supervisor and his eventual
         termination. The fact that [Appellant’s] termination came
         roughly two months after he made a report to his supervisor
         does not mean that there is a causal connection between
         the two. As the adage provides, correlation does not equal
         causation.

(Trial Court Opinion, 3/30/22, at 6-7). The trial court found that Appellant

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failed to satisfy the threshold showing of a causal connection, and therefore

did not meet his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case.

      Our review of the record supports the court’s analysis. Similar to the

facts in Golaschevsky, supra, Appellant’s allegations amount simply to a

change in his perception of how others treated him after he made the report.

He offers no concrete evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that would

show that his report led to his dismissal. As such, we agree with the trial

court that because Appellant did not satisfy that threshold burden to show a

causal connection, the burden did not shift to Appellee to justify its actions.

See Golaschevsky, supra.        Therefore, the trial court applied the correct

standard in evaluating the motion for summary judgment concerning

Appellant’s Whistleblower Law claim, and correctly concluded that Appellant

could not prove the essential elements of the Whistleblower Law claim.

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order granting summary judgment.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/19/2023

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