Court Opinion

ID: 9774558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:24:22.308188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:10.284840
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
ONION, Judge.
I concur in the results reached by the majority, but not on the basis of Vallejo v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 408 S.W.2d 113, which was followed in Cisco v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 411 S.W.2d 547. I strongly feel that serious reconsideration of these holdings should be undertaken before they are held applicable to bond forfeiture cases, particularly where there exists another ground on which this appeal might properly be disposed of.
In Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, the Texas Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Calvert, said:
“We note again the specific language of Craddock that a new trial should be granted to a defaulting defendant if his motion “sets up a meritorious defense.” This does not mean that the motion should be granted if it merely alleges that the defendant “has a meritorious defense.” The motion must allege facts which in law would constitute a defense to the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff, and must be supported by affidavits or other evidence proving prima facie that the defendant has such meritorious defense. City of Fort Worth v. Gause, 129 Tex. 25, 28, 101 S.W.2d 221, 222 (1937); Holliday v. Holliday, 72 Tex. 581, 10 S.W. 690 (1889); Dowell v. Winters, 20 Tex. 793, 794 (1858); Foster *408v. Martin, 20 Tex. 118, 119 (1857). This much is necessary to prevent the reopening of cases to try out fictitious or un-meritorious defenses. But once these requirements are met, it is improper to try the defensive issues made by the motion or the pleadings. In Cragin v. Henderson County Oil Dev. Co., 280 S.W. 554, 555 (Tex.Com.App.1926, holding approved), the court, after stating the requirements of a motion for a new trial in default judgment cases, said:
‘But when he (the applicant) has thus set forth such meritorious defense, supported by such affidavits or other evidence as prima facie to entitle him to a new trial, such new trial should not be denied upon any consideration of counter affidavits or contradictory testimony offered in resistance to such motion.’
See also Maeding v. Maeding, 155 S.W.2d 991, 993 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1941, no writ).”
Testing the case at bar by the foregoing rules, we observed that appellant did not introduce or bring forward in the record the affidavits upon which the informations were based which appellants claim are defective under Barnes v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 390 S.W.2d 266, 855 S.Ct. 942 and Mayberry v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 537, 330 S.W.2d 203. As far as the record before this Court is concerned, the affidavits in question may very well comply with Barnes and Mayberry.
Even if we assume the motion for a new trial alleges facts which in law would constitute a defense to a cause of action asserted by the appellee, it is not supported by affidavits or other evidence proving prima facie that the appellants have such meritorious defense.
The trial court did not err in overruling the motion.