Court Opinion

ID: 9367719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 19:00:41.410133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:02.906242
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-40760         Document: 00516630938             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/01/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                 February 1, 2023
                                        No. 20-40760                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Joseph Church,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 3:17-CR-25

   Before Higginson, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Joseph Church pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit
   sex trafficking and three counts of sex trafficking of minors. On appeal,
   Church contends that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to
   permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm as harmless any district
   court error denying Church’s motion to withdraw his plea, but we remand so
   that the district court can correct errors in the judgment.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 20-40760      Document: 00516630938           Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                     No. 20-40760

                                          I.
          Church and several others were indicted for various sex trafficking
   offenses.   Count one charged Church with conspiracy to commit sex
   trafficking of persons “knowing[ly] and in reckless disregard for the fact that
   means of force, fraud, and coercion would be used to cause these persons to
   engage in commercial sex acts and that the persons, whom defendants had a
   reasonable opportunity to observe, had not attained the age of 18 years.” See
   18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(c), 1591(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (c). Counts two,
   three, and four charged Church with sex trafficking of minors, and aiding and
   abetting, “knowing[ly] and in reckless disregard of the fact that (1) means of
   force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion . . . would be used to cause [the
   minor] to engage in a commercial sex act, and that (2) [the minor], whom
   defendants had a reasonable opportunity to observe, had not attained the age
   of 18 years.” See id. § 1591(a), (b), and (c).
          In February 2019, after deciding to change his plea to guilty, Church
   appeared with counsel for rearraignment. At the rearraignment, the court
   instructed the government to explain the charges to which Church was
   pleading guilty, the potential consequences of those charges, and the facts
   that the government expected to prove at trial. In doing so, the government
   stressed that Church was not pleading guilty to the use of force, fraud, or
   coercion:
          I just want to be very clear on the record, Your Honor, that the
          provisions in Counts Two, Three and Four that the defendant
          is pleading to is the subsection that contemplates that the
          individuals were under the age of 18 and not via force, fraud or
          coercion, because that has an impact on the sentencing
          guidelines. And I want to be very clear even as to Count One,
          that it’s a conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of minors, not
          by force, fraud or coercion.

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                                    No. 20-40760

   The government attempted to make clear that Church was pleading guilty
   under § 1591(b)(2) (10-year mandatory minimum for sex trafficking of
   minors), not under § 1591(b)(1) (15-year mandatory minimum for sex
   trafficking by means of force, fraud, or coercion).
          The district court accepted Church’s guilty plea. During the plea
   colloquy, the court confirmed that Church understood the terms of the plea
   agreement and the possible consequences of his guilty plea. Church also
   agreed to the facts that the government would prove against him at trial.
          In May 2019, the presentence investigation report (PSR) was
   disclosed to the parties. In the PSR, the probation officer calculated a base
   offense level of 34, on the erroneous view that Church intended to plead
   guilty under § 1591(b)(1). See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(1) (setting a base offense
   level of 34 for defendants convicted under § 1591(b)(1)). The probation
   officer then determined that the total offense level exceeded 43. Under the
   Sentencing Guidelines, offense levels above 43 are treated as level 43 and
   thus carry an advisory range of life imprisonment. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, cmt.
   n.2.
          In October 2019, Church filed objections to the PSR. Among other
   things, Church argued that the base offense level should have been 30, not
   34, because he pleaded guilty under § 1591(b)(2), not § 1591(b)(1). The
   probation officer declined to revise the base level calculation.
          In December 2019, Church appeared for sentencing. Before the
   district court could rule on Church’s objections to the PSR, Church advised
   the court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. The court postponed
   sentencing so that the parties could prepare briefs on the motion to withdraw.
          In his brief, Church argued, among other things, that “he is innocent
   of any sexual malfeasance toward the minors subject to the allegations” and
   that he did not use any force, fraud, or coercion. Church also claimed that

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   his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he believed that he was
   pleading guilty under § 1591(b)(2), not § 1591(b)(1). In its response brief, the
   government agreed with Church that the probation officer erred by using §
   1591(b)(1) to calculate the base offense level. But the government also noted
   that a base level of 30 still yields a total offense level of 43 in this case. So the
   advisory range under the Guidelines would be life imprisonment regardless
   of which base level is used.
          After a hearing, the district court denied Church’s motion to
   withdraw his guilty plea. Several months later, at the sentencing hearing, the
   court also overruled Church’s objection to the PSR’s base offense level. The
   court then accepted the PSR’s total offense level of 43. But the court did not
   impose the advisory life sentence—it departed downward and sentenced
   Church to 400 months.
          The written judgment that followed similarly describes Church’s
   conviction on count one as “[c]onspiracy to commit sex trafficking of minors
   by force, fraud, or coercion.” In other words, the judgment wrongly reflects
   that Church pleaded guilty under § 1591(b)(1).
                                            II.
                                            A.
          Church’s plea agreement includes an appeal waiver that reserves only
   the right to assert claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.                The
   government argues that the waiver bars this appeal.
          We disagree. Appeal waivers “cannot be enforced to bar a claim that
   the . . . plea agreement . . . was unknowing or involuntary.” United States v.
   Carreon-Ibarra, 673 F.3d 358, 362 n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).
   And that’s precisely what Church argues on appeal—that his guilty plea was

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   unknowing and involuntary because he did not understand the nature of the
   charges to which he was pleading guilty.
          Accordingly, the waiver does not bar this appeal. We therefore turn
   to the merits.
                                         B.
          “A district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
   reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Lord, 915 F.3d 1009, 1013
   (5th Cir. 2019). The burden is on the defendant to establish a “fair and just
   reason” for withdrawing the plea. Id. at 1014 (quotations omitted). Seven
   factors guide the analysis: (1) whether the defendant asserted his innocence;
   (2) whether withdrawal would prejudice the government; (3) whether the
   defendant delayed in filing the motion to withdraw; (4) whether withdrawal
   would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether the defendant had
   the benefit of close assistance of counsel; (6) whether the guilty plea was
   knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether withdrawal would waste judicial
   resources. Id. (citing United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343–44 (5th Cir.
   1984)). The district court should consider the totality of the circumstances,
   but it need not “make explicit findings as to each” factor. Id.
          Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
   Church’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.           Church unequivocally
   acknowledged as true the facts that the government would prove against him
   at trial; he was represented by counsel throughout the process; and he did
   not seek to withdraw his guilty plea until ten months after the rearraignment
   and seven months after the PSR was prepared. We have found that much
   shorter delays weigh against the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas,
   13 F.3d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1994) (six-week delay); United States v. Harrison,
   777 F.3d 227, 237 (5th Cir. 2015) (five-week delay); Carr, 740 F.2d at 345
   (three-week delay).

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            The record also reflects that Church entered a knowing and voluntary
   guilty plea under §§ 1591(a), (b)(2), and 1594(c) based on the age of the
   victims. To be sure, the PSR and the judgment describe that Church pleaded
   guilty to the use of force, fraud, or coercion, leading the district court to use
   § 1591(b)(1) to calculate the base offense level. The government concedes
   that this was an error.
            But as the government stresses, Church would have faced a total
   offense level of 43 even if the PSR used the correct base level. Church does
   not claim otherwise. Nor does he claim that the error in the PSR tainted his
   ultimate sentence. After all, the district court departed downward from the
   Guidelines—which called for a life sentence—by sentencing Church to 400
   months. Simply put, Church’s sentence does not reflect that he is being held
   responsible for a crime to which he did not plead guilty.
            We thus conclude that any error as to the knowing and voluntary
   nature of Church’s plea as to count one was harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
   11(h).
            We do note, however, that there are errors in the written judgment
   that require correction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106; United States v. Gomez Gomez,
   23 F.4th 575, 577–78 (5th Cir. 2022) (remanding under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to
   correct a judgment that should have been entered under one subsection
   rather than another). The written judgment for count one cites § 1591(b)(1)
   and describes the offense of conviction as “[c]onspiracy to commit sex
   trafficking of minors by force, fraud, or coercion.” The district court should
   correct these two errors on remand. See United States v. Ballardo-Ramos, No.
   21-40306, 2022 WL 358312, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 7, 2022) (remanding for
   correction under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 because “[t]he judgment lists his
   conviction as falling under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), [but t]he judgment should
   . . . list 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) . . . as the offense of conviction”).

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                                  No. 20-40760

                                     ***
         We affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the
   guilty plea. We remand for the district court to correct the errors in the
   written judgment.

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