Court Opinion

ID: 9865070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:22:31.650863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:04.022713
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Bouck,
specially concurring.
In the reversal of this case I concur on the ground that it was reversible error to exclude evidence offered on behalf of the defendant which tended to show his insanity or mental derangement at the time of the homicide, as bearing upon the issue of criminal intent. However, I do not agree [with the opinion of Mr. Justice Butler in its entirety. As is there rightly stated, the present review does not involve the constitutionality of that part of our insanity plea act (S. L. ’27, c. 90, p. 296) which apparently confers upon the district court a discretionary power to try the insanity defense separately from the main case (Id. p. 297, §3), nor the constitutionality of that part which prescribes confinement in the state hospital for a defendant acquitted because of insanity existing when the alleged crime was committed (Id., p. 297, §4). Under the record in this case I regard practically no part of the *531aforesaid act as now involved, for the reason that the plea here was “not guilty,” and thereunder the provisions concerning insanity pleas do not apply.
Our act undoubtedly presents several points of real difficulty. These are likely .to arise some time in our criminal trials but have not yet done so. No statute.in any other state is exactly like ours; indeed, most of these statutes bear but a slight resemblance to our own. As a necessary result, the reasoning employed by courts of our sister states on the subject of the particular legislation before them, with varying facts and different constitutional rights, is, I fear, almost wholly fallacious if applied as a theoretical matter to our local criminal procedure, which after all must be judged in the light of the Colorado Constitution and the deliberate interpretation thereof in a proper case. This court has hitherto restricted its decisions in a remarkable degree to actual controversies, not imaginary ones; to concrete cases rather than abstract problems. I have full confidence that it will continue to do so.
What, then, is here decided? First, I take it, the court has decided that insanity, in order to obtain consideration as a defense, must be specially pleaded according to section 1 of our act. Early notice of that defense is conducive to efficiency and fairness. In addition, there is the practical and wholesome suggestion of the court that, if the defendant changes his plea so as to include the insanity defense, the trial court should exercise its discretion by submitting such issue along with the main case to a single jury. Another helpful suggestion, coupled with the first, properly points the way to a similarly safe choice of procedure.
In my opinion it is not necessary or desirable for us to decide, on the present record, whether section 2 of the act violates the constitutional guaranty that no criminal defendant shall be compelled to testify against himself. Colo. Const., art. II, §18. This question may well become important if a defendant should plead insanity at *532the time of the alleged commission of the crime. Should this question arise on the next trial, it will doubtless be properly presented and disposed of after a more thorough consideration than amid the present exacting work of the court could be given a situation that does not now exist.