Court Opinion

ID: 9753179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:02:43.39009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:31.829751
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
by Mr. Justice Roberts :
A criminal defendant’s right “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor” is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S. Ct. 1920 (1967). This right was denied appellant when the trial court refused to permit his counsel to call Earl Williams as a witness, and I therefore dissent.
It is firmly established that the prosecutor in a criminal case may not call a witness who he has reason to believe will refuse to testify on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Fletcher v. United States, 332 F. 2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Tucker, 267 F. 2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; United States v. Maloney, 262 F. 2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959); *233People v. Pollock, 21 N.Y. 2d 206, 234 N.E. 2d 223 (1967); State v. Fournier, 91 N.J. Super. 477, 221 A. 2d 225 (1966); cf. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S. Ct. 1151 (1963). From this line of decisions the majority reasons as follows: If the prosecution cannot call a witness likely to claim his privilege against self-incrimination, the defense should likewise be barred from calling a witness likely to invoke the Fifth Amendment.
This argument achieves an empty symmetry without significance. As ably put by Chief Judge Bazelon in Bowles v. United States, 439 F. 2d 536, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion): “The differing situations of the defense and prosecution, which we have recognized in other contexts . . ., is central to an understanding of the appellant’s contention. Cf. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960). The position of a defendant asserting his Sixth Amendment right to bring witnesses before the jury is not analogous to that of a prosecutor attempting to insinuate that a defendant is guilty because his confederates refuse to answer incriminating questions. . . . This tactic on the prosecutor’s part is equivalent to an outright denial of the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and it is unconstitutional to employ a defendant’s silence as an element of the proof needed to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 88 S. Ct. 1229, 20 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1968); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965). By contrast, when the accused suggests that another person is the culpable party, the other’s refusal to testify is merely being used as corroboration.” Id. at 545 n. 11 (citations omitted).
Putting aside the hobgoblin of symmetry and analyzing the instant case in terms of the Sixth rather than the Fifth Amendment, I believe that appellant’s right *234to compulsory process has been violated. In so concluding, I am much persuaded by the analogous case of United States v. Seeger, 180 F. Supp. 467 (S.D. N.Y. 1960). The defendant in that case had been charged with wilfull refusal to answer pertinent questions put to him in the course of a Congressional investigation. His counsel submitted an affidavit setting forth his intention to question the Congressional Committee Chairman concerning the subject matter of the investigation, the pertinency of the questions asked of defendant, the authority of the Committee to conduct the investigation, and the legislative purpose of the hearing. An appropriate subpoena was served upon the Chairman, and the Government moved to quash the subpoena.
In refusing the Government’s motion, Judge Weestfeld reasoned as follows: “Under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution a defendant accused of crime is guaranteed the right to compel the attendance of witnesses. Who these witnesses shall be is a matter for the defendant and his counsel to decide. It does not rest with the prosecution or the person under subpoena. The defendant may not be deprived of the right to summon to his aid witnesses who it is believed may offer proof to negate the Government’s evidence or to support the defense. . . .
“The materiality of a witness’ proffered testimony must rest with the trial judge after the witness has been sworn. If questions are objected to, a ruling as to relevancy or materiality can be made within the framework of the charges contained in the indictment and against the background of the evidence in the case. To issue such a ruling in advance of trial and to hold that the witness’ testimony is not material and hence the subpoena should be vacated, would deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment. . . .” Id. at 468 (emphasis added). Just as the possible immateriality *235of a witness’ testimony should not he anticipated in advance of trial, I do not believe that a court should attempt to anticipate that a witness will in fact refuse to answer all questions put to him on the ground of self-incrimination.
Finally, I am not persuaded that permitting appellant to call Earl Williams as a witness would have put the Commonwealth at any disadvantage. As noted by Chief Judge Bazelon in Bowles v. United States, supra: “There is some danger that a defendant might misuse the inference from another’s failure to testify. This potential abuse is mitigated, however, by jurors’ natural skepticism of any "'buck passing',’ and by the prosecutor’s right to demonstrate to the jury that the person accused by the defendant is someone on whom he has prevailed (through friendship, or by threats of injury) to come to court and then refuse to testify.” 439 F. 2d at 545 n. 13.
Mr. Justice O’Brien joins in this dissent.