Court Opinion

ID: 9410253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 16:09:49.737198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:56.341435
License: Public Domain

J-A15037-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    JOHN R. RODGERS                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MICHELE M. JEWETT                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1428 WDA 2021

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 22, 2021
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County
                       Civil Division at No(s): 2021-2543

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                   FILED: July 20, 2023

        I respectfully dissent. Upon review, I would conclude that the trial court

misapplied the law in granting John R. Rodgers (“Rodgers”) a final order

pursuant to the Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) Act,1 because, even deferring

to the trial court’s credibility determinations,2 Rodgers failed to prove he had

an objectively reasonable fear of bodily injury based on the course of conduct

of Michele M. Jewett (“Jewett”).

        This Court has explained that “[t]he purpose of the [PFA Act] is to

protect the victims of domestic violence from the perpetrators of such

____________________________________________

1   See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122.

2Our standard of review for an order granting PFA relief is abuse of discretion,
and we must view the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. Kaur v. Singh, 259 A.3d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 2021). On
appeal, this Court defers to the trial court’s credibility determinations. Id.
J-A15037-22

abuse.” Fonner v. Fonner, 731 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa. Super. 1999) (internal

citations omitted) (emphasis added).3 The PFA Act “is concerned with persons

who have or have had domestic, familial and/or romantic relationships. It is a

domestic relations statute, not a statute governing persons without any such

relations.” Scott v. Shay, 928 A.2d 312, 314 (Pa. Super. 2007); accord 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a) (providing that abuse must occur “between family or

household members, sexual or intimate partners or persons who share

biological parenthood”).

       A     PFA   petitioner   must    establish   that   “abuse”   occurred   by   a

preponderance of the evidence. See E.K., 237 A.3d at 519.               The PFA Act

(“the Act”) defines “abuse,” in relevant part, as:

       (5)     Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly
               committing acts toward another person, including following
               the person, without proper authority, under circumstances
               which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily
               injury. . . ..

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(5) (emphases added). Bodily injury is defined as

“impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.4

Further, a petitioner’s fear must be objectively reasonable.              See, e.g.,

____________________________________________

3Conversely, criminal culpability is not at issue in PFA proceedings. See E.K.
v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 519 (Pa. Super. 2020); accord E.A.M. v. A.M.D.
III, 173 A.3d 313, 319 (Pa. Super. 2017).

4 See also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(b) (stating that “[t]erms not otherwise
defined in this chapter shall have the meaning given to them in 18 Pa.C.S.[A.]
(relating to crimes and offenses)”).

                                           -2-
J-A15037-22

K.N.B. v. M.D., 259 A.3d 341, 351 (Pa. 2021) (observing that the General

Assembly conveyed in the PFA Act that “a plaintiff’s fear of harm must be

objectively reasonable to support the issuance of a protective order”).

      The relevant factual and procedural history of this case as follows:

Rodgers began an extra-marital affair with Jewett in May 2020, which ended

acrimoniously nearly a year later, after which the parties, alleging abuse at

the hands of each other, petitioned for temporary and then final PFA orders.

See N.T., 11/22/21, at 4, 10-11, 43, 59, 94.        Ultimately, only Rodgers

received a final PFA order. See id. at 140-41.

      The evidence in the light most favorable to Rodgers is as follows: At

the end of the affair, Jewett was angry at Rodgers, and she told him she would

get back at him by telling his wife (hereinafter “Wife”) about the affair and

sending her “the information that she had.” Id. at 59-60. Jewett told Rodgers

via text message to “fess [sic] up to [Wife] and take your beating. We will

both leave you.” Id. at 74. After the breakup, Rodgers learned that Jewett

had taken a photograph of her and Rodgers, while the affair was ongoing,

from her home surveillance system. Following the breakup, Jewett posted it

to Facebook. See id. at 64-65. In March 2021, after the affair concluded,

Jewett, using an alias, sent Wife e-mails at her work e-mail address about the

affair. See id. at 24-26. About six months later, in September 2021, Wife

received approximately thirty-four additional e-mails from Jewett containing

screenshots of text messages between Rodgers and Jewett. See id. at 29,

                                    -3-
J-A15037-22

66. There is no testimony by Wife that Jewett threatened her or Rodgers with

any physical harm.

       Additionally, in October 2021, prior to Rodgers petitioning for a

temporary PFA order, Jewett approached his daughter, M.R., in the bathroom

of the restaurant where M.R. worked and told her about the affair. See id. at

103. According to M.R., Jewett did not threaten her or Rodgers with physical

harm. See id. at 106. Jewett, additionally, sent a friend request to Rodgers’s

sister-in-law around the day of the hearing on Rodgers’s petition for a

temporary PFA order. See id. at 111. Rodgers testified that he feared Jewett,

but he did not assert that Jewett threatened him with any physical injury.

Rodgers, on direct examination, expressed fear of escalation, but on cross-

examination, Rodgers testified that Jewett had never physically injured him,

never physically threatened him, and that her only threat was not of physical

harm but to tell his family about the affair. See id. at 80, 85-86. Rodgers

later testified on re-direct examination that he feared Jewett’s conduct would

escalate to physical harm, but his testimony lacks any mention of physical

threats against him either during or after the affair. See id. at 94.5

____________________________________________

5 The majority relies heavily on the fact that Jewett informed Rodgers that she
had been criminally charged after her ex-husband accused her of pointing a
loaded gun at him. See Majority Memorandum at 1 n.1. However, this fact
is unsupported by the record. Firstly, Rodgers testimony is devoid of any
mention of this alleged conversation with Jewett.           He never mentions
discussing this in any way with Jewett, and he does not cite to this alleged
incident as grounds for his fear of Jewett. See, e.g., N.T. 11/22/21 at 80, 92-
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -4-
J-A15037-22

       In concluding that Rodgers proved abuse, within the meaning of the Act,

the court concluded that Jewett’s conduct would “place a reasonable person

in fear,” and that a “reasonable person would be afraid based on the invasion

of privacy of the individual.” See id. at 140-41. The court later elaborated

that it concluded Rodgers “was in fear for his personal safety, due to the

ongoing, persistent, and escalating nature of the multiple instances and

methods employed by [Jewett] to harm, disrupt, harass, and destroy the

personal life and career of [Rodgers].” Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/22, at p.

2 (¶ 1) (emphasis added).6

____________________________________________

94 (Rodgers explaining why he feared Jewett). Secondly, Jewett was
questioned about the charges, but she unequivocally denied ever pointing a
gun at her ex-husband, and she specifically testified that she told Rodgers she
pled guilty to summary offenses for “calling her ex-husband a bad word.” See
id. at 18-19; see also id. at 127-28 (Jewett explaining the charges, but
providing no information about the allegations, and testifying that her
summary convictions were expunged). Thirdly, Wife, in a statement that the
trial court deemed not “responsive,” id. at 40-41, and which the Court
specifically noted it did not consider, see Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/22, at pp.
7-8 (¶ 4), briefly mentioned the charges and prior allegations about the gun.
Finally, no certified record of the charges or any testimony verifying the facts
underlying the plea were submitted as evidence. Thus, there is ultimately no
properly admitted evidence or substantive evidence in the record about the
nature of the original allegations by Jewett’s ex-husband (an individual who
whose relevance to these proceedings was tenuous).

6 The majority states the trial court relied on a prior allegation by Jewett’s ex-
husband that she pointed a gun at him as part of its finding that Rodgers had
a reasonable fear of bodily injury. See Majority Memorandum at 2 n.2. To
the contrary, the trial court notably did not reference Jewett’s prior summary
guilty plea or the facts supporting the plea in either its findings of fact and
legal conclusions at the hearing or in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion in support
of its conclusion that Rodgers proved “abuse” by a preponderance of the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -5-
J-A15037-22

       Subsection 6102(a)(5) requires a showing of “abuse,” namely, that

Jewett engaged in a course of conduct giving rise to an objectively

reasonable fear of bodily injury directly upon Rodgers.           However, the

evidence in the light most favorable to Rodgers, does not support the trial

court’s legal conclusion that “abuse” occurred within the meaning of the Act.

The evidence of record establishes that Jewett sent e-mails and text messages

to Rodgers and Wife about the affair; she posted a picture of herself with

Rodgers on her personal Facebook page; she, in person, informed Rodgers’s

daughter about the affair; and she sent a Facebook friend request to Rodgers’s

sister-in-law. Id. at 24, 27, 29, 103-106, 111. However, Rodgers conceded

that Jewett never physically harmed or threatened him, either directly, or

indirectly. See id. at 85. He also admitted that Jewett’s only “threat” was to

tell his wife about the affair. See id. He explained that his fear arose from

“speculation” about how Jewett’s conduct may escalate to the infliction of

bodily injury, but Rodgers never testified that there was a history of physical

abuse between the two or even threats thereof. See id. at 94. I further note

____________________________________________

evidence. See N.T., 11/22/21, at 140-41 (trial court’s statement findings of
fact and conclusions of law in which it omits discussion of Jewett’s prior guilty
pleas or the allegations underlying them); accord Trial Court Opinion,
1/26/22, at pp. 2-3 (¶¶ 1-2), pp. 8-9 (¶¶ 5-6, 8) (concluding Rodgers had
established abuse, but without referencing Jewett’s prior convictions or the
allegations underlying them). In fact, the trial court’s only mention of the
alleged incident with the ex-husband is limited to its response to Jewett’s
evidentiary argument that the information was hearsay and should have been
excluded. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/22, at pp. 7-8 (¶ 4).

                                           -6-
J-A15037-22

that Jewett’s statement to Rodgers via text message that he needed to “take

[his] beating,” in context, referred to her demand that he confess the affair to

Wife: “You need to fess up to her[, i.e., Wife] and take your beating. We will

both leave you. She already knows anyhow, cause [sic] she showed up at the

office.” Id. at 74. Thus, in context, Jewett’s reference to a “beating” cannot

reasonably be read to constitute a threat of bodily injury by Jewett. The word

was plainly used figuratively; and even if taken literally, Jewett indicates the

“beating” should occur by Wife, not Jewett.      Further,   Jewett’s belief that

Rodgers had not “suffer[ed]” enough occurred in context of her comments

about Rodgers not getting the aforementioned “beating” and not getting

divorced. See id. at 92-93. Crucially, Rodgers conceded that Jewett had

never physically threatened him, never physically injured him, never

threatened him with a firearm, and had made no threats to him apart from

threatening to tell his wife about the affair. See id. at 85.7

       This case is factually similar to D.H. v. B.O., where the PFA petitioner,

D.H., left town for vacation and, on his return, received from the defendant,

B.O., “several ‘disturbing’ messages at his place of employment.” 734 A.2d

409, 410 (Pa. Super. 1999). D.H. ended his relationship with B.O. B.O. then

contacted him via pager and telephone calls at home and the office. See id.

____________________________________________

7 Wife’s testimony was devoid of evidence that Jewett, in her communications,
threatened her or Rodgers with bodily injury. Additionally, M.R.’s affirmatively
testified that Jewett did not threaten her or her father “in any way” during
their interaction. See N.T., 11/22/21, at 106-107.

                                           -7-
J-A15037-22

B.O. attempted to reach D.H. at least thirteen times over five days and stated,

among other things, “I know what you[’re] doing with that pervert[, your co-

worker],” and, “I’m going to get him any way I can.” Id. at 410-11. B.O.

actually threatened the life of D.H.’s boss, and threatened to come to D.H.’s

office to strangle his boss. See id. at 411. B.O. further threatened D.H. that

he, B.O., would reveal to authorities harmful information about the company

for which D.H. worked, including that it “expended funds to send its

employees, [D.H and a co-worker], on vacation.” Id. at 411. The trial court

granted D.H. a permanent PFA order against B.O. for one year, based on

section 6102(a)(5), and this Court reversed the grant of the PFA order and

concluded that this course of conduct does not rise to the level of placing the

PFA petitioner in reasonable fear of bodily injury. Id. at 410–12.

       As in D.H., the trial court’s findings of fact, i.e., that Jewett attempted

to “harm, disrupt, harass, and destroy the personal life and career of

[Rodgers,]” Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/22, at p. 2 (¶ 1) (emphasis added), are

insufficient to support its legal conclusion that Rodgers had an objectively

reasonable fear of bodily injury based on Jewett’s course of conduct, in which

she attempted to destroy Rodgers’s personal life by informing his family about

their affair. See D.H., 734 A.2d at 412.8

____________________________________________

8 The majority relies principally on E.K. See Majority Memorandum at 10-
11. E.K. is inapt because it employed a different subsection of the Act, i.e.,
section 6102(a)(2), which requires proof of different elements, namely,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
J-A15037-22

       In sum: Jewett’s conduct, although wholly inappropriate and possibly

criminal, did not rise to the level of “abuse” under section 6102(a)(5) of the

PFA Act, because the facts of record did not bear out any history of violence

between Rodgers and Jewett, or any threats of bodily harm to Rodgers. Thus,

as a matter of law, Rodgers failed to show an objectively reasonable fear of

bodily injury as required under the statute.      See D.H., 734 A.2d at 412.

Accordingly, I would reverse the order granting Rodgers’s petition for a final

order under the PFA Act. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

____________________________________________

“reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” See E.K., 237 A.3d at
519-20. Even more saliently, while E.K. concerned harassing social media
posts, that case is dissimilar because those posts occurred against a backdrop
of an extensive history of “past physical abuse” directly between the parties
to the petition and stalking of the petitioner by the defendant. Id. at 520. In
E.K., the court heard evidence, including, but not limited to, J.R.A. hitting E.K.
with his truck, grabbing her by the neck and choking her, dragging her down
the street in a headlock while pregnant, and “unspecified sexual violence.”
Id. at 516. Unlike in E.K., and as the majority concedes, the record contains
no past physical violence by Jewett toward Rodgers, or threats thereof. See
Majority Memorandum at 9.

                                           -9-