Court Opinion

ID: 9705566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:11:53.409473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:12.466919
License: Public Domain

On Petition eoe Reheaeing We held in this case that the decision of the Alabama court voiding the insurance policy here involved was not binding on the Illinois courts because the personal injury plaintiffs were not made parties defendant. In so doing we departed from the rule laid down in Western States Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. May, 18 Ill App2d 442, 152 NE2d 608, which had for some years been the law as stated by the Appellate Court and on which the citation defendant (the insurance company) relied. We specifically preserved the right of citation defendant however to defend on the ground that the policy was obtained by misrepresentation. We further sustained Point 4 of citation defendant’s brief, that the trial court erred in proceeding to summary judgment before depositions were taken on that issue. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion in diminution of the record and to amend by filing a supplemental record. Plaintiffs also filed a document called a “Motion to Expunge the Order of Remandment as Beyond the Constitutional Power of the Appellate Court and a Petition for Rehearing.” This document relied in part on portions of the trial proceedings contained only in the supplemental record.  Under Section 92(1) (c) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill Rev Stats c 110, § 92(1) (c) (1963)), the Appellate Court has the power “to order or permit the record to be amended by correcting errors or by adding matters which should have been included.” It has been held that a supplementary record may be filed on rehearing only where the clerk has inadvertently omitted a portion of the record or where the record was irregularly obtained. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor v. Dalberg, 138 Ill 508, 28 NE 785; Pearl v. Wellman, 9 Ill 395; Gerke v. Fancher, 57 Ill App 651. No such, situation exists here. Plaintiffs wish to file additional portions of the trial proceedings which could have been included in the original record through the use of the ordinary praecipe practice. To allow their motion would needlessly prolong litigation by allowing new arguments to be urged on rehearing. The motion will be denied. We turn to a consideration of plaintiffs’ motion to expunge the order of remandment and petition for rehearing without reference to the supplemental record. Plaintiffs’ argument is twofold: (1) no order was ever entered denying defendant’s motion for a continuance for the purpose of taking the depositions of James Busby and the Blackwoods and that it must be presumed at law that the motion was never urged and therefore this court was exercising original rather than appellate jurisdiction; and (2) that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting the continuance for the purpose of taking depositions. The plaintiffs and the citation defendant both desired to take depositions. James Busby was the driver of the car at the time the accident occurred and he is the one sought to be covered by the insurance company. On January 17, 1963, plaintiffs’ attorney in Chicago wrote to the defendant’s attorney in Chicago as follows: “We are enclosing a copy of the Notice for the taking of the depositions of Lane Busby and James Busby on February 2,1963, in Jasper, Alabama. “In accordance with our agreement, we hereby stipulate to the taking of any depositions in behalf of Safeco Insurance Company, in accordance with arrangements to be made between the law firms of Tweedy and Beech, representing Safeco Insurance Company, and attorneys Bevill and Jackson, representing the plaintiffs.” There were difficulties in finding James Busby. Both sides had lawyers in Jasper, Alabama, and on September 16, 1963, attorneys for defendant in Jasper wrote to plaintiffs’ attorneys in Jasper as follows: “We have had testimony set up to be taken of the witnesses three or four times in this ease. The first time the Busbys did not show up. The second time we took Mr. Busby’s testimony, but his son was sick and unable to continue, and this put it off; and something has happened the other two times so that it could not be taken. Mr. busby’s son in the meantime has been out of the county and just returned, so Mr. Jackson of the firm of Bevill and Jackson has just informed me. We will arrange to take his testimony and have it to you within the next ten days. “This is just a letter of explanation, and because the plaintiff has not been able to take the Busby’s testimony as yet, and we felt that that should be taken before we took our testimony. However, if you will have the case passed over for a short time, we will go ahead with our testimony even though they do not take young Busby’s testimony.” It thus appears clear that both parties desired these depositions and we must assume that both parties considered that the testimony thus to be given was important and relevant to the issue of misrepresentation. Plaintiffs on September 10, 1963 had filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment. When it came on for hearing on September 17, 1963, leave was granted to the citation defendant to reply to the motion and the hearing was continued to October 8, 1963. The citation defendant filed its reply on September 18, 1963, alleging among other things that the deposition of James Busby was pending and that plaintiffs had requested and there were pending depositions to be taken of the citation defendant’s agent and office manager at Jasper, Alabama. On October 7, 1963, the day before the motion for summary judgment was to be heard, the citation defendant filed a motion supported by the affidavit of its attorney asking the trial court to order the setting of the depositions of James Busby and the Blackwoods for October 26, 1963. No order was entered with respect to this motion, and on October 8, 1963, summary judgment was entered for plaintiffs.  The constitutional argument is urged for the first time in the petition for rehearing. Point IV of the citation defendant’s opening brief is as follows: “Since the Citation Defendant Could Make Any Defense to the Plaintiffs’ Citation That It eould Make to an Action on its Policy by James Busby, Since There were Genuine Issues of Material Pact Present in the case, and Especially Since the Plaintiffs’ Attorney Had Stipulated to the Taking of Depositions by the Citation Defendant Which Had Not Been Taken at the Time Judgment Was Entered, It Was Error for The Trial Court to Enter Judgment on the Pleadings Or Summary Judgment.” (Citing cases.) The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court on the question was of course therein assumed, and if there was any question about it, plaintiffs should have raised the point at that time. Appellate Court Rule 9 provides that the petition for rehearing shall state concisely the points supposed to have been overlooked or misapprehended by the court, with proper reference to the particular portion of the abstract and brief relied upon. Reargument of the case shall not be made in the petition. Parties cannot for the first time on petition for rehearing raise questions which were not urged or argued on appeal. Rose v. City of Chicago, 317 Ill App 1, 45 NE2d 717; Chicago City Bank & Trust Co. v. Johnson, 293 Ill App 564, 13 NE2d 191. We cannot consider this argument on a petition for rehearing. In their original brief plaintiffs contended that defendant obtained no ruling on the motion to set the day for the taking of depositions and that it is thereby deemed to have waived and abandoned the motion, citing Brandes v. Illinois Protestant Children’s Home, Inc., 33 Ill App2d 319, 179 NE2d 425, for the proposition that a “Motion upon which no order is entered or which is never called to the attention of the court presumably is waived or abandoned.” The fact is that the court, without ruling on the motion for an order for the setting of the depositions, proceeded to hear the motion for summary judgment. The citation defendant had persistently maintained in both the trial and appellate courts its right to try the issue of misrepresentation if the decree of the Alabama court was not accepted as conclusive. The pending nature of James Bushy’s deposition was known to the court by citation defendant’s answer of September 18, 1963. It was again before the court in citation defendant’s motion of October 7, 1963. To argue that it must be presumed the motion was never urged or that it was waived or abandoned is to ignore the realities of the case. Plaintiffs’ attorney in the petition for rehearing expresses apprehension that there is language in our opinion which reflects on him and on the trial judge. It was not so intended. Motions and petition for rehearing denied. DEMPSEY, P. J. and SULLIVAN, J., concur.