Court Opinion

ID: 9625979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:57:37.778107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:14.207549
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion does not decide this case on the theory applied by the trial court, to-wit: that there was no proof that defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. I believe the trial court erred in directing a verdict against plaintiff and I believe this Court errs in affirming the judgment, even if it does so upon the basis of another theory.
In my opinion it is not necessary to decide whether a fireman occupies the status of a licensee or an invitee when he enters private premises to fight a fire. In Oklahoma there is no distinction between the duty owed by a landowner to a licensee or an invitee. As to either one, the landowner owes the duty of exercising ordinary care to'avoid injury to him. Good v. Whan, Old., 335 P.2d 911; Julian v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 168 Old. 192, 32 P.2d 31.
Plaintiff alleged and offered proof of the violation of the following ordinance of Oklahoma City (Title 4, section 85) :
“ * * * no combustible material shall be permitted under or within ten feet of any above ground outside storage tank.”
Plaintiff testified that an above ground outside storage tank containing 100,000 gallons of oil was so heated by nearby flames that the oil was boiling inside. He could tell this by feeling the tank, which he did. Next to this tank was the dock on which defendant had stacked the pails or drums which were burning and causing the danger to the large tank. These stacked pails were about a foot and a half from the large storage tank. Plaintiff’s testimony continu- ' ed as follows:
“Q. What did you do after you got back there, what happened ?
“A. Well, I proceeded to start moving the burning stack of drums and stuff there.
“Q. How high were the drums stacked ?
“A. About fifteen feet above my head with me on the ground.
“Q. Plow did you move them ?
“A. Well, by pushing and pushing sideways like that (Indicating).
“Q. With the pike pole?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Now, in what manner did you do that, did you put it up against the drums and push them over?
“A. It has got hooks, you see the hook comes out like that (Indicating), and one back here comes like that (Indicating), anyway I would put that hook part in the side of that container if I couldn’t push them over, well then, I would push and pull out, pull to the left, in other words to the west, this way (Indicating).
“Q. Well, was it necessary to remove those?
“A. Well, to get them away from this tank. In other words to eliminate the fuel that was burning there next to the tank.
“Q. Why was it necessary to move it away from this tank ?
“A. Because of the possibility of that tank exploding if I had left that fire right up against it.
“Q. Now, how many stacks of drums were you able to move?
“A. You mean before I got burned?
"Q. Yes, sir.
“A. Well, I was on the last row.
*1007“Q. You had removed several rows?
“A. I had removed them all except one real high, clear up to the top, and I had the other one down about half way.
“Q. What occurred when you got burned ?
“A. Well, I pushed this one and when it went over it hit something back of it and it came hack at me like that (Indicating) and I tried to turn.
“Q. What was it you got on you?
“A. Well, I was covered with oil like that and fire started on me.”
On cross-examination plaintiff testified as follows:
“Q. And you were pushing them which direction?
“A. Well, at the time I got burned I was pushing away, they were stacked that way (Indicating) into the dock and building area.
******
“Q. I will ask you if it isn’t true on one or more occasions before you were burned that you would pull the can towards you and Phillips missed hitting it with the water and that the fire splashed over to you or almost on you?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. That did not happen?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Well, I meant Purdue instead of Phillips.
“A. I knew what you meant.”
The above testimony and the reasonable inferences therefrom reveal that plaintiff was attempting to remove a source of burning petroleum products (a combustible material) which had been stacked within less than ten feet from an above ground outside storage tank containing 100,000 gallons of oil. He was attempting to do the thing which the ordinance had required of defendant, that is, provide a safe space or distance between the drums of combustibles and the storage tank. The defendant violated the ordinance, and I believe it was for the jury to decide the issue of proximate cause. I find nothing in this testimony to .cause all reasonable men to conclude that he pulled the stacked drum or pail over on himself, as the trial judge apparently concluded. An equally reasonable conclusion is that he was pushing one of the drums away from himself and it hit something, because of the way defendant had stacked it, causing it to rebound unexpectedly toward him. The majority opinion finds as a matter of law from the above quoted evidence that plaintiff “was fully aware of all existing conditions at the time of and surrounding the particular occurrence,” and that the “conditions were open and obvious and observed by plaintiff.” I disagree. I believe a reasonable inference, from his testimony that the drum “hit something back of it and it came back at me,” is that all the conditions were not open and obvious, and he was not aware of all existing conditions as to the manner of stacking the drums and as to what was behind them. Therefore, I do not believe the rule of law which the majority of the Court relies on herein is applicable to the facts of this case. I believe that a jury question was raised by the evidence and the trial judge should have submitted it to the jury under proper instructions. We held in the second paragraph of the syllabus of Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. Jones, Okl., 354 P.2d 415:
“On defendant’s general motion for a directed verdict in a tort action, the trial judge should consider only the evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, most favorable to plaintiff, and, unless, on the basis thereof, he can correctly say that all reasonable men would agree that defendant was not negligent, or that its negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, he should overrule the motion, and submit the cause to the jury.”
I would reverse the case and remand it for a new trial.
I dissent.