Court Opinion

ID: 9410281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 17:06:13.008147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:56.460402
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/20/23 In re L.N. CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

In re L.N., a Person Coming                                    2d Juv. No. B322094
Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                (Super. Ct. No. YJ40799)
                                                               (Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

     Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.N.,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      L.N. appeals after the juvenile court sustained an
allegation that he committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code,
§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) with several accomplices. He contends
there was insufficient evidence to identify him as one of the
perpetrators of the robbery. We affirm.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      In December 2021, while investigating a drive-by shooting,
Los Angeles police officer Simon Beal learned that a robbery had
been committed at a nearby shoe store. Officer Beal watched
surveillance footage, which showed seven perpetrators leaving
the store with stolen items. Some of the perpetrators knocked an
employee down as they fled.
       Officer Beal identified L.N. as one of the shoe store robbers,
and Angel Torres as another. He recognized the two as members
of a criminal street gang. Officer Beal believed L.N. was one of
only three or four Hispanic members of the 50-person gang, about
half of whom he could identify. Every time Officer Beal had seen
L.N. he was with other gang members.
       L.N. wore a mask covering the lower half of his face during
the robbery. Officer Beal was nevertheless able to identify him
based on what he could see of L.N.’s face, his “distinctive style of
walking,” and his “limp” gait. L.N. also had a slender build and
“very pale[,] very light” complexion. He was taller and thinner
than the other Hispanic gang members.
       After watching the surveillance footage, Officer Beal
learned that L.N. was wanted in conjunction with the shoe store
robbery. He arrested L.N. two months later in a “stronghold” of
his neighborhood gang.
       Prosecutors played the surveillance footage at the
jurisdictional hearing. The juvenile court watched the footage
and noted that it showed “something” on L.N.’s left hand. L.N.’s
left hand has “distinctive tattoos.”
                            DISCUSSION
       L.N. contends we should vacate the finding that he robbed
the shoe store because there was insufficient evidence that he
was one of the robbery’s perpetrators. We disagree.
       “An essential element of any crime is . . . that the [accused]
is the person who committed the offense.” (People v. Hogue

                                 2
(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1500, 1505.) “Identity as the perpetrator
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) We will
uphold a juvenile court’s finding that prosecutors met this burden
of proof if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Cuevas
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 257 (Cuevas).)
       “ ‘[W]e review the whole record in the light most favorable
to the [juvenile court’s findings] to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find’ ” beyond a reasonable doubt that L.N. was one of the
shoe store robbers. (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500,
507.) When undertaking our review, we neither evaluate witness
credibility nor resolve evidentiary conflicts (People v. Manibusan
(2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87); such tasks are within the exclusive
province of the trier of fact (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1181 (Young)). So long as “the circumstances reasonably
justify the [juvenile court’s] findings, reversal . . . is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also . . . be
reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45
Cal.4th 1, 27.)
       The circumstances here reasonably justify the juvenile
court’s finding that L.N. was one of the perpetrators of the shoe
store robbery. Officer Beal recognized L.N.’s face, skin color,
slender build, and walk in the surveillance footage. The identity
of a perpetrator may be established by such characteristics.
(People v. Mohamed (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 515, 522
(Mohamed).) The officer also knew L.N. prior to the robbery.
Such familiarity supports the determination that Officer Beal’s
identification was reliable. (Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 267.)

                                 3
       Other evidence corroborated Officer Beal’s identification.
Officer Beal identified L.N. in the surveillance footage prior to
learning that he was wanted in conjunction with the shoe store
robbery. The footage showed L.N. with at least one fellow gang
member during the robbery, which was consistent with the
officer’s prior encounters with L.N. The footage also showed
“something” on L.N.’s left hand, a hand that has “distinctive
tattoos.” Such corroboration reinforces the reliability of Officer
Beal’s identification. (Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 267.)
       L.N. counters that Officer Beal’s inability to recognize
anyone other than him and Torres in the surveillance footage
undermines the reliability of the officer’s identification because it
contradicts his claim that he was familiar with L.N.’s fellow gang
members. L.N. also speculates that he may not have been the
only light-skinned Hispanic member of his gang, or perhaps not
the only one with a “distinctive style of walking” and “limp” gait,
which suggests that Officer Beal guessed as to his identity.
       But these assertions ignore that “ ‘ “it is not necessary that
[an] identification be positive or free from inconsistencies” ’ ” for
us to uphold a finding that a minor committed an offense.
(People v. Martinez (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 809, 812.) Such
matters “ ‘go to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of
the witnesses,’ ” which are issues to be resolved by the trier of
fact. (Mohamed, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 522.) As an
appellate court, we will reject an identification only when the
evidence underlying it is so unreliable that it “constitute[s]
practically no evidence at all.” (People v. Lindsay (1964) 227
Cal.App.2d 482, 493.) Here, there was “ ‘ “positive[,] direct
testimony” ’ ” that L.N. was one of the perpetrators of the shoe
store robbery. (Martinez, at p. 813.) “ ‘ “It was thus incumbent

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upon him to show that [Officer Beal’s] testimony [was] inherently
unbelievable in order to prevail.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see also Young, supra,
34 Cal.4th at p. 1181 [testimony of single witness sufficient to
uphold conviction].) He has not done so.
                          DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders,
entered June 20 and July 26, 2022, are affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             CODY, J.

                                  5
         J. Christopher Smith and Brian C. Yep, Judges

             Superior Court County of Los Angeles

                ______________________________

      Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.