Court Opinion

ID: 9584457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:48:33.83131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:54.278722
License: Public Domain

Knutson, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. It seems to me that when the public examiner receives a petition for an audit, properly certified by the county auditor, he is under a duty to proceed with the audit. M. S. A. 1949, § 215.19, makes the certificate of the auditor conclusive evidence of the sufficiency of the petition in an action for costs of such audit. State v. Town of Balkan, 234 Minn. 329, 48 N. W. (2d) 515. To hold that, after the public examiner has commenced his audit, a few signers may withdraw and thereby render a petition, certified as sufficient, insufficient can lead to nothing but confusion. It is true in this case that only a small amount of work had been done before the attempted withdrawal. Supposing, in another case, work involving the expenditure of $1,000 or even more had been done. Are we then to hold that signers may still withdraw? It seems to me that the petitioners who do not wish to withdraw their signatures are entitled to some protection as well as those who for some reason or another, or for no reason at all, have a change of heart. It may be true that those who still wish to have an audit may go out and procure additional signers and have the examiner start over again, *245but does not that inevitably lead to a doubling up of expense? Supposing the examiner starts again, and again a small number withdraw. May this process go on ad infinitum, or where must it stop? I think that the rule should be that, absent a showing of fraud, it is too late to withdraw once the petition has been certified to the public examiner by the county auditor. At least, it should be too late once the work is begun. Any other rule will leave the examiner in the position of never knowing whether he has authority to complete an audit once it is started.
On Appeal prom Clerk’s Taxation op Costs.
On January 7, 1955, the following opinion was filed:
Per Curiam.
Appeal from clerk’s disallowance of taxation of costs and disbursements. Appellant contends that the well-established rule in this court that costs cannot be taxed against a state officer in litigation relating to the governmental affairs of the state (State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, 186 Minn. 331, 243 N. W. 133) does not apply to this case. Cited as support for this claimed exception is Bartles Oil Co. v. Lynch, 109 Minn. 487, 124 N. W. 1, 25 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1234, which involved an action to enjoin the state oil inspector from preventing plaintiff’s practice of selling illuminating oil to which a red coloring had been added. This court affirmed the clerk’s taxation of costs against the state oil inspector, pointing out that there was no authority in the applicable statute which authorized the oil inspector’s threatened act. The facts in the Bartles Oil Co. case do not parallel those now before us. The public examiner was authorized by M. S. A. 1949, § 215.19, to commence an audit in response to the original petition. By ceasing his audit upon learning of the second petition and seeking a test of its adequacy, the public examiner was merely attempting to determine whether this authority survived the second petition. His actions throughout have manifested an intention to remain within his granted powers.
The clerk’s disallowance of taxation of costs against the public examiner is affirmed.