Court Opinion

ID: 9959652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:06:21.481315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:44.607812
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                    No. 22–0401

              Submitted September 14, 2023—Filed February 23, 2024

SENATOR ROBY SMITH, SENATOR JIM CARLIN, SENATOR CHRIS COURNOYER,
SENATOR ADRIAN DICKEY, SENATOR JASON SCHULTZ, SENATOR DAN
ZUMBACH, FORMER SENATOR ZACH WHITING, REPRESENTATIVE BROOKE BO-
DEN, REPRESENTATIVE BOBBY KAUFMANN, REPRESENTATIVE CARTER NORD-
MAN, and REPRESENTATIVE JEFF SHIPLEY,

       Plaintiffs,

vs.

IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY,

       Defendant.

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Sarah Crane, Judge.

       Nonparty legislators seek a writ of certiorari to quash subpoenas issued to

them in underlying litigation challenging recent election legislation on the basis

of a legislative evidentiary privilege. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

GRANTED; WRIT SUSTAINED.
       Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
       Brenna Bird, Attorney General; Samuel P. Langholz (until withdrawal),

Chief Deputy Attorney General; W. Charles Smithson, Legal Counsel and

Secretary of the Senate; and Eric H. Wessan (argued), Solicitor General, for

plaintiffs.

       David R. Fox (argued), Uzoma N. Nkwonta, Melinda K. Johnson, William

K. Hancock, Alexander F. Atkins, and John M. Geise (until withdrawal), of Elias

Law Group LLP, Washington, D.C.; and Shayla McCormally of McCormally &
Cosgrove, PLLC, Des Moines, and for defendant.
                                     2

     Alan R. Ostergren of Alan R. Ostergren, PC, Des Moines, for amici curiae

Republican National Committee, National Republican Senatorial Committee,

National Republication Congressional Committee, and Republican Party of Iowa.
                                         3

OXLEY, Justice.
      In an effort to support its constitutional challenges to recent legislative

changes to voting procedures, the League of Latin American Citizens of Iowa

(LULAC) served subpoenas on several Iowa legislators, seeking discovery of com-

munications the legislators had with third parties related to enactment of the

legislation. The legislators, who were not parties to the underlying litigation, ob-

jected to the subpoenas, LULAC filed a motion to compel, and the district court

granted the motion in part. The nonparty legislators filed a petition for writ of

certiorari, arguing they are protected from compelled document production by a

legislative privilege under the Iowa Constitution.

      This certiorari proceeding presents our first opportunity to address

whether the Iowa Constitution—which lacks a speech or debate clause—none-

theless supports a legislative privilege that protects Iowa legislators from com-

pelled production of documents related to the passage of legislation. The district

court concluded that the Iowa Constitution provides a privilege, but the privilege

is conditional rather than absolute. It then concluded that compelling, compet-

ing interests—specifically LULAC’s claims that the legislation amounts to uncon-

stitutional viewpoint discrimination—require piercing the privilege with respect
to most of the documents sought in the underlying litigation.

      We now hold that the Iowa Constitution contains a legislative privilege that

protects legislators from compelled document production and that the privilege

extends to communications with third parties where the communications relate

directly to the legislative process of considering and enacting legislation. How-

ever, we need not, and therefore do not, decide whether the legislative privilege

is absolute or qualified. The district court applied the wrong analysis when it

relied on gerrymandering cases, where some courts hold that “judicial inquiry
into legislative intent is specifically contemplated as part of the resolution of the
                                         4

core issue that such cases present.” Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,

114 F. Supp. 3d 323, 337 (E.D. Va. 2015). The district court should have con-

sidered the underlying claims—which challenge changes to the voting proce-

dures as violating individual voters’ constitutional rights—through the lens of

the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,

789 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). That test balances the

“character and magnitude” of the injury to the individual voters’ rights against

the state’s justification for the changes, Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, neither of

which turn on legislative intent. Therefore, the individual legislators’ intent has

little, if any, relevance to LULAC’s claims. Whether absolute or qualified, the leg-

islative privilege protects the legislators from the requested document produc-

tion.

        I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

        The League of Latin American Citizens of Iowa (LULAC) is part of the larg-

est and oldest Latino civil rights organization in the United States, with more

than 600 members in Iowa alone. In March of 2021, LULAC sued the Iowa Sec-

retary of State and the Iowa Attorney General, challenging several provisions of

two recently enacted state election laws under the Iowa Constitution. The chal-
lenged provisions shorten the time for voters to register, shorten the time to re-

quest and send absentee ballots, alter ballot receipt deadlines, limit who can

return absentee ballots on behalf of another, and reduce polling place hours on

election day, among other changes. See 2021 Iowa Acts chs. 12, 147 (codified at

scattered sections of Iowa Code 2022). LULAC alleges the provisions, individually

or collectively, are targeted at voters based on their political views and impose

an unconstitutional burden on their members’ rights to vote, violate free speech

protections, violate equal protection by subjecting absentee voters to arbitrary
and disparate treatment, and amount to intentional viewpoint discrimination in
                                         5

violation of free speech and equal protection. LULAC seeks declaratory and in-

junctive relief prohibiting enforcement of both statutes.

      That case proceeded to discovery, which is where this certiorari action

begins. In November and December of 2021, LULAC served third-party

subpoenas on several nonparty state legislators, including Senators Jim Carlin,

Chris Cournoyer, Adrian Dickey, Jason Schultz, Roby Smith, and Dan Zumbach;

former senator Zach Whiting; and Representatives Brooke Boden, Bobby

Kaufmann, Carter Nordman, and Jeff Shipley (collectively “Legislators”). The

subpoenas sought production of meeting documents and communications

related to the Legislators’ consideration and enactment of the challenged election

laws, including the proffered justifications for enactment and the prevalence or

absence of voter fraud in Iowa elections. The subpoenas specifically limited the

requests to documents from meetings or communications with “non-Legislators,”

defined in the subpoenas to exclude current members of the general assembly,

their predecessors, successors, employees, staff, agents, and representatives.

      The Legislators objected to LULAC’s requests, asserting that legislative

privilege and third-party privacy interests under article I, section 20 of the Iowa

Constitution protect them from responding. LULAC filed a motion to compel, ar-
guing that communications with third parties outside of the legislature were not

protected by a legislative privilege, to the extent one even exists under Iowa law.

Alternatively, LULAC argued that if a legislative privilege exists, it is qualified,

and the important constitutional rights at stake require abrogating the privilege

in this case. After a hearing held on January 21, 2022, the district court granted

LULAC’s motion to compel, in large part.

      The district court concluded that a legislative privilege exists under Iowa

law, the privilege applies to the requested external communications, and its pro-
tection extended to the documents being sought by the subpoenas. Nonetheless,
                                               6

the court held that the privilege is qualified and that it must give way to LULAC’s

interests in this case where the privilege’s underlying purposes are outweighed

by a compelling, competing interest. The court found that discovery into individ-

ual legislators’ intent is “highly relevant” to LULAC’s First Amendment claim,

which challenges the law-making process itself by alleging the election laws were

enacted to impose unjustified barriers on Latino voters’ ability to vote and par-

ticipate in the political process. The court rejected the Legislators’ argument that

individual legislators’ intent is irrelevant to interpretation of a statute because

the claim turned on the reason for enactment, not the meaning of the enacted

legislation. The court ordered the Legislators to comply with most of the subpoe-

nas’ requests, but it denied LULAC’s motion to compel to the extent it sought the

Legislators’ work product that had not been subject to communications with

nonlegislators. The court entered a protective order to maintain the confidenti-

ality of documents produced in discovery.

       On March 2, 2022, the Legislators filed a petition for writ of certiorari to

challenge the discovery order, which we granted.1

       II. Standard of Review.

       We review discovery rulings by the district court for abuse of discretion.
Jones v. Univ. of Iowa, 836 N.W.2d 127, 139 (Iowa 2020). “An abuse of discretion

consists of a ruling which rests upon clearly untenable or unreasonable

grounds.” Id. (quoting Lawson v. Kurtzhals, 792 N.W.2d 251, 258 (Iowa 2010)).

However, the Legislators’ claim that the ruling violates the Iowa Constitution is

       1The Republican Party of Iowa and various Republican National Committees intervened

in the underlying litigation, and LULAC served discovery on those parties seeking similar infor-
mation. The district court’s order also addressed LULAC’s motion to compel discovery over the
intervenors’ objections to the discovery requests, granting in part and denying in part LULAC’s
motion to compel. This certiorari proceeding is limited to the nonparty Legislators’ challenge to
the district court’s order directed to them. The intervenors filed an amicus brief supporting the
Legislators’ position in this proceeding.
                                          7

reviewed de novo. Klouda v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 642 N.W.2d

255, 260 (Iowa 2002).

      III. Analysis.

      This case presents our court with the first opportunity to determine

whether a legislative privilege exists under Iowa law. Initially, we note there is no

authority in Iowa that explicitly grants a legislative privilege. The Legislators (and

their amici) urge us to find that an absolute legislative privilege exists premised

on principles of separation of powers and article I, section 20 of the Iowa Consti-

tution, which protects “[t]he people[’s] . . . right . . . [to] make known their opin-

ions to their representatives.” LULAC contends that even if we find that some

form of legislative privilege exists in Iowa, the district court did not abuse its

discretion because it correctly determined that the privilege is qualified and

should be abrogated in this case. We begin our analysis by addressing the exist-

ence of a legislative privilege under Iowa law.

      A. The Iowa Constitution Provides a Legislative Privilege. The

Legislators assert they are exempted from responding to LULAC’s subpoena for

documents related to their legislative duties under a legislative privilege. The

legislative privilege the Legislators rely on is an evidentiary privilege that protects
legislators “against both compulsory testimony and compulsory production of

evidence.” Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E.2d 469, 478 (Va. 2016); see also Brown

& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 418, 420–21 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (“A party is no more entitled to compel congressional testimony—or

production of documents—than it is to sue congressmen.”). It is often invoked to

prevent “evidence of legislative acts from being used against legislators in

proceedings.” U.S. EEOC v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 666 F. Supp. 2d

526, 531 (D. Md. 2009); see also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182–
                                         8

85 (1966) (addressing legislative privilege in criminal proceedings against

senator).

      A legislative privilege “is a derivative of legislative immunity.” Wash.

Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 531 (addressing the differences

between legislative immunity and legislative privilege). While legislative privilege

derives from legislative immunity, they are distinct, and it is important to

recognize that distinction. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Alviti, 14 F.4th 76, 86 n.6

(1st Cir. 2021) (“[F]ollowing the Supreme Court’s lead in United States v. Gillock,

445 U.S. 360, 368–73, 100 S.Ct. 1185, 63 L.Ed.2d 454 (1980), we use ‘immunity’

only when discussing potential liability and ‘privilege’ only when referring to

evidentiary issues.”). “Legislative immunity . . . protects legislators from suit

arising from their legitimate legislative actions.” Wash. Suburban Sanitary

Comm’n, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 531 (emphasis added). Where it applies, it is

absolute—protecting legislators not only from civil liability but also from being

sued in the first place. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84–85 (1967)

(per curiam) (“[L]egislators engaged ‘in the sphere of legitimate legislative

activity,’ should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation’s

results but also from the burden of defending themselves.” (citation omitted)).
Legislative privilege is an evidentiary privilege that serves to protect a legislator

from being required to produce documents or testify in court proceedings. It may

arise in situations like here where the legislator is not a party to the underlying

suit. See Am. Trucking, 14 F.4th at 88, 90–91 (granting writ of mandamus to

nonparty state officials seeking to quash subpoena issued in a case challenging

the constitutionality of a state statutory scheme under the dormant Commerce

Clause).

      The Legislators urge us to equate the absolute legislative immunity we
have previously recognized to an absolute legislative privilege. In Teague v.
                                          9

Mosely, we recognized that absolute immunity can protect local officials from

civil liability where county supervisors were sued for allegedly failing to provide

safe conditions after an inmate was assaulted in a county jail. 552 N.W.2d 646,

649 (Iowa 1996).

      When officials are threatened with personal liability for acts taken
      pursuant to their official duties, they may well be induced to act with
      an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways
      that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent
      criteria that ought to guide their conduct. In this way, exposing gov-
      ernment officials to the same legal hazards faced by other citizens
      may detract from the rule of law instead of contributing to it.

Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988)). But we were also care-

ful to limit the immunity to officials acting in a legislative capacity, as opposed

to an administrative capacity, because “immunity [from liability] is justified and

defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it

attaches.” Id. (quoting Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227). Facing civil liability is far dif-

ferent from being forced to turn over documents, particularly when the legislator

is not even a party to the suit and does not face personal liability.

      Given the distinction between immunity and privilege, we proceed to con-

sider the origins of legislative immunity and its derivative legislative privilege to

determine whether a legislative privilege exists under the Iowa Constitution.

      In the federal system, legislative immunity derives from the United States

Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause, which provides:

      Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason,
      Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during
      their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses . . . ; and
      for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be ques-
      tioned in any other Place.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 6. The roots of the Speech or Debate Clause can be traced

back to political problems in the English Parliament, predating the United States
Constitution. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951) (“The privilege
                                         10

of legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what they do or say in

legislative proceedings has taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of the Six-

teenth and Seventeenth Centuries.”). “England’s experience with monarchs ex-

erting pressure on members of Parliament by using judicial process to make

them more responsive to their wishes led the authors of our Constitution to write

an explicit legislative privilege into our organic law.” Gillock, 445 U.S. at 368–69.

“[T]he purpose of this clause was ‘to prevent intimidation (of legislators) by the

executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.’ ” Powell v.

McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969) (quoting Johnson, 383 U.S. at 181); see

also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311, 316 (1973) (stating that the Clause aims

to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive or a possibly hostile judi-

ciary). Thus, the separation-of-powers doctrine is an important rationale under-

lying the Speech or Debate Clause. Gillock, 445 U.S. at 369–70.

      While the legislative immunity doctrine that is derived from the Speech or

Debate Clause protects members of Congress from facing civil liability, federal

courts recognize that an additional evidentiary privilege stems from the doctrine

as well. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180–85 (holding that federal prosecutors could

not question a senator about a speech he gave on the House floor that helped
form the basis for bribery charges against him). To safeguard “legislative immun-

ity and to further encourage the republican values it promotes,” courts have rec-

ognized a corresponding privilege “against compulsory evidentiary process” that

can be applied “whether or not the legislators themselves have been sued.” EEOC

v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 631 F.3d 174, 181 (4th Cir. 2011). In other

words, the evidentiary privilege helps protect the legislative immunity granted by

the Speech or Debate Clause.

      Identifying the exact source of the evidentiary privilege is complicated. The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that the “last sentence of the
                                          11

[Speech or Debate] Clause provides Members of Congress with two distinct priv-

ileges.” Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614 (1972). Recall that that sen-

tence provides that congressmembers are “privileged from Arrest during their

Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses,” and that they “shall not

be questioned in any other Place” “for any Speech or Debate in either House.”

U.S. Const. art. I, § 6. Immunity from civil liability (and from being sued) stems

largely from the first part of the Speech or Debate Clause’s privilege against ar-

rest, see Gravel, 408 U.S. at 614, although courts have also recognized that the

“shall not be questioned” protection does some work to make the immunity ab-

solute, see, e.g., Am. Trucking, 14 F.4th at 86–87 (quoting only the second part

of the Clause in identifying the source for absolute legislative immunity from

suit).

         The protection from being “questioned in any other Place,” U.S. Const. art.

I, § 6, has been read as the source of the evidentiary privilege based on the recog-

nition that “[t]he Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal

branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation with-

out intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch,” Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616

(finding the Speech or Debate Clause exempted a senator from answering ques-
tions about occurrences during a congressional subcommittee meeting); see also

Edwards, 790 S.E.2d at 477 (addressing identical clause in the Virginia Consti-

tution and concluding that “[t]he term ‘questioned’ should be understood broadly

to mean ‘subjected to examination by another body’ ”). Thus, while the legislative

privilege helps protect the legislative immunity provided by the Federal Speech

or Debate Clause, courts have relied on the “shall not be questioned” portion of

the Clause to identify the source for the evidentiary privilege.

         The Speech or Debate Clause by its express terms applies only to con-
gresspersons, not state legislators. Nonetheless, federal courts have recognized
                                          12

that the federal common law provides a similar legislative immunity that protects

state and local lawmakers from civil liability for actions taken in their legislative

capacities. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376 (holding that state legislators were enti-

tled to absolute immunity from suit under federal common law and concluding

that in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Congress did not, without more specific lan-

guage, intend § 1983 liability to “impinge on a tradition so well grounded in his-

tory and reason”); see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49–52 (1998) (ex-

tending absolute immunity to local legislators).

      While federal common law provides absolute legislative immunity to state

lawmakers, the accompanying evidentiary privilege is qualified. See Doe v.

Pittsylvania County, 842 F. Supp. 2d 906, 920 (W.D. Va. 2012) (“In contrast to

the privilege enjoyed by members of Congress under the Speech or Debate

Clause, there is no absolute ‘evidentiary privilege for state legislators [in federal

prosecutions] for their legislative acts.’ Nor has the Court recognized an absolute

testimonial privilege for state or local legislators in civil cases.” (citation omitted)

(quoting Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373)). The distinction stems from principles of

federalism and the federal government’s supremacy over the states. See Gillock,

445 U.S. at 369–70. Whereas separation-of-powers principles demand that the
federal judiciary treat the federal legislature as a coequal branch of government,

the Supremacy Clause in article VI, section 2 of the United States Constitution

gives the federal judiciary greater license to interfere with state legislative

functions when necessary to protect federal interests. “That is because the

separation-of-powers rationale underpinning the Speech or Debate Clause does

not apply when it is a state lawmaker claiming legislative immunity or privilege

[in federal court].” Am. Trucking, 14 F.4th at 87 (recognizing nonetheless that

“federal courts will often sustain assertions of legislative privilege by state
                                         13

legislatures except when ‘important federal interests are at stake,’ such as in a

federal criminal prosecution” (quoting Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373)).

      State courts have also addressed legislative privilege under their respective

state constitutions. Forty-three states have adopted a speech or debate clause

into their state constitutions modeled directly after the Federal Clause. See

Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450,

1615 n.129 (1985) (noting that since Tenney v. Brandhove, which identified forty-

one states with identical speech or debate clauses, Alaska and Hawaii were

admitted to the union and adopted the full protection of the federal speech or

debate clause). Notably, the Iowa Constitution does not have a speech or debate

clause, a point LULAC relies on to argue that the Iowa Constitution does not

provide a legislative privilege. However, article III, section 11 of the Iowa

Constitution does provide some of the same protections: “Senators and

Representatives, in all cases, except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, shall

be privileged from arrest during the session of the General Assembly, and in

going to and returning from the same.” Nonetheless, we cannot ignore that while

our constitution includes the privilege against arrest, it omits the “shall not be

questioned in any other place” language included in the Federal Speech or
Debate Clause and that of forty-three other states. Notably, the United States

Supreme Court noticed the missing “shall not be questioned” provision from our

constitution, see Tenney, 341 U.S. at 375 n.5 (noting forty-one states have the

same protection as the Federal Speech or Debate Clause; five states, including

Iowa have only a “freedom from arrest” provision; and only Florida provides no

constitutional privileges for its legislators), as has the Iowa Attorney General, see

1979 Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 174 (1980) (“Noticeably absent from the Iowa

constitutional scheme is a provision ensuring that legislators will not be held
accountable in any other tribunal or place for their speeches and debates.”). See
                                          14

also Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State

Legislatures, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 221, 236–37, 237 n.54 (2003) (identifying

Iowa as one of “seven states entirely without any constitutional language

granting the [legislative] privilege”).

      Although many state courts have found a broad legislative privilege under

their state constitutions, we must be cautious in following those state courts,

given the differences between their constitutional language compared to ours.

For instance, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that legislators enjoyed abso-

lute legislative privilege with respect to communications made “within the legis-

lative sphere” between legislators and their staff or “alter egos.” Edwards, 790

S.E.2d at 482–83 (reversing the circuit court in part, noting that it could not

“speculate as to potentially privileged communications involving third parties”

given the early stages of discovery). The Edwards v. Vesilind court relied on “[t]he

term ‘questioned’ ” in its speech or debate clause, giving it a broad application

in concluding the privilege was absolute, where it applied. Id. at 477. Similarly,

Maryland’s highest court found a broad legislative privilege stemmed, at least in

part, from article 10 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, providing “[t]hat free-

dom of speech and debate, or proceedings in the Legislature, ought not to be
impeached in any Court of Judicature,” to quash a subpoena seeking documents

and testimony from legislators related to drafting redistricting plans. In re 2022

Legis. Districting of the State, 282 A.3d 147, 193–98 (Md. 2022) (quoting Md.

Const. Declaration of Rights art. 10). While the majority in that opinion did not

characterize the privilege as absolute, one dissent recognized it as such. Id. at

233 (Getty, C.J., dissenting).

      Yet the missing protection against “being questioned” from article III,

section 11 of the Iowa Constitution does not mean there is no legislative privilege.
Florida is one of two states lacking any legislative protections in its constitution.
                                         15

Despite “the absence of a Speech or Debate Clause and the strong public policy

. . . favoring transparency and public access to the legislative process,” the

Florida Supreme Court still found a legislative privilege exists. League of Women

Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d 135, 144–45 (Fla.

2013). It relied on the doctrine of separation of powers, a doctrine expressly

included in the Florida Constitution. Id. (“[The] privilege is based on the principle

that ‘no branch may encroach upon the powers of another,’ and on inherent

principles of comity that exist between the coequal branches of government.”

(citation omitted) (quoting Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260,

264 (Fla. 1991))). The court clarified the privilege was not absolute, however, and

“may yield to a compelling, competing interest.” Id. at 143.

      Turning to our constitution, we conclude that three provisions of the Iowa

Constitution support recognizing a legislative privilege: article III, section 1,

which expressly provides for separation of powers between the three branches of

government; article III, section 11, which gives senators and representatives a

“privilege[] from arrest during the session of the general assembly;” and article I,

section 20, which protects “[t]he people[’s] . . . right . . . [to] make known their

opinions to their representatives.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 20; id. art III, §§ 1, 11.
The principles behind separation of powers are evident in most discussions of

legislative privilege. See, e.g., Edwards, 790 S.E.2d at 476 (“Legislative privilege

arose in the young American nation from the same underlying principles [of free-

dom of speech and legislative immunity in parliamentary law], combined with

the uniquely American emphasis on separation of powers and representative

government.”); League of Women Voters of Fla., 132 So. 3d at 144 (“These factors,

however, are not conclusive because there is another important factor that

weighs in favor of recognizing the privilege—the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers.”). Even though the United States Constitution lacks an express separation-
                                         16

of-powers provision, federal courts still recognize that the Speech or Debate

Clause is one facet of a larger separation-of-powers design. See United States v.

Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972) (“Our speech or debate privilege was de-

signed to preserve legislative independence, not supremacy.”).

      As we already noted, article III, section 11’s protection against arrest

serves a similar purpose as the Speech or Debate Clause, even absent the “ques-

tioned in any other place” clause. See id. at 521 (“We recognize that the privilege

against arrest is not identical with the Speech or Debate privilege, but it is closely

related in purpose and origin.”); Powell, 395 U.S. at 503–05 (explaining that the

arrest clause ensures “that legislators are free to represent the interests of their

constituents” without risk of being taken to court). “The immunities of the

Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the

personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity

of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators.”

Brewster, 408 U.S. at 507. In the same way, article III, section 11 enables legis-

lators to exercise their constitutional duties free from threats to their personal

liberty that could unduly affect the legislative decision-making process.

      Finally, article I, section 20 reinforces our conclusion that the Iowa
Constitution includes a legislative privilege. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 20

(protecting the right of the people “to assemble together to counsel for the

common good; to make known their opinions to their representatives and to

petition for a redress of grievances”). This provision expresses the importance

our constitution places on legislators’ role in our tripartite system of government

to act as their constituents’ voices. See Knorr v. Beardsley, 38 N.W.2d 236, 245

(Iowa 1949) (“The people, then, have vested the legislative authority inherent in

them, in the general assembly.”). It also emphasizes the significance of citizen
involvement in the legislative process. See Mathis v. Palo Alto Cnty. Bd. of
                                        17

Supervisors, 927 N.W.2d 191, 196 (Iowa 2019) (citing article I, section 20 as

authority for the proposition that “[l]obbying our government is every citizen’s

constitutional right”). The people’s ability to communicate with their elected

representatives is vital to the effective exercise of legislative functions. The

protection of citizens’ role in the legislative process helps ensure the separation

of powers and supports finding a legislative privilege that limits the unelected

judicial branch’s power to interfere with elected representatives’ performance of

official duties. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla., 132 So. 3d at 146

(recognizing a legislative privilege to “ensure that the separation of powers is

maintained so that the Legislature can accomplish its role of enacting legislation

in the public interest without undue interference”). We conclude from these

provisions, taken together, that a legislative privilege inherently flows from the

Iowa Constitution.

         B. The Scope of the Legislative Privilege Under the Iowa Constitution

Extends to Communications with Third Parties Related to Consideration

and Enactment of Legislation. We next consider the scope of the legislative

privilege. LULAC intentionally limited the subpoenaed documents to communi-

cations with third parties in an attempt to avoid infringing on the legislative pro-
cess. The requested communications must fall within the scope of the legislative

privilege to be protected, regardless of whether the privilege is absolute or qual-

ified.

         The requested documents here relate directly to enacting legislation, so

from that perspective, they are legislative in nature. The United States Supreme

Court has explained that conduct falls within the legitimate legislative sphere

when the activities are “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative

processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings
                                        18

with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legisla-

tion.” Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625; see also Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421

U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (“[T]he power to investigate is inherent in the power to make

laws because ‘[a] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the ab-

sence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended

to affect or change.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting McGrain v. Daugherty, 273

U.S. 135, 175 (1927))).

      But LULAC limited its requests to communications with third parties out-

side the legislators’ immediate circle of advisors. Recent federal appellate court

decisions have concluded that the legislative privilege under federal common law

protects communications between state legislators and outside third parties. In

In re North Dakota Legislative Assembly, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eighth Circuit held that “[c]ommunications with constituents, advocacy

groups, and others outside the legislature are a legitimate aspect of legislative

activity. The use of compulsory evidentiary process against legislators and their

aides to gather evidence about this legislative activity is thus barred by the leg-

islative privilege.” 70 F.4th 460, 464 (8th Cir. 2023). The Fifth Circuit similarly

held that state legislators’ communications with third parties were protected
from discovery after finding that the legislative privilege was not waived merely

because the requested information had been communicated outside the legisla-

ture: “An exception for communications ‘outside the legislature’ would swallow

the rule almost whole, because ‘[m]eeting with “interest” groups . . . is a part and

parcel of the modern legislative procedures through which legislators receive in-

formation possibly bearing on the legislation they are to consider.’ ” La Union Del

Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 68 F.4th 228, 236 (5th Cir. 2023) (alteration and omis-

sion in original) (quoting Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 1980)).
While the court acknowledged that the legislative privilege could be waived in
                                         19

certain circumstances—such as when legislators publicly reveal the infor-

mation—it was not waived there because “the legislators did not send privileged

documents to third parties outside the legislative process; instead they brought

third parties into the process.” Id. at 236–37.

       On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Virginia has limited the scope of

its constitution’s legislative privilege to communications with only those third

parties who act as the agent, or alter ego, of the legislator. See Edwards, 790

S.E.2d at 481. Edwards addressed whether communications with individuals

beyond a legislator’s paid staff fell within the absolute privilege protected by the

Virgina speech or debate clause. Id. at 481–82. The court held that communica-

tions between legislators and consultants or constituents were protected as long

as they met an alter ego test: “Provided the legislator has requested the constit-

uent or third party’s assistance in the performance of a legislative act, the privi-

lege applies to that individual as much as to any other alter ego.” Id. at 483. The

court went on to limit its holding, explaining: “However, unsolicited communica-

tions and acts taken by the constituent or third party on his or her own initiative

will not satisfy this test, even when closely connected to legitimate legislative

activity.” Id.
       Our reliance on article I, section 20, protecting citizens’ involvement in the

legislative process, as supporting recognition of a legislative privilege leads us to

adopt the reasoning of the federal courts and conclude that the protection pro-

vided to the Legislators’ communications with third parties is not limited to only

those third parties acting as the Legislators’ agents. If the legislative privilege

extended only to individuals whom a legislator has asked to act on her behalf, a

citizens’ unsolicited communications to his legislator about specific legislation

would fall outside the legislative privilege. The subject of the communication is
what provides the limiting principle.
                                          20

      LULAC’s subpoenas target communications containing information about

the enactment and consideration of the election legislation. Because the

Legislators engaged in and received those communications “with respect to the

consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation,” Gravel, 408 U.S.

at 625, the information falls within the sphere of legislative activity regardless of

whether it originated from persons outside the legislature. Therefore, we

conclude that the Legislators’ communications with third parties regarding the

election legislation fall within the scope of the legislative privilege.

      C. The Requested Communications Are Not Relevant to LULAC’s

Claims and Are Therefore Protected by the Legislative Privilege. The

Legislators urge us to apply an absolute legislative privilege, under which our

analysis would stop once we conclude that the requested discovery falls within

its protection. LULAC argues that to the extent we recognize a privilege, we

should affirm the district court’s application of a qualified privilege and conclude

that the need for the discovery outweighs the privilege. LULAC asserts that the

Legislators’ communications with third parties will provide evidence that the

election legislation was enacted to intentionally discriminate against its members

based on their viewpoints. However, delving into the motive or purpose of
individual legislators to determine the constitutionality of legislative action is

confined to cases where such inquiry is required by the very nature of the

constitutional question presented. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.

367, 382–83 (1968) (rejecting defendant’s argument—that “the 1965 Amendment

is unconstitutional as enacted” since Congress’s purpose in implementing the

law was “to suppress freedom of speech”—because “under settled principles the

purpose of Congress, as [defendant] uses that term, is not a basis for declaring

this legislation unconstitutional”) Therefore, we must carefully consider how the
requested communications fit into LULAC’s underlying claims.
                                         21

      We believe the district court applied the wrong framework to LULAC’s

claims. As we explain, an individual legislator’s intent is not relevant when

LULAC’s claims are considered under the proper framework, and the legislative

privilege therefore precludes the requested production even if we recognized only

a qualified privilege. We need not, and do not, decide whether the legislative

privilege we adopt today is qualified or absolute. Either way, it protects the

Legislators in this case.

      The district court rightly rejected the Legislators’ argument that the views

of individual legislators are irrelevant to legislative intent in the context of stat-

utory interpretation, noting that count IV of LULAC’s petition was “not based on

the interpretation of the statutes” but was a challenge to “the law-making pro-

cess itself.” Instead, the district court applied a First Amendment free speech

framework to conclude that legislative intent is relevant to count IV, asserting

intentional viewpoint discrimination. The district court relied on Shapiro v.

McManus as recognizing that laws enacted with “ ‘the purpose and effect of bur-

dening a group of voters’ representational rights’ can be analyzed within the

framework of [the] First Amendment’s free speech protections.” (Quoting Shapiro,

203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 596 (D. Md. 2016).) Because that free speech analysis re-
quires the challenging parties to produce evidence of specific intent, the district

court concluded that the requested documents would shed light on legislative

intent, making it highly relevant to LULAC’s claim and leading the district court

to grant the motion to compel.

      The district court’s reliance on Shapiro is misplaced. Shapiro was a redis-

tricting case where the asserted injury was vote dilution based on political party.

203 F. Supp. 3d at 598. Initially, we note that Shapiro is a legal dead-end. The

United States Supreme Court subsequently held that the political gerrymander-
ing challenge to Maryland’s congressional redistricting that was raised in Shapiro
                                         22

presented a nonjusticiable political question. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139

S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (“We conclude that partisan gerrymandering claims

present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts. Federal judges

have no license to reallocate political power between the two major political par-

ties, with no plausible grant of authority in the Constitution, and no legal stand-

ards to limit and direct their decisions.”).

      Putting that legal hurdle aside, even racial gerrymandering cases like

Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections raise significantly different issues

than those posed by the election legislation challenged in this case. Some courts

have stated that “[r]edistricting litigation presents a particularly appropriate

circumstance for qualifying the state legislative privilege because judicial inquiry

into legislative intent is specifically contemplated as part of the resolution of the

core issue that such cases present.” Bethune-Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 337; see

also League of Women Voters of Fla., 132 So. 3d at 147 (concluding the legislative

privilege was outweighed by the “compelling, competing interest [of] ensuring

compliance with article III, section 20(a) [of the Florida constitution], which

specifically   outlaws   improper    legislative   ‘intent’   in   the   congressional

reapportionment process”); cf. J. Pierce Lamberson, Note, Drawing the Line on
Legislative Privilege: Interpreting State Speech or Debate Clauses in Redistricting

Litigation, 95 Wash. U. L. Rev. 203, 203 (2017) (recognizing “that [state] Speech

or Debate Clause protections [are being] watered down in the redistricting

context” and advocating for use of independent commissions for redistricting to

avoid “weaken[ing] Speech or Debate Clause protections”). And even then, some

federal courts applying the federal common law legislative privilege have rejected

“call[s] for a categorical exception [to the legislative privilege] whenever a

constitutional claim directly implicates the government’s intent.” Lee v. City of
                                        23

Los Angeles, 908 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting a categorical “exception

would render the privilege ‘of little value.’ ” (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377)).

      We also reject LULAC’s reliance on cases involving Fifth Amendment equal

protection challenges to voting laws as intentionally racially discriminatory. See,

e.g., Harness v. Watson, 47 F.4th 296 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (per curiam).

Voting laws like the disenfranchisement provision added to the Mississippi Con-

stitution are analyzed under “the Arlington Heights standard,” which applies to

laws “that are facially neutral but have racially disproportionate effects.” Id. at

303 (emphasis added). Under that “standard, ‘[p]roof of racially discriminatory

intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.’ ”

Id. at 303–04 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429

U.S. 252, 265 (1977)).

      But there is a distinct difference between claims of intentional discrimina-

tion premised on race, a suspect class for Fifth Amendment purposes, and those

premised on political viewpoint. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141

S. Ct. 2321, 2349 (2021) (“The spark for the debate over mail-in voting may well

have been provided by one Senator’s enflamed partisanship, but partisan mo-

tives are not the same as racial motives.”); Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502 (“Unlike
partisan gerrymandering claims, a racial gerrymandering claim does not ask for

a fair share of political power and influence, with all the justiciability conun-

drums that entails. It asks instead for the elimination of a racial classification.

A partisan gerrymandering claim cannot ask for the elimination of partisan-

ship.”). Thus, intentional discrimination involving a suspect class does not pro-

vide the proper framework, either.

      We believe the district court should have applied the balancing approach

set out by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, to determine whether the requested
                                         24

documents are relevant to LULAC’s constitutional claims. The underlying

premise of LULAC’s lawsuit challenges the election laws as burdening their

members’ individual rights to vote by making the voting process more difficult

and less accessible. Whether premised on free speech or equal protection,

challenges to voting regulations as burdening individual voters’ access to the

polls are more properly considered based on the severity of the burden under the

Anderson-Burdick balancing approach. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election

Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“To evaluate

a law respecting the right to vote—whether it governs voter qualifications,

candidate selection, or the voting process—we use the approach set out in

[Burdick].”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 344 (1995)

(describing Anderson and Burdick as cases where the Court “reviewed election

code provisions governing the voting process itself”); Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d

396, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2020) (“The Anderson-Burdick test may apply to First

Amendment claims as well as to Equal Protection claims.”). We adopted the

Anderson-Burdick framework in recent voting rights challenges under the Iowa

Constitution. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee v. Pate involved a

dispute over an emergency election directive issued by the secretary of state
concerning the dissemination of absentee ballot request forms leading up to the

November 2020 general election during the COVID-19 pandemic. 950 N.W.2d 1,

2–3, 6–7 (Iowa 2020) (per curiam). We employed the Anderson-Burdick balancing

test to reject the plaintiffs’ claim that the revised procedures impermissibly

burdened voting rights in violation of article II, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution,

as well as the due process and equal protection clauses of the Iowa Constitution.

Id. at 6–7 (putting the claims “in perspective” and concluding the burden of

providing a few additional items of personal identification on the request form
was not so great to “forc[e] us to rewrite Iowa’s election laws less than a month
                                         25

before the election”). We again used the balancing test in League of United Latin

American Citizens of Iowa v. Pate to reject a requested temporary injunction to

block enforcement of a recently enacted election law that limited how county

auditors could correct defective absentee ballot requests. 950 N.W.2d 204, 209

(Iowa 2020) (per curiam) (concluding the state’s interest in ensuring the person

completing an absentee request form is in fact the registered voter supported the

changed procedure). We believe this framework provides the correct analysis for

LULAC’s constitutional challenges here.

        The Anderson-Burdick test applies to challenges to “generally-applicable

and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the elec-

toral process itself.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.9. This is a flexible standard

that balances “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights

protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to

vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications

for the burden imposed by its rule.” Id. at 789. In Burdick, the United States

Supreme Court succinctly explained the balancing test as follows:

               Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the
        propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a
        challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment
        rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected
        to “severe” restrictions, the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to
        advance a state interest of compelling importance.” But when a state
        election law provision imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory
        restrictions” upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of
        voters, “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally suf-
        ficient to justify” the restrictions.

See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citation omitted) (first quoting

Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992); then quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at

788).
                                          26

      Under the Anderson-Burdick framework, legislative intent is not part of the

court’s analysis. Rather, courts employ an “analytical process comparable to that

used by courts ‘in ordinary litigation,’ ” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345 (quoting

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789), by weighing the state’s interests against the

respective interests of injured voters and assessing the extent to which the

contested voting restrictions are justified by the state’s interests, id. Thus, even

if a voting restriction is found to be severe and subject to a higher level of scrutiny

under the balancing test, it is the state’s regulatory interest—not the individual

legislator’s intent—that determines whether the restriction violates voters’

constitutional rights.

      At this stage of the litigation, the intent of individual legislators has little,

if any, relevance to LULAC’s claims. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203–04 (majority

opinion) (“[I]f a nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications,

those justifications should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests

may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators. The state

interests identified as justifications for SEA 483 are both neutral and sufficiently

strong to require us to reject petitioners’ facial attack on the statute.”). Unless

and until a showing is made that that framework should be supplanted, the
communications LULAC seeks by subpoena from the Legislators will not further

its underlying claims, and there is no reason to abrogate the legislative privilege

in this case, even if we determined it to be a qualified privilege. Cf. Bethune-Hill,

114 F. Supp. 3d at 337 (abrogating the common law legislative privilege afforded

state legislators was “particularly appropriate” in redistricting litigation where

“legislative intent is specifically contemplated as part of the resolution of the core

issue” involved).
                                    27

     IV. Conclusion.

     We reverse the district court’s judgment granting in part LULAC’s motion

to compel and remand with instructions to quash the subpoenas.

     PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI GRANTED; WRIT SUSTAINED.