Court Opinion

ID: 9550130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:30:13.267375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:35.406059
License: Public Domain

ERWIN, Justice
(concurring).
I regret that I am forced to dissent from the reasoning expressed even though I agree with the result in this case. “I have no objection, dislike or distaste for any particular hair style worn by either male or female of any age. My acceptance of the hair styling of other human beings is tempered by my thinking that whatever the style it should be clean, reasonably neat (whatever that means, and present no danger to. the health or safety of the individual or to others.” 1. In the case at hand, there appears to be no question but that the hair in question was clean, neat and presented no danger to the health or safety of Breese or anyone else.
But the length or style of Michael Breese’s hair is not the issue here. It is rather the nature and scope of the power of the school board — more precisely, the limits of that power. Traditionally, the board’s power has rested on the common law doctrine of in loco parentis. William Blackstone has provided us with what is perhaps the classic statement of this doctrine :
“[A parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or school master of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer for the purposes for which he is employed.” 2
Thus the board’s authority must be delineated on the basis of subtle distinctions de*176rived from the functions that society has given it to perform. Today the situation has changed somewhat and the modern school board is a public agency operating under a legislative grant of authority. While the statutory delegation of school board authority is exclusive, the statutory scheme must nevertheless be read against the background of the common law rules.3
The American community groups together in its schools hundreds, even thousands, of energetic, volatile and sometimes aggressive young people in close contact with one another and in confined areas, during a substantial part of each school day for three-fourths of each year and twelve years of their lives.
The bare process of teaching them in the traditional sense demands the best that the profession can offer. But in addition we call upon the schools to give our children driver training, vocational skills, public speaking, music instruction, and sex education, and to maintain their physical fitness, to carry on ever broadening athletic programs, engage in fund raising, and plan, produce and chaperone social events.
Citizens expect and demand that their children be physically safe in the schools to whose supervision they are consigned, and the citizenry is outraged if the schools are less than safe and orderly. At the same time we expect that the requirements of order, and of protection and implementation of the educational program of the school, will be met by limited enforcement means — the force of the school establishment itself and the school-related disciplines of reprimand, suspension, and expulsion — recognizing that the schoolroom is an inappropriate place for the policeman to be, whether called or needed.
Just as we do not expect parents to be perfect, recognizing that a certain amount of trial and error is necessary for the development of both the parents and the child, we cannot rationally demand perfection from the school. Each year, as the makeup of a school class changes, the same trial and error process is necessary to establish an atmosphere for teaching. The initial guidelines provide a basic starting point for teachers and students alike to assess each other and to establish a working relationship. In measuring the appropriateness and reasonableness of school regulations against constitutional protections, the courts must give full credence to the role and purposes of the schools and of the tools with which they must deal with their problems. The courts must be careful to recognize the differences between what are reasonable restraints in the classroom and what are reasonable restraints on the street corner. This is not to say, however, that there are no limits to board authority. Indeed, there must be (just as there must be limits on parental authority).
The majority opinion balances these interests by placing the burden of a school board of justifying each regulation which restricts any constitutional right of a student to establish a “compelling state interest” before the regulation will be upheld. I feel that the majority has placed the wrong burden on the wrong party. I view of the nature and function of the school board in the present day educational process, I am strongly of the opinion that it is the student who should bear the burden of showing that a particular rule bore no reasonable relationship to the purpose for which it was promulgated. This reasonable relationship “must be an obvious and real connection between the regulation and its purpose. . . . ”4
The effect of the majority opinion is to tightly constrict board authority at a time when citizens are demanding more from *177the school. This could bring the educational process to a ponderous halt:
“Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the ‘compelling state interest’ standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than perfection.5
This court is in a difficult position to judge the needs of local school districts scattered over the reaches of Alaska. Their problems are as diverse as the inhabitants and the climate. Innovation and experimentation have been the order of the day as local schools met local problems. I fear the perfection we now require will greatly limit this at a time when we most need new ideas and approaches to solve our basic problems. The board may spend its time repetitively justifying its legitimate authority rather than solving its problems.
However, the application of a burden such as I have proposed would not have changed the result in the case at bar. The school board, in its arguments both below and on appeal, limited its justification of the instant rule to a claim that the regulation of hair length was conducive to good academic performance and deportment.6 Highly qualified expert testimony brought forth by appellant was unanimous in denying that there was any “obvious and real connection” between the length of hair and academic performance or deportment. We have not been cited to nor have we found any medical authority which refutes this testimony.7 It is on this very narrow basis that I concur in this case.

. Murphy v. Pocatello School District #25, 94 Idaho 32, 480 P.2d 878, 884 (1971) (Shepard, J., dissenting). I am indebted to Justice Shepard for this forceful expression of views which reflect strongly my feelings on this issue.

. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 453.

. Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Non-Constitutional Analysis, 117 U.Pa.L.Rev. 373, 384 (1969).

. State v. Also, 11 Ariz.App. 227, 463 P.2d 122 (1969).

. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274, 296 (1972), Chief Justice Burger, dissenting.

. A further issue of direct relevance to the tyj>e of rule promulgated here arises on the passage of the sexual discrimination amendments to both the federal and state constitutions. However, the point was not raised and was not considered by the court.

. The adoption of regulations concerning dress and style can, perhaps, be reasonably related to health, safety, or character development. However, common sense dictates that such regulations should be adopted only with both student and parent participation in order to insure an even approach to the problem, to avoid the possible prejudices of any one individual, and to insure both respect and understanding of the regulations. See King v. Saddleback Jr. College Dist., 495 F.2d 932, 934-935 (9th Cir.1971).