Court Opinion

ID: 3612323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:56:07.100135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:18.706663
License: Public Domain

I dissent from the decision about to be made. The relator having been arrested under a warrant charging him with the commission of grand larceny, sued out in the Supreme Court a writ of habeas corpus, in aid of which a writ of certiorari was issued. On the return to the writs the relator was remanded to custody by the Special Term. This order was reversed by the Appellate Division and the relator discharged, and from that order an appeal is brought to this court.
That the warrant was sufficient on its face is unquestioned, and the ground on which the relator has been discharged is that the depositions before the magistrate were insufficient to justify the issue of the warrant. Doubtless, where there is no evidence in the depositions tending to show the commission of the crime and the guilt of the defendant, the court may go behind the warrant and discharge the prisoner. (Church on Habeas Corpus, sec. 286.) But there must constantly be borne in mind the radical distinction between the proof requisite for the issue of a warrant and that required for conviction on the trial of the defendant. In the latter case the proof must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In the former it is sufficient that the evidence shows reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed a crime (Code of Crim. Pro. sec. 150), or, as commonly said, a case of probable cause. If there is no evidence whatever justifying the inference of guilt the magistrate acts without jurisdiction, the process is illegal, and both the magistrate and the party suing out the warrant are liable as trespassers. But if "the evidence produced was colorable — something upon which the judicial mind was called upon to act in determining the question of probable cause" — the magistrate had jurisdiction and the warrant was valid. (Pratt
v. Bogardus, 49 Barb. 89.) It must be further borne in mind that the relator was discharged before examination, and the distinction between a discharge upon the warrant and the depositions on which it was issued and a discharge after examination is important. In the first case the discharge proceeds on the *Page 432 
theory that the arrest is absolutely illegal, the case being destitute of any evidence of guilt calling for a judicial determination, while after examination the Supreme Court, as the successor of the King's Bench, may, even on habeas corpus, review the evidence and reverse the decision of the magistrate. But, as pointed out by Church in his work on Habeas Corpus (Sec. 234; see also Hurd on Habeas Corpus, chap. 6, secs. 3, 4 and 5), such power in reality springs from the superiority and appellate power of the court issuing the writ, and not from the Habeas Corpus Act. Therefore, the question presented to us is the same as that which would arise were the relator to sue the magistrate for false imprisonment in having issued the warrant. If in such an action the court ought to instruct the jury that, as a matter of law, the arrest of the relator was illegal, the relator has properly been discharged; if not, not.
We are, therefore, brought to the question whether there was any evidence in the depositions tending to show that the relator had been guilty of a crime; for "when the proof has a legal tendency to make out a proper case, in all its parts, for issuing the process, then, although the proof may be slight and inconclusive, the process may be valid, until it is set aside by a direct proceeding for that purpose." (Miller v.Brinkerhoff, 4 Denio, 118.) In Swart v. Richard (148 N.Y. 264) it was held that a deposition stating "deponent believes and has reason to believe that said store was broken into and burglarized by James H. Swart and Wallace Van Evera and another, from the fact that said parties were about that time, i.e.,
after one o'clock that night prowling around and near the premises," was sufficient to give the magistrate jurisdiction to issue the warrant and to defeat an action for false imprisonment. In that case Judge MARTIN, writing for the court, said: "The deposition contained a statement of facts which was sufficient to call upon the magistrate for judicial consideration and determination, and tended to prove the guilt of the respondent."
It is not necessary to consider whether the facts stated in *Page 433 
the depositions would make out a case of larceny at common law; because for more than a century embezzlement by clerks, agents and officers had been made criminal by statute, and the effect of the Penal Code was to abolish the distinction between the two crimes and make both larceny. By section 528 of the Penal Code, "A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person. * * * Having in his possession, custody, or control, as a bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trustee, or officer of any person, association or corporation * * * any money, property, evidence of debt or contract, article of value of any nature, or thing in action or possession, appropriates the same to his own use, or that of any person other than the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof; steals such property, and is guilty of larceny." The depositions show that in September, 1904, the relator, who was a trustee and vice-president of the New York Life Insurance Company, had a conversation with the president of said company, in which the latter stated that he had promised to contribute to Cornelius N. Bliss, treasurer of the Republican national committee, the sum of $50,000, or so much thereof as might be necessary for the purposes of the Republican campaign. It was then substantially agreed between the parties that the relator should pay the money out of his own funds and thereafter be repaid by the company. In pursuance of this understanding the relator did pay Bliss sums aggregating $48,500. On December 30, 1904, the relator demanded repayment of the sums advanced by him, which was made by order of the president through the method of a check of the company drawn, not to the order of the relator personally, but to that of J.P. Morgan  Company, a firm of bankers of which the relator was a member. This occurred at a meeting of the finance committee at which the relator's agreement with the president was stated, but no vote authorizing the payment was taken and no minutes of the transaction entered. In the stub of the company's *Page 434 
check book the entry was made, "No. 7283 Dec. 30, 1904, Charge Hanover Office a.c Order of J.P. Morgan  Co. 48,702.50," and in the books of account, the following: "1904, Dec. 30. Hanover Office Account charged — Treasury Department. Cheque J.P. Morgan Co. $48,702.50. Entry made by Mattison. Hanover Bank Office Account: Charged Ledger Bo. 3. — Treasury Department. 1904. Dec. 30. By order of President $48,702.50. Entry made in ledger by Mattison." In the deposition of Darwin P. Kingsley it is averred that the president of the company "by virtue of his office, had power to make disbursements known as disbursements upon executive order; and that said president did not ask the committee as such to take official action on the transaction narrated, but desired to inform the committee of the facts." There was submitted to the magistrate a written statement made by the relator to the district attorney, in which he admitted the understanding with the president as to the payment of the moneys by him to Bliss, and their repayment by the check of the company. He denied knowledge of the entries in the company's books and asserted that when he made the advances and was reimbursed therefor "it never occurred to me (him) that there could be any question as to the propriety of such expenditure, which I believe to be for the benefit of the Company."
It is also unnecessary to consider whether the relator as an officer of the company had at the time in his "possession, custody or control," the funds or property of the company within the provisions of the Penal Code. Certainly the president had such custody and control, and by section 29 of the Penal Code a person who aids or abets the commission of a crime or directly or indirectly counsels its commission, is equally a principal with the person who commits the acts. Nor have the provisions of section 548, that it is a sufficient defense to indictment for larceny that the property was appropriated openly under a claim of title in good faith, any application to the case. The crime, if there was any in this case, commenced when the original agreement was made between *Page 435 
the relator and the president, by which the money of the company was to be appropriated to the use of Bliss and the method was adopted, for the purpose of concealing such appropriation, that the relator should in the first instance pay the money to Bliss and thereafter receive the money of the company. The repayment to the relator was not an independent transaction, but part of the original scheme, and must stand or fall with the legality or criminality of that scheme.
It thus appears that by the joint action of the relator and the president of the company this large sum of money was taken from the funds of the company and given to Cornelius Bliss for expenditure for political purposes. Mr. Bliss, neither in his personal nor in his representative capacity had any claim on the company for the money, legal, equitable or moral. The company was to be permanently deprived of it, for it never was to be returned, nor was any consideration to inure to the company for the money paid. The purpose for which it was to be employed was wholly foreign to the business of the corporation and one in which the company had no possible interest, except that of every citizen in the good government of the country. That this was an illegal misappropriation of the company's funds, for which every director or officer engaged therein was personally liable to the corporation, seems to me too clear for debate. A majority of the Appellate Division so held, and as I read the opinion of my brother GRAY this court is of the same opinion. Hence it is unnecessary to pursue the discussion of this question further. The relator, therefore, falls exactly within the provisions of the Penal Code, so far as the act is involved, not dealing for the moment with the question of the relator's intent and his belief as to his own authority or that of the president. He has without right deprived the company of its property and appropriated the same to the use of another person not the owner nor entitled to the benefit thereof.
But it is said by the judges of the Appellate Division that the misappropriation of the moneys was simply ultra vires and not illegal, and reliance is placed upon a quotation from the *Page 436 
opinion of Judge COMSTOCK in Bissell v. Michigan Southern N.I.R.R. Co. (22 N.Y. 258) where he said: "A subscription made by authority of the board of directors and under the corporate seal, for the building of a church or college, or an almshouse, would be clearly ultra vires, but it would not be illegal." By a singular fatality there has been entirely overlooked the very next sentence to the one quoted: "If every corporator shouldexpressly assent to such an application of the funds, it would still be ultra vires, but no wrong would be committed and no public interest violated." Doubtless the action or contract of a corporation may be ultra vires and yet be vicious in no other respect, but also the action of a board of directors of a corporation may be not only ultra vires, but criminal. If a bank should purchase and operate a railroad the action would be, in the absence of any statutory provision on the subject, simplyultra vires, and the corporation could not defend an action against it by a passenger for personal injuries on the plea that the operation of the road was beyond its corporate powers. If, however, the directors of a bank should direct the assets of the corporation to be divided among themselves to the exclusion of the stockholders, the action would not only be ultra vires,
but on the part of the directors who might receive the money under the resolution simply theft. The appropriation of the funds or property of a corporation towards an enterprise or business upon which the corporation is not under its charter authorized to embark, is merely ultra vires, if the enterprise is prosecuted for the benefit of the corporation. But when the money or property is applied, not for the use or benefit of the corporation, but for that of third persons, the act is either a tort or a crime, regardless of the question whether the purpose to which the money is applied is one which the corporation under its charter might or might not have pursued. In other words, where the money is applied to the use of a corporation, but to an unauthorized use, it is ultra vires; where it is applied to the use of third parties it is a wrong.
There is this further answer to the argument of the Appellate *Page 437 
Division. There is no proof that the corporation authorized the payment to Bliss, and as it would have been an illegal act on the part of the directors (from whom it seems to have been concealed), it must be assumed in the absence of proof to the contrary that it was not authorized. "Power to bind the corporation can be presumed to exist only in its executive agents and officers within the scope of its ordinary business and their ordinary duties." (First National Bank of Lyons v. OceanNational Bank, 60 N.Y. 278.) It appears by a statement in one of the affidavits already quoted that the president by virtue of his office "had power to make disbursements known as disbursements upon executive order." Plainly the authority so given to the president was solely to make disbursements for the use and benefit of the corporation. If that is to be construed as an authority for the president to appropriate the moneys of the company for whatever purpose he chose, and for the benefit of any person he might desire to befriend, regardless of any interest of the corporation in the appropriation, then it is sufficient to say that all the parties were engaged in a criminal conspiracy to loot the company, and this instead of relieving the relator from responsibility would emphasize his offense. It must be remembered that the relator was not a mere clerk or subordinate, to whom the word of the president was law, and whose means of livelihood might be dependent on the president's favor, but a trustee and vice-president of the company, and a member of one of the greatest banking firms in the country. He owed the company the duty, not only of abstaining from participating in any misappropriation of the funds by the president, but of aggressive action against the president to prevent or expose such misappropriation. Surely, no one will pretend that the authority so given the president would have authorized the relator to advance, with the agreement for repayment from the company's funds, $50,000 to buy a diamond necklace for a woman, and there is nothing wrong in buying a necklace for a woman if a man pays for it with his own money. There is a distinction between the two cases, in that it is even more apparent *Page 438 
in the necklace purchase than in the payment to Bliss, that the expenditure was for a subject in which the corporation had no interest. But the very distinction proves that the authority of the president was not unlimited or unqualified. It is only fair to the relator, however, to say that his claim is not that the authority of the president was unlimited, but his belief that the payment was for the benefit of the company, and, therefore, within the authority of the president.
Something is also said in the opinion below of the beneficent character of the purpose to which the money was appropriated. Of that we can hardly take judicial notice. Probably at all times it would be regarded as beneficient in Vermont and maleficent in Georgia, while in New York its character would vary from year to year. The meritorious character of the object to which the money was appropriated has no bearing on the question of larceny. The gist of that offense is not the application of money to a bad purpose, but taking money that does not belong to the taker to appropriate to an object good or bad. It is the fraudulent deprivation of an owner of his property that constitutes larceny. It is a crime to steal, even though with the intent to give away in charity and relieve distress. (Regina v. White, 9 C.  P. 344.) I do not assert that it is immaterial which party is in control of the government of the nation and that the subject is a matter of indifference to the citizen. If this were so, the profession of political faith would be mere hypocrisy. If the citizen, with his own means, contributes to legitimate political expenses to secure the success of the party which he deems will most inure to the welfare of the nation, his action is laudable, and even if the inducement be the belief that the success of that party will inure to the advancement of his personal interest, as distinguished from that of the country at large, it may be justifiable; but to apply the money of another without his consent to such an object is neither laudable nor justifiable, but dishonest. The money given to Bliss belonged neither to the president nor to the relator, but was simply in their custody. Its legal owner was the artificial being, the corporation; *Page 439 
its beneficial owners were the policyholders. With the immense business carried on by the corporation, policies issued in every part of the country and to persons of every political party, both the relator and the president must have well known that the universal assent of the policyholders, the only thing which could have justified, even morally (not legally), the payment to Bliss, could never be obtained and that at all times a substantial minority would be opposed to such payment. But though there was an illegal misappropriation of the corporate funds by the relator this does not necessarily prove that he was guilty of larceny. It may have been simply a trespass for which he is only civilly liable. I agree with Judge GRAY that to constitute larceny there must be what is termed a felonious intent, but we do not make progress towards the determination of the question before us unless we ascertain what is a felonious intent. The question has given rise to much discussion in text books and in judicial opinions. Whether "intent" is the proper term to employ may well be doubted. Though a man may commit many statutory offenses unwittingly, no one can become a thief or an embezzler accidentally or by mistake. To constitute the offense there must be in the perpetrator the consciousness of the dishonesty of the act. This, however, as frequently turns on the knowledge or belief of the party as to his authority as on his intent regarding the disposition of the property. It is not necessary either at common law or under the statute that the intent should be the profit of the taker, for as already said it is theft to take property to give away as well as to keep for oneself. In the present case no one will doubt that had a clerk taken from the company's till a sum of money to give to the Republican club of his ward it would have been larceny. Whatever distinction there may be between the hypothetical case and that of this relator does not lie in the object for which the moneys were appropriated, for that in each case would be the same, but in the difference between the authority over the corporate funds possessed by the mere clerk and by the president and vice-president. The *Page 440 
clerk, of course, would know that he had no authority to so divert the corporate funds; the president and the relator might, though they should have known to the contrary, possibly have entertained a different view on the subject. This brings us to the real and, to my mind, the only question in this case. As has been already said, the relator and the president of the company, without the authority of the corporation and knowing that all the beneficial owners would never assent to the act, took the moneys of the company without consideration and appropriated them to the exclusive use of a third party. The relator must be presumed to have known the law and to have intended the natural consequences of his acts, which were to deprive the company of the money. If he knew the illegality of his act and his intention was solely to benefit either Mr. Bliss personally or the political organization which he represented, then he was guilty of larceny. If, however, as asserted in his statements to the district attorney, he believed that the expenditure would be for the benefit of the company and that the president had the power to make the same, then, however mistaken on the subject, he was not guilty. This was necessarily and properly a question of fact to be determined by the magistrate, not one of law. Though the prosecution put in evidence before the magistrate the written statement of the relator, the magistrate was at liberty to believe it or to reject it in whole or in part. (People v. Van Zile, 143 N.Y. 368;Becker v. Koch, 104 id. 394; President, etc., Manhattan Co. v. Phillips, 109 id. 383.) The indirect method in which the payment to Mr. Bliss was made and the fact concealed by having the money in the first instance advanced by the relator instead of by the company, and the method in which the relator was reimbursed by a check, not to him personally, but to the order of J.P. Morgan  Company, a banking firm with which the corporation may have large legitimate dealings, casts suspicion on the good faith of the relator, and might be considered by the magistrate as militating against him. The explanation of this course offered by the relator, that it was to relieve the president from solicitations from *Page 441 
other political parties, might also be discredited. It is difficult to imagine how the representatives of other parties would have access to the company's books; nor would the scheme of payment enable the officers of the company when solicited to say that the company had made no contributions to other parties, because such an answer would be as essentially a falsehood as if the money had been paid by the company in the first instance. The concealment of the payment as described would warrant the magistrate in finding that the parties were conscious of wrongdoing in making it and feared exposure. The relator asserts that he was ignorant of the character of the entries made in the company's books, and there is no proof to the contrary of this statement. But he must have known that the check to pay him was drawn, not to himself, but to Morgan  Company. On the other hand, there is, doubtless, to be considered in the relator's favor the fact that he made no pecuniary profit by the transaction and that he afterwards openly admitted his participation in it. All this, however, merely raised a question of fact to be passed on by the magistrate, with whose determination other courts cannot interfere in this proceeding.
In the very recent case of Tyson v. Bauland (186 N.Y. 397), which was an action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff, a woman entirely reputable but in the humbler walks of life, was arrested for theft in a department store. The prosecuting witness had placed her bag containing money with other articles on a counter in the store while she was examining goods. The bag was missed. Afterwards the plaintiff was discovered with it going towards the door. She surrendered it to the prosecuting witness, stating that it had been given to her by a woman in another part of the store, who directed her to carry it to a lady whom she would find at the door. On opening the bag it was discovered that the money had been taken therefrom. The plaintiff was arrested, but the grand jury evidently believed her story, for it failed to indict. Thereupon she brought the suit for false imprisonment. We said that the officer was not bound to accept the plaintiff's *Page 442 
explanation, and that on the facts there was probable cause for the arrest, although the plaintiff was in fact innocent. It may be in the present case that the relator's character is so good and his standing so high that either on the examination or on the trial it will seem clear that he could not have consciously and knowingly misappropriated the money of the company. It is also but fair to the memory of the president, who is now deceased, to say that it is entirely possible that his standing and character may appear to have been equally as good. The relator is entitled to the full benefit of the presumption arising from such character when presented at the proper place and before the proper tribunal. But, of course, nothing of that nature appears or can appear in the depositions on which the warrants were issued. However high the standing and character of the relator may be, it does not justify a departure in his case from the same orderly course of procedure in the administration of justice which would be followed in case of the humblest citizen charged with an offense.
As to the questions discussed in the opinion of Judge HISCOCK, with the utmost deference to my learned brother I insist that the rule already stated by me of the right of the magistrate to credit part of the statement of the relator and reject the rest, applies with the same force to an admission made out of court and put in evidence by the prosecution as it would to testimony given by the relator on the trial itself. I dissent from the doctrine "that where use is made in a judicial proceeding of a prior declaration the entire declaration at the time made, so far as relevant, must be taken together; a party may not utilize only so much of the declaration as is for his benefit, but he must also admit that which is against his interest and the whole must stand or fall together," though it may be that my brother intends this to be qualified by his subsequent statements. If the proposition is correct, then the action of the district attorney in laying before the magistrate the declaration of the relator was without justification, because he had proof outside of that declaration of the *Page 443 
facts showing the commission of the offense. But I respectfully insist that the law is the reverse. The rule is thus stated by Mr. Greenleaf, referring to admissions made not on the trial: "But though the whole of what he said at the same time, and relating to the same subject, must be given in evidence, yet it does not follow that all the parts of the statement are to be regarded as equally worthy of credit; but it is for the jury to consider, under all the circumstances, how much of the whole statement they deem worthy of belief, including as well the facts asserted by the party in his own favor, as those making against him" (Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 201); and referring to confessions in criminal prosecutions: "The jury may believe that part which charges the prisoner, and reject that which is in his favor, if they see sufficient grounds for so doing." (Id. sec. 218.) Of course, if the only evidence against a party is his admission or confession then the adverse party cannot rely on the admission without taking the explanation. The cases cited by my learned brother are of that nature. Even that rule, however, is not unqualified, for if the explanation is improbable then it may be rejected, though there is no evidence against the party making it other than the declaration. (Penfield v. Jacobs, 21 Barb. 335.) The case of Kelsey v. Bush (2 Hill, 440) asserts the principle: "If that part of the confession which discharges the party is in itself highly improbable, or if there be evidence aliunde, though but slight, tending to discredit it, the jury may believe one part of the confession and reject the other." In fact, however, under the Code of Criminal Procedure the question can never arise in this bald form in a criminal prosecution, for a conviction cannot be supported by the confession of the defendant without additional proof to show that the crime charged has been committed. (Sec. 198.)
The voluntary character of the admission of the act charged against him is doubtless to be considered on the question of his good faith. But the weight to be accorded it may depend very much on the circumstances under which it was made. If, when the charge was first publicly made that the money *Page 444 
of the company had been appropriated for a political contribution, the relator admitted the fact and justified it, his conduct would be potent, if not conclusive, evidence in his favor. The offense is charged to have been committed in December, 1904. The relator's declaration was made in March, 1906. If, during this interval, there was a complete exposure of the transaction upon evidence taken before some tribunal or legislative body, of such a conclusive character as to render denial futile and unavailing, the voluntary character of the relator's admission might be deprived of its merit. Any clever offender might, under similar circumstances, not unnaturally, adopt the same course. Of the circumstances under which the admission was made we have, however, no knowledge, but on an examination before the magistrate those circumstances would appear.
The case of McCourt v. People (64 N.Y. 583) decided no new principle of law. A similar case seems to have arisen as far back as the time of Elizabeth, when a traveler meeting a fisherman, who refused to sell him fish, forcibly took the fish from him but left with him money exceeding their value. (2 East's Pleas of the Crown, 661.) Both cases proceed on the theory that as the party paid or offered to pay more than the value of the goods taken there could be no fraudulent intent. That principle has no relevancy to the present case.
The recent statute prohibiting political contributions by corporations (Laws of 1906, chap. 239), and punishing officers and agents making such contributions as for a misdemeanor does not bear on the question before us. The statute now makes the payment of such contributions criminal, though even every stockholder and every director of the company should expressly authorize and direct it. But returning to the illustration of the clerk taking the money of the corporation from the till to give to his ward club, the statute will not reduce his offense from larceny to a misdemeanor. The charge against the relator is not that he paid the money to Bliss and received it back from the company, by the authority of the *Page 445 
corporation, but that the payment and repayment were made without that authority.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and that of the Special Term affirmed.