Court Opinion

ID: 9859491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:54:13.821835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:50:26.304391
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the-majority that the defendant’s convictions for the offense of possession of title without complete assignment, in violation of section 4 — 104(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4 — 104(a)(2) (West 1996)), cannot stand. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s further conclusion, in response to the defendant’s petition for rehearing, that the defendant’s convictions for failure to keep records, in violation of section 5 — 401.2(a) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/5— 401.2(a) (West 1996)), must also be reversed. The defendant now argues, and the majority now agrees, that the statute defining that offense might punish innocent conduct and is therefore unconstitutional. I believe that section 5 — 401.2(a) is valid; accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion, as modified on denial of rehearing, and I would instead adhere to the conclusion found in our original opinion in this case, filed February 17, 2000, that the trial judge properly found the defendant guilty of those charges. The record-keeping requirements of section 5 — 401.2 are part of a group of statutes found in chapter V of the Vehicle Code that regulate licensed automobile dealers, transporters, wreckers, and rebuilders. As a dealer in used auto parts, the defendant was licensed under article III of that chapter, which is applicable to automotive parts recyclers, scrap processors, repairers, and rebuilders. Pursuant to section 5 — 401.2, the defendant was required to maintain extensive and detailed records regarding the acquisition and disposition of automobiles and automobile parts in the course of his business. In addition, the defendant’s operations were subject to periodic inspections by the Secretary of State, whose office is authorized to ensure compliance with the record-keeping requirements of the Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/5 — 403 (West 1996). As the majority recognizes, the legislative purposes for this statutory scheme are expressed in section 5 — 100—1 of the Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/5 — 100—1 (West 1996). After stating a number of findings by the legislature regarding the problems of motor vehicle theft and the business of motor vehicle sales and repairs, section 5 — 100—1 concludes, “It is, therefore, the intent of the General Assembly to establish a system of mandatory licensing and record keeping which will prevent or reduce the transfer or sale of stolen vehicles or their parts within this State.” It is readily apparent that the records that scrap yard operators and licensees like the defendant are required to keep under section 5 — 401.2 represent an integral part of this statutory scheme. The defendant, as a licensee under the Vehicle Code, is a participant in a highly regulated industry, and the legislature has reasonably determined that extensive record keeping is a responsibility of licensees under the Code. Despite the legislature’s clear findings and statement of intent, the majority concludes that the offense found in section 5 — 401.2 does not bear a rational relationship to the evil it is designed to address. Specifically, the majority concludes that the statute might punish what, in the majority’s view, is wholly innocent conduct. I disagree. The record-keeping requirements of section 5 — 401.2 apply only to persons licensed under the provisions of chapter V of the Vehicle Code. I believe that the legislature may define offenses in this manner and impose on persons who engage in certain trades and occupations the duty to compile and maintain records of their business. The pertinent constitutional question in these circumstances is not whether there might be an innocent explanation for a licensee’s knowing failure to keep certain records, as the majority suggests, but whether the record-keeping requirements imposed by the legislature are rationally related to the evils the legislation is designed to remedy. The second question must be answered in the affirmative, in light of the obvious relationship between the record-keeping requirements of section 5 — 401.2 and the legislature’s goal of reducing the traffic in stolen automobiles and automobile parts. Given the state’s significant interest in regulating the business of automobile recyclers and parts dealers, and the corresponding necessity for extensive record keeping by licensed operators, I believe that the present case is much different from the cases cited by the majority, in which challenged offenses might irrationally criminalize conduct legitimately performed without a criminal purpose (see People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36 (1994); People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62 (1985); see also State v. Saiez, 489 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1986) (possession of credit card embossing machine); Akron v. Rasdan, 105 Ohio App. 3d 164, 663 N.E.2d 947 (1995) (possession of knife more than 2½ inches long)), or in which the penalty for a challenged offense is not rationally related to the goals of the underlying legislation (People v. Hamm, 149 Ill. 2d 201 (1992)). The present appeal does not involve circumstances remotely similar to those cases. The defendant is licensed under chapter V of the Vehicle Code, and pursuant to section 5 — 401.2 he is required to keep certain records regarding his business. The duty imposed on the defendant as a licensee under the Code is rationally related to the goals of the legislation, and I would therefore conclude that section 5 — 401.2 is constitutional. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.