Court Opinion

ID: 9378983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 14:00:26.042821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:28.335165
License: Public Domain

22-1158
    Smulley v. Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc.

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                         SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

                  At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 14th day of March, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                REENA RAGGI,
                JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                      Circuit Judges. ∗
    _____________________________________

    Dorothy A. Smulley,

                               Plaintiff-Appellant,

                      v.                                                    22-1158

    Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc., Safeco
    Insurance Company of Illinois, Liberty Mutual Insurance
    Company, Howd & Ludorf LLC, Philip T. Newbury, Jr.,
    Berchem Moses PC, Jonathan D. Berchem, Daniel H.
    Kryzanski,

                      Defendants-Appellees.
    _____________________________________

    ∗
       Circuit Judge José A. Cabranes, originally a member of the panel, has recused himself from
    considering this matter. The two remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement, have
    determined the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone, 140
    F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 1998).
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                              Dorothy A. Smulley, pro se,
                                                                      Stratford, CT.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES LIBERTY                                      Philip T. Newbury, Jr.,
MUTUAL HOLDING COMPANY, INC.,                                         Howd & Ludorf, LLC,
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF                                           Wethersfield, CT.
ILLINOIS, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, HOWD & LUDORF LLC, PHILIP T.
NEWBURY, JR.:

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES BERCHEM                                      Peter J. Biging,
MOSES PC, JONATHAN D. BERCHEM:                                        Goldberg Segalla LLP,
                                                                      New York, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE DANIEL H.                                      No appearance.
KRYZANSKI:

       Appeal from a judgment, entered on May 3, 2022, of the United States District Court for

the District of Connecticut (Omar A. Williams, J.).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

       Appellant Dorothy A. Smulley, proceeding pro se, sued defendants-appellees, bringing

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Her claims arise from a Connecticut state court

action in which she sued Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois (“Safeco”) and two auto repair

shops in connection with a dispute as to whether to repair her car or consider it a total loss. In the

instant action, Smulley sues Safeco and affiliated insurance entities (the “insurance company

defendants”), as well as the law firms and attorneys involved in representing the defendants in the

state court litigation (the “law firm/attorney defendants”), for various torts and constitutional

violations. Smulley appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

                                                  2
       In reviewing a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), this Court reviews factual

findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547

F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008). We may “affirm on any ground with support in the record,” Cox v.

Onondaga Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 760 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 2014), “including grounds upon which

the district court did not rely,” Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1993).

       The district court erred in grounding dismissal in lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather

than failure to state a claim. In determining whether the district court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1331, “[a] non-frivolous allegation of a cause of action under federal law suffices to

invoke federal court jurisdiction.” Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)); see Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45 (2015) (stating

that court should not dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction unless federal claim is “wholly

insubstantial and frivolous”). The failure to name a state actor in a § 1983 action is not a

jurisdictional defect here, but should instead be evaluated under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Id.

       Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and “allow[] the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although all allegations contained in a complaint are accepted

as true, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts are

obligated to construe pro se complaints liberally to raise the strongest claims they suggest. Hill

v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011).

                                                 2
       “[T]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was injured by either a state

actor or a private party acting under color of state law.” Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292

F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002). Private parties act under color of state law when their conduct is

“fairly attributable to the state.” Den Hollander v. Copacabana Nightclub, 624 F.3d 30, 33 (2d

Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

       Here, none of the defendants are state actors. The insurance company defendants are not

state actors for purposes of § 1983 simply because they are regulated by the state, see Jackson v.

Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350–51, 358 (1974), and Smulley has not plausibly alleged that

their conduct was fairly attributable to the state. Similarly, the law firm/attorney defendants’

participation in the state court action did not render them state actors. See Polk County v. Dodson,

454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when

performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”);

Milan v. Wertheimer, 808 F.3d 961, 964 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (holding that law guardians

appointed to represent children in a state court custody dispute were not state actors); Fine v. City

of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975) (“Although Klein’s status as an attorney provides him

with no immunity, neither does it satisfy the test of state action that must be met before liability

may be imposed pursuant to § 1983.”).

       Nor does the complaint support a plausible claim that any defendant conspired with a state

actor. A private actor “engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal

rights” acts under color of state law for the purposes of § 1983. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914,

920 (1984). “In order to survive a motion to dismiss on [a] § 1983 conspiracy claim, [a plaintiff]

must allege (1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to

                                                 3
inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing

damages.” Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 324–25. “A merely conclusory allegation that a private

entity acted in concert with a state actor does not suffice to state a § 1983 claim against the private

entity.” Id. at 324.

       Notwithstanding Smulley’s conclusory assertions in her complaint, she has not alleged

facts that could support a plausible inference that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy with the

state court judge. Her factual allegations only demonstrate that the law firm/attorney defendants

performed the traditional lawyer functions of representing their clients. “[M]erely resorting to the

courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint

actor with the judge.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980).

       In sum, because Smulley has not alleged any state action, she has failed to state a claim

under § 1983. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of her § 1983 claims. In light

of the dismissal of her federal claims, we do not address Smulley’s state law claims, which the

district court dismissed without prejudice. Travelers Ins. v. Keeling, 996 F.2d 1485, 1490 (2d

Cir. 1993); see also Kolari v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2006).

       We have considered Smulley’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                               FOR THE COURT:
                                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                                  4