Court Opinion

ID: 9720308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:25:49.744075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:15.860255
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). The pertinent language of the statute precludes discrimination on the basis of marital status. There is no factual dispute that the defendants declined to rent their premises because the male and female plaintiffs were unmarried. Under these facts, the relevant “inquiry is if one is mar*147ried . . . Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355, 362; 362 NW2d 650 (1984).
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), defines marital as “[r] elating to, or connected with the status of marriage; pertaining to a husband; incident to a husband.” “Status” means “[standing, state or condition, social position. The legal relation of individual to the rest of the community. The rights, duties, capacities and incapacities which determine a person to a given class. A legal personal relationship, not temporary in its nature nor terminable at the mere will of the parties, with which third persons and the state are concerned.” It would appear that “marital status,” which is not otherwise defined in the pertinent portion of the statute, MCL 37.2502(1); MSA 3.548(502)(1) refers to the status of being married. It follows logically that the term marital status, like marital communications and marital deductions, does not encompass the “status” of being an unmarried cohabitating1 couple.
The majority correctly notes that California, Alaska, and Massachusetts have found that marital status carries the meaning of both married and unmarried. In my view, the language of Michigan’s statute, which is the best evidence of the Legislature’s intent, does not support this conclusion. However, even if the term were deemed ambiguous, the public policy embodied in statutes criminalizing cohabitation, MCL 750.335; MSA 28.567, and renouncing common-law marriage, *148MCL 551.2; MSA 25.22 refute the claim that the Michigan Legislature intends to guarantee access to housing to individuals who choose to cohabit with persons of the opposite sex. Other courts addressing the issue have concluded that retention of “fornication statute,” or the repeal by statute of common-law marriages, evidence a public policy inconsistent with defining marital status to encompass cohabitation. State v French, 460 NW2d 2 (Minn, 1990); Mister v ARK Partnership, 197 Ill App 3d 105; 553 NE2d 1152 (1990). See also Jasniowski v Rushing, 287 Ill App 3d 665; 678 NE2d 743 (1997) (Mister was held to be no longer controlling in light of the decriminalization of cohabitation by Illinois Public Act 86-490, effective January 1, 1990).
The Legislature has not repealed the prohibition against cohabitation. Contrary to the majority’s implication, the fact that a criminal statute has not been successfully prosecuted does not somehow render the prohibited conduct legal or the criminal statute void. Not only has the Legislature failed to repeal this statute, first enacted in 1846, but, indeed, by the amendment of one word in 1931, the Legislature apparently sought to make prosecution under the statute simpler. 1931 PA 328 altered the opening sentence from “If any man and woman” to “[a]ny man or woman . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The effect of this amendment was to overrule earlier case law, see, e.g., Delany v People, 10 Mich 241 (1862); People v Frye, 248 Mich 678, 680; 227 NW 748 (1929), which held *149that the pre-1931 statutory language created an exception to the general rule that conviction or acquittal of one defendant has no legal effect on the status of other defendants. It now appears that the statute can be enforced against either or both individuals who cohabit and associate lewdly and lasciviously with a person of the opposite sex. It is immaterial whether “there is insufficient evidence,” ante at 141, that plaintiffs in this case intended to engage in lewd and lascivious behavior. What is material is that it is the declared public policy of the state to discourage such behavior. Indeed, in enacting the criminal sexual conduct law, 1974 PA 266, the Legislature repealed several proscriptions involving sexual behavior, MCL 750.333, 750.336, and 750.339-750.342; MSA 28.565, 28.568, and 28.571-28.574, but did not repeal the prohibition against “lewd and lascivious” cohabitation.
Unmarried cohabitation is far more common today than it was when the term “marital status” first appeared in the forerunner of the present statute.3 However, as observed by the Illinois Supreme Court in the context of rejecting the creation of legally enforceable property rights from nonmarital cohabitation:
There are major public policy questions involved in determining whether, under what circumstances, and to what extent it is desirable to accord some type of legal status to claims arising from such relationships. Of substantially greater importance than the rights of the immediate parties *150is the impact of such recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage. [Hewitt v Hewitt, 77 Ill 2d 49, 58; 394 NE2d 1204 (1979).]
This is a paradigm of an issue of magnitude requiring legislative evaluation and resolution of competing factors, such as the legal status of unmarried cohabitation, the need for access to housing, and the free exercise of religion.4 The Legislature can define marital status to include cohabitants. The Legislature has not done so, and we should not do so by judicial fiat. To ascribe to the Legislature an intention to burden a religious belief in the interest of protecting the conduct at issue5 requires a suspension of disbelief that is beyond me.
For these reasons, I dissent.
Weaver, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

 Cohabitation is defined in Black’s Dictionary, supra, as “[t]o live together as husband and wife.” In Dane Co v Norman, 174 Wis 2d 683, 685; 497 NW2d 714 (1993), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that living together is conduct, not status.

 The public policy of this state disfavors the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants. Carnes v Sheldon, 109 Mich App 204; 311 NW2d 747 (1981) (accord Riley, X); Featherston v Steinhoff, 226 Mich App 584; 575 NW2d 6 (1997) (Corrigan, C.J.).

 The legislative analysis of the amendment to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which added “marital status,” observes that the housing problem was particularly acute for single-parent families with children. Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 13, September 22, 1975. Nothing in the analysis suggests a perception of need for housing for cohabitation.

 Further, if the majority insists on addressing the free exercise of religion under the federal and state constitutions, it should first remand to allow the parties an opportunity to thoroughly argue the issues and the lower courts to address the issue. A remand on the constitutional issue seems particularly prudent, given the fact that, as of yet, this Court has declined to determine whether the Michigan Constitution affords greater protection to the free exercise of religion than that afforded by the First Amendment as interpreted by Employment Div, Oregon Human Resources Dep’t v Smith, 494 US 872, 884; 110 S Ct 1595; 108 L Ed 2d 876 (1990). See People v DeJonge (After Remand), 442 Mich 266, 279, n 27; 501 NW2d 127 (1993).

 The majority does not acknowledge the heavy presumption against repeal by implication. See Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 569, 576; 548 NW2d 900 (1996). In House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 562; 495 NW2d 539 (1993), we stated that “ ‘[r]epeals by implication are not favored and will not be indulged in if there is any other reasonable construction. The intent to repeal must very clearly appear, and courts will not hold to a repeal if they can find reasonable ground to hold the contrary.’ ” (Quoting Attorney General ex rel Owen v Joyce, 233 Mich 619, 621; 207 NW 863 (1926) [citations omitted].)