Court Opinion

ID: 9640369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:04:40.858755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:29.403751
License: Public Domain

Sullivan, J.
(concurring in result). I think the majority opinion is too restrictive of the State’s right to probe a defendant’s credibility as a witness. A defendant has a right to remain silent when arrested or at trial, and no adverse inference can be drawn therefrom. This right is guaranteed not only by the Eifth Amendment but also, as the majority notes, “is enshrined in the common law.” A defendant’s mere silence can never be substantive evidence of guilt admissible as part of the State’s main ease.
However, where a defendant elects to waive his right to remain silent, and testifies at trial in his own defense, he thereby puts in issue his credibility as a witness. To that end he may be tested as to the veracity of his testimony and whether or not the story he tells is fabricated or conceived after the event. Depending on the facts of the particular case, prior silence can be a relevant consideration in weighing the credibility of an exculpatory story revealed for the first time at trial.
*120The person who can demonstrate that he was not involved in a criminal episode will ordinarily protest his innocence at the first opportunity. Should he choose to remain silent when arrested and then at trial present a completely exculpatory version of events, the State ought to have the right to ask him why he did not tell the police what he now says from the witness stand. If his answer is that he was retying on his right to say nothing, or that the atmosphere was hostile and he was frightened and confused, or wanted to talk to an attorney first, whatever he says, the jury can consider this in weighing the credibility of his courtroom testimony. It is not unheard of for a defendant in a criminal case to listen to all of the incriminating details proved by the State and then tailor an exculpatory story which fits neatly into what the State has proved. Silence at the time of arrest can never be substantive evidence of guilt but it can be relevant to the credibility of defendant’s later version of innocence. In such circumstances, cross-examination as to the prior silence is proper and I believe within the rationale of Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971), as well as being permitted by our Evidence Rule 25(d) (N. J. S. A. 2A:84A-19).
In the instant case it does not appear that defendant Deatore was questioned at all when he was arrested. Por that reason his silence at that time could be said to have little or no probative weight in considering the veracity of his testimony as to alibi given at trial. United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171, 95 S. Ct. 2133, 45 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1975). But these facts were presented to the jury and presumably considered by it in considering defendant’s credibility as a witness. Even if the cross-examination be considered technically improper because of the foregoing, since the proof of guilt of both defendants was overwhelming, I would find any error to be harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). However, I agree we must reverse both convictions because of the juror incident referred to in the majority opinion.
Justice Schreiber joins in this opinion.