Court Opinion

ID: 9954202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 20:03:19.177962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.999641
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 P. v. Kennedy CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                       B324835

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. NA092421)
           v.

 JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded with directions.

     Spolin Law, Aaron Spolin, Caitlin Dukes, and Jeremy
Cutcher for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  _____________________________
      Following a jury trial in 2012, Appellant John F. Kennedy
was convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder.
The jury imposed firearm enhancements under Penal Code
section 12022.53 subds. (b)–(d)1 and a gang enhancement under
section 186.22. Upon remand after Kennedy’s second appeal, the
resentencing court declined to strike Kennedy’s firearm
enhancements under newly amended section 12022.53 and
section 1385 because it found Kennedy would still pose a danger
to public safety. The resentencing court also declined to strike
Kennedy’s gang enhancement under newly amended section
186.22. We conclude that the resentencing court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to strike the firearm enhancements.
However, we reverse the resentencing court’s ruling on the gang
enhancement based on the new requirements of section 186.22.
We remand to allow the prosecution to retry the gang allegations
under newly amended section 186.22.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Underlying offenses2
      On the night of April 1, 2012, Kennedy’s brother, Keyon
Kiles, was shot and killed at a strip club on Pacific Coast
Highway (PCH) in Harbor City. Kiles and Kennedy were there
attending a “going away party” for Charlie Parker, who was

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
2     We largely take the facts and procedural history leading to
this appeal from nonpublished opinions (People v. Kennedy
(Jan. 26, 2017, B264661 [nonpub. opn.] (Kennedy I) and People v.
Kennedy (Jan. 15, 2020, B264661) [nonpub. opn.] (Kennedy II)).

                                2
heading to prison. Parker belonged to the Rolling 20s gang.
Kiles and Kennedy were members of the rival Insane Crips gang.
       Between eyewitness testimony and surveillance video
evidence, there is no dispute that Kennedy pulled out a gun and
began firing multiple shots outside the club right after his
brother was killed. The video showed Kennedy just outside the
club in a parking lot that separated it from a restaurant, in a
firing stance with his arm raised. The parking lot led out to
PCH. A few hundred feet to the west was a hotel. Three guests
from the strip club party—Ashley Kennedy, Danisha Dixon, and
Britney Batiste—fled the shooting and ran down PCH to Dixon’s
car, which was parked outside the hotel. The three women heard
gunshots as they entered the car. One round entered the car and
struck Batiste in the breast, causing a nonfatal wound.
       Ashley Kennedy testified she heard two shots from nearby
and believed they came from a car that had pulled up alongside.
However, she did not see a car. Dixon said the shots came from a
distance and did not see or hear a car pull up. Batiste could not
tell where the shots came from but said no car had pulled up
when the shots were fired. Batiste had the bullet removed and
recovered. Ashley Kennedy’s wrist was cut by broken glass.
       Los Angeles police officers investigating the shooting
recovered eight .40 caliber Winchester casings from the scene.
Based on photos documenting the location of those casings, three
were found in the parking area outside the strip club that led out
to PCH, with the rest mostly a line heading west on PCH toward
the hotel. They also found a .40 caliber Federal casing on the
sidewalk right by the hotel.
       About six weeks later, on the night of May 12, 2012,
Kenneth McRoyal and Devon Augustine were both attending a

                                3
party at a downtown loft complex. McRoyal was shot and killed,
and Augustine was shot and wounded at the party. Photographs
taken at the party show that Kennedy was there. Three .40
caliber Winchester casings that came from the same gun used in
the Harbor City shooting were recovered at the scene—two near
the loft and one nearly 400 feet away next to a set of car keys.
       Witness testimony and police photos show that the shooting
took place near a ground floor wood deck adjacent to a doorway
into the loft. A metal gate, covered by a sheer tarp, sat at the far
end of the deck. McRoyal and Augustine were outside the deck
area when they were shot, and the shots came from behind the
tarp. Witness Dwayne W. said he heard arguing near the deck,
saw some people shaking hands, then heard one round of
gunshots, followed soon after by another round of gunfire.
       Between the two shootings, Long Beach police detectives
obtained a warrant to add Kennedy’s cell phone to an ongoing
wiretap of Insane Crips members. In a wiretapped conversation
on April 17, 2012, Kennedy talked to an unidentified male about
selling or trading his gun. In an April 22, 2012 conversation,
Kennedy referred to his brother’s feud with Parker, and
identified another Rolling 20s gang member as the person who
shot and killed Kiles. He also said he was nearby when Kiles was
shot and then “pulled out the hammer,” “tore the club up,” and
“just ran out of shells . . . [because] ten . . . [was not] enough.”
A police gang expert explained that Kennedy’s statement that he
pulled out a hammer and tore up the club was an admission to
committing the shooting.
       On May 13, hours after the May 12 loft shooting, a wiretap
recorded a conversation where Kennedy asked the other person if
he ever found a certain key. The other person said the key had

                                 4
not been found and that the area had been blocked off. The gang
expert believed this referred to the car key that was found near
one of the bullet casings. In a conversation later on May 13, an
unidentified male asked Kennedy if he had any “shells for that
thing?” Kennedy replied that he did not because he had used his
last night. The other man asked if he “got off last night,” which
the gang expert translated as asking whether he had fired his
gun. Kennedy said yes, adding that he got shot in the leg, too.
Asked where this happened, Kennedy answered, “Aw, at some
loft function in L.A. somewhere.”
       During another phone conversation shortly after the loft
shooting, Kennedy said he had been shot and was trying to get
home. Asked to describe what happened and who did it, Kennedy
replied: “Nah just, you feel me. You know how niggas be, it’s just
like a group of niggas, you know what I’m saying, just get there,
they talking, wolfing and shit. I didn’t say shit. You feel me,
I just kept going. But you know how confrontations go, and
niggas end up start shooting.” The other male asked if Kennedy
had “knock[ed] back.” Kennedy answered, “Yeah, hell yea.”
According to the gang expert, “knock back” means to shoot or to
shoot back. During a May 15 wiretapped conversation, Kennedy
offered to sell his gun for $500.
       In addition to the wiretapped conversations, a variety of
physical evidence placed Kennedy at the scene of the two
shootings. As noted, he was identified in a surveillance video as
the person taking a firing stance with a gun in his hand in
Harbor City. Kennedy made several phone calls at or near the
time of the Harbor City shooting that were relayed through cell
phone towers in the club’s vicinity. As part of the wiretap
warrant, a GPS device had been attached to Kennedy’s car.

                                5
It showed that right before the loft shooting, his car was parked
near the loft where the car keys and one .40 caliber Winchester
casing were found. The car began to drive away moments after
the shooting ended.
      A detective who went to Kennedy’s house on a pretext saw
that Kennedy had an in-and-out bullet wound on his left thigh.
II.   Additional relevant gang evidence and prosecutor’s
      closing argument
      At trial, the prosecution introduced Long Beach Police
Detective Chris Zamora as their gang expert. The prosecution
presented Zamora with a hypothetical similar to the facts of the
Harbor City strip club shooting. Zamora explained that a gang
member and his gang would suffer a loss of reputation if he did
not respond to a shooting by a rival gang member. Zamora
further testified that a gang member who shoots innocent
bystanders creates a more fearsome reputation for the gang
beyond that of a gang member who merely kills other gang
members. The gang member must escalate the violence and
could do so by “spray” shooting, meaning indiscriminately
shooting bystanders and targeted victims. By spray shooting,
the gang member “instill[s] the maximum amount of violence and
injury that you can for both the basic fact [] of shooting, but for
notoriety, for the gang context, to show this is the gang that
answers back and answers back at a significant level.” Zamora
further testified that this response helped maintain the gang’s
control, served to recruit other gang members, and uphold the
gang’s reputation. Zamora testified that even if the spray
shooting was in response to a family member being killed, that
it would not change his opinion that it enhances the gang’s

                                 6
reputation. “If you shoot anybody that’s a bystander that gets in
the way and you still shoot them, that’s a reputation.”
      The prosecution also introduced evidence of two additional
predicate offenses to prove a pattern of criminal gang activity
under section 186.22. The prosecution submitted minute orders
for Tom Love Vinson and Kai Edwards. Zamora testified that a
jury convicted Vinson, an active Insane Crips gang member, for
murdering a Rolling 20s gang member during an argument on
October 30, 2009. Zamora further testified that a jury found the
gang enhancement to be true under section 186.22.
      As to Edwards, Zamora testified that a jury convicted
Edwards, an active Insane Crips gang member, for murdering a
rival Rolling 20s gang member on January 29, 2009.
      During closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
      “You heard the testimony of Detective Zamora of why the
defendant or why a person in that situation would just try to
spray people. That enhances the reputation, not only of the
person shooting, but of the gang itself. Doesn’t matter that
nobody called out Insane Crips or anything like that. People
there knew who was there.”
III. Sentence and appeals
      A jury convicted Kennedy of the second degree murder of
McRoyal (count 4) and the attempted murders of Augustine
(count 5), Dixon (count 2), Batiste (count 1), and Ashley Kennedy
(count 3). (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664.) The jury also convicted
Kennedy of shooting at an occupied vehicle (count 6). (§ 245.)
The jury found true allegations that he personally and
intentionally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)), that the
Harbor City crimes were committed for the benefit of his street
gang (§ 186.22), and that Kennedy had served a prior prison term

                                 7
for purposes of the one-year enhancement provided by section
667.5, subdivision (b). Kennedy was sentenced to a combined
state prison sentence of life, plus 173 years and eight months.
       We affirmed the judgment of conviction in an opinion filed
January 26, 2017. (Kennedy I, supra, B264661.) The California
Supreme Court granted review. The high court deferred further
consideration of the matter pending its decision in People v.
Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591 (Canizales) addressing the kill
zone theory of attempted murder. After the Supreme Court
issued Canizales, it transferred the matter to this Court with
directions to vacate our original decision and reconsider the cause
in light of Canizales, People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612,
619, and Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 620;
Stats. 2017, ch. 682). We also granted Kennedy permission to file
a supplemental brief addressing Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020
Reg. Sess.) (SB 136; Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1).
       On January 15, 2020, we affirmed the judgment in part.
(Kennedy II, supra, B264661.) Relevant to this appeal, we found
that “[t]he evidence strongly supported a finding of a direct or
specific intent to kill. As to the Harbor City shooting, the
evidence of Kennedy’s direct intent is strong, as shown by the
trail of expended shell casings leading down PCH toward Batiste,
Dixon, and Ashley. This suggested Kennedy specifically targeted
them and came closer in order to increase his chances of hitting
his targets, especially as they got into the car, an enclosed space.”
(Kennedy II.) As such, we found no prejudice under Canizales.
(Ibid.)
       We remanded for the trial court to: (1) exercise its
discretion to strike or dismiss the prior serious felony
enhancement under SB 620; (2) strike the one-year prior prison

                                 8
term enhancement attendant to count 1 under SB 136; and
(3) conduct a People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 hearing.
(Kennedy II, supra, B264661.)
IV. Resentencing proceedings
        On March 2, 2022, the resentencing court, different from
the original trial court, struck the one-year prior prison term
enhancement under count 1. The resentencing court then
continued the proceedings to address the remaining sentencing
issues. Kennedy filed a brief arguing that SB 620, Assembly Bill
No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 333), and section 1385
required his firearm and gang enhancements to be stricken.
        On July 26, 2022, the resentencing court declined to strike
the firearm enhancements under SB 620. The court continued
the proceedings to allow for more briefing on whether AB 333
required the court to strike Kennedy’s gang enhancement.
The court stated its reasoning for not striking the firearm
enhancements:
        “As far, though, as my exercising my discretion under
SB 620, if I look at all of the factors that I need to consider in
terms of anytime I impose sentence—and I know I wasn’t the
person who originally imposed it— but there just aren’t—there
just aren’t any mitigating factors, [appellant], that tell me that
it’s not appropriate or would justify me exercising that discretion.
        “There are two separate shootings. If you saw your brother
murdered or you lost siblings, you know the pain that that
inflicts on a family. You know it personally. And to have
inflicted that on other people two separate times, one was a loss
of life, the other very close, where there could have been four
other people killed, the law is set at the 25 to life for the gun use
for a reason because it has such an impact when people are shot

                                  9
at and potentially going through that horrible life experience of
feeling like they’re going to die even if they survive it.
      “And so I do not disagree with the way that the initial court
imposed the gun enhancements, and while I’m happy that you
are using your time in some way productively, I don’t see it as
something that is so impressive that it is telling me that you
deserve, quote, unquote, a break.
      “I am concerned about the gang involvement, even if the
gang enhancement is stricken. Under the new law, the sheer fact
that this crime involves gang activity tells me a lot. And, again,
it enhances to me the scariness of these two offenses.
      “The court is choosing for the protection of society, for
deterrence, for punishment of the defendant, for preventing this
defendant from committing new crimes, which at this stage he
has only been in ten years. I don’t know if 30 years from now
that might be a different decision. But right now I’m not
convinced that he would live a law-abiding lifestyle considering
he committed the first time in April and he had time to think
about what he had done between April and May, and then he
commits another even more serious crime in May.
      “So he had that time to reflect upon his behavior and that
didn’t change his behavior, and I want to protect the public.
      “So for those reasons, I’m not going to resentence the
defendant on the gun enhancements. [¶] So that portion of the
sentence remains.”
      On August 30, 2022, the court held a hearing on whether to
grant relief under AB 333.
      The court considered Kennedy’s brief arguing that AB 333
required that his gang enhancement must be vacated or struck.
Kennedy also argued that section 1385 required that his gang

                                10
enhancement must be stricken in the interest of justice. Kennedy
attached the testimony of the prosecution’s gang expert Detective
Zamora, some of the jury instructions that the trial court read to
the jury, and the prosecutor’s closing argument.
       The parties agreed that AB 333 applied retroactively to
Kennedy because his judgment was not final. The parties further
agreed that the gang enhancement only applied to counts 1–3,
and 6 that arose from the first shooting at the Harbor City strip
club because the second shooting at the loft party was not gang-
related.
       The court discussed the split in authority over People v.
Clark (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 133, reviewed and remanded
February 22, 2024, No. S275746 (Clark), and People v. Delgado
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1073, rehearing denied March 2,
2022, review denied April 27, 2022, disapproved by People v.
Clark (Feb. 22, 2024, S275746) __Cal.5th__. In Clark, the Fourth
District held that even under AB 333, individual gang members
may commit each predicate offense. In contrast, in Delgado, our
colleagues in Division Seven of this District held that each
predicate offense requires at least two gang members. The court
recognized that agreeing with Delgado would compel the
conclusion that the predicate offenses did not meet the new
requirements of AB 333 because Vinson and Edwards committed
the crimes individually. The court stated that it agreed with the
Fourth District in Clark.
       The court stated its ruling on the record:
       “In this case, and I’m just going to stick to the facts of this
case, the predicates established that collectively the gang of
Insane Crips choose and kills rivals Rolling 20s, and that’s
established by the predicates collectively. That was the

                                 11
motivation for both predicates, and that’s the motivation to the
counts to which the gang allegation applies in this case.
       “So collectively that gang is not reputation, although
reputation is always a part of it, collectively they are responding
to a threat to their gang by being armed and shooting at rivals
just like Mr. Kennedy’s [half-brother] being killed, Rolling 20s is
collectively attacking Insane Crips, so to speak.
       “So I think the people have met their burden as to showing
that if this case were to be tried today the jury could find beyond
a reasonable doubt on the verdicts that this gang—sorry—this
crime, counts 1 through 3, were committed in furtherance of gang
activity using the same evidence that was presented at the trial
originally.
       “I don’t think I have to deal with 1109, the bifurcation
issue. I don’t think that applies retroactively. I don’t think
I have to deal with that.
       “So given that, I’m not resentencing the defendant. I will
acknowledge on the record that he’s 22. I know that.
       “I know that Mr. Nguyen asked for him to be resentenced
under either 1385 or SB 81. I’m aware of those code sections.
In my analysis, I did not know that these crimes were separated
by such a different time frame. That, to me, adds to the
egregiousness of these crimes because while the first one might
have been a reaction to the shooting of his [half-brother], the
second one was much more calculated and resulted in the death
of the individual.
       “And the court at the time of sentencing was aware of the
same facts that I would be aware of in terms of the mitigating
factor that the defendant’s brother or [half-brother] was shot at
the same time or right next to him and then that precipitated the

                                12
counts related to that incident and chose to run the counts
concurrent—sorry—consecutive, and just the fact that he is
under the age of 26, I am not required to run them concurrent.
I have to see if there were any mitigating factors. I don’t see any.
        “This is not a situation where I can choose between high
term, midterm, or low term. Because of the gun use allegations,
they’re all indeterminate terms.
        “So with that said, I’m not going to change the sentence
initially pronounced by the judge at the time of sentencing.”
        The court further noted that Kennedy was “old enough in
terms of being a gang member, and he’s well-entrenched by 22.
[¶] . . . [¶] And I do remember reviewing them and citing to them
at the last court date as to one of the reasons that I was not
striking the firearm enhancement. [¶] Other than he was taking
classes, there wasn’t a whole lot that I found to be mitigating at
that stage.”
        Kennedy timely appealed.
V.      Attorney General’s request for judicial notice
        The Attorney General requests that we take judicial notice
of our own record in Kennedy’s direct appeal in Kennedy II,
supra, B264661. Kennedy does not oppose the request. We grant
the request and take judicial notice of case No. B264661 and the
record on appeal because they are records of a court of this state.
(See Evid. Code, § 459; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a).)
                             DISCUSSION
I.      Kennedy’s firearm enhancements
        Kennedy argues that reversal is required because the
resentencing court did not consider mitigating factors when it
declined to strike Kennedy’s firearm enhancements. We conclude
that the resentencing court did not abuse its discretion because it

                                13
found that striking Kennedy’s firearm enhancements would
endanger public safety.
       A.     Applicable law
       Before 2018, sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 prohibited a
trial court from striking a firearm enhancement required to be
imposed under those sections. (See People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688, 695 (Tirado).) The Legislature enacted SB 620 to
amend sections 12022.5 and 12022.53, effective January 2018, to
give a trial court discretion to strike those enhancements.
Sections 12022.5, subdivision (c), and 12022.53, subdivision (h),
now provide that a “court may, in the interest of justice [under]
Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an
enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by this section.”
(See Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 1; Tirado, at pp. 695–696.)
       In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) (SB 81), which amended section 1385 to specify
mitigating circumstances that the trial court should consider
when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a
defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 721, § 1.)
       “Section 1385(c)(2) provides that in determining whether to
dismiss an enhancement ‘under this subdivision,’ the court must
consider nine listed mitigating circumstances if proven by the
defendant (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)–(I)), ‘unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety’ (id.,
subd. (c)(2)). That provision means that if the court finds that
dismissal of an enhancement ‘would endanger public safety,’ then
the court need not consider the listed mitigating circumstances.”
(People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296, rehg. den.
Apr. 26, 2023 (Mendoza).) “[T]he language of all of the listed

                                 14
mitigating circumstances, applies only if the court does not find
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
That interpretation gives meaning to the language in section
1385(c)(2) requiring the court to consider whether dismissal
‘would endanger public safety,’ and it consequently avoids
rendering that language surplusage.” (Ibid., original italics.)
        We review a lower court’s resentencing determination for
an abuse of discretion. (People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
858, 863.) “ ‘In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided
by two fundamental precepts. First, “ ‘[t]he burden is on the
party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’ ” [Citations.] Second, a “ ‘decision will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” ’ ”
[Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.’ ” (People v. Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563, 571.)
        B.     The resentencing court did not abuse its
               discretion when it refused to strike the firearm
               enhancements
        First, the record does not support Kennedy’s contention
that the court was not aware of SB 81. The court considered
Kennedy’s sentencing briefs that extensively discussed SB 81.
At the resentencing hearing on Kennedy’s gang enhancement,

                                15
the court confirmed that it was aware of section 1385 and SB 81.
Thus, Kennedy’s claim on this point is unavailing.
       Second, the court stated its reasons for why it thought
Kennedy would endanger public safety. The court explained
when Kennedy saw his brother murdered, he was aware of the
pain that it inflicted and still chose to shoot people on two
separate occasions. Even though there was no loss of life at the
Harbor City shooting, the court emphasized that being shot at
creates a significant impact on people because they fear death.
As to the second shooting at the loft party, the court determined
that Kennedy had time to reflect on his actions between April
and May. Yet, he committed “another even more serious crime in
May” by murdering someone.
       Because the resentencing court found that Kennedy would
endanger public safety, it was not required to consider mitigating
factors. (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 296.) Even if it
was required to, the resentencing court had Kennedy’s sentencing
brief setting forth mitigating factors for the court to consider.
The court showed that it considered them by finding that “there
just aren’t any mitigating factors . . . that . . . would justify me
exercising that discretion.” The court’s ruling also shows that it
considered that Kennedy’s brother was killed in front of him.
Nonetheless, the court then concluded that Kennedy’s brother’s
murder did not give him reason to inflict the same violence on
others. We disagree with Kennedy’s assertion that because the
resentencing court did not explicitly reference each potential
mitigating factor, the court did not consider those factors. “[T]he
general rule is that, faced with a silent record, an appellate court
will presume that the trial court performed its duty and acted in
the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction.” (People v. Allegheny

                                16
Casualty Co. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 704, 715.) In any event, there is
nothing in the record to support Kennedy’s argument that the
resentencing court misapplied the law. The resentencing court
explained its rationale for why Kennedy continued to pose a
danger to public safety. Kennedy does not argue and we find no
authority that holds “that dismissal is required even when it
would endanger public safety.” (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
287 at p. 297.) In fact, “every version of the statute—including
. . . the current one—expressly empowered the court to impose
the enhancement upon a finding that dismissing it would
endanger public safety.” (People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87
Cal.App.5th 9, 19, rehg. den. Mar. 22, 2023.) Accordingly, the
court did not abuse its discretion.
        While a different court may have reached another result in
this case, the resentencing court’s conclusion was not
“ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd.” ’ ” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378.) Nor was its conclusion
completely unsupported by the record, such that it amounted to a
reversible abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 379.)
II.     Kennedy’s gang enhancement
        Kennedy argues that the court was required to strike his
gang enhancement under SB 81 for the same reasons it was
required to strike the firearm enhancements. We decline to
strike the gang enhancement under SB 81 for the same reasons
we decline to strike the firearm enhancements. However, we
reverse the resentencing court based on the new requirements of
AB 333.
        A.    Statutory framework and AB 333
        Section 186.22 provides for a gang enhancement when a
defendant is convicted of an enumerated felony committed “for

                                17
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist
in criminal conduct by gang members.” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
        Prior to the amendments made by AB 333, a “ ‘criminal
street gang’ ” was defined as “an ongoing organization,
association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or
informal, within an established hierarchy, having as one of its
primary activities the commission of one or more of the
[enumerated criminal acts], having a common name or common
identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or
collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal
gang activity.” (Former § 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.)
A “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ” was defined as “the
commission of . . . two or more of the [enumerated] offenses,
provided at least one of these offenses occurred after the effective
date of this chapter, and the last of those offenses occurred within
three years after a prior offense, the offenses were committed on
separate occasions or by two or more persons.” (Former § 186.22,
subd. (e).)
        Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333 modified the definition of
a “ ‘criminal street gang’ ” to “an ongoing, organized association
or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal,
having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or
more of the [enumerated criminal acts], having a common name
or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal
gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.) Thus, AB 333
no longer allows for gang members to individually engage in a
pattern of criminal gang activity under the predicate offenses.

                                 18
       AB 333 also redefined “ ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’ ”
to mean “the commission of . . . two or more of the [enumerated
criminal acts], provided at least one of these offenses occurred
after the effective date of this chapter, and the last of those
offenses occurred within three years of the prior offense and
within three years of the date the current offense is alleged to
have been committed, the offenses were committed on separate
occasions or by two or more members, the offenses commonly
benefited a criminal street gang, and the common benefit from the
offenses is more than reputational.” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), italics
added.)
       Under the new legislation, “imposition of a gang
enhancement [now] requires proof of the following additional
requirements with respect to predicate offenses: (1) the offenses
must have ‘commonly benefited a criminal street gang’ where the
‘common benefit . . . is more than reputational’; (2) the last
predicate offense must have occurred within three years of the
date of the currently charged offense; (3) the predicate offenses
must be committed on separate occasions or by two or more gang
members, as opposed to persons; and (4) the charged offense
cannot be used as a predicate offense.” (People v. Lopez (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 327, 345, quoting § 186.22, subds. (e)(1)–(2).)
       The new legislation further adds: “[T]o benefit, promote,
further, or assist means to provide a common benefit to members
of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational.
Examples of a common benefit that are more than reputational
may include, but are not limited to, financial gain or motivation,
retaliation, targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or
intimidation or silencing of a potential current or previous
witness or informant.” (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)

                                 19
      B.     Kennedy is entitled to the ameliorative benefits
             of AB 333
       During the resentencing proceedings, the parties agreed
with the resentencing court that Kennedy was entitled to the
retroactive benefits of AB 333. On appeal, the Attorney General
notes that AB 333 was not within the scope of our remand order
from the prior appeal and thus Kennedy’s judgment was final
when AB 333 went into effect. Because the question presents a
pure question of law based on undisputed facts, we exercise our
discretion to consider it for the first time on appeal. (See In re
Stier (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 63, 75–76.) We hold that AB 333
applies retroactively to Kennedy.
       The parties do not dispute our Supreme Court’s holding
that the changes AB 333 made to the elements of section 186.22
apply retroactively to any criminal matter that is not yet final on
appeal. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207
(Tran).) However, there is a split in authority on whether a
defendant is entitled to retroactive application of AB 333 where
he appeals for a second time after his judgment was conditionally
reversed and the Court of Appeal issued a limited remand to the
trial court to address sentencing issues.
       In People v. Lopez (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1110, review
granted November 15, 2023, S281488 (Lopez), the majority held
that the defendant was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of
AB 333 when his matter was remanded to the trial court to strike
specific enhancements. (Id. at p. 1119.) Nonetheless, the
majority held that those benefits were “irrelevant” because the
matter had been remanded solely for resentencing, thus the trial
court had no jurisdiction to relitigate the gang enhancements.

                                20
(Id. at pp. 1114, 1119.) For this reason, the majority declined to
extend AB 333’s benefits to the defendant. (Ibid.)
       In People v. Mitchell (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1127, review
granted February 21, 2024, S283474 (Mitchell), our colleagues in
the Fifth District disagreed with Lopez. (Mitchell, at p. 245.)
The Fifth District noted that our Supreme Court has held that
“[a] judgment and sentence are generally considered synonymous,
and there is no judgment of conviction without a sentence.” (Id.
at p. 241.) The Fifth District concluded that “[a]lthough the trial
court in Lopez (like the lower court in this matter) may have been
bound by the scope of the prior remittitur, the retroactive
benefits should have been extended to the defendant on appeal
because his criminal proceeding had not yet been reduced to a
final judgment.” (Id. at p. 245.)
       We find Mitchell more persuasive. Applying the reasoning
in Mitchell, Kennedy’s “criminal prosecution had not concluded
before the ameliorative legislation took effect. [Kennedy] was
still waiting for his 2022 resentencing to occur when this new law
became operative on January 1, 2022.” (Mitchell, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 243.) Thus, Kennedy’s “criminal judgment
never became final, and we must presume the Legislature
intended for this ameliorative enactment to apply as broadly as is
constitutionally permissible.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, Kennedy is
entitled to the benefits of AB 333 on appeal. (Ibid.)
      C.     AB 333 requires us to vacate Kennedy’s gang
             enhancement
       The jury was presented with the prior version of section
186.22 that did not include the new elements of the amended law.
As relevant here, AB 333 now requires that the predicate and
underlying offenses provide more than a reputational benefit to

                                21
the gang. (§ 186.22, subds. (e)(1), (g), as amended January 1,
2022.) “When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an
offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements,
the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under
the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless ‘it appears
beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the jury verdict would have been
the same in the absence of the error.” (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th
1169 at p. 1207, quoting People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470,
504.)
      The jury’s true findings on the gang enhancement
allegations on each count must be vacated because we cannot
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have
been the same if the jury was instructed under the new law.
(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1207.) In particular, “the
prosecution’s evidence and argument focused on reputational
benefit to the gang, which is . . . no longer permitted under
amended section 186.22.” (People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
467, 479.)
      The Attorney General argues that any error was harmless
because there was overwhelming evidence that the common
benefit to the Insane Crips was more than reputational as there
was evidence that Kennedy retaliated or targeted a perceived or
actual gang rival. We disagree.
      People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657 (Sek) is instructive.
In that case, the prosecution’s expert testified about several ways
in which a crime could benefit a criminal street gang, including
enhancing reputation. (Id. at p. 669.) The Attorney General in
that case argued that any error was harmless because the
prosecution’s gang expert also testified that “gang members may
commit crimes to retaliate against rival gangs, to defend and to

                                22
try to expand their territory.” (Id. at p. 668.) As in this case, the
prosecution’s expert testified that a hypothetical crime similar to
the charged offense could “enhance the reputation” of a gang.
“[I]n closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that Sek’s crime
benefits the gang because ‘[t]hey want you to know who they
are.’ ” Our colleagues in Division One of this District held that
“[a]lthough there was a great deal of evidence of benefits to the
gang that went beyond reputational, we cannot rule out the
possibility that the jury relied on reputational benefit to the gang
as its basis for finding the enhancements true. Thus, the
instructional error on this question was not harmless . . . .” (Id.
at p. 669.)
       Here, the case for reversal is even stronger. The
prosecution’s expert testimony overwhelmingly focused on
Kennedy’s actions being a benefit to the Insane Crips’s
reputation. Additionally, in Kennedy’s prior appeal, we found
that substantial evidence supported a finding that “Kennedy’s
direct intent is strong, as shown by the trail of expended shell
casings leading down PCH toward Batiste, Dixon, and Ashley
Kennedy. This suggested Kennedy specifically targeted them
and came closer in order to increase his chances of hitting his
targets, especially as they got into the car, an enclosed space.”
(Kennedy II, supra, B264661.) Batiste, Dixon, and Ashley
Kennedy were neither actual nor perceived gang members.
Further, like in Sek, the prosecutor’s closing argument focused on
Kennedy committing the crime because it enhanced his or the
gang’s reputation. Thus, “the basis of the jury’s verdict is not so
clear[,]” and the instructional error was not harmless. (Sek,
supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 669.)

                                 23
       In dispute in this case is the narrow question of whether
collective engagement under amended section 186.22, subdivision
(f), requires that the predicate offenses must have each been
“committed by more than one person,” rather than “individually
but on a different day.” (Delgado, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1088–1089; accord, People v. Lopez, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 345.) As we noted, the resentencing court followed the Fourth
District’s holding in Clark that under amended section 186.22,
subdivision (f), the predicate offenses may be committed by an
individual gang member rather than two or more gang members.
(Clark, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 145–146.) Our Supreme
Court recently clarified that “[b]y contrasting offenses committed
on ‘separate occasions’ with those committed by ‘two or more
members,’ the language of section 186.22(e)(1) indicates that only
the second alternative requires the participation of more than
one gang member. This is the most straightforward reading of
the language of the statute.” (People v. Clark, supra, __Cal.5th__
[p. 13].) Thus, the Supreme Court disapproved of Delgado and
agreed with the Fourth District in Clark on this point.
Accordingly, the resentencing court correctly held that the
predicate offenses may be committed by individual gang
members.
       However, the jury was not asked whether any of the
predicate offenses provided a common benefit to the gang that
was more than reputational, as required under amended section
186.22, subdivision (e)(1). While Zamora testified that both
Vinson and Edwards targeted rival Rolling 20s gang members,
Zamora’s expert testimony on Kennedy’s charged offense also
suggested that the predicate offenses could produce reputational
benefits. “To rule that the existence of evidence in the record

                               24
that would permit a jury to make a particular finding means that
the jury need not actually be asked to make that finding would
usurp the jury’s role and violate [Kennedy’s] right to a jury trial
on all the elements of the charged allegations.” (People v. Lopez,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 346.) On this record we cannot say
beyond a reasonable doubt (see Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1207) that the jury would have found at least two predicate
offenses provided a qualifying common benefit.
       Accordingly, we vacate the gang enhancement findings and
remand so that the prosecution may retry the gang enhancement
based on the new requirements of AB 333. (People v. Clark,
supra, __Cal.5th__ [p. 30].)
                           DISPOSITION
       The resentencing court’s order declining to strike
Kennedy’s firearm enhancements is affirmed. The resentencing
court’s order declining to strike Kennedy’s gang enhancement is
reversed. The jury’s true findings that Kennedy committed the
offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang are vacated.
The cause is remanded to provide the People an opportunity to
retry the criminal street gang enhancement under newly
amended section 186.22.

                                           VIRAMONTES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        GRIMES, J.

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