Court Opinion

ID: 9643403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:28:01.608764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:00.372069
License: Public Domain

On Petition op Dependant to Beheab.
SWEPSTON, J.
The first ground of the petition relates to the matter of interest and has already been called to the Court’s attention by petition of complainants for correction of the opinion, which correction has been made with no change in the net result, interest having been allowed by the original opinion from the accrual of the cause of action and no change is made in that regard.
The second ground relates to page 23 of the original opinion [245 S. W. (2d) 656] whereby provision is made for reimbursement of complainants for expenses incurred in prosecuting this suit.
Petitioner complains that Mrs. Boggs is being required to pay same. Reference to the original opinion will disclose that such is not a correct statement. A judgment is rendered against her for the total amount due on the accounting plus interest plus court costs and no more. Under no circumstances would she have had to pay more than that, if we had required the full amount to be paid into court; and if such had been required, the expenses of litigation incurred by complainants would be deducted from the total judgment and interest and paid to them as reimbursement before any pro rata distribution of the net partnership asset because complainants have already paid, or incurred personal and individual liability for, these expenses; not only their part but the shares of the other partners also; it is only after the complainants *391have been reimbursed that any assets remain for distribution among the partners.
In view, however, of the position taken in the suit by the other partners to the effect that Mrs. Boggs owed nothing to the firm, they should not now be allowed to participate in the assets at the expense of Mrs. Boggs, and they do not so contend, nor should the complainants have the benefit of the entire net assets at the expense of Mrs. Boggs, and they do not so contend.
But it would seem to be a legal solecism to hold that complainants could be deprived of full reimbursement of expenses by reason of the estoppel of the other partners.
For these reasons we have made the provision as to the way the judgment against Mrs. Boggs is to be satisfied.
All other grounds are reargument of matters disposed of in thó original opinion, with one exception. It is said we overlooked the objection to the testimony of the several oil mill officials and employees on the ground they were not experts, as in State ex rel. Stewart v. Follis and Burns v. City of Nashville.
With deference to counsel, we did not overlook the point but did not see fit to discuss it, because obviously there is no merit in it. We think the factual situation, to which the rule was applied, in those cases is quite different from what we have here in the testimony of the oil mill witnesses.
In those cases the witnesses were called on to audit voluminous records and documents and to compile a statement of the net result; that is to compile the account. Of course, this could only be performed by a person accustomed to keeping books.
In the instant suit the oil mill witnesses were not called on to compile a statement of account with anybody, neither Mrs. Boggs nor the partnership; the accounts *392with the partnership were already compiled in the form of the ledger entries. Some of the witnesses had either made the entries, or were familiar with them and did therefore testify the hooks were correct; others had no connection with the hooks during the period in question and could not testify to their correctness. But every witness called for the purpose could and did identify the books and records as being those of his employer; this did not require skill as a bookkeeper, but merely personal knowledge of the fact; any clerk, stenographer, or lesser employee having personal knowledge of the fact that they were the employer’s books and records could identify them as such, although they might have no knowledge of the contents or of the correctness of same. Almost any literate person could make a correct copy of the ledger sheet.
The procedure followed was:
The witness identified the books and supporting records, as being those of his employer but in some instances did not testify to their correctness; exhibited copies of all such and testified they were true copies; this put them in evidence conditioned upon proof being made of their correctness; we held in view of Mrs. Boggs ’ conduct that not only were these records an admission against interest, but also that she was estopped to question their correctness.
On the other hand, Crandell, who was procured by complainants to do so, was the person who compiled the account between Mrs. Boggs and the partnership from the records of the mills, the banks, the partnership and other sources. His function furnishes the analogy to the function of the witness in the Follis and the Burns cases.
*393We dealt with, the question of his competency on page 15 of the original opinion [245 S. W. (2d) 652].
We might add that the qualification of a witness as an expert is largely within the discretion of the trial jndge and will not be reversed on an appeal unless clearly erroneous or abuse shown. Keys v. Keys, 23 Tenn. App. 188, 129 S. W. (2d) 1103; Foster & Creighton Co. v. Hale, 32 Tenn. App. 208, 222 S. W. (2d) 222, 226.
With due appreciation of the skill and zeal of counsel, we think the petition should be disallowed.
Baptist, P. J., and Davis, Sp. J., concur.