Court Opinion

ID: 4936376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-09-24 01:15:59.313375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:14:42.186747
License: Public Domain

Wiswell, O. J.
We do not think that the instruction of the presiding justice, relative to the doctrine of equitable estoppel, was called for by the facts of the case, or that the necessary elements of such an estoppel existed. But, even if the instruction was on that account erroneous, it does not follow that the exceptions should be sustained. It must also appear that the excepting party, the plaintiff in-this case, was prejudiced by the instruction complained of. In this case we do not think that the plaintiff was thereby prejudiced, because, in our opinion, the action was not maintainable, independently of the doctrine of estoppel.
These are the uncontroverted facts: the action is trover for the alleged conversion of the hay and a quantity of apples grown upon a farm, in the summer of 1893, the legal title to which was unquestionably in the plaintiff. He had purchased the farm for and at the request of one Orcut. He gave a bond to Orcut for the. sale of the farm to him, and Orcut gave back notes to the plaintiff for the purchase price. The bond contained no provision as to the possession of the farm, but it was understood by both of them that Oi’cut was to have possession, and shortly after the time of. the purchase Orcut went into possession, with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, and in accordance with the original understand*550ing between them at the time of the purchase of the farm by the plaintiff.
Orcut paid the first $50 note at or about the time when it became due, and caused the second $50 note, which became due in May, 1893, to be paid at its maturity. In the spring of 1893, Orcut, desiring to go to another part of the state temporarily to find employment at his trade as a stone cutter, let the premises to the defendant for the year. The defendant cut and hauled away the hay and gathered and took away the apples, under this authority derived from Orcut. These acts of the defendant constitute the conversions relied upon by the plaintiff.
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff cannot maintain trover for the conversion of the hay and apples taken by the defendant, by virtue of the letting from Orcut, because the plaintiff did not own these crops. The relations of the plaintiff and Orcut were analogous, so far as the ownership of the crops is concerned, to those of landlord and tenant, or mortgagor in possession and mortgagee. While a person in possession of real estate under a contract of purchase, in some respects and for some purposes, is not a tenant, yet, so far as his ownership of crops severed by him while he remains in possession is concerned, his rights are similar to those of a tenant. In a certain sense he is a tenant at will. Lapham v. Norton, 71 Maine, 83.
The landlord, or mortgagee out of possession, cannot maintan trespass quare clausum for any mere injury to the possession, because such an action being for an injury to the possession must be brought by the person whose possession has been injured. Lawry v. Lawry, 88 Maine, 482; Hewes v. Bickford, 49 Maine, 71. It is, of course, otherwise when the injury is to the realty itself. Leavitt v Eastman, 77 Maine, 117.
No more can such landlord or mortgagee maintain trover for the conversion of crops taken by the tenant or mortgagor in possession, because such crops belong to the tenant, or mortgagor in possession, if severed by him while his possession is allowed to continue. The same principle necessarily applies between the owner and one who is in possession by permission of the owner under a contract to *551purchase. In this case the possession of the defendant was that of Orcut.
It is true, that the plaintiff claims to have taken possession of the farm in the fall of 1892, and again in the spring of 1893. But we do not think that his contention, in this respect, is supported by the evidence, or that a jury would be justified in so finding. It would not be profitable in this opinion to discuss the evidence in this respéct.
It is sufficient to say that, after a careful examination of all the evidence, we are satisfied that the plaintiff did not retake possession of this farm until' after the crops sued for had been gathered and taken away by the defendant under the permission received by him from Órcut.

Exceptions overruled.