Court Opinion

ID: 9712329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:51:35.848686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.548424
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GREEN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the affirmance of the conviction but dissent from the modification of the sentence. The conduct of the defendant in the instant case in striking a police officer and knocking him to the ground superimposed upon a record of defendant’s having committed burglary, conspiracy and theft supported a determination by the trial judge that a sentence to further incarceration for the instant offense was necessary to protect the public from still further criminal conduct by the defendant. The longest term of imprisonment that could be imposed here was 3 1/3 to 10 years. Since defendant was already sentenced to terms of 3 to 9 years, a concurrent sentence of 3 1/3 to 10 years would impose little additional incarceration. Only by ordering a consecutive sentence could additional incarceration of any substance be given. I do not interpret section 5 — 8—4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections to require a sentencing judge, before imposing a consecutive sentence, pursuant to its terms, to make a statement of record that he is of the opinion that a consecutive sentence is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant. I do not find any implication negating such an opinion in the trial judge’s statement that a minimum sentence served consecutively would be sufficient punishment. The trial judge is vested with discretion in determining to impose a consecutive sentence. (People v. Wright (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 736, 336 N.E.2d 18; People v. Taylor (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 332 N.E.2d 188.) The record here shows no abuse of that discretion.