Court Opinion

ID: 9702670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:20:35.149723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:40.446180
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, J.,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the Majority that distinct drug transactions committed in two counties are within the “jurisdiction of a single court” under Section 110 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(l)(ii), I respectfully dissent.
Section 110 bars a subsequent prosecution where the former prosecution resulted in a conviction and the subsequent prosecution is for “any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the first trial and was within the jurisdiction of a single court----” 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(l)(ii)(emphasis added). Section 110 does not define “jurisdiction of a single court.” This Court has not previously decided the meaning of Section 110’s “jurisdiction of a single court” language in a case involving multi-county offenses.
The Pennsylvania Constitution defines the original jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas as unlimited in all cases “except as may otherwise be provided by law.” Pa. Const. Art *543V, § 5. The Majority recognizes that the Judicial Code circumscribes the original jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas in civil actions with certain statutory exceptions, not relevant here. 42 Pa.C.S. § 931. However, I respectfully note that the Majority disregards the well-established common law rule that the locus of the crime dictates the court of common pleas in which charges must be brought.
This Court has consistently stated:
[t]he law is clear that “ ‘the locus of a crime is always in issue, for the court has no jurisdiction of the offense unless it occurred within the county of trial, or unless, by some statute, it need not....’ ” For a county to take jurisdiction over a criminal case, some overt act involved in that crime must have occurred within that county. In order to base jurisdiction on an overt act, the act must have been essential to the crime, an act which is merely incidental to the crime is not sufficient.
Commonwealth v. Boyle, 516 Pa. 105, 112-13, 532 A.2d 306, 309-10 (1987) (citations omitted). See, also, Commonwealth v. Nailon, 416 Pa. 280, 283, 206 A.2d 43, 45 (1965); Commonwealth v. Mull, 316 Pa. 424, 426, 175 A. 418, 419 (1934).
As explained by our Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Simeone, 222 Pa.Super. 376, 294 A.2d 921 (1972), “[ejmbedded in the common law is the proposition that subject matter jurisdiction of criminal courts extends only to offenses committed within the county of trial.” Id. at 377-78, 294 A.2d at 922. The historic foundation for the rule is that, “[b]y the ancient law, ‘all offenses were said to be done against the peace of the county....’ Fiction in civil cases ... has dispensed with this as to actions purely personal, but in criminal actions never.” Id. at 379, 294 A.2d at 922 (quoting Simmons v. Commonwealth, 5 Binney 617, 628-29 (1813)). The Simeone Court recognized that Pennsylvania case law has presented some confusion between the language of jurisdiction and that of venue. The court noted, however, numerous opinions that address the jurisdiction of criminal courts to try cases when it is alleged that certain elements of the prosecuted crimes occurred in different counties. Therefore, the court concluded *544that “there is no doubt that the actuality of what our courts have done is to treat the place of the crime as determining which court has the power to try the offense.” Id. at 379, 294 A.2d at 922.
Thus, the Superior Court has consistently interpreted the Section 110 “jurisdiction of a single court” as circumscribed by county territorial limits. Commonwealth v. Caden, 326 Pa.Super. 192, 473 A.2d 1047 (1984); Commonwealth v. Nichelson, 294 Pa.Super. 438, 440 A.2d 545 (1982); Commonwealth v. Harris, 275 Pa.Super. 18, 418 A.2d 589 (1980). In Nichelson, the defendant carjacked a victim at gunpoint in Philadelphia County, drove to Chester County where he attempted to kill the victim, and then returned to Philadelphia County where he was apprehended while attempting to use the victim’s credit card. Charges arising in each county were filed in each respective county. Following his conviction in Philadelphia County, the defendant filed a motion to quash the informations in Chester County under Section 110. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion, reasoning that the Chester County Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction of the charges arising in that county.
We recently reaffirmed the territorial basis for common pleas court jurisdiction in Commonwealth v. Conforti, 533 Pa. 530, 626 A.2d 129 (1993). In Conforti, a prosecution for multicounty offenses arising from a continuous criminal episode, the defendant argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over crimes that had occurred outside the county of trial. We reiterated that a court has no jurisdiction of an offense unless it occurred within the county of trial or unless a statute confers jurisdiction on the court. We then affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the Journey Act1 conferred jurisdiction on that court for all the alleged offenses, including those that *545had occurred during the defendant’s journey through more than one county.
Here, however, the Majority rejects the traditional countywide territorial basis for common pleas court jurisdiction espoused in Boyle as inconsistent with the concept of a unified judicial system. The Majority does not discuss Conforti I note, however, that this Court decided Boyle and Conforti after the adoption of Article V, § 1 (providing for a unified judicial system) and Article V, § 5 (relating to the courts of common pleas) of the Pennsylvania Constitution and after amendment of 42 Pa.C.S. § 931 (relating to jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas). Further, the Majority’s reliance on the concept of a unified judicial system in support of its jurisdictional analysis is suspect in light of this Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Beatty, 500 Pa. 284, 455 A.2d 1194 (1983), and Commonwealth v. Taylor, 513 Pa. 547, 522 A.2d 37 (1987).
In Beatty, despite the concept of a unified judicial system, this Court preferred a traditional jurisdictional analysis for purposes of Section 110. In that case, we held that a conviction for a summary offense does not bar a subsequent prosecution for aggravated assault arising from a single criminal episode because, we held, the two offenses were not within the jurisdiction of a single court. We reasoned that the summary offense was a matter within the original jurisdiction of the district justice whereas the aggravated assault was within the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas. In reaching our conclusion, we recognized, however, the concurrent jurisdiction of the court of common pleas over summary offenses pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 931(b). Nevertheless, we construed the phrase “within the jurisdiction of a single court” to give effect to the traditional division of labor in our court system, casting the court of common pleas in the role of reviewing tribunal as opposed to the court of original jurisdiction for summary offenses.
The Majority also declares that the county-wide territorial analysis of common pleas court jurisdiction is undermined by the constitutional guarantee of the right to trial by an impar*546tial jury of the vicinage. I do not disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that vicinage is a matter of venue. I, however, disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that, notwithstanding Boyle, the locus of a crime is a matter of venue and not jurisdiction for Section 110 purposes. The Majority correctly describes venue as the right of a party to have an action brought and heard in a particular locality, and jurisdiction as the competency of a court to hear and decide controversies in the nature of the matter involved. McGinley v. Scott, 401 Pa. 310, 164 A.2d 424 (1960). Despite any imprecision in this Court’s usage of the term “jurisdiction” in Boyle and Conforti, no constitutional right precludes application of the well-established rule that the locus of the crime determines the county in which an action must be brought for proposes of Section 110.
That counties lack the status of independent sovereigns is not inimical to the territorial analysis of common pleas court jurisdiction for Section 110 purposes. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, articulated in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985), two states may prosecute an accused for the same conduct. It is well settled, however, that no two courts of common pleas may prosecute an accused for the same criminal act. Commonwealth v. Downs, 334 Pa.Super. 568, 483 A.2d 884 (1984)(citing Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977)). In contrast, here, the issue is whether two courts of common pleas may prosecute separate crimes occurring within each county of trial. Thus, I disagree with the Majority Opinion that the logic of Heath leads to the conclusion that the offenses in this case are within the jurisdiction of a single court.
Further, I do not agree with the Majority’s statement that Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 540 Pa. 460, 658 A.2d 755 (1995), and Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482, 491, 458 A.2d 177, 181 (1983), adequately limit the interpretation of a “single criminal episode” so as to provide a substantial safeguard against prosecutorial forum-shopping or “dragging the accused all over the Commonwealth.” In Hude, this Court held that a series of marijuana sales to the same individual on *547twenty separate days, for more than a three to four-month period, constituted a single criminal episode. This Court reasoned that separate prosecutions for the drug sales involved a substantial duplication of factual and legal issues, particularly where prosecution of each charge rested solely on the credibility of a single witness.
We reached a contrary result in Bracalielly where the defendant had participated in four drug transactions during a two to three-week period in two different counties. The critical factor that distinguished Bracalielly from Hude was the involvement of two different law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the proof of each drug transaction in each county would not have rested solely on the credibility of a single witness, but would have required the testimony of different police officers and experts and the establishment of separate chains of custody.2
Here, while purchasing cocaine from Appellant Roosevelt E. McPhail on or about June 26,1990, undercover narcotics agent Donald Alston also arranged to purchase a larger amount at a later date. On June 27,1990, Officer Alston and McPhail then travelled to another county to complete the pre-arranged transaction. Prosecution of both the June 26, 1990 and June 27,1990 offenses would substantially depend upon the credibility of Officer Alston. The Commonwealth conceded that the drug transactions, here, formed part of the same criminal episode pursuant to Bracalielly and Hude.
I believe, however, that in Bracalielly and Hude, this Court erred in extending the meaning of the “same conduct or [conduct] arising from the same criminal episode” to include separate and distinct drug transactions. Before Bracalielly and Hude, this Court applied Section 110 to bar a subsequent prosecution where the second offense arose from precisely the *548same criminal episode. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 493 Pa. 24, 425 A.2d 346 (1981)(search of defendant revealed possession of pistol and heroin at the same time); Commonwealth v. Muffley, 493 Pa. 32, 425 A.2d 350 (1981)(search-of defendant revealed possession of marijuana and LSD). Subsequently in Hude, this Court engrafted a “logical relationship” test to the Section 110 inquiry, drawing from the “same transaction” analysis of compulsory counterclaims. Pursuant to the logical relationship test, this Court has analyzed whether the offenses present a substantial duplication of factual and/or legal issues. Thus, this Court has determined that the definition of the “same criminal episode” is no longer limited to acts that immediately connect in time.
Such an extension of the “same criminal episode” inquiry thwarts the purposes of Section 110 by facilitating prosecutorial forum shopping. Further, where, as here, a defendant has participated in two discrete drug transactions, where the possession, sale and delivery of the illegal substances has occurred on two separate occasions in two counties, the Bracalielly and Hude analysis interferes with the inherent jurisdiction of each county to try the offenses against it.
I conclude that the Allegheny County charges and the Washington County charges were not within the jurisdiction of a single court within the meaning of Section 110. The charges arising in Allegheny County were properly brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Therefore, Section 110 does not bar prosecution of the charges in Allegheny County. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court, reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the Allegheny County charges.

. Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 427, as amended, 19 P.S. § 525. Although this Act was apparently repealed, it is retained by virtue of 42 Pa.C.S. § 20003(b). Conforti, 533 Pa. at 537 n. 1, 626 A.2d at 130 n. 1. Where a defendant commits several crimes during a journey through more than one jurisdiction, the Journey Act may vest jurisdiction for all the offenses in any county in which an offense was committed. Conforti. Neither party addressed application of the Journey Act to this case.

. In Commonwealth v. Starr, 540 Pa. 460, 658 A.2d 755 (1995), the companion case to Bracalielly, we also held that two drug transactions on two different dates were not part of the same criminal episode. Although the Commonwealth relied on the same confidential informant to facilitate each transaction and both transactions were part of an ongoing investigation, Starr failed to show how the transactions themselves were related.