Court Opinion

ID: 9768987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:01:14.512109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:34.294981
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10194    Document: 29-1      Date Filed: 08/29/2023   Page: 1 of 15

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10194
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        CHARLES KEVIN AGERTON,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00027-AW-MAF-1
                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court               22-10194

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Charles Agerton appeals his 135-month sentence for
        possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in
        violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii). On appeal,
        Agerton argues that the district court erred (1) in sentencing him
        as a career offender, and (2) in applying a two-level increase for
        maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or
        distributing a controlled substance under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).
        After careful review, we affirm.
                              I.     BACKGROUND
        A.    Offense Conduct
               Beginning in the fall of 2019, the Wakulla County Sheriff’s
        Office (“WCSO”) in Florida received several citizen complaints
        about drug activity at a residence in Panacea, Florida. In
        November 2019, the WCSO Narcotics Unit began to investigate
        the sale and distribution of illegal drugs from the residence.
               In January 2020, the WCSO conducted two controlled
        purchases of 1.4 and 2.6 grams of methamphetamine from Agerton
        at the residence. Based on the controlled purchases, the WCSO
        applied for and was granted a search warrant for the residence.
              In February 2020, WCSO officers searched the residence.
        The officers found Agerton in a bedroom inside the residence. In
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        22-10194                   Opinion of the Court                         3

        that same bedroom, the officers located 90.3 grams of crystal
        methamphetamine.
               During the search, the officers also found 1.7 grams of
        cocaine, 26.7 grams of marijuana, and drug paraphernalia,
        including digital scales and small clear plastic baggies. The officers
        found three other people in the residence and located small
        amounts of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in the
        residence’s other bedrooms. The officers also seized $731 in cash.
               Agerton was detained. After he was advised of his Miranda 1
        rights, Agerton gave a statement to law enforcement. Agerton
        claimed ownership of the drugs located in the bedroom where he
        was found. Agerton admitted that he sold drugs for profit to
        further his drug business.
               The total weight of pure methamphetamine purchased in
        the controlled buys and seized from the residence was 74.9 grams.
        The total converted weight for all drugs involved in this case was
        1,498.61 kilograms.
               At the time of his arrest, Agerton had rented and resided at
        the residence where the drugs were found for approximately four
        years.
        B.      Agerton’s Indictment and Guilty Plea
               In June 2021, Agerton was indicted for possession with
        intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in

        1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-10194

        violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii). In October
        2021, Agerton pled guilty to that offense.
        C.    Agerton’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) and
              Objections
                The PSI assigned Agerton an offense level of 32 consisting
        of: (1) a base offense level of 30 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), plus
        (2) two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) because Agerton
        maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or
        distributing a controlled substance.
               Next, the PSI applied the greater offense level of 37 under
        U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(1) because it concluded Agerton was a career
        offender. The PSI identified these two prior convictions as
        qualifying felony convictions of a controlled substance offense:
        (1) a 2016 Florida conviction for sale of marijuana, and (2) a 2018
        Florida conviction for sale of methamphetamine.
               Finally, the PSI reduced Agerton’s offense level by three
        under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for acceptance of responsibility.
        This yielded a total offense level of 34.
               The PSI calculated a criminal history category of III based
        on six criminal history points. Then, the PSI assigned Agerton a
        criminal history category of VI under § 4B1.1(b) due to Agerton’s
        status as a career offender. With a total offense level of 34 and a
        criminal history category of VI, Agerton’s advisory guidelines
        range was 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment.
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        22-10194               Opinion of the Court                        5

               Agerton objected to the two-level drug-premises increase
        under § 2D1.1(b)(12) and to the career-offender designation under
        § 4B1.1. As to his career-offender status, Agerton argued that his
        prior offenses did not qualify as predicate controlled substance
        offenses because Florida’s controlled substance statute
        (1) criminalizes the inchoate offense of attempted sale, (2) does not
        require the state to prove mens rea as to the illicit nature of the
        controlled substance, and (3) defines marijuana more broadly than
        the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).
        D.    Agerton’s Sentencing
                On January 3, 2022, at Agerton’s sentencing hearing, the
        district court overruled Agerton’s objections to his career-offender
        status as foreclosed by this Court’s precedent.
               Next, the district court found that the government met its
        burden under § 2D1.1(b)(12) to show that Agerton maintained a
        premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a
        controlled substance based on the unobjected-to facts in the PSI.
        These facts included (1) the volume of drugs and drug
        paraphernalia found at Agerton’s residence, (2) the length of time
        Agerton lived at the residence, (3) law enforcement’s two
        controlled purchases of methamphetamine from Agerton at his
        residence, and (4) the multiple complaints about drug activity at
        the residence by people in the neighborhood. The district court
        thus overruled Agerton’s objection to the two-level drug-premises
        increase and adopted the PSI’s guidelines calculations.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-10194

              Ultimately, the district court (1) determined that a
        127-month downward variance from the 262 to 327-month
        advisory guidelines range was appropriate, and (2) sentenced
        Agerton to 135 months’ imprisonment, followed by 10 years of
        supervised release.
               The district court stated that it had considered all of the 18
        U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the seriousness of Agerton’s
        offense, the need to protect the public, and the need to provide a
        just punishment. The district court also explained that its 127-
        month downward variance was warranted based on (1) Agerton’s
        age and health, (2) the lack of violence in his criminal history, and
        (3) the court’s finding that “the overall career offender
        enhancement would have been too great” given the facts of
        Agerton’s case. The district court explicitly stated that it would
        have imposed the same sentence regardless of how the
        § 2D1.1(b)(12) drug-premises issue was resolved.
              Agerton timely appealed.
                               II.    DISCUSSION

                On appeal, Agerton contends that the district court erred
        (1) in designating him as a career offender under § 4B1.1(b)(1), and
        (2) in applying a two-level drug-premises increase under
        § 2D1.1(b)(12). We address each issue in turn.
        A.    Career-Offender Designation
               A defendant is a career offender under the Guidelines if
        (1) he was at least 18 years old when he committed the instant
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        22-10194                   Opinion of the Court                                7

        offense of conviction, (2) “the instant offense of conviction is a
        felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
        offense,” and (3) he “has at least two prior felony convictions of
        either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.”
        U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). The career-offender guideline in § 4B1.2(b)
        defines a “controlled substance offense” as “an offense under federal
        or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
        year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution,
        or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a
        controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import,
        export, distribute, or dispense.” Id. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). 2
               Both of Agerton’s relevant drug convictions are under Fla.
        Stat. § 893.13(1)(a), which provides that “a person may not sell,
        manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell,
        manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance.” Fla. Stat.
        § 893.13(1)(a) (2016); see also Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) (2018) (same). 3
               This Court expressly held in United States v. Smith that a drug
        conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) is a “controlled substance
        offense” under the career-offender provision in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).
        775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Pridgeon, 853 F.3d at
        1197–98 (following Smith). The Smith Court concluded that the

        2 We review de novo whether a prior conviction is a “controlled substance

        offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Pridgeon, 853 F.3d
        1192, 1198 n.1 (11th Cir. 2017).
        3 Agerton does not dispute that his prior drug convictions are all felonies under

        Florida law and are punishable by more than one year of imprisonment.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10194

        definition of a “controlled substance offense” in § 4B1.2(b) does not
        require that a predicate state offense include an element of mens
        rea with respect to the illicit nature of the controlled substance. 775
        F.3d at 1268. In Smith, this Court declined to look to statutory
        federal analogues in considering whether § 893.13(1)(a) was a
        controlled substance offense because we concluded that (1) the
        Guidelines do not define “controlled substance offense” by
        reference to those analogues and (2) the definition of “controlled
        substance offense” in § 4B1.2(b) is unambiguous. Id. at 1267–68.
               Agerton argues that his Florida drug convictions are not
        “controlled substance offenses” under § 4B1.2(b) because the
        Florida controlled substance statute, Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a),
        proscribes a broader range of conduct than § 4B1.2(b)’s definition
        of “controlled substance offense.” Relying on the categorical
        approach, Agerton contends that, because § 893.13(1)(a)
        criminalizes attempt crimes, his Florida drug convictions cannot
        qualify as controlled substance offenses under § 4B1.2(b). See
        United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc)
        (concluding that the definition of “controlled substance offense” in
        § 4B1.2(b) “unambiguously excludes inchoate offenses”).
               The problem for Agerton is that this Court recently held in
        United States v. Penn that “[t]he sale of drugs is not an inchoate
        offense under Florida law.” 63 F.4th 1305, 1317 (11th Cir. 2023). In
        Penn, the defendant argued that his prior Florida drug convictions
        under § 893.13(1)(a)—the same statute here—did not qualify as
        serious drug offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act
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        22-10194               Opinion of the Court                         9

        (“ACCA”) because § 893.13(1)(a) is broader and criminalizes the
        inchoate offense of attempted transfer of a controlled substance.
        Id. at 1308, 1317.
               Applying the categorical approach, this Court rejected
        defendant Penn’s arguments and concluded that (1) the least
        culpable conduct under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) is the attempted
        transfer of a controlled substance; (2) the attempted transfer of a
        controlled substance constitutes “distributing” under the ACCA;
        (3) a defendant who attempts to transfer drugs commits a completed
        crime of distribution, not an inchoate crime of attempted
        distribution; and (4) therefore, defendant Penn’s prior convictions
        under § 893.13(1)(a) qualified as ACCA predicates. Id. at 1311–17.
        In so holding, this Court stressed that, “like the crime of
        distribution under federal law, the crime of selling drugs under
        Florida law is not an inchoate offense.” Id. at 1317 (emphasis added).
               So too here. Even though Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a)
        criminalizes the attempted transfer of drugs, this Court held in Penn
        that a defendant who attempts to transfer drugs commits the
        completed crime of distribution, not the inchoate crime of attempted
        distribution. See id. at 1311–12, 1316–17. Because Florida’s
        controlled substance statute in § 893.13(1)(a) does not criminalize
        inchoate offenses, this Court concluded that Florida’s § 893.13(1)(a)
        statute is not broader than the definition of “controlled substance
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10194

        offense” in the § 4B1.2(b) guideline. See id. at 1317. 4 Agerton’s case
        is controlled by our precedent.
               Agerton’s remaining arguments fare no better. First,
        Agerton contends that his prior convictions under Fla. Stat.
        § 893.13(1)(a) do not qualify as predicate “controlled substance
        offenses” because that Florida statute lacks a mens rea element as
        to knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance. Second,
        Agerton asserts that his § 893.13(1)(a) conviction in 2016 for sale of
        marijuana is not a controlled substance offense under § 4B1.2(b)
        because Florida’s definition of marijuana at the time of his prior
        conviction in 2016 was broader than the definition of marijuana in
        the federal CSA. Specifically, Agerton explains that, at the time of
        his 2016 conviction, Florida law criminalized the sale of hemp, but
        the CSA’s definition of marijuana did not include hemp at the time
        of his federal sentencing in 2022. 5 Compare Fla. Stat. § 893.02(3)
        (2016), with 21 U.S.C. § 802(16).

        4 Agerton filed a notice of supplemental authority, requesting that this Court

        stay his appeal pending resolution of the petition for rehearing en banc filed in
        Penn. Because this Court has since denied the petition in Penn, we deny
        Agerton’s request as moot.
        5 By contrast, the government contends that we should compare Florida’s

        definition of marijuana with the federal CSA’s definition of marijuana at the
        time of Agerton’s prior conviction in 2016. In 2016, Florida law and federal
        law both included hemp in the definition of marijuana. See Fla. Stat.
        § 893.02(3) (2016); 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2016). We need not reach this issue
        because we held in Smith that the Guidelines do not define “controlled
        substance offense” by reference to statutory federal analogues, like the CSA.
        See Smith, 775 F.3d at 1268.
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        22-10194               Opinion of the Court                        11

               Agerton’s arguments are also foreclosed by our binding
        precedent. In Smith, this Court concluded that (1) a prior
        conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) qualifies as a “controlled
        substance offense” under the § 4B1.2(b) guideline, notwithstanding
        the lack of an element of mens rea with respect to the illicit nature
        of the controlled substance, and (2) the § 4B1.2(b) guideline does
        not define “controlled substance offense” by reference to federal
        statutory analogues. See Smith, 775 F.3d at 1267–68; see also
        Pridgeon, 853 F.3d at 1198 (“We are bound to follow Smith.”);
        United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (explaining that a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent
        panels unless the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc
        overrules it). The Smith Court did not expressly consider the
        definition of marijuana, but “a prior panel precedent cannot be
        circumvented or ignored on the basis of arguments not made to or
        considered by the prior panel.” Tippitt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
        Co., 457 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2006).
               In light of our binding precedent, the district court properly
        concluded that Agerton’s prior sale of marijuana and sale of
        methamphetamine offenses, all violations of Fla. Stat.
        § 893.13(1)(a), qualified as “controlled substance offenses” under
        U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). Because Agerton had two convictions for
        “controlled substance offenses,” the district court did not err in
        determining that Agerton was a career offender under § 4B1.1.
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                       22-10194

        B.      Drug-Premises Increase
               Agerton also challenges the district court’s application of a
        two-level increase under § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premise
        for drug distribution. Agerton claims that the government failed
        to prove that he maintained the home for the “primary purpose”
        of distributing controlled substances. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt.
        n.17 (stating manufacturing or distribution need not be the “sole
        purpose” of the premises, but it must be a “primary or principal,”
        rather than an “incidental or collateral,” use for the premises).
               We review a district court’s factual finding that a defendant
        maintained a premises for the manufacture or distribution of drugs
        under the clear-error standard. United States v. George, 872 F.3d
        1197, 1205 (11th Cir. 2017). However, a guidelines calculation
        error is harmless if (1) the district court stated it would impose the
        same sentence even if it decided the guidelines issue in the
        defendant’s favor, and (2) the sentence is substantively reasonable.6
        United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2006).
                Here, as to the merits, the evidence amply supports the
        district court’s fact finding that Agerton maintained a premises for
        the primary purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled
        substance.

        6 We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential

        abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct.
        586, 591 (2007).
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        22-10194              Opinion of the Court                       13

               Beginning in the fall of 2019, law enforcement received
        several citizen complaints about drug activity at Agerton’s
        residence. Then, in January 2020, law enforcement officers
        conducted two controlled purchases of methamphetamine from
        Agerton at the residence. When officers searched Agerton’s
        residence, they found him in a bedroom along with 90.3 grams of
        crystal methamphetamine. The officers also found 1.7 grams of
        cocaine, 26.7 grams of marijuana, $731 in cash, digital scales, and
        small clear plastic baggies. After Agerton was detained, he
        admitted (1) that he owned the drugs located in the bedroom
        where he was found, and (2) that he sold drugs for profit to further
        his drug business. Further, at the time his arrest, Agerton had
        rented and resided at this residence for approximately four years.
        Based on this evidence, the district court did not clearly err in
        determining that the § 2D1.1(b)(12) drug-premises increase was
        appropriate.
               Indeed, this evidence is at least comparable to, if not
        stronger than, the evidence in United States v. Rodriguez where this
        Court affirmed the district court’s application of a § 2D1.1(b)(12)
        drug-premises increase. United States v. Rodriguez, __ F.4th __, No.
        20-13534, 2023 WL 4873851, at *5–6 (11th Cir. Aug. 1, 2023). In
        that case, this Court observed that (1) law enforcement conducted
        eight trash pulls outside of Rodriguez’s house and found
        “supplement packaging with unknown white powder, discarded
        pills, ventilator masks, and gloves,” (2) during a search of
        Rodriguez’s home, law enforcement found him trying to flush pills
        down the toilet, (3) the search of his home revealed “56 grams of
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10194

        methamphetamine, approximately 300 grams of heroin,
        approximately 10 grams of counterfeit pills containing
        methamphetamine, $50,000 in cash, a chemical mask, and two
        scales,” and (4) Rodriguez admitted at his sentencing hearing that
        he prepared and distributed drugs at his house. Id. (stating “[c]ourts
        should view the totality of the circumstances to determine whether
        a defendant maintained a premises for drug distribution or
        manufacture” (quotation marks omitted)).
              Alternatively, any alleged error in applying the
        drug-premises increase under § 2D1.1(b)(12) was harmless for two
        independent, alternative reasons.
               First, the district court, in imposing the 135-month sentence,
        stated that it would have applied the same sentence regardless of
        the outcome of the § 2D1.1(b)(12) drug-premises issue. We cannot
        say, and Agerton does not argue, that his 135-month sentence,
        which represented a 127-month downward variance, was
        substantively unreasonable. Thus, any error in calculating the
        Guidelines was harmless. See id.
               Second, even if the district court erroneously applied the
        drug-premises increase under § 2D1.1(b)(12), Agerton’s advisory
        guidelines range would have remained the same because Agerton’s
        career-offender status drove the offense level—not the
        drug-premises increase. To be sure, the drug-premises increase
        added 2 levels to Agerton’s base offense level, resulting in an
        adjusted offense level of 32. The PSI, however, applied the 2-level
        drug-premises increase before it assigned Agerton an offense level
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        22-10194               Opinion of the Court                       15

        of 37 due to his career-offender status. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a)(3),
        (6) (instructing the court to “apply any appropriate specific offense
        characteristics” before “[d]etermin[ing] from Part B of Chapter 4 any
        other applicable adjustments”); id. § 4B1.1(b)(1) (increasing offense
        level to 37 if, as here, the offense statutory maximum sentence is
        life imprisonment). Because the drug-premises increase did not
        affect the calculation of Agerton’s advisory guidelines range, we
        conclude that any alleged error in applying the § 2D1.1(b)(12)
        increase was harmless. See United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191,
        1220 n.39 (11th Cir. 2009).
                                III.   CONCLUSION
              For the reasons stated, we affirm Agerton’s 135-month
        sentence.
              AFFIRMED.