Court Opinion

ID: 9648954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:39:27.826256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:06.732990
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice, dissenting.
The majority relies upon a non-existent constitutional mandate, which they justify by the fiction of an insolubly disruptive relationship between county government and the court system, to intrude upon the province of an equal branch of government and thereby offend a doctrine that this Court has consistently held to be sacrosanct. See, e.g., Young v. Commonwealth, Board of Probation and Parole, 487 Pa. 428, 409 A.2d 843 (1979); In re 42 Pa.C.S. § 1703, 482 Pa. 522, 394 A.2d 444 (1978); Commonwealth *77v. Sutley, 474 Pa. 256, 378 A.2d 780 (1977); Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977); Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 250 A.2d 474 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971). This unabashed interference with a legislative scheme clearly within the province of the General Assembly mandates my dissent.
The two issues raised in this appeal are whether the various counties are required by statute to fund the common pleas court system from their respective tax revenues and, if they are, whether such a directive is violative of the constitutional mandate providing for a Unified Judicial System in this Commonwealth. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the counties are statutorily required to maintain the courts of common pleas within their county, 42 Pa.C.S. § 2302; 42 Pa.C.S. § 3544; 42 Pa.C.S. § 3722; 16 P.S. § 4822; and 16 P.S. § 1623; however, the majority neglects to note that the Commonwealth makes a significant direct contribution by reimbursement to the county from the state treasury to defray those expenses, and in addition pays directly all judicial salaries.1
Relying upon Webster’s Third New International Dictionary definition of the word “unify”, the majority proceeds from this authoritative source to conclude that the second issue must be answered in the affirmative. The underlying premise of the majority’s position is that Article V’s mandate for a unified system requires that the General Assembly fund the entire system by direct appropriation from the general treasury. In reaching this result the majority ignores the distinction between the obligation to provide the funding and the discretion involved in determining an appropriate scheme of funding.
*78The majority ignores the fact that the county's taxing power is not separate and independent of the state's taxing power. Rather, the authority to tax is a power of the state which is delegated by the state to the counties to be exercised by them in accordance with the terms of that delegation. Mastrangelo v. Buckley, 433 Pa. 352, 250 A.2d 447 (1969); Fischer v. City of Pittsburgh, 383 Pa. 138, 118 A.2d 157 (1955); Evans v. West Norriton Township, 370 Pa. 150, 87 A.2d 474 (1952); Wilson v. School District of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937). Thus, the present funding system for courts of common pleas is, in effect, simply an exercise by the state of its own taxing power through the counties in order to maintain that particular segment of the Unified Judicial System. The mere delegation of the state's taxing powers to the counties where the courts of common pleas are physically located and functioning is in no way incompatible with the Unified Judicial System set forth in Article V, Section 1.
The mandate for a Unified Judicial System requires the state to provide for the funding of that system, but this mandate cannot be construed as directing the method by which that financing must be accomplished. Such a judgment is the prerogative of the appropriating body, and that judgment cannot properly be intruded upon by a separate branch of government, Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 439 A.2d 638 (1981); Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949); Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 A. 697 (1932). Thus the Commonwealth Court responsibly rejected this claim in concluding that the issue raised was non-justiciable because of: (1) the textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate governmental branch, and (2) the impossibility of an appropriate judicial remedy. 93 Pa.Comwlth. 112, 500 A.2d 1267 (1985). Confirmation of the latter conclusion of the Commonwealth Court is manifested by the majority's attempt to fashion a mandate in the instant matter.
The majority in its effort to manipulate the facts of this lawsuit to justify its intrusion upon the discretion of its *79sister branch completely ignores that we are not here faced with a complaint by a member of the unified court system of inadequate funding. To the contrary, under the facts of this case we have a political subdivision of the Commonwealth complaining as to the burden placed upon it by its parent. The conferrence upon the county of the right to exercise a portion of the state's taxing power carries with it the concomitant responsibility to use the funds generated therefrom for the purposes designated by the state. See United Tavern Owners of Philadelphia v. School District of Philadelphia, 441 Pa. 274, 272 A.2d 868 (1971); County of Chester v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 420 Pa. 422, 218 A.2d 331 (1966); School District of Philadelphia v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 277, 207 A.2d 864 (1965). Since the county has no independent authority to tax, it has no right to complain as to the purposes for which the resulting funds are to be directed.
The most transparently fallacious argument raised by the majority is the contention that the interjection of the county into the financing scheme has created an air of dissension that is incompatible with the concept of a unified system. While occasional disputes between the judges of a court of common pleas and county commissioners have given rise to litigation, in each case the particular problem has been resolved. In most of those cases the disputes resulted from uncertainties as to the relationship between the parties. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. AFSCME, District 84, 515 Pa. 23, 526 A.2d 769 (1987). Our decisions in those matters have been primarily instructive, clarifying the parameters of an effective on-going relationship. See, e.g., Ellenbogen v. County of Allegheny, 479 Pa. 429, 388 A.2d 730 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Bradley v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 479 Pa. 440, 388 A.2d 736 (1978); Sweet v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 479 Pa. 449, 388 A.2d 740 (1978); Board of Judges, Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Seventh Judicial District, v. Bucks County Commissioners, 479 Pa. 457, 388 A.2d 744 (1978). Thus, it is inaccurate to contend that the differences brought to light and resolved in those *80isolated lawsuits establish the existence of an irreconcilable state-wide breakdown of the local funding process. Moreover, it is ludicrous to suggest that direct state funding will eliminate disputes over appropriations. The nature of the relationship between an appropriating body, whether it be the county commissioners or the General Assembly, and the would-be recipient of funds renders some degree of disagreement inevitable. It would be unrealistic to suggest that direct funding for the courts of common pleas will provide a more harmonious process.
The underlying public policy in the area of public employment in this Commonwealth has been to establish and maintain a harmonious relationship between the public employer and the public employee.2 It must be emphasized that the public policy in furthering the harmonious relationship between public employer and public employee is not here involved. In fact the judicial system has been unique in avoiding the disruptive disputes that so frequently plague other areas of public employment (e.g., the teachers strikes) and the private sector. The instant dispute is' nothing more than an instrumentality of the sovereign attempting to challenge the judgment of that sovereign. In my judgment such a controversy clearly does not justify the unprecedented response that the majority today is willing to bestow.
Implicit in the majority’s holding is the unstated judgment that direct funding would provide a greater benefit to the operation and maintenance of the system than the present system supplies. In addition to the fact that this is not a judgment to be made by the judicial branch, the validity of that assumption is far from clear. This state is unique in its economic diversity. The cost of living varies significantly throughout the state. Presently, the salaries paid through local funding are based upon the cost of living *81within that area.3 Any effort to standardize salaries according to function to accommodate the suggested direct funding would greatly inflate the present cost of operation without assuring any enhancement in the quality of the services rendered. To accommodate those areas with a higher cost of living to assure the ability to attract competent personnel will result in raising the cost in other areas far beyond what would be necessary to find competent help in the latter areas. Conversely, any effort to set the rates based upon the economy of areas having a lower cost of living or attempting to seek a medium between two extremes would render it impossible for those areas at the top of the economic scale to obtain competent staffing. Since these areas are the most populous, with the heaviest case loads, such a result would be disastrous.
The utilization of the delegated taxing power of the counties in financing the functioning of the local court systems has proven helpful in insulating the judiciary from direct involvement in labor disputes with their employees. This salutory effect of the present relationship is evidenced by the fact that since the passage of Act 195,4 there has not been a strike of any group of court employees. Again, it is to be noted that the instant complaint is not being made by court employees, nor is there a complaint against the judges. The squabble is between the county and its parent as to the former’s responsibilities in this area.
Thus, I am constrained to conclude that the constitutional challenge raised herein is totally without merit. Moreover, even if we enjoyed the prerogative of questioning the wisdom of the General Assembly’s financing scheme, which we do not, I cannot agree with the view that direct funding *82will necessarily improve the functioning of our present system.
I therefore must register my dissent.
McDERMOTT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The legislature has provided for payment to the counties as reimbursement for these costs $10,000.00 per authorized judgeship. General Appropriations Act of 1986, Act No. 5-A, § 289. Since 1985 the General Assembly has directly funded the expense of the operation and maintenance of the three statewide appellate courts. 42 Pa.C.S. § 3703.

. Act 111, Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. 111, 43 P.S. § 217.1 et seq. Act 195, Public Employe Relations Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, 43 P.S. § 1101.101 et seq.

. The Office of the State Court Administrator estimates that the operating expenditures for the fiscal year 1987-88 will be $369,487,-174.00. The amount appropriated from the state treasury is approximately 130 million dollars. The difference is presently paid through county funding.

. The Public Employe Relations Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, as amended, 43 P.S. § 1101.101 et seq.