Court Opinion

ID: 9738457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:53:38.731347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:06.230278
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). There are a number of points the lead opinion makes with which I agree. For example, I agree that the defendant’s sentence in this case is not an abuse of discretion,1 that the sentencing guidelines are inapplicable to habitual offenders, and that the interplay between the sentencing guidelines and the habitual offender statutes do not create a rigid mathematical formula for the review of an habitual offender’s sentence._
*631I write separately, however, because I believe that the lead opinion fails to adequately discuss and apply the principle of proportionality established in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), the primary judicial authority regulating appellate review of criminal sentences in Michigan. Furthermore, the creation in the lead opinion of an abuse of discretion standard based on 1994 PA 445, § 34(10) is erroneous because that provision is simply inapplicable to the case at bar. 1994 PA 445, § 34(10) has not been suggested to be applicable, let alone controlling, by either the parties, the trial court, or the Court of Appeals. It is imprudent, to say the least, to construe a statute that is not yet effective, not properly before the Court, and not necessary to decide the case at bar.
i
Milbourn holds that all criminal sentences in this state must conform to the principle of proportionality. Id. at 661, n 29. In so holding, this Court attempted to honor the intent underlying Michigan’s legislatively prescribed sentencing scheme. In Milbourn, we noted that the Legislature established different sentencing ranges for different offenses. We further held that this statutory sentencing scheme embodies the "principle of proportionality” according to which sentences must be proportional to the seriousness of the matter for which punishment is imposed. Milbourn provides the same principle of proportionality that the Legislature embraced in devising sentencing ranges for a given crime should also guide a trial court’s discretion when imposing sentence. Therefore, a sentence is an abuse of discretion if it is not proportional to the seriousness of the offense and the offender.
*632One aspect of creating a sentence that is proportional to the offense and the offender may include, in appropriate cases, a consideration of the offender’s prior criminal history:
In our judgment, it is appropriate — if not unavoidable — to conclude that, with regard to the judicial selection of an individual sentence within the statutory minimum and maximum for a given offense, the Legislature similarly intended more serious commissions of a given crime by persons with a history of criminal behavior to receive harsher sentences than relatively less serious breaches of the same penal statute by ñrst-time offenders. [Id. at 635. Emphasis added.]
We held that the best way to honor this legislative intent is by requiring judicial sentencing discretion to be exercised in light of the same considerations.
While much of the discussion in Milbourn involved the role of sentencing guidelines, we, in no way, limited the scope of that opinion to crimes encompassed solely within the sentencing guidelines. "Sentences for crimes not included in the guidelines, of course, remain reviewable under the principle of proportionality.” Id. at 661, n 29 (emphasis added).
The entire import of Milbourn is that judicial sentencing discretion should be guided by the legislatively established sentencing scheme. The particular legislative sentencing scheme involved in the case at bar is embodied in MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083:
(1) If a person has been convicted of 2 or more felonies . . . and that person commits a subsequent felony within this state, the person shall be punished upon conviction as follows:
*633(a) If the subsequent felony is punishable upon a first conviction by imprisonment for a term less than life, then the court . . . may sentence the person to imprisonment for a maximum term which is not more than twice the longest term prescribed by law for a first conviction of that offense or for a lesser term.
Thus, the defendant, as an habitual offender, was eligible to receive a maximum sentence that was twice as great as the statutory maximum. The habitual offender statutes2 represent a legislative determination that offenders who persist in criminal activity should be subject to longer possible sentences.3 Having made this determination explicit, the judicial imposition and review of habitual sentences should be guided by it. One way such guidance can be provided is by comparing the guidelines’ recommendation to the degree of sentence enhancement authorized by the Legislature.4
This approach harmonizes sentence review for *634both habitual and nonhabitual sentences, which, according to Milbourn, is how it should be. Although the guidelines do not apply to habitual offenders, in coordination with the enhancement statutes they can be useful tools to evaluate whether a sentence is proportional.
Despite their usefulness, they are still only a part of the sentencing equation. The other part of the equation is a consideration of the seriousness of the offense and the offender. The various parts of the sentencing equation cannot be divorced from one another and still be consistent with Milbourn. Using the guidelines and the habitual offender statutes, when appropriate, as tools to determine whether a defendant’s sentence is proportional is entirely consistent with Milbourn because it honors the legislative intent in providing for enhanced sentencing of repeat offenders.
This is not to say that a simple mathematical approach (i.e., doubling the guidelines’ maximum/ minimum range) will result in a proportional sentence in all cases. In some habitual cases, as in this one, a departure beyond a simple doubling of the guidelines’ maximum/minimum range may be proportional. This is due to the fact that there is no place in the principle of proportionality for any type of rigid approach, be it mathematical or otherwise.
A rigid mathematical approach simply fails to consider the surrounding circumstances of the offense and offender. "[T]he key test is whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter, not whether it departs from or adheres to the guidelines’ recommended range.” Milbourn, supra at 661. Just as a guidelines’ departure regarding a nonhabitual offender’s sentence alerts a reviewing court to closely examine the record for articulated reasons justifying the departure, so it *635should regarding an habitual offender’s sentence. Thus, once the reviewing court’s curiosity is piqued, the analysis turns to the reasons offered by the court to justify the departure.
ii
It is evident that the defendant’s ten- to twenty-year sentence exceeds the guidelines’ recommended minimum of zero to two years by more than the factor provided in MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the reasons offered for the departure.
When sentencing this defendant, the trial court made the following comments:
[O]ne of the purposes of this sentencing process is to treat the community fairly and to treat you fairly. To take into account your background, your history and to take into account the type of crime you committed in putting together a sentence that’s fair to the community and fair to you. That’s the overall purpose of imposing a sentence.
In that regard there are certain goals that sentencing judges have in mind when they impose a sentence. One of those goals is rehabilitation. . . . The problem in this case is the Court can’t count on you making that decision because this Court made the mistake of giving you that chance a couple of years ago when it placed you on probation for other breaking and enterings .... So the prospects of rehabilitation seems to me pretty bleak.
Another purpose of sentencing is to protect the community, to impose a sentence that safeguards the community for some period of time. . . . The community is at risk. Property, and more importantly since this incident with the knives, people.
A third purpose of sentencing is to deter people *636from committing crimes. That means to fix the market price for crime today.
* * *
Another purpose of sentencing is just to fairly punish the kind of crime you committed. And I think if people looked at these crimes, particularly the crime that carries the greatest maximum, the breaking and entering as a third felony, if people are honest they’d say that’s a serious crime particularly as a third felony, but it’s not the worst sort of 20 year offense we can imagine. It’s a crime against property and it’s serious, but it’s not as bad as many we see. That probably benefits you to some degree.
The Court’s considered all of those factors and-I’ve also considered the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in People v Milborn [sic] and in Milborn . . . the Supreme Court said that the greatest possible sentence ought to be reserved for the worse [sic] offender committing the worst offense. That helps you in this case because no one looking at this record can honestly say that you’re the worst offender who committed the worst offense with regard to the b & e and the two prior supplements. That means that under Milborn it’s questionable whether you should receive the greatest possible sentence. Milborn says to me you shouldn’t. ... So I’ve taken that into account.
This defendant has now been convicted of five felonies. He was on probation when he committed these offenses. The trial court developed at length its reasons for imposing the sentences it did. While acknowledging that this was not a worst case scenario, the court noted that defendant had not learned from his prior mistakes, showed little signs of ever changing his behavior, and escalated his criminal activity from crimes against property to crimes against people.
When engaging in appellate review of a given sentence, the question is not whether an appellate *637court would have imposed the same sentence the trial court imposed. Milbourn at 666. The question is whether an appellate court can say that the sentence imposed is an abuse of discretion because it is disproportionate. On this record, and in light of the surrounding circumstances of these offenses and this offender, I cannot conclude that the sentence is disproportionate.
Brickley, C.J., and Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 Because it is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and offender.

 See also MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082 and MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084.

 Given the fact that the defendant in this case was sentenced as an habitual offender, it would seem to go without saying that it is the legislative intent underlying the habitual offender provisions that the Court should be interpreting in this case. Despite this seemingly self-evident conclusion, the lead opinion instead draws upon 1994 PA 445, § 34(10) to support its analysis. "In the present case, the best indication of legislative intent can be found in the recently enacted sentencing guidelines’ legislation . . . .” Ante at 627. It does this in spite of the fact that neither the parties, the trial court, nor the Court of Appeals has suggested that this statute, enacted nearly four years after the events in this case transpired, somehow controls the result in this case. Finally, it is more than a little ironic that the lead opinion, while decrying the fact that the present guidelines do not apply to habitual offenders, turns directly to the guidelines’ legislation, which will apply to habitual offenders, to draw support for its conclusion.

 While correctly acknowledging that sentencing habitual offenders was not considered in drafting the existing guidelines, the proposition that their use in sentencing habitual offenders would be "misleading and statistically invalid” simply does not follow from the fact that habitual offenders are outside the scope of the guidelines. See ante at 626.