Court Opinion

ID: 9951677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 18:03:03.924219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:00.693923
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24 In re Journee B. CA2/7
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

In re JOURNEE B., et al., Persons                                 B325829
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.                                                              (Los Angeles County
________________________________                                  Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  22LJJP00357AB)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

VIVIAN B.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Donald A. Buddle, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
     Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                     _____________________________

                        INTRODUCTION

      Vivian B. appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition
order removing her two-year-old son Royal. Vivian argues
substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding by clear
and convincing evidence that returning Royal to Vivian would
create a substantial danger to his physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On August 19, 2022 Vivian reported to law enforcement
that her 11-year-old daughter Journee was missing. A sheriff’s
deputy found Journee, who said she ran away because Vivian
asked her for her email password and, when Journee said she did
not know it, Vivian became angry and hit Journee with a
cell phone charger cord. Journee had scabs and abrasions on her
arm and leg “consistent with . . . being struck by a thin cable.”
The deputy arrested Vivian on suspicion of child abuse, and the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
took Journee and Royal into protective custody. Vivian denied
Journee’s allegations. She told a sheriff’s detective “[t]hat eleven-
year-old is fucking lying.” The district attorney charged Vivian
with child abuse under circumstances or conditions likely

                                 2
to cause great bodily injury or death, in violation of Penal Code
section 273a, subdivision (a).
       At a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on
December 6, 2022, the juvenile court sustained six counts under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b),
and (j).1 The court found: (1) Vivian physically abused Journee,
endangering her physical health, safety, and well-being and
placing Journee and Royal at risk of serious physical harm;
(2) Vivian had a history of engaging in violent altercations with
her partner, Rayshon S., in the children’s home, and Vivian’s
failure to protect the children from Rayshon endangered
Journee’s and Royal’s physical health and safety and placed them
at risk of serious physical harm; (3) Vivian’s current abuse of
marijuana rendered her incapable of providing regular care to
Journee and Royal; and (4) Vivian medically neglected Journee,
endangering her physical health and safety and placing Journee
and Royal at risk of serious physical harm.
       At disposition the court removed Journee and Royal,
finding “by clear and convincing evidence that there is or would
be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection,
or physical or emotional well-being of the children” if they were
returned to Vivian. The court ordered Vivian to participate in
domestic violence counseling, individual counseling, and anger
management and parenting classes, and to undergo drug testing.
The court ordered monitored visitation. At the request of counsel
for the children, the court ordered a psychological evaluation of

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 3
Vivian. Vivian timely appealed from the court’s jurisdiction
findings and disposition orders.2

                          DISCUSSION

      A.      Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      Section 361, subdivision (c), provides: “A dependent child
shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her
parents . . . unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing
evidence” there “is or would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and
there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical
health can be protected without removing the minor from the
minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (See In re M.D. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 836, 856; In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510,
520.)
      “We review a dispositional order removing a child from a
parent for substantial evidence, ‘“keeping in mind that the trial
court was required to make its order based on the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence.”’ [Citation.]

2     In her notice of appeal, Vivian stated she was appealing
from the juvenile court’s December 6, 2022 jurisdiction findings
and disposition orders. Because in her brief Vivian addresses
only the removal order, she has abandoned any challenge to the
court’s jurisdiction findings and other orders. (See In re M.B.
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 617, 620, fn. 1.) In addition, we granted a
motion by the Department to dismiss Vivian’s appeal from the
order removing Journee because Vivian in her brief does not
challenge the juvenile court’s findings or orders regarding
Journee.

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‘[A]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of
a finding requiring clear and convincing proof must account for
the level of confidence this standard demands.’ [Citation.] In
applying this standard of review, ‘the question before the
appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ [Citation.]
We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 960; see Conservatorship
of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995.) The appellant has the burden
to show “‘“there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial
nature”’ to support the dispositional removal order.” (In re L.O.
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227, 245; see In re E.E. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)

      B.     Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s
             Order Removing Royal from Vivian
      Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
by clear and convincing evidence that returning Royal to Vivian
would create a substantial danger to his physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being. The evidence
showed Vivian physically abused Journee. Journee told a nurse
practitioner who examined her that Vivian hit her “about every
month.” Journee stated that during the August 2022 incident
that led to Vivian’s arrest, Vivian hit Journee with a cell phone
cord, a broom handle, and a pole, dragged Journee by the hair,
and told her to stay in a closet. Journee said that Vivian later

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opened the closet door and threatened to use a taser on her
unless she revealed her email password. Marks on Journee’s arm
and leg appeared to have been caused by a thin cord or cable.
Journee told the social worker she left home without permission
at least five times because she feared Vivian would harm her.
She also said Vivian called her a “hoe” and accused her of “always
lying.” Journee stated she did not want to live with Vivian
because she was afraid Vivian would hurt her and “say someone
else did it.”3
      Vivian refused to take any responsibility for harming
Journee. Vivian denied hitting Journee and said the marks on
her body were caused by jumping rope and sleeping in a bed with
a metal frame. Vivian said Journee ran away and falsely accused
Vivian of hitting her because Journee was angry Vivian took her
phone away as punishment for not doing chores.
      There was also evidence Vivian was indifferent to Journee’s
emotional well-being. Vivian complained to law enforcement and
to the social worker that Journee had become rebellious after she
was sexually assaulted by a 13-year-old cousin and that she was
always talking on the phone to boys about sex. Vivian told the
sheriff’s detective that “Journee put her in jail,” that Journee was
“manipulative,” and that Vivian did not trust her. When Journee
was 10 years old, Vivian told a school counselor that Journee had
attempted suicide. Vivian told a social worker Journee was “not

3     Vivian had a history of domestic violence with Rayshon,
including as the perpetrator and as the victim. Four months
before the Department filed the petition, Vivian shot Rayshon in
the back of his head with a BB gun. Vivian denied that she used
a BB gun, but stated that she hit Rayshon with a pocketknife
after he poured a beverage on her and that she was arrested.

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suicidal,” but had tried to kill herself because she was
embarrassed about stealing a cell phone.
       Vivian’s pattern of volatile, erratic, and belligerent
behavior also supported the court’s finding removal was
necessary. When the detective interviewed Vivian at the sheriff’s
station, she “continuously interrupted” him, yelled at him, and
cursed at him. The detective stated: “Toward the end of the
interview Vivian became extremely belligerent and angry,
showing what appeared to be an extremely volatile temper.” The
social worker reported that Vivian spoke “sporadically amidst her
erratic behavior of screaming and yelling.” The social worker
ended the interview when Vivian appeared to be
hyperventilating.
       At a monitored visit with Royal at the Department’s office,
Vivian yelled at a Department “parent partner” and walked with
Royal toward the door “as though she was going to leave with
him but was stopped by security.” After Vivian calmed down and
the visit ended, Vivian’s father (who was Royal’s caregiver) called
the social worker and said Vivian was at his house kicking the
door and beating on the windows. The social worker could hear
Vivian yelling in the background. The same day, Vivian sent the
social worker a rude, profanity-laced text message suggesting
Vivian had a relationship with the social worker’s husband.
       During another visit with Royal, Vivian got into an
argument with her father at her father’s home. While Vivian’s
father spoke on the phone with his doctor, Vivian yelled at him
because she suspected he was talking to someone about Royal.
When Vivian appeared to be leaving with Royal, Vivian’s father
blocked her, told her the visit was over because Vivian was
agitated and cursing in front of Royal, and called law

                                 7
enforcement. He told the social worker he was no longer willing
to have Vivian visit Royal in his home.
       Even when appearing in juvenile court, Vivian was unable
to control her temper. At the arraignment hearing, Vivian
interrupted and repeatedly stated, “I want to talk.” And at the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, Vivian interrupted while the
court was making its findings, and she said, “Shit. This is
stupid.” Addressing the bench officer (using his first name), she
stated: “I’m not doing that. Y’all out here fooling for a check, for
a fucking check. Y’all doing all that. And I got—presented all
the evidence in your face, Donald. You bold as hell. You bogus as
fuck. You know that’s wrong. You know it.” After the bailiff
removed Vivian, she could be heard yelling outside the
courtroom.
       Vivian argues that, even if the juvenile court did not err in
removing Journee, there was insufficient evidence that returning
Royal to Vivian would create a substantial danger to him because
“Royal was differently situated from Journee.” Vivian contends
the “significant hardship” Journee had experienced damaged her
relationship with Vivian. In contrast, Vivian argues, Royal was
just a baby, and Vivian had never physically disciplined, abused,
or neglected him. She also points to evidence she behaved
appropriately with Royal at a monitored visit, where she sang to
Royal and Royal smiled at her.
       While Vivian may not yet have physically or emotionally
harmed Royal, the court could reasonably infer Royal was at
substantial risk of danger, given Vivian’s history of physically
abusing Journee and Vivian’s explosive temper. (See In re M.D.,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 856-857 [the “‘minor need not have
been actually harmed before removal is appropriate’”]; In re L.O.,

                                 8
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 245 [the “‘“court may consider a
parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances”’”]; In re
D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328 [“The focus of the statute is
on averting harm to the child”]; In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
126, 133 [“A parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future
behavior.”].) The juvenile court could also reasonably conclude
that, because Vivian failed to take responsibility for
inappropriately physically disciplining Journee, she would use
the same methods of discipline on Royal when he was older. (See
M.D., at pp. 857-858 [“A fact finder could reasonably conclude,
based on the evidence of [the father’s] habitual parenting
practices, coupled with his ongoing denial and lack of insight,
that it was highly probable returning [the child] to his care put
her at risk of physical danger.”]; In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
283, 293 [“In light of [the] mother’s failure to recognize the risks
to which she was exposing the minor, there was no reason to
believe the conditions would not persist should the minor remain
in her home.”]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197
[“[o]ne cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”].)
       Vivian also contends that, at the time of the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing, she had completed an online parenting
course where, she testified, she learned that parenting required
“a lot of patience and communication, no yelling.” But Vivian’s
angry outburst at the same hearing undermined her assertion
she had learned how to communicate without yelling. Nor was
there evidence Vivian was willing to work on becoming a better
parent. When the court ordered services for Vivian (which
included parenting and anger management classes), Vivian
stated: “I ain’t doing none of my services. If my kids can’t come
home, I ain’t doing it.”

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       Finally, citing In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282,
Vivian argues a court may not remove a child based on a parent’s
“hostility” about the allegations in a petition. In that case the
juvenile court removed a 15-year-old child after her parents, who
were “‘law-abiding citizens’ with no alcohol or drug dependencies
and no prior encounters with the juvenile dependency system,”
used corporal punishment. (Id. at p. 285.) The court in
Jasmine G. reversed the removal order, concluding substantial
evidence did not support the juvenile court’s finding because the
parents “expressed remorse for having used corporal
punishment” and attended parenting classes and therapy
sessions to improve their parenting skills. In addition, the child
wanted to return home, and her therapist stated it was “totally
safe to return the child.” (Id. at pp. 288-289.) The court in
Jasmine G. held the juvenile court erred by relying on, among
other things, “the subjective belief of the social worker that the
parents ‘lack[ed] understanding of their responsibility and their
roles in the [corporal punishment] incident’” and the parents’
“‘lack of cooperativeness and the hostility’ perceived by the social
worker.” (Id. at pp. 289-290.)
       In re Jasmine G. is readily distinguishable. Unlike the
parents in that case, Vivian did not admit she physically
disciplined her child, did not promise to refrain from using
corporal punishment, and did not complete her case plan. To the
contrary, Vivian denied physically abusing Journee (despite the
physical evidence she did), was indifferent to Journee’s emotional
well-being, and demonstrated volatile, angry behavior toward
Journee, Vivian’s father, law enforcement, Department
employees, and the juvenile court judge. Substantial evidence

                                 10
supported the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing
evidence it was not safe to return Royal to Vivian.

                         DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s order removing Royal is affirmed.

                                          SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

                  FEUER, J.

                  MARTINEZ, J.

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