Court Opinion

ID: 9384655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 17:00:49.929097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.469684
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                             APR 4 2023
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                                 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: LATASHA DENELL MITCHELL,                     No.   21-60050

               Debtor,                              BAP No. 21-1010

------------------------------
                                                    MEMORANDUM*
LATASHA RICHARDSON, AKA
LaTasha Denell Mitchell,

               Appellant,

 v.

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING,
INC.,

               Appellee.

                             Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
                              Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
            Lafferty III, Brand, and Taylor, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

                                 Submitted March 28, 2023**
                                  San Francisco, California

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: GOULD and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,*** District Judge.

      Latasha Richardson appeals from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (BAP)

judgment (1) affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of a discharge injunction

violation under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) and (2) holding that the violation of the

automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) was harmless. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 158(d), and we affirm in part and reverse in part.

      The BAP did not err in holding that, although Select Portfolio Servicing,

Inc. (SPS) technically violated the automatic stay, the violation did not give rise to

any emotional distress damages, because Richardson’s claims of emotional distress

were based on non-significant harms that are not compensable as actual damages

under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). See In re Snowden, 769 F.3d 651, 655–57 (9th Cir.

2014); In re McHenry, 179 B.R. 165, 168–69 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).1 Richardson

is, however, entitled to attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred in prosecuting the stay

under § 362(k), including on appeal. See In re Schwartz-Tallard, 803 F.3d 1095,

1101 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). We therefore reverse as to the issue of attorneys’

      ***
             The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
      1
         To the extent Richardson argues she is entitled to the $3,100 she paid to
SPS during the automatic stay as actual damages for a violation of the stay, we
reject this argument because that payment allowed her to stay in her home and
avoid foreclosure.
                                           2
fees and remand to the BAP with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court

for a determination of the amount of attorneys’ fees Richardson reasonably

incurred in litigating her claim that SPS violated the automatic stay at the

bankruptcy court and at the BAP. See Easley v. Collection Serv. of Nev., 910 F.3d

1286, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018).

      The bankruptcy court’s finding that SPS did not try to collect a personal debt

from Richardson after discharge is not clearly erroneous. See In re Mellem, 625

B.R. 172, 182–83 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2021). Because a secured lien survives a

discharge in bankruptcy up to the value of the collateral, see 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1),

SPS was entitled to enforce its lien even though Richardson did not reaffirm her

debt to SPS, which would have reaffirmed her personal liability.

      The record supports the BAP’s conclusion that SPS did not make any effort

to collect from Richardson personally; rather, SPS’s communications with

Richardson related to how she could avoid foreclosure by making mortgage

payments, or to the loan modification agreement between Richardson and SPS.

Such communications did not violate the discharge injunction. See In re Garske,

287 B.R. 537, 545 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002); see also 11 U.S.C. § 524(j).

                                           3
Therefore, the BAP did not err in holding that SPS did not violate the discharge

injunction.2

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.3

      2
        Because Richardson does not explain how she was treated differently than
other debtors, we reject her claim that her Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977).
      3
       We deny as moot Richardson’s Motion for Judicial Notice, Dkt. 40, and
Richardson’s Motion to Strike SPS’s Response, Dkt. 46. Each party will bear its
own costs on this appeal.
                                         4