Court Opinion

ID: 9363723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 15:10:58.349233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:32.086664
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Fulton and White
UNPUBLISHED

              JUSTIN MICHAEL PAYNE
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0574-22-4                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                 JANUARY 17, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                  FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FREDERICK COUNTY
                                            William W. Eldridge, IV, Judge

                               (Howard J. Manheimer, on brief), for appellant.

                               (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Lindsay M. Brooker, Assistant
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Justin Michael Payne pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine under a written plea

              agreement that provided that his sentence would not exceed the “high end of his [sentencing]

              guidelines.” The circuit court sentenced him to three years’ incarceration with all but one year and

              two months suspended. Payne contends that the circuit court erred by considering his “prior

              probation violations as ‘prior convictions’ for the purposes of determining” the range of his

              sentencing guidelines. Payne also argues that his active sentence violated his plea agreement. After

              examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is

              unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a).

              We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
                                         BACKGROUND

       On February 1, 2022, Payne pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine under a

written plea agreement that provided that his sentence would “be capped at the high end of his

[sentencing] guidelines.” After conducting a colloquy and concluding that Payne’s plea of guilty

was “freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made,” the circuit court convicted Payne of possession

of methamphetamine and ordered preparation of a presentence investigation report.

       Before the sentencing hearing, a probation officer filed a presentence investigation report

that contained sentencing guidelines recommending imposition of active incarceration between

nine months at the low end, one year and eight months at the high end, and one year and six

months at the midpoint. On Section A of the sentencing guidelines worksheet, the probation

officer included three felony probation violations among Payne’s prior convictions.

       At the sentencing hearing, Payne objected to the sentencing guidelines as prepared.

Relying on Jaccard v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 56 (2004), Payne argued that the probation

officer erroneously treated his prior felony probation violations as “convictions” for purposes of

computing the recommended sentencing range. The circuit court held that Jaccard was

inapposite and overruled the objection. The circuit court then sentenced Payne to three years’

incarceration with one year and ten months suspended. Payne appeals.

                                           ANALYSIS

                                     I. Sentencing Guidelines

       Payne argues that the circuit court erroneously “counted” his previous probation

violations as “prior convictions” in calculating his sentencing guidelines. He asserts that if

properly computed, the guidelines should have recommended a maximum sentence of six

months’ incarceration. We do not consider Payne’s argument as it is not cognizable on appeal.

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       Code § 19.2-298.01, governing the use of discretionary sentencing guidelines, requires

the circuit court “to consider the sentencing guidelines before sentencing [the appellant] and to

file with the record of the case a written explanation of any departure from the indicated range of

punishment.” Fazili v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 239, 248-49 (2019) (alteration in original)

(quoting West v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 273 Va. 56, 65 (2007)). “[T]he recommended sentencing

ranges contained in these discretionary guidelines are not binding on the trial judge but, rather,

are mere tools to be used by the judge in fixing an appropriate sentence within the limitations

established by the statute governing punishment for the particular crime.” Luttrell v.

Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 461, 465 (2004). Thus, a judge’s failure to follow the sentencing

guidelines “shall not be reviewable on appeal or the basis of any other post-conviction relief.”

Code § 19.2-298.01(F); see also Fazili, 71 Va. App. at 248-49.

       Although Payne asks this Court to review the circuit court’s calculation of his sentencing

guidelines, we lack the authority to do so. See Code § 19.2-298.01(F). Accordingly, we do not

consider his argument challenging the calculation of the guidelines.

                                  II. Violation of Plea Agreement

       Payne asserts that “by erroneously allowing [his] prior probation violations to be included as

part of his ‘prior convictions’ for sentencing guidelines purposes,” the circuit court sentenced him

“to an active period of incarceration that exceeded that which was contemplated in the plea

agreement.” Payne has failed to preserve this argument for appellate review.

       “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection

was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to

enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. Accordingly, “this Court ‘will not

consider an argument on appeal [that] was not presented to the trial court.’” Farnsworth v.

Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 490, 500 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Ohree v.

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Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308 (1998)). Moreover, appellate courts “will not consider an

argument that differs from the specific argument presented to the trial court, even if it relates to the

same general issue.” Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 761 (2003) (en banc) (citing

Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 584 (1978)). “Specificity and timeliness undergird the

contemporaneous-objection rule [and] animate its highly practical purpose.” Bethea v.

Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019); see also Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217

(2010). “Not just any objection will do. It must be both specific and timely—so that the trial judge

would know the particular point being made in time to do something about it.” Bethea, 297 Va. at

743 (quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 351, 356 (2011)).

        At trial, Payne argued only that his sentencing guidelines were inaccurate, not that his

sentence violated his plea agreement. Accordingly, we do not address his argument which he raises

for the first time on appeal. Farnsworth, 43 Va. App. at 500. Payne does not invoke the good cause

or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18, and we will not do so sua sponte. Edwards, 41

Va. App. at 761.

                                            CONCLUSION

        For the above reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

                                                                                               Affirmed.

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