Court Opinion

ID: 9947361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 17:10:42.279983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:23.356140
License: Public Domain

03/04/2024
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                           AT NASHVILLE
                         October 3, 2023 Session

     BRITTANY SHARAYAH LEHMANN V. JERRY SCOTT WILSON

              Appeal from the Chancery Court for Rutherford County
                    No. 22CV-712     Barry R. Tidwell, Judge

                            No. M2023-00232-COA-R3-CV

The appellant challenges his convictions on two charges of criminal contempt for violating
an order of protection prohibiting him from contacting his former partner. The convictions
arise from two communications between the appellant and the appellee when exchanging
their minor child. We have determined that the underlying orders lack the required level of
clarity and contain significant ambiguities. We, therefore, reverse the convictions.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ARNOLD B. GOLDIN
and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined.

Daniel Alexander Horwitz, Melissa Kathleen Dix, and Lindsay Smith, Nashville,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Jerry Scott Wilson.

Catherine Teresa Mekis and Laurie Young, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the
appellee, Brittany Sharayah Lehmann.

                                       OPINION

                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Brittany Sharayah Lehmann and Jerry Scott Wilson are former romantic partners
who previously lived together and have one minor child together. The relationship between
the parties deteriorated until eventually Ms. Lehmann and Dr. Wilson filed competing
petitions for orders of protection against one another. In her petition against Dr. Wilson,
filed on April 19, 2022, Ms. Lehmann alleged verbal and physical abuse and that she feared
for her safety. The Chancery Court for Rutherford County entered an ex parte order of
protection (the “April 19 order”) the same day. The order prohibited Dr. Wilson from
contacting Ms. Lehmann or her minor children “either directly or indirectly, by phone,
email, messages, mail or any other type of communication or contact.”1

        The parties agreed to continue the original hearing date on Ms. Lehmann’s petition
to allow for discovery to take place, with the ex parte order remaining in place until further
orders of the court. Both parties appeared in court on August 1, 2022, and were represented
by counsel. The court entered an agreed order (the “August 1 order”) to continue the ex
parte order of protection. The August 1 order provided that the minor child would be
removed from the ex parte order of protection and for Dr. Wilson to have parenting time
with the child every Wednesday and certain Saturdays. The order also provided that the
exchanges of the child would occur at the child’s care provider and the Rutherford County
sheriff’s department. The ex parte order would remain in effect until April 18, 2023, and
would automatically expire on that date.

       In September 2022, Ms. Lehmann contacted law enforcement alleging that Dr.
Wilson had violated an order of protection that prohibited him from contacting her. On
September 13, 2022, the Rutherford County General Sessions court entered an Order
Authorizing Law Enforcement Arrest on Contempt of Ex Parte Order of Protection
supported by the affidavit of a sheriff’s deputy. The affidavit recounted what Ms. Lehmann
had told the deputy regarding a text Dr. Wilson sent to her on September 12, 2022, about
the parties’ internet service. On September 14, 2022, the general sessions court entered
another Order Authorizing Law Enforcement Arrest on Contempt of Ex Parte Order of
Protection supported by the affidavit of a sheriff’s deputy. This affidavit recounted what
Ms. Lehmann had told a deputy about an interaction with Dr. Wilson after exchanging their
child at the sheriff’s department, also about the internet service. Dr. Wilson was served
with the orders on September 14, 2022. Dr. Wilson was eventually arrested for the two
charges, made bail, and was released.

       After several agreed continuances, a trial on the two contempt charges was held in
chancery court on January 23, 2023. At the trial, there was some confusion concerning
whether the matter was civil or criminal in nature and whether the matter could later also
be heard in criminal court. The court determined that the matter was not going to be heard
in criminal court based on the docket number assigned to the case and Tenn. Code Ann. §
36-3-612(a).2 The court also determined that the proceeding was to be treated as a criminal
contempt hearing.

    1
      Dr. Wilson’s separate petition for order of protection is not included in the record and is not at issue
on appeal. While he did bring his own contempt complaint against Ms. Lehmann, he ultimately dismissed
the complaint.
    2
     Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-612(a) explains the procedure for contempt hearings after an
order of protection has allegedly been violated, stating in relevant part: “A person arrested for the violation
of an order of protection issued pursuant to this part . . . shall be taken before a magistrate or the court
                                                    -2-
        During the hearing, testimony was given regarding the two events underlying the
contempt charges. Both contempt charges are based upon communications from Dr.
Wilson to Ms. Lehmann. The first charge concerns a text message from Dr. Wilson to Ms.
Lehmann about the parties’ internet service provider. Dr. Wilson was attempting to transfer
the service into his name from Ms. Lehmann’s name and needed Ms. Lehmann to speak
with the provider to allow the change to go into effect. Ms. Lehmann testified that on
September 12, 2022, Dr. Wilson texted her saying, “Xfinity is calling you now. Please
answer. I’m here now. I didn’t realize the account was apparently just in your name when
I transferred.” Dr. Wilson testified that he had appointments the next day with several high
needs patients and was worried about being able to properly contact them via telehealth.

        Ms. Lehmann also testified to an interaction between her and Dr. Wilson on
September 14, 2022, that formed the basis of the second contempt charge. The parties were
meeting at the Rutherford County sheriff’s department to exchange custody of their child.
After exchanging the child, Ms. Lehmann went back to her vehicle to leave when Dr.
Wilson came to her car and began speaking about events surrounding the Xfinity account.
There is disputed testimony regarding what specifically was said at this encounter, but it is
undisputed that Dr. Wilson approached Ms. Lehmann’s car and began to speak to her. After
initially leaving the sheriff’s department, Ms. Lehmann returned and reported what had
occurred.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found Dr. Wilson guilty of both contempt
charges and ordered him to pay a fine of $10 to the clerk for each violation. The trial court
entered a written order later that day. Dr. Wilson filed a timely appeal.

                                                  ISSUES

        Dr. Wilson raises numerous issues for our review:

    1. Whether [Ms. Lehmann’s] failure to introduce into evidence the orders that
       [Dr. Wilson] allegedly violated precludes Appellant’s contempt convictions.

    2. Whether the trial court’s August 1, 2022, order prohibiting “derogatory”
       statements was lawful.

    3. Whether, as to either count, [Ms. Lehmann] introduced sufficient evidence
       to prove that the terms of the order that [Dr. Wilson] allegedly violated were
       clear, specific, and unambiguous.

having jurisdiction in the cause . . . to answer a charge of contempt for violation of the order of protection
. . . .”
                                                    -3-
   4. Whether, as to either count, [Ms. Lehmann] introduced sufficient evidence
      to prove that [Dr. Wilson] actually violated the trial court’s order.

   5. Whether, as to either count, [Ms. Lehmann] introduced sufficient evidence
      to prove that [Dr. Wilson’s] alleged violations were “willful.”

   6. Whether [Dr. Wilson’s] convictions must be vacated due to notice defects.

   7. Whether the trial court’s convictions must be vacated due to the trial court’s
      failure to make sufficient factual findings.

      Ms. Lehmann presents the same issues while also raising the issue of attorney’s fees
and costs on appeal.

                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       As this Court has previously stated:

              A person charged with criminal contempt is “presumed innocent and
       may not be found to be in criminal contempt in the absence of proof beyond
       a reasonable doubt that they have willfully failed to comply with the court’s
       order.” Long v. McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)
       (citing Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tenn. 1996); Thigpen v.
       Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). If the defendant is found
       guilty by the trial court, the defendant has the burden on appeal of illustrating
       why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of guilt. Black, 938
       S.W.2d at 399.

Pruitt v. Pruitt, 293 S.W.3d 537, 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). Once an individual is
convicted of criminal contempt, he or she loses the presumption of innocence and must
overcome his or her presumption of guilt on appeal. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d at 53. “Appellate
courts do not review the evidence in a light favorable to the accused and will reverse
criminal contempt convictions only when the evidence is insufficient to support the trier-
of-fact’s finding of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Tenn. R. App. P.
13(e)). Reviewing courts, therefore, will not reverse a verdict of guilty “unless the relevant
facts contained in the record are insufficient, as a matter of law, for a rational trier of fact
to find the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ross v. Ross, No. M2008-00594-
COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 5191329, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2008) (citing State v.
Johnson, No. E2002-02028-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 23094414, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Dec. 30, 2003)).

                                              -4-
                                     ANALYSIS

   I.     Ambiguity of the Underlying Orders

        A court’s contempt powers have “long been regarded as essential to the protection
and existence of the courts and the proper administration of justice.” Konvalinka v.
Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 354 (Tenn. 2008). In
Tennessee, as in other states, the courts’ contempt power is now purely statutory. Id.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 authorizes courts to “inflict punishments for
contempts of court . . . [including cases of] [t]he willful disobedience or resistance of any
. . . person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of such courts.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3).

       There are four essential elements to a charge of criminal contempt, (1) the order
allegedly violated was lawful; (2) the order was clear, specific, and unambiguous; (3) the
individual charged must have actually violated the order; and (4) the individual acted
willfully in violating the order. Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354-55. While Konvalinka was
concerned with a civil contempt proceeding, as opposed to a criminal contempt proceeding,
this Court has previously held that the analysis set forth in Konvalinka applies to all
contempt proceedings. Furlong v. Furlong, 370 S.W.3d 329, 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).

        When a court makes a finding of contempt based on disobedience of a court order,
the order underlying the charge must be clear, specific, and unambiguous. Boren v. Wade,
No. W2022-00194-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 3000881, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2023).
Vague or ambiguous orders that can be interpreted as having more than one reasonable
understanding cannot support contempt charges. Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 356. An order
“need not be full of ‘superfluous terms and specifications’” to avoid being vague. Id.
(quoting Ex parte Blasingame, 748 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1988)). Courts reviewing orders
that have been alleged to have been violated should interpret any ambiguities in the order
in favor of the person facing the contempt charge. Id. Courts evaluating an order alleged to
have been violated apply “an objective standard that takes into account both the language
of the order and the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the order, including the
audience to whom the order is addressed.” Id. Parties subject to an order are only required
to interpret it reasonably to determine what conduct they may or may not do. Id. at 359.
Courts are to subject the order to de novo review to determine whether it has the required
level of clarity to be enforced in a contempt proceeding. Id. at 356.

       Orders which form the basis for a contempt charge must “expressly and precisely”
spell out the details of compliance in a way that “reasonable persons” will know exactly
what actions are required or forbidden. Id. at 355. In the present case, we have concluded
that the underlying orders are not sufficiently clear and unambiguous. It is unclear from
the two orders what actions are required or forbidden. The ambiguity arises from the
different terms contained in the two orders regarding contact between the parties. The

                                            -5-
initial April 19 order prohibited all contact between Dr. Wilson and Ms. Lehmann and her
children. This order was then incorporated into the August 1 order by adding a visitation
schedule and designating how the parties’ child was to be exchanged by the two parties but
did not address the no contact provision. Thus, Dr. Wilson was both prohibited from
contacting Ms. Lehmann and required to meet her weekly to exchange their child. These
conflicting orders create an ambiguity and, therefore, they are not sufficient for a
conviction of criminal contempt.

       On appeal, Ms. Lehmann argues that the August 1 order only modifies the April 19
order to allow for the exchange of the child without modifying the no contact provision at
all. Ms. Lehmann appears to understand the two orders as meaning no verbal
communication between the two parties, regardless of other mandated events like
exchanging their child. However, the April 19 order does not make this subtle distinction.
The April 19 order specifically orders Mr. Wilson not to “contact [Ms. Lehmann or her
minor children] either directly or indirectly, by phone, email, messages, mail or any other
type of communication or contact.” The order not only proscribed verbal communication
with Ms. Lehmann, but also proscribed any contact at all with Ms. Lehmann. The order
itself makes a distinction between communication and contact through the use of a
disjunctive list (“communication or contact”). The subsequent order mandating Dr. Wilson
to meet with Ms. Lehmann regularly creates an ambiguity regarding how Dr. Wilson is to
both not contact Ms. Lehmann and meet with her regularly.

        The August 1 order does not provide sufficient clarity as to what conduct Dr.
Wilson was prevented from doing to support a finding of contempt. Orders underlying a
finding of contempt must “leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding their meaning.”
Id. at 356. Ms. Lehmann’s interpretation of the orders does not resolve the ambiguity
regarding what contact was allowed under the August 1 order. Courts are not to “go beyond
the four corners of the order in contempt cases to clarify an ambiguity.” Scobey v. Scobey,
No. M2016-00963-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 4051085, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13,
2017). We are limited to the plain meaning as understood from the orders themselves.

       In concluding that the orders at issue were not sufficiently clear to support a finding
of contempt, we have considered not only the circumstances of the alleged violations, but
also the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the orders and their audience. See
Furlong, 370 S.W.3d at 339 (citing Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 356) (requiring the
application of this standard when evaluating whether an order is ambiguous). Indeed, some
of the conduct complained of occurred at a mandated meeting between the two parties. It
appears that the parties did not have a clear idea of what the orders required of them. This
confusion was even shared by Ms. Lehmann and her counsel at trial.3

    3
      Ms. Lehmann testified at trial that it was her belief that the August 1 order allowed only contact
regarding the parties’ child. It appears that this was her counsel’s understanding of the orders as well. She
has reversed her interpretation on appeal, asserting instead that the orders prevent any communication.
                                                   -6-
       Construing the ambiguity in favor of Dr. Wilson, we find that the ambiguities are
such that the orders cannot support a conviction of contempt. The determination that the
order which was allegedly violated lacked specificity and was ambiguous requires a
reversal of the convictions of contempt. See Ross, 2008 WL 5191329, at *6.

        Because this issue is dispositive, we do not reach Dr. Wilson’s remaining issues. In
light of our decision to reverse the judgment of criminal contempt, any opinion concerning
the other issues would be advisory in nature. See Furlong, 370 S.W.3d at 336. We also
seek to “avoid deciding constitutional issues when a case can be resolved on non-
constitutional grounds.” Haynes v. City of Pigeon Forge, 883 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1994).

   II.    Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal

        We now turn to Ms. Lehmann’s claim that she should be awarded her attorney’s
fees and not be taxed costs on appeal. As Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-617 (a)(1) does not
support her request, we decline to award Ms. Lehmann her attorney’s fees. Turning next to
costs, because Dr. Wilson is the prevailing party, we would typically tax the costs on appeal
to Ms. Lehmann. However, before we could assess costs against Ms. Lehmann, the statute
and controlling authority requires us to make certain findings we are unprepared to make.

        Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-617(a)(2) and controlling authority, before we could
tax costs on appeal to Ms. Lehmann, we would have to make two findings by clear and
convincing evidence. First, that the petitioner is not a domestic abuse victim, and second,
that the petitioner knew that the allegation of domestic abuse, . . . was false at the time the
petition was filed. See Furlong, 370 S.W.3d at 341 (holding that the statute requires making
these findings by clear and convincing evidence before taxing costs on appeal against the
petitioner for an order of protection). The record does not contain sufficient evidence for
this Court to make these findings, therefore, we cannot tax the costs on appeal to Ms.
Lehmann. We therefore decline to tax costs against either party.

                                        CONCLUSION

        The judgment of the chancery court is reversed. Neither party is taxed with the costs
of this appeal.

                                                   /s/ Andy D. Bennett
                                                   ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

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