Court Opinion

ID: 9965215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 20:00:50.82632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:48.323633
License: Public Domain

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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11401
                           ____________________

        ANGELA M. POER,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMISSION,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-01361-AMM
                           ____________________

        Before GRANT, ABUDU, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11401

        ABUDU, Circuit Judge:
               Angela Poer appeals the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment in favor of her former employer, the Jefferson County
        Commission (the “Commission”), on her employment discrimina-
        tion claims brought under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), and
        42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Poer, a White woman, alleged in her
        complaint that her supervisor, a Black woman, discriminated
        against her based on her race, and that the Commission denied her
        request for a lateral transfer or reassignment to another depart-
        ment resulting in “disparate treatment.” She claimed that her ulti-
        mate termination was race-based, and she sought damages in the
        form of reinstatement and back pay among other forms of mone-
        tary and injunctive relief. The district court determined that Poer
        had failed to present any evidence showing that she was terminated
        or otherwise discriminated against because of her race. The court
        also declined to consider Poer’s argument, raised for the first time
        at summary judgment, that the Commission’s employment deci-
        sions were forms of retaliation in response to her grievances.
               After carefully reviewing the record, and with the benefit of
        oral argument, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
        I.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
               Poer joined the Commission’s General Services Department
        as an Administrative Services Manager (“ASM”) in October 2017.
        Her duties included approving expenditures for all line items
        within the budget; preparing and monitoring monthly reports on
        credit cards; handling petty cash; overseeing operational and capital
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        22-11401              Opinion of the Court                        3

        budgets; purchasing equipment and supplies; supervising person-
        nel by assigning and reviewing work; monitoring personnel perfor-
        mance; ensuring policies and procedures were followed by person-
        nel; and training employees, among other tasks.
               The Commission described the ASM role as a “fast paced
        position with a lot of moving parts,” and stated that the ASM was
        responsible for managing a team of administrative clerks and ac-
        counting assistants in the department. Poer’s direct supervisor, and
        the person she complains was chieﬂy responsible for her termina-
        tion, was Trisha Wilkins, who is Black.
               When Poer started the job, the Commission assigned Edwin
        Yergan, the Chief Administrative Analyst, as Poer’s “start partner.”
        Yergan was responsible for “acclimat[ing] [Poer] to the organiza-
        tion and provid[ing] guidance to successfully transition” her into
        the role. Almost immediately, according to the Commission, the
        management team identiﬁed problems with Poer’s performance.
        The Commission’s Director of the General Services Department,
        Jeﬀ Smith, who is White, determined that Poer was receiving the
        necessary support to perform her duties, but that she was still “ex-
        hibiting signs of not getting along with her subordinates and strug-
        gling” to manage her team. As an example, he noted that an em-
        ployee was removed from Poer’s supervision after just three
        months of Poer being on the job because of a verbal altercation
        between the two of them. Poer, in response, maintained that the
        employee was diﬃcult to manage and that on at least two occa-
        sions, she had informed Wilkins and the Commission’s Equity and
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                22-11401

        Inclusion Department (“EID”) of the employee’s insubordinate be-
        havior. Poer claimed that the EID never responded to her com-
        plaints and that Wilkins actively championed the employee, thus
        favoring her over Poer.
               Poer was provided with a Training & OD Advisor, Tiﬀany
        Owens, to serve as Poer’s professional coach. Smith created a
        “New Employee Development Plan” to support Poer’s professional
        development.
               The Commission had a policy of evaluating employees who
        were in their probationary period every three months. The perfor-
        mance scoring worked as follows:
              A- “Below Expectations”
              B- “Needs Improvement”
              C- “Meets Expectations”
              D- “Commendable”
              E- “Exceeds Expectations”
               Wilkins and Yergan conducted Poer’s first evaluation in Jan-
        uary 2018. Poer received two scores of “Needs Improvement,” and
        four scores of “Meets Expectations.” She did not receive a score of
        “Exceeds Expectations” or “Commendable.” Yergan signed the
        evaluation form. Poer signed the form and stated that she “agreed
        with it.”
               Poer had her second evaluation in April 2018 and received
        the following: (1) three scores of “Needs Improvement,” two of
        which involved the same areas of concern identified in her first
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        22-11401                 Opinion of the Court                            5

        evaluation; and (2) two scores of “Meets Expectations.” 1 She did
        not receive any scores of “Exceeds Expectations” or “Commenda-
        ble.” The evaluation form, which Wilkins signed, explained that
        Poer “[i]sn’t clear about who is responsible for what,” “[d]oesn’t
        provide work-in-progress feedback,” is “disorganized,” and “just
        throw[s] tasks at people”—among other concerns. Poer signed the
        evaluation form, but she disagreed with the scores she received.
        Although she believed she should have earned higher ratings, she
        did not explain why the scores were unjustified.
               Poer received her third, and final, evaluation in July 2018.
        Owens, Yergan, Smith, and Wilkins discussed the evaluation. This
        time, Poer received “Needs Improvement” scores in eight catego-
        ries: Compliance; Drafting Directives; Managing Details; Review-
        ing, Revising, and Maintaining Departmental Policies; Managing
        Payroll Computations, Customer Satisfaction, and Maintenance
        Tracking; Managing and Monitoring the Parking System; Encour-
        aging Communication; and Purchasing Departmental Supplies.
        She also received “Meets Expectations” scores in two categories:
        Establishing Onboarding Packets, and Assigning Work to Subordi-
        nates. She did not receive any scores of “Exceeds Expectations” or
        “Commendable.” Poer signed the evaluation form, but she disa-
        greed with the scores she received. Although she believed she

        1 There are nine categories for which Poer was evaluated on for her three-

        month evaluation and six-month evaluation. However, there are fourteen
        categories for which she was evaluated on for her nine-month evaluation.
        Poer was not evaluated on all categories on any given evaluation (i.e., not
        every category was filled out).
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11401

        should have earned higher ratings, she did not explain why the
        scores were unjustified. Wilkins also signed the evaluation form,
        and Poer stated in an affidavit that she believed that the low ratings
        were based, at least in part, on a misunderstanding regarding one
        of Poer’s supply purchases.
               On July 10, 2018, shortly after her nine-month evaluation,
        Poer requested a lateral transfer or reassignment from the General
        Services Department to the Equalization Board. She sent an email
        to the Commission’s Chief Executive Officer, Tony Petelos, who is
        White, carbon copied Human Resources Director Michelle Ro-
        drigues and stated:
               I am writing to request reassignment. I understand
               there is an opening for Administrative Services Man-
               ager with the Board of Equalization.
        Poer acknowledged the lateral nature of the lateral transfer or re-
        assignment request when she noted that she was “currently an Ad-
        ministrative Services Manager [same title] in General Services.”
        She did not include a reason for her request, and she made no men-
        tion of being discriminated against by Wilkins.
                Poer later testified that she “was trying to get out of the
        [General Services] department.” Rodrigues’s sworn affidavit sup-
        ported Poer’s statement that her motivation for requesting the lat-
        eral transfer or reassignment was to “get away from Trisha Wil-
        kins.” According to Rodrigues, Poer “had just received her 9-
        month appraisal and did not think it was a fair rating by Trisha Wil-
        kins . . . and Jeff Smith . . . .” Though Poer cited unfairness, she did
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        22-11401                Opinion of the Court                          7

        not accuse Wilkins or anyone else in the Commission of discrimi-
        nating against her based on her race at that time.
                Rodrigues interpreted Poer’s request as one for a “reassign-
        ment or transfer.” Consequently, Rodrigues explained to Poer that
        because Poer was “in her probationary period-meaning she had
        been employed with Jefferson County Commission for less than a
        year [and] that she could not be transferred.” Rodrigues told Poer
        that, in the event she was requesting a transfer, she was not eligible.
        Rodrigues informed Poer that if she wanted to be reassigned to an-
        other department, she could make that request directly to Smith.
        When Rodrigues spoke with Smith about Poer’s interest in a reas-
        signment, Smith responded that he could not recommend or sup-
        port reassigning an employee with performance problems to an-
        other department. Therefore, according to the Commission, Poer
        was ineligible for a transfer due to her limited tenure on the job and
        was denied a reassignment because of her work performance prob-
        lems.
                According to Poer, her “email makes perfectly clear that
        [she] was asking for a reassignment.” Poer contends that Ro-
        drigues told her that she could not be “reassigned” because she was
        employed with the Commission for less than one year. Poer also
        referred to the request as both a “reassignment” and “lateral trans-
        fer” in her complaint.
               Smith later stated in his affidavit that he “did not seek any
        input on [his] decision to refuse to give [Poer] [a] referral.” Also, in
        its response to the formal Equal Employment Opportunity
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-11401

        Commission (“EEOC”) charge that Poer subsequently filed, the
        Commission maintained that the denial of Poer’s request for a re-
        assignment was based solely on her subpar performance.
               Poer blamed Wilkins for the denial of her lateral transfer or
        reassignment request and alleged that Wilkin’s actions were ra-
        cially motivated. Specifically, Poer claimed that she “was not reas-
        signed to [the Board of Equalization] because [Wilkins] did not like
        [her] because of [her] race.” Poer’s contention was based, in large
        part, on the fact that a Black employee, Tansy Long, was assigned
        to the Board of Equalization position that Poer had sought.
              On or around July 10, 2018, Poer filed an internal complaint
        with the Commission’s EID and Human Resources. She claimed
        that Wilkins engaged in “unfair treatment,” but she did not accuse
        Wilkins of “racial discrimination.”
               Poer also claimed that Wilkins made several racially insensi-
        tive comments directed at her and other White employees and
        that, in general, Wilkins gave Black employees preferential treat-
        ment. The examples that Poer gave during her deposition were:
        (1) Wilkins asking her why a White person told a particular story,
        suggesting that Poer would know why because she is White;
        (2) Wilkins stating that “money did not need to be spent on [W]hite
        men because [W]hite men didn’t want it spent on [B]lack people”;
        (3) Wilkins asking one of Poer’s subordinates, who is Black, “Why
        did you let that [W]hite woman get to you[,] . . . you [are] a strong
        [B]lack woman ?”; and (4) Wilkins telling Poer that she would have
        problems managing Black female employees. Poer also alleged
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        22-11401              Opinion of the Court                        9

        that Wilkins told her that she “would have trouble managing Black
        female employees because [she] was a White female.” According
        to Poer, another employee overheard Wilkins say, “if it were up to
        her, she would fire all of the [W]hite male managers.” Overall,
        Poer contends that Wilkins was blaming her for staffing difficulties
        instead of recognizing that Poer’s subordinates were actually the
        problematic ones. Poer asserted that Wilkins’s comments and be-
        havior made her fearful and anxious to the point where she started
        experiencing heart palpitations and had to increase her blood pres-
        sure medication.
               Poer identified Smith, Yergan, and Barry Kennamer as wit-
        nesses to Wilkins’s alleged racially discriminatory comments and
        conduct, but none of them corroborated her accounts. Smith af-
        firmed in his affidavit that, “Poer never reported to me that she
        thought she was being discriminated against by Ms. Wilkins or an-
        yone else in the department.” Yergan attested that he “never wit-
        nessed or heard Trisha Wilkins say that [Poer] would have prob-
        lems managing [B]lack women because she was [W]hite; [Wilkins]
        does not speak in that manner.” Kennamer, in his affidavit,
        acknowledged that he was “personally not fond” of Wilkins, but he
        denied ever hearing Wilkins “make any racist statement,” or say
        that “she would fire all the [W]hite managers.” Although Ken-
        namer disagreed with Wilkins’s management style, he believed
        that she held “employees equally accountable across the board no
        matter what race or gender.” Poer did not depose Smith, Yergan,
        or Kennamer, and she did not present any evidence either to sub-
        stantiate her claims regarding Wilkins’s alleged behavior, or to
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-11401

        impeach the managers’ sworn statements. For her part, Wilkins
        also denied making any such comments and the Commission fo-
        cused on Poer’s failure to proffer testimony from any witnesses or
        other evidence to corroborate the alleged statements and mistreat-
        ment.
               After her third performance evaluation, the Commission
        placed Poer on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) in July
        2018, which lasted until October 2018. The key areas that the Com-
        mission identiﬁed as needing improvement were “Time Manage-
        ment,” “Timely Decision Making,” “Decision Quality,” and “Drive
        for Results.” The PIP included a chart which broke down the spe-
        ciﬁc steps Poer needed to take, including a minimum number of
        action items with projected results, for her to successfully complete
        the plan. The Commission informed her that it would formally
        evaluate her performance at the end of the plan period to deter-
        mine how well she accomplished the plan’s objectives. In addition,
        the PIP made clear that if her performance did not improve, she
        could face termination. Poer signed the PIP in August and her di-
        rector, Jeﬀ Smith, signed it in September.
               While Poer was on the PIP, the Commission documented a
        couple of instances in which Poer did not properly secure the
        agency’s funds. On one occasion, an employee reported to Wilkins
        that Poer mishandled money by leaving it on her desk exposed and
        unattended. Poer disputed the Commission’s characterization that
        she “left money unsecured on more than one occasion.” She ex-
        plained that she left money behind a door that was closed and
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        22-11401              Opinion of the Court                      11

        locked in one case; and on another occasion, she left money behind
        a closed door, but the door’s bolt was malfunctioning which is why
        the door was not locked.
               Ultimately, the Commission determined that Poer’s perfor-
        mance had not improved in the nine months she had been on staﬀ,
        and especially during the following three months she was on the
        PIP. On October 3, 2018, Smith issued Poer a “Notice to Employee
        of Contemplated Disciplinary Action.” The Notice was based on
        Poer’s “unsatisfactory performance in probationary period” and
        “incompetence or ineﬃciency.” Even though the Commission was
        not required to hold hearings related to the termination of an em-
        ployee for poor performance during their probationary period, the
        Commission nevertheless granted Poer’s request for one.
               On October 12, 2018, while her disciplinary proceedings
        were pending, Poer filed a Charge of Discrimination with the
        EEOC against the Commission. In the section of the form labeled
        “Discrimination Based On,” she only checked the “race” box, not
        the box for “retaliation” or any other basis. The EEOC issued its
        “Dismissal and Notice of Rights” in May 2019. The EEOC was “un-
        able to conclude” that the Commission had violated federal em-
        ployment laws.
               On October 18, 2018, Petelos presided over Poer’s discipli-
        nary hearing. Petelos considered Poer’s “entire work history” in
        reaching his ultimate decision to terminate her, including her rep-
        rimands and attendance record. He made particular note of the
        fact that she had approximately twenty-three days of absences
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-11401

        within the first year of her employment which Petelos determined
        was “unacceptable” and “worthy of her termination.” He also con-
        sidered Smith’s recommendation to terminate her given that Poer
        “had left money unsecured on more than one occasion,” among
        other things, which Petelos found was a sufficient basis for firing
        her as well.
               Poer disputed Petelos’s charge that she was “absent 23
        days.” Although Poer conceded that Smith’s affidavit correctly re-
        flected that she had total or partial “absences” on twenty-six days,
        she maintained that Wilkins approved many of those absences and,
        therefore, they should not have counted against her. She also later
        identified three Black employees—Sonya Moore, Rita Hutchins,
        and L’Tanya Blackmon—as alleged similarly-situated individuals
        who she claimed had job performance issues and yet were not dis-
        ciplined.
               The Commission officially terminated Poer on October 19,
        2018, almost one year after she started the position. The person
        the Commission hired to replace Poer was a White woman.
        II.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               In August 2019, Poer filed suit in the Northern District of
        Alabama and alleged that the Commission discriminated against
        her based on her race in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
        and 1983. The gravamen of her complaint was that the Commis-
        sion, primarily through Wilkins, subjected her to race-based dispar-
        ate treatment which created a hostile work environment that in-
        cluded the improper denial of her “lateral transfer request” and her
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        22-11401               Opinion of the Court                         13

        unlawful termination. The Commission first filed a Fed. R. Civ. P.
        12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the
        district court denied. After the parties engaged in discovery, the
        Commission moved for summary judgment on the ground that
        Poer failed to present a prima facie case of race-based employment
        discrimination. The Commission further maintained that, even if
        she did satisfy the first part of the burden shifting test set forth in
        McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Poer had not
        met her burden of proof in showing that the reasons for the Com-
        mission’s employment decisions were pretextual.
                In opposition, Poer argued that the evidence created a gen-
        uine question of material fact to overcome the Commission’s sum-
        mary judgment motion, and that she presented sufficient evidence
        for a jury to find that the real reason she was fired was because of
        Wilkins’ animus against White people. In addition to relying on
        the McDonnell Douglas framework, Poer asserted that her claims
        could succeed based on a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evi-
        dence. She accused the Commission of retaliating against her as
        evidenced by the timing between her internal grievances, her
        EEOC charge, and the agency’s decisions to deny her lateral trans-
        fer or reassignment request and terminate her. She also argued
        that she established a prima facie claim of hostile work environ-
        ment. Overall, because Poer disputed the Commission’s represen-
        tations regarding her work performance and the reasons given for
        her removal, she maintained that there were genuine issues of ma-
        terial fact to present to a jury.
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                     22-11401

                After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
        Poer, and weighing any factual disputes in her favor, the district
        court granted the Commission’s motion. At the outset, the court
        ruled that Poer never included a retaliation claim in her complaint
        and did not otherwise provide the Commission with notice that
        such a claim was part of the litigation. Therefore, the court held,
        “the retaliation claim to which [] Poer alluded to in her opposition
        to summary judgment [was] not before the court.” Although the
        district court described Poer’s complaint as “not [being] a model of
        clarity,” it did credit her repeated references to Wilkins’s alleged
        race-based comments and how those comments “instilled fear and
        anxiety in Poer,” as asserting a hostile work environment claim.
        The court then ruled that there was no direct evidence that sup-
        ported Poer’s racial discrimination claims, and the circumstantial
        evidence she introduced did not lead to a reasonable inference that
        her termination was racially motivated.
               As to Wilkins’s alleged discriminatory remarks, the district
        court found that those remarks, if actually made, pertained to
        “[W]hite male managers,” not all White managers which would
        have included Poer; the statements “addressed hypothetical termi-
        nations,” as opposed to any specific decision; and none of the state-
        ments were made by the management staff involved in the deci-
        sions around Poer’s lateral transfer or reassignment request and
        termination.2

        2 During oral argument, Poer’s counsel represented that Poer raised the “cat’s

        paw” issue before the district court and on appeal. However, a close review
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        22-11401                   Opinion of the Court                               15

               The district court also held that any circumstantial evidence
        Poer produced failed to support her assertion that the Commis-
        sion’s decision to end her employment was racially motivated. The
        court reasoned that the record did not include any similarly-situ-
        ated employees who had been treated more favorably than Poer,
        and there was no evidence to corroborate those assertions.
               Poer timely appealed the district court’s judgment. On ap-
        peal, Poer does not challenge the district court’s finding that she
        lacks the evidence of a comparator needed under the McDonnell
        Douglas analysis. Instead, her arguments on appeal are based on
        the court’s purported failure to properly analyze the evidence sup-
        porting her claims under her convincing mosaic argument.
        III.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
                We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
        novo. Munoz v. Selig Enters., 981 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020).
        Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
        is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is en-
        titled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact
        is “material” if it could “aﬀect the outcome of the suit under the
        governing law.” Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1303
        (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a
        genuine dispute of material fact exists where “the evidence is such

        of Poer’s brief reveals that she did not challenge the district court’s decision
        regarding her “cat’s paw” theory on appeal. That argument has, therefore,
        been forfeited. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872 (11th Cir. 2022) (en
        banc).
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                    22-11401

        that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
        party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
                “[T]he moving party has the burden of demonstrating that
        there are no genuine issues of material fact . . . .” Paylor v. Hartford
        Fire Ins., 748 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2014). In determining
        whether the movant has met this burden, we must view the evi-
        dence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Al-
        varez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2010).
        We also must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s
        favor. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437
        (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc); FindWhat Inv’r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658
        F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011). However, inferences that are sup-
        ported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary
        judgment motion. See Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181
        (11th Cir. 2005).
                The nature of a summary judgment movant’s burden varies
        depending on which party would bear the burden of proof on a
        disputed issue at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115
        (11th Cir. 1993). Where a defendant moves for summary judgment
        on an issue for which it would not bear the burden of proof at trial,
        it is not necessary for the defendant to entirely negate the plaintiﬀ’s
        claim. Id. at 1115–16; see also Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
        323 (1986) (“[W]e ﬁnd no express or implied requirement in Rule
        56 that the moving party support its motion with aﬃdavits or other
        similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” (emphasis in orig-
        inal)). Instead, the movant “has the burden of either negating an
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        22-11401               Opinion of the Court                        17

        essential element of the nonmoving party’s case or showing that
        there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the nonmoving
        party’s case.” McGee v. Sentinel Oﬀender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236,
        1242 (11th Cir. 2013).
                Once a summary judgment movant’s initial burden is met,
        “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to bring the court’s at-
        tention to evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.” Paylor,
        748 F.3d at 1121. “Overcoming that burden requires more than
        speculation or a mere scintilla of evidence.” Id. at 1122. The non-
        movant must “go beyond the pleadings,” to provide evidence and
        “designate speciﬁc facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
        trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted).
        The non-movant will survive summary judgment in this instance
        if it can demonstrate “that the record in fact contains supporting
        evidence, suﬃcient to withstand a directed verdict motion.” Doe v.
        Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 604 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
        marks omitted).
        IV.   DISCUSSION
               Title VII prohibits employers from discharging an individ-
        ual, or otherwise discriminating against that person with respect to
        her terms, conditions, or privileges of employment “because of ”
        that person’s race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1981, likewise,
        forbids employers from intentionally discriminating against em-
        ployees based on their race. See Webster v. Fulton Cnty., 283 F.3d
        1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002). Both Title VII and Section 1981 have
        the same burden of proof and use an identical analytical
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11401

        framework. Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1307
        (11th Cir. 2023). A plaintiﬀ may present either direct evidence, cir-
        cumstantial evidence, or both to support a race discrimination
        claim. Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 944 (11th Cir.
        2023); Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 1999).
                Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiﬀ assert-
        ing a race discrimination claim under either statute must show that:
        (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualiﬁed to do the
        job; (3) she was subjected to adverse employment action; and (4)
        her employer treated similarly-situated employees outside her class
        more favorably. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S at 802; Lewis v. City of
        Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Lewis I”) (en
        banc); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Mia., Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th
        Cir. 2003) (per curiam). If the plaintiﬀ succeeds in making out a
        prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
        legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Tex. Dep’t of
        Cmty. Aﬀairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Lewis I, 918 F.3d at
        1221. If, at summary judgment, an employer meets its burden of
        articulating a non-discriminatory reason for any purportedly ad-
        verse action, “to avoid summary judgment [the plaintiﬀ] must in-
        troduce signiﬁcantly probative evidence showing that the asserted
        reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Clark v. Coats &
        Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 1993). A reason is not pre-
        text for discrimination “unless it is shown both that the reason was
        false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor
        Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (emphasis in original).
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        22-11401               Opinion of the Court                         19

                While the McDonnell Douglas framework is commonly em-
        ployed when analyzing a Title VII or Section 1981 claim, it is only
        one method or evidentiary tool by which a plaintiﬀ can prove dis-
        crimination by circumstantial evidence. Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946. A
        plaintiﬀ who cannot satisfy the McDonnell Douglass framework may
        still be able to prove her case with a convincing mosaic of circum-
        stantial evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer or ﬁnd
        intentional racial discrimination in an adverse employment action.
        See id.; Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.
        2011) (“A triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light
        most favorable to the plaintiﬀ, presents a convincing mosaic of cir-
        cumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional
        discrimination by the decisionmaker.”); Ossmann v. Meredith Corp.,
        82 F.4th 1007, 1020 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he convincing mosaic met-
        aphor oﬀers an alternative to plaintiﬀs unable to succeed through
        the McDonnell Douglas framework.”); see also Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310–
        11 (“[A] ‘convincing mosaic’ is a metaphor, not a legal test and not
        a framework.”). Thus, unlike the necessary three-part test that
        Poer had to satisfy to succeed under the McDonnell Douglas frame-
        work, she could have introduced a variety of evidence which, as a
        whole, strongly suggested that the Commission’s employment de-
        cisions were based on her race. Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328.
               Among other things, a plaintiﬀ may establish a convincing
        mosaic with evidence of “(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous state-
        ments . . . , and other bits and pieces from which an inference of
        discriminatory intent might be drawn [;] (2) systematically better
        treatment of similarly-situated employees [;] and (3) that the
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11401

        employer’s justiﬁcation is pretextual.” Lewis v. City of Union City,
        934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Lewis II”) (internal quotation
        marks and citation omitted).
               On appeal, Poer does not challenge the district court’s ruling
        that she failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination
        under step one of the McDonnell Douglas framework, i.e., that she
        did not present any comparators to show that she was treated less
        favorably than similarly-situated employees. Instead, she argues
        that the district court erred in granting the Commission’s summary
        judgment motion because she presented suﬃcient circumstantial
        evidence to support her Title VII and Section 1981 claims under the
        convincing mosaic evidentiary tool. She also contends that the dis-
        trict court impermissibly made credibility determinations and
        drew factual inferences that should have been left to a jury. Further,
        she asserts that the district court erred in ﬁnding that her complaint
        did not include a claim for retaliation. We address retaliation ﬁrst.
              A. Retaliation
                On appeal, Poer admits that she did not include a separate
        count or any speciﬁc allegations in her complaint raising a retalia-
        tion claim. She nonetheless argues that the Commission was on
        notice that she was challenging its conduct as a form of retaliation
        “given the multitude of references to her complaints to EID, termi-
        nation, and demand for reinstatement present in both her com-
        plaint and the motion to dismiss brieﬁng/Order.” Poer contends
        that, like her hostile work environment claim (which she does not
        appeal), her complaint contained suﬃcient allegations to put the
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        22-11401               Opinion of the Court                         21

        Commission on notice that she was challenging its decisions as be-
        ing retaliatory. We agree with the district court that Poer cannot
        raise a retaliation claim for the ﬁrst time at summary judgment,
        deny the Commission an opportunity to defend itself, and then ex-
        pect a ruling on that issue.
               A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement” of
        the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Despite the liberal pleading stand-
        ard for civil complaints, plaintiﬀs may not “raise new claims at the
        summary judgment stage.” Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382
        F.3d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Instead, the proper
        mechanism to amend the complaint is to ﬁle a motion under Fed.
        R. Civ. P. 15, not “through argument in a brief opposing summary
        judgment.” Id. at 1315.
               Generally, a Title VII plaintiﬀ must allege in her complaint
        that she has met the prerequisites of a valid and timely ﬁled EEOC
        charge. Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 999,
        1010 (11th Cir. 1982). Here, the record shows that Poer did not
        assert a “retaliation” claim in her complaint. Poer’s charge of dis-
        crimination with the EEOC stated that “Wilkins inappropriately
        used her position of power to block [Poer’s] transfer” and that she
        “was discriminated against because of [her] race in violation of Ti-
        tle VII,” and her complaint alleged that she was “harmed by the
        Defendant’s discrimination on the basis of the Plaintiﬀ’s race, as a
        [W]hite female . . . .” Neither the EEOC charge nor her complaint
        addressed the purported retaliation claim. Although Poer raised
        the issue of retaliation in her opposition to summary judgment, a
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        22                    Opinion of the Court                22-11401

        plaintiﬀ may not “raise new claims at the summary judgment
        stage.” Gilmour, 382 F.3d at 1314.
                In addition, the district court’s analysis of Poer’s hostile
        work environment claim does not support her argument that she
        asserted a retaliation claim. Poer’s complaint alleged that she
        sought a reassignment or lateral transfer that “would have removed
        her from the hostile work environment that Wilkins had created”;
        that “employees were fearful of Wilkins”; that Yergan commented,
        “it is a good thing for county employees to be afraid so that they
        would do their jobs”; and that “Wilkins’[s] comments instilled fear
        and anxiety in Poer to the point at which Poer was forced to in-
        crease her blood pressure medication and began to exhibit a startle
        reﬂex which resulted in heart palpitations.” Therefore, the district
        court concluded that, even though there was no separate “hostile
        work environment” count in the complaint, the Commission was
        on notice that Poer was also complaining about being subjected to
        a hostile work environment. Poer’s argument that she asserted a
        retaliation claim, in contrast, has no foundation in the complaint.
        She never used the term “retaliation,” and she never alleged that
        her termination was, even in part, a direct result of her internal
        grievances and EEOC charge. Therefore, we agree with the district
        court that Poer did not allege a retaliation claim.
              B. Race Discrimination
              Poer argues that she presented a convincing mosaic of cir-
        cumstantial evidence to support her Title VII and Section 1981
        claims. She presented the following: (1) disparaging comments
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        22-11401               Opinion of the Court                         23

        that Wilkins allegedly made to her and about other White employ-
        ees; (2) the “inconsistent and shifting reasons” given for the denial
        of her lateral transfer or reassignment request; (3) evidence regard-
        ing alleged comparators; and (4) evidence regarding Wilkins’ al-
        leged mistreatment of employees, including Poer.
                     i. Poer’s Request for a Lateral Transfer or Reassignment
               Poer asserts that the denial of her request for a lateral trans-
        fer or reassignment was based on Wilkins’ racial animus against
        her. The Commission conceded in the district court that the denial
        of Poer’s request for a lateral transfer or reassignment was an ad-
        verse employment action. However, as discussed below, she did
        not present enough evidence to overcome the non-discriminatory
        reasons the Commission gave for its decision. Nor did she tie any
        alleged racial animus to the ﬁnal decision-makers on the lateral
        transfer or reassignment request.
                    ii. Poer’s Termination
               The sole issue remaining is whether the district court erred
        in granting the Commission’s motion for summary judgment as to
        Poer’s claim that she was ﬁred based on her race. In this regard,
        Poer contends that she presented a convincing mosaic of circum-
        stantial evidence to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
        Commission’s true motivation in terminating her was because she
        is White.
              Contrary to her assertions, the district court did consider
        whether Poer had presented a convincing mosaic of circumstantial
        evidence to support her contention that her termination was race-
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11401

        based. In opposing summary judgment, Poer relied on the follow-
        ing circumstantial evidence: (1) Petelos’s awareness, as the decision-
        maker, of Poer’s complaints against Wilkins; (2) Petelos’s
        knowledge that her request for a lateral transfer or reassignment
        was denied; (3) Wilkins’s alleged racist comment about White peo-
        ple; and (4) the Commission’s reliance on her absences to support
        her termination even though, she claims, the absences were ap-
        proved.
               The Commission, in its defense, oﬀered several legitimate,
        non-discriminatory explanations for terminating Poer, a probation-
        ary employee who, within her ﬁrst year, exhibited multiple perfor-
        mance issues, ineﬀectively managed her subordinates, left com-
        pany money unsecured, and displayed interpersonal conﬂicts with
        her supervisor, co-workers, and subordinates. These accounts
        were, in the business judgment of the Commission, worthy of ter-
        mination and Poer has not oﬀered any evidence to rebut the Com-
        mission’s legitimate, non-discriminatory explanations for terminat-
        ing her. In other words, as part of her convincing mosaic argu-
        ment, Poer has not shown any pretext. See Berry, 84 F.4th at 1312-
        1313.
              Even assuming that her absences should not have been held
        against her, Poer does not deny that she received multiple and re-
        peated low ratings in her evaluations, that she had problems getting
        along with her subordinates and other co-workers, and that she left
        money unsecured on at least one occasion—all within a year of be-
        ing on the job. Instead of rebutting these non-discriminatory
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        22-11401               Opinion of the Court                         25

        reasons the Commission gave for terminating her, Poer oﬀers only
        conclusory assertions about Smith and Petelos’s motivations. Such
        generalizations are not enough to rebut the Commission’s prof-
        fered reasons, nor do they create an inference of pretext. See id.
               Poer also argues that “the district court . . . ignored properly
        articulated [Eleventh] [C]ircuit precedent requiring it to analyze
        Poer’s mosaic of circumstantial evidence and pretext even when
        there is no comparator.” The problem with Poer’s argument is
        that the district court did consider each of the tiles in her mosaic
        and found the evidence to be unconvincing of racial discrimination
        considering the totality of the circumstances.
               Poer heavily relies on Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243 (11th Cir.
        2022), to support her contention that Wilkins’s alleged racist re-
        marks, alone, preclude summary judgment under her convincing
        mosaic argument. However, her reliance on Jenkins is misplaced
        because that case is materially distinguishable.
               William Jenkins, a White crane operator sued his employer
        for race discrimination after his Black supervisor terminated him.
        Jenkins, 26 F.4th at 1246. There, we concluded that even though the
        plaintiﬀ failed to make out a prima facie case under McDonnell
        Douglas for lack of comparators, he had successfully presented a
        convincing mosaic of race discrimination. Id. at 1249–51. The rec-
        ord evidence in Jenkins supported a reasonable inference that the
        supervisor engaged in racist behavior toward him and other White
        employees, and that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether
        he was ﬁred because of his race. In particular, Jenkins had
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11401

        substantiated testimony from other employees regarding racial
        comments against White employees, evidence of mistreatment of
        White employees, and the termination of White employees for en-
        gaging in behavior that Black employees also exhibited without
        reprimand. Id. Moreover, the supervisor was the ultimate deci-
        sion-maker who terminated Jenkins, and there was an otherwise
        inexplicable exodus of at least eighteen White employees under his
        management. Id. at 1246, 1251.
                Unlike Poer, Jenkins could directly attribute the alleged rac-
        ist comments that, again, others corroborated, to the undisputed
        sole decision-maker who terminated him. Overall, Jenkins pre-
        sented much more evidence of discriminatory intent than what ex-
        ists in Poer’s case. Even crediting Poer’s assertion that Wilkins
        made racist comments, and accepting her description of those
        comments as accurate, Poer did not tie Wilkins’s alleged comments
        to the ultimate decision-makers—Petelos and Smith.
               Because Wilkins did not make the ﬁnal decision to ﬁre Poer,
        and because Poer failed to tie any alleged comments Wilkins made
        to Petelos and Smith, Jenkins actually hurts her case as opposed to
        helps it. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that the
        evidence proﬀered did not create a triable issue as to discriminatory
        intent, and the Commission was entitled to summary judgment.
        VI.   CONCLUSION
               Poer has not presented a convincing mosaic of circumstan-
        tial evidence that would support even an inference at summary
        judgment, let alone a jury ﬁnding at trial, that the Commission
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        22-11401             Opinion of the Court                   27

        terminated her because of her race. We, therefore, AFFIRM the
        district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Com-
        mission.
        AFFIRMED.