Court Opinion

ID: 9598392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:08:28.004994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:20.432351
License: Public Domain

GtveN, Judge,
dissenting:
Being of the firm view that the controlling question, the question relating to the application of the statute of limitations, was unquestionably for jury determination, and that the experienced and learned trial judge properly submitted that question to the jury, I am forced to dissent. It is of interest to note that the majority admits that there is a conflict in the evidence, and though the majority now says that the verdict was contrary to the “clear and decided” preponderance of the evidence, it did not seem so when the re-argument was ordered, on the very same record. Moreover, in the study of the evidence, and in the decision conferences of this Court, the view of the majority members of the Court, on the very same question, was not always the same, yet the majority points out that ordinarily the question here involved is one for jury determination.
I do not doubt the power or duty of this Court to set aside a verdict which is against a clear preponderance of the evidence, but it is just as clear that every reasonable inference warranted by the evidence should be considered in support of a verdict. In other words, the jury is the proper body to weigh the evidence and draw inferences.
In considering the cogency or probative value of the evidence as to either party, it is necessary to keep in mind certain basic facts not disputed. The plaintiff’s account of its indebtedness, filed with its declara*262tion, showed an undisputed balance of $272,571.12, which amounted to only a part of the charges as to the transactions for the five year period immediately before the date of the institution of the action, April 22, 1958. During that five year period there were sixty payments, usually referred to as monthly payments, equaling to the very cent the entire total of all net charges made against the defendant during the sixty months, less the amount of the jury verdict, $1,304.43. In no possible manner could the jury have arrived at that exact amount except on the theory that the monthly settlements and payments were understood and intended by the plaintiff and the defendant to be in satisfaction of the monthly net balances. It may also be noted that the amount of plaintiff’s claim, $272,571.12, was a balance which existed, and was reflected by the books of account of both parties, for years prior to the beginning of the five year period, and that it never varied except as affected by the monthly charges or payments. There may be a further exception as to the transactions for April, May and June, 1953, when defendant was unable to make regular monthly payments, which is fully explained by the evidence, but even for those three months, when payment on the charges for such three months was resumed, the payments were in round, even figures, not in odd dollars and cents.
It should also be noted that during the five year period, the monthly charges made by defendant against the plaintiff were paid to defendant each month, to the very cent, either by check or by deduction from the larger amount owed plaintiff by the defendant. Thus, hundreds of items of charges, both as to plaintiff and defendant, to the very cent, were settled, satisfied and paid monthly. Can we believe that if there had been no such understanding as to the application of payments, as contended for by defendant, that the plaintiff would have continued to make regular monthly payments to defendant of the charges made by the defendant against plaintiff? It is also *263significant that the net monthly balances were paid by defendant, and accepted by plaintiff, to the odd dollar and cent. Certainly no one conld contend, with much force, that sixty consecutive payments, covering sixty consecutive monthly settlements, to the very cent in each case, could not have been intended and accepted as payment for such specific monthly settlements. In fact, that very pattern of the method of settlement and payment existed long before the commencement of the five year period, as pointed out by the majority. Moreover, when the attention of the president of the plaintiff company was directed to the fact that when partial payments on the account were made, long before the commencement of the five year period, and for the three unpaid monthly accounts mentioned above, they were always in “round figures”, such as $10,000, $1,000, $8,000, $2,000, $4,000 and $3,000 and, when requested to explain why such method of payments differed as to odd dollars and cents, answered: “I have no explanation for that”. And the plaintiff’s witness Moore, treasurer and general manager of the plaintiff company, was asked the following question, “It would be unusual would it not, to pay odd cents and odd dollars if it were not meant to cover a particular statement or invoice 1 ’ ’ to which he answered, “I would say it would be”.
Looking to the whole of plaintiff’s evidence, as to its cogency and probative value as related to the particular problem, five witnesses testified in chief. Three of them gave no testimony concerning the question here involved, except as it related to the manner or method of bookkeeping. The other two, in addition to their testimony relating to the method of bookkeeping, were more emphatic as to the intention of plaintiff to apply the monthly settlement-payments to the older part of the account. None of the witnesses, however, contended that any specific requirement or instruction to that effect was ever made by the officers of the plaintiff company, or that any such instruction existed. It is admitted by the witnesses for plain*264tiff that no request or demand for even a partial payment of the old account was made until after the family difficulty between Mrs. Greer and her daughter, Mrs. Kelly, arose. That difficulty, and its implications, seem to be sufficiently reflected by the statement contained in the letter to Jane G. Kelly, president of the defendant company, by Mrs. Greer as vice president of the plaintiff company, dated September 13, 1957, wherein it is stated: “Inasmuch as our proposal was for the acquisition of stock controlling your company and was not for the acquisition of the assets of your company, we have no proposal to make to your Board of Directors. We are, however, directing a purchase proposal to you personally.
“If we are unable to acquire control of your company and bring about a unification of management and resources, we shall be forced to choose from two alternative courses of action.” The alternatives were either that the defendant should accept the proposal of plaintiff concerning an increase in rates or charges for power sold by it to defendant, so that plaintiff would not “be forced to proceed with collection of the $272,571.12 account receivable due from the Light & Power Company. Prompt court action of this matter is particularly desirable to the Coke Company since even in the unlikely event of an adverse decision it would have the tax advantage of an established loss while the Light & Power Company would have an empty victory and incur an income tax liability of $141,736.98; a debt which could crush that company”, or, the other alternative, “cease all expansion work”, thereby forcing defendant to purchase power from a different company at a rate considered prohibitive. Again the written statement of plaintiff recognized the $272,571.12 as an old account carried on the books of the two companies as something wholly different from the monthly settlements and payments, and also that defendant was denying liability in relation thereto.
While I believe the whole evidence of the plaintiff, considering the inferences the jury would have *265been warranted in drawing therefrom, was sufficient to go to the jury, I most certainly do not believe it to be conclusive, or even strongly supporting plaintiff’s theory. Stripped of the method of plaintiff’s bookkeeping little, if anything, is left to support a verdict for plaintiff. I think it not necessary to cite any authority to the effect that the mere method of bookkeeping does not conclusively establish intention of the parties as to how payments on any account, whether a running, open or monthly account, should be allocated, or that allocation of payments may be directed by the payer by implication. The majority, apparently, concedes that much. See, however, Ryan, Special Receiver v. Gasto, 76 W. Va. 314, 85 S. E. 553; Chapman v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 721.
In addition to the foregoing facts, especially the uniform pattern of the monthly settlement and payment for the entire five year period, and long before, other pertinent and strong testimony exists supporting the verdict of the jury. Mr. Crane, vice president of the defendant company and the only person authorized to sign checks for it, testified: “I can speak from the period from August, 1953, on in which I either made up the checks personally or gave directions to one of the girls in the office to make them up to which they were intended to pay a specific month’s invoice, or invoices, and they were always made exactly to the penny. Q. Mr. Crane, does your answer to that question cover also the checks and invoices embraced in Defendant’s Exhibit No. 3? A. They do.” Mr. Crane further testified positively that the sum claimed, $272,571.12, “represents an amount that had been accumulated on our books prior to the time I went with the company”, 1953, and that no “express demand” other than the one made just before institution of the action was ever made of the defendant for payment of any part of the old account.
In a letter from plaintiff to defendant dated September 16, 1955, the plaintiff said: “Your accounts are in pretty good shape now and if your collections *266come in as they have been in the past yon should have no trouble in meeting your monthly account”. Thus, the plaintiff clearly and definitely, the second time, in writing recognizes the monthly account settlement and payment pattern, contended for by defendant and found by the jury to have existed.
Honig, an experienced certified public accountant, engaged in the business since 1928, made a thorough examination of the account books of defendant and plaintiff, especially as to the claim here involved. From his testimony, not denied, it appears that during the five year period here material, the amount of the monthly invoices of defendant, plus the amount of payments to plaintiff as represented by defendant’s cancelled checks, was “equal to the penny” to the exact amount of the payments made by defendant. He also testified as to a notation on the ledger of plaintiff in connection with the credit of the November, 1953, charge, in handwriting, saying, “paid on November account”, which unquestionably constituted a recognition by plaintiff of a monthly account, and of the payment of that monthly account. The witness further testified to the effect that such a memorandum was not necessary as to subsequent monthly payments, for the reason that, as a matter of bookkeeping, such fact “was obvious”. Also, the November, 1953, worksheet of defendant showed a “Bal due Coke Co. Nov. 3,365.30”; and a cancelled check for that exact amount was exhibited to the jury, indicating the pattern of monthly settlement and payment of monthly accounts.
Beginning long before the commencement of the five year period, at least by March, 1951, and continuing through the period in which the monthly charges made by defendant against plaintiff were deducted from the monthly charges made each month by the plaintiff against the defendant, each individual monthly statement or invoice received from plaintiff by defendant, or defendant’s worksheet for that particular month attached to such monthly statement, was marked “paid”, with the further notation, *267“Balance dne Coke Company”, “balance dne Coke Company Nov.”, “Balance dne Coke Company Dec”, “Total amount dne Coke Company”, or “Balance”, together with the date of payment, and, nsnally, with the number of the check by which the specific monthly statement was paid. In every snch instance there were exhibited to the jury individual monthly statements, with such notations thereon, together with cancelled checks to the exact cent, constituting payment for each particular monthly statement. Subsequent to that period, and during the remaining part of the five year period, the account books of defendant showed separately and distinctly the charge and credit of every particular monthly charge or settlement, and separate checks, for each separate month’s settlement, showing full payment to the plaintiff for each such month, were exhibited to the jury. Also, separate checks during the latter part of the five year period were executed by plaintiff and delivered to defendant for each month’s charges against plaintiff. The only possible answer to the conclusive effect of such cogent proof would be that plaintiff had no knowledge of the notations or pattern of settlement and payment. But is such an answer reasonable, in view of the indisputable fact, pointed out by the majority, that certain individuals were officers, in managing authority, of the plaintiff company and of the defendant company, and of the further admitted fact that every such monthly settlement, and payment therefor, was accepted and acted on by the plaintiff? At least, would such question not be one for jury determination?
Mrs. Kelly testified as to various conversations with Mrs. Greer and other officers of the plaintiff company, and stated that it was her understanding that the old account was being carried on the books “and should remain on the books only in some reference to some tax difficulties we would get in if it were removed * * She further testified that she had a conversation with the treasurer and general manager of the plaintiff company, who desired an exchange of *268balance sheets, and that she informed him that the defendant company would not agree to such exchange if the exchange involved any recognition of the old debt and, when asked if he so agreed, testified: “He must have agreed because we did exchange the Balance Sheets”. As pointed out by the majority, the statement was denied by the general manager, but, in my view, the credibility of the witnesses was a matter for the jury. If the testimony is true it constituted solid proof of the fact that the only reason the old claim remained on the account books of the parties was in connection with tax liabilities.
Mrs. Kelly also testified to the effect that Mrs. Creer agreed to release or cancel the entire old account. Though, as pointed out by the majority, there was probably lack of sufficient consideration for such cancellation, the testimony most certainly had probative value as to the reason for the carrying of the old debt on the books for so many years, without any demand for even a partial payment thereon.
In F. M. Slagle & Co. v. Bushnell, 70 S. D. 250, 16 N. W. 2d 914, a ease in point factually, though the facts proved or admitted in the instant case are much stronger, it was held: “19. Evidence established that payments by check in small amounts, most of which exactly matched current purchases, were intended as in payment of particular items of indebtedness and not as payment on general balance of account and that such intention was manifest to creditor so that such payments did not interrupt running of six year statute of limitations as to balance of account. 20. A person owing money under distinct contracts may apply payments to whichever debt he may choose and direction as to application of payment may be evidenced by circumstances as well as by words. 21. Payments were earmarked as specific rather than general payments on balance of account by fact that they were made by checks drawn in comparatively small odd dollar and cent amounts, and hence appropriation by debtor of such payments to particular items resulted *269as a matter of law.” Though, the Court, in the cited case, held the pattern of payment, “as a matter of law”, established direction by the payer as to the manner of application of such payments, in the instant ease the majority holds the question is not even for jury consideration. For other authorities supporting the Bushnell holdings, see Hawley v. Little Falls Mill & Mercantile Co., 220 Minn. 165, 19 N. W. 2d 161; Farbstein v. Eichmann, 23 N. J. Super. 484, 93 A. 2d 414; St. Joseph & G. I. Ry. Co. v. Elwood Grain Co., 199 Mo. App. 432, 203 S. W. 680; Caffarelli Bros. v. Lyons Bros. Co. (Tex.), 199 S. W. 685; Spencer v. Sowers, 118 Kansas 259, 234 P. 972.
Being of the views indicated, I respectfully dissent. As definitely appears from the testimony of defendant, quoted above, and from undisputed facts pointed out, the verdict of the jury on which the judgment of the lower court was founded, was not only warranted but was the only verdict that could be justified.