Court Opinion

ID: 9915816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 18:02:31.559542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:21.083777
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/8/24 P. v. Trotter CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                B329822

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                        (Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. No. NA058971-02)
           v.

 RAMON TROTTER,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Tomson T. Ong, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
      Lauren Noriega for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       In 2005 a jury convicted Ramon Trotter of first degree
murder, three attempted murders, and related crimes in
connection with a shooting spree on the freeway. The jury also
found true the special circumstance allegation the murder was
committed “by means of discharging a firearm from a motor
vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside the
vehicle with the intent to inflict death.” (Pen. Code, § 190.2,
subd. (a)(21).)1 The trial court sentenced Trotter on the murder
conviction to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole,
and on each of the three attempted murder convictions to life in
prison with a minimum parole eligibility of seven years. The
court also imposed additional terms for various firearm
enhancements. We affirmed Trotter’s convictions on direct
appeal. (People v. Trotter (July 25, 2007, B187097) [nonpub. opn.]
(Trotter I).)
       In 2021 Trotter filed a petition under section 1172.6
(former section 1170.95), which, as amended effective January 1,
2022, authorized certain individuals convicted of murder under
the felony-murder rule or murder, attempted murder, or
voluntary manslaughter under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, to petition for resentencing. After finding
Trotter had made a prima facie showing he was eligible for relief,
the superior court issued an order to show cause, held an
evidentiary hearing, and denied the petition.
       Trotter appealed from the order denying his petition,
arguing the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt he was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. We

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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reversed the order denying Trotter’s petition on one of his
three attempted murder convictions, modified the judgment to
vacate his conviction and sentence on that conviction, and
otherwise affirmed. (People v. Trotter (Oct. 20, 2022, B318152)
[nonpub. opn.] (Trotter II).)
       In March 2023 Trotter filed a motion asking the court for a
resentencing hearing under the full resentencing rule in People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857. In Buycks the Supreme Court held
that, “when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand
for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing
discretion in light of the changed circumstances,’” and that “the
resentencing court may consider ‘any pertinent circumstances
which have arisen since the prior sentence was imposed.’” (Id. at
p. 893.) Trotter argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Buycks required the superior court to resentence him on all of his
convictions under current California law, correct various
sentencing errors, and consider his post-sentencing conduct in
prison.
       The superior court denied Trotter’s motion “as non-
justiciable.” The court ruled that this court’s decision in
Trotter II was “law of the case” and that “jurisdiction is with the
Court of Appeal to modify its decision on resentencing.” The
court stated: “I think that the law of the case, as far as this court
is concerned, is the Court of Appeal decision. And so, you know,
your remedy should really be to petition for review with the
California Supreme Court, not to come back and relitigate this
same issue with the Superior Court. Procedurally, that is the
way it should work, right? We don’t come back down as soon as
the Court of Appeal makes a decision, you go up. Why am I

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giving this a second shot?” The court further stated: “You know,
I don’t believe, and I rule at this time, that the case is non-
justiciable to be relitigated for that issue because the law of the
case is the Court of Appeal decision. The Supreme Court of
California doesn’t have to do that. They can always consider a
petition for review, but that is a different avenue. You know,
that is not within the jurisdiction of this court.”
       Trotter argues, the People concede, and we agree the
superior court erred in refusing to conduct a full resentencing
after Trotter II. (See People v. Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 893;
People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 46; see also People v.
Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922, 927 [because of
ameliorative legislative changes in the law, a full resentencing on
remand is appropriate].) “Resentencing is not limited to ‘just the
portion [of the sentence] subjected to recall”; instead, “‘the full
resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing
decisions when resentencing a defendant.’” (People v. Trent
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 33, 44.) As the People put it, quoting
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1), “the superior court erred in
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to resentence [Trotter] or
address his claims of sentencing error. The proper remedy is to
remand for a full resentencing hearing in accordance with
section 1172.6’s mandate that, upon vacating a conviction under
that section, the court must ‘resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not
previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if
any, is not greater than the initial sentence.’” Exactly.

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      The order denying Trotter’s motion for a full resentencing
is reversed. The superior court is directed to conduct a full
resentencing under People v. Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th 857.

                                          SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

                  FEUER, J.

                  EVENSON, J.*

*     Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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