Court Opinion

ID: 9916436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 00:02:18.437787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:27.113878
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/13/23; certified for publication 1/9/24 (order attached)

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 In re L.B. et al., Persons Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN                                              F086109
 SERVICES,
                                                                    (Super. Ct. Nos. JD127177-03;
          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  JD136860-02; JD138698-02;
                                                                     JD141596-01; JD143815-00)
                   v.

 A.B. et al.,                                                               OPINION
          Defendants and Respondents;

 L.B. et al.,

          Appellants.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Susan M. Gill,
Judge.
         Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellants.
         David M. Yorton, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent A.B.
       Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent A.S.
       Margo. A. Raison, County Counsel, and Alexandria M. Ottoman, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                         -ooOoo-
       At a dispositional hearing in April 2023, the juvenile court adjudged then 14-year-
old L.B., six-year-old J.R., five-year-old Aur.S., three-year-old Aug.S., and one-year-old
Aum.S. (collectively, “the children”) dependent children and ordered reunification
services to A.B. (mother) and A.S. (father), who is the father of Aur.S., Aug.S., and
Aum.S. The children appeal from the dispositional orders, contending the juvenile court
erred when it provided mother and father with family reunification services. We agree
with the children that the juvenile court erroneously relied upon the parents’ current
participation in treatment when it declined to apply Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). We therefore reverse the juvenile court’s order and
remand for a new disposition hearing consistent with section 361.5.
                    PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
       Initial Removal
       On August 17, 2022, the Kern County Department of Human Services
(department) received a referral alleging that there was ongoing domestic violence in the
home with the children present. It was reported that the children’s 15-year-old sister,
M.H., intervened during a recent physical altercation between mother and father, which
resulted in a bruise on the outside of M.H.’s eye. M.H. was picked up on the date of the
incident by a maternal aunt, T.B. (aunt), who lived in the Bay Area.
       An emergency response social worker, who was assigned to investigate the
referral, determined that there was a call for service to law enforcement at the family’s

       1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                             2.
home in March 2022. According to a sheriff’s report from that incident, father was
arrested for assaulting mother. M.H. initially denied witnessing any domestic violence in
the home because she was concerned about entering foster care again.2 The social
worker obtained warrants to interview the children at their schools on August 22, 2022.
On the following day, L.B. was not attending school when the social worker attempted to
interview her, and L.B. did not return to school that week due to a positive COVID-19
test. Staff at a local high school informed the social worker that M.H. was no longer
showing as an active student, and the social worker eventually discovered that a school in
Marin County had requested M.H.’s student records. J.R. was interviewed by the social
worker, but it was determined that she was unable to be interviewed due to her inability
to answer basic questions.
      On August 29, 2022, L.B. was interviewed by the social worker at her school.
L.B. was at her grandmother’s home at the time of the most recent incident. M.H. called
L.B. after the incident and explained how father gave her a black eye. Mother kicked
M.H. out of the home, and she was now living with aunt. L.B. was afraid to speak with
the social worker, and she did not want to return to foster care. She acknowledged that
mother and father were using alcohol, and she claimed the most recent incident was the
only incident of violence in the home.
      Later that same day, the social worker spoke with mother over the phone to
address the allegations in the referral. Mother claimed that M.H.’s version of events was
untrue, and she explained that M.H. “ ‘charged’ ” at father while father and mother were
having a “verbal disagreement.” She insisted that M.H. was accidentally hit in the eye
when father threw up his arms to protect himself from M.H. Mother also indicated that
aunt made the report to the department because aunt wanted to take the children from her.

      2 Mother and father were involved in dependency proceedings that terminated in
January 2022.

                                            3.
M.H. was reportedly taken from the home without mother’s consent, but mother did not
contact law enforcement because she was afraid that the children would be removed from
her care. Father eventually took over the phone call at the social worker’s request. Both
father and mother continued to assert that their “verbal disagreement” did not become
physical. Throughout the conversation both mother and father directed expletives at the
social worker.
       In a conversation with the social worker by phone, aunt explained how she
traveled to Bakersfield to pick up M.H. after mother reportedly kicked her out of the
home. Aunt had concerns about alcohol abuse and domestic violence in the home. M.H.
was currently enrolled in school by aunt, and mother was currently in agreement with
M.H. remaining with aunt. Aunt described mother as being a volatile person. Aunt
hoped that M.H. could enjoy the remainder of her childhood, and she was provided
information on processes to seek a legal guardianship of M.H.
       Aunt handed the phone to M.H., who agreed to speak with the social worker.
M.H. described how mother and father would get drunk and engage in domestic violence
in the home. On the date of the incident, mother and father picked up M.H. from a
paternal aunt’s home while both parents were already drunk. Mother began yelling for
M.H. after father hit mother, and M.H. ran into the room to hit father. M.H. was knocked
to the ground when father hit her, and she could hear her siblings crying afterward.
Mother refused to take M.H. to obtain medical care because mother insisted the injuries
would heal on their own. M.H. told mother that she was going to the hospital. Mother
called M.H. a “ ‘bitch,’ ” and told her to go live somewhere else.
       M.H. left the home and was eventually picked up by her grandmother. All M.H.’s
items were thrown out of the home when M.H. returned to gather her things. Mother told
M.H. to never return to their home. M.H. went to live with aunt, and the bruise
eventually healed without medical attention. M.H. also described an incident that took

                                            4.
place two weeks earlier where mother and father were drunk and engaging in an
altercation in the presence of the children.
       The children had to be taken care of by M.H. when mother and father were drunk.
M.H. could not recall how many times she intervened during mother and father’s
physical altercations because there were “too many” incidents. Mother and father would
purchase alcohol whenever they had money, and they drank continuously until the
alcohol was gone. M.H. indicated that mother and father became involved in a physical
altercation every time they drank alcohol together. M.H. was worried about her younger
siblings because mother often left Aum.S. in his crib. She admitted to lying to law
enforcement in March 2022 because she did not want her siblings to go back into the
foster care system.
       On September 2, 2022, the children were taken into protective custody by law
enforcement pursuant to a protective custody warrant. The department filed original
petitions on that same date, which alleged the children were described by section 300,
subdivision (b). The petitions alleged the children were at substantial risk of suffering
serious physical harm as a result of mother’s and father’s substance abuse and ongoing
domestic violence. At a continued detention hearing held on September 9, 2022, the
juvenile court ordered the children detained from mother and father.
       Child Welfare History
       The department’s jurisdiction report detailed mother’s and father’s child welfare
history. In 2007, there were three referrals involving allegations of domestic violence
between mother and the father of M.H., but the referrals were closed as inconclusive. A
referral was received in 2009 after mother tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)
at the time of a sibling’s birth. Mother admitted to smoking marijuana during her
pregnancy, and she declined to participate in supportive services.
       In August 2011, the department filed a dependency petition for M.H., L.B., and
two of their half siblings. The petition alleged mother had a lengthy history of exposing

                                               5.
her children to domestic violence and substance abuse. Mother was ordered to participate
in substance abuse counseling and random drug testing after her children were adjudged
dependents of the court. Family maintenance services were ordered for mother in July
2012, and dependency was terminated in October 2012. In June 2013, a referral alleged
that one of the children’s half siblings suffered a skull fracture and lacerated liver after
falling from the second story balcony while left with mother’s teenage nephew.
       The department received a referral in August 2014, alleging mother was an
alcoholic, engaging in domestic violence, and threatening to kill herself and her children.
The referral was deemed unfounded because none of the children disclosed information
that was alleged in the referral to the social worker. In July 2015 and August 2015, two
referrals alleged that mother was engaging in domestic violence and using drugs and
alcohol. Mother admitted to occasional use of alcohol and “Spice,” and she accepted
Differential Response3 services. In April 2016, a referral alleged that mother tested
positive for THC during a pregnancy, but mother tested negative at the time of delivery.
       On December 7, 2016, the department filed a dependency petition alleging M.H.,
L.B., J.R., and two half siblings were at risk of serious physical harm as a result of
mother’s substance abuse problem involving alcohol, marijuana, and “Spice.” The
petition further alleged that mother physically abused M.H. and her half siblings while
mother was intoxicated. The allegations in the petition were found true, and M.H., L.B.,
J.R., and their half siblings were adjudged dependents of the court. Mother was ordered
to participate in counseling for substance abuse and random drug testing.
       The father of the half siblings was granted sole physical custody of the half
siblings pursuant to a section 388 modification petition in January 2018, and jurisdiction

       3 Differential Response services are voluntary services provided in situations that
do not call for the filing of a dependency petition. (See § 10609.9, subd. (a)(1)(D); see
also <https://www.cdss.ca.gov/inforesources/child-welfare-protection/differential-
response> [as of Dec. 13, 2023].)

                                              6.
over the half siblings was terminated. M.H., L.B., and J.R. were returned to mother
under a plan of family maintenance services in February 2018. In June 2018, mother
tested positive for alcohol and engaged in a domestic violence incident with father while
under family maintenance, and she was required to re-enroll in substance abuse
treatment. Dependency jurisdiction over M.H., L.B., and J.R. was terminated in January
2019 with sole physical custody awarded to mother.
       On August 12, 2019, a referral was received alleging mother was drinking alcohol
and engaging in domestic violence with father. Mother reportedly threatened to kill one
of the children’s older half siblings if he said “ ‘stuff’ ” about father. The father of the
half siblings explained his concerns for the safety of the half siblings while they were
participating in a weekend visit with mother. Mother refused to submit to a voluntary
drug test. The referral was deemed unfounded due to the presence of “conflicting
statements” after mother, father, M.H., and L.B. denied the allegations. Additional
referrals involving allegations of domestic violence were received in August 2019 and
October 2019, but the referrals were found to be inconclusive.
       On November 29, 2020, the department received a referral after mother was
arrested for domestic violence and father was heavily intoxicated. Mother admitted to
several incidents of domestic violence, and M.H., L.B., Aug.S., Aur.S., and J.R. were
placed into protective custody. The department filed dependency petitions alleging those
children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm as a result of the
parents’ ongoing domestic violence and untreated substance abuse. J.R. stated that
mother drank daily, and mother was observed drinking gin straight from the bottle.
       The allegations in the petitions were found true on January 27, 2021, and M.H.,
L.B., J.R., Aur.S., and Aug.S. were adjudged dependents of the court on March 23, 2021.
Mother and father were ordered to participate in counseling for substance abuse and
random drug testing as part of their family reunification services. In June 2021, both
parents filed petitions pursuant to section 388 alleging that they completed their case

                                              7.
plan, and the petitions requested that their children be returned to their custody under a
plan of family maintenance services. The parents’ petitions were granted in July 2021,
and their children were returned under a plan of family maintenance. The juvenile court
terminated its jurisdiction over M.H., L.B., J.R., Aur.S., and Aug.S. on January 21, 2022.
Mother was awarded sole physical custody of M.H., L.B., and J.R., and mother and father
were awarded joint physical custody of Aur.S. and Aug.S.
       Jurisdiction and Disposition
       The department’s report for the jurisdiction hearing recommended the allegations
in the original petition be found true. Mother disclosed daily marijuana use for the past
two months to help her keep an appetite, and she also reported drinking alcohol
occasionally at night. At a jurisdictional hearing held on November 30, 2022, mother and
father submitted on the department’s report, and the juvenile court sustained the
allegations in the children’s petitions. The disposition hearing was continued to
January 11, 2023, for the completion of a report.
       In its disposition report, the department recommended that mother and father be
provided family reunification services, and the fathers of L.B. and J.R. were not
recommended services. Both father and mother were enrolled in parenting and domestic
violence programs and participating in their supervised visitation. In October and
November 2022, father missed three drug tests and tested positive for marijuana during
another test. In September, October and November 2022, mother tested positive for
marijuana twice and missed three tests.
       At the disposition hearing held on April 5, 2023, mother and father were both
present and represented by counsel. The parties stipulated to a request from mother’s and
father’s counsel for the juvenile court to consider documents about their progress in
services. Counsel for mother and father requested that the children be returned under a
plan of family maintenance services. Counsel for the children opposed the parents’
request for family maintenance and requested that the juvenile court deny family

                                             8.
reunification services to both parents under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). The
children’s counsel argued that the parents’ continued alcohol abuse after dismissal of the
prior proceedings amounted to more than a “mere relapse” as described in the case of In
re B.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 932 (B.E.). Counsel for the department submitted on its
recommendation while acknowledging the parents’ history before the court.
       After hearing argument from all counsel, the juvenile court ordered the children
removed from the custody of their parents and family reunification services be provided
to mother and father. The fathers of L.B. and J.R. were both denied family reunification
services. In declining the request of children’s counsel, the juvenile court stated as
follows, “I don’t think, however, I have the ability to deny reunification services under
(b)(13) . . . because the parents are engaging in treatment. They’re engaging in
counseling. It’s not—it’s not a passive resistance sort of situation, I agree with that. It
wouldn’t qualify under In re B.E., but they have shown they can engage in programs.” A
six-month review hearing was set for October 4, 2023. The children filed a timely notice
of appeal on April 10, 2023.
                                       DISCUSSION
       I. Respondent’s Request for Judicial Notice
       “A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in
issue in the case before it.” ’ [Citation.] A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant
him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) “ ‘On a
case-by[-]case basis, the reviewing court decides whether subsequent events in a
dependency case have rendered the appeal moot and whether its decision would affect the
outcome of the case in a subsequent proceeding.’ ” (In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th
784, 802.) Courts also have discretion to resolve appeals that are technically moot if they

                                              9.
present important questions affecting the public interest that are capable of repetition yet
evade review. (In re A.M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1078–1079.)
       “While appellate courts rarely consider postjudgment evidence or evidence
developed after the ruling challenged on appeal, such evidence is admissible for the
limited purpose of determining whether the subsequent development has rendered an
appeal partially or entirely moot.” (In re M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 86, 110; see id. at
pp. 110–111 [taking judicial notice of minute orders from hearings that occurred after the
challenged order]; see also In re Salvador M. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422
[augmenting the record to show the issue on appeal was rendered moot by subsequent
events in the juvenile court].) Mother’s November 30, 2023 request for judicial notice of
the juvenile court’s October 31, 2023 order returning Aum.S., Aug.S. and Aur.S. to her
custody is hereby granted.4
       We acknowledge that the children’s notice of appeal was filed on April 10, 2023,
and it is likely that review of any ruling of the juvenile court’s order for reunification
services would be mooted by a subsequent review hearing. This fact is evident in the
orders returning at least three of the children to mother’s custody prior to the completion
of this appeal. The issues raised in this appeal are of continuing public importance
because they challenge the juvenile court’s erroneous application of section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(13), which risks children being deprived of permanency and stability in a
timely manner. (See In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548 [refusing to
address errors on appeal by declaring the case moot has the undesirable result of
insulating erroneous rulings from review].)
       Accordingly, we will reach the merits of this important issue of proper application
of a bypass provision despite subsequent events. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 273

       4 We note that no motion to dismiss accompanied the request for judicial notice,
but we still consider whether these subsequent events render the children’s appeal moot.

                                              10.
[appellate courts retain inherent discretion to review merits of appeal despite termination
of juvenile court’s jurisdiction].) The proper application of section 361.5, subdivision
(b)(13) is an issue that is capable of repetition by the juvenile court and would otherwise
evade review. (See In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 563, fn. 3 [review of merits on
extension of services to 24-month review hearing even though reunification services
could no longer be extended].) Furthermore, the juvenile court might provide
reunification services in subsequent proceedings involving the children until the
definition of active resistance has been properly clarified. Thus, we consider the merits
of the appeal.
       II. Order for Reunification Services to Mother and Father
       The children contend the juvenile court erred when it ordered that mother and
father were to be provided family reunification services. They argue that mother’s and
father’s pattern of behavior demonstrated active resistance to prior court-ordered
treatment within the meaning of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13).
       A. Applicable Law
       As a general rule, when a child is removed from parental custody under the
dependency laws, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services to “the
child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)).
However, it is also the “intent of the Legislature, especially with regard to young
children, . . . that the dependency process proceed with deliberate speed and without
undue delay.” (Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) Thus,
the statutory scheme recognizes that there are cases in which the delay attributable to the
provision of reunification services would be more detrimental to the [child] than
discounting the competing goal of family preservation. (Ibid.) Specifically,
section 361.5, subdivision (b), exempts from reunification services “ ‘those parents who
are unlikely to benefit’ ” from such services or for whom reunification efforts are likely
to be “ ‘fruitless.’ ” (In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 470, 474.)

                                            11.
       Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), provides (in relevant part) that a court “need
not” provide reunification services when it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that a
parent “has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has
resisted prior court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year period
immediately prior to the filing of the petition that brought that child to the court’s
attention.” This provision requires proof that the resistance to such treatment occurred
within the three years preceding the filing of the current petition. (Laura B. v. Superior
Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 776, 780 (Laura B.); accord, In re William B. (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1220, 1230 (William B.).)
       The Legislature has superseded Laura B. and William B. to the extent they suggest
mere relapse constitutes resistance to court-ordered substance abuse treatment. (See
§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 585, § 2.5; B.E., supra, 46
Cal.App.5th at pp. 935, 939–941, 944.) Accordingly, section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13),
now also states: “For purposes of this paragraph, ‘resisted’ means the parent or guardian
refused to participate meaningfully in a prior court-ordered drug or alcohol treatment
program and does not include ‘passive resistance,’ as described in [B.E., supra,] 46
Cal.App.5th 932.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).)
       B. Standard of Review
       “A discretionary order that is based on the application of improper criteria or
incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion, and is subject to
reversal even though there may be substantial evidence to support that order.” (Mark T.
v. Jamie Z. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1124–1125.) “If the record affirmatively
shows the trial court misunderstood the proper scope of its discretion, remand to the trial
court is required to permit that court to exercise informed discretion with awareness of
the full scope of its discretion and applicable law.” (F.T. v. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
1, 26, italics omitted.)

                                             12.
       C. Analysis
       The children specifically contend that the juvenile court abused its discretion when
it concluded that it could not deny reunification services to mother and father while they
were participating in services. In order to find that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) was
applicable to mother and father, the juvenile court was required to find that both parents
“resisted” prior court-ordered treatment in the three years prior to September 2, 2022.
The case of B.E. held that, in using the term “ ‘resisted,’ ” the Legislature meant active
resistance, not passive resistance. (B.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 941.) In doing so,
the court extensively criticized a line of cases (including its own prior decision in
William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 1220), which allowed for denial of reunification of
services after only passive resistance—in other words, one mere relapse—even if the
parent had benefited from services in the past. (B.E., at pp. 935, 939–941, 944.)
       Because the Legislature intended the bypass provision to apply to “parents who
refuse to participate meaningfully in a court-ordered drug treatment program, not parents
who slip up on their road to recovery” (B.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 934–935), B.E.
held that courts should focus on whether a parent has actively demonstrated an
unwillingness to change (id. at p. 942). The court reasoned that its interpretation of the
“resisted” term was consistent with the statute’s plain language, as well as the concept of
futility (underlying the other bypass provisions): “It is decidedly not fruitless to offer
services to a parent who genuinely made an effort to achieve sobriety but slipped up on
the road to recovery. On the other hand, where a parent has recently actively resisted a
court-ordered drug treatment program—i.e., demonstrated an unwillingness to commit to
sobriety—it becomes more apparent that trying the same approach so soon is unlikely to
work.” (Id. at pp. 941–942.)
       The Legislature amended the statute (effective Jan. 1, 2022), to explicitly exclude
the B.E. court’s description of “passive” resistance from being utilized to deny
reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). (See § 361.5, subd.

                                             13.
(b)(13), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 585, § 2.5.) Accordingly, a parent may resist
treatment by either “refusing to attend a program” or “failing to engage meaningfully in
the drug treatment” while attending. (B.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 940, 942.) A
parent who merely “ ‘go[es] through the motions’ of treatment with the aim of achieving
reunification and then immediately resum[es] a drug habit” is actively resisting treatment.
(Id. at p. 943.)
       Here, the department provided evidence that mother and father participated in
court-ordered substance abuse counseling and random drug testing during the previous
reunification period of March 2021 through July 2021. Both parents successfully
reunified with their children and dependency was eventually terminated with the parents
regaining custody of the children in January 2022. Both M.H. and L.B. disclosed
repeated alcohol use and domestic violence by the parents in the months following the
termination of the previous dependency. Although the record remained undeveloped
based upon the absence of a contested evidentiary hearing on dispositional issues, there
was significant evidence contained in the reports that both parents had resumed their
habit of consuming alcohol in excess and engaging in domestic violence.
       The juvenile court’s own stated reasons for not applying section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(13) were as follows:

              “What the mother and [father] have shown over and over again is that they
       can take classes. They can perform well in their classes. And then as [children’s
       counsel] said, when we terminate dependency jurisdiction, they go back to the
       same behaviors, the same patterns that they engaged in that brought the children
       into the system before, and that is just not acceptable. We’ve got kids, older kids
       who have significant trauma because of this. We have younger kids we want to
       prevent having that trauma. I don’t think, however, I have the ability to deny
       reunification services under (b)(13), 361.5(b)(13), because the parents are
       engaging in treatment. They’re engaging in counseling. It’s not -- it’s not a
       passive resistance sort of situation, I agree with that. It wouldn’t qualify under In
       re B.E., but they have shown they can engage in progress. [¶] So what I’m going

                                            14.
       to do is I’m going to order reunification services with the same concern that has
       been expressed by [children’s counsel] . . . .”

       The juvenile court’s apparent understanding of what constitutes “resistance” is
inconsistent with the Legislature’s recent amendment to section 361.5, subdivision
(b)(13). Under the amended version, a parent can be found to “resist” previously court-
ordered treatment where there was a refusal to “participate meaningfully” in the program.
(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13).) Furthermore, a parent’s “mere relapse” after successfully
undergoing drug treatment is excluded from the statute’s definition. (See ibid.)
However, “a form of active resistance that would warrant bypassing reunification
services under subdivision (b)(13),” includes situations where parents “ ‘go through the
motions’ of treatment with the aim of achieving reunification and then immediately
resum[e] a drug habit.” (B.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 943; see id. at pp. 942–943.)
       A parent’s engagement in treatment at the time of the disposition hearing does not
prevent a juvenile court from denying reunification services pursuant to section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(13). The bypass provision only requires proof of the parent’s resistance
during the three-year period prior to the filing of the petition. (Laura B., supra, 68
Cal.App.4th at p. 780.) Thus, the parent’s conduct in the three-year period preceding the
petition is the only relevant consideration for the juvenile court to determine the
applicability of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13).
       There is no requirement in the statute or case law that the parent must continue to
resist prior treatment at the time of the disposition hearing. The children’s current
circumstances, being subjected to multiple dependency proceedings at such young ages,
demonstrate the absurd consequences of such an interpretation. The juvenile court is not
required to ignore the cumulative trauma that the children face each time they have to be
removed from parental custody due to continued failures to overcome addiction. (See
William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1228 [“Substance abuse is notoriously difficult
for a parent to overcome, even when faced with the loss of . . . children.”]; see also ibid.

                                             15.
[“Experience tells us that such a parent has a high risk of reabuse.”].) The purposes of
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) would be rendered null if a parent could overcome
their active resistance during the three-year period by simply attending treatment at the
time of the disposition hearing.
       Accordingly, the juvenile court’s conclusion that it was unable to apply the bypass
provision because the parents were “engaging in treatment” was in error. When the
juvenile court’s application of an incorrect legal standard prevents it from resolving
factual disputes, the proper remedy is to reverse and remand for a new hearing under the
proper standard rather than to decide the matter on the existing state of the evidentiary
record. (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 167 [rehearing proper where juvenile
court applied incorrect legal standard].)
       In light of the juvenile court’s initial comments that the parents repeated the same
patterns of drug abuse and domestic violence after taking classes, we cannot conclude
that its application of an incorrect legal standard was harmless. A reasonable fact finder
could have found that both parents demonstrated an “unwillingness to commit to
sobriety” by continuing their pattern of “ ‘go[ing] through the motions’ of treatment with
the aim of achieving reunification and then immediately resuming a drug habit.” (B.E.,
supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 941, 943; see id. at pp. 941–943.)
       We decline the children’s request that the matter be remanded with instructions to
bypass the parents for reunification services. As appellate counsel for father correctly
points out, the children would need to demonstrate that the juvenile court was compelled
to find that mother and father resisted prior court ordered treatment within the meaning of
the applicable bypass provision to achieve such a result. Trial counsel for the children
did not provide “ ‘uncontradicted’ ” and “ ‘unimpeached’ ” evidence that both parents
actively resisted their prior treatment. (See In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517,
1528.) The parties proceeded on the social worker’s report without any additional
evidence or testimony on the issue. Given the state of this undeveloped record, we

                                            16.
cannot say that the juvenile court was compelled to find that mother and father were
merely “ ‘go[ing] through the motions’ ” in their previous case.
       In sum, the juvenile court’s decision to provide mother and father family
reunification services rested on its misapplication of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13).
We therefore reverse the dispositional order providing mother and father family
reunification services for all five children and remand for the juvenile court to conduct a
new disposition hearing based upon the family’s present circumstances. We
acknowledge this may have a limited effect because mother was being provided family
maintenance services and Aum.S., Aug.S. and Aur.S. were returned to her custody on
October 31, 2023. As discussed previously, we render our decision despite these
subsequent events to address this important issue of statutory interpretation. (In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 273.)
                                     DISPOSITION
       The judgment of disposition is reversed insofar as it provided family reunification
services to mother and father for their children. The case is remanded to the juvenile
court for a new disposition hearing. If the court determines that any parent should be
provided family reunification services, it shall proceed as required by the statutory
timeframes from the date of the children’s initial removal.

                                                                      DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, J.

SMITH, J.

                                            17.
Filed 1/9/24

                           CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                            FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 In re L.B. et al., Persons Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN                                     F086109
 SERVICES,
                                                          (Super. Ct. Nos. JD127177-03;
          Plaintiff and Respondent,                        JD136860-02; JD138698-02;
                                                           JD141596-01; JD143815-00)
                v.
                                                       ORDER GRANTING REQUEST
 A.B. et al.,                                             FOR PUBLICATION

          Defendants and Respondents;

 L.B. et al.,

          Appellants.

       As the nonpublished opinion filed on December 13, 2023, in the above entitled
matter hereby meets the standards for publication specified in the California Rules of
Court, rule 8.1105(c), it is ordered that the opinion be certified for publication in the
Official Reports.
                   DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, J.

SMITH, J.

              2.