Court Opinion

ID: 9882346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 21:00:44.669498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:24.963088
License: Public Domain

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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10922
                           ____________________

        CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        GENERAL MILLS, INC.,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-00201-TWT
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                    22-10922

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, and
        PROCTOR, ∗ District Judge.
        JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
                CSX Transportation, Inc. is a freight railroad company that
        provides rail transportation services. General Mills, Inc., a food
        company, operates a cereal processing plant in Georgia near one of
        CSX’s rail lines. A small connecting railroad known as a “sidetrack”
        connects CSX’s main rail line to General Mills’s plant, allowing
        General Mills to receive materials, ingredients, and equipment at
        its plant and to send its cereal away for distribution. A contract be-
        tween CSX and General Mills governs the use of the sidetrack.
               To make a very long story short, a General Mills employee
        suﬀered severe injuries while working on the sidetrack and then
        sued CSX for negligence. After a jury found CSX liable, the em-
        ployee recovered a large settlement from CSX. CSX then sought to
        recover the settlement amount, as well as the expenses it incurred
        in defending the negligence suit, from General Mills. In this law-
        suit, CSX sued General Mills for breach of contract, claiming that
        under the parties’ agreement, General Mills was required to indem-
        nify CSX—regardless of whether CSX alone was responsible for the
        employee’s injury or CSX and General Mills were jointly responsi-
        ble. The district court dismissed one of CSX’s breach-of-contract
        claims and granted General Mills summary judgment on the other.

        ∗ Honorable R. David Proctor, United States District Judge for the Northern

        District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
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        22-10922               Opinion of the Court                        3

               On appeal, CSX challenges both the district court’s rulings.
        We agree with the district court that under the parties’ agreement,
        General Mills was not required to indemnify CSX if CSX was solely
        negligent. But we disagree with the district court that the Georgia-
        law doctrine of vouchment barred CSX from litigating the issue of
        General Mills’s negligence. If it turns out that General Mills was at
        least partially at fault for the injury, then under the contract Gen-
        eral Mills must indemnify CSX for at least a portion of the settle-
        ment and related expenses. We thus aﬃrm in part, reverse in part,
        and remand.
                              I.     BACKGROUND
               We begin by reviewing the provisions in the contract be-
        tween CSX and General Mills governing the sidetrack that connects
        the CSX rail line with the General Mills cereal plant. We then de-
        scribe how a General Mills employee was injured on the sidetrack,
        sued CSX, and secured a substantial settlement. We then turn to
        CSX’s efforts to hold General Mills liable for the settlement and ex-
        penses CSX incurred in the underlying litigation.
        A.    The Sidetrack Agreement
                CSX and General Mills signed a contract to build the side-
        track in 1989 (the “Sidetrack Agreement”). They agreed that a phys-
        ical railroad would be constructed and that General Mills would
        have the option to conduct its own “switching” on that sidetrack—
        that is, “moving railcars that have been previously delivered by a
        train or assembling railcars in the proper order so that they can be
        coupled to a locomotive and pulled out of [the General Mills]
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10922

        facility.” Doc. 63 at 3–4. 1 To switch railcars, an operator uses a
        “trackmobile,” a type of mobile railcar mover used to move railcars
        across short distances.
               Relevant to this appeal, two contractual provisions ad-
        dressed indemnification between the parties for losses related to
        use of the sidetrack. First, in Section 11 the parties agreed that
        “[e]xcept as otherwise provided” in the contract, for claims arising
        out of “use . . . of the Sidetrack,” the parties would “jointly defend
        and bear equally” losses due to “joint or concurring negligence,”
        but each party would “hold the other party harmless” for any losses
        due to “the indemnifying party’s . . . sole negligence.” Doc. 63-1 at
        5–6. Section 11 carved out circumstances in which the default
        rule—that the parties would jointly defend and bear equally any
        losses—would not apply. The carved-out circumstances do not ex-
        ist here. 2

        1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
        2 Under the carveout, General Mills is “solely responsible” for the following
        losses: (1) “the failure of [General Mills] to properly maintain its segment of
        the Sidetrack”; (2) “the construction, alteration[,] or removal of the Sidetrack
        by [General Mills]”; (3) the presence of a restricted clearance on [General
        Mills’s] Segment”; (4) “any personal injuries (including death) or property
        damage (real or personal) sustained . . . as the result of any road crossing col-
        lision on [General Mills’s] Segment”; and (5) “the explosion, spillage[,] and/or
        presence of Hazardous Materials on [General Mills’s] properties, facility or on
        [General Mills’s] Segment . . . when such Losses would not have occurred but
        for the dangerous nature of the Hazardous Materials.” Doc. 63-1 at 6.
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        22-10922                Opinion of the Court                          5

               Second, Section 15 gave General Mills the option to conduct
        its own switching operations on the sidetrack. Section 15 provided
        that if General Mills exercised the option to perform its own
        switching, it would “assume[] all risk of loss, damage, cost, liability,
        judgment[,] and expense, (including attorneys’ fees) in connection
        with any personal injury” sustained or incurred by “employees of
        either [General Mills] or [CSX] or third persons . . . in connection
        with, or arising from or growing out of, the operation of” General
        Mills’s switching operations. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
               For over a decade, General Mills chose not to conduct its
        own switching operations. Later, however, General Mills exercised
        its contractual option to conduct its own switching. It bought a
        trackmobile from a company that also provided training to General
        Mills’s employees on how to use the trackmobile to conduct
        switching operations. As part of the training, employees were
        taught to use “chocks”—wedges placed on either side of a railcar’s
        wheels to inhibit movement—and to employ the handbrakes on
        railcars when operating the trackmobile.
        B.     The Negligence Lawsuit
                A couple of years later, Doug Burchfield and Rodney Turk,
        two General Mills employees, were using the trackmobile to move
        AEX 7136, a railcar stocked with wheat that CSX had delivered to
        the juncture between the main rail line and General Mills’s side-
        track. After uncoupling AEX 7136 from the trackmobile and park-
        ing it, Turk thought he saw the railcar move. He asked Burchfield
        if he had set the handbrake. Burchfield assured Turk that he had set
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        6                           Opinion of the Court                         22-10922

        it. The pair left the railcar sitting on the track and moved away to
        switch an empty railcar that was located just downhill from
        AEX 7136. While Burchfield stood near the trackmobile, AEX 7136
        sprung loose, rolled down the slope, and crashed into the track-
        mobile, which in turn ran into the empty railcar. All three vehicles
        derailed and ran over Burchfield. He suffered extensive injuries
        leading to the amputation of both his lower legs.
                Burchfield filed a personal injury suit in the Northern Dis-
        trict of Georgia against CSX and the company that owned AEX
        7136. 3 In his complaint, Burchfield alleged that CSX negligently de-
        livered AEX 7136 to General Mills with a faulty handbrake, which
        caused the accident.
              CSX sent General Mills a letter notifying it of Burchfield’s
        lawsuit. CSX demanded that General Mills provide a defense. Gen-
        eral Mills refused to defend CSX.
             In the Burchfield litigation, CSX sought to attribute fault to
        General Mills for Burchfield’s injury. CSX argued that General

        3 Because Burchfield received workers’ compensation for his injuries, Georgia
        law precluded him from suing General Mills, his employer, for damages. See
        O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) (“The rights and the remedies granted to an employee
        by this chapter shall exclude and be in the place of all other rights and remedies
        of such employee . . . on account of such injury . . . .”); see also Brooks-Powers v.
        Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 579 S.E.2d 802, 804 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (stat-
        ing that “[w]here the [Georgia Workers’ Compensation] Act is applicable, its
        provisions are the exclusive remedy for the employee against the employer”
        (internal quotation marks omitted)). And the company that owned the railcar
        settled with Burchfield, leaving CSX as the sole defendant.
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        22-10922              Opinion of the Court                        7

        Mills failed to train and supervise Burchfield and Turk and that be-
        cause of General Mills’s negligence AEX 7136 was left without
        chocks blocking the wheels or handbraking before the accident.
        CSX requested that the district court use a verdict form that would
        allow the jury to allocate fault to non-party General Mills.
                Burchfield moved for summary judgment on the issue of
        General Mills’s liability. The district court granted the summary
        judgment motion, concluding that CSX failed to raise the affirma-
        tive defense of General Mills’s fault in a timely manner and also
        failed to introduce expert testimony regarding the standard of care.
        See Burchfield v. CSX Transp. Inc, No. 1:07-cv-1263, 2009 WL
        1405144, at *9–11 (N.D. Ga. May 15, 2009).
                Burchfield’s negligence claim against CSX went to trial. The
        jury found in CSX’s favor, and Burchfield appealed. Burchfield v.
        CSX Transp. Inc., 636 F.3d 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2011). We reversed
        the judgment and remanded for a new trial on the ground that the
        district court erred in admitting certain evidence. Id. at 1338.
               The case proceeded to a second trial. This time, the jury
        found CSX liable and awarded Burchfield more than $20 million.
        Asked to allocate fault between Burchfield and CSX, the jury found
        that Burchfield was zero percent negligent and CSX was 100 per-
        cent negligent. The jury was not asked about General Mills. CSX
        appealed. While CSX’s appeal was pending, CSX and Burchfield
        settled for $16 million.
             Following the settlement, CSX demanded indemnification
        from General Mills. CSX asserted that under the Sidetrack
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10922

        Agreement General Mills owed it the full amount of the settlement
        payment, as well as the attorney’s fees and costs CSX incurred in
        defending the case. According to CSX, General Mills was required
        to indemnify it under both Section 11 and Section 15 of the Side-
        track Agreement.
               General Mills again refused CSX’s demand, contending that
        there was “no basis—contractual or otherwise—for the demand
        that General Mills indemnify CSX for its own negligence and re-
        sulting damages.” Doc. 63-8 at 2. Addressing Section 11, General
        Mills maintained that it was required to indemnify CSX only if Gen-
        eral Mills was also negligent. In General Mills’s view, because the
        jury in the Burchfield litigation concluded that CSX was 100 percent
        at fault, “meaning 100% individually at fault as compared to any-
        one else in the world who could have been potentially at fault for
        Mr. Burchfield’s injuries,” Section 11 did not support CSX’s re-
        quest. Id. at 3.
               As to Section 15, General Mills contended that it owed no
        duty to indemnify CSX for the same reason: CSX’s negligence was
        the sole cause of Burchfield’s injury. General Mills asserted that
        Section 15 did not require it to indemnify CSX for losses that arose
        solely from CSX’s own negligence.
        C.    CSX’s Breach-of-Contract Lawsuit
              CSX sued General Mills for breach of contract, seeking in-
        demnification for the settlement with Burchfield. As relevant on
        appeal, CSX alleged that under Section 15 of the Sidetrack Agree-
        ment General Mills was required to assume all costs for injuries
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        22-10922                 Opinion of the Court                              9

        arising from General Mills’s switching operations “without regard
        to who ultimately was determined to be at fault.” Doc. 1 at 18.
                 General Mills moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
        state a claim, and the district court granted the motion. The court
        explained that under Georgia law, a party is contractually obligated
        to indemnify another party for losses when the first party is not
        negligent only if the parties’ contract meets the “heightened speci-
        ficity requirement” of “expressly, plainly, clearly, and unequivo-
        cally” providing for indemnification under such circumstances.
        Doc. 36 at 8 (emphasis omitted). The court determined that Section
        15 did not meet that standard and thus General Mills was not re-
        quired to indemnify CSX when CSX alone was negligent. The dis-
        trict court thus concluded that the Sidetrack Agreement did not re-
        quire General Mills to indemnify CSX for the Burchfield settlement
        or its litigation costs.
               CSX moved for reconsideration of the district court’s order
        dismissing the complaint. It argued that the dismissal relied on the
        “unspoken premise” that CSX could not litigate General Mills’s
        fault because federal collateral estoppel principles precluded it from
        doing so. Doc. 38 at 5. In CSX’s view, the district court committed
        legal error by applying federal collateral estoppel law when it
        should have applied Georgia law. Georgia’s collateral estoppel rule
        would have allowed CSX to litigate General Mills’s negligence. 4

        4 Under Georgia’s collateral estoppel rule, CSX would be precluded from rais-
        ing arguments about General Mills’s negligence in the indemnity suit only if
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10922

        The district court denied the motion, stating that CSX “failed to
        show that the Court committed a clear error of law.” Doc. 41 at 3.
                CSX appealed the district court’s dismissal of its complaint,
        and we reversed. CSX Transp., Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 846 F.3d
        1333 (11th Cir. 2017). We focused on the district court’s conclusion
        that federal collateral-estoppel principles precluded CSX from liti-
        gating General Mills’s fault in the indemnification action. Id. at
        1335. We agreed with CSX that the district court should have ap-
        plied Georgia’s collateral estoppel rule. Id. at 1340. But we re-
        manded for the district court to determine whether, under that
        rule, General Mills and Burchfield were “identical parties” so that
        the Burchfield judgment was binding on CSX in the indemnity suit.
        Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We expressly declined to
        decide “whether the Sidetrack Agreement requires indemnification
        assuming CSX was solely at fault.” Id.
              On remand, CSX filed an amended complaint alleging three
        counts. Count One again alleged that Section 15 of the Sidetrack
        Agreement required General Mills to indemnify CSX “without

        the Burchfield lawsuit involved “the same parties or their privies.” Cmty. State
        Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
        omitted); see Camden Cnty. v. Sweatt, 883 S.E.2d 827, 833 (Ga. 2023) (explaining
        that collateral estoppel precludes “re-adjudication of an issue that has previ-
        ously been litigated . . . in another action between the same parties or their
        privies (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). By contrast,
        under the federal rule, a non-party to a previous action (General Mills) may
        assert collateral estoppel offensively to preclude a party to the previous action
        (CSX) from litigating issues decided in the previous action. See Parklane Hosiery
        Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
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        22-10922               Opinion of the Court                        11

        regard to who ultimately might be determined to be at fault.” Doc.
        63 at 16 (emphasis omitted). Count Two alleged, in the alternative,
        that Section 15 required General Mills to indemnify CSX because
        General Mills bore “at least some fault in causing Mr. Burchfield’s
        injuries.” Id. at 19 (emphasis omitted). Count Three alleged, also in
        the alternative, that if “Burchfield’s injuries did not arise from or
        grow out of use of the trackmobile” and CSX and General Mills
        were jointly or concurrently negligent, Section 11 required General
        Mills to indemnify CSX for 50 percent of CSX’s loss. Id. at 21.
               General Mills again moved to dismiss CSX’s claims. The dis-
        trict court dismissed Count One for the same reason it had dis-
        missed the Section 15 claim in its earlier order: Section 15’s lan-
        guage was too broad and vague to require General Mills to indem-
        nify CSX without regard to fault. But the court did not dismiss
        Counts Two or Three. Applying Georgia’s collateral estoppel rule,
        the court concluded that CSX was not barred from arguing that
        General Mills was partially at fault for Burchfield’s injuries. There-
        fore, the claims in Counts Two and Three, which required CSX to
        show General Mills was at least partially at fault, survived.
              After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
        judgment. In its summary judgment motion, General Mills ex-
        plained that for CSX to prevail on Counts Two or Three, it had to
        show that General Mills’s negligence caused or contributed to
        Burchfield’s injuries. Again, General Mills maintained that CSX was
        precluded from litigating General Mills’s negligence. This time, it
        argued that because CSX had vouched General Mills into the
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10922

        Burchfield litigation, CSX was bound by the Burchfield judgment,
        which General Mills said determined that “CSX was 100% at fault
        . . . Burchfield was 0% at fault . . . and General Mills was not negli-
        gent.” Doc. 188 at 17. The district court agreed, remarking that “in
        the vouchment doctrine, [General Mills] appears to have finally hit
        on a viable preclusion argument.” Doc. 258 at 7. The district court
        entered judgment against CSX.
               CSX now appeals the district court’s orders granting General
        Mills’s motion to dismiss Count One and its motion for summary
        judgment on Counts Two and Three.
                         II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
                We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss for
        failure to state a claim. See Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th
        Cir. 2021) (en banc). We also review de novo a district court’s grant
        of summary judgment. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Spangler,
        64 F.4th 1173, 1178 (11th Cir. 2023). In addition, the interpretation
        of a contract or statute is a question of law that we review de novo.
        See Hoever, 993 F.3d at 1357 (statute); Southland Distribs. Mktg. Co. v.
        S&P Co., 296 F.3d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 2002) (contract).
                                III.   DISCUSSION
               CSX raises two theories on appeal for why General Mills is
        required to indemnify it. First, CSX argues that even if it was solely
        at fault for Burchfield’s injuries, Section 15 of the Sidetrack Agree-
        ment required General Mills to indemnify it. Second, it argues that
        that General Mills owed it a duty to defend because a reasonable
        jury could find that General Mills was at least partially at fault in
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        22-10922                 Opinion of the Court                         13

        causing Burchfield’s injuries. As to this second theory, CSX argues
        that the district court erred in concluding that Georgia’s vouch-
        ment statute precluded it from establishing that General Mills was
        at least partially at fault for Burchfield’s injuries. We address the
        two theories in turn.
        A.     The Sidetrack Agreement does not require General Mills
               to indemnify CSX when CSX is solely at fault.
                CSX argues the district court erred in dismissing Count One,
        its indemnification claim under Section 15. It reasons that the Side-
        track Agreement unambiguously required General Mills to indem-
        nify CSX, even for CSX’s sole negligence, so the district court erred
        in refusing to enforce the provision. We disagree.
                Under Georgia law, 5 a contract requires indemnification for
        an indemnitee’s sole negligence only when it explicitly says that the
        indemnitor must pay even if he is not negligent. See Park Pride At-
        lanta, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 541 S.E.2d 687, 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
        In Park Pride, a non-profit organization agreed to hold a city harm-
        less “from any and all claims . . . of any kind . . . or nature . . . for
        any activity sponsored by” the organization. Id. (internal quotation
        marks omitted) At a park clean-up event sponsored by the organi-
        zation, a city dump truck rolled backward crushing a woman, who
        died from her injuries, and injuring her husband. Id. at 688. The
        husband sued the city, bringing claims arising out of his wife’s

        5 The parties agree that Georgia law governs CSX’s claims.
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10922

        death and his injuries. Id. After the city settled the tort litigation, it
        sued the organization seeking indemnification. Id.
                The Georgia Court of Appeals considered whether the in-
        demnification agreement required the organization to indemnify
        the city for the city’s own negligence. Id. at 689. The court began
        with the principle that “[p]ublic policy is reluctant to cast the bur-
        den for negligent actions upon those who are not actually at fault”
        because “[p]ublic policy seeks to encourage people to exercise due
        care in their activities for fear of liability, rather than to act care-
        lessly cloaked with the knowledge that an indemnity contract will
        relieve such indifference.” Id. Based on this public policy concern,
        it explained that a party who was not negligent generally would
        not be required to indemnify a party who was negligent unless a
        contract “explicitly and expressly” required indemnification. Id.
        The court emphasized that “[t]he words of a contract of indemnifi-
        cation . . . must be construed strictly against the indemnitee” with
        “every presumption” against indemnification. Id. (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted).
                Relying on this standard, the Georgia Court of Appeals con-
        cluded that the parties’ agreement did not require the organization
        to indemnify the city. Although the indemnification provision at
        first blush “appear[ed] to indemnify the [c]ity ‘against any and all
        claims,’” the provision was “bereft of any express or explicit state-
        ment about coverage for the [c]ity’s own negligent acts.” Id. Be-
        cause the indemnity provision “failed to expressly, plainly, clearly,
        and unequivocally state that [the organization] would indemnify
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        22-10922                Opinion of the Court                           15

        the [c]ity from the [c]ity’s own negligence,” the organization had
        no obligation to indemnify the city for the settlement in the under-
        lying litigation. Id.; see also Viad Corp. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 808 S.E.2d
        58, 60, 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that an agreement to indem-
        nify for “[a]ll debts, liabilities, and obligations” was not “sufficient”
        to require indemnification for a party’s sole negligence because the
        agreement did not explicitly mention the “negligence” of the party
        seeking indemnification (internal quotation marks omitted)); S. Ry.
        Co. v. Union Camp Corp., 353 S.E.2d 519, 520–21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
        (reaching same conclusion for agreement to indemnify for “all loss,
        damage, liability or expense” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                 With this guidance, we return to the Sidetrack Agreement.
        Section 15 set forth General Mills’s option to conduct its own
        switching operations and the risk of liability it accepted in ex-
        change. If General Mills chose to perform its own switching, it “as-
        sume[d] all risk of loss, damage, cost, liability, judgment[,] and ex-
        pense . . . in connection with any personal injury. . . arising from
        . . . the operation of [General Mills’s] trackmobile or locomotive
        power upon [the] Sidetrack.” Doc. 63-1 at 7 (emphasis in original).
                Applying Georgia law, we conclude that this provision did
        not require General Mills to indemnify CSX for CSX’s sole negli-
        gence. Nothing in Section 15 “explicitly and expressly” stated that
        indemnification was required if General Mills was not at fault. Park
        Pride, 541 S.E.2d at 689. To be sure, under Section 15’s broad terms,
        General Mills “assume[d] all risk of loss.” Doc. 63-1 at 7 (emphasis
        omitted). But as Park Pride made clear, such language does not
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-10922

        “expressly, plainly, clearly, and unequivocally” state that an indem-
        nitor must cover losses that result from the indemnitee’s own neg-
        ligence. Id. at 689.
                CSX’s counterarguments are unavailing. It contends that
        Section 15 makes sense only if General Mills was required to in-
        demnify it regardless of fault. In its view, the Sidetrack Agreement
        allowed General Mills to take over its switching operations—mean-
        ing that CSX would give up “both control over the risk and the
        revenue from performing the switching function for General
        Mills”—in exchange for General Mills’s agreement to “assume all
        risk of liability for any personal injury to any person.” Appellant’s
        Br. at 25 (alterations adopted). At first blush, CSX’s quid pro quo
        argument is compelling: CSX gave up control over—including the
        potential ability to prevent accidents—and revenue from switching
        activity on the sidetrack, and in return General Mills accepted all
        liability regardless of who was at fault. But the Georgia Court of
        Appeals concluded that a similar indemnification provision—in
        which the indemnitor agreed to assume liability for “all loss” that
        the indemnitee incurred “because of any injury to or death of any
        person or loss of or injury or damage to any property”—did not
        “expressly state[] that the negligence of the indemnitee is covered”
        and thus did not require indemnification for the indemnitee’s own
        negligence. See S. Ry. Co., 353 S.E.2d at 520–21. Section 15’s lan-
        guage is simply not explicit enough to require General Mills to in-
        demnify CSX for CSX’s own negligence, particularly given that we
        must construe the contract “strictly against” CSX as the indem-
        nitee. Park Pride, 541 S.E.2d at 689. Here, construing the contract
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        22-10922                Opinion of the Court                         17

        strictly against CSX means that General Mills does not have to in-
        demnify unless it was at least partially liable for Burchfield’s acci-
        dent.
               Georgia’s rules of contract construction require that we in-
        terpret Section 15 in the context of the entire agreement. See
        Peachtree on Peachtree Invs., Ltd. v. Reed Drug Co., 308 S.E.2d 825, 828
        (Ga. 1983). But our reading does not conflict with the rest of the
        contract. Section 11(A) generally provided that each party would
        “hold the other party harmless” for losses arising from “the indem-
        nifying party’s . . . sole negligence.” Doc. 63-1 at 6. Section 11(C)
        carved out five specific exceptions in which General Mills agreed
        to indemnify CSX “irrespective of the sole . . . negligence of [CSX].”
        Id. These carveouts described the only circumstances in which
        General Mills was required to indemnify CSX if CSX was solely
        negligent. And none of the carveouts included incidents arising out
        of General Mills’ switching operations discussed in Section 15.
              Because Section 15 did not expressly, explicitly, and une-
        quivocally require General Mills to indemnify CSX for CSX’s sole
        negligence, the district court did not err in dismissing CSX’s claim
        that General Mills was liable under Section 15 even if CSX alone
        was negligent. We thus affirm the district court’s dismissal of
        Count One.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                22-10922

        B.    The vouchment doctrine does not bar CSX from estab-
              lishing that General Mills was at least partially at fault
              and thus liable under the Sidetrack Agreement.
               CSX’s other argument on appeal arises from its alternative
        theory that the Sidetrack Agreement required General Mills to in-
        demnify CSX because General Mills’s negligence contributed to
        Burchfield’s injuries. CSX argues that the district court erred in
        granting General Mills’s motion for summary judgment because
        the court misapplied Georgia’s vouchment law when it found that
        CSX was bound by the Burchfield jury’s verdict and thus could not
        prove that General Mills was partially at fault.
               We begin by introducing Georgia’s vouchment statute. We
        then explain why we agree with CSX that the vouchment statute
        binds only General Mills to the Burchfield judgment.
              1.     Vouchment under Georgia law
               Georgia’s vouchment doctrine addresses when a non-party
        may be bound by the judgment in a lawsuit. The term “vouch”
        means “to call into court to warrant and defend.” Loeb v. May,
        198 S.E. 785, 786 (Ga. 1938) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
        rudimentary hypothetical demonstrates how vouchment works: A
        plaintiff sues a defendant for an injury. But the defendant believes
        that a non-party is liable for the plaintiff’s injury instead. Vouch-
        ment empowers the defendant as a “voucher” to bind the non-
        party as the “vouchee” to the judgment in the first lawsuit about
        the plaintiff’s right to recover.
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        22-10922               Opinion of the Court                         19

                To use this tool, the defendant merely needs to notify the
        non-party about the action against the defendant. See, e.g., Chicago
        v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 423 (1862); W. & Atl. R.R. Co. v.
        City of Atlanta, 74 Ga. 774, 777 (1885). Importantly, vouchment does
        not make the non-party a party to the lawsuit. See 13 Ga. Jurispru-
        dence § 10:27 (Sept. 2023 update). Instead, vouchment occurs out-
        side of court and is subject to few procedural rules. It requires noth-
        ing more of the voucher than giving notice of the lawsuit to the
        vouchee, which can be done in a letter or even orally. Id.
              In 1895, Georgia enacted a statute codifying the common-
        law doctrine of vouchment. The statute provides:
               Where a defendant may have a remedy over against
               another person and vouches him into court by giving
               notice of the pendency of the action, the judgment
               rendered therein shall be conclusive upon the person
               vouched, as to the amount and right of the plaintiﬀ
               to recover.

        O.C.G.A. § 9-10-13. The doctrine’s primary purpose is judicial effi-
        ciency:
               [I]f the act of the vouchee is the real thing complained
               of, so that, if there is a recovery by the injured party
               against the voucher, he can turn right around and
               claim indemnity from the vouchee, then it is to the
               interest of the state that a multiplicity of suits should
               be avoided by requiring the vouchee to appear in the
               original suit and set up any defense which he has.
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10922

        Raleigh & G.R. Co. v. W. & A.R. Co., 65 S.E. 586, 588 (Ga. Ct. App.
        1909). The idea is that the first lawsuit will conclusively determine
        the injured party’s right to recover, limiting the scope of a later in-
        demnification lawsuit to the sole question of “the relationships and
        liabilities between the party vouching and the person vouched.”
        McArthor v. Ogletree, 61 S.E. 859, 860 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908). In this
        way, vouchment incentivizes the vouchee to support the voucher’s
        defense against the plaintiff by raising affirmative defenses or intro-
        ducing any relevant evidence in the first lawsuit. See S. Ry. Co. v.
        Acme Fast Freight, 19 S.E.2d 286, 287–88 (Ga. 1942). That said, the
        vouchee is not obligated to participate in the voucher’s defense. Id.
        It may, as General Mills did, decline to defend. But it will be bound
        by the judgment in the underlying lawsuit. See id. With this back-
        ground, we turn to the vouchment issue before us.
               2.     Application of Vouchment to the Burchfield Judg-
                      ment
                The parties agree that CSX vouched General Mills into the
        Burchfield case and that General Mills refused to participate. In a
        traditional vouchment scenario, CSX would then be able to invoke
        the vouchment doctrine to bar General Mills from relitigating is-
        sues related to Burchfield’s right to recover or the amount of his
        damages because those issues were already decided in the Burchfield
        case. But in this lawsuit, it is General Mills—the vouchee—who
        seeks to use vouchment to bar CSX from litigating issues that Gen-
        eral Mills insists were decided against CSX in the Burchfield litiga-
        tion. As a federal court addressing an issue of Georgia state law in
        this diversity action, we must defer to the Georgia courts’ appellate
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        22-10922                    Opinion of the Court                                 21

        decisions on that issue. 6 But here, no Georgia court has ever con-
        sidered whether an earlier judgment has preclusive effect on a
        voucher in an action against his vouchee. In the prior vouchment
        cases, the vouchee, not the voucher, sought to relitigate the earlier
        liability finding, so this question has not been decided. See, e.g., W.
        & Atl. R.R., 74 Ga. at 777. Thus, the question whether vouchment
        binds both parties or only the vouchee is one of first impression on
        which we have no state court guidance.
                The district court determined that the Burchfield judgment
        decided the question of whether General Mills was liable for Burch-
        field’s accident and that CSX was precluded from pursing indemni-
        fication based on General Mills’s partial or complete fault for
        Burchfield’s accident. CSX’s claims for recovery under Counts Two
        and Three both depend on General Mills being at least partially at
        fault. So, by precluding CSX from attempting to show that General

        6 Because our jurisdiction in this case rests on diversity of citizenship,
        see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, we apply the substantive law of Georgia—the forum
        state, see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). When a state’s highest
        appellate court (in this case the Georgia Supreme Court) has addressed an is-
        sue of state law, we simply apply its holding. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dol-
        gencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 1021 (11th Cir. 2014). But when we are confronted
        with a state-law issue of first impression, we must attempt to predict how the
        state’s highest court would decide the issue. See Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254,
        1262 (11th Cir. 2018). Absent certainty from the state’s highest court, we apply
        the decisions of the state’s intermediate court—here, the Georgia Court of Ap-
        peals—unless there is “persuasive indication that the [Georgia Supreme Court]
        would rule otherwise.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc.,
        182 F.3d 788, 791 (11th Cir. 1999).
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10922

        Mills was negligent to support its claims, the district court eviscer-
        ated CSX’s theory of recovery and inevitably concluded that CSX’s
        alternative claims failed.
                CSX argues that the district court misinterpreted the vouch-
        ment statute because vouchment binds only the vouchee (General
        Mills), not the voucher (CSX), to a judgment. We agree with CSX’s
        reading of the vouchment statute.
               In interpreting Georgia’s vouchment statute, we look to
        Georgia’s rules of statutory construction. See Grange Mut. Cas. Co.
        v. Woodward, 826 F.3d 1289, 1300 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining that
        we “examine Georgia’s canons of statutory construction to attempt
        to determine how Georgia courts would interpret a statute”). Un-
        der Georgia law, “if the statutory text is clear and unambiguous,
        we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for
        statutory meaning is at an end.” Deal v. Coleman, 751 S.E.2d 337,
        341 (Ga. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                As a reminder, the vouchment statute provides that when a
        defendant in a lawsuit gives notice to another person and vouches
        her into the lawsuit, “the judgment rendered therein shall be con-
        clusive upon the person vouched, as to the amount and right of the
        plaintiff to recover.” O.C.G.A. § 9-10-13 (emphasis added). By its
        plain language, the statute addresses the preclusive effect of a judg-
        ment in an underlying action on the vouchee, not the voucher. And
        the title of the statute, “Effect of judgment on party vouched into
        court,” is consistent with that language. Id. (emphasis added); see
        Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
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        22-10922                Opinion of the Court                         23

        of Legal Texts § 35, at 221 (2012) (recognizing that “title and headings
        are permissible indicators of meaning”); Ne. Atlanta Bonding Co. v.
        State, 707 S.E.2d 921, 926 n.5 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that
        statute’s title may be considered when “ascertaining legislative in-
        tent”). As to the preclusive effect of the judgment on the vouching
        party, the statute is silent. See O.C.G.A. § 9-10-13.
                This interpretation is also consistent with the canon of con-
        struction that “[a] statute will be construed to alter the common
        law only when that disposition is clear.” Scalia & Garner, § 52, at
        318; see Boca Petroco, Inc. v. Petroleum Realty II, LLC, 678 S.E.2d 330,
        332–33 (Ga. 2009) (recognizing that a “common law rule survives
        [a] statute regarding same area of concern when [the] statute does
        not directly address certain elements of [the] common law rule”).
        Here, there are no clear signs that the statute altered the common
        law. Instead, the Georgia Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
        the vouchment statute codified—and did not alter—the common-
        law doctrine of vouchment. See, e.g., Loeb, 198 S.E. at 786; McArthor,
        61 S.E. at 860. Therefore, we must interpret the statute in the light
        of its common-law history.
               And we see nothing in the common law to suggest that
        vouchment precludes the voucher from litigating issues that may
        have been decided in earlier litigation between the injured party
        and the voucher. At the time Georgia enacted the vouchment stat-
        ute, the key Georgia common-law decisions on vouchment were
        Western & Atlantic Railroad, 74 Ga. at 777, and Faith v. City of At-
        lanta, 78 Ga. 779 (1887). See Loeb, 198 S.E. at 786 (explaining that
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10922

        Georgia’s vouchment statute adopted the reasoning from these de-
        cisions). Neither case holds that vouchment precludes the voucher
        from relitigating issues that were decided in the underlying litiga-
        tion.
                We start with Western & Atlantic Railroad. In that case, a pe-
        destrian who was injured at a railroad crossing sued a city for neg-
        ligent maintenance of the crossing. 74 Ga. at 776. Although the city
        notified the railroad of the case and claimed that the railroad was
        liable, the railroad did not participate in the pedestrian’s negligence
        action. Id. at 776–77. After the city was held liable in the negligence
        action, it sued the railroad. Id. at 776.
                In the indemnification action, the railroad (which was the
        vouchee) sought to introduce evidence that the pedestrian was at
        fault. Id. at 777. The trial court excluded the evidence. The Georgia
        Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that “both the city and the rail-
        road company were concluded” by the verdict in the negligence
        case “and should not be heard to say that [the pedestrian] . . . could
        have avoided the injuries which he received.” Id. at 778. Although
        the Court’s broad language, read in isolation, could suggest that
        both the city and railroad were bound by the judgment, the deci-
        sion was addressing the effect that the judgment in the underlying
        negligence action had on the vouchee (the railroad), not the
        voucher (the city). The Georgia Supreme Court made no ruling
        about the vouchment’s preclusive effect on the city because that
        issue was not before it. Id.
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        22-10922               Opinion of the Court                        25

                A few years later, the Georgia Supreme Court again ad-
        dressed vouchment in Faith. In that case, a person injured on a city
        street sued a city for negligence. 4 S.E. at 3. The city believed that
        the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a property owner who had
        dug holes in the street and left the holes uncovered. Id. The city
        asked the property owner to appear and defend the suit. Id. The
        property owner refused. Id. After the plaintiff recovered against the
        city in the negligence action, the city sued the property owner seek-
        ing indemnification. Id. The city prevailed in the indemnification
        action, and the property owner appealed. Id.
                On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed the issues
        the property owner (the vouchee) could raise in defending the in-
        demnification action brought by the city (the voucher). Because
        “the judgment of the injured party against the city” was “conclu-
        sive” as to the right of the injured party to recover and the amount
        of his damages, the property owner could not raise these issues. Id.
        at 4. But he could raise other defenses including that “he was under
        no obligation to keep that portion of the streets in safe condition;”
        that “it was not through his [fault] that the injury happened;” and
        that if he and the city were both responsible, the city could not re-
        cover against him. Id. Although the Georgia Supreme Court stated
        broadly that the judgment was “conclusive between the city and
        [the property owner],” it did not address the vouchment’s preclu-
        sive effect on the voucher because that question was not at issue.
        Id.
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10922

                In these two foundational common-law vouchment cases,
        the Georgia Supreme Court held that the earlier judgment bound
        the vouchee. No more, no less. We agree with CSX that we are not
        bound by any “loose language,” Appellant’s Br. at 46, in which the
        Georgia Supreme Court commented on issues not before it in each
        case. See Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir.
        2010) (“We have pointed out many times that regardless of what a
        court says in its opinion, the decision can hold nothing beyond the
        facts of that case.”); State v. Dorsey, 875 S.E.2d 900, 907 n.5 (Ga. Ct.
        App. 2022) (“Language that sounds like a holding—but actually ex-
        ceeds the scope of the case’s factual context—is not a holding no
        matter how much it sounds like one.” (internal quotation marks
        omitted)). We thus conclude that the vouchment statute, con-
        sistent with Georgia common law, provides that the vouchee alone
        is bound from relitigating issues decided in the earlier litigation.
                General Mills nevertheless argues that we should reject this
        interpretation of the vouchment statute because it allows a
        voucher to “unilaterally bind a vouchee to favorable findings and
        contest unfavorable ones,” which provides an impermissible wind-
        fall to the voucher. Appellee’s Br. at 24 (internal quotation marks
        omitted). This argument misunderstands vouchment’s purpose.
                “Vouchment is a right granted to the voucher under the statute,
        as is the binding effect of the judgment against the vouchee.” Hardee
        v. Allied Steel Bldgs., Inc., 356 S.E.2d 682, 684 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
        (emphasis added). In other words, by design, vouchment empowers
        the voucher, not the vouchee. Vouchment exists to incentivize the
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        22-10922                  Opinion of the Court                               27

        vouchee to participate in the earlier action, defend his interests
        there, and reduce the burden of duplicative litigation on the judicial
        system. To accomplish this purpose, vouchment creates carrots
        and sticks for the vouchee. One stick is that a vouchee who is in-
        vited to participate in the earlier action and chooses not to do so is
        more likely to find herself bound to determinations she does not
        like precisely because she chose not to participate when invited to
        do so. General Mills’s concern that vouchment, if it only binds the
        vouchee, tends to work against vouchees is simply a feature of the
        doctrine. 7
               Because the doctrine of vouchment does not preclude CSX
        from introducing evidence of General Mills’s fault, CSX may be
        able to establish that General Mills was at least partially at fault for
        Burchfield’s injuries and thus required under the Sidetrack Agree-
        ment to indemnify CSX for at least a portion of the settlement and
        expenses incurred in the Burchfield litigation. Accordingly, we re-
        verse the district court’s order granting summary judgment on
        Counts Two and Three.

        7 CSX argues in the alternative that the vouchment statute does not bar it from
        raising an issue about General Mills’s fault because no issue regarding General
        Mills’s negligence was decided in the Burfield litigation. Because we conclude
        that the vouchment statute does not preclude CSX (as voucher) from relitigat-
        ing any issues against General Mills, we need not address this alternative argu-
        ment.
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        28                    Opinion of the Court               22-10922

                             IV.    CONCLUSION
               For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district
        court’s dismissal of Count One, REVERSE the district court’s entry
        of summary judgment on Counts Two and Three, and REMAND
        for further proceedings.
            AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
        REMANDED.