Court Opinion

ID: 9633502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:49:44.087022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:36.600688
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting from the majority opinion, and specially concurring in Justice JOHNSON’S dissenting opinion.
Justice Johnson benefits the Court admirably in setting forth the reasons why the evidence here did not fall within any of the listed exceptions to the I.R.E. 404(b) prohibition against other bad acts evidence. Having participated in this Court’s State v. Wrenn opinion, and having authored the *748opinion for this Court in State v. Byers, my recollection of those two opinions wholly substantiates the views which Justice Johnson expresses today.
However, more needs to be said about the majority’s analysis of the Rule, and, accordingly, this opinion is confined to a critique of the majority views. Even assuming the majority is correct in holding the evidence fell within one of the I.R.E. 404(b) exceptions, that holding does not end all analysis. The next step, and the one the majority only summarily takes, is to weigh the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative value. State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 501-02, 616 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1980). It is vital for our trial courts to engage in this balancing test before admitting I.R.E. 404(b) evidence.
Balancing the prejudice against the probative value is especially vital in sex abuse cases where the possibility for unfair prejudice is at its highest.
Once the accused has been characterized as a person of abnormal bent, driven by biological inclination, it seems relatively easy to arrive at the conclusion that he must be guilty, he could not help but be otherwise.
Slough and Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 325, 333-34 (1956).
These considerations were not sufficiently addressed in the majority’s opinion. There is no indication that the majority even considered the prejudicial effect of the evidence as no mention of it is made until it conclusively states the ipse dixit, without analysis, that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect. If the majority truly sees that probative value does outweigh the prejudicial effect, then the majority should point to the reasons why that is so. If it does not view the probative value as outweighing prejudicial effect, that is yet another reason why the appellant’s motion in limine should have been granted.