Court Opinion

ID: 9768719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:46:06.267774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:43.868494
License: Public Domain

MAUS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. “The Fourth Amendment does not require that the police obtain a warrant to search an automobile when they have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity, [footnote omitted].” Warrantless Searches & Seizures, 80 Geo.L.J., 962, 1007 (1992). The stop was lawful. The follow-up search was lawful if Trooper Crowe had probable cause to believe the van contained illegal weapons or drugs, unless preceded by an unreasonable period of detention. An important factor in determining if Crowe had probable cause to conduct the follow-up search of the van is his training and experience.
“[Officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior experience with aliens and smugglers.” United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 898, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 2589, 45 L.Ed.2d 623, 629 (1975).
Crowe had knowledge of the following circumstances. Warfield and defendant were traveling on 1-44, “a notorious route used by drug traffickers”. State v. Burkhardt, 795 S.W.2d 399, 405 (Mo. banc 1990). They were driving 79 m.p.h. in a 65-m.p.h. zone at 1:30 a.m. When ordered to stop, they did so only with hesitation by driving at a slow speed on the shoulder for 100 yards. They were driving a van only a few months old with 28,000 miles on the odometer. Warfield was extremely nervous, his hands were shaking uncontrollably and he had a stutter in his voice.
From these circumstances Crowe, a trained officer, could reasonably infer defendant and Warfield were couriers engaged in illegal drug traffic and that such *314couriers frequently carry illegal weapons to protect their cargo and its proceeds. From the hesitancy of the driver in stopping, Crowe could also reasonably infer that because of contraband on board the occupants considered attempted flight or armed resistance. Cf. U.S. v. Blanco, 844 F.2d 344 (6th Cir.1988); U.S. v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972 (10th Cir.1989).
That each of the foregoing circumstances was not evidence of criminal activity is not decisive.
“Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion. ... We noted in [Illinois v. ] Gates, 462 U.S., [213] at 243-244, n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317 [, at 2335] n. 13, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), that ‘innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of probable cause,’ and that ‘[i]n making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is “innocent” or “guilty,” but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.’ That principle applies equally well to the reasonable suspicion inquiry.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1586-1587, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 11-12 (1989).
When the foregoing factors are considered together, in the light of his training and experience, I believe the officer had probable cause to believe the van carried illegal weapons. The officers conducted their investigation with dispatch. The total period of detention was not unreasonable. Cf. U.S. v. Walraven, supra. The trial court’s decision that the circumstances justified the follow-up search was not clearly erroneous.
I have considered defendant’s contention the evidence was insufficient because there was no evidence the substance was adequately identified as marijuana. That contention has no merit. I would affirm the conviction.