Court Opinion

ID: 9363536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-16 00:12:50.100523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:32.298485
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                       OF TEXAS

                                     NO. PD-0679-21

                              VITAL GARCIA, Appellant

                                             v.

                                THE STATE OF TEXAS

            ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
               FROM THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
                            HARRIS COUNTY

     SLAUGHTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J.,
HERVEY, RICHARDSON, YEARY, KEEL, WALKER, and MCCLURE, JJ., joined.
NEWELL, J., concurred.

                                      OPINION

       In January 2019, a jury convicted Appellant Vital Garcia of first-degree aggravated

assault on a family member resulting in serious bodily injury for shooting his then-

girlfriend with a firearm. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a), (b)(1). The question we must

answer is whether the court of appeals improperly acted as a thirteenth juror by concluding

that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that the two gunshot wounds inflicted
                                                                                    Garcia – 2

on the victim caused serious bodily injury, namely, because neither bullet hit a vital organ.

Here, the evidence presented to the jury demonstrated that the victim sustained two gunshot

wounds to her thigh and chest; she suffered significant bleeding to the point that she

blacked out and believed she would die; her injuries were described as “deep lacerations”

which required twelve surgical staples to close; and her treating physician believed that her

wounds constituted “serious bodily injury.” Considering the cumulative force of the

evidence and allowing the drawing of reasonable inferences, we conclude that the evidence

was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the victim faced a substantial risk of death

as a result of her injuries. Therefore, the court of appeals erred by concluding that the jury

acted irrationally in finding that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. We reverse the

lower court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I.     Background

       A.     Historical Facts

       Appellant and Marissa Melendez were in a romantic relationship and shared an

apartment in Houston. At the time of the offense, they had been dating for a little less than

a year. The relationship started off fine but soon took a turn for the worse when Appellant

became physically and verbally abusive. Appellant frequently threatened to kill Melendez

if she ever cheated or left him. Because Appellant carried a loaded .40 caliber handgun

with him “24/7,” Melendez believed his threats and was afraid of him.

       On May 25, 2016, Appellant came home early from work to find Melendez smoking

marijuana in the living room with a male friend. Appellant went into the bathroom and

Melendez heard him cock his handgun. He then came out and began shooting at Melendez

and the man. Melendez tried to run to the kitchen, but Appellant shot her through the back
                                                                                  Garcia – 3

of her right thigh. She was able to remain standing and made her way to the kitchen.

Appellant then fired at the man, who jumped through the second-floor balcony window to

escape. 1 Appellant turned his focus back to Melendez and trapped her in the kitchen. He

told her he was going to kill her, and she believed that he would. Appellant then shot

Melendez in the right side of her chest from a close distance and fled from the apartment.

         Melendez was bleeding, but conscious. She testified that she did not call 911

because she was in shock. Instead, she grabbed her keys, phone, and wallet and went to her

car, thinking she could make it to the hospital. Melendez drove one or two blocks when

she saw a police car on the side of the road. Realizing that she would not be able to make

it to the hospital on her own, she pulled over and asked the officer for help. The officer

then called for an ambulance. Melendez testified that the last thing she remembers before

blacking out is entering the ambulance. She told the jury that she thought she was going to

die.

         There was also testimony from a security guard for the apartment complex who saw

Melendez trying to drive away from the scene. The security guard stopped her and told her

she was “bleeding” and needed to wait for him to call an ambulance. He then got into the

car with her. He testified that she was “driving with one hand” while applying pressure to

one of her gunshot wounds with the other hand. He eventually got out of the car when she

stopped to seek help from a police officer on the side of the road.

1
    The man was shot multiple times but also survived the incident.
                                                                                    Garcia – 4

       The Houston Fire Department (HFD) responded to assist Melendez. HFD

emergency medical records indicate that Melendez was “ambulatory on scene” and

“conscious and alert” when HFD arrived. The records note that Melendez appeared to have

gunshot wounds to her right breast and right upper thigh and that each appeared to have an

entry and exit wound. She received treatment for bleeding 2 as well as occlusive dressing

on the breast gunshot wound. Melendez was transported as a priority two 3 emergency to

the hospital, and records note that her condition remained unchanged during transport.

       Once at the hospital, Melendez was treated by emergency physician Dr. Jordan

Smith. According to her medical records that were admitted at trial, she suffered “multiple

deep lacerations to the right thigh and right breast”—two entry and two exit wounds—

which required twelve staples in total to close. The medical records further indicate that

the laceration to her right superior breast was 1.5 centimeters long and was repaired with

1 staple; the right lower breast laceration was 3 centimeters long and was repaired with 4

staples; the right anterior thigh laceration was 4 centimeters long and was repaired with 5

staples; and the right lateral thigh laceration was 2 centimeters long and was repaired with

2 staples. The records state that Melendez was “neurovascularly intact in all four

extremities. Chest x-ray negative for intrathoracic injury and right femur x-ray negative for

bony injury. Doubt vascular injury given the location of the entrance and exit wounds.”

The records also indicated the presence of several small, scattered bullet fragments in the

2
 The EMS record indicates that Melendez was treated for bleeding with “4x4’s,” but the record
does not explain what this means.
3
 There was no explanation provided either through testimony or the admitted exhibits of what a
“priority two” transport designation meant.
                                                                                      Garcia – 5

right leg. Melendez reported experiencing pain measured as high as an eight out of ten, and

she was given Hydrocodone and Toradol to alleviate her discomfort. Melendez’s wounds

did not require surgery and she was discharged from the hospital after a few hours. She

still bears scars from her injuries.

       In his testimony at trial, Dr. Smith stated that Melendez presented with “two gunshot

wounds: one through the right breast,” and one “through the right thigh with a retained

bullet.” He cleaned and repaired four wounds through staple closure. Dr. Smith explained

to the jury that a gunshot wound can cause serious bodily injury and even death. He testified

that he has seen patients die from gunshot wounds to the chest. Dr. Smith also told the jury

that, based on the location of Melendez’s wounds, he believed she sustained serious bodily

injury. He noted that, although the bullets did not strike any of her vital organs, the bullets’

paths were close to her ribs, which have “a lot of vessels right underneath . . . as well as

[the vessels] in her thorax.” He noted that the bullets had struck in close proximity to her

heart, lungs, aorta, vena cava, femur, femoral artery, and femoral vein.

       Several photographs of the crime scene were also introduced at trial. Blood can be

seen on the walls, blinds, and soaked into the carpet, as well as on a pillow and towel. No

photographs of Melendez’s injuries before or after medical treatment were introduced.

       Following the conclusion of evidence, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree

felony aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of a family member resulting in serious

bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a), (b)(1). Appellant pleaded “true” to an

enhancement allegation of a prior felony conviction for indecency with a child, and the

trial court sentenced him to 35 years’ imprisonment.
                                                                                    Garcia – 6

       B.     On Appeal

       On direct appeal, Appellant contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish

that Melendez suffered serious bodily injury or that she was Appellant’s family member.

He also complained that the trial court erred in refusing to submit a jury instruction on the

lesser-included offense of second-degree aggravated assault. In a 2-1 decision, the court of

appeals agreed that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that

Melendez suffered serious bodily injury, and it reversed Appellant’s conviction. See

Garcia v. State, 631 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021). Because

the court sustained Appellant’s complaint with respect to the element of serious bodily

injury, it did not reach his second argument pertaining to the evidence of a family/dating

relationship, nor did it reach the second point of error addressing the denial of the lesser-

included-offense instruction. Id. at 880, 882 n.1.

       In holding the evidence insufficient to support the jury’s finding of serious bodily

injury, the court reasoned that there was no evidence that the bullets “hit any vital organs

or caused any serious or lasting impairment or disfigurement.” Id. at 880. It also noted that,

although Melendez testified that she thought she was going to die, she did not explain the

basis for that belief. Id. Additionally, the court gave considerable weight to the EMS

records stating that Melendez was conscious at the scene and that her condition remained

unchanged during the transport to the emergency room. Id. at 879–80.

       The court of appeals also concluded that Dr. Smith’s testimony was insufficient to

show that Melendez suffered serious bodily injury. Although he testified “that he thought

her wounds constituted serious bodily injury, . . . he was not asked about and expressed no
                                                                                   Garcia – 7

opinion regarding the statutory criteria for serious bodily injury.” Id. at 881. The court

continued, explaining that Dr. Smith “was not asked and did not indicate what would or

could have happened with [C]omplainant’s wounds had she not received medical care.” Id.

Finally, the court observed that the treatment Melendez received “was relatively brief and

nonintrusive,” and she was released from the hospital after three hours and twenty minutes.

Id. Ultimately, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with

instructions to reform the conviction to second-degree aggravated assault and hold a new

punishment hearing. Id. at 877.

       Justice Poissant dissented. Id. at 883–85. In her view, the evidence was sufficient

for a rational trier of fact to have found that Melendez was exposed to a substantial risk of

death as a result of the gunshot wounds, thereby establishing the element of serious bodily

injury. Id. at 883 (noting that Melendez “suffered two gunshot wounds near vital organs,

bled profusely, lost consciousness, required emergency room treatment, has bullet

fragments in her right thigh, and has scars from the bullet wounds. The testimony of the

emergency room physician who treated Complainant established both that the Complainant

suffered serious bodily injury and that her injuries could have caused Complainant’s

death.”).

       We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to answer the following

question: “Whether the Fourteenth Court of Appeals improperly acted as a ‘thirteenth

juror’ by re-evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence showing that the

[C]omplainant’s gunshot wounds constituted serious bodily injury?”

II.    Analysis
                                                                                    Garcia – 8

       We reject the court of appeals’ conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to

support the jury’s finding that Melendez suffered serious bodily injury. The court of

appeals failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and

impermissibly substituted its own judgment for that of the factfinder. Applying the

appropriate level of deference and considering the cumulative force of the evidence, we

find that the jury could have rationally inferred that Melendez’s gunshot wounds posed a

substantial risk of death, such that the element of serious bodily injury was satisfied.

       A.     Standard of Review

       In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the

evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979); Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “This

familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from

basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. A proper review of evidentiary

sufficiency considers the cumulative force of the evidence. See Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d

900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

       When considering a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, a reviewing court does not

sit as the thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by

reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633,638

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The jury acts as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses
                                                                                    Garcia – 9

and may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented. Sharp v. State,

707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). “Furthermore, the trier of fact may use

common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in

ordinary affairs when drawing inferences from the evidence.” Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d

621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). If the record supports conflicting inferences, the

reviewing court must “presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the

prosecution” and defer to the jury’s factual determinations. Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). In other words, when there are two reasonable

interpretations of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly

erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

       We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the hypothetically correct jury

charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The “hypothetically

correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not

unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s

theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant

was tried.” Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). “As

authorized by the indictment” means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by

the charging instrument. Id.

       B.     Aggravated Assault and Serious Bodily Injury

       Here, Appellant was charged with and convicted of first-degree aggravated assault

on a family member. A person commits ordinary assault if he “intentionally, knowingly,

or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1). The offense
                                                                                     Garcia – 10

is elevated to first-degree aggravated assault if “the actor uses a deadly weapon during the

commission of the assault and causes serious bodily injury to a person whose relationship

to or association with the defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005,

Family Code”—i.e., a family member, a member of the defendant’s household, or a person

with whom the defendant has a “dating relationship.” Id. § 22.02(b)(1); TEX. FAM.

CODE §§ 71.0021(b), 71.003, 71.005.

       Thus, based on the statutory language as modified by the indictment, the

hypothetically correct jury charge here would include the following elements: (1)

Appellant; (2) knowingly or intentionally; (3) caused serious bodily injury to Melendez;

(4) who was a member of Appellant’s household or a person with whom he had a “dating

relationship;” and (5) in doing so, he used a deadly weapon. Given the scope of the ground

on which we granted review, we will consider only the third element—whether a rational

juror could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Melendez suffered serious bodily

injury as a result of Appellant’s conduct.

       The Penal Code defines “bodily injury” as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment

of physical condition.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(8). It further defines “serious bodily

injury” as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious

permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily

member or organ.” Id. § 1.07(a)(46).

       In examining sufficiency questions surrounding the element of serious bodily injury,

this Court’s precedent has indicated that the degree of risk posed by the injury, or the

disfiguring or impairing qualities of the injury, should be evaluated based on the injury as
                                                                                    Garcia – 11

inflicted, rather than after the ameliorating effects of medical treatment. Pruett v. State,

510 S.W.3d 925, 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Specifically, in Blea v. State, we noted that

the definition of serious bodily injury plainly “refers to the injury caused by the offender,

and it does not require consideration of any medical treatment that may have lessened the

impact of the injury.” 483 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Thus, in determining

whether a bodily injury creates a substantial risk of death, a court should consider “the

disfiguring and impairing quality of the bodily injury as it was inflicted on a complainant

by an offender,” and should “not consider the amelioration or exacerbation of an injury by

actions not attributable to the offender, such as medical treatment.” Id. at 34–35.

       Moreover, we have recognized that expert medical testimony is not strictly required

to establish serious bodily injury. Blea, 483 S.W.3d at 35 (observing that “serious bodily

injury may be established without a physician’s testimony when the injury and its effects

are obvious”). We have further observed that an injured person’s lay testimony about the

seriousness of her injuries may support a finding of serious bodily injury. See Wade v.

State, No. PD-0157-20, 2022 WL 1021056, at *7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (“We have

previously held that a lay witness’s opinion testimony supported a finding of serious bodily

injury . . . . ‘[A] person who has received injuries is qualified to express an opinion on the

seriousness of those injuries.’”) (citing and quoting Hart v. State, 581 S.W.2d 675, 676

(Tex. Crim. App. 1979)). And, jurors are permitted “to apply common sense, knowledge,

and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life in drawing reasonable inferences from

the evidence presented to it in order to conclude that a particular injury constitutes ‘serious

bodily injury.’” Id. at *6.
                                                                                 Garcia – 12

       C.     Application – The evidence was sufficient to establish serious bodily
              injury.

       In view of the foregoing law and substantive principles, and viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the jury was not irrational in

concluding that Melendez’s gunshot wounds posed a substantial risk of death and thus

constituted serious bodily injury. The record in this case shows that Melendez sustained

two gunshot wounds from close range to her chest and right thigh. She testified that she

was bleeding, and this was corroborated by the photos of the apartment taken in the

aftermath of the shooting which showed a significant amount of blood around the

apartment, as well as by the testimony of the security guard who indicated that Melendez

was still bleeding as she was driving away from the scene. After attempting to drive herself

to the hospital, Melendez realized she would not be able to make it there on her own and

sought help from a police officer on the side of the road. She testified that she does not

remember anything after the ambulance arrived, suggesting that she either lost

consciousness or was in shock and blacked out. She also testified that she thought she

would die.

       Melendez’s EMS and medical records show that she sustained two gunshot wounds,

each producing an entry and exit wound ranging in size from 1.5 to 4 centimeters. She

received immediate treatment from EMS to help alleviate bleeding. Once at the hospital,

she received emergency treatment from Dr. Smith, who cleaned and stapled each of the

four wounds, using a total of twelve staples. Dr. Smith testified that he believed Melendez

suffered serious bodily injury as a result of her injuries:
                                                                                   Garcia – 13

       Prosecutor:   And can a gunshot wound cause serious bodily injury?

       Dr. Smith:    Yes, it can.
       Prosecutor:   Can a gunshot cause death?
       Dr. Smith:    Yes, it can.
       Prosecutor:   Based on the location of Ms. Melendez’s gunshot wounds,
                     would you consider that serious bodily injury?
       Dr. Smith:    Yes, I would.
       ....
       Prosecutor:   Approximately how many gunshot wounds would you say
                     you’ve treated over the years of you being a doctor?
       Dr. Smith:    Hundreds.
       Prosecutor:   And out of those hundreds, have you seen death occur?
       Dr. Smith:    Yes.
       Prosecutor:   Have you seen deaths occur from being shot in the thigh area?
       Dr. Smith:    Not that I remember specifically.
       Prosecutor:   Have you seen deaths occur from being shot in the chest area?
       Dr. Smith:    Yes.

       In view of the totality of this evidence, we cannot agree with the court of appeals

that the jury lacked a sufficient basis for finding serious bodily injury. In reaching this

conclusion, we emphasize that the definition for serious bodily injury looks to the nature

of the injury as inflicted, not after the ameliorating effects of medical treatment. See Blea,

483 S.W.3d at 34–35. Focusing solely on the nature of Melendez’s injuries prior to her

receiving medical treatment, the gunshot wounds produced deep lacerations that caused

significant bleeding and resulted in Melendez losing consciousness. Dr. Smith indicated

that gunshot wounds can cause death, and he opined that the injury here was indeed serious

bodily injury. Viewing this evidence in its totality, the jury was free to apply its own

common sense and knowledge of this type of injury to conclude that, absent timely medical
                                                                                   Garcia – 14

treatment to control bleeding and clean and repair the wounds, Melendez would have faced

a substantial risk of death. There is nothing speculative about permitting the jury to draw

these reasonable inferences under the circumstances of this case.

       The flaw in the court of appeals’ opinion, broadly speaking, is that it failed to view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and failed to permit the drawing of

reasonable inferences by the jury. For example, the court of appeals disregarded

Melendez’s testimony that she lost consciousness or blacked out, noting instead that the

EMS records contradicted this testimony by stating that Melendez was alert upon arrival.

See Garcia, 631 S.W.3d at 880. But the EMS reports do not necessarily negate Melendez’s

statement that she blacked out at some point while in the ambulance. And even if they did,

“[w]hen the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the

conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination.” Dobbs v. State, 434

S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

       Further, the court of appeals seemed to focus on what the evidence failed to show,

and ways in which the evidence could have been stronger, rather than analyzing whether

the basic facts adduced were sufficient to permit the jurors to rationally infer the existence

of serious bodily injury. For example, the court of appeals focused on the fact that

Melendez did not appear to have received a blood transfusion and that the treatment she

received “was relatively brief and nonintrusive.” Garcia, 631 S.W.3d at 880–81. It also

emphasized what it perceived to be weaknesses in Dr. Smith’s testimony, noting that he

“was not asked about and expressed no opinion regarding the statutory criteria for serious

bodily injury,” did not testify that “any of [C]omplainant’s vital organs were hit or
                                                                                     Garcia – 15

otherwise impacted by the bullets,” and “did not indicate what would or could have

happened with [C]omplainant’s wounds had she not received medical care.” Id. at 881. But

the fact that Melendez received prompt and effective medical treatment does not diminish

the severity of her wounds as of the time they were inflicted. With respect to Dr. Smith’s

testimony, while he could have provided a more detailed explanation of why he believed

Melendez’s wounds amounted to serious bodily injury, this does not mean that his

conclusion stating that he believed this was serious bodily injury, coupled with the basic

facts of Melendez’s injuries, constituted an insufficient basis for the jury to conclude that

the statutory standard was met. We also disagree with the court of appeals’ implicit

suggestion that the statute requires a showing that a vital organ was struck to establish

serious bodily injury under these circumstances. While evidence showing that a vital organ

was struck by a gunshot would likely suffice to meet the statutory standard, that is not a

necessary condition for finding serious bodily injury. Instead, the sole relevant inquiry is

whether the injury as inflicted “creates a substantial risk of death.” TEX. PENAL

CODE § 1.07(a)(46).

       Finally, the court of appeals relied on several decisions to support its holding, but

we find those decisions to be readily distinguishable. For example, in Williams v. State, the

complainant was shot in the lower back, buttocks, and thigh. 696 S.W.2d 896, 897 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1985). The State offered no expert testimony concerning the risk or severity of

the injuries and the victim did not testify to the extent of his injuries. Id. We observed there

that “[n]o testimony, whatsoever, was offered to prove serious bodily injury.” Id. at 898.

Similarly, in Black v. State, the State did not offer any testimony from the treating
                                                                                   Garcia – 16

physician, nor did it offer any hospital records. 637 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tex. Crim. App.

[Panel Op.] 1982). The victim’s testimony about his injury, a gunshot wound to the thigh,

was limited in scope and did not address the severity of the wound. Id. Further, the focus

of Black was on whether the injury constituted a protracted loss or impairment, rather than

posing a substantial risk of death. Id. Given these distinctions, we cannot agree with the

lower court’s reliance on these cases to support its holding.

III.   Conclusion

       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude

that it was sufficient to establish the element of serious bodily injury. The court of appeals

erred by focusing on the weaknesses in the State’s case, rather than on whether the jury

could have relied on the basic facts to draw reasonable inferences about the existence of

serious bodily injury without the ameliorating effects of medical treatment. Considering

the cumulative force of the evidence and allowing the drawing of reasonable inferences by

the jury, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Melendez faced a substantial

risk of death as a result of two gunshot wounds to the thigh and chest. We therefore reverse

the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for consideration of Appellant’s

remaining arguments raised on appeal.

DELIVERED: January 11, 2023

PUBLISH