Court Opinion

ID: 9671045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:30:02.500175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:41.431220
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because I believe the majority has impermissively limited the authority of the trial court. The majority declares that “the legislature has circumscribed the trial court’s power in dictating wherq the custodial parent may reside within the state.” Swpra,, at 124. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to sec. 767.245(6), Stats.
In Dovi v. Dovi, 245 Wis 50, 13 N.W.2d 585 (1944), *131this court considered the power of the trial court in custody matters. We concluded, after an extensive review of case law in other jurisdictions, that a court of equity has jurisdiction of personal rights, including those of infants, and we held that such jurisdiction may be exercised in divorce actions as well as in other actions of an equitable nature. We further found that the court receives its jurisdiction from the constitution; hence the legislature cannot take it away. Id. at 55. Furthermore, in Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965), we stated that the trial court has wide discretion in determining custody matters. I do not believe the legislature in enacting sec. 767.245(6), Stats., intended to limit the authority of the court to regulate the in-state moves of custodial parents. Rather, the legislature was simply stating its concern for the child-parent relationship by establishing a restriction on the distance a custodial parent can move without permission. The great distances which may separate the noncustodial parent from the children and the ability of the court to supervise the parties and the children are significant considerations. Although the legislature chose the state boundary lines as limitations, an in-state move can present similar concerns.
I do not believe the legislature attempted to deprive courts of the longstanding power to do what is necessary to protect the best interests of the children. Because I believe accessibility of children to a parent is the legislature’s concern in enacting sec. 767.245(6), Stats., I cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that the legislature intended to deny court supervision in those cases where an in-state move would frustrate visitation. Instate moves often place a greater distance barrier between parents and children than do out-of-state moves. Thus, limiting the court’s power to regulate such moves by applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio *132alterim to sec. 767.2,45 (6) may produce an absurd result. In interpreting statutes we are to avoid absurd results. Kania v. Airborne Freight Corp., 99 Wis. 2d 746, 766, 300 N.W.2d 63 (1981).
Nor do I believe that the trial court abused its discretion. This is simply a custody order. The order followed a petition to change custody based on an allegation by Edward Groh that Janette Groh was not fulfilling the religious, moral, and physical needs of the children and that her removal of the children from Milwaukee to Rhinelander made it difficult for him to provide the guidance which he believed they needed.
The trial court’s findings reflect concern for the children’s needs. The custody order implements the court’s finding that, while both parents were fit for custody, the best interests of the children would be served by having them reside in the Milwaukee area. Because I believe that, based on the record in this case, the trial court could have transferred custody to Edward, I find no merit to Janette’s argument that conditioning custody upon her move to the Milwaukee area is unreasonable. She continues as a custodial parent as long as she is willing to do what is in the best interests of the children. If she chooses not to accommodate those interests by moving to Milwaukee, Edward will gain custody. The trial court wisely attempted to accommodate the interests of children and parents. It avoided the trauma of changing custody by permitting Janette to make a choice which would enable her to prevail in the custody matter. The court’s decision was compatible with the recommendations of the guardian ad litem and the other experts. For these reasons, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
We have long recognized that the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the conflicting interests of the parties and the children. Whitman v. Whitman, 28 Wis. *1332d 50, 135 N.W.2d 835 (1965). Therefore, this court strongly defers to the trial court’s findings in custody matters. Sommers v. Sommers, 33 Wis. 2d 22, 146 N.W. 2d 428 (1966). The trial court should be accorded such deference in this case.
I am authorized to state that Justice Donald W. Steinmetz and Justice Louis J. Ceci join in this dissenting opinion.