Court Opinion

ID: 9940864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 16:09:21.946648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:59.312326
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                       Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                              STATE OF MINNESOTA
                              IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                    A23-0155

                                  State of Minnesota,
                                     Respondent,

                                           vs.

                              David Francis Chamberlain,
                                      Appellant.

                               Filed February 14, 2024
                                      Affirmed
                                 Smith, John, Judge *

                            Hennepin County District Court
                              File No. 27-CR-21-11260

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

      Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Smith,

John, Judge.

*
 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
                            NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, JOHN, Judge

         We affirm appellant’s conviction of second-degree felony murder because appellant

does not meet his burden to show that the prosecutor’s reason for striking a juror was

race-based and because the prosecutor did not engage in prejudicial misconduct during

cross-examination or closing argument.

                                           FACTS

         In June 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant David Francis

Chamberlain with one count of first-degree arson following a residential house fire that

injured two people, D.S. and L.S. See Minn. Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (2020) (criminalizing

first-degree arson of a dwelling). The state later amended the complaint to add one count

of second-degree felony murder after D.S. died from complications due to injuries from

the fire. See Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2020) (criminalizing second-degree felony

murder). Chamberlain entered a plea of not guilty, and the matter was scheduled for trial.

         The parties proceeded with jury selection. 1 Following voir dire, the prosecutor

exercised a peremptory strike of prospective juror L.M. Chamberlain raised a Batson

challenge, arguing that the state’s peremptory strike was unlawful because L.M. is Black

and because L.M. did not say anything during questioning that should have disqualified

him from serving as a juror. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that

1
    The following factual summary is based on the evidence and testimony presented at trial.

                                              2
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution prevents parties from striking

prospective jurors based solely on their race).

       The district court denied Chamberlain’s Batson challenge, stating that Chamberlain

failed to make a prima facie showing that the state exercised the strike on the basis of race.

       At trial, the expert witness testimony centered around the intent requirement of

arson. See Minn. Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (“Whoever unlawfully by means of fire or

explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building that is used as a dwelling at the

time the act is committed . . . commits arson in the first degree . . . .” (emphasis added)).

Several experts, including an investigator with the Minneapolis Fire Department and a

deputy investigator with the Minnesota State Fire Marshal, testified for the state as to the

cause of the fire. Their testimony established that, based on their review of the scene, the

fire started in a chair on the first-floor porch, and “[w]ith the totality of the information,

the witness statements, the fire patterns, [and] the fire dynamics,” the fire was

“intentionally set.”

       Chamberlain had one expert witness testify, a professor who was a professional fire

and explosion investigator from Kentucky. The expert noted that he was “concern[ed]

with . . . the conclusions that were being reached [by the state’s experts] . . . [and] the lack

of evidence that supported” the conclusion that the fire was “incendiary.”                 More

specifically, the expert testified that the state’s experts did not follow the scientific method,

and he challenged the state’s experts’ conclusion that the fire was intentionally started in a

chair on the porch.

                                               3
       The jury found Chamberlain guilty on both counts and the district court entered a

conviction for second-degree felony murder. The district court also granted the state’s

motion for an upward departure and sentenced Chamberlain to a 360-month executed

prison sentence. Chamberlain appeals.

                                        DECISION

                                              I.

       Chamberlain argues that the district court erred by denying his objection to the

state’s peremptory challenge to a Black prospective juror. A party may use a peremptory

challenge “to strike a prospective juror that the party believes will be less fair than some

others” in an effort “to select as final jurors the persons they believe will be most fair.”

State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 100 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). But a party may

not use a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror based on race, as doing so

violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Batson, 476 U.S. at 84; see also State v.

Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 136-37 (Minn. 2012) (applying Batson).

       Minnesota courts use the three-step framework set forth in Batson to determine

whether racial discrimination motivated the peremptory challenge. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at

101; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3) (adopting the Batson three-step process).

Under this framework,

              (1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the
              prosecutor executed a peremptory challenge on the basis of
              race; (2) the burden then shifts to the prosecution to articulate
              a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question; and

                                              4
              (3) the district court must determine whether the defendant has
              carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination.

Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 101. It is important for the district court to clearly demarcate and

“announce on the record its analysis of each of the three steps of the Batson analysis.”

State v. Reiners, 664 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn. 2003).

       The existence of racial discrimination in the use of a peremptory challenge is a

factual determination. State v. Diggins, 836 N.W.2d 349, 355 (Minn. 2013). An appellate

court gives “great deference to the district court’s [Batson] ruling and will uphold the ruling

unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation omitted); State v. White, 684 N.W.2d 500,

507 (Minn. 2004) (“[U]pon review of a district court’s determination under step one of the

Batson process that a prima facie showing of discrimination has not been established, we

will reverse only in the face of clear error.”). This deference recognizes “that the record

may not reflect all of the relevant circumstances that the court may consider.” State v.

Pendleton, 725 N.W.2d 717, 724 (Minn. 2007).

       During voir dire, Chamberlain objected to the state’s peremptory challenge to venire

member L.M., who is Black. Chamberlain’s counsel noted that nothing L.M. said during

questioning would “make a basis for exercising a peremptory strike,” thus raising the

inference that the state’s strike was based on race. The district court denied the request,

finding that Chamberlain had failed to make a prima facie showing at the first step. The

district court stated that Chamberlain did not show that the motive for the strike was based

on L.M.’s race, explaining:

                     So, although I do understand and respect the—and,
              frankly, agree [that L.M.] strikes me as a perfectly satisfactory

                                              5
              juror—but preemptive strikes inherently eliminate . . . [and]
              by definition exclude people who, in another person’s
              eyes . . . would be perfectly reasonable jurors. And so that by
              itself I am going to find is not sufficient to constitute a prima
              facie case in this instance.

(Emphasis added.) The district court further explained that the jury panel had “a number

of people of color on it” and was “more proportional” than the district court was “used to

seeing.”

       After the district court explained its ruling, the prosecutor provided a race-neutral

explanation, “just in case [the] appellate court were to disagree with [the district court’s]

analysis on the first step.” The district court responded, “All right,” and made no further

findings concerning either the second or third step.

       Chamberlain argues that the district court erred by ruling that he did not establish a

prima-facie case and asks this court to remand the case to the district court to address steps

two and three of the Batson analysis.

       “The defendant’s burden to establish a prima-facie case is low; a defendant need

only ‘produce evidence sufficient to permit the [district court] judge to draw an inference

that discrimination has occurred.’” State v. Black, 919 N.W.2d 704, 711 (Minn. App.

2018) (quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005)). To make a prima facie

case of discrimination, the challenging party must show two things: “(1) that a member of

a racial minority has been peremptorily excluded and (2) that circumstances of the case

raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 831

(emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). “[T]he fact that the prospective juror is a member

of a racial minority, alone, does not raise an inference that the exclusion was based on

                                              6
race.”     Black, 919 N.W.2d at 711 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Onyelobi,

879 N.W.2d 334, 345 (Minn. 2016) (“It is well-settled that mere removal of a member of

a racial minority does not necessarily establish a prima facie case of discrimination.”

(quotation omitted)). “[A] prima-facie showing is based on the ‘totality of the relevant

facts’ regarding the proponent’s conduct during the trial.” Black, 919 N.W.2d at 711

(quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005)). Additionally, the supreme court

stated:

                The inference of discrimination can be drawn by proof of
                disproportionate impact upon the racial group, e.g., the
                prosecutor totally excluded all [Black people] from the venire,
                or upon an examination of all the surrounding circumstances,
                e.g., an examination of the prosecutor’s questions in voir dire
                or stated reasons in exercising peremptory challenges . . . .

State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Minn. 1989).

          Neither party challenges the first requirement—that L.M. is a member of a racial

minority—L.M. is Black. But for the reasons that follow, we disagree that Chamberlain

met his burden to show that the state engaged in prima facie discrimination because the

circumstances of the case do not “raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.”

Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 831 (quotation omitted).

          Chamberlain argues that the district court erred at the second requirement because

“the peremptory strike could not be based on the words [that] L.M. spoke, [so] it’s

reasonable to infer [that] it was based on the color of his skin.” Chamberlain relies on the

district court’s statement that L.M. “strikes [the district court] as a perfectly satisfactory

juror” as establishing an inference of discrimination.       The state contends that it is

                                              7
“irrelevant” as to whether L.M. could be a satisfactory juror because “peremptory

challenges are designed to excuse jurors who can be fair but are otherwise unsatisfactory

to the challenging party.”

       In Reiners, the supreme court explained that “[p]eremptory challenges are designed

to be used to excuse prospective jurors who can be fair but are otherwise unsatisfactory to

the challenging party.” 664 N.W.2d at 833. Chamberlain does not point to any facts in the

record that raise an inference of discrimination; rather, he argues that the absence of facts

showing a motivation to strike creates the inference. And Chamberlain does not cite any

Minnesota caselaw stating that the absence of facts showing a motivation to strike leads to

an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, just because the district court stated that L.M.

could be “a perfectly satisfactory juror,” it does not raise an inference of discrimination.

       Chamberlain also argues that the district court erred because it “suggest[ed] that

Chamberlain failed to make a prima facie showing because the state did not strike all

‘people of color’ from the panel.”

       An inference of racial discrimination can be drawn upon “proof of disproportionate

impact upon the racial group, [such as when] the prosecutor totally excluded all [Black

people] from the venire.” Moore, 438 N.W.2d at 107 (emphasis added). It is proper to

consider whether a person of color was already seated on the jury at the first step of the

Batson analysis. State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 815 (Minn. 2019); see also White,

684 N.W.2d at 507 (concluding that the defendant had not established a prima facie case

in part because a Native American woman with a Black husband “had already been

accepted as a juror”).

                                              8
       Here, the district court explained that the venire panel had “a number of people of

color on it,” the prosecutor did not exclude “the only person of color on the panel,” and the

jury was “more proportional” than the judge had seen in other cases. Accordingly, the

district court appropriately considered whether the prosecutor had excluded all other people

of color.

       In sum, on this record, and in light of the district court’s opportunity to assess prima

facie cases of discrimination, we affirm the district court’s denial of the Batson challenge

to the peremptory strike of L.M.

                                             II.

       Chamberlain argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor engaged

in misconduct during cross-examination and closing arguments. “The prosecutor is an

officer of the court charged with the affirmative obligation to achieve justice and fair

adjudication, not merely convictions.” State v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 2007).

       Chamberlain did not object to the prosecutor’s questions during cross-examination

or during closing argument.        Unobjected-to claims of prosecutorial misconduct are

reviewed under a modified plain-error standard. State v. Epps, 964 N.W.2d 419, 423

(Minn. 2021). Under a traditional plain-error analysis, the defendant must establish (1) an

error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected his or her substantial rights. State v. Ramey,

721 N.W.2d 294, 298-99 (Minn. 2006). An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, and

usually this is shown if the error violates caselaw, a rule, or a standard of conduct. Id. at

302. If the three plain-error prongs are satisfied, we then determine whether the error

should be addressed to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id. at

                                              9
298. Under the modified approach, if a defendant shows the existence of an error that was

plain, the burden shifts to the state to show that the plain error did not affect the defendant’s

substantial rights. Id. at 300-02.

       Chamberlain first argues that the prosecutor committed plain error because “a

prosecutor may not suggest that the testimony of a defendant’s expert witness is attributable

to the payment of money” during either cross-examination or in closing argument.

       The state and Chamberlain both provided expert witness testimony concerning the

fire. A key issue at trial involved whether the state proved that the fire was “intentionally”

set to meet the element for arson. See Minn. Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (requiring the

defendant to “intentionally destroy[] . . . any building that is used as a dwelling at the time

the act is committed” for first-degree arson of a dwelling).

       The state presented expert witness testimony from the Minneapolis Fire Department

and State Fire Marshal. A Minneapolis Fire Department investigator responded to the fire

at the duplex and presented his observations about the origin of the fire. As required by

the national guidelines, he ruled out other possibilities of the cause of the fire. He explained

that the evidence was consistent with an open flame being the source. He testified, “[w]ith

the totality of the information, the witness statements, the fire patterns, [and] the fire

dynamics, . . . this was an intentionally set fire.” Another investigator with the State Fire

Marshal also testified that the fire was “intentionally set.”

       Chamberlain called Gregory Gorbett, who owns a fire and explosion investigation

company and is a university professor in Kentucky. Gorbett reviewed the information,

which included photographs and reports. He agreed that the fire likely started in the general

                                               10
area of the porch but disagreed that it started on a chair and that the fire was intentional,

providing several alternatives for the source of the fire. Based on those alternatives, he

concluded that the cause of the fire should have been “undetermined.”

       Chamberlain challenges the prosecutor’s questioning during cross-examination that

Gorbett:

       •      testified “on a retained, paid basis”;
       •      earned an hourly rate for work on the case outside of the courtroom;
       •      earned $225 per hour;
       •      was paid for his lodging and travel expenses;
       •      traveled by airplane from Kentucky to testify; and
       •      stayed in a hotel while in Minnesota, which was “covered.”

       Chamberlain also challenges the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument

relating to Gorbett’s compensation:

       •      “The standard in an American courtroom is not, can the . . . defense attorney
              and an expert who’s been paid to testify for a defendant come up with an
              alternative theory of the case? That’s—that’s not the standard.”
       •      L.S. was “not a practiced witness that gets paid $225 an hour to, you know,
              come in and . . . dazzle juries.”
       •      The prosecutor stated that Gorbett’s testimony was “speculation by an expert
              who’s been flown in from Kentucky.”

(Emphasis added.)

       Finally, Chamberlain argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in “closing

argument by making arguments not supported by the evidence to bolster the credibility of

[K.J.,] a critical state witness.” Specifically, Chamberlain challenges the prosecutor’s

statement that:

                     [K.J.] testified as well, and he certainly isn’t a polished
              witness, either. He got aggravated with the [d]efense
              attorney’s questions. Frankly—you didn’t necessarily see in

                                             11
              the courtroom, but he—you know, not a huge fan of mine,
              either. Because, sometimes, he doesn’t like being asked
              questions that he thinks are stupid. He doesn’t like being asked
              questions that he thinks are repetitive or—he doesn’t
              understand why it’s important.
                      But, just like [L.S., the other state’s witness], he
              testified to all the important events.

(Emphasis added.)

       Ultimately, we need not determine whether the prosecutor’s statements in this case

constitute plain error because we are satisfied that the alleged error did not affect

Chamberlain’s substantial rights. See State v. Moore, 863 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Minn. App.

2015) (“If an appellate court concludes that any requirement of the plain-error test is not

satisfied, the appellate court need not consider the other requirements.”), rev. denied (Minn.

July 21, 2015). In making that determination, we consider the strength of the evidence

against Chamberlain, the pervasiveness of the erroneous conduct, and whether

Chamberlain had an opportunity to rebut any improper remarks.               State v. Peltier,

874 N.W.2d 792, 805-06 (Minn. 2016). When reviewing a prosecutor’s closing arguments,

we “review the closing argument as a whole.” State v. Cao, 788 N.W.2d 710, 717 (Minn.

2010); see also State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 1993) (noting that courts look

at the state’s closing argument “as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks

that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence”).

       First, the state argues that the evidence against Chamberlain was “strong.” The

evidence includes testimony that Chamberlain had multiple conflicts with the residents of

the duplex in the days leading up to the fire and that shortly before the day of the fire,

Chamberlain threatened to “burn this mother-cker down.” The state further notes that on

                                             12
the day of the fire, L.S. testified that he saw Chamberlain walking near the duplex, and K.J.

testified that he heard Chamberlain’s voice at the door by the porch. And when K.J. and

L.S. went to the porch, they saw a chair on fire. Furthermore, the state highlights its fire

investigators’ testimony concluding that the fire was intentionally set on the back porch

and was consistent with an open flame, which was consistent with K.J. and L.S.’s

description of seeing a chair on the porch on fire.

       The state explains that the prosecutor’s comments on cross-examination were brief

“when viewed in the context of the entire cross,” and “brief in light of the amount of time

the prosecutor spent talking about Gorbett’s investigation and conclusions.” And any

statements involving the witness, K.J., during closing argument were “very brief in the

context of the entire closing argument.”

       The state also notes that Chamberlain’s counsel had an opportunity to rebut any

alleged misconduct during closing argument when it responded to the state’s

characterization of Gorbett. “When defense counsel responds to allegedly improper

comments by taking liberties in his own argument, the court may determine that the

improper comments are harmless in the context of the entire trial.” State v. McDaniel,

534 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 20, 1995). Here,

Chamberlain’s counsel argued that he was unable to procure an unpaid expert, stating that

he “was unable to get anybody to work for free. . . . [T]hey don’t have those out there.”

The state asserts that “[i]nstead of objecting to the prosecutor’s cross-examination or

closing argument, defense counsel chose to emphasize that Gorbett is an expert” and stated

that it did not matter “what state he’s from or that he had to fly in here to [testify].” Lastly,

                                               13
the state notes the district court’s jury instruction that “the arguments or other remarks of

an attorney are not evidence.”

       We are satisfied that the state has met its burden to show that any alleged

prosecutorial errors did not affect Chamberlain’s substantial rights. As the state notes, the

evidence against Chamberlain was very strong. Chamberlain had conflicts with the

residents of the duplex in the days leading up to the fire, a witness testified that

Chamberlain threatened to burn the house down, another witness testified that he saw

Chamberlain near the house the day of the fire, and yet another witness testified that he

heard Chamberlain’s voice before seeing the fire on the porch. And Chamberlain’s

statements to law enforcement that he did not know anyone at the house and denied ever

being at the residence were contradicted by the jailhouse calls that he made.            See

Eggersgluss v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 393 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Minn. 1986) (noting that

lack of truthfulness may show consciousness of guilt). Accordingly, for all of these

reasons, Chamberlain is not entitled to a new trial.

       Affirmed.

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