Court Opinion

ID: 9663789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:50:52.498421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:56.664737
License: Public Domain

Becker, J.
I dissent as to plaintiff’s appeal from judgment in favor of defendant employer.
Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Heinold (1932, C.A. 3d Pa.) 60 F.2d 360, involves a situation where an employee hit the employee of a subcontractor with a lead pipe when the plaintiff did not move his equipment as ordered. “It is undisputed that in the early cases a master- was held not liable for the tortious act of his servant, when the act was wanton and malicious. In later eases, the master is held liable for the wrongful act of the servant, notwithstanding its wanton and malicious character, if the act was done in the course and within the scope of his employment, and the determination of the question whether the tort was committed while the servant was acting in the course and within the scope of his employment is for the jury.”
The foregoing statement is a short summation of the law as it has developed in the past thirty years. Standing alone the case would not necessarily persuade. But a careful reading of the very authorities cited by the majority, i.e., Restatement, Second, Agency, section 245, Comment a (as amended by the Appendix, Restatement, Second, Agency, section 245) and annotation 34 A.L.R.2d 372, 396, indicates the rule stated in Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Heinold, supra, is the majority view. It should be followed by this court. See also annotation 20 A.L.R.2d 868, 911, 912.
The change in Restatement, Second, Agency, section 245, as indicated in the Appendix written twenty-three years later should be especially noted because the change is substantial and weakens the authority upon which the majority relies. At page 389 the author of the Appendix states: “It is believed that it is now desirable to state a rule invoking a somewhat greater liability because of the cases in the intervening years. The courts of some states are more conservative in subjecting the master to *576liability than those of other states, but the tendency of the courts is to broaden the area within which the principal is found liable.” The author then carefully reviews the history of the development of the doctrine and cites numerous cases supporting his conclusion.
There are so many cases reaching divergent results that this matter should be determined by the broad general principles as they have developed in this field. In Carr v. William C. Crowell Co. (1946), 28 Cal.2d 652, 655, 656, 171 P.2d 5, 7, 8, Traynor, J., analyzes the problem in a closely analogous case and sets forth several principles that should govern our consideration here:
“The employer’s responsibility for the tortious conduct of his employee ‘extends far beyond his actual or possible control over the conduct of the servant. It rests on the broader ground that every man who prefers to manage his affairs through others, remains bound to so manage them that third persons are not injured by any breach of legal duty on the part of such others’ while acting in the scope of their employment. (Cases cited) In the present case, defendant’s enterprise required an association of employees with third parties, áttended by the risk that someone might be injured. ‘The risks of such associations and conditions were risks of the employment.’ Cardozo, J., in Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 472, 128 N.E. 711, 13 A.L.R. 522. Such associations ‘include the faults and derelictions of human beings as well as their virtues and obediences. Men do not discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into the job they carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and rectitude. Just as inevitably they take along also their tendencies to carelessness and camaraderie, as well as emotional makeup. In bringing men together, work brings these qualities together, causes frictions between them, creates occasions for lapses into carelessness, and for fun-making and emotional flareup. Work could not go on if men became automatons repressed in every natural expression * * #. These expressions of human nature are incidents inseparable from working together. They involve risks of injury and these risks are inherent in the working environment.’ (Cases cited.) * * *
“If an employee inflicts an injury out of personal malice, *577not engendered by the employment, the employer is not liable.”
It is recognized that plaintiff relies heavily on the foregoing case. It appears to be worthy of his trust — and ours.
The Cardozo citation is borrowed from a case involving workmen’s compensation but is applicable to this problem. In fact it underlines the need for growth in the law in concomitant fields.
These principles are in harmony with what has been said in such Iowa cases as St. Peter v. Iowa Telephone Co., 151 Iowa 294, 131 N.W. 2; Nesbit v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 163 Iowa 39, 143 N.W. 1114; Fagg v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 175 Iowa 459, 157 N.W. 148.
Such views are also in harmony with what is said in Prosser, Law of Torts, Third Ed., section 69, page 476: “It may be said, in general, that the master is held liable for any intentional tort committed by the servant where its purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part to further the master’s business.”
Here the employees’ duties regularly brought them in contact with the inspector. The inspector and Montagne had had previous altercations. This fight developed over the method of performing the employer’s business of laying the pipe. Montagne entered the fray on the side of the fellow employee, if not on his behalf. It is for the jury to decide whether this employee was acting within the scope of his employment or on a venture of his own. I would affirm as to defendant Montagne but would reverse and reinstate the verdict as to employer-defendants.
Garfield, C.J., and Mason, J., join in this dissent.