Court Opinion

ID: 9636326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:24:13.097687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:44.223396
License: Public Domain

GODFREY, ROBERTS and VIOLETTE, JJ.,
concurring.
WATHEN, Justice,
with whom McKU-SICK, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I strongly disagree with the conclusion that the presiding justice erred in refusing to instruct the jury with regard to section 252(3). Contrary to the position stated in footnote 1 of the Court’s opinion, I believe that the language of section 252(3) can only be read as requiring that the defendant touch the genitals of the prosecutrix rather than the order of the relation being reversed. The statutory language is clear and unambiguous:
It is a defense to a prosecution [for forcible rape] .. . which reduces the crime to a Class B crime that the victim was a voluntary social companion of the defendant at the time of the crime and had, on that occasion, permitted the defendant sexual contact, (emphasis added)
The Court’s opinion states that logical symmetry and common sense suggest that the same reduction in the class of the offense should apply in those instances where the victim commits rather than permits a sexual contact. It is sufficient to note that the language of the statute provides no support for this view.
In enacting section 252(3), the Maine legislature addressed a factual circumstance which is frequently present, or at least claimed to be present, in prosecutions for rape. The circumstance involves the claim that the victim and the perpetrator were voluntary companions rather than strangers and that the victim willingly engaged in acts of sexual intimacy at some point prior to the act of forcible rape. It is certainly *182permissible for the legislature to have concluded that the seriousness of such an offense is consistent with Class B rather than Class A. This type of rape begins in voluntary companionship .and is preceded by a consensual act which could serve as a warning to one of the participants, while serving as a sign of encouragement to the other. Clearly, the legislature could have selected, for that purpose, any act of either participant anywhere along a continuum starting with the holding of hands. The wisdom of the legislative selection is not before us; our task is to carry out the limitations expressed in the language of the statute. It was the intent of the legislature to diminish the seriousness of the offense only in those cases where the trier-of-fact con-eludes that the victim permitted the defendant to touch her genitals.1
In the case now before us there is no evidence to suggest, even if believed, that the forcible rape was preceded by the victim permitting the defendant to touch her genitals. The presiding justice correctly ruled that the section 252(3) “defense” had not been generated factually. I would affirm the conviction.

. In State v. Giglio, 441 A.2d 303 (Me.1982) we did not hold, nor did we suggest, a contrary construction of the statute. In Giglio, a section 252(3) instruction was given over defendant’s objection and this Court held that no error was committed by the presiding justice in giving the instruction. Because of the manner in which the issue was posed, this Court, quite properly, did not focus upon an affirmative statement or delineation of the conduct which would result in mitigation under the statute. Furthermore, when one considers the freedom of the fact-finder to selectively adopt or reject evidence, it is clear that the evidence in Giglio generated the issue whether the victim had “permitted the defendant” to touch her genitals.