Court Opinion

ID: 9698388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:49:06.280886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:40.517357
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. I am convinced that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction on the charge of theft by receiving stolen property.
Instantly, the record reveals that, at approximately 3:00 p.m., the appellant went with Frederick Miller to the Bate-man home located down a back road in rural Perry County. After seeing Harry Bateman exit his house, the appellant, waiting inside Frederick Miller’s car, watched as Miller entered the residence through a window. The appellant knew the residence was not Miller’s home. The appellant witnessed Miller remove items of personal property, including a rifle and a shotgun, from the home and place them in the trunk of the car in which he was a passenger. Hours later during the evening of the same day, the appellant was *291present when Miller sold the stolen weapons to an undercover state trooper. Immediately thereafter, Miller gave $60.00 from the proceeds of the sale to the appellant in repayment of a debt.1
To sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) the property was stolen; 2) the accused knew or had reason to believe the property was stolen; and 3) the accused received, retained or disposed of the property. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925; Commonwealth v. Deemer, 316 Pa.Super. 28, 31, 462 A.2d 776, 778 (1983).
It is undisputed that the property was stolen and that the appellant knew the rifle and shotgun were stolen. Thus, the only question remaining is whether the appellant had joint or constructive possession of the property. See Commonwealth v. Stasiak, 305 Pa.Super. 257, 451 A.2d 520 (1982). Instantly, the appellant was not only present when the weapons were stolen but also was present at the sale of the guns. Significantly, the appellant, immediately after the sale of the stolen property, accepted $60.00 in proceeds from the sale.
The majority holds that “receipt of proceeds from the sale of stolen property will not alone support a charge of theft by receiving stolen property[,]” citing Commonwealth v. Light, 10 Pa.Super. 66, 72, affirmed, 195 Pa. 220, 45 A. 933 (1900). However, under the facts before us, I fail to discern the difference between the appellant having actually touched the stolen property even for a brief moment (an event which would have certainly sufficed to sustain the conviction), and the appellant’s receipt of the proceeds immediately after the sale. In the case sub judice, I would hold that the appellant’s receipt of the proceeds did in fact constitute constructive possession of the property and ergo was sufficient to support his conviction for receiving stolen *292property.2
Moreover, this appellant clearly was not a mere innocent bystander: He knew the property was stolen; he was present at the burglary; he was a passenger in the car where the stolen property was stored; he was present at the sale of the stolen property; and he knowingly accepted proceeds from the sale of the stolen property. While standing alone any one of those facts would not support a conviction, I believe that their amalgamation does support the conviction of the appellant on the charge of theft by receiving stolen property.

. Immediately after the sale. Miller and the appellant were arrested. When the appellant was searched, three of the marked twenty dollar bills used in the purchase were found on the appellant’s person.

. Moreover, "[i]f the property comes under the control of the receiver it is not necessary that the possession be manual; it is sufficient if he has control of the custodian, as if the receiving be by a servant, by direction of his master[.]" Light, 10 Pa.Super. at 72. Presently, the appellant had control over the custodian, Miller, to the extent that Miller owed the appellant $60.00.