Court Opinion

ID: 9943581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 21:02:53.630556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:24.263455
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 P. v. Ward CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F086207
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                                (Super. Ct. No. F18905084)
                    v.

 JOSEPH MATTHEW WARD,                                                                     OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kristi C.
Kapetan, Judge.
         Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Jeffrey D.
Firestone, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                     INTRODUCTION
       This case was previously before us on appeal from defendant Joseph Matthew
Ward’s judgment of conviction for multiple crimes.1 Although otherwise affirming the
judgment, we remanded for resentencing due to two unauthorized sentences. On remand,
the trial court corrected the unauthorized sentence issues while resentencing defendant on
all counts. Defendant now appeals the judgment imposed at resentencing and argues the
trial court did not conduct a full resentencing and failed to order a supplemental probation
report that included updated information about defendant’s postconviction conduct.
Defendant also requests we reconsider our determination in the prior appeal that Penal
Code section 667.61, subdivision (h) (section 667.61(h))2 precludes staying the execution
of sentence under section 654 for offenses subject to punishment under the “One Strike”
law (§ 667.61), a request the People join in light of new authority on this issue.
       For the reasons discussed post, we conclude a full resentencing is required. The
trial court may exercise its discretion to order a supplemental probation report that
includes updated information about defendant’s postconviction conduct. In light of new
authority, and in view of the fact the case must be remanded for resentencing on a
different ground, we conclude section 667.61(h) does not preclude a stay of sentence
under section 654 for offenses committed by a person who is subject to punishment under
the One Strike law.

1      People v. Ward (Dec. 23, 2022, F082046) [nonpub. opn.] (Ward I).
2      Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                               2.
                                   FACTUAL SUMMARY
I.     Basic Underlying Facts3
       A full version of the underlying facts is not relevant to the sentencing issues on
appeal, and an abbreviated summary of the facts drawn from our initial opinion in Ward I
is as follows. After brandishing a knife and forcing his way into a private residence,
defendant twice sexually assaulted a woman (M.) inside the home where she was
working as a nanny for a young child; defendant stole several items inside the home; and
then he forced M. and the child into M.’s car and drove them to an automatic teller
machine (ATM) where he demanded M. obtain money for him from her bank account.
Once out of the car with the child, M. withdrew money from the ATM, threw it towards
defendant who was sitting inside the car, and ran away—escaping with the child;
defendant drove off with M.’s car. Defendant was later arrested and charged with
multiple crimes arising from these events.
II.    Procedural History
       A jury convicted defendant of two counts of sexual penetration by force (§ 289,
subd. (a)(1)(A); counts 1–2), two counts of assault to commit sexual penetration by force
in the commission of a burglary (§§ 220, subd. (b), 460, subd. (a); counts 3–4); first
degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count 5); first degree robbery (§§ 211,
212.5, subd. (a); count 6); criminal threats (§ 422; count 7); assault with a deadly
weapon, a knife (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 8); kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking
(§ 209.5, subd. (a); count 9); kidnapping to commit a robbery (§§ 209, subd. (b)(1), 211;
count 10); first degree ATM robbery (§ 211; count 11); and child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a);
count 12).

3       On August 14, 2023, defendant’s request for judicial notice of the record on appeal and
the briefing in Ward I was granted.

                                               3.
       The jury also found true all special allegations, including that counts 1 and 2
involved aggravating circumstances within the meaning of the One Strike law (§ 667.61),
and were subject to punishment under section 667.61, subdivision (a); that another person
who was not an accomplice was present during the first degree residential burglary,
causing count 5 to be a violent felony (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)); that defendant used a
deadly weapon with respect to counts 1 through 4, causing those offenses to be serious
felonies within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)–(d), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)); that defendant personally used a deadly weapon
within the meaning of section 12022.3, subdivision (a) (counts 1–4); and that defendant
used a deadly and dangerous weapon within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (b)(1) (counts 6, 7, 9–12).
       Based on two prior strike convictions found true by the jury in a bifurcated
proceeding, defendant was sentenced in November 2020 as a third-strike offender under
the Three Strikes law. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2).) The court imposed five years determinate
for the one-year enhancement allegation found true on counts 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12 under
section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), followed by two consecutive terms of 75 years to life
for counts 1 and 2 (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i)), followed by two consecutive life terms with
the possibility of parole for counts 9 and 10 (§§ 209.5, subd. (a), 209, subd. (b)(1)),
followed by four consecutive terms of 25 years to life for counts 6, 7, 8 and 12 under the
Three Strikes law. Execution of the terms imposed on counts 3, 4 and 5 were stayed, as
were the section 12022.3, subdivision (a), enhancements imposed on counts 1, 2, 3 and 4.
During the oral pronouncement, no sentence was imposed on count 11 (first degree ATM
robbery), although the minute order following the sentencing hearing and the abstract of
judgment both indicated the imposition of a consecutive term of 25 years to life had been

                                              4.
imposed on count 11 pursuant to section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A)(ii), and enhanced by
one year under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).4 Defendant timely appealed.
       A.     Resentencing Ordered Upon Appeal
       In our original decision in Ward I, we explained counts 10 and 11 involved an
indivisible course of conduct and were committed pursuant to the same intent and
objective: to rob the victim at the ATM. We explained defendant could not be punished
for both convictions under section 654; rather, the trial court was required to impose and
stay execution of sentence on either count 10 or count 11, and the failure to do so
resulted in an unauthorized sentence. Moreover, we explained that sentence inadvertently
had not been imposed on count 11, resulting in another unauthorized sentence. Remand
for resentencing was required so that, at a minimum, the trial court could impose a
sentence on count 11, and elect which punishment to stay (either that on count 10 or
count 11) under section 654.
       Defendant also argued that due to Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Assembly Bill 518), the trial court had new discretion under amended section 654 to
elect whether to stay the greater punishments on counts 1 and 2 rather than stay the lesser
punishments on counts 3 and 4. Relying on People v. Caparaz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
669 (Caparaz), then the only published authority addressing this issue, the People argued
the punishments imposed on counts 1 and 2 were mandated under section 667.61(h) of
the One Strike law, and could not be stayed regardless of the amendments to section 654.
In reply, defendant argued Caparaz was wrongly decided, and noted that
section 667.61(h) does not expressly preclude application of section 654. We agreed with
the People, applied the reasoning in Caparaz and held that section 667.61(h) precludes

4      During the oral pronouncement of judgment, the trial court calculated an aggregate total
sentence that included another term of 25 years to life, plus one year under section 12022,
subdivision (b)(1), apparently on count 11, although no sentence on count 11 was actually
imposed.

                                               5.
application of section 654 to offenses committed by a person subject to punishment under
the One Strike law. As such, we concluded the trial court had no discretion to stay counts
1 and 2 under amended section 654.
       B.      Resentencing After Remittitur
       After remittitur issued, a resentencing hearing was held on May 1, 2023. At that
time, Caparaz was binding on trial courts as to whether section 667.61(h) precluded the
application of section 654 to offenses subject to punishment under the One Strike law.5
The trial court imposed sentence on count 11 and elected to stay the punishment under
section 654. In all other respects, the court imposed the same sentence it had in
November 2020. Defendant appeals the judgment imposed at resentencing.
                                        DISCUSSION
I.     Full Resentencing is Required
       A.      Unauthorized Sentences on Counts 3, 4, 9 and 10
       At our request, the parties filed supplemental briefs, and agreed the sentences
imposed on counts 3, 4, 9 and 10 are unauthorized.
       Defendant was convicted of, among other offenses, two counts of assault to
commit sexual penetration by force in the commission of a burglary (§§ 220, subd. (b),
460, subd. (a); counts 3–4); kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking (§ 209.5, subd. (a);
count 9); and kidnapping to commit a robbery (§§ 209, subd. (b)(1), 211; count 10).

5       On January 26, 2023, a different panel of this court issued a published decision in People
v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1085–1086, review granted April 12, 2023, S278803,
and relied on Caparaz to hold section 667.61(h) precludes a stay of sentence under section 654
for offenses subject to punishment under the One Strike law. Our Supreme Court granted review
in Bolanos on April 12, 2023, for reasons unrelated to section 667.61(h), and Bolanos became
citable only for its potential persuasive value. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(e)(1).) When
resentencing in this case occurred on May 1, 2023, Caparaz was the only published Court of
Appeal decision regarding the scope of section 667.61(h) and was binding on all trial courts.
(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; Sarti v. Salt Creek Ltd.
(2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1193 [trial courts are bound by published decisions of the Court of
Appeal where they have not been disapproved by the California Supreme Court and are not in
conflict with another appellate court decision].)

                                                6.
Attached to counts 3 and 4 was an enhancement for personal use of a deadly weapon
under section 12022.3, subdivision (a), which was found true by the jury. Attached to
counts 9 and 10 was a deadly weapon enhancement under section 12022, subdivision
(b)(1), found true by the jury.
       Each of the offenses in counts 3, 4, 9 and 10 is punishable by life in prison with
the possibility of parole. (§§ 220, subd. (b), 209.5, subd. (a), 209, subd. (b)(1).) As such,
these offenses are categorized as violent and serious felonies within the meaning of the
Three Strikes law. (§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(7) [identifying a violent felony as one punishable
by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life], 1192.7, subd. (c)(7) [identifying
serious felony as one punishable by imprisonment for life].) Due to the respective
enhancements, the offenses are also serious felonies under section 1192.7,
subdivision (c)(23). In addition, it was alleged and proven true that defendant suffered
two prior strike convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, and was thus
subject to punishment under section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A) (section 667(e)(2)(A)), for
current violent or serious offenses. As the court did not strike any of the prior strike
convictions, application of a three-strike sentence under section 667(e)(2)(A) was
mandatory on these counts, and the failure to do so resulted in an unauthorized sentence.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 [Three Strikes law does not offer a
discretionary sentencing choice; it establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in
every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike]; see People v. Vizcarra
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 422, 436 [failure to impose prior serious felony enhancement and
double sentence under Three Strikes law or exercise discretion under § 1385 to strike the
strike prior resulted in an unauthorized sentence].)
       To calculate a three-strike sentence under section 667(e)(2)(A), the term imposed
for the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with
a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greatest of “(i) Three
times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction

                                              7.
subsequent to the two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions. [¶]
(ii) Imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years. [¶] (iii) The term determined by the
court pursuant to Section 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancement
applicable under Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or any
period prescribed by Section 190 or 3046.” (§ 667(e)(2)(A)(i)–(iii); accord, § 1170.12,
subd. (c)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).)
       Here, the indeterminate life terms required on counts 3, 4, 9 and 10 have no
minimum period of parole ineligibility specified. Thus, they are subject to the seven-year
minimum term of parole ineligibility under section 3046, which is used to calculate the
minimum term of the indeterminate term to be imposed under section 667(e)(2)(A).
(§ 3046; People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 96 [§ 3046 is a minimum term within
sentence-doubling language of § 667, subd. (e)(1)]; People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th
105, 118 [§ 667(e)(2)(A)(i) “requires tripling of the minimum period of parole
ineligibility”]; People v. Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 415 [discussing Three
Strikes calculations under § 667(e)(2)(A)]; People v. Flores (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 368,
381 [same].)
       With respect to counts 3 and 4, the trial court imposed life with the possibility of
parole, plus an aggravated 10-year term for the enhancement under section 12022.3,
subdivision (a), all of which were stayed, ostensibly under section 654.6 In this case, the
greatest minimum term for the indeterminate term to be imposed under
section 667(e)(2)(A)(ii) is calculated as 25 years to life—not a life term with an
unspecified minimum—and should have resulted in a sentence of 25 years to life plus

6       The trial court indicated these terms were stayed subject to section 667(e)(2)(A)(i), but
that provision relates only to calculating the greatest minimum term for third-strike sentences,
not staying the execution of a sentence.

                                                 8.
10 years for the enhancement.7 (See Couzens & Bigelow, Cal. Practice Guide:
California Three Strikes Sentencing (The Rutter Group 2023) § 7:3.)
       The same is true as to counts 9 and 10. The trial court imposed life with the
possibility of parole on counts 9 and 10 (with no minimum term specified), plus a one-
year enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). However, the greatest
minimum term calculated for these counts is section 667(e)(2)(A)(ii)—i.e., 25 years to
life, and should have resulted in a sentence of 25 years to life, plus one year for the
enhancement.
       These unauthorized sentences require correction. (People v. Dotson (1997) 16
Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6 [an unauthorized sentence “is subject to judicial correction
whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court”]; People v. Serrato
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 764, fn. omitted [unauthorized sentence “is subject to being set
aside judicially and is no bar to the imposition of a proper judgment thereafter, even
though it is more severe than the original unauthorized pronouncement”], disapproved on
another ground in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583, fn. 1.) In this case,
addressing the unauthorized terms represents changed circumstances that require a full
resentencing—i.e., the court may elect to make downward discretionary choices with
respect to other terms due to the corrections of the unauthorized portions of the sentence.
(People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; see People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
198, 205–206 & fn. 4 [upon resentencing, trial court must apply the law in effect at the
time of resentencing except where barred by prohibition against ex post facto laws].)

7       The calculation under section 667(e)(2)(A)(i) requires tripling the seven-year minimum
period of parole eligibility under section 3046 for a total of 21 years; section 667(e)(2)(A)(ii) is a
default 25-year minimum parole ineligibility; and the calculation for section 667(e)(2)(A)(iii)
requires taking the minimum period of ineligibility (seven years) plus the 10-year enhancement
for a total of 17 years. Section 667(e)(2)(A) requires the greatest of these options be imposed,
which is the default 25 years under section 667(e)(2)(A)(ii).

                                                  9.
        Upon resentencing, the trial court is free to reconsider all of its discretionary
choices with respect to any other portions of the sentence, so long as those choices are
not the basis for any increase to the original aggregate sentence. (People v. Hill (1986)
185 Cal.App.3d 831, 834 [“When a case is remanded for resentencing by an appellate
court, the trial court is entitled to consider the entire sentencing scheme[] … [and] may
reconsider all sentencing choices.”]; People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1413
[“If an increase in penalty has no nexus to the original illegality in the sentence, [t]he
general rule applies that in California a harsher penalty may not be imposed after a
successful appeal.”]; People v. Trammel (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 415, 427–428.)
II.     Scope of Remittitur
        Defendant argues, and the People concede, the trial court did not conduct a full
resentencing in May 2023, which was required by our disposition and remittitur in the
first appeal, and the case should be remanded for a full resentencing.
        To the extent there was some confusion about the scope of our remittitur that
required resentencing, that issue is moot. As a result of the unauthorized sentences
identified ante, full resentencing is required.
III.    Remaining Issues
        A.     Supplemental Probation Report
        Defendant argues the trial court failed to obtain a supplemental probation report
that included updated information about defendant’s postconviction conduct and other
relevant mitigating factors. In light of their concession to remand for a full resentencing,
the People maintain the trial court will have discretion to order a supplemental probation
report that contains accurate and updated information.
        As remand for resentencing is required, an order regarding a supplemental
probation report is for the trial court to make in the first instance. The parties are free to
present their requests and arguments regarding a supplemental probation report to the
trial court.

                                              10.
       B.      Trial Court’s Discretion Under Section 1385
       In asserting the matter must be returned to the trial court for full resentencing, the
parties dispute the scope of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H), and whether prior strike
convictions may be dismissed under that provision. The trial court has not previously
made any express determination under section 1385 as amended by Senate Bill No. 81
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.); thus, there is no claim of error regarding section 1385 to be
addressed in the context of this appeal and the parties’ arguments are prospective only.8
Upon resentencing, the parties are free to present these (and any other relevant sentencing
arguments) so that they may be decided by the trial court in the first instance.
       C.      Trial Court Has Discretion to Stay Punishment on Counts 1 and 2
               Under Amended Section 654
       In the original appeal in Ward I, the parties disputed whether section 654, amended
by Assembly Bill 518 after defendant’s original sentencing in 2020, was applicable to
stay sentences for offenses subject to the One Strike law under section 661.67(h). At that
time, Caparaz, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th 669 was the only published authority on this issue,
and that court had held section 667.61(h) prohibited staying a sentence under section 654
for offenses subject to punishment under the One Strike law. (Caparaz, supra, at p. 690.)
       In deciding the issue, we followed the reasoning in Caparaz and similarly
concluded section 667.61(h) prohibits staying a sentence under section 654 for an offense
subject to punishment under the One Strike law. After defendant was resentenced in May
2023, a split of authority on this issue developed when our colleagues in the Second
District Court of Appeal, Division Seven, published People v. Govan (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 1015 (Govan) and declined to follow Caparaz. Due to this new authority,
defendant requests that we exercise our discretion not to apply the law of the case

8       For this reason and because defendant declined to file a reply brief addressing the issue,
we denied defendant’s subsequent request to file a supplemental opening brief related to the trial
court’s discretion under section 1385.

                                               11.
doctrine, revisit our original decision and apply the reasoning and conclusion reached in
Govan. The People join defendant’s request.
       D.      Background
       Among other offenses, defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual
penetration by force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); counts 1–2) and two counts of assault to
commit sexual penetration by force in the commission of burglary (§§ 220, subd. (b),
460, subd. (a); counts 3–4). Counts 3 and 4 were deemed to have arisen from the same
indivisible course of conduct as counts 1 and 2, and, thus, pursuant to section 654,
defendant could not be punished on all four counts. (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th
350, 358 [§ 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or omission or from an
indivisible course of conduct incident to one criminal objective].)
       Attached to counts 1 and 2 were One Strike allegations that ultimately subjected
defendant to longer terms of imprisonment than those applicable to counts 3 and 4.
When the trial court originally sentenced defendant in November 2020, section 654
provided that when an act or omission was “punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law,” the trial court was required to punish the defendant “under the
provision that provide[d] for the longest potential term of imprisonment .…” (§ 654,
former subd. (a).) The trial court correctly imposed punishment on counts 1 and 2, but
imposed and then stayed execution of the punishments imposed on counts 3 and 4 under
section 654.
       While this case was originally pending on appeal, Assembly Bill 518 amended
section 654 “to afford sentencing courts the discretion to punish the act or omission under
either provision,” without regard to the longest potential term of imprisonment. (People
v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 351.) In the original appeal, defendant argued
Assembly Bill 518 operated retroactively and he was entitled to a remand so the trial
court could exercise its new discretion to elect whether to stay counts 1 and 2 rather than
counts 3 and 4. Although agreeing Assembly Bill 518 applied retroactively, the People

                                            12.
argued the One Strike law, under which counts 1 and 2 were subject to punishment,
prohibited application of section 654. Specifically, section 667.61(h) provides,
“Notwithstanding any other law, probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution
or imposition of sentence be suspended for, a person who is subject to punishment under
this section.” Relying on Caparaz, the People argued the phrase nor shall the execution
or imposition of a sentence be suspended for prohibited staying the execution of sentence
under section 654.
       Based on the plain meaning of the language in section 667.61(h), Caparaz
construed the prohibition against suspended sentences to preclude a stay of sentence
under section 654 for offenses subject to punishment under the One Strike law.
(Caparaz, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 690.) While the defendant in Caparaz argued the
phrase encompassed only a suspension of execution or imposition of sentence for
purposes of probation (and not sentences suspended for other reasons)—an argument
defendant echoed in Ward I—Caparaz pointed out such an interpretation would render
section 667.61(h)’s phrase prohibiting suspended sentences meaningless because the
immediately preceding clause already prohibits granting probation. (Caparaz, supra, at
p. 689.) The defendant in Caparaz also argued the statute did not expressly identify
section 654 and, thus, did not prohibit its application, nor did it refer to a “‘stay’” of
sentence that is more commonly associated with suspending execution of sentence under
section 654. (Caparaz, supra, at p. 689.) In rejecting these arguments, the court
reasoned section 667.61(h) expressly applies “‘[n]otwithstanding any other law,’” which
would encompass section 654, and a stay is a type of suspension such that the statute
would include a stay of sentence under section 654. (Caparaz, supra, at p. 689; see
People v. Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784, 791–792 [Legislature not required to cite § 654 in
§ 667.6, former subd. (c), in order to demonstrate an intent to override the general
provisions contained in § 654].)

                                              13.
       Relying largely on relevant legislative history, Govan concluded section 667.61(h)
does not divest the trial court of discretion under section 654 to stay execution of
sentence for an offense subject to punishment under the One Strike law. (Govan, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1033–1035.) Govan pointed out that suspending execution or
imposition of a sentence is language unique to a grant of probation, and relevant
legislative history indicates the Legislature intended to prohibit probation, not the
application of section 654. (Govan, supra, at pp. 1034–1035.)
       E.     Law of the Case Doctrine
       Under the law of the case doctrine, “‘the decision of an appellate court, stating a
rule of law necessary to the decision of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and
makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal
in the same case.’” (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 301.) The
doctrine is a rule of procedure, not of jurisdiction. (England v. Hospital of the Good
Samaritan (1939) 14 Cal.2d 791, 795.) “[A] court is not absolutely precluded by the law
of the case from reconsidering questions decided upon a former appeal.” (Ibid.) “Where
there are exceptional circumstances, a court which is looking to a just determination of
the rights of the parties to the litigation and not merely to rules of practice, may and
should decide the case without regard to what has gone before.” (Ibid.)
       A mere disagreement with our prior ruling, even one aided by recent appellate
decisional authority, does not establish a “‘manifest misapplication of existing principles
resulting in substantial injustice’” to deviate from the doctrine under the unjust decision
exception. (Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425, 435.) However, we are
not bound by the law of the case doctrine where, as here, reversal of the May 2023
judgment is required on another ground that was not presented to us nor considered in the
prior appeal. In such a circumstance, the judicial economy basis underpinning the law of
the case doctrine is “inoperative.” (Ibid.) The fact reversal is necessary “frees” us from
the compulsion the rule of law of the case might otherwise impose to follow a ruling in a

                                             14.
prior appeal now perceived to be erroneous. (Ibid.) As reversal for full resentencing is
required on a different ground not previously considered, the case will “not be prolonged
or complicated” by divergence from the conclusions drawn in the first appeal with respect
to the scope of section 667.61(h). (Searle, supra, at p. 435.)
       F.     Analysis
       “The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo.
[Citations.] ‘“‘“As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task
here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.
[Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning.”’”’ [Citation.] ‘“[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute
… in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision .… [Citation.]’
[Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question ‘“in context, keeping in mind the
nature and obvious purpose of the statute .…” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We must
harmonize ‘the various parts of a statutory enactment … by considering the particular
clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.’”’” (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)
       If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and the literal
interpretation does not result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend, there
is no need for judicial construction and the interpretive task is at an end: “‘we presume
the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain meaning governs.’” (Even
Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th
830, 838; accord, People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 976.) If the language is
reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, however, we may examine extrinsic
aids such as the apparent purpose of the statute, the legislative history, the canons of
statutory construction, and public policy. (Zohar, supra, at p. 838.) “‘Generally, we
consult extrinsic sources, like a statute’s history, to interpret a statute only when its
language is ambiguous.’” (Prudholme, supra, at p. 976.)

                                              15.
              1.     Plain Meaning of Section 667.61(h)
       Section 667.61(h) provides, “Notwithstanding any other law, probation shall not
be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, a
person who is subject to punishment under this section.” (Italics added.)
       In interpreting the language of a statute, we are to “give the words their usual and
ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and
the statute’s purpose [citation].” (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51
Cal.4th 524, 529–530.) The provisions of the Penal Code “are to be construed according
to the fair import of their terms .…” (§ 4.) From an ordinary-meaning perspective, by
prohibiting the suspension of the execution of sentence, section 667.61(h) appears to
preclude a stay of execution of sentence under section 654. A stay of execution of
sentence imposed under section 654 means the sentence is suspended, and suspending the
execution of sentence describes precisely what occurs upon application of section 654.
(People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 592 [§ 654 “requires the sentence for one
conviction to be imposed, and the other imposed and then stayed”]; People v. Alford
(2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1469 [under § 654, “trial court must impose sentence on
all counts, but stay execution of sentence as necessary to prevent multiple punishment”].)
       Section 667.67(h)’s prohibition on suspended sentences does not explicitly extend
to sentences stayed under section 654, but courts have recognized the Legislature is not
required to cite section 654 to override its general provisions. (See, e.g., People v. Hicks,
supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 791–792 [Legislature not required to cite § 654 in § 667.6, former
subd. (c), to demonstrate intent to override its provisions].) Moreover,
section 667.61(h)’s prohibition applies “Notwithstanding any other law .…” In another
context, this language has been held sufficient to override the application of section 654.
(People v. Palacios (2007) 41 Cal.4th 720, 729 [“broad and unambiguous scope of
‘[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law’ overrides the application, if any, of
section 654 to the imposition of punishment prescribed in section 12022.53,

                                             16.
subdivisions (b), (c) and (d)”], superseded by statute as stated in People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688, 695–696.)
                     a.     Technical Meaning of Language
       Nevertheless, when words or phrases acquire specialized or technical meaning,
they “must be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.” (§ 7,
subd. 16.) Statutory references prohibiting suspended sentences have been recognized as
terms of art employed in conjunction with a grant of probation. (People v. Superior
Court (Himmelsbach) (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 524, 536, fn. 8 (Himmelsbach) [while at
one time staying a sentence and suspending a sentence may have been used
interchangeably, they have developed into terms of art; the words “‘suspension of
execution’ are employed in conjunction with a grant of probation” whereas “‘stay of
execution’ is utilized where full execution of sentence is prohibited by law and must be
avoided”], disapproved on another ground in People v. Norrell (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1, 7, fn.
3.) Indeed, the Penal Code defines probation to mean “the suspension of the imposition
or execution of a sentence” (§ 1203, subd. (a)), and that is a how a grant of probation is
accomplished as a procedural matter (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1087).
But section 667.61(h) clearly prohibits more than a traditional grant of probation—it
expressly prohibits probation or the suspension of sentence. If a suspended sentence
encompassed only a grant of probation, there would have been no reason to prohibit both
probation and suspended sentences.
       More recently, at least one court has recognized that prohibiting suspension of
sentence has a technical meaning intended to prohibit probation or a functionally
equivalent form of revocable release. (See People v. Borynack (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
958, 965 [“phrase ‘suspend execution of a sentence’ is a term of art” that means probation
or a functional equivalent—i.e., mandatory supervision].) For example, mandatory
supervision under section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(A)–(B), is imposed by suspending
execution of a concluding portion of the term imposed, and that period of release from

                                            17.
custody is supervised by the county probation officer. Similarly, a conditional sentence is
defined separately from probation (§ 1203, subd. (a)), but it is procedurally ordered in the
same manner—by “the suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence” with
revocable release into the community subject to conditions and without the supervision of
a probation officer (ibid.). Understanding section 667.61(h)’s phrase “nor shall the
execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for” as extending to other forms of
revocable release that are not accompanied by a traditional grant of probation matches the
structure of section 667.61(h) while incorporating the recognized technical meaning a
suspended execution or imposition of sentence has acquired.
                     b.     Related Statutory Usages
       Beyond giving effect to the technical meaning ascribed to suspended execution or
imposition of sentence, we must interpret section 667.61(h)’s language in the context of
related statutes, harmonizing them whenever possible. (Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th
657, 663.) There are multiple criminal statutes with related purposes that contain
language identical to section 667.61(h): section 1203, subdivision (k) (“Probation shall
not be granted to, nor shall the execution of, or imposition of sentence be suspended for,”
a person convicted of a violent or serious felony who was on probation at the time of the
current offense); section 1203.06, subdivision (a) (“probation shall not be granted to, nor
shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for,” a person who used
firearms during the commission of enumerated serious and violent felonies);
sections 1203.065, subdivision (a) and 1203.066, subdivision (a) (“probation shall not be
granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for,” persons
convicted of enumerated sex offenses); section 1203.075, subdivision (a) (“probation
shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended
for,” persons who personally inflicted great bodily injury upon another during the
commission of certain offenses); section 1203.08, subdivision (a) (“probation shall not be
granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for,” persons

                                            18.
convicted of designated felonies who were previously convicted of at least two prior
designated felonies within 10 years); and section 1203.09, subdivision (a) (“probation
shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended
for,” persons who committed designated crimes against elderly or disabled victims); and
section 12022.53, subdivision (g) (“Notwithstanding any other law, probation shall not be
granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, a person
found to come within the provisions of this section.”).
       These statutes’ prohibition against suspended sentences has not been historically
interpreted or understood to extend to a stay of sentence under section 654. (See, e.g.,
People v. Luckett (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1217 [applying § 654 to punishment for
burglary conviction for which the defendant was ineligible for probation or a suspended
sentence under § 1203.09, subd. (f)]; People v. Barela (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 152, 160–
161 [§ 654 may apply to the punishment of offenses listed in § 1203.06, which prohibits
probation or the suspension of sentence]; Himmelsbach, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 536,
fn. 8 [prohibiting suspension of execution of sentence under repealed § 12311 did not
prohibit stay of execution of sentence under § 654].)
       Indeed, if they did, these statutes would override section 654 with respect to a
substantial number of offenses. For example, section 1203.06 would prohibit application
of section 654 to punishment for offenses such as murder, robbery, kidnapping and
burglary in the first degree, among others, where a firearm was personally used in the
commission or attempted commission of the crime. With one exception,9 we find no
evidence courts have applied section 1203.06 in this manner. (See, e.g., People v. Bui
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1015 [§ 654 applied to attempted murder and robbery

9      In People v. Bradley (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 744, 753–754, disapproved on another
ground in People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 371, fn. 18), the court concluded the
prohibition against probation or a suspended sentence in section 1203.06, subdivision (a),
precluded application of section 654 to avoid what the court perceived to be an illogical result.

                                                19.
count, even though both offenses were attempted and committed with the personal use of
a firearm, and trial court had applied § 654 to a first degree burglary committed with
personal use of a firearm]; People v. Barela, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d at p. 160.) An
interpretation that section 667.61(h)’s prohibition against a suspended sentence does not
prohibit a stay of sentence under section 654 is consistent with how the same language in
these statutes has been interpreted and applied.
       Moreover, many of these statutes were in effect well before section 667.61(h),
which was originally enacted in 1994. For example, the Legislature enacted
section 1203.066 in 1981 to prohibit probation or the suspension of sentence for a
number of sexual offenses committed under various circumstances. (Stats. 1981,
ch. 1064, § 4, p. 4095.) Similarly, the Legislature enacted section 1203.06 in 1975 to
prohibit probation or the suspension of sentence for offenses committed with the use of a
firearm. (Stats. 1975, ch. 1004, § 2, p. 2357 [“[p]robation shall not be granted to, nor
shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, any of the following
persons”].) The same is true of section 1203.08 (originally enacted in 1976 as
§ 1203.11), which prohibits probation or the suspension of sentence for certain types of
recidivism. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1135, § 1, p. 5052.)
       By prohibiting the suspension of sentence under section 667.61(h) using identical
language as in these earlier-enacted statutes, we presume the Legislature was aware
courts had not extended the language to prohibit a stay of execution of sentence under
section 654, and that it “intended to maintain a consistent body of rules.” (People v.
Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 199; Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer
& Nelson, LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 785 [we presume Legislature intended the same
interpretation to apply to related laws with identical or substantially similar language].)
       In sum, when considering the technical meaning ascribed to language prohibiting
suspended sentences, and construing it consistently with identical language in other
earlier-enacted statutes, section 667.61(h)’s language does not prohibit other forms of

                                             20.
suspended sentences outside the revocable release context, such as a stay of sentence
under section 654.
              2.      Extrinsic Sources Confirm Interpretation
       To the extent there is ambiguity, or simply to buttress our construction of
section 667.61(h), resort to extrinsic aids confirms the Legislature did not intend to
preclude the application of section 654 under section 667.61(h). (See In re Tobacco II
Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 316 [although recourse to extrinsic material may be
unnecessary given plain language of statute, reviewing courts may consult it for material
that buttresses construction of the statutory language]; see also Mendoza v. Fonseca
McElroy Grinding Co., Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1118, 1125 [“‘If the statutory language
permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as
the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’”].)
                      a.     Legislative History
       The Legislature’s intent that section 667.61(h)’s prohibition have a limited and
technical meaning finds support in the legislative history. As explained by Govan, when
examining relevant legislative history underlying Senate Bill No. 26X (1993–1994 1st
Ex. Sess.) (Senate Bill 26X), the Senate Committee on Judiciary’s analysis explained the
bill would prohibit probation for more sex offenses, but there was no discussion of
whether sentences for sex offenders may be stayed under section 654 for multiple
offenses committed through an indivisible course of conduct. (Govan, supra, 91
Cal.App.5th at p. 1034; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 26X (1993–
1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 4, 1994, p. 7.)
       Senate Bill 26X also amended section 1203.066 to provide, “Notwithstanding
Section 1203 or any other law, probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution
or imposition of sentence be suspended for” any person convicted of violations of
section 288 or 288.5. (Stats. 1994, 1993–1994 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 60, § 3.5, italics added.)
A legislative committee analysis clarifies the “any other law” language added by Senate

                                              21.
Bill 26X was included to ensure probation would not be granted to specified sex
offenders regardless of what other laws provided. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 26X (1993–1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 4, 1994, p. 7 [“This bill
would specify that the prohibition on granting probation takes precedence over any other
law or exception.”].)
       Further, when section 667.61(h) was amended in 2006 to include the precursive
phrase “Notwithstanding any other law,” it tracked the language in section 1203.066.
(Stats. 2006, ch. 337, § 33, p. 2641.) As Govan notes, by tracking the language of
section 1203.066, “it is reasonable to read the 2006 amendment to section [667.61(h)]
consistent with the 1994 legislative history of section 1203.066, subdivision (a).”
(Govan, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 1035.) Indeed, section 667.61(h)’s prohibition on
probation and suspended sentences is now a carbon copy of the language in
section 1203.066, subdivision (a).
       The legislative history has repeated references to how Senate Bill 26X would
ensure probation ineligibility would apply to a wider range of offenders, but nothing
indicates the Legislature contemplated a prohibition on probation or suspended sentences
in sections 667.61(h) or 1203.066, subdivision (a), would extend beyond the revocable
release context and prohibit other forms of suspended sentences.
                        b.   Purpose of the One Strike Law
       Finally, we must construe a statute “with a view toward promoting rather than
defeating its general purpose and the policy behind it.” (People v. Barrajas (1998) 62
Cal.App.4th 926, 929; accord, Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v.
Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 290.)
       The recognized purpose of the One Strike law is to increase the penalties for
aggravated sex offenders, even if they do not have prior convictions. (People v. Acosta,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 127; People v. Betts (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 294, 299.) As Caparaz
notes, considered as a whole, “the One Strike law evinces the Legislature’s intent to

                                            22.
impose the greatest punishment possible for offenses covered by the law. Section 667.61,
subdivision (f), for example provides that where ‘the minimum number of circumstances
… that are required for the punishment provided in subdivision (a), (b), (j), (l), or (m) to
apply have been pled and proved, that circumstance or those circumstances shall be used
as the basis for imposing the term provided in subdivision (a), (b), (j), (l), or (m)
whichever is greater, rather than being used to impose the punishment authorized under
any other law, unless another law provides for a greater penalty or the punishment under
another law can be imposed in addition to the punishment provided by this section.’
(Italics added.)” (Caparaz, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 689, fn. 27.)
       We do not think this purpose is undercut by interpreting section 667.61(h)’s
prohibition to apply only to sentences suspended for probation or other forms of
revocable release. It is true that if section 667.61(h)’s prohibition on suspended sentences
does not prohibit a stay of sentence under section 654, certain offenders may avoid the
harsher punishments of the One Strike law. It is also true that if a stay of sentence under
section 654 is not precluded under section 667.61(h), it creates an inconsistency: an
offender who engages in conduct that constitutes a single, qualifying offense subject to
punishment under the One Strike law must serve the law’s harsher sentence, but an
offender whose indivisible course of conduct constitutes multiple sex offenses (e.g., a
One Strike offense and another lesser nonqualifying offense (like defendant here)) will
not necessarily have to serve the harsher One Strike sentence if section 654 may be
applied.
       Despite these potential consequences, the trial court is not required to stay
execution of the longest potential sentence under section 654; therefore, its application
does not necessarily avoid the harsher One Strike penalties. Additionally, section 654
serves a separate purpose which, as Govan points out, is to prohibit punishment for two
crimes arising from a single, indivisible course of conduct, which ensures that a
defendant’s punishment is commensurate with his culpability and that he is not punished

                                             23.
more than once for what is essentially one criminal act. (Govan, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1034.) By not precluding a stay under section 654, section 667.61(h) leaves the trial
court discretion to fashion a sentence that best achieves the separate purposes of both
statutes.
       Additionally, when the One Strike law was enacted in 1994, a different version of
section 654 was in effect that permitted the trial court the discretion to stay the longest
potential term, as it does currently. (Stats. 1977, ch. 165, § 11, p. 644.)10 By electing to
use the word suspended in prohibiting probation or a suspended sentence in
section 667.61(h), the Legislature presumably knew that courts had construed
prohibitions against probation and suspended sentences in other similar statutes, notably
section 1203.06, as not precluding application of section 654. As such, the Legislature
also presumably understood the potential consequences outlined above and elected to
leave those issues to the sound discretion of the trial courts under section 654.
       In light of further development in the decisional law, we are persuaded to change
our position as to the scope of section 667.61(h). We conclude section 667.61(h)
prohibits suspended sentences for the purpose of probation or other type of revocable
release, but does not prohibit other forms of suspended sentences like a stay of execution
of sentence under section 654.11

10     In 1994, section 654 then provided in relevant part, “An act or omission which is made
punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one .…”
11      Defendant’s punishment on counts 1 and 2 was imposed under the Three Strikes law,
calculated by reference to the punishment he was subject to under the One Strike law. (People v.
Acosta, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 123–124 [term under One Strike law is not imposed and then
multiplied; rather, Three Strikes law imposes the indeterminate term and references the One
Strike law to calculate the minimum term for that indeterminate sentence].) The parties make no
argument whether, due to imposition of sentence under the Three Strikes law, defendant remains
“a person who is subject to punishment” under the One Strike law (§ 667.61(h)), and we do not
address that issue.

                                               24.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing
consistent with this opinion.

                                                                            MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

FRANSON, J.

                                           25.