Court Opinion

ID: 9795936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:42:55.980631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:03.235904
License: Public Domain

Judge RUSSEL
dissenting.
This case turns on the meaning of one sentence in the Boulder County Land Use Code. The sentence, which appears in a provision defining “open agricultural uses,” is this: “One single family dwelling, occupied by the owner or manager of the farm, will be considered customary and incidental as a part of this use.” Code art. 4-502(E)(5)(c).
The majority’s opinion is premised on the view that this sentence applies whenever “a parcel is determined to feature open agricultural uses.” I respectfully disagree with this view for structural, textual, and practical reasons.
1. Structure
In Boulder County, the Director of the Land Use Department has authority to “administer and enforce all provisions of the Land Use Code.” Code art. 2-300(B). This grant of authority includes the power to determine whether, on a given property, a particular use is “accessory” or “principal,” as those terms are defined in articles 4-516 and 18-186.
Under the majority’s view, article 4-502(E)(5)(c) implicitly bypasses the director’s inquiry into whether an open agricultural use is accessory or principal. But I doubt that subsection (5)(c) was intended to foreclose that inquiry. I think that, if the drafters had intended to limit the director’s authority on such a basic question, they would have said so expressly, instead of placing an implicit limitation in the corner of a definitional provision.
I therefore do not view subsection (5)(c) as an implicit bar on the director’s authority to determine that a particular property is prin*1275cipally residential. I rather think that (5)(c) applies only after the director has determined that the property is principally used for open agriculture.
2. Text
I admit that the drafters did not expressly limit subsection (5)(e) to situations in which the agricultural use is primary. But I think that this limitation is implied by the provision’s text.
Subsection (5)(c) applies when a dwelling is “occupied by the owner or manager of the farm” (emphasis added). Because “farm” connotes agricultural activity on a scale larger than is typical of residential properties, I think (5)(c) was intended to apply only when the agricultural use is primary. And I see similar textual evidence in related code provisions that allow dwellings in other agricultural settings. See Code arts. 4-501(B)(5)(a) (applies to a dwelling occupied by the owner, operator, or manager of a feed yard), 4-502(A)(5)(b) (applies to a dwelling occupied by the owner, operator, or manager of a commercial nursery), 4-502(B)(5)(e) (applies to a dwelling occupied by the owner or manager of an equestrian center), 4-502(C)(5)(a) (applies to a dwelling occupied by the owner, operator, or manager of a farm stand business).
3. Practical Consequences
Under the majority’s view, it does not matter whether a property is plainly residential. Any open agricultural use (such as a vegetable garden) will automatically convert the pi'operty’s principal use to one of “open agriculture.” This, in turn, will trigger further automatic consequences, such as the right to board horses and build “[ijmproved riding facilities” under article 4 — 502(E)(5)(d). I do not think that the drafters intended such results.
Because the code does not explicitly resolve the issue presented, I conclude that it is ambiguous. I further conclude that the board’s decision is consistent with a defensible interpretation of the code. I therefore would reverse the district court’s ruling and remand with directions to affirm the board’s decision,