Court Opinion

ID: 9390972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 20:08:06.204964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:38.505960
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Gilliam v. Rucki, 2023-Ohio-1413.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     LUCAS COUNTY

Dale L. Gilliam                                    Court of Appeals No. L-22-1107

        Appellant                                  Trial Court No. CI0202101301

v.

Cynthia Rucki                                      DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellee                                   Decided: April 28, 2023

                                              *****
        James L. Murray and William H. Bartle, for appellant

        John A. Rubis and Jonathon Angarola, for appellee

                                              *****

        OSOWIK, J.

        {¶ 1} In this premises liability action, the plaintiff-appellant, Dale Gilliam, appeals

an April 14, 2022 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, which granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee, Susan Rucki. As set forth below,

we affirm.
                                I. Background and Facts

       {¶ 2} This case arises from an injury sustained by Gilliam while in defendant’s

Toledo home on October 19, 2019. Gilliam is a self-employed contractor and was hired

by defendant to service a bathtub that did not have hot water.

       {¶ 3} According to the complaint, upon arriving at defendant’s home, Gilliam

“was shown into” the first-floor bathroom. Gilliam alleges that, while he was inspecting

the bathtub valve, the defendant “entered the bathroom and removed a crawl space hatch

or cover immediately next to the bathtub with no notice or warning.” When Gilliam

finished inspecting the valve, he “turned and fell into the 6 foot deep crawl space.” As a

result of the fall, Gilliam suffered multiple rub fractures and a knee injury. Gilliam

claims that he was unaware that defendant had opened up the hatch and “was given no

warning that [she] was planning to do so.” In his sole claim for relief, Gilliam alleges

that Rucki was negligent in failing to warn or notify him that “she was going to remove”

the hatch door and that, as a direct and proximate result of her negligence, he was injured.

       {¶ 4} After filing an answer and conducting discovery, defendant moved for

summary judgment. Defendant’s motion was based on Gilliam’s deposition testimony

and the opinion of her expert witness, Richard Kraly, a licensed architect. Defendant

argued that the “large crawl space area” was an open and obvious hazard that obviated

any duty to warn Gilliam. Alternatively, defendant argued that, even if she owed a duty

to Gilliam, his claim would still fail as a matter of law, because his negligence—“in not

paying attention as he traversed [the] bathroom”—outweighed any negligence by her.

2.
       {¶ 5} Gilliam moved to strike the expert’s affidavit and report. Gilliam argued

that Kraly’s conclusions were based upon hearsay statements from defendant and further

that Kraly had rendered an opinion “on a legal issue reserved for judicial determination,”

specifically that the hazard was open and obvious. Gilliam also objected to defendant’s

motion for summary judgment.

       {¶ 6} By judgment dated April 14, 2022, the trial court found Gilliam’s motion to

strike well-taken, in part. It indicated that it would “disregard any hearsay, legal opinions

or legal conclusions” made by Kraly and would “only consider that which is properly

before the court.” In that same judgment, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, dismissing Gilliam’s case. Gilliam appealed and assigns two errors

for our review:

              A. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of

       the defendant in its 4-13-2022 opinion and order, finding the open and

       obvious doctrine applied because plaintiff witnessed defendant removing

       the hatch and concluding alternatively that plaintiff’s own negligence

       outweighed any negligence attributable to the defendant.

              B. The trial court erroneously reached these conclusions by failing to

       construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Assuming

       a conflict between plaintiff’s interrogatory answers and his deposition

       testimony, the trier of fact must weigh all the answers and resolve the

       conflict. The plaintiff did not witness defendant removing the hatch.

3.
                                 II. Summary Judgment

      {¶ 7} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment is de

novo. Chalmers v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-16-1143, 2017-Ohio-

5678, ¶ 21; Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-4505, 936

N.E.2d 481, ¶ 29. Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C),

             Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

      depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,

      transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed

      in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

      that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No

      evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A

      summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the

      evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that

      reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is

      adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is

      made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed

      most strongly in the party's favor.

Id.; See also Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375

N.E.2d 46 (1978).

      {¶ 8} When seeking summary judgment, a party must specifically delineate the

basis upon which the motion is brought and identify those portions of the record that

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affirmatively demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact—not the

reliance on conclusory assertions that non-movant has no evidence to prove its case—

regarding an essential element of the non-movant’s case. Beckloff v. Amcor Rigid

Plastics USA, LLC, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-16-041, 2017-Ohio-4467, ¶ 14. When a

properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, an adverse party may not rest

on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must respond with specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial in accordance with Civ.R.

56(E). Id. A “material” fact is one which would affect the outcome of the suit under the

applicable substantive law. Id.

                                III. Premises Liability Law

       {¶ 9} Premises liability is a form of negligence, which generally requires the

plaintiff to establish: (1) a duty of care by the defendant to the plaintiff (2) breach of that

duty, and (3) injury caused directly and proximately resulting from the breach.

Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1989). Whether or not a

duty exists is a question of law for the court. Id. There is no formula for whether a duty

exists as a matter of law. Id. Appellate review of a question of law is de novo. Sanborn

v. Hamilton Cty. Budget Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 20, 2014-Ohio-5218, 27 N.E.3d 498, ¶

3.

       {¶ 10} The duty that an owner or occupier of premises owes to one who is injured

on those premises is governed by the relationship between the parties. Light v. Ohio

University, 28 Ohio St.3d 66, 67, 502 N.E.2d 611 (1986). “That relationship will fall into

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one of three categories: invitee, licensee, or trespasser.” Turner v. Cathedral Ministries,

6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-14-020, 2015-Ohio-633, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.). A business invitee is

an individual who is “rightfully on the premises of another for purposes in which the

possessor of the premises has a beneficial interest.” (Citation omitted.) Clark v. BP Oil,

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1218, 2005-Ohio-1383, ¶ 10. “A business owner ordinarily

owes its invitees a duty of ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe

condition and has the duty to warn its invitees of latent or hidden dangers.” Id. In this

case, the parties agree that Gilliam was a business invitee.

       {¶ 11} A premises owner is not an insurer of a business invitee’s safety and is

under no duty to protect a business invitee from dangers known to the invitee “‘or are so

obvious and apparent to such invitee that he may reasonably be expected to discover [the

dangers] and protect himself against them.’” Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc., 18

Ohio St.3d 203, 203-204, 480 N.E.2d 474 (1985), quoting Sidle v. Humphrey, 13 Ohio

St.2d 45, 233 N.E.2d 589 (1968), paragraph one of the syllabus.

       {¶ 12} The open-and-obvious doctrine concerns the first element of a negligence

claim, namely, whether a duty exists. Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 79,

2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 5, 8. If the doctrine applies, it “obviates the duty to

warn and acts as a complete bar to any negligence claims.” Id. “A hazard is considered

to be open and obvious when it is in plain view and readily discoverable upon ordinary

inspection.” Miller v. First Internatl. Fid. & Trust Bldg., Ltd., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-08-

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1187, 2009-Ohio-6677, ¶ 68. As explained by this court in Semprich v. Cty. of Erie, 6th

Dist. Erie No. E-12-070, 2013-Ohio-3561,

               Courts must consider whether the object or danger itself was

        observable. Even when an invitee does not actually see the object or

        danger until after he or she falls, no duty exists when the invitee could have

        seen the object or danger if he or she had looked. The issue of whether a

        risk was open and obvious may be decided by the court as a matter of law

        when only one conclusion can be drawn from the established facts. But,

        where reasonable minds could reach different conclusions as to the

        obviousness of the risk, the issue should be resolved by a jury.

Id. ¶ 12.

     A. The trial court opinion

        {¶ 13} The trial court found that defendant owed no duty to warn Gilliam because

the hazard posed by the floor opening was “open and obvious.” It said,

               The opening was large enough that [Gilliam] fell through it. There

        is no indication that the crawl space was open when Plaintiff entered the

        bathroom. Rather, after entering and while inspecting the bathtub,

        [Gilliam] witnessed Defendant removing the hatch on the floor. There is

        no evidence that the area was then covered up creating a hidden danger.

        There is no evidence of obstructions to his view. If Plaintiff had looked, he

        would have seen the opening of the crawl space before he fell into it. He

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        knew the space was open. * * * Defendant did not breach any duty owed to

        Plaintiff. (J.E. at 5).

     B. The floor opening was an open and obvious hazard.

        {¶ 14} In his first assignment of error, Gilliam challenges the trial court’s

application of the open and obvious doctrine to his case. He further complains—in his

second assignment of error—that the trial court failed to construe the evidence in the light

most favorable to him. We review the arguments together, but first we review the

evidence in this case.

        {¶ 15} Gilliam testified that, as the problem was described to him, he suspected

that the valve servicing the tub was likely faulty. So, upon entering the bathroom,

Gilliam looked for the valve, which he easily spotted “on the left side wall in the back” of

the bathroom. Gilliam estimated that the distance between the entryway of the bathroom

to the valve was “[a]bout 4 feet.”

        {¶ 16} As Gilliam walked to the tub and valve, he walked over a bathroom rug.

During his deposition, Gilliam testified that, in retrospect, he “had to have” traversed

over the trap door, but—because it was covered by a rug—he had no knowledge of it.

        {¶ 17} Once he reached the tub, Gilliam began to examine the valve. Gilliam

straddled the tub by putting his right foot in the tub, his left foot on the floor outside the

tub, and sat “on the edge.” This exchange followed:

               Q. How long did it take you to look * * * at the valve?

8.
            A. Just a few seconds.

            Q. While you were looking at the valve, did you hear anything

     behind you * * * or to your left side of you to indicate something had

     changed in the bathroom?

            A. * * * I heard [a] racket or something going on. I don’t know

     what it was. I was concentrating on the valve, on the job she hired me to

     do.

            Q. To your knowledge, * * * was [she] in the vicinity while you

     were looking at the tub?

            A. She [led] me into the bathroom. At one point she was ahead of

     me. She stepped to the side to let me get in the tub, and that’s when I seen

     she lifted the top off.

            Q. Now were you having conversations with her while you were

     looking at the valve?

            A. No. I just [examined] * * * what the valve looked like so if I was

     to replace it, like I said, it was similar to what she had.

            Q. All right. So after you fiddle with the water a bit to confirm there

     was no hot water and get the * * * maker’s mark [of the valve] * * * what

     happened next?

            A. I got off the edge of the tub to walk out and stepped into a hole.

            Q. All right. Where was the hole in relation to the tub?

9.
             A. I would say about three feet.

             Q. Three feet away from it?

             A. Roughly, yes.

             Q. Did you have to walk three feet before you fell into the hole?

             A. I would say one step I took and down I went.

             Q. To be clear, you did not have to step over the hole before you got

      to the bathtub, is that correct?

             A. Correct.

             Q. To the best of you recollection, that cover or that hole, that was

      there when you climbed into or straddled the tub?

             A. Yes. I walked across it. Had to have been. She had rugs down.

      The first I noticed there were rugs on the floor, which being a plumber - -

      no offense to your client - - that’s sort of the health indicator of the

      bathroom. If you see a rug, it’s generally going to be somewhat dirty

      because rugs and bathrooms in my mind aren’t a good mix. I noticed the

      rug at the tub, walked across the floor, and looked at the tub.

             Q. Got it. You recall walking over or stepping on or over a rug, is

      that correct?

             A. Yes.

             Q. Do you remember what the rug looked like?

             A. Green, kind of off 70s green.

10.
             Q. Okay. When you fell into the hole, tell me what happened. What

      happened to your body?

             A. Well, I got like just a supercharge of energy in my chest [like]

      what’s going on, because there’s nothing there, you know, and before you

      know it I’m on the side trying to pull myself out. It just happened so fast.

      Really nothing to think about other than: what’s going on?

             Q. Right. Was she right there within the vicinity, my client?

             A. No, she wasn’t.

             Q. What happened next?

             A. I pulled myself out of the hole and laid on the floor and asked her

      - - she came running. She heard me. I asked her to call 911, which she did.

             Q. Did you have any conversations with her there at the scene

      regarding what happened involving the hole in the bathroom.

             A. Well, she repeatedly said: I should have never opened it was

      what come out of her mouth at least three times during the whole incident.

             Q. * * * Do you know why she opened the crawl space?

             A. I have no idea. (Gilliam Depo. at 20-24).

      {¶ 18} There is no disagreement that the hazard in this case, i.e. the hole, was

“created after [Gilliam] entered” the bathroom. (Gilliam’s Brief at 8; emphasis added).

Indeed, the only real dispute is whether Gilliam saw defendant remove the hatch. Again,

the trial court found—based upon his deposition testimony—that Gilliam “witnessed

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Defendant remov[e] the hatch” and therefore “knew the space was open.” Gilliam insists

that neither is true. That is, he denies that he “saw” or “knew” that defendant had

removed the hatch, until he stepped into the hole. He maintains that the evidence

supports that conclusion, specifically his response to Interrogatory No. 19, in which he

asserted that defendant “removed [the] hatch * * * unbeknownst to me.” (Emphasis

added.) Gilliam contends that a “fair reading” of his “entire deposition * * * in

conjunction with his answer to Interrogatory No. 19” establishes that, at most, he “heard

a racket” behind him but “[didn’t] know what it was.” On appeal, Gilliam argues that the

trial court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to him, specifically

because it did not consider his interrogatory response and more broadly because it failed

to resolve any conflict, as to whether he observed defendant remove the trap door—in his

favor.

         {¶ 19} As set forth below, we find that, even if the trial court failed to construe

evidence on that particular point in Gilliam’s favor, any such error was harmless because,

whether or not Gilliam observed the hatch being removed is not a material fact. That is,

whether or not Gilliam saw defendant remove the trap door, he concedes that it was

removed and the hole was observable, before he “turned to walk away from the tub”

toward the door. He further concedes that the hole was not hidden, concealed from

view, or undiscoverable. Moreover, Gilliam does not allege that there were any

distractions that diverted his attention away from the opening in the floor. Indeed, he

specifically denied that he was engaged in conversation with the defendant or that

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defendant was even in the vicinity of the bathroom at the time. Again, the only

conclusion that can be drawn is that, from the time defendant “turned” from the tub and

proceeded to walk the “three feet” between the tub and the hole, there was nothing that

contributed to Gilliam’s fall, other than his failure to notice it.

       {¶ 20} “Open-and-obvious hazards are those hazards that are not concealed and

are discoverable by ordinary inspection.” Lykins v. Fun Spot Trampolines, 172 Ohio

App.3d 226, 2007-Ohio-1800, 874 N.E.2d 811, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.); see also, Shipman v.

Papa Johns, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-14-17, 2014–Ohio–5092, ¶ 22 (“Open-and-obvious

dangers are those not hidden, concealed from view, or undiscoverable upon ordinary

inspection[.]”). The facts establish that, although Gilliam may not have seen the hole,

nothing prevented it from being seen. Thus, we agree with the trial court that the hole

was not “covered up” or “obstruct[ed]” and that “if [Gilliam] had looked, he would have

seen the opening of the [hole] before he fell into it.” These facts are material to whether

the hazard was open and obvious, not Gilliam’s awareness. Accord Howard v. Meat City

Inc., 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-32, 2016-Ohio-7989, ¶ 19 (Hole in asphalt parking lot was

open and obvious where the plaintiff admitted that she could have seen the hole had she

looked. “The fact that [plaintiff] was not looking at the pavement does not alter the

condition from being open and obvious.”).

       {¶ 21} In a strikingly similar case, the plaintiff-electrician was called to a farm to

service an electrical issue and was injured when he fell into a “well pit.” Williamson v.

Geeting, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2011-09-011, 2012-Ohio-2849, ¶ 8-10. The electric

13.
panel was located in a barn, and beneath the electric panel was the “well pit” that

measured two and one-half feet square and five feet deep. Prior to the plaintiff’s visit, the

homeowner had removed the floor boards that covered the well pit on the assumption that

access to a pump located in the pit would be necessary. Upon entering the barn, the

plaintiff spotted the electric panel on the wall, which he estimated was about ten feet

from the entryway. As he walked toward the panel, he fell into the hole. In affirming

summary judgment in favor of the homeowner, the court of appeals found that “[t]he

record indicates the open well pit was in plain view, observable to the naked eye and was

observable to [the electrician] had he looked where he was walking. Therefore,

reasonable minds could only conclude that the open well pit was an open and obvious

hazard.” Id. at ¶ 20.

       {¶ 22} Conversely, the facts in the instant case are unlike those in Sabitov v.

Graines, 177 Ohio App.3d 451, 2008-Ohio-3795, 894 N.E.2d 1310 (8th Dist), where a

customer fell though an open trapdoor, located in the floor of a deli. The trapdoor was

attached to a ladder that led to a basement, and the customer died when she fell into the

opening. The court of appeals found that an issue of fact existed as to whether the

opening in the floor was an open and obvious danger, in part, because the record

evidence indicated that the trapdoor was a hidden hazard that was “not visible as a person

walks through the corridor towards the toilet facility.” Likewise, in Hill v. Mullins, 2d

Dist. Montgomery No. 27127, 2017-Ohio-1302, a contractor was touring a home under

renovation. Prior to the tour, the homeowners had removed two walls and a doorway,

14.
that had enclosed a staircase leading to the basement. A third wall was kept in place. The

contractor was injured when she stepped around the remaining wall and “stepped into the

opening in the floor.” According to the contractor’s testimony, she would not have seen

the hole, even if she had been looking, “due to the [remaining] wall and [the

homeowner’s] presence immediately in front of her.” Id. at ¶ 6. The appellate court

found that, although the hole may have been “prominent” and “observable,” the plaintiff

approached the opening in the floor “from a direction in which the hole might have been

obscured by the wall alongside it.” The court found that these circumstances presented a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the hole was open and obvious from the

plaintiff’s vantage point. Accord, Asher v. Glenway Real Estate, LLC, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-180663, 2019-Ohio-4851, ¶17 (“Once the hazard [was] discovered, the invitee

[had] already encountered it [which] as a matter of law [necessitates a finding that] the

hazard encountered by [the plaintiff] was not open and obvious.”); Rice v. Kroger, 6th

Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1175, 2020-Ohio-2654, ¶ 15 (“Reasonable minds could disagree

whether an empty pallet located next to a produce bin would be hidden from view until a

patron was nearly upon it and whether it was readily apparent to a reasonable patron in

the process of shopping who was traveling in the same direction as the [plaintiff].”)

       {¶ 23} Gilliam urges the court not to apply the open and obvious doctrine, under

the authority of Simmers v. Bentley Constr. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 597 N.E.2d 504

(1992) because, he argues, the defendant in that case and in the instant case were

responsible for creating the dangerous condition. In Simmers, the Ohio Supreme Court

15.
held that “an independent contractor who creates a dangerous condition on real property

is not relieved of liability under the doctrine which exonerates an owner or occupier of

land from the duty to warn those entering the property concerning open and obvious

dangers on the property.” Id. The court concluded that because the defendant “had no

property interest” in the premises where the plaintiff was injured, ordinary negligence

law applied. Given that the defendant herein is the property owner, we find that Simmers

does not apply.

       {¶ 24} “The relevant issue [in these cases] is not whether an individual observes

the condition, but whether the condition is capable of being observed.” (Citations

omitted.) Hill at ¶ 15. Here, because the hole was not obscured and was capable of being

observed by Gilliam, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the

hazard, created by the removal of the trap door, was an open-and-obvious danger.

                              IV. Comparative Negligence

       {¶ 25} In its decision, the trial court also found that “[Gilliam’s] own negligence

outweighs any purported duty attributable to the Defendant.” (J.E. at 5). Gilliam

argues—also in his first assignment of error—that the issue of comparative negligence is

an issue of fact for the jury to resolve, specifically, as to whether his negligence was

greater than defendant’s.

       {¶ 26} Where the issue of duty and its breach are firmly established, the issue of

comparative negligence “arguably comes within the domain of the jury.” Trutza v.

Cleveland, 102 Ohio App.3d 371, 376–77, 657 N.E.2d 327 (8th Dist.1995), citing

16.
Simmers at 645. However, our finding in this case—that defendant did not owe a duty of

care to Gilliam—renders the issue of comparative negligence moot. Tipton v. Bernie’s

Elec. Sales & Service, Inc., 6th Dist. Williams No WM-03-021, 2004-Ohio-5249, ¶ 42;

see also Williams v. Ohio Dep’t. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No 04AP-1193,

2005-Ohio-2669, ¶ 16 (“Because ODRC owed no duty, plaintiff’s second assignment of

error, addressing the comparative negligence conclusion of the Court of Claims, is

rendered moot.”). Because we find that there was no duty on the part of defendant, the

issue of comparative negligence is moot.

       {¶ 27} Finally, Gilliam complains that the trial court improperly considered the

“legal opinions and credibility determinations” rendered by defendant’s expert, Peter

Kraly. Gilliam did not assign this issue as an error for our review. Under App.R.

12(A)(1)(b), an appellate court must determine an appeal based on the assignments of

error set forth in the briefs. See, e.g., State v. Roberson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-16-1131,

2017-Ohio-4339, ¶ 103. An appellate court rules on assignments of error only, and

cannot address mere arguments. Id. Accordingly, because Gilliam did not assign as error

the trial court’s purported consideration of Kraly’s legal opinions and credibility

determinations, we decline to address his argument. We do note that that trial court

specified in its final judgment that it disregarded “any hearsay” and “legal opinions or

legal conclusions made by [Kraly].” Gilliam points to no evidence that the trial court did

otherwise.

17.
                                     V. Conclusion

       {¶ 28} Because we find that the opening in the floor was an open and obvious

danger, defendant had no duty to warn Gilliam of the hazard in this case. Accordingly,

we find that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant was

appropriate. In light of our finding, Gilliam’s claim, regarding comparative negligence,

is moot, and we decline to address it. For these reasons, we find Gilliam’s first and

second assignments of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 29} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Gilliam is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           ____________________________
                                                          JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                               ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                     JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                          JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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