Court Opinion

ID: 9947547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 01:00:42.288582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:33.939838
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10566           Document: 76-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/04/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                  ____________                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                   FILED
                                    No. 23-10566                               March 4, 2024
                                  ____________
                                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                   Clerk
Jayson Howard Moore,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

City of Dallas, Texas; Jabari Demaun Howard; Jason
Scott Webb; Stephanie Mitchell-Huff; Pamela Griffin;
Griffin & Associates, L.L.C.,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 3:22-CV-714
                  ______________________________

Before Stewart, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Pro se plaintiff Jayson Howard Moore sued several defendants,
alleging they engaged in a conspiracy to frame him for production of child
pornography. The district court dismissed Moore’s claims. We AFFIRM.

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10566       Document: 76-1        Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/04/2024

                                 No. 23-10566

                                      I.
                                     A.
       Moore was convicted of felony robbery in Dallas County in 2002. In
2015, a community member reported to Jabari Demaun Howard—a detective
with the Dallas Police Department who was cross-deputized to work as a
federal Task Force Officer (“TFO”) with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”)—that Moore possessed several
firearms. Howard investigated and learned that Moore might have pawned
firearms in August 2015. A pawn shop employee later identified Moore out
of a photo lineup. In September 2015, ATF seized Moore’s pawned firearms.
       In October 2015, local law enforcement arrested Moore, and his cell
phone and other personal property were inventoried. Shortly thereafter,
Howard and other ATF agents took Moore and his property into federal
custody. In November 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Moore on one
count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
       Two weeks later, Howard obtained search warrants for Moore’s cell
phone, signed by Judge Stephanie Mitchell-Huff, a Texas state judge. These
searches uncovered a nude photograph of a child in Moore’s text messages.
In January 2016, a federal grand jury issued a superseding indictment,
charging Moore with both the felon-in-possession count and a new count of
production of child pornography.
       After a two-year delay to assess Moore’s competency to stand trial, a
federal grand jury issued a second superseding indictment in May 2018,
which removed the child pornography charge. In November 2019, a jury

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                                      No. 23-10566

convicted Moore of two counts of violating federal firearms statutes. 1 After
further delays due in part to winter weather conditions and COVID-19,
Moore was sentenced in March 2021 to time served (45 months of custody)
and three years’ supervised release. 2
                                           B.
        On March 28, 2022, proceeding pro se, Moore sued Howard, Dallas
police officer Jason Webb, Judge Mitchell-Huff, the City of Dallas, Texas,
and court reporter Pamela Griffin and her court reporting LLC (collectively,
“Defendants”). Moore brought several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that, by framing him for production of child pornography,
Defendants engaged in malicious prosecution, abuse of process, denial of due
process, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and
conspiracy.
        On August 18, 2022, Assistant United States Attorney Sarah Delaney
appeared on behalf of Howard, explaining that she could represent Howard
because he was acting as a federal officer with respect to Moore’s case.
Moore then moved to disqualify Delaney, alleging Howard had been acting
only as a Dallas police officer and thus was not entitled to federal
representation. Meanwhile, all Defendants moved to dismiss Moore’s
claims.

        _____________________
        1
         In addition to the original felon-in-possession charge under § 922(g)(1), a second
count was added in September 2019 charging Moore with possession of a firearm by a
person subject to a domestic violence protective order under § 922(g)(8).
        2
          Moore appealed his criminal conviction, which remains pending before this
Court. See United States v. Moore, No. 21-10345 (5th Cir.).

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                                  No. 23-10566

       In a 40-page opinion, the district court denied Moore’s motion to
disqualify Delaney, dismissed all his claims with prejudice, and entered final
judgment. Moore appeals.
                                      II.
       We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim.
See Norsworthy v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.4th 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2023). A
complaint that fails to state a facially plausible claim must be dismissed. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Facial plausibility” means
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). While we accept well-pled facts as true and view them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, PHI Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 58
F.4th 838, 841 (5th Cir. 2023), we disregard “conclusory allegations,
unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Heinze v. Tesco Corp.,
971 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
                                     III.
       Moore raises several arguments on appeal, which we address in turn.
                                      A.
       The district court held Moore failed to state a § 1983 claim against
Howard because he was a federal officer for purposes of Moore’s allegations.
See Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979, 981 (5th Cir. 1982) (federal officials, who
act under color of federal not state law, “are not subject to suit
under § 1983”); cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (a proper § 1983
defendant must “have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The court then analyzed
Moore’s allegations as an improperly pled Bivens action. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).

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The court declined to extend Bivens to this new context and accordingly
dismissed Moore’s claim.
        On appeal, Moore continues to argue that Bivens does not apply
because Howard was working only as a Dallas police officer when he allegedly
“fabricated” evidence and warrants against Moore. We disagree. Howard
produced ample evidence showing that he was appointed as a federal ATF
officer. Moore raises nothing to the contrary save conclusory allegations. See
Heinze, 971 F.3d at 479 (we disregard “conclusory allegations, unwarranted
factual inferences, or legal conclusions” at Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
(citation omitted)). 3 Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing
Moore’s claims against Howard. 4
                                             B.
        The district court dismissed Moore’s claims against Judge Mitchell-
Huff based on absolute judicial immunity. Judicial immunity bestows
immunity from suit as well as assessment of damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). Judges are entitled to absolute immunity for
actions taken within the scope of their jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Immunity yields only in two narrow circumstances:
first, for “for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial

        _____________________
        3
           In addition, because Moore does not engage the district court’s Bivens analysis—
in fact arguing that Bivens does not apply—Moore has forfeited any argument that the
district court erred in that regard. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th
Cir. 2021); SEC v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2022). Although Moore proceeds
pro se, he must still grapple with the issues and cite authorities to avoid forfeiture. See
Hannah v. United States, 523 F.3d 597, 600 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008).
        4
         In light of our decision, the district court also did not err in denying Moore’s
motion to disqualify Delaney from representing Howard.

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                                       No. 23-10566

capacity,” and second, “for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12.
        On appeal, Moore contends Judge Mitchell-Huff lacked jurisdiction
to issue the search warrants because no cases involving Moore were pending
before her. We disagree. Moore cites no authority for the proposition that
judges must have a person’s case already pending before them to issue a
search warrant. In any event, the “absence of jurisdiction” exception refers
to situations where judges act “in a private and non-judicial capacity.”
Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1979). The district court
correctly found that “issuing search warrants is squarely within Judge
Mitchell-Huff’s jurisdiction, as the presiding judge of the 291st Judicial
District Court (Dallas County).” 5
        Moore also argues Judge Mitchell-Huff lacked jurisdiction to issue the
warrants because she was not the judge of record in Moore’s criminal case.
Wrong again. Under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Judge Mitchell-Huff need not have been the judge “of record” in his criminal
case, but only “a judge of a state court of record in the district.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 41(b)(1). The district court correctly found that Judge Mitchell-
Huff satisfied this requirement as the presiding judge of the 291st Judicial
District Court.
        Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing Moore’s
claims against Judge Mitchell-Huff.

        _____________________
        5
         See Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 (“District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive,
appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies,” except when
conferred to another court); Housley v. Berry, 15 F.3d 1079 (5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished)
(per curiam) (signing search warrant “is a judicial act for which [the judge] is absolutely
immune from liability”).

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                                  No. 23-10566

                                      C.
       Claiming Officer Webb acted in concert with Howard to fabricate
evidence of child pornography against him, Moore sued Webb for the
common law torts of abuse of process and IIED, malicious prosecution
under the Fourth Amendment, and denial of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, Moore argues the district court erred in
dismissing these claims on various grounds. We address each of his
arguments (or non-arguments, as the case may be) in turn.
                                      1.
       The district court dismissed Moore’s claims against Webb for abuse
of process and IIED, correctly concluding that those are common law torts,
not constitutional violations redressable via § 1983. See Morgan v. Chapman,
969 F.3d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to be
free from abuse of process.”); Shinn v. Coll. Station Indep. Sch. Dist.,
96 F.3d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“There is no constitutional
right to be free from emotional distress.”). On appeal, Moore says nothing
about his IIED claim, forfeiting the issue. Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397. As to abuse
of process, Moore only says “there should be an exception” to the rule that
there is no such constitutional right, without citing any authority. Naked
hope is not a legal argument, though, and so Moore has forfeited that issue as
well. Ibid.
                                      2.
       The court dismissed Moore’s Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim based on qualified immunity because, although the
Supreme Court recognized such a claim in 2022, see Thompson v. Clark,
596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022), this right was not clearly established at the time of
Webb’s alleged conduct. See Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir.
2023) (holding Thompson “overrul[ed] our precedent” denying the

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possibility of a constitutional malicious prosecution theory); see also Guerra
v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278, 289 (5th Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of pre-
Thompson Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim because “this
court’s caselaw explicitly disclaimed the existence [of such a claim] at the
time of [defendant’s] alleged conduct”). Moore does not address this aspect
of the qualified immunity analysis on appeal. So, he has forfeited the issue
and, in any event, fails to show how the district court erred.
                                          3.
        The court dismissed Moore’s Fourteenth Amendment due-process-
fabrication-of-evidence claim as time-barred. See Morgan, 969 F.3d at 250 (we
have recognized a “due process right not to have police deliberately fabricate
evidence and use it to frame and bring false charges against a person”). The
limitations period for a § 1983 suit is determined by the forum state’s general
statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736,
751 (5th Cir. 2023). In Texas, that period is two years. Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code § 16.003(a). Federal law, however, determines when such
claims accrue. Turnage v. Britton, 29 F.4th 232, 244 (5th Cir. 2022). Due-
process-fabrication-of-evidence claims do not accrue “until the criminal
proceedings against the defendant (i.e., the § 1983 plaintiff) have terminated
in his favor.” McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2154–55 (2019). 6
        Moore argues that favorable termination on his child pornography
charge did not occur until March 29, 2021, when the court entered judgment
and formally dismissed the remaining charges on the Government’s motion.
We disagree. Moore cites no authority that favorable termination occurs only
        _____________________
        6
           Thompson addressed a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. The
district court applied Thompson’s favorable termination discussion to Moore’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim. Moore raises no error with respect to that decision, so we do not
address it.

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at final judgment. Instead, as the district court correctly noted, Moore was
on notice much earlier that the child pornography charge would terminate in
his favor—at the latest by May 2018, when the grand jury issued a second
superseding indictment removing that charge. Yet Moore waited over three
years, until March 2022, to file his complaint. Accordingly, we see no error
in the district court’s dismissing Moore’s Fourteenth Amendment due-
process-fabrication-of-evidence claim as time-barred. 7
                                            D.
        The district court dismissed Moore’s claims against the City of Dallas
because Moore failed to allege an actionable policy under Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). On appeal, Moore only points to
letters he received from Dallas police supervisors advising him that they
received his complaints but declined to investigate them because such
complaints should be addressed in the judicial system. Moore claims this
evidence shows the City has a “pro-corruption policy.” We disregard
conclusory allegations like these. Heinze, 971 F.3d at 479. As the district court
correctly found, Moore’s allegations do not plausibly show a municipal policy
or practice under Monell. See James v. Harris County, 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th
Cir. 2009) (official policy “usually exists in the form of written policy
statements, ordinances, or regulations, but may also arise in the form of a
widespread practice that is ‘so common and well-settled as to constitute a
custom that fairly represents municipal policy’” (citation omitted)).

        _____________________
        7
          In McDonough, the plaintiff had been charged, proceeded to trial on those charges,
and was acquitted. 139 S. Ct. at 2153–54. Here, by contrast, Moore never went to trial on
the child pornography charge. Hence, the prosecution of that charge ended favorably for
Moore when there was no longer a charge to prosecute—specifically, when the grand jury
issued a second superseding indictment removing that charge.

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Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing Moore’s Monell
claims against the City of Dallas.
                                            E.
        The district court dismissed Moore’s claims against court reporter
Griffin and her LLC because they were not state actors under § 1983 and
because these claims were time-barred. On appeal, Moore merely reiterates
conclusory allegations of Griffin’s involvement in the conspiracy, which we
disregard. Heinze, 971 F.3d at 479. Moore has therefore failed to show any
error by the district court in dismissing his claims against Griffin and her
company. 8
                                                                         AFFIRMED.

        _____________________
        8
          The district court dismissed Moore’s conspiracy claims because Moore failed to
establish any underlying § 1983 violation. See, e.g., Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th
Cir. 1995) (“[A] conspiracy claim is not actionable without an actual violation of section
1983.” (citation omitted)). Because we have affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
Moore’s § 1983 claims, we necessarily affirm the dismissal of Moore’s conspiracy claims.
         Finally, Moore argues the district court should have let him file a second amended
complaint. We disagree. Given the radical insufficiency of Moore’s claims, any amendment
would have been futile. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moore
leave to amend. See Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 232
(5th Cir. 2022).

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