Court Opinion

ID: 9740446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:35:45.915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.324490
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the court’s opinion that the policy period for a policy of automobile insurance issued for a term of less than 6 months is 6 months and that cancellation under Minn.Stat. § 65B.15 (1982) is required to terminate coverage within the 6-month term. Because the trial court concluded that Minn.Stat. § 65B.17 (1982) governing policy renewals applied and further concluded that Dairyland had satisfied the renewal requirements, this case must be reversed.
However, in my opinion it is unnecessary for this court to determine whether Dairy-land’s notice was sufficient to meet the cancellation requirements provided in section 65B.15. In the memorandum attached to the order granting Dairyland summary judgment, the trial judge observed that “(tjhere is no evidence whatsoever that the plaintiff [Dairyland] had any intention to either cancel defendant Charles Hansen’s policy or to attempt to do so.” If that were a finding of fact, that should terminate the inquiry.1
Secondly, if it is concluded that the court’s statement in the memorandum did not constitute a finding, Dairyland itself took the position in the trial court that the policy had not been cancelled. Accordingly, I suggest that it is unnecessary for the court to examine the question further.
However, if it is necessary for us to address the issue, I agree that in this case Dairyland’s notice was ineffective under the test we have previously announced in Cormican v. Anchor Casualty Co., 249 Minn. 196, 81 N.W.2d 782 (1957), and in Lievers v. National Insurance Underwriters, 257 Minn. 268, 101 N.W.2d 817 (1960). Therefore, Dairyland’s “renewal” notice is not the cancellation notice required by Minn.Stat. §§ 65B.15, subd. 2 and 65B.16 (1982). To be effective, the notice of cancellation, whether specifically denominated as such or contained in a premium due notice, must be tested by the meaning it would reasonably convey to one who receives it. One important factor, of course, is its obviousness, but there may also be other factors.

. I note the trial court did not make the memorandum a part of the order granting a summary judgment. Under our decisions, of course, the memorandum may not be referred to for the purpose of impeaching, contradicting or overcoming express findings or conclusions necessarily following from the decision. Ross v. Duluth, M. & I.R. Railway Co., 207 Minn. 157, 290 N.W. 566 (1940); Alton v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Railway Co., 107 Minn. 457, 120 N.W. 749 (1909); Holland v. Great Northern Railway Co., 93 Minn. 373, 101 N.W. 608 (1904). However, whether or not expressly made a part of the order, the memorandum may be referred to for the purpose of throwing light upon or explaining a decision. Kleidon v. Glascock, 215 Minn. 417, 10 N.W.2d 394 (1943); Ross v. Duluth, M. & I.R. Railway Co., 207 Minn. 157, 290 N.W. 566 (1940). My examination of the order and the memorandum leads me to the conclusion that the memorandum in no way impeaches, contradicts or overcomes conclusions necessarily following from the court’s order granting summary judgment. It appears more akin to a finding that Dairyland did not comply with the cancellation provisions of Minn.Stat. § 65B.15 (1982).