Court Opinion

ID: 9514919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:52:30.190588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:22.567783
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 19.] Ryyth was ordered to pay extradition costs in the amount of $1,175.00 to Pennington County. The majority opinion correctly determines that the County cannot recover these costs under the victim restitution statute. See State v. Sprecher, 2000 SD 17, 606 N.W.2d 138 (stating a county is not a proper party to recover under the victim restitution statute).
[¶ 20.] However, the majority opinion attempts to justify these extradition costs as costs of prosecution under SDCL 23A-27-26:
*294In all criminal actions, upon conviction of the defendant, the court may adjudge that the defendant pay the whole or any part of the costs of that particular prosecution in addition to the liquidated costs provided by SDCL 23-3-52. However, the costs shall not include items of governmental expense such as juror’s fees, bailiff’s fees, salaries and expenses of special agents, and reporter’s per diem. Payment of costs may be enforced as a civil judgment against the defendant,
(emphasis added). Obviously, the costs at issue are statutorily excluded as governmental expense.
[¶ 21.] Although some states have interpreted general costs of prosecution statutes to include extradition costs, see State v. Maupin, 166 Ariz. 250, 801 P.2d 485, 487 (App.1990) (allowing costs of extradition to be imposed), these costs are inappropriate under our definition for costs of prosecution. SDCL 23A-27-26 generally excludes governmental expense and specifically excludes salaries and expenses of special agents. In other words, these expenses for extradition are prohibited generally as governmental expense and specifically as salary and expenses of special agents.
[¶ 22.] The majority’s construction scheme is completely against the long established principle of ejusdem generis. See O’Neill v. South Dakota Bd. of Charities and Corrections, 377 N.W.2d 587 (S.D.1985) (stating the “ejusdem generis principle holds that where general words follow ... the enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of the same general kind as those enumerated”). If properly construed, plain meaning can not be any plainer.
[¶ 23.] SDCL 59-1-2 provides that a special agent is “[a]n agent for a particular act or transaction.” Pennington County hired the United States Marshall service to return Ryyth to South Dakota. This created a special agency relationship. The expenses associated with this employment is specifically and statutorily excluded from consideration as costs of prosecution. The legislative pronouncement is clear and unambiguous. Plain meaning could not be plainer.
[¶ 24.] The better approach is demonstrated by Illinois Courts. In People v. Johnson, the Illinois appellate court determined that a general cost statute is not specific enough to include costs of extradition. 175 Ill.App.3d 908, 125 Ill.Dec. 469, 530 N.E.2d 627, 634 (1988). See also State v. Wildman, 296 N.J.Super. 565, 687 A.2d 340, 342 (1997) (refusing to allow such costs without specific statutory support). In so deciding, it noted that “statutory provisions allowing the recovery of costs must be strictly construed.” Id. As such, extradition costs could not be imposed in the absence of a specific grant of authority.
[¶ 25.] Only after the Johnson holding did the Illinois Legislature modify the costs of prosecution statute to include costs of extradition. Id. Our legislature must do the same, if it is so inclined. Our costs of prosecution statute supports the same interpretation as Johnson. Id. SDCL 23A-27-26 identifies examples of governmental expense which are excluded as costs of prosecution. It is not an all-inclusive list of costs which can not to be taxed to a defendant. These excluded costs relate to incidental costs of prosecution, such as juror and bailiff fees and salaries and expenses of special agents. Extradition costs are also incidental to the prosecution and derived entirely in this case from the employment of special agents to return Ryyth to South Dakota.
[¶ 26.] “The allowance and recovery of costs rests entirely upon statutory provisions which must be strictly construed.” People v. Bratcher, 149 Ill.App.3d 425, 102 *295Ill.Dec. 853, 500 N.E.2d 954, 958 (1986). The Illinois court found that extradition costs were not costs of prosecution. Id. 102 Ill.Dec. 853, 500 N.E.2d at 960. In so reasoning, the court found that the imposition of such costs could be boundless unless specificity is provided, hypothesizing that these costs of prosecution could include meals and medical care. The court refused to extend the scope of the statute for costs without specific legislative guidance. We should do the same and construe this statute in accordance with South Dakota law. If the legislature wishes to add extradition costs as costs of prosecution they must do so with specificity. The trial court and the majority opinion should not do it for them.
[¶ 27.] Additionally, the trial court and majority opinion improperly place the burden on Ryyth to demonstrate which costs were for salary (prohibited from recovery by Garnett, 488 N.W.2d 695) and those that were for transportation of the defendant. Because the prosecution is the party asserting that the assignment of costs was appropriate, “the burden of justifying the costs by the preponderance of evidence is on the plaintiff, the [State] here.” Commonwealth v. Coder, 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406, 410 (1980). As such, the State must establish the costs “sufficiently specific to meet [its] burden of proof.” Id. It has not.2
[¶ 28.] We should simply reverse these improper costs of $1,175.00.

. I invite the reader to compare the inconsistent statutory construction scheme of the majority in this case and in State v. Olson-Lame, 2001 SD 51, 624 N.W.2d 833, with that of Maryott v. First National Bank of Eden, 2001 SD 43, 624 N.W.2d 96.