Court Opinion

ID: 9480998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:05:06.519776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:02.622761
License: Public Domain

*670DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree that the sentences imposed by the district court must be affirmed, but my reasoning differs in several respects from that of my colleagues.
Turning first to defendant McCarvey, I note that McCarvey’s presentence report suggested that the appropriate offense level would be 28. The district court rejected that suggestion, concluding that the guidelines justified an offense level of 30. The two-level difference results from the district court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b), captioned “Specific Offense Characteristics,” which says in subsection (1) that “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed during the commission of the offense, increase [the offense level] by 2 levels.” The presentence report did not recommend such a two-level increase, but Judge Batchelder — noting that she had “some difficulty with the way that the Probation Department has applied the guidelines” — felt that the increase was appropriate.
With a total offense level of 30, and given Mr. McCarvey’s Criminal History Category (Category III), the sentencing table of the guidelines specified a range of 121-151 months’ imprisonment. The district court did not depart from that range. Instead, the court imposed the maximum sentence — imprisonment for 151 months— that would be possible without a departure.1
On appeal, Mr. McCarvey presents only one question for us to decide:
“WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO ONE HUNDRED FIFTY ONE (151) MONTHS IMPRISONMENT, WHEN A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE WAS WARRANTED.”
In urging us to hold that the district court erred in not departing downward, Mr. McCarvey relies on United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491 (6th Cir.1989). It seems to me that Joan, where we affirmed a decision to depart upward, is inapposite here. A district court’s decision to depart upward is appealable, see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3), but a decision not to depart downward is not appealable.
At least seven federal courts of appeal, including this one, have held that “the appellate review statute does not authorize review of a district court’s discretionary refusal to depart from a properly determined guideline range_” U.S. Sentencing Commission Annual Report for 1989 at 15, citing United States v. Tucker, 892 F.2d 8 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 553, 107 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989); United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269 (3d Cir.1989); United States v. Rojas, 868 F.2d 1409 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. Draper, 888 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Fos-sett, 881 F.2d 976 (11th Cir.1989). The guideline range was determined properly in the case at bar, and Mr. McCarvey’s argument that the trial court ought to have departed downward is simply not cognizable on appeal.
Like defendant McCarvey, defendant Sargent presents only one assignment of error: that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence within the guideline range when a downward departure was “warranted.” Again, such a claim is not cognizable on appeal.
Defendant Sams offers three assignments of error: (1) that his offense level under the guidelines should have been reduced because Sams was either a “minimal” participant in the criminal activity or a “minor” participant therein; (2) that he should not have received an “additional sentence” because of the firearm possessed by another defendant; and (3) “A Court may not depart from the use of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines without specific find*671ings of fact to indicate why a departure is being made.”
As to Mr. Sams’ first assignment of error (which is dealt with in Part IV of this court’s opinion), I agree with my colleagues that the district court’s conclusion regarding the extent of Sams’ participation in the criminal activity was not clearly erroneous.
As to the second assignment of error (Part II-C of this court’s opinion), Mr. Sams’ counsel told the district court prior to the imposition of sentence that “Mr. Sams, obviously knew [of] the firearm being present and could reasonably foresee this conduct.” Whether the district court took this circumstance into account in deciding to sentence Mr. Sams at the upper end of the guideline range is immaterial, in my view; the court was certainly free to do so if it wished.
I agree with this court’s disposition of Mr. Sams’ third assignment of error; the district court had no occasion to make findings of fact to justify a departure that never occurred.
With regard to Mr. Smith, finally, the record shows that Smith’s lawyer, speaking in open court, clearly and unambiguously asked the district judge to accept the government's recommendation of a 120-month sentence. The judge did exactly what the defendant asked her to do; she imposed a sentence of 120 months. The announcement of the sentence evoked the following response from the defendant’s lawyer: “We are most grateful, your Hon- or. Thank you.” I frankly do not understand how the defendant may now be heard to contend that the judge committed reversible error by complying with the defendant’s express request.
If the defendant thought that a 120-month sentence would be in violation of the law or that it reflected an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, he had an obligation to tell the district judge so. We usually do not countenance the sandbagging of district judges, and I trust that our publication of this run-of-the-mine per cu-riam opinion will not lead anyone to think we are trying to encourage such a practice.

. Perhaps the district judge could have increased the sentence above the authorized guideline range pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.6, but she did not purport to do so. She decided, rather, that the case "must be sentenced at the maximum end of the guidelines." J.App. (89-3833) at 39.