Court Opinion

ID: 9427904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:13.25847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:10.421728
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Marshall,
with whom Me. Justice Brennan joins,
dissenting.
I am substantially in agreement with the Court’s definition of “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). In my view, the Miranda safeguards apply whenever police conduct is intended or likely to produce a response from a suspect in custody. As I read the Court’s opinion, its definition of “interrogation” for Miranda purposes is equivalent, for practical purposes, to my formulation, since it contemplates that “where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect.” Ante, at 302, n. 7. Thus, the Court requires an objective inquiry into the likely effect of police conduct on a typical individual, taking into account any special susceptibility of the suspect to certain kinds of pressure of which the police know or have reason to know.
I am utterly at a loss, however, to understand how this objective standard as applied to the facts before us can rationally lead to the conclusion that there was no interrogation. Innis was arrested at 4:30 a. m., handcuffed, searched, advised of his rights, and placed in the back seat of a patrol car. Within a short time he had been twice more advised of his rights and driven away in a four-door sedan with three police officers. Two officers sat in the front seat and one sat beside Innis in the back seat. Since the car traveled no more than a mile before Innis agreed to point out the location of *306the murder weapon, Officer Gleckman must have begun almost immediately to talk about the search for the shotgun.
The Court attempts to characterize Gleckman’s statements as “no more than a few offhand remarks” which could not reasonably have been expected to elicit a response. Ante, at 303. If the statements had been addressed to respondent, it would be impossible to draw such a conclusion. The simple message of the “talking back and forth” between Gleckman and McKenna was that they had to find the shotgun to avert a child’s death.
One can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a suspect — any suspect — than the assertion that if the weapon is not found an innocent person will be hurt or killed. And not just any innocent person, but an innocent child' — a little girl — a helpless, handicapped little girl on her way to school. The notion that such an appeal could not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect were known to have some special interest in handicapped children verges on the ludicrous. As a matter of fact, the appeal to a suspect to confess for the sake of others, to “display some evidence of decency and honor,” is a classic interrogation technique. See, e. g., F. Inbau & J. Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 60-62 (2d ed. 1967).
Gleckman’s remarks would obviously have constituted interrogation if they had been explicitly directed to respondent, and the result should not be different because they were nominally addressed to McKenna. This is not a case where police officers speaking among themselves are accidentally overheard by a suspect. These officers were “talking back and forth” in close quarters with the handcuffed suspect,* traveling past the very place where they believed the weapon was located. They knew respondent would hear and attend to their conversation, and they are chargeable with knowledge *307of and responsibility for the pressures to speak which they created.
I firmly believe that this case is simply an aberration, and that in future cases the Court will apply the standard adopted today in accordance with its plain meaning.

Gleckman may even have been sitting in the back seat beside respondent. See App. 60, 52, 56; but see id., 39, 43, 47, 58.