Court Opinion

ID: 9931065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 15:06:45.097305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:13.221772
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                    IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                 CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                      FEBRUARY 8, 2024
                                                                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT
                   STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2024 ND 18

State of North Dakota,                                Plaintiff and Appellee
     v.
Erica Good Bear,                                   Defendant and Appellant

                                No. 20230193

Appeal from the District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial
District, the Honorable James S. Hill, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.

Kendra M. Richard, Assistant State’s Attorney, Mandan, ND, for plaintiff and
appellee.

Kristen A. Clow, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.
                              State v. Good Bear
                                 No. 20230193

Jensen, Chief Justice.

      Erica Good Bear appeals from a judgment entered following a jury
verdict finding her guilty of terrorizing, a class C felony. Good Bear asserts
there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, the district court
abused its discretion in admitting hearsay statements of a non-appearing child
witness through the testimony of the victim and the responding officer, and she
was denied her right to confront a witness. We affirm.

      On November 17, 2022, law enforcement was dispatched to a call
reporting a woman and her two children had run to a neighbor’s residence
asking for help. After responding and speaking with the involved parties, Good
Bear was placed under arrest for terrorizing and domestic violence. At trial,
the victim, the 911 caller, and the arresting officer testified.

      The victim testified Good Bear told her Good Bear wanted to kill her,
causing the victim fear. Good Bear then approached the victim from behind
and strangled her. This attack continued until the victim’s four-year-old child
came into the room, yelling, “Don’t kill my mom.” The victim testified she was
able to get away and run with her children to a neighbor’s house to get help.

      Good Bear objected as hearsay to the admission of the victim’s testimony
repeating the child’s statement. The State argued the statement was not being
offered to show the truth of the matter asserted but instead was being offered
to show the effect on the child. The district court overruled the objection.

       The arresting officer was subsequently called as a witness by the State.
The officer indicated upon arriving, she briefly spoke with the 911 caller before
she entered the caller’s home to speak with the victim. The officer testified that
prior to getting any information from the victim, the victim’s four-year-old child
approached the officer and stated Erica tried to kill his mommy.

                                        1
      Good Bear objected to the officer’s testimony repeating the statement of
the child as hearsay. The State argued its admission was permitted under the
excited utterance exception to the rule excluding hearsay from evidence. Good
Bear rebutted, stating it was not an excited utterance because too much time
had passed between the event described by the statement and the child making
the statement. The district court overruled the objection, finding the statement
was obtained during the “gathering of information in a police investigation at
the immediate scene in response to a 911 call.”

       At the conclusion of the State’s case, Good Bear moved pursuant to
N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 for a judgment of acquittal arguing there was insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for terrorizing. The district court denied the
motion after making a finding there was sufficient evidence to put the charges
before the jury. The jury returned a verdict convicting Good Bear on the charge
of terrorizing.

       Good Bear challenges the admission into evidence of the two statements
made by the victim’s four-year-old child, the first offered through the testimony
of the victim and the second offered through the testimony of the arresting
officer.

      The district court exercises broad discretion in determining
      whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its determination will
      be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. A district
      court abuses its discretion in evidentiary rulings when it acts
      arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably, or it misinterprets or
      misapplies the law.

State v. Vickerman, 2022 ND 184, ¶ 8, 981 N.W.2d 881 (cleaned up).

       In determining if an out-of-court statement is admissible, the district
court must first determine if the statement is hearsay under the rules of
evidence. Hearsay is a statement, other than made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. N.D.R.Ev. 801(c)-(c)(2). “As a general rule, hearsay evidence

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is inadmissible.” Vickerman, 2022 ND 184, ¶ 9; N.D.R.Ev. 802. It is only after
determining a statement is hearsay that the court must determine if it falls
into one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule listed within Rules 803 and 804.

                                        A

       During the State’s case, the victim testified to the domestic incident
which occurred that night. She indicated Good Bear only stopped the assault
after the victim’s four-year-old child came into the room and said, “Don’t kill
my mom.” The defense objected, asserting the statement was hearsay and
should be excluded from evidence. The State responded the statement of the
child was not being used to prove the truth of the matter but instead to show
the effect the incident had on the child. The district court overruled the
objection determining the statement was not hearsay, and admitted it into
evidence. The court found the statement, “Don’t kill my mom,” was not being
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted because it was not being
offered to prove Good Bear was attempting to kill the victim.

      Good Bear argues although not directly stating a threat had been made,
the child’s statement still infers that a threat of great bodily harm was directed
toward the victim. Good Bear essentially argues we should look beyond the
actual words of the statement, conclude the statement is evidence of a threat,
and disregard the State’s explanation of why the statement was offered,
thereby allowing a determination the statement was offered to prove such a
threat occurred, qualifying it as hearsay. Even if the statement, “Don’t kill my
mom,” is being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, qualifying it as
hearsay, the statement may still be admitted.

      Hearsay is generally inadmissible as evidence pursuant to N.D.R.Ev. 802
unless it falls within one of the exceptions outlined in N.D.R.Ev. 803 or
N.D.R.Ev. 804. The excited utterance exception allows admission of “[a
hearsay] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement that the event or condition
caused.” N.D.R.Ev. 803(2). This exception to the rule excluding hearsay from
evidence is permitted regardless of the declarant’s availability to testify as a
witness. N.D.R.Ev. 803. For a statement to be considered an excited utterance,

                                        3
“[t]he foundational facts must show: (1) a startling event or condition; and (2)
the statement is the product of the declarant’s stress or excitement resulting
from the startling event or condition.” State v. Schweitzer, 2007 ND 122, ¶ 11,
735 N.W.2d 873.

      The victim’s testimony regarding her four-year-old’s statement, “Don’t
kill my mom,” would qualify as an excited utterance. The child made the
statement after walking in to see Good Bear strangling the victim, his mother,
a startling event. The child then made the statement, “Don’t kill my mom,” as
a direct result of the stress or excitement caused by witnessing this event. We
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
statement into evidence.

                                        B

       The arresting officer testified prior to gathering any information from
the victim, the four-year-old child came up to the officer and stated Good Bear
had tried to kill the victim. Good Bear objected, asserting the statement was
hearsay and not admissible as evidence. The State responded indicating the
statement was admissible under the excited utterance exception to N.D.R.Ev.
802’s exclusion of hearsay from admission as evidence; Good Bear contended
the statement did not fall within this exception as too much time had elapsed
between the startling condition occurring and the child’s statement to the
officer. The district court overruled the objection. Upon appeal, the State
continues to assert the child’s statement is admissible under the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

      It is unclear from the record the reason the district court overruled Good
Bear’s objection. Regardless of the basis for the court’s ruling, “we will not set
aside a correct result merely because the district court’s reasoning is incorrect
if the result is the same under the correct law and reasoning.” State v.
Lafromboise, 2021 ND 80, ¶ 20, 959 N.W.2d 596 (quoting Sanders v. Gravel
Prods., Inc., 2008 ND 161, ¶ 9, 755 N.W.2d 826).

      In determining if an out-of-court statement is admissible, the district
court must first determine if the statement is hearsay under the rules of

                                        4
evidence. Here, in their response to Good Bear’s objection to the admission of
the child’s statement Erica tried to kill his mommy, through the officer, the
State concedes that the statement is being offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. However, the State argues that even though it is hearsay, its
admission was permitted under the excited utterance exception to the rule
excluding hearsay from evidence. As the State conceded this issue at trial, we
will not reanalyze if the statement is hearsay upon appeal.

      Hearsay is generally inadmissible as evidence pursuant to N.D.R.Ev. 802
unless it falls within one of the exceptions outlined in N.D.R.Ev. 803 or
N.D.R.Ev. 804. The excited utterance exception is included within Rule 803.
Good Bear argues the excited utterance exception does not apply because, by
the time the statement was made after the child had reached the neighbor’s
house, the stress or excitement resulting from the startling event or condition
had passed.

      This issue was recently considered by the Iowa Supreme Court. State v.
Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 2021). The amount of time that is permissible
to lapse between the event and the statement, to allow the statement to qualify
under the excited utterance exception, is more likely to be on the high end of
the range permitted when the statement is made by a child. Id. at 601-02. The
Iowa Supreme Court inferred the basis for allowing longer periods of time
between the event and a child’s statement is that young children will likely
remain in an excited state longer than adults. See id.

       Here, the declarant was a four-year-old child who had recently witnessed
this altercation within the child’s home against his mother and left the home
running to seek safety at a neighbor’s house. The responding officer arrived
very shortly after the event had occurred. The statement was made shortly
after the child witnessed Good Bear strangling his mother, a startling event.
Further, the statement was made as a result of the child’s stress or excitement
resulting from his witnessing this event. We conclude under these
circumstances, the hearsay statement qualified as an excited utterance and
the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement.

                                      5
      Good Bear also asserts the district court erred admitting the officer’s
testimony regarding the child’s statement as its admission violated Good
Bear’s Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United
States Constitution.

      “[T]he Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of testimonial hearsay
against the accused, unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the
accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The
Confrontation Clause does not apply to non-testimonial hearsay.” State v.
Kalmio, 2014 ND 101, ¶ 15, 846 N.W.2d 752 (citing Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006)).
“We review an alleged violation of a constitutional right, including the right to
confront an accuser, de novo.” State v. Bowen, 2023 ND 25, ¶ 12, 985 N.W.2d
636.

      The district court determined the child’s statement made to the officer
was hearsay and properly admitted the statement into evidence under the
excited utterance exception to N.D.R.Ev. 802’s exclusion of hearsay from
evidence. However, even when a hearsay statement falls within an exception
to the rule, it may not be admitted if the statement is testimonial in violation
of the Sixth Amendment. Here, the court determined the statement was not
testimonial because it was gathered during a police investigation at the
immediate scene in response to a 911 call.

      “Statements are testimonial when they are (1) a product of formal
interview, (2) obtained with government involvement, and (3) have a law
enforcement purpose.” Vickerman, 2022 ND 184, ¶ 17. This Court has further
indicated statements are nontestimonial when the primary purpose is to
“enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” and are considered
testimonial when the “circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.” State v. Froelich, 2017 ND 154, ¶ 9, 897 N.W.2d 905 (quoting
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).

                                       6
       The officer testified she had responded to a report of a woman and her
two children, who were not dressed for the weather, and had frantically run to
a neighbor’s house asking for help. Upon arrival, the officer spoke with the 911
caller, the neighbor, outside the house and entered his residence. She indicated
that before being able to talk with the victim, the child came up to her and
made the statement at issue.

      Although the officer is a government official, this statement was not
obtained through a formal interview or police interrogation; the statement was
obtained through no action of the officer and was the result of a child’s excited
utterance. There is no indication the officer was objectively gathering this
statement to establish or prove past events relevant to criminal prosecution.

      We conclude the statement made by the child was not testimonial under
the Sixth Amendment.

      Good Bear also argues there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury’s verdict on the charge of terrorizing. After reviewing the record, we
conclude sufficient evidence supports the verdict. We summarily affirm under
N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3), concluding the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence.

      We conclude the State produced sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict of guilty to the charge of terrorizing, a class C felony. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in the admission of the child statement through the
testimony of the victim or the responding officer because in both instances the
statements met the requirements of the excited utterance exception to the rule
excluding hearsay from evidence. The hearsay statement offered through the
testimony of the responding officer also did not violate Good Bear’s
constitutional right to confrontation because the statement was not
testimonial. We affirm.

                                         7
Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr

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