Court Opinion

ID: 9623856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:45:01.736006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:35.750756
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
“Forgery is a common law crime in Virginia.” Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 171, 173, 313 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1984). “[It] is the false making or materially altering with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy, or the foundation of legal liability.” Bullock v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 558, 561, 138 S.E.2d 261, 263 (1964). A century ago, the Supreme Court explained:
The instrument must appear on its face to be, or be in fact, one which, if true, would be valid or legally capable of effecting a fraud. Writings invalid on their face are not subjects of forgery.
Terry v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 672, 674, 13 S.E. 104, 105 (1891).
The Commonwealth did not establish that the check, if genuine, was of apparent legal efficacy. The proof of that element was lacking because the check did not contain a signature purporting to be that of a drawer. Under the common law, “[f]orgery cannot happen in the case of an unsigned paper.” State v. Imboden, 157 Mo. 83, 87, 57 S.W. 536, 537 (1900).
For any check to be valid it must be “signed by the maker or drawer.” Code § 8.3-104. “ ‘Signed’ includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing.” Code § 8.1-201(39). A signature may consist of “any word or mark used in lieu of a written signature.” Code § 8.3-401. The check that Abdullah Muhammad gave to the cashier, however, did not have a symbol, word, mark, or any other writing purporting to be the drawer’s signature at the line designated for the drawer’s signature.
Neither State v. Morse, 38 Wash. 2d 927, 234 P.2d 478 (1951), nor Mayes v. State, 264 Ark. 283, 571 S.W.2d 420 (1978), supports the majority’s position that the check had appar*201ent legal efficacy. In Morse, the court held as follows:
The recognized rule is that, in order to constitute a forgery, a writing or instrument must be such that if genuine it would have efficacy as affecting some legal right. State v. Kuluris, 132 Wash. 149, 231 P. 782; State v. Taes, 5 Wash. 2d 51, 104 P.2d 751. In the latter case it was held that an instrument purporting to be a bank check but not containing the name of any bank would not, if genuine, have such efficacy as to furnish the basis for a charge of forgery.
Whether a check signed only “Hillyard Motors” would, if genuine, have some legal efficacy depends upon the provisions of the negotiable instruments act relating to the kind of signature necessary to create liability. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 3409, § 18 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act provides that: “No person is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon, except as herein otherwise expressly provided. But one who signs in a trade or assumed name will be liable to the same extent as if he had signed his own name.”
The name “Hillyard Motors” signed to this check, as drawer, is a trade name or assumed name. Had such name been signed by, or upon authority of, the person or persons doing business under this trade name or assumed name, then, under the above-quoted statute, such person or persons would have been liable thereon. The check in question therefore has legal efficacy within the meaning of the rule stated above, and is a “written instrument” or “writing” within the meaning of the forgery statute. The trial court did not err in upholding the sufficiency of the information in this respect.
38 Wash. 2d at 929-30, 234 P.2d at 479-80 (emphasis added).
In Mayes, the court stated that where the company name was printed on the check at the place where the drawer’s signature would ordinarily appear, that printing served as “a sufficient signature, if it is intended as such.” 264 Ark. at 292, 571 S.W.2d at 426. It should be noted, however, that Mayes involves the interpretation .of an Arkansas statute that does not contain the requirement that the instrument be of “apparent legal efficacy.” 264 Ark. at 293, 571 S.W.2d at 426.
*202Under the [Arkansas] statute, one forges a written instrument, if with purpose to defraud he draws, makes, completes, counterfeits, possesses or utters a written instrument that purports to be or is calculated to become or to represent if completed, the act of a person who did not authorize the act.
Id. at 290, 571 S.W.2d at 424 (emphasis added). The court clearly states that a finding of “apparent legal efficacy ... is not a requirement under [Arkansas Code § 41-2302].” Id. at 293, 571 S.W.2d at 426.
Although in Mayes the court found by way of dictum that the check had apparent legal efficacy because the printed name constituted a drawer’s signature, the court held that the check was a forgery under the Arkansas statute because it “purports ... to represent if completed, the act of a person who did not authorize the act.” Id. While the Arkansas statute obviously has a purpose broader than that promoted by the common law rule, the Arkansas Court emphatically removed any ambiguity when it pronounced, “It is clear that the concept of [forgery] is a much broader one than it was under prior law.” Id. at 293, 571 S.W.2d at 426. The majority in this case loses sight of the fact, however, that the Arkansas statute is not the law in Virginia. In Virginia, the common law of forgery prevails. Fitzgerald, 227 Va. at 173, 313 S.E.2d at 395.
It has long been the common law rule that a check that lacks a drawer’s signature is an instrument so incomplete that the check, even if genuine, would have no apparent legal efficacy. Terry v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. at 674, 13 S.E. at 105. See also Smith v. State, 7 Md. App. 457, 462, 256 A.2d 357, 361 (1969); Metropolitan Nat’l Bank v. National Surety Co., 48 F.2d 611, 612 (D.C. Minn. 1931); State v. Imboden, 157 Mo. 83, 87, 57 S.W. 536, 537 (1900); 4 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 512 (14th ed. 1981); Annotation, Invalid Instruments as Subject of Forgery, 174 A.L.R. 1307-08 (1948). Compare Nikolic v. State, 439 So. 2d 828 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983)(unsigned traffic ticket void on its face and, therefore, not subject of forgery); Poe v. People, 163 Colo. 20, 24-25, 428 P.2d 77, 80 (1967)(unsigned power of attorney and title having no real or apparent legal efficacy); People v. Snyder, 85 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282, 274 A.D. 371, 372 (1948)(unsigned bill of weight is void and ineffective on its face and cannot support for*203gery charge); State v. Taes, 5 Wash. 2d 51, 53, 104 P.2d 751, 752 (1940) (purported bank check omitting name of bank “would not have any efficacy as affecting a legal right and could not be basis for the [forgery] charge”). Moreover, under our statutory law, “[n]o person is liable on [a check] unless his signature appears thereon.” Code § 8.3-401(1).2
An unsigned . . . check . . ., the validity of which is dependent upon the signature of the person who makes or issues it, is susceptible of use as an instrument of fraud, but is not a counterfeit [or forgery].... It actually purports to be nothing more than what it is, an invalid instrument, because unsigned.
Metropolitan Nat’l Bank, 48 F.2d at 612.
By failing to distinguish between the signature of a drawer and the signature of an indorser, the majority reaches the wrong conclusion. The absence of an indorsement does not affect the apparent legal efficacy of a check. The cases of Wyatt v. State, 257 Ala. 90, 57 So. 2d 366 (1952), Norton v. State, 129 Wis. 659, 109 N.W. 531 (1906), and Santolini v. State, 6 Wyo. 110, 42 P. 746 (1895), upon which the majority rely, all address the problem of a missing or forged indorsement. Whether an instrument “would, if genuine, have some legal efficacy depends upon the provisions of [the Commercial Code] relating to the kind of signature necessary to create liability.” Morse, 38 Wash. 2d at 929, 234 P.2d at 479. “[T]he Code accords separate treatment to . . . drawer signatures . . . and . . . indorsements.” Perini Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1977). The dispositive question is the facial validity of the instrument.
[T]he mere filling in of the fictitious name of the payee and the amount, might be enough to constitute forgery, even if another unauthorized person had signed the name of the purported drawer. The fact that the check was not indorsed or *204negotiated is not determinative.
Draper v. State, 231 Md. 423, 426, 190 A.2d 643, 645 (1963). The absence of a signature by the drawer is significant because, without it, there is no foundation for liability. See Code § 8.3-401(1).
I believe that the majority simply misperceives the issue to be decided. The majority’s extended discussion of Gordon v. Commonwealth, 100 Va. 825, 41 S.E. 746 (1902), highlights the problem. The Court in Gordon had no cause to address the elements of forgery of a check. The Court emphatically stated, “But, the gravamen of the charge is not the forgery of the check, as such, but, its endorsements, as a receipt.” Id. at 828, 41 S.E. at 747 (emphasis in the original). The following quote clearly discloses that the issue before the Gordon Court was whether a writing which was added to a valid and previously negotiated check was fraudulently written to the prejudice of another:
After it had been construed and treated by the parties as a valid check for ten dollars, drawn by J.W. Gordon, payable to the order of W.E. Hughes, endorsed by Hughes in blank, endorsed by H. Hutchinson & Co. to the cashier of the Valley Nat’l Bank, endorsed and stamped paid by the Valley Nat’l Bank, and stamped on its face “paid” by the Farmers and Merchants Bank, upon which it was drawn, and had been delivered to the drawer, J.W. Gordon (and this is the legal import of the paper, with its endorsements, etc., as set out in the indictment), however irregular it may have been in its inception, according to business usage and custom, and common understanding, it constituted a valid voucher from Hughes to Gordon for ten dollars, which the former, by his endorsement and conduct, was estopped to deny. That being the legal import of the paper with its endorsements, the addition of the words “in full of account to date,” alleged to have been fraudulently written upon the face of it by the accused after the paper came to his possession, had the effect of converting a genuine receipt from Hughes to the accused, for ten dollars, into a spurious receipt “in full of account to date,” and necessarily enured to the prejudice of Hughes’ rights. The writing, with the endorsements set out in the indictment, was sufficient to enable the court to perceive judicially that *205it might be made the vehicle of fraud and prejudice, as charged, and hence the averment of extrinsic circumstances was unnecessary.
100 Va. at 828-29, 41 S.E. at 747 (emphasis in the original). The issue of forgery concerned only whether the writing, “in full of account to date,” constituted a forged receipt. Id. Whether the check had legal efficacy or not was immaterial. In this case, however, we are required to decide whether a check, not a receipt, if genuine, would have apparent legal efficacy when it clearly lacks a drawer’s signature. It does not.
In a criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth may select the appropriate crime or crimes upon which an accused may stand charged and convicted. However, when the prosecution pursues a charge which does not contemplate the particular case circumstances, it is not this Court’s duty to expansively redefine the crime after the fact so as to accommodate the Commonwealth’s erroneous theory. In my view, Muhammad may very well be guilty of a criminal offense, but it is not forgery as defined by Virginia common law. See Code § 18.2-178; see Bateman v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 595, 139 S.E.2d 102 (1964); Bullock v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 867, 140 S.E.2d 821, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 927 (1965).
For these reasons I dissent, and I would reverse the conviction.

 Any bank that pays a check that is missing the required signature of a drawer does so at the bank’s risk. See Code § 8.3-401(1); Spec-Cast, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 128 Ill. 2d 167, 538 N.E.2d 543 (1989); Wolfe v. University Nat’l Bank, 270 Md. 70, 310 A.2d 558 (1973). See also Jacoby Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Continental Bank, 277 Pa. Super. 440, 419 A.2d 1227 (1980). Furthermore, the complainants in fact did not accept or honor the unsigned check. There is no evidence that the grocery store manager would have approved and honored the incomplete instrument or that he intended to do so.