Court Opinion

ID: 9737430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:24:57.963572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:58.861761
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE O’BRIEN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of defendant’s convictions for intentional murder (720 ILCS 5/9—1(a)(1) (West 1994)) and knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9—1(a)(2) (West 1994)). In all other matters, I concur. Section 7—1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/7—1 (West 1994)) provides that a person is justified in the use of deadly force if he reasonably believes such force was necessary to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. The definition of “forcible felony” includes criminal sexual assault. 720 ILCS 5/2—8 (West 1994). Criminal sexual assault is defined as “an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force.” 720 ILCS 5/12—13(a)(1) (West 1994). A criminal defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on any legally recognized defense theory that has some foundation in the evidence, however tenuous. People v. Yarbrough, 269 Ill. App. 3d 96, 100 (1994). Thus, the issue here is whether some evidence exists supporting defendant’s theory that he killed Kenneth Posey because he reasonably believed such force was necessary to prevent Posey from sexually assaulting him. There were no eyewitnesses to the crime; the only direct evidence of what actually occurred comes from defendant’s admission to Detective Disotaur. Defendant told Disotaur that Posey picked him up at North Avenue and Austin Boulevard and drove him to Posey’s home. Defendant suspected Posey was a homosexual. Although defendant hated homosexuals, he went with Posey because he thought he could get “something” from him. Three or four other men were at the house when defendant and Posey arrived; defendant suspected they were homosexuals, too. After the other men left, Posey invited defendant upstairs. Immediately preceding the killing, Posey touched defendant on the pants in the area of the penis, thereby signalling a sexual interest in defendant. Defendant told Posey “not to do that.” Instead of taking defendant’s no for an answer, Posey attempted to kiss defendant on the mouth. Posey’s attempted kiss was a second indication that he was sexually interested in defendant; the attempted kiss also demonstrated Posey’s unwillingness to comply with defendant’s request that he stop acting in a sexual manner toward him. In response to the unwanted kiss, defendant punched Posey three times in the face, turned around, and started to walk toward the kitchen. Posey immediately came up behind defendant and put his hands around defendant’s throat. At this point, defendant knew that Posey had made two unwanted sexual passes at him, that Posey had refused to stop when defendant told him “no,” and that Posey was now coming at defendant a third time even after defendant had punched him. Defendant knew that Posey was the bigger man, 6 feet 2 inches tall as compared to 5 feet 8 inches tall, and that Posey had his hands on defendant’s neck in an act of force. Under these facts, defendant reasonably could have believed deadly force was necessary to prevent a criminal sexual assault. A jury might disbelieve defendant’s story and/or determine that defendant’s killing of Posey was motivated by something other than a fear of criminal sexual assault. Nonetheless, since some evidence existed supporting defendant’s theory of defense, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the justifiable use of deadly force to prevent a criminal sexual assault. See People v. Jefferson, 257 Ill. App. 3d 258, 265 (1993) (defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on any defense that the evidence supports, even if the evidence is slight.) The majority states that any error in failing to give the instruction was harmless because the trial judge instructed the jury that a person is justified in the use of deadly force if he reasonably believed such force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself. I disagree. Here, the defendant presented separate theories such that the jury could separately consider whether defendant acted to prevent his imminent death or great bodily harm and/or whether defendant acted to prevent the commission of a criminal sexual assault upon him. However, this jury instruction error relates only to the intentional murder and knowing murder counts. Defendant’s conviction for felony murder is not vitiated as felony murder is premised on strict liability for a killing during the commission of a forcible felony. People v. Hall, 291 Ill. App. 3d 411, 420 (1997). The trial judge sentenced defendant to natural life in prison for first degree murder for the intentional murder conviction (720 ILCS 5/9—1(a)(1) (West 1994)) but imposed no sentence on the felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9—1(a)(3) (West 1994)) or knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9—1(a)(2) (West 1994)) convictions. I would remand for a new sentencing hearing on the felony murder conviction. In all other respects, I concur.