Court Opinion

ID: 9586986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:17:04.852878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:58.309389
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, J.,
dissenting.
Because I do not believe that the officers had authority to open (search) the black plastic compact, I dissent.
If the officers were authorized to open all containers found on defendant’s person during the book-in inventory, that is the end of the inquiry. In State v. Ridderbush, 71 Or App 418, 692 P2d 667 (1984), we held that such authority does not exist under the Oregon Constitution as part of the inventory process, saying that an item should be inventoried “by its outward appearance; no closed, opaque container may *118be opened to determine what, if anything, is inside it so that the contents may be inventoried in turn.” 71 Or App at 426.
That is the present state of the law, unless, during the inventory process, probable cause develops that the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime other than the one for which he has been arrested and for which he is being booked into jail. I agree with the majority that, if that occurs, the officer may conduct a search incident to an arrest for the other crime, even though no arrest has been made at the time. State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 729 P2d 524 (1986). The question here, then, is whether the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was in possession of contraband when he found the compact during the inventory.
In Owens, the defendant was arrested for shoplifting and while the officer, incident to that arrest, was searching her purse for stolen objects, he found a clear vial of white powder, which he believed to be cocaine. The defendant indicated that it belonged to a friend and that it might contain cocaine. The officer then proceeded to open two compacts found in the purse. The court held that, although the officer was not entitled to search the compacts incident to the arrest for shoplifting, see State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741, 653 P2d 942 (1982), he was entitled to do so incident to an arrest for possession of narcotics after he found the transparent vial of white powder, because he then had probable cause to believe that the defendant was in possession of cocaine. The transparent vial “announced its contents.”
Here, the only fact on which probable cause could be premised is the finding of a black plastic compact in defendant’s boot. The officer had no reason to believe that defendant was under the influence of narcotics and no reason to believe that the compact contained narcotics, other than his general knowledge that contraband is sometimes kept in compacts. Owens tells us that probable cause has both a subjective and objective component. The officer may have had a subjective belief that defendant possessed a controlled substance; objectively, he may have had a suspicion, even a well-founded suspicion; however, “a suspicion, no matter how well-founded, does not rise to the level of probable cause.” State v. Verdine, 290 Or 553, 624 P2d 580 (1981). Unlike a paperfold, known on the street as a “bindle,” in State v. McCrory, 84 Or App 390, *119734 P2d 359 (1987), which is customarily used as a unique container for cocaine, the compact did not announce its contents.
Lacking probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of a controlled substance, the police were not authorized to search the compact. It should have been listed in the inventory only by its outward appearance. The motion to suppress should have been granted.
Warren, Newman and Graber, JJ., join in this dissent.