Court Opinion

ID: 9724202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:48:26.661123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:57.399182
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court; This case began with the arrest of defendant, David W. Millner, in Marion County for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the time of his arrest, defendant was warned that refusal to take a breath test would result in summary suspension of his driver’s license. Whether defendant was also warned that evidence of his refusal could be used against him is contested. Defendant refused the test. After being charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the State from using evidence of his refusal to take the breathalyzer test, claiming he had not been warned such a refusal could be used against him. The trial court, finding defendant had not been warned that evidence of his refusal could be used against him, granted the motion in limine, ruling the use of such evidence by the State would violate defendant’s due process rights as well as his right against self-incrimination. The State appealed this decision to our court. We remanded the case back to the trial court for the purpose of an explicit ruling on whether section 11 — 501.2(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 — 501.2(c)) violates our Illinois Constitution by depriving defendant of due process rights and his right not to incriminate himself. (People v. Millner (1991), 239 Ill. App. 3d 8.) The trial court, on remand, found the statute as applied to be constitutional and reaffirmed its position that the State was barred from using defendant’s refusal to take the breath test. Defendant then filed a motion to supplement the record with the ruling of the circuit court per our opinion. Defendant’s motion was granted. We now address the question whether evidentiary use of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a breath test deprives that defendant of due process of law or of his right not to incriminate himself as guaranteed by the Hlinois Constitution.  We initially note defendant has conceded that the admission into evidence of a person’s refusal to submit to a breath test does not offend the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. (See People v. Rolfingsmeyer (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 137, 141-42, 461 N.E.2d 410, 412; see also South Dakota v. Neville (1983), 459 U.S. 553, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748, 103 S. Ct. 916.) Consequently, we need not address this aspect further, other than to say the trial court erred in ruling to the contrary. Turning to the other contention on appeal, in accordance with our supreme court’s recent decision in People v. Wegielnik (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 418, 605 N.E.2d 487, we further hold that the evidentiary use of a defendant’s refusal to take a breath test also does not deprive that defendant of due process under the Illinois Constitution. The trial court therefore erred in granting defendant’s motion in limine in this instance.  It is true that a driver’s license is a protectable property interest and that the due process clause applies to the suspension of driving privileges. (In re Summary Suspension of Driver’s License of Rakers (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 27, 31, 542 N.E.2d 1311, 1314; People v. Honaker (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1038, 469 N.E.2d 1120, 1122.) Because a person can be required to submit to a breath test without his consent, however, a warning that a person’s driving privileges will be suspended for failure to submit to the test is not constitutionally mandated. (Rakers, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 32, 542 N.E.2d at 1314; Honaker, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 1039, 469 N.E.2d at 1123.) Simply because our legislature has by statute granted a driver the right to refuse to take a breath test does not mean this “right” is constitutionally mandated. (Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d at 427-28, 605 N.E.2d at 491; Rakers, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 32, 542 N.E.2d at 1314.) A defendant’s statutory right to refuse to take such a test is “simply a matter of grace.” (Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d at 428, 605 N.E.2d at 491.) Consequently, due process does not require that the person be warned, either orally or in writing, of the consequences of his refusal. (Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d at 428, 605 N.E.2d at 491; Rakers, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 32, 542 N.E.2d at 1314; Honaker, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 1039, 469 N.E.2d at 1123.) More specifically, due process does not require that a defendant be informed his refusal to submit to a breath test could be used against him at trial. (See People v. Thomas (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 268, 283, 558 N.E.2d 656, 667; see also State v. Superior Court (Ariz. App. 1986), 149 Ariz. 601, 721 P.2d 149.) Therefore, even if we were to agree with the trial court that defendant here had not been warned his refusal could be used against him, we still would reach the same result that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion in limine on the grounds of due process. For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Marion County granting defendant’s motion in limine. We therefore remand this cause for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. CHAPMAN, P.J., concurs.