Court Opinion

ID: 9390851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 19:02:37.92533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:37.532656
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/28/23 Marriage of Knight CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re the Marriage of BRIAN and
 REENA KNIGHT.
                                                                      D080680
 BRIAN KNIGHT,

           Respondent,                                                (Super. Ct. No. 18FL009961C)

           v.

 REENA KNIGHT,

           Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jose S. Castillo, Judge. Affirmed.
         Antonyan Miranda, Anthony J. Boucek and Andrew Rosenberry for
Appellant.
         Bickford Blado & Botros and Andrew J. Botros for Respondent.
         Reena Knight appeals the findings and order after hearing issued by
the family court regarding her former husband Brian Knight’s request for
reimbursement after the parties’ dissolution proceeding. The court ordered
Reena to reimburse Brian for half of a judgment he was ordered to pay
Reena’s parents in a separate civil action for repayment of a loan to the
former couple during their marriage, and half of the attorneys’ fees he
incurred in the civil action. The parties do not dispute that the original loan
of $150,000 to them from Reena’s parents represents a community obligation.
Rather, the crux of this appeal is whether the $150,000 obligation was
divided into two separate property obligations, for which each was separately
responsible, before Brian’s request for reimbursement.
      Reena contends that this division occurred at some point during the
civil lawsuit Reena’s parents filed against Brian to recover half of the loaned
money, and the trial court therefore erred in ordering Reena to reimburse
Brian for half of the civil judgment he paid to Reena’s parents from his
separate funds as a result of that lawsuit, as well as half of the attorneys’
fees he incurred during the civil lawsuit. Brian contends that the civil
judgment remained a community obligation at the time the family court
ruled on his request for reimbursement, and the family court thus properly
granted the request. We agree with Brian and therefore affirm the trial
court’s order.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Parties’ Marriage and Dissolution Case
      Brian Knight and Reena Knight were married in 2006 and purchased a
home in San Diego in 2009 (the marital residence). Around that same time,
Reena’s parents provided funds to Brian and Reena totaling $150,000, which
were used for the down payment and to make certain improvements on the
marital residence. Brian and Reena signed a written promissory note
reflecting an obligation to repay the $150,000, plus specified interest, to
Reena’s parents.

                                        2
      The parties separated in June 2018. Their marital status was
terminated in May 2019, and a dissolution trial was held in September 2019.
      In June 2019, Reena’s parents filed a civil lawsuit against Brian for
repayment on the promissory note Brian and Reena had executed in their
favor, seeking a judgment in the amount of $75,000 plus interest. (Gupta v.
Knight (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2021, No. 37-2019-00033648-CU-BC-
CTL) (the civil case).) Reena’s parents did not name her as a defendant in
the civil case.
B. Dissolution Judgment and Family Court Reservation of Jurisdiction

      In December 2020, the family court1 entered judgment on reserved
issues (the dissolution judgment) after a trial was held in the dissolution
case. The dissolution judgment awarded the parties’ marital residence to
Reena and directed her to pay Brian an amount that represented half of the
acquired equity in the marital residence, which the family court determined
was community property.
      The dissolution judgment referenced the pending civil case between
Brian and Reena’s parents and noted that Reena’s parents had not been
joined to the dissolution case. Accordingly, the family court reserved
jurisdiction as to the issue of the promissory note, explaining that after the
civil case concluded, the family court would “determine the community
nature of any obligation that may arise from the civil case, including, but not
limited to, principal, interest, and/or attorney’s fees owed by either party.”

1     To avoid confusion, we refer to the trial court that presided over the
parties’ dissolution case as the family court and to the trial court that
presided over the civil case as the civil court.
                                        3
C. Civil Case Judgment
      In April 2021, the trial court in the civil lawsuit filed by Reena’s
parents against Brian found in favor of plaintiffs and against Brian,
concluding that the $150,00 promissory note was a loan, not a gift as Brian
had contended. The civil court found in favor of Brian, however, on his
statute of limitations defense, determining that all interest accrued prior to
June 28, 2015 was time barred. The civil court then stated: “There is little
doubt in my mind that this is a – this was a community property
obligation. . . . Ultimately, Mr. Knight will only be responsible for one-half of
the principal and one-half of the interest payments. The other half will be
borne or allocated, if you will, by Ms. Knight.”
      At this point, the civil court paused, stating to counsel: “Folks, I can
make all of the additional findings and save you a trip back to Family court
or I can stop my analysis at this point in time and you can go back to Family
court and let your judge in Family decide what to do. What do you want me
to do?” Counsel for Reena’s parents responded: “I don’t think we have a
choice, Your Honor. I think the Family court’s already ruled on that and
reserved its own jurisdiction. Can you overrule that?” The civil court
responded: “I cannot overrule a call in Family. So again, it’s real easy for me
to imagine Mr. Knight going into a Family court department and asking that
he be relieved of one-half of the principal and all of the interest payments or
obligation that would have accrued from June 28th, ’015 to present.
However, I think I’m hearing you say I should stop.” Counsel for Reena’s
parents replied: “No, no, I don’t think so. I just . . . was wondering if you
even had the jurisdiction to do it. If you have the jurisdiction. . . . I will
stipulate.” Counsel for Brian stated: “We’re ready for you to move forward.”

                                         4
      The civil court went on to state that the $150,000 loan was a
community property obligation and that Brian was “entitled to a 50 percent
offset in the principal and . . . 50 percent of all interest payments accrued.”
Counsel for Brian then clarified for the court that the complaint only sought
one-half of the promissory note amount and asked whether the court’s
calculations were based on the $150,000 figure or the $75,000 figure. The
civil court responded: “You’re correct. I saw the 150- in the body of the
complaint, but the prayer limits it to 75-.” The court continued, speaking
directly to counsel for Brian: “I agree . . . that plaintiff is limited to what they
asked for in the complaint. But again, we’re going to get there no matter
what. Your client is not going to be obligated for more than his share of one-
half of the – or his share of the one-half of the principal, which is 75-. All
right?” Counsel for Reena’s parents then asked: “So, in essence, the
judgment is 75,000 plus 5 percent interest from June 28, 2015 until the
judgment is issued; right?” The civil court replied: “Yeah, and then you don’t
have to get into the offset part.” The court directed counsel for Reena’s
parents to prepare a judgment reflecting the court’s findings and orders.
      In May 2021, the civil court signed the civil judgment, which provides:
“1. The Court finds that the underlying transaction was a loan and not a gift.
[¶] 2. Plaintiff is the prevailing party. [¶] 3. The Court finds that
defendant is liable for one-half of the principal sum of $150,000.00 due under
the note, and one half of the interest calculated at the contract rate of five
percent (5%) from and after June 28, 2015.” The judgment further states:
“IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that ISHWAR C. GUPTA and MADHU
GUPTA do have and recover from defendant BRIAN S. KNIGHT, the
following sums: [¶] Principal: $75,000.00 (1/2 of $150,000 principal due on
note) [¶] Interest: $21,474.57 (1/2 of interest on $150,000 @ 5% from

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6/28/15 - 3/19/21) [¶] Costs: $1,333.45 (Per memo to filed [sic] with
judgment) [¶] TOTAL JUDGMENT: $97,808.02.”
      In June 2021, Brian and Reena’s parents filed an acknowledgment of
satisfaction of judgment in the civil case showing that Brian had paid the
judgment in full.
D. Motion for Reimbursement in Family Court
      In July 2021, Brian filed a request for order (RFO) with the family
court seeking an order requiring Reena to reimburse him for one-half of the
civil judgment paid to Reena’s parents and one-half of all legal expenses
incurred as a result of the civil case. Brian argued that the family court had
reserved jurisdiction to determine the community nature of the promissory
note and any resulting obligation, the civil judgment was in fact a community
obligation, Brian had used his separate funds to pay the community debt and
incurred attorneys’ fees to defend the community, and he should therefore be
reimbursed for one-half of the judgment and his fees.
      Reena opposed Brian’s RFO, filing a responsive declaration stating that
she had made an agreement with her father, before the civil case trial and
based on unspecified “interest calculations,” that she owed him $140,000
under the promissory note. She further declared that a document attached to
her declaration, which showed a summary of account activity from an
unspecified Bank of America account, came from her father’s bank account
and showed the transfers she had made to him. Reena stated: “According to
the attached, I have made $148,000 in payments.” Reena further declared
that the civil court had ordered Brian to pay one-half of the amount due
under the promissory note, “recognizing” that Reena would be responsible for
the other half.

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E. Motion for Reimbursement Hearing and Order After Hearing
      At the hearing in February 2022, the family court provided its tentative
ruling to the parties, stating that it had carefully reviewed the records and
declarations, the civil judgment, the transcript from the civil trial, and the
memorandum of points and authorities filed by Brian’s counsel, which the
court found to be persuasive. The court then advised that its tentative was to
follow the analysis of Brian’s brief with some modifications, meaning that the
court would rule that the amount in dispute was community property and
“that the community is responsible for splitting it half and half,” which
“would include splitting the attorney’s fees incurred defending the
community at the time.”
      Counsel for Brian proposed to submit on the tentative ruling, subject to
rebutting argument by counsel for Reena, and requested to admit Brian’s two
declarations, filed in support of his RFO, into evidence. Counsel for both
parties then argued their interpretations of the civil trial and civil judgment.
Counsel for Reena then requested that Reena be permitted to testify
regarding the payments she claimed to have made to her father on the
promissory note, which the family court allowed.
      Reena testified that she submitted a responsive declaration with
exhibits reflecting the payments she made to her father for her half of the
amount owed on the promissory note. After Reena’s testimony, her
declaration was admitted into evidence. Counsel for both parties then gave
closing arguments and responded to questions from the family court.
      At the conclusion of the hearing, the family court issued its ruling,
stating that it had considered the testimony that was presented, the
arguments of counsel, and the evidence submitted, and that it stood by its
tentative ruling. The family court adopted the analysis of Brian’s

                                        7
memorandum of points and authorities submitted in support of his RFO. It
found that the debt owed to Reena’s parents was community in nature, the
community was responsible for the payment, and Brian and Reena each bore
responsibility for half of that amount. The family court also concluded that
the community was responsible for the attorneys’ fees spent in defending the
civil case and that Brian had spent his separate funds defending the
community interest. The court further found unpersuasive Reena’s argument
that she had continued to separately pay her father on the promissory note.
Accordingly, the court concluded that Brian was entitled to reimbursement
for half of the payment as well as half of the attorneys’ fees he had incurred.
      Reena timely filed this appeal challenging the family court’s findings
and order after hearing.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Reena contends that the family court erred in several different ways
when it granted Brian’s request for reimbursement. Specifically, she argues
that (1) the family court’s order exceeded its express reservation of
jurisdiction, (2) the family court erred in treating the civil judgment as a
community obligation because it had already been divided into two separate
property obligations, (3) the order unfairly results in the assignment of three-
quarters of the community obligation to Reena and is further prejudicial to
Reena because there was no benefit to the community, and (4) Brian should
have been estopped from seeking reimbursement because he failed to join
Reena in the civil case. We address each argument in turn and find each
without merit.
A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
      We apply different standards of review to the different questions raised
on appeal. First, we review de novo the issue presented by Reena as to

                                        8
whether the family court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, which is a legal
question. (Robbins v. Foothill Nissan (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1769, 1774.)
Though there are certain facts in dispute here, the procedural facts appear to
be undisputed. And where resolution of an issue “requires a critical
consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying
values,” the issue is a mixed question of law and fact in which legal issues
predominate, and de novo review applies. (In re Marriage of Brandes (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1472 (Brandes), internal quotation marks omitted.)
      Second, we review a trial court’s ruling characterizing a particular debt
as a community obligation to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the finding. (Brandes, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 1472.) Our
review of the trial court’s decision is “ ‘limited to a determination whether
there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that
supports the finding. [Citation.] In so reviewing, all conflicts must be
resolved in favor of [the prevailing party] and all legitimate and reasonable
inferences must be indulged to uphold the finding.’ ” (Ibid., quoting McLellan
v. McLellan (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 343, 356.)
      Finally, under the Supreme Court’s ruling in In re Marriage of Epstein
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84–85 (Epstein), a spouse who uses separate property
funds after the date of separation to pay community debts is entitled to be
reimbursed by the community. (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 298, 302, fn. 1 (Oliverez).) These reimbursements are commonly
referred to as Epstein credits. (In re Marriage of Boblitt (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 1004, 1010, fn. 2.) We review the family court’s decision to
award Epstein credits for abuse of discretion. (Oliverez¸ at pp. 318–320.) In
reviewing the decision, “we do not replace the court’s exercise of discretion
with our own by accepting evidence the court rejected; we are required to

                                        9
uphold the judgment if any substantial evidence supports the court’s decision,
without consideration of whether there also exists substantial evidence to
support [the opposing] position.” (Id. at p. 319.)
B. The Family Court Acted Within the Scope of Its Jurisdiction
      Reena contends that the family court acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it granted Brian’s request for order awarding reimbursement of one-
half of the civil judgment and one-half of his attorneys’ fees. Brian responds
that the family court reserved jurisdiction to determine the community
nature of any obligation arising from the civil case, and his request for
reimbursement was an obligation that arose from the civil case. We agree
with Brian.
      Under Family Code section 2556, a trial court has continuing
jurisdiction to award to the parties any community assets or liabilities that
have not been previously adjudicated. Here, the liability resulting from the
civil judgment had not yet been adjudicated because the case had not
concluded at the time the dissolution judgment was issued, so the family
court had continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of the civil judgment.
Indeed, the family court specifically included a section regarding the
promissory note from Reena’s parents in the dissolution judgment, stating as
follows: “The Court acknowledges the pending nature of the civil case
between [Reena]’s parents and [Brian] (Gupta v. Knight). The Court
acknowledges that [Reena]’s parents have not been joined to this dissolution
case. As such, the Court has reserved jurisdiction as to the issue of the
promissory note. After the civil case has concluded, the Court has reserved
jurisdiction to determine the community nature of any obligation that may
arise from the civil case, including, but not limited to, principal, interest,
and/or attorney’s fees owed by either party.” (Italics added.) The family

                                        10
court therefore properly reserved jurisdiction to determine how to
characterize and divide the civil judgment and related attorneys’ fees.
      Reena argues that the civil court assigned the civil judgment as Brian’s
separate property obligation, and there was therefore “no ‘community nature
of any obligation’ resulting” from the civil case for the family court to divide.
But the family court’s “broad jurisdictional authority where the right to and
disposition of community property are concerned,” along with its specific
reservation of jurisdiction on the promissory note issue, means that it was for
that court to determine whether the judgment resulting from the civil case
was community or separate property in the first instance. (Glade v. Glade
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1450 (Glade).) “[W]hen a dissolution proceeding
is pending in the family court, another department of the superior court may
not act so as to interfere with the family court’s exercise of its powers in that
proceeding.” (Dale v. Dale (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1183; see also Glade,
at p. 1454 [where a “ ‘family law court acquires jurisdiction to divide
community property in a dissolution action, no other department of a
superior court may make an order adversely affecting that division’ ”].) Here,
the parties’ dissolution proceeding preceded the civil case and was still
pending in the family court at the time the civil judgment was entered, as the
family court had reserved jurisdiction to determine whether any obligation
arising from the civil case was community in nature.
      Reena seeks to avoid this conclusion by arguing that Brian waived the
family court’s reservation of jurisdiction and expressly stipulated to the civil
court’s determination of all issues relating to the promissory note. As we
explain in more detail below, however, the record does not support her
argument. Accordingly, we find that the family court acted within the scope

                                        11
of its jurisdiction in determining the community nature of the civil judgment
and ruling on Brian’s request for reimbursement.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Family Court’s Finding That the Civil
Judgment Was a Community Obligation
      The parties agree that the $150,000 promissory note was a community
obligation, but they dispute whether the civil judgment resulted in the
division of that obligation. Reena makes the same argument she repeats
throughout her briefing under different headings: the civil judgment
represents Brian’s separate property obligation, and he is thus not entitled to
reimbursement. She contends that Brian stipulated to the civil court’s
jurisdiction, and the court’s comments indicated that it intended to divide the
debt and assign the entirety of the civil judgment to Brian as his separate
property obligation. She further argues that the civil judgment expressly
assigns one-half of the $150,000 community obligation to Reena and one-half
to Brian as their respective separate property obligations. According to
Reena, the family court therefore erred in characterizing the civil judgment
as a community obligation rather than Brian’s separate property obligation.
      We remain unpersuaded. As an initial matter, even if it were clear
from the record that the civil court intended to divide the community
obligation into two separate property obligations, it lacked the authority to do
so under these circumstances. (See Glade, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455.)
As we have explained, the family court already had subject matter
jurisdiction to characterize and divide the community property, and once a
“family law court acquires jurisdiction to divide community property in a
dissolution action, no other department of a superior court may make an
order adversely affecting that division.” (Id. at p. 1454, quoting Askew v.
Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 961.) Reena was not party to the civil case,
so the civil court had no personal jurisdiction over her or subject matter

                                       12
jurisdiction over the community estate, and Brian could not unilaterally

waive the family court’s reservation of jurisdiction.2
      Even assuming Brian could waive the family court’s reservation of
jurisdiction and stipulate to the civil court deciding all issues necessarily
reserved to the family court, as Reena claims, it is not clear from the record
that this is what occurred. Reena relies on the fact that Brian’s trial counsel
explained in closing to the civil court that the family court judgment provided
that the civil court was to decide the issue of whether the promissory note
was a loan or a gift and, once the civil court made that determination, “it goes
back to the Family court for the court to decide if – whatever you decide, if
that is going to be a community obligation or – or not.” This is in fact what
happened and is precisely what the family court intended in reserving
jurisdiction to determine the community nature of any obligation arising from
the civil case.
      The oral proceedings are similarly ambiguous in terms of whether the
civil court intended to make a final determination as to the community
nature of the promissory note and judgment. Although the civil court
initially stated on the record that it could make “additional findings” and
“save [the parties] a trip back to Family court,” it later seemed to realize that
the civil complaint’s prayer of relief was limited to $75,000 plus interest,
rather than the full amount owed on the promissory note. The civil court
then explained that Brian would “not . . . be obligated for more than his share
of one-half of the – or his share of the one-half of the principal, which is 75-.”

2      These same principles compel us to reject Reena’s related argument,
styled under a separate heading in her opening brief, that the family court’s
findings and order after hearing is an “impermissible infringement” on the
civil judgment.
                                        13
The court never expressly stated that it was making a final determination
regarding the characterization and division of the community debt.
      More importantly, it is the final written judgment—not the civil court’s
oral musings on the record—that is controlling. (See In re Jennifer G. (1990)
221 Cal.App.3d 752, 756, fn. 1 [to the extent the “court’s oral pronouncement
differ[s] from its written order, the written order controls”].) The civil
judgment makes no determination as to whether the promissory note or
judgment itself constitutes a community obligation. Nor does it state that
any community obligation has been divided into two separate property
obligations, as Reena claims. Rather, it provides that Brian is liable for one-
half of the principal sum of $150,000 due under the promissory note, as well
as one-half of the interest calculated at the rate of five percent beginning on
June 28, 2015. This is all it could do, as Reena’s parents chose to seek only
one-half of the principal sum, or $75,000, plus interest in their complaint. In
the absence of any explicit determination of this issue in the civil judgment,
the family court still had reserved jurisdiction to decide whether the civil
judgment was community in nature.
      We similarly reject Reena’s argument that her parents “effectively
accomplished” the judicial division of the $150,000 obligation by filing a civil
complaint. She provides no support for her assertion that the filing of a civil
lawsuit can subvert the family court’s reservation of jurisdiction. It was not
for Reena’s parents to decide what constitutes a community or separate
obligation. That power was held by the family court alone in this case, and
we conclude that it properly characterized the civil judgment as a community
obligation.

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D. The Family Court Appropriately Exercised Its Discretion in Granting
Brian’s Request for Reimbursement
      Reena also contends that the family court erred in granting Brian’s
request for reimbursement because it is contrary to fundamental principles of
California community property law. According to Reena, the result of the
family court’s order is an unequal division of the parties’ community property
without justification, which cannot stand under Family Code section 2550,
and the order requiring reimbursement of one-half of Brian’s attorneys’ fees
incurred in the civil case should also be reversed because there was no benefit
to the community. We are not persuaded.
      As an initial matter, we disagree with Reena’s claim that the family
court and civil court both “confirmed” that one-half of the $150,000
promissory note was assigned to Brian as his separate property obligation.
Rather, the family court concluded that “the loan owed to [Reena]’s parents
evidenced by a promissory note in the amount of $150,000, which was
resolved via the Civil Case, is a community obligation.” (Italics added.) The
family court also explained at the end of the hearing on Brian’s request for
reimbursement that it “found persuasive the analysis in [Brian’s]
memorandum of points and authorities regarding the debt owed by the
community, that was resolved in the civil case. Because it is community
property, then the community is responsible for half. And so each side bears
half, responsibility for half of that amount.” The court thus properly divided
the civil judgment (and corresponding attorneys’ fees), which it determined to
be a community obligation, equally between Brian and Reena. Because Brian
had already satisfied the entire judgment with his separate property funds,
he was entitled to reimbursement out of the community property. (Oliverez,
supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 302, fn. 1.)

                                       15
      Reena’s argument that because the $150,000 note constituted a
community obligation, the $75,000 (plus interest) civil judgment necessarily
represents Brian’s separate property obligation, rests on a flawed premise—
that the remaining amount originally owed on the promissory note also
constitutes a legally enforceable obligation, and one that has been “assigned”
to Reena. To the contrary, the civil judgment represents the entire
community obligation as it pertains to the promissory note after the
conclusion of the civil case. The family court agreed with Brian, as do we,
that Reena’s parents have no legal claim at this point for the remainder of
the promissory note, as any such claim would be barred by the statute of

limitations and the doctrine of res judicata.3 Reena’s parents made a
strategic decision to sue only Brian and to seek only one-half of the total
amount due to them under the promissory note. While their choice may be
understandable given that the alternative was to sue their daughter, the
result is that there is no legally enforceable obligation to Reena’s parents on
the promissory note outside of the civil judgment, which Brian has already
satisfied in full.
      Although Reena claims to have made a separate agreement with her
parents to make payments related to the promissory note, any such
agreement or debt is not a community obligation. In any event, the family
court concluded Reena’s evidence regarding these payments was not credible,
stating that it found “unpersuasive the position that she continued to pay on
the promissory note.” Based on the family court’s fact findings, then, the only
payments that have been made on the loan were those made by Brian. The

3      The family court adopted the analysis of the memorandum of points
and authorities Brian submitted in support of his request for reimbursement,
“finding the analysis persuasive.”
                                       16
court thus rejected the only evidence supporting Reena’s equitable argument
on appeal that Brian’s request for reimbursement should have been denied
because it will result in the assignment of three-quarters of the community
obligation to Reena and thus unfairly benefit Brian. (See Epstein, supra, 24
Cal.3d at p. 84 [reimbursement not appropriate where the “ ‘payment was
made under circumstances in which it would have been unreasonable to
expect reimbursement’ ”].)
      We cannot say the family court abused its discretion in reaching this
conclusion. Substantial evidence supports it: Reena presented no written
agreement with her parents regarding her payments to them outside of the
note, and her father testified in the civil case that one did not exist; her
testimony regarding the details of their verbal agreement conflicted with that
of her father; and the documents purporting to show Reena’s payments to her
father lacked basic, necessary information, such as the source and recipient
of the funds. “Drawing every inference in favor of the trial court’s decision as
we are required to do,” we agree with Brian that there was sufficient basis for
the family court to order reimbursement. (See Oliverez, supra, 33
Cal.App.5th at p. 313.) And, as in Oliverez, the result of the family court’s
ruling is that the only legally enforceable debt—the civil judgment—“is being
divided equally between the parties, as required by [Family Code] section
2550.” (Ibid.)
      We also disagree with Reena’s contention that the family court erred in
granting the request for reimbursement of one-half of Brian’s attorneys’ fees
incurred in the civil case because there was no benefit to the community. Her
argument—that Brian cannot be reimbursed for funds he spent defending his
separate property obligation—is based on the premise that the civil judgment
was not a community obligation, which we have already rejected. We

                                        17
therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
ordered Reena to reimburse Brian for one-half of the judgment and one-half
of his attorneys’ fees.
E. Brian Was Not Required to Join Reena to the Civil Case
      Finally, although Reena argues that Brian should be estopped from
seeking reimbursement based on his failure to join her in the civil case, she
admits that the rule she cites in support of her argument is permissive. We
first note that Reena did not present this argument to the family court, so we
may reject it as forfeited. (See City of San Diego v. D.R. Horton (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 668, 685 [contentions or theories raised for the first time on
appeal are not entitled to consideration].) Even considering the argument on
its merits, we agree with Brian that he was not required to join Reena to the
civil case. The family court had expressly reserved jurisdiction to determine
the community nature of any obligation resulting from the civil case, so there
was no need for Reena to be party to the civil case.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. Brian is entitled to recover his costs on appeal.

                                                               BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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