Court Opinion

ID: 9857454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:35:34.877325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:30.786125
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
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In his first point of error appellant contends the evidence was not sufficient to prove that when he “restrained” his wife before he killed her, he did so with the intent to prevent her liberation. Thus, although he admittedly murdered her in the course of falsely imprisoning her, he did not murder her in the course of a kidnapping. Compare V.T.C.A. Penal Code, §§ 20.02 & 20.03. Specifically he contends that the evidence shows he restrained his wife with the exclusive intent to kill her, and that there is no evidence he specifically intended to prevent her liberation.
The majority rejects this contention on authority of a single citation, viz: Brimage v. State, — S.W.2d — (Tex.Cr.App., No. 70,105, delivered September 21, 1994). Bri-mage, however, is a plurality opinion. It is, moreover, pending this Court’s grant of the State’s motion for rehearing, and although the State’s motion does not assail the particular holding in Brimage that the Court relies upon today, this does not alter the fact that Brimage is not yet authoritative. In any event, the majority does not explain how Brimage serves to rebut appellant’s argument. The Court has more work to do.
*579Appellant concedes he “restrained” his wife before he killed her. I take this to mean he admits that the evidence shows he “restriet[ed her] movements without [her] consent [i.e., by force],” either “by moving [her] from one place to another or by confining [her].” V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 20.01(1) & (1)(A). He contends, however, that he did not “abduct” her in that he did not restrain her with the specific “intent to prevent [her] liberation by ... secreting [her] or holding [her] in a place where [she] is not likely to be found” or “using or threatening to use deadly force.” See V.T.C.A Penal Code, § 20.01(2)(A) & (B).
The majority answers that because appellant 1) admits he restrained his wife, and 2) the evidence clearly shows he did, in fact, “secrete” her, by placing her hog-tied body in the “closed” trunk of a ear, ipso facto, the evidence shows an intent to prevent her liberation. Maj. op. at 575. The majority apparently relies on Brimage for this proposition.
In Brimage the plurality opined that in order to commit the offense of kidnapping, it is not necessary to actually secrete the victim or use or threaten to use deadly force against her. The only actus reus element of kidnapping is restraint. The act of restraining amounts to kidnapping, not just false imprisonment, when it is accompanied by a specific intent to prevent the victim’s liberation; an intent to do so, moreover, in one of the two statutorily enumerated ways, either by secreting the victim or by using or threatening to use deadly force. Id., Slip op. at 10-12, — S.W.2d at-. The evidence need not show an actual secreting or use or threat of deadly force to justify a kidnapping conviction.
When the evidence does establish a secreting in fact, however, the majority evidently believes this necessarily establishes an intent to prevent liberation by secreting. In short, actual secreting equals a specific intent to prevent liberation. I do not accept this equation. In my view it is possible to restrain by actually secreting without harboring a specific intent to prevent liberation. The instant cause presents a good example.
To say that one restrains and secretes another with the intent to prevent liberation is to say it is one’s “conscious objective or desire” thus to prevent liberation. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 6.03(a). It is also possible, however, both to restrain and to secrete, not with the “conscious objective or desire,” but only “with knowledge” that it will prevent liberation. V.T.C.A Penal Code, § 6.08(b). That is to say, it is possible to restrain and secrete, being “aware” that it will prevent liberation, though preventing liberation is not the specific “conscious objective or desire.”
In the instant cause, it is clear appellant’s conscious objective or desire was to kill his wife and hide the body. It is clear that in order to do so he restricted her movement by force, substantially interfering with her liberty, by moving her from one place to another and by confining her. Thus, he “restrained” her. § 20.01(1) & (1)(A), supra. Moreover, when he hog-tied her and placed her in the trunk of the car and closed it, he “secreted” her; at least the jury could rationally have found he thereby “deposit[ed] or concealed her] in a hiding place.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1979), at 1036. What is not so clear, however, is that in so secreting her it was his “conscious objective or desire” to prevent her liberation. His conscious objective was to take her to the river and kill her, and then dispose of the body. Undoubtedly the evidence supports a finding he was at least “aware” she would not likely be liberated while in the trunk. But “awareness” does not support a jury verdict that he kidnapped her, and thus cannot support a conviction for capital murder.
It may be consistent with the evidence presented to conclude that appellant had a “conscious objective or desire” to prevent his wife’s liberation. But it is equally, if not more, consistent with the circumstantial evidence to conclude that he at best harbored an awareness that it was not reasonably likely she would be liberated if he put her in the trunk of the car in order to carry out what was his clear conscious objective, viz: to take her to the river (i.e., to “restrain” her) and kill her. The State offered no evidence to cause a rational jury to prefer one theory over the other. I have noted elsewhere that *580“[t]his is no more than to say that as to the element of specific intent, the State has failed to carry its burden of production.” Nelson v. State, 848 S.W.2d 126, 138-39 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (Clinton, J., dissenting). As in Nelson, the Court today “sanctions jury confabulation; plugging evidentiary gaps with speculation about what might have happened that is at least consistent with what the State has proved. But confabulation is not itself proof.” Id., at 139. For this reason I am inclined to hold the evidence insufficient to establish the requisite specific intent.
When it comes to the mens rea element of an offense, however, this Court has effectively excused the State from this burden of production. In Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843-46 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), the Court held that the former “reasonable alternative hypothesis” method for analyzing sufficiency of the evidence, rejected in Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), had never in any event applied to appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence to prove a culpable mental state. In essence this means that if all of the State’s circumstantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is consistent both with a culpable mental state and a non-culpable mental state, but does not lead a rational jury to prefer one theory over the other, we will nevertheless hold the evidence sufficient. The notion seems to be that when it comes to proving what is in the mind of a criminal, it would just be too onerous to hold the State to its full, albeit constitutionally mandated, burden of proof. Matson, supra, at 846.
Writing for a plurality of the Court in Brimage, I deferred to stare decisis and held the circumstantial evidence sufficient, despite the fact there was nothing in the evidence to lead a rational jury to prefer the theory that Brimage harbored a specific intent to prevent liberation over the theory that he simply meant to sexually assault his victim and then immediately kill her. Slip op. at 13-14 & n. 9, — S.W.2d at-& n. 9. For this proposition I cited Matson. Given the ghastly nature of crimes like Brimage’s and appellant’s, it is oftentimes tempting to relieve the State of its burden to prove the full capital component of an offense; to join, as it were, in the collective retributive impulse. Alas, as judges — even as popularly elected judges— we do not enjoy that liberty. In my view Matson legitimates that retributive impulse, and we should re-examine it.

II.

The instruction given by the trial court in this cause in an attempt to satisfy the Eighth Amendment limitations of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), is identical to that given by the trial court in Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1994). The majority in Riddle held it to be a sufficient Penry instruction, likening it to one we had earlier approved in Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 209 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). In my concurring opinion in Riddle I disagreed, pointing out that the instruction was much more like the one we expressly disapproved in Rios v. State, 846 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). I nevertheless concurred in the result in Riddle because there the defendant failed “to identify any mitigating evidence that either cannot be accounted for in mitigating fashion within the confines of the special issues, see Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993), or that this Court has seen fit to agree has mitigating significance apart from the special issues.” 888 S.W.2d at 9. I cannot say the same thing here. Thus I dissent to the Court’s disposition of appellant’s second through fifth points of error. Maj. op. at 575-576.
At the punishment phase of trial appellant adduced evidence that from his earliest childhood he was beaten and abused by his natural father, and by a succession of alcoholic stepfathers, usually after trying to save his mother from a similar fate. This exposure to violence, according to Dr. Wendell Dickerson, a forensic psychologist, in combination with substance abuse, produced in appellant an antisocial personality disorder. Another psychologist, Dr. Jerome Brown, affirmed that “there is a cause and effect relationship between [appellant’s] upbringing ... and the fact that he’s sitting here at counsel table today[.]” This level of childhood abuse and its formative effect on appellant’s personality can only have aggravating significance as it *581relates to the special issues under former Article 87.071, V.A.C.C.P. And it clearly has mitigating significance apart from the special issues. Moreover, appellant has even adduced evidence of so-called “nexus.” See Goss v. State, 826 S.W.2d 162, 165-66 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). The Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of appellant in the absence of jury consideration of the mitigating impact of this evidence. Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).
For reasons given in Rios and in my concurring opinion in Riddle, the instruction appellant got was not adequate. The Court should at least vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new punishment hearing under Article 44.29(c), V.A.C.C.P. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.