Court Opinion

ID: 9695801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:29:29.77353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:16.626002
License: Public Domain

PERRIS, Bankruptcy Judge,
concurring:
I concur because I am bound by the decision in Price that the actual notice requirement of § 523(a)(3) is met where the creditor “was given actual notice in time to file a complaint, or at least to file a timely motion for an extension of time.” Id. at 99. (emphasis added). The dissent characterizes as dictum Price’s indication that the notice is sufficient where the creditor has given actual notice of the bankruptcy in time to file a timely motion for an extension of time. I disagree. While the 58 day period in Price may have been sufficient to allow the timely filing of a complaint, the Ninth Circuit did not indicate that it was. It merely indicated that the notice was sufficient to allow either (1) a complaint or (2) a motion for an extension. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit set forth a two prong disjunctive test. Because it is unclear which prong of the test was satisfied in Price, neither prong of the test is dictum. Appellant’s attorney conceded at oral argument that he could have filed a timely motion for an extension of time even though he received only 7 days notice. Consequently, appellant received sufficient actual notice to prevent a complaint filed after the bar date from being timely.
Hopefully, the Court of Appeals will reexamine the portion of the Price decision that notice of the bankruptcy received by the creditor in time to request an extension of time before the bar date is sufficient to meet the actual notice requirement of § 523(a)(3). The plain language of *723§ 523(a)(3)(B) refers to actual notice in time to permit a request for a determination of dischargeability. While a complaint to determine dischargeability is such a request, a motion for an extension of time is not. In addition, the rule in Price upsets the normal responsibilities for scheduling creditors imposed upon debtors and the reasonable period usually accorded creditors to file objections to discharge and discharge-ability complaints. As the dissent suggests, rewarding a debtor who fails to live up to his normal responsibility for scheduling creditors by shifting to the creditor an obligation to seek an extension in order to have a reasonable period of time to utilize a remedy may encourage abuse by debtors.