Court Opinion

ID: 9729139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:27:17.978392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.582839
License: Public Domain

Heavican, C.J.,
dissenting.
Initially, we note that state and federal courts have considered numerous cases concerning Moore’s conviction, sentencing, and resentencing.1 In his second postconviction action following his resentencing to death, Moore raised an Eighth Amendment challenge to execution by electrocution generally and to the electrocution procedure in the then newly adopted 15-second protocol. Moore requested an order declaring electrocution to be unconstitutional.
On appeal from the denial of his request, this court determined that Moore’s constitutional challenge to electrocution as the state-mandated method of execution was procedurally barred because in his direct appeal following resentencing, he did not *501appeal the district court’s overruling of his motion challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty.2 We further concluded that we could not reach Moore’s challenge to the protocol because “Moore’s.electrocution procedure challenge would not constitute grounds for setting aside his sentence of death and would not ‘render the judgment void or voidable,’ ”3 a requirement for relief under Nebraska’s postconviction statutes.
However, we specifically distinguished civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) from actions for postconviction relief and indicated that a challenge to the protocol may be available under § 1983: We discussed cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a § 1983 action was an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment challenge to a state’s method of execution, seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief against application of its procedures.4 “A [civil rights] suit seeking to enjoin a particular means of effectuating a sentence of death does not directly call into question the ‘fact’ or ‘validity’ of the sentence itself — by simply altering its method of execution, the State can go forward with the sentence.”5 This type of action is not procedurally barred as the functional equivalent of a successive application for habeas corpus relief.
Despite our clarification of the proper method for challenging the means of execution, Moore has not filed a § 1983 action seeking to enjoin his execution until the State alters its protocol or adopts another means of execution. Moreover, Moore has recently filed a pleading in this court stating that he no longer wishes to challenge his sentence and further stating that “no filings are to be accepted by this court which are not prepared and filed by myself.” Moore’s statements and lack of action show that he has elected to waive his right to challenge the State’s protocol.
*502Through its inherent judicial power, this court has authority to do all things reasonably necessary for the proper administration of justice whether or not any previous form of remedy has been granted.6 We have specifically stated that we have the inherent judicial power to set successive execution dates and issue death warrants.7 However, in so doing, we must respect constitutional, jurisdictional, and jurisprudential restraints on our power to act.
Except in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court is one of limited and enumerated powers.8 Article V, § 2, of the Nebraska Constitution prohibits the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court except for causes of action listed in that provision.9 While it is not a constitutional prerequisite for jurisdiction, the existence of an actual case or controversy is necessary for the exercise of judicial power by a Nebraska state court.10 There is no pending request in this case, and the Attorney General has filed an affidavit averring that Moore has no known pending actions in state or federal court. We know of no case in which a court suspended a state’s executions outside of the court’s authority to act in response to a request for relief in an existing case by the condemned person.11
We are aware of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in In re Ross,12 in which petitioners — the public defender and *503father of Michael B. Ross — sought to stay Ross’ execution and were denied relief. In an earlier case, the court had stated that Ross had not forfeited his ability to “exercise his right to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus at any time and that, if he does so, the execution will be stayed.”13 Nonetheless, Ross specifically stated he did not wish to pursue such relief. The petitioners then sought postconviction relief on Ross’ behalf. They argued that Ross could not waive his right to seek postconviction remedies and that his execution must therefore be stayed.
The court rejected, for lack of standing, the petitioners’ attempt to gain next friend status to file the action on behalf of Ross and dismissed their motions to stay the execution. “It simply is unprecedented for this court to conclude that, although it has no jurisdiction over the case before it, it may act in that case to enter a stay in a separate proceeding.”14 The Connecticut Supreme Court further stated that the pendency of an unrelated unproven case in which the claim of systematic arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty would not provide grounds for staying the death penalty in Ross’ case.15
Since this court issued the death warrant, there have been no requests for relief to this court by Moore, nor has he rescinded his earlier request that no action be taken by this court in his case. In the absence of any such action, this court has no immediate basis to act and it is unprecedented to do so.
Miller-Lerman, J., and Cassel, Judge, join in this dissent.

 See, State v. Moore, 272 Neb. 71, 718 N.W.2d 537 (2006); State v. Moore, 256 Neb. 553, 591 N.W.2d 86 (1999); State v. Moore, 250 Neb. 805, 553 N.W.2d 120 (1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1176, 117 S. Ct. 1448, 137 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1997); State v. Moore, 243 Neb. 679, 502 N.W.2d 227 (1993); State v. Moore, 217 Neb. 609, 350 N.W.2d 14 (1984); State v. Moore, 210 Neb. 457, 316 N.W.2d 33 (1982), cert. denied 456 U.S. 984, 102 S. Ct. 2260, 72 L. Ed. 2d 864; Moore v. Kinney, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Neb. 2000), affirmed 320 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2003); and Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1990), rehearing denied 951 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 504 U.S. 930, 112 S. Ct. 1995, 118 L. Ed. 2d 591 (1992).

 See State v. Moore, supra note 1, 272 Neb. 71, 718 N.W.2d 537 (2006).

 Id. at 80, 718 N.W.2d at 544.

 See, Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 165 L. Ed. 2d 44 (2006); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 158 L. Ed. 2d 924 (2004).

 Nelson, supra note 4, 541 U.S. at 644.

 State v. Joubert, 246 Neb. 287, 518 N.W.2d 887 (1994).

 Id.

 State ex rel. Wieland v. Moore, 252 Neb. 253, 561 N.W.2d 230 (1997).

 See id.

 Johnston v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 270 Neb. 987, 709 N.W.2d 321 (2006).

 Compare, e.g., Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (discussing history of stays and evidentiary hearings conducted after condemned prisoner filed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging lethal injection procedures); Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1999) (holding that execution by electric chair did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment after court had issued stay for evidentiary hearing pursuant to condemned prisoner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed while he was under warrant of death).

 In re Ross, 272 Conn. 676, 866 A.2d 554 (2005).

 State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 580 n.2, 863 A.2d 654, 656 n.2 (2005).

 In re Ross, supra note 12, 272 Conn, at 679-80, 866 A,2d at 557.

 See id.