Court Opinion

ID: 9738099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:42:44.950148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.683292
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting: In assessing the effectiveness of counsel at capital sentencing hearings, my colleagues are disregarding recent Federal court decisions that suggest that we should reconsider and abandon our prior holding that the failure to offer evidence in mitigation does not demonstrate incompetence of counsel. (See 121 Ill. 2d at 389.) In particular, Dillon v. Duckworth (7th Cir. 1984), 751 F.2d 895, and Gaines v. Thieret (N.D. Ill. 1987), 665 F. Supp. 1342, demonstrate that the Federal courts intend to overturn death sentences that we affirm based on the majority’s view that defense counsel’s failure to introduce any evidence in mitigation does not indicate ineffective assistance of counsel. Because I agree with the position followed by the Federal courts that a wholly unexplained decision not to offer any mitigation evidence in a capital sentencing hearing is strong evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, and because I see no reason to prolong this case by waiting for reversal on Federal habeas review, I dissent. In Dillon, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that a counsel’s “almost nonexistent effort to avoid the death penalty once [defendant’s] guilt was established is incomprehensible and was extremely prejudicial to [defendant].” (Dillon v. Duckworth, 751 F.2d at 901.) There the court did not reach the question whether this “incomprehensible” behavior alone constituted ineffective assistance, because counsel’s performance at trial was so deficient that the court ordered a retrial. Dillon’s message for defense counsel in capital sentencing hearings is nonetheless clear: the failure to call any character witnesses or to make a reasonable effort to present mitigating factors indicates a lack of preparation sufficient to form the basis of an ineffective-assistance claim. The majority attempts to distinguish Dillon, noting that defendant made no showing that his counsel had “failed to present mitigating evidence of which he was aware.” (121 Ill. 2d at 390.) But the point of Dillon was that counsel was so inexperienced and under such stress that he did not try to discover or present mitigating factors. At least in Dillon, defense counsel called defendant to testify that the defendant was only 18 years old, had no previous criminal record and had not intended to kill anyone. In this case, the sum total of defense counsel’s efforts at the sentencing hearing is as follows: “The Court: Mr. Washington, do you care to present any mitigation on behalf of your client? Mr. Washington: No, your Honor. Other than to state to your Honor that we feel that there is a lack of significant criminal history on the part of this defendant. We are mindful of the two juvenile convictions, but we feel that that does not fall within the category that is anticipated by the statute in which a lack of significant criminal history should be considered as a mitigating factor. Other than that, we have no mitigation.” This almost nonexistent effort does not fall “within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” required by Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065. Paradoxically, the majority seems to recognize that by virtue of the defendant’s good relationship with his mother, she was a logical character witness, yet it uses the lack of any record of what she might have said to support its view that counsel’s failure to offer mitigating evidence did not demonstrate incompetence. (121 Ill. 2d at 389-90.) I respectfully suggest that this view completely distorts the ineffective-assistance inquiry. The lack of evidence introduced in mitigation does not imply counsel was effective; rather, it suggests he was ineffective. Moreover, the implication that no mitigating evidence was available is belied by the death penalty statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(c)) and our previous case law (e.g., People v. Stewart (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 463, 492-93), which demonstrate that the type of mitigating evidence admissible at a sentencing hearing is by no means limited. In fact, as commentators have noted, the list of potential mitigating factors is virtually endless. (See, e.g., Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: Strickland and the Illinois Death Penalty Statute, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 131, 154-55; Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 Akron L. Rev. 331, 360 (1979) (suggesting several potential mitigating factors, including alcohol or drug addiction and defendant’s precarious mental state at the time of crime).) In this case, it takes little imagination to see the potential mitigating evidence available, in particular, that defendant was 33 years old and his only criminal record was over 15 years ago, that he maintained a good relationship with his mother and that he was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the crime. The majority also speculates that the trial judge might not have believed defendant’s alibi witness. (121 Ill. 2d at 389-90.) However, this speculation does not explain or excuse counsel’s failure to call her as a character witness. Responding to a similar argument presented in Gaines, the district judge wrote: “The remaining mitigating evidence available simply had no downside risk. Arguably, the jury might not attach much weight to the testimony *** however, something is still better than nothing. Even if counsel had the sense.that [defendant’s] family was generally hostile toward him, *** we again point out that there is no evidence that the family members would not testify in his behalf or that they wanted [defendant] to receive the death penalty.” (Gaines, 665 F. Supp. at 1366.) Here, as in Gaines, the record reveals no strategic rationale for counsel’s decision to present no mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. “Instead, without mitigating evidence, counsel essentially left [defendant] with no defense at all. Such an approach *** could only produce the worst possible result for his client and cannot, under these circumstances, be considered ‘sound trial strategy.’ ” Gaines, 665 F. Supp. at 1367-68. Not only do I agree with the court in Gaines that such total failure to present mitigating factors fulfills the requirements of the first prong of the Strickland ineffective-assistance analysis, but also I believe that the circumstances present here are “so likely to prejudice the accused that such prejudice need not be shown, but instead will be presumed.” (People v. Hattery (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 449, 461.) Normally, to state a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the counsel’s ineffectiveness made a difference in the outcome. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) But as we noted in Hattery, in cases in which counsel utterly fails in his role as advocate to test the prosecution’s case, defendant’s sixth amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel have been violated, and the outcome is presumptively unreliable. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 461; see also Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: Strickland and the Illinois Death Penalty Statute, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 131 (suggesting that Strickland requires Illinois courts to adopt a per se rule of ineffective assistance where prosecution has shown aggravating factors and defense counsel fails to present mitigating evidence). In this case, the prosecution had presented its case-showing that defendant was eligible for the death penalty and arguing that defendant’s juvenile record precluded defendant from arguing no prior criminal activity as a mitigating factor. The Illinois death penalty statute requires that a judge who determines that defendant is eligible for the death penalty must sentence that defendant to death if it is also determined that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(h); see also People v. Owens (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 88, 113-14 (holding that section 9 — 1(h) is mandatory).) Though I continue to believe it unconstitutional, this court has interpreted section 9 — 1 to mean that “once the State established the existence of statutory aggravating factors defendant had the burden of coming forward with evidence of mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty.” (People v. Olinger (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 324, 351; see also 112 Ill. 2d at 355 (Simon, J., dissenting).) Thus, defense counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence was tantamount to conceding that defendant should be sentenced to death. I believe that defense counsel’s failure to come forward with any mitigating evidence undermines the reliability of the sentencing hearing by destroying its adversarial nature. As the Supreme Court explained in the companion case to Strickland: “[T]he adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires that the accused have ‘counsel acting in the role of an advocate.’ [Citation.] The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted — even if defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors — the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.” (United States v. Cronic (1984), 466 U.S. 648, 656-57, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 666, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2045-46.) Defense counsel’s perfunctory representation of defendant at the sentencing hearing causes me to believe that “[c]ounsel simply did not subject the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing that would justify our reliance on the proceeding as having produced a just result.” Gaines, 665 F. Supp. at 1371. Even if prejudice is not presumed in this case, I believe that Strickland’s second prong is met here. Strickland requires that to show prejudice “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) Considering the wide discretion vested in the capital sentencer to dispense mercy, it is impossible to determine with confidence sufficient under Strickland that defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure in the sentencing hearing. Several commentators have pointed out that the ultimate effect of defense counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence at a capital sentencing hearing simply cannot be gauged. (E.g., Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 350-54 (1983); Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: Strickland and the Illinois Death Penalty Statute, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 131, 146-47.) Assessing errors taking place at a capital sentencing hearing, this court has similarly hypothesized that “where a sentencer’s discretion in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors is quite wide, the predicate for harmless-error review — an ability to ascertain the impact of an error on the decision maker — is missing.” (People v. Simms (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 259, 274.) In such an uncertain area, where the decisionmaker’s discretion is wide and the adversarial nature of the proceeding is compromised, how much confidence can one place in the outcome? To ensure the fairness and reliability of the imposition of this ultimate sentence, Strickland requires more than speculation with respect to how the addition of mitigating evidence might have affected the sentencer’s decision. I am aware that my position is in conflict with the holdings of several of our previous cases, but if the Federal courts are going to remand such cases for resentencing, I see no reason why this court should not reconsider the reasoning of these cases. For example, when we considered Gaines’ ineffective-assistance claim, this court found no prejudice in light of the substantial evidence in aggravation. We also noted that Gaines had failed to indicate, what evidence could have been offered at the sentencing hearing. (People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 79, 94-95.) Nevertheless, on habeas review the Federal district court vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. (Gaines, 665 F. Supp. 1342.) Here, the majority simply cites some of the cases the district court found unpersuasive in Gaines, notes that the record does not reveal what mitigating evidence could have been presented, and rejects defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim. Rather than disregarding the Gaines decision and awaiting reversal on Federal habeas review, I would reconsider those holdings that are inconsistent with the Gaines and Dillon decisions in the Federal courts, and in this case order a new sentencing hearing. In addition, I adhere to my view that the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional for the reasons stated in my dissent to People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 129, 179 (Simon, J., dissenting). I also agree with Justice Marshall’s calling for Supreme Court review of “a scheme that gives the prosecutor the unbridled discretion to select, from the group of individuals convicted of an offense punishable by death, the subgroup that will be considered for death.” Eddmonds v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 894, 896, 83 L. Ed. 2d 207, 208, 105 S. Ct. 271, 272 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also People v. Johnson (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 119, 152-53 (Simon, J., dissenting) (citing cases and articles that argue that prosecutorial discretion must be limited to prevent arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty). For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.