Court Opinion

ID: 9631824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:51:22.583148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:54.134332
License: Public Domain

PHELPS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. I quite agree with the premise assumed by the majority that a body of ore, however rich in mineral content may be, may be of little or no value when so located that it is not accessible to mining equipment or to a processing plant. And I agree with the converse that the mining equipment or processing plant is likewise of little value except when it is capable of being used for mining and processing of ores and to that extent their proximity and availability for use of each by the other is a proper matter for consideration in arriving at their assessed valuation for taxing purposes.
It is the application of the above principle by the majority opinion to which I object. In my humble judgment the majority opinion has gone beyond the realm of reason and reduces the principle to what appears to me to be an absurdity. To illustrate. Let us use the figures incorporated in the majority opinion upon which its conclusion is reached. At the time of the trial in this case on October 14, 1949, and a long time prior thereto the 46,308 tons designated therein in column 1 as “mined” ore had been previously reduced to cash, resulting in a net profit to appellee in the sum of $235,868.64 which it then had in its possession. The remaining 46,980 tons designated as “reserve” was estimated to have a net cash value of $45,100.80’ (whether this latter tonnage had then been reduced to cash the record does not show), making a total of $280,969.44. Appellee then availed itself of the discounts allowed in what is known in mining circles as the Hoskold table to estimate the present cash value of the $280,969.44. The result reached *379was a present net value of the ore mined and in place, at the time of trial amounting to the sum of $260,158.03. This amount is only approximately $25,000 in excess of the cash then in its possession as a result of the conversion of a portion of the ore into cash.
The county assessor had previously and within the time prescribed by law, fixed the assessed value of the plant located upon the property at $146,405. No appeal was taken by appellee from that assessment. It was therefore final and binding upon everyone including appellee. The superior court therefore was wholly without jurisdiction to consider, review, or to change such assessment. Its jurisdiction was limited to a determination of the value of the mine itself as distinguished from the plant. Notwithstanding its lack of jurisdiction it did, in effect, reduce the assessed value of the plant from $146,405.00 to $46,228. It accepted testimony of witnesses for the appellee that the plant had only a junk value of $46,228. It then added this amount to the $260,158.03 and for some reason wholly beyond my power to comprehend, deducted the $146,405.00 from the total leaving a net value of the mine of $159,981.03. This result is reached notwithstanding the fact that the undisputed evidence was to the effect that appellee then had in its possession $235,868.64 cash constituting the net profit derived from the mined tonnage of ore shown in the majority opinion in column 1 of its table. In addition to this, it had $45,100.80 estimated profits from the remaining tonnage in reserve. By the majority opinion this court is holding that $235,868.64 actual cash in hand plus $45,-100.60 worth of ore in reserve has a value of only $159,981.03 for taxing purposes. This method of computation and accounting is not in accord with any mathematical calculation with which I am familiar and has no support from the courts of any other state.
As a further illustration of its unsoundness let us assume that the plant here involved and assessed at $146,405.00 by the county assessor had been owned by John Doe and the mine by appellee during the year 1949. Could it then be contended that the assessor’s valuation of the plant must be deducted from the assessed value of the mine itself. The answer is emphatically “no”. How can the union of ownership in the mine and the plant alter the value of each for tax purposes? The answer is, it cannot. In my opinion the most that appellee is entitled to claim as a deduction from its net profits of $260,158.03 (largely reduced to cash) is the reasonable depreciation of the plant caused by its use in mining and processing ore taken from the mine during the year 1949. If plant depreciation was not considered in arriving at the net profits of $235,868.64 for the ore that has been converted into cash as well as the estimated net value of the ore in reserve, I dare say appellee stands alone among the industries of America in failing to avail itself of that legal right.
The assessment of the mine by the Tax Commission finds no support in the records *380of this case. It was clearly unjustified. It is equally clear to me that the assessed valuation of the mine and plant fixed by the court and sustained by the majority opinion is contrary to the law as established in the cases heretofore decided by this court on the subject and cited by the majority opinion. I think the majority has misinterpreted the language used in those cases.
Without discussing the other question raised, suffice it to say that I concur with Justice DE CONCINI in the views expressed in his dissenting opinion to the effect that the deduction of the development work in the sum of $148,926.60 in arriving at the assessed value of the mine is in direct conflict with the rule laid down in the previous Eagle Picher case decided in 1951, and should not have been allowed.