Court Opinion

ID: 9686019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:14:30.3656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:22.668457
License: Public Domain

SACKETT, C.J.
(concurring specially)
I concur in the result, but write separately concerning the basis for upholding the grant of a directed verdict. The majority correctly notes that, “[w]hen interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and give' effect to the intention of the legislature.” See Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004). However, “[w]e resort to ‘the rules of statutory construction only when the terms of [a] statute are ambiguous.’ ” State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 2006) (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001)). I do not see any ambiguity in the terms of the statute. The legislature listed numerous transactions that are excluded from the definition of “transfer” for purposes of real estate disclosures, including:
• A transfer to a mortgagee by a mortgagor or successor in interest who is in default,
*832• or a transfer by a mortgagee who has acquired real property at a sale conducted pursuant to chapter 654,
• a transfer back to a mortgagor exercising a right of first refusal pursuant to section 654.16A,
• a nonjudicial voluntary foreclosure procedure under section 654.18 or chapter 655A,
• or a deed in lieu of foreclosure under section 654.19.
Iowa Code § 558A.l(4)(b) (2003).
The district court concluded the words “or a deed in lieu of foreclosure” had “to modify or go with” the second item in the list grammatically. The unambiguous language and structure of the statute does not support this conclusion. After seeking the intent of the legislature, the majority determined, “The exclusion [in the second item] should apply whether a mortgagee acquires the property by a sale following a foreclosure or whether it acquires title by way of a deed in lieu of foreclosure. ” (Underlining added; italics in original). Since the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we should not seek the intent of the legislature. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d at 541; Harker, 633 N.W.2d at 325. Rather, we should apply the plain terms of the statute to the facts before us. For a court to determine a statute “should” say a certain thing is to make a policy decision — a role- reserved for the legislature. See Jensen v. Sattler, 696 N.W.2d 582, 586 (Iowa 2005).
Based on the plain language of the statute, the transfer at issue is not listed among the transactions excluded from a disclosure requirement. I believe the district court erred in concluding otherwise and in granting the motion for directed verdict on that basis. I would affirm the district court’s grant of a directed verdict for lack of substantial evidence to support the claim.2 See Hansen v. Seabee Corp., 688 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 2004) (noting we may affirm the district court’s decision if there is an alternative ground urged in the district court and on appeal that can support the court’s decision).

. When reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict, we view the evidence in the same light as the district court to determine whether the evidence generated a jury question. Toney v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa 1990). If there is not substantial evidence to support each element of the plaintiffs’ claim, a directed verdict is appropriate. See Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Iowa 2005); Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 317-18 (Iowa 1992).