Court Opinion

ID: 9407405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 20:06:13.416185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:37.366105
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 23055-U
                                         No. 2-23-0055
                                    Order filed July 6, 2023

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE

                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

In re S.S., a Minor.                   ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                       ) of McHenry County.
                                       )
                                       )
                                       ) Nos. 20-JA-74
                                       )
(The People of the State of Illinois,  ) Honorable
Petitioner-Appellee v. Brandon S.,     ) Jeffrey L. Hirsch,
Respondent-Appellant)                  ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Jorgensen and Kennedy concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1      Held: The trial court properly found respondent unfit and that it was in the minor’s best
              interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶2     Respondent, Brandon S., appeals from the trial court’s orders finding him unfit and

terminating his parental rights over the minor S.S, respondent’s daughter. Brandon contends that

the unfitness and termination findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶4     The facts of this case may be stated briefly and without controversy (in contrast to

Brandon’s presentation in his brief). The minor, S.S. was born in Nevada in February 2020. S.S.’s
2023 IL App (2d) 230055-U

mother, H.B., signed a specific consent for adoption by a relative. H.B.’s rights are not at issue in

this appeal.

¶5     In June 2020, there was a domestic incident between Brandon and H.B., in Hebron, which

occurred while three-month-old S.S. was present. At the time, Brandon, H.B., and S.S. were all

homeless and had no long-term housing arrangements. During the altercation, Brandon broke

H.B.’s phone and pushed her, then he took S.S. and fled with the child in a vehicle. He was later

stopped by the authorities and arrested. Afterwards, Brandon called and texted H.B. saying he

knew where the minor would be staying, that he would “beat the bloody pulp” out of her, and

“mop the floor with her blood.” In addition, it was discovered that there was an open abuse and

neglect case involving Brandon, H.B., and S.S, in Nevada. The circuit court issued an emergency

no-contact order enjoining Brandon from contacting either H.B. or S.S. Meanwhile, the State filed

a neglect petition, alleging that S.S.’s environment was injurious to her welfare. 705 ILCS 405/2-

3(1)(b) (West 2020). Protective custody was taken of S.S. and the case was managed by a contract

agency, Youth Services Bureau (YSB).

¶6     Subsequently, Brandon was arrested in July 2020 for threatening the initial foster parent

and the DCFS caseworker, which resulted in felony charges (20-CF-533). As will become relevant

later, the public defender was appointed to represent Brandon.

¶7     In August 2020, Brandon participated in an integrated assessment. During the intake

portion, Brandon stated that he was “registered as a lethal weapon” and reported that he had been

psychiatrically hospitalized over 500 times as an adolescent. Brandon made some additional

statements indicating that he knew the location of S.S.’s foster home and was in contact with

another child in that same foster home. This turned out to be false and the child Brandon described

never resided in the same foster home. Brandon also stated that he told the court to change S.S.’s

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foster home, and that the court then ordered it, and the child was moved from a relative to a non-

relative foster placement. Although a transfer did occur, it was not at all at Brandon’s direction; in

fact, it occurred in part as a result of safety concerns for the child and foster parents due to

Brandon’s threats. As a result of Brandon’s statements, and the fact that Brandon had previously

attempted to take S.S., heightened security protocols were implemented, particularly with respect

to any future court-ordered visitation.

¶8     The integrated assessment also recommended that Brandon: obtain suitable housing and

employment; remain drug and alcohol free (including cannabis); receive a psychological and

psychiatric assessment, if the latter was necessary; receive a medication management assessment;

participate in mental health services. Brandon was also recommended to participate in parenting

education and domestic violence services, but that could only be accomplished after treatment

through mental health services. These recommendations became Brandon’s service plan and were

prerequisites to restoring S.S. to his custody.

¶9     After paternity was established in October 2020, the court ordered supervised visitation.

Only one scheduled visit took place. Three other visits were tried but unsuccessful, and the court

suspended visitation indefinitely.

¶ 10   In February 2021 H.B. stipulated to the allegations in the State’s neglect petition and S.S.

was adjudicated neglected and made a ward of the court. The court then heard evidence that

Brandon had not undertook, much less completed, any recommended evaluations or services. In

particular, the court was informed that Brandon was only willing to be assessed by a physician

who agreed to prescribe him cannabis. In addition, Brandon was arrested again for threatening his

public defender in the prior threats case (20-CF-533, added charge). The court found that Brandon

was unwilling or unable to care for the minor, and that he was dispositionally unfit.

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¶ 11   Brandon completed a psychological assessment in June 2021, which found he suffers from

intense delusion and hallucinations, and presents with disorganized speech and thought patterns.

The evaluator diagnosed Brandon with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and recommended

inpatient psychiatric treatment and an additional psychiatric assessment. Laura McCoy, the YSB

caseworker, sent Brandon the results of the psychological assessment. Brandon was displeased

and sent a series of text messages to McCoy and the foster father in which Brandon berated McCoy,

denigrated the court, and stated that he knew where S.S. was staying and could take her. Brandon

sent an additional threat to S.S.’s foster father, which resulted in criminal charges and Brandon’s

arrest. A permanency hearing was held five days later, and the court found that Brandon had not

made reasonable efforts or progress. The court also ordered that Brandon undergo a psychiatric

evaluation.

¶ 12   In August 2021 Brandon was arrested for felony criminal damage to government property

(21-CF-691). In November, Brandon pled guilty and was sentenced to time served and probation.

The day after his release, H.B. sought and received an order of protection for her and S.S. Three

days after that, Brandon was charged with a violation of the order (21-CM-1059). At a permanency

hearing in February 2022, the court again found that Brandon had not made reasonable efforts or

progress.

¶ 13   Brandon received a psychiatric assessment and was referred for individual counseling in

April 2023. At the permanency hearing in July 2022, H.B. signed a specific consent for adoption

and the court found that Brandon still had not made reasonable efforts or progress. On the State’s

motion, the court changed S.S.’s permanency goal to substitute care. The State then filed a petition

to terminate Brandon’s parental rights, which alleged he was unfit because he (1) failed to maintain

a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for S.S.’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b)

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(West 2020)); (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for

removal during specified nine-month periods (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); and (3) failed to make reasonable

progress towards S.S.’s return to his care during specified nine-month periods (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)).

In particular, the State’s unfitness petition noted Brandon’s failure to attend 12 court dates after

his arraignment on the neglect petition.

¶ 14   At the unfitness hearing in October 2022, caseworker McCoy testified regarding Brandon’s

service plan, and his failure to complete services. McCoy noted that Brandon’s admitted cannabis

usage largely disqualified him from drug testing, that he had no consistent address, and that he

attended only a single counseling session after his psychiatric assessment. McCoy stated that

Brandon had made negligible progress, that he was not consistently taking prescribed psychiatric

medication, and that he either could not or would not complete services due to his disorders. The

only services Brandon completed were paternity testing and his initial assessments. Brandon

testified that he attempted to make it to his various appointments and comply with the service plan

but was frustrated by his occasional incarceration and treatment providers’ lack of flexibility

regarding initial scheduling and rescheduling for appointments he missed. Brandon also stated that

he had been seeing “a therapist” remotely but he could not recall the provider’s name or dates on

which he attended sessions. The trial court issued an 11-page memorandum decision finding

Brandon unfit under counts I and III of the petition.

¶ 15   Brandon did not appear at the best-interests hearing. The court, upon learning that Brandon

was in Tennessee and wished to appear remotely, attempted to accommodate this request; but after

waiting 35 minutes for Brandon to connect to the session without success, the court proceeded

without him. McCoy testified that S.S. was strongly bonded with her foster parents, who provided

S.S. with a loving home for the preceding 2½ years. By contrast, S.S. had virtually no relationship

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2023 IL App (2d) 230055-U

with Brandon since her infancy and often months would go by without Brandon making contact

with the agency or inquiring about S.S. Both foster parents testified regarding S.S.’s daily routine,

activities, and participation in events with her extended foster family. When S.S. first arrived in

her new home, physical therapy was needed to compensate for deficits in her motor skills, and she

had made considerable progress. Both foster parents were committed to S.S.’s adoption and her

long-term permanency. The hearing concluded without Brandon having joined remotely.

¶ 16   At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that it was in S.S.’s best interests to

terminate Brandon’s parental rights and entered a written order. The court appointed appellate

counsel to represent Brandon and this appeal followed.

¶ 17                                     II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18   On appeal, Brandon contends that the trial court’s unfitness and best-interests findings were

contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The State, on the other hand, contends that the

evidence was more than sufficient. We agree with the State.

¶ 19   At any time after the entry of the dispositional order, the State may file a petition requesting

termination of parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-13(4) (West 2022); In re Brandon A., 395 Ill. App.

3d 224, 234, 334 (2009). Thereafter, the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.

(West 2022)) provides for the termination of parental rights in a two-step process. “First, there

must be a showing, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is ‘unfit,’ as that term

is defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998)).” In re C.W., 199

Ill. 2d 198, 210 (2002). After finding the parent unfit, the court next considers whether it is in the

best interests of the child to terminate parental rights. Id. We will reverse an unfitness or best-

interests finding only if the trial court’s determination was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. In re Nevaeh R., 2017 IL App (2d) 170229, ¶ 17. A decision is against the manifest

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weight of the evidence where the opposite result was clearly apparent. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill.

App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006).

¶ 20   We first address unfitness. Section 1(D) of the Adoption Act provides various grounds

under which a parent may be found unfit. We focus our attention on count I—that Brandon failed

to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for S.S.’s welfare—as

any one count, properly proven, is sufficient to sustain a finding of parental unfitness. See In re

D.C., 209 Ill. 2d 287, 296 (2004). Because the language used in this ground for unfitness is in the

disjunctive, “any one of the three individual elements, i.e., interest or concern or responsibility,

may be considered by itself as a basis for unfitness.” In re B’Yata I., 2013 IL App 2d 130558, ¶ 31

(emphasis in original). When determining whether a parent has shown a reasonable degree of

interest, concern, or responsibility for a minor's welfare, a court considers “the parent’s efforts to

visit and maintain contact with the child as well as other indicia, such as inquiries into the child’s

welfare. Id. Courts may also consider whether a parent completed necessary service plans in

making such a determination. Id. A parent’s interest, concern, or responsibility “must be

objectively reasonable,” and courts must focus on the parent’s efforts that show interest in the

child’s wellbeing, and not on his or her successes. Id.

¶ 21   Brandon largely contends that his actions were reasonable and that his progress was

hindered by “government interference in his ability to comply.” He asserts that he did all he could

under the circumstances and attributes the result in this case to the failure of YSB caseworkers to

make a “proper” psychiatric referral. We disagree.

¶ 22   Brandon’s argument unduly minimizes the evidence before the trial court of his own

actions and inaction. First, there was overwhelming evidence of Brandon’s failure to comply with

the directives of his service plan, which indicates a lack of interest, concern, or responsibility for

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the minor’s welfare. See In re B’yata I., 2014 IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31. The service plan

outlined the necessary steps for Brandon to obtain visitation and potentially restore S.S. to his

custody. The record shows that over the 2½ years this case was pending, Brandon failed to

complete most of the plan. Second, the record is replete with instances showing Brandon was

hostile towards S.S.’s caregivers and caseworkers, which resulted in his arrest (and later,

conviction) on felony charges, and willfully defied court orders to stay away from H.B. and S.S.

Eventually, Brandon proved himself to be an outright threat to the safety of others, including S.S.

That is not something that caseworkers, the trial court, or this court could take lightly.

¶ 23   To the extent that Brandon faults YSB and DCFS for perceived errors in making referrals,

we note that this was the basis on which the trial court found insufficient evidence of unfitness on

count II. But, those errors, if any, do not diminish the evidence with respect to count I. As our

supreme court has pointed out, subsection (b) “contains no state of mind requirement, nor does it

carve out an exception for faultless failure.” In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 26. Circumstances such

as difficulty in obtaining transportation, poverty, actions and statements of others that hinder

progress or visitation, and the need to resolve other life issues are relevant, to be sure. In re

Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 278-79 (1990). However, a parent is not fit merely because he

or she has demonstrated some interest or affection toward the child. In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill App.

3d 239, 259 (2004). Again, the degree of interest, concern, and responsibility must be objectively

reasonable. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1064.

¶ 24   Throughout the pendency of this case, Brandon’s behavior revealed a preoccupation with

himself and his grievances, rather than S.S.’s welfare. When, as here, “personal visits with the

child are somehow impractical, letters, telephone calls, and gifts to the child or those caring for

the child may demonstrate a reasonable degree of concern, interest and responsibility, depending

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upon the content, tone, and frequency of those contacts under the circumstances.” (Citation and

internal quotation marks omitted.) In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 26; see also In re B’yata I., 2014

IL App (2d) 130558-B, ¶ 31 (citing In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 279). The record is devoid

of any evidence of letters, gifts, or even inquiries by Brandon regarding S.S.’s wellbeing. Brandon

refused to release medical or psychiatric records to the agencies, which he claimed he had, yet

never provided. Rather, the record is replete with instances of missed critical appointments and

court dates, all of which showed that Brandon was either unable or simply unwilling to take

responsibility for his behavior, outlook, or psychiatric condition. Brandon was not even minimally

compliant with medication therapy, misrepresented the statements of clinicians and the court, and

asserted that he “kn[e]w” best, despite ample evidence to the contrary. Some of his conduct may

be explained as symptoms of his largely untreated psychiatric condition; but that does not excuse

his failure to make any meaningful progress towards, or inquiry into, S.S.’s wellbeing. As the trial

court noted:

       “Brandon came up with tenuous excuses time after time[,] showing indifference rather than

       demonstrating an interest, concern[,] or responsibility for the welfare of the child by taking

       reasonable, doable steps for his services and attending court to review his efforts and

       progress. Whatever else being a fit parent may entail, showing up and earnestly trying to

       follow through with services are undoubtedly the least ounce of that measure.”

We agree. The evidence in this case admits only the conclusion that Brandon was unfit under

subsection (b), his efforts were not objectively reasonable, and the trial court’s unfitness finding

was consistent with the evidence.

¶ 25   The same holds true for the court’s best-interests finding as well. At this phase, “the

parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a

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stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). Section 1-3(4.05) of the Adoption

Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)) sets forth various factors for the trial court to consider

in assessing a child’s best interests. In addition, at this phase, “the full range of the parent's conduct

can be considered.” In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 217. The State bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the minor, which again is

subject to the highly deferential manifest-weight standard. See In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366.

¶ 26    We conclude that Brandon has not established that the trial court’s best-interests finding

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court reasonably concluded that the

stability and permanency of S.S.’s adoption was preferable to a continued guardianship. At the

time of the best-interests hearing, S.S. was three years old, and had resided in the same foster home

for most of her life. The evidence showed that she was strongly bonded to her foster parents, and

had a loving, stable home. Brandon, conversely, suffers from a serious psychiatric condition, had

been non-compliant with therapy, and represented that he was potentially dangerous to

caseworkers and foster parents when he does not get his way. Additionally, Brandon did not have

a consistent residence and at no time was in a position to have S.S. restored to his custody. As

such, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that it was in S.S.’s best interests to terminate

Brandon’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 27    Before concluding, we note that the State raised several concerns regarding Brandon’s

appellate brief and its failure to conform to supreme court rules. The State is correct, in that the

argument section contains scant citations to authority (mostly boilerplate) and no citations to the

record (cf. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)). In addition, Brandon’s entire argument

section appears to have been dictated, or at least styled, like a closing argument, and its flippant,

fact-free assertions are not well taken. Things did not improve with his three-page reply brief

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either. Although our local rules allow less-technical memoranda in lieu of briefs, counsel for

Brandon filed briefs, not memos; but in either case we are “entitled to have the issues clearly

defined with pertinent authority cited ***.” In re M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 30. While these failures

were not so grave as to hinder our review, we caution Brandon’s appellate counsel that compliance

with supreme court rules is non-optional, and trust that we should not have occasion to repeat this

admonishment in the future.

¶ 28                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29   After carefully examining the record, we agree with the trial court that Brandon was unfit

and that it was in S.S.’s best interests to terminate his parental rights. We, therefore, affirm the

judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County.

¶ 30   Affirmed.

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