Court Opinion

ID: 9915862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 20:09:17.20495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:14.440891
License: Public Domain

01/08/2024
                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT NASHVILLE
                             Assigned on Briefs December 4, 2023

                                          IN RE LYRIK L.1

                    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Putnam County
                      No. 2022-28-A Ronald Thurman, Chancellor
                         ___________________________________

                                No. M2023-00276-COA-R3-CV
                            ___________________________________

This appeal arises from a pending petition for termination of parental rights and adoption.
Two weeks after the maternal grandparents commenced their action to terminate the
parental rights of the mother of their grandchild (the father being deceased), the paternal
grandparents (“the Intervenors”) filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of filing a
competing petition for adoption and termination of parental rights; they also sought to set
aside an order granting permanent guardianship over the child to the maternal grandparents
previously issued by the juvenile court in a separate proceeding. The Intervenors also filed
a motion for leave to intervene for the purpose of filing a petition for grandparent visitation.
The maternal grandparents opposed all relief sought by the Intervenors. The trial court
denied the motion to set aside the juvenile court’s order of permanent guardianship for lack
of jurisdiction, and it denied the motion to intervene for purposes of adoption on the ground
that the Intervenors lacked standing because they did not meet the definition of prospective
adoptive parents under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(44). However, the court
granted their motion to intervene for the purpose of grandparent visitation. The Intervenors
appeal the denial of the motion to intervene for purposes of adoption, and the maternal
grandparents appeal the order granting the Intervenors leave to intervene for the purpose
of grandparent visitation. We have determined that the Intervenors have standing to file a
petition for adoption and termination of parental rights; thus, we reverse the trial court’s
ruling on that issue. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed
                           in Part and Affirmed in Part

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD
B. GOLDIN and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

        1
          This court has a policy of protecting the identity of children by initializing the last names of the
parents, children, and immediate relatives.
Thomas H. Miller, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellants, Alisa and Michael S.

Laurie A. Seber, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Donna and Bruce S.

                                               OPINION

                                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On June 11, 2019, Donna and Bruce S., the maternal grandmother and maternal
step-grandfather of Lyrik L. (“the Maternal Grandparents”), filed a petition for permanent
guardianship of Lyrik in the Putnam County Juvenile Court. Lyrik’s father had just died,
and her mother consented to the guardianship as a co-petitioner. Days later the juvenile
court entered an agreed order for permanent guardianship, which remains in effect. Lyrik
has remained in the custody of and lived with the Maternal Grandparents ever since.

       This action for termination of parental rights and adoption of Lyrik was commenced
by the Maternal Grandparents on April 5, 2022, in the Chancery Court for Putnam County.
Two weeks later, on April 19, 2022, the Intervenors, Alisa and Michael S., the child’s
paternal grandparents, filed a motion to intervene as of right and alternatively by
permission to intervene for the purposes of (1) filing an intervening petition for adoption
and termination of parental rights2 and (2) filing a motion to set aside the Maternal
Grandparents’ order of permanent guardianship and to determine the appropriate custodial
arrangement for Lyrik. The Intervenors subsequently filed an amended motion to intervene
with an attached intervening petition for adoption of a related child and petition for
termination of parental rights.3

        The motion to intervene was heard on August 12, 2022. Pursuant to an order entered
on October 10, 2022, the court denied the Intervenors’ motion to set aside the order of
permanent guardianship, ruling, “This Court does not have the jurisdiction or power to do
such.” The court also denied their motion to intervene for purposes of adoption “as [the
Intervenors] do not meet the definition of prospective adoptive parents that is required for
standing.” However, the court granted their motion to intervene for purposes of
grandparent visitation. Two weeks later, the Intervenors filed a petition for grandparent
visitation pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-306.

        2
          The proposed intervening petition for termination of guardianship rights for custody and adoption
and/or grandparent visitation was attached.

        3
         The Intervenors had also filed a motion seeking visitation; however, their motion for visitation
was denied with the court stating, “The Court must follow the orders from the juvenile court as it relates to
custody and visitation.”

                                                   -2-
       On November 9, 2022, the Intervenors filed a timely motion to alter or amend the
ruling on the adoption intervention motion. The motion was denied by order entered on
February 14, 2023. This appeal followed.

                                          ISSUES

        The only issue raised by the Intervenors is whether the trial court erred in denying
their motion to intervene for purposes of adoption and/or custody. For their part, the
Maternal Grandparents contend that the trial court erred in granting the Intervenors’ motion
to intervene for purposes of grandparent visitation.

                                        ANALYSIS

            I. INTERVENTION FOR PURPOSES OF ADOPTION AND/OR CUSTODY

        The Intervenors contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to
intervene for purposes of adoption and/or custody based on standing. The trial court’s order
states: “The Court denies the intervening petitioners’ motion to intervene for adoption
and/or custody, as they do not meet the definition of prospective adoptive parents that is
required for standing.”

        “Standing is a judge-made doctrine by which a court determines whether a party
should be permitted to pursue a claim.” Dossett v. City of Kingsport, 258 S.W.3d 139, 143
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted). We have stated that the basis for this decision is
“whether the plaintiff has alleged a sufficiently personal stake in the outcome of the
litigation to warrant a judicial intervention.” Wood v. Metro. Nashville & Davidson Cnty.
Gov’t, 196 S.W.3d 152, 157 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

       A trial court’s determination of whether a party has standing to pursue a cause of
action is a conclusion of law. Cox v. Shell Oil Co., 196 S.W.3d 747, 758 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005). We review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of
correctness. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn.
2001).

        The Intervenors filed a motion to intervene in an ongoing petition for termination
of parental rights and adoption case. They sought permission to intervene as a matter of
right pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.01 and/or permissive intervention
pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24.02. The trial court denied their motion
to intervene based on the finding that the Intervenors lacked standing, thus pretermitting
whether they should be granted leave to intervene pursuant to Rule 24.01 and/or 24.02.

                                           -3-
      The definition of “prospective adoption parents” is found at Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-1-102(44) (2023):4

        “Prospective adoption parents” means a nonagency person or persons who
        are seeking to adopt a child and who have made application with a licensed
        child-placing agency or licensed clinical social worker or the department for
        approval, or who have been previously approved, to receive a child for
        adoption, or who have received or who expect to receive a surrender of a
        child, or who have filed a petition for termination or for adoption[.]

Edited for clarity, the definition of “prospective adoption parents” as it pertains to the
Intervenors reads: “‘Prospective adoption parents’ means . . . persons who are seeking to
adopt a child and . . . who have filed a petition for termination or for adoption[.]” Id.

       While the court’s ruling as set forth in its written order is succinct, as noted above,
the court provided additional reasoning when it announced its ruling during the hearing on
the motion in open court. In pertinent part, the court reasoned:

        I also — as far as intervening for the purposes of adoption, I don’t think this
        is the appropriate case for it. I think under the factors the Court looks to under
        the rule under mandatory or permissive intervention, I don’t see that this —
        since [the Maternal Grandparents] had custody this whole time, I just don’t
        see that it’s appropriate.

        But having said that, I think since, [counsel for Intervenors], you did file for
        grandparent visitation rights in juvenile court — and I have questions myself
        as to whether or not this adoption statute can terminate that — I think you
        would be entitled to intervene as far as it relates to grandparent visitation
        rights. I’m not sure those are exhausted and I think you — it would be my
        impression and it would be my order that [the Intervenors] can intervene as
        it relates to grandparent visitation rights because I think clearly they have
        standing to do so, especially in light of the fact they filed that in juvenile
        court or down below and that was pending at the time.

        So that would be — that would be the Court’s impression of your motions
        here.

       The Intervenors contend that the trial court’s reasoning was based on a
misunderstanding of the statute. Specifically, they rely on the Tennessee Supreme Court
case of In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772 (Tenn. 2010). In that case the maternal grandparents

        4
          The definition appeared in subsection -102(43) when the case was argued in the trial court, and
that is how the parties cite to the definition in their respective briefs.

                                                  -4-
were awarded temporary custody after the child’s father killed the child’s mother.
Thereafter, the maternal grandparents filed a petition to adopt the child. The paternal
grandparents responded by filing an intervening petition for adoption. The trial court
granted the intervening adoption petition and awarded visitation to the maternal
grandparents. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the paternal grandparents did
not meet the physical custody requirement. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals, allowing the intervening petitioners to adopt and affirming visitation to the
maternal grandparents. In pertinent part, the Sidney Court reasoned:

      Section 36-1-116(f)(1) governs, among other things, a trial court’s authority
      to grant an adoption petition. This section provides, in pertinent part:

             Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall have exclusive
             jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the child . . . except for
             allegations of delinquency, unruliness or truancy of the child
             pursuant to title 37; provided, that, unless a party has filed an
             intervening petition to an existing adoption petition concerning
             a child who is in the physical custody of the original
             petitioners, the court shall have no jurisdiction to issue any
             orders granting custody or guardianship of the child to the
             petitioners or to the intervening petitioners or granting an
             adoption of the child to the petitioners or to the intervening
             petitioners unless the petition affirmatively states, and the court
             finds in its order, that the petitioners have physical custody of
             the child at the time of the filing of the petition, entry of the
             order of guardianship, or entry of the order of adoption, or
             unless the petitioners otherwise meet the requirements of § 36-
             1-111(d)(6) [validly executed surrender].

      (Emphasis in original).

      Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-116(f)(1) generally prohibits a
      trial court from granting an adoption “unless the petition affirmatively
      states . . . that the petitioners have physical custody of the child at the
      time of the filing of the petition.” By its plain language, however, the
      statute also includes an exception to the physical custody requirement
      when the petitioners “ha[ve] filed an intervening petition to an existing
      adoption petition concerning a child who is in the physical custody of the
      original petitioners.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(f)(1); See Dawn
      Coppock, Coppock on Tennessee Adoption Law 80 (2005).

      Although the language of section 36-1-116(f)(1) is clear and unambiguous,
      we are required to construe a statute “so that the component parts are

                                            -5-
consistent and reasonable.” Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tenn.
1996). We must therefore address the maternal grandparents’ argument that
other provisions in the statutory scheme require us to depart from the plain
language of section 36-1-116(f)(1).

We first note that the plain language of section 36-1-116(f)(1) is consistent
with section 36-1-115(b), which governs standing to file an adoption petition.
This section states that “petitioners must have physical custody or must
demonstrate to the court that they have the right to receive custody of the
child sought to be adopted as provided in [the statute governing a validly
executed surrender] at the time the petition is filed, unless they are filing an
intervening petition seeking to adopt the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
115(b) (2005) (emphasis in original). Thus, intervening petitioners are not
required to have physical custody or the right to receive physical custody
of the child sought to be adopted for purposes of filing their petition.

On the other hand, there are two adoption provisions that do not appear to
contemplate an exception to the physical custody requirement. Section 36-1-
116(b)(5), which governs the contents of an adoption petition, requires that
the petition include a statement “[t]hat the petitioners have physical custody
of the child or that they meet the requirements of [a validly executed
surrender].” Likewise, section 36-1-120(a)(4), which governs the contents of
a final order of adoption, requires that the final order include “[t]he date when
the petitioners acquired physical custody of the child and from what person
or agency or by which court order.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-120(a)(4)
(2005).

To conclude that these requirements apply to intervening petitioners
would, however, render inoperative the exception to the physical
custody requirement for those “filing an intervening petition seeking to
adopt the child” in section 36-1-115(b). We have a duty “to construe a
statute so that no part will be inoperative.” Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d
674, 676 (Tenn. 1975). We suspect, moreover, that the General Assembly
simply did not deem it necessary to reiterate for purposes of these particular
subsections that intervening petitioners are exempt from the physical custody
requirement. We therefore conclude that the requirements of sections 36-
1-116(b)(5) and -120(a)(4) do not apply when the petition was filed
pursuant to the exception to the physical custody requirement for
intervening petitioners in section 36-1-115(b).

For the reasons articulated above, we conclude that the trial court properly
granted Sidney’s paternal grandparents’ adoption petition even though
Sidney was in the physical custody of her maternal grandparents, the original

                                      -6-
       petitioners, at the time the paternal grandparents filed their intervening
       adoption petition.

In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d at 774–76 (emphasis in bold added) (footnote omitted).

       As the court noted in Sidney, “intervening petitioners are not required to have
physical custody or the right to receive physical custody of the child sought to be adopted
for purposes of filing their petition.” Id. at 775. For these reasons, we respectfully disagree
with the trial court’s legal conclusion that the Intervenors lacked standing to intervene in
the Maternal Grandparents’ petition for termination of parental rights and adoption of
Lyrik.

        Although we have determined that the Intervenors have standing, that alone does
not necessarily establish whether they are entitled to intervene as a matter of right or based
on permissive intervention pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Because the
trial court did not get past the issue of standing in deciding whether the Intervenors are
entitled to intervene in the pending action, we remand the intervention issue to the trial
court for further consideration and for such other proceedings as the court may deem
appropriate.

                               II. GRANDPARENT VISITATION

       The Maternal Grandparents contend that the trial court erred in granting the
Intervenors’ motion to intervene for purposes of grandparent visitation.

       The standard of review for the granting or denial of permissive intervention is abuse
of discretion. State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18 S.W.3d 186, 191 (Tenn.
2000) (citation omitted). The abuse of discretion standard does not permit reviewing courts
to substitute their discretion for the trial court. See Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d
515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). Nevertheless, the abuse of discretion standard of review does not
immunize a trial court’s decision from meaningful appellate scrutiny:

       Discretionary decisions must take the applicable law and the relevant facts
       into account. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court strays beyond the
       applicable legal standards or when it fails to properly consider the factors
       customarily used to guide the particular discretionary decision. A court
       abuses its discretion when it causes an injustice to the party challenging the
       decision by (1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical
       or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a clearly erroneous
       assessment of the evidence.

                                             -7-
Id. (citations omitted). Discretionary decisions require “a conscientious judgment,
consistent with the facts, that takes into account the applicable law.” White v. Beeks, 469
S.W.3d 517, 527 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 524).

       The Maternal Grandparents contend that the trial court did not need to ensure this
right was protected when there is specific statutory authority allowing for the Intervenors
to pursue grandparent visitation, even if the Maternal Grandparents are successful in the
adoption proceeding. In making this argument, they state:

       The relevant statute provides that, “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of
       T.C.A. § 36-1-121, if a relative or stepparent adopts a child, the provisions
       of this section apply. (2) if a person other than a relative or a stepparent
       adopts a child, any visitation rights granted pursuant to this section before
       the adoption of the child shall automatically end upon such adoption.”
       Lovelace [sic] v. Copley, 2012 WL 368221, at *9. Based upon this definition,
       we interpret this prepositional phrase to mean that, in spite of the adoption
       statute, (i.e., T.C.A. § 36-1-121), if a relative or stepparent adopts the child,
       then the Grandparent Visitation Statute, as opposed to the adoption statute,
       is the controlling statute. Id. This case was appealed to the Tennessee
       Supreme Court where they too held that:

              Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the
              statutes do not conflict. The relevant provision of the Adoption
              Statute was enacted in 1995. The relevant provision of the
              Grandparent Visitation Statute was enacted two years later.
              Not only is the Grandparent Visitation Statute more specific
              and more recently enacted statutory provision, its statutory text
              is clearly and unambiguously carves out a narrow, limited
              exception, in the case of grandparent visitation and stepparent
              adoption, to the more general rule stated in the Adoption
              Statute. Mr. Copley was the minor child’s stepparent at the
              time of the adoption. We conclude, therefore that the exception
              in the Grandparent Visitation Statute, specifically Tennessee
              Code Annotated section 36-6-306(d)(1), controls. Thus, Mr.
              Copley’s adoption of the minor child did not terminate the
              visitation rights the Lovelaces [sic] received pursuant to the
              Agreed Order. The provision of the Final Order of Adoption
              reserving the Lovelaces’ [sic] visitation rights is not void and
              is consistent with the exception for stepparent adoptions in the
              Grandparent Visitation Statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-
              306(d)(1).

       Lovelace [sic] v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 20–21 (Tenn. 2013).

                                             -8-
       Relying on the foregoing ruling, the Maternal Grandparents state that the
Intervenors’ visitation rights are protected by the Grandparent Visitation Statute, which,
they contend, has priority over the adoption statute. Thus, they conclude,

       in this particular set of circumstances, there is no justification for the
       [Intervenors] intervening in the adoption that has now been delayed over one
       year due to their intervention. Had the Court realized that the adoption did
       not sever their claim to visitation rights, it is highly doubtful the [Intervenors]
       would have been allowed to intervene.

       In essence, as is noted in the Intervenors’ reply brief, the Maternal Grandparents are
contending that the intervention for purposes of grandparent visitation was “unnecessary,”
as opposed to clear error. Nevertheless, as the Intervenors contend, intervention at this
stage may be necessary to preserve their rights because the case the Maternal Grandparents
rely on pertained to a case in which grandparent visitation had been established by court
order prior to the adoption. And as the Intervenors correctly note, “It is unclear whether
an action to establish grandparent visitation that is initiated after an adoption occurs would
be successful.”

       Significantly, while “[a] final order of adoption of a child cannot require the
adoptive parent to permit visitation by any other person,” see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
121(f), there appear to be two exceptions. One, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-121(f)
expressly permits the entry of an order “enforcing or modifying a contract for post-adoption
contact pursuant to § 36-1-145.” Two, “if a relative or stepparent adopts a child,” pursuant
to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-306(d)(1), the Grandparent Visitation Statute still
applies. More specifically, as held in Lovlace, where a stepparent adopted the child, “[t]he
provision of the Final Order of Adoption reserving the [grandparents’] visitation rights is
not void and is consistent with the exception for stepparent adoptions in the Grandparent
Visitation Statute.” Lovlace, 418 S.W.3d at 21. While Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-
121(f) seems to contemplate contracts for post-adoption contact, there does not appear to
be a case on point to support this conclusion.

      For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision
to grant the Intervenors leave to intervene for the purpose of filing a petition for
grandparent visitation. Thus, we affirm this decision.

                                       IN CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and this
matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs of appeal are assessed against the Maternal Grandparents, Donna and Bruce S.

                                              -9-
         ________________________________
         FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.

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