Court Opinion

ID: 9891445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 16:10:29.86349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:22.635937
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 TERRANCE SMITH                          :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 325 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 13, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0000531-2013

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                     FILED OCTOBER 18, 2023

     Terrance Smith appeals from the order denying without a hearing his

first timely petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546. We affirm.

     The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts as follows:

             The relevant facts occurred on the evening of September 1,
     2012. Johmeen Washington, the victim, arrived at the Whitehall
     Apartments in the City and County of Philadelphia to attend a
     birthday party at his aunt’s home. Washington possessed a pistol
     he had used to practice shooting at a gun range earlier that day.
     At the apartment complex, Washington was confronted by his ex-
     girlfriend’s brother, Laquan Hayes, and the two argued about
     Washington’s recently terminated relationship with Hayes’ sister.
     Washington walked away, went to his aunt’s apartment to deliver
     a birthday card to his little cousin, then walked back to his car to
     leave the apartment complex. On the way back to his car,
     Washington passed Khali Boyd. Boyd and Hayes are cousins.
     Wahington and Boyd proceeded to walk together towards
     Washington’s car, when Hayes appeared on a bicycle, riding up
     beside Washington. Hayes and Washington once again exchanged
     words, with Hayes telling Washington that he should “take [him]
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      out right now.” [Smith] approached Washington from behind,
      raised a gun to his head, and patted Washington down as he told
      him ”I’m going in your pockets to get your gun.” As Washington
      attempted to seize [Smith’s] gun, [Smith] shot Washington in the
      abdomen. Washington retrieved his pistol from the ground and
      fired several shots toward his assailants. Police arrived at the
      Whitehall Apartments at approximately 8:52 P.M. and transported
      Washington to Temple Hospital. He was treated for his injuries,
      including a spinal cord injury which left him permanently
      paralyzed from the waist down.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/12/22, at 1-2 (citations omitted).

      Following his arrest on multiple charges, Smith’s jury trial began on June

2, 2016. On June 13, 2016, the jury returned a guilty verdict of attempted

murder and related charges. On August 23, 2016, the trial court sentenced

Smith to an aggregate term of twenty to forty-five years of imprisonment.

The trial court denied Smith’s timely-filed post sentence motions.

      Smith appealed. On March 31, 2017, this Court dismissed his appeal

because he failed to file a docketing statement. Thereafter, Smith filed a PCRA

petition, which the court granted, and therefore reinstated Smith’s appellate

rights on July 18, 2017. That same day, Smith filed a nunc pro tunc appeal.

On November 18, 2019, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, and on

February 19, 2020, our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of

appeal. Commonwealth v. Smith, 224 A.3d 752 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal

denied, 225 A.3d 1100 (Pa. 2020).

      On April 24, 2020, Smith filed a pro se PCRA petition, and the PCRA

court appointed counsel.     On February 3, 2021, PCRA counsel filed an

amended PCRA petition.     Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a motion to

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dismiss. On November 1, 2020, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907

notice of its intent to dismiss Smith’s petition without a hearing. Smith did

not file a response.     By order entered January 13, 2022, the PCRA court

granted the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss Smith’s petition. This appeal

followed. Both Smith and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Smith raises the following six issues on appeal:

      I.      Whether the PCRA court erred in denying [Smith’s] PCRA
              petition without an evidentiary hearing on the issues
              presented in the amended PCRA petition[:]

           A. Whether counsel       was    ineffective   for   failing   to
              investigate[.]

           B. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to call
              witnesses[.]

           C. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to file a weight
              of the evidence motion.

           D. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to properly
              argue the discretionary sentence issue[.]

           E. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
              not having the prison phone tapes played in open court[.]

Smith’s Brief at 7 (excess capitalization omitted).

      This Court’s standard of review for an order dismissing a PCRA petition

calls for us to “determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported

by the evidence and free of legal error. The PCRA court’s factual findings will

not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified

record.” Commonwealth v. Webb, 236 A.3d 1170, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citing Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191–92 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

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            The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without
      a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine
      issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
      to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
      would be served by further proceedings. [See Pa.R.Crim.P.
      909(B)(2).] To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to
      dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that
      he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,
      would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
      abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted). Regarding a claim that counsel was ineffective:

             It is well-established that to succeed on a claim asserting
      the ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must plead and
      prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, three elements: (1)
      the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
      reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the
      petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or
      inaction. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975–76 (Pa.
      1987). If a petitioner fails to satisfy any of the three prongs of
      the ineffectiveness inquiry, his claim fails. Commonwealth v.
      Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 150–51 (Pa. 2018).

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022) (citation

formatting altered).

      Moreover, we note that a defendant claiming he or she received

ineffective assistance of counsel must allege sufficient facts from which a court

can determine counsel’s effectiveness.      Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(12); see also

Commonwealth v. Pettus, 424 A.2d 1332 (Pa. 1981) (stating that a

defendant may not argue ineffectiveness in a vacuum). Where the facts do

not appear of record, the defendant must identify “any affidavits, documents,

and other evidence showing such facts[.]”         Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(12)(b);

Pettus, 424 A.2d at 1335 (explaining that when a defendant claims

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ineffectiveness he or she must set forth an offer to prove at an appropriate

hearing facts upon which a reviewing court can conclude that trial counsel may

have been ineffective).

      In his first issue, Smith claims that trial counsel was ineffective “when

he failed to do any investigation on the case.” Smith’s Brief at 14. In his

supporting argument, Smith contends that trial counsel made no attempt to

obtain video camera footage from a nearby business “that would have shown

[his] location at the time of the shooting.” Id. (footnote omitted). He also

asserts that trial counsel “failed to inquire whether any witnesses could be

located who were present at or near the scene.”        Id.   Additionally, Smith

contends that he provided trial counsel “with people who were present at the

shooting and counsel failed to interview or attempt to interview [them].” Id.

According to Smith, trial counsel “provided ineffective assistance of counsel

for failing to locate and investigate witnesses at the scene and the video which

would have shown that [he] was not involved [in the shooting].” Id. at 15.

      Counsel has a duty to undertake reasonable investigations or make

reasonable decisions that render particular investigations unnecessary.

Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 713 (Pa. 2000) (citation

omitted). As this Court has summarized:

      The failure to investigate presents an issue of arguable merit
      where the record demonstrates that counsel did not perform an
      investigation. It can be unreasonable per se to conduct no
      investigation into known witnesses.         Importantly, a [PCRA]
      petitioner still must demonstrate prejudice. To demonstrate
      prejudice where the allegation is the failure to interview a witness,

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      the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability
      that the testimony the witness would have provided would have
      led to a different outcome at trial.

Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626, 638-39 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citation omitted).

      Here, the PCRA court found that Smith did not establish a factual issue

as to this claim:

             [Smith] claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
      to investigate the facts of the case, and that counsel failed to
      locate and subpoena a video camera on the 4700 block of
      Tackawanna Street. According to [Smith], the video would have
      shown him at the time of the shooting. [Smith] also claims that
      trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and locate
      any possible witnesses. “A PCRA petitioner must exhibit a
      concerted effort to develop his ineffectiveness claim and may not
      rely     on    boilerplate   allegations     of     ineffectiveness.”
      Commonwealth v. Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 2007).
      [Smith] broadly claims that counsel failed his duty to investigate
      and briefly mentions that he told counsel about this video
      surveillance that “would have shown [Smith’s] location at the time
      of the shooting;” however, this claim is not fully developed, and it
      is unclear whether counsel followed a different defense strategy
      in which counsel had a reasonable strategic basis for his act or
      omission. [Smith] did not supplement this petition with any
      evidence that there was even a surveillance video at this location.
      Without more information this claim lacked merit and was
      undeveloped.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/12/22 at 5. We agree.

      As noted above, ineffectiveness claims are not self-proving. Pettus,

supra. In his brief, Smith contends that the video “camera was at the Chinese

store but the store no longer exists today.”         Smith’s Brief at 14 n.1.

Nevertheless, without proffering any evidence that the video footage existed,

Smith’s claim fails. Moreover, while the PCRA court did not address Smith’s

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claim that trial counsel did not investigate witnesses that were at the scene,

at least for this issue, Smith provides no names or proffers any further

information. Thus, we concur with the PCRA court’s conclusion that Smith has

not developed his ineffectiveness claim; Smith’s first issue warrants no relief.

        In his second issue, Smith claims that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to call James Watts and Kyhir Armstrong as defense witnesses at his

trial. According to Smith, both of these witnesses would have testified that

he was not at the scene of the shooting. Furthermore, Smith avers that they

both wanted to testify at trial but were never contacted. Smith’s Brief at 17.

        In order to establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate and/or call a witness at trial, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate

that:

          (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to
          testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have
          known of, the existence of the witnesses; (4) the witness was
          willing to testify for the defense; and (5) absence of the
          testimony of the witness was so prejudicial that it deprived a
          defendant of a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810-11 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation

omitted). “Prejudice” as used in this test, requires the petitioner to “show

how the uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been beneficial under the

circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 16

(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Thus, “the petitioner’s burden is to show

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that testimony provided by the uncalled witnesses would have been helpful to

the defense.” Id.

      The PCRA court concluded that Smith failed to meet his burden under

Matias, supra. The court explained:

             [Smith] claimed that he advised trial counsel of two
      witnesses[,] James Watts and Kyhir Armstrong. The counseled
      amended PCRA petition states that both witnesses told PCRA
      counsel that they wanted to testify but they were not contacted
      to testify. However, there are no affidavits attached to the PCRA
      petition. The amended PCRA petition states that the affidavits will
      be attached when received. [Smith] claims that the witness
      testimony would have negated the Commonwealth’s theory of the
      shooting. The petition states that James Watts told PCRA counsel
      that “he was with [Smith] on the corner at the time of the
      shooting. He heard the shots so that [Smith] could not have been
      involved. Kyhir Armstrong told PCRA counsel “she was coming
      out of her aunt’s house looking for her daughter when the shooting
      started, she saw [Smith] on the street so he could not have been
      involved.” Both witnesses’ statements of what they would have
      testified to is nonspecific. These statements do not detail where
      this corner was [in relation to] where the shooting took place.
      Moreover, this petition has not been supplemented with the
      witness affidavits. This claim is not fully developed without more
      specifics and without more details and the affidavits it fails to lack
      merit.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/12/22, at 6. Once again, we agree with the PCRA

court’s conclusion that Smith’s claim is undeveloped.

      Smith’s claims to the contrary are unavailing.           In his brief, he

acknowledges that trial counsel called two defense witnesses who testified

that Smith was standing on a porch with them at the time of the shooting.

Smith’s Brief at 18 (citing N.T., 9/10/16, at 5-20). Nevertheless, Smith argues

that purported testimony of Watts and Armstrong, “were crucial to [his]

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defense.” Smith’s Brief at 18. He provides no other explanation to support

this claim, and it appears that their testimony would only serve to corroborate

the testimony of the witness called at his trial.   Moreover, although PCRA

counsel informed the court that these witnesses’ affidavits would be attached

when received, the PCRA court did not have them prior to dismissing his

petition. Indeed, nowhere in his brief does Smith state that the affidavits were

ever received by him.      Hearsay statements from PCRA counsel are not

sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Clark,

961 A.2d 80, 94 (Pa. 2008) (explaining that, in the absence of a sufficient

proffer, a petitioner’s bare assertions would inappropriately convert an

evidentiary hearing into a “fishing expedition” for possible exculpatory

evidence). Thus, Smith’s second ineffectiveness claim fails.

      In his third claim, Smith asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence

supporting his convictions.    Before determining ineffectiveness, we first

determine the merits of Smith’s underlying claim.

      This Court summarized the law regarding challenges to the weight of

the evidence as follows:

              The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the
      finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the
      evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new
      trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony
      and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the
      credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
      determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so

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      clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
      weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

            On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined
      to whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the
      jury verdict did not shock it conscience. Thus, appellate review of
      a weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of
      discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citations omitted). As often reiterated, “the trial court’s denial of a motion

for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable

of its rulings.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1036 (Pa. 2007).

      Here, the PCRA court found that Smith’s ineffectiveness claim lacked

arguable merit, because instead of arguing weight of the evidence, in essence,

Smith merely sought to relitigate his sufficiency claim that was rejected on

direct appeal:

      To satisfy the first prong [of the ineffectiveness test], the claim
      must be of arguable merit. On direct appeal, [Smith] argued that
      the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for
      attempted murder because he claimed the evidence did not
      establish his intent to kill the victim. The Superior Court found
      there was no merit to this claim. Here [Smith] claimed that the
      evidence was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
      that he committed the crime.            [He] attacks the victim’s
      identification of him. According to the petition, the victim was
      unable to identify the shooter until he pointed out [Smith] from a
      photo array. However, [Smith] does not elaborate as to why the
      photo identification was not reliable. [He] has failed to satisfy his
      burden of proof, especially considering the degree of deference
      case law affords the fact finder. The verdict does not shock the
      conscience and therefore is not of arguable merit.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/12/22, at 7-8.

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      Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusions.        In

arguing to the contrary, Smith merely repeats his claim that the evidence “was

not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that that [he] committed

the offenses.” Smith’s Brief at 19. He further argues, without specifics, that

the victim’s identification of him was unreliable, and the guilty verdicts were

therefore “based on conjecture and surmise.” This claim warrants no relief.

As noted above, “[t]he weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the

finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to

determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Gonzalez, supra. Thus, in the

instant case, the jury was free to credit the victim’s identification testimony.

Smith’s third ineffectiveness claim fails.

      In his fourth claim, Smith contends that trial counsel was “ineffective

for failing to properly argue the discretionary sentence issue.” Rule 1925(b)

Statement, 6/7/22, at 2.       On direct appeal, we concluded that Smith’s

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence was waived because the

specific claim he raised on appeal, the Commonwealth’s introduction of his

prior arrests, was not raised in his post-sentence motion.        Smith, non-

precedential decision at 11-12.       Notwithstanding waiver, however, in a

footnote, we explained how the claim lacked merit even if it had been

preserved:

      When sentencing [Smith] below, the court recognized that the
      case had been nolle prossed and merely referred to it as one in a
      long list of criminal cases in which [Smith] had been involved,
      including two juvenile adjudications for delinquency, nineteen
      arrests and seventeen convictions. As the Commonwealth notes,

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         this extensive criminal history is certainly relevant to the court’s
         duty to protect the public when imposing sentence. [Smith]
         makes no meaningful attempt to explain, and we fail to see, how
         the sentencing court committed a manifest abuse of discretion
         under the circumstances.

Id. at 12 n.6 (citations omitted).

         Here, the PCRA court interpreted Smith’s Rule 1925(b) statement to

challenge trial counsel’s failure to preserve the issue of the Commonwealth’s

introduction of Smith’s prior arrests at sentencing. See PCRA Court Opinion,

7/12/22, at 8.      In finding no arguable merit to this claim, the PCRA court

agreed with this Court that Smith’s prior arrests could be considered during

sentencing. Id.

         On appeal, Smith repeats his argument that the trial court should not

have considered his arrest that was nolle prossed. As noted above, both this

Court and the PCRA court found no merit to this claim. In his brief, Smith

additionally argues that we should vacate his sentence “because the sentence

imposed by the trial court, in light of the record, raises serious doubts that

the trial court properly considered the general [sentencing] guidelines

provided by the Legislature.”        Smith’s Brief at 20.    We note that Smith

improperly raises this claim for the first time on appeal.         See generally,

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Thus, Smith’s fourth claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness

fails.

         In his fifth claim, Smith faults trial counsel for failing to object to the

trial court’s decision to allow “his prison phone tapes to be played in the jury

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room supervised by two court officers, rather than playing the tapes in open

court, before the [trial court], counsel and [Smith].” Smith’s Brief at 22.

       The PCRA court found no merit to this claim:

              [Smith] claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for
       failing to object to the jury’s request to play previously introduced
       prison tapes in the jury room during deliberations. However, as
       the Commonwealth noted in their motion to dismiss, [trial]
       counsel raised this same argument in his post-sentence motion,
       which the trial court rejected. The prison phone calls included
       [Smith] placing himself at the scene, having knowledge that [the
       victim] was paralyzed, and trying to convince [the victim’s]
       mother not to testify.

              [A] trial court’s decision regarding materials that may be
       taken out with the jury will not be reversed unless there is an
       abuse of discretion or a violation of court rules. [Smith] was
       unable to show that there was arguable merit to this claim or that
       he was prejudiced by [trial] counsel’s failure to object because it
       is unlikely the objection would have changed the outcome of the
       proceedings.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/12/22, at 8-9 (citations omitted).

       Our review reveals that a discussion about the playing of the prison

tapes was initiated after the jury asked to see the transcripts of prison tapes

during their deliberations.        In his brief, Smith reproduces the discussion

between the trial court and the parties, as well as the court’s instruction to

the jury about how and where the tapes will be played.1 See Smith’s Brief at

22-23.    However, Smith provides no other argument or citation to case

____________________________________________

1 Although the jury requested the transcripts, the court ultimately denied that

request, but instead allowed the tapes to be replayed in the jury deliberation
room.

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authority to support his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to this process. Thus, this claim is woefully undeveloped, and we will

not consider it further. See Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81, 93

(Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that undeveloped claims will not be considered on

appeal).

      In sum, Smith’s claims of ineffectiveness are either undeveloped or

without merit. Thus, we reject Smith’s final issue claiming the PCRA court

erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing. We therefore affirm the

PCRA court’s order denying Smith post-conviction relief.

      Order affirmed.

Date: October 18, 2023

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