Court Opinion

ID: 9919231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:02:19.805577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.677792
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Schuller CA3
Opinion on remand from Supreme Court
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                       (Nevada)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C087191

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. F16000111)

           v.                                                                      OPINION ON REMAND

 JASON CARL SCHULLER,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         During his murder trial, defendant Jason Carl Schuller requested the trial court
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. The trial
court denied the request. Following a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, a jury
found Schuller guilty of first degree murder in the guilt phase. He was ultimately found
legally sane and sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life. Schuller appealed,
arguing substantial evidence demonstrated he had an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief in

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the need for self-defense that was not entirely delusional. In our original published
decision in this matter, we agreed the trial court erred in denying Schuller’s request for an
imperfect self-defense instruction; but, we concluded the error was harmless based on the
overwhelming evidence Schuller had not acted out of any form of self-defense, and
affirmed the judgment. (People v. Schuller (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 221, 243 (Schuller I),
revd. with directions (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237.)
       After this court filed its opinion in November of 2021, Schuller sought, and our
Supreme Court granted, review. Our Supreme Court held the standard for evaluating
prejudice for this form of instructional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) and concluded our prejudice
analysis did not comport with Chapman. (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260,
261-263 (Schuller II).) Our Supreme Court specifically found that our prejudice analysis
suggested this court improperly weighed the evidence. (Id. at pp. 261-263.) The
Supreme Court also explained that once an appellate court concludes sufficient evidence
exists to compel an instruction on imperfect self-defense, the appellate court cannot also
find the error harmless under Chapman solely because “the evidence against imperfect
self-defense was so overwhelming that no reasonable jury could have possibly found in
[defendant’s] favor.” (Id. at p. 263.) Accordingly, our Supreme Court reversed the
judgment and remanded the matter to us with directions to reconsider whether the failure
to instruct on imperfect self-defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp.
263-264.) We have received and considered supplemental briefing from the parties, and
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision, we now conclude the error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we will reverse and remand the matter
for further proceedings.

                                             2
                                   I. BACKGROUND
       We draw our summary of the facts from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Schuller
II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 244-251 and our opinion in Schuller I, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 225-230.
       The Nevada County District Attorney charged defendant Jason Schuller with the
first degree murder of W.T. and further alleged that Schuller had personally used and
discharged a firearm causing death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 12022.53.)1 Schuller pled not
guilty by reason of insanity and the case proceeded to trial.
A.     Trial Court Proceedings
       1.     Evidence at Trial
              a.     Prosecution’s Case-in-Chief
       Jesse, W.T.’s neighbor and close friend, testified that Schuller visited W.T.
frequently and had temporarily lived at his residence. In early 2016, however, W.T. told
Jesse that Schuller was no longer welcome at his home. On the night of March 20, 2016,
Jesse returned from a dinner and was surprised to see Schuller’s vehicle, a white Chrysler
300, parked outside of W.T.’s home. Shortly after Jesse entered his house, he heard
multiple rounds of gunshots and then saw Schuller’s car speed away from W.T.’s home.
       As Jesse approached W.T.’s residence he saw W.T.’s daughter, H.T., who lived in
a second-floor unit directly above W.T., pacing in front of the window. Jesse knocked on
H.T.’s door and asked her if she had heard gunshots. She said she was uncertain what
she had heard, but that a noise had caused her apartment to rattle. Jesse then went
downstairs to check on W.T. When he entered the residence, he saw “flames coming out
of [the] house” and W.T.’s burning body lying on the floor. Jesse ran back to his house
to retrieve a fire extinguisher. When he returned, H.T. had come down to her father’s

1 All further undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

                                             3
apartment. As Jesse tried to put out the fire, he noticed that all four burners of the gas
stove had been opened and “turned on full bore without flames,” like someone was trying
to “blow the place up.” Jesse called 911 and provided a description of Schuller’s car.
       H.T. testified that Schuller had become friends with her father and started staying
on his couch from time to time. On the night of March 20, 2016, she observed Schuller’s
car parked outside her father’s apartment. Shortly thereafter, she heard a succession of
sounds like metal hitting metal coming from the residence and then “a very loud sound
that physically shook the house.” She then observed Schuller’s vehicle leaving the home
at a high rate of speed. When H.T. entered the apartment, she observed smoke and her
father’s body lying on the ground surrounded by shell casings, with his dentures out of
his mouth.
       Shortly after Schuller was seen leaving W.T.’s residence, police began pursuing a
white Chrysler 300 in the area. Schuller was driving the vehicle and refused to stop,
resulting in a 38-mile high-speed pursuit that ended only after the vehicle’s tires were
punctured with strip spikes. The handgun used in the shooting of W.T. was found in the
car.
       Investigating officers testified that 13 shell casings were recovered from the area
near W.T.’s body. A gun case, a gas can, and a large knife were found on the kitchen
table. Although there was significant blood spatter on the walls and floor, there was no
blood on the knife. W.T.’s cell phone was found under the table with a bullet lodged in
it. The apartment had sustained fire damage and smelled of gas. Nevada County Fire
District Chief Jim Turner determined that gasoline had been poured on the body and
ignited. An autopsy revealed W.T. had sustained nine gunshot wounds to the left side of
his head, with five shots entering the “facial area” and four shots entering above his ear in
the “cranial area.” W.T.’s body also exhibited significant burn injuries. According to the
pathologist, the nature of the burn markings indicated W.T.’s body had been ignited after
he was dead.

                                              4
              b.     The Defense’s Case
       Schuller testified that he met W.T. after moving from Nebraska to California in
2013. Over the next few years, Schuller lived with W.T. from time to time and visited
him often.
       In 2016, Schuller was injured in a car accident and began experiencing visions of
his dead ancestors and a “beautiful light.” He described the light as “a gift of god” and
had heard voices telling him to be “careful who [he] share[d] the light with.” Schuller
stated that he believed he was sent to “pave the way for the second coming . . . of Christ,”
and that a battle was being fought with “Satan’s army.” In March of 2016, Schuller
drove to Nebraska in response to voices directing him to perform an operation there.
Schuller claimed that during his drive to Nebraska he was shot at and attacked with
grenades but did not suffer any injuries.
       While in Nebraska, Schuller visited his sister. She testified that Schuller seemed
to be experiencing visual and auditory hallucinations at the time of the visit, telling her
that people were “following him” and telling him to shut up. His sister also reported that
Schuller appeared to be in fear for his life and was uncharacteristically aggressive.
       Schuller eventually decided to drive back to California. One day before the killing
of W.T., Nevada police officers stopped Schuller on suspicion of reckless driving.
Schuller told the officers that three men were trying to attack him with needles. He
further stated that “the entire police force and agencies of the world [we]re letting Satan”
do something and commented on the “fake light.” At one point, an officer stepped on an
aluminum strip that produced a popping noise, causing Schuller to believe a gunshot had
been fired and that the officers were trying to hurt him. The officers eventually allowed
Schuller to go, believing he was not a danger to himself or others.
       Schuller testified that he arrived back in California on March 20 and went straight
to W.T.’s house. After the two had shared several drinks, W.T. asked Schuller to get rid
of a firearm that Schuller had stored at W.T.’s house. W.T. retrieved the gun and placed

                                              5
it in a case on the kitchen table, asking Schuller to take it with him when he left the next
morning.
       Schuller explained that he “ended up sharing the light with” W.T., who initially
experienced “over-whelming joy.” Later in the night, however, Schuller shared the light
with W.T. again, but was unable to get the light back. Schuller testified that W.T. looked
outside with a smile on his face and said, “See, I told you I could take it from him.” W.T.
then pulled a knife from a kitchen drawer. Schuller “tried to leave through some French
doors, but they wouldn't open. He then ran to the kitchen table to put something between
him and W.T.,” and W.T. tried to “stab at [Schuller].”
       Schuller grabbed the gun on the kitchen table and asked W.T. if he was “Lucifer,”
to which W.T. responded yes. Schuller stated that he then put the gun down and said,
“Yeah, right, . . . You’re not Lucifer.” As soon as Schuller set the gun down, W.T.
“went for the gun and raised the knife.” Schuller then picked the gun up again, took a
step back, and “pulled the trigger.” Schuller said he was “in fear for [his] life” because
W.T. had a “big knife.”
       Schuller was uncertain whether he fired more than one shot but recalled the bullet
hitting W.T. “right in the head and he went down to the ground. The knife . . . f[ell] out
of his hand.” Schuller testified that W.T. then “pushed himself up off the ground.”
Schuller described W.T.’s movement: “It was all like one motion like push yourself up,
getting to your knees, grabbing something at the same time.” Schuller could not recall
how the knife got back on the table, and testified, “I don't remember if he grabbed the
knife and somehow it got back on the table but he was like pushing himself up.” W.T.’s
actions “shocked” Schuller, causing him to “jump[] back” and “pull[ the trigger] four or
five more times.” When asked why he shot W.T. four or five more times, Schuller
testified he was “scared” because W.T. had yelled, “You f’d up” and was then able to
“push himself up . . . off the ground . . . without hesitation.”

                                               6
       After firing the second round of shots, Schuller retrieved W.T.’s cell phone and
attempted to call 911. However, he was unable to unlock the phone, which kept ringing.
Schuller then heard a loud gasp and saw W.T.’s dentures fly at him, which scared
Schuller again, causing him to “pull the trigger three more times.” Schuller continued
trying to call 911 with W.T.’s phone, but the phone kept ringing so Schuller shot it
several times. Schuller finally decided to leave the residence but felt “a hundred
thousand demons [sweep] through” him. Schuller turned and saw a demon enter W.T.’s
body. Schuller attempted to “kill the demon” by pouring gasoline on W.T.’s body and
igniting it. Schuller then left the home to travel to Monterey.
       On cross-examination, Schuller admitted that in his initial statements to the police
he never claimed to have shot W.T. in self-defense because he “did not know who to
trust.” Instead, Schuller had told the police W.T. was gay and trying to come on to him.
              c.     Prosecution’s Rebuttal Witnesses
       A detective testifying as a rebuttal witness for the prosecution explained that he
had monitored calls Schuller made to friends and family from jail after his arrest.
According to the detective, Schuller appeared “lucid and normal” during his initial
conversations about the case. In subsequent calls Schuller revealed that he intended to
pursue a “mental health defense.” After that intent became clear, the detective noticed a
difference in how Schuller talked in his conversations. He began speaking “much more”
about conspiracy theories, including “law enforcement conspiring against him” and
“angels and demons . . . [a]ffecting things in his everyday life.”
       The prosecution also called two forensic psychologists who had been appointed by
the court to evaluate Schuller. The first psychologist opined that defendant was
exaggerating or feigning psychiatric distress. The psychologist did not believe Schuller
was mentally ill but acknowledged that his extensive drug use could have caused
hallucinations. The psychologist testified that Schuller’s decision to burn W.T.’s body

                                              7
and then attempt to evade police demonstrated knowledge of wrongdoing and an
understanding of consequences.
       The second psychologist likewise testified that she believed defendant was
“malingering or exaggerating his mental health condition.” The psychologist noted that
during Schuller’s initial recorded jailhouse conversations, he had discussed his case at
length but made no mention of any psychiatric symptoms, hallucinations, seeing demons
or any of the problems that he later described to the psychologist.
       2.      Defense’s Request for Instruction on Imperfect Self-Defense
       Prior to closing argument, the defense requested an instruction on voluntary
manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. The prosecution opposed, arguing that
Schuller’s testimony demonstrated that any alleged belief in the need to defend himself
was the result of delusions, and thus amounted to a claim of insanity that could only be
raised in the sanity phase of the trial. (See People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 130,
146 (Elmore) [“the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense is [not] available when belief in
the need to defend oneself is entirely delusional”; such a claim must instead be raised at
“a sanity trial”].)
       The defense, however, argued that Schuller’s imperfect self-defense claim was not
based on “purely delusional belief[s]” (Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 130), but rather
was supported by the objective circumstances of the crime scene. Specifically, Schuller
had testified that W.T. attempted to attack him with a knife while reaching for a firearm,
and a knife and an empty gun case had been recovered from the kitchen table. According
to the defense, while Schuller’s testimony suggested his reactions to W.T. may have been
“distorted by mental illness,” there was nonetheless sufficient evidence to support a
finding that he mistakenly believed the actual circumstances required him to act in self-
defense. (See id. at p. 146 [“defendants who mistakenly believed that actual
circumstances required their defensive act may argue they are guilty only of voluntary
manslaughter, even if their reaction was distorted by mental illness”].)

                                             8
       The trial court ultimately sided with the prosecution, concluding that Schuller’s
testimony demonstrated his “reaction [to W.T.] was produced by the mental disturbance
alone, which is the very thing that the cases talk about as being for the sanity phase, not
for the guilt phase.” The court acknowledged that a knife was found on the kitchen table
but concluded that was insufficient to warrant an instruction on imperfect self-defense.
The court did, however, instruct the jury that it could consider evidence of Schuller’s
mental condition “in deciding whether [he had] acted with deliberation and
premeditation.”
       3.     Closing Argument and Jury Verdict
       Because Schuller had admitted that he intentionally shot W.T. in the head and the
trial court had denied his request for an instruction on imperfect self-defense, the sole
issue contested at closing argument was whether Schuller should be found guilty of
premeditated first degree murder or second degree murder.
       The prosecution emphasized to the jury that “self-defense was [not] an option . . .
in this case” and that there was “no legal self-defense argument that [it could] even
consider.” The prosecution explained that in light of the absence of any such possible
defense, the element of malice had been conclusively established by Schuller’s admission
that he repeatedly shot W.T. in the head. The prosecution further contended that the
manner of the killing and Schuller’s subsequent attempts to burn the body and evade the
police showed he had acted not only with malice, but also with deliberation and
premeditation. Finally, the prosecution discussed how the jury should evaluate the
“mental health evidence,” noting that multiple psychologists had testified Schuller
appeared to be exaggerating his condition as a means to avoid criminal liability.
       In response, the defense argued that Schuller’s testimony showed he was suffering
from a “severe mental health crisis” that had caused him to believe W.T. was “a physical
threat . . . and that is why he killed.” The defense theorized that Schuller’s “delusional
state of mind” had led him to believe that “W.T. was allied with forces of darkness” and

                                              9
“react[] to things that weren’t there.” According to Schuller, this evidence raised at least
a reasonable doubt whether his “paranoid beliefs” had caused him to act out of a
perceived fear for his life rather than with deliberation and premeditation.
       The jury found Schuller guilty of first degree murder. Following the
determination of guilt, the trial proceeded to the sanity phase. The jury was unable to
reach a decision on that issue and a second jury was empaneled. The second jury found
that Schuller was legally sane at the time of the shooting.
B.     Court of Appeal Proceedings
       In his direct appeal, Schuller asserted the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the
jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense, because substantial
evidence demonstrated he had an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief in the need for self-
defense. We concluded the trial court erred in refusing the instruction because, “[w]hile
defendant's testimony included evidence of delusion, his account pertaining to the actual
shooting was not entirely delusional and thus provided substantial evidence of an actual
but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense.” (Schuller I, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th
at p. 233.) We then evaluated the error under the prejudice standards of People v. Watson
(1956) 45 Cal.2d 818, 836 and Chapman (Schuller I, supra, at pp. 237-239) and
concluded under either standard, the error was harmless “given the overwhelming
evidence that defendant was not acting under any form of self-defense” (id. at p. 238).
We affirmed the judgment.
C.     Supreme Court Proceedings
       The Supreme Court granted review and held the appropriate standard to evaluate
prejudice when the record contains substantial evidence of imperfect self-defense is
under the federal Chapman standard; that is, the reviewing court is required to reverse the
conviction unless it concludes “no ‘rational juror who made the findings reflected in the
verdict and heard the evidence at trial could have had a reasonable doubt regarding the
findings necessary to convict the defendant [absent the instructional error].’ ” (Schuller

                                              10
II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 244.) The Supreme Court also held our analysis did not
comport with that standard. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court noted we had identified evidence
that “ ‘undercut [defendant’s] claim of self-defense’ ” or “ ‘did not entirely align with his
story.’ ” (Id. at p. 262.) “The [appellate] court’s discussion suggests that rather than
assess whether any reasonable jury could have credited Schuller’s claim of imperfect
self-defense ‘given the . . . actual verdict and the state of the evidence’ [citation], the
[appellate] court performed its own weighing of the evidence and its own assessment of
witness credibility. It was not the [appellate] court’s role, for example, to decide whether
Schuller’s failure to raise the issue of self-defense in his initial conversations with police
demonstrated that his trial testimony was not true or credit the psychologists’ disputed
conclusion that Schuller was malingering. While much of the trial evidence certainly
casts doubt on Schuller’s claim of imperfect self-defense, it was ultimately the jury’s
role, not that of the reviewing court, to assess whether such evidence showed beyond a
reasonable doubt that Schuller did not ‘kill[ ] with an actual but unreasonable belief in the
need for self-defense against imminent death or great bodily injury.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Additionally, our Supreme Court explained that a proper application of Chapman
precludes finding both that failure to give an imperfect self-defense instruction was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on overwhelming evidence and that
substantial evidence supports the instruction. (Schuller II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 263.)
       Accordingly, our Supreme Court reversed the judgment affirming Schuller’s
conviction and remanded the matter to us with instructions to reconsider whether the
failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Schuller II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 263.)
                                      II. DISCUSSION
       The sole issue for us on remand from our Supreme Court is whether the trial
court’s denial of Schuller’s request for an imperfect self-defense instruction was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

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       In supplemental briefing, the People argue no reasonable jury would have found
Schuller acted in imperfect self-defense as: (1) the jury’s finding of premeditation and
deliberation shows the jury rejected a finding that Schuller acted in imperfect self-
defense; (2) there is no evidence at the time of the fatal shot Schuller actually believed
that immediate deadly force was necessary against W.T.; and (3) firing fatal shots at a
disabled assailant precludes a finding of imperfect self-defense.
       “ ‘Generally, the intent to unlawfully kill constitutes malice.’ ” (Schuller II,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 252.) Imperfect self-defense negates the element of malice and
limits the offense to manslaughter. (Ibid.) When imperfect self-defense is at issue, the
People must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that the defendant committed an
unlawful, intentional killing, but also that the defendant did not kill in an actual but
unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense.” (Id. at p. 254.) When, as here, there is
substantial evidence of imperfect self-defense, the failure to instruct on the theory
amounts to an incomplete instruction on an actual element of murder, namely malice.
(Id. at pp. 244-245.)
       In Schuller II, our Supreme Court concluded the instructional error at issue here is
one that misdescribes the elements of the charged offense and as such the error was
subject to review under the Chapman standard. Our Supreme Court clarified the
Chapman standard requires “reversal unless the reviewing court is persuaded that
‘ “ ‘[n]o reasonable jury’ ” would have found in favor of the defendant on the missing
fact, given the jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence’ [citation]. When
making this evaluation, the reviewing court ‘ “does not . . . ‘become in effect a second
jury to determine whether the defendant is guilty.’ [Citation.] Rather a court, in typical
appellate-court fashion, asks whether the record contains evidence that could rationally
lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.” ’ [Citation.] As stated by
our high court, ‘safeguarding the jury guarantee will often require that a reviewing court
conduct a thorough examination of the record. If, at the end of that examination, the

                                              12
court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been
the same absent the error—for example, where the defendant contested the omitted
element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding—it should not find
the error harmless.’ ” (Schuller II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 261.)
A.     Jury’s Premeditation and Deliberation Finding
       The People argue the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation was
necessarily a rejection that Schuller acted under the effects of delusions and
hallucinations; and therefore, no reasonable jury would have found he actually, but
unreasonably, believed in the need to defend himself. As the People reason, defense
counsel’s closing argument was that Schuller acted in a delusional state of mind when he
killed W.T. and therefore did not premeditate the killing. The jury rejected this defense
and found Schuller carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice, and
knowing the consequences decided to kill W.T. The People conclude that this verdict is
“completely at odds with a finding that while in a delusional state [Schuller] actually
believed he needed to act with lethal force to save his life.”
       The jury was instructed that to find premeditation and deliberation, there must be
proof that Schuller decided to kill after weighing the consequences of that choice and
before completing the acts that caused death; that a decision to kill made rashly,
impulsively or without careful consideration was not deliberate or premeditated; and that
a cold calculated decision to kill can be reached quickly. (CALCRIM No. 521.) An
instruction on imperfect self-defense would have informed the jury that Schuller acted in
imperfect self-defense if he: actually believed he was in imminent danger of being killed
or suffering great bodily injury and actually believed the immediate use of deadly force
was necessary to defend against that danger; but at least one of those beliefs was
unreasonable. And, the instruction would have instructed the jury that to convict Schuller
of murder, the People were required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Schuller
was not acting in imperfect self-defense. (CALCRIM No. 571.)

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       As the People acknowledge, a jury’s finding that a defendant acted with
premeditation and deliberation does not necessarily preclude a finding that he honestly
but unreasonably believed he needed to act in self-defense. “Imperfect self-defense does
not require a rash or impulsive killing. Rather, the requirements of self-defense are
consistent with a killing undertaken with premeditation and deliberation. A defendant
who acts in self-defense must honestly believe that he or she is ‘in imminent danger of
being killed or suffering great bodily injury’ and that ‘the immediate use of deadly force
[is] necessary to defend against the danger.’ (CALCRIM No. 571.) These requirements
imply that a defendant has evaluated both the danger present and alternate options for
escape or deescalation and has concluded that ‘ “imminent danger to life or great bodily
injury” ’ requires the use of deadly force.” (Schuller II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 265,
(conc. opn. of J. Liu).) As Justice Liu concluded, Schuller’s imperfect self-defense claim
meets these requirements. Schuller “testified that after unsuccessfully attempting to flee
W.T.’s apartment and then seeing W.T. reach for a gun and attempt to attack with a knife,
he determined that responding with deadly force was necessary. [Citation.] Schuller’s
testimony supports a conclusion that he premeditated—that is, he ‘decided to kill before
completing the act[ ] that caused death,’ a decision that ‘can be reached quickly’—and
that he deliberated by ‘carefully weigh[ing] the considerations for and against’ his
decision to kill. (CALCRIM No. 521.) A juror who credited his testimony could
rationally conclude both that he acted with premeditation and deliberation and that he
honestly though unreasonably believed he needed to act in self-defense.” (Schuller II,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 265 (conc. opn. of J. Liu).)

                                             14
       The People’s argument to the contrary characterizes Schuller’s imperfect self-
defense claim as a claim of “delusional self-defense”2 and asserts Schuller’s claim of
imperfect self-defense was inextricably bound with his claims of hallucinations and
delusions. In essence, the People reiterate the argument made by the prosecutor in the
trial court opposing giving the imperfect self-defense instruction and to us on the original
appeal. We rejected this argument on appeal when we concluded that the trial court erred
in failing to instruct on imperfect self-defense because, “[w]hile defendant’s testimony
included evidence of delusion, his account pertaining to the actual shooting was not
entirely delusional and thus provided substantial evidence of an actual but unreasonable
belief in the need for self-defense.” (Schuller I, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 233.)
       Moreover, the People’s argument ignores the fact that because of the trial court’s
refusal to give the imperfect self-defense instruction, the sole contested issue was
whether Schuller should be found guilty of premeditated first degree murder or second
degree murder. (Schuller II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 249.) There was no argument
regarding malice. Instead, the prosecutor argued malice had been conclusively
established as Schuller admitted he intentionally shot the victim and failed to proffer any
legally valid theory of self-defense. In turn, defense counsel’s argument was limited to
arguing Schuller’s “perceptions of W.T.’s conduct raised a reasonable doubt as to
whether the killing was committed with deliberation and premeditation. In other words,
the lack of instruction forced Schuller to concede, and enabled the prosecution to
affirmatively argue, that Schuller’s belief in the need to defend himself was entirely
immaterial to the jury’s determination of malice.” (Id. at p. 255.)

2 A claim of self-defense based solely on delusion (“delusional self-defense”) is more
than a claim of imperfect self-defense, it is a claim of legal insanity. (Elmore, supra, 59
Cal.4th at p. 145.)

                                             15
        Without an instruction on imperfect self-defense, the jurors were never informed
that if they had “a reasonable doubt whether [defendant] was operating under an actual
but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense, they were required to acquit him of
murder for lack of malice.” (Schuller II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 255, italics added.) The
misinstruction thus precluded the jury from making a factual finding as to an “actual
element,” malice, necessary to prove the offense. We see nothing in the jury findings that
fills this void.
        Schuller contested an element of the offense, malice, and raised sufficient
evidence to support a finding that he acted without malice (in imperfect self-defense),
that is a finding contrary to the jury’s finding. We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the instructional error.
Accordingly, we cannot find the error harmless under Chapman. (Schuller II, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 261.)
B.      Actual Belief in Need to Use Deadly Force/Disabled Assailant
        The People also claim there is no evidence that Schuller actually believed in the
need to use deadly force and that his firing shots at a disabled assailant precluded a
finding of imperfect self-defense. In these claims, the People argue that as to the second
round of shots, there was not evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Schuller
actually believed in the immediate need to use deadly force against W.T.
        In making this evaluation, we are constrained by our Supreme Court’s directive
that we must not weigh the evidence or in effect become a second jury determining guilt
and instead must limit our analysis to the “ ‘actual verdict and the state of the evidence.’ ”
(Schuller II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 261.) So constrained, we cannot conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same verdict absent the
instructional error. (Ibid.) Schuller testified W.T. attempted to get the gun and twice
attempted to attack Schuller with a knife. These attempts made Schuller fear for his life,
so he shot W.T. Despite being shot in the head, without hesitation, W.T. pushed himself

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up, possibly grabbed something, and yelled, “You f’d up.” Schuller was shocked and
scared, so he shot W.T. four or five more times. If the jury credited this testimony, it
could have rationally concluded Schuller actually believed the danger from W.T. had not
passed after the first shot; and that Schuller’s actions were taken in the actual, albeit
unreasonable, belief in the need to defend himself from imminent danger of death or
great bodily injury. Nothing in the jury’s verdict demonstrates it would have necessarily
rejected this claim. Accordingly, we cannot find the error harmless under Chapman.
                                    III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with his opinion.

                                                           /S/

                                                   RENNER, J.

       We concur:

       /S/

       HULL, Acting P. J.

       /S/

       WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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