Court Opinion

ID: 9758029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:08:16.947863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:46.041483
License: Public Domain

SUE WALKER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority’s statement of the facts and with its recitation of the controlling case law. I cannot agree,'however, that viewing the summary judgment evidence in the fight most favorable to the nonmovant, Appellant Denis Proulx, it fails to- raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Appellant acted as an ordinary prudent person would have acted under the same circumstances and whether Appellant acted diligently up until the time Appellee *637Michael A. Wells was served. Consequently, I would sustain Appellant’s sole issue and reverse the trial court’s summary judgment.
The law is well settled that when a movant seeks summary judgment on the ground that the suit was not served upon him within the applicable limitations period and the nonmovant raises the issue of due diligence, then to obtain summary judgment the movant must conclusively establish that diligence was not used to effectuate service. S.W. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.2002); Zale Corp. v. Rosenbaum, 520 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.1975); Tate v. Beal, 119 S.W.3d 378, 381 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). A matter is conclusively established if reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the summary judgment proof. See, e.g., Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.1982). In other words, if the summary judgment evidence concerning due diligence — including the nonmovant’s controverting summary judgment evidence— viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning the nonmovant’s diligence in obtaining service, then summary judgment is improper. Tate, 119 S.W.3d at 381 (holding that “[vjiewing all of the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Tate [the non-movant], we hold that a fact issue exists concerning whether Tate exercised due diligence in effecting service on Beal”). Generally a plaintiffs diligence in effectuating service is a question of fact that is determined by a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff acted as an ordinary prudent person would have acted under the same circumstances, and (2) whether the plaintiff acted diligently up until the time the defendant was served. Id. (citing Hodge v. Smith, 856 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied)).
Here, Appellant’s summary judgment evidence included affidavits from two process servers, one in-house investigator, and one private investigator. Viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, these affidavits raise a fact issue concerning whether Appellant acted with reasonable diligence in effecting service on Appellee.1 The summary judgment affidavits filed by Appellant establish that during the nine months between when suit was filed and when Appellant finally successfully obtained substituted service on Appellee’s brother, Appellant utilized two process servers who attempted service on Appellee twenty-three times at five different addresses and utilized two different investigators in an effort to locate Appellee. The private investigator stated in his affidavit that Appellee “appears to be moving from relative to relative and doing his best to avoid service from the courts and creditors.”
Viewing this evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Appellant and resolving all doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against Appellee, the sheer volume of Appellant’s repeated and consistent service attempts, combined with his use of two investigators and supported by the private investigator’s sworn conclusion that Appel-lee was intentionally avoiding service, at least raise a fact issue regarding Appellant’s due diligence in serving process on Appellee. See, e.g., id. (holding that appellant, who served appellee three months after suit was filed and after the limitations period, used due diligence even *638though there was an eleven-day delay in first attempting service and a near three-month delay between the first failed attempt at service and the date of actual service); Tranter v. Duemling, 129 S.W.3d 257, 261-63 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (holding that appellant, who served appellee three months after suit was filed and after the limitations period, used due diligence); Martinez v. Becerra, 797 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ) (noting that defendant’s efforts to conceal his identity “weigh heavily in favor of finding due diligence”); see also Forrest v. Houck, No. 14-03-00583-CV, 2004 WL 2163057, at *7 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 28, 2004, no pet.) (mem.op.) (recognizing defendant’s use of address other than his residence for driver’s license was major cause of delay in serving defendant and constituted explanation for delay in service requiring reversal of summary judgment for defendant).
The majority points to the following facts in holding that appellant failed to raise a fact issue on diligence: the nineteen-day delay between the date of filing suit and the date that the process server received citation, Appellant’s nearly five-month delay in hiring a private investigator to locate Appellee (prior to that time Appellant explained that he had been using an in-house investigator), a twenty-four day delay in delivering citation to the second process server, and the total nine-month delay between when suit was filed and when substituted service on Appellee was finally obtained. The short purported gaps in Appellant’s nine-months’ worth of repeated and continuous service efforts, however, do not conclusively establish a lack of diligence in effectuating service, especially in light of the summary judgment evidence -that Appellee was actively dodging service. Compare Gant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex.1990) (holding that plaintiffs’ unexplained delay of three periods totaling thirty-eight months in obtaining service on defendant was lack of due diligence); Webster v. Thomas, 5 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding four-month delay between obtaining citation and having it served on the defendant was a lack of due diligence when the plaintiffs actions during this time “were not designed to procure the issuance of citation and service”); Butler v. Ross, 836 S.W.2d 833, 835-36 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (five and one-half months of inactivity between failure of service on wrong address and service at new address was a lack of due diligence); Hansler v. Mainka, 807 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (no request for service of process for five months after suit filed was a lack of due diligence); Allen v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 538 S.W.2d 857, 860 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (unexplained six-month delay between filing suit and obtaining service was a lack of due diligence); Williams v. Houston-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 531 S.W.2d 434, 435-36 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (unexplained almost eight-month delay between expiration of first citation and issuance of second citation was a lack of due diligence). The majority cites no cases that hold otherwise. In fact, until today, no case existed holding that twenty-three attempts to serve a defendant at five different addresses over nine months — all made while the defendant was actively dodging service — constitutes a lack of diligence as a matter of law.
Because reasonable minds can differ as to whether Appellant exercised due diligence in effectuating service upon Appel-lee, I would sustain Appellant’s first issue and reverse the trial court’s summary judgment for Appellee.