Court Opinion

ID: 9881486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-02 20:03:57.639448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:35.138354
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/2/23 In re N.S. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

In re N.S. et al., Persons                                   B327096
Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County
Court Law.                                                   Super. Ct. No.
                                                             18CCJP00304C–D)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

S.C.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, Nichelle L. Blackwell, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.
     Megan Turkat Schrin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     Tarkian & Associates, Arezoo Pichvai, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

                     _______________________

                     I.    INTRODUCTION

      S.C. (mother) appeals from an order terminating parental
rights to two of her children, N.S. (a son born in 2012) and A.S. (a
son born in 2014), under Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26.1 She contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it concluded that the beneficial parental relationship
exception did not apply.2 We affirm.

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institution Code.

2     In her notice of appeal, mother also purports to appeal from
the juvenile court’s December 15, 2022, order denying her section
388 petition, but her opening brief does not raise a challenge to
that order. She therefore has waived her challenge to the denial
of her section 388 petition. (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State
University and Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4; Telish v.
State Personnel Bd. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1487, fn. 4 [“An
appellant’s failure to raise an argument in the opening brief
waives the issue on appeal”].)

                                 2
     II.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.         Jurisdiction

      On January 17, 2018, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a section 300
petition on behalf of the children,3 and the juvenile court
detained them from mother.
       On March 13, 2018, mother entered a plea of no contest to
an amended petition that alleged father’s history of drug use and
mother’s failure to protect the children from it placed them at
risk of harm. (In re D.S. (Aug. 12, 2021, B309872 [nonpub. opn.].)
       The juvenile court sustained the petition and removed the
children from mother. The court granted mother monitored
visitation for nine hours per week and reunification services for
the family. (In re D.S., supra, B309872.)
       At the October 2, 2018, six-month review hearing, the
juvenile court found that the extent of mother’s progress in her
case plan was substantial and therefore placed the children with
her (as well as father). (In re D.S., supra, B309872.)
       In a March 15, 2019, status review report, the Department
advised that the family was struggling because mother had been
convicted in a criminal court case and incarcerated since
January 2, 2019. Pursuant to a plea agreement, mother was
sentenced to 90 days in jail and, upon release, was required to

3     At the time the petition was filed, mother’s seven children
by Juan S. (father)—D.S., J.S., N.S., A.S., X.S., Ju.S., and I.S.
(the children)—ranged in age from nine years to five months old.
Father is not a party to this appeal.

                                3
enroll in a six-month drug treatment program. (In re D.S., supra,
B309872.)
      In an April 19, 2019, last minute information, the
Department advised that mother had been released from jail on
April 4, 2019, and admitted to a six-month inpatient drug
treatment facility. (In re D.S., supra, B309872.)
      In a September 17, 2019, status review report, the
Department explained that mother had consistently participated
in her court-ordered programs, was doing well, and would be
released from the facility on September 30, 2019. After her
release, mother would be placed in a sober living facility for an
additional six months where she would continue to drug test and
attend a 12-step program. (In re D.S., supra, B309872.)
      On October 1, 2019, the juvenile court removed custody of
the children from father and released them to mother under
Department supervision. (In re D.S., supra, B309872.)

B.   Termination of Reunification Services and Selection of
     Permanent Plan

       In an April 10, 2020, detention report, the Department
advised that on October 4, 2019, mother was incarcerated for
violating the terms of her probation. She was released from
custody on October 31, 2019, and returned to her sober living
program. But, on February 7, 2020, mother was discharged from
that program for noncompliance and again incarcerated. (In re
D.S., supra, B309872.)

                                4
      Based on the information in the detention report, the
Department filed two petitions.4 The first, a section 342
subsequent petition, alleged that mother had made an
inappropriate plan for the care of her children by leaving them
with the maternal grandmother, whose home was cluttered with
bags and infested with cockroaches and rodents and who allowed
father unlimited access to the children in violation of the juvenile
court’s orders. The second, a section 387 supplemental petition,
alleged that mother had failed to comply with the court’s orders
to participate in parenting classes and individual counseling. (In
re D.S., supra, B309872.)
       At an April 15, 2020, detention hearing, the juvenile court
found that the Department had made a sufficient prima facie
showing to warrant removal of the children from mother. The
Department placed N.S. and A.S. together in a foster home. (In
re D.S., supra, B309872.)
       On June 9, 2020, N.S., A.S., X.S., and Ju.S. disclosed to the
social worker that they had been sexually abused by maternal
grandmother’s male friend while they lived in her home. They
reported disclosing the abuse to maternal grandmother, who
continued to allow the alleged abuser to have access to the
children. Mother and grandmother denied knowledge of the
sexual abuse. (In re D.S., supra, B309872.)
       At the August 24, 2020, hearing on the petitions, the
juvenile court sustained the section 342 petition and the section
387 petition as to count s-1. The court also denied mother

4      On April 7, 2020, the Department applied for and received
an interim order from the juvenile court authorizing the removal
of the children from the maternal grandmother’s house.

                                 5
reunification services and ordered that the permanent plan goal
for the children was adoption or legal guardianship. In addition,
the court granted the parents in-person visitation with the
children.
      On June 3, 2021, the Department placed N.S. and A.S. with
new foster parents G.H. and J.C. (the foster parents).
      In its October 1, 2021, interim review report, the
Department provided the following information about N.S. and
A.S. based on its interview of one of their foster parents5: During
mother’s bi-weekly calls with N.S. and A.S., she would tell them
that she was trying “‘her best to get [them] back,’” causing the
foster parent concern that mother was giving them false hope.
Mother spent most of the calls speaking with N.S. and was
“‘disconnected’” from A.S. The foster parent also observed that,
during one visit, N.S. ran to mother, hugged her, and became
emotional; A.S., on the other hand, appeared “‘stiff’” when he
hugged mother. Mother spent more time during that visit
interacting with N.S. than she did with A.S. The foster parent
explained that although N.S. believed he would be returning to
mother’s home, A.S. did not share that belief. But they both also
expressed a desire for adoption by their foster parents, if their
siblings were adopted.

5     When the social worker tried to interview N.S., she “was
unable to obtain a meaningful statement from the child,” who
either refused to answer questions or provided one-word answers.
A.S. responded to her questions, telling the social worker that he
did not talk to mother during her calls, he did not know whether
he wanted to live with mother, and he liked living in his foster
home.

                                 6
         In an October 15, 2021, last minute information, the
Department reported that mother, without first clearing the
dates with the foster parents, promised N.S. that she would
either take him to Chuck E. Cheese’s for his birthday or have a
party at the park. The foster parents rescheduled mother’s
upcoming visit with the children so they could celebrate N.S.’s
birthday with him at Universal Studios. But mother then failed
to attend the rescheduled visit. According to the foster parents,
N.S. was disappointed, as mother had been promising him a cake
and a celebration at the park.
         In a February 9, 2022, status review report, the
Department reported that N.S. and A.S. continued to live with
the foster parents and appeared comfortable and happy. The
foster parents ensured that N.S. and A.S. were “supported in all
their needs” and continued to express a desire to adopt them.
         In an August 4, 2022, status review report, the Department
advised that the foster parents continued to express their
willingness to adopt N.S. and A.S. They reported that N.S had
“been receptive and [was] doing much better.” A.S. was “doing
very well in school and [had] received many achievement awards
during the last school year.”
         The Department also reported that, during visits with N.S.
and A.S., mother was “limited in her engagement with the
children . . . and . . . continued to show disregard for the
caregivers’ requests when made.” She also continued to tell N.S.
and A.S during phone calls that “she [was] going to get them back
. . . ,” which upset and confused them.
         On August 18, 2022, mother filed a section 388 petition
requesting a change to the juvenile court’s August 24, 2020, order
establishing adoption as the permanent plan for N.S. and A.S.

                                7
According to mother, she had completed all court ordered services
and had maintained housing for two years “such that [N.S. and
A.S.] could be reunified with all siblings currently before the
court . . . .” She therefore asked the court to order that N.S. and
A.S. be returned to her home.
       During her September 17, 2022, monthly visit with N.S.,
A.S., and her other children6, mother brought food, party favors,
a pinata, and individual gifts for each child. Mother, who
appeared to be pregnant,7 struggled “to keep watch of all [the]
children while they played.” At times, she was “oblivious as to
where the children were and if they were safe.” And, she did not
appear to be engaging or conversing with the children.
       On October 18, 2022, a social worker interviewed N.S. and
A.S. They both stated that they wanted to live in the foster home
and did not want to leave. N.S. told the social worker that he
was well treated in the foster home, felt safe there, and did not
want to leave if he was not able to return to his parents. A.S.
stated that things in the foster home were going well and that he
liked their new house. He felt safe in the home and did not want
to leave if he was unable to return to his parents.

6     As noted, all seven children were declared dependents of
the juvenile court and removed from mother during these
proceedings. Parental rights to D.S. and I.S. were terminated.

7     Mother confirmed to the social worker that she was six
months pregnant, but had not told her children about the
pregnancy. Although she denied that she was pregnant by
father, he told the social worker that the child was his eighth
with mother.

                                 8
       During the October 29, 2022, monthly visit, mother brought
the children food, toys, and candy. The children hugged mother,
and N.S. gave her a doll he made with yarn.
       During the November 5, 2022, monthly visit, mother
brought breakfast; some of her children greeted her, but others
required prompting. The social worker observed that N.S. was
“very clingy to mother” and that “it was difficult for mother to
handle all the children at once, as they all [had] different needs”
and “the children did not listen to her . . . .” When A.S. fell and
hurt his knee, mother did not console him.
       On November 29, 2022, the social worker interviewed N.S.,
A.S., and the foster parents. N.S. said that his visits with mother
were “good” and that she brought food and toys. When asked
with whom he would like to live, N.S. responded, “I want to go
back with my mom.” When asked why, he explained, “I want to
be with all my brothers[.] I don’t want us to be separated
anymore. I have so much family that I have not seen in a long
time. Yes, I want to be back with my family.”
       A.S. also stated that during visits with mother, she would
bring food and toys, and he would play with his brothers. When
asked with whom he would like to live, he initially responded,
“What did [N.S.] tell you?” The social worker again asked A.S.
for his preference, and he stated, “[N.S.] told me that he was
going to tell you that he wants to go back home.” When the social
worker reiterated that she wanted his preference, A.S. explained,
“Well, I am okay with staying here, but if I can go home then yes,
I want to go home. I want to be with all my brothers. I also
know that my mom now has to take care of another baby too so, I
don’t know. So, I don’t know if she would be able to take care of
me. I just want us to be happy.”

                                9
       One foster parent advised the social worker that N.S. was
“‘attached to . . . mother’” and had “‘expressed at times that he
want[ed] to go with [her].” But he also explained that it had
“‘taken us time to get where the kids are now’” and that N.S.
“‘took the longest to adjust.’” The other foster parent related that
mother’s phone calls with N.S. and A.S. were “‘very robotic’” and
that the majority of the calls involved “‘what . . . they want[ed her
to bring] for [the next] visit.’” He also observed that mother had
“‘no control’” of the children during visits and that the foster
parents in attendance would need “‘to intervene and tell her to
pay attention.’” Mother did not take the time to ask him how
N.S. and A.S. were doing or whether they had made any progress.
She also failed to ask about their mental health services,
challenges at school, or if there had been any changes in their
behavior.
       During the December 3, 2022, monthly visit, mother
brought breakfast for the children, as well as new games and
toys. But she appeared “to struggle with what to ask her children
and what to say to them in response.” When mother brought out
the toys and games, the children fought over them, and one of the
foster parents was required to intervene. N.S. hugged mother
and rubbed her stomach while she had her back turned to the
other children.
       The social worker spoke to N.S. about returning to his
parents, and he “quickly” responded that he wanted to go back to
them. Because N.S. had previously said he did not want to
return home, the social worker asked what changed his mind. He
replied that “he wanted to go home because [mother] was having
a baby and he did not want to miss them.” When asked the same
question, A.S. also said that he wanted to return his parents

                                 10
because he “thinks about them and misses them” after their
visits. He explained that he did not know why he changed his
mind, but that he wanted “to see his grandma and his uncle that
he [did] not see anymore.” He added that he knew N.S. wanted
to return and that if N.S. returned, “he would have to go back
too.”
       Before a scheduled visit with the children on
December 10, 2022, mother informed the social worker that she
would be late. While they waited for mother to arrive, A.S. told
the social worker that he had changed his mind about returning
to mother’s home because there were “bugs in the refrigerator
and mice in the home.” A.S. claimed that N.S. wanted to go home
“to help clean the mess.” A.S. was not sure whether he would
return, even if “they cleaned the mess . . . .” When mother
arrived, she asked if the children could come to her car and see
the new baby. The children crowded around the car and seemed
excited to see and hold their new baby brother.
       The social worker observed that mother struggled to
express herself with A.S. and N.S., and the children would lose
interest and walk away from her. In contrast, they listened to
and respected the foster parents and had developed a strong bond
with them.
       On December 15, 2022, the juvenile court held a combined
hearing under sections 388 and 366.26. The court denied the
section 388 petition because mother had failed to demonstrate
changed circumstances.
       On mother’s claim that the beneficial parental exception
applied, the juvenile court stated that it would consider the three
prongs articulated in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614
(Caden C.).

                                11
        As to the first prong, the juvenile court concluded that
mother had demonstrated that she had regular visitation and
contact with N.S. and A.S.
        The juvenile court continued, “The second prong is that
there is a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit
the child in this case. And the way that particular prong has
been assessed is whether or not there is a substantial and
emotional positive attachment between the children and the
parents. . . . [¶] As it concerns [N.S. and A.S.,] however, I do
believe that they have a positive attachment. I do not believe
that it is a substantial attachment. I look at the wavering that
[N.S. and A.S.] have had with respect to wanting to go back
home, not wanting to go back home, then saying they want to go
back home, then not wanting to go back home. That tells me that
the positive attachment is not one that I would identify as
substantial. In fact, [N.S.]’s most recent desire to . . . go home [is]
so he can clean up the home and make sure they don’t have the
bugs and mice in it. That is not his job, not his responsibility. He
is a child, and he is entitled to have a childhood and to grow. It is
not his responsibility to say, ‘I got to clean up all of the mess of
my parents that they are not doing the work that they should do
just so we can all have a home.’ That is not appropriate. I don’t
believe that to be a substantial, positive attachment.
        “As it concerns [A.S.], . . . when I look at his statements, he
has recently said he doesn’t want to go back home because of the
. . . condition of the home . . . , and that he’s afraid of living under
those conditions again. I know he previously said that he would
want to go back home as of December 3rd, 2022, but then as of
December 10th, 2022, he said he doesn’t want to go back home.
Then [A.S.] is not always using his voice about what he wants

                                  12
and relying on [N.S.]. He said, ‘If [N.S.] wants to go back home,
then I know I’ll have to go back home too.’ It doesn’t sound like
he has this substantial positive attachment that he must
absolutely need to go back home or else his life would end. It
sounds like he’s relying—his feelings are directly intertwined and
connected with [N.S.]’s feelings. Maybe [N.S.] has some level of
influence over [A.S.] that makes him think that his responses
should be equivalent to [N.S.]’s responses. [¶] When I look at
that second prong of [Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614] there is a
positive attachment. I don’t believe it is a substantial positive
emotional attachment. I don’t believe that that prong weighs in
favor of the parents.”
       Finally, the court considered the third prong set forth in
Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614: “I do not find it would be
detrimental to [N.S. and A.S.] to implement a termination of
parental rights. When I look at the progress that [the foster
parents] have made with these two young men, they are doing an
excellent job in taking care of them. They are addressing the
needs that these children have. They are focused on the
children’s needs. They are making sure that they get all of the
services that they need in order to address their issues, and these
children have come a long way being in the care, custody and
control of [the foster parents]. . . . [¶] . . . I believe that overall
looking at the totality of the circumstances and applying the
[Caden C.] analysis, I believe that all three prongs are not met to
justify the parent/child bond exception as it concerns termination
of parental rights.”
       The juvenile court therefore terminated parental rights to
N.S. and A.S. On February 14, 2023, mother filed a notice of
appeal.

                                  13
                        III.   DISCUSSION

       Mother contends she established that “there was a
beneficial parental relationship [with N.S. and A.S.] due to [her]
being a consistent and positive part of their lives and their sense
of belonging to a family.” According to mother, “the detriment to
[N.S. and A.S.] if this relationship was severed, overcame the
preference for adoption, and . . . the juvenile court erroneously
minimized the harm to the children from the loss of that
relationship.”

A.    Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception

       “[T]he goal at the section 366.26 hearing is ‘specifically . . .
to select and implement a permanent plan for the child.’
[Citations.] To guide the court in selecting the most suitable
permanent arrangement, the statute lists plans in order of
preference and provides a detailed procedure for choosing among
them. [Citation.] According to that procedure, the court must
first determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the
child is likely to be adopted. [Citation.] If so, and if the court
finds that there has been a previous determination that
reunification services be terminated, then the court shall
terminate parental rights to allow for adoption. [Citation.] But if
the parent shows that termination would be detrimental to the
child for at least one specifically enumerated reason, the court
should decline to terminate parental rights and select another
permanent plan. [Citation.]” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 630–631.)

                                  14
       One such enumerated exception to the termination of
parental rights is the beneficial parental relationship exception.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In order to demonstrate that this
exception applies, a parent must show: “(1) regular visitation
and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which
would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 631.)
       “As to the second element, courts assess whether ‘the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).) . . . [T]he focus is the child. And the relationship
may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child,
the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the
“positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.]” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) It is the parent’s burden to show
“that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment
to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Id. at p. 636.)
       “When it weighs whether termination would be
detrimental, the court is not comparing the parent’s attributes as
[a] custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive
parent(s). . . . [C]ourts should not look to whether the parent can
provide a home for the child; the question is just whether losing
the relationship with the parent would harm the child to an
extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new,
adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.)
Relevant factual determinations include “the specific features of
the child’s relationship with the parent and the harm that would
come from losing those specific features,” “how harmful in total

                                15
that loss would be,” and “for the particular child, how a
prospective adoptive placement may offset and even
counterbalance those harms.” (Id. at p. 640.)
       “A substantial evidence standard of review applies to the
first two elements.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.)
“[T]he ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship
with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse
of discretion.” (Id. at p. 640.)

B.    Analysis

      The juvenile court’s conclusion—that although N.S. and
A.S. had a positive attachment to mother, that attachment was
not sufficiently substantial to establish the second prong of the
beneficial parental relationship test articulated in Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th 614—is supported by substantial evidence.
      When they were first detained from mother in January
2018, N.S., who was five and A.S. who was three, spent the next
10 months in foster case. Then, between October 2018 and April
2020, they were returned to the parents, but during large
portions of that time, mother was either incarcerated or living in
drug treatment programs and sober living homes. Moreover, in
October 2019, the children were again removed from father,
requiring mother to make arrangements for them to reside in the
maternal grandmother’s home. The court then authorized
removal of the children from the maternal grandmother’s home
in April 2020 and placed in foster care. They were eventually
placed with the foster parents. Thus, contrary to mother’s
assertion, N.S. and A.S. did not spend most of their lives in her

                                16
care. At the time mother’s parental rights were terminated in
December 2022, N.S. had been living in alternative placements
almost as long as he had been in mother’s care, and A.S. had been
alternatively placed longer than he had been in her care.
       Following the final removal of N.S. and A.S. from mother in
April 2020, her interactions with them consisted of phone calls
and monthly visits in a monitored setting. During the calls,
mother repeatedly told them they would be returned to her,
causing them to experience frustration and confusion when
mother failed to keep that promise. The calls were also described
as robotic. And, during the visits, although mother brought food
and toys, she struggled to communicate meaningfully with the
children. Moreover, although N.S. and A.S. missed their parents
and other relatives following visits and, at times, expressed a
desire to return to their home, on other occasions, they stated
that they wanted to stay in their current placement and be
adopted.
       The evidence documenting mother’s relationship with N.S.
and A.S. was therefore sufficient to support the juvenile court
finding that their attachment to her was not a “substantial,
positive, emotional” one. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
       Finally, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse
its discretion when it concluded that the termination of parental
rights would not be sufficiently detrimental to N.S. and A.S. to
outweigh the benefits of adoption. The conflicting responses
given by N.A. and A.S. on the issue of being returned to mother
suggested that they were ambivalent about their current
relationship with her. And, their interactions during calls and
visits supported an inference that they would not suffer
significant harm if those contacts terminated. On this record,

                               17
that N.S. and A.S. missed mother following monthly visits was
insufficient, by itself, to support an inference of significant
emotional detriment.
       By contrast, the evidence of the significant benefits to be
derived from adoption was substantial. It was undisputed that
the foster parents had maintained a stable home environment for
N.S. and A.S. and provided for all their needs. They appeared to
be thriving in that home. On balance, that evidence supported a
finding that the security and permanence of adoption would more
than offset any harm that would flow from ending the
relationships with mother.
       Mother maintains that the juvenile court nevertheless
abused its discretion under Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614 by
focusing on an improper factor, namely, with whom N.S. and A.S.
wished to reside, and equating it with the required detriment
determination. According to mother, “the issue of whether a child
wants to return home does not answer the question of emotional
detriment.”
       The record shows that, following the removal of N.S. and
A.S. from mother in April 2020, social workers repeatedly
questioned them about whether they wished to be returned to
her, and on different occasions they gave conflicting responses.
In making its second-prong analysis, the juvenile court
acknowledged their responses and considered them when
evaluating the substance of the parties’ relationship. But there is
nothing in the record of the section 366.26 hearing to suggest
that the court’s subsequent weighing of whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental was based solely on the
expressed preferences of N.S. and A.S. concerning placement. To
the contrary, the record reflects that the court was well aware of

                                18
the three-prong analysis required by Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
614 and both cited and followed its mandates, including the
required weighing of detriment against benefits. The court
therefore did not abuse its discretion.

                      IV.   DISPOSITION

     The orders denying the section 388 petition and
terminating parental rights are affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             MOOR, J.

                               19