Court Opinion

ID: 9730200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:05:05.436267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:04.850771
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(concurring). I agree with the result of the majority opinion; however, I believe the reasoning to be either faulty or confusing and I therefore concur.
*816The majority has misapplied the first phase of the test of After Hour Welding v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis. 2d 734, 324 N.W.2d 686 (1982). The majority holds: “Thus, ‘extraneous prejudicial information’ is knowledge coming from the outside which is prejudicial. . . . The juror’s statement here does not fall under the category of extraneous prejudicial information.” (Supra, at 794.) In After Hour this court held:
“The concern for fairness to the parties and monitoring the integrity of the judicial system leads us to conclude that a trial court may, in appropriate circumstances, consider allegations that extraneous prejudicial remarks were made to jurors which were not a part of the judicially guarded evidence they received.” 108 Wis. 2d at 739.
By that the court meant “extraneous” referred to outside of the court proceedings and evidence received therein even though it came during jury deliberations. It is not necessary that a source which is foreign to the jurors make the prejudicial remarks in order for it to be an outside influence. Section 906.06(2), Stats., distinguishes between “extraneous prejudicial information which was improperly brought to the jury’s attention” and “any outside influence [that] was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.”
If the majority is convinced this is not competent evidence under sec. 906.02(2), Stats., then there is no need to consider the other two phases of the After Hour test.
The extraneous prejudicial information in this case did not come to the jury “through the judicial sieve, where the fundamental guarantees of procedural law protect the rights of those accused of crime.” United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922 (1970).
The majority states: “We conclude that the evidence does not warrant a conclusion that the conviction must *817be reversed as a matter of fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due process clause.” (At 806.) That is a statement of principle stated in After Hour and Poh as forming a basis for the third phase test but it is not one of the phases. It may fit in either the second phase of whether the evidence shows substantial grounds sufficient to overturn the verdict or the third phase of whether the error would have prejudiced a hypothetical average jury.
Since the majority holds that it was not competent evidence, as it did at page 794 of the majority opinion, then it should not consider the second and third phases of After Hour. It is misleading for the majority to agree with the trial court and court of appeals analysis, which was not based on whether it was competent evidence.
The majority states that the trial court held “this information would [not] be prejudicial to a hypothetical jury . . .” (Majority op. at 792.) That is the third phase of After Hour, not the first or second phase of competency or substantial grounds to set aside the verdict as a matter of law.
The only protection for a fair trial in attempting to eliminate prejudices of individual jurors is to discover them during the voir dire phase of the proceedings and to strike them for cause or peremptory challenges. All jurors like all persons have some prejudices; however, when it is one of race, religion, gender or national origin, it must not be used as an influence on other jurors by keeping them from making decisions based on the evidence. If individual prejudice cannot be eliminated, at the least, the judicial system must prevent it from spreading as a cancer by influencing other jurors during the impartial decision-making process. As we stated in Poh, 116 Wis. 2d at 518-19: “We cannot ‘expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opinions of jurors, their attitudinal expositions or their philoso*818phies. These involve the very human elements that constitute one of the strengths of our jury system.’ ” However, when such attitudes are expressed by a juror which have an influence outside of the evidence received, the trial court must consider such information. If this means looking at such information when it comes to the trial court’s attention that a jury verdict may have been the result of any such form of prejudice (After Hour), then it is a duty not a burden of the judicial system to ferret out the truth, and this is done by applying one or all of the three phases of the After Hour test to arrive at the truth.
In this case, I believe the evidence of the juror’s statement was competent under sec. 906.06(2), Stats. I do not believe the evidence shows by clear and satisfying proof that substantial grounds sufficient to set aside the verdict exist as a matter of law. The proof therefore fails under the second phase of the After Hour test. 108 Wis. 2d at 740.
This record does not show that the trial court held a sufficient hearing or made findings as to all of the seven requirements stated in After Hour, 108 Wis. 2d at 742, in reviewing the extraneous information. They are:
“ ‘(1) that the statement was in fact made;
“ ‘(2) specifically when it was made;
“ ‘(3) the circumstances under which it was made;
‘“(4) who made it;
(5) which, if any, jurors were present;
“‘(6) whether jurors not present were informed of the statement; and
“ ‘(7) other relevant facts about the statement which will assist the trial court to assess the prospect of unfair prejudice.’ ”
Had those requirements been considered on the record by the trial court, the reviewing courts would be in a better position to analyze the extraneous information.
In the dissent of Justice Bablitch, he states: “[T]he jury could have become biased against the defendant *819after hearing this information.” (Dissent at 833.) I reject that as a test under either the second or third phase of the After Hour test. The test under the second phase of the After Hour test is whether by clear and satisfying proof the extraneous information demonstrated substantial grounds sufficient to set aside the verdict as a matter of law; the test under the third phase is whether there is a reasonable possibility or probability that the hypothetical average jury would have been prejudiced in the total context of the evidence which it was considering. See, Poh, majority and concurring opinions. I do not believe the other 11 jurors can be said to be so weak and uncommitted to their oaths to have been prejudiced against the defendant when considering the total evidence before them. The statement, if made, was one fraught with the individual’s racial prejudice without any specific knowledge of the individual defendant’s character as was the case in After Hour. To say that personal and isolated prejudiced remark could influence 11 other average jurors with the evidence before them as here is to weaken the jury system beyond giving it any conclusiveness.
The third phase of After Hour need not be considered. However, since there appears to be confusion in the majority opinion, I feel compelled to state that although the evidence shows an apparent prejudice of the juror, there was not a convincing showing there was a reasonable possibility or probability that prejudice would have resulted on a hypothetical average jury on the basis of the nature of the matter and the total context of the evidence before the jury. {See, Poh, majority and concurring opinions.)
Although I disagree with the reasoning of the majority, I concur in the result and would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.