Court Opinion

ID: 9838477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 15:06:38.265861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:17.371623
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                    HOWARD NELSON BARTEE, III,
                            Appellant,

                                    v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                             No. 4D22-1932

                           [September 6, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Indian River County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; L.T. Case No.
312018CF000196.

   Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Nancy Jack, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anesha Worthy,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

    The defendant appeals from his convictions for burglary of an occupied
dwelling with a firearm, and attempted manslaughter with discharge of a
firearm. The defendant raises five arguments seeking to overturn his
convictions, but none of those five arguments has merit. Thus, we affirm
the defendant’s convictions without further discussion.

   We write to address only the defendant’s sixth argument – the circuit
court erred in denying his postconviction motion to correct the written
judgment’s statutory citation and felony degree for his burglary of an
occupied dwelling with a firearm conviction. The state concedes, and we
agree, that the written judgment requires correction. As the state’s answer
brief submits:

         [T]he language in the information alleged all of the
      necessary elements of section 810.02(2)(b)[, Florida Statutes
      (2017)] and the jury found [the Defendant] guilty of each
      element [of the statute]. However, the written judgment lists
      a violation of subsection (a). … [T]he judgment should not
      reflect a violation of section 810.02(2)(a), and this Court
      should remand for the trial court to correct the written
      judgment so it [indicates] a violation of … section 810.02(2)(b)
      to reflect the language in the information and the jury’s
      findings. [See] Sweeney v. State, 138 So. 3d 1095, 1095 (Fla.
      4th DCA 2014) (remanding for trial court to correct statute
      number on appellant’s written judgment and sentencing
      documents); [cf.] Moseley v. State, 688 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla.
      2d DCA 1997) (“Because the information recited the
      appropriate factual description of a violation of section
      810.02(2)(a), we treat the citation to the incorrect statute as a
      scrivener’s error and remand this case for correction of the
      judgment to indicate a conviction under section
      810.02(2)(a).”).

         This Court should also remand for the trial court to correct
      the written judgment so it properly reflects that [burglary of
      an occupied dwelling with a firearm] is a first-degree felony
      punishable by life.        Section 810.02(2)[(b)] provides that
      [burglary of an occupied dwelling with a firearm] … is a first-
      degree felony punishable by a term of years not exceeding life
      or up to 30 years. See also 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017).
      However, as the Defendant pointed out, the written judgment
      incorrectly lists [that offense] as a life felony. [See] Flowers v.
      State, 16 So. 3d 1047, 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (remanding
      for the written judgment to be corrected where it listed the
      crime as a life felony rather than a first-degree felony
      punishable by life imprisonment).

(internal record citations omitted).

    Based on the foregoing, we remand for the circuit court to correct the
written judgment to indicate the defendant’s burglary of an occupied
dwelling with a firearm conviction constitutes: (1) a violation of section
810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2017); and (2) a first-degree felony
punishable by life. The defendant’s presence is not required for this
ministerial act. See Prentice v. State, 319 So. 3d 57, 62 (Fla. 4th DCA
2021) (“[Because] correction of the written judgment in this case is a
ministerial act, neither resentencing nor Appellant’s presence is required
for this purpose.”).

   Convictions affirmed; remanded for correction of written judgment.

                                       2
GROSS and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.

                         *       *        *

  Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                                 3