Court Opinion

ID: 9775342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:54:40.651733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:25.301581
License: Public Domain

FOWLER, Justice,
concurring.
I find myself in a disconcerting position because I agree with every single statement in the dissenting opinion, and yet, I am obligated to join in the majority opinion. As both the majority and dissenting opinions explain, the ultimate issue before us is how can the State authenticate an audiotape— which appears to have been made by one of two co-defendants during the planning of the murder of one of the co-defendant’s wives— when the defendants refuse to acknowledge either the planning session or the recording of it. See Tex.R. Evid. 901.
The majority opinion concludes that the contents of the tape could not be introduced as evidence because a per curiam opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Kephart v. State,1 holds that the only way a video or audio tape can be properly authenticated and thereby introduced is if the proponent for the introduction of the tape has personal knowledge (1) of where or when the tape was made and therefore (2) that the “tape accurately represented the actual scene or event at the time it occurred.” Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 322-323. I agree with this conclusion of the majority.
The dissenting opinion argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals has through the per curiam Kephart opinion effectively repealed part (b) of rule 901 of the rules of criminal evidence. The dissenting opinion also argues that the State presented enough evidence to sufficiently authenticate the tape because the State identified the voices on the tape as the defendants’, and presented circumstantial evidence connecting the discussion to the murder. See, dissenting opinion supra; see also, United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 820 (5th Cir.1980); State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 814 P.2d 333, 343-45 (1991). I agree with both of these arguments.
But, in spite of my agreement with the dissent, I must join the majority. The Court of Criminal Appeals promulgated this state’s rules of criminal evidence. See Tex. Govt. Code § 22.109 (giving the court rulemaking power in the promulgation of rules of evidence to be used in criminal cases). Likewise, the Court of Criminal Appeals has ultimate say in the interpretation of the rules of evidence, and, as an intermediate appellate court, we are bound to follow its pronouncements. Through Kephart, the court has stated that a tape can be authenticated only by someone with personal knowledge of where or when the tape was made, because, without personal knowledge, one cannot state the tape accurately represents the actual scene or event at the time it occurred. Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 322. The effect of Kephart, intended or not, is to prevent the State from introducing an audiotape containing a conversation between two defendants if neither of the defendants acknowledges that the tape accurately recorded their conversation. See id. It would also prevent the State from *665-685introducing an audiotape made by a complainant who later died, even though evidence indicates the reliability and accuracy of the tape. See id; compare State v. Lavers, 814 P.2d at 343-45 (holding that State could introduce tape made by deceased complainant during deadly assault because the tape recorded events confirmed by other circumstantial evidence of the crime.). If that is what the court intended, then the court should explain the purpose and intended uses of part (b) of rule 901.2 If that result was not intended, the court must correct the confusion the per curiam opinion has created. Regardless of which position it takes, the court is responsible for clearing up the apparent conflict between the Edwards3 seven part test and part(b) of rule 901.
For these reasons, I join in the majority opinion and yet choose to write separately.

. 875 S.W.2d 319, 322-323 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).

. For example, one monograph on the Texas Rules of Evidence states the following about part (b) of rule 901:
While the ten subdivisions of Rule 901(b) are illustrative and not limiting, they are in aggregate so comprehensive—especially with the general language in subdivision (b)(1) on testimony that a matter "is what it is claimed to be” and subdivision (b)(4) on "distinctive characteristics” and "circumstances"—that it is hard to envision a reasonable form of authenticating proof that would not be embraced by these illustrations.
2 Steven Goode, et al., Texas Practice, Guide to the Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal 194 (2d ed. 1993), (citing 5 David Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 506, at 24 (1981)).

. Edwards v. State, 551 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).