Court Opinion

ID: 9723815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:34:01.729701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:20.787745
License: Public Domain

HANSON (Thaxton), J.
I respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in the majority opinion.
In my opinion the ball game is over and the petition should be denied once the majority opinion correctly concluded, as it did, (1) that while litigants may elect to pursue recovery pursuant to the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688) and under the general maritime law doctrine of unseaworthiness in state courts, as distinguished from federal courts (probably for some perceived procedural reasons), “The prevailing rule is *105that, regardless of the forum, federal [maritime] substantive law applies” (original italics); (2) that the remedies available under the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness doctrine can produce only one recovery and are now considered “Siamese twins”; and (3) that no federal statute has expressly authorized nor has any federal decisional law awarded punitive damages under circumstances presented in the instant case.
In clear language the Jones Act adopts the law of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.)1 which governs actions against railroads (which criss-cross the United States) by their employees, thus making FELA part of the Jones Act for the purposes announced. (See Engel v. Davenport (1926) 271 U.S. 33, 38 [70 L.Ed. 813, 817, 46 S.Ct. 410]; Bell v. Tug Shrike (E.D.Va. 1963) 215 F.Supp. 377, affd. 332 F.2d 330, cert. den. 379 U.S. 844 [13 L.Ed.2d 49, 85 S.Ct. 84]; Cox v. Dravo Corporation (3d Cir. 1975) 517 F.2d 620, cert. den. 423 U.S. 1020 [46 L.Ed.2d 392, 96 S.Ct. 457]; Dixon v. Grace Lines, Inc. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 278 [103 Cal.Rptr. 595].)
It is also clear that in FELA actions only compensatory damages are recoverable. Punitive damages are not allowed. (See Kozar v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company (6th Cir. 1971) 449 F.2d 1238; see also State ex rel. Burlington Northern, Inc. v. District Court (1976) 169 Mont. 480 [548 P.2d 1390, 1392-1393]; Orona v. Isbrandtsen Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1962) 204 F.Supp. 777, 779; Cleveland Tankers v. Tierney (6th Cir. 1948) 169 F.2d 622, 624; Vanbeeck v. Sabine Towing Co. (1937) 300 U.S. 342 [81 L.Ed. 685, 57 S.Ct. 452]; Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines Ltd. (S.D.Tex. 1970) 323 F.Supp. 865, 874, affd. (1971) 449 F.2d 1163.)
Accordingly, since federal maritime substantive law adopting FELA, as noted above, applies and not California substantive law, and since the “Siamese twins” remedies under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness doctrine can produce only one recovery, it is axiomatic that one “twin” (unseaworthiness doctrine) cannot recover exemplary damages while the other “twin” (the Jones Act) is limited to compensatory damages only. To allow such a result in a “Siamese twin” situation would be illogical.
*106The majority opinion concedes that recent case law reflects an overwhelming reluctance on the part of the courts sitting in admiralty to award punitive damages and then flatly concludes that since no federal law precludes the plaintiff from presenting the issue of punitive damages to a jury, it is proper for a state court to authorize such damages by decisional law.
While reasonable minds may differ construing statutory and decisional law, in my view there is no federal authority in admiralty whatsoever supporting the majority opinion’s determination. The cases cited are factually distinguishable and the language referred to in those opinions is mere dicta and not binding authority. Nor does the fact that federal law does not expressly prohibit punitive damages in any way license a state court to impress upon the federal system its proclivity to expand the circle of civil liability to infinity. To the contrary, the fact that federal law only allows compensatory damages and does not expressly include exemplary damages indicates that it was not intended that such damages be included in the overall carefully thought out statutory scheme concerning maritime personal injury claims.
In my opinion it is not only highly improper and presumptuous but also grossly unwise for a California state court of review by judicial fiat to invade the federal jurisidiction and attempt to graft onto federal maritime law a punitive damage claim where none presently exists, thereby destroying the important concept of the need to preserve uniformity in maritime tort law regardless of the place of injury.2 The practicality and desirability of preserving a uniform federal law in this field is apparent in view of the many states which border the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the great Saint Lawrence Seaway into the Great Lakes, and the Gulf of Mexico as well as the numerous interior states by and through which a labyrinth of inland navigable waterways pass.
I would therefore hold as a matter of law that the petitioner may not seek an award of punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages. I would leave to the United States Congress and to the federal *107courts interpreting federal statutory enactments the determination as to whether or not exemplary damages should be allowable in maritime tort claims.
I would affirm the trial court’s order striking plaintiff’s allegations concerning punitive damages and deny the petition for writ of mandate.3
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 24, 1980, rule 27(e), California Rules of Court. The petition of real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 17, 1980. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

The Jones Act in pertinent part provides: “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of a trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railroad employees shall apply,...” (Italics added.)

The major premise of the Jensen Doctrine (see Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U.S. 205 [61 L.Ed. 1086, 37 S.Ct. 524]), which remains good and sound law today, is that maritime law should be uniform within the United States. The need for national maritime unity was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (1920) 253 U.S. 149 [64 L.Ed. 834, 40 S.Ct. 438, 11 A.L.R. 1145],

The result of the majority opinion in my view is disturbing in two other practical aspects which should not be ignored.
First, such a pronouncement by a single state within the union will tend to unnecessarily snarl and foul the lines in the field of maritime tort law which in recent years have slowly become unsnarled and unfouled. (See The Tangled Seine: A Survey of Maritime Personal Injury Remedies (1947) 57 Yale L.J. 243-274.)
Secondly, there are a great number of companies or individuals who own fleets of vessels with large crews which sail the seven seas and which are either located in or have business contacts in California, thus subjecting them to the jurisdiction of our state courts. It is reasonably forseeable that litigants and lawyers from all over the United States (indeed the world) may rush into California courts with their maritime cases seeking “windfall” exemplary damages, thus either sinking our already overcrowded courts into the briny deep or requiring the long suffering California taxpayers to add more courts to act as bilge pumps to process such out of state claims in order to stay afloat. This possibility punctuates the desirability of a uniform maritime law and any changes in the present law should be left to federal authorities in order to insure the case load is spread throughout the various states.