Court Opinion

ID: 9675177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:44:03.152023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:31.936889
License: Public Domain

SCHUDSON, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority's analysis of the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of counsel in this case. Interestingly enough, so does the Attorney General. Conceding the merits of Smith's argument, the Attorney General's brief explains why Smith is correct:
The state's concession that Smith is entitled to relief on the merits of his ineffectiveness claim recognizes the following matters. First, the state failed to abide by a portion of the parties' plea agreement: the state agreed to make no sentencing recommendation, and, at sentencing, the prosecutor [inadvertently] recommended a sentence of a partic*832ular term. Second, the circuit court was correct in its determination that defense counsel's failure to object to the state's breach of the plea agreement constituted deficient performance by defense counsel within the meaning of the two-part standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Third, the state agrees with Smith that the circuit court erred in holding that the second part of the Strickland test, prejudice from counsel's deficient performance, was not established here.
The circuit court held that there is nothing in the record "to suggest that the court would have imposed a lesser sentence in this case, or that it would have gone along with defense counsel’s recommendation [,]" if the prosecutor had kept his promise to make no recommendation on sentencing rather than recommending a sentence of almost five years on Smith's felony conviction for burglary. The state agrees with Smith that this was an improper application of the Strickland prejudice standard in the context of defense counsel's failure to object to a conceded violation by the state of its sentencing recommendation obligations under a plea agreement. Where a claim of a prosecutor's breach of a plea agreement on sentencing is considered by itself, it is clear that the question is not whether the prosecutor's improper recommendation affected the trial court's sentencing decision, but whether the prosecution complied with the plea agreement or not. As this court has stated, "the possibility that the trial court could have disregarded the [prosecutor's] recommendation is not relevant. Here, the prosecutor did not unqualifiedly make the sentence recommendation bargained for and so breached the plea agreement." State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, 364, [394 N.W.2d 909, 911] (Ct. App. 1986). What the defense is denied in such a case — the prejudice the *833defendant sustains — is the absence of the performance it bargained for. Because of the breach of the plea agreement, the proceedings have been rendered flawed and unfair. The question is not whether the prosecutor's abiding by its sentencing recommendation would have produced a different sentence. The question is not whether the outcome of the sentencing would have [been] different if defense counsel had objected at the time to the state's failure to stick with its promise not to recommend a sentence. Instead, the question is whether the sentencing proceeding itself would have been different but for trial counsel's failure to object. The state and the defense agree in these circumstances that the answer is yes: the sentencing hearing would have been different because the state's error would have been noted and corrected, and the defendant would have obtained the benefit of what he had bargained for. Thus, the integrity of the plea process would have been ensured.
Respondent's brief at 10-12 ("[inadvertently]" added in place of omitted footnote; Poole citation corrected; "[been]" added; all other brackets in Respondent's brief).
The majority mistakenly asserts that Smith has argued "that he does not have to prove prejudice in this case," and that he "has failed to provide any controlling authority" in support of his contention. Majority op. at 827-828 n.6. On the contrary, both Smith and the Attorney General have carefully briefed this issue, cited extensive authority, acknowledged that prejudice must be established, and explained that prejudice under these circumstances consists not in proving that a different sentence would have been ordered, but rather, that a different State recommendation would have been expressed.
*834The authority supporting Smith's and the Attorney General's argument is overwhelming. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court drew the distinction between the "result" (in this case, the sentence recommendation) and the "outcome" (in this case, the sentence):
The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.
Id. at 694. Indeed, in reiterating Strickland's prejudice prong, Chief Justice William Rehnquist explicitly rejected the theory now presented by the majority's attempt to equate unreliable results of a proceeding with an outcome determination:
Under our decisions, a criminal defendant alleging prejudice must show "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374, 91 L.Ed.2d 305, 106 S.Ct. 2574 (1986) ("The essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that counsel's unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect"); Nix v. Whiteside, supra, [475 U.S. 157], at 175, 89 L.Ed.2d 123, 106 S.Ct. 988. Thus, an analysis focussing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.
*835Lockhart v. Fretwell, 122 L.Ed.2d 180, 189 (1993) (emphasis added).
Further, years before Strickland, the Supreme Court resolved the very issue on which Smith and the Attorney General agree. In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), at the guilty plea proceeding the prosecutor agreed to make no sentencing recommendation. Id. at 258. At the subsequent sentencing, however, another prosecutor inadvertently recommended a one-year sentence. Id. at 259. The sentencing judge stated, "I am not at all influenced by what the District Attorney says. ... It doesn't make a particle of difference what the District Attorney says he will do, or what he doesn't do." Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded:
It is now conceded that the promise to abstain from a recommendation was made, and at this stage the prosecution is not in a good position to argue that its inadvertent breach of agreement is immaterial. . . .
We need not reach the question whether the sentencing judge would or would not have been influenced had he known all the details of the negotiations for the plea. He stated that the prosecutor's recommendation did not influence him and we have no reason to doubt that. Nevertheless, we conclude that the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the case [for either resentencing by a different judge or plea withdrawal].1
*836Id. at 262-263.2
Under substantial authorities including State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, 394 N.W.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1986), Strickland, Santobello, and Lockhart, Smith is entitled to relief. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

 1n Wisconsin courts, "the appropriate remedy for the State's breach of its agreement is resentencing." State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, 365, 394 N.W.2d 909, 911-912 (Ct. App. 1986).

 Given that the sentencing judge in Santobello explicitly declared that the prosecutor's recommendation did not influence the sentencing decision, the rationale of Santobello renders the majority's opinion particularly peculiar in one other respect. The majority "suggestfs] to all trial courts that a trial court's explicit reference to whether or not it is relying on a prosecutor's sentencing recommendation would assist us in handling future appeals in this area." Majority op. at 827 n.5. Under Santobello, of course, such an "explicit reference" would make no difference. See id. at 262-263. Further, it seems improvident for this court to suggest that in the real world of sentencing, trial judges now should attempt to articulate whether they are influenced by a prosecutor's recommendations in countless cases every day, on the outside chance that one of them may result in an appeal on this rarely raised issue.