Court Opinion

ID: 9352328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 19:01:08.441382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:00:51.277462
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10654        Document: 00516598718            Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/05/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                     FILED
                                      No. 22-10654                             January 5, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk

   Kent Rogers,

                                                                 Petitioner—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of
   Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,

                                                                 Respondent—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:22-CV-367

   Before Davis, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Kent Rogers, Texas prisoner #02256795, appeals the district court’s
   denial of his motion for release pending resolution of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
   application. We conclude that the district court did not err and AFFIRM.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10654        Document: 00516598718              Page: 2       Date Filed: 01/05/2023

                                          No. 22-10654

                                               I.
           Rogers filed this § 2254 petition challenging his three 2019
   convictions. In particular, Rogers asserts that his Fourth Amendment rights
   have been violated, that one of his sentences was illegally enhanced, and that
   there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for tampering with
   evidence. Additionally, Rogers filed a “Motion for Personal Recognizance
   Bond or Appeal Bond.” The district court denied Rogers’ motion for
   release. Rogers appealed and requested release pending the resolution of his
   appeal. The district court stayed Rogers’ habeas proceeding and
   administratively closed his case pending this appeal. 1
                                               II.
           On appeal, Rogers argues that the district court erred in denying his
   motion for release and that the State has violated his constitutional rights. In
   response, the State notes that we have jurisdiction over this appeal and argues
   that the district court properly denied Rogers’ motion for release pending
   habeas review.
           As an initial matter, we must review the basis for our jurisdiction over
   the instant appeal. 2 Nine other circuits have held that appellate courts have
   jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for release in a habeas

           1
             Because an “order denying a motion for release is not a final order for purposes
   of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(11), [Rogers] does not need a [certificate of appealability] to
   appeal.” Beasley v. Stephens, 623 F. App’x 192, 192 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
   (unpublished) (citing Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009)). Unpublished opinions
   issued in or after 1996 are “not controlling precedent” except in limited circumstances, but
   they “may be persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir.
   2006).
           2
             See United States v. Pittman, 915 F.3d 1005, 1007 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[A]s courts of
   limited jurisdiction, we are obligated to examine the basis of our own jurisdiction before
   reviewing the merits.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

                                                2
Case: 22-10654           Document: 00516598718             Page: 3      Date Filed: 01/05/2023

                                          No. 22-10654

   proceeding. Seven of those circuits have held that jurisdiction exists under
   the collateral order doctrine, 3 whereas two circuits have treated such appeals
   as petitions for mandamus. 4 As noted by the State, we have previously
   exercised jurisdiction over appeals from the denial of motions for release on
   bond in habeas proceedings. 5 Accordingly, we exercise jurisdiction over the
   instant appeal.
           In order to obtain release pending review of his habeas petition,
   Rogers must show that he is raising “substantial constitutional claims upon
   which he has a high probability of success,” and that “extraordinary or
   exceptional circumstances exist which make the grant of bail necessary to
   make the habeas remedy effective.” 6                    Examples of “extraordinary
   circumstances” include where there has been a “serious deterioration of the
   petitioner’s health while incarcerated, short sentences for relatively minor
   crimes so near completion that extraordinary action is essential to make
   collateral review truly effective, or possibly extraordinary delay in processing

           3
             See Pagan v. United States, 353 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2003); Grune v. Coughlin,
   913 F.2d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1990); Dotson v. Clark, 900 F.2d 77, 78-79 (6th Cir. 1990);
   United States v. Smith, 835 F.2d 1048, 1049-50 (3d Cir. 1987); Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d
   324, 328-29 (8th Cir. 198); Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Cherek v.
   United States, 767 F.2d 335, 336-37 (7th Cir. 1985). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has
   held the same in an unpublished decision. See Perkins, 53 F. App’x at 667. Additionally,
   the Fourth Circuit has held the same in an unpublished opinion. See United States v.
   Perkins, 53 F. App’x 667, 667 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished).
           4
             See United States v. McCandless, 841 F.3d 819, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Land
   v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 318, 318 (9th Cir. 1989)); Woodcock v. Donnelly, 470 F.2d 93, 94 (1st Cir.
   1972).
           5
             See, e.g., Finch v. Lumpkin, 819 F. App’x 279, 280 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
   (unpublished) (citing Calley v. Callaway, 496 F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1974); Watson v.
   Goodwin, 709 F. App’x 311, 312 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished)); see also Nelson
   v. Davis, 739 F. App’x 254, 255 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished).
           6
               Calley, 496 F.2d at 702.

                                                 3
Case: 22-10654            Document: 00516598718          Page: 4       Date Filed: 01/05/2023

                                          No. 22-10654

   a habeas corpus petition.” 7 The district court concluded that Rogers failed
   to establish any of these circumstances. We find that the record fully
   supports this conclusion.
           Rogers argues on appeal that he has shown extraordinary or
   exceptional circumstances because “Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of
   1966[,] which requires federal courts to release a[] defendant charged with a
   non-capital offense on his recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond,
   unless the trial judge determine[s] that the defendant would fail to appear for
   trial under minimal supervision.” However, the district court’s authority to
   release a prisoner while a habeas proceeding is pending is inherent in its
   power to issue the writ itself, 8 and is not governed by the Federal Bail Reform
   Act, which applies to federal defendants pending sentencing or appeal. 9
           Rogers additionally asserts that he is entitled to release because he is
   not a flight risk, has never missed a hearing, and will not pose a danger to
   others on release. None of these contentions, however, are the type of
   circumstances that this court has articulated as constituting extraordinary or
   exceptional circumstances. 10
           Because Rogers has not demonstrated extraordinary or exceptional
   circumstances that necessitate his release, we need not consider whether he
   has raised substantial constitutional claims that have a high probability of

           7
               Id. at 702 n.1.
           8
             See In re Wainwright, 518 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (“In spite of
   the lack of specific statutory authorization, it is within the inherent power of a District
   Court of the United States to enlarge a state prisoner on bond pending hearing and decision
   on his application for a writ of habeas corpus.” (citations omitted)).
           9
              18 U.S.C. §§ 3041, 3141, 3142; see also Wainwright, 518 F.2d at 175 (noting the
   lack of statutory authority for bail for state prisoners proceeding under § 2254).
           10
                See id.

                                                4
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                                         No. 22-10654

   success. 11 Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Rogers’ motion for
   release is AFFIRMED. We likewise DENY his motion for release pending
   resolution of this appeal.

           11
             See Nelson, 739 F. App’x at 255 (refusing to address whether the state prisoner’s
   § 2254 petition raised substantial constitutional claims that have a high probability of
   success because “he has not demonstrated extraordinary or exceptional circumstances”).

                                               5