Court Opinion

ID: 9581671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:17:24.911492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:10.927765
License: Public Domain

Benton, X,
dissenting.
Because in Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 191, 413 S.E.2d 645 (1992), the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the finding of the trial judge that the encounter in that case was not sufficiently coercive to implicate the fourth amendment, the majority concludes that Baldwin mandates a factual finding in this case that the encounter was not coercive even though the trial judge found as a fact that the encounter between the officer and Satchell was sufficiently coercive to cause a reasonable person to believe he could not leave. I dissent.
*133“[W]hen [a law enforcement] officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen . . . a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). “[If] the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed [that] he was not free to leave if he had not responded, . . . the [encounter] resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment.” I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). “[C]ircumstance[s] that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would [include]... the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Because the trier of fact must view the “totality of the circumstances — the whole picture,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981), each encounter must be viewed upon the circumstances then prevailing. Moreover, consistent with established principles, on appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed at the suppression hearing. Baldwin, 243 Va. at 193, 413 S.E.2d at 646.
In this case, the evidence proved that the officer pursued Satchell from a corner to the porch area of a house. Satchell tried to enter the house but the door was locked. The officer followed Satchell onto the porch area of the house, stood “face-to-face to him” and identified himself as a police officer. The officer demanded to see what was in his hands. “[His] exact words were ‘what’s in your hand, pal?’ ” After Satchell complied and showed his left hand, the officer demanded to know, “What’s in your right hand?” The trial judge asked the officer, “If [Satchell] had responded ‘None of your business’ what would you have done?” The officer responded, “I would have asked him why not.”
Relying upon “the location of. . . Satchell at time [of] being confronted” and the “manner in which [the question] was asked,” the trial judge concluded Satchell was not free to leave. Because at trial the officer testified that “if [Satchell] wanted to leave, there was no way that I could keep him,” the majority overturns the trial judge’s finding that the location of the encounter and the manner of questioning objectively proved that Satchell was not free to leave. Clearly, the officer’s recognition of the legal impediments upon his ability to detain a citizen is not the controlling standard. Moreover, the majority inappropriately analogizes the facts of this case to those in Baldwin. The evidence in Baldwin proved that the officer saw two people in a *134parking lot at night and merely “ ‘did call towards — call for them’ as they were ‘walking back towards apartments.’” Id. at 194, 413 S.E.2d at 646. The trial judge found that this act did not amount to a coercive encounter implicating the fourth amendment.
Whether a reasonable person in Satchell’s circumstances would have believed he or she was free to leave cannot be answered by a talismanic reference to Baldwin. We must determine whether there was a “coercive effect” in the police conduct and whether there was a condition of submission to the police. United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 123 (4th Cir. 1991). The majority’s determination, as a matter of law, that a reasonable person who was pursued by a police officer onto a porch, confronted “face-to-face,” and ordered to open first his left hand and then his right would have felt free to leave is, in my judgment, unsustainable and certainly is not supported by Baldwin. The trial judge had the advantage of gauging the manner in which the officer related his commands to Satchell, and the trial judge properly gave significant weight to the officer’s testimony that if Satchell had rebuffed his command to open his hands, he would have pursued the matter. The trial judge’s findings are supported by the evidence on the record.
When we review the evidence in this record with a view toward determining whether the factual circumstances were resolved by the trial judge in the manner that was appropriate, we must sustain the trial judge’s findings that coerciveness occurred within the confines of the porch where Satchell was confronted and that a fourth amendment violation occurred.
I dissent.