Court Opinion

ID: 9855506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:26:33.679791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:06.701378
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I do not join the Court in its assessment of the facts.
At the hearing conducted pursuant to this Court’s remand, the prosecutor testified that his exercise of the peremptory challenge in question was not racially motivated. Rather, he explained that he was motivated by deep feelings against defense counsel engendered by a lengthy and heated exchange between them concerning the propriety of handpicking supplemental prospective jurors from the master jury list on the express basis of race.
In addition to the excerpts of the prosecutor’s testimony set forth in the majority opinion, the following excerpt more clearly establishes his motivation in exercising the peremptory challenge:
I don’t believe that race figured into it at all, as far as my challenge went. I think it was part of her [defense counsel’s] motivation, but, it was not part of mine.
(Emphasis added.)
The use of a peremptory challenge solely on the basis of race violates equal protection.1 One who attacks a peremptory challenge must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination; then the burden shifts to show the existence of a racially neutral reason for the challenge.2 The is*520sue as to whether the evidence rebuts the prima facie case generally turns on the evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility.3 Hence, a reviewing court need give great deference to the findings of the trial court.4 In addition, findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.5 Application of these standards in the instant case prompts the affirmance of the trial court’s decision.
Based upon and supported by the evidence presented, the trial court concluded:
[T]he prosecutor and defense counsel were in heated arguments over the selection of any further jurors to supplement the jury panel that was already in existence.
There is nothing to rebut the fact that the prosecutor’s selection was on the basis of his contempt and ire, with the prosecutor not allowing any additional jurors that was [sic] selected.
... [I]t does not appear that the challenges is [sic] made on the count [sic] of race, but made for reasons other than race and specifically the contention between the two counsels and that there does not appear to be any reason to show that there was any pattern existing that would show that minorities were excluded from the jury, and that the peremptory challenges were exercised in order to strike minorities from the jury panel.
(Emphasis added.)
It is of note that the wholly unorthodox procedure followed in this case in handpicking additional prospective jurors on the basis of race, rather than selecting them at random,6 would appear to be error. However, the issue was not preserved on this or the prior appeal. Nevertheless, the fact that additional jurors were so selected graphically demonstrates the tension that existed at trial which erupted into the heated argument engaged in by counsel. Also, it adds credence to the testimony offered in explanation of a racially neutral peremptory challenge, which in turn supports the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HALL, C.J.

. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

. State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 595 (Utah 1988).

. United States v. David, 844 F.2d 767, 769 (11th Cir.1988).

. Id.

. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).

. As required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-13 (Supp.1985) (amended 1986).