Court Opinion

ID: 9477478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:24:43.033696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:54.229972
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would remand this matter to the district court with directions to enter an order extending insurance coverage to defendants under the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) policy.
St. Paul issued its excursion boat insurance policy to S.S. Empress, Inc. which policy provided public liability and other coverage for the operation of the Belle of Hot Springs (Belle). In the “revised schedule of vessels” contained in the insurance contract, the insured warranted that the Belle would operate with no more than three crewmen (in addition to the master of the vessel, apparently) and with no more than 400 passengers.
After the occurrence described in the majority opinion, St. Paul sought to disclaim coverage by alleging violation of the three separate warranties contained in the agreement. These warranties were described at oral argument as the (a) “in charge of” warranty;1 (b) the “seaworthiness” warranty; 2 and (c) the “best efforts” warranty.3
Counsel for St. Paul pointed out at oral argument that the trial judge did not reach the issue of the best efforts warranty. Thus, we deal in this appeal with only the other two.
I. SEAWORTHINESS
I address the seaworthiness warranty first because it provides, in my opinion, the most tenuous basis for the granting of the St. Paul motion for summary judgment.
*555Seaworthiness is a concept which encompasses the condition of the vessel and, in appropriate instances, the manning of the ship. There is no real dispute that a boat may be or may become unseaworthy if it lacks a crew of sufficient size to operate the vessel with safety. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 386 U.S. 724, 728, 87 S.Ct. 1410, 1412, 18 L.Ed.2d 482 (1967); June T., Inc. v. King, 290 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir.1961). Likewise, an incompetent crew may lead to unseaworthiness. Waldron, 386 U.S. at 727, 87 S.Ct. at 1412. Cf. Usner v. Luckenback Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 500, 91 S.Ct. 514, 518, 27 L.Ed.2d 562 (1971). However, a single, isolated incident of operational negligence involving a single member of the crew does not rise to the level of creating a condition of unseaworthiness. Unser, 400 U.S. at 500, 91 S.Ct. at 518 Campbell v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 581 F.2d 98, 99 (5th Cir.1978).
St. Paul claims that placing Brett Hacker, the most inexperienced member of the crew, at the helm of the Belle made her unseaworthy. Counsel argues that the un-seaworthy condition commenced two hours before the accident when Hacker was assigned by the master, Craig Buhrow, to pilot the vessel without the immediate supervision of Buhrow. Such an argument is conceptually faulty under the facts of this action because no cause of action implicating the insurance coverage arose until the time of the collision with the dock, which collision resulted in personal injury to passengers. The occurrence, if any, giving rise to a breach of the seaworthiness warranty had to be the inartful docking of the vessel by Hacker or the failure of Craig Buhrow to return to the pilothouse in time to assume direct or constructive control of the docking operation. The uneventful cruise by the Belle on Lake Hamilton with Hacker at the controls is not material to the issues in this case.
As warranted, the Belle was operating with three crew members. Therefore, the cases cited by St. Paul dealing with insufficiency in the number of crewmen are inap-posite. Thus, the unseaworthy condition alleged must rest as previously indicated upon the act of the ship’s master in putting Brett Hacker in a position to dock the vessel without immediate assistance from a more experienced pilot or, in the alternative, Hacker’s act of docking the boat by himself. If one of these acts is sufficient to breach the seaworthiness warranty and to void coverage, there are many situations in which St. Paul will not have exposure under the policy. Only acts performed by the master or by experienced crewmen will extend coverage and then, only if an inexperienced employee is not involved. Use of crewmen undergoing training will, inevitably, lead to abrogation of insurance coverage if they are guilty of any measure of culpable conduct. In my view, neither the insurer nor the insured could have reasonably contemplated at the time the policy was issued such sweeping protection for the insurance company under the seaworthiness warranty.
St. Paul contends that the evidence is “uncontroverted” that Hacker “had absolutely no experience piloting or docking the vessel alone with passengers aboard.” Appellee’s brief at 13. The deposition of Craig Buhrow and Brett Hacker place this statement in dispute. Hacker had piloted the ship on more than 30 occasions and had successfully docked the vessel with passengers on board. Craig Buhrow’s deposition at 43:9-44:1, 69:15-70:10. It is true, apparently, that Hacker had never dockéd the vessel without a more experienced pilot standing by to help if needed and that Hacker was not considered by the master to be experienced enough to perform this docking act unsupervised. Craig Buhrow testified:
Q. Okay, you felt comfortable with Mr. Hacker docking the vessel as long as you were in the pilothouse instructing him, I assume?
A. (Craig Buhrow) Yes.
Q. But you didn’t feel comfortable with him doing it with your not being there?
A. That’s right.
Q. Why was that?
*556A. Because in my opinion I didn’t feel that he was ready for a solo landing as yet.
Q. Just lack of experience?
A. Right.
Craig Buhrow deposition at 92:25-93:11.
The evidence is clear, however, that Hacker was instructed not to dock the vessel until Craig Buhrow returned to the pilothouse. In fact, Hacker took steps to extend the time consumed by the trip because he expected Craig Buhrow to appear to supervise the docking operation. Buh-row did return to the pilothouse at almost the instant of the crash. Thus, the only act which could have resulted in the alleged creation of an unseaworthy condition was the failure of Craig Buhrow to return to the wheelhouse to supervise the act of landing the vessel by Hacker or to perform the task himself if conditions dictated that he should. This may have been negligence. It was not a violation of the seaworthiness warranty. There were sufficient crewmen on board to safely operate the ship and the crewmen on board, collectively, had sufficient skills to perform all required tasks. Crewman Mark Buhrow, the master’s brother, was an experienced pilot who had previously held a license issued by the State of Iowa. He had been the regular pilot when the boat operated on Lake Oko-boji, Iowa. Therefore, the quantity and quality of the crew in this instance made the vessel seaworthy. And, assuming for the sake of argument that an isolated act of negligence involving a single crewman can give rise to an unseaworthy condition, under the facts of this action, the issue, at the very least, involves a dispute of material fact which cannot be decided by a motion for summary judgment.
II. MASTER IN CHARGE
Unlike the seaworthiness warranty, the alleged breach of the “in charge of” warranty is susceptible to resolution through a motion for summary judgment. It should, however, have been decided in favor of coverage.
St. Paul argues that the ship’s master cannot be in charge of the vessel unless he or she is in control of the ship. Presumably that means, according to the district court, that the master must “be present in or near enough to the pilothouse to take such action as a sudden emergency would mandate, either through direct control or operational control of the vessel.” Majority opinion at 552.
There is little dispute that the master is in charge of the entire ship. This includes the engine room, the lifeboats, and the galley as well as the pilothouse. Therefore, one needs to change the facts only slightly to illustrate the vagaries of the position taken by St. Paul.
Presumably, there is but one master on board a ship. Thus, if he or she is called away from the pilothouse for an emergency such as a fire in the engine room, he or she must relinquish both direct and operational control of the steering wheel. Yet, under the analysis advanced by the district court and approved by the majority, the “in charge of” warranty is breached and coverage abrogated when this occurs because, to preserve coverage, the master must at all times be in or near enough to the pilothouse to take such action as would be necessary through direct or operational control of the boat. This would appear to be true under the rationale advanced by St. Paul regardless of the skill or experience of any other crewman in piloting the vessel during the master’s absence from the wheelhouse. I do not read the policy to require such a result, and if it does, I would suggest that state insurance authorities may want to review their approval of these policy forms and require better protection for the passengers who book voyages on vessels insured under this policy language.
Thus, for the reasons stated, I would reverse and remand this case to the district court with instructions to find coverage which protects the injured passengers.

. "That said vessel will be in charge of a qualified Master at all times.”

. "Warranted at the inception of this policy the vessel shall be in a seaworthy condition and thereafter, during the currency of this policy, the Assured shall exercise due diligence to keep the vessel seaworthy, and in all respects fit, tight, and properly manned, equipped and supplied.”

.“That the Assured will use its best efforts to comply with all regulations of the United States Coast Guard relating to the carrying of passengers and/or crew.”