Court Opinion

ID: 9718202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:18:43.286776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:57.921853
License: Public Domain

Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Petition for Rehearing. Upon petition for rehearing, the defendant urges, among other things, that we failed to comment on his point that certain testimony of the biochemist should have been stricken because it was highly prejudicial and speculative. The biochemist testified on direct examination that there is a wide variety of rhizopus mold, some of which can be eaten without any harm and others which can be extremely dangerous. The thrust of the contention is aimed at the words “extremely dangerous.” However, on cross-examination, the biochemist stated: “The molds about which I was speaking were not viable when I was examining them. They were not living. They were dead molds when I examined them. “Q. Can you tell us, sir, with any degree of medical or — strike the word medical — biochemical certainty when the mold had died ? A. No. I cannot. “I made my examination between the 20th and 30th of April. I continued to watch it grow each day. I did not cause the mold to grow. I examined what was already there, which was dead. “Q. Then can you tell me with a reasonable degree of medical certainty when before the date of your examination the mold was alive? A. No, I cannot. “I cannot answer yes or no that molds change over the course of time. “Some rhizopus are dangerous and some are not. “Q. Now you never stated in your direct examination whether or not the molds that you were speaking about were of one class or another in terms of — I guess we’ll have to use the word ‘danger.’ Do you know the answer to that question? A. This is quite impossible without extensive medical tests. I cannot specifically state that this particular mold, which I examined, will produce untoward effects.” The defendant urges that this testimony was prejudicial and speculative in that the chemist could never say with any degree of biochemical certainty whether or not the dangerous type of rhizopus mold was involved in this case; and that his motion for a mistrial should have been granted because of the failure of the biochemist to connect the extremely dangerous type of rhizopus mold with this case. In our opinion we noted that the “trial court refused to strike the testimony of this witness, and stated that the defendant’s objections were to the weight to be accorded the testimony rather than to its admissibility”; that the “court expressed doubt as to whether the testimony helped the plaintiff’s case”; that the plaintiff and others “testified that the physical appearance of the contents of the bottle was the same at the time of the trial as it was on the day she drank from it”; and that she and others “testified relative to the sediment and particles in the Coke, and to the slime on the inside of the bottle.” In view of all of the evidence, we sustained the trial court in permitting this testimony to stand.  When we consider this testimony in its totality, we find nothing prejudicial in it. We believe it to be relevant and question whether it could be classed as speculative. We distinguish this case from Marut v. Costello, 53 Ill App2d 340, 362, 202 NE2d 853 (1964), and other cases cited by the defendant. However, even if we assume for the purpose of argument in this case that the evidence was improperly admitted, we find the error to be harmless in that no prejudice was caused thereby. The object of the review of judgments of trial courts is not to determine whether the record is free from error but to ascertain whether a just conclusion had been reached, founded upon competent and sufficient evidence, in a trial in which no error has occurred which might be prejudicial to a litigant’s rights. People v. Storer, 329 Ill 536, 542, 161 NE 76 (1928); Ziegler v. Smith, 86 Ill App2d 215, 224, 229 NE2d 340 (1967); Reske v. Klein, 33 Ill App2d 302, 312, 313, 179 NE2d 415 (1962); Johnson v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 9 Ill App2d 340, 357, 358, 132 NE2d 678 (1956). Consequently, we adhere to the affirmation of the judgment herein and deny the petition for rehearing. Judgment affirmed and petition for rehearing denied.