Court Opinion

ID: 9541946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:30:02.447458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:27.449778
License: Public Domain

Justice SCOTT
dissenting:
. The majority holds that The Mill, the owner of real property, did not have “reasonable investment-backed expectations” as to the contemplated use of the “mill yard” because “an extensive regulatory scheme [was] in place at the time of investment,” maj. op. at 999-1000, and, as a consequence, any taking by the State does not require compensation. Because I believe such a rule impermissibly blurs the distinction between takings of real and personal property and improperly permits takings without compensation in violation of constitutional mandates, and because I believe the record does not support a conclusion that The Mill’s expectations were “highly unreasonable,” I respectfully dissent.
Moreover, because the lower court’s determination that The Mill was deprived of its entire economic interest in the property is supported by the record, I would hold the actions of the State compensable, assuming The Mill can establish a regulatory taking premised upon its compliance with directives set forth in agency letters and similar communications. Accordingly, because the analysis I would employ requires that we examine the issues the majority fails to address, I respectfully dissent.19
I
In 1973, respondent, The Mill, purchased a lot in Gunnison, Colorado, which had previously been used as a uranium mill and disposal site for uranium mill tailings. The lot was divided into two separate parcels: the “tailings pile” and the “mill yard.” Prior to purchasing the lot, The Mill searched the records of the Colorado Department of Health (CDH) and discovered that in 1971, the State of Colorado had removed the mill yard from licensure, authorized its unrestricted use, and considered the mill yard not contaminated and free for lawful uses such as those contemplated by The Mill.20 Based on its review of the information in CDH’s files, which indicated that the mill yard parcel was decontaminated and safe for unrestricted use, The Mill purchased the subject property in July of 1973.
From 1973 to 1978, CDH conducted various tests of the tailings pile located on property adjacent to The Mill. At some point, CDH also conducted tests of the mill yard. In 1976, CDH found radioactive contamination throughout the mill yard. At that time, CDH informed The Mill of its finding and advised it to take precautionary measures with regard to the mill yard. Both the mill yard and the tailings pile were designated for radiation clean-up under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-604, 42 U.S.C. § 7901 (1991) (“UMTRCA”). The Mill was informed that it was a “candidate for remedial action” in 1978.
In 1983, The Mill notified CDH that it had leased the mill yard to O.C. Coal. CDH then sent several letters to both The Mill and O.C. Coal informing them of the “existing mill yard radioactive contamination” and the limited uses to which the mill yard could be put. The trial court found that there had been a taking because of the letters and other actions of CDH, and awarded compensation in the amount of $200,000, based on a total loss of use, rather than a loss of property valuation.
*1012The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the CDH correspondence amounted to a total regulatory taking. A majority of this court now reverses, and, in effect, ignores the distinction so clearly drawn between real and personal property in federal takings jurisprudence and, in its place, holds that the adoption of “an extensive regulatory scheme” trumps the fundamental constitutional right to just compensation as a consequence of a government taking. It is to that conclusion of the majority that I take exception.
II
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922), where Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, opined that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Lucas, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2893 (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415, 43 S.Ct. at 160). Writing for the majority in Lucas, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the seventy years of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence has been essentially by ad hoc, factual inquiries. The Court has, however, found regulatory takings “com-pensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint” in instances in which it has “found ... regulation [by the state] denied all economically beneficial or productive use of land.” Id. (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3147, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1247, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-96, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (footnote omitted)).
In fact, the Court has categorically held that takings which deny all economically beneficial use require compensation. Noting this categorical rule, Justice Scalia suggested the justification for the rule was “simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.” Lucas, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2894 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652, 101 S.Ct. 1287, 1304, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Essentially, then, Justice Scalia opined, “when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.” Lucas, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2895.
On appeal to this court, CDH argued, and the majority agreed, that the court of appeals erred by failing to apply the exception stated in Lucas that no compensation is due if the restrictions merely duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts through nuisance or property law. Lucas, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2901. That exception only applies, however, where the “owner is barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed by those existing rules or understandings.” Id. The Lucas Court established that “[w]here the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.” Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2899 (emphasis added). At the time The Mill purchased the land in 1973, the contemplated use of the land (storage) was not proscribed by any rules or understanding that existed at that time. The anticipated investment-backed use of The Mill property was not unlawful, since the State itself had declared the property authorized for unrestricted use. By its actions in 1983, however, the State was in effect changing the uses and hence, in effect, understandings that reflect a more developed understanding of the hazards of radiation— all of which occurred years after the purchase. Thus, the Lucas exception that “the proscribed use interests were not part of [The Mill’s] title to begin with,” i.e., in 1973, has no application to the case at hand.
*1013Importantly, despite its early infatuation with “harmful or noxious uses,” or reliance upon nuisance law, the Lucas Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court because its judgment was premised upon a determination that the property owner’s proposed use was a nuisance, harmful to the public, and, as a consequence, would render a taking not subject to compensation. Lucas, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2897-98. Instead, the Court reasoned, “noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory ‘takings’ — which require compensation — from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation.” Id. at — -, 112 S.Ct. at 2899. Continuing, the Court held: “A fortiori the [state’s] recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be a basis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulato'ry takings must be compensated.” Id. (emphasis added). The majority fails to take this holding into account.21
Ill
The United States Supreme Court has identified several factors that should be taken into account when determining whether a governmental action amounts to a taking. Among those factors are “the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.” PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2042, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). I would agree with the majority that the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the regulated party is a dispositive factor in this case. I would disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that The Mill’s expectations in 1971 were unreasonable, in light of the CDH determination that the property was not contaminated and was available for unrestricted use. With respect to owner expectations, the Lucas Court stated:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with. This accords, we think, with our “takings” jurisprudence, ivhich has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of and the State’s poiver over the “bundle of rights” that they acquire when they obtain title to property.
Lucas, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2899 (emphasis added). Continuing the concept of owner expectations, the Court noted a distinction between personalty and realty:
And in the case of personal property, by reason of the State’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, he ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless.... In the case of land, however, we think the notion ... that title is somehow held subject to the “implied limitation” that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the historic compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture.
Where “permanent physical occupation” of land is concerned, ive have refused to allow the government to decree it anew (without compensation) no matter how weighty the asserted “public interest” involved. ... We believe similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory regulations, *1014i.e., regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land. Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself ... already place[d] upon land ownership.
Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2899-900 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The Court’s analysis is consistent with the sharp distinction historically drawn between the treatment of real property and personal property. See Property Tax Administrator v. Production Geophysical, 860 P.2d 514, 519 (Colo.1993). For example, we apply the statute of frauds to interests in real property but not to interests in personal property (§ 38-10-108, 16A C.R.S. (1963)) and specific performance is generally directed in contracts concerning the sale of land but not in contracts concerning personal property. See, e.g., Atchison v. City of Englewood, 193 Colo. 367, 568 P.2d 13 (1977); Radetsky v. Palmer, 70 Colo. 146, 199 P. 490 (1921). The basis for drawing such a distinction is that every parcel of real property is unique. See Mt. Sneffels Co. v. Estate of Scott, 789 P.2d 464, 466 (Colo.App.1989). Hence, when the property interest is that associated with the ownership of land, as opposed to personalty, our takings analysis must be guided by the landowner’s understandings regarding the bundle of rights he or she acquires with the title to the property. Lucas, — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2899. To the contrary, here, the majority assumes that the existence of a comprehensive regulatory scheme requires that we impute to land owners at the time of purchase, today’s knowledge of the harm caused by radiation. Such owner expectations are unreasonable years before the effects of radiation are fully understood; the majority’s position does not comport with our previous treatment of owner expectations. The inconsistency of the majority’s position is reflected by its statement in footnote 4. Maj. op. at 1000 n. 4.22
There have been three important cases decided in this jurisdiction which deal with the concept of owner expectations. See Ford Leasing v. Board of County Comm’rs, 186 Colo. 418, 528 P.2d 237 (1974); Nopro Co. v. Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217, 504 P.2d 344 (1972); Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of County Comm’rs, 38 Colo.App. 44, 554 P.2d 317 (1976). In each of these three cases, the harm was self-inflicted. For example, in No-pro, a zoning case, the court held “Nopro’s land investment was made in full knowledge of the zoning limitations. It took the calculated risk that it could break the zoning use barrier and thereby double the profit from its investment.” Nopro, 180 Colo. at 227, 504 P.2d at 349. The court concluded “if'hardship exists ... it was incurred voluntarily by the choice of Nopro and was self-inflicted.” Id. Likewise, in Ford Leasing and Gold Run, the court emphasized the fact that the owner bought the property having full knowledge of existing restrictive zoning, thus rendering a hardship self-inflicting.
In this case, the majority asserts that The Mill was on notice that the radioactive materials present on the property were highly regulated at both the state and federal level, stating “the facts stipulated to by the parties in the regulatory taking action indicated that the entire property, including the mill yard, had been subject to federal licensing and regulation since 1962 due to the presence of radioactive contamination.” Maj. op. at 1000. The majority maintains that even in 1973, when The Mill purchased the lot, there “existed an awareness that the hazards posed by radiation were potentially severe.” Id. The majority’s observation fails to fairly take into account two important realities: (1) in 1973, the extent of the potential hazards posed by radiation was not fully understood; and (2) The Mill had no knowledge of the site’s *1015contamination at the time of its purchase due to its reliance upon CDH findings that the mill yard was uncontaminated and available for uses contemplated by The Mill.23 These and other facts found by the trial court cannot be ignored. Where the findings of the trial court are supported by the record, those findings must be accepted on review unless they are clearly erroneous. M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer, 866 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Colo.1994). Because we have consistently disapproved of the substitution of new factual findings by reviewing courts for those made by the trial court, Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 313, 592 P.2d 792, 796 (1979), and because the record clearly supports the findings of the trial court, it would be inappropriate on review to fail to take such facts into consideration.
The facts of this case deal with what was described during the trial as “a regulatory framework which has evolved over time to deal with our increase in knowledge of radiation and its dangers.” As found by the trial court, the need to clean up areas such as the Gunnison uranium mill site was not “an overriding concern” in the early 1970’s. Testimony shows that in 1971, cleanup efforts were done related to buildings and equipment, with an emphasis at that time on alpha con-taminations. That same testimony indicates that since 1971, concerns have grown for other types of radiation contamination, including radon contamination, radon progeny called radon daughters and gamma radiation. Although there were proper tools and equipment for testing for these types of other radiation problems in 1971, there was not a sufficient concern at that time for the dangers from these other radiation hazards. Thus, they were not part of the examination that was done prior to the delicensure in 1971. In fact, testimony indicated that in 1971, when the property in question was removed from licensure, CDH did not even consider it important enough to regulate the tailings pile, let alone the mill yard. Today, on the other hand, according to testimony which was introduced at trial, radiation is considered potentially harmful in any degree.
Before purchasing the property in 1973, The Mill fully researched the possibility of contamination on that site by reviewing CDH files in February of 1973. The Mill found that the site had been regulated at one time, but that the state had delicensed the parcel, representing that it was not contaminated, and authorizing its unrestricted use. After regulatory examination, the state demonstrated its approval of the storage use contemplated by The Mill, as well as any other reasonable uses. The record reflects that The Mill purchased the property based on an expectation created by the government. Given the fact that “scientific knowledge concerning the hazards of radiation was not as sophisticated as it is now,” maj. op. at 1000, the state’s representations were conceivable. It follows that The Mill’s reliance on those representations was reasonable. Thus, in 1973, despite the fact that the mill yard remained subject to federal regulation, The Mill’s contemplated use of the property for storage, a use also contemplated by government officials after regulatory examination, was reasonable.
It is not disputed that the mill yard is contaminated and should be regulated by the state. The issue comes down to who should bear the cost of the government’s intervention — the state or the private party. When a citizen relies on government records and the government later changes its position, the only logical solution is for the government to bear any costs involved.
IV
I would therefore find that the investment-backed expectations of The Mill based upon information from CDH were not highly unreasonable. Since the trial court’s findings with respect to the remaining material facts are supported by the record, I would find a potentially compensable taking requiring that we determine issues not reached by the ma*1016jority. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. I do not address the issues raised in the eminent domain action because it would be premature in light of my analysis of the takings issue.

. The mill yard had been licensed in 1964 by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Pursuant to the license, the property was authorized: "[f]or storage only of the contaminated equipment and buildings constituting the Gunnison uranium mill. This license does not authorize removal, use, transfer or decontamination of the equipment and/or buildings in any manner.” In 1968 the license was amended to allow for transfer of contaminated equipment to persons not possessing an AEC license provided that decontamination was accomplished in accordance with the AEC standards. Decontamination of equipment and buildings was also authorized.

. The majority in this case emphasizes principles of nuisance law in its holding, stating "under Colorado common law, land owners have a duty to prevent activities and conditions on their land from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others.” Maj. op. at 1002. The majority sets forth further, "[i]n accord with ordinary intuition, government need not pay even in complete takeover or destruction if the latter is justified by the owners insistence on using his property to injure other people or their property'.” Maj. op. at 1001 (citing Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 593 (New York 1988)).
In the nuisance cases relied on by the majority it was the conduct of the owner of the property that caused the nuisance, not the character of the property itself, over which the owner had no control. In the case at bar, however, The Mill is not putting its property to any noxious use at all — it is merely using it as a storage facility. The Mill is not engaging in any act that makes the property itself dangerous; the property is already dangerous because it is contaminated with radiation.

. The majority asserts that "expectations of unregulated use are unreasonable when an extensive regulatory scheme is in place at the time of the investment.” Maj. op. at 1000. The picture drawn by the majority is no different, however, from a situation in which property is acquired for permissible use under existing zoning ordinances and is subsequently "taken” by a change of zoning ordinances within the existing regula-toiy scheme. Yet it is undisputed that in that situation compensation is required. See, e.g., Cottonwood Farms v. Board of County Comm’rs of Jefferson County, 725 P.2d 57, 60 (Colo.App.1986); see also Gold Run, Ltd. v. Board of County Comm’rs, 38 Colo.App. 44, 46, 554 P.2d 317, 319 (1976) (when zoning is confiscatory it rises to a "taking” of private property requiring compensation).

. The trial court held that The Mill "knew there had been a uranium mill on that site; and knew what was still there; that is to say, the tailings pile. The [Mill] did not know, at the time that it purchased, that there was radioactive contamina- . tion on the mill site itself.” This finding is supported by the record.