Court Opinion

ID: 9399910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 17:10:06.679138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.575927
License: Public Domain

J-S07026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 SAMMIE CAMPBELL                          :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :    No. 578 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 15, 2022,
           in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013197-2008.

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J:                             FILED JUNE 6, 2023

      Sammie Campbell appeals pro se from the order denying his second

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-46. We affirm.

      The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history

through Campbell’s direct appeal as follows:

            On or about October 30, 2007, [Campbell] was arrested and
      was charged with inter alia attempted murder and conspiracy to
      commit murder for the September 12, 2007 shooting that
      occurred on Mifflin Street.     [Campbell], along with his co-
      conspirators Markeem Vicks and Maurice Wilkerson, were involved
      in two related shooting battles between rival gangs in South
      Philadelphia.

            The first of these (“the Mifflin Street shooting”) occurred
      around 3:00 p.m. on the 400 and 500 blocks of Mifflin Street, a
      quiet residential block. Later that evening, [Campbell] and his co-
      conspirators took part in a second gunfight that occurred on or
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     around the 500 block of Moore Street (“the Moore Street
     shooting”). The second gun battle targeted Anthony Alonzo Reid,
     who suffered multiple near-fatal gunshot wounds.

           In 2010, [Campbell] was convicted of attempted murder
     and related charges in a non-jury trial[.] That conviction was
     vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial, following
     PCRA litigation in which [Campbell] alleged that trial counsel was
     ineffective for failing to investigate or present Erlene Muirhead,
     [Campbell’s] girlfriend, as an alibi witness.

           In between [Campbell’s] original 2010 trial and his retrial in
     2015, the victim, [Reid], was killed in another shooting.
     Additionally, Wilkerson and Vicks pled guilty to their roles in [the
     Moore Street shooting] and admitted that they participated in a
     conspiracy together with [Campbell] to attack Reid.

            In 2015, represented by new counsel, [Campbell] was re-
     tried before this court and a jury. At that trial, the Commonwealth
     presented the testimony of Wilkerson and Vicks, including their
     guilty pleas. [Reid’s] testimony from the 2010 trial was read into
     the record, as Reid was unavailable to testify in person due to his
     death. [Campbell] called [Muirhead] as an alibi witness.

           On December 15, 2015, the jury convicted [Campbell] of
     attempted murder, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an
     instrument of crime, relating to the Moore Street shooting, which
     targeted [Reid]. [Campbell] was acquitted of all charges relating
     to the Mifflin Street shooting.

           [Campbell] filed a timely direct appeal raising three claims:
     (1) that the trial court erred in expressing skepticism toward
     [Vicks’] testimony; (2) that the prosecutor committed misconduct
     in cross-examining [Muirhead] about why she failed to come
     forward as an alibi witness immediately; and (3) that the trial
     court abused its discretion by admitting two recorded prison
     conversations involving [Wilkerson].

           The Superior Court rejected all three of [Campbell’s] claims
     as meritless and affirmed the judgment of sentence.
     Commonwealth v. Campbell, 996 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. 2017).
     The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied [Campbell’s] petition for
     allowance of appeal on August 6, 2018.

Rule 907 Notice, 1/6/22, at 1-2 (unnumbered) (formatting altered).

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      The PCRA court summarized the subsequent procedural history as

follows:

            [Campbell] initiated PCRA proceedings on September 15,
      2018. New counsel was appointed to represent him. After
      conducting an independent review of the record and determining
      that three were no meritorious issues to be raised, counsel filed a
      no-merit brief and petition to withdraw pursuant to
      Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

            On May 20, 2019, after reviewing the Finley letter, issuing
      notice of its intent to dismiss under Rule 907, and considering
      [Campbell’s] pro se responses to both the Finley letter and the
      907 notice, this court formally dismissed the PCRA petition.
      [Campbell] did not file an appeal.

Rule 907 Notice, 1/6/22, at 2 (unnumbered) (formatting altered).

      On September 6, 2019, Campbell filed the PCRA petition at issue, his

second. Thereafter, several pro se filings and changes of counsel followed.

Ultimately, privately-retained counsel entered his appearance, and, on

September 7, 2021, filed a “Second Amended/Supplemental PCRA Petition”

on Campbell’s behalf. In this amended petition, Campbell raised the following

four claims: 1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial

due to the prosecution’s belated disclosure of evidence concerning Muirhead

and Officer Nancy Morley; 2) that the trial court erred in permitting Campbell’s

two cases to be joined for trial; 3) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to the admission of Wilkerson and Vicks’ guilty pleas a trial; and 4)

that the jury’s verdict was “an affront to the incontrovertible physical facts

doctrine.” Amended Petition, 9/7/21, at 7.

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      On January 6, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of

its intent to dismiss Campbell’s petition without a hearing because the issues

he raised, although arguably waived, were nonetheless without merit. The

court explained:

             Despite [Campbell’s] argument to the contrary, these claims
      are partially or entirely waived. While [Campbell’s] second
      petition was initiated within the one-year window set forth by 42
      Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), and is therefore timely, it is a second
      petition. [Campbell] had the opportunity to raise all of these
      issues on direct appeal and/or during his first PCRA petition and
      he did not do so. His claims are therefore waived.

            In order to evade waiver, [Campbell] would have to be able
      to show that prior counsel was ineffective for failing to raise and/or
      preserve the underlying substantive claims. However, as all of
      [Campbell’s] claims are substantively without merit, he cannot
      make this showing.

Rule 907 Notice, 1/6/22, at 3 (unnumbered) (formatting altered). The PCRA

court then went on to provide a detailed explanation for this conclusion. See

id. at 1-5 (unnumbered).

      This timely pro se appeal followed.      The PCRA court did not require

Pa.R.A.P. compliance. Campbell raises the following issues, which we have

reordered as follows:

         I.    Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion by denying
               [Campbell] relief and failing to hold a hearing for trial
               counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to request a
               cautionary instruction and/or mistrial when the
               Commonwealth introduced both [co-conspirator’s]
               guilty pleas as substantive evidence against [him],
               violating his due process rights to a fair trial?

         II.   Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion when it failed
               to grant relief and hold a hearing for trial counsel’s

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                failure to request a curative instruction and/or mistrial
                for the Commonwealth’s discovery violation for not
                disclosing (trial by ambush) rebuttal impeachment
                (school records) evidence of alibi witness, violating
                [Campbell’s] due process rights to a fair trial.

         III.   Was PCRA counsel ineffective for not raising trial
                counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to preserve for
                direct review, and request a curative instruction
                and/or mistrial for the inflammatory and prejudicial
                admission of [co-conspirator Wilkerson’s] jail calls,
                violating [Campbell’s] due process rights to a fair trial.

         IV.    Was PCRA counsel ineffective for not raising trial
                counsel’s ineffectiveness for not investigating
                [and/or]    presenting       impeachment       evidence
                concerning Detective Edward Tolliver, violating
                [Campbell’s] rights to a fair trial (due process).

Campbell’s Brief at 7.

      This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition

under the PCRA is to ascertain whether “the determination of the PCRA court

is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings

in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92

(Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

         The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without
         a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no
         genuine issues concerning any material fact, the defendant
         is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no
         legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings.
         To obtain a reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a
         petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he
         raised a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in
         his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court
         otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

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Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted).

      In this appeal Campbell continues to claim that this is his first PCRA.

Although he contends that in a previous filing he only sought to compel the

Commonwealth to file private criminal complaints against certain detectives

and police officers, the court treated the filing as a PCRA petition. Further,

the PCRA court appointed counsel, and, in seeking to withdraw, first PCRA

counsel informed the court that his review of the record revealed no issue that

would warrant post-conviction relief. See PCRA Counsel Letter, 2/6/19 at 1.

Nevertheless, because Campbell has cited Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261

A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), and his claims of ineffectiveness of both PCRA counsel

are raised in some fashion, we will address the merits of his issues.

      Each of Campbell’s issues involve a layered claim of ineffectiveness. To

obtain relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was ineffective,

a petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's

ineffectiveness so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009).               “Generally, counsel’s

performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will

only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing by the petitioner.” Id.

This requires the petitioner to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is

of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her

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action or inaction; and (3) counsel’s act or omission prejudiced the petitioner.

Id. at 533.

      In making a layered claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner “must

properly argue each prong of the three-prong ineffectiveness test for each

separate attorney.” Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1190 (Pa.

Super. 2012). “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical

inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective

did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel.”    Commonwealth v.

Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).            “If that attorney was

effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to

raise the underlying issue.” Id.

      In his first issue, Campbell asserts that the PCRA court erred and/or

abused its discretion when it rejected his claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to request a mistrial and/or cautionary instruction after

his co-conspirators guilty pleas were introduced into evidence. According to

Campbell, contrary to his alibi, these guilty pleas placed him at the scene and

were used as substantive evidence against him. Campbell’s Brief at 23.

      The PCRA court found no merit to this claim.         The court first placed

Campbell’s claim in context:

             Prior to [Campbell’s] trial, both Wilkerson and Vicks pled
      guilty to criminal conspiracy and related charges stemming from
      the Moore Street shooting. During both plea colloquies, the
      prosecutor read a statement of facts that indicated that
      [Campbell] was present at the Moore Street shooting, and both

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      Wilkerson and Vicks agreed with that statement of facts. Neither
      man, however, made any independent confession or statement
      implicating [Campbell] as part of their guilty plea colloquies. At
      [Campbell’s] trial, both Vicks and Wilkerson were called as
      witnesses, and their guilty pleas were read into evidence.
      However, while both men acknowledged their own guilt, they also
      both testified that [Campbell] was not present. Vicks said that
      “Me and Wilkerson were there that night and we did some
      shooting. [Campbell] was nowhere in sight. He wasn’t there;
      that’s the truth.” Wilkerson testified that he and Vicks discussed
      shooting [Reid], armed themselves after that discussion, and shot
      at Reid together, but that “[Campbell] wasn’t there at all. At all.”

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 14 (citations omitted).

      Next, the court explained why the guilty pleas were properly admitted

and why there was no basis for trial counsel to object:

             Because both Vicks and Wilkerson testified that [Campbell]
      was not present at the Moore Street shooting, but had previously
      stipulated to his presence under oath during their guilty pleas,
      their pleas were admissible as prior inconsistent statements under
      Pa.R.E. 803.1(1)(A) (providing that a prior statement by a
      declarant-witness is admissible where it is inconsistent with that
      declarant-witness’s trial testimony, and the prior statement was
      given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury). There was,
      accordingly, no basis for trial counsel to object to the admission
      of those statements, because they were clearly admissible under
      Pa.R.E. 803.1(1)(A)

            Additionally, because evidence that Wilkerson and Vicks
      pled guilty to the Moore Street shooting was essential to the
      defense theory that they alone were responsible for Reid’s
      shooting, and that [Campbell] had not be involved or even present
      on the scene, there was a reasonable strategic basis for trial
      counsel to refrain from objecting to the admission of those pleas.
      The defense argument relied on Vicks and Wilkerson taking
      responsibility for the crime, and therefore absolving [Campbell] of
      any involvement. [Campbell] cannot show that trial counsel acted
      unreasonably by failing to object to the admission of Vicks[’] and
      Wilkerson[’s] pleas. There was a clear strategic reason for the
      defense to want the jury to hear about the guilty pleas, and the
      pleas were plainly admissible under the rules of evidence. Absent

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     their pleas, the defense theory of the case would have lost much
     of its persuasive force. As previously stated, [Campbell] cannot
     establish that he was prejudiced, and counsel cannot be found
     ineffective for failing to make a frivolous objection.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 14-15 (footnote omitted; citation corrected).

     Moreover, as to Campbell’s argument regarding the necessity of a

curative instruction or motion for mistrial, the PCRA court explained why

Campbell’s reliance on our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Boyer, 891 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 2006), this Court’s decision in Commonwealth

v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149 (Pa. Super. 2004), and Commonwealth v. Geho,

302 A.2d 463 (Pa. Super. 1973) was misplaced:

           [Campbell] argues that [the above cases] concluded that,
     where one or more of several charged defendants plead guilty, it
     is incumbent upon the trial judge to give adequate and clear
     cautionary instructions to the jury to avoid “guilt by association”
     as to the remaining defendant.          Therefore, according to
     [Campbell], a new trial is warranted since no such instruction was
     given, and no objection as made by trial counsel. This argument
     also fails.

            Here, [Campbell] relies on [Geho, supra,] in support of his
     claim of counsel’s ineffectiveness. However, the primary concern
     [in] Geho is not present in [Campbell’s] case. Geho involved a
     scenario in which three defendants were being jointly tried before
     a jury. Midway through the trial, two of the three co-defendants
     changed their pleas to “guilty” in the presence of the jury. The
     trial then proceeded solely against Geho. The trial court advised
     the jury that they were not to be concerned with, or influenced
     by, the two co-defendants’ guilty pleas, but to consider Geho’s
     guilt strictly based on the trial evidence.

            In Geho, the co-defendants’ guilty pleas were
     unaccompanied by any substantive evidence. The sole concern
     was that the jury would interpret co[-]defendant’s guilty pleas, in
     and of themselves, as proof of Geho’s guilt. Here, by contrast,
     Wilkerson and Vicks were not [Campbell’s] co-defendants before
     this jury. Wilkerson and Vicks’ guilty pleas were introduced not

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      simply to show that they had pled guilty, but because their prior
      inconsistent statements were admissible as substantive evidence.
      See Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 155 (Pa. Super.
      2004) (introduction of co-defendant’s guilty plea “was appropriate
      because it was used to introduce [other admissible] evidence”).
      Furthermore, as previously discussed, evidence concerning
      Wilkerson and Vicks’ guilty pleas was crucial to the defense theory
      of the case.

             While evidence of a co-defendant’s guilty plea might
      ordinarily be viewed with caution, due to the risk that the jury
      might improperly impute the co-defendant’s guilt to the defendant
      on trial, in this case, evidence of the other two co[-]defendants
      guilty pleas was the bedrock of the defense argument. Thus, while
      a cautionary instruction might have been preferable out of an
      abundance of caution, its absence cannot have prejudiced
      [Campbell]. His entire defense hinged on the fact that two of his
      co-defendants had pled guilty to the Moore Street shooting and,
      after acknowledging their own guilt, had testified that [Campbell]
      was not there. Under these circumstances, there was little risk
      that the jury would improperly attribute the co-defendants’ guilt
      to [Campbell].

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 15-17 (citation and some emphasis omitted).

      Finally, the PCRA court concluded Campbell was also not prejudiced

because, if any error occurred in failing to give a cautionary instruction, the

error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Campbell’s guilt:

            [A]ny error in the absence of a cautionary instruction was
      harmless because there was considerable other evidence of
      [Campbell’s] guilt.     Before his death, [Reid] gave a police
      statement in which he identified [Campbell] by name as one of
      the three men who shot him on the night of September 12, 2007.
      He also identified [Campbell’s] photograph as being that of one of
      the men who shot him and explained the motive of the crime to
      police. Gihad Topping, Reid’s friend, also witnessed the shooting
      and identified [Campbell], by both name and picture, to police as
      one of the perpetrators. Topping told police that [Campbell] was
      “from 7th Street,” that they had had prior violent altercations, and
      that he had known [Campbell] “for about three years.”

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             This was a case in which [Campbell] was identified by
      multiple eyewitnesses, including the victim, as one of the
      shooters. The witnesses knew [Campbell] by name, and their
      accounts were consistent across multiple details, such as the
      make and color of Wilkerson’s burgundy Chevy Impala, [Reid]
      having been told to “take his fucking hands out of his pockets”
      before the shooting, and the fact that Wilkerson drove away after
      this interaction, then returned in a different vehicle with his co-
      conspirators to shoot at Reid. Any error concerning the lack of a
      cautionary instruction was therefore harmless.                 See
      Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d at 155 (although it was
      error to admit a co-defendant’s guilty plea without a cautionary
      instruction, that error was harmless, where there was a proper
      basis for admitting the plea and the other evidence of guilt was
      overwhelming). Under the totality of the circumstances, it is
      apparent that the lack of a cautionary instruction regarding the
      jury’s consideration of the co-conspirators’ guilty pleas was not
      prejudicial. Because [Campbell] could not have been prejudiced
      by trial counsel’s inaction, this argument fails.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 17-18 (citations omitted).

      Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s thorough discussion

of why Campbell’s first issue does not warrant post-conviction relief.      The

defense theory at trial clearly was to use Wilkerson and Vicks’ testimony to

Campbell’s advantage.     Indeed, as noted by the Commonwealth and not

disputed by Campbell, trial counsel informed the court that he had

subpoenaed these two men and intended to present them as defense

witnesses had the Commonwealth not called them first. See Commonwealth’s

Brief at 11 n.6 (citing N.T., 12/9/15, at 272). Further, while Campbell claims

that his name was not “redacted” from the factual basis given for the guilty

pleas, such redaction is only required to protect defendants from out-of-court

statements made by a non-testifying codefendant at a joint trial.           See,

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generally, Commonwealth v. Brown, 925 A.2d 147 (Pa. 2007). Such is

not the case here, as both Wilkerson and Vicks had previously pled guilty and

were subject to cross-examination by trial counsel.

         Moreover, contrary to Campbell’s claim, the guilty pleas were properly

admitted as substantive evidence of his participation in the conspiracy to shoot

Reid.     See Commonwealth v. Pitner, 928 A.2d 1104, 1109 (Pa. Super.

2007) (holding that a co-defendant’s prior statements relevant to his own

guilty plea were admissible as substantive evidence because they were

inconsistent with co-defendant’s trial testimony and he was subject to cross-

examination).

         Finally, our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion

that any error in failing to give a cautionary instruction was harmless, given

the overwhelming evidence of Campbell’s guilt. Thus, Campbell’s first issue

fails.

         In his second issue, Campbell asserts that the PCRA court erred by

dismissing without a hearing his claim that trial counsel should have objected

and/or asked for a cautionary instruction or mistrial based upon the

Commonwealth’s discovery violation with regard to impeachment evidence

involving Muirhead, his alibi witness.          According to Campbell, this late

disclosure essentially caused a “trial by ambush,” which prejudiced him.

         The PCRA court found no merit to this claim. Once again, the court first

placed the claim in context:

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              At trial, [Campbell] presented [Muirhead] as both an
       eyewitness to the Mifflin Street shooting and an alibi witness to
       the Moore Street shooting.          Muirhead testified that she,
       [Campbell], and a fiend of theirs were on the 400 block of Mifflin
       Street when their car broke down and they were attacked by an
       unknown shooter. Although her testimony placed [Campbell] as
       present on the scene at that shooting, Muirhead said that he was
       not armed and never fired any bullets of his own. She also
       testified that [Campbell] could not have been present at the Moore
       Street shooting, because he was with her at a friend’s house in
       Sharon Hill, Pennsylvania, watching movies and having sex all
       night. As part of her testimony, Muirhead testified that on
       September 12, 2007, she was enrolled in the 10th grade at Furness
       High School. After witnessing the shooting on Mifflin Street, she
       had an altercation with a group of girls who attacked her.
       According to Muirhead she “got kicked out of school [the following
       day] for the incident. They said I was an endangerment to the
       school because of the incident.” A week later, she said, she
       transferred to Overbrook High School.

             On rebuttal, the prosecution called a school official to testify
       that Muirhead’s school record did not reflect any disciplinary
       action, that she was never suspended or expelled, and that she
       did not miss any required attendance days in the month of
       September.     According to school records, Muirhead did not
       transfer to Overbrook High School until October 24, 2007.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 9-10 (paragraph break added; citations

omitted).

       The PCRA court then rejected Campbell’s claim that he was ambushed

at trial:

             Despite his argument to the contrary, nothing in the
       transcript suggests that trial counsel was ambushed by either the
       school official’s testimony or the documents supporting that
       testimony. [Campbell] has offered no citations to the record or
       other evidence to support his contention that the evidence was
       “withheld until after the trial began,” or that trial counsel was
       surprised by the late disclosure. To the contrary, the record shows
       that the prosecution had spoken with trial counsel about the
       rebuttal witness and had provided the supporting documents in

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      advance, and that trial counsel was able to cross-examine the
      witness extensively about gaps in those records. Thus, not only
      does the record fail to support [Campbell’s] argument, but it
      shows that trial counsel was able to effectively cross-examine the
      witness, and that any delay that may have existed in the
      prosecution’s disclosure of that information (although not actually
      established that there was any delay) did not prejudice the
      defense.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 10-11 (citations omitted).

      Our review supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that Campbell’s claim

of late disclosure had no support in the record. On the contrary, Campbell

does not dispute the Commonwealth’s contention that it informed the trial

court that it had given trial counsel documents relevant to the rebuttal of

Muirhead’s trial testimony, and trial counsel “did not suggest that he had not

seen them before, let alone that he was unfamiliar with their substance.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 19 (citing N.T., 12/14/15, at 75-79).             Instead,

Campbell relies upon a question he asked counsel about a “pile of papers” that

appeared on the defense table to support his claim that the Commonwealth

had not given trial counsel the discovery until that very moment.             See

Campbell’s Brief at 53. Campbell’s claim is not persuasive given the PCRA

court’s conclusion that trial counsel effectively cross-examined the witness.

Thus, Campbell’s second issue fails.

      In his third issue, Campbell asserts that PCRA counsel was ineffective

for failing to challenge prior counsel’s failure to preserve for direct review, the

claim that trial counsel should have requested a curative instruction and/or

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mistrial after the Commonwealth introduced into evidence two prison phone

calls allegedly made by Wilkerson.

      On direct appeal, Campbell claimed that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting into evidence portions of two phone calls in which

Wilkerson and others discussed efforts to silence or pressure witnesses.      In

the first recording, Wilkerson and his mother discussed his mother’s

confronting Reid and/or Topping at the courthouse and asking, “did you come

here to snitch?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 15 (citing N.T., 12/9/15, at 258).

In the second recording Wilkerson and an unidentified person discussed

Wilkerson’s desire to “bury the rat” and “get off” as a result. Id. (citing N.T.,

12/9/15, at 262).

      Campbell argued on appeal that the second recording was not

authenticated because Wilkerson denied recognizing his voice, and that both

recordings were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial because they did not

mention Campbell. Although this Court rejected Campbell’s claim regarding

authentication, we concluded that the claim regarding the relevancy and

prejudicial nature of the recorded evidence was waived because Campbell

failed to “move for a mistrial or request a curative instruction or any other

relief based on the      prejudicial   nature   of the   recorded evidence[.]”

Commonwealth v. Campbell, 179 A.3d 600 (Pa. Super. 2017), non-

precedential decision at 25.

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      Our standard of review regarding the admission of evidence is well

settled:    “It is well settled that the admissibility of evidence is a matter

addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and may be reversed only

upon a showing that the court abused that discretion.” Commonwealth v.

Wynn, 850 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).                 As our

Supreme Court has summarized:

                Appellate courts typically examine a trial court’s decision
           concerning the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
           discretion. An abuse of discretion may not be found merely
           because an appellate court might have reached a different
           conclusion,     but    requires    a   result    of    manifest
           unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or
           such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. Typically,
           all relevant evidence, i.e., evidence which tends to make the
           existence or non-existence of a material fact more or less
           probable, is admissible, subject to the prejudice/probative
           value weighing which attends all decisions upon admissibility.
           See Pa.R.E. 401; Pa.R.E. 402[.]

Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 136-37 (Pa. 2007).

      The Commonwealth contends that both recordings were properly

admissible even though neither call mentioned Campbell. As to the first call,

the Commonwealth argues that attempts by Wilkerson’s mother and others to

pressure and/or intimidate Reid and Topping was admissible to explain why,

contrary to their pretrial statements, neither Reid nor Topping identified any

of the perpetrators of the shooting.             Further, as to both calls, the

Commonwealth contends they demonstrated Wilkerson’s “bias against the

Commonwealth and its witnesses, and therefore that his trial testimony

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purporting to exculpate [Campbell] was less credible than his statements

during his guilty plea colloquy.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 17.

      We agree that these phone calls were admissible.               See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 159, 164 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(acknowledging courts have “permitted the Commonwealth to engage in a line

of questioning designed to reveal that a witness changed his testimony fear if

the consequences of testifying truthfully”); Commonwealth v. Collins, 702

A.2d 540, 544 (Pa. 1997) (holding the evidence of efforts to influence a

witness are admissible to help explain why the witness changed his or her

version of the pertinent facts); Pa.R.E. 607(a) (providing that the “credibility

of any witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the

witness”). Moreover, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, see supra,

Campbell cannot establish that evidence of these phone calls prejudiced him.

Thus, Campbell’s third issue warrants no post-conviction relief.

      By order entered October 4, 2022, this Court granted Campbell’s

application to correct brief and strike from the record the fourth issue in his

brief. In this issue he asserted that second PCRA counsel rendered ineffective

assistance for declining to pursue a claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for

not impeaching Detective Tolliver with evidence allegedly showing that in

2007, the detective allegedly committed misconduct in Campbell’s unrelated

case in which he pled guilty to third-degree murder.

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      On December 8, 2022, Campbell filed with this Court an application for

remand in which he recasts his claim regarding Detective Tolliver as a violation

of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), due to the Commonwealth’s

suppressing information about Detective Tolliver in the unrelated case.

According to Campbell, even though he pled guilty, evidence of Detective

Tolliver’s supposed dishonesty and bias toward him in that case would have

been important impeachment evidence in this case.

      Campbell has failed to establish any basis for remand. It appears that

Campbell knew of the alleged misconduct as early as 2015 and, therefore

could have raised it in his first PCRA petition. More fundamentally, Campbell

provides no evidence to support his claim that the detective invented a non-

existence witness in his other case. Thus, we deny Campbell’s motion for

remand.

      In sum, because the PCRA court correctly rejected Campbell’s layered

claims of ineffectiveness and a evidentiary hearing was not necessary, we

affirm the PCRA court’s order denying him post-conviction relief.

      Motion for remand denied. Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/6/2023

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