Court Opinion

ID: 9748962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:18:51.757739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:41.078831
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with those portions of the majority opinion which affirm the judgment of conviction. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s conclusion imposition of full, separate and consecutive sentences under Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (c) was appropriate on this record.1
The statement of reasons given by the trial court, and considered sufficient by the majority, suffers from the same deficiencies identified by our Supreme Court as unacceptable in People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335 [193 Cal.Rptr. 882, 667 P.2d 686]. The majority opinion nevertheless holds it is sufficient if the record demonstrates the trial court was aware it had a sentencing choice between section 1170.1 and section 667.6 even if the reasons supporting the ultimate choice are wholly inadequate. Based on the doctrine of stare decisis, I am compelled to conclude the statement of reasons given by the trial court to justify consecutive sentences under the harsher provisions of section 667.6 is inadequate and the matter should be remanded for resentencing. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937] [“Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court . . . .”].)
*1319In Belmontes the defendant was found guilty of kidnapping, rape, oral copulation, and sodomy. Apparently relying on section 667.6, subdivision (c), the trial court imposed full consecutive sentences for the violent sex crimes. Before imposing sentence, the court recited aggravating and mitigating factors. In aggravation, the court mentioned the violence and cruelty involved in the crimes, the vulnerability and fear of the victim, the threats made against her, the deliberation and premeditation involved in luring her into the car and the defendant’s poor performance on parole.2 In mitigation, the court noted the defendant suffered from a personality defect and had a drinking problem.
The court determined the factors enumerated in California Rules of Court, rule 425 listing criteria affecting the decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences were equally relevant to a decision to impose consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c) (providing for full consecutive terms) in lieu of section 1170.1 (providing for fractional terms to run consecutively to the principal term). The court nevertheless concluded the decision to select the harsher terms of section 667.6, subdivision (c) was a separate sentencing choice for which reasons must be separately stated. “A decision to sentence under section 667.6, subdivision (c) is an additional sentence choice which requires a statement of reasons separate from those justifying the decision merely to sentence consecutively.” (Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 347.)
The Supreme Court then explained its holding. “This does not mean that the reasons justifying full term consecutive sentencing under section 667.6, subdivision (c) must necessarily be different than those used to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences under section 1170.1. The criteria listed *1320in [California Rules of Court,] rule 425—which, as noted, incorporate those of [California Rules of Court,] rules 421 and 423—apply to both decisions and cover all degrees and nuances of depravity. What is required is an identification of the criteria which justify use of the drastically harsher provisions of section 667.6, subdivision (c). The crucial factor, in our view, is that the record reflect recognition on the part of the trial court that it is making a separate and additional choice in sentencing under section 667.6, subdivision (c).” (Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 348.)
The court then outlined the proper procedures for trial courts to follow in sentencing under section 667.6, subdivision (c). “The ideal method of proceeding would be for the trial court first to decide generally between concurrent and consecutive terms, following the criteria listed in [California Rules of Court,] rule 425. Once the court has decided to sentence a defendant to consecutive terms and has stated its reasons therefor, it then must decide whether the consecutive terms should be under the principal/subordinate scheme of section 1170.1 or under the full and separate term scheme of section 667.6, subdivision (c). If the latter is chosen, the reasons therefor should be stated for the record. This decision, of course, should be made very carefully, for the Legislature obviously intended by the alternative language in section 667.6, subdivision (c) that this more punitive provision be reserved for the more serious sex offenders. (See People v. Wilson [1982] 135 Cal.App.3d 343, 353 [185 Cal.Rptr. 498].)” (Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 348-349.)
Based on this standard the Supreme Court found the comprehensive statement of reasons given by the trial court (see fn. 2, ante, at p. 1319) inadequate to justify imposition of consecutive sentences under the harsher provisions of section 667.6, subdivision (c) and remanded the matter for resentencing. “Although the factors listed are relevant to the choice between concurrent and consecutive sentences under [California Rules of Court,] rule 425, there is no indication why the more punitive provisions of section 667.6, subdivision (c) were chosen over those in section 1170.1.” (Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 349.) Similarly in the case at bar, the trial court failed to give a valid statement of reasons for consecutive sentences generally and therefore failed to justify its decision to impose consecutive sentences under the harsher provision of section 667.6, subdivision (c).
In choosing the high base term on the burglary count the court cited the following aggravating factors: the defendant’s prior convictions as an adult were numerous or of increasing seriousness and he was on probation when he committed the crime. In sentencing defendant to the high terms for the rape and oral copulation convictions the court identified additional aggravating factors: that the victim was particularly vulnerable, elderly and handicapped and that the manner in which the crime was carried out indicated premeditation.
*1321However, in choosing consecutive sentences over concurrent sentences generally the reason given by the trial court was legally insufficient. The reason the court offered was as follows: “the court has considered the criteria effecting [sic] the imposition of concurrent or consecutive sentences and finds per [California Rules of Court,] rule 425 that the crimes involved separate acts of violence. The crimes were committed on separate occasions, in that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his actions and nevertheless resumed sexual assault—excuse me, sexually assaultive behavior.”
As the majority opinion itself explains at section V, A, ante, the sexually assaultive acts in this case were not separate acts of violence nor were they committed on separate occasions. Thus, the only reason offered to justify consecutive sentences under either provision was invalid. It consequently appears the court’s statement of reasons may have been inadequate to even impose consecutive sentences under section 1170.1. In any event, it was certainly insufficient to impose consecutive sentences under the harsher full term provision which the Belmontes court stated requires a separate and distinct statement of reasons explaining “why the more punitive provisions of section 667.6, subdivision (c) were chosen over those in section 1170.1.” (34 Cal.3d at p. 349.) The trial court identified no reason other than that the crimes were “separate acts of violence” which even the majority finds to be legally erroneous. Because no other reason justifying consecutive terms was offered, there is no valid reason in the record to support consecutive terms in general nor to justify full term consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c).
The decision in People v. Wilson (1983) 135 Cal.App.3d 343 [185 Cal.Rptr. 498], cited with approval in Belmontes, bears several similarities to the case at bar. The defendant in Wilson was convicted of rape in concert, sodomy in concert and oral copulation. The trial court sentenced him to the high base term on the sodomy conviction and to full, separate and consecutive terms on the rape and oral copulation convictions under section 667.6, subdivision (c).
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment but remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. The court held the trial court was required to state reasons for imposing consecutive sentences and, furthermore, was required to separately state reasons for sentencing the defendant under the harsher provisions of section 667.6, subdivision (c) in lieu of section 1170.1. The court reasoned the “Legislature did not intend the automatic sentencing of multiple violent sex offenders under section 667.6, subdivision (c). . . .” (Wilson, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 352.) The court found the evidence reasonably suggested the defendant’s crimes were committed so closely in *1322time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior. (Id. at p. 353.)
The court contrasted the situation in Wilson with the circumstances in People v. Karsai (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406], in which full, separate and consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c) were proper for a defendant who was convicted of committing multiple violent sex crimes while on probation for the identical conduct. (Ibid.) “Once a trial judge has decided to sentence a multiple sex offender to consecutive terms, the judge must then decide whether the consecutive terms should be subordinate to the principal term under section 1170.1, subdivision (a), or full and separate terms under section 667.6, subdivision (c). This decision must be made thoughtfully because the Legislature obviously intended by the alternative language in section 667.6, subdivision (c), that the more punitive statute be utilized for the more serious sex offenders such as Karsai with his prior sex offense record.” (135 Cal.App.3d at p. 353; see also People v. McElrath (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 178 [220 Cal.Rptr. 698] [consecutive terms under section 667.7, subdivision (c) proper because the trial court found “the defendant to be a more serious sex offender. . . .”]; compare People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585 [250 Cal.Rptr. 635, 758 P.2d 1165] [full consecutive sentences proper under section 667.7, subdivision (c) where defendant convicted of single heinous sex crime as well as other felonies].)
As many courts have recognized, the Legislature intended full, separate and consecutive terms under section 667.6, subdivision (c) be reserved for the truly serious sex offender. In interpreting that section the Belmontes court directed trial courts to identify the factual circumstances which would justify full term consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c) as distinct from, or in addition to, those circumstances which would justify consecutive sentences generally. Because the trial court in the present case only gave the single invalid reason for consecutive sentences generally as well as for sentencing to full consecutive terms under section 667.6, subdivision (c), the statement of reasons was inadequate and the matter should be remanded for resentencing.
Consequently, there are several reasons why I cannot join my colleagues in overlooking the deficient justification for consecutive sentences in this case. First, as previously stated, the high court’s decision in Belmontes precludes such a course as a matter of stare decisis. Second, condoning, overlooking or excusing a deficient statement of reasons for a sentencing choice would encourage lax or sloppy treatment of significant sentencing issues affecting a person’s liberty interests. Third, requiring a trial court to state its reasons for exercising sentencing discretion promotes uniformity *1323and proportionality in sentencing. Fourth, an adequate statement of reasons on the record provides meaningful appellate review to determine whether in a given instance a trial court has abused its discretion. Finally, while I acknowledge complying with the Belmontes decision requires an additional step in the sentencing procedure, the extra work for the trial judge is not nearly as onerous a burden as the extra years a defendant may have to serve unjustifiably if a trial court is not required to carefully and thoughtfully exercise its discretion.
For these reasons I would find the trial court’s statement of reasons inadequate to impose full term consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c) and would remand the matter for resentencing.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 24, 1992. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

In identifying the aggravating factors the trial court stated:
“ ‘The Jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had committed the offenses with which he was charged and the Court, of course, heard the evidence and notes that the crime itself involved violence. It involved cruelty, total lack of consideration by the Defendant for a fellow human being, [fl] The Defendant did have available to him a knife. Threatening remarks were made by the Defendant to the victim. [j|] The victim was a female and was vulnerable to the whims and wishes of the Defendant. [j|] She was reduced to fear. She was not capable of adequately defending herself or protecting herself. [j[] Additionally, such conduct as to conjure up a false story to lure her away from her home and safety, reflects obvious deliberation and premeditation, [fl] Because of the Defendant’s acquaintanceship with the victim, and the brother, his brother’s acquaintanceship with the victim, it would appear that there was a certain amount of trust and confidence on the part of the victim, which was reposed in the Defendant, [f] He violated that trust and confidence that was really his. [j|] Now the Defendant himself has demonstrated that he does not perform well on parole or under supervision; that he has been brought back by the Board of Prison Terms, given additional time, additional supervision. I don’t really see that his offenses have increased in severity, save and except for the present offense, which is heinous. . . .’” (34 Cal.3d at p. 342, fn. 2.)