Court Opinion

ID: 9914835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 16:01:11.577239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:46.257689
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11463   Document: 29-1    Date Filed: 01/03/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-11463
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       NICOLE REEVES,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT,

                                                 Defendant- Appellee,

       FORMER CHIEF RICKY BOREN, et al.,

                                                          Defendants.

                         ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                23-11463

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00080-CDL
                          ____________________

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Nicole Reeves, a black former police oﬃcer, challenges the
       district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former
       employer, Columbus Consolidated Government. We also address
       Columbus’s motion to ﬁnd this appeal frivolous and award just
       damages.
                                       I.
              We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg-
       ment. Anthony v. Georgia, 69 F.4th 796, 804 (11th Cir. 2023). “Sum-
       mary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no
       genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
       to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
       “In determining whether the movant has met this burden, [we]
       must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-mo-
       vant.” Id. “Nonetheless, unsubstantiated assertions alone are not
       enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.” Id. (quo-
       tation marks omitted).
              Title VII prohibits an employer from ﬁring an employee be-
       cause of race or otherwise racially discriminating against an indi-
       vidual with respect to the terms of her employment. 42 U.S.C. §
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       23-11463                Opinion of the Court                           3

       2000e 2(a). Plaintiﬀs bear the burden of proving that their em-
       ployer discriminated against them unlawfully. Hinson v. Clinch Cty.,
       Georgia Bd. Of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000). To survive
       summary judgment, a plaintiﬀ must present facts suﬃcient to per-
       mit a jury to ﬁnd there was intentional discrimination. Lewis v. City
       of Union City, Ga, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). A
       plaintiﬀ can do this by (1) “present[ing] direct evidence of discrim-
       inatory intent,” (2) “satisfying the burden-shifting framework set
       out in McDonnell Douglas,” or (3) “demonstrat[ing] a ‘convincing
       mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that warrants an inference of
       intentional discrimination.” Id. at 1220 & n.6.
               Direct evidence is that which shows an employer’s discrimi-
       natory intent “without any inference or presumption.” Hinson, 231
       F.3d at 827. By contrast, any evidence that requires an inferential
       step is circumstantial. See Fernandez v. Trees, Inc., 961 F.3d 1148, 1156
       (11th Cir. 2020). “Only the most blatant remarks whose intent
       could mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of
       some impermissible factor constitute direct evidence of discrimi-
       nation.” Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1055 (11th Cir. 2012) (quota-
       tion marks omitted); see also Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d
       1181, 1189 90 (11th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases where statements
       were suﬃcient to demonstrate direct evidence of discrimination
       under Title VII).
              Under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework,
              [T]he plaintiﬀ bears the initial burden of establishing
              a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1)
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11463

              that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was
              subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) that
              she was qualiﬁed to perform the job in question, and
              (4) that her employer treated “similarly situated” em-
              ployees outside her class more favorably.
       Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220 21. In this circuit, “similarly situated” is de-
       ﬁned as “similarly situated in all material respects.” Id. at 1226. In
       Anthony v. Georgia, a black law enforcement oﬃcer alleged that his
       employer racially discriminated against him when he was placed on
       administrative leave following misconduct allegations. 69 F.4th at
       799 801. In determining whether the plaintiﬀ and his proﬀered
       comparator were “similarly situated in all material respects,” we
       looked to whether the comparator “engaged in the same basic con-
       duct (or misconduct) as the plaintiﬀ; was subject to the same em-
       ployment policy, guideline, or rule; had the same supervisor as the
       plaintiﬀ; and shared the plaintiﬀ’s employment or disciplinary his-
       tory.” Id. at 805 (quotation marks omitted and cleaned up).
              “If the plaintiﬀ succeeds in making out a prima facie case,
       the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-
       discriminatory reason for its actions.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1221. If
       the defendant carries its burden, “the plaintiﬀ must then demon-
       strate that the defendant’s proﬀered reason was merely a pretext
       for unlawful discrimination, an obligation that merges with the
       plaintiﬀ’s ultimate burden of persuading the factﬁnder that she has
       been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Id. (quotation
       marks omitted).
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       23-11463                Opinion of the Court                          5

               Satisfying the McDonnell Douglas framework is not essential
       for a plaintiﬀ to survive summary judgment. Smith v. Lockheed Mar-
       tin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). “Rather, the plaintiﬀ
       will always survive summary judgment if [s]he presents circum-
       stantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the em-
       ployer’s discriminatory intent.” Id. In other words, a court must
       deny a defendant’s motion for summary judgment if the plaintiﬀ
       “presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that
       would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the deci-
       sionmaker.” Id. (footnote and quotation marks omitted).
              A plaintiﬀ may establish a “convincing mosaic” by pointing
       to evidence that shows, “among other things, (1) suspicious timing
       or ambiguous statements, (2) systematically better treatment of
       similarly situated employees, and (3) pretext.” Yelling v. St. Vincent’s
       Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks
       omitted); see also Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2022)
       (ﬁnding the plaintiﬀ had established a “convincing mosaic” by
       showing, inter alia, that employees who committed similar miscon-
       duct remained employed, that a supervisor made racially biased
       comments, and that the supervisor gave “shifting reasons” for the
       plaintiﬀ’s termination).
              While the “convincing mosaic” approach is more ﬂexible
       than the McDonnell Douglas framework, it is not a separate legal
       test. Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1342. The plaintiﬀ’s “‘mosaic’ of evidence
       must still be enough to allow a reasonable jury to infer but-for cau-
       sation.” Id. The “convincing mosaic” framework is rather a
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                     23-11463

       recognition “that courts must consider the totality of a plaintiﬀ’s
       circumstantial evidence” before granting summary judgment. Id.
              The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
       for Columbus because Reeves failed to present facts suﬃcient to
       permit a jury to ﬁnd intentional discrimination. Lewis, 918 F.3d at
       1220. First, Reeves has not presented any direct evidence of racial
       discrimination. She does not point to any “blatant remarks” of ra-
       cial animus and, in fact, admitted in her deposition that neither
       Boren nor the Oﬃce of Professional Standards (“OPS”) team said
       anything to make her think their decisions were racially motivated.
       Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1189-90. All of her evidence requires inference
       or, to be more accurate, speculation to reach a ﬁnding of inten-
       tional race-based discrimination. Thus, she fails to survive sum-
       mary judgment under the direct evidence approach. See Fernandez,
       961 F.3d at 1156.
              Second, Reeves fails under the McDonnell Douglas frame-
       work because she cannot establish a prima facie case. Lewis, 918
       F.3d at 1220-21. She cannot establish a prima facie case because her
       proﬀered comparators were not “similarly situated in all material
       respects.” Id. at 1226. Watkins, Still, and Vardman were accused
       of very diﬀerent misconduct—on-duty use of force and violation
       of the requirement to log in evidence—and were governed by dif-
       ferent policies. 1 Anthony, 69 F.4th at 805. While Vardman’s miscon-
       duct also involved making false statements, his behavior diﬀered

       1 And the decision-makers were also different with respect to Still’s violation

       of the evidence log-in rule.
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       23-11463              Opinion of the Court                       7

       from Reeves’ because Vardman came clean within minutes. None
       of Reeves’ purported comparators involved other witnesses in ly-
       ing, or engaged in prolonged lying, as did Reeves throughout the
       administrative proceedings and thereafter. Because Reeves fails to
       show she was treated diﬀerently than similarly situated non-black
       employees, she fails to establish a prima facie case of race-based
       discrimination and the McDonnell Douglas analysis ends there.
       Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220 21.
              Finally, Reeves also has not presented “a convincing mosaic
       of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer inten-
       tional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Smith, 644 F.3d at
       1328. The crux of her argument is that the Columbus police de-
       partment had a “cover up culture” of protecting white oﬃcers who
       committed misconduct that did not extend to black oﬃcers. How-
       ever, she has not suﬃciently shown that such a culture existed.
       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Reeves, there
       might have been some evidence (although not much) suggesting
       an attitude of “protecting our own” within parts of the Columbus
       police department. However, there was no evidence at all, other
       than Reeves’ conclusory assertions, to show that such an attitude
       extended only to white oﬃcers. In fact, Vardman testiﬁed that if
       Reeves had been honest at the beginning of his investigation, he
       would have recommended that she, a black oﬃcer, not be charged.
              Reeves’ “unsubstantiated assertions” that the Columbus po-
       lice department had a custom of more strictly punishing black of-
       ﬁcers do not on their own create a genuine question for the jury as
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       8                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11463

       to whether her suspension and termination were racially moti-
       vated. Anthony, 69 F.4th at 804. Therefore, the district court was
       correct to grant summary judgment.
                                         II.
       An appellate court may—in response to a separately ﬁled motion
       and after a reasonable opportunity to respond—award damages
       and costs to the appellee if it determines that an appeal is frivolous.
       Fed. R. App. P. 38. “An award of damages and costs under [Rule 38]
       is appropriate when an appellant raises clearly frivolous claims in
       the face of established law and clear facts.” McLaurin v. Terminix
       Int’l Co., 13 F.4th 1232, 1243 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omit-
       ted). “[A] claim is clearly frivolous if it is utterly devoid of merit.”
       Id. The Supreme Court has cautioned that when considering sanc-
       tions against a losing plaintiﬀ in an employment discrimination
       case, courts should not “undercut the eﬀorts of Congress to pro-
       mote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII.”
       Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 434
       U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (discussing sanctions under § 706(k) of Title
       VII).
              Here, although we agree with the district court that it comes
       close, we cannot say Reeves’ appeal is so “utterly devoid of merit”
       to warrant sanctions. McLaurin, 13 F.4th at 1243.
            The district court’s grant of summary judgment is
       AFFIRMED and Columbus’s motion is DENIED.