Court Opinion

ID: 9732097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:07:44.160743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:23.236688
License: Public Domain

WATHEN, C.J., with whom RUDMAN, J., joins,
concurring.
[¶ 35] I concur in the result reached by the Court but write separately to distance myself from the curiously ambiguous and restricted conclusion “that the state does have a compelling interest in providing a forum within which grandparents who have acted as parents to their grandchild may seek continued contact with that child.” The District Court held that the Grandparents Visitation Act violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution on its face because it requires no showing of harm to the child before a court can order visitation with a grandparent. The court also concluded that the “best interest standard is not a compelling state interest by itself.” With the advantage of the teaching in Troxel, I reject the notion that the Act is invalid on its face and that the application of the best interests of the child standard is always unconstitutional in the context of grandparent visitation.19 ■
[¶ 36] In my judgment, the issue before us is whether the Act can ever be applied constitutionally. Although the United States Supreme Court stopped short of ruling on this precise issue, the opinion in Troxel is instructive and persuades me that the Act survives a facial challenge.
[¶ 37] I begin my analysis, as did the United States Supreme Court, in Troxel, by recognizing that the passage of the Act in Maine and similar statutes in every one of the other forty-nine states reflect profound changes in the structure of the American family.
The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of families varies greatly from household to household. While many children may have two married parents and grandparents who visit regularly, many other children are raised in single-parent households. In 1996, children living with only one parent accounted for 28 percent of all children under age 18 in the United States. U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, 1997 Population Profile of the United States 27 (1998). Understandably, in these single-parent households, persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing. In many cases, grandparents play an important role. For example, in 1998, approximately 4 million children — or 5.6 percent of all children under age 18 — lived in the household of their grandparents. U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1998 (Update), p. i (1998).
The nationwide enactment of nonpa-rental visitation statutes is assuredly due, in some part, to the States’ recognition of these changing realities of the American family. Because grandparents and other relatives undertake duties of a parental nature in many households, States have sought to ensure the welfare of the children therein by protecting the relationships those *305children form with such third parties. The States’ nonparental visitation statutes are further supported by a recognition, which varies from State to State, that children should have the opportunity to benefit from relationships with statutorily specified persons — for example, their grandparents.
Troxel v. Granville, 580 U.S. 57, -, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2059, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
[¶ 38] In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court was presented with the State of Washington’s version of a nonparent visitation statute. The Washington statute is significantly broader than the Maine Act. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.10.160, 26.09 .240 (1998) (allowing any third party to petition for visitation at any time, subject only to the best interests of the child). Our Act is confined to grandparents and in this case requires a “sufficient existing relationship” between grandparent and child, see 19-A. M.R.S.A. § 1803(1)(B); no significant interference with the parent-child relationship, see § 1803(3); in addition to a finding that visitation is in the best interests of the child. See § 1803(3). The Washington Supreme Court struck down its statute on the basis of the Federal Constitution and held that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2058. That ruling rested on the fact that the statute requires no threshold showing of harm and also that by allowing “ ‘any person’ to petition for forced visitation of a child at ‘any time’ with the only requirement being that the visitation serve the best interest of the child” the statute sweeps too broadly. See id. (citing In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, 28-30 (1998)). In a plurality opinion, four members of the United States Supreme Court declined to declare the statute unconstitutional on its face. Rather, they found it unconstitutional as applied. In doing so, they emphasized the need for care in elaborating the precise scope of parental due process rights in the visitation context and observed that “[bjecause much state-court adjudication occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2064 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). Two of the dissenting justices, Justices Stevens and Kennedy, concluded, each for different reasons, that the facial challenge to the statute should fail and Justice Kennedy opined persuasively that a parent does not have a constitutional right to prevent visitation in all cases not involving harm. See id. 530 U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2068 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. 530 U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2075 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Taking into account the separate view of Justice Scalia that, as a judge, he is without authority to deny legal effect to laws that infringe upon rights that are not enumerated in the Constitution, see id. 530 U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting), I can come to only one conclusion — on the basis of existing federal precedent, Maine’s Grandparent Visitation Act does not facially violate the Due Process Clause.20
[¶39] The inquiry, however, does not end here. The Act escapes a facial challenge, not solely because the grandparents in this case may be de facto parents as relied upon by the Court. Rather, the Act escapes facial invalidity because it operates within the rich confluence of the constitutional interests of the parents, the children, the state, the grandparents, and the family, whether these interests are derivative or otherwise. In this complex context, *306categorical statement and pronouncements of facial invalidity must yield to careful balancing of the competing constitutional interests of all. To focus with strict scrutiny, as does the Court, on the compelling interest of the state, vis-a-vis the parents, is to ignore what may in a particular case be the equally compelling interests of the children, the family, and the grandparents. The District Court must apply the Act with great sensitivity in order to balance and protect the rights of all parties and not run afoul of the constitution. Although the United States Supreme Court has not as yet definitively catalogued the factual considerations or decisional frameworks that are constitutionally required or appropriate, developing caselaw offers guidance.
[¶ 40] As the United States Supreme Court grappled with the changes in American society that started in the 1960s and continue to the present day, the Court has consistently expanded the definition of family and recognized that individuals other than biological or adoptive parents may exercise child-rearing authority. This broader understanding of the parent-child relationship led the Court to acknowledge the rights of nonparents to be a part of a child’s life. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977). In Moore, an ordinance attempted to restrict children from living with their extended families, specifically with their grandparents. See id. at 499-506, 97 S.Ct. 1932. The Court held that this sort of “family choice” is a constitutionally-protected area under the Due Process Clause even when parents are not involved. See id. In particular, the Court ruled that a grandmother had the right to live with her grandchildren. See id. at 504, 97 S.Ct. 1932.
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.... Decisions concerning child rearing, which [Wisconsin v.] Yoder [406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526 (1972) ], Meyer], 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042], Piercel 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070] and other cases have recognized as entitled to constitutional protection, long have been shared with grandparents or other relatives who occupy the same household — indeed who may take on major responsibility for the rearing of the children.
Id. at 504-05, 97 S.Ct. 1932; see also id. at 508-13, 97 S.Ct. 1932 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the increasing number of nontraditional families in the United States and their right to constitutional protection); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (recognizing the parental rights of a biological father who is not married to his child’s biological mother). The United States Supreme Court has also reaffirmed that the State may regulate the behavior of adults, including parents, in the attempt to protect the constitutional rights of children. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-41, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968). It is constitutionally significant that the Maine Act requires a “sufficient existing relationship.” Although in my judgment it is not controlling, it is also significant that in the present case, the grandparents may have acted as caregivers over a significant period of time and may have developed a close relationship with the children. Some courts, without statutory authority, have modified the common law presumption and opened the door to visitation by adults who have become the de facto parent of a child. See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 198 Wis.2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (1995); see S.F. v. M.D., 132 Md.App. 99, 751 A.2d 9, 15 (2000); V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539, 551-54 (2000); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886, 892-93, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed.2d 386 (1999). Addi*307tionally, the American Law Institute (ALI) has suggested that being a de facto parent may create a lawful basis to grant court-ordered visitation. See Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.03(l)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000). By confining the Act to de facto parents in the present case, the Court unnecessarily strips the Act of any significance beyond the limited results that could be achieved at common law.
[¶ 41] One of the primary constitutional deficiencies in the application of the Washington statute in Troxel was the fact that the trial court gave no special weight to the parent’s determination of her daughter’s best interests. In doing so, the court violated the constitutional presumption “that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.” Id. 530 U.S. at-, 120 S.Ct. at 2061. As noted in Troxel, the Maine Act affords a special measure of protection for parental decision making by requiring the court to find that grandparent visitation would not significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with the parent’s rightful authority over the child. See id. 530 U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2062 (citing 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1803(3)). In applying the Act, it is important for trial courts to appreciate that the decisions of fit parents are entitled to special weight and that this principle is embedded in the Act and is required by the Constitution.
[¶ 42] In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court also criticized the failure of the Washington trial court to credit the fact that the parent had voluntarily provided visitation to the grandparents, never sought to deny visitation, and resisted only the expanded visitation the grandparents demanded. The Maine Act does not, as do the statutes in many other states, expressly condition an award of visitation on a parent’s denial or unreasonable denial of visitation to the grandparent. Such considerations, however, fit comfortably within the comprehensive formulation of best interests set forth in the Act. See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1803(3)(H), (I).
[¶ 43] Finally, Troxel introduces a note of caution about sweeping interpretations and applications of nonparental visitation statutes. The Act deals with an important right described as follows by the Supreme Court:
The liberty interest at issue in this case — the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.
“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”
Troxel, 530 U.S. at-, 120 S.Ct. at 2060 (citation omitted). Courts must afford primacy and weight to the interests and views of a fit parent and are not free to resolve a difficult call by splitting the difference as the Washington trial court did in Troxel.
[¶44] The present case illustrates the more exacting decisional framework that is required. Here, the court determined hypothetically that the requirements of the Act had been met and indicated that if the Act were constitutional, it would order visitation. The court went on to note, without explanation, that if the children were to be exchanged, it would be accomplished under the supervision of a third party or guardian ad litem and the parents and grandparents were not to be present at the delivery point at the same time. Although such a ready solution may be appropriate in a divorce setting for resolving a conflict in parental rights, in the context of grandparent visitation, it also implicates the analysis of best interests. The capacity of the parents and grandparents to cooperate and resolve disputes is an explicit part of the best interests analysis required by the Act in determining whether visitation *308should be ordered. See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1803(3)(H), (I).
[¶ 45] One court has usefully observed that “[a]s a general proposition, visitation awarded to adults is not for their gratification or enjoyment, but to fulfill the needs of the child.” Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993). As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he extension of statutory rights in this area to persons other than a child’s parents, however, comes with an obvious cost,” and could “place a substantial burden on the traditional parent-child relationship.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at-, 120 S.Ct. at 2059. Under the Act, it is the court’s function to order visitation only under the limited circumstances when it will benefit the child, and then, only if that benefit can be realized without significantly burdening or interfering with the parent-child relationship.21
[¶ 46] Because, in my judgment, the Act is not facially unconstitutional, I join in vacating the dismissal of the action and remanding for further proceedings.

. The District Court in the present case took evidence, addressed the merits hypothetically, and purported to find the Act unconstitutional as applied. In fact, the court concluded that a showing of harm to the children is essential to justify any interference with parental rights, and that the best interests standard alone is never sufficient. In effect, the court found that the Act could never be applied constitutionally and fails a facial challenge, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 63-64, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).

. Justice Souter voted to affirm on the basis that the statute "sweeps too broadly and is unconstitutional on its face.” Id. 530 U.S. at -, 120 S.Ct. at 2066 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas voted to affirm on the basis that the statute could not survive analysis in accordance with the strict scrutiny standard of review. See id. 530 U.S. at-, 120 S.Ct. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

. The Act seeks to minimize the potential burden on parents by requiring the court to first consider a petition summarily on affidavits before ordering an evidentiary hearing. Only if the court determines on the basis of the petition and the affidavits that "it is more likely than not that there is a sufficient existing relationship or ... that a.sufficient effort to establish one has been made,” should the court proceed to a hearing. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1803(2)(C). Here, the parents responded to the grandparents’ affidavit with a motion to dismiss. The court leapfrogged over the procedural requirements of the Act and went directly to the merits and the constitutional challenge. In addition, the Act authorizes the court to award “costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, for defending or prosecuting actions ....”§ 1803(6). Because of constitutional sensitivities and practical considerations, courts should be scrupulous in following the procedures specified in the Act.