Court Opinion

ID: 9955988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 22:02:33.818815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:29.091389
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 P. v. Nukida CA6

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H050513
                                                                     (Santa Cruz County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. 20CR03181)

             v.

 TIM MAKOTO NUKIDA,

             Defendant and Appellant.

         In 2022, a jury found defendant Tim Makoto Nukida guilty of 19 counts stemming
from his sexual abuse of a child on various occasions over a period of seven years. The
victim in all counts, Jane Doe, was Nukida’s stepdaughter. The trial court sentenced
Nukida to a total aggregate term of 112 years and eight months in prison.
         On appeal, Nukida raises the following arguments related to his trial: (1) the trial
court erred in admitting expert testimony about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome (CSAAS); and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on CSAAS with
an incorrect version of CALCRIM No. 1193. With respect to his sentence, Nukida
argues: (1) his aggregate sentence of 112 years and eight months is cruel and unusual
under the United States and California Constitutions; and (2) the trial court erred in
ordering him to pay a $20,000 restitution fine, which exceeded the maximum fine
permitted under Penal Code1 section 1202.4, subdivision (b). The Attorney General

         1
             Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
concedes that the court may have erred in its imposition of the restitution fine but argues
that the matter should be remanded for the trial court to clarify the record regarding the
applicable statute for the fine and correct the amount ordered only if necessary.
       For the reasons explained below, we reverse the $20,000 restitution fine and
remand for the trial court to clarify the statutory basis for the fines ordered and exercise
its discretion within the limits of that statute. In all other respects, we affirm.
                     I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing
       On September 12, 2022, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney’s Office filed a
first amended information charging Nukida with 19 criminal counts as follows: six counts
of committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 1-2,
6-7, 17-18); 12 counts of committing a forcible lewd act upon a child under the age of 14
(§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 3-5, 8-16); and one count of committing a lewd act upon a
child between the ages of 14 and 15 years old and 10 or more years younger than Nukida
(§ 288, subd. (c)(1); count 19).
       On September 14, 2022, after a 12-day trial, the jury found Nukida guilty on all 19
counts as charged.
       On October 19, 2022, the trial court sentenced Nukida to an aggregate term of 112
years and eight months in prison. Nukida’s sentence consisted of the following: 12
consecutive terms of the middle term of eight years for committing a forcible lewd act
upon a child under the age of 14 (counts 3-5, 8-16); the middle term of six years on one
count of committing a lewd act against a child under the age of 14 (count 1); six
consecutive terms of two years (one-third the middle term of six years) for committing a
lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (counts 2, 6-7, 17-18); and one consecutive
term of eight months (one-third the middle term of 24 months) for committing a lewd act
upon a child between the ages of 14 and 15 years old and 10 or more years younger than
Nukida (count 19).

                                               2
       In addition, the trial court imposed a restitution fine of $20,000,2 an additional
parole revocation fund fine of $20,000, suspended pending successful completion of
parole (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b), 1202.45), and victim restitution.
       Nukida timely appealed.
       B. Factual Background
              1. Prosecution’s Case
                     a. Nukida’s Relationship with Jane Doe
       Nukida began dating Jane Doe’s mother, E.V.3 in 2007 after E.V. separated from
Jane Doe’s father. That same year, E.V., Jane Doe, and Jane Doe’s brother, I.V. moved
in with Nukida. E.V. and Nukida married in approximately 2008 or 2009, at which time
Nukida began financially supporting E.V. and her children. In August 2008, Nukida,
E.V., I.V., and Jane Doe moved to the Almaden Lake Apartments in San Jose (Almaden
Lake) where they resided for approximately three years.
                     b. Jane Doe’s Testimony
       Jane Doe was approximately six years old when the family moved to Almaden
Lake and slept in her own room at the end of the hall. After moving to Almaden Lake,
Nukida began entering Jane Doe’s bedroom early on some mornings, undressing her, and
touching her back and buttocks. Jane Doe woke up when Nukida came into her bedroom
on the first occasion, but kept her eyes closed as he undressed her. Nukida continued to
engage in this behavior once or twice a month, and on occasion, he also took off his

       2
         On the record, the trial court stated that it was imposing $20,000 in “fines”
without specifying the type of fines or an applicable statute. However, the minute order
states that this was a restitution fund fine pursuant to “1202.4 PC,” which presumably
was a reference to section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1).
       3
        We refer to the witnesses in the proceedings by their initials only to protect their
personal privacy interests pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10), (11).

                                              3
pants, touched Jane Doe’s vaginal area, and pressed his penis against her vagina.
Afterwards, Nukida got dressed, helped Jane Doe get dressed, and left the room.
       On one occasion, Jane Doe was by herself folding laundry in the Almaden Lake
laundry room when Nukida came in and began talking with her. Nukida then closed the
door, pulled his pants down to his ankles, and tried to push Jane Doe’s head down
towards his penis while holding it up in one hand. Jane Doe pulled away and left the
room. Nukida also approached Jane Doe approximately three to five times in the kitchen
at Almaden Lake, “groped” her, and touched her buttocks and vaginal area over her
clothes. On some of these occasions, other people, including E.V., were in the apartment
but in another room.
       Jane Doe stated that Nukida’s contact was “unwanted,” and she was confused and
did not fully understand what was going on. At the time, she did not tell anyone what
had happened.
       In 2011, the family moved from Almaden Lake to a house on Tabor Drive in
Scotts Valley (Tabor house). Jane Doe’s bedroom was upstairs, while the master
bedroom, which was shared by E.V. and Nukida, was downstairs. While living at the
Tabor house, Nukida often led Jane Doe downstairs into the closet of the master bedroom
and closed the door. Once they were inside the closet, Nukida took off Jane Doe’s
clothes and occasionally took off his own clothes, then touched Jane Doe’s vagina and
his penis. He frequently placed Jane Doe’s hand on his penis and directed her to rub it.
Jane Doe also testified that at least once a month while in the closet, Nukida would hug
Jane Doe from behind and “grind” into her by rubbing his groin on her hip or buttocks.
       A few times each month, after Nukida brought Jane Doe down into the master
bedroom, he undressed her and himself, leaned Jane Doe on her back over the bed, and
pressed his penis into her inner thigh and near her vaginal area to simulate having sex
with her, although he did not actually place his penis inside her vagina. While he did

                                             4
this, Nukida occasionally made grunting noises or kissed Jane Doe on her cheek or lips,
but never said anything to her. The interactions lasted approximately five to ten minutes.
       On several occasions, while Jane Doe was watching television with Nukida in the
living room, Nukida moved closer to her and either put her hand on his penis over his
pants or unzipped his pants and put her hand directly on it. Nukida also came into the
bathroom three times while Jane Doe was taking a bath, opened the shower curtain, and
looked at Jane Doe while she was naked; on one such occasion, he kneeled over the bath
and touched Jane Doe’s thigh. After these incidents, Jane Doe began locking the door
while taking a bath.
       Jane Doe estimated that overall, she experienced unwanted touching by Nukida on
a weekly basis while the family lived at the Tabor house. However, she did not tell E.V.
about what was happening because she was afraid Nukida would stop supporting them
financially. Nukida also expressed to her at one point that the extra attention and
physical touching were his way of making up for the lack of attention Jane Doe got from
her parents, who were more focused on her brother I.V.
       In approximately 2014 when Jane Doe was 12, Nukida lost his job and could no
longer pay the mortgage on the Tabor home, resulting in the family moving to a smaller
mobile home park in Scotts Valley. During this time, Jane Doe and I.V. initially stayed
alone with Nukida in the mobile home, while E.V. stayed in San Jose. While living in
the mobile home, Nukida touched Jane Doe over her clothes in her buttocks, chest, and
vaginal area while in the kitchen; Jane Doe occasionally “froze” when this happened, but
on some occasions, she exited the kitchen immediately. Nukida also attempted to lead
Jane Doe into the master bedroom and touch her, but she stopped him right away and left.
On one occasion while Jane Doe was already in the master bedroom, Nukida came in,
closed the door, and tried to take Jane Doe’s clothes off, but did not succeed because she
left the room. At this point, Jane Doe knew what was happening was wrong, and she felt

                                             5
“dirty.” However, she still felt unable to speak up and tell E.V. because of the potential
consequences, including the possible loss of Nukida’s financial support.
       In 2015, E.V. and Nukida divorced, and Jane Doe and I.V. moved with E.V. to an
apartment on Gilda Way in San Jose. Nukida continued residing in Scotts Valley, but
still kept in contact with E.V. and interacted with the family on occasion. However, Jane
Doe did not regularly socialize with Nukida at this time as she was often busy or chose
not to go with the rest of the family when they met him. However, on one occasion,
Nukida came to the Gilda Way apartment to meet E.V. while Jane Doe was there alone.
After letting him in, Jane Doe went to change for volleyball practice when Nukida came
into her room, pulled down her shorts, and began touching her buttocks. Nukida also
touched Jane Doe’s chest through her clothes. Jane Doe indicated that she initially just
stood still, then “snapped out of it,” pulled up her shorts, and left shortly after. This was
the final occasion that Nukida touched Jane Doe in a sexual manner.
                     c. Discovery of Sexual Conduct
       On March 16, 2019, Jane Doe attended I.V.’s birthday party, which was held at
Nukida’s mobile home in Scotts Valley. At the time, I.V. was residing in the mobile
home with Nukida. After drinking some alcohol and becoming inebriated, Jane Doe
began crying and revealed to I.V. that Nukida had touched her and engaged in
inappropriate behavior. According to I.V., Jane Doe was “in distress” and crying in a
manner he had never seen before. I.V. was very angry and tried to find out more
information from Jane Doe, but she did not provide further details. I.V. did not confront
Nukida with Jane Doe’s allegations, but began avoiding him while continuing to live with
him.
       In March 2020, E.V. lost her job due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result,
E.V. could no longer keep her apartment in Aptos, where she and Jane Doe were living,
and Jane Doe had to move in with her father. After Nukida offered that E.V. move in
with him, E.V. decided to accept his offer and informed Jane Doe that she (E.V.) would

                                              6
be moving in with Nukida. Jane Doe was very frustrated to hear this and told E.V.
“ ‘don’t do this,’ ” that Nukida did not deserve E.V., and that she was making a mistake.
When E.V. questioned her further, Jane Doe finally revealed that Nukida had touched her
inappropriately in a sexual manner in the past “behind closed doors.” E.V. indicated that
Jane Doe was very upset and asked E.V. to forgive her because she “ ‘didn’t know [she
was] doing [or] what was going on.’ ” According to Jane Doe, E.V. was very shocked by
the news and that she had not noticed anything for so many years; as a result, she did not
move in with Nukida.
       In April 2020, Jane Doe spoke with I.V. again about Nukida’s past behavior with
her and asked him to move out of Nukida’s home. I.V. subsequently moved out a few
months later in July 2020. Before moving out, I.V. confronted Nukida about Jane Doe’s
allegations.
       After speaking with E.V., Jane Doe told her father about the sexual abuse and
reported it to the Scotts Valley Police Department on April 16, 2020.
                     d. Pretext Phone Call and Meetings
       After Jane Doe reported the sexual abuse to the police, the investigating officer,
Officer Justin Milroy, arranged for her to make a pretext phone call to Nukida.4 During
the call, Nukida began talking immediately and indicated that he wanted to contribute
$10,000 per year towards her college expenses as a gift to her. Nukida also offered to
give Jane Doe his car after he purchased a new one. Jane Doe then said, “I’ve had a lot
of time to think recently…and I just need some closure, um, about some things that
happened between you and me when, um, when we lived together.” Nukida responded,
“[d]o you want to come over? Um, right now? I’d rather not talk about anything, you
know, over the phone.” Jane Doe indicated that she “didn’t want to make a big deal

       4
         As described by Milroy, a pretext call is frequently used in sexual assault cases,
where the victim calls the suspect and attempts to engage him or her in a conversation to
see if the suspect makes any incriminating statements or acknowledges the assault.

                                             7
about it” and repeated that she was seeking “closure.” Nukida again responded that he
wanted to “discuss face to face,” and not over the phone. The call ended shortly
thereafter.
       After the call, Jane Doe agreed to meet Nukida at a park in Scotts Valley. During
the meeting, Milroy parked nearby in an unmarked vehicle, where he could still see Jane
Doe, and equipped Jane Doe with a recording device to record the conversation. During
their conversation, Jane Doe asked Nukida why he “did the things [he] did” to her
because she was “so little” and didn’t understand what was happening. Nukida replied
that he “[didn’t] understand it either.” When Jane Doe attempted to discuss specific
details about the location and number of times the assaults occurred, Nukida repeatedly
stated “no, no, no.” Jane Doe then asked Nukida to “not pretend” that nothing happened,
to which Nukida responded that he was “not saying [he was] pretending.” Nukida then
claimed it was due to “his psyche,” that he “didn’t know what to say,” and repeatedly
apologized to Jane Doe. When Jane Doe asked him if he deserved punishment and
should go to jail, Nukida responded, “Yes, if that’s what it takes.”
       At Milroy’s request, Jane Doe agreed to another meeting with Nukida in May
2020. Nukida met Jane Doe in her parked vehicle, while Milroy parked approximately
four to five car lengths in front and equipped Jane Doe with two recording devices.
During this conversation, Nukida began apologizing to Jane Doe for various events that
had happened over the years, and repeated his offer to contribute $10,000 a year towards
Jane Doe’s college expenses. Nukida also offered for Jane Doe and E.V. to move into his
home. When Jane Doe asked Nukida about what happened when she previously lived
with him, Nukida responded that he was “sorry” and did not know what he could do.
Nukida then spoke at length about a cycle of abuse that began with him observing his

                                             8
mother abuse his sister. He also talked about an incident during his childhood where he
was lost in a graveyard. He then stated:
“Some things I just don’t understand. Why some things happened. I wonder if some of it
is psychological, you know, psychological, that’s deep-rooted trauma that happened way
back…Something just something just clicked inside or something. I don’t know. It’s just
too much, too much of a pattern there. So, I’m not using any of this as an excuse. I
apologize for my behavior and I want I want to know what I can help with, what I can do,
because I really care about you. And I want to make sure you’re well the rest of your
life. Whatever way I can do to help you uh get closure to that, to overcome that. I want
to help. If you want me to uh go to jail that’s fine too. I can do that.”
       When Jane Doe indicated she was suffering from flashbacks, Nukida offered to
“kill himself” and told Jane Doe to “just tell [him] what to do” to help her. Jane Doe
attempted to discuss the various incidents of sexual abuse with Nukida, but Nukida
responded that he “[didn’t] understand it,” and “[didn’t] recall” the first time he went into
Jane Doe’s room when she was six or seven years old. He repeated that he “didn’t
understand” when Jane Doe asked him what his intentions were during the incidents of
unwanted touching, why he had molested her, and whether she had done anything to “call
this attention.” Jane Doe told him that she felt his offer to pay for her college tuition was
an attempt to buy her silence, which Nukida denied. Nukida then suggested he see a
hypnotist to find out what really happened, and again stated that he would kill himself if
Jane Doe asked him to. As Jane Doe again attempted to talk to Nukida about the various
incidents, Nukida continued to state that he “didn’t understand it.” Finally, Nukida stated
that he hoped there was “no government mind control going on,” and spoke about “high-
tech mind control.”

                                              9
       Nukida ultimately stated that he would go to jail if Jane Doe wanted him to,
because his life “was pretty much over.” He then stated that he planned to leave
everything to Jane Doe and her family, and offered to sign a will if she wrote up for him.
                 e. CSAAS evidence
       Dr. Anthony Urquiza testified as an expert on child sexual abuse and child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Dr. Urquiza defined CSAAS as an
educational tool to inform and educate therapists about common characteristics exhibited
by children who have been sexually abused, including dispelling common myths or
misconceptions therapists may have about sexual abuse. He noted that CSAAS was not
used to diagnose or give an opinion on whether someone was the victim of sexual abuse.
       Dr. Urquiza indicated that some of the common myths about child sexual abuse
were that: (1) the victims disclose the incident right away; (2) the perpetrators are usually
strangers, not someone the child knows or has regular contact with; and (3) the victims
can be discerned easily because they exhibit visible signs of distress. He also explained
how child victims of sexual abuse often respond or react to the abuse in ways that
differed from an “adult” way of handling similar trauma. For example, Dr. Urquiza
indicated that in most cases, the perpetrator is someone whom the child knows and has an
ongoing relationship with. As a result, the perpetrator is often able to convince the child
that disclosing would be negative or harmful, or cultivates a close relationship with them
prior to the abuse such that the child does not feel comfortable disclosing.
              2. Defense’s Case
                     a. Testimony of Nukida’s Relatives
       Four of Nukida’s relatives testified on his behalf during the trial. Nukida’s older
sister, G.N., testified that because of their Japanese culture, her family was very reserved
and not the “touchy-touchy” type of people. She indicated that she had a close
relationship with Nukida and visited him on several occasions after he married E.V. and
began living with E.V., Jane Doe, and I.V. G.N. indicated that Nukida had a reputation

                                             10
in their family for being honest and truthful, and he would not touch anyone in the family
inappropriately. G.N. also testified on cross-examination that she had never witnessed
Nukida “act sexually” in front of her towards anyone, including adult women.
      Nukida’s sister, F.N., testified that she saw Nukida at least four times a year and
had regularly interacted with E.V., Jane Doe, and I.V. during Nukida and E.V.’s
marriage. F.N. also described Nukida as very honest and had never observed him behave
inappropriately with her own daughter during their interactions over the past 26 years.
      Nukida’s youngest sister, E.B., testified that she interacted with Nukida, E.V.,
Jane Doe, and I.V. frequently during family trips and vacations, and also had a son who
was the same age as Jane Doe. Like her sisters, E.B. described Nukida as very honest,
and she did not believe he was capable of touching any child inappropriately based on her
interactions with Nukida and observations of him around children. E.B. further testified
on cross-examination that she and Nukida had never discussed his sexual preferences,
and she had never observed him engaging in sexual activity.
      Finally, Nukida’s niece, J.F., testified that she had seen Nukida regularly
throughout her life and had interacted with I.V. and Jane Doe during family social
gatherings. J.F. testified that Nukida had always been very honest, respectful, and calm,
and had respected boundaries with “all of us.” Based on her observations and
interactions with Nukida, J.F. believed he would never touch a child inappropriately. On
cross-examination, J.F. clarified that she had seen Nukida approximately three to four
times per year while he was married to E.V.
                    b. Expert Witness Testimony
      Clinical psychologist Dr. Mary Alumbaugh testified as an expert on Nukida’s
disposition to commit sexual offenses. Dr. Alumbaugh evaluated Nukida’s
developmental history by interviewing Nukida about his background, reviewing police
reports, and reviewing the recording of the May 2020 conversation between Nukida and
Jane Doe. Dr. Alumbaugh also administered various personality tests on Nukida. She

                                            11
described Nukida’s responses to the questions as representative of “underreporting,”
where he was very careful, deliberate, and defensive in how he responded to each
question. Dr. Alumbaugh also evaluated Nukida’s ability to function in interpersonal
relationships, and determined that he had difficulty asserting himself in a relationship and
taking control. The tests further revealed that Nukida had a low tendency to act out and
be impulsive. Based on Nukida’s overall performance on the tests, Dr. Alumbaugh did
not find any indication that Nukida was experiencing a paraphilia5 towards children,
including prepubescent children.
       On cross-examination, Dr. Alumbaugh acknowledged that she had only performed
this type of evaluation, known as a Stoll evaluation, five times. She also did not compile
an extensive sexual history on Nukida, including the number of sexual partners he had,
his sexual preferences, or how frequently he had sex. Dr. Alumbaugh confirmed that
based on Nukida’s test results, she felt Nukida portrayed himself as someone
“exceptionally free of common shortcomings” that most people would admit to, and that
he was reluctant to admit any dysfunction or faults across many areas. She further
concluded that he may be “insensitive to negative consequences associated with his
behavior tending to minimize the negative impact that his behavior has on others and
himself.” Lastly, Dr. Alumbaugh noted that someone with Nukida’s test results could
still molest children as the tests were not designed to answer that specific question.
                       c. Nukida’s Testimony
       Nukida testified in his own defense. He stated that he was born in Sapporo, Japan,
and moved to the United States when he was six years old. Nukida met E.V. at a health
spa and began dating her, but initially felt bad about pursuing a relationship with her
because she was still married at the time. After Nukida. E.V., Jane Doe, and I.V. moved
to Almaden Lake, Nukida would typically go straight to work in the morning while E.V.

       5
           Dr. Alumbaugh defined paraphilia as a “sexually deviant disorder.”

                                             12
would take care of the children. From the time they moved to Almaden Lake, E.V. was
100 percent dependent on Nukida to pay all expenses and did not have much money of
her own.
       Nukida denied any of the incidents of inappropriate touching that Jane Doe alleged
to have taken place at Almaden Lake. He also denied that any incidents took place at the
Tabor house. Lastly, while he confirmed that Jane Doe and I.V. lived with him in his
mobile home for a period of time after he and E.V. separated, he denied ever grabbing
Jane Doe in the kitchen or bedroom of the mobile home. Nukida could not think of or
identify anything in hindsight that Jane Doe could have misconstrued as inappropriate or
harmful touching.
       In 2015, Nukida and E.V. divorced, and E.V. moved with both children to her
sister’s home. While Nukida and E.V. were not in touch for approximately one year,
E.V. subsequently reestablished contact, and Nukida suggested that she move into the
Gilda Way apartment. Nukida subsequently began paying the rent for the Gilda Way
apartment.
       Nukida admitted that on one occasion, he had arrived at the Gilda Way apartment
to take Jane Doe to a volleyball tournament. E.V. was not home, but he began chatting
with Jane Doe, who was already dressed in her volleyball uniform. During the
conversation, he followed Jane Doe into her room, where he patted her on the buttocks as
a “form of affection;” he further described this as a “congratulatory pat” for Jane Doe
doing so well on the team despite being one of the shorter players. Nukida indicated that
Jane Doe was about 15 years old at the time and did not invite him to pat her this way.
However, he denied squeezing or rubbing Jane Doe’s buttocks or pulling down her
shorts. However, Nukida stated he later felt bad about what he had done because it was
the “wrong thing to do” as Jane Doe’s stepfather.
       Nukida continued to remain involved in E.V.’s life after the divorce and assisted
her financially. He also visited frequently and spent time with Jane Doe and I.V.

                                            13
socially. However, in 2019, Jane Doe asked to come meet him at his mobile home in
Scotts Valley, which she did not do regularly. When Jane Doe arrived, Nukida was
sleeping and did not answer the door, which he believed made her very angry. After this
incident, Jane Doe began acting “cold” towards Nukida, which he attributed to her being
jealous that he was spending more time with I.V. However, despite this incident, Nukida
still wanted to contribute to Jane Doe’s college tuition because he was “proud” of her and
knew E.V. would not be able to pay on her own.
       Nukida later testified that when he first met Jane Doe in the park in 2020, he did
not understand why she was bringing up “all these things” and “denied everything.”
However, he ended up having to walk away because Jane Doe became “emotionally
upset” and he was worried she would explode into a tantrum. Nukida testified that even
though he did not understand what Jane Doe was saying, he still wanted to “mend” his
relationship with her and agreed to meet her again.
       When he met Jane Doe the second time, Nukida claimed that he was only
apologizing about the incident at the Gilda Way apartment as well as the 2019 incident
when she came to visit him while he was asleep. In an effort to “manage” the situation,
he offered to go to jail and kill himself. He also admitted that he was “fixated” on the
Gilda Way incident to such an extent that he wasn’t paying as much attention to the other
incidents Jane Doe was describing.
       On cross-examination, Nukida reiterated that his responses to Jane Doe’s
accusations were his attempts to “manage the situation,” and he offered to go to jail and
kill himself because he was “desperate” to mend the relationship. Nukida characterized
the sexual abuse allegations against him as “all lies” and believed Jane Doe was making
the allegations up because she was jealous of the attention he gave I.V. However, Nukida
admitted he never confronted Jane Doe with this belief.

                                            14
                                      II. DISCUSSION
       A. Admission of CSAAS Expert Testimony
       Nukida argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Urquiza to testify over his
objection. First, he claims that the CSAAS testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible
under Evidence Code section 801 because the misconceptions it seeks to correct are no
longer prevalent in society and were not present among the jurors in the instant case.
Second, he argues that the prosecution failed to establish Dr. Urquiza’s opinions were
reliable amongst the scientific community. Lastly, Nukida contends that Dr. Urquiza’s
testimony exceeded the bounds of permissible CSAAS evidence because he testified
about the characteristics of persons who sexually abuse children and the typical nature of
the abuse, not just the characteristics of sexual abuse victims. Nukida therefore
concludes that his constitutional rights to due process were violated because the CSAAS
evidence was “used to unfairly corroborate and bolster [Jane Doe’s] allegations against
appellant.”
       As we explain below, we conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the
CSAAS testimony and reject Nukida’s arguments in their entirety.
              1. Procedural Background
       Before trial, the prosecution filed a motion in limine to admit Dr. Urquiza’s expert
testimony regarding CSAAS to disprove common myths and misconceptions about
children's reactions to sexual abuse and to assist the jury in evaluating the victim’s
testimony. Specifically, the prosecution asked to offer expert testimony “as to
molestation victims in general so as to dispel common misconceptions which may exist
among the jurors about how victims react to such abuse and how they go about disclosing
the abuse, as well as the fact that there is no ‘typical’ child molester.” The prosecution
further argued that a limiting instruction could be given admonishing the jury that the
evidence was admissible solely for the purpose of showing that the victim’s reactions

                                             15
were not inconsistent with having been molested, and not to assess the truth of the
victim’s claim.
       Nukida’s trial counsel moved to exclude the CSAAS evidence in its entirety.
Counsel claimed that such evidence was not generally accepted in the scientific
community and requested that the court hold a Kelly/Frye6 hearing before admitting the
evidence. Counsel also argued that if Dr. Urquiza was permitted to testify, his testimony
should be limited to “only the myths or misconceptions that are present in this case that
are beyond the common knowledge of the jurors.” Counsel additionally contended in
court that there “really [was] no misconceptions about [late reporting] in society
anymore” such that the testimony would be irrelevant.
       The trial court ruled that the CSAAS evidence was admissible so long as Dr.
Urquiza did not render an opinion as to what happened, who did what, or who was telling
the truth. The court noted that “not all jurors are going to be familiar with the subject
appropriate for expert testimony.” The court informed Nukida’s counsel that he could
object if the testimony exceeded the permissible scope.7
       At trial, Dr. Urquiza testified as an expert in CSAAS. He testified that CSAAS
was developed in the early 1980s as an educational tool for therapists to address myths
and misconceptions they may have about the behavior of child sexual abuse victims.
There are five general categories of CSAAS: secrecy, helplessness, entrapment or
accommodation, delayed and unconvincing disclosure, and retraction.
       According to Dr. Urquiza, most child victims of sexual abuse have some type of
ongoing relationship with their abuser. The perpetrators are usually bigger, older,

       6
         This rule, now known as only the Kelly rule (see People v. Bolden (2002) 29
Cal.4th 515, 545 (Bolden)) refers to the test for reliability of expert witness testimony as
set out in People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24.
       7
       The record does not reflect that counsel made any objections during Dr.
Urquiza’s testimony.

                                             16
stronger, and often in a position of control or authority in the child's life. The
perpetrators also use various methods of coercion to ensure the child stays quiet. This
can range from overt threats that something bad might happen, to intimidating the child
into staying quiet, to befriending the child and making the child care about them enough
that he or she feels “stuck” about reporting unwanted contact or touching.
       Many children feel unable to fight back or resist the abuser and submit to the
abuse, particularly if the abuser is someone in a position of significant authority in their
life. Child sexual abuse victims generally feel trapped and will often take steps to
accommodate or attempt to cope with the abuse by compartmentalizing their emotions
and “disassociating” while being abused, or finding ways to make it harder for the
perpetrator to have access to them.
       Dr. Urquiza testified that most children can sometimes take months, years, or even
“decades” before they initially disclose the abuse. In addition, the amount of information
the child initially discloses is often not fully articulate or detailed, and the child often will
“test the waters” by sharing only a little information to gauge how supportive of a
reaction they receive. Similarly, children often have difficulty remembering the details of
the abuse the more frequently it occurred, thereby resulting in inconsistent or
unconvincing disclosures.
       Dr. Urquiza clarified that a child did not have to go through all five stages of
CSAAS to be classified as a victim and that CSAAS is not a mechanism to diagnose
whether a particular child has been sexually abused. In addition, he testified that he was
not familiar with the facts of this case or any of the parties related to the case, and was
not offering an opinion as to whether Jane Doe had been sexually abused.
              2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Expert opinion testimony is admissible when the subject matter is “beyond
common experience” and the opinion would assist the trier of fact. (Evid. Code, § 801,
subd. (a).) “‘When expert opinion is offered, much must be left to the trial court's

                                               17
discretion.’ [Citation.] The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit
or exclude expert testimony [citation], and its decision as to whether expert testimony
meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.
[Citations.]” (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426.)
       “Trial courts may admit CSAAS evidence to disabuse jurors of five commonly
held ‘myths’ or misconceptions about child sexual abuse. [Citation.] While CSAAS
evidence is not relevant to prove the alleged sexual abuse occurred, it is well established
in California law CSAAS evidence is relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating the
credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse. [Citations.]” (People v. Lapenias
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 171 (Lapenias); see also In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
396, 418; People v. Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 188; People v. Patino (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744-1745 (Patino); People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947,
955-956; People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 449-450 (Harlan); People v.
Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116-117.) CSAAS evidence “is admissible solely for
the purpose of showing that the victim's reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are
not inconsistent with having been molested.” (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d
385, 394 (Bowker).) “For instance, where a child delays a significant period of time
before reporting an incident or pattern of abuse, an expert could testify that such delayed
reporting is not inconsistent with the secretive environment often created by an abuser
who occupies a position of trust.” (Ibid.) CSAAS evidence “is not admissible to prove
that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused; it is admissible to
rehabilitate such witness's credibility when the defendant suggests that the child's conduct
after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony
claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of
commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional
antecedents of abused children's seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (People v.
McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–1301, fn. omitted (McAlpin).)

                                             18
               3. Analysis
                      a. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting the
                          CSAAS Evidence
        Nukida argues that the trial court abused its discretion because “[t]he
misconceptions that CSAAS testimony has been upheld to refute no longer exist.
Moreover, in this case, there was no evidence that any of the prospective jurors held the
misconceptions that previously prevailed in our society.” In support of this argument,
Nukida largely cites scholarly articles and cases from other jurisdictions. We find this
argument without merit.
        The California Supreme Court ruled in McAlpin that CSAAS testimony is
admissible to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse
victims' behavior and to explain seemingly contradictory behavior of a child sexual abuse
victim. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1302.) As this court is bound by
decisions of the California Supreme Court, Nukida’s references to decisions from other
jurisdictions that reached different decisions on the admissibility of CSAAs testimony
have no effect on the binding nature of McAlpin. (See People v. Ramirez (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 175, 216. ) Based on this binding precedent, as well as the substantial
precedent set forth above regarding admissibility of CSAAS evidence, we conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that the prosecution’s proposed expert
testimony on CSAAS was relevant and admissible for the limited purpose for which it
was admitted in the instant case. (See Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 172; Patino,
supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1744-1745; People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 231,
245.)
                      b. CSAAS Evidence is Not Subject to the Kelly Rule
        Nukida next argues that because CSAAS evidence has never been evaluated by the
Kelly rule and its model has not been generally accepted in the scientific community, the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Urquiza’s testimony. We disagree.

                                             19
       Under the Kelly rule, “evidence obtained through a new scientific technique may
be admitted only after its reliability has been established under a three-pronged test. The
first prong requires proof that the technique is generally accepted as reliable in the
relevant scientific community.” 8 (Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 544.)
       The California Supreme Court has explained that the “additional scrutiny” under
Kelly, which “imposes certain preconditions on the admission of evidence derived from a
novel scientific technique or procedure.…‘is justified because “[l]ay jurors tend to give
considerable weight to ‘scientific’ evidence when presented by ‘experts’ with impressive
credentials. We have acknowledged the existence of a ‘. . . misleading aura of certainty
which often envelops a new scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental
nature.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Peterson (2020) 10 Cal.5th 409, 457 (Peterson).)
       However, unlike evidence that is based on a new scientific technique or procedure,
expert opinion testimony is not necessarily subject to the Kelly test. The California
Supreme Court has explained as follows: “[I]n most cases no similar caution is required
before a jury considers expert opinion testimony. Unlike results ‘produced by a
machine,’ to which jurors may ‘ascribe an inordinately high degree of certainty,’ jurors
presented with the personal opinion of a witness, even an expert witness, ‘may temper
their acceptance of his [or her] testimony with a healthy skepticism born of their
knowledge that all human beings are fallible.’ [Citations.] For this reason, ‘ “[a]bsent
some special feature which effectively blindsides the jury, expert opinion testimony is not
subject to Kelly[].” ’ [Citations.] Of course, some expert testimony may be ‘based, in
whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science and, even more
so, the law’ [citation]; where the novel technique ‘appears in both name and description
       8
          Although the Kelly rule involves two more prongs regarding the qualifications of
the testifying witness and the procedure used to perform the technique at issue (see
Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 244-245), Nukida does not contend that Dr. Urquiza’s
testimony failed to satisfy these other two elements. Therefore, we do not discuss them
further.

                                             20
to provide some definitive truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and
relay to the jury,’ additional scrutiny under Kelly is warranted.” (Peterson, supra, 10
Cal.5th at pp. 457-458, some italics added.)
       In the instant matter, Nukida contends that the California Supreme Court applied
Kelly to evidence regarding rape trauma syndrome in People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d
236 (Bledsoe), and therefore, Kelly must be applied to CSAAS evidence as well. In
Bledsoe, “expert testimony describing the [rape trauma] syndrome and applying it to [the]
victim was used to prove that ‘a rape in the legal sense had, in fact, occurred.’ ” (People
v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1160 (Stoll), italics omitted.) However, “rape trauma
syndrome was not devised to determine . . . whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense
occurred - but rather was developed by professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool,
to help identify, predict and treat emotional problems experienced by the counselors'
clients or patients.” (Bledsoe, supra, at pp. 249-250.) In other words, the scientific
literature regarding rape trauma syndrome did “not . . . purport to claim that the syndrome
is a scientifically reliable means of proving that a rape occurred.” (Id. at p. 251.) The
court therefore found that the evidence was inadmissible as it did not meet the Kelly test.
(Id. at p. 1161.)
       The Third District Court of Appeal subsequently indicated in Bowker that Bledsoe
created an exception allowing for the admissibility of evidence related to rape trauma
syndrome only for the limited purpose of “ ‘[disabusing] the jury of some widely held
misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of
the constraints of popular myths.’ [Citation.]” (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p.
391.) The court similarly found that notwithstanding Kelly, CSAAS evidence may
similarly be admissible for the limited purpose of “disabusing the jury of misconceptions
as to how child victims react to abuse.” (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 392.)
       Although Nukida claims that the holding in Bowker reflected a misinterpretation
of Bledsoe , the California Supreme Court subsequently made clear that its opinion in

                                               21
“Bledsoe did not hold that the [Kelly] test applied to the expert opinion in that case” and
that Bledsoe did not “discuss the test’s relationship to ‘syndrome’ or other expert
psychological evidence in general.” (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1161.) Significantly,
subsequent to Bledsoe, the California Supreme Court in Stoll concluded that where
psychological testimony is based on methods that “are not new to psychology or the law”
and “carry no misleading aura of scientific infallibility,’ ” the testimony is not subject to
the Kelly rule. (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1157.) Notably, Nukida does not address
Stoll in his argument.
       In the present case, Nukida fails to demonstrate that CSAAS evidence is based on
methods that are “new to psychology or the law” and that testimony about CSAAS
carries a “misleading aura of scientific infallibility.” (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1157;
accord, Peterson, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 458.) Indeed, the case of People v. Munch
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464 (Munch), specifically found that with respect to CSAAS
evidence, “we are not dealing with new experimental scientific evidence ‘ “not
previously accepted in court.” ’ ” (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 472.)
       In the instant case, Dr. Urquiza had been a licensed psychologist for over 30 years
and was the director at the U.C. Davis Care Center, a child abuse treatment program.
Over the course of his work at the Center, he had treated over 1,000 children, including
supervising and training others in their treatment of children. His expert testimony was
therefore “ ‘based on [his] clinical experience with child sexual abuse victims and on [his
. . .] . . . familiarity with professional literature in the area.’ [Citation.] . . . Such expert
testimony meets ‘traditional standards for competent expert opinion, without need for
additional screening procedures [under Kelly/Frye.]’ ” (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at
p. 473.) In addition, CSAAS evidence “has been ruled to be properly admitted by the
courts of this state for decades.” (Id. at pp. 468, 472.)
       Furthermore, testimony about CSAAS does not purport to make any definitive
statements about whether a child has been abused and instead simply attempts to dispel

                                                22
misconceptions about the conduct of child sexual abuse victims. (See Munch, supra, 52
Cal.App.5th at pp. 468, 473; Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 173.) Dr. Urquiza
specifically testified that he knew nothing about the case or the facts, and did not know
anyone related to the case. The California Supreme Court has also rejected the notion
that the “use of ‘syndrome’ . . . terminology by a mental health professional makes the
[testimony] seem ‘scientific’ to a jury, and thus invokes [Kelly].” (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d
at p. 1161, fn. 22 [court was “not persuaded that juries are incapable of evaluating
properly presented references to psychological … ‘syndromes’ ”].)
       Finally, due to Nukida’s failure to demonstrate the applicability of the Kelly rule to
the CSAAS evidence in this case, we find unpersuasive his reliance on out-of-state
authority regarding whether CSAAS evidence meets a Kelly (or Frye) requirement
regarding general acceptance within the scientific community. (See, e.g., State v. J.L.G.
(N.J. 2018) 234 N.J. 265, 301 [“we apply the Frye test and consider whether CSAAS has
achieved general acceptance in the scientific community”].)
       In conclusion, because Nukida does not establish that CSAAS evidence is based
on methods that are “new to psychology or the law” and that the evidence carried a
“misleading aura of scientific infallibility” (see Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1157; accord,
Peterson, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 457-458), we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting expert testimony about CSAAS without first conducting a Kelly
test. (See, e.g., Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 173 [“expert CSAAS testimony is
not ‘ “ ‘scientific’ ” evidence’ subject to the Kelly rule”]; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 472-473 [CSAAS evidence not subject to Kelly analysis]; Harlan, supra, 222
Cal.App.3d at p. 449 [Kelly rule does not apply to expert testimony about the reactions of
child molestation victims, where expert’s “opinion was based on her clinical experience
with child sexual abuse victims and on her familiarity with professional literature in the
area”].)

                                             23
                      c. The CSAAS Testimony Did Not Exceed the Bounds of
                         Permissible CSAAS Evidence
       Nukida next argues that Dr. Urquiza’s testimony went beyond the permissible
scope of CSAAS evidence because it included his opinions about the abuser, locations
where abuse typically occurred, the frequency of abuse, and a non-offending parent’s
knowledge of the abuse. Nukida claims that because such testimony did not focus on the
typical reactions of child victims to abuse and, in fact, mirrored the “exact scenario” that
Jane Doe testified to, those portions of Urquiza’s testimony should have been excluded.
We find no merit to this contention.
       As set forth above, Dr. Urquiza testified to the five general stages of CSAAS and
expressly stated that he had no knowledge of the facts of this case. Further, in reviewing
Dr. Urquiza’s testimony, it is apparent that the portions cited by Nukida were not
attempts to draw parallels to the case, but instead provided further insight into the various
stages of CSAAS. For example, in noting that an abuser is often someone already known
or related to the child, Dr. Urquiza indicated that this allowed for the abuser to coerce the
child into secrecy or contribute to the child’s feeling of helplessness. Similarly, Dr.
Urquiza discussed a non-offending caregiver or parent’s lack of knowledge as it related
to a child’s helplessness or vulnerability. Lastly, Dr. Urquiza noted that the location of
the abuse was important to dispel one of the common myths surrounding secrecy,
namely, that the abuse typically happened in a “dark alley” or unknown place and with an
unknown person. Accordingly, based on our review of the record, we find that Dr.
Urquiza’s testimony fell within the scope of permissible testimony, and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting it.
                      d. Admission of CSAAS Evidence Did Not Violate Due Process
       Finally, Nukida contends that the admission of the CSAAS evidence violated his
due process rights to a fair trial because it was irrelevant, unreliable, and inflammatory,
as set forth in his above-described arguments.

                                             24
       Generally, a court's compliance with the rules of evidence does not violate a
defendant's right to due process. (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 174, citing
People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834-835.) Reviewing courts have also routinely
held the admission of CSAAS evidence does not violate due process. (See, e.g., Patino,
supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1744-1745 [trial court's admission of CSAAS evidence did
not violate due process].) For the same reasons, we conclude that Dr. Urquiza’s
testimony about CSAAS did not violate Nukida’s constitutional right to due process.
       Further, we have already rejected Nukida’s contentions that (1) the evidence
should have been excluded as irrelevant; and (2) CSAAS evidence is unreliable and that
the Kelly test must be applied. The “rejection of a claim on the merits necessarily leads to
rejection of any constitutional theory or ‘gloss’ raised” on appeal. (People v. Scott (2011)
52 Cal.4th 452, 487, fn. 29.) Having rejected each of the underlying claims of error in
admitting the CSAAS evidence, we accordingly reject Nukida’s due process claim.
       B. Instructional Error
       Nukida next argues that the court erred in giving the jury a “version” of
CALCRIM No. 1193, the instruction generally provided when a case involves CSAAS
expert testimony. Nukida specifically argues that the court improperly failed to include
language from CALCRIM No. 1193 that the expert testimony was also not evidence that
Nukida committed the conduct with which he was not charged. Nukida further argues
that the court erroneously used the wrong pronoun of “his” instead of “her”, which
“undoubtedly misled the jury” on how it should use the CSAAS evidence and resulted in
them evaluating his credibility, as opposed to Jane Doe’s as contemplated by the
instruction. Nukida claims that due to these omissions and errors in the instruction, the
prosecution’s burden was lowered from guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of
Nukida’s due process rights.

                                            25
              1. Trial Court Proceedings
       Prior to instructing the jury and outside the jury’s presence, the trial court
indicated it had reviewed the instructions with counsel off-the-record. Defense counsel
indicated he “was not adding anything” and only asked for one instruction (not
CALCRIM No. 1193) to be pulled.
       At the conclusion of evidence, the court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM
No. 1193 as follows: “You have heard testimony from Dr. Anthony Urquiza regarding
[CSAAS]. [¶] Dr. Urquiza’s testimony about [CSAAS] is not evidence that the
defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him. [¶] You may consider this
evidence only in deciding whether or not [Jane Doe]'s conduct was not inconsistent with
the conduct of someone who has been molested and in evaluating the believability of his
testimony.”
              2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       As a threshold matter, the Attorney General argues that Nukida has forfeited his
claim of instructional error by failing to object to CALCRIM No. 1193 at trial. However,
because Nukida contends the challenged instruction was an incorrect statement of law
and affected his substantial rights under section 1259, we decide that we can consider the
merits of his claim in spite of his failure to object below. (See People v. Grandberry
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 599, 604; People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 312.)
       “We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the
independent or de novo standard of review.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
1082, 1088.) When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider
“ ‘ “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged
instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43
Cal.4th 959, 1028 (Richardson).) We consider the instructions as a whole and “ ‘assume

                                              26
that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury
instructions which are given.’ ” (Ibid.)
              3. No Error in Instructing with CALCRIM No. 1193
                     a. Use of Incorrect Pronoun
       Nukida argues that the court’s erroneous use of “his testimony” at the end of the
instruction instead of “her testimony” would have led the jury to erroneously believe the
instruction referenced the credibility of someone else’s testimony apart from Jane Doe.
Nukida notes that since he was a male and referred to in the previous sentence, the jury
would have erroneously assumed that “his testimony” referred to Nukida and improperly
used the CSAAS evidence in evaluating his (Nukida’s) credibility.
       In reviewing the instruction, it is apparent that the trial court should have used
“her” instead of “his” in the last sentence of this instruction as the jury was to use Dr.
Urquiza’s testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome to evaluate Jane
Doe’s credibility. However, we do not agree that the mistaken pronoun led the jury to
evaluate Nukida’s credibility using Dr. Urquiza’s testimony for two reasons: (1) it is
more likely that “his” would refer back to Dr. Urquiza, not Nukida; and (2) evaluating
Nukida’s credibility using Dr. Urquiza’s testimony would be illogical.
       To explain, as the only testimony referred to in the instruction is Dr. Urquiza’s, it
is more likely that if the jury had been misled by the instruction, they would attribute the
pronoun to Dr. Urquiza, not Nukida. Moreover, as explained clearly by Dr. Urquiza, the
purpose of his testimony was to demonstrate potential reasons why child victims of
sexual abuse may exhibit certain behaviors, such as delayed reporting, that dispelled
prevailing myths about such victims. Accordingly, such testimony would only logically
apply to the credibility of the victim’s testimony, not the abuser.
       Furthermore, we agree with the Attorney General that in considering the mistaken
pronoun in light of the full instruction, it is not reasonably likely that the jury would have
erroneously interpreted the instruction in the manner claimed by Nukida. Specifically,

                                              27
the language immediately preceding the incorrect pronoun refers to “the conduct of
someone who has been molested.” Therefore, relying on the assumption that jurors are
intelligent persons capable of understanding jury instructions as given, we believe the
jury would not have misinterpreted this instruction as referring to Nukida’s credibility,
but reasonably understood that this referred to the credibility of the person who had
allegedly been molested, Jane Doe. (See Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1028.)
                  b. Omission of Language Regarding Uncharged Conduct
       Nukida next argues that the court erred in omitting language from CALCRIM No.
1193 regarding uncharged conduct. He indicates that CALCRIM No. 1193, in its original
form, reads as follows:
“You have heard testimony from [expert’s name] regarding child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome. [¶]
“Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome relates to a pattern of behavior that may
be present in child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as to the accommodation syndrome is
offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse. [¶]
“[expert’s name]’s testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is not
evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against (him/her) [or
any conduct or crime[s] with which (he/she) was not charged]. [¶]
“You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not [alleged victim’s
name]’s conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested, and
in evaluating the believability of the alleged victim.” (Italics added.)
       Nukida argues that because the trial court did not include the bracketed language
“or any conduct or crimes with which he was not charged,” the jury could have used the
CSAAS testimony as evidence that Nukida committed other acts of abuse against Jane
Doe that were not charged but introduced at trial by the prosecution. Nukida therefore

                                             28
contends that the jury may have impermissibly relied on such evidence as a basis for their
guilty verdicts. We find no merit to this contention.
       In addition to CALCRIM No. 1193, the court provided the jurors with
CALCRIM No. 1191A9, which addresses the appropriate use of evidence regarding
uncharged sex offenses. The instruction specifically provides that such evidence can
only be used to prove that the defendant committed the charged offenses of sexual abuse.
Accordingly, if the jury used the CSAAS testimony as evidence Nukida committed the
uncharged offenses, this would, in turn, violate the explicit language in CALCRIM No.
1193 that CSAAS testimony is not evidence he committed the charged offenses.
Moreover, by testifying that CSAAS was not used to diagnose or give an opinion on
whether someone was the victim of sexual abuse, Dr. Urquiza’s testimony made it
apparent that CSAAS evidence was not any indication of whether someone had
committed any acts of sexual abuse – charged or uncharged. (See People v. Gonzalez
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504 [noting that the omission of language regarding
uncharged offenses did not violate due process when viewed in context with other

       9
         This instruction, as provided to the jury in Nukida’s case, reads as follows: “The
People presented evidence that the defendant committed the crime of Lewd Act Upon a
Child that was not charged in this case. This crime is defined for you in these
instructions. [¶] You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the uncharged
offense. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof from
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if
you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true. [¶] If the People have not
met this burden of proof, you must disregard this evidence entirely. [¶] If you decide
that the defendant committed the uncharged offense, you may, but are not required to,
conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit
sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to
commit Forcible Lewd Act Upon a Child and Lewd Act Upon a Child, as charged here.
If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged offense, that conclusion is
only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself
to prove that the defendant is guilty of Forcible Lewd Act Upon a Child and Lewd Act
Upon a Child. The People must still prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”

                                             29
limiting instructions and content of expert testimony].) Accordingly, we conclude that
there was no error in the trial court not including the bracketed language regarding
uncharged offenses. As we find no instructional error in this regard, we reject Nukida’s
alternative argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
instruction. (See People v. Poslof (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“[w]here there is ‘no
sound legal basis for objection, counsel's failure to object to the admission of the
evidence cannot establish ineffective assistance’ ”].)
                     c. Harmless Error
       Nukida claims that the mistaken pronoun and omission of the bracketed language
violated his due process rights by reducing the prosecution's burden of proving Nukida’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He therefore argues we must apply the federal standard
test under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, which provides that
constitutional error can be held harmless only if the court is able to declare a belief that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, even assuming that (1)
there was instructional error, and (2) Nukida is correct concerning the standard to be
applied, we conclude the error was harmless.
       The record reflects that the evidence in support of Nukida’s guilty verdicts was
particularly strong and credible. Jane Doe provided substantial details regarding multiple
incidents of sexual abuse and remained consistent in her explanations throughout cross-
examination. Jane Doe also testified more than once that she chose not to disclose any of
the abuse when it was happening because she was afraid of the family losing Nukida’s
full financial assistance, and E.V. and Nukida both confirmed that E.V. was fully
dependent on Nukida for paying all the family’s expenses. In addition, Nukida made
numerous statements to Jane Doe during the first in-person meeting that reflected
admissions or acknowledgments of guilt, including that: (1) he “didn’t understand” why
he had abused her; (2) apologizing for his behavior; (3) stating that his conduct was due
to his “psyche”: and (4) offering to go to jail for his behavior. Nukida made additional

                                              30
statements reflecting his guilt during the second in-person meeting, where he apologized
for his behavior once again, talked about going to see a hypnotist to find out what
happened, and offered to do whatever he could to bring Jane Doe closure, including
going to jail or killing himself.
       In conclusion, even if we assume that the trial court erred in giving the challenged
instruction, such an error was harmless because it is evident beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury would have still reached the same verdicts.
       C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Sentence
       Nukida argues for the first time on appeal that his sentence of 112 years eight
months constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation under the Eighth
Amendment of the federal Constitution and article I, section 17, of the California
Constitution. He contends the aggregate sentence shocks the conscience, offends
fundamental notions of human dignity, and is grossly disproportionate to his crimes.
              1. Forfeiture
       The Attorney General argues that Nukida has forfeited his claim by failing to
object to the condition on cruel and unusual punishment grounds in the trial court.
Although Nukida concedes this point, he nevertheless contends that we should reach the
merits of his claim “ ‘in order to forestall a possible claim of ineffectiveness of counsel
based on failure to object.’ ” Because we can easily resolve Nukida’s claim on the
merits, we will not address the issue of forfeiture and need not address the issue of
ineffective assistance.
              2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       “Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.
Punishment is cruel and unusual if it is so disproportionate to the crime committed that it
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (People v.

                                             31
Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358, fns. omitted; see also Ewing v. California
(2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20-23 (Ewing).)
       “The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains
a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” (Ewing,
supra, 538 U.S. at p. 20, quoting Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 996-997.)
“ ‘The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to
the crime.’ ” (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 23.)
       California's Constitution imposes a similar standard. “[I]n California, a
punishment may violate . . . the Constitution if, although not cruel or unusual in its
method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8
Cal.3d 410, 424, superseded by statute on another ground.) “The main technique of
analysis under California law is to consider the nature both of the offense and of the
offender. [Citation.] The nature of the offense is viewed both in the abstract and in the
totality of circumstances surrounding its actual commission; the nature of the offender
focuses on the particular person before the court, the inquiry being whether the
punishment is grossly disproportionate to the defendant's individual culpability, as shown
by such factors as age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind.”
(People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494.)
       The California Supreme Court has “distilled three analytical techniques to aid [a
court's] deferential review of excessiveness claims: (1) an examination of the nature of
the offense and the offender, with particular attention to the degree of danger both pose to
society; (2) a comparison of the punishment with the punishment California imposes for
more serious offenses; and (3) a comparison of the punishment with that prescribed in
other jurisdictions for the same offense.” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 973.)

                                              32
“Disproportionality need not be established in all three areas.” (People v. Norman (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 221, 230.)
       Whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is a question of law.
(People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1474.) A reviewing court therefore
applies the de novo standard of review when determining whether a defendant's sentence
is cruel and unusual. (Ibid.)
              3. Nukida’s Sentence Does Not Constitute Cruel and Unusual
                 Punishment
       In arguing that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, Nukida
specifically points to the lack of physical force or weapons used in the commission of his
crimes and his lack of any prior record. Nukida also notes that in comparison, other more
serious crimes involving sexual conduct would not have triggered “full, separate,
consecutive terms of imprisonment” under section 667.6.10
       In analyzing the first prong of the test, we recognize that Nukida’s lack of criminal
history is a factor to be taken into consideration. With that said, Nukida’s conduct
involved 19 distinct charges, beginning from the time Jane Doe was only six years old
until she was a teenager. The evidence reflects that he took advantage of his relationship
with Jane Doe as a person of authority and trust by engaging in unwanted sexual conduct
with her over numerous years. In addition, as noted by the Attorney General, section
288, subdivision (b) only requires that the force used be “substantially different from or
substantially in excess of that required for the lewd act.’ ” (See People v. Schulz (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 999, 1004.) Therefore, we assign little weight to his argument that there was
“minimal physical force” used during the commission of the abuse. In summary, we

       10
         Section 667.6 provides, in relevant part, that “a full, separate, and consecutive
term may be imposed for each violation of an offense specified in subdivision (e) if the
crimes involve the same victim on the same occasion.” (§ 667.6, subd. (c).) Section 288,
subdivision (b) is one such offense specified in subdivision (e). (§ 667.6, subd. (e).)

                                            33
cannot conclude that the factors cited by Nukida, when weighed against the severity of
the offenses committed, render his sentence so disproportionate to his crimes as to shock
the conscience. (See People v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 530-531
(Bestelmeyer).)
       With respect to the second prong, Nukida’s argument primarily rests on the fact
that the offenses for which he was convicted carry mandatory consecutive sentences
under section 667.6, while other more serious crimes may be sentenced concurrently. We
find no merit to this argument. As explained in Bestelmeyer, “[p]unishment is not cruel
or unusual merely because the Legislature may have chosen to permit a lesser
punishment for another crime. Leniency as to one charge does not transform a reasonable
punishment into one that is cruel or unusual. [Citation.] When they enacted Penal Code
section 667.6, subdivision (d) the Legislature chose to treat violent sex offense and
violent sex offenders differently than other types of offenses and offenders.”
(Bestelmeyer, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at pp. 530-531.) Therefore, given the nature of the
charges against Nukida and the number of offenses committed, we cannot say that his
sentence was grossly disproportionate or cruel and unusual solely because the crimes in
question mandate consecutive, as opposed to concurrent, sentences.11
       Finally, Nukida does not provide us with any information regarding the third
prong. Therefore, we have no information from which to “conclude that other
jurisdictions would have treated defendant more leniently than California for these
multiple crimes of sexual abuse.” (See Bestelmeyer, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d at p. 531.)
Yet even if Nukida had demonstrated that other states would have imposed a more lenient
sentence on him for the same crimes, this would not mandate reversal. “This state
       11
         On reply, Nukida attempts to distinguish Bestelmeyer by noting that the sex
offenses in that case involved “more egregious conduct” that were inherently violent.
However, nothing in section 667.6 indicates that the offense in question must involve a
certain degree of violence to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences. We
therefore find this contention without merit.

                                            34
constitutional consideration does not require California to march in lockstep with other
states in fashioning a penal code. It does not require ‘conforming our Penal Code to the
“majority rule” or the least common denominator of penalties nationwide.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Martinez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1516.)
       In conclusion, we find that Nukida’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. As we find no merit in his Eighth Amendment claims, his counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection in the trial court. (See People v.
Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 732.)
       D. Imposition of Restitution Fine
       Nukida contends that the trial court erred in fining him $20,000 in restitution fund
fines, which exceeded the maximum amount of $10,000 as provided under section
1202.4, subdivision (b). While the Attorney General concedes that this may have been
error, he argues that because the trial court did not specify a statutory authority for the
fines on the record, the matter should be remanded for the trial court to clarify its
sentence and reduce the fine amount if appropriate.
       As Nukida correctly states, the maximum amount for a restitution fund fine
imposed under section 1202.4 is $10,000. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) However, we find
merit to the Attorney General’s argument that the court may have intended to impose a
fine under section 667.6, subdivision (f), which provides for a maximum fine of $20,000,
to be paid to the Victim-Witness Assistance Fund, for anyone sentenced to specified sex
crimes, including lewd or lascivious acts under section 288, subdivision (b).
       Further, in reviewing the record, the transcript from Nukida’s sentencing hearing
reflects that the trial court imposed “$20,000 in fines,” without reference to any particular
statute. However, the minute order from the hearing indicates that this was a restitution
fund fine imposed pursuant to “1202.4 PC.” “Where there is a discrepancy between the
oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the
oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.)

                                              35
Although we may ordinarily correct a court’s minute order or abstract of judgment if it
does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement (see People v. Mitchell (2001) 26
Cal.4th 181, 185), we cannot do so in this case because the court did not specify the
statutory authority for its order.
        Accordingly, because the court could have permissibly imposed a maximum of
$20,000 in fines under section 667.6, subdivision (f), we conclude that the appropriate
remedy is to remand for the court to clarify its decision. However, if the trial court did in
fact intend to impose the fine as a restitution fund fine pursuant to section 1202.4,
subdivision (b)(1), we direct the court to reduce the amount to $10,000.
                                       III.   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed as to the restitution fine only and remanded for the court
to clarify its ruling. The trial court is directed to specify the statutory authority for the
fine and to exercise its discretion within the limits of that statute. The trial court is also
directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy of the
amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                               36
                           ___________________________________
                                             Wilson, J.

WE CONCUR:

__________________________________________
           Greenwood, P.J.

__________________________________________
           Bamattre-Manoukian, J.

People v. Nukida
H050513