Court Opinion

ID: 9549103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:13:22.289025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:50.726290
License: Public Domain

LOCKWOOD, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the reasoning or conclusion reached by the majority of the court.
The factual situation set out in their opinion is essentially correct, but fails to include the fact that appellee did at some time offer to “contribute a sum of money equal to the difference between the retirement deduction to which her salary had been subjected and the regular police pension deduction.” Likewise during her employment she did question the fact that her deductions were not the same as those for other members of the police department, but was advised “not to bring it up”.
Appellant’s claim for a pension from the Police Pension Board of the City of Phoenix is based upon the statute enacted by the Legislature. She claims that she was a “member of the police department” within the meaning of A.R.S. § 9-911 (6), as a matter of law, regardless of the interpretation given that section by the Police Pension Board or the administrative policies of the Phoenix Police Department In determining this controversy, this court’s duty is to interpret the meaning of the legislative enactment, not to pass upon the wisdom thereof.
*189The interpretation of the majority of the legislative definition of a “member of the police department” includes only those persons subjected to the consequences of extra hazardous risks of bodily harm, disability, or death, and thus excludes the appellee. It is reasonable to suppose that the historical basis for police pension statutes was recognition of the extra hazardous nature of a policeman’s duties in apprehension of dangerous criminals. However, we are concerned only with the meaning of the statute enacted by the Arizona Legislature. As this court said in Ernst v. Collins, 81 Ariz. 178, at 182, 302 P.2d 941 at 944:
“Where the language of a statute is plain or unambiguous, and the meaning does not lead to an impossibility nor an absurdity, the courts must observe the obvious and natural import of the language used therein; nor are they free to extend the meaning, though the result may be harsh, unjust, or mistaken policy. Garrison v. Luke, 52 Ariz. 50, 55, 78 P.2d 1120; Perkins v. Hughes, 53 Ariz. 523, 529, 91 P.2d 261.”
We therefore should not extend the meaning of the legislative definition beyond its plain and unambiguous phraseology.
The majority opinion recognizes that the word “department” may be “as broad or as narrow as the establishing municipal authority chooses to decree.” With this particular administrative structure we are not here concerned. If the Legislature establishes a policy of pension payments to a “member of the police department”, we are concerned only with whether the claimant falls within that definition — not whether we would have included such person as a matter of policy.
In the majority opinion is a discussion of the meaning of the word “police”. The meaning of this word is not really the problem. The cases cited, Wyndham v. United States, and State ex rel Walsh v. Hine, cast no light upon the specific problem involved. Wyndham concerned the question of whether a “game warden” was a “police official”; in State ex rel. Walsh v. Hine, the court dealt with the question of whether the wording “officers of local police” could be applied to the term “school commissioners.” We are concerned only with the meaning of the phrase “police department” as defined by the Legislature.
Certainly one might at first blush consider that the word “rank” would be of significance in distinguishing between persons performing duties as peace officers and those performing merely clerical duties. However, among the numerous definitions found in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961), are the following: “a: a position or order in relation to others in a group * * *. 8: a grade of official standing: as a: a grade in the armed forces. b: a title of nobility, c: a diplomatic or high governmental position * * (Emphasis added). In defining the word “rank” the same authority states: “3: to determine *190the relative position or merit of: CLASSIFY, IDENTIFY, RATE * * * ” Hence it would be quite possible and logical to find included in a police department the “rank” of “clerk, typist, secretary, radio operator” etc. That these terms are frequently spoken of as “classifications” brings no comfort, since so are the “ranks” of “patrolman, sergeant, detective, captain, etc.”
To say that appellee was not employed by the Phoenix Police Department, but by the City of Phoenix, but was assigned to the Police Department, is merely a matter of semantic terminology. Certainly, the Police Department is a part of the City of Phoenix, and all who work for the department are working for the City, and are therefore “employed” by the City, regardless of assignment to the Police Department. No doubt someone in the Police Department “assigns” the duties of a secretary such as appellee, even though those duties appear listed in a City “classification plan”. The fact that appellee, if transferred from the Police Department prior to working there twenty years, would not have established a valid claim for retirement under the act, applies likewise to any other member of the department who might transfer within that period.
As recently as 1964 the Legislature changed the wording of its definition of a “member of the [police] department” by amending § 9-911. The new definition reads:
“ ‘Member’, or ‘member of the department’ means a member of the police department, duly commissioned and sworn as a peace officer with all the powers and duties thereof, and includes all ranks and both sexes.”
That the Legislature was aware that the change in definition might have the effect of excluding from pension rights persons who were included prior to the 1964 revision is obvious from the language immediately following the new definition:
“Any person employed in the police department who has actually contributed to the police pension fund prior to the first day of January 1964, and who is not included within this definition, shall be allowed to continue to contribute to the police pension fund and to receive the benefits conferred by this article but all other persons are excluded.”
From this language it is apparent that the Legislature contemplated a change in definition, but indicated the change was to apply to future conditions only. Thus it is obvious the Legislature itself regarded as. plain and unambiguous the all-inclusive meaning of the words used in the original section.
The Police Pension Board, by regulation, excluded the secretaries from police pension plans immediately after the adoption of the 1937 legislation, and has continued this policy to the present day. This is beyond their power. Where the Legislature has *191extended a benefit to a class of persons, an administrative body cannot by regulatory fiat, deprive these persons of the benefits given by the Legislature. After the Legislature determined that Arizona should have the all inclusive type of police pension plan, a local administrative body could not decide that a restricted type would be better, because less burdensome on the taxpayers or for any other reason. Cf. Luhrs v. City of Phoenix, 52 Ariz. 438, 83 P.2d 283 (1938).
Appellee testified at the Pension Board Hearing that she knew deductions were not being made for her on the same basis as the police officers. She further testified that she felt this was an error, but “was advised not to bring it up” when she discovered it. Obviously, if she had “brought it up” in the face of the regulation as adopted by the Police Department, and the “advice” not to do so, her job could well have been in jeopardy.
Appellant did not make contributions to the plan during her employment. She has, however, tendered these payments. Because of the administrative interpretation that she was not covered, no payments were ever demanded of her. In this respect the case is similar to Gerendasy v. Police and Fire Department Pension Commission, 130 N.J.L. 226, 32 A.2d 447 (1943); See also Dempsey v. Alber, 212 Iowa 1134, 236 N.W. 86 (1931). The tender was sufficient to ¡comply with the requirement of contributions.
■ It is not for us to determine whether appellee would be entitled to share in social security under the Federal Government’s regulations. Quite possibly she would be barred from doing so if she came under the police pension fund, the same as police officers. We cannot say that she would be in a better position than they under such circumstances.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
BERNSTEIN, Justice.
I concur in the above dissent.