Court Opinion

ID: 9681725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:55:25.484694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:35.590062
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(dissenting).
I concur in the opinion of my brother Odom only to the extent that he takes exception to the majority’s reliance upon Alexander v. State, 482 S.W.2d 862 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). That case is in fact distinguishable for the reasons stated in Judge Odom’s opinion.
However, I would hold that the argument constituted unsworn testimony outside the record and that reversal is required under the authority of Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and Lott v. State, 490 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), two cases where this Court reversed because of prosecutors’ arguments which unfairly and illegally urged the jurors not to grant probation.
In Alejandro the prosecutor argued as a fact that the probation officer attached to the trial court already had 350 probationers under his supervision. The defendant’s objection to this argument was overruled. The prosecutor then argued that the probation officer was supposedly limited to 75 probationers and that there was a special unit in the Texas Department of Correc*753tions for the first offenders, where the defendant could get a junior college education. The jury assessed punishment at 25 years, and this Court held that the argument required reversal.
In Lott, the prosecutor argued that there were different units in the Department of Corrections, including one for young offenders. He then argued that the defendant would be sent to the Ferguson Unit with other young offenders. Objections to these arguments were overruled. The jury assessed a term of ten years without probation; this Court reversed, holding that the error could not be labelled harmless.
The argument before us presents a stronger case for reversal than either Lott or Alejandro. Here, the prosecutor not only injected unsworn testimony in an obvious attempt to persuade the jury not to grant probation, he also completely misstated the law. Probation is clearly not limited to defendants within a given age group. See Article 42.12, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., especially Sections 3, 3a, and 3d(a). Such a misstatement could only have served to prejudice the rights of the appellant.
Nor can I agree that the prosecutor was merely expressing his view of probation and who should receive probation. The only reasonable interpretation of the prosecutor’s statement is that the Legislature had decided that only those between seventeen and twenty-two were entitled to probation.
Moreover, in this case, as in Lott and Alejandro, the appellant’s objection was overruled; this compounded the error. Cherry v. State, 507 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
Finally, this case does not present the problem common to Lott and Alejandro, where it was suggested that the prosecutor’s argument was invited; here, no such suggestion is made — nor from this record could it be.
I can only conclude that we are faced with the situation described in Alejandro, where this Court held:
“To receive the stamp of approval of this court, jury arguments need to be within the areas of: (1) summation of the evidence, e. g., Ward v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 474 S.W.2d 471; Andrews v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 95, 199 S.W.2d 510; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence, e. g., Frazier v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 480 S.W.2d 375; Archer v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 474 S.W.2d 484; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel, e. g., Turner v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 482 S.W.2d 277; Miller v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 670; and (4) plea for law enforcement, e. g., Minafee v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 482 S.W.2d 273; Langham v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 473 S.W.2d 515. The arguments that go beyond these areas too often place before the jury unsworn, and most times believable, testimony of the attorney.” 493 S.W.2d, at 231-232 (emphasis added).
The prosecutor’s argument in this case was not within the areas approved by this Court. It unquestionably placed damaging believable testimony before the jury, testimony which was both unsworn and untrue.
The judgment should be reversed.