Court Opinion

ID: 9742846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:21:35.592662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:37.195538
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
White, J.
If this appeal is from the judgment rendered on August 13, 1969, it is too late and must be dismissed. The transcript was filed October 30, 1970, more than ninety days after the rendition of that judgment. Since no motion for new trial was timely filed (i.e., within ninety days of the date of judgment) and no request for additional time was made to this court, the time for taking the appeal was not extended. Old Rule 2-2; Carper v. Peter & Burghard Stone Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 191, 8 N. E. 2d 1020.
If appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal had shown us that the “petition” filed by appellant eighty-nine days after the rendition of the divorce judgment was nothing more than a belated and mis-named motion for new trial, then it would have shown that we are without jurisdiction of the appeal and the motion to dismiss should be sustained. But neither appellee’s motion nor appellee’s briefs in support of his motion tell us anything at all about the “petition” filed by appellant. For aught that appears in appellee’s motion to dismiss (and in his briefs) that “petition” could have alleged facts dehors the record (such as fraud) which, if known to the trial court at the time he rendered judgment would have prevented him from rendering the judgment he did render. The denial of motions, petitions, or complaints alleging such facts has often been treated as a second appealable judgment. Jurdzy v. Liptak (1962), 243 Ind. 1, 6, 180 N. E. 2d 530, 532; Globe Mining Company v. Oak Ridge Coal Company (1922), 79 Ind. App. 76, 80, 134 N. E. 508; Miedreich v. Lauenstein (1909), *36172 Ind. 140, 142, 86 N. E. 963; Yocum v. Yocum (Ind. App. 1969), 247 N. E. 2d 532, 17 Ind. Dec. 479; Holmes v. Holmes (Ind. App. 1969), 248 N. E. 2d 564, 18 Ind. Dec. 91. The statutory and case law in this regard has been codified in our new rules as TR. 60(B), (C), and (D).
I believe it to be a basic premise of our adversary system that the burden of showing that a motion should be sustained rests on the moving party. Therefore, the motion to dismiss should be overruled for failure to show that the denial of appellant’s petition to vacate was not an appealable judgment (under the rationale of the case and statutory law codified in the foregoing rule).
Sharp, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 269 N. E. 2d 568.