Court Opinion

ID: 9703226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:46:29.590348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:39.216349
License: Public Domain

*168FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The sale of the property at issue was fully authorized by Decedent’s will.
The Probate, Estate and Fiduciaries Code, 20 Pa.C.S. § 3351, which defines the power of an executor to sell specifically devised real property, imposes a requirement that the devisee join in the sale only under certain circumstances. The Code expressly applies only where the power of an executor to sell property has not been adequately defined in the will. The Code provides:
Except as otherwise provided by the will, if any, the personal representative may sell, at public or private sale, any personal property whether specifically bequeathed or not, and any real property not specifically devised, and with the joinder of the specific devisee real property specifically devised.
20 Pa.C.S. § 3351 (emphasis added).
The present will contained an express authorization for the executors, in their sole and absolute discretion, to sell any and all estate property. It was not necessary, therefore, for the Devisees to join in a sale. Paragraph 8 of Decedent’s will provided, in pertinent part:
I expressly authorize my executors, in their sole and absolute discretion ... to sell, lease, pledge, mortgage, transfer, exchange, convert or otherwise dispose of any and all property at any time forming a part of my estate, in such manner, at such time or times, for such purposes, for such prices and upon such terms, and conditions, as they may deem advisable; ... and to execute and deliver such instruments as may be necessary to carry out any of these powers.
(Emphasis added). This language, in plain and unambiguous terms, authorized the sale of any and all estate property. No exception was provided for property which had been specifically devised.
Nevertheless, the decision of the majority holds that the will should be interpreted as not having made the power of *169sale applicable to specifically devised real property. The majority reasons that, upon consideration of the will in its entirety, there is evident a testamentary scheme which did not contemplate the sale of such property.
It could, perhaps, be speculated that Decedent might have preferred that the property in question not have been sold. In interpreting a will, however, we are constrained to apply the language chosen by the testator, rather than engage in speculation as to intent. The language chosen is the determinative evidence of that intent. As stated in Bloom v. Selfon, 520 Pa. 519, 523, 555 A.2d 75, 77 (1989), “[t]his Court has repeatedly enunciated the principles governing interpretation of wills, emphasizing that the keystone is ascertainment of the intent of the testator as expressed in the actual language of the will." (Emphasis added). Similarly, in Britt Estate, 369 Pa. 450, 454-55, 87 A.2d 243, 245 (1952), we stated:
In determining the testator’s intention — if no uncertainty or ambiguity exists — his meaning must be ascertained from the language of his will; it is not what the Court thinks he might or would have said in the existing circumstances, or even what the Court thinks he meant to say, but what is the meaning of his words____
(Emphasis in original). See also Toland Estate, 495 Pa. 482, 486, 434 A.2d 1192, 1194 (1981) (“ ‘The duty of the court is not to determine what the testator might or should have said in light of subsequent events but, rather, the actual meaning of the words used.’ ”) (quoting Blough Estate, 474 Pa. 177, 185, 378 A.2d 276, 280 (1977)). Thus, when a will as written is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning must be given effect. Schwenk Estate, 507 Pa. 409, 414-15, 490 A.2d 428, 430-31 (1985); Baker Estate, 495 Pa. 522, 525, 434 A.2d 1213, 1214 (1981).
Paragraph 8 of Decedent’s will is clear and unambiguous in its conferral of broad powers of sale upon the executors, bestowing “sole and absolute discretion” to sell “any and all” estate property. Specifically devised property is plainly within the range of property subject to sale. Also, it cannot *170be said that Paragraph 8 is inconsistent with the existence of specific devises, for it is possible for both specific devises and broad executors’ powers of sale to coexist. See O’Brien Estate, 381 Pa. 322, 325, 112 A.2d 178, 180 (1955) (“[EJvery clause and every word of a will must be construed together and given effect if that is reasonably possible____”). The present sale by the executors was, therefore, fully authorized.
The Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, 20 Pa.C.S. § 301(b), provides that “[ljegal title to all real estate óf a decedent shall pass at his death to his heirs or devisees, subject, however, to all the powers granted to the personal representative by this code and lawfully by the will...” (Emphasis added). The title acquired by the Devisees was, thus, subject to the executors’ power of sale, and, when the properties were transferred to the appellants, the appellants acquired title.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority sets a dangerous precedent by declining to apply the expressed intent of the testator. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine testamentary language that more clearly conferred the power to sell property than that presented here.
The majority places great emphasis on the fact that the will states that debts are to be paid from the residuary of the estate rather than from specifically devised property. This case does not, however, involve a dispute over the source from which debts are to be paid. The property at issue was not sold for the purpose of paying debts. The majority’s emphasis is clearly misplaced. By inferring from Paragraph 5 that Decedent might have preferred that the property not be sold, the proper focus of this case has been distorted. We are called upon to decide what Decedent authorized, not what Decedent in hindsight might have preferred.
Finally, the opinion of the majority quoted the following statement of the purpose of the Probate, Estate and Fiduciaries Code: “[T]o create stability of procedure for the disposition of decedents’ realty and personalty and certainty *171in the marketability of title.” Quality Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Andrus, 414 Pa. 411, 419, 200 A.2d 754, 759 (1964). The decision reached, however, undermines this purpose by making it impossible for executors, and for purchasers of estate property, to rely upon express statements of executors’ powers set forth in wills. Disposition of estate property will plainly be hindered by placing parties at risk of having these powers ignored by the courts.
Accordingly, I believe the Superior Court erred in reversing the summary judgment which had been entered in favor of the appellants. The order of the Superior Court should, therefore, be reversed.
NIX, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion.