Court Opinion

ID: 9957428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 15:11:15.622633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:19.558770
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Marzan v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2024-Ohio-857.]

                              IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

 ANGEL MARZAN                                             Case No. 2023-00533JD

         Plaintiff                                        Judge Lisa L. Sadler
                                                          Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck
         v.
                                                          ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI                                 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

         Defendant

        {¶1} Plaintiff brings this action for negligence claiming that, on September 18,
2019, while enrolled as a student with Defendant, he was injured on the way to his on-
campus job as a result of tripping and falling on an uneven walkway on Defendant’s
premises.
        {¶2} On December 14, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant Civ.R. 56. On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Response, and, on January 23,
2024, Defendant filed a Reply. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion shall
be granted.

Standard of Review
        {¶3} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in
Civ.R. 56(C), which states, in part:
        Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
        depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,
        transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in
        the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
        that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
        No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule.
“[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis
for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which
Case No. 2023-00533JD                       -2-                                    ENTRY

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the
nonmoving party’s claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264
(1996). To meet this initial burden, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary
materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293.
       {¶4} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a
reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E), which provides that “an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s
response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” When considering the evidence, “‘[a]ny
doubt must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.’” Pingue v. Hyslop, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 01AP-1000, 2002-Ohio-2879, ¶ 15, quoting Helms v. Cahoon, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 20527, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 102, *3 (Jan. 16, 2002). Summary judgment
is not appropriate unless, “construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the
nonmoving party: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; (2) the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the nonmoving party.”           Robinette v.
Orthopedics, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97AP-1299, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2038, *7
(May 4, 1999).

Analysis
       {¶5} Defendant argues that it is immune from liability under the Workers’
Compensation Act, R.C. Chapter 4123. Plaintiff argues that workers’ compensation
immunity does not apply because he had not yet arrived at his work station in the building
and actually begun working.
       {¶6} Defendant submitted a transcript of Plaintiff’s deposition, which establishes
the following undisputed facts relating to the issue of workers’ compensation immunity.
Defendant employed plaintiff in a work study position “at the building where the accident
happened,” known as the Learning Commons. (Deposition, pp. 13-14.) Plaintiff’s brother
drove him by car from their home to Defendant’s campus shortly before he was scheduled
to begin work at 3:00 or 3:30 p.m., dropping him off on Defendant’s premises at a sidewalk
near the building. (Id. at pp. 21-24.) Plaintiff proceeded directly along a walkway leading
Case No. 2023-00533JD                        -3-                                    ENTRY

to the building to report for work but tripped when he was “just about to walk in,” only “a
few feet away” from the front doors. (Id. at p. 33.)
       {¶7} Defendant also submitted an affidavit from Gloria J. Woods, Assistant Director
of Leave Administration for Defendant, whose responsibilities include managing workers’
compensation claims. (Affidavit, ¶ 2.) Woods avers that Defendant is a participant in the
Ohio Workers’ Compensation program and was so in 2019. (Id. at ¶ 4-5.) Woods further
avers that “[e]mployees of [Defendant], including federal work study students, are eligible
to file a claim under the Workers’ Compensation program.” (Id. at ¶ 6.)
       {¶8} “Generally, employers who either pay their workers’ compensation premiums
or are self-insuring are not ‘liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for
any injury * * * received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of
his employment * * *.’” Stinnett v. Halcore Group, Inc., 165 Ohio App.3d 464, 2006-Ohio-
504, 847 N.E.2d 16, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), quoting R.C. 4123.74; see also Hahn v. Groveport,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-27, 2007-Ohio-5559, ¶ 25, quoting Maynard v. H.A.M.
Landscaping, Inc., 166 Ohio App.3d 76, 2006-Ohio-1724, 849 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.)
(“‘Cases construing R.C. 4123.74 have held that this statute provides to employers
immunity from liability to employees so long as the employer was in full compliance with
the workers’ compensation statutes at the time of the accident’”).
       {¶9} “To be compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an injury which
arises out of the employment must also be sustained during the course of employment.
This element refers to the time, place and circumstances of the injury.” Slagle v. White
Castle Sys., Inc., 79 Ohio App.3d 210, 214, 607 N.E.2d 45 (10th Dist.1992).             “For
employees with a fixed and limited place of employment, the course of employment is
typically restricted to activities occurring on the employer’s premises or within the
immediately adjacent ‘zone of employment.’” Id. “[T]he ‘zone of employment’ * * * has
been defined as ‘the place of employment and the area thereabout, including the means
of ingress thereto and egress therefrom, under control of the employer.’” Cunningham v.
Bone Dry Waterproofing, Inc., 2016-Ohio-3341, 66 N.E.3d 187, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), quoting
Merz v. Indus. Comm., 134 Ohio St. 36, 39, 15 N.E.2d 632 (1938). “This zone ‘is not a
fixed area, rather, its relative limits or expansion must be determined “from the logical and
close association of the surrounding area to the premises of employment, together with
Case No. 2023-00533JD                        -4-                                    ENTRY

the particular circumstances and hazards existing in relation thereto.”’” Id., quoting Berry
v. G.C. Murphy Co., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-81-049, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 11403 (Oct. 2,
1981), quoting Frishkorn v. Flowers, 26 Ohio App.2d 165, 169, 270 N.E.2d 366 (8th
Dist.1971).
       {¶10} “Injuries occurring on the employer’s premises are generally sustained in the
course of employment.” Slagle at 214. “Injuries that occur in parking lots or walkways
owned or controlled by the employer and intended primarily for employees’ use have been
held to be within the zone of employment.” Hart v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., S.D.Ohio No.
2:12-cv-733, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105755, *21 (July 29, 2013). “But injuries sustained
while traveling to and from a fixed place of employment are not generally compensable
because time spent commuting is considered a private activity, not one undertaken in the
service of the employer.” Slagle at 214.
       {¶11} “The ‘zone of employment’ rule ‘has been applied before, during and after
an employee’s work hours.’” Fitch v. Ameritech Corp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1277,
2007-Ohio-2725, ¶ 17, quoting Remer v. Conrad, 153 Ohio App.3d 507, 2003-Ohio-4096,
794 N.E.2d 766, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.).
       {¶12} In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant at
the time of the accident. Further, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was injured on Defendant’s
premises while walking into the building where he worked, specifically on a walkway just
a few feet from the front doors that were his normal means of ingress and egress. Even
though Plaintiff was not yet actively engaged in his work, the zone of employment test is
not contingent on the injury occurring in the actual performance of work duties. See Hicks
v. Safelite Group, Inc., 2021-Ohio-3044, 178 N.E.3d 63, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.). As such, there
is no genuine issue of fact that Plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment. See
Id. at ¶ 19 (employee who fell when stepping from a parking lot onto a sidewalk on the
way to the building entrance was injured in the course of employment). And based upon
the uncontroverted affidavit testimony from Gloria J. Woods, there is no genuine issue of
fact that Defendant was at all times a relevant participant in the Ohio Workers’
Compensation program. Therefore, reasonable minds can only conclude that Defendant
is immune from liability under R.C. 4123.74.
Case No. 2023-00533JD                        -5-                                     ENTRY

       {¶13} Defendant also argues that, even if Plaintiff’s claims were not barred by the
Workers’ Compensation Act, the claims would still fail because the alleged defect in the
walkway was open and obvious. Plaintiff argues that the defect was not open and
obvious, and that even if it were, there were attendant circumstances that preclude the
application of the open and obvious doctrine.
       {¶14} “In a negligence action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant breached a duty owed to him and that
the breach proximately caused the injury.” Harris v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-81, 2019-Ohio-5137, ¶ 7. Under Ohio law, the duty owed by an
owner or occupier of a premises generally depends on whether the injured person is an
invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75
Ohio St.3d 312, 315, 662 N.E.2d 287 (1996). There is no dispute in this case that Plaintiff
was an invitee. An owner or occupier of a premises generally owes its invitees “a duty of
ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition and has the duty
to warn its invitees of latent or hidden dangers.” Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio
St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 5. “However, a premises owner is not an
insurer of its invitees’ safety against all forms of accident that may occur on its premises.”
Simms v. Penn Natl. Gaming, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-185, 2022-Ohio-388, ¶
21. “Although a pedestrian using a public sidewalk is not required to constantly look
downward, a pedestrian is under a duty to care for their own safety as those of ordinary
carefulness and prudence would observe.” Id. at ¶ 27.
       {¶15} “Where a danger is open and obvious, a landowner owes no duty of care to
individuals lawfully on the premises.” Armstrong at ¶ 14. “The rationale behind the
doctrine is that the open and obvious nature of the hazard itself serves as a
warning. Thus, the owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering the
premises will discover those dangers and take appropriate measures to protect
themselves.” Simmers v. Bentley Constr. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 597 N.E.2d 504
(1992). “Open-and-obvious dangers are those not hidden, concealed from view, or
undiscoverable upon ordinary inspection.” Thompson v. Ohio State Univ. Physicians,
Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-612, 2011-Ohio-2270, ¶ 12. “‘[T]he dangerous
condition at issue does not actually have to be observed by the plaintiff in order for it to
Case No. 2023-00533JD                         -6-                                     ENTRY

be an “open and obvious” condition under the law. Rather, the determinative issue is
whether the condition is observable.’” McConnell v. Margello, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
06AP-1235, 2007-Ohio-4860, ¶ 10, quoting Lydic v. Lowe’s Cos., Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 01AP-1432, 2002-Ohio-5001, ¶ 10.
       {¶16} “In certain circumstances, the presence of ‘attendant circumstances’ may
preclude the application of the open-and-obvious doctrine.” Haynes v. Mussawir, 10th
Dist. Franklin Nos. 04AP-110 & 04AP-117, 2005-Ohio-2428, ¶ 22. “To serve as an
exception to the open and obvious doctrine, an attendant circumstance must be ‘so
abnormal that it unreasonably increased the normal risk of a harmful result or reduced
the degree of care an ordinary person would exercise.’” Mayle v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab.
& Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-541, 2010-Ohio-2774, ¶ 20, quoting Cummin v.
Image Mart, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-1284, 2004-Ohio-2840, ¶ 10. “Although
not an exhaustive list, attendant circumstances can include the following: poor lighting, a
large volume of pedestrian traffic, the visibility of the defect, the overall condition of the
walkway, and whether the nature of the site is such that one’s attention would be easily
distracted.” Jenkins v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-787,
2013-Ohio-5106, ¶ 16.
       {¶17} In his uncontroverted deposition testimony, Plaintiff testified that he was
familiar with the walkway because it was a normal route he would take to go to and from
his job and, in his words, “I had seen the sidewalk that was uneven * * *.” (Deposition, p.
34.) Plaintiff authenticated a photograph of the walkway (a copy of which Defendant
submitted with its Motion) that he and his brother took after the accident, depicting a place
in the walkway made uneven by a difference in elevation between two sections of
concrete. (Id. at p. 42.) Rather than looking at the walkway that he knew to be uneven,
Plaintiff testified that he was “looking at the front doors” of the building when he fell. (Id.
at p. 31.) Plaintiff stated that the accident occurred on a warm, sunny afternoon and that
nothing distracted him as he walked toward the building. (Id. at pp. 30, 34.) Plaintiff
stated that there was a shadow from a tree in the area, but that he has no recollection of
it obstructing his ability to see the walkway. (Id. at pp. 30, 40.) Plaintiff also stated that
there were paramedics nearby attending to someone, but that he was not distracted by
them or by anything else when he fell. (Id. at p. 34.)
Case No. 2023-00533JD                       -7-                                    ENTRY

        {¶18} Even when making all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, reasonable
minds can only conclude that the defect in the walkway was an open and obvious
condition for which Defendant owed no duty. Plaintiff’s testimony establishes that the
defect was observable; in fact, he already knew the walkway was uneven. And Plaintiff’s
testimony establishes that there were no attendant circumstances that distracted him at
the time he fell.
        {¶19} Because Defendant owed no duty, the Court need not address Defendant’s
remaining argument that the defect was a trivial one for which there can be no liability.

Conclusion
        {¶20} Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of Defendant. All previously scheduled events are VACATED.
Court costs are assessed against Plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice
of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.

                                           LISA L. SADLER
                                           Judge

Filed February 23, 2024
Sent to S.C. Reporter 3/8/24