Court Opinion

ID: 9489915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:27:40.463613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:47.769637
License: Public Domain

TATEL, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree that the prosecution’s use of Moore’s post-custodial silence violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. I also agree that its use was harmless. I write separately only to emphasize that the Government’s reliance on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), and its progeny for the proposition that comment on Moore’s silence was proper is misplaced. The Doyle Court did not rest its decision on the Fifth Amendment privilege, holding instead that use of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes violates due process. 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. at 2245. While Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), did address and reject a Fifth Amendment claim, that decision turned on the principle, first enunciated in Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926), that “the Fifth Amendment is not violated when a defendant who testifies in his own defense is impeached with his prior silence.” 447 U.S. at 235, 100 S.Ct. at 2127. Here, because Moore did not take the stand, the prosecution’s reference in summation to his failure to offer exculpatory statements to police officers at the time of his arrest impermissibly penalized him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege.