Court Opinion

ID: 9949046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 17:11:12.697285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:34.564750
License: Public Domain

J-S06038-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LEKITA P. MCDUFFIE                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1736 EDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 11, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008550-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                              FILED MARCH 8, 2024

       Lekita P. McDuffie (“McDuffie”) appeals nunc pro tunc from the

judgment of sentence imposed after she pled guilty to third-degree murder,

conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime.1 We affirm.

       The trial court described the facts underlying McDuffie’s guilty plea as

follows:

             Sometime before the [F]all of 2018, [McDuffie], dated a
       man named Max Elmine. Elmine, who was wanted in connection
       [with the murder] of Nasim Alameen, fled to Haiti in the [F]all of
       2018. After Alameen’s murder, [McDuffie’s] home was “shot up”
       on three separate occasions and [she] believed it was in retaliation
       against Elmine for Alameen’s murder. [McDuffie] texted Elmine,
       blaming him for the house shootings and telling him that she was
       going to have to protect her family since he was no longer there
       to do so.     [McDuffie] also began texting her cousins, co-
       defendants[,] Tyrone McDuffie [(“Tyrone”)] and Dolores McDuffie
       [(“Dolores”)], about [McDuffie’s] belief that the house shootings
       were retaliatory and about planning her own retaliation for the
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 903, and 907(b).
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     shootings. [McDuffie] and Dolores texted about how they believed
     the person responsible was someone by the name “Dino” and
     discussed getting Dino’s address in order to retaliate. [McDuffie]
     texted Tyrone to be “on standby” to retaliate against “Dino.”

           In early October 2018, Julien Johnson [(“Johnson”)], who
     went by the nickname “Dino,” began receiving threatening
     messages on Instagram from what he considered a fake
     Instagram account. These messages consisted of death threats
     against Johnson and his family.      Johnson believed he was
     receiving these threats in retaliation for the shootings of
     [McDuffie’s] home, which he had heard about in the
     neighborhood.    Investigation revealed that the messages to
     Johnson through the Instagram account had been sent by
     [McDuffie].

            In the early morning hours of October 9, 2018, Johnson was
     parked in the rear driveway of 5223 Westford Road. In the car
     with him was his girlfriend, Andrea Meyers [(“Meyers”)], as well
     as Kevin Ulysses [(“Ulysses”)] and Duke Jules [(“Jules”)]. Video
     surveillance of the area shows two vehicles drive past the rear
     driveway before circling the block. The video then shows two
     individuals approach the car that Johnson, Meyers, Ulysses, and
     Jules were in from the direction of the two cars previously seen
     driving past the rear driveway. The two individuals began firing
     at the car. Meyers was struck by the gunfire and killed. The other
     three occupants of the car, including Johnson, were not injured.
     The two shooters then ran towards the area where the vehicles
     were previously seen circling the block and drove [a]way.
     [McDuffie’s] cellphone records placed her directly in the area of
     the murder at the time it occurred. Immediately following the
     murder, [McDuffie] went to 4842 North Hope Street, which was
     the home of her cousins[,] Tyrone and Dolores. All of this
     established that [McDuffie] enlisted the aid of her codefendants to
     shoot Johnson, and that Meyers, who had the misfortune of being
     in a car with Johnson at the time of the attack, was killed as a
     result.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/23, at 2-4 (footnotes, records citations, and

unnecessary capitalization omitted).

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       McDuffie entered an open guilty plea to the above-listed crimes in

December 2021.        Following receipt of a pre-sentence investigation report

(“PSI”) and a mental health evaluation, the trial court sentenced McDuffie to

an aggregate term of twenty-three to forty-six years in prison.

       McDuffie filed a timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration of

sentence and to withdraw her guilty plea. That same day, trial counsel filed

a motion to withdraw.          The trial court granted trial counsel’s motion to

withdraw and appointed new counsel. Subsequently, McDuffie withdrew her

motion to withdraw her guilty plea and the trial court denied her motion for

reconsideration of sentence. McDuffie did not file a direct appeal.

       In March 2022, through counsel, McDuffie filed a petition seeking

reinstatement of her direct appeal rights. The court granted the petition, and

the instant, timely appeal followed.2

       McDuffie raises the following issue:

             Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion in sentencing
       [McDuffie] to an aggregate sentence of [twenty-three to forty-six]
       years of incarceration with two [eleven and one-half to twenty-
       three] year consecutive sentences when [McDuffie] had no other
       prior convictions, when there was a singular focus on retribution
       by the sentencing court rather than also considering [McDuffie’s]
       potential for rehabilitation, when [McDuffie] presented mitigation
       and accepted responsibility, and when [McDuffie] was not the
       actual shooter and faced significant prior violence from the
       intended target of the underlying shooting?

McDuffie’s Brief at 4.

____________________________________________

2 McDuffie and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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       In her only issue, McDuffie challenges the discretionary aspects of her

sentence. McDuffie’s Brief at 8-14. There is no absolute right to challenge

the discretionary aspects of a sentence.          See Commonwealth v. Hill, 66

A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013).                 Before reaching the merits of a

discretionary sentencing claim, we must determine:

       (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
       h[er] issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a concise
       statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with
       respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether
       the concise statement raises a substantial question that the
       sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329–30 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citation omitted).

       McDuffie preserved her sentencing issues in a post-sentence motion,

filed a timely appeal, and included in her brief a statement of the reasons

relied upon for allowance of appeal. Therefore, we consider whether McDuffie

has raised a substantial question.

       McDuffie contends the sentence was excessive, and the trial court: (1)

failed to properly consider mitigating factors; and (2) only contemplated the

need for retribution.3        McDuffie’s Brief at 9-11.     These claims raise a

____________________________________________

3 McDuffie also challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences.  However,
it is settled the trial court had discretion to impose consecutive sentences.
Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 470 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating
that “Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its
sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences,” and recognizing
the imposition of consecutive sentences ordinarily does not raise a substantial
question (citation omitted)).

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substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 692

(Pa. Super. 2021) (concluding a claim that the sentence was harsh and

excessive and trial court failed to consider mitigating factors raises a

substantial question); Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064-65 (Pa.

Super. 2011) (stating that “a claim that a sentence is excessive because the

trial court relied on an impermissible factor raises a substantial question.”

(citation omitted)).

      We next consider the merits of McDuffie’s claim mindful of the following:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

      When a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines,

Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing

Code. See Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010).

We may only vacate a sentence within the guidelines where the sentence is

“clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2). In addition, when the trial

court has had the benefit of a PSI, we “presume that the sentencing judge

was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and

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weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988).

      Here, the trial court considered the PSI, the mental health evaluation,

McDuffie’s lack of a prior criminal history, letters from her friends and family,

the sentencing guidelines, the Commonwealth’s sentencing memorandum,

and testimony from a witness on behalf of the Commonwealth. See N.T.,

3/11/22, at 36-37.     The trial court discussed the sentencing factors and

McDuffie’s rehabilitative needs.     See id. at 37-40.    While acknowledging

McDuffie was not the shooter, the court noted McDuffie “set this entire thing

in motion. She was the ringleader[.]” Id. at 38. The court commented on

the “series of terrible events that provoked McDuffie,” but stated, “[t]his was

a planned assassination of somebody” based upon McDuffie’s unsupported

belief Johnson was involved with the shootings at her home. Id. at 39.

      The court further explained:

            Here, in fashioning an appropriate sentence, the court
      explicitly considered everything presented during the course of
      the case, including the presentence report, all materials submitted
      on behalf of [McDuffie], including several letters of support, and
      the Commonwealth’s sentencing memorandum.                The court
      considered the need for protection of the public, the gravity of the
      offense, and its impact on the victim and the community. In
      addition, the court delineated and weighed both the mitigating and
      aggravating factors in the case. While [McDuffie] argues that the
      court did not consider the mitigation she presented or the fact that
      she accepted responsibility, the court explicitly considered several
      mitigating factors including [McDuffie’s] acceptance of
      responsibility, remorse, and the provocation she experienced
      based on the shootings of her home. Furthermore, the court
      explicitly took into account [McDuffie’s] rehabilitative needs, her
      family and community support, and her prior record score of zero.

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Trial Court Opinion, 7/24/23, at 5-6 (record citations and unnecessary

capitalization omitted).

      After careful review, we conclude McDuffie’s standard-range sentences

were neither excessive nor clearly unreasonable and discern no abuse of

discretion in sentencing.   See, e.g., Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (holding a

sentence within the standard range of the guidelines is viewed as appropriate,

and the sentence is not unreasonable where the trial court had the benefit of

a PSI and imposed a standard range sentence); see also Commonwealth

v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding defendant’s

standard-range sentences were neither unreasonable nor excessive where the

“record reflects that the [sentencing] court carefully considered all of the

evidence presented at the sentencing hearing”).

      As we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court, McDuffie’s

sentencing issue does not merit relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 3/8/2024

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