Court Opinion

ID: 9777962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:29:00.240892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.813687
License: Public Domain

PREWITT, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the evidence falls well short of showing abandonment of the children for the six months preceding September 18, 1981.
Section 211.447.2(2)(a)b, RSMo Supp.1984 (since amended, see RSMo Supp.1985), under which the principal opinion finds abandonment, states in part that abandonment occurs if the “parent has, without good cause, left the child without any provision for support and without any communication or visitation from the parent.” Abandonment under this section requires both a finding of failure of support and a failure to communicate with or visit the children within the statutory period. J.H.H. v. J.D., 662 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Mo.App.1983).
Here, during the six months preceding September 18, 1981, the period during which the principal opinion finds that the abandonment must have occurred, the children were receiving adequate support through social security benefits of $939.00 per month. The principal opinion notes that “contributions from the mother could have freed those funds for accumulation for their future needs.” That appears irrelevant to me. The statute requires that the children be left without any provision for support and this obviously did not happen within the relevant period.
As there was provision for the children’s support all during the six months prior to September 18, 1981, abandonment as found in the principal opinion could not have occurred.
I also do not believe that the evidence shows that the mother “without good cause ... left” the children “without any communication or visitation” from her. Distance, her financial condition, and other factors made communication and visitation difficult. The children were placed with the *949aunt on February 4, 1978. In May of 1979 and April of 1980 the aunt and her husband filed actions against the mother, one suit apparently seeking adoption, and the other termination of the mother’s parental rights.
During the relevant period of abandonment, at least one and possibly two lawsuits were pending against the mother. By these she knew, or reasonably could have believed, that her visitation would be restricted or prohibited, as it was when in April of 1982 she sought from the trial court and was denied permission to see the children. This denial was admitted by respondents’ counsel in oral argument. Since May of 1979 the mother has been involved in litigation over the children and has been seeking them. This strongly indicates that she was not abandoning or disregarding them.
The weakness in the evidence of abandonment during the relevant period is apparent in that respondent, as does the principal opinion, refers extensively to what happened before that period. While we cannot view the six months in a vacuum, the undue emphasis on the prior period, when the mother was unable to care adequately for the children, does not correct the absence of evidence needed to establish that abandonment occurred during the critical period.
Aside from the statute on which the principal opinion relies, abandonment has not otherwise been shown. The children were left with a relative for their own good and no intent to abandon was present. Abandonment is the willful giving up of a child with the intention that the severance be of a permanent nature. In Interest of W.F.J., 648 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Mo.App.1983). “As defined in Missouri case law, abandonment implies a willful, positive act such as deserting the child.” Id.
Where there is good cause a parent may leave a child in the custody of a third person without abandoning the child. J.H.H. v. J.D., supra, 662 S.W.2d at 896; H.D. v. E.D., 629 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Mo.App.1982). The mother made the arrangements with their father’s great aunt because she thought these arrangements were in the best interest of the children at that time.
In re Ayres, 513 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Mo.App.1974), is applicable here. That opinion said:
[W]e would set a dangerous precedent of charging the parents with neglect and depriving them of the natural custody of their children if every time parents placed the physical custody of their children with a surrogate or a member of their extended family because of a temporary inability — on account of economic reasons, illness, marital disruptions or otherwise fail to provide for their children. On principle, when tragedy strikes and the parents are beleaguered by problems beyond théir control, in our opinion, a placement with a more fortunate relative or concerned friend would appear to be the best thing reasonable, concerned, caring parents could do for their children.
The result of the present case is a warning to parents that if they place their children temporarily with someone else, no matter how good the reason, they are in danger of permanently losing them. By this decision we are discouraging parents from placing' their children temporarily with another even though the welfare of the children would demand it.
There is no serious dispute that at the time of trial that the mother was capable of caring for the children. I am convinced that my colleagues who have voted to affirm this matter believe what they are doing is in the “best interest” of the children, perhaps, at least in part, because of the length of time the children have spent with the aunt and her husband. Whether the children remain there after this decision is out of our control. In addition, the length of time was not caused by the mother but by the litigation over the children. The result here allows the foster parents to take advantage of delay created by them, the juvenile officer, and our legal system in this and in the other two legal actions.
*950I also do not believe that this action should have been brought. This case did not call for the involvement of the juvenile officer. Juvenile officers should be aiding children who need their immediate help, and not seeking to terminate parental rights to aid others with their adoption petition. The welfare of the children was not critical if the great aunt was properly caring for them, as the juvenile authorities obviously thought she was.
To terminate parental rights, there must be strict and literal compliance with the statutes. In Interest of R.L.H., 639 S.W.2d 241, 241-242 (Mo.App.1982). Only when grave and compelling reasons exist should parental rights be severed; the test is not whether the children would be “better off” with someone else. In Interest of A.R.S., 609 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Mo.App.1980).
Because I do not believe that abandonment of the children was established, I must dissent.