Court Opinion

ID: 9449160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:59:34.094763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:44.594710
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
This is a distressing case; neither in procedure nor in result does it comport with my conception of American standards of fair play and judicial impartiality. True, petitioner, during his Nazi phase down to late 1945, was unattractive enough in his political ideology to justify or at least explain the strictures here heaped upon him if, as has been done, we concentrate entirely upon that early period of his life.1 ******But the governing statute requires proof of a petitioner’s attachment to the principles of the Constitution only during the five years prior to the filing of his petition for naturalization, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a), and allows proof of his earlier conduct and acts only for the light it may give on his conduct during the five-year period. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e). Hence the concentration here upon petitioner’s early life does not comport with the statutory mandate. Nor is it realistic in the light of modern international relations. Apparently in the troubled world we now live in, it is an obligation of good citizenship to hate the enemies of one’s country and anyone who would consort with them. But must we not keep our hates up to date lest we prejudice or poison our country’s alliances of the moment ? Here the hate at the basis of this decision, both in its administrative and in its legal phases, is now two decades old and quite out of date.
It seems unusual, and indeed worthy of comment, that petitioner’s present acts, beliefs, and conduct have been kept so completely out of the case. My brothers do not try to assess what he now is; and only in a succinct statement at the beginning of his opinion,2 thereafter disregarded, does the trial judge allude to *327it, even though the petitioner did present a strong affirmative case. In an appendix to this opinion, I have tried to outline this in brief compass.3 Here I shall discuss the case attempted to be made against him.
First it should be noted that my brothers excuse their failure to go into what to me is the heart of the case by resorting to a patently erroneous view of the law, namely, that appellate decision can rest without more upon the trial judge’s findings unless they are “clearly erroneous.” But F.R. 52(a), to which my brothers have obvious reference, states the rule as to the status of findings of fact, not a rule as to the application or execution of the law to facts found or conceded. Here the facts as to petitioner’s German life, 1937-1945, are well understood and are not contested. As the trial judge says: “The biographical facts are not in substantial dispute. Indeed, most of them come from Sittler’s own lips.” D.C.S.D.N.Y., 197 F.Supp. 278, 284. And as he says, decision “requires ascertainment of his state of mind, * * * and that can be fathomed only by the credibility of what he says and the reflection of his inner views by his outward conduct.” 197 F.Supp. at page 280. This obviously calls for the highest skill and the most careful judgment in making deductions and drawing conclusions as to the application of 8 U.S.G. § 1427(a) in the light of the conceded facts. Hence we have a prime question of law and cannot hide behind the gown of the trial judge. Indeed, to attempt to do so is, I submit, to show a lack of judicial candor. I realize, of course, that the result would hardly have been different in any event; the opinion’s cumulation of only items derogatory to the petitioner shows my brothers’ inherent sympathy with the ruling of the trial judge. Nevertheless the responsibility is clearly ours; we cannot and should not attempt to evade it.
As the trial judge thus indicates, the attempt was made to convict Sittler out of his own mouth. So he was subjected to a long and hostile cross-examination —on six occasions, covering about 200 pages of the typewritten transcript before the Hearing Examiner, and on a later occasion in an additional 50 pages before the district court. The court tried to find positive misstatements, cf. 197 F.Supp. 284-286; but against the background of Sittler’s main admissions of all essential facts, these appear trivial or but natural failures of memory of details twenty years after the events. They were not relied on by the Hearing Examiner in his report or adverted to by my brothers in their opinion, and may thus be dismissed. The case is rested entirely upon Sittler’s ideological concepts as disclosed by these searching examinations. And since at all times he answered patiently and at length, a regular field day in abstract political -theories and history has been indulged in. But what all this actually proves is another question. On this crucial problem I do not find my brothers’ opinion enlightening. Their strong condemnation of petitioner’s views is made abundantly clear, but what there is so uniquely offensive in them as permanently to bar him from citizenship is anything but clear. I had supposed our country was a place for people of different, even foolish, beliefs; unless there is something of definite evil in what the petitioner believes, I do not see how he can be barred. And of this there is certainly no showing.
The petitioner is obviously an intelligent and well educated individual, given to thinking aloud — perhaps more than he wisely should — about his own past and what has happened in the world, rather than to pronouncing short sentences of breast-beating repentance and patriotic affirmation. Here quite obviously is where he made a mistake, so far as the success of his petition might be concerned. My brothers, the trial court, and the Hearing Examiner all make it clear that he did not show the proper *328contrition and repentance. In other words he did not grovel as he should have done.4 To me this would not have carried conviction; what he said seems more in keeping with his character as otherwise disclosed. I should think his repudiation of Hitlerism and of his own past conduct was intelligent and complete, more persuasive just because he has attempted to explain it in intellectual, nonemotional terms, rather than merely to resort to a show of sackcloth and ashes. And of course this must be evaluated against his later career of studying and teaching, not to speak of the efficient aid he rendered our Department of Justice prosecutors in the several later treason trials. The opinion contains copious quotations from his testimony, and I suggest these be read with care. I can only say that they do not seem to me to show what they are quoted as showing or to indicate a secret intent to harbor designs against the peace and prosperity of the country. And this all seems to me particularly unreal, as there is no Nazi country for which he can retain concealed affection; thus altogether improbable is any secret allegiance on his part to our enemy in the present cold war. So he is being barred from citizenship on abstract grounds lacking reality or pertinency, while his solid case goes unheeded.
In what seems to me a very cruel touch against this background, my brothers dangle the prospect of a later more favorable consideration of his case should he find himself able “without equivocation” to demonstrate his attachment to the United States. The implication of course is that if he will grovel sufficiently he may have a chance of admission. The stated condition does not seem-likely of fulfillment; that this 50-year-old intellectual should suddenly change to beg forgiveness, etc., etc., does not seem likely. But if he should, he would certainly show himself so lacking in any sincerity that his application must be rejected. Thus my brothers have neatly constructed an insoluble dilemma for him which will bar his citizenship so long as this precedent stands.
But I venture to believe that this court in a very few years at most will come greatly to regret this decision and the rationale upon which it is based.
APPENDIX
Sittler Today
If we focus on the statutory period of five years preceding Sittler’s application for citizenship, we find almost nothing that can be taken as evidence of his disloyalty to American principles. At the start of that period, Sittler, who had obtained a Ph.D. degree from Northwestern University in 1950, was head of the English department at Shurtleff College in Alton, Illinois. He represented the college at the 1956 convention of the American Association of University Professors, where academic freedom was an issue. The convention adopted a statement of general principles supporting free intellectual inquiry, and Sittler testified as to his agreement with the statement. He also testified that while at Shurtleff he waged a successful campaign, writing letters to the Association, for the reinstatement of a professor whose dismissal, Sittler believed, abridged academic freedom. Sittler at*329tributes his own dismissal from Shurtleff to his efforts in this regard.
Sittler secured temporary employment for the fall of 1956 in the local high school in East Alton, Illinois, substituting for the American history teacher who was ill. This job required a state certificate and Sittler was issued one. Part of his duties included preparing his classes for a state examination on the United States Constitution.
In February 1957 Sittler began teaching English, American, and world literature at Thiel College in Greenville, Pennsylvania. He and his wife were awarded fellowships by the Danforth Foundation, under an agreement with the administration of the college, which enabled the Sittlers to invite students to their home for regular group discussions of religious and moral problems. In addition, pursuant to the Danforth grants, the Sittlers studied history of art and religion at Drew University, Madison, New Jersey, during the summer of 1957, and literary criticism and religion at the University of Chicago during the summer of 1958. While Sittler was teaching at Thiel, his wife matriculated at Allegheny College in Meadville, Pennsylvania, where she majored in English and received a B.A.
During the academic year 1958-1959 Sittler was Associate Professor of German at Alfred University in Alfred, New York. That spring, his son entered the United States Army and his wife won a Woodrow Wilson Fellowship. Sittler secured work at C. W. Post College on Long Island, so that his wife could use her fellowship to study comparative literature at Columbia University.
The sole evidence for the government during the statutory period was a New York Post news item about Sittler’s views on Hitler and the Hitler regime published in December 1959 and purportedly based on an interview with Sittler a month before. When called to testify about the incident, the reporter could only read his article into the record. Sittler testified that he had written the editor of the Post complaining of the inaccuracy of the story and testified further as to his own rather more complete recollections of the interview.
Over forty letters were written the naturalization examiner concerning Sittler’s application for citizenship. Almost a third of the letters, in emotion-laden language, contended for the rule of law enunciated by the majority: that a former American citizen who became a citizen of Nazi Germany should be forever barred from again becoming an American citizen. But it is worth noting that not one letter opposing Sittler’s application alleges that its writer has the slightest acquaintance with the petitioner ; in fact, many disavow personal knowledge and quite a few come from groups such as Veterans of Foreign Wars posts, National Jewish Civil Service Employees, Inc., etc. These letters are the apparent result of unusually extensive publicity. See, e. g., “Pursued by the Past,” Newsweek, Dec. 28, 1959, pp. 41-42. On the contrary, every letter supporting the application comes from a personal acquaintance of Sittler.
Six character witnesses of post-war acquaintance testified in Sittler’s behalf —three students, a friend, a colleague, and an attorney with the United States Department of Justice. One girl had studied American literature with Dr. Sittler at Thiel College before she transferred to Barnard (where she was elected to Phi Beta Kappa), and a young man had been taught German by the petitioner at C. W. Post College. Both testified that Sittler would make a better citizen than most Americans. Another former student of Sittler’s at Thiel, who had since become a staff writer for the National Lutheran Council, and a friend, who had known the Sittlers in Alfred, New York, testified in most certain terms that petitioner would make a loyal citizen, well disposed toward the good order of the United States and attached to its principles.
Another character witness was the renowned political scientist Professor Kenneth Colegrove. Long associated with Northwestern University, Professor *330Colegrove, though retired, continued to do some teaching at C. W. Post. The professor recalled the faculty meeting at Northwestern where a handful of faculty members carried on a “bitter debate” to effect their “intense desire” to deny Sittler the degree to which he was entitled. Professor Colegrove had become well acquainted with Sittler more recently by sharing a car ride with him from Manhattan to the C. W. Post campus on Long Island and back again three times a week. Based on conversations during these rides, Professor Colegrove came to assess Sittler as “a man who was completely devoted to the United States, completely devoted to the high ideals of teaching, * * * the type of man that you’d like to have teach your young boy or your young girl who is going to college.” Professor Colegrove told of the dismay with which he learned that Dean Hoxie, a former student of his, had given in to the pressures to discharge Sittler because of petitioner’s background.
Sittler’s final character witness was Victor C. Woerheide, long attorney with the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, prosecutor in a number of treason trials in which Sittler was the star government witness, and acquaintance and friend of Sittler since the war. His twenty years of activity in the important post he has occupied have made him coneededly an expert in the Internal Security field; and his personal knowledge of the case, coupled with his disinterested position, made him perhaps the most competent and reliable of all the witnesses, and his testimony the most important in the proceedings. It is instructive to note the treatment it has received. The Hearing Examiner referred only to the witness’ early testimony as to “the treasonable conduct of the petitioner during World War II,” leaving out the testimony as to later conduct stressed by the witness; thus the Examiner’s report gives a completely distorted view of this evidence. The trial judge made the briefest of references to it, 197 F.Supp. at page 283, which, while not affirmatively inaccurate, failed to do justice to its impact. And finally my brothers attempt a complete denigration of this witness which is quite unintelligible to me.
For they say that by eliminating far the largest portion of the testimony relating to what are emotively described as “Sittler’s friends, the traitors Burg-man, Chandler and Monty” (against whom Sittler had testified years earlier), the bulk of his testimony was directed to the proposition that Sittler was an unimportant cog in the Nazi machine and that his otherwise treasonable conduct did not reflect upon his moral character because of his taking German citizenship. Doubtless the witness did testify to relatively unimportant details, due to his evident desire and that of his examiner to show his full knowledge of all the petitioner’s former Nazi activities and connections; and these were accentuated by a lengthy cross-examination longer than the direct examination. But it is difficult to see why this should justify total disregard of the basic features of his evidence, namely, his affirmative statements in regard to Sittler’s good character and potentiality as an American citizen. Here his testimony was clear, strong, and believable. I shall close with a single quotation, out of the many available in the testimony, given in response to a question asking an appraisal of Sittler today and in the light of their post-war acquaintanceship. Mr. Woerheide responded;
“ * * * j have no doubt in my own mind that if Edward Sittler is accorded the privilege of American citizenship, that he will be a loyal and law abiding citizen. He is not a conformist. He is a man who does think for himself. I wouldn’t say that his ideas will fall into a regular idea pattern, the ideas that, let’s say, a group of citizens in the United States, patriotic group of citizens in the United States, may have, but they will be, his ideas will be based on a sincere appreciation of the, of the merits and the qualities of our constitutional system of government in the United States.”

. A balanced history of petitioner’s life would undoubtedly point out that he went to Germany, the land of his grandparents, in 1937 at the age of 21, just after the breakup of his first marriage and when he was concerned with the future of America struggling out of the great depression, and that his seeking German citizenship in 1939 and 1940 eventually led him into deeper waters than any of which his naive political generalizations had given him warning, leaving him no point of return until the Nazi debacle of 1945. But he was a grown man and must suffer the natural punishment for his wrong turning at that time. Had he been then visited with doom permanently barring him — like Philip Nolan- — from all American citizenship, there would have been ■ -at least a certain grim justice in the result. But, as all concede, the statutes do not permit of such a result; and it is not tolerable to secure it through the manipulation of legal procedure.

. “Petitioner has complied with all the formal requirements of the law, and his reputation and general conduct have been shown to be good. He avows his attachment to the principles of the Constitution and to the good order and happiness of the United States. He produced, at various times, twenty witnesses from among his neighbors, colleagues, pupils, relatives, friends, and an attorney from the Department of Justice, all of whom testified to the effect that he was truthful, law-abiding, attached to the principles of the Constitution, a devoted husband and father, a dedicated teacher, and a man of good habits. None had ever heard him say anything against the United States. All held him in high esteem and recommended him for citizenship. Indeed, many testified that, in their opinion, he would *327make a better than average citizen.” 197 F.Supp. 278, 280.

. See Appendix, pp. 328-330, infra.

. This form of apologia for the result here seems to be reserved only for the special case of an American turned Nazi, and not to be permissible as to other German nationals seeking citizenship. Even Sittler’s wife, a former dual national of Great Britain and Germany and once a member of a Hitler Youth group, has had her companion petition duly approved for the granting of citizenship when she presents herself for the purpose. The difference in treatment is pointed up by the case of Dr. Wernher Yon Braun, the great rocket aud missile engineer, now the trusted leader in our vast missile program, who came to this country in 1945 and was naturalized in 1950. His services to the Hitler regime in 1937-1945 in developing the long-range rocket and guided missile were of incalculable value, as history now tells usi but he has had the grace not to grovel or to attempt to cover up these activities, as he demonstrates in his authorized biography in Who’s Who in America, vol. 32, 1962-1963, pp. 3233, 3234.