Court Opinion

ID: 9388092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 20:03:17.303504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:17.448906
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/19/23 Serena G. v. Robert H. CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 SERENA G.,
             Respondent,                                                 A164396
 v.
 ROBERT H.,                                                              (Alameda County
             Appellant.                                                  Super. Ct. No. HF18900120)

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         After Serena G. filed a petition to establish parental relationship
alleging Robert H. as her child’s father,2 the parties appeared in the Alameda
Superior Court for a status conference. Representing themselves, they
admitted they are the child’s parents and signed an uncontested judgment of
parentage which they prepared in court. About a year and a half later (after
Serena requested child support), Robert moved through counsel to set aside
the judgment on two grounds: first, under Code of Civil Procedure section
473, arguing the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction over him

        Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; Ct. App., First Dist., Local Rules of Ct.,
         1

rule 19.
       We use the parties’ first names to protect the child’s privacy.
         2

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(11).)

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based on a fraudulent proof of service of summons; and second, under Family
Code section 7646, arguing he is not the child’s genetic father. The court
denied both motions: under the Code of Civil Procedure, “finding that
[Robert] acquiesced to the court’s jurisdiction at the [status conference]”; and
under the Family Code, “stating no grounds and making no findings for said
denial.” Robert appeals on the same grounds he argued in the superior
court.3 We find no error.
      1.    The judgment is not void because Robert consented to the superior
            court’s jurisdiction by making a general appearance.
      When the superior court does not have jurisdiction over a party, its
judgment affecting that party is void, subject to direct or collateral attack at
any time (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th
653, 660), and the court “may, on motion of either party after notice to the
other party, set aside any void judgment or order” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473,
subd. (d)). “[T]he word ‘may’ in . . . section 473, subdivision (d) [means the]
trial court [has] discretion to grant or deny a motion to set aside a void
judgment. [Citation.] However, the trial court has no statutory power under
section 473, subdivision (d) to set aside a judgment that is not void.
[Citation.] Thus, the reviewing court faces two separate determinations

      3 Serena did not file a respondent’s brief, and Robert did not request
oral argument. We therefore decide the appeal on the record and the opening
brief (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a), (c)), though “we do not treat the
failure to file a respondent’s brief as a ‘default’ (i.e., an admission of error)”
(In re Marriage of Riddle (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1078, fn. 1, italics
omitted): “A judgment or order of [the superior] court is presumed to be
correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in
favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130,
1133.) It is Robert’s burden as the appellant “to demonstrate, on the basis of
the record . . . , that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal . . . .” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.)

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when considering an appeal founded on section 473, subdivision (d): whether
the judgment is void and, if so, whether the trial court properly exercised its
discretion in setting (or not setting) it aside. [Citation.] The trial court’s
determination whether a judgment is void is reviewed de novo; its decision
whether or not to set aside a void [judgment] is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 369.)
      “Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court in which an action
is pending has jurisdiction over a party from the time summons is served on
him . . . . A general appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of
summons on such party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subds. (a), (b); Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.68(c).) A defendant4 makes a general appearance by
participating in the action in a manner that recognizes the court’s authority
to proceed. (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.) “Such
participation operates as consent to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction . . . ,
[waiving] all objections based on lack of personal jurisdiction or defective
process or service of process . . . even if the defendant is unaware that a
jurisdictional objection is available.” (In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 1, 7–8.) “A California defendant can preserve objections to
personal jurisdiction only by making a special appearance, i.e., an
appearance for the sole purpose of objecting to the court’s jurisdiction.” (In re
Marriage of Obrecht, at p. 8, italics omitted.)
      The superior court is correct that Robert “acquiesced” to its jurisdiction
at the status conference. By personally going to court, participating in
preparing the judgment, and then signing it, Robert made a general
appearance. (See Adoption of Matthew B. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1270–

      4 Here, respondent. (Fam. Code, §§ 50, 127; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.16(a)(1).)

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1271 [party made a general appearance by signing stipulated orders for entry
of judgment and establishment of support even before the parentage action
was filed].) Because his general appearance equates to personal service of
the summons and petition (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.68(c)), and operates as consent to the court’s jurisdiction over
him (In re Marriage of Obrecht, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 7), his
contentions about fraud in the proof of service and total failure of service of
process are waived. (In re Marriage of Obrecht, at p. 8; Adoption of
Matthew B., at p. 1270.) It follows that because the judgment is not void, the
court did not abuse its discretion by not setting aside the judgment when it
did not have the power to do so. (Kremerman v. White, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th
at p. 369.)
      Robert’s contention that he appeared in court only because Serena
allegedly tricked him to go there is ineffectual. “A court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) “The actual
presence of an individual in the courtroom is the most widely recognized
basis for jurisdiction of a court. Indeed, it has been held that even one who is
brought into a state illegally may not challenge the jurisdiction of its courts
upon that ground.” (In re Patterson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 357, 360, citing
Frisbie v. Collins (1952) 342 U.S. 519 [does not violate due process]; see, e.g.,
United States v. Alvarez-Machain (1992) 504 U.S. 655, 657, 661–662, 669–670
[not a defense to personal jurisdiction that a defendant’s presence in a Texas
district court was obtained by a “ ‘shocking’ ” “forcible abduction” from Mexico
orchestrated by American law enforcement].)
      Likewise ineffectual is Robert’s contention that he “signed any
documents required without reading them, naively believing that with a

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judge in the room things had to be alright [sic],” and that he “had no concept
of the actual legal impact [citation].” “[J]udges must not assume the role of
advocate for any litigant. . . . [A] self-represented litigant who is not indigent
‘must expect and receive the same treatment as if represented by an
attorney—no different, no better, no worse.’ ” (Nuño v. California State
University, Bakersfield (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 799, 811.) If Robert signed
documents in court without reading or understanding them and without legal
counsel, then he must bear the risk of his mistake. (Estate of Eskra (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 209, 215.) The record, however, contradicts his claim. The
judgment and status conference minutes state the parties prepared the
judgment themselves in court after “discuss[ing] the issues before the
Court . . . .” As part of the judgment, Robert signed Judicial Council Forms,
form FL-235 (Advisement and Waiver of Rights Re: Establishment of Parental
Relationship), acknowledging: “I understand that if I admit I am the parent
of the children in this action that those children will be my children for legal
purposes,” including child support; “I understand that I am admitting that I
am the parent of the children named”; and, “I have read and understand the
Judgment (Uniform Parentage–Custody and Support) (form FL-250) and this
Advisement and Waiver of Rights.” And, at the hearing on Robert’s set-aside
motion the judge asked Robert’s counsel, “[H]e did agree to it on the record?”;
Robert’s counsel answered, “I wasn’t there, but I believe he did so”; and
Robert, who was present, said nothing.5

      5The record does not include a transcript of the status conference.
“ ‘We must therefore presume that what occurred at that hearing supports
the judgment.’ ” (In re Marriage of Obrecht, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 9.)

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      2.    Robert waived his right to challenge the judgment on the grounds
            that he is not the child’s genetic father.
      The Uniform Parentage Act (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.) empowers the
superior court, under specified conditions, to set aside a judgment if genetic
testing shows a child’s previously established father is not the child’s genetic
father. (Fam. Code, § 7645 et seq.) “A trial court’s order granting or denying
a request for genetic testing is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. . . .”
(County of Orange v. Superior Court (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1257–
1258.) “We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis,
regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked.” (In re Marriage of
Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32.)
      One such basis is readily available: “ ‘[A] stipulation for a judgment is
a consent to the entry of the judgment and is a waiver of errors by the party
consenting thereto.’ ” (Adoption of Matthew B., supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p.
1272; see generally Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 399–402.)
By signing the advisement and waiver of rights (Judicial Council Forms, form
FL-235), Robert acknowledged his rights to a judge’s determination whether
he is a parent of the child and to court-ordered parentage tests “where the
law permits,” before “admitting that I am the parent of the children named in
the stipulation and am giving up the rights stated above . . . .” Serena signed
the same form, and entry of the uncontested judgment followed. “Because
[Robert] consented to the paternity judgment, thereby waiving any errors,”
the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion under
the Family Code, and “there remains nothing else for us to review.”
(Adoption of Matthew B., at p. 1272.)
                                 DISPOSITION
      The Alameda Superior Court’s order of November 19, 2021, is affirmed.

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                                     _________________________
                                     Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Simons, J.

_________________________
Burns, J.

A164396/Serena G. v. Robert H.

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