Court Opinion

ID: 9534352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:38:50.456378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:20.450943
License: Public Domain

M. F. Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). The defendant was charged with the crime of felonious driving, MCLA 752.191; MSA 28.661. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court instructed the jury that they could find the defendant guilty even if his conduct was not found to have been reckless, wilful, or wanton. The clear import of the instruc*529tion was to permit the jury to find the defendant guilty upon a finding of mere negligence. People v Ames, 60 Mich App 168; 230 NW2d 360 (1975), seems to interpret the felonious driving statute as requiring something less than wilful or wanton conduct. That case, however, was attempting to explain why a verdict of guilty of negligent homicide was not necessarily inconsistent with one of felonious driving. The rationale was that the phrase, "but not wilfully or wantonly”, in the negligent homicide statute simply lessened the degree of conduct necessary for conviction. It clearly does not mean that one who drives wilfully and wantonly cannot be guilty of negligent homicide. I am also convinced that the Legislature did not intend that a negligent driver who causes a crippling injury be subject to conviction of a felony.
When the felonious driving statute was enacted in 1931 PA 214, much of its language was taken verbatim from the reckless driving statute then already in existence, 1927 PA 318, § 4.1 The Legislature clearly sought to punish reckless drivers who caused crippling injuries in a manner far more serious than the penalty required of those convicted of mere reckless driving. While the elements of the reckless driving statute could reasonably be interpreted to include ordinary negligence, the courts and the contemporary commentary interpreted the reckless driving and felonious driving statutes to require wilful and wanton misconduct. 2 U Pet L J 51 (1932), PAG, 1941-1942, No *53020286, p 203. Nothing has occurred since enactment of the felonious driving statute to change that interpretation.2
In several other jurisdictions which possess reckless driving statutes essentially the same as the language in our felonious driving statute and original reckless driving statute, the courts have construed the statutes to require a finding of at least gross, culpable negligence. State v Sisneros, 42 NM 500; 82 P2d 274 (1938), State v Roberson, 240 NC 745; 83 SE2d 798 (1954), State v Tjaden, 69 NW2d 272 (ND, 1955), Commonwealth v Forrey, 172 PA Super 65; 92 A2d 233 (1952), State v Rossman, 64 SD 532; 268 NW 702 (1936). I agree with the Oregon Supreme Court:
"That part of the reckless driving statute which reads 'or without due caution or circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any other person or property’ could be construed to describe simple negligence. Neessen v Armstrong, 1931, 213 Iowa 378, 239 N.W. 56, 57; Barkley v State, 1932, 165 Tenn. 309, 54 SW2d 944; Kirk v State, Ala. App. 1950, 47 So. 2d 283. However, we agree with those courts which regard the reckless driving statute as requiring more than ordinary negligence to constitute a violation. The statutory requirement that the conduct endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property indicates the intention to make the statute applicable only if the conduct was more culpable than *531that embraced in simple negligence.” State v Wilcox, 216 Or 110, 122; 337 P2d 797, 802 (1959).
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to find the defendant guilty of reckless or grossly negligent driving which caused a crippling injury, the trial court’s instruction was prejudicial error. I would reverse.

 1927 PA 318, § 4 provided:
"Any person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property, shall be guilty of reckless driving and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in section fifty-five of this act.”

 By 1965 PA 262, § 1, the reckless driving statute, was amended into two sections: MCLA 257.626; MSA 9.2326 continued the punishment of 90 days in jail or $100 fine upon conviction of reckless driving, while MCLA 257.626b; MSA 9.2326(2) added the punishment of 10 days in jail or $100 fine upon conviction of careless or negligent driving. The felonious driving statute’s language was left unchanged. Had the Legislature thought that the reckless driving statute encompassed careless or negligent driving, there would have been no reason to add the new section. Moreover, failure to similarly amend the felonious driving statute is persuasive of the Legislature’s acquiescence in the original interpretation of the felonious driving statute to require proof of reckless misconduct.