Court Opinion

ID: 9443927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:34:15.305244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:38.837496
License: Public Domain

BONE, Circuit Judge.
I dissent.
The “Stipulation of Compromise and Settlement” upon which the judgment of the court below was based was filed with that court on December 11, 1951. It was drafted so as to include the United States as a party thereto. The United States Attorney, however, did not sign the document. On the same day the United States presented findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with the stipulation. These findings and conclusions were adopted by the court and judgment entered accordingly. In the findings it was noted that the United States was not a party to the stipulation.
On December 14, 1951, the United States filed with the court below a letter pertaining to this case, dated October 5, 1951, signed by an Assistant Attorney General of the United States and directed to the United States Attorney in Seattle. I quote this letter in pertinent part:
“In the instant case the file indicates that the insured was not survived by a child or children or a natural parent. His wife survived him, but died shortly thereafter. Therefore, the question as to the person or persons entitled to the unpaid benefits depends upon who or whom in fact stood in loco parentis to the insured for the period of time required by the Act. This is a question which must be determined by the Court upon the basis of evidence adduced before the court and not left to the parties to decide, as is proposed by the attorney for William E. Hath.” (Emphasis mine.)
The letter contained other statements similar in effect. I cannot agree with my associates that in the circumstances of this case the “presentation” by an Assistant United States Attorney of the findings and conclusions of law adopted by the court precludes review of the questions here sought to be raised.
It should be noted that the rule as to the saving of questions going to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of a court sitting without a jury is liberal. Review of such questions may be obtained even though the party raising them requested no findings, made no objection to the findings made, and made no motion to amend such findings or a motion for judgment. See Rule 52(a) and (b), Fed.Rules of Civ.Proc., 28 U.S. C.A.; Monaghan v. Hill, 9 Cir., 140 F. *3902d 31, 33, 34; Stoltz v. United States, 9 Cir., 99 F.2d 283, 284. While ordinarily a party may not ask for appellate relief from matters in a judgment which were Included in his own requested findings, the rule is by no means absolute. If there is a showing of excusable mistake, or if the mistake was brought to the attention of the trial court, the question should be noticed on appeal. Omaha Hardwood Lumber Co. v. J. H. Phipps Lumber Co., 8 Cir., 135 F.2d 3, 10.
Here the United States in its complaint prayed that the court “determine” the rights of appellants. Thereafter the United States failed and refused to be a party to the stipulation of compromise and settlement executed by the parties which was made the basis for the court’s findings. What prompted the Assistant United States attorney to “present” the findings is not apparent from the record, but the findings specifically note that the United States was not a party to the stipulation. And within three days after entry of judgment, the United States filed with the court the letter referred to above, which could have had no other purpose than to apprise the court of the error committed. I think the question is properly before this Court for review.
In any event, I think this is “one of those exceptional cases where the error is so basic, plain and clear as to prompt this court to consider the question to avoid the injustice which might otherwise result.” Mondshine v. Short, 5 Cir., 196 F.2d 606, 608; see also Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-559, 61 S. Ct. 719, 85 L.Ed. 1037; Shokuwan Shimabukuro v. Higeyoshi Nagayama, 78 U.S. App.D.C. 271, 140 F.2d 13, certiorari denied 322 U.S. 755, 64 S.Ct. 1270, 88 L.Ed. 1584.
The majority recognizes the error of the court below and there is no need to labor it here. The National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1008 et seq., as amended, 38 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq., is replete with provisions showing the meticulous care taken by Congress to make certain that insurance proceeds, which came in substantial part from general public funds, see §§ 604-607 of the Act, United States v. Henning, 344 U.S. 66, 71, 73 S.Ct. 114, should go to certain persons and no others. See §§ 602(g), 602(i), 602(j), 613, 614, 615 and 616, referring to 38 U.S.C.A. § 454a; United States v. Henning, supra, 344 U.S. at page 71, 73 S.Ct. 114.
When Congress amended the Act in 1942 to bring persons standing in loco parentis to the insured within the devo-lutionary plan for payment of the insurance benefits, §§ 7-9, 56 Stat. 659, 38 U. S.C.A. §§ 801(f), 802(g), 802(h) (3) (C), it carefully defined the term “loco parentis” and permitted payment only to those who “last bore” that relation to the insured, doubtless to preclude diversion of insurance funds to hosts of undeserving strangers. See United States v. Henning, supra, 344 U.S. at page 77, 73 S.Ct. 114.
These measures are made meaningless if, as here, claimants are to be permitted, purely by stipulation in lieu of evidence, to determine that they qualify as beneficiaries as limited and defined by Congress. See United States v. Leverett, 5 Cir., 197 F.2d 30; United States v. Snyder, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 177 F.2d 44, 49. I think the purpose of Congress is ill served by allowing a judgment based solely upon such a stipulation to stand simply because of a mistake in tactics by counsel for the United States in the court below.
As the majority pqints out, the interest of the United States in this action and on this appeal is far more than that of an ordinary stakeholder. The United States has a vital interest in seeing that the mandate of Congress as to the disposition of the insurance funds is observed, and not left to self-serving compromise arrangements between claimants. See the Leverett and Snyder cases, supra.
Adoption of my view in this case would require but a very brief proceeding in the lower court. I agree that the delay resulting from a remand of any cause is unfortunate. “But, although prompt despatch of judicial business is *391a virtue, it is neither the sole nor the primary purpose for which courts have been established. Denial of a trial on disputed facts is worse than delay.” Doeh-ler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., 149 F.2d 130, 135.
While appellees may indeed have good faith claims to the insurance proceeds in question, it would appear that none of them was willing to gamble on proving his or her claim by an adversary proceeding in court. If in fact they each recognized the merit of the claims of the others, and deemed it just to share equally in the proceeds, nothing prevented them from agreeing in advance to later share the award of a judgment following a trial.
I would reverse and remand the cause for a trial of the question as to which, if any, of the appellees qualify to receive the insurance proceeds under the Act.