Court Opinion

ID: 9809660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:20:03.622377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:28.939121
License: Public Domain

Walker and BitowN, JJ.,
concur in the result, that there should be a new trial, but are of the opinion that in no view of the evidence, as presented in the record, can plaintiff recover damages beyond the amount paid for the service or the cost of the message, because the transaction was interstate, and the contract between the parties required a continuous transmission of the message from Johnson City, Tennessee, to Bakersville, for which’ the plaintiff paid the entire toll when the message was delivered by him to the operator at the former place. The record clearly shows that the defendant did not agree to transmit the message to Toecane, N. C., and, for plaintiff’s accommodation, or as his agent, to forward it over the telephone line to Bakersville, but to send it through to Bakersville for one charge, which was prepaid. Being, therefore, an interstate message (W. U. T. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S., 347; Lance v. Brown, 234 U. S., 542), the highest Federal court, by whose decisions upon the question we are bound, has held, contrary to our ruling, that the stipulation as to repeating the message, and as to the amount of damages to be recovered, if not repeated, is a valid one. Since the passage of the act of Congress of 18 June, 1910 (1 Fed. Statutes Anno., Suppl. of 1912, p. 112), telegraph companies are to be considered as common carriers within the meaning and provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. The power of Congress over such interstate commerce is exclusive, as it has occupied the field, and the exercise of such power cannot be affected or impaired, or in any degree changed or modified, by State regulation. Mich. C. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S., 59; Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S., 671. In the last, case the Court said: “When Congress acts in such way as to manifest its purpose to exercise its constitutional authority, the regulating power of the State ceases to exist.” But coming down to the very question herein presented, it has been held, in Primrose v. W. U. Tel. Co., 154 U. S., 1, that a regulation of a telegraph company requiring the sender of a message to have it repeated and to pay an additional amount therefor, in order to hold the company liable for mistakes or delays in transmitting or delivering, or for not delivering a message, is a reasonable one, and further, that the terms printed on the back of the message, so far as otherwise not inconsistent with law, form part of the contract between the sender and the company, under which the message is transmitted, citing numerous cases from the English and American courts, and stating that “the great pre*39ponderance of authority in this country sustains the reasonableness and validity of such regulation.” Among other reasons for its decision is this one: “By the regulation now in question the telegraph company has not undertaken to wholly exempt itself from liability for negligence, but only to require the sender of the message to have it repeated and to pay half as much again as the usual price, in order to hold the company liable for mistakes or delay in transmitting or delivering, or for not delivering a message, whether happening by negligence of its servants or otherwise.” The validity of like stipulations, limiting the measure of liability in case of loss of goods resulting from the negligence of an interstate carrier, has been sustained in numerous cases, and, among others, are the following: Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S., 491; Ch. B. and D. R. Co. v. Miller, ibid., 517; Ch. St. Paul, M. and O. R. Co. v. Latta, ibid., 519; Mo. K. and T. R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S., 657; S. A. L. R. Co. v. Pace Mule Co., 34 Supr. Ct. Rep. (U. S.), p. 775; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Bilisoly, 82 S. E. (Va.), 91; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Compton, 169 S. W., 946. See, also, W. U. Tel. Co. v. Dant, recently decided in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
Under the cases last cited, if plaintiff can recover more than the cost of the message, his recovery could not exceed the stipulated maximum amount of $50 as liquidated damages.
The ease of W. U. Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U. S., 542, cited in the opinion of the Court, is not in point, the case involving the right of one State to control the law of another State, as to a transaction taking place partly in both, the Court specifically holding that the statute of South Carolina, as to the recovery for mental anguish in telegraph cases, could not operate in the District of Columbia; but it did give strong intimation that the statute was an unwarranted interference with interstate commerce.
Since the passage by Congress of the act of 1910, above mentioned, telegraph companies are subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, and whatever the law may have been before that time, the case is now governed by the principles as stated in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger and other like cases supra.