Court Opinion

ID: 9963214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 19:03:02.103629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:43.017592
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,             )
                               )     I.D. Nos.    2308015044
                               )                  2308015473
      v.                       )
                               )
                               )
RAHEEM FULLMAN,                )
                               )
             Defendant.        )

                          Submitted: February 15, 2024
                            Decided: April 24, 2024

                                   OPINION

                     Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress

                                    DENIED

Lindsay A. Taylor, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Dover,
Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Cara M. Brophy, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender,
Dover, Delaware, Attorney for the Defendant.

Primos, J.
       Defendant Raheem Fullman moves to suppress all evidence found as the result
of a warrantless seizure. For the reasons explained below, the motion is DENIED.
                               FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
       On August 28, 2023, at around 6:00 p.m.,2 a past-proven reliable3 confidential
informant (the “CI”) provided a tip directly to Detective Brian Holl of the Delaware
State Police via text messages that Raheem Fullman was in possession of a firearm
and residing in Brightway Commons apartment complex in Milford, Delaware.4 The
CI informed Holl that:
       •      Fullman was located at 108 Brightway Commons, sitting on the
              stoop in front of the building;5
       •      Fullman was on probation;6
       •      Fullman was in possession of a firearm, and the firearm was
              tucked into his waistband;7
       •      Fullman was residing with his girlfriend, who lived there;8
       •      Fullman was socializing with a large group of individuals who
              were drinking alcohol, including another probationer, Clyde
              Harris;9 and
       •      Fullman was wearing a black jumpsuit and had dreadlocks.10

1
  The facts contained herein are taken from the Suppression Hearing that was held on February 15,
2024, the transcript of which is cited hereinafter as “Hr’g Tr. at __.” There, the State supplied two
Exhibits, both consisting of body camera footage (“BCF”) of the encounter: State’s Exhibit 1 is
Detective Holl’s BCF, cited hereinafter as “Ex. 1 at __ (Holl BCF).” State’s Exhibit 2 is Detective
Saccomanno’s BCF, cited hereinafter as “Ex. 2 at __ (Saccomanno BCF).” Holl’s BCF has no
audio for the first minute; nonetheless, its visual depiction during that period is probative.
2
  Hr’g Tr. at 30:22.
3
  Id. at 17:22–18:4. The CI has provided Holl with at least ten prior tips that have all led to felony
firearm convictions. Id. at 18:9–20, 30:17–20. Holl testified that the CI had never provided
information that was unreliable or not actionable. Id. at 18:21–23, 19:1–3.
4
  Id. at 6:3–8:5, 18:3–4, 31:15–18.
5
  Id. at 19:13–16.
6
  Id.
7
  Id.
8
  Id. at 46:20–22.
9
  Id. at 19:19–20:6. Harris was on Level IV probation and wore an ankle monitor. Id. at 7:16–
19, 12:7–8.
10
   Id. at 19:14–15, 35:7–8.
                                                  2
The CI also told Holl where to park at Brightway Commons and how to approach
building 108.11 The CI’s motivation was to “enhance public safety in and around”
the Brightway Commons community.12
       Holl contacted Probation and Parole (“P&P”) Senior Probation Officer David
Angelo to conduct inquiries and to verify the tip’s information.13 Angelo ran a
DACS check and confirmed that Fullman was on Level II probation out of Sussex
County.14      Angelo also confirmed that Fullman was on probation for drug
possession and for violating his probation in a drug dealing case, and that he had just
been released from incarceration for a firearms charge related to the possession
case.15 In addition, Holl reviewed a photograph of Fullman that matched the
physical description provided by the CI.16
       Holl and the CI remained in contact until 10:00 p.m.; once Holl arrived at
Brightway Commons, the communications ceased.17 Throughout the course of the
investigation, Holl relayed all the information that the CI had provided him to the
other members of the Governor’s Task Force, which consisted of Holl, Detective
Saccomanno, Sergeant Doughty, and Angelo.18
       Brightway Commons is a high crime area.19 Once there, Doughty was
conducting surveillance from the rear of the apartment complex and relaying his
observations to Holl.20 Doughty could see the group socializing but could not

11
   Id. at 20:5–6.
12
   Id. at 19:8–10.
13
   Id. at 6:9–7:1.
14
   Id. at 6:23.
15
   Id. at 7:4–13.
16
   Id. at 23:5–8.
17
   Id. at 23:17–21, 24:23–25:2, 31:7–10.
18
   Id. at 24:13–14.
19
   Id. at 8:18; see also id. at 21:22–22:3 (describing Brightway Commons as an “open-air drug
market where violent crimes occur … such as murder, shootings, assaults, rapes”).
20
   Id. at 24:15–22.
                                             3
identify any of the individuals.21 Saccomanno, Holl, and Angelo parked where the
CI had recommended.22
       At or around 10:00 p.m.,23 Saccomanno, Holl, and Angelo approached the
group by taking the route recommended by the CI, and Doughty approached
separately from the rear of the complex.24 Saccomanno led the group of three
officers, accompanied by his K9.25 Holl immediately recognized Fullman sitting on
the steps leading up to the stoop.26 Angelo also immediately spotted Harris.27
Saccomanno stated generally to the group around the stoop, “Nobody move.”28 The
group of bystanders was large and somewhat verbally aggressive, although generally
compliant.29
       Holl approached Fullman and requested that he stand.30 Fullman refused.31
In contrast, Harris complied with Angelo’s request to stand and approach him.32
Holl, relatively quickly into the encounter, placed his hand on Fullman’s right
shoulder, grabbed Fullman’s right wrist, and continued to request him to stand;

21
   Id.
22
   Id. at 20:5–6, 24:6–8.
23
   Although the BCF shows a different time, e.g., 21:53 (9:53 p.m.), Holl testified that that time
was incorrect and that it was indeed 10:00 p.m. Compare id. at 26:16–22 with Ex. 1 at 0:04 (Holl
BCF).
24
   Hr’g Tr. at 9:4–13, 24:15–18, 29:16–19.
25
   Id. at 26:23–27:2.
26
   Id. at 9:14–15, 25:4–6.
27
   Id. at 9:11–13.
28
   Id. at 27:1–2; Ex. 2 at 0:26–30 (Saccomanno BCF).
29
   Hr’g Tr. at 10:5–10 (“[D]ue to the large amount of people there I was kind of – you know, it
was an officer safety concern. So I was trying to watch everybody. The crowd was being kind of
verbally aggressive and giving us a hard time about what we were doing out there.”); id. at 10:17–
20 (“Other than, you know, verbally abusive or anything, expressing their frustration with police
presence there, everybody else was compliant.”); id. at 28:14–18 (“Generally yes … [W]e can hear
the hostility towards them … but they were generally for the most part compliant.”).
30
   Id. at 10:22–23; Ex. 2 at 0:36–44 (Saccomanno BCF).
31
   Hr’g Tr. at 10:21–23, 28:10–11.
32
   Id. at 9:16–10:13.
                                                4
Fullman continued to refuse.33 Doughty intervened by grabbing Fullman’s left
arm.34 As Fullman was still sitting down on the stairs of the stoop, Holl placed a
handcuff on Fullman’s right wrist.35 Holl and Doughty helped Fullman stand.36
Once Fullman stood, his left wrist was also placed into handcuffs, and both wrists
were secured behind his back.37
       Angelo saw a firearm in Fullman’s waistband as Fullman stood up: “[H]is
shirt raised a little bit and I could see the clear handle of a firearm sticking out of the
waistband of his pants, along with the impression of a barrel on his pant line.”38
Angelo immediately moved to secure the firearm.39 Fullman was arrested and
transported to Sussex Correctional Institute ( “SCI”), where, during the stripping
process, two baggies of suspected crack cocaine were found on his person.40
       On January 8, 2024, Fullman filed a motion to suppress (the “Motion”). On
January 29, 2024, the State filed its response. On February 15, 2024, the Court held
a suppression hearing.
                                 BURDEN OF PROOF
       Generally, a defendant who moves to suppress evidence bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged search or seizure violated his or her Constitutional
rights.41 For a warrantless search, however, the “State has the burden of proof of
showing the propriety of the search,”42 i.e., the legality of the search, by a

33
   Id. at 60:16–17; Ex. 2 at 0:43–2:12 (Saccomanno BCF).
34
   Hr’g Tr. at 11:4–6; Ex. 1 at 1:49 (Holl BCF); Ex. 2 at 2:07–12 (Saccomanno BCF).
35
   Ex. 1 at 1:52–54 (Holl BCF).
36
   Id. at 1:52–57; Hr’g Tr. at 11:4–6.
37
   Ex. 1 at 2:00–02 (Holl BCF).
38
   Hr’g Tr. at 11:7–10.
39
   Id. at 11:10–12.
40
   Id. at 63:6–8.
41
   State v. Medina, 2020 WL 104323, at *3 (Del. Super. Jan. 7, 2020).
42
   State v. Henderson, 906 A.2d 232, 235 (Del. Super. 2005). See also Medina, 2020 WL 104323,
at *3; State v. Garnett, 2021 WL 6109797, at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 23, 2021).
                                             5
preponderance of the evidence.43 To survive a motion to suppress in a case involving
a warrantless seizure, the State must satisfy the reasonable and articulable suspicion
standard by showing specific facts “which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.”44 The judge, as the trier of fact
at a suppression hearing, determines the credibility of witnesses.45
                             PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
       Fullman argues that (1) law enforcement did not have reasonable and
articulable suspicion to conduct a warrantless seizure of him, and (2) the seizure
violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in the stoop as part of the curtilage of
Brightway Commons.46 Conversely, the State argues that (1) the information
obtained from the CI satisfied the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard
because it was provided by a past-proven reliable informant and corroborated by law
enforcement, and (2) the stoop of a multi-unit apartment complex is not part of the
curtilage.47
       For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with the State on both
issues.
                                      DISCUSSION
       Under Delaware law, an investigative detention, or Terry48 stop, is governed
by 11 Del. C. § 1902.49 It is well settled that, if police officers have reasonable and

43
   Garnett, 2021 WL 6109797, at *3.
44
   Backus v. State, 845 A.2d 515, 517 (Del. 2004) (cleaned up).
45
   State v. Nyala, 2014 WL 3565989, at *5 (Del. Super. July 17, 2014).
46
   Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Evid. [hereinafter “Def.’s Mot.”] ¶¶ 12–18.
47
   State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. ¶¶ 9–16.
48
   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
49
   In full, Title 11 Section 1902 provides that:
         (a) A peace officer may stop any person abroad, or in a public place, who the
             officer has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or
             is about to commit a crime, and may demand the person's name, address,
             business abroad and destination.
                                             6
articulable suspicion that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to
commit a crime, they may stop that individual for investigatory purposes.50 In
determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists, the Court looks to
the totality of the circumstances, which is viewed through the eyes of a “reasonable,
trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts
with an officer’s subjective interpretation of those facts.”51
       When assessing an officer’s articulation of the facts and his or her conduct,
Delaware courts use a two-pronged test that looks at (1) the “objective observations
and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of
lawbreakers” and (2) “inferences and deductions that a trained officer could make
which might well elude an untrained person.”52 Generally, “the court defers to the
experience and training of law enforcement officers.”53

        (b) Any person so questioned who fails to give identification or explain the
             person's actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further
             questioned and investigated.
        (c) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed 2
             hours. The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in
             any official record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be
             released or be arrested and charged with a crime.
11 Del. C. § 1902 (emphasis supplied). Notably, in Subsection 1902(a), the term “reasonable
ground” has been determined by the Delaware Supreme Court to mean “reasonable and articulable
suspicion.” Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 (Del. 1999) [hereinafter Jones (1999)].
50
   Miller v. State, 25 A.3d 768, 771 (Del. 2011).
51
   Id.
52
   Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1287 (Del. 2008) (quoting Riley v. State, 892 A.2d 370,
375 (Del. 2006)).
53
   Flowers v. State, 195 A.3d 18, 27 (Del. 2018) (quoting Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1262
(Del. 2001)).
                                               7
I.    FULLMAN WAS SEIZED WHEN THE OFFICERS APPROACHED BECAUSE A
      REASONABLE PERSON IN HIS POSITION WOULD NOT HAVE FELT FREE TO
      IGNORE THE POLICE PRESENCE.

       Whether a police officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a
 Terry stop requires a threshold finding of when, specifically, the stop took place.54
 “A person is considered to be ‘seized’ when, in view of the surrounding
 circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave,”55 i.e., where law
 enforcement communicates to a reasonable person that he or she is not at liberty to
 ignore the police presence and go about his or her business because of law
 enforcement’s use of physical force or show of authority.56
       The “question of whether a seizure occurs under article I, section 6 of the
 Delaware Constitution ‘requires focusing upon the police officer’s actions to
 determine when a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to
 ignore the police presence.’”57 The Delaware Supreme Court has adopted a non-
 exhaustive list of totality of the circumstances factors established in United States v.
 Scheets58:
           i.   Whether the encounter occurred in a public or private place;
          ii.   Whether the suspect was informed that he was not under arrest
                and free to leave;
         iii.   Whether the suspect consented or refused to talk to the
                investigating officers;
         iv.    Whether the investigating officers removed the suspect to
                another area;
          v.    Whether there was physical touching, display of weapons, or
                other threatening conduct; and
 54
    Jones (1999), 745 A.2d at 861 (“The question of when a seizure has occurred is perhaps the
 most critical issue.”); Woody, 765 A.2d at 1263; Purnell v. State, 832 A.2d 714, 719 (Del. 2003);
 Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1286–87.
 55
    Medina, 2020 WL 104323, at *4.
 56
    Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1286; Hall v. State, 981 A.2d 1106, 1111 (Del. 2009).
 57
    Jones v. State, 28 A.3d 1046, 1051 (Del. 2011) [hereinafter Jones (2011)] (quoting Jones (1999),
 745 A.2d at 869).
 58
    188 F.3d 829, 836–37 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1096 (2000).
                                                 8
        vi.    Whether the suspect eventually departed the area without
               hindrance.59

      Fullman argues that he was seized at the moment Saccomanno approached the
stoop and stated to the group of bystanders, “Nobody move.”60 The Court agrees.
Fullman was seized at that moment because any reasonable person would not have
felt free to ignore the police presence in a situation in which a police officer stated
“Nobody move” while approaching with a trained K9 at 10:00 p.m. at night,
surrounded by a group of armed police officers with flashlights.61
      Thus, given the determination that law enforcement had seized Fullman once
the statement “nobody move” was made, the issue now becomes whether the officers
had reasonable and articulable suspicion, either before or at that moment, to conduct
a Terry stop of Fullman. Because the CI supplied the tip to Holl before the Terry
stop, the analysis begins there.62

59
   Jones (2011), 28 A.3d at 1052–53 (cleaned up) (citing Scheets, 188 F.3d at 836–37).
60
   Def.’s Mot. ¶ 12.
61
   See, e.g., Hall, 981 A.2d at 1111 (finding a seizure when a detective parked car behind suspect
and blocked him in, then approached the car and gave an order); Riley, 892 A.2d at 374 (finding a
seizure when police approached with badges and flashlights after having parked police vehicle
behind suspect’s vehicle to prevent suspect from driving away). Moreover, even if Saccomanno’s
general statement “nobody move” did not effectuate a seizure, Fullman was seized seconds later
when Holl placed his hand on Fullman’s right shoulder and grabbed his right wrist. Ex. 2 at 0:44
(Saccomanno BCF).
62
   See Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1287 (“[T]he courts consider the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at the time of the stop.”).
                                                9
II.    THE CI’S TIP SUPPLIED REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION.63
        In evaluating whether an informant’s tip provided reasonable and articulable
  suspicion, the Court looks to (1) the reliability of the informant, (2) the specificity
  of the informant’s tip,64 and (3) the degree to which the tip is corroborated by
  independent police surveillance and information.65
        Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable and
  articulable suspicion, based on the past-proven reliable CI’s tip and independent
  police surveillance and information, that criminal activity was taking place to
  conduct a Terry stop of Fullman.
       A. The CI Was Past-Proven Reliable.
        “An informant’s tip may provide reasonable suspicion for a stop and seizure
  where the totality of the circumstances, if corroborated, indicates that the
  information is reliable.”66 Merely referring to the informant as past-proven reliable,
  or a conclusory allegation that describes an informant’s past performance as

  63
     The specific criteria for whether an informant’s tip satisfies reasonable and articulable suspicion
  or probable cause are similar but not identical. Probable cause is a higher, more stringent standard.
  Nonetheless, there is no reason why the Court should not apply the benchmarks established for
  probable cause based upon an informant’s tip, whether in analyzing a warrantless arrest or a search
  warrant. See Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 751 (Del. 2006) (determining probable cause for a
  warrantless arrest based on informant’s tip, the Supreme Court looked to (1) the reliability of the
  informant, (2) the details contained in the tip; and (3) the degree of independent police
  corroboration); Holden, 60 A.3d at 1115–16 (same). Cf. Valentine v. State, 207 A.3d 566, 572
  (Del. 2019) (using essentially the same test in the context of a search warrant but inserting “basis
  of knowledge” for the second prong).
  64
     Miller, 25 A.3d at 771. Although Valentine is the more recent decision, Miller dealt with a
  known tipster and whether there was reasonable and articulable suspicion for a Terry stop, not
  whether there was probable cause for a search warrant. Id. at 771–74. Therefore, the Court follows
  Miller’s precise language even as the Court generally applies the benchmarks established for
  probable cause to the case sub judice. Whether the Court uses the “specificity” terminology
  utilized in Miller, the “basis of knowledge” terminology utilized in Valentine, or the “details
  contained in the tip” terminology utilized in Brown and Holden, the analysis is the same, that is,
  whether the substance of the tip supplied by the informant establishes personal knowledge in
  specific detail.
  65
     Id. at 771–72.
  66
     Id. at 771.
                                                   10
credible, does not establish reliability.67 Instead, something more is needed, e.g.,
that the investigation of prior tips corroborated their accuracy or led to convictions.68
      In Miller v. State,69 the Delaware Supreme Court evaluated whether a tip
satisfied the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard.70 The Court found that
it did.71 Notably, the informant in Miller was not past-proven reliable.72 The Court,
however, noted that “the informant’s tip was more reliable than the information of a
one-time anonymous caller” because the informant had “made contact with [the]
Detective [ ] on multiple occasions, … suggest[ing] … familiarity between the police
and the informant.”73
      As in Miller, the CI and Holl had a working rapport74:                        the CI had
communicated with Holl on multiple occasions prior to the tip regarding other
investigations75 and had Holl’s phone number to contact him.76 Moreover, this case
is stronger than Miller because, here, the Court finds that the CI is past-proven
reliable: the CI had provided at least ten prior tips to Holl that had led to convictions,
most involving firearms, and none of the tips had later been found to be inaccurate.77

67
   See Valentine, 207 A.3d at 572 (“But such a conclusory allegation regarding the informant’s
past performance is problematic because it interferes with the issuing magistrate’s ability to make
an independent determination regarding the informant’s reliability.”); see also id. at 572–73
(noting the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), which
found that a “mere conclusion” describing the informant as a “credible person,” was insufficient
to establish credibility); id. at 573 (noting the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), that an affidavit had no support where it only
described the informant as “credible” and his information as “reliable”).
68
   Id. at 572.
69
   25 A.3d 768 (Del. 2011).
70
   Id. at 771–74.
71
   Id. at 774.
72
   Id. at 769.
73
   Id. at 773 (footnote omitted).
74
   See id.; see also Hr’g Tr. at 17:22–19:3.
75
   Hr’g Tr. at 18:9–17.
76
   Id. at 31:15–18.
77
   Id. at 18:9–19:3. Compare Purnell, 832 A.2d at 720 (finding that the informant was known
personally by the police officer and had given reliable information in the past) (citing Adams v.
                                                11
   B. The CI’s Tip Was Sufficiently Detailed.
      “[I]f a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be
required to establish the requisite quantum than would be required if the tip were
more reliable.”78 By the same token, therefore, if a tip is more reliable, less
information      is   required      to    establish    reasonable       articulable     suspicion.79
Consequently, as this Court has observed in a non-published decision, if the
informant is past-proven reliable, the tip needs only to have “a certain amount of
detail” and not a “heightened level of detail.”80
      In Culver v. State81 and Sierra v. State,82 the Delaware Supreme Court took
issue with the tips in question because they provided information that failed to show
personal knowledge of the suspect and criminal activity, and the information could
have been readily observable from the street.83 Here, there has been no evidence
presented that shows how the CI obtained the information about Fullman’s
possession of a firearm, or how the CI knew (or knew of) Fullman, i.e., the CI’s basis
of personal knowledge to supply the tip.84 Nonetheless, the absence of first-hand

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)), with Valentine, 207 A.2d at 572 (“The detectives’ affidavit
… said nothing about the manner in which the informant had proved to be reliable in the past (e.g.,
investigation of prior tips corroborated their accuracy or led to convictions).”).
78
   LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103, 1109 (Del. 2008) (quoting Jones (1999), 745 A.2d at 871).
79
   See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause,
is dependent upon both the content of the information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability. Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the ‘totality of the
circumstances[.]’” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981))).
80
   State v. Johnson, I.D. No. 2204003342, at 4:2–7 (Del. Super. Nov. 28, 2022) (TRANSCRIPT)
(D.I. 22).
81
   956 A.2d 5 (Del. 2008).
82
   958 A.2d 825 (Del. 2008).
83
   Although both cases involved Department of Correction P&P Procedure 7.19, their reasoning,
as with the probable cause benchmarks, remains useful here: in Culver, “[t]he tip was based upon
readily observable facts [from the street] that demonstrated no special insight into illegal activity.”
956 A.2d at 12. In Sierra, “the tip only provided observable information.” 958 A.2d at 831.
84
   See Culver, 956 A.2d at 13 (“Nothing about the tip demonstrated any personal connection
between the caller and [the suspect] and, thus, no credible opportunity for the tipster to have
personal knowledge of illicit activity.”).
                                                  12
and personal knowledge can be excused where, as here, the tip contains sufficient
detail that dispels the concern that the tip is a casual rumor “circulating in the
underworld” or based on a suspect’s general reputation.85
      By way of example, the Delaware Supreme Court in Purnell v. State86 dealt
with the issue currently before the Court, i.e., whether there was reasonable and
articulable suspicion for the police to conduct a Terry stop based on a past-proven
reliable informant’s tip that the suspect was engaging in criminal activity.87 There,
the Supreme Court distinguished Purnell from Jones (1999), where an anonymous
tipster had provided a tip indicating merely that there was a “‘suspicious black male
wearing a blue coat’ in the vicinity.”88 The Purnell Court explained that the case
before it was distinct from Jones (1999) because the informant was past-proven
reliable in addition to the tip’s supplying a detailed description of what each suspect
male was wearing, the activities in which they were engaging, and the vicinity where
they were located.89
      Here, the tip provided some general information that could have been
observable from the street, e.g., a description of Fullman’s physical appearance,
activity, and location.90 The informant in Purnell similarly provided information
regarding the race, clothing, and location of the suspect; moreover, the suspect was
walking from a different direction than that described by the informant.91

85
   Valentine, 207 A.3d at 574. The Court also notes that providing details regarding how the CI
obtained the information could jeopardize the CI’s safety. Cf. Hr’g Tr. At 44:15-22 (Holl’s
testimony that details regarding the CI’s tip were omitted from the police report to protect the CI).
86
   832 A.2d 714 (Del. 2003).
87
   Id. at 718–20.
88
   Id. at 720 (citing Jones (1999), 745 A.2d at 858, 873–74).
89
   Id. at 716, 720.
90
   Hr’g Tr. at 19:13–16, 35:7–8.
91
   832 A.2d at 717–20.
                                                 13
Nonetheless, the Purnell Court found that reasonable and articulable suspicion had
been established.92
     Tellingly, the CI in this case provided additional information that could not
have been merely observed from the street, e.g., Fullman’s name, that he was on
probation, that he resided with his girlfriend at Brightway Commons, and that he had
a firearm concealed in the waistband of his pants, as well as where the officers should
park and the best route to take in approaching 108 Brightway Commons on foot.93
This additional information is more than enough to satisfy reasonable and articulable
suspicion. A lower quantum of information has satisfied probable cause, as shown
infra.
     In King v. State,94 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this Court based on
similar facts. There, the defendant argued that the police did not have probable cause
for a warrantless arrest, let alone reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk.95
A detective received a phone call from a past-proven reliable confidential informant
that there was “a black male wearing a black baseball cap and cut-off jeans at a card
table on South Kirkwood Street who was in possession of a large amount of crack
cocaine.”96 The police immediately went to the area described, which was “an open
air drug market,” spotted the defendant who matched the description, and arrested
him.97 The Supreme Court reasoned that, under the totality of the circumstances,
probable cause was “clearly established” because a past-proven reliable informant
had supplied the tip and detectives then observed the defendant at the scene.98

92
   Id. at 720.
93
   Hr’g Tr. at 56:21–58:11.
94
   633 A.2d 370, 1993 WL 445484 (Del. Nov. 1, 1993) (ORDER). Supreme Court Orders may be
cited as precedent. New Castle Cnty. v. Goodman, 461 A.2d 1012, 1013 (Del. 1983).
95
   King, 1993 WL 445484, at *1.
96
   Id.
97
   Id.
98
   Id. at *2. As the Supreme Court explained,
                                          14
      Accordingly, in a situation in which a past-proven reliable informant initiates
communication and supplies a tip that includes a matching description of the
defendant, his location, and the criminal activity, this satisfies the specificity
requirement under the second prong, especially when there is independent police
corroboration at the scene.
   C. The Tip Was Bolstered By Independent Police Surveillance and
      Information.

      It is important to consider “not only specific facts and conditions existing at the
time of the informant’s tip but also whether the tip includes references to future
actions that are not ordinarily easily predicted.”99 This is because it shows that the
informant knows the person well enough to predict future behavior.100
      Here, the CI has knowledge of Fullman’s future actions and movements. The
CI knew when Fullman could be found by officers (August 28, 2023, from 6:00 p.m.
through 10:00 p.m.),101 precisely where he could be found (on the front stoop at 108
Brightway Commons), and his activity during that time (socializing with a large
group that included Harris).
      Moreover, where, as here, if “police can corroborate predictive information
regarding the defendant’s movements and behavior, [then] the informant’s

       The informant, who had provided similar information which had proven reliable on
       numerous occasions in the past, provided Detective Balke with: (1) a description of
       an individual which matched that of King, (2) a location known to be a drug area
       and (3) information that the person was in possession of a large amount of cocaine.
Id.
99
   Miller, 25 A.3d at 771 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983)).
100
    Id. at 772 (“only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual’s itinerary”);
Holden, 60 A.3d at 1116 (“Corroboration of an informant’s tip about a suspect’s movements
suggests that the informant possesses knowledge of the suspect’s criminal behavior, because the
informant knows the person well enough to know what they will do.”).
101
    The initial tip was provided around 6:00 p.m. The seizure did not occur until around 10:00
p.m. The CI knew that Fullman would still be there around 10:00 p.m. and consistently
corroborated that information for four hours.
                                               15
credibility is bolstered.”102        Even if nothing is known about the informant’s
credibility, independent police work can sufficiently corroborate the tip.103
      Law enforcement first sought to corroborate the information of the CI’s tip
prior to arriving at Brightway Commons. The CI initiated communications with
Holl via phone around 6:00 p.m.104 Holl then verified Fullman’s name, probationary
status, and description with Angelo.105
      Officers next corroborated the CI’s tip through independent surveillance. The
officers knew that Brightway Commons was a high crime area.106 Doughty observed
the social gathering from a safe distance in the rear of the apartment complex.107
Although he could not see clearly, he could discern a group of individuals
congregated near the stoop engaging in the activity described by the CI, i.e., drinking
alcohol.108    He relayed this information to the other officers.109                 All the law
enforcement officers who were present at Brightway Commons knew what Holl had
learned from the CI and through the course of the investigation.110

102
    Miller, 25 A.3d at 772 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990)); LeGrande, 947
A.2d at 1108.
103
    LeGrande, 947 A.2d at 1108.
104
    Hr’g Tr. at 31:11–16.
105
    Id. at 23:5–8. While it does not appear that Holl was able to verify with Angelo the portion of
the CI’s tip regarding Fullman’s residence at Brightway Commons, this does not preclude a finding
that reasonable and articulable suspicion was established. In Purnell, the Court found reasonable
and articulable suspicion despite the fact that the suspect approached from a different direction
than that indicated by the informant. 832 A.2d at 720.
106
    Hr’g Tr. at 8:18, 21:22–22:3. The fact of a suspect’s being in a high crime area does not, on its
own, establish reasonable and articulable suspicion. See Jones (1999), 745 A.2d at 871
(“Reasonable and articulable suspicion cannot be based on a defendant’s presence in a particular
neighborhood at a particular time of day with no independent evidence that the defendant has
committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.”). It is, nevertheless, a factor to consider
as part of the totality of the circumstances in a reasonable and articulable suspicion analysis.
Woody, 765 A.2d at 1265 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)).
107
    Hr’g Tr. at 24:15–22.
108
    Id.
109
    Id. at 24:19–21.
110
    Id. at 24:13–14.
                                                 16
      The officers further corroborated the tip when they approached the stoop and
observed Fullman. Holl immediately spotted Fullman, who matched the description
provided by the CI and confirmed by Angelo.111 Importantly, the verification of
Fullman occurred before the order “nobody move.” Thus, at the latest, reasonable
and articulable suspicion was satisfied at the moment Holl spotted Fullman, thus
independently verifying the veracity of the tip.112
      Once confronted, Fullman refused to stand up although ordered to do so by the
officers.113 When he was eventually brought to his feet by the officers, Angelo saw
a firearm tucked in his waistband.114 Upon seeing the firearm, Angelo seized it.115

111
    See Purnell, 832 A.2d at 720 (“[The suspect] matched the description given by an informant
who had given reliable information in the past …. He was also in the general vicinity” that the
informant described). Although Harris was also wearing all black and had dreadlocks and was
sitting on the top of the stoop behind Fullman, Harris immediately rose and stood next to Angelo
when the officers approached before Holl interacted with Fullman. Ex. 2 at 0:25–43 (Saccomanno
BCF).
112
    The officers were unable to corroborate, prior to seizing Fullman, that he had a firearm in his
waistband, as he was seated when they approached him. However, the CI’s past-proven reliable
status coupled with the officers’ corroboration of the other details clearly satisfies the reasonable
and articulable suspicion standard. See, e.g., Purnell, 832 A.2d at 721 (finding that officers had
reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk because past-proven reliable
informant supplied a tip that the suspect was armed and because of the officers’ prior experience).
113
    Hr’g Tr. at 10:21–11:1.
114
    Id. at 11:4–12.
115
    Id. at 11:10–12. It is unclear whether Fullman was patted down prior to Angelo’s seizure of
the firearm. The BCF does not show this one way or the other. Regardless, the firearm was clearly
seen. Given the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds no improper police conduct.
     Fullman has not argued that Holl’s handcuffing of Fullman’s right wrist while Fullman was
seated, and the subsequent handcuffing of his left wrist after Fullman was brought to his feet by
the officers, converted the seizure into a warrantless arrest, which would have required probable
cause. As the Delaware Supreme Court has observed, an investigatory stop does not turn into a
full arrest merely because the officers use handcuffs, provided, however, that the police conduct
is reasonable. Flowers, 195 A.3d at 25; accord Womack v. State, 296 A.3d 882, 891 (Del. 2023).
In any event, the Court finds that it was reasonable for officers to secure Fullman with handcuffs
when he refused to stand as directed, where officers had been warned by a past-proven reliable
informant that Fullman was carrying a firearm in his waistband. Moreover, even if these actions
did convert the seizure into an arrest, the probable cause standard would likely have been satisfied
by the CI’s tip and the subsequent corroboration of it, given the Delaware Supreme Court’s
decision in King, supra.
                                                 17
   Fullman was arrested and transported to SCI, where additional contraband was found
   on his person.116
          Given the totality of the circumstances, the State has met its burden of showing
   specific facts that reasonably warranted the Terry stop by a preponderance of the
   evidence based on the past-proven reliable CI’s tip and independent police
   corroboration.117 Therefore, all contraband discovered as a result of the stop,
   including the firearm and the cocaine, were legitimately obtained and are not subject
   to suppression.
III.     THE STOOP OF A MULTI-UNIT APARTMENT COMPLEX PROVIDES NO
         REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AS PART OF THE CURTILAGE.

          Fullman argues that the stoop is a “private place” that is part of the curtilage of
   Brightway Commons and, therefore, his reasonable expectation of privacy was
   compromised by the Terry stop. As a result, all evidence found on his person there,
   and during his intake at SCI, must be suppressed. The State argues that the stoop of
   a multi-unit apartment complex is not part of the curtilage. The Court agrees with
   the State.
         Delaware looks to four factors when determining if an area lies within
   the curtilage:
              i.   The proximity of the area that is claimed to be curtilage to the
                   home;
             ii.   Whether the area is in an enclosure surrounding the home;
            iii.   How the resident uses the area; and
            iv.    The efforts undertaken by the resident to protect the area from
                   observation.118

   116
       Hr’g Tr. at 63:6–8.
   117
       King, 1993 WL 445484, at *2 (“Under the totality of the circumstances, when police arrived at
   the scene and saw King, who matched the description, they had probable cause to arrest him[.]”).
   118
       State v. Chapman, 2019 WL 2209092, at *4 (Del. Com. Pl. May 22, 2019) (cleaned up) (citing
   State v. Guardarrama, 2016 WL 7235694, at *4 (Del. Super. Dec. 14, 2016), aff’d, 179 A.3d 865,
   2018 WL 619856 (Del. Jan. 18, 2018) (ORDER)).
                                                  18
      The State provides no Delaware authority that addresses whether a stoop of a
multi-unit apartment complex is (or is not) part of a resident’s curtilage. Instead, the
State refers to Lease v. Tyler,119 a Middle District of Pennsylvania decision. There,
the court reasoned that “[t]he concept of curtilage has been significantly modified
when applied to a multiple [unit] dwelling,”120 and that “[b]ecause of the number of
residents and guests visiting a multiple-occupancy residence,” there is no justified
expectation of privacy, just as there would not be with a common yard or parking lot
open to the public.121
      This Court agrees with the reasoning in Tyler and sees no reason that a public
stoop such as the one here should be considered part of the curtilage. Thus, the Court
definitively holds that the stoop of a multi-unit apartment complex provides no
reasonable expectation of privacy as part of the protected curtilage.
                                       CONCLUSION
       For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
       IT IS SO ORDERED.

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119
    2008 WL 2673381 (M.D. Pa. June 30, 2008).
120
    Id. at *6 (first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Romano, 388 F. Supp. 101, 104
(E.D. Pa. 1975)).
121
    Id.
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