Court Opinion

ID: 9416897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:57:55.806983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:33.943323
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice-BE ADLEY:
I concur in the judgment of the court in this case, by which the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is affirmed, but not for the reasons specified in the opinion just read.
*140The claim of the plaintiff’, who is a married woman, to be admitted to practice as an attorney and counsellor-at-law, is based upon the supposed right of every person, man or woman, to engage in any lawful employment for a livelihood! The Supreme Court of Illinois denied the application on the ground that, by the common law, which is the basis of the laws of Illinois, only men were admitted to the .bar, and the legislature had not made any change in this respect, but had simply provided that no person'should be admitted to practice as attorney or counsellor without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from two justices.of the Supreme Court, and that no person should receive a license without first obtaining a certificate from the court of some county of his good moral character. .In other respects it was left to the discretion of the court to establish the rules by which admission to the profession should be determined. The'court, however, regarded itself as bound by at least two limitations. One was that it should establish such terms of admission as would promote the-proper administration of justice, and the other that it should not admit any persons, or class of persons, not intended by the legislature to be admitted, even though not expressly excluded by statute. In view of this latter limitation .the court felt compelled to deny the application of females to be admitted as members of the bar. Being contrary to the rules of the common law and the usages of Westminster Hall from time immemorial, it could not be supposed that the legislature had intended to adopt any different rule.
The claim that, under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, which declares that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, the statute law of Illinois, or the common law prevailing in that State, can no longer be set up as a barrier against the right of females to pursue 'any lawful employment for a livelihood (the .practice of law included), assumes that it is one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens to engage in any and every profession, occupation, or employment'in civil life,.
*141It certainly cannot be affirmejj as an historical fact, that this has ever been established as one of the fundamental privileges and immunities of the sex. On the contrary, the civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman’s protector aud defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicapy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic- sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong,-or should belong, to the family institution ■ is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the commou law that it became a ma£im of that system .of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social state; aud, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon„this cardinal principle still exist in full force in most States. One of these is, that a married woman is incapable, without her husband’s consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on her or him.- This very incapacity Was one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering a married woman incompetent fully' to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and counsellor.
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount destiny and.mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. ' Aud the rules of civil society *142must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.
The humane movements of modern society ^ which have for their object the multiplication of avenues for woman’s advancement, and of occupations adapted to her condition and sex,.have my heartiest concurrence. But I am not prepared to say that it is one.of her fundamental rights and privileges-to be admitted into every office and position, including those which require highly special qualifications and demanding special responsibilities. In the nature of things it is not every citizen of every age, sex, and condition that is qualified for every calling and position. It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on nature, reason, and experience for the due admission of qualified persons to professions .and .callings demanding special skill aud confidence. This fairly belongs to the police power of the State; and, in my opinion, in view of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within the province of-the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings shall be filled and discharged by men, and shall, receive the benefit of those energies and responsibilities, aud that decision and firmness which are presumed to predominate in the sterner sex.
For these reasons I think that the laws of Illinois now complained of are not obnoxious to the charge of abridging any of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.
Mr. Justice SWAYNE and Mr. Justice FIELD concurred in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice BRADLEY.
The CHIEF JUSTICE dissented from the judgment of the court, and from all the opinions.