Court Opinion

ID: 9520895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:52:47.645901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:11.669134
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Justice,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion. However, I do not read our court’s opinion in Tawney v. State, 439 N.E.2d 582 (Ind.1982), to “erroneously attribute ... to Blockburger v. United States ” double jeopardy analysis that looks to the manner in which offenses are charged in addition to the statutory definitions of the offenses. While our court’s opinion in Tawney mentioned the Blockburger “same elements” test, it went on to hold that, following an Indiana precedent, the court would look further:
In applying the test, however, we must look to the manner in which the offenses are charged and not merely to the statutory definitions of the offenses, as we do in determining the entitlement to an instruction on necessarily included offenses; Lawrence v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 330, 375 N.E.2d 208.
Tawney, 439 N.E.2d at 588. Lawrence was not a double jeopardy case; it involved a defendant’s entitlement to an instruction on a lesser included offense. This Court unanimously found the principle enunciated in Lawrence sufficiently analogous to be applicable in the double jeopardy context.
Tawney does not stand as an “erroneous” statement of federal double jeopardy jurisprudence but as a statement of the separate and distinct way in which Indiana courts analyze such claims. See Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 60 n. 7 (Ind.1995) (manner in which the offenses are charged is “[t]he second prong of our double jeopardy analysis”) (emphasis added); Kemp v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (Sullivan, J., concurring) (“Indiana double jeopardy analysis is therefore not identical to the federal analysis.”), transí denied.1 This statement reflects application of the principle *840of statutory construction that we will not attach cumulative penalties to the same offense, absent a clear indication to the contrary from the legislature. See Grinstead v. State, 684 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind.1997). We have also held that this analysis is required under art. I, § 14, of our state constitution. Chiesi v. State, 644 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ind.1994).2

. See also, e.g., Jewell v. State, 672 N.E.2d 417, 427 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied (Indiana double jeopardy jurisprudence distinct from federal); Channell v. State, 658 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (same), trans. denied; Smith v. State, 655 N.E.2d 532, 545 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (same), trans. denied; Ott v. State, 648 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (same); Shipley v. State, 620 N.E.24 710, 717 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (same).

. Chiesi was a unanimous decision making no reference, express or implied, to the federal constitution. Cf. Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 473 & n. 7 (Ind.1997) (federal Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence does not require looking to the manner in which offenses are charged; defendant presented no argument that Indiana Constitution provides double jeopardy protections different from those under federal constitution).