Court Opinion

ID: 9775573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:03:57.265315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:28.993344
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The Corpus Christi Area Convention and Tourist Bureau (Tourist Bureau) has filed a vigorous motion for rehearing in this case. The main thrust of the motion is that its “MOTION TO QUASH PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION IN ITS ENTIRETY”, since no exceptions were levelled at the conclusions alleged therein, was sufficient to serve as a plea in abatement; and, further, the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the plea.
Plaintiff Bryce alleged in his original petition:
“James R. Bryce brings this action as a property taxpayer pursuant to Article IX, Section 18, of the City Charter of Corpus Christi, Texas, to recover all monies illegally and without authorization paid by the defendant Corpus Christi Area Convention and Tourist Bureau to its officer, defendant Bob Conwell, from tax monies furnished to said Corpus Christi Area Convention and Tourist Bureau by the City of Corpus Christi pursuant to a contract or contracts between the City and the said Tourist Bureau • . . ”
The Tourist Bureau, in its said motion, alleged:
“Article 9, Section 18 does not authorize a suit to be brought by a private citizen against a contractor whereby the only claim by such Plaintiff is that such contracting party has made an illegal distribution . . . ”
Despite the Tourist Bureau’s contentions that no special exceptions were filed with respect to its motion, Bryce did challenge all allegations therein in a pleading denominated “PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO QUASH ACTION IN ITS ENTIRETY”, wherein the asserted provision of Article IX, Section 18 of the Corpus Christi City Charter is quoted, as follows:
“[I]n case any . . . illegal, unauthorized or fraudulent bills, claims or demand, or any such salary or compensation shall have been paid (a) citizen may maintain an action in the name of said city against the officer making such payment and the party receiving the same, or either, or both, to recover the amount so paid . . . ”
The allegations contained in the motion and in the response thereto do not constitute evidence. They do, however, put the authority of Bryce to bring the suit under the authority of the Charter in issue.
The City of Corpus Christi is not a party to the suit, and Bryce is not attempting to recover money that was illegally expended by the City itself. He brings the action in behalf of the City to recover monies which *501he alleges were illegally expended by the Tourist Bureau. Our observations in the original opinion apply solely to cases where the City itself has illegally expended public funds. Here, a recovery is sought, not against the City, but against the Tourist Bureau and Con well on two grounds: 1) an alleged violation by the defendant Tourist Bureau of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1396-2.24; and 2) pursuant to the provisions of Article IX, Section 18, of City of Corpus Christi Charter. Assuming, arguendo, that Bryce is not such a party who may bring this suit under the aforesaid statute, the burden was on the Tourist Bureau, in order to sustain its motion, to prove that the suit brought by Bryce was not authorized by Article IX, Section 18 of the Charter. This, it did not do. As noted in the original opinion, the relevant portion of the Charter was not introduced in evidence at the hearing on the motion. The record does not show that the Charter of the City of Corpus Christi, including Article IX, Section 18 thereof, has been recorded or certified in the manner required by Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. arts. 1165 and 1174, respectively. Consequently, neither the trial court (nor this Court) could take judicial notice of Article IX, Section 18 of the Charter. See Kirkman v. City of Amarillo, 508 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Hayden v. City of Houston, 305 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Under the record here presented, since the relevant provision of the Charter was not introduced in evidence and as the trial court was not authorized to take judicial notice of Article IX, Section 18 of the Charter, no basis existed for an abatement of the action.
The motion for rehearing is OVERRULED.