Court Opinion

ID: 9625315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:36:08.869669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:23:19.036132
License: Public Domain

Hamley, J.
(dissenting)—I fully agree with the dissenting views expressed by Judges Hill and Donworth. Judge Hill’s presentation of the constitutional question seems to me unanswerable. That Judge Donworth’s extensive discussion of the ultra vires question is equally unanswerable is pretty well indicated by the fact that, on that important point, the majority opinion has only this to say:
“Nor do we agree that the fluoridation is ultra vires simply because the police power is exercised through a municipal agency operated by the city in its proprietary capacity.”
The majority opinion appears to be based upon alternative theories, each of which seems to me unsound. The first of these is that no invasion of constitutional rights is involved because “the ordinance under consideration does not compel him [appellant] to do anything; it subjects him to no penalty . . . ” On this ground, the majority distinguishes State ex rel. Bolling v. Superior Court, 16 Wn. (2d) 373, 133 P. (2d) 803 (compulsory flag salute); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 147 A. L. R. 674 (compulsory flag salute); and Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Hill Military Academy, 268 U. S. 510, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571, 39 A. L. R. 468 (compulsory attendance at public schools).
In my opinion, this argument will not bear objective analysis. An employed homeowner in Chehalis must consume fluorides added to the water supply, or surrender constitutionally protected property rights in home and employment and move away (unless, of course, someone wants to suggest the quibble that such a person can buy bottled spring water). There are many who feel, as I do, that this penalty for refusing to consume fluorides is more severe, than the nominal jail sentences and fines usually meted out for violation of an ordinance.
Can the state or one of its subdivisions of government circumvent constitutional controls by devising a regulation *639which is practically incapable of avoidance; thereby making it unnecessary to prescribe a criminal penalty? If so, the area of governmental action thus released from constitutional fetters will be limited only by the ingenuity of man. If not, I do not see how this ordinance can stand.
The alternative theory upon which the majority opinion seems to be based seeks not to disclaim compulsion, but to defend it. The two cases cited in this section of the majority opinion sanctioned compulsory vaccination to protect against a contagious disease. The majority infers that the result would have been the same had the compulsion related to a noncontagious disease.
This alternative theory appears to follow this process of reasoning: The protection of public health is a valid exercise of the police power; the protection of public health includes protection from the introduction or spread of both contagious and noncontagious diseases; therefore, it is immaterial that the disease of dental caries is noncontagious rather than contagious.
In this process of reasoning, the majority, I believe, overlooks a very important limitation upon the exercise of the police power, which is that, whether the police power is being exercised for the protection of public health or for any other reason, it may not extend to the point of impairing a constitutionally guaranteed personal right, unless justified by “conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others” (Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 89, 34 L. Ed. 620, 11 S. Ct. 13), or by “pressure of great dangers” (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 49 L. Ed. 643, 25 S. Ct. 358).
It is because of this limitation on the exercise of the police power that the courts have drawn a distinction between contagious and noncontagious diseases. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, supra; Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N. E. 89, 50 L. R. A. 64, 80 Am. St. 195. Where it is shown that, because of the contagious nature of a disease, a serious threat to public health is presented, the tests referred to above, for determining whether the exercise of the police power can *640extend to the impairment of personal rights, have been met. By necessary inference, where it is shown that a disease is not contagious, these tests have not been met, and the indicated limitation upon the exercise of the police power applies.
The fact that dental caries is not a contagious disease is therefore material, since it is thereby established that the limitation on the exercise of the police power applies in this case. Any other view would, it seems to me, be an admission that the courts have been fooling all of this time when they have said that it is a valid exercise of the police power to interfere with constitutionally guaranteed personal liberties, where necessary to prevent the introduction or spread of contagious or communicable diseases.
The principle being established by the majority opinion, even more than the specific deprivation of personal liberty here accomplished, warrants deep concern. The case before us deals with what some will regard as a relatively minor aspect of dental health. But the principle announced is not so limited. It would be equally applicable if fluoridation (or iodination) was being relied upon to counteract goiter or any other noncontagious bodily malady. What future proposals may be made to treat noncontagious diseases by adding ingredients to our water supply, or food, or air, only time will tell. When that day arrives, those who treasure their personal liberty will look in vain for a constitutional safeguard. The answer will be: “You gave the constitution away in the Kaul case.”
There is no contention in the instant case that the fluorides program represents the majority opinion of the citizens of Chehalis. No referendum vote was taken. Considering the results of referendum votes taken elsewhere, it is, to say the least, doubtful if such a program would meet with the approval of the people of Chehalis. At the November 2, 1954, elections, nine of the eleven American communities which voted on the proposition turned it down. Among these nine cities Were Atlantic City, New Jersey; Salem, Oregon; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Fremont, Nebraska. The *641proposition was approved in Palo Alto, California, and Mountain Home, Arkansas.
It may be that the voting citizens of our country have been influenced by a disquieting concern for their liberties which has so far failed to stir the judiciary.
But even were it to be assumed that the majority of the citizens of Chehalis approve of this move, that would not condone an impairment of constitutional rights. The constitutional guarantees are to protect the rights of the minority—not the majority. The majority does not need protection, because it does not do anything it does not want to do.
The question which I asked in my dissent in State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wn. (2d) 860, 873, 239 P. (2d) 545, now becomes more urgent than ever:
“Can we, . . . withstand the insidious erosion [of our basic liberties] produced by a multiplicity of little instances where, as here, a guaranteed right is set aside because it interferes with what is said to be good for us?”
Grady, C. J., Hill, and Donworth, JJ., concur with Hamley, J.
January 13,1955. Petition for rehearing denied.