Court Opinion

ID: 9681809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:56:55.702125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:35.982620
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent with all the vigor at my command.
This court has repeatedly held that while the allegations in a motion to revoke need not strictly comply with the requirements of an indictment, they should fully inform the probationer so that he and his counsel will know what he will be called upon to defend against. Wilcox v. State, 477 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Campbell v. State, 4S6 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). Where the basis of the revocation is a violation of a penal law, the “allegations must give fair notice and should allege a violation of the law.” Jansson v. State, 473 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). See also Gamble v. State, 484 S.W.2d 713 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). And, when the motion fails to so fully inform the probationer, he is denied the rudiments of due process. Kuenstler v. State, 486 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).
In the instant case the State’s motion to revoke probation filed March 28, 1972 alleged that the appellant
“. . . on or about the 19th day of March, 1972, in Harris County, Texas then and there was legally in a retail business establishment as an invitee and licensee, and while in said establishment did then and there remove from their place in said establishment merchandise, of the value of less than fifty dollars, which was then and there being kept, stored and displayed for sale in said establishment, with the intent to fraudulently take said property and deprive the owner thereof, of the value of the same and to appropriate the same to the use and benefit of the said ALBERT JOE DEMPSEY.”
The defects in such pleadings by which the State sought to charge the offense of shoplifting are obvious. The motion is couched in such general terms as to give the appellant no notice of what retail establishment in populous Harris County was involved, nor was he even informed of the general type of retail establishment or the name of the owner, or the type of merchandise. Further, the allegation “on or about the 19th day of March, 1972” does not bind the State in a revocation proceeding to that date in its proof so long as the date proved is within the probationary term. See Rogers v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 239, 333 S.W.2d 383 (1960).
Such motion in no way was sufficient to enable the appellant to prepare a defense or to determine what witnesses to subpoena.
On June 2, 1972, a hearing was conducted on the motion in question. Just as soon as the State had read aloud its motion, appellant’s court-appointed counsel entered a plea of “untrue” for the appellant, and in the same sentence immediately called the trial court’s attention to the deficiencies in the motion and informed the court he was unable to prepare any defense for the appellant. The motion was, in effect, overruled and the testimony was ordered commenced. At the conclusion of the hearing, the motion was renewed and again overruled.
*54Appellant relies upon Campbell v. State, supra; Pollard v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 39, 353 S.W.2d 449 (1962); Jansson v. State, 473 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Bur-kett v. State, 485 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and Kuenstler v. State, 486 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). These authorities clearly support appellant’s position and call for reversal.
The majority, however, struggles mightily to distinguish these cases, but, in my opinion, fails.
In Pollard and Jansson there is nothing in the opinions to indicate when or what form the challenge to the motion to revoke took.1 Therefore, the majority attempts to distinguish these cases solely by simply saying the allegations there were more general than the instant case or did not necessarily charge a violation of the law. This is merely a matter of degree. While the allegations in Pollard were more general than in the instant case, the allegations here still did not properly inform the appellant what he had to defend against. He was not told what retail establishment was involved or who the owner was, or what type of merchandise was involved, and, in view of the “on or about” allegation as to date, the State was free to cause him to meet proof of any shoplifting violation from the very time he was placed on probation. Further, in my opinion, the allegations in the motion to revoke did “not allege which facts would necessarily constitute a violation of the law” just as the allegations in Jansson failed to do the same thing.
Clearly the majority’s artificial efforts to distinguish these cases are not successful.
Campbell is sought to be distinguished merely because the motion to quash the revocation motion was “timely filed prior to the hearing.” Burkett was sought to be distinguished because there a written motion to quash was filed and Kuenstler because “prior to the hearing” the accused raised the question as to “vague, general and indefinite” allegations.
Without holding that a written motion to quash a revocation motion is absolutely required, the majority holds that the “objection” was not timely because it came after the State had read its motion and the plea of “untrue” was entered. As earlier observed, the oral motion to quash was contained in the same sentence as the plea of “untrue” and was prior to the hearing and before any witness testified.2
There is nothing in this record to show if a copy of the revocation motion was ever served upon the appellant or his counsel or that they had any knowledge that the same was defective before the same was read in open court.
For the majority to draw these narrow, shallow, technical, and unrealistic distinctions in an attempt to avoid the requirements of due process in this case is wrong.
For the reasons stated, I dissent.
ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissent.

. Pollard was actually x-eversed on another ground and the court in passing called attention to the defective pleading. An examination of the record in that cause does not reveal a motion to quash or other challenge to the revocation motion. In Horman v. State, 423 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.Cr.App.1968), this court held the pleadings defective. An examination of the i-ecord reveals no challenge to the revocation motion. It may well be argued, however, that Horman was reversed because the proof fails to show a violation of a penal law or other probationary condition.

. In effect the majority is saying that a motion calling the trial court’s attention to fatal defects in the revocation motion at the time the plea is entered and prior to the taking of testimony is the same as raising the question of the sufficiency of the motion for the first time on appeal. See Burkett v. State, supra; Vance v. State, 485 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) ; Kinard v. State, 477 S.W.2d 896 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) ; Wilcox v. State, 477 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and Guinn v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 181, 289 S.W.2d 583 (1956).