Court Opinion

ID: 9555825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 13:11:30.616838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:12.548146
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Humphreys, Malveaux and Fulton
              Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia

              BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF RAPPAHANNOCK
               COUNTY

              v.     Record No. 1432-22-4

              JOSEPH B. LONG, ET AL.                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
                                                                           JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
                                                                                 AUGUST 15, 2023
              JEREMIAH J. ATKINS

              v.     Record No. 1451-22-4

              JOSEPH B. LONG, ET AL.

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY
                                               Jeanette A. Irby, Judge

                              Robert T. Mitchell, Jr. (Hall, Monahan, Engle, Mahan & Mitchell, on
                              briefs), for Board of Supervisors of Rappahannock County.

                              David L. Konick for Jeremiah J. Atkins.

                              William D. Ashwell (Ashwell & Ashwell, PLLC, on briefs), for
                              Joseph B. Long and John Cappiali.

                     The Board of Supervisors of Rappahannock County (the “Board”) and Jeremiah J. Atkins

              (Atkins) appeal the judgment of the circuit court reversing the Board’s denial of Joseph B. Long and

              John Cappiali’s application for a special exception permit to operate a contractor’s yard. On appeal,

              the Board and Atkins argue that the circuit court erred by ruling that Long and Cappiali rebutted the

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
presumptive validity of the Board’s decision and that the Board’s decision to deny the application

was not fairly debatable.

                                          BACKGROUND

       Long owns an agriculturally-zoned property lot in Rappahannock County along Route 211

(the “property”). On May 29, 2018, Long authorized Cappiali to “in any way or manner deal with”

the property on his behalf. Cappiali resided at the property and used it in connection with the

operation of his general contractor business.

       In early 2018, the Rappahannock County Zoning Administrator (the “Administrator”)

received complaints that Long and Cappiali were operating the property as a “junkyard.” On

October 30, 2018, the Administrator inspected the property and subsequently issued a notice of

violation to Long and Cappiali because their use of the property violated the Rappahannock County

zoning ordinance (the “zoning ordinance”). Specifically, the Administrator found that there were

more commercial vehicles on the property than the zoning ordinance permitted, that the equipment

on the property “vastly exceed[ed] what would be customarily found in a residential or agricultural

use,” and that Long and Cappiali were operating a contractor’s yard without a special exception

permit.1 The Administrator advised Long and Cappiali that they “may” be able to resolve these

issues by applying for a special exception permit to operate a contractor’s yard on the property.

       On January 25, 2019, Cappiali filed an application with the Rappahannock County Zoning

Office requesting a special exception permit to operate a 2.62-acre contractor’s yard on the property

(the “permit application”). The permit application included a letter from Long and Cappiali to the

Administrator informing her that they intended to construct two buildings on the property, one to

       1
          The zoning ordinance defines “contractor’s offices, shops and materials storage yards”
as “[e]stablishments for the construction and/or repair of buildings, road and utility lines;
installation and servicing of heating, cooling and electrical equipment; flooring; painting,
plumbing, roofing and tiling; and/or excavating.” Rappahannock County Code § 170-8.
                                                -2-
“supply covered storage” and another two-story building to “serve as a shop and covered storage.”

The permit application further included construction plans and permits for the proposed buildings.

        On November 20, 2019, the Rappahannock County Planning Commission (the “Planning

Commission”) held a public hearing on whether it should recommend that the Board approve the

permit application. Atkins, who lived across from the property, requested that the Planning

Commission recommend that the Board deny the permit application because one of the proposed

buildings “would be one of the five largest structures in the [c]ounty” and other such structures were

located in commercial or industrial zoning districts. Atkins further argued that the permit

application did not comply with Rappahannock County’s Comprehensive Land Use Plan (the

“comprehensive plan”). Relevant to this case, principle seven of the comprehensive plan states that

Rappahannock County is a “scenic county” and that one of its principles is to “[p]romote only

economic growth that assists in maintaining [its] existing balance and is compatible with the

environmental quality and rural character and does not adversely affect active farm operations,

forestry operations, residential neighborhoods, the tourist industry, and the county’s fiscal stability.”

        Other citizens present at the Planning Commission hearing also objected to the permit

application because the property “was very visible at the entry to” Rappahannock County, the

proposed contractor’s yard would reduce the value of nearby properties, and granting the permit

application would convert farmland “to a use that had nothing to do with farming.” The owners of

three adjacent properties also submitted letters in opposition to the permit application because

granting the application would reduce the value of their properties. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the Planning Commission unanimously recommended that the Board deny the permit

application “[b]ased on concerns of economic impact on the residential community of where the

property is located, changing of the rural character of neighborhood, potential adverse impact of the

tourist industry of the county fiscal stability, environmental issues, property located on a scenic

                                                  -3-
entry way of the county.” The Planning Commission also cited principle seven of the

comprehensive plan in support of its recommendation.

       On March 2, 2020, the Board held a public hearing on the permit application. At the

hearing, Cappiali stated that his work had “contributed to the county and to the property,” and

“stressed the importance” of fostering small family businesses. Atkins argued that granting the

permit application would adversely affect neighbors, use of adjoining properties, and reduce

agricultural land in violation of the comprehensive plan. Other citizens argued that the property was

not a proper location for a contractor’s yard. The Board unanimously denied the permit application

“based on the general standard pertaining to special exception permits under § 170-52 of the zoning

ordinance, including subsections A & E and incorporating by reference the Planning Commission’s

prior recommendation for denial.”

       On March 10, 2020, Long and Cappiali appealed the Board’s decision to the circuit court

arguing that their proposed use of the property complied with both the zoning ordinance and the

comprehensive plan and would not negatively impact other properties. Atkins filed a motion to

intervene in the appeal, which the circuit court granted.

       At the appeal hearing, Long and Cappiali introduced testimony from the Administrator. The

Administrator explained that she presented the permit application to the Board along with the

Planning Commission’s recommendation. She further explained that she did not present any

additional “data or facts” to the Board regarding the proposed use of the property but noted that the

Board members were familiar with the property and heard from members of the community. The

Administrator also testified that the property is located at a scenic entryway into Rappahannock

County.

       Long and Cappiali also introduced testimony from Garrey Curry, the Rappahannock County

Administrator and the Board’s clerk, who similarly testified that his office did not undertake “any

                                                 -4-
particular research, investigation,” or “data collection,” to assist the Board in making its decision.

Curry further testified that the property is visible from Route 211.

        Cappiali testified that the area in which the proposed contractor’s yard would be located is

not visible from Route 211. Cappiali acknowledged that two members of the Planning Commission

and three Board members had visited the property previously. Additionally, Cappiali testified that

the Planning Commission’s minutes were “inaccurate” because they did not include additional

statements made at the hearing and claimed that the Planning Commission recommended that the

Board deny the permit application solely on the basis that its approval would “harm the viewshed.”2

Cappiali further testified that no “data or facts” were presented to the Board to support its decision

and that the Board’s minutes included additional reasons in support of its decision that were not

discussed at its public hearing.

        At the conclusion of Long and Cappiali’s case-in-chief, the Board and Atkins moved to

strike the appeal on the basis that Long and Cappiali failed to rebut the presumptive validity of the

Board’s decision. The circuit court found that Long and Cappiali rebutted the presumption and

denied the motion to strike. Thereafter, the Board introduced testimony from the Zoning

Administrator and Curry, who both testified that the Planning Commission’s and Board’s minutes

were accurate.

        The Board also introduced testimony from Keir Whitson, the member of the Board who

moved to deny the permit application; he also testified that the Board’s minutes were accurate.

Supervisor Whitson testified that he visited the property twice while considering the permit

application and described it as both a “junkyard” and “a gathering place for . . . a random collection

of equipment and other things.” He explained that he “had no confidence [the property] would be a

        2
        Cappiali conceded, however, that he did not remember all of the reasons for which the
Planning Commission recommended that the Board deny the permit application.
                                             -5-
contained contractor’s yard,” that the proposed location of the contractor’s yard could be seen from

Route 211, and that granting the permit application would have an “immediate and long-lasting

adverse effect on any neighboring property in the entire area.”3 Supervisor Whitson also testified

that the property is located at the “primary scenic gateway” into Rappahannock County that

“tourists really appreciate” and that he had “a responsibility to do everything possible not to

undermine the revenue that comes from tourism.”

        In closing, the Board and Atkins argued that Long and Cappiali failed to prove that the

Board unreasonably denied the permit application because the record and Supervisor Whitson’s

testimony supported its decision. The Board and Atkins further argued that the evidence showed

that whether to grant the permit application is a fairly debatable question and that, as such, the

Board’s decision “must be sustained.”

        Noting that the circuit court had previously found that they had rebutted the presumptive

validity of the Board’s decision, Long and Cappiali argued that the Board and Atkins failed to

introduce evidence showing that the Board’s decision to deny the permit was fairly debatable. They

contended that no evidence had been introduced showing that granting the permit application would

impact neighboring properties or would result in a “scenic impact.” They further argued that

Supervisor Whitson’s testimony did not include any substantive basis for the Board’s decision.

        After considering the evidence and the arguments of the parties, the circuit court ruled that

the Board’s denial of the permit application was “arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable” and that

the Board’s decision was not fairly debatable. In support of its ruling, the circuit court found that no

evidence showed that granting the permit application would adversely affect the use of any

neighboring property and no “credible evidence” that the contractor’s yard would be visible to an

        3
       Supervisor Whitson testified that the property is situated lower than Route 211, which is
“somewhat elevated,” and that “basically the whole property” could be seen from Route 211.
                                              -6-
adjoining landowner.4 As to the complaints regarding the conversion of farmland, the circuit court

found that non-farm uses were allowed on the property with a special exception permit. The circuit

court also found that Supervisor Whitson “did not provide any additional information or relevant

evidence” supporting the Board’s decision. The circuit court subsequently reversed the Board’s

decision and ordered it to grant the permit application. The Board and Atkins appeal.

                                            ANALYSIS

       On appeal, the Board and Atkins contend that the circuit court erred by ruling that Long and

Cappiali rebutted the presumptive validity of the Board’s decision and that the Board’s decision to

deny the permit application was not fairly debatable. As we recently held in Manors, LLC v. Board

of Supervisors, 76 Va. App. 737, 750 (2023):

               Granting or denying a special exception is a legislative action,
               which courts review under the “fairly debatable” standard. Cnty.
               Bd. of Arlington v. Bratic, 237 Va. 221, 227 (1989). “A legislative
               act involves the ‘balancing of the consequences of private conduct
               against the interests of public welfare, health, and safety.’”
               Helmick [v. Town of Warrenton], 254 Va. [225,] 229 [(1997)]
               (quoting Bd. of Supervisors v. Southland Corp., 224 Va. 514, 522
               (1982)). We presume that all legislative acts are reasonable.
               Bratic, 237 Va. at 227. But if a petitioning property owner
               presents “probative evidence of unreasonableness,” he defeats that
               presumption. Id. A board then bears the burden to present
               evidence that the decision was reasonable. Id. If that evidence
               shows that the decision was at least “fairly debatable,” then the
               legislative act is valid and must be upheld. Id. A decision is fairly
               debatable if “the evidence offered in support of the opposing views
               would lead objective and reasonable persons to reach different
               conclusions.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Supervisors v. Jackson, 221 Va.
               328, 333 (1980)).

       4
         In support of its finding that no “credible evidence” showed that the proposed
contractor’s yard would be visible to an adjoining landowner, the circuit court found that “[t]he
adjoining landowner . . . did not testify.” As the record shows that three “adjacent” landowners
submitted letters to the Planning Commission in opposition to the permit application, the circuit
court appears to have misunderstood the nature of the proceeding.
                                                 -7-
        We assume, without deciding, that Long and Cappiali met their initial burden and produced

probative evidence showing that the Board unreasonably denied the permit application. As a result,

the question before the Court is whether the Board and Atkins produced evidence sufficient to allow

any objective and reasonable person to conclude that the Board reasonably denied the permit

application. Id. The Board and Atkins argue that they did, and we agree.

        Long and Cappiali contend that the evidence failed to show that the Board reasonably

denied the permit application and that they “created a record which the Board could not . . . rebut.”

In support of their argument, they rely on evidence in the record suggesting that the Board

unreasonably denied the permit application, the circuit court’s finding that Supervisor Whitson “did

not provide any additional information or relevant evidence,” and the circuit court’s conclusion that

the Board’s decision was “arbitrary and capricious.” Long and Cappiali misunderstand the fairly

debatable standard. As set forth above, the Board and Atkins did not need to persuade the circuit

court that the Board reasonably denied the permit application, but rather only that an objective and

reasonable person could conclude that it reasonably did so. See id. Moreover, the circuit court’s

findings do not diminish the presumptive validity of the Board’s decision on appeal. See Bd. of

Supervisors v. Stickley, 263 Va. 1, 6 (2002) (explaining a legislative action is presumed reasonable

until this Court “holds with the trial court that the legislative action is unreasonable” (quoting

Jackson, 221 Va. at 334)).

        In this case, the Rappahannock County Code requires that a use must comply with ten

requirements before the Board will grant a special exception permit. Rappahannock County Zoning

Ordinance § 170-52. Relevant to this appeal, the code requires that the use “will not adversely

affect the use or development of neighboring properties . . . or impair the value thereof.” Id.

§ 170-52(A). Further, the proposed use must not “cause an undue impact on the historic or scenic

qualities of the immediate area.” Id. § 170-52(I). Finally, the use must not “be detrimental to the

                                                  -8-
implementation of the adopted Comprehensive Plan, including the goals contained therein.” Id.

§ 170-52(J). The comprehensive plan states that Rappahannock County is a “scenic county” and

that one of its land use principles is to “[p]romote only economic growth” that is “compatible with”

its “rural character” and that “does not adversely affect . . . the tourist industry.”

        At the hearing, Supervisor Whitson testified that the property is located at the “primary

scenic gateway” into Rappahannock County that “tourists really appreciate.” Furthermore, both

Supervisor Whitson and Curry testified that the location of the proposed contractor’s yard is visible

from Route 211. After visiting the property twice, Supervisor Whitson had “no confidence” that the

property would be a “contained contractor’s yard” and determined that granting the permit

application would have an “immediate and long-lasting adverse effect on any neighboring property

in the entire area.” The record further shows that multiple landowners, including Atkins, informed

the Planning Commission that granting the permit application would reduce the value of their

properties, which the Planning Commission incorporated into its recommendation to the Board.5

        Considering the evidence contained in the record, we find that an objective and reasonable

person could conclude that the Board reasonably denied the permit application. As such, the

Board’s decision was fairly debatable and must be sustained. Manors LLC, 76 Va. App. at 750.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and enter final judgment in favor of the

Board and Atkins.6

        5
         Notwithstanding Cappiali’s testimony that the Board and Planning Commission’s
minutes were inaccurate, Long and Cappiali concede on appeal that “the record . . . was
stipulated to by the parties” and “evidence to be considered by the trial court.”
        6
        As we conclude that the Board and Atkins introduced sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the Board’s decision was fairly debatable, we do not consider their additional
assignments of error. See Moore v. Joe, 76 Va. App. 509, 517 n.2 (2023) (noting that the Court
must decide case on the best and narrowest grounds possible).
                                              -9-
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is reversed.

                                                              Reversed and final judgment.

                                       - 10 -