Court Opinion

ID: 9490617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:49:23.968901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:12.838144
License: Public Domain

FARRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would grant deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation of § 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Under this interpretation, the phrase “related to” encompasses inchoate crimes such as Arizona’s solicitation offense when the underlying conduct would be in violation of a controlled substances law.
As evidenced by the amount of analysis given by the majority to the federal statute, I do not appear to be alone in my belief that interpretation of § 241(a)(2)(B)© controls. In this regard, I begin with a point of possible agreement. Resolution of this matter requires a dual inquiry, with dual standards of review. Under the Chevron doctrine, deference may be employed in establishing the parameters of § 241(a)(2)(B)®. Once a proper interpretation is determined, however, de novo review of the Arizona statute will establish whether solicitation falls within those parameters. Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 580 (8th Cir.1995)(Bennett, J. dissenting).
Contrary to the majority’s implication, application of Chevron is not inconsistent with the sole Ninth Circuit authority cited on § 241(a)(2)(B)(i), Flores-Arellano v. INS, 5 F.3d 360 (9th Cir.1993). Flores-Arellano did not address the question of deference, finding instead a clear congressional intent to include under-the-influenee crimes within § 241(a)(2)(B)(i). Id. at 362. This approach follows the teachings of Chevron. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (stating that courts must give effect to the clearly expressed intent of Congress).
In reversing the Board, the majority mentions deference, but relies upon the type of plain language approach used in Flores-Arellano. I cannot agree that this is a plain language ease.1 As in Flores-Arellano, *1327§ 241(a)(2)(B)(i) is silent as to a conviction for solicitation of a controlled substance. Unlike the crime in Flores-Arellano, however, there is more than one plausible interpretation for whether solicitation should be included in the statutory definition of deportable offenses. Focusing solely on the specific inclusion of two generic crimes, the statute may be read in the manner that the majority suggests. Focusing on the broad “relating to” phrase, as was done by the Board, it may be read in the opposite manner.
As the majority notes, the statutory history does little to clarify which approach is correct. Congressional intent need be ascertained, if at all, from the plain language of the statute. The majority suggests no viable alternative method and I believe that none exists. I conclude that § 241(a)(2)(B)® is either silent or ambiguous on the inclusion of solicitation crimes and deference to the Board’s interpretation is appropriate. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781; De Osorio v. INS, 10 F.3d 1034, 1043 (4th Cir.1993)(rejecting the doctrine of lenity as non-dispositive).
Employing deference, I would also conclude that the Board’s interpretation of § 241(a)(2)(B)(i) is reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. We have previously recognized Congress’ clear intent to deport aliens who commit drug related crimes. See Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 944 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir.1991). A reasonable implementation of this intent, and the language of the statute, is found in the Board’s interpretation.
The question of deference is dispositive in this context. It is virtually unquestionable that Arizona’s solicitation statute meets the requirements of § 241(a)(2)(B)® under the Board’s interpretation. Because solicitation is a deportable offense, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10), as amended by § 440(a) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
j woui¿ affirm,

. Nor do I believe that the majority has looked solely to plain language. Instead, it indicates that "[s]imply put, solicitation is not on the list.” Under any interpretation, this is an application *1327of the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alteri-us.” This maxim has been severely questioned as a reliable indicator of Congress' intent. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C.Cir.1973).