Court Opinion

ID: 9949041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 17:11:09.80061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:33.969983
License: Public Domain

J-A26008-23

                               2024 PA Super 43

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

                                         :          PENNSYLVANIA

                                         :

              v.                         :

                                         :

                                         :

 RICKY G. VANCE                          :

                                         :

                   Appellant             :   No. 2886 EDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 20, 2022

  In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                    at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003484-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.:                               FILED MARCH 8, 2024

     Appellant, Ricky G. Vance, appeals from the October 20, 2022 Judgment

of Sentence of life imprisonment entered in the Montgomery County Court of

Common Pleas following his jury conviction of First-Degree Murder and

Criminal Conspiracy to Commit First-Degree Murder arising from his role in

the November 28, 2020 murder-for-hire of the Victim.1 Appellant challenges

numerous evidentiary rulings.     After careful review, we affirm Appellant’s

Judgment of Sentence.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a) and 903(a), respectively.
J-A26008-23

      The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows.              At

approximately 10:00 PM on November 28, 2020, a person or persons fatally

shot the Victim at the intersection of East Handcock and Church Roads in

Lansdale, Montgomery County.

      Through the course of its investigation into the Victim’s murder, the

police developed a theory that Chong Ling Dan had set into motion a murder-

for-hire scheme to retaliate against his former paramour by hiring two men to

kill the Victim, a woman with whom Mr. Dan’s former paramour was currently

romantically involved.

      The police investigation into the murder revealed that a distinctive black

Cadillac, later identified as belonging to Appellant, followed the Victim’s car

on and then off the Pennsylvania Turnpike. In addition, witness testimony

and surveillance video depicted Appellant’s Cadillac pull up to the Victim’s

vehicle at the intersection where the crime occurred and then leave

immediately after multiple gunshots were fired.        The passenger side of

Appellant’s Cadillac later tested positive for gunshot residue.     Ultimately,

police discovered that Terrence Marche had borrowed Appellant’s Cadillac on

the night of the murder.

      The evidence also indicated that, although Mr. Dan and Mr. Marche did

not know each other, Appellant knew both Mr. Dan and Mr. Marche.

                                     -2-
J-A26008-23

      The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the above crimes.2 At trial,

and relevant to the instant appeal, the Commonwealth presented Montgomery

County Detective Bureau Lieutenant William Mitchell as an expert in call detail

record analysis and cell phone records.     He testified that he reviewed cell

phone records for Appellant’s phone, for Mr. Dan’s cell phone, and for two of

Mr. Marche’s cell phones, and generated reports. Lieutenant Mitchell testified

extensively regarding the numerous dates and times that the cell phone

activity and Google GPS location data indicated that the cell phones and, thus,

the men, had been together. These records included data indicating that in

the days leading up to the murder, Appellant and Mr. Dan had been together,

and on the night of the murder Appellant’s and Mr. Marche’s cell phones were

together. Appellant lodged numerous objections to the Commonwealth’s use

of the Google GPS location data.3     The trial court overruled each of these

objections.

2 The Commonwealth also charged and convicted Mr. Dan of the same
offenses. Police have been unable to locate Mr. Marche and he has not been
charged for his role in the scheme.

3 As we will discuss in detail infra, Appellant objected to the admission of the

Google GPS location data on the grounds that it was hearsay and that the
Commonwealth had failed to properly authenticate it. He also objected to the
testimony of, and the expert report prepared by, the Commonwealth’s expert
witness, Lieutenant William Mitchell, asserting that Lieutenant Mitchell was
not qualified to offer evidence pertaining to the accuracy of Google GPS
location data, and to the admission of Commonwealth’s Exhibit C29-D—a
certification from Eugene Maduewesi, Google’s custodian of records—
regarding the GPS data.

                                     -3-
J-A26008-23

      Appellant testified in his own defense, claiming that he was not involved

in the murder, even though his Cadillac had been used in the crime.           He

asserted that Mr. Marche had asked Appellant to borrow the Cadillac and

Appellant had agreed. Appellant claimed that he did not know why Mr. Marche

wanted to borrow the Cadillac and that Appellant did not need money and

would not participate in a murder-for-hire scheme. Relevantly, Appellant also

sought to testify about certain statements purportedly made to him by Mr.

Marche.4 The Commonwealth objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds

and the trial court sustained the objection and precluded this testimony.

      A jury convicted Appellant of First-Degree Murder and Criminal

Conspiracy to Commit First-Degree Murder. On October 20, 2022, the trial

court sentenced Appellant to a term of life imprisonment. This timely appeal

followed.5

      Appellant raises the following six issues for our review:

      I.     Whether the trial court erred in admitting at trial Google GPS
             location evidence, through the testimony of Lieutenant
             William Mitchell and his expert reports, in that the Google
             GPS location information constitutes inadmissible hearsay

4 In particular, Appellant sought to testify that on the night of the murder, Mr.

Marche told Appellant that he wished to borrow Appellant’s vehicle to “see a
broad and take care of some business” and that the next day in response to
questioning by Appellant, Mr. Marche made the statements “I did some fucked
up shit . . . its better you not know about it.” N.T. Trial, 9/20/22, at 229-30.
Appellant argued that these statements were not hearsay because he was
offering them not for their truth but to explain his state of mind and
subsequent course of conduct and that excluding this testimony violated his
due process rights. Id. at 230-31.

5 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

                                      -4-
J-A26008-23

            and its admission violated Appellant’s Sixth Amendment
            right to confront witnesses?

     II.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting at
            trial Google GPS location information, through the testimony
            of Lieutenant William Mitchell and his expert reports, in that
            the Google proprietary GPS location information was not
            properly authenticated by foundational evidence or
            testimony by a witness with personal knowledge identifying
            and establishing a proper foundation that the machines,
            processes and algorithms used by Google to generate the
            location information, produce consistent, reliable and
            accurate results?

     III.   Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
            Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-29D which was proffered as a
            certification by Google’s Custodian of Records but which
            contained [a] statement without any foundation by the
            custodian of records that Google’s “electronic process or
            system [for generating GPS location information] produces
            an accurate result” and that “[t]he accuracy of Google’s
            electronic process and system is regularly verified by
            Google,” where such statement constituted inadmissible
            hearsay     and   its  admission     violated   [A]ppellant’s
            constitutional right to confrontation, and was further
            admissible because it constituted an expert opinion, by a
            person not properly qualified as an expert in court, as to the
            accuracy of the location information produced by Google’s
            unknown technical process for generating GPS location
            information?

     IV.    Whether the GPS location evidence introduced through the
            expert testimony of Lieutenant Mitchell and his expert
            reports was properly introduced at trial as information relied
            upon by an expert, where Lieutenant Mitchell merely served
            as a conduit for communication or parroting to the jury the
            GPS location information generated by Google and Google’s
            assessment (in meters) of the accuracy of that information,
            where Lieutenant Mitchell did not participate in the
            generation of the data or the assessment of its accuracy,
            was unfamiliar with and had no knowledge of the algorithm
            or technical protocols used by Google’s automated process
            for generating such data and its accuracy, and, further
            where the [c]ourt did not instruct the jury that any Google
            location information that Lieutenant Mitchell relied on in

                                     -5-
J-A26008-23

            rendering his opinions should not be used as substantive
            evidence?

      V.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in precluding as
            inadmissible hearsay, [] Appellant from testifying that on
            the night of the killing, Terrence Marche told Appellant that
            he wished to borrow Appellant’s vehicle to “see a broad and
            take care of some business” and that the next day in
            response to questioning by Appellant, Marche made the
            statements “I did some fucked up shit . . . its better you not
            know about it,” where the statements were being offered
            solely to show Appellant’s subsequent course of conduct in
            the days and weeks following the killing in communicating
            more frequently with Marche, and in denying that he lent
            his car to anyone that night in his interview with detectives,
            where the probative value of the statements was not in any
            way dependent on the truth of the statements?

      VI.   Did the trial court’s preclusion of the aforesaid statements
            by Marche, that he wished to borrow Appellant’s vehicle to
            “see a broad and take care of some business” and that the
            next day in response to questioning by Appellant, Marche
            made the statements “I did some fucked up shit . . . its
            better you not know about it,” deny Appellant a fair and full
            opportunity to assert a complete defense in violation of
            Appellant’s right to due process under both the Pennsylvania
            and United States Constitutions?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-7 (reordered for ease of disposition; suggested answers

omitted).

                                      A.

      Appellant’s issues require us to consider the trial court’s rulings on the

admissibility of evidence.   We review such determinations for an abuse of

discretion. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 754 (Pa. Super.

2014). An abuse of discretion is “the overriding or misapplication of the law,

or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of

bias, prejudice, ill-will[,] or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”

                                     -6-
J-A26008-23

Commonwealth v. Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations

omitted).

      In addition, Appellant’s claim the trial court’s rulings violated his rights

under the Confrontation Clause is a question of law which we review de novo.

Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 530 (Pa. 2013).

                                       B.

      In his first two issues, Appellant challenges the admission of the Google

GPS location data obtained from his cell phone as hearsay and not properly

authenticated. We address each claim seriatim.

Hearsay

      Appellant first claims that the Google GPS location evidence admitted at

trial by way of Lieutenant Mitchell’s expert report and testimony is

inadmissible hearsay. Appellant’s Brief at 24-32.

      “[H]earsay is an out of court statement offered for the truth of the

matter asserted and is inadmissible unless it falls within an exception to the

hearsay rule.”   Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 480 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (citation omitted); Pa.R.E. 801(c).

      Pennsylvania’s hearsay rule explains that hearsay is a statement that:

“(1) the declarant [did] not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing

and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in

the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c)(1)-(2). The Rule defines a “statement” as “a

person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person

                                      -7-
J-A26008-23

intended it as an assertion,” and a “declarant” is “the person who made the

statement.” Id. at 801(a)-(b) (emphasis added).

      In Commonwealth v. Wallace, 289 A.3d 894 (Pa. 2023), our Supreme

Court recently held that GPS data is not hearsay evidence. Id. at 907-08.

The Wallace Court explained that GPS location data is not a statement made

by a person; rather, it is data collected electronically. Id. at 904. As such,

GPS location data cannot constitute hearsay because Rule 801 is clear that “a

statement is a written or oral assertion of a person.”       Id. (emphasis in

original).   Accordingly, pursuant to the holding in Wallace and the plain

language of Rule 801, an automatically generated GPS record, like the record

at issue in this case, does not constitute a statement, and therefore, is not

hearsay. Appellant’s first issue, thus, fails.

Authentication

      Appellant next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting the Google GPS location data because the Commonwealth failed to

properly authenticate it. Appellant’s Brief at 32-35. We disagree.

      Business records are admissible if

      (A) the record was made at or near the time by--or from
      information transmitted by--someone with knowledge;

      (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted
      activity of a “business”, which term includes business, institution,
      association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
      whether or not conducted for profit;

      (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

                                      -8-
J-A26008-23

      (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the
      custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that
      complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting
      certification; and

      (E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or
      other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

Pa. R.E. 803(6)(A)-(E) (emphasis added).

      Additionally, “[a]uthentication generally entails a relatively low burden

of proof and requires only, as stated in Rule of Evidence 901, that the

proponent ‘produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is

what the proponent claims it is.’” Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509,

527 n.12 (Pa. Super. 2023), appeal granted, 2023 WL 7123941 (Pa. Oct. 30,

2023) (citing Pa.R.E. 901(a)). Some evidence is self-authenticating such that

it “require[s] no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted[.]”

Pa. R.E. 902. Pursuant to Rule 902(11), a record of a regularly conducted

activity is self-authenticating if it is accompanied by a certificate of the

custodian.

      Here, the trial court concluded that the Google GPS location records,

whose authenticity Google’s custodian of records certified, were admissible as

self-authenticating business records. N.T. Trial, 9/21/22, at 116. We agree.

The Google GPS location records are business records because they are kept

by Google in the course of its regularly conducted business activity.

Furthermore, they are self-authenticating under Rule 902(11) because they

were accompanied by a certification provided by Google’s custodian of

                                     -9-
J-A26008-23

records.6 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

the Google GPS location data over Appellant’s objection.

                                           C.

      In his third issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting

Commonwealth Exhibit C29-D, the certification of Google’s custodian of

records regarding the accuracy of Google’s process for generating the Google

GPS location data. Appellant’s Brief at 36-41. In particular, Appellant asserts

that the evidence regarding the accuracy was inadmissible hearsay and not

properly authenticated. Id. at 36. He further asserts that the custodian’s

certification “constitutes an expert opinion by a mere custodian of records who

was not qualified as an expert witness with the necessary technical knowledge

to opine about the accuracy of Google’s processes.” Id.

      The Commonwealth contends, inter alia, that Appellant did not challenge

the admission of Exhibit C29-D on authentication grounds. Commonwealth’s

Brief at 25 n.5.

      It is axiomatic that the argument portion of an appellate brief must be

developed with citation to and discussion of relevant authority.         Pa.R.A.P

2119(a)-(c).   “[I]t is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are

6 In the certification, Google’s custodian of records explained that he has
personal knowledge of the facts in the certification and that he is familiar with
how Google location records are “created, managed, stored and retrieved.”
Exhibit C29-D. He also explained that Google’s system produces an accurate
result because Google regularly verifies the accuracy of the results and that
Google makes and retains the records pertaining to the geographical
coordinates, and Google servers record the data automatically at the time or
reasonably soon thereafter.

                                      - 10 -
J-A26008-23

sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with

pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal

authorities.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super.

2007) (internal citation omitted). “This Court will not act as counsel and will

not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Id. If a deficient brief

hinders this Court’s ability to address any issue on review, we shall consider

the issue waived. Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa. Super.

2006) (holding that appellant waived issue on appeal where he failed to

support claim with relevant citations to case law and record). See also In re

R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding that, where the argument

portion of an appellant’s brief lacked meaningful discussion of, or citation to,

relevant legal authority regarding an issue, the issue was waived because

appellant’s lack of analysis precluded meaningful appellate review).

      “We shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour

the record to find evidence to support an argument[.]” Milby v. Pote, 189

A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018). To do so would place this Court “in the

conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter.”       Commonwealth v.

Williams, 782 A.2d 517, 532 (Pa. 2001) (Castille, J., concurring). Therefore,

when an appellant fails to develop his issue in an argument, the issue is

waived.    Sephakis v. Pa. State Police Bureau of Records and

Identification, 214 A.3d 680, 686-87 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      The argument Appellant has presented is underdeveloped.          Although

Appellant has provided citation to pertinent legal authority, he did not provide

                                     - 11 -
J-A26008-23

citation to the place in the record where he objected to the admission of the

Commonwealth’s Exhibit C29-D. This is particularly problematic in light of the

Commonwealth’s assertion that Appellant did not preserve in the trial court

certain arguments he has raised to this Court. Appellant’s failure to reference

the Notes of Testimony in his Brief has impeded our ability to conduct

meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, this issue is waived.7

                                          D.

      In his fourth issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion in permitting Lieutenant Mitchell to offer an expert opinion about

the Google GPS location data because he “lacked any personal knowledge of

how Google’s GPS location information is obtained, stored and/or verified for

accuracy.” Appellant’s Brief at 41. Appellant avers that, because Lieutenant

Mitchell “does not know anything about Google’s proprietary information” and

“simply repeats and parrots [Google’s] information in his expert opinion,” the

court should have excluded this testimony.” Id. at 43. He also claims that

the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider Lieutenant Mitchell’s

7 Even if it were not waived and we found that the trial court had abused its

discretion in admitting Exhibit C29-D as evidence, any error would be
harmless as the record reflects that the court did not read the certification into
the record or publish or otherwise give it to the jury for its consideration.
Accordingly, the admission of Exhibit C29-D could not have “contributed to
the verdict.” See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 880 A.2d 608, 614 (Pa. 2005
(citation omitted) (“[A]n evidentiary error of the trial court will be deemed
harmless on appeal where the appellate court is convinced, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.”).

                                     - 12 -
J-A26008-23

testimony without any cautionary instruction that the testimony should not be

considered substantive evidence of guilt. Id.

      Appellant has again failed to properly develop this argument by

providing us with citation to the place in the record where he preserved his

objection to Lieutenant Mitchell’s testimony or his request that the court

provide the jury with a cautionary instruction. Thus, to undertake review of

Appellant’s issue would require us to scour the record and craft an argument

on his behalf, which we will not do. This issue is, therefore, waived.8

                                          E.

      In his final two issues, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its

discretion in precluding him from testifying about statements he alleges Mr.

Marche made to him and, in so doing, denied him from presenting a full and

fair defense. Appellant’s Brief at 44-51. He asserts that the court should have

8 Even if Appellant had not waived this issue, we would conclude that no relief

is due. Pursuant to Rule 703, “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or
data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally
observed.” Pa.R.E. 703. The Rule further provides that “[i]f experts in the
particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming
an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be
admitted.” Id.

In explaining its reasons for overruling Appellant’s objection to Lieutenant
Mitchell’s expert testimony, the trial court, applying Rule 703, observed that:
“Lieutenant Mitchell was qualified as an expert in historical call analysis, the
Google GPS location records are records ordinarily relied upon by similar
experts, and he was made aware of this information when it was provided by
Google.” Trial Ct. Op., 1/13/23, at 28. Accordingly, the trial court concluded
that our Rules of Evidence permitted the Commonwealth to offer Lieutenant
Mitchell’s expert testimony. Appellant’s issue as framed provides no reason
to conclude the court’s ruling resulted from an abuse of discretion.

                                     - 13 -
J-A26008-23

permitted him to testify that: (1) Mr. Marche told him on the night of the

murder that he wanted to borrow Appellant’s Cadillac in order to “see a broad

and take care of some business,” and (2) the following day that Mr. Marche

“did some fucked up shit” and “it’s better you not know about it.” Id. at 44.

Appellant argues those statements are admissible pursuant to the “course of

conduct” exception to the hearsay exclusion rule9 because he did not offer

them for their truth, but rather to explain: (1) that he believed Mr. Marche

had a non-criminal purpose for borrowing his Cadillac; (2) the effect the

statements had on him; (3) his subsequent course of conduct, including why

he maintained close contact with Mr. Marche and why he lied to police about

loaning Mr. Marche his Cadillac; and (4) why he had come to believe that Mr.

Marche had done something bad with his Cadillac.10 Id. at 45, 47.

9 The “course of conduct” exception to the hearsay exclusion rule applies when

a witness offers a statement to explain his or her actions. Commonwealth
v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1017 (Pa. 2007). However, it is often not necessary
for a witness to provide full and explicit statements to explain course of
conduct behavior. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Palsa, 555 A.2d 808, 811
(Pa. 1989) (“[T]he police easily could have explained the course of their
conduct . . . without resorting to the full and explicit statements given by [the
informant].”). Moreover, the course of conduct exception is not a license to
admit any and all statements that may have impacted the witness’s course of
conduct. See id. (“[T]here is often a subtle, and elusive, difference between
the use of statements to establish the truth of facts averred by one not in
court and their use to establish a course of conduct[.]”).

10  Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred in considering the
statements under the “state of mind” exception to the rule precluding the
admission of hearsay statements and not under the “course of conduct”
exception. Appellant’s Brief at 46-47. This claim lacks merit given that, at
trial, Appellant specifically argued that the statements were admissible under
the “state of mind” exception. N.T. Trial, 9/20/22, at 230-31, 238, 242.

                                     - 14 -
J-A26008-23

      With respect to his constitutional claim that the court deprived him of

his due process right to present a full and fair defense, Appellant argues that

the court’s ruling forced him to “testify in a piecemeal fashion” in violation of

his due process rights. Id. at 49. He asserts that the court denied him his

“right to vigorously counter” the Commonwealth’s evidence that Appellant

communicated with Mr. Marche around the time of the murder and during the

weeks and months of the police investigation. Id. at 50.

      In explaining its decision to disallow Appellant from testifying about

certain specific statements he alleges Mr. Marche made to him, the trial court

opined as follows:

      [Appellant’s] proposed testimony, recalling [Mr.] Marche’s
      statements that he needed [Appellant’s] car to take care of
      something by himself and that it was something bad he did not
      want [Appellant] to know about, was being offered to show that
      [Mr.] Marche acted alone, it was something bad, and that
      [Appellant] did not know about it. In addition, [Appellant] was
      able to describe through his own testimony that he loaned the car
      to [Mr.] Marche, how [Mr.] Marche looked when he returned the
      vehicle, and his subsequent actions with police when his vehicle
      was connected to the murder.

Trial Ct. Op. at 33-34.

      As set forth above, Appellant argues that the court’s ruling precluded

him from offering testimony that explained his beliefs and actions. Following

our review of the Notes of Testimony, we conclude that the record belies this

claim.

      Specifically, our review indicates that, at trial, Appellant testified that he

loaned his Cadillac to Mr. Marche. N.T. Trial, 9/22/20, at 169. He also testified

                                      - 15 -
J-A26008-23

that when he gave Mr. Marche the car, Mr. Marche had a backpack, which was

unusual. Id. at 171.

       With respect to seeing Mr. Marche later on the night of the murder,

Appellant testified that Mr. Marche looked “distraught” and was “rocking back

and forth like in a daze.” Id. at 177-78.

       Appellant testified that he visited Mr. Marche the next day to “see what

was wrong with him.” Id. at 180. He described Mr. Marche “uncomfortable,”

“serious,” and not wanting to talk, as if something was bothering him. Id. at

183-84. He also explained that he subsequently spoke with Mr. Marche by

phone numerous times between the date of the murder and February of 2021,

but that he never again mentioned the events of November 29, 2020. Id. at

185.

       Finally, Appellant testified that when police officers approached him and

told him that his Cadillac had been involved in a murder, he thought of Mr.

Marche. Id. at 186-87. He explained that he decided not to tell the officers

that Mr. Marche had borrowed his car because he was afraid of retaliations

from Mr. Marche, and he thought he would be accused of a crime. Id. at 198-

99. Appellant further testified that he “kept [Mr. Marche] close” because he

believed that Mr. Marche had set him up to take responsibility for the murder.

Id. at 199. Appellant believed this because, even though Mr. Marche had five

cars, he borrowed Appellant’s Cadillac. Id. at 200.

       As the trial court observed, and the Notes of Testimony confirm,

Appellant’s testimony at trial pertained to each topic he now alleges the court’s

                                     - 16 -
J-A26008-23

ruling prevented him from offering.       Thus, even if the trial court erred in

precluding Appellant from testifying with respect to Mr. Marche’s specific

statements, Appellant did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the ruling.

Accordingly, any error would be harmless.             See Commonwealth v.

Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 603 (Pa. 2007) (explaining that an error is

harmless, in part, if “the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice

was de minim[i]s[.]” This claim, thus, fails.

      Appellant’s due process claim that he was unable to “explain his

subsequent course of conduct in the context of [Mr.] Marche’s communications

to him and their impact on him,” and his course of conduct after the night of

the killing likewise fails. Appellant’s Brief at 50. As outlined above, Appellant

testified at length about each of these topics.         Nothing in the Notes of

Testimony suggests that the court denied him of the opportunity to “vigorously

counter” any of the Commonwealth’s evidence or theories of the case.

Appellant is, thus, not entitled to relief on this claim.

                                           F.

      Having found each of Appellant’s issues either meritless or waived, we

affirm his Judgment of Sentence.

      Judgment of Sentence affirmed.

      Judge King joins the opinion.

      Judge McLaughlin files a concurring opinion.

      Judge Dubow and Judge King join the concurring opinion.

                                      - 17 -
J-A26008-23

Date: 3/8/2024

                 - 18 -