Court Opinion

ID: 9380982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 18:07:01.660243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.873887
License: Public Domain

J-A01015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KHALIF ABDULRUA SINCLAIR                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1289 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 30, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                       at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001690-2021

BEFORE:       LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                            FILED MARCH 21, 2023

        Khalif Abdulrua Sinclair (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas following

his jury convictions of first-degree murder, persons not to possess firearms,

possession of an instrument of crime (PIC), and recklessly endangering

another person (REAP).1 On appeal, Appellant contends: (1) the jury’s verdict

was against the weight of the evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in denying

his request for an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction. For the reasons

below, we affirm.

        The underlying charges stem from the November 20, 2020, homicide of

Abdur Small (the Victim). Earlier that day, Appellant went to Donte Holland’s

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1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a), 6105(a), 907(a), and 2705, respectively.
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home at 502 W. Lafayette St., Norristown, Montgomery County, looking to

fight Holland. N.T., 3/28/22, at 98. Holland testified that he “heard banging

[and] someone . . . throwing stuff at [the] door.” Id. Appellant and Holland

got into a heated verbal argument about Appellant’s ex-girlfriend, Jhanely

Rodriguez (Girlfriend), outside the house. See id. at 98-99. Appellant was

living with Girlfriend next door to Holland, until Appellant was evicted the day

before as Girlfriend had obtained a temporary Protection From Abuse Order

against him. N.T., 3/29/22, at 100-02. Appellant was arguing with Holland

about Holland’s prior “one night stand” with Girlfriend. See N.T., 3/28/22, at

49; N.T., 3/29/22, at 102.

      Christopher Hall, Holland’s brother and a resident of 502 W. Lafayette

St., witnessed the interaction between Holland and Appellant. Hall testified

that Appellant “felt disrespected” and said, “Watch y’all kids, watch ya’ll crib.”

N.T., 3/28/22, at 49. Shawn McCray, Holland’s neighbor across the street,

recalled that Appellant threatened Holland, stating, “[I]f you don’t want to die,

don’t be here when I get back.” Id. at 89.

      Appellant then called Nafees Smith (Brother), his brother, asking for a

gun. N.T., 3/29/22, at 39. Brother did not have one, but picked up Appellant

in Norristown and drove him to a friend’s house in King of Prussia. Id. at 39-

40. Brother then drove Appellant back to Norristown. Id. at 40. He told

Montgomery County Detective Anthony Caso that he parked by an apartment

complex “across from the Norristown Transportation Center.”           Id. at 54.

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Detective Caso explained there is “a tunnel” in the Transportation Center that

connects the apartment complex and the Schuylkill River Trail. Id. at 55.

Appellant walked through that tunnel to eventually return to 502 W. Lafayette

St. Id. The Commonwealth presented surveillance footage evidence showing

Appellant walking around the block for 15 minutes before he entered the

porch. Trial Ct. Op., 8/17/22, at 8.

      Around 5:00 p.m., Appellant arrived at 502 W. Lafayette St. The Victim,

who was not at the house earlier, and Holland were downstairs. See N.T.,

3/28/22, at 104. They heard someone trying to get into the house, but the

door was locked. Id. at 105. Hall testified that he sold drugs at the house,

and it was not unusual that strangers would knock at the door. Id. at 51.

Holland stated that the person at the door said, “[G]ang, gang,” which was a

“friendly term,” and that his name was “Timmy” or “Tommy.” Id. at 106,

108-09.   Holland went upstairs to get Hall and when they looked out the

window, they saw a man in a ski mask wearing all black. Id. at 106. It was

dark outside, and they could not identify the man. Id.

      As Holland and Hall were walking down the stairs, the front door opened

and gun shots were fired.    N.T., 3/28/22, at 109-10; see also id. at 53.

Holland dove under a table to take cover. Id. at 100-10. Hall, who was in

the living room at this point, fired his own gun at least twice. N.T., 3/28/22

at 54-55. Appellant and the Victim were standing in the doorway area. Id.

at 54. After the shooting, Hall discovered that the Victim had been shot in the

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head. Id. at 55. Everyone immediately called the police. Id. at 56. One of

Hall’s stray bullets — not Appellant’s — hit the Victim. See id. at 55.

        A few days after the shooting, Appellant asked Girlfriend to take him to

his sister’s house in Chester. N.T., 3/29/22, at 104.

        The Commonwealth also presented the expert testimony of Detective

Terrance Lewis of the Montgomery County Forensic Services Unit, summarized

by the trial court as follow:

        [Detective Lewis] recovered two 9-millimeter fired cartridge
        casings, one right next to the doorway . . . and . . . one . . . a
        couple of feet . . . from the doorway. A fired projectile was found
        in the basement area. There were two strike marks, i.e., an area
        that is believed to have been struck by a bullet, in the living room,
        and a small projectile was recovered from one of those strike
        marks. More strike marks were found above the steps, and by
        the front window in the living room. . . .

        Detective Lewis would not know when the strike marks were
        made, unless there was something else there to indicate when it
        was struck, such as some debris that was fresh.

Trial Ct. Op. at 12-13 (record citations omitted & paragraph break added).

Pertinently, Detective Lewis also testified “the strike mark above the stairs

was consistent with a .38 revolver.” Id. at 20.

        Appellant was charged with first-degree murder, persons not to possess

firearms, PIC, and REAP.        A three-day jury trial commenced on March 28,

2022.     On the second day of trial, out of the jury’s presence, Appellant’s

counsel requested an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction. N.T. 3/29/22

at 6. The trial court deferred ruling on the matter until all evidence had been

presented. Id. at 7.

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       Appellant did not testify at trial but presented character witnesses; his

mother, sister, and friends testified he has a reputation for being a peaceful

and law-abiding citizen. See N.T., 3/29/22, at 150, 155, 158, 161.

       At the close of the evidence, Appellant again requested an involuntary

manslaughter jury instruction. N.T., 3/29/22, at 177. In support, Appellant

argued the evidence showed his “bullet was shot over the head of Donte

Holland, causing return fire[,]” and “[Appellant] did not intend to kill him but

it was reckless.” Id. (emphasis added).

       On the last day of trial, the trial court denied Appellant’s jury instruction

request, finding the evidence did not support intent consistent with

involuntary manslaughter. N.T., 3/30/22, at 3-4. The court considered the

evidence that Appellant had “already expressed his intentions of killing” and

intentionally returned to the house armed with a gun, and found the shooting

did not “just happen[ ] as a result of total recklessness.” Id. at 4.

       The trial court then gave its final instructions to the jury. Immediately

thereafter, the court asked the parties whether they had any additions or

corrections. N.T., 3/30/22, at 85. Pertinently, Appellant replied, “No.” Id.

       The jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder by transferred

intent,2 persons not to possess firearms, PIC, and REAP. Appellant waived his

____________________________________________

2The doctrine of transferred intent provides that “the intent to murder may
be transferred when the person actually killed is not the intended victim.”
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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right to a presentence investigation. On the same day, the trial court imposed

concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for murder, one to two years for

persons not to possess firearms, one to two years for PIC, and one to two

years for REAP.

       Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on April 7, 2022,

challenging: (1) the weight of the evidence; and (2) the denial of the

involuntary manslaughter jury instruction request. On the same day, the trial

court denied the post-sentence motion.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 6, 2022, and complied

with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of errors complained of

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

       1. Is [Appellant] entitled to an arrest of judgment and/or new
       trial in the above-captioned matter on the ground that the jury’s
       verdict was against the weight of the evidence since the evidence
       did not support a finding of specific intent to kill because it showed
       that [Appellant] merely fired over [the] top of Donte Holland into
       the ceiling over the staircase of 502 W. Lafayette St[.]?

       2. Did the lower court err in denying [Appellant’s] request for an
       involuntary manslaughter jury instruction since evidence existed
       supporting such a charge, namely, analysis of the crime scene
       that revealed evidence from which the jury could potentially infer
       that [Appellant] did not intend to kill Donte Holland, but rather,
       merely fired over [the] top of Holland into the ceiling over the
       staircase of 502 W. Lafayette St.?

____________________________________________

Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 279 (Pa. 2006), citing 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 303(b)(1).

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Appellant’s Brief at 3.

      First, Appellant asserts that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of

the evidence because there was no evidence he had a specific intent to kill.

Appellant’s Brief at 11. We note the relevant standard of review for challenges

to the weight of the evidence:

      The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who
      is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence and to
      determine the credibility of the witnesses. Resolving contradictory
      testimony and questions of credibility are matters for the finder of
      fact. It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for
      that of the trier of fact.

      Moreover, [a]ppellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
      exercise of discretion, not the underlying question of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial
      judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
      presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
      to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
      reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is [or is
      not] against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
      assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower
      court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the
      weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in
      the interest of justice.

      Furthermore, in order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to
      the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous,
      vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the
      court.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 642-43 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Further, this Court will not find an abuse of discretion

      based on a mere error of judgment, but rather . . . when the [trial]
      court has reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the
      law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable,

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      or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Importantly,
      [this C]ourt should not find that a trial court abused its discretion
      merely because [we] disagree[ ] with the trial court’s conclusion.
      Indeed, when reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, it
      is improper for [this C]ourt to step[ ] into the shoes of the trial
      judge and review the evidence de novo. In other words, [this
      C]ourt may not disturb a trial court’s discretionary ruling by
      substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Gill, 206 A.3d 459, 467 (Pa. 2019) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

      Appellant does not challenge his liability under the theory of transferred

intent. Instead, he contends the evidence merely showed he “negligently or

recklessly fir[ed] a shot over the head [of] Donte Holland.” Appellant’s Brief

at 12. In support, Appellant reasons:

      The only evidence of a firearm being fired into the property – the
      position from which [Appellant] would have been firing – was a
      strike mark that entered the ceiling of the first floor at the top of
      the stairs leading to the second floor. Such a shot, however,
      would have been well over the heads of Donte Holland and the . . .
      other occupants and thus, was inconsistent with the intent to kill.
      ...

Id. Appellant avers that the jury’s finding of a specific intent to kill “shocks

the [conscience].” Id. We conclude no relief is due.

      We note:

      In order to find a defendant to be guilty of first-degree murder, a
      jury must find: (1) a specific intent to kill; and (2) malice.
      Pursuant to the doctrine of transferred intent, the intent to murder
      may be transferred where the person actually killed is not the
      intended victim. . . .

Jones, 912 A.2d at 279, citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 303(b).

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      [“S]pecific intent to kill can be inferred from the circumstances
      surrounding an unlawful killing. Because a person generally
      intends the consequences of his act, specific intent to kill may be
      inferred from the fact that the accused used a deadly weapon to
      inflict injury to a vital part of the victim’s body.”

Commonwealth v. Geathers, 847 A.2d 730, 737 (Pa. Super. 2004).

      In denying relief, the trial court reasoned:

      [Appellant] wanted the jury to believe that the strike mark above
      the steps was a strike mark from the day of the murder, which
      was a fact the jury had to determine[,] and that it was made by
      [Appellant’s] firearm, which [he] claimed was a revolver, which
      was another fact the jury had to determine. . . .

Trial Ct. Op. at 20.   However, “the jury did not credit [this] theory of the

evidence,” but instead “credit the evidence of [Appellant’s] specific intent to

kill Holland.” Id. The trial court cited the following evidence:

      [Appellant] threatened to return to Holland’s house after the
      verbal argument in order to kill him; [Appellant] did in fact return
      with a firearm; [and] he lied in wait for Holland[,] surreptitiously
      tried to gain entry into the home by pretending he was someone
      friendly to the home’s residents[,] and when the door opened and
      Holland was in his sight he shot off his firearm. This evidence was
      demonstrated and corroborated through several witnesses and
      video surveillance. . . .

Id. at 20-21. Thus, the trial court determined that the verdict was supported

by the weight of the evidence. Id. at 21.

      Appellant does not address or dispute the trial court’s reasoning. He

merely focuses on the evidence of the strike mark at the top of the staircase.

Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant ignores the trial court’s discussion of the

evidence that he: threatened Holland during an argument earlier in the day;

asked his brother for a gun and when Brother did not have one, they drove to

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a friend’s house to retrieve one; rode back with the gun and had Brother park

away from the house; walked around the house for 15 minutes before

approaching the front door; disguised himself with a ski mask; pretended to

be someone else when he tried to gain entry to the house; and finally, shot in

Holland’s direction once the door was opened. Appellant also ignores the trial

court’s discussion that the expert witness testified he could not determine

when the strike mark was made.

      We emphasize the jury was free to consider all the evidence presented

at trial. See Miller, 172 A.3d at 642-43. Indeed, a jury “who hears witness

testimony first-hand is able to take into account not only the words that are

spoken and transcribed, but the witnesses’ demeanor, tone of voice,

mannerisms, and the like.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 231 A.3d 807, 818

(Pa. 2020). Here, the jury considered all the testimony and video surveillance

footage presented. We decline to substitute our credibility determinations for

that of the jury.   See Gill, 206 A.3d at 467; Miller, 172 A.3d at 642-43.

Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s determination that the weight of the

evidence supports the jury’s verdict.

      Second, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for

an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction.       Appellant’s Brief at 13.

Appellant contends that the court “employed an incorrect standard of review”

because it did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to him. Id.

at 15. He argues:

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      In its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court . . . states, “[t]here was no
      direct evidence suggesting [the strike mark at the top of the
      stairs] was from his firearm or whether that strike mark was even
      made on the night of the murder. It was a defense theory, not
      evidence.”

      This holding is incorrect [because] it ignores that in addressing
      the propriety of a jury instruction requested by the defense, the
      court must[ ] view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
      defendant. . . .

Id. at 15-16 (citations and some quotation marks omitted). Appellant insists

the jury could have inferred, from the evidence of the strike mark at the top

of the staircase, that he did not intend to kill Holland. Id. at 16. We determine

this issue is waived.

      When reviewing a challenge to jury instructions, this Court’s standard

of review is well-settled:

      the reviewing court must consider the charge as a whole to
      determine if the charge was inadequate, erroneous, or prejudicial.
      The trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions,
      and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly,
      adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its
      consideration. A new trial is required on account of an erroneous
      jury instruction only if the instruction under review contained
      fundamental error, misled, or confused the jury.

Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 792 (Pa. 2009). However, in

order to preserve an objection to jury instructions, a party must make a

specific objection after the trial court reads the instructions, before jury retires

to deliberate. Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372, 421 (Pa. Super.

2019), vacated on other grounds, 252 A.3d 1092 (Pa. 2021).

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      Here, although Appellant requested a jury instruction on involuntary

manslaughter, he did not object to the jury instructions after they were given

to the jury. See N.T., 3/30/22, at 85. The court asked both parties if there

were “any additions or corrections to [the] instructions,” and both parties said,

“[N]o.” Id. As a result, the jury instruction issue is waived for our review.

See Cosby, 224 A.3d at 421.

      Moreover, even if Appellant had properly objected to the jury

instruction, we would agree that no relief is due. Involuntary manslaughter is

      a killing that occurs when, as a direct result of the doing of an
      unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the
      doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, an
      individual causes the death of another person. An instruction on
      involuntary manslaughter is not required unless it has been made
      an issue in the case and the facts would support such a verdict.

Fletcher, 986 A.2d at 790 (quotation marks omitted), citing, inter alia, 18

Pa.C.S. § 2504(a).

      In this case, the trial court explained that “the facts developed at trial

did not reasonably support a finding of involuntary manslaughter.” Trial Ct.

Op. at 24. We agree. As discussed earlier, Appellant threated Holland during

an argument, returned a few hours later with a gun, wearing a ski mask;

attempted to gain entry to the house, and shot in Holland’s direction once the

door opened.     The trial court found the evidence was inconsistent with

involuntary manslaughter or recklessness.        Again, Appellant cites only the

evidence that supports his argument and disregards all the surrounding facts

that the trial court discussed in its opinion.

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     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2023

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