Court Opinion

ID: 9376589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 06:05:33.6342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.689230
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

ZACHARY RIDENOUR,                                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      March 2, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                     No. 356734; 356815
                                                                      Ingham Circuit Court
PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE                                        LC No. 19-000405-NF
COMPANY,

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and SHAPIRO and PATEL, JJ.

SHAPIRO, J. (concurring).

        I reluctantly concur in the majority opinion given the language of MCL 500.3114, which
on its face supports defendant’s position. However, I urge the Supreme Court to grant leave to
appeal and address whether this outcome is consistent with its decision in Dye v Esurance Prop &
Cas Ins Co, 504 Mich 167; 934 NW2d 674 (2019), and the purposes of the no-fault act.

        Dye held that an effective policy on a vehicle may issue even if the policy is purchased by
someone other than the owner or registrant and that this will not result in the owner being ineligible
for PIP benefits. Id. at 172-173. The Supreme Court concluded that despite not having purchased
insurance on the vehicle himself, the owner is deemed to have complied with MCL 500.3101’s
requirement that “the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle . . . maintain security for payment of
benefits under personal protection insurance,” and so is not barred from coverage pursuant to MCL
500.3113(b), which states that “[a] person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance
benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident . . . [t]he person was the owner
or registrant of a motor vehicle . . . involved in the accident with respect to which the security
required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect.” The Court reasoned that “the statutory
language links the requires security or insurance solely to the vehicle” and so made clear that for
purposes of MCL 500.3113(b) the question is not whether the owner or registrant was a named

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insured but whether there was an insurance policy on the vehicle.1 Dye, 504 Mich at 189.
Accordingly, Dye expressly rejected the insurer’s view that if a policy is purchased by a third party,
the owner has failed to maintain the required security. Dye ultimately held that

       an owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in an accident is not excluded
       from receiving no-fault benefits when someone other than that owner or registrant
       purchased no-fault insurance for that vehicle because the owner or registrant of the
       vehicle may “maintain” the insurance coverage required under the no-fault act even
       if he or she did not purchase the insurance. [Id. at 173.]

        Thus, under Dye, the vehicle’s owner is entitled to PIP benefits in the event of a motor
vehicle accident so long as someone maintains no-fault insurance for the vehicle. In this case,
although MCL 500.3114(4)(a) refers to “the insurer of the owner or registrant of the motor vehicle
involved in the accident,” a Court following Dye’s approach would interpret this to mean “the
insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.”

        Our decision leaves the law in the confounding, if not absurd, situation in which a vehicle’s
owner who has “maintained the security” required by MCL 500.3101, albeit through the purchase
of insurance by a third party, is entitled to PIP benefits but may not seek those benefits from the
insurer of the vehicle that he owns, was driving and for which he has paid the charged premiums.
It is difficult to square that result with the purposes of the no-fault act or with an insured’s
reasonable expectations, as discussed in Dye. Accordingly, I respectfully suggest that the Supreme
Court grant leave to appeal and resolve the seeming conflict between our decision and its ruling in
Dye, revisit this area of law and provide guidance to the bench, the bar and the public.

                                                              /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

1
  Justice CLEMENT’s dissent confirmed the nature of the holding, stating, “According to the
majority, as long as the vehicle is insured, MCL 500.3113(b)’s disqualification provision has not
been triggered, no matter who is named in the policy.” Dye, 504 Mich at 196 (CLEMENT, J.,
dissenting).

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