Court Opinion

ID: 9465920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:59:50.273713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:26.682780
License: Public Domain

LOGAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the Court in this case, and its discussion of the discretionary power of the trial judge to stay or dismiss a proceeding where identical issues are being litigated in a state court which will resolve everything involved in the federal suit. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 98 S.Ct. 2552, 57 L.Ed.2d 504 (1978).
The majority opinion, however, treats the appeal filed by the insurance company as improper because the dismissal was without prejudice, but treats it as a petition for writ of mandamus, which it characterizes as a proper way to obtain review by this Court of such action on the part of the trial judge.
When an appeal is filed from dismissal of a complaint we now look at all of the facts and circumstances. “If it is clear that the plaintiff may not start over again with a properly drawn complaint, because of limitations problems or otherwise, the action is treated as final and the order is appeala-ble.” Bragg v. Reed, 592 F.2d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir. 1979).
While the trial judge characterized his dismissal of the action as being “without prejudice,” it is clear that he would take precisely the same action with respect to any new complaint filed. Neither would he accept a new complaint after the state court renders judgment, because he declares “a state court judgment will preclude litigation of the issues before this Court.” Thus, the only sense in which this dismissal is “without prejudice” is that it is not to be treated as an adjudication of the merits of the litigation. The only circumstances under which a new complaint would be acceptable to the federal court would be in the unlikely event the state action were dismissed on some technicality which did not reach the merits, which would not constitute res judicata, with this happening prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Therefore, I would treat the dismissal under these circumstances as a final reviewable order.
Had the judge simply entered a stay of the proceeding I would not take the same view. Thus, I do not agree with the trial court’s statement quoted in the majority opinion that this dismissal without prejudice is the same as a stay of proceedings under the circumstances. A stay eliminates statute of limitations questions and leaves the judge free to reconsider his decision to defer or to take other action.
Obviously, if Judge Will had dismissed Calvert’s action Calvert could have appealed the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals, which could have required such action of Judge Will “as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2106. Since he did not dismiss the action, Calvert remained free to urge reconsideration of his decision to defer based on new information as to the progress of the state case; to this extent, at least, deferral was not “equivalent to a dismissal.”
Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. supra, 437 U.S. at 665, 98 S.Ct. at 2559.
I believe a stay of proceeding would be much preferable to dismissal in a situation like that involved here.