Court Opinion

ID: 9959117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 18:09:38.128843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:28.273518
License: Public Domain

04/10/2024
                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                              AT KNOXVILLE
                                Assigned on Briefs March 1, 2024

                          ELIZABETH COX V. KYLE VAUGHAN

                       Appeal from the Circuit Court for Carter County
                              No. C14486 Suzanne Cook, Judge
                          ___________________________________

                                No. E2023-00930-COA-R3-CV
                            ___________________________________

The pro se plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her legal malpractice action against
her former attorney. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to offer any proof in
support of her claim of negligence against the defendant attorney. We affirm.

           Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
                               Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD,
P.J., W.S., and JEFFREY USMAN, J., joined.

Elizabeth Cox, Elizabethton, Tennessee, pro se.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION1

       On October 27, 2014, Elizabeth Cox (“Plaintiff”) was involved in a motor vehicle
accident in Washington County, Tennessee with her motor home and another vehicle.
Plaintiff took her motor home to Chaparral Buick GMC for repairs (“GMC”). GMC
completed the repairs and returned the motor home. Plaintiff discovered several issues
with the job completed by GMC. Plaintiff employed attorney Kyle Vaughan

       1
           Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

       This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
       or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
       would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall
       be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be
       cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
(“Defendant”)2 to represent her in an action she sought to file against Farm Bureau
Insurance Company, State Farm Insurance Company, GMC, and the other driver involved
in the accident. Plaintiff provided Defendant with a $2,000 retainer and executed a retainer
agreement on October 20, 2015. The agreement limited Defendant’s representation to his
pursuit of an action against GMC.

      Defendant never filed any action on Plaintiff’s behalf and avoided communication
with her. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Tennessee Board of Professional
Responsibility in September 2018. The Board complaint was resolved by placing
Defendant on diversion, pending his completion of a practice and professional
enhancement program. Defendant ultimately returned the $2,000 retainer.

        On January 31, 2019, Plaintiff filed this civil action against Defendant, alleging
negligence relating to his legal representation, i.e., legal malpractice. Plaintiff asserted the
statute of limitations had expired on a number of her claims as a result of Defendant’s
failure to file her claims as promised. Defendant denied liability and moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the retainer agreement limited the scope of his representation to her
claims against GMC for breach of contract of implied and express warranties, which carry
a six-year statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-109(a)(3) (providing that
causes of action based upon contract must be commenced within six years after the cause
of action accrued). Defendant asserted that Plaintiff’s claims against GMC had not yet
expired. Defendant noted that he had also refunded Plaintiff’s money, thereby establishing
that Plaintiff had not been harmed by any alleged negligence.

       On June 23, 2020, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
holding that genuine issues of material fact remained including (1) the scope of
Defendant’s representation as a result of any oral representations made and (2) whether the
repairs made by GMC were sufficient to make Plaintiff whole or whether the damages
claimed were caused by the accident or an unrelated cause. The court set the action for a
hearing on October 30, 2020.

        Defendant moved for a continuance, citing his unavailability as a result of his
incarceration on a one-year sentence, beginning July 21, 2020. The court reset the action
for September 14, 2022. Defendant did not appear, and Plaintiff requested a continuance,
citing the unavailability of her witnesses. The court reset the action once more for June 5,
2023, cautioning Plaintiff that this continuance would be the last continuance provided.
The court advised that the matter would be dismissed with prejudice if Plaintiff was not
prepared with witnesses and evidence on that date.

       On June 5, 2023, Plaintiff appeared for the hearing. Defendant did not appear. The
court dismissed the action with prejudice, holding that Plaintiff failed to offer any proof as

       2
           Defendant no longer practices law and was permanently disbarred on April 21, 2022.
                                                  -2-
to (1) negligence by Defendant; (2) breach of duty by Defendant; (3) legal causation of
alleged damages; and (4) damages.

        Plaintiff timely filed this appeal, arguing that she was present on the day of the
hearing with the owner of Danny’s Auto Glass and Upholstery, who was prepared to testify
concerning the damages to her motor home. She provided that she never spoke of
Defendant’s negligence “because that was NOT what this court was scheduled for.” She
believed that she merely had to establish her damages because Defendant failed to appear
at the prior hearing.

        “Trial courts possess inherent, common-law authority to control their dockets and
the proceedings in their courts. Their authority is quite broad and includes the express
authority to dismiss cases for failure to prosecute or to comply with the Tennessee Rules
of Civil Procedure or the orders of the court.” Hodges v. Attorney Gen., 43 S.W.3d 918,
921 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). We review such decisions under an abuse of discretion
standard. Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion only when it ‘applie[s] an incorrect legal
standard, or reache[s] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that cause[s] an
injustice to the party complaining.’” State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999).
The abuse of discretion standard does not allow an appellate court to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998).

        The record reflects that the court set the hearing to address Plaintiff’s claim of legal
malpractice against Defendant and any alleged damages as a result of his malpractice. A
plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must establish the following elements:

       (1) that the accused attorney owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) that the attorney
       breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered damages, (4) that the breach
       was the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s damages, and (5) that the attorney’s
       negligence was the proximate, or legal, cause of the plaintiff’s damages.

Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted); Shearon v. Seaman,
198 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (listing the same elements). “In order to prove
damages in a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove that [s]he would have obtained
relief in the underlying lawsuit, but for the attorney’s malpractice; consequently, the trial
of a legal malpractice claim becomes, in effect, a ‘trial within a trial.’” Shearon, 198
S.W.3d at 214 (quoting Gibson, 58 S.W.3d at 108). While the damages to her motor home
were a relevant issue, Plaintiff did not offer evidence concerning Defendant’s negligence
in his representation or whether his negligence was the proximate cause of her damages.

        We believe that the aforementioned misunderstanding was due, in part, to Plaintiff’s
status as a pro se litigant. This court “must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with
the same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.”
Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Edmundson v. Pratt,
                                              -3-
945 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)). It is well-settled that “[w]hile a party who
chooses to represent himself or herself is entitled to the fair and equal treatment of the
courts, [p]ro se litigants are not . . . entitled to shift the burden of litigating their case[s] to
the courts.” Chiozza v. Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (internal
citations omitted).

       Plaintiff failed to set forth any evidence concerning Defendant’s negligence. We
cannot task the trial court with the responsibility of litigating Plaintiff’s claim on her behalf.
With all of the above considerations in mind, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The
case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of the appeal
are taxed to the appellant, Elizabeth Cox.

                                                     _________________________________
                                                     JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE

                                               -4-