Court Opinion

ID: 9681147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:44:36.700116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:21.109740
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, concurring. By per curiam order of July 13, 1987, with no dissenting vote, we amended Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(c) to state: Any defendant charged after October 1, 1987, in circuit court and held to bail, or otherwise lawfully set at liberty, including released from incarceration pursuant to subsection (a) hereof, shall be entitled to have the charge dismissed with an absolute bar to prosecution if not brought to trial within twelve (12) months from the time provided in Rule 28.2, excluding only such periods of necessary delay as are authorized in Rule 28.3. Previously, this subsection of the rule had provided for dismissal under the stated conditions if the defendant were not brought to trial within 18 months. We were convinced the state could and should bring defendants to trial within a year. The change in the rule seems, as could have been expected, to have brought with it more cases in which we and the court of appeals are asked to review determinations of “excluded periods.” I have no doubt that each member of this court remains receptive to argument that the period should not have been shortened. Perhaps we will be convinced by someone, such as our Committee on Rules of Pleading, Practice, and Procedure (Criminal), if its members are so inclined, that we should return to the 18-month standard. My reason for writing this concurring opinion is not to disagree with any aspect of the court’s opinion in this case. It is, rather, to address the issue raised by Justice Hickman’s dissenting opinion and Justice Glaze’s concurring opinion in this case and Justice Hickman’s dissenting opinion in Asher v. State, 300 Ark. 57, 776 S.W.2d 816 (1989). The suggestion of those opinions seems to me to be that we should have no absolute limit as a speedy trial rule but should consider factors such as whether the defendant made a demand for a speedy trial and whether he was prejudiced by his alleged denial of a speedy trial. Such a change would be far more radical than a change back to the 18-months provision. The primer on the subject of the “modern” constitutional right to a speedy trial is the opinion of Mr. Justice Powell written for the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In that opinion, the Supreme Court did indeed address matters such as demand, waiver, and prejudice in deciding whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. However, it was made clear that the court was not writing an opinion applicable to those states, such as Arkansas, which had adopted a rule narrowly, and definitely, establishing the period in which a defendant must be tried or have the case against him dismissed. It was recognized in the opinion that there is far more at stake in the resolution of the speedy trial issue than .the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee. The right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused. In addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused. The inability of courts to provide a prompt trial has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban courts which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system. In addition, persons released on bond for lengthy periods awaiting trial have an opportunity to commit other crimes. It must be of little comfort to the residents of Christian County, Kentucky, to know that Barker was at large on bail for over four years while accused of a vicious and brutal murder of which he was ultimately convicted. Moreover, the longer an accused is free awaiting trial, the more tempting becomes his opportunity to jump bail and escape. Finally, delay between arrest and punishment may have a detrimental effect on rehabilitation. [407 U.S. at 519-520, footnotes omitted] It was interests such as these I thought we were considering when we reduced the period from 18 to 12 months, and which I have always assumed to be part of the judgment which must be made if we are to impose a speedy trial limit. After noting that the speedy trial right is “more vague” than other procedural concepts, the Supreme Court recognized that a number of states have adopted speedy trial deadlines like ours, and that the American Bar Association recommended it as a solution to the problem. With respect to the possibility that the Supreme Court adopt such a standard, Mr. Justice Powell wrote: But such a result would require this Court to engage in legislative or rulemaking activity, rather than in the adjudicative process to which we should confine our efforts. We do not establish procedural rules for the States, except when mandated by the Constitution. We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months. The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less precise. [407 U.S. at 523] Thus, while the federal courts and the Supreme Court are limited to applying the Sixth Amendment imprecisely, and must include in the decisional process the usual balancing factors such as demand, waiver, and prejudice, it is clear that the decision in Barker v. Wingo does not require us to do likewise. In footnote 29, 407 U.S. at 530, it is stated, “[n]othing we have said should be interpreted as disapproving a presumptive rule adopted by a court in the exercise of its supervisory powers which establishes a fixed time period within which cases must normally be brought.” In the dissenting and concurring opinions of my colleagues, to which I referred above, there seems to be a suggestion that we have gone astray in our efforts to protect the right of an accused to a speedy trial. No consideration is given to the other relevant interests of society which have been recognized by the Supreme Court and which we should recognize too. If the suggestion is that we revoke our criminal procedure rule and put ourselves back in the position of the Supreme Court with all the vagueness and imprecision that would carry with it, and if a majority of this court should choose to follow such a suggestion in some future order, then so be it. I think it would be a mistake because of the considerations recited by Justice Powell and because it would provide another fertile field for litigation and make the speedy trial issue much more difficult to decide in the courts of this state.