Court Opinion

ID: 7823012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 18:00:38.42924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:47.400258
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. I have no problem with the general rule expressed by the majority, which permits a sale by a life tenant without prior approval by a court, where the language of the will makes it clear the testator intended that result. I submit, however, the rule is misapplied here, as both the four corners of the will and the circumstances of the case suggest the testator did not intend an unlimited power to be exercised at the discretion of the appellant. The Chancellor was entirely correct and I would affirm the decree. Rules of construction of wills are used to determine the intent of the testator in the absence of a clear expression of intent. They are never to be used to circumvent such intent, even where the intent is only implied from the four corners of the will. See Armstrong v. Butler, 262 Ark. 31, 553 S.W.2d 453 (1977). It is but the statement of a commonplace rule of law to observe, in the interpretation of the provisions of a will, that the intention of the testator as therein expressed must prevail. The statute of this state commands that all courts and others concerned in the execution of last wills shall have due regard to the directions of the will and the true intent and meaning of the testator in all matters brought before them. Bussoner v. Marsh, 140 Or. 331, 12 P.2d 329 (1936). The general rule, stated in 51 Am.Jur.2d 293, is if the grant of power to sell or convey is otherwise full or general in its terms and the determination of whether the condition for the exercise of the power involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, the life tenant has the exclusive right to make that determination, if done in good faith. The rule has two constituents: the power to dispose of the property must be full or general in its terms, and the fulfillment of the condition must not be objectively defined by the instrument and, therefore, judgment or discretion must be exercised in the decision process. The second aspect of the rule is applicable here: this will provides no standard for determining when the wife (Appellant) does not have enough to maintain herself according to her accustomed standard. In concluding that the wife has the power to make the determination in light of the general rule, the majority is overlooking an aspect of the rule which is absent here — the power to sell, rather than being full and general, is impliedly if not specifically limited under the wording of the will. Admittedly, a restriction that the proceeds from a sale be used for the support and maintenance of a life tenant, taken alone, has not been considered a significant limitation so as to avoid the general rule. However, in this case the wife’s right to sell was subject to a requirement that she first notify the testator’s children of an intent to sell and that she give the children the first option to purchase the property. And if the land was sold, it was not to be sold for a price less than was offered by the children. Additionally, the proceeds of any sale were to be used “only" for the support and maintenance of the wife. In sum, the appellant’s power of sale from the four corners of this will falls short of being full and general. In the cases relied on by the majority opinion from Am. Jur.2d and A.L.R., there is no indication of any restriction on the power to sell. The language typically found in those cases is notably lacking here (“as she may see fit,” “if in her opinion”), language evidencing an intent by the testator that the life tenant have unbridled discretion in determining when her station in life is reduced. No such wording appears in this will. An early case from Massachusetts is in point, notwithstanding the distance in time, Minot and Others v. Prescott, 14 Mass. 496 (1817). The last will of J. Betton on July 17, 1776 devised to his wife, Mary, the income from his real and personal estate during her life and “if not sufficient to support her comfortably,” then the power to sell any of his estate for that purpose. In December, 1776, Mary granted the premises, and contended in the ensuing litigation that she was the sole judge of the insufficiency of the income to support her comfortably, citing 2 Wilson 6. Chief Justice Cushing wrote for a unanimous court: This is not a fee simple. The power is not to dispose of at will and pleasure, as in the case cited from Wilson, but on the happening of a particular event, viz., the income proving insufficient to support the wife comfortably. This is a precedent condition; and was so adjudged in the case of Dike v. Ricks, where the clause in the will was substantially the same with that in the present case. The happening of this condition ought to have been stated in the deed to Prescott, as well as shown in the verdict, in order to entitle the defendant to judgment. It is a matter which can be traversed; and as the jury have found that there was a sufficiency of personal estate for the comfortable support of the widow, this conveyance cannot be supported. I am therefore clearly of opinion that the demandants ought to have judgment on this special verdict. Finally, the circumstances of each case are subject to scrutiny in resolving these disputes (51 Am.Jur.2d, Life Tenants and Remaindermen, § 66, p. 294). Here the testator had been married for many years to a first wife, who died in 1973 after their children were grown to middle age. He and the appellant were married only five years and while the marriage was doubtless a happy one, it is clear the decedent wanted his children provided for. The land in question, a farm of some 125 acres, had been bought when the children were small and had been their home from infancy. The Chancellor heard a wealth of testimony that all the family had worked hard to improve the place and the testator wanted the children to have the land. His findings were not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed.