Court Opinion

ID: 9905892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:10:59.398178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:57.901361
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Clemmons, 2023-Ohio-4312.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                          No. 112432
                v.                               :

RYAN CLEMMONS, SR.,                              :

                Defendant-Appellant.             :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 30, 2023

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-21-656773-A

                                           Appearances:

                Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                Attorney, and Lindsay Patton, Assistant Prosecuting
                Attorney, for appellee.

                Brian Kraft, for appellant.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

                Defendant-appellant Ryan Clemmons, Sr. appeals the consecutive

sentences the trial court imposed on him in four criminal cases, resulting in an

aggregate indefinite sentence of 12 to 16 years in prison. Clemmons contends that
the sentences are disproportionate to the seriousness of his offenses. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.   Factual Background and Procedural History

               Clemmons has not had a valid driver’s license since 2013.

               In March 2020, University Circle police conducted a traffic stop of a

vehicle that Clemmons was driving.           Police found illegal drugs including

methamphetamine in the vehicle.

               In August 2020, Cleveland police found an empty vehicle idling with

its engine on; they found illegal drugs and items indicative of drug trafficking in the

vehicle. Clemmons arrived at the scene and admitted that he had been operating

the vehicle.

               On January 30, 2021, Clemmons was driving in East Cleveland with a

loaded firearm under his seat when police attempted to initiate a traffic stop of his

vehicle. Clemmons fled in the vehicle. Clemmons’ friend Shawn Crenshaw was a

passenger in the vehicle when Clemmons fled. The police pursued Clemmons into

Cleveland; the pursuit reached speeds of up to 90 miles per hour. Clemmons

eventually lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a tree, killing Crenshaw.

Crenshaw was 27 years old when he died. Police rescued Clemmons from the

vehicle, which had caught fire after the crash.

               Clemmons was arrested at that time. He was released on bond in

February 2021.
             On March 10, 2021, Clemmons was cited by police in Newton Falls,

Ohio for driving at 88 miles per hour on a road with a speed limit of 70 m.p.h.

             On April 13, 2021, Clemmons was driving a vehicle in Cleveland.

Cleveland police conducted a traffic stop and asked Clemmons to step out of the

vehicle. Clemmons stepped out, reaching into his pockets and discarding items onto

the road. Among other things, he discarded a tablet containing methamphetamine.

             On April 20, 2021, Clemmons was cited by Cleveland police again for

driving under a suspended license.

              On May 11, 2021, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Clemmons

on charges of involuntary manslaughter, aggravated vehicular homicide, failure to

comply, having weapons while under disability and improperly handling firearms in

a motor vehicle stemming from the January pursuit and Crenshaw’s death.1

              Clemmons ultimately pleaded guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide

in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a) (a second-degree felony), failure to comply in

violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) (a third-degree felony), one count of having weapons

while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) (a third-degree felony) and

improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B) (a

fourth-degree felony). The remaining charges were dismissed through a nolle

prosequi.2

      1 Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-656773-A

      2 The trial court’s original journal entry from the plea hearing erroneously stated

that Clemmons pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter; the error was corrected on
January 25, 2023 through a nunc pro tunc entry. Although the January 25 entry was not
              On June 17, 2021, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Clemmons

on charges of tampering with evidence and possession of methamphetamine

stemming from the April traffic stop.3 Clemmons ultimately pleaded guilty to

attempted tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2921.12(A)(1)

(a fourth-degree felony) and possession of methamphetamine in violation of R.C.

2925.11A (a fifth-degree felony).

              On June 22, 2021, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted

Clemmons on charges including trafficking methamphetamine, stemming from the

August 2020 encounter with police. Clemmons ultimately pleaded guilty to one

count of trafficking methamphetamine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) (a fourth-

degree felony) with forfeiture specifications.4      The remaining charges were

dismissed through a nolle prosequi.

              On June 26, 2021, Clemmons posted a video on Instagram that the

state said showed him driving on a highway late at night. Clemmons said he was

getting a ride home from work and was not driving.

              On October 18, 2022, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted

Clemmons on charges of drug trafficking and drug possession for the March 2020

University Circle traffic stop.5 Clemmons ultimately pleaded guilty to attempted

captioned “nunc pro tunc,” an entry on January 26, 2023 clearly states that the
January 25 entry was the corrected journal entry for the November 2022 plea hearing.
      3 Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-660490-A.

      4 Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-660510-A.

      5 Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-675242-A.
drug possession in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2925.11(A) (a fourth-degree felony)

with forfeiture specifications and two counts of drug possession in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A) (each a fifth-degree felony). The remaining counts were dismissed

through a nolle prosequi.

               As of November 2022, Clemmons had four pending criminal cases:

(1) the methamphetamine-trafficking case from the August 2020 encounter,6 (2) the

aggravated-vehicular-homicide case from the January 2021 pursuit and crash, (3)

the methamphetamine-possession case from the April 2021 traffic stop and (4) the

methamphetamine-possession case from the March 2020 traffic stop. The trial

court accepted Clemmons’ guilty pleas in each of these cases, as identified in the

paragraphs above, on November 28, 2022.

              On November 28, 2022, Clemmons pleaded guilty in each case as

described above. The trial court ordered a presentence-investigation report and the

defense filed a sentencing memorandum and letters written in support of the

defendant by eight of his relatives.

               On January 26, 2023, the trial court held a hearing in which it

sentenced Clemmons in each of these cases. The state, defense counsel, two of

Crenshaw’s relatives and Clemmons addressed the court.

               The state recommended a ten-year sentence in the aggravated-

vehicular-homicide case, calling Clemmons “an individual who is either fully unable

      6 Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-660510-A.
or entirely unwilling to follow the State of Ohio laws and has absolutely no problem

jeopardizing the lives of every other person on the roadways.” It recommended that

the sentences imposed on the other pending cases be served concurrently with that

ten-year sentence.

                The court decided to impose consecutive sentences on all of the cases,

stating as follows:

          This defendant’s behavior is indicative of a person that doesn’t care
          about anybody else but himself. He doesn’t care about his friend.
          He doesn’t. He just cares about himself. * * * Mr. Clemmons needs
          to be sentenced for his outrageous behavior in our community and
          I mean outrageous. Driving through residential neighborhoods * * *
          in excess of 90 miles an hour.

          ***

          So just so everybody knows what this Court is dealing with here, the
          presentence investigation indicates that this individual has a
          lengthy, serious criminal record. * * * You know, the comparative
          analysis has to start with a defendant who has got 19 prior cases.
          Now, those are misdemeanor and felony cases and a couple of
          driving under suspensions. What, [defense counsel], you also don’t
          mention is that he has 28 prior traffic convictions, 28 prior traffic
          convictions. That clearly demonstrates that he is a person that cares
          only about himself. He’s heedlessly indifferent to the rights and
          safety of everybody else in the community. You will blow through
          the intersection at 90 miles an hour late in the morning. * * * He’s
          got four cases and he’s committing the second case while he’s on
          bond for the first case. He’s committing the third case while he’s on
          bond for the first two cases. He’s committing the fourth case while
          he’s on bond for the first three cases. We eventually have to
          incarcerate him to stop what you could arguably say is a one-man
          walking crime lab. * * * You’ve now taken a life, along with three
          other cases where he is drug trafficking in our community to our
          children, to our friends, to our neighbors, right? Repeatedly, over
          and over without any remorse whatsoever. * * * I find that your
          behavior, considering your traffic record, considering your prior
          record, is the worst possible form of this aggravated vehicular
          homicide * * *.
          ***

          [T]his individual was on bond committing crimes while on bond for
          the first case. We have covered that. He continued to act in an
          unlawful and reckless manner, selling drugs in our community and
          having possession of drugs in our community.

          It is obvious with his driving record and with his criminal record
          that this sentence is not disproportionate. The harm here is so great
          and unusual that no single term adequately reflects the seriousness
          of this individual’s conduct and his criminal history shows that
          consecutive terms are necessary to protect the public. * * *
          [O]bviously this kind of behavior just simply cannot be tolerated in
          a civilized society.

                The trial court thereafter announced its sentence.         It sentenced

Clemmons to eight years in prison on the aggravated-vehicular-homicide offense

and to one year in prison on the failure-to-comply offense. The trial court imposed

those sentences consecutively to each other, finding that consecutive service was

mandatory. The trial court sentenced the defendant to one year in prison on the

having-weapons-while-under-disability charge, to be served concurrently with the

other sentences in the case. The trial court sentenced Clemmons to one year in

prison on the offense of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, to be

served concurrently. 7

      7  The trial court initially announced at the hearing that it was sentencing
Clemmons to 18 months in prison on the failure-to-comply charge, to 36 months on the
having-weapons-while-under-disability charge and to 18 months on the improper-
handling charge. Later in the hearing, it stated that it was sentencing Clemmons to one
year in prison on each of those charges. The court did not explain the discrepancy on the
record, but its sentencing journal entry states that the sentences on these charges were
one year in prison each.
                In the methamphetamine-trafficking case stemming from the August

2020 encounter with police,8 the trial court sentenced Clemmons to one year in

prison, to be served consecutively to the sentences in Clemmons’ other cases.

                In the methamphetamine-possession-and-evidence-tampering case

stemming from the April 2020 traffic stop,9 the trial court sentenced Clemmons to

one year in prison on each of the two counts, to be served concurrently with each

other but consecutively to the sentences imposed in the other two cases.

                In the methamphetamine-possession case stemming from the

University Circle traffic stop, the trial court sentenced Clemmons to one year in

prison, to be served consecutively to the sentenced imposed in the other cases.

                Clemmons objected to the consecutive sentences at the sentencing

hearing.

                In total, then, the trial court sentenced Clemmons to a minimum of

12 years in prison and a maximum of 16 years. The trial court suspended Clemmons’

driver’s license for life.

                The trial court published sentencing journal entries in each of the

cases, stating as follows with regard to consecutive sentences:

       The court imposes prison terms consecutively finding that consecutive
       service of the prison term is necessary to protect the public from future
       crime or to punish Defendant; that the consecutive sentences are not
       disproportionate to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct and to the
       danger Defendant poses to the public; and that, Defendant’s history of

       8 Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-660510-A.

       9 Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-660490-A.
      criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are
      necessary to protect the public from future crime by Defendant.

               Clemmons appealed the sentencing judgment entry in the vehicular-

homicide case only, raising the following assignment of error for review:

         The record does not support the trial court’s imposition of
         consecutive sentences.

II. Law and Analysis

       A. Standard of Review Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)

               We review felony sentences under the standard of review set forth in

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59

N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 21. Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase,

reduce or otherwise modify a sentence or vacate a sentence and remand for

resentencing if it “clearly and convincingly” finds that (1) the record does not

support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D),

2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) or 2929.20(I) or (2) the sentence is “otherwise contrary

to law.” “‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof * * *

which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to

the facts sought to be established.’”      State v. Franklin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 107482, 2019-Ohio-376o, ¶ 29, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469,

120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

               Clemmons asks us to vacate the consecutive sentences and remand

the matter to the trial court for resentencing because the trial court’s findings are
not supported by the record; he does not argue that his sentence is “otherwise

contrary to law.”

       B. Standard of Review for These Consecutive Sentences

              Under Ohio law, sentences are presumed to run concurrently unless

the trial court makes the required findings set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v.

Reindl, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 109806, 109807 and 109808, 2021-Ohio-2586,

¶ 14; State v. Gohagan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107948, 2019-Ohio-4070, ¶ 28. To

impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must find that (1) consecutive

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the

offender, (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of

the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public and (3) at

least one of the following applies:

      (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
          while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
          sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or
          2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for
          a prior offense.

      (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
          or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
          of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that
          no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of
          any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness
          of the offender’s conduct.

      (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
          consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
          future crime by the offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
               Thus, a defendant can challenge consecutive sentences on appeal in

two ways. First, the defendant can argue that consecutive sentences are contrary to

law because the court failed to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b); Reindl at ¶ 13; State v. Nia, 2014-Ohio-2527, 15 N.E.3d

892, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Second, the defendant can argue that the record “clearly and

convincingly” does not support the court’s findings made pursuant to

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a); Reindl at ¶ 13.

               Here, Clemmons makes the latter argument. He concedes that the

trial court made the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) but argues that the

record clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s finding that

“consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of [Clemmons’]

conduct.” R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

                In addressing this assignment of error, we review the record and

consider whether we “clearly and convincingly” find that it does not support that

finding. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).10

      10 See also State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5 (lead opinion)

(“[T]he trial court’s findings must be upheld unless those findings are clearly and
convincingly not supported by the record.”), ¶ 27 (Fischer, J., concurring in judgment
only) (“[T]he appellate court could not find that the record does not support the trial
court’s consecutive-sentence findings * * *.”) and ¶ 73 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“De novo
review of the record * * * is in fact what the statute requires.”). We note that the Ohio
Supreme Court has accepted the following proposition of law for review in State v. Jones,
Ohio Supreme Court Case No. 2022-1049: “A court of appeals violates an appellant’s right
to meaningful appellate review and its obligations pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) when
it fails to conduct the proper de novo review in determining whether the trial court made
all required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and whether the record contains an
evidentiary basis sufficient to support each required finding.” We also note that the
Supreme Court accepted an appeal in State v. Glover, Ohio Supreme Court Case No.
       C. Analysis

               Clemmons argues that the trial court “did not find that [Clemmons’]

conduct in this particular case was more or less serious than that of other cases” and

says that the trial court relied too heavily on the fact that Clemmons caused someone

else’s death in the crash, when “death is inherent with any fact pattern relative to”

the aggravated-vehicular-homicide charge. He also says that the trial court relied

too heavily on Clemmons’ criminal history, as opposed to focusing on the specific

factual circumstances of his present offenses.

                The state responds that the record supports consecutive sentences.

               After a thorough review of the record, we are not left with the “firm

belief or conviction” that the consecutive sentences the trial court imposed are

disproportionate to the seriousness of Clemmons’ conduct.

                As an initial matter, the trial court did analyze the specific

circumstances of Clemmons’ present conduct. The court found it “outrageous” that

Clemmons was “driving through residential neighborhoods * * * in excess of 90

miles an hour” with no valid license, “blow[ing] through the intersection at 90 miles

an hour late in the morning,” and ultimately killing someone. The trial court found

that the specific reckless behavior demonstrated in this case, “considering your

2023-0654, that raises two assignments of error related to the standard of review in
consecutive-sentence cases: (1) “Neither the trial nor the appellate courts are required by
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to focus on a defendant’s aggregate prison term when imposing or
reviewing consecutive sentences” and (2) “The clear and convincing standard of review
set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow the court of appeals to substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court.”
traffic record, considering your prior record, is the worst possible form of this

aggravated vehicular homicide * * *.” The trial court then considered the factual

circumstances of Clemmons’ conduct in the other pending cases, focusing on the

fact that Clemmons continued driving without a valid license while possessing illegal

drugs. It found an aggravating circumstance in the fact that Clemmons continued

engaging in criminal and dangerous conduct “[r]epeatedly, over and over without

any remorse whatsoever” even after his prior reckless behavior killed Clemmons’

friend.

               The trial court, after appropriately reviewing Clemmons’ present

criminal conduct in the context of his criminal history, determined that “[t]he harm

here is so great and unusual that no single term adequately reflects the seriousness

of this individual’s conduct * * *. [O]bviously this kind of behavior just simply

cannot be tolerated in a civilized society.”

               The record supports these findings.

               Clemmons’ criminal record stretches back to 2007, at least, and

reflects a heedless indifference to traffic laws and a history of drug problems. He

incurred drug-related convictions, including for trafficking, in 2007, 2008, 2009,

2013, 2014, 2016 and 2017. In 2009, he was convicted for resisting arrest. He has

a conviction for burglary and two OVI convictions.

               The record further reflects that, despite a history of drug abuse and

dangerous driving and despite a license suspension, Clemmons simply could not or

would not stop getting behind the wheel of a car. In addition to his numerous traffic
citations, his sister wrote that Clemmons routinely drove his great-grandmother to

run errands and take her to appointments and routinely drove Crenshaw, too.

Clemmons reported in the presentence-investigation report that he “loves cars” and

wants to learn to paint and wrap cars.

               Not only did Clemmons continue driving when he had no valid

license, but he continued driving recklessly. He continued speeding and driving

with drugs, even when he was on bond and even after his reckless driving — in the

course of attempting to flee the police — killed his friend. He was cited for driving

88 m.p.h. the month after he was released on bond and then he was caught driving

twice the following month, including once with methamphetamine on his person.

               It was reasonable for the trial court to find that Clemmons’ conduct

in these four cases was more serious in light of Clemmons’ record and history of

driving recklessly and driving while in the possession of illegal drugs (including for

purposes of trafficking). It was further reasonable to find that Clemmons’ conduct

was more serious in the 2021 methamphetamine-possession case because he

committed that offense while on bond.

               In reviewing the record, we did note several positive facts. Clemmons

seemed genuinely remorseful at sentencing that his conduct resulted in Crenshaw’s

death, and the letters from his relatives confirmed that he was very affected by the

tragic consequence of his actions. Clemmons previously secured his GED in prison

and also took college courses while incarcerated. He reported that he is willing to

attend substance-abuse treatment and receive related services. He said he is
interested in attending self-help, employment and educational programs. Time will

tell if Clemmons follows through on securing that help. But these positive facts do

not diminish the seriousness of Clemmons’ conduct.

                 We have thoroughly reviewed the record and considered whether it

clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court’s finding that these

consecutive sentences and an aggregate 12- to 16-year sentence are not

disproportionate to the seriousness of Clemmons’ conduct. Clemmons does not

challenge any of the other necessity or proportionality findings. After our review,

and even noting that the sentence exceeded the state’s recommended sentence of

ten years, we do not have the firm conviction or belief that the record does not

support the trial court’s finding in light of the consecutive terms imposed and the

aggregate sentence. We find no error in the sentences.

                We, therefore, overrule Clemmons’ assignment of error.

III. Conclusion

                 Having overruled Clemmons’ sole assignment of error for the reasons

stated above, we affirm.

         It is ordered that the appellee recover from the appellant the costs herein

taxed.

         The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

         It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
The defendant’s convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is

terminated.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR