Court Opinion

ID: 9372785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:34.860998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.488825
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                      MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                      2022 MSPB 15
                            Docket Nos. SF-0752-15-0014-I-1
                                        SF-0752-15-0155-I-1

                                     Harinder Singh,
                                       Appellant,
                                              v.
                              United States Postal Service,
                                         Agency.
                                       May 31, 2022

           Myrna Castanon, Esquire, Los Angeles, California, for the appellant.

           Catherine V. Meek, Long Beach, California, for the agency.

                                        BEFORE

                              Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                  OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his demotion.       For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the
     appellant’s petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision AS MODIFIED
     by this Opinion and Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The   appellant   was    employed        by     the   agency    as     the   Manager
     Transportation/Networks,     EAS-23,   at      the     Los Angeles        Processing   and
     Distribution Center (P&DC).      Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket
                                                                                      2

     No. SF-0752-15-0014-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0014 IAF), Tab 76 at 4.           In
     March 2013, one of the appellant’s subordinate employees reported to agency
     authorities that the appellant physically threatened him during a meeting.      Id.
     The agency’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigated those allegations.
     OIG later expanded its investigation to include other alleged misconduct by the
     appellant. Id. at 4-5. The appellant was temporarily assigned to another position
     and then put on administrative leave while he was under investigation. Id.
¶3        After OIG completed its investigations into the appellant’s conduct, the
     agency interviewed the appellant and other employees. Id. at 5-6. On April 29,
     2014, the agency issued the appellant a Notice of Proposed Removal. 0014 IAF,
     Tab 4 at 138-50.   The agency charged the appellant with misuse of position,
     acceptance of gifts from subordinates, and improper conduct. Id. at 138-40. The
     appellant provided both oral and written responses to the proposed removal; he
     also submitted a number of documents to the deciding official. Id. at 17-136.
¶4        On September 9, 2014, the agency issued a Letter of Decision removing the
     appellant. Id. at 12-16. The deciding official sustained the charges of misuse of
     position and acceptance of gifts from subordinates in full and he sustained three
     of the five specifications of improper conduct.     Id. at 12-13.   The deciding
     official determined that the penalty of removal was appropriate for the sustained
     misconduct. Id. at 13-15.
¶5        On October 3, 2014, the appellant timely filed a Board appeal challenging
     his removal. 0014 IAF, Tab 1. On November 26, 2014, the agency issued a new
     Letter of Decision rescinding the September 9, 2014 removal decision and
     replacing it with a decision to demote the appellant, effective November 29,
     2014, to the position of Network Operations Specialist, EAS-19. 0014 IAF, Tab 7
     at 7-12. The deciding official wrote in part:
           Although I believe your conduct warrants your removal from the
           Postal Service, I believe it is in everyone’s best interest to attempt
           rehabilitation through a lower level assignment with direct
                                                                                        3

           supervision and no subordinates. Such a position was unavailable at
           the time of my original decision, but is available now.
     Id. at 10. The agency informed the appellant that he was entitled to back pay for
     the period during which his removal was in effect. Id. at 7.
¶6        The appellant timely filed an appeal of his demotion with the Board on
     December 2, 2014.     Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-
     0155-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0155 IAF), Tab 1. The administrative judge joined
     the removal and demotion appeals for adjudication. 0014 IAF, Tab 14; 0155 IAF,
     Tab 8. The agency later moved to dismiss the removal appeal as moot, 0014 IAF,
     Tab 27, but the appellant argued that the removal appeal was not moot because he
     had not been returned to the status quo ante and because he had not received a
     performance-based increase to his salary for 2013 and 2014, 0014 IAF, Tab 28.
     After a hearing on the joined appeals, the agency supplemented its motion to
     dismiss with additional evidence regarding the salary increase issue. 0014 IAF,
     Tab 82. The appellant responded, arguing that the removal appeal was still not
     moot. 0014 IAF, Tab 83.
¶7        The administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the appellant’s
     demotion. 0014 IAF, Tab 86, Initial Decision (ID). She found that the agency
     proved the charge of misuse of position and the three specifications of improper
     conduct that were sustained by the deciding official, but that the agency failed to
     prove the charge of acceptance of gifts from subordinates. ID at 4-20. As to
     penalty, the administrative judge limited her review to the demotion to avoid the
     possibility of affirming a penalty more severe than the one the agency ultimately
     chose to impose. ID at 22. Even though she did not sustain all of the charges, the
     administrative judge found that the penalty of demotion was within the tolerable
     limits of reasonableness. ID at 22-24. 1

     1
       The administrative judge also found that the agency fully rescinded the removal and
     provided the appellant with all of the relief he could have received in his removal
                                                                                           4

¶8         The appellant has filed a timely petition for review of the initial decision.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. He argues that the administrative judge
     erred in crediting the testimony of one of the agency’s key witnesses.               Id.
     at 23-24. Additionally, he argues that the administrative judge improperly denied
     his motion to compel discovery related to the consistency of the penalty with
     those imposed on employees for the same or similar offenses. Id. at 12-13. He
     also challenges the administrative judge’s analysis of the Douglas factors. 2 Id.
     at 13‑16. Finally, the appellant argues that he was denied due process and that
     the deciding official was improperly influenced. Id. at 16-22. The agency has
     responded in opposition to the petition for review, PFR File, Tab 3, and the
     appellant has filed a reply, PFR File, Tab 4.

                                          ANALYSIS
     The appellant’s disparate penalty claim does not provide a basis for reversing the
     initial decision.
¶9         The appellant argues that he was denied discovery regarding the agency’s
     treatment of other employees who engaged in similar misconduct.              PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 12-13. He speculates that such discovery would have revealed that the
     agency treated similarly situated employees more leniently. Id. at 13. Before we
     address the appellant’s arguments relating to discovery, we take this opportunity
     to reinstate our former law governing the analysis of disparate penalty claims and
     thereby overrule Figueroa v. Department of Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R.
     422 (2013); Villada v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 268 (2010); Woebcke v.

     appeal. ID at 24-25. She did not find that the removal appeal was moot, however. ID
     at 24.   On review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s
     disposition of the removal appeal, and therefore we will address only the
     demotion appeal.
     2
       In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-306 (1981), the Board
     articulated a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered when evaluating the penalty
     to be imposed for an act of misconduct.
                                                                                       5

      Department of Homeland Security, 114 M.S.P.R. 100 (2010), abrogated in part
      on other grounds as recognized in Bowman v. Small Business Administration,
      122 M.S.P.R. 217 (2015); Lewis v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R.
      657 (2010), and their progeny, except to the extent that the law may have been
      modified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (Federal
      Circuit’s) decision in Williams v. Social Security Administration, 586 F.3d 1365
      (Fed. Cir. 2009), discussed infra.
¶10        It is well settled that among the factors an agency should consider in setting
      the penalty for misconduct is “consistency of the penalty with those imposed
      upon other employees for the same or similar offenses.”       Douglas v. Veterans
      Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305 (1981).      For decades after Douglas was
      decided, for a disparate penalty claim to succeed, the Board required close
      similarity in offenses between the appellant and any comparator(s), and that the
      appellant and the comparator(s) worked in the same unit and for the same
      supervisors.   E.g., Jackson v. Department of the Army, 99 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 7
      (2005); Fearon v. Department of Labor, 99 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶ 11 (2005);
      Rasmussen v. Department of Agriculture, 44 M.S.P.R. 185, 191-92 (1990);
      Archuleta v. Department of the Air Force, 16 M.S.P.R. 404, 407 (1983).
¶11        In a series of cases issued in 2010, however, the Board changed its approach
      to disparate penalty claims.     Under the new precedent, broad similarity in
      misconduct between the appellant and the comparator(s) was sufficient to shift
      the burden to the agency to explain the difference in treatment, and the universe
      for potential comparators was seemingly limitless. See Figueroa, 119 M.S.P.R.
      422, ¶¶ 3‑4, 10-12; Villada, 115 M.S.P.R. 268, ¶¶ 10-12; Woebcke, 114 M.S.P.R.
      100, ¶¶ 19‑22; Lewis, 113 M.S.P.R. 657, ¶¶ 5‑15.
¶12        In announcing its “more flexible approach” to disparate penalties claims,
      the Board relied in large part on a 2009 decision from our reviewing court. In
      Williams, 586 F.3d 1365, the Federal Circuit remanded an appeal to the Board for
                                                                                              6

      further development of the record as to the agency’s treatment of an alleged
      comparator. Id. at 1368-69. Previously in that case, the administrative judge had
      found the comparator evidence irrelevant because the comparator was not in the
      same chain of command as the appellant.           Id. at 1368.    The court found that
      “[w]hile the fact that two employees are supervised under different chains of
      command may sometimes justify different penalties,” the record before it did not
      justify the alleged disparity in treatment, particularly because the appellant was a
      mere participant in a tax fraud scheme orchestrated by the comparator.                 Id.
      at 1368-69.    Applying Williams, the Board in Lewis held that there must be
      enough similarity between both the nature of the misconduct and the other factors
      to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the agency treated similarly situated
      employees differently, but that the Board would not have “hard and fast rules
      regarding the ‘outcome determinative’ nature of these factors.”                    Lewis,
      113 M.S.P.R. 657, ¶¶ 15, 21.
¶13         Under the binding precedent of Williams, a comparator need not always
      have to be in the same work unit or under the same supervisor. 3               Williams,
      586 F.3d at 1368-69. Thus, the Board’s pre-Williams statements to the contrary
      are no longer valid.         Nevertheless, while no single factor is outcome
      determinative, the fact that two employees come from different work units and/or

      3
        A panel of the Federal Circuit recently held that “[a] comparator employee is an
      employee that ‘was in the same work unit, with the same supervisor, and was subjected
      to the same standards governing discipline.’” Miskill v. Social Security Administration,
      863 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Lewis). To the extent this statement can
      be read as an absolute requirement that comparator employees be in the same work unit
      with the same supervisor, it conflicts with the prior panel decision in Williams, in which
      the court held that “the fact that two employees are supervised under different chains of
      command may sometimes justify different penalties.” Williams, 586 F.3d at 1368
      (emphasis supplied). We remain bound by Williams, the earlier panel decision. See
      Deckers Corporation v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 959, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
      (explaining that only an en banc court opinion, intervening Supreme Court precedent, or
      Congressional change of an underlying statute may overrule prior precedential
      panel decisions).
                                                                                         7

      supervisory chains remains an important factor in determining whether it is
      appropriate to compare the penalties they are given. In most cases, employees
      from another work unit or supervisory chain will not be proper comparators. In
      Williams, the court emphasized the fact that the comparator had originated and
      organized a tax fraud scheme in which Mr. Williams was one of several
      participants. Id. at 1366-69. Given the unusually close connection between the
      two employees’ misconduct in that case, the court found that the agency needed
      to justify the alleged disparity in the discipline they received. 4     The unique
      circumstances in Williams illustrate that there must be a close connection between
      the misconduct or some other factor for an employee from another work unit or
      supervisory chain to be a proper comparator for disparate penalty purposes. The
      universe of potential comparators will vary from case to case, but it should be
      limited to those employees whose misconduct and/or other circumstances closely
      resemble those of the appellant.
¶14         Prior to Williams, a panel of the Federal Circuit held that when an employee
      raises an allegation that he received more severe discipline than another
      employee, the proper inquiry is whether the agency knowingly treated employees
      differently “in a way not justified by the facts, and intentionally for reasons other
      than the efficiency of the service.”      Facer v. Department of the Air Force,
      836 F.2d 535, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1988). To the extent the panel in Williams intended
      to remove the knowledge portion of the disparate penalty analysis, as we
      similarly noted, supra, in footnote 3, we are bound to follow the court’s previous
      analysis, as set forth in the court’s earlier panel decision in Facer, which includes
      the knowledge portion. See Deckers Corporation v. United States, 752 F.3d 949,
      959, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that, “[i]n this Circuit, a later panel is bound

      4
        Mr. Williams alleged that the agency reemployed the comparator, an assertion the
      agency disputed. Williams, 586 F.3d at 1368-69. The court remanded the appeal for
      further development of the factual record. Id. at 1369.
                                                                                      8

      by the determinations of a prior panel, unless relieved of that obligation by an
      en banc order of the court or a decision of the Supreme Court[]”).      Thus, we
      overrule Lewis and subsequent cases to the extent they have deviated from the
      standard set forth in Facer. In assessing an agency’s penalty determination, the
      relevant inquiry is whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated
      employees differently.
¶15        Since 2010, the Board has used its “flexible” approach to disparate penalty
      claims as a basis for mitigating agency-imposed penalties.       For example, in
      Portner v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶¶ 2-6, 9, 16-22 (2013), the
      Board mitigated the removal of a supervisor who operated his official
      Government vehicle (OGV) and made multiple false statements to agency
      employees and the police regarding his actions in an attempt to hide the fact that
      he parked the OGV in a parking lot adjacent to a Hooters restaurant, where he
      consumed alcohol and ate dinner. In reducing the penalty to a 45-day suspension,
      the Board relied in part on evidence that other employees who had been charged
      with misuse of an OGV and other misconduct had received lesser penalties, even
      though none of the comparators had been charged with both misuse of an OGV
      and making false statements, like the appellant. Id., ¶¶ 20-22. The Board found
      that, although the misconduct of the comparators was not the same as the
      appellant’s, it “appear[ed] at least as serious as the appellant’s wrongdoing” and
      that the agency failed to offer a sufficient explanation for the significantly
      harsher penalty imposed on the appellant. Id., ¶¶ 21‑22.
¶16        In Boucher v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶¶ 2-13, 20-29 (2012),
      the Board affirmed an administrative judge’s decision mitigating the removal of a
      mail handler who was arrested near agency property while on duty and later
      convicted of a felony, unlawful possession of a controlled substance.           In
      mitigating the removal to a 90-day suspension, the administrative judge cited
      another employee who worked at the same facility as the appellant and was not
      removed after being charged with drug possession. Id., ¶¶ 3, 11, 13. The Board
                                                                                            9

      recognized several differences between the appellant’s circumstances and those of
      the comparator, including that the comparator was charged with possession of
      marijuana only, whereas the appellant was charged with possession of both
      cocaine and marijuana, and that the comparator was not arrested on or near
      agency property.       Id., ¶¶ 21-22.   Nevertheless, the Board determined that the
      comparison between the two penalties was appropriate because the comparator
      had engaged in “a more serious act” by attempting to smuggle marijuana into a
      prison facility. Id.
¶17         The Board’s disparate penalty analysis in cases like Portner and Boucher
      represents a departure from the standard set forth in Douglas, which calls for
      comparison with penalties “imposed upon other employees for the same or
      similar offenses.” Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305 (emphasis added). The Board in
      Portner and Boucher did not find that the comparators had engaged in the same or
      similar offenses as the appellants. Instead, the Board found comparisons of the
      penalties appropriate in those cases because the comparators’ misconduct was “as
      serious as” or “more serious” than that of the appellants. Portner, 119 M.S.P.R.
      365, ¶ 22; Boucher, 118 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 22. We overrule Portner and Boucher to
      the extent they held that the disparate penalty analysis should extend beyond the
      same or similar offenses. The Board should not attempt to weigh the relative
      seriousness of various offenses in order to determine whether two employees who
      committed different acts of misconduct were treated disparately.
¶18         Additionally, the consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon other
      employees for the same or similar offenses is simply one of a nonexhaustive list
      of   12   factors   that   are   relevant   for   consideration   in   determining   the
      appropriateness of a penalty.      Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305-06.       The Board has
      frequently stated that the nature and seriousness of the offense, and its relation to
      the employee’s duties, position, and responsibility, is the most important factor in
      assessing the reasonableness of a penalty.         E.g., Batara v. Department of the
      Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 278, ¶ 8 (2016); Spencer v. U.S. Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R.
                                                                                          10

      132, ¶ 7 (2009).     Under the Board’s post-Lewis standard, in some cases the
      consistency of the penalty has become not only more important than any of the
      other Douglas factors, it has become the sole outcome determinative factor. We
      hereby reiterate that the consistency of the penalty is just one of many relevant
      factors to be considered in determining an appropriate penalty. Therefore, while
      the fact that one employee receives a more severe penalty than that imposed on a
      comparator who has committed the same or similar misconduct should be
      considered in favor of mitigating the penalty in a given case, mitigation is by no
      means required in all such cases. There often will be a range of penalties that
      would fall within the tolerable limits of reasonableness in a given case. That an
      agency chooses to impose a penalty at the more lenient end of that range in one
      case should not mean that it cannot impose a penalty at the more severe end of
      that range in another case. 5
¶19         In light of our reinstatement of the former legal standard for analyzing
      disparate penalty claims, we now turn to the appellant’s argument that he was
      improperly denied discovery regarding potential comparators. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 12-13. Specifically, the appellant sought information regarding the treatment
      of employees agency-wide who had engaged in similar misconduct. 0014 IAF,
      Tab 11 at 20. The agency objected to the appellant’s request as overbroad and
      limited its response to employees at the Los Angeles P&DC. Id. at 32-33. The
      appellant reiterated his request for agency-wide information.         Id. at 60.   The
      agency reiterated its objections, but it did supplement its discovery response with
      information regarding EAS employees within the Pacific Area (i.e., California

      5
        There is no guarantee that a prior agency penalty determination even fell within the
      tolerable limits of reasonableness. Thus, the consistency called for under Villada,
      Woebcke, and Lewis might be rooted in an earlier disciplinary decision that was unwise,
      meaning that a manager could be forced to go easy on an employee who committed
      serious misconduct because of the unwarranted leniency of some other manager in the
      past.
                                                                                     11

      and Hawaii) who were charged with arguably similar misconduct over the prior
      2 years. 0014 IAF, Tab 18 at 225. The appellant asked the administrative judge
      to compel the agency to produce information about potential comparators
      agency-wide.    0014 IAF, Tab 11 at 4-12, Tab 19.        The administrative judge
      denied the appellant’s motion to compel, finding the requests to be “overbroad
      and burdensome and not likely to lead to the discovery of relevant admissible
      evidence.” 0014 IAF, Tab 74 at 1-2.
¶20        An administrative judge has broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters,
      and absent an abuse of discretion the Board will not find reversible error in such
      rulings. Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 16 (2016). We find
      no abuse of discretion in this matter, particularly in light of the above
      reinstatement of our former legal standard for analyzing disparate penalty claims.
      The agency provided information regarding potential comparators within
      reasonable geographic and temporal limits. Information regarding the treatment
      of employees across the country is simply not likely to lead to the discovery of
      admissible evidence regarding whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably
      treated employees differently.
¶21        Beyond his arguments regarding discovery, the appellant offers nothing
      more than speculation regarding the treatment of similarly situated employees.
      “Had the record been developed,” he argues on review, “the evidence would have
      likely shown that employees with over 30 years of service, and no discipline with
      numerous high profile awards received a suspension or letter of warning for
      engaging in the same or similar conduct.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 13. In fact, the
      only evidence regarding the treatment of employees who engaged in conduct that
      was at all similar to the appellant’s indicates that those employees were either
      demoted or removed. Hearing Transcript (HT) at 666 (testimony of the deciding
      official). Thus, we find that the appellant has not shown that the administrative
      judge erred in her consideration of the consistency of the penalty.
                                                                                      12

      The appellant has not shown that the agency violated his due process rights.
¶22         The appellant argues that the agency violated his due process rights because
      the deciding official contacted an official at agency headquarters about one of the
      specifications without notifying the appellant of that contact. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 16-18. The deciding official testified that there was conflicting information as
      to whether the appellant was authorized to make the contract changes that formed
      the basis of the first specification of the improper conduct charge. The deciding
      official therefore contacted an official at agency headquarters to find out whether
      the appellant’s actions were in fact improper. HT at 697-700 (testimony of the
      deciding official).
¶23         Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Ward v. U.S. Postal Service,
      634 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance
      Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999), a deciding official
      violates an employee’s due process rights when he relies upon new and material
      ex parte information as a basis for his decisions on the merits of a proposed
      charge or the penalty to be imposed.        See Norris v. Securities & Exchange
      Commission, 675 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Gray v. Department
      of Defense, 116 M.S.P.R. 461, ¶ 6 (2011). An employee’s due process right to
      notice extends to both ex parte information provided to a deciding official and
      information personally known to the deciding official, if the information was
      considered in reaching the decision and was not previously disclosed to the
      appellant. Solis v. Department of Justice, 117 M.S.P.R. 458, ¶ 7 (2012). Ward,
      Stone, and their progeny recognize, however, that not all ex parte communications
      that introduce new and material information to the deciding official rise to the
      level of a due process violation. Solis, 117 M.S.P.R. 458, ¶ 8.
¶24         In Stone, the Federal Circuit identified the following factors to be used to
      determine if ex parte information is new and material: (1) whether the ex parte
      information introduced cumulative, as opposed to new, information; (2) whether
      the employee knew of the information and had an opportunity to respond; and
                                                                                         13

      (3) whether the communication was “of the type likely to result in undue pressure
      on the deciding official to rule in a particular manner.” Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377.
      Ultimately, we must determine “whether the ex parte communication is so
      substantial and so likely to cause prejudice that no employee can fairly be
      required    to    be   subjected   to   a   deprivation   of   property   under   such
      circumstances.” Id.
¶25        A deciding official does not violate an employee’s due process rights by
      initiating an ex parte communication that only confirms or clarifies information
      already contained in the record. Blank v. Department of the Army, 247 F.3d 1225,
      1229 (Fed. Cir. 2001). On the other hand, information obtained from an ex parte
      communication may be considered new and material if it constitutes a significant
      departure from evidence already in the record and the deciding official considers
      it in reaching a decision.         See Young v. Department of Housing & Urban
      Development, 706 F.3d 1372, 1376-78 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
¶26        We find that the ex parte communication in this case does not constitute a
      due process violation. The agency charged the appellant with improper conduct
      for his actions regarding the contract changes.       0014 IAF, Tab 4 at 139.     The
      deciding official reached out to the official at headquarters because there was
      some indication in the record that the appellant’s actions may not have been
      improper.     HT at 697-700; 0155 IAF, Tab 6 at 64.       The effect of the ex parte
      communication appears to have been to confirm to the deciding official that the
      appellant’s actions were in fact improper, just as the agency indicated in the
      notice of proposed removal. Therefore, we find that the ex parte communication
      in this case did not introduce new and material information to the deciding
      official. Rather, it merely clarified or confirmed information that was already in
      the record.      See Mathis v. Department of State, 122 M.S.P.R. 507, ¶¶ 12, 16
      (2015) (applying the Stone factors and finding no due process violation when the
      deciding official contacted a human resources representative to determine
                                                                                     14

      whether allegations made in response to the proposed removal were supported by
      the facts).

      The appellant failed to show that his demotion was ultra vires or otherwise
      procedurally improper.
¶27         The appellant alleges that the decision to demote him was actually made by
      another agency official and communicated to the deciding official; he argues that
      the action is therefore ultra vires and should be reversed as not in accordance
      with law. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-22. Agency actions have been found to be not in
      accordance with law when the individual taking the action lacked the legal
      authority to do so. For example, in Hamilton v. U.S. Postal Service, 58 M.S.P.R.
      486, 487-88 (1993), the Board found that a demotion was not in accordance with
      law because the deciding official had retired from the agency prior to issuing the
      decision. In McCollum v. National Credit Union Administration, 417 F.3d 1332,
      1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit held that a removal was not in
      accordance with law because the only entity within the agency with the authority
      to authorize the appellant’s removal never did so. Here, by contrast, there is no
      claim that the deciding official lacked the authority to demote the appellant.
      Therefore, that action was not ultra vires.
¶28         Nevertheless, the Board does require that the ultimate decision regarding an
      adverse action be made by the deciding official, not by some other individual.
      See Fontes v. Department of Transportation, 51 M.S.P.R. 655, 668 (1991). Here,
      the deciding official testified that the decision to demote the appellant was his
      alone. HT at 704-05 (testimony of the deciding official). The appellant points to
      testimony from another agency official who stated that he told the deciding
      official to place the appellant in the EAS-19 position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-22.
      However, the official could not recall when that conversation took place, except
      that it was sometime before December 1, 2014. HT at 793-94 (testimony of the
      Manager, Network Operations for the Pacific Area). The decision demoting the
      appellant was issued on November 26, 2014. 0014 IAF, Tab 7 at 7. Thus, even if
                                                                                          15

      the conversation took place as the official claimed, it may have taken place after
      the decision to demote the appellant already had been made. Accordingly, we
      find that the appellant failed to show that the decision to demote him was made
      by someone other than the deciding official.           See Gores v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 68 M.S.P.R. 100, 121 (1995) (finding no harmful procedural
      error when the appellant failed to show that the deciding official did not make the
      ultimate decision), rev’d on other grounds, 132 F.3d 50 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Table).

      The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge erred in her
      credibility determinations.
¶29         The appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in crediting the
      testimony of one of the agency’s key witnesses because that witness had been
      charged with several types of misconduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11, 23-24. He also
      argues that the witness was biased against the appellant. Id. The administrative
      judge applied the Hillen factors 6 and found the testimony of the agency’s witness
      to be more credible than that of the appellant. ID at 6-7.
¶30         The   Board    must    defer   to   an   administrative    judge’s    credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing, and may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.
      Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, the
      administrative judge found the witness’s testimony to be more consistent with the

      6
        To resolve credibility issues, an administrative judge must identify the factual
      questions in dispute, summarize the evidence on each disputed question, state which
      version she believes, and explain in detail why she found the chosen version more
      credible, considering such factors as: (1) the witness’s opportunity and capacity to
      observe the event or act in question; (2) the witness’s character; (3) any prior
      inconsistent statement by the witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or lack of bias; (5) the
      contradiction of the witness’s version of events by other evidence or its consistency
      with other evidence; (6) the inherent improbability of the witness’s version of events;
      and (7) the witness’s demeanor. Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453,
      458 (1987).
                                                                                       16

      other evidence than the appellant’s. She also found the appellant’s testimony to
      be inherently improbable. In addition, the administrative judge explicitly cited
      the respective demeanors of the witness and the appellant during their testimony.
      ID at 6-7. We find the administrative judge’s credibility determinations to be
      well reasoned and supported by the record, and we find that the appellant has not
      presented sufficiently sound reasons for overturning those determinations. 7

      The penalty of demotion was within the tolerable limits of reasonableness.
¶31         In addition to his arguments regarding disparate penalty, the appellant
      challenges other aspects of the administrative judge’s penalty analysis. First, the
      appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to properly consider the
      adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions. In support of his argument,
      the appellant cites the deciding official’s testimony that he did not consider
      giving the appellant a suspension or letter of warning. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-14.
      However, the deciding official testified that the appellant’s misconduct made him
      “unsuitable to manage other people.”          HT at 664 (testimony of the deciding
      official).   When pressed about why he did not give the appellant a letter of
      warning, the deciding official testified that it was not a viable option because of
      the nature of the misconduct and the appellant’s position.           HT at 701-02
      (testimony of the deciding official). We find no error in the deciding official’s
      consideration of possible lesser sanctions.
¶32         The appellant also argues that the administrative judge, when assessing the
      penalty, failed to properly consider his lack of training. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-16.
      The testimony he cites in support of that argument relates to one specification of
      the improper conduct charge dealing with changes to transportation contracts. Id.
      at 14-15. The appellant does not argue that there was a lack of training or notice

      7
        The appellant has not otherwise challenged the administrative judge’s findings
      regarding the charges. We have reviewed those findings and see no basis for
      overturning them.
                                                                                           17

      regarding any of the other charges or specifications. Even if he is correct that he
      was not properly trained on the rules governing contract changes, we find that it
      is not a sufficient basis to mitigate the penalty.
¶33         The deciding official testified in detail regarding his consideration of each
      of the Douglas factors. HT at 660-72 (testimony of the deciding official). We
      agree with the administrative judge that the deciding official properly considered
      the relevant Douglas factors and that the penalty of demotion is within the
      tolerable limits of reasonableness for the sustained misconduct. Cf. Gonzalez v.
      Department of the Air Force, 51 M.S.P.R. 646, 654 (1991) (affirming the removal
      of an employee with 24 years of service and no prior disciplinary record for
      misuse of position and unauthorized off-duty employment).

                                             ORDER
¶34         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should

      8
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      18

immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                  19

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC    review    of   cases   involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).            If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     20

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                21

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.