Court Opinion

ID: 9467731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:55:01.036547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:29.550889
License: Public Domain

A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, Jr., Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with so much of the majority’s decision which vacates the judgment of conviction and the entry of a judgment of acquittal on Count Two. I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the convictions on Counts One and Three. Though Judge Weis has written a thoughtful opinion, I believe the views expressed by Judge McKay in United States v. Sparrow, 635 F.2d 794 at 796-797 (10th Cir. 1980) (in banc), express the correct statement of law as to 18 U.S.C. 2314:
[T]he plain meaning of the statute requires the prosecution to show that the security was in a forged or altered condition at the time of its interstate passage. The rule is clear that a criminal statute is limited to its terms; it “must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity.” United *285States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 1015, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973); see also United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297, 92 S.Ct. 471, 474, 30 L.Ed.2d 457 (1971); United States v. Fisher, 456 F.2d 1143, 1145 (10th Cir. 1972).
The three circuits which have interpreted this section have all given it this meaning. See United States v. Sparrow; United States v. Hilyer, 543 F.2d 41 (8th Cir., 1976); United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1972). Cf. United States v. Lee, 485 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1977). Indeed, at oral argument in this case, the government conceded that the section under which McElroy was indicted required that the check be in a forged state when it crossed state lines.
In support of its interpretation, the majority relies on the broad purpose of the National Stolen Property Act “to bring operators in these false securities into substantially the same reach of federal power as applied to others dealing in stolen goods, securities, and money.” Majority Opinion at 277, quoting United States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 389, 67 S.Ct. 332, 337, 91 L.Ed. 359 (1946). I agree that the government possesses the authority under the Constitution and the Act to prosecute McElroy even though the check may not have been forged when it crossed state lines. But this broad purpose is satisfied by prosecution under other provisions of the Act. Section 18 U.S.C. 2314 also holds criminally liable any person who “with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any tool, implement, or thing used or fitted to be used in falsely making, forging, altering, or counterfeiting any security or tax stamps... . ” Transportation of the unsigned check by McElroy across state lines with the intent of forging it would have satisfied this standard, and the intent of the Act. Unfortunately, McElroy was not charged under this paragraph. Thus, the question we must address is not whether the federal government could have prosecuted McElroy under the Act for his actions, which it clearly could, but whether the specific section under which McElroy was indicted reached that activity.
On this question I believe there is some ambiguity. The wording of the section suggests, as other courts have held, that it is a forged check that must be transported across state lines, not a check that is later forged. Under the majority’s analysis, on the other hand, if one individual transported an unforged check across state lines and handed it to a second person, who forged the check and carried it across the street, the second person could be convicted of transportation of a forged check in interstate commerce. This is a reasonable interpretation, but not the most apparent.
The majority’s analogy to Section 2315 is not determinative. Section 2315 holds individuals liable for “receiving,” “selling,” or “storing” a forged security “moving as, or which is part of, or which constitute, interstate commerce.” Unlike the act of “transportation,” the “sale,” “receipt” or “storage” of forgeries obviously cannot occur, except in unusual circumstances, across state lines. Thus, a broader interpretation of the special clause included in that section —“moving as, or which is part of, or which constitute” — is logical. No such broad interpretation is impelled by the language of Section 2314. Because criminal statutes must be “resolved in favor of lenity,” I would interpret the prohibition on transporting a forged check in interstate commerce under Section 2314 to require movement of the forged check across state lines. Thus, as I see it, the district court judge’s charge on Counts One and Three was improper.
Finally, I do not believe that the government should be prohibited from retrying the defendants on these two counts. From my review of the record, there was substantial evidence for a jury to infer that the check involved in Count Three had been forged before it was brought into Pennsylvania. Thus, retrial of the defendants on this count would not contravene the Double Jeopardy Clause. As to Count One, on the other hand, there was probably insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, for the jury to infer that the check had been forged before *286it entered interstate commerce. The absence of such evidence, however, is attributable to an unmeritorious objection made by the defendant which, in my opinion, was improperly sustained by the court. Its decision excluded evidence that had been proffered by the government to establish the transportation in interstate commerce jurisdictional nexus. Since the exclusion of this jurisdictional evidence on Count One was attributable solely to the defendant’s objection, I would not find that another prosecution on Count One is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.1

. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Hudson v. State of Louisiana, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), and Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), would not preclude retrial of the defendant. These cases merely hold “that a reversal ‘due to a failure of proof at trial,’ where the state received a ‘fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble,’ bars retrial on the same charge.” Hudson v. State of Louisiana, - U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 972, quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. at 16, 98 S.Ct. at 2150. In this case, the government did not have a “fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble.”