Court Opinion

ID: 9947082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-02 00:01:58.64058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.472828
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/1/24 In re Nasir B. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

In re NASIR B., a Person                                     B328283
Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County
Court Law.                                                   Super. Ct. No.
                                                             19CCJP01759A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

C.B.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Charles Q. Clay III, Judge. Affirmed.
     Carolyn S. Hurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                       _________________________

       C.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights over her son, Nasir B. (born Jan.
2019).1 She alleges that both the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and the
juvenile court failed to comply with the duty of further inquiry
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1900 et seq.)
(ICWA) and related California law. Finding no error, we affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
       During DCFS’s initial investigation into the family in
March 2019, mother filled out a Parental Notification of Indian
Status form (ICWA-020) stating that she is “or may be a member
of, or eligible for membership, in a federally recognized Indian
tribe” because her paternal grandmother (great-grandmother)
was Choctaw. She provided a phone number for her father
(grandfather).
       At the detention hearing, mother reported that great-
grandmother was deceased and that she could not provide her

1     Nasir’s father is not a part of this appeal.

2     Because ICWA error is the only issue raised in this appeal,
this summary of the factual and procedural background focuses
on matters related to ICWA compliance. (In re I.B. (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 367, 370.)

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date of birth. The juvenile court ordered DCFS to contact
grandfather “and inquire whether he has birth date information
and further information regarding [great-]grandmother’s possible
Choctaw nation heritage.” It then instructed DCFS “to notice the
Choctaw nation[.]”
         At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on May 1, 2019,
DCFS reported that it had not been able to reach grandfather.
Mother provided the name and phone number of her paternal
aunt (great-aunt). The juvenile court again ordered DCFS “to
notice the Choctaw Nation[,]” “and after[wards] to interview with
. . . [great-]aunt if further information is provided to follow
through on that.”
         That same day, DCFS sent notices to the Choctaw Nation
of Oklahoma, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, and the
Jena Band of Choctaw Indians. The notices included Nasir’s
name and birthdate; mother’s name, birthdate, and address; and
the names of both maternal grandparents. The notices did not
include great-grandmother’s name.3
         DCFS reported that the information in the notices came
from Nasir’s caretaker, who was a family friend. At the time,
great-aunt had not returned DCFS’s calls, and grandfather
“stated [that] he would not give [DCFS] any information[.]” The
juvenile court ordered DCFS “to make further phonecall[s]” to
both grandfather and great-aunt.4

3     All three tribes sent return letters stating that they did not
consider Nasir to be an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA.

4     The relevant minute order states that DCFS is to further
inquire of great-grandmother; in the reporter’s transcript for this
hearing, the juvenile court refers to this relative only by her last
name. Since great-grandmother and great-aunt share the same
last name, and since the juvenile court had already been

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        On July 22, 2019, DCFS contacted great-aunt. She
confirmed that great-grandmother was deceased, and “stated that
she did not have any additional information regarding the
famil[y’s] Indian heritage.”
       Nine days later, the juvenile court found that the “ICWA is
not applicable” because “at this time, based on the information
the court has, the court has no reason to know that [Nasir] is an
Indian child[.]”
       In June 2022, DCFS reinterviewed great-aunt and Nasir’s
caretaker. Great-aunt said that “the family has no Indian
heritage[,]” and Nasir’s caretaker reported that “she has never
heard any indication that there was American Indian heritage.”
       In March 2023, the juvenile court terminated mother’s
parental rights over Nasir. Mother timely appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable Law
       “ICWA was enacted to curtail ‘the separation of large
numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes
through adoption or foster care placement’ [citation], and ‘to
promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by
establishing . . . standards that a state court . . . must follow
before removing an Indian child from his or her family’
[citations].”5 (In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 780,
review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578 (Dezi C.).)

informed that great-grandmother was deceased, we presume that
the court’s order referred to great-aunt.

5      ICWA defines an “Indian child” as any unmarried person
under the age of 18 who is (1) a member of an Indian tribe; or
(2) eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4);
§ 224.1, subd. (a).)

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       Under California law enacted to implement ICWA, DCFS
and the juvenile court have “three distinct duties . . . in
dependency proceedings.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052.) The first is the initial duty of inquiry, which DCFS
“discharges . . . chiefly by ‘asking’ family members ‘whether the
child is, or may be, an Indian child.’ ([§ 224.2], subd. (b).)”
(Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 780.)
       If the initial inquiry yields a “reason to believe [a] . . . child
is involved in a proceeding . . . is an Indian child[,]” the juvenile
court must order DCFS to make further inquiry into the child’s
potential Indian status. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (e).)6
“There is reason to believe a child [may be] an Indian child
whenever the court . . . has information suggesting that either
the parent . . . or the child is a member or may be eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe.” (Ibid.)
       To satisfy the duty of further inquiry, DCFS must, among
other things, “[i]nterview[] the parents . . . and extended family
members to gather . . . [relevant] information[,]” (§ 224.2, subd.
(e)(2)(A)) including, among other things, the “birth dates” and
“any other identifying information” of the child’s “great-
grandparents” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C)).
       The third duty—to notify the relevant Indian tribes—is
triggered only if, after the prior rounds of inquiry, DCFS “or the
[juvenile] court ‘knows or has reason to know . . . that an Indian
child is involved.’ (§ 224.3, subd. (a).)” (Dezi C., supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 781.) Notices must include, among other
things, “[a]ll names known of the Indian child’s . . . great-

6     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

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grandparents . . . as well as their . . . birth dates[.]” (§ 224.3,
subd. (a)(5)(C).)
II.    Standard of Review
       “‘[W]e review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the
substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports’ the court’s
ICWA finding.” (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 777.) Even
if substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
ICWA findings, we may not reverse unless we find that error was
prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Dezi C., supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 777.)
III. Analysis
       Mother argues that DCFS and the juvenile court failed to
satisfy ICWA’s duty of further inquiry by failing to ask great-
aunt about great-grandmother’s birth and death dates. In
rebuttal, DCFS contends that the duty of further inquiry was not
triggered because there was no reason to believe that Nasir is or
may be an Indian child.
       Contrary to DCFS’s arguments, mother’s assertion of
Choctaw heritage met the “reason to believe” standard. The
Legislature has made clear that there is reason to believe a minor
is an Indian child when there is specific information suggesting
that either a child or parent “may be eligible for membership in
an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) Mother’s claim of
Choctaw ancestry could suggest eligibility for tribal membership.
(See In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 294 [“To be sure, an
‘Indian child’ is defined in terms of tribal membership, not
ancestry. But the question of membership is determined by the
tribes, not the courts or child protective agencies . . . . That
determination often requires providing a tribe with extensive
biographical data (that is, information about ancestors and

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ancestry)”].) Thus, the juvenile court appropriately ordered
DCFS to make further inquiries with mother’s relatives.
      The sole error that mother identifies in DCFS’s further
inquiry is its failure to ask great-aunt for biographical
information about great-grandmother. But neither the ICWA nor
the juvenile court’s order compelled DCFS to collect such data
from great-aunt. ICWA (and the state laws implementing it) do
not include a great-aunt among the “‘extended family member[s]’”
that must be interviewed in the course of a further inquiry. (See
25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) [defining “‘extended family member’” to
include a child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent”]; § 224.1, subd. (c) [“‘extended family
member’” is “defined as provided in [s]ection 1903 of the” ICWA].)
      The juvenile court had the authority to order DCFS to go
above and beyond these statutory requirements by reaching out
to great-aunt. However, unlike in its prior order regarding
grandfather, the juvenile court did not direct DCFS to obtain
“birth date information and further information regarding
[great-]grandmother[]” from great-aunt. It merely instructed
DCFS to “interview with . . . [great-]aunt.” The record shows that
DCFS complied with this order, asking great-aunt multiple times
about the family’s Indian heritage. Because neither the juvenile
court’s order nor ICWA itself required DCFS to collect
biographical information from great-aunt, the agency’s failure to
do so does not constitute error.
      Mother also argues that the notices DCFS sent to the three
Choctaw nations were inadequate because they omitted great-
grandmother’s name, which mother provided in her ICWA-020
form. But because the juvenile court found that there “[w]as no

                                7
reason to know that [Nasir] is an Indian child[,]”7 DCFS had no
duty to send those notices in this case. (§§ 224.2, subd. (d) &
224.3, subd. (a); see also In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 55,
fn. 14 [Notice to “tribes is required only if information produced
by the initial inquiry gives the court [or] social worker . . . reason
to know the minor is an Indian child”] (italics added).) We cannot
find that DCFS failed to satisfy a statutory duty that it had no
obligation to perform.
       Finally, mother suggests that DCFS violated the duty of
further inquiry by sending defective formal notices. However, the
requirements for formal notice are not the same as those for the
comparatively informal contact with tribes that can satisfy the
duty of further inquiry. The duty of further inquiry does include
“[c]ontacting the tribe or tribes . . . [and] sharing information
identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a
membership or eligibility determination.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(e)(2)(C).) But the formal notices DCFS issued in this case (which
the trial court ordered before it made any ICWA findings do not
resemble the “telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail contact to
[a] tribe’s designated agent for receipt of [ICWA] notices”
contemplated by the further inquiry statute. Mother cites (and
we have found) no authorities holding that defective formal
notices violate this provision of the ICWA or the state laws
implementing it.8 (In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703,

7     Mother does not challenge this finding, so we have no
occasion to review it.

8      In her reply brief, mother briefly argues that any general
“failure to provide known information when there is a reason to
believe[] is universally acknowledged to be prejudicial [error]” but
the cases she cites for this proposition are inapposite. (In re K.H.
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 620 [finding DCFS failed to satisfy the

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708 [“‘[P]arties are required to include argument and citation to
authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary
elements allows this court to treat appellant’s . . . issue as
waived.’ [Citation.]”].)
       Under these circumstances, we conclude that DCFS did not
err in failing to include great-grandmother’s name in the notices
sent to the three Choctaw tribes.
                           DISPOSITION
       The order is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                               _____________________, J.
                               ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

duty of initial inquiry because it did not interview “numerous
maternal and paternal relatives[,]” including the child’s
grandparents]; Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 778
[discussing the typical difficulties in assessing the prejudice of an
initial inquiry error].)

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