Court Opinion

ID: 9567616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:56:12.844437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:43.460638
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice
(dissenting)-
The majority today concludes that
[wjhere there has been but one statute violated by a single act, without intent to harm multiple victims, the Alaskan constitutional prohibition against placing a person in jeopardy twice for the same offense prevents [the] imposition of multiple punishments.1
I must respectfully dissent from that holding.
The majority relies heavily on our decision in Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302 (Alaska 1970) in reaching its conclusion.2 In Whitton the trial court convicted the defendant of both robbery 3 and the use of firearms during the commission of the *1198same robbery.4 On appeal we held that the convictions for robbery and for the use of firearms during the commission of the same robbery amounted to conviction twice for the same offense. The inquiry in Whitton was thus essentially whether the distinct statutes under which Whitton was convicted mutually proscribed the same criminal behavior and therefore whether punishments for violating both statutes could be imposed consistently with our double jeopardy proscriptions. The court explained that:
The problem we are faced with has arisen by reason of legislative division or refinement of what may be a unitary criminal episode into a number of ’statutory offenses, with differences based upon intent or means or method of perpetration.5
We determined that the legislature defined two different forms of the same offense and that under the facts of that case double jeopardy prohibited punishment for both.6 In my view, Whitton is distinguishable from the case at bar and is not controlling.
In the case before us, we are concerned not with whether several distinct but overlapping statutes have been applied to exact multiple punishment for what is essentially a “unitary criminal episode,” but rather whether Thessen’s conduct violated a single statute several times over.
The majority seems to hold that since the 14 victims lost their lives as a result of Thessen’s single act of arson, only a single conviction for manslaughter may be sustained. In Neal v. State, 55 Cal.2d 11, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839 (1960), the California Supreme Court faced a similar case. The defendant Neal was accused of attempting to murder two persons by burning down a dwelling with the intended victims inside. Neal was convicted on two counts of attempted murder. The Supreme Court of California allowed the separate convictions for attempted murder to stand. Speaking for the court Justice Traynor said:
The purpose of the protection against multiple punishment is to insure that the defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability. A defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent to harm more than one person or by a means likely to cause harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms only one person.7
As Justice Traynor later commented in his dissent in In Re Hayes, 70 Cal.2d 604, 75 Cal.Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d 430 (1969), the defendant’s culpability must be assessed in light of the expressed legislative purpose, and that therefore it is of little consequence that several victims died as a result of a single muscular contraction.8
*1199In the case at bar, the court focuses on what it characterizes as a singular physical act, and concludes that there can be one “allowable unit of prosecution.” 9 Alaska’s relevant statute provides that:
. a person who unlawfully kills another is guilty of manslaughter, and is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 20 years.10
The controlling language defining the- offense of manslaughter is “unlawfully kills another.” In my view this language reflects the legislature’s intent to have the offense depend on the consequences of the defendant’s act and not the means by which those consequences were achieved. The majority would apparently uphold separate manslaughter convictions had Thes-sen burned down 14 houses, each containing one of his victims. Under that analysis a person convicted of 14 counts of manslaughter under those circumstances is more culpable than a defendant who causes the death of one person by burning down one house. The majority thus seems to reward the defendant for the efficiency of his criminal behavior, by defining the offense in terms of the number of physical acts which produced the unlawful killings. AS 11.15.040, however, requires no such inquiry. In my view this manslaughter statute measures the wrongfulness of the defendant’s behavior by the number of victims.
Each unlawful killing under AS 11.15.-040 is an offense under the statute. To read the statute as the majority has does violence to its plain language.11 I would therefore affirm Thessen’s 14 separate convictions of manslaughter.12

. Thessen v. State, Supreme Court Opinion, at 1195.

. I agree that Whitton should be applied retroactively in appropriate cases. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 93 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (January 16, 1973).

. AS 11.15.240 provides:
A person who, by force or violence, or by putting in fear, steals and takes anything of value from the person of another is guilty of robbery, and is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than 15 years nor less than one year.

. AS 11.15.295 provides :
A person who uses or carries a firearm during the commission of a robbery, assault, murder, rape, burglary, or kidnapping is guilty of a felony and upon conviction for a first offense is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years. Upon conviction for a second or subsequent offense in violation of this section, the offender shall be imprisoned for not less than 25 years.

. 479 P.2d 302, 312.

. The Supreme Court in Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173, 21 L.Ed. 872, 878 (1874) condemned as a violation of double jeopardy multiple punishment for the same offense. See also United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307-309, 51 S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354, 356-357 (1931).

. 55 Cal.2d 11, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 612, 357 P.2d 839, 844.

. 70 Cal.2d 604, 75 Cal.Rptr. 790, 451 P.2d 430, 438. Other courts have adopted the same basic position. Accord United States v. Tarrant, 460 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1972) (possession of five unregistered firearms held to constitute five separate offenses) ; United States v. Hodges, 436 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1971) (assault on several penal officers during jail house altercation held to constitute multiple offenses) ; State v. Miranda, 3 Ariz.App. 550, 416 P.2d 444 (1966) (separate manslaughter convictions for each victim of a single traffic accident upheld) ; State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 *1199(1937) (separate third degree murder prosecutions permitted where two victims killed in single automobile accident) ; State v. Grate, 254 Or. 474, 461 P.2d 829 (1969) (armed robbery of two persons at same time and place held to constitute two separate crimes).

. The term “allowable unit of prosecution” was coined in United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221, 73 S.Ct. 227, 97 L.Ed. 260, 264 (1952).

. AS 11.15.040.

. Under a different statute, the number of victims may, of course, have no bearing on the defendant’s culpability. Thus in Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958), the United States Supreme Court held that in light of the lenity doctrine, a single shotgun blast directed at two federal officers could result in only one assault conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 254. And in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955), the Court expressed a legitimate doubt as to whether the appropriate unit of offense under the Mann Act should depend on the number of women transported across state lines. The majority thought that it did not. Justice Minton, in dissent, thought that the statute protected individual women and girls from exploitation, and as he succinctly put it:
Surely [Congress] did not intend to make it easier if one transported females by the bus load. 349 U.S. 81, 84, 75 S.Ct. 620, 623, 99 L.Ed. 908, 911.

. On the other hand I would remand the case to the sentencing court for a hearing to determine whether imposition of the three consecutive twenty year terms of imprisonment was an appropriate sentence in the case at bar. State v. Pete, 420 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1966). AS 11.05.050 does not furnish any guidelines as to when consecutive sentences should be imposed. Minimally, I think the trial judge should be required to state his reasons why consecutive sentences wore appropriate in this case. See, Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections on the Neal Doctrine, 58 Cal.L.Rev. 357, 367-69 (1970), American Bar Association Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 3.4, at 171-172, 176-178 (Approved Draft, 1968).