Court Opinion

ID: 9536669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:04:48.952786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:56.911879
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting.
The majority opinion says the Board of Adjustment or the members thereof have no power to have reviewed the judgment of the district court, which reversed its decision, without express authorization by charter; and further the City, not being a party to the record before the Board, cannot prosecute a writ of error; and finally, the judgment of the court does not run against the City.
Because the judgment, in so many words, does not mention the City as such, it nevertheless directly prevents the City from the exercise of one of its municipal functions. In comparing the Board with a court by saying a court cannot prosecute a review of a reversal of one of its decisions, because it has no interest that is effected, is to make a comparison in a situation not analogous. The Board here involved is an administrative board, and, in the performance of its duty, it represents the interest of the city of which it is an agency.
*356The majority opinion is in effect, against the argument of claimant, who says through counsel, that the sole interest of the city was to have the cause justly decided by the tribunals having jurisdiction. (Page 9 of brief in support of motion to dismiss.) It is difficult to follow the reasoning of claimants’ counsel who stipulated that the City could become a party, and that it had an interest to see that a just decision was had, and then say, in so many words, that it has no business being heard. I am at a loss to understand how the City could see that a just decision be had, without being in court. It surely has no means of remote control in such matters. Of course, the City had a duty to perform in representing interests of the public which are entrusted to it. The overall plan of zoning is involved. This plan was evolved by the City under its police power, in the interest of public health, safety and welfare. The City would be derelict in its duty if it stood by and permitted a neighborhood dispute to change the zoning regulations for that area. The overall zoning plans and regulations are involved, and they in turn involve the city and the public interest, which is not confined to the participants in the hassel underlying this litigation.
If we have a rule to the effect that by agreement the city may become a party to the action, and then cannot be heard, and cannot initiate a review of a judgment effecting the interest it was there to protect, then we had better start all over again. The absurdity of the entire argument of claimant on this point is illustrated by the answer. Who can logically say that when the officer or agent of the city was directed to issue the permit, that the principle or city had no interest? It is the absolute duty of the city to see that the permit is proper, and to oppose the issuance of an improper permit.
The function of the district court was to conduct a review of the finding and order of the Board to determine if the Board properly exercised the discretion *357vested in it. In no event had the court any authority or power to substitute its judgment for that of the Board as it did here in a nine-page opinion and judgment. It is to be observed that the Board is composed of persons familiar with such property situations and can balance the equities of the interests presented, while the average court is not so equipped. The court has the qualifications to determine whether the Board exercised a sound discretion or acted arbitrarily.
It becomes at once a dangerous condition when a court denies to a duly authorized board, the right to establish appropriate conditions and safeguards in the public interest. Ordinances under which zoning boards act are designed to regulate future growth and expansion of the city, and are usually drawn with a view to stabilize.
While there is no express authority in the charter for the Board to prosecute a review of a reversal of its orders, neither is there a limitation restricting it to perform quasi judicial functions only. I believe the opinion in the case of Rommell v. Walsh, 127 Conn. 16, 15 Atl. (2d) 6, where the exact question was presented, is sound and expressive of my views, and is in part as follows:
“In some appeals from administrative boards the question at issue is of consequence only to certain parties who will be directly affected, as, for example, where the public utilities commission is called upon to apportion between a municipality and a railway company the cost of the construction of a highway bridge over a railroad track. City of Norwalk v. Connecticut Co., 88 Conn. 471, 91 A. 442. In proceedings for the assessment of benefits and damages, the parties directly concerned are the property owners affected and the municipality which must bear the expense of the public improvement. In other cases, however, there is a definite public interest to be protected. This is true, for instance, of many orders of the public utilities commission, and is particularly true with respect to zoning regulations. In appeals of this type, the public interest should be represented. In *358appeals in zoning cases the municipality might no doubt properly do this. However, under most, if not all, of our municipal charters, the function of protecting and advancing the public interest in establishing and maintaining a proper and adequate zoning system is entrusted to certain boards, who, in that respect, exercise a large discretion. While these boards have ordinarily no corporate existence as such but are merely agencies of the municipality, and while they have no direct interest in the litigation, it would be a logical conclusion that because of the function they perform they should represent the public interests entrusted to them in appeals taken from their decisions.
“Administrative boards differ radically from courts because frequently in the performance of their duties they are representing such interests, whereas courts are concerned with litigating the rights of. parties with adverse interests who appear before them. Appeals taken from decisions of such boards are in a very different category than are appeals taken from a lower to a higher court, where the lower court, having acted, ceases to have any interest in the controversy, direct or representative. An appeal from an administrative board is not the means by which jurisdiction of a cause is transferred from one tribunal to another, but is a process by which a court may be called upon, not to substitute its judgment for that of the board, but to determine whether the latter has acted legally and in a proper exercise of the discretion vested in it.”
All cases cited by counsel for claimant in support of his motion to dismiss are carefully qualified by indicating that the ruling that an administrative board cannot seek review, has no application to the city. Why shouldn’t the city have the same right of appeal that any other litigant has? Zoning Appeals Board v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 Atl. 540. The motion to dismiss the writ of error should be denied.