Court Opinion

ID: 9831641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:15:46.790253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:36.685997
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
This motion has received careful consideration, and our conclusion is that it should be overruled.
Seley v. Williams, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 405, 50 S. W. 399; Callender, Holder & Co. v. Short, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 364, 78 S. W. 367; Yett v. Green, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 184, 86 S. W. 787; Harris v. Salvato, 175 S. W. 802; and Watson v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 228 S. W. 243—cited and relied upon by appellee, are not believed to be in point. In the first case cited, which is the leading case upon that subject, the bill of lading, issued by the carrier and accepted by the shipper, showed that the property was consigned to a place in the county in which the suit was brought, and for that reason it was held that the shipper, as well as the carrier, has obligated himself to perform in that county. The other cases cited are similar to that case, and rest upon the same reasons. '
In the case at bar the shipment was made from San Francisco, Cal., to Flatonia, Tex. The property was in transit at the time the contract of sale between appellant and appellee was made, and the shipment was, in effect, delivered to Early-Foster Company at Sweetwater, Tex. In other words, by an arrangement between the interested parties, Early-Foster Company was permitted to divert the shipment to a point outside of the state. But failing to dispose of it at that place, Early-Foster Gompany, on its own motion, caused it to be shipped to Waco, Tex. Neither the invoice made out by Cowdin Grocery Company and attached to the draft, which was caused to be sent to Waco, Tex., nor the bill of lading attached to that draft showed that the property sold and bought was to be delivered in Waco, Tex. The bill of lading designated Flatonia, Texas, as the destination of the property. These facts distinguish the case from those relied on in the motion for rehearing.
On the other point decided in our original opinion, we refer to 13 Corpus Juris, p. 582, and quote therefrom as follows:
“Where a contract is made by telephone, it is regarded as made at the place from which the accepting party speaks. The fact that letters confirming the acceptance are mailed will not cause the contract to be regarded as having been made at the place whence such letters are mailed.”
The motion is overruled.
Motion overruled.