Court Opinion

ID: 9630248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:06:14.117347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:34.690270
License: Public Domain

RUDMAN, Justice,
with whom COLLINS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to void the provision of Paul Norton’s will devising a remainder interest in certain of his real and personal property to his niece, Lillier E. Langille. We have repeatedly said that “[t]he intention of the testator, collected from the language of the whole instrument interpreted in light of the manifest object of the testator, guides the construction of [a] will.” Estate of Hardy, 609 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Me.1992) (quoting Estate of Sweet, 519 A.2d 1260, 1264 (Me. 1987)). The testator’s clearly expressed intent must be carried out unless it contravenes some established rule of law or public policy. Bragdon v. Smith, 136 Me. 474, 478, 12 A.2d 665, 667 (1940). “Canons of construction, although helpful, are not per se controlling and must give way to the true intent of the testator.” Whicher v. Abbott, 449 A.2d 353, 355 (Me.1982) (citations omitted).
The Court relies on the rule stated in Estate of O’Connor, 615 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1992), that “the devise of a fee simple interest in one clause of a will makes a limitation on such devise in a subsequent clause ‘repugnant and void.’ ” Id. at 1180 (quoting Browne v. Dubey, 251 A.2d 424, 425 (Me.1969)). However, “[r]epugnant portions of a will must be reconciled if possible by considering the will in its entirety and as an expression of consistent intents.” Whicher, 449 A.2d at 355 (citing Thaxter v. Fry, 222 A.2d 686, 690 (Me. 1966)). A subsequent clause in a will controls a preceding clause, and may reduce a previously devised estate if stated in “clear and unambiguous language.” Barnard v. Linekin, 151 Me. 283, 286, 118 A.2d 327, 329 (1955). Although the probate code is not applicable to the will in question, section 2-604 of Title 18-A (“A devise of property conveys all the estate of a devisor unless it appears by his will that he intended to convey a lesser estate.”), is a statement of pre-code law.
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom a summary judgment has been granted, as this Court must, see Estate of Althenn v. Althenn, 609 A.2d 711, 714 (Me.1992), I conclude that Norton’s will clearly and unambiguously evidences the testator’s intent that Roger maintain a life estate in the devised property, with the right to consume, convey, or transfer it, and that Lillier inherit that portion of the property de*672vised remaining at Roger’s death. In fact, the Superior Court found this to be Norton’s “actual intent,” but, nevertheless, voided the bequest to Lillier. Since it is the Court’s obligation to examine the will as a whole, and not isolate certain portions, see Estate of Sweet, 519 A.2d at 1264, I disagree with the Court’s exclusive emphasis on the provision of the will making the bequest to Roger. The Court’s reading of the will renders the provision devising property to Lillier mere surplusage, a result obviously not intended by the testator. While the will’s provisions were inartfully drafted, that does not change the Court’s primary role in will construction; namely, to seek the intention of the testator. Babb v. Rand, 345 A.2d 496, 498 (Me.1975). Following the bequest to Roger, the will provides,
If my said brother, Roger R. Norton, at the time of his decease shall own and/or possess any real or personal property that shall have come to him from my Estate, such property not having been used, sold, consumed or expended by him, I give and devise such property, both real and personal to Dean Horne and Lilia Horne, both of York Beach, in the Town of York.
(emphasis added). Because I find that language clearly and unambiguously reveals the testator’s intent to create a remainder interest in Lillier, I conclude that it was error to apply a canon of construction to defeat that intent, and would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.