Court Opinion

ID: 9907521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 17:08:04.722341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:34.437478
License: Public Domain

J-A25014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: ADOPTION OF: N.J.N.                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: J.L.N., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 630 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans’ Court
                          at No(s): No. 86 of 2022

  IN RE: ADOPTION OF: O.A.N                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: J.L.N., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 631 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans’ Court
                          at No(s): No 87 of 2022

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILED: December 6, 2023

       J.L.N. (“Father”) appeals from the orders entered on April 13, 2023,

involuntarily terminating his parental rights as to his two children, N.J.N., a

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A25014-23

daughter born in February 2015, and O.A.N., a son born in September 2019.1

We affirm.

       On December 19, 2022, the Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau

(“WCCB”) filed separate petitions to terminate Father’s rights as to each child,

with the aim of having the children adopted by the foster family with which

they both resided. The orphans’ court held a hearing concerning the petitions

on April 6, 2023.2 The court summarized the ensuing relevant testimony from

the hearing:

             The children were placed in WCCB custody June 4, 2021 and
       adjudicated dependent on June 22, 2021. Father did not attend
       the [dependency] hearing despite having notice. The children
       were placed in agency custody as a result of [N.J.N.] missing a
       week of school, [Mother] being homeless and living with the
       children with her paramour who had recently been incarcerated
       for    drug    possession,    Mother    testing   positive   for
       methamphetamines, and Father being unable to be located. The
       children had been in agency custody for [twenty-two] months at
       the time of the [termination] hearing.

                     ....

             Father has not completed either hands-on parenting or the
       curriculum-based parenting classes.      Father’s visits were
____________________________________________

1 In different orders entered the same date, the orphans’ court also terminated

the parental rights of the children’s biological mother, K.E.S. (“Mother”). She
did not contest the termination proceedings and has not appealed to this
Court.

2 Diane Murphy, Esquire, was appointed to represent both children as legal

counsel and as Guardian ad litem (“GAL”) during the termination proceedings.
See Order of Court, 2/7/23. At the hearing, Attorney Murphy confirmed that
there was no conflict between either child’s legal and best interests “because
of their ages and the complexity of the proceeding.” See N.T. Hearing,
4/6/23, at 3.

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     supervised except for a brief period between December 27, 2022
     and January 27, 2023, when they were monitored. The visits went
     back to being supervised due to a domestic violence incident
     during a visit. Father has attended [eighty-seven] of the 112
     visits offered. Among the concerns during visits are lack of
     planning during his community visits, bringing his paramour after
     being told not to bring her, failure to bring money for the activities
     with the children, inappropriate behavior (i.e., talking about
     [N.J.N.]’s body), talking about adult issues, [and] requesting love
     and affirmation when the children were resistant. During visits
     Father spends most of his time with [N.J.N.] and does not appear
     to have established a bond with [O.A.N]. Father also reportedly
     was relying on [N.J.N.] for emotional support. Additional services
     were put into place to assist her with establishing boundaries with
     Father.

           Father does not have [a] stable and appropriate address and
     does not have a legal and verifiable source of income. Father has
     told the caseworker that he receives Social Security benefits but
     has not offered any substantiating proof.

                 ....

             Father has been incarcerated at the Westmoreland County
     Prison since February, 2023 and was on disciplinary [restrictions]
     until a week or two prior to the hearing. The counselors at the
     [prison] were unable to accommodate WCCB’s attempts to set up
     visits.

                 ....

           WCCB provided evidence of Father’s criminal history. . . .
     Father is currently facing a criminal mischief charge [and] a
     burglary charge . . . . He also has an indirect criminal contempt
     charge pending for allegedly violating a Protection from Abuse
     order[.]

           Dr. Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D.[,] was contracted to provide
     Father with a mental health evaluation and a parenting
     assessment.     The mental health assessment occurred on
     November 17, 2021.       Dr. Rosenblum testified that Father
     minimized his mental health and substance abuse issues. He
     found that Father was unable to provide a safe and secure
     environment for the children at the time of the evaluation and

                                     -3-
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       recommended [that] Father undergo intensive dual diagnosis
       outpatient treatment, an evaluation by a psychiatrist, and a
       referral to case management.

             Father did not attend his interactional assessment with Dr.
       Rosenblum, so the latter was unable to offer any insight into
       whether severing Father’s parental tie would be harmful to the
       children. However, he did perform an interactional assessment
       with the children and the foster parents. The children appeared
       to be thriving with the foster parents. [N.J.N.] was progressing
       well after having been parentified3 and suffering from some
       related sleep disorders. [O.A.N.] had qualified for speech and
       language treatment along with early Head Start.

             Elaine Logan from Neveah, Inc. provided therapy services
       to both [N.J.N.] and Father beginning in June, 2021. [N.J.N.]
       presented with anxiety and emotional health concerns. She was
       parentified and was anxious over her concerns for her parents’
       safety. She was fearful that they would have a fatal overdose and
       often felt safer when either of them was incarcerated. While she
       loves Father, their relationship is more of a peer relationship
       rather than parent-child. She often was called upon to offer
       emotional support for Father. [N.J.N.] refers to her foster siblings
       as brothers and sisters.

                     ....

              Dustin Yingling, an independent contractor with Allied
       Family Services[,] began providing Father services beginning in
       August, 2022. He was to assist Father with parenting instruction,
       community resources, transportation, and supervise Father’s
       visits. Father was to have one, three-hour visit per week with the
       children. He attended [twelve] of [twenty-four] visits that were
       offered. Among the reasons offered for Father missing visits

____________________________________________

3 Dr. Rosenblum did not define or explain the term “parentified” during his
testimony. However, we understand the word generally to signify the
situation where a child is placed in a role of feeling the need to care for and
support a parent. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.L.R., 2020 WL 1427113 at
*3 (Pa.Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision) (summarizing testimony
from WCCB caseworker Molly Clayton, who indicated that “parentified” meant
that children “viewed themselves as the adults in the household”).

                                           -4-
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      were: incarceration, illness, and failure to confirm the visit. The
      visits ended in February of 2023 due to Father’s incarceration.

            Mr. Yingling testified that the children are affectionate with
      Father at visits and run up to Father at the beginning of visits to
      hug him. He also observed the children being loving toward the
      foster parents.

            There were several concerning incidents that occurred
      during the visits. On one instance, Father brought [N.J.N.] high
      heeled shoes and told her that she had the legs for them. Another
      time he brought a live python to a supervised visit at the local
      public library.   He failed to understand why doing so was
      problematic. On December 27, 2022, Father ended a visit early
      when he became visibly upset when attempting to assemble a doll
      house he had brought for [N.J.N].

            Chelsea Crewe was assigned as the caseworker for this
      family beginning on February 15, 2022. After [twenty-two]
      months in care, Ms. Crewe still has concerns for Father’s drug use,
      lack of verifiable income, lack of stable housing, mental health
      issues, and parenting deficiencies.

             The children acknowledge [the] foster parents as their
      family. The children are happy and well-adjusted to their lives in
      the foster home. The foster parents actively participate in services
      . . . and the children have all of their needs met in the home.
      [N.J.N.] has been making progress with her anxiety since being
      placed with the foster parents and undergoing individual therapy.

           At the conclusion of the termination hearing, [the GAL]
      agreed with WCCB that the best interests of the children would be
      served by the termination of parental rights of Father.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/13/23, at 3-9 (cleaned up).

      At the hearing, Father testified on his own behalf, explaining that he had

substantial difficulty getting his life in order.   He requested more time to

demonstrate that he could care for the children. Father also testified that he

had a close emotional attachment with both children. On cross-examination,

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he indicated that he would possibly need another one or two years before he

would be in a position to perform his parental duties. He similarly conceded

that as of the date of the hearing, the children’s interests were best served by

having them remain with the pre-adoptive foster family.

      Following the hearing, the orphans’ court issued a single order, that was

entered at the respective dockets, terminating Father’s parental rights to the

children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and § 2511(b). Father filed

timely notices of appeal, and both he and the orphans’ court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. We consolidated the matters sua sponte. Father presents

the following question for our consideration: “Whether the trial court erred in

finding by clear and convincing evidence that [WCCB] met its burden, under

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?” Father’s brief at 4.

      Our standard of review is well-settled:

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard
      employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to
      accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
      trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not
      require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences
      or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported,
      we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result
      merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
      different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only
      upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
      prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an
      error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
      decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized
      our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand

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      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However,
      we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in
      order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported
      by competent evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).

      The grounds for termination of parental rights are contained within

§ 2511 and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, which is

evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier

of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the

precise facts in issue.” Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 831 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(citation omitted).   The court must engage in a bifurcated analysis to

determine first whether parental conduct warrants termination pursuant to

§ 2511(a), and then look to § 2511(b), which requires consideration of the

child’s “developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare[.]” Int. of

K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023) (citation omitted).

      Father does not contest that WCCB sufficiently proved that subsection

(a) grounds were established. Instead, he asserts solely that WCCB failed to

meet its burden as to subsection (b). In whole, that provision provides as

follows:

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to [provisions not implicated herein], the court shall not consider
      any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described

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      therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice
      of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

      Our High Court has recently framed the analysis of § 2511(b) thusly:

      [C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,
      placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
      welfare above concerns for the parent.

            Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular
      developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must
      be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law
      regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
      mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests
      and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.
      Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs.

            Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include
      intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As
      further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs
      and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always
      consider. The court must consider whether the children are in a
      pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
      parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent,
      the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not
      always an easy task.

Int. of K.T., supra at 1105–06 (cleaned up).

      This Court has highlighted that “the extent of the bond-effect analysis

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”            In re

Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up).

Assuming there is a bond, “the trial court must examine whether termination

of parental rights will destroy a ‘necessary and beneficial relationship[.]’” Int.

of M.E., supra at 837 (citation omitted). Additionally, our Supreme Court

has observed that while termination of parental rights has “heavy and

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irrevocable consequences,” it is nonetheless “intended to prevent children

from growing up in an indefinite state of limbo, without parents capable of

caring for them, and at the same time unavailable for adoption by loving and

willing foster families.” Int. of K.T., supra at 1111 (cleaned up).

      With this legal framework in mind, we turn to Father’s sole issue on

appeal. He argues that WCCB did not meet its burden pursuant to § 2511(b)

because there was insufficient evidence as to what impact termination of his

parental bond would have on the children.       See Father’s brief at 11.     He

highlights that several witnesses testified as to the existence of a bond;

however, Dr. Rosenblum was unable to assess the detriment either child would

experience if the relationship was severed, since Father never participated in

an interactional assessment.     Id.   Accordingly, Father contends that the

orphans’ court lacked a basis in which to ascertain whether the trauma caused

by termination was outweighed by the benefit of moving them into a

permanent home with the pre-adoptive foster family. Id. at 10.

      As to its subsection (b) analysis, the orphans’ court stated the following:

            While the oldest child does appear to enjoy her visits with
      Father, the children are currently thriving and making
      developmental progress in their placement. Because Father did
      not appear for the interactional assessment with Dr. Rosenblum,
      the doctor was unable to assess what, if any, impact the children
      would experience if Father’s parental rights were terminated. The
      children have become rooted in their foster family and removing
      them from this family would cause them further distress, as they
      have developed stability in their current home.

                                       -9-
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            The children report feeling safe and secure in their current
      home. They are well-adjusted to their schedules. The children
      have developed secure and beneficial relationships with [the]
      foster parents and are residing in a safe and predictable home.
      For these reasons, this court is convinced that termination of . . .
      Father’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
      the children.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/13/23, at 12 (cleaned up).

      Notably, Father’s argument focuses exclusively upon the existence of a

bond between him and his children.        He does not assert that any such

relationship was necessary or beneficial for the children, nor does he discuss

the relationship between either child and the foster family. In short, he asks

us to mechanically apply our caselaw speaking to the importance of analyzing

parental bonds and thereby overlook the best interests and the needs and

welfare of the children. Considering our High Court’s recent pronouncement

in Int. of K.T., supra at 1105-06, which favors a particularized review of a

child’s needs and welfare over the rote application of the statute, we reject

Father’s request to elevate the incomplete bond analysis over the intangible

evidence relating to love, comfort, security, stability and permanency. After

a comprehensive review of the record, we find well-supported the orphans’

court’s conclusion that the children’s developmental, physical, and emotional

needs and welfare warranted the termination of Father’s parental rights, such

as to allow adoption by the foster parents.

      First, there was no evidence at the hearing that any existing relationship

between Father and the children was necessary or beneficial. Int. of M.E.,

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supra at 837.    Indeed, as between O.A.N. and Father, the orphans’ court

correctly concluded that the testimony did not demonstrate the presence of

any bond. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/13/23, at 4. WCCB Caseworker

Chelsea Crewe testified that during visits, Father devoted more attention to

N.J.N., and there appeared to be less of an attempt by Father to bond with

O.A.N. See N.T. Hearing, 4/6/23, at 123, 126. This preferential treatment

by Father was a cause of concern for WCCB and was one consideration in its

recommendation to terminate Father’s parental rights as to O.A.N. Id. at 126.

Without a beneficial bond between Father and O.A.N., the court could not find

that severing that tie would lead to any “extreme emotional consequences”

for O.A.N. Int. of M.E., supra at 837.

      Regarding N.J.N., the orphans’ court determined that although there

was a relationship between her and Father, it was a peer relationship, not that

of a responsible parent caring for a child.     See Orphans’ Court Opinion,

4/13/23, at 6. This conclusion was supported by the testimony of multiple

witnesses. Dustin Yingling attested that the visits with the children involved

“play” and “basic fun,” and Father never took parental actions such as

disciplining the children.   N.T. Hearing, 4/6/23, at 111.    Father failed to

provide food for the children during visits and did not plan or adequately

prepare for activities. Id. at 123, 161. Ms. Crewe testified that N.J.N. felt

responsible for making Father happy, and that he would often seek comfort

and validation from her. Id. at 126. Several witnesses felt that N.J.N. was

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parentified and working to overcome those effects.       Id. at 21, 45. N.J.N.

feared for Father’s wellbeing when he was not incarcerated. Id. at 45. This

non-parental relationship was further displayed by Father’s admission that he

is not currently capable of caring for the children. Id. at 161, 165. In all, the

evidence dispelled the conclusion that Father’s relationship with N.J.N was

necessary or beneficial for her.

      Additionally, the orphans’ court properly considered the existence of the

bond between the children and the foster family, and the detrimental effect of

severing that relationship.        See Int. of K.T., supra at 1106.            As

Dr. Rosenblum testified, the children require “stability and the opportunity to

have their emotional and developmental needs met on a consistent and

continuing basis,” and therefore recommended the court grant termination to

allow for adoption. N.T. Hearing, 4/6/23, at 22. The certified record supports

the conclusion that the pre-adoptive foster parents have been the source of

the intangibles such as “love, comfort, security, and stability” for both children

in the twenty-two months preceding the hearing. Int. of K.T., supra at 1106.

      Both children are strongly bonded with, and have a primary emotional

connection to, the foster parents. See N.T. Hearing, 4/6/23, at 23, 142-43.

They are likewise close with the foster siblings. Id. at 144. N.J.N. refers to

the foster parents as “mom” and “dad,” and the foster siblings are “sisters.”

Id. at 18-19. The foster parents have taken care of the special needs of the

children, particularly aiding N.J.N. in treating her anxiety and taking O.A.N. to

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speech therapy. Id. at 143. The testimony proved that the foster parents

“put the children’s emotional wellbeing first when making any decision within

the home.” Id. at 142. This all bears out the orphans’ court’s finding that

removing the children from the foster family would cause them significant

distress. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/13/23, at 12.

      By his own concession, Father would need at least another one to two

years before he could parent both children. See N.T. Hearing, 4/6/23, at 161.

Had the court refused to terminate Father’s parental rights, the children would

be forced remain in an “indefinite state of limbo,” depriving them of the

opportunity to be adopted by the ready and willing foster parents. Int. of

K.T., supra at 1111. We cannot countenance that result. Accordingly, we

find that WCCB met its burden pursuant to § 2511(b) and that the court’s

decision was supported by competent evidence.

      Based on the foregoing, we affirm the orders of the orphans’ court

terminating Father’s parental rights as to N.J.N. and O.A.N.

      Orders affirmed.

DATE: 12/6/2023

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