Court Opinion

ID: 9907324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 07:10:09.860108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:46.816930
License: Public Domain

REVERSE; RENDER and REMAND and Opinion Filed November 29, 2023

                                            S   In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                          Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                       No. 05-22-00589-CV

                              NATHAN LONG, Appellant
                                        V.
                         DR. KRISTI LARSON LONG, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
                                Dallas County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-03491-E

                                       OPINION
                    Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Smith
                              Opinion by Justice Goldstein
        Nathan Long appeals the trial court’s order awarding Dr. Kristi Larson Long

attorney’s fees in connection with her motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens

Participation Act (TCPA).1 In five issues, Nathan argues the trial court erred in (1)

dismissing his claims under the TCPA; (2) acting untimely in attempting to vacate a

December 15, 2021 order; (3) dismissing his claims because Kristi failed to meet her

burden under the TCPA; (4) dismissing his claims because he satisfied the minimal

    1
      The Notice of Appeal advises of the desire to appeal from the final order, which is an “amalgam of
several orders” including the last order issued on May 23, 2022, relative to attorneys’ fees. Those orders
are identified and addressed below.
pleading obligations under Rule 91a; and (5) awarding attorney’s fees to Kristi

pursuant to the TCPA. We reverse and render in part and reverse and remand for

further proceedings.

                               FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        In August 2021, Nathan filed his original petition against Kristi in which he

alleged the following facts. He and Kristi were married for eighteen years and had

seven children. They divorced in April 2021, “after many months of acrimonious

litigation,” Nathan and Kristi divorced. Among other things, the final divorce decree

awarded Kristi a $3,000,000 promissory note to compensate her in the division of

the parties’ estate. The note had a term of eight years and called for an initial

payment of $500,000, which Nathan prepaid, and eight subsequent annual

installments of $312,500 payable commencing on January 1, 2022, and thereafter on

January 1 each year until January 1, 2029.

        The petition alleged that, in the early morning hours of July 5, 2021, Nathan

and a date were arrested after falling asleep in his SUV where they had been parked

at the top of a tower garage watching Fourth of July fireworks. The two were

arrested for misdemeanor public intoxication although neither Nathan nor his date

had been driving an automobile or walking around in public, and neither one was

intoxicated. Further, no breathalyzer test was performed on either Nathan or his

date.

                                         –2–
      The next day, Nathan began receiving “oblique but threatening” texts from

Kristi. The first text stated, “Wait until you see what’s coming for you! I always

suspected but I finally have proof. [Eldest child] will run scared from you.” On or

about July 20, 2021, Kristi texted Nathan screen shots of partially unclothed male

dancers from advertisements for La Bare Dallas, a nightclub in Dallas. Kristi also

attached a screen shot of the parking lot at La Bare Dallas. In a series of texts, Kristi

said Nathan “paid the men” in the photographs “in cash” and told Nathan to “stop

texting teenagers.”

      On or about July 29, 2021, Nathan’s divorce lawyer reached out to Kristi in

an attempt to negotiate a present value discount to pay off the entire remaining

balance of the note. Kristi immediately responded that she would agree to the very

first discount being considered, but she conditioned her acceptance on the entire

transaction being closed and funded within a period of hours. Given that no

documents were yet drafted and because of the history between the parties, Kristi’s

response was “at best suspicious,” according to Nathan. Kristi was told that several

days would be required to fund the transaction and generate the necessary

documentation.

      That same day, “within minutes” of the contact with Kristi, multiple envelopes

that had been deposited in the United States postal system on July 27, 2021, began

arriving at the homes and businesses of Nathan’s close friends, relatives, and close

business associates. The envelopes were mailed anonymously from various zip

                                          –3–
codes near Italy, Texas, and they all contained an identical package of materials

including a copy of Nathan’s and his date’s July 5, 2021 arrest reports; their mug

shots; a photocopied photograph of La Bare Dallas; and a photograph of the La Bare

parking lot with the typed legend, “Woman’s Club that also caters to bisexual and

gay males.”

      The petition alleged that the recipients of the packages were not random.

Instead, each recipient was targeted from a private mailing list to which only Nathan

or Kristi had access, and only Nathan or Kristi had knowledge of each recipient’s

significance to Nathan and his businesses and an understanding of the harm delivery

of such a package would inflict on Nathan and his businesses.

      Based on these allegations, Nathan accused Kristi of sending the packages and

asserted claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy:

intrusion on seclusion, and public disclosure of private facts. Specifically, the

petition asserted Nathan suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress

and humiliation because of Kristi’s “purposeful and ongoing attack upon him.” The

petition contains nearly two pages alleging intentional and malicious actions taken

by Kristi in sending the packages to the targeted recipients. Regarding invasion of

privacy, the petition asserted Kristi invaded Nathan’s privacy by intruding on his

solitude, seclusion, and private affairs or concerns.

                                         –4–
                        PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On September 20, 2021, Kristi filed motions to dismiss under both the TCPA

and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. Kristi’s TCPA motion alleged she “had no

role in the dissemination of these alleged mailings.” Even assuming for the sake of

argument that Nathan’s account was true, Kristi argued, Nathan’s legal action was

based on, “related to,” or in response to Kristi’s exercise of her right of free speech,

right to petition, and right of association, and Nathan could not establish by clear

and convincing evidence a prima facie case for each and every element of his causes

of action. The motion attached the mug shots of Nathan and his date and a Farmers

Branch arrest summary and asserted that all the matters that Nathan alleged were

publicized were of legitimate public concern and publicly available. Further, the

motion alleged the mailings consisted of public records, establishing a “clear bar” to

Nathan’s recovery for invasion of privacy, and Nathan’s intrusion upon seclusion

claim failed as a matter of law because he could not establish an intrusion or,

alternatively, because any alleged intrusion was not highly offensive to a reasonable

person.

      On October 1, 2021, the parties’ attorneys entered the following Rule 11

agreement:

      I am writing to memorialize our Rule 11 Agreement. Plaintiff agrees
      to waive any argument that Defendant Dr. Long has not or did not file
      her motions timely or has not or did not timely have the motions heard,
      or that the Court’s ruling was not timely pursuant to the Texas Rules of
      Civil Procedure, in exchange for Defendant’s consent to move her

                                          –5–
      hearings on her Motion to Dismiss and Anti-Slapp that are scheduled
      for October 15, 2021 to October 29, 2021.

      On December 3, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on both of Kristi’s motions

to dismiss. On December 15, 2021, the trial court signed two conflicting orders: (1)

an order granting Kristi’s TCPA motion to dismiss but awarding no attorney’s fees

and (2) an order denying the TCPA motion with the request for attorney’s fees to be

considered at a subsequent setting. On December 28, 2021, the trial court signed an

order vacating the order granting Kristi’s TCPA motion to dismiss; thus, only the

trial court’s order denying Kristi’s TCPA motion to dismiss remained in effect.

      On January 18, 2022, the trial court signed an order granting Kristi’s 91a

motion and dismissing Nathan’s causes of action with prejudice. The trial court

crossed out the paragraph in the order providing for an award of attorney’s fees and

added the handwritten notation “NEED separate order + hearing” in the margin.

      On February 15, 2022, the trial court signed an “order vacating order denying

defendant’s motion to dismiss TCPRC chapter 27” in which it stated the order

denying relief under the TCPA was “inadvertent error,” vacated that order in all

respects, granted Kristi’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed the case. The order

further provided “[a]ny relief not GRANTED, is specifically denied” with the caveat

that “[a]ny remaining issues regarding attorney’s fees must be set for a hearing

before the Court.”

      Nathan filed a motion for new trial, or alternatively a motion to reconsider on

February 17, 2022, thirty days from the order granting Kristi’s 91a motion and
                                     –6–
dismissing the case with prejudice. The trial court did not rule on the motion for

new trial, which was denied by operation of law.2

         On May 13, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on attorney’s fees at

which Nathan’s attorney stated his belief that Kristi put on her entire case at the

December 3, 2021 hearing and “closed it” without meeting her burden. Counsel

noted that the trial court had not entered a “final, final order yet” but asserted that

there was finality on Kristi’s TCPA claims, which were denied. Counsel argued that

Kristi could therefore not get fees for a claim on which she did not prevail. Finally,

counsel complained that Kristi’s counsel failed to segregate his attorney’s fees. In

response, Kristi’s counsel argued Rule 91a did not require the trial court to rule on

the attorney’s fees issue within any allotted time, and counsel for the prevailing party

was not required to segregate attorney’s fees where discrete legal services advanced

both recoverable and unrecoverable claims.

         On May 23, 2022, the trial court entered an order awarding Kristi $15,003.68

in attorney’s fees on her TCPA motion to dismiss and ordering “that the Court will

not award Defendant’s reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs incurred

through the filing and prosecution of her 91a Motion to Dismiss.” This appeal

followed.

   2
       We note that March 16, 2022, was thirty days from the granting of Kristi’s TCPA motion.
                                                  –7–
                                     ANALYSIS

      We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a TCPA motion to dismiss.

Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 132 (Tex.

2019); Goldberg v. EMR (USA Holdings) Inc., 594 S.W.3d 818, 827 (Tex. App.—

Dallas, pet. denied) (citing Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018)).

We review the merits of a Rule 91a motion de novo because the availability of a

remedy under the facts alleged is a question of law and the rule’s factual-plausibility

standard is akin to a legal-sufficiency review. City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d

722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).

      Issues 1 and 2:      TCPA Motion

      Whether the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s claims under TCPA
      given it had already twice, timely denied the motion, it lost subject
      matter jurisdiction and subsequently entered its Order No. 5, 73 days
      after its TCPA hearing took place.

      Whether the court’s untimely effort to vacate its December 15, 2021,
      Order No. 1 was an error or was void given (i) its untimeliness and its
      (ii) failure to vacate its December 28, 2021, Order No. 3 and (iii) the
      TCPA’s express language denying, by operation of law, motions not
      ruled on timely.

      We first address Nathan’s argument relative to proceedings under the TCPA

and his assertion that the trial court erred in “trying to vacate” its December 15, 2021

order denying Kristi’s TCPA motion to dismiss with its “untimely February 15,

2022, Order.” Nathan argues that, even if the trial court was able to vacate its

December 15, 2021, order, Kristi’s TCPA motion to dismiss was denied by operation

                                          –8–
of law. The trial court’s February 15, 2022, order shows that, in addition to vacating

its December 15, 2021, order, the trial court granted Kristi’s TCPA motion to

dismiss, dismissed the case, and ordered that the issue of attorney’s fees had to be

set for a hearing.    We understand Nathan to contend that the trial court lost

jurisdiction to take further action with respect to Kristi’s TCPA motion 30 days after

the December 3, 2021, hearing on the motion. As explained below, on this record

we disagree that the trial court lost plenary jurisdiction to vacate the order but agree

that the trial court had no authority to enter an order granting the TCPA motion more

than 30 days after the hearing.

      When a motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA is filed, the trial court must

rule on the motion not later than the 30th day following the date the hearing on the

motion concludes. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(a). If a court does

not rule on a motion to dismiss under the TCPA in the time prescribed by Section

27.005, the motion is considered to have been denied by operation of law, and the

moving party may appeal. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.008(a). Nathan

argues that, on January 2, 2022, the thirtieth day after the hearing on Kristi’s TCPA

motion to dismiss, jurisdiction under the TCPA expired. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(a).

      The Supreme Court of Texas has held the TCPA does not impose a 30-day

restriction on a trial court’s authority to vacate a ruling on a TCPA motion to dismiss,

concluding:

                                          –9–
      While the TCPA imposes myriad deadlines, no statutory provision
      speaks to this issue. See id. §§ 27.001–.011. Section 51.014 of the
      Civil Practice and Remedies Code constrains the trial court’s authority
      to act on a prior ruling, but only when an interlocutory appeal is
      pending. Section 27.005(a) requires a timely ruling, but says nothing
      about a trial court’s power to vacate such a ruling outside the statute’s
      30-day deadline. To hold that the trial court had no power to vacate the
      dismissal order based on new precedent, as occurred here, would
      require us to “judicially amend” the TCPA “by adding words that are
      not contained in the language of the statute.” Lippincott v. Whisenhunt,
      462 S.W.3d 507, 508 (Tex. 2015). But we cannot do so because the
      statute’s “text is the alpha and the omega of the interpretive process.”
      BankDirect Capital Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d 76, 86
      (Tex. 2017).

      Put simply, nothing in the statutory scheme prohibits trial courts from
      vacating their own orders when they otherwise have plenary power to
      do so. Here, once the trial court vacated its February 22 order, as it had
      authority to do, no ruling on the dismissal motion was in place.
      Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was either overruled by operation
      of law for want of a timely ruling, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
      27.008(a), or denied by the trial court in a new trial. In this procedural
      posture, we need not consider whether the trial court’s order granting a
      new trial restarted the trial clock and permitted a new hearing and ruling
      on the dismissal motion, because even if it did not, the same result
      ensues. Whether the trial court properly denied the defendants’ TCPA
      motion or whether it was overruled by operation of law on vacatur of
      the prior order, the defendants can seek relief by interlocutory appeal
      as the Legislature contemplated.

In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 540–41 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (per

curiam).

      We follow Panchakarla’s lead, applying the rules of statutory construction:

      The proper construction of a statute is a question of law we review de
      novo. Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011). When a
      statute’s language is unambiguous, “we adopt the interpretation
      supported by its plain language unless such an interpretation would lead
      to absurd results.” TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340

                                        –10–
      S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). “We presume the Legislature included
      each word in the statute for a purpose and that words not included were
      purposefully omitted.” Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509
      (Tex. 2015). We construe statutes and related provisions as a whole,
      not in isolation, Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tex.
      2001), and as a general proposition, we are hesitant to conclude that a
      trial court’s jurisdiction is curtailed absent manifestation of legislative
      intent to that effect, cf. City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 393
      (Tex. 2009). In construing the TCPA, we are also mindful that it “does
      not abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or
      privilege available under other constitutional, statutory, case, or
      common law or rule provisions,” and it must be “construed liberally to
      effectuate its purpose and intent fully.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
      § 27.011.

      In TCPA cases, the Legislature has expressly constrained trial-court
      authority over TCPA orders in a very limited way: by making
      interlocutory orders denying TCPA dismissal motions immediately
      appealable and automatically staying all trial court proceedings until a
      perfected interlocutory appeal has been concluded. See id. §
      51.014(a)(12), (b). But the TCPA is silent about a trial court’s authority
      to reconsider either a timely issued ruling granting a TCPA motion to
      dismiss or a timely order denying such a motion when no interlocutory
      appeal is pending. Construing the statutory scheme as a whole, and
      giving weight to the language the Legislature included and excluded,
      we hold that the TCPA does not impose a 30-day restriction on a trial
      court’s authority to vacate a ruling on a TCPA motion to dismiss.

Id. at 540.

      In this case of first impression, we answer a question left open by

Panchakarla: whether a trial court with authority to vacate an order when it has

plenary power to do so can thereafter affirmatively rule on the TCPA motion more

than 30 days after the hearing. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005 (court

must rule not later than 30th day following date of hearing concludes). In construing

the statutory language and consistent with the Panchakarla court’s analysis, we

                                        –11–
conclude that the trial court had no authority to grant the TCPA motion 75 days after

the hearing.

      The trial court retained plenary power when, by order dated February 15,

2022, it vacated its order denying Kristi’s TCPA motion to dismiss. In accordance

with Panchakarla, this put the case back in the procedural posture wherein the

motion was deemed denied by operation of law. In this case, unlike Panchakarla,

procedurally, the order vacating a denial of the TCPA motion is a distinction without

a substantive difference. See Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d at 541. Rather than being

an express denial, the motion is deemed denied by operation of law. This presents

the procedural posture of a failure to rule. Id at 540–41.

      We must, however, address that portion of the February 15, 2022, order that

granted Kristi’s TCPA motion and dismissed the case. The TCPA is clear that the

trial court has the authority to rule on a motion within 30 days after the hearing;

otherwise it is deemed denied. To permit the trial court to grant the motion after 30

days have passed is directly contrary to the express statutory language. Section

27.005(a) requires a timely ruling, with consequences for a failure to rule, and

permitting an immediate interlocutory appeal from the deemed denial. To hold that

the trial court had power to rule, i.e. grant a motion 75 days after the hearing would

require us to “judicially amend” the TCPA “by adding words that are not contained

in the language of the statute.” Lippincott, 462 S.W.3d at 508. But we cannot do so

because the statute’s “text is the alpha and the omega of the interpretive process.”

                                        –12–
BankDirect Capital Fin., 519 S.W.3d at 86. While the trial court has plenary power

to vacate its ruling, thereby in this context putting it in the procedural posture of a

deemed denial, we conclude that does not provide the concomitant power to enter

an order granting a dismissal after the statutory 30-day deadline from the hearing

date.3

         We have concluded the trial court had authority to vacate the December 15,

2021 order, which had the effect of the motion to dismiss being deemed denied. We

have determined the trial court had no authority to thereafter grant the TCPA motion;

therefore, we sustain Nathan’s first and second issues to that extent. In all other

respects, we overrule Nathan’s first and second issues.

         Nathan’s third issue is rendered moot by our disposition of his first issue.4 As

no timely interlocutory appeal was taken, we address the ramifications of the deemed

denial relative to the May 23, 2022, final order and the award of attorney’s fees under

the TCPA under Nathan’s fifth issue.

    3
      To conclude otherwise could lead to absurd results. While the timeline on this record reflects a
wholesale failure to faithfully promote the expeditious resolution under two separate dismissal proceedings,
it was at least less than six months from the hearing. Any interpretation that would permit a trial court to
take affirmative action, other than to vacate a ruling after 30 days, could lead the trial court, sua sponte or
at the behest of the parties, to reconsider its ruling on the eve of trial. That is well beyond what the
Legislature contemplated in its statutory construct.
    4
     Nathan’s third issue is whether, “alternatively, the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff[‘]s claims as
Defendant failed and he satisfied any burdens the TCPA may have placed on them.”
                                                    –13–
        Issue 5: Whether the court erred in awarding any attorney fees to
        Defendant pursuant to the TCPA.

        In his fifth issue, Nathan complains that the trial court erred in awarding Kristi

attorney’s fees under the TCPA. The TCPA requires that, “if the court orders

dismissal of a legal action under this chapter, the court: (1) shall award to the moving

party court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending against the

legal action.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(a)(1); see also Sullivan v.

Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016). The procedural posture after the

February 15, 2022 order vacating the order to dismiss is that no ruling was signed

within 30 days of the hearing; therefore, the TCPA motion was deemed denied by

operation of law. As we have determined that the trial court had no authority to

grant the dismissal, it concomitantly had no authority to award attorney’s fees on

May 23, 2022, for a motion deemed denied by operation of law, for which no

interlocutory appeal was taken. We sustain Nathan’s fifth issue to the extent we

conclude Kristi is not entitled to attorney’s fees and reverse and render judgment

that Kristi take nothing on her claim for attorney’s fees.5

        Issue 4: Whether, alternatively, the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s
        claims as Plaintiff fully satisfied the minimal, pleading obligations TRCP
        91a placed on him requiring the motion be denied.

    5
      We note that when the court denied the motion on December 15, 2021, it was to consider an award of
costs and attorney’s fees at a subsequent setting. “If the court finds that a motion to dismiss filed under this
chapter is frivolous or solely intended to delay, the court may award court costs and reasonable attorney's
fees to the responding party.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.009(b). As the procedural
posture is deemed denied by operation of law, and the record reflects no prior finding by the court that the
motion was frivolous or solely intended for delay, we reverse and render as opposed to reverse and remand.
                                                    –14–
      We first note that the trial court’s January 18, 2022 order dismissing Nathan’s

causes of action under Rule 91a was not a final order because it clearly reflected the

trial court’s notation “NEED separate order + hearing” indicating an intention to

address the issue of attorney’s fees in a separate order following a hearing. See

Carroll v. Metro Off. Equip., Inc., No. 02-22-00087-CV, 2022 WL 1682156, at *1

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissal order under

Rule 91a not final where claim for attorney’s fees remained pending). A motion to

dismiss under Rule 91a must be granted or denied within 45 days after the motion is

filed. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.3(c). However, the 45-day deadline for ruling on a motion

to dismiss under Rule 91a is not jurisdictional. In re Joel Kelley Ints., Inc., No. 05-

19-00559-CV, 2019 WL 2521725, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 19, 2019, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.).

      Four months after issuing its order dismissing Nathan’s causes of action under

Rule 91a, the trial court entertained Kristi’s request for attorney’s fees and entered

the May 23, 2022 order denying attorney’s fees under Rule 91a and disposing of all

issues. Nathan timely appealed from that order. To the extent Nathan argues the

trial court lost jurisdiction to act prior to the issuance of its May 23, 2022 order as to

Rule 91a dismissal, we reject his argument.

      We therefore address that portion of Nathan’s fourth issue in which he asserts

dismissal was not warranted under Rule 91a. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a

                                          –15–
provides that a party “may move to dismiss a cause of action on the grounds that it

has no basis in law or fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1.

      In ruling on a Rule 91a motion, a court “may not consider evidence . . . and

must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together

with any pleading exhibits permitted by Rule 59.” Id. 91a.6; see also TEX. GOV’T

CODE ANN. § 22.004(g) (“The supreme court shall adopt rules to provide for the

dismissal of causes of action that have no basis in law or fact on motion and without

evidence. The rules shall provide that the motion to dismiss shall be granted or

denied within 45 days of the filing of the motion to dismiss.”). We review de novo

a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. Bethel v. Quilling, Selander,

Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2020).

      Nathan argues the trial court erred in granting the Rule 91a motion because

he “satisfied all notice, pleading and legal burden(s)” asserting three causes of

action: intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy by intrusion

upon seclusion, and invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts. In

averring that the trial court properly dismissed Nathan’s claims under Rule 91a,

Kristi does not challenge the existence of each of the causes of action under Texas

law; rather, Kristi challenges the factual allegations as pled as failing to satisfy one

element of each cause of action and asserts “the allegations taken as true

affirmatively demonstrate that [Nathan’s] claims have no basis in law.” In doing so,

Kristi conflates the grounds for obtaining dismissal under Rule 91a with the grounds

                                         –16–
for granting a motion for summary judgment, and we decline to follow Kristi’s

reasoning in this regard.

      Rule 91a provides a harsh remedy and should be strictly construed. Davis v

Homeowners of Am. Ins. Co., No. 05-21-00092-CV, 2023 WL 3735115 at *2 (Tex.

App.—Dallas May 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); Renate Nixdorf GmbH & Co. KG

v. TRA Midland Props., LLC, No. 05-17-00577-CV, 2019 WL 92038, at *10 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Jan. 3, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re RNDC Tex., LLC, No. 05-

18-00555-CV, 2018 WL 2773262, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 11, 2018, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.). Rule 91a is not a substitute for special exception practice

under rule 91 or summary judgment practice under rule 166a, both of which come

with protective features against precipitate summary dispositions on the merits.

Royale v. Knightvest Mgmt., LLC, No. 05-18-00908-CV, 2019 WL 4126600, at *4

(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      A cause of action has no basis in fact “if no reasonable person could believe

the facts pleaded.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. The “no basis in fact” prong of Rule 91a.1

relates to the believability of the facts alleged by a plaintiff in pleading a cause of

action and, thus, seldom rises to a point of contention in the case law. The “no basis

in fact” prong is a “factual plausibility standard.” Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d at 724;

Davis, 2023 WL 3735115, at *2. A cause of action alleged by a claimant has no

basis in law “if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably

drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” TEX. R. CIV. P.

                                        –17–
91a.1. In assessing whether the non-movant’s pleading has no basis in law, we apply

a fair-notice pleading standard to determine whether the allegations of the petition

are sufficient to allege a cause of action. Thomas v. 462 Thomas Fam. Props., LP,

559 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. denied); Davis, 2023 WL

3735115, at *3. A petition is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of the

facts upon which the pleader bases his claim. Thomas, 559 S.W.3d at 639–40.

“Even the omission of an element is not fatal if the cause of action may be reasonably

inferred from what is specifically stated.” Id. at 640 (quoting In re Lipsky, 460

S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding)).

      We limit our review to the four corners of the live pleading, the First Amended

Petition, and the exhibits attached thereto. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. A de novo,

four-corners review shows that all of Nathan’s causes of action have a basis in law

as well as a basis in fact. Specifically, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress has four elements: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) its

conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) its actions caused the plaintiff emotional

distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe. Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d

462, 468 (Tex. 2017). Kristi challenges element number two, averring that Nathan

cannot meet the high standard for extreme and outrageous conduct. To establish an

actionable invasion of privacy of the type Nathan alleges—intrusion upon

seclusion—a plaintiff must show (1) an intentional intrusion, physically or

otherwise, upon another’s solitude, seclusion, or private affairs or concerns, which

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(2) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853

S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993); Moore v. Bushman, 559 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). Kristi challenges the first element

asserting Nathan’s failure to articulate in what manner Kristi accessed his “private

data” whether by physical invasion or otherwise. Finally, a plaintiff alleging public

disclosure of private facts must show (1) publicity was given to matters concerning

his private life; (2) the publication of such matter would be highly offensive to a

reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities; and (3) the matter publicized is not of

legitimate public concern. Indus. Found. of the S. v. Tex. Indus. Acc. Bd., 540

S.W.2d 668, 682–83 (Tex. 1976); Robinson v. Brannon, 313 S.W.3d 860, 867 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Kristi challenges the third element,

asserting that criminal matters are of public record and therefore a matter of

legitimate public concern.

      We agree with Nathan that, on this record, he satisfied the fair notice standard

of his claims and allegations and satisfied the basis-in-fact component. Kristi’s

single element challenge does not overcome the factual plausibility standard, and,

upon reviewing the live pleading, we conclude it is possible a reasonable person

could believe the facts as pleaded. Further, Nathan’s causes of action do not meet

the two circumstances wherein a court may determine there is no basis in law under

Rule 91a: (1) where the plaintiff fails to plead a legally cognizable cause of action

or (2) where the allegations in the plaintiff’s own pleading establish a complete legal

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bar to the plaintiff’s claims by affirmatively negating entitlement to the relief

requested. See Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 608 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, no pet.). Kristi’s single element challenge does not

implicate either circumstance. As Nathan’s causes of action each had a basis in fact

and law, we conclude his claims were therefore improperly dismissed under Rule

91a. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. We sustain Nathan’s fourth issue to the extent he

asserts dismissal was not warranted under Rule 91a.

      We reverse the trial court’s judgment dismissing Nathan’s claims under the

TCPA and Rule 91a and awarding attorney’s fees under the TCPA, render judgment

that Kristi take nothing on her claims under the TCPA, and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                            /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
                                            BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
                                            JUSTICE

220589F.P05

                                       –20–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

NATHAN LONG, Appellant                         On Appeal from the County Court at
                                               Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00589-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. CC-21-03491-
                                               E.
DR. KRISTI LARSON LONG,                        Opinion delivered by Justice
Appellee                                       Goldstein. Justices Pedersen, III and
                                               Smith participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court dismissing Nathan Long’s claims under the TCPA and Rule 91a and
awarding attorney’s fees under the TCPA is REVERSED, and judgment is
RENDERED that Dr. Kristi Larson Long take nothing on her claims under the
TCPA. We REMAND this cause to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

      It is ORDERED that appellant NATHAN LONG recover his costs of this
appeal from appellee DR. KRISTI LARSON LONG.

Judgment entered this 29th day of November 2023.

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