Court Opinion

ID: 9648605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:30:08.2819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:04.060568
License: Public Domain

BATEMAN, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached, but only on the first ground mentioned in the main opinion. We are in agreement that our Court is bound by the conclusions of the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Employers Casualty Co., Tex. Civ.App., 335 S.W.2d 235, because of the *110refusal of the writ of error, “No Reversible Error”; otherwise this would be a dissenting opinion since it is my earnest conviction that the conclusion of the Austin Court, that appellant failed to prove a cause of action, was wrong. Likewise, I am unable to agree with the second, third and fourth grounds for affirming the judgment, as set forth in the main opinion. In discussing those grounds I shall use the same numbers to avoid verbiage.
(2) There seems to be considerable confusion among the few Texas authorities as to which of the two theories of construction the Texas Courts follow. The Chief Justice speaks of “The Texas version of the ‘complete operation’ theory” but the Austin Court of Civil Appeals, in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Employers Casualty Co., Tex.Civ. App., 335 S.W.2d 235, 238, says: “We do not believe the cases follow the ‘completed operations’ theory, but rather the ‘coming to rest’ theory.” Our own Court, in American Employers’ Ins. Co. v. Brock, Tex.Civ. App., 215 S.W.2d 370, err. ref. n.r.e., set forth the rationale of the two theories and quoted from some of the decisions expounding each of them, but the only principle of law actually announced in that case was that, since the language of the policy provision in question was ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the court should interpret the same liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. It is true that in the early part of the opinion it was said that appellant contended for the application of the “coming to rest” theory, while the appellee relied upon the “complete operation” theory; the decision was in favor of the appellee; therefore it might be said that the court favored the latter theory. But, as stated above, the Austin Court says we follow the other. Which theory do we follow? It is difficult to say, in the absence of a definitive expression by our Supreme Court.
In the main opinion it is said that “It (Texas) adheres to the principle announced in American Employers Ins. Co. v. Brock, Tex.Civ.App., 215 S.W.2d 370, to the effect that the unloading is completed when the material being unloaded is turned over to the party to whom delivery is to be made. In this case the party was Borders, the subcontractor acting for and in behalf of the general contractor with whom Capitol had its contract.” I do not read the opinion in the Brock case as being to that “effect,” but that is beside the point. The point is that I am fearful that the Chief Justice has lost sight of the fact that here we are considering Borders, not Capitol, as the “insured” under the Employers policy; we are trying to determine whether Borders was “using” the ready-mixed concrete truck by unloading the same, within the terms of the policy.
If we are to follow the “complete operation” theory, and if it is correct to say that “the unloading is completed when the material being unloaded is turned over to the party to whom delivery is to be made,” then it seems to me to be inescapable that in this case the unloading had not been completed when the accident happened because it had not been turned over to the general contractor, the “party to whom delivery is to be made.” It will not do merely to say that the concrete was turned over to the general contractor, Collins, by being turned over to Borders who was acting for Collins, thus making the operation complete. This presupposes that Borders was in some way made the agent of Collins to receive the wet concrete from Capitol, but I find neither pleading nor testimony of any such instruction or authorization in the record or in fact anything to indicate clearly for whom Borders was acting. But even assuming that Borders was so authorized, we must not lose sight of the fact that it is Borders’ alleged negligence in handling the concrete with a defective crane that was made the basis of the original claims, and that this occurred while Borders was removing the concrete from the truck to the forms. I say that in so removing the concrete Borders was actually unloading the truck.
The testimony quoted in the main opinion and in that of the Austin Court of Civ* il Appeals merely establishes that Capitol’s *111responsibility for, and its control over, the concrete ceased as soon as it left the truck; also that Capitol had no control over the crane. As I see it, these facts are wholly immaterial, for it is not Capitol’s conduct which is under scrutiny here. No claim was made by anyone against Capitol. The question here is: Who unloaded the truck? Presumably Capitol’s employees turned the spigot or valve which permitted the concrete to flow down the chute into the bucket; but suppose this employee had merely driven the truck to the site and said to Borders or his employee: “Here is the concrete. It will flow down the chute if you will turn that spigot.” If Borders turned the spigot would anyone question that he was unloading the truck? One might reply: “No, but the unloading was completed when the concrete was loaded in the bucket.” But what if instead of using the crane and bucket, Borders put the lower end of the chute into the upper end of a trough, or on a conveyor belt, leading to the forms. Could it then be properly said that the unloading was complete when it first touched the trough or belt? Or, wouldn’t it be more reasonable to say that the unloading process was not complete until the concrete reached its ultimate destination? I think this would be true no matter who actually turned the spigot.
As I see it, the principle of law involved would be the same if the truck were an open-bed type of truck with the material lying in the bed of the truck and the bucket of the crane was designed to scoop up the material and carry it to the forms, instead of having the material flow down a chute into the bucket. The principle should be the same as if one of Borders’ employees was standing in the open bed of the truck and throwing the material out from the truck with a shovel directly into the forms. If such a workman should scoop up a quantity of the material and hold it in his shovel a second until he determined exactly where he should deposit it, wouldn’t it be just as reasonable to say that the material had “come to rest” in the shovel as to say, as the Austin Court and the main opinion of this court have said, that the material “has come to rest” when it flows down the chute into the bucket?
The facts are almost identical with those in Lamberti v. Anaco Equip. Corp., 16 A.D. 2d 121, 226 N.Y.S.2d 70, 73. There the ready-mix truck contained more concrete than enough to fill the bucket of the crane. The concrete would flow down the chute into the bucket as in this case, and the crane would carry the bucket to the forms, dump the concrete therein and return for another bucketful, and on the third trip from the truck to the forms the concrete was accidently spilled on the plaintiff, injuring him. The question involved in that case was, as it is here, whether the operators of the crane and bucket were “using” the ready-mix truck by unloading it, thus bringing themselves under' the coverage of the automobile policy issued to the owners of the ready-mix truck. The court held that they were covered, using the following language, which I think very significant in the light of the testimony quoted in the main opinion in our case:
“It is not unfair to the insurance carrier to hold that the delivery function was not complete until the concrete reached its ultimate destination. Particularly so in the case of mixed concrete where there could be no intermediate place of sojourn. By the very nature of that material it is essential that it be taken directly from the delivery truck to the place at which it becomes a permanent portion of the construction. Concrete, unlike lumber or other building materials, cannot be stored at the job site for later incorporation into the structure. It must be deposited immediately at its permanent resting place. It is for that very reason that a transit-mix truck is used in this type of operation. If it were the intention of the insurer to confine its liability to a more circumscribed aspect of the loading process. *112language appropriate to such end could have been employed.”
In another place in the same opinion we find this language: “The sole test is whether the means used was in the process of unloading. In this case the bucket was merely an instrument to effect the unloading.”
It seems to me that the facts of the Lam-berti case are so like those in this case, and the logic of the Lamberti opinion so reasonable and sound, that it should be followed in this case, making it unnecessary to base the holding, as we did in the Brock case, upon the principle that the language in question is ambiguous and should be construed strictly against the insurer, which principle of construction should be employed as a last resort. But if need be in this case, that principle could easily be employed to reach the same result as reached in the Lamberti case.
We used the principle in the Brock case to establish coverage under a similar clause, and in that case nothing had been either loaded onto the truck or unloaded off of it at the time of the accident. Why should it not be used in this case, where the accident occurred during the process of removing the material from the truck to the forms ?
If it is now proper to say there is no coverage or liability because the unloading had been completed when the accident occurred, we should have said in the Brock case there is no coverage 6r liability because the loading had not commenced when the accident occurred.
It seems to me that appellee would be liable under either of the two theories. It was not a “complete operation” when the concrete was first placed in the bucket, or until it reached “its permanent resting place.” Moreover, there was no “coming to rest” until that time, for a material which cannot be stockpiled, even temporarily, but must be kept in a constant state of agitation until it reaches its final resting place in the permanent structure of which it is to be a part, cannot properly be said to have “come to rest” in the bucket which is to transport it away from the truck as soon as it is filled. I cannot agree to the conclusion that the unloading was completed as soon as the concrete left the confines of the truck.
(3) In the main opinion it is pointed out that “it was a defect in Borders’ crane which caused the accident, not anything done in the unloading of Capitol’s truck,” but I submit that this begs the question, which is: Does appellee’s policy insure Borders against liability for its negligence?' The type of negligence is immaterial. If Borders was engaged in unloading the concrete truck when the accident occurred the causal connection is clearly established.
(4) The main opinion speaks of our duty to uphold “the implied finding of the trial court that Capitol’s unloading process had been completed when the accident occurred,” but as pointed out above, we are not here concerned with Capitol’s unloading process, but with Borders’ unloading process. Moreover, the “implied finding” is not of a fact, but a conclusion of law which controls the entire case.
In conclusion, I do not have any way of knowing what the intent of the parties to-this insurance contract was except by the language used in the policy. There are numerous other out-of-state cases which I think are quite persuasive, such as Wagman-v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co. (NY), 304 N.Y. 490, 109 N.E.2d 592, which seems-to be a leading case on which the court in-the Lamberti case strongly relied; also-Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 108 Utah 500, 510, 161 P.2d 423, 160 A.L.R. 1251, wherein the Utah court said this: “Normally a delivery is not completed until the deliveror has finished his handling of the article, has completed his assignment or task of putting the articles into the possession of the receiving party.” In our case, the general contractor, M. Z. Collins Construction Company, is the “receiving party” and Borders is the “deliver-