Court Opinion

ID: 9720540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:34:38.542747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:19.367186
License: Public Domain

REYNOSO, J.
I dissent. Before children can be permanently taken from their parents, constitutional requirements of due process demand a showing of extreme neglect. We deal with a fundamental right on the part of parents to raise a family and on the part of children to be raised in a family setting. Further, the acts committed by the parents which permit the termination of parent-child relationship are otherwise defined as criminal acts. There is moral fault-finding implicit in such actions. Accordingly, the highest standard must be applied to the required proof before the parent-child relationship can be permanently severed; that is, there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard in making its determination as to five of the children, and I would therefore reverse the judgment as to those children. The trial court applied the appropriate standard in ruling on the matter of the youngest child, however I find that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment as to that child and would accordingly reverse.
I. Substantive Due Process Considerations
“It is beyond peradventure that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Here we are concerned with the most essential and basic aspect of familial privacy—the right of the family to remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state. The right to preservation of family integrity encompasses the reciprocal rights of both parent and children.” (Blumenfeld, J., in Duchesne v. Sugarman (2d Cir. 1977) 566 F.2d 817, 824.)
The majority reject appellant’s equal protection arguments. However, I find that the due process arguments which the appellant makes to be persuasive. The majority ignore that argument.
*902There is a fundamental interest which goes to each member of the family protecting them from state interference in the familial relationship except in the most extreme circumstances. The United States Supreme Court has long protected that interest. (Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 651 [31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558, 92 S.Ct. 1208].) The California Supreme Court agrees: “[T]he interest of the parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights . . . .” (In re B. G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688 [114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244].) And the permanent loss of that familial relationship by action of the state amounts to a deprivation of “liberty” under the due process clause. (In re George G. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 146, 165 [137 Cal.Rptr. 201]; In re Rose G. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 406, 421 [129 Cal.Rptr. 338].)
While the familial right is of a fundamental nature, the state has an interest, indeed a duty, to protect the young. (See Stanley v. Illinois, supra, 405 U.S. at p. 652 [31 L.Ed.2d at p. 559]; In re Eugene W. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 623, 629 [105 Cal.Rptr. 736].) The state interest protecting children must be balanced against the countervailing interest of the parent and child in maintaining the integrity of the family unit. (See In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636, 648 [119 Cal.Rptr. 475, 532 P.2d 123].)
The court’s duty to balance those interests is not easily achieved for the interests, at times, are not that distinct. Thus, the state, too, has a duty to preserve and strengthen the family home. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202.) In addition, the state may intervene on behalf of a child and temporarily remove the child from the parents in case of need to protect the child. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, formerly § 600.) The more serious step, that of permanently depriving the parents and children of the familial relationship, must be analyzed with the interests of the state and the family in mind.
Let us proceed to the weighing. The state, it would appear, has a compelling interest only when neglect and detriment of the child exists in serious dimensions. But when can such circumstances arise? The beginning of our analysis is In re B. G., supra, 11 Cal.3d 679, where the court suggested that the practice of awarding custody to nonparents in preference to parents should be only under “unusual and extreme circumstances.” This is in conformity with the notion that “the involuntary termination of that relationship by state action must be viewed as a *903drastic remedy which should be resorted to only in extreme cases of neglect or abandonment.” (In re T. M. R. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 703 [116 Cal.Rptr. 292].)
The thrust of the cases which deal with the removal of children from their parental control pursuant to Civil Code section 232, subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(7), convinces me that the familial relationship should be permanently severed only when there has been demonstrable extreme neglect. (See In re D. L. C. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 840 [126 Cal.Rptr. 863]; In re Susan M. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 300 [125 Cal.Rptr. 707]; In re Halamuda (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 219 [192 P.2d 781].) In fact, the neglect must be of a criminal nature. Thus, in In re D. L. C, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 840, the parent had already pled guilty to the crime of misdemeanor neglect of the child. Or, if we look at a criminal case, we find the appellate court, in upholding a conviction, stating: “This record discloses conditions of filth and wanton neglect which even the most ignorant and insensitive parent should recognize as hazardous to children.” (People v. Harris (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 393, 398 [48 Cal.Rptr. 677].) Extreme neglect, the Harris court said, is criminal. Extreme neglect, the cases dealing with Civil Code section 232, seem to say, is what warrants the severing of familial ties. That extreme circumstances amounting to criminal neglect must be proven before familial ties can be broken appears to be required constitutionally. Substantive due process requires that the state not act arbitrarily in contravention of fundamental liberties. (Palko v. Connecticut (1937) 302 U.S. 319, 327 [82 L.Ed. 288, 293, 58 S.Ct. 149].) A state act would be characterized as arbitrary and capricious if it permanently deprived the parent of the fundamental liberty of raising a family for mere neglect under Civil Code section 232, subdivisions (a)(2) or (a)(7). In like manner, interference with the fundamental liberty of a child to be raised by his or her parents cannot constitutionally be countenanced by a mere showing of neglect. To permit intervention for mere neglect would be to permit the state to interfere with impunity in the affairs of any family, for neglect is a human failing common to all of us. (See In re B. G., supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 694.)
An infringement on a fundamental liberty, whether the infringement is labeled civil or criminal, requires a high degree of justification to satisfy due process. (See In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 87 S.Ct. 1428].) Accordingly, in the context of Civil Code section 232, it is “extreme neglect” which must be shown.
*904II. Required Standard of Proof
When a fundamental interest is at stake, the standard of proof which the state must satisfy is of the highest order. In a Civil Code section 232 proceeding, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. To be deprived of one’s child or one’s parent is an intervention far more serious than the intervention which sends an individual to prison for many years.
When a child’s liberty is at stake, the highest standard of proof has been applied. (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068].) And the California Supreme Court has indicated that that same standard (proof beyond reasonable doubt) applies when two factors are present: First, a fundamental liberty is at stake; and second, the likelihood of “stigma” and loss of “good name” may result from the proceedings. (People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 319-321 [121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352].) Manifestly, a fundamental liberty is at stake in a Civil Code section 232 proceeding. Manifestly, too, parent and child suffer from the stigma of a public trial. The abusive parent is stigmatized as a social pariah (as are criminals) for the act they are accused of performing is characterized as penal in nature and socially reprehensible. The child, on the other hand, is stigmatized by having his or her family taken away. If no adoption results, the child will have no family. Even if there is an adoption, the public will know that the child came from abusive parents with the embarrassment and shame that that entails. The “good name” of the child, like that of parents, will be tarnished. In addition, for the children involved in this case, four of whom are more than six years of age, the chances of adoption are poor at best. (See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children (1976) 28 Stan.L. Rev. 625, 672.) The consequences are serious indeed.
The child and parent are not typically legal adversaries. The child has an interest in being protected from cruelty. At the same time, the child has a real interest in being protected from the severance of the familial relationship when the parent is innocent of wrongdoing as defined by the criminal code or by Civil Code section 232. Society, too, has an interest in not having innocent people so affected. The child and parents, as members of the same family, are tied together by that intricate and subtle relationship called the family. The state must act with caution and be very certain, indeed, that unusual and extreme circumstances exist before it acts. The majority seem to agree with my analysis but they answer the issue raised only in part. The majority agree that the standard must be a high one but they are satisfied with a “clear and convincing” standard. *905This court has recently held that a preponderance of the evidence test must be applied at a dependency hearing, while recognizing that clear and convincing proof is required to take custody from a parent. (In re Christopher B. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 608, 616-618 [147 Cal.Rptr. 390]. See also, In re Robert P. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 310, 319 [132 Cal.Rptr. 5].) These cases are concerned with temporary loss of custody, I suggest that when we deal with a far more serious matter—the permanent severance of the familial relationship—the standard should be even higher. In my view proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. When only a temporary breach in the integrity of the family unit is involved, a lesser standard is acceptable. It is when a sense of moral outrage is combined with a permanent loss of a fundamental liberty that the courts must require a finding “beyond a reasonable doubt” that such acts have been committed before the child can be declared free from parental control.
III. Conclusion
The trial court declared the six minor children involved free of parental custody and control. With respect to the five oldest children, it ruled that the parents had failed, or were likely to fail, to provide proper care and control and to maintain an adequate parental relationship. The court further ruled that the return of the children would be detrimental to the five oldest children. With respect to the youngest child it declared the child free of parental control ruling that proof had been presented beyond a reasonable doubt that the return of the child would be detrimental to it and that the parents had failed and were likely to fail in the future to provide the proper care, control and adequate parental relationship. With respect to the five oldest children, the court ruled that there was a preponderance of evidence in support of its ruling.
The majority correctly rule that the preponderance of evidence test as applied to the five older children is incorrect. It properly remands the case. I concur in the remand. I dissent from the test the majority direct be applied on remand. The majority rule the test ought to be “clear and convincing” while I believe it ought to be “beyond a reasonable doubt.” We all agreed the proper test was applied as to the youngest child.
The youngest child appears to have been caught in a situation of guilt by association for I find no evidence in the record of extreme neglect, even mere neglect of that child. He was only two months old when taken from his parents. I find no testimony in the record with respect to the *906activity of the parents toward the child during the two months when they apparently had custody of him.
As indicated in the majority, the child does not come within the provisions of Civil Code section 232, subdivision (a)(7), since he had not been in the custody of the county for two or more years prior to the filing of this action. It was Civil Code section 232, subdivision (a)(2) which applied. The trial court correctly applied the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt but incorrectly concluded, on this record, that the standard of proof was met and that parental custody should be terminated. Since I find no such evidence, I would rule that the trial court erred.