Court Opinion

ID: 9384717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 19:02:36.28079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.992647
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/4/23 Lab Zero v. Cartwright CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 LAB ZERO, INC.,                                                     B319561

      Cross-complainant and                                          (Los Angeles County
 Respondent,                                                         Super. Ct. No. 21STCV12297)

          v.

 MARIEL CARTWRIGHT et al.,

          Cross-defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Yolanda Orozco, Judge. Reversed.
      King & Siegel, Julian Burns King and Robert J. King for
Cross-defendants and Appellants.
      LEGALAXXIS, Nazgole Hashemi and Tannaz H. Hashemi
for Cross-complainant and Respondent.
                  ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       Plaintiffs Mariel Cartwright and Francesca Esquenazi
(plaintiffs), former employees and board members of defendant
Lab Zero, Inc., appeal from the denial of their special motions to
strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute,1 Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16.2
       Plaintiffs contend that four causes of action in Lab Zero’s
first amended cross-complaint arose from their speech in
connection with a public issue—their alleged public and private
statements accusing Lab Zero’s sole shareholder Michael Zaimont
of sexual harassment. As described below, we agree with
plaintiffs that the challenged causes of action arise, at least in
part, from their alleged statements about Zaimont’s sexual
harassment. We further agree with plaintiffs that those alleged
statements were made in connection with a public issue.
       We thus reverse and remand this matter to the trial court
to determine whether Lab Zero has established that there is a
probability it will prevail on the four challenged causes of action.

1      “SLAPP” is an acronym for “so-called strategic lawsuits
against public participation.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify
Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 139 (FilmOn).)
2     All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                 2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
I.    Lab Zero and ensuing controversy
       Plaintiffs and Zaimont worked at Lab Zero, a video game
development company. Lab Zero is known for its development of
two popular video games—Skullgirls and Indivisible.4
       During the events at issue, Cartwright worked at Lab Zero
as a lead animator and was a board member. Esquenazi was Lab
Zero’s chief executive officer and also a board member. Zaimont
was a designer and programmer when the company was founded,
and later became its president, a board member, and the sole
shareholder. Zaimont created the proprietary technology Lab
Zero used to design and build its video games.

3      The parties made over 400 evidentiary objections in the
trial court in connection with plaintiffs’ anti-SLAPP motions,
involving over 1,400 pages of objections and responses. On
appeal, neither party’s brief complains that the other party’s brief
has cited inadmissible evidence. As a result, we assume the
evidence cited by the parties in their briefs was admitted by the
trial court or that the parties have forfeited their objections to
such evidence for purposes of the present appeal.
4      Zaimont described Skullgirls as “a player-versus-player
‘fighting’ video game” that “features mild language and partial
nudity” and art that “became popular and moderately
controversial for its sexualized depiction of cartoon” women.
According to Zaimont, Indivisible is “an ‘action role-playing’ video
game” that was the subject of “moderate controversy because Lab
Zero employed a popular pornographic artist” during the game’s
development and permitted the artist “to have an avatar with
racy dialogue in one location in the game.”

                                 3
       The events at issue began around June 2020, when two
individuals in the video game community publicly accused
Zaimont of making inappropriate comments to them. An online
article dated June 29, 2020, reported that “[t]wo people have
accused Mike Zaimont, a lead designer on Skullgirls and
Indivisible, of making them uncomfortable with demeaning and
sexually suggestive comments.” One of the individuals was
“Bunny,” described by the article as a “popular Twitch[5]
personality with over 1.5 million followers across her various
social media pages.” The article reported that Bunny had
recently stated on Twitter that she would be “stepping away from
the [fighting game] genre,” and quoted her Twitter post
explaining that a “ ‘big reason . . . is sexual harassment [she]
received from a big creator . . . .’ ” According to the article, “[t]his
morning, Bunny came forward . . . saying that her previous
tweets were about Mike Zaimont, a veteran fighting game
competitor and developer on Skullgirls and Indivisible.” The
article further reported that writer and video game tournament
organizer Carbon Grey said in a video posted online, “ ‘I don’t
know what Mike said to [Bunny], but I’m sure it was shitty and I
know that because Mike’s been making weird, sexual comments
at me . . . at fighting game events for actual years.’ ” The video
apparently garnered more than 144,000 views. The next day, one
online gaming community announced it had banned Zaimont
from commenting on or participating in gaming events.
       A declaration submitted by Zaimont in opposition to
plaintiffs’ special motions to strike stated the day after the media

5     Twitch is a live-streaming service that focuses on
streaming live video games, including e-sports competitions.

                                   4
coverage, plaintiffs organized a staff meeting where Lab Zero
employees were openly critical of him. Afterwards, plaintiffs
created a Slack channel6 for Lab Zero staff, except for Zaimont, to
discuss their experiences with Zaimont. Employees discussed a
range of issues on the Slack channel, including their complaints
about Zaimont’s inappropriate behavior and comments; whether
they felt comfortable continuing to work with him; whether they
wanted him to remain in a leadership role in the company; and
the possibility of leaving Lab Zero and forming another company.
Cartwright later claimed in support of her special motion to
strike that Zaimont “frequently made unprompted, unwelcome,
and inappropriate comments about [her] body, dress, and
sexuality,” and that she had spoken to him several years earlier
“about his pattern of inappropriate behavior and explain[ed] that
his comments were making [her] and the other employees
extremely uncomfortable.”
      In early July 2020, plaintiffs met with Zaimont to discuss
his behavior and to attempt reaching an agreement about him
leaving Lab Zero and disbursing his equity in the company.
Zaimont did not resign.
      Instead, on August 17, 2020, Zaimont sent a memo to Lab
Zero board members and employees stating, among other things,
that he would not resign. Zaimont also stated that Lab Zero’s
situation was “obviously delicate,” and asked everyone “to decide
by the end of this month . . . if they would like to leave or
continue on here to try and help us all build a safer and better
Lab Zero.”

6     Slack is an instant messaging platform.

                                 5
II.   Public resignations from Lab Zero
       In late August 2020, several employees, including
Cartwright, publicly announced their resignations from Lab Zero.
       One artist posted his resignation letter on Twitter, stating,
in part, that “I’m leaving Lab Zero Games. Short version:
[Zaimont] creates an unsafe work environment for everyone.”
The attached letter stated, among other things, that “[t]his is not
a kneejerk reaction to singular recent incidents made public, but
a whole retrospection and investigation among all employees at
Lab Zero.”
       Another animator posted his resignation letter on Twitter,
stating, “Hey guys, I’ve resigned from Lab Zero Games.” The
resignation letter noted that after Zaimont’s recent “public
incident, the team began an internal investigation with all the
employees, and soon realized that [Zaimont’s] behavior wasn’t
just scattered incidents,” but that “[a]lmost every employee has a
story where [Zaimont] abused his position of power to put his
coworkers in uncomfortable stressful situations for years,”
including “frequently mentioning his genitals, forcing unwanted
physical contact, [and] making sexual comments about himself or
about employee’s bodies . . . .”
       Cartwright’s Twitter post said, “I’ve resigned from Lab Zero
Games” and included a letter describing her reasons for
resigning. Because Cartwright’s letter was a focus of Lab Zero’s
subsequent cross-complaint against plaintiffs, as well as
plaintiffs’ special motions to strike, we quote it at length.
       Her letter stated that she had considered Zaimont a “close
friend and coworker for 10 years” and that she had “tried to be as
understanding as any friend could b[e],” but that “June was hard.

                                 6
After the widely-criticized racist joke[7] and then the
inappropriate DMs[8] and other stories, our team started speaking
up. [¶] What we realized was that there was a pattern of
behavior that I don’t think we had fully understood until then. A
pattern of hostility, insults, threats, lying, and harassment that
many on our team had not openly shared with each other before.”
Cartwright claimed Zaimont did not “respect employees who
don’t work at all hours. He gets hostile and talks down to people.
He makes jokes about firing people to their faces. He makes
inappropriate jokes about his dick. He threatens and insults
people and our partners, both directly and in public. He straight
up lies, or misrepresents things he said earlier.”
       Cartwright’s resignation letter also stated that she had
“been subject to harassment by [Zaimont] too. I tolerated years of
sexual comments about my body and clothes, uncomfortable
jokes, unwanted hugs. He once suggested that I masturbate
when I told him I couldn’t sleep, and on another occasion
suggested I ‘help’ him with his unfulfilled sexual needs. I made a
complaint about him during my time at Reverge Labs[9] back in
2011. I did try to talk directly to him about how I was
uncomfortable in 2017, and in return he called me a hypocrite
and blamed me for how I dressed. He said he didn’t want sexual

7     Shortly after George Floyd’s murder, Zaimont apparently
remarked, “I can’t breathe” during a live-streamed video game
event.
8    “DMs” appears to be a reference to “direct messages”
between Zaimont and Bunny.
9      Zaimont and Cartwright worked together at Reverge Labs
prior to Lab Zero.

                                7
harassment training. If I wanted to keep my job, I felt like I had
to just deal with it. [¶] And to be totally honest—if it was just
me, I probably would’ve kept dealing with it. But I’ve learned
that it’s not just me. He’s done this for years, to multiple people,
and I can’t continue protecting him by staying quiet about it
anymore.”
       The resignations were followed by a public statement on
August 24, 2020, from Autumn Games, which owned the
intellectual property for Skullgirls, and Hidden Variable Studios,
which developed a mobile version of the game, that they would no
longer work with Zaimont or Lab Zero. Their statement noted
that “a number of Lab Zero Games employees have decided to
leave the company as a result of actions by Mike Zaimont and a
series of reported incidents that involved [Zaimont] over the
years,” and, “find[ing] their allegations to be credible,” declared
that the companies “will no longer be working with Mike Zaimont
or Lab Zero Games.”
       Then, on August 25, 2020, Zaimont announced that Lab
Zero was “no longer able to continue operating at the previous
capacity,” and that “[r]emaining employees have been laid
off . . . .”
         Dozens of online articles covered the Lab Zero resignations
and attendant controversy between August 24 and September 8,
2020.
III.   Lab Zero’s cross-complaint
      In April 2021, plaintiffs sued Lab Zero for retaliation and
wrongful termination.
      Lab Zero filed a first amended cross-complaint against
plaintiffs the following month, alleging that plaintiffs falsely
accused Zaimont of harassment with the aim of dismantling Lab

                                  8
Zero and starting their own competing company. The cross-
complaint included 11 causes of action, including the four causes
of action at issue here: The eighth cause of action for intentional
interference with contractual relations, the ninth cause of action
for intentional interference with prospective economic relations,
the tenth cause of action for defamation, and the eleventh cause
of action for unfair business practices.
        According to Lab Zero’s cross-complaint, plaintiffs
“facilitated written and oral conversations with Zaimont relating
to sex, sexual orientation, urination, menstruation, porn, plastic
surgery, body image, etc.,” and had “solicited commentary from
Zaimont in response to these topics.” Then, “[i]n or around 2020,
[plaintiffs] engaged in a scheme to characterize these
conversations with Zaimont as harassment, unwelcomed
behavior, and inappropriate behavior, and thus manipulate
Zaimont into leaving Lab Zero, to force him out of Lab Zero,
and/or to otherwise effectuate the dismantling of Lab Zero.” The
cross-complaint alleged that plaintiffs “falsely accused Zaimont of
sexual harassment and made various public statements that
Zaimont had sexually harassed them for years, when in fact” they
had “initiated and welcomed discussions relating to sex” and
related topics.
        Lab Zero alleged that the purpose of “[plaintiffs’] scheme
was to effectuate and further their ultimate plan to dismantle
and destroy Lab Zero and start a new, competing company . . . .”
Thus, the cross-complaint alleged that in early July 2020,
“[Plaintiffs] exchanged messages with one another and other
employees about forming a new company after they completed
their plan to force Zaimont out of Lab Zero,” including
“discussions about taking over Lab Zero’s current projects and

                                 9
business interests with publishers, presenting themselves with
positive publicity, and leaving Zaimont with all of Lab Zero’s
debt.” For example, in July 2020 “Cartwright engaged in
discussions with other employees on Lab Zero’s Slack channel
about starting a new company and whether Lab Zero’s game
engine was indeed proprietary.” Around the same time, plaintiffs
“discussed continuing to work with developer Hidden Variable on
Skullgirls without Zaimont. These discussions were based on
[plaintiffs] leaving Lab Zero and working on the game through
their new, competing company, Future Club.”
       Additionally, Lab Zero alleged that in early July 2020
Cartwright had a conversation with Lab Zero’s public relations
firm, asking whether it was “ ‘completely out of the question to
renegotiate the contract with a new entity’ ” started by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs also met with Focus, the publisher of Lab Zero’s next
game, without Zaimont present. Then, after the meeting
plaintiffs falsely informed other employees “that Focus did not
want [Zaimont] to stay at Lab Zero and would cancel the project
if he continued to stay at” Lab Zero. In fact, “Focus was
surprised to learn what [plaintiffs] had reported to Zaimont; and
Focus had requested that Lab Zero not publicly announce
anything about Zaimont’s departure so that the companies could
continue renegotiating the deal.”
       Plaintiffs’ alleged scheme also included a “plan whereby
they fostered negativity by other employees toward Zaimont with
the intent of encouraging them to help dismantle and destroy the
company.” For example, plaintiffs “facilitated and engaged in
conversations with other employees on Lab Zero’s Slack channel
and held team meetings without Zaimont, whereby they fostered
employee discontent and unhappiness in the workplace.”

                                10
       Then, “[a]fter falsely accusing Zaimont of harassment and
making public statements against him, [plaintiffs] destroyed Lab
Zero’s and Zaimont’s public images, causing Lab Zero to break up
and perish, as publishers cancelled their contracts with the
company and the company was left no funds to pay its employees
and continue its dealings.” The cross-complaint alleged that
Cartwright “resigned from her employment with Lab Zero, and
immediately made false public statements and complaints
against Zaimont.”
       In September 2020, plaintiffs announced the “existence of
Future Club,” describing the company on Twitter as “ ‘a new co-
op game dev studio, formed by the team that brought you
Skullgirls and Indivisible!’ ” According to the cross-complaint,
since forming Future Club, “[plaintiffs] have been working with
developer Hidden Variable on Skullgirls.”
       Based on these allegations, Lab Zero’s eighth cause of
action for intentional interference with contractual relations
alleged that plaintiffs knew of Lab Zero’s contracts with
developers and publishers, including Hidden Variable and Focus,
and “disrupted or prevented performance of the contracts”
through their “scheme, devise [sic], and plan to dismantle and
destroy Lab Zero and start a new competing company, namely,
Future Club.” The ninth cause of action for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations similarly alleged
that plaintiffs knew that Lab Zero was in an economic
relationship with developers and publishers, including Hidden
Variable and Focus, and “made defamatory statements to the
public, publishers or developers working with Lab Zero, and/or
Lab Zero’s employees” about Zaimont “as a part of their scheme,

                               11
devise [sic], and plan to disrupt these economic relations” and
“start[ ] a new, competing company, namely, Future Club.”
       Lab Zero’s tenth cause of action for defamation claimed
that plaintiffs “made false statements to the public, publishers or
developers working with Lab Zero, and/or Lab Zero’s employees
about Zaimont,” including that he had “sexually harassed them
over many years and that [he] had created a hostile work
environment,” despite knowing such statements were false.
       The eleventh cause of action for unfair business practices
likewise alleged that plaintiffs engaged in “a scheme, devise [sic],
and plan to dismantle and destroy Lab Zero and start a new,
competing company,” including making “false and deceiving
representations to the public, publishers, and/or Lab Zero’s
employees” to encourage and solicit them to terminate their
relationships with the company.
IV.   Plaintiffs’ anti-SLAPP motions
       Plaintiffs filed separate special motions to strike pursuant
to section 425.16. Both plaintiffs contended that the eighth
through eleventh causes of action in Lab Zero’s cross-complaint
arose, at least in part, from Cartwright’s resignation letter posted
on Twitter. Plaintiffs further argued that Cartwright’s
resignation letter was posted in a public forum—Twitter—and
was connected to a matter of public interest—“an ongoing debate
over sexism in the gaming industry generally,” and a “specific
debate over Mr. Zaimont’s conduct,” which was “started by others
more than a month before [Cartwright] made her statement.”
Plaintiffs’ motions attached numerous online articles covering the
public statements of Bunny and Grey, and the subsequent
resignation letters from Lab Zero employees, including
Cartwright, posted on Twitter.

                                 12
      Esquenazi also argued in her special motion to strike that
any other purported defamatory statements about Zaimont’s
sexual harassment at issue in the cross-complaint—such as
plaintiffs’ statements to Lab Zero employees—were also
protected, because they too concerned a matter of public interest.
      Finally, plaintiffs argued that Lab Zero was unable to show
a probability of prevailing on the merits of its causes of action.
V.    Lab Zero’s opposition
       Lab Zero opposed the motion. It argued that its eighth
cause of action for intentional interference with contractual
relations was not based on Cartwright’s Twitter post, but instead
plaintiffs’ scheme to dismantle Lab Zero and start a competing
company. Although it conceded that its eleventh cause of action
for unfair business practices arose in part from Cartwright’s
Twitter post, it argued that the cause of action also arose from
plaintifs’ “scheme, devise [sic], and plan to dismantle and
destroy” Lab Zero and start a new company, “which [did] not
necessarily implicate the defamatory Tweet, but rather all of the
events leading up to it.”
       Lab Zero did not dispute that Cartwright’s Twitter post
was the basis for its ninth cause of action for intentional
interference with prospective economic relations and its tenth
cause of action for defamation. Rather, it argued that the Twitter
post did not concern a matter of public interest. According to Lab
Zero, the purpose of Cartwright’s post was “to justify to the public
the departure of Lab Zero’s employees from the company and to
garner support from the public for the then-existing and later-
effectuated plan to form a new company that did not include
Zaimont.”

                                13
       It also argued that its evidence demonstrated it had a
probability of prevailing on the four challenged causes of action.
       Included with the opposition was a lengthy declaration
from Zaimont. He claimed that plaintiffs “routinely facilitated”
and participated in conversations with him regarding sex and
related topics and gave him the impression that “no topic was off
limits.” Zaimont contended that following the public accusation
by Bunny, plaintiffs “conspired/decided to characterize [their]
past conversations as harassment and thus manipulate” him into
leaving the company.
       He further pointed to evidence which, according to him,
showed that plaintiffs did not believe he had harassed anyone,
and nonetheless decided to release a public statement
characterizing his conduct as harassment. In particular, Zaimont
identified Cartwright’s resignation letter posted on Twitter,
which he claimed was a “defamatory statement” which plaintiffs
“worked together to draft . . . and conspired to release . . . upon
[Cartwright’s] resignation.”
       Zaimont also discussed plaintiffs’ purported interference
with Lab Zero’s contracts and business prospects. He claimed
that because of plaintiffs’ communications with Focus, Focus
refused to make a promised payment to Lab Zero and later
terminated a binding deal memo related to the development of a
new game. He also claimed that “following [Cartwright’s] Twitter
post, Autumn Games and Hidden Variables released an ‘official
statement’ . . . end[ing] their relationship with Lab Zero,” and
that Future Club thereafter “took over the relationship” with
those companies. According to Zaimont, Lab Zero’s relationship
with at least two other companies was also impaired as a result
of the controversy and Lab Zero’s subsequent closure.

                                14
VI.   Plaintiffs’ replies
      In reply, plaintiffs emphasized several points. First, they
contended that even if Lab Zero’s eighth cause of action was not
based on Cartwright’s Twitter post but instead “ ‘the events
leading up to it,’ ” such “events” included plaintiffs’ speech with
other employees accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment.
Plaintiffs argued that such speech, like Cartwright’s Twitter post,
was in connection with a public issue. They further argued that
even if some of the speech or conduct at issue in the cross-
complaint was not connected to a public issue, they could still
strike the allegations that did arise from such speech or conduct.
      Plaintiffs also challenged Lab Zero’s contention that
Cartwright’s Twitter post involved a mere private dispute,
arguing that it was directly related to an ongoing public
controversy over Zaimont’s alleged sexual harassment.
      Last, plaintiffs contended that Lab Zero could not show a
probability of prevailing on the merits of its challenged causes of
action.
VII. Trial court ruling
       The trial court denied plaintiffs’ special motions to strike as
to all four challenged causes of action. It held that Lab Zero’s
eighth and ninth causes of action for intentional interference
with contractual relations and prospective economic relations,
and eleventh cause of action for unfair business practices, did not
arise from Cartwright’s Twitter post. The court noted that the
pertinent question was not whether the causes of action “allege or
mention a protected activity,” but rather whether the causes of
action “themselves, are based upon, and seek to hold [plaintiffs]
liable, pursuant to and because of the protected activity.”

                                 15
       The court concluded these causes of action did not arise out
of Cartwright’s Twitter post, but instead plaintiffs’ alleged
“ ‘scheme to dismantle Lab Zero so that they could redirect its
business and affairs to the new, competing company that they
intended to form, namely, Future Club.’ ” The court further held
that to the extent Lab Zero’s cross-complaint referred to
Cartwright’s Twitter post, that reference was “merely incidental
or collateral to Lab Zero’s cause of action—such an allegation is
not the basis for the relief Lab Zero seeks and is instead offered
as evidence of Cartwright and Esquenazi’s purported scheme.”
       The trial court denied the motions to strike Lab Zero’s
tenth cause of action for defamation based on its determination
that Cartwright’s Twitter post was not connected to an issue of
public interest. Although it agreed that “allegations of sexual
harassment within an industry would be a topic of widespread
public interest,” it ruled that “the degree of connection between
the resignation letter and the topic of sexual harassment to the
public interest” was insufficient to warrant protection under
section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4). The court stressed
that the “alleged sexual harassment was done privately, within
the workplace and, according to Cartwright and Esquenazi’s
theory, from Zaimont to various Lab Zero employees.” It further
emphasized that the content of Cartwright’s letter “only
generally touches on the issues of sexual harassment—to explain,
in part, why Cartwright had chosen to leave Lab Zero—and is not
closely enough linked with any ongoing public interest that might
exist with respect to Zaimont.” The court concluded that
“[w]hatever its purported impact on the industry, the resignation
letter does not contribute to the public conversation about a
matter of public interest.”

                                16
      Cartwright and Esquenazi timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
I.    Applicable law and standard of review
       “Enacted by the Legislature in 1992, the anti-SLAPP
statute is designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits
that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and petition
on matters of public concern. (See § 425.16, subd. (a);
Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 619
[(Rand)]; Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35
Cal.4th 180, 192.)” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).) To that end, section 425.16,
subdivision (b)(1) provides: “A cause of action against a person
arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s
right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there
is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
       An “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other

                                  17
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e).)
       The analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.
“Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing
that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected
activity in which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1061 (Park).) A claim arises from protected activity “when that
activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Id. at
p. 1062.) Hence, “in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts
should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what
actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently
form the basis for liability.” (Id. at p. 1063; see also Bonni v. St.
Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1015 (Bonni) [“[A]
claim is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike if its elements
arise from protected activity.”].) “In deciding whether the ‘arising
from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based.’ ” (City of Cotati v. Cashman
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79, quoting section 425.16, subd. (b).)
       Importantly, an anti-SLAPP motion can be brought in
response to “a ‘ “mixed cause of action” ’—that is, a cause of
action that rests on allegations of multiple acts, some of which
constitute protected activity and some of which do not.” (Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010; see also Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1
Cal.5th 376, 393 (Baral) [“an anti-SLAPP motion, like a
conventional motion to strike, may be used to attack parts of a
count as pleaded”].) In that event, “courts should analyze each

                                 18
claim for relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief,
of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of
action—to determine whether the acts are protected and, if so,
whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of
merit to survive the motion.” (Bonni, at p. 1010.) Thus, at the
first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a moving defendant “must
identify the acts alleged in the complaint that it asserts are
protected and what claims for relief are predicated on them. In
turn, a court should examine whether those acts are protected
and supply the basis for any claims. It does not matter that other
unprotected acts may also have been alleged within what has
been labeled a single cause of action; these are ‘disregarded at
this stage.’ ” (Ibid.) “So long as a ‘court determines that relief is
sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the
statute, the second step is reached’ with respect to these claims.”
(Ibid.)
       However, “[a]ssertions that are ‘merely incidental’ or
‘collateral’ are not subject to section 425.16.” (Baral, supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 394.) “Allegations of protected activity that merely
provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot
be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Ibid.)
       If the defendant carries its burden to demonstrate that
plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must
then demonstrate its claims have at least “ ‘minimal
merit.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) To do so, “plaintiff
must show the complaint is legally sufficient and ‘ “ ‘supported by
a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
credited.’ . . .” ’ ” (Taheri Law Group v. Evans (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 482, 488.)

                                 19
      An order granting or denying a special motion to strike is
appealable. (§ 425.16, subd. (i); § 904.1, subd. (a)(13).) Our
review is de novo. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.)
II.   Parties’ contentions
       Plaintiffs contend that Lab Zero’s eighth cause of action for
intentional interference with contractual relations, ninth cause of
action for intentional interference with prospective economic
relations, tenth cause of action for defamation, and eleventh
cause of action for unfair business practices arise, at least in part,
from protected speech—i.e., Cartwright’s Twitter post10 and
plaintiffs’ alleged statements to coworkers accusing Zaimont of
sexual harassment. Plaintiffs further contend that such speech
was made in connection with a public issue, namely, an ongoing
public controversy regarding Zaimont’s alleged sexual
harassment.
       Lab Zero counters that the focus of its eighth, ninth, and
eleventh causes of action is not Cartwright’s Twitter post or
plaintiffs’ speech with coworkers regarding Zaimont’s purported
sexual harassment, but rather plaintiffs’ scheme to dismantle
Lab Zero and direct its business to their new company.11 To the

10    Although Cartwright posted the resignation letter on
Twitter, as noted above, Zaimont claimed she and Esquenazi
“worked together to draft this post and conspired to release it
upon [Cartwright’s] resignation.” For purposes of this appeal, we
therefore treat Cartwright’s Twitter post as speech by both
plaintiffs, not just Cartwright.
11    Lab Zero does not dispute that plaintiffs’ alleged speech
accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment is the focus of its tenth
cause of action for defamation.

                                 20
extent such speech features in these causes of action, Lab Zero
contends it is merely “collateral or incidental” to them or simply
evidence of plaintiffs’ scheme. Lab Zero further contends that
plaintiffs’ speech was not connected with a public issue, but
instead concerned a private personnel dispute.
       We first examine whether Lab Zero’s eighth cause of action
for intentional interference with contractual relations, ninth
cause of action for intentional interference with prospective
economic relations,12 tenth cause of action for defamation, and
eleventh cause of action for unfair business practices arise out of
Cartwright’s Twitter post and plaintiffs’ alleged statements to
coworkers accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment. We conclude
that these causes of action do arise, at least in part, from such
speech.
       We therefore next examine whether such speech was in
connection with a public issue, thus constituting protected
activity under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) or (e)(4). We
conclude it was connected to a public issue, namely, an ongoing
public controversy about Zaimont’s alleged sexual harassment.

12    Lab Zero titled its ninth cause of action “Intentional
Interference with Prospective Economic Relations.” We
understand this cause of action to be identical to a cause of action
commonly referred to as intentional interference with prospective
economic advantage (see Rand, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 628–629),
and thus use the terms interchangeably.

                                21
III.   The four challenged causes of action arise, at least in
       part, from plaintiffs’ alleged statements accusing
       Zaimont of sexual harassment
       A.   Eighth cause of action for intentional
            interference with contractual relations and
            ninth cause of action for intentional
            interference with prospective economic
            advantage
       “The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the
cause of action for intentional interference with contractual
relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third
party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s
intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the
contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the
contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” (Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal. 3d 1118,
1126.) “The five elements for intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage are: (1) an economic relationship
between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability
of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s
knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of
the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual
disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the
plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.” (Youst
v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71, fn. 6.)
       As our Supreme Court has recognized, these “two
intentional interference claims share many elements—
principally, an intentional act by defendant designed to disrupt
the relationship between plaintiff and a third party.” (Rand,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 628.) We thus analyze these causes of

                               22
action together to determine whether Lab Zero alleged that
plaintiffs’ intentional acts designed to disrupt Lab Zero’s
relationships with third parties included Cartwright’s Twitter
post and plaintiffs’ private speech with coworkers accusing
Zaimont of sexual harassment. (See id. at pp. 629–630.) Based
on our review of the record, we conclude that these causes of
action arise, at least in part, from such speech.
       As described above, in the summary of allegations at the
outset of its cross-complaint Lab Zero alleged that plaintiffs
“engaged in a scheme to characterize [prior conversations
between plaintiffs and Zaimont] as harassment, unwelcomed
behavior, and inappropriate behavior, and thus manipulated
Zaimont into leaving Lab Zero, to force him out of Lab Zero,
and/or to otherwise effectuate the dismantling of Lab Zero.” The
cross-complaint’s summary further alleged that “[a]fter falsely
accusing Zaimont of harassment and making public statements
against him, [plaintiffs] destroyed Lab Zero’s and Zaimont’s
public images, causing Lab Zero to break up and perish, as
publishers cancelled their contracts with the company” and the
company was forced to shutter. It thus seems clear that Lab
Zero’s cross-complaint characterized plaintiffs’ allegedly false
accusations of sexual harassment as intentional acts designed to
interfere with Lab Zero’s business relationships.
       Moreover, the cross-complaint alleged that Cartwright’s
Twitter post was a specific intentional act designed to disrupt its
business relationships. According to the cross-complaint, despite
having initially welcomed Zaimont’s conduct, plaintiffs later
“falsely accused Zaimont of sexual harassment and made various
public statements that Zaimont had sexually harassed them for
years . . . .” The public statement highlighted by the cross-

                                23
complaint is Cartwright’s Twitter post: The cross-complaint
alleged that “on or around August 24, 2020, Cartwright resigned
from her employment with Lab Zero, and immediately made false
public statements and complaints against Zaimont.” In turn,
Zaimont’s declaration in opposition to plaintiffs’ special motions
to strike described the alleged causal role Cartwright’s Twitter
post played in damaging Lab Zero’s relationship with Autumn
Games and Hidden Variables, and another potential business
partner, Arc System Works.
       The cross-complaint also alleges that plaintiffs’ speech with
coworkers accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment were some of
the intentional acts designed to disrupt the company’s
relationships with third parties. Lab Zero’s ninth cause of action
for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage
specifically alleged that plaintiffs “made defamatory statements
to the public, publishers or developers working with Lab Zero,
and/or Lab Zero’s employees about Zaimont . . . as part of their
scheme . . . to disrupt these economic relations . . . .” (Italics
added.) The earlier allegations in the cross-complaint leave little
doubt that these purportedly defamatory statements, a core
feature of plaintiffs’ alleged scheme, centered around plaintiffs’
accusation that Zaimont had engaged in sexual harassment.13

13     Our conclusion is buttressed by Lab Zero’s recognition that
this cause of action requires it to show that plaintiffs “engaged in
an independently wrongful act—i.e., an act ‘proscribed by some
constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other
determinable legal standard.’ ” (Reeves v. Hanlon (2004) 33
Cal.4th 1140, 1145.) Lab Zero concedes that plaintiffs’
defamation is the wrongful act in support of this cause of action.

                                 24
       Lab Zero emphasizes that unlike its ninth cause of action
for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage,
its eighth cause of action for intentional interference with
contractual relations does not explicitly refer to plaintiffs’
statements to the public or other employees about Zaimont’s
sexual harassment. Nevertheless, given the allegations in the
rest of the cross-complaint, which Lab Zero incorporated by
reference into this cause of action, we are hard-pressed to
conclude plaintiffs’ alleged statements about Zaimont’s sexual
harassment were not a principal part of the purported “scheme,
devise [sic], and plan” to destroy Lab Zero encompassed by this
cause of action too. That is especially so given that, as described
already, the cross-complaint’s summary of allegations described
plaintiffs’ false accusation about Zaimont’s sexual harassment as
an integral part of their scheme to dismantle Lab Zero, damage
its business relationships, and divert its business to their new
company. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1017 [concluding
complaint’s allegations regarding protected speech were not
“window dressing” where “the complaint makes clear that [the
plaintiff] intended them to have operative effect”].)
       Relying largely on Park, Lab Zero argues that to the extent
Cartwright’s Twitter post figures implicitly in its eighth cause of
action for intentional interference with contractual relations, or
explicitly in its ninth cause of action for intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage, it is simply evidence of
plaintiffs’ scheme to dismantle Lab Zero. In Park, supra, 2
Cal.5th at page 1060, the plaintiff, Park, sued his university
employer alleging it denied him tenure because of his national
origin. Among other things, Park’s complaint alleged the “school
dean ‘made comments to Park and behaved in a manner that

                                25
reflected prejudice against him on the basis of his national origin’
and that Park pursued an internal grievance, which was denied.”
(Id. at p. 1068.) The university filed a special motion to strike,
arguing that Park’s suit arose from its decision to deny Park
tenure and its communications connected to that decision, which
it contended were protected activities under the anti-SLAPP
statute. (Id. at p. 1061.)
       Our Supreme Court held that Park’s discrimination cause
of action was not subject to a special motion to strike because
“[t]he elements of Park’s claim . . . depend not on the grievance
proceeding, any statements, or any specific evaluations of him in
the tenure process, but only on the denial of tenure itself and
whether the motive for that action was impermissible. The
tenure decision may have been communicated orally or in
writing, but that communication does not convert Park’s suit to
one arising from such speech. The dean’s alleged comments may
supply evidence of animus, but that does not convert the
statements themselves into the basis for liability.” (Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1068.) As Park explained, “a claim may be struck
only if the speech . . . itself is the wrong complained of, and not
just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for
which liability is asserted.” (Id. at p. 1060.)
       The California Supreme Court reached a different result in
Rand. There, the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the plaintiffs
and the City of Carson agreed the plaintiffs would exclusively
represent the city in negotiations with the National Football
League over construction of a new stadium. (Rand, supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 617.) According to the complaint, the city breached
that agreement by allowing a different company, the Bloom
defendants, to represent it in negotiations with the NFL. (Id. at

                                 26
pp. 618–619.) The complaint further alleged that the Bloom
defendants engaged in intentional interference with contract and
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage by
secretly representing the city in negotiations with the NFL.
(Ibid.) Those two causes of action relied on the plaintiffs’
contention that the Bloom defendants “ ‘act[ed] as the City’s
agent’ by ‘contacting NFL representatives’ using [the plaintiffs’]
promotional materials and company name,” and met with the city
and its mayor to “ ‘conspire about how to breach’ ” the city’s
agreement with the plaintiffs. (Id. at p. 629.) The trial court
granted the Bloom defendants’ special motion to strike these two
causes of action. (Id. at p. 619.)
       On appeal, the California Supreme Court concluded that
“[t]hese two courses of conduct are more than ‘merely a reference
to a category of evidence that plaintiffs have to prove their
claims,’ ” and instead constituted the “conduct by which plaintiffs
claim to have been injured in their intentional interference
claims.” (Rand, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 629.) Rand emphasized
that the Bloom defendants’ secret communications with the city
“are the interference now complained of” in the plaintiffs’
complaint. (Ibid.)
       The present case resembles Rand, not Park. As in Rand,
and unlike in Park, plaintiffs’ purported speech about Zaimont’s
sexual harassment is an alleged basis for their liability. (See
Rand, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 629.) As illustrated above, Lab
Zero’s cross-complaint alleged that plaintiffs’ false accusation
about Zaimont’s sexual harassment was a key facet of their
scheme to disrupt the company’s relationships with third parties,
not just evidence of that scheme. We thus reject Lab Zero’s

                                27
contention that such speech is “ ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ ”
to these causes of action. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 394.)
       Nor do we find it determinative that, as Lab Zero
emphasizes, plaintiffs’ alleged scheme involved several acts in
addition to plaintiffs’ statements regarding Zaimont’s sexual
harassment, including “stealing trade secrets, poaching
employees and third-parties, and starting a competing business.”
As explained earlier, a special motion to strike may be brought in
response to a cause of action that “rests on allegations of multiple
acts, some of which constitute protected activity and some of
which do not.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 1010–1012;
Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 393; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City
of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 599 [“Under the rule in
Baral, we must disregard the unprotected conduct and focus on
whether any nonincidental protected conduct is charged, even
just in part.”].) Thus, because an element of the eighth and ninth
causes of action rests, at least in part, on plaintiffs’ alleged
speech accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment, that these causes
of action involve other activity does not by itself defeat plaintiffs’
anti-SLAPP motion.14

14    For this same reason, we are not persuaded by Lab Zero’s
argument that there were causes other than Cartwright’s Twitter
post that allegedly led to the cancellation of Lab Zero’s contracts
with Focus and 505 Games. Again, plaintiffs need not
demonstrate that every aspect of the eighth and ninth causes of
action arises from protected activity; it is sufficient that some
“nonincidental protected conduct is charged, even just in part.”
(Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda, supra, 20
Cal.App.5th at p. 599.)

                                 28
      B.    Tenth cause of action for defamation
      The parties do not dispute that Lab Zero’s tenth cause of
action for defamation arises from plaintiffs’ alleged false
accusation regarding Zaimont’s sexual harassment. As described
earlier, that cause of action alleged that plaintiffs “made false
statements to the public, publishers or developers working with
Lab Zero, and/or Lab Zero’s employees about Zaimont in his role
as a shareholder, employee, and/or director of Lab Zero,”
including that plaintiffs “felt that Zaimont had sexually harassed
them over many years and that Zaimont had created a hostile
work environment,” despite knowing and believing such
statements were false.
      C.    Eleventh cause of action for unfair business
            practices
       Lab Zero’s eleventh cause of action for unfair business
practices requires it to show “ ‘either an (1) “unlawful, unfair, or
fraudulent business act or practice,” or (2) “unfair, deceptive,
untrue or misleading advertising.” ’ ” (Adhav v. Midway Rent A
Car, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 954, 970; see also Cel-Tech
Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.)
       It is not apparent from Lab Zero’s cross-complaint or its
brief on appeal whether it contends plaintiffs’ alleged acts were
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent, or some combination of the three.
But again, based on our review of Lab Zero’s cross-complaint, the
eleventh cause of action plainly arises, at least in part, from
plaintiffs’ speech activity, and in particular, their alleged
statements regarding Zaimont’s sexual harassment.

                                 29
       The eleventh cause of action alleged that plaintiffs
“engaged in unfair business practices by engaging in a scheme,
devise [sic], and plan to dismantle and destroy Lab Zero and start
a new, competing company,” and “made false and deceiving
representations to the public, publishers, and/or Lab Zero’s
employees in an effort to solicit, induce, recruit, and encourage
them to terminate their relationships” with Lab Zero. (Italics
added.) The eleventh cause of action thus rests on the same
“scheme” as the eighth and ninth causes of action, and features
as a major component of plaintiffs’ scheme their purported
defamatory statements to the public and other employees. As we
have concluded already based on our review of the cross-
complaint, such statements concerned Zaimont’s alleged sexual
harassment.
       Lab Zero admits that the eleventh cause of action
“references the defamatory speech as a part of a series of conduct
constituting unfair business practices or acts,” but argues that
such speech is “just further evidence of liability for unfair
business practices and is therefore collateral or incidental” to the
cause of action. We disagree. Given that plaintiffs’ purportedly
defamatory speech is one of the only concrete allegations
supporting this cause of action, we cannot conclude it is merely
“collateral or incidental” to the cause of action. To the contrary,
the allegedly defamatory speech seems to be at the heart of the
cause of action according to Lab Zero’s pleading. (See Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1017 [in analyzing whether cause of action
arises from protected activity, “we will assume [the plaintiff’s]
complaint means what is says”].)
       Furthermore, for the reasons addressed already, we are
unpersuaded by Lab Zero that the cause of action does not arise

                                30
from plaintiffs’ speech activity because “there are other wrongs
complained of with respect to this cross-claim, i.e., all of the
events leading up to and before the defamatory speech.” Because
plaintiffs’ alleged speech pertaining to Zaimont’s sexual
harassment is a central part of Lab Zero’s eleventh cause of
action, the existence of other alleged unfair business practices is
not consequential. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010;
Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 393.)
IV.   Plaintiffs’ alleged statements regarding Zaimont’s
      sexual harassment were made in connection with a
      public issue
      Having concluded that the eighth, ninth, tenth, and
eleventh causes of action arise, at least in part, from plaintiffs’
alleged speech accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment, we now
address whether that speech is protected by section 425.16.
      A.    Cartwright’s Twitter post
      Plaintiffs contend Cartwright’s Twitter post was a “written
or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or
a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3)), and thus was protected by section 425.16.
We agree.
      There appears to be no dispute that Cartwright’s Twitter
post was “made in a place open to the public or a public forum,”
thus satisfying the initial requirement of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3). (See Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
471, 481 [“Statements made on a Web site are made in a public
forum.”]; Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1146
[holding that the “Internet is a classic public forum”].) We thus

                                 31
focus on whether Cartwright’s Twitter post was “in connection
with an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).)
       “Section 425.16 does not define ‘public interest,’ but its
preamble states that its provisions ‘shall be construed broadly’ to
safeguard ‘the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’ ”
(Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1039
(Nygard), quoting section 425.16, subd. (a).) Despite the absence
of a statutory definition, courts have concluded that speech on an
issue of public interest can concern “a person or entity in the
public eye [citations], conduct that could directly affect a large
number of people beyond the direct participants [citations], or a
topic of widespread, public interest [citations].” (Rivero v.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924 (Rivero); see Rand,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 621; FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 145–
146.) As one court put it, “ ‘an issue of public interest’ within the
meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) is any issue in which
the public is interested. In other words, the issue need not be
‘significant’ to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute—it is
enough that it is one in which the public takes an interest.”
(Nygard, at p. 1042.)
       By contrast, “ ‘a matter of concern to the speaker and a
relatively small, specific audience is not a matter of public
interest,’ ” and “ ‘[a] person cannot turn otherwise private
information into a matter of public interest simply by
communicating it to a large number of people.’ ” (Rand, supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 621.) Nor is a statement protected where it is
“unconnected to any discussion, debate or controversy.” (Du

                                 32
Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 107, 118 (DuCharme).)
       Cartwright’s Twitter post addressed both an issue and a
person in the public eye. Clearly, identifying and eliminating
sexual harassment is a topic of general public interest. (Baughn
v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2016) 246
Cal.App.4th 328, 339 [“[W]e do not doubt the public interest in
preventing sexual harassment in the workplace”]; Olaes v.
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1511
[“public interest in the fair resolution of claims of sexual
harassment is undeniable” and “the elimination of sexual
harassment implicates a public interest”]).
       More to the point, Zaimont’s purported sexual harassment
was of particular public interest following the public accusations
by Bunny and Grey, which attracted media coverage and thus
drew public attention to Zaimont’s alleged conduct. (See Seelig v.
Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807
[statements concerned public interest where they concerned “a
television show of significant interest to the public and the
media”]; Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 133, 143 [creation and broadcast of television show
an issue of public interest “as shown by the posting of the casting
synopses on various Web sites”]; compare Rivero, supra, 105
Cal.App.4th at p. 924 [statements not protected where they
“concerned the supervision of a staff of eight custodians by
Rivero, an individual who had previously received no public
attention or media coverage”].) Cartwright’s resignation letter,
which she posted on Twitter less than two months after the
media coverage began and which described her own experience
“tolerat[ing] years of sexual comments about [her] body and

                                33
clothes, uncomfortable jokes, [and] unwanted hugs” by Zaimont,
was thus specifically connected to an ongoing controversy.15 (See
Nygard, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1042; Seelig v. Infinity
Broadcasting Corp., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 807–808;
compare DuCharme, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 118 [Web site
posting regarding removal of union officer was not matter of
public interest where it was “unconnected to any discussion,
debate, or controversy”].) The connection between the ongoing
controversy and Cartwright’s Twitter post is further evidenced by
the significant media coverage that followed her and her
colleagues’ Twitter posts announcing their resignations.
        Plaintiffs and Lab Zero both argue that FilmOn favors
their respective positions. We find FilmOn favors plaintiffs here.
In FilmOn, our Supreme Court considered how to determine
whether a statement is protected by section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(4), the so-called “catchall provision,” which concerns “ ‘conduct
in furtherance of’ ” free speech “ ‘in connection with a public issue
or an issue of public interest.’ ”16 (FilmOn.com, supra, 7 Cal.5th

15     We are not convinced by Lab Zero’s contention that because
Cartwright’s resignation letter was not focused exclusively on
Zaimont’s sexual harassment, it did not concern a matter of
public interest. To be sure, Cartwright’s letter described a range
of objectionable conduct by Zaimont in addition to describing his
sexual harassment. In our view, that does not lessen the
connection between Cartwright’s resignation letter and the
ongoing controversy about Zaimont’s alleged sexual harassment.
16    Although FilmOn addressed subdivision (e)(4) of section
425.16, we agree with the parties that its analysis is also relevant
to determining whether a statement concerns “an issue of public

                                 34
at pp. 139–140.) FilmOn instructed that courts should first ask
“what ‘public issue or . . . issue of public interest’ the speech in
question implicates—a question we answer by looking to the
content of the speech. [Citation.] Second, we ask what functional
relationship exists between the speech and the public
conversation about some matter of public interest.” (Id. at
pp. 149–150.) FilmOn emphasized that it is not enough that a
statement “ ‘refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the
statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public
debate.’ ” (Id. at p. 150.) In examining that issue, a court must
consider “context—including audience, speaker, and purpose.”
(Id. at pp. 151–152.)
       At issue in FilmOn were the confidential reports of the
defendant, a for-profit business which tracked information about
the Web sites on which its clients advertised. (FilmOn, supra, 7
Cal.5th at pp. 140–141.) The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had disparaged its digital distribution network by falsely
classifying the plaintiff’s Web sites under the categories of
“ ‘Copyright Infringement File-Sharing’ and ‘Adult Content.’ ”
(Id. at pp. 141–142.) Even acknowledging that the general topics
at issue, including “sexually explicit media content,” “seem[ed] to
qualify as issues of public interest” under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(4), FilmOn concluded that the defendant’s
confidential reports did not further “the public conversation on an
issue of public interest.” (FilmOn, at pp. 152–153.) It stressed
that the defendant “issues its reports not to the wider public—
who may well be interested in whether [the plaintiff] hosts

interest” under subdivision (e)(3). (See Bernstein v. LaBeouf
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 15, 22, fn. 4 (Bernstein).)

                                35
content unsuitable for children or whether its streaming platform
infringes copyright—but privately, to a coterie of paying clients.
Those clients, in turn, use the information [the defendant]
provides for their business purposes alone. The information
never entered the public sphere, and the parties never intended it
to.” (Id. at p. 153.)
       Here, however, Cartwright’s resignation letter was directed
to the public: She broadcast it widely by posting it on Twitter
rather than privately submitting it to Lab Zero. By doing so, she
placed her own experiences with Zaimont in the context of the
ongoing public controversy that had been initiated months earlier
by Bunny and Grey. We thus have little trouble concluding her
statement was connected to an issue of public interest, which was
only amplified by the media coverage following her and her
colleagues’ public resignations.
       For these same reasons, we are not persuaded by Lab
Zero’s attempt to compare this case to our decision in Bernstein.
There the statements of the celebrity defendant calling a
bartender a “racist” “were not directed at someone in the public
eye,” and “[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that, prior to this
incident, [the plaintiff] was a public figure or had been involved
in any issue of public interest.” (Bernstein, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 23–24.) Bernstein also found “no evidence that [the
defendant’s] comments addressed an ongoing controversy or an
issue that had garnered any public interest before [the
defendant] lashed out at [the plaintiff].” (Id. at p. 24.) Here,
however, Zaimont’s purported sexual harassment was already
the subject of media coverage before Cartwright’s Twitter post.
Also, Cartwright’s Twitter post was directly connected to that

                                36
ongoing controversy by describing how she had “been subject to
harassment by [Zaimont] too.”
       Finally, Lab Zero challenges Cartwright’s motive for
posting her resignation letter on Twitter. It argues that she did
not want to address a matter of public concern; she instead
wanted “to justify to the public the departure of Lab Zero’s
employees from the company and to garner support from the
public for” plaintiffs’ scheme to form a new company. But
Cartwright’s motive is not relevant at the first step of the
analysis under section 425.16. (See Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 888 [“[A]t the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we
routinely have examined the conduct of defendants without
relying on whatever improper motive the plaintiff alleged.”];
Ojjeh v. Brown (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1038 [“[O]ur task at
the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis is to examine the
challenged conduct without regard to the allegations of improper
motive.”].) Hence, that Lab Zero points to evidence suggesting
Cartwright publicized her resignation letter on Twitter to further
plaintiffs’ purported scheme, not to further the public debate over
Zaimont’s conduct, does not factor into our conclusion that the
speech concerns an issue of public interest.
      B.    Plaintiffs’ statements to coworkers
       Plaintiffs argue that their alleged statements to coworkers
about Zaimont’s sexual harassment constituted “conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)),
and thus also are protected by section 425.16. Before we address
that issue, we examine Lab Zero’s preliminary arguments.

                                  37
            i.     Preliminary issues
       Lab Zero first contends that Cartwright failed to identify
her speech with coworkers accusing Zaimont of sexual
harassment as a category of protected speech in her special
motion to strike, and thus forfeited the argument.
       We conclude this issue was adequately raised in the trial
court and thus was not forfeited. As Lab Zero acknowledges,
Esquenazi’s special motion to strike addressed plaintiffs’ alleged
private speech to coworkers, urging that the speech was protected
under the anti-SLAPP statute because “[s]ection 425.16 protects
‘even private communications, so long as they concern a public
issue.’ ” In particular, Esquenazi contended that “allegations of
harassment by Mr. Zaimont were issues of public interest in the
summer and fall of 2020 and thus any private statements by . . .
Esquenazi or Cartwright about those issues are protected by
Section 425.16.” (Italics added.)
       Further, both plaintiffs’ reply briefs filed in the trial court
argued that their alleged private speech to coworkers about
Zaimont’s harassment was protected. They raised this argument
in response to Lab Zero’s contention that its cause of action for
intentional interference with contractual relations did not
concern Cartwright’s Twitter post, but instead the “events
leading up to it.”
       Finally, at the hearing on their motions plaintiffs pointed
out that the scheme described in Lab Zero’s cross-complaint
included their allegedly defamatory statements to coworkers
about Zaimont.17

17    Plaintiffs’ counsel argued as follows: “Again, if you look at
the opposition and if you look at the evidence submitted in the

                                 38
       Accordingly, because we find that this issue was adequately
raised in the trial court, we are not persuaded that Cartwright
forfeited it.
       Next, Lab Zero argues that plaintiffs’ alleged statements to
coworkers regarding Zaimont’s sexual harassment are not
described with sufficient particularity to warrant anti-SLAPP
protection. To the extent plaintiffs’ precise statements to
coworkers are not identified in Lab Zero’s cross-complaint or its
opposition to plaintiffs’ motions to strike, we hesitate to blame
plaintiffs for that. It was Lab Zero’s obligation to plead the exact
defamatory statements at issue. (See Hecimovich v. Encinal
School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450,
457, fn. 1 [“ ‘It is sometimes said to be a requirement, and it
certainly is the common practice, to plead the exact words . . . or
other defamatory matter.’ ”].) Lab Zero thus should not be
allowed to take advantage of that same vagueness as a reason to
defeat plaintiffs’ motions.
       In any event, we find that plaintiffs’ alleged statements
with coworkers are sufficiently identified for purposes of our anti-
SLAPP analysis. The summary of allegations in the cross-

opposition and if you look at the complaint, it’s clear that the
scheme that is alleged here is based on the protected speech act.
[¶] Specifically the scheme is the encouragement of the employees
and defamatory statements allegedly made by my clients that
caused the collapse of this company. So the scheme is itself based
on speech act. Again, you have to look at the conduct that is the
basis of the acts here. And as the complaint is clear, the conduct
is that cross-defendants made defamatory statements to the
public, publishers, or developers working with Lab Zero and/or
Lab Zero’s employees about Zaimont.” (Italics added.)

                                39
complaint alleged that plaintiffs “engaged in a scheme to
characterize [their] conversations with Zaimont as harassment,
unwelcomed behavior, and inappropriate behavior,” in
furtherance of their objective to dismantle Lab Zero. The ninth,
tenth, and eleventh causes of action all alleged that plaintiffs
made “false” and “defamatory” statements about Zaimont to Lab
Zero employees. And the tenth cause of action for defamation
makes clear that those false and defamatory statements were
that “Zaimont had sexually harassed [plaintiffs] over many years
and that Zaimont had created a hostile work environment.”
Notably, on appeal Lab Zero makes no effort to explain what such
defamatory statements were if not plaintiffs’ accusation that
Zaimont had engaged in sexual harassment.
      We thus conclude the cross-complaint adequately identifies
plaintiffs’ speech with coworkers for purposes of our analysis and
proceed to examine whether such statements were protected by
section 425.16.
            ii.   Plaintiffs’ statements to coworkers were
                  protected by section 425.16
       We conclude that plaintiffs’ alleged private statements to
coworkers accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment constituted
“conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(4)), and thus were protected by section 425.16.
       We begin by observing that “subdivision (e)(4) does not
require a public forum” and “applies to private communications
concerning issues of public interest.” (Terry v. Davis Community
Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1545–1546 (Terry)
[affirming special motion to strike causes of action arising from

                                 40
church report accusing youth group leaders of inappropriate
relationship with minor]; see FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 146
[noting that “[l]ong before Terry . . . we held that section 425.16
may protect private events and conversations”].) Thus, that
plaintiffs’ alleged statements to coworkers were private does not
undermine application of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) here.
       As FilmOn instructs, our first task in evaluating whether
speech is protected by subdivision (e)(4) is to “ask what ‘public
issue or . . . issue of public interest’ the speech in question
implicates—a question we answer by looking to the content of the
speech.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149.) We have already
concluded that Zaimont’s purported sexual harassment was an
issue of public interest following the publicized accusations of
Bunny and Grey. Plaintiffs’ alleged private statements to
coworkers accusing Zaimont of similar conduct thus concerned an
issue of public interest.
       “Second, we ask what functional relationship exists
between the speech and the public conversation about some
matter of public interest. It is at the latter stage that context
proves useful.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.) “[T]he
catchall provision demands ‘some degree of closeness’ between
the challenged statement[ ] and the asserted public interest,”
and, as noted already, “ ‘the statement must in some manner
itself contribute to the public debate.’ ” (Id. at p. 150.) Our
“inquiry does not turn on a normative evaluation of the substance
of the speech. We are not concerned with the social utility of the
speech at issue, or the degree to which it propelled the
conversation in any particular direction; rather, we examine
whether a defendant—through public or private speech or

                                41
conduct—participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes
an issue one of public interest.” (Id. at p. 151.)
       Applying the framework from FilmOn, we find a close
connection between plaintiffs’ alleged private statements
accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment and the public interest in
his alleged harassment. (See FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.)
According to Zaimont’s declaration in opposition to plaintiffs’
special motions to strike, plaintiffs’ statements to coworkers
accusing him of sexual harassment occurred in the period directly
after media coverage publicized the similar accusations of Bunny
and Grey. Additionally, the public resignation letters of Lab Zero
employees indicated that it was partly the accusations of Bunny
and Grey that spurred employees to begin discussing with one
another their own experiences with Zaimont’s sexual
harassment.
       We also find that plaintiffs’ alleged private statements to
coworkers accusing Zaimont of sexual harassment “furthered[ ]
the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 151.) Plaintiffs’ alleged private
accusations were followed by the public resignation letters of
Cartwright and her two colleagues, which, in turn, continued the
ongoing media coverage and controversy over Zaimont’s
purported harassment. And, importantly, Cartwright and her
colleagues emphasized in their public resignation letters the role
the earlier private communications among coworkers played in
their decisions. Because plaintiffs’ alleged private statements
were a catalyst for subsequent, similar speech in a public forum,
we conclude the private statements constituted “conduct in
furtherance” of “free speech in connection with a public issue or
an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4); see Tamkin v.

                                42
CBS Broadcasting, Inc., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 143 [“An act
is in furtherance of the right of free speech if the act helps to
advance that right or assists in the exercise of that right.”];
Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 156,
166 [defining “furtherance” in § 425.16, subd. (e)(4) as “helping to
advance, assisting”].)
V.    Remand
       Plaintiffs make no serious effort to address the second step
of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and instead refer us to their motions
in the trial court. We therefore do not reach the second step.
(See Colores v. Board of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293,
1301, fn. 2 [“[I]t is not appropriate to incorporate by reference,
into a brief, points and authorities contained in trial court
papers, even if such papers are made a part of the appellate
record.”].) We further note that Lab Zero has requested that we
remand this matter to the trial court to analyze step two in the
event we conclude plaintiffs have satisfied their burden at step
one. We thus conclude it is appropriate to remand this matter to
the trial court to determine whether Lab Zero can demonstrate
its claims “have at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 884.)
       To assist on remand, we reiterate our Supreme Court’s
direction regarding how to address a case involving so-called
“mixed” causes of action: “[C]ourts should analyze each claim for
relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which
there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to
determine whether the acts are protected, and, if so, whether the
claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive
the motion.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) At step two,
Lab Zero has the burden “to demonstrate that each challenged

                                 43
claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and
factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary
conflicts, must determine whether [Lab Zero’s] showing, if
accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a
favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of
protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated
from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on
which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)

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                        DISPOSITION
       The order denying plaintiffs’ special motions to strike
pursuant to section 425.16 is reversed. The matter is remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
decision. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                         EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                 LAVIN, J.

                 EGERTON, J.

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