Court Opinion

ID: 9575811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:17:29.499808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:08.726004
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe that this court makes three critical errors in reversing the trial court. First, it erroneously assumes that there is only one “literal interpretation” of AS 18.-60.670. Second, it disregards the admitted redundancy which will result from its interpretation. Third, it fails to construe the statute to give it the broadest safety application. For these reasons I dissent.
The plain meaning rule “provides that if a statute’s meaning is plain, it should be enforced as it reads without judicial modification or construction.” Alaska Public Employees v. Fairbanks, 753 P.2d 725, 726 n. 5 (Alaska 1988). Nevertheless, we have rejected a mechanical application of this rule that would require this court to automatically accept the “plain meaning” of a statute without consideration of legislative intent. State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208-09 n. 4 (Alaska 1982). In its place we adopted a sliding scale whereby the more plain the language of a statute, “ ‘the more convincing the contrary legislative history must be’ ” to effect the adoption of a different interpretation. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 229, 38 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974)).1
The court believes that the language of AS 18.60.670 is quite plain, noting that “[a] literal reading of the statute does not support [the trial court’s] interpretation.” Perhaps a more accurate description of the court’s methodology would be that a “literal” reading of subsection (1), taken out of context and without concern for any resulting redundancy between subsections, does *1048not support the trial court’s interpretation. This much I am willing to concede. The problem with the court’s approach is that (1) it wrongly concludes that the statute’s meaning is clear on its face and thus the plain meaning approach is appropriate and (2) it applies its literal reading to only one subsection of the statute rather than the statute as a whole.
With regard to the plain meaning approach, the United States Supreme Court has noted that “the threshold question in ascertaining the correct interpretation of a statute is whether the language of the statute is clear or arguably ambiguous.” K Mart v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 293 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1818 n. 4, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988). While the language of subsection (1) may be clear when read in isolation, it is far from clear when read together with subsection (2). As the Supreme Court stated, “in ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 291. It is incorrect to conclude, as this court does, that the statute can be read piece by piece without reference to other subsections or the statutory scheme as a whole.
With that in mind, I am persuaded that the redundancy between subsections (1) and (2) which results from the court’s reading cannot be so easily overlooked. The court does not reconcile this redundancy. Instead, it merely insists that the “actual language” of subsection (1) so convincingly conveys its interpretation that the redundancy should be ignored.2 This begs the question. I do not divine such a singular meaning from the “actual language.” I would sooner believe that the legislature made a grammatical error and improperly added a comma, than believe it simultaneously passed two subsections of a statute that provide for essentially coextensive restrictions.3 See Territory of Alaska v. Five Gallons of Alcohol, 10 Alaska 1, 9 (D. Alaska 1940) (“It is also an established doctrine of interpretation that punctuation is a minor and not a controlling element, and that courts will disregard the punctuation of a statute, or repunctuate it, if need be to give effect to what would otherwise appear to be its purpose and true meaning.”). •
As the court recognizes, “ ‘a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’ ” Alascom, Inc. v. North Slope Borough, Bd. of Equalization, 659 P.2d 1175, 1178 n. 5 (Alaska 1983) (quoting 2A C. Sands, Statutes & Statutory Construction § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973)). The court violates this rule of construction in several ways.
First, the court renders subsection (1) superfluous. Under the court’s interpretation, subsection (1) does not require or prevent any action which is not required or prevented by subsection (2). Additionally, the court fails to give effect and meaning to the phraseology used in subsection (1). Subsection (1) specifically identifies equipment “capable of lateral, vertical, or swinging motion.” AS 18.60.670(1). This differentiation in types of equipment is meaningless unless the equipment’s motion capability is accounted for. Why was this language used and this type of equipment singled out if the distinction makes no difference? The court provides no answer.
Furthermore, the court’s interpretation renders the statute insignificant as a safety measure. As construed by the court, AS 18.60.670(1) offers negligible protection.4 *1049This interpretation ignores another important rule of statutory construction. If there is an ambiguity in the meaning of a safety statute, whether internally or by virtue of reference to another statute, we should construe the statute in a manner most consistent with the legislative purpose of promoting safety. See Atwater v. Matanuska Electric Ass’n, 727 P.2d 774, 776 (Alaska 1986) (construing AS 18.60.685, the penalty provision for violations of AS 18.60.670). Safety legislation should be liberally construed. United States v. Blue Water Marine Ind., 661 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir.1981). Cf. Allison v. State, 583 P.2d 813, 817 (Alaska 1978) (“[W]e believe that exemptions [to safety legislation] should be narrowly construed.”).
I decline to join in this court’s speculation that the legislature “may” have been attempting to balance employee safety concerns with construction industry efficiency concerns. HEA did not argue efficiency concerns before this court.5 Rather, HEA has urged that the statute reflects a balance of competing safety concerns. Evidence is nonexistent that the court's interpretation would lead to a more safe workplace than the trial court’s interpretation, as HEA contends. The court, admitting that “the trial court’s interpretation promotes a higher degree of safety,” apparently agrees.
The Estate contends that the language “within 10 feet of a high voltage overhead electrical line or conductor” is the object of “capable of lateral, vertical, or swinging motion,” instead of the object of “place.”6 That is, the statute prohibits the placement of equipment so that it is capable of specified motion within ten feet of the electrical lines. Because the statute is itself ambiguous, I cannot agree that the Estate’s burden of proving its interpretation is a “heavy burden,” or as the court announces for the first time, that the Estate must present a “compelling case.” In light of the ambiguity of the statute, I consider the Estate's interpretation to be a reasonable one.
The court’s conclusion that AS 18.60.-670(1) offers no additional protection beyond that mandated by AS 18.60.670(2) is correct, as those two subsections are interpreted by the court. I believe this interpretation to be a rejection of the very purpose for which the statute was enacted. The trial court’s interpretation may be gleaned from reading AS 18.60.670 as a whole. It is the preferable interpretation in light of the statute’s recognized purpose of ensuring a safe workplace.

. There is little evidence in the legislative history of AS 18.60.670(1) that suggests what the legislature intended. The court believes that the legislative intent of subsection 670(1) can be inferred from another section, AS 18.60.675. Alaska Statute 18.60.675 requires that "equipment ... any part of which is capable of vertical, lateral, or swinging motion” carry a prominent warning sign that states: "It is unlawful to operate this equipment within ten feet of high voltage lines.”
However, this warning could also originate from the language of subsection 670(2). I do not believe that this brief warning is conclusive of the effect of AS 18.60.670 or dispositive of the effect of subsection (1) specifically.

.I note the court’s concern for the grammatical "ineffectiveness” of the sentence that would result from the Estate’s construction. Ironically the court does not show the same concern for the practical ineffectiveness of the statute which results from its interpretation. Likewise, the court is willing to look to subsection (2) to analyze sentence construction, yet disregards that subsection in interpreting subsection (1).

. It is theoretically possible to avoid the redundancy by differentiating between "place,” the verb used in subsection (1), and "store, operate, erect, maintain, move, or transport,” the verbs used in subsection (2). However, I cannot imagine a situation in which this difference would have any effect.

. Applying the court’s version of the statute to a hypothetical situation, it is apparent that the ten foot buffer is a truly minimal "margin of safe*1049ty." In fact, a few simple calculations reveal that subsection (1), as interpreted by the court, provides almost nothing to the workers it was intended to protect. Assuming that electrical wires are 30 feet above the base of the boom, use of an 80 foot boom yields the following results. With a ten foot buffer, the safe rotation range would be 195 degrees, exposing 147 feet of the electrical line to contact with the boom. In contrast, a five foot buffer would yield a safe rotation range of 188 degrees, exposing 148 feet of the electrical line to contact with the boom. If there were no buffer at all, the safe rotation range would be 180 degrees, exposing 148 feet of the electrical line to contact with the boom.

. The court cites affidavits by two of HEA’s experts, Michael Harbaugh and Terry Miller, in support of its efficiency concerns. In doing so, the court misconstrues HEA’s arguments and its reliance on these experts. Harbaugh testified solely as to the safety implications of the trial court's interpretation, and Miller testified only as to prevailing industry practices. Neither expert discussed competing “efficiency concerns,” or "heavier burdens for the construction industry.”

. The court implies several times that the Estate concedes there is but one "literal interpretation." The Estate is not urging that a non-literal interpretation be adopted, but only that the trial court’s reading is also a "literal interpretation.”