Court Opinion

ID: 9705943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:27:07.795616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:22.969414
License: Public Domain

*277RAKER, Judge,
with whom BELL, Chief Judge and ELDRIDGE, Judge, join, dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to admit Smullen’s evidence on the Battered Child Syndrome and to instruct the jury as to self-defense. I agree with the majority’s well-reasoned discussion of the Battered Spouse Syndrome and the Battered Child Syndrome and the interrelationship between the two syndromes. I respectfully dissent, however, from the holding of the Court that respondent did not generate sufficient evidence to raise the defense of self-defense.
In order to generate the issue of self-defense and entitle a defendant to an instruction on either perfect or imperfect self-defense, the defendant has the burden of initially producing some evidence. See General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 486-87, 789 A.2d 102, 108-09 (2002); State v. Martin, 329 Md. 351, 358-59, 619 A.2d 992, 995-96, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 855, 114 S.Ct. 161, 126 L.Ed.2d 122 (1993); Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 216-17, 571 A.2d 1251, 1256-57 (1990); Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 39-40, 542 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1988); State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 207-08, 362 A.2d 629, 635 (1976). In Dykes, we made clear that “some evidence” is not strictured by the test of a specific standard and that “some” means no more than what it says, merely some, as understood in everyday usage. We said:
“The source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from the defendant. It is of no matter that the self-defense claim is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. If there is any evidence relied on by the defendant which, if believed, would support his claim that he acted in self-defense, the defendant has met his burden. Then the baton is passed to the State. It must shoulder the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the jury that the defendant did not kill in self-defense.”
Id. at 217, 571 A.2d at 1257.
The question of whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a claim of self-defense is a question of law for the trial court, *278which must apply a subjective standard, viewing the evidence from the perspective of the defendant at the time of the killing. See Dykes, 319 Md. at 221, 571 A.2d at 1259. Imperfect self-defense, or partial self-defense, requires that the defendant subjectively believed that the actions taken were necessary for his or her safety; perfect or complete self-defense requires that, objectively, a reasonable person would so consider them. Imperfect self-defense requires no more than a subjective honest belief on the defendant’s part that the homicidal actions were necessary for his or her safety, even though objectively, the actions would not be found to be so. Id. at 213, 571 A.2d at 1255.
The trial court held, following an offer of proof, that evidence of the Battered Child Syndrome could not, as a matter of law, support a finding of self-defense, perfect or imperfect, because, it concluded, there was no “imminent threat” to respondent at the time of the killing. The court excluded the testimony and refused to instruct the jury on the theory of the defense. I would hold, as did the Court of Special Appeals, that it was error to exclude the evidence concerning the Battered Child Syndrome and to refuse to submit the issue of the reasonableness of respondent’s perceptions, in light of factual foundation and the proffered expert testimony on the Battered Child Syndrome, to the jury.
The trial court excluded all the defense testimony related to Battered Child Syndrome on the ground that the defense analogy to Battered Spouse Syndrome, codified in Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2003 Cum.Supp.) § 10-916 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, was inapposite. The trial court ruled that § 10-916 did not authorize, by analogy, the admission of evidence as to the Battered Child Syndrome. As the majority opinion eloquently sets out, the trial court was wrong on the law. It follows, then, that if the defense could produce some evidence as to the existence of the Battered Child Syndrome as it might bear on the reasonableness of respondent’s perceptions at the time of the killing, in light of the factual evidence admitted and proffered, then respondent should have been permitted to present the defense to the jury. *279The defense did present “some evidence” sufficient to create an issue before the jury of self-defense.
Defense counsel proffered to the court the summary of the testimony of Dr. Ellen McDaniel, a forensic psychiatrist, as follows:
“[Sjhe’s going to give the opinion that [respondent] was a battered child, which is similar to the battered spouse. And that because of such and because of the type of social situation he was brought up with and some of his past experiences with Warren Smullen, that because of all this his psychological profile would be consistent with him honestly and reasonably believing that there was no way out, that he had no alternative than to do what he did on May 6th of the year 2000.
“[U]ltimately, Your Honor, [Dr. McDaniel] would be testifying to the contents of this report and ultimately her decision would be that he has similar traits that one would have to battered spouse. And a battered spouse sometimes perceives things differently than other people because of the continued beatings, so on and so forth. It’s in here, if you want her to explain I will have her [do so] outside the presence of the jury.
“The long and short of it is Bruno Smullen has the same characteristics which may factor in his psychological profile, personality disorders. She would render an opinion that his psychological profile would be consistent with Bruno Smul-len honestly believing that he had to use the level of force that he used because he reasonably thought that his life was in jeopardy and basically that there was no other way out.
“So it would be the analogy, to be honest with the Court, battered spouse, battered child, I was going to ask her that question.”
In addition, respondent’s statement to the police, admitted in its entirety before the jury through Deputy Diane Furbush, included information that respondent told her that on the *280Tuesday evening before the killing, respondent and his father had argued about respondent’s friend, Shawn. On prior occasions, respondent said, his father hit him and once, his father hit him in the chest so hard that it knocked the breath out of him. He said that he was abused physically quite a bit since his mother had died, and the beatings began after her death. Respondent said that his father had threatened to hurt him, but the threat of harm was not tied to that particular Saturday. Respondent said that his father told him that the only way he would leave the house again would be in a pine box. Respondent said that he believed this statement to mean that his father was going to kill him.
Deputy Rudell Brown testified that respondent told him that he had been arguing with his father since the previous Tuesday over his friendship with Shawn and that his father would not let him leave the house. Respondent said that on different occasions, his father punched him in the chest with a piece of wood and that the only way he would be leaving the house was in a pine box.
The factual basis of respondent’s defense, supported by other witnesses, was set out in an offer of proof at trial, and was well stated by Judge Hollander, writing for the panel in the Court of Special Appeals. In a thoroughly researched opinion, the intermediate appellate court summarized the evidence the defense would have presented to the jury as follows:
“First, [respondent] called Willie Smullen, who described himself as Bruno’s ‘blood brother.’ At the bench, [respondent] proffered that Willie resided in the Smullens’ house with Bruno, and recalled ‘three violent episodes in the house that Bruno witnessed.’ One occurred when Warren broke furniture and ‘slapped Anna Mae around in a fight.’ Defense counsel continued: ‘Another was when [Warren] pulled a gun on Miguel, Anna Mae got Miguel in the car and drove away.... The third one, Warren and Carlos were physically fighting, Carlos wanted to hang out with friends. Warren got his gun but did not fire it.’ Defense counsel also represented: “Willie would further testify that Bruno was present when Warren shook [Willie].’ In addition, *281‘Willie would testify he left the house because of fear of Warren.... And that Warren drank alcohol to excess.’
“In addition, [respondent] attempted to introduce Anna Mae’s medical records to corroborate the brothers’ proffered testimony as to the cause of her injuries. Defense counsel also maintained that the records were relevant to establish [respondent’s] ‘perception’ and ‘psychological profile,’ which were ‘consistent with [respondent] having an honest but maybe unreasonable belief he had to do what he had to do to survive.’ The court sustained the State’s objection.
“The defense also proffered the testimony of Lori Batts, the vice principal of [respondent’s] school. [Respondent’s] attorney indicated that she would have testified that when [respondent] was suspended from school in January 1999, his ‘reaction to the suspension was very severe. He specifically said “I can’t go home, my dad is going to kill me, you don’t understand.’ ” She also would have said that [respondent] was ‘very upset and crying continuously saying he could not go home.’
“Further, the defense proffered the testimony of David Harner, Dean of Students at [respondent’s] school. According to defense counsel, Harner would have said that he occasionally ‘dropped Bruno off at home. At one point in time ... there was no one home and [respondent] said he was not allowed to enter the house.’ In addition, Harner would have testified that he was aware that Warren ‘was a strict disciplinarian’ and ‘Bruno was not allowed to hang out with his friends and not allowed to do stuff that [his] friends could do.’ Moreover, when Bruno was suspended from school, he was ‘emotionally upset to the point of having watery eyes,’ and he ‘was afraid that his father would find out.’ Bruno also disclosed to Harner that ‘his father could become violent at times.... ’
“Anthony Giddens, [respondent’s] high school guidance counselor, testified that he knew [respondent] since he was *282eight or nine years old, both as a neighbor and from church. In addition, Bruno worked for him on the weekends at his home, doing odd jobs. The State objected when Giddens was asked if he knew whether [respondent] ‘had made any plans recent to May 6th to move out of the house.’ At that point, the defense proffered that Giddens would say [respondent] was trying to ‘escape’ the house, but ‘was not able to escape.’ It was also Giddens’s understanding that [respondent] ‘was trying to live with the Harpers.’ After the killing, [respondent] told Giddens that his father had said that one of them would leave in a body bag. [Respondent] said that he was afraid, but did not know who to tell.
“The defense attempted to call Harrison Bell, the victim’s co-worker. Defense counsel proffered that Bell was present when Ashley and Erica informed Warren that Bruno was out with Shawn Williams, instead of at drill practice. According to the defense, Bell would have testified that ‘Warren’s response is I’m going to get him ... To be exact, get up in his ass.’ Bell would also say that he told Warren, “You better watch, that little jigger bug might get your ass.’
“A proffer was also made as to Alonso White, another coworker of the victim. Through him, the defense claimed it would show that Warren admitted ‘that he consumed alcohol ... and also beat Bruno.’ In addition, White would testify that Warren ‘warned Bruno not to say anything about it.’
“In addition, the defense proffered the testimony of Bernard White. He would have testified that, when Ashley and Erica told Warren that Bruno was out with Shawn, Warren responded ‘that he was going to get [respondent’s] ass when he got home.... ’
“Hope Collins, [respondent’s] friend, testified that in the weeks prior to May 2000, [respondent] Vas looking real depressed,’ and having ‘bad headaches.’ Moreover, she claimed that he seemed ‘spaced out.’ The court sustained the State’s objection when Collins was asked if she ever noticed any injuries to Bruno. Accordingly, [respondent] proffered that Collins would have said that she ‘did see bruises’ on [respondent’s] ‘forehead and elbows.’ Bruno also told Collins ‘that Warren would beat Bruno for things *283Bruno didn’t do.’ Bruno also revealed to Collins that Warren was Verbally abusive’ to him, and that Warren said he ‘was tired of looking at [respondent’s] face.’
“[Respondent] also proffered the testimony of Chastity White. According to the defense, she would have testified that [respondent] told her that Warren had ‘grabbed him by the collar’ when Warren was ‘in a drunken state.’
“Aundra Roberts, Administrative Assistant to the President of the University of Maryland, Eastern Shore, was called to testify for the defense. But, the court sustained the State’s objection to her proposed testimony regarding [respondent’s] depression and his close relationship with Anna Mae.”
The majority concludes that, notwithstanding the applicability of the Battered Child Syndrome and the analogy to the Battered Spouse Syndrome, the proffered evidence had no relevance. The majority determines that, notwithstanding the plethora of proffered evidence of the repetitive cycle of violence and threats to kill respondent, “[n]o one ever saw Bruno being assaulted by Warren or exhibiting any injuries from such an assault.” Maj. op. at 271. The short answer is “so what?” We have made clear that the source of the evidence is immaterial and the fact that it emanates from the defendant does not eviscerate the evidence. The majority refers to the proffered evidence as “hearsay.” Maj. op. at 272. Respondent’s confession was admitted without redaction or limitation. The other evidence which was excluded was excluded not on the basis of hearsay but rather of relevancy.
Throughout the majority opinion is an undercurrent that corroboration is required. Corroboration has never been required. So why does the majority’s comment that “[n]o one ever saw Bruno being assaulted by Warren or exhibiting any injuries from such an assault,” have anything to do with the issue before the Court — whether Bruno has presented some evidence bearing on the defense? See, e.g., “The only evidence that even remotely might corroborate an assault would have come from Ms. Collins, who apparently saw Bruno at some undefined point with some bruises on his forehead and *284elbow — bruises that were in no way linked to any assaultive conduct on Warren’s part.” Maj. op. at 272.
The majority rejects the evidence as irrelevant because the only evidence regarding the assaults came from hearsay statements made by respondent or Warren except for the incident when Warren hit respondent in the chest with a piece of wood. What about the threat that respondent would only leave the house in a pine box? And respondent’s statements that he believed that Warren would kill him?
The majority looks to State v. Marr, 362 Md. 467, 765 A.2d 645 (2001) as the foundation for the required analysis. Maj. op. at 270. The Court of Special Appeals seemed to agree, and noted that although Marr did not involve a battered person, “it tends to support the conclusion that, at the very least, [respondent] was entitled to present evidence relevant to his state of mind.” The intermediate appellate court continued:
“In elucidating the subjective component of imperfect self-defense and the element of state of mind, the Marr Court noted that the defendant’s belief as to imminent danger or the extent of force is ‘founded upon the defendant’s sensory and ideational perception of the situation that he or she confronts.....' Id. at 481, 765 A.2d 645. That perception, said the Court, is ‘often shaded by knowledge ... of ancillary or antecedent events. ’ Id. (emphasis added). Surely, a child’s history of abuse, inflicted by a parent, qualifies as an ‘antecedent event’ that might well ‘shade’ the child’s perception of reality. Moreover, even if the child’s ‘perception is incorrect,’ the Court observed in Marr that an error of this kind would ‘not necessarily make it unreasonable.’ Id. To the contrary, the Court recognized that ‘human beings often misunderstand their surroundings and the intentions of other people.’ Id. In those situations, according to the Court, ‘the jury would have to determine the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct in light of his reasonable, though erroneous, perception.’ ”
To be sure, testimony that respondent suffers from the Battered Child Syndrome, standing alone, does not ensure *285that his belief in imminent harm was reasonable and does not eliminate respondent’s need to present some evidence that his belief in imminent danger was reasonable at the time of the killing. But respondent made an offer of proof to support the necessary foundation. Other courts around the country have recognized that simply because “the triggering behavior and the abusive episode are divided by time does not necessarily negate the reasonableness of the defendant’s perception of imminent harm. Even an otherwise innocuous comment which occurred days before the homicide could be highly relevant when the evidence shows that such a comment inevitably signaled the beginning of an abusive episode.” State v. Janes, 121 Wash.2d 220, 850 P.2d 495, 506 (1993). Marr also supports this view.
As the Court of Special Appeals correctly noted, the burden of producing “some” evidence is not an onerous one. In reality, it is a very modest level of proof. The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of the expert witness and in refusing to instruct on the defense of self-defense. Petitioner met the standard and should have been permitted to present his defense to the jury.
Chief Judge BELL and Judge ELDRIDGE authorize me to state that they join in this dissenting opinion.