Court Opinion

ID: 9833082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:26:11.288292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:59.483634
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In disposing of this case on original hearing, the writer was not unmindful of the requirement of Revised Statutes, art. 3480, of an order of the probate court for the sale of property by an administrator as construed in the case of Webb v. Reynolds, by the Commission of Appeals (207 S. W. 914), for that decision approved the view of the writer as expressed in his dissenting opinion in the same ease reported in 160 S. W. 152 (Tex. Civ.). But we thought and now think this case very clearly distinguishable from the case of Webb v. Reynolds. In that case the sole reliance of title in the plaintiff, aside from his unapproved testimony that he was the owner, was an alleged conveyance of the notes therein involved by the .administrator of the estate of Laura Torrence. But here the pleadings and evidence show that the plaintiff, Phelps, claimed and had the right to rely, not only upon the conveyance of the administrator of the estate of Georgia: C. Kennedy, deceased, which was later formally ratified and approved by the probate court with a distribution of the proceeds thereof among the heirs entitled to the proceeds, but also upon an original undertaking upon the part of Prank G. Ramey, of which the other appellees were put upon notice at the time of the acquisition of the rights claimed by them, as well also as upon principles of estoppel and of subro-gation. In originally disposing of the case, we only undertook to specifically discuss ap-pellee’s right of subrogation. But we had no purpose thereby to ignore appellee’s claim *666under the doctrine of estoppel and other grounds upon which the court below predicated his conclusions. We think appellee’s contention that the circumstances show that, not only was Prank G. Ramey, but also the heirs of Mrs. Kennedy and those entitled to distribution of her estate, estopped, is well supported by the cases cited' in the able brief of counsel for appellee on pages 14 to 32. So, too, do we think appellee’s contention that the sale was ratified is well supported by the cases cited in his brief on pages 32 to-37. We accordingly adhere to the views' originally expressed, and now here also specifically approve the trial court’s conclusions of fact and of law in their entirety.
Motion for rehearing overruled.