Court Opinion

ID: 9464648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:39:01.582544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:44.565070
License: Public Domain

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc.
Thomas James Reddy, James Earl Grant, Jr., and Charles Parker, appellants, were convicted in the Superior Court of Mecklen-burg County, North Carolina, of unlawfully burning the Lazy B Riding Stables. After exhausting their state remedies, they applied to the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. A panel of this court affirmed on the basis of the district court’s opinion, and a majority of the judges in active service voted to deny rehearing en bane.
The record discloses that the appellants had made formal requests for information about all promises offered to two of the state’s witnesses, Thomas Alfred Hood and Walter David Washington, and all exculpatory evidence. Although their motion was granted, it is undisputed that not all of this information was furnished their counsel.
Hood and Washington had made detailed statements to federal agents implicating themselves and the appellants in the violation of federal and state criminal laws, including the burning of the Lazy B Stables. In return for these statements, the federal authorities promised Hood and Washington that they would be granted immunity from federal prosecution, placed in protective custody, and furnished relocation money.
Hood and Washington were cross-examined about the inducements for their testimony. Neither mentioned the promise of money. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the trial each was paid $4,000, one thousand of which was designated as a reward.
Washington gave a federal agent a statement that he did not see who actually threw the fire bombs at the stables. This statement is inconsistent with Washington’s testimony that Parker and Reddy threw the fire bombs.
The district court ruled that the failure to disclose the promise of payment did not violate the due process clause because the promise had been made by federal authorities and the state prosecutor was unaware of it. It also ruled that the non-disclosure of Washington’s exculpatory statement afforded no grounds for relief because it was made to a federal agent who did not transmit it to the state. Alternatively, it held that non-disclosure was harmless. Under the circumstances, this alternative ruling is difficult to sustain, and quite properly the panel did not rely solely on it when disposing of the appeal. Instead, the panel affirmed on the district judge’s “comprehensive opinion,” which, as I have indicated, is primarily based on the theory that non-disclosure did not violate the fourteenth amendment’s guarantee of due process.
The failure of a prosecutor to correct the false testimony of a witness about promises in consideration for his testimony violates an accused’s right to due process of law. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1950). This principle is applicable even though the prosecutor was unaware that someone else in his office had made the promise. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d.l04 (1972). Similarly, an accused is *987denied due process when the prosecution suppresses a witness’s exculpatory statement that is material either to guilt or to punishment regardless of the good faith of the prosecutor. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
This case therefore raises the following issues:
When a state prosecutor receives statements of witnesses from federal officials, does the prosecutor have a duty to inquire about all inducements made to the witnesses for their favorable testimony if this information is requested by defense counsel?
Under these circumstances does the state prosecutor also have a duty to inquire about exculpatory statements made by these witnesses to the federal officials?
Do the federal officials have a correlative duty to disclose to the state prosecutor the inducements they offered to the witnesses and the exculpatory statements made by the witnesses?
The district court did not recognize the existence of such duties, and consequently it held that the non-disclosure of the information the appellants had requested did not deny them due process.
I think that this use of a silver platter to restrict application of the principles of Na-pue, Giglio, and Brady, is of sufficient importance to warrant en banc consideration. Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).
Judge WINTER authorizes .me to say that he joins in this dissenting opinion.