Court Opinion

ID: 9895391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 22:05:51.422846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:28.013747
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 220551-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                         NOTICE
 Decision filed 11/06/23. The
                                                                              This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0551                     Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                 not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of               IN THE                         limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                    under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     Champaign County.
                                          )
v.                                        )     No. 21-CF-1289
                                          )
DERRIAL D. WEBSTER,                       )     Honorable
                                          )     Randall B. Rosenbaum,
      Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Cates and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1       Held: We reverse the defendant’s conviction and sentence for the offense of armed
               habitual criminal, and remand for further proceedings, because we agree with the
               defendant that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel where his
               counsel presented, as his sole defense, a meritless legal theory that was contrary to
               existing precedent that was binding on the circuit court.

¶2       The defendant, Derrial D. Webster, appeals his conviction and sentence, by the circuit court

of Champaign County, for the offense of armed habitual criminal. For the reasons that follow, we

reverse his conviction and sentence, and remand for further proceedings.

¶3                                        I. BACKGROUND

¶4       The facts necessary to our disposition of this appeal are as follows. On October 25, 2021,

the defendant was charged, by information, with, inter alia, the Class 2 felony offense of unlawful

possession of a weapon by a felon on mandatory supervised release (MSR). The information

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alleged, inter alia, that on October 24, 2021, the defendant, who had been convicted previously of

the felony offense of armed habitual criminal, “knowingly possessed a firearm, namely [a] Taurus

G2C 9mm [h]andgun,” and further alleged that “the defendant was on mandatory supervised

release or parole at the time of this offense.” Also on October 25, 2021, the defendant was charged,

by information, with a new count of armed habitual criminal, a Class X felony, based upon the

defendant’s alleged possession of the handgun. The previous felonies listed on the information,

which provided the basis, or predicate, for the new count of armed habitual criminal, were the

defendant’s alleged convictions in Champaign County cases 2008-CF-2303 and 2008-CF-2304,

both of which were Class 1 felony residential burglary cases. The public defender was appointed

to represent the defendant on the new charges. Thereafter, the defendant retained private counsel

to represent him, and the public defender was discharged.

¶5     Over the following months, private counsel made multiple oral motions to continue the

case, all of which were granted, with the final motion being granted over the objection of the State,

which announced it was ready for trial. On June 22, 2022, the case proceeded to what the

defendant’s counsel described as an “open plea and a bench trial *** by stipulation.” Counsel

thereafter clarified that the defendant would be entering an open plea on the charge of unlawful

possession of a weapon by a felon on MSR (count II), and that the defendant desired a bench trial

on the charge of armed habitual criminal (count I). Counsel added that “a stipulated bench trial is

fine because he will stipulate to—in the plea to most of the elements of Count I. His defense in

that case is a legal argument, not a factual one.”

¶6     When asked for her position, counsel for the State stated that she believed “the counts

would merge” because “[i]t’s one firearm.” She added, “But if he wants to plead guilty to one and

stipulate to the other one, I *** guess that makes no legal sense, but that’s fine.” After determining

that count I was the greater offense, the circuit court stated “that the logical order would be to do
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the stipulated bench trial in count I, and if he’s found guilty, he could still plead on count II.”

Thereafter, the defendant appeared with his counsel, at which time the defendant was admonished

as to his right to a jury trial, after which he executed a signed written waiver of that right. The

circuit court stated that it found that the defendant’s waiver was “knowingly, understandingly, and

voluntarily made.” The circuit court then stated that it understood that the defendant wished, in his

bench trial, to give up the right to present, cross-examine, and confront witnesses, and that instead,

the circuit court would “decide if you’re guilty or not guilty based on an agreement of what the

facts are that the lawyers” would present to the court. The defendant stated that he understood, had

no questions, and wished to proceed in that manner.

¶7      Counsel for the State then presented what the circuit court characterized as “the statement

of the agreed facts,” which included, inter alia, the following: (1) the defendant was the front-seat

passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over by authorities for traffic violations; (2) the driver of

that vehicle “was deemed to be under the influence of alcohol, and there [were] drugs observed by

officers”; (3) accordingly, “officers took the [d]efendant out of the vehicle”; (4) during a pat-down

search of the defendant, “officers observed a gun in the [d]efendant’s waistband”; (5) a struggle

ensued, during which the gun “fell down in [the defendant’s] pants” and had to be cut out; (6) the

gun thereafter “was identified as a Taurus G2C 9mm handgun”; and (7) “[t]he [d]efendant is a

convicted felon, being convicted of residential burglary in 2008-CF-2309 [sic], as well as 2008-

CF-2304,” with both of those convictions being entered on April 21, 2009. With regard to the prior

convictions, counsel for the State added that “[t]he State would present the court files at a bench

or a jury trial for judicial notice.”

¶8      When asked if he would “agree that those are the agreed-to facts that the Court [could]

consider at the stipulated bench trial,” the defendant’s counsel answered, “I would.” The

defendant’s counsel then offered, as “[d]efense evidence,” the court files showing the previous
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convictions in 2008-CF-2303 and 2008-CF-2304. The circuit court asked if the defense wished for

the court “to take judicial notice of the fact that the priors are for residential burglary,” to which

defense counsel responded, “And that he received a sentence to the [Illinois] Department of

Corrections to be served concurrently in those cases.” After the parties declined to present further

evidence, they offered argument. Defense counsel argued as follows:

        “Your Honor, our defense is not a factual one. The facts are as stated. It is a *** question

        of law. Did the legislature intend—when he was convicted of those two previous cases in

        the manner and circumstances of the judgment at the same day, at the same time, does that

        count as one or two? And our suggestion to the Court is that the legislature would have

        intended that to count as one. So, it is not two offenses.”

¶9      The State responded that it believed, based upon the organization and language of the

statutes in question, that concurrent sentences, entered on the same date but for separate charges,

satisfied the requirements for two prior, or predicate, felony convictions for purposes of an armed

habitual criminal charge and conviction. The circuit court first stated that defense counsel made

“a powerful argument” in support of his position, but thereafter the circuit court noted that although

the prior convictions were for two burglaries that occurred on the same date—December 5, 2008—

the burglaries occurred at two separate locations, which meant that, ultimately, “they are separate

and distinct offenses.” The circuit court further noted that defense counsel’s argument was that

because the defendant “pled at the same time, it should count as one offense,” but the circuit court

believed that the State’s argument countering the defendant was “well-taken” based upon the

organization and language of the statutes. The circuit court thereafter added: “This is an issue of

statutory construction. It is a legal argument. I don’t think the defense argument’s well-taken.” At

no point did the parties, or the circuit court, discuss—or even mention—any cases interpreting the

statutes.
                                                  4
¶ 10   Ultimately, the circuit court ruled that “based on the stipulated facts, the defendant did

possess the weapon on this particular date,” the defendant was “a convicted felon,” there were

“two prior convictions for residential burglary,” and, accordingly, the defendant was “guilty of

armed habitual criminal in count I” because the State had “proven that beyond a reasonable doubt.”

After defense counsel agreed to stipulate that the defendant was on MSR on the date of the

offenses, October 24, 2021, the circuit court stated, “I’m gonna show entry of conviction on count

II as well, based on the stipulated facts.” The circuit court added that because “the convictions

would likely merge,” the court would enter a sentence on count I only, and in fact the record on

appeal indicates that the circuit court ultimately entered a conviction on count I only, rather than

on both counts. The matter was set for sentencing, with the defendant given time to file a posttrial

motion.

¶ 11   On June 27, 2022, the defendant, by his same retained counsel, filed a posttrial motion in

which he asked the circuit court to vacate his conviction as to count I, and in which he argued that

he “was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on Count [I] because his convictions in

Champaign County Case Numbers 2008-CF-2303 and 2008-CF-2304 should be counted as one

prior conviction, not two as required by the statute.” Defense counsel’s written motion did not cite

any cases in support of counsel’s position. On June 28, 2022, the State certified that it had sent

“supplemental discovery” to the defendant, consisting of one USB drive containing photos and

videos, taken by the University of Illinois police and related to the incident.

¶ 12   On August 19, 2022, a hearing was held on the posttrial motion, with sentencing to follow.

Defense counsel stood on his written motion, and the State stood on the arguments it made at the

June 22, 2022, trial. Thereafter, the circuit court noted that precedent found by the court did not

support the position taken by defense counsel. Accordingly, the circuit court denied the

defendant’s posttrial motion. Following argument by the parties, and a statement in allocution by
                                              5
the defendant, the defendant was sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment in the Illinois Department

of Corrections, with credit for 300 days served in the county jail prior to sentencing. This appeal

was timely filed, also on August 19, 2022. Additional facts will be provided as necessary

throughout the remainder of this order.

¶ 13                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14   On appeal, the defendant argues, inter alia, that he did not receive the effective assistance

of counsel in the circuit court. Specifically, the defendant contends on appeal with regard to this

issue that his trial counsel “presented a meritless legal argument as [the defendant’s] only defense,”

which he contends deprived him of, inter alia, “a meaningful adversarial trial process.” He posits

that defense counsel’s strategy and tactics, which included stipulating to the State’s factual basis

for the charges, “left the trial court with no choice but to find [the defendant] guilty of” armed

habitual criminal, and thereby “resulted in [the defendant] forfeiting his constitutional rights to

contest his innocence by a trial and to hold the State to its burden of proof.” He points out that

defense counsel did not file any substantive pretrial motions, although filing, e.g., a pretrial motion

to dismiss would have allowed counsel to test his legal theory with the circuit court prior to trial,

without relying upon it as his sole defense, which in turn would have allowed the defendant, had

that theory been rejected by the court, to make meaningful choices regarding, inter alia, a possible

plea agreement or proceeding to a trial on the merits. He further argues that defense counsel was

ineffective because “[e]ven cursory research would have” revealed that defense counsel’s legal

argument did not constitute “a viable defense” to the armed habitual criminal charge.

¶ 15   In support of his position, the defendant first notes that under a traditional ineffective

assistance of counsel analysis, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was

deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by that deficient performance, and argues why he

believes he has met that burden in this case. In the alternative, the defendant notes that in cases in
                                                  6
which counsel’s errors are so profound and fundamental as to amount to a complete deprivation

of the right to counsel, no showing of prejudice is required, because such errors are structural ones

that represent a “complete failure of a functioning adversarial trial process.” The defendant

presents other alternative arguments as well. With regard to all of his arguments, the relief

requested by the defendant is the reversal of his armed habitual criminal conviction and remand

for a new trial. He does not contend that a new trial would be barred by principles of double

jeopardy and accordingly has forfeited any such claim. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1,

2020) (argument must contain the contentions of the appellant, the reasons therefor, and the

citation of authorities; points not argued in an opening brief are forfeited and shall not be raised in

the reply brief, in oral argument, or in a petition for a rehearing).

¶ 16    The State responds by contending, inter alia, that defense counsel’s theory in the circuit

court was not wholly without merit, and therefore constituted reasonable trial strategy, rather than

deficient performance. In support of this position, the State notes that the circuit court at one point

stated that defense counsel had made “a powerful argument” against the armed habitual criminal

charge in this case, even though the circuit court ultimately did not agree with that argument. The

State further claims that this court, on appeal, is not required to follow the cases that debunked

defense counsel’s circuit court legal theory. The State also disputes, inter alia, the defendant’s

contention that he has shown he was prejudiced by counsel’s purportedly deficient performance in

this case.

¶ 17    In reply, the defendant correctly points out, inter alia, that although this court, on appeal,

is not required to follow precedent from other districts of the Illinois Appellate Court that are

contrary to defense counsel’s circuit court legal theory, the circuit court, as a lower court, was

required to follow that binding precedent, and no effort was made by defense counsel to stipulate

to the facts for the sole purpose of distinguishing that precedent and preserving the legal issue for
                                                  7
appeal. To the contrary, defense counsel put forward his legal theory without citing any legal

authority either for or against it, apparently without doing any legal research at all. The defendant

also contends that the State “cherry picks” the record when the State argues that the record shows

that defense counsel’s circuit court legal theory was not wholly without merit.

¶ 18   We agree with the defendant. As the defendant repeatedly notes, defense counsel did not

support his legal argument in the circuit court with any citation to authority, either when he initially

made the argument at the defendant’s trial, or when he made it a second time in his written posttrial

motion, upon which he stood at the hearing on that motion. Had defense counsel done even a

modicum of research before staking the defendant’s entire defense on counsel’s theory, counsel

would have discovered that there was no precedent—at all—in support of his position, and that

there was precedent, binding on the circuit court, that directly refuted his position.

¶ 19   In People v. Patterson, 2018 IL App (1st) 160610, ¶¶ 13, 23-31, a panel of our colleagues

in the First District examined, in a published opinion, the question of whether two convictions

entered on the same date can serve as the two predicate convictions required under the armed

habitual criminal statute. The Patterson court answered this question in the affirmative, rejecting

the defendant’s argument that “because [the two] convictions were entered on the same day based

on plea agreements that were reached on the same day ***, he was convicted only one time of two

separate offenses.” Id. ¶¶ 26, 28-31. The Patterson court explicitly held that “[t]he plain language

of the [armed habitual criminal] statute does not contain any limiting language regarding the

sequence or separate entry of the predicate convictions.” Id. ¶ 29. Moreover, the court explicitly

considered, and rejected, the defendant’s argument that the “statute should be construed like

certain sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections to require sequential and separate

convictions,” because the court did not believe it was appropriate to “look beyond the clear and

unambiguous language in the” statute. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. The court added that “[b]ecause the legislature
                                                8
included the limiting language regarding sequential and separate convictions in the above-cited

recidivist provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections regarding the sentencing of habitual

criminals and Class X offenders and the imposition of extended term sentences,” but included no

such language in the armed habitual criminal statute, the court was required to “conclude that the

legislature intentionally refrained from imposing such a requirement in the” armed habitual

criminal statute. Id. ¶ 31. The court thereafter held that “[t]he presence of the limiting language in

the recidivist provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections and the absence of that language in

the [armed habitual criminal] statute establishes that [the] defendant’s claim has no arguable basis

in the law.” Id.

¶ 20    As noted above, Patterson was a published opinion, which, as the defendant correctly

argues in his reply brief, means that the circuit court in this case was required to follow and apply

it. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 539-540 (1992) (decision

of the appellate court, though not binding on other appellate districts, is binding on the circuit

courts throughout the state, unless there are conflicting decisions from various appellate districts

and no controlling authority from a particular circuit court’s home district, in which case that

circuit court may choose between the conflicting decisions). In this case, there exist no conflicting

decisions from other districts. Thus, the circuit court had no choice but to follow Patterson and

reject defense counsel’s theory in this case.

¶ 21    With regard to the State’s contention that the circuit court’s comment that defense counsel

made “a powerful argument” demonstrates that defense counsel’s argument was not wholly

without merit, we do not attach the significance that the State, on appeal, does to the circuit court’s

comment. As described above, the circuit court made the comment during the defendant’s June

22, 2022, stipulated bench trial, and at no point during the discussion of defense counsel’s

argument at that trial did the parties, or the circuit court, discuss, or even mention, any cases
                                                 9
interpreting the statutes in question or addressing the legal merits of defense counsel’s argument.

Also as mentioned above, no substantive written pretrial motions were filed by defense counsel,

and no effort was made by him to stipulate to the facts in this case for the sole purpose of

distinguishing the precedent contrary to his position and preserving the legal issue for appeal. To

the contrary, defense counsel put forward his legal theory without citing any legal authority either

for or against it, apparently without doing any legal research at all. For all of these reasons, there

is nothing in the record on appeal that reasonably could lead this court to believe that at the time

of its comment, the circuit court had conducted any legal research of its own and therefore was in

a position to assess the legal strength of defense counsel’s argument. In light of the record, it

appears far more likely that the circuit court’s comment addressed the passion or conviction with

which defense counsel put forward his argument, not the circuit court’s opinion of the legal merit

of that argument.

¶ 22   Moreover, immediately after making the “powerful argument” comment, the circuit court

noted that although the prior convictions in this case were for two burglaries that occurred on the

same date—December 5, 2008—the burglaries occurred at two separate locations, which meant

that, ultimately, “they are separate and distinct offenses.” The circuit court then further noted that

defense counsel’s argument was that because the defendant “pled at the same time, it should count

as one offense,” but the circuit court believed that the State’s argument countering the defendant

was “well-taken” based upon the organization and language of the statutes. The circuit court

thereafter added: “This is an issue of statutory construction. It is a legal argument. I don’t think

the defense argument’s well-taken.” Thus, the circuit court soundly—and correctly—rejected

defense counsel’s meritless argument at trial, and did so again after conducting legal research to

address the defendant’s posttrial motion. Finally, even if at trial the circuit court did hold the

subjective view, formed before conducting any research, that defense counsel made “a powerful
                                             10
argument” from a legal point of view, that does not change the fact that there was no legal support

for the argument, only binding precedent contrary to it, as discussed above. It also does not change

the fact that after conducting legal research, the circuit court reiterated its earlier rejection of

defense counsel’s argument, without reiterating any belief that the argument was “a powerful” one.

Thus, we are not persuaded by the State’s reasoning with regard to this point.

¶ 23   In light of the foregoing, we now turn to the question of whether the defendant received

the effective assistance of counsel under the circumstances of this case. As the defendant notes on

appeal, under a traditional ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, a defendant must show both

that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by that deficient

performance. See, e.g., People v. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d 233, 242 (1989) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). As the Illinois Supreme Court held in Chandler, both

prongs of the traditional Strickland test are met if defense counsel’s strategy at trial is based upon

a misunderstanding of the law, or a misunderstanding of the validity of a potential defense, that

results in a situation where the trier of fact is left “with no choice but to convict.” Id. at 248. The

Chandler court further held that “[b]y failing to comprehend the law ***, counsel’s strategy and

actions amounted to no real defense at all,” which meant that the State’s case “was not subject to

meaningful adversarial testing, and [the] defendant was deprived of a fair trial.” Id. at 249. In this

case, we agree with the defendant that he has met his Strickland burden because defense counsel,

inter alia, staked the defendant’s entire case on his meritless legal theory about the requirements

of the armed habitual criminal statute, and when that doomed strategy failed, the circuit court had

no choice but to convict the defendant.

¶ 24   We also agree with the defendant’s first alternative argument, in which he notes that under

a different line of cases, in situations in which defense counsel’s errors are so profound and

fundamental as to amount to a complete deprivation of the right to counsel, no showing of
                                          11
prejudice is required, because such errors are structural ones that represent a “complete failure of

a functioning adversarial trial process.” In People v. Dodson, 331 Ill. App. 3d 187, 192 (2002)

(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)), this court recognized as much, noting

that in rare cases “[w]here ‘counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful

adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the

adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.’ ” The Dodson court held that the case before

it—in which defense counsel at trial, inter alia, agreed to a State-drafted stipulation that contained

nothing “that offered a rational trier of fact reason to discredit any of the State’s evidence”—was

“not a case where counsel made a series of demonstrable mistakes during the course of a truly

adversarial criminal trial,” but was instead “a trial that lacked any meaningful adversarial test of

the prosecution’s case,” and wherein “[t]he decision to promote a bench trial and the decision to

sign the State-drafted stipulation virtually ensured a conviction and spared the prosecution those

hardships that usually accompany the existence of a trained and skilled adversary trying to defeat

its objectives.” Id. at 191-93. The court further held that “[t]he stipulated bench trial provided a

process to judgment that lost its character as a confrontation between adversaries,” and devolved

into “the functional equivalent of a guilty plea without the procedural due process safeguards

required by” existing precedent for such proceedings. Id. at 193.

¶ 25   We conclude that pursuant to Dodson and Cronic, even if we were to assume, arguendo,

that the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice in this case under a traditional Strickland

ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, we would still agree that he is entitled to a new trial

because in this case defense counsel, inter alia, staked the defendant’s entire case on a meritless

legal theory, in no way held the State to its burden of proof, and otherwise acted in a manner that

led to a complete failure of a functioning adversarial trial process. As defense counsel put it, his

argument was a legal one, not a factual one, and because that legal argument was completely
                                             12
without merit, defense counsel’s entire strategy amounted to no defense at all, and ensured that the

defendant would be convicted. Moreover, in exchange for pursuing this doomed strategy, the

defendant did not receive any tangible benefit—such as a sentencing cap—from the State at all.

We conclude in this case—as did the Dodson court with regard to the case before it—that “[s]ound

trial strategy should be made of sterner stuff.” 331 Ill. App. 3d at 194 (citing People v. Moore, 279

Ill. App. 3d 152, 159 (1996)).

¶ 26                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the defendant’s conviction and sentence for the

offense of armed habitual criminal and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 28   Reversed and remanded.

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