Court Opinion

ID: 9388839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 18:03:45.344447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:23.085151
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 220123-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                        NOTICE
 Decision filed 04/21/23. The
                                                                             This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0123
                                                                             Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                             not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                  IN THE                        limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                             under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND                )     Appeal from the
FAMILY SERVICES ex rel. CAROLYN WHITAKER,       )     Circuit Court of
                                                )     Alexander County.
      Petitioner-Appellee,                      )
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 12-F-84
                                                )
MICHAEL OLIVER JR.,                             )     Honorable
                                                )     Tyler R. Edmonds,
      Respondent-Appellant.                     )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Vaughan and McHaney concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: The trial court correctly dismissed the respondent’s pleading challenging the
               court’s personal jurisdiction over him in a proceeding 10 years earlier due to
               allegedly defective service of process where (1) the doctrine of res judicata barred
               his claim; and (2) the court obtained personal jurisdiction over the respondent
               because process was properly served at an address where it was reasonably likely
               to give him actual notice of the proceedings under all relevant circumstances.

¶2       The trial court entered a default judgment ordering the respondent, Michael Oliver Jr., to

pay child support to Carolyn Whitaker for their two children. The summons in that matter was

served by substitute service on the respondent’s mother. Nearly eight years later, the respondent

filed pleadings in the trial court, asserting that the service of process was defective and that the

court therefore lacked personal jurisdiction over him when it entered the default judgment. The

court denied his motions. The respondent appeals, arguing that his mother’s apartment was not his

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usual place of abode and that, as such, service was defective and did not confer jurisdiction on the

court. We affirm.

¶3                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On September 22, 2012, the respondent signed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity,

acknowledging that he is the father of the two children at issue in this case. The address provided

by the respondent on the form was an apartment on Martin Luther King Avenue in Cairo, Illinois.

¶5     On October 25, 2012, the petitioner, the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family

Services (Department), filed a complaint for child support against the respondent on behalf of

Whitaker. On the same date, the Illinois Attorney General, on behalf of the Department, sent an

address information card to the postmaster in Cairo requesting any updated information on the

respondent’s address. The card, returned the following day, indicated that the respondent still

received mail at the Martin Luther King Avenue address.

¶6     On November 12, 2012, an Alexander County deputy sheriff served a summons by

substitute service on the respondent’s mother, Karen Young, at the Martin Luther King Avenue

address listed on the acknowledgment of paternity form and confirmed by the Cairo postmaster.

The return of service found in the record is signed by Deputy Tatum and indicates that he served

the summons on a black female identified as the respondent’s mother, Karen Young, at that address

at 12:54 p.m. on November 12, 2012.

¶7     On November 28, 2012, the court held a hearing in the matter. The respondent did not

appear. The court entered a default judgment ordering the respondent to pay Whitaker $150 per

month in child support.

¶8     On September 12, 2017, the respondent filed a pro se pleading with the court titled “Motion

for Status and Production of Documents.” He alleged that in April 2017, while incarcerated, he

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received correspondence from the Department, including a petition to modify child support. He

further alleged that he was never served or summoned in the child support case and that he was

unaware of the existence of the case before receiving the correspondence from the Department

earlier that year. The respondent requested that the court “produce ALL documents from the

commencement of this case until the current date along with a photocopy of the record sheet.”

(Emphasis in original.) A September 21, 2017, docket entry indicates that a copy of the court

record was mailed to the respondent on that date.

¶9      On August 31, 2020, the respondent filed a pro se motion styled as a “Motion to Dismiss

Case.” He alleged that he was never properly served with the 2012 complaint for child support and

requested the immediate dismissal of the case.

¶ 10    On October 2, 2020, the Department filed its response to the respondent’s motion. The

Department argued that the return of service signed by Deputy Tatum constituted prima facie proof

of proper service that could be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence, and that the

respondent had not provided such evidence. The Department further argued that the respondent’s

challenge was barred by the doctrine of laches. In support of this argument, the Department pointed

out that the respondent did not challenge the alleged defects in service for more than seven years

after entry of the order. The Department also noted that the respondent indisputably had actual

notice of the default judgment at least as early as April of 2017, but he waited more than three

years to file his motion after that time.

¶ 11    On October 16, 2020, the respondent filed an affidavit in support of his motion to dismiss

the case. He acknowledged that at some point, he received mail at his mother’s apartment in Cairo,

but he alleged that he never resided at that address. He further alleged that on November 12, 2012,

when the summons was served, he was residing in Killeen, Texas, having recently moved there.

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He stated that he was “100% sure that [he] was incarcerated” in Texas, both on the date of service

and on the date the default judgment was entered (November 28, 2012). The petitioner alleged that

he was never served in the child support case and that once he became aware of the proceedings,

he “immediately began in inquiry to the court and began [his] own investigation and the study of

the law since [he could not] afford an attorney in this matter.” He requested the dismissal of the

case.

¶ 12    Attached to the motion was a copy of a sentencing order from Bell County, Texas. The

order was dated May 15, 2013. In the order, the Bell County court sentenced the respondent to 270

days in jail with credit for 113 days spent in custody on the charge prior to that date. As the

Department notes in its brief in this appeal, these numbers indicate that the respondent was not in

custody on that particular charge in November of 2012.

¶ 13    The court held a hearing on the respondent’s motion on May 19, 2021. The record indicates

that the respondent, who was incarcerated at the time, had notice of the hearing. However, he did

not appear, either in person or by telephone. The same day, the court made a docket entry denying

the respondent’s motion to dismiss and terminating his support obligation “excluding any amounts

owed to the State.”

¶ 14    On June 2, 2021, the court entered a written order in the matter. The court found that the

respondent owed an arrearage of $2700 to the Department but noted that Whitaker had waived any

arrearage the respondent owed to her. The court further found that the respondent’s incarceration

constituted a substantial change in circumstances that justified a modification in child support. The

court therefore reduced the respondent’s child support obligation to zero dollars, effective

September 1, 2021. Finally, the court expressly stated that the respondent’s objection to service

was denied.

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¶ 15   On June 8, 2021, the respondent filed two pro se motions. The first was titled “Motion for

Status.” In it, the respondent asserted that (1) he was not “summoned to court” for the scheduled

hearing on May 19 because no writ had been issued and (2) he had not received notice of any

further court dates. He requested that he be informed concerning “what is going on.” The second

pleading was titled “Motion to Supplement Record with Hypothetical Analysis.” In it, the

respondent argued that, assuming proper service, the amount of child support ordered in 2012 was

excessive in view of his circumstances under the version of the applicable statute in effect in 2021.

He asserted, conclusorily, that the child support order was therefore unconstitutional. We note that,

as the Department points out, child support was calculated based upon the version of the statute in

effect in 2012.

¶ 16   On November 22, 2021, the respondent filed a pro se pleading labeled as a counterclaim.

We note that the docket contains no entries between June and November of 2021. It is thus unclear

when the respondent received notice of the court’s order rejecting his challenge to the service of

the summons and modifying his child support obligations.

¶ 17   In the counterclaim, the respondent alleged that service of the original summons was

ineffective and that the default judgment against him violated his rights to due process and equal

protection. He further alleged that the proceedings were rendered “totally ineffective” pursuant to

principles of due process and equal protection because “judicial officers” failed to (1) “summon”

the respondent to the May 19, 2021, hearing, (2) “conclude the proceedings with an appropriate

ruling,” and (3) “respond to [his] motion for status.” As relief, the respondent requested that any

payments received by the Department be refunded.

¶ 18   On January 6, 2022, the Department filed a motion to dismiss the petitioner’s counterclaim.

The Department argued that if the petitioner’s pleading was construed as a response to the initial

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complaint for child support, filed on October 25, 2012, it should be dismissed under section 2-

619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2018)) because it was

not timely filed. The Department further argued that if construed as an attack on the default

judgment entered in November 2012, the respondent’s pleading should be dismissed because (1) it

was not brought pursuant to section 2-1401 (id. § 2-1401) and (2) the claims raised were barred by

res judicata (see id. § 2-619(a)(4)). Finally, the Department argued that if construed as an attack

on the June 2, 2021, order, the pleading should be dismissed because (1) it was not brought under

section 2-1401 (id. § 2-1401) and (2) the respondent had sufficient notice of the hearing to allow

him to either arrange for transportation to court or to participate in the hearing by telephone.

¶ 19   On February 2, 2022, after a hearing in the matter, the court made a docket entry granting

the Department’s motion to dismiss. On February 9, the court entered a written order dismissing

the respondent’s counterclaim. This timely appeal followed.

¶ 20                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21   The respondent’s primary argument in this appeal is that the trial court lacked personal

jurisdiction to enter the initial child support order because the service of process was defective. In

response, the Department contends that both the “motion to dismiss the case” and the

“counterclaim” were, in substance, petitions for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401

of the Code of Civil Procedure (id.) because the respondent filed both pleadings more than 30 days

after the entry of the child support order and, in both pleadings, he challenged the court’s

jurisdiction to enter that order. See Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 101-

02 (2002); Department of Healthcare & Family Services ex rel. Sanders v. Edwards, 2022 IL App

(1st) 210409, ¶ 43. The Department contends that the court properly denied the respondent’s

jurisdictional claim because (1) the claim was barred by res judicata because it was raised and

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litigated during the proceedings on the respondent’s earlier “motion to dismiss the case,” which

the respondent did not appeal, and (2) the court properly found that service was proper and that

the court therefore had personal jurisdiction over the respondent in the 2012 child support

proceedings.

¶ 22    In his reply brief, the respondent acknowledges that had he labeled his counterclaim as a

2-1401 petition, the substance of the claim would have been “exactly the same.” He argues,

however, that the pleading must be liberally construed. See Papadakis v. Fitness 19 IL 116, LLC,

2018 IL App (1st) 170388, ¶ 21. He argues that we should not find his claims to be barred by res

judicata “simply because [he] did not choose to abandon the jurisdictional issue after the Motion

to Dismiss.” To the extent the respondent suggests that liberally interpreting his pleading requires

this court to treat it as a true counterclaim, rather than a section 2-1401 petition, this argument does

not help him. If treated as a true counterclaim, his pleading was filed long after the trial court lost

jurisdiction to consider it. See Won v. Grant Park 2, L.L.C., 2013 IL App (1st) 122523, ¶ 20

(explaining that trial courts lose jurisdiction 30 days after entry of a final judgment if no timely

posttrial motion directed against the verdict has been filed). In any case, we agree with both of the

Department’s contentions.

¶ 23    The doctrine of res judicata applies where a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered

a final decision on the merits of a cause of action. Under the doctrine, the judgment bars any

subsequent litigation of the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies. Severino

v. Freedom Woods, Inc., 407 Ill. App. 3d 238, 244 (2010). Res judicata applies if the following

three elements are satisfied: (1) a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered a final judgment on

the merits, (2) the cause of action in each case is identical, and (3) the parties or their privies are

likewise identical. Id.

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¶ 24   In this case, each of the three elements is satisfied. First, there is no dispute that in June

2021, a court of competent jurisdiction rendered a final judgment rejecting the respondent’s claim

that defective service of process rendered the court’s November 2012 child support order void for

lack of jurisdiction. There is likewise no dispute that the respondent’s November 2021

“counterclaim” raised precisely the same issue. In addition, both actions involved the same parties.

Thus, the respondent’s claim is barred by res judicata. See Moore v. Illinois Pollution Control

Board, 203 Ill. App. 3d 855, 861 (1990) (noting that once the question of personal jurisdiction

“has been raised and decided, the adjudication of the issue precludes the raising of the question

again”).

¶ 25   In support of his contention to the contrary, the respondent cites Keith v. B&B Builders

Supply, Inc., 101 Ill. App. 3d 1123 (1981). There, a homeowner filed an action against a builder,

alleging breaches of warranties for habitability and suitability for a particular purpose. In a prior

action, the builder had obtained a default judgment against the homeowner for money due under

the construction contract. Id. at 1124. Generally, res judicata bars “not only what was actually

decided in the first action, but also whatever could have been decided.” Severino, 407 Ill. App. 3d

at 244; see also Keith, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 1125. The builder thus argued that the homeowner’s

subsequent action was barred by res judicata because the two actions involved the same parties,

and his claim could have been raised as a counterclaim in the builder’s prior suit. However, as the

Keith court explained, a party is not required to raise a claim that is wholly separate and distinct

from a case pending against him as a counterclaim even though he may do so. Keith, 101 Ill. App.

3d at 1125. Unlike Keith, this case does not involve a separate and distinct claim that could have

been raised earlier as a counterclaim. Rather, the case involves an identical claim that was

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previously raised and decided. Keith is inapposite to the question before us. We conclude that the

respondent’s claim was barred by res judicata.

¶ 26    Moreover, we agree with the Department and the trial court that the original service was

sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the respondent in the 2012 proceedings on the

petition for child support. As the respondent correctly points out, a judgment entered by a court

lacking subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the parties is void and may be

challenged at any time. Sarkissian, 201 Ill. 2d at 103. A trial court obtains personal jurisdiction

over a respondent either through service of process in accordance with the applicable statute or

through the entry of an appearance by the respondent. Mayfield v. Smith, 2019 IL App (1st)

181899, ¶ 26. We review de novo the question of whether the trial court obtained personal

jurisdiction over the respondent. Id. However, we review the court’s factual findings to determine

whether they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Sanders, 2022 IL App (1st) 210409,

¶ 44.

¶ 27    Section 2-203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-203 (West 2018)) governs the

service of process on individuals. Mayfield, 2019 IL App (1st) 181899, ¶ 27. In pertinent part, that

statute provides that service of the summons must be made by leaving a copy with the defendant

personally or by “leaving a copy at the defendant’s usual place of abode” with a person who resides

there and is at least 13 years old. 735 ILCS 5/2-203(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2018). If process is served

by “substitute service” on an individual residing with the defendant, the process server must inform

that individual “of the contents of the summons” and must also mail a copy to the defendant at his

usual abode “in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.” Id. § 2-203(a)(2). In the process

server’s certificate (or in a record maintained by the sheriff’s office or the private process server’s

                                                  9
employer), the process server must identify the gender, race, and approximate age of the person

served and must state the location, date, and time of service. Id. § 2-203(b).

¶ 28   Where, as here, the method of service is substitute service, the process server’s certificate

is required to demonstrate strict compliance with each requirement of the statute. Mayfield, 2019

IL App (1st) 181899, ¶ 28 (citing State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 309 (1986)).

However, failure to file a proper proof of service does not itself render otherwise proper service

invalid. Id. ¶ 31 (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 102(d) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) and Thill, 113 Ill. 2d at 312). The

process server’s certificate constitutes evidence that he or she served the summons in accordance

with the statute, but the certificate requirement “ ‘is a matter of convenience’ ” rather than a

prerequisite to proper service. Id. (quoting Clemmons v. Travelers Insurance Co., 88 Ill. 2d 469,

480-81 (1981)).

¶ 29   In determining whether substitute service was proper, we must consider the record as a

whole. Sanders, 2022 IL App (1st) 210409, ¶ 48. The process server’s certificate constitutes

prima facie evidence of proper service that cannot be overcome absent clear and satisfactory

evidence. The uncorroborated affidavit of the defendant or the person served is not adequate. Id.

This rule, however, applies only to matters within the process server’s knowledge—such as the

fact that he served the summons, where he served it, and who accepted service. Id. With respect to

matters outside the process server’s knowledge—such as the defendant’s usual place of abode—

the uncorroborated affidavit is sufficient to counter the certificate, thus requiring the plaintiff to

introduce evidence to rebut the defendant’s affidavit. Id. ¶ 49.

¶ 30   Here, the respondent challenges the service solely on the basis that he contends his

mother’s apartment was not his usual place of abode. This question turns on the legal definition of

a “usual place of abode.” There is no “hard and fast” definition of that term under Illinois law.

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Instead, whether a specific location constitutes a person’s usual place of abode depends on the

facts and circumstances of the particular case. Id. ¶ 71; United Bank of Loves Park v. Dohm, 115

Ill. App. 3d 286, 289 (1983). The primary consideration is whether service at a specific location is

reasonably likely to provide actual notice of the proceedings. Sanders, 2022 IL App (1st) 210409,

¶¶ 47, 71. Because this is a question of fact, we defer to the trial court’s finding unless it is against

the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 71.

¶ 31    In Sanders, the First District considered the question of whether a particular address was a

respondent’s usual place of abode under facts and circumstances similar to those before us in the

instant case. There, as in this case, the sheriff’s department certified substitute service on the

respondent’s mother. Id. ¶ 4. The respondent did not appear, and the court entered a default

judgment against him ordering him to pay child support. Id. ¶ 5. Sixteen years later, he filed a

motion to quash service and set aside that order, arguing that service was defective because the

address where the summons was served was not his usual place of abode. Id. ¶ 6.

¶ 32    In support of his motion, the respondent provided documents showing that he was

incarcerated in the Cook County jail for approximately two months, including the date on which

the summons was served. Id. ¶ 7. In addition, he provided an affidavit from his mother, who stated

that the respondent had never lived with her at the address listed in the certificate of service and

that she did not know his whereabouts at the time of service. Id. ¶ 8. Additional evidence, including

documents and testimony at an eventual evidentiary hearing, showed that the respondent lived a

transient lifestyle during the time period at issue (id. ¶ 22), that he was in and out of jail during

this period (id. ¶ 36), and that his mother’s address appeared as his residence on jail records and

employment records (id. ¶ 10). The respondent acknowledged in his hearing testimony that he used

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his mother’s house as a mailing address because she was the most reliable person to receive mail

on his behalf. Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 33    The trial court in Sanders expressly found, based upon this evidence, that the respondent’s

mother’s house was the most reasonable place for service of process because it was the place where

service was most likely to provide him with actual notice of the proceedings. Id. ¶ 36. The trial

court concluded, however, that because the process server did not testify at the hearing, the

documentary evidence and the respondent’s admission that his mother’s house was the most

reliable place for him to receive mail were not enough to rebut the respondent’s affidavit stating

that his mother’s house was not his usual place of abode. Id. ¶ 37.

¶ 34    On appeal, the First District reversed the trial court’s decision to quash service (id. ¶ 78),

but upheld the trial court’s factual finding that the respondent’s mother’s house was the place

where service was most likely to provide actual notice of the proceedings (id. ¶¶ 62, 67, 76-78).

Because there is no precise legal definition of a “usual place of abode” and because the reasonable

likelihood that service in a particular location will provide actual notice is the most important

consideration (id. ¶ 71), the appellate court found that the respondent’s mother’s home qualified

as his usual place of abode for purposes of substitute service (see id. ¶¶ 62, 67, 71-73, 76).

¶ 35    The record in Sanders was more developed than the record in this case, and unlike this

case, the trial court’s decision involved credibility determinations concerning the live testimony

of the respondent and his witnesses. See id. ¶ 67. Nevertheless, the factual similarities are salient.

Here, as in Sanders, the respondent has acknowledged receiving mail at his mother’s address, and

the Department’s documentary evidence establishes that he chose to provide that address to the

Department when he filled out and signed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity. The facts

alleged in the affidavit the respondent filed in support of his motion to dismiss also demonstrate

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that he, like the respondent in Sanders, led a transitory lifestyle at the time of service. He averred

that he had “just recently moved to Killeen, Texas,” when the summons was served and that he

returned to Illinois after being released from the Bell County jail. In light of these facts, service at

that address was reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings, and that

address was the place where service was most likely to provide that notice. Thus, it was his usual

place of abode.

¶ 36    In support of his argument to the contrary, the respondent asserts that his mother’s

apartment was “by definition” not his usual place of abode. As authority for this proposition, he

cites Sells v. Berry, 24 Fed. Appx. 568 (7th Cir. 2001), an unpublished decision of the Seventh

Circuit Court of Appeals. The issue in Sells, however, was not whether a particular location was

the defendant’s usual place of abode. Rather, the question was whether substitute service on the

defendant’s neighbor satisfied the requirements of the applicable Indiana procedural rule. Id. at

571. Thus, we find Sells inapposite to the question at hand.

¶ 37    The respondent also asserts that service of process at his mother’s apartment was not

reasonably calculated to provide actual notice, citing Najas Cortes v. Orion Securities, Inc., 362

Ill. App. 3d 1043 (2005). The question involved in that case was whether mailing the summons to

a multinational corporation’s representative in Chile was reasonably calculated to provide the

corporation with actual notice of an action against it even though that office had closed two years

earlier and the plaintiff regularly corresponded with the corporation’s offices in Canada. Id. at

1050-51. The respondent does not explain why he believes this case is remotely analogous to Najas

Cortes, and we find no support for his position in that case. For the reasons we have discussed, we

conclude that the court correctly determined that service at the respondent’s mother’s apartment

was proper, thus giving the trial court personal jurisdiction over the respondent to adjudicate the

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Department’s original complaint for child support. Moreover, as we have also discussed, the

court’s resolution of this question in proceedings on the respondent’s motion to dismiss the case

precluded the respondent from raising the same issue in his counterclaim.

¶ 38   The respondent raises three additional arguments, none of which merit much discussion.

He contends that, even assuming proper service and jurisdiction, the child support order was

unconstitutional because it would have been excessive under the version of the applicable statute

now in effect. As noted previously, the 2012 order calculated child support in accordance with the

version of the statute then in effect. Further, even assuming the support calculations were incorrect,

the respondent provides no explanation or supporting authority for the proposition that the error

would have rendered the judgment unconstitutional. Moreover, he did not timely challenge the

asserted error within 30 days of its entry.

¶ 39   The respondent further argues that various acts and omissions of the judiciary rendered the

court’s judgments “totally ineffective pursuant to due process and equal protection.” In particular,

he notes that he was not present at the May 19, 2021, hearing even though he filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus. Although he acknowledges that the petition does not appear in the record,

he asserts that “the reason has to be contributed to foul play.” Finally, the respondent asserts

without explanation that “the proceedings, before, during, and after, were totally arbitrary,” and

that the court’s order dismissing his counterclaim was erroneous and arbitrary, “reflecting the

previous denials of justice.” The respondent has not provided any argument in support of these

conclusory assertions, and we find them to be wholly without merit.

¶ 40                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41   For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 42   Affirmed.

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