Court Opinion

ID: 9521061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:56:15.797822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:35.515575
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TURNER, dissenting: Although I agree with the majority that Officer Davis had probable cause to initiate a valid traffic stop, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Officer Davis’s request for defendant to exit the car tainted the subsequent search. Therefore, I dissent. This case is factually distinguishable from our supreme court’s decision in Brownlee, relied upon by the majority. In that case, police officers stopped a vehicle and approached the car on both sides. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 506, 713 N.E.2d at 559. The officers obtained the identities of the occupants and checked for and found no outstanding warrants. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 506, 713 N.E.2d at 559. The officers decided not to issue any citations, but they did agree to ask the driver for permission to search the car. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 506, 713 N.E.2d at 559. One officer returned to the driver his license and insurance card and explained that no citations would be issued. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 506, 713 N.E.2d at 559. Thereafter, the officers stood near the car’s doors for about two minutes and said nothing. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 520, 713 N.E.2d at 565-66. After the pause, the officer asked the driver to search the vehicle, and the subsequent search revealed controlled substances. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d at 506-07, 713 N.E.2d at 559-60. This case is also factually distinguishable from this court’s opinion in Ortiz. In that case, an officer with the Illinois State Police stopped the defendant driver for speeding and asked him for his driver’s license and insurance information, which defendant provided. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 215, 738 N.E.2d at 1014. After asking general questions concerning the driver’s destination and the ownership of the vehicle, the officer returned to his squad car and ran a criminal history check. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 215, 738 N.E.2d at 1014-15. The officer then decided to call in a canine unit, which arrived prior to the officer’s receipt of the defendant’s criminal history or the completion of his paperwork. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 215-16, 738 N.E.2d at 1015. The officer walked back to the truck and asked the defendant to exit the vehicle. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 216, 738 N.E.2d at 1015. Thereafter, the officer issued the defendant a warning and returned his license, and, according to his testimony, the traffic stop was complete at that time. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 216, 738 N.E.2d at 1015. However, the officer then asked questions of the defendant, and after he refused to consent to a search of the truck, the canine unit eventually alerted to drugs in the vehicle. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 216-17, 738 N.E.2d at 1015-16. In the case subjudice, however, Officer Davis did not ask defendant to step out of the car after he returned his license and insurance card. Nor did Officer Davis explain that citations would or would not be issued prior to asking defendant to exit the vehicle. Based on the videotape evidence, the investigative stop of defendant had not ended, as the stops had in Brownlee and Ortiz, and Officer Davis could have asked defendant to exit the vehicle. During a lawful traffic stop, a police officer may order the driver out of the vehicle (Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 337, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1977)) as well as the passengers (Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 48, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997)). See Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 433, 752 N.E.2d at 1084 (“following a lawful traffic stop, police may, as a matter of course, order the driver and any passengers out of the vehicle pending completion of the stop”). Thus, as no delay existed here, the majority’s conclusion that the request for defendant to exit the car is the same as that in Brownlee is erroneous. At the hearing, Officer Davis testified his reason for asking defendant to exit the car was “to speak with him about the complaint” involving his alleged cannabis activity. This, however, is not fatal to the State’s case under our fourth amendment analysis. In Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 352, 117 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996), Deputy Roger Newsome stopped the defendant, Robert Robinette, for speeding. Newsome received the defendant’s license and ran a computer check. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 352, 117 S. Ct. at 419. Deputy Newsome then asked the defendant to exit his car, issued him a verbal warning, and returned his license. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 352, 117 S. Ct. at 419. Thereafter, Newsome asked the defendant if he was carrying any contraband, and the defendant replied he was not. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35-36, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 352, 117 S. Ct. at 419. Deputy Newsome then received the defendant’s consent to search his car, and the officer found controlled substances. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 36, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 352, 117 S. Ct. at 419. The Supreme Court found the fourth amendment does not require a police officer to advise a lawfully seized defendant that he is free to go before a consent to search will be deemed voluntary. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 355, 117 S. Ct. at 421. The Supreme Court also noted the Supreme Court of Ohio, in ruling the search resulted from an unlawful detention, held that Deputy Newsome had returned to the defendant’s car and asked him to exit, after he had determined not to give him a ticket. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 38, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 353-54, 117 S. Ct. at 420. The Supreme Court, however, found “the subjective intentions of the officer did not make the continued detention of [the defendant] illegal under the [fjourth [a]mendment.” Robinette, 519 U.S. at 38, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 354, 117 S. Ct. at 420. Moreover, the Supreme Court stated “there is no question that, in light of the admitted probable cause to stop Robinette for speeding, Deputy Newsome was objectively justified in asking Robinette to get out of the car, subjective thoughts notwithstanding.” Robinette, 519 U.S. at 38, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 354, 117 S. Ct. at 421. Based on the foregoing, Officer Davis could ask defendant to exit his vehicle prior to the stop’s completion notwithstanding his subjective intentions because defendant’s vehicle had been lawfully detained for a traffic violation and defendant could have been ordered out prior to the stop’s conclusion. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 38, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 354, 117 S. Ct. at 420 (continued detention of the defendant based on officer’s subjective intentions did not violate fourth amendment); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 n.6, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 n.6, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 n.6 (1980) (the subjective intentions of a police officer are irrelevant to a fourth amendment analysis, except to the extent they have been communicated to the defendant). Thus, the effect of the majority’s holding is to ignore the established precedent of the United States Supreme Court. In People v. Staley, 334 Ill. App. 3d 358, 360, 778 N.E.2d 362, 363-64 (2002), a Pontiac police officer pulled a driver over for operating a vehicle with a suspended registration and later found the driver had no insurance. The police officer sat in his squad car to run a computer check and to write out two citations and then returned to the driver’s vehicle to ask her to get in the squad car to issue the citations. Staley, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 361, 778 N.E.2d at 364. The officer then asked the driver for her consent to search the vehicle, which she gave. Staley, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 361, 778 N.E.2d at 364. The officer testified about 18 minutes elapsed from the stop of the car until he issued the citations and received the driver’s consent to search. Staley, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 361, 778 N.E.2d at 364. This court held the 18-minute traffic stop was reasonable, not unduly long, and affirmed the defendant passenger’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Staley, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 366-67, 369, 778 N.E.2d at 368-69, 370. Thus, an officer’s request that a driver step out of the vehicle to issue a citation does not impermissibly extend the traffic stop. The majority here would conclude the officer in Staley could not have asked the defendant to get in his squad car to issue the citations because “the traffic stop was nevertheless complete” (345 Ill. App. 3d at 842) even though the temperature in that case was -9 degrees. Staley, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 360, 778 N.E.2d at 363. The United States Supreme Court has stated: “The hazard of accidental injrny from passing traffic to an officer standing on the driver’s side of the vehicle may also be appreciable in some situations. Rather than conversing while standing exposed to moving traffic, the officer prudently may prefer to ask the driver of the vehicle to step out of the car and off onto the shoulder of the road where the inquiry may be pursued with greater safety to both.” Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 337, 98 S. Ct. at 333. Although our facts here do not indicate any particular hazardous conditions, the majority’s holding makes no exception for such situations. The majority now forces police officers to brave inclement weather and roadside conditions when returning a driver’s license or issuing citations, unable to ask a driver out of the car prior to the stop’s completion. Here, Officer Davis asked defendant to step out of the car roughly six minutes after stopping the vehicle. After Officer Davis asked defendant to “hop on out” of the car, but before he could complete the traffic stop, subsequent events in quick succession led to the discovery of incriminating evidence on defendant’s person. The trial court’s conclusion that the traffic stop was completed was therefore against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, I would find Officer Davis had probable cause to arrest defendant when defendant volunteered he possessed cannabis and a smoking pipe resulting in the subsequent discovery of those items on his person. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment.