Court Opinion

ID: 9765226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:56:51.035262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:04.468092
License: Public Domain

D. Franklin Arey, III, Judge, concurring. I agree that this matter should be affirmed. This court is not empowered to ignore the rules of construction established by the supreme court. We should therefore affirm on the basis that we cannot construe the insurance policy since it is not in the record before us. The commercial general liability insurance policy at issue has not been abstracted, nor does the policy appear in the record. As the prevailing opinion indicates, apparently the policy was not even produced before the trial court. The applicable rules of construction set out by our supreme court require us to examine the insurance policy as a whole, in order to construe any part of it. [I]t may be said to be a setded rule in the construction of contracts that the interpretation must be upon the entire instrument and not merely on disjointed or particular parts of it. The whole context is to be considered in ascertaining the intention of the parties, even though the immediate object of inquiry is the meaning of an isolated cause. Fowler v. Unionaid Life Ins. Co., 180 Ark. 140, 145, 20 S.W.2d 611, 613 (1929)(emphasis supplied). Our supreme court has “consistently adhered” to the notion that the entire contract should be before it, in order to construe any part of the contract. See First National Bank v. Griffin, 310 Ark. 164, 170, 832 S.W.2d 816, 819 (1992). This court adhered to the requirement that we review the entire contract in Hartford Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 54 Ark. App. 1, 922 S.W.2d 360 (1996). It is axiomatic that, to determine the rights and duties under a contract, we must determine the intent of the parties .... It is well settled that the intent of the parties is to be determined from the whole context of the agreement; the court must consider the instrument in its entirety. Clearly, it is an appellant’s burden to bring up a record sufficient to demonstrate error. Without the contract in question, which may have spoken in any number of ways to the issue of the person or persons entitled to the policy proceeds, we cannot determine whether the trial court erred. Id. at 3, 922 S.W.2d at 362 (citations omitted)(emphasis supplied). In Harford, the insurance contract did not appear in the abstract or the record. Based upon the rules quoted, we concluded that the appellant had failed in its burden to produce a record sufficient to demonstrate error, and we affirmed. Id. In the instant case, we cannot construe the term “advertising,” because the entire policy is not before us. “The rights and liabilities of the parties to an insurance contract must be determined by considering the language of the entire policy .... Whatever the construction of a particular clause standing alone may be, it must be read in connection with other clauses limiting or extending the insurer’s liability.” Continental Casualty Co. v. Davidson, 250 Ark. 35, 41-42, 463 S.W.2d 652, 655 (1971)(cita-tions omitted). The prevailing opinion neither cites authority for the proposition that we can ignore this mandate nor cites any authority for the proposition that these rules can somehow be “waived” by the parties. Since the appellant failed to bring up a record sufficient to demonstrate error, the judgment should be affirmed. Robbins, C.J., joins.