Court Opinion

ID: 9590072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:51:19.391366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:41.105214
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the majority does not properly apply this Court’s precedent concerning the assessment of whether an erroneous jury charge prejudices a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial, I respectfully dissent to Division 2 (a) of the majority opinion. Our precedent dictates that in a criminal prosecution, when a trial court gives an incorrect charge to a jury, such as occurred in this case, a reviewing court must determine whether the erroneous charge was likely to have confused or misled the jury in its deliberations. As explained below, my review of the trial court’s charge in this case leads me to the inescapable conclusion that the erroneous charge clearly caused the jury to be confused and misled. Therefore, I believe that the right to a fair trial was prejudiced in this matter, and a new trial should be ordered.
The written transcript of the trial court’s charge to the jury in this case is approximately 35 pages long. Early in its charge to the jury, on the fourth page of the written transcript, the trial court instructed that:
Intent is an essential element of any crime and must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Intent may be shown in many ways provided you, the jury, believe that it existed from the proven facts before you. . . . Criminal intent does not mean an intention to violate a penal statute, but means simply to intend to commit the act which is pro*777hibited by the statute.
Later in its charge, on the sixteenth page of the written transcript, the trial court instructed the jury that:
You may not find the defendant guilty unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that every element of the offense [as] defined under these instructions, was committed by some person or persons, and the defendant willfully participated in its commission.
Still later in its charge, on the twenty-second page of the written transcript, the trial court stated that:
an assault is an attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of another. A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when that person assaults another with the intent to rob or with a deadly weapon.
Finally, on the twenty-fourth page of the written transcript, the trial court erroneously charged the jury that:
the primary difference between the offense of malice murder and felony murder is that felony murder does not require malice or the intent to kill. Felony murder does not, however, require that the defendant possess the requisite criminal intent to commit the underlying felony. Aggravated assault may be the underlying felony of a charge of felony murder. Aggravated assault is a felony, and death, although unintended, resulting from such assault may constitute felony murder.
Thus, the jury in this case was, on the one hand, given correct instructions about (1) the general intent element required for every crime charged, and (2) the intent element required for a charge of aggravated assault. On the other hand, however, the jury was given an incorrect instruction that, in a felony murder prosecution, it is not necessary for the State to establish that the defendant intended to commit the underlying felony. The majority reasons that because the trial court gave correct instructions regarding intent in general and intent for aggravated assault, the charge as a whole “fairly conveyed the requirement that intent was necessary to commit the underlying felony,” despite the erroneous instruction that in order to find appellant guilty of felony murder, the jury need not have found that he intended to commit the underlying felony. Because this reasoning runs counter to this Court’s precedent, I believe that it has led the *778majority to the wrong conclusion.
In order to determine whether the right to a fair trial was prejudiced by an erroneous jury instruction, we examine the instruction in conjunction with the entire jury charge.2 When it appears probable that the erroneous instruction was the result of a simple misstatement or “slip of the tongue,” a new trial will not be ordered if, based upon our review of the entire jury charge, “it clearly could not have misled or confused the jury.”3
For example, in Gober v. State, the trial court incorrectly stated while charging the jury that the defendant had pled guilty, when in fact the plea had been not guilty. In assessing whether this “slip of the tongue” required a new trial to be ordered, this Court noted that (1) immediately before the misstatement, the trial court had stated correctly that the defendant had pled not guilty, (2) no less than six times during the jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury that the State carries the burden of proving all elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) during deliberations, the jury had before it a copy of the indictment, which indicated that the defendant had pled not guilty. Based upon these factors, revealed by a review of the entire charge, this Court reasoned that the jurors could not have been misled or confused by the single isolated misstatement, and therefore a new trial was not required.
Similarly, in Siegel v. State, the court was faced with a jury charge that instructed if the defendant was found not guilty, he would be given “the benefit of the doubt” and acquitted.4 The court noted that this erroneous instruction, standing alone, would have mandated a new trial.5 However, because an examination of the entire charge revealed that the trial court had, at least six times, instructed that the State carries all burdens of proof with regard to the charges against the defendant, and that a defendant comes into court with the presumption of innocence, the single “slip of the tongue” was deemed harmless error.6
This case, however, does not involve a single “slip of the tongue” that, when examined in light of the entire jury charge, clearly could *779not have misled or confused the jury. The jury charge in this case, when examined as a whole, does not reveal an abundance of correct instructions regarding the intent element of felony murder. In fact, no correct instruction regarding the intent element of a felony murder charge was ever given to the jury in this case. Thus, there is no profusion of correct charges in this case to counterbalance the erroneous charge, as existed in Gober and Siegel. Rather, this case involves a correct charge regarding general intent, a correct charge regarding intent for a charge of aggravated assault, and an incorrect charge regarding the specific intent necessary for a felony murder conviction. Under this scenario, it is entirely possible that a jury could believe that while intent generally is a necessary element to a crime charged, an isolated exception to that rule exists where felony murder is concerned. Obviously, a jury that understood its charge in this manner would be incapable of rendering a fair verdict as to the felony murder charge, and a new trial should be ordered.7
Finally, I note that the authority cited by the majority does not support its ruling. In Whitt v. State, the trial court, due to a “slip of the tongue,” erroneously charged that the State was hot “required to prove . . . guilt. . . beyond all reasonable doubt, but [was] required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” This Court found no reversible error, because the charge as a whole properly informed the jury of the State’s burden of proof.8 The same cannot be said in this case, of course, because a proper charge regarding the intent necessary for felony murder never was given to the jury. Similarly, Holliman v. State concerned an ambiguous statement made in recharging the jury, and the ambiguity was easily resolved by the correct charge, which had been given several times to the jury.9
In conclusion, I believe it is beyond any reasonable doubt that the erroneous charge in this case, when examined in conjunction with the entire charge, could only have caused the jury to be confused and misled. I therefore believe that the right to fair trial was compromised in this case, and that a new trial should be ordered. For that reason, I respectfully dissent to Division 2 (a) of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins in *780this dissent.
Decided March 10, 1997
Reconsideration denied April 3, 1997.
Douglas R. X. Padgett, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, John C. Culp, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Christopher S. Brasher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 Siegel v. State, 206 Ga. 252, 254 (56 SE2d 512) (1949); Chamberlain v. State, 216 Ga. App. 207, 208 (453 SE2d 793) (1995).

 Gober v. State, 247 Ga. 652, 655 (278 SE2d 386) (1981) (“ A mere verbal inaccuracy in a charge, which results from a palpable ‘slip of the tongue,’ and clearly could not have misled or confused the jury,’ is not reversible error”); Siegel, 206 Ga. at 254 (a verbal inaccuracy in the jury charge, “resulting from a palpable ‘slip of the tongue,’ ” did not mandate a new trial because it “clearly did not mislead or confuse the jury”); Chamberlain, 216 Ga. App. at 208 (when erroneous jury instruction is due to “slip of the tongue,” “we must address whether a fair risk exists that the mistake misled or confused the jury”).

 206 Ga. at 252.

 206 Ga. at 253.

 206 Ga. at 253-254.

 See also Reece v. State, 210 Ga. 578, 579 (82 SE2d 10) (1954), rav’d on other grounds, 350 U. S. 85 (76 SC 167, 100 LE 77) (1955) (a correct charge on criminal insanity and a subsequent incorrect charge on criminal responsibility for those adjudged insane were inconsistent and thus likely to create juror confusion, requiring new trial); Ledford v. State, 215 Ga. 799, 806 (113 SE2d 628) (1960) (same); Smith v. Smith, 454 F2d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 1971) (Georgia’s previous charge on alibi defense was inconsistent with the tenant that a criminal defendant carries no burden of proof whatsoever, and thus was likely to cause juror confusion, requiring a new trial).

 257 Ga. 8, 9 (354 SE2d 116) (1987).

 257 Ga. 209, 210 (356 SE2d 886) (1987).