Court Opinion

ID: 9685851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:07:31.23792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:10.707159
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A
COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION.
                                                RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2023
                                                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2022-SC-0237-MR

TIMOTHY GANTHER                                                    APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE ERNESTO SCORSONE, JUDGE
                            NO. 17-CR-01297

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                            APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

      Timothy Ganther appeals as a matter of right1 from a Fayette Circuit

Court judgment sentencing him to 25-years’ imprisonment for a murder

conviction and various drug offenses. On appeal, Ganther alleges prosecutorial

misconduct by the Commonwealth in relation to a misstatement of law made

during closing arguments of the trial, and also improper questioning by the

Commonwealth. Ganther argues that these issues amount to error that

demands reversal of his conviction. We hold that neither the statement nor the

questions amount to prosecutorial misconduct, and thus affirm Ganther’s

convictions.

      1 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).
                        I.   Facts and Procedural Background

         On September 3, 2017, Ganther picked up the victim,

Jerome Wadsworth, from a Greyhound bus station in Cincinnati. Wadsworth

had travelled from Detroit, Michigan and had been in contact with Ganther

regarding his visit to Lexington. Wadsworth brought with him 100 grams of

heroin from Ganther’s alleged drug supplier, Gaige Phillips. Ganther sold some

of the drugs that evening with Wadsworth. Later that night, the men were

involved in an altercation with one another that left Wadsworth dead, shot in

the back of the head. Ganther testified that Wadsworth attempted to take

money and drugs from Ganther’s pockets, and a scuffle ensued. Ganther

struck Wadsworth in the back of the head, knocking him to the ground. As

Wadsworth began to get up, Ganther fired a single shot into the back of

Wadsworth’s head, killing him. Ganther confessed to shooting Wadsworth

during the confrontation, but alleged he acted in self-defense with the intent

only to injure him.

         After a 3-day trial, the jury was given the option of convicting Ganther of

murder or of the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter, as well as

the various drug charges. After deliberations, the jury returned with a guilty

verdict as to murder as well as to the drug counts and recommended Ganther

be sentenced to a total of 25-years’ imprisonment. The trial court adopted the

jury’s recommendation. Ganther now appeals to this Court as a matter of

right.

                                           2
                              II. Standard of Review

      Neither issue presented by Ganther on appeal was preserved at trial.

Accordingly, we review for palpable error as set forth in RCr2 10.26. Ganther’s

claims may only succeed if the “error is clear and plain, affects the substantial

rights of a party, and is more likely than other ordinary errors to affect the

outcome of the case.” McCleery v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Ky.

2013).

                                    III. Analysis

  a. The prosecutor’s misstatement did not result in flagrant misconduct.

      Ganther first alleges that the Commonwealth’s explanation of intent as to

murder amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review for palpable error,

we reverse “a conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct during closing

argument only if that misconduct was flagrant.” Lewis v. Commonwealth, 475

S.W.3d 26, 37 (Ky. 2015). After first identifying an error, we utilize a four-part

test to determine whether a misstatement results in misconduct that is

flagrant:

      (1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the
      accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether
      they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and
      (4) the strength of the evidence against the accused.

Hannah v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 509, 518 (Ky. 2010), superseded by

statute on other grounds.

      2 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                         3
      This Court has further stated that for palpable error review of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments,

      [We] begin with an examination of both the amount of punishment
      fixed by the verdict and the weight of evidence supporting that
      punishment. Other relevant factors, however, include whether the
      Commonwealth's statements are supported by facts in the record
      and whether the allegedly improper statements appeared to rebut
      arguments raised by defense counsel. Finally, we must always
      consider these closing arguments “as a whole" and keep in mind
      the wide latitude we allow parties during closing arguments.

Young v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 66, 74-75 (Ky. 2000).

      Ganther’s argument that the prosecutor misrepresented the mental state

required for murder is well taken. During closing arguments, the prosecutor

stated that “. . .[the mental state] doesn’t have to be the intent to kill him

either, it’s just the intent for that action of shooting Jerome in the back of the

head.” This is a misstatement of the specific intent necessary for a conviction

of murder. As laid out in KRS3 507.020: “(1) A person is guilty of murder

when: (a) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death

of such person[.]” Thus, the intent needed for a murder conviction is not

simply the intent to shoot a person as the prosecutor declared, but rather the

intent to cause that person’s death. See Paulley v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.3d

715, 726 n.43 (Ky. 2010) (prosecutor’s statement that intentional murder only

required proof of intent to shoot, not intent to kill, was erroneous). Indeed, the

mere intent to pull the trigger lends itself to a number of possible offenses,

from wanton endangerment to murder, although we acknowledge that Ganther

      3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                         4
could hardly have anticipated the outcome of his shooting Wadsworth in the

back of the head would lead to anything less than Wadsworth’s death.

Nevertheless, the prosecutor’s description lacked sufficient precision to

comport with the law.

      A prosecutor may discuss the law applicable to the facts at hand during

a closing argument but may not misstate the law. Padgett v. Commonwealth,

312 S.W.3d 336, 351 (Ky. 2010). An unobjected to misstatement of law is

treated in the same way as a misstatement of fact with regard to the

assessment of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Matheney v. Commonwealth,

191 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Ky. 2006). Thus, we must analyze if this misstatement

of law satisfies the four-part test set forth in Hannah.

      Given the nature of the misstatement, it likely misled the jury regarding

the definition of murder and/or the mental state required for the conviction.

The comment made by the prosecutor invited the jury to conflate the intent to

kill with the intent to merely shoot Wadsworth in the back of the head. The

existence of an accurate statement of intent as to murder in the jury

instructions does not by itself persuade us that the jury would have been able

to parse the difference between the instructions and the comment sufficiently

to realize the prosecutor had erred in his closing. We conclude, therefore, that

the comment had a reasonable probability of at least confusing, and at worst

misleading, the jury.

      Proceeding to the remaining elements of the four-part test, the statement

was isolated, constituting only a small portion—roughly ten seconds—of the

                                         5
Commonwealth’s hour-long closing. The third element, whether the comment

was deliberate, cuts in favor of Ganther. We presume that the Commonwealth

is aware of the elements of murder and in the absence of evidence to the

contrary—an attempt to correct himself, for example—the comment appears to

have been deliberately placed before the jury.

      Finally, the evidence against Ganther was strong. No party contests that

Ganther shot Wadsworth in the back of the head. The act of shooting the

victim in the back of the head was itself compelling evidence that Ganther’s

intent was not merely to injure Wadsworth, but rather to cause his death. The

jury’s finding in accordance with this reasoning was imminently reasonable.

      In sum, given the isolation of the statement and the weight of the

evidence against Ganther, the prosecutor’s misstatement does not rise to the

level of flagrancy required under Hannah. See White v. Commonwealth, 544

S.W.3d 125, 146 (Ky. 2017) (as modified) (vacated on other grounds by White v.

Kentucky, 139 S.Ct. 532 (2019)). Even though the jury was conceivably

misinformed as to the nature of the intent required to find murder, whatever

misconception existed in the minds of the jury did little to effect the outcome of

Ganther’s case. Ganther shot Wadsworth in the back of the head, an act with

very few outcomes outside causing the death of the victim. Further, we note

that, as to the murder charge, Ganther was given 20 years, the statutory

minimum for murder and the maximum for first-degree manslaughter, one of

the lesser-included offenses presented to the jury. As a result, whether

Ganther received a harsher sentence upon conviction of the more serious

                                        6
offense is unclear, another factor cutting against reversal pursuant to Young.

Accordingly, we do not believe there was a “’substantial possibility’ that the

result in the case would have been different without the error.” Brewer v.

Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006).

  b. The Commonwealth’s questioning regarding Phillips was proper.

      Ganther next argues that alleged improper questioning by the

Commonwealth and misleading testimony from a witness had a prejudicial

impact on his conviction and sentencing. Specifically, Ganther argues that

questioning by the Commonwealth as to whether Ganther acted under orders

from Phillips—the individual in Detroit who provided drugs for Ganther and the

victim—to kill Wadsworth diminished the likelihood of the jury finding Ganther

guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter. After thorough review of the

record, we do not find error, much less palpable error.

      Ganther directs us to two instances in support of his argument. First, a

statement by Sergeant Tyson Carroll elicited during Ganther’s cross-

examination:

      Defense: In the course of talking to him about the event, you tell
      him, something to the effect of, “after it happened, I bet you were
      scared as hell afterwards.”

      Sgt. Carroll: [nods head “yes”].

      Defense: Do you believe that to be true?

      Sgt. Carroll: I can’t imagine a scenario where if anybody is in a
      traumatic situation, intentionally or otherwise, and they shoot
      somebody, that they wouldn’t be scared. Even a seasoned
      hitman’s going to have some fear running through them.

      Defense: He’s not charged with being that.
                                         7
      Sgt. Carroll: He’s not. He’s not charged with being a hitman.

      Second, Ganther directs us to questioning from the Commonwealth

during its cross-examination of Ganther:

      Commonwealth: From your testimony here today, it sounds like
      Gaige [Phillips] calls the shots in the drug dealing. You’re part of
      the drug dealing business, is that correct?

      Ganther: Yes.

      Commonwealth: Did he tell you to get rid of Jerome [Wadsworth]?

      Ganther: No, he didn’t.

      Commonwealth: That was your decision, wasn’t it?

      Ganther: What are you asking?

      Commonwealth: It was your decision to kill Jerome? Nobody told
      you to do that? It was your choice, right?

      Ganther: Yes.

      We can discern no error in either instance. Sgt. Carroll’s testimony was

perhaps intemperate and speculative, but it did not result in a fundamental

unfairness that would merit reversal. His intent was to underscore the amount

of fear a person would feel after taking the life of another. Further, Sgt.

Carroll’s non-responsive comment arose from a question posed by defense

counsel and to which defense counsel apparently felt could be cured by

subsequent clarification rather than an objection. Given the isolated nature of

the comment and the subsequent clarifying questioning by Ganther, no

palpable error resulted from the statement.

                                         8
         The Commonwealth’s questioning of Ganther similarly did not result in

palpable error. Although we have cautioned litigators against asking questions

that lack a factual predicate, Pace v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Ky.

1982),4 the questioning in this case was not mere speculation by the

prosecutor, but rather flowed from the contextual facts of the case adduced at

trial. Little dispute exists that Phillips was the orchestrator of the drug dealing

operation, having provided the drugs to Wadsworth and sent him to Lexington

to pass along to Ganther for sale. Given the existence of this arrangement, the

prosecutor’s question as to Phillips’ role, or lack of role, in Wadsworth’s death

was not the sort of “out of the blue” question we disapproved of in Pace. See,

e.g., Owsley v. Commonwealth, 743 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Ky. App. 1987).

Ultimately, the question was useful for establishing Ganther’s singular

involvement in the shooting of Wadsworth and Ganther’s responses reinforced

his narrative of the events that the killing was the unfortunate result of

Wadsworth’s attempt to rob him. The questions, at most, were unnecessary,

but they were not error.

         In sum, the evidence does not reflect that either line of questioning or

testimony had an impact on the conviction and sentencing of Ganther. Cross-

examination is the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of

truth,”5 and here, the respective cross-examinations and the responses elicited

         4 Overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Harrell, 3 S.W.3d 349 (Ky.

1999).
      5 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1367 at 32

(James H. Chabourn ed. 1974).

                                           9
thereto served that truth-finding function, even if the questions or responses

went beyond that which was strictly necessary. Because neither Sgt. Carroll’s

response nor the Commonwealth’s questions rose to the level of palpable error,

Ganther is not entitled to relief.

                                     IV. Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is

affirmed.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Kayley Valentien Barnes
Jennifer Leigh Wade
Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Stephanie Lynne McKeehan
Assistant Attorney General

                                         10