Court Opinion

ID: 9960549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 16:00:43.895615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:36.403313
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1205     Document: 010111032720      Date Filed: 04/16/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         April 16, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  JULIE ESPINOZA,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 23-1205
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-01871-MEH)
  COMMISSIONER, SSA,                                          (D. Colo.)

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Julie Espinoza appeals from the district court’s order affirming the Social

 Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits

 (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) under the Social Security Act.

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1205     Document: 010111032720       Date Filed: 04/16/2024   Page: 2

                                    BACKGROUND

       In July 2019, Ms. Espinoza applied for DIB and SSI. After the agency denied

 her application, she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).

 The ALJ held a hearing at which Ms. Espinoza and a vocational expert testified.

 Ms. Espinoza alleged that in August 2018 she became disabled due to chronic

 obstructive pulmonary disease, obstructive sleep apnea, morbid obesity, and

 gastroesophageal reflux disease.

       Proceeding through the traditional five-step evaluative framework for social

 security claimants,1 the ALJ found at step four Ms. Espinoza was not “disabled”

 under the Social Security Act and therefore not entitled to DIB or SSI. The ALJ

 also found, alternatively, that Ms. Espinoza was not disabled at step five because

 there existed other occupations in significant numbers in the national economy

       1
           We have described the five-step process as follows:

                Social Security Regulations mandate that the ALJ who
                determines a claim for benefits under the Social Security
                Act follow a five-step evaluation: (1) whether the claimant
                is currently working; (2) whether the claimant has a severe
                impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets
                an impairment listed in appendix 1 of the relevant
                regulation; (4) whether the impairment precludes the
                claimant from doing [her] past relevant work; and
                (5) whether the impairment precludes the claimant from
                doing any work. If at any point in the process the
                [Commissioner] finds that a person is disabled or not
                disabled, the review ends.

 Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation, footnote, and
 internal quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (discussing
 the five steps).

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 she would still be capable of performing. The Social Security Appeals Council

 denied Ms. Espinoza’s request for review. Ms. Espinoza then sought review

 in district court. A magistrate judge, hearing the case by consent under

 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), issued a thorough written order affirming the final decision of the

 Commissioner. This appeal followed.

                                      DISCUSSION

       In an appeal of a social security benefits determination, “we engage in de novo

 review of the district court’s ruling.” Smith v. Colvin, 821 F.3d 1264, 1266

 (10th Cir. 2016). “In conducting de novo review, we must determine whether the

 administrative law judge correctly applied legal standards and made findings

 supported by substantial evidence.” Id. “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary

 sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

 “A finding of no substantial evidence will be found only where there is a conspicuous

 absence of credible choices or no contrary medical evidence.” Trimiar v. Sullivan,

 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). For

 the reasons explained by the district court, we affirm the district court’s ruling that

 the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. See Aplt. App. vol. 1

 at 7-60.

       Ms. Espinoza advances four arguments on appeal. First, she asserts the ALJ’s

 decision failed to include: “(1) A finding of fact as to [her] [residual functional

 capacity (RFC),] (2) A finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the

 past job/occupation, and (3) A finding of fact that [her] RFC would permit a return to

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 [her] past job or occupation.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 10. The record belies this

 assertion. The ALJ found Ms. Espinoza

       has the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light
       work . . . . The claimant could only lift or carry up to ten pounds
       frequently and twenty pounds occasionally. The claimant could stand
       or walk with normal breaks for a total of six hours in an eight-hour
       workday and sit with normal breaks for a total of six hours in an
       eight-hour workday. She could perform pushing and pulling motions
       with her upper and lower extremities within the weight restrictions
       given. The claimant should avoid unprotected heights and moving
       machinery. The claimant should be restricted to a relatively clean work
       environment, meaning low levels of pollutants. The claimant could
       perform postural activities frequently, and those would be balancing,
       stooping, crouching, and kneeling. She should not climb any ladders,
       ropes, or scaffolds on the job. The claimant could occasionally climb
       ramps and stairs, and occasionally perform crawling. She could reach
       overhead bilaterally but would be limited to only frequent [reaches].

 Aplt. App. vol. 2 at 27. The ALJ further found, relying largely on the unrebutted

 testimony of the vocational expert, that an individual subject to those limitations

 could still perform Ms. Espinoza’s past relevant work as a general clerk, the duties

 for which are spelled out in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. And, the

 regulations permit the use of the Dictionary and vocational expert testimony in this

 way. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2) (“We may use the services of vocational

 experts . . . or other resources, such as the ‘Dictionary of Occupational Titles’ and its

 companion volumes and supplements, published by the Department of Labor, to

 obtain evidence we need to help us determine whether you can do your past relevant

 work, given your residual functional capacity. A vocational expert . . . may offer

 relevant evidence within his or her expertise or knowledge concerning the physical

 and mental demands of a claimant’s past relevant work, either as the claimant

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 actually performed it or as generally performed in the national economy.” (emphasis

 added)); see also Andrade v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1051

 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The ALJ may rely on the Dictionary’s job description for

 claimant’s job category as presumptively applicable to a claimant’s prior work.”

 (internal quotation marks and italics omitted)). Although Ms. Espinoza expresses

 disagreement with the ALJ’s findings, she does not show they lack substantial

 evidentiary support. The ALJ carefully explained how the record contradicts her

 claimed limitations.

       Second, Ms. Espinoza argues the ALJ erroneously considered the availability

 of reasonable accommodations when concluding she could still perform her past

 relevant work. Ms. Espinoza is correct that, “when the [agency] determines whether

 an individual is disabled for SSDI purposes, it does not take the possibility of

 ‘reasonable accommodation’ into account.” Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp.,

 526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999). But the ALJ did not do so here. Rather, the ALJ found

 Ms. Espinoza’s “past relevant work . . . does not require the performance of

 work-related activities precluded by [her RFC].” Aplt. App. vol. 2 at 31. And

 Ms. Espinoza acknowledges her RFC did not include a special reasonable

 accommodation provision, even asserting elsewhere that the restrictions the ALJ

 imposed were merely “normal safety procedures offered to any worker,” Aplt.

 Opening Br. at 11. So, the ALJ’s past-relevant-work finding did not improperly

 depend on the availability of reasonable accommodation.

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       Third, Ms. Espinoza asserts the ALJ failed to adequately address the opinions

 of Dr. Marcel Junqueira and Dr. Barton Giessel. But the records she describes from

 those doctors are not “medical opinions” as the social security regulations define that

 term. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2) (defining “medical opinion” as “a statement

 from a medical source about what [a claimant] can still do despite [her]

 impairment(s) and whether [she has] one or more impairment-related limitations or

 restrictions in” certain enumerated work-related functional areas). The regulations

 therefore required the ALJ to consider the records from Doctors Junqueira and

 Giessel, see id. § 404.1520(a)(3), but they did not require the ALJ to explicitly

 discuss them like medical opinions, compare id. § 404.1520c(a) (“We will articulate

 how we considered the medical opinions . . . in your claim . . . .”) and (b) (listing

 “articulation requirements”) with id. § 404.1513(a)(3) (defining “[o]ther medical

 evidence” as “evidence from a medical source that is not objective medical evidence

 or a medical opinion, including judgments about the nature and severity of your

 impairments, your medical history, clinical findings, diagnosis, treatment prescribed

 with response, or prognosis”). And some of the medical records Ms. Espinoza cites

 come from visits after the ALJ’s December 2021 decision, see Aplt. Opening Br. at

 13–14 (citing Aplt. App. vol. 2 at 9, 10, 14, which relate to an office visit with Dr.

 Giessel on January 18, 2022), so we will not fault the ALJ for not considering them.2

       2
         Ms. Espinoza appears to suggest the ALJ was required to give specific
 weight to the “opinions” of Doctors Junqueira and Giessel as Ms. Espinoza’s treating
 physicians. Because Ms. Espinoza’s claim was filed after March 27, 2017, we must

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        Fourth, Ms. Espinoza argues the ALJ did not adequately justify rejecting

 Dr. Matthew Harmon’s medical opinion, which advocated a somewhat more

 restrictive RFC.3 But the ALJ set forth on the record sound reasons for discounting

 this opinion, including Ms. Espinoza’s “grossly normal physical exams” that

 indicated “normal strength in her bilateral upper and lower extremities” and “normal

 gait.” Aplt. App. vol. 2 at 30. Even if the ALJ could have chosen to weigh

 Dr. Harmon’s opinion more favorably, the record does not reveal a “conspicuous

 absence of credible choices,” Trimiar, 966 F.2d at 1329 (internal quotation marks

 omitted), so we will not disturb this factual finding. We reject Ms. Espinoza’s

 contention that the ALJ’s factual findings were incomplete or insufficient.4

 disagree. The Commissioner’s revised regulations indicate an ALJ will not “defer or
 give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight,” to any medical
 opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a).
        3
          Dr. Harmon opined Ms. Espinoza “could stand and walk for four hours in a
 normal workday[,] . . . lift and carry ten pounds frequently and fifteen pounds
 occasionally[, and] . . . could occasionally perform postural activities, but . . . should use
 a cane for longer distances and uneven terrain.” Aplt. App. vol. 2 at 30.
        4
         Ms. Espinoza urges this court to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s “credit-as-true”
 doctrine, see Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019–21 (9th Cir. 2014), and remand
 for an immediate award of benefits rather than for additional factfinding. That
 doctrine applies “where it is clear from the administrative record that the ALJ would
 be required to award benefits.” Id. at 1019 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
 do not reach this argument, though, because Ms. Espinoza has not shown any error
 necessitating remand.

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                                   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                           Entered for the Court

                                           Veronica S. Rossman
                                           Circuit Judge

                                           8