Court Opinion

ID: 9746711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:34:27.485506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:16.142681
License: Public Domain

*381EAGEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In my Opinion in Support of Reversal, in Commonwealth v. Klobuchir, 486 Pa. 241, 257, 405 A.2d 881, 889 (1979), I explained that, while principles of double jeopardy do not prohibit imposition of a greater sentence following a conviction after retrial than that imposed following conviction in an initial trial which is reversed for trial error, the chilling effect on the constitutional right of appeal which is afforded in this Commonwealth and due process which, to avoid vindictiveness, prohibits imposition of a greater sentence after retrial absent identifiable conduct occurring after the time of original sentence should prohibit trial on any charge greater than that to which an accused has originally plead when the initial conviction is reversed. Hence, as in Commonwealth v. Klobuchir, supra, I would here assume jurisdiction and grant relief.*

 I do not mean to suggest that, in all cases presenting circumstances such as here presented, plenary jurisdiction should be assumed. But I would do so until a definitive ruling on this issue, i. e. the due process issue, is announced.