Court Opinion

ID: 9900476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:13:37.66958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.855101
License: Public Domain

176                                                   April 5, 2023         No. 164
164
325 OrofApp
Dept.
2023     Human Services v. L. B.                                                      April 5, 2023

                                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                                                 STATE OF OREGON

                                               In the Matter of R. M. S.,
                                                        a Child.
                                        DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                                                Petitioner-Respondent,
                                                           v.
                                                         L. B.,
                                                       Appellant.
                                            Columbia County Circuit Court
                                            20JU02052; A178633 (Control)
                                               In the Matter of A. G. S.,
                                                        a Child.
                                        DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                                                Petitioner-Respondent,
                                                           v.
                                                         L. B.,
                                                       Appellant.
                                            Columbia County Circuit Court
                                                 20JU02053; A178634

                                   Michael T. Clarke, Judge.
                                   Submitted January 17, 2023.
  Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, and Sean Connor, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Kirsten M. Naito, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
                                   MOONEY, J.
                                   Affirmed.
Cite as 325 Or App 176 (2023)   177
178                        Dept. of Human Services v. L. B.

        MOONEY, J.
          This is a juvenile dependency proceeding that con-
cerns mother’s children, R and A, both of whom are Indian
children within the meaning of the Oregon Indian Child
Welfare Act (ORICWA) and the federal Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA). See ORS 419B.600 - 419B.665; Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, 25 USC §§ 1901 - 1963. Mother appeals
from a permanency judgment that changed the permanency
plan for R and A from reunification to guardianship. R was
10 years old and A was 11 years old at the time of the per-
manency hearing. Mother asserts four assignments of error,
two for each child, each of which mirrors the assignments
for the other child: that the juvenile court erred in ruling
that the Department of Human Services’ (DHS) efforts to
reunify mother and her children qualified as “active,” and in
changing R’s and A’s permanency plans from reunification
to guardianship. We conclude that the juvenile court’s active
efforts findings were supported by the record and that it did
not err when it changed the permanency plan for each child.
We affirm.
          “[W]e review the juvenile court’s legal conclusions
for errors of law and are bound by its findings of historical
fact if there is any evidence in the record to support them.”
Dept. of Human Services v. J. G., 260 Or App 500, 504, 317
P3d 936 (2014).
         Given that this is an ORICWA case, and because
the permanency plan at the time of the permanency hearing
was reunification, the juvenile court was required to deter-
mine whether DHS had made “active efforts” to reunite R
and A with their mother. ORS 419B.476(2)(a). It was not
authorized to change the plan away from reunification
unless it could find that DHS had “provid[ed] active efforts
to make it possible for [R and A] to safely return home[.]”
ORS 419B.476(7)(b).
         “Active efforts” are efforts that are “affirmative,
active, thorough, timely and intended to maintain or
reunite an Indian child with the Indian child’s family.”
ORS 419B.645(1). “Active efforts require a higher stan-
dard of conduct than reasonable efforts.” ORS 419B.645(3).
That “standard is understood to impose on the agency an
Cite as 325 Or App 176 (2023)                            179

obligation greater than simply creating a reunification plan
and requiring the client to execute it independently.” State
ex rel Juv. Dept. v. T. N., 226 Or App 121, 124, 203 P3d 262,
rev den, 346 Or 257 (2009). Instead, DHS must “assist the
client through the steps of a reunification.” Id. “The type
and sufficiency of effort that DHS is required to make
depends on the particular circumstances of the case.” Dept.
of Human Services v. D. L. H., 251 Or App 787, 799, 284 P3d
1233, aff’d on recons, 253 Or App 600, 292 P3d 565 (2012),
rev den, 353 Or 445 (2013). To determine whether efforts
were active, a juvenile court will consider “whether a parent
is likely to benefit from a service.” Dept. of Human Services
v. M. K., 257 Or App 409, 416, 306 P3d 763 (2013).
         On appeal, mother argues that the juvenile court
erred by concluding that DHS’s efforts qualified as active
because DHS failed to provide her with a second neuropsy-
chological examination and other services that had been
suggested by mother’s counselor, and in changing the plan
for the children to guardianship. Those rulings occurred in
the context of a regularly scheduled annual permanency
hearing under ORS 419B.470(7). DHS had not requested
a change in plan; however, at the beginning of the hear-
ing, R’s attorney informed the court and the parties that R
wanted to change the plan to adoption. The court acknowl-
edged “that information” and proceeded with the hearing.
Both DHS and mother were prepared with witnesses who
testified about the efforts made by DHS and the progress
made by mother, and then mother testified. At the close of
evidence, the court took up the question of whether the plan
could be changed that day. The court appointed special advo-
cate (CASA) ultimately made an oral motion during that
hearing to change the plan for both children from reunifica-
tion to guardianship. DHS informed the juvenile court that
it was not prepared to request a change in plan at that time
because it had not yet followed its own internal process to
obtain approval from the agency’s guardianship committee,
but that it did not object to the CASA’s motion to change the
plan. The tribal representative provided the tribe’s support
for a change in plan from reunification to guardianship. R’s
counsel clarified that, while R preferred adoption, she would
not object to a change of plan to guardianship.
180                        Dept. of Human Services v. L. B.

         Ultimately, the juvenile court determined that DHS
had used active efforts to reunify R and A with their mother,
but that, despite those efforts, mother had not made suffi-
cient progress to allow her children to return safely home.
The juvenile court then changed the plan to guardianship.
There was discussion that the focus of the case would change
to support the new plan of guardianship given the change in
permanency plan. The court nevertheless directed DHS to
continue working with mother and to move forward in trying
to provide her with a second neuropsychological evaluation.
The juvenile court’s findings and permanency judgment met
the requirements of ORS 419B.476(5)(k), which places the
onus on the court to determine, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that active efforts were provided; that, despite those
efforts, continued removal is necessary to prevent serious
damage to the child; that the parent has not made sufficient
progress to allow the child to safely return home; and that
the new permanency plan complies with the placement pref-
erences outlined in ORS 419B.654.
         The permanency hearing in question occurred 25
months after R and A were removed from mother’s care and
21 months after jurisdiction was established. The perma-
nency judgment included, among other things, the juvenile
court’s findings regarding the reunification services that
DHS had arranged for mother and for R and A. The court
found that DHS had developed a safety plan for the fam-
ily and had arranged for and facilitated contact between
mother and the children, in-person and remotely, using pro-
fessional supervisors and parent trainers. The court found
that mother had visited with A 58 times and with R 54
times at that point in the case. DHS had arranged for alco-
hol and drug evaluation and treatment, psychological eval-
uation and treatment, mental health counseling, housing
assistance, transportation assistance, and other in-home
safety and reunification services. The court also adopted
and included in its active efforts findings the description of
DHS efforts reflected in (1) a letter from mother’s special-
ized parent coach from Wise Choice Educational Solutions
describing six parent coaching sessions and other “consul-
tations,” (2) the DHS Family Report prepared for the per-
manency hearing, and (3) the CASA’s most recent findings
Cite as 325 Or App 176 (2023)                                                181

and recommendations contained in her report, detailing the
efforts mentioned already as well as significant efforts used
to actively involve the children’s tribe in family reunification
work, all of which were offered and received by the court as
evidence.
         Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the
juvenile court did not err in making an active efforts deter-
mination and it did not err when it changed the permanency
plan to guardianship. DHS actively worked with mother,
her children, and the tribe toward reunification through
services that were specific to the circumstances that led to
jurisdiction in the first place.1 Mother acknowledges that
DHS was unable to immediately provide her with a second
neuropsychological evaluation because its policy is to pro-
vide one evaluation every two years. She also acknowledges
certain contractual limitations with respect to DHS’s abil-
ity to provide further specialized parent coaching through
Wise Choice. But mother contends that DHS nevertheless
fell short of its active efforts obligation despite those pol-
icy and contractual limitations. She argues that the juve-
nile court’s analysis was flawed in assessing DHS’s failure
to arrange for a second neuropsychological evaluation and
other specific therapies given DHS’s legal obligation to use
active, and not merely reasonable, efforts.
         In mother’s view, the court failed to do the proper
“cost-benefit analysis” when it evaluated whether DHS’s
efforts “gave mother an opportunity to ameliorate the juris-
dictional bases” specifically by balancing its burden in pro-
viding those services with the benefit that mother might
reasonably get from them. In the absence of any evidence
from DHS that it was “unable [ ]as opposed to unwilling[ ]”
to provide mother with certain services, she argues, the
court should not have made an active efforts finding. See
Dept. of Human Services v. K. G. T., 306 Or App 368, 473 P3d
131 (2020) (concluding that, because DHS failed to explore
alternate service options while father was incarcerated,

    1
      In asserting jurisdiction, the juvenile court relied on mother’s admissions
that she had mental health issues that interfered with her ability to safely parent
R and A and also that she needs the assistance of DHS to meet R’s and A’s physi-
cal and emotional needs.
182                           Dept. of Human Services v. L. B.

the court was required to conduct a “cost-benefit analysis”
to determine whether DHS could have provided other ser-
vices within reason, and a failure to conduct that analysis
required reversal).
        Mother’s argument misses the point. The juvenile
court made its active efforts determination giving proper
consideration to the services that mother had been offered
in conjunction with its consideration of evidence concerning
mother’s progress given those services. The court stated:
   “[I]t sure does not look to me that [mother] will, despite
   any other reunification efforts, will be able to get to a point
   [of minimal adequacy]. * * * I have specifically ordered
   [mother] a number of times not to do certain things.
   “* * * I just don’t believe that she is ever going to get to a
   point [of minimal adequacy]. Now, I don’t think that * * *
   ODHS should stop providing services and doing everything
   that they can to help her * * *.”

The juvenile court made clear findings that mother was
offered several services but had still not made progress
toward minimal adequacy. There is no indication in this
record that mother would benefit from additional services
that were not explored due to a “cost-benefit analysis” or
because of an unwillingness by DHS to provide a service
that could have been helpful to mother.
         We acknowledge that an internal DHS policy is not,
on its own, a sufficient reason to not provide a necessary
service to a parent, especially in a case requiring active
efforts. However, given the entirety of this record, we do
not find that DHS’s failure to request a policy exception or
to otherwise arrange for a second evaluation prior to the
permanency hearing shows a lack of active efforts on its
part. Rather, the court concluded that mother was unlikely
to benefit from any service DHS might offer in light of her
lack of progress up to the point of the hearing. The fact that
mother might benefit from specific therapies according to her
counselor does not mean that DHS was required to provide
those services, particularly given mother’s lack of progress
despite the extensive efforts DHS had already made. The
record supports the juvenile court’s active efforts finding.
Cite as 325 Or App 176 (2023)                            183

It follows that the court did not err in changing the plan to
guardianship.
        Affirmed.