Court Opinion

ID: 9899597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 01:00:29.751746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:42.104859
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60565        Document: 00516971072             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/16/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                 November 16, 2023
                                      No. 22-60565                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Benjamin Demond McAbee,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Mississippi
                              USDC No. 3:20-CR-150-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Appellant Benjamin McAbee (“McAbee”) appeals the district
   court’s sentence. For the reasons explained below, we VACATE and
   REMAND with instructions.
                                       I. Background
         In 1999, McAbee pled guilty to delivery of cocaine in violation of
   Mississippi law. In 2001, McAbee pled guilty to aggravated assault, after he
         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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   hit his victim with a stick and stabbed him with a shank. In 2003, McAbee
   pled guilty to manslaughter after shooting and killing his victim during an
   argument.
          In 2020, a Jackson Police Department officer was patrolling on foot
   when he smelled marijuana. The officer approached McAbee, who was in the
   parking lot of a gas station. The officer noticed a plastic bag containing what
   appeared to be marijuana next to McAbee. McAbee confirmed to the officer
   that the marijuana was his, and when asked if he had any other drugs on him,
   McAbee removed another bag of marijuana from his front right pocket. The
   officer placed McAbee under arrest. After arresting McAbee, the officer
   noticed a green and black 9mm pistol on the ground near where the officer
   found McAbee. Regarding the gun, McAbee stated “[y]eah that’s my gun,
   I’m not going to even lie. I’m going back to jail because I am a convicted
   felon.”
             In 2022, McAbee pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one
   count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
   922(g)(1). McAbee’s plea agreement included a section titled “Waivers,” in
   which he agreed that he “expressly waive[d] . . . the right to appeal the
   conviction and sentence imposed in this case, or the manner in which that
   sentence was imposed . . . on any ground whatsoever,” with an exception for
   a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. McAbee “further
   acknowledge[d] and agree[d] that any factual issues regarding the sentencing
   will be resolved by the sentencing judge” and that “in making its sentencing
   decision, the district court may consider any relevant evidence without
   regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial.” The
   plea agreement also outlined penalties, stating that the statutory maximum
   for a violation of the charged offense was “not more than 10 years in prison;
   a term of supervised release of not more than three (3) years; and a fine of up
   to $250,000.00.” However, the plea agreement explicitly stated that if

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   McAbee was “determined to be an Armed Career Criminal, the sentence
   shall be not less than fifteen years nor more than life in prison; a term of
   supervised release of not more than five years; and a fine of up to
   $250,000.00.”
          The presentence report (“PSR”) determined that McAbee qualified
   for enhanced sentencing under § 924(e) of the Armed Career Criminal Act
   (“ACCA”) and identified a mandatory minimum term of 15 years of
   imprisonment and a corresponding guidelines term of 180 months. McAbee
   objected to the PSR, and in his sentencing memorandum, he argued that two
   of his three prior convictions did not meet the definition of a “serious drug
   offense” or a “violent felony” under the ACCA; he raised the same
   arguments during the sentencing hearing. The district court overruled his
   objections, adopted the findings in the PSR, and sentenced McAbee under
   the ACCA to a 180-month term of imprisonment and five years of supervised
   release. McAbee timely appealed.
                                II. Legal Standard
          Preserved challenges to “legal conclusions underlying a district
   court’s application of” the ACCA are reviewed de novo. United States v.
   James, 950 F.3d 289, 291 (5th Cir. 2020).
                                 III. Discussion
          The ACCA mandates a 15‐year minimum imprisonment sentence for
   a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation
   of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) if the defendant has three prior convictions for a
   “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The
   district court identified McAbee’s previous convictions for delivery of
   cocaine, aggravated assault, and manslaughter as the predicate offenses for
   applying the ACCA enhancement. On appeal, McAbee only challenges the

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   district court’s categorization of his 1999 conviction for delivery of cocaine
   as a serious drug offense.
          McAbee argues that because “the government failed to produce
   Shepard 1 approved documents evidencing that Mr. McAbee’s conviction for
   delivery of cocaine was punishable by ten (10) years or more, the delivery of
   cocaine conviction does not constitute a serious drug offense under the
   ACCA.” In Shepard, the Supreme Court limited district courts’ inquiries
   into determining the character of an offense to “the statutory definition,
   charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and
   any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant
   assented” or “some comparable judicial record” of information about the
   “factual basis for the plea.” Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 26. The government
   responded in its brief that “the record reflects that the court considered the
   Shepard documents” and references the PSR attachments which included
   the relevant indictment, sentencing order, and the Mississippi statute.
          Our review of the record shows there are no Shepard approved
   documents supporting McAbee’s delivery of cocaine conviction. The
   indictment and sentencing order are silent as to the corresponding subsection
   under which McAbee was sentenced. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S.
   254, 257, 262 (2013). The government argues McAbee waived his right to
   appeal the conviction and sentence imposed in this case. And we have
   previously held that a defendant may waive his right to appeal his conviction
   and sentence notwithstanding a district court’s findings of facts not admitted
   in his guilty plea. See United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544-46 (5th Cir.
   2005); see also United States v. Meredith, 52 F.4th 984, 987-88 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (quoting United States v. Smith, 404 F. App’x 884, 887 (5th Cir. 2010 (per

          _____________________
          1
              Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).

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   curiam) (“We enforce broad appellate waivers and have declined to examine
   the correctness of applying a particular guideline where the defendant has
   agreed to a general waiver of the right to appeal the sentence.”)). Yet the
   district court judge here has not had the opportunity to determine whether
   the plea agreement encompasses waiver of Shepard approved documents. We
   are thus compelled to remand this matter to the district court for the
   following limited proceedings:
         1) to determine whether the government can provide evidence
         regarding McAbee’s 1999 delivery of cocaine conviction consistent
         with Shepard; and
         2) in the event the government cannot provide such evidence, to hold
         a hearing on whether the plea agreement’s waiver provision
         encompasses the requirement for Shepard approved documents in
         determining the ACCA’s applicability.
                                    IV. Conclusion
         Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND for further proceedings.
   The government’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. Moreover, the motion for
   leave to supplement brief is DENIED.

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   James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment and
   dissenting in part:
          I concur in the judgment reversing the district court. I join my
   colleagues in vacating Mr. McAbee’s sentence because the Shepard evidence
   is inconclusive about whether his 1999 conviction for delivery of cocaine
   constitutes a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act
   (“ACCA”). 1 I also agree with the panel majority’s recognition that Mr.
   McAbee did not waive his right to bring this appeal. However, I disagree with
   the panel majority’s remand instruction for the district court “to hold a
   hearing on whether the plea agreement’s waiver provision encompasses the
   requirement for Shepard approved documents in determining the ACCA’s
   applicability” but only “in the event the government cannot provide
   [conclusive Shepard] evidence.” Ante, at 5. Because I would remand for
   resentencing without instructions, I respectfully dissent.
                                         *        *         *
          As the panel majority explains, we are faced with a criminal appeal
   from a district court’s judgment imposing a fifteen-year term of
   imprisonment at sentencing. The hefty sentence stems from Mr. McAbee’s
   possession of a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
   922(g)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in
   any court of, a crime punishable for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . .
   possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.”). Mr.
   McAbee was charged by a one-count indictment for being a felon in
   possession of a firearm, and he entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a written
   plea agreement with the Government. The district court accepted Mr.
   McAbee’s guilty plea and sentenced him to a fifteen-year term of
          _____________________
          1
              Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).

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   imprisonment, finding that he qualified for an enhancement under the ACCA
   because he had three prior convictions for “violent offenses” or “serious
   drug offenses.” That enhancement prescribes a fifteen-year statutory
   minimum term of imprisonment. Without the enhancement, the statute
   applicable to Mr. McAbee’s offense imposes a ten-year statutory maximum
   term of imprisonment. 2 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2018) (amended 2022).
   Mr. McAbee appealed his sentence and argues, first, that his 1999 conviction
   for “delivery of cocaine” does not constitute a “serious drug offense” and,
   second, that he did not waive his right to appeal a sentence imposed in excess
   of a statutory maximum term of imprisonment.
          With respect to the first issue, the panel majority appropriately finds
   that Mr. McAbee does not qualify for the ACCA sentencing enhancement
   because we do not know whether his “delivery of cocaine offense” is a
   “serious drug offense.” The ACCA defines a “serious drug offense” to
   include “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing,
   or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance
   . . . , for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed
   by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). “[T]here are no
   Shepard approved documents supporting McAbee’s delivery of cocaine
   conviction . . . [because] [t]he indictment and sentencing order are silent as
   to the corresponding subsection under which McAbee was sentenced” in
   1999. Ante, at 4. Given that the subsection of the statute Mr. McAbee was
   convicted under in 1999 is unknown and considering that Mr. McAbee was
   only sentenced to five years of imprisonment for that conviction, we cannot
   say whether the crime carried with it the possibility of “ten years or more”

          _____________________
          2
                Mr. McAbee committed the instant offense before Congress increased the
   statutory maximum to 15 years. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-
   159, tit. II, § 12004, 136 Stat. 1313, 1327 (2022) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8)).

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   imprisonment. The district court therefore did not have a sufficient basis to
   find the 1999 conviction was a “serious drug offense” and apply the ACCA
   sentencing enhancement. Mr. McAbee’s sentence must be vacated.
           The second issue raised by the parties is whether Mr. McAbee waived
   his right to bring this appeal in light of appeal waiver language included in his
   plea agreement. 3 The panel majority fails to squarely address the issue, but,
   by proceeding to the merits and opting against granting the Government’s
   motion to dismiss, the majority implicitly—and correctly—rejects the
   Government’s contention that Mr. McAbee waived his right to bring the
   instant appeal. 4 See United States v. Leal, 933 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (holding that a defendant never waives his right to appeal a sentence imposed
   in excess of a statutory maximum when properly raised); see also United States
   v. Barnes, 953 F.3d 383, 388-89 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that a sentence
   imposed in excess of a statutory maximum is one exception to the general
   rule that a knowing and voluntary appellate waiver is enforceable); see also
   United States v. Fields, No. 20-60148, 832 F. App’x 317, 317 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (unpublished) (holding that a misapplication of the ACCA sentencing
   enhancement results in a sentence that is in excess of the statutory maximum
   term of imprisonment, meaning an appeal of the ACCA’s application is not
   barred by an appeal waiver under Leal); see also United States v. House, No.
   09-40302, 394 F. App’x 122, 124 n.6 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (same).
           Though the parties argue over whether Mr. McAbee waived his right
           _____________________
           3
               Mr. McAbee’s plea agreement says “Defendant . . . waives . . . the right to appeal
   the . . . sentence imposed in this case . . . on any ground whatsoever.” We review “de novo
   whether an appeal waiver bars an appeal.” United States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir.
   2014) (citing United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2002)).
           4
             The Government filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver
   in the plea agreement, which we denied.

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   to bring this appeal, the panel majority remands for the district court to
   determine whether Mr. McAbee waived a different right—his right to
   demand that the district court, presumably at a resentencing hearing, limit its
   ACCA review to Shepard evidence. 5 In Shepard, the Supreme Court limited
   district courts’ inquiries into determining the character of a prior offense for
   ACCA purposes to so-called Shepard evidence, i.e., “the statutory definition,
   charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and
   any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant
   assented” or “some comparable judicial record” of information about the
   “factual basis of the plea.” Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 26. The panel majority
   says the district court “has not had the opportunity to” decide the waiver
   issue that only the majority has raised and remands for further deliberation—
   but only if the Government cannot provide any other Shepard-approved
   documents clarifying whether Mr. McAbee’s “delivery of cocaine”
   conviction is a serious drug offense. Ante, at 5.

           _____________________
           5
             The panel majority deviates significantly from the principle of party presentation
   of argument. Not even the Government argues that Mr. McAbee waived the Shepard
   evidence limitation on the district court’s review. See Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City
   of Schertz, Tex., 969 F.3d 460, 474 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (recognizing that neutral
   arbiters of justice do not “make a party’s argument for it in the first place”); see also United
   States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (“In our adversarial system of
   adjudication, we follow the principle of party presentation.”); Castro v. United States, 540
   U.S. 375, 381-83 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
   (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best
   for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to
   relief.”); United States v. Samuels, 808 F.3d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987) (R. Arnold, J.,
   concurring in denial of reh’g en banc) (“Counsel almost always know a great deal more
   about their cases than we do, and this must be particularly true of counsel for the United
   States, the richest, most powerful, and best represented litigant to appear before us.”).

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          One need not do more than restate the majority’s remand instructions
   to demonstrate that both are poorly thought out. It is unsound to remand for
   a hearing on whether Mr. McAbee waived the requirement that the district
   court consider only Shepard evidence while simultaneously vacating a
   sentence for a lack of Shepard evidence and remanding in the first instance to
   see if there is more Shepard evidence. It is abundantly clear that the panel
   majority does not actually believe Mr. McAbee waived Shepard’s limitation
   on the district court’s review. If it did, why would the panel majority vacate
   Mr. McAbee’s sentence for lack of Shepard evidence? And why would the
   panel majority also initially require the Government to determine whether
   other Shepard evidence exists on remand? I would cut to the chase and not
   waste the district court and parties’ resources by mandating preparation for
   and participation in a hearing on a question that no one has raised and, in any
   event, one that we already know the answer to.
           Turning to that answer, the plea agreement’s waiver provision does
   not “encompass” the requirement that the district court, at resentencing,
   review only Shepard-approved documents to determine whether Mr.
   McAbee qualifies for the ACCA enhancement. We interpret plea agreements
   employing “ordinary principles of contract interpretation” and, in
   particular, “constru[e] waivers narrowly and against the Government.”
   Keele, 755 F.3d at 754 (citing United States v. Palmer, 456 F.3d 484, 488 (5th
   Cir. 2006)). The waiver provision in Mr. McAbee’s plea agreement reads in
   relevant part: “Defendant . . . hereby expressly waives . . . the right to appeal
   the conviction and sentence imposed in this case, or the manner in which that
   sentence was imposed . . . on any ground whatsoever[.]” 6 The right to appeal
          _____________________
          6
            Moreover, the provision in Mr. McAbee’s plea agreement where he “agree[d]
   that, in making its sentencing decision, the district court may consider any relevant
   evidence without regard to its admissibility” does not support a finding that Mr. McAbee
   “waived” the Shepard evidence limitation either. Shepard evidence is the only “relevant

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   a judgment entered after a sentencing hearing is distinct from a defendant’s
   right to demand the district court comply with Supreme Court precedent by
   limiting its ACCA sentencing enhancement review to Shepard evidence.
   Certainly, Mr. McAbee has not waived that latter right by way of his plea
   agreement’s appeal waiver provision. No court has ever found a defendant to
   have waived the Shepard evidence limitation, and we should caution the
   district court against haphazardly being the first.
                                    *        *         *
          The panel majority’s remand instructions raise more questions than
   answers. The panel should vacate Mr. McAbee’s sentence and remand for
   resentencing without the inclusion of instructions.
          I respectfully dissent.

          _____________________
   evidence” when it comes to determining the character of a prior offense for ACCA
   purposes. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 26.

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