Court Opinion

ID: 2963645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:26.995064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:44.306961
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1178

                                   THOMAS QUESNEL,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                            PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                Defendant - Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                      [Hon. Michael Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                                Lynch, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            and Casellas,* District Judge.
                                           ______________

                                _____________________

               John F. Moriarty,  Jr., with  whom Moriarty &  Neves was  on
               ______________________             _________________
          brief for appellant.
               Burton J. Fishman, with whom Tucker, Flyer & Lewis and Kevin
               _________________            _____________________     _____
          Patrick Reilly were on brief for appellee.
          ______________

                                 ____________________

                                  September 25, 1995
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

                    TORRUELLA,  Chief   Judge.  Plaintiff-appellant  Thomas
                    TORRUELLA,  Chief   Judge
                                _____________

          Quesnel challenges the district court's dismissal of his wrongful

          termination action, originally  brought in  state court,  against

          his former employer, Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudential").

          The  district  court  found  that  Quesnel's  claim  necessitated

          analysis of  the  collective  bargaining  agreement  binding  the

          parties,  and  accordingly  held the  claim  to  be preempted  by

          federal labor law.  For the following reasons, we affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    Quesnel  began  his  employment  at   Prudential  as  a

          district agent, and  became a sales  manager in  1991.  He  later

          returned  to the  level of  district agent  in September  of that

          year.

                    Throughout Quesnel's period  of employment,  Prudential

          had a  collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") with the Union

          of Food and  Commercial Workers (the  "Union") which covered  all

          "district  agents"  working for  Prudential, regardless  of union

          membership.1  This CBA contained  the terms by which Prudential's

                              
          ____________________

          1  Specifically, Article I of the CBA states:  

                      The  Employer agrees  to and  hereby does
                      recognize, to the extent required  by the
                      National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
                      The Union as the exclusive representative
                      for the purposes of collective bargaining
                      in  respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
                      of  employment,  or  other conditions  of
                      employment,   of   all  District   Agents
                                         ______________________
                      employed or hereafter  to be employed  by
                      the Employer . . . .

             (Emphasis added).

                                         -2-

          agents  were employed and compensated.   The CBA  also set forth,

          inter  alia,   grievance  procedures,  which  provided   for  the
          _____  ____

          arbitration of grievances for  wrongful termination.  Quesnel and

          Prudential  were also  parties to  a standard  Agent's Agreement,

          which set forth the scope of the agency relationship.

                    Quesnel was  terminated in March  1992.  He  filed this

          action in Massachusetts  state court in  May 1994, claiming  that

          Prudential  had terminated him for the purpose of denying him his

          earned commissions, which, under Massachusetts law, is considered

          a wrongful termination.  See Fortune National Cash Register  Co.,
                                   ___ ___________________________________

          373 Mass. 96, 104-05 (1977).  Prudential  removed the case to the

          United States  District Court for the  District of Massachusetts,

          and  moved to dismiss Quesnel's claim on  the grounds that it was

          preempted by federal  labor law  and that Quesnel  had failed  to

          exhaust his  administrative remedies  available to him  under the

          terms of the CBA.  Quesnel responded that he was not  a member of

          the Union  and therefore not  a party  to the CBA.   Instead,  he

          argued,   his  employment   relationship   with  Prudential   was

          controlled  by the  Agent's  Agreement, which,  he asserted,  was

          independent of the CBA,  and thus his claims were  not preempted.

          Accordingly, Quesnel moved for remand to state court.

                    On  February  1,  1995,   the  district  court  granted

          Prudential's motion  to dismiss and denied  Quesnel's request for

          remand.   The district court  ruled that because  "no court could

          begin to address [Quesnel's] claims here without immersing itself

          in  the CBA,"  Quesnel's state  law  claims were  preempted under

                                         -3-

          principles  of federal  labor  law.    The court  then  dismissed

          Quesnel's claim because it  was governed by the NLRA  and because

          Quesnel was time barred from any recovery.2

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                    A.   Standard of Review
                    A.   Standard of Review
                         __________________

                    Appellate  review of a district court's dismissal under

          Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is plenary.  We therefore apply the same

          standard as did the district court, that "'a complaint should not

          be  dismissed  for failure  to state  a  claim unless  it appears

          beyond  doubt that  the plaintiff  can prove  no set of  facts in

          support  of  his  claim  which would  entitle  him  to  relief.'"

          Miranda v.  Ponce Fed'l  Bank, 948 F.2d  41, 44  (1st Cir.  1991)
          _______     _________________

          (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
                   ______    ______

                    B.   Preemption of Quesnel's Claim
                    B.   Preemption of Quesnel's Claim
                         _____________________________

                    The sole issue before us is whether Quesnel's state law

          claims are preempted  as a matter  of law under    301(a) of  the

          Labor-Management Relations  Act,  29 U.S.C.     185(a).3   It  is
                              
          ____________________

          2   The CBA sets  forth grievance and  arbitration procedures for
          wrongful termination.  Quesnel did not pursue these remedies, and
          the  time  limit for  seeking relief  under  the CBA  has lapsed.
          Finding that Quesnel was  subject to the CBA, the  district court
          accordingly  dismissed his  claims for  failure to  exhaust these
          administrative remedies.

          3  Section 301(a) provides:

                      Suits for violation of  contracts between
                      an  employer  and  a  labor  organization
                      representing  employees  in  an  industry
                      affecting  commerce  as  defined in  this
                      chapter,  or  between   any  such   labor
                      organizations,  may  be  brought  in  any
                      district  court  of  the   United  States
                      having   jurisdiction  of   the  parties,

                                         -4-

          well-established that   301 completely preempts a state law claim

          if  the resolution  of  the claim  necessitates  analysis of,  or

          substantially depends on the  meaning of, a collective bargaining

          agreement.  Lingle  v. Norge  Division of Magic  Chef, Inc.,  486
                      ______     ____________________________________

          U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.  Lueck, 471 U.S.
                                   ____________________     _____

          202, 220 (1985); Magerer v. John  Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 528
                           _______    __________________

          (1st Cir. 1990).  

                      1. Does Quesnel's claim require interpretation of the
                      1. Does Quesnel's claim require interpretation of the
                         __________________________________________________
                         CBA?
                         CBA?
                         ____

                    Assuming  Quesnel  is  subject  to  the  CBA,  we  must

          determine whether  resolution of his  claims in the  instant case

          necessitates  analysis  of,  or substantially  depends  upon  the

          meaning of,  the CBA. If so, then his claims must be dismissed as

          preempted in light of the foregoing principles.  Having carefully

          examined the  CBA, we  think  that the  district court  correctly

          found  that the CBA is  directly implicated in  any resolution of

          Quesnel's claims.  The CBA sets  forth the terms and scope of the

          employment  relationship of  all  district  agents,  encompassing

          rates   of   pay,   wages,    and   conditions   of   employment.

          Significantly,  the  CBA  sets  forth  grievance  procedures  for

          alleged wrongful termination.   Determination of whether  Quesnel

          was  indeed wrongfully  terminated,  and whether  his failure  to

          follow  grievance procedures  set  forth in  the CBA  nonetheless

          precludes  his claim would require a court, as the district court

                              
          ____________________

                      without   respect   to   the  amount   in
                      controversy  or  without  respect to  the
                      citizenship of the parties.

                                         -5-

          found, to immerse itself  in the CBA's terms.   Interpretation of

          the  CBA is  therefore  crucial to  any  resolution of  Quesnel's

          claim.

                                         -6-

                      2. Is Quesnel subject to the CBA?
                      2. Is Quesnel subject to the CBA?
                         ______________________________

                    Because  we find  that resolution  of Quesnel's  claims

          require interpretation  of the CBA,  his claims are  preempted if

          Quesnel is indeed  subject to  the CBA's terms.   Quesnel  wisely

          does not  dispute  this; rather,  he claims  that his  employment

          relationship  with Prudential  was governed  not by the  CBA, but

          solely by the Agent's Agreement, and  therefore his claims should

          be  adjudicated in  state  court.   At  the very  least,  Quesnel

          argues,  there  exists a  genuine issue  of  material fact  as to

          whether he is subject to the CBA.4

                    Whether  Quesnel is subject to the CBA is in this case,

          however,  a  question of  law,  not  of fact.    See  Coll v.  PB
                                                           ___  ____     __

          Diagnostics Systems,  Inc., 50  F.3d 1115,  1122 (1st Cir.  1995)
          __________________________

          (interpretation of contract is a question of  law); Whitney Bros.
                                                              _____________

          v. Sprafkin,  3 F.3d  530, 534  (1st  Cir. 1993)  (same).   After
             ________

          examining  the CBA and the Agent's Agreement, we conclude that it

          is  clear  that Quesnel  is indeed  subject  to the  CBA's terms.

          First,  the  CBA  was effective  on  the  date  Quesnel became  a

          district agent, and by its terms encompasses "all District Agents

          employed or  hereafter to  be employed" by  Prudential, including

          those agents employed in the company's Massachusetts offices.
                              
          ____________________

          4  Quesnel contends  that because the district court  went beyond
          the pleadings by considering the CBA, the  Agent's Agreement, and
          an affidavit  of Quesnel,  it was actually  treating Prudential's
          motion  to dismiss as one for summary  judgment, and that we must
          therefore  apply the  standard  of review  applicable to  summary
          judgment decisions.  As we explain,  however, because we conclude
          as  a  matter  of law  that  Quesnel's  claim  is preempted,  his
          arguments  regarding  the  appropriate  standard  of  review  are
          irrelevant.

                                         -7-

                    Second, regardless  of the fact that Quesnel  was not a

          Union member, he  is a  member of the  bargaining unit for  whose

          benefit  the CBA was  created.   The Union  was and  is obligated

          under    9(a) of the  National Labor Relations  Act, 29 U.S.C.   

          159(a), to represent the interests of all employees in collective
                                                ___

          bargaining, including  nonmembers.  See  Vaca v. Sipes,  386 U.S.
                                              ___  ____    _____

          171  (1967) (unions must fairly represent all employees in a unit

          for which it is exclusive bargaining representative).  Therefore,

          the fact that  Quesnel is not a Union member  does not remove him

          from the bargaining unit  for whose benefit the CBA  was created.

          See Saunders v.  Amoco Pipeline  Co., 927 F.2d  1154, 1156  (10th
          ___ ________     ___________________

          Cir.  1991) (individual employee is bound  by terms of collective

          bargaining agreement even if not a union member).  Indeed, in his

          brief  Quesnel essentially concedes that  he was a  member of the

          bargaining  unit of  the CBA,  and maintains  that he  could have
                                                                 _____

          invoked  the  CBA's  grievance and  arbitration  procedures,  but

          properly chose not to.  Quesnel cannot pick and  choose among his

          avenues  of  remedy,  however;  having   been  a  member  of  the

          bargaining  unit and  received  the  benefits  of the  CBA  while

          employed,  Quesnel  cannot  now   disclaim  it.    The  grievance

          procedures set forth  in the  CBA is exclusive  of other  dispute

          resolution mechanisms.

                    Finally,  we do  not think  that the  Agent's Agreement

          displaces or in  any way  substitutes for the  CBA.  The  Agent's

          Agreement does not deal  with terms and conditions  of employment

          or  with  grievance procedures,  as does  the  CBA.   Rather, the

                                         -8-

          Agent's   Agreement   merely  delineates   Prudential's  business

          policies applicable to district  agents.  Moreover, Articles XXVI

          and XXVII of the CBA specifically reference and amend the Agent's

          Agreement, a strong  indication that the Agent's Agreement is not

          intended  to supplant,  but merely  to supplement,  the CBA.   We

          therefore  find that Quesnel is subject  to the terms of the CBA,

          and that his claims are, accordingly, preempted.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
                                                  ______

            

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