Court Opinion

ID: 9789841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:42:35.377819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:24.603304
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice,
concurring in part:
I concur with the majority opinion except as to its discussion in part IV whether the trial court erred in depriving Doporto of an interpreter to compensate for his hearing deficiency. I also write to clarify the discussion of our prior case law in part II regarding particular categories of potentially prejudicial evidence, the application of that case law to prior crime evidence, and the standard of review for the admissibility of trial court rulings on such evidence.
Regarding the interpreter question, I am of the view that this issue was not adequately briefed by the parties and is not necessary to the resolution of this case. Accordingly, I express no opinion as to how it should be resolved.
On the evidentiary question, I also write separately to distance myself from some statements made by Justice Stewart in part II of his opinion. There, he suggests that the standard of review we should apply to a 404(b) determination by a trial court regarding the admission of “other crimes” evidence is one that accords “limited deference” to the trial judge. I cannot agree with that eharac-*496terization of our prior ease law. I think “abuse of discretion” is still the appropriate standard of review. However, my difference with Justice Stewart in his articulation of the standard probably would not materially change how each of us would review a trial court decision to admit the evidence here. The reason for this similar outcome is that under the standard we articulated in Dibello, and the cases upon which it relied, where evidence falls into the category of being presumptively unfairly prejudicial, as does prior crime evidence, we have shifted the burden on admissibility. The presumption is against the admission of such evidence under rule 403. Justice Stewart rightly finds that presumption consistent with rule 404. Having shifted the presumption of unfair prejudice against prior crime evidence sought to be admitted under rule 404(b), a heavy burden is placed on the proponents of the evidence, and the trial court must make fairly specific findings to show that the burden has been met. On appeal, I would characterize the standard of review as abuse of discretion, as it is in other instances of the admission of evidence. However, because Dibello and its predecessors, and today’s decision in the area of prior crime evidence, have erected such high barriers to the admission of evidence which we consider presumptively prejudicial, in order to avoid the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting such evidence, all “i”s must be dotted and all “t”s crossed. Operatively, this may produce the same result as Justice Stewart’s articulation of a tighter standard of review. However, I think there is a fundamental and important difference.
Under the Dibello line of cases, we make it clear that while as a matter of law, certain categories of evidence are presumptively unfairly prejudicial, the trial judge is the one primarily responsible for making the evaluation of whether the proponent of the evidence has overcome that presumption. Under Justice Stewart’s articulation, the relative importance of the trial court’s judgment about those factors seems diminished and the appellate court’s enhanced. I cannot agree with this articulation because although the difference is subtle, and may not often produce a different outcome, I find Justice Stewart’s articulation to be premised on what I conclude is a view of the appellate court’s primacy that is inconsistent with our prior case law and with the appropriate allocation of responsibility between trial and appellate courts.