Court Opinion

ID: 9630076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:59:19.666827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:30.454031
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Van deb Voobt, J.:
I respectfully dissent from the Opinion of the majority of the Court in this case for the reason that I believe the Appellant-Defendant was clearly guilty of talcing part in either stealing the automobile or of receiving it as a stolen car and that the judgment of sentence should not be nullified.
Throughout all of my lifetime I have observed that getting caught with freshly stolen goods is strong evidence of having stolen them or of having received them as stolen .goods. I still believe this is a very sound principle of law and morality. The law in relation to the possession of stolen goods has become so weakened that it is becoming virtually impossible to prove that a person who is caught in possession of recently stolen goods is either the thief or the receiver. The public is losing confidence in our Courts because of the uncertainty of the law, and by expanding the uncertainty in this field we increase that loss of confidence. The uncertainty stems initially from the destruction of a well-established principle that once the Commonwealth has proved possession of recently stolen goods by an accused, the jury or Judge could presume from the unexplained possession of the recently stolen goods that the possessor was either the thief or the receiver. The destruction of this sound principle was bottomed on Turner v. U. S., 396 U.S. 398 (1970), and Leary v. U. S., 395 *47U.S. 6 (1969). Neither of these cases had anything to do with stolen goods, the Defendants in those cases being charged with violating the Federal Drag laws.
The uncertainty centers around whether or not there is any substantial difference between a “presumption” and an “inference” in this type of criminal proceeding. When the Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant possessed freshly stolen goods and this possession is unexplained, can the fact finder (the jury or the judge) presume guilt of the Defendant or can the fact finder infer guilt of the Defendant? While we in the command post debate the supposed difference in this kind of a setting between a “presumption” and an “inference”, those in the arena of contest (in the trial court) know that there is no substantial difference in the two words. Our law should be simple and clear that where proof of unexplained possession of recently stolen goods has been made by the Commonwealth, the fact finder can, but of course does not have to, conclude that the possessor is either guilty of stealing the goods or of receiving them knowing them to be stolen. We should not have to debate whether such proven facts create a “presumption” or an “inference” or “whether something is more likely than not to flow from the proven facts.”
In the instant case, the Defendant was clearly guilty of either stealing or receiving the automobile knowing it was stolen. I believe we should support the trial court which found the Defendant guilty, and I would affirm the judgment of sentence.