Court Opinion

ID: 9943319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 06:09:01.454792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:49.006521
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                         STATE OF MICHIGAN

                          COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                  FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                  February 22, 2024
              Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 9:05 a.m.

v                                                                 No. 353821
                                                                  Kent Circuit Court
JAMAR TERRELLE PURDLE,                                            LC No. 19-003606-FC

              Defendant-Appellant.

                                        ON REMAND

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SHAPIRO, JJ.

M. J. KELLY, J.

       This case returns to us on remand from our Supreme Court. People v Purdle, 997 NW2d
215 (2023). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.

                  I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Defendant, Jamar Purdle, was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, carrying
a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and two
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL
750.227b. The basic facts underlying his convictions are set forth in our prior opinion:

               On March 31, 2019, Mikeya Day was shot dead. The prosecution presented
       evidence that prior to Day’s death, she and Purdle travelled to a residence on
       Hancock Street in Grand Rapids. Day’s uncle called her while Purdle was outside
       the vehicle, and Day asked him to “hold” just before Purdle returned. As a result,
       he was on the line when Day was shot. He testified that Day and Purdle got into an
       argument over drugs and money. During the argument, Day demanded that Purdle
       give her money and drugs and that he leave the vehicle. Purdle refused. As the
       argument escalated, Day’s uncle heard a struggle followed by Day saying, “You
       ain’t going to do me like that.” He stated that it sounded like the phone was
       dropped, and, after that he overheard Purdle say “Fuck you” just before he heard a
       loud noise. Later, he learned that the noise had been a gunshot.

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        Surveillance footage from a nearby residence showed Day exiting the
driver’s side door and staggering across the street. Purdle got out of the front
passenger side door at the same time. He reached back into the vehicle as if to pick
something up and then walked out of view of the camera. Takeah Hill, a resident
of one of the houses, testified that Purdle had been at her home approximately eight
minutes before the shooting. She stated that he returned, banged on the door, and
told her that Day had shot herself. The surveillance footage shows Purdle returning
to usher Day, who appears to be covered in blood from her neck to her waist, back
into the vehicle. When Day exited the vehicle again, Purdle put her back inside and
then drove away.

        Day’s uncle recalled that after hearing the gunshot, it was quiet for two or
three minutes and then he heard the doors slam a couple of times. He heard Day
say that she thought she was dying and that she could not [breathe]. Purdle told her
she was not going to die. He also said, “Tell them that we got robbed, we got
robbed,” three or four times. Day’s uncle heard sounds of traffic, so he surmised
that they were driving to a hospital. He stated that he yelled, but no one responded
to him so he eventually hung up and called hospitals in the area to find where Day
had been taken.

         Purdle brought Day into the emergency department. He told a nurse that
Day had been shot and suggested that he might have also been shot. The nurse
examined Purdle and determined that he had not been shot. She stated that, over
approximately 30 minutes, Purdle made a number of statements regarding the
shooting. First, he explained that he and Day were in a car preparing to purchase
marijuana when the person they were going to purchase the marijuana from
attempted to rob them. Purdle said that he tried to push the gun away, but it went
off. The second time Purdle explained what happened, he stated that he was outside
the vehicle and tried to push the gun away when it went off. In his third version,
Purdle said that the gun discharged while he “tussled” with a person who was trying
to sell him a gun.

        In the meantime, a police sergeant investigating the shooting was informed
that a bullet had entered Day’s right cheek and exited the left side of her throat.
Determining that the shot could have been fired while Purdle was sitting in the
passenger seat, the sergeant went to speak to another officer, who was talking to
Purdle in a small room. While they were discussing things outside the room, Purdle
fled. He was located in the stairwell, “frantically pulling on the [locked] doors” to
other floors. After his arrest, Purdle told the police that he and Day were attempting
to sell a gun to a person near downtown Grand Rapids, and the gun accidentally
went off when Purdle handed it to the person through the passenger side window.
When the detectives suggested that the gun was in Purdle’s hand when it was fired,
Purdle insisted that it was in the hand of the unknown third person. When the
detectives suggested that Purdle shot Day and that there was an argument in the car,
Purdle denied that there was an argument. Purdle did not tell the detectives what
happened to the gun, and the gun was never recovered.

                                         -2-
               At trial, Purdle testified that Day attempted to rob him at gunpoint. He
       stated that he handed her drugs and when she demanded his phone, he dropped it
       in an attempt to distract her so he could escape. When she demanded his diamond-
       studded sunglasses, he went to remove them from his neck and Day lurched her
       body away from him. He testified that in the process the gun when off and Day
       accidentally shot herself. Believing he had been shot, he got out of the vehicle and
       then reached back in to get a liquor bottle. He testified that when he saw the blood
       in the driver’s seat, he realized that Day had shot herself. Purdle recounted that
       once he realized Day had shot herself, he got her back into the vehicle so he could
       take her to the hospital. He stated that while they were heading to the hospital, Day
       threw what sounded like a gun and some drugs out of the window and then she
       concocted a plan to tell people that she had been shot when some other third person
       tried to rob them. [People v Purdle, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court
       of Appeals, issued February 1, 2022 (Docket No. 353821), pp 1-3.]

        Purdle was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12. After
consideration of the advisory sentencing guidelines, the trial court determined that Purdle’s
minimum sentencing guidelines range for the second-degree murder conviction was 315 to 1050
months.1 The court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 680 to 960 months’ incarceration for
the second-degree murder conviction. Purdle appealed his convictions and sentence to this Court.
In relevant part, he argued that he was entitled to resentencing because his 680-month minimum
sentence was not proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender
because the sentence amounted to a de facto life sentence. We held that, under MCL 769.34(10),2
review of his proportionality challenge was precluded because his minimum sentence was within
the guidelines range, there was no error in the scoring of the guidelines, and the trial court did not
rely upon inaccurate information when determining his sentence. Purdle, unpub op at 6.

       Our Supreme Court subsequently addressed the constitutionality of MCL 769.34(10) in
People v Posey, 512 Mich 317, 326; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 162373) (lead opinion by

1
   Second-degree murder is listed as a Class M2 felony with a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment. See MCL 777.16p. The trial court assessed 100 points for Purdle’s prior record
variable (PRV) score, which means that he was scored at PRV Level F. See MCL 777.61. The
court assessed 90 points for Purdle’s offense variable (OV) score, which meant that he was scored
at OV Level II. See MCL 777.61. A defendant who scores at PRV Level F and OV Level II for
a Class M2 crime has a minimum sentencing guidelines range of 315 to 525 months’
imprisonment. MCL 777.61. However, because Purdle was also a fourth-offense habitual
offender, the upper limit of his minimum sentencing guidelines range was increased by 100%.
MCL 777.21(3)(c). Therefore, Purdle’s minimum sentencing guidelines range was 315 to 1050
months’ imprisonment. Purdle has not challenged the scoring of the PRVs or OVs, nor has he
disputed that he is a fourth-offense habitual offender.
2
  The first sentence of MCL 769.34(10) provides that “[i]f a minimum sentence is within the
appropriate guidelines sentence range, the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall not
remand for resentencing absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate
information relied upon in determining the defendant’s sentence.”

                                                 -3-
BOLDEN, J., joined by BERNSTEIN, J.); slip op at 3-5, (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); slip op at 2, and (WELCH, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment); slip op at 1. As recognized by this Court in People v Posey (On
Remand), ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 345491); slip op at 2:

       Supreme Court Justices BOLDEN, BERNSTEIN, CAVANAGH, and WELCH agreed that
       the opening sentence of MCL 769.34(10) is unconstitutional, although Justice
       WELCH offered a different constitutional analysis. Posey, 512 Mich at 351-352
       (opinion by BOLDEN, J.); id. at 361 (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part and
       concurring in the judgment); id. at 390-391 (WELCH, J., concurring in part,
       dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). [Quoted citations updated to
       reflect the pagination in the advance sheet.]

Notwithstanding that no majority consensus ever formed in the Supreme Court as to why the first
sentence of MCL 769.34(10) is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court vacated our determination
that MCL 769.34(10) precluded us from reviewing whether Purdle’s within-guidelines sentence
was proportionate and remanded to this Court “for reconsideration in light of Posey.” See Purdle,
997 NW2d at 215.

                           II. PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT OF POSEY

        It can be argued that our Supreme Court’s decision in Posey is not technically binding
because it is only a plurality opinion in which the majority of the justices were unable to concur
on the exact reasoning for the holding, see, e.g., People v Scarborough, 189 Mich App 341, 344;
471 NW2d 567 (1991) (“Technically, the Schultz holding is not binding on this Court. It is a
plurality opinion in which a majority of the justices failed to concur on the exact reasoning for the
holding.”); accord People v Jackson, 390 Mich 621, 627; 212 NW2d 918 (1973) (“Since neither
opinion obtained four signatures, neither is binding under the doctrine of Stare decisis.”). In
Scarborough, this Court concluded that, although the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion was not
technically binding, it was prudent to follow the holding in the interest of judicial economy.
Scarborough, 189 Mich App at 344. The Court reasoned:

       Four justices of the Supreme Court there addressed the issue now under
       consideration and concluded that the amendments to the act should be applied
       retroactively. Their reasonings were, if not the same, at least very similar. It would
       be wasteful of judicial resources to disregard Schultz. Defendant and those
       similarly situated to him would surely receive the benefit of sentencing under the
       amendments to the act upon appeal to the Supreme Court. Moreover, we are
       persuaded that the holding of the Schultz decision was correct. [Id.]

Like the Scarborough Court, in the interest of judicial economy and jurisprudential stability, we
will apply the essential holdings upon which the Posey plurality agreed to the instant case.

                                                -4-
                                    III. PROPORTIONALITY

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        As explained above, Purdle argues that he is entitled to resentencing because his 680-month
minimum sentence was not proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
offender. “[T]he proper inquiry when reviewing a sentence for reasonableness is whether the trial
court abused its discretion by violating the ‘principle of proportionality’ set forth in People v
Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), ‘which requires sentences imposed by the trial
court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the
offender.” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). The sentencing
court abuses its discretion if the sentence imposed is disproportionate to the seriousness of the
circumstances involving the offense and the offender. Id. at 460.

                                          B. ANALYSIS

       With regard to a within-guidelines sentence, “there is a nonbinding presumption of
proportionality.” Posey (On Remand), ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2. And, although a within-
guidelines sentence may be disproportionate or unreasonable, “the defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that their within-guidelines sentence is unreasonable or disproportionate.” Id.
Moreover, as explained in Posey (On Remand):

                “An appropriate sentence should give consideration to the reformation of
       the offender, the protection of society, the discipline of the offender, and the
       deterrence of others from committing the same offense.” People v Boykin, 510
       Mich 171, 183; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). With respect to sentencing and the
       guidelines, the key test is not whether a sentence departs from or adheres to the
       guidelines range. Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 472. The key test is whether the
       sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter. Id. In regard to
       proportionality, the Milbourn Court “observed that the Legislature has determined
       to visit the stiffest punishment against persons who have demonstrated an
       unwillingness to obey the law after prior encounters with the criminal justice
       system.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 668. “The premise of our system of criminal
       justice is that, everything else being equal, the more egregious the offense, and the
       more recidivist the criminal, the greater the punishment.” People v Babcock, 469
       Mich 247, 263; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). [Id. at ___; slip op at 2-3.]

         On appeal, Purdle does not dispute the seriousness of the offense, nor does he address
considerations related to the sentencing goals of reformation of the offender, protection of society,
discipline of the offender, and deterrence of others from committing the same offense. Rather, he
focuses only one circumstance related to himself. Specifically, he notes that his current parole
eligibility date is November 29, 2077, which means that he will be 89 years old before he is eligible
for parole. He contends that his minimum sentence is the equivalent of a death sentence when
considered in light of the life expectancy of African American men, both in general and in
Michigan prisons. Purdle did not, however, receive a death sentence, nor was he sentenced to life
in prison. Rather, he received a term of years sentence. The seriousness of his offense is not
lessened by Purdle’s age and race when he was sentenced for murdering Day. Indeed, a

                                                -5-
defendant’s age is insufficient to overcome the presumption of proportionality, especially when
considered in light of a defendant’s criminal record and the gravity of his offenses. People v
Bowling, 299 Mich App 552, 558-559; 830 NW2d 800 (2013).

       Here, Purdle had a lengthy criminal history.3 Indeed, he does not dispute that he is a fourth-
offense habitual offender, which is a fact that significantly increased his minimum guidelines range
under the advisory sentencing guidelines.4 Moreover, as demonstrated by the properly-admitted
other-acts evidence,5 Purdle’s action of shooting Day dead following an argument was not the first
time that Purdle pulled a gun on a woman he was dating in response to an argument. Indeed, a
few days earlier, in response to an argument, he frightened another woman he was dating by
displaying a gun in response to an argument. Given Purdle’s history, we conclude that he has
demonstrated “an unwillingness to obey the law after prior encounters with the criminal justice
system” and that in light of his recidivism a greater punishment is reasonable. See Posey (On
remand), ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2-3.

        Furthermore, we are unpersuaded that consideration of Purdle’s age and race at the time of
the offense would serve the goals of sentencing. See People v Sabin, 242 Mich App 656, 661-
662; 620 NW2d 19 (2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (stating that “the factors
considered in imposing sentence should be balanced with the following objectives: (1) reformation
of the offender, (2) protection of society, (3) punishment of the offender, and (4) deterrence of
others from committing like offenses.”).

        Moreover, the seriousness of the offense is significantly egregious and cannot be
understated. In response to an argument regarding drugs, Purdle pulled a gun on Day, a woman
whom he was dating. And, although he had done a similar thing to a different woman he was
dating just days earlier, this time, he escalated his behavior by shooting Day in the face. When
she twice left the vehicle, he put her back inside. While she was dying, he did not comfort her.
Instead, he told her to lie and say that they had been robbed. Before and after her death, he
attempted to shift blame for the shooting from himself to Day, stating multiple times (albeit in
different ways) that she had attempted to rob him and that she was responsible for disposing of the
gun used to kill her.

3
  According to the presentence report, at the time of sentencing Purdle had six juvenile
adjudications, and he had more than 25 adult convictions. He was previously given the opportunity
of probation, both in district court and in circuit court, but he repeatedly violated. At one point,
he was sentenced to a special alternative incarceration (SAI) program for an unarmed robbery
conviction, but he absconded from that program and had to serve time in prison.
4
    See note 1, supra.
5
 In our prior opinion, we determined that the trial court did not err by admitting this other-acts
evidence under MCL 768.27b(1) and by not excluding it under MRE 403’s balancing test. Purdle,
unpub op at 3-4. The Supreme Court did not vacate that potion of our opinion. See Purdle, 997
NW2d at 215.

                                                -6-
       In light of the seriousness of the offense and Purdle’s criminal history, we conclude that
his age and race at the time of sentencing does not render his within-guidelines sentence
disproportionate. Nor is such an argument sufficient to overcome the presumption that his within-
guidelines sentence is proportionate.

       Affirmed.

                                                           /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                           /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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