Court Opinion

ID: 9865232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:27:59.112747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:59.776910
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland,
dissenting.
I am unable, from any view of the record in this case, to concur in the majority opinion. According to my view the opinion in the present case announces in effect the doctrine that all real estate owned by a religious corporation is exempt from taxation.
No provision of our Constitution is more clearly worded, and the meaning less in doubt than section 5, article N, which is as follows: “Lots, with the buildings thereon, if said buildings are used solely and exclusively for religious worship, * * * shall be exempt from taxation, unless otherwise provided by general law.” Section 7198, C. L. 1921, concerning exemptions, is equally clear:' ‘ Second. Lots with the buildings thereon, if said buildings are used exclusively for religious worship.”
As to classification as vacant or improved property, these lots are admittedly vacant. No actual construction work has ever been commenced. The removal of the old buildings thereon was completed in November, 1932, and the building project has been dormant since that time. Counsel for the church contends that the work of razing the old buildings was the beginning of building operations and the majority opinion has adopted that view. No doubt the church authorities in 1931, in good faith contemplated and planned a building program, but that plan could be abandoned at any time and they may never build on these lots. The erection of a building, or part of a building, such as would bring this property within the meaning of the exemption provision of the Constitution and statute, as well as the rule announced by this *435court, is only a possibility. Exemptions from taxes are neither based, nor allowed, on possibilities.
In determining this case, we have no former decision to follow, notwithstanding the approval of former decisions cited in the majority opinion. There is a clear distinction between the facts here presented and those upon which our former decisions are based. The lots here involved are not a part of a unit of lands or lots devoted to religious purposes, neither is there a partly constructed building thereon; nor is there revenue received therefrom that could be said to be used in connection with religious work or purposes. It is true, as counsel for the church insists and prior decisions of this court hold, that in matters of tax exemption of religious and charitable institutions, a rule of liberal construction has been adopted; but there is no reason for an extension of the rule to embrace the simple facts presented in this case. Can liberal construction go so far as to bring into physical existence a building, or some part of a building on a lot, when admittedly there is none? The Constitution clearly says, “If said buildings are used solely and exclusively for religious worship, ’ ’ and does not say that the intention to construct a building to be used for religious worship exempts the real estate upon which it is to be located, from taxation. The mandate of the Constitution, subject to no exceptions, is that buildings be used for a designated purpose before the exemption applies. Counsel for the church present a claim founded solely upon good intentions. An expression of intention to do the thing necessary to place property in the exempt class, that is, build thereon, only emphasizes the fact that the act has not already been performed. If there was even a doubt as to the meaning of the wording of the Constitution and statute applicable to this case and it became necessary to indulge a presumption relative to the meaning of the words employed, the presumption is always in favor of the taxing power. 61 C. J. 391, section 395.
*436If by any stretch of the imagination, the injunction of the trial court resulting in exempting the property in question from the taxes of 1933, can be deemed proper, there surely is no justification for the extension of that injunction to cover the years 1934 and 1935. One of two things was required, the entry of a decree as prayed, exempting the property from all future taxation and ordering same stricken from the assessment roll, or the enjoining the collection of the tax that had accrued during the time that it is now contended the proposed building program was in progress. But enjoining the collection for the future years of 1934 and 1935 only, was an acknowledgment of the correctness of the reasoning of this dissenting opinion to the effect that the program could be abandoned or other contingencies arise, in which event the property thereafter would be subject to taxation.
There is neither a single fact, nor any contention, that brings this case within the rule as applied in any former decision of this court, and to the opinion of those who take a different view, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Butler concurs in this dissent.