Court Opinion

ID: 9744027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:52:19.762782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.265031
License: Public Domain

DICKSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree in part with Justice DeBruler’s view that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that the appellant was engaged in wrongdoing when they asked him for permission to search his luggage and his person, and would further find that a Fourth Amendment “seizure” occurred at the initial police intrusion.
However, this conclusion does not necessarily result from the cases cited by Justice DeBruler. In United States v. Sokolow (1989), — U.S. -, -, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10, the Court, noting the absence of government challenge on this issue, expressly assumed “without deciding” that an airport encounter amounted to a Fourth Amendment stop. Likewise, in Florida v. Rodriguez (1984), 469 U.S. 1, 6, 105 S.Ct. 308, 311, 83 L.Ed.2d 165, 171, the Court assumed “without deciding” that compliance with police requests to move and granting permission to search baggage constituted such a seizure.
Unlike Sokolow and Rodriguez, the State here vigorously contends not only that the investigatory stop was justified by a reasonable suspicion, but also that a Fourth Amendment “seizure” had not occurred in the present case.
Citing United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, the majority asserts that particularized justification is not required for the police to stop and question citizens, as long as the person being questioned remains free to walk away. However, this view was joined by only two justices in Mendenhall. Three others declined to join as to this issue but agreed with the majority opinion that reasonable suspicion justified the intrusion. Four justices dissented, arguing that the stop and questioning amounted to an unreasonable seizure.
Because these cited authorities are thus inconclusive as to whether an initial stop and questioning by police constitute a seizure, I seek guidance by reference to Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. In Terry, the United States Supreme Court instructed:
Our first task is to establish at what point in this encounter the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant.... There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as “stop” and “frisk” that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a “search” or “seizure” within the mean*1221ing of the Constitution. We emphatically reject this notion. It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs “seizures” of the person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime — “arrests” in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has “seized” that person.
Id. at 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d at 903. In apparent contrast, however, the Terry Court commented by way of footnote:
Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves “seizures” of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a “seizure” has occurred.
Id. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905 n. 16.
In the present case, three non-uniformed police officers followed Molino to a taxicab, at which point one of the officers identified himself by displaying his police badge, informed Molino that he was conducting a narcotics investigation, and asked Molino for identification. This encounter cannot be classified as mere “personal intercourse between policemen and citizens.” Rather, an officer, displaying his badge as a show of authority, restrained Molino’s departure from the airport, thereby effecting a “seizure” under Terry. Of course, this would have been a permissible seizure if the officers’ prior observations had led them to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880-81, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906.
I cannot find Molino’s arrival from Miami, his Hispanic appearance, his brisk pace through the airport, and his use of a single carry-on bag without claiming any checked baggage to constitute a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. Because of the absence of adequate reasonable suspicion, I would find the initial intrusion and questioning to be an unreasonable seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.