Court Opinion

ID: 9585824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:04:12.67815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:15.307399
License: Public Domain

Banke, Presiding judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Divisions 1 and 3 of the majority opinion but dissent to Division 2. As acknowledged by the majority, the state was required to articulate a racially neutral explanation for its decision to strike all the black jury panel members. See Durham v. State, 185 Ga. App. 163, 166 (363 SE2d 607) (1987); Barton v. State, 184 Ga. App. 258, 259 (361 SE2d 250) (1987). The state unquestionably met this burden with respect to the two black panel members who proclaimed a personal friendship with Glanton. However, the third black panel member merely stated that “she knew [Glanton] by sight.” When Glanton’s counsel observed that the state had not used a peremptory strike against a white juror who had said the same thing, the state’s attorney simply responded that her decision to strike the black juror had not been racially motivated, without offering any further explanation.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 98 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986), the Supreme Court held that mere denial of discriminatory intent will not suffice to rebut a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes. Because I do not believe the state met its burden of articulating a racially neutral reason for striking each of the three black jury panel members in this case, I would reverse Glanton’s conviction.
I am authorized to say that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Benham join in this opinion.