Court Opinion

ID: 9535719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:52:12.589603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:18.760542
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge,
dissenting:
The main opinion holds that the exclusionary rule applies in this case because judicial officers erred in approving the administrative traffic checkpoint. However, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the exclusionary rule applies only to police misconduct, not judicial misconduct. Because the main opinion does not follow controlling precedent, I respectfully dissent.
According to the United States Supreme Court, the purpose for the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the Court stated that
“The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of the accused. Where official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.”
Id. at 919, 104 S.Ct. at 3418 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2318, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975)) (emphasis added). In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), the Supreme Court reiterated that “the ‘prime purpose’ of the exclusionary rule ⅛ to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” Id. at 347, 107 S.Ct. at 1165 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 619, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 1193, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (noting “exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees”). Thus, the Supreme Court clearly and consistently has held that the exclusionary rule applies solely to police misconduct.
In an attempt to distinguish this case from the Krull case, the main opinion erroneously concludes that “[ijndeed, the officers here were acting outside the scope of the statute.” The Utah Legislature has specifically provided that the authorizing magistrate, not police officers or even the county attorney, shall determine whether an administrative traffic checkpoint complies with the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-104 (Supp.1997). Thus, the officers did not act outside the scope of the statute; their actions were fully consistent with the judicially approved administrative traffic checkpoint plan.
In the present case, the investigating officer followed a judicially approved plan that was ultimately determined to be outside the statute’s scope.1 The United States Supreme Court has held that
[i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. “[Ojnce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.” Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 921, 104 S.Ct. at 3419 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3054, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring)). The Supreme Court has expressly ruled that “evidence *507should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may be properly charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49, 107 S.Ct. at 1166 (quoting Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542, 95 S.Ct. at 2320) (emphasis added). The investigating officer therefore cannot be expected to question whether the form of a checkpoint plan is technically sufficient. The officer acted in reasonable good faith that the judicially approved plan conformed to the law. Hence, the trial court properly ruled that the officer seized the evidence in good faith reliance on the magistrate’s approval of the checkpoint plan.
In Arizona v. Evans, 177 Ariz. 201, 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz.1994) rev’d 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995), the Arizona Supreme Court took an erroneous approach similar to the main opinion. In Evans, the investigating officer ran a computerized records check after a routine traffic stop and discovered that the defendant had a misdemeanor warrant for his arrest. See id. at 870. Through a subsequent warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle, the officer found marijuana under the passenger seat. See id. Unbeknownst to the arresting officer, the arrest warrant had been quashed by the issuing justice court, and court personnel had failed to expunge it from the computer. See id. Based on that information, the trial court suppressed the evidence. See id. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the mistake was “made by justice court employees instead of law enforcement personnel.” Id. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and ruled that it is proper to invoke the exclusionary rule where negligent record keeping results in the discovery of contraband. “Such an application will hopefully serve to improve the efficiency of those who keep records in our criminal justice system.” Id. at 872.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court stated that the Arizona Supreme Court’s “holding is contrary to Leon; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984); and Krull. If court employees were responsible for the erroneous computer record, the exclusion of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors so as to warrant such á severe sanction.” Evans, 514 U.S. at 14, 115 S.Ct. at 1193. The Court explained its reasoning as follows:
First, as we noted in Leon, the exclusionary rule was historically designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not mistakes by court employees. Second, respondent offers no evidence that court employees are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion. ...
Finally, and most important, there is no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a significant effect on court employees responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been quashed.
Id. (citations omitted). Consequently, the Court reversed the Arizona Supreme Court and held that the evidence was admissible under the good faith exception. Id. at 16, 115 S.Ct. at 1194 (citations omitted). In so doing, the Court affirmed its earlier decisions of Leon and Krull by holding that only police misconduct is deterred by suppressing evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently declined to impose the draconian sanction of excluding evidence when a magistrate acts improperly. In reviewing the Leon decision in Evans, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
On the basis of three factors, we determined that there was no sound reason to apply the exclusionary rule as a means of deterring misconduct on the part of judicial officers who are responsible for issuing warrants. First, we noted that the exclusionary rule was historically designed “ ‘to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.’ ” Second, there was “ ‘no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the *508Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion.’ ” Third, and of greatest importance, there was no basis for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant would have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate.
Evans, 514 U.S. at 11, 115 S.Ct. at 1191 (quoting Krull, 480 U.S. at 348, 107 S.Ct. 1160 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 104 S.Ct. at 3417)). Here, the main opinion recognizes that the investigating police officer acted in good faith when he seized the drugs from the defendant. The main opinion, nonetheless, excludes the evidence to punish the erring magistrate. The main opinion defies Supreme Court precedent in so ruling. See id. at 8-9, 115 S.Ct. at 1190 (noting “[sjtate courts ... are not free from the final authority of this Court”).
I therefore dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s ruling that the evidence should not be suppressed because the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule clearly applies.

. The main opinion erroneously states that "the State and defendant agree with the trial court that the plan violated Utah law and the Constitution.” The State, however, only assumes arguen-do that the plan violated Utah law and the Constitution and urges this court to only rule "whether the trial court properly determined that the officers acted in good faith.”