Court Opinion

ID: 9696703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:55:39.085722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:25.682338
License: Public Domain

RAKER, Judge, dissenting, in which BELL, Chief Judge, and HARRELL, Judge, join:
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals remanding the case to the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) for a de novo hearing, and clarify that, to the extent that certain language in the lower court opinion could be interpreted as making factual findings, it does not do so, and that the OAH on remand would not be bound by these apparent findings.
The majority opinion offers two grounds for reversal, neither of which is persuasive. The majority’s holding that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) at respondent’s hearing did not err in concluding that respondent failed to make a protected disclosure because his allegations were not in fact made to persons with authority to act upon them is both procedurally and substantively erroneous. It is procedurally *177erroneous because petitioner did not raise this issue in its petition to this Court for a writ of certiorari. Further, even if this issue were properly before the Court, the ALJ’s conclusion should not be upheld.
The majority’s holding that the ALJ did not err in excluding as irrelevant respondent’s proffered evidence concerning the merits of the sexual harassment charges against him is likewise erroneous. The proffered evidence was relevant because it tends to show that petitioner’s stated reason for the employment action taken against respondent was a pretext for retaliation against respondent.
I.
In its petition for a writ of certiorari, petitioner presented the following two questions for our review:
“1. Where the ALJ specifically found that Mr. Heller lied under oath and that he was not a credible witness, did the Court of Special Appeals exceed its scope of review when it found, as a matter of fact, that, at the times Mr. Heller purportedly raised allegations that Somers Cove revenues were being unlawfully diverted by DNR, Mr. Heller reasonably believed that he was alleging actual violations of law?
“2. Did the Court of Special Appeals impermissibly usurp the functions of the administrative fact finder by finding that the ALJ should have permitted Mr. Heller to introduce evidence challenging the merits of Ms. Taylor’s sexual harassment allegations, where the ALJ determined such evidence to be irrelevant to the question of whether the agency decision maker committed an act of reprisal against Mr. Heller and where the merits of Ms. Taylor’s allegations had previously been resolved in a settlement of a disciplinary appeal filed by Mr. Heller?”
The majority opinion, purporting to reformulate these questions “for clarification purposes,” restated petitioner’s questions as follows:
*178“1. Did the ALJ erroneously determine that Respondent did not make protected disclosures as defined by Maryland’s Whistleblower Statute?
“2. Should the ALJ have permitted Respondent to introduce evidence challenging the merits of Ms. Taylor’s sexual harassment allegations, where the ALJ determined such evidence to be irrelevant to the question of whether the agency decision maker committed an act of reprisal against Respondent and where the merits of Ms. Taylor’s allegations had previously been resolved in a settlement of a disciplinary appeal filed by Respondent?”
Maj. op. at 164, 892 A.2d at 506. Although the majority’s restatement of the second question plausibly could be characterized as a reformulation simply for clarification purposes, its restatement of the first question cannot. Petitioner’s first question presents the issue of whether the Court of Special Appeals exceeded its scope of review by making a factual finding that respondent reasonably believed he was alleging actual violations of law when he made his allegations concerning the fiscal management of Somers Cove. It does not raise the issue of whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in setting aside the AL J’s finding that respondent did not make a protected disclosure because the DNR officials he made his allegations to were not in a position to remedy the alleged wrongdoing. The majority’s reformulation of the first question, however, materially alters the meaning of the first question so that it does encompass this issue, recasting the question as raising the issue of the propriety of all of the ALJ’s conclusions that bear on the issue of whether respondent made a protected disclosure, even though petitioner simply sought to raise the issue of whether the Court of Special Appeals erred by making factual findings at the appellate level.
Maryland Rule 8—131(b)(1) governs the scope of review in the Court of Appeals when the Court is reviewing a case where there has been a prior appellate decision. It provides as follows:
“Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court *179of Special Appeals or by a circuit court acting in an appellate capacity, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been presewed for review by the Court of Appeals. Whenever an issue raised in a petition for certiorari or a cross-petition involves, either expressly or implicitly, the assertion that the trial court committed error, the Court of Appeals may consider whether the error was harmless or non-prejudicial even though the matter of harm or prejudice was not raised in the petition or in a cross-petition.”
Md. Rule 8—131(b)(1) (emphasis added). Although the use of “ordinarily” in the language of the Rule vests this Court with discretion to consider issues not raised in the petition or cross-petition for a writ of certiorari, the Court has exercised this discretion carefully and explicitly, and has departed from the general rule set down in Rule 8—131(b)(1) only when it found compelling reasons to do so. See, e.g., Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93, 103-05, 887 A.2d 1029, 1035-36 (2005) (deciding case on grounds of res judicata even though issue of res judicata was not raised in petition for writ of certiorari because doing so would promote judicial economy and avoid unnecessary expense by obviating the need for a separate appeal); Lizzi v. WMATA, 384 Md. 199, 203, 205-06, 862 A.2d 1017, 1020, 1021-22 (2004) (same); Matthews v. Amberwood, 351 Md. 544, 580-81, 719 A.2d 119, 136-37 (1998) (considering issue not raised in petition for writ of certiorari because otherwise the case would have to be remanded to the Court of Special Appeals for consideration of the issue, which would be contrary to “the interests of judicial economy and expedition”). In Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 718 A.2d 588 (1998), we explained the scope of the discretion under Rule 8-131(b)(1) to consider issues not raised in a petition for a writ of certiorari as follows:
“The word ‘ordinarily’ [in Rule 8-131 (b)(1)] does indicate that there are exceptions. Nevertheless, neither the use of the word ‘ordinarily’ in Rule 8-131(b) nor the principle embodied in the rule, has been treated as granting a general *180discretion to reach an issue whenever the Court so desires ... Instead, we have held that the ‘exceptions’ to the principle embodied in Rule 8-131(b) are limited to ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ ”
Id. at 322-23, 718 A.2d at 596 (quoting State v. Broberg, 342 Md. 544, 573, 677 A.2d 602, 616 (1996) (Eldridge, J., dissenting)) (citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court has often declined to exercise its discretion under Rule 8-131(b)(l) to consider an issue not raised in the petition for a writ of certiorari, even when the parties have raised the issue in their briefs. See, e.g., Purnell v. State, 375 Md. 678, 686 n. 5, 827 A.2d 68, 73 n. 5 (2003); Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 219 n. 4, 406 A.2d 922, 928 n. 4 (1979).
In the case sub judice, the majority has not offered any reason at all, let alone a compelling reason, for departing from the general rule that issues not raised in a petition for a writ of certiorari should not be considered by the Court. Nor does it seem that it could offer such a reason. The issue of whether the ALJ’s finding that respondent did not make a protected disclosure because the DNR officials he made his allegations to were not in a position to remedy the alleged wrongdoing was premised on a correct legal standard is not an issue that would be raised on remand and result in a separate appeal because the Court of Special Appeals has already decided this issue. Thus, the interests of judicial economy and avoiding unnecessary expense that the Court found sufficient to justify exercising its discretion to consider an issue not raised in a petition for a writ of certiorari in Norville, Lizzi, and Matthews are not implicated in the present case.
In the absence of a compelling reason to depart from the general rule of Rule 8-131(b)(l), this case does not present any “extraordinary circumstances” that would warrant the Court’s exercising its discretion under Rule 8-131(b)(1) to consider the issue addressed by the majority. To the contrary, the majority’s consideration of the issue is, under the circumstances, unfair to the respondent. The issue was plainly raised in and addressed by the Court of Special Appeals. See Heller v. DNR, 161 Md.App. 299, 321-22, 868 A.2d 925, *181937-38 (2005). Although the Court of Special Appeals’s resolution of this issue was unfavorable to petitioner, it elected not to raise the issue in its petition for a writ of certiorari. Under these circumstances, respondent was entitled to rely on the petitioner’s apparent decision not to pursue this issue in proceedings before this Court.
Furthermore, as to the merits of the issue, even if the issue of whether the ALJ’s finding that respondent did not make a protected disclosure because the DNR officials he made his allegations to were not in a position to remedy the alleged wrongdoing were properly before the Court, it is not apparent that it should be resolved as it is by the majority. In interpreting the Maryland Whistleblower Law, Md.Code (1994, 2004 Repl.Vol., 2005 Cum.Supp.), § 5-301 et seq. of the State Personnel and Pensions Article, the Court has relied on federal caselaw interpreting the federal Whistleblower Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)). See Montgomery v. E.C.I., 377 Md. 615, 629, 835 A.2d 169, 178 (2003) (cases interpreting federal Whistleblower Protection Act highly persuasive in interpreting Maryland Whistleblower Law). Accordingly, the majority relies on three federal cases to support its position that in order for a disclosure to be a protected disclosure, the disclosure must be made to a person who actually has the authority to remedy the alleged wrongdoing: Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259 (4th Cir.2001), Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed.Cir.1999), and Willis v. Department of Agriculture, 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed.Cir.1998). See maj. op. at 23-26. None of these cases, however, support the majority’s position.
Regarding the issue of to whom a disclosure must be made in order for it to be a protected disclosure, Hooven-Lewis said the following:
“An additional element to the first factor [i.e., the protected disclosure element] is that the disclosure evidence an intent to raise an issue with a higher authority who is in a position to correct the alleged wrongdoing”
*182Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 276 (emphasis added) (citing Carr, 185 F.3d at 1326; Willis, 141 F.3d at 1143). Similarly, in Willis, the court held that there was no protected disclosure because the employee’s “disclosures did not evidence an intent to raise the issue with higher authorities who were in a position to correct the alleged wrongdoing.” Willis, 141 F.3d at 1143 (emphasis added). Despite the fact that HoovemLewis and Willis merely require that the employee’s disclosures be such that they show that the employee intended to bring the alleged wrongdoing to the attention of officials with the authority to remedy it, the majority goes much further and turns this intent requirement into a factual requirement that the employee must make “his disclosures to individuals in a position to remedy the disclosures” in order for the disclosures to be protected disclosures. Maj. op. at 172, 892 A.2d at 511 (citing Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 276; Willis, 141 F.3d at 1143).
Carr does not lend any more support to the majority’s position than Hooven-Lewis or Willis. In Carr, the court stated that “ ‘[t]he purpose of the Whistleblower Protection Act is to encourage disclosure of wrongdoing to persons who may be in a position to act to remedy it.’ ” Carr, 185 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Horton v. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 282 (Fed.Cir.1995)). Importantly, Carr says that the purpose is to encourage disclosure to those “who may be in a position to act to remedy” the wrongdoing, not to those who are in fact in a position to remedy the wrongdoing.
The majority offers no reason for its departure from Hooven-Lewis and Willis on this issue. The majority’s requirement that an employee must make a disclosure to someone who in fact is in a position to remedy the alleged wrongdoing substantially weakens the Maryland Whistleblower Law, in frustration of its evident purpose. The Maryland Whistle-blower Law prohibits reprisals “against an employee who ... discloses information that the employee reasonably believes evidences” one of the enumerated types of wrongdoing. State Pers. & Pen. Art. § 5-305 (emphasis added). Thus, as the text of the statute makes plain, the Maryland Whistleblower Law was intended to protect employees from reprisals for *183allegations of wrongdoing that, although reasonably believed to be correct by the employee, are nonetheless mistaken. See also Horton, 66 F.3d at 283 (interpreting federal Whistleblower Protection Act, holding that the statute “requires only that the whistleblower had a reasonable belief’ of wrongdoing). The majority’s requirement that the employee’s disclosure be made to someone who in fact has authority to remedy the alleged wrong has the practical effect of removing the protection of the Maryland Whistleblower Law in cases where an employee makes reasonable, but mistaken, allegations of wrongdoing. This is so because, in many instances, when an employee makes a reasonable allegation of wrongdoing that, as a matter of fact, turns out to be incorrect, there will be no person at all who is in a position to act to remedy the allegation of wrongdoing, precisely because there is no actual wrong to remedy.1
II.
The ALJ committed an error of law in excluding the evidence pertaining to the merits of Taylor’s sexual harassment allegations and in refusing to permit respondent to cross-examine Barton regarding the allegations. Assuming the evidence was not irrelevant, respondent had a right to offer it in the hearing. See Md.Code (1984, 2004 Repl.Vol., 205 Cum. Supp.), § 10-213(f)(2) of the State Government Article. Likewise, he had a right to cross-examine Barton on the issue of the merits of the sexual harassment allegations if such cross-examination was relevant to a contested issue in the case. State Gov’t Art., § 10-213(f)(3). Evidence pertaining to the merits of the Taylor’s sexual harassment claim was relevant in the hearing because it was relevant to the contested issue of *184whether petitioner’s claim that Barton was reassigned because of the allegations and the subsequent finding that they were supported by probable cause was really a pretext for retaliating against him for his allegations that petitioner had committed fiscal improprieties. See Rogers v. Dep’t of Def. Dependents Schs., 814 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed.Cir.1987) (under federal Whistleblower Protection Act, employee must show that “the independent grounds for the adverse action did not outweigh the retaliatory motive”).
Petitioner argues that respondent’s excluded evidence was not relevant because none of it concerned “facts and circumstances of Ms. Taylor’s allegations that were not known to ... Barton at the time he took the disciplinary action.” The majority apparently adopts this argument, holding that “the only evidence that is relevant to Colonel Barton’s motivations in disciplining Mr. Heller would have been confirmatory of information known to Colonel Barton at the time of the decision.” Maj. op. at 175, 892 A.2d at 513. This argument fails. The majority and petitioner base this claim on the assumption that Barton’s testimony that he reassigned respondent based solely on the investigative report concluding that there was probable cause that Taylor’s allegations is correct. See id. But this assumption assumes that the contested issue in the case as to the predominant motivation for Barton’s transfer of respondent has already been resolved in petitioner’s favor. As such, it is question-begging to make this assumption in deciding whether respondent’s proffered evidence is relevant to the issue of Barton’s predominant motivation for respondent’s transfer.2 Respondent’s evidence, to the *185extent it showed that Taylor’s allegations were meritless, would tend to make it less likely that Barton acted on the basis of the report, and thus more likely that he acted in retaliation. Therefore, it is relevant. See Md. Rule 5-401 (evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence” (emphasis added)).
If an administrative agency adjudicatory decision is premised on an erroneous conclusion of law, it is subject to reversal. State Gov’t Art. § 10—222(h) (3) (iv); Montgomery, 377 Md. at 625, 835 A.2d at 175-76 (2003). The decision of the ALJ was premised in part on her finding that there was no reprisal, and this finding in turn was premised on her erroneous legal conclusion that respondent’s proffered evidence was not relevant.3 Therefore, reversal is proper.
*186III.
Turning to the issue placed before the Court by petitioner’s first certiorari question, I would answer it in the affirmative, and make clear that, to the extent the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals suggests that it made a factual finding that respondent reasonably believed he was alleging a violation of law, this finding was improper and would not bind the OAH on remand. The Court of Special Appeals, discussing the issue of respondent’s reasonable belief, stated as follows:
“The DNR investigator, the ALJ, and the circuit court all emphasized that Heller’s complaints lacked merit, though we note that none explained why DNR could use funds earmarked for Somers Cove for personnel or property at other DNR facilities when section 5-908.1 prohibits that. Of significance to this appeal, however, is that none proceeded to consider the material question for purposes of assessing whether Heller’s communications qualified as protected disclosures, i.e., whether Heller made them in a good faith belief that SCM funds were being used in violation of section 5-908.1.
“We hold that, through his January 13, 2000 memo, his discussions with DNR management, and his other written complaints to his DNR supervisors, Heller made protected disclosures alleging that DNR policies and practices with respect to revenue generated by Somers Cove Marina and funds appropriated for the marina were prohibited by NR section 5-908.1.”
Heller, 161 Md.App. at 327, 868 A.2d at 941. Unfortunately, this language is ambiguous. It seems to permit two readings. First, it could be read to hold that the ALJ made an error of law, applying the wrong legal standard in interpreting the Maryland Whistleblower Law because she interpreted “reasonable belief’ as used in the Act to require the trier of fact “to measure objectively what Heller knew and believed at the *187time he made [the] disclosures, rather than what DNR officials knew and believed, what Heller later learned, or what DNR and the ALJ ultimately concluded.” Heller, 161 Md. App. at 326, 868 A.2d at 940. Second, it could be read to go further, to conclude as a factual matter that respondent did have a reasonable belief that he was disclosing violations of law.
I would make clear that, to the extent the language of the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals supports this second reading, the finding was improper and would not bind the OAH on remand. As a general rule, fact finding is the province of triers of fact, not of appellate courts. See, e.g., Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224, 571 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1990). With respect to judicial review of agency adjudicatory decisions, State Government Article § 10-222 gives the Circuit Court reviewing the decision the power to require the presiding officer at the agency adjudication to take additional evidence prior to a hearing in the Circuit Court, State Gov’t Art. § 10—222(f)(2), and to modify the agency’s factual findings in light of the additional evidence, State Gov’t Art. § 10—222(f)(3), but it does not give the reviewing court the power to take additional evidence or to make factual findings in its disposition of the petition for review of the agency decision. See State Gov’t Art. § 10—222(h)(3) (giving reviewing court the power to “modify the decision” of the agency, but not the power to modify its factual findings); but see State Gov’t Art. § 10-222(g)(2) (permitting reviewing Circuit Court to consider testimony offered by a party, not in the record before the agency, regarding alleged irregularities in procedure before the presiding officer). Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals did not have the power to make a factual finding that respondent had a reasonable belief that he was disclosing a violation of law.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

. In effect, then, the majority’s position places a heavy burden on employees contemplating disclosures of wrongdoing to determine in advance of the disclosure whether their allegations are in fact correct. This is particularly troublesome given that, in many instances, a particular employee may not have access to all the information that would be necessary to determine with certainty whether any wrongdoing took place.

. The majority relies on Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir.1998) to support its position that Colonel Barton’s testimony that he simply relied on Bias’s report in deciding whether to discipline respondent provides grounds for the ALfs exclusion of the evidence on relevance grounds. See maj. op. at 175, 892 A.2d at 513. Smith, however, does not support the majority’s position. The issue before the court in Smith was whether to adopt the "honest belief” rule for deciding whether an employer’s proffered reason for an employment action is a pretext applied by the Seventh Circuit in cases under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Smith, 155 *185F.3d at 806. The honest belief rule adopted by the Seventh Circuit provides that “so long as the employer honestly believed in the proffered reason given for its employment action, the employee cannot establish pretext even if the employer's reason is ultimately found to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Id. (citing Kariotis v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.1997)).
In Smith, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's approach. Rather, the court held that "in order for an employer's proffered nondiscriminatoiy basis for its employment action to be considered honestly held, the employer must be able to establish its reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made.” Smith, 155 F.3d at 807. Further, even if the employer presents evidence tending to show this, the employee should still have the opportunity to present evidence to the contrary. Id. This is so because " 'if the employer made an error too obvious to be unintentional, perhaps it had an unlawful motive for doing so.’ " Id. (quoting Fischbach v. Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1996)). Thus, if the Smith approach were to be applied to establishing pretext under the Maryland Whistleblower Law, respondent would be entitled to present evidence challenging the factual basis of the employment action taken against him by petitioner.

. The ALJ also found that respondent did not make a protected disclosure, but the Court of Special Appeals held that the ALJ based this finding on an erroneous interpretation of the Maryland Whistleblower Act. See Heller, 161 Md.App. at 317-27, 868 A.2d at 934-41. As discussed supra in § I, this issue is not properly before the Court *186because petitioner did not seek review of this holding in its petition for a writ of certiorari.