Court Opinion

ID: 9679499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:54:19.32292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:14.135687
License: Public Domain

McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting).
In State v. Jones, 220 La. 381, 56 So.2d 724 and State v. Sims, 220 La. 532, 57 So.2d 177, this court was called upon to de*898termine the effect to be given to Act 164 of 1950; wherein the Legislature had, for the first time, extended the offense of criminal neglect of family to include desertion and intentional nonsupport by a parent of his or her illegitimate, as well as legitimate, children.
While finding that the Legislature intended to coerce parents to fulfill their obligation to their illegitimate children, we concluded that the statute was applicable only to cases in which there was a civil obligation placed upon the parent to provide support — that is, that its operation was to be confined to matters in which the illegitimate offspring had been legally acknowledged by the parent or where he had been declared to be such by judgment of court, in accordance with the provisions of the LSA-Civil Code on this subject. The rationale of these decisions was that it would be unreasonable to view the action of the Legislature as rendering an act or course of conduct criminal for which no civil responsibility was imposed.
The last case, State v. Sims, supra, the' opinion which I wrote, was decided on January 14, 1952. Subsequently the Legislature clarified all doubt as to its intention by passing Act 368 of 1952, which is under consideration in this case. That Act declares :
“Criminal neglect of family is the desertion or intentional non-support:
‡ ‡ i}c :Je :jc ‡
“(2) By either parent of his minor child,, whether legitimate or illegitimate, who is in destitute or necessitous-circumstances, there being a duty established by this article for either parent to support his child. The parent shall have this duty without regard to his reasons amd irrespective of the causes of his living separate from the other parent. The duty established by this article shall apply retrospectively to- children, legitimate or illegitimate, born prior to the effective date of this article”. (Italics mine.)
Could anything be clearer? Here, the lawmaker has expressly spelled out, for the guidance of the courts, its aim to make the desertion or intentional nonsupport by a parent of his illegitimate child, whether he be acknowledged or not, a criminal offense.' And, in order to insure against any possibility of a misunderstanding of its purpose, it has specifically imposed an obligation upon all such parents to provide for those children.
The majority opinion neither cites nor discusses this very important change in the statute but, instead, bases its conclusion on what I believe to be an erroneous interpretation of the provision following the one above quoted, which reads:
“In the case of an illegitimate child, evidence may be introduced in the proceedings hereunder to prove paternity or maternity. This proof shall be made in accordance with the' rules estab*900lished by the Revised Civil Code of 1870, as amended, as for proof of paternity or maternity for civil purposes. Such proof, however, shall be used solely as the basis for the duty to support an illegitimate child established by this article and shall not be construed as establishing any civil obligation.” (Italics mine.)
Obviously, this provision pertains solely to the type of proof which may be administered for the purpose of establishing paternity or maternity and has nothing to do, as the majority would -construe it, with the criminal responsibility. imposed upon the parent by the statute for his desertion or intentionál nonsupport of his illegitimate child. The provision declares in plain terms that the proof in prosecutions under the Act shall conform to the rules established by the LSA-Civil Code for proof of paternity and maternity for civil purposes. These rules are set-forth in Articles 208,. 209, 210, 211 and 212 of the Civil Code. Articles 209 and 210 are applicable in this case because they deal with the methods of proving paternal descent.
Article 209 provides, in substance, that paternity can be shown either by the private writings in which the father “may have acknowledged the bastard as his child” or when he has referred to him as his child in conversation or has caused him to be educated as such or in instances where the mother, living in concubinage with the father, resided in his house when the child, Was conceived.
Article 210 declares that paternity may be proved by the oath of the mother, when supported by proof of her cohabitation with the reputed father, providing she is not known to be a woman of dissolute manners or one having had unlawful connection with one or more men either before or since the birth of the child.1
In the case at bar, the majority opinion does not conclude that the State has failed' to establish the paternity of the defendant in accordance with the above-quoted articles. Conversely, it proceeds to apply Article 242 of the LSA-Civil Code to the case. That article, which prescribes the proof 'required by an illegitimate in order to sue' for alimony in a civil action, is without' pertinence here for the simple reason that the 1952 statute does not say that the proof of paternity is dependent upon whether the' illegitimate child has a civil action against’ the parent for alimony; it imposes a duty of support in express terms. It merely employs the articles of the LSA-Civil Code in providing the method by which paternity or maternity is to be established.
Much reliance is also placed by the majority upon the per curiam of one of the' judges of the Juvenile Court in the case of-State v. Holmes, No. 41,076 of our docket, *902in which remedial writs were refused by-four members of this court, to which ruling I did not subscribe. The per curiam, which is quoted in the main opinion, does not attempt to analyze Act 368 of 1952 and, as I read it, adds nothing to sustain the majority view.
I respectfully dissent.

. ■ For a comprehensive discussion of the methods of proving paternity, see Rousseau v. Bartell, La., 70 So.2d 394.