Court Opinion

ID: 9902769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:23:21.742792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:59.007927
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D21-3172
                  LT Case No. 2021-10976-CODL
                  _____________________________

ABU KAWSAR, ANTHONY
KARDRIU, AND LAMIKA
VISHKUIRTI,

    Appellants,

    v.

ALHAMDI GROUP, LLC,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the County Court for Volusia County.
Angela A. Dempsey, Judge.

Tanner Andrews, of Tanner Andrews, P.A.,
DeLand, for Appellants.

David E. Borack, of Borack Law Group, P.A.,
Longwood, for Appellee.

                         August 31, 2023

PER CURIAM.
      Abu Kawsar, Anthony Kardriu, and Lamika Vishkuirti
(Appellants) appeal a final summary judgment entered in favor of
Alhamdi Group, LLC (Appellee) in this breach of commercial lease
case. We reverse the summary judgment as to lost business
revenue but otherwise affirm.

        In its motion for summary judgment and accompanying
evidence, Appellee alleged that Appellants breached their
commercial lease, and that Appellee was entitled to certain
damages, including “lost business revenue” of $2,070. Appellants
filed a memorandum in opposition to summary judgment but failed
to raise any argument concerning Appellee’s claim for lost business
revenue.

       The trial court ultimately rendered final summary judgment
in favor of Appellee, and Appellants filed a motion for rehearing
where they argued, for the first time, that the summary judgment
evidence failed to sufficiently establish the amount of lost business
revenues. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing.

     On appeal, Appellee argues that Appellants failed to preserve
this argument below. Although Appellants could have made this
argument during the summary judgment proceedings, we are
bound by our decision in Elser v. Law Offices of James M. Russ,
P.A., 679 So. 2d 309, 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). In that case, we
determined that a party could preserve an argument in opposition
to summary judgment by raising it for the first time on rehearing.
Id. In so doing, we expressly declined to follow the contrary
decisions in Trinchitella v. D.R.F., Inc., 584 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1991), and School Board of Pinellas County v. Pinellas
County Commission, 404 So. 2d 1178, 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
See also High Definition Mobile MRI, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 321 So. 3d 818, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). As required by
Elser then, we must consider this argument preserved.

     Having preserved this argument, at least in light of Elser, we
conclude that the summary judgment was improper as to the
award of damages for “lost business revenue” because Appellee’s
affidavit was conclusory as to this item. See Katz Deli of Aventura,
Inc. v. Waterways Plaza, LLC, 183 So. 3d 374, 382 (Fla. 3d DCA
2013) (“Lost profits must be established with a reasonable degree

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of certainty and must be a natural consequence of the wrong.”
(citation omitted)); Sampley Enters., Inc. v. Laurilla, 404 So. 2d
841, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (“[A]n award of lost profits must be
supported by evidence.”). We therefore reverse the summary
judgment as to the award of lost business revenue and certify
conflict with Trinchitella, School Board of Pinellas County, and
High Definition Mobile MRI.

      We otherwise reject Appellants’ arguments and affirm.

    AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED;
CONFLICT CERTIFIED.

EDWARDS, C.J., and WALLIS, J., concur.
EISNAUGLE, J., concurring specially, with opinion.

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                       Case No. 5D21-3172
                 LT Case No. 2021-10976-CODL

EISNAUGLE, J., concurring specially.

      I agree that we are bound by Elser v. Law Offices of James
M. Russ, P.A., 679 So. 2d 309, 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) and
therefore must reverse the award for “lost business revenue.”
However, in my view, Elser was wrongly decided. Therefore, were
it not for Elser, I would affirm because this argument was not
properly preserved.

       Our supreme court has identified three requirements to
properly preserve a legal argument for review. “First, the party
must make a timely, contemporaneous objection at the time of the
alleged error.” Aills v. Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 2010).
“Second, the party must state a legal ground for that objection.”
Id. “Third, ‘[i]n order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal,
it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the
objection, exception, or motion below.’” Id. (citation omitted); see
also Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n v. Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 928
(Fla. 2005) (“In order to be preserved for further review by a higher
court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the
specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review
must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered
preserved.” (quoting Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla.
1985))).

       Given that an argument must be raised timely and
contemporaneously, the general rule is that an appellate court
“cannot consider [an] issue[] raised for the first time in a motion
for rehearing in the trial court.” Trinchitella v. D.R.F., Inc., 584
So. 2d 35, 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (applying the rule to an
argument made on rehearing in opposition to a motion to compel
arbitration); accord High Definition Mobile MRI, Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 321 So. 3d 818, 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)
(concluding that an argument is not preserved when raised for the
first time “after the trial court had already granted the motion for
summary judgment and entered a final judgment”); Sch. Bd. of
Pinellas Cnty. v. Pinellas Cnty. Comm’n, 404 So. 2d 1178, 1178
(Fla. 2d DCA 1981). But see Williams v. Williams, 152 So. 3d 702,

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704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“[W]here an error by the court appears
for the first time on the face of a final order, a party must alert the
court of the error via a motion for rehearing or some other
appropriate motion in order to preserve it for appeal.”).1

      In this case, Appellants’ argument was not timely and
contemporaneous. Indeed, the motion for summary judgment
clearly sought damages for lost profits, and the affidavit alleged
the specific amount incurred. While the affidavit is conclusory and
therefore insufficient, Appellants could have, and should have,
pointed out this deficiency before rendition of the final summary
judgment.

       In my view, Elser is incorrect because it fails to consider the
first requirement of preservation—a timely and contemporaneous
objection at the time of the error. In Elser, we reasoned:

            In our view, the order granting a motion
            for summary judgment is not final until
            the motion for rehearing is considered and
            disposed. Until then, a trial judge is free
            to consider any legal error or matter
            overlooked relating to the entry of the
            summary judgment. Indeed, that is the
            very purpose of a motion for rehearing.

679 So. 2d at 312.

      It is true that a “summary judgment is not final until the
motion for rehearing is considered and disposed,” and I agree that
a trial court has considerable discretion to open a judgment on
rehearing. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(a). But while a motion for
rehearing gives the trial court, in some sense, an opportunity to
consider an argument raised for the first time, such a procedure
does not give the trial court a timely and contemporaneous

    1 I agree that we should certify conflict because I find no
meaningful way to distinguish our decision today from
Trinchitella, School Board of Pinellas County, and High Definition
Mobile MRI.

                                  5
opportunity to do so. In other words, even if the motion for
rehearing technically fulfills the second and third requirements on
preservation, it does not satisfy the first. See Aills, 29 So. 3d at
1108.

       This case illustrates two ways in which an argument raised
for the first time on rehearing is generally not timely and
contemporaneous. First, the legal landscape is entirely different on
rehearing than during summary judgment proceedings. Before
rendition of summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden,
and the trial court must either grant or deny the motion as a matter
of law. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a) (“The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” (emphasis added)). However, after rendition of
summary judgment, the burden not only shifts to the party moving
for rehearing, but the trial court also has substantial discretion.2
See Villas at Laguna Bay Condo. Ass’n v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 190
So. 3d 200, 202 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (holding that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying motion for rehearing without an
evidentiary hearing where the motion “was supported by an
affidavit from its counsel establishing colorable grounds that
excusable neglect occurred”); Coffman Realty, Inc. v. Tosohatchee
Game Pres., Inc., 381 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980),
opinion approved of, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982) (“[I]t is not an abuse
of discretion for a trial judge to hold that an affidavit filed with a
petition for rehearing is too late.”); see also Dalrymple v. Franzese,
944 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (denial of motion for
rehearing that attached accident reconstruction expert’s affidavit
was abuse of discretion where nonmovant was unable to timely file
opposing expert’s affidavit; “because of Hurricane Wilma and its
aftermath, [expert] was unable to meet with the investigating

      2 Appellants do not raise the separate argument on appeal

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for
rehearing. See Villas at Laguna Bay, 190 So. 3d at 202. Instead,
Appellants’ argument is that we should reverse the entry of
summary judgment as a matter of law.                These are two
substantively different arguments.

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officer and complete his investigation and affidavit before the
hearing”). For this reason, an argument that might have been a
winner before rendition of summary judgment does not necessarily
end the inquiry after a case proceeds to rehearing.

       Second, the untimely nature of Appellants’ argument is
especially clear given the time requirements of the summary
judgment rule. Our supreme court has carefully adopted a
procedure for efficiently disposing of appropriate cases by
summary judgment, including specific timeframes. See Fla. R. Civ.
P. 1.510. But in the fifth district, a party can simply stand silent
in the face of a deficient motion or affidavit, safely knowing that
Elser will compel the trial court to grant rehearing and start all
over. This opportunity for gamesmanship is inconsistent with the
rule on preservation and can thwart the time requirements of rule
1.510(b)–(c).3 Cf. Millar Elevator Serv. Co. v. McGowan, 819 So.
2d 145, 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (observing in the context of a jury
trial that the preservation requirement “also promotes judicial
economy and prevents ‘a party from rolling the dice with the jury,
confident that an unvoiced objection will garner a new trial if the
verdict is unfavorable’” (quoting Lowe Inv. Corp. v. Clemente, 685
So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996))).4

       In sum, Appellants’ argument could have, and should have,
been raised before rendition of the final summary judgment. Were
it not for Elser, I would affirm.

    3 For this reason, I would also certify a question of great public

importance.
    4 Appellants argue “[s]ummary judgment is meant as a trial

substitute, so that Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(e) should serve the same
purpose as following trial.” In essence, Appellants invite this court
to add the words “or after rendition of summary final judgment” to
rule 1.530(e). I reject this argument because it conflicts with the
plain language of the rule. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(e).

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          _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
           _____________________________

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