Court Opinion

ID: 9956121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 08:10:43.916041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:34.628672
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
      Second Appellate District of Texas
               at Fort Worth
            ___________________________

                 No. 02-23-00090-CR
                 No. 02-23-00091-CR
                 No. 02-23-00092-CR
                 No. 02-23-00093-CR
            ___________________________

        ERIC ANTONIO JOHNSON, Appellant

                          V.

                THE STATE OF TEXAS

        On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2
                   Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 1597343D, 1612161D, 1612163D, 1612167D

         Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                I. INTRODUCTION

         After Appellant Eric Antonio Johnson entered non-negotiated pleas of guilty

to four aggravated robberies, the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to

fifty years in prison for each offense with the sentences to run concurrently. On

appeal, Johnson asserts two points: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion

to withdraw his guilty pleas, and (2) the trial court unlawfully assessed duplicate court

costs.     Because the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Johnson

knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the offenses, we overrule his first point.

However, because the judgments in cause numbers 02-23-00091-CR, 02-23-00092-

CR, and 02-23-00093-CR improperly duplicated the court costs and reimbursement

fees assessed in cause number 02-23-00090-CR, we delete the court costs and

reimbursement fees assessed in those three cause numbers and affirm those three

judgments as modified. We affirm the judgment in cause number 02-23-00090-CR.

                                 II. BACKGROUND

         Johnson pleaded guilty to four aggravated robberies in July 2022. There is no

reporter’s record of the hearing, but the trial court later summarized the hearing with

Johnson present. Johnson voiced no disagreement with the trial court’s summary.

         According to the trial court judge, the parties were about to begin voir dire

when Johnson volunteered to plead guilty without a plea bargain. The trial court

further related that after Johnson conferred with his counsel and executed the

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appropriate documents, the trial court admonished Johnson before the bench.

According to the trial court, Johnson persuaded it that he was entering his guilty pleas

voluntarily,1 so it accepted Johnson’s pleas and ordered the Tarrant County

Community Supervision and Corrections Department to prepare a presentence

investigation report (PSI). The documents supporting the pleas are in the clerk’s

records for each of the four cases and include Johnson’s confessions.

      Less than two weeks later, in August 2022, however, Johnson filed a pro se

motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty.

      About four months later, in December 2022, when Johnson appeared for his

sentencing hearing, Johnson agreed that he was still acknowledging his legal

responsibility for his crimes and conceded that he was in fact guilty.2 Johnson,

      1
       The trial court articulated how Johnson persuaded it:

             Defendant advised me multiple times that he understood his
      rights, that he knew there was a jury in the hall, that he wanted me to
      make the decision [on punishment]. I advised him guilty/not guilty is
      water under the bridge; once you plea, the only issue is what -- the
      sentence, is it fair under the law, the facts and the rules and only what
      happens after the plea is accepted can be appealed, i.e., the sentence but
      [not] guilty/not guilty. The Defendant indicated he understood.
      Defendant was respectful[ and] polite, made eye contact, and [was]
      articulate. I believed him to be competent at the time to go to trial and
      competent to make a decision to enter an open plea instead [of having] a
      trial.
      2
       The trial court and Johnson engaged in the following exchange:

              THE COURT: Okay. And you do persist and acknowledge your
      legal responsibility for these crimes, different people have different roles,

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however, requested a continuance so that he could cooperate more fully with the

probation officer for purposes of the PSI. The trial judge advised Johnson that he

(the judge) would be retiring at the end of the year and that a different judge would

determine Johnson’s punishment; Johnson indicated that he understood but

nonetheless wanted his sentencing hearing continued. For this purpose, the trial court

agreed to Johnson’s requested continuance.

      But when Johnson appeared for his sentencing hearing in April 2023, he again

asserted that his guilty pleas were not voluntary and that he wanted to withdraw them.

The trial court refused Johnson’s request and proceeded with the sentencing hearing.

                                 III. DISCUSSION

A. Withdrawal of Pleas

      A defendant may withdraw his plea as a matter of right, without assigning a

reason, until the trial court pronounces judgment or takes the case under advisement.

Smith v. State, 609 S.W.3d 351, 352 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d);

Jagaroo v. State, 180 S.W.3d 793, 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet.

      but under the rules and the law, as you and your lawyer have discussed,
      you will still concede, as you did under oath before, you are in fact guilty
      and -- but would like to give an explanation on your behalf of what and
      how it happened to be in the PSI, versus, A, I just want to start over,
      which is what you’d told the officer and nothing else, pretty much.

             Is that correct?

             [JOHNSON]: Yes, sir.

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ref’d) (citing Jackson v. State, 590 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979)).

After the trial court has taken the case under advisement, however, if a defendant

wants to withdraw his guilty plea, withdrawal of the plea is within the trial court’s

sound discretion. Jagaroo, 180 S.W.3d at 802. After a trial court has admonished the

defendant, received the plea and evidence, and passed the case for presentence

investigation, it has taken the case under advisement. Lawal v. State, 368 S.W.3d 876,

882 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Jagaroo, 180 S.W.3d at 802.

      Johnson requested to withdraw his guilty pleas after the trial court had

admonished him, taken evidence, and passed his case for the presentence

investigation. Thus, Johnson attempted to withdraw his pleas after the trial court had

taken his cases under advisement. See Lawal, 368 S.W.3d at 882; Jagaroo, 180 S.W.3d

at 802.

      We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a plea after it has taken

a case under advisement for an abuse of discretion. Jackson, 590 S.W.2d at 515;

Jagaroo, 180 S.W.3d at 802. To show an abuse of discretion, an appellant must show

that the trial court’s ruling lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Smith,

609 S.W.3d at 352; Jagaroo, 180 S.W.3d at 802. A trial court abuses its discretion only

when no reasonable view of the record supports its ruling. State v. Lerma, 639 S.W.3d

63, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

      Courts determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea by the totality of the

circumstances. Thomas v. State, 615 S.W.3d 552, 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

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2020, no pet.). Only if the guilty plea is entered freely and voluntarily may a trial court

accept it. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b). When the record shows that the

defendant received the statutory admonishments, there is a prima facie showing that

he knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. Thomas, 615 S.W.3d at 568–69. A

defendant who attested that he understood the nature of his plea and that his plea was

voluntary carries a “heavy burden” on appeal to show that his plea was involuntary.

Id. To meet that burden, the defendant must affirmatively show that he was not

aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the trial

court’s erroneous admonishment. Id.

      The documents supporting the July 2022 pleas are in the clerk’s records for

each of the four cases. At the December 2022 hearing, Johnson reaffirmed that he

was guilty of the offenses. At the April 2023 sentencing hearing, Johnson maintained

that he did not understand what was happening at the July 2022 hearing. Although he

acknowledged having signed the documents, he denied having read them.

      As the factfinder, the trial court is entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of

a witness’s testimony. Jackson v. State, 617 S.W.3d 916, 923 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.). The trial court did not have to believe Johnson’s assertion

that he had not understood the consequences of pleading guilty and had not read the

admonishments before signing them. The signed July 2022 documents and Johnson’s

assertions at the December 2022 hearing support the trial court’s ruling. We hold that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Johnson to withdraw

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his pleas of guilty. See Lerma, 639 S.W.3d at 68; Jagaroo, 180 S.W.3d at 801. We

overrule Johnson’s first point.

B. Duplicate Costs

       In his second issue, Johnson contends that the trial court erred by assessing

duplicate court costs in the identical amounts of $345 (reflecting $290 in court costs

and $55 in reimbursement fees) in trial court cause numbers 1612161, 1612163, and

1612167 (appellate court cause numbers 02-23-00091-CR, 02-23-00092-CR, and 02-

23-00093-CR, respectively). The State concedes this point. We agree with both

parties.

       “In a single criminal action in which a defendant is convicted of two or more

offenses or of multiple counts of the same offense, the court may assess each court

cost or fee only once against the defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 102.073(a). And when a trial court erroneously assesses court costs for multiple

convictions that were tried in a single proceeding, we normally retain the court costs

for the offense of the highest category and modify the judgment in the offense of the

lower category to delete the duplicate court costs. Pickrom v. State, No. 02-19-00188-

CR, 2020 WL 1808485, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 9, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication). But when the convictions are the same category

of offense and the costs are all the same, the court costs should be based on the

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lowest cause number.3 Id.; Williams v. State, 495 S.W.3d 583, 590 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2016) (op. on reh’g), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, No. PD-0947-

16, 2017 WL 1493488 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 26, 2017) (not designated for

publication).

      Accordingly, we sustain Johnson’s second issue and delete the $290 award of

court costs and the $55 reimbursement fees in the judgments in trial court cause

numbers 1612161, 1612163, and 1612167 (appellate court cause numbers 02-23-

00091-CR, 02-23-00092-CR, and 02-23-00093-CR, respectively), and, in each

judgment, we modify the award of costs and reimbursement fees to reflect $0.

                                 IV. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled Johnson’s first issue and sustained his second issue,

          • in trial court cause number 1597343 (appellate court cause number 02-
            23-00090-CR), we affirm the judgment;

          • in trial court cause number 1612161 (appellate court cause number 02-
            23-00091-CR), we delete the $290 award of court costs and the $55
            reimbursement fees, modify the award of court costs and reimbursement
            fees to reflect $0, and affirm the judgment as modified;

      3
        The judgment in trial court cause number 1597343 (appellate court cause
number 02-23-00090-CR) had reimbursement fees of $65, not $55 like the other three
cause numbers, so its assessment was not identical to the other three. Johnson,
however, does not assert that the additional $10 fee in the first cause number was
improperly assessed. See Cain v. State, 525 S.W.3d 728, 734 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (opting for higher amount because the prohibition is
against assessing the same cost more than once).

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         • in trial court cause number 1612163 (appellate court cause number 02-
           23-00092-CR), we delete the $290 award of court costs and the $55
           reimbursement fees, modify the award of court costs and reimbursement
           fees to reflect $0, and affirm the judgment as modified; and

         • in trial court cause number 1612167 (appellate court cause number 02-
           23-00093-CR), we delete the $290 award of court costs and the $55
           reimbursement fees, modify the award of court costs and reimbursement
           fees to reflect $0, and affirm the judgment as modified.

                                                 /s/ Dana Womack

                                                 Dana Womack
                                                 Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 28, 2024

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