Court Opinion

ID: 9605228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:31:54.313977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:26.555003
License: Public Domain

COOPER, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s analysis of the only issues presented to us by this CR 60.02 motion, i. e., whether Appellant should be granted relief from the final judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence. I dissent, however, from the majority’s gratuitous suggestion that the admission at trial of George Wade’s “confession” in which he claimed Appellant was the sodomizer and triggerman in these gruesome crimes could be “cumulative evidence” or “harmless error.”
In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 72 (Ky.1990) (“Taylor /”), we upheld the admission of Wade’s statement under the common-law hearsay exception for statements against penal interest because the statement also inculpated Wade as an accomplice, i.e., it was, in fact, a statement against Wade’s penal interest. Id. at 75. See KRE 804(b)(3). When the issue was raised again on appeal from the denial of Appellant’s RCr 11.42 collateral attack, Taylor v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 166-68 (Ky.2001) (“Taylor II”), the United States Supreme Court had decided Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), in which a plurality of the Court held that Rule 804(b)(3) was not an available vehicle for admission of an out-of-court statement by a nontestifying codefendant that inculpated the defendant. However, we again upheld the admission of Wade’s statement because the relevant holding in Lilly, as a plurality decision, was not binding precedent, and because Wade’s statement also possessed “adequate indicia of reliability” demonstrated by “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” so that its admission was authorized by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Taylor II, 63 S.W.3d at 166-67.
Subsequent to our decision in Taylor II, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), which not only reaffirmed the plurality opinion in Lilly, id. at 55, 124 S.Ct. at 1367 (“[Accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.”) (quoting Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134,119 S.Ct. at 1899), this time in the context of a majority opinion, but also overruled Roberts, id. at 69, 124 S.Ct. at 1374, thus removing any remaining underpinning for the admission of such evidence in Taylor. In fact, the Court specifically identified Taylor II as an example of the type of error fostered by Roberts. Id. at 64, 124 S.Ct. at 1371.
We recently recognized the effect of Crawford on our Taylor decisions in Terry v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 794, 799-800 (Ky.2005). Presumably, that is why the majority of this Court feels compelled to attempt to defend our Taylor decisions on the “newly discovered” basis of “cumulative evidence” and “harmless error.” These issues were not raised in Taylor I or Taylor II and are not raised now. We need not defend our previous Taylor decisions. Both were supported by what appeared to be sound legal principles extant at the time they were decided. The United States Supreme Court subsequently decided otherwise — which is its prerogative when construing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. There is no good reason for us to sua sponte attempt to justify our prior decisions by conjuring and decid-*79mg new issues that are not before us. However, there is a very good reason not to do so. The position of a Court of Justice is that of neutral arbiter, not advocate. Our job is to apply sound legal principles to the facts and issues before us — not to advocate to the federal courts how they should decide an issue that is no longer before us.
Even if that were not so, Wade’s statement inculpating Appellant as the sodomizer and triggerman in this case was either admissible or not, and that decision will ultimately be decided by the federal courts on habeas corpus review. However, the admission of Wade’s statement was neither cumulative nor harmless. The only two people who know who actually committed the sodomy and murders are Appellant and Wade. In his statement to the police, Wade admitted to his participation in the kidnappings and thefts but claimed that he left the scene before Appellant committed the sodomy and murders, and that he heard the gunshots as he was leaving the scene. Appellant exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify in his own behalf. Thus, the only evidence of who was the actual sodomizer and triggerman was contained in Wade’s self-serving, out-of-court statement that cast the blame on Appellant.
“The relevant inquiry under the harmless error doctrine ‘is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’” Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Ky.1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). This same “harmless error” standard was reaffirmed as the basis for evaluating constitutional errors (such as this claimed Confrontation Clause violation) in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). “An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived of as harmless.” Id. at 23-24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. Obviously, Wade’s out-of-court statement was neither cumulative nor harmless.
But we should not address this issue at all. Appellant filed his CR 60.02 motion seeking relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence and that is the only issue before us. Even though Crawford was decided prior to the filing of Appellant’s brief to this Court (and is cited on page 1 thereof), Appellant has not asked this Court to grant him relief from the judgment on the basis of “change of law.” Nor has the Commonwealth asked us to reaffirm the judgment on the basis of “cumulative evidence” or “harmless error.”
“Intervening developments in the law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) [federal equivalent of CR 60.02(f) ]....” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2018, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997). That is true even when the intervening change results from a decision of the United States Supreme Court that is directly on point. Consider:
In the previous appeal in this qui tarn action under the False Claims Act (FCA), Garibaldi I [United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 244 F.3d 486 (5th Cir.2005)], we vacated the plaintiffs’ judgment on the verdict, and rendered judgment for the Orleans Parish School Board holding that the board was not a “person” subject to liability under the FCA. This court’s judgment in that case became final when the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in Cook County v. United States ex rel Chandler, [538 U.S. 119, 123 S.Ct. *801239, 155 L.Ed.2d 247 (2003) ] held that local governments are “persons” amenable to qui tam actions under the FCA. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Chandler, the plaintiffs filed a motion in the district court for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) from this court’s final judgment in Garibaldi I. The district court concluded that Chandler had overruled Garibaldi I, granted plaintiffs’ motion, and re-entered its judgment on the verdict for the plaintiffs against the school board. The school board appealed. We reverse. In the absence of “extraordinary circumstances,” a change in controlling decisional law after the finality of a judgment does not warrant reopening the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). The circumstances here are not “extraordinary” because this case in [sic] not materially distinguishable from the “ordinary” case in which a subsequent change in controlling law is not held to justify relief from a prior final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).
United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 397 F.3d 334, 335-36 (5th Cir.2005) (internal footnotes omitted). See also Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341-42 (3rd Cir.1999). Admittedly, there are cases holding that a particular change in the law created an “exceptional circumstance” warranting Rule 60(b)(6) review. E.g., Marrero Pichardo v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46, 56 (2nd Cir.2004) (change in deportation law). However, it is inappropriate for us to address whether Crawford requires a different result in this case when Appellant has not claimed that it does.
JOHNSTONE, J., joins this opinion.