Court Opinion

ID: 9398751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 00:03:45.816533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:36.062547
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/31/23 Chui v. Chui CA2/1
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying
on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by
rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION ONE

 BENJAMIN TZE-MAN CHUI,                                     B310325
 as Trustee, etc., et al.
                                                            (Los Angeles County
          Plaintiffs,
                                                            Super. Ct. No. BP154245)
          v.

 CHRISTINE CHUI, Individually
 and as Personal Representative,
 etc.,
          Defendant and Appellant;

 JACQUELINE CHUI, a Minor,
 et al.,
          Appellants;

 JACKSON CHEN, as Guardian,
 etc.,
       Respondent.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Gus T. May, Judge. Reversed with directions.
     Bohm Wildish & Matsen and James G. Bohm for Defendant
and Appellant Christine Chui.
      Ambrosi & Doerges and Mary E. Doerges Frey; Law Offices
of Angela Hawekotte, Angela Hawekotte; Bohm, Wildish & Matsen,
James G. Bohm, Nicholas P. Carrigan; Pastor Law Group and
Nathan Pastor for Appellant Michael Chui.
      Law Offices of Michael S. Overing, Michael S. Overing and
Edward C. Wilde for Appellant Jacqueline Chui.
      Hinojosa & Forer, Jeffrey Forer and Shannon H. Burns for
Respondent Jackson Chen.

                 ________________________________

       In this probate and trust litigation, the court appointed
Jackson Chen as guardian ad litem for minors Jacqueline Chui
and Michael Chui.1 After the minors’ mother, Christine Chui,
filed a petition to remove Chen as the minors’ guardian ad litem,
Chen requested the court appoint counsel to defend him against
Christine’s attacks, which the court granted. Sixteen months later,
Chen filed a petition to recover approximately $534,890 as his and
the appointed counsel’s fees, to be paid from the minors’ share of
the trust estate. Jacqueline and Michael, then 17 and 15 years
of age, respectively, hired counsel to assert their objections to the
fee petition and to petition for removal of Chen as their guardian
ad litem. Chen successfully moved to disqualify the minors’
counsel, and the court struck the minors’ removal petitions. The
court also appointed counsel to represent Jacqueline and Michael
at the hearing on the fee petition. After the court granted Chen’s
fee petition, Jacqueline, Michael, and Christine appealed.

      1Many of the parties share the same last name. To enhance
readability and to avoid confusion, we refer to them by their first
names. We intend no disrespect.

                                  2
       We agree with Jacqueline that the denial of her right to
have her chosen counsel represent her with respect to Chen’s fee
petition constitutes a denial of due process, and that Chen has
failed to show that the error was harmless. We therefore reverse
with directions to hold a further hearing on the fee petition. In
light of this holding, we decline to address other issues raised on
appeal.

           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
      A.    Background
       King Wah Chui (King) and Chi May Chui (May) had three
children: Robert Tak-Kwong Chui, Margaret Tak-Ying Chui Lee,
and Esther Chao. Robert and his first wife Helena Chang Chui had
a son, Benjamin Tze-Man Chui. Robert and Helena divorced, and
Robert married Christine. Robert and Christine had two children,
Jacqueline and Michael.
       King and May are the settlors of a trust and three subtrusts
(collectively, the King Trust). The assets of the King Trust consist
primarily of interests in residential apartment complexes and
related business entities, other real property, and financial
accounts.
       May died in 2004.
       In October 2012, Esther, a beneficiary under the King Trust,
filed a petition in the probate court concerning two subtrusts of the
King Trust, commencing Los Angeles County Superior Court case
No. BP137413. Esther alleged that King had become incapacitated,
that Robert and Margaret were acting as co-trustees of the King
Trust, and that Robert and Margaret had wrongfully delegated
their fiduciary responsibilities to Robert’s wife Christine.
       In January 2013, Esther petitioned to have a guardian
ad litem appointed for Jacqueline and Michael, who were then

                                  3
10 years old and 8 years old, respectively. Esther asserted that
Robert, the minors’ father, “[was] in a coma” and that Christine,
who had allegedly mismanaged the King Trust, “cannot act as
[guardian ad litem because] she will protect herself and not her
children.” Esther predicted that the case “will be heavily litigated,”
and therefore the court should appoint “a probate lawyer with trial
experience . . . to protect [the minors’] rights.”
       In March 2013, the court granted Esther’s petition and
appointed Chen as the minors’ guardian ad litem in the case.
       In April 2013, the court appointed Benjamin (Robert’s son
by his first marriage) and Margaret as co-trustees of the King
Trust. Robert died in June 2013. King died in 2014.
       Since the commencement of litigation in 2012, at least
seven other probate and trust administration cases have been
filed and deemed related to the case Esther commenced (case
No. BP137413).2 In one case (case No. BP145759), Christine was
appointed guardian of the estates for Jacqueline and Michael. And
in litigation concerning an insurance trust established by Robert
and his first wife Helena (case No. BP145642 (the ILIT case)), the
court appointed Christine guardian ad litem for Jacqueline and
Michael. It does not appear that the court formally appointed a
guardian ad litem in any other related case until March 3, 2020,

      2 The related cases are Los Angeles County Superior Court
case Nos. BP143884 (concerning Robert’s estate); BP145642
(concerning Robert and Helena’s irrevocable life insurance trust
(ILIT)); BP145759 (concerning the guardianship of the minors);
BP154245 (concerning the estate of King and May); BP155345
(concerning Trust A); BC544149 (concerning litigation regarding
Robert’s estate); and BP162717 (concerning the King Chui and Chi
May Chui life insurance trust).

                                  4
when the court appointed Chen guardian ad litem for Jacqueline
and Michael in most of the related cases.

     B.    The May 2018 settlement and the first guardian
           ad litem agreement
       In May 2018, Esther, Christine, Benjamin, and Margaret
resolved disputes among themselves in a settlement agreement,
the terms of which were set forth orally in court. Among other
terms, Christine “disclaim[ed] any rights as a beneficiary of [the
King Trust],” and agreed that only Chen (or his designee or court-
appointed successor) can bring a claim on behalf of Jacqueline or
Michael prior to their reaching the age of majority. Chen was not
present when the agreement was announced. The provisions of
the agreement “affecting [Jacqueline’s and Michael’s] interests and
rights” were expressly subject to approval by Chen. And, because
the agreement compromised Jacqueline’s and Michael’s rights
under the Trust, it also required the court’s approval. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 372.)
       In August 2018, Chen (as guardian ad litem for Jacqueline
and Michael), Benjamin, Margaret, and Esther—but not
Christine—signed what we described in Chui v. Chui (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 873, 885–886 (Chui I) as the “first GAL agreement.”
In November 2018, Chen filed a petition to approve the first GAL
agreement.
       Meanwhile, beginning in July 2018, Christine filed various
motions and petitions challenging the validity and enforceability
of the original oral settlement and the first GAL agreement. This
litigation is summarized in two prior opinions from this court:
Chui I, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 873, and Chui v. Chui (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 929 (Chui II). The court rejected each challenge.
       In addition to pursuing efforts to invalidate the first GAL
agreement, Christine filed a motion in December 2018, to remove

                                 5
Chen as guardian ad litem for Jacqueline and Michael and appoint
herself in his place. Christine alleged, among other misconduct,
that Chen committed fraud, negligence, unjust enrichment,
intentional interference with an expected inheritance to the minors,
intentional infliction of emotional distress to the minors, intentional
misrepresentations and nondisclosure to the court, and breach of
fiduciary duty.3
       In response to Christine’s motion, Chen applied ex parte
to the trial court for approval to retain counsel “to represent him
as guardian ad litem in these proceedings.” Chen acknowledged
that the court ordinarily appoints a guardian ad litem “with the
expectation that [the] appointed [guardian ad litem] represents
him[self] or herself.” Chen stated, however, that because of “the
high level of rancor Christine has demonstrated toward [Chen] and
the nature of the allegations she is now making against [him],” it is
in his and the minors’ best interests “to retain counsel to represent
him in defending against the claims made in Christine’s [m]otion.”
Chen represented that attorney Jeffrey Forer had agreed to reduce
his billing rate from $675 per hour to $500 per hour in representing
Chen.
       On January 16, 2019, the court granted Chen’s application
and appointed Forer of Hinojosa & Forer (H&F) “to represent . . .
Chen,” reserving “the right to reallocate . . . Chen’s fees.” The
court did not further describe Forer’s or H&F’s role in the case.
In the same order, the court vacated Christine’s motion to remove
Chen “as improperly filed,” without prejudice to the filing of a
procedurally proper petition to remove Chen.

      3 The motion, together with an accompanying memorandum
of points and authorities and supporting evidence, encompass more
than 800 pages of our record.

                                   6
       On February 1, 2019, Christine filed a petition to remove
Chen as guardian ad litem alleging nine causes of action against
Chen. Christine sought an order removing Chen as guardian
ad litem and appointing her in his place, an order voiding all
actions Chen had taken in the case, and sanctions against Chen
“related to his intentional fraud and concealment to the court to
harm the minors.”4 (Capitalization omitted.) Our record does not
disclose whether Chen filed any response to this petition.
       In April and May 2019, the court held a trial on Chen’s
petition to approve the first GAL agreement. Forer represented
Chen in connection with the trial and subsequent proceedings.
In July 2019, the court denied the petition. Chen, the court
stated, had not proven “that the agreement is in both or either
of the [minors’] best interests.”

      C.    The second guardian ad litem agreement
       In December 2019, Chen, Benjamin, Margaret, and Christine
participated in a mediation, which produced an agreement among
the parties except for Christine. The agreement, which we referred
to in Chui I as the second GAL agreement, was memorialized in
writing in January 2020. (Chui I, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 888.)
Chen promptly filed a petition for approval of the second GAL
agreement and a petition to remove Christine as the minors’
guardian ad litem and guardian of the person and estate of the
minors in any case in which she had those roles, and to have

      4 Christine filed subsequent petitions to remove Chen in
December 2019 and February 2020. Although the procedural
history concerning each of Christine’s petitions for removal of
Chen is not clear in our record, it appears they were ultimately
resolved in Chen’s favor in an order issued on March 3, 2020.

                                  7
himself appointed as the minors’ guardian ad litem in all cases
related to the May 2018 settlement.
       After a hearing held on March 3, 2020, the trial court issued
an order: (1) denying Christine’s petition to remove Chen as
guardian ad litem; (2) granting Chen’s petition to be appointed
guardian ad litem in all related cases, but one; and (3) granting
Chen’s petition to approve the second GAL agreement. In denying
Christine’s petition to remove Chen, the court stated that “there is
no basis to remove Chen where he has successfully done his job by
negotiating an approvable settlement for the minors, leaving them
far better off than they were under the [first] GAL agreement.”5
(Capitalization omitted.) According to the court, its failure to
appoint Chen guardian ad litem in the related cases previously
was due to “its own oversight” and that, by appointing Chen, the
court was “first and foremost remedying an administrative defect.”
       Christine, Jacqueline, and Michael, each represented by
different attorneys, appealed from the court’s March 3, 2020 orders.
In January 2021, Forer, on behalf of Chen, filed a motion in this
court to dismiss the appeals filed by Jacqueline and Michael, which
we denied.
       In March 2022, we affirmed the order in Chui I. (Chui I,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 873.)

      D.    Chen’s fee petition
     On May 15, 2020, Chen filed a petition in the trial court for
approval of his and H&F’s fees and costs (the fee petition). Chen

      5 As we noted in Chui v. Chui (Mar. 2, 2022, B306918)
[nonpub. opn.], Jacqueline and Michael’s “collective net value under
the settlement agreement and second GAL agreement would . . . be
approximately $22 million—approximately $5 million more than
what they were entitled to receive under the terms of the Trust.”

                                  8
sought: (1) $210,915 as fees for his services as guardian ad litem,
plus costs of $1,456; and (2) $323,975 for H&F’s fees, plus $7,102.35
in costs. In support of the petition, Chen states that he spent “no
fewer than 468.7 hours” as guardian ad litem in the underlying
cases and that his ordinary billing rate is $450 per hour. Chen
attached to his declaration billing statements showing particular
tasks and the time spent on each, and an itemized list of costs
advanced.
       Chen supported the claim for H&F’s fees and costs with a
declaration by Forer, which describes the work Forer and his H&F
colleague Shannon H. Burns performed in connection with the case.
Forer states that his regular billing rate is $675 per hour, but that
he billed his time in this case at $500 per hour “as agreed upon
by [the] [c]ourt.” Burns’s regular rate is $500 per hour, and she
charged her time at the rate of $375 per hour in this case. Forer
billed 452.5 hours on the case, and Burns billed 261.4 hours. H&F’s
itemized billings for the case are attached to the declaration.
       In his petition, Chen did not specify the source from which
payment for the fees and costs would be made. In a supplement
to the fee petition, Chen clarified that he is seeking payment for
his and H&F’s fees and costs only from Jacqueline’s and Michael’s
shares of the King Trust.
       While the fee petition was pending, Jacqueline, who was
then 17 years old, retained the firm of the Law Offices of Michael S.
Overing (the Overing firm) to represent her. On June 15, 2020, the
Overing firm filed on Jacqueline’s behalf a petition to remove Chen
as her guardian ad litem.6 On October 1, 2020 the Overing firm
filed an amended petition to remove Chen as her guardian ad litem

      6 Michael, who was then 16 years old, also retained counsel
and filed a motion to remove Chen as his guardian ad litem.

                                 9
(Jacqueline’s removal petition). Among other arguments,
Jacqueline asserted that Chen had never met or communicated
with her during his seven-year representation of her and had
recently taken positions contrary and hostile to her interests.
In Jacqueline’s view, Chen does not have “even the slightest
concern or knowledge for her good. He is simply the man who
is spending her inheritance without the courtesy of even saying
‘hello.’ ” Jacqueline sought an order authorizing her “to appear
without a guardian ad litem” or, in the alternative, “to proceed
with a different guardian ad litem until her 18th birthday.” She
also requested that the court deny “Chen any fees for his actions
as guardian ad litem.” (Italics omitted.)
       Chen responded to Jacqueline’s removal petition by filing:
(1) a motion to disqualify the Overing firm from representing
Jacqueline; (2) an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Jacqueline’s
removal petition; and (3) a demurrer to Jacqueline’s petition.
Among other arguments, Chen asserted that Jacqueline did not
have standing to seek Chen’s removal because, as a minor, she
“lacks legal capacity to make decisions or to contract,” “to hire an
attorney,” or “to act independently.”
       On September 30, 2020, prior to the court’s ruling on Chen’s
various challenges to Jacqueline’s removal petition, the Overing
firm filed a “special appearance” objection to the fee petition.
(Boldface and capitalization omitted.) According to the objections,
Chen’s and H&F’s billings reveal “systematic overcharging” by
H&F. The Overing firm identified 49 events that appear on the
billing statements of both Chen and Forer. For many of these
events, Forer billed substantially more time than Chen, implying
that either Forer overstated his time performing the task or Chen
understated his. Jacqueline further argued that Forer had been
retained for the limited purpose of representing Chen “in defending

                                 10
against the claims made” in Christine’s motion to remove him as
guardian ad litem, and that Forer billed for work in excess of his
appointment; indeed, Jacqueline asserted, Chen has been using
“Forer to attack Jacqueline while expecting her to pay for his
attacks.” Jacqueline also argued that Forer failed to disclose a
conflict of interest, and that Forer and Chen committed malpractice
and breached duties owed to Jacqueline. Jacqueline requested that
Chen’s fee petition be denied or, at least, that the court conduct an
evidentiary hearing.7
       On October 5, 2020, Chen filed a “preliminary reply”
to Jacqueline’s objections to the fee petition. (Boldface and
capitalization omitted.) In the preliminary reply, Chen asserted
that Jacqueline does not have standing to object to the fee petition.
The only parties with standing to object, Chen argued, are the
trustees of the King Trust. Chen concluded that the court should
strike Jacqueline’s objections.8
       On October 6, 2020, Christine filed objections to Chen’s
fee petition and requested an evidentiary hearing. Christine
asserted that Chen and/or Forer should not recover fees, because
among other reasons, they committed acts of “dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, reckless or intentional misrepresentation to the [c]ourt,”
“breach[es] of duty against” the minors, “intentional interference
with expected inheritance,” and “moral turpitude and corruption

      7There is a reference in our record to a notice of joinder in
Jacqueline’s objections filed by counsel for Michael. The referenced
document, however, does not appear to be in our record.
      8  On appeal, Jacqueline asserts in her opening and reply
briefs that the court struck her objections. She does not, however,
cite to the record for any order explicitly striking her objections.
Chen, however, does not dispute the point.

                                 11
in waiving the [m]inors’ interests, rights, and claims to over
$100 million.” She further alleged: Chen failed to bring any benefit
to the minors; Chen had a conflict of interest in representing both
minors and colluded with “adverse litigants”; Chen was derelict in
his duty during a trial concerning the settlement agreement; H&F
is “allied with” adverse parties; Chen should not recover for work
performed on cases prior to his appointment on such cases; and
Chen’s and H&F’s fees are excessive, duplicative, and unreasonable.
Christine further asserted that, if fees are paid, they should be paid
from the King Trust “in general, not from the children’s shares.”
       Christine supported her objections with a declaration from
Andre Jardini, an attorney specializing in auditing legal bills.
Jardini opined that Chen’s billing rate of $450 per hour is excessive
and that some of Chen’s time was duplicative of Forer’s time. He
concluded that Chen should be reimbursed, if at all, for 304.6 hours
of time (instead of the 468.7 hours Chen claimed) at the rate of $250
per hour, for a total of $76,150. Jardini further opined that staffing
at H&F “was inappropriate and excessive,” the hours billed for
certain tasks were excessive, there was unnecessary duplication
of effort and “double billing entries,” “inappropriately vague billing,”
and block billing. He concluded that H&F should be reimbursed
for no more than 572.52 hours (instead of the 713.9 hours Forer
claimed) for a total of $242,652.59.
       On October 20, 2020, the trial court granted Chen’s motion
to disqualify Jacqueline’s and Michael’s attorneys and struck their
petitions to remove Chen as their guardians ad litem, apparently
on the basis that the petitions had been filed by the minors’ chosen
counsel. The court subsequently appointed Adam Streltzer to

                                  12
represent Michael and Jacqueline “to review and respond” to
Chen’s fee petition.9
       On December 24, 2020, Streltzer filed a report with his
recommendations regarding the fee petition. Streltzer stated
that, in addition to reviewing Chen’s fee petition and supporting
documents, he reviewed the objections to the petition filed by
Christine and Jacqueline, and Chen’s response to Jacqueline’s
objections.10
       Streltzer noted that his review of the papers filed in
the case revealed “a tendency towards overly-litigious behavior”
among the “litigating parties” and that the litigants’ goal appeared
to be “simply to win at all costs and destroy the opposition without
regard to the cost or scope of the proceedings or any diminution
of the subject inheritance(s).” It was thus “a surprise [to Streltzer]
that the amounts sought by . . . Chen and his lawyer are not
significantly higher than claimed.”

      9 The court stated that its appointment of Streltzer and
Simon was made pursuant to Probate Code section 1470 and
in case No. BP145759, which is concerned with the guardianship
of the estates of Jacqueline and Michael.
      10  Streltzer further stated that he reviewed a “first
supplement to Jackson Chen, guardian ad litem’s petition for
guardian ad litem fees and attorney’s fees and costs,” filed on
June 3, 2020, and Michael’s “notice of joinder and joinder in
Jacqueline Chui’s (special appearance) objection to [the fee
petition].” (Capitalization omitted.) Neither of these documents
is included in our record on appeal. According to Streltzer, in
Chen’s “first supplement,” Chen “clarifies that he seeks payment
of [the requested fees and costs] only from his wards’ respective
share of the subtrusts established under the [King Trust].”
(Capitalization omitted.)

                                  13
        Streltzer pointed out that the probate court has a general
standing order limiting the hourly rate for appointed counsel
to $250 per hour, except in cases involving unusual problems
requiring extraordinary expertise. Streltzer concluded that Chen
had not satisfied his burden to justify an hourly rate above this
limit. He explained that, although the case has been extremely
litigious, difficult, and complex, “the issues before [the] [c]ourt
are, substantively, merely traditional probate and trust law
disputes concerning inheritance rights in real and personal
property, including business entities,” and that “the requirement
of ‘unusual problems requiring extraordinary expertise’ ” had not
been satisfied. Because the court had authorized Chen to retain
counsel, Streltzer explained, “there is even less compelling reason
for . . . Chen to charge his regular hourly attorney rate.” Moreover,
even if Chen could justify the higher rate prior to the appointment
of counsel to represent him, Streltzer agreed with Christine’s
expert, Jardini, that it would not be appropriate to compensate
Chen at a rate above of $250 per hour after the appointment of
counsel.
        Streltzer objected to Chen’s claim as to 26.3 hours of time
spent attending depositions other than his own and time spent
reviewing and revising certain law and motion papers. Streltzer
thus recommended that Chen should be awarded fees for 442.40
hours of work (instead of the 468.7 hours Chen claimed) at the
rate of $250 per hour (instead of the rate of $450 per hour sought
by Chen).
        As for Forer’s fees, Streltzer found that the billing rates
Forer charged were fair and reasonable. He agreed with Christine’s
expert, however, that Forer’s claim should be reduced because there
were instances when multiple attorneys were used “when a single
attorney would suffice,” when “lower-cost” employees were available

                                 14
to perform work, and where certain time is described in block
billing. When these reductions are taken into account, Streltzer
concluded that Forer’s claim of $323,975 should be reduced by
$18,890.02 to $305,084.98.
       In response to Streltzer’s report, Chen argued that he is
entitled to compensation at his regular rate of $450 per hour and
that his time spent on the case should not be reduced. Forer did not
contest the reductions to his firm’s fees that Streltzer had proposed.
       At the hearing on January 8, 2021, counsel appeared on
behalf of Benjamin, Margaret, Christine, and Esther. Chen
appeared as guardian ad litem for Jacqueline and Michael, Forer
as counsel for Chen, and Streltzer as “limited purpose specially
appointed counsel” for Jacqueline and Michael. Streltzer informed
the court that Jacqueline “is nearly the age of majority and that
she requests that this court continue the hearing and defer ruling
on [the fee petition] until after her 18th birthday in March so that
she may herself represent to the court what she believes is in her
best interest.” Streltzer further stated that he understands “that
Michael Chui joins in that request.” The court denied the request
for a continuance.
       The court also denied Christine’s request for an evidentiary
hearing, stating that the “court has discretion in attorneys fees
matters in connection with a guardian ad litem appointment as
to whether to rule on the declarations and the filings in the case
already, and [found] that those are all sufficient. . . . [T]o the extent
that there are any factual disputes, . . . either everything has been
ruled upon already or those disputes are not materially relevant to
the issue before the court today.”
       Regarding Chen’s hourly rate, the court allowed the higher
rate based on “the history of this case and the lengthy involvement
in it.” The court then approved Chen’s fees as requested in the

                                   15
petition and the reduced amount of Forer’s fees in accordance
with Streltzer’s recommendation and Forer’s concession. The court
further approved of the request for reimbursement of costs. The
court also directed Streltzer to file “a fee declaration” no later than
February 8, 2021, and set a hearing on Streltzer’s fee request for
February 23, 2021. (Capitalization omitted.)
       In the court’s formal order concerning the fee petition, filed
on February 1, 2021, the court ruled that the payments to Chen
and Forer are to be made from Jacqueline’s and Michael’s “share
of the sub-trusts established under the [King Trust] and NOT from
the Trust as a whole.”
       On February 2, 2021, Forer served notice of the court’s
February 1, 2021 order on counsel for the parties and on the
disapproved counsel for Jacqueline and Michael.
       Christine and Jacqueline filed separate timely notices
of appeal from the court’s February 1, 2021 order granting Chen’s
fee petition. Michael did not appeal from the February 1, 2021
order, but did file a notice of appeal from an order entered on
February 23, 2021.

                            DISCUSSION
      A.    Jacqueline’s appeal
      Jacqueline contends that the order granting the fee petition
must be reversed because the court denied her the opportunity to
be heard on the fee petition through counsel of her choosing. We
agree.
      In his fee petition, Chen sought approximately $534,890
in fees for his and H&F’s work to be paid from Jacqueline’s and
Michael’s shares of the King Trust. When, as here, the result of
a judicial proceeding may adversely affect a person’s interest in
property, constitutional due process generally requires that the

                                  16
court provide the person with “a meaningful opportunity to be
heard” in the proceeding. (Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S.
371, 379; see Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 80 [“the central
meaning of procedural due process” is that “ ‘[p]arties whose rights
are to be affected are entitled to be heard’ ”]; Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313–314 [to accord
with due process, an adjudication resulting in the deprivation
of property must be preceded by notice and an opportunity for
interested parties to present their objections].)
       The right to be heard includes the right to be heard by
counsel of one’s choosing. (See Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287
U.S. 45, 68 [the right to a hearing includes “the right to the aid
of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the
right”]; Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs. (1945) 26 Cal.2d
716, 727 [“refusing to allow petitioner’s counsel to participate in
the proceeding” “was a denial of a hearing”].) This right generally
applies to civil litigants, as well as criminal defendants. (Roa v.
Lodi Medical Group, Inc. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 920, 925 [“constitutional
due process guarantee[s]” “the right to be represented by retained
counsel in civil actions”]; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court
(1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 379, 382 [“in both civil and criminal cases
the right to a hearing includes the right to appear by counsel”];
Adir International, LLC v. Starr Indemnity and Liability Company
(9th Cir. 2021) 994 F.3d 1032, 1039 [courts recognize “a civil
litigant’s . . . due process right to retain and fund the counsel
of their choice”].)11 The right is not satisfied by the court’s

      11 The right to be represented by one’s chosen counsel is not
unlimited. The legislature and courts may, for example, require
that counsel be a member of the bar and admitted to practice
before the court in which he or she appears. (McCuin v. Texas

                                 17
appointment of counsel for a party when the party seeks and
can provide his or her retained counsel. (People v. Crovedi (1966)
65 Cal.2d 199, 206; see Texas Catastrophe Property Ins. Assn. v.
Morales (5th Cir. 1992) 975 F.2d 1178, 1181 [“[t]he right to counsel
in civil matters ‘includes the right to choose the lawyer who will
provide that representation’ ”].)12
       “Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution
and possess constitutional rights.” (Planned Parenthood of Missouri
v. Danforth (1976) 428 U.S. 52, 74; see In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S.
1, 13 [“neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone”].) More particularly, minors who have
“sufficient capacity to exercise due process rights”—a state that
presumably exists when the minor reaches 14 years of age—have
the right to be heard in proceedings implicating such rights. (In re
Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 921, 931.) A minor who has a due process

Power & Light Co. (5th Cir. 1983) 714 F.2d 1255, 1262.) And a
party’s chosen counsel may be disqualified when justified by “the
need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility.”
(People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems,
Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145.) These limitations do not apply
in this case.
      12 In the proceedings below, Chen repeatedly stated that
Jacqueline, as a minor, lacks legal capacity to retain counsel.
This is incorrect. Generally, a minor may make a contract for the
services of an attorney “in the same manner as an adult.” (Fam.
Code, § 6700.) Although the minor may be able to disaffirm the
contract with the attorney (ibid.) and a court must approve a
contract for “attorney’s fees for services in litigation” (Fam. Code,
§ 6602; Chui II, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 937, fn. 12), there is no
per se legal bar to a minor hiring counsel. Chen cited no apposite
authority for his assertion, and he does not reassert this view on
appeal.

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right to be heard has the correlated right to be heard through
counsel of his or her own choosing. (See In re Gault, supra, 387
U.S. at p. 41 [juvenile has a due process right to counsel of their
own choosing in delinquency proceedings].)
       When the party asserting the right to a hearing is a minor
for whom a guardian ad litem has been appointed, the assertion
of the right to counsel and retention of counsel will ordinarily
be initiated by the guardian ad litem. (Akkiko M. v. Superior
Court (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 525, 529.) When, however, the right
the minor seeks to have counsel assert on his or her behalf conflicts
with the interest of the guardian ad litem, the general rule that
the guardian ad litem will retain counsel for the minor (or act as
the minor’s counsel) must give way to the minor’s right to have
counsel of his or her own choosing. Thus, in Chui II, we held
that the trial court erred by granting Chen’s motion to disqualify
Jacqueline’s counsel and striking Jacqueline’s petition to remove
Chen as her guardian ad litem. A “minor capable of making
informed decisions,” we explained, has the right “to have counsel
assist with [a petition to the court for removal of a guardian
ad litem] and to appear on the minor’s behalf in court to advocate
for the petition.” (Chui II, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 937.)
       We expressly limited our holding in Chui II “to the right of
a minor to have independent counsel in connection with a petition
for the removal of his or her guardian ad litem” and expressed
“no view as to whether or under what circumstances a minor for
whom a guardian ad litem has been appointed may otherwise retain
or be represented by counsel of their choosing.” (Chui II, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 937.) The rationale that supported our narrow
holding in Chui II supports the similarly narrow conclusion we
reach here: Minors with standing to object to a guardian ad litem’s
fee petition and capable of making informed decisions have the

                                 19
right to a hearing on their objections and to have counsel of their
choosing assist them in the matter. In both situations—the minor’s
petition to remove the guardian ad litem and the minor’s objections
to the guardian ad litem’s fee petition—there is an inherent conflict
between the minor and the guardian ad litem. In both situations,
it would be patently unfair to give the guardian ad litem the power
to select or act as the minor’s counsel or, as Chen sought in this
case, to deprive Jacqueline of her right to seek his removal or to
object to his fee petition at all. Like the decision to deny Jacqueline
her right to counsel in seeking to remove Chen, the court erred in
denying Jacqueline her right to have her chosen counsel appear on
her behalf to oppose the fee petition.
       Because the denial of Jacqueline’s right to counsel of her
own choosing deprived her of her federal constitutional right to
due process, Chen has the burden of establishing that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. (See In re B.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 803,
827 [respondent’s actions denying minor “of the assistance of
fully informed counsel” was an “error of federal constitutional
dimension,” and respondent had the burden of proving lack of
prejudice].) Chen, however, fails to respond meaningfully to
Jacqueline’s arguments on appeal and makes no attempt to show
that the error was harmless under any standard.
       Nor can we conclude from our review of the record that
the error is harmless. Although the court appointed Streltzer
“to review and respond” to Chen’s fee petition, Streltzer did not
address in his report or assert at the hearing many of the objections
Jacqueline had asserted, and there is no indication in the record
that the court considered Jacqueline’s objections on their merits.
Neither Streltzer nor the court, for example, addressed the points
Jacqueline made that H&F sought fees for work that exceeded

                                  20
the limited scope of Forer’s appointment—to defend Chen against
Christine’s attacks—and that any award of fees should not be paid
out of her share of the King Trust. Indeed, Streltzer admitted that
he had “not inquired of either Jacqueline or Michael as to their
positions concerning” Chen’s fee petition and expressly disagreed
with the minors’ views in his report. Streltzer’s representation of
Jacqueline did not render the denial of her right to her own counsel
harmless. Accordingly, the order awarding Chen and H&F their
fees and costs is reversed and the matter remanded for a new
hearing where all interested parties can be heard.

      B.    Michael’s and Christine’s appeals
       Michael did not appeal from the court’s February 1, 2021
order granting Chen’s petition for fees. His notice of appeal, filed
on April 21, 2021, states that he is appealing from an order made
on February 23, 2021. Michael did not include an order with that
date in his appellant’s appendix, as required (Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 8.122(b)(1)(C) & 8.124(b)(1)(A)), and such an order is not
otherwise included in the record on appeal. Michael did, however,
include a copy of the court’s February 23, 2021 minute order with
his civil case information statement filed with this court. When
read together with documents in our record, it appears that the
February 23, 2021 minute order reflects the court’s granting of
a request for fees in the amount of $14,367.67 by Streltzer, the
attorney the court appointed to represent Michael and Jacqueline
to review and respond to Chen’s petition for fees. Although
the February 23, 2021 order refers to the court’s receipt and
review of objections filed to Streltzer’s request for fees, no such
objections are included in our record. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 8.122(b)(1)(C) & 8.124(b)(1)(B) [appellant must include in the
appellant’s appendix documents filed or lodged in the case that are

                                 21
“necessary for proper consideration of the issues”].)13 Michael’s
arguments on appeal are directed at the court’s award of fees to
Chen and Forer; he does not assert any point of error with respect
to the February 23, 2021 order.
       We requested Michael file a supplemental brief addressing
the question whether we may deem his appeal from the February
23, 2021 order abandoned, and dismiss his appeal on that ground.
Michael filed the requested brief. He explains that his notice of
appeal inadvertently refers to the February 23, 2021 order, and
that he intended to challenge the court’s February 1, 2021 order
granting Chen’s motion for fees. He requests that we “liberally
construe his notice of appeal and allow him to proceed on the appeal
of the [February 1, 2021] order.”
       Because Michael does not present any argument concerning
the order made on February 23, 2021, we deem his appeal from that
order to be abandoned. (See Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40
Cal.4th 529, 544, fn. 8.)
       The question Michael raises in his supplemental brief—
whether we should construe his notice of appeal as being from the
February 1, 2021—is moot because we are reversing that order for
the reasons given in our discussion of Jacqueline’s appeal, and the
effect of the reversal is to place the parties in the position they were
in “as if the matter had never been heard.” (Barron v. Superior
Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 293, 300.) Michael will thus have the
opportunity to assert his objections to Chen’s fee petition, with the
aid of retained counsel if he so chooses, when the matter is heard on

      13Nor did Michael include the required register of actions
(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.122(b)(1)(F) & 8.124(b)(1)(A)), which
may reveal other pertinent documents concerning the February 23,
2021 order.

                                  22
remand. Because the order granting the fee petition is reversed,
we do not reach the issues raised by Christine’s appeal.

                         DISPOSITION
      The order granting guardian ad litem Chen’s fee petition
is reversed. The court is directed to hold a new hearing on the
fee petition consistent with the views expressed herein.
      Appellant Jacqueline Chui is awarded her costs on appeal.
      Appellants Christine Chui and Michael Chui and respondent
Jackson Chen shall bear their own costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                         ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                       CHANEY, J.

                       BENDIX, J.

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