Court Opinion

ID: 9713657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:19:41.951185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.783872
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Horace Stern:
Plaintiff testified that as the train proceeded down the hill for about two miles prior to arriving at the curve where the accident happened she observed that it was increasing its speed, and that it continued to do so until the cars began to sway from side to side, baggage fell from the overhead racks, and passengers were jostled against one another. There was also testimony presented on the part of plaintiff that after the derailment the engines and various cars were scattered so far down the track, with one of the'engines over the embankment, as to show that the train must have been speeding at an excessive rate around the curve, that the nature of the curve and of the descent was such that the Railroad Company had a 35 miles-per-hour speed limit over the approach to the curve and a 39 miles-per-hour limit over the curve itself, and that the train, traveling on the inside of the curve, jumped a rail elevated to the *347height of three and a half inches and crossed over two other tracks before overturning. It seems to me that from all this evidence — which, in the light of the jury’s verdict, must be accepted as true — the jury was well warranted in finding, as it did find, that the train was being operated at this extremely dangerous place at a. highly excessive rate of speed, and that the speed was the cause of the derailment. Defendant argues that there may have been something wrong with the track itself, but there was no evidence whatever to support such a theory, and we have many times held that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to eliminate every possible cause of an accident which the ingenuity of the defendant or counsel may suggest.
Having found, then, that the accident was due to the excessive speed, the jury was then further justified in finding that the engineer was guilty of wanton negligence in operating the train in so flagrant a manner. He had traveled over this curve for many years, he knew the speed limit established by the Company, and he must be assumed to have known that the speed at which he was operating the train created a grave and unreasonable risk of harm to the passengers; he nevertheless disregarded the warnings of caution which his responsibility for the lives of hundreds of passengers should have impressed upon him. Reckless indifference to likely consequences, which constitutes wanton negligence, is a.state of mind, and a state of mind must be inferred, as the jury inferred it, from the circumstances. After what, in my opinion, was an accurate charge covering the facts and the law in the case, the jury found for the plaintiff, and I can see no justification for the court now entering judgment for the defendant n.o.v. In Pennsylvania R. R. v. Goldie, 182 F. 2d 9, a case arising out of this same accident, the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of a passenger who, like the present plaintiff, was *348traveling on a pass. While that decision is, of course, not binding upon this court, I can find no basis for distinguishing it either as to the evidence there presented or the applicable law.
I would affirm the judgment entered in the court below.