Court Opinion

ID: 9939789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 19:09:12.096751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:57.356492
License: Public Domain

J-S02003-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L.L., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: R.J., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1714 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered June 7, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000004-2023

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.:                         FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2024

       R.J. (Mother) appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, involuntarily terminating her parental rights with

respect to her child, J.L.L. (Child) (born 5/18).1 Counsel has filed a petition

to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 960 (Pa. 2018), does not apply in

the instant case as the June 7, 2023 order does not change Child’s
permanency goal from reunification to adoption, but rather scheduled a future
goal change hearing. See Order, 6/7/23. Mother was not required to file two
separate notices of appeal, however, she mistakenly did so. See 1713 EDA
2023. Mother’s appeal with respect to the goal change was quashed by our
Court on August 4, 2023. Order, 8/4/23. See Walker, 185 A.3d at 976
(“Where . . . one or more orders resolves issues arising on more than one
docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeals
must be filed.”); see also In re M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 981 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(applying Walker holding to children’s fast track appeals).
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Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).2               After careful

review, we deny counsel’s petition and direct counsel to file either a compliant

Anders brief or an advocate’s brief, in conformance with our decision.

       The trial court set forth the following relevant history leading to Child’s

adjudication of dependency and placement into the custody of the Philadelphia

Department of Human Services (DHS):

       On September 24, 2018, DHS received a General Protective
       Services [(GPS)] report alleging that [Mother] presented herself
       to her primary care physician’s office and expressed that she
       wanted help with housing, drug and alcohol treatment, and mental
       health treatment. Mother admitted to using phencyclidine [(PCP)]
       while Child slept at night. The report stated that Mother disclosed
       that she was recently in an inpatient program at Gaudenzia[, a
       substance abuse and co-occurring disorders treatment provider,]
       with Child, but she did not complete the program; that Mother was
       attempting to get back into an inpatient program, but her
       insurance would not cover it; that Mother had a lot of insight into
       her addiction and was aware that she needed support with staying
       sober; and that Mother was participating in an outpatient program
       at Drexel Medicine. The report alleged that Mother was supervised
       by an adult probation officer and was subject to random urine
       tests; that Mother was attempting to move out of the home of
       [D.L. (Father)3], Child’s [f]ather; that Mother was residing with a
       friend at the time of the report; that Mother wanted ongoing
       assistance with housing and[,] potentially, a dual diagnosis
       treatment program she could attend with Child. The report was
       substantiated.

____________________________________________

2 See In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders
briefing requirements to termination of parental rights appeals involving
indigent parents represented by court-appointed counsel).

3 Father is not a party to the present appeal.At the time of the termination
hearing, Mother and Father did not live together and Father testified that he
barely sees Mother. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 71-72.

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     On September 26, 2018, DHS met with Child, Mother, and Father
     at Father’s home and Child appeared happy, healthy, and with all
     of his needs met. Mother stated that she attended [t]he Caring
     Together program at Drexel to address her history of substance
     abuse. Mother requested that DHS assist her with housing.
     Mother denied using drugs around Child. Mother further stated
     that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and depression.
     Father denied knowing that Mother was using drugs again. Father
     was aware that Mother was attending therapy for substance abuse
     and that he provided care for Child while Mother attended her
     program. Father had a history of substance abuse and attended
     Sobriety Through Out-Patient, Inc. to address his drug and alcohol
     concerns. DHS found the home to be appropriate.

     On November 7, 2018, DHS visited the family and Child appeared
     happy and was safe. Mother reported she had [neither] used
     drugs recently[,] nor thought about using drugs. Father stated
     that he supported Mother and ensured she attended her drug
     treatment program daily. Father stated that he was moving into
     a larger home and told Mother that she was welcome to reside
     there. DHS subsequently closed the case for Child.

     On December 27, 2018, DHS received a GPS report alleging that
     Mother had five children who resided with various family members
     and foster families; that on December 26, 2018, Mother left
     Interim House West[, a residential treatment program,] and
     returned under the influence of PCP, which she admitted using;
     that Mother had Child in her care the whole time she was away
     from Interim House West; and that the staff supervised Child until
     Mother seemed to be able to care for herself. The report stated
     that Child had bronchitis and [] had been taken to a hospital for
     medical care several times. The report[] further stated that
     Mother [had] mental health concerns and suffered from bipolar
     disorder, severe depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder
     [(PTSD)]. The report was substantiated.

     On December 28, 2018, DHS met with Mother and Child at Interim
     House West. DHS noted that Child appeared lethargic and had a
     runny nose. Mother admitted that she used PCP at a friend’s
     house while Child was in her care. Mother stated that she had
     learned that her former paramour was being released from prison,
     which caused her distress. Mother stated that she was fearful of
     her former paramour[,] with whom she experienced domestic
     violence. Mother stated that she did not want Child removed from
     her care and would remain drug free and follow the facility rules.

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      DHS spoke to an Interim House West Administrator, who stated
      that Mother had been in the program for less than 30 days and
      had not complied with the rules of the program. The administrator
      stated that Mother had returned to the facility under the influence
      of drugs multiple times. DHS transported Mother and Child to a
      hospital. Child was later discharged to Father’s care.

      On May 17, 2019, DHS met with Child, Mother, and Father at the
      Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia [(CHOP)]. Child had an upper
      respiratory infection and needed to be monitored. CHOP staff
      further stated that Father appeared at CHOP agitated and was
      aggressive towards the staff. DHS interviewed Father, who denied
      having current substance abuse or mental health issues. Father
      stated that he last attended treatment at Wedge Recovery Centers
      and was not currently in treatment. Father stated that he was
      interested in caring for Child when Child was discharged from the
      hospital.

      DHS subsequently learned that Father is the perpetrator of an
      indicated Child Protective Services [(CPS)] report dated
      September 24, 2015[,] concerning Child’s half-sibling[.] Father
      exposed [the then] three-year[-]old [c]hild to PCP[,] which
      resulted in [the child’s] hospitalization. DHS further learned that
      Mother was Father’s paramour at the time and was in the home
      during the incident. On May 17, 2019, DHS obtained an [o]rder
      for [p]rotective [c]ustody [] for Child and [Child] remained at
      CHOP. On May 19, 2019, Child was discharged from CHOP and
      transported to his foster care placement with Turning Points for
      Children, where he currently remains.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/23, at 1-4 (citations and footnote omitted); see

also DHS Petition, 05/23/19, Ex. A ¶¶ f-q.

      Pursuant to the court’s order, Mother was to have weekly supervised

visits with Child, and Mother was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU)

for immediate drug screening, monitoring, and three random drug screens

prior to the next court date. See Order 5/28/19. In addition, Mother’s DHS

case plan objectives included parenting classes, substance abuse treatment,

and securing employment and housing.          See N.T. Termination Hearing,

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6/7/23, at 42. Throughout the time Child has been in placement, Mother has

attempted drug and alcohol treatment programs at least three times, but has

not been consistent or successful in completing a program.       Id. at 43-44.

Makeda Hunter, case manager supervisor with Turning Points for Children,

CUA-5,4 also testified that Mother has been unable to secure safe and stable

housing while Child has been in DHS’ care. Id. at 44. Regarding employment,

Hunter testified that Mother does have a job for which she was able to provide

pay stubs. Id. Mother has generally appeared for weekly visits with Child,

but is often late.     Id. at 44-45 (case manager testifying visitation records

show several instances of Mother arriving at end of visit between January and

June of 2023). Over the lifetime of Child’s placement, Mother’s compliance

with her case plan objectives was determined to be minimal.5 Id. 48-49.
____________________________________________

4  Philadelphia DHS works alongside neighborhood organizations, called
Community Umbrella Agencies (CUAs), to ensure the provision of services
within a neighborhood when possible. There are ten CUA regions within
Philadelphia. See Department of Human Services Who’s involved in your
case?, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, https://www.phila.gov/departments/department-
of-human-services/whos-involved-in-your-case/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2024).

5 We note that Mother’s case plan compliance was initially substantial or
complete, but that her compliance appeared to decrease at the end of 2020
and was minimal by the fall of 2021. A review of the dependency record
reveals the following findings during the lifetime of the case:

    •   August 8, 2019 permanency review order: visitation with Child’s mother
        to remain weekly and supervised by the Agency.
    •   November 1, 2019 permanency review: Mother has substantially
        complied with permanency plan.
    •   January 17, 2020 permanency review: Mother has been fully compliant
        with permanency plan; Mother to have unsupervised weekly visits, the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Since May of 2019, Child has remained in the same foster placement, in

kinship placement.6       Id. at 37-38.        Child lives with foster parent, foster

parent’s adopted niece, and Child’s older half-sister, who was adopted by

foster parent. Id. at 38-39. Child is very bonded to foster parent, refers to

____________________________________________

       Agency to supervise one visit per month, pending Mother does not have
       positive drug test results.
   •   June 10, 2020 permanency review: Mother has substantially complied
       with permanency plan; visitations to be virtual due to Covid; Mother to
       have unsupervised overnight visits once Covid restrictions lifted and
       Mother has suitable housing.
   •   November 2, 2020 permanency review:            Mother has moderately
       complied with permanency plan; Mother’s visits to be supervised by the
       Agency.
   •   March 22, 2021 permanency review: Mother has moderately complied
       with permanency plan; Mother’s visits to be supervised by the Agency.
   •   August 2, 2021 permanency review: Mother’s compliance not noted.
   •   October 25, 2021 permanency review: Mother has minimally complied
       with permanency plan; Mother’s visits to be supervised by the Agency.
   •   May 16, 2022 permanency review: Mother has minimally complied with
       permanency plan; Mother’s visits to be supervised by the Agency.
   •   September 2, 2022 permanency review: Mother’s compliance not
       noted.
   •   November 28, 2022 permanency review: Mother’s compliance not
       noted.
   •   December 19, 2022 permanency review: Mother’s compliance not
       noted, however stated that Agency is unable to verify certain objectives,
       but that Mother is attending visits with Child; Mother’s visits to be
       supervised by the Agency.
   •   January 23, 2023 permanency review: Mother has minimally complied
       with permanency plan; Mother’s visits to be supervised by the Agency.
   •   April 12, 2023 permanency review: Mother’s compliance not noted.

6 Child was temporarily in respite care following allegations of abuse by foster

parent’s spouse. CUA case manager Makeda Hunter testified that foster
parent and spouse were separated and that foster parent was pursuing a
divorce. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 40.

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her as “Mommy,” and the two appear to have an “affectionate relationship.”

Id. at 40-41.

       On January 6, 2023, DHS filed petitions seeking to terminate Mother’s

and Father’s parental rights.          On June 7, 2023, the trial court held a

termination hearing7 at which Mother, Father, two CUA case workers, a CEU

evaluator, and a social worker testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

trial court held in abeyance its decision with respect to Father, but found clear

and convincing evidence to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights

with respect to Child. On that same date, the trial court entered a decree

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1),

(2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act.8

       Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.     Thereafter, on November 29,

2023, counsel filed a petition to withdraw, as well as an accompanying Anders

brief.9
____________________________________________

7 At the termination hearing, Harry Levin, Esquire, represented Child’s legal

interests, and Jane Marie Morrissey, Esquire, guardian ad litem (GAL),
represented Child’s best interests. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a).

8 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.

9 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4):

       If counsel intends to seek to withdraw in a criminal case pursuant
       to Anders/Santiago or if counsel intends to seek to withdraw in
       a post-conviction relief appeal pursuant to Turner/Finley,
       counsel shall file of record and serve on the judge a statement of
       intent to withdraw in lieu of filing a [Rule 1925(b)] Statement.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       In In re V.E., supra, our Court stated:

       Counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first
       appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating his or her parental
       rights, may, after a conscientious and thorough review of the
       record, petition this court for leave to withdraw representation if
       he or she can find no issues of arguable merit on which to base
       the appeal. Given the less stringent standard of proof required
       and the quasi-adversarial nature of a termination proceeding in
       which a parent is not guaranteed the same procedural and
       evidentiary rights as a criminal defendant, the court holds that
       appointed counsel seeking to withdraw representation must
       submit an Anders brief.

Id. at 1275. Moreover, we held that “any motion to withdraw representation,

submitted by appointed counsel, must be accompanied by an advocate’s brief,

and not the amicus curiae brief delineated in McClendon.” Id. (emphasis

original); see also In re Adoption of R.I., 312 A.2d 601, 602 (Pa. 1973)

(“[T]he logic behind . . . an individual in a criminal case being entitled to

representation by counsel at any proceeding that may lead to ‘the deprivation

of substantial rights’ . . . is equally applicable to a case involving an indigent

parent faced with the loss of her child.”).

       When counsel seeks to withdraw pursuant to Anders and its progeny,

this Court may not review the merits of the appeal without first addressing

the request to withdraw. See In re Adoption of M.C.F., 230 A.3d 1217,

____________________________________________

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (c)(4). See In the Interest of J.T., 983 A.2d 771 (Pa. Super.
2009) (where Anders procedure from criminal proceedings has been applied
to parental termination cases, parent’s counsel acted appropriately by
following Rule 1925(c)(4) in appeal from decision terminating parental rights
to child).

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1219 (Pa. Super. 2020); see also Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d

590, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“We reiterate that [w]hen presented with an

Anders brief, this [C]ourt may not review the merits of the underlying issues

without first passing on the request to withdraw.”) (internal quotations

omitted). To procedurally withdraw, counsel must:

      (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
      making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
      determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy
      of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and (3) advise the
      [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
      or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
      of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc) (citations omitted); see also In re Adoption of V.G., 751 A.2d 1174

(Pa. Super. 2000) (reiterating requirements counsel must satisfy before being

permitted to withdraw in termination appeals).

      With respect to the third Anders requirement, that counsel inform the

appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has

held that counsel must “attach to [his or her] petition to withdraw a copy of

the letter sent to [the] client advising him or her of their rights.”

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

      An Anders brief must also comply with the following requirements:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record;

      (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
      supports the appeal;

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       (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

       (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
       frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
       controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
       conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Finally, this

Court must “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there

are   any     additional,    non-frivolous     issues   overlooked   by   counsel.”

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(footnote omitted).

       Instantly, counsel filed a petition to withdraw.        See Application to

Withdraw as Counsel, 11/29/23. Counsel also provided a copy of the letter

sent to Mother, notifying her that counsel was requesting to withdraw,

attaching a copy of the Anders brief, including the petition to withdraw, and

informing Mother of her right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se and

raise any issues worthy of consideration.10 See Anders Brief, 11/29/23, at

Ex. B. However, our review of counsel’s petition and Anders brief does not

reflect the type of zealous review required. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355-

56 (“[C]ounsel must consistently serve the client’s interest to the best of his

or her ability. Only after such an evaluation has led counsel to the conclusion

that the appeal is ‘wholly frivolous’ is counsel justified in making a motion to

withdraw.”). Further, we note that the petition to withdraw neither mentions

____________________________________________

10 Mother has not responded to this communication.

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counsel’s “conscientious examination of the record,” see Cartrette, supra,

nor is the Millisock letter attached to the petition as required.

       Moreover, rather than framing potential issues in the brief in support of

Mother’s appeal, counsel solely advances arguments in support of the

termination decree, and bookends those arguments with statements that she

has made a conscientious review of the record and has concluded that the

appeal would be wholly frivolous. See generally Anders Brief, 11/29/23, at

18-29. This is in direct violation of Santiago, wherein our Supreme Court

reiterated:

       To repeat, what the brief must provide under Anders are
       references to anything in the record that might arguably support
       the appeal. Indeed, we have recognized and emphasized the
       difference between an Anders brief, which offers an issue for
       a court’s consideration, but reflects counsel’s candid
       assessment of the complete lack of merit in his [or her]
       client’s case, and a merits brief, which implies that an issue is
       worthy of review and has some chance of succeeding.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 359-60 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

       Specifically, counsel’s brief with respect to termination under section

2511(b) practically mirrors the trial court’s section 2511(b) analysis found in

its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Moreover, counsel’s brief includes no reference to

the record in support of the appeal.11 Compare Anders Brief, 11/29/23, at

26-28 with Santiago, 978 A.2d at 360.
____________________________________________

11 The trial court referenced testimony that Child was “significantly bonded
with [his foster] parent[,] who he has lived with for the past four years[;]”
that Child calls the foster parent “mom” and wishes to be adopted by her; that
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       The determination of the best interests of the child is a separate

consideration from a finding that a statutory ground for termination has been

met under section 2511(a) and is “the paramount consideration in deciding

whether to terminate parental rights.” In re S.D.T., Jr., 934 A.2d 703, 706

(Pa. Super. 2007). Essential to a court’s section 2511(b) analysis is discerning

“the nature and status of the parent-child bond, [by] paying close attention

to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.” In re C.P., 901

A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006).               While expert testimony and a formal

bonding analysis are not specifically required by statute, the moving party

must at least produce sufficient evidence to prove that severing the bond

between child and parent will not have negative effects on the child. Id. In

addition, the proper way to evaluate the parent-child bond in termination

cases is to focus strictly on the bond between the parent and child and the

possible ramifications of severing this bond. Id. at 521.

       In this case, the only testimony as to the possible effect of severing any

bond between Mother and Child came from CUA case worker, Makeda Hunter,

who stated that she did not believe it would “cause irreparable harm” to Child

to terminate Mother’s parental rights. N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at

50. However, the record reveals Hunter was not qualified to provide testimony

as to the relationship between Mother and Child. Because Hunter was not
____________________________________________

Child’s primary bond is with the foster parent; and that Mother expressed a
bond with Child, but failed to offer any evidence of such a bond. Trial Court
Opinion, 10/26/23, at 16 (citing N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/7/23, at 38, 7-
8, 40-41, 93-94). Counsel’s only references to the record were the same.

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present at a single visit between Mother and Child, she could only comment

from “reading the notes” that Mother and Child would frequently have a snack

and watch a movie during Mother’s visits. Id. at 49, 51. In addition, Hunter

was not asked the basis for her opinion as to severing the bond between

Mother and Child, nor was she cross-examined on her statement.                See

generally id. at 49-64. Aaron Lloyd, a former CUA case worker who worked

with the family from approximately November 2020 to May 2022, was not

asked a single question about the interactions between Mother and Child

during visits or any bond between the two. See generally id. at 26-35. Roya

Paller, a social worker,12 testified regarding a visit with Child in respite care13

to assess Child’s understanding of adoption. Id. at 7. Paller testified that

Child expressed his desire to be adopted by “Mommy,” his foster parent. Id.

at 8-9. However, Paller provided no testimony as to Child’s relationship with

Mother, or whether she asked any questions with respect to any relationship

or bond between Mother and Child.14 See generally id. at 7-9. Paller was

not asked a single question on cross-examination by any party. Id. at 9.
____________________________________________

12 No testimony was elicited as to Paller’s credentials; however, her report
states she holds a Bachelor of Social Work and is employed by Forensic Social
Work Services. Paller was called as a witness by Attorney Levin, representing
Child’s legal interests.

13 See fn.6, supra.

14 We also note that a review of Paller’s report, admitted as CA-1, does not

include any information about Child’s understanding of adoption or any
information about Child’s relationship to Mother. Further, the report is
undated, both in terms of when it was prepared and when Paller visited with
Child.

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      Finally, we find the questioning of Mother, or lack thereof, with respect

to bonding to be particularly lackluster. See generally id. at 93-94. Mother’s

counsel asked her a total of six questions regarding her relationship with Child,

during which Mother expressed a close relationship with Child, stating that

they are bonded like “a mother and a son.” Id. Mother’s counsel did not ask

her to expand on any of her testimony, nor did representatives from DHS, the

GAL, or the child advocate.     See id.      We, therefore, cannot conclude that

counsel may withdraw on appeal. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 360 (“Under

Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by counsel’s examination and

assessment of the record and counsel’s references to anything in the record

that arguably supports the appeal.”).

      Accordingly, we deny counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw and

remand the matter. Upon remand, counsel shall file either (1) an Anders

brief that conforms to the requirements set forth in Santiago, supra; or (2)

an advocate’s brief on Mother’s behalf within 30 days from the date of this

decision. If counsel files an advocate’s brief, Appellees shall have 30 days

thereafter to file a responsive brief.

      Case remanded. Petition to withdraw denied with instructions. Panel

jurisdiction retained.

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Date: 2/12/2024

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