Court Opinion

ID: 9520083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:31:07.251808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:31.163129
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Prentice, J.
— I dissent to the majority holding upon issue II. I must acknowledge that the record discloses that the defendant probably understood his constitutional rights and entered the guilty plea knowingly and intelligently. Had the trial judge followed the simple mandate of Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3 (Burns 1975), however, I could eliminate the word “probably,” from that statement, and this case could have been disposed of summarily.
Since the adoption of Criminal Rule 10 (formerly Rule 1-11, adopted December 1, 1946), we have moved steadily and correctly towards assuring that guilty pleas are entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and that the record of the guilty plea hearing reflect as much. We have been aided by the adoption of the aforementioned statute, effective July 26, 1973, which clearly spells out specific advisements that the trial judge shall render before accepting a guilty plea. The rule and the statute combine to eliminate the necessity for trial judge in post-conviction proceedings and appellate judges reviewing such proceedings to be frustrated by such cases as Brimhall v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 153, 279 N.E.2d 557; Conley v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 29, 284 N.E.2d 803; Williams v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 165, 325 N.E.2d 827; Emert v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 340, 330 N.E.2d 750; Avery v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 417, 355 N.E.2d 395; Hollingshed *597v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 597, 365 N.E.2d 1215. Justice Hunter in his footnote to Williams v. State, supra, and Emert v. State, supra,1 made it clear that cases arising subsequent to the effective date of the statute would be governed not only by what the record disclosed but with who made the record, as well. This is not to say that we should be more concerned with the form than with the substance but, rather, that when, as here, the. form is clearly prescribed and is for the considered purpose of assuring substantive compliance, it is altogether appropriate that adherence to the form be strictly required. I, therefore, would hold compliance with Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3 to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to the acceptance of a guilty plea.
DeBruler, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 382 N.E.2d 714.

. “If the plea had been entered after the effective date of July 26, 1973, we would have a different question entirely in this case under P.L. 325, Acts 1973, being IC 1971, 35-4.1-1-3, Ind. Stat. § 9-1204, which provides:
‘Defendant advised by court. — The court shall not accept a plea of guilty from the defendant without first addressing the defendant and
‘(a) determining that he understands the nature of the charge against him;
‘(b) informing him that by his plea of guilty he is admitting the truth of all facts alleged in the indictment or information to an offense included thereunder and that upon entry of such plea the court shall proceed with judgment and sentence;
‘(c) informing him that by his plea of guilty he waives his rights to a public and speedy trial by jury, to face the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself;
‘(d) informing him of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence for the offense charged and of any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact of a prior conviction or convictions, and of any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
‘ (e) informing him that the court is not a party to any agreement which may have been made between the prosecutor and the defense and is not bound thereby.’
If this statutory standard had been applicable at the time of defendant’s plea, and if the record was identical to the one before us, defendant would undoubtedly have presented a solid case for post-conviction relief.”