Court Opinion

ID: 9716053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:24:29.829391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:41.030241
License: Public Domain

Burling J.
(dissenting). I am in accord with the conclusion of the majority that this State is not so inexorably wedded to the “out-of-pocket-loss” rule as to the measure of damages that the “benefit-of-the-bargain” rule cannot be applied where justice requires. The appropriate general rule as to damages in New Jersey was expressed in Patco Products, Inc., v. Wilson, 5 N. J. 543, 547 (1950), as “such as ma}^ reasonably be supposed to be in the contemplation of the parties at the time they made the contract.” Potential profits where based on sound fact and not upon mere opinion evidence without factual support have been recognized as a proper measure of damages if “capable of being estimated with a reasonable degree of certainty.” Rempfer v. Deerfield Packing Corp., 4 N. J. 135, 144 (1950). Cf. Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Rice, 4 N. J. 169, 179 (1950). In tort cases profits which are remote, speculative or uncertain are neither an element of damages nor evidence of damages. Woschenko v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 2 N. J. 269, 278-279 (1949).
In the present case the evidence is not adequate to form more than a basis for mere conjecture or speculation. The principal reason for this situation is that there is an absence of proof as to the value of the property acquired by the plaintiff which forms the basis for the action. Whether it is worth more or less than the plaintiff paid for it is not revealed. This principle of law was expressly declared in Lams v. Fish, 86 N. J. L. 321, 324 (E. & A. 1914), wherein the *77former Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed a judgment of nonsuit in this type of action. This settled law was reiterated by the former Court of Errors and Appeals in Bingham v. Fish, 89 N. J. L. 688, 690 (E. & A. 1916). And it was inferentially recognized in Turon v. J. L. Construction Co., 8 N. J. 543, 561 (1952), wherein this court held:
“The rule obtains in some jurisdictions that while nominal damages are allowable in actions in tort for strict trespass in vindication of the right, an action in case merely — i. e., for damages actually sustained — is not maintainable without proof of actual damage.”
The principle above adverted to has been expressed in the following language:
“Since the modern action of deceit is a descendant of the older action on the case, it carries over the requirement that the plaintiff must have suffered substantial damage before the cause of action can arise. Nominal damages are not awarded in deceit, and there can be no recovery if the plaintiff is none the worse off for the misrepresentation, however flagrant it may have been. * * *” Prosser on Torts (1941), sec. 90, p. 768.
“* * * jjj £jje cage 0f contrary to other intended wrongs, no damage is ‘presumed,’ that is, there can be no action for a recovery of nominal damages. Unless the plaintiff can show an actual pecuniary loss, he can recover nothing. Fraud without actual damage is not actionable. * * *” Harper on Torts (1933), sec. 226, p. 649.
One of the elements of action for deceit is that the plaintiff suffered damage from the action he was induced to take. 2 Cooley on Torts (4th ed. 1932), sec. 348; Prosser on Torts (1941), sec. 85, p. 705; Harper on Torts (1933), sec. 217, pp. 444-445; Bigelow on Torts (1907), pp. 73-74; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake (1872), pp. 324-325.
In the present case the evidence supports a finding that one item of expense was greater than represented. The effort of the plaintiff however is to measure his damages by capitalization of this item. This would seem a proper measure had there been proof that the actual value of the property were equal to or less than the price he paid therefor. If the prop*78eity is worth more, then the matter is conjectural for the excess in value over what he paid would reduce or perhaps entirety wipe out the alleged capitalized loss. In Batura v. McBride, 75 N. J. L. 480 (E. & A. 1907), unusual circumstances permitted a variance from this norm which is not available to the plaintiff under the facts adduced in the present matter.
Eor these reasons the trial court should have granted the defendants’ motions for judgment of dismissal. Therefore T am of the opinion that upon this determination on appeal it devolved upon the Superior Court, Appellate Division, to declare the judgment which the law imposes and to enter judgment for the defendants. Cf. Miller v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, Hudson County, 10 N. J. 398, 415 (1952); J aroszewski v. Central Railroad Co., New Jersey, 9 N. J. 231, 236 (1952). The judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate Division, which remanded the matter for new trial, should be reversed and the matter should be remanded for entry of judgment for the defendants.
For reversal — Chief Justice Vandebbilt, and Justices Oiapiiant, Jacobs and Bbennan — 4.
For concurrence as to Alfonso and Filomena Sabatino and for dismissal as to A. Albert Ur dang — Justice Heiibb, — 1.
For reversal and dismissal of complaint — Justice Bub-ling — 1.