Court Opinion

ID: 9732538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:24:22.460865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:53.186037
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the Majority. I write separately to emphasize the procedural posture of this case which to my mind has a substantial bearing on its proper disposition.
This case comes to us on appeal from an adverse determination of a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq. To be eligible for PCHA relief a petitioner must prove that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the reasons enumerated in the Act, and that the error has not been finally litigated or waived. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(3), (4). Among the reasons enumerated as supporting relief are “[t]he denial of his constitutional right to representation by competent counsel,” and “[a] plea of guilty unlawfully induced.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(3)(vi), (vii). For purposes of the Act, an issue is waived if the “petitioner knowingly and understanding^ failed to raise it ... on appeal” and “is unable to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify his failure to raise the issue.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). Furthermore, there exists a rebuttable presumption for purposes of the Act that failure to appeal is knowing and understanding. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(c).
It is undisputed that in the present case no direct appeal was taken. For most purposes, then, the issue of the adequacy of the guilty plea colloquy is waived. In order to meet the requirements for PCHA relief, the Appellant must prove extraordinary circumstances which would justify his *564failure to previously raise the issue. To this end he challenged the effectiveness of his trial counsel. At the PCHA hearing, the Appellant testified that he spoke to his counsel about appealing. Significantly, he testified that he never directed counsel to file an appeal. Moreover, the Appellant did not offer trial counsel as a witness. There was thus no evidence at the hearing from which it could be concluded that counsel’s decision not to appeal lacked a reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s best interests. Indeed, the reason for not appealing is clear from the face of the record. The evidence overwhelmingly proved guilt of second degree murder, punishable by life imprisonment. The plea agreement arranged in this case eliminated some of the charges against the Appellant and, most importantly, gave certification that the murder charge rose no higher than third degree, punishable by a maximum of 10 to 20 years imprisonment. Having obtained such a favorable result for his client, counsel reasonably would not attempt to overturn it and subject the Appellant to trial and almost certain life imprisonment for second degree murder.
I am also convinced that there is substantial evidence on the record — from the guilty plea colloquy, from the sentencing hearing, and from the PCHA hearing — to support the finding of the lower courts that, notwithstanding his later statement to the contrary, Appellant fully understood his rights at the time of the plea, and knowingly and voluntarily waived them. See Commonwealth v. Carson, 503 Pa. 369, 469 A.2d 599 (1983). Counsel could not be held ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.
There being no basis upon which the lower court could find an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying failure to appeal the issue of the allegedly defective colloquy, the court properly determined that the issue was waived and could not be the basis for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
LARSEN, J., joins in this concurring opinion.