Court Opinion

ID: 9599572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:19:49.099449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:45.468889
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Justice:
(dissenting).
I dissent.
The defendant alleges two grounds of error in the court below:
1. Lack of speedy trial.
2. Lack of jurisdiction to try him by reason of the operation of Sections 77-65-1 and 77-65-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended.
Defendant while on parole from the Utah State Prison was charged with two felonies, to wit, selling marijuana and selling heroin. On November 26 he was arrested for parole violation, and after a hearing by the board his parole was revoked, and he was reincarcerated in the state prison. On December 30 he demanded that all charges then pending against him be finally disposed of as provided by law. On February 8 following, the State was unable to have the chemist present at the preliminary hearing, and the committing magistrate dismissed the complaints.
On February 9 the defendant was charged in two new complaints with the same crimes, and preliminary hearings were held March 8. The committing magistrate finding from the evidence that the two crimes alleged in the complaints had been committed and that there was probable cause to believe the defendant had committed them ordered him to be held for trial in the district court.
The defendant was formally charged by information filed on March 15, only seven days after he had been bound over for trial. He was tried April 12 following and was by jury verdict found guilty as charged.
Defendant contends that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was denied. There is no merit to this contention. In the case of State v. Renzo 1 the same claim *559was made by the defendant and was rejected by this court in the foilwing language:
. The constitutional protection afforded one relative to a speedy trial has no application until after a prosecution is instituted. See Foley v. United States, 8 Cir., 290 F.2d 562, cert. den. 368 U.S. 888, 82 S.Ct. 139, 7 L.Ed.2d 88 (1961), holding that prosecution is not instituted until an indictment is returned or an information is filed.
The same contention was made by the defendant in the Arizona case of State v. Enriquez.2 The Arizona Supreme Court also rejected the claim, saying:
The defendant contends that he was denied a speedy trial in violation of constitutional guarantees. The motion to dismiss the case on the grounds of a denial of a speedy trial was addressed only to the time elapsed between the defendant’s arrest and the time that he was bound over to the superior court for trial. We have stated, “The rule is firmly established [sic] that the protection afforded by Art. 2, § 24 of the Arizona Constitution and by the Sixth Amendment right under the United States Constitution to a speedy trial, has no application until after a prosecution is commenced or an accused is held to answer.”

In the instant matter the defendant was not held to answer the charges against him until March 8, 1972. His trial was held April 12, 1972, just 35 days later, and this is certainly a speedy trial.
The defendant further contends that under the statute he had a right to have all criminal matters for which he was held fqr investigation dismissed finally. The prevailing opinion supports his contention although the committing magistrate is powerless to finally determine the matter. If the defendant had been arrested awaiting action by a grand jury and that grand jury failed to indict him, he would have the same right to avoid any further prosecution under the reasoning of the prevailing opinion, and he could not be subsequently indicted and tried, regardless of what the evidence might be, because he was not tried finally within 90 days of his demand.
In the case of State v. Belcher3 this court unanimously held:
[I]n the third place, there was no way to dispose of the matter finally until the information was filed. His request was premature.
In the case of State v. Clark 4 this court held as follows:
The defendant could not be tried on the complaint, the function of which was merely to detain him until a determination could be made at a preliminary hearing whether to hold him for trial or to release him.
Section 77-9-1, U.C.A.1953, provides for time limitations on prosecutions. It provides that “There shall be no limitation of time within which a prosecution for murder, . . . must be commenced.” For other felonies, prosecution must be based on indictment or information based on a complaint filed within four years after the commission of the crime.
The effect of the holding in the main opinion is to make the statute of limitations 90 days after demand for trial if the accused is incarcerated but not if he is on bond.
Suppose one in prison murders the warden and as soon as a complaint is filed demands trial. A preliminary hearing is held, and due to the absence of material witnesses the justice of the peace dismisses the complaint and discharges the defendant; or suppose the magistrate deliberately holds the matter under advisement until after the expiration of the 90-day period. Is the defendant freed from further prosecution if additional evidence is thereafter discovered? Under the rule announced in the prevailing opinion the murderer would be freed after the elapse of 90 days from demand, and this in spite of the fact that *560the justice of the peace could not make a final disposition of the matter.
When a statute is subject to more than one interpretation, it is our duty to make it harmonize with other statutes where possible and to interpret it in the light of reason and common sense. I think we did just that in the Belcher and Clark cases when we held that the only time a justice of the peace had the power to finally dispose of a matter pending before him on a complaint was when the charge was a misdemeanor, and I am not inclined to reverse that ruling.
The instant case falls squarely within those cases, and the trial judge properly refused to set the appellant free. The judgment and sentence should therefore be affirmed.
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of EL-LETT, J.

. 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 (1968).

. 102 Ariz. 402, 430 P.2d 422 (1967).

. 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60 (1970).

.28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P.2d 274 (1972).