Court Opinion

ID: 9447658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:40:33.869908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:07.927494
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing en Banc.
DUFFY, Circuit Judge.
A majority of the members of this Court in active service has voted to deny the petition herein for a rehearing en banc. As I voted in favor of granting such petition, a brief statement of my reasons therefor would seem to be in order.
This Court, on its own motion, and without any request by either party, has invalidated the basic stipulation upon which this litigation has proceeded in three courts for more than three years. The Government has made no effort to repudiate the agreement which it made.
On June 3, 1957, the Government had asked for a continuance to which plaintiffs objected. After eleven days of negotiation with the Internal Revenue" Service and the Department of Justice, the stipulation was entered into. No one has suggested the stipulation was unfair, inadequate or induced by misrepresentation or mistake. The Government does not claim that it has been over-reached. It seenis to me that the stipulation is in the public interest. This was not a stipulation of law as indicated in our opinion. It related only to “air conditioning units similar to those described in the above civil actions.”
Rather than try the same issue of fact and law in numerous proceedings, the parties agreed to try the issue once and for all in the present case. There can be no public interest that demands repeated trials of the same issue. Stipulations designed to avoid repeated trials of the same issue should be held valid and binding.
In United States v. Davison, D.C.W.D.Pa., 1 F.2d 465, affirmed Lewellyn v. Davison, 3 Cir., 9 F.2d 1022, certiorari denied, 271 U.S. 670, 46 S.Ct. 484, 20 L.Ed. 1143, as in the case at bar, the Government had stipulated that the decision in one tax case should control the decision in other tax cases involving the same factual situation. The court approved the stipulation stating, at page 470 of 1 F.2d. “It was greatly to the interest of both parties to that action that a score of cases, involving the same questions of fact and law, should be disposed of by the trial and final adjudication of a single case. This both sides agreed to.”
In my view, the decision of this Court is wrong in equating rated horsepower with nominal horsepower. We say “Whether or not such an individual is to bear a tax upon his purchase can readily be established by an inspection of the manufacturer’s horsepower rating tag affixed thereto.”
Nominal horsepower is not the same as rated horsepower. Nominal horsepower is assigned solely in the uncontrolled discretion of the various motor manufacturers. Actual horsepower and rated horsepower are standardized, measurable and easily ascertainable. Nominal horsepower is arbitrary and un-standardized.
The Supreme Court directed this Court to review the District Court’s findings as to what horsepower meant “among engineers.” Our Court has now disregard*775ed engineering concepts and selects criteria derived from plates on compressor housings and tags.
Inasmuch as the decision of this Court in this case is based to a considerable degree upon questions neither argued nor briefed, I have concluded that the Court, sitting en banc, should consider the issues.