Court Opinion

ID: 8862714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 17:53:53.79703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:05:53.182685
License: Public Domain

LONG, District Judge.
The United States is engaged in the distribution of fertilizer to the farmers of Florida and in other States as a part of a soil conserving program developed by the government to carry out the purposes of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 590a et seq. The outline of the program is set out in the complaint filed herein, and the attached affidavits. The fertilizer is purchased by the government from commercial manufacturers, inspected by the government as to suitability for the purpose for which it is to be used. It is then shipped under government bills-of-lading to county agricultural conservation associations for the purpose of delivery to the farmers. This distribution is for the purpose of facilitating the planting of such nitrogen-bearing crops as would increase the nitrogen content of the soil and thereby compensate for the critical shortage of nitrogen due to its use in munitions required by the war emergency.
Nitrogen, being unavailable for fertilizer purposes, can only be supplied by these nitrogen growing crops. It, therefore, becomes a question of either the diversion of nitrogen from war needs, or a reduction of the agricultural production, both of which are necessary because of these requirements of the armed forces, the needs of our allies, and the domestic demands. The program is nation wide. The action of the defendants complained of prior to the issuance of the temporary restraining order, had halted the distribution of this very widely needed fertilizer.
The Florida Commercial Fertilizer Law, Section 576.11, requires an inspection fee to be paid by every manufacturer or agent of commercial fertilizer. Section 576.13 refers to manufacturer and importer of, or dealer in fertilizers. Since the rule is that the general words of a statute do not include the government or affect its rights unless the construction be clear and undisputable upon the text of the act (Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314; United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 24 L.Ed. 192; United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071), the conclusion could be reached that by this statute of Florida the legislature had no intention of affecting the property of the Federal Government.
There is abundant authority for the holding that a State under the exercise of the police power may pass regulatory acts providing for inspection fees, but that is not the question here. The one and only question to be determined is whether or not Federal transactions are immune from such State regulations. It seems to *557be well settled as a matter of law that the police power of a State does not extend to the United States, its property or transactions, and that such Federal property and transactions are immune from State regulations, and State Statutes are invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Article VI, Clause 2). State of Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 19 S.Ct. 453, 43 L.Ed. 699 (cited with approval in Stewart & Company v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 60 S.Ct. 431, 84 L.Ed. 596, 127 A.L.R. 821); State of Arizona v. State of California, 283 U.S. 423, 51 S.Ct. 522, 75 L.Ed. 1154. The United States may perform its functions without conforming to the police regulations of a State. Johnson v. State of Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 41 S.Ct. 16, 65 L.Ed. 126; Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 49 S.Ct. 38, 73 L.Ed. 200; Chalk v. United States, 4 Cir., 114 F.2d 207; Id., 312 U.S. 679, 61 S.Ct. 449, 85 L.Ed. 1118; Posey v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 5 Cir., 93 F.2d 726.
The authority of State laws or their administration may not interfere with the carrying out of a national purpose. Where enforcement of the State law would handicap efforts to carry out the plans of the United States, the State enactment must, of course, give way. Stewart & Company v. Sadrukula, 309 U.S. 94, 60 S. Ct. 431, 84 L.Ed. 596, 127 A.L.R. 821.
The defendants rely chiefly upon the case, State of Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 S.Ct. 43, 86 L.Ed. 3, 140 A.L.R. 615.
All that is necessary to convince one that the King & Boozer case is not applicable here is to parallel this case with the case of Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Company, 314 U.S. 95, 62 S.Ct. 1, 86 L.Ed. 65, rendered the same day as the King & Boozer case. In King & Boozer the State Law operated only on the private independent contractor and with respect to its own property. In the Federal Land Bank case, which as stated above was rendered the same day as the case relied upon by the defendants, the State of North Dakota sought to impose its sales tax from a dealer directly to the Federal agent and instrumentality. The incident of the tax was, by compulsion of the State law rather than by contract, directly on the purchaser who in that instance was a Federal instrumentality. The Supreme Court accordingly held the levy invalid as in violation of a sovereign immunity of the Federal government. The Florida statute here involved, as applied by the defendants, operates directly on the United States, and it would seem that the case of Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Company is controlling in this instance. The Florida act is legislation for the regulation of the fertilizer industry, and not legislation for raising revenue, and the fees required are only one aspect of a total scheme of regulation which cannot be validly applied to the United States, its property or transactions. The property of the United States is immune from seizure, even to collect •a valid tax, and certainly this Federal property is immune from State seizure in the case at bar even to collect a valid fee.