Court Opinion

ID: 9496851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:36:59.564771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:50.599416
License: Public Domain

*921WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Though I agree with the ultimate decision in this case, I must disagree with the majority’s statement that the logic of Johnson v. Mississippi 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) and Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992) are limited to “those aggravating factors that establish [death] eligibility....” Majority opinion at 918 (emphasis added).1
I stand by the majority’s conclusion because Wallace failed to prove that the sentencer, here the trial judge, actually considered the invalid nonstatutory aggra-vators in his decision to impose death. This court has held that “Sochor and Clemons [... ] stand for the proposition that, when an ‘invalid’ aggravating factor is considered in sentencing in a ‘weighing’ state, a state appellate court must either reweigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances, engage in a meaningful harmless error analysis, or remand for resentencing.” Hough v. Anderson, 272 F.3d 878, 906 (7th Cir.2001). This step allows any potential error to be cured by the state court. However, we also reasoned that the defendant must first present sufficient evidence that the invalid aggravating factor was considered by the sentencer. Id. The trial judge’s written sentencing memorandum articulates his bifurcated consideration of the nonstatutory and subsequently invalid aggravating factors.2 Thus, Wallace has not satisfied his burden. See id. (reasoning that an appellate court need not reweigh aggravating and mitigating factors when the defendant has failed to prove that the sentencer actually considered the invalid factors).
I write separately to discuss the majority’s decision to limit the applicability of Johnson and Sochor to the death eligibility determination. The propriety of Wallace’s *922death eligibility is not at issue here, nor was eligibility at issue in Johnson3 or Sochor.4, Rather, the potential constitutional infirmity arises from the fact that Indiana is a “weighing” state coupled with the possibility that during the second phase of Wallace’s sentencing, the trial judge may have considered two aggravating factors later deemed invalid.
To satisfy the edicts of the Eighth Amendment, the imposition of the ultimate punishment must be “reliable.” Reliability is gauged by: (1) the degree to which the state properly narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); (2) the proportionality of the sentence imposed to the crime committed, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972); and (3) the extent to which the defendant received an individualized sentencing determination, see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). An invalid aggravating factor may affect the eligibility determination; however, in a weighing state, because the sentencer is asked to reweigh all mitigating evidence against all aggravating evidence, the invalid aggravator may also have a profound effect on the sentencer’s ultimate decision of whether to sentence the defendant to life in prison or sentence him to death.5 See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 230, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992) (noting that the Eighth Amendment does not permit a “state appellate court in a weighing State to affirm a death sentence without a thorough analysis of the role an invalid aggravating factor played in the sentencing process”). The Court’s analysis must extend to the entire sentencing process. See Tuggle v. Netherlands 516 U.S. 10, 11, 116 S.Ct. 283, 133 L.Ed.2d 251 (1995) (noting that in weighing states a death sentence may not be summarily affirmed on the basis of one valid aggravating factor once another aggravating factor is deemed invalid). Limiting Johnson and Sochor is therefore contrary to the Court’s reasoning.

. Weighing states, such as Indiana, conduct a two-part analysis when determining whether to apply the death penalty. In the first phase, the jury is asked to determine whether the defendant is "death eligible.” This inquiry asks whether the jury has found any statutory aggravating factors to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. In the second phase, the jury is asked to weigh all mitigating factors against all aggravating factors and decide whether to recommend the imposition of death. The trial judge, however, decides whether to accept or reject the jury's recommendation for death.

. The dearth of mitigating evidence also raises several questions concerning the propriety of Wallace’s attorney's sentencing trial strategy. Counsel called Joseph Kline, a rabbi, and Lowell G. Bishop, a Lutheran pastor, to the stand. Both men testified as to their theological understanding of the propriety of the death penalty. Rabbi Kline discussed the Jewish faith's disapproval of the death penalty and stated that the real meaning of "an eye for an eye” was that a victim should be monetarily compensated for a murder. Pastor Bishop discussed his personal disapproval of the death penalty based on his interpretation of Scripture. This court has suggested that mitigation strategies which seek the "equivalent of jury nullification” on the basis of religious beliefs are unreasonable. See Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Claims that the Bible or a particular religion opposes the death penalty 'have no bearing on the question of whether a particular defendant who has been found guilty of capital murder should receive death or some lesser authorized penalty.' ”) (quoting Stokes v. Armontrout, 851 F.2d 1085, 1096 (8th Cir. 1988)).
However, the record reveals that Wallace's attorney did investigate his background. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2536, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) ("[W]e focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of [the defendant's] background was itself reasonable.’’) (emphasis in original). The record is also replete with examples of Wallace impeding his attorney's mitigation investigation, which makes counsel's decisions seem more reasonable in light of the circumstances.

. "At the conclusion, of the sentencing hearing, the jury found three aggravating circumstances, any one of which, as a matter of Mississippi law, would have been sufficient to support a capital sentence.” 486 U.S. at 580-81, 108 S.Ct. 1981. The jury in Johnson was asked to weigh "mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances 'one against the other,' ” and ultimately "found 'that the aggravating circumstances do outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that the Defendant should suffer the penalty of death.' " Id. at 581, 108 S.Ct. 1981. Thus, the issue there was the propriety of the final decision to impose death, not death "eligibility.”

. The Sochor Court stated, "[i]n a weighing State like Florida, there is Eighth Amendment error when the sentencer weighs an 'invalid' aggravating circumstance in reaching the ultimate decision to impose a death sentence.” 504 U.S. at 532, 112 S.Ct. 2114 (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990)). Therefore, once again, death eligibility was not at issue.

. The Indiana Supreme Court has subsequently disallowed the consideration of non-statutory aggravating factors during the second phase of the death determination, though not required by the federal constitution. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). However, as Wallace's appeal began before 1995, and the Indiana Supreme Court has decided not to apply this new ruling retroactively, it does not apply to his case. See Bivins v. State of Indiana, 642 N.E.2d 928, 953-56 (Ind.1995) ("court must henceforth limit aggravating circumstances eligible for consideration to those specified in the death penalty statute, Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-9(b)”) (emphasis added).