Court Opinion

ID: 9376289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-02 17:00:39.101593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:05.805987
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-1643
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                        v.

                             Enrique Steven Abarca

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                      for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln
                                  ____________

                         Submitted: November 16, 2022
                             Filed: March 2, 2023
                                ____________

Before BENTON, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

      A jury convicted Enrique Steven Abarca of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams
or more of methamphetamine with two prior serious drug felonies, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 851. The district court 1 sentenced him to 324 months in prison.

      1
      The Honorable John M. Gerrard, United States District Judge for the District
of Nebraska.
He appeals his conviction. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court
affirms.

                                           I.

      Abarca believes the district court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) testimony
from Michael Muhle, a man who was not involved in the charged conspiracy but
began selling meth with Abarca three months after the conspiracy ended.

                                          A.

       Abarca asserts the court erred in introducing evidence from Muhle without
properly noticing him under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3). Abarca did not object at trial,
and this court reviews for plain error. See United States v. Loomis, 954 F.3d 1184,
1186 (8th Cir. 2020). For plain error, Abarca must show “there was an error, the
error is clear or obvious under current law, the error affected the party’s substantial
rights, and the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2011).

      Rule 404(b)(3) requires the government in a criminal case to:

      (A) provide reasonable notice of any such evidence that the prosecutor
          intends to offer at trial, so that the defendant has a fair opportunity
          to meet it;

      (B) articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which the
          prosecutor intends to offer the evidence and the reasoning that
          supports the purpose; and

      (C) do so in writing before trial—or in any form during trial if the court,
          for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3). The government did not file a specific notice of 404(b)
evidence on Muhle’s expected testimony, but Abarca received a copy of the report
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of his pretrial interview. The government argues that because the 404(b)(3) standard
is “flexible,” this report is sufficient to constitute notice. See United States v.
DNRB, Inc., 895 F.3d 1063, 1069 (8th Cir. 2018).

       In 2020, Rule 404(b) was amended “principally to impose additional notice
requirements on the prosecution.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), advisory committee
notes, 2020 Amendments (“The earlier requirement that the prosecution provide
notice of only the ‘general nature’ of the evidence was understood by some courts to
permit the government to satisfy the notice obligation without describing the specific
act that the evidence would tend to prove, and without explaining the relevance of
the evidence for a non-propensity purpose.”). The 2020 amendments make clear
that the government now must “articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for
which the prosecutor intends to offer the evidence and the reasoning that supports
the purpose.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3)(B) (2020). At best, the report of Muhle’s
pretrial interview provided notice of only the “general nature” of his testimony. The
government failed to give the notice required under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3).

       But under a plain error standard of review, the error did not affect Abarca’s
substantial rights. The evidence of his participation in the conspiracy was robust.
And, as he concedes, many witnesses had already testified about his drug
connections to California. Even if the “evidence was erroneously admitted, the
errors did not affect [Abarca’s] substantial rights as required by the plain-error
standard because the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming.” Loomis, 954 F.3d at
1187.

                                         B.

      Abarca contends the court erred in admitting Muhle’s testimony because it
did not fall under any of the Rule 404(b) exceptions and was unduly prejudicial.
This court reviews “evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) for an abuse of discretion,
reversing only when the evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was
introduced solely to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.”
                                         -3-
DNRB, 895 F.3d at 1068 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), “Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But such
“evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). “To admit evidence under Rule 404(b),
it must be (1) relevant to a material issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly remote
in time to the crime charged; (3) supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) higher in
probative value than prejudicial effect.” DNRB, 895 F.3d at 1068 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

       Muhle’s testimony met these requirements. It was relevant to a material issue
and admissible to show Abarca’s knowledge of drug trafficking and his intent to
participate in the alleged conspiracy. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The testimony
about Abarca’s plans to get meth from California was similar in kind to testimony
provided by his co-conspirators. DNRB, 895 F.3d at 1068. It thus had some
“bearing on the case,” and was not used “solely to prove” his “propensity to commit
criminal acts.” Id.

       Abarca argues the testimony, particularly about him exchanging guns for
drugs, was unduly prejudicial because it “changed a non-violent, alleged conspiracy
into a hyper-violent one.” But Muhle’s testimony about guns was only one
statement: “Well, at that time he told me that he was going to trade guns for [meth].”
And by the time Muhle testified, the jury had already heard testimony from two
people about Abarca owning a handgun and pulling it out during a fight. The jury
had also heard evidence about Abarca threatening his co-conspirators and their
family members saying things like, “I’m going to kill you, kill your mom, kill your
kids. I know where your aunt lives at.” He told another witness that she was “never
going to make it to court.” The court also gave a limiting instruction, telling the jury
that Muhle’s testimony “may be considered by you only for the purposes of intent,
knowledge, absence of mistake on behalf of the defendant in this particular case, and
                                          -4-
it may not be considered for any other purpose.” The evidence, particularly with the
court’s limiting instruction, was not unduly prejudicial. The district court did not
err in admitting Muhle’s testimony.

                                         II.

       Abarca argues the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. This court
reviews the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, “viewing evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, resolving conflicts in the government’s favor, and
accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States v.
Tillman, 765 F.3d 831, 833 (8th Cir. 2014). “A defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence in a conspiracy case has a heavy burden.” United States
v. Mann, 701 F.3d 274, 296 (8th Cir. 2012). This court will reverse “only if no
reasonable jury could have found” guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tillman, 765
F.3d at 833.

       “To establish that a defendant conspired to distribute drugs, the government
must show that there was an agreement to distribute drugs, that the defendant knew
of the conspiracy, and that the defendant intentionally joined the conspiracy.”
United States v. Davis, 826 F.3d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 2016). Here, four cooperating
witnesses and co-conspirators testified that Abarca brought and shipped meth into
Nebraska for redistribution. They also testified he sent money to California through
Wells Fargo and Walmart to buy meth. These witnesses corroborated each other.
This court does not “reweigh or reexamine the credibility of witnesses on appeal.”
United States v. Ferguson, 29 F.4th 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2022). Their testimony was
further corroborated by a package (intercepted by law enforcement) with about five
pounds of meth; Postal Service records of packages sent; records of wire transfers
sent to California; phone records; and records of drug sales kept by a cooperating
witness. There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict.

                                    *******

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The judgment is affirmed.
                ______________________________

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