Court Opinion

ID: 9819439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:25:15.746107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:19.620071
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting: Although the majority finds that a number of evidentiary rulings at the defendant’s trial were not sufficient error to warrant a reversal or were not error at all, I find it impossible to reach the same conclusion. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. The majority argues that a number of the evidentiary issues are waived because they were not brought in posttrial motion. In general, arguments not raised in a posttrial motion are waived on appellate review. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1988). Nevertheless, the defendant urges the court to review the issues for plain error. To assert plain error, the defendant must show that the evidence was closely balanced or that the error was so fundamental that the accused was denied a fair trial. People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 210, 561 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1990). With respect to each of the evidentiary issues, plain error review is appropriate. Each of the alleged evidentiary errors relates to the defendant’s ability to impeach A.E’s credibility, or to the State’s attempts to boost her credibility. The State’s entire case hinged on the jury believing A.E’s testimony. Any evidentiary ruling which may have threatened the defendant’s right to test A.E’s credibility could have been seriously prejudicial to the defendant. There was no physical evidence to link the defendant to any crime. The evidence was closely balanced and impeachment testimony could have changed the outcome of the trial. Therefore, I believe the rulings should be reviewed despite the fact that they were not raised in the posttrial motion. The first error complained of relates to testimony from individuals staying at the defendant’s house at the time of the alleged abuse. The defendant sought to have these individuals testify that they did not notice any signs of abuse and that it would have been difficult for the abuse to occur while they were at the house. It is clear that the evidence proposed by the defendant was relevant to the case. Since the State’s case was based entirely on the accusations of the victim, testimony that would show that the defendant did not have a ready or easy opportunity to commit specific alleged acts of abuse would possibly impeach A.E’s credibility and lead to an acquittal. The defendant at least should have been allowed to present the evidence to the jury, so that it could have assessed it for probative value, assigned it an appropriate weight, and evaluated A.E’s testimony in light of the information. The defendant also argues it was error for the trial court to prohibit the introduction of evidence that A.E had made a prior allegation of sexual misconduct against another minor, J.I. The trial court found that the evidence was inadmissible under the rape shield statute. The statute states that “the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the alleged victim *** is inadmissible except *** when constitutionally required to be admitted.” 725 ILCS 5/115—7(a) (West 2002). It does not appear to me that the evidence sought by defendant even implicates that statute since what is at issue is J.I.’s alleged sexual advances and not any claimed sexual activity or prior promiscuity on the part of A.E Assuming, however, that the statute does apply, the bar is not absolute, as the text of the statute indicates, and a defendant should be allowed to present evidence generally barred under the statute if it is necessary to give effect to the defendant’s sixth amendment right to confront his accuser. People v. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d 159, 191-92, 552 N.E.2d 726, 740 (1990). However, this right to confront is limited in scope. The Sandoval court identified three circumstances where an accused may use evidence otherwise barred by statute: (1) when the evidence will show bias, prejudice or motive, (2) when evidence is of other crimes that can be used to impeach a defendant should he choose to testify, and (3) when prior inconsistent statements are used to impeach. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 191, 552 N.E.2d at 740. The court found that the sixth amendment does not require evidence to be used solely to attack the credibility of a witness. Sandoval, 135 Ill. 2d at 190, 552 N.E.2d at 740. The defendant’s sixth amendment right is clearly implicated. He sought to show that A.E had a source — not himself — for her advanced knowledge of sexual terminology, and that she had a motive to lie about the defendant. The defendant attempted to present testimony that J.I., a 15-year-old, had kissed A.E and asked her to perform oral sex on him. He also tried to admit evidence that she wanted to punish defendant for preventing her from seeing the boy. The testimony is relevant to show an alternative source for the victim’s knowledge and to show motive to accuse him falsely. Despite the majority’s assertion that they do not find the evidence particularly convincing, it should have been admitted so that the jury could have made the determination whether to give credence to the evidence and to the defendant’s theory. Next, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in preventing him from presenting evidence that A.E was in therapy for a lying problem. The court found the testimony was barred under the Mental Health and Disabilities Confidentiality Act. The Act provides that “in any *** criminal *** proceeding ***, a recipient, and a therapist on behalf and in the interest of a recipient, has the privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent the disclosure of the recipient’s record or communications.” 740 ILCS 110/10(a) (West 2002). The defendant must he provided the opportunity to confront a witness with mental health records if the evidence would be useful in helping the jury to evaluate the truthfulness of the witness’s testimony. People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 102, 560 N.E.2d 258, 275 (1990). In Bean, the court found that generally barred medical records would he admissible if they indicated a bias against the defendant or revealed the witness to be lacking in her ability to perceive, relate, or remember the occurrences about which she testified. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d at 102, 560 N.E.2d at 275. Arguably, whether A.E sought treatment for a lying problem does not implicate these reasons for admitting such records. However, the information defendant sought to have admitted is not covered by the statute. The statute prevents the disclosure of records or communications, but there is no indication that the defendant sought to admit any medical records. Rather, the evidence was to be testimony from the defendant’s wife that she had sought the treatment for A.E’s lying problem and testimony from Girard stating that A.E had told him that she had sought treatment for lying. The mother’s testimony does not concern either a “record” or “communication” but relates only to the fact that the therapy was sought. It also does not, as the majority asserts, amount to a lay diagnosis of a mental problem. It is nothing more than the statement of the fact that the victim, at the invitation of her frustrated mother, underwent treatment. Girard’s testimony, while concerning a communication by A.E, does not concern a communication made in the context of mental health treatment. The court improperly denied the defendant the opportunity to present the evidence. The evidentiary rulings made by the trial court and complained of by the defendant prevented the defendant from meaningfully confronting the primary witness against him and from adequately presenting a defense. The case hung on the credibility of the alleged victim, and the defendant was unable, due to adverse evidentiary rulings, to contest that credibility. The rulings irreparably prejudiced the defendant and entitle him to a remand for a new trial. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.