Court Opinion

ID: 9405869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 15:13:40.202759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.716159
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 57

                  SUPREME COURT            OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2021AP267-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:        State of Wisconsin,
                                 Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       Mitchell D. Green,
                                 Defendant-Appellant.

                          REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                          Reported at 401 Wis. 2d 540, 974 N.W.2d 51
                                     (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         June 29, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         December 1, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Milwaukee
   JUDGE:              David L. Borowski

JUSTICES:
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and KAROFSKY,
JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which DALLET, J., joined.    HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general, with whom
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an
oral argument by John A. Blimling, assistant attorney general.

       For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by
John T. Wasielewski and Wasielewski & Erickson, Milwaukee. There
was an oral argument by John T. Wasielewski.
                                                                        2023 WI 57
                                                                  NOTICE
                                                  This opinion is subject to further
                                                  editing and modification.   The final
                                                  version will appear in the bound
                                                  volume of the official reports.
No.       2021AP267-CR
(L.C. No.    2019CF914)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                            :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

             Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                                                                     FILED
      v.                                                        JUN 29, 2023

Mitchell D. Green,                                               Samuel A. Christensen
                                                                Clerk of Supreme Court

             Defendant-Appellant.

REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and KAROFSKY,
JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which DALLET, J., joined.    HAGEDORN, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                Reversed.

      ¶1     REBECCA      GRASSL   BRADLEY,       J.    The      State      charged

Mitchell D. Green with trafficking of a child, a class C felony,

among other offenses.         See Wis. Stat. § 948.051(1) (2017–18).1

      1All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2017–18 version unless otherwise indicated. Wisconsin Stat.
§ 948.051(1) provides:    "Whoever knowingly recruits, entices,
provides, obtains, harbors, transports, patronizes, or solicits
or knowingly attempts to recruit, entice, provide, obtain,
harbor, transport, patronize, or solicit any child for the
purpose    of    commercial    sex    acts,   as    defined    in
s. 940.302 (1) (a), is guilty of a Class C felony."
                                                                          No.     2021AP267-CR

At trial, the victim, S.A.B., testified that Green had driven

her to a hotel in Milwaukee, where she was forced to engage in a

sex act.     After S.A.B. testified, Green called as a witness his

cousin, Jonathon Cousin, who testified that he, not Green, had

driven S.A.B. and another man, J.R., to the hotel.

    ¶2      After       a   recess      for   lunch,      the     trial      court      held    a

hearing    to     address     the       State's      concerns      regarding         Cousin's

testimony.       Specifically, the State argued that Green presented

a third-party perpetrator defense through Cousin's testimony,

without notifying the State or seeking a ruling from the court

regarding    the    admissibility          of     that    evidence       under       State     v.

Denny,     120     Wis. 2d 614,           357       N.W.2d 12         (Ct.      App.        1984)

(conditioning admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence

on a showing of a motive, opportunity, and direct connection

between the third party and the crime charged).                                 Green denied

offering     Cousin's        testimony        for    that       purpose.          The       court

concluded Cousin's testimony was Denny evidence and therefore

should not have been presented to the jury without the defense
notifying    the    State     in       advance      and   the    court    ruling        on    its

admissibility.          Because the jury heard that evidence without

either    precondition        being      satisfied,        the    court       determined        a

mistrial was necessary.

    ¶3      Green       filed      a    motion       to    dismiss       the      case       with

prejudice,       arguing     retrial       would      violate      his       right      against

double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution       as       incorporated          against       the      States        by     the
Fourteenth       Amendment.         After     the     trial      court    denied        Green's
                                              2
                                                                        No.    2021AP267-CR

motion,     Green       filed   a   motion     for    reconsideration,          which   the

court also denied.              Green appealed, and the court of appeals

reversed.         State v. Green, No. 2021AP267-CR, unpublished slip

op. (Wis. Ct. App. March 22, 2022).

      ¶4        Before this court, the State argues retrial would not

violate Green's right against double jeopardy because the trial

court exercised sound discretion in deciding manifest necessity

justified a mistrial.                 We agree; accordingly, we reverse the

decision of the court of appeals.

                                      I.    BACKGROUND

      ¶5        Prior    to   trial,       Green    filed      a   witness    list   naming

Cousin.         Green's counsel had a written statement from Cousin,

but the State did not demand its production.                           In August 2019,

the State filed pretrial motions in limine, asking the circuit

court      to    prohibit       Green       "from    introducing        any    other-acts

evidence involving a third-party perpetrator, unless and until

defendant        satisfies      his     burden      and    such     evidence    is   ruled

admissible by the court[.]"                 Green did not object to the State's
motions.        At a final pretrial hearing, the court acknowledged

the   "State      had    filed      their    motion       in   limine[.]"       Milwaukee

Circuit Court Judge Janet Protasiewicz presided over the case

until the day of trial.                    Nothing in the record indicates the

court ruled on the State's motion in limine before the trial

scheduled to commence on January 27, 2020.

                                               3
                                                                       No.    2021AP267-CR

         ¶6     On the day of trial, Judge Protasiewicz spun2 the case

to Judge David Borowski.               Three witnesses testified:                  S.A.B.;

Gerardo Orozco, a Milwaukee police officer; and Cousin.                             S.A.B.

was the prosecution's first witness.                   S.A.B. testified she "was

sex trafficked" between October 30, 2018 and December 4, 2018.

S.A.B.        explained   that   she    was       forced    to    be   part   of       a    sex

trafficking ring and that Green——who S.A.B. knew as Money Mitch—

—was integral to the operation.

         ¶7     S.A.B. testified specifically to Green's involvement

in one trafficking incident alleged to have occurred during the

fall of 2018:         "I got a call.          It was a date.           Money Mitch was

at JR's house, and I told JR that I had a date.                        Money Mitch was

like, well, I got a car.              I can drive you.            I said okay."        After

that conversation, S.A.B. testified that Green picked her up and

drove her to a hotel in Milwaukee.                         S.A.B. recounted further

details from the night, testifying she "remember[ed] the date

because the guy spit in my mouth and I didn't appreciate that,

so   I       made   him   give   me    more       money,    and    then   when     I       went
downstairs I gave Money Mitch all the money."

         ¶8     After Officer Orozco testified, Green called his first

witness, Cousin, who testified Green had "nothing to do with"

       Courts commonly stack cases for trial on the same day with
         2

the expectation that parties will reach a plea agreement on the
scheduled trial date.   When more than one case will proceed to
trial on the same day, the assigned judge will ask another judge
to preside over one of the trials to avoid delaying resolution
of the case.    As in this case, the practice is referred to as
"spinning."

                                              4
                                                                No.    2021AP267-CR

the events S.A.B. described; according to Cousin, he and not

Green had driven S.A.B. that night.              Cousin testified that one

night in 2018, "I think October," a family member named Delmar

called Cousin to ask for a ride home.                 Cousin agreed to drive

Delmar home, provided Delmar paid him for gas.                        When Cousin

arrived, Delmar approached the car alone.                 Sitting in Cousin's

passenger seat, Delmar asked if two more people could ride with

them.     Cousin agreed, "as long as I get my gas money."                   Cousin

denied knowing either S.A.B. or J.R.

     ¶9     With three passengers in Cousin's car, Cousin asked

Delmar where to take them.          According to Cousin, Delmar told him

"just drop us off downtown[.]"              Cousin testified "they didn't

tell me an exact destination.           They just said downtown, and that

actually    made   me    mad.     I'm   like   well     where   are   we   going."

Because "they didn't tell me where they were going, I stopped in

front of the blue building."            S.A.B. and J.R. exited the car,

but Delmar stayed in the car with Cousin and asked him to remain

parked    until    the   two    returned.      Cousin    agreed   after     Delmar
offered to give him more gas money.

     ¶10    According to Cousin, S.A.B. and J.R. returned to the

car no more than fifteen minutes later.                 While driving, Cousin

heard S.A.B. and J.R. conversing in the backseat "about a story

that happened[.]"        Cousin heard S.A.B. say:           "the guy asked me

to ask if he can spit in my mouth, . . . it's disgusting, I let

him do it, I threw up."             After hearing this exchange, Cousin

"turned up [his] radio" because he did not "know what[] [was]
happening in that back seat."
                                        5
                                                                       No.        2021AP267-CR

      ¶11   The     State    did    not    object        to   Cousin's      testimony      on

direct examination.           During cross-examination, when the State

asked Cousin about driving "a sex worker who is underage to a

hotel," Cousin replied he "had no recognition of what was going

on that night, so I was just doing it for the gas money."                                  At

the conclusion of Cousin's testimony, the trial court recessed

for lunch.

      ¶12   The     trial    court      met        in   chambers    with    each      party's

counsel, as well as an attorney from the state public defender's

office whom        the court       asked to advocate on Cousin's behalf.

After an off-the-record discussion, the court recalled the case

to   conduct   a     hearing       on    the       record     regarding         the   State's

concerns about Cousin's testimony.                        At the outset, the court

expressed concerns about Cousin's testimony, in which "arguably"

Cousin "said that he rather than the defendant committed the

child trafficking" although the court acknowledged "that's open

to interpretation, and technically [Cousin] denied that[.]"                                 In

the court's view, Cousin may have incriminated himself without
counsel,     and    Green     may       have       violated    Denny       by    presenting

Cousin's testimony without notifying the State in advance or

seeking a ruling on its admissibility.

      ¶13   The      trial     court           ultimately          concluded          Cousin's

testimony was "clearly" Denny evidence.                       The court characterized

Cousin's written statement as "literally . . . taking the fall

for . . . Green."           Reading from Cousin's statement, the court

noted Cousin said, "JR asked me if I was giving [sic] money
would I give them a ride.               Them being both of them, the pimp and
                                               6
                                                                       No.     2021AP267-CR

the alleged prostitute."            Green's counsel argued "it never was

my intent to accuse a known third party who had motive and

opportunity of the crime that . . . Green is charged with."                              The

court responded, "if he's not being called for that reason,

counsel,      why     is   he    being     called?        . . . [T]hat          would     be

completely irrelevant."            Addressing Green's counsel, the court

said "[i]t is Denny evidence clearly.                 You're offering him only

to get your client off."            Although Green's counsel argued Cousin

"didn't      incriminate        himself"    the     court       noted        that   Cousin

"admitted      to     every   single     element     of   the    crime        other     than

saying, yeah, I knew it was a prostitute[.]"                           In the court's

view, "the State has enough to arguably get past probable cause

right now based on what [Cousin] said on the stand."

       ¶14    The trial court allowed each party to recommend how to

proceed, noting "I don't know how I could possibly unring the

bell. . . .         I would have to tell [the jury] to disregard all

that testimony completely."              The State argued the solution was

best left to the "sound discretion" of the court, while defense
counsel      argued    Cousin's    testimony       reflected      he    "provide[d]        a

perfectly legal ride in exchange for gas money," which was not

Denny evidence; accordingly, "I don't think it's anything to

fix.    [Cousin's] testimony is what it is, it's relevant, and the

jury should be allowed to weigh it."

       ¶15    After summarizing Cousin's testimony, the trial court

concluded it was "impossible to unring that bell."                       It reasoned:

       I don't think there's any way that that bell can be
       unrung, because of the gravity of the testimony,

                                           7
                                                                   No.       2021AP267-CR

    because of Denny evidence, because there were only
    three witnesses in this case, and clearly at this
    point in time only will be three witnesses, the
    victim——or   alleged victim——[S.A.B], the  officer,
    and . . . Cousin.

    And as the State said, the timing of the evidence was—
    —happened to be right before lunch, the jury's now had
    two hours to think about that evidence, and all of
    them, I hope they're following my rules and are not
    discussing the case.      I'm sure they're not, but
    they're all probably thinking in their head, holy cow,
    that testimony . . . Cousin just gave, that's——they're
    thinking one of two things, either, well, . . . Green
    is clearly innocent based on that testimony, or
    they're     thinking,      that's    utter     garbage
    that . . . Green got his cousin to cover for him and
    take the fall.
    ¶16    Consequently,      the       trial    court      ordered      a    mistrial.

"[I]f it's a Denny issue," the court reasoned, "it needed to be

vetted before trial."       It continued:

    I would have handled this differently if this had come
    up at 11:00 rather than at 1:30 or 2:00. I would have
    had the witness speak to an attorney, first of all. I
    think he probably would not have testified . . . .
    And more importantly, it's clearly Denny evidence that
    the State has the right to know about and the State
    has a right to respond to, and the court has a right
    to know about, and the court is required to make a
    ruling on before it comes out of a witness's mouth
    during the middle of the trial.
    ¶17    After    the    court    ordered      a   mistrial,     Green       filed   a

motion to dismiss the case, arguing a retrial would violate his

Fifth   Amendment   right     against     double       jeopardy.         The    circuit

court   denied   Green's     motion,     as     well   as    his   reconsideration

motion,   and    the      court    of    appeals       granted     leave        for    an

interlocutory appeal.

                                         8
                                                                          No.    2021AP267-CR

      ¶18     The court of appeals reversed on four grounds.                            Green,

No. 2021AP267-CR.           First, the trial court never held a hearing

on   whether       Cousin's       testimony         was    admissible.           Id.,     ¶18.

Second, the trial court later concluded Cousin's testimony was,

in fact, admissible.              Id., ¶19.          Third, the testimony was not

unfair to the State because the State had the opportunity to

investigate Cousin before trial and to demand production of his

statement     but    did    not     do    so.       Id.,     ¶20.     Fourth,          even   if

Cousin's right to counsel was violated, any remedy would go to

Cousin, not the State.            Id., ¶23.

                             II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

      ¶19     In    this    case,    we    must      determine      whether       the    trial

court erred in finding manifest necessity for a mistrial, in

light   of    the    Green's      Fifth    Amendment         protection         from    double

jeopardy.      State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, ¶13, 261 Wis. 2d 383,

661 N.W.2d 822.            In Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461

(1973), the United States Supreme Court applied United States v.

Perez, 9      Wheat.        579     (1824),         "the      fountainhead         decision
construing     the     Double       Jeopardy        Clause    in    the    context       of   a

declaration of a mistrial[.]"                   In Perez, Justice Joseph Story,

on   behalf    of    the    Court,       formulated        the   "manifest       necessity"

standard for ensuring retrials do not violate the defendant's

right against double jeopardy, which is dependent upon the trial

court exercising "sound discretion" in declaring a mistrial:

      We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law
      has invested Courts of justice with the authority to
      discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in
      their opinion, taking all the circumstances into

                                                9
                                                                         No.        2021AP267-CR

     consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the
     act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be
     defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on
     the subject; and it is impossible to define all the
     circumstances,  which would render it proper to
     interfere.   To be sure, the power ought to be used
     with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances,
     and for very plain and obvious causes . . . .     But,
     after all, they have the right to order the discharge;
     and the security which the public have for the
     faithful, sound, and conscientious exercise of this
     discretion, rests, in this, as in other cases, upon
     the responsibility of the Judges under their oaths of
     office.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.

     ¶20    "A circuit court's exercise of discretion in ordering

a   mistrial      is    accorded      a    level     of     deference          that     varies

depending on the particular facts of the case."                               Seefeldt, 261

Wis. 2d 383,      ¶13    (citing      State     v.   Barthels,          174    Wis. 2d 173,

184, 495 N.W.2d 341 (1993)).               A rigid rule would not take into

account "all the circumstances" in which manifest necessity may

arise.      Perez,      22   U.S.     (9   Wheat.)        at    580.          The    level     of

deference    accorded        to   these    judgments        therefore          exists     on    a

spectrum.       Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶25.

     ¶21    On one end, appellate courts give "great deference" to

circuit     courts'      judgments         when      "the       jury      is        hopelessly

deadlocked."        Wayne R. LaFave et al., Manifest necessity and

trial court discretion, 6 Crim. Proc. § 25.2(e) (4th ed. updated

Nov. 2022).       In this scenario, "the trial judge is best able to

assess    the    risk    that     a   verdict        may       result    from        pressures

inherent in the situation rather than the considered judgment of

all the jurors."         Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶26 (citing Arizona
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).                        On the other end of

                                           10
                                                                             No.    2021AP267-CR

the spectrum, appellate courts apply "the strictest scrutiny" to

a     trial    court's       mistrial    order       when     "critical            prosecution

evidence" is unavailable or when "there is reason to believe

that the prosecutor is using the State's superior resources to

harass the defendant or to achieve a tactical advantage."                                   Id.,

¶25 (citing Washington, 434 U.S. at 508).

       ¶22     The     application       of    deference          does        not     end    the

appellate inquiry.            Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 775 (2010).

The trial court must weigh the decision to declare a mistrial by

also considering the defendant's interest in having the case

concluded before the jury called to decide it.                               Washington, 434

U.S. at 514 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486

(1971) (plurality)).            "In order to ensure that this interest is

adequately      protected,         reviewing       courts   have       an     obligation       to

satisfy themselves that, in the words of . . . Justice Story,

the    trial    judge       exercised    'sound      discretion'         in        declaring    a

mistrial."        Id.       "Perez itself noted that the judge's exercise

of discretion must be 'sound'" to justify a retrial.                                   Renico,
559     U.S. at       775    (quoting    Perez,       9     Wheat.       at        580).       In

Washington, the United States Supreme Court explained:                                      "[i]f

the record reveals that the trial judge has failed to exercise

the 'sound discretion' entrusted to him, the reason for such

deference by an appellate court disappears."                             434 U.S. at 510

n.28.         "Sound       discretion    means       acting       in     a     rational      and

responsible manner."               Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶36; see also

Washington,          434    U.S.    at   514       ("[I]f     a    trial           judge    acts

                                              11
                                                                          No.     2021AP267-CR

irrationally or irresponsibly, his action cannot be condoned."

(citations omitted)).

      ¶23       "The prohibition against retrial is not a mechanical

rule to be applied to prevent any second trial after the first

trial      is    terminated        prior     to     judgment."             Seefeldt        261

Wis. 2d 383,       ¶18    (citing       Somerville,        410    U.S.     at     462).     A

retrial     is    permissible          "whenever,     in    [the     circuit        court's]

opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there

is a manifest necessity" supporting a mistrial.                           Perez, 22 U.S.

at 580.         "Manifest necessity" refers not to absolute necessity

but to a "high degree" of necessity.                       Washington, 434 U.S. at

506; Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶19 (citing Washington, 434 U.S.

at 505; Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d at 183).

      ¶24       A trial court exercises sound discretion in deciding

manifest necessity justifies a mistrial provided the court:

     gives "both parties a full opportunity to explain their

      positions and consider[s] alternatives such as a curative

      instruction or sanctioning counsel."                       State v. Moeck, 2005
      WI 57, ¶43, 280 Wis. 2d 277, 695 N.W.2d 783;

     "accord[s] careful consideration to [defendant]'s interest

      in    having    the       trial   concluded     in    a     single        proceeding."

      Washington, 434 U.S. at 516; and

     "ensure[s]         that    the    record    reflects         that     there     is   an

      adequate       basis       for    a   finding    of        manifest        necessity."

      Moeck, 280 Wis. 2d 277, ¶43.

A court does not exercise sound discretion if "the . . . court
fails to consider the facts of record under relevant law, bases
                                            12
                                                                            No.        2021AP267-CR

its conclusion on an error of law or does not reason its way to

a rational conclusion."                Id. (quoting Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383,

¶36).

                                   III.       DISCUSSION

                           A. Double Jeopardy Principles

      ¶25    The       right       against             double         jeopardy      has        been

characterized as a "universal maxim" of a fair justice system.

See State v. Schultz, 2020 WI 24, ¶19, 390 Wis. 2d 570, 939

N.W.2d 524 (quoting 4 William Blackstone,                              Commentaries        *335).

It   is   protected       by     the       Fifth       Amendment,      which     provides,       in

relevant part:           "No person shall . . . be subject for the same

offence     to    be     twice    put        in    jeopardy       of     life     or     limb[.]"

Jeopardy attaches "in a jury trial when the selection of the

jury has been completed and the jury is sworn."                                  Seefeldt, 261

Wis. 2d 383,       ¶16    (citing          State       v.    Comstock,    168     Wis. 2d 915,

937, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992)).

      ¶26    "[T]here       was        a    time        when     English       judges      served

the . . . monarchs by exercising a power to discharge a jury
whenever     it    appeared        that        the          Crown's    evidence        would    be

insufficient to convict," and "the prohibition against double

jeopardy as it evolved in this country was plainly intended to

condemn this 'abhorrent' practice."                            Washington, 434 U.S. at

507–08.     As the United States Supreme Court has explained:

      Even if the first trial is not completed, a second
      prosecution may be grossly unfair.   It increases the
      financial   and  emotional  burden on   the  accused,
      prolongs the period in which he is stigmatized by an
      unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even
      enhance the risk that an innocent defendant may be

                                                  13
                                                                  No.     2021AP267-CR

       convicted.    The danger of such unfairness to the
       defendant exists whenever a trial is aborted before it
       is completed.    Consequently, as a general rule, the
       prosecutor   is   entitled  to  one,   and  only  one,
       opportunity to require an accused to stand trial.
Id.    at    503–05   (citations        omitted);    see   also    Seefeldt,      261

Wis. 2d 383,       ¶17.     Provided      the   trial   court     exercises    sound

discretion, retrial after declaring a mistrial based on manifest

necessity     will    not    violate      the    defendant's     double     jeopardy

right.

  B.     The Trial Court Exercised Sound Discretion in Ordering a
                              Mistrial.
       ¶27   We need not pinpoint where this case falls on the

spectrum      of   deference       to     be    accorded   the     trial     court's

conclusion that manifest necessity existed.                      Applying even a

strict scrutiny, we conclude the record demonstrates the trial

court exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial based

on manifest necessity.             The court ordered a mistrial because

"the State has the right to know about and . . . respond to"

testimony implicating a third-party perpetrator "and the court

is required to make a ruling on it before it comes out of a

witness' mouth during the middle of the trial."                   At the time the

court ordered a mistrial, Green did not dispute advance notice

of such Denny evidence was required.                Rather than informing the

court that no rule or order barred the introduction of Denny

evidence, defense counsel maintained Cousin's testimony was not

Denny    evidence     at    all.        Under   those   circumstances,       it   was

reasonable for the trial court to believe a pretrial order had
been violated.        All factors established under precedent support

                                           14
                                                                   No.     2021AP267-CR

the trial court's discretionary decision.                      We address them in

turn.

    ¶28   First, the record demonstrates the trial court gave

"both parties a full opportunity to explain their positions and

consider[ed]    alternatives    such       as    a    curative     instruction          or

sanctioning    counsel."       Moeck,      280       Wis. 2d 277,        ¶43     (citing

Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶36).                During the lunch recess, the

court   conferred    in    chambers     with         Green's    counsel        and     the

prosecutor to discuss the issues presented by Cousin's surprise

testimony.     The court then conducted a hearing to address the

State's concerns.

    ¶29   After     hearing    from    both       parties,       the     trial       court

identified     alternatives    to     mistrial.           Although        the        court

explicitly considered issuing a curative instruction or striking

Cousin's testimony, it explained why those remedies could not

"unring the bell":

    I don't know how I could possibly unring the bell. I
    can give them——I would have to tell them to disregard
    all that testimony completely.      Because there was
    nothing in there that wasn't Denny evidence.     There
    was nothing in there that didn't put him in the place
    of . . . Green on the day in question.

    . . . .

    Candidly it's impossible to unring that bell. I would
    have to tell the jury to completely ignore . . . 25
    minutes     of     pretty     compelling     testimony
    where . . . Cousin literally tries to take the fall
    for his cousin. . . . That would be impossible.

    . . . .

    And most importantly, I don't think there's any way
    that that bell can be unrung, because of the gravity
                                      15
                                                       No.   2021AP267-CR

      of the testimony, because of Denny evidence, because
      there were only three witnesses in this case, and
      clearly at this point in time only will be three
      witnesses, the victim——or alleged victim——[S.A.B.],
      the officer, and . . . Cousin.
The   record   establishes   the   court   carefully   considered    the

options for remedying the introduction of Denny evidence without

advance notice to the State or the court first ruling on its

admissibility.    The court declared a mistrial only after hearing

arguments of counsel and contemplating alternatives.         Given the

gravity and timing of Cousin's testimony, the court concluded
those remedies were inadequate.

      ¶30   Next, the trial court "accorded careful consideration

to [Green]'s interest in having the trial concluded in a single

proceeding."     Washington, 434 U.S. at 516.      The court did not

confine its analysis to Denny alone; it also acknowledged each

party's right to a fair trial:

      [B]oth sides have a right to a fair trial issue, and I
      think the State's basically saying they're literally
      caught by surprise with this testimony and the Denny
      aspect of it, which does change trial strategy
      potentially . . . .

      It would also be unfair to the State. Both sides have
      a right to a fair trial.   The defendant, . . . Green,
      has a right to a fair trial, and the State also has a
      right to a fair trial.
With each party's fair trial rights in mind, the court explained

at length its decision to order a mistrial and why it rejected a

curative instruction as insufficient.

      ¶31   The record also "reflects that there is an adequate

basis for a finding of manifest necessity" to order a mistrial.
Moeck, 280 Wis. 2d 277, ¶43.        As the trial court emphasized,

                                   16
                                                                No.   2021AP267-CR

Cousin   finished     testifying   "immediately        before    lunch."         The

court    considered    the   timing    of    Cousin's        testimony     to     be

impactful:

     [T]he timing of the evidence was——happened to be right
     before lunch, the jury's now had two hours to think
     about that evidence, and all of them, I hope they're
     following my rules and are not discussing the case.
     I'm sure they're not, but they're all probably
     thinking    in    their   head,    holy     cow,    that
     testimony . . . Cousin   just   gave,   that's——they're
     thinking one of two things, either, well, . . . Green
     is clearly innocent based on that testimony, or
     they're     thinking,     that's      utter      garbage
     that . . . Green got his cousin to cover for him and
     take the fall.
The court determined a mistrial was manifestly necessary because

the testimony and its timing precluded the effectiveness of a

curative    jury   instruction.       In    the   court's     estimation,        the

prolonged    break     immediately     following           Cousin's    testimony

unavoidably altered the jurors' take on the case and prejudiced

the State.     The court observed the jurors as Cousin delivered

what the court deemed "pretty compelling" testimony.                   Appellate

courts   cannot    weigh   the   credibility      of   a    witness   much      less
observe or gauge the jury's reaction to his testimony.                   Only the

trial court could assess the effect of the testimony on the

jury.    In this case, the record reflects an adequate basis for a

finding of manifest necessity to order a mistrial.

     ¶32    Lastly, the trial court considered the relevant facts,

based its conclusion on applicable law, and reasoned its way to

a rational conclusion.           See id.     After hearing each party's
arguments, the court concluded Cousin's testimony was "clearly"

                                      17
                                                                     No.     2021AP267-CR

Denny evidence because the defense offered third-party testimony

to   absolve     Green    of   any    wrongdoing.           The   record     shows      the

court's     consideration          of     Denny       and     its        applicability,

acknowledging factual nuances possibly distinguishing this case

from Denny:

      [Denny] certainly is a different situation.   That was
      a homicide case and the presentation of how that issue
      arose was different than this case.         But Denny
      discusses  motive   and  opportunity   and  presenting
      basically a——to the jury a plausible alternative——
      that's my language——as to who committed a crime, or a
      plausible theory of another person that committed a
      crime.
The court proceeded to summarize Cousin's testimony in detail,

concluding       its     "only       purpose"       was     "to     take     the        fall

for . . . Green[.]"            Before     ultimately         classifying         Cousin's

testimony as within Denny's scope, the court emphasized "I would

have needed [Cousin's testimony] to be vetted [a] bit more.                               I

would have wanted to hear more of an argument and briefing from

both sides as to the Denny issues.                  It strikes me as very, very

problematic[.]"        The court also noted it "is required to make a

ruling" on such evidence "before it comes out of a witness's

mouth during the middle of the trial."

      ¶33   Green      principally      argues      the   trial     court    based       its

decision    to    order    a     mistrial      on   an    error     of    law.         Green

emphasizes       the   court     "later     determined       that    Denny       did     not

preclude     this      evidence. . . .           If . . . Green           were     to     be

retried, a second jury could hear this same testimony.                                 Thus,
there was, in fact, no need to 'unring the bell.'"

                                          18
                                                                           No.        2021AP267-CR

      ¶34     The     court's       later         determination            on         Denny      is

irrelevant.         On review, we consider whether the court exercised

sound discretion.            At the time the court declared a mistrial,

the   court    believed       the     effect       on    the    jury       of        introducing

unnoticed     Denny     testimony      could       not    be    remedied             by   a    jury

instruction.           The    court     demonstrated           a      reasoning           process

grounded in the law.3

      ¶35     Adopting       "mechanical       rules,"         such       as        requiring     a

circuit court to halt a criminal jury trial and hold a full

evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of evidence the trial

court determined should have been considered before the trial

commenced, would be inconsistent with precedent.                                     The United

States    Supreme     Court     has   recognized         that       the    application           of

governing      principles       "to    any     particular           set        of     facts"     in

deciding whether to order a mistrial "entails an element of

judgment."      See Renico, 559 U.S. at 785.                       Although the circuit

court may have later determined Cousin's testimony was in fact

admissible, the court nonetheless grounded its mistrial order in
the law, as applied to the particular facts of the case.

      3Justice Brian Hagedorn claims the trial court "fail[ed] to
consider whether this evidence was admissible as an alternative
to ordering a mistrial[.]"     Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶75.
This statement oversimplifies the issue and does not apply the
legal test established in Perez, which requires "taking all the
circumstances into consideration" rather than hyper-focusing on
just one. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). The trial court
considered competing arguments regarding whether the testimony
was Denny evidence. It then reasoned the Denny issue needed to
be vetted ahead of time because the prejudice of "surprise" was
too great. See Justice Hagedorn's dissent, ¶74.

                                             19
                                                                    No.     2021AP267-CR

      ¶36   Although     this    court    in       Seefeldt      decided    the    trial

court erred in granting a mistrial in part because the trial

court had not assessed the admissibility of a witness' warrants,

261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶38, that type of evidence differs materially

from the Denny evidence introduced at trial in this case.                               As

the   State    argues,      determining        the       admissibility       of    Denny

evidence      could    require      an    evidentiary            hearing     involving

testimony from other witnesses.                Additionally, the trial court

said, "I would have wanted to hear more of an argument and

briefing      from     both     sides     as        to     the      Denny     issues."

Significantly, Seefeldt's holding was also based on the trial

court's failure to (1) afford the parties sufficient opportunity

to argue their positions; (2) take adequate time to consider the

parties' arguments; and (3) consider alternatives to mistrial.

Id.    Collectively,        those   failures        fell    short    of     showing     an

adequate    basis     for   a   finding       of    manifest      necessity       for   a

mistrial.     Id.     None of those failures are present in this case.

Seefeldt did not impose a rigid rule conditioning the propriety
of a mistrial on a threshold determination of admissibility of

the evidence triggering the order.                 Appellate courts must apply

a "flexible standard," under which they "take 'all circumstances

into account.'"        Somerville, 410 U.S. at 462 (quoting Wade v.

Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 691 (1949)).

      ¶37   After the trial court ordered a mistrial, Green filed

a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, which the court

denied.     Green filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
the State was not entitled to prior notice of the substance of
                                         20
                                                                  No.   2021AP267-CR

Cousin's testimony absent any demand for discovery by the State

or an applicable order in limine.                  The trial court declined to

reconsider its denial of Green's motion to dismiss, describing a

"culture" in the Milwaukee County court system of parties not

filing      discovery    demands    and        a   common   understanding    among

counsel that certain types of evidence will be disclosed before

trial regardless.

      ¶38 Green contends the State's pretrial motion in limine

was   not    operative   because,    so    far      as   the   record   shows,   the

pretrial court never ruled on the motion.                      This fact is also

irrelevant.      The trial judge rotated onto this case the morning

of trial, which was more than ninety days since the state filed

the motion in limine.        Supreme Court Rule 70.364 requires judges

to rule on all motions within ninety days of receiving them.

Under those circumstances, and with neither party requesting a

ruling on any pending motions, it was not unreasonable for Judge

Borowski to presume Judge Protasiewicz had granted the motion——

and that Green was prohibited from springing on the State an

      4   SCR 70.36(1)(a) provides:

      Every judge of a circuit court shall decide each
      matter submitted for decision within 90 days of the
      date on which the matter is submitted to the judge in
      final form, exclusive of the time the judge has been
      actually disabled by sickness.    If a judge is unable
      to do so, within 5 days of the expiration of the 90-
      day period the judge shall so certify in the record of
      the matter and notify in writing the chief judge of
      the judicial administrative district in which the
      matter is pending, and the period is thereupon
      extended for one additional period of 90 days.    This
      subsection applies to an assigned reserve judge.

                                          21
                                                                          No.       2021AP267-CR

alternative perpetrator of the crime.                          The trial court noted

that defense counsel "darn well knows that you can't spring a

witness on the State, especially a witness of this nature."

      ¶39      Green     also     contends      Denny     does    not    mandate       advance

notice to the State; therefore, he argues the trial court erred

in   concluding          Green    should       have    apprised    the       State     of    the

substance of Cousin's testimony before the trial.                               As the court

explained        during          the     hearing        on      Green's         motion       for

reconsideration,          however,       the    parties       seemed    to     be    operating

under    the    same      understanding          that    is    commonly       shared       among

attorneys practicing in the criminal court system in Milwaukee:

"I've seen similar situations, but even on my 17 years on the

bench, it's very, very rare that you have a situation like this

blow up in the middle of trial."                      Customarily, the court noted,

parties disclose all evidence before the trial commences:

      You know all of us know that the movie My Cousin Vinny
      was funny because of how ridiculous it was, and
      there's a point in there where the lead actor, the
      defense attorney, is like shocked that the State gave
      him all the evidence. Well, right, because that's how
      it works.
      Although in retrospect it is clear the State never made a

discovery demand for Cousin's statement and the pretrial court

never    ruled      on    the    State's       pretrial       motions    in     limine,      the

record      shows        defense       counsel        understood       there        were    some

constraints on the introduction of Denny evidence.                                  Instead of

arguing the absence of any rule or order prohibiting him from

introducing Denny evidence, defense counsel maintained Cousin's
testimony was not Denny evidence at all.                         Based on this record,

                                               22
                                                          No.    2021AP267-CR

it was neither irrational nor irresponsible for the trial court

to believe a pretrial order had been violated, particularly when

defense counsel did not disabuse the court of that notion.5

     ¶40    Green suggests the availability of retrials is limited

to only certain categories of errors.           In his response brief,

Green    surveys   a   number   of   double   jeopardy   cases    in   which

mistrials were granted without the defendants' consent based on

defense counsel misconduct, concluding:

     A review [of] these cases supports the generalization
     that retrial is allowed only in circumstances where
     either defense counsel's misconduct tainted the jury
     by introducing evidence which the jury never should
     have heard, e.g., Washington; or, the misconduct
     necessitated counsel being a witness, e.g., Fosse

     5  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent says this court
"allows the trial court to simply assume that a motion in limine
had been granted when the record contains no order or indication
that that is actually the case."    Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's
dissent, ¶56. Not so. The standard of review limits this court
to determining whether the trial court soundly exercised its
discretion, which "means acting in a rational and responsible
manner."   State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, ¶36, 261 Wis. 2d 383,
661 N.W.2d 822.    Under the particular circumstances of this
case, it was neither irrational nor irresponsible for the trial
judge, to whom the case was spun the morning of trial, to
presume pretrial orders prohibited Green from introducing
unnoticed testimony incriminating an alternative perpetrator of
the crime, particularly when defense counsel did not correct the
court's presumption.   Justice Ann Walsh Bradley also says the
court "lends its imprimatur to the trial court's treatment of
the State's motion in limine" and then accuses the court of "not
say[ing] on what basis a trial court can simply presume a motion
has been granted."   Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent, ¶¶64,
66.     Of course, neither of Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's
assertions is true.     We simply determine the trial court's
presumption was neither irrational nor unreasonable under the
circumstances surrounding the trial court's sound exercise of
its discretion, which we have explained in this opinion in great
detail.
                                     23
                                                                         No.     2021AP267-CR

      (defense counsel became witness); Duckett (prosecutor
      became witness).
Whatever     patterns       Green    may      observe,       mistrials         arise    in    a

multitude     of    situations       and      retrials       are   not    restricted         to

particular        case    scenarios.          See,    e.g.,     State     v.     Russo,      70

Wis. 2d 169, 171, 233 N.W.2d 485 (1975) (Double Jeopardy Clause

did not bar retrial of action dismissed after bench trial for

lack of jurisdiction because of defective information); State v.

Smith, 244 A.3d 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020) (mistrial

ordered     due    to    the     onset   of    the    COVID-19      pandemic);          United

States v. Garske, 939 F.3d 321 (1st Cir. 2019) (mistrial ordered

because a juror went missing); State v. Porter, 179 A.3d 1218,

1229 (R.I. 2018) (mistrial ordered because a spectator yelled

"How's    that?"        during    defense's        opening    argument);         Fields      v.

State, 626 A.2d 1037, 1043 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (mistrial

ordered because "a regrettable disagreement between the judge

and the prosecutor steadily escalated into an angry argument and

ultimately degenerated into a veritable shouting match of mutual

insults and displays of uncontrolled temper").
      ¶41    Most          mistrial            cases          "escape            meaningful

categorization[.]"             Somerville, 410 U.S. at 464.                    Because some

reasons     for     mistrials      dwell      in     those    "secluded         but     exotic

corner[s] of the double jeopardy garden," courts have declined

to adopt categorical rules defining manifest necessity.                                Fields,

626 A.2d at 1038 (quoting West v. State, 52 Md. App. 624, 625,

451 A.2d 1228 (1982)); Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480 ("[T]his Court has,
for   the    most        part,    explicitly         declined      the    invitation         of

                                              24
                                                                              No.     2021AP267-CR

litigants       to     formulate          rules         based       on      categories            of

circumstances         which     will       permit        or     preclude             retrial.").

Flexible rules ensure reviewing courts do not impede circuit

courts'     duty      to   protect         "the        integrity         of     the      trial."

Washington, 434 U.S. at 513.                      As the COVID-19 pandemic made

clear, a mistrial may be manifestly necessary in "varying and

often unique situations arising during the course of a criminal

trial."     See Somerville, 410 U.S. at 462.                        We therefore decline

to adopt any categorical rules governing the permissibility of

retrials.

                                    IV.    CONCLUSION

    ¶42     A     thorough      review     of     the    record      reveals          the    court

exercised    sound      discretion         in     ordering      a    mistrial          based      on

manifest    necessity.           The      court    responsibly           and        deliberately

considered the impact on the jury of third-party perpetrator

evidence, which the defense introduced without the court first

ruling on its admissibility.                The court gave both parties a full

opportunity to argue their positions, and took account of their
respective fair trial rights.                    Additionally, the court weighed

alternatives to a mistrial, including a curative instruction or

striking Cousin's testimony.                    After considering the facts of

record    under      relevant    law,      the     court      reasoned         its    way    to   a

rational    conclusion.             Although       a    different        judge         may   have

handled the matter differently, the standard of appellate review

compels     upholding         the      trial       court's          sound       exercise          of

discretion.       Accordingly, retrial will not violate Green's Fifth
Amendment right against double jeopardy.
                                             25
                                                          No.   2021AP267-CR

    By   the   Court.—The   decision   of   the   court   of    appeals   is

reversed.

                                  26
                                                   No.   2021AP267-CR.awb

    ¶43   ANN    WALSH   BRADLEY,   J.   (dissenting).    The   circuit

court declared a mistrial after Jonathan Cousin testified that

he, and not Mitchell Green, drove the victim to a hotel where

she was forced to perform a sex act.          In the circuit court's

view, this evidence was potentially inadmissible Denny1 evidence

that should not have been presented to the jury without prior

vetting by the court.

    ¶44   The circuit court stated that it was "impossible to

unring that bell," necessitating a mistrial.       Majority op., ¶15.

But ultimately, Cousin's testimony was found to be admissible in

any future trial.    In other words, there was no need to "unring"

any bells.    Still, the majority somehow concludes that the trial

court exercised sound discretion when it declared a mistrial.

    ¶45   The majority's reasoning is a headscratcher.           First,

it upholds the circuit court's declaration of a mistrial after

the jury heard admissible evidence.          But how can hearing 25

minutes of unobjected-to admissible evidence justify a mistrial?
    ¶46   And if that isn't perplexing enough, it then proceeds

to err by reading into the record an order that the trial court

never made.     Specifically, it premises its determination in part

    1  State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App.
1984).   "Denny 'created a bright line standard requiring that
three factors be present' for admissibility of evidence that an
alleged third-party perpetrator committed the crime."  State v.
Griffin, 2019 WI App 49, ¶7, 388 Wis. 2d 581, 933 N.W.2d 681.
Namely, the defendant must demonstrate a "legitimate tendency"
that the third party committed the crime, that is, that the
third party had motive, opportunity, and a direct connection to
the crime. Id., ¶7.

                                    1
                                                          No.   2021AP267-CR.awb

on a motion in limine that, the record reflects, had not been

ruled upon.      Yet the majority, without citing any authority,

forgives this gap in the record with the unwarranted leap that

"it was not unreasonable for Judge Borowski to presume Judge

Protasiewicz had granted the motion."           Id., ¶38.

      ¶47    The majority's hard-to-square conclusions expose Green

to double jeopardy,2 subjecting him to a second trial where the

evidence     presented     will    presumably    be   identical      to    that

presented in the first.           Its proffered reasoning should cause

the reader to pause and ponder how this can be so.                 Because it

certainly causes me to pause, I respectfully dissent.

                                      I

      ¶48    Green   was   charged   with   trafficking     a   child,3   among

other offenses.        In advance of trial, Green filed a witness

list, which contained the name Jonathan Cousin.                 Majority op.,

¶5.   Although Green possessed a written statement from Cousin,

the State did not demand that it be produced.          Id.

      ¶49    For its part, the State filed motions in limine prior
to trial.     One of those motions sought a ruling as follows:

      Prohibiting the defense from introducing any other-
      acts evidence involving a third-party perpetrator,
      unless and until defendant satisfies his burden and
      such evidence is ruled admissible by the court
      pursuant to State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 595
      N.W.2d 661 (1999), State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768,
      576 N.W.[2d] 30 (1998) and § 904.04(2) Stats.

      2   See U.S. Const. amend. V.
      3   Wis. Stat. § 948.051(1).

                                      2
                                                               No.    2021AP267-CR.awb

Nothing in the record indicates that the circuit court ever

ruled on this motion before the trial began.

       ¶50   At trial, Cousin took the stand and testified that it

was he, and not Green, who drove the victim to a hotel where she

was forced to engage in a sex act.                 Cousin claimed that he had

no knowledge regarding the purpose of the excursion, and that he

was "just doing it for the gas money."                Majority op., ¶11.           The

State did not object to Cousin's testimony as it occurred, and

proceeded to cross-examine him.

       ¶51   After Cousin's testimony concluded, the court recessed

for lunch and met in chambers with counsel for Green and the

State, as well as an attorney the court asked to advocate for

Cousin.      Id., ¶12.      The court indicated its concern that "Cousin

may have incriminated himself without counsel, and Green may

have   violated      Denny   by   presenting       Cousin's    testimony      without

notifying     the    State   in   advance     or    seeking    a     ruling   on   its

admissibility."       Id.

       ¶52   Ultimately, the circuit court determined that Cousin's
testimony      was    "clearly    Denny       evidence,"      as     the   testimony

presented someone else "taking the fall" for Green.                        Id., ¶13.

It rejected Green's argument that there wasn't "anything to fix"

and then turned to the question of remedy.                         In the circuit

court's estimation, it was "impossible to unring that bell" that

resulted from Cousin's testimony.                  Id., ¶15.       Accordingly, it

ordered a mistrial because it determined that Cousin's testimony

should not have been heard by the jury and that "it needed to be
vetted before trial."         Id., ¶16.

                                          3
                                                                      No.   2021AP267-CR.awb

    ¶53    Green subsequently moved to dismiss the case, arguing

that any retrial would violate his Fifth Amendment right against

double jeopardy.         The circuit court disagreed and denied the

motion, and Green sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal,

which the court of appeals granted.

    ¶54    The court of appeals reversed, disagreeing with the

circuit court on four points.               It determined:

          The     circuit      court       erred       by    failing       to    determine

           whether       Cousin's        testimony           was    admissible       before

           declaring a mistrial.                  State v. Green, No. 2021AP267-

           CR, unpublished slip op., ¶18 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 22,

           2022).

          At a later hearing, the circuit court determined that

           Cousin's      testimony          was    admissible         under       Denny,       so

           there was no need to "unring the bell" after Cousin

           testified.       Id., ¶19.

          The   State      had    an    opportunity          to   investigate        Cousin

           prior    to    trial       and    did     not      avail     itself      of    that
           opportunity.           Cousin was on Green's witness list five

           months before trial, and the State did not make any

           discovery demand.             Id., ¶20.           Relatedly, the motion in

           limine did not prohibit Cousin's testimony because it

           referenced only unknown-party and other-acts evidence,

           not known-party.           Id., ¶22.

          The question of whether Cousin should have had counsel

           before     his     testimony           did     not      create     a    manifest
           necessity      for     a     mistrial        because     any     remedy       for   a

                                             4
                                                               No.    2021AP267-CR.awb

               violation of Cousin's right to counsel would flow to

               Cousin, not to Green.             Id., ¶23.

Ultimately, a unanimous court of appeals concluded that "there

was not a manifest necessity justifying a mistrial, and that a

new    trial       would   violate    Green's      constitutional     right          against

double jeopardy."            Id., ¶25.

       ¶55     The    majority       now    reverses    the   court       of     appeals,

determining that the circuit court "exercised sound discretion

in ordering a mistrial based on manifest necessity."                            Majority

op., ¶42.

                                             II

       ¶56     The root of the majority's error boils down to two

main    missteps.          First,     the    majority     discounts       the    clearly

relevant fact that that Cousin's testimony was ultimately deemed

to be admissible.             And second, without providing authority for

doing so, it allows the trial court to simply assume that a

motion in limine had been granted when the record contains no

order or indication that that is actually the case.                                  I will
address each of these errors in turn.

                                             A

       ¶57     A    motion    for    mistrial      is   committed     to       the    sound

discretion of the circuit court and is reviewed for an erroneous

exercise of discretion.               State v. Ford, 2007 WI 138, ¶28, 306

Wis. 2d 1,          742    N.W.2d 61.            This   standard     is        admittedly

deferential to the circuit court.                  See State v. LaCount, 2008 WI

59, ¶15, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780.

                                             5
                                                                    No.   2021AP267-CR.awb

    ¶58      Nevertheless, a mistrial is a drastic remedy that must

be supported by "manifest necessity."                       "[G]iven the importance

of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, the

State bears the burden of demonstrating a 'manifest necessity'

for any mistrial ordered over the objection of the defendant."

State   v.    Seefeldt,      2003    WI     47,      ¶19,    261    Wis. 2d 383,         661

N.W.2d 822.         A    "manifest    necessity"        is     a    "high    degree"     of

necessity.        Id. (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505

(1978); State v. Barthels, 174 Wis. 2d 173, 183, 495 N.W.2d 341

(1993)).

    ¶59      The majority determines that the trial court exercised

sound discretion in declaring a mistrial because "[a]t the time

the court declared a mistrial, the court believed the effect on

the jury of introducing unnoticed Denny testimony could not be

remedied by a jury instruction."                  Majority op., ¶34.             It claims

that "[a]dopting 'mechanical rules' such as requiring a circuit

court to halt a criminal jury trial and hold a full evidentiary

hearing      on    the   admissibility          of   evidence       the     trial    court
determined        should    have     been       considered         before    the     trial

commenced, would be inconsistent with precedent."                         Id., ¶35.      In

arriving at this conclusion, the majority seeks to distinguish

Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, from the present case.                                But this

distinction falls flat and Seefeldt cuts the other way.

    ¶60      In    Seefeldt,   the    circuit        court     declared      a    mistrial

after   defense      counsel   discussed          other      acts    evidence       in   the

opening statement in violation of a pretrial order prohibiting
the introduction of such evidence without first seeking a ruling

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                                                                  No.    2021AP267-CR.awb

on its admissibility.       Id., ¶6.       This court determined that the

circuit court was too hasty in granting a mistrial and did not

exercise sound discretion for two reasons.                  It reasoned that the

testimony likely would have ultimately been admissible and that

alternatives      to   mistrial   were     not    sufficiently             considered.

Specifically, this court concluded:

      First, the existence of Bart's 15 warrants would
      likely have been admissible during trial and the
      record does not reflect that the judge considered
      whether the evidence would ultimately be admissible.
      Second, the trial judge did not provide sufficient
      opportunity for the parties to present, and for the
      judge to consider, arguments regarding whether a
      mistrial   should   be   ordered and  the   possible
      alternatives to a mistrial.
Id., ¶38.

      ¶61   In the eyes of the majority, "[n]one of those failures

are present in this case."         Majority op., ¶36.                   I disagree and

conclude that Seefeldt is on all fours with the present case.

To explain, just as in Seefeldt, the circuit court here did not

consider during trial whether the evidence would ultimately be

admissible.      It essentially said that answering such a question

during the trial was not possible, and that it would have asked

for additional briefing on the subject, which was not practical

in the middle      of a trial.       And like in             Seefeldt, here the

evidence was ultimately determined to be admissible.

      ¶62   In other words, the jury was not tainted by Cousin's

testimony   at    all.     The    evidence       it       heard    was     proper    and

admissible.      For this reason, like in Seefeldt "the record does
not   contain     an   adequate   basis     for       a    finding        of   manifest

necessity."      See Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶38.
                                       7
                                                                        No.    2021AP267-CR.awb

      ¶63     I     recognize        that     the       circuit        court     was        in     a

challenging position.                Would it have been difficult for the

circuit court to determine admissibility on a short timeline?

Perhaps.          But it was certainly possible to reach at least a

preliminary        determination        of    likely       admissibility.              And       the

constitutional        protections        against         double       jeopardy       create        a

strong    enough      interest4      that     the       court    should       have     at   least

tried.5

                                              B

      ¶64     Compounding         its       error,       the      majority        lends          its

imprimatur to the trial court's treatment of the State's motion

in   limine.        The    trial     court     treated          the   motion      as    granted

despite nothing in the record indicating that the pretrial court

had decided the motion one way or the other.

      ¶65     The majority rejects Green's argument that the motion

in   limine       filed   by   the    State       was    not    operative       because          the

record does not demonstrate that the circuit court ruled on the

motion.       "Under      those      circumstances,         and       with    neither       party

      4See State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 675-76, 360
N.W.2d 43 (1985) (describing the underlying idea behind the
double jeopardy clause that "the State with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense" and stating that
the clause "assures finality and fairness in the administration
of the criminal justice system").
      5 The procedure for which I advocate here is not uncommon.
Trials are often halted so legal issues can be argued outside
the presence of the jury, sometimes accompanied by proffered
witness testimony in the form of an offer of proof.      A Denny
hearing in the circumstances presented here could have been
brief and routine.

                                              8
                                                                No.   2021AP267-CR.awb

requesting     a    ruling     on    any       pending    motions,     it    was    not

unreasonable for Judge Borowski to presume Judge Protasiewicz

had granted the motion . . . ."                Majority op., ¶38.        Such a line

of    reasoning     is   unsupported       by    authority      and   requires      the

majority to read into the record information that simply isn't

there.

       ¶66   Further, the majority does not say on what basis a

trial court can simply presume a motion has been granted.                            It

cites no authority that would allow it to conclude that the

circuit court was not "unreasonable" in assuming a motion had

been granted where nothing in the record indicates that this was

the case.     Our review is limited to the record, and we are bound

by the record.           State v. Aderhold, 91 Wis. 2d 306, 314, 284

N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1979).                No "presumption" can get around

this precept.

       ¶67   Many questions are raised by the majority's approach.

How far does this rule extend?                 What other motions can a judge

simply "presume" were granted by another judge?                       Would it have
been    similarly    "not    unreasonable"         if    the   circuit      court   had

presumed that the motion was denied?                     It may be true that the

State's motions in limine in a criminal trial are often rote and

are    generally    granted.        But    there    is    no   indication     in    this

                                           9
                                                              No.   2021AP267-CR.awb

record that it was here, leading the majority to simply read

something into the record that is not there.6

       ¶68    The   State's    argument    on    this   point   plays       into   its

larger insinuation that it was taken by surprise by Cousin's

testimony.      But if it was indeed caught off guard, it was in the

end no one's fault but its own.                 Cousin's name was on Green's

witness list, and a written statement existed, which the State

never demanded in discovery.             The State further allowed Cousin's

initial testimony to pass without objection and completed its

cross-examination before voicing any concern.                 See majority op.,

¶11.       Even then, the State did not actually request a mistrial,

arguing only that the "solution was best left to the 'sound

discretion' of the court."         Id., ¶14.

       ¶69    Under the circumstances here, a mistrial was not the

only solution.       And it certainly was not a manifest necessity.

       ¶70    The   double    jeopardy    clause    demands     that   "the    State

with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make

repeated      attempts   to    convict     an    individual     for    an    alleged

       Even if the motion in limine were operative, the language
       6

of that motion does not necessarily preclude the admission of
Cousin's testimony.    Rather than citing Denny, the motion in
limine cited State v. Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285, 595 N.W.2d 661
(1999).    As the court of appeals here recognized, Scheidell
addressed unknown-third-party evidence, not known-third-party
evidence, which is governed by Denny.       State v. Green, No.
2021AP267-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶22 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 22,
2022). The Scheidell court was explicit that "Denny simply does
not apply" to evidence of allegedly similar crimes committed by
an unknown third party.    Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d at 297.  There
is thus no apparent overlap between Denny and Scheidell such
that a citation to Scheidell in the motion in limine would
somehow encompass Denny evidence.

                                          10
                                               No.   2021AP267-CR.awb

offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and

ordeal compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety

and insecurity."   State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 107-08,

369 N.W.2d 145 (1985).    By allowing Green to be retried under

these facts, the majority erodes the manifest necessity standard

and conducts an end run around the protections afforded by the

double jeopardy clause.

    ¶71   For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

    ¶72   I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK

DALLET joins this dissent.

                               11
                                                                      No.    2021AP267-CR.bh

       ¶73      BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.            (dissenting).           Our review of a

circuit         court's      decision       granting       a      mistrial         over     the

defendant's objection is generally deferential, but far less so

than       in   other     areas    where     we     consider       whether     the        court

erroneously exercised its discretion.                       See Oregon v. Kennedy,

456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982); State v. Seefeldt, 2003 WI 47, ¶¶35-

37,    261      Wis. 2d 383,       661     N.W.2d 822.            This    is   because        a

defendant's constitutional rights are at stake when a mistrial

is ordered.        Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 671-72 (discussing U.S. Const.

amend. V).        So the law is that a circuit court should not order

a    mistrial      unless     a    manifest       necessity      is   shown,       which     is

defined as a high degree of necessity.                          Arizona v. Washington,

434 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1978); Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶19.                                 As

part       of   this    judgment    call,     a    circuit       court      must    consider

alternatives to a mistrial.                Seefeldt, 261 Wis. 2d 383, ¶38.                   If

it    does      not,    it   has    not    applied        the    proper     law     and     has

erroneously exercised its discretion.                     See id.

       ¶74      This is a close case, but ultimately I conclude the
circuit court erred.               The heart of the matter is that Denny1

evidence was introduced that caught the prosecutor and the court

by surprise.           The circuit court determined this was too much of

a    surprise     because     these       issues    are    usually       resolved     before

trial.

       ¶75      The problem with the circuit court's decision is that

it did not consider an obvious and highly relevant alternative

       1   State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App.
1984).

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                                                                    No.   2021AP267-CR.bh

to mistrial:       the possibility that the evidence might actually

be admissible.       As Justice Ann Walsh Bradley points out in her

dissent,    we    have   the   odd   circumstance          of   a     mistrial    being

declared    due    to    the   introduction        of    evidence         later   deemed

admissible.       This seems discordant with the command that a court

should order a mistrial only "with the greatest caution, under

urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes."

United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).

While I do not want to supplant the broad discretion given to

circuit courts, I conclude that by failing to consider whether

this evidence was admissible as an alternative to ordering a

mistrial,    the    circuit     court      did    not    reasonably         conclude   a

mistrial    was    necessary.        For       these    reasons,      I   respectfully

dissent.

    ¶76     I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK

DALLET joins this dissent.

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    No.   2021AP267-CR.bh

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