Court Opinion

ID: 9375037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 18:01:03.077514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:55.204171
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-2094     Document: 010110817488      Date Filed: 02/24/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        February 24, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  RICHARD RALPH MARTINEZ,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 22-2094
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-00722-JB-LF)
  MICHELLE L. GRISHAM; MELANIE                                 (D. N.M.)
  MARTINEZ; ROBERTA COHEN,

        Defendants - Appellees.

                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Richard Ralph Martinez appeals the sua sponte dismissal by the United States

 District Court for the District of New Mexico of his complaint, brought under 42

 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that three New Mexico officials violated his constitutional

 rights by keeping him on parole for 13 years when state law mandated that he be

 discharged after two. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-2094    Document: 010110817488        Date Filed: 02/24/2023    Page: 2

 Under any of the state laws that possibly govern Mr. Martinez’s parole, that parole

 had no maximum term or mandatory discharge date; therefore, Mr. Martinez fails to

 state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

       On January 10, 1980, Mr. Martinez was charged with committing first-degree

 murder, a capital felony, on or about December 31, 1979. See N.M. Stat. Ann.

 § 30-2-1(A) (1978) (“Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a

 capital felony.”). A jury convicted him of that crime, and on May 22, 1980, he was

 sentenced to life imprisonment. Following several periods of parole and

 reincarceration, Mr. Martinez was paroled to New York on December 21, 2006; he

 was issued a certificate of discharge from that parole in March 2019.

       In July 2020, Mr. Martinez brought this suit in federal court. He alleged that

 by keeping him illegally on parole after state law “mandat[ed] discharge of [his]

 parole,” the officials violated his rights under the Eighth, Eleventh,1 Thirteenth, and

 Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. R. at 6. He sought

 damages of $10 million from each defendant.

       Because Mr. Martinez proceeded in forma pauperis, see Martinez v. Grisham,

 No. CIV 20-0722 JB/LF, 2022 WL 3019545, at *1 (D.N.M. July 29, 2022), the

       1
          Mr. Martinez does not specify the basis for his Eleventh Amendment claim,
 either in his complaint or on appeal. His complaint quotes Article I, § 11 of the New
 York State Constitution, labeling it the “Eleventh Amendment to the United States
 Constitution.” R. at 5. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
 bars suits against a nonconsenting state. See Williams v. Utah Dep’t of Corr.,
 928 F.3d 1209, 1212 (10th Cir. 2019). It does not provide a basis for Mr. Martinez’s
 claim that New Mexico officials violated his constitutional rights.
                                            2
Appellate Case: 22-2094     Document: 010110817488         Date Filed: 02/24/2023     Page: 3

 district court sua sponte considered whether he had failed to state a claim on which

 relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (for in forma pauperis

 actions “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . .

 the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted”). It

 determined that Mr. Martinez had failed to state a claim and dismissed the case

 without prejudice under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Martinez, 2022 WL 3019545,

 at *13–14.

        On appeal Mr. Martinez makes only one argument on the merits: that the

 district court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. “Like

 dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), we review de novo a district court’s sua sponte

 dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) in an in forma pauperis proceeding.”

 Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009). “Dismissal under

 Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the complaint alone is legally insufficient to state a

 claim.” Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1299 (10th Cir. 2019).

        We make two preliminary observations. First, all of Mr. Martinez’s

 constitutional claims are predicated on his contention that New Mexico law mandated

 that he be discharged from parole after a certain number of years. He does not allege

 that the State’s parole-discharge law is itself unconstitutional. Second, we note, as

 did the district court, that the provision of New Mexico law stipulating that an inmate

 “shall be required to undergo a two-year period of parole” applies only to non-capital

 felons. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-10(D) (1978); 1977 N.M. Laws Ch. 216, § 12(C); see

 also Martinez, 2022 WL 3019545, at *11–13. But, as we have explained, the district

                                              3
Appellate Case: 22-2094     Document: 010110817488          Date Filed: 02/24/2023       Page: 4

 court properly ruled that Mr. Martinez was convicted of a capital felony, see

 Martinez, 2022 WL 3019545, at *13, and Mr. Martinez does not contest this ruling.

 He merely argues in the alternative before this court that his parole should have

 lasted only five years, which is the minimum (but not the maximum) term of parole

 for a capital felon. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-10(B) (1978); 1980 N.M. Laws,

 Ch. 28, § 1(B); 1977 N.M. Laws Ch. 216, § 12(B).

       It is not clear which parole law governing capital felons applies to Mr.

 Martinez. But under any of New Mexico’s parole laws in place from 1955 through

 the present, Mr. Martinez’s parole had no maximum term or mandatory discharge

 date. Beginning in 1955, New Mexico law provided that for any conviction:

       The period served on parole shall be deemed service of the time of
       imprisonment, and . . . the total time served may not exceed the maximum
       term or sentence. When a prisoner on parole has performed the obligations
       of his release for such time as shall satisfy the [parole] board that his final
       release is not incompatible with his welfare and that of society, the board
       may make a final order of discharge and issue a certificate of discharge to
       the prisoner; but no such order of discharge shall be made in any case
       within a period of less than one year after the date of release except where
       the sentence expires earlier thereto.
 1955 N.M. Laws, Ch. 232, § 19 (emphasis added) (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann.

 § 41-17-30 (1953) (2d Repl. Vol. 6 1972) (recodified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-16

 (1978) (Original Pamph. 1978) (repealed 1979)). Under this statute there was no limit

 on parole for someone sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1977 the state legislature

 passed two conflicting parole laws. One law, Chapter 216, repealed the 1955 law’s

 discharge provision. See 1977 N.M. Laws, Ch. 216, § 17 (repealing “Laws 1955,

 Chapter 232, Section 19”) (effective July 1, 1979); see also N.M. Stat. Ann.

                                              4
Appellate Case: 22-2094     Document: 010110817488        Date Filed: 02/24/2023     Page: 5

 § 31-21-16 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (“Repealed by L. 1977, Ch. 216 § 17.”). In its place it

 provided, as relevant to Mr. Martinez, “Unless the board finds that it is in the best

 interest of society and the parolee to reduce the period of parole, a person who was

 convicted of a capital felony shall be required to undergo a minimum period of parole

 of five years”; but it did not specify a maximum parole term. 1977 N.M. Laws,

 Ch. 216, § 12(B). The second law, Chapter 217, amended part of the 1955 law but

 not the discharge provision quoted above. See 1977 N.M. Laws, Ch. 217 (effective

 June 21, 1977, see Skidgel v. Hatch, 301 P.3d 854, 856 (N.M. 2013)); N.M. Stat.

 Ann. § 31-21-16 (1978) (Original Pamph. 1978) (1955 law’s discharge provision

 remains codified in 1978). In February 1980, presumably to resolve this

 contradiction, the legislature passed a new parole-discharge law; it adopted,

 verbatim, the provision from Chapter 216 providing that a capital felon like Mr.

 Martinez must “undergo a minimum period of parole of five years.” 1980 N.M.

 Laws, Ch. 28, § 1(B). Current New Mexico law provides essentially the same:

 “Unless the board finds that it is in the best interest of society and the parolee to

 reduce the period of parole, a person who was sentenced to life imprisonment shall be

 required to undergo a minimum period of parole of five years.” N.M. Stat. Ann.

 § 31-21-10(B) (1978).

        We need not decide which law governs Mr. Martinez’s parole. Because all

 possibly applicable New Mexico laws do not mandate a parole-discharge date, Mr.

 Martinez’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

                                             5
Appellate Case: 22-2094    Document: 010110817488        Date Filed: 02/24/2023       Page: 6

       Mr. Martinez also makes two procedural arguments. First, he contends that the

 district court “erroneously made a judgment ruling on appellant’s civil action only in

 an official capacity, failing to make a judgment in their individual capacity.” Aplt.

 Br. at 8–9.2 But this contention is factually incorrect. The district court assumed that

 Mr. Martinez brought his complaint against the officials in their individual capacities.

 See Martinez, 2022 WL 3019545, at *3 (applying law governing “a § 1983 action

 against a government agent in their individual capacity”).

       Second, Mr. Martinez argues that the defendants’ failure to respond to his

 complaint violates New Mexico and federal law. See Aplt. Br. at 9. But this argument

 ignores a district court’s screening function under the in forma pauperis statute.

 Because the court dismissed Mr. Martinez’s complaint sua sponte, the defendants

 were not required to file a response. And we have previously held that “sua sponte

 dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports

 with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.” Curley v.

 Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001).

       We AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Harris L Hartz
                                             Circuit Judge

       2
         Because Mr. Martinez’s appellate brief is inconsistently paginated, we refer
 to the pagination introduced by the Tenth Circuit clerk’s office.
                                             6