Court Opinion

ID: 9481571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:24:16.694076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:25.791222
License: Public Domain

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
I concur and write separately to emphasize the narrowness of this decision.
The majority has stated:
*1421Our finding of materiality ... turns on the evidence that defendant’s false statements had the tendency to influence or were capable of influencing an EPA enforcement action.
Majority op. at 1417. This statement is correct under the facts of this case; however, this statement should not be construed as holding that influencing “enforcement action” is the exclusive basis for finding materiality.
This Circuit long ago enunciated a clear and straightforward test of materiality. In Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118 (10th Cir.1960), we stated:
[I]n determining whether a false statement is material, the test is whether it “has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination required to be made.”
Id. at 120.
As noted by the majority, the misstatements included in Brittain’s falsified discharge monitoring reports were capable of influencing EPA enforcement decisions and were therefore material. Looking at the Clean Water Act and the applicable regulations, we find other examples showing that agency determinations may also depend on the accuracy of the information contained in the discharge monitoring reports, such as certain permit decision (40 CFR §§ 122.-41(a) and 122.62) and the establishment of pretreatment requirements (40 CFR Part 403). Even to the extent these determinations are not “enforcement” oriented, upon proper proof, they may provide a basis for a finding of materiality. Many fact patterns could be presented wherein a false statement could be capable of influencing required agency determination yet not be “enforcement” oriented.