Court Opinion

ID: 9729619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:44:56.933223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.154539
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JIGANTI, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion that grants the plaintiff a new trial on the issue of damages only. I believe it was error for this court to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial on the issues of liability and damages. The issue of a new trial on damages only was not an issue raised in this court by the parties. Furthermore, even in considering this issue, I believe the court was in error. The manner in which the issue of a new trial on damages only arises is interesting and will be related. The plaintiff filed a post-trial motion requesting alternative forms of relief. The plaintiff asked for a new trial on the issue of damages or in the alternative for a new trial on both liability and damages. The motion specifically stated that the new trial should be limited to damages only “unless this Court finds evidence of a compromise verdict.” In that event the plaintiff asked for a new trial on both liability and damages. The court made just that finding, that this was a compromise verdict. It accordingly granted a new trial on both liability and damages. The defendant sought leave to appeal under Supreme Court Rule 306, and leave was granted. The plaintiff had the right to raise the denial of its request for a new trial on damages only. Apparently recognizing that the trial court was within its discretion in finding that this was a compromise verdict, it made no argument in its briefs concerning a new trial on damages only. It did not request that this court grant a new trial on damages only. The plaintiff’s specific request was that the order of the trial court be affirmed because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial. The issue for a new trial on damages only arose during oral argument by way of a question by one of the judges in the majority. That judge asked if the plaintiff was seeking a new trial on both liability as well as damages. Counsel responded that the trial judge denied the request for a new trial on damages only because liability was intertwined with the damages issue. Counsel commented that this was a compromise and that the cases clearly hold that the trial court can grant a new trial where there is a compromise. Later on in oral argument, the other member of the majority asked whether counsel was asking for a new trial on damages and liability or on damages only. Counsel candidly responded that a new trial could be ordered on damages only, but that the issue before this court was the propriety of the trial judge’s order which ordered a new trial on both liability and damages. Counsel stated it would be “disingenuous at this point for me to say to you we’d like a new trial on damages only when Judge Lore’s order is really what’s on appeal here *** that order said new trial on all issues.” Both counsel on appeal were especially good lawyers. I believe it is inappropriate for this court to grant relief that was neither argued not requested. It is particularly unfair to the defendant, who had no chance to respond to this court’s argument that a new trial should be granted on damages only. I further believe that the majority erroneously applied the law in this case. In Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse (1956), 10 Ill. 2d 28, 45, 139 N.E.2d 275, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue of the propriety of a new trial on the issue of damages only. The court there stated that a trial court is not justified in ordering a new trial on the issue of damages alone where it appears that the damages awarded by the jury were the result of a compromise on the question of liability. Compromise is described as being a situation where jurors bargained inadequate damages for unjustified liability. Without belaboring the evidence as recited in the majority opinion, I believe that the trial court’s conclusion that the jury rendered a compromise verdict is amply supported and therefore the discretion vested in the trial court must be acceded to since there was no clear abuse of that discretion. Ramseyer v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1969), 110 Ill. App. 2d 95, 249 N.E.2d 120.