Court Opinion

ID: 9566604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:41:14.483245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:38.078172
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
Counsel for the. plaintiff in error tendered to the court a second motion for rehearing, which disclosed that this court in its original opinion had failed to state the principles of law which control the decision of this court with sufficient clarity for the very able and astute counsel for the plaintiff in error to determine the basis of the decision. The court accordingly feels that the opinion will be more clearly elucidated by this appendage on the second motion to rehear, which, while not sufficient to convince counsel for plaintiff in error of its correctness, will yet clearly state the ruling of the court on the issues raised in the original record and again insisted upon in the second motion to rehear.
In ground 1 of the second motion, plaintiff in error “contends that Code [Ann.] § 81-1506 and Code § 46-105 should determine when defensive pleadings in garnishment cases should be filed.” The court, applying Code § 46-105, held that the last day when the garnishee could file its answer without being in default was on July 21, 1958. Plaintiff in error complains, however, because this court held that a default judgment entered on July 22, 1958, before the expiration of the 15-day period when the ease might have been opened as a. matter of right, was subject to be set aside. Plaintiff in error contends that Chapter 46-1 of the Code, which deals with default judgments, is a part of the pleading act of 1946 and should not be applied to “special statutory proceedings” under Code (Ann.) § 81-1506. This court is of the opinion that, after a case has been reduced to final judgment, the law as to final judgments applies to it regardless of what kind of case it is, and when a default judgment is sought to be set aside -the law of default judgments applies, and that the law of default judgments is neither a “special statutory -proceeding” within the meaning of the Practice and Pleading Act nor is the default judgment itself changed into- something else because the action, before it was reduced to judgment, was a *276special statutory proceeding. All of the law as to default judgments, except a part of one Code section inapplicable here, was repealed in its entirety by the Act of 1946. Unless the law of default judgments applies to this default judgment, it might be said that there is no such thing as a default judgment in this case, and no law would be applicable thereto. This was obviously not the intention of the legislature.
In ground 2 the plaintiff in error contends that this court misconstrued Peacock v. Walker, 213 Ga. 629, supra, citing the following: “If a party have a good defence at law, and from negligence fail to set it up at the proper time, he must take the consequences of his own laches; he cannot gO' into equity to be relieved from the consequences of his own negligence.” That was an equity case where, a default judgment in a garnishment proceeding having been entered against the garnishee, it sought in equity to reopen the judgment by independent suit for that purpose. The terms of the City Court of Blackshear where that action was filed are quarterly, on the fourth Mondays of February, May, August, and November. The record shows that the garnishment was filed August 2nd, 1956, at the May term “returnable to the August term, 1956”, according to the allegations of the petition, and the Peacock case specifically points out that “since a judgment by default could not be entered at the return term” it would be presumed it was entered at a subsequent term, the petition failing to allege when the default judgment was entered. The subsequent terms commenced on November 26, 1956, February 25, 1957, and May 26, 1957, and the equitable petition was filed on June 18, 1957. If the motion in this case had been made from one to three terms after the default teim, the judgment of this court would certainly be different, but in this case the motion to set aside was made within 15 days of the judgment, which is a period given to the defendant to open such a judgment as a matter of right. It will be observed that the law of default judgments was applied in the Peacock case in order to determine the term of court at which the judgment might properly have been entered, since the equitable petition to set aside failed to allege when, in fact, it was entered.
Burger v. Dobbs, 87 Ga. App. 88 (73 S. E. 2d 75), holds *277merely that on a motion to reopen after final judgment the provisions of Code (Ann.) § 110-404, which apply only befm'e judgment is entered, do not affect the case. Code (Ann.) § 110-404 was not applied here.
Division 3, like division 1, contends that the law of default judgments should not be applied in this case because a garnishment case is a purely statutory proceeding, citing Anderson v. Ledbetter-Johnson, 62 Ga. App. 732 (2) (9 S. E. 2d 860). As above pointed out, when the suit is reduced to judgment, then oh a motion to set aside the judgment, the law of judgments applies, regardless of the initial character of the suit.
Ground 4 contends that because the summons of garnishment required the defendant to appear “on the 5th day of May, 1958” that this had the effect of constituting May 5, as the appearance day in the case. Examination of the record shows that the summons of garnishment was filed on February 26, 1958, and the bill of exceptions recites said summons was “returnable to the May term.” The first day of the May term was May 5, 1958. Under the ruling in the Peacock case, supra, no judgment could have been entered on that day or at that term of court.
This court did not, as contended in ground 5, pass upon any judgment of the trial court as to the merits of this case. So far as this record shows, the court has not yet acted on the motion to set aside the judgment. This case is here on the overruling of demurrers to the motion to set aside the judgment and on a motion to dismiss the motion to set aside. All that this opinion holds, or can hold, is that this motion is not fatally defective as a matter of law.
Ground 6 appears to complain on the basis that the demurrers to the motion to set aside the judgment should have been sustained because the motion does not denominate itself as a motion to set aside a default judgment. All that this court is deciding at this time is that the facts and allegations in the record show the judgment to have been a default judgment prematurely entered, and that a general demurrer will not lie to a proper motion to set such a judgment aside.
In ground 7 the defendant again contends that the court *278cannot set aside a judgment for a-defect not on- the face of the record. The motion in this case was made before the judgment became final, at the same term of court, and within the time limited for motions for a new trial. In such cases, where jury-verdicts are not involved, the court has plenary power to revise, vacate, or modify such a judgment. Maxwell v. Cofer, 201 Ga. 222 (39 S. E. 2d 314); Shivers v. Shivers, 206 Ga. 552 (57 S. E. 2d 660); Tyler v. Eubanks, 207 Ga. 46 (60 S. E. 2d 130); Hunter v. Gillespie, 207 Ga. 574 (63 S. E. 2d 404); Williams v. Lawler Hosiery Mills, 212 Ga. 617 (94 S. E. 2d 699).
Ground 8 reiterates the argument advanced in ground 1, and is without merit for the same reason.