Court Opinion

ID: 9433430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:40:10.975877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:41.407910
License: Public Domain

*97Justice Kennedy
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion,
in which The Chief Justice, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg join.
In consequence of life’s two certainties a decedent’s estate faced federal estate tax deficiencies, giving rise to this case. The issue is whether the amount of the estate tax deduction for marital or charitable bequests must be reduced to the extent administration expenses were paid from income generated during administration by assets allocated to those bequests.
I
The estate of Otis C. Hubert was substantial, valued at more than $30 million when he died. Considerable probate and civil litigation ensued soon after his death. The parties to the various proceedings included his wife and children; his nephew; one of the estate’s coexecutors, Citizens and Southern Trust Company (Georgia), N. A., the predecessor of respondent C & S Sovran Trust Company (Georgia), N. A.; the district attorney for Cobb County, Georgia, on behalf of certain charitable beneficiaries; and the Georgia State Revenue Commission. Hubert had made various wills and codicils, and the legal disputes for the most part concerned the distribution of estate assets; but they were not confined to this. In addition to will contests alleging fraud and undue influence, there were satellite civil suits including claims of slander and abuse of process. The principal proceedings were in the Probate and the Superior Courts of Cobb County, Georgia.
The estate attracted the attention of petitioner, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The executors filed the federal estate tax return in 1987, about a year after Hubert died. In 1990, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency, claiming underreporting of federal estate tax liability by some $14 million. The Commissioner’s major challenge then was to the estate’s claimed entitlement to two deduc*98tions. One was the marital deduction, under 68A Stat. 392, as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 2056, for qualifying property passing from a decedent to the surviving spouse. The other was the charitable deduction, under §2055, for qualifying property passing from a decedent to a charity. The Commissioner’s notice of deficiency asserted, for reasons not relevant here, that the property passing to Hubert’s surviving wife and to charity did not qualify for the marital and charitable deductions. The estate petitioned the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.
Within days of the estate’s petition in the Tax Court, much of the other litigation surrounding the estate settled. The settlement agreement divided the estate’s residue principal between a marital and a charitable share, which we can assume for purposes of our discussion were worth a total of $26 million on the day Hubert died. The settlement agreement divided the $26 million principal about half to trusts for the surviving spouse and half to a trust for the charities. The Commissioner stipulated that the nature of the trusts did not prevent them from qualifying for the marital and charitable deductions. The stipulation streamlined the Tax Court litigation but did not resolve it.
The settlement agreement provided that the estate would pay its administration expenses either from the principal or from the income of the assets that would comprise the residue and the corpus of the trusts, preserving the discretion Hubert’s most recent will had given his executors to apportion administration expenses. The apportionment provisions of the agreement and the will were consistent for all relevant purposes with the law of Georgia, the State where the decedent resided. The estate’s administration expenses, including attorney’s fees, were on the order of $2 million. The estate paid about $500,000 in expenses from principal and the rest from income.
The estate recalculated its estate tax liability based on the settlement agreement and the payments from principal. *99The estate did not include in its marital and charitable deductions the amount of residue principal used to pay administration expenses. The parties here have agreed throughout that the marital or charitable deductions could not include those amounts. The estate, however, did not reduce its marital or charitable deductions by the amount of the income used to pay the balance of the administration expenses. The Commissioner disagreed and contended that use of income for this purpose required a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the amounts of the marital and charitable deductions.
In a reviewed opinion, the Tax Court, with two judges concurring in part and dissenting in part, rejected the Commissioner’s position. 101 T. C. 314 (1993). The court noted it had resolved the same issue against the Commissioner in Estate of Street v. Commissioner, 56 TCM 774, 57 TCM 2851 (1988), ¶ 88,553 P-H Memo TC. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had reversed this aspect of Estate of Street, see 974 F. 2d 723, 727-729 (1992), but in the instant case the Tax Court adhered to its view and said, given all the circumstances here, no reduction was required by reason of the executors’ power, or the exercise of their power, to pay administration expenses from income. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, adopting the latter’s opinion and noting the resulting conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Street and with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Burke v. United States, 994 F. 2d 1576, cert. denied, 510 U. S. 990 (1993). See 63 F. 3d 1083, 1084-1085 (CA11 1995). We granted certiorari, 517 U. S. 1166 (1996), and, in agreement with the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, we now affirm the judgment.
II
A necessary first step in calculating the taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes is to determine the property in-*100eluded in the gross estate, and its value. Though an alternative valuation date is authorized, the executors of the Hubert estate used the standard date-of-death valuation. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 2031(a), 2051. A later step is to compute any claimed charitable or marital deductions. See §§ 2055 (charitable), 2056 (marital). Our inquiry here involves the relationship between valuation principles and those computations. The language of the charitable and marital deduction sections differs. For instance, § 2056 requires consideration, in valuing a marital bequest, of obligations or encumbrances the decedent imposes on the bequest, “in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined.” § 2056(b)(4). Section 2055 has no similar language. Treasury Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a), 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (1996), moreover, has amplified aspects of the marital deduction statute, as we discuss. There is no similar regulation for the charitable deduction statute. These differences notwithstanding, the Commissioner and respondent agree that, for purposes of the question presented, the two deduction statutes should be read to require the same answer. We adopt this approach. For the issue we decide, the marital deduction statute and regulation speak in more specific terms than the charitable deduction statute, so we concentrate on the marital provisions. Our holding in the case applies to both deductions.
We begin with the language of the marital deduction statute. It allows an estate to deduct for federal estate tax purposes “an amount equal to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the gross estate.” 26 U. S. C. § 2056(a).
The statute allows deduction for qualifying property only to the extent of the property’s “value.” So when the executors value the property for gross estate purposes as of the date of death, the value of the marital deduction will be lim*101ited by its date-of-death value. This is directed by the statutory language capping the deduction at “the value of any interest . . . included in determining the value of the gross estate.” It is made explicit by Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(a), which says “value, for the purpose of the marital deduction ... is to be determined as of the date of the decedent’s death [unless the estate uses the alternative valuation date].”
Section 20.2056(b)-4(a) provides that “value” for marital deduction purposes is “net value,” determined by applying “the same principles ... as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined.” Section 25.2523(a)-l, entitled “Gift to spouse; in general,” includes a subsection (e), entitled “Valuation,” which parallels § 20.2056(b) — 4(d); see also § 20.2055-2(f)(l). Section 25.2523(a)-l(e) provides:
“If the income from property is made payable to the donor or another individual for life or for a term of years, with remainder to the donor’s spouse . . . the marital deduction is computed . . . with respect to the present value of the remainder, determined under [26 U. S. C. § ]7520. The present value of the remainder (that is, its value as of the date of gift) is to be determined in accordance with the rules stated in § 25.2512-5 or, for certain prior periods, § 25.2512-5A.”
Section 7520, in turn, refers to present-value tables located in regulation § 20.2031-7. The question presented here, involving date-of-death valuation of property or a principal amount, some of the income from which may be used to pay administration expenses, is not controlled by the exact terms of these provisions. For that reason, we do not attempt to force it into their detailed mold. It is natural, however, to apply the present-value principle to the question at hand, as we are directed to do by §20.2056(b)-4(a). In other words, assuming it were necessary for valuation purposes to take into account that income, see infra, at 106-107 (discussing materiality), this would be done by subtracting from the *102value of the bequest, computed as if the income were not subject to administration expense charges, the present value (as of the controlling valuation date) of the income expected to be used to pay administration expenses.
Our application of the present-value principle to the issue here is further supported by Justice Holmes’ explanation of valuation theory in his opinion for the Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929). The decedent there bequeathed the residue of his estate in trust to charity, subject to a particular life interest in his wife. After holding that the charitable bequest qualified for the charitable deduction under the law as it stood in 1929, the Court considered how to value the bequest. The Government argued the value should be reduced to reflect the wife’s probable life expectancy as of the date the decedent died. The estate argued for a smaller reduction than the Government, because by the time of the litigation it was known that the wife had, in fact, lived for only six months after the decedent died. Justice Holmes wrote:
“The first impression is that it is absurd to resort to statistical probabilities when you know the fact. But this is due to inaccurate thinking. . . . [Value] depends largely on more or less certain prophecies of the future; and the value is no less real at that time if later the prophecy turns out false than when it comes out true.... Tempting as it is to correct uncertain probabilities by the now certain fact, we are of opinion that it cannot be done. . . . Our opinion is not changed by the necessary exceptions to the general rule specifically made by the Act.” Id., at 155.
So the charitable deduction had to be valued based on the wife’s probable life expectancy as of the date of death rather than the known fact that she died only six months after her husband.
*103It is suggested that § 20.2056(b)-4(a)’s direction to value the marital deduction as a spousal gift refers to a gift tax qualification regulation, § 25.2523(e) — 1(f), and a Revenue Ruling interpreting it, Rev. Rul. 69-56, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 224. Post, at 116 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). The suggestion misunderstands the regulations and the Revenue Ruling. Section 20.2056(b)-4(a) concerns how to determine the “value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest.” Before determining an interest’s value under § 20.2056(b)-4(a), one must decide the extent to which the interest qualifies as deductible.
There is a structural problem with interpreting § 20.2056(b)-4(a) as directing reference to § 25.2523(e) — 1(f) for valuation purposes. Qualification and valuation are different steps. Section 25.2523(e) — 1(f) prescribes conditions under which an interest transferred in trust qualifies for a marital deduction under the gift tax. It tracks the language of § 20.2056(b)-5(f), which prescribes the same conditions for determining whether an interest transferred in trust qualifies for a marital deduction under the estate tax. Any interest to which § 25.2523(e) — 1(f) would apply, were its principles understood to be incorporated into § 20.2056(b)-4(a), would, of necessity, already have been analyzed under the same principles at the earlier, qualification stage of the estate-tax marital-deduction inquiry under § 20.2056(b)-5(f). So under the suggested interpretation, whether or not an interest passed the qualification test, there would never be a need to value it. If it failed, there would be nothing to value; if it passed, its value would never be reduced at the valuation stage. The qualification step of the estate-tax marital-deduction inquiry would render the valuation step superfluous.
We do not think the Commissioner adopted this view of the regulations in Revenue Ruling 69-56. The Revenue Ruling held that a trustee’s power to:
*104“charge to income or principal, executor’s or trustee’s commissions, legal and accounting fees, custodian fees, and similar administration expenses ... [does] not result
“[does] in the disallowance or diminution of the marital deduction for estate and gift tax purposes unless the execution of such directions would or the exercise of such powers could, cause the spouse to have less than substantially full beneficial enjoyment of the particular interest transferred.” Rev. Rul. 69-56, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 224.
The Revenue Ruling cites for this proposition §§ 20.2056(b)-5(f)(1) and 25.2523(e)-l(f)(l), parts of the estate and gift tax qualification regulations discussed above. The qualification regulations provide that an interest may qualify as deductible only in part. Where that happens, the deduction need not be disallowed but it must be diminished. See, e.g., § 20.2056(b)-5(b); § 25.2523(e)-l(b); see also 26 U. S. C. §§ 2056(b)(5), 2523(e). It is in this qualification context that the Revenue Ruling speaks of “diminution” of the marital deduction. There is no dispute the entire interests transferred in trust here qualify for the estate tax marital and charitable deductions, respectively. The question before us is one of valuation. Sections 25.2523(e)-l(f) and 20.2056(b)-5(f) and Revenue Ruling 69-56 do not bear on our inquiry.
The parties here agree that the marital and charitable deductions had to be reduced by the amount of marital and charitable residue principal used to pay administration expenses. The Commissioner contends that the estate must reduce its marital and charitable deductions by the amount of administration expenses paid not only from principal but also, and in all events, from income and by a dollar-for-dollar amount. The Commissioner cites the controlling regulation in support of her position. The regulation says:
*105“The value, for the purpose of the marital deduction, of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse is to be determined as of the date of the decedent’s death [unless the estate uses the alternative valuation date]. The marital deduction may be taken only with respect to the net value of any deductible interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, the same principles being applicable as if the amount of a gift to the spouse were being determined. In determining the value of the interest in property passing to the spouse account must be taken of the effect of any material limitations upon her right to income from the property. An example of a case in which this rule may be applied is a bequest of property in trust for the benefit of the decedent’s spouse but the income from the property from the date of the decedent’s death until distribution of the property to the trustee is to be used to pay expenses incurred in the administration of the estate.” 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)-4(a) (1996).
The regulation does not help the Commissioner. It says a limitation providing that income “is to be used” throughout the administration period to pay administration expenses “may” be material in a given case and, if it is, account must be taken of it for valuation purposes as if it were a gift to the spouse, as we have discussed, see supra, at 101-102. The Tax Court was quite accurate in its description of the regulation when it said:
“That section is merely a valuation provision which requires material limitations on the right to receive income to be taken into account when valuing the property interest passing to the surviving spouse. The fact that income from property is to be used to pay expenses during the administration of the estate is not necessarily *106a material limitation on the right to receive income that would have a significant effect on the date-of-death value of the property of the estate.” 101 T. C., at 324-325.
There is no indication in the case before us that the executor’s power to charge administration expenses to income is equivalent to an express postponement of the spouse’s right to income beyond a reasonable period of administration. Cf. 26 CFR § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(9) (1996) (requiring valuation of express postponements of the spouse’s right to income beyond a reasonable period of administration). By contrast, we have no difficulty conceiving of situations where a provision requiring or allowing administration expenses to be paid from income could be deemed a “material limitation” on the spouse’s right to income. Suppose the decedent’s other bequests account for most of the estate’s property or that most of its assets are nonincome producing, so that the corpus of the surviving spouse’s bequest, and the income she could expect to receive from it, would be quite small. In these circumstances, the amount of the estate’s anticipated administration expenses chargeable to income may be material as compared with the anticipated income used to determine the assets’ date-of-death value. If so, a provision requiring or allowing administration expenses to be charged to income would be a material limitation on the spouse’s right to income, reducing the marital bequest’s date-of-death value and the allowable marital deduction.
Whether a limitation is “material” will also depend in part on the nature of the spouse’s interest in the assets generating income. This analysis finds strong support in the text of § 20.2056(b)-4(a). The regulation gives an example of where a limitation on the right to income “may” be material — bequests “in trust” for the benefit of a decedent’s spouse. The example suggests a significant difference between a bequest of income and an outright gift of the fee interest in the income-producing property. A fee in the *107same interest will almost always be worth much more. Where the value of the trust to the beneficiaries is derived solely from income, an obligation to pay administration expenses from that income is more likely to be “material.” In the case of a specific bequest of income, for example, valued only for its future income stream, a diversion of that income would be more significant. The marital property in this case, however, comprising trusts involving either a general power of appointment (the GPA trust) or an irrevocable election (the QTIP trust), was valued as being equivalent to a transfer of the fee. See Brief for Petitioner 8-9, n. 1 (“[T]he corpus of both trusts is includable in the estate of the surviving spouse”). As a result, the limitation on the right to income here is less likely to be material. The inquiry into the value of the estate’s anticipated administration expenses should be just as administrable, if not more so, than valuing property interests like going-concern businesses, see, e. g., § 20.2031-3, involving much greater complexity and uncertainty.
The Tax Court concluded here: “On the facts before us, we find that the trustee’s discretion to pay administration expenses out of income is not a material limitation on the right to receive income.” 101 T. C., at 325. The Tax Court did not specify the facts it considered relevant to the materiality inquiry. As we have explained, however, the Commissioner does not contend the estate failed to give adequate consideration to expected future administration expenses as of the date of death in determining the amount of the marital deduction. We have no basis to reverse for the Tax Court’s failure to elaborate. Here, given the size and complexity of the estate, one might have expected it to incur substantial litigation costs. But the anticipated expenses could nonetheless have been thought immaterial in light of the income the trust corpus could have been expected to generate.
The major disagreement in principle between the Tax Court majority and dissenters involved the distinction be*108tween expected and actual income and expenses. Judge Halpern’s opinion, joined by Judge Beghe, explained:
“I believe the majority is undone by its view that income earned on estate property is not included in the gross estate. Once it is accepted that income earned on estate property (as anticipated at the appropriate valuation date) is included in the gross estate, the next question is whether, but for the use of such income to pay administration expenses, it would be received by the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary. If the answer is yes, then it follows easily that, when such income is used for administration expenses, rather than received by the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary, the value of the interest passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse or charitable beneficiary is decreased.” Id., at 342-343 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Tax Court dissenters recognized that only anticipated, not actual, income is included in the gross estate, as the gross estate is based on date-of-death value. See also id., at 342, n. 5 (opinion of Halpern, J.) (“It is true, of course, that income actually earned on . . . property [included in valuing the gross estate] during the period of estate administration is not included in the gross estate. The gross estate, however, does’ include the discounted value of post mortem income expected to be earned during estate administration” (emphasis deleted)). The dissenters failed to recognize that following their own logic, as a general rule, assuming compliance with § 20.2056(b)-4(a)’s limitation to relevant facts on the controlling valuation date, only anticipated administration expenses payable from income, not the actual ones, affect the date-of-death value of the marital or charitable bequests. The dissenters were, in a sense, a step closer to § 25.2523(a)-l(e)’s present-value approach than the Commissioner, for they would have required the estate to reduce the marital or char*109itable deduction by only the discounted value of the actual administration expenses, whereas the Commissioner insists on a dollar-for-dollar reduction. The dissenters’ wait-and-see approach to the valuation inquiry, however, is still at odds with the valuation inquiry required by the regulations: What is the net value of the marital or charitable bequest on the controlling valuation date, determined as if it were a gift to the spouse?
The Commissioner directs us to the language of § 2056(b)(4), which says:
“In determining . .. the value of any interest in property passing to the surviving spouse for which a deduction is allowed by this section—
“(B) where such interest or property is encumbered in any manner, or where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such encumbrance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being determined.”
We interpreted this language in United States v. Stapf, 375 U. S. 118 (1963). The husband’s will there gave property to his wife, conditioned on her relinquishing other property she owned to the couple’s children. We held that the husband’s estate was entitled to a marital deduction only to the extent the value of the property the husband gave his wife exceeded the value of the property she relinquished to receive it. The marital deduction, we explained, should not exceed the “net economic interest received by the surviving spouse.” Id., at 126. The statutory language, as we interpreted it in Stapf, is consistent with our analysis here. Where the will requires or allows the estate to pay administration expenses from income that would otherwise go to the surviving spouse, our analysis requires that the marital *110deduction reflect the date-of-death value of the expected future administration expenses chargeable to income if they are material as compared with the date-of-death value of the expected future income. Using this approach to valuation, the estate will arrive at the “net economic interest received by the surviving spouse.” Ibid.
For the first time at oral argument, the Commissioner suggested that the reduction she seeks is necessary to avoid a “double deduction” in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 642(g). Under § 642(g), an estate may take an estate tax deduction for administration expenses under § 2053(a)(2), or it may take them, if deductible, off its taxable income, but it may not do both. The so-called double deduction argument is rhetorical, not statutory. As our colleagues in dissent recognize, “nothing in § 642(g) compels the conclusion that the marital (or charitable) deduction must be reduced whenever an estate elects to deduct expenses from income.” Post, at 137 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The Commissioner nevertheless suggests that, unless we reduce the estate’s marital deduction by the amount of administration expenses paid from income and deducted on its income tax, the estate will receive a deduction for them on its income tax as well as a deduction for them on its estate tax in the form of inflated marital and charitable deductions. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 15. The marital and charitable estate tax deductions do not include income, however. When income is used, consistent with state law and the will, to pay administration expenses, this does not require that the estate tax deductions be diminished. The deductions include asset values determined with reference to expected income, but under our analysis the values must also be reduced to reflect material expected administration expense charges to which that income may be subjected. As noted above, the Commissioner has not contended the estate’s marital and charitable deductions fail to reflect such expected payments. So *111there is no basis for the double deduction argument. Our analysis is consistent with the design of the statute.
The Commissioner also invites our attention to the legislative history of the marital deduction statute. Assuming for the sake of argument it would have relevance here, it does not support her position. The Senate Report accompanying the statute says:
“The interest passing to the surviving spouse from the decedent is only such interest as the decedent can give. If the decedent by his will leaves the residue of his estate to the surviving spouse and she pays, or if the estate income is used to pay, claims against the estate so as to increase the residue, such increase in the residue is acquired by purchase and not by bequest. Accordingly, the value of any additional part of the residue passing to the surviving spouse cannot be included in the amount of the marital deduction.” S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 6 (1948).
The Report supports our analysis. It underscores that valuation for marital deduction purposes occurs on the date of death.
The Commissioner’s position is inconsistent with the controlling regulations. The Tax Court and the Court of Appeals were correct in finding for the taxpayer on these facts, and we affirm the judgment.

It is so ordered.