Court Opinion

ID: 9771713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:51:47.747139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:35.630150
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, dissenting. The majority opinion points out correctly that the bill of assurances and the warranty deed prohibited commercial use of the Holadays’ lot and use of any outbuilding as a residence. The presence of the metal building violated neither provision. The Holadays argue the injunction should have been limited to prohibiting commercial activity on their lot. The majority opinion answers the point by saying it was not raised to the Chancellor and, therefore, it will not be considered. The following are excerpts from the Holadays’ abstract of the Chancellor’s ruling from the bench: In this case it is a question of fact of whether the blue metal shop building is a commercial building or nothing more than an oversized garage. But maybe I could say that is a question of fact whether or not it violates the covenants. I guess if we argued that the building is ok if you do not use [it] for anything except to tinker with and you do not ever use [it] for anybody’s benefit or sell your services. That would be the hardest question I would have to answer. Let’s say that the Defendant [the Holadays] is going to use the building for his own private use. So, everybody in the neighborhood is entitled to one of those. The next thing you know somebody sells one of those lots with that building up there and the guy brings in the lawnmowers. He can advertise in the paper because signs are prohibited on the property and pretty soon you have folks coming in with their lawnmowers. The question whether the injunction should be limited to prohibition of commercial activity was before the Chancellor. His apparent conclusion was that a building which could be used for commercial purposes would necessarily be so used. Nothing in the evidence presented compels that conclusion; nor am I able to say it is demanded by logic. While a chancellor has broad power to fashion a decree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the effect of a decree should be limited to the minimum necessary to solve the problem at hand. It must be limited to action which is “justified by the proof.” See Lott v. Cromer, 317 Ark. 250, 878 S.W.2d 367 (1994); Chambers v. Manning, 315 Ark. 369, 868 S.W.2d 64 (1993); Keith v. Barrow-Hicks Extensions of Water Improvement Dist. No. 85, 275 Ark. 28, 626 S.W.2d 951 (1982). I respectfully dissent.