Court Opinion

ID: 9451534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:19:18.293078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:47.530954
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
The ultimate question is whether appellant was shown, on the administrative record upon the basis of which the District Court acted, not to be entitled to the establishment of a period of disability under Section 216 (i) of the Social Security Act, as amended, or to disability benefits under Section 223(a) of the Act. Stated otherwise the question is whether appellant has a disability that renders him unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration.” 42 U.S.C. § 416 (i) (1). This determination is normally for the Secretary, but where he places reliance upon one portion of the testimony to the disregard of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, his findings cannot be affirmed. Cyrus v. Celebrezze, 4 Cir., 341 F.2d 192, 195. Nor is his conclusion to be accepted when the findings themselves are inadequate to support it. Ray v. Celebrezze, 4 Cir., 340 F.2d 556, 559.
Appellant alleged medically determinable impairment, both physical and mental, consisting of grand mal epilepsy and an associated chronic brain syndrome.1 He also alleged that this would prevent him engaging in substantial gainful employment. The Examiner found,
From all the evidence there would appear to be no doubt that this claimant suffers from epileptic seizures, and that this condition has existed for many years.
He went into considerable detail, and there is substantial support in the record for this finding. The Examiner also concluded that the epileptic seizures were controlled by medication and that there was no acceptable evidence they had increased in number since appellant had been employed so as to disable him at present. The medication was the maximum dosage.
In addition to being an epileptic it clearly appears that appellant suffered from a brain syndrome related to the epilepsy. As the Examiner stated, in August 1963, a medical staff conference at St. Elizabeths Hospital diagnosed that appellant had a chronic brain syndrome of unknown or unspecified cause, which had existed in May 1962.2 Eleven of the twelve staff members who participated in the diagnosis agreed to this. The *831other stated that although appellant had symptoms of a chronic brain syndrome he did not believe they were so pronounced as to lead him to the conclusion the condition was critical.
Bearing further upon the brain condition the Examiner set forth that appellant had been discharged from the hospital of the Virginia State Penitentiary in 1952 as a “schizoid personality” with a history which indicated epileptic attacks since 1944, and that he had been hospitalized in 1945 for epilepsy. The Examiner also referred to the personal history of appellant, his low I.Q., poor education, and moderately retarded intelligence.
As to the brain syndrome the Examiner stated:
There is a finding of chronic brain syndrome by some psychiatrists, but if it does exist it certainly is not severe * * * and does not significantly impair this claimant’s ability to engage in gainful employment.
His final conclusion was that the epilepsy and mental condition were “not of sufficient severity to prevent the claimant from continuing gainful employment.” (Emphasis added.)
This conclusion I think is without substantial support in the evidence considering the record as a whole. There is no doubt whatever, and the Examiner so found, that appellant is afflicted with grand mal epilepsy and is subject to seizures, to reduce the frequency of which maximum dosages are required.3 The only testimony on how he could be gainfully employed was that he had earned money as a cook, and as a part-time barber on weekends. This poses the question whether one in his condition can be put to work as a cook or barber, without danger to himself and others, and whether he could obtain such employment now. There is nothing in the record or findings upon which to base a conclusion that appellant could without serious danger to himself and others be substantially gainfully employed as a cook or a barber. On the contrary, there was uncontradicted evidence from a doctor that one in his condition should never be allowed to work as a barber; and the Examiner failed to explore the assertion of appellant that the heat of a kitchen was bad for his condition. Moreover, there has been no exploration in the record and therefore no findings with respect to what “substantial gainful” employment is available to one in claimant’s condition.4 In Ray v. Celebrezze, supra at 559, it is said:
[W]here the Secretary finds a claimant is unable to return to his former job but still is able to work and the evidence in the record does not show any other work which the claimant is capable of doing, the Secretary must take evidence and make specific findings based upon the particular claimant’s ability, education, background and experience as to what, if any, kind of work he or she can perform and that employment opportunities of this nature are available.
*832I think this approach definitely applies to this case.
In Celebrezze v. Warren, 339 F.2d 833, 837 (10th Cir.) it is said:
The activity in which the applicant must be able to engage must be both substantial and gainful. “Disabled” does not mean “completely helpless”, but means an inability to engage in “any substantial activity.” Teeter v. Flemming [7 Cir., 270 F.2d 871, 77 A.L.R.2d 636]; Flemming v. Booker, 5 Cir., 283 F.2d 321. Such ability is not to be measured by the hypothetical average man, but by the particular claimant’s capabilities. Celebrezze v. Bolas [8 Cir., 316 F.2d 498]; Kerner v. Flemming, 2 Cir., 283 F.2d 916. The word “any” in the statute is to be construed by what is reasonably possible, not what is conceivable. A theoretical ability to so engage is not enough if no reasonable opportunity is available. Kerner v. Flemming, supra; Cele-brezze v. Bolas, supra.
It was incumbent upon the Examiner, if the Secretary and the court were to agree with his conclusion, to explore appellant’s reasonable possibilities of substantial gainful employment, taking especially into account the nature of his illness and the degree and likelihood of its control, dependent upon continued maximum dosages.
The ultimate conclusion of the Examiner as I have stated was that appellant could continue gainful employment. This omitted a finding that the gainful employment would be substantial. Moreover, the only basis for the finding that he could continue gainful employment is data as to his former employment evidenced by an earnings certification of the Social Security Administration. It indicates that over a period of five years from 1957 to 1961 appellant earned $8,-896.09. This comes to about $141.00 a month for a man with a family of four to support — himself, his wife, and two small children. This presents the question whether, even if he could “continue” to be employed as thus indicated, his employment would be substantially gainful within the meaning of the statute. Note should be taken of the fact that the former earnings fall below the poverty level for a man with a family of four. Extensive legislative programs of recent years have taken as their premise that an urban family of four with income of less than $3,000 a year is in poverty. 1964 Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers 57-59, cited generally in S.Rep. No. 1218, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See, also, The Economic Report of the President (1964). I do not say this controls the question before the Secretary. The Report of the Economic Advisers points to the necessity of considering each family separately and lists some of the factors to be taken into account. I think these judgments within the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government do show a sensitivity to economic need which bears upon the problem the Secretary faces in administering the statutory provisions here involved.
The findings of the extent of impairment do not meet the standard expressed in Cyrus-, the findings as to work opportunities are at best limited to the Examiner’s references to previous employment as a cook and part-time barber, which clearly do not meet the requirements of the Ray and Warren cases; and there are no findings with respect to the substantiality of appellant’s prior employment.
Finally, the Secretary’s decision should be tempered by the spirit of the Act. As was said by the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia:
[The] obvious purpose [of the Act] was the attainment of a humanitarian end; and, like all remedial legislation, it should be liberally construed, interpreted, and administered that it may accomplish the beneficent result intended.
Graham v. Celebrezze, 4 Cir., 230 F.Supp. 936, 939.
*833It may be the claim should be disallowed, but I think not on this record. I would reverse and require the case to be remanded to the Secretary for reconsideration in light of the foregoing, with further evidence if desired.

. The appellant does not claim disability-on the basis of a “personality disorder characterized by socially unacceptable behavior.” Discussion by the Hearing Examiner of such ground is irrelevant to the proper disposition of the case.

. December 1962 is the date of the alleged impairment for purpose of the claim of appellant in this case.

. Appellant, as the Examiner stated, claimed that he had many seizures in addition to the few testified to by the physicians who attended him at the prison. He requested issuance of subpoenas to support his claim. But the Examiner refused, saying, I think incorrectly, that “The evidential facts are not in dispute, but only the conclusions that must be drawn in the light of the provisions of the Social Security Act.” This seems clearly not well founded factually, with particular reference to appellant’s effort to obtain the testimony of jail guards who he claimed had observed his otherwise unreported seizures. Failure to test such testimony of appellant weakens the Examiner’s conclusion that appellant’s claims respecting his condition were unreliable and also the conclusion that his condition was controlled.

. In reference to the contrary proposition asserted by the majority it should be noted that in the Jones and Witherspoon cases the court found substantial undoubted testimony in the record as to the work that appellants there could do, and in Gotshaio and Graham the court applied the very test that this dissent finds necessary. The Adams case was decided on a lack of relationship between the illness and the retirement.