Court Opinion

ID: 9951140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 17:03:19.808368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:18.142527
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 P. v. Castellanos CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098489

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. 21CF06109)

           v.

 RUDY CASTELLANOS, JR.,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         After defendant Rudy Castellanos, Jr., pled guilty to transporting controlled
substances for sale, the trial court sentenced him to the middle term and imposed a fine
and two fees. Defendant contends the court (1) abused its discretion by not imposing the
lower term and (2) erred in imposing the fine and fees for various reasons. We find no
merit in defendant’s first contention but agree with his second under People v. Dueñas
(2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas). We order a limited remand for the trial court to
ascertain defendant’s ability to pay the fine and fees. Statutory citations are to the Penal
Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                                             1
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       During a traffic stop, an officer found two small plastic bags of methamphetamine
in defendant’s possession. The officer later recovered a separate plastic bag of
methamphetamine that defendant had earlier thrown out of his car window. Defendant
pled guilty to transporting methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379,
subds. (a) & (c)) in exchange for a four-year maximum sentence and dismissal of other
charges and allegations. He stipulated that the court could find aggravating factors based
on the probation report, that the court could sentence him to the lower, middle or upper
term, and that he could submit evidence of mitigating factors.
       According to the probation report filed in April 2023, defendant is 45 years old,
participated in trauma counseling from ages 5 to 11 due to witnessing domestic abuse in
his home, has used methamphetamine every day since age 12, considers himself addicted
to methamphetamine, was willing to seek addiction treatment if granted probation, and is
remorseful for his actions. He also has no income, is in poor health, and has been
unemployed for the last five years due to body aches.
       The report cited one factor in mitigation (defendant voluntarily acknowledged
wrongdoing before arrest or at an early stage in the criminal process; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.423(b)(8)) and three factors in aggravation (defendant has six prior felony
convictions, defendant has served a prior prison term, and defendant’s prior performance
on probation was unsatisfactory; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2), (3), (5)). The
probation officer recommended the middle term.
       At the sentencing hearing, the court expressed its intent to impose the “middle
term with county prison with [731 days on] mandatory supervision.” Defense counsel
then argued that the probation report supported an additional mitigating factor, namely,
that defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly
reduced culpability for the crime (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(2)) based on the
trauma defendant experienced from ages 5 to 11. Defense counsel then referred to

                                             2
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) and the lower term presumption “if the person
experienced that type of childhood trauma.”
       The court asked defense counsel to clarify how “abuse from the age of five to 11
would cause [his] client to sell methamphetamine at the age of 45.” In response, counsel
requested additional time to obtain a professional opinion or that the issue be sent back to
probation for analysis. He also argued that defendant began using substances at a young
age to numb the pain from the abuse and that “when you are abused at that early of an
age, your emotional growth pattern takes time and develops differently” than others.
       The court found section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) inapplicable because it was not
“provided with any information to substantiate a nexus between” the crime and the abuse
he experienced from ages 5 to 11. And the court determined that the upper term was
inappropriate because the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh those in
mitigation. Those aggravating factors, according to the court, included defendant
engaging in conduct indicating a serious danger to society. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(1).) The court sentenced defendant to the middle term of three years in
“county prison” with the final 731 days to be served under mandatory supervision. The
court also ordered defendant to pay a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $40
court operations assessment fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)), and a $30 conviction assessment
fee (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)) (“the fine and fees”).
       Defendant timely appeals and challenges the middle term sentence and the fine
and fees. We address each challenge separately.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                                  Middle Term Sentence
       To start, we reject the People’s contention that a certificate of probable cause is
required for us to address defendant’s sentencing claim. (See § 1237.5.) Defendant’s
challenge is to “ ‘the exercise of individualized sentencing discretion within an agreed

                                              3
maximum sentence,’ ” and “does ‘not constitute an attack on the validity of the plea, for
which a certificate is necessary.’ ” (People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 199.)
       We nevertheless reject defendant’s sentencing claim on the merits. Defendant
contends the court abused its discretion by refusing to impose the lower term under
section 1170, subdivision (b). As amended by Chapter 731 of the Statutes of 2021, that
provision prohibits the court from exceeding the middle term of a sentencing triad in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, as specified. And a presumption in favor of the
lower term applies when the defendant’s “psychological, physical, or childhood trauma”
was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense, “unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
       The critical inquiry here is whether defendant’s psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of his offense. Although
the probation report and defense counsel’s arguments were sufficient to raise the issue
(See People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 994), the trial court found the
requisite connection lacking. The trial’s court determination on this point is “a
quintessential factfinding process” subject to review for substantial evidence. (People v.
Oneal (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 589.) In conducting that review, we do not reweigh
the evidence: it is the exclusive function of the trier of fact to draw reasonable inferences
from the evidence. (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1086; People v.
Whitmore (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 116, 129.) We also view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People and presume the existence of every fact the trier of fact could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “If
there is more than one inference which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we
accept the inference which supports the [trier of fact’s finding].” (People v. Davis (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1437.)

                                              4
       Although the probation report indicated defendant experienced childhood trauma
and has regularly used methamphetamine since age 12, defendant offered no evidence
linking the childhood trauma to his crime. On appeal, defendant does not contend that
the trial court erred by rejecting his counsel’s request for additional time to obtain a
professional opinion or other analysis.1 Instead, defendant relies on defense counsel’s
argument at sentencing that defendant turned to controlled substances as a child to cope
with the trauma and that the trauma therefore contributed to defendant selling
methamphetamine decades later. A reasonable trier of fact could find this argument
insufficient to create the requisite connection without supporting evidence. Thus, we
affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the lower term presumption did not apply, and we
need not address defendant’s secondary argument that the court considered an
unsupported aggravating factor in determining whether to apply that presumption.
                                              II
                                        Fine and Fees
       Defendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights by imposing
the fine and fees without holding a hearing to determine his ability to pay them. We
agree under Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157.2
       Although defendant did not raise this issue in the trial court, we exercise our
discretion to resolve the issue for two reasons: (1) to forestall unnecessary ineffective
assistance of counsel claims and (2) in the interests of fairness given the probation
report’s clear statement that “defendant is not employed . . . [,] not able bodied” and

1      We reject defendant’s attempt to raise this concern in his reply brief. “We do not
consider arguments offered for the first time on reply.” (People v. Marrero (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 896, 911, fn. 2.)
2      Because we agree remand is required under Dueñas, we do not address
defendant’s contention that imposition of the fine without an ability to pay hearing
violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or equal protection.

                                              5
“may not be able to comply with any financial conditions imposed by the [c]ourt.” (See
People v. Leon (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1023.)
       Under Dueñas, fines, fees, and assessments cannot be imposed on an indigent
defendant, and must be stayed in the case of a mandatory restitution fine under
section 1202.4, unless there is a determination that the defendant has the ability to pay
them. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1168-1169, 1172.) Although various issues
presented by Dueñas are pending review in the California Supreme Court (see People v.
Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 94-98, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844), the
People do not argue that Dueñas was incorrectly decided as to non-punitive fees like the
fees imposed on defendant. In fact, the People submit that they “do not seek to uphold
the imposition of these assessments on those who have no ability to pay.” (See People v.
Taylor (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 390, 398-399 (Taylor) [applying Dueñas where no party
argued Dueñas was wrongly decided].) As to punitive fines, we reject the People’s view
questioning the Dueñas due process analysis of a minimum restitution fine like the fine
imposed here. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1172; People v. Belloso (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 647, 654-662, review granted Mar. 11, 2020, S259755; but see Kopp at
pp. 96-97 [rejecting Dueñas due process analysis in favor of analysis under excessive
fines clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution].) We conclude
that the trial court committed Dueñas error by imposing the fine and fees without
ascertaining defendant’s ability to pay them.
       Because Dueñas error is of constitutional magnitude, “we inquire whether the
failure to conduct an ability to pay hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Taylor, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.) We find Dueñas error harmless if “the record
demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant cannot establish his or her
inability to pay.” (Ibid.) The record here does the opposite: the trial court relied solely
on the probation report and that report stated that defendant is in poor health and has been
unemployed for five years as a result. That report also undercuts the People’s position

                                              6
that defendant will be able to work and earn wages in prison. We cannot find harmless
error in these circumstances.
       Thus, we remand for a hearing on defendant’s ability to pay the fine and fees.
Given the evidence of defendant’s financial status in the probation report, the People will
bear the burden of proving defendant’s ability to pay the fine and fees. (See People v.
Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 489-490 [Dueñas does not support conclusion
that People bear burden of proving ability to pay in the absence of evidence in the record
of defendant’s inability to pay].)
                                       DISPOSITION
       The order imposing the restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), the court operations
assessment fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)), and the conviction assessment fee (Gov. Code,
§ 70373, subd. (a)) is vacated, and the matter is remanded for a hearing on defendant’s
ability to pay the fine and fees. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                   /s/
                                                  MESIWALA, J.

I concur:

 /s/
ROBIE, J.

                                              7
EARL, P. J.
       I must respectfully dissent to Part II of the draft opinion for the following reasons:
       Relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, defendant Rudy
Castellanos, Jr., argues the $300 restitution fine must be stayed pending an ability to pay
hearing, otherwise it violates the prohibition against excessive fines and violates equal
protection. He asserts ineffective assistance of counsel if we find he forfeited this
argument.
       I would conclude that defendant forfeited his challenge to the restitution fine
because the sentencing hearing was held over four years after Dueñas was decided; there
was thus authority for requesting an ability to pay hearing at the time of the sentencing
hearing, and defendant failed to do so. (Cf. People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
485, 489; People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 859 [constitutional exception to
forfeiture rule did not apply to claim concerning failure to obtain express waiver of an
ability to pay hearing]; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880-881 [noting
longstanding rule that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal proceedings by
“ ‘ “failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine it” ’ ”].)
       To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must first show
counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Second, the defendant must show
resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” (People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) On direct appeal, a judgment will be reversed for
ineffective assistance “only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a
reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.

                                               1
All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas
corpus proceeding.” (Ibid.)
       Defendant points to nothing in the record as to why defense counsel failed to
object to the imposition of the restitution fine, and it thus does not appear that the record
affirmatively discloses that counsel had no tactical purpose for doing so. “ ‘[If] the
record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one,
or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ the claim on appeal must be
rejected. [Citations.] . . . [I]t is inappropriate for an appellate court to speculate as to the
existence or nonexistence of a tactical basis for a defense attorney’s course of conduct
when the record on appeal does not illuminate the basis for the attorney’s challenged acts
or omissions . . . .” (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, citing People v. Pope
(1979) 23 Cal. 3d 412, 426.) Thus, I would also deny defendant’s claim of effective
assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment in its entirety.

                                                    /s/
                                                    EARL, P. J.

                                               2