Court Opinion

ID: 9727048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:18:27.750884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:33.130615
License: Public Domain

*532WORK, J., Concurring.
Although I have concurred in the lead opinion, I write separately to specifically address one portion of Justice Staniforth’s thoughtful dissent.
The dissent posit of an equal protection specter misses the analytical boat. The voluntariness or involuntariness of the commitment does meaningfully differentiate as to the legal issue in this case. The dissent suggests the affected classes are those victims who are damaged by acts of the persons released, one being allowed to sue the releasing authority where the commitment was voluntary, and another barred from doing so where the commitment was involuntary. However, the fact is that releasing authorities have no control over voluntarily committed patients. Those persons may sign out at will. There is no “release” which is subject to the discretionary control of the housing facility. The involuntarily committed may only be released in accordance with statutory guidelines, one of which is the discretion of staff. The departure of a voluntary patient imposed no liability on staff for an improvident release while, in the absence of statutory immunity, liability could be established on proper facts where the patient is subject to nonconsensual confinement. Considered in light of the legal authorities in the two situations, the relevant legal classes are distinct and different.