Court Opinion

ID: 9645753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:34:09.715551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:31.125694
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON DENIAL OF MOTION FOR REHEARING
RICKHOFF, Justice.
While one could uncover authority for the majority’s en banc decision (or indeed almost any result in this complex case), the majority’s decision is a most tortured climb over true equity, the express language of the lease, the trial court’s faultless rulings and submissions, the admissible evidence and the jury’s verdict. Then, at the summit, other courts’ reliance on and praise for the original panel’s decision comes into view. See, e.g. Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc., 925 F.Supp. 1163, 1169-70 (N.D.Miss.1996); Neel v. HECI Exploration Co., 1996 WL 426066, at *8-9 (Tex.App.-Austin July 31, 1996, n.w.h.).
Perhaps most notable among these subsequent developments is Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc. In that case, the pipeline settled with the producer/lessee for a single lump sum payment of $6,578,000.00 in exchange for the lessee’s agreement to waive any past claims and to decrease the sales price for any future gas purchases. 925 F.Supp. at 1166. In addition, the pipeline’s make-up rights were eliminated. Id. In reliance on the original panel opinion in the instant ease, the court held that “a court’s finding that nonreeoupable settlements are indeed royalty-bearing, based on the fact that production has occurred, is consistent with the Texas court’s literal interpretations of the lease language.” Id.
Interestingly, although Chief Judge Senter noted in his opinion in Williamson that the issue was a matter of first impression in Mississippi, he praised the analysis of the original panel decision in the instant case and acknowledged that the Mississippi Supreme Court’s general policy of adopting Texas law in cases involving previously unaddressed oil and gas issues would be followed. Id. at 1167, 1169-70. Evidently, our en banc reversal will distort and disturb the equities in this area of the law beyond this one case and beyond our borders.
In Finkelstein’s Motion for Rehearing, he states, simply, that either the language of the lease permits him to recover the royalties, or if the language does not so permit, the issue was properly submitted to the juiy under the unjust enrichment theory. Without reason, the majority wrests the case from the jury and renders its own judgment. That judgment should be reheard and reconsidered in light of the approval voiced for the original panel opinion in subsequent eases. See, e.g. Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc., 925 F.Supp. at 1169-70; Neel v. HECI Exploration Co., 1996 WL 426066, at *8-9.