Court Opinion

ID: 9474026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:45:57.285264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:51.852920
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result and in the majority’s analysis but I think certain points would be helpful, in focusing on the precise issue being resolved here.
In United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.), vacated, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 419, 78 L.Ed.2d 355 (1983) (McMani-gal I), the government petitioned for forfeiture under two different theories. Under the first theory, it claimed that the legal fees were proceeds of an interest acquired in violation of section 1962, and so were forfeitable under section 1963(a)(1). Under the second theory, it claimed that the defendant’s share of the law firm’s accounts receivable was an interest in the enterprise, and thus forfeitable under section 1963(a)(2). These were clearly alternative theories; either would support forfeiture. This court held that proceeds were not an interest under section 1963(a)(1), and that an interest in an enterprise must be in existence at the time of conviction to be forfeitable under section 1963(a)(2). Because neither'theory was satisfied, the forfeiture order was'vacated.
In Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a forfeitable interest under section 1963(a)(1) included proceeds and profits of an interest acquired in violation of section 1962. Thus our holding on the first theory in McManigal I was overruled. The Court vacated McManigal I for reconsideration in light of Russello.
In United States v. McManigal, 723 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.1983)(McManigal II), this court reversed the district court’s order forfeiting $99,700 to the United States. McManigal II is overruled today by the en banc majority’s opinion insofar as it concerns the first theory, which deals with section 1963(a)(1). However, the holding in McManigal II dealing with the second theo*804ry is not overruled. That theory holds that under section 1963(a)(2) an interest in an enterprise is not forfeitable unless it is in existence at the time of conviction.1 Section 1963(a)(2) was not at issue in Russello, and the Supreme Court there was careful to distinguish what it called the narrower section 1963(a)(2) from the broader section 1963(a)(1).

. This second theory would not have supported forfeiture in McManigal II because no accounts receivable were in existence at the time of defendant’s conviction.