Court Opinion

ID: 9762482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:25:23.126098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:34.940221
License: Public Domain

SAM BASS, Justice,
dissenting
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority's reasoning and disposition of appellant’s second, third, and fourth points of error, I believe that the affidavit underlying the search warrant did not set forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause.
First of all, I would find that Mrs. Man-dujano’s consent was not voluntary. Other than the statements contained in the consent form, and Mrs. Mandujano’s statement that she had an opportunity to read and understand it, nothing in the record indicates that Officer Hallmark advised Mrs. Mandujano of her right to decline her consent to the search.
Further, although Mrs. Mandujano testified that she voluntarily consented, the coercive aspects of the police activity giving rise to the signing of the consent form vitiate her “consent,” which she gave in acquiescence to the assertion of lawful authority. Mrs. Mandujano testified that the police visited appellant’s home at approximately 3:00 or 3:30 a.m., and then again at 5:00 a.m., when the police executed the arrest warrants for outstanding traffic tickets. While Officer Hallmark did not remember whether the police had shined spotlights on appellant’s home that evening, both appellant and his wife testified that the police did in fact shine lights on their home. After Mrs. Mandujano was awakened by these lights shining at 3:00 a.m., she was unable to go back to sleep. Further, appellant testified that his wife was upset because she could not understand why three police officers had come to the house to arrest him for outstanding warrants on traffic tickets. While Mrs. Mandujano did testify that she had an opportunity to read and understand the contents of the consent form, and that she believed that signing the consent form was the right thing to do, she also testified that she thought she was signing a search warrant, and that it was her duty to sign it. Mrs. Mandujano’s confusion as to whether she was signing a search warrant or consent form at 5:30 a.m. is understandable, especially in light of the fact that there was a considerable amount of police activity focused on her home during the early morning hours immediately preceding her “consent.” I would hold that the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Mandujano’s consent was voluntary. Accordingly, in determining whether the warrant is supported by probable cause, I would not consider that portion of the search warrant affidavit that discusses the Nike tennis shoes.
Secondly, I would find that the search warrant affidavit did not set forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause. While the person who sexually assaulted the complainant had physical features and a modus operandi similar to the person who assaulted the other victim specifically mentioned in the affidavit, the affidavit does not contain a sufficient number of distinguishing characteristics or incriminating facts to establish that appellant was the attacker. The other victim could not positively identify appellant at the live lineup, but merely stated that appellant was “the right size.” Further, the affidavit mentioned nothing about the complainant having positively identified appellant, which was borne out by the trial testimony. It is also not particularly helpful that other sexual assaults in the area were similar to this one, and very possibly committed by the same person, as the identity of the attacker in none of the assaults was established. The mere allegation that three weeks later *326appellant looked suspicious to a resident in the neighborhood was conclusory. Although appellant was present in the area on several other occasions, each of these incidents occurred between three to five months after the attack. Finally, the fact that appellant has the same blood type as the attacker (type 0), is hardly a distinguishing feature, because approximately 45 percent of the Hispanic population in North America has the same blood type as the attacker (type 0). Although a search warrant affidavit must be read in a common sense manner, and reasonable inferences may be drawn from all the facts contained within its four corners, Cassias v. State, 719 S.W.2d 585, 587-588 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Williams v. State, 699 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.); see also Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848, 109 S.Ct. 127, 102 L.Ed.2d 101 (1988), the mere affirmation of belief or suspicion is insufficient to sustain the issuance of a search warrant. Tolentino v. State, 638 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982). While the facts set forth in the affidavit most likely rise to the level of reasonable suspicion, they fail to establish probable cause that appellant was the attacker. This would be true even considering the match between the footprints found near the other victim’s home and appellant’s right Nike tennis shoe, which is a common brand.
Finally, I would hold that the good faith exception to the Texas exclusionary rule does not render admissible evidence seized pursuant to a warrant that is based on an affidavit lacking in probable cause. I agree with the State that the good faith exception to the federal exclusionary rule would render the evidence admissible on federal constitutional grounds. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3422, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (Supreme Court held suppression inappropriate where officers’ good faith reliance on a warrant issued by a magistrate was objectively reasonable, even though the warrant affidavit was lacking in probable cause).
However, article 38.23(b), Tex.Code Crim. P.Ann. (Vernon Supp.1990), the good faith exception to the Texas exclusionary rule, reads as follows:
It is an exception to the provisions of Subsection (a) [the Texas statutory exclusionary rule] of this Article that the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause.
(Emphasis added.) Article 38.23 applies to our case, because appellant objected on Texas constitutional grounds, which is sufficient to invoke article 38.23. Polk v. State, 738 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987).
Courts of appeals in this state have treated the Leon good faith exception and the good faith exception under 38.23(b) as being synonymous. See Robinson v. State, 771 S.W.2d 710, 711-12 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref’d) (fruits of a search seized pursuant to a warrant were admissible, even though the parties stipulated that affidavit underlying warrant was defective because it did not state when information in the affidavit was obtained); Young v. State, 776 S.W.2d 673, 677-79 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1989, no pet.) (good faith exception under Leon and article 38.23 permitted introduction of evidence seized pursuant to facially valid arrest warrant, where there was no evidence of any deliberate falsehoods or reckless disregard for the truth employed by the affiant in obtaining the warrant); Curry v. State, 780 S.W.2d 825, 826-27 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. granted) (affirmed trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress cocaine, seized pursuant to allegedly defective “traffic warrants”; article 38.23 good faith exception applied, even if the affidavits underlying the traffic warrants did not establish probable cause).
I recognize the defect stipulated to between the parties in Robinson, 771 S.W.2d at 711, the failure to mention when the affiant received information contained in the affidavit, is one that renders a warrant invalid, Schmidt v. State, 659 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), and would necessitate the application of the good faith ex*327ception to uphold a search pursuant to that warrant. However, I find it significant that the Court of Criminal Appeals has granted a petition for discretionary review of the Curry decision, in which the intermediate appellate court stated that the good faith exception of article 38.23(b) applied to warrants not supported by probable cause. 780 S.W.2d at 826-27. This fact, coupled with the Legislature’s inclusion of the phrase “based on probable cause,” within article 38.23(b), compels me to conclude that the good faith exception to the Texas exclusionary rule does not apply to search warrants based on affidavits lacking probable cause. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress, and that the error was harmful. Tex.R. App.P. 81(b)(2).
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the cause for a new trial.