Court Opinion

ID: 9714484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:38:36.872818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:26.385987
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GREEN, specially concurring: I concur with the majority that the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. I agree that portions of decedent’s discovery deposition, required by the trial court to be read in evidence, went beyond the requirements of the “fairness” doctrine. Because of the prejudice created thereby, I agree that reversible error occurred. I also agree that the admissions in defendants’ pleadings should have been admitted into evidence. Although the question is close, I disagree with the majority ruling that plaintiff’s incompetency under section 2 of the Evidence Act was waived by the requirement of the trial court at. defendants’ request that most of the evidence deposition of defendants’ decedent be presented with decedent’s admissions. In discussing the problem of fairly dealing with the offer of portions of a writing or conversation, McCormick on Evidence §56 (1972) states: “It seems, however, that to guard against the danger of an ineradicable false first impression, the adversary should be permitted, at least within the court’s discretion, to require the proponent to prove so much as pertains to the fact sought to be proved, that is, all that explains or is useful in interpreting the part proved.” (Emphasis added.) Although, as further stated by McCormick, the majority rule requires the opponent to present the evidence placing the excerpt from a statement in context, Rule 212(c) clearly permits the procedure advocated by McCormick. The effect of the procedure is that the proponent is required to present excerpts in fair context. The material presented to do so is evidence presented by the proponent, here the plaintiff and not the opponents, here the defendants. The trial court is granted discretion as to tire amount of context material that it may require to be presented. (Schmitt v. Chicago Transit Authority.) Here that discretion was exceeded and we are properly granting a new trial. Plaintiff is thus adequately protected from prejudice. I know of no case, however, where the incompetency of section 2 of the Evidence Act has been held to be waived except by the presentation of evidence by a protected party or person aligned therewith. Since that was not the case here, I cannot conclude that waiver occurred. Since we are in agreement that a new trial should be granted because of the excess of material required to be presented with the admissions, a discussion of all of the legal ramifications of what occurred is scholastic. The majority opinion, however, gives directions for retrial. The opinion rales that presentation of decedent’s admissions in his deposition, if presented without context material, would not work a waiver of plaintiff’s •incompetency. If I understand the opinion correctly, though, it further rules that a requirement that these admissions be placed in context, even if limited only to matters properly required in fairness, would work a waiver “if fairness necessitates letting the plaintiff respond.” The admissions from the discovery deposition were admissible because they were admissions and not because they were part of a discovery deposition. The majority opinion would seem to indicate that if an incompetent party introduced, out of context, an admission of a protected party’s decedent, the requirement by the court that other material be presented to place the admission in context, if concerning a transaction with the incompetent party, would work a waiver if “fairness” so required. I do not believe that to be the law. I consider the more sound rale to be that no waiver of section 2 incompetency can arise from a proponent being required to present context material with admissions. If a proponent wishes an admission in evidence, he should not be able to gain advantage by being required to put the admission in context. If, as here, the proponent is required to present material not required to give context and is prejudiced thereby, reversal should be ordered. I also disagree with portions of the next to last paragraph of the majority opinion concerning instructions on contributory negligence where the evidence is such that there is no issue on that point. In Zydeck v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 333 Ill.App. 388, 77 N.E.2d 830, the defendant contended that reversible error occurred because a peremptory instruction was given which made no mention of an affirmative defense. No motion for directed verdict had been made as to that defense. The appellate court held the instruction to be proper because there was no evidence to support the affirmative defense. By analogy, the jury should be instructed that plaintiff must prove her exercise of due care only when that is an issue for the jury’s determination regardless of whether a motion for directed verdict has been made.