Court Opinion

ID: 9388620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 05:04:54.001819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.477527
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     April 20, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 360477
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
CHANCHEZ DEZARAY STEWART,                                            LC No. 10-003925-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GARRETT, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant, Chanchez Dezaray Stewart, appeals by delayed leave granted1 the trial court’s
order denying his postconviction motion for relief from judgment made on the basis of an affidavit
in which another inmate, incarcerated with defendant, purported to take responsibility for the
shooting death of Michael Spahr. Because the trial court’s reason for denying defendant’s motion
was insufficient, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for reconsideration consistent with
this opinion in front of a different judge.

                      I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

     This is the fourth time this case has been before us.2 In defendant’s direct appeal, the Court
summarized the basic facts of the case:

1
 People v Stewart, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 7, 2022 (Docket
No. 360477).
2
  See People v Stewart, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 10,
2012 (Docket No. 300476) (affirming defendant’s convictions on direct appeal); People v Stewart,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 25, 2015 (Docket No. 324437)
(denying defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal denial of defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment); People v Stewart, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 6, 2021

                                                -1-
               Desmond Kaigler contacted LaTanya Norman regarding purchasing two to
       three pounds of marijuana for Tyler Binkley and Michael Spahr. Norman then
       contacted [defendant], her ex-boyfriend, regarding the purchase and he agreed to
       make the sale. On June 6, 2009, Spahr and Binkley drove from Ohio to Michigan
       to purchase the marijuana. Once in Michigan, Binkley and Spahr picked up Kaigler
       and Norman. Norman then contacted [defendant] who told her to meet him at an
       address on Irvington Street in Detroit. Once at the designated location, Norman
       exited the vehicle and called [defendant] to tell him that they had arrived. Shortly
       thereafter, the vehicle was approached by three men, two of whom were armed with
       guns. The armed men demanded money from the vehicle’s occupants and then
       began shooting. Spahr was killed during the incident and Binkley was shot several
       times. [People v Stewart, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals,
       entered January 10, 2012 (Docket No. 300476), p 1.]

        Defendant was subsequently convicted of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(b),
and possession of a firearm during the course of a felony, MCL 750.227b. In 2014, defendant
filed his first motion for relief from judgment under MCR 6.502(C), which was denied by the trial
court.3 In 2019, defendant again moved for relief from judgment, this time on the basis of newly
discovered evidence, which consisted of an affidavit from an inmate, Bobby McGowan, who was
incarcerated with defendant and who implicated himself and his dead brother in the murder of
Spahr. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding defendant was not entitled to relief
because he failed to allege the evidence was not available to him when he filed his initial motion
for relief from judgment in 2014. The trial court also addressed the credibility of McGowan in
relation to defendant’s motion, stating: “McGowan is serving a life without parole sentence which
offers him little risk in taking the fall for a crime to which he previously committed. Defendant
has nothing to offer to corroborate McGowan’s account of the crime.” By concluding McGowan
was not credible, the trial court denied defendant’s motion.

        Defendant sought leave to appeal the trial court’s order, arguing the trial court abused its
discretion when it concluded, without holding an evidentiary hearing, that McGowan’s affidavit
lacked credibility. In lieu of granting defendant’s application, we vacated the order and remanded
the matter for reconsideration. People v Stewart, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered July 6, 2021 (Docket No. 357069). The Court provided the following instructions for the
trial court on remand:

       The trial court is directed on remand to consider whether relief is warranted under
       the four-part test for newly discovered evidence. See People v Johnson, 502 Mich
       541, 566; 918 NW2d 676 (2018). In addressing the fourth prong of the analysis,
       the trial court must not base its decision on whether the trial court would find the

(Docket No. 357069) (peremptorily reversing trial court’s order denying defendant’s second
motion for relief from judgment).
3
  In defendant’s first motion for relief from judgment, he asserted that the trial court improperly
closed the court room for witness testimony and his attorney rendered ineffective assistance for
failing to object.

                                                -2-
       affiant credible, but rather, on whether a reasonable juror could find the affiant
       credible. Id. at 566-568. And, if a reasonable juror could find the testimony
       credible, the court must then “consider the impact of that testimony in conjunction
       with the evidence that would be presented on retrial. . . . [T]he trial court must
       consider the evidence that was previously introduced at trial.” Id. at 571. If the
       trial court finds it necessary, it may order that an evidentiary hearing be held. MCR
       6.508(C). [Id.]

      On remand, the trial court again denied defendant’s motion for relief from judgment—once
more without holding an evidentiary hearing—concluding:

       [T]he Court concludes that no reasonable juror could believe McGowan’s claim
       that he was the real killer and acted independently of defendant. It is public
       information that McGowan is serving a life-without parole sentence, and that his
       brother, Derrick is deceased. As such, McGowan risks nothing by trying to accept
       responsibility for the crimes defendant was convicted of. Moreover, defendant has
       nothing to offer to corroborate McGowan’s account. The [prosecution] contend[s],
       and this Court agrees, if such evidence were enough to merit a new trial, every
       prisoner in the Michigan Department of Corrections would ask for relief as soon as
       they found a lifer to confess to the crime.

Defendant again applied for delayed leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion for relief
from judgment, which this Court granted. People v Stewart, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered July 7, 2022 (Docket No. 360477).

                                 II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        This Court “review[s] a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an
abuse of discretion . . . .” People v Swain, 288 Mich App 609, 628; 794 NW2d 92 (2010). An
abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes. Id. “A trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” People v
Johnson, 502 Mich 541, 565; 918 NW2d 676 (2018). “Clear error occurs if the reviewing court is
left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). This Court also “reviews de novo the trial court’s interpretation of court
rules.” People v Owens, 338 Mich App 101, 113; 979 NW2d 345 (2021).

                                          III. ANALYSIS

                                A. POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

         Defendant argues he is entitled to postconviction relief because the substantive issue raised
in his successive motion for relief from judgment involved newly discovered evidence. Defendant
contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to first determine whether the newly
discovered evidence presented in defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment was
credible. While we do not conclude, at this stage of the proceedings, that defendant is entitled to
the postconviction relief and thus a new trial, we do agree with defendant that the trial court abused
its discretion when it concluded that McGowan’s affidavit lacked credibility apparently and merely

                                                 -3-
because it was from an inmate serving a life sentence. Accordingly, we must vacate the trial
court’s order and remand once again for reconsideration.

        MCR 6.500 et seq. governs the procedures for postappeal relief from a criminal conviction
and is the exclusive means to challenge a conviction once a defendant has exhausted the normal
appellate process. People v McSwain, 259 Mich App 654, 678; 676 NW2d 236 (2003). Typically,
“one and only one motion for relief from judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction.”
MCR 6.502(G)(1). However, under MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b), a defendant may file a second or
subsequent motion for relief from judgment “based on a claim of new evidence that was not
discovered before the first motion was filed.” Under MCR 6.508(D)(3), 4 however, the trial court
may not grant relief if the motion alleges grounds “that could have been previously raised, unless
the defendant demonstrates both good cause for failing to raise such grounds earlier as well as
actual prejudice.” Johnson, 502 Mich at 565.

        In defendant’s first motion for relief from judgment, filed in 2014, he asserted that the trial
court improperly closed the court room for witness testimony and his attorney rendered ineffective
assistance for failing to object. That motion was denied, and this Court denied defendant’s
application for leave to appeal. People v Stewart, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered February 25, 2015 (Docket No. 324437). In his subsequent motion for relief from
judgment, defendant submitted an affidavit from McGowan, which was dated October 3, 2018.
Although the prosecutor and trial court speculated defendant knew of McGowan’s claims when he
filed his first motion for relief from judgment in 2014, there was no evidence presented that
defendant knew of McGowan’s claims before 2018. Accordingly, the affidavit constitutes new
evidence that, on the basis of the record before us, appears was not discoverable before his first
motion for relief from judgment in 2014. See MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b). Therefore, MCR 6.508(D)(3)
does not bar the newly discovered evidence regarding McGowan’s statements in his affidavit. See
Johnson, 502 Mich at 565.

       Because defendant has filed a successive motion on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, he is entitled to a new trial only if he can establish the following four elements:

       (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the
       newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using

4
 Under MCR 6.508(D)(3), a trial court may not grant relief from judgment if the defendant’s
motion
       alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have been
       raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under this
       subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates

              (a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior
       motion, and

                 (b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for
       relief.

                                                   -4-
       reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4)
       the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. [Id. at 566 (quotation
       marks and citation omitted).]

         The trial court did not address the first three factors to determine whether defendant was
entitled to a new trial and we have little trouble concluding, on the basis of the record before us,
that McGowan’s affidavit satisfies the first three. The evidence presented was newly discovered
because McGowan’s affidavit did not exist until October 3, 2018, well after defendant’s first
motion for relief from judgment, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest otherwise.
Additionally, the evidence is not merely cumulative because the statements in the affidavit—that
McGowan and his brother were responsible for the shooting—were not introduced at trial. Further,
there is no evidence defendant could have obtained this information for his trial through reasonable
diligence, as he purportedly only learned of McGowan’s involvement after he became incarcerated
with McGowan after his trial. Accordingly, defendant would be entitled to relief if the new
evidence, i.e., McGowan’s testimony, would make a different result probable on retrial. See id.

       “In order to determine whether newly discovered evidence makes a different result
probable on retrial, a trial court must first determine whether the evidence is credible.” Id. at 566-
567. The Johnson Court explained:

       In making this assessment, the trial court should consider all relevant factors
       tending to either bolster or diminish the veracity of the witness’s testimony. A trial
       court’s function is limited when reviewing newly discovered evidence, as it is not
       the ultimate fact-finder; should a trial court grant a motion for relief from judgment,
       the case would be remanded for retrial, not dismissal. In other words, a trial court’s
       credibility determination is concerned with whether a reasonable juror could find
       the testimony credible on retrial.

                                               * * *

       If a witness’s lack of credibility is such that no reasonable juror would consciously
       entertain a reasonable belief in the witness’s veracity, then the trial court should
       deny a defendant’s motion for relief from judgment. However, if a witness is not
       patently incredible, a trial court’s credibility determination must bear in mind what
       a reasonable juror might make of the testimony, and not what the trial court itself
       might decide, were it the ultimate fact-finder. [Id. at 567-568 (citations omitted).]

        In this case, the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded no reasonable juror could
believe McGowan was credible simply because he was serving a life sentence without the
possibility of parole. The trial court concluded “no reasonable juror could believe McGowan’s
claim that he was the real killer and acted independently of defendant.” The trial court noted that
McGowan is serving a life sentence, that his brother—the other purported perpetrator—was
deceased, and noted “defendant has nothing to offer to corroborate McGowan’s account.” In other
words, the trial court concluded because McGowan is serving a life sentence and “has nothing to
lose” by confessing to the murder, no reasonable juror would believe him. This fact alone is
insufficient to conclude McGowan could never be found credible by any reasonable juror, and we
cannot countenance a categorical rule that would deny a potentially-innocent defendant from

                                                 -5-
obtaining postconviction relief simply because the actual perpetrator was already serving a life
sentence.5 Thus, because the trial court relied on improper reasoning and failed to “consider all
relevant factors tending to either bolster or diminish the veracity of the witness’s testimony,” see
Johnson, 502 Mich at 567, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for reconsideration
consistent with this opinion.

                                       B. REASSIGNMENT

       Defendant also contends that should the court agree with him, the matter must be
reassigned to a new trial judge on remand. We agree.

       MCR 2.003(C)(1) states, in relevant part:

              (1) Disqualification of a judge is warranted for reasons that include, but are
       not limited to, the following:

               (a) The judge is biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney.

                (b) The judge, based on objective and reasonable perceptions, has either (i)
       a serious risk of actual bias impacting the due process rights of a party as enunciated
       in Caperton v Massey, [556 US 868]; 129 S Ct 2252; 173 L Ed 2d 1208 (2009), or
       (ii) has failed to adhere to the appearance of impropriety standard set forth in Canon
       2 of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. [MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a), (b) (alteration
       in original).]

“A case should be assigned to a different judge if it would be unreasonable to expect the trial judge,
given her handling of the matter, to be able to put previously expressed findings out of mind
without substantial difficulty.” People v Pillar, 233 Mich App 267, 270-271; 590 NW2d 622
(1998).

        This matter was previously before us in Docket No. 357069. In the trial court’s first
opinion and order, the trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding: “McGowan is serving a
life without parole sentence which offers him little risk in taking the fall for a crime to which he

5
  This is not to say that the trial court may not inquire into the motivations behind McGowan’s
purported confession. However, simply concluding that McGowan could never be found credible
by a reasonable juror as a result of his incarcerated status is not, standing alone, a sufficient reason
to deny defendant’s motion. In People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692; 664 NW2d 174 (2003), for
example, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied the defendant’s motion for postconviction relief on the basis of a third-party confessor
because the purported confessor’s testimony “sharply deviated from the established facts regarding
the crime . . . .” The Supreme Court also noted that the confessor admitted to others he fabricated
the claim, had incentives to lie, and refused to provide details of the murder during the defendant’s
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 693. Taken together, these factors diminished the purported confessor’s
credibility to such an extent that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the
defendant’s motion. Id. at 693-694.

                                                  -6-
previously committed. Defendant has nothing to offer to corroborate McGowan’s account of the
crime.” This Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the matter, instructing the trial
court reconsider defendant’s motion for relief from judgment under the correct framework under
Johnson. People v Stewart, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 6, 2021
(Docket No. 357069).

        On remand, the trial court again denied defendant’s motion, using the same reasoning but
this time couching it in terms of what a “reasonable juror” would conclude:

       Considering the above, the [c]ourt concludes that no reasonable juror could believe
       McGowan’s claim that he was the real killer and acted independently of defendant.
       It is public information that McGowan is serving a life-without parole sentence,
       and that his brother, Derrick is deceased. As such, McGowan risks nothing by
       trying to accept responsibility for the crimes defendant was convicted of.
       Moreover, defendant has nothing to offer to corroborate McGowan’s account. The
       [prosecution] contend[s], and this [c]ourt agrees, if such evidence were enough to
       merit a new trial, every prisoner in the Michigan Department of Corrections would
       ask for relief as soon as they found a lifer to confess to the crime.

        Defendant’s motion has been before this particular judge twice and both times the trial
court’s analysis was the same: McGowan was not credible because he was already serving a life
sentence. It is, therefore, unreasonable to expect the trial court judge to be able to put previously
expressed findings out of mind without substantial difficulty were we to remand the case to that
judge for the third time. Accordingly, on remand, the matter must be reassigned to a new judge.
See Pillar, 233 Mich App at 270-271.

        We vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                              /s/ Noah P. Hood

                                                -7-