Court Opinion

ID: 9546287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:26:55.136914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:14.129013
License: Public Domain

HANSCUM, District Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority affirming the appellant’s judgment and conviction. I am compelled, however, to comment upon the allegations raised by the appellant of prosecutorial misconduct which were not detailed in the majority opinion.
The appellant raises several allegations of prosecutorial misconduct which are insufficient to warrant reversal in this case; but it seems the prosecutor was not entirely mindful of the standards by which the prosecutorial function properly should be performed. The prosecutor exhibited an inattentiveness towards many of the standards relating to the prosecution function during the course of proceedings in this case.
The prosecution function is surrounded by the general obligation of the prosecutor to “seek justice, not merely to convict.” American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice 3-l.l(c) (2d. ed. 1980) (hereinafter referred to as “ABA Standards”). It is this general duty with which the prosecutor in any criminal proceeding is charged.
The prosecutor in this case permitted a deputy county attorney who was not admitted to the Wyoming State Bar to participate in the prosecution. It is axiomatic that the prosecution authority should be vested in a public official. The prosecution function should be performed by a public prosecutor who is a lawyer subject to the *633standards of professional conduct and discipline (ABA Standard 3-2.1). Moreover, by statute the county attorney must be a member of the Wyoming State Bar (W.S. 18-3-301, as amended); hence anyone acting on behalf of the county attorney should be qualified in a similar manner. Similarly, the Amended Rules Adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming Providing for the Organization and Government of the Bar Association of the Attorneys at Law of the State of Wyoming provide at Rule 19 as follows:
“No attorney from any other state shall be permitted to enter his appearance in, prosecute or defend, any action pending in any court or before any tribunal, commission, board or other governmental agency of the state, whose rulings are subject to review by the courts of this state, unless he shall have associated with him in such action or proceeding an active member of the Wyoming State Bar.” (Emphasis added.)
The record on appeal reveals the participation in the prosecution of this case of an individual who was not a member of the Wyoming State Bar. While W.S. 33-5-111 permits the admission of a foreign attorney for all purposes in a particular cáse provided that he shall have associated with him during the proceeding an active member of the Wyoming State Bar, the record reveals no such admission of the deputy county attorney. See also Dorador v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 839 (1978). While there is some suggestion that the trial court acquiesced in the deputy county attorney’s participation in the prosecution, it has been ruled, “... no court is justified in permitting an appearance before it by persons outside its jurisdiction and control or unaccountable for acts committed in processes before that court_” Brown v. Riner, Wyo., 496 P.2d 907, 908 (1972).
In reviewing the record on appeal, however, I am unable to discern or ascertain any showing or prospect of prejudice to the appellant arising in connection with the ultra vires aspect of the prosecution in this regard.
The record on appeal suggests that the prosecuting attorney may have encouraged prosecution witnesses not to discuss possible testimony with the appellant or appellant’s counsel. The ABA Standards provide:
“(c) A prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct communication between prospective witnesses and defense counsel. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to advise any person or cause any person to be advised to decline to give to the defense information which such person has the right to give.” ABA Standard 3-3.1(c).
In the comments to ABA Standard 3-3.1 the reasons for the rule are explored wherein it is stated:
“Prospective witnesses are not partisans. They should be regarded as impartial and as relating the facts as they see them. Because witnesses do not ‘belong’ to either party, it is improper for a prosecutor, defense counsel, or anyone acting for either to suggest to a witness that the witness not submit to an interview by opposing counsel. It is not only proper but it may be the duty of the prosecutor and defense counsel to interview any person who may be called as a witness in the case (except that the prosecutor is not entitled to interview a defendant represented by counsel). In the event a witness asks the prosecutor or defense counsel, or a member of their staffs, whether it is proper to submit to an interview by opposing counsel or whether it is obligatory, the witness should be informed that, although there is no legal obligation to submit to an interview, it is proper and may be the duty of both counsel to interview all persons who may be witnesses and that it is in the interest of justice that the witness be available for interview by counsel.
“Counsel may properly request an opportunity to be present at opposing counsel’s interview of a witness, but counsel may not make his or her presence a condition of the interview. It is proper to call the attention of the witness to the *634problem of subscribing to a statement prepared by another person. In the event that a written statement is signed or otherwise acknowledged by the witness as a correct representation of facts known to the witness, a copy of the statement should be furnished the witness upon request.
“This standard does not impose any obligation upon a prosecutor to disclose the identity of prospective witnesses. The prosecutor’s obligation in this respect is governed by the applicable law pertaining to discovery and the furnishing of the names of witnesses who are intended to be called.”
It should be observed that this duty is a “two-way street.” It is unprofessional conduct for a defense attorney to advise a person, other than a client, to refuse to give information to the prosecutor or counsel for co-defendants. ABA Standard 4-4.-3(c). The same reasons are advanced in support of the reciprocal obligation of defense counsel to act in congruity with the prosecution standard.
The record on appeal reveals numerous instances in which the prosecutor appeared to evade discovery on the part of the appellant. While it has been said that there is no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case (Dobbins v. State, Wyo., 483 P.2d 255 (1971)) and Rule 18, W.R.Cr.P., limits discovery, it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to intentionally fail to disclose to the defense at the earliest feasible opportunity evidence which would tend to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the degree of the offense or reduce the punishment. ABA Standard 3-3.11(a). The Standard further provides that “[t]he prosecutor should comply in good faith with discovery procedures under the applicable law.” ABA Standard 3-3.11(b).
Moreover, the constitutional standards of due process require certain disclosures, i.e. of exculpatory materials, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); of evidence regarding complaining witness, Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 87 S.Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967); and of evidence of promise of leniency to a witness, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). The prosecutor may have perceived that the trial judge imposed a greater obligation to disclose information to the defense than the law requires. Yet, the trial judge must be vested with wide discretion in interpreting and applying the appropriate constitutional standards of due process to the particular set of circumstances before the trial court. In the furtherance of due administration of justice, the trial court possesses the inherent power to define the general parameters of discovery in a criminal case. State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954). It is the obligation of the prosecutor to comply. In this case the prosecutor appeared to evade numerous attempts at discovery by the appellant and appellant’s counsel; although, the level of noncompliance does not rise to a sufficient degree as to warrant reversal in this case.
The record on appeal reveals a comment by the prosecution in closing argument that the appellant was a member of an “unholy trinity.” The appellant contends that this reference constituted an impermissible injection of religion into the prosecution. While the phrase itself may be given a secular connotation, the question arises as to the permissibility of injecting the element of religion and invoking it on the side of the prosecution. The comments to the ABA Standards categorically disapprove of such remarks. The Commentary of ABA Standard 3-5.8(c) states:
“Arguments that rely on racial, religious, ethnic, political, economic, or other prejudices of the jurors introduce into the trial elements of irrelevance and irrationality that cannot be tolerated....”
While the arguments of counsel in this case could carry religious connotations, the court finds that the use of the phrase carries secular connotations so as to constitute permissible argument and not warrant reversal. This comment in and of itself might be construed as being innocuous if it were not for the later communication be*635tween the prosecutor and the appellant which revealed the fervor of the prosecution in this case.
The fervor of which I speak is exemplified by a letter which was written directly to the appellant by the prosecutor. The letter was written after the trial but at a time when the prosecutor knew that the appellant was represented by counsel. Thus, the communication was an unauthorized communication under the Canons of Ethics (See DR 7-104(A)(l)). The tone of the letter, which bears the printed biblical verse on the prosecutor’s letterhead, “ ‘he will not be disheartened or crushed until he has established justice in the earth....’ Isaiah 42:4,” gives rise to an inference of the messianic zeal of the prosecutor in this case. The letter, which is attached to the supplemental brief of the appellant as Appendix M, is replete with biblical verses and persona] opinions of the prosecutor and was improper in form and content. It should not be approved.
All told, I do not find prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to warrant reversal. At the most, it constitutes harmless error. However, the acts of the prosecutor were in several respects improper and were not sufficiently admonished in the majority opinion.