Court Opinion

ID: 9394101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 14:04:48.249057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.003613
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 5, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2021-CA-0839-MR

PHILLIP B. ALLEN                                                     APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                   FAMILY COURT DIVISION
             HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER J. MEHLING, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 94-CI-00408

TAMI V. BURGOYNE                                                       APPELLEE

                              OPINION
                           REVERSING AND
                      REMANDING WITH DIRECTIONS

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Phillip B. Allen brings this appeal from a June 25, 2021,

Order of the Kenton Circuit Court, Family Court Division, that awarded more than

two million dollars in interest on a child support arrearage. We reverse and

remand with directions.
                                           BACKGROUND

                  Phillip B. Allen and Tami V. Burgoyne were married on August 29,

1987, and had two children, Rebecca and Phillip. Rebecca was born on July 11,

1988, and Phillip was born on January 15, 1992.1 On March 15, 1994, Allen, pro

se, filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage.2 Shortly thereafter, on April 4,

1994, Christopher J. Mehling and Philip Taliaferro filed an Entry of Appearance

for Burgoyne, which was signed by Mehling. Record at 6. The record reveals that

Mehling and Taliaferro represented Burgoyne through at least July 12, 1994. On

that date, Mehling, on behalf of Burgoyne, signed an Agreed Order, substituting

William Hillman as council for Burgoyne. Record at 32.

                  The parties’ marriage was eventually dissolved by Decree of

Dissolution dated December 22, 1995. Beginning in 1995, Allen failed to make

timely child support payments, thus resulting in arrearages. For instance, by an

August 25, 1995, Agreed Order, the family court set the child support arrearage at

$21,009.26. And, by an April 13, 2000, Order, the family court set Allen’s

arrearage at $285,049.36. However, by Judgment entered May 9, 2018, the family

1
  Rebecca Allen was emancipated in 2006 and Phillip B. Allen, Jr. was emancipated in 2010.
Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.213(3), the emancipation of a child does not
terminate child support arrearages accrued while the child was a minor.
2
    The record reflects that Phillip Allen is an attorney licensed in the state of Illinois.

                                                    -2-
court determined Allen’s child support arrearage, including applicable interest, was

$135,136.50, effective as of October 26, 2017.

             After entry of the 2018 Judgment, Burgoyne filed a motion for

contempt on May 13, 2020, for Allen’s failure to comply with the 2018 Judgment.

After conducting a zoom hearing on June 24, 2020, the family court ordered the

parties to submit an interest calculation. In response, Burgoyne sought interest on

the child support arrearage dating back to April 13, 2000, when an order was

entered setting the arrearage amount at $285,049.36. Burgoyne then filed the

affidavit of J. Whitney Stith, a certified public accountant. According to Stith, the

total interest accrued on the $285,049.36 child support arrearage, set by the April

13, 2000, Order, was $2,315,571.29, as of April 27, 2021. Considering payments

made by Allen since April 13, 2000, Stith concluded that Allen’s payoff for the

arrearage was $2,289,313.38, inclusive of all accrued interest.

             Allen filed a response to Burgoyne’s motion and Stith’s affidavit.

Therein, Allen stated that he did “not question the accuracy of the calculations.”

Record at 270. Allen argued that under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)

360.040, Burgoyne was only entitled to interest from the date the arrearage

judgment was entered in 2018, effective October 26, 2017. He further argued that

it was improper and punitive to impose interest from the April 13, 2000, Order, as

it was over twenty years old.

                                         -3-
             Another Zoom hearing was conducted in June of 2021. By Order

entered June 25, 2021, the family court awarded Burgoyne interest in the amount

sought. The court stated:

             1.    In Kentucky, an award of interest on a judgment is
                   governed by KRS 360.040. The current statutory
                   rate is 12%. However, an award of interest is not
                   limited to a situation wherein a judgment has been
                   entered. In Young v. Young, [479 S.W.2d 20, 22
                   (Ky. App. 1972)], the Court of Appeals held, “The
                   intent of the statute is that interest ordinarily
                   should run from the date when each payment
                   became due and payable.”

             2.    In the present case, the arrearage became due and
                   payable when the court entered the April 13, 2000,
                   order setting [Allen]’s arrearage at $285,049.36.

             3.    [Burgoyne]’s motion is well-taken pursuant to
                   Kentucky law.

             4.    [Allen] does not question the accuracy of
                   [Burgoyne]’s calculations as set forth in the
                   affidavit of CPA, Whitney Stith.

             5.    Accordingly, the total amount due from [Allen] to
                   [Burgoyne] as of April 27, 2021, is $2,289,313.38.

Record at 273. This appeal follows.

             Allen contends the family court erroneously awarded interest in the

amount of $2,315,571.29 beginning from the April 13, 2000, Order. Allen asserts

that the child support arrearage at the time the court ordered interest in 2021 was

only $54,160, based on the county attorney’s child support records. By ordering

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over two million dollars in interest, Allen asserts that the court was acting

punitively and that he would not be able to pay same. Additionally, Allen states

that he is over 72 years old and that both children are emancipated. Other facts

will be addressed as necessary in the Opinion.

                        DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE
                          MEHLING NOT REQUIRED

             Allen’s first argument on appeal is that this Court must disqualify

Judge Mehling and vacate the June 25, 2021, Order. For the reasons stated, we

disagree.

             There is no dispute as set out in the record below that Judge Mehling,

then a practicing attorney, represented Burgoyne at the outset of this case,

beginning in April of 1994. After entering an appearance, Mehling and his partner,

Philip Taliaferro, represented Burgoyne until July 12, 1994, when another attorney

was retained. Mehling was elected as a Kenton County Family Court Judge in

November of 2006 and assumed office on January 1, 2007, whereupon this case

was assigned to his docket.

             In February of 2008, Judge Mehling apparently made the parties

aware of his potential conflict and a hearing was conducted on February 19, 2008,

in which Allen appeared by telephone. Unfortunately, the telephone conference

was conducted in chambers and was not recorded in the record of this case.

However, upon returning to the bench, Judge Mehling went back on the official

                                          -5-
court record, in the presence of Burgoyne’s counsel. Therein, he reported that he

had disclosed his prior representation of Burgoyne and the parties were both in

agreement that his recusal was not necessary. The family court noted that the

parties were to sign and tender an agreed order. Record, February 19, 2008, court

hearing, 2:37:15-2:50.

               Unfortunately, the agreed order was never tendered nor entered in the

record. However, Allen never filed any subsequent motion for Judge Mehling to

recuse, never filed an affidavit for review by the Chief Justice pursuant to KRS

26A.020, and never raised the recusal issue again until filing his appellate brief

with this Court on February 11, 2022.3

               Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Judge Mehling

sufficiently satisfied the remittal of disqualification requirement set forth in Canon

3F, of Supreme Court Rule 4.300.4 Likewise, given Allen’s failure to object on the

record or file a motion to recuse during the sixteen years that Judge Mehling was

assigned this case, he waived any objection to Judge Mehling presiding over the

case. See Bussell v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Ky. 1994).

3
 At a subsequent hearing on July 31, 2017, Allen appeared again by telephone. During the
hearing, the Judge announced again that the parties had waived his recusal in 2008, to which
Allen made no response or objection.
4
 This provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct was in effect on January 1, 2007, when Judge
Mehling assumed the bench. The current code was implemented by Supreme Court Order 2018-
04, effective January 31, 2018. The disqualification remittal provisions are essentially the same.

                                               -6-
Accordingly, any orders entered by Judge Mehling since 2007 are not void or

voidable as argued by Allen. We also take judicial notice that Judge Mehling

retired effective December 31, 2022, making his removal from this case a moot

issue on remand.

                                  INTEREST ANALYSIS

              KRS 360.040(2) controls interest on unpaid child support payments.

The statute reads:

              (2) A judgment for unpaid child support payments shall
              bear twelve percent (12%) interest compounded annually
              from the date the judgment is entered.

The law is clearly established that “[o]nce a [child support] payment becomes

delinquent, it becomes a judgment, and interest generally runs from the payment’s

due date until it is paid.” Gibson v. Gibson, 211 S.W.3d 601, 611 (Ky. App. 2006).

However, whether to award interest on a child support arrearage is clearly within

the sound discretion of the family court. Id. at 611. While the award of interest is

discretionary with the court, it may be denied “if there are factors making it

inequitable.” Id.; see also Young v. Young, 479 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Ky. 1972).5

5
  This Court is cognizant of our Supreme Court’s decision in Doyle v. Doyle, 549 S.W.3d 450
(Ky. 2018). However, that case is distinguishable from the facts of this case as it pertains to
whether postjudgment interest could be awarded on a judgment regarding marital property, not
child support arrearages. The Supreme Court concluded that the judgment was required to bear
interest. There is no language in Doyle that expressly overrules the line of cases involving
postjudgment interest on child support arrearages in Kentucky relevant to this appeal.

                                              -7-
              In this case, it is undisputed that Allen’s child support arrearages date

back to 1995. Based on our review, the record does not reflect that interest was

ever requested or referenced in any court motions or orders prior to 2018,

including the April 13, 2000, Order. In June of 2017, Burgoyne filed a motion for

contempt and further sought to reduce the arrearages to a sum certain. At a hearing

on July 31, 2017, the family court specifically addressed the consequences of

entering a judgment, including the accumulation of postjudgment interest thereon.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Burgoyne requested the court to not enter a

judgment, but rather a specific payment schedule for Allen, that was formalized

into an Agreed Order entered August 24, 2017. Record at 201. Thereafter, in

September of 2017, after Allen failed to comply with all of the agreed terms, the

family court requested the child support collection division to provide an audit of

the arrearage collections.6 A report was filed with the family court in October of

2017 that reflected the total child support owed by Allen as of October 26, 2017, to

be $135,136.80, for which the family court announced a judgment would be

entered at a hearing on that date. Record at 213. The record also reflects that the

family court inquired of the possibility of settlement and the matter was passed to a

6
 Presumably this is an office within the Kenton County Attorney’s Office responsible for
collecting child support payments.

                                              -8-
hearing in February of 2018. By Judgment entered May 9, 2018, following a

hearing on February 21, 2018, the family court ruled as follows:

             IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that
             all amounts owed by [Allen], including applicable
             interest, are hereby reduced to a judgment in the amount
             of $135,136.50, effective October 26, 2017. It is further
             ORDERED AND ADJUGED that [Allen]’s monthly
             child support arrearage payments be increased to $2000
             and paid through the Division of Child Support, due the
             15th day of each month.

Record at 216.

             This Judgment clearly states that interest had been included in the

judgment through October 26, 2017. The language therein establishes that this was

a final and appealable judgment per Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)

54.01. Equally important, the Judgment was prepared by counsel for Burgoyne

and tendered to the family court for entry. Neither party contested nor appealed

this Judgment. Thus, it became binding on both parties to this action and a final

adjudication regarding accrued interest through October of 2017. Inexplicably, the

June 25, 2021, Order entered by the family court setting the current arrearage,

inclusive of interest at $2,289,313.38, makes no reference whatsoever to the

judgment entered May 9, 2018. This, on its face, was clearly an error of law, as

                                        -9-
well as an abuse of discretion that requires reversal of the family court’s order

entered June 25, 2021.7

                On remand, pursuant to KRS 360.040(2), the family court shall limit

Burgoyne’s motion for postjudgment interest on the child support arrearage to the

period beginning after October 26, 2017, the effective date of the May 9, 2018,

Judgment. Also, the family court shall limit the application of postjudgment

interest to amounts accruing on the judgment balance of $135,136.50. Of course,

Allen shall be given credit for any and all payments made after October 26, 2017.

                For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Kenton Circuit Court,

Family Court Division, is reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order

on the child support arrearage consistent with this Opinion.

                ALL CONCUR.

    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:

    Phillip B. Allen, Pro Se                    Michelle L. Burden
    Richmond, California                        Ft. Michell, Kentucky

7
 We do not reach or address the issue of whether the award of over $2,300,000 of interest on the
child support arrearage was inequitable, which was not addressed by the family court below.
However, we note that this award of interest was more than seventeen times the amount of the
arrearage Judgment entered on May 9, 2018.

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