Court Opinion

ID: 9612676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:10:32.805696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:51.213906
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
with whom KAUGER, Justice, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part II of the court’s opinion which holds that in a medical malpractice action to recover for a failed sterilization the plaintiff does not have a duty to mitigate damages by undergoing an abortion or placing the unplanned child for adoption. I dissent from Part I which pronounces that the wronged patient may not recover damages equal to the costs of raising the healthy but unintended offspring. I disagree with Justice Hodges’ conclusion that the plaintiff’s sole remedy lies in an action for breach of contract.1
It must be noted at the outset that in suits arising from a failed sterilization damages are sought for the physician’s substandard performance of a surgical procedure designed to prevent a woman from being able to conceive. The disputes here *191before us bear no legal or logical resemblance to those which may be spawned in the aftermath of a surgical or medical interruption of pregnancy by abortion.2 A person’s decision not to conceive a child and to undergo surgical sterilization should not be confused with one’s decision to' abort a child already conceived.
In my view the parent’s recovery should extend to:
(1) the costs of a failed sterilization procedure and of a repeated surgery, should the plaintiff desire to undergo another operation to correct the former, and damages for pain and suffering,
(2) compensation for the plaintiff’s mental and emotional distress, loss of consortium, lost wages, and hospital and medical expenses incident to pregnancy, labor, prenatal and postnatal care, together with
(3) the costs of raising the child to majority.
These elements of damage are, of course, subject to being offset (a) by the anticipated monetary contribution the parents may receive from the child after it reaches majority and (b) by the emotional or other benefits, if any be shown, the parents are likely to derive from the companionship and love of the child.3
Procreative self-determination is rooted in the constitutional shield of privacy.4 It is entitled to the same recognition and protection as that given to other constitutional guarantees.5 One’s liberty to determine when or even whether one will reproduce is vital to the existence of a civilized society and goes to the very essence of human dignity. There is no reason to single out a physician’s invasion of this constitutionally protected interest for a diminished measure of recoverable compensation.
Both federal and state governments foster the exercise of procreative self-determination through an extensive network of family planning programs. The Family Planning Services and Population Research *192Act of 1970 authorizes federal funding for family planning services, education, and research concerning contraceptive development.6 Similarly, the Oklahoma legislature has established family planning centers7 as a tool of implementing its declared policy that “[f]amily planning services are ... essential to the health and welfare of the citizens of Oklahoma.” [Emphasis added]8
Everyday, millions of people throughout this Nation exercise their protected liberty interest in procreative self-determination by the use of contraceptives. These people use contraceptives because they choose not to have children, healthy or otherwise.9 Their decision is often dictated by lack of emotional or financial resources to raise a well-kept child.10 The birth of an unplanned healthy and normal offspring unquestionably imposes emotional and economic stress on the parents’ psyche and on their financial resources. No amount of rhetoric can paper over this undeniable fact of real life. Contraception has thus become an integral part of the American family unit.11 Unimpeded access by legally competent adults to birth-prevention devices of their choice merits full-scale judicial protection. The law’s solicitude for this value must be expressed in no less than complete vindication for those who are harmed by the substandard administration of medical or surgical sterilization procedures. Contraceptive access rights, if any, of underage individuals or of those who may be under legal disability are not implicated in the cases before us today. That issue is left unaddressed.
A physician’s failure to accomplish a successful sterilization procedure directly causes the parents to put forth a substantial amount of money and emotional energy to discharge a familial responsibility to which they had already decided not to allot any of their available resources.12 The ensuing financial and emotional burdens are a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. A fundamental and time-honored tenet of tort law is to hold the actor liable for all damages which are a direct result of the wrong.13 Fairness requires that the injured party receive full compensation for the harm suffered.14
An award of child-rearing costs is consistent with public interest in minimizing substandard medical practice. It would provide an incentive for physicians to take greater care when performing sterilization procedures. Great violence is done to the law’s symmetry that places like interests under the same rubric when a limited recovery is fashioned for the harm from one particular type of medical procedure. There is no basis for the conclusion that want of due care in sterilizations deserves lesser quantum of compensation than negligent performance of other medical procedures.15 Child-rearing costs are not speculative; they are routinely calculated by actuaries for estate planners and insurance companies.16 These costs are also familiar to and well understood by the average citizen.
*193Procreative self-determination deserves complete judicial protection as a value firmly anchored on the constitutional guarantee of privacy. A meaningful shield for this liberty violates no espoused principle of public policy. On the contrary, it is consistent with both federal and state legislation and with contemporary societal mores. Recovery of child-rearing costs does no discredit to the value of human life. It compensates the injured party for the diversion and diminution that family resources suffer because of a physician’s professional negligence.17 Recognition of harm dealt the parents by the birth of an unplanned child neither disparages the value of human life nor ignores the intangible benefits of parenthood; it realistically appraises that “parental pleasure softens but does not eradicate economic reality.” 18 In short, ample recovery for the consequences of conception that should have been prevented by the exercise of due professional care will vigorously further our society’s goal to achieve a stable family structure through population control.19

. A majority of states have recognized a tort action for unsuccessful sterilization. In those jurisdictions, the plaintiff does not stand confined to the breach-of-contract remedy. See Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172,347 S.E.2d 743, 747, footnote 2 [1986]. Jackson allowed recovery for a physician’s failure to replace an IUD during surgery for an ovarian cyst. The court found no basis for placing medical procedures related to birth control into a distinct tort category that warrants less legal protection than that which is accorded other medical procedures.
It is quite possible that an ex contractu claim might support many, if not all, of the same elements of damage that a tort action would yield. By the teaching of Hadley v. Baxendate, 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng.Rep. 145, 154 [1854], a* contractu recovery is allowed for those damages which "may fairly and reasonably be considered arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself." In the circumstances of a failed sterilization, it is clearly foreseeable that (a) if the defendant-physician were negligent in the performance of a birth-prevention procedure, the plaintiff would likely become pregnant, and that (b) no patient willing to undergo surgical sterilization would be desirous of having a child. The expense of raising the unplanned child is hence a foreseeable consequence of a failed sterilization procedure.

. Sterilization means any procedure by which an individual is rendered incapable of reproduction, while abortion means the premature expulsion from the uterus of the products of conception. See, Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 23rd ed. (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1957), pp. 4 and 1302.
"Tubal ligation is the most commonly employed sterilization procedure for women. It generally, but not always, results in sterility. Where pregnancy occurs following an unsuccessful attempt at sterilization, a cause of action may lie for wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy, based on negligence or breach of contract -” See, Medical and Hospital Law, infra note 4 at p. 19-4.

. The monetary-contribution offset is likely to be minimal since there are many welfare and retirement programs which provide for support of parents in their later years. See also, Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518 [1971], where the court remarked that "[tjhere is a growing recognition that the financial ‘services: which parents can expect from their offspring are largely illusory.” Troppi allowed the plaintiff to recover child-raising expenses for a healthy infant against a pharmacist who negligently filled a birth control prescription.
The love-and-companionship offset consists of the same elements as those for which parents may recover in actions for the wrongful death of a child. See, 12 O.S. 1981 § 1055.

. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-156, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726-728, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 [1973] and Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 [1965]; see also, Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, infra note 5 at 175.
“Competent [£«i juris ] women have a constitutionally protected right to voluntary sterilization. Sterilization is a legal and medically accepted method of birth control which carries no civil or criminal liabilities for its performance. A state may not restrict voluntary sterilization without proving a compelling need to do so. This right to sterilization comes within a woman’s fundamental right to privacy in matters of reproduction — ” [Emphasis supplied.] S. Sandy Sanbar, M.D., Ph.D., J.D., Medical and Hospital Law [Oklahoma City: Law of Medicine Publications, 1987], p. 19-4.

. See, Ochs v. Borelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883, 885 [1982] (in an action for negligent tubal ligation parents recovered full child-rearing costs instead of compensation limited to mild birth defect); Troppi v. Scarf, supra note 3, 187 N.W.2d at 517; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 [Minn.1977] (parents entitled to costs of raising a healthy child in an action for negligent performance of vasectomy); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 [1976] (parents could recover child-rearing expenses for a healthy child in an action arising from negligent tubal ligation). See also Annot., Tort Liability For Wrongfully Causing One To Be Born, 83 ALR3d 15, §§ 21-25 [1978].

. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 et seq. [1982].

. 63 O.S. 1981 §§ 2071-2075.

. 63 O.S. 1981 § 2071.

. Troppi v. Scarf, supra note 3, 187 N.W.2d at 517.

. University of Ariz v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294, 1299 [1983] (parents recovered child-raising expenses for a healthy child in an action to recover for negligent performance of vasectomy).

. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra note 5 at 175.

. Troppi v. Scarf, supra note 3, 187 N.W.2d at 513.

. University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, supra note 10 at 1300; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra note 5 at 175 and Troppi v. Scarf, supra note 3, 187 N.W.2d at 514.

. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra note 5 at 175 and Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal.App.3d 698, 127 Cal.Rptr. 652 [1976] (the mother was allowed to recover child-rearing expenses for a healthy infant in her action for a negligently performed abortion).

. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra note 5 at 175.

. Jones v. Malinowski, infra note 19 at 436.

. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra note 5 at 173.

. Ochs v. Borelli, supra note 5 at 445 A.2d 885-886.

.Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429, 435 [1984] (parents allowed compensation for raising a healthy child in an action for negligent tubal laparoscopy).