Court Opinion

ID: 9906049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:03:29.912587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.054296
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 In re Daisy H. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re Daisy H., a Person Coming                                 B321581
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                          Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP07594A)
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 Victor H.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
     Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Victor H.
     Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Respondent Irene I.
     Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Respondent Minor Daisy H.
       Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services.
                 _________________________________
                          INTRODUCTION
       Victor H., the alleged father of minor Daisy H., appeals
from the juvenile court’s June 14, 2022 order denying his request
for presumed father status.1 On appeal, Victor argues the
juvenile court denied him due process by failing to designate him
as the child’s presumed father and to appoint counsel for him at
or prior to the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Victor
asserts these alleged errors were prejudicial because they
required him to establish himself as a third presumed parent
later in the proceedings, after the juvenile court found another
man to be Daisy’s presumed father. We conclude Victor forfeited
his right to challenge the juvenile court’s earlier paternity rulings
because he failed to timely appeal those rulings, and no exception
to the forfeiture rule applies. We further conclude the juvenile
court did not err in denying Victor’s request to be found a third
presumed parent, because he did not have an existing parental
relationship with Daisy. We accordingly affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Dependency petition
       Irene I. (Mother) is the mother of Daisy (born July 2015)
and Beverly S. (born December 2017). In the children’s

1    We refer to the minors and their relatives by their first
names to protect the minors’ personal privacy. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.401(a)(2), (a)(3).)

                                 2
respective birth certificates, Victor is listed as the father of Daisy,
and Javier is listed as the father of Beverly.
      As of November 2019, when the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) first
became involved with the family, Mother and Javier were living
together and had been in a relationship for about three years.
Both Daisy and Beverly resided with Mother and Javier, and
Daisy referred to Javier as her “daddy.” Mother reported Victor
was incarcerated, but provided no other information as to his
whereabouts.
      On November 25, 2019, DCFS filed a dependency petition
for Daisy and Beverly under Welfare and Institutions Code2
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). As amended, the petition
alleged the children were at substantial risk of harm because
(1) Mother and Javier engaged in a violent physical altercation
with Javier’s ex-girlfriend in the children’s presence; (2) Mother
had a history of substance abuse and was a current abuser of
methamphetamines; and (3) Victor had a history of substance
abuse and drug-related convictions. In its detention report,
DCFS listed Victor’s last known address as an address in
Huntington Park, California.
II.   Detention hearing
      Referee Robin Kesler presided over the November 26, 2019
detention hearing, and Judge Mary Kelly presided over the
subsequent hearings. At the detention hearing, Mother
submitted a parentage questionnaire for Daisy in which she
indicated that Victor was present at the child’s birth and signed

2     Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                  3
the birth certificate naming him as the father, that Victor had
openly held himself out as the father, and that Victor had
received the child into his home. During the hearing, the court
inquired about Daisy’s parentage. When asked about the last
time she saw Victor, Mother replied, “Maybe like 2016.” When
asked if Victor provided any financial assistance or child support
for Daisy, Mother responded, “That I know of, I don’t know.”
Mother denied that she knew Victor’s relatives or had social
media contact with them. She also denied that Victor visited
Daisy.
       The court found Victor to be an alleged father of Daisy, and
stated it would make further inquiry once Victor appeared in
court and the child’s birth certificate was obtained. The court
ordered that Daisy remain released to Mother, and that DCFS
conduct a due diligence search for Victor. The court found Javier
to be the presumed father of Beverly, and ordered that Beverly
remain released to Mother and Javier. The court set the
adjudication hearing for February 4, 2020.
III. Jurisdictional and dispositional hearing
       On January 23, 2020, DCFS filed its jurisdictional and
dispositional report. In its due diligence search, DCFS learned
that Victor was in custody at a federal prison in Mendota,
California. He was scheduled to be released on August 11, 2020.
Victor also had an extensive criminal record, including prior
convictions for possession and use of a controlled substance.
Mother stated that she ended her relationship with Victor due to
his drug use and gang activity. DCFS’s report included a notice
of hearing and proof of service, which indicated that it sent Victor
notice of the February 4, 2020 adjudication hearing via certified
mail at his place of incarceration. The notice advised Victor that

                                 4
he had a right to be present at the hearing and to be represented
by an attorney.
       At the February 4, 2020 adjudication hearing, both Mother
and Javier appeared with their respective counsel. The juvenile
court began by stating that it had an off-the-record discussion
with the parents, “explaining that [Victor] is in a federal
correctional facility in Mendota, California. The [dependency]
investigator has been trying to reach [Victor] but has not been
successful. All parties agree that bifurcating is not practical in
this matter even though [Victor] is only named in one count. So
we’ve discussed as a plan to . . . ask the social worker to reach out
to [Victor] and determine whether or not [he] would like an
attorney.” The court ordered DCFS to report back on whether it
was able to make contact with Victor and whether he wished to
have counsel appointed. The court continued the adjudication
hearing.
       In a last minute information for the court (LMI) report filed
on March 9, 2020, DCFS indicated that it had interviewed Victor
by telephone in February 2020 at the federal prison. Victor
stated that he had not had any contact with Mother since his
detention, and before then, he had only limited contact with
Mother and Daisy. He admitted he had a history of substance
abuse and drug-related convictions. He also told DCFS that he
wanted to have a relationship with Daisy and to have counsel
appointed to represent him.
       On March 10, 2020, the juvenile court held a progress
report hearing. DCFS’s counsel informed the court that Victor
was in federal custody and wanted the appointment of counsel.
The court specially appointed attorney Ken Nielsen as a friend of
the court to reach out to Victor. The record does not disclose,

                                  5
however, whether Nielsen made any attempt to do so. Due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the adjudication hearing was again
continued.
       In May 2020, Mother informed the children’s social worker
that Victor had called her demanding to see Daisy, and that
Mother was disturbed by the call. The social worker then
contacted Victor at the telephone number provided by Mother,
and tried to advise him that DCFS had to monitor any contact he
had with Daisy. Victor interrupted, however, and stated that he
knew his rights, he was not the offending parent, and he would
not be told when and where to see his daughter. Victor refused
the social worker’s request that they meet about the case and told
her not to call him again. The dependency investigator also
reached out to Victor via text message, but he did not reply.
On May 19, 2020, the dependency investigator learned Victor had
been released to a halfway house in Los Angeles, and left a
telephone message for his case manager.
       In June 2020, Mother reported to DCFS that Victor
continued to harass her and make demands to see Daisy.
The dependency investigator again attempted to contact Victor,
but he refused to engage in conversation or to meet to discuss the
next court hearing and a visitation schedule for Daisy. Instead,
Victor became angry and accused the dependency investigator of
making false allegations to keep him from his child. The
dependency investigator also contacted the halfway house again
and received confirmation that Victor continued to reside there.
For the next scheduled hearings held on June 30, 2020 and
August 19, 2020, DCFS sent Victor notices of the hearings via
certified mail at his halfway house address. Victor did not,
however, appear for either of those hearings.

                                6
       After several continuances, the adjudication hearing was
set for January 11, 2021. While the record does not disclose
when Victor left the halfway house, DCFS stated in a LMI report
filed on November 19, 2020 that Victor’s whereabouts were then
unknown. On that date, DCFS sent Victor notice of the
January 11, 2021 hearing via certified mail at his former
Huntington Park address.
       On January 11, 2021, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Victor did not appear
and was not represented by counsel at the hearing. The court
sustained the counts in the section 300 petition related to
substance abuse by Mother and Victor, and dismissed the counts
related to domestic violence involving Mother and Javier.
The court declared Daisy and Beverly dependents of the court
under section 300, subdivision (b), ordered the children released
to the home of Mother and Javier under the supervision of DCFS,
and granted Mother and Javier family maintenance services.
The court bypassed reunification services for Victor, stating that
“although [Victor] did surface recently, he has remained
whereabouts unknown. So the court has no basis to impose
reunification services for him.”
       The corresponding minute order for the January 11, 2021
hearing showed that the deputy court clerk served both Victor
and Mother with a notice of entry of the minute order and appeal
rights form via regular mail, although the mailing addresses used
were not listed. Victor did not file an appeal from the January
11, 2021 jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
IV. Supplemental petition
       On June 9, 2021, DCFS filed a supplemental petition for
Daisy and Beverly under section 387 based on Mother’s alleged

                                7
abuse of methamphetamines. In an addendum report filed that
same date, DCFS indicated that a federal inmate search revealed
that Victor was incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention
Center in Los Angeles, and was scheduled for release on
September 3, 2021. Mother told DCFS that she did not know any
details about Victor’s incarceration. Mother also stated that
Daisy had not seen Victor since she was one or two years old, and
that Daisy did not have any connection to Victor’s family.
       On June 11, 2021, Javier filed a Statement Regarding
Parentage (JV-505) form for Daisy. According to Javier, Daisy
had been living with him since 2016. He told everyone Daisy was
his daughter, he was involved in her everyday life, and he
provided for all of her needs. Javier also stated that Daisy saw
him as her father, and that he was the only father she had ever
known.
       In a LMI report filed on June 14, 2021, DCFS advised the
court that it did not oppose Daisy being released to Javier if he
was found to be her presumed father. DCFS noted that Javier
had been raising, supporting, and caring for Daisy for the past
four years, and that he wanted the child to remain in his custody.
Daisy referred to Javier as her father and appeared to feel safe in
his care.
       On June 14, 2021, the juvenile court held a detention
hearing on the section 387 petition. The court began by
expressing concern about Victor’s paternity status. The court
noted that, at the prior detention hearing on the section 300
petition, Referee Kesler found Victor to be an alleged father only,
even though Mother’s questionnaire indicated that Victor was
present at the child’s birth, signed the birth certificate, received
the child into his home, and supported the child until sometime

                                 8
in 2016. The court also noted that Javier had been in Daisy’s life
since then, that Javier held himself out as the child’s father and
provided her with care and support, and that the child believed
Javier was her father. The court stated that, if it had made the
original paternity finding, it would have found Victor “to be a
presumed father as well,” but Victor “is not represented by
counsel” and “[t]here’s been no request to revisit that finding.”
       The court found Javier to be the presumed father of Daisy.
The court detained both Daisy and Beverly from Mother and
ordered them released to Javier. The court ordered DCFS to
contact Victor at his place of incarceration to advise him of
Daisy’s detention and to inquire if he wanted an attorney and
presumed father status. The court set an adjudication hearing on
the section 387 petition for September 14, 2021. DCFS sent
Victor notice of the adjudication hearing via certified mail at his
place of incarceration. The notice advised Victor that he had a
right to be present at the hearing and to be represented by an
attorney.
       In its jurisdictional and dispositional report filed on
August 30, 2021, DCFS stated that the children remained in
Javier’s care. Although the dependency investigator had made
multiple attempts to contact the federal prison, she had not been
able to speak to anyone there. Mother reported to DCFS that she
had a history of domestic violence with Victor, and that she
intended to obtain a restraining order against him once he was
released from prison. Mother also stated that Daisy considered
Javier to be her father.
       The adjudication hearing on the section 387 petition was
continued to September 17, 2021. At the hearing, DCFS’s
counsel noted that Victor had attempted to call in, and asked that

                                9
he be present before proceeding with disposition. Later in the
hearing, the juvenile court stated, “We thought we had [Victor].
I don’t know if he’s having technical difficulties. That is his
number confirmed by [counsel]. However, he was not able to
state his name and the court is uncomfortable proceeding in a
confidential matter without someone being able to state who they
are.” The court sustained the section 387 petition, ordered that
both Daisy and Beverly remain dependents of the court, and
released them to Javier under the supervision of DCFS.
V.     Victor’s request for presumed father status
       On January 11, 2022, attorney Katherine Mitchell filed a
walk-on request on Victor’s behalf, seeking the appointment of
counsel for Victor and a DNA test for both Daisy and Beverly.
The request stated that Victor had been released from
incarceration, and that he wished to elevate his paternity status
pending the results of the DNA test. The request attached a
Statement Regarding Parentage (JV-505) form in which Victor
indicated that Daisy lived with him from birth until February
2017, that he told everyone she was his child and was involved in
her day-to-day childcare activities, and that he sent money for
her a few times a year until October 2021. Mitchell also filed a
Notification of Mailing Address (JV-140) form for Victor, which
reflected that Victor was residing in Anchorage, Alaska.
       On January 21, 2022, the juvenile court appointed counsel
for Victor. On February 8, 2022, the court set a contested
hearing on Victor’s request for presumed father status, and
ordered the parties to submit briefing on the matter. On
March 18, 2022, the court ordered DCFS to assess Victor for
visits with Daisy, and ordered Victor to make himself available
for the assessment. Following continuances on April 27, 2022

                               10
and May 13, 2022, the contested hearing on Victor’s request for
presumed father status was set for June 14, 2022.
       In a LMI report filed on April 26, 2022, DCFS stated that it
had been unsuccessful in assessing Victor for visitation due to his
lack of communication. Between February and April 2022, the
social worker repeatedly attempted to contact Victor to discuss
his availability for visits with Daisy. Victor often did not respond
to these attempts to reach him. When he did respond, Victor told
the social worker he was busy and would call back later, but he
did not do so.
       Both Victor’s counsel and Daisy’s counsel submitted briefs
regarding the request for presumed father status. Victor claimed
that he qualified as Daisy’s presumed father because he signed
the birth certificate, received Daisy into his home, and openly
held Daisy out as his child. He contended that these facts were
known to the court at the initial detention hearing, and that the
court erred in failing to designate him as the presumed father at
that time. He also argued that, although the court previously
found Javier to be Daisy’s presumed father, it should find Victor
to be a third presumed parent because it would be detrimental to
the child not to do so. In opposing the request, Daisy’s counsel
asserted that Victor waived any argument that the court’s prior
paternity finding was erroneous by failing to timely appeal that
ruling. Daisy’s counsel further argued that Victor did not qualify
as a third presumed parent because he did not have an existing
relationship with Daisy.
       On June 14, 2022, the juvenile court held the contested
hearing on Victor’s request for presumed father status. Victor
was represented by counsel at the hearing, but he did not appear.
The court denied the request, finding that Victor did not qualify

                                11
as a third presumed parent of Daisy. The court explained:
“[T]his father did have a relationship at one point, but it’s too
little too late, and the child has an established relationship with
[Javier]. [¶] [Victor] is the biological father. I am not going to
elevate him to presumed. I do find that the facts relayed by
[Daisy’s counsel] are more persuasive. [Victor] was given the
opportunity to assert himself in this case very early on. [He] did
not. This case has limped along and . . . in the last six months
[Victor] has asked to come in and be another father. [¶] So I do
find that [Victor] is the biological father for the minor, but I do
not believe that these facts warrant having a third parent. Those
are reserved for rare circumstances, and . . . I don’t believe it’s
appropriate. And I don’t believe it’s in the best interest of the
child to have three parents.”
        On June 16, 2022, Victor filed a notice of appeal. In his
notice, Victor stated that he was appealing the “court’s denial of
[his] request to be found presumed.” He also checked the box for
“Other appealable orders relating to dependency,” and specified
that the appealed order was the “[d]enial of request for presumed
status.” Victor identified the hearing date of the appealed order
as January 21, 2022; February 8, 2022; March 18, 2022; April 27,
2022; May 13, 2022; and June 14, 2022.3

3     Victor requests that this court take judicial notice of (1) the
juvenile court’s postappeal orders terminating jurisdiction over
Daisy and granting sole legal and physical custody to Javier with
no visitation for Victor, and (2) Victor’s notice of appeal from the
termination and custody orders. Victor asserts these records are
relevant to showing that he appealed the termination order as a

                                 12
                           DISCUSSION
       Although Victor appeals from the juvenile court’s June 14,
2022 order denying his request for presumed father status, he
argues the errors underlying that order occurred much earlier in
the case. Victor contends the juvenile court denied him due
process by failing to designate him as Daisy’s presumed father
and to appoint counsel for him at the November 26, 2019
detention hearing, and then by proceeding with the January 11,
2021 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in his absence and
without representation by counsel. Victor claims these errors
caused him undue prejudice at the June 14, 2022 hearing on his
request for presumed father status by requiring Victor, rather
than Javier, to establish himself as a third presumed parent.
I.     Victor cannot challenge the juvenile court’s
       November 26, 2019 and January 11, 2021 rulings
       DCFS and Mother assert that Victor is procedurally barred
from challenging the juvenile court’s findings and orders at the
November 26, 2019 detention hearing and the January 11, 2021
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing because he failed to file a
timely appeal from those rulings, and he cannot show a violation
of his due process rights that would excuse such failure.
We agree that Victor forfeited his right to challenge the juvenile
court’s earlier paternity rulings, and that no exception to the
forfeiture rule applies in this case.

means of preserving the issues raised in his current appeal.
We grant Victor’s unopposed request for judicial notice. (Evid.
Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)

                                 13
      A.       Victor forfeited his claims by failing to timely
               appeal the January 11, 2021 dispositional order
       “ ‘ “[A]n appealable judgment or order is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to an appeal.” ’ ” (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
70, 74.) In dependency proceedings, appeals are governed by
section 395, which provides in relevant part that “[a] judgment in
a proceeding under [s]ection 300 may be appealed in the same
manner as any final judgment, and any subsequent order may be
appealed as an order after judgment.” (§ 395, subd. (a)(1); see
In re A.A. (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1234.) The judgment and
first appealable order in a dependency case is the dispositional
order. (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 532; In re A.O. (2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 145, 148.) “ ‘ “A consequence of section 395 is
that an unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final
and binding and may not be attacked on an appeal from a later
appealable order.” ’ ” (In re S.B., at p. 532.)
       It is also well-established that “ ‘the timely filing of an
appropriate notice of appeal or its legal equivalent is an absolute
prerequisite to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.’ ” (In re J.F.,
supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 74.) A notice of appeal must be filed
within 60 days after the juvenile court makes the appealable
judgment or order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).)
“An appeal from the most recent order in a dependency matter
may not challenge earlier orders for which the time for filing an
appeal has passed.” (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th
998, 1018.) Accordingly, “ ‘[o]nce the deadline [to appeal] expires,
the appellate court has no power to entertain the appeal.’ ” (In re
A.O., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 148.)
       A notice of appeal is sufficient if it identifies the particular
judgment or order being appealed. (Cal. Rules of Court,

                                  14
rules 8.100(a)(2), 8.405(a)(3).) The notice must be “ ‘liberally
construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably
clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where
the respondent could not possibly have been misled or
prejudiced.’ ” (In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272.)
Nevertheless, “when a notice of appeal manifests a ‘ “clear and
unmistakable” ’ intent to appeal only from one order, we cannot
liberally construe the notice to apply to a different, omitted
order.” (In re J.F., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 76.) “ ‘We have no
jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.’ ”
(Id. at p. 75.)
       Here, Victor seeks to challenge the juvenile court’s alleged
error at the November 26, 2019 detention hearing in failing to
elevate him to presumed father status and to appoint counsel to
represent him. He also seeks to challenge the court’s alleged
error at the January 11, 2021 jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing in asserting jurisdiction over Daisy when Victor was
neither present nor represented by counsel at the hearing.
However, Victor did not file an appeal from the January 11, 2021
dispositional order, and the time for doing so has since expired.
The unappealed dispositional order is therefore final and binding,
and cannot be attacked in Victor’s current appeal.
       In addition, Victor’s notice of appeal makes no reference to
the court’s earlier findings and orders at either the November 26,
2019 detention hearing or the January 11, 2021 jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing. Instead, the notice makes clear Victor
is appealing from the postdispositional order denying his request
for presumed father status. But Victor did not seek to elevate his
paternity status until January 11, 2022, one year after the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Because Victor did not

                                15
timely appeal from the juvenile court’s earlier paternity rulings,
he forfeited his right to challenge the rulings in this appeal.
       B.    Victor has not shown the due process exception
             to the forfeiture rule should apply
       The purpose of the forfeiture rule is “to balance the parents’
interest in the care and custody of their children with the
children’s interest in the expeditious resolution of their custody
status.” (In re T.G. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 976, 984.) However,
the forfeiture rule is not absolute, and “must not be applied if
‘due process forbids it.’ ” (Id. at p. 985; see In re Janee J. (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 198, 208.) In most cases, “the forfeiture rule does
not infringe upon a parent’s due process rights because of the
numerous safeguards built into the dependency system.” (In re
T.G., at p. 985.) For the due process exception to the forfeiture
rule to apply, the parent must show there was a defect in the
proceedings that “fundamentally undermined the statutory
scheme” so as to prevent the parent “from availing himself or
herself of the protections afforded by the scheme as a whole.”
(In re Janee J., at p. 208.) Moreover, the defect “must go beyond
mere errors that might have been held reversible had they been
properly and timely reviewed.” (Id. at p. 209.) We generally
review de novo whether a parent has shown a due process
violation. (In re J.F. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 321, 329.)
       Victor contends the juvenile court violated his due process
rights when it failed to designate him as Daisy’s presumed father
and to appoint counsel for him prior to adjudicating the
section 300 petition. According to Victor, the court should have,
of its own accord, found that he was Daisy’s presumed father
based on the information provided by Mother at the November
26, 2019 detention hearing. Victor claims that, if the court had

                                 16
elevated him to presumed father status at the detention hearing,
he would have been entitled to the immediate appointment of
counsel and to custody and reunification services once he
appeared. We conclude Victor’s due process claim lacks merit.
       Dependency law recognizes three categories of fathers:
alleged, biological, and presumed. (In re H.R. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 1277, 1283; In re D.P. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 689,
695.) The extent of a father’s rights in a dependency proceeding
depends on his paternal status. (In re D.P., at p. 695.) “A man
who may be the father of a child but has not established his
biological paternity, or achieved presumed father status, is an
alleged father.” (In re H.R., at p. 1283.) “ ‘An alleged father has
limited due process and statutory rights.’ [Citation.] ‘He is not
entitled to appointed counsel or to reunification services.’ ”
(Ibid.) Rather, “ ‘[d]ue process for an alleged father requires only
that he be given notice and an opportunity to appear and assert a
position and attempt to change his paternity status.’ ” (Ibid.)
       At the detention hearing, or as soon as otherwise
practicable, the juvenile court must inquire of the mother and
any other appropriate person as to the identity and address of all
possible presumed or alleged fathers. (§ 316.2, subd. (a); Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.635(a).) “Once identified, any alleged
father should receive notice by certified mail of the proceedings
and the fact that the proceedings could result in the termination
of parental rights.” (In re H.R., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1284.) The court is not required, however, to elevate an
alleged father to presumed father status absent a request. (In re
O.S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1410.) Instead, once an
alleged father “appears at a hearing in dependency matter . . .
and requests a judgment of parentage on form JV-505, the court

                                 17
must determine: [¶] (1) Whether that person is the biological
parent of the child; and [¶] (2) Whether that person is the
presumed parent of the child, if that finding is requested.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.635(h).) Thus, “[t]o be declared a presumed
father under Family Code section 7611, a man must ask the
[court] to make such a determination and establish the existence
of the foundational facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
[Citation.] . . . [T]he court cannot sua sponte make such a
declaration . . . .” (In re O.S., at p. 1410, fn. omitted.)
       In this case, Mother submitted a parentage questionnaire
for Daisy at the November 26, 2019 detention hearing. Although
Mother’s responses in the questionnaire suggested that Victor
qualified for presumed father status, her statements to the court
during the hearing were more equivocal. When the court
inquired about Victor’s paternity status, Mother stated that she
last saw Victor in 2016, that he did not visit Daisy, and that she
did not know if he provided Daisy with financial assistance or
support. Based on the information provided by Mother, the court
stated that it was finding Victor to be an alleged father “at this
time,” and that it would make further inquiry once Victor
appeared in the proceedings and the court received a copy of the
child’s birth certificate. Because Victor’s whereabouts were
unknown as of the detention hearing, the court ordered DCFS to
conduct a due diligence search for him.
       After learning that Victor was in a federal prison, DCFS
provided him with notice of the February 4, 2020 adjudication
hearing via certified mail at his place of incarceration. When
Victor was later released from prison to a halfway house in
Los Angeles, DCFS provided him with notice of the June 30, 2020
status review hearing and the August 19, 2020 continued

                               18
adjudication hearing via certified mail at his halfway house
address. Each notice advised Victor that he had a right to be
present at the hearing and to be represented by an attorney.
Victor did not, however, appear for any of those hearings. DCFS
also tried to make telephone contact with Victor following his
release from prison, but in response, he was openly hostile
toward the social worker, refused to meet to discuss the case, and
told her not to call him again. The record therefore reflects that,
prior to the January 11, 2021 jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing, Victor was given notice of the proceedings and an
opportunity to appear and attempt to change his paternity
status, but he failed to avail himself of that opportunity.
       In his appellate brief, Victor asserts the record does not
contain proof that he received actual notice of the January 11,
2021 jurisdictional and dispositional hearing or his right to
appeal the orders made at that hearing. Victor notes that, at the
time of the hearing, DCFS reported that his whereabouts were
again unknown, but instead of conducting a new due diligence
search, DCFS sent him notice of the hearing at his last known
address as of November 2019. Victor also notes that, following
the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court clerk
served him with a copy of the minute order from the hearing,
along with an advisement of his right to appeal, but did not list
his address in the certificate of mailing.
       To the extent Victor is claiming on appeal that either notice
was defective because his whereabouts were then unknown, the
proper remedy would have been to file a section 388 petition.
“When an alleged father claims that a lack of notice of the
proceedings caused him to fail to achieve presumed father status
prior to expiration of the reunification period, his remedy is to file

                                 19
a section 388 petition.” (In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th
701, 712; see In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189
[“[a] section 388 motion is a proper vehicle to raise a due process
challenge based on lack of notice”].) Victor did not file any such
petition. While Victor did file a request for presumed father
status later in the case, he did not contend that he was unable to
do so earlier because he lacked notice of the proceedings.
Instead, he claimed that “[h]e was unable to appear for most of
the proceedings in this case because he was incarcerated and had
no counsel, although he was noticed of the court hearings and
indicated a desire to have counsel appointed.” On this record,
Victor has not shown a due process violation based on lack of
notice that excused his failure to file a timely appeal.
       We also reject Victor’s claim that the forfeiture rule does
not apply because the juvenile court denied him due process
when it failed to appoint counsel for him prior to adjudicating
the section 300 petition. At the time of the January 11, 2021
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, Victor was an alleged
father only. An alleged father generally is not entitled to
appointed counsel, “except for the purpose of establishing
presumed fatherhood.” (In re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 139,
147.) Whether a parent has a due process right to counsel in a
dependency proceeding is determined on a case-by-case basis,
requiring the court to balance the private interests at stake, the
government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will
lead to an erroneous decision. (In re O.S., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1407, citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981)
452 U.S. 18, 31–34.) We also consider “whether the presence of
counsel would have made a ‘determinative difference’ in the
outcome of the proceeding and if the absence of counsel rendered

                                20
the proceedings fundamentally unfair.” (In re Claudia S. (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 236, 251.) “[A] court deciding whether due
process requires the appointment of counsel need not ignore a
parent’s plain demonstration that [he or] she is not interested in
attending a hearing.” (Lassiter, at p. 33.)
       Based on the totality of the record, we conclude the juvenile
court did not violate due process by failing to appoint counsel for
Victor earlier in the proceedings. Victor first communicated that
he wanted the appointment of counsel in February 2020 when
DCFS interviewed him while he was in federal custody. While
the court ordered an attorney to reach out to Victor as a friend of
the court in March 2020, the record is silent on whether counsel
complied with the order. By May 2020, however, Victor had been
released from prison and was residing in a halfway house. DCFS
contacted Victor in May and June 2020 to discuss the next court
hearing and visitation with Daisy, but Victor refused to cooperate
and said he would not be told when and where he could see his
child. Although Victor was given notice of the next two court
hearings, he did not attend either hearing or take any action to
elevate his paternity status at that time. Victor also did not visit
Daisy following his release from prison, and Mother reported
Daisy had not seen Victor since she was one or two years old.
After the January 11, 2021 jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing, Victor waited another year before asking the court to
appoint counsel for him and find him to be Daisy’s presumed
father. In the meantime, Javier requested and was granted
presumed father status based on his established parental
relationship with Daisy. Under these circumstances, the court’s
failure to appoint counsel for Victor earlier in the case did not

                                21
deny him due process, and thus, does not provide an exception to
the forfeiture rule.
       Citing In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, Victor
argues the forfeiture rule does not apply where a parent raises
a due process claim based on the failure to appoint counsel. In In
re Christopher L., our Supreme Court considered whether a
juvenile court’s violation of an incarcerated father’s right under
Penal Code section 2625 to be present and represented by counsel
at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was structural
error or subject to a harmless error analysis. (In re Christopher
L., at p. 1069.) The Supreme Court concluded that the error did
not require automatic reversal. (Ibid.) In its opinion, the
Supreme Court did not consider the timeliness of the father’s
appeal or whether the forfeiture rule applied. While the Court of
Appeal did briefly address the issue of forfeiture in its opinion, it
declined to decide whether the father forfeited his due process
claims by not timely raising them, and instead concluded that,
even if he did, it would exercise its discretion to address the
merits of his appeal. (In re Christopher L. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
1172, 1183, fn. 4.)
       We conclude the forfeiture rule applies in this case.
The totality of the record demonstrates that Victor was provided
with notice and an opportunity to appear in court and assert a
position on his paternity status, long before the juvenile court
adjudicated the section 300 petition and found Javier to be
Daisy’s presumed father. Victor has not shown that the court’s
failure to elevate him to presumed father status or to appoint
counsel for him earlier in the proceedings prevented him from
meaningfully participating in the case, and availing himself of
the protections afforded by the dependency scheme. Because

                                 22
Victor has not shown the type of fundamental error that would
support an exception to the forfeiture rule, his challenges to the
juvenile court’s earlier paternity rulings are not cognizable in this
appeal.
II.    The juvenile court did not err in denying Victor’s
       January 11, 2022 request for presumed father status
       At the time Victor filed his request for presumed father
status on January 11, 2022, the juvenile court had made a prior
finding that Javier qualified as Daisy’s presumed father. In
seeking to elevate his own paternity status, Victor did not
contend that Javier failed to satisfy the requirements for
presumed fatherhood. Rather, Victor claimed that he also
qualified as Daisy’s presumed father, and thus, should be
designated a third presumed parent. The court denied the
request on the grounds that Victor did not have an existing
relationship with Daisy sufficient to entitle him to third parent
status under Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c). We
conclude the juvenile court did not err in denying Victor’s
request.
       Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c) states, in
relevant part, that “[i]n an appropriate action, a court may find
that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this
division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two
parents would be detrimental to the child.” This statutory
provision, however, is limited in scope. It “ ‘allows a court to
recognize three parents only in “rare cases” where a child truly
has more than two parents.’ [Citation.] Specifically, ‘ “an
appropriate action” for application of section 7612, subdivision (c)
requires a court to find an existing, rather than potential,
relationship between a putative third parent and the child, such

                                 23
that “recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the
child.” ’ ” (M.M. v. D.V. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 733, 742.) Absent
an existing relationship with the child, a parent cannot be
recognized as a third presumed parent. (In re L.L. (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 1302, 1317.) We review a juvenile court’s findings
under section 7612, subdivision (c), for substantial evidence.
(M.M. v. D.V., at p. 744.)
       In this case, there was substantial evidence to support the
finding that Victor did not qualify as a third presumed parent of
Daisy under Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c). DCFS
first became involved with the family in November 2019 when
Daisy was four years old. Victor was incarcerated at the time,
and Daisy did not have any contact with him. According to
Mother, Daisy had not seen Victor since the child was one or two
years old, and she considered Javier to be her father. In May
2020, following his release from prison, Victor began contacting
Mother demanding to see Daisy, but he refused to meet with
DCFS to arrange a visitation schedule. In March 2022, while
Victor’s request for presumed father status was pending, the
juvenile court ordered DCFS to assess Victor for visitation. Over
the next two months, DCFS repeatedly attempted to contact
Victor about visiting Daisy, but he never made himself available
for visitation and instead claimed that he was busy.
       On this record, the evidence was sufficient to support the
finding that Victor did not have an existing parental relationship
with Daisy, as required for a third presumed parent under
Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c). The juvenile court
accordingly did not err in denying Victor’s request for presumed
father status.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The juvenile court’s June 14, 2022 order denying Victor’s
request for presumed father status is affirmed.

                                         VIRAMONTES, J.

     WE CONCUR:

           GRIMES, Acting P. J.

           WILEY, J.

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