Court Opinion

ID: 9409319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 20:00:49.877566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.539737
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          JUL 17 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERIC PEREYRA-ROJAS,                             No. 21-1199
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A200-551-937
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted July 13, 2023**
                            San Francisco, California

Before: BEA, BENNETT, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Eric Pereyra-Rojas petitions for review of the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) final

order of removal. Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we

recite them only as necessary for the disposition of this petition. We have

jurisdiction, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

      1.     For the first time in these proceedings, Pereyra-Rojas challenges

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the adequacy of the notice to appear. Although the exhaustion requirement in

8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S.

Ct. 1103, 1110 (2023), the exhaustion requirement is mandatory if a party

timely urges us to apply it, Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th

Cir. 2023). Because the government timely raised § 1252(d)(1), Pereyra-Rojas’s

challenge to the adequacy of the notice to appear is not properly before us.

      2.     Pereyra-Rojas, through counsel, waived an explanation of his

procedural rights at the master calendar hearing. He now argues that the IJ

should have explained to him his apparent eligibility for pre-conclusion

voluntary departure. An IJ may, in some situations, question an alien directly to

“confirm he understands the legal consequences of his decisions. But those

circumstances typically involve an applicant who is proceeding pro se. On the

other hand, we typically allow IJs to rely on representations by counsel.”

Troncoso-Oviedo v. Garland, 43 F.4th 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

The IJ was entitled to rely on Pereyra-Rojas’s attorney’s waiver of an

explanation of Pereyra-Rojas’s procedural rights.

      3.     Pereyra-Rojas, through counsel, conceded that his conviction for

embezzlement, Cal. Penal Code § 503, was a crime of moral turpitude that

barred cancellation of removal and post-conclusion voluntary departure. See de

Rodriguez v. Holder, 724 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that an

alien’s concessions “are binding” where “there is no possibility that [the alien]

mistakenly conceded removability based on a now-questionable rule of law”

                                        2                                      21-1199
(distinguishing Huerta–Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir.

2003))).

      4.     The IJ analyzed Pereyra-Rojas’s proposed particular social groups

(“PSGs”) under the specific facts of this case, see Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968

F.3d 1070, 1086 (9th Cir. 2020), by examining the documents he submitted

regarding country conditions in Peru1 and by concluding that those documents

did not prove that his proposed PSGs are sufficiently distinct or particular in

Peru. The IJ further concluded that Pereyra-Rojas did not prove a likelihood of

future persecution “on account of” his membership in any such PSG, which is

consistent with a determination of whether membership in a PSG is “a reason”

for persecution, see Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357–60 (9th Cir.

2017).

      5.     The record does not compel the conclusion that Pereyra-Rojas will

more likely than not be tortured with the acquiescence of government officials if

removed to Peru, as is required to obtain relief under the Convention Against

Torture. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033–35 (9th Cir. 2014).

      PETITION DENIED.

1
      Neither the documents cited by the IJ nor any other documents submitted by
Pereyra-Rojas mention persecution of Peruvian deportees or Pereyra-Rojas’s family,
which were the two proposed PSGs in which Pereyra-Rojas claimed membership.

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