Court Opinion

ID: 9710937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:21:04.177677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.203811
License: Public Domain

Beasley, J.
(dissenting). The majority hold that
it was error to admit in evidence, for the purpose of impeaching the alibi testimony of the codefendant, a tape recording of a conversation in which defendant, codefendant and the police officer participated. The holding rests upon the failure of the prosecutor to comply with the rule requiring a proper foundation before the introduction of prior inconsistent statements. People v Gunne, (On Rehearing), 66 Mich App 318, 320; 239 NW2d 603, *303604 (1976), Ebel v Saginaw County Board of Road Commissioners, 386 Mich 598, 608; 194 NW2d 365, 369 (1972), Scholnick v Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 187, 195; 86 NW2d 324, 328 (1957). The purpose of this latter rule is said to be "to avoid surprise of the witness to be impeached”. This holding also rests upon an inference that the prosecutor improperly manipulated its order of proofs for greatest impact on the jury.
I disagree with both reasons underlying the majority’s holding; the surprise of a witness does not require a ruling that the prosecutor unfairly presented the evidence, and the facts of this case do not compel an inference that the prosecutor improperly manipulated the order of proofs.
Surprise of a witness, standing alone, does not require a ruling that the prosecutor unfairly presented the evidence. The "surprise” standard was enunciated by the case of People v Gunne, supra at 320:
"The purpose of the rule requiring the asking of foundational questions is to avoid surprise of the witness to be impeached. This purpose is accomplished once the questions are posed. Answers by the witness are not required. He may answer such questions to deny that prior inconsistent statements were made, or he may explain the prior statements in an attempt to nullify or lessen their impeaching nature.”
The primary purpose of both cross-examination and impeachment is discovery of the truth. No weapon is more important to effective cross-examination than surprise. The situations in which the element of surprise served to reveal the truth are legion. The rule adhered to by the majority has been criticized for interfering with that pursuit of truth:
*304"The rule of Queen’s Case [2 Brod & Bing 284 (Eng, 1820)] was long ago abrogated in England where it was first expounded but is still adhered to by most American courts. While it rests in part on the quite insecure ground that it is required by the best evidence rule, it also finds some justification on the ground of being inherently fair to the conscientious witness. Very often, however, the enforcement of the rule places a great obstacle in the way of effective cross-examination of a slippery and dishonest witness, and that fact explains its abolition in England. The English precedent should compel a modification of the rule and a more enlightened approach in this country as some decisions have recognized.
At the moment, despite these recent precedents and the example of England, most state courts continue to apply the rule of Queen’s Case without much regard to considerations justifying a relaxation of the rule. But relaxation of the rigid application of the rule is encountered in some cases.” 4 Jones on Evidence (6th ed), 183-185. (Citations omitted.)
Reconsideration of the rule is especially appropriate if the rule is interpreted to require exclusion of the evidence now in question. The previous testimony of the police officer had set forth in detail the time, place and parties to the alleged conversation. After that testimony, the codefendant freely denied that the conversation ever took place. Form is exalted over substance if further foundation is required regarding a tape of that very same conversation.1
The record before this court does not divulge the reason why the prosecutor reserved for rebuttal the tape in question. Nevertheless, this Court has the power to draw an inference of fact regarding that reason. GCR 1963, 820.1. However, I disagree with the inference drawn by the majority.
*305The record indicates that both the introduction and the reproduction quality of the tape have been challenged on various grounds. Given these evident problems, the prosecutor may have decided that the tape should be avoided if at all possible. Such a decision would be reasonable since the tape’s information would still be presented through the testimony of the police officer who participated in the taped conversation.
The factors underlying the prosecutor’s decision changed when one codefendant chose to take the stand. The codefendant’s testimony conflicted directly with that of the police officer; she denied that either she or her codefendant were at the place alleged by the officer. In essence, her testimony presented alibis for both herself and her codefendant. In these circumstances, it would be reasonable for the prosecutor to consider the merit of offering the tape in evidence by way of rebuttal to impeach this alibi witness. Rather than improper prosecutorial manipulation, I would consider this an appropriate effort to get at the truth.
In summary, I do not believe that under the facts of this case, there was a lack of proper foundation for admission of the tape into evidence and neither would I find improper manipulation of the order of proofs by the prosecution. But, if, as the able majority finds, precedent requires a finding of a lack of foundation for introduction of the tape into evidence, then the time has come for our Supreme Court to revisit, reconsider and reverse the ill-founded, archaic rule that prohibits trial attorneys from using the element of surprise to destroy perjured testimony.
I would vote to affirm the conviction and, therefore, must respectfully dissent.

 The examination of the tape for authenticity is considered a separate matter.