Court Opinion

ID: 9544592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:57:30.475569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:16.087359
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (specially concurring). I specially concur. To grant summary judgment under the facts and circumstances of this case, extensive and circumfluent in scope and description, is a sad reflection of the judicial process. To my knowledge, summary judgment has never been upheld in a case of such complexity. This is a matter of common knowledge. During extensive oral arguments by competent attorneys, the court said with reference to summary judgments: Why not eliminate the whole rule. Every time I grant one, I get reversed. Despite the fact that we have repeatedly said that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, district courts, for unknown reasons, at the conclusion of excellent oral arguments, say: I’m going to grant the motion. Thank you. District Judges and lawyers constantly avoid the rules set forth in Goodman v. Brock, 83 N.M. 789, 498 P.2d 676 (1972). Goodman is never mentioned in oral argument and oral argument never follows the rules. (1) The burden is on defendant to make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment; i. e., such evidence as is sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted. (2) If done, the burden then shifts to plaintiff to show there was a genuine issue of material fact. We no longer speak in terms of the “slightest doubt” as to the facts to deny summary judgment. Summary judgment should be denied if there are “reasonable doubts” in the court’s mind. Plaintiff is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. A substantial dispute as to a material fact forecloses summary judgment. Goodman said: Unquestionably the burden was defendants to show an absence of a genuine issue of fact, or that they were entitled as a matter of law for some other reason to a summary judgment in their favor. [Emphasis added.] [Id. 792, 498 P.2d 676.] Plaintiffs mistakenly argued that defendant failed to establish an independent intervening cause as a matter of law. This was not defendant’s position. Defendant argued at the motion for summary judgment that plaintiffs’ claims boiled down to whether defendant failed to adequately warn prescribing physicians and failed to furnish prescribing information to physicians relating to the use of Neomycin, a drug; that based upon the testimony of Dr. Weaver at trial, the warning in effect at the time that Dr. Weaver used the drugs, and the indication for use, were adequate; that the actual language of the warning is immaterial because Dr. Weaver didn’t read it, didn’t rely upon it, and didn’t refer to it in any way in his decision to prescribe the drug. If I understand defendant’s position correctly, the negligence of defendant, if any, by way of its warning, was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Prom the oral argument and the judgment entered in favor of defendant, summary judgment was granted because there was no genuine issue of material fact, nor “as a matter of law for some other reason,” to-wit: an independent intervening cause. Defendant answered in denial with the following pertinent affirmative defenses stated briefly: (1) plaintiff’s injuries resulted from an independent intervening cause, and (2) the negligence of other persons. Defendant did not seek summary judgment on its affirmative defense that the conduct of Dr. Weaver was an independent intervening cause. The first point in defendant’s Answer Brief is: DEFENDANT AT NO TIME ARGUED THAT IT WAS INSULATED FROM LIABILITY BY AN INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE. [Emphasis added.] At the end of a long “Introduction” the defendant said: * * * Defendant Upjohn moved for summary judgment on the grounds that there was no genuine issues of fact as to the cause of the injury, as to the adequacy of the warnings and as to its position that the adequacy or inadequacy of the warnings and precautions * * * had no effect on the decision to prescribe neomycin * *. [Emphasis added.] I read plaintiffs’ second amended complaint free from any such claims expressed by defendant. Plaintiffs charged: * * * Defendants knew or should have known that said drugs would very likely be prescribed by physicians * * * to patients such as Plaintiff without inspection for defects in same. Defendants * * * expressly and impliedly, warranted to Plaintiff that the neomycin sulfate and Ploymixin B supplied for the use of Plaintiff as above-stated were free of contamination, were safe and were reasonably fit for the intended purpose for which they were used. ****** We have not been advised by the court of the basis upon which summary judgment was granted. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment stated that “there is here present no genuine issue of material fact” or in the alternative, “to enter partial summary judgment as to each of the claims asserted.” The court found “that there remains no genuine issue of material fact” and entered summary judgment. The question for decision is: Was there no genuine issue as to any material fact within the theory of plaintiffs’ claim? In a discussion of “The Law Governing Summary Judgment,” defendant said: [A] motion for summary judgment requires that the Court go beyond the allegations of the pleadings to determine whether a claim can in reality be supported on the grounds alleged and whether a material factual controversy exists as to those allegations. Pederson v. Lothman, 63 N.M. 364, 320 P.2d 378,1958. [Emphasis added.] Pederson said this: * * * It must be borne in mind that a summary judgment amounts to more than a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; it is by its own terms a judgment. The court goes beyond the allegations of the complaint and determines whether a claim can in reality be supported on the grounds alleged, and whether a controversy as to an issue of fact exists as to the statements of the complaint. [Emphasis added.] [Id. 369, 320 P.2d 378.] Defendant has misinterpreted Pederson. What the court said was that if the defendant produces by way of deposition or affidavits that the allegations of the complaint are overcome by facts, plaintiff cannot stubbornly rely upon the allegations of the complaint to create an issue of fact. The plaintiff must show that evidence is available which would justify a trial on the issue alleged. The “bare contention” of the complaint is not a showing of “evidence available.” Under these circumstances, a plaintiff does not raise a factual issue on the allegations made. Rekart v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 81 N.M. 491, 468 P.2d 892 (Ct.App.1970). So, in the instant case, where plaintiff claims defendant knew or should have known that physicians would prescribe the drugs to patients without an inspection for defects and defendant expressly and impliedly warranted to plaintiff that the drugs were safe, these are the material issues of fact. Defendant cannot leave the theory of liability stated and wander into questions of warnings given, especially so, when the doctor has not read the warnings. Defendant did not make a prima facie showing as required under the Goodman rule. Summary judgment, as practiced in the district courts, has become an escape route instead of a remedy. To make it a remedy, Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure entitled “Summary Judgment” must be amended or expanded to state: (1) That the motion must state specifically the material fact or facts upon which there is no genuine issue as a basis upon which summary judgment is sought. (2) A hearing shall be held upon this fact or facts raised. (3) The district court must make findings or explicitly state the reasons why summary judgment was granted or denied. Otherwise, the purpose of the rule will be defeated. Its purpose is to hasten the administration of justice, expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials and to enable one to obtain judgment promptly by preventing frivolous defenses for purpose of delay. Agnew v. Libby, 53 N.M. 56, 201 P.2d 775 (1949). Since 1949, we have been flooded with erroneous summary judgments that have delayed trials, and perhaps, increased the cost and expenses, changed the status of parties, caused the loss of witnesses and destroyed the fabric woven around the Rules of Procedure to grant the parties a fair trial. In 1913, sixty-seven years ago, before the faculty and students of Yale University, the Honorable John W. Goff said: To-day our profession is almost a storm center, and I include in our profession the judiciary and the bar. In the popular arena of discussion grave questions have arisen which to many appear revolutionary and which, if carried into popular action by law, would certainly be revolutionary according to our system * * *. The delay of the law particularly in the administration of justice has evoked from the President of the United States language so scathing that it would be difficult in polite words to excel it in intensity- Goff, “The Lawyer,” 22 Yale L.J. 433 (1913). “Polite words” cannot describe the inexcusable delay in litigation today. The adoption of the Rules of Procedure was to be the forerunner of the solution to this urgent situation. Summary judgment has not played its part.