Court Opinion

ID: 9749036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:21:46.105229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:42.583337
License: Public Domain

NOBLE, J.,
Dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent.
Relying on case law that is thirty to forty years old, and the fact that seven other states have agreed with their position, the majority holds that a “look-see,” or visual identification of an alleged drug is sufficient in the scientific world of today to say that the pills in question here had the chemical signature of alprazolam. Chemistry being what it is, that view seems to me comparable to saying any white powder is cocaine — not good science. This view harkens back to a time when drug abuse was just beginning to be the problem that it is today, and little was known about trafficking in look-alike drugs, or how easy it is to counterfeit a common *257drug. In an effort to save a conviction, the majority sets a precedent that is unwarranted and will lead to felony convictions which should rightfully be misdemeanors.
In the only other case from this Court dealing with this issue, Miller v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 941 (Ky.1974), a witness for the Commonwealth had observed the defendant prepare and inject a drug into his body and identified it as methylene-dioxy-amphetamine or “MDA” based on her own familiarity with that drug and how the defendant reacted to the drug. In response, the defendant noted the testimony of a state police narcotics officer, who claimed that MDA could not be identified outside a laboratory. Based on this testimony, the defendant argued that the phys- - ical identification of the drug was insufficient to sustain his conviction because the drug had not been analyzed in a laboratory. Id. at 943. The Court held that notwithstanding the officer’s testimony, the jury was free to believe the Commonwealth’s witness due to her familiarity with the drug and because she was on the same footing as the officer, who had not been qualified as an expert. Id. The Court reasoned that “[t]o hold otherwise and demand laboratory analysis would defeat the purpose of the statute and allow traffic or transfer of controlled substances to flourish in. the secret confines of society.” Id.
In light of current laboratory usage to identify chemical substances and the subsequent enactment of a statute making trafficking in a simulated substance a crime, Miller appears to be somewhat a product of the times, though it is consistent with federal authority allowing proof of identity of a substance, which will be discussed later in this dissent. However, ironically, in this case laboratory chemical analysis was done on the other substance sent to the lab, but not on the “alprazo-lam.” Can any chemical signature be detected by the naked eye?
Also, in Miller, the witness had observed the effect of the drug on the person to whom the defendant gave the drug, and she had personal familiarity with the drug. Id. at 942-43. Thus, her identification resulted from a combination of the basic physical appearance of the drug, her personal experience with that type of drug, and the physical effects she observed, whereas the lab technicians in this case identified the pills solely through a comparison of the physical appearance of the pills against a drug identification database. Here the pills were identified as a controlled substance based only on a visual identification. Additional facts brought out in testimony that Appellant thought the pills were Xanax, the brand name of alprazolam, and that the technician had never personally seen simulated Xanax do nothing to establish that the pills were in fact Xanax.
Miller, decided in 1974, precedes the enactment of the simulated substances statute, KRS 218A.350, by eight years. That statute was specifically drafted in recognition of the fact that the drug-trafficking culture did not always deal in actual controlled substances, and to prevent the defense that the substance trafficked was not the drug charged. The statute is generally directed against drug trafficking, and despite not involving an actual controlled substance, does not violate due process. See Buford v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 909, 911-12 (Ky.App.1997). However, by its very definition, it is not a lesser-included offense to trafficking in a controlled substance. This statute requires that the trafficking be in a substance other than a controlled substance for the offense to apply. There is also a significant difference in penalties. Trafficking in a controlled substance is a Class *258B felony, and trafficking in a simulated substance is a Class A misdemeanor.
Of course, Appellant was free to challenge the testimony of the Commonwealth’s experts. Indeed, she did by cross-examining the lab technicians on the possible existence of simulated alprazolam pills, which was admitted, though the technician further testified that she had never seen any. Appellant could also have called into question the reliability of Identidex as a vehicle for identification, through cross-examination, a hearsay challenge, or otherwise. She also could have challenged the technicians’ qualifications as experts. Additionally, she could have tried to call her own expert to attest to the alleged unreliability of physical identification or the mis-identification of the pills. These efforts would have clarified the problems of a sight-only identification of the alprazolam. Her failure to ask these questions, however, does not change the fact that the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove that the drug was a controlled substance.
It is a baseline fact that if such a purported drug is not actually a controlled substance, then it is a simulated controlled substance. This pivotal fact appears necessary for the Commonwealth to know how to charge in the case, since trafficking in a simulated substance is not a lesser-included offense of trafficking in a controlled substance. To prove trafficking in a controlled substance, the question then is what is necessary to positively identify a chemical substance as controlled? The statutes which establish the schedule of drugs and thus determine what is a “controlled substance” are instructive. KRS 218A.050 and KRS 218A.070 list which drugs are considered to be Schedule I or Schedule II controlled substances. Each lists “[a]ny material, compound, mixture or preparation that contains any quantity of the following” and proceeds to list chemicals that must be present before a substance fits in that schedule. The list reads like a chemist’s final exam.2 Without *259chemical testing or observing the effect of the drug after ingestion, any “identification” is mere guesswork, and such testimony should not be allowed. Additionally, these statutes, though first enacted in the 1970s when widespread drug abuse and trafficking hit our nation, have been amended six times, most recently in 2005. The legislature has clearly kept apace with the changing drug scene and chemical analyses, and it is a miscarriage of justice for the Court to fail to do so.
Indeed, it can be argued that it is not testimony about Xanax, or even alprazolam that is required, but rather which of the chemicals in a controlled substance listed in the schedules was contained in the drug.
Since it is the chemical signature of a substance that identifies it as belonging to a particular controlled substance category or schedule, that signature must be identified sufficiently for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance (drug) is what it is purported to be. It would appear obvious that a chemical signature cannot be identified to a reasonable level by looking at the substance or because someone thinks that is what the substance is. That would be permitting a subjective belief rather than objective proof.
While it is true that an argument can be made that the identity of the drug in this case could be established by circumstantial evidence if that evidence was sufficient to convince a reasonable jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was al-prazolam, a significant level of proof would be required and would have to include some evidence that at some point the evidence in question was positively known to be the drug. In United States v. Scott, 725 F.2d 43 (4th Cir.1984), the Fourth Circuit enumerated several circumstantial factors that, when combined, could prove the identity of a substance, including knowing that the substance produced the expected effects when ingested and that it was used in the same manner as the illicit substance would be used, similar to the holding in Miller. However, as the Sixth Circuit later expressed in a case following Scott, that circumstantial proof must be substantial and competent, and based on the record as a whole. United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429 (6th Cir.1994). The proof in Wright included that two government witnesses had personally used some of the drugs in question which were not available for testing.
That level of proof does not exist here. No one testified that any of the substance had been ingested or that anyone was observed after taking it. The effect of the chemical reaction which is at the heart of making a substance controlled was not tested. In short, there was no objective evidence that could establish that the substance was in fact alprazolam rather than a simulated substance.
And further, as a matter of policy, there is no reason to resort to circumstantial evidence when a simple chemical analysis can remove all question. In fact, the other drugs in the Appellant’s possession were chemically tested, and the opportunity surely existed for chemical testing of the purported alprazolam. Given that Kentucky law recognizes two ways to commit drug offenses — through a controlled substance or through a simulated controlled substance — there is a need for objective identification so that prosecutors can make the appropriate charge. Additionally, for evidence to be substantial and competent, it must be based on more than a subjective belief. And while I do not hold that a substance may never be identified by circumstantial evidence, that situation should *260be rare and is best limited to cases where the substance is no longer available for chemical testing. Obviously, the proof will still have to be competent and substantial, and sufficient to objectively identify the drug.
Here, the most compelling evidence is that the Appellant thought she was selling Xanax, and the technicians thought it looked like Xanax and had never seen any simulated Xanax. There is not even a scintilla of proof that the substance actually was Xanax, let alone competent and substantial proof. Because the Commonwealth failed to prove an essential element of its case, the Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict on the trafficking in al-prazolam charges. I would reverse and require proof commensurate with sound chemical testing, easily obtainable in today’s scientific world, and which would be sound policy.
SCHRODER, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. ■ For example, KRS 218A.050 lists the following chemicals:
Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, unless specifically excepted, whenever the existence of these isomers, esters, ethers, or salts is possible within the specific chemical designation: Acetylmethadol; Allylprodine; Alphacetylmethadol; Alphameprodine; Al-phamethadol; Benzethidine; Betacetylme-thadol; Betameprodine; Betamethadol; Betaprodine; Clonitazene; Dextromoram-ide; Dextrorphan; Diampromide; Die thylthiambutene; Dimenoxadol; Dime-pheptanol; Dimethylthiambutene; Dioxa-phetyl butyrate; Dipipanone; Ethylmethyl-thiambutene; Etonitazene; Etoxeridine; Furethidine; Hydroxypethidine; Ketobemi-done; Levomoramide; Levophenacylmor-phan; Moipheridine; Noracymethadol; Norlevorphanol; Normethadone; Norpipa-none; Phenadoxone; Phenampromide; Phenomorphan; Phenoperidine; Piritram-ide; Proheptazine; Properidine; Propi-ram; Racemoramide; Trimeperidine.
Acetorphine; Acetyldihydrocodeine; Benzylmorphine; Codeine methylbromide; Codeine-N-Oxide; Cyprenorphine; Deso-morphine; Dihydromorphine; Etorphine; Heroin; Hydromorphinol; Methyldesor-phine; Methyldihydromorphine; Morphine methylbromide; Morphine methylsulfonate; Morphine-N-Oxide; Myrophine; Nicoco-deine; Nicomorphine; Normorphine; Pholcodine; Thebacon.
... 3, 4-methylenedioxyamphetamine; 5-methoxy-3, 4-methylenedioxy amphetamine; 3, 4, 5-trimethoxyamphetamine; Bufotenine; Die thyltryptamine; Dimethyl-tryptamine; 4-methyl-2, 5-dimethox-yamphetamine; Ibogaine; Lysergic acid die thylamide; Marijuana; Mescaline; Peyote; N-ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate; N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate; Psilocybin; Psilocyn; Tetrahydrocannabinols; Hashish; Phency-clidine, 2 Methylamino-l-phenylpropan-1-one (including but not limited to Methcathi-none, Cat, and Ephedrone); synthetic can-nabinoid agonists or piperazines; salvia. *259... gamma hydroxybutyric acid. KRS 218.050(l)-(4).