Court Opinion

ID: 9377224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 14:05:17.217849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:12.772506
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA22-563

                                Filed 07 March 2023

New Hanover County, Nos. 19 CRS 5130-32, 19 CRS 57261-62

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

RICHARD CRAIG WILKINSON, Defendant.

      Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 3 March 2022 by Judge Joshua

W. Wiley, Jr., in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

11 January 2023.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Olga E.
      Vysotskaya de Brito, for the State.

      Drew Nelson for Defendant.

      GRIFFIN, Judge.

      Defendant Richard Craig Wilkinson appeals from a judgment entered after a

jury found him guilty of soliciting a child by computer. Defendant argues the trial

court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the State presented insufficient

evidence to support the charge. We find no error.

                   I.   Factual and Procedural Background

      During the summer of 2019, Defendant, who was fifty-nine years old, began
                                       STATE V. WILKINSON

                                         Opinion of the Court

communicating with Danielle1, a fifteen-year-old, online. Defendant, although aware

of Danielle’s age, began messaging her about engaging in sexual activity. On at least

four separate occasions, Danielle went to Defendant’s home where he served her

alcohol and gave her around $300 in cash along with other gifts. Upon Danielle’s first

visit to Defendant’s home, Defendant asked Danielle to take off her clothing and sit

on his lap wearing only a bikini. Danielle complied with Defendant’s requests. On

other occasions, when Danielle visited Defendant’s home, Defendant reached under

her dress, groped her, and, on at least one occasion, kissed her.

      The Federal Bureau of Investigation received an anonymous tip regarding

Defendant’s inappropriate relationship with Danielle and began an investigation into

the matter. On 29 August 2019, with the FBI and her father present, Danielle began

a Snapchat conversation with Defendant.                 During this conversation, Defendant

stated he “thought about [Danielle] every minute [o]f every day and of . . . [h]ow good

[her] touch feels” and how he “so want[s] [his] hand right there [f]eeling how smooth.”

Defendant also messaged Danielle saying: “And to have you one day completely butt

nekkid laying across my lap” and “I just want my hands in that hair . . . [p]ulling it

back[,] [b]iting that neck[,] [w]atching your back arch.” Further, in planning their

next in-person encounter, Defendant told Danielle to come see him whenever she

could get out of the house and even offered to get her a ride stating, “let me know if

      1   We use a pseudonym to protect the identity of the minor child. N.C. R. App. P. 42(b).

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                                  STATE V. WILKINSON

                                   Opinion of the Court

ya need a uber ;) [.]” Danielle asked Defendant if he was working the following day,

30 August 2018, and Defendant replied: “Yeah I always work [b]ut can get away

anytime you can.” When Danielle responded that she would “try to find a ride and

leave school early[,]” Defendant sent a heart emoji and said: “I’d love it. 5 minutes or

hours and I’ll be stoked either way[.]”

      On 30 August 2019, Defendant was arrested and charged with one count of

first-degree statutory sex offense, one count of placing a child in sexual servitude, five

counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, three counts of providing alcohol to a

minor, one count of soliciting a child by computer, and one count of contributing to

the delinquency of a minor—all stemming from his relationship with Danielle. On

31 August 2019, Danielle turned sixteen.

      On 2 December 2019, a grand jury indicted Defendant on all charges. During

trial, at the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant made a motion to dismiss the

charge of soliciting a child by computer, which was denied.          At the close of all

evidence, Defendant renewed his motion to dismiss which was again denied. The

trial court dismissed one count of first-degree statutory sex offense, one count of

placing a child in sexual servitude, and two counts of taking indecent liberties with a

child. Defendant was found not guilty on one count of taking indecent liberties with

a child. However, the jury found Defendant guilty on two counts of taking indecent

liberties with a child, three counts of providing alcohol to a minor, one count of

contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and one count of soliciting a child by

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                                 STATE V. WILKINSON

                                  Opinion of the Court

computer.

      Defendant timely appeals challenging only the sufficiency of the State’s

evidence regarding the charge of soliciting a child by computer.

                                  II.   Analysis

      Defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support

the charge of soliciting a child by computer. We disagree.

      This Court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal charge for

insufficient evidence de novo. State v. Chekanow, 370 N.C. 488, 492, 809 S.E.2d 546,

550 (2018). “In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all

reasonable inferences.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455

(2000). Further, we must determine, “whether there is substantial evidence (1) of

each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein,

and (2) of [the] defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.” Id. at 378, 526

S.E.2d at 455 (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith,

300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980).

      Defendant specifically contends the State’s evidence was insufficient, under

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.3(a), to prove he intended to commit an unlawful sex act

with a child younger than sixteen because the 29 August 2019 Snapchat messages

with Danielle concerned actions Defendant aspired to take at an undefined future

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                                 STATE V. WILKINSON

                                   Opinion of the Court

date as there was “no sort of plan or request to meet [Danielle] in person” prior to her

sixteenth birthday.

      Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.3(a),

             A [defendant] is guilty of solicitation of a child by a
             computer if the [defendant] is 16 years of age or older and
             the [defendant] knowingly, with the intent to commit an
             unlawful sex act, entices, advises, coerces, orders, or
             commands, by means of a computer or any other device
             capable of electronic data storage or transmission, a child
             who is less than 16 years of age and at least five years
             younger than the defendant, . . . to meet with the
             defendant . . . for the purpose of committing an unlawful
             sex act.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.3(a) (2021). It is well established that intent is the state of

mind that exists at the time the defendant commits an offense. State v. Accor, 277

N.C. 65, 73, 175 S.E.2d 583, 589 (1970) (internal marks and citations omitted); see

also State v. Keller, 374 N.C. 637, 648, 843 S.E.2d 58, 66 (2020). Further, intent “may

be read from a defendant’s acts, conduct, and inferences fairly deducible from all the

circumstances.” Accor, 277 N.C. at 73, 175 S.E.2d at 589 (“If intent required definite

and substantive proof, it would be almost impossible to convict, absent facts

disclosing a culmination of the intent.”).

      Here, the State offered testimony from Danielle who stated Defendant knew

she was fifteen years old but continued to communicate with her both online and in

person.   Danielle also testified at trial that, on multiple occasions, she visited

Defendant at his home where he groped her beneath her dress, kissed her, and asked

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                                STATE V. WILKINSON

                                  Opinion of the Court

her to take her clothes off so he could see her bathing suit. Additionally, the State

offered evidence of Defendant’s 29 August 2019 Snapchat exchange with Danielle in

which Defendant sent Danielle explicit messages describing how he thought of her

every day and would have her “butt nekkid laying across [his] lap.” Further, within

that exchange, Danielle told Defendant she was not sure she would be able to meet

him before her sixteenth birthday, yet Defendant continued to entice Danielle to meet

him on 30 August 2019 saying he could “get away anytime” Danielle was available

and would love to see her whether it be for five minutes or hours.

      From this evidence—Defendant’s previous conduct and the Snapchat

conversation—it can be inferred, in the light most favorable to the State, Defendant

intended to commit a sex act with Danielle despite the lack of a definite plan to meet

up before her sixteenth birthday. Not only had Defendant previously met with

Danielle, but the conversation indicated his intent to meet with her again, which a

reasonable mind could conclude was intended to be on 30 August 2019, while she was

still fifteen years old. Because Defendant’s intent to meet with Danielle before her

birthday can be inferred from his acts and conduct during past encounters as well as

from the 29 August 2019 Snapchat conversation, the State introduced sufficient

evidence of each essential element of the offense charged under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

202.3(a)—solicitation of a child by a computer.

                               III.   Conclusion

      We hold the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss

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                                  Opinion of the Court

the charge of soliciting a child by a computer.

      NO ERROR.

      Judges MURPHY and CARPENTER concur.

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