Court Opinion

ID: 9378651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-11 19:08:24.90859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:35.144114
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-21-00124-CV

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

KIMBERLY DAWN DAY AND
REBECCA B. DAY,                                                             Appellants,

                                                v.

JOHN MCHAZLETT,                                                                Appellee.

               On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
                      of Galveston County, Texas.

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

    Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Silva
              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

       Appellants Kimberly Dawn Day and Rebecca B. Day challenge the trial court’s

denial of their motion to dismiss appellee John McHazlett’s defamation, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and theft of property suit pursuant to the Texas Citizen’s

Participation Act (TCPA). By their sole issue, appellants assert that it was error to deny
their TCPA motion to dismiss. We affirm.

                                          I.       BACKGROUND 1

        Kimberly was an employee of McHazlett’s company, Elizabethtown Properties,

LLC (Elizabethtown). Kimberly was terminated from her employment after just over a

week of employment. The parties dispute the reason for Kimberly’s termination—Kimberly

asserts her termination was retaliation for her refusal of McHazlett’s sexual advances,

and McHazlett asserts Kimberly was fired for failure to complete certain job tasks

assigned to her. After her termination, Kimberly’s attorney sent a demand letter to

McHazlett, informing him that Kimberly was filing a sexual harassment complaint against

him and Elizabethtown. Kimberly asserted that McHazlett exposed his penis and testicles

to her as an attempted sexual advance, which she “rebuffed.” The demand letter alleged

that because of her refusal of McHazlett’s sexual advance, Kimberly was fired via e-mail

the next calendar day. The demand letter stated: “If we are unable to resolve this matter,

[Kimberly] will file a Charge of Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission [EEOC], and then follow up with a lawsuit as allowed by law.” No response

was received. Kimberly’s lawyer sent another e-mail to McHazlett and Jonathan Cottrell,

an individual whom Kimberly addressed as “managing partner” of Elizabethtown. The e-

mail included a draft charge of discrimination to the EEOC. The charge of discrimination

was subsequently filed with the EEOC on March 13, 2020, and was still pending when

this appeal was filed.

        1  This case is before this Court on transfer from the First Court of Appeals in Houston pursuant to
a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 22.220(a)
(delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer
cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer).
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      In October 2020, McHazlett, through his attorney, sent demand letters to Kimberly

and her attorney, alleging that Kimberly’s allegations against him were false and that her

actions in filing the charge of discrimination with the EEOC, repeating the allegations to

members of McHazlett’s church, and copying Cottrell, whom McHazlett argues is not a

“managing partner” but rather an employee of Elizabethtown, on the correspondence

relating to the allegations constituted defamation. The demand requested immediate

retraction of the statements by Kimberly. McHazlett’s attorney also sent a letter to

Rebecca, Kimberly’s mother, asserting that it was “discovered” that Rebecca “repeated

slanderous statements to members” of the church that she and McHazlett attended. The

demand also requested Rebecca retract her statements. Neither Kimberly nor Rebecca

made any retractions and McHazlett filed suit against them, bringing claims for

defamation, defamation of character, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. McHazlett also brought separate claims of libel and theft of property against

Kimberly.

      Appellants moved to dismiss McHazlett’s suit under the TCPA and a hearing was

set. McHazlett filed a motion for limited discovery to oppose the TCPA motion to dismiss

and sought to reset the hearing pending discovery. He also filed a response to the TCPA

motion. The court did not reset the hearing on the TCPA motion to dismiss. After the

hearing, the trial court denied appellants’ TCPA motion to dismiss. This appeal ensued.

                                      II.    TCPA

      In their sole issue on appeal, appellants challenge the trial court’s denial of their

TCPA motion to dismiss.

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A.      Standard of Review & Applicable Law

        The stated purpose of the TCPA is to “encourage and safeguard the constitutional

rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in

government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the

rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 27.002. 2 When a legal action is based on one of the enumerated rights

in the TCPA, the aggrieved party may move to dismiss the action. Id. § 27.003(2).

        A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under the TCPA is reviewed de novo,

as is the court’s determination on the statutory interpretation of the TCPA. See Dall.

Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019); Youngkin v. Hines, 546

S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018). “The court first examines whether the defendant invoked

the TCPA by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff’s claim ‘is

based on, relates to, or is in response to the [Defendant’s] exercise of: (1) the right of free

speech; (2) the right to petition; or (3) the right of association.’” Darnell v. Rogers, 588

S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 27.005(b)). If the movant meets its burden, the court then looks to whether the

nonmovant has “establishe[d] by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each

essential element of the claim in question.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(c);

see Darnell, 588 S.W.3d at 300–01. If the nonmovant fails to meet his burden under the

        2 Section 27.010 of the TCPA was amended in 2021. See Act of May 27, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 915, § 3.001, sec. 27.010, 2021 TEX. SESS. LAW SERV. Ch. 915. The amendment was made to confirm
numbering references to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, but does not substantively change the text
of § 27.010. See id. In any event, the instant suit was filed before the effective date of the amended statute.
See id. § 22.001. All references to the TCPA are to the version that applies to this dispute.
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second step, his claim must be dismissed. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(b).

However, if the nonmovant meets his burden under the second step, the third step still

requires dismissal if the movant demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence “each

essential element of a valid defense to the nonmovant’s claim.” Id. § 27.005(d). We look

to all “the pleadings, evidence a court could consider under Rule 166a, Texas Rules of

Civil Procedure, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the

liability or defense is based.” Id. § 27.006.

B.     Matter of Public Concern

       Appellants assert that the TCPA applies to McHazlett’s claims because he filed his

suit in response to statements appellants made regarding McHazlett’s alleged sexual

harassment of Kimberly, which they claim constituted an exercise of their free speech

rights. “Exercise of the right of free speech” means “a communication made in connection

with a matter of public concern.” Id. § 27.001(3). There is no dispute that McHazlett’s

claims are based on statements, oral and in writing, made by both appellants, meeting

the communication prong. See id. Accordingly, we must determine whether those

communications are made in connection with a matter of public concern. See id.

       “Matter of public concern” means a statement or activity regarding:

       (A)    a public official, public figure, or other person who has drawn
              substantial public attention due to the person’s official acts,
              fame, notoriety, or celebrity;

       (B)    a matter of political, social, or other interest to the community;
              or

       (C)    a subject of concern to the public.

Id. § 27.001(7). Appellants argue that the allegation of sexual harassment is a “matter of

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political and social interest to the community.” Appellants rely on Lippincott v.

Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam), to support their position.

While Lippincott does involve allegations of sexual harassment, in that case the Texas

Supreme Court found that the communications were made in connection with a matter of

public concern because they were related to the provision of medical services by a health

care professional. See id.

       Appellants also cite to two federal cases to support their position that sexual

harassment allegations are a matter of public concern. See Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973

F.2d 1263, 1269 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Hammond v. Lovings, No. 5:15-CV-00579-RP,

2016 WL 9049579, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 25, 2016). In Wilson, a female police officer

reported allegations of sexual harassment against male officers. Wilson, 973 F.2d. at

1266. The female officer was subsequently demoted and discharged from her position,

which she alleged was done in retaliation for her reports of sexual harassment. Id. In

determining whether the female officer’s allegations of sexual harassment were matters

of public concern, the Fifth Circuit determined “the content of [the female officer’s]

speech—reports of sexual harassment perpetrated on her and other women at UTHC—

is of great public concern.” Id. at 1269. The Fifth Circuit indicated, in part, that speech

“concerning public official misconduct” is a matter of “public concern.” Id. Citing to Wilson,

the court in Hammond determined that allegations of sexual harassment against “a

federal employee tasked with determining compliance with federal law in a federal facility”

were of “great public concern.” Hammond, 2016 WL 9049579, at *3.

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        We find Wilson and Hammond to be distinguishable from the case before this

Court. Here, we do not have a public official or government employee being accused of

sexual harassment. The harassment allegation against McHazlett is alleged to have

occurred in a private employment office setting. While we are not belittling the nature of

the allegation against McHazlett, we do not find that allegations against a private

employer under these facts rise to the level of a matter of public concern. 3

        Appellants further argue that McHazlett’s suit against them related to their exercise

of their right of association. “‘Exercise of the right of association’ means to join together

to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests relating to a

governmental proceeding or a matter of public concern.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 27.001(2) (emphasis added).                4   There is no argument that the alleged

communications related to a governmental proceeding and, having already determined

that the allegation of sexual harassment against McHazlett is not a matter of public

concern, we need not address this argument further.

        We conclude appellants failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that McHazlett’s claims are based on, related to, or in response to appellants’ exercise of

their right to free speech or right to association as defined by the TCPA.

        3  In one sentence, appellants also generally assert that “[t]he #metoo movement is known
throughout this Country, and Courts recognize its public concern and importance.” Appellants cite no
authority to support this assertion, nor do they attempt to draw connections between the case before this
Court and the “#metoo movement” aside from this blanket assertion. To the extent that appellants are
claiming the “#metoo movement” supports their argument, we find this argument to be inadequately briefed.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

        4 We note that appellants cite a prior version of § 27.001(2) which stated the “‘exercise of the right
of association’ means a communication between individuals who join together to collectively express,
promote, pursue, or defend common interests.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(2), amended
by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., ch. 378 (H.B. 2730), eff. Sept. 1, 2019.
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C.     Right to Petition

       Appellants also assert that part of McHazlett’s suit was in response to Kimberly’s

right to petition. Appellants contend Kimberly’s e-mail to McHazlett and Cottrell

constituted the exercise of her right to petition because it was “communication that is

reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative,

executive, judicial, or other governmental body or in another governmental or official

proceeding.” Id. § 27.001(4)(C). Aside from citing a portion of the TCPA’s definition for

“right to petition,” appellants present no authority or argument to support their contention

that an e-mail sent containing a draft of a charge of discrimination constitutes an exercise

of the right to petition. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). McHazlett’s claims against appellants

did not challenge Kimberly’s filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC; rather,

McHazlett alleged defamation when Kimberly sent the allegations in draft format, copying

Cottrell on the e-mail. Appellants cite no support for the proposition that an e-mail

containing a draft of a potential EEOC complaint sent to a third-party employee of a

private employer is “likely to encourage consideration or review of an issue by a

legislative, executive, judicial, or other governmental body or in another governmental or

official proceeding.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(4)(C).

       We conclude appellants failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that McHazlett's claims are based on, related to, or in response to appellant’s exercise of

their right to petition as defined by the TCPA.

D.     Summary

       Because appellants failed to satisfy their initial burden of establishing by a

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preponderance of the evidence that the TCPA applies to McHazlett’s claims, the trial court

did not err by denying the motion to dismiss. See Tervita, LLC, v. Sutterfied, 482 S.W.3d

280, 287 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (concluding that because appellant failed

to meet its burden of showing TCPA applied to appellees’ claim, appellate court need not

address other prongs of TCPA analysis).

                                   III.   CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s order denying appellants’ motion to dismiss.

                                                              NORA L. LONGORIA
                                                              Justice

Delivered and filed on the
9th day of March, 2023.

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