Court Opinion

ID: 9819060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:11.327185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:41:47.206803
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: The proceedings which culminated in Jackson’s sentence of death were fatally flawed because they did not comport with the new rules enacted by our court governing the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 631-36 (2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in those rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now coming before us. Because Jackson was tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his convictions and death sentence should be vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial. Even if Jackson were not entitled to the benefit of the new rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Absent the new rules, there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum, Jackson’s sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9 — l(j) (West 1994). Because he was convicted of murdering more than one victim, the term of imprisonment must be natural life. 730 ILCS 5/5_8 — l(a)(l)(c)(ii) (West 1994). JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting: For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 636-40 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536, 581-85 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe this cause should be remanded for a new trial conducted in compliance with the new rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my dissents, the procedures in capital cases prior to this court’s adoption of the new rules were inherently unreliable and did not sufficiently protect a defendant’s constitutional rights. For this reason, I believe that the new rules should be applied retroactively. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.