Court Opinion

ID: 9947470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 21:09:41.253164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:28.842027
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Csehi, 2024-Ohio-779.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                ASHTABULA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                        CASE NO. 2023-A-0040

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                      Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                        Court of Common Pleas

NICHOLAS TIMOTHY CSEHI,
                                                      Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00072
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                               OPINION

                                           Decided: March 4, 2024
                                            Judgment: Affirmed

Colleen M. O’Toole, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Christopher R. Fortunato,
Assistant Prosecutor, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Plaintiff-
Appellee).

Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., P.O. Box 609151, Cleveland, OH 44109 (For Defendant-
Appellant).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant, Nicholas T. Csehi, appeals his conviction for Murder

on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff-appellee, the State of Ohio, failed to disprove that he

acted in self-defense and (2) there was racial bias in the selection of jurors. For the

following reasons, Csehi’s conviction is affirmed.

        {¶2}     On March 11, 2022, the Ashtabula County Grand Jury indicted Csehi for

Aggravated Murder (Count One), an unclassified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A)

and 2929.02(A), and Murder (Count Two), an unclassified felony in violation of R.C.
2903.02(A) and (D) and 2929.02(B). Both Counts included a Firearm Specification as

provided for in R.C. 2941.145(A).

         {¶3}   Between June 5 and 7, 2023, a jury trial was held. The jury returned a

verdict of “not guilty” to the charge of Aggravated Murder and “guilty” to the charge of

Murder including the Firearm Specification.

         {¶4}   On July 14, 2023, the trial court sentenced Csehi to serve an indefinite term

of fifteen years to life of imprisonment for Murder and an additional term of three years

for the Firearm Specification to be served consecutively to and prior to the sentence for

Murder.

         {¶5}   On July 21, 2023, Csehi filed a Notice of Appeal. On appeal, he raises the

following assignments of error:

                [1.] Appellant’s conviction is against the manifest weight of the
                evidence.

                [2.] The trial court erred by overruling Appellant’s Batson challenge.

         {¶6}   In the first assignment of error, Csehi argues the prosecution failed to meet

its burden of persuasion in disproving his claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable

doubt. The following testimony, relevant to the claim of self-defense, was presented at

trial:

         {¶7}   Heather Csehi testified that she is Csehi’s mother. On February 1, 2022,

she was living with her boyfriend, Randall Cohen. On that date, Cohen was away from

the house shoveling snow to make money.                  Heather was watching her two

granddaughters while her son and his girlfriend (the granddaughters’ mother), Kaitlyn

Colby, went to a movie. At about 9:30 p.m., Cohen returned with food for the family.

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
About a half an hour later, Csehi and Colby returned to pick up the children. Heather was

talking to Csehi in the kitchen about the family dog while Cohen was in the living room.

             I’m talking to my son and Randall starts yelling, ‘I take care of the
             dog. I do this. I do that’. And he was being offended by what Nick
             was saying about Puppy [the dog] being so small. And the next thing
             I know, Nick is saying I’m just talking to my mom, you know? Randall
             hopped off the couch and came charging at Nick. And they fought in
             the dining room. And Nick got him down on the ground and tried to
             leave. He’s like leave me alone. And Randall just wouldn’t let him
             go. He’s yelling at him, they’re having words. My son tries to leave,
             and Randall catched [sic] him. Caught him in the kitchen heading
             out, you know, getting ready to go down the stairs to leave the house.
             And he caught him and they fought again. And Nick’s telling him the
             whole time just leave me alone, I don’t want anything to do with you.
             And Randall’s just going off, just about everything. Telling him I love
             you like a son, and my son’s like I don’t need your love, leave me
             alone, leave my family alone. Just stay away from me. And he’s
             trying to get out the door, and Randall is fighting him the whole way.
             He followed him out to the car.

             [While Csehi and Cohen were fighting, Colby and the two children
             went to the car and were waiting to leave. Csehi was then able to
             leave the house.]

             Randall was six three. He’s almost the same height, * * * they were
             about the same size. * * * Randall was fighting with Nick, chasing
             down to his side of the car. And somehow pulled him out of the car.
             And I’m hollering and screaming, and he had his hands around my
             son’s throat. And he was trying to choke my son. * * * And I was
             there at the front of his car trying to get Randall off of him. * * * I
             thought Randall was following me back into the house. I thought they
             were done. * * * I got to the side door * * *. Randall started yelling
             at Nick again, and I turned * * * and I see Randall yelling at Nick, and
             heading back towards him. And Nick was telling him ‘I have a gun,
             leave me alone’. And Randall’s like ‘you can’t shoot me, I’m my own
             god’. And just starting going [sic] after my son, and that’s when Nick
             shot him.

      {¶8}   In a recorded interview with law enforcement, Heather stated that “the first

time [Csehi] tried to get in the car, Randall pulled him out and they fell in the snow and

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
then they were up [and] choking each other.” At trial, Heather testified that Cohen tried

to kill Csehi by choking him and that Csehi had a look in his eyes like “I’m gonna die.”

       {¶9}   Dr. Thomas Gilson, the Cuyahoga County medical examiner, testified that

Cohen received three gunshot wounds. One bullet entered the right side of his chest,

collapsed a lung, and cut his spinal cord. As a result of this wound, Cohen would not

have been able to stand. Another bullet struck the tip of his right thumb. A third entered

his right buttock. In addition to the gunshot wounds, Cohen had abrasions and contusions

on his left knee and face. There was no testimony regarding the order in which the

wounds were received.

       {¶10} Officer Cody Caruso of the Ashtabula Police Department responded to the

scene of the shooting. A recording from Officer Caruso’s body camera was played for

the jury. In the recording, Csehi states that Cohen came into the kitchen screaming at

him, “we both grabbed each other about at the same time and just started from there.”

He continued:

              I started to come outside. My shirt was already ripped. I was -- it
              was done and over with in my opinion. He kept following me, he kept
              screaming in my face, he kept putting his f***ing hands on me, * * *
              bumping his chest on me, spitting in my f***ing face. * * * When I
              got to my car he would not let me get in the car. He literally just stood
              at my door and any time I tried to get in he started pressing up against
              me. I finally got in my car. He was standing in front of the car like
              he was going to do some s**t. I grabbed my gun out. He started
              going, “go ahead motherf***er.” * * * He wasn’t f***ing stopping.
              They were begging him. I gently, gently at that, because at this point
              we had already fought and I proved my point. I had put my hand
              against his chest and gently pushed him back. I said “get out of my
              face you are not going to like what happens next.” He kept going. I
              told him, I said “Randall, I’m not afraid to get my gun out right now,
              please get away from me.” He said “mother***er, you ain’t s**t, get
              your gun blah, blah, blah” -- f***ing instigating and s**t, and one thing
              led to another. All I wanted to do was go home.

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
       {¶11} Kaitlyn Colby testified that, when “Randall started hitting [Csehi] and they

ended up in the dining room,” she took her children to the car. She placed the children in

the back seat and returned to the house. When Csehi appeared in the door, she told him

to follow her and went to the passenger side of their car. Csehi walked to the driver’s

side but Cohen “was walking down the driveway screaming more stuff at him” and “[t]rying

to get in his face and hit him more.” Csehi opened the door but Cohen pulled him away.

Cohen began choking Csehi who was “begging that he couldn’t breathe.” Colby entered

the car:

             I was telling the girls to look at me, and just try to focus on me. And
             Nicholas had gotten the door open and I hear patting, like he’s patting
             his clothes. And he like, he says ‘F, my keys’. Cuz he realized he
             didn’t have his keys. And so I turned towards the girls and I’m just
             talking to them cuz they’re freaking out, they’re crying. * * * And then
             when I turned around, I’d turn around just to see Randall rushing
             Nicholas, and that’s when the shots were fired.

       {¶12} Colby could not recall how Csehi retrieved the gun from the glove box.

According to Colby, Csehi was at the front of their car when Cohen lunged at him. When

she turned back around again, she saw Csehi calling 911.

       {¶13} Lieutenant Michael Palinkas of the Ashtabula Police Department responded

to the Ashtabula County Medical Center on the night of the shooting. Palinkas interviewed

Csehi at the hospital and a recording of the interview was played for the jury. Csehi

described the incident as follows:

             I was talking to my mom in the kitchen about my dog * * *. Randall
             was in the living room. He heard me tell my mom the dog seemed
             skinny. He chimed in and he immediately started heading my way
             hostily [sic]. * * * I met him in the divider [between the kitchen and
             the dining room] we both grabbed each other immediately and
             started scuffling in her dining room. My mom and my fiancée were

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
              screaming for a few minutes. I’m not entirely sure how long we were
              inside. I eventually made my way outside. Randall followed me,
              pushing on me, screaming on -- at me, getting in my face the entire
              time. Would not just let me walk away. I made it to my car. He
              pushed me up against the car, kept getting in my face, grabbed me
              by my neck. And then when I pushed him against his chest, he
              punched me in the face, started talking more s**t, starting pushing
              me some more. * * * I got in the car. He stood in front of my car
              hooting and hollering, “get your gun, you won’t do s**t, blah blah
              blah.” And then I got out of the car and I shot him. [Csehi was asked
              how much time elapsed between him taking a seat in the car and the
              shooting.] About twenty seconds. Just long enough for me to get
              my gun out of the glove box, load it, and get out of the car. * * *
              [Csehi was asked if he could have left at that point.] I should have
              left at that point. I understand that I should have left at that point.

       {¶14} Csehi also commented that, “I can’t just have somebody attack me in front

of my family. I can’t be attacked with my family and not retaliate.”

       {¶15} Three shell casings were recovered on the ground by the front bumper of

Csehi’s vehicle. Another was found on the passenger side windshield. And a fifth shell

casing was found on the driver’s seat. From the location of the shell casings, Palinkas

concluded that Csehi was standing by the driver’s side door when he fired and that the

door was open. He also noted that there were two impacts on Heather’s residence which

he believed were caused by the same round (i.e., it ricocheted).

       {¶16} Lieutenant Palinkas also interviewed Colby and Heather. In the interview

with Colby, she did not mention Csehi looking for his keys or that he could not breathe

while Cohen was choking him. She did indicate that Cohen “took a step forward” prior to

the shots being fired. Both Colby and Heather indicated that they were not aware Csehi

did not have the keys at the time of the shooting.

       {¶17} Nicholas Csehi testified on his own behalf. As Cohen was coming at him

from the living room, Csehi took off his jacket which contained his keys and cell phone.

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
It was Cohen who first grabbed Csehi in the dining room. During the fighting in the

kitchen, Csehi’s shirt was ripped and hanging off him. Csehi testified as follows regarding

the events outside the house:

              I get outside and he’s dogging my every step. He followed me all the
              way to the car. He pushed me, he hit me. He was grabbing me the
              whole way out to the car. * * * He was berating me. I couldn’t take
              a step without feeling him on me at some point. * * * I attempt to
              open the door. The first time I opened the door, he grabbed my
              shoulder, spun me around, and shut the door. I have my back to the
              car now. I turned my face to look at my mother, and ask her for help.
              And when I did that, he sucker punched me. I looked back at him
              and * * * said something * * * but as I was saying it he grabbed my
              throat. He just started digging in with his nails. * * * [The look in his
              face] was like anger and rage, and malice. And a little bit of
              enjoyment, like he was angry but loving it. * * * At first I didn’t know
              what to do. I’ve never been choked like that. But vision started to
              go black. I grabbed his shirt and I used the remainder of my strength
              to push him toward * * * the front of my car. The second he was off
              me, I grabbed my car door and I opened it and I got inside, and I
              slammed the door shut and I locked it. I got in the car and started
              patting my pockets. I’m not wearing a shirt, I don’t have my coat. My
              keys aren’t in my pockets. I don’t have my phone. So I grabbed my
              gun. He’s standing in front of my car, watching me. I reached in my
              pants pocket and put the clip in my gun. I load it. I made sure he
              saw me load it. I step out of the car. I said stop. And when I said
              stop, he took a step toward me. I shot at the ground. I was trying to
              let him know I was serious. * * * At that point my mentality was if I
              get out the car and I point the gun at him, he won’t charge me. I can
              tell my mom to bring me my keys. I can tell her to bring me my things,
              and I can leave. * * * And he took a step toward me and I shot at
              the ground. And then he looked at the ground and looked back at
              me, and came again. Two steps. That’s all he got. * * * According
              to the evidence I fired five [rounds]. I thought I only fired four. The
              one at the ground, and then three panicking shots. * * * I never
              intended to fire. And when he kept coming, I just pulled the trigger
              until he fell.

       {¶18} Csehi further testified that he felt his life was in danger and, because of the

proximity of Colby and his children, he could not allow Cohen close enough to wrestle for

the gun. Given the circumstances, Csehi believed he had no choice but to fire on Cohen.

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
“The point was I did not want to be in the altercation anymore, and I refused to continue

fighting.”

       {¶19} The Ohio Constitution recognizes “that a court of appeals has the authority

to reverse a judgment as being against the weight of the evidence.” Eastley v. Volkman,

132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 7. “When a court of appeals

reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of

the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “‘thirteenth juror’” and disagrees with the

factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.”       (Citation omitted.)    State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997); State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio

St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25 (“a reviewing court asks whose

evidence is more persuasive–the state’s or the defendant’s”). “The court, reviewing the

entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility

of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must

be reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should

be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against

the conviction.” (Citation omitted.) Thompkins at 387.

       {¶20} Moreover, “[t]he trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve all or any of the

testimony” and “is in the best position to take into account inconsistencies, along with the

witnesses’ manner and demeanor, and determine whether the witnesses’ testimony is

credible.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Jarrett, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2022-T-0081, 2023-

Ohio-1627, ¶ 13. “Consequently, although an appellate court must act as a ‘thirteenth

juror’ when considering whether the manifest weight of the evidence requires reversal, it

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
must also give great deference to the fact finder’s determination of the witnesses’

credibility.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

       {¶21} In order to convict Csehi of Murder, the State was required to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that he “purposely cause[d] the death of another.” R.C. 2903.02(A).

“If, at the trial of a person who is accused of an offense that involved the person’s use of

force against another, there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused

person used the force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s

residence, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused

person did not use the force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that

person’s residence, as the case may be.” R.C. 2901.05(B)(1).

       {¶22} “[A] defendant charged with an offense involving the use of force has the

burden of producing legally sufficient evidence that the defendant’s use of force was in

self-defense,” i.e., “if the defendant’s evidence and any reasonable inferences about that

evidence would allow a rational trier of fact to find all the elements of a self-defense claim

when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, then the defendant has satisfied

the burden.” State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, 216 N.E.2d 653,

¶ 25. Where, as here, the defendant satisfies this burden of production, the prosecution

must satisfy the “burden of disproving the defendant’s self-defense claim beyond a

reasonable doubt,” i.e., the burden “of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doubt

that [the defendant] was not acting in self-defense when he [used force against another].”

Id. at ¶ 27, 26.

       {¶23} The elements of a self-defense claim include the following: “(1) that the

defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) that the

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
defendant had a bona fide belief that he [or she] was in imminent danger of death or great

bodily harm and that his [or her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use

of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the

danger.” Id. at ¶ 14. “The state need only disprove one of the elements of self-defense

beyond a reasonable doubt at trial to sustain its burden.” State v. Hardman, 5th Dist.

Stark No. 2023-CA-00046, 2024-Ohio-300, ¶ 23; State v. Knowlton, 11th Dist. Ashtabula

No. 2023-A-0013, 2023-Ohio-3759, ¶ 18.

       {¶24} In the present case, the determinative element is the second element of a

self-defense claim, i.e., whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

Csehi did not have a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great

bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such danger was deadly force. The

Supreme Court of Ohio has described “the second element of self-defense [as] a

combined subjective and objective test.” State v. Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d 323, 330, 673

N.E.2d 1339 (1997). “[T]he jury first must consider the defendant’s situation objectively,

that is, whether, considering all of the defendant’s particular characteristics, knowledge,

or lack of knowledge, circumstances, history, and conditions at the time of the attack, [he]

reasonably believed [he] was in imminent danger.” Id. “Then, if the objective standard is

met, the jury must determine if, subjectively, this particular defendant had an honest belief

that [he] was in imminent danger.” Id. at 331. “Although the term ‘great bodily harm’ is

not statutorily defined, Ohio courts of appeal have concluded that the term is substantially

similar to ‘serious physical harm,’ which is statutorily defined.” State v. Chavez, 3d Dist.

Seneca Nos. 13-19-05, 13-19-06, and 13-19-07, 2020-Ohio-426, ¶ 69.

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
       {¶25} The only point at which Csehi could objectively be said to have been in

imminent danger of death or great bodily harm was when Cohen choked him. State v.

N.S., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 20AP-66 and 20AP-67, 2020-Ohio-5318, ¶ 61 (“Ohio courts

have consistently held that being choked to the point of unconsciousness constitutes

serious physical harm”). At trial, Csehi, Heather, and Colby all testified that, after Csehi

had initially tried to enter his vehicle, Cohen pulled him away and choked him so that he

could not breathe. Csehi testified that he was at the point of losing consciousness when

he was able to push Cohen away from him. Pictures taken by Detective Palinkas at the

Ashtabula Medical Center document abrasions at the sides and the back of his neck.

Csehi claimed these were caused by Cohen trying to strangle him. Contrary to this

evidence, the State notes that none of the witnesses on the night of the shooting

described Cohen choking Csehi in a way that could be described as life-threatening.

Heather described Csehi and Cohen as “choking each other.” Colby did not mention that

Csehi could not breathe. In his initial statement to Officer Caruso, Csehi did not mention

that he had been choked, but rather he “gently pushed [Cohen] back” while threatening

to get his gun. At the Ashtabula Medical Center, Csehi stated that Cohen “grabbed me

by my neck” but without further elaboration. This evidence fairly establishes that Cohen

choked Csehi. The extent to which it was reasonable for him to believe that he was in

imminent danger is equivocal. The evidence as to whether he subjectively believed he

was in imminent danger is far less uncertain.

       {¶26} The testimony is generally consistent that, after being choked by Cohen,

Csehi was able to enter his vehicle. Cohen was moving toward the house and was at the

front of Csehi’s vehicle. Csehi never claimed that he was in danger of death or serious

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
bodily injury at the time of the incident. After fighting with Cohen in the house, Csehi told

Officer Caruso that he had “proved [his] point.” Csehi then threatened Cohen to get away

or else he would get his gun. Cohen continued to instigate and “one thing led to another”

but all Csehi “wanted to do was go home.” At the Ashtabula Medical Center, Csehi

complained about Cohen pushing, punching, hooting and hollering but little else when he

shot him. Csehi entered his vehicle “[j]ust long enough for me to get my gun out of the

glove box, load it, and get out of the car.” Csehi also stated “I can’t be attacked with my

family and not retaliate.” Even at trial, Csehi testified “[t]he point was I did not want to be

in the altercation anymore, and I refused to continue fighting.” When Cohen was shot, he

may have begun to move back toward the driver’s side of the car, but he was still several

feet away. This is compelling evidence that Csehi did not subjectively believe that he was

in imminent danger. Csehi testified at trial that he believed his life was in peril and that

he never intended to fire but, rather, wanted to hold Cohen at bay until he could obtain

his keys which were in the house. This version of events is at odds with the testimony

cited above. Several details in Csehi’s trial testimony were contrary to if not contradicted

by other testimony. The car keys were never mentioned as important to events of the

night in question until trial. Csehi’s claim to have fired a warning shot is consistent with

Heather’s testimony of a “quick” succession of shots. The fact that Csehi was firing from

the driver’s side door across the hood of his car makes it doubtful that he could have fired

a warning shot into the ground.

       {¶27} While there was evidence that did support Csehi’s self-defense claim, there

was also evidence, both competent and credible, that the shooting of Cohen was not in

self-defense. As this court and others have recognized where credibility is an issue,

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
particularly in the context of a self-defense claim, the issue is best resolved by the trier of

fact. Knowlton, 2023-Ohio-3759, ¶ 24. The present case is not that exceptional case that

merits the reversal of the conviction.

       {¶28} The first assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶29} In the second assignment of error, Csehi argues the trial court erred by

overruling his Batson challenge.

       {¶30} “In Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69,

the United States Supreme Court recognized that the Equal Protection Clause of the

United States Constitution precludes purposeful discrimination by the state in the exercise

of its peremptory challenges so as to exclude members of minority groups from service

on petit juries.” State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 96, 116, 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000); State

v. Stalder, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-2359, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 16. “When a defendant

objects to a prosecutor’s peremptory challenge on these grounds, the trial court must

apply a three-step analysis.” Stalder at ¶ 16. “First, the court must determine whether

the defendant has established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.” Id. “To

make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the defendant must demonstrate

(1) that members of a cognizable racial group were peremptorily challenged, and (2) that

the facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor

used the peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race.” Johnson at

116. “If the defendant has established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination,

then the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race- or gender-neutral explanation

for the challenge.” Stalder at ¶ 16. “Finally, the trial court must decide, based on all the

relevant circumstances, whether the defendant has proved purposeful discrimination.” Id.

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
“A trial court’s findings of no discriminatory intent will not be reversed on appeal absent a

determination that it was clearly erroneous.” Johnson at 116.

       {¶31} In the present case, counsel for Csehi raised a Batson challenge to the

State’s peremptory challenge of [S], juror number twelve.

              David PerDue:         I want it on the record that that’s the only black
              in this panel. It seems every time I get a jury, it has a black on there.
              And it’s only been four in thirty-eight years. It seems the State gets
              rid of ‘em for one reason. And I think under the law there has to be
              a reason for that.

              Judge Schroeder: Ms. Cantalamessa, that is in the nature of a
              Batson challenge to be --

              D. Cantalamessa:     She’s not black. She’s Asian or Indian.

              Judge Schroeder:     Yeah, I think she is, yes.

              David PerDue:        She’s black.

              D. Cantalamessa:     She isn’t black. Is it on her questionnaire?

              ***

              Sandra Kuhar:        I don’t think we put that one on.

              Judge Schroeder:     To be honest with you, I didn’t even realize the
              Defendant was --

              David PerDue:        He’s half.

              Judge Schroeder:     mixed race.

              David PerDue:        He has a mother, white mother, and a black
              father.

              Judge Schroeder:     And this is in the nature of a Batson challenge?

              David PerDue:        Yeah.

              Judge Schroeder:     Ms. Cantalamessa?

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
             D. Cantalamessa: Your Honor, so Ms. [S] has an accent. She’s
             been on a civil jury. She mentioned she had no transportation in the
             questionnaire. Although she didn’t bring it up today, I’m just afraid
             she’s going to tell us tomorrow she can’t be here because she
             doesn’t have a car. So that’s why … as our first peremptory.

             David PerDue:        That’s why I’m sure the court will be putting
             alternates on. If she would have a problem tomorrow.

             D. Cantalamessa: I asked her about being able to understand
             English, and … her accent. So --

             Judge Schroeder: For the record, her questionnaire indicates I am
             very much -- and I’m reading this verbatim -- ‘I am very much want
             to be excused. I will be sixty-eight years of old [sic] this year. On
             March 4th 2023 I had a crash and my car was totaled. I have no
             vehicle right now. It will be an incom --

             David PerDue:        Inconvenience.

             Judge Schroeder: Something.           Minus or something, ‘for my
             husband to drive me because he is seventy-one years old. I hope
             you consider my request. Thank you for …’ I believe it’s cut off, but
             I think the last word’s … in there. There is nothing on the face of the
             jury questionnaire that indicates what her race or ethnicity is. The
             Court will deny the challenge to the State’s peremptory challenge for
             the reasons stated. It’s unclear to this Court what her race is. She
             did, as counsel indicated, she did have an accent. So for what that’s
             worth. But simply I don’t have enough information regarding her
             ethnicity or race to sustain. And based on the totality of the
             circumstances, the other things that she said with respect to
             transportation, there are all legitimate concerns that exist for her to
             be excused. So the State’s peremptory challenge number one will
             be sustained by the Court.

      {¶32} Contrary to the trial court’s determinations, Csehi claims that he did make a

prima facie case of discrimination and the facts demonstrated purposeful discrimination

by the State. We disagree. Csehi claims that a prima facie case was established by the

fact that “[t]he juror in question was the only non-white member of the venire” and

“Appellant is mixed race.” Brief of Appellant at 15. The fact that a peremptory challenge

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Case No. 2023-A-0040
is exercised against a minority, without more, does not establish a prima facie case. “The

litigant must then show an inference or inferences of racial discrimination by the striking

party.” Hicks v. Westinghouse Materials Co., 78 Ohio St.3d 95, 98, 676 N.E.2d 872

(1997); Moore v. Vannoy, 968 F.3d 482, 491 (5th Cir.2020) (“[r]eference merely to the

race of one excused venireman, without more, is insufficient to raise the inference of

discrimination”). The court found that [S]’s ethnic ambiguity and Csehi’s mixed-race

background was insufficient to make an inference of purposeful discrimination. The court

is entitled to consider “all relevant circumstances in determining whether a prima facie

case exists,” which includes a lack of information about the racial backgrounds of the juror

and the defendant. Accordingly, we find that the court’s determination was not clearly

erroneous.

       {¶33} Csehi relies on State v. Lyons, 2017-Ohio-4385, 93 N.E.3d 139 (7th Dist.),

where the court of appeals noted that “Lyons satisfied the first element of a prima facie

case; counsel objected after the prospective juror–who was the only African-American–

was dismissed.” Id. at ¶ 13. Lyons is distinguishable in the first instance because both

the juror and the defendant were African-American without any issue about their racial

identity. In the second instance, it was the trial court that found that Lyons had made a

prima facie case and shifted the burden to the State “to articulate a race-neutral

explanation for striking the juror in question.” Id. Lyons was not challenging the trial

court’s determination that a prima facie case was established and the court of appeals

was not reviewing the propriety of such a determination.

       {¶34} The second assignment of error is without merit.

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      {¶35} For the foregoing reasons, Csehi’s conviction for Murder is affirmed. Costs

to be taxed against the appellant.

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.,

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

concur.

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