Court Opinion

ID: 9721305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:55:40.419651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:24.570066
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
concurring.
I fully concur with the majority's decision with respect to the conclusions that Hastings' statement did not constitute a voluntary confession and that the trial court properly admitted into evidence Hastings' prior guilty plea to neglect of a dependent. I write separately to indicate that had the State introduced the factual basis surrounding Hastings' prior guilty plea to neglect of a dependent and had that factual basis indicated that she admitted she was negligent in allowing Kelley to be around Jimmy, I would disagree that her conviction of the second neglect of a dependent charge must be reversed. This factual basis underlying the guilty plea would have been the practical equivalent of Hastings' statements, that she suspected Kelley of injuring Jimmy, and thus rendered the admission of the statements harmless. See Hensley v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1125.
The State, however, did not introduce the guilty plea transcript, which it had at its disposal, and it is impossible to tell upon what factual basis Hastings' prior guilty plea rests. I, therefore, reluctantly agree her conviction must be reversed because the error in admitting Hastings' statements to the welfare worker was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the overwhelming admissible evidence of her guilt. Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; Clark v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1090.