Court Opinion

ID: 9635844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:07:57.614453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:37.621521
License: Public Domain

OPINION
DUGGAN, Justice.
This appeal tests the legality of the City of Houston’s creation by ordinance and staffing of nine positions in the City of Houston Police Department (“HPD”) as part of its “civilianization” program. Houston, Tx., Ordinances 82-1165 (July 27, 1982), 84-1290 (August 21, 1984), 85-568 (April 23, 1985), and 86-1278 (July 23, 1986).
Appellants, the City of Houston, Mayor Kathryn J. Whitmire, Chief of Police Lee P. Brown, and the Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Commission of the City of Houston, appeal a final judgment entered following a non-jury trial. The judgment: (1) declared void four City of Houston ordinances insofar as the ordinances attempted to create certain civilian positions within HPD in contravention of former Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1269m 1, the firefighters’ and police officers’ civil service statute; (2) enjoined the City from hiring civilians to fill certain positions in HPD; and (3) awarded back pay, promotion, and attorney’s fees to 16 named plaintiff appellees.
The appellees are police officers who allege that they should be promoted to fill either the new positions created by the ordinances or the vacancies created by the promotion of other officers into the new positions, if the procedures of article 1269m are applicable.
Historically, the Houston Police Department has hired numerous civilian employees in addition to the uniformed classified officers appointed pursuant to article 1269m. The number of civilian employees has doubled since 1970; at the time of trial, HPD employed approximately 4,600 classified police officers and 2,000 civilians. The civilian employees serve as clerks, clerk typists, secretaries, word processor operators, administrative assistants, chemists, computer programmers, crisis counselors, psychologists, financial officers, automobile *182mechanics, janitorial and maintenance personnel, and in other positions.
Uniformed classified officers and civilian personnel within HPD are employed under different authority. Classified police officers are hired pursuant to article 1269m for positions created by municipal ordinance consistent with article 1269m, while civilian personnel are employed under the municipal civil service system established by city charter. All classified officers receive the same pay, while civilian employee salaries are set within a range. Unlike classified officers, civilians are not entitled to overtime pay. Classified officers, under article 1269m, are either class A, with 1,400 hours of training at the police academy prior to employment, class B, with 340 hours of training, or class C, with between 240 and 280 hours of training.
Many work assignments within HPD do not require the specialized training required of uniformed officers for law enforcement duties. A series of management studies, beginning with the April 1983 HPD “Plan of Action” report, have stated that a need exists to hire additional civilians throughout HPD for managerial and technical roles to free up trained police officers for the “police work” that only classified law enforcement personnel can do. A March 1983 study recommended that the HPD garage be placed under the direction of a professional fleet management, and that it function as a separate entity under the command of the police chief. A December 1984 report on recruit training recommended that a qualified educational specialist be hired to head the police academy.
Although law enforcement training is not required for many HPD jobs, classified police officers nevertheless fill such jobs, working side by side with civilian employees in many divisions. The Office of Planning and Research, for example, is staffed by 29 civilians and 18 classified officers.
By City Ordinances 82-1165, 84-1290, and 85-568, the Houston City Council created nine “civilian” positions between 1982 and 1985 within HPD: four police administrators, two assistant police administrators, one urban policy planner IV, one administrative assistant IV, and one education coordinator in the police academy. The City hired civilians to fill each of these positions and did not follow the procedures set out in article 1269m for the appointment or promotion of classified police officers.
Each of the four civilian police administrators assumed duties supervising a division,2 duties formerly assigned to captains; the two civilian assistant police administrators each assumed duties formerly performed by lieutenants. The classified police officers who were previously assigned to perform these duties were reassigned within HPD, but their positions were never abolished by city council ordinance. The urban policy planner IV, the administrative assistant IV, and the education coordinator each assumed posts allegedly “equivalent in salary and assignment” to those held by lieutenants.
On January 20, 1986, four new HPD bureaus, created by City Ordinance 86-1278, were implemented in a plan of reorganization: (1) the Management Information Bureau, formerly the Technical Services Bureau, with the added duties of the now-abolished Computer Services Division; (2) the Fleet Maintenance Bureau, created by the elevation of the former Police Garage Division to bureau status; (3) the Career Development Bureau, which assumed the duties previously performed by the Personnel Services Bureau; and (4) the Office of Planning and Research, created by the elevation of the former Planning and Research Division to bureau status. The four civilian police administrators were promoted to head these bureaus. Prior to this reorganization, bureaus were traditionally headed by deputy chiefs.
Appellees filed suit alleging that the four bureau posts headed by the new police administrators were classified positions under article 1269m and should have been *183filled, under the procedures of Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 1269m, § 103, by the appel-lee captains,4 who, by virtue of examination grades, occupied the second, third, and fourth places on the deputy chief eligibility list. The standing and status of the remaining appellees follows in a domino-like sequence. The five appellee lieutenants5 occupied the top five places on the captain eligibility list, and alleged that they would have been promoted to the four captain positions that would have been vacated, had four captains been promoted to the bureau commander positions, and to one of the two vacancies in the police administrator posts resulting from the civilians’ promotion, which would have allowed two lieutenants to be promoted to captain and would have created two vacant lieutenant positions.
Appellees further alleged that six sergeants who did not join in this suit would have been promoted to lieutenant had six lieutenants been promoted to captain. Four intervenor-appellees, all sergeants,6 alleged that they would have been promoted to four lieutenant positions that would have been vacant had the top five lieutenants been promoted to captain to assume command of the police administrator divisions to which the civilians had been appointed. The sergeants occupied the first, third, fourth, and fifth positions on the lieutenant eligibility list.
The appellee police officers7 occupied the top four positions on the sergeant eligibility list, and alleged that they would have been promoted to four of the six sergeant positions that would have been vacated had six sergeants been promoted.
Appellees also contended that the civilians’ assumption of duties that were traditionally performed by classified police officers caused the civilians to function as classified police officers and constituted, in effect, the abolition of positions within a classification, action that required a showing of good cause by the City. City of San Antonio v. Wallace, 338 S.W.2d 153, 157 (Tex.1960).
Appellees sought promotion in rank, increased pay, and longevity time credit from January 20,1986, the date upon which they allege their promotions should have been effective. Additionally, appellees sought injunctive relief prohibiting the City from filling these posts with civilians.
Essentially, appellees’ claim is that the four newly created police administrator positions heading the four new bureaus, and the two assistant police administrator positions, all now occupied by civilians, are positions specifically described by title, to-wit: bureau commander and division director, and are within the civil service classifications of deputy chief and captain, respectively, even though the City did not expressly create these posts as “positions” within those classifications. Obviously, ap-pellees’ argument is premised on the conclusion that these posts are required to be within an article 1269m classification, thus prohibiting the appointment of civilians.
After a non-jury trial, the trial court entered judgment for appellees that: (1) promoted them to the ranks sought; (2) awarded them salary increases retroactive to January 20, 1986; (3) permanently enjoined the City from employing civilians to assume duties traditionally assigned to police officers; and (4) ordered the City to pay appellees’ attorney’s fees. The court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with its judgment.
Article 1269m creates a firemen’s and policemen’s civil service and civil service commission, and provides for the classification of policemen within police departments and for their promotion to higher classifica*184tions according to their positions on eligibility lists after competitive examinations.
Section 28 defines a “policeman” as
any member of the Police Department or other peace officer appointed to such position in substantial compliance with the provisions of Sections 9, 10, and 11 of this Act, or entitled to Civil Service Status under Section 14B or 24 of this Act.
Section 8(a)9 provides that:
In a city having a population of 1,500,-000 or more, according to the most recent federal census, the [Firefighters’ and Police Officers’ Civil Service] Commission shall provide for the classification of all ... policemen. Such classification shall be provided by ordinance of the City Council, or legislative body. Said City Council, or legislative body, shall prescribe by ordinance the number of positions of each classification. (Emphasis added.)
City of Houston ordinances have uniformly ranked Houston police officers below the non-classified chief of police in the following ranks or classifications, from highest to lowest: assistant chief, deputy chief, captain, lieutenant, sergeant, police officer, and probationary police officer.
Article 1269m, § 8(b)10 provides that:
Except as expressly provided by Subsection (f) of this section, no classification now in existence, or that may be hereafter created in such cities, shall ever be filled except by examination held in accordance with the provisions of this law.... All vacancies shall be filled by permanent appointment from eligibility lists furnished by the Commission within sixty (60) days after such vacancy occurs. If no list is in existence, the vacancy shall be filled from a list which the Commission shall provide within ninety (90) days after such vacancy occurs. (Emphasis added.)
Section 8(c)11 provides that:
Firemen and policemen shall be classified as above provided, and shall be under civil service protection_
Section 8(f)12 provides that:
In any city having a population of 1,500,000 or more ... the Fire Chief or Police Chief may appoint persons to hold command staff positions in their departments subject to the following:
(1) The Police Chief may appoint to any position at the rank of Assistant Chief any member of the classified service who has served for at least five (5) years in the department as a sworn police officer and who meets the additional qualifying criteria.... An appointment may not be made before the required qualifying criteria have been established and approved as prescribed by this subdivision.
Section 9(a)13 requires the Civil Service Commission, in order to compile the eligibility lists for classifications mandated in § 8(b), to conduct examinations of qualified persons making proper application. Section 9(a) provides further:
All eligibility lists for applicants for original positions in the Fire and Police Departments shall be created only as a result of such examinations, and no appointments shall ever be made for any position in such Departments except as a result of such examination, which shall be based on the applicant’s knowledge of and qualifications ... for police work and work in the Police Department, as shown by competitive examinations in the presence of all applicants for such position, and shall provide for thorough inquiry into the applicant’s general education and mental ability. (Emphasis added.)
*185Section 10 governs the procedure for filling a vacant classified position:
When a vacancy occurs in the ... Police Department, the ... Police Chief or head of the Police Department shall request in writing from the Commission the names of suitable persons from the eligibility list, and the Director shall certify to the chief executive of said city, the names of three (3) persons having the highest grades on the eligibility list, and the said chief executive shall thereupon make an appointment from said three (3) names. The appointment shall be of the person with the highest grade, except there be a valid reason why such appointment should be given to the one making the second or third highest grade. Whenever such appointment is made of one not holding the highest grade, such reasons shall be reduced to writing and filed with the Commission, and there shall be set forth plainly and clearly good and sufficient reasons why said appointment was not made to the person holding the highest grade in the event the one holding the third highest grade shall receive the appointment.
Section 1214 provides that:
(a) A person who has received an appointment to the ... Police Department hereunder, shall serve a probationary period of one (1) year from date of employment with the Department ... as a Policeman, or trainee in an academy.
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• (c) ... When ... Policemen ... have served the full probationary period, having been appointed in substantial compliance with Sections 9, 10, and 11 of this Act and not otherwise, they shall automatically become full-fledged civil service employees and shall have full civil service protection. All positions in the ... Police Department, except that of Chief or head of the Department, shall be classified by the commission and the positions filled from the eligibility lists as provided herein. (Emphasis added.)
Section 1415 sets out a procedure similar to that of § 10 for promotional appointments:
The Commission shall make rules and regulations governing promotions and shall hold promotional examinations to provide eligibility lists for each classification in the Police and Fire Departments. ...
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F. The Commission shall proceed to hold examinations to create eligibility lists within ninety (90) days after a vacancy in any classification occurs, or new positions are created, unless an eligibility list is in existence. If an eligibility list exists, the Commission shall certify within ten (10) days after notification of the vacancy to the Head of the Department the names of persons eligible to fill all promotional positions. The certified names must come from the eligibility list which exists on the date the vacancy occurs.
G. In the event any new classification is established either by name or by increase of salary, the same shall be filled by competitive examination in accordance with this law. (Emphasis added.)
Section 16a16 provides that the purpose of this statutory scheme for appointment and promotion within the police department
is to secure to the cities affected thereby efficient Police and Fire Departments, composed of capable personnel, free from political influence, and with permanent tenure of employment as public servants.
In their first through thirteenth points of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in entering the injunction and judgment against them because:
(1) as a matter of law, the City of Houston is not prohibited from hiring civilian *186employees either to perform functions within the Houston police department or to supervise classified police officers, so long as those police officers are not performing traditional law enforcement functions;
(2) the creation of the civilian posts that encompass administrative duties previously assigned to officers in classifications neither constitutes the creation of new classifications that must be filled by the procedures of article 1269m nor abolishes any positions within an article 1269m classification;
(3) there is no evidence that the appointed civilians perform law enforcement duties; and
(4) as a matter of law, no vacancies existed within a classification that were required to be filled under article 1269m.
We agree with each of appellants’ above contentions and reverse the judgment of the trial court.
In analyzing the parties’ positions, we note that some confusion arises from the use within article 1269m of the terms “classification” and “position,” with no statutory definition of either term.
The terms “rank” and “classification” within HPD are synonymous. Section 8(a) provides that “[s]aid City Council ... shall prescribe by ordinance the number of positions of each classification.” Thus, the term “position,” when applied to policemen within a classification, indicates the number of individuals employed at a given rank, e.g., 34 captains, 8 deputy chiefs, and 4 assistant chiefs. In some cities, positions within a classification of policemen or firemen are defined in the establishing ordinances by titles reflecting the duties involved. An example of this is the “plans checker” position within the fire lieutenant classification in McLeod v. City of San Antonio, 702 S.W.2d 279 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). However, the only evidence before the trial court showing article 1269m classifications for HPD consisted of the 28 successive personnel ordinances enacted by the Houston City Council between December 31, 1980, and February 11,1986. The accompanying certificate of the Houston City Secretary attested that these were the only “personnel ordinances creating and recreating positions, classes and classifications for Police Department classified personnel” within that time period. None of the ordinances described the positions established by titles indicating the duties to be performed. Stated otherwise, no ordinance specifies that a bureau, division, office, or other HPD unit must per se be headed by a classified officer.
Viewing article 1269m overall, we note first that the act requires only that law enforcement personnel be classified. Section 8(a) requires the City to classify “policemen. ” Section 2 defines a “policeman” as a peace officer appointed in substantial compliance with the procedures of §§ 9,10, and 11,17 or entitled to civil service status under §§ 14B or 24,18 of the act. Section 9(e)19 requires that, to be certified as eligible for a “beginning position with a Police Department,” an applicant must meet “all legal requirements necessary to become eligible for future licensure by the Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education.” Section 12(c) provides that policemen who have served the one year probationary period required by § 12(d), and who were “appointed in substantial compliance with §§ 9, 10 [and] 11 of this Act and not otherwise, ... shall automatically become full fledged civil service employees and shall have full civil service protection.”
From this requirement of eligibility for licensure as a law enforcement officer as a prerequisite for initial qualification as a policeman, we conclude that the “positions” spoken of in §§ 9(a), 12(c), and elsewhere within article 1269m are law enforcement positions, and the definition of a *187“policeman” includes only a member of the department performing law enforcement duties; article 1269m does not govern the HPD employee who works in an administrative or policy-making capacity, but performs no law enforcement duties.
The dissent focuses upon a select portion of § 9(a)’s text (“no appointments shall ever be made for any position in [the police] department except as a result of [competitive] examination”) as mandating that all jobs within HPD are classified civil service posts that must be filled by competitive examinations. Such a reading ignores both (1) the context of § 9, which pertains to classified positions and the eligibility exams required to obtain such positions, and (2) past case law and remedial legislative action. It would make little sense to require that a secretary or manager of building maintenance have law enforcement training.
Second, an overview of article 1269m shows that, except for requirements for the assistant chief position, as set out in § 8(f)(1), nothing in the act prohibits the employment of civilians within a police department in administrative or policy-making capacities, as long as these civilians are not assigned to perform duties that must be performed by certified peace officers. Section 8(f)(1) specifically restricts appointment to an assistant chief position to “any member of the classified service who has served for at least five (5) years in the department as a sworn police officer and who meets additional qualifying crite-ria_” Neither does article 1269m prohibit the employment of civilians within police departments to perform jobs previously performed by classified officers, but which do not require the performance of law enforcement duties, or to perform jobs that involve the supervision of classified officers who perform non-law enforcement duties. The City of Houston “as a home-rule city has the power and authority to do anything and everything not prohibited by, in conflict with or inconsistent with the Constitution or a general law.” Wright v. City of Fort Worth, 497 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex.Civ.App.— Fort Worth 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (posts in Aircraft Crash Rescue Squad in city’s aviation department were not required to be classified fire department positions under article 1269m). None of the civilians appointed to positions created by the City of Houston ordinances in question either perform law enforcement duties or supervise classified police officers who are performing duties that require that they be certified peace officers.
This holding is consistent with the stated purpose- of the statute set forth in § 16(a). Those who do “police work,” that is, who enforce the law, make arrests, and conduct criminal investigations, are guaranteed permanent tenure and the opportunity for promotion on the basis of merit, although such enforcement of the laws may be controversial. Police officers need not fear that they will be fired or will lose the opportunity to be promoted if they enforce an unpopular or controversial statute, or arrest a popular person. Department employees who perform administrative and policy-making duties, and who are not involved in enforcing the law in specific cases, are not exposed to this type of controversy, and therefore do not fall within the protective policy underlying article 1269m. Accordingly, article 1269m, § 8 does not require the classification of positions within HPD that do not involve the performance of law enforcement duties. Thus, when read in context, the wording of § 9(a) that “no appointment shall ever be made for any position in such Departments except as a result of such [civil service] examination,” refers to appointment to a classified position as a law enforcement officer.
Nothing in the record indicates that the newly created civilian posts require the exercise of law enforcement duties. Accordingly, the positions of Commander of the Management Information Bureau, Commander of the Fleet Maintenance Bureau, Commander of the Career Development Bureau, Commander of the Office of Planning and Research, Division Commander of the Computer Services Division, Division Commander of the Police Training Academy, Police Administrator, and Assistant *188Police Administrator are not required to be classified under article 1269m; neither have they in fact been classified by ordinance duly enacted by the city council, the only agency authorized to make such classification. Therefore, as a matter of law, no vacancies existed in an article 1269m classification for any of these positions.
Further, we find no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that any positions within article 1269m classifications were abolished. King v. Bauer, 688 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.1985); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965). Appellees produced no evidence of formal abolition of any positions by ordinance. Neither was there evidence that the number of positions in any classification was reduced by the creation of the. civilian posts; therefore, there being no reduction or abolition of classified positions, the City was not required to prove that it acted in good faith in abolishing positions.
Appellants’ first through thirteenth points of error are sustained.
Appellants contend in their fourteenth point of error that the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to appel-lees because the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars such an award. Generally, governmental immunity applies to governmental functions exercised by a municipality. Gates v. City of Dallas, 704 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.1986). Such immunity extends to public officials. Steele v. Barbian, 620 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1981, no writ); Kelly v. Galveston County, 520 S.W.2d 507, 512 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). Providing police protection is a governmental function. Burnett v. City of Houston, 442 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref’d). Appellees contend that the City is liable for attorney’s fees under Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 37.009, 104.001, 104.002 (Vernon 1986). Thus, we must determine whether the City’s governmental immunity from liability for attorney’s fees has been waived by these statutes.
We find nothing in § 37.009 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act that constitutes a waiver of governmental immunity. It provides: “[i]n any proceeding under this chapter the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” This issue is similar to that in Texas Employment Comm’n v. Camarena, 710 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.App.—Austin 1986, no writ), rev’d on other grounds, 754 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.1988), wherein the court stated:
[t]here is in § 37.009 nothing that even remotely suggests a waiver of governmental immunity in suits brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Where such waivers are made, the Legislature does so in relatively explicit terms.
Id. at 671. Because we have found nothing implicitly or explicitly waiving governmental immunity, we hold that the appellants are not liable for attorney’s fees under § 37.009. See also Cole v. City of Houston, 442 S.W.2d 445 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ).
Similarly, a review of §§ 104.001, 104.-002, to determine whether those sections contain a waiver of immunity for the City and its officials, discloses that they do not; both sections refer only to the liability of the State, which is not a party to this suit. Nothing in these sections relates to municipal liability; therefore, the appellants are not liable for attorney’s fees under §§ 104.-001, 104.002.
Appellants’ fourteenth point of error is sustained.
In light of our ruling on the fourteenth point of error, we do not reach appellants’ fifteenth and sixteenth points of error, which also challenge the award of attorney’s fees.
The trial court’s judgment is reversed, the injunction issued is dissolved, and judgment is rendered that appellees take nothing.
LEVY, J., dissenting.

. Repealed, by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen. Laws 1306, recodified as Loc.Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 143.001-.134 (Vernon 1988).

. The divisions involved were:
Planning and Research Division; Houston Crime Information Center (H.C.I.C.) Division; Police Garage Division; and the Police Training Academy.

. Ch. 325, 1947 Tex.Gen.Laws 550, repealed by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306.

. E.E. Milam, M.C. Simmons, and H.A. Contreras.

. Richard W. Lee, Delvin H. Kendrick, Murvel L. Yates, Jerry W. DeFoor, and Sam A. Merrill.

. Stephen P. Ward, Robert L. Watson, John C. Modesette, and Andrew L. Gilbert.

. Dana F. Moran, D.R. Simerly, Carlos Gonzalez, and D.E. Elder.

. Ch. 958, § 21, 1985 Tex.Gen.Laws 3240, repealed by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306.

. Ch. 958, § 1, 1985 Tex.Gen.Laws 3227, repealed by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Ch. 958, § 4, 1985 Tex.Gen.Laws 3229, repealed by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306.

. Ch. 215, § 1, 1981 Tex.Gen.Laws 525, repealed by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306.

. Ch. 910, § 4, 1985 Tex.Gen.Laws 3047, repealed by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306.

.Ch. 424, § 1, 1977 Tex.Gen.Laws 1130, repealed by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306.

. Ch. 325, 1947 Tex.Gen.Laws 550, repealed by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306.

. Ch. 325, 1947 Tex.Gen.Laws 550, repealed by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306.

.Ch. 910, § 4, 1985 Tex.Gen.Laws 3047, repealed by ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306.