Court Opinion

ID: 9566863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:44:06.356321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:56.099579
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. Under the pleading, as admitted, and the evidence in this case, the following facts existed: Defendant, Peter J. Rice (deceased, executor substituted) owned a 1960 Chevrolet, at time of collision, that was kept, used and maintained by him as a family car for the use, pleasure and enjoyment of the members of his family, and at the time of said collision, Betty Norton, who was not related to or lived within defendant’s household, at the request of the defendant’s wife, had driven to Red’s Drive-In in defendant’s said 1960 Chevrolet automobile to buy refreshments for the defendant’s family and whatever materials that were needed by Mrs. Rice and the group at her house. Betty Norton, at that time 16 years of age, was the only one of the girls present who had a driver’s license. Beth Rice, 15-year-old daughter of defendant and who had a learner’s license, and two other girls accompanied Miss Norton on the trip.
Miss Norton’s testimony was that Mrs. Rice, defendant’s wife, asked her to take Beth Rice and her two friends to Red’s Drive-In *728to get cokes; that she had driven the car as directed and that after going to the drive-in, the collision occurred as she was pulling out of the driveway of Red’s Drive-In. She further testified that Beth Rice was not telling her where to go or how to operate the car, and that she had control of the automobile and that she was not subject to any supervision or control of anybody in the car. This was objected to as a conclusion by the plaintiff, but was overruled. The statement of the driver that the family member had no authority to control her driving, while under the law of the case, may not be a conclusion of the witness; yet the family member, as agent of the father, had such right as a matter of law, it not appearing that either the father or the mother had expressly forbidden the exercise thereof. Under these circumstances, the jury was not bound to accept this statement of the driver.
The jury returned a verdict and judgment was rendered plaintiff, and defendant appealed to this court.
Under these facts, I think it is undisputed that the wife, under the "family car doctrine” was authorized to drive and control the car for the use and enjoyment of herself and family. Ferguson v. Gurley, 218 Ga. 276 (127 SE2d 462). The same would also apply to the daughter of owner with limitation that she drive only when accompanied by an adult. Here, Miss Norton was driving to a place as directed by Mrs. Rice, who was not present in the car, but Beth Rice, her daughter, was in the car. While it is shown that the daughter did not direct Miss Norton how to drive, it does not necessarily follow that she could not have done so if she had so chosen, or, that being a member of the family, she had no right to do so. Could the jury, under the facts in this case, find that she had the right, whether she exercised it or not? The jury heard the evidence and had the right and duty to construe it. Could they have construed the statements of Miss Norton to only mean that she was totally in physical control of the operation unless directed otherwise by the daughter — especially when she testifies that she was directed or requested by Mrs. Rice, the mother, to go to' Red’s Drive-In? I think they could have and did. We must construe the evidence to uphold the verdict if it can do so.
While some cases, such as Pritchett v. Williams, 115 Ga. App. 8 (153 SE2d 639) and Myrick v. Sievers, 104 Ga. App. 95 (121 SE2d 185), hold that the father is liable under the family car doctrine for negligence of the third person who was permitted by the son to drive, where the son remained in the automobile and retained control, authority and direction over automobile, and where the *729automobile was still being used in furtherance of its purpose as a family car; they do not hold that one member with authority cannot give permission and another member, if in the car, cannot direct and control its operation.
It was stated in Hubert v. Harpe, 181 Ga. 168, 171 (182 SE 167), "In every such case the question is whether the father has expressly or impliedly made the furnishing of an automobile for such purpose a part of his business, so that one operating the vehicle for that purpose with his consent, express or implied, may be considered as his agent.” It was also said on pages 175 and 176 in that case: "It is true that an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality, so as to make the owner liable, as in the case of a wild animal loose on the streets; but, as a matter of practical justice to those who are injured, we can not close our eyes to the fact that an automobile possesses excessive weight, that it is capable of running at a rapid rate of speed, and, when moving rapidly upon the streets of a populous city, it is dangerous to life and limb and must be operated with care. If an instrumentality of this kind is placed in the hands of his family by a father, for the family’s pleasure, comfort, and entertainment, the dictates of natural justice should require that the owner should be responsible for its negligent operation because only by doing so, as a general rule, can substantial justice be attained.” Here, there is no question that it was part of his business, for such is stipulated. As to the second portion, could the jury find that he had impliedly consented for one other than a member of his family to be his agent, when his wife had instructed her to drive on family business and his daughter accompanied the driver in the car? We think, under the particular facts of this case, that they were authorized to so find.
I would affirm the lower court.
I am authorized to state that Judges Deen, Quillian and Evans concur in this dissent.