Court Opinion

ID: 9904928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 15:01:42.389438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:48.653412
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14117    Document: 28-1     Date Filed: 11/28/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14117
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MUHUMMAND WASHINGTON,
       a.k.a. Mahammed Washington,
       a.k.a. Muhammed Ali Washington,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-14117

                   D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00021-TKW-MJF-1
                          ____________________

       Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Muhummand Washington appeals his 300-month sentence
       for one count of possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or
       more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). He
       speciﬁcally challenges the district court’s decision to classify him as
       a career oﬀender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 for purposes of sentenc-
       ing. In response, the government cites United States v. Keene, 470
       F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006), and argues, in part, that it is unnecessary
       for us resolve his career oﬀender status because: (i) the district court
       reasoned that Washington’s sentence would have been the same
       under § 3553(a) irrespective of how it ruled on Washington’s objec-
       tions to the Sentencing Guideline calculations; and (ii) his 300-
       month sentence is substantively reasonable. After careful review,
       we agree with the government and therefore aﬃrm Washington’s
       sentence.
              Generally, we review the district court’s determination that
       a defendant qualifies as a career offender under the Guidelines de
       novo. United States v. Gibson, 434 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006).
       But precedent dictates “we need not review [a sentencing] issue
       when (1) the district court states it would have imposed the same
       sentence, even absent an alleged error, and (2) the sentence is sub-
       stantively reasonable.” United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213,
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       22-14117               Opinion of the Court                         3

       1221 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349). Here, the dis-
       trict court explicitly maintained both at the sentencing hearing and
       in its statement of reasons that it would have imposed the same
       sentence notwithstanding Washington’s career offender objec-
       tions. We therefore turn to the substantive reasonableness of the
       sentence.
               In determining whether a sentence is reasonable, we assume
       that the alleged Guideline calculation error occurred, adjust the
       Guideline range accordingly, and ask whether the sentence im-
       posed is reasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Keene,
       470 F.3d at 1349. It is the defendant’s burden to prove the unrea-
       sonableness of his sentence in light of the record and § 3553(a). Id.
       at 1350. A sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than nec-
       essary, to comply with the purposes” listed in the statute, including
       the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect
       for the law, provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct, pro-
       tect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct, and
       supply effective correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Ad-
       ditional considerations include the nature and circumstances of the
       offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the appli-
       cable guideline range, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
       disparities among similarly situated defendants, among others. See
       id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
               The weight due to each § 3553(a) factor lies within the dis-
       trict court’s sound discretion, and we will not substitute our judg-
       ment for that of the district court. United States v. Joseph, 978 F.3d
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-14117

       1251, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). A district court abuses its discretion
       only when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due sig-
       nificant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrel-
       evant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing
       the proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
       1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Nevertheless, a district court may
       reasonably “attach great weight to a single factor.” United States v.
       Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 19 (11th Cir. 2022).
               When departing from a Guideline range, “a sentencing
       court may impose an upward variance based upon unchanged con-
       duct . . . [or] if it concludes that the Guidelines range was insuffi-
       cient in light of a defendant’s criminal history.” United States v. But-
       ler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal citations omitted).
       However, “a district judge must give serious consideration to the
       extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain his
       conclusion that an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sen-
       tence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient justifica-
       tions.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).
               We examine whether a sentence is substantively reasonable
       under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 51. We will vacate a
       sentence as substantively unreasonable only if we are “left with the
       definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a
       clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriv-
       ing at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences
       dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quoting
       United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)).
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       22-14117                      Opinion of the Court                           5

               Here, it is unnecessary to resolve the alleged Guideline issue
       because we cannot conclude that the district court committed clear
       error. Under Keene, we assume that a miscalculation occurred and
       adjust the Guideline range, which results in a term of 120-months’
       imprisonment. 1 The record reveals that the district court consid-
       ered the relevant Guidelines and balanced them within its sound
       discretion. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189–91. The district court ex-
       plained that the 300-month sentence was appropriate based upon
       pertinent § 3553(a) factors, with a particular emphasis upon Wash-
       ington’s extensive criminal history, the seriousness of the current
       offense, and reengagement in drug trafficking shortly after his re-
       cent release from federal custody. Specifically, the court empha-
       sized the “nature and circumstances of this offense are extremely
       serious,” involving three kilograms of cocaine and $354,000 in cash.
       It further highlighted concerns surrounding deterrence and future
       criminal conduct, given Washington’s extensive operation within
       a year and a few months of his last federal release. Its concerns
       were punctuated by two prior federal drug trafficking sentences—
       totaling 285 months—with “essentially the same level of criminal
       activity despite the passage of time.” Finally, the court found a

       1 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).Without the career offender enhancement, Wash-
       ington’s guideline range would be 87 to 108 months. However, the applicable
       statutory provisions provide a minimum term of 120 months and a maximum
       term of life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii). Therefore
       the applicable mandatory minimum raises his guideline sentence to 120
       months. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required minimum sen-
       tence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the stat-
       utorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14117

       higher proportion sentence was necessary because he was more
       culpable than the other defendants and he alone had two prior fed-
       eral convictions. The court therefore held that Washington’s age,
       upbringing, and substance abuse history failed to offset the crime’s
       circumstances. Based upon this record, we are not left with the
       “definite and firm conviction” that the district court abused its dis-
       cretion in its weighing and judgment of the § 3553(a) factors. Ra-
       ther, due to Washington’s criminal escalation and the present of-
       fense’s magnitude, the sentence appears to fall within the “range of
       reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of [his] case.” Irey, 612
       F.3d at 1190 (quoting Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191).
              This conclusion holds true even in the context of a substan-
       tial upward variance. The district court emphasized Washington’s
       “unchanged conduct” across his criminal history, and explained his
       conclusion that he is “unquestionably a ‘career offender’ in the col-
       loquial sense.” He had previously served two ten-year convictions
       for federal drug offenses, each with increasing volumes of cocaine.
       And shortly following each sentence, Washington violated super-
       vised release with various drug-related offenses that led to two ad-
       ditional 21–24 month sentences. Thus, the present federal sen-
       tence for a considerably greater cocaine operation strongly sug-
       gests that a significant—rather than third, 120-month—sentence
       was “sufficient, but no greater than necessary” to reflect the pur-
       poses of § 3553(a). Moreover, our precedent has repeatedly af-
       firmed sentences as substantively reasonable that include major up-
       ward variances for defendants with significant and recidivist crimi-
       nal histories. See, e.g., Grushko, 50 F.4th at 18–21 (affirming 145-
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       22-14117              Opinion of the Court                      7

       month sentence as substantively reasonable despite Guidelines
       range of 75–87 months); United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627,
       636–40 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming 420-month sentence where
       Guidelines range was 180–210 months); United States v. Shaw, 560
       F.3d 1230, 1237–41 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming 120-month sentence
       although Guidelines range was 30–37 months); United States v.
       Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming 240-
       month sentence when Guidelines range was 51–63 months).
              Ultimately, because we cannot find that the district court
       abused its discretion in sentencing Washington, any alleged error
       regarding the career offender enhancement is harmless. See Keene,
       470 F.3d at 1349–50. We therefore affirm.
             AFFIRMED.