Court Opinion

ID: 9864775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:10:48.382712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:42.308173
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Campbell,
dissenting.
I am unable to agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Bouck in this case for the reasons stated in this dissenting opinion.
The state of Colorado, by its attorney general, brought this action against the defendants Tolbert and others, *444who, plaintiff says, unlawfully imported from the state of Kansas into the state of Colorado motor fuel without paying a tax thereon, which a Colorado statute has imposed in such cases, and who threaten to continue such importation. Defendants are not licensed distributors in Colorado of fuel oils. The attorney general says such payment is required by section 2 of our 1933 Session Laws, chapter 140, page 718, which imposes an excise tax of four cents per gallon on all motor fuel sold or used in this state. Defendants demurred to the complaint on the grounds that the district court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action; that the complaint does not state a cause of action, and unlawfully seeks to regulate interstate commerce. The trial court sustained this demurrer for the reasons stated by it that the acts therein complained of constitute a criminal offense under the laws of Colorado, hence not taxable at all; but, if taxable, are in violation of section 7 of article 5 of the Constitution of Colorado in that they amount to an attempt by the General Assembly itself to impose a tax for highway purposes; that is, for highway construction and maintenance, and the levy in such cases is for the county and not for the state to exact. All other grounds of the demurrer were overruled. The plaintiff state, objecting to this judgment, has sued out this writ of error to review the same. The trial court apparently would have upheld the complaint had it not believed that the acts pleaded therein constitute a criminal offense. And this is manifest because the trial judge said that all other grounds of the demurrer to the complaint were overruled. That circumstance, in my view, however, is not important for I am of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed for the following reasons.
It is not seriously, or at all, contended by the plaintiff state that the bringing of motor fuel from the state of Kansas into the state of Colorado does not constitute interstate commerce. It would seem too plain for argu*445ment that it has this effect. The complaint clearly and distinctly charges that the defendants are engaged in the business of bringing from one state — Kansas—into another state — Colorado—motor fuel without paying, or offering to pay, the tax which section 2, chapter 140, of Colorado Session Laws of 1933 in such circumstances imposes. Such acts, constituting, as they do, interstate commerce, are within the protection of section 17, page 739, chapter 140, S. L. 1933, which reads: “No provision of this chapter [140] shall apply or be construed to apply to interstate commerce.”
The trial court’s judgment in my opinion should be affirmed.