Court Opinion

ID: 9573813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:59:34.83013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:24.601413
License: Public Domain

SLOAN, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent.
It may be that the evidence in this case is not so clear and convincing as it should be to sustain plaintiff’s case. If that were the basis of the decision, I would probably concur in the result. However, this is a case in which a view of the witness may be equally important with the words said. The trial court’s findings, therefore, should be sustained. The pertinent ones are:
“II.
“At the time of the accident plaintiff was under the care of George McGowan, M. D., for an existing pregnancy. After the accident plaintiff went to Dr. McGowan for diagnosis and treatment of the injuries resulting from the accident. Dr. McGowan did not diagnose the case as involving a ruptured disc, took no x-rays, and advised plaintiff and her husband that plaintiff sustained sacroiliac and lumbar strains, and that her pain would continue until her pregnancy was completed.
“ni.
“With the permission of plaintiff and at the request of Mr. H. L. Young, agent of the Western Pacific Insurance Company representing the defendant herein, Dr. McGowan furnished the insurance company with a report which contained the following prognosis:
‘Apparently good. However, I feel her back and hip will continue to be painful until pregnacy is completed.’
*369“V.
“At the time of the execution of the release neither plaintiff, nor her husband, nor Mr. Young, was aware of the disc involvement. No other injuries were discussed or ¡suspected and all parties concerned relied on Dr. McGowan’s diagnosis and prognosis and regarded the injuries temporary and fully covered by his report.
“VI.
“Plaintiff read and understood the release but intended releasing only her claim for the sacroiliac and lumbar strains.
“VII.
“The question of liability was at no time discussed between the parties ¡and the execution of the release was not the result of a compromise on that issue.
“VIII.
“At the time of the execution of the release all parties concerned were mistaken as to the nature and extent of the injuries sustained by plaintiff as the result of the accident.”
In any other area of the law that I am familiar with those findings would be sufficient to allow rescission of a contract. But assume that the insurance adjuster was not mistaken. It could not be said that he 'had knowledge for that would then be evidence of fraud. If he were not mistaken and did not know, then he must have been indifferent. He was only interested in buying a release at the lowest price possible. Certainly, a legitimate interest. But that does not deny plaintiff relief.
I certainly do not intend to exhaust this subject; only to introduce some of the established rules that guide the courts in other cases where a party acting in good faith, mistakenly enters into some form of transaction that we call a contract. Plaintiff in this *370case did not act improvidently. She acted in good faith on the advice of the doctor in which she 'had a right to rely.
“Suppose, first, a ease in which a bidding contractor makes an offer to supply specified goods or to do specified work for a definitely named price, and that he was caused to name this price by an antecedent error of computation. If, before acceptance, the offeree knows, or has reason to know, that a material error has been made, he is seldom mean enough to accept; and if he does accept, the courts have no difficulty in throwing him out. He is not permitted ‘to snap up’ such an offer and profit thereby.* If, without loxowledge of the mistake and before any revocation, he has accepted the offer, it is natural for him to feel a sense of disappointment at not getting a good bargain, when the offeror insists on withdrawal; but a just and reasonable man will not insist upon profiting by the other’s mistake.* There are now many decisions to the effect that if the error was a substantial one .and notice is given before the other party has made such a change of position that he can not be put substantially in statu quo, the bargain is voidable and rescission will be decreed.* 3 Corbin on Contracts, 1951, Section 609, 680-682. (Footnotes omitted).
“It is the rule in general that a contract will not be reformed for a unilateral mistake,* nor does such a mistake, of itself render the transaction voidable.* However, equitable relief by way of rescission may be given if the mistake relates to a material feature of the contract, if it is of such grave consequence that enforcement of the contract as made will be unconscionable, if it occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party making the mistake, and if the other party can be put in statu quo.*” 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 1941, Section 870a, 388. (Footnotes omitted).
*371“Here the consequence of the mistake is not the failure to express an intended agreement (in which ease the failure might be rectified), but the'entering into any bargain at all, in view of the circumstances. To rescind the transaction is, therefore, the only available remedy. An agreement for the sale of a bar of metal, understood to contain a certain proportion of silver illustrates this kind of mistake. Through an error in the assay of the metal, on the strength of which the bargain was made, the parties acted under a mistake; there was less silver than they supposed. It was held that on tendering back the bar, the buyer was entitled to recover the money he had paid.* It will be noticed that there was here an actual sale of the bar in question. There was a clear expression of assent to the sale of that particular bar. The case, therefore, is one of rescission of a sale on equitable grounds.” Williston on Sales, 1948, Section 656, 514-515. (Footnotes omitted).
And see M. F. Kemper Construction Co. v. The City of Los Angeles, 1951, 37 Cal2d 696, 235 P2d 7, in which the court canceled a firm construction bid for a mistake on the part of the bidder even though the official bid form provided bidders, “will not be released on account of errors.” The case is not fully in point, but the analysis made by the court is aldn to the ease at bar. See note on the Kemper case at 100 Pa L Rev 753. It goes without saying that defendant in this case can readily be returned to status quo.
It seems apparent then that equity will relieve a person from a contract such as this in a variety of circumstances when that person in good faith gets his foot in a trap. The horror expressed by the majority that this plaintiff wants to renege on her contract must be motivated by the precise nature of this particular contract. Similar revulsion has not been *372expressed by the courts and authorities when relief is sought from other forms of contract for the very same reasons.
The judgment should be affirmed.