Court Opinion

ID: 9419342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:48:58.114488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:42:05.726238
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Murphy,
concurring:
I join in the opinion of the Court, but the importance of this and the other cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses decided today, moves me to add this brief statement.
I believe that nothing enjoys a higher estate in our society than the right given by the First and Fourteenth Amendments freely to practice and proclaim one’s religious convictions. Cf. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 at 621. The right extends to the aggressive and disputatious as well as to the meek and acquiescent. The lesson of experience is that — with the passage of time and the interchange of ideas — organizations, once turbulent, perfervid and intolerant in their origin, mellow into tolerance and acceptance by the community, or else sink into oblivion. Religious differences are often sharp and pleaders at times resort “to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310. If a religious be*150lief has substance, it can survive criticism, heated and abusive though it may be, with the aid of truth and reason alone. By the same method, those who follow false prophets are exposed. Repression has no place in this country. It is our proud achievement to have demonstrated that unity and strength are best accomplished, not by enforced orthodoxy of views, but by diversity of opinion through the fullest possible measure of freedom of conscience and thought.
Also, few, if any, believe more strongly in the maxim, “a man’s home is his castle,” than I. Cf. Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 at 136. If this principle approaches a collision with religious freedom, there should be an accommodation, if at all possible, which gives appropriate recognition to both. That is, if regulation should be necessary to protect the safety and privacy of the home, an effort should be made at the same time to preserve the substance of religious freedom.
There can be no question but that appellant was engaged in a religious activity when she was going from house to house in the City of Struthers distributing circulars advertising a meeting of those of her belief. Distribution of such circulars on the streets cannot be prohibited. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413. Nor can their distribution on the streets or from house to house be conditioned upon obtaining a license which is subject to the uncontrolled discretion of municipal officials, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147; Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418, or upon payment of a license tax for the privilege of so doing. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 105; Jones v. Opelika, ante, p. 103. Preaching from house to house is an age-old method of proselyting, and it must be remembered that “one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” Schneider v. State, supra, p. 163.
*151No doubt there may be relevant considerations which justify considerable regulation of door to door canvassing, even for religious purposes, — regulation as to time, number and identification of canvassers, etc., which will protect the privacy and safety of the home and yet preserve the substance of religious freedom. And, if a householder does not desire visits from religious' canvassers, he can make his wishes known in a suitable fashion. The fact that some regulation may be permissible, however, does not mean that the First Amendment may be abrogated. We are not dealing here with a statute “narrowly drawn to cover the precise situation” that calls for remedial action, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 105; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 311. As construed by the state courts and applied to the case at bar, the Struthers ordinance prohibits door to door canvassing of any kind, no matter what its character and purpose may be, if attended by the distribution of written or printed matter in the form of a circular or pamphlet. I do not believe that this outright prohibition is warranted. As I understand it, the distribution of circulars and pamphlets is a relatively minor aspect of the problem. The primary concern is with the act of canvassing as a source of inconvenience and annoyance to householders. But if the city can prohibit canvassing for the purpose of distributing religious pamphlets, it can also outlaw the door to door solicitations of religious charities, or the activities of the holy mendicant who begs alms from house to house to serve the material wants of his fellowmen and thus obtain spiritual comfort for his own soul.
Prohibition may be more convenient to the law maker, and easier to fashion than a regulatory measure which adequately protects the peace and privacy of the home without suppressing legitimate religious activities. But that does not justify a repressive enactment like the one now before us. Cf. Schneider v. State, supra, p. 164. Freedom of religion has a higher dignity under the Con*152stitution than municipal or personal convenience. In these days, free men have no loftier responsibility than the preservation of that freedom. A nation dedicated to that ideal will not suffer but will prosper in its observance.
Me. Justice Douglas and Me. Justice Rutledge join in this opinion.
Me. Justice Feankfuetee:
From generation to generation, fresh vindication is given to the prophetic wisdom of the framers of the Constitution in casting it in terms so broad that it has adaptable vitality for the drastic changes in our society which they knew to be inevitable, even though they could not foresee them. Thus it has come to be that the transforming consequences resulting from the pervasive industrialization of life find the Commerce Clause appropriate, for instance, for national regulation of an aircraft flight wholly within a single state. Such exertion of power by the national government over what might seem a purely local transaction would, as a matter of abstract law, have been as unimaginable to Marshall as to Jefferson, precisely because neither could have foreseen the present conquest of the air by man. But law, whether derived from acts of Congress or the Constitution, is not an abstraction. The Constitution cannot be applied in disregard of the external circumstances in which men live and move and have their being. Therefore, neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendment is to be treated by judges as though it were a mathematical abstraction, an absolute having no relation to the lives of men.
The habits and security of life in sparsely settled rural communities, or even in those few cities which a hundred and fifty years ago had a population of a few thousand, cannot be made the basis of judgment for determining the area of allowable self-protection by present-day industrial communities. The lack of privacy and the hazards *153to peace of mind and body caused by people living not in individual houses but crowded together in large human beehives, as they so widely do, are facts of modem living which cannot be ignored.
Concededly, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not abrogate the power of the states to recognize that homes are sanctuaries from intrusions upon privacy and of opportunities for leading lives of health and safety. Door-knocking and bell-ringing by professed peddlers of things or ideas may therefore be confined within specified hours and otherwise circumscribed so as not to sanctify the rights of these peddlers in disregard of the rights of those within doors. Acknowledgement is also made that the City of Struthers, the particular ordinance of which presents the immediate issue before us, is one of those industrial communities the residents of which have a working day consisting of twenty-four hours, so that for some portions of the city’s inhabitants opportunities for sleep and refreshment require during day as well as night whatever peace and quiet is obtainable in a modem industrial town. It is further recognized that the modem multiple residences give opportunities for pseudo-canvassers to ply evil trades — dangers to the community pursued by the few but far-reaching in their success and in the fears they arouse.
The Court’s opinion apparently recognizes these factors as legitimate concerns for regulation by those whose business it is to legislate. But it finds, if I interpret correctly what is wanting in explicitness, that instead of aiming at the protection of householders from intrusion upon needed hours of rest or from those plying evil trades, whether pretending the sale of pots and pans or the distribution of leaflets, the ordinance before us merely penalizes the distribution of “literature.”' To be sure, the prohibition of this ordinance is within a small circle. But it is not our business to require legislatures to extend the area *154of prohibition or regulation beyond the demands of revealed abuses. And the greatest leeway must be given to the legislative judgment of what those demands are. The right to legislate implies the right to classify. We should not, however unwittingly, slip into the judgment seat of legislatures. I myself cannot say that those in whose keeping is the peace of the City of Struthers and the right of privacy of its home dwellers could not single out, in circumstances of which they may have knowledge and I certainly have not, this class of canvassers as the particular source of mischief. The Court’s opinion leaves one in doubt whether prohibition of all bell-ringing and door-knocking would be deemed an infringement of the constitutional protection of speech. It would be fantastic to suggest that a city has power, in the circumstances of modern urban life, to forbid house-to-house canvassing generally, but that the Constitution prohibits the inclusion in such prohibition of door-to-door vending of phylacteries or rosaries or of any printed matter. If the scope of the Court’s opinion, apart from some of its general observations, is that this ordinance is an invidious discrimination against distributors of what is politely called literature, and therefore is deemed an unjustifiable prohibition of freedom of utterance, the decision leaves untouched what are in my view controlling constitutional principles, if I am correct in my understanding of what is held, and I would not be disposed to disagree with such a construction of the ordinance.