Court Opinion

ID: 9577079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:31:29.294613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:57.267463
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
concurring specially.
I fully concur with the majority opinion. I write separately regarding Division 1 to address what I perceive to be a weakening of the mandatory nature of the word “shall.”
Thebaut correctly notes that OCGA § 50-13-17 (c) requires that an agency “shall render a final decision . . . within 30 days after the close of the record.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that “the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words” except words of art and trade words. OCGA § 1-3-1 (b). Ordinarily, “shall” connotes a command. See State v. Henderson, 263 Ga. 508, 510 (436 SE2d 209) (1993) (“must” and “shall” are synonymous); see also In the Interest of R. D. F., 266 Ga. 294, 295 (466 SE2d 572) (1996) (OCGA § 15-11-26, which contains the word “shall,” is construed to be mandatory); Ga. Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. ITT-Rayonier, 198 Ga. App. 467 (402 SE2d 54) (1991) (the word “shall” in OCGA § 34-9-362 required compliance with time limitation); Van Shallern v. Stanco, 132 Ga. App. 794, 795 (209 SE2d 243) (1974) (Code Ann. § 61-302 containing word “shall” described as *204“mandatory statutory provision”).
Decided November 10, 1998.
Chilivis, Cochran, Larkins & Bever, Anthony L. Cochran, John K. Larkins, Jr., for appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Brenda H. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, Alan Gantzhorn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kristin R. Loecke, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Notwithstanding the generally accepted meaning of “shall,” however, the Supreme Court of Georgia has carved out an exception for cases in which the word “shall” specifies a time period for the accomplishment of some action. “[W]hen not accompanied by any negative words restraining the doing of the thing afterward, [the word ‘shall’] will generally be construed as merely directory and not as a limitation of authority, and this is especially so where no injury appeared to have resulted from the fact that the thing was done after the time limited by the plain wording of the Act.” Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733, 739 (1) (187 SE2d 835) (1972).
“Probably the most firmly established rule of statutory construction is the ‘plain meaning rule.’ ” Pittman v. State, 133 Ga. App. 902, 905 (1) (212 SE2d 505) (1975). Since I believe the plain meaning of “shall” is “must,” I am inclined to agree with Thebaut. Nevertheless, I am constrained by the precedent set forth in Barton, and, therefore, I specially concur.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope joins in this special concurrence.