Court Opinion

ID: 9375939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 15:04:28.700219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.076705
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 115
                    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                        DIVISION III
                                        No. CR-22-444

                                               Opinion Delivered   March 1, 2023
JOHN A. ROBERTS
                              APPELLANT        APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
                                               COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V.                                             [NO. 63CR-21-113]

                                               HONORABLE KEN CASADY, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
                                APPELLEE       AFFIRMED; REMANDED TO
                                               CORRECT SENTENCING
                                               ORDER

                         STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

       John Roberts was convicted by a Saline County Circuit Court jury of murder in the

second degree and two counts of failure to appear. He was sentenced as a habitual offender

with more than four felony convictions to sixty years’ imprisonment on the second-degree

murder conviction and thirty years’ incarceration for each of the failure-to-appear

convictions. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, for a total of 120 years.

On appeal, Roberts argues (1) there was insufficient evidence that he caused Oliver’s death;

(2) there was insufficient evidence that the Saline County Circuit Court had jurisdiction; (3)

the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on jurisdiction; and (4)

the circuit court erred by permitting the State to make an improper closing argument in
rebuttal. We affirm the convictions, but we remand to correct an error in the sentencing

order.

                                           I. Facts

         The testimony relevant to the issues on appeal included that of Alexander Chief of

Police Robert Burnett, who testified that on October 14, 2020, he was traveling on Highway

111 South in Alexander at approximately 9:30 in the morning, when he saw three people he

believed were working on a vehicle on Vine Street. However, as he came around the curve,

he noticed a young man kicking someone lying on the ground in the middle of the street.

Chief Burnett, realizing there was a problem, turned around and came up behind the vehicle

on Vine Street; by that time, according to Chief Burnett, the victim, later identified as

Michael Oliver, had rolled into a field, and a person Chief Burnett identified as Roberts was

still kicking Oliver in the head, neck, and shoulders. After Chief Burnett arrived at the

scene, Roberts began trying to help Oliver off the ground, which Chief Burnett testified

“wasn’t working out too good” because Oliver was “like a limp noodle,” and he was

screaming that he could not see. Chief Burnett explained that when Roberts could not get

Oliver up, he “kind of picked him up and was kind of dragging him to the car” and put

Oliver in the driver’s seat; Chief Burnett believed Roberts was attempting to downplay the

situation by saying that they “were good.” Chief Burnett testified that even though he did

not see any blood on Oliver, his condition worsened after medical assistance and backup

were called; that Oliver had a lot of snot and fluid coming out of his nose and mouth; and

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that Oliver lost consciousness and never regained consciousness before an ambulance

transported him to the hospital.

       Detective Sergeant Jessica Burnett of the Alexander Police Department testified that

she responded to the incident for backup, and she was responsible for processing the scene.

When she arrived at the scene, she found Oliver in the driver’s seat of a vehicle with his head

leaned back, completely unresponsive, with excessive mucus and drool coming from his

mouth and nose, and he had urinated on himself. She found no weapons at the scene, and

although there was no bruising, injuries, or blood she could see on Oliver, she stated that he

appeared to be injured because he was “completely unresponsive.”

       Dr. Frank Peretti, a recently retired associate medical examiner at the Arkansas State

Crime Laboratory, testified that Oliver died on November 8, 2020, and he performed

Oliver’s autopsy on November 10, 2020. He explained that Oliver had developed a subdural

hematoma—a blood clot on his brain—as a result of the assault, and it was necessary to

perform surgery to remove it and to relieve pressure on his brain; otherwise, herniation of

the spinal cord would occur, rendering him brain dead. Dr. Peretti explained that Oliver’s

injury was contained inside of his skull, on the top of the brain; however, the excess mucus

and drool, the seizures, and the inability to see were all symptoms consistent with a subdural

hematoma.

       Dr. Peretti determined that Oliver’s cause of death was pneumonia complicating

blunt-force head injuries, and the manner of death was homicide, meaning that his death

was caused by another person. When asked how the manner of death could be homicide if

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the cause of death was pneumonia complicating blunt-force head injuries, Dr. Peretti

explained that Oliver had sustained significant head trauma and had undergone extensive

surgical intervention; on October 21, while still recovering from surgery in the hospital,

Oliver fell, hit his head, and became bedbound; he then developed pneumonia and died.

Dr. Peretti opined that Oliver developed pneumonia as a result of his assault; if Oliver had

not been assaulted and required surgery, he would not have been in the hospital and fallen,

and he would not have developed pneumonia. Dr. Peretti considered the time from the

assault on October 14 to Oliver’s death on November 8 to be an uninterrupted sequence of

events.

          On cross-examination, Dr. Peretti admitted Oliver had begun to recover from surgery

when he fell in the hospital and suffered new injuries. The new injury caused a rebleed

where the first subdural hematoma occurred, and Oliver developed another blood clot.

          The State rested after Dr. Peretti’s testimony. Roberts moved for a directed verdict

on the charge of murder in the second degree, arguing the State had failed to prove he caused

Oliver’s death. The State argued that there could be concurrent causes of death, but conduct

that hastens or contributes to a person’s death is a cause of death. The circuit court denied

the directed-verdict motion, finding it was a question for the jury.

          After calling one witness whose testimony is not germane to the issues on appeal, the

defense renewed its directed-verdict motion, which was again denied by the circuit court.

The following morning, the defense moved to reopen its case, which was allowed without

objection.     The defense then called Pam Wright, a geographical information systems

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administrator for Saline County. Wright was shown a parcel map of the area where the

altercation between Roberts and Oliver had occurred. The location is on the Pulaski/Saline

County line, and Wright testified that all of the 8-1-0 parcel numbers on the map are billed

and represented in Saline County, including the parcel in question, 810-65022-000. She

explained that a parcel is not divided between counties even if it is in two counties, and that

all of the parcels in question are considered to be in Saline County. Wright agreed that if

part of the crime was committed on parcel 810-65022-000, which is in both Saline and

Pulaski Counties, it is considered to be in Saline County.

       After Wright’s testimony, Roberts renewed his directed-verdict motion regarding

murder in the second degree, and he added the argument that because it was unclear whether

the fatal blow happened in Saline County, there was a jurisdictional issue. The State

responded that venue and jurisdiction are appropriate if part of the crime occurred in Saline

County, and the fatal blow did not have to occur in Saline County. The circuit court denied

Roberts’s motion, stating that the jury could weigh the evidence.

       The State recalled Chief Burnett as a rebuttal witness. He testified that when he first

saw Oliver, he was “right about” on the county line, but when he circled back around, Oliver

was in a grassy area clearly in Saline County. After Chief Burnett’s testimony, Roberts again

moved for a directed verdict, which was again denied.

       During discussion of jury instructions, Roberts requested a jury instruction based on

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-111 (Repl. 2013), stating that an issue of fact as to

jurisdiction had been raised and that the State would need to prove beyond a reasonable

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doubt that the incident had occurred in Saline County. The State objected, arguing that if

one part of the crime happened in one county and another part of the crime happened in

another county, charges could be brought in either county, and Roberts had not presented

any evidence that part of the crime had not occurred in Saline County. The circuit court

denied Roberts’s request for the jury instruction, finding that the State was not required to

prove venue or jurisdiction unless evidence was admitted affirmatively showing that the

circuit court lacked jurisdiction, which it did not believe had been shown.

                   II. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Murder in the Second Degree

       Roberts argues the circuit court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict on

the charge of murder in the second degree because the State failed to prove that he caused

Oliver’s death. A motion for directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

Benton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 223, 599 S.W.3d 353. When reviewing a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence, this court assesses the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State, considering only the evidence supporting the verdict, to determine if there is

substantial evidence to support the verdict. Id. Substantial evidence can be direct or

circumstantial, and it is evidence of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion

one way or the other, with reasonable certainty, without resorting to speculation or

conjecture. Id. The jury determines the credibility of the witnesses, and it is free to believe

all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and

inconsistent evidence. Id.

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       A person commits murder in the second degree if he or she (1) knowingly causes the

death of another person under circumstances manifesting indifference to the value of human

life; or (2) with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person, the person

causes the death of any person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-103(a) (Repl. 2013). Arkansas Code

Annotated section 5-2-205 (Repl. 2013) provides:

          Causation may be found when the result would not have occurred but for the
       conduct of the defendant operating either alone or concurrently with another cause
       unless:

          (1) The concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result; and

          (2) The conduct of the defendant was clearly insufficient to produce the result.

“Where there are concurrent causes of death, conduct which hastens or contributes to a

person’s death is a cause of death.” Cox v. State, 305 Ark. 244, 248, 808 S.W.2d 306, 309

(1991).

       We hold that the State provided sufficient evidence that Roberts caused Oliver’s

death. Dr. Peretti testified that Oliver sustained significant head trauma and underwent

extensive surgical intervention as a result of Roberts’s assault on him; he sustained a fall in

the hospital while recovering from surgery for the injuries caused by Roberts; and he

contracted pneumonia after becoming relegated to bed after the fall. Dr. Peretti explained

that if Oliver had not been assaulted by Roberts, he would not have been in the hospital; he

would not have sustained a fall in the hospital while recovering from surgery; and he would

not have developed pneumonia as a result of being bedbound. While pneumonia may have

been a cause of Oliver’s death, the State produced sufficient evidence that Roberts’s assault

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on Oliver was a contributing cause to his death as well, and the jury, as the trier of fact, was

entitled to believe Dr. Peretti’s expert testimony as to what caused Oliver’s death. The circuit

court did not err in denying Roberts’s directed-verdict motions.

                            III. Sufficiency of Evidence—Jurisdiction

       Roberts next argues there was insufficient evidence that the Saline County Circuit

Court had jurisdiction to hear his case.1 We disagree.

       No person may be convicted of an offense unless jurisdiction and venue are proved

beyond a reasonable doubt, except as provided otherwise in the statute. Ark. Code Ann. §

5-1-111(a) (Repl. 2013). Subsection (b) of this statute states that the State is not required to

prove jurisdiction or venue unless evidence is admitted that affirmatively shows that the

court lacks jurisdiction or venue. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-111(b).

       If an offense is committed on the boundary of two or more counties or if it is

uncertain where the boundary is, either county has jurisdiction to hear the matter. Ark.

Code Ann. § 16-88-108(a) (Repl. 2005). If an offense is committed partly in one county and

partly in another, jurisdiction is in either county. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-88-108(c). There is

a presumption that the court had venue. Penix, supra. There must be positive evidence that

an offense occurred outside the jurisdiction of the court before the State is required to offer

evidence of jurisdiction or venue. Id. The test is “whether the record contains substantial

       1
        While Roberts designates this argument as one of jurisdiction, he does not argue
that the Saline County Circuit Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction; rather his real
argument is venue—the geographic area where an action is brought to trial. See Penix v. State,
2022 Ark. App. 407, 654 S.W.3d 828.

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evidence showing that the offense, or elements of it, occurred within the jurisdiction and

venue of the court.” Penix, 2022 Ark. App. 407, at 14, 654 S.W.3d at 836 (citing Lindsey v.

State, 54 Ark. App. 266, 268, 925 S.W.2d 441, 442–43 (1996)).

       Roberts argues that Pam Wright’s testimony showed that the parcel of property where

Oliver was injured, while located near the Pulaski/Saline County line, was located “entirely

within Pulaski County.” This is an incorrect characterization of Wright’s testimony. She

testified that all of the 810 parcel numbers were considered to be Saline County parcels.

Chief Burnett’s rebuttal testimony supported Wright’s testimony: he stated that he first saw

Roberts and Oliver right on the county line, but they were in Saline County when he turned

around to investigate the incident. Because Roberts failed to present substantial evidence

that the offense occurred outside of Saline County, the State was not required to offer

evidence of jurisdiction or venue. We hold that the charges were properly brought in Saline

County.

                        IV. Refusal to Give Jurisdiction Jury Instruction

Roberts next argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the

jurisdictional element. Roberts’s proffered instruction provided, “Arkansas Code Section 5-

1-111, Burden of Proof, Jurisdiction. The issue of jurisdiction as a defense has been

submitted to the jury. Any reasonable doubt on the issue requires that the Defendant be

acquitted.”

       A party is entitled to a jury instruction when it is a correct statement of the law and

when there is some basis in the evidence to support giving the instruction. Keesee v. State,

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2022 Ark. 68, 641 S.W.3d 628. The circuit court’s decision to give or reject an instruction

will not be reversed unless the court abused its discretion. Id. Because of our disposition of

Roberts’s jurisdictional argument, as discussed above, we hold the circuit court did not abuse

its discretion in refusing to give the proffered instruction.

                             V. Improper Closing Rebuttal Argument

       Roberts argues the circuit court erred in permitting the State to make the following

improper closing argument in rebuttal:

                Causation is not an issue, ladies and gentlemen. He talks about—and did you
       see his reaction? Were you watching when they were talking about how he fell in the
       hospital? And that’s the only time I’ve seen any reaction from him at all. He hasn’t
       shown any remorse for the person who died at his hands. But when they talked about
       him falling in the hospital, he was over there, Yeah, yeah. Like that absolves him
       from responsibility, ladies and gentlemen. That’s abhorrent. It’s abhorrent. That
       fall in the hospital only happened because he beat him down so severely that he had
       to have brain surgery.

       Roberts admits he failed to object to the prosecutor’s statements at trial. Generally,

issues raised for the first time on appeal, even constitutional ones, will not be considered.

Witherspoon v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 468. Roberts nonetheless contends that his argument

should be reached as one of the exceptions to the contemporaneous-objection rule found in

Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980).                   Four exceptions to the

contemporaneous-objection rule are set forth in Wicks: (1) when a circuit court, in a death-

penalty case, fails to bring to the jury’s attention a matter essential to its consideration of the

death penalty itself; (2) a circuit court errs at a time when defense counsel has no knowledge

of the error and thus no opportunity to object; (3) a circuit court should intervene on its

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own motion to correct a serious error; and (4) the admission or exclusion of evidence affects

a defendant’s substantial rights. Wicks, 270 Ark. at 785–87, 606 S.W.2d at 369–70. Roberts

submits that this court can reach his argument under the third Wicks exception—that the

circuit court should have intervened on its own motion to correct the prosecutor’s improper

appeal to the jury’s passions and emotions by commenting on his alleged lack of remorse.

We disagree. In Wicks, our supreme court held:

       We implied in Wilson v. State, 126 Ark. 354, 190 S.W. 441 (1916), that no objection
       is necessary if the trial court fails to control a prosecutor's closing argument and allows
       him to go too far: “Appellant cannot predicate error upon the failure of the court to
       make a ruling that he did not at the time ask the court to make, unless the remarks
       were so flagrant and so highly prejudicial in character as to make it the duty of the
       court on its own motion to have instructed the jury not to consider the same. See
       Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 74 Ark. 256, 85 S.W. 428 (1905); Harding v. State,
       94 Ark. 65, 126 S.W. 90 (1910).”

               It must be noted that, first, we did not reverse the judgment in Wilson, and
       second, the quoted statement was taken essentially from the cited Murphy case, where
       we went on to say explicitly that if the court fails to restrain on improper argument,
       counsel should make a definite objection and call for a ruling. We have mentioned
       the Wilson suggestion in two recent cases, but in neither one was the judgment actually
       reversed because of the trial court’s failure to act on its own motion. Ply v. State, 270
       Ark. 554, 606 S.W.2d 556 (1980); Wilson and Dancy v. State, 261 Ark. 820, 552
       S.W.2d 223 (1977). Thus every statement of the original Wilson suggestion has been
       obiter dictum, because no judgment has been reversed on account of the trial court’s
       failure to intervene. Such a reversal would necessarily be an extremely rare exception
       to our basic rule.

270 Ark. at 786–87, 606 S.W.2d at 369–70. Our case law is clear that Wicks exceptions are

narrow and are to be rarely applied. In Anderson v. State, 353 Ark. 384, 398, 108 S.W.3d

592, 600–01 (2003) (citations omitted), our supreme court held:

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               Our case law is clear that Wicks presents only narrow exceptions that are to be
       rarely applied. Specifically, the third Wicks exception has only been applied to cases
       in which a defendant’s fundamental right to a trial by jury is at issue. The third Wicks
       exception has not been applied to consider possible prosecutorial errors in relation
       to cross examination, to privileged testimony, or closing arguments.

See also Tiarks v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 325, 633 S.W.3d 788 (third Wicks exception has not

been applied to possible prosecutorial errors in cross-examination; privileged testimony; or

closing arguments). Under our case law, the third Wicks exception requiring the circuit court

to intervene of its own accord is not applicable in this case, and Roberts’s failure to object

during the State’s rebuttal closing argument precludes consideration of his argument on

appellate review.

       Although we affirm Roberts’s convictions, we remand this case for the limited

purpose of correcting a clerical error in the sentencing order. The State charged Roberts as

a habitual offender who had previously been convicted of more than four felonies, and

Roberts was sentenced accordingly. However, on the sentencing order, the habitual-offender

boxes are not checked; rather, the third page of the sentencing order identifies “5-4-501

Habitual Offender” as a separate offense. Habitual-offender status is not a separate crime or

offense. Hunter v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 256, 522 S.W.3d 793. The circuit court is free to

correct a clerical error to have the judgment speak the truth; therefore, we remand to the

circuit court with instructions to correct the sentencing order by marking the boxes

indicating that Roberts was sentenced as a habitual offender on all three offenses and

removing the improper listing of habitual offender as a separate offense. See Carter v. State,

2019 Ark. App. 57, 568 S.W.3d 788.

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Affirmed; remanded to correct sentencing order.

ABRAMSON and GRUBER, JJ., agree.

Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Walker K. Hawkins, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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