Court Opinion

ID: 9529967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:53.258107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:58.048965
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE MILLS, concurring in part and dissenting in part: The majority is, of course, quite correct in its conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the defendant to be prosecuted as an adult. And I certainly concur. But the second issue is indeed another question. I find neither horseback sense nor Aristotelian logic in the majority’s reasoning. A reading of the record of the evidence before the trial jury leads me to the unalterable conclusion that there were two separate and distinct confrontations between defendant Underwood and victim Downs. In essence, Downs yelled at the three boys about bothering his wife after which two of them walked away but Underwood stayed and carried on a dialogue with Downs. Downs then stepped out of his truck and picked up a chain. A shoving match then took place between Downs and Underwood after which Downs returned to his truck. As Downs prepared to drive away, defendant shouted further obscenities and something about fighting without the chain. Downs again got out of the truck and scuffled with the defendant. His wife said he took the chain with him the second time, but she also said she “couldn’t see his hands, just him.” There is a void of any other direct testimony concerning the chain in the second melee, yet the specifics and context of the entire evidence clearly reflects that Downs did not use a chain in clash #2. During this second encounter, defendant stabbed Downs in the stomach three times. The evidence, as I view it, reflects that the defendant deliberately initiated a second, separate fight with Downs after the victim had returned to his pickup. The use of the knife was a deliberate, intentional act — in fact, in a statement to the authorities following the attack, Underwood even said, “I stabbed him once, I don’t know whether I got him the second time, but I tried.” To boot, the mere fact that the individual justices of this court disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence as spelled out in the cold, hard record graphically demonstrates that this is a pure question of fact. Clearly, this was within the purview of the trier of fact and a reviewing tribunal should not tinker or meddle in factual interpretation unless the lower court committed clear error or abused its discretion. Neither is here present and we have no business second-guessing or meddling in the trial court’s exclusive domain. Against the backdrop of this evidence, I must fault the majority’s holding on the “reasonably believes” jury instruction. Defendant tendered his own non-IPI instruction on reasonable belief and it was properly refused upon objection. The State even went so far as to suggest that defendant should have tendered the standard DPI Criminal Instruction 4.13. But defendant did not take the hint and neither submitted any other substitute instruction nor asked for additional time in which to prepare an alternative instruction. His was a procedural waiver. I strongly disagree that under these tenuous circumstances the “interests of justice” doctrine of Supreme Court Rule 451(c) can be invoked. I would affirm.