Court Opinion

ID: 9781269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:27:51.324017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:01.820566
License: Public Domain

DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
44 The majority concludes that the drug testing at issue here fails to qualify as a special needs search under the United States *1013Supreme Court's jurisprudence and therefore must be supported by probable cause. I disagree. In my view, this case fits squarely within that category of special needs cases where probable cause need not be shown. The majority further concludes that the order requiring drug testing is not reasonable as required by Utah Code section 78A-6-117(2)(t) (2008). Again, I disagree. Applying the majority's reasonableness test, I conclude that the testing was reasonable.
I. THE DRUG TESTING DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE THE TESTING IS SUPPORTED BY A SPECIAL NEED AND IS DIVORCED FROM THE STATE'S INTEREST IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
145 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches.1 Ordinarily, a search without probable cause is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.2 As the majority notes, however, the Supreme Court has held that there are "exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."3 Thus, the Court has permitted suspicionless drug testing under a special needs analysis in cases involving "railway employees involved in train accidents, ... United States Custom Service employees seeking promotion to certain sensitive positions, and ... high school students participating in interscholastic sports." 4
1 46 The majority distinguishes these cases from the one before us on the ground that the persons subject to testing in these cases had a reduced privacy interest because they were employees in pervasively regulated in-dustrics or had taken voluntary actions that reduced their privacy interest. The majority concludes that absent such a reduced privacy interest it "would be nearly impossible for even the most compelling government interest to override an individual's privacy interest.6
11 47 I disagree. In my view, this interpretation misapplies the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in its special needs cases. Under the special needs test, a court weighs "the intrusion on the individual's interest in privacy against the 'special needs' that supported the program."5 The foeus in the analysis should be on the nature of the special need and the extent of the privacy intrusion it occasions, not on whether the privacy interest of the individual subject to the intrusion has already been reduced for some reason independent of the special need.
"I 48 I believe this point is clearly illustrated by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson v. Charleston, a case in which the Court conducted a special needs analysis of a state hospital's drug testing policy.7 Although the Court struck down the policy, in doing so the Court distinguished some of its prior special needs cases in a way that I believe strongly supports the conclusion that the drug testing now before us is constitutional.
4 49 In Ferguson, a state hospital had the policy of testing pregnant mothers for cocaine and turning positive test results over to the police.8 In comparing Ferguson to previous special needs cases, the Court noted that *1014the previous four cases, there was no misunderstanding about the purpose of the test or the potential use of the test results, and there were protections against the dissemination of the results to third parties.9
*1013invasion of privacy in this case is far more substantial than in those cases. In
*1014Most importantly, the Court stated that
The critical difference between those four drug-testing cases and this one, however, lies in the nature of the "special need" asserted as justification for the warrant-less searches. In each of those earlier cases, the "special need" that was advanced as a justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement.10
1 50 The special need advanced in the case now before us-the promotion and protection of the child's best interest by ensuring that she live in a drug free home-is one divorced from the State's interest in law enforcement. A drug test for the purpose of protecting this child is a far less substantial intrusion on the father's right of privacy than a test for the purpose of his eriminal prosecution would be. I would conclude that the special need supporting the test outweighs the privacy intrusion it would require. Accordingly, I would hold the juvenile court's order constitutional.
II. THE DRUG TESTING MEETS THE REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT OF UTAH CODE SECTION 78A-6-117(2)(t) BECAUSE ITS PURPOSE IS TO REFORM THE MINOR, NOT PUNISH THE PARENT, AND THERE IS A NEXUS BETWEEN THE PARENTS POSSIBLE DRUG USE AND THE CHILD'S DRUG USE
I would further hold that the drug testing order is reasonable, pursuant to Utah Code section T8A-6-117(@)(t) (2008), which provides that "[the court may make any other reasonable orders for the best interest of the minor or as required for the protection of the public, exeept that a child may not be committed to jail or prison."
152 This statutory requirement that the order be reasonable is not necessarily satisfied by a finding that an order is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the Utah statute, which applies to all conditions that the juvenile court may order relating to delinquent children, not just search or seizure orders, imposes its own requirements as to reasonableness. Therefore, a separate analysis is required to determine if a constitutional search order is also reasonable under section 78A-6-117(2)(t)). The majority has articulated a test under which courts should conduct that analysis. Applying the majority's test, I conclude that the order was reasonable.
"[ 53 The majority states that to be reasonable, an order (1) must "have behavioral reform of the minor as [its] sole motivation"; (2) must not "be aimed at punishing the parent"; and (8) must be part of a "nexus between the actions of the parent that are to be constrained by the court's conditions, the behavior of the minor that led to her adjudication as delinquent, and the order imposed by the court." In this case, the court's order satisfies this test. First, the court sought to prevent C.M. from engaging in further drug activity. Second, the court's order would not criminally punish the father because the results of the drug test would not be available to law enforcement. And third, a nexus is apparent. CM. was adjudicated delinquent because of her marijuana use and attempted methamphetamine possession. The court suspected her father of drug use because he lived with a known drug user. Further, the police suspected that Mr. Moreno "may be cooking meth in the hills," and also considered Mr. Moreno a "threat." While these suspicions are insufficient to amount to probable cause, they are sufficient to form a nexus between the actions of the parent that the court seeks to constrain and the behavior of the child that led to her adjudication as delinquent. Accordingly, I would hold that the order was reasonable.
"I 54 Justice WILKINS concurs in Associate Chief Justice DURRANTS dissenting opinion.

. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989).

. Id.

. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n. 7, 121 S.Ct 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

. Id. at 77, 121 S.Ct. 1281 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384; Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995)).

. Id. at 78, 121 S.Ct. 1281.

. Id. (analyzing and balancing a state hospital's need to drug-test new mothers with the mothers' reasonable expectation that the test results would not be shared with non-medical personnel).

. 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.EBd.2d 205.

. Id. at 79-82, 121 S.Ct. 1281.

, Id. at 78, 121 S.Ct. 1281.

. Id. at 79, 121 S.Ct. 1281.