Court Opinion

ID: 9929899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 18:01:08.902477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:52.736776
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-7008          Document: 010110994748   Date Filed: 02/05/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                           PUBLISH                              Tenth Circuit

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    February 5, 2024

                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         Clerk of Court
                             _________________________________

  DONALD RAY LOGSDON, JR.,

         Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 23-7008

  UNITED STATES MARSHAL SERVICE;
  PHILIP BRIAN GILLIAM, Deputy,
  United States Marshal; JERE SMITH,
  United States Marshal; CODY VAUGHN,
  Task Force Officer, United States Marshal
  Service,

         Defendants - Appellees.

  ----------------------------

  ACLU, ACLU OF OKLAHOMA, ACLU
  OF COLORADO, ACLU OF KANSAS,
  ACLU OF NEW MEXICO, ACLU OF
  UTAH & ACLU OF WYOMING;
  INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE,

          Amici Curiae.
                             _________________________________

                         Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
                            (D.C. No. 6:21-CV-00253-KHV-TJJ)
                           _________________________________

 Kevin E. Jason, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., New York, New York
 (Janai S. Nelson, Samuel Spital, and Ashok Chandran, NAACP Legal Defense &
 Educational Fund, Inc., New York, New York; Christopher Kemmitt, NAACP Legal
 Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., Washington, D.C, and Wil M. Crawford, Indian &
Appellate Case: 23-7008     Document: 010110994748          Date Filed: 02/05/2024       Page: 2

 Environmental Law Group, PLLC, Ada, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs) for Plaintiff -
 Appellant.

 Dana L. Kaersvang, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Brian M. Boynton,
 Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Wilson, United States Attorney,
 Barbara L. Herwig, and Edward Himmelfarb, Attorneys, Appellate Staff, Mary H. Mason, and
 Evelyn S. Yarborough, Attorneys, Torts Branch, Washington, D.C., with her on the briefs) for
 Defendants - Appellees.

 Brett M. Kaufman, Elizabeth Gyori, ACLU Foundation, New York, New York (joined by
 Megan Lambert, ACLU of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Tim Macdonald,
 ACLU of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, Cecillia D. Wang, ACLU Foundation, San
 Francisco, California, Sharon Brett, ACLU of Kansas, Overland Park, Kansas, María
 Mártinez Sánchez, ACLU of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Stephanie
 Amiotte, ACLU of Wyoming, Jackson, Wyoming, John Mejia, ACLU of Utah
 Foundation, Salt Lake City, Utah); filed a brief on behalf of Appellant, for Amici Curiae
 ACLU, ACLU of Oklahoma, ACLU of Colorado, ACLU of Kansas, ACLU of New
 Mexico, ACLU of Utah, and ACLU of Wyoming.

 Trace Mitchell, Anya Bidwell, Patrick Jaicomo, Institute for Justice, Arlington, Virginia;
 filed a brief on behalf of Appellant, for Amicus Curiae Institute for Justice.
                            _______________________________

 Before HARTZ, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
                          _________________________________

        In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court

 first created a cause of action against federal agents for a violation of the Bill of

 Rights. The opinion held that agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics could be

 liable for damages for an unlawful warrantless arrest and search and for employing

 unreasonable force in making the arrest. See id. at 389–90.

        But, at least in the view of the Supreme Court in recent decades, that opinion

 has not worn well. Although the Court recognized causes of action under Bivens in

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 two subsequent cases—a congressional staffer’s Fifth Amendment Due Process sex-

 discrimination claim against a Member of Congress, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.

 228 (1979), and a claim against federal prison officials under the Eighth Amendment

 for inadequate care of an inmate, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)—it is on

 course to treating Bivens as a relic of the 20th century. This development has been

 gradual, but relentless. Without explicitly overruling its three acknowledged

 precedents, the Court has shown an increasing willingness to distinguish them, now

 stating that the ultimate question to ask when determining whether the courts should

 recognize a Bivens cause of action not created by Congress is ordinarily only

 “whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create

 a damages remedy.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022). And the

 circumstances in which the answer to the question is “no” appears to comprise a null

 set. See id. at 503. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“When might a court ever be ‘better

 equipped’ than the people’s elected representatives to weigh the ‘costs and benefits’

 of creating a cause of action? It seems to me that to ask the question is to answer it.

 To create a new cause of action is to assign new private rights and liabilities—a

 power that is in every meaningful sense an act of legislation.”); see also Silva v.

 United States, 45 F.4th 1134, 1140 (10th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e are left in no doubt that

 expanding Bivens is not just ‘a disfavored judicial activity,’ it is an action that is

 impermissible in virtually all circumstances.” (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491)

 (citation omitted)). The Court has said in effect that almost any difference between

 the case at hand and the three Court precedents can justify rejecting a cause of action.

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 See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 503 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Candidly, I struggle to see

 how this set of facts differs meaningfully from those in Bivens itself.”).

       And, perhaps even more striking, the Court has justified a departure from

 those precedents even when the facts are virtually the same if the government can

 provide a reason for not recognizing a cause of action that was not considered in the

 applicable precedent. Thus, in Egbert itself the Court considered an excessive-force

 claim, similar to the one in Bivens, against a federal officer. See Egbert, 596 U.S. at

 495 (“Bivens and this case do involve similar allegations of excessive force and thus

 arguably present almost parallel circumstances or a similar mechanism of injury.”

 (internal quotation marks omitted)). But it held that the court of appeals erred by

 recognizing a cause of action under Bivens, distinguishing Bivens based on facts that

 have no bearing on the elements of an excessive-force claim: the incident arose in the

 “border-security context,” and Congress had created remedies for misconduct by

 government agents. See id. at 494. Given such hurdles placed in the way of a Bivens

 cause of action, Mr. Logsdon has no claim.

       I.     BACKGROUND

              A.     Factual Background

       Supplementing the allegations of the complaint (which we take as true) with

 undisputed facts, we briefly summarize the relevant facts. On March 5, 2020, Deputy

 United States Marshal Phillip Gilliam and Special Deputy United States Marshals

 (Task Force Officers) Jere Smith and Cody Vaughn (Defendants) were executing a

 state-court warrant for the arrest of Mr. Logsdon on a charge of assault with a

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 dangerous weapon. They secretly approached him after dark while he was working

 on a generator outside a friend’s house. Deputy Gilliam ran up behind him and

 kicked him in the face, rendering him unconscious. The three officers then stomped

 on him for two minutes.

              B.     Procedural History

       Mr. Logsdon filed a pro se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the

 Eastern District of Oklahoma against the United States Marshal Service (USMS) and

 the three deputies, asserting a claim under Bivens based on the alleged excessive use

 of force. After the district court dismissed USMS as an improper party for a Bivens

 claim, Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that Bivens does not provide a

 remedy for Mr. Logsdon’s allegations against them, or, alternatively, on the ground

 that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The district court overruled the motion

 on both grounds.

       Defendants then filed a motion to reconsider that ruling as to their Bivens

 argument. The district court sustained the motion to reconsider and dismissed the

 case. Mr. Logsdon now appeals that order, arguing that the district court erred on the

 merits and abused its discretion by considering the motion to reconsider.

       II.    DISCUSSION

              A.     The Bivens Claim

       In Egbert the Supreme Court recognized that it had previously analyzed

 whether to recognize a proposed Bivens claim by conducting a two-step analysis. See

 596 U.S. at 492. “First,” it said, “we ask whether the case presents a new Bivens

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 context—i.e., is it meaningfully different from the three cases in which the Court has

 implied a damages action.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Then,

 if it is a new context, “a Bivens remedy is unavailable if there are special factors

 indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to weigh

 the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id. (internal

 quotation marks omitted). But it is hard to see the difference between the analyses

 conducted in the two steps. Regarding the first step, the Court has said:

       A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the
       officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or
       specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how
       an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted;
       the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was
       operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the
       functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors
       that previous Bivens cases did not consider.

 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 139–40 (2017) (emphasis added). If there was any

 doubt concerning whether the “special factors” in the final catchall clause describing

 the first step of the analysis were somehow different from the “special factors” to be

 considered in the second step, that doubt was dissipated when Egbert said: “While

 our cases describe two steps, those steps often resolve to a single question: whether

 there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a

 damages remedy.” 596 U.S. at 492.

        In this case we conclude our analysis should focus on that single question. We

 address three features of this case not considered by the Supreme Court in Bivens:

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 (1) the nature of the law-enforcement conduct, (2) the category of defendant, and

 (3) the existence of other remedies for misconduct.

        The law-enforcement conduct at issue in Bivens involved the warrantless entry

 into a home. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388. Here, the deputy marshals executed an

 arrest warrant outside the house of Mr. Logsdon’s friend. Mr. Logsdon contends that

 the warrant and location of the arrest have no legal significance in an excessive-force

 case. We agree, and we give little weight to this distinction. See Snowden v. Henning,

 72 F.4th 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2023) (“Hotel or home, warrant or no warrant—the claims

 here and in Bivens stem from run-of-the-mill allegations of excessive force during an

 arrest.”). 1 To be sure, there is substantial authority to the contrary. Several other

 circuits have said that a new Bivens context exists when federal officials execute a

 valid warrant. See Annappareddy v. Pascale, 996 F.3d 120, 135 (4th Cir. 2021)

 (Fourth Amendment claims asserting that investigators falsified evidence and

 affidavits to obtain search and arrest warrants created a new Bivens context because

 Bivens involved “the Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable warrantless

        1
         In addition to Snowden, Mr. Logsdon cites other cases in which Bivens claims
 were examined on their merits even though officers had a warrant or acted in a place
 where the plaintiff lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy. But those cases are
 irrelevant because they each considered only whether a Bivens claim was defeated by
 qualified immunity without considering whether Bivens should apply under the
 circumstances. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 605–06 (1999); Thomas v.
 Durastani, 607 F.3d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 2010); Salmon v. Schwarz, 948 F.2d 1131,
 1135 (10th Cir. 1991); Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1129 (10th Cir. 1996);
 Wellington v. Daza, No. 21-2052, 2022 WL 3041100, at *1 & n.1 (10th Cir. Aug. 2,
 2022) (unpublished); Alvarado-Escobedo v. United States, 817 Fed. App’x. 536,
 539–40 (10th Cir. 2020); Serrano v. United States, 766 Fed. App’x 561, 564 (10th
 Cir. 2019).
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 searches and seizures; this case, by contrast, involves searches and a seizure

 conducted with a warrant.”); Cantú v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 423 (5th Cir. 2019)

 (Fourth Amendment claim alleging officers fabricated evidence was “meaningfully

 different from the Fourth Amendment claim at issue in Bivens” in part because the

 plaintiff did not allege that officers entered his home without a warrant); Cain v.

 Rinehart, No. 22-1893, 2023 WL 6439438, at *3 (6th Cir. July 25, 2023)

 (unpublished) (unlawful entry into a residence to execute an arrest warrant of a third-

 party who officers believed resided there was a new Bivens context). And some

 circuits have said that a new context arises when the violation does not occur in the

 plaintiff’s home. See Mejia v. Miller, 61 F.4th 663, 668 (9th Cir. 2023) (Fourth

 Amendment claim based on excessive force created a new Bivens context because

 “unlike Bivens, none of the events in question occurred in or near [the plaintiff]’s

 home. The entire incident occurred on public lands managed by [the Bureau of Land

 Management] and the National Park Service, a place where [the plaintiff] had no

 expectation of privacy.”); Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879, 882 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Byrd’s

 lawsuit differs from Bivens in several meaningful ways [, including that the] case

 arose in a parking lot, not a private home as was the case in Bivens.”). We need not,

 however, dwell on our differences with other circuits on these points, because there

 are other sufficient grounds for holding that Mr. Logsdon has no claim under Bivens

 in this case.

        More compelling as a special factor is that agents of the USMS are a new

 category of defendant. See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492 (involvement of a “new category

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 of defendants” is a new context that presents “potential special factors that previous

 Bivens cases did not consider” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Mr. Logsdon

 argues that a new agency does not create a new Bivens context when the defendants

 are “rank-and-file federal officers.” Aplt. Br. at 28, 32. We disagree.

       After all, the defendant in Egbert was a rank-and-file Border Patrol agent. See

 Egbert, 596 U.S. at 486. And since that decision two other circuits have held that

 there was a new context when confronting lower-level officers from a different

 agency. See Mejia, 61 F.4th at 668 (in rejecting Bivens claim against Bureau of Land

 Management [BLM] officers, court notes that Egbert “identifie[d] the legal mandate

 under which the officer was operating as an example of a new context” and that

 plaintiff did “not point to any reason to believe . . . that BLM has the same mandate

 as agencies enforcing federal anti-narcotics law [as in Bivens]” (internal quotation

 marks omitted); Cain, 2023 WL 6439438, at *4 (unpublished) (“Another meaningful

 distinction between this case and Bivens is the federal agency involved. This case

 involved the U.S. Marshals Service, while Bivens concerned the actions of agents of

 the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Thus, allowing [the plaintiff]’s claim would extend

 Bivens to ‘a new category of defendants,’ which Egbert identified as a new context.”

 (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492)). 2

       2
         Mr. Logsdon argues that the Supreme Court and this court have already
 recognized Bivens claims against USMS officers. But none of the cited cases is
 relevant because none considered whether there was a new Bivens context. Instead,
 they considered whether Deputy U.S. Marshals were entitled to qualified immunity in
 a Bivens action, see Wilson, 526 U.S. at 605–06; Alvarado-Escobedo, 817 Fed. App’x
 at 539–40; Serrano, 766 F. App’x at 564, whether the plaintiff adequately alleged a
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        Of particular relevance here is a duty of the USMS that was not a factor

  considered in Bivens. The USMS is statutorily required to partner with state and local

  law-enforcement authorities to create Fugitive Apprehension Task Forces, which are

  directed and coordinated by the USMS. See 34 U.S.C. § 41503(a). And it has the

  authority (which was exercised in this case) to federally deputize officers from other

  jurisdictions to perform the functions of a Deputy U.S. Marshal. See 28 C.F.R.

  § 0.112(b). These officers act under color of federal law when acting in that capacity.

  See Yassin v. Weyker, 39 F.4th 1086, 1090–91 (8th Cir. 2022). Chilling participation

  in joint task forces is therefore a potential cost of expanding Bivens to Deputy U.S.

  Marshals. See Cain, 2023 WL 6439438, at *4 (“[A]llowing claims for damages

  against members of federal fugitive-apprehension task forces could impair the

  government’s recruitment of officers to participate in those task forces and could

  negatively affect task members’ performance of their duties.”); see also Egbert, 596

  U.S. at 499 (“Recognizing any new Bivens action entails substantial social costs,

  including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will

  unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” (brackets and internal

  quotation marks omitted)). 3 We are confident that the Supreme Court would hold

  constitutional violation, Smith v. Arguello, 415 F. App’x 57, 60–61 (10th Cir. 2011),
  or whether the plaintiff sued the defendants in their individual capacities, Trapp v.
  U.S. Marshals Serv., 139 F. App’x 12, 14–15 (10th Cir. 2005).
        3
           Mr. Logsdon argues that Defendants forfeited this argument by failing to
  raise it before the district court. But the Supreme Court, even when reversing the
  lower court, considered and rejected a similar forfeiture argument in Egbert, and we
  do the same here. See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 497 n.3 (“Because recognizing a Bivens
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  “that the Judiciary is not undoubtedly better positioned than Congress to authorize a

  damages action in [this] context,” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 495, where the impact of

  potential liability on cooperation among law-enforcement agencies needs to be

  assessed.

         A second independent ground for not recognizing a Bivens action in this case

  is that the availability of alternative remedies for misconduct by Deputy U.S.

  Marshals suggests that this court should not be the institution to create a remedy. “If

  there are alternative remedial structures in place, that alone, like any special factor, is

  reason enough to limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of

  action.” Id. at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted). “So long as Congress or the

  Executive has created a remedial process that it finds sufficient to secure an adequate

  level of deterrence, the courts cannot second-guess that calibration by superimposing

  a Bivens remedy. That is true even if a court independently concludes that the

  Government’s procedures are not as effective as an individual damages remedy.” Id.

  at 498 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Egbert the Court said that an

  administrative grievance procedure was a sufficient alternative remedy without

  describing how the procedure operated or stating what type of penalty was available.

  cause of action is an extraordinary act that places great stress on the separation of
  powers, we have a concomitant responsibility to evaluate any grounds that counsel
  against Bivens relief.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover,
  this court has repeatedly stated that we can affirm the judgment below on any ground
  supported by the record, so long as addressing the ground is fair to the opposing
  party. See, e.g., Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d 1073, 1088
  (10th Cir. 2006).

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  All it said about the remedy was: “The U.S. Border Patrol is statutorily obligated to

  control, direct, and supervise all employees. And, by regulation, Border Patrol must

  investigate alleged violations of the standards for enforcement activities and accept

  grievances from any persons wishing to lodge a complaint.” Id. at 497 (cleaned up);

  cf. Silva, 45 F.4th at 1141 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534

  U.S. 61, 74 (2001), in holding that the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy

  Program was adequate). The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the process

  was inadequate because he had no right to participate in it or seek judicial review of

  an adverse determination, explaining that “Bivens is concerned solely with deterring

  the unconstitutional acts of individual officers—i.e., the focus is whether the

  Government has put in place safeguards to prevent constitutional violations from

  recurring.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 498 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

        Here, as several other courts have already held since Egbert, the internal

  USMS grievance procedure and the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector

  General (OIG) investigation procedure are adequate alternative remedies. See Cain,

  2023 WL 6439438 at *4; Robinson v. Heinze, 655 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1284 (N.D. Ga.

  2023); Lewis v. Westfield, 640 F. Supp. 3d 249, 254–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2022); McIntyre v.

  U.S. Marshal Serv., No. 18-1268, 2023 WL 2447424, at *6–7 (D.N.J. 2023).

        The director of the USMS “shall supervise and direct the [USMS],” see 28

  U.S.C. § 561(g), including by investigating “alleged improper conduct on the part of

  [USMS] personnel,” 28 C.F.R. § 0.111(n). Individuals may submit a complaint by

  filling out an online form. See Complaint Regarding United States Marshals Service

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  (USMS) Personnel or Programs, United States Marshals Service (last visited Jan. 5,

  2024), https://www.usmarshals.gov/sites/default/files/media/document/complaint-

  form.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW46-7ZBC]. “[T]he USMS may share the information

  with law enforcement agencies investigating a violation of law (whether criminal,

  civil, and/or administrative).” Id. “All complaints of employee misconduct will be

  investigated by the appropriate agency or office. . . . [C]omplaints against [Task

  Force Officers] will be referred to the Investigative Operations Division . . . .”

  Misconduct Investigations, Policy Directive 2.3, U.S. Marshal Service, 1 (Oct. 7,

  2020), https://www.usmarshals.gov/sites/default/files/media/document/usms-policy-

  directive-misconduct-investigations.pdf [https://perma.cc/M78C-WGBB]. And

  “[i]ntentional, reckless or negligent violation[s] of rules governing searches and

  seizures” are punishable by reprimand or removal. Table of Disciplinary Offenses

  and Penalties, United States Marshals Service, 6 (last visited Jan. 5, 2024),

  https://www.usmarshals.gov/sites/default/files/media/document/united-states-

  marshals-guidance-table-of-disciplinary-offenses-and-penalties.pdf

  [https://perma.cc/4CWJ-WG4R].

        Moreover, the USMS is a bureau within the Department of Justice (DOJ), see

  28 U.S.C. § 561(a), and the DOJ Inspector General “may investigate allegations of

  criminal wrongdoing or administrative misconduct by an employee of the Department

  of Justice,” 5 U.S.C. § 413(b)(2). A person can report misconduct “related to” the

  USMS to OIG by submitting an online complaint. Submitting a Complaint, U.S.

  Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (last visited Jan 5, 2024),

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  https://oig.justice.gov/hotline/submit_complaint [https://perma.cc/K4WK-2M3T].

  OIG investigations “sometimes lead to criminal prosecution or civil or administrative

  action.” Criminal and Civil Cases, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the

  Inspector General (last visited Jan. 5, 2024),

  https://oig.justice.gov/investigations/criminal_and_civil_cases

  [https://perma.cc/BVR7-G7DL]. If the OIG does not investigate the allegation, it may

  refer the complaint to the internal-affairs office of the relevant DOJ component (here,

  the USMS). Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA

  PATRIOT Act, No. 22-102, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector

  General, 3–4 (Sept. 2022), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/22-

  102.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB8L-CYV2].

        Mr. Logsdon makes some cogent arguments challenging the efficacy of these

  administrative remedies. But those arguments are addressed to the wrong audience.

  The Supreme Court has made clear that it is not the judiciary’s function to assess the

  adequacy of executive orders or legislative remedies in deterring constitutional

  violations that might be remedied through a Bivens-type suit. Mr. Logsdon also

  contends that there is nothing new about the OIG remedy, noting that the Supreme

  Court has reaffirmed its three Bivens precedents since the initial legislative creation

  of Offices of the Inspector General. But the failure of any of those precedents, or any

  reaffirmations of those precedents, to consider this legislation is dispositive. After

  all, the Supreme Court has said that a departure from the Bivens precedents may be

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  justified by “the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did

  not consider.” Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 140.

                B.    The Motion to Reconsider

        Finally, we reject Mr. Logsdon’s argument that the district court abused its

  discretion when it granted Defendants’ motion to reconsider. He contends that the

  motion failed to satisfy requirements limiting when a motion to reconsider is proper.

  But “‘every order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of

  the district judge.’” Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.9 (10th Cir. 2005)

  (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12

  (1983)). Caselaw relied on by Mr. Logsdon regarding postjudgment motions, such as

  Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000), is

  inapposite.

        III.    CONCLUSION

        We AFFIRM the judgment below.

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