Court Opinion

ID: 9905845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:06:42.478007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:56.191680
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 128575

                                         IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT
                                            OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                    (Docket No. 128575)

          ALEC PINKSTON, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant.

                             Opinion filed November 30, 2023.

        JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Cunningham, Rochford,
     and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                         OPINION

¶1       Plaintiff, Alec Pinkston, filed a class-action complaint alleging defendant, the
     City of Chicago (City), had engaged in the routine practice of improperly issuing
     central business district tickets for parking meter violations. The City moved to
     dismiss, arguing plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and
     voluntarily paid his fine. The Cook County circuit court granted the motion, but the
     appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 2022 IL App (1st)
     200957, ¶ 3.

¶2       Now on appeal, the City argues dismissal of plaintiff’s class-action complaint
     was proper because he (1) failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and
     (2) voluntarily paid the fine. We reverse the judgment of the appellate court and
     affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶3                                    BACKGROUND

¶4       Within the Municipal Code of Chicago (Municipal Code), the City has
     established various provisions with respect to public parking, including the use of
     parking meters. The fine for exceeding the time purchased at a parking meter differs
     depending on whether the violation occurs in the “central business district” or the
     “non-central business district.” At the time the alleged violation occurred in this
     case, the failure to comply with the parking meter regulations in the central business
     district resulted in a $65 fine. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-190(b) (amended
     Nov. 16, 2016); Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-020(b) (amended at Chi. City
     Clerk J. Proc. 37,265, 38,062 (Nov. 16, 2016)). A $50 fine applied to a similar
     violation outside the central business district. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-64-
     190(a) (amended Nov. 16, 2016); Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-020(b)
     (amended Apr. 21, 2021).

¶5      Section 9-4-010 of the Municipal Code defines the central business district as
     comprising the following area:

        “beginning at the easternmost point of Division Street extended to Lake
        Michigan; then west on Division Street to LaSalle Street; then south on LaSalle
        Street to Chicago Avenue; then west on Chicago Avenue to Halsted Street; then
        south on Halsted Street to Roosevelt Road; then east on Roosevelt Road to its
        easternmost point extended to Lake Michigan.” Chicago Municipal Code § 9-
        4-010 (amended July 21, 2021).

¶6      In October 2019, plaintiff filed a class-action complaint against the City.
     Therein, he alleged that on May 21, 2019, he parked his vehicle in a parking meter
     zone located at or near 1216 South Wabash Avenue in Chicago. He returned to his

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     vehicle and found a parking ticket, purporting to be pursuant to section 9-64-190(b)
     of the Municipal Code for an expired parking meter within the central business
     district and carrying with it a $65 fine. According to plaintiff, 1216 South Wabash
     Avenue is located south of Roosevelt Road and thus outside the southernmost
     boundary of the central business district. Plaintiff alleged he paid the $65 fine
     “under duress.”

¶7       Also in his complaint, plaintiff cited a May 2019 news article that analyzed a
     dataset containing information regarding parking tickets issued by the City. Based
     on the article, he claimed that, over a five-year period from 2013 to 2018, the City
     issued more than 30,000 central business district tickets for vehicles that were
     parked outside the central business district. Plaintiff alleged the City had a “routine
     practice” of issuing central business district tickets to vehicles parked outside the
     boundaries of that district. Thus, he claimed plaintiffs and proposed class members
     were subjected to fines for Municipal Code violations they did not commit.

¶8        On behalf of himself and a proposed class of similarly situated individuals,
     plaintiff set forth three counts in his complaint, seeking (1) a judgment declaring
     all central business district tickets issued to vehicles parked outside the district were
     facially invalid, void, and unenforceable; (2) an injunction to prevent the City from
     continuing to issue central business district tickets to vehicles parked outside the
     district; and (3) as a remedy for unjust enrichment, the repayment of fines,
     penalties, and interest the City had unjustly received and retained at the expense of
     him and class members.

¶9       In response, the City filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9)
     of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West
     2018)), arguing plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that
     failure deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction over his class-action lawsuit. The
     City contended the Municipal Code establishes an administrative process for
     challenging parking tickets, including providing for a hearing before the Chicago
     Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), and a finding of liability could
     be challenged by filing a complaint for judicial review under the Administrative
     Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2018)).

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¶ 10       In addition, the City argued plaintiff’s claims were barred by the voluntary
       payment doctrine and that his conclusory allegation that he paid “under duress” did
       not provide an exception to the doctrine.

¶ 11       In his response, plaintiff argued he did not need to exhaust administrative
       remedies before seeking judicial review because several exceptions to the
       exhaustion doctrine applied, including that the administrative proceeding could not
       provide adequate relief, such as an injunction. Plaintiff also argued the voluntary
       payment doctrine did not bar his claims because his payment of the ticket amounted
       to compulsion and duress, as he and other class members could be subjected to late
       payment fees, interest, immobilization of vehicles, suspension of driver’s licenses,
       liens on personal property, and other costs associated with the City’s debt collection
       attempts.

¶ 12       In September 2020, the circuit court granted the City’s motion with prejudice.
       The court found plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and none of
       the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine applied. The court did not base its decision
       on the voluntary payment doctrine, finding a factual question remained as to
       whether plaintiff’s payment of the parking ticket fine was truly voluntary.

¶ 13       Plaintiff appealed. While his appeal was pending, he filed an unopposed motion
       for judicial notice, asking the appellate court to take notice of the outcome of his
       proceedings before the DOAH. Plaintiff indicated he challenged his ticket before
       the DOAH but was still found liable. The court allowed the motion.

¶ 14       In its response to the motion, the City included a letter dated May 27, 2019, in
       which plaintiff challenged his ticket, by mail, on the ground the parking meter
       application he used to pay the meter did not record the correct license plate. A
       printout of the administrative hearing indicates plaintiff did not show any evidence
       as to why a Minnesota license plate was on the receipt and thus he was found liable.

¶ 15       In its written opinion, the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, reversed
       and remanded for further proceedings. 2022 IL App (1st) 200957, ¶ 3. Plaintiff had
       argued several exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine applied, and the appellate
       court agreed one exception did apply, i.e., that the DOAH could not have provided
       him the ultimate relief he sought, including injunctive and monetary relief. Id. In
       response to the City’s argument on the voluntary payment doctrine, the court agreed

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       with the circuit court that questions of fact remained, precluding dismissal on that
       basis. Id. ¶ 66.

¶ 16      The dissenting justice disagreed with the majority’s holding that plaintiff met
       an exception to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, stating the relief plaintiff
       sought was premised on the factual finding of whether the ticket was proper, which
       was within the authority of the DOAH and not the circuit court. Id. ¶ 80 (Oden
       Johnson, J., dissenting).

¶ 17        In September 2022, the City petitioned this court for leave to appeal, and we
       allowed that petition. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). The Illinois Municipal
       League, Chicago Appleseed Center for Fair Courts, Chicago Council of Lawyers,
       Chicago Jobs Council, and Woodstock Institute sought, and we granted, leave to
       file amicus briefs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 18                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 19       The City raises two issues on appeal. First, the City argues plaintiff failed to
       exhaust his administrative remedies and he could not avoid exhaustion by bringing
       a class action for equitable relief based on allegations of a routine course of conduct.
       Second, the City argues plaintiff voluntarily paid his fine and thus has no cause of
       action.

¶ 20                                   I. Standard of Review

¶ 21       The circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint under section 2-619(a)(9) of
       the Procedure Code, which permits dismissal of an action where “the claim asserted
       against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of
       or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2018). “ ‘The phrase
       “affirmative matter” refers to a defense that negates the cause of action completely
       or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact contained in or
       inferred from the complaint.’ ” Valerio v. Moore Landscapes, LLC, 2021 IL
       126139, ¶ 19 (quoting McIntosh v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., 2019 IL 123626,
       ¶ 16).

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¶ 22       In deciding a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, “a court is to accept all well-pled
       facts in the complaint as true and will grant the motion only when it appears that
       no set of facts could be proved that would allow the plaintiff to recover.” Dawkins
       v. Fitness International, LLC, 2022 IL 127561, ¶ 24. Moreover, a court “ ‘must
       interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the
       nonmoving party.’ ” Valerio, 2021 IL 126139, ¶ 20 (quoting In re Chicago Flood
       Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 189 (1997)). We review de novo the circuit court’s
       dismissal of the complaint pursuant to section 2-619 and consider whether
       dismissal was proper as a matter of law. State ex rel. Leibowitz v. Family Vision
       Care, LLC, 2020 IL 124754, ¶ 31.

¶ 23                                II. Exhaustion of Remedies

¶ 24       The doctrine of exhaustion provides that a party aggrieved by an administrative
       decision ordinarily cannot seek judicial review without first pursuing all available
       administrative remedies. Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 132 Ill. 2d
       304, 308 (1989). “The reasons for the exhaustion requirement are to allow the
       administrative agency to fully develop and consider the facts of the case before it,
       to allow the agency to utilize its expertise, and to allow the aggrieved party to obtain
       relief from the agency, thus making judicial review unnecessary.” Canel v. Topinka,
       212 Ill. 2d 311, 320-21 (2004). Moreover, the doctrine “helps protect agency
       processes from impairment by avoidable interruptions, allows the agency to correct
       its own errors, and conserves valuable judicial time by avoiding piecemeal
       appeals.” Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 308.

¶ 25       In Illinois, the common-law doctrine of exhaustion is incorporated in the
       Administrative Review Law. Id. at 321; see also County of Knox ex rel. Masterson
       v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 551 (1999) (stating “[t]he exhaustion
       doctrine includes administrative review in the circuit court”). When the
       Administrative Review Law applies, “any other statutory, equitable or common law
       mode of review of decisions of administrative agencies” shall not be employed, and
       a party who fails to seek review of an administrative decision within the time and
       manner provided by the statute “shall be barred from obtaining judicial review.”
       735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 2018). Thus, “where the Administrative Review Law is
       applicable and provides a remedy, a circuit court may not redress a party’s

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       grievance through any other type of action.” Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 40;
       see also County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 552 (“The court’s power to resolve factual
       and legal issues arising from an agency’s decision must be exercised within its
       review of the agency’s decision and not in a separate proceeding.”).

¶ 26       This court has recognized that several exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion
       of administrative remedies exist. Canel, 212 Ill. 2d at 321.

          “An aggrieved party may seek judicial review of an administrative decision
          without complying with the exhaustion of remedies doctrine [(1)] where a
          statute, ordinance or rule is attacked as unconstitutional on its face [citations],
          [(2)] where multiple administrative remedies exist and at least one is exhausted
          [citations], [(3)] where the agency cannot provide an adequate remedy or where
          it is patently futile to seek relief before the agency [citations], [(4)] where no
          issues of fact are presented or agency expertise is not involved [citations], [(5)]
          where irreparable harm will result from further pursuit of administrative
          remedies [citations], or [(6)] where the agency’s jurisdiction is attacked because
          it is not authorized by statute [citation].” Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 308-09.

¶ 27       In this case, the appellate court found the third exception applied—that the
       agency could not provide an adequate remedy. Specifically, the court found
       plaintiff was not seeking an “individualized determination” of his parking ticket
       (2022 IL App (1st) 200957, ¶ 56) but instead alleged that the City was engaging in
       a “routine or systemic practice” (id.) and the DOAH was “simply not equipped to
       provide [him] or the class with the relief sought in this case” (id. ¶ 53).

¶ 28       In arguing dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint was proper, the City contends he
       had an adequate administrative remedy and he could not avoid exhaustion by
       bringing a class action for equitable relief based on allegations of a routine course
       of conduct.

¶ 29       Initially, we note the underlying issue here—whether plaintiff received an
       improper parking ticket—is one that is routinely handled at the administrative level.
       The General Assembly has authorized municipalities to “provide by ordinance for
       a system of administrative adjudication of vehicular standing and parking
       violations.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208.3(a) (West 2018). The City created the DOAH “to
       provide for the administrative adjudication of violations of ordinances defining

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       parking” and “to establish a fair and efficient system for the enforcement of such
       ordinances.” Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-010(a) (amended Oct. 28, 2015).

¶ 30       Upon receipt of a parking ticket, the recipient “may contest the charge through
       an administrative adjudication” and raise one or more grounds, including “that the
       facts alleged in the violation notice are inconsistent or do not support a finding that
       the specified regulation was violated” and “that the illegal condition described in
       the compliance violation notice did not exist at the time the notice was issued.”
       Chicago Municipal Code § 9-100-060(a)(5), (6) (amended Oct. 27, 2021). An
       “administrative correspondence hearing to review the materials” (Chicago
       Municipal Code § 9-100-070(a), (d) (amended Oct. 28, 2015)) or an
       “administrative in-person hearing” (id. § 9-100-080(a)) with the presentation of
       evidence and testimony can then take place. The purpose of the administrative
       hearing “is to consider the evidence presented by the ticket recipient, make findings
       of fact, and determine whether the ticket recipient is liable for violating the
       Ordinance.” Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 305 Ill. App. 3d 972, 984-85 (1999).
       Thereafter, “the administrative law officer shall enter a determination of no liability
       or of liability in the amount of the fine for the relevant violation.” Chicago
       Municipal Code § 9-100-070(d) (amended Oct. 28, 2015). “Upon issuance, such
       determination shall constitute a final determination for purposes of judicial review
       under the Administrative Review Law of Illinois.” Id.

¶ 31       Here, the administrative procedure in place provided plaintiff with ample
       opportunity to contest his parking ticket. He even sent a letter identifying his reason
       for contesting the ticket—that the license plate was incorrect. The hearing officer
       found him liable, stating plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence to prove his
       case.

¶ 32       What plaintiff did not do was contest his ticket by stating he was not parked
       within the central business district—the very issue at the forefront of his class-
       action lawsuit. See Calderwood Corp. v. Mahin, 57 Ill. 2d 216, 220 (1974) (“A
       defense as to the merits of the case must be raised through administrative review or
       it will be considered waived.”). Had he done so, the hearing officer could have
       considered the evidence and the applicable Municipal Code sections, made findings
       of fact, and, quite possibly, ruled in his favor. He then could have received a
       reduced fine. If he had been found liable, he could have filed a complaint for

                                                -8-
       judicial review. At present, neither the DOAH nor the circuit court has determined
       whether plaintiff’s parking ticket was invalid on the central business district issue.

¶ 33       If plaintiff had properly pursued his administrative remedies, it would have
       served the essential purposes of the exhaustion doctrine. Plaintiff would have given
       the DOAH the opportunity to fully develop and consider the facts of the case,
       allowed it to utilize its expertise in applying the Municipal Code, allowed him to
       obtain relief from an improper ticket, and conserved valuable judicial resources. It
       also would have allowed the City to correct its own error. Because plaintiff failed
       to raise his central business district argument before the DOAH and did not seek
       review of the administrative decision in the circuit court, he failed to exhaust his
       administrative remedies.

¶ 34       We also find no exception to the exhaustion doctrine present under the facts of
       this case. The only exception relied upon by the appellate court was where the
       agency cannot provide an adequate remedy. Plaintiff had argued the DOAH could
       not provide him with injunctive and monetary relief. However, the case law is clear
       that an aggrieved party cannot circumvent administrative remedies “by a class
       action for declaratory judgment, injunction or other relief.” People ex rel. Naughton
       v. Swank, 58 Ill. 2d 95, 102 (1974) (citing Chicago Welfare Rights Organization v.
       Weaver, 56 Ill. 2d 33 (1973)).

¶ 35       In Naughton, the plaintiffs filed a class action challenging the Illinois
       Department of Public Aid’s practice of awarding financial assistance from the date
       of approval, rather than from the date of application. Id. at 96-97. The plaintiffs
       sought a declaratory judgment that the regulations were invalid and a writ of
       mandamus directing the department to promulgate new regulations. Id. at 97-98.

¶ 36       This court held the plaintiffs were still required to exhaust their administrative
       remedies. Id. at 101-02. Otherwise, an applicant for aid could “disregard the
       procedures” the legislature had provided for internal appeal and instead seek review
       “by any form of action he chooses.” Id. at 101. This court held the proposed class
       action “largely nullifie[d] the Administrative Review Act,” which “was not
       intended to eliminate the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted, or
       to establish an additional method for the review of administrative decisions.” Id. at
       101-02. Instead, the act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 110, ¶¶ 204 to 279) “was designed

                                               -9-
       to channel into a single procedure the judicial review of the decisions made by
       administrative agencies in particular cases.” Naughton, 58 Ill. 2d at 102.

¶ 37       Naughton was followed by the appellate court in Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell
       Telephone Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 448 (1975). There, the plaintiff’s class action alleged
       the telephone company had a “policy and practice” of offering lower rates to its
       officers, directors, and employees in violation of Illinois law and asked that the
       practice be declared unlawful and enjoined. Id. at 449-50. The plaintiff argued he
       was not required to pursue administrative remedies because a purely legal issue was
       involved and the outcome was predictable. Id. at 456.

¶ 38       The appellate court disagreed, finding the plaintiff must pursue “the requested
       remedy” from the agency before seeking “relief by original proceedings in equity.”
       Id. at 457. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that, because the agency
       had no jurisdiction to entertain class actions, the inherent powers of a court of equity
       were needed to provide redress. Id. (“The commencement of a class action does not
       automatically invoke the jurisdiction of equity.”). Thus, where a plaintiff fails to
       exhaust administrative remedies and has no individual cause of action, “it
       necessarily follows that any attempted class action must also fail.” Id. at 457-58.

¶ 39       Like Dvorkin, we find the rationale of Naughton applies to the facts in this case.
       Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in challenging his parking
       ticket, and there is no class-action exception to the exhaustion requirement. To
       allow an administrative plaintiff to disregard the process set forth by the legislature
       and seek review by any means he chooses effectively “eliminate[s] the requirement
       that administrative remedies be exhausted.” Naughton, 58 Ill. 2d at 101.

¶ 40       Moreover, alleging a “routine practice” or “systemic failure” does not obviate
       the need for exhaustion of remedies. Had plaintiff raised his central business district
       argument in the DOAH and succeeded, he would have had no need for declaratory
       or injunctive relief. The same can be said of similarly situated plaintiffs, who would
       have had the same opportunity to challenge their tickets before the DOAH and then
       on administrative review in the circuit court. Where each individual has an adequate
       remedy in the administrative process, that remedy cannot be avoided by bundling
       similar claims in a class action.

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¶ 41        Plaintiff’s argument that his complaint is not about how the DOAH adjudicates
       the tickets but how the City issues them is unavailing. While the City may issue the
       tickets through its code enforcement officers, it has also implemented an
       administrative process to deal with challenges to those tickets, including a hearing
       before the DOAH. To simply claim it is the City’s actions at issue and thus
       exhaustion is not required would have the effect of nullifying the administrative
       process for a whole host of code violations and flood the circuit court with
       litigation. This was not the legislature’s intent in establishing the Administrative
       Review Law. See Outcom, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 233 Ill.
       2d 324, 333 (2009) (“The Administrative Review Law eliminates the use of
       mandamus, certiorari, injunction and other equitable, statutory and common law
       actions as a means of reviewing agency decisions, thus providing a single uniform
       method of review.”).

¶ 42       On the exhaustion exception issue, the appellate court here focused its analysis
       on two cases: Midland Hotel Corp. v. Director of Employment Security, 282 Ill.
       App. 3d 312 (1996), and Board of Education of Chicago v. Board of Trustees of the
       Public Schools Teachers’ Pension & Retirement Fund of Chicago, 395 Ill. App. 3d
       735 (2009).

¶ 43       The City relies on Midland Hotel, where the plaintiff employer challenged a
       decision of the Illinois Department of Employment Security (IDES) that it owed
       unemployment insurance contributions for certain quarters. Midland Hotel, 282 Ill.
       App. 3d at 313-14. The Director of Employment Security (Director) affirmed the
       determination and assessment. Id. at 314.

¶ 44       The plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review and, on the same day,
       filed a class-action complaint for injunction, an accounting, and other relief. Id.
       Several months later, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging the Director
       was engaged in a continuing violation of the Unemployment Insurance Act (820
       ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 1992)). Midland Hotel, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 314. The
       circuit court affirmed the Director’s decision on administrative review and later
       dismissed the class action. Id. at 314-15.

¶ 45      On appeal, the employer argued that any administrative remedy would have
       been inadequate, as the administrative hearing could not provide injunctive relief,
       an accounting, or refunds. Id. at 320. Also, the employer argued that, without a

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       class action, the IDES would be able to continue its ongoing illegal and invalid
       practices. Id.

¶ 46       The appellate court found the circuit court properly dismissed the employer’s
       amended class-action complaint on the basis that it was an improper collateral
       attack on the final administrative review decision and the employer failed to
       exhaust its administrative remedies. Id. at 316. The court stated administrative
       remedies were not inadequate, as the employer could have raised its concerns
       within an administrative review action. Id. at 320.

¶ 47       The appellate court noted “[a]n administrative review judgment cannot be
       avoided by bringing a subsequent class action.” Id. at 321. Instead, a class action
       would only be appropriate after the employer successfully challenged the IDES
       order on administrative review. Id. Thereafter, when a judicial determination was
       entered against the IDES, a petition for injunction against IDES could then be
       heard. Id.

¶ 48       The appellate court here found Board of Education instructive. 2022 IL App
       (1st) 200957, ¶ 55. There, the board of education filed a complaint in the circuit
       court challenging the method by which the trustees calculated average salaries for
       certain teachers in relation to the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.
       (West 2006)). Board of Education, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 737. The complaint sought a
       declaratory judgment, an accounting, and an injunction. Id. The circuit court
       dismissed the board’s complaint and denied its request to file an amended
       complaint. Id. at 738.

¶ 49       On appeal, the board argued the case did not involve an administrative decision
       but challenged a general policy that went unchallenged in the underlying pension
       proceedings. Id. at 741. The appellate court held the trustees’ decisions were not
       subject to administrative review because (1) they involved a “systemic
       miscalculation” that fell outside the definition of an administrative decision under
       the review law and (2) the board was a third party to the decisions and thus had no
       interest in or standing to seek review of individual decisions before the board. Id.
       at 744-45.

¶ 50      In considering the reach of Board of Education and similar cases, the appellate
       court in De Jesus v. Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2019 IL App

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       (1st) 190486, ¶ 26, found that, “when pension or disability benefits are at issue, a
       party may challenge a pension board’s action without timely initiating
       administrative review under two limited circumstances.” “The first circumstance is
       when the party challenging the miscalculations was not a party to the underlying
       administrative action, i.e., a city and not a pensioner, and the challenge is to a
       systematic miscalculation, not merely an individual miscalculation.” Id.

¶ 51       In De Jesus, the plaintiffs argued Board of Education stood for the proposition
       that systematic miscalculations are not litigated via the Administrative Review
       Law. Id. ¶ 27. But the appellate court found that too broad of a reading, especially
       with Board of Education “expressly limiting the applicability of systematic
       miscalculation claims to litigation where the dispute involves a nonparty to the
       underlying administrative proceedings who would ‘not have an interest in and
       standing to seek the review of each individual case that comes before the pension
       board.’ ” Id. (quoting Board of Education, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 743). The appellate
       court in De Jesus went on to note the second limited circumstance occurs when “the
       party challenging the systematic miscalculations can point to a specific rule,
       regulation, standard, or statement of policy from the pension board itself.” Id.

¶ 52       While neither Midland nor Board of Education is directly on point with the facts
       of this case, we find Midland more in line with our exhaustion jurisprudence. Like
       in Midland, plaintiff was required to successfully challenge his parking ticket in the
       DOAH and on administrative review before he could seek an injunction. In contrast
       to Board of Education, which involved the impact on an affected third party in a
       pension case, plaintiff here had the immediate opportunity to challenge his
       individual ticket before the DOAH and the circuit court within the confines of the
       Administrative Review Law. This he failed to do, and he cannot circumvent the
       administrative review process with his class-action complaint. Moreover, he has
       not alleged a specific rule, regulation, standard, or statement of policy from the City
       or the DOAH as to issuing or ratifying erroneous central business district tickets
       that would lead us to relax the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine.

¶ 53       Because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and no
       exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine apply here, we find the appellate court erred
       in reversing the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
       Based on this finding, we need not address the City’s argument that the complaint

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       should have been dismissed based on the voluntary payment doctrine.

¶ 54                                   CONCLUSION

¶ 55       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and
       affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 56      Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 57      Circuit court judgment affirmed.

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