Court Opinion

ID: 9919515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 17:02:15.706261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:23.760838
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                  SUMMARY
                                                            January 18, 2024

                                 2024COA8

No. 22CA2120, Wolven v. del Rosario Velez — Torts — Personal
Injury; Creditors and Debtors — Health-care Provider Liens —
Assignment — Not Admissible as Evidence

     In this personal injury action, the defendant appeals the trial

court’s decision to exclude evidence of the plaintiff’s health-care

provider lien from trial per section 38-27.5-103(2), C.R.S. 2023,

arguing that because the lien was amended to comply with the

statute shortly before trial, it did not meet the statutory

requirements. A division of the court of appeals concludes, as a

matter of first impression, that so long as a health-care provider

lien agreement conforms with the statute when it is created or

amended, it must be excluded from trial per section 38-27.5-103(2).

     The division also holds that the trial court’s admission of the

plaintiff’s expert testimony concerning an “impairment rating,” as
calculated using the American Medical Association’s Guides to the

Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (5th ed. 2001), was proper, and

it agrees with another division of this court’s decision to admit such

evidence in Herrera v. Lerma, 2018 COA 141. The division also

holds that the trial court properly denied defendant’s request for a

limiting instruction informing the jury how impairment ratings

differ in personal injury and worker’s compensation cases.

Therefore, it affirms.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                            2024COA8

Court of Appeals No. 22CA2120
Jefferson County District Court No. 21CV30399
Honorable Russell Klein, Judge

Cory Wolven,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jeanmadi del Rosario Velez,

Defendant-Appellant.

                             JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
                      AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

                                    Division II
                             Opinion by JUDGE FOX
                          Schutz and Berger*, JJ., concur

                           Announced January 18, 2024

Cheney Galluzzi & Howard, LLC, Timothy C. Galluzzi, Kevin B. Cheney,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Baker & Hostetler LLP, Casie D. Collignon, Keeley O. Cronin, Matthew T.
Schock, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.
¶1    Defendant, Jeanmadi del Rosario Velez, appeals the trial

 court’s order of judgment and jury verdict against her and in favor

 of plaintiff, Cory Wolven, awarding Wolven $1,953,443.00 in

 damages. We affirm and remand with directions.

                           I.   Background

¶2    On September 26, 2019, Velez failed to stop at a stop sign in

 Wheat Ridge, Colorado, and collided with Wolven’s vehicle. After

 the accident, Wolven was diagnosed with several long-term spinal

 and neck injuries that she attributes to the crash. Wolven sued

 Velez for these injuries on April 8, 2021, and a jury found in

 Wolven’s favor on October 13, 2022.

¶3    The jury awarded Wolven $450,264.00 for noneconomic and

 injury losses, $500,000.00 for economic losses, and $1,003,179.00

 for physical impairments, for a total award of $1,953,443.00.1

 1 The trial court totaled the jury verdict as $1,954,443.00, but by

 our calculation the jury’s verdict totals $1,953,443.00. Wolven also
 mistakenly stated that the jury verdict was for $1,945,443.00 in her
 October 18, 2022, “Motion to Tax Interest and Enter Judgment,” a
 figure the trial court then mistakenly used in its order granting the
 motion. We note below that this issue needs to be corrected on
 remand.

                                   1
 Velez now challenges the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s order

 entering judgment against her.

¶4    On appeal, Velez raises three issues for review. First, Velez

 contends that the trial court erred when it allowed Wolven’s expert

 to testify about Wolven’s 8% “whole person permanent impairment

 rating,” calculated using the American Medical Association (AMA)

 Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (5th ed. 2001)

 (AMA Guides). Velez contends that the AMA Guides’ use is

 improper here because section 8-42-107(8)(b.5)(I)(A), (b.5)(II), C.R.S.

 2023, requires the third edition of the AMA Guides to be used in

 Colorado workers’ compensation cases, and that the AMA Guides

 are irrelevant and therefore inadmissible in cases outside the

 worker’s compensation context.

¶5    Second, Velez contends that the trial court should have issued

 a limiting instruction informing the jury how impairment ratings

 are calculated, or about their use in workers’ compensation cases,

 and that without such an instruction the jury could not reliably

 calculate Wolven’s damages.

¶6    Third, Velez contends that the trial court erred by retroactively

 applying section 38-27.5-103(2), C.R.S. 2023, to exclude evidence of

                                    2
 Wolven’s health-care provider lien from trial, despite the lien’s

 pretrial amendment to conform with the statute.

¶7    We reject these contentions, remand for correction of the

 judgment amount consistent with this opinion, and otherwise

 affirm.

                               II.   Preservation

¶8    “[I]ssues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be

 addressed for the first time on appeal.” Melat, Pressman & Higbie,

 L.L.P. v. Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18. To preserve an

 issue for appeal, an appellant, during trial, must raise it in a

 manner specific enough that it “draws the [trial] court’s attention to

 the asserted error.” People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, ¶ 31. Velez’s

 first two contentions were preserved by specific objections, and the

 third by a pretrial motion.

                        III.     Standard of Review

¶9    We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence

 for an abuse of discretion. Hall v. Frankel, 190 P.3d 852, 858 (Colo.

 App. 2008). We will only overturn the judgment of the trial court as

 an abuse of its discretion if the decision was “manifestly arbitrary,

 unreasonable, or unfair.” Id.; see also People v. Destro, 215 P.3d

                                       3
  1147, 1152 (Colo. App. 2008) (“A trial court has broad discretion to

  determine the admissibility of expert testimony pursuant to CRE

  702, and we will not overturn its ruling absent an abuse of that

  discretion.”). “Whether the court misapplied the law in making

  evidentiary rulings is reviewed de novo.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v.

  DPG Farms, LLC, 2017 COA 83, ¶ 34.

¶ 10   We also review de novo whether a trial court’s jury

  instructions correctly informed the jury of the law. Day v. Johnson,

  255 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 2011). If the trial court’s instructions

  were an accurate statement of the law, “we review a trial court’s

  decision to give a particular jury instruction for an abuse of

  discretion.” Id. “[A] trial court has broad discretion to determine

  the form and style of jury instructions.” Id. Thus, a trial court only

  abuses its discretion when deciding whether to provide a particular

  jury instruction when the ruling is “manifestly arbitrary,

  unreasonable, or unfair.” Id.

                                    4
                                    IV.   Analysis

       A.      The Trial Court Properly Admitted the Impairment Rating
                          Evidence Based on the AMA Guides

¶ 11        Velez’s first argument is that the trial court erred by admitting

  Wolven’s expert’s testimony concerning Wolven’s “whole person

  permanent impairment” rating, derived from the AMA Guides,

  because the AMA Guides’ impairment ratings are only relevant in

  the workers’ compensation context. To this end, Velez asks that we

  decline to follow another division of this court’s holding on this

  issue in Herrera v. Lerma, 2018 COA 141. Because we find the

  reasoning in Herrera persuasive, we reject Velez’s contention.

                               1.     Relevant Facts

¶ 12        After he was admitted as an expert in “physical medicine and

  rehabilitation,” Dr. Lee Moorer testified about the AMA Guides’

  impairment rating for Wolven. Because Wolven hired him to

  conduct an independent medical evaluation, Dr. Moorer testified

  extensively about the examinations he performed. This included,

  for example, reviewing Wolven’s medical history and her medical

  imaging results, assessing her neck’s possible range of motion,

  assessing Wolven for damaged spinal ligaments and conducting

                                          5
  orthopedic ligament testing, and verifying that Wolven was not

  “faking” her injuries.

¶ 13   Dr. Moorer’s examinations led him to conclude that Wolven

  had suffered various injuries, including a torn alar ligament, spinal

  disc bulges and herniations, and cervical facet injuries. Dr.

  Moorer’s diagnosis was for “cervical instability,” damage to cervical

  ligaments, and “cervicogenic headaches.” He also concluded that

  Wolven would suffer a “permanent impairment” and would not

  return to her “pre-crash health status.”

¶ 14   When Wolven’s counsel asked whether there were

  “standardized guidelines” for measuring permanent impairment, Dr.

  Moorer then provided testimony on the AMA Guides’ impairment

  ratings, over Velez’s objection. Dr. Moorer testified that the AMA

  Guides are released by the AMA and routinely updated, and that he

  used the fifth edition of the AMA Guides to conclude that Wolven

  had an 8% “whole person permanent impairment,” based on her

  “pain and loss of range of motion.”

¶ 15   On cross-examination, Velez’s counsel inquired about the

  impairment rating and how it was calculated. This included asking

  Dr. Moorer to explain that the AMA Guides are typically used in

                                    6
  workers’ compensation cases, which are administrative

  proceedings. Velez’s counsel then discussed at length Dr. Moorer’s

  examinations, the medical imaging he reviewed, and his

  expectations for Wolven’s future care. Velez’s counsel also asked if

  most doctors use the third edition of the AMA Guides in workers’

  compensation cases, and Dr. Moorer said that, at least when he

  was doing workers’ compensation cases, he believed this was

  correct.

¶ 16   On redirect, in response to cross-examination about the AMA

  Guides’ use in workers’ compensation cases, Wolven’s counsel

  asked Dr. Moorer to read an excerpt of text to the jury. The excerpt

  included an explanation by the AMA that the AMA Guides were

  intended to be used as a tool for medical practitioners to “rate

  impairment to assist adjudicators and others in determining the

  financial compensation” awarded to injured individuals and that

  they have applications in contexts outside of workers’

  compensation, like personal injury cases.

¶ 17   The AMA Guides were later discussed during cross-

  examination of Velez’s expert witness, Dr. Gretchen Brunworth.

  Wolven’s counsel revisited Dr. Brunworth’s testimony that she

                                    7
  believed Wolven had a “good range of motion in her cervical spine,”

  by probing the basis of this conclusion. Dr. Brunworth confirmed

  that she had “eyeballed” Wolven’s possible range of motion and

  could do so because of her professional experience, but she had not

  used a specific tool (such as an “inclinometer”) to reach this

  conclusion.

¶ 18   Wolven’s counsel then asked if she was aware that the AMA

  Guides prefer inclinometers for range of motion testing because it

  can be difficult to assign standardized values for a person’s

  impairment. Dr. Brunworth responded that this was true, but she

  was unsure how helpful the AMA Guides would be outside of

  workers’ compensation cases. Dr. Brunworth later agreed with Dr.

  Moorer’s prior testimony that, under the AMA Guides, Wolven had

  an 8% permanent impairment rating.2

¶ 19   On redirect, Velez’s counsel also questioned Dr. Brunworth to

  clarify that an impairment rating is used to derive a figure for

  2 Wolven’s counsel asked Dr. Brunworth if she agreed that the 8%

  impairment rating from the sixth edition of the AMA Guides was
  accurate, while Dr. Moorer testified that he used the fifth edition.

                                     8
  settlements in workers’ compensation cases, which do not include

  compensation for pain and suffering.

                               2.   Analysis

¶ 20   Herrera v. Lerma dealt with a very similar issue to the

  contention in this case. 2018 COA 141. There, the plaintiff’s

  vehicle was struck from behind, causing the plaintiff neck and back

  pain, so the plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit. Id. at ¶¶ 2-4.

  The plaintiff’s expert witness determined that the plaintiff had a

  “permanent whole person impairment rating of 15%” based on the

  fifth edition of the AMA Guides. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.

¶ 21   The defense, much like in this case, argued the evidence

  should have been excluded because impairment ratings are

  irrelevant outside of workers’ compensation cases. Id. at ¶ 18. The

  argument was grounded in the fact that, by statute, in workers’

  compensation cases, treating physicians must base their physical

  impairment ratings on testing required by the revised third edition

  of the AMA Guides. § 8-42-107(8)(b.5)(I)(A), (b.5)(II); Am. Med.

  Ass’n, Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (3d ed.

  1988).

                                     9
¶ 22      The Herrera trial court excluded the exact percentage of the

  rating, fearing it might be irrelevant and overly prejudicial, but it

  allowed the expert to testify that the plaintiff “had suffered

  permanent impairment according to the AMA Guides.” Herrera,

  ¶ 16. On appeal, a division of this court held that, “[s]imply

  because the workers’ compensation statute requires using the AMA

  Guides in determining a workers’ compensation claimant’s medical

  impairment rating doesn’t mean it necessarily excludes using an

  impairment rating in other types of personal injury claims.” Id. at

  ¶ 18.

¶ 23      The division held that the expert’s testimony was relevant

  because it “would’ve helped make the existence of plaintiff’s claim of

  permanent medical impairment more probable by showing that a

  physician using the objective AMA guidelines had concluded not

  only that plaintiff was permanently impaired, but that the

  impairment could be quantified into a scientifically determined

  percentage.” Id. at ¶ 19. Put simply, because the evidence could

  have given the jury a “a concrete percentage on which it could base

  its verdict,” the evidence was relevant, and the division could not

  discern how the evidence was irrelevant. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.

                                      10
¶ 24   Furthermore, the Herrera division held that the evidence

  would not have been overly prejudicial, in violation of CRE 403,

  because the expert had testified about the purpose of the AMA

  Guides, how the rating was determined, and which version of the

  AMA Guides the expert used. Id. at ¶ 22. Additionally, the division

  concluded that the use of the AMA Guides in workers’

  compensation cases had “no bearing” on their use elsewhere and

  that explaining — rather than introducing confusion about — how

  the rating is calculated would only help the jury. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24.

  As a result, the division found that the trial court had abused its

  discretion by excluding the permanent impairment rating

  percentage. Id. at ¶ 25.

¶ 25   We find the reasoning in Herrera persuasive and hold that the

  impairment rating evidence based on the AMA Guides at issue here,

  admitted through an expert, was relevant and not unfairly

  prejudicial. CRE 403; see also Sovde v. Scott, 2017 COA 90, ¶ 24

  (“Trial courts have broad discretion to admit or to exclude expert

  testimony . . . .”). Further, while section 8-42-107(8)(b.5) does

  require the use of the AMA Guides in workers’ compensation cases,

  it does not prohibit the admission of AMA Guides evidence in cases

                                    11
  not involving workers’ compensation, nor does any other Colorado

  statute.

¶ 26   The relevancy of the AMA Guides’ impairment rating is the

  same here as it was in Herrera — the AMA Guides can provide a

  jury with a standardized rating for an injured individual’s

  impairment, as determined by a medical professional. Herrera,

  ¶ 19. Thus, the AMA Guides can provide additional concrete

  information that may aid the jury’s factfinding, and we perceive no

  reason why they might be irrelevant simply because a version of the

  AMA Guides is used in workers’ compensation cases in Colorado.

¶ 27   This is particularly true where any disagreement about the

  AMA Guides’ value, or an impairment calculation, can be contested

  through direct and cross-examination, as well as additional expert

  witnesses, to mitigate risks of prejudice. See Ross v. Colo. Nat’l

  Bank of Denver, 170 Colo. 436, 446, 463 P.2d 882, 887 (1969) (“It is

  fundamental that once a witness testifies as an expert, he subjects

  himself to the most rigid kind of cross-examination, including

  searching questions concerning his qualifications, the extent of his

  knowledge, and the basis of his opinion.”). A jury is free to decide

  for itself what weight to give an expert’s testimony. See Murray v.

                                    12
  Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC, 2016 CO 47M, ¶ 23. Indeed, the

  court explicitly instructed the jury that it could accept or reject any

  expert testimony.

¶ 28   Additionally, much like in Herrera, the jury here was

  presented with multiple pieces of testimony that highlighted the

  probative value of the AMA Guides evidence and provided context

  for the impairment rating. This included what the AMA Guides are

  and who creates them, their use in workers’ compensation cases,

  and which version Wolven’s expert used. Furthermore, the jury

  heard extensive direct and cross-examination testimony about the

  medical examinations and imaging that informed Wolven’s expert’s

  diagnoses and impairment rating decision, and his expert opinions.

¶ 29   The jury also learned how the AMA intended for the AMA

  Guides to be used and their potential applicability to fields other

  than workers’ compensation. Furthermore, Velez’s expert witness

  also testified on cross-examination whether she thought the AMA

  Guides might apply to issues outside of workers’ compensation.

  And, had Velez wished, her counsel could have cross-examined

  Wolven’s expert witness on the subject further. Or she could have

  asked her own expert witness about the AMA Guides to further

                                    13
  highlight disagreements over their use. But she largely failed to do

  so.

¶ 30     As a result, we find that the expert testimony concerning the

  AMA Guides’ impairment rating at issue was relevant and its

  probative value outweighed its risk of unfair prejudice, in

  accordance with Herrera’s persuasive reasoning. See Herrera,

  ¶¶ 19-24; CRE 403. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion

  by relying on binding precedent to admit the evidence. See Hall,

  190 P.3d at 858; Scott, ¶ 24; C.A.R. 35(e) (Court of appeals

  “[o]pinions designated for official publication must be followed as

  precedent by all lower court judges in the state of Colorado.”).

        B.   The Trial Court Properly Refused Velez’s Proposed Jury
                                   Instruction

¶ 31     Velez next contends that the trial court erred by declining to

  provide a limiting instruction “on how impairment ratings work —

  specifically, how and why they are different in workers’

  compensation cases than they would be in personal injury cases.”

  We disagree.

                                     14
                           1.   Relevant Facts

¶ 32   Velez never proffered a specific jury instruction to the trial

  court detailing a proposed limiting instruction for the impairment

  rating evidence from the AMA Guides. But, at trial, Velez’s counsel

  noted for the court that “the physical impairment in a civil case is

  not the same thing as a physical impairment in a workers’

  compensation case.”

¶ 33   Thus, Velez’s counsel requested that the trial court explain in

  a jury instruction that the trial court had taken judicial notice of

  this, and that workers’ compensation cases “do not have a category

  for noneconomic damages.”3 The fear, Velez’s counsel reasoned,

  was that because workers’ compensation cases do not award

  noneconomic pain and suffering damages, the jury would be

  confused by the mention of pain and suffering damages in the same

  instruction as physical impairment damages. Velez’s counsel also

  requested that the trial court include a definition of “physical

  3 “The [Workers’ Compensation] Act does not provide for

  compensation for non-economic damages, such as pain and
  suffering.” Reliance Ins. Co. v. Blackford, 100 P.3d 578, 580 (Colo.
  App. 2004).

                                    15
  impairment,” but dropped this contention during trial. The trial

  court denied both requests.

¶ 34   The accepted jury instructions did not define physical

  impairment and the damages instruction was modeled on Colorado

  Pattern Civil Jury Instruction 6:1, CJI-Civ. 6:1 (2023). It detailed:

            Plaintiff, Cory Wolven, has the burden of
            proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
            the nature and extent of her damages. If you
            find in favor of the plaintiff, you must
            determine the total dollar amount of plaintiff’s
            damages, if any, that were caused by the
            negligence of the defendant.

            In determining such damages, you shall
            consider the following:

            1. Any noneconomic losses or injuries which
            plaintiff has had to the present time or which
            plaintiff will probably have in the future,
            including: physical and mental pain and
            suffering, inconvenience, emotional stress, and
            impairment of the quality of life. In
            considering damages in this category, you
            shall not include actual damages for physical
            impairment, since these damages, if any, are
            to be included in a separate category.

            2. Any economic losses or injuries which
            plaintiff has had to the present time,
            including: reasonable and necessary medical
            treatment expenses.

            3. Any physical impairment. In considering
            damages in this category, you shall not include
            damages again for losses or injuries already

                                    16
            determined under either numbered paragraph
            1 or 2 above.

                              2.   Analysis

¶ 35   “As long as the instruction properly informs the jury of the

  law, a trial court has broad discretion to determine the form and

  style of jury instructions.” Day, 255 P.3d at 1067.

¶ 36   In regard to defining physical impairment, note 9 to CJI-Civ.

  6:1 explicitly states that “[t]he terms ‘physical impairment’ and

  ‘disfigurement’ are not expressly defined in section 13-21-102.5[,

  C.R.S. 2023,] or in any appellate decision.” By our review, this

  remains true. Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court chose not to

  provide a definition for “physical impairment” even when discussing

  the term at length, albeit without making a point that this was a

  conscious decision. See Pringle v. Valdez, 171 P.3d 624, 631 (Colo.

  2007) (holding that physical impairment and disfigurement are a

  separate category of damages from noneconomic damages, though

  never defining physical impairment with any greater specificity);

  Preston v. Dupont, 35 P.3d 433, 441 (Colo. 2001) (stating that

  “[p]hysical impairment and disfigurement are often the most serious

                                    17
  and damaging consequences of a defendant’s negligence or

  misconduct,” without defining the terms further).

¶ 37   Thus, the trial court did not inaccurately inform the jury of the

  law by refusing to include an instruction defining physical

  impairment, particularly given trial courts’ broad discretion

  concerning jury instructions. See Day, 255 P.3d at 1067. And it

  certainly did not abuse its discretion by refusing to define the terms

  when our supreme court and legislature have declined to do so as

  well. See id.

¶ 38   As for whether the trial court should have provided a limiting

  instruction to the jury detailing how the AMA Guides calculate

  impairment ratings, there is no CJI-Civ. instruction available that

  could have informed the trial court on this issue, nor, again, did

  Velez propose one of her own. Furthermore, we have identified no

  authority that indicates the trial court needed to provide such an

  instruction. To the contrary:

            Despite a trial court’s discretion as to jury
            instructions’ form and style, we disfavor
            instructions emphasizing specific evidence.
            We have stated a trial court “has no duty to
            select all the salient points in the evidence,
            favorable and unfavorable, and specifically call
            them to the attention of the jurors,” because

                                    18
            such pointed instructions tend to confuse the
            jury and result in incorrect directives
            regarding evidentiary weight.

  Krueger v. Ary, 205 P.3d 1150, 1157 (Colo. 2009) (quoting Lowe v.

  People, 76 Colo. 603, 615, 234 P. 169, 174 (1925)).

¶ 39   Velez’s requested limiting instruction, to the degree we can

  infer its contents, would likely have been the kind of instruction

  that could improperly bring a jury’s attention to an evidentiary

  issue and cause unnecessary confusion.

¶ 40   Velez’s main point on this issue, that workers’ compensation

  cases do not allow noneconomic damages like pain and suffering,

  was discussed only briefly during trial — particularly compared to

  the direct and cross-examination testimony addressing how the

  AMA Guides work and their use by Wolven’s expert, as discussed

  above. Velez brought the damages contention up briefly with her

  own expert witness, Dr. Brunworth, but only asked a single

  question on the subject, and the jury declined to ask any questions.

  And the point was briefly elaborated on during Velez’s closing

                                    19
  argument, highlighting how workers’ compensation cases utilize

  impairment ratings differently.4

¶ 41   For the trial court to then issue a separate limiting instruction

  detailing that the jury must consider that workers’ compensation

  cases treat physical impairment damages differently than personal

  injury cases do — invoking a wholly different field of law not before

  the jury — would be irrelevant at best, and confusing at worst.

  And, importantly, such an instruction could improperly direct

  jurors to give more, or less, weight to the AMA Guides impairment

  evidence introduced at trial. See Krueger, 205 P.3d at 1157. Had

  Velez wished to further highlight her disagreements with the AMA

  Guides evidence, the proper way to address this would have been

  4 The main contention Velez raises on this point is that in workers’

  compensation cases, a claimant needs to be at “maximum medical
  improvement” (MMI) before their permanent disability and a
  settlement can be determined. MGM Supply Co. v. Indus. Claim
  Appeals Off., 62 P.3d 1001, 1005 (Colo. App. 2002) (“MMI is . . .
  when any medically determinable physical or medical impairment
  as a result of injury has become stable and when no further
  treatment is reasonably expected to improve the condition. . . .
  Evaluation for permanent disability cannot precede the
  determination that the claimant has reached MMI.”). Thus, Velez
  argues that a permanent impairment rating cannot be reliably
  calculated for Wolven where her MMI was not determined.

                                     20
  through direct and cross-examination and closing argument, rather

  than a jury instruction.

¶ 42   Finally, precedent explicitly dictates that physical impairment

  damages are a separate category of damages from noneconomic

  ones — as expressed in the final accepted instructions. In Preston,

  for example, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that, “[b]ecause

  damages for these injuries are often the most important in making

  the plaintiff whole, a separate category of damages for physical

  impairment and disfigurement is necessary and important.” 35

  P.3d at 441; see Pringle, 171 P.3d at 631 (“Our analysis of the

  common law and principles underlying our discussion in Preston

  that physical impairment and disfigurement constitute a separate

  category of damages from noneconomic damages stands.”).

¶ 43   The trial court did not inaccurately convey the law to the jury

  by refusing Velez’s requested limiting instruction — indeed it likely

  avoided improperly confusing the jury and conformed with

  precedent’s demand that physical impairment damages be a

  separate damages category. See Krueger, 205 P.3d at 1157; Pringle,

  171 P.3d at 631. Further, particularly given trial courts’ broad

  discretion to determine the form and style of jury instructions,

                                    21
  along with the fact that the trial court’s accepted instruction

  matched CJI-Civ. 6:1, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

  See Day, 255 P.3d at 1067.

       C.   The Trial Court Properly Excluded Evidence of Wolven’s
                          Health-Care Provider Lien

¶ 44    Velez lastly contends that the trial court erred when it

  excluded evidence of Wolven’s health-care provider lien from trial

  per section 38-27.5-103(2). We disagree.

                           1.    Relevant Facts

¶ 45    After Wolven’s car crash, she financed some of her medical

  care provided by the Centento-Schultz Clinic through a health-care

  provider lien with a company called Quantum Specialist Network

  (QSN). Wolven granted QSN a lien on any favorable judgments or

  settlements Wolven received in exchange for payment of her medical

  expenses. It is unclear from the record before us exactly when the

  original lien agreement between Wolven and QSN was finalized, but

  Wolven began receiving treatment from the Centento-Schultz Clinic,

  apparently billed to QSN, in March 2021.

¶ 46    On October 5, 2022, five days before Wolven’s October 10 trial

  began, QSN and Wolven amended the lien agreement. The change

                                    22
  may have been made after QSN realized that it needed to amend the

  agreement to satisfy the disclosure requirements in section 38-

  27.5-104(1)(a)-(g), C.R.S. 2023, and to conform with the liability

  requirements of section 38-27.5-105(4), C.R.S. 2023.5

                                2.   Analysis

¶ 47      Colorado’s “collateral source rule” originated in common law

  but is now codified in statute. Ronquillo v. EcoClean Home Servs.,

  Inc., 2021 CO 82, ¶ 13; § 13-21-111.6, C.R.S. 2023; § 10-1-

  135(10)(a), C.R.S. 2023. The rule seeks to ensure that a tortfeasor

  cannot attempt to reduce an injured party’s damages at trial by

  using benefits the injured party receives from sources wholly

  independent of a tortfeasor (i.e., collateral source benefits) to

  remedy the tortfeasor’s harms against the injured party. Ronquillo,

  ¶ 13.

¶ 48      The “pre-verdict evidentiary” component of the rule, as

  relevant here and codified at section 10-1-135(10)(a), achieves this

  5 H.B. 21-1300, which enacted sections 38-27.5-101 to -108, went

  into effect on September 7, 2021. See Ch. 473, secs. 1-2, §§ 38-
  27.5-101 to -108, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3388-94 (bill went into
  effect ninety days after adjournment of the 2021 legislative session
  on June 8, 2021).

                                      23
  aim by requiring trial courts to exclude evidence of collateral source

  benefits from trial. Ronquillo, ¶¶ 14, 18 (“By excluding collateral

  source information entirely, the rule ensures that tortfeasors will

  not escape liability simply because the injured party had the

  foresight to obtain a benefits provider to offset the risk of

  unexpected medical expenses.”).

¶ 49   In 2021, the Colorado legislature enacted sections 38-27.5-

  101 to -108, C.R.S. 2023, creating new rules for health-care

  provider liens. See Ch. 473, secs. 1, §§ 38-27.5-101 to -108, 2021

  Colo. Sess. Laws 3388-94. Specifically, per section 38-27.5-103(2),

  all evidence related to the “amount paid by an assignee,” “fact of the

  assignment,” or “terms” of health-care provider liens created under

  section 38-27.5-103(1) are excluded from discovery and trial, akin

  to section 10-1-135(10)(a)’s exclusion of collateral source benefits, if

  a health-care provider or its assignee provides certain disclosures

  per section 38-27.5-104(1) before the lien is created and complies

  with section 38-27.5-105(4). Health-care provider liens that comply

  with the requirements of sections 38-27.5-104(1) and -105(4)

  “necessarily provide a benefit” to an injured party, akin to collateral

                                     24
  source benefits, and therefore are excludable from trial per section

  38-27.5-103(2). Ronquillo, ¶ 33.

¶ 50   Here, the questions are not whether the amended QSN lien

  meets the requirements of section 38-27.5-105(4) and whether QSN

  provided the proper disclosures per section 38-27.5-104(1).

  Instead, the question is whether the amended QSN lien qualifies for

  the protections afforded by section 38-27.5-103(2) — despite being

  amended to comply with sections 38-27.5-104(1) and -105(4) just

  five days ahead of trial.

¶ 51   The trial court excluded the amended QSN lien agreement

  from trial, denying Velez’s pretrial motion, because it found that

  section 38-27.5-103(2) effectively created a prospective rule of

  admissibility, and that the amended lien agreement met the

  statutory criteria. Thus, while the trial court had “some concerns”

  about the lien’s last-minute amendment, because the amended lien

  complied with the requirements of sections 38-27.5-104(1)

  and -105(4), it was inadmissible at trial.

¶ 52   Velez contends that the trial court erred by granting the

  statutory protections of section 38-27.5-103(2) because when the

  original lien agreement was formed, it did not conform to the

                                     25
  disclosure requirements of section 38-27.5-104(1). Thus, Velez

  says, the trial court should not have, in effect, retroactively applied

  section 38-27.5-103(2). Wolven, in turn, contends that the

  amended lien complied with the requirements of sections 38-27.5-

  104(1) and -105(4) before it was created. Thus, even if created so

  close to trial, it was inadmissible at trial per section 38-27.5-103(2).

  We agree with Wolven and the trial court, and conclude that the

  application of section 38-27.5-103(2)’s protections did not require a

  retroactive application of the statute, and that evidence of the

  amended QSN lien was properly excluded.

¶ 53   Whether the amended QSN lien agreement was properly

  excluded at trial depends on whether it met the requirements of

  sections 38-27.5-104(1) and -105(4), and was therefore excludable

  under section 38-27.5-103(2). See Ronquillo, ¶ 33. The original lien

  agreement is irrelevant because it was superseded by the amended

  lien. The amended lien agreement explicitly detailed that it covered

  any unpaid services Wolven had received from QSN providers and

  any judgment or settlement arising from Wolven’s September 26,

                                     26
  2019, crash.6 See Phx. Power Partners, L.P. v. Colo. Pub. Utils

  Comm’n, 952 P.2d 359, 364 (Colo. 1998) (novation, and

  extinguishing an old contract and substituting a new one, need not

  be explicit and “may be inferred from facts and circumstances” if

  there was a previous valid contract and agreement to abide by a

  new valid contract that extinguished the old agreement).

¶ 54   The plain language of section 38-27.5-104(1) supports this

  interpretation and is the only section in article 27.5 that provides

  any, albeit limited, guidance on timing requirements for the

  6 Even if the amended lien agreement was not explicit about taking

  over any payments Wolven still owed for care resulting from the
  crash, the inherent inconsistency between two lien agreements
  covering judgments arising out of litigation for the same injury, with
  presumably contrasting repayment terms, would cause the
  amended lien agreement to implicitly supersede the original
  agreement. See In re Estate of Gadash, 2017 COA 54, ¶ 47 n.6 (“In
  order for a subsequent contract to implicitly supersede an earlier
  one, the two agreements must cover the same subject matter and
  be inconsistent with one another.”). That said, however, the record
  before us only provides the amended agreement and the disclosures
  associated with it to demonstrate it conforms to sections 38-27.5-
  104(1) and -105(4), C.R.S. 2023, and we do not have the original
  agreement in the record before us to compare the agreements’
  terms. See Schuster v. Zwicker, 659 P.2d 687, 690 (Colo. 1983) (“It
  is the obligation of the party asserting error in a judgment to
  present a record that discloses that error, for a judgment is
  presumed to be correct until the contrary affirmatively appears.”);
  LePage v. People, 2014 CO 13, ¶¶ 15-16.

                                    27
  creation of health-care provider liens. Section 38-27.5-104(1) notes

  that the required disclosures must be provided “[b]efore a health-

  care provider lien is created” for it to be compliant and entitled to

  section 38-27.5-103(2)’s protections. But this occurred here —

  before the amended QSN lien agreement was created, QSR gave

  Wolven the disclosures required by section 38-27.5-104(1). Thus,

  because the amended QSN lien complied with sections 38-27.5-

  104(1) and -105(4), it was excludable from trial per section 38-27.5-

  103(2). See Ronquillo, ¶ 33.

¶ 55   As a result, the trial court properly excluded evidence of the

  amended lien agreement from trial in accordance with section 38-

  27.5-103(2). We perceive no error, on de novo review, in the trial

  court’s adherence to the plain language of the statute. See DPG

  Farms, ¶ 34.

¶ 56   We, however, share the trial court’s concerns surrounding the

  last-minute amendment of the QSN lien agreement ahead of trial.

  Because section 38-27.5-104(1) and -105(4) compliant health-care

  provider liens are required to be excluded from trial and discovery

  per section 38-27.5-103(2), such last-minute changes could lead to

  gamesmanship. In affirming the trial court’s decision to exclude

                                    28
  evidence of the amended QSN lien at trial, as required by statute,

  we in no way endorse plaintiffs changing lien agreements to comply

  with section 38-27.5-104(1) on the eve of trial. However, only the

  legislature may provide more specific timing rules to determine

  whether a health-care provider lien that has been amended to

  conform with section 38-27.5-104(1) is admissible at trial. Dep’t of

  Transp. v. City of Idaho Springs, 192 P.3d 490, 494 (Colo. App.

  2008) (“Courts may not rewrite statutes to improve them.”). If a

  health-care provider lien, before it is created, complies with sections

  38-27.5-104(1) and -105(4), then it is protected by section 38-27.5-

  103(2) and is excluded from discovery and trial.

                            V.    Disposition

¶ 57   Because the trial court’s October 13, 2022, “Order Regarding

  Verdict” mistakenly totals the jury’s verdict to be $1,954,443.00,

  when by our calculation the award should in fact be for a total of

  $1,953,443.00, we correct this mistake with this opinion and

  remand to the trial court to recalculate Wolven’s damages award.

  See Bell v. McCann, 535 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo. App. 1975) (not

  published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)) (appellate court may correct

  mathematical errors in trial court’s damages award when supported

                                    29
  by the record); see also C.R.C.P. 60(a) (trial court may correct

  clerical errors in judgment on its own initiative or by motion from

  the parties at any time).

¶ 58   We affirm the jury verdict and the judgment of the trial court

  and remand the case with directions.

       JUDGE SCHUTZ and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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