Court Opinion

ID: 9882389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:09:07.02157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:17.269348
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Stallworth, 2023-Ohio-3316.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                       FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                            HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                                  :   APPEAL NO. C-220247
                                                     TRIAL NO. B-1705451
          Plaintiff-Appellee,                    :

                                                 :
    VS.                                                O P I N I O N.
                                                 :

 GERALD STALLWORTH,                              :

       Defendant-Appellant.                      :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 20, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith Sauter,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Gerald Stallworth, pro se.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Judge.

       {¶1}   In this appeal, defendant-appellant Gerald Stallworth challenges the

trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas for various sex offenses

involving a juvenile victim. Stallworth alleges that he should have been able to

withdraw his pleas, because he was operating under the mistaken belief that he would

be eligible for programs in prison that would enable him to reduce the total length of

his sentence. However, because the record demonstrates that the trial court informed

him that he may be able to participate in programming, not that he would be able to,

and because he was informed at the time of his pleas that any sentence reduction for

programming was required to meet statutory requirements, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Stallworth’s motion.

                         Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶2}   In 2017, Stallworth was indicted on 13 counts of unlawful sexual activity

involving a minor. In 2018, in a negotiated agreement with the state, he pleaded guilty

to five counts of rape in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining eight counts.

       {¶3}   Before it accepted Stallworth’s guilty pleas, the trial court reviewed the

potential punishments that could be imposed on Stallworth. It informed him that the

first of the five rape counts to which he was pleading guilty carried a potential prison

sentence of three to 11 years and that whatever term the court imposed would be

mandatory. With respect to the remaining four counts to which Stallworth pleaded

guilty, the trial court told him that it could impose a term of between five and 11 years

in prison, that each term would be mandatory, and that he would have to serve it. After

going over the total maximum time Stallworth could receive under the plea agreement,

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the trial judge again reiterated that “whatever sentence I impose would be mandatory.”

Stallworth indicated that he understood.

       {¶4}    The trial court next informed Stallworth about the possibility of earning

credit to reduce the total amount of time he spends in prison: “Though you may be

eligible for additional days of credit, or additional credit under circumstances specified

in Revised Code 2967.193, but those are not automatic, but you’ve got to earn those

pursuant to the criteria in the statute.” Stallworth again said he understood.

       {¶5}    At a later sentencing hearing, on July 10, 2018, the trial court sentenced

Stallworth to an aggregate prison term of 20 years.

       {¶6}    More than three years later, in October 2021, Stallworth filed a motion

to withdraw his guilty pleas. In the motion, he alleged that his attorney ineffectively

advised him regarding the nature of his sentences, in that Stallworth believed he would

be eligible for judicial release after ten years and that he would be eligible for earned

credit by participating in programs and classes in prison, which he claims turned out

to be untrue. The trial court denied the motion, and Stallworth now appeals.

                            Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

       {¶7}    In a single assignment of error, Stallworth alleges the trial court denied

him due process by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without a hearing.

We disagree.

       {¶8}    The decision whether to grant or deny a postsentence motion to

withdraw a guilty plea lies within the trial court’s discretion, which an appellate court

will reverse only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. James, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-210319, 2021 Ohio App. LEXIS 4456, 8 (Dec. 22, 2021). Under

Crim.R. 32.1, the trial court may grant such a motion to correct a manifest injustice, a

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

standard which the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating. State v. Smith, 49

Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Royal,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160666, 2017-Ohio-4146, ¶ 9. Though a trial court is not

required to hold a hearing on every postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a

hearing is required if facts alleged by the defendant, accepted as true, would require

that the defendant be allowed to withdraw the plea. (Internal quotation marks and

citations omitted.) State v. Norris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107894, 2019-Ohio-3768,

¶ 26.    A postsentence motion to withdraw a plea should only be granted in

extraordinary circumstances. Smith at 264; State v. Testerman, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-010040, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3605, 5 (Aug. 17, 2001).

        {¶9}   Stallworth argues that he was unaware at that time he pleaded guilty

that his 20-year aggregate sentence would be mandatory. But the trial court advised

him on no fewer than three occasions that each count to which he was pleading carried

mandatory prison time and that he would have to serve the total time imposed by the

court. Stallworth indicated that he understood the mandatory nature of the sentences

before he entered his pleas.

        {¶10} Stallworth also argues, both based on statements by the trial court and

unspecified discussions with his attorney outside of court, that he believed he would

be eligible for a sentencing reduction based on his participation in programs and

classes in prison. He represents that he has now been told by prison officials that he

cannot earn credit against his sentences through these programs, despite successfully

participating in them.

        {¶11} While we commend Stallworth for his efforts to complete prison

programming, the record reveals no promise of earned credit for doing so. To the

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

contrary, the trial court advised Stallworth that he may be able to reduce his sentences

this way, but only if he met certain statutory criteria. The trial court further explained

that this opportunity was “not automatic.”

       {¶12} As such, this is not an extraordinary case in which allowing

Stallworth’s guilty pleas to stand would constitute a manifest injustice. Rather, the

record reveals that the trial court advised Stallworth before he elected to plead guilty

both of the fact that his prison time was mandatory and that earned credit through

programming was subject to statutory criteria. The trial court therefore did not abuse

its discretion in denying Stallworth’s postsentence motion to withdraw his plea. See

James, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210319, 2021 Ohio App. LEXIS 4456, at 9.

       {¶13} We accordingly overrule Stallworth’s sole assignment of error and

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                    Judgment affirmed.
CROUSE, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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