Court Opinion

ID: 9754561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:04:05.387188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:54.650815
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice O’Brien:
I have no quarrel with the view of the majority that prejudice results from the injection of the fact of insurance into cases such as this. The general rule is sound and, quite obviously, juries should not be permitted to consider the fact of a party’s insurance cov*153erage or lack thereof In reaching a verdict in a trespass case, or, for that matter, in any other case.
I believe, however, that courts have developed a phobia in this connection which might well be characterized as the insurance syndrome.
As stated in the opinion of the majority: “The court below granted a new trial because of the prejudicial effect of revealing to the jury, during the cross-examination of' Parr ‘during the last hour of the last day of the seven days required for testimony’, that Parr had liability insurance”. I fail to perceive in the record that the jury was anywhere informed that Parr had liability insurance.
The testimony which formed the basis of the order of the court below, and the opinion of the majority here, is set out in the majority’s opinion. Reading of that testimony shows simply that while Parr was being cross-examined as to the earnings or lack thereof of his business, the question was asked as to how much money he had spent in a particular year for insurance. First of all, it must be noted that this question was not answered. Secondly, there is nothing to indicate that the insurance spoken of was liability insurance. The insurance referred to could very well have been theft insurance, cargo insurance, fire insurance, life insurance on key employees, hospitalization insurance, or any of a myriad other forms of insurance available to and purchased by countless business men and private individuals.
Nor can I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the question was “beyond doubt” asked intentionally in an effort to place prejudicial testimony before the jury. This inference drawn by the majority is wholly gratuitous and has no support in the record.
In Trimble v. Merloe, 413 Pa. 403, 197 A. 2d 457 (1964), cited in the majority opinion, this closely divided court held that it was sufficiently prejudicial to *154require a new trial for plaintiff’s counsel to state that the jury should not consider whether the defendant had liability insurance. Today, we go even further and hold that the mere mention of the word “insurance” is sufficient ground for the grant of a new trial.
Since I believe that the grant of a new trial in this case, based upon what I consider to be an innocuous, unanswered question, is an extreme manifestation of the insurance syndrome, I dissent and would reverse the order of the court below and reinstate the jury’s verdicts.
Mr. Justice Musmanno and Mr. Justice Cohen join in this dissent.