Court Opinion

ID: 9705599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:13:27.69276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:12.881396
License: Public Domain

Dissent
Jackson, C. J.
I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the majority opinion herein. For that reason I dissent thereto.
The factual situation in the record in this case discloses that this is the fourth time that this case has been tried, the original action having- been filed in the Vanderburgh Probate Court in March 1954. The cause was thereafter venued to the Warrick Circuit Court, trial was had therein before a jury resulting in a verdict in favor of the appellant in the sum of $18,000. An appeal was perfected from the judgment rendered therein to the Appellate Court and was transferred from the Appellate Court to this Court pursuant to Acts 1901, ch. 247, § 15, p. 565, § 4-209, Bums’ 1946 Replacement. On December 2,1958, this court reversed said cause and remanded the same to the trial court with instructions to grant a new trial. This Court denied rehearing therein on January 13, 1959. In the case previously tried and appealed the appellee there, appellant here, claims that the inference of negligence arose in this case under the doctrine of res ipsa, loquitur, that contention was held invalid by this Court in said cause, and in reversing and remanding said cause with instructions to grant a new trial this Court there said “[t]he only question remaining is whether there is any evidence of negligence proximately causing the injury.” This Court also answered that question on the succeeding page, which in pertinent part, reads as follows:
“We believe there is not. In oral argument before us, counsel for appellee was not able to point out any specific *75item of negligence. It was urged however, that the inspection and testing of the chairs before their use should have been more thorough. There is no independent duty to make inspection upon which negligence can be based. The duty to inspect arises from knowledge of possible defects or their reasonable probability. There is no showing here that the appellant had any previous knowledge of the defective chair or had cause to suspect the chairs were defective. The undisputed evidence is to the contrary.” Evansville American Legion, etc. v. White (1959), 239 Ind. 138, 141, 154 N. E. 2d 109.
For further discussion of the proceedings heretofore had in the case now before us reference is had to White v. Evansville American Legion Home Assn. (1965), 207 N. E. 2d 820. In the interest of brevity we deem it unnecessary to repeat in this opinion the procedural steps heretofore had and therein set forth.
I point out that the law of the case as established by this court by its opinion of December 2, 1958, [Evansville American Legion etc. v. White, supra] precludes recovery by the appellant herein and requires denial of transfer in the action now before us.
Under the circumstances existing in the case at bar, the previous determination and decision of this court, no new evidence as to negligence having been adduced in the case at bar, makes the giving or refusing to give instruction No. 5 immaterial because under the law of the case as heretofore enunciated this Court had determined “[i]n oral argument before us, counsel for appellee was not able to point out any specific item of negligence.” Evansville American Legion, etc. v. White, supra.
Further the rule as to “pure accident” attempted to be imposed by the majority opinion in the case of Miller v. Alvey (1965), 246 Ind. 560, 207 N. E. 2d 633, is pure dicta, not applicable in said case for the reason that appellant there was a guest in the automobile driven by the appellee. Trial by jury was had resulting in a negative verdict denying plaintiff-*76appellee any recovery. Appellant there having the burden of proving wilful and wanton negligence and having failed to sustain that burden was not entitled to recover. On the state of the record in said cause, the determination by this Court that the instruction complained of constituted reversible error, was not germane to the issues to be determined on appeal and is certainly not applicable in the case at bar.
Appellant further complains that instruction No. 35 was erroneous and constituted reversible error. Again we point out that under the law of the case heretofore established by this Court, the giving of said instruction could not be harmful to the appellant, and the giving or refusal to give such instruction would be immaterial, and would be neither helpful nor harmful in the determination of the issues in this cause. Under other circumstances and in another case such an instruction might well be prejudicial, harmful or cause for reversal, but in the instant case appellant was neither harmed nor benefited by the giving of the instruction and the court did not therein commit reversible error.
We further point out that in the cause now under consideration there was a judgment against the appellant and in favor of the appellee on the first paragraph of appellant’s complaint as amended by interlineation. No motion for a new trial was ever filed with reference to the judgment rendered on said amended paragraph one of appellant’s complaint, nor was there any appeal taken or perfected from the judgment rendered on said amended paragraph one of appellant’s complaint.
In conclusion I wish to specifically call attention to the language of this Court’s opinion in the former appeal [Evansville American Legion, etc. v. White (1959), 239 Ind. 138, 154 N. E. 2d 109]. In pertinent part the same at page 139 reads as follows:
“The pertinent parts of the evidence show that the appellee, Mrs. White, and her sister, attended a bingo game on the evening of the accident and bought tickets from *77the appellant for that purpose. After entering the hall she selected a chair at a table and pulled it out and sat down on it and the chair immediately collapsed. The chair involved was a metal folding chair put together with rivets and welding. An examination of the chair after the accident showed that the curl on the end of the rivet holding the two right legs of the chair together had been sheared or broken off. The place where the curl had come off was bright and shiny, not oxidized or corroded. It showed a recent shearing off. We do not find any dispute in the evidence as to this fact.”
Again referring to the language of this Court on page 141 we find the former opinion reads in pertinent part “[t] here is no showing here that the appellant had any previous knowledge of the defective chair or had cause to suspect the chairs were defective. The undisputed evidence is to the contrary.” [Emphasis supplied.]
The evidence adduced at the first trial and that adduced in the case at bar is, so far as the writer of this opinion is able to determine, practically identical. That being the case, in view of the former opinion of this court, [Evansville American Legion, etc. v. White, supra] the doctrine of res judicata applies and appellant here cannot recover. Lieb v. Lichtenstein (1890), 121 Ind. 483, 23 N. E. 284; Cutler v. Cox (1828), 2 Blackford 178; United Oil etc., Co. v. Ellsworth (1909), 43 Ind. App. 670, 88 N. E. 362.
The petition to transfer should be denied.
Note. — Reported in 210 N. E. 2d 845.