Court Opinion

ID: 9406067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 18:03:54.374385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.758726
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/29/23 P. v. Lopez CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084487
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. LF010149A)
                    v.

 ROBERTO GARCIA LOPEZ,                                                                    OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John R.
Brownlee, Judge.
         Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Ivan P.
Marrs, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
         Appellant Roberto Garcia Lopez appeals his present judgment and sentence,
imposed following a resentencing hearing ordered in a prior appeal. Appellant’s case has
been proceeding through the appellate process for several years. In a prior appeal, this
court generally upheld appellant’s convictions under the then-existing law but remanded
the matter to the trial court to exercise its discretion under then recently enacted Senate
Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). (People v. Lopez (Jan. 31, 2020, F074412)
[nonpub. opn.].) Since that time, many additional changes to the law have occurred. In
this appeal, appellant again asks us to remand the matter to the trial court based on these
additional changes to the law, noting that the trial court felt it could not consider these
issues given the specific nature of the remittitur following the prior appeal. Notably, the
People concede that all of the issues raised by appellant are related to newly enacted laws
that are retroactive and applicable to appellant. Upon review, we agree with appellant
and the People and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings warranted
under recent changes to the law.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The underlying facts relating to the crime are neither contested by the parties for
the purpose of this appeal nor particularly relevant to the arguments, aside from some
references to the scope of the expert testimony provided in support of the gang aspects of
the case. This court previously recounted the facts of the case in detail in People v.
Lopez, supra, F074412, and the parties generally adopt those facts in their briefing.
Accordingly, we incorporate by reference the factual and procedural background section
from our opinion in People v. Lopez as if fully set forth herein and note that any
additional relevant facts will be included as part of the discussion if necessary to the
resolution of this appeal.
       Following our opinion in People v. Lopez, supra, F074412, appellant sought
review with our Supreme Court but was denied. Accordingly, the remittitur was issued
on June 17, 2020. At that point, our disposition instructed the trial court “to determine
whether to exercise its discretion pursuant to [Penal Code] section 12022.5,
subdivision (c)” to dismiss certain sentencing enhancements previously imposed and
resentence appellant.
       After several continuances and status conferences, appellant filed a brief in April
2022, seeking to set aside his gang enhancements under former Penal Code

                                              2.
section 186.22 based on changes to the law made by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333). At this point, the trial court had not yet acted upon the
remittitur. The People opposed, arguing appellant’s case was final for purposes of the
gang enhancements prior to the effective date of Assembly Bill 333 and that the remittitur
did not permit the trial court to consider such arguments.
       At a hearing in May 2022, the trial court agreed with the People that appellant’s
case was final with respect to the arguments under Assembly Bill 333 and rejected
appellant’s request. The trial court concluded it would “limit any resentencing to the
direction of the remittitur as to the gun enhancement.” After a short continuance, the trial
court then heard argument on whether to reimpose the gun enhancement under Penal
Code section 12022.53.1 After taking additional mitigation evidence and hearing
argument, the trial court determined it would “exercise its discretion in imposing the
[section ]12022.5[, subdivision ](c) enhancements as it previously did at the initial
hearing” because “the gravity of the offense and [appellant]’s criminal history” made
striking the enhancements inappropriate.
       This appeal timely followed.
                                       DISCUSSION
       In this appeal, appellant identifies six changes to the law that occurred while he
sought further review or waited for the court to act on the remittitur. First, appellant
identifies Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136), which now
requires the court find specific circumstances exist to impose the upper term for a
sentence. Second, appellant identifies Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.),
which now grants trial courts the authority to impose any term, rather than only the
greatest term, when multiple convictions result in stayed sentences under section 654.
Third, appellant identifies Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended
section 1170 to make the middle term the presumptive sentence and created a

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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presumption in favor of a low prison term when certain circumstances exist. Fourth,
appellant identifies case law changes to the trial court’s discretion under section 12022.53
as described in People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694–695, which created
additional options besides imposing or rejecting the gun enhancement penalty. Fifth,
appellant identifies Assembly Bill 333, which made substantive changes to the
requirements for conviction of a gang enhancement under section 186.22. Sixth,
appellant identifies Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which modified
section 1385 and instructed courts that they should give great weight to evidence in favor
of dismissing certain enhancements unless that act would endanger public safety.
       Appellant concedes that counsel did not raise some of these grounds below, but
argues that such an action would have been futile given the trial court’s determination
that the case was final and that it could not consider any issues other than that identified
in the remittitur. On the merits, appellant requests this court review his sentence in light
of the changes and direct the trial court to strike various aspects of the sentence or utilize
its discretion to reconsider others. Appellant further suggests this court should strike the
gang enhancement convictions imposed under former section 186.22.
       In response, the People concede that appellant is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing, including consideration of each law identified. With respect to Senate Bill 136,
the People agree that changes to the law invalidate appellant’s sentence because it
included time for prior prison terms imposed pursuant to former section 667.5 and point
out that additional relevant changes implemented through Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483) support appellant’s requests on appeal. As part of
these changes, a court conducting a resentencing hearing under Senate Bill 483 is
obligated to consider any other ameliorative laws that would be applicable to sentencing
at that time. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Based on this concession, the People contend that
the best course of action is to remand for a new sentencing hearing, where appellant can
raise his arguments as to each of the newly enacted laws, but asks this court to refrain

                                              4.
from reaching the merits on these disputes given the need for a new hearing. With
respect to the gang enhancement changes, the People accept that the evidence does not
appear to support a conviction under the new law but contend that they should be
permitted to retry appellant on that enhancement.
       Effect of Senate Bill 136 as Amended by Senate Bill 483
       Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill 136 amended section 667.5, subdivision (b)
to limit application of prior prison term enhancements to only prior prison terms that
were served for sexually violent offenses as defined by Welfare and Institutions Code
section 6600, subdivision (b). (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) That
amendment was applied retroactively, pursuant to In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, to
all cases not yet final on Senate Bill 136’s effective date. (People v. Lopez (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 337, 341–342, citing In re Estrada, at p. 742.)
       Later, Senate Bill 483 added section 1171.1.2 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) As
currently numbered, section 1172.75, subdivision (a) reads: “Any sentence enhancement
that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5,
except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense
as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is
legally invalid.” Resentencing after relief pursuant to section 1172.75 “shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the
repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety” and “shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) Further,
resentencing “shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).)

2       Section 1171.1 was subsequently renumbered section 1172.75, effective June 30, 2022.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)

                                              5.
       In light of the requirements of section 1172.75 and the People’s concessions, we
agree that remanding for a new sentencing hearing is the proper and most judicially
efficient result. As both appellant and the People recognize, appellant’s sentence is
currently invalid because it includes sentence enhancements that were imposed pursuant
to subdivision (b) of former section 667.5, which are no longer permitted under Senate
Bill 136. At a minimum, under section 1172.75, appellant is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing at which time the court shall apply the current sentencing scheme, including
those ameliorative laws identified by appellant and enacted during the pendency of his
appeal. This includes all of the new legal arguments identified by appellant, save for the
effect Assembly Bill 333 may have on his gang enhancement convictions under former
section 186.22, which we discuss further below. (See People v. Flores (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039 [Sen. Bill No. 567 applies retroactively as an ameliorative
change in the law applicable to all nonfinal convictions on appeal]; People v. Tirado,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 697 [trial court has discretion to impose enhancement under
§ 12022.43, subd. (b) or (c), in place of § 12022.43, subd. (d), even if not previously
alleged]; People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673–674 [Assem. Bill No. 518
entitled to retroactive application and Sen. Bill No. 81 specifically applicable to
resentencing hearings occurring after Jan. 1, 2022].)
       Effect of Assembly Bill 333
       Prior to resentencing, appellant requested the trial court consider the impact of
Assembly Bill 333 on the gang enhancements applicable to his sentence. The People
opposed at the time, arguing that appellant’s case had become final prior to the effective
date of Assembly Bill 333 and that this court’s remittitur did not allow consideration of
any issues outside of issues relating to Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). The
trial court agreed, rejecting any claim it could consider changes implemented under
Assembly Bill 333 because it concluded appellant’s case was final as to that issue.

                                             6.
       On appeal, the People no longer argue that appellant’s case was final for purposes
of Assembly Bill 333 and concede not only that appellant “will also be entitled to the
benefit of [Assembly Bill] 333’s amendments to section 186.22,” but that “the gang
enhancement findings made at appellant’s trial do not appear to comply with the new
statutory terms.” We agree with the People’s concessions. Our Supreme Court has
confirmed that Assembly Bill 333 is retroactive to all nonfinal cases under In re Estrada.
(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207 (Tran).)3 Further, as appellant
points out, our Supreme Court recently explained that under In re Estrada, a case is no
longer final when the underlying sentence is vacated and a new sentence is imposed.
(People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 161–162 (Padilla).)
       In this case, although appellant’s conviction was upheld in the prior appeal, this
court remanded for resentencing purposes because changes in the law had conferred new
discretion on the trial court that had not existed when it initially sentenced appellant. The
need to reconsider appellant’s sentence thus necessarily worked to vacate the existing
sentence so that the trial court could exercise its discretion and then impose a new
sentence. Appellant’s case was thus not final at the time the trial court reconsidered
appellant’s sentence. (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 161 [“A case is final when ‘the
criminal proceeding as a whole’ has ended [citation] and ‘the courts can no longer
provide a remedy to a defendant on direct review.’ ”].) Further, even if this were not the
case, the changes implemented in section 1172.75 require vacating appellant’s existing
sentence and, under Padilla, means that appellant’s case is not final, and consideration of
changes implemented by Assembly Bill 333 is now proper. (Padilla, at pp. 161–162
[“When Padilla’s sentence was vacated, the trial court regained the jurisdiction and duty

3       In that opinion, our Supreme Court recognized a split of authority regarding the
retroactivity of amendments to section 1109 but did not resolve that split. (Tran, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1208.) That question is currently pending before the Supreme Court in People v.
Burgos, review granted July 13, 2022, S274743. The People’s concession here is limited to the
retroactivity of amendments to section 186.22.

                                               7.
to consider what punishment was appropriate for him, and Padilla regained the right to
appeal whatever new sentence was imposed. His judgment thus became nonfinal, and it
remains nonfinal in its present posture because the Court of Appeal ordered a second
resentencing, from which the Attorney General now appeals.”].)
       Based on its conclusion that the case was final, the trial court did not reach the
merits of appellant’s motion seeking to vacate the gang enhancements attached to his
conviction. On appeal, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction because the newly structured statutory scheme requires proof that the gang
collectively engaged in a pattern of gang activity, that each predicate crime was
committed by a gang member, that the predicate offenses commonly benefited the gang,
and that the alleged benefit was more than reputational, and no evidence was submitted
on those requirements. In response, the People do not contest the evidence submitted
fails to meet one or more of the new requirements, explaining that without “the guidance
of the current state of the law, it is questionable whether the evidence presented at trial
fulfilled [Assembly Bill] 333’s amendments to section 186.22. Specifically, it is unclear
how the specific crimes benefitted the [Varrio Chico Lamont] gang beyond reputation.”
The People argue, however, that they are entitled to retry appellant on the gang
enhancements because they properly proved the gang enhancement under the applicable
law at the time. (See People v. Lopez (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1, 13–14 [confirming
Assem. Bill 333 is ameliorative and retroactive and noting the proper “ ‘remedy for this
type of failure of proof—where newly required elements were “never tried” to the jury—
is to remand and give the people an opportunity to retry the affected charges.’ ”].)
       This court accepts the People’s concession that there is a failure in the existing
record to demonstrate that the predicate offenses benefited the Varrio Chico Lamont gang
in a manner other than reputationally. Upon review of the relevant record in People v.
Lopez, supra, F074412, which this court previously took judicial notice of, there appears
to be no expert testimony shedding light on why the predicate offenses were committed,

                                              8.
only evidence as to the offenses committed and the fact they were committed by Varrio
Chico Lamont gang members. While there was no reason to extract information under
the prior statutory scheme on the benefit to the gang when committing the predicate
offenses, this lack of evidence means the record is now insufficient to satisfy the current
statutory requirements. (See People v. Lopez, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 12 [“As of
January 1, 2022, predicate offenses must be shown to have ‘commonly benefited’ the
alleged gang, and the common benefit must have been ‘more than reputational.’
(§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1).”].) Notably, we also agree with the People, in line with our
affirmation of the conviction in appellant’s prior appeal, that the People properly
obtained a conviction under the law as it stood prior to Assembly Bill 333 becoming
effective. We therefore vacate appellant’s enhancements under former section 186.22
and remand to give the People an opportunity to retry appellant on the affected charges.
(See Lopez, at pp. 13–14.)
                                     DISPOSITION
       All enhancement findings under former section 186.22, subdivision (b) are
reversed but subject to retrial. Appellant’s sentence is ordered vacated and the matter is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                 HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

POOCHIGIAN, J.

SMITH, J.

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