Court Opinion

ID: 9409004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 16:08:51.460759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.170537
License: Public Domain

J-S22039-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRIAN J. BUSH                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 957 WDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 9, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                  Criminal Division at CP-02-CR-0001252-1989

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                               FILED: JULY 14, 2023

       Brian J. Bush (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order denying his

petition for writ of habeas corpus for lack of jurisdiction.1 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 The trial court correctly treated Appellant’s pro se pleading as a petition for
writ of habeas corpus. Appellant challenged his detention by the Department
of Corrections (DOC), asserting that the DOC lacked authority to detain him
based on alleged errors with the DC-300B form and the denial of his right to
seek parole. Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10/28/21, at 4-5. Because Appellant did
not assert his innocence or claim his sentence was illegal, his claims are not
cognizable under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9543; see also Commonwealth v. Hockenberry, 689 A.2d 283, 288 (Pa.
Super. 1997) (holding issues “relating to the legality of sentence cannot be
waived and are cognizable under the PCRA.”) (citation omitted).

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court “has never held that habeas corpus
cannot provide a separate remedy, in appropriate circumstances. Indeed, the
boundaries of cognizable claims under the PCRA can only be extended so far
as is consistent with the purposes of the statute[.]” Commonwealth v.
Judge, 916 A.2d 511, 520 (Pa. 2007); see also Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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       The trial court recounted the procedural history as follows:

       On November 24, 1992, now retired Judge Donna Jo McDaniel
       sentenced [Appellant] … to an aggregate term of imprisonment of
       not less than 20 nor more than 80 years relative to [Appellant’s]
       convictions for robbery, kidnapping, rape and involuntary deviate
       sexual intercourse. Judge McDaniel ordered that the Pennsylvania
       sentence run concurrent to an eight-year prison term [Appellant]
       was serving in the state of California. After imposition of the
       Pennsylvania sentence, [Appellant] was extradited to California to
       serve the California sentence. While serving time in California,
       [Appellant] was charged with and convicted of additional crimes
       in Nevada and he was sentenced to serve a prison term of 30
       years there. That sentence was ordered to run consecutive to the
       California sentence but concurrent to the Pennsylvania sentence.
       On November 19, 1994, [Appellant] was paroled from the
       California sentence. He was then transferred to Nevada to serve
       the Nevada sentence.       On May 19, 1995, [Appellant] was
       extradited to Louisiana where he was convicted of additional
       crimes and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. That
       sentenced was later vacated.

             On April 25, 2015, Judge McDaniel issued a warrant for
       [Appellant] and directed that he be extradited to Pennsylvania to
       serve the Pennsylvania sentence.          Upon consideration of
       [Appellant’s] motion to clarify his sentence, on August 30, 2018,
       Judge McDaniel issued an order directing that “[Appellant] is to
       receive credit for these cases as of the date of parole from the
       California imposed sentence.”

             [Appellant] was released from the Louisiana sentence on
       March 18, 2019. He was arrested on September 22, 2019[,] and
       extradited to Pennsylvania to serve the balance of the
       Pennsylvania sentence. He filed his pro se “Writ of Habeas
       Corpus” on October 28, 2021.        Counsel was appointed to
       represent [Appellant] and a counseled brief was filed. The
       Commonwealth also filed a brief. After original appointed counsel
       was removed from the case, newly appointed counsel filed a
____________________________________________

365, 368 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding claim that defendant’s confinement is
illegal “due to the inability of the DOC to ‘produce a written sentencing order
related to [his] judgment of sentence’ constitutes a claim legitimately
sounding in habeas corpus”) (citations omitted).

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J-S22039-23

       motion to withdraw his appearance indicating a difference of
       opinion with [Appellant] over the proper forum in which to raise
       the instant claims.[2] [The trial c]ourt granted the motion to
       withdraw appearance and it denied [Appellant’s petition].

Trial Court Opinion, 11/30/22, at 1-3 (footnote added).

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Although the trial court did not

order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 concise statement, the trial court filed

an opinion on November 30, 2022.

       Appellant presents the following issues for review:

       1) Did the [trial] court err in denying [A]ppellant’s Writ of Habeas
          Corpus on the ground that he filed in the “wrong forum”?

       2) Did the actions of the sentencing court in not filing the DC-
          300B commitment papers for 27 years, even after being
          officially notified by [A]ppellant of this error, create [sic] a due
          process violation and warrant further court inquiry under
          Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)]?

       3) Did the sentencing court[’]s deliberate actions in not filing the
          DC-300B in combination with the PA state authorities[’] failure
          to seek extradition of [A]ppellant, leading to his releases from
          custody after 30 years[’] of confinement, amount to PA waiving
          the right to require [A]ppellant to serve out the remainder of
          the PA sentence under the theory of w[ai]ver or estoppel?

       4) [Did] the now know[i]ngly forged DC-300B commitment
          papers and other possibly forged and missing documents from
          the record render [A]ppellant’s incarceration illegal?

       5) Did denying [A]ppellant the opportunity to seek parole after his
          minimum date in 2014 for a year[] period, in combination with
          his release from custody in this matter[,] create prejudice and
          require his release under Barker?
____________________________________________

2 There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel for post-conviction
proceedings. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 580 (Pa. 2013); see
also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).

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J-S22039-23

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      We consider Appellant’s issues mindful that:

      Our standard of review of a trial court’s order denying a petition
      for writ of habeas corpus is limited to abuse of discretion. Thus,
      we may reverse the court’s order where the court has misapplied
      the law or exercised its discretion in a manner lacking reason. As
      in all matters on appeal, the appellant bears the burden of
      persuasion to demonstrate his entitlement to the relief he
      requests.

      ….

             Accordingly, the writ may be used only to extricate a
      petitioner from illegal confinement or to secure relief from
      conditions of confinement that constitute cruel and unusual
      punishment.

Rivera v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 837 A.2d 525, 528 (Pa. Super.

2003).

      In his first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s determination

that it lacked jurisdiction.    Appellant’s Brief at 4.      However, Appellant

abandons this issue in the argument section of his brief. See id. at 5-28. The

issue of jurisdiction is critical to our disposition. The trial court explained:

      Due to Judge McDaniel’s order clarifying that [Appellant’s]
      sentence was to begin upon [Appellant’s] being paroled from the
      California sentence, there is no dispute that the Pennsylvania
      sentence started when [Appellant] was paroled in California on
      November 18, 1994. Accordingly, [Appellant’s] sentence was to
      run from November 19, 2014[,] through November 19, 2094. In
      [the trial court’s] view, Judge McDaniel’s order controls any
      interpretation of [Appellant’s] sentence and there is nothing [the
      trial court] can do to further enforce that [o]rder because
      [Appellant] is currently serving the Pennsylvania sentence. Any
      decision to release and/or parole [Appellant] prior to the
      maximum sentence date rests with the Pennsylvania Board of

                                       -4-
J-S22039-23

     Probation and Parole [PBPP] because “the actual sentence of a
     prisoner subject to total confinement is his maximum sentence,
     and his minimum sentence merely sets the time after which he is
     eligible to serve the remainder of his sentence on parole.”
     Hudson v. [PBPP], 204 A.3d 392, 396 (Pa. 2019). As set forth
     in Hudson:

           Release on parole is “a matter of grace and mercy
           shown to a prisoner who has demonstrated to the
           Parole Board’s satisfaction his future ability to function
           as a law-abiding member of society upon release
           before the expiration of the prisoner’s maximum
           sentence.” Rogers v. PBPP, [] 724 A.2d 319, 322-
           23 ([Pa.] 1999).      Parole is not a right, but “a
           penological measure for the disciplinary treatment of
           prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside
           of prison walls.” Commonwealth v. Brittingham.
           275 A.2d 83, 85 ([Pa.] 1971).

     Id.

            As noted in Brittingham, parole is neither a right of the
     prisoner nor a prerogative of the court and the granting,
     reinstatement and revocation of parole is within the exclusive
     jurisdiction of the [PBPP]. [Brittingham,] 275 A.2d at 85; see
     also Commonwealth v. Button, 481 A.2d 342 (Pa. Super.
     1984) [(]citing Commonwealth v. Gooslin, 421 A.2d 775 ([Pa.]
     1980)[)]. All challenges concerning the grant of parole shall be
     directed to the [PBPP] and the Commonwealth Court is vested with
     original jurisdiction over “all civil actions or proceedings…
     [a]gainst the Commonwealth government.”         42 Pa. C.S. §
     761(a)(1). Accordingly, [Appellant’s] request for release should
     be, in the first instance, directed at the PBPP and then in the
     Commonwealth Court. Because [Appellant] is currently serving
     the Pennsylvania sentence, any decisions regarding his release
     are vested exclusively in the [PBPP].

Trial Court Opinion, 11/30/22, at 3-4 (some citations modified).

     The trial court’s analysis is supported by the record and pertinent legal

authority. See Commonwealth, Department of Corrections v. Reese,

774 A.2d 1255, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2001) (appeals from order issued by the

                                     -5-
J-S22039-23

PBPP are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court);

Commonwealth v. Miller, 770 A.2d 362, 363 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“When an

offender is sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of less than two

years, the common pleas court retains authority to grant and revoke parole;

when the maximum term is two years or more, authority to grant parole is

vested in the PBPP.”); Commonwealth v. Fells, 518 A.2d 544 (Pa. 1986)

(courts of common pleas lack jurisdiction over direct appeals from decisions

of the PBPP).

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding it lacked

jurisdiction.   Rivera v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 837 A.2d at 528.

Accordingly, we decline to address Appellant’s remaining issues and affirm the

denial of relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/14/2023

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