Court Opinion

ID: 9456799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:02:41.499296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:06.376036
License: Public Domain

HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
Although I agree with the majority opinion that Locks’ failure to exhaust his available remedies within the military justice system deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear his claim (Younger v. Harris (1971) 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669; Samuels v. Mackell (1971) 401 U.S. 66, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688), I am unable to concur in the majority’s disposition of the appeals of Bright, Williams, and O’Connell.
Bright, Williams, and O’Connell have no remedies to exhaust within the military justice system. None of them has violated the challenged regulation and none has been subjected to court martial. The military courts have not been given authority to grant declaratory relief or to issue injunctions, except as that authority may be incidental to the Court of Military Appeals’ jurisdiction over pending court martials. (See Gale v. United States, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 40, 37 C.M.R. 304; United States v. Bevilacqua, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. 10.)
The majority opinion recognizes that Bright, Williams, and O’Connell do not stand in Locks' shoes, but the opinion nevertheless forces the trio in Locks’ stance on the theory that a disposition of their case by the court will have an impact on Locks’ pending court martial.
I am unaware of any principle of law to support the theory that a federal court should or can decline to exercise jurisdiction, otherwise appropriately invoked, because a judgment for or against the federal plaintiff, as a matter of stare decisis, may affect the disposition of a third person’s case, wherever that case may be pending.
There is nothing in the record before us suggesting that there is any privity between or among the appellants. Joinder of two or more plaintiffs in the prosecution of their several claims against the same defendant challenging the constitutionality of the same regulation does not make the plaintiffs members of a single class. Locks would not be bound by any aspect of res judicata by any *482judgment rendered for or against his coappellants. The fact that the appellee Laird would be bound by any judgment rendered against him in the Bright, Williams, and O’Connell cases has no collateral estoppel effect on Locks’ case, unless we are prepared to say that mutuality of estoppel is now abandoned in military courts, a proposition none of the parties has urged and for which no authority has been discovered.
A holding by the Supreme Court dismissing the indictment of a criminal appellant on the ground that the federal statute under which he was prosecuted is unconstitutional not only frees that appellant, but also has the effect of freeing every other defendant whose prosecution under the same statute is pending. But it would be entirely incorrect to describe the Court’s mandate in the first case as an injunction issued to restrain prosecution of the other cases. That same situation exists in the case at bench; therefore, Younger v. Harris (1971) 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 is irrelevant.
We are thus presented with the question whether or not declaratory and injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent threatened violation of the appellants’ First Amendment rights when their sole alternative is to violate the regulation and risk criminal prosecution. I think that it is. (E. g., Oney v. Oklahoma City (10th Cir. 1941) 120 F.2d 861.)
I turn to the merits. The regulation challenged by appellants provides as follows :
“Recent developments have established a need for clarification of the circumstances in which Air Force members are not permitted to wear their uniform. Accordingly, pursuant to para 1-10d, AMF 35-10, 26 June 1968, the Secretary of the Air Force has specified that Air Force members will not wear the uniform at any public meeting, demonstration, or interview if they have reason to know that a purpose of the meeting, demonstration, or interview is the advocacy, expression, or approval of opposition to the employment or use of the Armed Forces of the United States.”
The regulation does not prohibit wearing the uniform to any public meetings at which the employment of the Armed Forces is a discussion topic. It does not prohibit wearing uniforms to all public meetings. It prohibits wearing uniforms only to those meetings in which there may be criticism of the use to which the Armed Forces are put. Thus the uniform can be worn to a meeting held in praise of the use of our Armed Forces in Vietnam. But a member of the Air Force who wears the uniform to a meeting in which the topic may be criticism of the use of our Armed Forces in Vietnam is subject to court martial. The regulation is patently unconstitutional.
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” (West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1187, 87 L.Ed. 1628.)
In Schacht v. United States (1970) 398 U.S. 58, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 26 L.Ed.2d 44 the Court unanimously struck down a similar law that prohibited the wearing of the uniform of the Armed Forces in a theatrical production in which the portrayal tended “to discredit that armed force.” (10 U.S.C. § 772(f).) “The final clause of § 772(f), which leaves Americans free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it, cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment.” (398 U.S. at 63, 90 S.Ct. at 1559, 26 L.Ed.2d at 48.) The rationale of Schacht controls this case.
I would affirm the judgment as to Locks and reverse as to Bright, Williams, and O’Connell with directions to issue the relief prayed for.