Court Opinion

ID: 9410578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 21:01:00.979579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.657401
License: Public Domain

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                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-11791
                         ____________________

        LHOIST NORTH AMERICA OF ALABAMA, LLC,
                                          Petitioner-Cross Respondent,
        versus
        NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

                                          Respondent-Cross Petitioner,

        UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER,
        MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL &
        SERVICE WORKERS LOCAL UNION 563 (“THE UNION”),

                                                           Intervenor.
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                     21-11791

                               ____________________

                       Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                           National Labor Relations Board
                              Agency No. 10-CA-221731
                              ____________________

        Before JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,*
        District Judge.
        SCHLESINGER, District Judge:
                This review involves a long-term, reliable employee—until
        the employee’s union activities caught the ire of the company. The
        company targeted the employee until an excuse could be found to
        discipline and ultimately terminate his employment. This oppor-
        tunity arrived the day the employee participated in a union phone
        call on company time.
               Desilynn “Floyd” Avery, while on break, participated by
        phone call, as the acting union president, in another employee’s
        termination hearing. Although the call lasted at least 25 minutes
        longer than Avery’s break, he did not clock out for the extra time,
        or later report he had overstayed his break. Avery’s employment
        was terminated. The question is whether the firing was

        * The Honorable Harvey Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Mid-
        dle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        21-11791               Opinion of the Court                        3

        appropriate. Following oral argument and a review of the record,
        we affirm the conclusion it was not.
                                          I
                                         A
               Lhoist North America of Alabama, LLC (“the Company”)
        operates two quarries and three lime manufacturing plants in Ala-
        bama that employ over 200 employees. At its Montevallo plant, in
        Calera, Alabama, it receives raw materials to produce lime and
        lime products and employs around 50 hourly employees, including
        Avery.
               Since 1987, United Steel, Paper, and Forestry, Rubber, Man-
        ufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers Interna-
        tional Union, Local 563 (“the Union”) has represented a bargaining
        unit of production and maintenance employees at the Company’s
        plants. In the fall of 2016, the parties began negotiations for a new
        collective-bargaining agreement to succeed the one due to expire
        in December. Senior Human Resources Manager Emily Berkes
        characterized the negotiations as “contentious” because the Com-
        pany proposed changes to the agreement.
              Following an impasse in bargaining, in October 2017, the
        Company unilaterally implemented new terms and conditions of
        employment. In 2017 and early 2018, the Union filed many charges
        with the National Labor Relations Board (“the Board”), some of
        which involved the unilateral implementation.
                                         B
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11791

              Avery joined the Company in 1991. He was its sole slurry
        operator at the Montevallo plant; a job that entailed mixing hy-
        drated lime and water, sampling it, and loading the finished prod-
        uct onto a truck. Slurry is usually mixed once or twice each week
        and the process takes around 4-6 hours.
                Avery typically worked Monday through Friday on the day
        shift, from 6:00 a.m. until 2:30 p.m. Like other employees in the
        plant, he clocked in when arriving at work and clocked out if leav-
        ing the facility. His lunch was a non-paid 30-minute break automat-
        ically deducted from his pay. For a regular 8-hour shift, employees
        received a 15-minute paid break. Like other employees, and under
        the employee handbook, Avery did not clock out for lunch or any
        break unless he left the plant. His usual 15-minute morning break
        began around 9:00 a.m. and lasted until 9:15 a.m. The supervisors,
        whose offices are next to the break room, would normally take
        their breaks alongside the employees.
               Besides his slurry operator obligations, Avery performed
        other duties outside of his job’s requirements. Production Manager
        Grant McCallum characterized Avery as someone who “would
        typically help out . . . in other areas of the plant.” Avery’s help in-
        cluded regularly filling and driving a water truck used to spray the
        plant down to limit dust; a task not part of his job description.
        Avery also sometimes loaded bags with product and helped stack
        them in the bagging shed.
              During the relevant time, Stacey Barry was the Company’s
        Senior Human Resources Director while Emily Berkes was the
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        21-11791               Opinion of the Court                        5

        Senior Human Resources Manager. Terry Beam was Avery’s direct
        supervisor and he reported to Production Manager Grant
        McCallum. Barry characterized Avery as an employee who “al-
        ways worked” and was unaware of any complaints about his work
        performance. McCallum was unaware of any complaints about
        Avery’s work the day of his discharge.
                                         C
               Avery was a member of the Union for his entire employ-
        ment, serving as Union Steward and then as vice-president since
        2010. Avery was the acting president for part of 2018. In his role as
        vice-president, Avery attended all arbitrations. He also participated
        in the most recent, and prior, collective-bargaining negotiations.
        Avery was a vocal opponent of the implemented terms, according
        to Berkes. McCallum also considered Avery a strong employee ad-
        vocate who often challenged management.
               During work time, Avery, and Union president Jon Wilson
        received phone calls from Barry and Berkes to discuss union mat-
        ters. Wilson and Avery were not given notice and did not notify
        their supervisor about the calls or have their time docked. The
        Company also called Avery and Wilson to represent employees in
        meetings on the “spur of the moment” without prior notification
        and without providing notice to their supervisors. Before his dis-
        charge, Avery was never disciplined for taking a cell phone call at
        work.
                                         D
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  21-11791

               On January 5, 2017, Avery received his first discipline; a final
        written warning for a no call, no show on January 3. The warning
        suggested a second no call, no show “may result in termination.”
        The incident stemmed from Avery’s confusion about his work
        schedule following a vacation. The Company issued the final warn-
        ing despite the highest ranking official at the plant, Plant Manager
        Craig Gordinier, recommending the Company withhold Avery’s
        pay for the New Year’s holiday and charge him with one occur-
        rence. Under the Company’s attendance policy, a single occurrence
        does not result in any discipline.
              The Company’s attendance policy and its employee hand-
        book address disciplinary action for a no call, no show differently.
        The attendance policy states:
               Not reporting to work or not calling to report the ab-
               sence properly is considered No Call/No Show. The
               first instance of a no call/no show will result in a Final
               Written Warning. The second offense may result in
               termination of employment without additional inter-
               ventions. Consistent with the Labor Agreement, Sec-
               tion 12.11(i), an employee who is absent from work
               without notification to the Company for 2 consecu-
               tive work days without excuse satisfactory to the
               Company will lose their Seniority Rights.
        While the handbook provides, “[t]he first instance of a ‘no call/no
        show’ will typically result in a written/formal reminder. The sec-
        ond separate offense may result in progressive disciplinary action
        leading up to and including termination of employment.”
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        21-11791              Opinion of the Court                        7

               The Company also has General Conduct and Safety Rules
        every employee must follow. These rules established a “Policy for
        Disciplinary Action” that provided, “[t]he records for disciplinary
        actions on an employee will be good for a period of one year. If the
        employee then passes a period of one year without further discipli-
        nary problems, the record will be reduced so that the employee’s
        next offense would be a written warning.”
                                         E
               More than a year later, Avery once again found the ire of the
        Company, but this time for his union activity. On January 22, 2018,
        Avery attended an offsite arbitration hearing in his capacity as un-
        ion vice-president and acting president. Barry and Berkes were pre-
        sent at the arbitration, as the Company’s representatives, and nei-
        ther commented on Avery’s presence. Nor did Beam contact Avery
        about his absence from the plant.
              Avery did not notify Beam, his supervisor, that he was at-
        tending the arbitration and had never done so before. From his ex-
        perience, the Company representatives advised Avery’s supervisor
        he would attend the arbitration.
               The next day, January 23, Avery’s supervisor directed him
        to see Grant McCallum, the production manager. McCallum ques-
        tioned Avery about his absence from work the previous day. At
        McCallum’s request, Avery provided a handwritten statement ex-
        plaining why he did not provide advance notice for the arbitration.
               In this statement, Avery explained, “I was under the assump-
        tion that by me being the acting president of the Union that the
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        8                        Opinion of the Court                    21-11791

        company would inform my supervisor and let him or her know
        that I would be excused from work. At least that’s how it’s been
        done in the past.”
                On January 26, Avery was called to another meeting about
        the arbitration, but this time Avery was joined by Barry, Berkes,
        McCallum, and a union steward. Barry explained the “higher-ups”
        wanted Avery discharged, but he did not. So McCallum presented
        Avery with a last chance agreement. Avery objected, asserting he
        had never provided notice to a supervisor before attending an arbi-
        tration. But Barry read Section 16.3 of the unilaterally implemented
        collective-bargaining agreement, which required union officials to
        give the Company a week’s advance notice if they needed unpaid
        union leave to attend “third step grievance meetings, arbitration
        hearings, and labor negotiations” and “union conventions or meet-
        ings.”1
               Based on Barry’s warning, a failure to sign the last-chance
        agreement would be considered a voluntarily resignation, so Avery
        signed. The agreement included a one-day suspension and required
        Avery to notify his supervisor of an absence at least one hour be-
        fore the scheduled start time. It also stated that Section 16.3 of the
        implemented terms and conditions of employment required Avery
        “to provide the Company in writing a one (1) weeks’ notice in

        1
         Unlike under the expired collective-bargaining agreement, the Company had
        required advance notice only for union conventions or meetings, and it would
        notify employees’ direct supervisors of planned attendance at meetings be-
        tween the Company and the Union.
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        21-11791               Opinion of the Court                        9

        advance of the need for leave for union officials or other employees
        attending union conventions or meetings, including third step
        grievance meetings, arbitrations hearings and labor negotiations.”
               The agreement noted, “If you are required to be off on un-
        ion business leave, as a union official you will agree to provide the
        Company one (1) weeks’ notice in advance of your need for union
        leave in accordance with Article 16, section 16.3.” By its terms, the
        agreement remained in effect for the next 12 months and provided
        that another “no show” or any violation of the Company’s policies,
        rules, or regulations would result in termination. In response, the
        Union filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the Board regard-
        ing the last-chance agreement.
                                         F
                The matter reached a turning point less than six months
        later, on June 1, 2018. That morning Avery began his break at about
        9:12 a.m. in the break room. At 9:21 a.m., while still on break,
        Avery received a call from a hearing officer with the Alabama Un-
        employment Office. To hear better, Avery stepped outside the
        break room. The unemployment hearing officer stated that he was
        calling Avery about a case involving a discharged coworker, Willie
        May, and asked whether Avery was “potentially going to be serv-
        ing as a representative.” Avery replied, “Yes.” Avery also had a
        pending grievance regarding May’s discharge, with a meeting
        scheduled for June 7.
               After contacting Avery, the hearing officer brought the
        other parties onto the call and officially started the unemployment
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                21-11791

        hearing. He introduced the parties on the call as claimant May, his
        representative Union vice-president Avery, company representa-
        tive Kellen Anderson, and company witness Barry. All the other
        participants, except Avery, called into the hearing.
               Avery agreed to participate in the call, which he did not con-
        sider a personal call, because he believed he needed to cooperate
        with a governmental agency. He had not expected the call and re-
        ceived no earlier written notification from the unemployment of-
        fice. Nor had Avery discussed with May being a witness or repre-
        sentative.
               Avery’s portion of the call lasted 31 minutes. During the call
        Avery walked to the water truck and stood outside it. The plant
        was already watered down, and the grounds were wet. During the
        call, no slurry was running, and Avery had no trucks to load.
        Avery’s participation was limited to asking one question to Barry
        and making a statement on May’s behalf. After the call, at 9:52 a.m.,
        Avery retrieved diesel fuel from the maintenance shop, topped off
        the slurry machine, and resumed his work activities with the water
        truck.
               Barry said nothing to Avery during the hearing and raised
        no concerns or objections to Avery’s presence on the call. Avery
        did not report the time to anyone because he thought the call was
        work-related, particularly with Barry on the line, and because the
        Company knew he was on the call. Neither Joey Hemphill, acting
        as Avery’s supervisor that day, nor any other supervisor said any-
        thing to Avery while he was on the call. Nor did anyone ask him
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        21-11791              Opinion of the Court                       11

        where he was after the call ended or object to management about
        Avery’s work that day.
               After the unemployment hearing call concluded, Barry noti-
        fied Berkes that Avery was on the unemployment hearing call and
        asked her to investigate whether he was present at work that day.
        Human Resources directed McCallum, the plant manager, to speak
        with Avery about the call and determine whether Avery alerted
        anyone about it.
              Four days later, on June 5, McCallum questioned Avery
        whether he let anyone know of his participation in the unemploy-
        ment hearing. Avery showed his phone log to McCallum and ex-
        plained the call was unexpected and came in during his break.
              On June 6, in a follow up conversation, McCallum asked
        Avery to provide a written statement. The statement, submitted
        on June 7, at 7:30 a.m., detailed:
                     On Friday June 1, 2018 while on my break I
              received a phone call at 9:21 a.m. from an Agent of
              the Unemployment Office. The call was in regards
              to Willie May filing for unemployment. The Agent
              said that [May] told him to call me. [The Agent] then
              told me that he had [May], Stacey Barry and some-
              one else from the company . . . waiting to be confer-
              enced in for a hearing on the matter of [May’s] un-
              employment. I assumed that I was supposed to par-
              ticipate being that Human Resources was involved
              and that I was called. I’ve never been involved in this
              before.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  21-11791

               Avery told McCallum he was willing to have his pay docked
        for the telephone call. McCallum had the power to change Avery’s
        time but did not do so.
              Around 9:00 a.m. on June 7, McCallum explained the Com-
        pany had “looked over everything” and Avery was being sus-
        pended pending an investigation. Avery told McCallum he thought
        he was supposed to take the call and asked why he was being sus-
        pended. McCallum’s response was Avery performed “[u]nion busi-
        ness on company time.”
               Later that morning, after Avery left the facility, Berkes called
        Avery and asked him to meet with her. At the meeting, with the
        Union president Wilson in attendance, Avery told Berkes he did
        not know about the call from the unemployment office in advance,
        he had received nothing in the mail about the hearing, the hearing
        officer called him, and he was not sure if he was May’s representa-
        tive at the hearing. He added May called him about 3 days before
        the hearing about the status of his pending termination grievance
        and his job search. Avery also provided Berkes with a screenshot of
        the phone call, which confirmed the unemployment office called
        him at 9:21 a.m. and the call lasted 31 minutes.
                Avery asked Berkes what all the questionings were about.
        She suggested Avery had performed “[u]nion business on company
        time” when he participated in the phone call. Avery again ex-
        plained he thought he was supposed to take the call, and suggested
        that if the concerns centered on his time, then his pay should be
        reduced. Berkes rejected Avery’s suggestion, and countered that
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        21-11791              Opinion of the Court                      13

        Avery claimed the same lack of knowledge when confronted about
        the January 2018 arbitration.
                On June 11, Berkes met with Avery and told him the Com-
        pany terminated his employment. Avery was given a termination
        letter, which Berkes drafted. The letter referenced the last-chance
        agreement Avery signed and his awareness of the Company’s poli-
        cies in its handbook. The letter also specified:
                     Based on our investigation, it appears that
              you failed to properly notify your leadership of your
              intentions of participating in an unemployment
              hearing call on June 1, 2018 while still on work time.
              You admitted that you never made an effort prior to
              or immediately after the call to notify your supervi-
              sor that you were on this call when you were sup-
              posed to be working.
                                       ***
                     You claimed that you were not sure if you
              were called as a witness or a representative. How-
              ever, our Investigation indicates that you were not
              sworn in as a witness, did not act as a witness, and
              instead acted as a representative for Willie May dur-
              ing the hearing.
                                       ***
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        14                    Opinion of the Court                 21-11791

                    You clearly had no intentions of ever notify-
              ing management about falsely reporting your time
              while getting paid for this time off the job.
               The termination letter mentioned Avery acting as May’s
        representative rather than a witness because, according to Berkes,
        as a representative “he should have requested time off as union
        business[,]” and he should have asked the hearing officer to wait
        until he obtained supervisory approval to continue on the call.
             On November 20, 2018, the Company issued a memoran-
        dum entitled “Important Cellphone and Returning from Break
        Timely Memo.” It stated:

                     In support of some recent labor charges, the
              Union has alleged that the Company does not uni-
              formly enforce its guidelines and policies prohibiting
              the use of cellphones during working time and re-
              quiring employees to return to work from breaks in
              a timely manner. The Company wants to make sure
              everyone fully understands expectations related to
              cellphone use at the plants and the need to follow
              break policies. In addition, the Company wants to
              make sure these guidelines and policies are enforced
              in a consistent manner.

              The memo provided guidelines explaining cell phones
        should be used only during scheduled work breaks in certain areas
        and that employees would face disciplinary action for failing to
        timely return to work after breaks.
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        21-11791                Opinion of the Court                         15

             Employees, including Wilson, continued to use their cell
        phones for personal use without receiving discipline.
                                           II
               The Union filed with the Board unfair labor practice charges
        against the Company because it suspended and ultimately termi-
        nated Avery for engaging in protected activity, union activity, or
        both. After an investigation, the Board’s General Counsel issued a
        consolidated complaint alleging the Company violated Section
        8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) and (1), by suspend-
        ing and discharging Avery for engaging in union activity when he
        participated in an unemployment hearing on behalf of a discharged
        former coworker.
               An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) heard evidence on
        these charges and issued a decision finding the Company’s actions
        were unlawful under both grounds alleged. The ALJ determined
        Avery’s participation in the unemployment hearing was protected
        concerted activity and there was direct evidence Avery’s employ-
        ment was terminated because of his union activity. The ALJ also
        found circumstantial evidence of “unlawful animus” in the Com-
        pany’s investigation and shifting explanations for its adverse ac-
        tions.
                In reaching her decision, the ALJ explained, besides basing
        her credibility rulings on the observation of witness demeanor, she
        relied “on a variety of factors, including, but not limited to, the con-
        text of the witness testimony, the weight of the respective evi-
        dence, established or admitted facts, inherent probabilities, and
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                21-11791

        reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record as a
        whole.” The ALJ gave specific reasons for discrediting certain testi-
        mony, including the Company’s repeated use of leading questions
        and its reliance on hearsay and contradictory statements and incon-
        sistencies between witness testimony and the Company’s own doc-
        uments.
                For example, in discrediting Barry, the ALJ found his testi-
        mony misleading, contrary to documentary evidence, and “exter-
        nally inconsistent” with Berkes’ admissions that she included cer-
        tain statements in the discharge letter based on Avery’s union ac-
        tivity. Similarly, in discrediting McCallum, the ALJ found his “tes-
        timony was frequently generalized and incorrect.” But in crediting
        Avery’s testimony that McCallum told him he was suspended for
        conducting union business, while discrediting McCallum’s denial,
        the ALJ noted the latter’s “weak” denial was “externally incon-
        sistent with Berkes’ admissions regarding the termination letter.”
        Given Berkes’ admissions about the termination letter, the ALJ
        found it “difficult to believe Berkes’ testimony that the group meet-
        ing [to discuss Avery’s status] did not consider Avery’s role at the
        unemployment hearing.”
                On review, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s rulings, findings,
        and conclusions, and adopted the recommended Order with mod-
        ifications. The Board agreed with the ALJ that the Company vio-
        lated Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by suspending and discharg-
        ing Avery for engaging in union activity. But the Board passed on
        the ALJ’s recommended finding of a Section 8(a)(1) violation for
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        21-11791              Opinion of the Court                      17

        the Company “suspending and discharging Avery for engaging in
        protected concerted activity and based upon an overbroad applica-
        tion of Sec. 16.3 of the collective-bargaining agreement.”
               The Board agreed with the ALJ “that Sec. 16.3 was inappli-
        cable to Avery’s cell phone participation in the hearing while at
        work, and that the Respondent’s reliance on that provision and on
        an alleged cell phone policy that did not exist at the time of the
        events at issue was pretextual.” The Board explicitly found:
              General Counsel met his initial burden of proving
              that the suspension and discharge were motivated by
              animus against Avery’s union activity, we first note
              that Avery, the Charging Party Union’s vice presi-
              dent, was engaged in union activity when he partici-
              pated in the hearing, and that the Respondent knew
              as much because its director of human resources was
              also on the call. As further evidence of knowledge and
              direct evidence of animus, we rely on the statements
              by two of the Respondent’s officials, Senior Human
              Resources Manager Emily Berkes and Production
              Manager Grant McCallum, that Avery was suspended
              and discharged for engaging in “union business.” As
              the [ALJ] correctly stated, “[t]hese statements alone
              are ‘independently sufficient to demonstrate unlaw-
              ful discrimination,’” quoting from Tito Contractors,
              Inc., 366 NLRB No. 47, slip op. at 5 (2018), enfd. 774
              Fed. Appx. 4 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Although the [ALJ]
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                21-11791

              discussed several additional circumstantial evidence
              factors as further supporting an inference of unlawful
              antiunion motivation, we rely only on evidence of the
              Respondent’s pretextual defenses and its disparate
              treatment of Avery, who was suspended and dis-
              charged for using his cell phone for doing “union
              business” on company time, whereas the Respondent
              generally permitted other employees to use their cell
              phones for personal calls on working time.
                The Board rejected the Company’s claimed defense that it
        would have discharged Avery because he did not explain to his su-
        pervisor the call and have his time corrected. Instead, the Board
        concluded the Company “generally permitted employees to take
        personal calls on working time, and it did not show that it has re-
        quired other employees to notify their supervisor or correct their
        time record after doing so.” As support for this finding, the Board
        accepted that the Company discharged “one temporary employee
        for multiple instances of using a cell phone on working time, but it
        introduced no evidence that it has ever discharged anyone for a
        single instance—except Avery, who was suspended and discharged
        expressly for using a cell phone to do ‘union business.’”
                The Board’s Order required the Company to cease and de-
        sist from the unfair labor practices, and in any like or related man-
        ner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
        ercise of their statutory rights.
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        21-11791               Opinion of the Court                       19

               Affirmatively, the Order directed the Company to offer
        Avery reinstatement and make him whole for any loss of earnings
        because of his unlawful discharge, including by reimbursing his
        search-for-work and interim employment expenses. The Order
        also required the Company to post a remedial notice.
                                         III
                We affirm the Board’s Order when “its findings with respect
        to questions of fact are supported by substantial evidence on the
        record considered as a whole.” NLRB. v. Gimrock Const., Inc., 247
        F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)). But
        “[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence,”
        instead it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
        accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” NLRB v. Allied Med.
        Transp., Inc., 805 F.3d 1000, 1005 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting NLRB v.
        Contemp. Cars, Inc., 667 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 2012)). See also
        Northport Health Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 961 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir.
        1992) (stating that we will not simply “rubber stamp” the Board’s
        Order). When reviewing a conclusion by the Board that a “discrim-
        inatory motive” existed, we “are even more deferential” since
        “most evidence of motive is circumstantial.” NLRB v. Goya Foods of
        Fla., 525 F.3d 1117, 1126 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Vincent Indus.
        Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
               As for an ALJ’s credibility determinations, “[a]s a general
        rule courts are bound by the credibility choices of the ALJ, even if
        they ‘might have made different findings had the matter been be-
        fore [them] . . . de novo.’” Goya Foods of Fla., 525 F.3d at 1126
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                  21-11791

        (quoting Ona Corp. v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 713, 719 (11th Cir.1984)). But
        a credibility finding “will not bind the Court when they are inher-
        ently unreasonable or self-contradictory or when they are based on
        an inadequate reason, or no reason at all.” Id. (internal citations and
        quotations omitted).
                                          IV
                In its petition for review, the Company raises four chal-
        lenges to the Board’s Order. First, the Company contends the
        Board’s Order is flawed because the ALJ misunderstood or misap-
        plied the law, the testimony, and the evidence. Second, the Com-
        pany argues the Board misapplied the Wright Line analysis. Wright
        Line, a Division of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083, 1088-89 (1980),
        enforced on other grounds, 662 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
        455 U.S. 989 (1982). Third, the Company alleges the Board misap-
        plied the second stage of the Wright Line analysis because it simply
        concluded, with no analysis, the Company did not reasonably be-
        lieve Avery engaged in misconduct and its decision was not based
        on Company policy and practice. And fourth, the Company claims
        the Board failed to analyze whether its finding of pretext supported
        a finding of unlawful discrimination.
                The Company’s contentions can be summed up this way—
        the Board misunderstood the facts and misapplied the law. After a
        careful review of the record, however, we conclude the Board’s
        finding that Avery’s discharge was motivated by anti-union animus
        is well supported by substantial evidence in the record.
                                          A
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        21-11791                Opinion of the Court                           21

               The National Labor Relations Act prohibits terminating or
        otherwise disciplining an employee because of union activity. 29
        U.S.C. §§157, 158(a)(l). But “employers retain the right to discharge
        workers for any number of other reasons unrelated to the em-
        ployee’s union activities.” NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S.
        393, 394 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Dir., Off. of Workers’
        Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 276-77 (1994).
              This case centers on whether the Company had a lawful mo-
        tive when it discharged Avery for his participation in the unem-
        ployment hearing. The Company insists it did. It had every right to
        discharge Avery, the Company suggests, because he significantly
        exceeded his break time, did not inform his supervisor, and did not
        correct his time record.
                In mixed-motive situations for both protected concerted ac-
        tivity cases under Section 8(a)(1) and those arising from possible
        antiunion animus under Section 8(a)(3), the Board applies the
        Wright Line burden shifting test. Wright Line, 251 NLRB at 1089.
        This test allows us to “to determine whether an employer violated
        the Act . . . .” Ridgewood Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd.,
        8 F.4th 1263, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021). The first step requires the Board
        to “show by a preponderance of the evidence that a protected ac-
        tivity was a motivating factor in the employer’s [adverse] decision.”
        Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Northport Health Servs., Inc. v.
        NLRB, 961 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992)). The second step asks
        whether “the employer can show as an affirmative defense that it
        would have discharged the employee for a legitimate reason
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11791

        regardless of the protected activity.” Northport Health Servs., Inc. v.
        N.L.R.B., 961 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting NLRB v.
        United Sanitation Serv., 737 F.2d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1984)). Last, “the
        Board ‘may then offer evidence that the employer’s proffered ‘le-
        gitimate’ explanation is pretextual.’” Ridgewood Health, 8 F.4th at
        1279 (quoting Northport Health Servs., Inc., 961 F.2d at 1550).
               As for motive, this “is a question of fact, and the Board may
        rely upon direct and circumstantial evidence to infer anti-union
        motive.” Ridgewood Health, 8 F.4th at 1279 (quoting NLRB v.
        McClain of Ga., Inc., 138 F.3d 1418, 1424 (11th Cir. 1998)). Courts
        recognize the unique nature of direct evidence of unlawful motiva-
        tion and have treated it as “especially persuasive.” See Turnbull Cone
        Baking Co. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining
        “where an employer’s representatives have announced an intent to
        discharge or otherwise retaliate against an employee for engaging
        in protected activity, the Board has before it especially persuasive
        evidence that a subsequent discharge of the employee is unlawfully
        motivated.”). Our sister court suggests when an employer admits
        an employee’s union activity played a part in its decision, the ad-
        mission serves to “eliminate[] any question” about its reason for
        the adverse action or “other causes suggested as the basis for the
        discharge.” L’Eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir.
        1980) (quoting NLRB v. Ferguson, 257 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1958)).
               The Board’s finding that Avery’s discharge was motivated
        by anti-union animus is a question of fact. We find substantial evi-
        dence supports the Board’s conclusion that the Company violated
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        21-11791                   Opinion of the Court                                 23

        the Act when it suspended and then discharged Avery for engaging
        in union activity. 2
               The Board properly relied on the “direct evidence of ani-
        mus” consisting of statements by Berkes and McCallum—the
        Company’s representatives—that Avery was disciplined for engag-
        ing in union business. McCallum told Avery he was being sus-
        pended “due to his union activity.” Berkes’ termination letter to
        Avery also included statements reasonably construed to demon-
        strate Avery’s union activity was the reason for his discipline.
        These admissions were sufficient for the Board to reasonably infer
        Avery’s union activities were the essence of his suspension and dis-
        charge. We agree. These admissions from corporate

        2 As an initial matter, the first step of the Wright Line factors requires that the
        terminated employee have engaged in protected concerted activity. Union ac-
        tivities are protected activities. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
        Act prohibits employer “discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
        ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
        membership in any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). “An employer
        violates [that section] by taking adverse employment action or changing the
        terms or conditions of employment in retaliation for the union activities of its
        employees.” Allied Med. Transp., 805 F.3d at 1007. The Company contends that
        the Board erred in concluding that Avery engaged in protected concerted ac-
        tivity by participating in the unemployment compensation hearings during
        work hours. But the Board contends that Avery’s participation in the unem-
        ployment hearing was union activity. We conclude that there is substantial
        evidence on the record to support the Board’s finding that Avery was engaged
        in union activities, even if the unemployment call occurred during work
        hours.
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11791

        representatives are clear indications of the true motivations impli-
        cated in Avery’s discharge. See L’Eggs Prods., Inc., 619 F.2d at 1343.
               Substantial circumstantial evidence also supports the
        Board’s finding that the Company was motivated to discharge
        Avery because of his union activities. Avery’s discipline came de-
        spite other instances when the Company’s representatives con-
        tacted Avery, and the union president, about union business yet
        without objection or having to account for his time. This is the es-
        sence of conducting union business on company time, and without
        advance notice—the suggested motivation for Avery’s discipline.
               Indeed, Avery was also treated more harshly compared to
        other employees who used cell phones on company time; despite
        the Company’s lack of a written policy covering cell phone use at
        work. The sole instance the Company ever disciplined another em-
        ployee for cell phone use stands unlike Avery’s telephonic partici-
        pation in the unemployment hearing. In the other situation, the
        Company sent a temporary employee back to the employment ser-
        vice, but only after what McCallum characterized as “multiple of-
        fenses” during work time for being on his cell phone and not per-
        forming work, including sitting down in the bagging section and
        “surfing the web.” Significantly, the Company gave the temporary
        employee multiple chances to correct his conduct. Yet Avery was
        given no leniency. Avery was suspended and discharged for his first
        offense.
            The Board also reasonably relied on a lack of evidence of the
        Company’s proffered motives for firing Avery. There was no
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        21-11791                Opinion of the Court                         25

        evidence the Company ever terminated an employee for falsifying
        records. To the contrary, the Company threatened other employ-
        ees with discharge for violations, like falsely entering truck weights
        to appear to be within the legal limits, but did not discharge them.
        The Company provided no examples of discharging employees for
        falsification of records in its Alabama facilities—even when one
        employee falsified records a second time.
               We find substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclu-
        sion that anti-union animus was the Company’s underlying motive
        to suspend and discharge Avery for engaging in union activity. See
        Ridgewood Health Care Ctr., Inc., 8 F.4th at 1279.
                The Board also concluded the Company’s justifications for
        its actions were pretextual and need not be accepted. See Justak
        Bros. & Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074, 1077 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting
        NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965)) (sug-
        gesting the company’s “explanation need not be accepted if there
        is a reasonable basis for believing it ‘furnished the excuse rather
        than the reason’ (an employer’s) retaliatory action.”). This conclu-
        sion is amply supported by the record.
               After careful review of the record, we likewise conclude sub-
        stantial evidence, both direct and circumstantial, supports the
        Board’s finding that Avery’s discharge was motivated by unlawful,
        anti-union animus, the Board reasonably rejected the Company’s
        affirmative defenses, and the Company’s attempts to justify its ac-
        tions were pretext. See Northport Health Servs., Inc., 961 F.2d at 1550;
        Ridgewood Health, 8 F.4th at 1279.
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        26                    Opinion of the Court                21-11791

               The Company also faults the ALJ’s creditably findings. We
        disagree. The ALJ carefully explained her credibility rulings were
        based on: the observation of witness demeanor; the context of the
        witness testimony; conflicts in the testimony; the weight of the ev-
        idence; and reasonable inferences drawn from the record. The
        ALJ’s and the Board’s credibility determinations were not “‘inher-
        ently unreasonable,’ ‘self-contradictory,’ or ‘based on an inade-
        quate reason,’” so we are bound by their credibility choices. Allied
        Med. Transp., 805 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Goya Foods of Fla., 525 F.3d
        at 1126).
               We now pivot to the Company’s insistence that the Board
        misunderstood the Wright Line test. These arguments are mis-
        placed. The Board applied the proper legal standards, and its deci-
        sion is supported by substantial evidence—direct and circumstan-
        tial. We affirm the Board’s ruling that the Company violated Sec-
        tion 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by discharging Avery.
                                        IV
              For all these reasons, we DENY the Company’s petition and
        GRANT the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of the Order in
        full.