Court Opinion

ID: 9659546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:49:12.830778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:05.227118
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority chooses to reverse the Court of Appeals opinion because, although the Court of Appeals used the correct de novo standard of review, it was incorrectly applied. Because the correct analysis has already been completed by the Court of Appeals with the appropriate deference to the trial court, I dissent.
I.
Appellant was originally suspected by the U.S. Border Patrol of transporting undocumented aliens. Appellant aroused the suspicion of the agente because he was driving an older vehicle which appeared weighted down and was very close to another vehicle. Further, the vehicles were located several miles from an immigration checkpoint. The Court of Appeals gave deference to the historical facts of the trial court and conducted a review based upon the totality of the circumstances. Loesch, 921 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996).
This Court has recently held “reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal.” Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Cr.App.1997) (citing Ornelas v. United States, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1657,134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). As this Court opined, “if the issue is whether an officer had probable cause to seize a suspect, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial judge is not in an appreciably better position than the reviewing court to make that determination.” Guzman, at 87. A careful review of the Court of Appeals opinion reveals that the Court took every historical fact as the trial court found it. Loesch, 921 S.W.2d at 407. Only after the Court applied the proper legal, analysis, was the trial court’s decision determined erroneous. Id., at 411. The Court held:
... [t]his court cannot warrant roving searched based on the nervous appearance of drivers in older cars who happen to drive down certain highways, absent other articulable facts which create reasonable suspicion. While we are of the opinion that the State did testify as to some of the *833criteria stated in Brignoni-Ponce which might, together with other factors justify reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances in this case could not warrant the seizure and inspection of appellant’s vehicle.” Id., at 410-11. (Emphasis in the original.)
The Court of Appeals applied the proper de novo standard of review in this case, accepting every issue of credibility in favor of the State, yet applying the proper legal analysis. As a court of discretionary jurisdiction, we must give all due deference to the courts of appeals when they properly conduct their reviews. When the Court of Appeals adequately and properly analyzes the issue, “there is no need for this court to reevaluate it.” Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 957 (Tex.Cr.App.1994). It is not, and has never been, the function of this Court in non-capital cases to function as an intermediate appellate court. Por that reason, when a Court of Appeals applies the proper standard, giving deference to the findings of the trial judge, we should not usurp their role.
II.
Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the Court of Appeals determined there was not reasonable suspicion to stop this vehicle. See, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Edüd 607 (1975). Further, the Court of Appeals analyzed this case under current Texas law and held “there was no indication that [the border agent’s] suspicions were anything more than a ‘hunch’ in this case, and therefore could not justify stopping appellant’s car.” Loesch, 921 S.W.2d at 410 (citing Saenz v. State, 842 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex.Cr.App.1992)).
The majority singles out certain aspects of the Court of Appeals opinion and singularly analyzes those points, without giving deference to the total de novo review of the Court of Appeals. For example, the majority’s contention that the Court of Appeals used the wrong standard in looking at the “older vehicle” factor is disingenuous. Ante, at 831. The “as consistent with innocent activity test” was the standard when the case was decided and ultimately, there is only the briefest of considerations of that standard. As we recently decided in Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), that test is no longer the standard. Woods states “that the reasonableness of a temporary detention must be examined in terms of the totality of the circumstances and will be justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead him to conclude that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” Id., 956 S.W.2d 33, 38.
The following historical facts give due deference to the trial court’s determinations:
1. Two older cars
2. driving under 50 miles per hour
3. appearing heavily loaded
4. at 1:30 a.m.
5. many miles from an immigration checkpoint
6. with drivers not looking at passing police officers
7. and contemporaneously appearing nervous.
If this Court were to analyze the articula-ble facts and correctly apply the Woods “totality of the circumstances test” along with the Brignoni-Ponce factors, it appears many people are subject to lawful detentions if they happen to drive an older car slowly at night and don’t look at a police officer driving by them. Under a de novo review, those factors do not give rise to reasonable suspicion.
Because the Court of Appeals correctly decided the issue giving deference to the findings of the trial court, I respectfully dissent to the majority holding otherwise.