Court Opinion

ID: 9889588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 19:00:55.263983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:19.063547
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-70005      Document: 00516924626             Page: 1   Date Filed: 10/09/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                    FILED
                                                                           October 9, 2023
                                  No. 23-70005                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                    Clerk

   Jedidiah Isaac Murphy,

                                                                Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                        versus

   Ali Mustapha Nasser,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Texas
                             USDC No. 1:23-CV-1170
                   ______________________________

   Before Smith, Southwick, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Leslie H. Southwick: Circuit Judge:
          Before us is an emergency appeal by the State of Texas seeking to
   vacate a stay of execution entered by the district court. The issue on which
   the district court decided to enter a stay is whether the inmate is entitled to
   have DNA testing performed on certain evidence. The district court granted
   a stay because similar issues were pending before this court in a case brought
   by a different Texas prisoner. That related case is fully briefed and has been
   orally argued, and a decision in the case is pending. We agree with the district
   court that a stay is appropriate at least until a decision in that case. At that
   time, this court will order additional briefing.
Case: 23-70005      Document: 00516924626          Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                    No. 23-70005

          Before we discuss why we leave the stay in place at this time, we need
   to explain our jurisdiction. The dissent’s alternative opinion contains the
   same analysis, and we restate much of it here. The inmate, Jedidiah Murphy,
   somewhat surprisingly argues that we do not have jurisdiction to consider
   whether to leave the stay of execution in place. This circuit and others have
   said previously that we have jurisdiction to review a stay of execution on
   interlocutory appeal. Indeed, as defendants remind us, the practice is so
   commonplace that we have a circuit rule governing it. 5th Cir. R. 8. We
   discuss here why the practice is commonplace.
          The State brought this appeal asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
   § 1292(a)(1). Generally, that section allows appeals from orders “granting,
   continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing” to
   enter such orders. Id. As our quotation reveals, Section 1292(a)(1) explicitly
   refers to injunctions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court stated that it had “not
   allowed district courts to ‘shield [their] orders from appellate review’ by
   avoiding the label ‘injunction.’” Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2320 (2018)
   (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 87 (1974)). That means “where an
   order has the practical effect of granting or denying an injunction, it should
   be treated as such for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.” Id. at 2319.
          To explain, the Court stated that when “an interlocutory injunction is
   improperly granted or denied, much harm can occur before the final decision
   in the district court.” Id. Orders are “effectively injunctions” when they
   “barred” conduct at issue in the litigation. Id. A “stay” is more aptly applied
   to a court order that “operates upon the judicial proceeding itself, either by
   halting or postponing some portion of it, or by temporarily divesting an order
   of enforceability.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
          Here, the district court order bars Texas officials from carrying out
   “lawful and important conduct” because it prevents them from performing

                                          2
Case: 23-70005      Document: 00516924626            Page: 3   Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                      No. 23-70005

   Murphy’s execution. See Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2319. Moreover, the district
   court’s order does not operate on the judicial proceeding but restricts the
   actions of specific defendants. That is the function of an injunction. We
   reject Murphy’s arguments that the defendants here, a police chief and
   prosecutor, are not in a position to cause or stop the execution from being
   carried out. The purpose and effect of the stay were to stop the execution.
          Consequently, we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s grant
   of a stay of execution. We have no cause to believe the district court was
   seeking to shield his order by calling it a stay, as that court likely recognized
   our jurisdiction to review. Now, to the request by the State to vacate.
          The background is that Jedidiah Murphy was convicted of the 2000
   murder of an 80-year-old woman, Bertie Cunningham. After the jury found
   him to be guilty of the offense, evidence of his future dangerousness was
   offered at sentencing. Among the evidence was testimony from the victim of
   another vicious crime who identified Murphy as her attacker. Murphy was
   not tried for that offense. Murphy is now seeking DNA testing of evidence
   from that other crime that he argues could exonerate him.
          One problem with this request is that the evidence that Murphy wants
   tested would not prove him innocent of the capital offense. It might
   undermine the specific testimony relevant to future dangerousness.          The
   Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, including in a recent decision involving
   Murphy, has made clear that the relevant statute providing for DNA testing
   “does not authorize testing when exculpatory testing results might affect
   only the punishment or sentence that [a defendant] received.” Murphy v.
   State, 2023 WL 6241994 at * 4 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2023) (quoting Ex
   parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883, 901 (Tex. Crim App. 2011). Instead, such
   evidence can be sought only to show that the inmate would not have been
   found guilty of the offense. Id.

                                           3
Case: 23-70005      Document: 00516924626          Page: 4    Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                    No. 23-70005

          Murphy challenges the limitation of testing to evidence affecting guilt.
   A different district court agreed with a similar argument and declared that
   Texas must provide testing if a sufficient basis is shown that it would have
   affected sentencing and not just the finding of guilt. See Gutierrez v. Saenz,
   565 F. Supp. 3d 892, 911 (S.D. Tex. 2021). A Fifth Circuit panel heard oral
   argument in that case on September 20, 2023, and a decision on that appeal
   is pending. See Gutierrez v. Saenz, No. 21-70009.
          The district court relied on the pendency of a decision in Gutierrez as
   a reason to grant Murphy a stay of execution. See Murphy v. Jones, No. A-23-
   cv-01170-RP, slip op. at 5-6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2023). Certainly, that appeal
   has similar issues that could affect the proper resolution in this case. Waiting
   for that decision is not required by any general procedural rule or by rules of
   this court. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that complete briefing and
   argument has occurred in Gutierrez, unlike the emergency-necessitated
   accelerated consideration here, we conclude we should wait for that decision
   unless there is some basis to distinguish the present appeal.
          A possible distinction concerns Murphy’s delay in filing for DNA
   testing. Nonetheless, delay also is a live issue in Gutierrez. Given that delay
   is a concern in both cases, and both Murphy and Gutierrez make the same
   constitutional challenge, we will consider all issues regarding the stay after
   the release of the opinion in Gutierrez.
          We enter no ruling on the motion to vacate the stay at this time.
   Therefore, the stay of execution will remain in effect. Once the opinion of
   this court issues in Gutierrez, we will order additional briefing on whether the
   stay should be vacated.
          Judge Graves concurs in not making a ruling on the motion to
   vacate the stay at this time. A concurring opinion will be filed.

                                          4
Case: 23-70005      Document: 00516924626          Page: 5   Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                    No. 23-70005

   Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          The majority opinion is grave error. It succumbs to a vapid last-
   minute attempt to stay an execution that should have occurred decades ago.
          In the interest of time, instead of penning a long dissent pointing to
   the panel majority’s and district court’s myriad mistakes, I attach the Fifth
   Circuit panel opinion that should have been issued.
          I respectfully dissent.

                                         5
Case: 23-70005    Document: 00516924626          Page: 6   Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                  No. 23-70005

                            Attachment to Dissent

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                               ____________

                                No. 23-70005
                               ____________

   Jedidiah Isaac Murphy,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                     versus

   Ali Mustapha Nasser,

                                          Defendant—Appellant.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 1:23-CV-1170
                 ______________________________

   Before Smith, Southwick, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge.
         Jedidiah Murphy is a prisoner on Texas death row who is scheduled
   to be executed on October 10, 2023. He has filed two eleventh-hour civil
   rights complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Western District of Texas,
   one on October 4, 2023 (“the October complaint”), and the other on
   September 26, 2023 (“the September complaint”).           Each filing was

                                       6
Case: 23-70005      Document: 00516924626           Page: 7    Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                     No. 23-70005

   accompanied by a motion for stay of execution to allow the litigation of these
   claims (the “September motion” and “October motion” respectively). The
   district court denied the October motion but granted the September motion
   and stayed the execution. Texas appeals and asks us to vacate the stay. As
   of this writing, Murphy has not appealed the denial of the October motion.
   For the reasons that follow, the district court abused its discretion in granting
   the September motion to stay execution because Murphy has failed to
   demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits of any claim in the
   September complaint, and no other equitable factors weigh in his favor.
          Accordingly, we VACATE the stay of execution in No. 1:23-cv-1170.

                                          I.
          Murphy’s journey through the federal and state judicial systems has
   lasted over twenty years and is well documented in numerous opinions. See
   e.g., Murphy v. Davis, 901 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2018) (denying one of Murphy’s
   federal habeas corpus petitions). What follows is a brief recitation of the facts
   and procedural history needed to understand Murphy’s current § 1983
   actions and motions to stay his execution.
          In 2001, a jury convicted Murphy of capital murder, and Texas sought
   the death penalty. The jury could not impose the death penalty unless it
   found that “there [was] a probability that [Murphy] would commit criminal
   acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Tex.
   Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071(b)(1). One way—among many others—
   by which Texas attempted to show Murphy’s “future dangerousness” was
   to implicate him in a kidnapping case. The alleged victim of the kidnapping
   gave detailed testimony and identified Murphy as the perpetrator. Murphy
   attacked the credibility of the alleged victim and the reliability of her
   testimony, but the jury—after hearing additional evidence of future
   dangerousness—found that Murphy was a continuing threat to society and

                                          7
Case: 23-70005         Document: 00516924626            Page: 8      Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                         No. 23-70005

   imposed the death penalty. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”)
   affirmed on direct appeal. See Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim.
   App. 2003). Thus began a decades-long post-conviction journey.
          Murphy first sought state habeas relief based on new evidence that
   allegedly cast more doubt on the kidnapping victim’s identification; that
   litigation ended in 2012. Murphy then sought federal habeas relief on
   numerous grounds; that litigation ended in 2019. Murphy remained on death
   row.
          On March 24, 2023, Murphy filed a motion for post-conviction
   forensic DNA testing in state court. The trial court denied that motion, and
   the CCA affirmed on September 26, 2023, though Murphy contends that the
   mandate in that case has not yet issued. One day later, Murphy filed another
   state habeas petition accompanied by a motion to withdraw or modify his
   execution date. The trial court denied the motion to stay execution, and the
   CCA affirmed on October 5, 2023.1
          Concurrently with this flurry of state court activity, Murphy filed two
   separate civil rights actions in the Western District of Texas under § 1983.
   The September complaint was filed on September 26, 2023. That complaint
   asserted four violations of Murphy’s federal rights. First, Murphy contended
   that Texas law has created a right to demonstrate innocence of the death
   penalty and that the state has violated the federal Constitution’s procedural
   due process protections by denying him access to DNA evidence that he
   could use to exercise that right. Second, Murphy posited that the restrictions
   on his access to DNA evidence unconstitutionally limit his ability to seek
   executive clemency. Third, Murphy averred that he has been deprived
   meaningful access to the courts. Fourth, and finally, Murphy alleged that
          _____________________
          1
              We do not know whether the mandate has issued for that decision.

                                               8
Case: 23-70005        Document: 00516924626             Page: 9      Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                        No. 23-70005

   18 U.S.C. § 3599(e) preempts the state-law restrictions on access to DNA
   evidence.
           Murphy’s October complaint was filed on October 4, 2023. It alleged
   four violations of his federal rights. First, he alleged a violation of his
   Fourteenth Amendment rights because Texas supposedly intends to execute
   him via lethal injection with expired drugs that have been damaged. Second,
   Murphy alleged that Texas is violating the due process and the equal
   protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution by violating state pharmaceutical
   laws concerning the storage of the lethal injection drugs.2 Claims three and
   four of the October complaint mirror the September complaint’s allegations
   regarding deprivation of procedural due process and access to the courts.3
           Murphy filed motions to stay his execution concurrently with each
   complaint. He asked the Western District of Texas to stay his execution to
   allow adjudication of his pending § 1983 claims. On October 6, 2023, the
   district court granted the September motion for stay, finding that Murphy’s
   procedural due process claim challenging Texas’s restrictions on DNA
   evidence was likely to succeed on the merits. Also on October 6, the district
   court denied the October motion for stay, holding that all claims asserted in
   the October complaint were unlikely to be successful. Texas timely appealed
   the grant of the September motion. As of this writing Murphy has not
   appealed the denial of the October motion.

           _____________________
           2
           This allegation is confusingly pled. The above is our own attempt to summarize
   what Murphy is pleading.
           3
             The October complaint includes a fifth “claim,” but that claim consists only of
   broadly worded statements that Murphy’s federal constitutional rights are being violated
   and that the federal courts must accordingly provide a remedy.

                                              9
Case: 23-70005        Document: 00516924626              Page: 10       Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                         No. 23-70005

                                               II.
           “We review a district court’s grant of a stay of execution for abuse of
   discretion.” Adams v. Thaler, 679 F.3d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 2012). A “stay of
   execution is an equitable remedy” and “is not available as a matter of right.”
   Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). “The party requesting a stay
   bears the burden of showing that the circumstances can justify an exercise of
   [judicial] discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433–34 (2009). In
   deciding whether to grant a stay of execution, courts must consider four
   factors:
           (1) [W]hether the stay applicant has made a strong showing
           that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the
           applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether
           issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties
           interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
           lies.
    Id. at 434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)).4

                                               III.
           We start, where we always must, with jurisdiction. Defendants
   contend that we have jurisdiction to review the stay of execution under
   28 U.S.C. § 1292(a). Murphy responds that, because the district court
   entered a stay and not an injunction, the order is not immediately appealable,
   and we do not have jurisdiction to review it.
           As a general matter, “only final decisions of the federal district courts
   [are] reviewable on appeal.” Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83

           _____________________
           4
             Murphy cites O’Bryan v. Estelle to contend that we must apply a more lenient
   standard where we ask only whether he can show “a substantial case on the merits when a
   serious legal question is involved.” 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). But
   O’Brian pre-dated Nken, so its standard is inapplicable. Cf. Diaz v. Stephens, 731 F.3d 370,
   379 (2013) (applying the Nken factors when evaluating a motion to stay execution).

                                               10
Case: 23-70005        Document: 00516924626               Page: 11        Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                           No. 23-70005

   (1981). But Congress has created exceptions to this general rule. One of
   these exceptions gives courts of appeals jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory
   orders of the district courts” that “grant[], continu[e], modify[], refus[e] or
   dissolv[e] injunctions.”         28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).            Though the text of
   § 1292(a)(1) refers expressly to injunctions, the Supreme Court has made
   clear that “district courts [cannot] shield [their] orders from appellate review
   by avoiding the label ‘injunction.’” Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2320
   (2018) (cleaned up). That means “where an order has the practical effect of
   granting or denying an injunction, it should be treated as such for purposes
   of appellate jurisdiction.” Id. at 2319.
           An order has the “practical effect” of an injunction if it would cause
   “lawful and important conduct [to] be barred.” Id. That stands in contrast
   to stays that “‘operate[] upon the judicial proceeding itself,’ [but] not on the
   conduct of a particular actor.” All. For Hippocratic Med. v. Food & Drug
   Admin., No. 23-10362, 2023 WL 2913725, at *4 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2023)
   (unpublished order) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434).
           Altho0ugh the district court used the word “stay” in its opinion, the
   order undoubtably has the practical effect of an injunction. The order bars
   Texas officials from carrying out “lawful and important conduct” because it
   prevents them from performing Murphy’s execution. See Perez, 138 S. Ct. at
   2319.       Moreover, the purported “stay” operates not on the judicial
   proceeding, but to restrict the actions of specific defendants.5 That is

           _____________________
           5
              Cf. All. For Hippocratic Med. v. Food & Drug Admin., 78 F.4th 210, 254 (5th Cir.
   2023) (“[U]nlike a preliminary injunction, a stay does not actively prohibit conduct.”),
   petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 12, 2013) (No. 23-235), and petition for cert. filed (U.S.
   Sept. 12, 2013) (No. 23-236). Murphy contends that the district court’s order was not an
   injunction because the defendants in this case—the Arlington police chief and the
   prosecutor—are not among those who could be effectively enjoined from carrying out an
   execution in Texas. The question under Perez, however, is not whether the order was an

                                                 11
Case: 23-70005        Document: 00516924626               Page: 12        Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                           No. 23-70005

   quintessentially the function of an injunction. Therefore, as our circuit and
   others have said previously, we have jurisdiction to review a stay of execution
   on interlocutory appeal.6 Indeed, as defendants aptly point out, the practice
   is so commonplace that we have a circuit rule governing it. 5th Cir. R. 8.
   See also Adams, 679 F.3d at 314, 323 (vacating a stay of execution two days
   after it was issued). Consequently, we have jurisdiction to review the district
   court’s stay of execution.

                                                IV.
           We start with the September complaint, because the district court
   granted a stay of execution to allow Murphy to litigate the procedural due
   process claims raised in this complaint. Murphy contends that Chapter 64 of
   the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is facially unconstitutional. He claims
   the State of Texas unconstitutionally violated his state-created right to
   challenge his death penalty conviction using DNA evidence. As we explain
   below, the district court abused its discretion in finding that Murphy’s
   procedural due process claim is likely to succeed on the merits.
           Texas grants convicted defendants the right to seek relief through “a
   subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus” upon a showing of
   “sufficient specific facts establishing . . . by clear and convincing evidence
   [that], but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror
   would have answered in the state’s favor one or more of the special issues
   that were submitted to the jury in the applicant’s trial under Article 37.071,

           _____________________
   injunction, but whether it had the practical effect of an injunction. The order was a stay, but
   since that stay had the practical effect of an injunction, we have jurisdiction to review it.
           6
             Cf. Cooey v. Strickland, 588 F.3d 921, 922–23 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a stay
   of execution had the “practical effect” of an injunction); Howard v. Dretke, 157 F. App’x
   667, 670 (5th Cir. 2005) (same); Mines v. Dretke, 118 F. App’x 806, 812 n.27 (5th Cir. 2007)
   (same).

                                                 12
Case: 23-70005     Document: 00516924626            Page: 13   Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                     No. 23-70005

   37.0711, or 37.072.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3).
          One way a defendant may satisfy Article 11.071’s requirements is with
   the use of DNA testing evidence. While there is no freestanding right for a
   convicted defendant to obtain evidence for post-conviction DNA testing,
   Dist. Atty’s Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009), states
   may create such a right. And that is the case for Texas. Under Chapter 64
   of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may move for post-
   conviction DNA testing of evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.01.
   To do so, Chapter 64 requires a “convicted person [to] establish[] by a
   preponderance of the evidence that . . . the person would not have been
   convicted if the exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA
   testing.” Id. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A).
          By creating a right to obtain evidence for post-conviction DNA
   testing, Texas must provide convicted defendants with adequate procedures
   to vindicate that right. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 72–74. Given that a defendant
   has “already been found guilty at a fair trial,” he “has only a limited interest
   in postconviction relief.” Id. at 69. So “‘when a state chooses to offer help
   to those seeking relief from convictions,’ due process does not ‘dictate the
   exact form such assistance must assume.’” Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v.
   Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987)) (cleaned up). Texas’s procedures for
   postconviction relief do not violate due process rights if the procedure it
   offers does not “offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
   and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, or transgress[]
   any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.” Id. (internal
   quotations omitted).
          Murphy asserts Chapter 64 facially violates defendants’ procedural
   due process rights. Specifically, he theorizes that Article 11.07 section 5(a)(3)
   is rendered illusory because Chapter 64 bars the use of DNA testing to

                                          13
Case: 23-70005       Document: 00516924626            Page: 14      Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                       No. 23-70005

   demonstrate a defendant is innocent of the death penalty. The district court
   determined that claim is likely to succeed on the merits because a district
   court in the Southern District of Texas had ruled in a prisoner’s favor on a
   similar issue and that case is currently on appeal with our court. That
   conclusion was an abuse of discretion for three reasons:
          First, Murphy’s procedural due process claim falters at the starting
   line because he fails to make the necessary showing successfully to mount a
   facial challenge to the statute. To prevail on a facial challenge, a challenger
   “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
   would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Thus,
   Murphy must demonstrate that Article 11.071 § 5(a)(3) does not allow any
   criminal defendant to show he or she is innocent of the death penalty.
   Murphy cannot meet this burden. The CCA regularly considers—and grants
   merits review of—applications under Article 11.071 in which a defendant
   claims he is ineligible for the death penalty.7            Indeed, Murphy’s own
   subsequent habeas petitions fatally wound his instant facial challenge: By
   raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel, false testimony, suppression of
   exculpatory evidence, and Eighth Amendment claims under Article 11.071
   § 5(a)(3), he has affirmatively demonstrated that section 5(a)(3) provides
   ample avenues for defendants to show they are innocent of the death penalty.
   Consequently, Murphy’s facial challenge fails as a matter of law.
          Second, Murphy fails to meet his burden to establish that Article 11.071
   creates a substantive right to challenge a death penalty conviction with
   evidence that might persuade a jury to decline to impose the death penalty.
   Murphy asserts Article 11.071 codifies “the doctrine found in Sawyer v.
          _____________________
          7
            See, e.g., Ex parte Milam, No. WR-79,322-04, 2021 WL 197088, at *1 (Tex. Crim.
   App. Jan. 15, 2021) (per curiam); Ex parte Weathers, No. WR-64,302-02, 2012 WL 1378105,
   at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2012) (per curiam).

                                             14
Case: 23-70005        Document: 00516924626              Page: 15        Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                          No. 23-70005

   Whitley.”8 But Ex parte Blue—the very case Murphy cites—contradicts his
   assertion: There, the CCA expressly declined to interpret Article 11.071
   unequivocally to incorporate Sawyer in all its particulars.9
           Regardless, assuming arguendo that Article 11.071 fully codifies Sawyer
   still does Murphy’s claim no good. “Evidence that might have persuaded
   the jury to decline to impose the death penalty is irrelevant under Sawyer”
   because it “has no bearing on [a criminal defendant’s] claim of actual
   innocence of the death penalty.” Rocha v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 815, 825–26 (5th
   Cir. 2010). Murphy seeks to use DNA evidence solely for the purpose of
   showing that he did not commit an extraneous offense the state presented in
   support of the future-dangerousness special issue. But that claim—even if
   supported by the DNA evidence—would not have changed Murphy’s
   eligibility for the death penalty; at best, it would only make the death penalty
   a less suitable punishment.
           The state presented multiple independent pieces of aggravating
   evidence from which the jury found a probability that Murphy would be a
   future danger. That aggregating evidence includes Murphy’s record of theft
   convictions, testimony about a domestic-abuse call involving him and his
   girlfriend, a witness who testified that he pulled a gun on her at a high school
   party, testimony from one of his former coworkers, the results of his
   Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-II test, and his murder of

           _____________________
           8
            The Court in Sawyer defined the term “innocent of the death penalty” to include
   both “innocence of the capital crime itself” and “a showing that there was no aggravating
   circumstance or that some other condition of eligibility had not been met.” 505 U.S. 333,
   345 (1992).
           9
             Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d at 160 n.42 (“We hesitate to declare that Article 11.071,
   Section 5(a)(3) wholly codifies the Supreme Court’s doctrine of ‘actual innocence of the
   death penalty,’ even inasmuch as it has tied the exception to the bar on subsequent writs to
   the statutory criteria for the death penalty under Article 37.071.”).

                                                15
Case: 23-70005       Document: 00516924626              Page: 16       Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                         No. 23-70005

   eighty-year-old Bertie Cunningham.10             Thus, even under his erroneous
   interpretation of Article 11.071, Murphy still fails to show the DNA testing
   he seeks would make him innocent of the death penalty.11
           Third, Murphy misapplies Chapter 64 to Article 11.071. His claim—
   that Chapter 64 precludes him from challenging his death sentence by
   denying the DNA testing he seeks—is belied by the text and structure of the
   statute. Chapter 64 allows a convicted person to “submit to the convicting
   court a motion for forensic DNA testing of evidence,” Tex. Code Crim.
   Proc. art. 64.01, which would, in turn, allow the convicting court to “order
   forensic DNA testing” provided certain statutory conditions are met, id.
   art. 64.03(a).
           The statute thus creates an additional mechanism by which a
   defendant can obtain potentially exculpatory DNA test results. DNA testing
   results obtained through Chapter 64 could be used as part of a defendant’s
   Article 11.071 application to show there are “sufficient specific facts
   establishing that . . . by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of
   the United States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the
   state’s favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury
   in the applicant's trial under Article 37.071, 37.0711, or 37.072.”                    Id.
   art. 11.071 § 5(a)(3).
           But Article 11.071 certainly doesn’t require that DNA test results
   come exclusively from a defendant’s Chapter 64 motion. Section 5(a)

           _____________________
           10
             Davis, 901 F.3d at 583, 585; see also Guevara v. State, 97 S.W.3d 579, 581 (Tex.
   Crim. App. 2003) (noting that “[t]he facts of the crime alone can be sufficient to support
   the affirmative finding to the future dangerousness special issue”).
           11
            See Rocha, 626 F.3d at 825 (“The quality of the mitigation evidence the petitioner
   would have introduced at sentencing has no bearing on his claim of actual innocence of the
   death penalty.”).

                                               16
Case: 23-70005     Document: 00516924626           Page: 17   Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                    No. 23-70005

   requires that a subsequent habeas application “contain[] sufficient specific
   facts,” and that neither favors nor disfavors Chapter 64 DNA test results
   over DNA test results obtained through other means. In sum, Chapter 64—
   contrary to Murphy’s assertion—expands the available sources of evidence
   convicted defendants may use in their subsequent habeas petitions.
   Consequently, Murphy has failed to identify any facial constitutional
   infirmity.
          The district court ignored all this authority and instead relied solely
   on Gutierrez v. Saenz, 565 F. Supp. 3d 892 (S.D. Tex. 2021). The court in
   Gutierrez first observed that Article 11.071 “grants the substantive right to
   file a second habeas petition with a clear and convincing showing of
   innocence of the death penalty.” Id. at 910. It then found that “Chapter 64
   denies the petitioner access to DNA evidence by which a person can avail
   himself of that right” and violates a petitioner’s procedural due process
   rights. Id. at 910–11.
          The district court abused its discretion in relying exclusively on
   Gutierrez. That case cites Rocha for the proposition that the CCA construed
   “Article 11.071 . . . to mean that petitioners must make a threshold showing
   that the applicant is actually innocent of the death penalty.” Id. But Rocha
   obligates us “to construe and apply section 5(a)(3) as the [CCA] construes
   and applies it.” 626 F.3d at 822. Gutierrez disregards that command; it fails
   to cite any case in which the CCA has held that Article 11.071 creates a
   substantive right to challenge a death penalty conviction with evidence that
   might persuade a jury to decline to impose the death penalty. Thus, the
   district court could not have relied on Gutierrez’s reasoning to conclude that
   Murphy had met his burden of showing a cognizable liberty or property
   interest—as is necessary for a procedural due process claim. See Richardson
   v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 220, 229 (5th Cir. 2020).

                                         17
Case: 23-70005      Document: 00516924626            Page: 18     Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                      No. 23-70005

          Furthermore, the defendant in Gutierrez sought DNA evidence under
   Chapter 64 to demonstrate innocence of the death penalty by casting doubt
   on whether he had committed the underlying crime for which he was
   convicted.12 He wanted DNA evidence to show that he was not in the home
   of the victim at the time of the murder. That means the DNA evidence
   sought in Gutierrez would provide evidence directly relevant to the degree of
   culpability of the crime for which he was being sentenced. Here, in contrast,
   Murphy seeks DNA evidence not to challenge his guilt of the underlying
   crime, but to show that he did not commit an extraneous offense the state
   presented in support of the future-dangerousness special issue.
          That factual distinction makes all the difference: As we explained
   above, “[e]vidence that might have persuaded the jury to decline to impose
   the death penalty . . . has no bearing on [a criminal defendant’s] claim of
   actual innocence of the death penalty.”            Rocha, 626 F.3d at 825–26.
   Therefore, even if Gutierrez was correctly decided, it is not applicable to
   Murphy’s situation because Murphy is not attempting to demonstrate
   innocence of the death penalty by attacking his underlying conviction.
   Rather, the DNA evidence he seeks is relevant to the special issue on future
   dangerousness, which encompasses a much broader category of potential
   evidence.
          Despite Gutierrez’s non-binding nature as an opinion from a district
   court, and further despite its questionable reasoning and inapplicability to our
   facts, the district court à quo used Gutierrez to conclude that Murphy has
   shown a likelihood of success on the merits because the issue Murphy seeks

          _____________________
          12
             See Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (noting
   Gutierrez’s argument that “exculpatory DNA test results . . . would show, by a
   preponderance of the evidence, that he would not have been convicted of capital
   murder.”).

                                           18
Case: 23-70005        Document: 00516924626               Page: 19       Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                          No. 23-70005

   a stay of execution to litigate is now on appeal before our court. Rank
   speculation about the potential outcome of a case pending appeal does not
   support the district court’s finding of a likelihood of success on the merits.13
   The district court abused its discretion by relying on the fact that Gutierrez is
   pending on appeal to grant a stay of execution.
           Even if our precedent allowed the district court to rely on a pending
   appeal, the unique procedural history of Gutierrez counsels strongly against
   doing so in this case. In 2020, Gutierrez sought a stay of execution so he
   could litigate “the constitutionality of Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of
   Criminal Procedure” and Texas’s “policy refusing to allow chaplains to
   accompany inmates into the execution chamber itself.” Gutierrez v. Saenz,
   818 Fed. App’x 309, 311 (5th Cir. 2020). The district court granted a stay of
   execution, but our court reversed. Id. at 313. We rejected Gutierrez’s facial
   and as-applied procedural due process challenges to Chapter 64 as well as his
   spiritual-advisor claim.        Id. at 312. The Supreme Court then granted
   certiorari, vacated, and remanded for further consideration of the spiritual-
   advisor claim. See Gutierrez v. Saenz, 141 S. Ct. 1260, 1260 (2021).
           On remand, Gutierrez again challenged Chapter 64, and the district
   court again ruled in his favor. Gutierrez, 565 F. Supp. 3d at 908. The
   Gutierrez district court distinguished our earlier reasoning on the sole basis
   that Gutierrez’s new Chapter 64 claim was “legally distinct” from the one
   we had rejected because the new claim challenged Chapter 64’s denial of

           _____________________
           13
              Cf. Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 1986) (“In the absence of a
   declaration by the [higher court] that the executions should be stayed in cases presenting
   the issue raised by [Murphy], we must follow our circuit’s precedents and deny . . . a stay
   of execution on this issue.”); Moreno v. Collins, No. 94-50026, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
   41477, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 17, 1994) (per curiam) (“[T]he grant of certiorari by the United
   States Supreme Court to review an issue settled in this circuit does not itself require a stay
   of execution.”).

                                                19
Case: 23-70005     Document: 00516924626           Page: 20    Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                    No. 23-70005

   evidence “that would demonstrate he is innocent of the death penalty,”
   whereas the claim we had ruled on previously challenged Chapter 64’s denial
   of evidence that would “demonstrate innocence of capital murder.” See id.
          We do not, and cannot, know how our court will ultimately resolve
   Gutierrez. But the difference between Gutierrez’s rejected Chapter 64 claim
   and his current one is so small that it cannot be fairly said that the pending
   appeal gives Murphy a likelihood of success in this case.
          Finally, the district court also determined that the possibility of
   irreparable harm weighs heavily in Murphy’s favor. It is true that this factor
   typically favors the movant in a capital case. See O’Bryan, 691 F.2d at 708.
   However, the procedural posture of this case is unique. The CCA denied
   Murphy’s request for DNA testing both because Chapter 64 bars it as a
   matter of law and because Murphy had unreasonably delayed in requesting
   DNA testing. See Murphy v. State, No. AP-77,112, 2023 WL 6241994, at *4–
   5 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 26, 2023). This second holding is crucial because,
   even if the application of Chapter 64 violates Murphy’s procedural due
   process rights, he still would not be entitled to the DNA testing he seeks
   under the state court’s alternative holding of unreasonable delay.
          Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that Murphy would
   suffer irreparable harm in not being able to pursue his procedural due process
   claims. Rather, the balance of equities weighs against granting Murphy’s
   motion for stay of execution: Both the state and victims of crime have a
   “powerful and legitimate interest in punishing the guilty.” Calderon v.
   Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). And
   “[b]oth the State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the
   timely enforcement of a [death] sentence.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct.
   1112, 1133 (2019) (internal quotations omitted).       Even apart from the
   likelihood-of-success inquiry, the district court abused its discretion in

                                        20
Case: 23-70005        Document: 00516924626              Page: 21       Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                         No. 23-70005

   concluding the balance of equities weighs in favor of granting Murphy’s
   motion for stay of execution.

                                              V.
           It does not appear that the district court relied on any other claim in
   Murphy’s September complaint when granting the stay of execution. To the
   extent that it did, it abused its discretion because none of Murphy’s other
   claims is likely to succeed.
           First, Murphy contends Chapter 64 unconstitutionally limits his
   ability to seek executive clemency. Problematically for him, Murphy’s claim
   is premised on his assumption that Chapter 64 facially violates defendants’
   procedural due process rights under Article 11.071. But as we have already
   explained, that assumption holds no water. If anything, Chapter 64 makes it
   easier for convicted defendants to seek executive clemency since it expands
   the avenues by which a defendant may obtain DNA test results.
   Furthermore, Murphy fails to cite any case in which the denial of DNA
   testing violated a defendant’s procedural due process right to present a
   clemency claim.14 Murphy has therefore failed to bear his burden of proving
   that any procedural due process violation exists.15
           Next, Murphy contends the denial of DNA testing deprives him of his
   right to adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the courts. That
   contention lacks merit. The right of access to the courts does not include the

           _____________________
           14
              Nor is there a substantive due process right to executive clemency. See Conn.
   Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981).
           15
             See Richardson, 978 F.3d at 229 (noting plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
   a cognizable liberty or property interest to state a procedural due process claim).

                                               21
Case: 23-70005        Document: 00516924626               Page: 22       Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                          No. 23-70005

   ability “to discover grievances[] and to litigate effectively once in court.”16
   Murphy seeks to compel the state to provide DNA testing on the mere hope
   that its results would support some speculative and hypothetical claim in the
   future. That is nothing more than an attempt “to discover grievances.”
   Casey, 518 U.S. at 354 (emphasis removed).
           A request for DNA testing, by itself, does not tend to prove or
   disprove Murphy’s claim that he is innocent of the death penalty. The DNA
   testing “may prove exculpatory, inculpatory, or inconclusive. In no event
   will a judgment that simply orders DNA tests necessarily impl[y] the
   unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525
   (2011) (internal quotations omitted). As a result, Murphy fails to show he
   has been denied his right of access to the courts.
           Finally, Murphy contends 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e) entitles him to
   representation through all available post-conviction process, including
   applications for stays of execution and clemency proceedings. There is no
   merit to Murphy’s final theory. That statute “authorizes federal courts to
   provide funding to a party who is facing the prospect of a death sentence and
   is ‘financially unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative,
   expert, or other reasonably necessary services.’” Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S. Ct.
   1080, 1092 (2018) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(1)). It is merely a funding
   law and “not a law that grants federal courts authority to oversee the scope
   and nature of federally funded legal representation.” Beatty v. Lumpkin,
   52 F.4th 632, 634 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 416 (2022).
           For these reasons, Murphy has failed to show a likelihood of success

           _____________________
           16
              Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996); see Whitaker v. Livingston, 732 F.3d 465,
   467 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“One is not entitled to access the courts merely to argue
   that there might be some remote possibility of some constitutional violation.”).

                                                22
Case: 23-70005     Document: 00516924626          Page: 23   Date Filed: 10/09/2023

                                   No. 23-70005

   on the merits on any claim in his September complaint. To the extent the
   district court relied on any claim other that the Chapter 64 challenge in
   granting the September motion to stay, it abused its discretion.
                                   * * * * *
          Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in granting
   Murphy’s September motion to stay execution. Accordingly, we VACATE
   the stay of execution entered in No. 1:23-cv-1170. The mandate shall issue
   forthwith.

                                        23