Court Opinion

ID: 9387069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 17:01:06.01816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.224776
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-1005, 04/14/2023, DktEntry: 28.1, Page 1 of 5

                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          APR 14 2023
                                                                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Boota Singh,                                     No. 21-1005

               Petitioner,                       Agency No.      A216-395-124

  v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney
General,

               Respondent.

                    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted March 27, 2023**
                              San Francisco, California

Before: BOGGS,*** M. SMITH, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

       Boota Singh, a Sikh citizen of India and Congress Party member, petitions

for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

Against Torture (CAT). Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not

       *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
       ***
            The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
              Case: 21-1005, 04/14/2023, DktEntry: 28.1, Page 2 of 5

recount them here, except as necessary to provide context to our ruling. We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition for review.

      We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence.

Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022). Under this

standard, we must uphold the agency’s findings unless the evidence “compels the

conclusion that these findings and decisions are erroneous.” Ibid. (quoting Davila

v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020)).

      1. Singh argues that the agency erred in upholding the immigration judge’s

(IJ) finding that Singh was not credible. We need not decide this issue, however,

because even assuming that Singh provided credible testimony, substantial

evidence supports the agency’s dismissal of Singh’s applications on the merits.

INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule

courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of

which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

      2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s dismissal of Singh’s claims

for asylum and withholding of removal because Singh can safely and reasonably

relocate within India. To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must show

that he was persecuted, or has a well-founded fear of persecution, “on account

of” a statutorily protected ground. Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 657 (9th Cir.

2022) (quoting Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2009)). An

applicant who demonstrates past persecution establishes a presumption of future

persecution, which is one way to obtain asylum or withholding of removal. See

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Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2019); Tamang v. Holder, 598

F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “[t]his presumption may be rebutted

where the IJ finds changed country conditions mitigate against the threat of

persecution or the petitioner could reasonably be expected to relocate to a

different part of his or her country.” Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1091 (citing 8 C.F.R.

§§ 208.16(b)(1)(i), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)). In determining whether a petitioner can

“safely and reasonably relocate” within his country, the agency “must conduct a

reasoned analysis with respect to a petitioner’s individualized situation . . . in light

of the persons or entities that caused the past persecution, and the nature and

extent of the persecution.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d at 661.

       Singh is twenty-eight years old, with no reported health problems or

criminal record. His mother, wife, and children live in Uttar Pradesh, India. While

country-conditions reports present some evidence of periodic clashes between

political parties, they do not indicate that Singh would face future persecution as

a Sikh or Congress Party member in Punjab. These reports also suggest that, at

least at the time of the IJ hearing, Sikhs represented the dominant religion in

Punjab and the Congress Party controlled the state legislature in Punjab.

       Moreover, the agency reasonably found, based on the evidence, that the

particular kind of work Singh engaged in was unlikely to result in harm to him.

Though hard-core militants, or those who have drawn the interest of central

Indian authorities, may be unable to feasibly relocate within India, political-party

workers like Singh who do not draw governmental scrutiny appear able to do so.

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The reports further indicate that no laws restrict Sikhs from moving to other parts

of the country or place “checks on a newcomer to any part of India arriving from

another part,” and that Sikhs can practice their faith without restriction throughout

India. And though Singh reiterated his fear of future persecution in India based

on two attacks that he experienced as a Congress Party member in Uttar Pradesh,

nothing in the record compels the conclusion that he has a well-founded fear of

persecution in Punjab.

      3. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s dismissal of Singh’s

claim for protection under CAT. To establish relief under CAT, Singh must

establish that it is “more likely than not” that he will be tortured by or with the

acquiescence of a public official if removed to India. Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th

at 658–59 (citing Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 2001)). In

determining whether an applicant has established eligibility for protection under

CAT, relevant considerations include: “evidence of past torture inflicted upon the

applicant, evidence of safe internal relocation, evidence of mass violations of

human rights within the country of removal, and other pertinent country

conditions.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d at 663 (citing Nuru v. Gonzales, 404

F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005)).

      Even assuming Singh’s credibility, it is unclear whether the two beatings

that he suffered amount to torture. See Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1201

(9th Cir. 2007) (affirming the denial of CAT relief where the petitioner was taken

into custody and beaten on four occasions). And, as discussed above, substantial

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evidence supports the conclusion that Singh can safely and reasonably relocate to

Punjab. See Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 893 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing

§ 1208.16(c)(30(ii)) (explaining that relocation is relevant to the CAT inquiry).

Moreover, while the country-conditions reports note that political clashes and

instances of politically motivated violence occur in India, they do not indicate

that Sikhs or Congress Party members, like Singh, are subject to torture in Punjab

by or with the acquiescence of government officials.

      PETITION DENIED.

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