Court Opinion

ID: 9927814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 14:00:53.753471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:52.721501
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12927     Document: 22-1    Date Filed: 01/30/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                No. 22-12927
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       LARRY COTTON,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       SGT. COOPER,
       SGT KNIGHT,
       LT. WALKER,
       SGT. JORDAN,
       P. MYERS,
       Captain, et al.,

                                                  Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12927

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00359-MHT-CSC
                          ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Larry Cotton, an Alabama state prisoner proceeding pro se,
       appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in
       favor of the defendants—current and former Alabama Department
       of Corrections officials—on his Eighth Amendment deliberate
       indifference and First Amendment access-to-courts claims. We
       affirm in part and vacate and remand in part. Cotton has
       abandoned his access-to-courts claim on appeal, so we affirm the
       district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim. But
       because the magistrate judge applied the wrong legal standard in
       evaluating the merits of Cotton’s deliberate indifference claim, we
       partially vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment and
       remand for the court to consider Cotton’s evidence under the
       correct legal standard.
                                        I.
              We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
       novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
       nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in their
       favor. Sutton v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 64 F.4th 1166, 1168 (11th
       Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
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       22-12927                  Opinion of the Court                               3

       genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
       to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 1
              Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. Campbell v. Air
       Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). But “this leniency
       does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party,
       or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
       action.” Id. at 1168–69 (quotation omitted).
                                             II.
              The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel
       and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend VIII. Under the
       Eighth Amendment, prison custodians are not the “guarantor[s] of
       a prisoner’s safety.” Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., 400
       F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). The Eighth
       Amendment does, however, require that “inmates be furnished
       with the basic human needs, one of which is reasonable safety.”
       Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (quotation omitted).
       Subjecting prisoners to “life-threatening condition[s]” while
       incarcerated is an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain that
       constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. Thus, the Eighth
       Amendment provides an inmate with the right to be reasonably

       1 To the extent that Cotton argues on appeal that the district court’s grant of

       summary judgment violated his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, this
       argument is foreclosed by longstanding precedent. “The Supreme Court
       made clear long ago that summary judgment does not violate the Seventh
       Amendment.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 919 (11th Cir. 2018)
       (quotation omitted).
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12927

       protected from an “excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence.”
       Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1320. To sufficiently allege a deliberate
       indifference claim, a plaintiff must state facts showing “(1) a
       substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate
       indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty.,
       50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995).
               The first element requires a showing of incarceration under
       conditions that objectively pose a “substantial risk of serious
       harm.” Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1358 (11th Cir. 2021)
       (quotation omitted). To satisfy this element under a generalized
       risk of violence theory, a plaintiff must show that the conditions of
       confinement at the time of the officials’ conduct “were extreme
       and posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health
       or safety.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019)
       (quotation omitted). “While occasional, isolated attacks by one
       prisoner on another may not constitute cruel and unusual
       punishment, confinement in a prison where violence and terror
       reign is actionable.” Id. at 1234 (alteration adopted and quotation
       omitted). To establish this showing, the plaintiff must show that
       “serious inmate-on-inmate violence was the norm or something
       close to it.” Id. at 1234 (quotation omitted).
               For the second element, “the official must both be aware of
       facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
       risk of serious harm exists, and also draw the inference.” Id. at 1233
       (alteration adopted and quotation omitted). “Whether a prison
       official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a
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       22-12927               Opinion of the Court                         5

       question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways,
       including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Hale, 50 F.3d at
       1583 (quotation omitted). Thus, a court “may conclude that a
       prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the
       risk was obvious.” Id. (quotation omitted). In the context of claims
       regarding an excessive risk of inmate assaults, the plaintiff need not
       show that he notified an official that he feared an attack. Id. The
       plaintiff must also produce evidence that, with knowledge of the
       substantial risk of serious harm, the government official
       “knowingly or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to take
       reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. (alteration adopted and
       quotation omitted).
              Finally, the plaintiff must show proof of “an affirmative
       causal connection between the actions taken by a particular
       person . . . and the constitutional deprivation.” LaMarca v. Turner,
       995 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted).
              Cotton’s Eighth Amendment claim asserts that, while
       incarcerated at Ventress Correctional Facility, he was subjected to
       an excessive risk of prisoner-on-prisoner violence. His complaint
       alleges that he witnessed multiple incidents of beatings, stabbings,
       and rape, some occurring less than four feet away from him. He
       describes a prison environment where the strong preyed on the
       weak with impunity, leaving him “in fear of [his] life every day.”
       He alleges that, as a result, he suffered significant mental and
       emotional injury and had to seek medical treatment.
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12927

              Cotton further alleges that these violent and unsafe
       conditions were perpetuated by understaffing and overcrowding,
       and that defendants were aware of the violent conditions in the
       prison but failed to make any changes. He specifically alleges that
       the wardens allowed the officers to lock the dorms and leave the
       prisoners unsupervised without separating the violent prisoners
       from the weak and nonviolent prisoners.
              In support of these contentions, Cotton submitted sworn
       affidavits from himself and several other prisoners at Ventress.
       These affidavits generally describe an atmosphere of regular
       prisoner-on-prisoner violence, and also detail specific assaults.
       David Harmon’s affidavit, for example, states that in the previous
       two months, he had been “extorted on several occasions,”
       “assaulted by numerous inmates, along with gangs,” “hit with a
       whip and lock,” and had “a knife and two (2) ice picks put in [his]
       face.” Donald Knight’s affidavit describes another inmate stabbing
       him twice, which pierced his spine and severely injured him. And
       Josh Roberts’s affidavit states that he was cut by a fellow prisoner
       eight times over an outstanding debt; when he was moved to a
       different lock-up, another prisoner attempted to stab him in the
       face through his cell window with a long, sharp rod.
               Several of these affidavits also assert that correctional
       officials at Ventress, including some of the named defendants,
       either personally witnessed incidents of prisoner violence or were
       informed of them by the affiants; either way, they did nothing in
       response. Some specific assaults were recorded by the inmates and
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       22-12927              Opinion of the Court                        7

       posted on the video-sharing platform WorldStarHipHop, where
       they went “viral.”
              The magistrate judge concluded that Cotton could not
       succeed on his deliberate indifference claim because he never
       personally “allege[d] that he ha[d] been the victim of any violent
       attack by a fellow prisoner or guard,” or “allege[d] that any
       Defendant knew a risk of serious harm existed to him and
       disregarded the risk.” The magistrate judge also apparently
       disregarded the affidavits submitted by other inmates at Ventress
       as impermissible attempts to raise third-party claims on those
       inmates’ behalf. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
       recommendation.
              But to succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, a prison
       inmate need not show that he was personally subject to a previous
       attack because “the Eighth Amendment protects against future
       harm to inmates.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 33. “[C]onfinement in a
       prison where violence and terror reign” is itself actionable—a
       plaintiff “need not await a tragic event” before bringing suit.
       Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1234; Helling, 509 U.S. at 33.
              Nor must Cotton show that the prison officials knew of a
       specific risk to him. While “relevant, a claimant’s failure to give
       advance notice of an attack is not dispositive” and “an official may
       not escape liability merely by showing that he did not know the
       claimant was likely to be assaulted.” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583
       (alteration adopted and quotation omitted). Cotton need show not
       that the defendants “knew precisely who would attack whom,” but
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12927

       rather that they “had subjective knowledge of a generalized,
       substantial risk of serious harm from inmate violence” and that
       they “knowingly or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to
       take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. (alteration adopted and
       quotation omitted).
               The affidavits from Cotton’s fellow inmates may be relevant
       in this regard—not as attempts to raise third-party claims on other
       prisoners’ behalf, but as evidence that there existed extreme
       conditions at the jail posing “an unreasonable risk of serious injury
       to [Cotton’s] future health or safety.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233
       (quotation omitted). Likewise, the affidavits may also be relevant
       evidence on the question of whether the defendants subjectively
       knew about the generalized risk from inmate-on-inmate violence
       but failed to take action to abate it. Accordingly, we vacate the
       district court’s order granting summary judgment to the
       defendants on Cotton’s Eighth Amendment claim and remand for
       consideration of Cotton’s evidence in the first instance under the
       correct legal standards.
              Finally, the district court also granted summary judgment to
       the defendants on Cotton’s First Amendment access-to-courts
       claim. While he mentioned this claim in his notice of appeal, he
       did not address it in his brief. Although pro se pleadings are held
       to a less stringent standard, any issues not briefed on appeal by a
       pro se litigant are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d
       870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
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       22-12927             Opinion of the Court                     9

       grant of summary judgment on this count. See Sapuppo v. Allstate
       Floridian Ins., 739 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2014).
           AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN
       PART.