Court Opinion

ID: 9831635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:15:38.13001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:36.639690
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
McCoy’s well-reasoned motion for rehearing has at least succeeded in creating a doubt in our minds upon the questions determining whether the cause should be remanded rather than judgment rendered. We adhere to the conclusion that the facts found by the jury in connection with the undisputed facts show that McCoy’s driver was -guilty of negligence per se. Such negligence under any view was at least a proximate cause of the collision. Under these conclusions the judgment in favor of McCoy awarding him a recovery on his cross-action cannot stand.
If it was an issue of fact whether the negligence of Wright’s driver was a proximate cause of the collision and injuries, then likewise it was an issue of fact whether the negligence of McCoy’s driver was a proximate cause. These questions are material here, only upon the question of whether the case should be remanded or judgment rendered for one of the parties. There happens to be presented a situation where it does not result that if plaintiff is not entitled to recover, then the defendant is entitled to recover, such situation existing by reason of the cross-action based upon the same transaction. It may be we were in error in holding that as a matter of law the negligence of Wright’s driver was not a cause of the injury, and hence we have concluded to change our order to provide that the judgment of the court below shall be, reversed and the cause remanded. It is so ordered.
On Second Motion for Rehearing.
McCoy, construing our action upon his first motion,—namely, in remanding the case instead of. rendering judgment,—to be for the sole purpose of enabling him to try out his cross-action, proposes to waive such right, and requests the court to affirm the judgment. Our purpose in remanding the case was not merely to permit McCoy to try out his cross-action, but to enable Wright to have a new trial of his case, free of the errors held to have accrued in the former trial.
McCoy’s second motion requires consideration of a question which it suggests, namely, whether the errors in the trial should be regarded as harmless, and thus enabling this court to - affirm the judgment upon that theory.
The issues of contributory negligence were determined by the verdict of the jury against Wright in favor of McCoy. Ordinarily a proper determination against the plaintiff of the issue’s of contributory negligence may render immaterial, and, therefore, harmless errors affecting the determination of issues involved in plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant. Such general rule applies where the issues of contributory negligence, and the supporting and rebuttal evidence upon such issues, are of a distinct subject matter from the issues involved in plaintiff’s cause of action, and the supporting and rebuttal evidence upon the latter issues. Where such subject matter is distinct, errors in the submission of one class of issues are not reasonably calculated to prejudicially influence the determination of the other class of issues. This, we believe to be the test determinative of the question of harmless error under consideration.
Now, in the instant case, it so happens that any evidence tending to show that the negligence of McCoy’s driver in driving on the wrong side of the road, was a proximate cause of the collision and consequent injury to both plaintiff and defendant, was in the nature of rebuttal evidence upon the issues involved in the question of contributory negligence on the part of Wright’s driver. As shown by the opinion on the first motion for rehearing, the issue of whether the negligence of McCoy’s driver was a proximate cause of the injury and the issue of whether the negligence of *56Wright’s driver was a proximate cause were so inter-related and dependent one upon the other that if one was a question of law so was the other, and if one was a question of fact so also was the other.
 Wright was entitled to have the jury find by their verdict whether the act of McCoy’s driver in driving on the wrong side of the road was a proximate cause of his injuries. This issue was not passed upon by the jury, their failure to do so being induced by the error of the court in submitting as an issue a matter of negligence per se thus permitting the jury to determine that driving on the wrong side of the road was not negligence. Can we be certain that if the court had recognized negligence per se and submitted to the jury the issue of whether such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries, the jury would nevertheless have found, - as they did, that the speed of Wright’s truck was a proximate cause? Although there may be no necessary inconsistency in so finding, yet since each such finding would be based largely upon the same evidence, we think it does not appear beyond a reasonable doubt, as the law requires that it must, that Wright suffered no prejudice from the error which deprived him of a verdict upon the issue of whether the negligence of McCoy’s driver was a proximate cause of the injury. It cannot, we think, be said, as .a matter of law certainly and free of doubt, that the jury had they found that McCoy’s driver’s negligence was a proximate cause of the collision would have also found, as they did, that Wright’s driver’s negligence was a proximate cause. The well recognized principle that the-theories of each party should be independently submitted, and that the finding of one-should not be conclusive of the harmless-effect of the failure to submit the other, lends support to this view.
In Thurman v. Chandler, 125 Tex. 34, 81 S.W.2d 489, it was said to be settled' “that either party is entitled to have any fact or group of facts raised by the pleadings and the evidence affirmatively and: directly presented to the jury” and that “it is no answer to say that the findings on other issues actually submitted to the jury amounted to a finding on an issue not submitted. The conditions as they existed before not after the verdict must control.” This is, of course, only persuasive upon the present question but it affords some analogy in that two distinctly opposite theories were involved as to the cause of the injury. Both were entitled to be submitted but because of the error of the court only one in legal effect was submitted.
It is our conclusion that the errors for which the reversal has been ordered cannot properly be held to have been harmless, and that, therefore, the second motion for rehearing should be overruled. It is accordingly so ordered.