Court Opinion

ID: 9439271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:29:08.524257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:16.212253
License: Public Domain

*288KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with my brethren but write separately to emphasize caution in applying their approach too broadly. The United States Supreme Court commands a mechanical application of Rule 58. See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 222, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam) (“separate document” provision of Rule 58 “must be mechanically applied to avoid new uncertainties as to the date on which a judgment is entered”). But such a mechanical application must be leavened with common sense. For example, the single citation/single sentence rule developed in this Circuit properly utilizes common sense in separating the conforming from the non-conforming. See Kidd v. District of Columbia, 206 F.3d 35, 37-39 (D.C.Cir.2000) (“[I]t is one thing to say that Rule 58 creates a straightjacket, another to define the straightjacket’s precise measurements.”); Diamond by Diamond v. McKenzie, 770 F.2d 225, 230 n. 10 (D.C.Cir.1985). Taking a similar common sense approach here, I believe, as is clear to any reasonable reader, that the district court penned a final, appealable judgment when it signed and issued the July 10,1998 Order. I am unconvinced that the three “mistakes” emphasized by the majority— the stapling of the Order to the Memorandum, the district court’s failure to sign the Memorandum and the Clerk’s failure to file-stamp the Order — melded the Order and Memorandum into one.1 First, the fact that the Order is stapled to the accompanying Memorandum does not transform it to mere ordering language tacked on to the Memorandum. Physical attachment, whether it be by a staple, paper clip or otherwise, cannot be determinative; we should, if anything, encourage attachment to promote order. The majority cites cases disfavoring judgments “tacked on” to opinions. See Maj. Op. at 285-86 & n.8. But in each of the cases, “tacked on” describes ordering language which, by my reading, appears to be included within or at the conclusion of a court’s opinion or memorandum, not in an order on a separate page with a separate heading. See Whitaker v. City of Houston, 963 F.2d 831, 833 (5th Cir.1992) (ruling included at end of opinion); Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683, 689 (4th Cir.1978) (“notation” at end of ten-page opinion); see also Nunez-Soto v. Alvarado, 956 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1992) (judgment with single sentence of reasoning satisfies Rule 58 although tacked on judgments do not). Likewise, the unsigned Memorandum has no effect on whether the signed Order is a separate document under Rule 58. Finally, the Clerk’s failure to file-stamp the 0 Order is irrelevant to the Order qua a separate document; the separate document requirement of Rule 58 addresses how the judgment must be “set forth,” not how it is recorded or treated by the Clerk. In any event the Clerk sufficiently complied with Rule 79(a) in entering the Order — the docket entry accurately depicts *289its “nature” and “substance.” The Clerk’s mistake was in failing to enter both the Order and the Memorandum.
Nevertheless, because the opinion is narrow, applying only to the unusual facts here, and because our precedent favors dotting each “i” and crossing each “t” in applying Rule 58, I join in the remand.

. If it did, it would, as the majority recognizes, see Maj. Op. at 8, plainly violate our single citation rule since it would then encompass the multiple citations contained in the Memorandum.