Court Opinion

ID: 9670383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:19:45.320445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:04.185677
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice
(dissenting)
In Iowa, evidence of a defendant’s prior acts is inadmissible when offered to prove that the defendant has a bad character and is therefore likely to have committed the crime with which he is presently charged. State v. Spargo, 364 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Iowa 1985); State v. Cott, 283 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1979); Iowa R.Evid. 404(b) (“Evi*234dence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.”) Evidence of prior acts may be offered for other proper purposes, such as proving the identity, preparation, intent or knowledge of the defendant. Iowa R.Evid. 404(b). However,
the exclusionary force of the rule applies equally to instances where the proponent offers the evidence for another avowed purpose, but the court determines that in fact its only relevancy is to illustrate the character of the accused for purposes of establishing other actions in conformity with that character.
State v. Barrett, 401 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1987).
The majority correctly states that to be admissible, evidence of a defendant’s prior acts must be relevant. To be relevant, however, the evidence offered must tend to prove some fact that is in issue. Iowa R.Evid. 401. In the present case, the only fact issue is whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual activity between herself and defendant. More specifically, the issue is whether the sex acts were “done by force or against the will of the other participant.” Iowa Code § 709.4(1). The majority concludes that evidence of a prior, nonconsensual sex act committed by the defendant is relevant to prove that the sex acts in the present case were also non-consensual.
The majority’s conclusion involves a leap in logic that I am unwilling to make. The issue of consent in a sexual abuse case focuses on the alleged victim’s state of mind. I fail to see how one woman’s state of mind on a previous occasion is relevant to prove another woman’s state of mind, on a later occasion. In the abstract, it may be true that a person who has committed one sexual abuse may be more likely to commit another. However, the defendant’s acts and state of mind are not at issue in this case. The only issue involved is the alleged victim’s state of mind. Evidence of prior acts is simply irrelevant.
In addressing this issue, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, “[t]he fact that one woman was raped, however, has no tendency to prove that another woman did not consent.” Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir.1948); see also People v. Key, 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 895, 203 Cal.Rptr. 144, 148 (1984) (such evidence “is, at best, only tangentially probative” of consent issue); Meeks v. State, 249 Ind. 659, 664, 234 N.E.2d 629, 632 (1968) (“with consent being the only element at issue, the other alleged rape was irrelevant”); State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis.2d 723, 730, 324 N.W.2d 426, 429, (1982) (“Consent is unique to the individual.”).
Even if the evidence were in some sense relevant to the issue of consent its probative value is so slight, as compared to its potential prejudicial effect, that the trial court erred in admitting it under rule of evidence 403. Our cases have previously recognized that in prosecutions involving sexual abuse, evidence that a defendant has committed prior sexual abuses is highly prejudicial. State v. Spaulding, 313 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1981); State v. Cott, 283 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Iowa 1979). In Cott, we addressed the issue of whether evidence of a prior sex offense involving a child could be admitted against a defendant charged with a sex offense against a five-year-old girl. We stated:
A focus on the criminal or aberrant disposition of the defendant with regard to various victims is exactly the sort of prejudice which the general rule seeks to avoid. By creating an exception of this kind, we would seriously erode the impact of the general rule proscribing evidence of prior criminal conduct, in the context of sex crimes. The result and unfairness to those accused of sex crimes is self evident.
Cott, 283 N.W.2d at 327 (footnotes omitted).
Despite the prosecution’s claim that the challenged evidence was offered to prove lack of consent, its only possible relevance would be to prove that defendant had a bad character and acted in conformity with that character under the facts of this case. This is particularly true in regards to evidence of the extent of injury suffered by *235the prior victim. Under our rule in Barrett, the prosecution may not avoid the force of the rule excluding such evidence by seeking to bring it in under some exception to the rule. 401 N.W.2d at 187. The evidence has no relevance to the issue of consent, as that issue focuses on the alleged victim’s state of mind and not on the defendant’s state of mind or the defendant’s acts. Evidence that defendant engaged in prior nonconsensual sexual conduct does not tend to prove the state of mind of the alleged victim in this case. Furthermore, I believe that the potential prejudicial effect this evidence is obvious. It is so great as to substantially outweigh any potential probative value the evidence might have. I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence and that a new trial should be granted.
CARTER and ANDREASEN, JJ., join this dissent.