Court Opinion

ID: 9460371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:48:14.606472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:35.285729
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur completely with Judge Lay’s views. I add my individual comments solely to emphasize that the excluded testimony would have cast serious doubt on the prosecuting witness’ version of events and might well have led to the defendant’s acquittal.
Under the indictment in this case, the Government’s obligation was to prove that the defendant knowingly transported in interstate commerce a person who had been “unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise.” 18 U.S.C. § 1201. On the record in this case, the victim’s testimony relating to forcible abduction is entirely uncorroborated and somewhat suspect.1 Without doubt, its weaknesses would have been highlighted for the jury by the proffered evidence, had it been admitted.
At the close of the prosecution’s case, the defense produced three witnesses who had been the roommates of the victim at the time in question2 The trial court was extremely dubious about the admissibility of their testimony and, therefore, insisted upon hearing a voir dire examination of the witnesses outside the presence of the jury as an offer of proof before allowing them to testify. In addition to testimony about the victim’s propensity to bruise easily — which was eventually admitted — and about the *949victim’s reputation for truth and veracity — which has now been discussed at length in Judge Lay’s opinion3 — the witnesses were prepared to testify to the following:
1) That the victim claimed on an earlier occasion in Kansas City that she had been raped by a young man, and then on further questioning by her roommate later retracted the statement;
2) That, on a number of occasions, the victim had gone out to beer-bars with her roommates, but later was “picked up” by various men who were strangers to the group;
3) That the victim stayed out late at night, after hours as stipulated by school regulations, and on some occasions, all night; and
4) That, on the day following the alleged kidnap-rape, the victim displayed no signs of being upset and indeed went out to a bar and “went home with another guy” that night.4
Whether the proffered testimony on these latter four points was admissible as relevant to the issue of consent as a defense to the charge of kidnapping or as extrinsic impeachment evidence eon-tradicting statements on collateral matters made by the prosecuting witness are difficult questions which we are not called upon to answer, since the appellant does not raise them as error. But the very existence of this testimony encourages us to look more closely at the exclusion of the testimony relating to the victim’s reputation for truth and veracity.
In reviewing the record in this case, I am left with the distinct feeling that the trial judge improperly restricted the defendant’s opportunity to present an adequate defense to the charge of kidnapping. I recognize that the exclusion of the proffered testimony relating to the victim’s reputation for truth and veracity stemmed from the trial court’s concern to shield the prosecuting witness from a collateral assault upon her integrity. Yet the defendant too must be considered.
The prosecutor’s proof that the defendant had kidnapped the victim rested upon her unsupported testimony, and the defendant was entitled to contest her reliability. Since the trial court deprived him of that opportunity, reversal is clearly merited.

. According to her own testimony, the victim did not try to exit the car at any time until after the sexual act occurred, although the car repeatedly slowed for automatic traffic signals. She admits that she engaged in what appears to have been a casual conversation with the driver about her parents, her school, and other topics. Although she had told her roommates on several occasions that she bruised easily, the examining physician found her neck unmarked despite her claim that the defendant gripped her by the neck during the entire trip which started in Kansas City, Missouri, and terminated in Prairie Village, Kansas.

. Because of the trial court’s insistence that the evidence be concluded that evening —although the defense did not even begin its case until after 5 :00 P.M. — defense counsel agreed that he would rely upon the testimony of these three witnesses and forego the testimony of a fourth roommate who would have been available the next morning.

. Typical of the reputation testimony proffered was that of one former roommate who testified in part:
Q Are you acquainted with the reputation for truth and veracity of Jalaine Mo-Quay in the community and with the people with whom she was living on November 16, 1972, and shortly thereafter, and prior thereto, for several weeks?
A During that time, I would say that everybody that lived with her, in both dorms, would feel the same way I do, that nobody could believe anything she said. People didn’t even listen to her any more. They didn’t even want to talk to her.
* * *
Q Are you acquainted with her reputation for truth and veracity, then?
A Yes.
Q And what was that reputation?
A Not very good.
Another witness under cross-examination by the prosecutor explained regarding the victim:
At first she had us all pretty snowballed that she was the sweet innocent type. But later on it appeared that she had been lying to all of us. She would tell us one thing and run upstairs. and tell some more girls another thing, and she came back that was lying about us and about everybody else.

. In this connection, one witness observed: “any girl who is raped just doesn’t go home with another guy the very next night.” She contrasted the victim’s calm reaction to the alleged rape with an earlier incident when the victim went into near-hysterics when some boys had tried to break into the girls’ apartment.