Court Opinion

ID: 9957271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 21:06:01.551194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.349732
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
     in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                 2024 IL App (3d) 230219-U

                             Order filed April 3, 2024
____________________________________________________________________________

                                           IN THE

                            APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                     THIRD DISTRICT

                                             2024

GEORGE M. HATCH, LOUISE V. HATCH,          ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ROBERT V. KING, and MARGARET H.            ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
KING,                                      ) Du Page County, Illinois.
                                           )
        Plaintiffs,                        )
                                           )
        and                                )
                                           )
(Otis Dungan and Kathryn Dungan,           ) Appeal No. 3-23-0219
                                           ) Circuit No. 70-G-2266
        Intervenors-Appellants,            )
                                           )
        v.                                 )
                                           )
City of Elmhurst, a municipal corporation, ) The Honorable
                                           ) Bonnie M. Wheaton
        Defendant-Appellee).               ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________

      PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
      Justices Brennan and Peterson concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________

                                          ORDER

            Held: The trial court erred in denying a petition to intervene for purposes of
                  enforcing restrictions in the court’s prior orders because it failed to apply
                  the reasoning in Anundson v. City of Chicago, 44 Ill. 2d 491 (1970).
¶1          In 1970, the original plaintiffs, George and Louise Hatch (the Hatches), and Robert and

     Margaret King (the Kings), filed a complaint for declaratory judgment challenging the

     constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that barred them from constructing an apartment

     complex. Finding the City’s zoning ordinance unconstitutional as applied, the trial court ordered

     the City to issue the requisite construction permits and declared that the planned development

     was valid subject to specific restrictions. One of those restrictions limited construction on certain

     land to surfacing. The order retained jurisdiction over the case to enable the trial court to

     construe and enforce the order.

¶2          The appellants, Otis and Kathryn Dungan (the Dungans), sought to intervene in the

     original case in February 2023, asserting that their property interests were adversely affected by

     permits issued by the City of Elmhurst that allowed construction of structures that they believed

     ran afoul of the restrictions in the prior order. They attached two proposed filings to their

     petition, demonstrating their intent to seek the substitution of new parties for the original

     plaintiffs and to enforce the terms of the prior judgments.

¶3          The trial court denied the Dungans’ petition to intervene as of right and, alternatively, as

     a matter of discretion. We reverse and remand the cause to the trial court for additional

     proceedings.

¶4                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶5          The Dungans have owned property located at 270 West Eggleston Avenue, Elmhurst,

     Illinois, since 1995. The legal description of that property is:

            “LOT 3 OF HOFFMANN'S DIVISION OF LOT 32 OF ARGYLE ADDITION

            TO ELMHURST, A SUBDIVISION OF PART OF THE NORTHEAST

            QUARTER OF SECTION 11, TOWNSHIP 39 NORTH, RANGE 11, EAST OF

                                                       2
            THE THIRD PRINCIPAL MERIDIAN, ACCORDING TO PLAT OF SAID

            HOFFMANN'S SUBDIVISION RECORDED JUNE 30, 1924, IN BOOK 11 PLATS,

            PAGE 52, AS DOCUMENT 179562, IN DUPAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS.” (Emphasis

            added.)

¶6          The Dungans filed a petition to intervene in the Du Page County Circuit Court after the

     issuance of construction permits that allegedly violated building restrictions imposed in a 1971

     judgment order that materially benefitted their property. The 1971 order resulted from a 1969

     proposal by the four original plaintiffs, the Hatches and the Kings, to construct a 42-unit

     apartment complex on what is now called the Transite Parcel and the Wild Meadows Trace

     Parcel. After the City’s denial of those plaintiffs’ application to rezone the subject tract from

     single- to multiple-family usage, they sought declaratory judgment in August 1970, challenging

     the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance and naming the City as the sole defendant. On

     stipulated facts, the trial court entered a judgment for the Hatches and the Kings in May 1971,

     finding the City’s zoning ordinance unconstitutional as applied. The order voided the zoning

     ordinance covering the tract, enjoined the City to authorize the permits necessary for

     construction of the proposed apartments, and declared that development valid subject to the

     following limitations:

            “A. No ‘structure’ (except for surfacing) shall be erected on the following portion of the

            subject premises:

                      That portion lying West of the East line of Lot 4 in said Hoffman’s [sic]

                      Division of Lot 32 in Argyle Addition to Elmhurst extended south to the South

                      line of said parcel,

                                                       3
            Until and unless the subject premises and Lots 2, 3, and 4 in said Hoffman’s [sic]

            Division of Lot 32 in Argyle Addition to Elmhurst shall be under common ownership.”

            (Emphases added.)

     Thus, under the terms of the 1971 judgment, any construction beyond surfacing of the tract

     identified as the Transite Parcel plus 5.41 feet to its east was barred until that land, along with the

     neighboring Dungan Parcel and lots 2 and 4, were all held by a common owner.

¶7          The original plaintiffs transferred their interests in the site of the proposed apartment

     development in 1986. The proposed 42-unit complex was never built. The property was

     subsequently transferred several more times before title came to rest in NDB Trust Company of

     Illinois, as trustee, which recorded a Declaration of Condominium Ownership (Declaration) in

     1989. That Declaration created a condominium for first phase development, gave control of the

     Transite Parcel and the Wild Meadows Trace Parcel to the Wild Meadows Trace Association

     (Association), and declared easements on the Transite Parcel for the benefit of the Association.

     The Association was to govern the condominium’s common elements, including the easements

     over the Transite Parcel and the northern 48.42 feet of the Transite Parcel. A 6-unit residential

     complex was later built on the land previously approved for development.

¶8          In 1990, the City filed an unopposed motion to amend the 1971 judgment to permit the

     construction of an additional seven-townhouse building on the tract. That motion was granted,

     and the 1971 judgment was amended, retaining the prior building restrictions. The order was

     deemed an “Agreed Order to Amend Judgment Order” and provided, in pertinent part:

            “IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECLARED that the

            Judgment Order entered May 18, 1971 be, and is hereby, amended so that the maximum

            number and type of units permitted on the Subject Property shall be 13 townhouse units

                                                       4
            as set forth on the site plan, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made

            part hereof, provided that the conditions set forth in Subparagraphs A. and B., page 8 of

            the Judgment Order entered May 18, 1971 and as set forth hereinabove in Paragraph 4

            shall remain in full force and effect.

            IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECLARED that the

            Judgment Order entered May 18, 1971 shall remain in full force and effect, except as

            modified herein; and that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of the above entitled action

            for the purpose of affording the parties hereto, their successors and assigns, the

            opportunity at any future time to apply to this Court for such further orders and directions

            as may be necessary for the construction and implementation of the Judgment Order, as

            amended.” (Emphases added.)

     The site plan, referred to in the 1990 Agreed Order as ”Exhibit A,” is missing from the record

     and cannot be located. An unrelated downtown parking map is, however, attached to that order.

¶9          The diagram below shows the location of the relevant parcels.

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¶ 10               In 2017, the Transite Parcel plus the 5.41 feet of land to its east, was transferred to

       Eggleston Street LLC., which also acquired the Abutting Parcel in 2018. On December 11, 2019,

       the record reveals that an attorney from the law firm representing Eggleston obtained part of the

       underlying court file, including two copies of the 1990 Agreed Order to Amend Judgment,

       despite not having filed an appearance or having a client that was a party to the case. On that

       same day, the 1990 agreed order was refiled, bearing an e-filing stamp from the Clerk’s Office,

       but without any record of a notice of filing. Eggleston and a number of adjacent property owners

       subsequently filed a zoning application seeking conditional use permits from the City that would

       allow, in relevant part, the construction and operation of parking lots at 272 W. Eggleston

       Avenue and 276 W. Eggleston Avenue.

¶ 11               The City’s Zoning and Planning Commission held public hearings on that zoning

       application on January 20, 2021, February 2, 2021, March 16, 2021, and April 20, 2021. During

       the February 2 hearing, the Dungans’ attorney, Mark Daniel, appeared to oppose the zoning

                                                                                            6
       application. In addition, attorney Daniel submitted to the Commission a 100-page document

       entitled “Elmhurst Neighbors United (Part One) Opposition to Morecci/Roberto’s Application

       for Conditional Use” (“Opposition Document”) prior to the March 16 hearing. Daniel appeared

       again at the March 16 zoning hearing and gave an oral presentation based on the Opposition

       Document and discussing the 1970 zoning case and the resulting 1971 and 1990 judgments.

¶ 12          In 2021, the City Council approved the zoning application and adopted zoning ordinance

       No. ZO-27-2021, authorizing the changes necessary to obtain the conditional use permits needed

       to construct the parking lots. The Dungans did not seek administrative review of zoning

       ordinance No. ZO-27-2021. In 2022, the City approved permits to build the parking lots on the

       land, subject to the Association’s interest. Construction later began on a parking lot that included

       the addition of structures such as curbs, gutters, 20-foot tall light posts, fencing, and large

       stormwater conveyance and detention systems.

¶ 13          On February 2, 2023, the Dungans filed a petition to intervene in the 1970 action,

       alternatively asserting intervention as of right and by permission. The petition referred to the

       portion of the rezoned property owned by Eggleston as the “Transite Parcel” and made no

       mention of zoning ordinance ZO-27-2021. As owners of property (lot 3) named in the 1971 and

       1990 orders, the Dungans argued that intervention was necessary to protect their interests in their

       land value, the avoidance of nuisance, and neighboring residents’ welfare, health, and safety.

       They also sought to uphold the building restrictions imposed in the prior orders. They contended

       that the permitted structures violated those orders, which barred development of the Transite

       Parcel and the 5.41 feet east of the Transite Parcel with anything other than surfacing until the

       Dungan Parcel (lot 3), the Abutting Parcel, and other specified parcels were held in common

                                                         7
       ownership. It is undisputed that the parcels have never had a common owner since the entry of

       the 1971 judgment.

¶ 14           The Dungans argued that the City’s issuance of the construction permits ignored the

       restrictions in the earlier orders and demonstrated its abdication of its former role as the

       representative of neighboring landowners’ interests during the proceedings that resulted in the

       1971 and 1990 judgments. The Dungans asserted that the issuance of those permits, and

       Eggleston’s subsequent construction of elements beyond surfacing, adversely impacted them and

       their property interests.

¶ 15           Attached to their petition, the Dungans included two pleadings that they intended to file if

       their petition to intervene were allowed. Because the Hatches and the Kings no longer possessed

       any interest in the subject land, with Eggleston owning both the Transite Parcel and the Abutting

       Parcel, the Dungans sought to substitute it, Wild Meadows Trace Townhome Association, Inc.,

       and Wild Meadows Trace Condominium Association as the plaintiffs in the original case. The

       Dungans also sought an order to enforce the 1971 and 1990 judgments that precluded the

       construction of any structures other than surfacing on the Transite Parcel. Noting that the trial

       court had retained jurisdiction in both orders, they argued that, under General Motors Corp. v.

       Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (2011), a court with continuing jurisdiction could hear an action

       seeking enforcement of a prior judgment as a collateral matter. Their proposed petition to

       enforce set forth the relevant chain of title, noted the absence of the common ownership required

       prior to any construction other than surfacing on the subject tract, and sought relief that would

       prevent Eggleston from making additional improvements.

¶ 16           In its 200-page response, the City contested factual matters pertaining to its new zoning

       ordinance (ZO-27-2021), which was necessary to issue the construction permits. It argued that

                                                         8
       the petition to intervene was untimely and that the zoning change was permissible as a valid use

       of its legislative authority, despite the limitations set out in the1971 and 1990 orders. The City

       also contended that the petition to intervene was, in effect, a challenge to the new zoning

       ordinance after the Dungans failed to seek administrative review of that change. In their reply,

       the Dungans denied that contention.

¶ 17          On April 13, 2023, the trial court denied the Dungans’ petition to intervene as well as

       their subsequent request for leave to amend their petition, citing the rationale in its prior oral

       ruling. The written order stated, “Denial of the Petition to Intervene *** operates without

       prejudice to the initiation or continuation of litigation in a new lawsuit, provided, however, that

       this Order is final and appealable pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 and 303.”

¶ 18          In its oral ruling, the trial court questioned whether the Dungans had any rights under the

       prior orders when the original plaintiffs and their successors in title were no longer parties to the

       case. The court also believed that allowing the Dungans to intervene and substitute party

       plaintiffs would greatly expand the issues presented beyond those considered by the court in

       1971, 1990, and 2019, when the 1990 amended order was refiled. In its oral ruling, the trial court

       concluded that it did not “believe that it is necessary or desirable to allow the intervention in this

       case when the issues are so diametrically and wildly different than they were before the Court in

       those three previous years in which the judgment was entered or amended.”

¶ 19          Without permission to intervene, the Dungans were barred from obtaining leave to file

       either their motion to substitute parties or their petition to enforce the prior judgments.

       Consequently, they filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of their petition to intervene.

¶ 20                                             II. ANALYSIS

                                                         9
¶ 21           The Dungans raise two closely related issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred

       in denying their petition to intervene as a matter of right (735 ILCS 5/2-408(a) (West 2022)); and

       (2) whether the trial court erred in denying their petition to intervene by permission (735 ILCS

       5/2-408(b) (West 2022)). We review the denial of a petition to intervene for an abuse of the trial

       court’s discretion. A & R Janitorial v. Pepper Construction Co., 2018 IL 123220, ¶ 15 (stating

       that “[a] trial court's decision whether to allow intervention will not be reversed on appeal unless

       the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] It is always an abuse of discretion for a trial court to

       base a decision on an incorrect view of the law”). Due to the extensive overlap in the parties’

       arguments on the two issues, we will address them together.

¶ 22           “In determining whether to allow a petition to intervene, the circuit court ‘must consider

       whether the petition to intervene is timely, whether the petitioner's interest is sufficient, and

       whether that interest is being adequately represented by someone else in the lawsuit.’ ” Winders

       v. People, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 13 (quoting Soyland Power Co-operative, Inc. v. Illinois

       Power Co., 213 Ill. App. 3d 916, 918 (1991)). Intervention after judgment is entered may be

       allowed when the failure to intervene prior to the entry of judgment is justified or when

       intervention is the only way to protect the rights of the party seeking to intervene. Id. ¶ 14.

¶ 23           To support their petition, the Dungans rely on our supreme court’s decision in Anundson

       v. City of Chicago, 44 Ill. 2d 491 (1970), a case not discussed by either the trial court or the City.

       The facts in Anundson strongly parallel those in the instant appeal. In 1962, the trial court found

       portions of a Chicago zoning ordinance unconstitutional as applied to land owned by the

       Anundsons. The judgment order granted them and their successors the right to construct a

       mixed-use building that adhered to specified parameters, including the provision of off-street

       parking, and expressly retained jurisdiction to address future enforcement issues.

                                                         10
¶ 24             Construction on the building began in 1964, shortly after the issuance of the necessary

       construction permits. After construction started, an adjoining landowner complained to the Chief

       Building Inspector of the City of Chicago about violations, and an order stopping all work was

       issued but later rescinded. The neighbor later sent a second letter to the Building Inspector that

       went unanswered. He then filed a formal complaint with City officials, challenging the absence

       of the required off-street parking in the new construction. After being informed that no corrective

       action was planned, the neighbor filed a petition in the circuit court in 1966 that was treated as a

       petition to intervene in the original action. The petition alleged that the construction violated the

       court’s 1962 decree because it included an unauthorized meeting hall and roof garden and failed

       to provide for the mandated parking facilities. The complaint did not challenge the provisions of

       the 1962 degree or seek to alter it. The trial court subsequently dismissed the petition. Anundson,

       44 Ill. 2d at 494-96. The appellate court reversed and remanded the cause with directions to

       enjoin construction until it complied with the restrictions in the 1962 decree. Anundson, 44 Ill. 2d

       at 494.

¶ 25             In upholding the appellate judgment, the supreme court rejected timeliness and

       jurisdictional arguments similar to those raised by the City here. Anundson, 44 Ill. 2d at 495. The

       court found that the neighboring landowner had a sufficient private interest to permit

       intervention, citing its holding in Bredberg v. City of Wheaton, 24 Ill. 2d 612 (1962). There, the

       court declared that adjoining landowners whose rights could be harmed were entitled to

       intervene because their interests exceeded those of the general public. In reaching that

       conclusion, the court recognized that “a municipality, concerned primarily with the maintaining

       of the municipality-wide zoning pattern, might inadvertently compromise or neglect the rights of

       adjoining landowners.” Anundson, 44 Ill. 2d at 495-96. Under “the liberal provisions” of the

                                                         11
       intervention statute, Illinois courts could act to protect the rights of adjoining landowners by

       permitting intervention. Anundson, 44 Ill. 2d at 496.

¶ 26          The court also rejected as overly narrow the claim that its retained jurisdiction extended

       “solely” to the original plaintiffs, barring any others from intervening. Rather, the original trial

       court had more broadly “retained jurisdiction to enforce its decree, and legal standing to enforce

       it was not limited to the plaintiffs.” Anundson, 44 Ill. 2d at 496.

¶ 27          The analysis in Anundson governs the outcome of the instant case. The Dungans’ alleged

       that they owned land adjoining the subject property and asserted that the construction of the

       parking lot, an alleged violation of the 1971 and 1990 orders, would damage their private

       interests. The uniqueness of their interest in the enforcement of those orders is further evinced by

       the orders’ specific references to their lot. Although the City may have provided adequate

       representation of neighboring landowners’ interests during the original proceedings and its

       subsequent unilateral pursuit of an amended order, its adoption of the new zoning ordinance and

       issuance of the conditional use permit were sufficient to establish its abdication of that role. See

       Anundson, 44 Ill. 2d at 495-96 (recognizing that “a municipality, concerned primarily with the

       maintaining of the municipality-wide zoning pattern, might inadvertently compromise or neglect

       the rights of adjoining landowners”). Here, as in Anundson, the trial court expressly retained

       jurisdiction to address issues involving the enforcement and construction of its prior orders. The

       proposed pleadings attached to the Dungans’ petition to intervene demonstrated their intent to

       seek enforcement of those building restrictions. Thus, the facts in this case fall squarely within

       the scope of the discussion in Anundson.

¶ 28          Nonetheless, the City argues that the petition to intervene was untimely because the

       Dungans, who took title to their land in 1995, could have intervened long before 2023. The court

                                                         12
       in Anundson rejected a nearly identical argument. In rejecting that claim, the Anundson court

       distinguished between potential litigants who sought to change or re-adjudicate the original

       judgment and those, like the neighboring landowner, who merely sought to enforce its terms “in

       accordance with the reservation of jurisdiction to grant such relief.” Anundson, 44 Ill. 2d at 496-

       97. Both the Dungans and the petitioner in Anundson fall into the latter group.

¶ 29           Anundson also rejected the claim that the intervenor should have acted earlier by noting

       that the “adjoining landowners had no reason to suspect there would be any violation of the

       decree” during the nearly two years of “nonactivity” that followed the entry of the 1962 decree.

       Anundson, 44 Ill. 2d at 497. After the adjoining landowner observed violations of that order

       during the construction process, he promptly complained to the City and continued to pursue

       those claims for over a year. “When the [adjoining landowner] determined that his administrative

       complaints concerning the failure to provide parking facilities would be ineffectual,” he properly

       sought judicial relief “without undue delay,” making his petition to intervene timely. Anundson,

       44 Ill. 2d at 497.

¶ 30           Here, the subject parcel remained vacant for decades after the Dungans took title to their

       land, giving them no reason to seek intervention. As soon as they became aware of activity that

       they believed violated the prior orders, the Dungans objected. After learning that Eggleston was

       seeking zoning changes and a conditional use permit that would allow construction of structures

       that could violate the prior orders, they strenuously objected before the Planning and Zoning

       Commission on multiple occasions. Their counsel appeared at multiple Commission hearings

       and submitted extensive written arguments and oral presentations in opposition to the proposed

       zoning changes and permit. Although those efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, they

                                                       13
       demonstrate the affirmative steps that the Dungans took to protect their interests at the earliest

       possible opportunity.

¶ 31          Later, after the Dungans became aware of construction activity that they believed

       violated the court’s prior orders, they again acted without delay by filing their petition to

       intervene. As in Anundson, 44 Ill. 2d at 497, the facts here demonstrate that the Dungans acted

       “without undue delay” after determining that their objections “would be ineffectual.” Thus, their

       petition to intervene was timely filed.

¶ 32          Nonetheless, the City claims that the Dungans’ attempt to intervene were actually a

       belated challenge to the new zoning ordinance and the construction permits issued to Eggleston

       after they failed to seek timely administrative review. We are not persuaded by that

       characterization. Administrative review actions and petitions to intervene involve entirely

       different issues, standards, and burdens of proof. They are not interchangeable. To be allowed to

       intervene, the Dungans needed only show that their petition was timely, their interest in the

       underlying matter was adequate, and their interests would not be represented in the absence of

       intervention. See Winders, 2015 IL App (3d) 140798, ¶ 13 (stating the showing necessary for

       intervention). In contrast, an administrative review proceeding would have been focused on the

       actions taken by the City and the Planning and Zoning Commission. We conclude that the

       Dungans’ petition to intervene is not an improper attempt to overcome their failure to seek

       administrative review.

¶ 33          In the trial court’s oral ruling, it expressed additional concerns underlying its decision to

       deny intervention, including the absence of any continued involvement by the original plaintiffs

       or their successors. That concern was dispelled by the Dungans’ proposed substitution motion. In

       that motion, they asked to substitute new parties that possessed current interests in the property

                                                        14
       for the original plaintiffs, who had long ago sold their interests. Thus, the grant of the

       substitution motion proposed by the Dungans would have resolved the trial court’s concerns. In

       the absence of leave to intervene, however, the Dungans were unable to file that substitution

       motion.

¶ 34          The trial court also premised its denial of the petition to intervene on its belief that the

       issues the Dungans raised were “so diametrically and wildly different than they were before the

       Court in those three previous years in which the judgment was entered or amended” that the

       scope and complication of the original case would be greatly, and unnecessarily, expanded. Once

       again, the attachments to the Dungans’ petition to intervene adequately addressed that concern.

       The attached copy of the Dungans’ proposed enforcement action demonstrated their intent to

       seek only enforcement of the building restrictions in the prior orders. As in Anundson, 494 Ill. 2d

       at 496, they were not seeking to re-adjudicate or modify those orders. Because the trial court

       expressly retained jurisdiction to address future issues regarding the enforcement of its orders,

       the Dungans’ proposed enforcement action properly invoked the court’s continuing jurisdiction.

       Accordingly, allowing the Dungans to intervene would not have unnecessarily expanded or

       complicated the issues in the case, contrary to the trial court’s oral finding. We hold that the facts

       of this case fall squarely within the scope of the rationale in Anundson.

¶ 35          In lieu of addressing the reasoning in Anundson, however, the City relies on the reasoning

       in People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 243 Ill. App. 3d 544 (1993), Seger v.

       Du Page County, 58 Ill. App. 3d 858 (1978), and Moran v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 74 Ill.

       App. 3d 964 (1979). After reviewing those decisions, we conclude that all of them are factually

       distinguishable and fail to support the City’s contentions here.

                                                         15
¶ 36          In Hartigan, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 547, the court found that the reason underlying the

       petitioner’s petition to intervene was at cross-purposes with the trial court’s retained jurisdiction.

       The court had retained jurisdiction “to implement and administer a refund as outlined in its May

       1986 stay order,” but the petitioner sought intervention “for the limited purpose of clarifying and

       amending the RMO as to the tax consequences.” Thus, the petitioner’s intent to seek changes to

       the order were outside the scope of the court’s retained jurisdiction. Here, in contrast, the

       intervenors sought to enforce the limitations in the court’s prior orders, a purpose that falls

       completely within the scope of the trial court’s retained jurisdiction.

¶ 37          Turning to Seger, the trial court had issued a declaratory judgment order permitting

       limited mining operations to be conducted until a specified date and had retained jurisdiction “to

       interpret and enforce all provisions.” The order was later modified to extend the operation’s

       termination date, with the apparent consent of the parties. Seger, 58 Ill. App. 3d at 859, 862. The

       intervenors were adjoining property owners who sought to join the case about 15 months later.

       They raised three arguments: (1) the trial court’s modification was void because it lacked

       jurisdiction; (2) the mining operation did not adhere to the order’s depth limitations; and (3) the

       operation violated the constitution because it “amount[ed] to a nuisance diminishing their

       property values.” Seger, 58 Ill. App. 3d at 859-60. After determining that the order did not

       contain the limitations on mining depths asserted by the petitioners, the appellate court upheld

       the denial of the petition to intervene as untimely because it could have been filed during the

       pendency of the prior proceedings. Seger, 58 Ill. App. 3d at 861. Here, however, the intervenors

       could not have sought to intervene in the prior proceedings because they did not acquire title to

       their property until 1995, well after the completion of those proceedings.

                                                         16
¶ 38          The facts in Moran are even more disparate. There, the plaintiffs sought the equitable

       distribution of settlement proceeds from a contract dispute but never filed a petition to intervene.

       Instead, they contended that intervention was unnecessary because “they were at all times parties

       to the entire consolidated action and hence there was no need to file a petition to intervene.”

       Moran, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 974. The court rejected that claim as unsupported by the record,

       concluding that the plaintiffs “were never parties in the breach of contract action wherein they

       alleged a settlement had been made” and “were attempting to do by indirection what they had

       been precluded from doing by direction.” Moran, 74 Ill. App. 3d at 974. The reasoning in that

       case has no application to the instant appeal. Thus, the reasoning in all three of the cases cited by

       the City is inapt, and we decline to follow it.

¶ 39          Finally, the City attempts to argue that the construction restrictions in the 1971 and 1990

       orders were void ab initio because they went beyond the scope of the original 1970 complaint.

       The trial court did not reach that argument in its ruling on the petition to intervene, instead

       denying the petition on other grounds. We decline to address it for the first time on appeal. If the

       defendants choose to raise that claim again on remand, the trial court may address it at that time.

¶ 40                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41          Because Anundson governs the facts in this case, the trial court erred in denying the

       Dungans’ petition to intervene. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of that petition and remand

       the cause to the Du Page County Circuit Court for additional proceedings.

¶ 42          Reversed and remanded.

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