Court Opinion

ID: 9899219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 16:00:47.413489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:55.418802
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1903    Document: 29    Page: 1   Filed: 11/16/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

         BARRDAY, INC., BARRDAY CORP.,
               Plaintiffs-Appellants

                            v.

                LINCOLN FABRICS INC.,
                    Defendant-Appellee
                  ______________________

                        2022-1903
                  ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Western District of New York in No. 1:15-cv-00165-LJV-
 MJR, Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo.
                 ______________________

                Decided: November 16, 2023
                  ______________________

     MICHAEL J. BERCHOU, Harter Secrest & Emery, Buf-
 falo, NY, argued for plaintiffs-appellants.

    ROBERT J. FLUSKEY, JR., Hodgson Russ LLP, Buffalo,
 NY, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
 CHARLES RAUCH.
                 ______________________

 Before HUGHES, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
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 2                           BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CUNNINGHAM.
         Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge STARK.
 CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
     Barrday, Inc. and Barrday Corp. (collectively,
 “Barrday”) appeal from the stipulated final judgment of
 noninfringement of the United States District Court for the
 Western District of New York, which was entered in favor
 of Lincoln Fabrics Inc. (“Lincoln”) as to two of Barrday’s
 patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 8,573,261 and 9,127,379 (collec-
 tively, the “Asserted Patents”). See J.A. 1–4. The stipu-
 lated final judgment of noninfringement was predicated on
 the district court’s construction of the securing yarns claim
 term. See Barrday, Inc. v. Lincoln Fabrics Inc., No. 15-CV-
 165-LJV-JWF, 2021 WL 3076869 (W.D.N.Y. July 21, 2021)
 (“Claim Construction Order”); Barrday, Inc. v. Lincoln Fab-
 rics Inc., No. 15-CV-165-LJV-JWF, 2021 WL 8263498
 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2021) (“Clarification Order”). Because
 the district court did not err in its construction of the se-
 curing yarns claim term, we affirm the district court’s judg-
 ment of noninfringement of the Asserted Patents.
                        I.    BACKGROUND
                    A. The Asserted Patents
      The Asserted Patents, both entitled “Woven Multi-
 Layer Fabrics and Methods of Fabricating Same,” cover
 certain woven, multi-layer fabrics used in ballistic applica-
 tions. See, e.g., ’261 patent col. 10 ll. 10–25; see also id. col.
 1 ll. 15–17, col. 2 ll. 12–13. 1 The fabrics comprise an upper
 (or first) layer and a lower (or second) layer, where each
 layer is made up of “warp” and “weft” yarns. Id. col. 2 ll.
 14–31. “Warp” and “weft” refer to yarn direction, with

     1    Because the Asserted Patents are related and
 share a specification, we generally cite to the specification
 of the ’261 patent.
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 warp yarns “run[ning] lengthwise along the fabric” and
 weft yarns “run[ning] across the length of the fabric” such
 that they “are interwoven with and generally perpendicu-
 lar to the warp yarns.” Id. col. 1 ll. 23–26; see also id. col.
 5 ll. 55–58. The upper and lower layers are “secured to-
 gether” by “securing yarns.” Id. col. 2 ll. 42–46.
     Figure 1 shows an embodiment with “an overhead per-
 spective view”:

 Id. fig. 1, col. 1 ll. 55–56. “[T]he woven fabric 10 is formed
 by interweaving the securing yarns 22 with” the upper
 warp yarns 12, lower warp yarns 15, upper weft yarns 14,
 and lower weft yarns 17 “as the fabric 10 is formed.” Id.
 col. 2 ll. 48–50; see also id. col. 2 ll. 14–31.
     The Asserted Patents each have only one independent
 claim, and both of these independent asserted claims con-
 tain the disputed “securing yarns” claim term. See id. col.
 10 ll. 10–25; ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 9–23. Independent claim
 1 of the ’379 patent recites:
     1. A multi-layer ballistic woven fabric, comprising:
         a. an upper woven layer having upper warp
         yarns and upper weft yarns that are inter-
         woven together;
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 4                      BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

         b. a lower woven layer having lower warp
         yarns and lower weft yarns that are inter-
         woven together;
         c. a plurality of securing yarns, each secur-
         ing yarn interwoven with at least some of
         the upper yarns and some of the lower yarns
         so as to secure the upper and lower woven
         layers together;
         d. wherein the multi-layer ballistic woven
         fabric is formed by interweaving the secur-
         ing yarns with the warp yarns and weft
         yarns as the upper woven layer and lower
         woven layer are made: and further wherein
         at least some of the upper and lower yarns
         are offset from each other so as to overlap
         by more than 10%.
 ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 9–23 (emphasis added to relevant lim-
 itation). Independent claim 1 of the ’261 patent contains
 the same relevant limitation. See ’261 patent col. 10 ll. 15–
 18.
     Dependent claims 10 through 14 of the ’379 patent, re-
 cited below, also contain limitations relevant to the claim
 construction issue on appeal:
     10. The multi-layer ballistic woven fabric of claim
     1, wherein the securing yarns include one or more
     of the upper warp yarns, the lower warp yarns, the
     upper weft yarns and the lower weft yarns.
     11. The multi-layer ballistic woven fabric of claim
     1, wherein the securing yarns include one or more
     of the upper warp yarns and the upper weft yarns.
     12. The multi-layer ballistic woven fabric of claim
     1, wherein the securing yarns include one or more
     of the lower warp yarns and the lower weft yarns.
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     13. The multi-layer ballistic woven fabric of claim
     1, wherein the securing yarns include one or more
     of the upper warp yarns and the lower warp yarns.
     14. The multi-layer ballistic woven fabric of claim
     1, wherein the securing yarns include one or more
     of the upper weft yarns and the lower weft yarns.
 ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 52–67 (emphases added to relevant
 limitations).
                   B. Procedural History
      On February 24, 2015, Barrday sued Lincoln, alleging
 that Lincoln’s fabrics infringed one or more claims of the
 ’261 patent. See J.A. 54–58. In response, Lincoln sent a
 letter to Barrday on March 10, 2015, explaining that
 Barrday lacked a reasonable basis for suit because the ac-
 cused Lincoln fabrics interweave the upper (or first) and
 lower (or second) layers without using securing yarns. See
 J.A. 559–60. A few weeks later, on April 2, 2015, Barrday
 amended the claims of the pending patent application that
 issued as the ’379 patent, including by adding the claims
 that issued as dependent claims 10 through 14. See J.A.
 567; see also J.A. 564, 572, 574. After this amendment, the
 examiner issued a notice of allowance; the ’379 patent is-
 sued; and Barrday filed an amended complaint to add in-
 fringement allegations for the ’379 patent. See J.A. 82, 86–
 87. 2
     In July 2021, the district court issued its claim con-
 struction order, construing securing yarns to mean “yarns,

     2   We take judicial notice of the relevant portions of
 the publicly-accessible ’379 patent file history not included
 in the appellate record. See, e.g., Hoganas AB v. Dresser
 Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 954 n.27 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations
 omitted); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus.,
 Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 514 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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 6                       BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 other than yarns from the upper and lower woven layers,
 that secure the upper and lower woven layers together.”
 Claim Construction Order at *13–14. In doing so, the dis-
 trict court adopted in substantial part Lincoln’s proposed
 construction. See id. at *6, *14; J.A. 542. The district court
 rejected Barrday’s argument that no construction was nec-
 essary, Claim Construction Order at *6 n.4, and rejected
 Barrday’s alternative proposed construction of “yarns for
 securing or holding upper and lower woven layers to-
 gether.” J.A. 200; Claim Construction Order at *6. Subse-
 quently, Barrday filed a motion for clarification of the claim
 construction order, which the district court denied. See
 J.A. 768–76; Clarification Order at *1–2.
     Following the district court’s orders, the parties stipu-
 lated to noninfringement of the asserted claims of the As-
 serted Patents based on the district court’s securing yarns
 construction, and the district court entered final judgment
 in accordance with the stipulation on May 12, 2022. See
 J.A. 1–4.
                       II. DISCUSSION
     Barrday presents only one issue on appeal: whether
 the district court erred in construing securing yarns as
 “yarns, other than yarns from the upper and lower woven
 layers, that secure the upper and lower woven layers to-
 gether.” See Claim Construction Order at *13–14; Appel-
 lants’ Br. 18–21. We agree with the district court’s
 construction.
                   A. Standard of Review
     “Where the district court’s claim construction relies
 only on intrinsic evidence,” as is the case here, “the con-
 struction is a legal determination reviewed de novo.” Poly-
 Am., L.P. v. API Indus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1135–36 (Fed.
 Cir. 2016) (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
 574 U.S. 318, 331–33 (2015)); see also Allergan Sales, LLC
 v. Sandoz, Inc., 935 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
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 (citation omitted). “Claim terms are generally given their
 ordinary and customary meaning, which is the meaning
 they would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at
 the time of the invention.” Poly-Am., 839 F.3d at 1136 (cit-
 ing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed.
 Cir. 2005) (en banc)). The skilled artisan “is deemed to
 read a claim term not only in the context of the particular
 claim in which it appears, but in the context of the entire
 patent” and terms are interpreted in view of “the intrinsic
 evidence of record, including the written description, the
 drawings, and the prosecution history.” Allergan, 935 F.3d
 at 1373 (cleaned up).
                   B. Claim Construction
     The crux of the parties’ dispute is whether the securing
 yarns claim term can include yarns from the upper and
 lower woven layers when such yarns are serving the secur-
 ing function. See Appellants’ Br. 18; Appellee’s Br. 13.
 Barrday first argues that the district court should not have
 construed the securing yarns claim term because no con-
 struction is required. See Appellants’ Br. 18. Alterna-
 tively, Barrday contends that the intrinsic evidence does
 not support the district court’s construction and rather sup-
 ports its proposed construction: “yarns for securing or
 holding upper and lower woven layers together.” Id. at 25;
 see also id. at 21, 41–42. Under Barrday’s proposed con-
 struction and contrary to the district court’s construction,
 securing yarns include, rather than exclude, yarns from the
 upper and lower layers. See id. at 25, 38; Appellants’ Reply
 Br. 5. We address each argument in turn.
     Barrday first contends that the securing yarns claim
 term requires no construction “[g]iven the language of the
 claims.” Appellants’ Br. 25; see also id. at 23–24. We disa-
 gree. “When the parties present a fundamental dispute re-
 garding the scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to
 resolve it.” Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. Silver Spring
 Networks, Inc., 815 F.3d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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 8                      BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 (quoting O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech.
 Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Though the par-
 ties agree that “securing yarns” secure the upper and lower
 woven layers together, they dispute whether the term ap-
 plies to warp and weft yarns from the upper and lower lay-
 ers when such yarns are serving the securing function. See
 Appellants’ Br. 18; Appellee’s Br. 13, 17–18. In other
 words, the dispute is whether the securing yarns are sepa-
 rate from the yarns of the upper and lower layers. See Ap-
 pellants’ Br. 18; Appellee’s Br. 13, 17–18. Because the
 parties raise “a fundamental dispute regarding the scope”
 of securing yarns, it was proper for the district court—and
 is now proper for this court—to resolve the dispute. See
 Eon, 815 F.3d at 1318 (quoting O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1362);
 Claim Construction Order at *5–14 & n.4.
     Moving to Barrday’s challenge to the district court’s
 construction and starting with the claim language, as-
 serted independent claims 1 of the Asserted Patents con-
 tain the identical relevant limitation: “a plurality of
 securing yarns, each securing yarn interwoven with at
 least some of the upper yarns and some of the lower yarns
 so as to secure the upper and lower woven layers together.”
 ’261 patent col. 10 ll. 15–18; ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 14–17.
 Barrday concedes that these claims refer to the upper
 yarns, lower yarns, and securing yarns as “separate struc-
 tural limitations.” Oral Arg. at 5:42–53, https://oralargu-
 ments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=22-1903_0504202
 3.mp3; see also id. at 4:35–43 (Barrday admitting same).
 Where a claim lists elements separately, as done here,
 there is “a presumption that those components are dis-
 tinct.” Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade
 Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citation
 omitted); see also Helmsderfer v. Bobrick Washroom
 Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Our
 precedent instructs that different claim terms are pre-
 sumed to have different meanings.”) (citations omitted).
 Moreover, it would be “nonsensical” to interpret yarns from
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 the upper and lower layers as the same structure as the
 securing yarns when these distinct terms are used and
 these yarns are “interwoven with” one another as claimed.
 See Neville v. Found. Constructors, Inc., 972 F.3d 1350,
 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (finding it would be
 “nonsensical” to construe an “end plate” as an indistin-
 guishable part of a “protrusion” because the latter was “ex-
 tending outwardly” from the former as claimed).
 Therefore, the language of the independent claims sup-
 ports the district court’s securing yarns construction ex-
 cluding yarns from the upper and lower layers.
       The specification, which is often “the single best guide
 to the meaning of a disputed term,” similarly supports the
 district court’s construction. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315
 (citation omitted). The specification exclusively refers to
 securing yarns as structures that are separate and distinct
 from warp and weft yarns of the upper and lower layers.
 See, e.g., ’261 patent col. 8 ll. 17–19 (“The upper and lower
 woven layers 411, 413 are secured together using one or
 more securing yarns 422[.]”); id. col. 5 ll. 49–52 (“The first
 [i.e., upper] and second [i.e., lower] layers 111, 113 are se-
 cured together by securing yarns 122 that are interwoven
 with the first and second warp and weft yarns as the fabric
 110 is woven together.”); id. col. 2 ll. 66–col. 3 l. 2 (“[T]he
 securing yarns 22 may be generally parallel to or aligned
 with the warp yarns 12, 15 and generally perpendicular to
 the weft yarns 14, 17.”). Furthermore, in at least some em-
 bodiments, the specification repeatedly describes the se-
 curing yarns as having different characteristics from the
 warp and weft yarns of the upper and lower layers. See,
 e.g., id. col. 4 ll. 23–26 (“[T]he securing yarns 22 are gener-
 ally of significantly smaller denier than the warp yarns 12,
 15 and/or weft yarns 14, 17 and may have significantly
 lower tenacities and tensile moduli.”); id. col. 4 ll. 42–44
 (“[T]he securing yarns 22 may be generally of a much
 smaller size than the warp yarns 12, 15 and weft yarns 14,
 17.”).
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 10                       BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

      “Where, as here, a patent repeatedly and consistently
 characterizes a claim term in a particular way, it is proper
 to construe the claim term in accordance with that charac-
 terization.” Wis. Alumni Rsch. Found. v. Apple Inc., 905
 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
 and citation omitted). The specification’s “clear, repeated,
 and consistent statements” treating the securing yarns as
 “different and distinct” from the warp and weft yarns of the
 upper and lower layers and statements describing how the
 characteristics of the yarns are different supports a secur-
 ing yarns construction that excludes yarns from the upper
 and lower layers. See SkinMedica, Inc. v. Histogen Inc.,
 727 F.3d 1187, 1203–04 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Wis.
 Alumni, 905 F.3d at 1351–52; In re Abbott Diabetes Care
 Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
     And even more notably, the specification expressly crit-
 icizes the interweaving practice where securing yarns in-
 clude yarns of the upper and lower layers—i.e., the
 construction proposed by Barrday and endorsed by the dis-
 sent. This excerpt states:
      Generally, the yarns of one layer are not interwoven
      with the yarns of another layer because such inter-
      weaving tends to increase the degree of crimp for
      the yarn in relation to [the] rest of the yarns in the
      fabric, which can create ballistic weak points. In
      particular, the first or upper yarns 12, 14 are not
      interwoven with the second or lower yarns 15, 17,
      and vice versa. Instead, as shown, the first or upper
      layer 11 and second or lower layer 13 are secured
      together by one or more securing yarns 22. The se-
      curing yarns 22 are interwoven with at least some
      of the upper yarns 12, 14 and some of the lower
      yarns 15, 17 so as to secure the upper and lower
      layers 11, 13 together.
 ’261 patent col. 2 ll. 36–46 (emphases added). As Barrday
 concedes, this excerpt describes the advantages of
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                        11

 interweaving with securing yarns that are distinct from
 yarns of the upper and lower layers. See Appellants’ Reply
 Br. 9.
      Although Barrday argues that this excerpt does not
 “amount to an express disavowal of claim scope,” Appel-
 lants’ Br. 34, “[o]ur case law does not require explicit re-
 definition or disavowal.” Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of
 N.Y. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
 2016) (citation omitted). “When the scope of the invention
 is clearly stated in the specification, and is described as the
 advantage and distinction of the invention,” as is the case
 here, “it is not necessary to disavow explicitly a different
 scope.” Id. at 1364 (quoting On Demand Mach. Corp. v.
 Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
 The “repeated description” of securing yarns as separate
 and distinct structures from yarns of the upper and lower
 layers, the “extolling of the virtues” of separate securing
 yarns, and the “criticism” of the interweaving practice
 where securing yarns include yarns of the upper and lower
 layers “clearly point to the conclusion” that the construc-
 tion of securing yarns excludes yarns from the upper and
 lower layers. See UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co.,
 816 F.3d 816, 823 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
      The Asserted Patents’ figures further support the dis-
 trict court’s securing yarns construction that excludes
 yarns from the upper and lower layers. Each of the nine
 figures depicts securing yarns as separate from yarns of the
 upper and lower layers. See ’261 patent figs. 1–9, col. 1 l.
 51–col. 2 l. 8. Indeed, Barrday and the dissent concede that
 none of the nine figures “show[s] an embodiment in which
 the securing yarns include upper or lower warp or weft
 yarns.” Appellants’ Reply Br. 11; see also Oral Arg. at 2:38–
 47 (Barrday admitting that “[t]here’s no figure that shows
 the use of the warp and weft yarns . . . as securing yarns.”);
 Dissent at 10 (“I recognize that all of the figures in the spec-
 ification only depict embodiments in which the securing
 yarns are separate from the warp and weft yarns.”). Where
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 12                      BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 each figure in the asserted patent aligns with a particular
 construction, as is the case here, such figures offer further
 support for that particular construction. See, e.g., Ad-
 vanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc., 808 F.3d
 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s con-
 struction because, in part, the “construction [wa]s sup-
 ported by . . . every figure” and “patent drawings are highly
 relevant in construing the limitations of the claims”) (em-
 phasis in original) (cleaned up); ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris
 Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
 Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 822 F.3d 1312,
 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839
 F.3d 1034, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Barrday conceded as
 much at oral argument, agreeing that “all of the figures in
 the [Asserted] Patents support the district court’s claim
 construction.” Oral Arg. at 2:27–37.
     In the face of such overwhelming intrinsic evidence
 supporting the district court’s securing yarns construction,
 Barrday directs this court to a specification excerpt and
 certain dependent claims of the ’379 patent as the intrinsic
 support for its proposed construction. See Oral Arg. at
 8:20–58. Neither undermines the district court’s construc-
 tion. The specification excerpt on which Barrday relies
 states:
      In some embodiments, one or more of the warp
      yarns 12, 15 and/or weft yarns 14, 17 could be used
      in addition to, or in place of, one or more securing
      yarns 22 for holding the two or more layers to-
      gether. For example, one or more the [sic] of the
      warp yarns 12, 15 and/or weft yarns 14, 17 could
      be interwoven along a path similar to the path of
      the securing yarn 22 as shown in FIG. 2 to secure
      the first layer 11 to the second layer 13.
 ’261 patent col. 3 ll. 35–42 (emphasis added); see Appel-
 lants’ Br. 26–27, 38. Barrday contends that this excerpt
 “spells out exactly how the warp and weft yarn may be used
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                       13

 as a securing yarn.” Appellants’ Br. 26. However, as the
 district court correctly explained, “the relevant question is
 one of definition, not function.” Claim Construction Order
 at *10. Although this excerpt suggests that warp and weft
 yarns of the upper and lower layers can be substituted for
 and serve as the functional equivalent of securing yarns, it
 does not indicate that the latter refers to the former.
      Although Barrday argues that the district court’s con-
 struction “exclude[s] the embodiment” disclosed in this ex-
 cerpt where the yarns of the upper and lower layers are
 substituted for the securing yarns, see Appellants’ Br. 38,
 “[o]ur precedent is replete with examples of subject matter
 that is included in the specification, but is not claimed.”
 TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d
 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (refusing “to
 construe the claim term to encompass the alternative em-
 bodiment” because such a construction “would contradict
 the language of the claims” and “the [other] intrinsic evi-
 dence”); see also Kyocera, 22 F.4th at 1382–83 (similar).
 “[T]he mere fact that there is an alternative embodiment
 disclosed [here] that is not encompassed by [the] district
 court’s claim construction does not outweigh the language
 of the claim, especially when the court’s construction is
 supported by the intrinsic evidence.” TIP, 529 F.3d at
 1373. Additionally, on the other hand, Barrday contends
 that the district court’s construction erroneously reads in a
 limitation from the specification—namely, “other than
 yarns from the upper and lower woven layers.” Appellants’
 Br. 32; see also id. at 33–35. We disagree. “[R]ather than
 improperly reading a limitation . . . into the claims, the dis-
 trict court’s construction, with which we agree, properly
 reads the claim term in the context of the entire patent.”
 Wis. Alumni, 905 F.3d at 1352.
     Aside from the specification excerpt on which Barrday
 relies, Barrday points to the independent-dependent claim
 structure of the ’379 patent as alleged support for its pro-
 posed construction. See Appellants’ Br. 32; see also id. at
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 14                      BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 27–31, 39–42. Dependent claims 10 through 14 of the ’379
 patent, each of which relies on independent claim 1, recite
 that “the securing yarns include” various combinations of
 upper warp yarns, upper weft yarns, lower warp yarns, and
 lower weft yarns. See ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 52–67. Barrday
 argues that the securing yarns term recited in the inde-
 pendent claim must therefore include the upper warp
 yarns, upper weft yarns, lower warp yarns, and lower weft
 yarns terms recited in the dependent claims. See Appel-
 lants’ Br. 24–25, 27–29. Barrday also contends that the
 district court’s construction violates this court’s precedent
 discouraging constructions that render dependent claims
 “meaningless” because the district court’s construction ren-
 ders dependent claims 10 through 14 of the ’379 patent
 meaningless. See id. at 27–29 (first citing Littelfuse, Inc. v.
 Mersen USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
 2022); then citing Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 972 F.3d
 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020); then citing Intell. Ventures I
 LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 902 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
 2018); then citing Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan
 Labys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008); and then
 citing Wright Med. Tech. Inc. v. Osteonics Corp., 122 F.3d
 1440, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
      We do not find Barrday’s argument persuasive. “While
 it is true that dependent claims can aid in interpreting the
 scope of claims from which they depend, they are only an
 aid to interpretation and are not conclusive.” Multilayer
 Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp.,
 831 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
 “[C]laim differentiation is a rebuttable presumption that
 may be overcome by a contrary construction dictated by the
 written description or prosecution history.” Howmedica,
 822 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted). This court has adopted
 a construction rendering dependent claims meaningless
 when that construction was supported by either the speci-
 fication or the prosecution history. See Marine Polymer
 Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1358–59 (Fed.
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                      15

 Cir. 2012) (en banc) (construction supported by specifica-
 tion); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal., Inc.,
 517 F.3d 1364, 1371–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (construction sup-
 ported by prosecution history); Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Ap-
 plera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149, 1154–57 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
 (construction supported by specification); Multilayer
 Stretch, 831 F.3d at 1358–62 (construction supported by
 specification). 3 Similarly, we do so here where the claim
 language, specification, and figures all support a securing
 yarns construction that excludes yarns from the upper and
 lower layers. 4
     The lack of weight afforded to the dependent claims is
 particularly appropriate here because such claims were
 added after the filing of the original patent application and

     3    Contrary to the dissent’s contention, independent
 claim 1 of the Asserted Patents is “clear on its face.” Dis-
 sent at 7 (quoting Multilayer, 831 F.3d at 1360). Independ-
 ent claim 1 of the Asserted Patents refers to the upper
 yarns, lower yarns, and securing yarns as separate struc-
 tural limitations “interwoven with” one another. ’261 pa-
 tent col. 10 ll. 15–18; ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 14–17.
     4    Even the one specification excerpt on which
 Barrday affirmatively relies that we addressed above does
 not support Barrday’s proposed construction, which
 Barrday argues is supported by these dependent claims.
 The excerpt suggests that warp and weft yarns of the upper
 and lower layers can only serve as the functional equivalent
 of securing yarns, not that securing yarns can be warp and
 weft yarns of the upper and lower layers as recited in the
 dependent claims. Compare ’261 patent col. 3 ll. 35–42
 with ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 52–67. Counsel for Barrday did
 not have an explanation for this linguistic difference at oral
 argument, stating “I don’t have an answer for that” when
 asked why the excerpt fails to employ the same language
 as the dependent claims. See Oral Arg. at 4:12–23.
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 16                     BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 because the motive for adding such claims appears to be
 litigation-driven. See ICU, 558 F.3d at 1376 (affirming
 summary judgment of noninfringement based on a con-
 struction rendering a dependent claim superfluous be-
 cause, in part, the claim was only added “after the filing
 date of the original patents” and after “the introduction of
 the allegedly infringing [competitor] products”); Cave Con-
 sulting Grp., LLC v. Optum Insight, Inc., 725 F. App’x 988,
 995 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (adopting a construction rendering de-
 pendent claims meaningless because it was “significant”
 that the claims “were added after the filing of the original
 application”), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 825 (2019); Barkan
 Wireless Access Techs., L.P. v. Cellco P’ship, 748 F. App’x
 987, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (same). Dependent claims 10
 through 14 were not only added after the filing of the un-
 derlying litigation, but also mere weeks after Barrday re-
 ceived a letter from Lincoln explaining that there was no
 reasonable basis for suit as to the ’261 patent because the
 accused Lincoln fabrics interweave the upper and lower
 layers without using securing yarns. See J.A. 559–60 (Lin-
 coln’s March 10, 2015 letter); J.A. 564, 567, 572, 574
 (Barrday’s April 2, 2015 prosecution amendment adding
 claims that issued as claims 10 through 14 of the ’379 pa-
 tent). On these facts, “[t]he dependent claim tail cannot
 wag the independent claim dog.” Multilayer, 831 F.3d at
 1360 (citations omitted). 5

      5  The dissent argues that “broadening claims during
 prosecution to capture a competitor’s product is not im-
 proper.” Dissent at 13 (quoting Synthes USA, LLC v. Spi-
 nal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) and
 citing Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Intern. Trade
 Comm’n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). However,
 in Synthes and Texas Instruments, this court explained
 that such broadening was permissible when the specifica-
 tion already disclosed the embodiments covered by the
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                     17

     The cases on which Barrday relies, where this court re-
 jected a construction that rendered dependent claims
 meaningless, are inapposite. In those cases, the specifica-
 tion did not support such a construction, unlike the speci-
 fication here. See Littelfuse, 29 F.4th at 1379–81; Baxalta,
 972 F.3d at 1347–48; Intell. Ventures, 902 F.3d at 1377–78;
 Ortho-McNeil, 520 F.3d at 1362; Wright, 122 F.3d at 1444–
 45. And in none of those cases did the motive for adding
 the dependent claims at issue appear to be litigation-
 driven, as is the case here.
     In sum, based on the intrinsic evidence, 6 we conclude
 that the district court correctly construed securing yarns in
 the Asserted Patents as “yarns, other than yarns from the
 upper and lower woven layers, that secure the upper and
 lower woven layers together.” Claim Construction Order

 broadened claims. See Synthes, 734 F.3d at 1341; Texas
 Instruments, 871 F.2d at 1065. As discussed in the previ-
 ous footnote, the single specification excerpt on which both
 Barrday and the dissent relies for support for their pro-
 posed construction does not actually disclose the embodi-
 ments covered by the dependent claims. See supra note 4
 (explaining the linguistic differences between column 3
 lines 35 through 42 of the ’261 patent and dependent claims
 10 through 14 of the ’379 patent).
     6    Although Lincoln points to extrinsic evidence in the
 form of a related foreign application as alleged claim con-
 struction support, see Appellee’s Br. 30–32, we—like the
 district court—decline to consider this extrinsic evidence.
 See J.A. 272, 289–91 (Lincoln raising arguments on related
 foreign application); Claim Construction Order at *5–14
 (district court not addressing such extrinsic evidence). Be-
 cause the intrinsic evidence “resolves any ambiguity” as to
 the meaning of securing yarns, “it is improper to rely on
 extrinsic evidence to contradict the meaning so ascer-
 tained.” Helmsderfer, 527 F.3d at 1382 (citation omitted).
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 18                    BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 at *13–14. Because the parties stipulated to noninfringe-
 ment of the asserted claims of the Asserted Patents based
 on the district court’s construction of securing yarns, see
 J.A. 1–4, we affirm the district court’s judgment of nonin-
 fringement. See Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d
 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Vasudevan Software, Inc. v.
 MicroStrategy, Inc., 782 F.3d 671, 681 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
                      III. CONCLUSION
      We have considered Barrday’s remaining arguments,
 and we find them unpersuasive. For the above reasons, we
 affirm the district court’s judgment of noninfringement of
 the asserted claims of the Asserted Patents.
                       AFFIRMED
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         NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                   ______________________

          BARRDAY, INC., BARRDAY CORP.,
                Plaintiffs-Appellants

                              v.

                LINCOLN FABRICS INC.,
                    Defendant-Appellee
                  ______________________

                         2022-1903
                   ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Western District of New York in No. 1:15-cv-00165-LJV-
 MJR, Judge Lawrence J. Vilardo.
                 ______________________

 STARK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
     As is often the case, the claim construction dispute be-
 fore us today presents a close call. Determining what a
 person of ordinary skill in the art, reading the claims in the
 context of the patent, would understand to be the scope of
 the claims is frequently entirely contestable, with reasona-
 ble (even strong) arguments on both sides. That is cer-
 tainly the situation we confront here. For the reasons I
 explain below, I think the patentee, who proposes a broader
 construction than was adopted by the district court, has the
 more persuasive position. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
                               I
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 2                       BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

     The disputed claim term is “securing yarns,” which ap-
 pears in all of the claims at issue in this appeal. Independ-
 ent claim 1 of the ’379 patent is representative and recites:
     1. A multi-layer ballistic woven fabric, comprising:
         a. an upper woven layer having upper warp
         yarns and upper weft yarns that are inter-
         woven together;
         b. a lower woven layer having lower warp
         yarns and lower weft yarns that are inter-
         woven together;
         c. a plurality of securing yarns, each secur-
         ing yarn interwoven with at least some of
         the upper yarns and some of the lower
         yarns so as to secure the upper and lower
         woven layers together;
         d. wherein the multi-layer ballistic woven
         fabric is formed by interweaving the secur-
         ing yarns with the warp yarns and weft
         yarns as the upper woven layer and lower
         woven layer are made; and further wherein
         at least some of the upper and lower yarns
         are offset from each other so as to overlap
         by more than 10%.
 ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 9-23 (emphasis added). 1

     1    Claim 1 of the ’261 patent contains the identical
 “securing yarns” limitations (i.e., limitations c and d) and
 only differs from claim 1 of the ’379 patent by reciting the
 “offset” limitation (i.e., the second half of limitation d of
 claim 1 of the ’379 patent) as a separate limitation (e), with
 a different range: “wherein at least some of the upper yarns
 and lower yarns are offset from each other so as to overlap
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                        3

     The patentee, Barrday, proposed that “securing yarns”
 be construed as “yarns for securing or holding upper and
 lower woven layers together.” 2 By contrast, the accused in-
 fringer, Lincoln, argued that “securing yarns” should be
 more narrowly construed as “[y]arns, other than yarns from
 the upper and lower woven layers, that tie the upper and
 lower woven layers together.” J.A. 283 (emphasis added).
 The difference between the proposals, and the only issue
 before us on appeal, is whether the construction should, as
 Lincoln proposed, exclude embodiments in which an upper
 or lower layer warp or weft yarn may also be a securing
 yarn. The district court included Lincoln’s narrowing lim-
 itation in the construction it adopted: “yarns, other than
 yarns from the upper and lower woven layers, that secure
 the upper and lower woven layers together.” Barrday, Inc.
 v. Lincoln Fabrics Inc., No. 15-CV-165-LJV-JWF, 2021 WL
 3076869, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. July 21, 2021) (“Claim Con-
 struction Order”) (emphasis added).
     The Majority affirms the district court’s construction.
 Reviewing the issue de novo, see Poly-Am., L.P. v. API In-
 dus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 2016), I would,
 instead, side with Barrday. I believe that a skilled artisan
 considering the claims in the context of the intrinsic and

 by between 10% and 95%.” ’261 patent col. 10 ll. 10-25.
 These differences are not relevant to this appeal.
      2   I agree with my colleagues that the district court
 properly rejected Barrday’s alternative position that “se-
 curing yarns” requires no construction. Where, as here, the
 parties present “a fundamental dispute regarding the scope
 of a claim” – such as whether the securing yarns must be
 separate from the yarns of the upper and lower layers – “it
 is the court’s duty to resolve it.” O2 Micro Int’l, Ltd. v. Be-
 yond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed.
 Cir. 2008).
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 4                      BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 extrinsic evidence would conclude that an upper or lower
 layer warp or weft yarn may serve as a securing yarn.
                              II
     The claim language, specification, prosecution history,
 and extrinsic evidence all favor Barrday’s proposed broader
 construction rather than the narrower construction pre-
 ferred by Lincoln and adopted by the district court.
                              A
     The claims do not expressly indicate whether upper
 and lower layer warp and weft yarns may also be securing
 yarns. Importantly, the claim language is broad and non-
 limiting. The claims, including representative claim 1 of
 the ’379 patent (reproduced above), contain no language
 that excludes embodiments in which the same yarn serves
 as both a warp or weft yarn and also, at the same time, as
 a securing yarn. Given that “[t]here are no words of mani-
 fest exclusion,” Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755
 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014), a person of ordinary skill
 would likely understand that the patentee intended to
 claim the full scope of what is captured by the plain mean-
 ing of “securing yarns,” which includes when upper and
 lower layer yarns serve the function of holding two or more
 layers together. See also Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent.
 Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The pa-
 tentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain
 the full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning unless the
 patentee explicitly redefines the term or disavows its full
 scope.”).
     Because the claims identify, on the one hand, upper
 and lower layer yarns and, on the other hand, securing
 yarns, it is presumed that these separately described yarns
 are different structures. See Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools
 Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
 2022); see also Maj. Op. at 8. This presumption, however,
 may be rebutted. A patentee is free to claim embodiments
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                       5

 in which a single structure performs the functions of mul-
 tiple, separately recited claim limitations. See, e.g., Powell
 v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1231-32 (Fed. Cir.
 2011) (“[T]he specification teaches that the cutting box may
 also function as a ‘dust collection structure.’”) (emphasis
 added); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
 653 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The claims and the
 specifications indicate that the ‘needle holder’ and ‘retainer
 member’ need not be separately molded pieces.”). That is
 just what a person of skill in the art would understand to
 be the case here, since the presumption of separate struc-
 tures is rebutted by the claims (and by the specification, as
 I describe below in Part II.B).
      In my view, the presumption that securing yarns must
 be a separate structure from the warp and weft yarns is
 persuasively rebutted by the existence of claims that un-
 ambiguously claim embodiments in which warp or weft
 yarns are performing the agreed-upon function of securing
 yarns. I am referring here to dependent claims 10-14 of the
 ’379 patent, which expressly claim embodiments wherein,
 for example, “the securing yarns include one or more of the
 upper warp yarns, the lower warp yarns, the upper weft
 yarns and the lower weft yarns.” ’379 patent col. 10 ll. 52-
 54 (emphasis added); see also Maj. Op. at 4-5 (reproducing
 all pertinent dependent claims). No one – not Lincoln, not
 the district court, and not the Majority – disputes that
 these dependent claims read on embodiments in which an
 upper or lower layer warp or weft yarn is holding two lay-
 ers together and there is no separate securing yarn.
     Nonetheless, the district court’s construction requires
 that the securing yarns be “yarns, other than yarns from
 the upper and lower woven layers,” and thereby reads the
 undisputed embodiments of claims 10-14 out of independ-
 ent claim 1, from which they depend. This results in the
 scope of dependent claims 10-14 being broader than the
 scope of independent claim 1, an outcome not permitted by
 the law – making the district court’s construction a
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 6                       BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 strongly disfavored one. See Alcon Research, Ltd. v. Apotex
 Inc., 687 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is axiomatic
 that a dependent claim cannot be broader than the claim
 from which it depends.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 4 (“A
 claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate
 by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it re-
 fers.”). The district court’s construction is problematic for
 the additional reason that it renders dependent claims 10-
 14 unintelligible, as it means these claims simultaneously
 allow and prohibit warp and weft yarns serving as securing
 yarns. We have directed courts to “strive[] to reach a claim
 construction that does not render claim language in de-
 pendent claims meaningless,” Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc.
 v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
 and also to apply a “strong presumption against a claim
 construction that excludes a disclosed embodiment,” In re
 Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d
 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The construction affirmed by
 the Majority is inconsistent with these instructions.
      I recognize that “[c]anons of claim construction, such as
 the doctrine of claim differentiation and the canon of inter-
 preting claims to preserve their validity, are not absolute.”
 Cave Consulting Grp., LLC v. Optum Insight, Inc., 725 F.
 App’x 988, 995 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also ICU Med., Inc.
 v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1376 (explaining
 claim differentiation “is not a rigid rule but rather is one of
 several claim construction tools”). While not dispositive,
 neither are these canons irrelevant, and both of them here
 support Barrday’s construction, which complies with the
 presumption that dependent claims should be “of narrower
 scope than the independent claims from which they de-
 pend,” AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234,
 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and which may preserve the validity
 of the claims, see generally Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innova-
 tive Wireless Solutions, LLC, 824 F.3d 999, 1004 (Fed. Cir.
 2016) (“If, after applying all other available tools of claim
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                      7

 construction, a claim is ambiguous, it should be construed
 to preserve its validity.”).
      The Majority rightly notes that the “dependent claim
 tail” cannot be permitted to wag the “independent claim
 dog,” echoing our warning in Multilayer Stretch Cling Film
 Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1360
 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See Maj. Op. at 16. I do not find Barrday’s
 construction to run afoul of this guidance. Our point in
 Multilayer was that “the language of a dependent claim
 cannot change the meaning of an independent claim whose
 meaning is clear on its face.” Multilayer, 831 F.3d at 1360
 (emphasis added). Here, it is far from “clear on its face”
 that independent claims 1 of the ’261 and ’379 patents do
 not include embodiments lacking separate securing yarns.
     The other cases the Majority relies on, see Maj. Op. at
 14-15, provide little support for its conclusion that depend-
 ent claims 10-14 should not factor heavily in the claim con-
 struction analysis.      In Marine Polymer Techs., Inc.
 v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
 we adopted a construction that rendered dependent claims
 meaningless because any other construction would have re-
 sulted in the scope of these claims contradicting limiting
 statements we read as referring to all embodiments “of the
 invention.” See also id. at 1359 (analogizing to cases in-
 volving patents with specifications referring to “the present
 invention.”). Barrday’s specifications do not similarly use
 the term “of the invention” (or the like) to limit claim
 scope. 3 In Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal,
 Inc., 517 F.3d 1364, 1371-76 (Fed. Cir. 2008), we noted that

     3    To the contrary, Barrday’s specification expressly
 states that “[t]he drawings included herewith are for illus-
 trating various examples . . . and are not intended to limit
 the scope of what is taught in any way.” ’261 patent col. 1
 ll. 51-54.
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 8                      BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 the presumption of claim differentiation can be rebutted by
 prosecution history. Here, nothing in the prosecution his-
 tory does so. See infra Part II.C. And in Enzo Biochem Inc.
 v. Applera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149, 1154-57 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
 we held that “dependent claims cannot broaden an inde-
 pendent claim from which they depend,” but there is noth-
 ing in Barrday’s proposed construction that results in the
 independent claims being any broader than a person of or-
 dinary skill in the art would find them to be, even without
 the dependent claims. See generally Curtiss-Wright Flow
 Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
 2006) (“[C]laim differentiation can not broaden claims be-
 yond their correct scope.”) (emphasis added; internal quota-
 tion marks omitted).
     Thus, I conclude that the claim language, and particu-
 larly that of dependent claims 10-14 of the ’379 patent, fa-
 vors a construction which allows the warp and weft yarns
 of the upper and lower layers to be securing yarns.
                              B
      That securing yarns do not have to be separate struc-
 tures from the upper and lower layer warp and weft yarns
 is further confirmed by the specification, which explicitly
 contemplates embodiments in which a warp or weft yarn is
 also a securing yarn. Although the specification generally
 distinguishes between securing yarns and the yarns in the
 upper and lower woven layers, and teaches that embodi-
 ments using a separate securing yarn are preferred, the
 specification also states:
     [i]n some embodiments, one or more of the warp
     yarns and/or weft yarns could be used in addition
     to, or in place of, one or more securing yarns for
     holding the two or more layers together.
 ’261 patent col. 3 ll. 35-38 (emphasis added; internal cita-
 tions to numbered elements omitted). The specification
 even describes one way such an embodiment could be
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                         9

 structured: “one or more of the warp yarns and/or weft
 yarns could be interwoven along a path similar to the path
 of the securing yarn . . . to secure the first layer to the sec-
 ond layer.” ’261 patent col. 3 ll. 38-42 (internal citations to
 numbered elements omitted); see also Appellant Br. at 26-
 27 (“For example, every fifth lengthwise yarn could be a
 ‘securing yarn’ holding the layers together, while the first
 to fourth lengthwise yarns in this example would be warp
 yarns.”); Reply Br. at 3 (“If, for example, every fifth length-
 wise (warp) yarn in the upper layer of the claimed multi-
 layer fabric is interwoven with ‘at least some’ of the upper
 yarns and some of the lower yarns, so as to secure the up-
 per layer to the lower layer, that fifth lengthwise yarn
 would constitute a ‘securing yarn’ performing the function
 of holding the layers together and that fifth lengthwise
 yarn would be structurally distinct from the other four
 lengthwise yarns in the pattern.”). 4 The Majority is incor-
 rect, then, when it asserts that “[t]he specification exclu-
 sively refers to securing yarns as structures that are
 separate and distinct from warp and weft yarns of the up-
 per and lower layers.” Maj. Op. at 9 (emphasis added).
     Since the specification calls out that “in some embodi-
 ments” the warp and weft yarns may be used “in place of”
 securing yarns, a claim construction that mandates sepa-
 rate securing yarns – and thereby excludes disclosed em-
 bodiments – is most likely incorrect. See, e.g., Oatey Co.
 v. IPS Corp., 514 F.3d 1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We

     4    I see nothing in the record to support a conclusion
 that these embodiments would be a “physical impossibil-
 ity,” Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP,
 616 F.3d 1249, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding “hinged
 arm” could not be connected to itself), or otherwise “non-
 sensical,” Maj. Op. at 9. After all, Lincoln contends that its
 accused products are precisely such embodiments. See,
 e.g., J.A. 560.
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 10                      BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that ex-
 cludes embodiments disclosed in the specification.”). This
 is yet another mark against the district court’s construc-
 tion.
      In discussing this portion of the specification, the Ma-
 jority says: “The excerpt suggests that warp and weft yarns
 of the upper and lower layers can only serve as the func-
 tional equivalent of securing yarns, not that securing yarns
 can be warp and weft yarns of the upper and lower layers
 as recited in the dependent claims.” Maj. Op. at 15 n.4; see
 also id. at 13 (explaining concern is with “definition, not
 function”). I do not understand how this distinction leads
 to a decision to affirm the district court, especially because
 the definition of securing yarns is all about their function,
 i.e., to hold two layers together. Elsewhere, the Majority
 recognizes that “[t]he crux of the parties’ dispute is
 whether the securing yarns claim term can include yarns
 from the upper and lower woven layers when such yarns
 are serving the securing function.” Maj. Op. at 7 (emphasis
 added). The district court likewise framed the dispute as
 one about function, writing:
      As a general matter, the parties agree that, for pur-
      poses of the ’261 and ’379 patents, “securing yarns”
      are yarns that serve the function of holding the up-
      per and lower woven layers together. What they
      dispute is whether the term applies to a warp or
      weft yarn from the upper or lower layer when such
      yarn is serving that function.
 Claim Construction Order at *6 (emphasis added). To me,
 then, this appeal is about whether warp and weft yarns can
 function as securing yarns, and the specification (like the
 claims) makes clear that they can.
     I recognize that all of the figures in the specification
 only depict embodiments in which the securing yarns are
 separate from the warp and weft yarns. The specification,
 however, “did not need to include a drawing of [an
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                       11

 embodiment] to cover that particular embodiment.” CCS
 Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed.
 Cir. 2002). I further recognize that the specification
 teaches that the preferred embodiments of the invention
 employ separate securing yarns and criticizes embodi-
 ments lacking them. But “statements about the difficulties
 and failures in the prior art, without more, do not act to
 disclaim claim scope.” Retractable Techs., 653 F.3d at
 1306; see also Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566
 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[D]iscussion of the short-
 comings of certain techniques is not a disavowal of the use
 of those techniques in a manner consistent with the
 claimed invention.”). Moreover, claims are not limited to
 their preferred embodiments, even when the specification
 discloses only a single embodiment. See Apple Inc. v. Wi-
 LAN Inc., 25 F.4th 960, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“Embodi-
 ments in the specification – even if there is only one em-
 bodiment – cannot limit the scope of the claims absent the
 patentee’s words or expressions of manifest exclusion or re-
 striction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5

     5    Lincoln suggests that various passages in the spec-
 ification do contain words of exclusion, but all of the state-
 ments on which Lincoln relies are discussing exemplary
 embodiments, not the full scope of the claims. See ’261 pa-
 tent col. 2 l. 65 – col. 3 l. 9 (“As shown, in some embodiments
 the securing yarns may be aligned with the warp or weft
 yarns.”) (emphasis added; (internal citations to numbered
 elements omitted); id. at col. 3 ll. 10-25 (describing specific
 embodiment illustrated in Figure 2); id. at col. 3 ll. 58-67
 (“The ratio between securing yarns and ballistic yarns . . .
 tends to depend on the desired inter-layer stability.”) (em-
 phasis added); id. at col. 4 ll. 23-26 (“In some embodiments,
 the securing yarns are generally of significantly smaller de-
 nier than the warp yarns.”) (emphasis added; internal
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 12                       BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

     Barrday’s specification, when describing the ad-
 vantages of embodiments with separate securing yarns, re-
 iterates that embodiments lacking these advantages are
 also contemplated, stating:
      Generally the yarns of one layer are not interwoven
      with the yarns of another layer because such inter-
      weaving tends to increase the degree of crimp for
      the yarn in relation to [the] rest of the yarns in the
      fabric, which can create ballistic weak points.
 ’261 patent col. 2 ll. 36-39 (emphasis added). The pa-
 tentee’s statement that the claims “generally” have sepa-
 rate securing yarns tells a person of ordinary skill in the
 art that the claims also extend to specific embodiments –
 which are expressly called out in column 3, lines 35-42 of
 the ’261 patent – that do not have separate securing yarns.
     In sum, then, the specification, like the claim language,
 would most likely be understood by a person having ordi-
 nary skill in the art as supporting the conclusion that “se-
 curing yarns” include upper and lower layer warp and weft
 yarns when those yarns hold the upper and lower layers
 together.
                                C
     “[T]he prosecution history provides evidence of how the
 PTO and the inventor understood the patent.” Phillips
 v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For
 purposes of the claim construction dispute we resolve to-
 day, the most significant event in the prosecution of
 Barrday’s patents was the addition, by amendment, of

 citations to numbered elements omitted); id. at col. 4 ll. 42-
 50 (“In some embodiments, the securing yarns may be gen-
 erally of a much smaller size than the warp yarns and weft
 yarns.”) (emphasis added; internal citations to numbered
 elements omitted).
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                    13

 dependent claims 10-14 of the ’379 patent. These are the
 claims which expressly claim embodiments in which the
 upper and lower layer warp and weft yarns function as se-
 curing yarns. The record shows that Barrday applied for
 dependent claims 10-14, in its then-pending application for
 the ’379 patent, only after learning that Lincoln’s accused
 products directly interweave upper and lower layers with-
 out separate securing yarns. See J.A. 559-60. The district
 court placed little weight on these dependent claims be-
 cause of concerns about the timing and motivation by
 which Barrday obtained them. See Claim Construction Or-
 der at *11 (“[T]he probative value of a dependent claim in
 defining the scope of an independent claim is vitiated
 where the motive for creating the dependent claim appears
 to be litigation-driven.”) (internal quotation marks omit-
 ted).
     In my view, these facts are not relevant to the claim
 construction analysis. All patent claims – even those added
 by amendment, during litigation, and with the specific in-
 tent to aid an infringement case – are presumed valid. See
 35 U.S.C. § 282. Neither the statute nor our cases makes
 any distinction in the strength of this presumption on the
 basis of the timing or motivation underlying acquisition of
 a claim. To the contrary, we have said “[i]t is not improper
 to amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor’s
 product the applicant’s attorney has learned about during
 the prosecution of a patent application.” Texas Instruments
 Inc. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com’n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1065 (Fed.
 Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Syn-
 thes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1341
 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[B]roadening claims during prosecution
 to capture a competitor’s product is not improper.”). 6

     6  My colleagues distinguish Texas Instruments and
 Synthes as cases in which “the specification already
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 14                      BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

     My colleagues state that “[t]he lack of weight afforded
 to the dependent claims is particularly appropriate here
 because such claims were added after the filing of the orig-
 inal patent application and because the motive for adding
 such claims appears to be litigation-driven.” Maj. Op. at
 15-16. The Majority’s conclusion is not well-supported in
 the cases on which it relies. In ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris
 Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009), we
 repeated the district court’s observation that a dependent
 claim “was only added . . . years after the filing date of the
 original patents . . . and the introduction of the allegedly
 infringing . . . products.” We did not, however, accord any
 importance to this fact; for instance, we did not use it to
 devalue the weight of the dependent claims or to question
 their validity. In Cave Consulting, 725 F. App’x at 995, a
 nonprecedential opinion, we allowed that application of the
 doctrine of claim differentiation could be affected by the
 fact that dependent claims were added after the filing of an
 original application, finding this to be a “significant” but
 “not dispositive” factor. But we also stressed that “had the
 originally filed application . . . in any way indicated that its
 invention included direct standardization, the later-added
 dependent claims” – which indisputably claimed direct
 standardization – “could have lent support to [the patent
 owner’s] contention that the independent claims cover di-
 rect standardization.” Id. Here there is just such an “indi-
 cation,” as Barrday’s original specification always and
 expressly disclosed embodiments with no separate secur-
 ing yarns. See ’261 patent col. 3 ll. 35-42. This would lead
 a skilled artisan to conclude that the dependent claims

 disclosed the embodiments” covered by the added claims.
 Maj. Op. at 16 n.5. As explained above (see supra Part
 II.B), I read Barrday’s specification as disclosing embodi-
 ments that use the warp/weft yarn “in place of” securing
 yarns – that is, the embodiments that are also the subject
 of the dependent claims.
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                      15

 were added for clarification and not as an (improper) ex-
 pansion of claim scope. In Barkan Wireless Access Techs.,
 L.P. v. Cellco P’ship, 748 F. App’x 987, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2018),
 another nonbinding opinion, we found that dependent
 claims identified by the patentee did “not compel a con-
 struction of [a disputed claim term that is] inconsistent
 with the specification, particularly where these claims
 were added after the patent application filing date.” Here,
 by contrast, Barrday is not relying on dependent claims to
 compel a construction that is inconsistent with the specifi-
 cation.
     From all this, I believe a person of ordinary skill in the
 art would find the prosecution history to be supportive of
 Barrday’s proposed construction. Certainly, there is noth-
 ing in the prosecution history that detracts from the con-
 clusion the skilled artisan would derive from the claims
 and the specification. At worst, from Barrday’s perspec-
 tive, the prosecution history is neutral.
      In reaching these conclusions, I do not mean to suggest
 that one or more of Barrday’s claims cannot be found inva-
 lid or unenforceable. It may be that the breadth of the con-
 struction preferred by Barrday makes its claims more
 vulnerable to an obviousness or anticipation defense. See
 generally 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 889
 F.3d 735, 742 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[I]f a claim term must be
 broadly interpreted to read on an accused device, then this
 same broad construction will read on the prior art.”). It
 may also be that some or all of the claims would capture
 embodiments that are unsupported by the specification’s
 written description or are not adequately enabled. See,
 e.g., Idenix Pharm. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149,
 1155-59 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (applying patentee’s preferred
 construction and invalidating claims for lack of adequate
 written description and enablement); Liebel-Flarsheim Co.
 v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371,1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The
 irony of this situation is that [patent owner] successfully
 pressed to have its claims include a jacketless system, but,
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 16                      BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

 having won that battle, it then had to show that such a
 claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could not meet.”).
 Because this case ended at the claim construction stage,
 the district court did not reach issues of validity or enforce-
 ability. 7 I would remand to allow the parties to resume
 their litigation based on application of the correct claim
 construction.
                               D
     The district court did not consider any extrinsic evi-
 dence. I agree it is unnecessary to do so. See Seabed Ge-
 osolutions (U.S.) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285,
 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“If the meaning of a claim term is
 clear from the intrinsic evidence, there is no reason to re-
 sort to extrinsic evidence.”). However, the parties have
 presented extrinsic evidence and have briefed their argu-
 ments regarding it. Therefore, I will briefly address it.
     Like the intrinsic evidence, the extrinsic evidence here
 supports Barrday’s proposed construction. The extrinsic
 evidence is the prosecution history of Barrday’s application
 for a European patent related to its ’261 and ’379 patents.
 See J.A. 289-91, 420-23, 548-49; see also Starhome GmbH
 v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849, 858 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
 (“[S]tatements made before foreign patent offices are some-
 times relevant to interpreting the claims.”). As part of the
 European prosecution, in responding to an examiner

      7  Barrday filed a motion seeking clarification as to
 whether the district court’s construction rendered depend-
 ent claims 10-14 invalid or unenforceable. It was denied
 without prejudice because the magistrate judge who han-
 dled the motion had only been referred the matter of claim
 construction. See Barrday, Inc. v. Lincoln Fabrics Inc., No.
 15-CV-165-LJV-JWF, 2021 WL 8263498 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.
 28, 2021).
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 BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.                      17

 objection, Barrday stated that the specification paragraph
 I highlighted above – including the statement that “one or
 more of the warp yarns . . . and/or weft yarns . . . could be
 used in addition to, or in place of, one or more securing
 yarns” – described features that “are not illustrated in a
 drawing or claimed, [although] these features [neverthe-
 less] form part of an embodiment of the invention.” J.A.
 349 (emphasis added). Barrday eventually amended the
 European specification to strike reference to embodiments
 in which warp or weft yarns are used “in place of” separate
 securing yarns; thereafter, the European claims were al-
 lowed. See J.A. 355, 361.
     This history – which relates to a different patent with
 different claim scope, examined and granted under a dif-
 ferent set of patent laws – does not support a conclusion
 that the U.S. patents at issue in this appeal likewise fail to
 claim embodiments lacking separate securing yarns. To
 the contrary, because the “in place of” language remains in
 the specifications of the ’261 and ’379 patents, a person of
 ordinary skill in the art would understand the European
 application to have been prosecuted with a different claim
 scope in mind.
     Additionally, the European claims require securing
 yarns having different characteristics – such as tenacity,
 tensile moduli, and denier (i.e., are finer) – than the warp
 and weft yarns. See J.A. 440. The claims of the patents we
 are considering, by contrast, contain no requirement that
 the securing yarns and warp/weft yarns differ in any of
 these characteristics (and Lincoln does not contend other-
 wise).
     From all this, a person of ordinary skill in the art would
 conclude, once again, that embodiments without separate
 securing yarns are within the scope of the claims of the U.S.
 patents that are the subject of this appeal. The extrinsic
 evidence, then, confirms what such an artisan would al-
 ready have concluded based on the intrinsic evidence.
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 18                    BARRDAY, INC. v. LINCOLN FABRICS INC.

                            III
     For all of these reasons, I would vacate the district
 court’s judgment of non-infringement and remand with in-
 structions to conduct further proceedings based on a con-
 struction of “securing yarns” as “yarns for securing or
 holding upper and lower woven layers together.” Accord-
 ingly, I respectfully dissent.