Court Opinion

ID: 9574524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:05:43.936191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:40.554253
License: Public Domain

LANGDON, J., Dissenting.
I dissent.
Article IV, section 1 of our state Constitution declares that ‘ ‘ The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a Senate and Assembly which shall be designated ‘The Legislature of the State of California’ ”.
Section 2 of the same article provides that “The sessions of the legislature shall be biennial, unless the governor shall, in the interim, convene the legislature, by proclamation, in extraordinary session. ...”
Sections 3 and 4 provide that the “term” of office of members of the Assembly and of the Senate shall be two years and four years, respectively.
Section 23' declares that members of the legislature “shall receive for their services the sum of one hundred dollars each for each month of the term for which they are elected ... ”.
None of the foregoing sections, in my opinion, expressly declares or impliedly infers that either house of the legislature is not a “continuing body”. In fact, said sections appear to suggest a contrary conclusion and for the following reasons: (1) The length of the session is not prescribed or limited—if necessary, it could extend until the date fixed for *510the next biennial session which would coincide with the term of the members of the assembly and the remainder of the term of one-half of the senate. (2) The members of both houses are paid for their full “term” and not on a per diem or session basis. (3) After adjournment sine die, and at any time prior to the next ensuing biennial session, they may be convened at the call of the governor and may “legislate” upon matters included in such call; that is to say the power to legislate is ever present and continues to exist even after adjournment sine die.
In the early case of Ex parte McCarthy, 29 Cal. 395, this court had occasion to declare that “A legislative assembly, when established, becomes vested with all the powers and privileges which are necessary and incidental to a free and unobstructed exercise of its appropriate functions. These powers and privileges are derived not from the Constitution; on the contrary, they arise from the very creation of a legislative body, and are founded upon the principle of self-preservation. The Constitution is not a grant, but a restriction upon the power of the legislature, and hence an express enumeration of legislative powers and privileges in the Constitution cannot be considered as the exclusion of others not named unless accompanied by negative terms. A legislative assembly has, therefore, all the powers and privileges which are necessary to enable it to exercise in all respects, in a free, intelligent, and impartial manner, its appropriate functions, except so far as it may be restrained by the express provisions of the Constitution, or by some express law made unto itself, regulating and limiting the same. (Cush. Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, p. 221.)
“That powers and privileges, therefore, a legislative assembly takes by force and effect of its creation are to be ascertained by a reference to the common parliamentary law. These powers and privileges are classified by Cushing (p. 246) as follows: . . .
‘12. To investigate, by the testimony of witnesses or otherwise, any subject or matter, in reference to which it has power to act; ...”
It goes without saying that a legislature cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Certainly if a legislature needs information con*511cerning a problem simple enough to be canvassed quickly, it probably stands in greater need of accurate insight into a problem of greater complexity. Is it not strange to imply a power to investigate without also implying a power to investigate thoroughly? The public interest in the competent discharge of legislative functions should be strong enough to overwhelm technical objections.
The case just above cited, and others that might be mentioned, recognize, and all parties to this litigation concede, that investigation is an indispensable and important incident, and an inherent auxiliary to the proper exercise of the legislative power and that such incidental and auxiliary function may be exercised by either house by single house resolution empowering a committee to sit during the constitutional recess. Inasmuch as the power to legislate continues and exists after adjournment sine die, just as fully and completely as during the constitutional recess, and inasmuch as either house may eoncededly by single house resolution lawfully create a committee to investigate during the period of such constitutional recess, when technically it is no more engaged in legislating than it is following an adjournment sine die, there would appear to be no substantial reason for denying to either house the right by single resolution to create interim committees for the purpose of carrying on proper legislative investigations. In other words, if the express power to legislate continues and exists (though it be dormant) in the interim between sessions of the adjourned legislative body, it seems reasonable to conclude that the incidental and auxiliary investigatory function likewise continues and may be employed during such period, thus insuring a more effective exercise of the principal legislative function. If this be so, a single house resolution is sufficient to create a lawful interim committee, for under section 9 of article IV, supra, “each house shall determine the rule of its proceeding”—which latter provision would appear to delegate to each house the choice of methods for the most advantageous use of its functions in the exercise of the state’s legislative power.
The question here involved is a novel one in this state, and being peculiar to our constitutional set-up, I have treated the same solely in the light of our constitutional provisions and without regard to the weight of authority elsewhere apparently to the contrary. The decisions of other jurisdictions *512are considered at length in the majority opinion. They may be correct under the constitutional provisions there prevailing but even if decided under provisions analogous to our system of government, they need not prove determinative here. In the absence of express constitutional prohibition, I am of the opinion that interim committees of the legislature may be lawfully created by single house resolution.