Court Opinion

ID: 9735883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:34:32.797924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:02.413302
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
DeBruler, J.
I concur in the majority opinion but only because it is evident that the practice of the jury commissioners of selecting jurors who are “somewhat successful” is no longer followed and was not followed at the time of this trial.
A jury panel must be chosen in a manner which is impartial, does not unreasonably exclude any class of citizens and is not arbitrary in nature. Harrison v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 147, 106 N. E. 2d 912. A defendant who demonstrates that his jury was not so chosen need not show any particular harm to him resulting from the system used. Jones v. Georgia (1967), 389 U.S. 24, 88 S. Ct. 4, 19 L. Ed. 2d 25; Whitus v. Georgia (1967), 385 U.S. 545, 87 S. Ct. 643, 17 L. Ed. 2d 599; *464Brewer v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 154, 252 N. E. 2d 429 (DeBruler, J., dissenting). Neither must he prove that the jury-commissioners acted in bad faith in their selection of jurors, as the good or bad faith of the selectors is not a relevant factor. Smith v. Texas (1940), 311 U.S. 128, 61 S. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84; Brewer v. State, supra (DeBruler, J., dissenting). Rather, the sole focus of the constitutional requirements here that the panels not exclude groups of citizens and that the selection of the panel not be conducted in an arbitrary manner.
Perhaps it is true as the majority writes here that we cannot assume that the “successful” standard, at one time applied by one of the commissioners, refers to economic success and that there was therefore no systematic exclusion of any group or class of citizens. On the other hand, however, it is clear that when the choice of potential jurors revolves around the commissioner’s standard of “somewhat successful” the selection is patently arbitrary. Such a standard is bounded only by the whim or caprice of the one applying the test and is contrary to the goal of eliminating individual discretion, and potential discrimination, from the selection process. A system which would incorporate discretion to this extent would, in my judgment, violate constitutional requirements.
It is apparent from the testimony of the three jury commissioners, however, that this practice is no longer pursued and that the system presently employed, and used at the time of the trial here, does not incorporate arbitrary standards.
Note.—Reported in 288 N. E. 2d 155.