Court Opinion

ID: 9481709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:28:59.031284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:31.355301
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I join in the majority's decision that the Hong Kong evidence used against Chu constituted inadmissible hearsay, and that Chu’s convictions must be reversed. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the double jeopardy clause bars Chu’s retrial on certain of the counts, and I therefore dissent from that portion of the opinion.
The majority correctly sets out the standard to be used in analyzing the double jeopardy claims. We must not bar retrial if the evidence admitted against Chu, including the evidence we now deem inadmissible hearsay, sufficiently supports his convictions. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 83, 39-41, 109 S.Ct. 285, 290-91, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988) (Lockhart). There is sufficient evidence to support Chu's convictions if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, “ ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Adler, 879 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir.1988) (Adler), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in Jackson). In determining whether the convictions are supportable, we are required to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence. United States v. Arriaga-Segura, 743 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir.1984). Although the majority recognizes this standard, I believe that it improperly applies its mandate.
I
The majority first concludes that the government may not retry Chu on counts one and four, which allege that he lied on his residency application when he stated that he had not been a member of any organization or society. To prove that Chu had lied, the government presented evidence that Chu had in fact been convicted in 1974 of illegal membership in a triad society. On this basis, the jury convicted Chu on counts one and four.
The majority holds, however, that there is insufficient evidence to support Chu’s conviction on these counts. First, it observes that the Hong Kong statute under which Chu was convicted proscribes conduct other than triad society membership. Maj. op. at 1002. It therefore concludes that an allegation that Chu was convicted for violating that statute “does not, in and of itself, demonstrate that [Chu] was a member of a triad society.” Maj. op. at 1002. But the majority ignores the fact that the government did not merely allege that Chu had violated the general statute; it presented evidence to show that Chu was guilty of triad society membership. For example, all three of the Hong Kong records that identify Chu’s 1974 crime specify that he was found guilty of “membership of a triad society.” The cumulative criminal record does not even identify the statute number; it labels the crime simply as a membership crime. The inferences drawn from the evidence therefore support the jury’s conclusion that Chu was convicted of membership in a triad society. The majority replies that the district judge was *1006wrong in allowing the jury to draw these inferences, but instead should have himself determined whether Chu’s prior conviction rested on triad society membership or another sort of violation. Maj. op. at 1002. Even assuming this error, I would hold that the proper remedy is to remand these counts to the district court with instructions to investigate the underlying nature of Chu’s 1974 Hong Kong conviction. No rationale supports the view that such an error bars retrial.
As further support for its conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to prove that Chu lied when he stated that he had never belonged to any organization or society, the majority observes that the 1974 triad society membership conviction is under the name of Chu Kwong Yin, rather than Chu Kong Yin. The issue that arises is whether Chu, the defendant, was the person convicted of triad society membership. The majority analyzes the evidence offered by the government on the identity issue, finds that some of it contains discrepancies and contradictions, and therefore concludes that the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Chu was the person convicted. Maj. op. at 1002-1003. In concentrating on the reasons to believe that Chu was not the person convicted in 1974, the majority ignores the reasons to believe that he was the one convicted.
For example, Chu Kwong Yin’s triad society membership conviction, identified as case number 5175/73, is listed on the criminal record entered into evidence against the defendant. Although the criminal record is under the name Chu Ping Yin, it contains the 1981 gambling conviction of Chu Kong Yin, case number 9248/81. Fingerprint documentation proves that the Chu on trial in this case was the person convicted of that gambling violation. Thus, whatever aliases were used, the criminal record supports a reasonable inference that the same person was convicted of gambling in 1981 and triad society membership in 1974. The fingerprints demonstrate that Chu, the defendant, is that person. Other evidence also supports this conclusion. Chu’s Hong Kong fingerprint records, taken at the time of his arrest for the 1981 gambling violation, are identified by C.R.O. No. 7071-66. This number, which is assigned to an offender upon his first arrest, is used as identification for a listing of previous crimes on Chu’s fingerprint card, a listing that includes the 1974 triad society membership conviction. Moreover, C.R.O. No. 7071-66 identifies the criminal record that contains both Chu’s 1981 gambling conviction and the 1974 triad society membership conviction at issue. Thus, repeat identification by C.R.O. No. 7071-66 supports the conclusion that Chu was the person convicted of triad society membership.
I do not dispute the majority’s assertion that there are reasons that auger against such a view. Such is the case in most trials, but a reviewing court has the duty to allow the conclusions of a rational jury to stand. The jury in this case reviewed the conflicting evidence and concluded that Chu was the person convicted in 1974, and that he was convicted of triad society membership. Thus, it convicted Chu on counts one and four for lying on his application. This conclusion was a rational one based upon the evidence presented, and it is not our job to bar retrial on the ground that we disagree with the inferences drawn by the jury. See Adler, 879 F.2d at 495.
I can only assume that the majority’s decision to bar retrial is colored by the fact that we now deem most of the evidence used to convict Chu to be inadmissible hearsay. I agree that the evidence was hearsay, and therefore would reverse the convictions. But the evidentiary and double jeopardy inquiries must remain separate; all evidence, whether it is now deemed admissible or inadmissible, is viewed equally, in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 39-41, 109 S.Ct. at 290-91. The reasonable inferences that favor the prosecution demonstrate to my satisfaction that the government should be allowed to retry Chu on counts one and four with any admissible evidence that it could offer.
II
Chu was also convicted on counts three and six, which charged that Chu lied on his *1007application when he stated that he had never committed or been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. The indictment charged that Chu lied while knowing “that he had been convicted of the crimes of Larceny by Finding, Criminal Intimidation, and Gambling in a Gambling Establishment.” The majority concludes that there is insufficient evidence to support the convictions on counts three and six, because gambling and criminal intimidation do not involve moral turpitude and the government failed to prove that Chu had been convicted of larceny. Maj. op. at 1002-1005.
I write separately on this issue to point out the technical nature of the majority’s decision on the larceny issue. The majority observes that Chu was conditionally discharged under Hong Kong laws on the charge of larceny by finding. Maj. op. at 1004-1005. I agree with the majority that proof of such a conditional discharge does not equal proof of a conviction. Chu’s conditional discharge, however, is evidence that Chu committed larceny. The Hong Kong statute in effect at the time of Chu’s larceny arrest provides that a conditional discharge is appropriate only if a magistrate “thinks that the charge is proved,” and directs the magistrate to consider “the extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed.” Hong Kong Laws, ch. 227, § 35(1) (renumbered as § 36 in 1981) (amended in 1986) (emphasis added). Maj. op. at 1004-1005. Chu stated on his application that he had never committed or been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Chu’s conditional discharge is proof that he committed larceny. We have held as a matter of law that larceny involves moral turpitude. United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir.1989); Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 933 n. 4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892, 78 S.Ct. 265, 2 L.Ed.2d 190 (1957). Thus, the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to prove that Chu lied when answering the moral turpitude question on his application.
However, the indictment charged not only that Chu lied in answering the question, but that he lied while knowing “that he had been convicted of the crime[] of Larceny.” Because the government failed to demonstrate that Chu had been convicted of larceny, it failed to satisfy all that was required by the narrow indictment charge. Thus, the majority holds that the government is barred from retrying Chu on counts three and six, as drafted. This double jeopardy ruling should be viewed in a correspondingly narrow context, for the ruling would not bar Chu’s trial on a charge that he lied on the moral turpitude question while knowing that he had committed larceny. Given the inherent limitation of the majority’s holding, the government may retry Chu on this theory.