Court Opinion

ID: 9884264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:50:13.098653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.111273
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Schaefer, dissenting: This case was tried twice. The first trial resulted in a hung jury, which is the “mistrial” referred to in the majority opinion. Prior to the second trial, the defendant Ross moved for a severance on the ground that at the first trial Lt. King had testified to statements, allegedly made to him by the defendant Pawlak, which implicated Ross in the crime. The motion for severance was denied. At the second trial the prosecution again called Lt. King, on rebuttal, and the following occurred: Q. “Tell the court and jury what was said by you, what was said by Mrs. Pawlak. “King: I said to her, T am surprised, disappointed in you.’ And she said, ‘You don’t believe everything that Mauricaux told you, do you?’ I said, T do. Because — ” “Mr. Wolfson : On behalf of Ross object to this entire testimony. “The Court : “It doesn’t pertain to Ross at this point. “King : I said, T do, because everything he told us we have checked out and it has been the truth.’ I added, ‘You know about Mayes and Ross, you talked with them about being hired to do this job.’ And she said, ‘Yes, I talked with them but that in no way indicates I had anything to do with it.’ I said, ‘It does to me indicate you had knowledge of it.’ Also I said, ‘You didn’t report this to any police agency from that day to this.’ That was the termination.” No one contends that this hearsay testimony was admissible against Ross, and in my opinion the Bruton case requires that the judgment be reversed as to him. The majority attempts to distinguish Bruton on grounds which, in my opinion, are inadequate. Despite the majority’s assertion to the contrary, Lt. King’s hearsay statement directly implicated Ross in the crime charged. There were no “cautionary instructions” in this case. The only statement made by the trial judge with respect to this testimony was his ambiguous observation, when overruling Ross’ objection to the alleged conversation, “It doesn’t pertain to Ross at this point.” The majority states that Mrs. Pawlak took the stand and denied making this statement. I am unable to see how that fact affords a basis for distinguishing this case from Bruton. What was said by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Townsend v. Henderson (No. 18516, decided December 26, 1968, 4 Cr. L. 2338), would then be pertinent. “The only possible distinction between the present case and Bruton is 'that in Bruton the co-defendant did not take the witness stand, whereas here Terry did testify in his own behalf. But, this distinction is unimportant since, although Terry was called as a witness, he denied making the confession. Townsend therefore had no effective right of cross-examination in regard to the confession. A similar question was presented in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965), and it was there held ‘effective confrontation of Loyd was possible only if Loyd affirmed the statement as his.’ ”