Court Opinion

ID: 9794281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:02:58.489552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:36.465715
License: Public Domain

WOOD, J., Dissenting.
I dissent. In my opinion the record shows an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion for a new trial. The pregnancy of plaintiff resulted in a miscarriage. Plaintiff testified that sexual relations commenced after mutual promises of marriage were made, but when she became pregnant she mailed a letter to defendant, which in part is as follows: “I shall put it plainly. I am in a familie way with you, as sure as anything. It just dawned on me a week ago. I started checking up on myselv, and you know how I feel. I can’t sleep or rest. So please do not keep me waiting to hear from you. I was *321deply hurt when I found you had left the Hotel without telling me. I am not imaging thise thing. It is now 3 weeks overtime and you know what that means. I am terbely sorry to have to write you thise, for I see now how every little I mean to you, and I should gladly leave you to Mrs. It. but as the matter stands, I don’t know what to do, as I allways have said, when we do something wrong, we will pay the prise. I am paying now. I am forced to beg you to come to me, but our sins have found us out, just when we were getting ready to quit each other.” She signed and delivered to defendant a statement containing no reference to a marriage engagement, but containing this language: “In consideration of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable considerations hereby acknowledged I hereby release M. A. Davis from all liability on my being in the family way. ” Defendant denied that he promised to marry plaintiff. The judgment was entered May 12, 1936. On motion for a new trial defendant presented affidavits from which it appeared that plaintiff was married to one Theis on May 17, 1936. In her counteraffidavit plaintiff admitted this marriage. It was impossible for defendant to present this information during the trial. Plaintiff’s prompt marriage to another man immediately following the entry of judgment had an important bearing upon the amount of damages she claims to have suffered. In view of her letter and release of defendant and other conduct of the parties shown in the record the evidence proffered in the affidavit would have a material and important bearing upon the plaintiff’s allegation and defendant’s denial that there were mutual promises to marry.
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on April 22, 1937.