Court Opinion

ID: 9369771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 18:02:16.432024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:17.004988
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/23 P. v. Slaughter CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   A163706
 v.                                                                      (Alameda County
 TERRY LAWRENCE SLAUGHTER,                                               Super. Ct. No. 80264)

             Defendant and Appellant.

         In 1980, defendant Terry Lawrence Slaughter committed a burglary
during which his coperpetrator killed a security guard. In 1986, Slaughter
was convicted of murder. He later petitioned for resentencing, arguing his
murder conviction was no longer valid in light of recent amendments to the
felony-murder law. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6; statutory references are to this
code.1) The trial court granted the petition and, based on an agreement
between the People and Slaughter, it resentenced him for the target offense
of robbery. On appeal, Slaughter argues the court abused its discretion by
designating robbery, rather than burglary, as his underlying felony. We
affirm.

       Slaughter originally petitioned for resentencing under former section
         1

1170.95. While this appeal was pending, section 1170.95 was amended and
renumbered as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022.)
We refer to the renumbered provision.
                                                               1
                               BACKGROUND
      Slaughter lived with Edison Forward, who Slaughter said was formerly
in prison for “murder or suspicio[n] [of] murder.” (People v. Slaughter (1984)
35 Cal.3d 629, 634 (Slaughter I).) Forward had a .22-caliber rifle, a pistol,
and a considerable amount of stolen property in the apartment. (Id., at
p. 635.) Together, Slaughter and Forward committed approximately four to
five burglaries each night. (Id., at p. 634) Forward generally drove the two of
them to the Oakland hills to select targets. (Ibid.) Slaughter would remain
in the car as a lookout while Forward committed the burglaries. (Ibid.)
      Early one morning in July 1980, Forward drove Slaughter to a home.
(Slaughter I, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 634.) Forward, who was under the
influence of drugs and alcohol, parked the car at the curb, took out a gun, and
walked alongside the house, which was located by a gas station. (People v.
Slaughter (Nov. 6, 1989, A037700) [nonpub. opn.] (Slaughter II).) Slaughter,
who remained in the car, heard a few gun shots and saw Forward running
back from the side of the house to the car. Police later discovered a victim
who was shot and killed close to that location; the victim was in a car parked
at the gas station. (Slaughter I, at p. 634.) Slaughter was arrested a few
weeks later in a stolen car. In the car, police found a .38-caliber loaded
revolver, later identified as being registered to the victim.
      Slaughter was charged with murder and prosecuted on various
theories, including premeditated murder and felony murder. The jury
instructions included both burglary and robbery as underlying felonies for
a felony-murder conviction. The jury found Slaughter guilty of first degree
murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 26 years to life in prison.
      In an appeal from the judgment, Slaughter noted the jury verdict did
not specify whether burglary or robbery was the underlying felony, and he
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challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for a robbery finding. (Slaughter II,
A037700.) The Court of Appeal subsequently affirmed the judgment,
concluding substantial evidence supported convictions for conspiracy to
commit robbery and aiding and abetting robbery because Slaughter had
knowledge of Forward’s possession and use of firearms. (Ibid.)
      In January 2019, Slaughter filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95. The People conceded he was entitled to relief, and
the trial court vacated his murder conviction. Based on an agreement
between Slaughter’s counsel and the People, the court designated robbery as
Slaughter’s target offense for resentencing purposes. (§ 211.) There was
a significant colloquy regarding Slaughter’s terms of parole and custody
credits; at no time, however, did Slaughter argue burglary should be his
target offense. Indeed, at one point during the hearing, the court noted “Mr.
Slaughter, you are no longer a convicted murderer now, just a robber,” and
Slaughter replied, “Good.”
      The trial court imposed the upper term of five years, which was deemed
served since Slaughter had already completed his prison term for the murder
conviction.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Slaughter contends the trial court abused its discretion by designating
robbery as his target offense because the evidence only demonstrated he
intended to commit burglary. We disagree.
      In 2018, the Legislature declared “a person should be punished for his
or her actions according to his or her own level of individual culpability.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1.) It then limited the scope of the felony-murder
rule “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant
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in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f) [eliminating the natural and probable
consequences doctrine for murder and limiting the scope of the felony-murder
rule].) As amended, section 189 limits liability under a felony-murder theory
to actual killers, those who aid and abet the actual killer with the intent to
kill, and major participants in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)–(3).) Relevant here,
defendants convicted of felony murder where malice is imputed solely based
on their participation in an underlying crime may petition to vacate the
conviction and for resentencing on the remaining counts. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).) The petition must allege, among other things, that the “petitioner
could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because
of changes to Section 188” — murder committed with express or implied
malice — or section 189 — felony murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
      Upon a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief, the trial court shall
issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The prosecution must
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing relief. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) But the parties may also stipulate
that the petitioner is eligible for resentencing. (Id., subd. (d)(2).) In those
circumstances, the parties “may waive the eligibility hearing and proceed
directly to resentencing,” as occurred here. (People v. Silva (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 505, 517; § 1172.6, subd. (d)(2).) Thus, the prior conviction
is vacated, and the court resentences the petitioner on any remaining
charges. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Where a “murder was charged generically,
and the target offense was not charged,” the “petitioner’s conviction shall be
redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony” — i.e., “the offense
that was the basis for felony-murder liability at trial” — “for resentencing
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purposes.” (Id., subd. (e); People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727, 737.)
The court has “considerable discretion in redesignating the petitioner’s
murder convictions as underlying felonies and resentencing a petitioner to an
appropriate term of years based on his or her individual culpability.” (Silva,
at p. 532.)
      Even assuming Slaughter did not forfeit his argument by expressly
agreeing to robbery as his target offense, the trial court’s designation was not
an abuse of discretion. Under section 1172.6, the court “could redesignate
a vacated murder conviction as a lesser offense commensurate with his
participation in the underlying felony, not just generically, but with the
petitioner’s individual culpability in mind based on the evidence at trial.”
(People v. Silva, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 519, italics added.) Substantial
evidence at trial established Slaughter aided and abetted Forward in
committing robbery. (People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 [“A trial
court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision
find no support in the evidence”].)
      “Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession
of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) “Aider-abettor liability
exists when a person who does not directly commit a crime assists the direct
perpetrator by aid or encouragement, with knowledge of the perpetrator’s
criminal intent and with the intent to help him carry out the offense.”
(People v. Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 407.) Those factors exist
here. Slaughter admits he conspired with and aided and abetted Forward to
commit burglaries, including the July 1980 offense. More importantly,
Slaughter knew Forward took the gun with him and intended to commit

                                        5
a crime at a residence while Slaughter served as lookout. (Id., at p. 407
[presence at the scene of an offense supports a finding the accused is
a principal under aiding and abetting liability].) Slaughter heard gunshots.
After the shooting, Slaughter and Forward drove back to their apartment and
where Slaughter continued to live with him, despite realizing that Forward
had killed the victim. (Slaughter II, A037700; People v. Campbell (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409 [companionship after an offense is relevant to
assessing aider and abettor liability].) As this court previously held, this was
sufficient evidence Slaughter aided and abetted robbery, which originally
supported Slaughter’s conviction for felony murder. (Slaughter II, A037700;
People v. Howard, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 737–738.)
      The evidence also supports Slaughter’s liability for robbery under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, which remains a valid theory of
liability for offenses other than murder. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e);
see, e.g., People v. Robins (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 413, 422.) Indeed, the
Legislature expressly stated it was necessary to amend “the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer . . . .”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, italics added.) The Legislature could have, but did
not, eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine for other
criminal offenses. Under that doctrine, aiders and abettors are guilty of the
offense they intended to facilitate and encourage, as well as “any reasonably
foreseeable offense committed by the actual perpetrator.” (People v. Miranda,
supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at pp. 407–408.) The “issue does not turn on
the defendant’s subjective state of mind.” (People v. Nguyen (1993)
21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531.) Instead, it depends on whether, under the
circumstances, a reasonable person should have known the charged offense
                                        6
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act the defendant aided and
abetted. (Ibid.) Here, Slaughter was aware of Forward’s drug use and that
he may have previously committed murder. (Slaughter II, A037700.)
Although Slaughter disavows any intent to commit robbery, a reasonable
person in his position — knowing Slaughter had a violent criminal past, was
committing burglaries, and was wielding a gun — would have or should have
known that robbery was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the burglary
he aided and abetted. (Nguyen, at p. 531.)
      Slaughter does not contest these conclusions; indeed, he concedes
substantial evidence supports a robbery conviction. He nonetheless argues
the trial court’s failure to designate burglary as his target offense was an
abuse of discretion because he was only culpable of burglary. That is,
Slaughter contends his “individual culpability” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1) can
be determined by reference only to his “actual intent” — i.e., his intent to
commit burglary. This argument ignores that culpability may be based on
aider and abettor liability, as well as the natural and probable consequences
doctrine (for crimes other than murder). (Id., at § 1, subd. (f); People v.
Miranda, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 407; People v. Nguyen, supra,
21 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.) Moreover, his interpretation would create an
absurd result. Slaughter concedes he could have been charged with and
convicted of robbery in the first instance based on the evidence in the record.
But he would have us conclude that, under section 1172.6, subdivision (e), the
same evidence does not support designating robbery as his target offense and
resentencing him accordingly. We decline to do so.
      By vacating Slaughter’s murder conviction and designating robbery as
the target offense, the trial court properly eliminated a lengthy sentence
which had “been declared incommensurate with” his culpability and instead
                                        7
calibrated the punishment to his culpability for robbery. (People v. Ramirez
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 923, 933; People v. Howard, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th
at p. 739.)2
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

      2 In light of this conclusion, we do not address whether Slaughter
forfeited his challenge to the target offense designation.
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                                _________________________
                                Rodríguez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

_________________________
Petrou, J.

A163706

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