Court Opinion

ID: 9765247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:57:05.338611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:06.936231
License: Public Domain

Nahmias, Justice,
dissenting.
It is true that “[a] trial court’s findings of fact and weighing of those facts in a speedy trial claim generally are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 601 (592 SE2d 848) (2004). See Maj. Op. at 374-375, 377 (citing State v. Lattimore, 287 Ga. 505, 506 (696 SE2d 613) (2010)). “However, where, as in this case, the trial court has clearly erred in some of its findings of fact and/or has misapplied the law to some degree, the deference owed the trial court’s ultimate ruling is diminished.” Williams, 277 Ga. at 601. As Justice Melton’s dissenting opinion explains, the trial court’s finding of actual prejudice is not supported by the record, and I note that the trial court’s order characterized actual prejudice as “the most important factor in the Barker v. Wingo[, 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972)] analysis.”
Because of that clear and significant error, I believe that this Court should not affirm the trial court’s judgment, and so I respectfully dissent. However, I cannot say that application of the Barker v. Wingo factors, without including the erroneous finding of actual prejudice, requires the judgment that Gleaton’s speedy trial rights were not violated, as Justice Melton concludes. Instead, I would reverse and remand the case with direction to the trial court to exercise its discretion again after re-weighing the speedy trial factors without the erroneous factual finding. See Williams, 277 Ga. at 601 *380(remanding in part for reconsideration of a speedy trial claim due to a factual error in the trial court’s initial order). See also Lattimore, 287 Ga. at 510 (Nahmias, J., dissenting).
Decided November 8, 2010
Reconsideration denied December 14, 2010.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Marc A. Mallon, Bettieanne C. Hart, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Tony L. Axam, Cinque M. Axam, for appellees.