Court Opinion

ID: 9465849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:57:28.049654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:24.244979
License: Public Domain

BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
With sincere respect for the thinking of my panelists, I must differ with them. Their accurate and precise recount of the facts leads me to a differing conclusion; substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s decision that while the claimant was unable, because of his numerous ailments to return to his former work, he, nevertheless, was not prevented from engaging in sedentary gainful employment, available in the national economy.1
*1313In my reading, ample proof supports the Secretary’s rejection of the appellant’s claim. This was the conclusion, too, of the Administrative Law Judge, the Appeals Council, the Secretary, the United States Magistrate in the District Court and, finally, the District Judge. The majority of this court now rejects these findings until the vocational expert’s testimony may be administratively retaken. Yet, we have said repeatedly:
“ ‘the findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .’ [Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1978).] The fact that the record as a whole might support an inconsistent conclusion is immaterial, for the language of § 205(g) precludes a de novo judicial proceeding and requires that the court uphold the Secretary’s decision even should the court disagree with such decision as long as it is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’ Whiten v. Finch, 437 F.2d 73, 74 (4 Cir. 1971); . . . Hayes v. Gardner, 376 F.2d 517, 520 (4 Cir. 1967).”
Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
It is the function of the Secretary, not the Court of Appeals, to weigh the evidence. The Appeals Council, the Secretary, the Magistrate and the District Judge had before them all of the evidence. Analysis of it reveals at once and fully “substantial evidence” 2 upon which the Secretary could rely in denying benefits, and, therefore, his decision must be upheld.
Perceiving no justification for the remand, I would affirm on the opinion of the District Judge, Swaim v. Califano, No. 76-650-WS (M.D.N.C. February 16, 1978).

. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1977). A person is disabled “only if his physical or mental . . . impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy . . . .”

. For discussion of “substantial evidence,” see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951).