Court Opinion

ID: 9900845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 17:03:06.233441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:19.971306
License: Public Domain

Nov 20 2023, 9:08 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David L. Joley                                            Theodore E. Rokita
Fort Wayne, Indiana                                       Indiana Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                          Daylon L. Welliver
                                                          J.T. Whitehead
                                                          Deputy Attorneys General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
     COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Steven Slater, Jr.,                                       November 20, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-3060
        v.                                                Appeal from the Allen Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Steven O. Godfrey,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          02D04-2208-F6-001027
                                                          02D06-2204-F6-00496

                                Opinion by Judge May
                      Chief Judge Altice and Judge Mathias concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023                            Page 1 of 16
      May, Judge.

[1]   Steven Slater, Jr., appeals following his convictions of Level 6 felony possession

      of methamphetamine1 and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement,2

      his adjudication as a habitual offender,3 and the revocation of his probation as a

      result of his new convictions. Slater presents four issues for our review, which

      we consolidate and restate as:

                 1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Slater’s

                 convictions of:

                          1.1. possession of methamphetamine; and

                          1.2. resisting law enforcement;

                 2. Whether Slater’s aggregate sentence for his criminal convictions is

                 inappropriate given the nature of his offenses and Slater’s character; and

                 3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking two-and-a-

                 half years of Slater’s probation.

      We affirm.

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a).
      2
          Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a).
      3
          Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023       Page 2 of 16
      Facts and Procedural History                                 4

[2]   On October 30, 2021, Slater stole a change machine from a hotel in Fort

      Wayne, Indiana. The State charged Slater with Level 6 felony theft in case

      number 02D06-2204-F6-000496 (“F6-496”), and pursuant to a plea agreement,

      Slater pled guilty to the offense on August 4, 2022. The trial court sentenced

      Slater to a term of two-and-a-half years in the Indiana Department of

      Correction (“IDOC”). However, the trial court suspended execution of that

      sentence and placed Slater on probation.

[3]   On August 13, 2022, Detective Chris Hoffman of the Fort Wayne Police

      Department was on patrol near the Economy Inn on West Coliseum Boulevard

      in Fort Wayne. Detective Hoffman observed a black Hyundai Elantra drive

      into the hotel’s parking lot, and he watched as two individuals he recognized—

      Slater and Morgan Rayoum—got into the car. Slater sat in the backseat on the

      driver’s side, and Rayoum sat in the backseat on the passenger’s side. Reginald

      Edwards was driving the Elantra. Detective Hoffman knew Rayoum had an

      active warrant out for her arrest, and he decided to initiate a traffic stop of the

      vehicle as it drove away from the hotel. Detective Hoffman was driving an

      unmarked police car at the time. The car had “multiple emergency lights on it

      4
       We heard oral argument in this case on October 31, 2023, at DeKalb County High School. We commend
      counsel for their advocacy and thank the school’s faculty, staff, and students for their warm reception and
      hospitality.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023                           Page 3 of 16
      in the front, back, on the mirrors, and the grill, on the front windshield. It’s—

      it’s highly illuminated when it’s activated.” (Tr. Vol. II at 74.)

[4]   Detective Hoffman activated the emergency lights and siren on his vehicle, and

      Edwards pulled the Elantra over to the side of the road. Detective Hoffman

      was wearing his full police uniform at the time, and he approached the back

      passenger’s side of the vehicle to speak with Rayoum. Detective Hoffman

      noticed “an abnormal amount of movement” from Slater as he walked toward

      the Elantra. (Id. at 75.) Detective Hoffman asked Rayoum to exit the vehicle,

      and Detective Hoffman proceeded to take Rayoum to the ground to handcuff

      her. While Detective Hoffman was “dealing with” Rayoum, he also noticed

      Slater “grabbing things off the center of the seat, throwing it into one hand.

      He’s all over the seat clearly grabbing small items or contraband off the seat.

      He goes into the brown purse the entire time.” (Id. at 77.) Seconds later, Slater

      exited the vehicle and sprinted away, leaving the brown purse in the vehicle.

      Inside the vehicle, Detective Hoffman found a baggie “on the inner door

      threshold on the rear driver’s side door.” (Id. at 84.) The substance inside the

      baggie was later determined to be 1.8 grams of methamphetamine.

[5]   Police apprehended Slater on August 20, 2022, and on August 25, 2022, the

      State charged Slater with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and

      Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement in case number 02D04-2208-

      F6-001027 (“F6-1027”). The State also filed a verified petition for revocation of

      Slater’s probation in F6-496. On October 24, 2022, the State amended the

      charging information in F6-1027 to allege Slater was a habitual offender. The

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023    Page 4 of 16
      trial court held a jury trial in F6-1027 on November 9, 2022. After the State

      rested, Slater moved for a directed verdict with respect to the Class A

      misdemeanor resisting law enforcement charge because “[t]here was no

      evidence that Officer Hoffman ever told [Slater] to stop.” (Id. at 109.) The trial

      court denied the motion. Slater then testified that the methamphetamine

      belonged to Edwards, who threw the drugs into the back of the car during the

      traffic stop. The jury returned verdicts finding Slater guilty of possession of

      methamphetamine and of resisting law enforcement. The jury then heard

      evidence about whether Slater qualified for the habitual offender enhancement.

      While the jury deliberated on that question, the trial court found Slater violated

      the terms of his probation in F6-496 by committing the new criminal offenses of

      which he was convicted in F6-1027. The jury returned a verdict finding Slater

      was a habitual offender.

[6]   On December 2, 2022, the trial court held a combined hearing to address both

      Slater’s sentence with respect to F6-1027 and his sanction for violating the

      terms of his probation in F6-496. The trial court ordered Slater to serve the

      entirety of his previously suspended two-and-a-half-year sentence in F6-496 in

      the IDOC. In F6-1027, the trial court found Slater’s criminal history to be an

      aggravating factor, and the trial court did not find any mitigators. The trial

      court sentenced Slater to two years of imprisonment for possession of

      methamphetamine, enhanced by an additional six years because of the habitual

      offender finding, and one year for resisting law enforcement. The trial court

      ordered the possession of methamphetamine and resisting law enforcement

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023     Page 5 of 16
      sentences to be served concurrently, for an aggregate term of eight years in the

      IDOC. The trial court ordered Slater to serve his sentences in F6-496 and F6-

      1027 consecutively, resulting in a combined term of imprisonment in the two

      cases of ten-and-one-half years.

      Discussion and Decision
      1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[7]   We apply a well-settled standard of review to claims challenging the sufficiency

      of the evidence to support a conviction:

              Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims . . . warrant a deferential
              standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge
              witness credibility. Rather, we consider only the evidence
              supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn
              from that evidence. We will affirm a conviction if there is
              substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a
              reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty
              beyond a reasonable doubt.

      Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262-63 (Ind. 2020) (internal citations omitted).

      1.1 Possession of Methamphetamine

[8]   Slater argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he possessed the

      methamphetamine found in the vehicle. Indiana Code section 35-48-4-6.1

      provides: “A person who . . . knowingly or intentionally possesses

      methamphetamine (pure or adulterated) commits possession of

      methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony[.]” To satisfy the possession element of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023    Page 6 of 16
      the offense, the State must prove the defendant had either actual or constructive

      possession of the contraband. Parks v. State, 113 N.E.3d 269, 273 (Ind. Ct. App.

      2018). “For the State to prove constructive possession, it must prove the

      defendant had the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over

      the contraband. To prove intent to maintain dominion and control, there must

      be additional circumstances supporting the inference of intent.” Id. (internal

      citation omitted). Such additional circumstances may include:

              (1) incriminating statements by the defendant, (2) attempted
              flight or furtive gestures, (3) location of substances like drugs in
              settings that suggest manufacturing, (4) proximity of the
              contraband to the defendant, (5) location of the contraband
              within the defendant’s plain view, and (6) the mingling of the
              contraband with other items owned by the defendant.

      Id.

[9]   Here, when Detective Hoffman initiated the traffic stop, Slater began gathering

      items on the backseat of the vehicle, and then Slater sprinted away while

      Detective Hoffman interacted with Rayoum. Shortly thereafter, Detective

      Hoffman found a baggie of methamphetamine near where Slater had been

      sitting in the Elantra and by the door Slater used to exit the vehicle, which

      permits an inference that Slater dropped a baggie of methamphetamine that he

      was trying to take with him when he exited the car. Thus, these additional

      circumstances—furtive gestures, flight, and proximity—indicate Slater had the

      intent to maintain dominion and control over the contraband. Id. Therefore,

      the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Slater of possession of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023          Page 7 of 16
       methamphetamine. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 1259, 1266 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2012) (holding the State presented sufficient evidence of the defendant’s

       exercise of constructive possession over drugs when the drugs were found near

       the driver’s seat of vehicle the defendant was driving and the defendant fled

       from officers during traffic stop), trans. denied.

       1.2 Resisting Law Enforcement

[10]   Slater also contends the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his

       conviction of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Indiana Code

       section 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) provides:

               (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally:

                                         *****

                        (3) flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer
                        has, by visible or audible means, including operation of the
                        law enforcement officer’s siren or emergency lights,
                        identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop;

                commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor[.]

[11]   Slater argues he did not commit the offense of resisting law enforcement

       because Detective Hoffman never orally ordered him to stop. At oral

       argument, Slater explained: “We are here today about the absence of one word.

       One word. Stop!” (Oral Argument at 1:48-57.) “Our first task when

       interpreting a statute is to give its words their plain meaning and consider the

       structure of the statute as a whole. We avoid interpretations that depend on
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023       Page 8 of 16
       selective reading of individual words that lead to irrational and disharmonizing

       results.” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dept., 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195

       (Ind. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We pay attention

       both to what a statute says and to what it does not say. Id.

[12]   We have consistently held that a police officer can both identify himself or

       herself as a law enforcement officer and order the person to stop through means

       other than an oral order to stop. In Fowler v. State, we explained:

               A police officer’s order to stop need not be limited to an audible
               order to stop. The order to stop may be given through visual
               indicators. Evidence of a proper visual order to stop is based on
               the circumstances surrounding the incident and whether a
               reasonable person would have known that he or she had been
               ordered to stop.

       878 N.E.2d 889, 894-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted). For

       example, in Conley v. State, we held sufficient evidence supported the

       defendant’s conviction of resisting law enforcement when the defendant ran

       away after a fully uniformed officer raised his hand to signal for the defendant

       to stop. 57 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Likewise, in

       Cowans v. State, we affirmed the defendant’s conviction of resisting law

       enforcement even though the officer never orally directed the defendant to stop

       because the defendant continued driving for three miles after the officer

       activated the lights and siren on his patrol vehicle and began following the

       defendant. 53 N.E.3d 540, 541-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), disapproved on other

       grounds by Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 562-63 (Ind. 2019) (disapproving

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023        Page 9 of 16
       specific jury instruction on the definition of “flee” proposed by the panel in

       Cowans because of the instruction’s potential to confuse and mislead a jury).

[13]   When a police officer initiates a traffic stop, the officer seizes all occupants of

       the vehicle, not only the driver. See Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258

       (Ind. 2019) (“When a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle for a suspected

       traffic infraction like speeding, that officer seizes the vehicle’s occupants under

       the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section

       11 of the Indiana Constitution[.]”); see also Guthery v. State, 180 N.E.3d 339, 347

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“For the duration of a traffic stop, an officer effectively

       seizes everyone in the vehicle, the driver as well as any passengers.”), trans.

       denied. When Detective Hoffman activated the lights and siren of his patrol

       vehicle, he both identified himself as a law enforcement officer and ordered all

       the Elantra’s occupants to stop. Slater reads “ordered the person to stop” in

       Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) to require a police officer to issue an

       individualized oral command to each passenger, but we disagree with this

       reading of the statute because requiring police officers to individually address

       each passenger in a vehicle at the beginning of a traffic stop – when the law

       already presumes the passengers are not free to leave – would be an absurd

       result.    See, e.g., ESPN, Inc., 62 N.E.3d at 1199-1200 (holding a reading of a

       statute that would have included a private university’s police department within

       the meaning of “public agency” would lead to absurd results).

[14]   Slater also directs us to West v. State, in which we held the evidence was

       insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of resisting law enforcement

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023      Page 10 of 16
       when drug task force officers stormed into the defendant’s home and shot her in

       the back with a foam baton as she walked toward a bedroom in the house to

       retrieve her sleeping two-year-old grandson. 85 N.E.3d 608, 610 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2017). We determined there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury

       could conclude the defendant intended to flee from the police, in part because

       “in the twenty seconds of chaos during which West is alleged to have fled from

       police by walking toward her grandson’s bedroom, there is no evidence that

       West was ordered to stop.” Id. at 611.

[15]   However, West is distinguishable from the instant case for two key reasons.

       First, Detective Hoffman’s traffic stop of the Elantra was not the same type of

       chaotic situation that unfolded in West. It was a relatively routine traffic stop.

       Detective Hoffman activated his lights and siren, and Edwards understood

       these signals to mean that he should immediately pull over. Yet, mere seconds

       after Detective Hoffman approached the vehicle, Slater sprinted away from the

       vehicle. Second, Slater’s motivation for running away from Detective Hoffman

       was different from West’s motivation in walking away from the police officers

       who entered her house. While West simply intended to retrieve her grandchild,

       Slater fled the scene of the traffic stop to avoid arrest. Therefore, we hold the

       State presented sufficient evidence to support Slater’s conviction of Class A

       misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. See, e.g., Whaley v. State, 843 N.E.2d

       1, 10 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding sufficient evidence supported the

       defendant’s conviction of resisting law enforcement when, after an officer

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023     Page 11 of 16
       activated his lights and siren, the defendant drove his car into a ditch and then

       began to flee on foot), trans. denied.

       2. Inappropriate Sentence
[16]   Slater also argues his aggregate eight-year sentence for his criminal convictions

       in F6-1027 is inappropriate given the nature of his offenses and his character.

       Our standard of review regarding such claims is well-settled:

               Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) gives us the authority to revise a
               sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
               and the character of the offender. Our review is deferential to the
               trial court’s decision, and our goal is to determine whether the
               appellant’s sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other
               sentence would be more appropriate. We consider not only the
               aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any
               other factors appearing in the record. The appellant bears the
               burden of demonstrating his sentence [is] inappropriate.

       George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations

       omitted).

[17]   When we evaluate whether a sentence is inappropriate given the nature of the

       offense, we first look at the advisory sentence. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d

       482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). Indiana

       Code section 25-50-2-7(b) provides: “A person who commits a Level 6 felony

       (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed term

       of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 ½) years, with the advisory

       sentence being one (1) year.” Indiana Code section 35-50-2-8(i) states: “The

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023      Page 12 of 16
       court shall sentence a person found to be a habitual offender to an additional

       fixed term that is between . . . three (3) years and six (6) years, for a person

       convicted of a Level 5 or Level 6 felony.” Indiana Code section 35-50-3-2 sets

       out: “A person who commits a Class A misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a

       fixed term of not more than one (1) year[.]” Thus, the trial court imposed a

       sentence of only six months below the maximum sentence allowed by law for

       Slater’s crimes.

[18]   Regarding the nature of Slater’s offenses, we agree with the State that they “are

       not particularly heinous.” (Appellee’s Br. at 21.) However, with respect to

       Slater’s character, he has an extensive criminal history. Slater’s juvenile history

       included a referral for acts that would constitute arson if committed by an adult.

       The juvenile court found Slater to be delinquent for acts that would constitute

       burglary if committed by an adult. The State also accused Slater of acts that

       would constitute battery if committed by an adult, and the juvenile court

       disposed of that case through an informal adjustment. Slater’s adult criminal

       history included felony convictions of armed robbery, burglary, theft,

       possession of cocaine, and failure to return to lawful detention and

       misdemeanor convictions of resisting law enforcement, possession of

       marijuana, and criminal conversion. In addition, Slater’s history included

       multiple probation revocations, including the revocation that occurred because

       of his crimes at issue herein occurring while he was on probation.

[19]   Slater asserts he is “a person who obviously has very real substance abuse

       issues” and would benefit from a shorter term of imprisonment. (Appellant’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023      Page 13 of 16
       Br. at 21.) However, the Indiana Risk Assessment System score placed him at a

       high risk to reoffend, and Slater failed to curb his behavior after being convicted

       of similar offenses in the past. Therefore, we cannot say Slater’s sentence in F6-

       1027 is inappropriate given the nature of his offenses and his character. See, e.g,

       Denham v. State, 142 N.E.3d 514, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding defendant’s

       sentence was not inappropriate given his extensive criminal history), trans.

       denied.

       3. Revocation of Probation
[20]   Slater contends his commission of two new offenses while on probation for

       theft in F6-496 does not warrant a full revocation of the two- and one-half year

       sentence order for F6-496.5 “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court

       discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court

       determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the

       conditions are violated.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)

       (internal citation omitted). We review a trial court’s sanctioning decision

       following the revocation of probation for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse

       of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of

       the facts and circumstances.” Id. Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) provides

       5
        Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(e), Slater must serve his sentence in F6-1027 consecutive to his
       sentence in F6-496.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023                           Page 14 of 16
       that, upon finding a probationer violated the terms of his probation, the trial

       court may:

               (1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying
               or enlarging the conditions.

               (2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than
               one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

               (3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was
               suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[21]   Slater’s criminal history supports the sanction imposed by the trial court.

       Before being convicted of theft in F6-496, Slater had a previous conviction of

       theft. In addition, he had been convicted of possessing drugs and resisting law

       enforcement before repeating those crimes, leading to his convictions in F6-

       1027. His criminal history also included multiple past revocations of probation.

       Given Slater’s past failures to lead a law-abiding life or abide by the terms of his

       probation, we hold the trial court’s sanction order was not an abuse of

       discretion. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, 918 N.E.2d 458, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)

       (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning defendant to serve

       incarcerated the entirety of his previously suspended sentence).

       Conclusion
[22]   The State presented sufficient evidence to support Slater’s convictions of

       possession of methamphetamine and resisting law enforcement. Slater’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023     Page 15 of 16
       aggregate eight-year sentence in F6-1027 is not inappropriate given the nature

       of his offenses and his character. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its

       discretion in ordering Slater to serve the entirety of his previously suspended

       sentence in F6-496. We accordingly affirm the trial court.

[23]   Affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3060 | November 20, 2023     Page 16 of 16