Court Opinion

ID: 9756715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:49:24.666924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:27.645851
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice CUNNINGHAM.
In spite of the well-written opinion of the Court by my distinguished brother, Justice Scott, I respectfully dissent.
First of all, the majority concedes that the trial court committed error when it allowed the testimony of Ms. Diltner of Perry County Pretrial Services. Such testimony is inadmissible under RCr 4.08 which states:
Information supplied by a defendant to a representative of the pre-trial services *15agency during the defendant’s initial interview or subsequent contacts, or information obtained by the pre-trial services agency as a result of the interview or subsequent contacts, shall be deemed confidential and shall not be subject to subpoena or to disclosure without the written consent of the defendant ...
Said the majority in this case, “Clearly, RCr 4.08 was violated here, as a pretrial services intake agent testified concerning confidential information supplied to her without Appellant’s written consent, and none of the exceptions apply.” See op. at 10.
Since this error was unpreserved, the majority went on to review this mistake under a palpable error standard. “Accordingly,” to quote from Justice Scott, “we must determine whether there was a substantial possibility that Appellant would have received a different result at trial absent the introduction of the complained of testimony.” See op. at 10.
The majority goes on to find that it was not palpable error. This seems to be incongruous.
The witness, Ms. Diltner, was called by the court after both sides had closed their proof and had made closing arguments. In other words, such proof was deemed so critical by the trier of fact that this witness was deemed necessary before a verdict could be rendered. Therefore, it is difficult for me to understand how the majority can conclude that Appellant would not have “received a different result at trial absent the introduction of the complained of testimony.” The ease was over, both sides had made closing arguments, and the court had taken it under consideration. It was then that the trial court found the Commonwealth’s case lacking and called the witness on its own. Only after the defense objected to this unusual turn of events did the court proclaim that Ms. Diltner’s testimony was not critical. This error cannot be considered harmless or non-palpable by a prophylactic disclaimer.
Secondly, it is clear to me that the trial court stepped outside its independent and neutral role when it called — what can only be called a prosecution witness — after all the evidence had been presented and closing arguments had been made. Our Court has always cautioned trial judges against discarding the mantle of impartiality and easing across the line into a prosecutorial role. See LeGrande v. Commonwealth, 494 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.1973).
That line was crossed in this case.
Here, the defendant waived only his right to a trial by jury. All the other constitutional protections remained in place, including presumption of innocence and the burden of proof being upon the Commonwealth. KRS 500.070 states a universally accepted principle of our criminal justice system: “The Commonwealth has the burden of proving every element of the case beyond a reasonable doubt[.]”
Inexplicably, in this case, my distinguished brothers and sisters, with whom I am most honored to serve, ignore this revered precept.
I am furthermore compelled to consider this from the defense lawyer’s perspective. When advising his or her client on the pros and cons of waiving a jury trial, it is reasonable to expect that the defense lawyer will also advise his or her client that the judge will remain objective throughout the trial. It is hardly unlikely that counsel would inform his or her client that if the court was not happy with the Commonwealth’s case than it would call witnesses of its own. Given that kind of information, a defendant might very well choose to go with a jury trial instead. At least a jury is stuck with the facts presented to them by *16the lawyers and the law as presented to them by the court.
The majority relies upon the trial court’s right to call witnesses by citing KRE 614.1 Surely, this rule only affords the court this privilege during the course of the trial. Here, the trial was over. Arguments had been made and the case had been finally submitted to the judge. To allow such a prerogative for the fact-finder would be akin to sending a jury to' the jury room after a case has been submitted for deliberation, and then permitting that jury to request and call additional witnesses.
Lastly, there is a strong policy reason for reversing the judgment below. A jury trial is time-consuming, expensive, and fertile ground for reversible errors. We should not erect a judicial scarecrow that would discourage criminal defendants from waiving a jury trial and placing their trust in a judge alone. By this decision, we do just that. Every defense lawyer is going to be reluctant to recommend a waiver of a jury trial now that it is known that the state’s highest court has allowed the judge to step outside its role of independent magistrate and into the role of prosecutor. Most disturbing, the decision of the majority today would encourage trial judges, even in criminal jury cases, to abandon its independent role, especially when it observes inept prosecutions. There is no difference between judges aggressively assisting the prosecutor in a court trial than doing the same thing in a jury trial.
The litigation of the trial below was converted to that of an inquisitorial nature instead of adversarial. In the process, it more closely resembled a panel discussion and decision rather than a criminal trial.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
SCHRODER, J„ joins.

. This rule may very well be of dubious constitutional validity in criminal cases as being an infringement upon the separation of powers of the prosecutors to prosecute, the defense lawyers to defend, and judges to be fair and impartial. Also, it is clear when reading the entire rule that it is intended for jury trials, and not when the judge is the fact-finder. See KRE 614(3).