Court Opinion

ID: 9548931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:10:52.666328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:38.317352
License: Public Domain

ROVIRA, Justice,
dissenting:
The court’s opinion is, I think, constructed on a faulty premise which undermines the validity of its conclusion.
Sections 8-51-108(2) and 8-53-119, 3 C.R.S. (1973), authorize reopening of a ease where an award has been made. Section 8-51-108(2) authorizes an interested party to initiate the reopening of a case where there is a showing that the disability of the injured employee has undergone a change in condition since the entry of an award. Section 8-53-119 permits the director to reopen any award on his own motion on the ground of error, mistake, or change in condition.
In its analysis of section 8-51-108(2), the court correctly notes that reopening is conditioned upon there being an award. Maj. Op. 277. However, in its analysis of section 8-53-119, it incorrectly concludes that the statutory provision “vests the Director with discretion to reopen a case on the Director’s own motion_” Maj. Op. 277.
My reading of section 119 does not comport with that of the majority opinion. Simply stated, section 119 allows the Director, for certain reasons and within specified periods of time, whether or not compensation has been paid, to “review and reopen any award.” Authority to reopen an award is not authority to reopen a ease where no adjudication has ever taken place. A review of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and its history demonstrates that the legislature provided that disputes could be resolved either through settlement agreements or adjudication. After providing for these two routes of resolution, however, the legislature only provided the director with authority to reopen in cases where an award was made.
The General Assembly has, by the adoption of section 8-53-102(2), 3 C.R.S. (1973), evidenced its approval of settlement of cases under certain conditions.1 That section provides, in part: “No receipt or settlement shall be final unless in conformity *282with the provisions of articles 40 to 54 of this title and the rules and regulations of the commission or until such receipt or settlement has been approved by the director.”
In my view, settlement of disputed issues of liability and extent of injury not only serve a useful and beneficial purpose for the claimant, the employer, and the employer’s insurance carrier, but also allow efficient use of public resources.
The court’s opinion, which treats awards and statutorily authorized settlements as being one and the same for purposes of reopening, is not based on sound statutory analysis or good public policy. It ignores not only the statutory authorization of settlements, but also the benefit of settlements, fairly arrived at, as an alternative to litigation.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice ERICKSON joins me in the dissent.

. Legislative approval of settlements in workmen’s compensation cases is evidenced by the fact that settlement provisions have existed since the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1919. Ch. 210, sec. 93, 1919 Colo. Sess.Laws 739. Section 8-53-105, 3 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.) also supports the view that settlements made in accordance with the statute are viewed with favor.