Court Opinion

ID: 9794843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:12:48.520382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:14.939811
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Fontron, J.:
The plaintiffs, Julius D. Spears, Spears Realty Co., Inc., and West Riding Development Company, bring this action against the defendant, Kansas City Power and Light Company, to recover damages for an alleged appropriation of their land by means of the construction of underground transmission lines and conduits. Summary judgment was entered in the defendant’s favor and the plaintiffs have appealed. For convenience we shall hereafter refer to the appellants as Spears or plaintiffs, and to the appellee as defendant or Company.
None of the facts required to determine the issue here presented are in dispute. In 1956 the Company instituted eminent domain proceedings to secure an easement in certain lands lying in that part of Johnson County which is now a part of Prairie Village. Included in the condemnation proceedings was a strip of land along the south line of a tract presently bounded by Roe and Nall Avenues, on the east and west, and by 87th Street and the Meadowbrook Golf and Country Club, on the north and south. This tract, which was owned at the time by Mr. and Mrs. Irwig, was acquired by Spears in 1960. It is not denied that Spears took title to the tract subject to the Company’s easement acquired in the condemnation action.
In paragraph 3 of the petition filed in the condemnation proceedings, the Company alleged that it desired “to construct, operate and maintain a 161 Kv transmission line or lines, together with *522necessary distribution lines,” extending a distance of some 2% miles between two of its substations “for the purpose of more adequately serving present and future customers in the State of Kansas.” Paragraph 4 of the same petition reads as follows:
“Petitioner desires to exercise the right of eminent domain as conferred upon it by Section 17-618 of General Statutes of Kansas, 1949, in the manner provided by Section 26-101 of General Statutes of Kansas, 1949, for the purpose of constructing, operating and maintaining said transmission line or lines as heretofore described, to acquire by condemnation, an easement or right-of-way over, under, along and across each of the hereinafter described tracts or parcels of land, for the purpose of transacting and conducting its said business, as aforesaid.” (Emphasis supplied.)
No complaint is made by Spears as to the regularity of the eminent domain proceedings. The appraisers appointed by the court awarded the Irwigs $18,000 for the easement across their tract, and this award was appealed to district court, where the appeal was settled for $20,000.
Shortly after acquiring its easement, the Company constructed ■overhead electric transmission lines within its right of way, and in 1958 constructed certain underground installations. In 1966, the ■Company installed additional underground electric transmission lines within its right of way across the tract, which was then ■owned by Spears, and the construction of these later lines gave xise to this lawsuit. In view of the limited question before us in this appeal, the alleged character and extent of the underground installations, whenever they were constructed, are not of material ■consequence and need not be determined here.
Responding to the plaintiffs’ petition, the Company filed an answer conceding its construction of underground electrical facilities within the right of way, both before and after Spears acquired title, and incorporating therein by reference the petition filed in the condemnation action. The Company also filed a verified motion for .summary judgment admitting the underground installations and setting out by means of exhibits the entire eminent domain proceedings.
The Company’s motion for summary judgment was thereafter sustained by the court pursuant to the following Memorandum Decision:
“1. The entire court file in Case No. 22791 is made a part hereof by reference.
*523“2. The petition, order appointing appraisers, publication notice and report of appraisers all refer to the easement for transmission lines — under, along — the land involved.
“3. The appraisers’ report is controlling as to what is taken in a condemnation proceeding. It recites — in through, under and across the lands described in the petition.
Sutton Vs. Frazier, 183 Kansas 33.
Roberts, et al. Vs. Upper Verdigris Water District,
No. 24, 193 Kansas 151.
“The court finds and decrees that the defendant acquired, by condemnation in Case No. 22791, the right to construct, operate, and maintain underground electric transmission lines in its easement across the land described in plaintiffs’ petition prior to the plaintiffs acquiring any interest therein.
“The motion for summary judgment is sustained.
“Costs are taxed against the plaintiffs.
“Dated December 12th, 1967.
/s/ Clayton Brenner
Judge, Division No. 2.”
As previously stated, the plaintiffs appealed from the summary judgment entered against them and the issue raised by them on appeal is presented in this concise statement found in their brief:
“The sole question in this case is whether or not defendant power company acquired the right to install an underground conduit by virtue of the easement which it acquired in the 1956 condemnation action.”
Following the phrasing of the question, the plaintiffs’ contentions are succinctly summarized:
“Appellant contends: (1) there was no statutory authority by which defendant power company could have acquired by condemnation any right to construct an underground conduit, and (2) even if such statutory authority existed, the purpose and effect of the 1956 condemnation action was to acquire a right-of-way for a 161,000 volt transmission line and defendant power company thereby acquired no right to construct underground conduits.”
A conduit is a pipe, tube or tile for receiving and protecting electric wires or cables. (Webster’s Third International Dictionary, Unabridged; Wofford Heights Associates v. County of Kern, 219 C. A. 2d 34, 32 Cal. Rptr. 870.) The connotation of the word “conduit” presupposes a cable or wires for the transmission of electric power, and we consider the term as being used co-extensively with electric lines throughout these proceedings.
Proceeding to the first point, Spears suggests that under Kansas statutes an electric power company is not authorized to acquire property by condemnation for the purpose of constructing underground transmission lines or conduits. This contention must be rejected.
*524Under the provisions of K. S. A. 17-618 various corporations affected with a public interest are empowered to exercise the right of eminent domain. By the very terms of the act, electric companies are included among those so favored. In Cline v. Kansas Gas and Electric Company, 260 F. 2d 271, the United States Court of Appeals, 10th Circuit, held that an electric utility company came expressly within the act and was empowered to obtain a right of way by eminent domain for the construction of its electric line.
Although the statute may never serve as a model for clarity of expression, nonetheless we believe it furnishes authority for the acquisition by a public utility company engaged in producing electricity, to acquire an underground easement for the purpose of installing underground lines. As we read K. S. A. 17-618, using a kaleidoscopic process, it authorizes a corporation such as the defendant, which desires to transmit power by electrical current, to obtain a right of way by condemnation for the purpose of laying its wires “on, through, or over any land or lot.” (Emphasis supplied.) The term “through,” in our opinion, is used in the sense of and is equivalent to “under.”
If an electric power company is authorized by statute to install underground wires through property in which it has an easement, we believe that by natural intendment of the law it may insulate and protect its wires by conduit or otherwise to the extent required for rendering service to its customers. Although statutes which confer rights to exercise the power of eminent domain are to be strictly construed, this doctrine does not preclude the reasonable and sound construction thereof in the light of the purposes and objectives sought to be obtained by its enactment. (29A C. J. S., Eminent Domain, § 22, pp. 220, 221.)
We now turn to plaintiffs’ second contention on which, according to their counsel, reliance is chiefly placed. Put briefly, the argument is that the only right acquired by the Company in the 1956 condemnation action was to construct overhead wires or lines above the right of way, not underground lines beneath the surface. The trial court rejected this construction of the eminent domain proceedings. We believe it was correct in so doing.
In its decision, the trial court said that the report of the appraisers controls what is taken in a condemnation action. This conclusion is supported by our cases. In Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. 33, 325 P. 2d 338, we held that where land was taken under eminent domain *525for the purpose of constructing and operating a sewage disposal plant, the condemner, an improvement district, acquired no title to the minerals underlying the land condemned. Paragraph 8 of the syllabus reads:
“In an eminent domain proceeding the report of the appraisers must show what is taken, and what the landowners part with. Nothing is taken by implication or intendment, and the landowners may rely implicitly on the report filed which becomes the evidence and the only evidence of the commissioners’ doings.”
The Sutton case was followed in Roberts v. Upper Verdigris Watershed, 193 Kan. 151, 392 P. 2d 914, where an easement was taken for the impounding, permanent storage and temporary detention of waters. In considering what use of the easement was acquired by the condemner this court held:
“In a condemnation proceeding instituted under the provisions of G. S. 1949, 24-438 et seq., and amendments thereto, the commissioners’ report becomes the evidence and the only evidence of the extent of the easement taken and the extent of its use.
“The extent of the easement taken in the condemnation proceeding and the extent of its use is to be determined as a matter of law from the language used in the commissioners’ report.” (Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2.)
For an earlier case to like effect, see Mercantile Co. v. O. H. & G. Rld. Co., 56 Kan. 174, 42 Pac. 712, in which the subject is discussed and prior decisions are cited.
The appraisers report in the present action is fully set out in the record. In the report, which is verified, the appraisers state they were appointed to appraise the lands taken and assess the damages done to owners, tenants, etc., by reason of the condemnation of “right-of-way easements for the construction, operation and maintenance of electric transmission line or lines and the construction thereof, as more particularly described in the petition filed with the Clerk of said Court, in, through, under and across the hereinafter designated tracts and parcels of land in Johnson County, Kansas, more particularly described in said petition, . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The report thereafter lists each tract separately, together with the amount of damages awarded. The report also incorporates by reference the notice given landowners by mail and by publication.
At this point it is appropriate to mention that the order appointing appraisers shows their appointment to view and appraise the value of the easements taken through, under and across each of the tracts and to assess the damage done to the owners, etc. The notice given *526by the appraisers, both by publication and by individual mailing, likewise reflects their appointment to view, appraise and assess damages by reason of the condemnation of right of way easements to construct, operate and maintain electric transmission and distribution lines in, through, under and across the several described tracts of land.
After thoroughly considering the appraisers’ report, corroborated as it is by the order appointing the appraisers and by the appraisers’ notice of their appointment, we feel bound to conclude that the Company, through the 1956 condemnation proceedings, acquired an easement not only for the erection of overhead transmission lines, but for underground lines as well. There is no ambiguity as to the extent of the easement taken. It is explicitly described in each instrument as through, under and across the several properties.
We are well aware of plaintiffs’ argument that the sole and only purpose of the condemnation suit was to obtain an easement for the construction of overhead lines. In this connection, they point out two maps attached to the petition in that case, the first purporting to show the proposed route of “161 Kv Transmission Line”, and the second tracing the route across the Irwig property. We discern nothing in either map which suggests the design of or the manner in which the line or lines are to be constructed or which negatives in any way the condemner’s intention, openly expressed in its petition, to acquire an easement in, under, through and across the Irwig and other tracts. Moreover the maps, even had they revealed the nature, design and manner of the construction contemplated, were not made a part of the appraisers’ report. (Roberts v. Upper Verdigris Watershed, supra, p. 158.)
Spears also points to language found in the condemnation petition which refers to towers, poles, wires, anchors and appurtenances. The reference relates to the condemner’s rights of ingress and egress to the right of way to erect, construct, maintain, inspect, rebuild and repair its transmission and distribution lines, and to replace, renew and relocate steel towers, poles, wires, anchors and appurtenances thereto “upon, across, over, under or along said right-of-way.” (Emphasis supplied.) The petition does not define “appurtenances” nor does it attempt to limit what may be erected upon, across, over, under or along the right of way. The reference can not be said to negate the acquisition of sub-surface easement rights, even by implication, when the adverb “under” has been specifically *527included. Nor do provisions in the condemnation petition which relate to the cutting of trees upon the right of way, and prohibit the erection of permanent structures under transmission lines have the significance attributed to them by Spears; neither provision is inconsistent with the condemner’s obtaining the right to construct its lines both underground and overhead.
Thus we discover nothing, either in the appraisers’ report, which is the controlling document, or in other papers filed in the condemnation action, which is inconsistent with the right claimed by the Company to install underground power lines or conduits within the boundaries of its easement. The prevailing rule is that an easement or a servitude imposed upon another’s land extends to all uses directly or indirectly conducive to advance the purposes for which it was obtained. (26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, § 133, p. 794.) As it applies specifically to power lines, the rule is stated in 30 C. J. S., Eminent Domain, § 451, pp. 644, 645, in this fashion:
“Tower Lines. An easement obtained by condemnation of a right of way for a power line extends to all uses directly or incidentally conducive to the advancement of the purposes for which the right of way was acquired, including the right to erect, maintain, and service underground wires. . . .”
As the rule is applied to the taking of lands for railroad purposes and for highway purposes, we find it exemplified in the cases of Hennick v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 364 Mo. 883, 269 S. W. 2d 646 and S. C. State Hwy. Dept. v. Butterfield et ux., 216 S. C. 463, 58 S. E. 2d 737, respectively.
In Aycock v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 175 S. W. 2d 710 (Tex.), which was an eminent domain proceeding to condemn an easement for the construction of lines to transmit and distribute electric current, the Texas appellate court ruled that the trial court did not err in adjudging the power company, as part of its easement, had acquired the right to erect, maintain and service underground wires.
This court has recently said in Soden v. State Highway Commission, 192 Kan. 241, 387 P. 2d 182; Reinecker v. Board of Trustees, 198 Kan. 715, 426 P. 2d 44 and Shelor v. Western Power & Gas Co., 202 Kan. 428, 449 P. 2d 591, that in determining the extent of land needed for legitimate public purposes, it is proper to consider future demands which may reasonably be anticipated. These holdings mirror the generally accepted view that land condemned in the public interest is taken for such present and prospective uses as are *528consistent with the purpose for which the land is appropriated. (S. C. State Hwy. Dept. v. Butterfield et ux., supra; Hennick v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., supra.)
At the time it instituted proceedings to obtain a right of way for the transmission of electric power, the Company could reasonably expect that demand for its product would grow, requiring additional transmission lines and facilities. Recognition of this contingency is reflected in the condemnation petition where the Company alleged that its contemplated construction of the transmission line or lines was for the purpose of more adequately serving present and future needs of its Kansas customers. This was a legitimate consideration in acquiring an easement over, under and across the plaintiffs’ tract.
Having once concluded that the Company, through the 1956 eminent domain proceedings, acquired the right to use its easement for the construction of underground lines as well as for lines overhead, we are constrained also to hold the trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment in the Company’s favor. In this connection we have not failed to note the plaintiffs’ argument that they had not completed their discovery at the time summary judgment was entered. However, we consider their contention unavailing.
It is true we said in Brick v. City of Wichita, 195 Kan. 206, 403 P. 2d 964, that ordinarily motions for summary judgment should not be sustained so long as pretrial discovery remains unfinished. But we also said in Brick, and we have consistently held in other cases, that K. S. A. 60-256 authorizes the entry of summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. (Evans v. Lynch, 200 Kan. 331, 436 P. 2d 867; West v. Prairie State Bank, 200 Kan. 263, 436 P. 2d 402.)
For the most part our cases in this area have dealt with situations where depositions have been taken, interrogatories answered, affidavits filed, etc. But we have also recognized that summary judgment may be granted upon the pleadings alone, where only a question of law remains. This was the problem confronting us in In re Estate of Mullin, 201 Kan. 756, 443 P. 2d 331, where we said:
“The purpose of summary judgment is to make possible the expeditious disposition of cases in which there are no genuine issues of material fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. In determining whether a motion for summary judgment is well founded, the court may pierce formal allegations *529of fact in pleadings and determine from the entire case whether there are genuine issues of fact to be resolved at a formal trial. . . .” (p. 761.)
In the instant case we must appraise the propriety of entering summary judgment against Spears in the context of the pleadings, including the summary judgment motion which set out the entire eminent domain proceedings, together with the nature and character of the evidence which Spears proposed to obtain. The only pleadings of record are the plaintiffs’ petition, the defendant’s answer, and the Company’s motion for summary judgment. All three pleadings incorporate the petition in the condemnation action.
The plaintiffs now say they offered to make available to the court the plans for constructing the underground conduit as to size and as to location vis-á-vis their own sewer lines. Even were this offer made of record, the evidence would have been irrelevant to the issue before us on appeal. Neither are we persuaded that the nature and extent of the underground cables installed in 1958 would be of any moment on the limited issue formulated in plaintiffs’ brief conformably with their statement of points.
We are fully cognizant of the authorities which formulate the rule that the use made of an easement must not only be germane to the purposes for which the easement was acquired but that it must be a reasonable use, as well. (Aycock v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., supra; Jenkins v. Depoyster, 299 Ky. 500, 186 S. W. 2d 14.) Rut the reasonableness of the defendant’s use of the easement has not been made an issue in this lawsuit; the issue is confined to whether the Company’s use was an authorized use. Consequently, evidence as to whether the Company has used its authority to construct underground lines in a reasonable and justifiable fashion has no bearing on any material issue raised herein.
We emphasize: the issue we are called upon to decide is whether the Company acquired the right to install an underground line or conduit by virtue of the easement obtained in the condemnation action; that is, whether such use of its easement was an authorized use. The answer depends, as a matter of law, upon the extent of the easement and extent of the use shown by the language in the appraisers’ report. (Roberts v. Upper Verdigris Watershed, supra.) The extent of the use in this case, as clearly shown by the report, is to construct, operate and maintain electric transmission line or lines in, through, under and across the lands involved.
We are not to be understood as saying that a condemner may *530make an unlimited or unreasonable use of an easement it has acquired, or that he may burden a servitude imposed on a condemnee’s land in disregard of latter’s correlative rights. That kind of a situation does not confront us in this case. The issue framed by the pleadings was not the reasonableness of the Company’s use of the easement but whether the company was authorized to use the easement for laying underground lines. This has been the issue throughout the course of this action, not only in this court but before the trial court as well, and our decision is confined thereto.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.