Court Opinion

ID: 9735649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:26:52.449756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:00.687491
License: Public Domain

*437GIERKE, Justice,
dissenting.
This Court will not reverse a trial court’s finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Sorum v. Schwartz, 411 N.W.2d 652, 654 (N.D.1987).
Bernard Thomas contends that the trial court's approval of the change of residence of his children, Jason, Tammy and Tanya, from Bismarck, North Dakota to Brainerd, Minnesota was clearly erroneous. I agree with him and respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In this case, on these facts, I am left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made by the trial court.
In determining the best interests of the children, trial courts are to consider the following ten factors, if applicable, as set out in Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C.:
“1. The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parents and child.
“2. The capacity and disposition of the parents to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education of the child.
“3. The disposition of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs.
“4. The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
“5. The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home.
“6. The moral fitness of the parents.
“7. The mental and physical health of the parents.
“8. The home, school, and community record of the child.
“9. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference.
“10. Any other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute.”
Based on the relevant factors of Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., as applied to the facts, I do not believe Kimberly Nelson has met her burden of proving that the change of residence of the children from Bismarck to Brainerd was in the best interests of the children.
From a review of the record, it is obvious that both Kimberly and Bernard love their children deeply and that their children love them. The trial court opinion states that the children also have a loving relationship with their stepfather, Dan Nelson. This seems to be in conflict with the fact that Tanya stated she really didn’t like Dan. Further, Tammy testified that she sometimes feels uncomfortable around Dan Nelson because of his touching of her. Jason is the only child who did not speak negatively about Dan Nelson.
The second and third factors of Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., appear to be in favor of neither party as the record reflects that both Bernard and Kimberly love and care for their children deeply and are both able to provide the children with food, clothing and other material needs.
It is unquestioned that the children have lived their entire lives in Bismarck. Bernard has had physical custody of the children during the summer months since 1985, the year of the divorce. Kimberly has had physical custody of the children during the school months. Bernard exercised his visitation rights extensively, both on weekends and during the week. Both of these “environments” seem stable and satisfactory in light of the children’s needs. Hence, this factor appears to favor neither party.
This Court has noted the importance of the extended family in determining the best interests of the child with respect to custody or change of residency actions. Bashus v. Bashus, 393 N.W.2d 748, 751 (N.D.1986). The extended family tends to lend to the *438permanence of the family unit and can be a factor favoring a proposed custodial home.
In Bashus, Jeff Bashus contested the move of his children from Bismarck to Texas, where his ex-wife, Janet, was pursuing a singing career. Jeffs mother and father lived in Bismarck. Also two of Jeffs brothers and their families resided in Bismarck. On the other hand, Janet had no relatives in Texas, where she was residing at the time of the action. We properly noted that Jeffs extended family was a factor in his favor.
In this case, Bernard has a brother, Jim Thomas, who, together with his wife, Arlene, lives approximately 25 miles from Bismarck on the family homestead. Additionally, Jim and Arlene’s children reside in the Bismarck-Mandan area. All of Bernard and Kimberly’s children testified that they were very close to Jim and Arlene’s family and that they very much enjoyed visiting them.
Testimony revealed that Jim and Arlene’s daughter, Laurie, had lived with Bernard and Kimberly from February 1982 until April of 1985 and that Paula, Jim and Arlene’s other daughter, had also lived with Bernard and Kimberly for a number of years. During this time, it appears that Jason, Tammy and Tanya developed a close family relationship with Jim and Arlene’s family that still exists today. On the contrary, there is no evidence that either Kimberly or Dan have extended family in Brainerd, Minnesota. It seems clear that the permanence of the family unit, including the extended family, favors Bernard.
The sixth factor to consider, the moral fitness of the parents, has not been called into play. However, I am particularly disturbed by the testimony of Tammy concerning her relationship with Dan Nelson. Although the majority appears to be satisfied with the trial judge’s determination that Dan’s touching of Tammy was unintentional, I am troubled by this finding.
It appears that the trial court placed insufficient weight on Tammy’s testimony that Dan’s touching made her uncomfortable and that it bothered her. At the time of trial, Tammy was a 13-year-old, seventh-grade student. Absent evidence indicating untruthfulness, I believe the trial court should have taken Tammy’s testimony more seriously than it did. Based on Dan’s testimony, the court found Dan’s touching unintentional despite the fact that Tammy, when questioned by the court,1 clearly testified that Dan had grabbed her buttocks and had placed his hand on her leg by her thigh, making her feel uncomfortable. Considering that Tammy has stated she “loved” Dan, it seems to be highly improbable that she would fabricate a story, under oath, concerning such serious value judgments. Thus, I believe that the trial court placed insufficient weight on Tammy’s testimony.
The home, school and community records of the children is factor number eight of Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C. The children have completed all of their schooling in Bismarck. All three children, while not doing outstanding school work, are fulfilling the requirements to advance each year in their school system. The trial judge, in his memorandum opinion, stated that the educational system in Brainerd is essentially identical to the school system in Bismarck. I believe that misses the point as one could find substantially identical school systems in numerous parts of the country. However, that does not necessarily mean that the attendance of the children in the new school system is in their best interests. I believe as a matter of common knowledge that uprooting children from their accustomed schools and school friends is very disruptive for children and would be a factor weighing against the move to Brain-erd.
The ninth factor of Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., that the trial court must consider, if applicable, is the reasonable preferences of the children. This Court has noted that presumably a trial court gives more weight to the child’s preference as the child matures. Mertz v. Mertz, 439 N.W.2d 94, 96 n. 2 (N.D.1989). This makes sense simply because a child’s preference would pre*439sumably be more reasonable and informed as the child progresses in age and matures. However, I am not convinced that the trial court accorded greater weight to the children’s preferences despite the fact that Jason, Tammy and Tanya were ages 16, 13 and 12 respectively at the time of trial.
I believe the trial court gave insufficient weight to the children’s preferences to stay in Bismarck where their father, extended family and friends reside and where they have completed all of their education. The trial court concluded that the children’s preferences were a natural reaction to being forced to choose between their old residence in Bismarck or a new residence in Brainerd. I believe such logic undermines the whole purpose of inclusion of the preference of child as a factor in determining the children’s best interests. Thus, it appears the trial court seemed to disregard the children’s sincere desire to remain in Bismarck despite the fact that at the time of trial, Jason, Tammy and Tanya were young teenagers.
In Mertz, supra, 439 N.W.2d at 96-97 n. 2, we recognized that in some instances, a child’s preference to live with the noncustodial parent may be motivated by goals and ambitions which may be detrimental to the child’s best interests.2 In this case, there is no evidence that such ulterior goals and ambitions by the children are present. It appears that the children’s preferences have not been influenced in any way by ambitions that would be considered detrimental to their best interests. I must note that this Court has given serious consideration to preferences expressed by children as young as nine or ten years old. See Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 296 N.W.2d 490 (N.D.1980); Guldeman v. Heller, 151 N.W.2d 436 (N.D.1967). Absent evidence of coercion or duress, which there is no evidence of, the trial court should not have brushed the children’s preference away as an understandable reaction to the proposed residence change.
I am mindful of the fact that a child’s preference is only one factor to consider in determining the best interests of the child. However, where such clear and unequivocal preferences are given by three young teenagers and where the record is devoid of evidence of ulterior goals and ambitions, the preferences should be accorded greater weight than the minimal weight given to their preferences by the trial court.
Although Section 14-09-06.2 does not require a trial court to make express findings as to each factor enunciated in that section, it requires that the factfinder consider all factors. In Novak v. Novak, 441 N.W.2d 656 (N.D.1989), I joined in Justice Vande-Walle’s special concurrence allowing a change of residence because in Novak there was evidence that the custodial parent, who retained custody, provided more discipline for the child and was less indulgent and permissive with the child than the noncustodial parent was. However, in this case, the evidence reflects that both Kimberly and Bernard provided adequate discipline for the children. Further, it is my opinion that the extended family in this case is a more significant factor than the extended family in Novak. The factors weighing against the move to Brainerd are, I believe, significantly greater than those present in Novak. Although I joined in Justice YandeWalle’s concurrence in No-vak, I believe the factors in this case weigh more heavily against moving the children from the environment of which they have become accustomed.
Understandably, the task of the trial court in determining the best interests of Jason, Tammy and Tanya was not an easy one. Although there is not one particular finding by the trial court pursuant to Section 14-09-06.2, N.D.C.C., that I find clearly erroneous, the trial court’s analysis of all the factors in sum leaves me with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made in determining the children’s best interests. While I find that none of the ten factors explicitly weighs in favor of *440the children’s change of residence to Brain-erd, I believe several of the factors weigh in favor of keeping the children in Bismarck. In particular, the permanence of the family unit, including the extended family, favors keeping the children in Bismarck, the children’s sincere preferences favor them staying in Bismarck, the children’s home, school and community records favor them staying in Bismarck and finally, Tammy's testimony that Dan’s touching made her feel uncomfortable together with Tanya’s testimony that she really didn’t like Dan clearly indicate that keeping the children in Bismarck would be in their best interests. Therefore, I believe the trial court’s decision to approve Kimberly’s motion for change of residence of the children was clearly erroneous under Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., and thus I would reverse the trial court’s decision.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., concurs.

. For the transcript of the court’s questioning of Tammy, see note 1 of the majority opinion.

. In Novak v. Novak, 441 N.W.2d 656 (N.D. 1989), a change of residence case in which the child expressed a preference to live with the noncustodial parent, the majority observed that the trial court found that the custodial parent provided more discipline for the child and was less indulgent and permissive with the child.