Court Opinion

ID: 9898418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:34.818856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:16.811153
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                           Washington State
                                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                                            Division Two

                                                                                              July 5, 2023

      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                           DIVISION II
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                               No. 57334-2-II

                                  Respondent,

           v.

    JOHN MICHAEL BALE,                                          UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                                  Appellant.

          VELJACIC, J. — John Bale appeals his conviction of two counts of assault in the first degree,

arguing that the trial court erred by mistakenly believing it did not have the discretion to run the

crimes concurrently under the de minimus crime doctrine. Bale also argues that racism played a

role in his sentence, and raises several claims in a statement of additional grounds (SAG) for

review.

          We hold that the trial court correctly followed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1981

procedure in imposing a standard range sentence, and we decline to address Bale’s SAG claims

because they rely on matters outside of the record. We affirm.

                                                FACTS

I.        BACKGROUND1

          On July 2, 2012, Officers Stephen Morrison and Charles Schandel contacted three males

in a trailer park as part of a narcotics investigation. One of the men contacted was Bale. The

1
 The facts found in this section are taken from Bale’s prior appeal before this court, found at State
v. Bale, No. 44172-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2014) (unpublished),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/.
57334-2-II

officers requested Bale’s identification, but he claimed he was unable to find it. Morrison, fearing

for the officers’ safety due to Bale’s “nervous” demeanor, decided to place wrist restraints on Bale

to “detain him [and] frisk him for weapons.” State v. Bale, No. 44172-1-II, slip op. at 2 (Wash.

Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2014) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/. Morrison reached for

Bale’s wrist, but “as soon as [Morrison] went hands on with [Bale], he start[ed] pulling away.” Id.

Bale then broke free and ran.

       The officers pursued Bale, catching up to him and tackling him. When Morrison tackled

Bale, Morrison heard a metallic noise, which he later recognized as a pistol being racked. The

officers saw Bale gripping a pistol in his right hand. Morrison noticed that the gun’s hammer was

back, indicating that the gun was cocked. Morrison testified that seeing the cocked gun put him

in fear for his life because “there’s only one reason to cock a gun . . . and that’s to shoot it.” Id.

The gun would not fire without being cocked, but once cocked, the gun would fire with only slight

pressure on the trigger.

       Schandel testified that Bale “had a death grip on that gun.” Id. Morrison gripped the gun’s

barrel in an attempt to prevent Bale from shooting. Morrison yelled at Bale to “drop the gun.” Id.

Instead, Bale turned and began to aim the gun towards Morrison’s chest at a distance of a few

inches. Morrison had his hands on the gun’s slide, meaning that if fired, the gun would “more

than likely fire one round and malfunction.” Id. Morrison was able to wrest the gun away from

Bale’s grip. The entire struggle lasted five to ten seconds, and Bale at no time attempted to point

the gun away from the officers. Bale said nothing during the struggle. Both officers were in fear

of being shot.

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57334-2-II

       Bale got away again and continued to run from the officers who chased him. Finally,

Morrison apprehended Bale with the use of a stun gun. Morrison thereafter disabled Bale’s gun,

which was loaded. Officers also found a nylon ankle holster lying between Morrison’s patrol car

and the location of the struggle.

II.    PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Bale was convicted of two counts of assault in the first degree with a firearm enhancement

on each, and one count of possession of a stolen firearm. Bale appealed, and argued that the

evidence was insufficient to prove first degree assault because he never fired the gun nor verbally

communicated an intent to inflict harm. In an unpublished opinion, this court affirmed the two

assault convictions, reversed the possession of a stolen firearm conviction, and ordered that count

be dismissed on remand, which required resentencing. The supreme court denied review. See

Ruling Den. Review, State v. Bale, No. 91083-9 (Wash. Apr. 1, 2015).

       On August 29, 2022, Bale appeared before the superior court for resentencing arising from

the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). Bale argued

for a departure from the standard range; the trial court did not find mitigating factors, stating:

               The requirement on Count 1 which is the offender score of six, seriousness
       level of 12 with a standard range [of] 162 to 216, plus a special allegation of a
       firearm, possessing a firearm associated with that that was found by the jury. That
       special allegation requires a 60 month sentence to be imposed and to serve—serve
       completely. I don’t believe that there is any mitigating circumstances that would
       allow me to serve that, order that anything other than consecutive or the sentence
       on that charge consecutive to that 60 month sentence.
               The same with Count 2. There’s a 60 month allegation that has to be
       consecutive to the first 60 month special allegation, plus the offender score is zero
       on that matter as a matter of law with a standard range on a level 12 crime of 93 to
       123. The rule of law requires that that be run consecutive, unless I do find
       mitigating circumstances that would allow me to issue a sentence that is a[n]
       exceptional sentence underneath the standard range.
               There are no statutory (indiscernible). I was looking at that very
       specifically. But I don’t—I don’t see that. they—the statutes are very clear to me

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57334-2-II

           that I am required to sentence these consecutively. The question is what the
           numbers are gonna be. And that’s really the question.

Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 50.

           The trial court imposed standard range sentences for the two assault in the first degree

convictions and ran them consecutively pursuant to RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b). The court also

sentenced Bale to consecutive firearm enhancements for each count for a total of 342 months.2 In

the present case, Bale appeals, contending that the sentencing court mistakenly failed to recognize

a de minimus factor in deciding it did not have the discretion to run the assault counts

concurrently3.

                                               ANALYSIS

I.         SENTENCING

           Bale argues that the sentencing court erred by mistakenly believing that it did not have the

discretion to run crimes concurrently under a de minimus mitigating factor. We disagree.

           A.     Legal Principles

           We review a sentencing court’s decision to deny an exceptional sentence for abuse of

discretion. State v. McGill, 112 Wn. App. 95, 100, 47 P.3d 173 (2002). A court abuses its

discretion when it denies an exceptional sentence based on an incorrect belief that it is not

authorized to grant the sentence. State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696-97, 358 P.3d 359 (2015).

2
     At this, Bale’s third sentencing, his offender score was reduced to 6.
3
 Bale also argues that his sentence was the result of racism, but did not assign error on this basis.
While he devotes a portion of this brief to discussing the general presence of racism in the court
system, he does not specify any error committed in the trial court. We are left to presume he is
making an equal protection argument, but even so, he does not articulate a standard that we should
apply, nor does he set out elements of such a claim or any analysis as it relates to his case
specifically. In light of his failure to specify his claim, we cannot address it.

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57334-2-II

       Generally, a sentencing court must impose a sentence within the standard range set by the

SRA. State v. Graham, 181 Wn.2d 878, 882, 337 P.3d 319 (2014). In general, a defendant cannot

appeal a standard range sentence. RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Nevarez, 24 Wn. App. 2d 56, 60,

519 P.3d 252 (2022), review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1005 (2023). This rule does not prohibit defendants

from appealing the process by which the trial court imposed its sentence. In re Pers. Restraint of

Marshall, 10 Wn. App. 2d 626, 635, 455 P.3d 1163 (2019).

       The SRA sets standard range sentences for multiple serious violent offenses in RCW

9.94A.589(1)(b). Assault in the first degree is a serious violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030 (46)(v).

Under the SRA’s multiple offense policy, running the sentences for two or more serious violent

offenses consecutively is considered a standard range sentence. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b). However,

RCW 9.94A.535(1) provides that a sentencing court may depart from the standard sentence range

for substantial and compelling reasons, and it may “impose an exceptional sentence below the

standard range if it finds that mitigating circumstances are established by a preponderance of the

evidence.” The court may order that multiple serious violent offenses run concurrently as an

exceptional sentence downward only if it finds mitigating circumstances that justify its departure

from the standard range. RCW 9.94A.535(1); In re Pers. Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d

322, 329-31, 166 P.3d 677 (2007).         The SRA provides a nonexclusive list of mitigating

circumstances that can support an exceptional sentence below the range. RCW 9.94A.535(1).

       The de minimis nature of the acts constituting a particular crime is not on that list. But the

SRA states that its list of mitigating factors is “illustrative only and [the listed factors] are not

intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences.” Id. The de minimis nature of a crime

can constitute a nonlisted mitigating factor sufficient to support an exceptional sentence below the

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57334-2-II

range. State v. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d 717, 724, 888 P.2d 1169 (1995); State v. Thomason, 199

Wn.2d 780, 788, 512 P.3d 882 (2022).

        Importantly, the fixing of punishments is within the purview of the legislature, which has

given courts limited discretion to grant exceptional sentences. State v. Rousseau, 78 Wn. App.

774, 777, 898 P.2d 870 (1995). Absent reliance by a trial court on an unconstitutional basis for

imposing a particular sentence that discretion is not disturbed, and the exercise thereof inherently

involves the possibility of different results. Id. Offenders may in some instances benefit from a

court’s exercise of discretion, but offenders do not have a right to a particular result that lies within

the court’s discretion. Id.

        B.      The Trial Court Correctly Followed SRA Procedure in Imposing the Standard
                Range Sentence

        The trial court appropriately imposed Bale’s standard range sentence previously imposed.

There is no factual support for Bale’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion because it was

unaware of its authority to deviate from the standard range. The sentencing court plainly stated

that an exceptional sentence was not justified without mitigating factors and that it did not find

mitigating factors to exist. This is not an abuse of discretion, but rather an appropriate exercise of

discretion, discretion that allows a trial court to disagree that a certain criminal violation is de

minimus, just as the trial court did here.4

4
 Notably, while Bale cites Alexander as support for his assertion that the crimes herein were de
minimus, Alexander addressed circumstances involving possession of .03g of controlled
substances. 125 Wn.2d at 719. Those circumstances are a far cry from the circumstances here,
where the responding law enforcement officers were nearly killed by Bale. Bale’s reliance on
Alexander is misplaced.

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57334-2-II

        The trial court was aware of its authority to deviate from the standard range in light of

mitigating factors and did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so and instead imposing the

standard range sentence.

                                               SAG

        Bale raises two additional grounds for review in his SAG. First, Bale argues that he was

improperly searched and detained because the information gleaned from the informant did not

provide reasonable suspicion, and the officers did not observe suspicious behavior. Specifically,

Bale claims that we should reach the same result as State v. Hopkins, 128 Wn. App. 855, 117 P.3d

377 (2005). Second, Bale argues that he was wrongly seized when asked to identify himself and

placed in an unwarranted investigative detention, and the trial court erred by allowing the illegal

search into the trial.

        The record before us does not support any of Bale’s contentions: it only contains a report

of proceedings in regards to Bale’s 2022 sentencing hearings, where the investigatory stop was not

at issue. We hold that these arguments rely on information outside of the record and we decline

to address them, moreover, they are outside the scope of the proceedings before us, which regard

the most recent sentencing hearing only. RAP 10.10(c) (A SAG should refer only to documents

that are contained in the record on review.); State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d

1251 (1995) (We can consider only matters demonstrated by the trial record.).

        We affirm.

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        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                            Veljacic, J.

We concur:

        Cruser, A.C.J.

        Che, J.

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