Court Opinion

ID: 9418001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:46:26.63024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:53.992614
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Peckham,
with whom concurred
Me.'Justice White and Me. Justice McKenna, dissenting.'
I dissent from the opinion1 and judgment of the court in this case, and wish simply to state the grounds of my dissent without any attempt to do more. The indictment-avers that the *86conspiracy was entered into in Washington, District of Columbia, on December 30, 1901, and the opinion holds, in substance (and rightly, as I think), that it is essential to aver its information in the District in order to give the courts therein jurisdiction of the offense. The indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause, but evidence may be given to rebut it. It is averred in the application for the writs of habeas corpus and certiorari, in the case of Hyde, that the evidence taken before the Commissioner showed indisputably that the petitioner was never in the District of Columbia, except upon one occasion in 1901, and then only for about six hours, and that he was not then guilty of any of the offenses charged in the indictment; and in the case of Dimond, it was said the evidence showed that the transactions complained of as a conspiracy occured in California or Oregon,, of which former State the defendant was, and had been for twenty years, a resident. In other words, it'was claimed that the evidence before the Commissioner showed conclusively and without contradiction that there was no probable cause to believe the defendants guilty of any offense, as charged in the indictment. The writ of certiorari was called for in order that this evidence might be brought before the Circuit Judge, so that he could see from it that there was affirmative and conclusive proof of the absence of probable cause. The applications for the writs of habeas corpus and of certiorari were both denied. The opinion of the Circuit Judge, delivered upon refusing the writs, shows that the question of the want of probable cause to believe the defendants guilty, based upon the absence of both defendants from the District of Columbia at the time of the alleged formation of the conspiracy, was not touched upon by him, but the objections considered were those based upon the charge contained in the indictment, and whether it charged.an offense under the laws of the United States. This court now holds that the refusal of the judge to grant the writ of certiorari was within his discretion.
I think this is not the case for the application of the rule *87stated in the cases cited in the opinion of the court. Those from New York were based upon a matter of public policy, where the purpose was to overturn proceedings in assessments and taxation, in which the public was interested, and the courts refused in such cases to grant the writ. The result of the refusal in this case is to prevent the review of the findings of the Commissioner before whom the original proceeding was had, upon the question of probable cause. I admit that the weight of evidence will not in such cases be reviewed here, but evidence which conclusively rebuts the presumption of probable cause arising from the indictment and which is uncontradicted, may be looked at, and a finding of probable cause reversed. In order to refer to it the evidence must be part of the record, and in such a case .as this the application for a writ of certiorari to bring up the evidence which the petitioner avers shows such fact is not addressed to the discretion of the court, but on the contrary the petitioner has the right to demand that it shall be granted. The right is none the less, when the want of probable cause rests upon conclusive evidence of the absence of the defendants from the district at the time when the indictment alleges the conspiracy was formed in such district. If defendants were not then there, they could not be guilty of the crime charged in the indictment. This case is an extreme illustration of the very great hardship involved in sending a man 3,000 miles across the continent, from California or Oregon, to this District for trial, where he is to bring his witnesses, and where on such trial it will appear that the court must direct an acquittal, because the averment of the formation of the conspiracy at Washington, D. C., is shown to be false to a demonstration.
The expense to a defendant in his necessary preparation for trial, and in procuring the attendance of witnesses in his behalf from such a distance, must necessarily be enormous, and in many, if not in most cases, utterly beyond the ability of a defendant to pay. The enforcement of the criminal law should not be made oppressive in such cases, and, therefore, when it *88appears there was no probable cause to found the indictment upon, the order of removal should be refused.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice McKenna ‘concur in this dissent.