Court Opinion

ID: 9906825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 15:00:57.961947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:14.661630
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11389   Document: 38-1    Date Filed: 12/05/2023    Page: 1 of 17

                                                         [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-11389
                         ____________________

        In re: ASSET ENHANCEMENT, INC.,
                                                               Debtor.
        ___________________________________________________
        ROBERT A. SWEETAPPLE,
                                                  Plaintiff - Appellant,
        versus
        ASSET ENHANCEMENT, INC.,

                                                 Defendant - Appellee.

                         ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                 22-11389

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Florida
                        D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cv-60777-RS,
                           Bkcy No. 0:20-bk-15782-PDR
                             ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
               Juliet was generally right that a rose by any other name
        smells as sweet. 1 But Juliet’s observation does not apply here.
               Depending on the name—or more specifically, the con-
        text—an order that leaves nothing to be determined in a proceed-
        ing but the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded may or may
        not be a final, appealable order under our precedent. To be sure,
        most orders that resolve everything but the amount of attorneys’
        fees to be awarded qualify as final, appealable orders. But we’ve
        said that a contempt order that contemplates imposing attorneys’
        fees as a sanction for contempt but does not specify the amount of
        any such award is not a final, appealable order. Rather, the final
        order in that situation is the later order that awards the specific
        amount of fees. The earlier order that awards fees generally with-
        out indicating the amount awarded then merges into the later or-
        der, and they both become appealable.

        1 See William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 2, sc. 2.
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        22-11389               Opinion of the Court                        3

                When we apply that rule here, we conclude that Plaintiff-
        Appellant Robert A. Sweetapple timely appealed the bankruptcy
        court’s order finding him in contempt—even though the bank-
        ruptcy court entered that order more than fourteen days before
        Sweetapple appealed. Sweetapple’s appeal was timely because he
        filed it within the fourteen-day period following the bankruptcy
        court’s entry of its order sanctioning Sweetapple with a specific
        amount of attorneys’ fees for the contempt the bankruptcy court
        found in its earlier order. Because the district court reached the
        opposite conclusion, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of this
        aspect of Sweetapple’s appeal and remand for the district court to
        consider the appeal in the first instance.

                                I. BACKGROUND
               This case has a somewhat long and messy history. It origi-
        nates out of a Florida Public Records Act request that Asset En-
        hancement made to the Town of Gulfstream. After the Town of
        Gulfstream responded to that request in what Asset Enhancement
        deemed an incomplete and delayed way, in 2014, Asset Enhance-
        ment ﬁled an action in Palm Beach Circuit Court against Gulf-
        stream. Because of Gulfstream’s alleged delay, Asset Enhancement
        argued, it was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and reasonable
        costs associated with enforcement of the record request.
               Gulfstream and Asset Enhancement eventually settled the
        matter with ﬁnal judgment entered against Gulfstream. But the
        parties left the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs for the state
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                      22-11389

        court to determine. The state court held an evidentiary hearing on
        that matter and set ﬁnal argument for May 28, 2020.
               A day before ﬁnal argument occurred, though, Asset En-
        hancement ﬁled its Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. It then noti-
        ﬁed the state court of its bankruptcy ﬁling and asked the state court
        to conﬁrm that the May 28 hearing would not proceed because of
        the automatic stay. 2 Gulfstream’s counsel emailed a legal memo-
        randum to the state court, arguing that the automatic stay did not
        apply. After hearing arguments from both Gulfstream and Asset
        Enhancement, the state court concluded that Asset Enhancement’s
        ﬁling of its bankruptcy petition did not stay the attorneys’ fees pro-
        ceeding because Asset Enhancement, as the Debtor, initiated the
        action. So the state court held the May 28 hearing on the issue of
        attorneys’ fees.
               Gulfstream, through its attorney (and now-Plaintiﬀ-Appel-
        lant) Robert A. Sweetapple, argued that Asset Enhancement was
        not entitled to attorneys’ fees for two reasons: (1) its fees resulted
        from an orchestrated scheme to abuse Florida’s Public Records Act,
        and (2) in any case, its fees were unreasonable. Instead, Sweetapple
        asserted, the state court should sanction Asset Enhancement for its
        actions and reduce any attorneys’ fees award to basically $0.

        2 “The automatic stay is a fundamental protection” that the Bankruptcy Code
        “provide[s] to debtors upon the filing of a bankruptcy case in most instances.
        It works to give debtors a breathing spell to attempt to reorganize or simply
        be relieved of the financial pressures that led to the bankruptcy.” In re Cole,
        552 B.R. 903, 911 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2016).
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        22-11389               Opinion of the Court                       5

        Despite its decision to proceed with arguments, the state court de-
        cided to wait to rule on the issue of attorneys’ fees until the con-
        clusion of the bankruptcy proceedings.
                           A. Bankruptcy Court Proceedings
               Meanwhile, back in the bankruptcy court, about six weeks
        after the May 28 state-court hearing, Asset Enhancement ﬁled its
        Amended Motion for Contempt for Violation of the Automatic
        Stay and For Sanctions (“Motion for Contempt”). According to As-
        set Enhancement, Gulfstream and Sweetapple violated the auto-
        matic stay by (1) convincing the state court to proceed with the
        May 28 hearing and (2) requesting sanctions against Asset Enhance-
        ment. As relief, Asset Enhancement sought damages for Gulf-
        stream and Sweetapple’s alleged willful violation of the automatic
        stay:
              [Asset Enhancement] respectfully requests that this
              Court: (1) grant the Motion; (2) ﬁnd that [Gulfstream]
              and Sweetapple knowingly and willfully violated the
              automatic stay in pursuing the sanctions claim and
              the setoﬀ of the sanctions claim; (3) compel [Gulf-
              stream] and Sweetapple to ﬁle with the trial court a
              complete waiver of any sanctions claim; (4) enter a
              monetary sanction against [Gulfstream] and
              Sweetapple for reasonable costs associated with ﬁling
              and prosecuting this Motion; (5) enter an award of pu-
              nitive damages against them joint and several; and (6)
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                22-11389

              grant any further or additional relief as this Court
              deems necessary or appropriate.
        Mot. for Contempt 8, Bankr. ECF No. 32.
               The bankruptcy court granted Asset Enhancement’s motion
        in part (“Contempt Order”).
               First, the bankruptcy court determined that the automatic
        stay applied to the state-court action even though Asset Enhance-
        ment instituted the action. That was so, the bankruptcy court rea-
        soned, because Gulfstream sought oﬀensive relief when it argued
        in support of sanctions against Asset Enhancement. Based on Gulf-
        stream’s eﬀorts to obtain that relief in the state court, the bank-
        ruptcy court held that Gulfstream violated the automatic stay. And
        the bankruptcy court found Sweetapple, as Gulfstream’s counsel,
        personally liable for violating the stay.
               Then, the bankruptcy court addressed the remedies for the
        violation of the automatic stay. The court explained that because
        Asset Enhancement was a corporation, 11 U.S.C. § 105, which gen-
        erally covers reorganizations involving corporations and partner-
        ships and creates a statutory contempt power in bankruptcy pro-
        ceedings, supplied the bankruptcy court’s authority to award dam-
        ages.
              Next, the bankruptcy court considered each form of dam-
        ages that Asset Enhancement requested. In so doing, the bank-
        ruptcy court held that Asset Enhancement was not entitled to com-
        pensatory damages because it did not put forth any evidence to
        support such damages. The bankruptcy court also declined to
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        22-11389               Opinion of the Court                       7

        award injunctive relief, reasoning that the automatic stay, at bot-
        tom, is an injunction, so injunctive relief is neither necessary nor
        appropriate to protect the property of the estate. And as for puni-
        tive damages, the court concluded that Asset Enhancement wasn’t
        entitled to them because the record indicated no type of egregious
        or malicious misconduct nor signiﬁcant and foreseeable harm. But
        the bankruptcy court did award Asset Enhancement reasonable at-
        torneys’ fees and costs for the ﬁling and prosecution of its Motion
        for Contempt.
              Sweetapple timely moved for reconsideration of the bank-
        ruptcy court’s Contempt Order. The bankruptcy court denied the
        motion (“Reconsideration Order”).
               Consistent with the Contempt Order, Asset Enhancement
        timely moved for speciﬁc attorneys’ fees. And after the parties
        agreed to the amount of attorneys’ fees, the bankruptcy court en-
        tered an order awarding Asset Enhancement $12,931.50 for attor-
        neys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with the Motion for
        Contempt (“Fee Order”).
               Sweetapple and Gulfstream consented to the Fee Order on
        the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs Asset Enhancement sought
        “solely” “to avoid the necessity of a contested hearing.” Fee Order
        2, Bankr. ECF No. 120. The Fee Order clariﬁed that Sweetapple’s
        consent to the order did not “constitute a waiver or admission as to
        any aspect of the Contempt Order and/or Order Denying Recon-
        sideration. [The] Order [was] expressly entered without prejudice
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11389

        to [ ] Sweetapple’s right to appeal any aspect of the Contempt Or-
        der and/or the Order Denying Reconsideration.” Id.
              After the bankruptcy court entered the Fee Order, Gulf-
        stream paid Asset Enhancement’s attorneys’ fees.
                              B. District Court Proceedings
              Sweetapple then ﬁled his Notice of Appeal in the district
        court. In it, he challenged the Contempt Order, the Reconsidera-
        tion Order, and the Fee Order. Asset Enhancement moved to dis-
        miss Sweetapple’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
                The district court agreed and dismissed Sweetapple’s appeal.
        First, the district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
        Sweetapple’s appeal of the Contempt and Reconsideration Orders
        because the appeal was untimely. In support of that conclusion,
        the district court reasoned that these orders were ﬁnal orders and
        were therefore immediately appealable, even though they left the
        amount of attorneys’ fees unresolved. In reaching this conclusion,
        the court relied on Supreme Court precedent holding that the issue
        of attorneys’ fees is collateral to the merits, and a decision on the
        merits is immediately appealable even if an issue as to the attor-
        neys’ fees remains unresolved.
                And because the Bankruptcy Rules provide fourteen days to
        appeal from the entry of a ﬁnal decision or order, and Sweetapple
        failed to appeal within that fourteen-day window from the entry
        of the Contempt and Reconsideration Orders, the district court
        ruled his appeal untimely. As a result, the district court concluded
        it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
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        22-11389                   Opinion of the Court                               9

               Second, the district court concluded that Sweetapple lacked
        standing to challenge the Fee Order. Though Sweetapple had
        timely ﬁled the appeal of the Fee Order, the district court reasoned,
        he had consented to the entry of the Fee Order, so he could not,
        on appeal, challenge the fees awarded. The district court did iden-
        tify one possible basis for an appeal of the Fee Order, though: if
        the award deviated from the parties’ agreement. But Sweetapple
        did not allege that to be the case. So the district court dismissed
        Sweetapple’s appeal of the Fee Order.
               Sweetapple now appeals to us the dismissal of his appeal to
        the district court of his challenges to the Contempt and Reconsid-
        eration Orders. 3

                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
              In the bankruptcy context, we sit as a “second court of re-
        view.” In re Issac Leaseco, Inc., 389 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2004)
        (quoting In re Club Assoc., 951 F.2d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 1992)). That

        3 Sweetapple’s Notice of Appeal also appeals the dismissal of the Fee Order.
        Sweetapple’s briefing includes no argument challenging the district court’s dis-
        missal of his appeal of the Fee Order, though. As a result, Sweetapple has
        abandoned any challenge to the Fee Order. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
        Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). But even had Sweetapple not forfeited
        this issue, we would have affirmed. That’s so because Sweetapple, through
        his consent to the Fee Order, waived any objection he otherwise may have
        had to the amount of fees that order awarded. So the district court correctly
        dismissed that appeal. See Hofmann v. De Marchena Kaluche & Asociados, 657
        F.3d 1184, 1187 (11th Cir. 2011) (“As a general rule, a party has no standing to
        appeal an order or judgment to which he consented.”).
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      22-11389

        role requires us to “examine[] independently the factual and legal
        determinations of the bankruptcy court and employ[] the same
        standards of review as the district court.” Id. Generally, we review
        de novo legal conclusions by either the bankruptcy court or the
        district court. In re Fin. Federated Title & Tr., Inc., 309 F.3d 1325,
        1328–29 (11th Cir. 2002). As for the bankruptcy court’s ﬁndings of
        fact, we review those for clear error. In re Optical Techs., Inc., 425
        F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005).

        III.    The district court had jurisdiction over Sweetapple’s ap-
                             peal of the contempt order.
                The district court, sitting as the ﬁrst court of review, con-
        cluded Sweetapple ﬁled his appeal of the Contempt Order too late,
        so it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. We review de novo
        the district court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction. If the
        district court lacked jurisdiction, so do we. And we must dismiss
        an appeal in those circumstances. After all, “we are a court of lim-
        ited jurisdiction, [and] adjudicating an appeal without jurisdiction
        would ‘oﬀend[ ] fundamental principles of separation of powers.’”
        Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020) (alter-
        ation in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
        U.S. 83, 94 (1998)).
              In bankruptcy cases, we have jurisdiction to hear appeals of
        “ﬁnal decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees[.]” 4 28 U.S.C.

        4 The rules about what qualifies as “final” are more flexible in bankruptcy be-
        cause a bankruptcy case is “‘an aggregation of individual controversies,’ many
        of which would exist as stand-alone lawsuits but for the bankrupt status of the
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        22-11389                   Opinion of the Court                               11

        § 158(d)(1). As relevant here, a “ﬁnal decision” is one “by which a
        district court disassociates itself from a case.” Bullard v. Blue Hills
        Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015) (citation omitted). “Final decisions”
        “end[] the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court
        to do but execute the judgment.” Budinich v. Becton Dickinson &
        Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988) (citation omitted). The ﬁnal-decision
        rule prevents “piecemeal, prejudgment appeals that would under-
        mine eﬃcient judicial administration and encroach upon the pre-
        rogatives of [trial] judges.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC,
        140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020) (cleaned up).
               That said, the Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of
        determining whether an order is a “ﬁnal decision” under 28 U.S.C.
        § 1291 (the statute endowing courts of appeals with jurisdiction of
        appeals from all “ﬁnal decisions of the district courts”), an out-
        standing attorneys’ fees issue does not preclude an otherwise-ﬁnal
        decision from being a “ﬁnal decision.” Budinich, 486 U.S. at 202. In
        reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court expressly considered
        whether this rule should be diﬀerent if the attorneys’ fee issue
        might be considered part of the merits of the case. See id.

        debtor.” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015) (citation omitted).
        So an order in a bankruptcy case is “final” for purposes of § 158(d)(1) (and
        therefore immediately appealable) if the order “finally dispose[s] of discrete
        disputes within the larger case.” Id. (citation omitted). The added flexibility
        in what constitutes a “final order” in bankruptcy (but not outside the bank-
        ruptcy context) does not factor into the analysis here, so we do not further
        discuss that flexibility.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11389

                It decided the rule should not. Id. As the Court explained,
        “[f ]or all practical purposes an appeal of merits-without-attor-
        ney’s-fees when there is a statute deeming the attorney’s fees to be
        part of the merits is no more harmful to the trial process than an
        appeal of merits-without-attorney’s-fees when there is no such stat-
        ute.” Id. Plus, the Court reasoned, having the time of appealability
        depend on whether attorneys’ fees issues are viewed as part of the
        merits of the dispute or not in each case is confusing for litigants.
        See id. And because a wrong conclusion about whether an attor-
        neys’ fees issue is a merits or non-merits issue could have jurisdic-
        tional consequences, the Court concluded that “[c]ourts and liti-
        gants are best served by the bright-line rule.” Id. So under Budinich,
        “a decision on the merits is a ‘ﬁnal decision’ for purposes of § 1291
        whether or not there remains for adjudication a request for attor-
        ney’s fees attributable to the case.” Id. at 202–03.
               Several years later, the Supreme Court reaﬃrmed this rule
        in a diﬀerent context. Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of
        Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs and Emps., 571 U.S. 177 (2014). Budi-
        nich considered the issue in the statutory context. That is, Budinich
        held that an outstanding attorneys’ fee issue didn’t prevent a deci-
        sion from being ﬁnal when that decision awarded a litigant employ-
        ment compensation under Colorado law, which provided that the
        judgment in such a suit “shall include a reasonable attorney fee in
        favor of the winning party, to be taxed as part of the costs of the
        action.” 486 U.S. at 197 (citation omitted).
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        22-11389                    Opinion of the Court                                  13

               Ray Haluch, in contrast, considered the issue in the context
        of contractual damages. 571 U.S. at 184. There, the Court held
        that an unresolved attorneys’ fee issue did not prevent a decision
        from being “ﬁnal” even though attorneys’ fees were part of the
        contract damages to be awarded. Id. at 184–85. As the Court em-
        phasized, the rule was the same in both cases because the rule “did
        not depend on whether the statutory or decisional law authorizing
        a particular fee claim treated the fees as part of the merits.” Id. at
        185. Rather, the rule was a “uniform rule.” Id.
               We can understand why the district court thought these
        cases supported the conclusion that the Contempt Order was a “ﬁ-
        nal decision.” After all, the Contempt Order left only the determi-
        nation of attorneys’ fees, so a straight-forward application of the
        “bright-line rule” from Budinich and Ray Haluch yields the conclu-
        sion that the Contempt Order was a “ﬁnal decision.” And, it might
        seem, so does the “uniform rule” reasoning underlying the Su-
        preme Court’s adoption of the Budinich/Ray Haluch rule.
               But this is a contempt case. 5 And we have explained that a
        contempt decision does not become “ﬁnal” until the contempt pen-
        alties imposed are no longer “conditional or subject to

        5 Although we’ve recognized differences between the Bankruptcy Code’s au-
        tomatic stay and a court-ordered injunction, we’ve described the automatic
        stay as “essentially a court-ordered injunction.” Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d
        1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). And we’ve noted that “any per-
        son or entity who violates the stay may be found in contempt of court.” Id.
        (citation omitted); see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11389

        modiﬁcation.” PlayNation Play Sys., Inc. v. Velex Corp., 939 F.3d 1205,
        1212 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). This rule aims to avoid
        the “risk of disrupting a continuing, orderly course of proceedings
        below.” Combs v. Ryan’s Coal Co., Inc., 785 F.2d 970, 976 (11th Cir.
        1986) (citation omitted).
                And it ﬁnds its origins in Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105
        (1936). In Fox, the district court found Fox in contempt and entered
        an order that ﬁned Fox (1) $235,082.03 for his contempt and (2) an
        additional $10,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 106. Under
        the order, payment of the $235,082.03—but not the $10,000 in
        fees—would be remitted if Fox purged himself of his contempt. Id.
        at 106–07. Fox sought to appeal the entry of the $10,000 ﬁne, not-
        ing that it was not conditional. See id. at 108. But the Supreme
        Court held that the order in which the $10,000 ﬁne was set was not
        a ﬁnal one. Id. at 109. That was so because when the district court
        issued the order, Fox could still purge his contempt and avoid pay-
        ing the $235,082.03. Id. at 108-09. In other words, the district court
        still had work to do in the case even after it issued the order. And
        the Court held that the controversy could not be “split” to render
        the $10,000 ﬁne its own ﬁnal decision. See id.
                Relying on our Fox-based precedent, in PlayNation, we con-
        sidered a case in which the district court found parties in contempt
        and ordered them to pay attorneys’ fees and expenses, without
        specifying the amount. 939 F.3d at 1209–10. In a later order, the
        district court established the amount of the award for fees and
        costs. Id. at 1210. We held that “there was no ﬁnal decree until the
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        22-11389                   Opinion of the Court                               15

        amount of attorneys’ fees and costs awarded as part of the [earlier]
        contempt order was set in the [later] order.” Id. at 1212. When that
        happened, we explained, “the order containing the ﬁnding of con-
        tempt merged into the judgment and became subject to review on
        appeal.” Id. (cleaned up). In other words, we eﬀectively concluded
        that the contempt decision was “conditional or subject to modiﬁ-
        cation” until the district court determined the amount of fees to be
        awarded. 6 Id.
               Factually, Sweetapple’s case is materially indistinguishable
        from PlayNation. 7 In both cases, the court entered an order ﬁnding
        litigants in contempt and awarding attorneys’ fees generally as a
        contempt sanction. Then, the court in each case waited to ﬁx the
        amount of attorneys’ fees to be paid until it issued a later order for
        that purpose. Because we held that the court’s contempt decision

        6 Nothing in the factual recitation in PlayNation suggests that the district
        court’s decision to award fees itself was conditional or subject to modification,
        which might make the contempt order there seem like a “final” one if we were
        applying Budinich’s bright-line rule. But treating the contempt order as though
        it is not “final” when the only question left is the amount of fees to be awarded
        does promote “uniformity,” or a “bright-line rule,” in the context of contempt
        proceedings—even if that bright-line rule is the opposite of the one Budinich
        and its progeny espouse. And in any case, as we note above, we are bound by
        PlayNation, regardless.
        7 In PlayNation, we considered whether the order there was “final” under §
        1291, while here, we evaluate whether the order is “final” under § 158 because
        the contempt order at issue is a bankruptcy order. But that is a distinction
        without a difference in this case. After all, it is the nature of contempt, and
        not of bankruptcy, that drives the outcome here.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11389

        in PlayNation did not become ﬁnal until the court issued its later
        order setting the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded, we must
        conclude the same thing here, on the same facts.
               Our prior-precedent rule requires this result. Under our
        prior-precedent rule, we must comply with our precedent unless
        the en banc court or the Supreme Court abrogates it. Sabal Trail
        Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Cnty., 59 F.4th 1158,
        1164 (11th Cir. 2023). For a Supreme Court opinion to overrule our
        precedent, it must be “clearly on point” and “actually abrogate or
        directly conﬂict with, as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of
        the prior panel.” Id. (citations omitted). Even if a later panel “is
        convinced the prior one reached the wrong result—for whatever
        reason,” we must follow the prior precedent. Id. (citation omitted).
        And here, we issued PlayNation after the Supreme Court issued its
        decisions in Budinich and Ray Haluch. That means PlayNation con-
        trols.
               So long story, short: we hold that the Contempt Order did
        not become a ﬁnal and appealable order until the bankruptcy court
        issued the Fee Order. Because Sweetapple ﬁled his appeal within
        fourteen days of the bankruptcy court’s issuance of the Fee Order,
        see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1) (“[A] notice of appeal must be ﬁled
        with the bankruptcy clerk within 14 days after entry of the judg-
        ment, order, or decree being appealed.”), Sweetapple’s appeal of
        the Contempt Order was timely. And the district court had juris-
        diction over the appeal.
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        22-11389               Opinion of the Court                      17

               We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of
        Sweetapple’s appeal and remand for the district court in the ﬁrst
        instance to consider the merits of Sweetapple’s appeal.

                              IV. CONCLUSION
               We vacate the district court’s dismissal of Sweetapple’s ap-
        peal of the Contempt Order as untimely because Sweetapple
        timely ﬁled his appeal within fourteen days of the bankruptcy
        court’s entry of the Fee Order, which rendered the Contempt Or-
        der ﬁnal. And we remand Sweetapple’s challenge to the bank-
        ruptcy court’s Contempt Order to the district court for further pro-
        ceedings consistent with this opinion.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.