Court Opinion

ID: 9465053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:34:22.454747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:56.984777
License: Public Domain

FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
Once the merits are reached, I agree with Part II of the opinion. Respectfully, however, I would dismiss the appeal and not reach the merits. I do not agree that the denial of the government’s motion is ap-pealable by the government. In my opinion the government has not shown a sufficient interest, separate from the interest of the district court itself.
In a more typical disqualification motion, the movant is attempting to protect himself from an unfair advantage through his adversary’s use of counsel who has a conflicting professional duty to movant. If the motion be granted, the adversary is denied the attorney of his choice and the attorney is subjected to a restriction on his practice. If the motion be denied, the movant is subjected to the supposed disadvantage. In any case, an interest of some substance is affected, and if the court’s decision be erroneous, the injury cannot be adequately remedied on appeal from the ultimate judgment. Thus the order arguably has Cohen finality, and is appealable.
The case before us seems to me to be different. The primary responsibility for conducting the grand jury rests with the court, not the government, and the guardian of the public interest in proper professional conduct is, again, the court and not the government. Surely the government may alert the court to what it considers to be unethical professional conduct, and courts often call upon prosecutors for assistance in presenting such matters for consideration. If another appeals, the prosecution often defends the court’s decision. The prosecutor, when acting as the court’s delegate, however, has no independent standing to appeal when he differs with the court’s own appraisal of the challenged conduct.
The only particularized interest suggested in the present situation is that it will be more difficult for the prosecutor to obtain an indictment if witnesses testify falsely or remain silent on claim of privilege. Possibly the attorney’s conflict in duty may cause him to give improper advice. One or more witnesses may commit perjury, or may remain silent without a valid claim of privilege, or conceivably may make a valid claim when such claim is not in his best interest.
It seems to me that the described type of interest is just too tenuous to give a prosecutor the standing, independently of the court, to initiate a proceeding against an attorney or to appeal from the decision of the court that the claim is unfounded.