Court Opinion

ID: 9894807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 05:09:02.709337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:47.359583
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

RONALD JORDAN,                                                       UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     November 2, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 365270
                                                                     Court of Claims
DENNIS L. KENDALL,                                                   LC No. 22-000140-MZ

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and HOOD and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

     Plaintiff Ronald Jordan appeals as of right the order of the Court of Claims granting
summary disposition in favor of defendant Dennis L. Kendall. We affirm.1

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        This case originates with Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) personnel
confiscating personal property from Jordan. Relevant here, the property included a bottle of
Gorilla Glue2 and a pair of sheepskin mittens. It appears that the confiscation of the various items
belonging to Jordan occurred when Jordan was transferred from one MDOC facility to another.
Jordan was previously held at “LRF,” also known as the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility
in Muskegon County, but then transferred to “ARF,” also known as the Gus Harrison Correctional
Facility in Lenawee County. Jordan appears to have arrived at ARF in early June 2021, and,

1
 We note that Jordan failed to comply with the disclosure requirements in MCL 600.5507. See
MCL 600.5507(2). Though in the trial court he disclosed the number of civil actions and appeals
he has previously filed, he did not disclose that number when he commenced this appeal. His
appeal is therefore subject to dismissal. See Tomzek v Dep’t of Corrections, 258 Mich App 222,
224-225; 672 NW2d 511 (2003); MCL 600.5507(3)(b). Nevertheless, we address Jordan’s claims
on appeal.
2
 Jordan appears to have originally purchased two bottles of Gorilla Glue while incarcerated at
LRF, but came to ARF with only one bottle.

                                                -1-
relevant to this appeal, it is where prison staff confiscated the personal property at issue in this
case.

         MDOC has several policies related to prisoner personal property and hobbycraft materials.
Relevant here are MDOC policy directive (PD) 04.07.112 and PD 05.03.102. PD 04.07.112
governs prisoner personal property and, relevant here, relates to Jordan’s mittens. PD 04.07.112
states, in relevant part:

              L. Except if authorized pursuant to Paragraph M, the following kinds of
       clothing are prohibited:

                                              * * *

              10. Winter gloves/mittens except if single-layered construction and either
       knit or cloth construction. Suede, leather, and similar artificial materials are
       prohibited.

               M. Prisoners shall be permitted to possess and wear personal winter coats,
       winter jackets, winter gloves, and winter mittens that were legitimately in their
       possession prior to January 12, 1998 provided they fit within allowable property
       limits, even if they are not machine washable or do not meet the requirements set
       forth in Paragraph L, numbers 1, 4, and 9, and the attachments to this policy. New
       personal winter coats or winter jackets and new personal winter gloves or winter
       mittens may be ordered only through established institutional ordering procedures
       and must comply with all requirements set forth in this policy. A prisoner may only
       have one personal winter coat or winter jacket and one pair of personal winter
       gloves or winter mittens in their possession at any time. [PD 04.07.112(L)(10) and
       (M).]

MDOC PD 05.03.102 governs the hobbycraft program within correctional facilities. According
to PD 05.03.102(C), hobbycraft materials, supplies, and projects are “subject to prisoner property
limits set forth in” PD 04.07.112. Relevant here, PD 05.03.102 also states:

              N. Hobbycraft materials and supplies are subject to cost limitations set forth
       in PD 04.07.112 “Prisoner Personal Property”. They also are subject to the
       following restrictions:

                                              * * *

               6. Liquids and gels, including all paints, must be water-based.

       The Gorilla Glue and mittens were confiscated separately and proceeded separately
through the prison grievance process. Though some of the critical events overlap, for clarity’s
sake, we separate the administrative background related to each item.

              A. TIMELINE OF EVENTS RELATED TO THE GORILLA GLUE

                                                -2-
        When Jordan arrived at ARF in early June 2021, a prison employee identified as “T.
Skelton” confiscated Gorilla Glue from Jordan. Skelton found that the Gorilla Glue was “not water
based” nor “non-toxic,” and noted that the bottle’s label identified it as “an eye and skin irritant”
and waterproof. Skelton believed it should be “handled as contraband per PD 04.07.112[.]” In
mid-July 2021, Kendall held an administrative hearing related to the Gorilla Glue. At the hearing,
Jordan stated he was “authorized to order[]” the glue at his previous facility. Kendall noted that
Jordan had a receipt for the glue, but found that although he was “allowed to order this product[,]
it [did] not meet the criteria” under PD 05.03.102(N)(6). Kendall found that the glue was
contraband, concluding that the glue was “not water based” and noting the warning label that the
glue was an eye and skin irritant. He indicated in his report that Jordan could either send the glue
home “at his expense” or have it destroyed under prison policy.

        A day after the administrative hearing, Jordan filed a Step I appeal of Kendall’s decision,
asserting that the glue was not contraband because he was previously authorized to purchase and
possess the glue as a hobbycraft item. In early August 2021, two individuals identified as J. Lundy
and A. Thomas upheld Kendall’s decision, noting that although Jordan was authorized to purchase
the glue at LRF, this was a violation of prison policy and, regardless, Jordan was “no longer at
LRF . . . .” Lundy and Thomas concluded the glue was contraband under the policy directives
because it was not water-based.

        In mid-August 2021, Jordan filed a Step II appeal, claiming that because the Step I decision
“admit[ted]” that he had authorization to purchase and possess the glue it did not meet the
definition of contraband. Shortly after Jordan filed the appeal, the warden of ARF, “S. Campbell,”
reviewed it and determined that Thomas and Lundy properly addressed the issue, concluding that
the glue was not permitted by prison policy because it was not water-based.

        In late August 2021, Jordan filed a Step III appeal, reiterating his position that, under prison
policy, a prisoner could “possess any item(s) authorized by staff” and he “had staff authorization.”
In late October 2021, Richard D. Russell, manager of the Grievance Section of the Office of Legal
Affairs within the MDOC, denied Jordan’s Step III appeal, determining that his claims were
“considered, investigated, and a proper decision was rendered.”

                     B. TIMELINE OF EVENTS RELATED TO MITTENS

        A few days after Skelton confiscated Jordan’s glue, MDOC Officer Baldwin conducted a
“ride in property”3 for Jordan and found several items that he identified as contraband. Relevant
here, this included a “pair of brown suede mittens not allowed,” i.e., the sheepskin mittens. The
same day these items were confiscated, Jordan wrote a letter to Baldwin identifying the items
Baldwin withheld as including the “Brown Gloves.” Jordan requested return of the items, “or an
explanation for withholding.”

       In early July 2021, Kendall held a hearing relating, in part, to the mittens. Jordan “was
present for this hearing” and indicated he had “ ‘receipts for these things.’ ” In his findings,

3
 “Ride in property” is a reference to a property check and release of property upon arrival at a
new institution, either from jail or another MDOC facility.

                                                  -3-
Kendall cited PD 04.07.112(L)(10), the policy directive prohibiting leather or suede gloves or
mittens, and identified the gloves at issue as “suede,” indicating they were “sent home[.]”

        Jordan filed a Step I appeal of Kendall’s decision in mid-July 2021, contending that his
mittens were not suede and explaining they were “[s]heepskin with fur inside; suede does not have
fur on one side of [s]heepskin.” He argued that prison policy allowed him to “possess ‘Winter
gloves/mittens’ ” and that Kendall’s refusal to return the mittens violated policy. Jordan also
claimed that Kendall admitted at the hearing that the mittens were sheepskin. In late July 2021,
an MDOC employee identified only as “Condon” interviewed Jordan. Condon found that Jordan
failed to provide evidence supporting a violation of prison policy with respect to the mittens.

        Jordan then filed a Step II appeal in early August 2021, arguing that Condon’s decision
was “clearly erroneous because [the] grievance makes [an] unrefuted claim” that prison policy (PD
04.07.112(L)(10)) authorized prisoners to possess winter gloves and mittens. Campbell, the ARF
warden, denied Jordan’s Step II appeal. He concluded that the “grievance was appropriately
addressed at Step I,” concluding that PD 04.07.112 prohibited winter gloves or mittens “made of
suede, leather, and similar artificial material” and found that “[s]heepskin is leather.”

        In mid-August 2021, Jordan filed his Step III appeal with the MDOC. He explained the
basis for his appeal as follows: “Kendall violated policy because item NOT contraband.” Russell
(the manager of the Grievance Section of the MDOC’s Office of Legal Affairs) denied Jordan’s
Step III appeal, concluding that, after review, the issues were “considered, investigated, and a
proper decision was rendered.” This decision was mailed to Jordan in late October 2021. Notably,
aside from referencing having receipts for the items seized in his administrative hearing, Jordan
did not raise the argument that he purchased the mittens prior to 1998 at Step I, II, or III of the
administrative grievance process.

       C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY IN CIRCUIT COURT AND COURT OF CLAIMS

        In mid-May 2022, Jordan sued Kendall in Lenawee Circuit Court, raising claim-and-
delivery claims related to the sheepskin mittens and Gorilla Glue. He alleged that he was suing
Kendall “in his individual capacity.” Jordan further alleged that, under MCL 600.5507(2), he had
“previously filed 257 civil actions or appeals” and that he had “exhausted all administrative
remedies by filing an administrative grievance through all three steps.” Regarding the claim-and-
delivery claims, Jordan alleged that Kendall had “no lawful right to refuse [to] return” the mittens
and glue that Jordan “legitimately owned and possessed” and that Kendall’s “taking and retention
of [those] items” was unlawful. He alleged that he had a “legal right to [the] continued possession”
of his mittens and glue and that Kendall “undermined [that right] by refusing return of [Jordan’s]
property items.” Jordan sought return of the mittens and glue or $71.53 in compensatory damages,
$500 in punitive and exemplary damages, and costs for litigation.4

4
 In early July 2021 Kendall moved for summary disposition in the circuit court. This motion and
Jordan’s response to it are essentially identical to their respective filings in the Court of Claims.
Because this appeal relates to the arguments in and decision of the Court of Claims, we do not

                                                -4-
        In late September 2022, Kendall filed a notice of transfer, transferring the case to the Court
of Claims because Jordan sought “monetary and injunctive relief against a state employee” and
the case was “within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims as provided by 2013 PA 164, at MCL
600.6419(1) and (7).” In late October 2022, Jordan moved to dismiss the case from the Court of
Claims and for it to remand to the Lenawee Circuit Court. He argued that the Court of Claims
lacked jurisdiction over the case because it could only hear cases against the state and its officers,
but Kendall, as a prison counselor, was not an officer. Jordan based this argument on several cases
from the 1980s and an unpublished opinion from 1997, an important point for this appeal because
the Legislature amended the Court of Claims Act in 2013, and, in doing so, expanded the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. He also cited Council of Orgs & Others for Ed About
Parochiaid v Michigan, 321 Mich App 456; 909 NW2d 449 (2017), to support his argument that
the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction over claims against persons sued in their individual
capacities, like Kendall here.

        In late October 2022, Kendall moved for summary disposition in the Court of Claims.
Kendall first argued that Jordan could not possess the mittens or glue because they were prohibited
by prison policy directives. He argued that although prisoners may be exempt from the leather
prohibition if they legitimately possessed the item before January 12, 1998, Jordan failed to raise
this claim during the grievance process. Regarding the Gorilla Glue, Kendall asserted that
although the policy directives allowed items for “hobbycraft programs,” liquids and gels had to be
water based, so Jordan’s non-water-based glue was prohibited.

       Kendall also argued that summary disposition was appropriate because Jordan failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claim that he purchased the mittens at issue
before 1998. Kendall noted that Jordan’s “grievance affidavit” indicated the basis for his
complaint was that his mittens were “not suede but were sheepskin.” That is, Kendall asserted that
Jordan had not raised his claim that he purchased the mittens before 1998 and did not provide
proof of legitimate ownership. Kendall also argued that governmental immunity precluded
Jordan’s claim for money damages because he performed a governmental function when
addressing Jordan’s grievance, and that Jordan failed to plead in avoidance of immunity.

        Kendall also responded to Jordan’s motion to dismiss the same day he moved for summary
disposition. He noted that Jordan relied on outdated and unpublished caselaw to support his
argument that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction, noting the Legislature’s 2013 amendment
of the Court of Claims Act. Kendall also distinguished Council of Orgs, arguing that Jordan’s case
did not involve intervention and that Jordan’s discussion of individual capacity relied on outdated
dicta from Council of Orgs. He further argued that he acted in an official capacity when conducting

rehash the arguments in the parties’ circuit court filings. We note, however, that Jordan moved
for leave to file an amended complaint. He sought to add a gross-negligence claim to avoid
immunity, in response to a claim in Kendall’s dispositive motion.

                                                 -5-
the hearing related to Jordan’s personal property. Finally, Kendall argued that Jordan had “not
properly disclosed his litigation history,” contrary to MCL 600.5507.5

        In mid-November 2022, Jordan responded to Kendall’s motion for summary disposition,
asking the Court of Claims to deny the motion. He asserted he had a right to continued possession
of the mittens and Gorilla Glue. Referencing his affidavit attached to his response, Jordan asserted
that an “authorized prison official” issued him the Gorilla Glue and that, under PD 04.07.112, he
could possess the glue as a hobbycraft item. He argued that the authorization “negate[d] any claim
the Glue was prohibited ‘contraband,’ ” but, “[a]t the very least,” it created a factual dispute
sufficient to preclude summary disposition.

        Jordan also contended that he fully exhausted all of his administrative remedies. Jordan
asserted that the Federal Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 USC 1997e et seq., which Kendall cited
in his motion for summary disposition, was inapplicable and that only the Michigan Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), MCL 600.5501 et seq., applied. Noting that he had to “exhaust
all three steps of the prison grievance procedure,” Jordan asserted that he “presented his claim in
the grievance which was reviewed at all levels and denied.” Jordan contended that he informed
Kendall that he had possessed the mittens since 1996, but that Kendall “elected to ignore and
exclude this important fact from the hearing report” he prepared. Finally, Jordan asserted that
Kendall was not entitled to governmental immunity because his conduct was grossly negligent.

        In mid-January 2023, the Court of Claims entered an order granting Kendall’s motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The Court of Claims, noting that the MDOC had
statutory authority to limit personal property of prisoners, concluded that Jordan did not have a
right to possess the mittens and Gorilla Glue. It found that PD 04.07.112(M) prohibited prisoner
possession of “gloves like the ones taken from [Jordan].” The Court of Claims also found that the
Gorilla Glue was “properly considered contraband” under PD 05.03.102(N)(6) because it was a
non-water-based liquid. Because it found that Jordan did not have a right to possess the mittens
and glue, the Court of Claims “order[ed] that [Jordan] has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted and [his] request to amend the complaint would be futile.” The Court of Claims
therefore dismissed Jordan’s case.

        In early February 2023, Jordan moved for reconsideration of the January 2023 order, which
the Court of Claims denied. He argued that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction over his case
for the same reasons articulated in his motion to dismiss, namely because Kendall was not an
officer of the state acting in an official position, as required to vest jurisdiction with the Court of
Claims. He also argued that the Court of Claims improperly granted summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) because it made findings of fact and should not have relied on documentary
evidence attached to Kendall’s dispositive motion. The Court of Claims denied reconsideration.
This appeal followed.

5
  MCL 600.5507(2) provides: “A prisoner who brings a civil action or appeals a judgment
concerning prison conditions shall, upon commencement of the action or initiation of the appeal,
disclose the number of civil actions and appeals that the prisoner has previously initiated.”

                                                 -6-
                                 II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        “Whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court
reviews de novo.” Council of Orgs, 321 Mich App at 463 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Where a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit, any action with respect to such
a cause, other than dismissal, is absolutely void.” Id. at 466 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

       This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “A motion
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim based on the factual allegations in
the complaint.” Id. at 159 (emphasis omitted). “When considering such a motion, a trial court
must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone.” Id. at
160. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted when a claim is so clearly
unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Id.

        A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.” El-Khalil,
504 Mich at 160 (citation and emphasis omitted). In considering a motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10), the trial court “must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Id. (citation omitted). Such a motion “may only be
granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citation omitted). “A genuine issue
of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might
differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

                           III. COURT OF CLAIMS JURISDICTION

        Jordan argues that the Court of Claims only has jurisdiction over cases involving officers
of the state and that Kendall, as a “prison counselor,” did not constitute an officer. He therefore
argues that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction over his case and should have remanded it back
to Lenawee Circuit Court. We disagree.

       Under the current version of MCL 600.6419(1)(a), the Court of Claims has jurisdiction

       [t]o hear and determine any claim or demand, statutory or constitutional, liquidated
       or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, or any demand for monetary, equitable,
       or declaratory relief or any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or
       any of its departments or officers notwithstanding another law that confers
       jurisdiction of the case in the circuit court.

MCL 600.6419(7) defines “the state or any of its departments or officers” as:

       [T]his state or any state governing, legislative, or judicial body, department,
       commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of the state, or an officer, employee,
       or volunteer of this state or any governing, legislative, or judicial body, department,
       commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of this state, acting, or who
       reasonably believes that he or she is acting, within the scope of his or her authority
       while engaged in or discharging a government function in the course of his or her
       duties.

                                                 -7-
In other words, an employee of this state who acts (or reasonably believes they are acting) within
the scope of their authority while engaged in or discharging a governmental function in the course
of their duties constitutes “the state or any of its departments or officers” under MCL 600.6419(7),
and the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over claims against that employee under MCL
600.6419(1)(a).

       Though the Court of Claims did not address this argument, it had jurisdiction over this case
because Kendall is an employee of a state department. ARF, a state prison facility, is part of the
MDOC. Kendall is an ARF prison counselor who was designated to conduct administrative
hearings related to Jordan’s Gorilla Glue and sheepskin mittens. He is therefore an employee of
MDOC who discharged a governmental function—regulating prison property—when evaluating
Jordan’s grievances. Accordingly, Kendall is an officer or employee of the state under MCL
600.6419(7). This case was therefore one against an officer of the state and the Court of Claims
thus had jurisdiction over it. See MCL 600.6419(1)(a).

         Jordan’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive because he relies on mostly outdated
caselaw. He cites several cases from the 1980s and 1990s to support his position.6 Jordan’s
reliance on these cases is misplaced for the same reason: they were all decided before the
Legislature amended MCL 600.6419 in 2013. Before the 2013 amendment, the general
jurisdictional provision of the Court of Claims Act provided that the Court of Claims had
jurisdiction “[t]o hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex
contractu and ex delicto, against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards,
institutions, arms or agencies.” MCL 600.6419(1)(a), as enacted by 1984 PA 212, effective July
9, 1984. “This provision ha[d] been interpreted to mean that the Court of Claims ha[d] exclusive
jurisdiction over suits against public officials acting in their official capacities as well as suits
against state agencies or departments.” Grunow v Sanders, 84 Mich App 578, 581; 269 NW2d
683 (1978).

6
  Jordan cites Burnett v Moore, 111 Mich App 646, 648; 314 NW2d 458 (1981) (involving state
police trooper), and Hamilton v Reynolds, 129 Mich App 375, 379; 341 NW2d 152 (1983)
(involving director of psychiatric hospital), for the proposition that the director of a state facility
or a prison warden qualify as state officers for purposes of Court of Claims jurisdiction. Positions
he contends do not qualify as state officers include Michigan State Troopers, see Burnett, 111
Mich App at 648, prison guards, see Lowery v Dep’t of Corrections, 146 Mich App 342, 349; 380
NW2d 99 (1985), prison work camp supervisors, see Bandfield v Wood, 104 Mich App 279; 304
NW2d 551 (1981), or anyone in an administrative position, see Haider v Mich Technological Univ,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 13, 1997 (Docket No.
183350). Unpublished opinions of this Court are not binding authority but may be considered for
their persuasiveness. See Legacy Custom Builders, Inc v Rogers, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___
NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 359213); slip op at 9. The opinions he cites decided before
November 1, 1990, are not strictly binding pursuant to MCR 7.215(J)(1), but, as published
opinions, they nevertheless have “precedential effect under the rule of stare decisis” pursuant to
MCR 7.215(C)(2). See id. at ___; slip op at 5 n 1. This rule applies to other pre-November 1,
1990 cases cited in this opinion.

                                                 -8-
        As Kendall points out, the only post-2013 decision Jordan cites is Council of Orgs &
Others for Ed About Parochiaid v Michigan, 321 Mich App at 456. This case is distinguishable.
First, the critical issue in Council of Orgs was intervention. See id. Members of the state
legislature, in their private capacities, and private organizations sought to intervene as defendants
in a case involving public funds for private schools. Id. at 459-463. Intervention is not at issue in
this case. Second, this Court’s determination that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction over the
intervening defendants, state legislators—acting in their individual capacities—and private
organizations, in Council of Orgs hinged on the fact they were “nonstate actors.” Id. at 465-470.
Essentially, in Council of Orgs, the intervening defendants sought to piggyback on the Court of
Claims’ existing jurisdiction because of their personal interests in the suit. See id. Jurisdiction
otherwise was not largely in dispute. Here, there is no dispute that Kendall is a state actor; he is
an employee of MDOC who was acting in his official capacity when he determined that Jordan’s
mittens and glue were contraband. Council of Orgs therefore does not support Jordan’s position.
We conclude that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction over this case.

                                 IV. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

                      A. FACTUAL FINDINGS UNDER MCR 2.116(C)(8)

       Jordan argues that the Court of Claims erred when it granted summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) because it relied on documentary evidence attached to Kendall’s dispositive
motion and made factual findings. We agree.

        The Court of Claims concluded that the applicable policy directives “prohibit[ed] prisoners
from possessing gloves like the ones taken from [Jordan]” and that the “Gorilla Glue was properly
considered contraband because it was not a water-based liquid as required by PD
05.03.102(N)(6).” The court’s conclusions regarding the mittens and Gorilla Glue included factual
determinations (i.e., that sheepskin is suede or leather; that Gorilla Glue is not water-based). The
court therefore looked beyond the pleadings and inappropriately made factual findings. Summary
disposition was, accordingly, improper under MCR 2.116(C)(8).

                                       B. GORILLA GLUE

         We may nevertheless affirm the trial court when it reaches the right result, even if for the
wrong reason. Gleason v Mich Dep’t of Transp, 256 Mich App 1, 3; 662 NW2d 822 (2003). We
address the Gorilla Glue issue first. Here, PD 05.03.102(N)(6) provides that “[l]iquids and gels,
including all paints, must be water-based.” Gorilla Glue is a liquid or gel, so it must be water-
based for a prisoner to possess it as a hobbycraft material. Kendall found that the Gorilla Glue “is
not water based . . . .” To be clear, that Gorilla Glue is not water based is a factual conclusion, but
it is a conclusion that Jordan did not dispute during the administrative process or in the trial court,
and one that does not dispute on appeal. He conceded at oral argument that the glue was not water-
based. There is therefore no factual dispute that it was prohibited under PD 05.03.102(N)(6),
absent some other administrative carveout.

       Jordan contends that PD 05.03.102(M) allowed him to retain possession of the Gorilla Glue
because he presented evidence that “the warden’s designee had authorized [him] to purchase and
possess the Gorilla Glue.” That evidence, as far as we can tell, is an affidavit from Jordan

                                                 -9-
indicating that he ordered the glue in May 2020 and received it in mid-July 2020; an order form
dated what appears to be May 28, 2020, for two eight-ounce bottles of Gorilla Glue; and a receipt
indicating that Jordan received “2 gorilla glue” on July 17, 2020. The order form indicates that
Jordan was at LRF when he ordered the Gorilla Glue. And though it does not say LRF on the
receipt, the receipt is signed by the same individual who signed the order form as the “R.U.M or
Authorized Agent.”

       PD 05.03.102(M) provides, in relevant part, that “[t]hat prisoners shall be permitted to use
only those hobbycraft materials and supplies authorized for use by the Warden or designee for the
hobbycraft activities in which the prisoner is participating.” PD 05.03.102(M). According to
Kendall’s administrative hearing report, Jordan stated to Kendall that he was “ ‘authorized to order
[the Gorilla Glue] at LRF.’ ” Even if true, Jordan transferred to ARF, which is where the glue was
confiscated. That he was permitted to possess the glue at LRF (though it appears this may have
been improper under 05.03.102(N)(6))7 does not mean he would automatically be allowed to
possess it at ARF.

       In conclusion, the Court of Claims improperly granted summary disposition of Jordan’s
claim-and-delivery action related to the Gorilla Glue under MCR 2.116(C)(8), but we affirm that
decision under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The uncontradicted evidence showed that Gorilla Glue is a
non-water-based liquid, so it was prohibited under PD 05.03.102(N)(6). Jordan conceded at oral
argument that the “Gorilla Glue” at issue here is a non-water-based liquid. He only challenges the
confiscation based on his authorization to purchase it. It is immaterial whether Jordan had
authorization to possess the Gorilla Glue while he was imprisoned at LRF because he was
subsequently transferred to ARF, which is where the glue was confiscated and determined to be
contraband.8

7
  PD 05.03.102(N) states that “[h]obbycraft materials and supplies . . . are subject to the following
restrictions[,]” which includes the limitation that liquids and gels “be water-based.” This serves
as a limitation on PD 05.03.102(M). That is, although a warden or designee may authorize a
prisoner to use certain hobbycraft materials and supplies under PD 05.03.102(M), that
authorization is still subject to the restrictions outlined in PD 05.03.102(N). Indeed, as noted,
Lundy and Thomas indicated in the Step I Grievance Response Form that Jordan was “authorized
to purchase the Gorilla Glue at LRF even though it violated policy.”
8
    We note PD 05.03.102(P), which governs hobbycraft materials and prison transfers. It provides:
                  If a prisoner with hobbycraft materials or supplies transfers to a facility
         which does not offer at the prisoner’s security level a hobbycraft activity for which
         the same materials and supplies are authorized, the materials and supplies not
         allowed at that facility shall be disposed of as set forth in PD 04.07.112 “Prisoner
         Personal Property”; this includes storing the items if the prisoner is placed in
         security Level IV or V if storage is required by PD 04.07.112. If the receiving
         facility does offer a hobbycraft activity at the prisoner’s security level for which
         any or all of the same materials or supplies are authorized, those materials and/or
         supplies which are authorized shall be stored for the prisoner for at least 30 calendar

                                                  -10-
                                     C. SHEEPSKIN MITTENS

       The next issue relates to the sheepskin mittens. Jordan raises two arguments related to the
mittens. First, he argues that summary disposition was inappropriate and the mittens should be
returned to him because PD 04.07.112(L)(10) prohibited suede and leather gloves, not sheepskin
gloves. We disagree.

       Here, PD 04.07.112(L)(10) prohibits winter gloves or mittens unless they are “single-
layered construction and either knit or cloth construction. Suede, leather, and similar artificial
materials are prohibited.” PD 04.07.112(L) is subject to PD 04.07.112(M). Subsection (M)
provides that prisoners are allowed to

        possess and wear personal winter coats, winter jackets, winter gloves, and winter
        mittens that were legitimately in their possession prior to January 12, 1998 provided
        they fit within allowable property limits, even if they are not machine washable or
        do not meet the requirements set forth in Paragraph L, numbers 1, 4, and 9, and the
        attachments to this policy. [PD 04.07.112(M).]

        There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Jordan could retain possession
of his sheepskin gloves under PD 04.07.112(L)(10). Jordan seems to misread that policy directive.
During the grievance process, he appeared to believe that it allowed him to possess winter gloves
or mittens. It instead prohibits possession of winter gloves or mittens unless they are “single-
layered construction and either knit or cloth construction.” PD 04.07.112(L)(10). And it explicitly
prohibits gloves or mittens that are “[s]uede, leather, [or a] similar artificial material[] . . . .” Id.
There is no factual dispute that the sheepskin gloves are prohibited under PD 04.07.112(L)(10).
Even if they are not suede, leather, or a similar artificial material, there is no dispute that the gloves
are neither knit nor cloth construction. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary
disposition as it relates to Jordan’s argument under PD 04.07.112(L)(10).

         Second, Jordan argues that because he purchased the mittens in 1996, PD 04.07.112(M)
allows him to possess the mittens, even if they do qualify as suede or leather that is otherwise
prohibited under PD 04.07.112(L)(10). Jordan did not raise his argument that he has owned the
gloves since 1996 in Step I, II, or III of the grievance process and he has thus failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies as it relates to this argument. See MCL 600.5503(1) (requiring exhaustion
of all available administrative remedies as a precondition to filing an action). The Court of Claims
therefore properly granted summary disposition of this claim, albeit under the wrong subrule.

        It is well settled that a claimant must exhaust administrative remedies within an agency
before seeking judicial review of the agency decision. See Wilcox v Wheatley, ___ Mich App ___,
___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 358630); slip op at 3; Citizens for Common Sense in
Gov’t v Attorney General, 243 Mich App 43, 51-54; 620 NW2d 546 (2000). Further, the PLRA

        days to permit the prisoner an opportunity to apply to participate in the hobbycraft
        activity. [PD 05.03.102(P).]

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provides “certain requirements that apply when a prisoner brings a civil action concerning prison
conditions.” Anderson v Myers, 268 Mich App 713, 715; 709 NW2d 171 (2005) (quotation marks
and citations omitted). This includes the requirement that “[a] prisoner shall not file an action
concerning prison conditions until the prisoner has exhausted all available administrative
remedies.” MCL 600.5503(1).

        Throughout the grievance process, Jordan argued that Kendall improperly retained
possession of the sheepskin mittens because prison policy (PD 04.07.112(L)(10)) allowed him to
possess them. At Step I, Jordan asserted that his mittens were not suede, but sheepskin, and that
prison policy “authorize[d] [him] to possess ‘Winter gloves/mittens . . . .’ ” He contended that, at
the grievance hearing, Kendall “admitted [the] mittens were Sheepskin.” There was no mention
of Jordan having purchased the mittens in 1996 in his Step I grievance. Nor did he raise his claim
that he bought the mittens in 1996 in his Step II or Step III appeals. Jordan’s Step II appeal
essentially reiterates the same point in his Step I grievance—that prison policy allowed possession
of winter gloves or mittens, and Kendall’s retention of the mittens violated that policy. And his
Step III appeal only stated that Kendall “violated policy because item NOT contraband.” Jordan
therefore never raised his argument that he was entitled to return of the mittens under PD
04.07.112(M) during the administrative grievance process.9 See PD 03.02.130 (relating to prisoner
grievances); Burton v Jones, 321 F3d 569, 574 (CA 6, 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Jones
v Bock, 549 US 199; 127 S Ct 910; 166 L Ed 2d 798 (2007) (“We understand these policies to
require that a prisoner seeking to administratively exhaust a claim against a prison official describe
the alleged mistreatment or misconduct at Step I of the grievance process”).10 Because he did not
raise the issue during the grievance process, instead first raising it in the circuit court then Court
of Claims, he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, although the Court of
Claims improperly granted summary disposition of this claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8), summary
disposition was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(4). Rudolph Steiner Sch of Ann Arbor, 237 Mich
App at 730.

       We affirm.

                                                              /s/ Anica Letica
                                                              /s/ Noah P. Hood
                                                              /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

9
  Even if Jordan raised his argument related to PD 04.07.112(M) and having owned the mittens
since 1996 at the administrative hearing before Kendall, there is no documentary evidence
supporting that beyond Jordan’s own affidavit. And because he did not raise this argument during
his Step I, II, or III appeals, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
10
  Although not binding on state courts, lower federal court decisions may be considered for their
persuasive value. Abela v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 607; 677 NW2d 325 (2004).

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