Court Opinion

ID: 9382728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 16:11:32.321466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.205398
License: Public Domain

J-S45017-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 MARCUS JOHNSON                     :
                                    :
                   Appellant        :   No. 791 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
           Criminal Division at No: CP-23-CR-0006098-1998

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 MARCUS JOHNSON                     :
                                    :
                   Appellant        :   No. 792 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
           Criminal Division at No: CP-23-CR-0007000-1998

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 MARCUS JOHNSON                     :
                                    :
                   Appellant        :   No. 793 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
           Criminal Division at No: CP-23-CR-0007001-1998

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-S45017-22

                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 MARCUS JOHNSON                            :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 794 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-23-CR-0000576-1999

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED MARCH 28, 2023

      Appellant, Marcus Johnson, appeals pro se from the March 4, 2022 order

of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County dismissing as untimely his

serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are not at issue.

Briefly, the underlying convictions arose out of four separate robberies of two

“Wawa” convenience stores: the first in Upper Darby on September 22, 1998,

and the following three at the same “Wawa” in Yeadon on October 5, October

7, and October 13, 1998. The jury, on March 16, 2000, found Appellant guilty

of the charged offenses, and the trial court imposed sentence on May 2, 2000.

Appellant took a direct appeal to this Court, and we affirmed the judgment of

sentence on August 29, 2001. Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 1891 EDA

2000, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed August 29, 2001).

      Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on September 20, 2001, which the

PCRA court denied without a hearing. This Court, on June 30, 2003, affirmed

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the denial of PCRA relief, see Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 2596 EDA

2002, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed June 30, 2003), and the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 847 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 2004).

        On December 16, 2009, Appellant filed his second PCRA petition, which

the PCRA court denied on December 19, 2011, after holding an evidentiary

hearing. On appeal, we affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, No.

336 EDA 2012, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed November 9,

2012).

        On September 19, 2013, Appellant filed his third PCRA petition, which

he amended on December 12, 2014.                 In his third petition, as amended,

Appellant alleged newly-discovered facts,1 which, in Appellant’s estimation,

qualified as a Brady2 violation.        The PCRA court dismissed the petition on
____________________________________________

1   In his third PCRA petition, Appellant alleged that

        the discovery that witness Jackie Hayes had spoken with police
        after the crimes and also with a composite sketch artist, and that
        the police had told a second witness, Lakeisha Robinson, that they
        “had their man” before the identification of Appellant, amounted
        to the discovery of new evidence and a Brady violation by the
        police[.]

Johnson, No. 3759 EDA 2015, unpublished memorandum, at 8 (Pa. Super.
filed December 12, 2016.

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that a due process
violation occurs when the state suppresses or fails to disclose material
exculpatory evidence). A Brady claim requires a petitioner to show “(1) the
prosecutor has suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence, whether exculpatory
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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November 17, 2015.         On appeal, we affirmed.     See Commonwealth v.

Johnson, No. 3759 EDA 2015, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed

December 12, 2016).

       On July 26, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition seeking DNA

testing, in addition to PCRA relief for a Brady violation (i.e., Appellant alleged

that the Commonwealth never disclosed exculpatory police reports from

eyewitnesses). On appeal, Appellant abandoned the Brady violation claim,

focusing solely on the PCRA court’s refusal to order a DNA testing.           We

affirmed.      See Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 3285 EDA 2017,

unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed December 14, 2018).

       On January 30, 2019, Appellant filed the instant pro se PCRA petition,

which was supplemented and amended several times.              The most recent

version of the PCRA petition at issue in this appeal was filed on August 3,

2021. In his most recent PCRA petition, Appellant argues that the instant

petition, while facially untimely, meets the governmental interference

exception. Specifically, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth committed

a Brady violation by suppressing or withholding police/incident reports,3 and

____________________________________________

or impeaching, is helpful to the defendant, and (3) the suppression prejudiced
the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d 220, 244 (Pa. 2006).

3 While Appellant speaks generally of police reports being withheld, in his most
recent petition, Appellant mostly focuses on a statement given by witness
Jacqueline Hayes to the police on October 5, 1998, in which, allegedly, Hayes
described the perpetrator of the robbery as 5’6’’ tall. Other reports describe
the perpetrator as 5’ 9’’ and 6’ 0” tall. Appellant argues that the Hayes report
has been suppressed by the Commonwealth.

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911   police   recordings,   which, in   Appellant’s understanding,    provided

exculpatory/impeachment evidence capable of changing the “tenor” of

Appellant’s trial. PCRA Court Opinion, 6/20/22 at 5.

      On March 4, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. This

appeal followed.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following question for our review:

      Did the PCRA court err in summarily dismissing Appellant’s
      petition without a hearing pertaining to unknown facts, 42
      Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii); governmental interference, 42
      Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i); after discovered facts, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
      § 9543(A)(2)(vi), and by not following the Pennsylvania Supreme
      Court’s directive in Commonwealth v. Small, 239 A.3d 1267
      (Pa. 2020) pertaining to the public record presumption?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      When reviewing the propriety of an order pertaining to PCRA relief,

      we consider the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
      party at the PCRA level. This Court is limited to determining
      whether the evidence of record supports the conclusions of the
      PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. We grant
      great deference to the PCRA court’s findings that are supported in
      the record and will not disturb them unless they have no support
      in the certified record. However, we afford no such deference to
      the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions. We thus apply a de
      novo standard of review to the PCRA [c]ourt’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 183 A.3d 417, 421 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an

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exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 4 “The PCRA’s

time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature.   Thus, if a PCRA petition is

untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the

petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to

address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. (Frank) Chester, 895

A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

(overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267

(Pa. 2020)).      As timeliness is separate and distinct from the merits of

Appellant’s underlying claims, we first determine whether this PCRA petition

is timely filed. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008).

If it is not timely, we cannot address the substantive claims raised in the

petition. Id.

       The instant PCRA petition is facially untimely.5     Appellant argues,

however, that he meets the governmental interference timeliness exception,

____________________________________________

4  The one-year time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and
proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1), and (2)
files a petition raising this exception within one year of the date the claim
could have been presented, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

5 Appellant was sentenced on May 2, 2000. We affirmed Appellant’s judgment
of sentence on August 29, 2001. Appellant did not file a petition for allocatur
to our Supreme Court. Thus, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final
on September 28, 2001. Accordingly, Appellant had until September 30,
2002, to file a timely PCRA petition. Accordingly, the instant pro se PCRA
petition, which was filed on January 30, 2019, is patently untimely. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

                                           -6-
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as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), and the newly-discovered fact

exception, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). 6          Specifically,

Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in not holding an evidentiary

hearing on his petition “when the Commonwealth failed to answer Appellant’s

pleadings in a sufficient matter for the [PCRA court] to establish jurisdiction.”

Appellant’s Brief at 16. To this end, Appellant explained:

        For example, the Commonwealth never addressed Appellant’s
        averments that they withheld evidence in violation of [Brady], by
        informing the [PCRA court] whether the evidence was disclosed to
        trial counsel, or if it wasn’t, whether or not the claim
        governmental interference could have been brought earlier with
        the exercise of due diligence.

        The Commonwealth refused to address these pertinent questions
        which goes to the jurisdiction of the court to address the
        controversy. Notwithstanding this, the Lower Court dismissed the
        petition as untimely, despite the record being completely silent on
        genuine issues of material fact. A remand is necessary to
        establish the record.
____________________________________________

6   Section 9545(b), in relevant part, reads:

        (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
        subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
        judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
        petitioner proves that:

        (i)    the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
        interference by government officials with the presentation of the
        claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
        or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

        (ii)  the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
        to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
        exercise of due diligence[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(ii).

                                           -7-
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      Moreover, the Lower Court erred as a matter of law, and abused
      its discretion by finding that Commonwealth’s witness Jacqueline
      Hayes recent revelations did not constitute a “newly discovered
      fact.” A remand is necessary to establish record.

Id. at 16-17 (verbatim).

      Appellant’s argument section spans several pages of his brief, mostly

focused on the merits of his Brady claim. To the extent that Appellant

discusses the timeliness of his petition, the discussion is premised on several

faulty grounds.

      Appellant   apparently   believes   that   his   claim   of   governmental

interference is proved by the simple fact that the Commonwealth did not

dispute his allegations of wrongdoing. Appellant fails to appreciate that it is

Appellant’s burden to prove the timeliness of his petition. Whether the

Commonwealth addresses timeliness is irrelevant. “As our Supreme Court has

repeatedly stated, the petitioner maintains the burden of pleading and proving

that one of the exceptions applies.    Johnson, No. 3795 EDA 2015, at *6

(citing Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008)).

      Appellant seems to believe, erroneously, that an allegation of a Brady

violation exempts him from proving the timeliness of the petition. Stokes,

supra; Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1268 (“Although a Brady violation may fall

within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and

prove the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference

                                      -8-
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by government officials, and the information could not have been obtained

earlier with the exercise of due diligence.”).

      Furthermore, Appellant seems to believe that he can request and obtain

an evidentiary hearing “to fl[u]sh out” the facts surrounding the alleged

interference. Amended PCRA Petition, 8/3/21, at 10. Appellant must plead

and prove he is entitled to relief and cannot use a hearing to find evidence

supporting his claim. “[A]n evidentiary hearing is not meant to function as a

fishing expedition for any possible evidence that may support some

speculative claim . . . .” Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 605 (Pa.

2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

      There are, however, additional problems with the timeliness of

Appellant’s petition.   The thrust of Appellant’s argument throughout the

multiple filings and proceedings, at all levels, is that his conviction resulted

from some sort of misidentification by eyewitnesses, that the Commonwealth

has proof of inconsistent witnesses’ identification, and that the Commonwealth

unlawfully withheld or suppressed said inconsistent identification.

      Appellant fails to appreciate that the issue of eyewitness identification

and potential inconsistencies, in particular with eyewitness Hayes, has been

addressed in prior proceedings, including his preliminary hearing, trial, PCRAs,

direct appeal, and appeals from denial of PCRA relief. Indeed, focusing on the

PCRAs only, as noted before, the issue was raised, unsuccessfully, in

Appellant’s third, fourth, and now, in his fifth PCRA petition. Thus, no relief is

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due because the issue of alleged conflicting eyewitness identifications by

Hayes qualifies as a “previously litigated” issue.7          See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9544(a)(2).

       Similarly, and more importantly (giving that this is the main claim raised

here), to the extent Appellant argues that the Commonwealth unlawfully

withheld a statement made by Hayes, this very same claim already has been

raised and addressed in previous PCRA petitions. See Johnson, No. 3759

EDA 2015. As such, no relief is due on Appellant’s Brady claim as it was

previously litigated.

       Appellant, in his own words, even admits that the very same issue he

raises here already was raised in a previous, unsuccessful appeal. To this end,

Appellant states:

       Around July of 2013, Appellant’s family hired an investigator who
       went to visit Jacqueline Hayes the October 5, 1998 robbery victim.
____________________________________________

7   See Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A,2d 564 (Pa. 2005):

       [The term] “issue” refers to the discrete legal ground that was
       forwarded on direct appeal and would have entitled the defendant
       to relief. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83
       S. Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (defining “grounds” as “a
       sufficient legal basis for granting the relief sought by the
       applicant”). The theories or allegations in support of the ground
       are simply a subset of the issue presented. Stated another way,
       there can be many theories or allegations in support of a single
       issue, but ultimately, § 9544(a)(2) refers to the discrete legal
       ground raised and decided on direct review. Thus, at the most
       basic level, this section prevents the relitigation of the same legal
       ground under alternative theories or allegations.

Id. at 570 (footnote omitted).

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       Ms. Hayes was shown a picture of Kevin Powell[8] the confessor to
       the September 22, 1998 robbery. It was at this time that Ms.
       Hayes stated in a post-trial statement that she never identified
       Appellant as committing any crime and that the perpetrator was
       5’6 and that a person of Appellant’s stature 6’0 would have stood
       out. Ms. Hayes stated that the night of the crime she was taken
       to a small precinct and gave police a statement identifying the guy
       as 5’6. . . .

       Based upon this information, Appellant filed a PCRA petition
       alleging inter alia a [Brady] violation. Trial counsel never had
       none of this material. It’s worth noting, that the Commonwealth
       throughout the proceedings never once stated that the evidence
       was disclosed to trial counsel.

       The petition was ultimately denied without a hearing. The district
       attorney’s argument opposing the petition was predicated upon
       that the evidence could have obtained earlier without any
       argument as to how.

       This Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. [Johnson, No.
       3759 EDA 2015]. An allocatur petition to the Pennsylvania
       Supreme Court was denied and a request to file successive habeas
       petition in the third Circuit was denied.

Appellant’s Brief, at 11-13 (citations to exhibits omitted).

       Thus, because the Brady claim has been previously litigated, Appellant

is unable to meet the governmental interference exception.

       In his questions for our review, Appellant appears to rely on the newly-

discovered fact exception to overcome the facial untimeliness of his underlying

petition.   To the extent Appellant raises a newly discovered fact exception

____________________________________________

8 “Kevin Powell, another state inmate, . . . supposedly admitted to
participating in an armed robbery that [Appellant] had been convicted of.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, No. 3759 EDA 2015, at 3, unpublished
memorandum (Pa. Super. filed December 12, 2016) (footnote omitted).

                                          - 11 -
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based on Hayes’s 2013 statement, we note that the claim has been raised

before. Johnson, No. 3759 EDA 2015. Additionally, Appellant makes the

same mistake he made in his previous unsuccessful attempt at PCRA relief.

The statement from eyewitness Jacqueline Hayes is from 2013, and nowhere

does Appellant explains why he waited approximately 15 years to contact her.

Indeed, in his previous, unsuccessful appeal we noted:

       Appellant maintains he is entitled to the section 9545(b)(1)(ii)
       PCRA timeliness because he filed his PCRA petition within 60 days
       of receiving an investigative report alleging that Hayes gave a
       statement to the police[.] However, . . . Hayes testified at
       Appellant’s pre-trial hearing and trial, and [was] subject to cross-
       examination by Appellant. Appellant’s petition does not explain,
       as it must, why he waited 15 years to contact [this witness] and
       question [her] further. Failing to speak with known, available
       witnesses for 15 years does not amount to reasonable diligence
       on Appellant’s part.

Commonwealth           v.   Johnson,       No.     3759   EDA   2015,   unpublished

memorandum, at 9 (Pa. Super. filed December 12, 2016) (footnote omitted).

Thus, Appellant is unable to meet the newly-discovered fact exception.

Because Appellant failed to prove that the instant petition is timely, we are

unable to entertain the merits of the petition.9

____________________________________________

9  In passing we note that, even if the Brady issue had not been previously
litigated, or if it was otherwise timely, Appellant would not have been entitled
to relief because Hayes’s statement “would be merely cumulative of
Appellant’s cross-examination at trial and/or could be used merely to impeach
the witness[.]” Johnson, No. 3759 EDA 2015, at 10.

Even if the statement existed, Appellant would not be eligible for relief because
the statement would not qualify as “after-discovered evidence” under 42
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Finally, Appellant argues he is entitled to a remand due to the PCRA

court’s failure to provide a Rule 907 notice. We disagree.

       The PCRA court noted:

       While the dismissal notice is mandatory, dismissals have been
       upheld in the absence of said notice. In Commonwealth v.
       Pursell, [749 A.2d 911 (Pa. 2000)], the [Supreme Court] denied
       relief where [the] petition was dismissed without notice because
       defendant had failed to prove one of the exceptions to the one-
       year filing period.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/20/22, at 5.

       Applying Pursell, the PCRA court noted: “[Appellant] has failed to plead

and prove the newly-discovered facts exception or the governmental

interference exception to the PCRA jurisdictional time bar. . . . Therefore,

[the PCRA court] lacks jurisdiction to review [Appellant]’s PCRA petition, and

thus it was adequate for it to be dismissed without notice. Id. at 6.

       Appellant, however, argues that reliance on Pursell is misplaced

because, according to Appellant, the Pursell rule is limited to ineffective

____________________________________________

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). To establish such a claim, a petitioner must prove
that (1) the evidence has been discovered after trial and it could not have
been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the
evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach
credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.          See
Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 228 (Pa. 2016) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Because the statement at issue here “would be
merely cumulative of Appellant’s cross-examination at trial and/or could be
used merely to impeach the witness” Johnson, supra, the statement does
not qualify as after-discovered evidence, preventing Appellant from being
eligible for relief under the PCRA.

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assistance of counsel situations, and it does not extend to due process

violations (Brady violations). Appellant’s Brief at 42-43. Appellant contends

the difference in treatment between the two situations is that ineffective

assistance of counsel does not provide an independent ground to overcome

the PCRA time restrictions. Id. at 43 (citing Commonwealth v. Gamboa-

Taylor, 753 A.2d 780 (Pa. 2000)).        In other words, Appellant apparently

believes   that   Brady   violation   claims   are   independently   enforceable,

regardless of their timeliness.

      Needless to say, Appellant offers no authority for his novel argument.

Indeed, caselaw abounds that all claims that fall within the purview of the

PCRA must be timely raised, even if they raise issues of constitutional

dimension. See Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 100-01 (Pa.

2001); Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 767 (Pa. 2013) (“we have

already held that, in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on

the right to bring a PCRA petition, the constitutional nature of a collateral claim

does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review”) (internal

citation omitted).

      Regarding the specific issues raised here, we note the Pursell Court’s

statement regarding the absence of a Rule 907 notice is not as restrictive as

Appellant argues. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated:

      We recognize the merit in Appellant’s first claim that the trial court
      failed to comply with [Rule 907] when it dismissed Appellant’s
      petition without the requisite notice in advance. While we do not
      condone the trial court’s error in this regard, we will not provide

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      Appellant with relief on this issue as our independent review has
      determined that Appellant failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the
      trial court by failing to plead and prove the applicability of the
      timeliness exceptions contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–
      (iii).

Pursell, 749 A.2d at 917, n.7. See also Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d

462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013) (Even when a petitioner preserves a claim that a

PCRA court failed altogether to provide notice of dismissal under Rule 907, it

does not automatically warrant reversal when the petition is untimely).

      Here, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely, yet

nothing in his argument regarding the failure of the PCRA court to issue a Rule

907 notice in this case bears upon the timeliness of his petition.     Indeed,

Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he was adversely affected at all by

the absence of a Rule 907 notice.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/28/2023

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