Court Opinion

ID: 9375426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 18:03:18.509424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:58.786281
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/23 Conservatorship of J.C. CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

Conservatorship of the Person                                 2d Civil No. B317869
of J.C.                                                   (Super. Ct. No. 21PR00055)
                                                            (Santa Barbara County)

P.M., as Conservator, etc.,
et al.,

     Petitioners and Respondents,

v.

A.C.,

     Objector and Appellant.

      A.C. appeals an order of the trial court terminating her as
coconservator of the person of J.C., a disabled adult. The court
had suspended A.C. as a coconservator before it issued the
termination order. We conclude, among other things, that the
court did not abuse its discretion in terminating her as
coconservator. We affirm.
                                FACTS
       A.C. was a coconservator for the person of J.C., her disabled
adult son. B.R., J.C.’s father, was also a coconservator. P.M. is
the current conservator. The conservatorship petition was filed
in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. An order appointing
conservators for this “limited conservatorship” was initially
entered in 2004. Additional conservatorship proceedings took
place in the Santa Barbara County Superior Court. Our
reference to the trial court in this opinion refers to the judges of
these two county superior courts who issued the relevant orders
in this case.
       In August 2019, while on a hiking trip, A.C. sprayed J.C.
with “pepper gel” in his face. She claimed she acted in self-
defense. A county sheriff’s department report of this incident
concluded that A.C. was “acting out of anger and not self-
defense.” The case was referred to the district attorney, but no
criminal prosecution of A.C. was initiated. The trial court
appointed counsel for J.C.
               The May 15, 2020, Evidentiary Hearing
       In April 2020, J.C.’s appointed counsel declared A.C. was
“interfering with” J.C.’s care, and J.C.’s caregivers agreed that
her interference was “detrimental” to J.C. A.C. over medicated
J.C. in violation of his doctors’ orders, threw water in his face,
took his medicine for her personal use, and broke into his
medicine box.
       The trial court issued an order to show cause regarding
termination of A.C. as a coconservator. The court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on May 15, 2020, where A.C. testified. The
court suspended A.C. as a coconservator and ordered her not to
interfere with J.C.’s care.

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      J.C.’s Counsel’s August 2020 Report to the Trial Court
      J.C.’s counsel filed a report with the trial court and
declared that A.C. violated the court’s order that she not interfere
with J.C.’s health care. A.C. violated the order by sending
“threatening and strange” e-mails to J.C.’s caregivers. The court
had previously ordered her not to initiate contact with J.C.’s
caregivers. A.C. violated that order by initiating “a barrage” of
e-mails to the medical staff. Counsel requested A.C.’s “powers
should be terminated.”
                   The November 5, 2020, Hearing
      Counsel for conservator B.R. sought an amended order and
declared A.C. “is harming conservatee [J.C.] by violating the
Court’s Order” by inferring with J.C.’s medical treatment.
Counsel requested an order to limit A.C.’s visits with J.C. and her
contacts with his doctors. A.C. filed an opposition. The trial
court held a hearing on November 5, 2020, and issued orders
limiting A.C.’s contacts with J.C. and his doctors. The court
warned A.C. that noncompliance with its orders could lead to
contempt charges.
                     The February 9, 2021, Order
      In February 2021, counsel for B.R. requested another court
order. Counsel declared that A.C. “is still harming the
conservatee . . . by violating the Court’s Order.” A.C. “continues
to harass and disparage staff” at J.C.’s care facility. Counsel
attached a medical report from a psychiatrist indicating that A.C.
was interfering with J.C.’s health care by “berating him" and
“turning him against” his caregivers.
      On February 9, 2021, the trial court issued an order
preventing A.C. from being present at A.C.’s health care
appointments. It found good cause to temporarily suspend all

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contact and telephone calls between A.C. and J.C. because of her
conduct.
                       The Restraining Order
      In the same month, coconservator B.R. claimed A.C. sent
him threatening messages. He obtained a restraining order
against A.C. prohibiting her from sending threatening messages
to him regarding J.C.’s care.
            Motions to Terminate A.C. as Coconservator
      In July 2021, J.C.’s counsel filed a report with the trial
court and declared that A.C. had a pattern of berating J.C.,
bullying caregivers, aggressive behavior against coconservator
B.R., harassing medical providers, and “ignoring the orders of the
court.” Counsel requested an order terminating A.C. as
coconservator.
      Counsel for coconservator B.R. filed a declaration and
requested summary removal of A.C. as coconservator under
Probate Code section 2655 for violating the trial court’s orders.1
A.C. did not file a declaration to respond to these declarations.
      On July 29, 2021, the trial court held a hearing. The court
said that it wanted the court investigator to “make another effort
to speak to [A.C.]”; that there was enough evidence in the record
to support the termination of A.C. as coconservator without
taking additional evidence. A.C. did not attend that hearing. On
the issue of A.C.’s noncompliance with court orders, A.C.’s
counsel said, “There was some period of difficulty, but I think
we’re past that.” The court set a hearing for August 26, 2021.
      At that August hearing, counsel for the conservators
requested the trial court “to remove [A.C.] as co-conservator.”

      All statutory references are to the Probate Code unless
      1

otherwise stated.

                                4
A.C. was not present. A.C.’s counsel requested the court to
schedule an evidentiary hearing. The court declined. It said,
“The Court . . . has received a wealth of information. And I think
that taking it further, or to an evidentiary hearing, does not serve
a purpose and is not in the conservatee’s best interest because
we’ve been round and round here on this issue. I am going to go
ahead at this point and remove [A.C.].”
                             DISCUSSION
                      The Disentitlement Doctrine
       P.M. contends A.C. is not entitled to appeal because of the
disentitlement doctrine. He claims she did not comply with the
trial court’s orders and she should be denied appellate relief.
       “It is well settled that this court has the inherent power to
dismiss an appeal by any party who has refused to comply with
orders of the trial court.” (TMS, Inc. v. Aihara (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 377, 379.) The disentitlement doctrine is not limited
to violation orders that a party has appealed. (In re E.M. (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 467, 477.) It extends to “cases in which the
appellant has violated orders other than the one from which the
appeal has been taken.” (Ibid.)
       The findings from the November 5, 2020, hearing and the
February 9, 2021, order in favor of B.R. support P.M.’s claim that
A.C. violated the trial court’s May 15, 2020, orders. In a
December 11, 2020, order, the court warned A.C. that
noncompliance with the court’s orders could lead to her being
held in contempt. A.C. contends the doctrine does not apply
because she did not engage in “felonious behavior.” But the
doctrine is not so limited. (TMS, Inc. v. Aihara, supra, 71
Cal.App.4th at pp. 379-380.) Here A.C.’s disobedience was
repetitive and involved the conservatee’s health care. In a phone

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message to B.R., A.C. demonstrated her contempt for the court
with these words: “I don’t care what the fucking Judge says . . . .”
(TMS, Inc., at p. 379.) But even if the disentitlement doctrine did
not apply, the result would not change.
                    Inadequate Record on Appeal
       P.M. contends A.C. has not provided an adequate record on
appeal. We agree.
       The appellant has the burden to produce an adequate
record. Where the record is incomplete, we must presume that
the trial court’s rulings are supported by the missing portions of
the record. (Null v. City of Los Angeles (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d
1528, 1532.) We may not presume error on an incomplete record.
(Ibid.)
       A.C. contends there was no admissible evidence to support
her termination as coconservator. But a major part of this case
involves the May 15, 2020, hearing where the trial court
suspended her powers as coconservator for misconduct. A.C. did
not provide a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement for that
hearing. There is no reporter’s transcript or settled statement
regarding the November 5, 2020, or February 9, 2021,
proceedings. “In numerous situations, appellate courts have
refused to reach the merits of an appellant’s claims because no
reporter’s transcript of a pertinent proceeding or a suitable
substitute was provided.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co.,
Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186.)
       A.C. claims the May 15, 2020, proceeding was not an
evidentiary hearing and the order suspending her as a
coconservator is not relevant. We disagree. The trial court’s
“order after hearing” states the court heard A.C.’s “testimony,”
and the minute order states that the court took “testimony

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regarding the outstanding issues.” The order suspending her for
misconduct as a coconservator is a relevant factor in considering
whether to terminate her authority as a coconservator. A.C. did
not include many of the documents her opponents filed. The
record is not complete.
            Was Another Evidentiary Hearing Required?
       A.C. contends the trial court erred by terminating her as a
coconservator at the August 2021 hearing based on declarations
filed on behalf of the other coconservator and conservatee. She
claims the court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing
because this was a contested issue.
       The decision to remove a conservator rests within the broad
discretion of the trial court. (Guardianship of Davis (1967) 253
Cal.App.2d 754, 761.) An appellant has a strong burden to
reverse such a ruling. (Ibid.) Removal of a conservator for cause
may be initiated by declarations. But where the declarations are
contradicted, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing to
decide the facts from the conflicting declarations. (Estate of
Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1310.) The parties agree
that whether the court erred by not conducting an evidentiary
hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
       Here there were two declarations submitted in support of
the order to terminate A.C. as coconservator. But A.C. did not
file a declaration in response to those declarations.
       A.C., relying on Bennett, suggests that because her counsel
went to the July and August hearings and requested another
evidentiary hearing, the trial court had to conduct one.
       But Bennett is distinguishable. There the party opposing
the motion filed “four declarations” in opposition (Estate of
Bennett, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307) and claimed there

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was a contested factual issue based on the “competing
declarations.” (Id. at p. 1309.) Here, there was no competing
declaration. A.C. did not attend the July and August 2021
hearings. In July the trial court continued the hearing to August.
That gave A.C. an opportunity to timely serve and file a written
opposition to the motion to remove her. To contest that motion,
she had to file a written opposition nine days prior to the August
hearing date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) She did not do
so. The court could find the factual basis for the motions to
remove her was uncontradicted and the motions were
uncontested. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.801; E.N.W. v.
Michael W. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 896, 899 [a “proceeding is
uncontested when no answer or opposition is filed” (italics
added)].)
                            Section 2655
      P.M. contends the trial court properly removed A.C.
without conducting another evidentiary hearing under section
2655.
      Section 2655 provides, “(a) A guardian or conservator may
be removed from office if the guardian or conservator is found in
contempt for disobeying an order of the court. [¶] (b)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, a guardian or
conservator may be removed from office under subdivision (a) by
a court order reciting the facts and without further showing or
notice.” (Italics added.)
      A.C. contends the trial court did not follow the procedures
required to punish her for contempt.
      P.M. responds that A.C. was not being prosecuted for
contempt. Instead, the coconservator gave notice that he was
seeking A.C.’s removal under this statute. P.M. claims from

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A.C.’s repeated violations of the trial court’s orders, the court
could find A.C. acted in contempt of the court’s authority and find
“her immediate removal was authorized by Probate Code section
2655.”
       It is true there is evidence that supports a finding of
contempt from A.C.’s phone message to B.R. Quite apart from
that, section 2655 is one of several Probate Code sections that
give trial courts broad authority to promptly act against
noncompliant conservators and representatives, even on the
court’s own motion. (§§ 2102, 2404, 2654, 15642, subd. (a); Stine
v. Dell’Osso (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 834, 846; Schwartz v. Labow
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 417, 428.)
       These statutes authorize trial courts “to promptly detect
and swiftly remove a conservator who breaches his or her
fiduciary duties.” (Stine v. Dell’Osso, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at
p. 846, italics added; Schwartz v. Labow, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th
at p. 428 [probate court’s authority to immediately remove a trust
representative on its own motion].) A.C. has not shown why the
trial court could not act within the scope of this broad authority
given the record in this case.
       As stated earlier, A.C.’s termination was appropriate under
the disentitlement doctrine given her record of violating its
orders and her attitude toward the court. That doctrine may be
applied by trial courts (In re C.C. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 76, 85-
86), and it does not require a “formal judgment of contempt,” but
only conduct from which the court may find “willful
disobedience.” (In re E.M., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 477.)
A.C has not shown why the record would not support such a
finding.

                                9
                             Other Factors
        Additional factors support the trial court’s decision not to
conduct another evidentiary hearing. The court had previously
issued an order to show cause for A.C.’s termination as
coconservator in May 2020. It held an evidentiary hearing where
A.C. testified. It suspended her as a coconservator. In two
subsequent proceedings, it granted relief in favor of B.R., which
showed it had found A.C., as a suspended coconservator, had
violated its orders. Consequently, the court could reasonably find
that its prior proceedings had already established the grounds to
remove her. It found the facts presented in the proceedings
occurring prior to the August hearing had already established a
“surfeit of evidence indicating that [A.C.’s] continued participation
as a co-conservator is not benefiting the conservatee.” (Italics
added.)
        In April 2020, J.C.’s counsel declared A.C. is “interfering
with [J.C.’s] care.” “The professionals responsible for [J.C.’s] care
. . . agree that her constant interference is detrimental to [J.C.].”
A.C. over medicated J.C. against the doctors’ orders, threw water
in J.C.’s face, broke the lock on J.C.’s medicine box, and took his
medication for “her personal use.” She placed J.C. at “risk of
serious harm.”
        Because A.C. did not provide a record of the May 15, 2020,
hearing, we must presume counsel’s claims were proven and the
evidence there showed “good cause” to suspend her. (Null v. City
of Los Angeles, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1532.) Given the lack
of a record for the November 2020 and February 2021
proceedings, we must presume the evidence there showed she
violated the trial court’s orders and continued to interfere with
J.C.’s care. (Ibid.) This and the evidence the court relied on to

                                 10
issue orders to protect J.C. and his care providers support a
termination order well before the August hearing. (§ 2650,
subds. (a), (c), (f), (j); In re E.M., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 477;
Guardianship of Davis, supra, 253 Cal.App.2d 754, 761; Estate of
Howard (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 535, 539; Guardianship of White
(1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 624, 629.)
       The trial court could also reasonably find A.C.’s counsel did
not make a sufficient offer of proof. “Failure to make an adequate
offer of proof precludes consideration of the alleged error on
appeal.” (In re Mark C. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 433, 444.) A.C.’s
counsel said, “I think that if the Court were to have an
evidentiary hearing, the Court would be satisfied that [A.C.]
should continue on as the conservator.” But an offer of proof
must state the witness’s “testimony.” (United Sav. & Loan Assn.
v. Reeder Dev. Corp. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 282, 294.) Counsel did
not state what A.C. would testify to in order to justify her
noncompliance with the court’s orders or her interference with
J.C.’s care. Here, as in Conservatorship of Farrant (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 370, 378, A.C. failed to make a sufficient offer of
proof to support her claim that the trial court abused its
discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing.
       But even had A.C. shown that not holding a hearing was
error, it was harmless as there is no showing from this record of
any reasonable probability of a more favorable result. (In re J.P.
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 128.)

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                          DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded in
favor of respondents.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

             YEGAN, J.

             BALTODANO, J.

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                   Colleen K. Sterne, Judge

           Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

               ______________________________

      Law Office of Neal B. Jannol and Neal B. Jannol for
Objector and Appellant.
      Haas Law Corporation, Kirstin Glass Haas; Ferguson Case
Orr Paterson and Wendy C. Lascher for Petitioners and
Respondents.

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