Court Opinion

ID: 9919021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 14:02:29.286227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.142668
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: January 17, 2024

       S23Y0807. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER RYAN

                                              BREAULT.

        PER CURIAM.

         This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board (“Review

Board”), recommending that the Court adopt the recommendation of

Special Master Daniel S. Reinhardt that Christopher Ryan Breault

(State Bar No. 207142), a member of the State Bar of Georgia since

2013, be suspended for a period of one month.1 The conduct

underlying this matter occurred while Breault was litigating a

personal injury case in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Georgia, resulting in Breault being charged

        1 The Special Master recommended a suspension of 30 days, while the Review

Board recommended a suspension of one month. Throughout this opinion, we refer to
the recommended suspension as a one-month suspension, for consistency.
with violating Rules 1.1, 1.6 (a), 1.16 (a) (3), and 3.5 (d) of the

Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), found in Bar Rule

4-102 (d). The maximum penalty for a single violation of Rules 1.1

and 1.6 is disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a single

violation of Rules 1.16 and 3.5 (d) is a public reprimand.

     After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the

Special Master failed to adequately analyze Breault’s conduct under

the framework found in the American Bar Association Standards for

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), a framework that

though not controlling, is “generally instructive as to the question of

punishment.” In the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 213 (3) (a) (857

SE2d 212) (2021). Thus, we decline to determine at this juncture

whether a one-month suspension is an appropriate sanction for

Breault’s conduct. We reject the recommendations below and

remand the case to the Review Board, with direction to remand the

case to a Special Master to conduct a full analysis of Breault’s

conduct under the helpful ABA Standards and to issue a new

recommendation consistent with this opinion. At this stage, we do

                                  2
not decide whether the Special Master and Review Board correctly

concluded that Breault violated the provisions of the GRPC with

which he was charged, nor do we decide Breault’s exceptions to these

conclusions.

     1. Procedural History

     This matter was referred to the State Bar by a federal district

court, which held a disciplinary hearing regarding the conduct of

Breault and his co-counsel during the personal injury case. The

district court issued a sealed order disciplining Breault and his co-

counsel, and it sent the order to the State Bar. In subsequent orders,

the district court granted the State Bar permission to disclose the

sealed disciplinary order to individuals aiding in the investigation

and potential prosecution of disciplinary matters involving Breault,

and allowed the State Bar to access related pleadings, exhibits,

transcripts, and orders from the district court proceedings. In

pertinent part, the district court concluded in the sealed disciplinary

order that Breault had violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.6, and 1.16 of the

GRPC, and disciplined Breault by revoking his pro hac vice

                                  3
admission and ordering that he could reapply for admission to

practice in the Southern District after six months, conditioned upon

his completion of at least 30 continuing legal education credits in

ethics.2

       On January 11, 2019, the State Disciplinary Board found

probable cause to file a formal complaint against Breault for

violating Rules 1.1, 1.6, 1.16, and 3.5 (d).3 A formal complaint was

filed on May 6, 2019, and a Special Master was appointed on May 7,

2019.4 See Case No. S19B1185. On July 22, 2019, Breault filed a

timely answer after being personally served with the notice of a

finding of probable cause, the formal complaint, the petition for

appointment of a Special Master, and the order appointing a Special

       2  The federal district court’s discipline only governed Breault’s ability to
practice in that court. See In re Stubbs, 285 Ga. 702, 703-04 (681 SE2d 113) (2009)
(“While the federal district court had authority to discipline or suspend [an attorney]
from the practice of law in its court for misconduct or violation of its local rules . . . it
has no authority to confer or revoke [the attorney’s] license to practice law.”
(emphasis added)). This Court has the exclusive authority to determine whether
Breault should be disciplined under the GRPC. See Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a) (“The
level of punishment imposed rests in the sound discretion of this Court.”).
       3 Breault was also charged with violating Rule 1.3, but the State Bar later

abandoned that charge.
       4 This Court appointed Special Master Reinhardt on November 10, 2020, after

the original special master was no longer able to continue performing his duties.

                                             4
Master. During litigation, the Special Master entered a protective

order in an attempt to maintain compliance with the then-sealed

district court orders. The Special Master held an evidentiary

hearing on March 14, 2022, and entered his report and

recommendation on October 17, 2022. Breault filed timely

exceptions and requested review by the Review Board. The Review

Board entered its report and recommendation on March 27, 2023,

summarily adopting the Special Master’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law, and rejecting all of Breault’s arguments.5

      2. The Special Master’s Report and Recommendation

      (a) The Facts

      The Special Master recounted that on October 14, 2015, a man

from South Carolina was injured in an automobile accident in

      5 When the matter was filed in this Court, the State Bar initially sought
permission from this Court to file certain portions of the disciplinary record under
seal to maintain compliance with the sealed district court orders and protective
orders entered by the Special Master. This Court denied that motion without
prejudice because the Bar had provided no authority for filing those records under
seal. The State Bar ultimately sought and received an order from the district court
allowing it to file those records in this Court with the name of Breault’s co-counsel
redacted therefrom. Accordingly, throughout this opinion, we refer to Breault’s co-
counsel by his initials, C.M.
                                         5
Savannah. The man and his wife hired a Georgia attorney, C.M., to

represent them in the ensuing personal injury case. C.M. lacked

experience in personal injury matters, so he associated a more

experienced personal injury firm, which filed a lawsuit on behalf of

the couple (collectively referred to as “clients,” individually referred

to as “husband” and “wife”) in federal district court in Savannah in

February 2016. C.M. formally appeared as counsel of record in

September 2016.      The    personal injury     firm completed the

substantive work on the case, and the district court entered a

pretrial order, setting trial to start on June 27, 2017. In May 2017,

C.M. became dissatisfied with the personal injury firm because he

believed that the husband had suffered a cognitive injury and

thought that the personal injury firm had failed to fully develop

evidence of damages. On the other hand, a partner from the personal

injury firm believed that C.M. wanted to remove the firm from the

case so that he could receive a larger percentage of any recoverable

fee. With his clients’ permission, C.M. terminated the services of the

                                   6
personal injury firm, and the partner filed a motion to withdraw on

behalf of the firm, which was granted in June 2017.

     In May 2017, C.M. associated his former law school classmate,

Breault, on the case. Breault assumed the role of lead counsel

knowing that the case was set for trial in June and that he only had

one month to develop additional evidence. He filed an appearance,

was admitted pro hac vice on June 5, 2017, and then immediately

associated additional lawyers to assist with research, writing, and

other legal work. Breault and C.M. decided that it was necessary to

depose the husband’s treating physician. On May 24, Breault

contacted the physician’s office and scheduled a deposition, which

Breault later cancelled. On June 7, Breault and C.M. met with the

physician at the physician’s office, where, unbeknownst to Breault

and the physician, C.M. recorded their conversation. On June 20,

Breault called the physician’s office manager about rescheduling the

deposition for a date before the trial, indicating that he would have

to subpoena the physician to appear in court if the deposition could

not be scheduled. The physician agreed to give a deposition, which

                                 7
was set for June 23. Because of confusion arising from the

scheduling of the deposition, defense counsel contacted the

physician’s office and was told by the office manager that Breault

had been threatening towards her. As a result, on June 21, the

defendants filed a motion to revoke Breault’s pro hac vice admission

(“Defendants’ Motion to Revoke”), arguing that he had violated

provisions of the district court’s guidelines for courtroom conduct

with respect to his interactions with the office manager.

     On June 22, Breault and C.M. filed a response brief in which

they incorporated portions of the recorded conversation they had

with the physician and attached a transcript of the conversation as

an exhibit.6 They also sent the audio recording of the conversation

to the district court and defense counsel. It was undisputed that the

transcript contained privileged information that Breault and C.M.

gained in their professional relationship with the clients. Yet, the

lawyers did not obtain the clients’ permission to disclose that

     6 Breault testified at the disciplinary hearing before the Special Master

that C.M. and two other lawyers had agreed with Breault to include the
transcript in their response to the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke.

                                     8
information by filing the transcript and the recording. Moreover,

Breault and C.M. indicated in their response brief that while they

understood they were “tipping the ‘playing field’” in favor of the

defendants by disclosing work product via the recording and

transcript, they felt that “the esteem and confidence of [the district

court] [were] more important.” Later at the disciplinary hearing

before the Special Master, Breault admitted to making the

disclosures public to make defense counsel look like “a disingenuous

a**hole.” The district court denied the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke

after a hearing, but specifically found that the disclosure of the

conversation was unnecessary and damaging to the plaintiffs’ case.

     In other orders, the district court allowed Breault and C.M. to

add as a witness the neuropsychologist that the physician had

previously recommended, extended the time for discovery, and

postponed trial until October 30, 2017. The district court also

ordered the parties to depose the neuropsychologist by mid-August

to allow the defendants a fair opportunity to respond to his

testimony. On July 20, Breault emailed defense counsel that the

                                  9
neuropsychologist’s deposition would occur on the morning of

August 14. On August 9, Breault responded to a defense inquiry

about the neuropsychologist’s curriculum vitae, stating that the

neuropsychologist could not appear for deposition on August 14. In

reality, Breault had never confirmed the deposition date with the

neuropsychologist. Breault advised defense counsel that he would

file a request for more time to conduct the deposition, but he never

did.

       C.M. attempted to fire Breault on August 8, but he had not

received the clients’ permission to effectuate the firing. On August

16, 2017, C.M., with the clients’ permission, terminated Breault’s

representation by letter, citing as a reason the difficulties with

scheduling medical depositions. The Special Master noted that C.M.

had been in contact with a well-known plaintiff’s lawyer and that

after Breault was terminated, that lawyer became lead counsel.

Breault was upset by the termination, believed the real reason was

to deprive him of a fee, and did not believe that the clients had

approved the termination. On August 17, he appeared unannounced

                                10
at the clients’ home in South Carolina to try to remain on the case.

The wife texted C.M., who told Breault over the telephone to leave.

As Breault later stated in his response to another filing, he then told

the husband to seek advice from a litigation funding company before

leaving the clients’ home. After Breault left, the wife texted him

confirming that he had been terminated. After receiving the text,

Breault invited the wife to attend a “focus group” that he had

purportedly scheduled for August 23, and indicated to the wife that

he would file a notice of withdrawal the next day, but Breault failed

to file the notice.

     Because of Breault’s failure to file a notice of withdrawal, on

October 4, 2017, C.M. filed on behalf of the clients a motion to revoke

Breault’s pro hac vice admission (“Plaintiffs’ Motion to Revoke”). In

that motion and Breault’s response thereto, C.M. and Breault

accused each other of misconduct. Breault also included in his

response privileged work-product and communications between

himself and the clients concerning the admissibility and credibility

of potential evidence. It was undisputed that these communications

                                  11
contained privileged information, which Breault disclosed by filing

them with his response.

      Based on these filings, the district court held a disciplinary

hearing on October 30, 2017, instead of starting the trial as

scheduled. Breault filed a notice of withdrawal on the same day. In

its ruling at the end of the hearing, the district court found that the

disclosures that Breault and C.M. had made in response to the

Defendants’ Motion to Revoke were damaging to their clients.

According to the district court, these disclosures gave the defendants

“a strategy for undermining the [plaintiffs’] case,” and defense

counsel testified that the disclosures gave him valuable cross-

examination material against the plaintiffs’ experts and suggested

an easy roadmap to damage the clients’ case.

      (b) Rules Violated

      The State Bar argued that Breault violated Rule 1.17 by filing

a response to the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke that violated Rule

      7 Rule 1.1 imposes the duty of competence on a lawyer representing a client,

meaning that “a lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or should

                                       12
1.6 (a),8 and by advising the husband to seek advice from a litigation

funding company. The Special Master rejected the first argument

because he viewed the requirement of competence in Rule 1.1 “more

broadly” and observed that even if a single violation of Rule 1.6 could

also constitute a violation of Rule 1.1, Breault’s background still

qualified him to represent a client in a serious personal injury case

arising from an automobile accident. The Special Master rejected

the second argument because the State Bar had “not produced any

expert opinion evidence” to support it.

      Next, the Special Master noted that the State Bar had

abandoned its claim that Breault had violated Rule 1.3,9 and that

the State Bar argued the misconduct underlying that alleged

know to be beyond the lawyer’s level of competence without associating another
lawyer who the original lawyer reasonably believes to be competent to handle the
matter in question.”
      8 Rule 1.6 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] lawyer shall maintain in

confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a client,
including information which . . . would likely be detrimental to the client, unless the
client gives informed consent, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation[.]”
      9 Rule 1.3 states: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness

in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this rule means that a lawyer
shall not without just cause to the detriment of the client in effect willfully abandon
or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”

                                          13
violation was part of a pattern of misconduct supporting a finding

that Breault violated Rule 3.5 (d).10

      The Special Master concluded that Breault violated Rule

3.5 (d) because, by failing to timely withdraw, he “effectively re-

wrote the District Court’s schedule with respect to his client[s’]

case,” which was unfair to the clients. The Special Master stated

that Breault’s explanation about “his decision not to withdraw and

whether and when he finally believed that his services had been

terminated strains belief.”11 Moreover, the Special Master found

that Breault violated Rule 3.5 (d) by failing to schedule and take the

neuropsychologist’s deposition by mid-August as ordered by the

district court. At the disciplinary hearing, Breault had testified that

the neuropsychologist was busy and nonresponsive. But if

scheduling the deposition was difficult, the Special Master

      10 Rule 3.5 (d) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not, without regard to whether

the lawyer represents a client in the matter . . . engage in conduct intended to disrupt
a tribunal.”
      11 Here, the Special Master referenced a transcript from the district court,

which does not appear to be in the record before this Court. It is unclear how Breault
explained his actions to the district court.

                                          14
explained, Breault could have issued a subpoena, contacted the

district court, or filed a motion for an extension of the time for

discovery – none of which occurred. Also, the Special Master found

that Breault disrupted the litigation process by giving “opposing

counsel unequivocal factual information about the date and time of

a scheduled deposition” even though Breault never got the

neuropsychologist to firmly agree to that date. Finally, the Special

Master pointed to Breault’s failure to seek an extension of time to

take the deposition despite his promise to opposing counsel that he

would do so.12

      As for Rule 1.6 (a), the Special Master found a violation in two

ways. First, the Special Master noted that Breault disclosed the

transcript and recording of the conversation with the physician in

response to the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke – which the

defendants filed due to Breault’s phone interactions with the

physician’s office manager. The Special Master noted that while

      12 The Special Master does acknowledge that Breault could no longer
reschedule a deposition after August 16 because that was the date on which he was
terminated.

                                       15
disclosing the recording helped Breault defeat the motion since the

recording lacked evidence of Breault using aggressive tactics

towards the physician, no one disputed that the recording contained

privileged information. The Special Master also stated that he

believed that if the physician had been deposed, “most of the facts

disclosed in the recording would have been forthcoming based on

[the physician’s] records alone.” Nonetheless, the Special Master

reiterated that it was improper to disclose that information without

the clients’ consent.

     Breault contended that the disclosure was strategic because it

changed the case from an orthopedic case to a case with a brain

injury component. And, Breault pointed out, the district court

denied the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke, and the decision to

disclose the conversation was made by all of the clients’ attorneys,

including C.M. The Special Master rejected this argument,

reasoning that there were ways to defeat the motion without

disclosing the privileged information in the transcript and

recording, such as using redaction or asking the district court to

                                16
conduct an in camera review. The Special Master found that Breault

sought neither of these remedies and disclosed the information

without his client’s permission. And, the Special Master indicated

that Breault’s testimony showed he had disclosed privileged

information in order to show that defense counsel was a

“disingenuous a**hole.”

     Second, the Special Master found that Breault violated Rule

1.6 by disclosing privileged information in response to Plaintiffs’

Motion to Revoke his pro hac vice status, which the plaintiffs filed

after Breault failed to withdraw. The Special Master found that

Breault’s disclosure of privileged information here was designed

solely to further his own interests and did not benefit his former

clients.

     As for Rule 1.16 (a) (3),13 the Special Master found Breault in

violation by failing to timely move to withdraw as he said he would.

The Special Master recounted that C.M. delivered a termination

     13  Rule 1.16 (a) (3) provides that a lawyer “shall withdraw from the
representation of a client if . . . the lawyer is discharged.”

                                   17
letter to Breault on August 16; Breault appeared unannounced on

August 17 at the house of the clients, who told him that they did

intend to terminate his representation; and despite indicating that

he would withdraw the next day on August 18, Breault failed to file

a motion to withdraw until his disciplinary hearing before the

district court on October 30.

     (c) Recommendation of Discipline

     In evaluating discipline, the Special Master did not analyze

three components of the ABA Standards: (1) the duty violated, (2)

the lawyer’s mental state, and (3) the actual or potential injury to

the clients. See In the Matter of Morse, 265 Ga. 353, 354 (2) (456

SE2d 52) (1995), superseded on other grounds by Rule as stated in

Cook, 311 Ga. at 207-08 (1). Instead, he analyzed only the applicable

aggravating and mitigating factors. In aggravation, the Special

Master found that Breault had not acknowledged the wrongful

nature of his conduct or the personal nature of his actions. The

Special Master did not deem the case to involve a pattern of

misconduct because “[a]lthough there are multiple offenses, they all

                                 18
arise in one representation.” In mitigation, the Special Master found

that Breault had no prior disciplinary offenses and that he was

inexperienced in the practice of law because he had only been

practicing for four years when his misconduct occurred. The Special

Master then indicated that he found the other aggravating and

mitigating factors as listed in the ABA Standards to be inapplicable.

Throughout his report and recommendation, the Special Master also

commented that: (1) the clients were not harmed financially and

that Breault did not steal money from them, but that (2) Breault was

angry about how C.M. treated him and how his work would go

unrewarded, and he let his anger drive and cloud his actions.14 The

Special Master recommended that Breault be suspended from the

practice of law for one month without conditions for reinstatement.

The Special Master did not cite any case law supporting a one-month

suspension as the appropriate form of discipline.

      14 It is unclear whether the Special Master’s comments on anger and the lack

of stealing and financial harm factored into his recommendation of discipline, and
whether or where he intended them to fit into the ABA Standards analysis. However,
we mention these comments because the next Special Master may or may not elect to
analyze these comments on remand.

                                       19
      3. Review Board’s Report and Recommendation

      Breault sought review by the Review Board, arguing that the

Special Master erred by recommending a one-month suspension

because clear and convincing evidence was not presented that

Breault violated any provision of the GRPC. The State Bar

responded that the Special Master’s recommendation of a one-

month suspension was appropriate.

      The Review Board affirmed the Special Master’s factual

findings, legal conclusions, and recommendation of discipline. First,

it did not find clear error in the Special Master’s factual findings,

and adopted those findings and incorporated them by reference.

Next, the Review Board did not find error in the Special Master’s

conclusions of law and adopted them, stating that it weighed all of

Breault’s arguments, including Breault’s argument that his conduct

was excused by Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii).15 According to the Review Board,

      15 Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii) provides that a lawyer “may reveal information covered

by paragraph (a) which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to establish a
claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer

                                         20
Breault argued that Rule 1.6’s exceptions excused his disclosure of

client confidential information and that his violation of Rule 1.6

ultimately benefitted the client. The Review Board found these

arguments unavailing, concluding that “[w]hether a violation of the

Rules ultimately leads to a benefit to a client does not excuse the

underlying violation,” particularly when Breault would not have

violated Rule 1.6 if he had obtained informed consent from the

clients before disclosing the privileged information. The Review

Board observed that Breault used Comment 16 to Rule 1.616 to argue

that unlimited disclosure is permitted any time a lawyer is accused

of violating the law. The Review Board rejected this argument, too,

based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in
any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client [.]”
      16 Comment 16 to Rule 1.6 provides, in relevant part:

      Where a legal claim or disciplinary charge alleges . . . misconduct of the
      lawyer involving representation of the client, the lawyer may respond to
      the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a
      defense. . . . In any event, disclosure should be no greater than the
      lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to vindicate innocence, the
      disclosure should be made in a manner which limits access to the
      information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it,
      and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be
      sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.

                                         21
reasoning that Breault had ways to respond to the motions to revoke

while reasonably safeguarding the clients’ privileged information.

      The Review Board stated that it was adopting the Special

Master’s analysis of the ABA Standards as to the duties violated,

Breault’s mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by

Breault’s misconduct,17 and the aggravating and mitigating

factors.18 The Review Board recommended that this Court suspend

Breault from the practice of law for one month with no conditions

for reinstatement.19

      4. Analysis

      “The primary purpose of a disciplinary action is to protect the

public from attorneys who are not qualified to practice law due to

      17 The Review Board did not address the Special Master’s lack of analysis on

duty, mental state, and potential or actual injury.
      18 The Review Board then discussed several aspects of Breault’s unprofessional

conduct in the proceedings before it, but because much evidence of that alleged
conduct is not in the disciplinary record and because the Board did not clearly tie its
professionalism discussion to its recommendation of discipline, we do not consider it
for the purposes of this opinion.
      19 Though the Review Board mentioned the ABA Standards and case law on

the factors that should be considered in determining an appropriate sanction, it did
not cite any authority to support imposing a one-month suspension.

                                          22
incompetence or unprofessional conduct, but this Court is also

concerned with the public’s confidence in the profession generally.”

Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a). The sanction imposed for disciplinary

infractions should be one that is sufficient to penalize the offender

for his wrongdoing, deter other attorneys from engaging in similar

behavior, and inform the general public that the courts will

maintain the ethics of the profession. See id. The ABA Standards

are “generally instructive as to the question of punishment,” though

“they are not controlling.” Id. See also In the Matter of Hunt, 304 Ga.

635, 640 (820 SE2d 716) (2018) (“[T]his Court relies on the [ABA

Standards] for general guidance in determining the appropriate

level of discipline”); In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470

SE2d 232) (1996) (“[W]e look to the American Bar Association’s

standards for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction to

impose.”). Ultimately, “the level of punishment imposed rests in the

sound discretion of this Court.” Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a).

                                  23
     (a) ABA Standards

     To properly determine the appropriate sanction for attorney

discipline, the Special Master “should look to the [ABA Standards]

for guidance.” Morse, 265 Ga. at 354 (2) (remanding case to review

panel to consider the disciplinary matter under the ABA Standards).

As we have repeatedly indicated in our prior decisions, those

standards offer several factors for consideration in imposing

discipline: “the duty violated; the lawyer’s mental state; the actual

or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and the

existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” Cook, 311 Ga. at 210

(2). See also Morse, 265 Ga. at 354 (2); ABA Standards at II &

III.C.3.0.

     Here, although the Special Master discussed aggravating and

mitigating factors, he did not first analyze the duty violated, the

lawyer’s mental state, and any actual or potential injury. Thus, we

refrain at this point from deciding what sanctions are appropriate,

if any, and remand the case for a full analysis of the ABA Standards

                                 24
consistent with our discussion below. That analysis, in turn, may

affect the recommendation of discipline.

     (b) Duty Violated

     The GRPC prescribes duties for attorneys authorized to

practice law in Georgia. See e.g., Matter of Tuggle, 317 Ga. 255, 271

(6) (a) (892 SE2d 761) (2023) (concluding that an attorney “violated

his duty of competence, as prescribed in Rule 1.1,” his “duty of

diligence, as prescribed in Rule 1.3,” and “his duties upon

termination of representation, as prescribed in Rule 1.16 (d)”

(emphasis added)); In re Skinner, 292 Ga. 640, 641 (740 SE2d 171)

(2013) (“Rule 1.6 of the [GRPC] requires a lawyer to maintain in

confidence all information gained in the professional relationship

with a client” subject to certain exceptions (emphasis added)).

     The ABA Standards—though themselves not controlling, see

Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a)—assist the Court in its determination of

sanctions by providing a non-exhaustive list of the duties explicitly

or implicitly prescribed by the GRPC and by grouping those duties

into several categories: duties that a lawyer owes to his clients;

                                 25
duties that he owes to the general public; duties he owes to the legal

system; and duties he owes to the legal profession. See ABA

Standards at II & III.C.4.0-7.0. On remand, the Special Master

should consider which of these duties Breault may have violated by

his violations, if any, of the GRPC.

     For example, the Special Master should consider the duty of

loyalty owed by a lawyer to a client, which includes the duty to

maintain client confidences. See Rule 1.6 (a); ABA Standards at II.

Rule 1.6 safeguards these duties by requiring a lawyer to obtain

informed    consent   before   disclosing   a   client’s   confidential

information, subject to certain exceptions. These exceptions include

Rule 1.6 (a), whereby a lawyer may disclose confidential client

information that he is “impliedly authorized [to disclose] in order to

carry out the representation,” and Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii), whereby a

lawyer may disclose the client’s confidential information that he

“reasonably believes [is] necessary” to defend himself against

criminal or civil claims based on his representation of the client.

                                  26
     Here, the duty to maintain client confidences, as part of a duty

of loyalty to a client, was implicated by Breault’s disclosure of

confidential client-related information in response to two motions to

revoke his pro hac vice status in the district court. Breault argued

that he was impliedly authorized to disclose the information under

Rule 1.6 (a), and that he reasonably believed that disclosing the

information was necessary to defend himself against civil or

criminal claims under Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii). On remand, the Special

Master should explicitly address these Rule 1.6 exceptions in

determining whether Breault violated Rule 1.6, and if he did, state

whether in doing so Breault violated the duty to maintain client

confidences and a duty of loyalty to the client.

     The Special Master should also consider whether Breault

violated a lawyer’s duty to the legal system. Here, Breault’s duty to

the legal system to refrain from improper conduct was implicated by

the Special Master’s conclusion that he violated Rule 3.5 (d) by

disrupting the district court proceedings on two occasions. The

Special Master should consider whether Breault violated this duty.

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     In addition, lawyers owe duties to the legal profession,

including a duty to properly terminate representation of a client.

This duty was implicated by the Special Master’s conclusion that

Breault violated Rule 1.16 (a) (3) when he failed to promptly

withdraw from representing the clients. The Special Master should

consider whether Breault violated this duty.

     We recognize that sometimes it may be apparent, even without

explicit explanation, which duty or duties were violated (and that a

duty was violated) by a Rules violation. For example, a violation of

Rule 1.6 (a)’s requirement that a lawyer “maintain in confidence all

information gained in the professional relationship with a client

[subject to exceptions],” will, likely in every case, be a violation of

the “duty” to maintain client confidences and “duty” of loyalty owed

to the client. But even if so, it is often helpful for this Court’s

determination of discipline when a Special Master explicitly uses the

framework of duty—that is, when a Special Master, for every Rule

that he or she deems violated, discusses whether that Rule violation

entails a violation of a duty to the client, to the general public, to the

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legal system, to the legal profession, or to a combination thereof.

Thus, to assist our determination of discipline, we ask the Special

Master on remand—and encourage Special Masters in general—to

use the framework of duty, even though the ABA Standards, again,

are not controlling. See Cook, 311 Ga. at 213 (3) (a).

     (c) Mental State

     The ABA Standards also provide helpful, albeit non-binding,

definitions of three mental states: intent, knowledge, and

negligence. See ABA Standards at III (Definitions); Tuggle, 317 Ga.

at 273-74 (6) (b) (analyzing lawyer’s mental state through the

categories of intent, knowledge, and negligence). A lawyer acts with

intent—the most culpable mental state—when he acts with the

“conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.”

ABA Standards at III. A lawyer acts with knowledge when he acts

with “conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances

of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to

accomplish a particular result.” Id. And a lawyer acts with

negligence—the “least culpable mental state”—when a lawyer “fails

                                  29
to be aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a

result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of

care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.” Id. at

II.

      Here, although the Special Master found that Breault’s actions

were “clouded by anger,” he made no explicit findings as to Breault’s

mental state as the ABA Standards define that term. That makes it

difficult for this Court to determine appropriate discipline. Thus, to

aid our determination of discipline in this case, the Special Master

on remand should consider, based on the record, which mental

state(s) Breault acted with when he committed the Rules violations,

if any. Potential starting points in the record as to Breault’s mental

state in relation to Rule 1.6 include Breault’s testimony at the

disciplinary hearing that he “purposefully” filed the transcript of the

conversation with the physician as part of a “brilliant grand

strategy,” and his acknowledgement in his response to the

Defendants’ Motion to Revoke that by making the disclosure, he was

“tipping the ‘playing field’” in favor of the defendants.

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     (d) Potential or Actual Injury

     An analysis of actual or potential injury to a client is a helpful

factor for this Court to consider in ultimately determining what

sanction is appropriate for a lawyer’s violations of the GRPC, so the

Special Master should explicitly consider the actual or potential

injury suffered by the client. The ABA Standards define “[p]otential

injury” to include “harm to a client . . . that is reasonably foreseeable

at the time of the lawyer’s misconduct and which, but for some

intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the

lawyer’s misconduct.” ABA Standards at III (Definitions).

     Here, the Special Master found that Breault’s clients were “not

financially hurt,” that Breault “did not steal money,” that “no one

raised the issue of improper disclosure” at various proceedings

before the district court, and that if the physician had been deposed,

most of the matters disclosed in the recording would have been

“forthcoming” based only on the physician’s records. But the Special

Master did not explicitly link any of these findings to a discussion of

actual or potential injury, and the Review Board purported to adopt

                                   31
the Special Master’s findings on injury even though the Special

Master had made no explicit findings.

     However, the record contains evidence suggesting that

Breault’s disclosures in response to both of the motions to revoke,

may have resulted in actual or potential injury to his clients. For

example, in its ruling on the Defendants’ Motion to Revoke, the

district court found that Breault’s disclosures damaged the

plaintiffs’ case, and that defense counsel testified that the recording

of the conversation with the physician gave the defense valuable

cross-examination material against the plaintiffs’ experts. And

Breault’s response to the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Revoke could have

damaged the clients’ case by disclosing information on the credibility

and admissibility of potential plaintiff evidence. On remand, taking

into account facts such as these and the record as a whole, the

Special Master should consider whether any of Breault’s misconduct

caused actual or potential injury to the clients.

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     (e) Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

     After determining the appropriate sanction based on his

findings as to duties violated, mental state, and injury, the Special

Master    should   turn    to   the    aggravating   and   mitigating

circumstances to determine whether the balance of those factors

warrants a departure from the appropriate sanction. See ABA

Standards at II (“[A]fter making the initial determination as to the

appropriate sanction, the court would then consider any relevant

aggravating or mitigating factors.”). The ABA Standards define

aggravation as “any considerations or factors that may justify an

increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed,” and mitigation as

“any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the

degree of discipline to be imposed.” Id. at III.C.9.21 & C.9.31.

     Here, the Special Master considered some aggravating and

mitigating factors and found that in aggravation, Breault refused to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. See id. at III.C.9.22

(g). The Special Master specifically declined to apply the

aggravating factor of a pattern of misconduct. See id. at III.C.9.22

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(c). In mitigation, the Special Master found only that Breault did not

have a prior disciplinary record and he was inexperienced in the

practice of law. See id. at III.C.9.32 (a) & (f).

     On remand, the Special Master should reconsider the

application and balance of aggravating and mitigating factors after

and in light of his analysis of duty, mental state, and injury. See id.

at II. In other words, the Special Master should first determine an

appropriate sanction based on these three elements, and then

determine what aggravating and mitigating factors exist and

whether their balance calls for an upward or downward departure

from the appropriate sanction.

     5. Conclusion

     Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Special

Master erred by failing to conduct a full analysis of the ABA

Standards before recommending that Breault receive a one-month

suspension, and the Review Board erred by adopting the Special

Master’s      recommendation.        We      therefore   reject    the

Recommendations of the Review Board and the Special Master and

                                    34
remand to the Board, with direction that the Board remand this case

to a Special Master, within ten business days of the publication of

this opinion, for (1) a full analysis of the ABA Standards, including

(a) the duties violated,20 (b) Breault’s mental state, (c) the potential

or actual injury caused by Breault’s misconduct, and (d) any

aggravating or mitigating factors that might justify an upward or

downward departure from the appropriate sanction; and (2) in light

of this analysis and the record, a new recommendation as to the

appropriate discipline to be imposed, consistent with the framework

outlined in this opinion. The Special Master is directed to submit an

amended report and recommendation with additional findings of

fact and conclusions of law, and a new recommendation, within 90

days of the date of the Review Board’s order remanding the case.

After the Special Master submits the amended report and

     20 Before the Special Master assesses whether Breault violated the duty

of loyalty and duty to maintain client confidences by violating Rule 1.6, the
Special Master should first analyze the two exceptions to Rule 1.6 raised by
Breault and mentioned earlier in this opinion, to determine whether Breault
violated Rule 1.6 at all.

                                     35
recommendation, both the State Bar and Breault may, if they so

desire, file exceptions with the Review Board.

      Recommendation rejected and matter remanded with direction.
All the Justices concur.

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