Court Opinion

ID: 9790300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:50:28.61657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:28.155806
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I agree with the main opinion except that it seems to me that if we look to the purpose of the legislature as shown in the Sales Tax Act and the amendment of 1949 which declares that, “no sale of a motor vehicle shall be deemed isolated or occasional”1 the intent is to impose such tax upon all motor vehicles including trailers and semi-trailers.
A realistic view of the matter requires an appreciation of the fact that the legislative process is somewhat cumbersome at best and enactments often lack the preci*151sion of expression which might be desired It is therefore necessary for those charged with administration, .and for the courts, to view such enactments in their entirety and in the light of the purpose sought to be accomplished to make the most sensible skein of the law possible in accordance with the objectives and consistent with the language employed. Aside I remark that the Motor Vehicle Act is primarily concerned with traffic regulations and safety and for that reason the definition therein is in no way relevant to the status of vehicles insofar as the Sales Tax Act is concerned.
If we are to look to other areas in our statutes for analogies, it would seem better to look to the Public Utility Act. Section 54-6-1, U.C.A.1953 defines motor vehicle as, “any automobile, truck, trailer, semi-trailer, tractor, motor bus, * * thus plainly indicating the legislative intent to include plaintiff’s equipment as motor vehicles.
It is plain enough that the legislative purpose here was to produce revenue for the state. An adjunct to that purpose is that they selected motor vehicles as a type of property upon which the tax could be imposed and collected with relative ease because of the necessity of registering them and of transferring title through the Tax Commission.
Consistent with the above purpose, and with my conclusion on the question here involved, is the fact that the legislature used the term motor vehicle in correlation with “registration and licensing” of the same. In Section 59-15-5, U.C.A.1953 dealing with the collection of the tax it is provided that:
“ * * * on all motor vehicle sales made by other than a regular licensed dealer the tax shall be paid by the purchaser directly to the state tax commission upon every sale of a motor vehicle subject to registration and licensing under the laws of this state, shall be collected by the state tax commission at the time of such registration and licensing.” (Emphasis ours.)
This provision clearly indicates that the criteria for determining the scope of the Sales Tax Act as applied to motor vehicles is whether they are subject to registration and licensing. The interpretation placed thereon by the Tax Commission gives it literal effect. This is in accord with the rule of statutory construction that specific statutory provisions will prevail over general ones.2
In addition to the above, there is the further consideration that when the Commission has adopted an administrative interpretation and put it into practice, it will be given some consideration by the *152courts, and not be disturbed unless there is persuasive reason for doing so.3 Sales Tax Regulation 38 promulgated and published by the commission August 25, 1950, reads:
“No sale of a vehicle subject to the registration laws of this state shall be deemed an isolated or occasional sale.”
Since trailers are by law subject to registration the same as other motor vehicles, it is apparent that they too fall within the scope of this regulation.
It is so axiomatic as to seem almost banal to state that a motor vehicle includes all of its parts. In regard to the units in question, the fact is that the motor itself is not used except in connection with the trailer; nor is the trailer without the motor. It takes the two mutually dependent parts to form the functioning vehicle. It would be as logical to argue that the motor by itself is not a motor vehicle because it is not used on the highway without the trailer, as it is to argue that the trailer is not a motor vehicle because it is not a complete one without the motor.
It is important to realize that if we do not follow the natural and reasonable interpretation of the taxing statutes by regarding the motor and the trailer as being subject to the tax, then other equipment almost identical in physical makeup and purpose of use would be subjected to the tax without any valid basis for discrimination between them. For example, suppose two truckers: A has a large truck which is one intergrated unit, motor and body:under the decision its sale would be subjected to the tax. B has a large truck, identical in all respects except that the trailer is detachable from the motor. In the latter instance the sale of the motor part of the truck would be subjected to the tax; the trailer not. This poses a constitutional question which must be confronted in order to make a forthright disposition of this case, and which the main opinion entirely fails to deal with.
I fail to see how the mere fact that the units are separable could properly provide a basis for taxing the one and exempting the other and opine that if a legislative enactment purported to do so, the courts would be quick to point out the lack of any sound basis for discrimination and strike down the statute as unjustly discriminatory.4 It would be in accordance with established and sound policy to interpret and apply the statute as the Tax Commission has done to avoid such groundless discrimination. This court said *153in the case of Norville v. State Tax Commission,5
“Moreover in seeking to give effect to the intent of the legislature the court will adopt that interpretation of a taxing statute which lays the tax burden uniformly on all standing in the same degree with relation to the tax adopted * * * and will avoid an interpretation which would lead to an impractical, unfair, or unreasonable result.”
It is to be conceded that there are cases holding that trailers are not motor vehicles under some circumstances and for particular purposes. Insofar as I am aware, none have indicated any view contrary to the position of the Tax Commission under facts and statutes similar to those here. On the other hand, there are numerous cases holding that trailers are motor vehicles for various purposes notwithstanding the general definition of motor vehicle and trailer relied upon by plaintiff. The only general pattern that can be found in the decisions is that the courts will adopt that meaning of “motor vehicle” which comports with the intent of the statute in question in order to produce a fair and equitable result consistent with its general purpose.
In the case of State v. Schwartzman Service, Inc.,6 the defendant was convicted of the operation of a “motor vehicle” having excess weight, which involved the defendant’s trailer. The court held that the trailer was a motor vehicle. In Vest v. Kramer,7 the court held that a two-wheeled utility trailer designed for and employed in general transportation and attached to and operated as a unit with an automobile, was a motor vehicle within the Ohio statute. In State v. Rowell,8 a trailer was deemed to be a part of a motor vehicle under that state’s Vehicle Code prescribing standard equipment for motor vehicles. In State v. Harper,9 in a prosecution for larceny of tires, tubes and wheels from a trailer the court reasoned that a trailer becomes a part of a motor vehicle for transportation purposes, and the fact that the detached trailer contains no motor was not persuasive that it was not properly classified as a motor vehicle, or at least as part of one. In Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.,10 the court held that a trailer was within the meaning of “motor vehicle” as used in a statute providing for a lien on motor vehicles in favor of one injured through negligent operation thereof.
The majority opinion purports to distinguish the above cases, but I see no valid *154distinction therein and stand on the proposition that the courts will and do very properly adopt the meaning of “motor vehicle” which is in accord with the general purpose and intent of the statute. I remain aware of the rule that generally taxing statutes are applied in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing authority. Nevertheless, it seems to me quite inescapable, that if we look at the over-all purpose of the legislature in the light of the rules of statutory construction applicable, that it was the intent to impose the sales tax upon all sales of motor vehicles, including trailers and semi-trailers, which are integral parts thereof and subject to registration and licensing as are other motor vehicles. I would affirm the order of the Tax Commission.

. S.L.U.1949, Chapter 83.

. Pacific Intermountain Exp. v. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549; Nelden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P. 524.

. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542; Decker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 94 Utah 166, 76 P.2d 568, 115 A.L.R. 1377.

. See State v. Mason, 1938, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, 117 A.L.R. 330.

. 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937, 940, 126 A.L.R. 1318.

. 1931, 225 Mo.App. 577, 40 S.W.2d 479.

. 158 Ohio St. 78, 107 N.E.2d 105.

. 1957, 120 Vt. 166, 136 A.2d 349.

. 1945, 353 Mo. 821, 184 S.W.2d 601.

. 223 S.C. 320, 75 S.E.2d 688.