Court Opinion

ID: 9576738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:27:55.848719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:17.841960
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, C. J.,
(dissenting). Plaintiff sued defendants to recover damages for injuries sustained to his person as a result of being struck in the face by matter flowing from the top of an oil well following the shooting thereof with nitroglycerine.
The accident occurred September 3, 1948, at a well drilled on a lease owned by one J. F. Smith and located in Lincoln county. The well was being drilled by one Price Smith under contract with the owner. The plaintiff was an employee of said Price Smith and as such acted in the capacity of a tool dresser for one Fred Louvier, who was employed by said Price Smith as a driller. Defendant Torpedo Company, under contract with the owner, shot the well and defendant Kamp, acting as its agent and employee, performed the service. The well had been drilled to a depth of 5,607 feet and plugged back to the depth of 4,950 feet and casing split in preparation for the shot. In accordance with its contract with the-owner, the Torpedo Company, on September 2, 1948, placed in the hole three containers of nitroglycerine, each containing 20 quarts, attached thereto a time bomb set to explode at 11:02 a. m. on September 3, 1948, and placed there-over what is termed an umbrella. Upon the completion thereof the drilling contractor put in the hole 2 or 3 cubic yards of sand and then filled the hole with water and inserted a water hose so as to maintain that volume of water until the shot was exploded. Present on the premises on the forenoon of September 3rd were said driller and plaintiff, who were on twelve hour tour, which did not end until 12 noon of that day; Kamp, one Walter W. Morris, lease superintendent and representative of said J. F. Smith, and two others, landowners in the vicinity who were interested in knowing the potential of the well. Kamp, who came by automobile, brought with him a seismographic instrument, known as a shot detector, which he installed by placing the diaphragm thereof in the ground beside the car which was parked about 75 feet south of the well. The instru-*649meet was provided with an ammeter which reflected to the eye the force of an explosion and ear phones which reflected the sound thereof. Shortly before 11:02 a. m., Kamp, seated upon the running board of his car, placed the seismograph phones in his ears and held the ammeter in his hand in anticipation of the explosion. At the same time Morris and Louvier stood about 25 or 30 feet from the well with watches in hand in order to note the time of the explosion. Practically on the minute set Kamp waved his hand to Morris and cried “its off”, or words to such effect, meaning that the shot had exploded. Morris, in response, made a similar cry in recognition of the truth of Kamp’s statement. Thereupon Louvier went to start the power in order that the motors, which had been dead more than 24 hours, might warm up. After giving said signal Kamp assembled his seismograph, placed same in his car and came to where Morris was standing and they together went to the well to note whether the water which filled the well at time of the explosion had settled. After noting the fact that the water had settled they left the platform of the well and stood nearby, engaged in conversation with Louvier who had returned from starting the motors. They were standing with their backs to the well and while so standing and engaged there was a terrific noise of an eruption. On turning to look at the well they observed the plaintiff lying on his back upon the derrick floor with water and oil which covered his face and had filled his eyes and nose, all of which resulted in injury. Reflecting his conduct at the time of and immediately preceding his injury, plaintiff testified that he was in the lease utility building known as “doghouse” talking with one of said landowners at the time set for the explosion. That from the doorway thereof, he observed the signal given by Kamp to Morris, and though he did not distinctly hear the words that Kamp spoke he was satisfied that they meant that the shot had exploded. That he saw Louvier going to start the motors and joined him in order to assist. That after the motors were started he concluded that the large motor was running rather fast and he went to the side thereof to idle it down. After doing so he started across the derrick floor en route to the doghouse when he noted some lease tools lying around and he concluded to pick them up and thus leave the place clean when going off tour at noon. Then he was in the act of stooping to pick up a tool near the mouth of the well when the eruption occurred.
The uncontroverted facts in this case show that Kamp, the shooter, gave the warning that the shot had exploded and from that moment on it was dangerous to be around the mouth of the well. This fact was known to the plaintiff and the shooter had the right to rely on the fact that employees on a drilling well were experienced enough to know that it was dangerous to get near the well under such circumstances. This plaintiff had seen a hundred wells shot and was cognizant of the danger. He had been around drilling oil wells since he was twelve or fourteen years of age. The law is well settled that where reasonable warning has been given, the person in charge of a dangerous instrumentality on seeing another approach a dangerous place may assume that the latter will not place himself in obvious peril. 65 C.J.S. Negligence, §67; Choquette v. Key System Transit Co., 118 Cal. App. 646, 5 P. 2d 921. In 38 Am. Jur. §89, this statement is made:
“Persons who own, operate, or maintain dangerous instrumentalities have a right to rely upon others who may be imperiled thereby to take the usual and customary measures to avoid injury. They may assume, in the absence of information to the contrary, that others are in possession of their faculties and will exercise them in the normal and usual manner.”
This statement is supported by the following citations: Bresee v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 149 Cal. 131, 85 P. *650152, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1059; Herring v. Wilmington & R. R. Co., 32 N. C. 402, 51 Am. Dec. 395; Derringer v. Tatley, 34 N.D. 43, 157 N.W. 811, L.R.A. 1917F, 187; Deans v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 107 N.C. 686, 12 S. E. 77, 22 Am. St. Rep. 902.
What more could reasonably be expected of the shooter in this case? He went on the premises at the request of the owner. He knew that it was a drilling well and that it was customary to have experienced workers on the well. He warned the workers. He knew that he did not have to personally tell all of them to stay away from the mouth of the well. The plaintiff was warned that the shot had exploded. The shooter had no reason to think that the plaintiff would get so close to the mouth of the well that he would be injured by the explosion. There was nothing in the shooter’s conduct, or the warning given, to make the plaintiff think that there was no danger at the well’s mouth. It is true the shooter glanced at the well immediately after he gave the warning that the explosion had' taken place, but he immediately stationed himself a safe distance from the mouth of the well. Sec. 480, vol. 2 in the Restatement of the Law of Torts contains this statement:
“A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance could have observed the danger created by the defendant’s negligence in time to have avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, but only if, the defendant (a) knew of the plaintiff’s situation, and (b) realized or had reason to realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.”
In this case there was no negligence on the shooter’s part, but even if there were there was nothing to make him realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid harm. What person who was engaged in shooting oil wells would think that any one who was experienced enough to be a tool dresser would get so near to the mouth of the well containing such a shot of nitroglycerin as to be injured before the all-clear signal had been given? Further on in sec. 480, this statement is made:
“The defendant is entitled to assume that the plaintiff is paying or will pay reasonable attention to his surroundings; until he has reason to suspect the contrary, he has no reason to believe that the plaintiff is' in any danger. Therefore, the defendant is liable only if he realizes or has reason to realize that the plaintiff is inattentive and consequently in peril.”
In this case the shooter did everything that a man of ordinary prudence would do who was working with a high explosive. The shot had been placed 23 hours before and there was no danger to any one as long as they kept away from the mouth of the well. No worker around the well was justified in getting too near the well’s mouth until he was told it was safe to do so. In this instance, the plaintiff knew the danger, but let his curiosity get the better of him or forgot what he was doing. There was nothing in his conduct to indicate to the shooter that he should be given additional warning.
There was no evidence to sustain plaintiff’s contention that there was negligence in the detection of the time the shot went off. The best methods were used and no living person can say that the shot did not go off when the shooter said it did. Surely that explosion at the mouth of the well could not take place at the same time the shot went off at the bottom of the well. The oil and sand from the bottom of the well that struck the plaintiff took some time to get to the surface of the earth. The doctor who first examined the plaintiff testified:
“When I saw the man, both of his eyes were filled with sand and mud; you could see the mud and what looked *651to be crude oil or black oil; and, his nose was completely packed with it; his mouth was full of it; his upper part of his throat was; there was a number of abrasions filled with sand and gravel up each cheek in front of his ears beginning at the chin; and under his upper lip a laceration was filled with mud and gravel and oil; and his hair was and even his throat was just packed with it.”
These materials traveled 4,600 feet, at least, through water before hitting plaintiff.
But what difference would the time the shot went off make in this case? Plaintiff knew it was not safe to be at the mouth of the well after the signal was given. One hour was the shortest time after the shot was supposed to go off that the danger period was over. Here the explosion reached the surface from 15 to 30 minutes after the warning was given.
Much is made of a Professor Cloud’s testimony, but his testimony boiled down is that he thought that water would flow out of the top of the hole when the shot went off. He did not-say that the matter from the bottom of the hole went out of the mouth of the well immediately upon the discharge of the shot. The evidence showed that water settled to a lower level immediately after the shot went off.
Even though the defendants were liable in this case, the verdict is excessive. This man was not blind after he recovered from the injury. He drove an automobile. He would not do that unless he could see enough to drive to his own satisfaction. If his employer had set off this shot the most he would have received would have been $10,500. The plaintiff was engaged in a hazardous employment covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Laws of the State of. Oklahoma. To place a judgment against these defendants of $65,000, when the shooter performed his duty as any prudent person would have done, is unreasonable. It is placing a burden on one of the necessary operations in the production of oil that it is not able to bear. It makes one in the well shooting business an insurer of all who come near a well that is being shot by him. This court should not countenance such a rule of law.
Under the facts in this case there was no duty upon the shooter to warn the plaintiff more than he did, and there was no negligence shown on the part of the shooter.
I dissent.