Court Opinion

ID: 9908292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:28.728328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:06.381959
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1082-MR

JAMES DALE BOYD                                                       APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE DAVID WILLIAMS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 18-CR-00068

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: A circuit court jury convicted James Boyd of marijuana

cultivation, trafficking in marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Boyd

appeals the Adair Circuit Court’s judgment sentencing him to five years’

imprisonment, contending that the trial court improperly instructed the jury,

resulting in a double jeopardy violation, and that his rights under the Confrontation

Clause were violated.

             Upon review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             On February 13, 2018, an Adair County grand jury indicted Boyd for

cultivating marijuana (five plants or more, first offense), trafficking marijuana

(five pounds or more, first offense), and possessing drug paraphernalia. The trial

court held a two-day jury trial in June 2023.

             The evidence at trial indicated that, at some point, law enforcement

received information about the cultivation of possible marijuana on Hadley Church

Road. On October 15, 2017, Officer Josh Brockman went to that area and drove

past Boyd’s residence numerous times. Officer Brockman testified that each time

he drove past the residence, he smelled marijuana. Subsequent drone images

showed marijuana growing near Boyd’s house.

             Thereafter, Officer Brockman obtained a search warrant and returned

to Boyd’s residence. During the warrant’s execution, the officers found a large

amount of marijuana in Boyd’s house, yard, garage, and barn. For instance, police

discovered eighteen (18) rooted plants growing outside Boyd’s residence and one

hundred and seventy-one (171) plants growing inside his garage. Additionally,

officers discovered evidence that thirteen plant stalks had been harvested, and there

were ten (10) additional holes where officers believed plants had been removed.

Moreover, law enforcement discovered what the Commonwealth estimated was

over ten (10) pounds of processed marijuana in Ziploc bags inside Boyd’s house.

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             During Boyd’s conversation with the police after their discoveries,

Officer Brockman testified that Boyd told him that it was his marijuana but that the

entire amount was for personal use. At the time, Boyd did not claim that the plants

recovered were anything other than marijuana. Law enforcement subsequently

took the plant material seized from Boyd’s property to the state police forensic

laboratory for testing, and it was ultimately found to contain marijuana.

             Boyd testified at trial that everything recovered was for his personal

use and not to sell or share. Additionally, Boyd refused in his testimony to

acknowledge that the confiscated plants were marijuana.

             After hearing the guilt-phase evidence, the jury convicted Boyd on all

counts. Following the sentencing phase proof, the jury recommended that he serve

one year in prison for cultivating marijuana and five years for trafficking

marijuana. However, the jury recommended no punishment for his drug

paraphernalia conviction. Finally, the jury recommended that his sentence be

served concurrently for a total of five years’ imprisonment.

             The trial court ultimately entered a judgment consistent with the jury’s

recommendations, although it imposed a fine of $1.00 and a sentence of one (1)

day in jail for the drug paraphernalia conviction. This appeal followed.

             We will discuss additional facts as needed for our analysis.

                                         -3-
                                         ANALYSIS

               a. Jury Instructions

               Boyd first contends the trial court erred by improperly instructing the

jury, resulting in a double-jeopardy violation. Specifically, Boyd asserts that the

trafficking and cultivation jury instructions created the possibility that the jury

convicted Boyd for the same act by referencing the same quantity of marijuana.

Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that Boyd invited the error, as the trial

court ultimately used substantively identical instructions as those proposed by

Boyd.

               We agree with the Commonwealth that we may not reach the merits

of this claim because Boyd invited the error he now claims. Invited errors arise

from “invitations that reflect the party’s knowing relinquishment of a right[.]”

Quisenberry v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 19, 38 (Ky. 2011) (citation omitted).

As the Kentucky Supreme Court discussed in Quisenberry, “[g]enerally, a party is

estopped from asserting an invited error on appeal.” Id. at 37 (citation omitted).

               For example, by requesting facilitation instructions, the defendant in

Quisenberry waived any claims on appeal that insufficient evidence of facilitation

existed.1 Id. at 37-38. See also Rudd v. Commonwealth, 584 S.W.3d 742, 746

1
 In this case, Boyd made no argument on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to grant his
directed verdict motion or that insufficient evidence existed of marijuana trafficking or
cultivation. As the Kentucky Supreme Court has stated, “[a]rguments not pursued on appeal are

                                               -4-
(Ky. 2019) (finding invited error and waiver because defendant proposed jury

instructions substantially similar to that given by trial court); Webster v.

Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 321, 324 (Ky. 2014) (when a party tenders an

instruction that is substantially similar to those ultimately given by the trial judge

the issue of the giving of the instruction is not eligible for appellate review);

Thornton v. Commonwealth, 421 S.W.3d 372, 376-77 (Ky. 2013); and Graves v.

Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 144, 152 (Ky. 2012).

             In this case, the jury instructions Boyd tendered to the trial court

discloses that they are substantively identical to the instructions given by the trial

court. Thus, Boyd invited the alleged double jeopardy error, and we may not

address that issue on appeal.

             b. Confrontation Clause

             Boyd next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the

Commonwealth to introduce a report from the state crime laboratory without live

testimony from its author. He further argues that this error ran afoul of the

Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution – as applicable to the states

through the Fourteenth Amendment – and under Section 11 of the Kentucky

Constitution.

deemed waived.” Garland v. Commonwealth, 458 S.W.3d 781, 785 (Ky. 2015) (citations
omitted).

                                          -5-
                  A careful review of the record reveals that Allison Standifer

(“Standifer”), a supervisor at the Kentucky State Police forensic laboratory, was

called to the stand. She explained to the jury her responsibility performing peer

reviews of analyst reports. Specifically, when a report is complete Standifer

explained she looks over the findings and signs off on it, making it final. One such

report was authored by analyst Christopher Ramsey who analyzed the evidence in

the case sub judice. As the prosecutor began questioning Standifer as to the

specifics of the report, defense counsel objected. The attorneys were instructed to

approach the bench for a sidebar discussion. It is at this point that the record

becomes inaudible. The trial judge failed to use the “white noise”2 and, instead, all

parties whispered. As a result, one cannot hear the substance of the objection, the

ensuing discussion, or the ruling by the judge. RAP3 25 governs unavailable or

omitted proceedings:

                  (A)(1) Narrative Statement.

                  In the event no official record of the . . . trial was made
                  or, if made, is not clearly understandable from the
                  recording, the appellant may prepare a narrative
                  statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best
                  available means, including appellant’s recollection, for
                  use as a supplement to[,] or in lieu of [,] an insufficient
                  official record. This statement shall be served on all
                  opposing counsel who participated below who may serve

2
  A judge has the ability to create a static noise making conversations at the bench, spoken at normal
levels, inaudible to the jury but still recorded on the record.
3
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.

                                                    -6-
             objections or proposed amendments to the trial court
             within 10 days after service. Both parties may attach
             affidavits or other documents to support their statements,
             objections, or proposed amendment . . . .

             (B) Effect of Omitted Record.

             The appellate court shall not consider any claim or
             contention which is based upon a portion of the record
             below that has not been made part of the record before
             the appellate court . . . .

Both parties, in their briefs, state that Boyd objected to Standifer’s testimony, and

that the objection was sustained. Further, Boyd acknowledges he then agreed that

Standifer could testify that she reviewed the report. Unfortunately, this

recollection of the record does not comport with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Therefore, as mandated by RAP 25(B), this court will not consider any claim or

contention which is based upon the inaudible sidebar. Notably, however, Boyd is

not appealing any ruling regarding Standifer’s testimony. Boyd’s appeal is limited

in scope to the admission of the report into evidence.

             Following the discussion at the bench, Standifer remained on the

stand and went on to testify as to the information contained in the report. The

Commonwealth then admitted the report into evidence without objection.

             Boyd now argues the trial court ran afoul of the Confrontation Clause

by admitting the report into evidence without testimony of its author, although no

such objection was made at trial. Therefore, Boyd has requested we review his

                                         -7-
claim under the “palpable error” standard. Under Kentucky Rule of Criminal

Procedure (“RCr”) 10.26, “[a] palpable error which affects the substantial rights of

a party may be considered . . . by an appellate court on appeal, even though

insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted

upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.” A party

claiming palpable error must show a “probability of a different result or error so

fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.”

Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006).

             In this case, we conclude that any error in the trial court’s handling of

the report did not rise to the level of palpable error. Regarding identifying the

substance, Officer Brock testified that it was marijuana, a plant he had been trained

to recognize as a police officer and based on his involvement in hundreds of

marijuana cases. Kentucky courts have allowed law enforcement to testify about

matters based on their training and experience. See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth,

416 S.W.3d 302, 310 (Ky. 2013) (collecting cases).

             Moreover, Boyd presented no evidence that he was licensed to grow

hemp legally. Under Kentucky law:

             While the level of THC distinguishes marijuana plants
             from hemp plants under federal and Kentucky law, that
             distinction is only relevant if [Boyd] could legally
             possess industrial hemp. Under Kentucky law, he could
             do so only if properly licensed and engaged in growing

                                         -8-
             hemp or possessing hemp for industrial use. No such
             evidence was presented.

Lundy v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.3d 398, 406-07 (Ky. App. 2017). Additionally,

the Commonwealth provided video evidence revealing the large amount of

marijuana seized from Boyd’s home. But, significantly, Standifer’s testimony

included an overview of the report Boyd now claims was admitted in error. As

opined above, this court will not review any claim or contention regarding the

inaudible sidebar. And, Boyd is not appealing Standifer’s testimony, only the

admission of the report itself. The jury heard Standifer read all the findings in the

report. Even if the jury had been prevented from accessing the physical report, the

tests of the substances in question and the author’s conclusions were admitted as

parol evidence. Any error created by the admission of the physical report was

therefore inconsequential. We can discern no manifest injustice.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -9-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Steven J. Buck            Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky       Attorney General of Kentucky

                          Christopher Henry
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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