Court Opinion

ID: 9474821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:10:01.856673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:21.325769
License: Public Domain

*470WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s ruling that the statements of Diana Dres were admissible. I must respectfully dissent, however, concerning the majority’s determination that Short’s two inculpatory statements are inadmissible. For the reasons that follow, I would remand to the district court to determine: (1) whether Short’s September 24 statement was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda and therefore inadmissible since she was not given Miranda warnings; and (2) whether her September 25 confession was voluntary and admissible in light of Oregon v. Elstad, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).
1. The September 24 statement
I would remand to the district court to determine whether Short made her September 24 statement “in custody.” Short only had a right to Miranda warnings if she made her statement in a custodial environment under the case law. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). The district court did not have an opportunity to address this important issue because of misrepresentations or misunderstandings by both parties concerning whether Short had received Miranda warnings prior to her September 24 statement.
The trial court was unaware of the content or circumstances of the September 24 statement. I see no reason to require the government to retry defendant instead of requiring the lower court to address the issue on remand. In light of the confusion caused by both parties on this issue, it seems unfair and inefficient to dismiss the case on the ground the government failed to carry its burden.
2. The September 25 statement
At the pretrial suppression hearing, it. was clear that the court considered only the defendant’s September 25 oral statement.1 The agents testified at the suppression hearing that while defendant could not read or write well in English, she could understand and speak in English without apparent difficulty. One agent, Corbin, who understood German, testified that Miranda warnings were given and carefully explained, and that there was “no problem in our communication” in English.2 The *471agents conceded that they did not attempt to have Mrs. Short execute a standard written Miranda waiver form. After the submission of testimony and the court’s ruling, the government apparently rendered an order overruling the suppression motion, and the following colloquy occurred between the court and counsel:
MS. HASENOUR [defendant’s counsel]: Your Honor, I have one other point. The order which was tendered concerned two statements, and the United States has only put on evidence of one, has only shown, carried the burden on one. I think there was—
BY THE COURT: (Interrupting) Well, actually, the United States didn’t have the burden to start with,—
MR. WESTBERRY [government’s counsel]: (Interrupting) I was going to say—
BY THE COURT: (Continuing) — but Mr. Westberry, in a burst of generosity, assumed it. I know nothing about the second statement. Apparently, Mr. Robinson is not here.
MR. WESTBERRY: I don’t believe there is a second statement as to Stephanie Short, Your Honor. That may be when the husband gave another statement to the CID agents.
MS. HASENOUR: Is it the United States’ position that the only confession statement that was made is the one made on October 23rd in the car?3
MR. WESTBERRY: I don’t want to misstate anything. May I have just one second to ask my agent here to make sure that’s right?
(Colloquy)
BY THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. WESTBERRY: (Conferring off the record at counsel table) Your Honor the CID agents had some initial contact with her. I don’t believe a statement was taken. The United States is not intending to rely on anything that was said to Mrs. Short by the CID agents. We stand on the one statement that we took here today. I believe there was some very brief initial contact there early in the investigation.
BY THE COURT: Does that solve your problem?
MS. HASENOUR: Yes, it does, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT: All right. Then the motion to suppress will be denied.
The court, in overruling the motion to suppress, which was concerned only with the September 25 statement, had stated:
The Court’s heard the evidence and is convinced that the United States, assuming the burden that it did not have, has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant understood her Miranda rights as read to her, or given to her, by the agents. There’s no question in my mind that this lady has a fundamental grasp of the English language which precludes a finding that she did not understand what she was doing when she made the statements. So the motion to suppress will be denied.
The court, then, ruled specifically that defendant understood the Miranda rights given to her and that she understood what she was doing in making the alleged September 25 confession. Defendant now appeals from that ruling.
I am not satisfied that the trial court had an adéquate or fair opportunity to rule upon the admissibility of either of the statements made by the defendant. The record reveals counsel misconstrued or misunderstood important factors affecting the admission of the part of the Farmer testimony that concerned defendant’s September 24 statement. Moreover, I believe the trial court should have the opportunity to review the admissibility of the defendant’s September 25 statement in light of Elstad. The trial court had the benefit of seeing *472and hearing first hand the witnesses who have knowledge of the circumstances of these statements. It had the opportunity to hear and observe Short’s ability to understand and express herself in English. The court should take into account that defendant was apparently not given any Miranda warnings prior to September 25th. Indeed, the government took the position at oral argument this warrant was not necessary because there was no probable cause to implicate Short unitl after her responses to Mrs. Farmer's inquiries. We have no basis of knowing whether the district court considered whether Short’s alleged statements on September 24th took place in a custodial setting, whether the statements were voluntary, whether Short felt any reasonable apprehension about not responding to all questions, and whether she appreciated and comprehended what was then taking place. The district court should be given the opportunity to make a reasoned disposition of these important suppression issues unhampered by the misconceptions referred to previously.
Accordingly I would REMAND for further proceedings.

. Defendant made this statement in response to the agents’ questions following her early morning arrest. At the time she was travelling by automobile to a preliminary appearance before the magistrate in Louisville, Kentucky. Subsequently, the defendant’s oral statement was reduced to writing. At the preliminary appearance, defendant stated that she did not fully understand the charges and the proceedings. Counsel was immediately appointed for her and there was a German interpreter provided at the bail hearing.

. I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that Short’s understanding of English was insufficient for her to make a knowing and voluntary confession. First, the trial judge found that "[t]here’s no question in my mind that this lady has a fundamental grasp of the English language.” We should not disturb this finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Second, the majority’s suggestion that the magistrate determined that defendant would not understand the proceedings without a German translation is misleading. My review of the record suggests the magistrate merely granted the request of defendant’s attorney for assistance in that regard. The magistrate had ordered counsel appointed for Short because she was indigent After Short stated she did not fully understand the charges and proceedings, the magistrate ordered consultations between Short and her appointed counsel before the court would conduct any further proceedings. Subsequently her appointed counsel requested a German translator. I see nothing in the record to indicate the magistrate made a finding regarding defendant’s ability to communicate in English. Third, I do not think the agents conceded Short’s English "was so poor that they took special precautions in explaining the Miranda warnings to her” as the majority states. The agents believed Short could understand and speak English, although her reading and writing skills in English were deficient. It is hardly surprising the agents took special precautions to explain Miranda to a non-citizen who speaks English as a second language. But this circumstance does not suggest to me that the agents doubted Short could understand English sufficiently to give a voluntary confession. Finally, I do not share the majority's view that the presence of the word "fellatio” in Short’s confession, as reduced to writing, suggests she did not make her statement knowingly. The record reveals the reason she used *471this term was that she was having difficulty explaining the act the word defines. The agents explained its meaning to Short, and subsequently she used the word as shorthand. Whether this explanation is accurate is a fact question subject to clearly erroneous review.

. The reference to October 23rd is in error.