Court Opinion

ID: 9955747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 14:14:49.952426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:19.795007
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 22, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2023-CA-0214-MR

TERRI WALLER                                                    APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE SUSAN GIBSON, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-003669

STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY                                                 APPELLEE

                               OPINION
                       REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, COMBS, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Terri Waller (“Waller”), appeals an order

granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, State Auto Property and

Casualty Insurance Company (“State Auto”). After our de novo review of the

issues presented, we reverse and remand for factual findings.
                             APPELLATE ERRORS

             We begin with Waller’s counsel’s appellate errors. This case joins an

expanding list of cases where a practitioner has failed to comply either with the

Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”), or the predecessor appellate

rules formerly in the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”). See, e.g.,

Hamilton v. Milby, 676 S.W.3d 42 (Ky. App. 2023); French v. French, 581 S.W.3d

45 (Ky. App. 2019); Prescott v. Commonwealth, 572 S.W.3d 913 (Ky. App. 2019);

and Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. App. 2010).

             Here, Waller’s counsel’s mistakes began early, with the notice of

appeal. Waller’s counsel initially listed the Honorable Susan Gibson, the Trial

Court Judge who authored the order on appeal, as an appellee. See RAP 2(A)(2)

(“[A]ll parties to the proceedings from which the appeal is taken, except those who

have been dismissed in an earlier final and appealable order, shall be parties before

the appellate court.”). Following a show cause order issued by this Court, Waller’s

counsel recognized his improper inclusion of non-parties and moved to dismiss

Judge Gibson from the appeal. We granted the motion.

             Next, a prehearing conference order was entered on March 30, 2023,

directing Waller’s counsel to file a designation of evidence within ten days. See

RAP 24(B)(1)(b). Waller’s counsel did not file the designation of evidence within

ten days. Instead, Waller’s counsel filed the designation on April 17, 2023, some

                                         -2-
seven days late. Three days later, Waller’s counsel filed in this Court a motion

styled “Motion of Appellant for Order Regarding Her Designation of Evidence

Filed with the Circuit Court Clerk on 04/17/23.” In that motion, Waller’s counsel

gave two reasons for his failure to file a timely designation of record: (1) the RAP

was newly adopted; and (2) storms in the area had disrupted internet service at

counsel’s office. This Court treated Waller’s motion as a request for additional

time to file Waller’s designation of record, which is what should have been filed,

and granted the same.

             Waller’s counsel next requested a 15-day extension of time to file

Waller’s opening, appellant’s brief. Waller tendered a brief within the requested

extension of time. This Court granted the motion for extension and ordered the

tendered brief to be filed.

             While the foregoing extension motion was not in error, some ten days

after tendering the brief, Waller’s counsel moved this Court to permit Waller to file

an amended brief due to briefing improprieties Waller’s counsel subsequently

discovered. Waller’s counsel averred that he realized there were over a dozen

errors, largely involving citations to the record. This Court granted the motion,

struck from the record Waller’s original opening brief, and ordered the amended

appellant’s opening brief to be filed in the record.

                                          -3-
             Though somewhat corrected, the amended, appellant’s opening brief

still contains substantial errors. For example, RAP 31(A)(1)(c) requires briefs to

use a font “no smaller than 12-point set at standard width.” Waller’s Statement of

Points and Authorities appears to contain font smaller than 12-point set at standard

width. Continuing, RAP 31(E)(1) requires citations to Kentucky cases reported

after June 1886 to be in a particular style that includes a parenthetical indicating

the court that rendered the decision and the year in which it was rendered. Many

of Waller’s citations do not comport with RAP 31(E)(1).

             RAP 32(A)(3) requires an appellant’s, opening brief to contain a

statement of the case “with ample references to the specific location in the record

supporting each of the statements contained in the summary.” Waller’s opening,

appellant’s brief contains roughly 50 citations to the record in her 13-page

statement of the case, which equates to an average of five citations per page.

While an average of five citations per page may suffice to be “ample,” it is

noteworthy here that some paragraphs contain no citations to the record. More

problematic, though, are that many of the citations are not “specific” as they

reference multiple pages, i.e., footnote 19 references almost 100 pages of record

when arguing “the policy language is misquoted by State Auto,” footnote 18

references almost 80 pages of record, footnote 10 references 13 pages of record,

footnote 21 references 22 pages of record, and so forth.

                                          -4-
             And some critical statements contain no supporting citation, such as

Waller’s statement that the Trial Court sustained State Auto’s summary judgment

motion. This reference is to the order that is being appealed, yet it contains no

citation to where this order is contained within the hundreds of pages and multiple

volumes of record.

             The latter error becomes more glaring when coupled with Waller’s

failure to comply with RAP 32(A)(4) and (7). RAP 32(A)(4) requires a

preservation statement at the beginning of the argument section of an appellant’s

opening brief. That statement should contain a reference to the record showing

whether and how the appellate issue is properly preserved for review. Strict

compliance is mandated, as our Supreme Court recently reiterated:

             We have strictly mandated compliance with this rule
             since its inception under the prior Kentucky Rules of
             Civil Procedure. Skaggs v. Assad, By & Through Assad,
             712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986) (citing CR
             76.12(4)(c)(iv)) (“It goes without saying that errors to be
             considered for appellate review must be precisely
             preserved and identified in the lower court.”). RAP
             32(A)(4) does not distinguish between this Court and the
             Court of Appeals when prescribing the organization and
             contents of an appellant’s opening brief. The failure of
             an appellant’s brief to conform to the appellate rules
             justifies the striking of the brief under RAP 31(H)(1).

                                         -5-
Gasaway v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 298, 310 (Ky. 2023).1

               Additionally, RAP 32(A)(7) requires an appellant’s opening brief to

contain an appendix “that conforms with section (E) of this rule.” RAP

32(E)(1)(a) requires an appellant to attach to its appendix first an appendix index

listing all items in the appendix, followed immediately by “the judgment, opinion,

or order under review . . . so that it is most readily available to the court.” The

order being appealed does not immediately follow the appendix index here,

though. In fact – the order is not in the appendix at all.

               Waller’s amended, opening brief wholly fails to comply with this rule.

Pursuant to Gasaway, these substantial failures could justify striking Waller’s

appellate brief. 671 S.W.3d at 310. See also RAP 31(H)(1). Or, we could elect to

review the claims without striking the brief. Gasaway, 671 S.W.3d at 311. We

reluctantly choose the latter as State Auto has not raised any issues with the

briefing, the summary judgment issues are relatively straightforward, and the Trial

Court’s Order frames the issues well, though we ultimately review those issues de

novo. We caution counsel that future, repeated errors may not be countenanced

and may result in sanctions. See RAP 10 and RAP 31(H).

1
  The Supreme Court ultimately elected to refrain from imposing a sanction for multiple reasons,
with the Court noting that the case was on discretionary review and “the Court of Appeals urged
this Court to consider the applicability of Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution.” Id. at 311.

                                               -6-
                                    BACKGROUND

              On or about June 26, 2018, Waller’s home allegedly suffered a

casualty when a tree fell on the rear portion of her house’s roof. Waller was out of

town and learned about the incident from a neighbor. According to Waller, she

had a tree service remove the tree, and that company concluded that any damage

was within Waller’s homeowner’s insurance deductible. Waller’s Amended

Complaint alleges that she verbally notified State Auto at some point, although she

does not specify the date. Waller admitted in her deposition that she was unsure if

she called her insurance agency and notified it about the June 26, 2018, incident.

An e-mail in April of 2019 from Andrew Reilmann, an insurance adjuster with

State Auto, relating to a separate incident that later occurred to the front of the

house in 2019,2 indicated Waller may have called about the June 26, 2018,

incident, but elected not to make a claim:

              Mrs. Waller, I cannot include the damage to the interior
              or rear of the home on this claim, as it did not occur on
              the same date of loss. I understand you called in a claim
              last year, and it did not get entered. The only was [sic]
              for SA to provide coverage is for you to contact your
              agent, and enter another claim for the date of loss that the
              damage to the rear of the home occurred. That would be
              another claim, and another wind and hail deductible.

2
 Waller claims that when Reilmann inspected the house, he commented to her that the rear roof
was a “rubber” roof that would last “forever.”

                                             -7-
             Regardless of any notice from Waller to State Auto in 2018, she

admitted that she did not make an insurance claim until June of 2020, because she

did not believe the damage exceeded the deductible. It is undisputed that no one

from State Auto came to Waller’s home to inspect the damage in 2018. Waller did

not have “a roofer or anybody else go up there and take a look at [her] roof to see if

there were any problems” in 2018. Waller Deposition p. 17. Waller claimed the

tree removal company saw “no visible damage” on the roof.

             And, in spite of the information in the April 2019-e-mail from

Reilmann about “damage to the interior or rear of the home,” Waller claimed in her

deposition that it was not until April or May of 2020 that she started having or

noticing leaking from the rear roof. She allegedly noticed water coming in the

electrical area and the light in the laundry room, which is in the downstairs portion

of her house. Waller supports this claim by a statement in one of her affidavits that

she had a home inspection for an appraisal in July of 2019, and the appraisal did

not find any leaks.

             Waller claims that it was not until after the April 2020, leaking ceiling

that she inspected the upstairs portion of her house, called in two professionals, and

had a tarp placed on the rear roof. Danny Colvin, a roofer with All Star

Construction, swore an affidavit in the instant case. Colvin inspected the roof in

May of 2020 and found two damaged places where water was leaking through the

                                         -8-
decking under the roof and into the interior of the home. Colvin stated that Waller

provided photos of the June 26, 2018, incident, along with photos from April 10,

2019, where Reilmann inspected the roof for the separate incident. Colvin

believed these photos showed that the roof had been damaged on June 26, 2018,

and a “delayed onset” occurred where the hole in the roof became larger and larger

over time, ultimately leading to water damage to the interior of the home.

              Colvin averred that:

              It would cost more now to do the repairs than what it
              would have cost had the repairs been done 04/10/19.
              Based on the history and on roofing probability, the
              damage to the interior walls and carpet of the home of
              Terri Waller had not yet occurred as of 04/10/19.

              Following Colvin’s inspection, Waller did not contact State Auto in

May of 2020. Waller claims that she had homeowner’s insurance through another

company at that point and needed guidance on the manner in which she should

proceed. She contacted a personal adjuster, Brian Elmore, who inspected the home

on May 22, 2019. Waller claims Elmore may have contacted State Auto soon

thereafter. Regardless, Elmore recommended Waller contact an attorney, who, on

June 22, 2020, gave notice to State Auto prior to initiating this lawsuit.3 Waller’s

attorney’s e-mail to State Auto avers, “This is the first notice you have had of the

3
 The terms of the homeowner’s insurance policy required any legal actions be initiated within
two years of the occurrence, thus the hastily-filed, original Complaint.

                                              -9-
06/26/18 claim[,]” though the e-mail also notes that there may be factual errors

given the newness of the case to the attorney and the need to file an action within

two years per the insurance contract’s terms.

              At the Circuit Court, the case proceeded with discovery, and State

Auto twice filed motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court denied the

first motion because it found genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to

whether State Auto suffered substantial prejudice from a delay in notice, and to

whether State Auto delayed in providing an inspection for coverage. However, the

Circuit Court granted the second, renewed motion,4 this time holding that there

were no genuine issues of material fact, and that State Auto had demonstrated that

as a matter of law it was entitled to judgment because it had proven Waller did not

comply with the prompt notice provision and, further, that State Auto was

prejudiced by this failure to notice the loss promptly. Waller timely appealed.

Additional facts are discussed as necessary below.

4
  This motion relied in part on a March 14, 2022, signed affidavit from Amanda Heeke, a
personal lines manager for Hyland Insurance Agency (“Hyland”), who had reviewed the
agency’s files regarding any notices made or claims filed by Waller regarding the 2018 and 2019
losses. Heeke averred that “Ms. Waller did not report a claim for property damage to Hyland for
a June 26, 2018, loss.” She also averred that Waller contacted Hyland on September 3, 2019,
“regarding a potential insurance claim related to claimed tree and storm damage that occurred in
2018 including new damage she discovered upstairs, but she never requested Hyland to formally
present any such claim to State Auto.”

                                             -10-
                                    ANALYSIS

             The issue in this case principally revolves around the notice-prejudice

rule, which alleviates a liability insurer from adjusting and/or defending an

otherwise covered occurrence if the terms of the policy require prompt notice, such

prompt notice was not given by the insured, and the insurer can demonstrate

prejudice from the delay. Waller’s appellate issues largely involve the giving of

notice. She presents multiple, alternative arguments. First, she argues that under

the notice-prejudice rule, an insured should not have a “covered occurrence”

requiring “notice” to her insurer until the insured is aware that she has a claim in

excess of her deductible. Waller argues that because her deductible was high, she

did not file a claim with State Auto about the June 26, 2018, occurrence until she

realized she had a covered occurrence in excess of her deductible. Next, Waller

claims that her alleged, verbal notice of the loss to her insurance agent in 2018

satisfied the insurance contract’s terms. Additionally, Waller asserts that she had

no loss of which to provide notice until May of 2020, because the damages were a

result of an insidious onset. State Auto counters that the notice was not promptly

given and that it was prejudiced by the delay.

             We hold that pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract, there

remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding the timing of the notice to State

Auto of the loss. Thus, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

                                         -11-
                           STANDARD OF REVIEW

             This appeal involves a grant of summary judgment. The summary

judgment standard of review is well-established:

             “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a summary
             judgment is whether the circuit judge correctly found that
             there were no issues as to any material fact and that the
             moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of
             law.” Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Systems,
             Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002). Summary judgment
             is only proper when “it would be impossible for the
             respondent to produce any evidence at the trial
             warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc., v.
             Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
             1991). In Steelvest, the word “‘impossible’ is used in a
             practical sense, not in an absolute sense.” Perkins v.
             Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992). In ruling
             on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required
             to construe the record “in a light most favorable to the
             party opposing the motion . . . and all doubts are to be
             resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480. A
             party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot rely
             on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the
             movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must present
             affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly
             supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 481.

Phelps v. Bluegrass Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 630 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Ky. 2021) (citing

Ryan v. Fast Lane, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 787, 789-90 (Ky. App. 2012)) (alterations and

error in original). Our appellate review involves only issues of law; thus, our

review is de novo. Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Soc., Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901,

905 (Ky. 2013).

                                        -12-
   I.    Notice-Prejudice Rule

             The notice-prejudice rule allows insurance companies to avoid

adjusting or defending otherwise covered claims on liability, occurrence policies if

an insured does not promptly notice the insurance company of a covered

occurrence and the insurance company demonstrates that it was prejudiced by the

untimely notice. The rule was adopted in Jones v. Bituminous Casualty

Corporation, 821 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1991). There, a claimant of a mining accident

waited six and one-half months to notice the incident to the insurer of a

commercial, general liability policy. Id. at 799-800. The policy required prompt

notice of every “occurrence,” the latter being defined as “an accident, including

continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful

conditions.” Id. at 800. Judgment was granted in favor of the insurer on the

prompt notice provision due to the six and one-half months before the occurrence

was reported.

             On appeal, our Supreme Court rejected Kentucky’s established

jurisprudence that “‘prompt notice’ requirements are strictly a matter of contract

law, and, as such, ‘a condition precedent to recovery on the policy.’” Id. at 800

(citations omitted). Instead, our highest Court added a requirement that liability

insurers under occurrence policies who have “prompt notice” provisions must

demonstrate that they were prejudiced by insureds’ failures to notice occurrences

                                        -13-
promptly. But see Kentucky State Univ. v. Darwin Nat’l Assurance Co., 677

S.W.3d 294 (Ky. 2023) (rejecting the notice-prejudice rule in certain claims-made-

and-reported liability policies). Furthermore, that Court ruled that the burden of

proving “some substantial prejudice” rests upon the insurance company:

              We view the question of prejudice in terms of whether it
              is reasonably probable that the insurance carrier suffered
              substantial prejudice from the delay in notice. If the
              evidence on this issue is in conflict, or if reasonable
              minds could differ as to what the evidence proves in this
              regard, the issue is one for the trier of fact. The issue is
              ripe for summary judgment only where the proof is
              conclusive, or there has been a failure of proof, on this
              subject.

Id. at 803.

   II.    The date of the notice

              Waller’s principal argument is that she was not required to give State

Auto notice of the loss until she was aware that her claim exceeded her deductible.

Waller’s argument relies on one use of the phrase “covered occurrence” in the

Jones opinion, extrapolating from that phrase that “[a] covered occurrence means

an occurrence for which the insured can obtain benefits in excess of a deductible.”

Appellant’s Brf. at 14. Jones, however, provides no such support for this

interpretation.

              The Jones Court used the phrase “covered occurrence” while it was

discussing one of the four “major features” of insurance law in Kentucky that made

                                          -14-
it unreasonable to decline to require insurers to prove they were prejudiced by

untimely notice. That Court noted that these standard, form insurance policies are

contracts of adhesion that afford a customer no “realistic opportunity to bargain.”

821 S.W.2d at 801. Ambiguous terms in a contract of adhesion must be construed

liberally to resolve all doubts in favor of the insured. Id. The Court noted that

“prompt notice” in this contract of adhesion had neither a clear meaning nor strong

parameters. Accordingly,

              [a] strict forfeiture interpretation of the prompt notice
              requirement excludes from the equation both the reasons
              why the insured failed to give prompt notice, such as
              whether a layman would realize that there was a covered
              occurrence, and the question whether the insurance
              carrier suffered any substantial prejudice from the delay.

Id. at 802.

              Waller’s interpretation of “covered occurrence” as a loss that exceeds

the deductible is not to be found in this citation to Jones. Such interpretation is

potentially too broad, as insurance contracts vary by their terms. “Every insurance

contract shall be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as

set forth in the policy . . . .” KRS 304.14-360. Pursuant to contract law principles,

“a court will interpret the contract’s terms by assigning language its ordinary

meaning and without resort to extrinsic evidence” and enforce the contract strictly

according to its terms in the absence of ambiguity in the written instrument. Frear

v. P.T.A. Indus., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 106 (Ky. 2003) (citing Hoheimer v.

                                         -15-
Hoheimer, 30 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Ky. 2000)). Ambiguity exists “‘if a reasonable

person would find it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations.’” Wehr

Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 384 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Ky. 2013)

(quoting Hazard Coal Corp. v. Knight, 325 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Ky. 2010)). Any

“[a]mbiguity is generally resolved in favor of the insured.” Kentucky State

University, 677 S.W.3d at 301 (citing Thomas v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,

626 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Ky. 2021)). But “[w]hen ‘the terms of an insurance policy

are clear and unambiguous, the policy will be enforced as written.’” Kentucky

State Univ., 677 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Kemper Nat’l Ins. Cos. v. Heaven Hill

Distilleries, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 869, 873 (Ky. 2002)).

             Here, Waller’s insurance contract did not require notice of a loss only

after that loss exceeded the deductible. The relevant, notice provision reads as

follows:

             B. Duties After Loss

             In case of a loss to covered property, we have no duty to
             provide coverage under this policy if the failure to
             comply with the following duties is prejudicial to us.
             These duties must be performed either by you, an
             “insured” seeking coverage, or a representative of either:

             1. Give prompt notice to us or our agent . . . .

                                         -16-
              The relevant deductible provision states: “subject to the policy limits

that apply, we will pay only that part of the total of all loss payable under Section I

that exceeds the deductible amount shown in the Declarations.”

              Together, this insurance contract requires an insured to notice the

insurer once there is a loss. Separately, the insurer has a duty to pay the total of all

loss that exceeds the deductible. In other words, the deductible controls the

amount to be paid by the insurer to the insured on a covered loss; the deductible

does not control whether and when there is a loss. Thus, Waller’s argument that

she was not required to notice a loss until the loss exceeded the deductible must

fail. See Hartford Fin. Serv’s Grp., Inc. v. Cleveland Pub. Library, 168 F. App’x

26 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting argument that a “loss” has not occurred “until the

damage to its property exceeded the amount it would have to pay as a

deductible”).5

              Waller alternatively argues that if she was required to “notice” State

Auto, she complied with the provision in 2018.6 She notes that the 2019-e-mail

from Reilmann, State Auto’s adjuster on her 2019 claim stated, “I understand you

called in a claim last year, and it did not get entered.” This argument ostensibly

5
 See Sixth Circuit Rule 32.1(a) permitting citation of any unpublished opinion, in contravention
of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32.1(a).
6
 Much like the record evidence regarding the timing of the notice of loss, Waller’s arguments on
appeal are a moving target, sometimes claiming the notice occurred in 2018, sometimes in 2019,
and sometimes in 2020.

                                              -17-
separately defines “notice” and “claim.” Interestingly, State Auto’s brief uses

“notice” and “claim” almost interchangeably.

             As insurance contracts vary according to their terms, though, we must

analyze the contract to determine whether “notice” and “claim” are synonymous.

Here, the instant, insurance contract’s “notice” provision does not require that a

“claim” be made, but only mandates that the insured “[g]ive prompt notice to us or

our agent” of a loss. Neither “notice” nor “claim” is a term in the definitions

section of the insurance contract. The two terms are not wholly synonymous,

either, as a notice is an action that may occur before a claim is initiated. See, e.g.,

Jones, 821 S.W.2d at 800 (“The insurance carrier, Bituminous Casualty, first

became aware of the occurrence through a letter sent to Partin by Jones’ attorney,

dated August 20, 1988, with a copy to Partin’s insurance agent, Energy Insurance

Agency, advising Jones intended to pursue a claim. This agency in turn reported

the potential claim to Bituminous Casualty on August 24, 1988.”).

             It is noteworthy that State Auto, the drafter of the instant, insurance

contract, used both “notice” and “claim” in different contexts throughout the

contract. It even used “notice” at other times in this same, “prompt notice” section,

i.e., an insured has a duty to [n]otify the police in case of loss by theft,” and

“[n]otify the credit card or electronic fund transfer card or access device company

                                          -18-
in case of loss . . . .” Neither of those uses equates “notify” to filing a claim with

the insurance company.

             The contract contains the term “claim,” on the other hand, just a few

paragraphs below the “notice” provision regarding an insured’s duty to provide

“[e]vidence or affidavit that supports a claim under E. 6. . . .” This use of “claim”

indicates the insured has taken further steps beyond the notice provision. And,

more on point, a later provision in the contract differentiates the two terms:

             e. You may disregard the replacement cost loss
             settlement provisions and make claim under this policy
             for loss to buildings on an actual cash value basis. You
             may then make claim for any additional liability
             according to the provisions of this Condition C. Loss
             Settlement, provided you notify us of your intent to do so
             within 180 days after the date of loss.

             This provision explicitly differentiates “notices” and “claims,” making

them separate and distinct actions to be undertaken by the insured, who can “make

claim,” but only if first “notify[ing] us of your intent to do so[.]” Additionally, the

two words differ in meaning as the requisite notice to be provided under this

section has a time limitation, but the filing of the claim does not. Thus, it appears

“notice” and “claim” are separate terms and actions, and the contract required the

insured to notify State Auto or its agent of a loss prior to the formal initiation of a

claim. See also Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Darwin Select Ins. Co., 664 S.W.3d 509,

515 (Ky. 2022) (“did not constitute notification of circumstances that might give

                                          -19-
rise to a claim”); Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass’n v. Witte, 406 S.W.2d

145 (Ky. 1966) (“‘The purpose of a provision for notice and proof of loss is to

allow the insurer to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and liabilities, to

afford it an opportunity for investigation, and to prevent fraud and imposition upon

it.’”) (quoting 29A Am. Jur. 490 (Insurance, s 1374), Couch on Insurance (2d), s

49.373 (Vol. 14, p. 15), and O’Reilly v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 60 N.Y. 169,

19 Am.Rp. 151 (1875)). Moreover, to the extent, if any, that “notice” and “claim”

are ambiguous in this insurance contract, we generally resolve any ambiguities in

favor of the insured to provide coverage for the insured under a reasonable

interpretation of the ambiguous clauses. See Ashland, 664 S.W.3d at 516

(summarizing Kentucky’s insurance contract interpretation jurisprudence). But see

Keathley v. Grange Ins. Co. of Michigan, 803 F. App’x 907, 911 (6th Cir. 2020)

(unpublished) (while interpreting Michigan law, the majority held that an insured’s

phone call notice to an insurance agent with explicit instructions to avoid filing a

claim was an insufficient action to constitute notice of a loss). Compare with

Keathley, 803 F. App’x at 913-15 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting

part) (concluding that the same type of notice as in Keathley did comply with the

notice of a loss provision because the provision was ambiguous, and Michigan law

required the ambiguity to be construed in favor of the insured).

                                          -20-
              This discussion of “notice” versus “claim” brings us to the question of

the appropriateness of summary judgment on the notice issue here. As we have

noted previously:

              while the meaning of words in an insurance contract is a
              question of law, whether the conduct of the policyholder
              meets the definition of those words is a question of fact
              for the jury. Anderson v. National Sec. Fire and Cas.
              Co., 870 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Ky. App. 1993). Further, if
              there is evidence from which different inferences may be
              drawn, then the inference to be drawn is for the jury to
              determine. Id.

Marshall v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Company, 618 S.W.3d 499, 502 (Ky.

App. 2020).

              Here, the insurance contract required Waller to notice State Auto

promptly of a loss. The parties provided conflicting evidence regarding the timing

and manner by which Waller noticed State Auto of the loss, and a factfinder could

determine notice occurred under any of three dates. First, a factfinder could

determine that Waller provided notice of the loss to State Auto in 2018. The

Reilmann e-mail shows that Waller may have notified State Auto of the 2018

incident in 2018. However, Waller, in her deposition, averred that she did not

know if she called her agent and noticed the loss in 2018. She did recall that she

did not make a claim at that time because she did not believe the damage exceeded

her deductible. That evidence is supported by Heeke’s affidavit, which states that

Waller did not “report a claim” to her insurance agency for the 2018 loss.

                                         -21-
               Next, a factfinder could determine that Waller gave notice to State

Auto in 2019 of the 2018 loss. The Reilmann e-mail also provides evidence of this

2019 notice.7 The Heeke affidavit further supports that conclusion, as it states that

Waller informed her insurance agent about the 2018 damage in 2019, but Waller

“never requested Hyland to formally present any such claim to State Auto.”

               Finally, a factfinder could determine that Waller provided notice to

State Auto in 2020 of the 2018 loss. Indeed, Waller’s attorney’s e-mail affirms

that she definitively notified them of the 2018 incident as of June 22, 2020.

               Accordingly, a material issue of fact remains regarding the date that

notice occurred. Phoenix American Adm’rs, LLC v. Lee, 670 S.W.3d 832, 840

(Ky. 2023) (“Because a factual dispute existed as to when Lee first notified

Phoenix that his Kia was totaled, the [Court of Appeals] held that summary

judgment was improper. We agree.”). Remand is necessary for a factfinder to

determine the date that State Auto was noticed of the 2018 incident. Id. A factual

finding on the timing of the notice is an essential pre-requisite to determining

whether the notice was “prompt” pursuant to the contract’s terms. See, e.g., Jones,

821 S.W.2d at 800 (six and a half months’ delay not prompt); Falls City Plumbing

Supply Co. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 193 Ky. 734, 237 S.W. 376, 378 (1922) (“[T]he

7
 Interestingly, State Auto seemingly concedes that notice might have been given by at least this
point in time, as it argues in its brief that it was under no obligation to investigate the loss in
2019 because no claim was made at that time. Appellee’s Brf. at 4-5.

                                               -22-
question whether the notice was given within a reasonable time is one for the

jury.”). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for factual findings on this issue.

             We address the remaining issues to the extent that they may be

relevant to the issues presented on remand.

   III.   Discovery rule -- insidious onset

             Waller alternatively argues that her notice in June of 2020 was timely

because the damages allegedly occurred by insidious onset. Waller’s argument is

based on her belief that the discovery rule should apply to the later-discovered,

interior damage to her home. “The discovery rule allows for an action to accrue

when the plaintiff discovers (or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have

discovered) the injury.” Bridgefield Cas. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Yamaha Motor Mfg.

Corp. of America, 385 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Ky. App. 2012) (citing Fluke Corp. v.

LeMaster, 306 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Ky. 2010)). The discovery rule is not available in

all circumstances; instead, it is “available only in cases where the fact of injury or

offending instrumentality is not immediately evident or discoverable with the

exercise of reasonable diligence[.]” LeMaster, 306 S.W.3d at 60. While we do not

hold that the discovery rule applies in homeowner’s liability, insurance contracts,

we can dismiss this claim because, arguendo, the circumstances presented here

would not sustain an invocation of the discovery rule.

                                         -23-
             In the instant case, a large tree fell on Waller’s house in 2018. The

facts viewed in a light most favorable to Waller show that the injury to her home

could have been discovered immediately through the exercise of reasonable

diligence, or, at worst, at least by 2019. Moreover, Waller was abundantly aware

of the need to inspect her roof in 2018 based solely on the large tree limbs laying

across her roof. The evidence even demonstrates that she may have noticed her

insurance agent at the time, although she did not make a formal claim, providing

evidence that Waller was, indeed, aware of the damage to her home.

             And, in 2019, while addressing a different tree falling on her roof,

State Auto affirmatively apprised Waller of the need to make a claim on the 2018

tree fall. Thus, State Auto provided evidence that the alleged damage from the

2018 tree fall was or should have been reasonably apparent by at least the time of

the 2019 inspection. In fact, Waller’s own roofer in 2020 looked at the photos

from 2018 and 2019 and determined the cause must have been the 2018 incident.

Her roofer, Colvin, swore an affidavit that states in relevant part:

             5. I have seen a photograph dated 04/10/19 attached
             hereto as Exhibit B which I understand was taken by a
             State Auto adjuster when visiting the home of Terri
             Waller at that time. In my opinion, the places on the roof
             which are indicated on this photograph are the same
             places where I found damage to the roof when I
             inspected the home in 05/2020.

             ....

                                         -24-
             9. The photograph attached hereto as Exhibit C is a
             photograph of the top of the roof taken by State Auto on
             04/10/19 which based on reasonable roofing probability
             shows damage caused when the tree fell on the roof on
             06/28/18. State Auto indicates that this damage was not
             significant, but the damage is significant and caused
             leaks which contributed to the interior damage to the
             home.

             Even if Waller did not realize the existence or extent of the interior

damage until much later, this discovery does not alter Waller’s knowledge both

that the tree fell on her house in 2018 and that such an incident could result in

damage to her house. She could have made her claim then, or at least by 2019.

She did neither, instead waiting another year, which is almost two years after the

incident, before making a claim with State Auto. Accordingly, without deciding

whether the discovery rule should apply in cases such as these, arguendo, its

application to the instant case affords Waller no quarter. The evidence shows that

she should have discovered the “fact of injury or offending instrumentality”

through the exercise of reasonable diligence initially in 2018, again in 2019, and, at

the latest, May of 2020. LeMaster, supra. Thus, assuming Waller first provided

actual notice on June 22, 2020, as her counsel claims, she would be afforded no

relief under the discovery rule.

   IV.    Reconsideration of previous motion for summary judgment

             Waller summarily argues that it was improper for State Auto to file its

second motion for summary judgment in this case because State Auto was relying

                                         -25-
on only one additional affidavit. Waller relies on obiter dicta from Moore v.

Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 470, 496 (Ky. 2011), admonishing the bar to stop

“badgering the court” with “multiple vexatious motions to reconsider” its previous

interlocutory rulings prior to entry of a judgment. Here, State Auto engaged in

additional discovery and filed a second motion for summary judgment, both of

which are wholly appropriate pre-trial steps. State Auto was not “like the famed

importunate widow of Holy Writ” attempting to “‘wear out’ the court by [its]

continual coming[.]” Burton v. Tartar, 385 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Ky. 1964). The

Circuit Court properly rejected this claim.

    V.     Estoppel

              Waller also argues that State Auto should be estopped from asserting

the notice-prejudice defense because State Auto was on notice of a loss by at least

2019 and elected not to investigate. As we are remanding for a factual finding on

the date that Waller provided notice to State Auto,8 resolution of the estoppel issue

is premature.

8
  For example, Reilmann’s e-mail does indicate that Waller noticed her agent in 2018 or 2019 of
the 2018 loss. However, we do not know Reilmann’s source for this information. Was he
simply reiterating what Waller had informed him? Was his e-mail based on facts derived from
State Auto or its agents? A genuine issue of material fact remains as to the manner and timing of
any notice to State Auto of the loss. Depending on the future fact-finding of the notice date,
Waller may have a viable, equitable estoppel claim if State Auto was on notice and chose not to
investigate the claim.

                                              -26-
   VI.    Prejudice

             Finally, we must briefly discuss whether State Auto has demonstrated

that it was substantially prejudiced by any delay in notice per the notice-prejudice

rule. Pursuant to the rule, once it is shown that a prompt notice provision has been

breached, the burden is on the insurer to demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the

breach. Jones v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 821 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Ky. 1991). The

insurer must show “substantial prejudice from the delay in notice. If the evidence

on this issue is in conflict, or if reasonable minds could differ as to what the

evidence proves in this regard, the issue is one for the trier of fact.” Id.

             On remand, the question whether State Auto suffered prejudice may

also constitute a fact issue, depending upon the date that the factfinder determines

notice was given to State Auto of the loss. If the factfinder determines Waller

promptly noticed State Auto, then there is no need for a prejudice inquiry because

there was no delay. If, however, the factfinder decides that Waller did not

promptly provide notice, State Auto may be able to demonstrate that it was

substantially prejudiced if the damage, which sat unrepaired for one or two years,

became more extensive than in 2018 or 2019. We note that Waller’s own expert

admitted in his affidavit that the damage in 2020 was worse than in 2019.

Accordingly, on remand the question of prejudice may be a nullity, a fact issue, or

an issue ripe for summary judgment.

                                          -27-
   VII. Bad faith

             The parties also disagree as to whether the Circuit Court properly

granted summary judgment on Waller’s bad faith claims. State Auto claims that

no statutory or common law bad faith claim can be sustained because State Auto

either had no contractual duty to pay or, alternatively, had a “fairly debatable”

dispute over the factual or legal basis for the claim. As we are reversing and

remanding for further proceedings as to the date on which notice was given, these

defenses are not yet ripe for adjudication. Thus, we likewise reverse and remand

for further proceedings on the bad faith claims.

                                  CONCLUSION

             There exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding the timing of

State Auto’s notice of the 2018 loss. Whether that notice was prompt, and if not,

whether State Auto was prejudiced by a failure to receive prompt notice, are

questions that remain open until a factfinder determines the date State Auto was

notified of the loss. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings

as set forth in this opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -28-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Eric M. Lamb             Perry A. Adanick
Louisville, Kentucky     Carmen C. Sarge
                         Louisville, Kentucky

                       -29-