Court Opinion

ID: 9763236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:39:28.724412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:31.656879
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.
¶ 1 I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating appellant’s two drug charges. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s disposition of the sentencing issue.
¶ 2 First, appellant did not raise a substantial question in order to enable our review. In order to raise a substantial question for review, Rule 2119(f) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure requires appellant’s concise statement of reasons for an allowance of appeal to specify “[1] where the sentence falls in relation to the sentencing guidelines ... [2] what particular provision of the Code is violated ... [3] what fundamental norm the sentence violates ... and [4] the manner in which it violates that norm.” Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa.Super.2000). See also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).
*1052¶ 3 The majority states appellant argued that his sentence was contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process, and therefore raises a substantial question. I cannot agree. Specifically, appellant’s statement does not indicate the provisions of the code the sentencing court violated, nor does it indicate the fundamental norms that the trial court purportedly violated. While appellant states that his sentence was above the aggravated range, and contends that the trial court improperly considered various, factors,, the statement does not indicate the violation of either a fundamental norm or of the sentencing code. And, while appellant argues that the trial court improperly considered and weighed certain factors in arriving at the final sentence, this does not raise a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 9 (Pa.Super.2002).
¶ 4 Second, even were I to find a substantial question, I cannot agree that appellant’s sentence constituted an abuse of discretion. As the majority stated, the sentencing code requires the trial court to consider the protection of the public, the gravity, of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721. Here, the trial judge considered the protection of the public (stating “both [locations of the crimes] are very low income neighborhoods” N.T. 5/21/01, at 10.); the gravity of the offense (stating “I also note there was a substantial amount of money recovered ... surveillance indicated he was giving out bundles ... and [was] not just a street level dealer, who I think are very, very serious offenders” N.T. 5/21/01, at 11.); and the individual needs of appellant (stating “then we have an additional circumstance where within a couple of months and within one half block of where he was arrested the first time, he’s arrested the second time ... and in addition to that, he was a fugitive and fled” N.T. 5/21/01, at 11.). Furthermore, the court also had before it, and considered, the pre-sentence report. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, at 8 (noting that our Supreme Court has ruled that where pre-sentence reports .exist, the presumption will stand that the sentencing judge was both aware of and appropriately weighed all relevant information contained therein).
¶ 5 Finally, the majority discusses our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 2004 WL 2086298 (Pa.Super.), for the proposition that re-sentencing is required. Whitmore, however, involved the double-counting of a prior conviction in addition to a lack of an individualized sentence tailored to the attendant facts of appellant’s case. Id. at 5. Unlike Whit-more, double-counting was not in issue here; and, unlike Whitmore, appellant’s sentence in the instant matter was clearly tailored to his individual circumstances.
¶ 6 Thus, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.