Court Opinion

ID: 9776583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:39:31.276568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:15.387428
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In five points, appellee N_ D_ R_asserts we erred in our original opinion. In the second of these points she argues that in reversing and dismissing the entire cause, we failed to distinguish between the separate jurisdictional bases for orders concerning custody, visitation, child support, and visitation expenses. We will now discuss those matters.
It is settled that a “custody determination” is a status adjudication not dependent upon personal jurisdiction over the parents. Henry v. Rivera, 783 S.W.2d 766, 769 n. 2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ); Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, no writ); see also, Cunningham v. Cunningham, 719 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ dism’d). A “custody determination” is defined as an order or judgment, etc., which provides for the custody or visitation of a child, (emphasis added). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(b)(3) (West Supp.1990). It logically follows, then, that determinations of both custody and visitation require subject matter jurisdiction. We remain convinced that Minnesota has jurisdiction to determine both custody and visitation issues.
However, a claim for child support is closely analogous to a claim for debt in that it seeks a personal judgment establishing a direct obligation to pay money. Per*299ry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d at 312-13. That being so, personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is necessary to the validity of such an order. Id.
In relation to visitation expenses, appellee argues that Hilt v. Kirkpatrick, 538 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1976, no writ), inferentially holds that personal jurisdiction over a non-resident is not essential to the validity of an order requiring the payment of such expenses. We disagree. Not only was the Hilt case decided before the passage of the PKPA, which, we think, might well require a different outcome, but, upon close examination, it becomes obvious that the instant question was neither presented to nor considered by that court. Of the cases that cite and even follow Hilt, none do so for the purpose of holding that allocation of visitation expenses requires status adjudication. See Creavin v. Moloney, 773 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied); Perry v. Ponder, supra; Crockett v. Crockett, 589 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Thornlow v. Thornlow, 576 S.W.2d 697 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1979, writ dism’d), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949, 100 S.Ct. 1596, 63 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980); Butler v. Butler, 577 S.W.2d 501 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1978, writ dism’d).
We believe that visitation expenses are also more akin to a personal obligation or debt that a valid order requires personal rather than status jurisdiction. See Hemingway v. Robertson, 778 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ), and Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1977, no writ). Thus, if the trial court here had personal jurisdiction over appellant, that portion of its orders pertaining to support and visitation expenses would be valid.
In Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.1975), the Court adopted a two-pronged test for acquiring personal jurisdiction over a non-resident. That test requires (1) a statute which authorizes the acquisition of jurisdiction in the manner used and (2) sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state relevant to the cause of action to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 366.
Pursuant to Texas Family Code Annotated § 11.051 (Vernon 1986), a court can exercise personal jurisdiction in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship over the non-resident parent if certain procedural prerequisites are met. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a permits a special appearance for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over a party on the ground that such party is not amenable to process issued by the court. The rule also provides that any appearance not complying with it is a general appearance. Appellant has attempted to enter such a limited appearance contesting the jurisdiction of the trial court.
In part A of her third point in this motion for rehearing, appellee points out that in his appearance, appellant raised the question of subject matter jurisdiction as well as that of personal jurisdiction. The effect of doing so, she urges, was to waive appellant’s right of special appearance thereby investing the trial court with in personam jurisdiction over him. We agree.
The initial challenge made by appellant was to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. As this Court explicated in Ex parte Bowers, 671 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1984, no writ), a court’s jurisdiction consists of two elements: (1) jurisdiction of the subject matter and (2) jurisdiction of the person. The first element is established by operation of law through the constitutional and statutory provisions that enumerate the kinds of cases the courts can entertain. The second element is established either by a litigant’s voluntary entry into the court or by the serving of process on the litigant in accordance with state procedures consistent with due process. Id. It is the second element which is within the purview of the limited appearance contemplated by Rule 120a(l). See Botello v. Salazar, 745 S.W.2d 540, 541 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
*300In Perry v. Ponder, supra, the court, while recognizing that subject matter contentions cannot properly be raised by a special appearance, suggested:
Rule 120a permits them (subject matter questions) to be asserted alternatively without making a general appearance, like a defense on the merits, after the plea of lack of personal jurisdiction has been overruled.
604 S.W.2d at 323. In his pleading in this case, appellant’s initial attack was upon the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. He made no attempt to plead it in the alternative in the manner suggested by the Perry court. By failing to do so, appellant made a general appearance and subjected himself to the in personam jurisdiction of the trial court.
Accordingly, appellee’s second point and part A of her third point are sustained. We remain convinced that our original disposition of the case was otherwise correct and overrule the remainder of her points. Accordingly, that portion of the trial court’s judgment modifying child support and visitation expenses is affirmed. The remainder of its judgment is reversed and the cause is dismissed as to those matters.
Costs are assessed equally between appellant and appellee. Tex.R.App.P. 89.