Court Opinion

ID: 9827127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:11:38.674718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:23.967043
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[3] Upon further consideration of this case, we are of the opinion that we were in error in holding that appellants were chargeable with constructive notice of what the sheriff’s return would show. The abstracting of the judgment did no more than to fix a lien upon the property as provided in the statute. That lien had not been foreclosed, and when the county records were examined, they would not have disclosed any sale of the property by deed made for the same. There is no law which makes the papers in a case in court constructive notice, except where specially provided for, such, for instance, as a lis pendens notice. And that acquires its vitality and force as a notice by reason of a compliance with the registration laws by filing it for record in the office of the county clerk. So Leonard was in the attitude of any other person holding an unrecorded deed who stands by and sees his property sold to some one else.
[4, 5] The tenancy of Gray would not protect him because he simply remained in possession after Leonard bought the property, and neither he, Leonard, nor any other person, so far as the record shows, said anything about the change of ownership. Furthermore, Leonard, while he paid $195, obtained a credit on a judgment which was against him, as well as against Gray et al. lie knew that the mortgage was being foreclosed, represented Gray in that suit, and approved the judgment which stated that “said lien and said mortgage as it existed on the 15th day of August, 1913, is still in full force and effect.” Knowing this and all the facts, and that he held a deed to the property, which he had not recorded, Leonard maintained silence.
“The general rule is that a person who stands by at a judicial sale when his property is being sold as the property of a third person, and makes no objection, but permits purchasers to buy the same, believing that the property belonged to such third person, will be estopped from claiming the property against such purchaser.” Gregmoore v. Gilmour, 159 Mo. App. 215, 140 S. W. 765.
Leonard did all this. He' said he had intended to enjoin the sale, but decided to give notice at the time the sale was ma'de, but was out of the city. Mr. Bigelow, in his work on Estoppel (6th Ed.) p. 051, says:
“If a man knowingly, though passively, by looking on suffers another to purchase land for valuable consideration under an erroneous impression of title, without making known his claim, he will not be permitted thereafter to exorcise his legal right against such person.”
Practically to the same effect is the language used ■ in 16 Cyc. p. 762, where it is said:
*783“An owner of property who stands by and sees a third person selling or mortgaging it under claim of title without asserting his own title or giving the purchaser or mortgagee any notice thereof is estopped, as against such purchaser or mortgagee, from afterward asserting his title”
—'and in support thereof is cited Hardeman v. Maud, 78 Tex. 84, 14 S. W. 287; Stanley v. Epperson, 45 Tex. 644; Luter v. Rose, 20 Tex. 639; Moore v. Tarrant County Association, 31 S. W. 709.
So we think that, under all the circumstances, Leonard is clearly estopped to assert his title as against appellants, and, so viewing the case, the motion for rehearing is granted, the judgment of affirmance, as well as the judgment rendered by the trial court, is set aside, and judgment is here rendered that appellee recover nothing against appellants, and that all costs in this court and the court below he adjudged against appel-lee.
Reversed and rendered.