Court Opinion

ID: 9833795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:02:05.735748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:06.836825
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
The disposition made of this appeal under appellant’s motion for rehearing, predicated on the judgment of the trial court sus*112taining appellee’s special exceptions Nos. 1 and 9 to appellant’s original petition, is challenged by appellee’s motion on the ground that appellant did not plead the facts presenting the issue of ratification of the original contract made by appellee with one J. B. Williams as the contract of employment between appellant and appellee so as to make same a part of the cause of action pleaded by it; the allegations in reference thereto being only contained in appellant’s first supplemental petition. Prom a careful examination of the pleadings, it is manifest that appellee’s contention in this respect is correct. Therefore, we were in error in - basing bur holding on the facts of ratification as pleaded by appellant in its first supplemental petition. Pacts alleged in a supplemental petition cannot be considered or taken into account in aid of the allegations contained in an original petition or an amendment thereto, the office of a supplemental petition being to present exceptions to defendant’s answer, and to reply to new matters alleged therein, and not to supply any defects in or make additions to the original petition; that being the office of an amendment. Glenn v. Dallas County Board of Levee Improvement District, 114 Tex. 325, 268 S. W. 452; Mann et al. v. Trinity Farm Co. et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 270 S. W. 923; Burger v. Ray (Tex. Civ. App.) 239 S. W. 257; Jones v. Davis Motor Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 224 S. W. 701; Creosoted Wood Block Paving Co. v. Mackay (Tex. Civ. App.) 234 S. W. 587; Crescent Ins. Co. v. W. R. Camp et al., 64 Tex. 521; Lynch v. Ortlieb et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 28 S. W. 1017; Blewitt v. Greene, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 588, 122 S. W. 915; Burks v. Burks (Tex. Civ. App,) 141 S. W. 337; May v. Anthony (Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 337; May v. Anthony (Tex. Civ. App.) 151 S. W. 602; Kiehn v. Willmann (Tex. Civ. App.) 218 S. W. 15; Sanger Bros. v. Barrett (Tex. Civ. App.) 221 S. W. 1087.
This error we acknowledge, but at the same time feel constrained to say that it was at least in a measure due to the way in which" the case was presented to this court, and there being no occasion prior to the filing of appellee’s motion to make a critical examination of appellant’s pleading to ascertain the allegations by which appellant’s cause of action could alone be sustained. However, in the careful examination given the pleadings, we found the following allegations, which had altogether theretofore been overlooked, contained in appellant’s original petition, namely:
“Plaintiff further shows that the defendant, by virtue of said contract, has been, in plaintiff’s employ since March, 1924, the defendant working for plaintiff under the terms and provisions of said contract, and plaintiff paying the defendant regularly wages and salaries of not less than $14 per week until on or about March 22,1927, when the defendant ceased to work for plaintiff without giving plaintiff the 15 days’ written notice, as provided in said agreement, and without plaintiff violating in any way the terms of said agreement.”
These allegations undoubtedly rendered the petition impervious to said special exceptions as well as to a general demurrer, for the effect of its language was to allege that appellee remained in appellant’s employ from March, 1924, to March 22, 1927, by virtue of said contract, worked for appellant during said time under the terms and provisions of said contract, and appellant paid appellee his wages and salaries according to the terms thereof. Certainly this could not be true unless said original contract had in some way become the contract between appellant and appellee so that the terms thereof became equally binding upon them as the same were upon the original parties thereto. By this holding we do not wish to be understood as saying that this allegation would not be subject to special exceptions requiring more definite and accurate allegations in reference to the facts constituting the ratification and perhaps even as to the adoption by appellant and appellee of said contract.
Appellant’s petition, by reason of the above allegations, not being subject to the special exceptions Nos. 1 and 9, sustained by the trial court, appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.