Court Opinion

ID: 9762952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:34:20.552677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:38.742690
License: Public Domain

LARSEN,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe this suit presents two questions: Is Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 317 the law in Texas, and if so, do the facts here create a genuine question as to whether § 317 apples? I conclude that our Texas Supreme Court has twice specifically recognized § 317 as our law. So should we. I would also find plaintiffs present fact questions for resolution here, and remand the case for further proceedings.

RESTATEMENT

The majority has correctly recited Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 317. In concluding that this is not the recognized law of this state, however, I think the majority has missed certain unequivocal language used by the Supreme Court in two separate cases. In Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay, *211466 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Tex.1971), the Court found a duty existed under § 317:
[I]f and when the partnership received information from which it knew or should have known that there might be a need to take action, it was under a duty to use reasonable means at its disposal to prevent any partner or employee from improperly using his position with the Clinic to work a tortious invasion of legally protected family interests. This duty relates only to conduct of a partner or employee on the premises of the Clinic or while purportedly acting as a representative of the Clinic elsewhere. Failure to exercise ordinary care in discharging that duty would subject the Clinic to liability for damages proximately caused by its negligence. Id. at 720, citing Restatement, Second, Torts, § 317. [Emphasis added.]
The Court recognized § 317 even more directly in Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.1983). Both the majority and “dissent in that case specifically acknowledge that § 317 is the law in this jurisdiction. Justice Kilgarlin’s majority opinion states:
[C]ertain relationships do impose, as a matter of law, certain duties upon parties. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) Secs. 316-20. For instance, the master-servant relationship may give rise to a duty on the part of the master to control the conduct of his servants outside the scope of employment. This duty, however, is a narrow one. Ordinarily, the employer is liable only for the off-duty torts of his employees which are committed on the employer’s premises or with the employer’s chattels. Restatement (Second) Sec. 317. Otis Engineering Corp., 668 S.W.2d at 309.
And Justice McGee’s dissent states in even more certain terms:
Texas courts have recognized limited instances in which an employer may be held liable for a failure to control his servants when acting outside the course and scope of their employment. One exception concerns off-duty employees who are either on the master’s premises or using a chattel owned by the master. Otis Engineering Carp., 668 S.W.2d at 313 (McGee, J. dissenting), citing Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay, 466 S.W.2d 716, 720 (Tex.1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 317 (1965).
The majority goes astray, I believe, in focusing on Justice Kilgarlin’s formulation of duty under the exact facts of the Otis case. That formulation actually owes more to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319, concerning those who take affirmative action towards one in need, than it does to the employer’s duty formulated under § 317. In focusing on that language exclusively, the majority ignores the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of § 317 as authority in this state.
Similarly in a case relied upon by the majority, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, while finding the employer not liable, impliedly accepted that § 317 was settled law. Pinkham v. Apple Computer, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). There, the question of whether the employee was on the employer’s premises when he consumed copious amounts of alcohol was never asserted as a theory of liability. That the employer furnished the beer (although not the tequila nor marijuana) that the employee imbibed was analyzed instead under the “chattel” prong of § 317, the Court there finding:
Consumption of beer furnished by an employer at an employee party does not constitute use of the employer’s chattels which would subject the employer to liability for negligent use of the chattel by the employee. Appellants’ contention in this regard apparently is the same contention advanced which would establish a duty just because the employer furnished an alcoholic beverage. Pinkham, 699 S.W.2d at 391. [Emphasis added].
Thus, it appears to this writer that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 is the law in this state, and I would therefore hold that plaintiffs here have stated a cause of action against defendant’s employer, Guynes Printing Company.
Having so concluded, I would reach the second question posed by this appeal, whether plaintiffs have raised genuine issues of material fact under the duty imposed by the Restatement section. I would hold in the *212affirmative and remand for trial. Plaintiffs’ summary judgment proof raises questions on all elements of the cause of action. There was evidence, which if viewed in the light most favorable to nonmovants, indicates that the parking lot in which the beer drinking here took place was a common area under the control of Guynes, that Guynes had the ability to control the negligent employee at the relevant time, and that it knew or should have known of the necessity and opportunity for control. For example, there was evidence that after-work beer parties in the Guynes parking lot, if not a habitual occurrence, were at least common. There was evidence that at least one supervisor was at the print shop during the time the beer drinking was taking place in the parking lot. There was evidence that an employee with some supervisory duties was even a participant in the party on the afternoon in question. There was evidence that Guynes’ landlord had requested that Guynes put up signs regarding drinking on the premises, and Guynes did so, thus creating the inference that both knew drinking on-premises was a potential problem. This evidence, I would hold, creates material fact issues on the application of § 317 here which should be determined by the trier of facts. For these reasons, I dissent.