Court Opinion

ID: 9778463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:05:59.369464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:33.851072
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL H. SCHNEIDER, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur with majority’s ultimate disposition of this case. However, I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority opinion on two grounds.
First, I do not believe it is necessary to determine whether a professional association may revoke articles of dissolution in order to resolve the issues presented on appeal. Even if a professional association could take such action, as the majority holds, the central question in this case remains the same: Did Cassidy remain an employee of the Association, post-dissolution, to wind-up the Association’s affairs? 1 To answer this question, we need not construe the TPAA.
The Association contends we need to determine whether a professional association can revoke articles of dissolution because, if such action was proper, then the revocation of its articles of dissolution related back to the date of its dissolution, “and its existence [is] deemed to have continued without interruption.” See Tex. Bus. Com.Code Ann. art. 6.05(D) (Vernon Supp.1999). Consequently, it argues that, because it legally never ceased to exist, Cassidy remained an employee of the Association at all times.
As the majority correctly points out, even if we accepted this argument as true, it “does not mean that the Hospital was powerless to enforce the terms of the Agreement.” Once the Association dissolved, the Hospital was entitled to enforce the terms of the Agreement, irrespective of whether the Association could come back later and revoke its dissolution.2 Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s consideration of whether the TPAA permits a professional association to revoke articles of dissolution.
Second, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a professional association may revoke articles of dissolution. Even though section 20 of the TPAA3 does not *334expressly permit a professional association to revoke articles of dissolution, the majority holds that a professional association may take such action. The majority reaches its conclusion by construing section 25 of the TPAA in conjunction with article 6.05(D) of the Texas Business Corporations Act (“TBCA”), which allows a corporation to revoke articles of dissolution.4
Section 25 of the TPAA states that “[t]he Texas Business Corporation Act shall be applicable to professional associations, except to the extent that the provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act conflict with the provisions of this Act.” Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1528f, § 25 (Vernon 1997) (emphasis added). The majority reasons that section 25 of the TPAA indicates the legislature intended for the TBCA to fill in the gaps where the TPAA was silent. Based on this premise, and because there is no language in the TPAA specifically contradicting the language of article 6.05D of the TBCA, the majority finds no conflict between the two statutes. Therefore, it holds that a professional association may revoke articles of dissolution.
I believe a conflict exists between the two statutes. First, the TBCA specifically provides a corporation with the right to revoke articles of dissolution, while the TPAA is completely silent in this regard. The legislature intentionally gave Texas corporations this right, while not granting the same right to Texas professional associations. We presume that every word excluded from a statute must excluded for a purpose. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 585, 540 (Tex.1981). Moreover, we should not insert language into statutes except to give effect to clear legislative intent. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex.1981); Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex.1980). Here, there is no evidence the legislature intended to allow a professional association to revoke articles of dissolution. In fact, an examination of the post-dissolution legal status of a corporation versus a professional association reveals the contrary.
Section 20 of the TPAA provides that, following dissolution, the legal status of a professional association ceases “except for the purpose of suits, other proceedings and acts necessary for the winding up of the association. ” Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1528f, § 20 (Vernon 1997) (emphasis added). In comparison, a corporation’s legal status ceases “except as provided in Article 6.05 [Revocation of Voluntary Dissolution Proceedings] or Article 7.12 [Limited Survival After Dissolution] of this Act.” Tex. Bus. CoRP. Act Ann. art. 6.07(B) (emphasis added).
Clearly, the TPAA and the TBCA differ as to the legal effects of dissolution. Therefore, there is a conflict between the two statutes, and, under section 25 of the TPAA, the TPAA controls. See Tex.Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1528f, § 25. However, under the majority’s holding, such is not the case. In finding that a professional association may revoke articles of dissolution, the majority not only grants a right to professional associations not expressly provided by the legislature, but modifies section 20 of the TPAA by creating a *335judicial exception to the rule that the legal status of a professional association, following dissolution, ceases except to perform acts necessary to wind-up the dissolved entity’s affairs.
For these reasons, I believe a conflict exists between the TBCA and the TPAA. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s holding that a professional association may revoke articles of dissolution. I respectfully concur.

. I agree with the majority’s finding that the Hospital was not entitled to terminate the Agreement under section 3.1.

. In rejecting the Association’s contention that the revocation of its articles of dissolution related back to the date it dissolved, the majority recognizes that the question of whether a professional association may revoke articles of dissolution is not dispositive or necessary to decide the issues on appeal.

.Section 20 of the TPAA provides:
Upon issuance of the certificate of dissolution by the Secretary of State, the dissolu*334tion shall become effective and the existence of the association shall cease except for the purpose of suits, other proceedings and acts necessary for the winding up of the association.
Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1528f, § 20 (Vernon 1997).

. Article 6.05(D) provides, in pertinent part, that:
[U]pon the issuance by the Secretary of State of a certificate of revocation of disso-Iution, the revocation shall be effective, the existence of the corporation shall be deemed to have continued without interruption after the issuance by the Secretary of State of the certificate of dissolution, the corporation may carry on its business as though ... dissolution proceedings had not occurred.
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 6.05(D) (Vernon Supp.1999).