Court Opinion

ID: 9710288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:05:49.631103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.591215
License: Public Domain

OXBERGER, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I think that the appellant has sustained his burden of demonstrating an infringement of his constitutional rights. Clearly, an inmate’s constitutional freedoms are inhibited to the extent that the exercise of such freedoms is inconsistent with necessities of implementing penological objectives and enforcing prison security. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3198, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). In the facts of this case, however, the appellant’s exercise of his first amendment rights in no way threatened prison objectives or security.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the letter was a “communication” within the meaning of the prison rules. A “communication” is defined as “a deliberate interchange of thoughts or opinions between two or more persons.... ” Black’s Law Dictionary 253 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Similarly, Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines a “communication” as “an act or instance of transmitting ... a process by which information is exchanged between individuals _” Webster ⅛ New Collegiate Dictionary 225 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Prevost v. Morgenthau, 70 App.D.C. 306, 106 F.2d 330, 334 (D.C.D.C.1939); Gulf Oil Co. v. Harris, 425 P.2d 957, 962 (Okla.1967).
The appellant’s letter was never “communicated” because it was never delivered; thus, the letter was nothing more than a statement of thoughts in written form. Punishing such an exercise of first amendment freedoms when no resultant danger is posed seems to represent a retreat to the time when our prison systems were characterized as “a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362, 381 (E.D.Ark.1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.1971)).