Court Opinion

ID: 9807435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:04:24.103594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:36:54.619457
License: Public Domain

Byhum, J.
Concurring. The decision of this Court in Brown v. Pike, 74 N. C., 531, was earnestly called in question upon the argument. Since it was made, the legislature has once met and adjourned without regarding it as-of such injurious consequence as to call for its interference. The act of 1844, Bat. Rev., ch. 43, § 10, had never received a construction before Brown v. Pike, and has never been di*387rectly referred to in previous decisions. It has never been decided that a judgment against the administrator was not conclusive of assets against the sureties in an action against them, as is perfectly clear from Bond v. Billups, 8 Jones, 423, decided as late as June Term, 1862. For in that case the Court said: “ That the judgment against the administrator is conclusive, appears as well from that case (4 Hawks, 339) as from the recent one of Strickland v. Murphy, 7 Jones, 242. Whether it loas so as against the sureties, we need not inquire, as they are not parties to the record in the Superior Court.”' The question therefore came directly before the Court for the first time in Brown v. Pike, and as it was then fully argued, and was the only point in the case, it necessarily received the attention and consideration of the whole Court. Whether the act was wise or unwise can not affect its construction. We are not at liberty to violate the plain letter of the act, and resort to any refinements of construction to make the act accord with our preconceived ideas of what the law should be. If the enactment had been “that all evidence admissible to prove the default of the principal, shall be admissible and competent against his sureties,” there would have been some ground for the construction now contended for. That would have beeu the natural, plain and direct way of communicating the legislative will. But that is not the language used.' Other words are added— “shall in like manner be admissible, &c.” — andas they are totally unnecessary to convey the meaning contended for, we have no right' t'o ignore them or distort their proper effect in the construction of the act. Webster defines “like” to be primarily “ equal in quantity, quality or degree, exactly corresponding,” by which we are certainly not to understand that when a judgment is conclusive of assets against the principal, it shall “ in like, manner ” not be conclusive against the surety ! The words do not import discrimination and a graduated scale of legal effect, conclusive as to *388one, inconclusive as to the other, absolute verity as to the principal, but simply admissible against the surety ; and to give such a construction to the words “ in like manner,” is to do violence to their plain straight-forward meaning of equality, and exact correspondence, both as to the admissibility and legal effect of evidence. I know of no warrant for treating as surplusage, any words or expression of a statute susceptible of meaning and a judicial construction. Such a liberty taken by the Courts would be a dangerous encroachment upon the legislative department of the government. Nor do I think the construction we have put upon the words “ in like manner,” at all inconrpatible with the legislative intent or good policy. The surety is bound for the honesty and fair dealing of his principal, and there is such a privity between them, that a judgment against the former in a manner touching the administration can not, except in a restricted sense, be said to be without the knowledge and consent of the latter. To hold the principal and surety upon the administration bond equally affected by the same evidence, will facilitate and better secure the prompt and watchful settlement of the estates of dead men. "With this explanation, I concur in the opinion of the Court.
Error. Judgment reversed and case remanded.