Court Opinion

ID: 9854126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:01:37.816612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:56.516107
License: Public Domain

STILWELL, J.,
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
The focus of the majority opinion is principally upon the one juror who unquestionably is guilty of misconduct and violated the clear instructions of the court.
However, I believe, as did the trial judge, and as the state supreme court has instructed us, that the focus should be on what influence the miscreant juror’s actions had upon the remaining jurors and whether her conduct prejudiced the outcome of the trial to such an extent that the parties did not receive a fair trial. See State v. Grovenstein, 335 S.C. 347, 352, 517 S.E.2d 216, 218 (1999) (finding misconduct that does not affect the verdict does not entitle a party to a mistrial). See also State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 108, 610 S.E.2d 859, 866 (Ct.App.2005) (stating “[t]he general test for evaluating alleged juror misconduct is whether there in fact was misconduct and, if so, whether any harm resulted to the defendant as a consequence.”).
The errant juror’s activities were initially reported to the trial judge by an alternate juror, after the jury verdict was received. That juror, being an alternate, was in no position to testify of her own knowledge as to what influence, if any, the misconduct had upon the other jurors during the deliberations that resulted in the verdict, as she would necessarily have *208been dismissed prior to the court submitting the case to the jury. It is worth noting that none of the jurors who actually took part in the deliberations thought the misconduct egregious enough to report it to the court.
The eminent trial court judge, following the procedure described by the state supreme court in State v. Aldret, 338 S.C. 307, 509 S.E.2d 811 (1999), held an extensive evidentiary hearing, assembling the jurors, minus the offending juror, and conducting voir dire to ascertain the nature and extent of the alleged misconduct and to determine if any of the misconduct affected the jury’s impartiality so as to undermine the verdict.15
Without reiterating the testimony of each individual juror and belaboring that issue, suffice it to say that the trial court made specific findings of fact to the effect that “[a]ll of the jurors indicated that no improper conduct or outside influences tainted their unanimous verdict.” Continuing, the court stated it had “previously concluded in Order recorded on November 10, 2005 that Ms. Abrams (the miscreant juror) had violated the instructions of the Court by making improper comments to other jurors and she was sanctioned as a result of her actions. However, the Court found at that time, and reaffirms by this Order, that the action of Ms. Abrams did not taint the judicial process or impact improperly on the jury’s unanimous verdict.”
The remarks made by the trial court judge at the hearing resulting in the contempt citation to the offending juror are illustrative of his factual conclusions:
The comments that were made in the jury room obviously were not heard by everybody. And many of the jurors heard nothing at all. And to their credit it appears that the jurors who did hear it did not respond to it in any way and did not act on it in their deliberations. The jurors ... *209unanimously said that they did not take those comments into account in their decision in this particular case.
I’m convinced that they did not taint the process, but I have only been convinced by doing what we have done, that is to talk with each one of these jurors individually, to inquire about them, to take more of their time away from their jobs as well, to make sure that ... the process has not been tainted by these improper discussions, deliberations, comments if you will, and actions on behalf of Mrs. Abrams.
These findings of fact were made by an experienced trial court judge who was in a position not only to view the jurors as they testified, but also to have the additional benefit of personally conducting the examination, circumstances that allowed him to better evaluate their responses, both verbal and non-verbal, and thereby judge their credibility. These are findings of fact that are entitled to great deference. State v. Harris, 340 S.C. 59, 63, 530 S.E.2d 626, 628 (2000).
I fear the majority opinion inadvertently injects into its analysis a “presumption of prejudice,” thereby resurrecting a concept already specifically rejected. See Grovenstein, 335 S.C. at 352, 517 S.E.2d at 218 (holding moving party has burden to demonstrate prejudice and adopting a “presumption of prejudice” standard is erroneous).
I would affirm.

. In Aldret, the supreme court established a review process for juror misconduct that becomes apparent after the jury’s verdict. The court authorized the trial court to consider affidavits and conduct an evidentiary hearing. 333 S.C. at 315, 509 S.E.2d at 815. Although this court found Aldret requires a hearing only where the misconduct is premature deliberation, this court did not conclude an Aldret hearing held for other types of misconduct would constitute error. See Long v. Norris & Assocs., Ltd.., 342 S.C. 561, 574, 538 S.E.2d 5, 12 (Ct.App.2000).