Court Opinion

ID: 9944587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 17:36:52.065228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:40.599930
License: Public Domain

Counsel for appellants filed an agreed motion, signed by attorneys for all parties, to dismiss this appeal pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 387a. The motion recites that the parties have settled all causes of action and claims incident to the appeal and prays the appeal be dismissed "with all costs to be borne by the party incurring same." Tex.R.Civ.P. 387a(d) provides that if dismissal occurs after submission, such action shall not prevent issuance of an opinion by the Court on the points presented if the Court deems such an opinion appropriate.
Previous appellate consideration of this case may be found in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175
(Tex. 1986), and in the original opinion of this Court, which was not published but is now annexed as an exhibit and made a part hereof. Repetition will be avoided so far as practical.
The Bains' original appeal brief contained three points of error. The first related to an instructed verdict in favor of James Cain. The second raised the issue of insufficient evidence to support the jury answer to Special Issue No. 7. And the third challenged the jury's answer to Special Issue No. 7 as being contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. This Court originally sustained the first and second points of error and did not reach or decide the third. The Supreme Court remanded the appeal saying, "There is some evidence to support the jury verdict," and instructing this Court to "consider the insufficiency points of error. . . ."
This Court's original opinion recognized and stated the insufficient evidence and great weight and preponderance of the evidence question should be decided in harmony with the standards set by In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662,244 S.W.2d 660 (1951), and interpretive writings consistent therewith. An effort was made to briefly and concisely draw attention to the character of the principal evidence and comment on the several aspects of its nature, quality, quantity, weight and preponderance.1 This Court mistakenly relied upon its comment to make the correct disposition of the insufficient evidence issue so obvious that it would be superfluous to write in specific detail.2 The Supreme Court opinion singularly misunderstood the purpose of this comment on the evidence and construed it as the application or enunciation of a standard of review in conflict with the standard established by In re King's Estate, supra. The comment that the facts in evidence did not point "unerringly to a foundation defect" explicitly called attention to the circumstance that inferences therefrom were ambiguous in nature. In context with the next sentence such meaning cannot easily be mistaken.
The Supreme Court's opinion sums up the evidentiary record in this manner:
 The evidence revealed that when the Bains moved into the house they noticed a bulge under one window, a crack in the kitchen wall, and a sticking door. Within *Page 423
 six or seven months after occupying the house, they noticed a foundation crack near the patio. Karen Bain testified that during the spring or summer of 1977 she was told there might be a slab problem with the house.
 The Bains presented some evidence to the contrary. They consulted with a foundation expert in April, 1978, who informed them that there was not a substantial foundation defect. Also, they argue the flaws in the house could have been indicative of problems other than a foundation defect, such as ordinary subsidence problems common to the Houston area, or the effects of age, dampness and weathering on a 20-year-old house.
This analysis of the evidence recognizes that from the same evidence by which the jury might infer a foundation defect as a fact, it might equally well infer as a fact the nonexistence of a foundation defect. In Litton Industrial Products v.Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1984), it is said when inferences are consistent with either of two facts and nothing shows that one is more probable than the other, neither fact can be inferred. In Houston Oil Co. of Texas v.Griggs, 181 S.W. 833 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1915),aff'd, 213 S.W. 261 (Tex.Comm'n App. 1919, opinion adopted), it is said:
 [W]here the circumstances relied upon as sufficient to charge a party with notice may equally as well be referred to some other matter as the one with notice of which he is sought to be charged, they will not be deemed to be sufficient.
See Texas Sling Company v. Emanuel, 431 S.W.2d 538
(Tex. 1968); Steinmetz Associates, Inc. v. Crow,700 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), 41 Tex.Jur.2d Notice Sec. 9 (1963). Moreover, if the evidence be fairly susceptible of two constructions, the Court of Appeals' construction and findings are binding upon the Supreme Court. Schwingle v.Keifer, 105 Tex. 609, 153 S.W. 1132 (1913).
The jury was asked to find from the preponderance of the evidence whether or not on or before October 13, 1977, the Bains either had knowledge of "such substantial foundation structural defect, or were on notice of such facts as would cause a reasonable, prudent person to make inquiry which would lead to the discovery of such defect by the exercise of reasonable diligence." Knowledge is said to be a clear perception of fact, an awareness of truth. Steinmetz Associates v. Crow, supra. There is no direct evidence that the Bains had knowledge of a foundation defect, but they were aware of the facts noted in the Supreme Court's analysis.
For practical purposes, the record is that the jury had for consideration positive evidence that a residential foundation expert was of the opinion in April, 1978, that the property did not have a substantial foundation defect and so advised the Bains. On the other hand, from the sticking door and other facts known to the Bains on or prior to October 13, 1977, the equivocal and inconsistent inferences arise that are the sole support of the jury's verdict on the issue. These inferences tended to prove either that the property had or did not have a substantial foundation defect and their potency as probative evidence of the fact found is compromised by ambiguity.
The positive nature of the expert's testimony so far outweighs and preponderates over the equivocal inferences that the conclusion is, as in this Court's original opinion, that the probative value of the evidence tending to support the jury's answer is insufficient to do so. Further, a finding based upon such inferences that the Bains had notice that the foundation was defective on or prior to October 13, 1977, is so contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. More elaborate discussion will be omitted in view of the judgment to be entered.
Disposition of the appeal by an opinion is deemed appropriate as contextual background to the Supreme Court's opinion and order. The motion to dismiss mentioned in the initial paragraph is granted, and the appeal is dismissed and costs adjudged as prayed. *Page 424
1 As earlier noted, no evidence was not an issue, the Bains urged a factual insufficiency point of error separately from their great weight and preponderance point. Only factual insufficiency was addressed in this Court's original opinion.
2 The original was written as a per curiam, not to be published opinion involving clearly settled issues. The factual record was in the hands of the parties and before the courts.
 EXHIBIT August 13, 1985