Court Opinion

ID: 9882159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 16:14:43.793629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:53.269525
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/5/23 Torres v. Dateland Construction Co. CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 RUDY RAUL TORRES,

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       E078625

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. PSC2001806)

 DATELAND CONSTRUCTION                                                   OPINION
 COMPANY, INC.,

          Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Richard Oberholzer,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Haffner Law, Joshua H. Haffner, and Trevor Weinberg, and Alfredo Torrijos for

Plaintiff and Appellant.

         Berman, Berman, Berman, Schneider & Lowary, Mark E. Lowary, Kelly M.

Henry, and Gina M. Genatempo for Defendant and Respondent.

                                                             1
       A construction worker fell into a shallow trench while carrying a heavy wood

form across a construction site managed by his employer, a general contractor. He sued

the subcontractor who excavated the trench under theories of premise liability and

negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment on both causes of action because

the subcontractor had no duty to warn employees where the employee could easily have

avoided the open and obvious condition, and no Cal-OSHA regulations or company

policies required warnings for a trench of the type the subcontractor built. We agree with

the trial court and also conclude premises liability does not apply in this suit against a

subcontractor. We therefore affirm the judgment.

                                              I

                                           FACTS

       On June 21, 2018, plaintiff and appellant Rudy Raul Torres was working for Sun

Country Builders (Sun Country) as a laborer and carpenter at a construction site staffed

by multiple contractors, all involved in a project called Villa Hermosa Phase II in Indio.

Torres suffered injuries that day when he stepped onto a board laid across an open fire

riser trench on the site. The board gave way, and Torres fell partially into the trench.

       Torres filed a complaint stating causes of action for general negligence and

premises liability against a subcontractor who performed electrical work at the site, and

later amended the complaint to add a second subcontractor, respondent Dateland

Construction Company, Inc. (Dateland), as a defendant. After discovery, Dateland filed a

motion seeking summary judgment, which it supported with a declaration by a

                                              2
construction industry expert; Torres’s interrogatory responses; a declaration by its project

manager; a statement of undisputed facts; and portions of the deposition transcripts of

Torres, three people at the site on the day of the injury, and the person designated the

most knowledgeable at Dateland.

       Torres opposed summary judgment and submitted a separate statement of material

facts, a copy of the contract between Sun Country and Dateland, a copy of the

construction site report about Torres’s injury, portions of Torres’s depositions, portions

of the deposition of the employee Dateland designated as its person most knowledgeable,

and a declaration from another construction industry expert witness.

       Because this is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, we refer to

those sources in setting out the facts below.

       Sun Country served as the general contractor for the Villa Hermosa Phase II

project, and Dateland worked as one of the subcontractors. Dateland’s job was “to

provide all water, fire suppression system distribution, storm drain and sanitary sewer

material and installation work.” It agreed to have a full-time supervisory presence and to

provide Sun Country with its safety policies and procedures, which had to “meet or

exceed Cal OSHA regulations.”

       As part of its work, Dateland dug a fire riser trench on June 20, 2018 and left it

there unattended the next day, when its workers were elsewhere at the site. The trench

would have to be left open for inspection by a fire marshal before a concrete kicker could

                                                3
be installed. Such inspections are a routine part of fire riser installation, and it typically

takes several days for the inspection. The inspection was set for June 22.

        On the morning of June 21, Torres was building concrete forms and moving them

across the jobsite. Torres was working alone in the middle of the site. Two other Sun

Country employees were doing the same work together. Those employees took a longer

route to the front of the building, while Torres took a shorter, more direct route. Torres

carried his concrete form—a single wood panel weighing between 25 to 35 pounds—on

his right shoulder. Torres says he was walking fast when he stepped on a wood plank,

which collapsed. He says part of his left leg went into the trench, and the wood concrete

form fell on him. He said he did not see the open trench because the wood plank obscured

it and there were no warning signs or barriers.

        Photographs taken after the incident show a trench with wood planks partially

fallen into it.

                                               4
It is unknown who placed the board over the trench. Sun Country was the only entity

using lumber boards of the sort left over the trench, but it had a policy against building

bridges out of boards to allow access over trenches. Daryl McFarland, at the time a Vice

President for Sun Country charged with overseeing project operations, reported that a

Sun Country employee said he saw Torres place the boards across the trench, but Torres

denied that accusation.

       At his deposition, Torres testified the trench was around five- to six-feet deep but

said he did not know its length. Dateland objected to Torres’s estimate. It said it routinely

digs fire riser trenches to a depth of about two feet and no more than three feet and had

done so at this site. Based on photos of the trench, McFarland estimated it was 2 feet

deep. Everardo Ortiz, an assistant superintendent in charge of jobsite safety who saw the

trench after the incident, testified it was about two feet deep. He said the area did not

require caution tape “because it wasn’t that deep of a trench,” and tape was required only

                                              5
for trenches at least four feet deep. Ortiz conducted June 20 and 21 safety inspections that

included the fire riser trench and noted no safety issues. The safety inspection on June 21

occurred at 10:00 a.m., after Torres’s fall, but did not note the incident. Ortiz said he

should have included in the safety report that boards had been placed over the fire riser

trench, a fact noted in the incident report.

       Dateland designated Dennis Chuck, the project manager, as its “Person Most

Knowledgeable.” He submitted a declaration offering to testify that he personally

oversaw the jobsite work. He said, “Dateland was contracted only for the installation of

fire risers which required trenches which are uniformly no more than two feet deep, and

approximately two (2) feet wide. . . . The trenches created by Dateland which were

present on the date of the incident were all that same size.” He said Dateland had

prepared an exemplar fire riser trench to allow its proposed construction industry expert

to inspect the trench. He said he observed the exemplar, and it was prepared in the same

dimensions and to the same standards as the trenches at the site, consistent with

Dateland’s custom. He testified the trench at the site and the exemplar trench were dug

consistent with Sun Country’s safety standards, and there were no safety requirements

under either OSHA safety standards or Sun Country’s safety standards which required

signs, caution tape, cover, or bridging over the trench. However, at his deposition, Chuck

responded affirmatively when asked whether Dateland “put any warning signs near its

trenches when the trenches have not been filled yet.” He said, “There would be caution

                                               6
tape all the way around the trench if [Dateland] leaves the trench open and no workers are

there.”

          Dateland proffered Mike Brown as an expert on practices in the construction

industry, and he submitted a declaration offering his opinions on construction procedures

for the kind of concrete forms, risers, and conduits being installed at the Villa Hermosa

Phase II project. He offered to testify that the documents and photographs from the

project, together with industry standards, do not support Torres’s claim that the fire riser

trench was 5 feet deep or more. Brown inspected an exemplar trench prepared by

Dateland, which he was told had been prepared in the same dimensions and using the

same standards as the fire riser trenches Dateland built at the project. Brown personally

measured the exemplar trench and compared it to site photos. His measurements

confirmed the trench was between two-and three- feet deep. Brown also offered to testify

that a fire riser trench does not exceed the two- to three-foot depth as a matter of custom,

practice, and necessity because other construction items such as water lines are required

to run deeper. He opined that if Torres fell into a trench deeper than three feet, it was not

a trench for a fire riser.

          Brown offered to testify that leaving fire riser trenches open for a few days prior to

inspection was common, understood by workers, and not a violation of any safety

standards. “Open trenches during the course of construction are common due to the

requirements by the city and the code to have access to the items in the trench by city

inspectors to perform their inspection unimpeded. That the trench was left open overnight

                                                7
or even for a few days is not uncommon, and is an expected occurrence on a construction

site should have been common knowledge for any workers on site.” He said no Cal-

OSHA or the California Building Code provision, and no industry standard, requires

signs, barricades, or fall protection for trenches less than five feet deep if the projects are

not open to the public. He said caution tape falls under the category of signs. Cal-OSHA

Construction Safety Orders at sections 1540 and 1541 define excavations and general

safety requirements, and they require fall protection only if an excavation is at least six

feet deep and wider than 30 inches. Brown concluded, “there are no Cal-OSHA standards

or requirements from any source for signage, caution tape, fencing or barricades or other

warnings for the trench . . . . Industry standard required a trench of the size and depth that

Dateland created, and it was necessary and appropriate to wait for authorities to inspect

the trench(es) before completing any further work on same.”

       In moving for summary judgment, Dateland argued it could not be found liable for

general negligence because it had no duty to warn employees on site of a two- to three-

foot trench, and the evidence was insufficient to establish the trench was 6 feet deep or

more, the Cal-OSHA threshold for a duty to warn and to build bridging. Dateland argued

it could not be found liable for premises liability because it did not control the worksite,

and because the trench was an open and obvious condition for workers.

       Against summary judgment on the negligence claim, Torres argued Dateland had

breached a duty to protect those at the site by putting up barriers around the trench. He

argued the duty arose from Cal-OSHA regulations and Dateland’s policies. He argued

                                               8
further that Cal-OSHA regulations required Dateland to build walkways with guardrails

if the trench was more than six feet deep and contended that Torres’s testimony created a

factual dispute on the depth of the trench. Torres also argued Dateland breached its duty

to have a competent person conduct a daily inspection, as required by Cal-OSHA and the

contractors’ contract.

       Against summary judgment on the premises liability claim, Torres argued there

was a factual dispute as to whether the trench was an open and obvious condition. He

argued a jury could find Dateland liable if Torres’s injury was foreseeable, even if the

condition was open and obvious. Finally, he argued Dateland could be liable for premises

liability despite not being the owner of the property on the basis that it exercised

sufficient control over the area as the party who created and failed to correct the

condition which foreseeably led to his injury.

       The trial court heard argument and entered an order granting the motion. The court

held Dateland had no duty to warn Torres or otherwise protect workers from the trench,

and found the trench to be an open and obvious condition. The court held there was no

material issue of fact on the depth of the trench because significant visual evidence

contradicted Torres’s testimony, the only evidence the trench was more than three feet

deep. The court held it was undisputed that the trench was open and obvious and that

Torres was not compelled to encounter the condition.

                                              9
                                             II

                                       ANALYSIS

       Torres argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Dateland on

both causes of action by concluding it had no duty to warn or protect workers like him. A

trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issues of material fact

exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Merrill v.

Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, considering all the

evidence the parties offered—except what the court properly excluded—and the

uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. (Merrill, at p. 476.)

       Torres asks us to hold Dateland had a duty to protect him. “The existence and

scope of a duty are questions of law for the court’s determination, and foreseeability is a

critical factor in the analysis. When foreseeability is analyzed to determine the existence

or scope of a duty, foreseeability is also a question of law.” (Ericson v. Federal Express

Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1300.)

       A. Premises Liability and Common Law Negligence

       Torres argues Dateland can be held liable under a premises liability theory

because, though not the owners of the property, it had sufficient control over the premises

when excavating under the terms of its agreement to take on a duty of care and a duty to

warn typically reserved for owners, lessees, or general contractors.

                                             10
       “Premises liability ‘“is grounded in the possession of the premises and the

attendant right to control and manage the premises”’; accordingly, ‘“mere possession

with its attendant right to control conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the

imposition of an affirmative duty to act.”’ [Citations.] But the duty arising from

possession and control of property is adherence to the same standard of care that applies

in negligence cases.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158 (Kesner).)

‘“The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land . . . is whether in

the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable [person] in view of the

probability of injury to others.’” (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119

(Rowland), partially superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Issakhani v.

Shadow Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 917, 926.) We are not

convinced Torres has succeeded in stating a premises liability cause of action, much less

in creating a triable issue of fact as to its elements.

       Premises liability is a negligence theory an injured plaintiff can use to reach the

property owner, or other person who controls the property, for failing to exercise due care

in managing activities on the premises or warning of hidden defects. (See, e.g., Kinsman

v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659 [landowner may be liable to a contractor’s

employee if it knew or should have known of a latent preexisting hazardous condition,

the contractor did not know and could not have reasonably discovered the condition, and

the landowner failed to warn of the condition]; Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course

(1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20 [golfer sued golf course for injuries from falling on a slippery

                                               11
cement surface on the golf course].) In construction litigation, these cases often arise

when a subcontractor’s employee seeks to prove liability against the general contractor,

who, though not the owner of the property, exercises substantial control. (E.g., Padilla v.

Pomona College (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 661 [subcontractor’s employee sued property

owner and general contractor].)

       Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), the source of these claims, provides

“[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an

injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the

management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or

by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Italics added.)

       This case, as alleged and as established by the evidence, does not fit this theory of

negligence liability. Here, an employee of a general contractor is suing a subcontractor

for unsafe conditions the subcontractor created on part of the jobsite. Torres has not

alleged or shown that Dateland caused his injury “by his or her want of ordinary care or

skill in the management of [its] property,” but rather that it caused his injury by actions in

working at the jobsite. That is not a claim of premises liability at all, but rather one of

simple negligence. We would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the

premises liability cause of action on that basis alone.

       However, even assuming, as the trial court did, that premises liability principles

apply, we conclude Dateland had no duty to warn Torres and other workers on site of the

danger posed by the fire riser trench. Premises liability is a form of negligence. A

                                              12
plaintiff must show the defendant had a legal duty of care, breached that duty, and the

breach proximately caused an injury. (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1158.) Thus, our

analysis of the common law duty applies not just to Torres’s negligence cause of action,

but also to his premises liability cause of action, if available against a subcontractor.

       Whether a duty should be imposed depends on policy considerations known as the

Rowland factors, which include the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff and the burdens

of imposing the duty. (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 112-113.) The determination of

whether a duty applies is made at the general level of a category of cases; it is not about

the particular facts of a case. (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 1143-1144.)

       “Foreseeability of harm is typically absent when a dangerous condition is open

and obvious. [Citation.] ‘Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could

reasonably be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the

landowner is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.’ [Citation.] In that

situation, owners and possessors of land are entitled to assume others will ‘perceive the

obvious’ and take action to avoid the dangerous condition. [Citation.] [¶] An exception to

this general rule exists when ‘it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite

the fact that it is obvious (e.g., when necessity requires persons to encounter it).’

[Citation.] In other words, while the obviousness of the condition and its dangerousness

may obviate the landowner’s duty to remedy or warn of the condition in some situations,

such obviousness will not negate a duty of care when it is foreseeable that, because of

                                              13
necessity or other circumstances, a person may choose to encounter the condition.”

(Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447.)

       Here, we agree with the trial court that a fire riser trench falls into the general

category of an open and obvious condition for which harm is not foreseeable for purposes

of the duty. An open fire riser trench is an ordinary feature of a construction jobsite and is

recognized as a hazard by workers at a jobsite. Dateland contracted to build fire trench

risers, which it is uncontested are standard in the construction industry. Dateland’s expert

explained “[o]pen trenches during the course of construction are common due to the

requirements by the city and the code to have access to the items in the trench by city

inspectors to perform their inspection unimpeded. That the trench was left open overnight

or even for a few days is not uncommon, and is an expected occurrence on a construction

site should have been common knowledge for any workers on site.” The parties agreed it

was uncontested that everyone at the jobsite, including Torres, understood the trench

would have to be left open for inspection by a fire marshal, and such inspections are a

routine part of fire riser installation. Torres, who was an experienced construction

worker, acknowledged at his deposition that he was aware of the presence of open

trenches on the jobsite and was aware some of the trenches had to be left open to allow

for inspections. The trench therefore falls into the general category of an open and

obvious condition for which there is no duty to warn.

       Torres argues he was compelled to encounter the hazard to allow him to perform

his work, but the uncontested evidence is to the contrary. In deposition testimony, Torres

                                              14
said he was building concrete forms that weighed between 25 and 35 pounds and moving

them on his own from one end of the jobsite to another. He said the accident occurred

while he was walking fast, carrying the extra weight of the form, and stepped on a wood

plank which crossed the fire riser trench. The plank collapsed, part of his left leg went

into the trench, and the concrete form fell on top of him. Torres encountered the trench

only because he took a shortcut to his destination. The two other Sun Country employees

who were doing the same work took a longer route around the trenches. In view of these

facts, the trial court correctly concluded the injury Torres suffered, though not

unimaginable, was not foreseeable for purposes of a necessity exception to the absence of

a duty to warn of open and obvious conditions.

       The remaining Rowland factors do not warrant imposing a duty on Dateland.

There is no doubt Torres in fact suffered an injury. However, we are unable to perceive in

Dateland’s conduct any moral culpability. “To avoid redundancy with the other Rowland

factors, the moral blame that attends ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to tip

the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability.” (Martinez v. Bank of America

National Trust and Savings Association (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 883, 896.) To assign

moral blame, courts have required inherently harmful acts, acting with the intent of

causing harm, actual or constructive knowledge the harm would result, or recklessness.

(Ibid.) There is no evidence to support such culpability here. In our judgment, requiring

contractors to put up and take down caution tape around every trench at a construction

site would impose a greater burden than the risk justifies, particularly because these

                                             15
hazards are known and understood by people working in construction. Finally, the

availability of workers’ compensation benefits weighs against imposing a duty of care.

       Torres argues we should find Dateland directly liable because “[t]riable issues of

fact exist as to whether [Dateland] breached its common law duty by leaving the open

trench unguarded, without any warning.” He locates this duty in cases holding a company

acts “under a duty to use reasonable care to see that the portion of the [project] under its

control and upon which it had worked was reasonably safe.” (Gibbons v. City of San

Bernardino (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 33, 35 (Gibbons).)

       The authority on which Torres relies concerns the duty of care construction firms

owe to the public when their work affects publicly accessible areas. In Gibbons, for

example, a motorist struck a raised manhole cover on a public street in San Bernardino

that was undergoing repairs by a paving firm. (Gibbons, supra, 108 Cal.App.2d at p. 34.)

The contract between the city and the paving firm required an expanse of surfaced

roadbed for use of the public during the work to permit public traffic to pass through the

construction area, and the raised manhole cover that caused the accident was in this

publicly accessible roadway. (Id. at pp. 34-35.) The Court of Appeal recognized in that

context the paving company “had a duty to warn the traveling public of dangers . . .

which it created in the course of its work,” though the court ultimately held the paving

company could not be liable because it was the city who placed the obstruction in the

roadway. (Id. at p. 35.)

                                             16
       Our case does not implicate the same principles because the Villa Hermosa Phase

II construction site was closed to the public, and the party injured was an experienced

construction worker, familiar with the risks inherent in such building projects and with

the risk of open trenches on the jobsite. That familiarity in turn informs whether the

category of harm was foreseeable.

       We conclude the trial court correctly concluded that Dateland had no duty to warn

Torres of the open fire riser trench. We therefore affirm the order granting summary

judgment on the negligence and premises liability claims to the extent they are based on

establishing a common law duty of care.

       B. Regulatory and Contractual Sources of a Duty

              1. Duty to post caution tape under safety policies

       As an alternative to a common law duty, Torres locates the source of the duty in

safety policies at the jobsite. He argues Dateland had a safety policy of placing caution

tape around unattended open trenches and that the evidence of this policy creates a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether it breached its duty of care by failing to put

caution tape around the trench Torres fell into.

       According to Torres, Dateland’s project manager’s testimony establishes the

existence of a policy to put up caution tape. The project manager agreed that Dateland

puts warning signs near its trenches when the trenches have not been filled. “There would

be caution tape all the way around the trench if we leave the trench open and no workers

are there.” Torres argues Dillenbeck v. City of Los Angeles (1968) 69 Cal.2d 472, 478

                                             17
(Dillenbeck) establishes “[t]he safety rules of an employer are . . . admissible as evidence

that due care requires the course of conduct prescribed in the rule.” In this case, he

argues, “Dateland’s safety rule/policy establishes the standard of care. There are triable

issues as to whether Dateland breached the standard of care by not complying with its

own safety rules for this trench.”

       Unlike in Dillenbeck, the trial court here did not exclude evidence of standard

practices. On the contrary, the court admitted the evidence that Dateland would place

caution tape around some trenches and considered whether the testimony could support a

finding that Dateland had a policy that established a duty of care. The court concluded the

project manager “did not testify that such was an established Dateland ‘policy,’ nor was

there any testimony about whether such a ‘policy’ was a written policy or regulation such

that failure to follow the policy/regulation is enforceable by Cal/OSHA.” We agree with

this determination. The testimony did not identify the use of caution tape as a policy or

safety rule, whether written, as in Dillenbeck, or otherwise. Moreover, the testimony did

not identify the kind of trenches Dateland would mark with caution tape, or the

conditions when they would do so.

       Other evidence established there was no such policy in place for constructing fire

riser trenches. In his declaration, the same project manager represented that Dateland

built the fire riser trenches at Villa Hermosa Phase II to comply with Sun Country’s and

Cal-OSHA safety standards and that neither set of standards included “requirements for

signage, caution tape, cover or bridging over the trench.” Everardo Ortiz, who was in

                                             18
charge of jobsite safety for Sun Country and saw the trench after the incident, testified

that the area did not require caution tape “because it wasn’t that deep of a trench” and

tape was required only for trenches that were four feet deep. We agree with the trial court

that the same project manager’s testimony about caution tape “does not raise a triable

issue of fact as to whether failure to place caution tape around the trench was a breach of

[a] duty.”

              2. Duty to warn under Cal-OSHA regulations

       Torres also contends “Dateland had a duty under Cal/OSHA regulations to place

warnings around the trench.” He cites Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915 (Elsner)

for the proposition that “Cal-OSHA provisions are to be treated like any other statute or

regulation and may be admitted to establish a standard or duty of care in all negligence

and wrongful death actions, including third party actions.” (Id. at p. 928)

       That much is correct. However, Torres identifies no Cal-OSHA regulations which

create a duty to place warnings around a trench like the one at issue in this case. Instead,

he relies on the purported company policy to put up caution tape discussed in part II.B.1.

above, and argues Cal-OSHA regulations required that policy to be in writing (Cal. Code

Regs., tit. 8, § 3203, subd. (a)), and Elsner and Evidence Code section 669 establish that

violating the policy is negligence per se.

       The testimony which addressed policies at the jobsite states unequivocally that the

companies did not have a policy requiring caution tape to be placed around fire riser

trenches. We disagree with Torres’s attempt to conjure a specific duty of care from the

                                             19
project manager’s vague testimony and deem it incorporated into Cal-OSHA regulations

and made enforceable by Evidence Code section 669.

       The construction business is heavily regulated precisely because active

construction sites necessarily create dangers for anyone with access to them. Specific

regulations address the dangers of trenches, but none address the kind of trenches at issue

in this case. In the trial court, Torres argued Cal-OSHA Construction Safety Order

sections 1540 and 1541, which define excavations and general safety requirements,

imposed a duty to warn and build fall protection. Section 1541, subdivision (l) requires

fall protection for excavations “[w]here employees or equipment are required or

permitted to cross over excavations over 6-feet in depth and wider than 30 inches.” (Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 8, § 1541, subd. (l).) Section 1540 defines trenches and establishes that

the measurement of a trench’s width concerns the width of the trench at the bottom. (Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 8, § 1540.)

       The trial court addressed these provisions in its ruling and rightly concluded they

do not establish a duty applicable to the trench in this case. Torres has not challenged this

portion of the trial court’s ruling in his appellate briefs and has therefore forfeited or

abandoned the issue. (See Eck v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 141, 146.)

However, we exercise our discretion to address the merits of the legal issue. Cal-OSHA

section 1541 requires fall protection only for “excavations over 6-feet in depth and wider

than 30 inches.” (Italics added.) Torres’s testimony does not establish the trench was that

large. At his deposition, he was asked, “Do you know approximately how big the trench

                                              20
was?” He responded, “Depth-wise, it was around 5 to 6 feet deep. Wide, I’m not too

sure.” His testimony does not support a finding that the trench was greater than six feet

deep and 30 inches wide. We agree with the trial court that his testimony fails to raise a

factual issue implicating the duties created by the Cal-OSHA fall protection regulations.

       Moreover, as the trial court concluded, Torres’s testimony was legally insufficient

to overcome the objective visual evidence that the trench was about two- to three-feet

deep. Photographs of the accident site contradict his testimony that the trench was five- to

six-feet deep. Two photos show boards collapsed in the trench after the incident. They

show a trench that is a few feet deep at most. We agree with the trial court that the

photographic evidence reveals Torres’s testimony to be a “visible fiction.” (See Scott v.

Harris (2007) 550 U.S. 372, 376, 380-381 (Scott) [“When opposing parties tell two

different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment”].)

       All the other evidence confirms what the photographs depict. Dateland’s

construction industry expert said that two- to three-feet deep fire risers were standard in

the industry and explained digging deeper would interfere with other building

infrastructure. Sun Country’s superintendent for the project said he saw the trench where

Torres fell, and it was about two feet deep. Dateland’s project manager confirmed

Dateland was contracted to install fire risers which required trenches “which are

uniformly no more than two feet deep, and approximately two (2) feet wide.” And

                                             21
Dateland built an exemplar fire riser trench of the same design used at the site, and its

expert said it was two- to three-feet deep.

       As the trial court held, a party cannot create a material dispute of fact warranting

trial by contradicting what can be plainly observed. (Scott, supra, 550 U.S. at p. 380; see

also Mezger v. Bick (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 76, 88.) Scott and Mezger involved video

recordings, not photographic evidence. However, the photographic evidence in this case

is sufficient to do the same work because the factual question is so simple. (See Marrero

v. Air Brook Limousine (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2014) 2014 WL 1623706, *1, 5 [holding

plaintiff failed to present a genuine issue of material fact in part because “damage to the

cars shown in the photograph is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s assertion”].)

       We reach the same conclusion in this case about Torres’s vague estimate of the

depth of the trench. Torres’s testimony was not sufficient to create a triable issue of fact

as to whether Dateland had a duty to provide fall protection under Cal-OSHA section

1541 because it is blatantly contradicted by objective photographic evidence as well as

the testimony of eyewitnesses and experts. No reasonable jury could believe Torres’s

testimony about the size of the trench. (Scott, supra, 550 U.S. at p. 376.)

              3. Duty to assign someone to perform daily inspections

       Finally, Torres argues Dateland had a duty to inspect the site of the fire riser

trenches and failed to do so, which led to him suffering an injury the inspection

requirement is designed to prevent. He argues Cal-OSHA section 1541, subdivision

(k)(1), requires daily inspections of excavations “for evidence of a situation that could

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result in possible cave-ins, indications of failure of protective systems, hazardous

atmospheres, or other hazardous conditions.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 1541, subd.

(k)(1).)

       We have already concluded the fire riser trench was not a hazardous or dangerous

condition that required special precautions under Cal-OSHA regulations. For example,

these small trenches did not require structural ramps under section 1541, subdivision (c)

or fall protection under section 1541, subdivision (l). There’s no suggestion that the

excavation occurred during rainfall (see § 1541, subd. (h)), next to an adjacent structure

(see § 1541, subd. (i)), or contained loose rock or soil that could endanger a worker in the

trench (see § 1541, subd. (j)). Indeed, on appeal, Torres has identified no regulation and

no dangerous condition against which an inspection could have protected him. Thus, the

only danger an inspection could have turned up was the fact that someone had placed

boards across the trench, allowing a worker, like Torres, to attempt to walk across it.

       It is uncontested the parties do not know who placed the boards across the fire

riser trench. The evidence suggested Sun Country employees were the only ones using

boards of the sort used, but also shows Sun Country had a policy against building bridges

out of boards to allow access over trenches. A Sun Country employee said he saw Torres

place the lumber over the trench for his own convenience, but Torres denied that.

Regardless, there is no evidence to support a finding that Dateland created the hazard

presented by the board.

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       The evidence is also uncontested that Sun Country employed a safety officer for

the jobsite, Everardo Ortiz, and that he conducted daily inspections. Ortiz testified that he

conducted safety inspections on June 20 and June 21 and noted no safety issues. Though

the safety inspection on the day of the incident occurred at 10:00 a.m., after Torres’s fall,

there is no support for Torres’s contention that no inspection occurred. Torres argues

Dateland was required to hire its own inspector for the jobsite under its agreement with

Sun Country. However, the agreement says only that Dateland was required to have a

supervisor on site and make regular reports to Sun Country, and Dateland’s project

manager said Dateland relied on Sun Country’s safety officer for inspections. We agree

with the trial court’s conclusion that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether

Dateland’s failure to have its own daily inspections was a breach of duty.

                                              III

                                       DISPOSITION

       We affirm the judgment. Dateland is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                  RAPHAEL
                                                                                            J.
We concur:

RAMIREZ
                        P. J.

McKINSTER
                           J.

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