Court Opinion

ID: 9894830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 13:00:38.766048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:49.817468
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10528    Document: 18-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023     Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10528
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        FREDI ELISEO CUX-LOPEZ,
        FLORIDALMA CUX-LOPEZ,
                                                                Petitioners,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A206-894-341
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        2                           Opinion of the Court                         23-10528

                                  ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Guatemalan citizens, Floridalma Cux-Lopez and her son
        Fredi Cux-Lopez (collectively “Petitioners”) seek review of the
        Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order affirming the
        Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum,
        withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Con-
        vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
        Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”). On appeal, Petitioners argue
        that the BIA erred by determining that they were ineligible for asy-
        lum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. After reviewing the
        record and the applicable law, we affirm.
                 I.       Denial of Asylum & Withholding of Removal
               We review only the decision of the BIA, except to the extent
        that the BIA expressly adopts or explicitly agrees with the IJ’s deci-
        sion. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016).
        We do not consider issues that the BIA did not reach. Id.
                We review de novo the BIA’s legal conclusions, such as
        whether a petitioner’s claimed social group qualifies as a particular
        social group under the INA. Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913
        F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2019). Our review is informed by Chev-
        ron 1 deference, meaning that if a statute that the agency administers

        1 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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        23-10528               Opinion of the Court                         3

        is silent or ambiguous, we determine whether the agency’s inter-
        pretation is permissible and if so, defer to that interpretation. Id.
        Because the INA does not clearly define the phrase “particular so-
        cial group,” we have deferred to the BIA’s interpretation as set
        forth in its unpublished, three-member decisions. Id. at 1307; see
        also Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 404 (“We have previously held that the
        BIA’s interpretation of the phrase ‘particular social group’ in 8
        U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) is entitled to Chevron deference because the
        INA does not define the phrase and it is ambiguous.”).
               The noncitizen bears the burden of establishing that she is
        entitled to asylum, which requires the noncitizen to establish, with
        specific and credible evidence, that: (1) she suffered past persecu-
        tion on account of a statutorily protected ground; or (2) she has a
        well-founded fear that she will be persecuted on account of a stat-
        utorily protected ground. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), (b). The stat-
        utorily protected grounds include, among other things, member-
        ship in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
                To qualify as a particular social group under the INA, the
        group must be composed of members who “share a common, im-
        mutable characteristic” that the group members either cannot
        change, or should not be forced to change, “because it is fundamen-
        tal to their individual identities or consciences.” Perez-Zenteno, 913
        F.3d at 1309-10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
        The “particular social group also must be defined with particular-
        ity,” meaning the group has discrete, definable boundaries, and is
        not vague or amorphous. Id. at 1310 (internal quotation marks and
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10528

        citation omitted). Moreover, the group should be seen within the
        given society as a “sufficiently distinct group.” Id. (internal quota-
        tion marks and citation omitted). Importantly, the particular social
        group cannot be circularly defined by the persecution of its mem-
        bers, meaning the particular social group’s defining attribute can-
        not be its risk of persecution stemming from being targeted by
        gangs. Id. at 1309-10 (holding that the BIA reasonably determined
        that the noncitizen’s proposed social group of “Mexican citizens
        targeted by criminal groups because they have been in the United
        States and have families in the United States” was impermissibly
        circular) (underline in original); see also Amezcua-Preciado v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 943 F.3d 1337, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that the
        BIA reasonably determined that the noncitizen’s proposed social
        group of “women in Mexico who cannot leave domestic relation-
        ships” was impermissibly circular); Rodriguez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735
        F.3d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that the BIA did not err in
        finding incognizable a noncitizen’s proposed social group of “mem-
        bers of a family targeted by a drug-trafficking organization because
        a family member sought criminal justice against a member of the
        drug-trafficking organization” because the social group was imper-
        missibly defined by the risk of persecution).
              Additionally, the petitioner must establish a nexus between
        the feared persecution and a statutorily protected ground by
        demonstrating that one of the protected grounds was or will be at
        least one central reason for persecuting her. 8 U.S.C.
        § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Evidence “consistent with acts of private vio-
        lence or the petitioner’s failure to cooperate with guerillas,” or
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        23-10528                Opinion of the Court                          5

        evidence merely showing the petitioner “has been a victim of crim-
        inal activity,” is insufficient to support a finding that the noncitizen
        faced persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. Ruiz v.
        U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2006).
               A noncitizen is eligible for withholding of removal if she
        shows that, upon return to her country, she will be persecuted in
        that country because of a protected ground, such as her member-
        ship in a particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). The stand-
        ard for withholding of removal is more stringent than that for asy-
        lum, meaning if the petitioner fails to meet the standard of proof
        for asylum, she necessarily cannot meet the standard for withhold-
        ing of removal. Rodriguez Morales v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 884,
        891 (11th Cir. 2007).
               Before the BIA and IJ, Cux-Lopez framed her proposed par-
        ticular social group as “Guatemalan mothers fleeing personal gang
        persecution and that of their young student children.” Fredi
        framed his proposed particular social group as “young Guatemalan
        male students who are targeted by gang members for repeated re-
        jection of gang recruitment to protect themselves and their family
        members.” At the hearing before the IJ, Petitioners presented evi-
        dence that they suffered from and feared gang violence. Fredi
        stated that when he was about 10 years old, he began experiencing
        repeated pressure to join gangs that chased, attacked, threatened,
        and harassed him. He indicated that some of those gang encoun-
        ters resulted in him getting bruised, but his mother acknowledged
        that he never received any medical attention for those injuries.
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      23-10528

        Petitioners also witnessed the murder of their pastor, and Cux-
        Lopez was grabbed by one of the assailants and had her phone sto-
        len so that she could not report the crime. Given these experiences,
        Petitioners feared leaving their home, and Fredi quit attending
        school due to this fear. Cux-Lopez further stated that she has fam-
        ily living in Guatemala City, about a four to five-hour drive from
        her hometown. However, her reluctance to relocate within Gua-
        temala was not based on fear, but instead because she has no
        money and her siblings told her she could not move there.
               After considering Petitioners’ testimony and the other evi-
        dence introduced, including reports regarding Guatemala’s human
        rights conditions, the IJ denied the Petitioners’ applications for asy-
        lum and withholding of removal, which the Petitioners appealed
        to the BIA. The BIA, in a single-member decision relying on prec-
        edent from this Court and the BIA, affirmed the IJ’s decision, con-
        cluding that Petitioners failed to sufficiently establish their mem-
        bership in a particular social group due to the circular nature of
        their proposed social group and the lack of a nexus between their
        claimed persecution and their proposed social group.
               We affirm the BIA’s decision. 2 As to asylum, Petitioners did
        not meet their burden of proof under the INA. Petitioners’ basis
        for asylum was that they are members of a particular social group
        and face a risk of persecution due to that status—specifically, as

        2 On appeal, Petitioners also argue that they demonstrated past persecution.

        Because the BIA did not reach that issue, Petitioners’ argument is not properly
        before the Court. Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 403.
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        23-10528                Opinion of the Court                          7

        “Guatemalan mothers fleeing personal gang persecution and that
        of their young student children” and “young Guatemalan male stu-
        dents who are targeted by gang members for repeated rejection of
        gang recruitment to protect themselves and their family mem-
        bers.” However, the definition of their “particular social groups”
        is circular in that the risk of persecution defines the very risk they
        fear. Cux-Lopez’s proposed social group’s defining attribute is the
        risk of persecution stemming from being a mother with a young
        student child fleeing gang persecution, which is the definition of an
        impermissibly circular social group. Perez-Zenteno, 913 F.3d at 1310.
        Fredi’s proposed social group suffers the same fate, for his proposed
        social group’s defining attribute is the fact that he has been targeted
        by gang members. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d at 1310 (holding that “family
        [members] targeted by a drug-trafficking organization” was an im-
        permissibly circular social group) (emphasis added). Thus, the pro-
        posed groups were not legally cognizable, and because they as-
        serted no other protected ground, they could not establish the req-
        uisite nexus between the claimed persecution and a protected
        ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Moreover, Petitioners’ fear of
        gang-related violence directed towards them, while obviously
        troubling, does not establish a widespread fear of violence against
        every Guatemalan mother or young student. The same, as a mat-
        ter of statutory interpretation and application, is true for Fredi who
        defined his proposed social group as all “young Guatemalan male
        students” targeted by gangs. Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1258. As such, the
        BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s denial of Petitioners’ application
        for asylum. Likewise, because Petitioners are not eligible for
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                23-10528

        asylum, they necessarily cannot establish their eligibility for with-
        holding of removal, and the BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s
        denial of such relief. Rodriguez Morales, 488 F.3d at 891.
                             II.    Denial of CAT Relief
               We review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evi-
        dence, wherein we “view the record evidence in the light most fa-
        vorable to the agency’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences
        in favor of that decision.” Perez-Zenteno, 913 F.3d at 1306 (internal
        quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
        1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). Under this standard of re-
        view, “we must affirm the BIA’s decision if it is supported by rea-
        sonable, substantial, and probative evidence” in consideration of
        the entire record. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
        Muhumed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2004)).
                To be eligible for CAT relief, the noncitizen must meet a
        higher burden of proof than for asylum eligibility and show that
        she will more likely than not be tortured if she returned to the des-
        ignated country of removal. Lingeswaran v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 969 F.3d
        1278, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). All
        relevant evidence must be considered, including the applicant’s
        ability to relocate and information regarding conditions within the
        country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). “Torture” is defined as an inten-
        tionally inflicted “extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment”
        that includes “severe pain or suffering” which can be either mental
        or physical. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1), (2).
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        23-10528               Opinion of the Court                          9

                Importantly, CAT only protects noncitizens from torture
        that is being inflicted, instigated, or acquiesced to by a public offi-
        cial or another individual acting in his or her official capacity. Lin-
        geswaran, 969 F.3d at 1293. For a public official to acquiesce to the
        torture, the public official must have awareness of the activity be-
        fore it occurs and be aware of his or her responsibility to intervene
        to prevent the activity. Id. A government does not acquiesce to
        torture when it “actively, albeit not entirely successfully, combats
        the alleged torture.” Lingeswaran, 969 F.3d at 1294 (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted) (quoting Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369
        F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2004)).
                Before the IJ, Petitioners only presented evidence of criminal
        gang activity by private actors they directly experienced or wit-
        nessed. Although their evidence showed that crime rates were
        high in Guatemala, the record does not demonstrate that the Gua-
        temalan government inflicted, instigated, or acquiesced to any ac-
        tivities that constitute torture under CAT. Although perhaps woe-
        fully inadequate and thus far unsuccessful, Petitioners’ evidence
        nevertheless did show some modest efforts on the part of the Gua-
        temalan government to curb the violence. Additionally, Petition-
        ers never reported the incidents of violence they personally experi-
        enced to Guatemalan officials. Based on this evidence, the IJ denied
        Petitioners’ application for CAT relief, and the BIA affirmed the de-
        nial.
               Here, the record, taken as a whole, does not support a find-
        ing that Petitioners would more likely than not be tortured with
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                23-10528

        the acquiescence of the Guatemalan government upon their re-
        turn. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2), (3); Perez-Zenteno, 913 F.3d at 1306;
        Lingeswaran, 969 F.3d at 1293-94. While Petitioners may under-
        standably be afraid of continued violence in Guatemala, their rea-
        sonable fears unfortunately do not satisfy the heightened standard
        to be eligible for CAT relief.
              PETITION DENIED.