Court Opinion

ID: 9544218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:53:15.923072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:25.079442
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice,
dissenting, with whom
BAKES, Justice, concurs.
I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the judgments of conviction in this case, but I must dissent from the affirmance of the defendants’ sentences of not less than ten years.
The majority opinion relies upon the case of In re Miller, 23 Idaho 403, 129 P. 1075 (1913), as authority for its decision. The majority opinion has concluded that the maximum sentence for the1 infamous crime against nature is left to the discretion of the trial court.
*932The court in In re Miller, supra, reasoned that although Revised Codes § 6810 (now I.C. § 18-6605) provided only a minimum sentence of not less than five years for the commission of the infamous crime against nature, the maximum sentence was not prescribed and hence was left to judicial discretion. Justice Ailshie dissented from the decision and questioned the majority opinion in failing to apply Revised Codes sec. 6312 (now I.C. § 18-112).
“Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by this code, every offense declared to be a felony, is punishable by imprisonment in the state Prison not exceeding five years, or by fine not exceeding $5,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
Justice Ailshie stated:
“Sec. 6312 makes no pretense at dealing with the minimum penalty, and so when it says that, ‘where a different punishment is not prescribed by this Code’ the penalty shall ‘not exceed five years’ imprisonment and $5,000 fine,’ it certainly means that where a different maximum penalty is not fixed. In the very nature of the sentence, it could not have reference to a minimum penalty but only to a maximum penalty. Sec. 6312 makes no pretense at being anything but a maximum penalty statute. It is neither unusual nor inconsistent for one statute to fix the minimum penalty to be inflicted and another and'general statute to fix the maximum penalty applicable to all felonies where a different, specific maximum penalty is not prescribed by statute. That is just the thing our statute has undertaken to do.” 23 Idaho at 410-411, 129 P. at 1077.
The majority opinion in In re Miller, supra, distinguished three previous cases of this court which had applied the provisions of Revised Statutes § 6313, which provided,
“[ejxcept in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by this Code, every offense declared to be a misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding six months, or by a fine not exceeding three hundred dollars, or by both,”
to a misdemeanor statute which had merely fixed the minimum penalty. Those three cases were State v. Mulkey, 6 Idaho 617, 59 P. 17 (1899); In re Rowland, 8 Idaho 595, 70 P. 610 (1902); and In re Burgess, 12 Idaho 143, 84 P. 1059 (1906). Although the majority in In re Miller, supra, stated that it considered those decisions right, it nonetheless ignored the reasoning therein. Justice Ailshie in his dissenting opinion concluded that the majority seemed to reverse the rule and reasoning in those three cases.
The majority opinion in In re Miller was based on the fact that the statute under which the defendant was charged by its terms fixed a minimum penalty. However, in my opinion, in 1947, the legislature destroyed the foundation supporting the case of In re Miller when it amended the indeterminate sentence law. See, S.L.1947, Ch. 46.1 Such amendment eliminated any minimum sentence. After 1947, I.C. § 18-6605, which previously had established a minimum sentence, but did not fix a maximum sentence, was left without any valid term of punishment being established. In such a situation, I.C. § 18-112 fills the gap. It establishes the punishment for a felony, where no other punishment is fixed by law, at imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years or by fine not exceeding $5,000 or by both such fine and imprisonment.
In my opinion the majority opinion in this case is in error in relying upon the case of In re Miller as supportive of its conclusion.
*933In spite of the henious nature of the crimes committed by the defendants, it is my conclusion that the specific statutory provisions of I.C. § 18-112 as established by the legislature must control. Therefore, I would affirm the judgments of conviction but impose only the maximum five year sentence as established by I.C. § 18-112.

. The 1947 amendment (S.L.1947, Ch. 46) provided:
“The minimum period of imprisonment in the penitentiary heretofore provided by law for the punishment of felonies, and each such minimum period of imprisonment for felonies, hereby is abolished. * *
See, I.C. § 19-2513.