Court Opinion

ID: 9857665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 15:53:27.179785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:59.323666
License: Public Domain

FOURNET, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
While I fully recognize that the constitution of the United States and those of the several states prohibit the taking of private property except for public use or utility without just compensation, the Louisiana constitution, unlike these, specifically prohibits such taking unless and until just and adequate compensation is previously paid.
Consequently, the decisions of the several states, as well as those of the federal courts, allowing a condemnor under certain conditions to go into possession of the property pending an appeal by the condemnee from judgment authorizing the talcing and fixing of the amount to be paid, as, for example, when the amount adjudged to be a fair value for the property is deposited with the court, or when a bond for such amount is furnished, can have no application in this state, for they were decided under the specific constitutional and/or statutory provisions of these respective jurisdictions. The error in the majority decision lies in its reliance on these authorities, in total disregard of the specific contrary provisions of our own constitution.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in The Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Company, 135 U.S. 641, 10 S.Ct. 965, 34 L.Ed. 295, cited and quoted from at length in the majority to support its holding, lucidly explains and expounds on the logic underlying the decisions in the other state and federal courts, and, I think, clearly exposes the reason why no reliance can be placed on such holdings to sustain the instant decision, for the United States Supreme Court there points out that “The Constitution declares that private property shall not be taken ‘for public use without just compensation.’ It does not provide or require that compensation shall he actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land *113to be taken. * * * In the event of an appeal from the finding of the referees, the company (condemnor) is required to pay into court double the amount of the award, to abide its judgment; and, that being done, the company may enter upon the property sought to be condemned, and proceed with the construction of its road.” It is obvious, therefore, that title does not vest in the condemnor under these statutory and constitutional provisions until the matter has been finally determined and the amount paid. (The emphasis and word in brackets are supplied.)
The United States Supreme Court, in the Cherokee case, considering the question of the status of the property if, upon trial, the amount assessed against the condemnor exceeded the amount paid into court, stated: “This question would be more embarrassing than it is if, by the terms of the act of Congress, the title to the property appropriated passed from the owner to the defendant * * *. But, clearly the title does not pass until compensation is actually made to the owner. * * * if the * * judgment in its favor (be) in excess of the amount paid into the court, the defendant must pay off the judgment before it can acquire the title to the property entered upon, and, failing to pay it within a reasonable time after the compensation is finally determined, it will become a trespasser, and liable to be proceeded against as such.” (The emphasis and word in brackets are supplied.)
Contrary to the holding of the majority that under R.S. 19:13 and Articles 2634 and 2636 of the Revised Civil Code, as amended by the legislature in 1960, the condemnor’s title in this state is “inchoate" until final determination in the appellate court, R.S. 19 :- 13, set out in full in the first footnote in the majority opinion, provides a suspensive appeal is unavailable to any party to an expropriation proceeding, and that when a devolutive appeal is resorted to “payment to the owner of the amount awarded by the trial court, or the deposit thereof in the registry of the court, entitles the plaintiff to the property described in the judgment in the same manner as would a voluntary conveyance,” the condemnor only being required to pay additional assessment or recover back surplus paid in the event the award is varied in the appellate court. (The emphasis has been supplied.)
It is thus obvious that the Congressional statute and those of the several states allow the condemnor to only take possession of the condemned property pending appeal while our statute vests title to the property sought to be condemned in the same manner as if it had been voluntarily conveyed by deed executed by the owner once the condemnee is paid the amount awarded, or this amount is merely deposited in the *115court’s registry pending final determination of the case on appeal.
It is clear, therefore, that Acts Nos. 92 and 93 of 1960, amending Articles 2634 and 2636, respectively, of the Revised. Civil Code, by denying condemnor a suspensive appeal and authorizing the taking of plaintiff’s property without adequate compensation having been previously paid are unconstitutional, being in direct contravention of the constitutional provisions on this subj ect, which are to the effect that “private property shall not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and after just and 'adequate compensation is paid” (Section 2. ' of Article I), nor shall “vested rights be divested, unless for purposes of public utility and for just- and adequate compensation previously paid.” Section 15 of Article IV. (The emphasis has been supplied.)