Court Opinion

ID: 9543140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:42:32.895307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:45.962581
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. This case is but another of the many which we are compelled to review on the basis of alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const, amend. IV. Again, we are called upon to measure police conduct on the basis of the oft-cited cases of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). The two-pronged test set out in Aguilar and Spinelli has not brought certainty into the law, but has provided the focal point in nearly every narcotics case.
*315In this case, the trial judge was in a better position than we are to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence which was offered to establish probable cause. Because of the overwhelming evidence which the police obtained against the defendant, I favor the result which the majority of the court has reached. Public criticism of the courts is due, in part, to the interpretations which have surrounded the exclusionary rule. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). The exclusionary rule was intended to deter overzealous and unconstitutional police conduct. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914).
It is doubtful that the exclusionary rule has served its purpose. The rule is grounded in procedure and not constitutional cement. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). Growing disenchantment with the exclusionary rule causes me to wonder whether the time has not come to fashion a new remedy which will protect every citizen against unlawful search or seizure and at the same time foster better and more cautious law enforcement practices. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (dissenting opinion); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970); Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U. L. Rev. 1 (1970); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. 255 (1961).
Until the exclusionary rule is modified, the members of this court and all lawyers have no choice but to attempt to find some logic and continuity in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In this case, as in nearly every narcotics case, the defendant’s complicity in the crime is established by the events which accompanied the arrest. Again, the arrest is predicated upon information supplied by the ubiquitous and anonymous, confidential, reliable informant. The reliability of the informant in this case is not questioned, and the only issue is whether or not the “basis-of-knowledge” prong of Aguilar and Spinelli is met. The informant did not detail or provide any of the underlying circumstances as to the manner in which he acquired his information. Where he got the information or how he got the information or the basis of his knowledge can only be arrived at by speculation.
A defect in the first prong, the “basis-of-knowledge” requirement, may be cured by self-verifying detail which is sufficient to permit a reasonable inference that the informant obtained his facts in a reliable manner. See DeLaCruz v. People, 177 Colo. 46, 492 P.2d 627 (1972); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959).
The informant told the detective that if he “wanted to make a heroin bust, that a party by the name of Frank Williams would be going to the parking lot of the K-Mart Shopping Center at 50th and Federal in approx*316imately fifteen minutes.” He also described the car that Williams would be driving. Admittedly, there were exigent circumstances, but the detail supplied does not satisfy the burden cast upon the prosecution to prove that probable cause existed to make an arrest without a warrant. See Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L. Rev. 741 (1974).
In my view, the record does not establish that there was probable cause to arrest, and I would, therefore, affirm the trial court.