Court Opinion

ID: 9732025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:05:29.441386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:22.642641
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Even if we assume that the decision to stipulate to the testimony of a key witness is a matter of trial strategy, such as what witnesses to call and whether and how to conduct cross-examination, defense counsel may make such decisions only “after consulting with his client.” Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54, 604 N.E.2d at 281. There is no support for the majority’s holding that “defendant need not be personally consulted about the matter.” 332 Ill. App. 3d at 814. Defense counsel’s stipulation to the testimony of a witness can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel in a criminal case may waive his client’s sixth amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence, so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorney’s decision, and so long as it can be said that the attorney’s decision was part of a prudent trial strategy. United States v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1999) (defendant achieved several tactical advantages as a result of stipulation: rushed prosecution to trial, limited witness’s testimony, allowed attack on officer who related the conversation). The argument that defendant’s failure to object to actions taken by his counsel at trial constitutes a waiver has been rejected on the basis defendant may have been surprised by the action and may not have been aware he had any right to complain. 3 W. LaFave, J. Israel & N. King, Criminal Procedure § 11.6(a), at 54-55 & n.62.9 (2d ed. Supp. 2002). The failure to consult with defendant may constitute ineffective assistance if it deprives defendant of an opportunity he otherwise would have taken advantage of. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476-80, 145 L. Ed. 2d 985, 994-97, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1034-36 (2000) (opportunity to appeal). Is the decision to stipulate to the testimony of a key witness a decision involving fundamental rights, such as the decision to plead guilty, which defendant has the right to make? Or is it a matter involving trial strategy, the day-to-day conduct of the trial, which must in practice be made by counsel? The answer is that the decision to stipulate is not only similar to a guilty plea, it often is a guilty plea. A defendant may dispute a particular issue, a ruling on a motion to suppress, for example, but otherwise stipulate that he does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence. If the disputed issue is resolved against him, defendant may be convicted without a trial. See People v. Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11, 16, 570 N.E.2d 320, 322 (1991); People v. Davis, 286 Ill. App. 3d 686, 688, 676 N.E.2d 675, 677 (1997). The majority recognizes that the rule it announces today cannot be applied where there is “a stipulation that the evidence is sufficient to convict.” 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a). In that situation, the defendant must be advised by the court that he has the right to plead guilty or not guilty and that by stipulating the evidence is sufficient to convict he waives the right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted with any witnesses against him who have not testified. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)(4). Even where the stipulation does not rise to the level of Rule 402, even where there is no stipulation “that the evidence is sufficient to convict,” it should be recognized that the decision to stipulate to the testimony of a key witness is more like the decision to plead guilty, a fundamental right, than it is like a matter of trial strategy. As a result of today’s decision, if counsel stipulates at trial to the testimony of a witness without discussing it with defendant, and defendant stands up and says “I object, that witness is lying and would admit it if he were on the stand,” the court may properly respond, “sit down, this isn’t your call.” I recognize there are concerns of judicial administration here, but the solution is not to suggest to counsel that defendant be excluded from important decisions in the case. See 3 W. LaFave, J. Israel & N. King, Criminal Procedure § 11.6(b), at 55 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (balancing of interests). I suggest that the decision whether to stipulate to the testimony of a key witness belongs to the defendant, after consultation with defense counsel.