Court Opinion

ID: 9697521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:19:07.335946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:33.260026
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority but write separately because the majority failed to address an issue which I believe is properly before us and should be resolved. The issue is whether the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony relating to the so-called “battered woman syndrome.”1 More specifically, the issue is whether we should permit expert testimony about the battered woman's syndrome in a self-*427defense case. Although “[t]he majority of states which have examined the admissibility of battered women syndrome evidence have held it admissible,” State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn.1989),2 a majority of this court has yet to fully resolve this issue.
Mrs. Dillon testified at trial that her husband had physically assaulted her approximately eighteen to twenty times during their eighteen month marriage. She also testified that Mr. Dillon had repeatedly struck her in the twenty-four hour period prior to the killing. Mrs. Dillon stated that on the night before the killing, her husband had hit her head on the night table, causing her head to bleed.
On the evening of the killing, Mrs. Dillon testified that she had broken free from her husband while they were in the car and went into the house. As she was cleaning up in the kitchen, Mr. Dillon grabbed her by the arm and pushed her over by the counter. She was pinned by the refrigerator and was unable to break away from her husband. He *428was punching her and kept telling her he was going to kill her. As she pleaded for him to stop, he kept repeating that he was going to kill her. She testified that she was scared he was going to kill her, because she had never seen him react like that. At that point, she reached into a drawer to pull something out and grabbed a knife, with which she stabbed him.
Ms. Zerbe, a cousin of Mrs. Dillon, testified that she was present in May of 1985 when Mr. Dillon started “hollering and screaming” and began “throwing punches” at Mrs. Dillon. Ms. Zerbe, in an attempt to protect her cousin, jumped in between the Dillons and was the recipient of the blows intended for Mrs. Dillon.
Mrs. Dillon's youngest son testified that on the night before the killing, his mother’s head was bleeding from a gash which she received after an argument she had with the deceased. The son testified that he asked the deceased whether he had hit his mother, but the deceased merely told him to get some aspirin for her, never answering the question,
Detective Miller testified that he observed bruises on Mrs. Dillon’s arms and legs on the day of the killing as well as red finger marks on her legs, “as if somebody had grabbed her by the leg and squeezed it.” He also testified that on the night of the killing, he saw an injury on her scalp with visible dried blood.
A neighbor of the Dillons testified that shortly before the killing, the deceased grabbed Mrs. Dillon by the arm in the car, restraining her from leaving the vehicle. He testified that Mrs. Dillon broke free and ran up the stairs to the house.
At the trial of this matter, counsel for Mrs. Dillon requested that he be permitted to call Dr. Richard G. Lonsdorf, a clinical psychiatrist, to testify about the battered woman syndrome and its applicability to the facts of the case. The trial court refused to admit such testimony, relying on the Superior Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. *429Stonehouse, 358 Pa.Super. 270, 517 A.2d 540 (1986), which held that “[t]he ‘battered woman syndrome’ has not been recognized in this Commonwealth as a viable defense in case [sic] of homicide.” 358 Pa.Super. 270, 278, 517 A.2d 540, 544 (1986).
Following the trial of the case sub judice, this Court reversed the Superior Court decision in Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41, 555 A.2d 772 (1989). In Stone-house, we stated, in a plurality decision,3 that:
[W]e believe that expert testimony regarding battered women is admissible as the basis for proving justification in the use of deadly force where the defendant has been shown to be a victim of psychological and physical abuse.
Id., 521 Pa. at 61, 555 A.2d at 783.
As was discussed in Stonehouse, the myths concerning battered women are firmly entrenched in the minds of our culture. For example, many people believe that battered women are masochistic, weak and uneducated, that they can easily escape victimization by leaving their tormentors, and that the police would protect such women if only they would *430request help.4 Although these beliefs are erroneous, many people still steadfastly hold to them. Thus, the necessity for and the importance of expert testimony is clear as it is helpful to the jury to assail these myths and to consider the evidence in a fair and impartial manner.
Evidence concerning battered women generally arises in two distinct types of murder cases. The first scenario is the “non-confrontational” type case in which an abused woman kills her husband during a period of time when he is not attacking her. Often, the killings occur while the husband is sleeping or otherwise incapacitated. See, Commonwealth v. Grove, 363 Pa.Super. 328, 526 A.2d 369, 373 (1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 630, 539 A.2d 810 (1987). That type of case is not before us here.
The battered woman issue also arises in “confrontational” killings, where the woman uses deadly force in response to an actual physical attack. Several jurisdictions have permitted testimony about the battered woman syndrome in cases involving a confrontational, self-defense posture. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C.1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C.1983); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn.1989); State v. Allery, 101 Wash.2d. 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984) and State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.1981), appeal after remand, 456 A.2d 1255 (Me.1983).5
As stated, the question before this Court is whether we should permit expert testimony about the battered woman *431syndrome in a self-defense case. I believe that such testimony is appropriate for two reasons. First, the testimony is helpful as an aid to the jury to explain matters beyond common knowledge and experience. Second, the testimony is relevant to the defendant’s state of mind.
First, it is clear that many jurors believe the myths about battered women and will often be unable to understand either why a woman failed to leave her husband or why she did not contact the police for assistance. These stereotypic beliefs underscore the importance of expert testimony to explain why women remain silent about and in denial of the abuse they have suffered. Without expert testimony, many jurors — who have little knowledge or understanding of the dynamics of batterers and their victims — find the tales of abuse and the reactions of those abused simply beyond their ken. One commentator thoughtfully notes:
Testimony concerning the battered woman syndrome is of particular value to a defendant whose emotional patterns and social history conform to the syndrome because it effectively rebuts common jury misconceptions, such as the notion that she might have been able to extricate herself from the abusive relationship by some means short of killing her batterer.6
Thus, expert testimony is proper to educate the jury about the phenomenon of batterers and their spouses. As Justice Flaherty wrote for the majority in Commonwealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 517 A.2d 920 (1986):
It has long been established that expert opinion testimony is proper only where formation of an opinion on a subject requires knowledge, information, or skill beyond what is possessed by the ordinary juror. As stated in Commonwealth v. Leslie, 424 Pa. 331, 334, 227 A.2d 900, 903 (1967) (quoting Commonwealth v. Nasuti, 385 Pa. 436, 443, 123 A.2d 435, 438 (1956)), “ ‘Expert testimony is admissible in all cases, civil and criminal alike, when it *432involves explanations and inferences not within the range of ordinary training, knowledge, intelligence and experience.’ ”
Id., 512 Pa. at 442, 517 A.2d at 921.
The danger of not presenting expert testimony in these cases is that the jury may well be predisposed to judge the actions and reactions of a woman in a position that they cannot hope to comprehend. In- my view, many jurors who know nothing about battered women simply find the tales of abuse too incredible to believe and thus, refuse to keep an open mind about the rest of the evidence, being convinced that “no one would have put up with such abuse therefore it must not be true.” The testimony of the expert is intended to refute some of the common prejudices against battered women, thus permitting the jury to have a better ability to judge the evidence rationally, rather than judge it on the basis of an erroneous prejudice.7 Once the jury is educated by an expert about the battered woman syndrome, they are in a much better position to assess the facts before them.8
This Court has consistently held that in self-defense cases, the jury must decide whether the acts of the defen*433dant are reasonable in light of the way in which the defendant perceives the alleged danger. See, e.g., Murray v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. 311, 317 (1875); Commonwealth v. Eberle, 474 Pa. 548, 379 A.2d 90 (1977); and Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 431 A.2d 949 (1981). It is only when the jury understands how the defendant perceives the alleged danger are they able to make a rational judgment about the defendant’s actions. In a self-defense case in which the defendant is a battered woman, rationally understanding the way in which she perceives danger may not be “within the range of ordinary training, knowledge, intelligence and experience” of the jury. Seese, 512 Pa. at 442, 517 A.2d at 921.
What may seem to be “reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm” to a person who is not the subject of abuse may not correspond with the reasonable fear of someone who has been living with an abusive husband.9 As the Washington Supreme Court aptly noted in State v. Allery, 101 Wash.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984),
We find that expert testimony explaining why a person suffering from the battered woman syndrome would not *434leave her mate, would not inform police or friends, and would fear increased aggression against herself would be helpful to a jury in understanding a phenomenon not within the competence of an ordinary lay person.
682 P.2d at 316.
The second reason I believe that expert testimony should be admissible is that it may be shown to be relevant to the defendant’s state of mind. Admitting such testimony in self-defense cases is wholly consistent with our case law allowing evidence tending to show whether the defendant beiieved his life was in danger.
In Commonwealth v. Michael Stewart, 461 Pa. 274, 336 A.2d 282 (1975), we held that state of mind evidence is relevant to show that the defendant acted not out of malice, but out of fear. See also, Commonwealth v. Scott, 480 Pa. 50, 389 A.2d 79 (1978), in which we held it was error not to permit appellant’s wife to testify about prior racial incidents in which they were victimized to show the jury that appellant was in a state of fear at the time of the shooting and that he acted in self defense, or at the very least, not out of malice. “Clearly appellant’s state of mind was relevant in the instant case. The evidence he sought to present to the jury tended to establish that his actions were motivated by fear rather than the intent required to convict for murder.” Id., 480 Pa. at 56, 389 A.2d at 82. Additionally, in Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 431 A.2d 949 (1981) we stated “there is no reason why a finding of self-defense should not consider the mental state of a reasonable person who has suffered repeated previous beatings at the hands of the victim.” 494 Pa. at 472-73, 431 A.2d at 952 (quoting Comment, 6 Pepperdine L.Rev. 213, 223 (1978)).
In self-defense cases, we have long permitted testimony about the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s prior violent acts, Commonwealth v. David Stewart, 483 Pa. 176, 394 A.2d 968 (1978), as well as evidence of the history of abuse suffered at the hands of the victim, Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 431 A.2d 949 (1981). In Commonwealth v. Grove, 363 Pa.Super. 328, 526 A.2d 369, 373 *435(1987), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 630, 539 A.2d 810 (1987), the Superior Court aptly acknowledged that:
Pennsylvania courts recognized that battered wives, viewing the facts through a filter of fear caused by past beatings, might reasonably perceive the approach of their threatening but unarmed husbands in the same way that another person would view the approach of a stranger with an upraised knife.
Id., 363 Pa.Superior Ct. at 336, 526 A.2d at 373 (emphasis in original).10
The Superior Court in Grove refers to Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 431 A.2d 949 (1981), in which we stated that:
In a case such as this, in which there has been physical abuse over a long period of time, the circumstances which assist the court in determining the reasonableness of a defendant’s fear of death or serious injury at the time of a killing include the defendant’s familiarity with the victim’s behavior in the past.... ‘[T]here is no reason why a finding of self-defense should not consider the mental state of a reasonable person who has suffered repeated previous beatings at the hands of the victim.’ [cites omitted]
Id., 494 Pa. at 472-73, 431 A.2d at 949 (emphasis supplied).
The reason testimony about the deceased victim’s prior behavior is admissible is that it is relevant to the state of mind of the defendant at the time the killing occurred. Psychiatric testimony may also be relevant to the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the killing.
In prior cases, this Court and the Superior Court have permitted expert psychiatric testimony to be introduced in murder cases when such testimony is relevant to certain *436recognized defenses involving the defendant’s state of mind. For example, psychiatric testimony is permitted to show that the defendant lacked the specific intent necessary for a first degree murder conviction. See Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976). Furthermore, we recognized that psychiatric testimony may be relevant to show that a killing was committed in the heat of passion in Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 391, 292 A.2d 286, 290-91 (1972) where we stated:
Applying the established principles of relevancy to a murder prosecution where a defendant asserts that he acted in the heat of passion, it seems clear [that] any evidence — lay or psychiatric — pertinent to that defense should be admissible.
The same rationale is applicable in a self-defense case. In Commonwealth v. Black, 474 Pa. 47, 50, 376 A.2d 627, 629 (1977), then Justice, now Chief Justice Nix, writing for the majority, stated that “we agree that the proffered evidence [psychiatric testimony] would have been relevant to a claim of self-defense....” In Black, however, the facts did not support the self-defense claim and thus, we found that the exclusion of the proffered testimony did not require reversal.11
In the plurality decision of Commonwealth v. Light, 458 Pa. 328, 326 A.2d 288 (1974), Justice Pomeroy (joined by Justice Jones, with Justices Eagen and O’Brien concurring in result) writing in favor of affirmance, stated that there were two elements to self-defense:
First, the defendant in fact must have acted out of an honest, bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger. Second, the belief must be reasonable in light of the facts as they appeared to him. [cite omitted] The first element is entirely subjective; the second, clearly objective.
*437Id., 458 Pa. at 334, 326 A.2d at 292. Justice Pomeroy went on to state that “psychiatric testimony should be admissible as to ... the subjective element of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the occurrence.” Id.12
As the cases cited herein demonstrate, permitting expert testimony in a case such a this is in complete accord with our existing case law. I do not believe we would be creating a new “battered woman’s defense” by permitting expert testimony in the case sub judice, nor would I suggest that we attempt to do so here. The defense asserted is self-defense. The testimony of the expert is relevant to the defendant’s state of mind concerning self-defense and is helpful to the jury in evaluating the testimony.
In a self-defense case in which the defendant alleges that she was battered by the victim and proffers competent expert testimony concerning the battered woman’s syndrome, I believe that an expert may testify about the *438elements of the syndrome and whether he or she believes that the defendant suffered from such a syndrome at the time of the act or acts in question. Additionally, as part of the syndrome, the expert should be able to testify about the perceptions of battered women generally when they are faced with violence by their husbands.13 The testimony is also important because it may establish that “among battered women who kill, the final incident that precipitates the killing is viewed by the battered woman as ‘more severe and more life-threatening than prior incidents.’ ” Stonehouse, 521 Pa. at 64, 555 A.2d at 784 (quoting from Schneider, supra, note 3, at 634). Thus, the testimony, while clearly relevant to the honesty of a defendant’s belief, is uniquely relevant to the reasonableness of her belief at the moment she killed him. In the case before us, Ms. Dillon testified as follows:
I asked him, “Please stop; don’t hit me anymore.” That just didn’t do anything. And he kept repeating, “I am going to kill you.” At this point I was scared. I thought he was going to kill me, because I have never seen him react like this.
Although we need not decide whether, as a general rule, expert testimony is relevant to the reasonableness of a defendant’s state of mind, in the case of self-defense involving the battered woman’s syndrome, it clearly is relevant.14
I believe it is furthermore apparent that if psychiatric testimony is relevant to the issue of self defense, it is *439relevant to the issue of an “imperfect self defense,” namely, whether the individual who committed the killing honestly believed that the circumstance were such that they justified the killing, although such belief is unreasonable. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(b); Commonwealth v. Cain, 484 Pa. 240, 398 A.2d 1359 (1979).
Reviewing the testimony of the witnesses as a whole in the case sub judice, I believe that the appellant introduced evidence establishing a “pattern of battering,” Stonehouse, 521 Pa. at 66, 555 A.2d at 785, sufficient to enable her to introduce expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome as initially recognized in Stonehouse.15
For the reasons recited, I believe that in addition to the remand as ordered by the majority, this case also should be remanded with the instruction that the trial court permit the appellant to introduce expert testimony about the battered woman syndrome.
LARSEN and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.

. According to Lenore Walker, the recognized leading expert on the subject, a battered woman is a "woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any concern for her rights." L.E. Walker, The Battered Woman (1979).

. See People v. Aris, 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 264 Cal.Rptr. 167 (1989); State v. Scott, 1989 WL 90613 (unreported, Del.Super.Ct.1989); Terry v. State, 467 So.2d 761 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985); Borders v. State, 433 So.2d 1325 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.2d 801 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982); Strong v. State, 251 Ga. 540, 307 S.E.2d 912 (1983); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); People v. Minnis, 118 Ill.App.3d 345, 74 Ill.Dec. 179, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983); State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d 563 (1986); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (1985); Commonwealth v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387 (Ky.1990); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.1981); May v. State, 460 So.2d 778 (Miss.1984); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980); State v. Norman, 89 N.C.App. 384, 366 S.E.2d 586 (1988), rev’d 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989) (reversing on the grounds that the defendant did not act in self-defense, but not disallowing the evidence of the battered woman syndrome); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268 (1986); People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1984); People v. Torres, 128 Misc.2d 129, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1985); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D.1983); State v. Thomas, 13 Ohio App.3d 211, 13 OBR 261, 468 N.E.2d 763 (1983); State v. Hill, 287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (S.C.1986); State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d 631 (Tenn.Crim.App.1990); Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); State v. Kelly, 102 Wash.2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984); State v. Allery, 101 Wash.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984); State v. Dozier, 163 W.Va. 192, 255 S.E.2d 552 (1979); State v. Felton, 110 Wis.2d 485, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983).

. Justice Larsen, joined by Justices Papadakos and Stout, wrote the opinion reversing the case on the grounds that counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to request a jury instruction that would require the jury to consider the cumulative effects of psychological and physical abuse when assessing what constitutes sufficient provocation to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter; and (2) failing to introduce expert testimony on the issue of the battered woman syndrome to assist the jury in assessing appellant’s claim that she had a reasonable belief that she faced a life-threatening situation when she fired her gun at the deceased.
Justice Zappala, joined by justice Flaherty, concurred with the holding that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request an instruction that would have provided guidance to the jury as to the import of the history of the physical and psychological abuse in determining whether appellant reasonably believed that she was in danger of death or serious bodily injury. Justices Zappala and Flaherty, however, believed that the appellant had made it clear that the battered woman syndrome was not an issue in the case and thus did not believe it was necessary or appropriate to reach that issue.
Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice McDermott, dissented, finding that the battered woman syndrome was not an issue in the case, per the statements of the parties at oral argument. Chief Justice Nix did not address any other issue in his dissenting opinion.

. Many studies conducted about police response to wife battering have established that the police often do not provide protection to women who call for help in domestic violence situations. See generally, Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 Harv. Women’s L.J. 121, 129, n. 36 (1985); Comment, The Battered Spouse Syndrome as a Defense to a Homicide Charge Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 26 Vill.L.Rev. 105, 105-07 (1980-81); Schneider, Equal Rights To Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 623, 626 (1980).

. In the vast majority of states addressing the battered woman syndrome testimony, the issue has arisen in a traditional self-defense posture and the clear majority of courts have allowed such testimony. See note 2, supra.

. Comment, Expert Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome: Its Admissibility in Spousal Homicide Cases, 19 Suffolk L.Rev. 877, 881-81 (1985).

. It is indeed curious that our society instinctively blames the battered woman for not leaving or getting help rather than blame the man who abuses her. This prejudice, many believe, arose from this country’s archaic laws that permitted wife beating and treated women as chattel. See, e.g., Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men In Self-Defense, 8 Harv. Women’s L.J. 121, 129, n. 35 (1985), in which the author notes that "[hjistorically, wife abuse has been culturally condoned and legally sanctioned." See also, State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (1984); Schneider, supra, note 3, at 629: "Since the law has historically permitted woman abuse, judges and jurors do not see it as serious or life threatening." See generally, U.S. Comm’n. on Civil Rts., Under the Rule of Thumb: Battered Women and the Administration of Justice 2 (1982). Since the law encouraged such misguided views, the law should now correct them. As this Court stated in Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 472, 431 A.2d 949, 951-52 (1981) "[a] woman whose husband has repeatedly subjected her to physical abuse does not, by choosing to maintain her family relationship with that husband and their children, consent to or assume the risk of further abuse.”

. Clearly, the Commonwealth would also be entitled to introduce any proper expert testimony in rebuttal.

. Part of the very root of the problem with courts accepting the battered woman’s syndrome is the so called “reasonable man" standard. How a reasonable man may perceive danger is quite possibly wholly different from how a reasonable woman may perceive danger. In Schneider, Jordan & Arguedas, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assaults, 4 Nat’l J.Crim.Def. 141, 153 (1978), the authors note:
Sex bias permeates the legal doctrine regarding the perception of imminent and lethal danger. The law assumes that both the attacker and the victim have approximately equal capacities. While a man is assumed to have the ability to perceive danger accurately and respond appropriately, a woman is viewed as responding hysterically and inappropriately to physical threat. However, certain factors relevant to women’s experiences are not taken into account. For example, women are less likely to have had training or experience in hand-to-hand fighting. Socially imposed proscriptions inhibit their ability to fend off an attacker. The fact that women generally are of slighter build also gives a male assailant an advantage. All of these conditions will have an impact on the reasonableness of a woman’s perception of an imminent and lethal threat to her life such as would justify the use of deadly force. These factors, however, have not usually been considered during the trial.

. In Grove, the Superior Court specifically disallowed evidence concerning specific violent acts of the victim as well as his general reputation for violence since there was no evidence of self-defense, and thus, the evidence would not have been relevant. Although the defendant alleged a twenty-two year history of being beaten by her husband, her husband was drunk and asleep when she shot him, tied him up and set him on fire. That issue is not before us in this case and we express no opinion thereon.

. The Superior Court has also held that psychiatric testimony is admissible in a self-defense case. "[I]t is clear that psychiatric testimony is admissible to prove the defendant’s subjective belief that he is in danger of imminent death or serious bodily injury....’’ Commonwealth v. McCloud, 309 Pa.Super. 316, 319, 455 A.2d 177, 179 (1983).

. The dissent in Light, by Justice Manderino, joined by Justice Roberts and (now Chief) Justice Nix, agreed that psychiatric testimony should be admissible in self-defense cases. However, the dissenting opinion remarked that the psychiatric testimony was also relevant to the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that the defendant was in imminent danger, and noted the difficulty in labeling the first part of self defense as “entirely subjective” and the second part as "clearly objective." The dissent correctly stated the function of the jury in a self-defense case involving expert psychiatric testimony:
It is for the jury to decide whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable. Such a determination must be based on the facts and circumstances as the defendant perceived them. This they were unable to do because psychiatric testimony concerning the defendant’s state of mind and its effect on his perception of the facts and circumstances that immediately preceded the shooting was withheld from the jury (emphasis in original).
Id. 428 Pa. at 341, 326 A.2d at 295.
The dissent reflects a position in accordance with the view expressed by the Section 3.04(1) of the Model Penal Code, many states, and several commentators. "Because the law of self-defense has moved towards a subjective approach that takes surrounding circumstances into account, the reasonable man is more often placed in the context of the defendant’s social reality." Donovan & Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. 435, 445 (1981). "[T]he standard of reasonableness applied in any jurisdiction is an amalgam of both subjective and objective factors....’’ Crocker, supra, note 4, at 132, n. 52; and see Schneider, Jordan & Arguedas, supra, note 9, at 155, n. 53.

. I strongly object, however, to any expert testimony that attempts to explain any discrepancies in appellant’s statements to the police. Such testimony would invade the province of the jury and would be at odds with well-established case law. The credibility of a witness is not the proper subject of expert testimony. “It is an encroachment upon the province of the jury to permit admission of expert testimony on the issue of a witness’ credibility.” Seese, 512 Pa. at 443, 517 A.2d at 922. Accord, Commonwealth v. Davis, 518 Pa. 77, 541 A.2d 315 (1988); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 519 Pa. 291, 547 A.2d 355 (1988).

. As this Court stated in Watson, “in determining the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief [in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury], we must also take into account any changes in her husband’s behavior towards her immediately before the killing." 494 Pa. at 473, 431 A.2d at 952. See also Stonehouse, id., n. 11.

. The opinion of the Superior Court in the case sub judice displays a marked disregard for the holding in Stonehouse. The court below stated that "expert testimony is appropriate ‘where uncontradicted testimony reveals that the defendant was a victim of such abuse.’ ” (emphasis supplied). The Superior Court then stated that "whether appellant ... was a battered woman was sharply disputed....” What the Superior Court has done is to paraphrase the issue as set forth in Stonehouse and transform it into a holding. There is absolutely no requirement that the testimony concerning the battering of the defendant be uncontroverted. In fact, in the majority of cases, whether or not the defendant was battered would be an issue subject to conflicting testimony.
What constitutes a "pattern of battering” is a question not before us and one which would be suitable for experts on the battered woman’s syndrome to answer — not members of the judiciary.