Court Opinion

ID: 9679633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:00:43.167977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:17.213517
License: Public Domain

DROWOTA, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion holds that the sole proximate cause of the accident and resulting death of Con-nell Nevill was the negligence of Wayne Culpepper. The trial court and Court of Appeals have held that the death of Plaintiffs’ decedent was proximately caused by the joint and concurring negligence of the Defendant and Wayne Culpepper. Issues of negligence and proximate cause are factual questions and our review of such ques*234tions, when we have concurrent findings of fact, is limited.

Our Standard of Review

Our review of findings of fact is set out in T.C.A. § 27-1-113, “[t]o the extent that the findings of the chancery court and the Court of Appeals concur, they shall, if there be any evidence to support them, be conclusive upon any review of the facts in the Supreme Court.” As Justice Tomlinson stated in Hoover Motor Exp. Co., Inc. v. Clements Paper Co., 193 Tenn. 6, 9, 241 S.W.2d 851, 852 (1951), “if there is any material evidence to sustain the concurrent finding of fact then the Supreme Court is bound thereby not only as to that finding but as well to an inference or conclusion reasonably drawn from the evidence that it is a fact.” In Howard v. Haven, 198 Tenn. 572, 577, 281 S.W.2d 480, 482 (1955), Chief Justice Neil stated that factual issues on which the trial court and Court of Appeals made concurrent findings were foreclosed for further review by the Supreme Court. See, Arnold v. Hayslett, 655 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tenn.1983). Thus, our review of the factual issues involved in this case is limited, if not foreclosed.

The Proceedings Below

The trial court, sitting without a jury, found: (1) that the police officers were negligent; (2) that their negligence was a proximate cause of the death of Plaintiffs’ decedent; and (3) that Plaintiffs’ decedent did not assume the risk and was not con-tributorily negligent. The trial court entered judgment against the Defendant, City of Tullahoma, in “the amount of $92,000.00 as the pecuniary value of the life of the deceased together with funeral expenses in the amount of $2,659.38 and medical expenses in the amount of $35,968.84 for a total judgment in the amount of $130,-628.22.” As pointed out in the majority opinion, this judgment was reduced by $25,-000.00, which represented the policy limits of Culpepper and which was paid in settlement to Plaintiffs, leaving a judgment of $105,628.22 against the City of Tullahoma.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the violations of T.C.A. § 55-8-108 and the written policy and regulation of the Tullahoma Police Department that “[n]o officer will pursuit [sic] a car unless ordered by the supervisor or supervisor gives permission,” were appropriate bases for the findings of negligence on the part of the pursuing officers; that such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury and death; and that the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the Defendants failed to carry the burden of proof that the decedent assumed the risk or was contributorily negligent in bringing about his own death.

The Facts

The City of Tullahoma had adopted, prior to the accident in this case, a formal, written policy pertaining to traffic pursuits and had published this policy in the “Tullahoma Police Department Policy and Procedures Manual” effective April 23, 1983. The pertinent portions provide as follows:
“Upon receiving a call or starting a pursuit, with supervisor’s consent, the officer shall write down the exact time, and the license number of the violator’s car. No officer will pursuit [sic] a car unless ordered by the supervisor or supervisor gives permission.” (emphasis added.)
The police chief testified that this policy was formulated and published because “all high speed chases are dangerous and especially in town where the traffic is.” He stated that the ends that might be obtained by the arrest of misdemeanor traffic violators do not justify the dangers involved; it was, therefore, the policy of the Tullahoma Police Department for its officers not to engage in high speed pursuit of traffic offenders “unless with the supervisor’s permission.”
The record reflects that on the night of July 8, 1983, Wayne Culpepper had been drinking and he and Jimmy Bickers got into a fight in the parking lot of Northgate Mall Shopping Center in Tullahoma. Con-nell Nevill and Culpepper were total strangers. Nevill “had not previously known [Culpepper] until the night of the *235fatal accident.” Nevill assisted in intervening and attempting to separate Culpepper and Bickers and to stop the fight between them. Nevill was talking to Culpepper and trying to calm him down, and, in an effort to do so, he got into the car with Culpep-per. Suddenly and without prior warning, Culpepper “started his car and began driving around the parking lot in circles at a fairly high rate of speed without lights.” As the Court of Appeals found, Plaintiffs’ son had no “reasonable opportunity to exit the car before it became too dangerous to attempt to do so.”
About a minute elapsed before police officers on routine patrol noticed the Culpep-per vehicle. When the police officers entered the shopping center parking lot with flashing blue warning lights, the Culpepper vehicle departed the parking lot onto a public street at a high rate of speed. It was at this time that the passenger door swung open and the officers saw an individual reach out and slam the door. This was the first time either officer realized there was a passenger in the car. The officers followed Culpepper, also at a high rate of speed, with siren sounding and blue lights flashing. It was at this time that the officers initiated their first radio transmission stating, “I am attempting to stop a vehicle headed North on North Atlantic Street ... traveling at a high rate of speed.” When the officers were approximately ½ mile from the Mall, Captain Holloway, the police officers’ supervisor, radioed “wanting to know how fast the vehicle was going,” and he was told “in excess of 100 miles an hour” and that “I [the pursuing officer] was doing 80 miles an hour, and I could not even get close to the vehicle.” Captain Holloway “radioed back” and said “back off” (meaning to reduce speed) but “to continue forward in case they had wrecked.” During the conversation with Captain Holloway, the police officers were still pursuing at a speed of “80 miles an hour” with siren on and the blue lights flashing. The officers stated that when their supervisor radioed to “back off” the driver of the police car let off the gas pedal, applied the brakes, and slowed to “about 40 miles an hour,” and “turned the siren off” but never turned off the flashing blue lights. As the officers proceeded down North Atlantic Street (Normandy Road), they discovered the wrecked Culpep-per vehicle about “five feet or so” off the roadway, and they immediately requested an ambulance. Connell Nevill sustained fatal injuries in the wreck.
I am of the opinion that the record supports Plaintiffs’ contention that the written policy and regulation of the Tullahoma Police Department was violated in that no supervisor ordered pursuit; in fact the pursuit was initiated and conducted without the permission of the supervisor. When the supervisor ordered the officers to “back off,” the evidence is conflicting on what action the officers took. As the Court of Appeals points out, “the testimony of details of the movement of the police [car] is controverted.” Not only was the movement and speed of the police car sharply controverted, but also the use of the siren. The officers’ testimony as to their speed and their distance from the Culpepper vehicle was contradicted by several witnesses. Two witnesses testified that the officers’ active pursuit had not terminated where the officers said it had.
The Court of Appeals, in citing and discussing T.C.A. § 55-8-108, stated that the statute permits emergency vehicles to exceed the speed limit without violating the law; however, it does not confer immunity from tort liability for negligence, particularly in view of the wording of section 108(b)(3) “so long as he does not endanger life or property.” Section 108(d) sets out the standard of care required of the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle as “the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons” under the existing circumstances. The duty owed under the statute extends to “all persons” including passengers in fleeing cars.
Plaintiffs contend, and two courts have held, that the violation of the policy and regulation of the Tullahoma Police Department constitutes negligence.1 Defendant *236avers that the officers substantially complied with the policy and regulation; however, this is a question of fact. The issues of negligence, assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and proximate cause, are all factual questions decided by the trial court and Court of Appeals in favor of the Plaintiffs.
Under our standard of review when we have concurrent findings of fact by the trial court and Court of Appeals, those facts are conclusive in this Court. I would, therefore, hold that the City and its police officers were negligent in the way and manner in which they initiated and conducted a high speed pursuit of a traffic offender in violation of the policy and operating procedures of the Tullahoma Police Department and in violation of T.C.A. § 55-8-108. I would further hold that the death of Plaintiffs’ decedent was proximately caused by the joint and concurring negligence of the City of Tullahoma Police Officers, acting within the scope of their employment, and the negligent conduct of Third-Party Defendant, Wayne Culpepper. As found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, the intervening negligence of Third-Party Defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the accident and death of Connell Nevill. Finally, I would hold that the evidence does not sustain the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence so as to bar recovery by Plaintiffs-Appellees. I have not discussed the numerous cases cited in the majority opinion because this case comes to this Court in a different factual posture. I would accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court and Court of Appeals.

. For a discussion of the admissibility of a city's safety rules and regulations in actions involving *236the allegedly negligent operation of a city ve-hide, see 82 A.L.R.3d 1285, Safety Rules of Municipal Corporation,