Court Opinion

ID: 9912355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 06:05:40.764212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:47.312290
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
              revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                      STATE OF MICHIGAN

                       COURT OF APPEALS

MATTHEW IKLE,                                                  UNPUBLISHED
                                                               December 21, 2023
           Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-
           Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v                                                              No. 360854
                                                               Livingston Circuit Court
DANIEL GOEBEL and BERT L.                                      LC No. 18-029855-CZ
KNICKERBOCKER,

           Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-
           Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
and

KERRY A. FRITTS, ALINA L. FRITTS, BARRY
C. FRITTS, THERESA A. KNICKERBOCKER,

           Defendants/Counterplaintiffs,
and

GENOA TOWNSHIP and ANDRA RUSH,

           Defendants-Appellees,
and

JOSEPH ANZALONE, SERENA ANZALONE,
GEORGE BEHER, JOANNE BEHER, WM
BEHER, MARGARET BEHER, G. RICHARD
BEHER, CORAL BLACK, MARK COLLINS,
CINDY CORBIN, LARRY CORBIN, KATHY
DURFEE, MICHAEL DURFEE, BEVERLY A.
FAVOR, JEFFREY GAGACKI, MARLENE
GAGACKI, PARTICK J. MONETTE, SANDRA
MONETTE, JUDITH PHILLIPS, RONALD LEWIS
RICE, JACK TEEGARDIN, NANCY
TEEGARDIN, CHRISTOPHER A. DAVIS,
LESTER DAVIS, JACK SMITH, JUDY LOCH,

                                           -1-
RUBEN BARRIOS, MICHELLE BARRIOS,
LAUREN E. ALM, JOHN M. STREMICK TRUST,
JOHN M. STREMICK, RICHARD A. WOLFRAM,
MICHELLE A. WOLFRAM, ROBERT BEHER,
KAY BEHER, ANDREW REA, DORIS CASPER
TRUST, DORIS CASPER, YVETTE WHITESIDE,
DORIS AVEY LIFE ESTATE, DORIS AVEY,
ALLEN WALBLAY, VIKKI WALBLAY, CAROL
J. HOLCOMB, RANDALL WILT, MARYLOU
WILT, MICHAEL J. WRIGHT, ERIC
NITSCHMAN, WENDY NITSCHMAN, WILLIAM
COZART, TRYGVE HAUG, DIANE HAUG,
BENJAMIN CROSS, MICHAEL JONES, 5645
GRAND RIVER, LLC, JOHN WARSOP, KAREN
WARSOP, MARK A. PETERS, AMANDA
SMYKLA, BERNARD VANHEUSDEN, KAREN
CHOUINARD, 5611 E. GRAND RIVER, LLC,
ARNOLD STEPHENS LIVING TRUST, ARNOLD
STEPHENS, 5587 E. GRAND RIVER, LLC,
BRANDON DENBY, RYAN W. BRADFORD,
MICHELLE L. BRADFORD, MICHAEL KUPFER,
JILL KUPFER, NANCY NOWAK, DENNIS
COURTER, JACQUELINE COURTER, LORI
MERITT, MICHAEL F. MERITT, THOMAS
KNIVILA, JACQUELINE KNIVILA, THOMAS R.
WOLFE, ANN R. WOLFE, ROBERT
BIALOWICZ, SANDRA BIALOWICZ,
RAYMOND AND HOLLY COPPIELLIE LIFE
ESTATE, RAYMOND COPPIELLIE, HOLLY
COPPIELLIE, PATRICK J. FISCHER, ROBIN L.
FISCHER, MELVIN A. TESCHKER, DEBRA M.
KROGE, CHAD NEWTON, RHONDA NEWTON,
JOHN S. JONES, RICHARD A. CORRUNKER,
LORETTA G. CORRUNKER, JOSEPH TIANO,
DENNING FAMILY TRUST, CHARLES
DENNING, MARY DENNING, DONNA
ANDERSON, MICHAEL D. FARNSWORTH,
JEFFREY HOWARD, DARLENE HOWARD,
LOUKAS N. KOVANIS, BRADLEY HOYES,
KRISTIN HOYES, ELDON HAWES,
MARQUERITE E. HAWES, NAKOS KOVANIS,
ANTHONY DUBANIK JR., ANNETTE M.
DUBANIK, ROBIN FREY, BEVERLY ROONEY,
ROBERT NAUGHTON JR., JASON SEE,
HEATHER SEE, JEREMY D. GRANTHAM,
KAMIL KOWALSKI, SAMANTHA L. BROUGH,

                                   -2-
SEAN WILSON, MATTHEW MARHOFER,
DANIEL ALLEN, STEPHANIE ALLEN, JOHN D.
DENBROCK, CHRIS BONK, LYNN BONK,
RALPH J. CHRISTENSEN, LAURA M.
CHRISTENSEN, KATIE MCALISTER, CLARIUS
KEEP AND JERRY DUNN REVOCABLE LIVING
TRUST, CLARIUS KEEP, JERRY DUNN,
STEVEN F. LYNCH, JACK AND JUDY PHILLIPS
REVOCABLE TRUST, JACK PHILLIPS, RYAN
W. HOFFECKER, WILLIAM HOFFECKER,
SHARON HOFFECKER, MARY ELLEN
TIBALDI, DAVID LARSON, PATRICIA
LARSON, DAVID D. AZAR, JENNIFER
LEVARIO, DAVID A. BRAUN, BRIGHT PENNY,
INC., GERALD MATEVIA, JOYCE MATEVIA,
DARIN MARCH, TAMMY PARISIAN, RICK
DONALD, and MARK DONALD,

          Defendants,
and

PETE BLACK, SUZANNE KOWALSKI, JEFFREY
T. BROUGH, TREVOR HAAK, BARBARA
HAAK, and PATRICIA LOTH,

          Defendants-Appellants/Cross-
          Appellees,
and

CHAD NEWTON, RHONDA NEWTON, RYAN
W. BRADFORD, and MICHELLE L. BRADFORD,

          Defendants/Third-Party Defendants,
and

KELLY NOWICKI, NATE PRESSOTTO,
AMANDA PRESSOTTO, JIM TIBALDI, JAMES
KUDIAWIEC, MARY KUDIAWIEC, MARY
KUDIAWIEC, and PATRICIA EILEEN
CROCKETT,

          Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

                                         -3-
Before: REDFORD, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        This case concerns which subdivision lot owners, if any, have riparian rights to lakefront
parks dedicated to the “use of Lot Owners.” The trial court determined that the “front-lot owners,”
i.e., owners whose lots are adjacent to the park areas but not the lakeshore, are the fee owners of
the park area between their respective parcels and the lake, and therefore have the sole riparian
rights to maintain docks and moor boats. The trial court further determined that the “back-lot
owners,” i.e., owners whose lots are separated from the park areas by the front lots, have a
nonriparian easement to use the park areas for various recreational activities. Appellants, a group
comprised of back-lot owners, appeal the trial’s court ruling by right. For the reasons stated in this
opinion, we reverse the trial court’s decision, vacate the judgment and permanent injunction, and
remand for further proceedings.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        The Glen Echo subdivision plat was dedicated in 1921 and consists of 179 lots. The plat
shows park areas in the subdivision that abut Lake Chemung in Genoa Township. Central to this
appeal, the plat contains the following dedication: “[T]hat the Parks, Paths, and Canals as shown
in said plat are hereby dedicated to the use of Lot Owners in said plat.”

         This case arose out of a dispute regarding the park area in front of lots 35 and 36, which
plaintiff Mark Ikle purchased in 2015. There is a six-foot wide walkway between Ikle’s lots and
the adjacent park area. Previously, an apartment building was located on lots 35 and 36. The
apartment building burned down in 2009, and the lots became vacant. Ikle built a residence on the
lots and began disputing with certain back-lot owners regarding their use of the park area. Relevant
to this appeal, Ikle asserted that the back-lot owners could not maintain docks in the park area. In
May 2018, Ikle filed this instant suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the plat dedication merely
granted the back-lot owners a nonriparian easement to the park areas. Ikle later filed an amended
complaint expressly asserting ownership of the park area.

        The original defendants1 were back-lot owners who had used the park area in front of Ikle’s
lots for picnics and large gatherings. Two of the original defendants installed docks in the park
area to which they moored their boats. The original defendants filed a counterclaim, seeking a
declaratory judgment allowing them to engage in these activities. After a motion by the original
defendants, the trial court ordered Ikle to amend his complaint to add all Glen Echo lot owners and
Genoa Township as defendants; the Township was later dismissed from the case.

        In October 2020, the parties filed dispositive motions under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no
genuine issue of material fact). The original defendants argued that the plat dedication provided
equal rights to all lot owners for use of the park and that there was no basis in Michigan caselaw
to conclude that Ikle obtained exclusive riparian rights to the lake. They further argued that the

1
 The original defendants were Daniel Goebel, Kerry and Alina Fritts, Barry Fritts, and Bert and
Theresa Knickerbocker.

                                                 -4-
evidence showed the park area in front of Ikle’s lots was historically used for the installation of
docks and boat mooring. Ikle argued that he was the owner of the underlying fee in the park area
because his land abutted the park, relying on Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282; 380 NW2d 463
(1985), which held that property separated from the lakeshore by a subdivision walkway had
riparian rights. In response, the original defendants argued that the controlling case was Dobie v
Morrison, 227 Mich App 536; 575 NW2d 817 (1998), which distinguished Thies when the front-
lot owner’s property was separated from the lake by a park.

        On March 5, 2021, the trial court issued an opinion and order granting summary disposition
to Ikle. After summarizing the procedural history and relevant caselaw, specifically Thies, 424
Mich 282, and Dobie, 227 Mich App 536, the trial court held that the front-lot owners have fee
ownership of the park areas between their lots and the lakefront, and that the back-lot owners have
an easement to use the park, excluding riparian rights. The trial court observed that Dobie had
distinguished a park from a walkway, but nonetheless applied the standard established by Thies
and other cases that owners of land abutting any right-of-way which is contiguous to the water are
presumed to own the fee in the entire way, subject to an easement, unless a contrary intention
appears. The trial court concluded that there was no evidence in this case to counter this
presumption. Turning to the scope of the easement held by the back-lot owners, the trial court
determined that the back-lot owners could use the park areas for walking, sunbathing, picnicking,
barbecues, reasonable fire pits, and access to the lake for purposes of fishing, swimming, and
launching small, unmotorized boats.

        On March 10, 2022, a judgment and permanent injunction was entered incorporating the
trial court’s summary-disposition rulings.2 This appeal followed. Michigan Realtors filed an
amicus brief in support of appellants’ arguments on appeal. The Township filed a brief requesting
that this Court clarify if changes are needed to the recorded plat. Ikle cross-appeals on a narrow
issue regarding the trial court’s determination that front-lot owners could not store personal
property in the park.

                                         II. DISCUSSION

                         A. FEE OWNERSHIP OF THE PARK AREAS

      Appellants first argue the trial court erred by ruling that the front-lot owners are the fee
owners of the park areas abutting the lake shore. We agree.3 Michigan caselaw establishes that

2
  A substantively identical default judgment and permanent injunction was entered as to the
defendant-lot owners who had defaulted in the proceedings.
3
  A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Ormsby v
Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich 45, 52; 684 NW2d 320 (2004). When reviewing a motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers the affidavits, depositions, pleadings, admissions, and
other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rose
v Nat’l Auction Group, Inc, 466 Mich 453, 461; 646 NW2d 455 (2002). Summary disposition is
appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled

                                                -5-
all lot owners have an irrevocable easement to the park. Neither the plat language nor the facts of
this case support the conclusion that any lot owner has fee ownership of the park areas.

        “Land which includes or is bounded by a natural watercourse is defined as riparian.” Thies,
424 Mich at 287-288. “Owners of riparian land enjoy certain exclusive rights, including the rights
to erect and maintain docks and to permanently anchor boats off the shore.” Morse v Colitti, 317
Mich App 526, 534; 896 NW2d 15 (2016). “A nonriparian owner, on the other hand, has a right
to use the surface of the water in a reasonable manner for such activities as boating, fishing and
swimming, as well as the right to anchor boats temporarily.” Astemborski v Manetta, 341 Mich
App 190, 196; 988 NW2d 857 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “rights
normally afforded exclusively to riparian landowners may be conferred by easement.” Little v
Kin, 249 Mich App 502, 511; 644 NW2d 375 (2002), aff’d 468 Mich 699 (2003).

        The two primary cases relevant to this issue are Thies and Dobie. In Thies, the plaintiffs
owned front lots that abutted a subdivision walkway running along the lakeshore; the defendants
owned back lots. Thies, 424 Mich at 286. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from
building a dock and permanently anchoring a boat on the shoreline in front of the plaintiffs’
property, and the defendants argued that “the plat’s dedication of the walk and alleys to ‘the joint
use of all the owners of the plat’ gave them title to these lands in common with the other
subdivision owners.” Id. at 286-89. The Supreme Court disagreed that the defendants had riparian
rights of the lakeshore walk as tenants in common. “[O]wners of land abutting a street are
presumed to own the fee in the street to the center,” and so the question before the Court was “who
owns the other half of the way which is clearly riparian property—the plattors, the ‘front lot’
owners, or the persons to whom the way is dedicated?” Id. at 291. The Court determined that this
question was settled by Croucher v Wooster, 271 Mich 337; 260 NW 739 (1935), which held that
a lot separated from the water by a highway contiguous to the water is riparian land. Applying
this holding in Thies, the Court did not find that there was a material distinction between a public
highway and a private walkway:

               Although Croucher . . . discussed only land abutting public ways, the
       holding of these cases can be stated more broadly: Unless a contrary intention
       appears, owners of land abutting any right of way which is contiguous to the water
       are presumed to own the fee in the entire way, subject to the easement. Since the
       owner’s property is deemed to run to the water, it is riparian property. Thus,
       plaintiffs are presumed to own the fee in the walk running along the front of their
       lots unless the plattors intended otherwise. [Thies, 424 Mich at 293 (citations
       omitted).]

to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving
the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable
minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).

                                                -6-
The Court then examined the plat dedication and concluded that it did not evince a different intent,
and therefore affirmed the trial court’s finding that the phrase “joint use” merely granted an
easement to the back-lot defendants. Id. at 293-294.

        In Dobie, the front-lot plaintiffs were separated from the lakeshore by a subdivision park
rather than a road or walkway. The plaintiffs, whose lot was previously owned by the plat
proprietors, argued that riparian rights attached to their property, and the back-lot defendants
opposed. Dobie, 227 Mich App at 537. This Court agreed with the defendants that Thies did not
control the outcome of the plaintiffs’ claim because there was a material difference between a lot
being separated from the water by a walkway and by a park:

               Defendants distinguish Thies by arguing that the holding should be confined
       to a right of way and not extended to the park in this case. We agree that this case
       is not controlled by Thies. Although the park in this case was primarily created to
       provide the back lot owners with access to the lakefront, a park is not the same as
       a right of way. The reasoning in Thies was predicated on a mere walkway dividing
       the riparian owners from the body of water in that case. We do not regard it as
       appropriate to compare a narrow walkway along a body of water to the relatively
       large park in this case. Absent a contrary indication, it is eminently reasonable to
       presume that a walkway along a lake was placed merely as an easement to provide
       access to the lake and not with the intent to convey actual fee ownership of the land
       containing the walkway. The same is simply not true of the relatively large park in
       this case. [Id. at 539-540 (citation omitted).]

        However, this Court nonetheless concluded that, under the circumstances of that case, the
plat proprietors intended to retain fee ownership of the park, and therefore the plaintiffs, as the
successor owners, also had ownership of the park and riparian rights. Id. at 540. This Court
reasoned, in part, that:

       The dedication provided that the park was dedicated to “the use of the owners of
       lots in this plat which have no lake frontage” (emphasis supplied), but did not
       explicitly purport to transfer ownership of the park from plaintiffs’ predecessors . . .
       to all the back lot owners. We find the language used to be more consistent with
       the grant of an easement rather than a grant of fee ownership rights. Further,
       undisputed testimony that [one of the plattors] had supplied the park with
       electricity, portable toilets, and picnic tables supports the conclusion that the
       [plattors] intended to retain general control and, accordingly, ownership of the park.
       [Id.]

Dobie went on to address the scope of the back-lot owners’ easement, which will be discussed in
in Part II-B of this opinion.

        Returning to this case, we agree with appellants that the trial court misapplied Dobie. The
trial court correctly recognized that Dobie distinguished a park from a walkway, but then
concluded that Dobie did not change the “the previous standard provided by these earlier cases[,
i.e., Croucher and Thies,] that owners of land abutting any right of way which is contiguous to the
water are presumed to own the fee in the entire way, subject to an easement ‘unless a contrary

                                                 -7-
intention appears,’ ” quoting Thies, 424 Mich at 293. Dobie plainly establishes, however, that
there is no presumption that front-lot owners are the fee owners of adjacent parks. Dobie expressly
declined to apply the presumption established by Thies to parks, and instead held that the plaintiffs
had fee ownership of the park under the plat language and facts of the case. See Dobie, 227 Mich
App at 539-540. Specifically, the plat language distinguished between front-lot owners and back-
lot owners by providing that the park was for the “use of the owners of the lots in this plat which
have no lake frontage.” Id. at 540. This conveyance showed that the original plattors were merely
granting an easement to the back-lot owners and that they intended to retain fee ownership of the
park. Id. This conclusion was supported by the fact that the plattors supplied the park with
electricity, portable toilets, and picnic tables. Id. Finally, the plaintiffs in Dobie were direct
successors to the original plattors. For these reasons, the plaintiffs (as opposed to all front-lot
owners) were deemed to be the owners of the lakeshore park. Id.

        Our reading of the caselaw is consistent with three unpublished opinions of this Court
holding that there is no rule or presumption that front-lot owners have fee ownership over adjacent
parks. See Virginia Park Subdivision Ass’n v Brown, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court
of Appeals, issued January 10, 2019 (Docket Nos. 339762, 339808), p 10; Horseshoe Lake Corp
v Carlson, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 2, 2012 (Docket
No. 304695), p 5; Locust Land Resort, LLC v Thiebaut, unpublished per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued February 24, 2009 (Docket No. 279061), p 4. Although these opinions are not
binding precedent, they can still be considered “instructive and persuasive.” Barclae v Zarb, 300
Mich App 455, 469; 834 NW2d 100 (2013). We find particularly instructive the discussion in
Virginia Park of why the rule established by Croucher and Thies with respect to roads and
walkways does not apply when the owner’s property is separated from the water by a park. The
panel explained that the rule established by those cases—that a lot separated from the water by a
road or walkway that is contiguous to the water is riparian land—was:

       [B]ased on the well-established principle that owners of land abutting a road retain
       ownership of the fee underlying the road subject to the easement. While a
       landowner’s fee interest in the road typically only extends to the center of the road,
       when the other side of the road abuts the shoreline rather than another parcel of
       land, the fee interest instead continues to the water. Thies, 424 Mich at 291-292.
       Hence, the possession of riparian rights by owners of property separated from the
       shoreline by only a road or walkway is grounded in the legal principles generally
       applicable to owners of property abutting roads. This rule is not based on the mere
       fact that such a property owner is closer to the water than the owner of what may
       be called a “back lot.” [Virginia Subdivision, unpub op at 9 (emphasis added).]

        Stated differently, the rationale for the rule stated in Thies has no application to similar
situations involving parks. There is no rule of law that would give a landowner an underlying fee
to the middle of an adjacent park, such that this ownership could be extended to a shoreline abutting
the park. The panel concluded that:

       Dobie merely stands for the proposition that a plat’s dedication of a park for “the
       use” of certain lot owners conveys only an easement to those lot owners, and the
       contemporaneous facts and circumstances may determine the ownership of the park
       when the dedication is silent as to the allocation of the ownership interest in the

                                                -8-
       park. Furthermore, Dobie makes clear that the rules announced in Croucher and
       Thies apply to easements in the form of roads or walkways and do not somehow
       automatically apply to all forms of easements that could potentially separate a lot
       from the shoreline. More specifically, Dobie rejected the extension of the rule for
       roads and walkways to an easement granted for purposes of maintaining a private
       park. [Id. at 10.]

        We find this reasoning persuasive and adopt it in the present case. The trial court erred by
applying a presumption that the front-lot owners have fee ownership of the park. Dobie, as well
as the unpublished caselaw cited above, make clear that the presumption established in Thies has
no application to parks. Further, these cases show that the plat language and facts of each case
control the lot owners’ respective rights and interests to the park. These matters will now be
addressed.

        “When interpreting a plat, this Court seeks to effectuate the intent of the plattor.” Morse,
317 Mich App at 534. The intent of the plattors must be determined from the language they used.
Thies, 424 Mich at 293. “[D]edications of land for private use in plats before 1967 PA 288 took
effect convey at least an irrevocable easement in the dedicated land.” Little v Hirschman, 469
Mich 553, 564; 677 NW2d 319 (2004).

        The plat dedication in this case stated that the parks were “dedicated to the use of Lot
Owners in said plat.” (Emphasis added). The language “to the use of” indicates a conveyance of
an easement rather than a fee interest. See Thies, 424 Mich at 293; Dobie, 227 Mich App at 540.
See also Morse, 317 Mich App at 534 (“Because language dedicating land for ‘the use’ of others
is consistent with a grant of an easement, not a grant of fee ownership, the plat granted an easement
in the Park.”) (citation omitted). Further, unlike in Dobie, Ikle is not the successor-in-interest to
the original plattors, and the plat language in this case did not distinguish between back- and front-
lot owners. These were the crucial facts that led to this Court’s holding that the plaintiffs in Dobie
had fee ownership of the park. There is evidence in this case that front-lot and back-lot owners
helped maintain the park areas, but this alone is not enough to show that the plattors intended to
convey fee ownership to the lot owners.

        Appellants have adopted a slightly different argument on appeal,4 now arguing that the
plattors intended to convey fee ownership of the park to all of the lot owners. Appellants’
argument in support of this position is difficult to follow. They seem to argue that it would be
superfluous for the plattors to include “parks” in the plat dedication if all that was intended was
mere access to the parks, because the inclusion of “paths” allows the lot owners to traverse the
park pathways. This argument assumes, however, that the “use” of the park is limited to walking
the paths, but there is no indication that this is the case. Indeed, under the trial court’s ruling, all
lot owners could use the park for a variety of activities such as picnics, bonfires, swimming, and

4
  While appellants did not make this precise argument before the trial court, “so long as the issue
itself is not novel, a party is generally free to make a more sophisticated or fully developed
argument on appeal than was made in the trial court.” Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich App
222, 228; 964 NW2d 809 (2020).

                                                  -9-
canoeing. Appellants provide no other argument in support of their position that the plattors
intended to convey fee ownership to all lot owners. As discussed, caselaw establishes that the
phrase “to the use of” the lot owners is consistent with the grant of an easement.

       In sum, the trial court erred by holding that the front-lot owners have fee ownership of the
park areas and the corresponding riparian rights. The plat dedication granted an easement to all
lot owners for use of the park areas, and no lot owner has established fee ownership of the park
areas. That said, it is possible that the scope of the easement includes riparian rights. See Thies,
424 Mich at 289 (“Even if we conclude that defendants merely have an easement interest in the
walk and alleys, they may still prevail. Plaintiffs cannot prevent defendants from erecting a dock
or permanently anchoring their boats if these activities are within the scope of the plat’s
dedication.”). The scope of the easement will be discussed next.

                                 B. SCOPE OF THE EASEMENT

        Appellants argue that the trial court erred by not finding that the scope of the easement
includes installing docks and mooring boats. We conclude that remand is necessary for the trial
court to redetermine the scope of the easement after an evidentiary hearing.

         “Where the language of a legal instrument is plain and unambiguous, it is to be enforced
as written and no further inquiry is permitted.” Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699, 700; 664 NW2d 749
(2003). “If the text of the easement is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be considered by the
trial court in order to determine the scope of the easement.” Id. Generally, the scope of an
easement is a question of fact. Morse, 317 Mich App at 534.

        We agree with appellants that the plat dedication is ambiguous because it does not identify
the permitted uses of the park areas. Accordingly, extrinsic evidence may be considered to the
determine the scope of the easement. Kin, 468 Mich at 700. In Dobie, this Court affirmed the trial
court’s findings that the scope of the dedication permitted the back-lot defendants to use the park
“as they had done ‘traditionally and historically,’ ” including the construction of one dock and
seasonal mooring of boats, and that this did not unreasonably interfere with the front-lot plaintiffs’
use of the property. Dobie, 227 Mich App at 541-542.

         Relying on Dobie, appellants argue that the trial court erred by not considering the
traditional and historical use of the park areas. The trial court cited Dobie for that proposition and
proceeded to find that the back-lot owners could use the park for walking, sunbathing, picnicking,
barbeques, reasonable fire pits, and access to the lake for purposes of fishing, swimming, and
launching small, unmotorized boats. It is clear that, in making this determination, the trial court
did consider the traditional and historical use of the park according to the deposition testimony and
affidavits provided by the original defendants in their motion for summary disposition. That said,
appellants are correct that the trial court declined to consider the back-lot owners’ historical use of
docks and boat moorings in the park areas. Presumably, the trial court did not consider that
evidence because it concluded that the front-lot owners had fee ownership, and therefore riparian
rights, to the park. In any event, because the trial court erroneously held that the front-lot owners
have fee ownership of the park, we must also reverse the trial court’s derivative ruling regarding
the scope of the easement.

                                                 -10-
        It would be improper for us to decide the scope of the easement, as appellants request,
because this Court does not make factual findings. See In re Martin, 200 Mich App 703, 717; 504
NW2d 917 (1993). Further, the evidence regarding the traditional and historical use of the park
areas is not so clear-cut that reasonable minds could not differ on the outcome. West v Gen Motors
Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). Ikle provided affidavits from prior owners and
operators of the apartment building regarding the park area in front of lots 35 and 36. Collectively,
these individuals attested that from the mid-1970s until the apartment building burned down in
2009, the park area in front of the apartment building was mowed and maintained by the apartment
building operator, and that the only dock on the waterfront in this area belonged to the apartment
building. On the other hand, two of the original defendants testified that they installed docks in
the park area after the apartment building burned down, and a third defendant, Bert Knickerbocker,
purchased two back lots in 1995 and testified that docks were placed in the park areas on a “first
come, first served” basis. We make no comments as to how this evidence should be interpreted
by the trial court in determining the scope of the easement. However, it is clear that all lot owners’
use of the park areas should be considered by the trial court, so long as this case concerns the entire
subdivision and not just the park area in front of Ikle’s lots.5

         Ikle argues that, whether the easement allows back-lot owners to install docks and moor
boats is a moot issue, because, under the trial court’s July 16, 2020 order, there exists no legal
outcome where the back-lot owners would be allowed to do so under the Township zoning
ordinance. In February 2020, Ikle moved for a declaratory judgment regarding the interpretation
of the zoning ordinance and dismissal of the Township. Ikle asserted that the Township was added
as a party in this case because of the impact of the Township’s zoning ordinance on the parties’
respective claims. Ikle further argued that, regardless of the outcome in this case, the back-lot
owners would be precluded by the zoning ordinance from constructing a dock on the park
shoreline. On July 16, 2020, the trial court entered an order dismissing the Township and ruling
that (1) if Ikle’s claim was successful, only he could maintain a dock on the subject parcel pursuant
to Section 11.04.05(b) (limiting lots to one dock) of the zoning ordinance, and (2) if Ikle’s claim
was not successful, a party may only maintain a dock on the parcel as provided under Section
13.03.03.6 Those rulings also applied to the other front-lot owners.

5
  Along these lines, we note the trial court plainly erred by deciding whether any front-lot owner
could continue maintaining a dock in their respective park areas under theories of adverse
possession, acquiescence, or abandonment. Those potential claims were raised by certain front-
lot owners at the summary-disposition hearing, but were not briefed. Nonetheless, the trial court
decided these issues against the front-lot owners in its March 5, 2021 opinion and order. Because
we are reversing the trial court’s March 5, 2021 opinion and order in full, a front-lot owner may
raise these claims on remand, but we express no opinion on the viability of these claims.
6
  Section 13.03 is the “Keyhole” ordinance, governing Riparian Common Lot Use. Section
13.03.03 governs “existing keyholes,” providing:
       Lots of record which existed prior to the effective date of this section (4/15/95) that
       provided common use access to a water body may continue to provide riparian
       rights subject to the marina operating permit requirements of the Michigan

                                                 -11-
        Appellants were not precluded from challenging this earlier order in their appeal, see Green
v Ziegelman, 282 Mich App 292, 301 n 6; 767 NW2d 660 (2009), but have not done so. Appellants
have made no substantive argument as to why the trial court’s interpretation of the ordinance was
erroneous. Accordingly, whether the trial court correctly interpreted the ordinance is not before
us on appeal. That said, we disagree with Ikle’s suggestion that the trial court’s order definitively
establishes that the back-lot owners may not maintain a dock under the ordinance. The trial court
merely held that Section 13.03.03 is the governing ordinance for any dock to be placed in the park
areas. The trial court later clarified that its ruling did not prohibit the Township from enforcing its
ordinances, and that it had “made no determination as [to] whether any dock in Lake Chemung
from the park is in violation of those ordinances[.]” For these reasons, whether the ordinance
would preclude placement of a dock in any of the park areas is not a question before this Court,
and has no bearing on the initial determination of the scope of the easement.

                                     C. REMAINING ISSUES

       Our resolution of the above issues renders moot the remaining arguments on appeal.

       Generally, this Court does not address moot questions or declare legal principles
       that have no practical effect in a case. Mootness occurs when an event has occurred
       that renders it impossible for the court to grant relief. An issue is also moot when
       a judgment, if entered, cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the
       existing controversy. [Flynn v Ottawa Co Dep’t of Pub Health, ___ Mich App ___,
       ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 359774); slip op at 5 (quotation marks and
       citation omitted).]

        Appellants’ final argument raised on appeal is that the trial court erred by not applying the
doctrines of unclean hands and equitable estoppel to preclude Ikle from making a claim of fee
ownership of the park. Appellants contend that these doctrines should apply on the basis of Ikle’s
successful argument to the Michigan Tax Tribunal that his lots were not waterfront property.
However, because we hold that the front-lot owners do not have fee ownership of the park areas,
appellants have been afforded their requested relief and this issue would have no practical legal
effect on the existing controversy. Further, the conclusion that no lot owner has fee ownership of
the park also renders moot the Township’s request that this Court require changes to the plat
documented in public record. Ikle’s cross-appeal concerning the storage of personal property in
the park areas is moot because we are vacating the judgment and permanent injunction.

       Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) under the Michigan Inland Lakes
       and Streams Act (Public Act 346 of 1972).

                                                 -12-
                                        III. CONCLUSION

        We reverse the March 5, 2021 opinion and order granting summary disposition, and vacate
the March 10, 2022 judgment and permanent injunction.7 Remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                             /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                             /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
                                                             /s/ Christopher P. Yates

7
    The default judgment and permanent injunction entered on the same day is also vacated.

                                                -13-