Court Opinion

ID: 9470979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:22:32.719441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:13.433194
License: Public Domain

WINTER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because the majority affirms an exercise of discretion which never happened, upon a rationale which is (i) conceded by the parties, including the government, to be erroneous, (ii) inconsistent with our decision in United States v. Bufalino, 683 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.1982), (iii) contrary to the Guidelines of the Committee on the Administration of Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States, (“Guidelines”) and (iv) needlessly confusing in an area where bright lines are in the interest of all concerned, I dissent.
The key facts glossed over by the majority are that the government never responded in any way to the defendant’s motion and Judge McLaughlin never ruled that he had the defendant’s motion actually under advisement after April 14. Indeed, it is an undisputed fact that “the motion was never actually under advisement.” Brief for Appellee at p. 13.
Recognizing that he did not as a fact ever have the motion under advisement, Judge McLaughlin held that the (J) period automatically began to run as a matter of law on the date on which the government’s response to the motion should have been, but was not, filed. He evidently believed that to do otherwise would prejudice a defendant by unduly extending the allowable (F) period, thereby enabling the government to delay a trial simply by failing to respond to a motion. We now know that his apprehensions were groundless in light of our decision in United States v. Cobb, 697 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.1982), but he did not have the benefit of that teaching at the time of his ruling in the instant case.
The majority affirms on the grounds that “[although the district court was not compelled to hold that, as of that date, the matter was under advisement, the court did not err in holding that it was.” So far as one can determine, the majority holds that when the government fails to make a timely response to a motion, the district court has unfettered discretion after the fact to pick a date as to when the (J) period began to run, without regard to whether the motion was actually under advisement. In contrast, Judge McLaughlin was not exercising discretion but was following what he believed to be a legal command. Even if the majority’s view of the law is correct, therefore, a remand would be in order. However, every available legal criteria suggest the law is otherwise.
In Bufalino, we specifically held that a district court “could not have taken [a] motion under advisement in any meaningful way until the defendants made their positions known.” Id. at 645. If there is a reason why district courts are able to take motions under advisement in a meaningful way when the government rather than a defendant does not make its position known, that reason is not evident in the majority opinion. It is also not evident to the government, which expressly conceded that Bufalino is exactly on point as to this issue. Brief for Appellee at p. 12. That position is hardly surprising since, if Bufalino held anything, it was that the (J) period begins only after the non-moving party has responded and the matter is submitted to the court for decision. Neither event occurred in this case.
Bufalino also stated that we should look to the Guidelines for guidance in interpreting the Speedy Trial Act. The Guidelines state that the (J) period starts on “the day following the date on which the court has received everything it expects from the parties.” In the present case, the government never informed Judge McLaughlin whether it intended to oppose the motion and proceed with the indictment, concede the motion and proceed, or seek a superseding indictment. Since the government had carefully preserved each of these options, some response was obviously to be “expect*228ed,” before the court could or would consider the motion on its merits. In rejecting the Guidelines’ sensible bright line for a “do your own thing” rule, the majority has introduced needless confusion which may well have unforeseen consequences.
The government concedes that (J) is inapplicable in the instant case but argues that the (F) period continued to run for a time to allow it to decide whether to oppose the motion or seek a superseding indictment. In view of the majority’s disposition of the appeal, that issue is moot. However, by relying on grounds which permit a district court ex post to cut off the (F) period simply by declaring well after the fact that the (J) period had begun to run, the majority may well be creating opportunities for skilled defense counsel in future cases to deprive the government of the time accorded it under (F).
I therefore dissent.