Court Opinion

ID: 9953875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 22:02:11.668763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:10:16.902559
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 P. v. Lash CA1/4
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
                        CALIFORNIA

                           FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
      Plaintiff and
 Respondent,                                                  A167156

 v.                                                           (Contra Costa County
 DASHEID KEYONTAE                                             Super. Ct. No.
 LASH,                                                        05001722768)
      Defendant and
 Appellant.

          Defendant Dasheid Keyontae Lash appeals the summary
denial of his Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition to vacate his
attempted murder conviction. We agree with Lash that the
trial court erred by determining his eligibility for relief based
on the information filed in December 2017, rather than the
amended information filed in May 2019 charging Lash with
attempted murder. We shall reverse the order and remand for
further proceedings.

          1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                      1
                        BACKGROUND
      On December 22, 2017, the People filed an information
against multiple defendants, including Lash and his brother,
and charged Lash with one count of conspiracy to commit
murder (§§ 182, 187; count 1); possession of a machine gun
(§ 32625, subd. (a); count 6); conspiracy to commit pimping
(§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 266h; count 8); and street terrorism
(§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 9). The information also alleged that
the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street
gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).)
      The information was later amended on May 1, 2019 (the
amended information), to add one count of attempted murder
(§§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 12) with an allegation that the
crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The same day, Lash pleaded no contest to
attempted murder (count 12) and to possession of a machine
gun (count 6). Lash also admitted the gang enhancement as to
count 12. The remaining charges were dismissed. A minute
order was entered for the hearing at which the information
was amended and the plea entered. We have no transcript of
the hearing, however, so the factual basis for the plea is not
reflected in the record. The court sentenced Lash to the
stipulated term of 12 years, eight months in prison.
      In July 2022, Lash filed a pro se petition for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95 (current section 1172.6,
renumbered by Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022).

                                2
The court appointed counsel for Lash. After a hearing, the
court denied his petition at the prima facie stage. The court
found that Lash had not established a prima facie case
“because the charge was a conspiracy to commit murder, which
requires a specific intent to commit murder, [and] a prima facie
case is not made out, even though [Lash] eventually pled to the
attempted murder.”2 Lash timely appealed.
                         DISCUSSION
     Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (Reg.
Sess. 2017–2018) amended the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to
murder, “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent
to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,

     2 Below, Lash filed a joinder in his brother’s section

1172.6 petition, which was decided prior to Lash’s petition.
Lash’s brother, Darnell Keyon Lash, like Lash himself, was
charged with conspiracy to commit murder in the 2017
information and pleaded no contest to an attempted murder
charge after the information was amended in 2019. That
stipulated sentence in that case was 12 years in prison. The
trial court stated at the hearing on Lash’s petition that it was
adopting its decision from Lash’s brother’s petition. As
respondent acknowledges, a separate panel of this Division
reversed the court’s order in Lash’s brother’s case, finding that
the trial court erred in determining eligibility for relief based
on the information filed in 2017 rather than the amended
information. (People v. Lash (July 17, 2023, A166708)
[nonpub. opn.].)

                                3
§ 1, subd. (f).) The bill also established a procedure under
former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, for eligible
defendants to petition for resentencing. (Lewis, at p. 959.)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 775 (Reg. Sess. 2021–2022) to clarify “that persons who
were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a
theory of felony murder [or] the natural [and] probable
consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those
persons convicted of murder under the same theories.” (Stats.
2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).)
      A person convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine may file a petition
to have the conviction vacated and to be resentenced when the
following conditions apply: “(1) A complaint, information, or
indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . . attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶]
(2) The petitioner was convicted of . . . attempted
murder . . . following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a
trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted
of . . . attempted murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not
presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The statute provides for appointment of

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counsel upon receipt of a proper petition3, if so requested, and
initial briefing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)–(c).) The trial court must
then hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has
established a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
      The prima facie inquiry is “limited.” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court must accept the petitioner’s
allegations as true and “should not make credibility
determinations or engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing
of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 974.) “If
the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that
the [petitioner] is ineligible for relief, the trial court may
dismiss the petition” as a matter of law. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) But if the court determines there
is a prima facie showing, it must issue an order to show cause
and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the
attempted murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).)
      We review de novo whether the trial court properly
denied the section 1172.6 petition without issuing an order to
show cause. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.)
      Lash contends that the trial court erred by relying on the
2017 information to determine his eligibility for relief for

      3 “The petition shall include all of the following: [¶] (A) A

declaration by the petitioner that the petitioner is eligible for
relief under this section, based on all the requirements of
subdivision (a). [¶] (B) The superior court case number and
year of the petitioner’s conviction. [¶] (C) Whether the
petitioner requests the appointment of counsel.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(1)(A)–(C).)

                                  5
various reasons, and he specifically argues in his reply brief
that the operative charging document is the amended
information. Respondent disagrees, arguing that the 2017
information would have been automatically reinstated had the
parties withdrawn from, or had the court rejected, the plea,
and Lash’s plea was not “in lieu of a trial” for attempted
murder because the only trial he avoided was that on the 2017
information. We agree with Lash and find respondent’s
reliance on the 2017 information to be unpersuasive.4
     Even accepting that the information was amended in
connection with the negotiated plea agreement, the amended
information remains the operative charging document for
purposes of resolving the section 1172.6 petition. “An amended
accusatory pleading . . . supersedes the original pleading,
which has no further effect.” (Garcia v. Superior Court (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 631, 647; People v. Scott (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th
525, 533 [“when a pleading is amended, the original pleading is
thereby set aside and abandoned”]; People v. Mack (1961)
197 Cal.App.2d 574, 578 [“ ‘ “an amendatory pleading
supersedes the original one, which ceases to perform any
function as a pleading” ’ ”]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law (4th ed.
2023) Pretrial, § 243, subd. (6).) Here, the 2017 information
was amended to add a charge of attempted murder. At that

     4 Given our disposition, we do not address the additional

arguments Lash raises in this appeal.

                                6
point, the amended information was the operative pleading,
and it included the attempted murder charge.
     Respondent asserts that Lash never faced trial for
attempted murder because that charge was only added with
his acquiescence to effectuate the plea agreement. Citing
People v. Superior Court (Garcia) (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 256,
and People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, respondent argues
that, had the parties withdrawn from that agreement or had
the court not approved it, the 2017 information would be
automatically reinstated. We disagree.
     In Garcia, supra, 131 Cal.App.3d at page 258, the
defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to first degree
murder. But for the bargain, the prosecutor would have
alleged special circumstances, and the defendant pleaded
guilty to avoid the death penalty. (Id. at pp. 257–258.) After
the judgment of conviction was reversed, the defendant
withdrew his guilty plea, the prosecutor filed an amended
information alleging special circumstances, and the defendant
successfully moved to strike the new allegations. (Id. at
p. 258.) The appellate court reversed the order striking the
amended allegations. It explained, “Familiar and basic
principles of law reinforced by simple justice require that when
an accused withdraws his guilty plea the status quo ante must
be restored. When a plea agreement has been rescinded the
parties are placed by the law in the position each had before
the contract was entered into. [Citation.] Here defendant

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agreed to plead guilty to murder in order to obtain a reciprocal
benefit: the forbearance of the prosecutor in not amending the
information to seek the death penalty. When a defendant
withdraws his plea, the prosecutor is no longer bound; counts
dismissed may be restored.” (Id. at pp. 258–259.) In People v.
Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 706–707, the court confirmed
that when a plea is withdrawn, the court cannot “ ‘ “ ‘proceed to
apply and enforce certain parts of the plea bargain, while
ignoring’ others. [Citation.] Instead, the court must restore
the parties to the status quo ante.” ’ ” In both cases, either
counsel or the court, on its own motion, took some affirmative
action after the plea was withdrawn; the reinstatement of the
original charges did not happen automatically upon
withdrawal of the plea.
      Here, had the no contest plea been withdrawn or
disapproved by the court, restoring the parties to the “status
quo ante” would require undoing Lash’s assent to the
amendment. Lash would then have been free to challenge the
amendment with a section 995 motion. (§ 995, subd. (a)(2)(B)
[information shall be set aside if defendant has been
committed without reasonable or probable cause]; People v.
Sherwin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1404, 1411 [purpose of a section
995 motion to set aside accusatory pleading is to review
sufficiency of information based upon preliminary hearing
record].) Likewise, as noted ante, the prosecution could elect to
proceed with the amended information, or it could move to

                                8
amend to restore the dismissed counts and/or to add any
additional counts otherwise permissible under section 1009.5
Respondent cites no authority for an exception to the general
rule that an amended information supersedes the original
pleading, which has no further effect (Garcia v. Superior Court,
supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 647). Accordingly, we do not agree
that the 2017 information would automatically have been
reinstated and the amended information stricken upon
withdrawal of the plea agreement.
      Applying section 1172.6, subdivision (a) to the amended
information, we conclude that Lash’s petition, on its face,
establishes a prima facie showing of his eligibility for relief:
The generic charge of attempted murder permitted the
prosecution to proceed under the natural and probable
consequences theory.6 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); see People v. Das
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 954, 958, 962–964 [prima facie case
established where prosecution could have pursued attempted
murder on a theory of aiding and abetting a gang assault, the
natural and probable consequence of which was attempted

      5 Under section 1009, after a defendant has entered a

plea, an information may be amended to add an offense so long
as it is one “shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary
examination.”
      6 Aside from respondent’s argument that 2017

information is the operative charging document and
establishes Lash’s ineligibility as a matter of law (an argument
we have rejected), respondent does not otherwise contend that
the record of conviction demonstrates Lash’s ineligibility for
relief as a matter of law.

                                 9
murder committed by a codefendant].) Lash accepted a plea
offer in lieu of a trial at which he could have been convicted of
attempted murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2).) And Lash’s
petition includes a sufficient averment that he could not
presently be convicted of attempted murder because of changes
to section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, as the
trial court recognized.7 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
      As Lash met the “ ‘very low’ ” prima facie bar (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972), the trial court must issue an order
to show cause (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether Lash is entitled to relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d).) On remand, with the benefit of a more
complete record, the trial court will be able to determine
whether Lash’s plea necessarily establishes that he is guilty of
attempted murder based on his aiding and abetting of the
attempted murder, rather than his aiding and abetting of a

      7 Lash filed a pro se petition averring generally that

Senate Bill No. 1437 (Reg. Sess. 2017–2018) and Senate Bill
No. 775 (Reg. Sess. 2021–2022) applied to his conviction and
afforded him relief. He also filed a joinder in his brother’s form
petition that complied with the requirements of section 1172.6,
subdivision (b), including the requirement of a declaration that
petitioner is eligible for relief under that section, based on all
the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (a). (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(1)(A).) The trial court’s appointment of counsel for
Lash shows that it concluded that his petition contained all the
information required under section 1172.6. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (b)(1)(A)–(C), (3).)

                                10
target crime for which the attempted murder was a natural
and probable consequence.
                           DISPOSITION
       The order summarily dismissing Lash’s petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 is reversed.

                                         BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
SMILEY, J.

People v. Lash (A167156)

       
        Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of
Alameda, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.

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