Court Opinion

ID: 9774944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:38:46.794431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:18.013824
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Presiding Judge.
We are indebted to counsel for appellant for a scholarly brief and a forceful argument.
On original submission we did not discuss Appellant’s Bill of Exception No. 3. We shall do so now. While testifying in his own behalf, the appellant told the jury that he was married, had a child, and was living with his family. He stated that on the night of the homicide his wife had told him that she had made arrangements to go to the show with her sister, and he told her that he was going over to the Craig house to eat steaks. He was then asked on cross-examination if his wife had not sued him for divorce during the month following the homicide. His objection was sustained, and the jury was instructed to disregard the unanswered question; but appellant’s motion for a mistrial was overruled. He was then asked nine separate questions about a *111two-weeks’ period of time following the homicide when he and his wife had lived separately. Appellant objected to the first three, and his objections were overruled. He was then asked the remaining six questions, and no objections were interposed. The appellant’s counsel then interposed a general objection to the “questions and answers that have been asked the witness” and asserted that the purpose of the questions was to convey to the jury the inference that the appellant and his wife had separated over the tragedy. The state then objected to counsel’s statement about the inference, and the court sustained this last objection. The court then stated “and I am going to sustain the objection to some of those questions, but you haven’t broken it down, Mr. Martin, as to which ones you are objecting to.”
Counsel then stated that he was objecting to all the evidence, and the court overruled this blanket objection. This was followed by argument between counsel about what the witness’ answer had been; then four more questions of the same nature were propounded the witness, and finally a general objection was interposed and sustained, and the court told the jury “disregard those questions then, gentlemen.”
It thus appears that the trial court entertained some doubt as to the wisdom of some of his prior rulings and called upon counsel to assist him in rectifying his mistakes. Patient counsel should, under such circumstances, have assisted the court and pointed out to him the objectionable matter which he wished withdrawn from the jury’s consideration.
In view of the appellant’s testimony, which was calculated to leave the jury with the impression that his visit to the Craig house had been with the consent of his wife and that she had ratified such consent by remaining with him following the homicide, we would be loathe to reverse this conviction because the state was permitted to prove that she did in fact leave him for a two-week period some time after the night in question.
It is urged that we reconsider our holding that the facts are sufficient to support the conviction for murder with malice.
Appellant points out that all the positive evidence on the subject would indicate that the appellant was left in charge of the Craig house and that the deceased and his companion were uninvited guests who were in the act of “crashing the party” at the time the deceased was killed.
*112We pointed out in our original opinion that when the appellant was cross-examined by the state he denied that he killed the deceased in protection of the Craig home and emphatically stated that he did not intentionally fire the weapon but that the same was discharged accidentally when he backed into a chaise-longue. Thus, at the close of appellant’s testimony, the jury was relegated to a choice between the state’s theory that the killing had been done with malice and the defendant’s theory that it was entirely the result of an accident.
After careful review of the entire record, we believe, from the facts that the appellant went around the house, approached the deceased from the rear, and shot him in the back, together with appellant’s flight from the scene of the homicide and other facts in evidence, that the jury was authorized to conclude that he was prompted in such act by malice aforethought.
We regret that our original opinion mentioned gin as one of the beverages consumed at the Craig home on the night in question. The record would support the conclusion that the party “crashers” brought some gin with them but the same was not shown to have been drunk at the Craig home.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this cause originally, the appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.