Court Opinion

ID: 9964347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 18:12:21.948177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:19.595121
License: Public Domain

J-S47002-23

                                   2024 PA Super 88

  IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.B., A                  :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: T.B.                              :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :    No. 2248 EDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 30, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-DP-0072802-2009

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B., A                  :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: T.B.                              :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :    No. 2249 EDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 30, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                Juvenile Division at No: CP-51-DP-0000484-2022

BEFORE:       STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.:                                    FILED APRIL 29, 2024

       T.B.   (“Former     Guardian”)     appeals   from   the   August   30,   2023

permanency review orders that removed her as a reunification resource for

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S47002-23

two minor children, A.B. (DOB: 01/2007) and Z.B. (DOB: 04/2009).1 Upon

review, we affirm.

       The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) first became

involved with this family in July 2009 when S.B. (“Mother”) left Z.B. at her

paramour’s home and never returned. Order for Protective Custody, 7/18/09.

Shortly thereafter, protective custody was lifted and Z.B. returned to Mother.

In 2012, Former Guardian was awarded permanent legal custody (“PLC”) 2 of

the children in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.         Dependency Petition,

7/27/22, ¶ 5(b).

____________________________________________

1 The parental rights of the biological parents have not been terminated and

they remain parties to the dependency action.

2 In a dependency action, permanent legal custody   “may be a permanency
goal when a caregiver makes a commitment to accept legal responsibility to
raising the child, but is unwilling or unable to adopt the child.” See
Pennsylvania Child Welfare Resource Center Permanent Legal Custody
Handout https://www.pacwrc.pitt.edu/Curriculum/209_CncrrntPlnnng1/Hndt
s/HO09_PrmnntLglCstdy.pdf (last visited March 28, 2024). “This is an
arrangement whereby a juvenile court discontinues court intervention as well
as supervision by a county agency, and awards custody of a dependent child,
on a permanent basis, to a custodian. Parental rights are not terminated.”
In re S.H., 71 A.3d 973, 977-78 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 80 A.3d
778 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis added).

In a typical dependency case, the goal is reunification which provides the
biological parent(s) an opportunity to correct the issues which led to
dependency and ultimately regain custody of the child. Here, PLC is a de facto
parent who may also be subjected to dependency proceedings, and the goal
of reunification may also be considered. The term “reunification resource,” as
used here, is meant to refer to the attempt to reunify the children with the
Former Guardian.

                                           -2-
J-S47002-23

       On April 19, 2022, DHS received a general protective services (“GPS”)

report which alleged numerous issues regarding Former Guardian’s ability to

care for the children. Id., ¶ 5(c). Significantly, it was alleged that the children

had poor hygiene and it was unknown if the children’s educational needs were

being met and when they last received medical or dental care. Id. It was

further alleged that Former Guardian suffered from untreated mental health

issues and the reporting source was concerned that her behavior could

escalate if the Philadelphia Police Department conducted a welfare check. Id.

       DHS visited the home the same day. Id., ¶ 5(d). Z.B. answered behind

a locked security door and was home alone because Former Guardian took

A.B. to the store an hour earlier. Id. DHS observed that Z.B.’s clothing was

stained, her hair was unkempt, she was delayed in her responses, and she

displayed poor eye contact. Id. Z.B. did not have a telephone number for

Former Guardian and did not know what to do if there was an emergency. Id.

       Also on the same day, DHS received additional allegations that the

children were not allowed outside of the home and friends and family were

not allowed inside the home. Id., ¶ 5(e). Additionally, it was alleged that

Former Guardian has stated for several years that the police and FBI are

coming after her, and that the children may believe it. Id. DHS spoke with

Former Guardian on the telephone who denied the allegations and stated the

children’s fathers are after her and that they cut her car seats.3 Id., ¶ 5(f).
____________________________________________

3 We note that the children were 14 and 16 years old when Former Guardian

made this statement.

                                           -3-
J-S47002-23

Former Guardian agreed to meet with DHS on the porch, but would not allow

DHS to enter the home. Id., ¶ 5(g).

      Former    Guardian   admitted    the   children   were   not   doing   well

academically, but denied that they were truant.         Id., ¶ 5(h).   She also

admitted that the children have not received medical or dental care because

she was afraid of being followed to the doctor’s office. Id. The children were

last seen by a dentist in May 2015. Id. She informed DHS that the children

slept on air mattresses because the home was once infested with bedbugs.

Id. Former Guardian refused DHS’s assistance in acquiring appropriate beds

for the children, as well as housing assistance. Id. During the conversation,

Former Guardian commented that DHS was just an extension of the district

attorney’s office that refused to investigate her claims. Id. When asked to

prioritize the children’s needs, Former Guardian stated that her litigations took

precedence. Id.

      On May 19, 2022, DHS filed a motion to compel Former Guardian’s

cooperation with the investigation because she refused DHS access to the

home to assess the safety and well-being of the children. On May 31, 2022,

the court granted the motion and ordered Former Guardian to allow a home

assessment within 48 hours. Additionally, a hearing was scheduled for June

29, 2022.

      Former Guardian’s home was assessed by DHS on June 2, 2022, who

observed holes in the dining room and kitchen ceilings and noted that there

was no gas service. Id., ¶ 5(n). Former Guardian was fixated on her criminal

                                      -4-
J-S47002-23

complaints, stalking allegations, and a medical malpractice lawsuit, and

requested DHS to detain the people harassing her. Id. Former Guardian was

more concerned with the children’s “safety” from the “illegal surveillance” than

their medical needs. Id. She refused to sign a release for her prior mental

health treatment, to undergo a mental health evaluation and to identify a

resource for a safety plan. Id. Former Guardian told DHS not to return to

her home. Id. DHS spoke with the children who confirmed that they rarely

leave the home, and no one visits them. Id.

      On June 21, 2022, DHS attempted a home visit, but were denied access.

Id., ¶ 5(q). The children spoke with DHS alone on the porch, but were given

notepads and instructed to take notes about the questions asked. Id. Both

children disclosed that they do not have contact with any family or friends

because it would cause legal troubles.        Id.   The children attended school

virtually and failed all their classes. Id.

      Following a hearing on June 29, 2022, the court ordered Former

Guardian to comply with DHS and Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) to

ensure the children’s medical care is current. The court further ordered the

children and Former Guardian to appear at the next court date. On July 14,

2022, Former Guardian did not attend the hearing and instead, sent A.B. with

a note that Former Guardian was unable to attend due to a medical condition.

Id., ¶ 5(u). The motion to compel was withdrawn and Former Guardian was

ordered to comply with DHS and CUA. Id.

                                       -5-
J-S47002-23

       On July 27, 2022, DHS filed a dependency petition. Adjudication was

deferred on August 10 and August 17, 2022. On August 17, 2022, DHS went

to Former Guardian’s home after she missed the court hearing. Dependency

Petition, 8/24/22, at ¶ 5(f).         Z.B. answered the door and called Former

Guardian, who instructed Z.B. to close the door. Id. Former Guardian then

called DHS and said she was hospitalized and left the children in the care of

an unidentified male friend. Id. Since DHS was unable to access the home,

it obtained an order for protective custody that included a break-down order.

Id., ¶ 5(i). DHS was ultimately able to gain entry with the assistance of police,

removed the children from the home and placed them in foster care.4 Id.

       On August 22, 2022, a shelter care hearing was held5, wherein the order

for protective custody was lifted and the children were ordered to remain in

the temporary custody of DHS. Former Guardian was ordered to appear at

the next court date. Adjudication was deferred on September 14 and October

3, 2022. On October 31, 2022, the children were adjudicated dependent. The

trial court discharged Former Guardian’s PLC from Delaware County and

referred her to BHS for an evaluation and to comply with all recommendations.

The placement goal was reunification, and supervised visitation with Former

Guardian was at the children’s discretion. The January 18, 2023 permanency

____________________________________________

4 DHS filed a supplemental dependency petition on August 24, 2022 to include

what occurred on August 17, 2022.

5 Former Guardian appeared via telephone.

                                           -6-
J-S47002-23

review hearing was continued due to unavailability of Former Guardian’s

counsel and the CUA.

      A permanency review hearing was held on March 7, 2023, wherein the

court found Former Guardian was not compliant with her permanency plan

objectives and made no progress towards alleviating the circumstances that

brought the children into care. Visitation with Former Guardian remained at

the children’s discretion. The May 1, 2023 permanency review hearing was

continued because the city solicitor was unavailable.

      A second permanency review hearing was held on July 19, 2023.

Former Guardian did not attend the hearing. At the outset, the court stated

its intention of addressing whether Former Guardian should remain a part of

the case and directed the city solicitor to subpoena her for the next hearing.

N.T., 7/19/23, at 6-7.    James Allen, CUA case worker, testified that the

children are together in a therapeutic foster home and doing very well. Id. at

8, 21-22. Foster mother, D.A., expressed an interest in being awarded PLC

of the children, but did not want to pursue adoption.      Id. at 10-11, 22.

Likewise, both children wish to reside with D.A. permanently and do not want

to reunify or have continuing contact with Former Guardian. Id. at 11, 14,

22, 29-31.

      The permanency review hearing continued on August 30, 2023, wherein

the trial court incorporated the testimony from July 19, 2023. N.T., 8/30/23,

at 7. Mr. Allen spoke with the children again on August 8, 2023, and confirmed

that the children did not want to reunify or have any contact with Former

                                    -7-
J-S47002-23

Guardian. Id. at 11. Moreover, Former Guardian refused all services that

were offered, such as parenting classes, mental health treatment and BHS

services. Id. at 15-16. Significantly, Mr. Allen had not been inside Former

Guardian’s home since the children were removed in July 2022. Id. at 17. At

the conclusion of the hearing, the court removed Former Guardian as a

reunification resource, stating:

       And let me be clear. With the kids no longer wanting to reunify,
       wanting PLC in their current home, and not even wanting to visit,
       I’m not even factoring in the fact that [Former Guardian] didn’t
       comply with any Single Case Plan objectives from CUA.

Id. at 31.

       By order dated August 30, 2023, the court maintained the children’s

permanency goal of reunification and concurrent goal of permanent legal

custody with a non-relative.6         Legal and physical custody of the children

remained with DHS and the children remained in foster care. The order further

stated that the children do not wish to visit or reunify with Former Gurdian,

therefore, she was vacated as a reunification resource, as well as her court-

appointed counsel after 31 days. The next permanency review hearing was

scheduled for November 21, 2023.

       On September 2, 2023, Former Guardian filed counseled notices of

appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal, which this

____________________________________________

6 PLC was added as a concurrent goal following the July 19, 2023 permanency

review hearing. See Permanency Review Order, 7/19/23.

                                           -8-
J-S47002-23

Court consolidated sua sponte.      Former Guardian presents the following

questions for our review:

      A. Whether the trial court erred when it vacated the legal guardian
         as a reunification resource for the child[ren] when the court
         goal remained reunification/return to guardian and/or parent
         and DHS did not ask or file for a change in goal?

      B. Whether the trial court erred when it vacated court appointed
         counsel for the legal guardian, when the court goal remained
         reunification with guardian or parent and DHS did not ask or
         file for a change in goal?

Former Guardian’s Brief, at 5.

      Before we address the merits, we must determine whether the orders

from which Former Guardian appealed are appealable as it implicates our

jurisdiction. See In Interest of N.M., 186 A.3d 998, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citing Kulp v. Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“[W]e lack

jurisdiction over an unappealable order, it is incumbent upon us to determine,

sua sponte when necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an appealable

order”)). “Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate standard of

review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary.” Interest of J.M., 219

A.3d 645, 650 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting Barak v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208,

215 (Pa. Super. 2018)).

      Generally, only final orders are appealable. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). A

final order is one that disposes of all claims and all parties. See Pa.R.A.P.

341(b). However, there are three limited exceptions: (1) interlocutory appeal

as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (2) interlocutory appeal by permission (Pa.R.A.P.

                                     -9-
J-S47002-23

312); and (3) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313). Dependency matters do not

end following a child’s disposition and the fact that further proceedings are

contemplated is not dispositive of the finality of the order. See J.M., 219 A.3d

at 651.

      In the dependency context, this Court “must examine the practical

consequences of the order to determine if the party challenging it has

effectively been put out of court.” In re Interest of M.B., 565 A.2d 804, 806

(Pa. Super. 1989), appeal denied, 589 A.2d 692 (Pa. 1990). “Thus, . . . this

[C]ourt acknowledges certain crucial points of finality when review is

appropriate despite the fact that such determinations may be later modified

by the trial court after further statutorily mandated review hearings are held.”

Id. at 808. Specifically, our Supreme Court has held that “[a]n order granting

or denying a status change, as well as an order terminating or preserving

parental rights, shall be deemed final when entered.” In re H.S.W.C.-B., 836

A.2d 908, 911 (Pa. 2003).

      Here, the orders did not grant or deny a status change – the goal

remained reunification throughout. PLC with a non-relative was added as a

concurrent goal on July 19, 2023, which was not appealed. The question is

whether the appealed orders effectively put Former Guardian out of court.

      When Former Guardian was granted PLC in 2012, she obtained legal and

physical custody of the children. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6357 (rights and duties

of legal custodian). The court vacated Former Guardian’s PLC on October 31,

                                     - 10 -
J-S47002-23

2022, thereby terminating her legal and physical custodial rights of the

children.   As such, we must determine the effect of the October 31, 2022

orders on Former Guardian’s legal status in the dependency matters. While

standing was not specifically raised and this Court is precluded from raising it

sua sponte, it must be included in the analysis to reach our conclusion.

      Generally, only a “party” has standing to participate in dependency

proceedings. See In the Interest of M.R.F., III, 182 A.3d 1050, 1055 (Pa.

Super. 2018). Our case law limits “party” status to three classes of persons:

(1) the biological parents of the child(ren); (2) the legal custodian of the

child(ren); and (3) the person whose care and control of the child(ren) is in

question. Id. Former Guardian is not a biological parent of the children and

was no longer the legal custodian. She was, however, the person whose care

and control of the children was in question at the dependency hearing.

Therefore, Former Guardian was considered a party.

      As a party, Former Guardian is entitled to legal representation, the

opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and otherwise be

heard. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6337, 6338.        On August 30, 2023, the court

removed Former Guardian as a reunification resource and vacated her court-

appointed counsel. The orders effectively put Former Guardian out of court

as they removed her status as a “party”; therefore, we deem the August 30,

2023 orders to be final and appealable. See M.B., supra.

      The standard of review in dependency cases is well-settled:

                                     - 11 -
J-S47002-23

      [A]ppellate courts must employ an abuse of discretion standard of
      review, as we are not in a position to make the close calls based
      on fact-specific determinations. Not only are our trial judges
      observing the parties during the hearing, but usually . . . they
      have presided over several other hearings with the same parties
      and have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best
      interests of the individual child involved. Thus, we must defer to
      the trial judges who see and hear the parties and can determine
      the credibility to be placed on each witness and, premised
      thereon, gauge the likelihood of the success of the current
      permanency plan. Even if an appellate court would have made a
      different conclusion based on the cold record, we are not in a
      position to reweigh the evidence and the credibility determination
      of the trial court.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). Here, Former Guardian asserts

that the court erred in finding that she is not a suitable reunification resource.

Without providing any citations, she argues that the court did not have the

authority to remove her as a reunification resource when the goal remained

reunification. Former Guardian’s Brief at 9. She “believes that as long as the

court goal is reunification, she should be offered an opportunity to reunify with

the children.” Id. at 10. We disagree.

      Under the Juvenile Act, courts must conduct regular permanency

hearings to review the permanency plan of the child.          See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 6351(e).    At each permanency hearing, the court must consider the

following, statutorily-mandated factors: (1) the continuing need for and

appropriateness of the placement; (2) the appropriateness, feasibility and

extent of compliance with the permanency plan developed for the child; (3)

the extent of progress made toward alleviating the circumstances which

necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of

                                     - 12 -
J-S47002-23

the current placement goal for the child; (5) the likely date by which the

placement goal might be achieved; and (6) whether reasonable efforts were

made to finalize the permanency plan in effect. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f).

“When the child welfare agency has made reasonable efforts to return a foster

child to his or her biological parent, but those efforts have failed, then the

agency must redirect its efforts toward placing the child in an adoptive home.”

In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      There is no law defining “reasonable efforts,” however, our case law

indicates:

      Because the focus of the Juvenile Act is on the dependent child,
      as opposed to parents, any services for parents must directly
      promote the best interests of the child. By requiring only
      reasonable efforts to reunify a family, the statute recognizes that
      there are practical limitations to such efforts. It is not sufficient
      for the court to find simply that an action will promote family
      reunification; the court must also determine whether the action
      constitutions a reasonable effort towards reunification. This Court
      has stressed that the agency is not expected to do the impossible
      and is not a guarantor of the success of the efforts to help parents
      assume their parental duties.

In Interest of C.K., 165 A.3d 935, 942 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

      Although preserving the family unit is a purpose of the Juvenile Act,

“[t]he necessary implication of the Juvenile Act is that a parent who cannot or

will not meet the irreducible minimum requirements . . . within a reasonable

time following state intervention may properly be considered “unfit,” and may

properly have parental rights terminated.” In re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 958

                                     - 13 -
J-S47002-23

(Pa. Super. 1990). “[P]arents are required to make diligent efforts toward the

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Id. at 959.

      We think this affirmative duty, at a minimum requires a showing
      by the parent of a willingness to cooperate with the agency to
      obtain the rehabilitative service necessary for the performance of
      parental duties and responsibilities. The agency must, of course,
      put forth a good faith effort in making services available to the
      parent, and once it has done so on a continuing basis, it has
      discharged this obligation.

Id. (citing In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 890 (Pa. 1986)) (emphasis

in the original).

      While these principles are specific to a biological parent, we see no

reason why they should not apply to a person who was awarded permanent

legal custody. If a parent must make diligent efforts toward reunification,

which at a minimum is cooperating with the agency, then it follows that a

person with PLC whose care, custody and control of the children is in question

must also make diligent efforts toward reunification. If a biological parent

fails to make diligent efforts, then the court has the authority to end

reunification services and terminate their parental rights. See J.W., supra.

However, the court cannot terminate parental rights where they do not exist.

What it can do is remove the person as a reunification resource and terminate

services.

      Here, after considering the factors enumerated in Section 6351(f), as

set forth above, the court concluded there was clear and convincing evidence

                                    - 14 -
J-S47002-23

to warrant the removal of Former Guardian as a reunification resource.7 See

Trial Court Opinion, 10/2/23, at 2. The primary reason is that the children,

ages 14 and 16, adamantly expressed on numerous occasions that they did

not want to reunify with Former Guardian. As discussed at length above, the

children were removed from Former Guardian’s care because she neglected

the children’s medical, dental, educational and social needs.           Additionally,

there are significant concerns regarding Former Guardian’s mental health and

her ability to care for the children.

       Moreover,     Former     Guardian       was   uncooperative   throughout   the

dependency proceedings. She refused to allow DHS in her home to assess

the safety and well-being of the children. She admitted that the children were

medically and educationally neglected, yet was more concerned about her

lawsuits and whether she was being followed. Due to her lack of cooperation,

DHS was forced to obtain a break-down order to remove the children. She

refused all services DHS offered and prohibited DHS from entering her home.

Serious safety concerns for the children continue to exist in the home and

Former Guardian does not have the ability to meet the basic needs of the

children. Therefore, the court found Former Guardian was not compliant with

her permanency objectives and made no progress towards alleviating the

circumstances that brought the children into care.
____________________________________________

7 No party has challenged the court employing a burden of proof by clear and

convincing evidence. We accept, without deciding, the burden of proof used
by the court, even if a lesser burden of proof would be the standard, as any
error in this regard would be harmless in this appeal.

                                          - 15 -
J-S47002-23

       Accordingly, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in determining

Former Guardian was not a viable reunification resource, effectively removing

her from the case. See R.J.T., supra. Additionally, we note that the parental

rights of the biological parents have not been terminated and are parties in

the dependency matter. As such, reunification remains an appropriate goal

because a biological parent could potentially reunite with the children.

Therefore, Former Guardian’s argument that she must be given an opportunity

to reunite with the children because the goal remained reunification is

misplaced; the reunification goal remained with a parent, not with her as the

PLC.

       Further, Former Guardian’s argument that the court could not remove

her as a reunification resource because DHS did not file for a goal change is

without merit.    The court can review the appropriateness of the goal sua

sponte, provided it gives the party notice, which it did at the previous

permanency review hearing on July 19, 2023.         See Appellee’s Brief at 11

(citing Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook, § 14-2); see also N.T.,

7/19/23, at 7, 31. Thus, Former Guardian had more than 15 days’ notice that

she may be removed as a resource at the permanency review hearing on

August 30, 2023, and no procedural error occurred.

       Finally, Former Guardian also asserts that the court erred when it

vacated the appointment of counsel for Former Guardian. We disagree. The

court directed the vacation occur 31 days after entry of the order, recognizing

that Former Guardian was entitled to counsel if she chose to appeal. Former

                                     - 16 -
J-S47002-23

Guardian is represented by counsel for this appeal. As discussed above, any

rights to custody, care or control of the children were removed, as was her

position as a party. Since she is no longer a party to the dependency matter,

Former Guardian is not entitled to court-appointed counsel beyond the direct

appeal process.   See Pa.R.J.C.P. 1151(E).   As a result, the court properly

vacated counsel’s appointment.

     Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 4/29/2024

                                   - 17 -