Court Opinion

ID: 9958269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 18:00:48.031192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.922340
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60106            Document: 82-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/08/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________                                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                                     No. 23-60106                                         FILED
                                   ____________                                        April 8, 2024
                                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
Candace E. Taylor,                                                                        Clerk

                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                          versus

Denis McDonough, Secretary, U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs,

                                             Defendant—Appellee.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Mississippi
                             USDC No. 1:21-CV-294
                   ______________________________

Before King, Ho, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
       Candace E. Taylor appeals the district court’s summary dismissal of
her claims of sexual harassment against her former employer in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Taylor’s claims arise from instances
of sexual harassment occurring between March 2017 and October 2017. The
district court concluded that a subset of Taylor’s claims was untimely, and
that the remaining claims were defeated by the Department of Veteran

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                 No. 23-60106

Affairs’ Ellerth/Faragher defense to vicarious sexual harassment liability. We
find no error in the district court’s conclusions and AFFIRM.
                                      I.
       In April 2013, Plaintiff-Appellant Candace E. Taylor began working at
the Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”). She was originally hired as a
Medical Administrative Support (“MAS”) Assistant, a position which she
maintained from 2013 to 2017. In her capacity as an MAS assistant, Taylor
worked with William Hardy, a Program Manager in the VA’s Equal
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office. During this time, Taylor agrees
that her personal interactions with Hardy were “very respectful” and
professional.
       In March 2017, Taylor transitioned into a new role as the EEO
Program Assistant and began directly reporting to Hardy. As part of her job
duties, Taylor received and acknowledged the VA’s internal memoranda and
policies about reporting sexual harassment, instructed other employees on
how to file sexual harassment claims, and taught other employees that the 45-
day deadline for filing such claims was a “firm” deadline.
       Taylor alleges that shortly after her transition, Hardy began sexually
harassing her. Taylor testified that in April 2017, Hardy revealed to her that
he was “sexually frustrated,” and began commenting on her “pretty
physique.” Taylor also states that around the same time, Hardy “pressed his
body up against [her]” and told her that she had “very nice jugs.”
Additionally, Hardy sent Taylor a series of text messages which stated, inter
alia, “R u getting dress for work . . . I guess you have clothes on �” and “I
ask[ed] to kiss your jugs that has not happened.”
       On May 24, 2017, Hardy sent Taylor a photograph of himself via text
message, accompanied by the caption, “I look great . . . Get FaceTime and

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you could see more lol . . . Thank you.” Also in May, while at a work event,
Taylor alleges that Hardy told her that “he was just tempted to take [Taylor]
into the bathroom to have sex,” and he let her know that he was allergic to
latex condoms as an “FYI.” Although Taylor testified that she knew how to
report these alleged harassment incidents in accordance with VA policies,
she explained that she did not do so because she feared retaliation and
believed Hardy would not be disciplined.
       Over the next three months, from June to August, Taylor testified that
Hardy engaged in “bad management” and continued to make inappropriate
comments to her, such as, “[H]opefully I’ll get lucky one of these days.”
However, Taylor did note that the comments were not “as aggressive as it
was before” and did not involve “direct contact” like before. And, when
asked if she ever reported Hardy’s behavior to anyone during this period,
Taylor stated that she did not because “there was nobody that [she] could
talk to.”
       Taylor makes two final allegations of sexual harassment, both
occurring in September 2017. First, on September 10, 2017, Hardy texted
Taylor: “You did not want me to go [on a trip] because you knew you would
be a bad girl . . . You may deny it but you know what probably would have
happened . . . It is all good and may never happen . . . I want it but you are so
hesitant.” Then, on September 20, 2017, Hardy texted Taylor: “I made you
show a side you did not want to and I regret that . . . Crying and hurting
you . . . The last I want to do is hurt you. Just because I can’t get what I want
should not be a reason to be mean to you.”
       By October 2017, Taylor was no longer speaking to Hardy, save for
work-related conversations. As a result, Taylor testified that Hardy
approached her and threatened to terminate her employment in EEO if she

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did not agree to his advances. To this end, Hardy asked the EEO office for a
list of vacant positions and gave those positions to Taylor.
       Ultimately, Taylor was relocated back to MAS on October 31, 2017.
However, the chronology of events leading up to Taylor’s relocation is
disputed and somewhat inconsistent. For example, Taylor testified during
her deposition that she met with her friend and coworker, Kimberly Booker,
and Human Resources Manager Constance Ceasar on October 23, 2017, at a
restaurant in Biloxi, Mississippi. During the meeting, Taylor claims she
spoke to Booker and Ceasar about Hardy’s conduct for the first time,
although she states that she “did not verbally come out and say what
happened.” But, in her email to Ceasar dated November 17, 2017, Taylor
states that she told EEO Counselor Stacy Porter that she never spoke to
“anyone else” about Hardy’s conduct until she made a formal complaint on
October 30, 2017, and did not reference her conversations with Booker or
Ceasar.
       In any event, however, there is no allegation that Hardy was the one
to actually make the decision to relocate Taylor. Rather, that decision was
initiated by Ceasar upon Taylor’s request and confirmed by Porter. In fact,
on November 2 and 3, after learning that Taylor had been moved to MAS,
Hardy emailed Taylor asking her who authorized the transfer, and he
attempted to reverse the authorization by threatening to “AWOL” Taylor
if she did not return.
       Moreover, the parties agree that, on October 24, 2017, Taylor made
an anonymous, informal complaint regarding Hardy’s alleged harassment to
the Office of Resolution Management. The parties also agree, as referenced
above, that Taylor submitted a formal complaint against Hardy on October
30, 2017. In addition to this complaint, Taylor contacted Ceasar and EEO
Counselor Mary Sloan multiple times requesting to be relocated because of

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Hardy’s harassment. Additionally, the parties agree that Taylor was moved
from the EEO office and temporarily reassigned to the MAS office one day
after she filed her formal complaint, and that an investigation into Hardy’s
conduct was immediately launched. Taylor did not see Hardy again at any
point after Tuesday, October 31, 2017, even though she was made to briefly
return to the EEO office on Friday, November 3, 2017, when Hardy was not
in the office. 1 Additionally, Taylor testified that between March 2017 and
October 2017—the period of her harassment—she did not suffer any
demotion, discipline, reduction in pay, or change in benefits at work.
       Taylor retained her temporary MAS position until its expiration in
April 2018. Taylor did apply for a permanent MAS position but was
ultimately not selected. Thus, Taylor asked and was returned to her old EEO
position after Hardy’s exit. Taylor stayed in the EEO position until May
2019, when she voluntarily moved to a new position in Tuscaloosa, Alabama.
       As for Hardy, the VA first temporarily reassigned him as a result of
Taylor’s claims. Ultimately, in December 2017, the agency prepared a notice
of proposed removal for conduct unbecoming of a federal employee. Hardy
resigned in lieu of termination. Additionally, after their investigation
concluded, the VA awarded Taylor $12,675.97 in compensatory damages
and $79,312.50 in attorney’s fees.
       Consistent with her right to file a civil action in addition to her agency
action, Taylor initiated this lawsuit in district court, on September 13, 2021,
against Defendant Denis McDonough, the VA Secretary. Taylor brought
claims for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

       _____________________
       1
        Taylor was there for one day, having previously arranged to take leave on
Monday, November 6. Upon returning to work on Tuesday, November 7, she reported to
the MAS office.

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42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. On September 30, 2022, the VA moved for
summary judgment, which the district court granted on February 3, 2023.
Taylor timely appealed.
                                       II.
       We review grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard on appeal that was applied by the district court. See McCarty v.
Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 2017). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute as to a material fact is
‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540
(5th Cir. 2005). In reviewing the record, the court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh evidence. Id.
       However, summary judgment cannot be defeated with “conclus[ory]
allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of
evidence.” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012). Instead,
“the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). We will grant summary judgment when
“critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not
support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant.” Armstrong v. City of Dallas,
997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993).
                                       III.
       Taylor’s appeal presents three issues: (A) whether Taylor’s
allegations of harassment occurring between April 2017 to August 2017 are
time-barred; (B) whether the district court correctly determined that Taylor

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did not suffer a “tangible employment action”; and (C) whether the district
court correctly determined that the VA is entitled to the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense. We address each issue in turn.
                                      A.
       Prior to filing suit against his or her employer in court for
discrimination under Title VII, a federal civil servant “must first exhaust his
administrative remedies.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 552–53 (2016);
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). To exhaust those remedies, the federal employee
must first “initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the
matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within
45 days of the effective date of the action.” Green, 578 U.S. at 553 (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1)). “Failure to notify the EEO counselor in timely
fashion may bar a claim, absent a defense of waiver, estoppel, or equitable
tolling.” Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Baker v.
McHugh, 672 F. App’x 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2016).
       Taylor’s earliest report to the Office of Resolution Management was
the one made anonymously on October 24, 2017. Therefore, it is undisputed
that all of Taylor’s allegations of sexual harassment are untimely on their
face, with the exceptions being the September 10, 2017, and September 20,
2017, text messages from Hardy. However, Taylor argues on appeal that the
VA waived the forty-five-day timeliness requirement relative to the
harassment occurring between April and August 2017.
       This court has held that “the docketing and acting on a complaint or
request for reconsideration does not alone constitute a waiver of the
timeliness objection.” Reveles v. Napolitano, 595 F. App’x 321, 325 (5th Cir.
2014) (citing Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1992), and Oaxaca
v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1981)). Rather, “to waive a timeliness
objection, the agency must make a specific finding that the claimant’s

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submission was timely.” Rowe, 967 F.2d at 191 (emphasis added); Werner v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 441 F. App’x 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2011). In fact, even a
“statement that a request for reconsideration is timely does not suffice
‘because agencies may inadvertently overlook timeliness problems and
should not thereafter be bound.’” Rowe, 967 F.2d at 191 (quoting Henderson
v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1986)).
        Here, the VA never made any specific finding that Taylor’s October
24, 2017, contact with an EEO counselor was timely. The VA merely
accepted, docketed, and investigated Taylor’s case, and ultimately awarded
Taylor attorney’s fees and compensatory damages. Taylor does not
convincingly argue that the VA’s actions were anything more than
“docketing and acting” on her complaint, which, by themselves, are
insufficient to waive a timeliness objection. 2 See Reveles, 595 F. App’x at 325;
Rowe, 967 F.2d at 191. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined
that all of Taylor’s allegations—with the exception of the September 10,
2017, and September 20, 2017, text messages from Hardy—are time-barred.
                                            B.
        We now turn to Taylor’s non-time-barred claims. In companion cases
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), the Supreme Court provided the appellate
courts with a clear road map for deciding supervisor sexual harassment cases
under Title VII. Under the Ellerth/Faragher framework, courts first

        _____________________
        2
            Taylor provides no authority supporting her contention that a payment of
attorney’s fees or damages constitutes an automatic waiver of the timeliness objection. In
fact, such an argument directly conflicts with the principle that an agency may not
inadvertently waive a timeliness objection, and instead “must make a specific finding” that
a claim is timely to waive any objection. See Rowe, 967 F.2d at 191; Werner, 441 F. App’x at
249; Reveles, 595 F. App’x at 325.

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determine whether the complaining employee has or has not suffered a
“tangible employment action.” Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 283
(5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761–62). If the court finds that
the employee has suffered such an action, her suit is classified as a “quid pro
quo” case; if not, it is classified as a “hostile work environment” case. See id.
at 283–84. In a way, this creates a “fork in the road” on the Ellerth/Faragher
road map.
        When a case is classified as quid pro quo, affirmative defenses are
unavailable, and an employer is per se vicariously liable for a supervisor’s
harassment if the plaintiff proves that “the tangible employment action
suffered by the employee resulted from his acceptance or rejection of his
supervisor’s alleged sexual harassment.” Id. On the other hand, when a case
is classified as a hostile work environment case—i.e., there was no “tangible
employment action”—the court must ask a different question: “[W]ould the
actions ascribed to the supervisor by the employee constitute severe or
pervasive sexual harassment?” Id. at 284. If the actions were not “severe or
pervasive,” there is no vicarious liability. Id. But, if the actions were “severe
or pervasive,” the employer is vicariously liable unless the employer can
satisfy both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. Id.
Specifically, the employer is not vicariously liable if it proves that (1) the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any such
sexual harassment; and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer to avoid the harm otherwise. 3 Id. This is the only affirmative

        _____________________
        3
          “[L]est our verbal exposition of the methodology mandated by the Supreme
Court in those two cases be less than pellucid,” we point to the Casiano court’s helpful
graphic representation of the described procedure. See Casiano, 213 F.3d at 283 & n.5, 288.

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defense available to an employer in a supervisor sexual harassment case post
Ellerth/Faragher. Id.
       Here, the parties do not dispute that Hardy, Taylor’s supervisor,
engaged in conduct that meets the criteria of sexual harassment. Rather, the
VA argues—and the district court held—that Taylor’s claims are properly
classified as hostile work environment claims and are defeated by the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. Accordingly, we must first decide
whether Taylor suffered a “tangible employment action,” before analyzing
whether the Ellerth/Faragher defense is available to the VA.
       In Ellerth, the Supreme Court defined a “tangible employment
action” as “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities,
or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” 524 U.S. at 761. It
occurs when “the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear
on subordinates.” Id. at 762 (emphasis added).
       Here, Taylor has not shown that Hardy imposed upon her any action
that could be characterized as a tangible employment action. As the district
court noted, Taylor herself requested the transfer to MAS by contacting
Ceasar, and Ceasar, not Hardy, initially authorized the transfer. That transfer
was then confirmed by Porter, not Hardy. Taylor argues that Hardy’s
requested list of potential other jobs establishes a “causal” connection to
Ceasar’s and Porter’s actions. Even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Taylor, we disagree. Hardy never actually terminated or
relocated Taylor using that list. In fact, Ceasar herself admitted that “the list
of open positions [that Hardy requested] did not have anything to do per se
with [Taylor] being moved to MAS.” Hardy even insisted that Taylor return
to EEO after she was reassigned and that he did not want her transferred to
MAS. Thus, there is insufficient evidence that Hardy, the harasser, took a

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tangible employment action against Taylor because she rejected his sexual
advances. See Casiano, 213 F.3d at 284–85 (finding no tangible employment
action when an employee was denied access to a training program because
another manager, not the harassing supervisor, was responsible for the
decision); Russell v. Univ. of Tex. of Permian Basin, 234 F. App’x 195, 201–02
(5th Cir. 2007); see also Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir.
2003) (“When a supervisor engages in sexual harassment, the employer is
liable for the harassment only if the harasser took a tangible employment action
as part of his harassment.”).
       Hardy’s threats to “AWOL” Taylor—in the absence of Hardy
actually reporting Taylor as “AWOL”—are also insufficient establish a
tangible employment action. See Ellerth, 542 U.S. at 762 (“A tangible
employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company
act.”); see also Ross v. Wald Moving & Storage Servs., Inc., 193 F.3d 516, 1999
WL 706057, at *4 (5th Cir. 1999); Jin v. Metro. Life Ins., 310 F.3d 84, 97 (2nd
Cir. 2002) (“[I]f [plaintiff] initially resisted [the harassment] and [the
harasser] did not follow through with his threat of termination, then that
threat would not qualify as a tangible employment action.”); May v. Autozone
Stores, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 682, 685–86 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (“The Supreme
Court has recognized a distinction in Title VII sexual harassment cases
between those based on threats that are carried out (often referred to as quid
pro quo cases) and those where bothersome attentions or sexual remarks
create a hostile work environment.” (emphasis added)). And, in any event,
by that time, Taylor had already filed a formal complaint and had requested
reassignment. Accordingly, we find that Taylor did not suffer a “tangible
employment action” at the hands of Hardy, and, as a result, that her claim is
properly analyzed as a “hostile work environment” claim.

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                                     C.
       Because the VA does not appear to address or dispute the severity or
pervasiveness of Hardy’s discrimination, we, like the district court, assume
that Taylor presented sufficient evidence of a hostile work environment.
Accordingly, our final step is to decide whether Taylor’s claims are defeated
by the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. We hold that they are.
       Under the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, an employer is not
vicariously liable for sexual harassment if it proves that (1) the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any such sexual
harassment; and (2) that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer to
avoid the harm otherwise. See Casiano, 213 F.3d at 284.
       Here, construing the record in favor of Taylor, the summary judgment
evidence indicates that the VA exercised reasonable care to promptly correct
Hardy’s harassment. Although Taylor argues that “[n]o one in the reporting
chain knew how to address a sexual harassment complaint against William
Hardy” because he was the EEO Program Manager, it is undisputed that the
VA commenced an investigation into Hardy’s conduct one day after Taylor
filed her formal complaint on October 31, 2017.
       It is also undisputed that Hardy was reassigned in December 2017,
and, at the end of that month, was permitted to resign in lieu of termination.
Thus, although Taylor did not officially commence her MAS position until
Tuesday, November 7, 2017, she had no “in person” or verbal interaction
with Hardy after Tuesday, October 31, 2017. And, when her temporary MAS
position expired in April 2018, she returned, at her request, to the EEO
office. Finally, as noted above, there is inconsistency in the record about
whether Taylor first reported Hardy’s harassment on October 30, or during
her informal meeting with Ceasar and Booker on October 23. However, as

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the district court stated, even crediting the earlier of the two dates, this court
has held that a one-week delay in remedial action is reasonable under the first
prong of Ellerth/Faragher. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d
258, 260–61, 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (calling “prompt” an agency’s one-week
delay in starting investigation into sexual harassment and one-month delay in
issuing discipline); see also Casiano, 213 F.3d at 280–83, 286–88. Therefore,
the district court correctly concluded that the VA met the first prong of the
Ellerth/Faragher defense.
       The summary judgment evidence also shows that, prior to her
October 2017 complaint, Taylor unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer to avoid
the harm otherwise. Taylor does not dispute her knowledge of the VA’s
preventative and corrective sexual harassment policies. In fact, as part of her
job, she discussed these policies with other employees. Nor does she dispute
that she waited more than six months to report her allegations to the VA.
“[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation
of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a
demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s
burden under the second element of the defense.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–
08.
       Taylor attempts to argue that her delay was caused by a fear of
retaliation or inaction if she reported the allegations any sooner. However:
       All harassment victims risk retaliation when they complain.
       For Title VII to be properly facilitated, the reasons for not
       complaining about harassment should be substantial and based
       upon objective evidence that some significant retaliation will
       take place. For example, a plaintiff may bring forward evidence

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       of prior unresponsive action by the company or management to
       actual complaints.
Harper v. City of Jackson Mun. Sch. Dist., 149 F. App’x 295, 302 (5th Cir.
2005) (quoting Young v. R.R. Morrison & Son, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927
(N.D. Miss. 2000)). Here, Taylor states that “Mr. Hardy would joke about
how he had EEO complaints filed against him and how he was able to dismiss
them,” and that “he joked about how he had the police called on him more
than once and nothing was done to him.” However, Taylor provides no
objective evidence of prior retaliation, inaction, or dismissiveness regarding
“actual complaints” made to the VA. The only evidence that comes close is
Taylor’s testimony that Hardy himself once asked an EEO manager to
mediate an EEO complaint involving another employee, but this singular
instance is insufficient to reach the level of “substantial,” “objective
evidence,” especially when there is no evidence on the record about what the
outcome in that case was. In short, Taylor’s subjective fears of retaliation are
insufficient to overcome the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense.
Thus, Taylor’s claims are defeated as a matter of law.
                                      IV.
       Finding no error in the district court’s dismissal of Taylor’s
discrimination claims, we AFFIRM.

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