Court Opinion

ID: 9371886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 00:02:49.913831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:30.873023
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/23 Bryant v. Dept. of Transportation CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 JESSE BRYANT, JR.,

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       E077978

 v.                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. RIC1903462)

 DEPARTMENT OF                                                           OPINION
 TRANSPORTATION,

          Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge.

Affirmed.

         Jesse Bryant, Jr., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

         Department of Transportation, Erin E. Holbrook, Chief Counsel, Alan M.

Steinberg, Deputy Chief Counsel, Joann Georgallis, Assistant Chief Counsel, Cassandra

Hoff, Deputy Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.

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                                              I.

                                     INTRODUCTION

       Jesse Bryant, Jr. dba Financial Management Consulting (FMC) unsuccessfully bid

on a government contract with the Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Caltrans

then denied Bryant’s bid protest and awarded the contract to a competitor. About two

years after losing his bid protest, Bryant filed a petition for writ of mandate in the

superior court. The trial court found Bryant’s petition was untimely filed and entered

judgment for Caltrans. We affirm.

                                              II.

                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In November 2016, Caltrans issued a Request for Proposal to solicit proposals on a

government contract. Bryant dba FMC and two other companies submitted proposals.

FMC received the lowest score from the evaluation committee, so it was not awarded the

contract. Caltrans issued a notice of intent to award the contract to CH2M, which

received the highest score from the evaluation committee.

       In February 2017, FMC filed a notice of intent to protest the award of the contract

to CH2M. A month later, FMC filed their Detailed Statement of Protest. The thrust of

their protest was that they should have received a higher score and thus should have been

awarded the contract. After a hearing by written submission, the Department of General

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                                                  1
Services (DGS) rejected the protest in June 2017. CH2M was awarded the contract,

which expired in June 2018.

       Bryant sued Caltrans in the superior court in December 2017. The trial court

sustained Caltrans’s two demurrers with leave to amend. The court then sustained

Caltrans’s demurrer to Bryant’s Second Complaint without leave to amend for failure to

state a claim and uncertainty.

       In June 2019, two years after DGS rejected Bryant and FMC’s bid protest and

about a year after the contract ended, Bryant filed a petition for writ of mandate under

Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Caltrans successfully demurred to the petition,

and Bryant filed his operative amended petition in November 2019.

       Caltrans eventually filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP).

Caltrans argued, among other things, that Bryant’s petition was barred by the applicable

30-day statute of limitations (see Gov. Code, § 11523). The trial court agreed, granted

the motion, and entered judgment for Caltrans. Bryant timely appealed.

       1
        DGS has exclusive jurisdiction to review bid protests for consultant contracts.
(See Pub. Contract Code, § 1034; Cal. Code regs, tit. 2, §§ 1195 to 1195.6.)

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                                              III.

                                       DISCUSSION

       Caltrans argues we should affirm the judgment because Bryant filed his petition
                                                      2
long after the 30-day statute of limitations expired. We agree.

       Government Code section 11523’s 30-day statute of limitations “governs the time

for filing a petition for writ of administrative mandate [under Code of Civil Procedure

section 1094.5] to obtain judicial review of the decision of an administrative agency”

unless there are “more specific statutory provisions applicable to the agency.” (Ventura

Coastal, LLC v. Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1,

30; Contractors’ State License Board v. Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 771, 776.)

Bryant argued in the trial court that Code of Civil Procedure section 343 controls, not
                                                                                              3
Government Code section 11523, and raises the argument again on appeal. We disagree.

       “Code of Civil Procedure section 343 states: ‘An action for relief not hereinbefore

provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have

accrued.’ It is a catchall provision that provides a statute of limitations in situations

       2
         We note that Bryant filed a 47-page opening brief totaling nearly the maximum
14,000 words permitted under California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(1). Like his trial
court briefs, his opening brief is dense, replete with arguments and authority, and difficult
to follow. We have considered all of Bryant’s arguments to the extent we can follow
them, but we need only resolve the statute of limitations issue for the reasons discussed
below.
       3
          Bryant forfeited the arguments concerning the statute of limitations that he
raises for the first time on appeal by failing to assert them in the trial court. (Perez v.
Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-592 [arguments raised for the first time on
appeal are forfeited].) We therefore decline to consider them.

                                               4
where no specific limitations period applies.” (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City of

San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 773-774.) This provision does not apply here

because Government Code section 11523 imposes a 30-day deadline to file a petition for

writ of mandate to challenge the decision of an administrative agency like Caltrans. (See

Hansen v. Board of Registered Nursing (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 664, 669.) Bryant fails

to show that Code of Civil Procedure section 343 (or any other provision) is a “more

specific statutory provision[] applicable” to Caltrans that displaces Government Code

section 11523’s 30-day deadline as the applicable statute of limitations here.

       DGS rejected FMC’s bid protest in June 2017, and its decision became final

immediately upon service. (See Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of

Health (2020) 9 Cal.5th 710, 718-720; Millview County Water Dist. v State Water

Resources Control Bd. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 585, 594-596 [agency’s decision is final

when no further issues to decide]; see also Cal. Code regs., tit. 2, § 1195.2 [DGS may

make “final disposition of the protest” after written hearing].) Under Government Code

section 11532, Bryant had 30 days from then to file a petition for writ of mandate in the

superior court. (See ibid.) He did not do so until June 2019, so his petition was not

timely filed. Because his petition was untimely filed, the trial court correctly granted

Caltrans’s MJOP. (See Ponderosa Homes, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (1994) 23

Cal.App.4th 1761, 1772.) We therefore affirm the judgment and need not address the

parties’ remaining arguments. (See ibid.)

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                                        IV.

                                  DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed. Caltrans may recover its costs on appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                           CODRINGTON
                                                                           J.

We concur:

MILLER
             Acting P. J.

MENETREZ
                       J.

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