Court Opinion

ID: 9527978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:35:56.919911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:20.432721
License: Public Domain

Durham, J.
(dissenting) — CrR 3.3(g)(6) unambiguously excludes the time spent in federal prison from the calculation of time under CrR 3.3(d)(4). Nonetheless, the majority attempts to amend this rule by decisional law, rather than by following the normal rule-making procedure. It does this by extending the "good faith and diligent efforts" requirement of State v. Peterson, 90 Wn.2d 423, 428, 585 P.2d 66 (1978) to the CrR 3.3(g)(6) exception. In doing so, the majority ignores the plain and unambiguous language of CrR 3.3(g)(6), our rules of statutory interpretation, and the intent of this court in adopting the criminal rules. Thus, I dissent.
Although the criminal rules are not legislative enactments, but rather are promulgated by this court, our normal rules of statutory construction are still to be applied. State v. *868Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d 585, 592, 845 P.2d 971 (1993). A bedrock principle of our approach to statutory construction is that when a rule is unambiguous, its meaning must be derived solely from its actual language. State v. Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 270-71, 814 P.2d 652 (1991). "The court has no power to insert new provisions into a rule that is plain on its face." State v. Carmichael, 53 Wn. App. 894, 896, 771 P.2d 364, review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1001 (1989). Neither the majority nor the respondent has made a showing of any ambiguity in CrR 3.3(g)(6), nor could they, as the rule is clear and unequivocal. The rule explicitly exempts from the speedy trial calculation the "time dining which a defendant is detained ... in a federal jail or prison . . .". CrR 3.3(g)(6).
Also overlooked by the majority are the principles that a legislative body is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of its enactments, Friends of Snoqualmie Vly. v. King Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 118 Wn.2d 488, 496, 825 P.2d 300 (1992), and that a potential conflict between two statutory provisions is to be resolved by giving effect to the more specific and more recently enacted provision, Morris v. Blaker, 118 Wn.2d 133, 143, 821 P.2d 482 (1992). As the majority points out, the CrR 3.3(g)(6) exception was added to the rule in 1980, subsequent to the decision in Peterson. Majority, at 856. There is more than a mere presumption that this court is aware of its own decisions and would have specifically included a "good faith and diligent efforts" requirement in the CrR 3.3(g)(6) exception had it wished to do so.42 The fact that we did not include such language in 1980 is nearly conclusive proof that such a requirement was never intended.
*869We adopted CrR 3.3's time limits specifically to avoid the uncertainty inherent in a case-by-case analysis. State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 213, 616 P.2d 620 (1980). The majority's amendment of our criminal rules to include a requirement of "good faith and diligent efforts" injects just such a measure of unnecessary ambiguity as we have attempted to avoid. Our criminal rules, which are intended to simplify criminal procedure, need no such qualification.43 CrR 3.3(g)(6) is plain on its face and, applied to the facts of this case, mandates that we affirm the conviction entered by the Superior Court.
Andersen, C.J., and Brachtenbach, J., concur with Durham, J.
Reconsideration denied September 1, 1993.

To the extent that this exception may conflict with some of our pre-1980 decisions, the exception must be given precedence. State v. Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d 585, 593, 845 P.2d 971 (1993). As to the majority's citations to our post-1980 cases applying the "good faith and due diligence" requirement, these cases involved situations upon which the rales remained silent, and we had to decide whether a pre-amendment case continued to fill that gap. State v. Pacheco, 107 Wn.2d 59, 65-66, 726 P.2d 981 (1986); Greenwood, at 592-93. In the case at hand, CrR 3.3(g)(6) is specifically meant to deal with defendants incarcerated in a federal prison.

A defendant incarcerated in another jurisdiction and aggrieved by the laxity of his prosecution is always free to bring a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. There has been no such claim here. A Sixth Amendment claim, which is independent of any claim under CrR 3.3, is the more appropriate arena for consideration of the prosecution's good faith and diligent efforts. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607, 89 S. Ct. 575 (1969). See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972) (rejecting precise time limits because constitutional speedy trial right cannot he quantified into a specified number of days).