Court Opinion

ID: 9714297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:35:00.700272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:25.112683
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION

Arterburn, J.
This case involves the “Guest Statute” in which one college student sued another as a result of an arrangement between the parents of the two students at a Dad’s Day celebration to leave one of the cars for the students of both families to drive back home in at a later date for Thanksgiving vacation, while the parents returned together in the other car. Appellee-Ely, one of the students, was a passenger in the car driven by appellant-Allison, the other student, and sues for personal injuries resulting from an accident which occurred on the trip home for the Thanksgiving vacation.
This is one of those close cases upon which legal minds can easily differ. The question here is — was there an actual payment or consideration within the meaning of the Guest Statute? Acts 1937, ch. 259, §1, being §47-1021, Burns’ 1952 Replacement.
I think the case of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stitzle (1942), 220 Ind. 180, 41 N. E. 2d 133, 139 A. L. R. 1391 is determinative of the question here. In that case the driver and the passenger were on a trip to look over furniture in Chicago at the time of the accident. There was only an anticipated benefit to each, yet this court held the salesman riding with a prospective customer *267was not a guest under the terms of the statute, but on the other hand, the trip was for business purposes and there was “payment” within the meaning of the statute.
In that ease it is held that the issues of fact to support the allegations should be submitted to the jury.
In the case before us, likewise, there is a question of fact to be submitted for the determination of the jury, namely, did the parents intend to be bound by their promises to exchange the use of their cars?
Could an action for breach of contract have been maintained if the promised ride to appellee had been refused after the other ride provided in exchange therefor had been promised and furnished? Was the saving of the price of a railroad ticket from Miami, Ohio, to Chicago, Illinois, (a distance of approximately BOO miles) by the exchange of the cars which appellant-Allison testified was decided upon as an economy measure, a basis for the furnishing of the car? This and the entire testimony bearing upon the question of the purpose of the trip were proper to be considered by the jury in determining whether or not a binding contract was intended, and whether a valid consideration was involved, which under the statute, is a payment contemplated by the agreement. Consideration is legal payment in any contract.
The interpretation given the statute in the Liberty Mutual case was made in 1942, and so long as that interpretation remains undisturbed by the legislature, I feel bound to follow such interpretation rather than contravene what I feel is a ruling precedent of this court. There is some evidence in this case of a consideration or payment, although admittedly small, to go before the jury and in my opinion the trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant-appellant.
*268The petition to transfer should be denied.
Landis, J., concurs in this dissent.
Note. — Reported in 170 N. E. 2d 371.