Court Opinion

ID: 9696738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:56:43.922974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:15.157212
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by HARRELL, J„ which BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ., Join.
I respectfully dissent as to the sanction only. Rather than an indefinite suspension, disbarment is more appropriate.
The majority is correct in sustaining the Commission’s exceptions. Thus, Reinhardt, for sanctioning purposes, stands adjudged as having violated the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 3.2, and 8.4(c) and (d) in the course of his representation of Ms. Cohen.
Mitigation is analyzed traditionally by the Court in terms of the American Bar Association’s (ABA) recommended standards. For example, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 488-89, 671 A.2d 463, 483 (1996), we stated:
The mitigating factors listed in the ABA Standards include: absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses. (Footnote omitted)
Id.; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 375, 872 A.2d 693, 713 (2005). As such, “facts tending to show mitigation are used to determine the severity *228of the sanction and not whether evidence adduced has established a violation of the rules by clear and convincing evidence.” Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 368, 872 A.2d at 709.
We intentionally set a high bar for respondents in cases where the flagship violation is of MRPC 8.4(c) (“conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”), such as the present one. That high bar is described best in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001).
In cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as “compelling extenuating circumstances,” anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the “root cause” of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the law and the MRPC.
Vanderlinde explained why the bar was set at that height:
Unlike matters related to competency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse. Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney’s character. Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct.
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.
The majority in the present case points out, appropriately so, that we are not inflexible and unyielding in our application of Vanderlinde, The majority seeks to illustrate this by quoting dicta from Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646-47, 790 A.2d 621, 628-29 (2002). See majority slip op. at 20. Interestingly, a unanimous Court in Lane nonetheless found disbarment to be the appropriate sanction where Lane made numerous misrepresentations to two clients about work he never did. We reached this result despite the mitigating circumstances of Lane’s private practice inexperience at the time of the misconduct, his remorse, his coopera*229tion with Bar Counsel throughout the grievance process, and his showing, by virtue of his successful practice as a public defender and later a prosecutor following the misconduct, that he was no threat to the public. Lane, 367 Md. at 644, 790 A.2d at 627. It seemed that the Court was persuaded that disbarment, rather than suspension, was appropriate because of the repetition and materiality of the misrepresentations made by Lane while in private practice. Lane, 367 Md. at 647, 790 A.2d at 629.1
Not cited by the majority in the present case, but referred to in Lane, is Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 785 A.2d 1260 (2001). In Harrington, the Court majority chose indefinite suspension over disbarment where Harrington violated: MRPC 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(d) in one matter; MRPC 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c) and (d) regarding a second complaint; and, MRPC 8.1(b) and 8.4(d) in a third ease. The misconduct that led to Harrington being found in the one case to have violated MRPC 8.4(c) was “leading his client to believe he had filed a lawsuit on her behalf, when in fact he had not, and accounting] for the delay because he was ‘waiting for a court date.’ ” Harrington, 367 Md. at 48, 785 A.2d at 1267.
In settling on suspension in Harrington, the Court focused almost entirely on Harrington’s multiple violations of MRPC 8.1, evinced by his “flagrant disregard of and response to communications from Bar Counsel.” Harrington, 367 Md. at 50-51, 785 A.2d at 1268. The singular MRPC 8.4(c) violation was barely mentioned by the majority in Harrington, in its brief analysis of the appropriate sanction. The lone dissenter in Harrington, Judge Raker, honed in on the 8.4(c) violation and urged disbarment on that basis. She stated there that “[a]n attorney who is dishonest and deceitful should not be practicing law.” Harrington, 367 Md. at 53, 785 A.2d at 1269-70.
*230Putting aside for a moment the weight to be accorded Dr. Janofsky’s 21 July 2005 written report2 in the mitigation analysis in the present case, it seems to me that the remaining relevant mitigation factors are in a state of equilibrium. The hearing judge found that Reinhardt did not act with a selfish motive. Also, Reinhardt cooperated with Bar Counsel. He expressed remorse and worked with Ms. Cohen’s new attorney to try and settle her restitution claim.3 On'the other side of the scale is Reinhardt’s prior history with the Commission4 and the fact that his misconduct in this case resulted in his client not being able to prosecute her tort claim where she sought $500,000 in damages. No other of the ABA factors are in play on this record.
Turning then to Dr. Janofsky’s report, I find it to be of little service in the mitigation analysis. Dr. Janofsky’s letterhead indicates that he was a Board-certified psychiatrist and neurologist. The opening paragraph of his report, however, states that Reinhardt’s counsel in the present case engaged the doctor only “to assess whether Mr. Reinhardt was suffering from psychological factors that would impact negatively on his ability to practice law.” (Emphasis in original). Having administered an MMPI-2 test5 to Reinhardt, Dr. Janofsky *231opined that, although noting a few frailties, Respondent’s “MMPI-2 diagnostic profile is just within normal range and was not diagnostically definitive.” Continuing, Dr. Janofsky reported that Reinhardt’s earlier alcohol abuse, occurring around the time of his ethical infractions leading to his indefinite suspension in the late 1980’s, had abated. Respondent had remained sober since about 1990. Other than the alcohol abuse treatment, Reinhardt had “no psychiatric contacts.”
The ultimate opinion expressed by Dr. Janofsky was, in pertinent part:
It is my opinion that around his alleged mismanagement of the Cohen matter, Mr. Reinhardt was not suffering from a diagnosable mental disorder. However, Mr. Reinhardt was suffering from personality trait vulnerabilities that may have interfered with his ability to adequately resolve the Cohen matter.
Personality traits are enduring lifelong patterns of perceiving, relating to and thinking about the environment and oneself and are exhibited in a wide range of important social and personal contexts. In Mr. Reinhardt’s case, Mr. Reinhardt’s tendency to misinterpret the motives of others and his rationalization of his own behavior in his way of avoiding his own feelings of hostility and affects his ability to deal with difficult matters. Additionally, his tendency to cover over and to deny the intensity of his resentments could have also exacerbated his problems in effectively dealing with his misplacement of the Cohen file.
Mr. Reinhardt’s statements to both myself and to the Bar Counsel investigator that “embarrassment” led to his behaviors in the Cohen matter is a very accurate statement. Failure to face the consequences of misplacing the file led to further errors in judgment on Mr. Reinhardt’s part.
Mr. Reinhardt’s difficulties were further exacerbated by his lack of a secretary, associates, partners or any other support systems to help him more appropriately deal with case difficulties. (Emphasis in original).
*232I glean from Dr. Janofsky's report that, while Reinhardt may have had “issues” (as that term is used in common parlance), he was not mentally ill at the time of the misconduct in this case. Merely having “issues,” however, is not sufficient since we decided Vanderlinde to dilute the ordinary sanction of disbarment for intentional dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation. The persuasive force of evidence required to satisfy the Vanderlinde threshold is
there ... needs to be almost conclusive, and essentially uncontroverted evidence that would support a ... finding not only that the attorney had a serious and debilitating mental condition, but that the mental condition, in a sustained fashion, affected the ability of the attorney in normal day to day activities, such that the attorney was unable to accomplish the least of those activities in a normal fashion. Unless that standard is met the impairment is not the “root cause” of the misconduct.
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418-19, 773 A.2d at 488. Dr. Janofsky’s report does not supply a sufficient basis for mitigation. Accordingly, I give Dr. Janofsky’s report little weight in the analysis of the appropriate sanction in this case.
Respondent engaged in intentional deceitful conduct, over an extended period of time, on multiple occasions. Embarrassment, however triggered, at having mislaid (or lost) Ms. Cohen’s file is not an acceptable excuse for avoiding the client’s many inquiries about the status of her case. Knowing that he had done nothing to effectuate service of process, or engaged in any other meaningful activity in furtherance of her case since filing suit on 30 July 1999, Reinhardt knew or should have known, given modern docket management practices and technologies used by clerk’s offices statewide, that Md. Rule 2-507(c) (dismissal after one year for lack of prosecution) likely would be effectuated, irrespective of whether he actually received a copy of the formal Notice of Contemplated Dismissal from the clerk, sent on 27 September 2001. He made no effort at any time to reconstruct those parts of his file that could be found easily from other sources, such as obtaining a copy of the complaint from the court jacket, thus *233enabling him to carry on the representation in a timely and diligent manner. Given Reinhardt’s prior skirmishes with the disciplinary system over lack of diligence and other ethical obligations, I have no confidence in our ability to protect the public in the future from Reinhardt repeating with other clients the problems spread across this record or in demonstrating to other attorneys our lack of tolerance for this sort of conduct if we do not order disbarment in this case. The trust that must be at the center of the lawyer-client relationship is undermined otherwise. This Court has stated that intentional dishonest conduct by an attorney is “almost beyond excuse” and that disbarment should ordinarily be the sanction for such conduct. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488.
I would order disbarment of Respondent.
Judge BATTAGLIA and Judge GREENE join in the dissenting opinion.

. Lane violated MRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) regarding one complainant. As to the other complainant, he violated MRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(c), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d).

. Dr. Janofsky did not supply live testimony before the hearing judge. Therefore, demeanor-based credibility could not have been a factor in the hearing judge’s analysis.

. In Harrington, the respondent attorney paid the particular complainant in the 8.4(c) violation case $35,000 in settlement of the loss she claimed as the result of his misconduct. Reinhardt, as he stands before us, offers only good intentions in similar regard.

. In addition to noting his prior indefinite suspension, Dr. Janofsky’s report, under the “Case Summary” heading, lists additional disciplinary contacts Reinhardt had with Petitioner. It was reported that he had been reprimanded in 1987 for neglect of a personal injury case. In August 2003, he received a warning from the Commission for lack of diligence in handling an estate.

. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)-2 is a frequently used clinical test to assess an individual’s psychological personality profile.