Court Opinion

ID: 9945030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 21:03:05.924274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:20.337213
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/26/24 Wertheim, LLC v. Omidvar CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION ONE

 WERTHEIM, LLC,                                                   B323036

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. Nos. BC395819,
          v.                                                      BC598307)

 O’NEIL OMIDVAR, et al.,

          Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Reversed.
      Henry J. Josefsberg for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Jens B. Koepke,
Jennifer A. Teaford for Defendants and Respondents.
              ___________________________________
       Wertheim, LLC sued O’Neil Omidvar for interference with
assignment agreements Wertheim made with a third party in
2006 and 2009. In an appeal on a related case, we observed that
although the issue was not before us, both Wertheim and
Omidvar essentially admitted in litigation that they acted
unconscionably toward the third party. Based on this
observation, the trial court granted Omidvar summary judgment,
finding no triable issue existed as to whether the assignment
agreements were unconscionable.
       We reverse. In the related appeal we did not decide any
unconscionability issue.
                         BACKGROUND
A.     Introduction
       We take the facts from plaintiff’s allegations in this
litigation and from evidence presented in prior appeals, reciting
them here only for context. Because this appeal comes to us after
summary judgment, there have been no factual findings.
       Plaintiff Wertheim alleges that defendants O’Neil Omidvar
and his relatives, Parviz and Oliver Omidvar, and their
companies, Currency Corporation, Tiffany Ventures, LLC,
Entertainment Factors, LLC, and Music Royalty Consulting, Inc.
(collectively Omidvar), lent money at high interest rates to
                                        1
elderly artists who owned royalty rights. In exchange, the
artists assigned their royalties to Omidvar.

     1
       In prior appeals we referred to Omidvar-aligned
defendants collectively as “Currency.” In this appeal we refer to
them collectively as “Omidvar” to synergize with the pleadings.
Although not all defendants have always appeared in the various
cases between these parties, for present purposes “Omidvar” and
“Currency” are interchangeable.

                                2
      Maibell Page, 1941-2012, was the widow of Eugene Page, a
highly successful songwriter, arranger and producer who died in
1998.
      In Currency Corp. v. Wertheim (Sept. 30, 2013, B240444)
[nonpub. opn.] (Currency 2013), we noted that in earlier
proceedings, Page’s daughter testified that Page was a preschool
teacher until 2005, when she suffered a debilitating stroke. After
her stroke, Page stopped working and for a time was incapable of
managing her financial affairs. She resided in an assisted living
community and received Social Security as her primary source of
income. Page received periodic royalty payments from two music
rights management companies, the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast
Music, Inc. (BMI). ASCAP, for example, generally made
payments 30 times per year. The revenue stream from Page’s
                                                       2
royalties amounted to approximately $50,000 per year.
      David Pullman was the principal of Wertheim, Structured
Asset Sales, LLC, and the Pullman Group, LLC (collectively
Wertheim). Pullman has negotiated with several of Omidvar’s
borrowers, including Page, for assignment of their claims against
Omidvar and reassignment of their music catalogs to Wertheim.
      This litigation concerns a loan Omidvar made to Page on
June 2, 2006, and an assignment Page made to Wertheim four
weeks later, on June 30, 2006, granting him the right to pursue
her claims against Omidvar regarding the June 2 loan.
      In prior litigation, Wertheim argued that Omidvar’s June 2
loan agreement was unconscionable because Page was

      2
        We relate Page’s circumstances only for context. No
factual findings have ever been made as to them.

                                3
incompetent when she entered into it. In a prior appeal, we
observed that this argument applied with equal force to
Wertheim’s June 30 assignment agreement.
B.    Loans and Assignments
      Wertheim alleges that Omidvar made numerous loans to
Page, each secured by a promissory note pursuant to which Page
assigned to Omidvar the royalty rights she derived from her
                3
husband’s work.
       As an example, Wertheim alleged that on June 2, 2006,
Omidvar lent Page $6,500, secured by a promissory note (the
June 2006 Note), for a period of six months at an interest rate of
two percent compounded every 10 days, plus an administrative
fee of 10 percent, for an effective annual interest rate of
approximately 107 percent. The note also provided that Page
assigned her royalty rights to Omidvar. Pursuant to this
provision, Page directed ASCAP to make royalty payments
directly to Omidvar.
       1.    2006 Assignment—Page Assigns Royalties to
       Wertheim
       On June 30, 2006, four weeks after the June 2, 2006 Note,
Page, now dissatisfied with her arrangement with Omidvar,
assigned any causes of action she might have against Omidvar to
Wertheim, and reassigned to Wertheim the same royalty rights
she had already assigned to Omidvar (2006 Assignment).

      3
        Defendants contend Parviz, Oliver and O’Neil Omidvar,
as well as Music Royalty Consulting, Inc. and Entertainment
Factors, LLC, did no business with Page.

                                4
       2.    Our Prior Characterization of Omidvar’s and
       Wertheim’s Dealings with Page up to 2006
       In Currency 2013, supra, B240444, we observed that the
June 6 Note between Omidvar and Page, and the 2006
Assignment between Wertheim and Page, were both
unconscionable. We stated:
       “[W]e feel constrained to make an observation about this
litigation that may save time for all parties and the court below.
Both sides urge us to accept and enforce provisions from various
agreements between them and Maibell. . . . Yet both sides [i.e.,
the Omidvar and Wertheim Parties] have admitted to conduct
that amounts to breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder
abuse. Indeed, this entire litigation . . . surrounds a three-sided
effort to separate Maibell Page, an ill, incompetent senior, from
her main source of income. Currency [equating here with
Omidvar] admitted during the arbitration hearing that it
extended loans to Maibell after she suffered a stroke and became
unable to understand the loan terms, failed and was unable to
account for the money it took from her, and retained her money
without just cause. (It offered to return the money at the
hearing.) Christopher Page [Maibell’s son] admitted he took
Maibell’s money for his own and his sister’s uses, knowing
Maibell was unable to understand the transactions. And
Wertheim admitted it extracted financial agreements from ‘an
unsuspecting elderly widow with short term memory loss, who
had been institutionalized for mental illness.’ And all of the
agreements were unconscionable. All were written in visually
dense incomprehensible language, heavily favored their authors,
and were obtained under conditions of undue influence.
Currency made purportedly commercial ‘loans’ to Maibell—some

                                 5
for under $100—at 107 percent annual interest—charged at its
own undisclosed discretion—while keeping no records. Wertheim
bought a royalty stream from her, worth approximately $50,000
per year, for $1,000.”
      However, we also observed that the issue of
unconscionability was not before us.
      3.     2009 Assignment—Wertheim Released its Claim
      to Page’s Royalties
      In September 2006, the relationship between Page and
Wertheim soured, and Page sued Wertheim for fraud and elder
abuse and sought rescission of the 2006 Assignment, alleging
Wertheim had isolated her from her family and induced her to
transfer her music library to it for essentially $1,000.
      On January 27, 2009, the parties settled this litigation,
with Wertheim releasing all interest in the Page music catalog
and Maibell assigning to Wertheim her claims against the
Omidvar parties (2009 Assignment). By its terms, the 2009
Assignment “superseded and replaced” all prior agreements
between Page and Wertheim.
C.    Prior Complaints
      Omidvar’s loans to Page prompted four more lawsuits, two
of which are relevant here—Case Nos. BC417798 and BC530925.
      1.     LASC Case No. BC417798 and Cross-Complaint
      The first lawsuit was filed not by Page or Wertheim but
Omidvar.
      On June 8, 2009, Wertheim, as Page’s assignee, filed a form
demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), alleging Omidvar defrauded Page. Wertheim
contended that each of the scores of transactions between
Omidvar and Page was subject to an arbitration clause found in
the June 2006 Note. It demanded $5 million.

                                6
      Omidvar sued Wertheim and Page to enjoin the arbitration,
LASC Case No. BC417798. (See Currency Corp. v. Wertheim
(May 20, 2011, B222851) [nonpub. opn.].)
      Page and Wertheim cross-complained against Omidvar,
alleging, as in the arbitration, that Omidvar defrauded Page.
      After years of litigation and several appeals, the cross-
complaint was dismissed and the court entered judgment for
Omidvar against Wertheim. (See Wertheim v. Superior Court
(June 25, 2015, B262513) [nonpub. opn.].)
      2.     LASC Case No. BC530925
      In December 2013, Christoper Page (representing the
estate of Maibell Page) and Wertheim filed an independent
lawsuit against Currency (here Omidvar), LASC Case No.
BC530925, asserting causes of action like those Wertheim and
Page had asserted in their cross-complaint in Case No.
BC417798. Wertheim and Christopher essentially alleged that
                            4
Currency defrauded Maibell.
      On December 16, 2015, the trial court dismissed the
lawsuit as time-barred.
D.    Instant Complaints
      1.     LASC Case No. BC395819—2006 Assignment
      In 2008, Wertheim sued Omidvar for interference with the
2006 Assignment, LASC Case No. BC395819.
      2.     LASC Case No. BC598307—2009 Assignment
      In 2015, Wertheim sued Omidvar for inducing breach of the
2009 Assignment between Wertheim and Page, interference with
that assignment, intentional and negligent interference with
prospective economic advantage derived from Wertheim’s

      4
        We will sometimes refer to the Pages by their first names
for clarity. Any reference simply to “Page” is to Maibell.

                                7
relationship with Page, and violation of the Racketeer, Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 1962; RICO), LASC
Case No. BC598307.
       The trial court consolidated the two lawsuits.
       The 2015 complaint exemplifies Wertheim’s basic claims as
                                         5
to both the 2006 and 2009 Assignments. In it, Wertheim alleges
at length that Omidvar’s practice is to defraud elderly artists and
their heirs, including Page, by purportedly lending them money
derived from their own royalty streams, charging exorbitant
interest and fees for the privilege, and making no accounting, all
memorialized by unconscionable, illegal, and void promissory and
assignment agreements.
       Wertheim alleges that it agreed with Page, in exchange for
the 2006 and 2009 Assignments, “to seek justice” for Omidvar’s
“long-running scheme . . . to steal money, benefits, and royalties
from an elderly widow . . . by way of predatory and fraudulent
lending practices . . . in connection with a continuous series of
‘loans’ purportedly made to Page pursuant to [illegal and void]
contracts[,] and [by way of] the . . . theft of Page’s retirement
funds.”
       Wertheim alleges that when Omidvar learned of the 2006
and 2009 Assignments between Wertheim and Page, it
threatened Page, her children, and her trust “with shakedowns,
financial ruin, [and] tax and IRS problems if the Pages brought
claims against [Omidvar] and/or cooperated with Wertheim in
pursuing their claims against [Omidvar].”

      5
       It has been a challenge to parse out the claims in the 2015
complaint, which comprises 76 pages and 252 paragraphs and is
short on factual allegations and long on evidentiary assertions
and argument.

                                 8
       Wertheim alleges that Omidvar induced Page to breach
and repudiate the 2006 and 2009 Assignments by extorting and
exercising undue influence on Page; slandering Wertheim and
Pullman; falsely telling Page that Omidvar had committed no
wrongful acts; forgiving loans; arranging to provide the services
of its attorney to Page; promising to defend Page from any claims
by Wertheim; causing Page to sue Pullman (in LASC Case No.
BC358871); interfering with a mediation involving Page’s
children, Christopher and Jennifer Page; causing Page to dismiss
her cross-complaint in LASC Case No. BC417798; and causing
Christopher Page to dismiss his claims against Omidvar in Case
No. BC530925, ante.
       Wertheim alleges that because of Omidvar’s conduct, Page
“refus[ed] to join with [Wertheim] in the pursuit of the Claims”
against Omidvar.
E.     Summary Judgment
       Omidvar and Wertheim filed cross-motions for summary
judgment or adjudication.
       Omidvar argued that contrary to Wertheim’s allegations,
Omidvar’s only communications with Page or her children
pertained to Page’s legal claims against Omidvar, its defenses
against Wertheim’s claims, and the repayment of Page’s loans.
       Omidvar argued: (1) Wertheim’s second interference
complaint, Case No. BC598307, was a sham designed to
circumvent an order staying proceedings on the first interference
complaint, Case No. BC395819; (2) all claims were barred by the
res judicata effect of the dismissals in Case Nos. BC417798, ante
(Wertheim’s cross-complaint in Omidvar’s original action), and
BC530925, ante (Page’s and Wertheim’s separate lawsuit); (3)
Wertheim’s claims were barred by the litigation privilege set
forth in Civil Code section 47; (4) Omidvar’s conduct was not
wrongful because it was designed only to protect its own

                                9
contracts with Page, not to interfere with Wertheim’s contracts or
economic relationships; (5) the 2006 and 2009 Assignments were
invalid, as we held in Borisoff v. Pullman Grp., LLC (Sept. 1,
2016, B259675) [nonpub. opn.], involving a similar assignment
between Wertheim and another Omidvar borrower, and a jury
found in another case involving an assignment with a different
Omidvar borrower; (6) Wertheim suffered no damages because
the claims Page assigned to it were worthless; (7) Wertheim’s
claims were time-barred; and (8) Parviz, Oliver and O’Neil
Omidvar, as well as Music Royalty Consulting and
Entertainment Factors, were improper parties because they did
no business dealings with Page.
       Omidvar supported its motion with declarations from its
principals, requests for judicial notice of various pleadings and
rulings, and declarations filed in earlier litigation.
       For example, Omidvar offered a 2015 declaration by
Christopher Page, Maibell’s son, filed in Case No. BC530925
(Page’s and Wertheim’s separate lawsuit against Omidvar), in
which he stated that in June 2006, when Page entered into the
2006 Assignment with Wertheim, she was “largely incapacitated
as a result of a stroke.”
       Omidvar also offered excerpts from Page’s testimony in the
arbitration proceedings to the effect that after she suffered a
stroke, she began to rely on Christopher to manage her financial
affairs and did not understand the 2006 Assignment when she
signed it. During portions of her testimony in the arbitration
proceedings in 2009, Page could not remember her age, did not
understand what the proceedings were about, did not understand
documents she was shown, and was confused about the events of
2006.
       Finally, Omidvar offered a 2013 declaration by Christopher
Page, in which he basically recited our observations in Currency

                                10
2013, supra, B240444, regarding statements Jennifer Page,
Maibell’s daughter, made early in the litigation about Page
experiencing severe anxiety after her stroke and suffering
disorientation, depression, panic attacks and difficulty writing
and speaking.
        Omidvar argued that the 2006 and 2009 Assignments were
invalid because Page was incompetent when she agreed to them.
Omidvar supported this argument solely with a citation to item
11 of its separate statement, which adduced as support for the
argument only our observation in Currency 2013, supra,
B240444, that “Wertheim admitted it extracted financial
agreements from ‘an unsuspecting elderly widow with short term
memory loss, who had been institutionalized for mental illness.’ ”
        In opposition to summary judgment, Wertheim argued that
our observation in Currency 2013, supra, B240444, was taken out
of context, and pertained only to the June 30, 2006 Assignment
(and, ironically, with equal force to Omidvar’s June 2, 2006 Note),
and did not consider the 2009 Assignment, by which Page ratified
the 2006 Assignment.
        Wertheim supported his opposition with Pullman’s
declaration that when she entered into the assignment
agreement on June 30, 2006, “Page seemed completely
competent, and appeared to understand all of the terms of the
assignments.”
        Wertheim also offered the May 16, 2007 deposition
testimony of Craig Lachman, the notary on the 2006 Assignment,
who stated that when she agreed to the assignment, Page “was
interested in signing the documents,” and “if she had any
questions about the document, . . . she would then address those
to Mr. Pullman.” Pullman “would explain to her what was going
on . . . with the document, and then she would sign it.”
        Each side filed objections to the other’s evidence.

                                11
      The trial court granted summary judgment to Omidvar on
the sole ground that our purported “factual finding” in Currency
2013, supra, B240444, i.e., that on June 30, 2006 Page was an
“unsuspecting elderly widow with short term memory loss, who
had been institutionalized for mental illness,” established that
Page was incompetent when she entered into both the 2006 and
2009 Assignments. The court reasoned that Wertheim failed to
provide evidence rebutting our finding, and thus no triable issue
existed as to whether the assignments were invalid because we
had found that they were not.
      Accordingly, the court granted Omidvar’s motion for
summary judgment and denied Wertheim’s.
                          DISCUSSION
      Wertheim contends summary judgment was improper
because no finding has ever been made as to Page’s competence
when she entered into even the 2006 Assignment, much less the
2009 Assignment. Therefore, Wertheim argues, Omidvar’s
simply reciting our observation in Currency 2013, supra,
B240444, failed to carry its burden on summary judgment. We
agree.
A.    Applicable Law
      A trial court properly grants summary judgment “ ‘if all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A
defendant may establish its right to summary judgment by
showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot
be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)” (Neiman v. Leo A.
Daly Co. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 962, 967.) “Once the moving
defendant has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the

                                12
plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to
each cause of action. [Citation.] A triable issue of material fact
exists where ‘the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact
to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the
motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’ ”
(Ibid.)
       On appeal, we apply an independent standard of review to
determine whether a trial is required—whether the evidence
favoring and opposing the summary judgment motion would
support a reasonable trier of fact’s determination in the plaintiff’s
favor on the cause of action or defense. (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) In doing so we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment. (Id. at p. 843; Alexander v. Codemasters
Group Limited (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 129, 139.) We accept as
true the facts shown by the evidence offered in opposition to
summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from them. (Spitzer v. Good Guys, Inc. (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385-1386.)
B.     Application
       1.     Page’s Competence
       As noted above, the trial court relied on only one piece of
evidence—our observation in Currency 2013, supra, B240444—to
support its finding that Page was incompetent when she agreed
to the 2006 Assignment, which the court found rendered both the
2006 and 2009 Assignments unconscionable, thereby establishing
that no triable issue existed as to any of Omidvar’s four causes of
action.
       (Omidvar argues that the court did not rely exclusively on
our observation, but instead stated it relied on “the evidence

                                 13
provided by [Omidvar].” Omidvar is correct that the court said
that, but it was referring only to the observation.)
       We preliminarily note that Omidvar’s summary judgment
motion and the trial court’s ruling impliedly relied, sans
authority, on the premise that an unconscionable 2006 contract
cannot be the predicate for causes of action for interference with
that contract, interference with a related 2009 contract,
interference with prospective economic advantage derived from
the 2009 contract, or RICO violations premised on such
interference. Given that the parties offer no significant briefing
on the issue, for the sake of argument we will assume the implied
premise is valid.
       Even so, our observation in Currency 13, supra, B240444,
was not evidence of any fact regarding Page’s mental state, her
competence, or the validity or conscionability of the 2006 or 2009
Assignments.
       An appellate court generally does not make factual
findings, and in Currency 2013, supra, B240444, we expressly
stated we were only making “an observation about th[e]
litigation,” after which we summarized the parties’ admissions.
The sentence upon which Omidvar relied, that in 2006 Page was
“ ‘an unsuspecting elderly widow with short term memory loss,
who had been institutionalized for mental illness,’ ” was our
quotation of an argument Wertheim made to challenge Omidvar’s
June 6 Note. We observed that pursuant to the parties’
admissions, both sides’ conduct in June 2006 was unconscionable.
We did not intend to find, and did not find, that Wertheim’s
argument established Page’s incompetence.
       The trial court therefore erred in finding that our
observation in Currency 2013, supra, B240444, carried Omidvar’s

                                14
burden on summary judgment. It did not, and because it did not,
Wertheim had no obligation to present controverting evidence.
       In any event, the evidence of procedural unconscionability
was equivocal. Pullman declared here, and Craig Lachman, the
notary, testified in 2007, that Page was alert enough in 2006 to
ask questions concerning the assignment, and Pullman explained
it to her before she agreed to it. This evidence raised the
reasonable inference that Page understood the agreement, and
thus established a triable issue as to procedural
unconscionability.
       Omidvar argues that Pullman’s declaration failed to create
a triable issue because he lacked credibility, and the declaration
was greatly outweighed by “all the other independent evidence of
Page’s incompetence.” Omidvar similarly argues that Lachman’s
2007 testimony was unreliable because he had been paid by
Pullman, and offered the testimony only at Pullman’s request.
       Considerations about witness credibility and bias, and the
overall weight of the evidence, are matters for a trier of fact, and
cannot support summary judgment.
       2.    Other Grounds for Summary Judgment
       Omidvar argues that we may affirm summary judgment on
any ground asserted by the moving party and supported by the
record. We agree. (California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 16, 22.) However, no such grounds exist.
             a.     Decisions in Other Cases
       Omidvar argues no triable issue exists as to the validity of
the 2006 and 2009 Assignments because other appellate courts
have held (and one jury has found) those or substantively
identical assignments to be unconscionable in other cases
involving other Omidvar borrowers. We disagree. Even were we

                                 15
to contemplate the holdings and findings of other courts (and one
jury) that substantively identical assignments are unconscionable
in other cases unconscionability is a product not only of contract
language but also the circumstances surrounding contract
formation. That similar assignments were held to be
unconscionable in other cases would not establish that the 2006
and 2009 Assignments were unconscionable here.
              b.    Claim and Issue Preclusion
       Omidvar argues that Wertheim’s interference claims are
precluded because they are “essentially identical” to the claims
raised in Wertheim’s cross-complaint in Case No. BC417798 (the
lawsuit to enjoin arbitration) and Case No. BC530925
(Chrisopher and Wertheim’s lawsuit), and could have been raised
there. We disagree.
       Claim preclusion bars litigation of a cause of action that
was or could have been litigated in a prior proceeding. (Busick v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 967, 975.) Issue
preclusion prevents “relitigation of previously decided issues,”
rather than cause of action “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an
identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in
the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the
first suit or one in privity with that party.” (DKN Holdings LLC
v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 825.)
       The cross-complaint in Case No. BC417798 and the
complaint in Case No. BC530925 asserted causes of action based
only on Omidvar’s fraud as to Maibell. There was no cause of
action for interference with the 2006 or 2009 Assignments.
Although both complaints alleged as background that Omidvar
interfered with the assignments, no claim was grounded on that
interference.

                                16
       Wertheim’s interference claims are entirely distinct from
Page’s claims (and Wertheim’s assigned claims) that Omidvar
defrauded Page. The issues raised by Wertheim’s claims have
never been litigated. Therefore, neither issue nor claim
preclusion supports summary judgment here.
             c.     Statute of Limitations
       Omidvar argues that no triable issue exists as to whether
Wertheim’s claims are time-barred. We disagree.
       A limitations period for injury arising from an ongoing
course of misconduct begins to run from the “ ‘last overt act’ ”
completing the misconduct. (Wyatt v. Union Mortg. Co. (1979) 24
Cal.3d 773, 786; Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013)
55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192.)
       Wertheim alleges in its second interference complaint that
Omidvar interfered with the 2009 Assignment in a continuous
course of conduct up to as late as 2014. The second interference
complaint was filed in 2015, within any applicable limitations
period. Wertheim also alleges, and Omidvar does not dispute,
that the 2006 and 2009 Assignments relate to exactly the same
rights and conduct. (Omidvar insists that Wertheim’s conduct
with respect to the 2006 Assignment is inseparable from his
conduct with respect to the 2009 Assignment.) That being the
case, we discern no practical way to distinguish between the 2006
and 2009 Assignments for limitations purposes.
             d. Litigation Privilege
       Omidvar argues no triable issue exists as to whether the
litigation privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47 bars
Wertheim’s claims. We disagree.
       Wertheim alleges a broad course of misconduct that
involves both litigation and nonlitigation activity. To be sure,

                               17
some of the alleged misconduct, for example Omidvar’s alleged
interference with Wertheim’s litigation, is privileged. But not all
is. For example, Wertheim alleges Omidvar threatened and
extorted Page. We decline at this level in the proceedings to sift
through the evidence and allegations to excise claims involving
only privileged activity, and will leave that task to the trial court.
C.    Conclusion
      For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that
summary judgment was improper.
                           DISPOSITION
      The order is reversed. Appellant is to recover its costs on
appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                            CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENDIX, J.

                                  18