Court Opinion

ID: 9391928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 18:03:36.863813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:34.458217
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/3/23 P. v. Harper CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081034

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCN308840)

 JULIE ELIZABETH HARPER,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Blaine K. Bowman, Judge. Affirmed.
         Julie Elizabeth Harper, in pro. per.; and Athena Shudde, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
         In 2015, a jury convicted Julie Elizabeth Harper of second degree

murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and found true an allegation that she
personally discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury

1        All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
(§§ 12022.53, subd. (d) & 12022.5, subd. (a)). Harper was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 40 years to life in prison.
      Harper appealed and this court affirmed the judgment in an
unpublished opinion. (People v. Harper (Jan. 5, 2018, D069632).)
      In 2022, Harper filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95
(now renumbered section 1172.6).
      The court appointed counsel, received briefing, reviewed the record of
conviction, and held a hearing. The court found Harper had not presented a
prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6 and therefore denied the
petition. The court stated:
         “[T]he Court has examined the record of conviction in this
         case, which includes the jury instructions that have been
         given. The Court did not instruct the jury on any felony
         murder rule under the natural and probable consequences
         doctrine, or any other theory of which malice was imputed
         to [appellant] based on solely on [sic] her participation in
         the crime.

         “The Court also has reviewed the verdict forms. The Court
         is looking at the verdict form that was filed on October 8,
         2015 in which the defendant, [appellant], was found guilty
         of murder in the second degree, which also included
         findings pursuant to [section] 12022.53(d). And I’ll quote
         from that allegation which states ‘And we the jury further
         find that in the commission or attempted commission of the
         above offense the defendant personally and intentionally
         discharged a firearm, To wit: A handgun, and proximately
         caused the death to a person within the meaning of Penal
         Code section 12022.53(d).’ That’s the finding by the jury in
         this case, that [appellant] personally discharged a firearm.

         “The jury also found true the allegation pursuant to
         [section] 12022.5(a). And reading from the verdict forms it
         states, ‘And we the jury find that in the commission or
         attempted commission of the above offense the defendant

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         personally used a firearm, To wit: A handgun. Within the
         meaning of Penal Code Section 12022.5(a).’

         “So based on the verdict forms that were given to the jury
         and the findings that they returned and the jury
         instructions, which notably do not contain any felony
         murder-type theory, the record is clear that the defendant
         is not entitled to the relief under the statute. So therefore
         the petition is denied.”

      Harper filed a timely notice of appeal.
      Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), indicating counsel has not been able to
identify any arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks the court to
exercise its discretion and independently review the record for error as we
would in an appeal under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We
grant the request and will review the record consistent with Wende. We
offered Harper the opportunity to file her own brief on appeal consistent with
Delgadillo. Harper has responded with a supplemental brief. We will
discuss her brief later in this opinion.
      In this case, Harper was charged and convicted as the sole perpetrator
of the offense, i.e., that she was the actual killer. As such, the jury was not
instructed on the felony murder rule or on the principle of liability as an
aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. We
set forth a summary of the facts of the offense in our previous appeal and will
therefore omit another statement of facts.
                                 DISCUSSION
      As we have noted, appellate counsel has filed a brief under Delgadillo
and asks the court to independently review the record for error. To assist the
court, and in compliance with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738

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(Anders), counsel has identified two issues which were considered in
evaluating the potential merits of this appeal:
      1.    Whether Harper established facts sufficient to show a prima facie
case for relief such that the court erred by denying the petition without first
issuing an order to show cause.
      2.    Whether the denial of the petition was prejudicial error.
      In her supplemental brief, Harper contends her recital of the standard
allegations in the form petition is sufficient to establish a prima facie case for
relief. Thus, she argues the court erred in denying the petition without
issuing an order to show cause. She also complains about the jury
instructions at trial. Fundamentally, Harper contends she acted in self-
defense and implicitly should have been convicted of manslaughter. She
argues that even though she shot and killed the victim, such act does not
demonstrate implied malice in this case.
      We understand Harper’s desire to avoid the murder conviction based on
her claim of self-defense, however, this appeal is from the denial of a petition
seeking specific relief under a statutory process for resentencing and does not
serve as a vehicle to challenge the jury instructions given at the trial. Harper
was not convicted on any of the theories now excluded by Senate Bill
No. 1437 or section 1172.6. Her supplemental brief has not raised any
arguable issues for reversal of this particular order.
      We have independently reviewed the entire record as we would do in a
review under Wende or Anders. We have not discovered any arguable issues
for reversal of this order on appeal. Competent counsel has represented
Harper on this appeal.

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                              DISPOSITION
      The order denying Harper’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.

                                                             HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

KELETY, J.

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