Court Opinion

ID: 9399386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 20:00:55.200156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.584267
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2003
ANDREW STACY,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                 Defendant-Appellee.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
          No. 1:19-cv-00301 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
                     ____________________

      ARGUED FEBRUARY 7, 2023 — DECIDED JUNE 2, 2023
                 ____________________

   Before HAMILTON, BRENNAN, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI,
Circuit Judges.
    BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. A restitution order in a criminal
case requires Andrew Stacy to pay the government more than
one million dollars. But the government also owes Stacy
$75,000 from a Federal Tort Claims Act settlement. The gov-
ernment plans to oﬀset the FTCA settlement against Stacy’s
restitution debt, to which he objects. The district court rejected
Stacy’s challenge to the government’s use of oﬀset, and we
2                                                   No. 22-2003

aﬃrm. Federal law authorizes the government to oﬀset
Stacy’s settlement award against his restitution debt.
                        I. Background
    Stacy’s restitution obligations arose from a 2014 conviction
for bank fraud. The district court sentenced him to a term of
imprisonment and ordered restitution. In total, the court or-
dered Stacy to pay $1,495,689.60 jointly and severally with a
codefendant. Though payable to the United States, the gov-
ernment forwards collected money to Stacy’s victims.
    Stacy’s time in prison eventually led to an FTCA claim.
When Stacy entered federal custody in 2015, he suﬀered from
pain and limited range of motion in his hip. Those problems
worsened while incarcerated, and he sought treatment
through the prison medical system. A consulting orthopedic
surgeon recommended a prompt hip replacement. But Stacy
did not receive the procedure while incarcerated—it was per-
formed only after his release in 2016. Stacy ﬁled suit against
the United States in 2019, alleging the federal prison was neg-
ligent in failing to procure his hip replacement surgery. The
United States settled with Stacy in 2021, not admitting liability
but agreeing to pay him $75,000.
    While the settlement concluded the FTCA claim, it did not
resolve what would happen with the settlement funds. The
parties diﬀered on whether the money could be oﬀset against
Stacy’s outstanding restitution obligations, and they memori-
alized that dispute in the settlement agreement. The govern-
ment expected the Treasury Department “to oﬀset the entire
$75,000 settlement amount … for application to Stacy’s crimi-
nal judgment debt.” Stacy disagreed and preserved the right
to “ﬁle a motion before the district court seeking to prevent
No. 22-2003                                                     3

the United States Department of the Treasury from perform-
ing an oﬀset.” The parties executed the agreement, and Stacy
moved in the district court to preclude the oﬀset. The district
court rejected Stacy’s arguments and held that the govern-
ment can oﬀset his settlement money. Stacy appeals.
                        II. Jurisdiction
    We determine ﬁrst whether we have jurisdiction and
whether sovereign immunity shields the government’s oﬀset
use from judicial challenge. See generally Avila v. Pappas, 591
F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 2010); Lipsey v. United States, 879 F.3d
249, 253 (7th Cir. 2018). Resolution of both issues turns on
interpretation of the FTCA, which “waive[s] the sovereign im-
munity of the United States for certain torts committed by fed-
eral employees” and confers federal court jurisdiction over
qualifying claims. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1994)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). The parties agree the district court
had jurisdiction over Stacy’s negligence claim against the
United States, but they dispute whether 28 U.S.C. § 1346(c)
confers federal court jurisdiction over Stacy’s oﬀset challenge.
    That provision says, “The jurisdiction conferred by this
section includes jurisdiction of any set-oﬀ, counterclaim, or
other claim or demand whatever on the part of the United
States against any plaintiﬀ commencing an action under this
section.” § 1346(c). Stacy argues this waives sovereign im-
munity and confers federal court jurisdiction over his chal-
lenge to the government’s use of oﬀset here. The government
disagrees. It reads § 1346(c) narrowly, arguing federal courts
in FTCA cases have “jurisdiction over a set-oﬀ or other claim
only when that other claim is brought by the United States
against the plaintiﬀ, not the other way around.” Because Stacy
challenges oﬀset here, the government asserts § 1346(c) fails
4                                                     No. 22-2003

to waive sovereign immunity or grant jurisdiction. Per the
government, “The court in an FTCA case can award damages,
but there is nothing in the FTCA that gives courts the power
to say what happens to the money.” The district court re-
solved this issue in Stacy’s favor, holding that § 1346(c) “is
written broadly and includes all cases, like this case, where
the United States claims a set-oﬀ against an FTCA plaintiﬀ.”
“We review de novo a determination of subject matter juris-
diction.” Nichols v. Longo, 22 F.4th 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2022) (cit-
ing Big Shoulders Cap. LLC v. San Luis & Rio Grande R.R., Inc.,
13 F.4th 560, 567 (7th Cir. 2021)).
    The plain language of § 1346(c) confers jurisdiction here.
Stacy is a “plaintiﬀ commencing an action under [the FTCA],”
and he is challenging a “set-oﬀ … on the part of the United
States” being used against him. § 1346(c). Resisting this con-
clusion, the government asks us to read “on the part of the
United States against any plaintiﬀ” as a one-way conferral of
jurisdiction applicable only when the government seeks an
oﬀset—not when an FTCA plaintiﬀ seeks to enjoin an oﬀset.
We disagree with the government’s reading. Section 1346(c)
grants subject matter jurisdiction over “any set-oﬀ … whatever
on the part of United States” against an FTCA plaintiﬀ. Id.
(emphasis added). The instigating party’s identity does not
matter. Even though Stacy was the movant below, the United
States still seeks to use oﬀset against an FTCA plaintiﬀ. Ac-
cordingly, jurisdiction exists to hear this case.
                         III. Discussion
    We turn to the merits of Stacy’s appeal. He presents four
main arguments for why the government is not authorized to
oﬀset his FTCA settlement award against his restitution debts.
First, he asserts that the statute governing criminal restitution
No. 22-2003                                                   5

procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3664, outright prohibits use of oﬀset to
enforce restitution obligations. Second, he argues that oﬀset is
improper because oﬀset only applies to funds owed to the
government and, per Stacy, his debt is “owed” to his victims.
Third, Stacy contends that oﬀset is only appropriate for delin-
quent debts, and he claims to be current on his obligations.
Fourth, Stacy asserts that nothing in his restitution order man-
dates that “settlements or other forms of large funds received
by [the] plaintiﬀ … be applied toward his restitution.”
    The government responds that through his criminal plea
agreement, Stacy waived his challenge to oﬀset. Beyond
waiver, the government asserts an oﬀset is authorized by stat-
ute and consistent with the district court’s restitution order.
Because the government’s ability to oﬀset turns on statutory
interpretation, our review is de novo throughout. United
States v. Miller, 883 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 2018).
    We start with this last point, the government’s contention
that Stacy may not challenge oﬀset. When Stacy pleaded
guilty, he “agree[d] that the United States may enforce collec-
tion of any ﬁne or restitution imposed in this case pursuant to
Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3572, 3613, and 3664(m),
notwithstanding any payment schedule set by the Court.”
The government reads that provision to mean that Stacy has
waived “any challenge to the United States’ administrative
oﬀset rights.” We see it diﬀerently. Stacy agreed the govern-
ment could use 18 U.S.C. §§ 3572, 3613, and 3664(m). But nei-
ther § 3572 nor § 3613 deal directly with oﬀset. Section 3664
authorizes enforcement of restitution by “all other available
and reasonable means,” but whether “all other available and
reasonable means” includes oﬀset is one of the questions
6                                                       No. 22-2003

Stacy raises on appeal. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). So, nothing in
the agreement forecloses Stacy’s challenge to the oﬀset.
    Turning to Stacy’s four arguments, we begin with whether
§ 3664—which outlines procedures for enforcing restitution
orders—bars the use of oﬀset. Stacy argues that statute does,
and he directs our attention to subsection (c), which states,
“The provisions of this chapter, chapter 227, and Rule 32(c) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure shall be the only
rules applicable to proceedings,” meaning restitution pro-
ceedings, “under this section.” Stacy interprets § 3664(c) to
mean that the government cannot enforce a restitution order
using tools, like oﬀset, housed elsewhere in the Code. But this
interpretation ignores § 3664(m)(1)(A), which reads “(i) An or-
der of restitution may be enforced by the United States in the
manner provided for in subchapter C of chapter 227 and sub-
chapter B of chapter 229 of this title; or (ii) by all other available
and reasonable means.” Id. (emphasis added). By its plain text,
§ 3664 authorizes the government to enforce restitution or-
ders not just through a stipulated set of mechanisms but also
through “all other available and reasonable means.” Id. Oﬀ-
set, as a collection tool available to the United States, is such a
means of enforcement. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3728, 3711, 3716.
    Perhaps recognizing this issue, Stacy suggests that 18
U.S.C. § 3664(n) changes the equation. That provision re-
quires an individual who “receives substantial resources …
including … settlement … during a period of incarceration”
to apply the value of those resources to outstanding restitu-
tion debts. § 3664(n). For Stacy, the fact that subsection (n) re-
quires incarcerated individuals to apply settlement money to
their restitution debt means non-incarcerated individuals
need not do so. But this argument fails in view of § 3664(m),
No. 22-2003                                                       7

which authorizes the United States to enforce restitution or-
ders using all its available and reasonable means. We do not
read § 3664(n) to constrain a co-equal statutory provision.
    As a ﬁnal point, Stacy agrees that the United States can en-
force restitution orders but argues § 3664 “does not say an or-
der of settlements or judgments received may be enforced by the
United States.” So, Stacy contends that “[r]estitution ordered
by a court in a criminal proceeding is separate to any
settlements received in a civil suit.” This argument reﬂects a
mistaken understanding of restitution, which creates a debt
obligation that may be satisﬁed from qualifying defendant as-
sets. United States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“An order for payment of restitution becomes a lien on all
property and rights to property of the defendant upon entry
of judgment … .”); 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (stating that a restitu-
tion order creates a lien in favor of the United States). A set-
tlement award is one such asset, so restitution and settlement
funds are not separate as Stacy contends. Nor does the gov-
ernment enforce a settlement agreement or civil judgment
merely by capturing the qualifying proceeds. In sum, § 3664
does not prevent the government from using oﬀset.
    Second to consider is whether, in this context, oﬀset is oth-
erwise authorized. For that, we brieﬂy review federal oﬀset
statutes.
   Title 31 U.S.C. § 3728 addresses situations, like here, where
a plaintiﬀ wins a judgment against the United States but al-
ready owes the government money. In that case, § 3728 com-
mands that “[t]he Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold
paying that part of a judgment against the United States Gov-
ernment presented to the Secretary that is equal to a debt the
plaintiﬀ owes the Government.” § 3728(a). It then describes
8                                                            No. 22-2003

the government’s next steps for dealing with the money: the
government can oﬀset the judgment amount if the plaintiﬀ
agrees, or it can “have a civil action brought if one has not
already been brought.” § 3728(b); see also 31 C.F.R. § 256.22.
    Diﬀerent oﬀset rules are housed in 31 U.S.C. § 3711 and
§ 3716. 1 Section 3711(a)(1) requires executive, judicial, or
legislative agency heads to try to collect claims “of the United
States Government for money or property.” It also provides
that an agency head is not to discharge any outstanding debt
until all appropriate collection steps have been taken,
“including (as applicable)—(A) administrative oﬀset.”
§ 3711(g)(9)(A). For its part, § 3716(a) addresses what happens
when an agency head’s collection eﬀorts are not successful:
“After trying to collect a claim from a person under section
3711(a) of this title, the head of an executive, judicial, or
legislative agency may collect the claim by administrative
oﬀset.” That same section also requires federal agencies owed
a “legally enforceable nontax debt that is over 120 days
delinquent” to notify the Secretary of the Treasury “for
purposes of administrative oﬀset.” § 3716(c)(6)(A).
    We pause to highlight the relevant distinctions between
the two oﬀset statutes at play, § 3728 and § 3716. The ﬁrst is
that § 3728 is more speciﬁc than § 3716. Whereas § 3728 deals
precisely with judgments won against the United States,
§ 3716 covers a broad swath of debts owed to the government.
Cf. §§ 3728(a); 3716(a). Second, oﬀset under the two provi-
sions takes place at diﬀerent points in the payment timeline.

    1 Section 3716 refers to offset as “administrative offset,” while § 3728
uses the term “setoff.” For sake of consistency, we describe operation of
both statutes as “offset.”
No. 22-2003                                                           9

Section 3728 oﬀset occurs “prior to payment certiﬁcation,”
while § 3716 oﬀset happens after certiﬁcation but before dis-
bursement. Compare 31 C.F.R. § 256.21, with §§ 285.1(m)(1),
and 285.5(d)(6), (e)(1). Given its more speciﬁc application,
§ 3728 appears to control oﬀset in this context. Nonetheless,
we examine both § 3728 and § 3716 for any indication that the
United States may not oﬀset Stacy’s settlement. 2
    Looking to this statutory framework, Stacy argues that
oﬀset is authorized only for debts owed to the United States.
Oﬀset cannot apply to him, he says, as restitution is owed to
victims, not the United States. Stacy is partially correct. In-
deed, oﬀset applies only to debts owed to the government.
Sections 3716 and 3711 both refer to the government collect-
ing “claims,” with “claim” statutorily deﬁned as “any amount
of funds or property that has been determined by an appro-
priate oﬃcial of the Federal government to be owed the United
States.” 31 U.S.C. § 3701(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section
3728(a), likewise pertains to “debt[s] the plaintiﬀ owes to the
Government.” § 3728(a) (emphasis added). But Stacy is incor-
rect that his restitution debt is not “owed” to the United States
for purposes of oﬀset—it is. The statutory scheme for pay-
ment of restitution debt makes this clear.
    To start, Stacy’s restitution is paid directly to the United
States, not the victims. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3612(c), the Attorney
General is responsible for collecting unpaid restitution. That
strongly signals restitution debt is a debt owed to the govern-
ment. Moreover, § 3612(c) provides that “[a]n order of resti-
tution … does not create any right of action against the United

   2   A comparison of these two offsets can be found here: https://fis-
cal.treasury.gov/judgment-fund/offsets.html.
10                                                   No. 22-2003

States by the person to whom restitution is ordered to be
paid.” So, the victims are not authorized to sue the United
States if the government fails to disburse the restitution it col-
lects from oﬀenders. This further conﬁrms that restitution is a
debt owed to the government. And for oﬀset under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3716, the deﬁnitions section lends additional clarity. As dis-
cussed above, § 3716 refers to the government collecting
“claims.” For purposes of § 3716, the meaning of “claim” or
“debt” “includes, without limitation … any amount the
United States is authorized by statute to collect for the beneﬁt
of any person.” § 3701(b)(1)(D). Restitution is a debt collected
by the government for the beneﬁt of another person, so it
qualiﬁes under that deﬁnition as a “debt” or “claim” subject
to oﬀset.
    For these reasons, Stacy’s argument that his restitution
debt is not owed to the United States lacks statutory support.
At least one other circuit court similarly reads these oﬀset stat-
utes. See United States v. Whitbeck, 869 F.3d 618, 620 (8th Cir.
2017) (“An order of restitution … is based on the victim’s
losses, but it is an obligation owed to the government.”) (cita-
tion omitted).
    Third, Stacy argues that oﬀset is authorized only for
“delinquent” ﬁnancial obligations and emphasizes that he is
current on his monthly restitution payments. This position
apparently relies on language from the oﬀset statutes and reg-
ulations indicating that only delinquent or past due debt qual-
iﬁes. See § 3711(g)(9)(A) (instructing that agency heads must
make appropriate eﬀorts “[b]efore discharging any delin-
quent debt”); 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(d)(3)(i) (“A debt submitted to
Fiscal Service for collection by centralized oﬀset must be: (A)
Past-due in the amount stated by the creditor agency … .”).
No. 22-2003                                                         11

Assuming without deciding 3 that oﬀset applies only to delin-
quent debt, this contention does not help Stacy. Contrary to
his arguments, his debt is delinquent. When the sentencing
court ordered Stacy to pay restitution, it included instructions
in a “Schedule of Payments” document. There, the court or-
dered that Stacy’s restitution was to be made in a “lump sum
payment … due immediately.” The court provided further in-
formation in a “special instructions” section, where it or-
dered: “The ﬁnancial obligations are due immediately from
any non-exempt assets. Otherwise, during imprisonment, De-
fendant shall make payments through the BOP’s Inmate Fi-
nancial Responsibility Program. Any balance remaining upon
release shall be paid while on supervised release in an amount
that is equal to 10% of Defendant’s net monthly income.”
    Notwithstanding the ﬁrst sentence repeating that restitu-
tion is “due immediately,” Stacy reads the special instruction
as creating distinct, severable obligations. For Stacy, the ﬁrst
sentence means that “if the person owing a criminal restitu-
tion has all the funds available immediately, then it is to be
paid.” But, because his non-exempt assets fell short, Stacy
contends his obligations changed. He believes he was re-
quired to make payments through the Inmate Financial Re-
sponsibility Program while incarcerated and, now that he has
been released, is responsible for paying monthly 10% of his
net monthly income. Based on this interpretation, Stacy ar-
gues his restitution debt is not past due or delinquent.
   We read the district court’s sentencing order diﬀerently.
The schedule of payments sheet lists various options from

   3  Nothing in 31 U.S.C. § 3728 or its accompanying regulations sug-
gests that only delinquent debt may be offset against a judgment award.
12                                                  No. 22-2003

which the district court can choose. Though several involve
installment payments, in Stacy’s case the district court se-
lected “[l]ump sum payment.” By doing so, the court ordered
Stacy to make a lump sum payment “due immediately.” The
court provided additional detail in a special instructions sec-
tion: “The ﬁnancial obligations are due immediately from any
non-exempt assets.” Given that language, Stacy’s restitution
was due in full on the date his sentence was imposed. Stacy
has not satisﬁed the entire amount, so it is delinquent.
    Stacy responds that the sentencing order lays out an in-
stallment schedule, such that his restitution is current as long
as he keeps making his 10% net monthly income payments.
Contrary to Stacy’s interpretation, though, the court’s imple-
mentation of minimum monthly payments does not modify
the underlying tardiness of his restitution debt. When we in-
terpret restitution orders, we consider any conditions of su-
pervised release. See United States v. Fariduddin, 469 F.3d 1111,
1113 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The [sentencing] form must be read har-
moniously with the statute and the special condition of super-
vised release … .”). Doing so here conﬁrms the function of
Stacy’s special payment instructions. One of Stacy’s special
conditions of supervised release commands, “The balance of
any ﬁnancial obligation shall be paid in monthly payments
during supervised release at a rate of ten percent of the de-
fendant’s net monthly income.” Given that condition, Stacy’s
monthly payments do not mean his debt, which was due im-
mediately as a lump sum, is current. Rather, the monthly pay-
ments serve as a minimum threshold above which Stacy must
remain to avoid violating his sentencing order and potentially
returning to prison. Those minimum payments are merely a
“ﬂoor” which Stacy must maintain. See id. (identifying no con-
tradiction in a sentence that required defendant to pay full
No. 22-2003                                                   13

restitution immediately but also ordered monthly payments
of at least $150 because failure to pay monthly minimum
would violate a condition of supervised release and “[a] ﬂoor
under payments diﬀers from a schedule”).
    Regulations pertaining to § 3716 oﬀset and debts owed to
the Department of Justice accord with this conclusion. See 31
C.F.R. § 285.5(b) (“Delinquent or past-due refers to the status
of a debt and means a debt has not been paid by the date spec-
iﬁed in the agency’s initial written demand for payment, or
applicable agreement or instrument … .”); 28 C.F.R. § 11.11(b)
(“Judgment debts remain past due until paid in full.”). Ac-
cordingly, Stacy’s restitution debt is delinquent.
    Fourth, Stacy argues that the restitution order “deﬁnitely
does not indicate that any settlements and judgments are to
be paid toward the restitution immediately.” Per Stacy, “[i]f
this were the case, the language would indicate so.” Building
on this idea, Stacy contends that if the restitution debt is due
“immediately” it “would also mean that any sums of money
Plaintiﬀ encounters (such as inheritance, gifted money, win-
nings, etc.) should be paid straight toward his owed restitu-
tion.”
    We need not opine on which of Stacy’s conceivable assets
the government may collect through oﬀset to satisfy his resti-
tution debt. The asset at issue here is a judgment against the
United States, and 31 U.S.C. § 3728 authorizes the govern-
ment to use oﬀset for that type of settlement award. § 3728(a)
(“The Secretary of the Treasury shall withhold paying that
part of a judgment against the United States Government pre-
sented to the Secretary that is equal to a debt the plaintiﬀ owes
the Government.”) (emphasis added). Further, a restitution
order need not identify which of defendant’s assets restitution
14                                                   No. 22-2003

is to be paid from, as statutory law provides those rules. For
example, 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) provides that “an order of resti-
tution … is a lien in favor of the United States on all property
and rights to property of the person ﬁned as if the liability of
the person ﬁned were a liability for a tax assessed under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” That authorizes the govern-
ment to capture a variety of Stacy’s property, the details of
which are not important here. See, e.g., United States v. Wykoﬀ,
839 F.3d 581, 582 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that the government
was empowered to garnish defendant’s pension despite lan-
guage in the restitution order that he was to pay “not less than
10% of [his] gross monthly income” towards restitution).
Stacy demands unnecessary detail from the restitution order.
    One related question: At oral argument, counsel for Stacy
suggested that Stacy’s plea agreement constitutes a written
agreement to repay the restitution debt which, for counsel,
“obviate[d] the ability of the government to invoke … the ad-
ministrative oﬀset.” Oral Arg. at 4:20–6:00. This argument ap-
parently grows out of certain procedural requirements for
§ 3716 oﬀset. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3716(a)(4) (“The head of the
agency may collect by administrative oﬀset only after giving
the debtor … an opportunity to make a written agreement …
to repay the amount of the claim.”). For Stacy, his plea agree-
ment is a written agreement already in place describing how
the restitution debt is to be paid. The existence of that agree-
ment, he says, bars the government from using oﬀset. Oral
Arg. at 4:44–5:15. To the extent raised at all in Stacy’s brieﬁng,
this argument ﬁrst appears in his reply brief, so it is waived.
See Stechauner v. Smith, 852 F.3d 708, 721 (7th Cir. 2017) (cita-
tion omitted).
No. 22-2003                                                   15

    Even on its merits, this reasoning fails. The restitution
order—not the plea agreement—deﬁnes how Stacy is to pay
restitution. The district court entered that order after the plea
agreement, where it mandated that restitution be paid
immediately. Stacy’s restitution obligation was not incurred
until that order. The plea agreement was executed to resolve
Stacy’s federal criminal charges, so it cannot be fairly
recharacterized as an agreement to repay a debt. Further, §
3728—which likely controls here—contains no “written
agreement” procedural component. We therefore see no legal
basis for using the plea agreement as a means around oﬀset.
    A ﬁnal issue remains. According to Stacy, even if he can-
not access the settlement award, a portion of the settlement
funds should be set aside to pay his attorneys. To him, allow-
ing full oﬀset here—with no carve out for his attorneys—
would “ignore[] the principles of quantum meruit.” This is be-
cause his attorneys’ eﬀorts created beneﬁts for him and “the
victim creditors,” and he believes that his attorneys should be
paid accordingly. But no legal basis exists here for a quantum
meruit award. Recovery under that theory requires Stacy to
show, at a minimum, that the United States requested his at-
torneys’ services. See Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors,
Inc., 557 F.3d 469, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2009). Obviously, that did
not occur. The United States did not ask Stacy’s attorneys to
sue the United States.
   Beyond quantum meruit, Stacy argues “there is no statu-
tory provision indicating that attorney’s fees are subject to an
oﬀset.” This point is unpersuasive because in a case like this,
applicable federal statutes speciﬁcally subordinate attorney’s
fees to restitution debt. The interaction of 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c)
and 26 U.S.C. § 6323(b)(8) shows this. As mentioned, § 3613(c)
16                                                          No. 22-2003

states that a restitution order creates a “lien in favor of the
United States on all property and rights to property for the
person ﬁned” coextensive with that of a tax liability. In turn,
§ 6323 identiﬁes certain types of liens that may take priority
against federal tax liens. Subsection (b)(8) gives an attorney’s
lien a sort of “superpriority” over federal tax liens, see United
States v. Ripa, 323 F.3d 73, 80–81, 83 (2d Cir. 2003), but with a
critical exception applicable here. The superpriority
§ 6323(b)(8) grants to attorney’s liens does “not apply to any
judgment or amount in settlement of a claim or of a cause of
action against the United States to the extent that the United
States oﬀsets such judgment or amount against any liability
of the taxpayer to the United States.” Stacy’s settlement arose
from a claim against the United States itself, which seeks to
oﬀset that settlement against his restitution debt. So, we are
not free to grant Stacy’s attorney’s lien priority over the gov-
ernment’s oﬀset here.
    The same goes for oﬀset under both § 3728 and § 3716. Sec-
tion 3728 allows the United States to oﬀset an entire judgment
without mention of attorney’s fees. Oﬀset under § 3716 is sim-
ilarly broad. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that even
statutorily authorized attorney’s fees are subject to complete
oﬀset under § 3716. See Astrue v. Ratliﬀ, 560 U.S. 586, 593
(2010) (concluding that statutorily awarded fees are the prop-
erty of the litigant—not counsel—which “subjects them to a
federal administrative oﬀset if the litigant has outstanding
federal debts”). We thus see no basis for sheltering a portion
of Stacy’s settlement from oﬀset to pay his counsel ﬁrst. 4

     4Stacy also criticizes oﬀset here as bad policy possibly violating the
Eighth Amendment. But this is a nonstarter given that Stacy never alleged
the prison violated his constitutional rights. Stacy asserts, “Without just
No. 22-2003                                                           17

                           IV. Conclusion
    The government is entitled to oﬀset Stacy’s settlement
award—including any amount that might have been used to
compensate counsel—against his outstanding restitution
debt. Stacy’s restitution is owed to the United States, and it
has been past due since the time of sentencing. The judgment
of the district court is AFFIRMED.

compensation for provided services, no attorneys [will] be willing to ac-
cept Federal Tort Claims Act cases for an abused inmate who still owes
restitution.” We understand this concern, but “[o]nly Congress may
change the law in response to policy arguments, courts may not do so.”
Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Chi., 985 F.2d 303, 304 (7th Cir. 1993).