Court Opinion

ID: 9929809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 14:01:19.134089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:52.419120
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                 Before
                        KISOR, DALY, and MIZER
                        Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                     v.

                       Peter G. VAZQUEZ
               Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps
                             Appellant

                             No. 202200241

                        _________________________

                         Decided: 2 February 2024

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                             Military Judge:
                            Matthew R. Brower

 Sentence adjudged 29 July 2022 by a general court-martial convened at
 Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, consisting of a military
 judge sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to
 E-1, confinement for 60 months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
 and a dishonorable discharge.

                            For Appellant:
                Captain Edward V. Hartman, JAGC, USN

                              For Appellee:
                Lieutenant Ebenezer K. Gyasi, JAGC, USN
                      Major Mary C. Finnen, USMC
                  United States v. Vazquez, NMCCA No. 202200241
                                Opinion of the Court

                              _________________________

           This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
                may be cited as persuasive authority under
                 NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                              _________________________

PER CURIAM:
    A military judge sitting alone as a general court-martial convicted Appel-
lant, consistent with his pleas, of one specification of possession of child por-
nography and one specification of soliciting the commission of an offense, in
violation of Articles 134 and Article 82, Uniform Code of Military Justice
[UCMJ], 1 for possessing and soliciting nude photos from a 14-year-old minor,
Ms. Kilo. 2
    In his sole assignment of error, Appellant asserts that his sentence includ-
ing 60 months of confinement was greater than necessary to achieve the goals
of sentencing in the military justice system. We find no error and affirm.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

    In the summer of 2020, Appellant met Ms. Kilo on a Facebook group page
for those interested in the practice of “Daddy Dominate Little Girl” [DDLG], a
type of sexual relationship which includes bondage, domination, sadism,
and masochism, where one party acts as a dominant caregiver and the other
party acts as a submissive child. 3 Both Appellant and Ms. Kilo posted in the
group looking for partners. After posting, Appellant received a message from
Ms. Kilo and the two exchanged contact information and Snapchat
usernames. 4 Appellant then contacted Ms. Kilo via Snapchat. At the time they
connected, Appellant was 21 years-old and Ms. Kilo was 14 years-old. Appel-
lant maintains that Ms. Kilo told him she was 16 years of age and he was not
aware that Ms. Kilo was actually 14.

   1 10 U.S.C. §§ 934, 882.

   2 Other than the names of Appellant, the judges, and counsel, all names in this

opinion are pseudonyms.
   3 R. at 248.

   4 Id.

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               United States v. Vazquez, NMCCA No. 202200241
                             Opinion of the Court

   In June 2020, Appellant solicited and received two nude digital images of
Ms. Kilo. The images were saved in a password protected folder on Appellant’s
phone. 5
    Ms. Kilo subsequently blocked Appellant on Snapchat. 6 About four weeks
after being blocked, Appellant reached out to Ms. Kilo on the social media ap-
plication Instagram. Ms. Kilo informed Appellant that she had blocked him on
Snapchat because she was uncomfortable with their relationship and she did
not want to get in trouble. 7 Appellant proceeded to convince Ms. Kilo to begin
communication with him again by telling her they could just be friends. Ms.
Kilo agreed, and they began conversation over Snapchat once more, resuming
their DDLG activities shortly after.
    In September 2020, the Department of the Air Force Office of Special In-
vestigations notified Naval Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS] that a Ma-
rine was allegedly soliciting nude images from a 14-year-old. 8 In addition to
the nude images, NCIS agents also recovered sexually explicit messages sent
between Appellant and Ms. Kilo. 9
     Later, in November 2020, an individual purporting to be Ms. Kilo’s father
contacted Appellant by phone. Appellant alleges this person instructed him to
cease communication with Ms. Kilo. 10 Appellant also claimed at trial the indi-
vidual told Appellant that Ms. Kilo had medical expenses that needed to be
paid. 11 In order to make amends for his improper and indecent communication
with Ms. Kilo, Appellant agreed to send money to Ms. Kilo’s father for the pur-
ported hospital bills. From November 2020 to the end of 2021, Appellant sent
approximately $700 a month to the purported father. 12 In total, Appellant sent
at least $7,748. 13

   5 R. at 248-49.

   6 Pros. Ex. 2.

   7 Defense Ex. C.

   8 Pros. Ex. 2.

   9 Pros. Ex. 3.

   10 R. at 126-31; Defense Exs. I-J. The record is silent as to whether the individual

who received the money was actually Ms. Kilo’s father.
   11 R. at 126-31; Defense Exs. I-J.

   12 Defense Exs. I-J.

   13 Id.

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               United States v. Vazquez, NMCCA No. 202200241
                             Opinion of the Court

    Appellant was charged with one specification each of possession and pro-
duction of child pornography, two specifications of sexual abuse of a child (in-
volving indecent exposure and indecent communication), and one specification
of soliciting the production of child pornography with a potential maximum
confinement of 80 years. The convening authority agreed to withdraw and dis-
miss the specification of production of child pornography, and the two specifi-
cations of sexual abuse of a child as part of the plea agreement bringing down
the maximum confinement to 20 years.

                                 II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and the Applicable Law
    We review sentence appropriateness de novo. 14 This Court may only affirm
“the sentence, or such part or amount of the sentence, as the Court finds correct
in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be
approved.” 15 In exercising this function, we seek to ensure that “justice is done
and that the accused gets the punishment he deserves.” 16 The review requires
an “individualized consideration of the particular accused on the basis of the
nature and seriousness of the offense and the character of the offender.” 17 We
have significant discretion in determining sentence appropriateness, but may
not engage in acts of clemency. 18
    A court-martial may adjudge any punishment authorized, except “[i]f the
military judge accepts a plea agreement with a sentence limitation, the court-
martial shall sentence the accused in accordance with the limits established
by the plea agreement.” 19 Additionally, “[t]he punishment which a court-mar-
tial may direct for an offense may not exceed such limits as the President may
prescribe for that offense.” 20

   14 United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

   15 Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ.

   16 United States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A. 1988).

   17 United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982) (citation and internal

quotation omitted).
   18 United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010). See also United States

v. Kerr, No. 202200140, 2023 CCA LEXIS 434 at *9 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2023)
(unpublished) (setting aside the punitive discharge as inappropriately severe).
   19 Rule for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 1002(a)(2).

   20 Article 56(a), UCMJ.

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               United States v. Vazquez, NMCCA No. 202200241
                             Opinion of the Court

B. Analysis
    Appellant asserts that a sentence of confinement for 60 months is inappro-
priately severe and should be reassessed to include confinement for only 30
months. Specifically, Appellant argues: (1) the facts and circumstances of the
case are not as egregious as they appear; (2) Appellant fully cooperated with
NCIS; (3) Appellant showed remorse by sending money to an individual he be-
lieved to be the father of Ms. Kilo; (4) Appellant has no additional record of
disciplinary history; and (5) similar cases have resulted in less confinement.
  Appellant’s crimes of possessing child pornography and soliciting a minor to
produce child pornography and send it to him are serious offenses that warrant
severe punishment. Given the facts of this case, the terms of Appellant’s plea
agreement, and the sentence adjudged, we find that the adjudged sentence did
not exceed the terms of the plea agreement and is not inappropriately severe.
Appellant committed serious offenses with a minor child. His relatively coop-
erative dealings with NCIS after his crime was discovered is not persuasive. 21
    Appellant argues that his contrition over the incident compelled him to
help Ms. Kilo and her family by sending money to Ms. Kilo’s father for medical
bills allegedly incurred by Ms. Kilo. 22 There is no evidence in mitigation that
would warrant sentence revision. Appellant’s record prior to committing these
crimes was properly introduced and considered. 23 When Appellant’s military
character is considered in conjunction with his serious crimes against a minor,
this Court does not finds the sentence inappropriately severe.
    Appellant urges us to compare his case to three unrelated cases where the
accused received lighter sentences than Appellant for similar or more serious
offenses. 24 We may engage in sentence comparison only “in those rare in-
stances in which sentence appropriateness can be fairly determined only by

    21 See United States v. Jablonska, No. 200101210, 2005 CCA LEXIS 7, *6 (N-M. Ct.

Crim. App. Jan. 13, 2005) (similarly noting that post-arrest cooperation with law en-
forcement authorities was not persuasive).
    22 As noted above, it is unclear who the money actually went to, but Appellant

believed it was being sent to Ms. Kilo’s family.
    23 See Dep’t of the Navy, Marine Corps Manual w/ch 1-3, para. 2500 (Mar. 21,

1980) (noting that Marines are expected to maintain exceptionally high standards in
the performance of their duties and in the conduct of their personal affairs).
    24 United States v. Pearson, 81 M.J. 592 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2021); United States

v. Toschiaddi, No. 200800044, 2009 WL 2151149 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Jul. 16, 2009);
United States v. Miles, 71 M.J. 671 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2012).

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               United States v. Vazquez, NMCCA No. 202200241
                             Opinion of the Court

reference to disparate sentence adjudged in closely related case.” 25 “Closely re-
lated” cases involve “coactors involved in a common crime, servicemembers in-
volved in a common or parallel scheme, or some other direct nexus between the
service members whose sentences are sought to be compared[.]” 26
    Here, we find no closely related case appropriate for sentence comparison.
Under United States v. Wacha, this Court may, but is not required to, consider
the sentences in unrelated cases. 27 Upon careful review of the sentences refer-
enced by Appellant, we note that each of the cases did not involve a bargained-
for plea agreement. Here, facing the possibility of 80 years confinement, Ap-
pellant entered into a plea agreement that reduced his criminal liability and
decreased his confinement exposure to 60 months. Within this context, 60
months confinement is not inappropriately severe.
    Appellant’s sentence was within the limits he agreed to. “Other than to en-
sure that the appellant’s approved sentence is one that ‘should be approved,’
we generally refrain from second guessing or comparing a sentence that flows
from a lawful pretrial agreement or a [convening authority]’s lawful exercise
of his authority to grant clemency to an appellant.” 28
   This Court has held before that the mere existence of another service mem-
ber elsewhere committing similar offenses and receiving a lighter sentence
does not entitle future offenders to the same benefit. 29
   We therefore find, Appellant’s bargained-for period of confinement is not
inappropriately severe based on the record of this case.

   25 United States v. Sothen, 54 M.J. 294, 296 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting United States

v. Ballard, 20 M.J. 282, 283 C.M.A. 1985)).
   26 United States v. Lacy, 50 M.J. 286, 288 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

   27 United States v. Wacha, 55 M.J. 266 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

   28 United States v. Widak, No. 201500309, 2016 CCA LEXIS 172, *7 (N-M. Ct.

Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2016) (unpublished) (quoting Article 66(c), UCMJ) (citing to
United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010)); see also United States v.
Casuso, No. 202000114, 2021 CCA LEXIS 328, *8 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Jun. 30, 2021)
(unpublished) (questioning an appellant’s “claim of inappropriate severity when the
sentence he received was within the range of punishment he was expressly willing to
accept in exchange for his pleas of guilty”); Kerr, 2023 CCA LEXIS 434 at *9 (setting
aside the punitive discharge as inappropriately severe).
   29 United States v. Williams, No. 201600197, 2017 CCA LEXIS 702, at *10 (N-M.

Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 16, 2017) (unpublished).

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              United States v. Vazquez, NMCCA No. 202200241
                            Opinion of the Court

                                III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and
that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights oc-
curred. 30
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                                 FOR THE COURT:

                                 MARK K. JAMISON
                                 Clerk of Court

   30 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

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