Court Opinion

ID: 9570943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:27:42.973233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:23:43.848119
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice,
dissenting:
I trust that today’s opinion does not signal a retreat from this Court’s position, evolved over the last decade or so, requiring fair and just treatment for married women.1 It will be cold comfort to Mrs. *34Pajak to hear the majority intone “[ijndeed, it is unfortunate for Mrs. Pajak that William J. Pajak, Sr., died so soon after the couple were married.” 182 W.Va. at 32, 385 S.E.2d at 388. What is truly unfortunate is the majority’s twisting of the law to deprive Mrs. Pajak of her statutory share in her husband’s estate.
Initially, it should be pointed out that this case was decided by way of a summary judgment. The majority completely ignores this fact and our well-established law that forecloses summary judgment except “when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” Syllabus Point 3, in part, Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).2 Greater reluctance to grant summary judgment exists where, as here, the complaint raises an issue relating to subjective intent, such as fraud or breach of a fiduciary relationship. See Alpine Property Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Mountaintop Devel. Co., 179 W.Va. 12, 365 S.E.2d 57 (1987); Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 164 W.Va. 241, 262 S.E.2d 433 (1980).
By avoiding any discussion of the summary judgment issue, the majority is able to supply critical facts that simply do not exist in the record.3 At the very least, this case should have been reversed and remanded for trial under Syllabus Point 1 of Masinter v. WEBCO Co., supra: “Even if the trial judge is of the opinion to direct a verdict, he should nevertheless ordinarily hear evidence and, upon a trial, direct a verdict rather than try the case in advance on a motion for summary judgment.”
I must also take issue with the majority’s reliance on the statement in footnote 2 of Gant v. Gant, 174 W.Va. 740, 329 S.E.2d 106 (1985), that “[w]e have always strongly favored prenuptial agreements that establish property rights at death in West Virginia.” 174 W.Va. at 745, 329 S.E.2d at 112. (Emphasis in original.) Looking at the cases cited in Gant, I find no support for this statement. Certainly, Gieseler v. Remke, 117 W.Va. 430, 185 S.E. 847 (1936), does not, as the Court there refused to uphold the antenuptial agreement. In Williamson v. First Nat’l Bank of Williamson, 111 W.Va. 720, 164 S.E. 777 (1931), the Court, by a 3-2 vote, upheld the antenup-tial agreement on the most narrow ground, i.e., that at the time the agreement was discussed, the parties were not engaged, and, therefore, no confidential relationship existed.
Bramer v. Bramer, 84 W.Va. 168, 99 S.E. 329 (1919), involved a contract where the husband promised not to assert any claim against his wife’s separate property. This Court held that the agreement was not specific enough to cut off his right of curtesy. In Syllabus Point 3 of Bramer, we evolved a rule rejecting any broad inter*35pretation of an antenuptial agreement.4 The reverse side of Bramer is found in Hinkle v. Hinkle, 34 W.Va. 142, 11 S.E. 993 (1890), where the widow’s right to dower was found not to have been abolished by an antenuptial agreement.
Moreover, in Beard v. Beard, 22 W.Va. 130 (1883), the Court concluded that despite an antenuptial agreement making the wife’s property separate from any claim of the husband, he was entitled to receive her personal estate when she died. Coatney v. Hopkins, 14 W.Va. 338 (1878), was based on the same law governing Beard, but the Court in that case found the language of the agreement sufficiently explicit to bar the husband’s right to inherit his wife’s separate property.
Our earlier cases, such as Bramer, Hin-kle, Beard, and Coatney, do not make any analysis of whether the prenuptial agreement was oppressive or procured by fraud or misrepresentation. They do not consider the various factors contained in Gant. The majority purports to rely on Syllabus Point 2 of Gant, which predicates the validity of a pre-nuptial agreement on a showing that (1) the agreement was executed “voluntarily, with knowledge of its contents and legal effect”; (2) the agreement was “free of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation”; and (3) independent advice of counsel “helps demonstrate that there has been no fraud, duress or misrepresentation.” The majority, however, fails to apply this test to the facts of this case.
We have consistently held, as even the majority recognizes, see 182 W.Va. at 33, 385 S.E.2d at 389, that the parties to an antenuptial agreement have a confidential relationship with each other. As we stated in Gieseler, 117 W.Va. at 432, 185 S.E. at 848:
“In antenuptial agreements a confidential relationship exists between the contracting parties and it is the duty of the prospective husband to fully disclose the amount of his property and to deal fairly with his prospective bride and to honestly carry out the provisions of the contract.”
It is important at this point to note some facts which the majority has overlooked. First, Mrs. Pajak had only a tenth-grade education, and her work experience as a retail clerk was not sophisticated. Second, she was asked to sign the antenuptial agreement one day before the wedding. The matter was first brought to her attention when, as she was riding to work with her then fiance, he advised her it was necessary to stop by his attorney’s office to sign some papers.
Upon arrival at the attorney’s office, Mrs. Pajak was asked to sign the agreement, after which the attorney went over the document briefly with her. She did not get to read the document, nor was she informed that she could have another attorney review it for her benefit. Mrs. Pajak stated in her pretrial deposition that there were a number of words and phrases in the agreement which she did not understand.5
Furthermore, neither the attorney nor Mr. Pajak ever advised Mrs. Pajak, even *36generally, as to Mr. Pajak’s assets, which were extensive and worth approximately $570,000.6 She was not informed that by executing the agreement, she was giving up her right to dower and her statutory share in her husband’s estate under W.Va. Code, 42-3-1. The agreement made no provision for Mrs. Pajak except that her husband would not claim an interest in her assets, which Mrs. Pajak valued at between $6,000 and $8,000.
Turning to an analysis of the Gant factors, it is clear that this agreement is void. The testimony is that while Mrs. Pajak signed the agreement, she did so without any relevant explanation from her husband’s attorney of what she was giving up. The fact that she had no advance warning of the agreement until she was taken to her husband’s attorney’s office the day before the wedding undercuts a claim of voluntariness. Furthermore, Mrs. Pajak received absolutely nothing under the ante-nuptial agreement. As stated in 41 Am. Jur.2d Husband and Wife § 298 (1968), the adequacy of the provision for the wife bears upon the fairness of the agreement: “However, adequacy of the provision for the wife is to be considered in connection with the question whether the contract is fair, and inadequacy may give rise to a presumption of fraud vitiating the agreement.” (Footnotes omitted). See Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 883 (1953).
Moreover, it seems axiomatic that to have knowledge of the agreement’s contents, as Gant requires, there must be some reasonable disclosure of the husband’s assets or at least a showing that the prospective wife had some independent knowledge of these facts. Neither condition exists in this case. Gieseler’s command that “it is the duty of the prospective husband to fully disclose the amount of his property” was surely violated in this case.7 This statement from Gieseler reflects the general view elsewhere, as summarized in 41 Am.Jur.2d Husband and Wife § 296 (1968):
“Antenuptial settlements and agreements are governed by the principle that an engagement to marry gives rise to a confidential relationship between the prospective spouses. They cannot with respect to such a settlement or agreement be regarded in the same category as ordinary buyers and sellers or as persons dealing with each other at arm’s length. It is the duty of each to be frank and unreserved in the disclosure of all circumstances bearing on the settlement or agreement. Overreaching, or abuse of the confidential relation between prospective spouses, makes an antenuptial settlement or agreement voidable. Such a settlement or agreement, to be enforceable, must be fair, equitable, and reasonable in view of the surrounding facts and circumstances. It must also be entered into voluntarily, with full or at least fair and adequate knowledge of the facts, and in the utmost good faith on the part of both.” (Footnotes omitted).
If we combine the foregoing with the fact that Mrs. Pajak was not advised nor given the opportunity to consult with her own lawyer about the agreement, the total unfairness is even more apparent. A number of cases involve fact patterns substantially similar to this case, i.e., lack of disclosure of assets, inadequate consideration to the wife, and a sudden request for an agreement with no time for the wife to talk to an attorney. Courts confronted with this fact pattern have had no difficulty in voiding the antenuptial agreement. E.g., *37Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So.2d 1111 (Fla. App.1976), appeal after remand, 362 So.2d 58 (Fla.App.1978), cert. denied, 367 So.2d 1125 (Fla.1979); Britven v. Britven, 259 Iowa 650, 145 N.W.2d 450 (1966); Estate of Benker, 416 Mich. 681, 331 N.W.2d 193 (1982); Zimmie v. Zimmie, 11 Ohio St.3d 94, 11 Ohio B.R. 396, 464 N.E.2d 142 (1984); Re Marriage of Norris, 51 Or.App. 43, 624 P.2d 636, review denied, 291 Or. 151, 634 P.2d 1345 (1981); Re Estate of Crawford, 107 Wash.2d 493, 730 P.2d 675 (1986). See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 883 (1953).
I regret to say that today’s opinion does not befriend the widow who believes that justice requires a prospective husband, in the words of Gieseler, “to fully disclose the amount of his property and to deal fairly with his prospective bride.” 117 W.Va. at 432, 185 S.E. at 848.
For these reasons, I dissent.

. See, e.g., Kathy L.B. v. Patrick J.B., 179 W.Va. 655, 371 S.E.2d 583 (1988) (mother’s right to birth expenses and child support from natural father): In Re Estate of Weller, 179 W.Va. 804, 374 S.E.2d 712 (1988) (alimony in gross collectible against deceased husband's estate); Butcher v. Butcher, 178 W.Va. 33, 357 S.E.2d 226 (1987) (wife’s right to equitable distribution of husband’s military pension); Molnar v. Molnar, 173 W.Va. 200, 314 S.E.2d 73 (1984) (wife’s right to rehabilitative alimony); Prather v. Prather, 172 W.Va. 348, 305 S.E.2d 304 (1983) (power of court to impress a trust to secure payment of wife’s alimony and child support); LaRue v. LaRue, 172 W.Va. 158, 304 S.E.2d 312 (1983) (wife’s right to equitable distribution for home*34maker services); Garska v. McCoy, 167 W.Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357 (1981) (primary caretaker rule); Marshall v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 273 S.E.2d 360 (1980) (confidential relationship between husband and wife through marriage requires dealing in good faith); Sparks v. Sparks, 165 W.Va. 484, 269 S.E.2d 847 (1980) (wife having custody of children entitled to move with them out of state); Murredu v. Murredu, 160 W.Va. 610, 236 S.E.2d 452 (1977) (wife with custody of minor children entitled to exclusive use of family home).

. See, e.g., Romano v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 178 W.Va. 523, 362 S.E.2d 334 (1987); Lusk v. Doe, 175 W.Va. 775, 338 S.E.2d 375 (1985); Price v. Bennett, 171 W.Va. 12, 297 S.E.2d 211 (1982).

. The following statements by the majority do not appear in the record:
(1) "[I]t was obvious that [Mr. Pajak] wished to protect the interests of his children.” 182 W.Va. at 32, 385 S.E.2d at 388. To the contrary, Mr. Pajak’s marriage to Mrs. Pajak resulted in the revocation of his will under W.Va.Code, 41-1-6. This will left his property to the two children from his second marriage and ignored the two children from his first marriage. Mrs. Pa-jak was his third wife.
(2) "It is unlikely that Mr. Pajak would have married Mrs. Pajak had he not been assured that he could protect his assets for his children." 182 W.Va. at 32, 385 S.E.2d at 388. Not only was there no testimony as to this fact, but, as earlier noted, his will left nothing to the two children from his first marriage.
(3) "Mrs. Pajak was aware that he owned a number of businesses, had real estate holdings, and lived reasonably well.” 182 W.Va. at 32, 385 S.E.2d at 388. The majority contradicts itself when it quotes Mrs. Pajak’s statement that she knew only that Mr. Pajak owned the family *35house, the Carolina Furniture Company, and a car. 182 W.Va. at 33, 385 S.E.2d at 389.

. Syllabus Point 3 of Bramer states: "But neither the husband nor wife should be deprived thereby of his or her respective marital rights in the other's property to a greater extent than is clearly manifested by the plain words of the instrument or by necessary implication therefrom.”

. These included the following:
(1) "first hereinabove set forth”;
(2) "contemplate”;
(3) "dower”;
(4) "statutory”;
(5) "waive";
(6) “relinquishes”;
(7) "with the same effect as though no marriage had taken place between the parties to this agreement”;
(8) "mutually”;
(9) "solely by virtue of said marriage”;
(10) “shall have or acquire any right”;
(11) “title or claim”;
(12) “descend";
(13) "vest";
(14) “heir-at-law”;
(15) “legatee";
(16) “devisee”;
(17) “statute";
(18) “binding upon them”;
(19) “cognizant”;
(20) "execute";
(21) "in consideration of the premises”; and
(22) "disclaim or release.”

. These assets included several rental properties, which generated approximately $30,000 in rental income each year, several parcels of undeveloped land, and a home valued at $130,000. Mr. Pajak’s entire real estate holdings were valued at approximately $500,000. He also had bank accounts and certificates of deposit worth approximately $56,000.

. I find Syllabus Point 2 of the majority opinion to be almost unintelligible. What is meant by "a general idea of the other party’s financial condition” and “there was no fraud or concealment that had the effect of inducing the party to be charged into entering an agreement that otherwise would not have been made?” The two concepts are self-defeating. Concealment is the most common technique practiced by the wealthy prospective marriage partner. There is no desire to disclose assets for fear that the other spouse will not want to forego all claims to it.