Court Opinion

ID: 9761124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:32:02.355641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.228664
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
dissenting. I concur in the Court’s use of a clearly erroneous test to evaluate the findings of the trial court. Use of this standard of review, even in the absence of testimonial evidence, is most consistent with the wording of V.R.C.P. 52 and the policy behind it. I do not concur, however, in the Court’s *469conclusion that essential findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous or that the trial court misapplied our precedents in granting post-conviction relief. Once we accept a deferential standard of review in this case, the trial court’s judgment must be affirmed.
The Court concludes, that two findings of fact are clearly erroneous. The first of these forms no part of the Court’s decision to reverse since its effect, according to the Court, was a possible misjudgment of credibility. The remedy for this error would be a new'trial for a correct assessment of credibility. However, the Court has chosen to reverse without a remand, making credibility irrelevant.
Even if there is error in the finding, it is harmless. The juror clearly down-played her knowledge of Bailey. She stated, “I just see her and wave to her, and that’s it.” I agree with the trial court that the juror was not candid about her relationship with the witness.
The second finding — actually a group of findings — that the Court finds clearly erroneous goes to the heart of this case. The Court relies on part of Bailey’s deposition testimony to the effect “I didn’t say anything” to conclude that the court erred in finding that Bailey told the juror everything she had seen and heard the night of the attempted rape. Earlier in the deposition, Bailey testified that the juror approached her, told her that she heard a lot of screams and asked what happened. Bailey then told her “what I saw and that I heard a lot of loud screams and stuff,” arid told her “I saw everything.” When asked whether it was fair to say that she told the juror “basically what [she].. . told the jury or the court during the trial,” she responded affirmatively.
There is a clear conflict in Bailey’s testimony, and the Court has adopted one method of resolving the conflict. It is equally proper to resolve the conflict by crediting the detailed testimony earlier in the deposition and refusing to credit the generalization “I didn’t say anything.”1 In any event, the resolution *470of the conflict was for the trial court, not for this Court. The findings involved here are directly supported by Bailey’s earlier deposition testimony. We can not find them clearly erroneous.
The Court’s importation of the “classic formulation” of the clearly erroneous test is an unfortunate red herring. While it may be mentioned in In re Quechee Lakes Corp., 154 Vt. 543, 554 n.10, 580 A.2d 957, 963 n.10 (1990), it is not used in our cases. Rather, when we review a trial court’s findings, we conduct the following inquiry:
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial court’s findings, this Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and exclude the effect of any modifying evidence. When evidence conflicts, the credibility of witnesses, the weight and sufficiency of evidence, and its persuasive effect are matters accorded to the exclusive determination of the trier of fact. If the record contains any credible evidence that fairly and reasonably supports the findings, the trial court’s ruling must stand even though inconsistencies or substantial evidence to the contrary may exist.
Lawrence v. Pelletier, 154 Vt. 29, 33, 572 A.2d 936, 939 (1990) (citations omitted). In addition, “where the evidence is in conflict, such findings will stand even if the evidence predominates against them; only where the contrary proof is so overwhelming that there is no reasonable basis upon which findings can stand will they be set aside.” Cliche v. Cliche, 143 Vt. 301, 306, 466 *471A.2d 314, 316 (1983). Nowhere does the Court explain that it has viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to petitioner, that the effect of modifying evidence has been excluded, that the persuasive effect of evidence is to be determined by the trial court, that the evidence it has disregarded was simply not credible, or that the evidence it finds persuasive is overwhelming. We would do better to admit that we do not give deference to trial judge fact-finding than to invoke one standard of review when we affirm and another when we reverse.
Once we properly accept the trial court’s findings, we are left with the following conflicts between the juror’s voir dire statements and the facts:
1. The juror stated during voir dire that she heard that the incident happened because “someone . . . mentioned it to me,” but she didn’t “hear of any particulars.” When asked whether she was “told anything that supposedly factually occurred,” she stated, “No.” In fact, she was given a detailed account of the attempted rape by an eyewitness who testified at trial.
2. The juror stated at the voir dire that she knew of Bailey because their children played together and “I just see her and wave to her, and that’s it.” She failed to answer the trial judge’s question inquiring whether she had learned anything about the case from a witness. In fact, it was Bailey who provided her the detailed information about the attempted rape, after the juror sought it out.
3. The juror indicated on voir dire that her knowledge of Bailey would not affect her ability to judge Bailey’s credibility at trial. In fact, the juror had a fixed view of Bailey’s credibility. She thought that Bailey “had a way of stretching things” and that she was a “gossip” and a “busybody.”
If I apply these facts to the tests adopted by the Court as found in our case law, I think it clear that the judgment must be affirmed. These facts show the presence of circumstances capable of prejudicing the deliberative function of the jury. State v. Onorato, 142 Vt. 99, 106-07, 453 A.2d 393, 396 (1982). They further show that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question and that grounds exist to challenge the juror for cause. Although it is not clear that the Court would disagree with this conclusion if it accepted all the facts as found by the trial court, I want to emphasize some additional considerations not mentioned in the Court’s opinion.
*472This is a post-conviction relief proceeding. The scope of review in such a proceeding is broad, “and its concerns include the exercise of discretionary powers by courts.” In re Provencher, 127 Vt. 558, 560, 255 A.2d 180, 182 (1969). It is the functional equivalent of a consideration of a new trial motion where the time limit for such a motion has run before the new evidence justifying juror disqualification is available. See State v. Sheppard, 155 Vt. 73, 77, 582 A.2d 116, 118 (1990). The State has not challenged the new evidence as discovered in an untimely fashion. I believe we must accord the post-conviction court the same discretion in ruling on this petition as we would accord the district court if the issues had arisen in a new trial motion. See State v. Dragon, 135 Vt. 168, 170, 376 A.2d 12, 13 (1977). Thus, just as the district court does not have to accept a juror’s claim of impartiality and can find bias despite such claims, the post-conviction court can find that claims of impartiality are.insincere.
Here the court had no opportunity to explore whether the juror’s knowledge and opinions prejudiced the deliberative functions of the jury. The juror’s failure to disclose information at voir dire could not have been inadvertent and unknowing. Cf. State v. Bevins, 146 Vt. 129, 134, 498 A.2d 1035, 1038 (1985) (failure of juror to disclose acquaintance with co-perpetrator of the crime was inadvertent where juror had no memory of dealings with co-perpetrator some bight years earlier). Thus, in choosing to believe the witness rather than the juror, the court necessarily concluded that the juror was aware that she had not answered truthfully. A finding of lack of honesty in response to voir dire questions is itself an indication of lack of partiality. See United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1532 (11th Cir. 1984).
It is also clear that the information disclosed at the post-conviction relief hearing would have been very relevant to a decision to challenge the juror, either for cause or peremptorily. Other courts have been sensitive to the effect on the trial process of a defendant’s inability to exercise challenges because of prospective jurors’ failure to disclose critical information. See, e.g., Ex parte O’Leary, 417 So. 2d 232, 240 (Ala. 1982) (parties have a right to have questions answered truthfully to enable them to exercise their challenges wisely), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1206 (1983). I concur in the recent observation of the Georgia *473Court of Appeals in Martin v. State, 168 Ga. App. 623, 625, 309 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1983):
The state seeks this court to find harmless error in the juror’s false silence .... We cannot view the error so lightly. While we agree that if one ignores the valuable right of voir dire to effect the selection of an impartial jury, the developed facts show that the juror probably was ultimately fair in her decisions. However, we express more dedication to the concept of a trial by peers and of a defendant’s right to have jurors selected after exposure and explanation of all apparent defects developed by voir dire. Were we to accept the position advanced by the state, we would for all intents and purposes emasculate the concept of voir dire. The trial court or this court could determine the propriety or acceptability of a juror by weighing the possible prejudice inherent in a juror’s defect. This would thus deprive the counsel of the right fully to explore a defect, waive it, challenge the juror for cause, or simply peremptorily challenge the suspect juror.
The observation is particularly relevant where' the facts as found below indicate that the defendant had grounds to challenge the juror for cause. See McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984); Perkins, 748 F.2d at 1532-33.
The Court has two additional responses to the trial court’s conclusion in this case: (a) the juror’s testimony showed that she found Bailey not to be credible, and since Bailey was a prosecution witness, any error is harmless; (b) any failure to evaluate properly the juror’s ability to serve fairly and impartially was caused by defense counsel’s failure to ask the proper questions during voir dire. •
The first ground might be more plausible if, as suggested by the Court, all of Bailey’s statements supported the State, and the juror always discounted Bailey’s statements. The juror’s deposition statement was, however, that Bailey told her “somebody tried to get raped last night.” The phrasing of the statement suggests that Bailey believed that the victim was partially responsible for the attempted rape. Thus, Bailey’s statements were not entirely pro-State, and we do not know what portion of the statements the juror might have disbelieved pursuant to *474her view of Bailey’s credibility.2 It is possible that the juror’s opinion of the witness helped the State.
Even if the juror’s expressed view of Bailey’s character and credibility helped only the defense, I do not think it warrants reversal of the trial court’s decision. The juror sought out Bailey’s observations, apparently considering them credible at the time. More importantly, the real basis for the court’s decision was the juror’s discussions with the witness and her failure to disclose them during voir dire. The credibility assessment, while relevant, is not determinative.
The second ground is the failure of the defense counsel to question the juror more fully. Certainly, 20/20 hindsight shows that a more complete interrogation was needed. For two reasons, I do not believe the failure to inquire more fully warrants reversal. First, the critical information warranting disqualification of the juror came from Bailey, not the juror. In essence, the trial court found that the juror failed to tell the truth when asked about her knowledge of the incident. No amount of questioning of the juror alone would have shown the true facts.
Second, the juror’s answers clearly stated that further inquiry would be unavailing. All potential jurors were asked by the trial judge whether they had “heard anything about the case?” and whether they “heard any of the witnesses say anything about it?” The juror answered that she had heard that the incident happened, without any particulars, from “someone ... on the street.” In view of the direct question about witnesses, one could conclude only that the “someone” was not a witness. At best, the response was misleading, and defense counsel can not be faulted for failing to follow up.
I would affirm.
On Motion for Reargument
Appellee’s motion to reargue asserts that this Court applied an improper clearly erroneous standard to key trial court findings. The test used was that articulated in United States v. *475United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395, that a judicial finding is clearly erroneous when “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Emphasis added.) Appellee contends that Gypsum is not and never has been the law of this state. Specifically, he points to several of our cases requiring that the reviewing court look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, excluding the effect of modifying evidence, see, e.g., Highgate Assocs. v. Merryfield, 157 Vt. 313, 315, 597 A.2d 1280, 1281 (1991); Semprebon v. Semprebon, 157 Vt. 209, 214, 596 A.2d 361, 363 (1991), and asserts he should have received the benefit of this rule.
This Court previously addressed this issue in Seaway Shopping Center Corp. v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 132 Vt. 111, 315 A.2d 483 (1974). While holding that the adoption of V.R.C.P. 52(a) had not changed Vermont’s clearly erroneous standard, id. at 116, 315 A.2d at 486-87, the Court maintained that, under the pre-Rule 52 standard, a reviewing court was required to consider the evidence “ ‘as a whole,’ ” just as Gypsum requires the court to look at the “entire evidence,” and consequently found “very little difference in result between the Federal rule and our case law as applied to our Vermont rule.” Id. at 117, 315 A.2d at 487 (quoting Little v. Little, 124 Vt. 178, 182, 200 A.2d 276, 279 (1964)).
Recent United States Supreme Court cases attest to the continued vitality of the Gypsum test and affirm its compatibility* with the deferential clearly erroneous standard. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573-74 (“If the [trial] court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the [appellate court] may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.”); Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988) (following Anderson). Rather, a finding supported by evidence is clearly erroneous only if the trial court misapprehends key evidence in a way that renders its finding implausible.
*476With regard to two key trial court findings in this case, the Court held that (1) the “transcript does not corroborate the court’s finding” on whether the juror ever stated that she did not know the witness, i.e., there was no competent, reasonable evidence to support this finding, and (2) the trial court “ignored or overlooked” evidence that the juror and witness had not discussed the details of the case, i.e., there were not two plausible explanations both supported by the evidence between which the trial court was entitled to choose. Rather, the trial court simply misapprehended the key evidence — its explanation was not plausible. Both are correct applications of our clearly erroneous standard.
Appellee’s remaining arguments are without merit.

Motion for reargument denied.

 While it is not determinative under our standard of review, the way Bailey testified supports the trial court’s method of reconciling her testimony. At trial, she testified as follows:
*470Q. I believe you said [he was] pulling pants back up or pulling them back on?
A. Pulling up. He had them down to his ankles.
Q. You saw that?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any doubt about that?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that that happened?
A. I know he did it.
Her answer to the first question about her doubt appears confused and may be inconsistent with her answer to the second question about her doubt. As in the testimony in the deposition, her answer to the general question (here about her doubt) appears to undercut her specific statement about what she saw

 As with Bailey’s own testimony, the majority acknowledges a conflict in the juror’s characterization of Bailey’s statements, yet chooses to believe a later rendition. I do not believe that the point here is undercut by the Court’s appellate fact-finding.

 Contrary to the dissent’s insistence that we view Gypsum and Rule 52(a) as “the same tests,” we stress their compatibility.