Court Opinion

ID: 9571057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:28:51.286046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:57.007600
License: Public Domain

Hunter, J.
This appeal arises from a disposition by the *563trial court of a remand by this court in the case of Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wn.2d 245, 422 P.2d 754 (1967) ,1
The action was instituted in the Superior Court for Pierce County in 1963 by the Department of Fisheries of the State of Washington (appellant) and the Department of Game of the State of Washington (respondent and cross-appellant), seeking by declaratory judgment to determine whether certain named individuals as members of the Puy-allup Indian Tribe and the Puyallup Tribe (respondents and cross-appellants) were immune from the application of state conservation measures under their claimed rights to fish for anadromous fish in the Puyallup River under article 3 of the Treaty of Medicine Creek (10 Stat. 1132), which is as follows:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing, together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses on open and unclaimed lands: Provided, however, That they shall not take shell fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens, and that they shall alter all stallions not intended for breeding horses, and shall keep up and confine the latter.
The Department of Fisheries and the Department of Game further sought a permanent injunction restraining the members of the tribe, and the tribe, from violating any fishing laws of this state or conservation regulations promulgated thereunder.
The trial court concluded that the Puyallup Tribe no longer existed as an entity and that its members no longer had any rights under the treaty; that there was no longer a *564Puyallup Indian Reservation and that the Puyallup Indians had no fishing rights within what had been the reservation; that they were subject to state conservation laws and regulations as were all citizens, and the court permanently enjoined the defendants and all members of the “Puyallup Tribe” from fishing in the Puyallup River watershed and Commencement Bay in any manner contrary to the laws of the State of Washington, or to the rules and regulations of the departments.
Upon appeal to this court in that case, we held in summary in Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., supra, at 260:
In summary: We have rejected the Departments’ argument that the Indian treaties are of no force and effect and that the state may repudiate them at will.
We have ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction to determine whether or not there had been a termination of the Puyallup Indian Tribe, and that the tribe continues to exist, at least so long as it is recognized as such by the appropriate agencies of the United States, or until' Congress passes a termination act.
We have agreed with the trial court that there is no longer a Puyallup Indian Reservation, and that the Puy-allup Indians no longer have any special or treaty rights to fish thereon because it was once a reservation; however, we hold that they continue to have a right to fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations and that any regulations of the Departments limiting or restricting those rights must be reasonable and necessary for the preservation of the fishery.
The state has clearly met that test, at least to the extent that it has established that continued use by the defendants of their drift nets and set nets would result in the nearly complete destruction of the anadromous fish runs in the Puyallup River and that a regulation prohibiting the use of such nets was necessary for the preservation of the fishery.
We are, therefore, in accord with the conclusion of the trial court that an injunction should be entered in this case; however, the injunction entered by the trial court is much too broad. It permanently enjoins individual defendants and members of the federal organization known as the “Puyallup Tribe” from fishing in the Puyallup *565River watershed and Commencement Bay in any manner that is contrary to the rules and regulations of the Department of Fisheries of the State of Washington and the Department of Game of the State of Washington. It is predicated on the trial court’s determination that the defendants have no treaty rights'.
The cause must be remanded to the trial court for the entry of a judgment and decree predicated upon the proposition that the defendants do have treaty rights, but that they are subject to conservation regulations which are reasonable and necessary to preserve the fishery.
The essence of this opinion is — and the decree, as re-framed, should so reflect: (1) If a defendant proves that he is a member of the Puyallup Tribe; and (2) He is fishing at one of the usual and accustomed fishing places of that tribe; (3) He cannot be restrained or enjoined from doing so, unless he is violating a statute, or regulation of the Departments promulgated thereunder, which has been established to be reasonable and necessary for the conservation of the fishery.
The injunction should be tailored to the particular situation. A specific act or acts should be enjoined on the basis that there has been a violation of a statute or statutes, or a regulation or regulations promulgated thereunder, and that such regulation or regulations are reasonable and necessary for the preservation of the fishery. The findings, conclusions, and judgment in this case should be rewritten to show clearly the basis and the extent of the injunction.
The judgment and decree appealed from is set aside, and the cause is remanded for the purposes indicated in this opinion.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 20 L. Ed. 2d 689, 88 S. Ct. 1725 (1968), and unanimously affirmed this court on May 27, 1968, with the following conclusion, at page 401:
Whether the prohibition of the use of set nets in these fresh waters was a “reasonable and necessary” (70 Wash. 2d, at 261, 422 P. 2d, at 764) conservation measure was left for determination by the trial court when the Supreme Court, deeming the injunction in No. 247 too broad, remanded the case for further findings. When the *566case was argued here, much was said about the pros and the cons of that issue. Since the state court has given us no authoritative answer to the question, we leave it unanswered and only add that any ultimate findings on the conservation issue must also cover the issue of equal protection implicit in the phrase “in common with.”
(Footnotes omitted.)
The remand trial in the superior court commenced on September 21,1970.
In the meantime, the Department of Fisheries took action which they considered was consistent with our decision in Puyallup and with the decision of the United States Supreme Court, by limiting the commercial net fishery in the East Bay Pass area of Puget Sound to permit a larger escapement of salmon for the Puyallup River, and adopted regulations to permit a Puyallup Indian fishery in the Puyallup River. These respective regulations were the following:
(121) WAC 220-47-040 and WAC 220-47-060 as last amended are superseded in part by the following emergency regulation:
It shall be unlawful to take, fish for and possess salmon taken with purse seme and gill net gear in that portion of Puget Sound Salmon Fishing Area 6 lying between lines projected from Point Robinson Light to Des Moines Light and from Browns Point Light to Piner Point on Maury Island from 9:00 a.m. September 18 until further notice.
Section 3. This Order shall take effect as required by R.C.W. 34.04.040.
Dated this 18th Day of September, 1970.
WAC 220-47-115 -Puyallup River — Indian Fishery.
It shall be unlawful to take, fish for or possess salmon taken for commercial proposes in waters of the Puyallup River and its tributaries, except that it shall be lawful for enrolled members of the Puyallup Indian tribe to take, fish for and possess salmon taken for commercial purposes with gill net and set net gear in that portion of the Puyallup River lying between the City of Puyallup and the 11th Street Bridge, in Tacoma, during the period *567September 21 through October 23, 1970, subject to the following regulations:
(1) It shall be unlawful to engage in this fishery during weekly closures from 6:00 p.m. Wednesday to 6:00 p.m. Sunday.
(2) It shall be unlawful to engage in this fishery with any set net extending more than % the width of the river.
(3) It shall be unlawful to engage in this fishery with gill net gear containing mesh larger than 6% inches stretch measure.
(4) It shall be unlawful for any person fishing pursuant to these regulations to fish for salmon with net gear in any manner, time or place contrary to these regulations.
Evidence introduced by the Department of Fisheries at the trial on remand, was in justification of the action of the department as being within the ambit of conservation of the salmon fishery as related to the run in the Puyallup River for the year 1970.
The Department of Game failed to recognize any right of the Puyallup Indians under the Medicine Creek Treaty, other than their right to fish in the same manner and in common with other citizens of the state. The Department of Game introduced evidence to show that a commercial net fishery would be inconsistent with the conservation of the steelhead fishery.
The trial court dissolved the injunction against the members of the Puyallup Indians and the tribe on the grounds there was no showing of irreparable injury; that adequate criminal sanctions were available, and on the grounds that the granting of the injunction would deprive those in violation of their right to a jury trial. The trial court further held that the burden was upon the state to prove the regulations were reasonable and necessary for the conservation of the fishery.
The Department of Fisheries appeals from the dismissal of the injunction, and from the holding of the trial court limiting the enforcement of its regulations to criminal sanctions, and the placing of the burden of proof upon the state *568to show the regulations were reasonable and necessary for the conservation of the fishery in each case.
The Department of Game appeals from the order dissolving the injunction, contending that the defendants have no treaty rights to fish contrary to the conservation statutes and the regulations adopted thereunder, and that the trial court erred in failing to hold that the steelhead fishery could not withstand a commercial fishery.
The Puyallup Indian Tribe and individual members’ (respondents and cross-appellants) contentions will be stated in the latter part of this opinion.
In considering the Puyallup Indians’ treaty rights to fish under the Medicine Creek Treaty, since the decision of the United States Supreme Court, 391 U.S. 392, in its review of our decision in Puyallup, there can no longer be any question that whatever the United States Supreme Court may ultimately construe to be the Indian rights to fish under the Medicine Creek Treaty, they are subject to the reach of the state powers and regulations necessary to the conservation of the fishery, providing the regulations are not discriminatory against the Indians. The United States Supreme Court stated in Puyallup, on page 398:
But the Treaty is silent as to the mode or modes of fishing that are guaranteed. Moreover, the right to fish at those respective places is not an exclusive one. Rather, it is one “in common with all citizens of the Territory.” Certainly the right of the latter may he regulated. And we see no reason why the right of the Indians may not also he regulated hy an appropriate exercise of the police power of the State. The right to fish “at all usual and accustomed” places may, of course., not be qualified by the State, even though all Indians bom in the United States are now citizens of the United States. Act of June 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253, as superseded by § 201 (b) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U. S. C. § 1401 (a) (2). But the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may he regulated hy the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians.
In Tulee v. Washington, 315 U. S. 681, we had before us *569for construction a like treaty with the Yakima Indians which guaranteed the right to fish “at all usual and accustomed places, in common with the citizens” of Washington Territory. 12 Stat. 951. Tulee, a member of the tribe, was fishing without a license off the Yakima Indian Reservation; the State convicted him for failure to obtain a license. We reversed, saying:
“[W]hile the treaty leaves the state with power to impose on Indians, equally with others, such restrictions of a purely regulatory nature concerning the time and manner of fishing outside the reservation as are necessary for the conservation of fish, it forecloses the state from charging the Indians a fee of the kind in question here.” Id., at 684.

In other words, the “right” to fish outside the reservation was a treaty “right” that could not be qualified or conditioned by the State. But “the time and manner of fishing . . . necessary for the conservation of fish,” not being defined or established by the treaty, were within the reach of state power.

The overriding police power of the State, expressed in nondiscriminatory measures for conserving fish resources, is preserved.

(Italics ours.)
The first issue to be resolved is whether the regulations promulgated by the Department of Fisheries, to permit an Indian net fishery for coho salmon in the Puyallup River, come within the ambit of regulations conforming to the necessary conservation of the coho salmon fishery.
Conservation is defined by J. E. Lasater, Associate Director of Operations, Department of Fisheries, as follows:
A. Very simply, it is wise use. When we put it in terms of salmon harvest, I would put it in three categories or three parts, by harvest, in management of salmon as a crop, one, there must be a surplus and over and above the needed spawning escapement to have an available crop and not be taking the feed stock. Two, the manner of fishing, itself, must be such that you can control it so that you do not dip into the seed stock. . . . The other thing is that the manner of fishing, itself, must not be destructive.
(Italics ours.)
*570Mr. Lasater testified that the first time there was a return of coho fish surplus over spawning and hatchery needs on the Puyallup since 1964, was in the fall of 1969, and that the 1970 regulation authorizing an Indian net fishery on the Puyallup permitted a harvest of the surplus and a sufficient escapement for spawning and hatchery needs. Mr. Lasater testified as follows:
A. They will fish three days a week each week, starting on the 21st until, in late October— ... I have mentioned that we fish in areas of passage, that is so that in a closed period fish actually move out of the fishery, and protected the four days, are to allow the fish to come from the milling area, Commencement Bay, pass completely through the fishery and into the spawning areas above without being fished, and the four days, we believe, is sufficient to pass a significant quantity of fish. So it is to allow a spawning escapement through the fishery. You must allow them time to move.
From this uncontradicted testimony, there is ample evidence in the record to support the reasonableness of the regulations to meet necessary conservation standards for the Indian coho fishery alone. However, another problem arises. Mr. Lasater also testified that “chinook salmon in the Puyallup system have not been built back to a point where they can withstand a fishery without damaging the potential future rims.”
The record shows that the manner of fishing in which the Indians engage for the catching of coho under the regulations, is with set or drift gill nets. In the recent case of State v. Moses, 79 Wn.2d 104, 483 P.2d 832 (1971), upon the basis of Mr. Lasater’s testimony, we clearly determined that fish once caught or entangled in a gill net are injured to the extent that a very high mortality results. Thus, the coho gill net Indian fishery that results in the catch of other species of protected fish, such as chinook, to conform to necessary conservation requirements, cannot be permitted. It “flies” directly into Mr. Lasater’s number three element of conservation — “The manner of fishing itself must not be destructive.”
*571The record is not clear as to the number of chinook or other protected species of fish that are or will be caught in the gill nets during the period of Puyallup Indian coho fishery; however, it is clear that a selective gill net fishery, coho in this instance, cannot withstand the test of the necessary conservation of the fishery in the event substantial numbers of protected species are caught, resulting in a high percentage of their destruction and endangering the conservation of those protected species.
We therefore expressly hold that, as a guideline in an allowable Indian gill net fishery, a selective net fishery for the lawful catching of one species of fish is not permissible in the event there is a substantial number of protected species caught that are within the number required for spawning escapement and hatchery needs, necessary for conservation of the fishery of that species.
We will now consider the separate contentions of the Department of Game. The department contends that statutes prohibiting net fishing for steelhead are controlling in the prohibition of an Indian net fishery. This contention is without merit. Statutes of this state must yield to rights the Indians may have under the Medicine Creek Treaty.
The Department of Game further contends, however, that the Puyallup Indians have no fishing treaty rights other than those held in common with other citizens of the state. This contention is inconsistent with our holding in Puyallup. We hold that it is incumbent upon the Department of Game to provide, annually, regulations for a Puyallup Indian net fishery of steelhead when it is determined by the department, upon supporting facts and. data, that an Indian net fishery would not be inconsistent with the necessary conservation of the steelhead fishery.
We are satisfied from the record in the present case, however, that a regulation authorizing an Indian net fishery for steelhead for the year 1970, in the Puyallup River, would have been destructive to the conservation of the steelhead fishery, and the Department of Game’s contention *572that there should be no commercial fishery in the Puyallup River for steelhead should be sustained as for that year.
Mr. Clifford J. Millenback, Chief of the Fisheries Management Division of the Department of Game, testified that the run of steelhead in the Puyallup River drainage is between 16,000 and 18,000 fish annually; that approximately 5,000 to 6,000 are native run which is the maximum the Puyallup system will produce even if undisturbed; that approximately 10,000 are produced by the annual hatchery plant of 100,000 smolt; that smolt, small steelhead from 6 to 9 inches in length, are released in April, and make their way to the sea about the first of August; that during this time all fishing is closed to permit their escapement; that the entire cost of the hatchery smolt plant, exclusive of some federal funds, is financed from licensee fees paid by sports fishermen. The record further shows that 61 per cent of the entire sports catch on the river is from hatchery-planted steelhead; that the catch of steelhead by the sports fishery, as determined from “card count” received from the licensed sports fishermen, is around 12,000 to 14,000 annually; 2 that the escapement required for adequate hatchery needs and spawning is 25 per cent to 50 per cent of the run; that the steelhead fishery cannot therefore withstand a commercial fishery on the Puyallup River.
Mr. Millenback further testified that, contrary to the salmon fishery, there is no commercial fishery of steelhead permitted; that the only fishing for steelhead is the sports fishery and that is primarily in the river itself.
We hold under this record that the steelhead fishery in the Puyallup River is not comparable to the salmon fishery; that (1) 61 per cent of the catch are hatchery fish, almost exclusively financed by licensee revenues of sports fisher*573men; that (2) no commercial fishing for steelhead is permitted in any area; that (3) contrary to the salmon fishery, which is conducted almost entirely in areas other than in the river, the steelhead sports fishery of the Puyallup run is conducted almost exclusively in the Puyallup River; that (4) the catch of the steelhead sports fishery alone in the Puyallup River leaves no more than a sufficient number of steelhead for escapement necessary for the conservation of the steelhead fishery in that river.
The trial court was therefore in error in dissolving the injunction restricting a violation of steelhead fishing statutes and regulations as applied to the Puyallup River..
The Departments of Fisheries and Game contend the trial court erred in holding that injunction was not a proper form of remedy in this case. We agree. We clearly stated in Puyallup that an injunction should be entered in this case, but that it was too broad and should be tailored to meet the specific act or acts.
Puyallup River fish runs are for substantially short durations and it is vital to the conservation of the fishery that adequate escapement be permitted during these periods. The continuing threat of violation of net fishing prohibitions and regulations by members of the Puyallup Indian Tribe, relying upon their asserted treaty rights to virtually an unregulated net fishery, justifies the remedy of enforcement by injunction to adequately protect the conservation of the fishery.
The contention that the right of a jury trial is denied by the remedy of an injunction in this case, is without merit. The purpose of an injunction is not to punish the wrongdoer for past transactions, but to restrain present or threatened future wrongful acts. Lewis Pac. Dairymen’s Ass’n v. Turner, 50 Wn.2d 762, 314 P.2d 625 (1957). Also, see, State ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Skagit River Nav. & Trading Co., 181 Wash. 642, 45 P.2d 27 (1935). One who thereafter violates the injunction is subject to contempt proceedings and, under those circumstances, a jury trial is properly not available. See People ex rel. Attorney *574General v. Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 86 P. 224 cited in State ex rel. Nicomen Boom Co. v. North Shore Boom & Driving Co., 67 Wash. 317, 121 P. 467 (1912).
The Department of Fisheries contends that the trial court erred in its holding on the burden of proof in that the holding requires the department to mount a full scale conservation case and reestablish the necessity of its regulations in each and every enforcement action as part of its case in chief. The department argues that the burden of proof which is upon the state to show that its regulations are reasonable and necessary for the conservation of the fishery, when applied to Indian treaty fishing rights, must be met when the regulations are adopted in compliance with the notice and hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, RCW 34.04, and that thereafter a presumption of validity attaches. The burden of proof, it is contended, shifts back to the state upon a violation hearing involving a treaty Indian. We agree.
We hold that a presumption of validity attaches to a regulation once adopted under the procedure required by the Administrative Procedure Act. However, the right of a Puyallup Indian to assert his treaty rights at any time cannot be abridged. The unreasonableness of a regulation as a defense to a violation by a Puyallup Indian must be available at all times and, by reason of the advantage of the state in its expertise on fishing conservation issues, the burden must immediately shift to the state to establish that the regulation is supported by the evidence on grounds of being necessary for the conservation of the fishery.
The Puyallup Tribe and the individual members, Ramona Bennett, James Siddle and Robert Satiacum (respondents and cross-appellants), in essence, contend that their rights under the Medicine Creek Treaty are not sufficiently recognized; that the limitation of their taking fish is too broad; and that the alternative of limiting the catch in Puget Sound should be invoked before limiting the catch of the Indians. They cite the testimony of their expert witness, James L. Heckman, Associate Regional Supervisor of *575the Division of Fishery Services with the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wild Life of the Department of the Interior. He supports these respondent/cross-appellants’ alternative theory that fishing should be cut off in Puget Sound to permit greater escapement for the Puyallup fishery. This theory is obviously without substance as related to the Puyallup River fishery, until the Puyallup River’s run can be identified. This was referred to in Mr. Lasater’s testimony as “splitting off” where the run of the different classes of fish can be identified by their “splitting off” from the commingled runs prior to their entrance into the river in which they return to spawn.
The “splitting off” of the coho run for the Puyallup River at the East Bay Pass area was considered by the Department of Fisheries and the alternative theory of limiting the catch before the run reaches the river was recognized by its promulgation of regulation order No. 680, plaintiff’s exhibit 5, prohibiting commercial net fishing in the East Bay Pass area.
The alternative theory of the Indian respondents and cross-appellants is wholly without merit as related to the steelhead because no net fishery or commercial fishery is permitted for steelhead in any area and for the further reason that substantially all the steelhead fishery occurs after their entrance into the respective rivers to which they return.
The Puyallup Tribe and individual member respondents and cross-appellants also contend the Department of Fisheries failed to assume its burden of proving the regulations were necessary for the conservation of the runs of the respective species. We have heretofore discussed and disposed of this issue in this opinion.
It is contended in the Indian respondents’ and cross-appellants’ briefs that the burden of proof is upon the Departments of Fisheries and Game to prove their regulations are reasonable and necessary for the conservation of the fishery prior to their becoming effective. We have also heretofore discussed and disposed of this contention.
*576It is also contended in briefs of the Indian respondents and cross-appellants that this case is moot. We must remember that this case was instituted under the declaratory judgment act, seeking guidelines for the adoption of continuing regulations, if any. It is therefore proper that all issues raised in this case be considered.
We have considered all of the arguments by the appellants, and respondents and cross-appellants not heretofore specifically mentioned and deem them resolved by our disposition of the contentions discussed in this opinion.
In summary, we hold:
(1) Puyallup Indian fishery regulations must be made each year supported upon facts and data that show the regulation is necessary for the conservation of the respective species of the anadromous fish in the Puyallup watershed;
(2) A selective gill net Puyallup Indian fishery cannot be allowed where a substantial number of species protected from the net fishery will be caught with those fish authorized to be taken, endangering the conservation of those protected species;
(3) The fishery regulations for coho in the year 1970 were reasonable, subject to the above limitation upon a selective Indian net fishery;
(4) This record does not support an Indian net fishery for .the taking of steelhead for the year 1970;
(5) The alternative theory of cutting off fishing in Puget Sound to enhance the Puyallup River run of anadromous fish is unfeasible while species of anadromous fish are commingled prior to “splitting off” for return to watersheds in which they spawn;
(6) Injunction is the proper remedy for the enforcement of Indian fishery regulations in the instant case;
(7) A fishing regulation adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act will be presumed valid. The burden to prove the regulation was necessary for the conservation of the fishery will shift to the state upon its challenge, as a *577defense by a Puyallup Indian, upon its violation, or upon an appropriate declaratory judgment proceeding.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed insofar as it is inconsistent with this opinion, and otherwise is affirmed. It is further ordered that the injunction be reinstated and the case remanded to the trial court for the appropriate modification of the injunction against the members of the Puyal-lup Indian Tribe, consistent with our holding in this opinion.
All parties will bear their own costs on this appeal.
Hamilton, C.J., Finley, Neill, Stafford, and Wright, JJ., concur.

 As stated in footnote “1” of the original case, “The case caption is erroneous, there being no entity known as ‘The Puyallup Tribe, Inc., a corporation.’ The Puyallup Tribe of Indians did appear and answer by and through the chairman of the Tribal Council.” Department of Game, 70 Wn.2d 247 n.l.

“2Daily Catch and Possession Limits: Trout and Steelhead — Six pounds and 1 fish, not to exceed 12 fish but shall not include more than 2 steelhead over 20" in length.
“Annual Catch Limit — Steelhead Only: Thirty steelhead over 20" in length . . .” 1970 Game Fish Seasons and Catch Limits, 3 (Dep’t of Game).