Court Opinion

ID: 9811391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:19:11.573307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:14.815105
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINION
JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s dicta opinion holding that section 263.405© of the Texas Family Code violates the separation of powers clause of the Texas Constitution.1 I concur in the judgment only.
Generally, a reviewing court determines constitutional questions only when the court cannot resolve the issues on noncon-stitutional grounds.2 Betty’s only complaint on appeal concerning the trial court’s actions in this case is that the trial *649court abused its discretion by denying her section 263.401(b) motion for an extension of the dismissal deadline. Betty, however, failed to make a record of the hearing on her motion to extend the deadline. Consequently, the majority affirmed the trial court’s ruling without reaching the merits of Betty’s complaint.3 It was, therefore, unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal for the majority to decide the question of whether section 263.405(i) violates the separation of powers clause because it bars us from reviewing the merits of Betty’s complaint. The majority’s opinion on that issue is dicta. It is also wrong.
The right to appeal a termination order is statutory, not constitutional.4 While the constitution confers on the appellate courts the general power to review appeals in civil cases, including termination proceedings, this power is expressly subject to “such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law.”5 As the Supreme Court of Texas stated in Seale v. McCal-lum, “[T]he principle is fixed that the Legislature has the power to limit the right of appeal....”6 Thus, our constitutional power to review an appeal from a termination order may be limited by the Legislature.7
The applicable version of section 263.405 of the family code provides in pertinent part:
(a) An appeal of a final order rendered under this subchapter is governed by the rules of the supreme court for accelerated appeals in civil cases and the procedures provided by this section....
(b) Not later than the 15th day after the date a final order is signed by the trial judge, a party intending to appeal the order must file with the trial court a statement of the point or points on which the party intends to appeal. The statement may be combined with a motion for a new trial.
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(i) The appellate court may not consider any issue that was not specifically presented to the trial court in a timely filed statement of the points on which the party intends to appeal or in a statement combined with a motion for new trial.... 8
Under section 263.405, an appellant has the right to appellate review of any issue *650that is presented to the trial court in a timely-fíled statement of points pursuant to section 263.405(b) and that is otherwise preserved in accordance with the rules of the Supreme Court of Texas.9 The Legislature has declared in section 263.405®, however, that there is no right to appellate review of an issue that is not preserved in accordance with the procedures provided by the section.10 Because the right to appeal a termination order is statutory, the limitation of section 263.405® on an appellant’s right to appellate review of a termination order constitutes a proper exercise of the Legislature’s constitutional power to regulate and restrict such appeals. It does not interfere with our power to review and decide issues that have been preserved in accordance with the rules and procedures governing section 263.405.
In comparing section 263.405 to court-made preservation of error rules, the majority performs a legislative function under the guise of judicial decision making. The majority holds that appellate rule 33.1(a) bars us from reviewing Betty’s first issue because it was not timely presented to the trial court, but then the majority strikes down section 263.405® as having “unduly interfered with our substantive appellate powers” because it bars us from reviewing two other issues that were, likewise, not timely presented to the trial court.11 The only explanation the majority offers for its deference to the court-made rules over the statutory rules is that, in the majority’s view, the court-made rules better serve the policy goals of the statute.12 This is a matter for the Legislature to decide, not the courts. While we may question the wisdom and efficacy of the statute, we may not refuse to follow its procedures merely because we believe they are flawed or that they fail to promote the Legislature’s objectives.13
The test for whether the separation of powers clause is violated by a procedural statute is not whether the legislative purpose of the statute is served effectively by the statute or whether court-made rules achieve the policy goals of the statute better than the statute itself. As the majority notes, “[i]t is [only] when the functioning of the judicial process in a field constitutionally committed to the control of the courts is interfered with by the ... legislative branch[ ] that a constitutional problem arises.”14 Appeals from termination or*651ders have not been constitutionally committed to the control of the courts. The right of appeal in a termination case is subject to the restrictions and regulations of the Legislature, and the mere possibility that a statute regulating this right may fail, in whole or in part, to accomplish its legislative purpose does not render the statute unconstitutional under the separation of powers clause.
The majority claims that, contrary to the statute’s legislative history, section 263.405® is not “directed at” the legislative goals of reducing post judgment delay and frivolous appeals but, instead, is exclusively directed at “prohibiting exercise of our appellate power to review issues.”15 The majority provides no support for what it perceives to be such a sinister legislative motive, other than the majority’s own criticisms of the statute in favor of court-made rules that similarly prohibit us from reviewing issues that are not preserved.16 Nothing in the language of section 263.405®, its legislative history, or its practical application suggests that the statute is directed at accomplishing any purpose other than the goals expressed by the Legislature when it enacted the statute.17 As this court sitting en banc unanimously held in In re M.R.J.M.,18 “[Section 263.405] is not intended to bar appeals that raise meritorious complaints, nor is it intended to prevent appellate courts from conducting meaningful review of such complaints.” 19 But, even assuming the Legislature’s only purpose in enacting section 263.405® was to limit our appellate review power to issues preserved in accordance with the procedures provided by subsection (b), the Legislature has the constitutional power to place this restriction on us.20
*652In conclusion, unlike the statutes in the three inapposite criminal law cases on which the majority misplaces its reliance,21 section 263.405(i) does not tell us how to perform our judicial function or “how we must rule on issues brought before us.”22 It simply limits appellate review of termination orders to issues that are preserved in accordance with the procedures provided by the statute. This limitation is well within the Legislature’s constitutional power to regulate and restrict the right to appeal a termination order.
Because there is no record of the hearing on Betty’s motion to extend the dismissal deadline under section 263.401(b), we must affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion without reviewing the merits of Betty’s complaint that it should have been granted. I would, therefore, not address Betty’s argument that section 263.405© violates the separation of powers clause because it bars us from reviewing the merits of her complaint. Otherwise, I would overrule Betty’s separation of powers argument, dismiss her other issues because they were not preserved in her timely-fíled statement of points,23 and affirm the judgment of the trial court.24
HOLMAN, J., joins.

. Tex. Const, art. II, § 1.

. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003), cert, denied, by Dossey v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 541 U.S. 945, 124 S.Ct. 1674, 158 L.Ed.2d 371 (2004).

. Maj. op. at 647-48; see In re A.R., No. 02-03-00235-CV, 2004 WL 40627, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 8, 2004, pet. denied) (mem.op.).

. See Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 109.002 (Vernon 2002); see also Sultan v. Mathew, 178 S.W.3d 747, 752 (Tex.2005) (stating that legislature has power to restrict right to appeal; open courts provision does not guarantee right to appeal); accord Doleac v. Michalson, 264 F.3d 470, 492-93 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that there is no due process right to appellate review in U.S. Constitution); Able v. Bacar-isse, 131 F.3d 1141, 1143 (5th Cir.1998) (noting that “the right to appeal is a statutory right, not a constitutional right").

. Tex Const, art. V, § 6(a); see Seale v. McCal-lum, 116 Tex. 662, 667, 287 S.W. 45, 47 (1926) (stating that legislature had power to limit jurisdiction of courts of appeals in primary election contests); Maddox v. Covington, 87 Tex. 454, 459, 29 S.W. 465, 466 (1895) (stating that legislature acted within its constitutional power in limiting jurisdiction of supreme court under identical language of Texas Constitution article V, section 3).

. Seale, 116 Tex. at 667, 287 S.W. at 47.

. Sultan, 178 S.W.3d at 752.

. Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(a), (b), (i) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). Effective for cases filed after June 16, 2007, the Legislature amended section 263.405(b) to add a requirement that a party intending to request a new trial "must file a request not later than 15 days after the date a final order is signed.” Act of May 21, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 526, §§ 2, 6, 2007 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 931, 931-32 (Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment of Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(b)). The amended version is not applicable to this case. Id.

. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(a), (b), (i).

. Id. § 263.405(i).

. Maj. op. at 630-31, 644-45; see Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a).

. Maj. op. at 643-46.

. See Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 757-58 (Tex.1993) (upholding and applying procedure mandated by Texas’s venue statute notwithstanding the fact that it was deemed by the court to be "fundamentally flawed"). Even if we had this discretion, the majority’s conclusion that section 263.405(i) does not expedite the appellate process is belied by data within this court’s own records showing that within the last two fiscal years, the average disposition rate for termination appeals involving one or more issues that were dismissed due to noncompliance with the procedures of section 263.405(b) is 26% faster than the average rate of disposition for other termination appeals. Case Management System, State of Texas Office of Court Administration (Jan. 4, 2008) (on file with court). Thus, the Legislature’s primary goal of disposing of appeals "with the least possible delay” has been achieved by the procedures provided by section 263.405 in appeals filed in this court. House Comm, on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 409, 79th Leg. R.S. (2005); see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(a).

.Maj. op. at 637 (quoting State Bd. of Ins. v. Betts, 158 Tex. 83, 90, 308 S.W.2d 846, 851-52 (1958)) (emphasis added).

. Maj. op. at 642.

. See id. at 642-45.

. This distinguishes section 263.405 from the Speedy Trial Act that the court of criminal appeals found to be unconstitutional in Me-shell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987), a case on which the majority heavily relies. According to the court in Meshell, the Act was expressly directed at controlling a "judicial” function — prosecutorial preparation and readiness for trial. Id. at 255. The court held that the Act violated the separation of powers clause not because it intruded into the prosecutor’s discretion to prepare for trial, which the court said was necessary to enforce a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, but because it did so without taking into account factors assuring the speedy "commencement of trial,” such as a defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial. Id. at 256. Thus, the Act encroached upon a prosecutorial function "without the authority of an express constitutional provision.” Id. Here, not only is there no intrusion into our power to decide issues that are preserved in accordance with the procedural requirements of section 263.405, but there is an express constitutional provision that empowers the Legislature to regulate and restrict the right of appellate review in termination cases. See Tex Const, art. V, § 6(a); Sultan, 178 S.W.3d at 752; Seale, 116 Tex. at 667, 287 S.W. at 47.

. 193 S.W.3d 670 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (en banc).

. Id. at 675. The issue presented here is much different than the potential issue we were confronted with in In re M.RJ.M., where, notwithstanding the provision in section 263.405(g) requiring an indigent parent to appeal a trial court’s frivolousness finding with only the record of the frivolousness hearing, we ordered that a free reporter’s record of the evidence admitted at trial to be prepared and filed to enable us to exercise our constitutionally assigned judicial power of reviewing factual sufficiency complaints. Id. at 672-76; see Tex Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(g). Unlike section 263.405(g), there is nothing in section 263.405(i) that would potentially hinder us in exercising our constitutionally assigned power to review issues that are appealed in accordance with the procedural requirements of the statute.

. See supra at 649-50, 651, 651 n. 17.

. Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Meshell, 739 S.W.2d at 246; Williams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

. Maj. op. at 645.

. The majority does not reach Betty's complaint that subsections (b) and (i) of section 263.405 violate her due process rights under the United States Constitution as applied to her case, and neither do I. Two of our sister courts, however, have recently decided that question, and both courts held that the statute as applied did violate the due process rights of the appellants in those cases. See In re DM., 244 S.W.3d 397, 415 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 894 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, pet. filed). Both DM. and S.K.A. involved late appointments of counsel that hindered or prevented the appellants from filing a timely statement of points. DM., 2007 WL 2325815, at *6; S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d at 885. In this case, however, Betty was represented by appointed counsel during the critical period before the deadline for filing her statement of points, and her counsel filed a timely statement of points raising insufficiency points, which she did not assert in this appeal.

. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(i); In re J.J., No. 05-06-01472-CV, 2008 WL 223841, at *7 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan.29, 2008, no pet. h.) (mem. op. on reh'g) (refusing to consider points not contained in a timely filed statement of points alone or in combination with a motion for new trial); In re A.A.A., No. 01-07-00160-CV, 2008 WL 201033, at ⅜11 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 24, 2008, no pet. h.) (op. on reh’g) (same); In re D.L.G., No. 05-07-00787-CV, 2007 WL 4375793, at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas Dec.17, 2007, no pet. h.) (mem.op.) (same); In re A.R., No. 04-07-00292-CV, 2007 WL 4180208, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Nov.28, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re S.M.T., No. 09-06-00525-CV, 2007 WL 4208743, at *1, 3-4 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Nov.29, 2007, no pet.) (same); In re N.Z.B., No. 13-07-00316-CV, 2007 WL 3225886, at *1 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Nov.l, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); Mikowski v. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01-07-00011-CV, 2007 WL 3038099, at *2-3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 18, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re C.R., No. 11-07-00060-CV, 2007 WL 2948916, at *1 (Tex.App.-Eastland Oct. 11, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re K.C.B., 240 S.W.3d 454, 455 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2007, pet. filed) (same); In re F.C.G., No. 11-07-00068-CV, 2007 WL 2823685, at *1 (Tex.App.-Eastland Sept.27, 2007, pet. filed) (mem.op.) (same); In re T.R.F., No. 10-07-00086-CV, 2007 WL 2325818, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco Aug.15, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re L.F.B., No. 06-07-00010-CV, 2007 WL 2001643, at *4 (Tex.App.-Texarkana July 12, 2007, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (same); In re RM„ No. 04-07-00048-CV,-S.W.3d -,-, 2007 WL 1988149, at *1-2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio July 11, 2007, pet. denied) (same); In re K.A.I., No. 10-07-00110-CV, 2007 WL 1704815, at *2 (Tex.App.-Waco June 13, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In *653re I.C., No. 04-06-00846-CV, 2007 WL 1608971, at *1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio June 6, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re T.T., 228 S.W.3d 312, 316-17 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (same); In re B.S., No. 09-06-00293-CV, 2007 WL 1441273, at *2, 4-5 (Tex.App.-Beaumont May 17, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re M.D., No. 05-06-00779-CV,-S.W.3d-, -, 2007 WL 1310966, at ⅜1 (Tex.App.-Dallas May 7, 2007, no pet.) (same); In re F.D.D., No. 04-06-00692-CV, 2007 WL 1267235, at *1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio May 2, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re S.C., No. 06-07-00051-CV, 2007 WL 1223880, at ⅜1 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Apr.27, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); In re R.J.S., 219 S.W.3d 623, 626-27 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (same); In re RM.R., 218 S.W.3d 863, 864 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2007, no pet.) (same); In re J.F.R., No. 09-06-00115-CV, 2007 WL 685640, at *1-2 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Mar.8, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re M.D.L.E., No. 09-05-00514-CV, 2007 WL 685562, at *3 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Mar.8, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); Pool v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 227 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (same); Adams v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2007, no pet.) (same); In re R.A.P., No. 14-06-00109-CV, 2007 WL 174376, at *1 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 25, 2007, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (same); In re J.H., No. 12-06-00002-CV, 2007 WL 172105, at ⅞1 (Tex.App.Tyler Jan.24, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re C.B.M., 225 S.W.3d 703, 706 (Tex.App.-E1 Paso 2006, no pet.); In re N.L.G., No. 06-06-00066-CV, 2006 WL 3626956, at *1, 3, 5 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Dec. 14, 2006, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (same); In re R.W., No. 06-06-00106-CV, 2006 WL 3391420, at *1 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Nov.22, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 881-82 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (same); In re A.H.L., 214 S.W.3d 45, 53 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, pet. denied) (same); In re C.M., 208 S.W.3d 89, 92 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (same); In re E.I.W., No. 04-06-00219-CV, 2006 WL 2871570, at *1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Oct. 11, 2006, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re H.H.H., No. 06-06-00093-CV, 2006 WL 2820063, at *1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Oct.4, 2006, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re D.A.R., 201 S.W.3d 229, 231 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (same); In re E.A.R., 201 S.W.3d 813, 813-14 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, no pet.) (same); In re A.C.A., No. 13-05-00610-CV, 2006 WL 1172331, at ⅝1 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi May 4, 2006, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re S.E., 203 S.W.3d 14, 15 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (same); In re I.M.S., No. 06-05-00139-CV, 2005 WL 3465518, at ⅝1 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Dec. 20, 2005, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); see S.M.T., 241 S.W.3d at 652, 654-55 (refusing to consider appellate points where statement of points was untimely filed); In re F.A., No. 13-07-00438-CV, 2007 WL 3293664, at *1-2 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Nov.8, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); In re J.L.W.M., No. 07-07-00043-CV, 2007 WL 2962933, at *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Oct. 11, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); In re T.R.F., 230 S.W.3d 263, 265 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007, pet. filed) (same); In re M.N., 230 S.W.3d 248, 249-50 (Tex.App.-East-land 2007, pet. filed) (same); In re R.C., 243 S.W.3d at 675-77 (Tex.App.-Amarillo Apr.25, 2007, no pet.) (same); In re K.R., No. 09-06-0056-CV, 2007 WL 117738, at *1 (Tex.App.Beaumont Jan. 18, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same); In re C.R., No. 02-06-0099-CV, 2006 WL 3114468, at *1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Nov. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); Coey v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-05-00679-CV, 2006 WL 1358490, at *2 (Tex.App.-Austin May 19, 2006, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); see also In re J.W.H., 222 S.W.3d 661, 662 (Tex.App.Waco 2007, no pet.) (refusing to consider points where statement of points was not sufficiently specific); Cisneros v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 13-06-00321-CV, 2006 WL 3824939, at *1 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Dec. 29, 2006, no pet.) (mem.op.) (same); N.L.G., 2006 WL 3626956, at *1, 3, 5 (same); A.C.A., 2006 WL 1172331, at *1 (same).