Court Opinion

ID: 9659343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:41:25.545676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:06.682333
License: Public Domain

SCHUMACHER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. A refusal, without good cause, to allow appointed counsel to continue representation may by itself be sufficient to constitute a valid waiver of the right to counsel. State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 277 (Minn.1998). An intelligent waiver can be implied based on the surrounding circumstances, even in the absence of a full, on-the-record trial court inquiry. Id. at 276. The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding a valid wavier where appellant had the benefit of an attorney for a year-and-a-half before firing him on the day of trial because of her general dissatisfaction with him. See id. at 276-77 (holding waiver valid because it could reasonably be presumed that benefits and risks of counsel have been described to defendants when defendants had competent legal representation for a month before they fired their public defenders on morning of trial); State v. Brodie, 532 N.W.2d 557, 557 (Minn.1995) (holding waiver valid when defendant wanted to “fire” his attorney and was aware that he would have to represent himself).
Appellant requested a continuance after she fired her public defender on the day of trial. She claims the district court abused its discretion when it denied her request for a continuance of the termination proceedings. In criminal proceedings, the granting of a continuance to permit attorney substitution, or for the appointment of alternative counsel, is within the district court’s discretion. State v. Fagerstrom, 286 Minn. 295, 299, 176 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1970). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for a continuance. See id. at 300, 176 N.W.2d at 265 (denying defendant’s request for continuance where court found that counsel had been appointed almost a year before trial, made appearances with defendant at prior proceedings, and defendant waited until day of trial to request different counsel).
Appellant also argues that counsel should have been appointed when the district court learned that her reading skills were below the eighth-grade level. The legal *103standard for competence to waive counsel is the same as the legal standard for competence to stand trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2687, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). Even if the court does not think it is a “good idea” for a defendant to choose self-representation, where the defendant is competent to assert his or her right to self-representation it is not the court’s role to inflict counsel on an unwilling defendant. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 172 (Minn.1997).
In this case, appellant’s reading level was brought up briefly on the third day of trial, during the state’s direct examination of appellant’s case worker. Quite simply, reading ability is not dispositive of making a decision to represent oneself, nor of the competence to represent oneself, and there is nothing in the record to suggest otherwise. See State v. Thornblad, 513 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn.App.1994) (denying defendant’s request to represent himself was improper where only facts district court knew about defendant were he had general understanding of court protocol and rights but little formal education). On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not conduct an inquiry into appellant’s waiving of her right to counsel after it learned she tested below an eighth-grade reading level. State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn.1990) (finding of knowing and intelligent waiver reversed only if clearly erroneous).
I would affirm.