Court Opinion

ID: 9620313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:40:55.145229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:49.287834
License: Public Domain

Karen R. Baker, Judge. Appellant A Team Temporaries appeals the Board of Review’s decision to grant appellee Jennifer Fraze benefits. There is no dispute that Ms. Fraze voluntarily quit her employment assigned through the temporary agency to the client firm. The Board based its decision upon the question of whether her voluntarily leaving the available assignment fell within the definition of “conclusion of an assignment” for purposes of benefits in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513 (Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007) and § 11-10-514 (Repl. 2002 & Supp. 2007). We hold that the Board improperly applied the law and reverse and remand for further findings of fact. Through her employment with A Team, Ms. Fraze was assigned to A Team’s client, Wing Stop, in a long-term position as manager. After expressing her desire to resign on various occasions, Ms. Fraze quit her assignment August 28, 2007, stating that she felt that she could not meet the expectations of the owner of Wing Stop, Mr. Cheatwood. On August 30, she turned in her Wing Stop uniforms to the Staffing Coordinator of A Team and stated that she needed another job. On September 4, she returned to A Team and requested another assignment; however, despite the employer’s attempts to find other acceptable positions, there were no other jobs available for her at that time. In a notice dated September 14, 2007, the Arkansas Department of Workforce services disqualified Ms. Fraze from receiving benefits pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513(a)(4) because she left her work voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work. Ms. Fraze appealed that decision and a hearing was conducted on October 2, 2007. After receiving testimony, the hearing officer reasoned that when Ms. Fraze resigned her long-term assignment for Wing Stop that she expected to report for other assignments available through A Team; therefore, she was laid off due to a lack of work when no assignments, other than the one she quit, were available. The hearing officer then reversed the Department’s denial of benefits under Ark. Code Ann. § ll-10-513(a) and awarded benefits under section ll-10-514(a), finding that claimant was discharged from last work for reasons other than misconduct connected with the work. The Board affirmed that decision on review. During the hearing, Mr. Cheatwood testified that Ms. Fraze would still be working at Wing Stop had she not quit and, in fact, he had made arrangements for additional training assistance for Ms. Fraze prior to her quitting. Throughout the discussions, A Team stated that it was its position that Ms. Fraze left an available assignment without completing it. We agree with the employer that the assignment did not end. Rather, Ms. Fraze did not complete her assignment because she refused to continue in the position available to her through the temporary agency, and there was no indication that Ms. Fraze would not still be in her assigned position had she not voluntarily left. However, whether Ms. Fraze voluntarily left her position is only the first question of fact that the Board had to determine. The next fact question is whether she left her last work “without good cause connected with the work.” Our statute providing for disqualification of benefits for voluntarily leaving work provides in relevant part as follows: (a) (1) If so found by the Director of the Department of Workforce Services, an individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he or she voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work left his or her last work. (2) (A) An individual working as a temporary employee will be deemed to have voluntarily quit employment and will be disqualified for benefits under this subsection if upon conclusion of his or her latest assignment, the temporary employee without good cause failed to contact the temporary help firm for reassignment, provided that the employer advised the temporary employee at the time of hire that he or she must report for reassignment upon conclusion of each assignment and that unemployment benefits may be denied for failure to do so. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513. Here the record reflects that Ms. Fraze voluntarily left available work by leaving an ongoing, open-ended assignment that remained available after she quit. The fact that she returned to A Team and requested a new assignment does not negate the fact that the position as manager, in which she had been placed, was still available and, accordingly, not concluded.  The Board misapplied the law when it, in effect, ignored subsection (a)(1) of section 11-10-513 to determine whether Ms. Fraze should be disqualified for benefits if she voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work left her last work. Ms. Fraze’s last work was her position as manager at Wing Stop. The fact that A Team was her employer for the available work as manager does not change the nature of her last work. Before the Board may consider subsection (a)(2)(A), it must first make findings of fact concluding whether or not Ms. Fraze’s resignation was without good cause connected with her work as manager at Wing Stop. If the Board finds that she left without good cause, then Ms. Fraze is disqualified from benefits. If the Board finds that she left with good cause, then it may resume its analysis to determine whether Ms. Fraze was deemed to have voluntarily relinquished her employment with A Team. Subsection (a)(2)(A) imposes a duty upon the temporary employment agency to inform an individual working as a temporary employee that the failure to report for reassignment may result in a denial of unemployment benefits and states that the employee’s failure to report for reassignment shall be deemed to be a voluntary relinquishment of employment. This subsection recognizes that assignments through a temporary agency are often short in duration and that the agency may quickly reassign the employee to a different position. Furthermore, strong public-policy considerations support the role that temporary agencies hold in our community. Jones v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 487 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa App.1992). Our court, in Weaver v. Director, Employment Sec. Dep’t, 82 Ark. App. 616, 120 S.W.3d 158 (2003), explained that whether there was good cause to leave is irrelevant if the departure was not voluntary. In Weaver, the employee did not voluntarily quit when she was hired for a part-time, temporary position at the school, and, she not only completed her deadline in December, but accepted an extension of her position until the end of the school year. The employee was entitled to benefits in that case because she fulfilled the obligations of the position until the position was no longer available.  The focus in Weaver was whether the employee had voluntarily left the position. The temporary nature of the position was dispositive of the issue of voluntariness. The Board in this case, however, stated that “no matter the manner in which the client firm accepted the claimant’s resignation from the assignment, the result was the ‘conclusion’ or end of the assignment.” The Board was mistaken in beginning its analysis from the temporary agency’s willingness to find another available position for Ms. Fraze. The availability of the work is the determinative factor in determining the disqualification of benefits, not whether an agency is willing to find an assignment more to the liking of the claimant. Because the Board failed to make a finding of fact as to whether Ms. Fraze voluntarily and without good cause left the position as manager at Wing Stop that remained available for her continued assignment, we reverse and remand for the Board to make that factual determination on the record in this case. See Southwestern Bell Tel., L.P. v. Director of Ark. Employment Sec. Dep’t, 88 Ark. App. 36, 36, 194 S.W.3d 790, 791 (2004). If the Board then determines that Ms. Fraze left for good cause connected with the work as manager, then it may proceed to apply the provisions of subsection (a)(2)(A) and section 11-10-514 to award or deny benefits. Reversed and remanded. Glover, Vaught, and Heffley, JJ., agree. Robbins and Griffen, JJ., dissent.