Court Opinion

ID: 9478364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:47:33.357548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:23.737366
License: Public Domain

*583WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority reverses Silverman’s conviction on the ground that the district court improperly admitted two statements of a co-conspirator under the hearsay exception of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The majority’s analysis of the foundation for admitting these two statements develops a rule of law inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) (.Bourjaily ), and with our duty to affirm the factual findings of the district court if they are not clearly erroneous. I therefore dissent. In addition, I must disagree with the majority’s holding that it was improper for either the court or the jury to consider evidence that Silverman attempted to conceal his identity from DEA agents investigating the crime with which Silverman was charged. Considered in light of other evidence introduced to prove Silverman’s involvement in the drug conspiracy, Silverman’s conduct could properly support an inference that he was conscious of his guilt of the criminal activity that ultimately led to his conviction. I would, therefore, affirm Silver-man's conviction.
I
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bourjaily, co-conspirator statements were admissible in this circuit only if the court found “independent evidence of the existence of the conspiracy and of the defendant’s connection to it,” and concluded that “the statement was made both during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Layton, 720 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1069, 104 S.Ct. 1423, 79 L.Ed.2d 748 (1984). We required the government to provide “substantial evidence,” independent of the contested hearsay statements, demonstrating that the defendant had “at least a slight connection” to an existing conspiracy. United States v. Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 2027, 85 L.Ed.2d 308 (1985). We applied a de novo standard of review to the independent proof of a conspiracy and a clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s finding that co-conspirator statements were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 794 (9th Cir.1986).
In Bourjaily, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the rule requiring that existence of and membership in a conspiracy be established by evidence independent of the contested hearsay statements. Bourjaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2782. Although the Court left open the question whether the challenged statements could constitute the sole basis for their own admissibility, it held that “a court, in making a preliminary factual determination under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), may examine the hearsay statements sought to be admitted.” Id.
The Court’s holding in Bourjaily explicitly abolished the prohibition against using hearsay to “lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), which was followed by eleven circuits, including our own, prior to Bourjaily. See 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, 11104[05] n. 33 (1986) (collecting cases adopting the independent evidence requirement). In doing so, the Court held that the preliminary question whether a proper foundation has been provided is a “factual” one, and that the district court’s conclusion that preliminary facts have been established by a preponderance of the evidence is reviewed for clear error. Bourjaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2778 (“the existence of a conspiracy and petitioner’s involvement in it are preliminary questions of fact”); id. at 2782 (holding that the district court’s factual finding that the government had established the defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence was not clearly erroneous). The Court stressed that under Rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial judge, in making the preliminary factual determination, may consider “any evidence whatsoever,” with the exception of privileged information, id. at 2780, and that the judge is entitled to “receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel.” Id. at 2782, quoting Unit*584ed States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175, 94 S.Ct. 988, 995, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).
A.
With these governing principles in mind, it is clear that there was adequate evidence before the trial judge to support his determination that the government had satisfied its burden of establishing Silverman’s connection to the conspiracy. The question before the trial court was a narrow one. The government presented overwhelming evidence that co-conspirators Pearl and Willard flew to the San Fernando Valley on three occasions for the purpose of obtaining cocaine. On each occasion, Pearl left the airport in a cab and returned one to three hours later with several ounces of cocaine. Thus, the question before the court was not whether Pearl and Willard obtained cocaine from a source in the Van Nuys area, but from whom Pearl obtained the cocaine on each occasion.
The government presented several pieces of evidence which, in combination, tended to show that Pearl obtained the cocaine from Silverman on each occasion. First, Willard, an admitted member of the conspiracy, testified that Pearl had explicitly identified her brother, David Silverman, as her cocaine source. On another occasion, when asked by Willard if her brother was “cool,” Pearl responded, “Don’t worry.” Under Bourjaily, this evidence itself could be considered in conjunction with the other evidence offered to show that Silverman was the source from whom the conspirators obtained their cocaine. Id. 107 S.Ct. at 2781 (rejecting the proposition that since hearsay statements of accomplices are unreliable, “they should not form any part of the basis for establishing a conspiracy”).
Next, the government offered evidence that on each occasion, after arriving at the Van Nuys airport, Pearl told Willard that she was going to call her brother. These statements, although made out of court, were admissible as statements of a party’s then-existing intent. Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). Viewing this evidence in conjunction with the hearsay statement identifying David Silverman as Pearl’s cocaine source and with the undisputed evidence that the purpose of each of her visits to the Van Nuys area was to obtain cocaine, the district court could properly infer that the “brother” Pearl referred to on each occasion was David Silverman, and that the purpose of each phone call was to arrange a meeting with her source. It is, of course, possible to speculate that Pearl may have been placing a purely social call to her brother, or that she actually intended to call a different brother. However, it is not our function to determine which inferences to draw from the evidence of Pearl’s statements on appeal. As the Court stated in Bourjaily, in making an admissibility determination, “the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel.” 107 S.Ct. at 2782. We do not sit to reweigh the evidence before the trial court, but only to determine whether the trial court’s conclusions were clearly erroneous. Id.
The evidence that Pearl intended to call Silverman, standing alone, is arguably insufficient to corroborate her statement that Silverman was her source. There is no evidence that Pearl actually contacted Sil-verman during any of these calls. However, the government produced additional evidence tending to show that Pearl in fact contacted Silverman and obtained the cocaine from him.
First, taxicab records and the testimony of the cab driver were strong evidence that Pearl took a cab to David Silverman’s residence on at least one of the three occasions. Viewed in the light of the evidence previously mentioned, the judge could properly find that Pearl in fact went to Silver-man’s house that evening for the purpose of obtaining cocaine. Moreover, evidence that Pearl returned to the airport approximately two hours later with six ounces of cocaine suggests that she was successful in this venture. Finally, Willard testified that on that very evening, Pearl returned to the airport in a car driven by a man who resembled David Silverman, gave the cocaine to Willard, and then drove off with the man resembling Silverman. Even without considering Pearl’s statement identifying Sil-*585verman as her supplier, in light of the evidence showing that Pearl was taken directly to Silverman’s residence that evening and returned to the airport approximately two hours later with the cocaine, the district court was surely entitled to conclude from the testimony identifying Silverman as the man who drove Pearl back to the airport that Silverman was, in fact, Pearl’s supplier.
After carefully considering this evidence, the district court found a sufficient showing of Silverman’s link to the conspiracy independent of Pearl’s challenged statements. Maj. op. at 575-76. With Bour-jaily ’s direction that the court should also consider those statements, including Pearl’s specific identification of Silverman as her cocaine source, the probative value of the circumstantial evidence of Silver-man’s involvement in the conspiracy is dramatically heightened. Bourjaily instructs us that “individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it. The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts.” 107 S.Ct. at 2781. Once it is permissible to consider Willard’s testimony that Pearl identified Silverman as the source for their cocaine, the inferences that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence clearly provide the required preponderance of proof of Silver-man’s connection to the conspiracy.
B.
This seems so clear. How did the majority come to the opposite conclusion? The majority commits two fundamental errors when analyzing the evidence offered by the government, both of which conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Bourjaily. First, disregarding both Bourjaily’s disapproval of the no-bootstrapping rule and its holding that the district court may, under Fed.R.Evid. 104, consider “any [unprivileged] information whatsoever” when making its preliminary factual determinations, the majority announces that the district court may not admit a co-conspirator statement unless it is corroborated by independently incriminating evidence. See maj. op. at 578. Second, in spite of the Supreme Court’s clear admonitions in Bourjaily, the majority fragments and minimizes the importance of the evidence which formed the basis of the trial court’s conclusion. See id. at 579-80. I believe this approach to the evidence to be inconsistent with the Bourjaily opinion, which states repeatedly that the district court is entitled to view the foundational evidence, including contested hearsay statements, as a whole, rather than as isolated fragments. Bourjaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2779-81. Thus, “[e]ven if out-of-court declarations by co-conspirators are presumptively unreliable, trial courts must be permitted to evaluate these statements for their evidentiary worth as revealed by the particular circumstances of the case.” Id.
The majority’s holding that the government failed to offer sufficient evidence corroborating the challenged out-of-court identifications of Silverman as Pearl’s supplier cannot be reconciled with Bourjaily. First, the majority states that Pearl’s statements that she intended to call her brother, like her challenged hearsay statements identifying her brother as her source, are presumptively unreliable and thus cannot corroborate the challenged hearsay statement identifying her brother as her supplier. Maj. op. at 579. This holding clearly conflicts with the Court’s holding in Bour-jaily that the district court may, under Fed.R.Evid. 104, consider “any evidence whatsoever,” with the exception of privileged information, when making its preliminary factual determinations. Bourjaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2780. Under Bourjaily, the district judge was entitled to receive this evidence and give it such weight as his experience and judgment counseled. Id. at 2782. The majority’s analysis ignores this holding, and establishes a rule that, in effect, requires that the district court ignore any “unreliable” evidence, including admissible out-of-court statements of a co-defendant, when determining the defendant’s connection to the conspiracy. This is precisely the rule that a majority of the Supreme Court overruled in Bourjaily.
I do not differ with the majority regarding the government’s obligation to produce *586some evidence corroborating the challenged hearsay statements. Although the Supreme Court left this question open in Bourjaily, our subsequent decision in United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1402 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1988), reaffirms that, in this circuit, there must be some evidence, in addition to the challenged statements, of the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant’s involvement in it. However, by insisting that the additional evidence offered by the government be incriminating enough to overcome the “presumptive unreliability” of the hearsay, the majority transforms a rule requiring additional evidence corroborating the hearsay statements into a rule requiring that the government prove, by proof independent of the hearsay, that the defendant knew of and participated in the conspiracy. To require that the district court view corroborating evidence independently from any out-of-court statement of a co-conspirator on the grounds that such statements are “inherently unreliable” simply reestablishes the gre-Bourjaily no-bootstrapping rule in this circuit. A majority of the Supreme Court, over a strongly worded dissent, explicitly rejected the proposition that co-conspirator statements are so inherently unreliable “that they should not form any part of the basis for establishing a conspiracy,” 107 S.Ct. at 2781, and observed that such statements “could themselves be probative of ... the participation of ... the defendant ... in the conspiracy.” Id. As a court of appeals, we are not free to adopt the views of the dissenters and reject those of the majority of the Supreme Court.
Second, in light of Bourjaily’s observation that “a piece of evidence, unreliable in isolation, may become quite probative when corroborated by other evidence,” id. at 2781, the district court was clearly entitled to view the evidence of Pearl’s attempts to call her brother, her identification of her brother as her source, her visit to her brother’s house, her brother’s presence in the car with Pearl during one of her cocaine-buying expeditions, and her brother’s subsequent attempt to conceal his identity from the DEA as a whole, rather than as independent pieces of evidence. The majority’s analysis, in contrast, minimizes the probative force of this evidence by breaking it into isolated fragments. The majority examines each piece of evidence offered to show Silverman’s link to the conspiracy separately, inquiring of each piece whether it is consistent with Silverman’s innocence or indicative of his guilt. See maj. op. at 579-80. This mode of analysis cannot survive the plain language of the Bourjaily decision.
In sum, by requiring that the proponent of a challenged co-conspirator hearsay statement overcome the “presumptive unreliability” of the statement with “fairly incriminating” evidence which “demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant knew of and participated in the conspiracy,” see id. at 578, the majority has attempted to transform the concerns of the dissenters in Bourjaily into the law of this circuit. {See maj. op. at 577-78, citing Bourjaily dissents.) I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
C.
The majority’s analysis of the district court’s admissibility determination in this case also ignores our very limited role in reviewing the factual findings of the district court. We do not review the finding of a sufficient connection to the conspiracy de novo, but may reverse only if we determine that the district court’s finding is clearly erroneous. See Bourjaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2782; see also id. at 2778 (“the existence of a conspiracy and petitioner’s involvement in it are preliminary questions of fact that, under Rule 104, must be resolved by the court”).1
*587Under the clearly erroneous standard, a reviewing court may not reverse a district court’s view of the evidence as long as it “is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety ... even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (Anderson) (construing Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)); see also United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200 n. 5 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (explaining that the clearly erroneous test set forth in Rule 52(a) is applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 88 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1511. Moreover, the rule that deference must be paid to the original finder of fact applies even where the district court’s findings do not rest on a credibility determination, but are based instead on inferences from other facts. Id.
In the present case, the district court’s finding that substantial evidence established Silverman's connection to the conspiracy rested on the inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence presented by the government. Under Anderson, findings of the district court that rest on inferences drawn from the facts are entitled to the same deference accorded a trial court’s credibility determinations. Id. The majority’s analysis of the evidence presented to support the admission of the hearsay statements utterly disregards the deference due to the district court. The majority reexamines each piece of evidence offered to corroborate the hearsay statement and, in each case, draws inferences from the evidence necessarily rejected by the district court. This approach cannot be reconciled with Bourjaily.
For example, the majority states that the evidence that Pearl traveled to Silverman’s residence immediately after arriving at the airport on one of her cocaine-buying trips demonstrates little more than “mere” association. Maj. op. at 579. While the majority’s view of this evidence as “innocent” is certainly a permissible one, it is not the only plausible explanation for Pearl’s behavior. As previously observed, given the purpose of Pearl’s trip to Van Nuys and her previous identification of her brother as her “source” for cocaine, it is not only plausible, but highly probable, that the reason she chose to visit her brother that evening was to obtain cocaine from him. Indeed, under the circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that a person on a cocaine-buying trip to California would interrupt her mission by paying a purely social call to a relative. In any event, the majority’s analysis of this piece of evidence demonstrates no more than that there are two permissible views of it. It follows, then, that the district court’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1511.
Similarly, the majority attempts to discount evidence that on the evening Pearl visited Silverman’s residence, Silverman accompanied her when she returned to the airport, some two hours later, with five ounces of cocaine. The majority concludes that this evidence shows little more than that Silverman “was in the presence of a relative who was involved in a conspiracy.” Again, while it is possible to infer from Silverman’s presence on this occasion that he was simply “along for the ride,” and that Pearl obtained her cocaine from some other source that evening, this inference is not the only plausible construction of this evidence. The evidence of Pearl’s activities *588that evening demonstrated that she traveled directly to Silverman’s residence from the airport and returned with Silverman approximately two hours later. There was no evidence before the district court suggesting that she met with any person other than Silverman that evening. It is certainly possible that, after arriving at Silver-man’s residence, she obtained her cocaine from some other source, and that she then asked her brother to give her a ride back to the airport. However, it is just as reasonable to infer from this evidence that Silver-man himself supplied the cocaine to Pearl. We thus have no basis for concluding that the district court’s construction of this evidence is clearly erroneous.
The cases cited by the majority in support of its construction of the evidence offered by the government are inapposite. In United States v. Weaver, 594 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.1979), for example, we held that Weaver’s presence in a truck containing cocaine, standing alone, was not sufficient to establish his knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. Id. at 1274-75. However, we did not hold that such evidence had little probative value when considered along with other relevant evidence of a defendant’s connection to a conspiracy. Weaver was decided under the pre-Bour-jaily no-bootstrapping rule, which barred the district court from considering the challenged hearsay statements when assessing the weight of the foundational evidence offered by the government. Thus, the district court could not evaluate the evidence of Weaver’s presence in the vehicle in the light of relevant hearsay evidence implicating him in the conspiracy. Indeed, in Weaver the only evidence, apart from the hearsay statements indicating that Weaver was in any way connected to the conspiracy, was his presence in the vehicle. Unlike the present case, there was no evidence suggesting that Weaver’s co-conspirators regarded him as their “source” or attempted to contact him for the purpose of obtaining cocaine.
In contrast, in United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir.1981), we held that the government satisfied the foundational requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) by introducing evidence that the defendant visited a co-conspirator on the night that a drug transaction took place. In Mason, DEA agents, hoping to apprehend a conspirator’s “source,” arranged a transaction with one of the co-conspirators and stationed themselves outside his house. The DEA agents testified that Mason was the only person to visit the house that evening. According to the agents, Mason drove up to the house, and, after a five-to-ten minute stay, drove away. Shortly thereafter, the occupant of the house told the DEA agents that he had the drugs, but that they were “hidden.” The occupant then went outside the house and came back with a manila envelope containing cocaine. Id. at 1268-69.
We held that the observations of the DEA agents provided “a reasonable basis for supposing that Mason played, at a minimum, the role of the courier” in the conspiracy. Id. at 1269. We based this determination on the facts that the occupant of the house told an undercover agent that he expected a delivery from his “source” that evening, that Mason was the only visitor to the house on the night in question, and that the occupant shortly thereafter produced a manila envelope containing cocaine. Id. at 1268-69. Thus, although mere presence at the scene of a drug transaction may not be sufficient under Weaver to establish a defendant’s involvement in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, Mason establishes that evidence of presence, viewed in the light of other evidence, including hearsay evidence, suggesting the defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy, may be sufficient to form the basis of an admissibility determination under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See also United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.) (evidence that defendants were present during negotiations and had repeated contact with conspirators sufficient under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 464, 74 L.Ed.2d 614 (1982); United States v. Federico, 658 F.2d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir.1981) (evidence that defendant was present at scene of drug transaction and drove others to rendezvous sufficient under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)), over*589ruled on other grounds, United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc).
Finally, the majority states that evidence that Silverman attempted to conceal his identity when confronted by DEA officials investigating the conspiracy was not evidence that Silverman knew of and participated in the conspiracy. In reaching this conclusion, the majority once again rejects a reasonable inference necessarily drawn by the district court. The majority states that the “uncontradicted evidence suggests that David Silverman concealed his identity in order to make arrangements through his attorney to surrender voluntarily rather than face possible arrest at his residence." Maj. op. at 582. Although this is a reasonable interpretation of the “uncontradicted evidence,” it is certainly not the only inference “suggested” by the evidence of Silver-man's two attempts to conceal his identity from the agents investigating his involvement in the conspiracy. In these circumstances, we are powerless to draw an inference, reasonable though it may be, which was necessarily rejected by the district court. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1511.
In conclusion, the majority's analysis permits this court, on the basis of a cold record, blithely to reject the district court’s factual findings and reassess the probative value of the evidence presented to the district court. It is impossible to reconcile the majority’s analysis of the evidence in this case with the rules guiding our review of the district court’s factual determinations set forth in Bourjaily and Anderson. In addition, the majority’s conclusion that the evidence offered by the government was insufficient to support the district court’s findings flies in the face of even our pre-Bourjaily cases which acknowledge that circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s involvement in a conspiracy may suffice to establish his connection to the conspiracy. I must, therefore, dissent.
II
I must also dissent from the majority’s holding that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it may infer guilt from Silverman’s attempt to conceal his identity from the DEA agents who attempted to question him at his home. The majority concludes that Silverman’s concealment of his identity lacked sufficient connection to the criminal acts with which he was charged for a jury to infer his guilt. I disagree. I do not believe we have held, as the majority suggests, either that a defendant’s attempt at concealment must immediately follow his last criminal act or that a defendant must be aware of the particular charges against him. See maj. op. at 581. Rather, our cases indicate that we have used a more flexible approach in determining whether the defendant’s behavior supports an inference of guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 622 (9th Cir.) (“[t]he probative value of flight evidence depends on all the circumstances”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 156, 83 L.Ed.2d 93 (1984). In so holding, we have also flatly rejected the argument that the government must prove that the defendant was “aware of the crime for which he was sought.” Id. I see no need to depart from this “totality of the circumstances” approach in the case before us. There was sufficient evidence that Silver-man’s evasive conduct was prompted by fear of apprehension for the jury to infer his guilt. The jury was properly instructed and could determine whether the inference should be drawn in light of the other evidence before it.
Moreover, even if we were (mistakenly, I suggest) to adopt a test requiring either “immediate” evasive conduct or a showing that the defendant had some knowledge that he was suspected of the criminal activity that prompted his arrest, I believe that such a test has been satisfied here. While it is true that Silverman did not attempt to conceal his identity until “two months after Pearl’s last trip to Van Nuys,” see maj. op. at 582, this fact does not necessarily indicate that an “immediacy” test is not met in the present case. Silverman had no reason to conceal his identity at the time of that transaction — the drug enforcement agents did not approach him at that time and he *590had no reason to fear that he was suspected of involvement in the drug conspiracy. However, Silverman did “immediately” attempt to conceal his identity when questioned by drug enforcement agents at his residence. Silverman instinctively reacted to the possibility of apprehension by concealing his identity, which is all that is required to demonstrate “immediacy.” See, e.g., United States v. Feldman, 788 F.2d 544, 555 (9th Cir.1986) (“It is the instinctive or impulsive character of the defendant’s behavior ... that indicates fear of apprehension and gives evidence of flight such trustworthiness as it possesses.”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067, 107 S.Ct. 955, 93 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1987), quoting United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1051 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847, 99 S.Ct. 147, 58 L.Ed.2d 149 (1978).
In addition, the majority’s assertion that Silverman’s attempt at concealment occurred after a “two-month delay” is erroneous. Silverman was not charged merely with isolated acts of supplying cocaine. He was charged with an ongoing conspiracy. It is difficult to ascertain when his “last criminal act” occurred. Where, as here, the “criminal act” is an ongoing affair, an act of concealment which occurs during or within a reasonable time after the conspiracy and which is directed toward law enforcement agents investigating the crime clearly satisfies a requirement that the conduct be “immediate” to the crime.
I must also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that no evidence suggests that Silverman knew of the accusations against him. Silverman did not know, to be sure, that he ultimately would be charged with conspiring to deal cocaine in violation of federal law. It is fair to say that most criminals are similarly ignorant about the particular charges they will face, if caught. For this reason, it does not make sense to require that a defendant know of the particular accusations against him as a prerequisite to finding that his evasive conduct supports an inference of guilt of the crime charged. See maj. op. at 582. Rather, it is sufficient that the defendant have reason to believe he is suspected of the criminal activity that ultimately led to his arrest.
While it is possible, as the majority maintains, id. at 581, that Silverman’s evasive conduct was prompted by fear that he was suspected of some other drug-related conduct, we have never conditioned the admissibility of flight evidence on the government’s ability to rule out every hypothetical suggested by the defendant. Every instance of flight is susceptible to more than one interpretation. A person caught fleeing from a store or bank in which an armed robbery has taken place is free to argue to the jury that he was merely an innocent bystander concerned for his safety. However, the possibility that a flight has an innocent explanation has never been a bar to its admissibility.
Applying the proper standard to the present case, it is clear that Silverman’s evasive conduct was prompted by fear that he was suspected of involvement in drug-related activities. Silverman attempted to conceal his identity the moment he had reason to believe that he was suspected of involvement in the cocaine conspiracy, that is, when the DEA officials confronted him at his residence. It is significant that Sil-verman again gave a false identity later that afternoon, after the agents left a message with him to call the DEA to answer some questions. The agents in question were not local police officers, but Drug Enforcement Agency officials, who identified themselves as such. Their presence at Silverman’s residence, their expressed interest in questioning Silverman, and their return to his residence later that day, surely indicated to Silverman that he was suspected of involvement with illegal drugs, and by the federal government, at that.
In conclusion, Silverman’s attempt to conceal his identity from DEA officers, when viewed in light of other evidence suggesting his guilt, clearly is sufficient to support the inference that Silverman was conscious of his guilt concerning the activity that led to his arrest, even under the majority’s ill-advised new rule. I must therefore disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it might infer guilt from Silverman’s false statements to the *591DEA agents. For the same reasons, I dissent from the majority’s holding that the district court was barred from considering this evidence when making its admissibility determination under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
I would affirm Silverman’s conviction.

. Responding to my dissent, the majority suggests that Bourjaily's statement that the trial court’s "factfinding" in that case "was [not] clearly erroneous” may not be binding on this court because the Supreme Court did not “unequivocally declare which standard is proper.” See maj. op. at 576. The statement in Bourjaily clearly was not dictum, nor does it appear to be merely a careless mistake. The Court repeatedly stressed that the question whether the defendant was a member of a conspiracy is a question of fact, see 107 S.Ct. at 2778-79; that the district *587court acts as a "factfinder” when making this determination, id. at 2781; and that the judge, when evaluating foundational evidence under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), is entitled to "receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel,” id. at 2782. The Court certainly applied the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factfinding in Bourjaily, see id. at 2782; therefore, its conclusion that the district court’s factfinding was not clearly erroneous binds us, even though the Court did not precede its statement with the words "We hold, therefore,_” I do not believe we are at liberty, as an appellate court, to impose a "plain statement” requirement on the United States Supreme Court.