Court Opinion

ID: 9941201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 01:01:45.569741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:20.297271
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10441     Document: 00517065342       Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                       REVISED February 15, 2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                               ____________
                                                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit
                                 No. 22-10441
                               ____________                              FILED
                                                                   February 1, 2024
   Karen Jimerson; JJ; JJ; XP; JP,                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                         Clerk
                                                         Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                     versus

   Mike Lewis, Lt,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 3:20-CV-2826
                  ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:
         A search warrant showed the correct address for the target house, but
   police officers executed the warrant at an incorrect address. The homeowner
   brought suit against the officers under Section 1983. When denying summary
   judgment on the issue of qualified immunity for the officer who led the
   search, the district court held that fact questions prevented deciding the
   issue. We find no genuine disputes of material fact. The disputed issue is
   one of law. We conclude that this officer’s efforts to identify the correct
Case: 22-10441      Document: 00517065342          Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                    No. 22-10441

   residence, though deficient, did not violate clearly established law.
   REVERSED and REMANDED for dismissal.
           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          In March 2019, at approximately 7:15 p.m., Waxahachie Police
   Department (“WPD”) SWAT Team Commander Mike Lewis received a
   call from a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) officer. The DEA
   officer needed assistance executing a search warrant that night on a suspected
   methamphetamine “stash” house located at 573 8th Street, Lancaster, Texas
   (“target house”). The officer provided Commander Lewis with information
   about a drug deal involving the target house. Lewis requested further
   information, including pictures of the target house, whether “the location
   was fortified,” whether “it appeared to have surveillance equipment,” and
   whether “there were any exterior indicators on the property that children
   may be present.”      He also “requested identifying information on the
   [methamphetamine] seller, as well as prior law enforcement history at that
   address” involving the Lancaster Police Department (“LPD”).
          In response, Lewis received pictures showing the front of the house
   and was told there was “surveillance established at the location.” DEA
   agents told Lewis that they saw no fortification or surveillance cameras at the
   property or any evidence of children. The agents had no description of the
   people occupying the target house.
          Lewis entered the information into the WPD SWAT’s risk analysis
   assessment worksheet, which scored the incident within the range for
   “optional SWAT deployment.” Consequently, Lewis contacted the WPD
   Chief and received approval to activate the SWAT team. He also gathered
   information on the target house from the Dallas Central Appraisal District
   website, including that the house was 744 square feet, was built in 1952, and
   had a “large, deeply extending backyard.”

                                         2
Case: 22-10441        Document: 00517065342              Page: 3      Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                         No. 22-10441

           Lewis then briefed SWAT officers at the WPD. The group decided
   to have a six-member team enter the target house and a three-member team
   enter the detached garage and backyard. Thereafter, Lewis received “real-
   time intelligence that surveillance officers at the scene reported a truck
   pulling a white box trailer [had] pulled up in front of the target location.” 1
   When Lewis received a copy of the warrant, he confirmed the address of the
   target house. The officers then finalized their preparations. LPD Officer
   Zachary Beauchamp led the SWAT team to the target house. Beauchamp
   was followed by the SWAT team vehicle, then Lewis in his marked patrol
   unit, then the Waxahachie K9, and then several unmarked DEA vehicles.
   Beauchamp was directed “to stop about a house before the target location,
   so SWAT officers could make an approach on foot.”
           When they arrived at the area, the SWAT team vehicle’s driver saw
   Beauchamp’s vehicle stop abruptly, “causing him to believe [Beauchamp]
   may have driven too far and stopped them too close to the target location.”
   As the officers exited their vehicles, Beauchamp pointed to the house with
   the truck and white trailer in front of it, and officers began their approach. As
   the SWAT team began gathering on the front porch, however, Lewis realized
   that the house did not look like the house from intelligence photos. The
   SWAT team had assembled at 583 8th Street, not at the target house at 573
   8th Street.
           When Lewis looked one house to the left, he decided the layout of the
   front of that house matched the one in the intel photos. Lewis noticed that
   “[f]rom left to right, it had one large window, followed by the front entry
   door, followed by a small window and then [four] larger windows.” He also

           _____________________
           1
             The record indicates that this intelligence was not accurate. Later investigation
   revealed that the white trailer was in front of 583 8th Street — not the target house.

                                               3
Case: 22-10441       Document: 00517065342         Page: 4    Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                    No. 22-10441

   noticed that “[t]he driveway was . . . on the left side of the property,” and he
   believed numbers on the front of the house read “573,” though the porch
   light obscured his view. This house, it turns out, was also the wrong house.
   The house Lewis identified was 593 8th Street, two doors down from the
   target house.
          Nevertheless, Lewis told the team that they were at the wrong house
   and instructed them to “go to the house just to the left of the house where
   they were.” That house was the home of plaintiffs Karen Jimerson, James
   Parks, and their two young sons and daughter. Officers ran to the front of the
   plaintiffs’ house, deployed a flashbang, broke the front windows, and
   breached the door. The officers began a protective sweep and checked for
   occupants. They “encountered two females” whom they told to get on the
   ground. The officers then encountered an adult male, but before they could
   direct him to get down, SWAT team members yelled “Wrong House!”
          The SWAT team left the plaintiffs’ home and proceeded to the target
   house. After the target house was secured, Lewis returned to the plaintiffs’
   house, where he joined other DEA agents who were already checking on the
   plaintiffs’ welfare. Plaintiff Karen Jimerson reported some pain in her side.
   Lewis called an ambulance and she was taken to the hospital. Lewis also
   coordinated with a glass company to make repairs and remained on the scene
   until 1:30 a.m.
          A WPD internal investigation determined that “reasonable and
   normal protocol was completely overlooked” and the WPD Chief of Police
   stated that these kinds of mistakes should not happen. Lewis was suspended
   for two days without pay.
          In September 2020, the plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C.
   § 1983. They alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and several state
   laws against 20 John Doe defendants. They later amended their complaint,

                                          4
Case: 22-10441      Document: 00517065342           Page: 5     Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                     No. 22-10441

   naming each of the individuals in the WPD SWAT team who executed the
   warrant, including Lewis. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs’ state-law tort
   claims were dismissed. The defendants moved for summary judgment based
   on qualified immunity, and the matter was referred to a magistrate judge for
   pretrial management.
          The magistrate judge recommended the district court grant qualified
   immunity to all the officers, whether they entered the house or not. The
   magistrate judge also concluded the plaintiffs failed to show that Lewis did
   not make reasonable efforts to identify the target house.
          The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s analysis on
   qualified immunity except with respect to whether Lewis made reasonable
   efforts to identify the target house. The court found “a genuine dispute of
   material fact regarding whether [Lewis] made the necessary reasonable effort
   to identify the correct residence and whether his actions were ‘[in]consistent
   with a reasonable effort to ascertain and identify the place intended to be
   searched,’” quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987). The court
   denied Lewis qualified immunity. Lewis timely appealed.
                                  DISCUSSION
          Federal and state officials may be entitled to qualified immunity from
   claims for money damages for their actions. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,
   735 (2011). To overcome this defense, a plaintiff needs to plead plausible
   facts “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2)
   that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged
   conduct.” Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
          If the district court denies qualified immunity either on a motion to
   dismiss or on summary judgment, the defendant official may immediately
   appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299,
   307 (1996). Here, summary judgment was denied, and our review is de novo.

                                           5
Case: 22-10441      Document: 00517065342           Page: 6     Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                     No. 22-10441

   Joseph ex rel. Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 331 (5th Cir. 2020). Review is
   limited to considering issues of law, including the legal significance of factual
   disputes identified by the district court. Id. at 331. That means “we may
   evaluate whether a factual dispute is material (i.e., legally significant), but we
   may not evaluate whether it is genuine (i.e., exists).”        Id. (emphasis in
   original). “Because the plaintiff is the non-moving party, we construe all
   facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Melton, 875
   F.3d at 261.
          As a preliminary matter, Lewis argues the plaintiffs failed to plead and
   argue that his efforts to identify the correct house were unreasonable. A
   plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity “must specifically identify
   each defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.” Thomas
   v. Humfield, 32 F.3d 566, 1994 WL 442484, at *5 (5th Cir. 1994). The
   plaintiffs complied with the need for specificity by alleging in the complaint
   that Lewis “was the person in charge” of the mistaken raid on their home,
   and in their summary judgment arguments that Lewis was the “overall leader
   of [the] misconduct” and that he overlooked “reasonable and normal
   protocol.”
          As to the merits, Lewis does not challenge the district court’s analysis
   of whether defendants violated the plaintiffs’ rights under federal law. The
   Fourth Amendment provides that individuals have a right “to be secure in
   their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
   seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has held that
   officers must make “reasonable effort[s] to ascertain and identify the place
   intended to be searched” in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment.
   Garrison, 480 U.S. at 88. To be clear about an occasional irrelevant addition
   to the proper analysis, we do not consider whether the officer’s actions were
   “objectively unreasonable.” That quoted standard is a “vestige of older
   caselaw that predates the Supreme Court’s current test.” Parker v. LeBlanc,

                                           6
Case: 22-10441      Document: 00517065342          Page: 7   Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                    No. 22-10441

   73 F.4th 400, 406 n.1 (5th Cir. 2023). In another precedential rejection of an
   “objectively unreasonable” component of qualified immunity, we held there
   is no “standalone ‘objective reasonableness’ element to the Supreme
   Court’s two-pronged test for qualified immunity.” Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th
   240, 251 n.10 (5th Cir. 2023).
          We evaluate the reasonableness of Lewis’s actions because the
   plaintiffs’ claims arise under the Fourth Amendment. The district court
   denied qualified immunity because the court found a “genuine dispute of
   material fact regarding whether [Lewis] made the necessary reasonable
   efforts to identify the correct residence.” As we stated earlier, we cannot
   review a district court’s determination that a factual dispute is genuine.
   Bartlett, 981 F.3d at 331. We are to decide, though, legal significance, i.e.,
   whether disputed facts are material to resolution of the case. Id.
          The district court did not find evidentiary disputes about what Lewis
   and others did before entering the incorrect house. The court stated that the
   central dispute was whether those actions constituted “necessary reasonable
   efforts.” Certainly, unlike here, exactly what an officer did may sometimes
   be factually unclear. A court’s determination of reasonableness under the
   Fourth Amendment, though, “‘is predominantly an objective inquiry.’” al-
   Kidd, 563 U.S. at 736 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47
   (2000)).    The circumstances are to be “viewed objectively” and a
   determination made of whether they “justify” the search. Id. (quoting Scott
   v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
          Consequently, as a legal issue for our de novo review, we consider
   whether Lewis’s conduct violated clearly established law. See id. at 325–26.
   Clearly established law is determined by reference to “controlling
   authority[,] or a robust consensus of persuasive authority.” Delaughter v.
   Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 139 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The keystone

                                          7
Case: 22-10441        Document: 00517065342              Page: 8       Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                          No. 22-10441

   in this analysis is fair warning. Id. at 139–40. To overcome qualified
   immunity, plaintiffs must cite “a body of relevant case law [] in which an
   officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated” a
   defendant’s constitutional rights. Bartlett, 981 F.3d at 330 (quotation marks and
   citations omitted). “While there need not be ‘a case directly on point,’ the
   unlawfulness of the challenged conduct must be ‘beyond debate.’” Id.
   (quoting al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).
           Compliance with the Fourth Amendment requires a law enforcement
   officer’s “reasonable effort[s] to ascertain and identify the place intended to
   be searched.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at 88. In applying that general principle,
   the district court relied on two opinions. One was a nonprecedential opinion
   of this court. Rogers v. Hooper, 271 F. App’x 431 (5th Cir. 2008). The other
   was nonprecedential in the Fifth Circuit because it was issued by a different
   circuit court of appeals. Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950 (11th Cir.
   1995). 2 The plaintiffs do not cite any other authority.
           In Rogers, we affirmed a grant of qualified immunity. Rogers, 271 F.
   App’x at 436. Officers secured a warrant to search a suspected drug house.
   Id. at 432. Before executing the warrant, officers drove by the target house
   to confirm its location. Id. They saw a maroon vehicle parked in front of the

           _____________________
           2
             A nonprecedential opinion “cannot be the source of clearly established law for
   qualified immunity analysis.” Marks v. Hudson, 933 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2019).
   Nevertheless, such opinions may be used to illustrate clearly established law. Bartlett, 981
   F.3d at 341 n.105; see also Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 525 n.8 (5th Cir. 2016). As for
   Hartsfield, “[w]e have not previously identified the level of out-of-circuit consensus
   necessary to put the relevant question ‘beyond debate’” and to constitute clearly
   established law. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 879 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting al-Kidd,
   563 U.S. at 741). It is unlikely that one out-of-circuit case is sufficient.

                                                8
Case: 22-10441      Document: 00517065342            Page: 9   Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                    No. 22-10441

   target house. Id. The officers then briefed their team on the location of the
   home and developed a plan for executing the warrant. Id. The night of the
   warrant’s execution, however, the maroon vehicle was parked in front of the
   house next door to the target house. Id. Officers broke into that house before
   ultimately realizing their mistake. Id.
          We emphasized that the officers made several efforts to identify the
   correct residence, including conducting “initial surveillance of the house
   shortly before the warrant was executed, though [the officers] increased the
   chance for mistake by approaching the house in the opposite direction than
   they would use later.” Id. at 435. There were differences in appearance
   between the mistaken house and target house, but “those differences were
   less noticeable at night.” Id. Further, we acknowledged the confusion that
   arose from the fact that “a car that earlier had been thought to be in front of
   the house to be searched was instead in front of the [p]laintiffs’ home when
   the search began.” Id. “[T]he officers made reasonable efforts, though
   obviously insufficient ones, to identify the correct house.” Id.
          In Hartsfield, the Eleventh Circuit determined that an officer was not
   entitled to qualified immunity when he executed a warrant at the wrong
   residence. 50 F.3d at 956. The officer had been to the proper residence the
   day before. Id. at 951. On the day of the raid, though, he did little to ensure
   he was leading officers to the correct address:
          As it is uncontroverted that the numbers on the houses are
          clearly marked, and that the raid took place during daylight
          hours, simply checking the warrant would have avoided the
          mistaken entry. Moreover, evidence before the court showed
          that the houses were located on different parts of the street,
          separated by at least one other residence, and that their
          appearances were distinguishable.

                                             9
Case: 22-10441     Document: 00517065342            Page: 10   Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                     No. 22-10441

   Id. at 955. “[S]earching the wrong residence when [the officer] had done
   nothing to make sure he was searching the house described in the warrant”
   violated clearly established law. Id.
          The dissent argues Hartsfield and Rogers constitute clearly established
   law that distinguishes Lewis’s actions as objectively unreasonable under the
   fair warning analysis. Even if these two nonprecedential opinions were
   indicative of clearly established law, they would not support that Lewis
   violated that law. Lewis erred, but he made significant efforts to identify the
   correct residence. As the district court summarized, Lewis
          (1) reviewed the search warrant; (2) conducted additional
          searches on the target residence through the Dallas Central
          Appraisal District website; (3) ran a computerized criminal
          history search of the occupant of the target residence; (4)
          debriefed with DEA agents twice; (5) was provided with “real-
          time intelligence that surveillance officers at the scene reported
          a truck pulling a white box trailer just pulled up in front of the
          target location and stopped;” and (6) observed the home and
          took note of the front windows, driveway, and the numbers on
          the front of the home in an attempt to confirm the residence as
          being the target location.
   To elaborate on that final point, Lewis was careful to confirm the house had
   the proper arrangement and size of windows, but only later became aware
   that those window features were shared by the plaintiffs’ home. Moreover,
   Lewis’s confusion was compounded by misleading intelligence.                When
   officers arrived, the white trailer was not parked in front of the target house.
   Lewis correctly identified that fact, but then erred in redirecting the officers.
   Lewis was far more careful than the officers in the two opinions cited to us as
   showing he violated clearly established law.
          The “central concern” when evaluating the immunity question “is
   whether the official has fair warning that his conduct violates a constitutional

                                           10
Case: 22-10441     Document: 00517065342           Page: 11   Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                    No. 22-10441

   right.” Delaughter, 909 F.3d at 140. That means the “dispositive question
   is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”
   Morrow, 917 F.3d at 875 (emphasis in original) (quotation marks and citation
   omitted). Here, the plaintiffs have not cited authority demonstrating that
   Lewis’s conduct violated clearly established law.
          We REVERSE the district court’s denial of summary judgment to
   Lewis and REMAND in order for the district court to dismiss this suit.

                                         11
Case: 22-10441        Document: 00517065342               Page: 12       Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                          No. 22-10441

   James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
           I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The district court
   properly denied qualified immunity to Lieutenant Mike Lewis, commander
   of the Waxahachie Police Department (WPD) SWAT team. The Jimersons’
   Fourth Amendment claim against Lewis is based on his failure to take
   sufficient steps to ensure that his team executed a no-knock warrant at the
   correct address. The district court found that factual disputes as to the
   reasonableness of Lewis’ efforts to identify the target house precluded
   granting qualified immunity to Lewis. While I agree with the majority’s
   finding that there are no factual disputes as to Lewis’ actions in leading the
   SWAT team to the wrong residence, I disagree that Lewis is entitled to
   qualified immunity 1 under clearly established law.
           Based on the undisputed facts in this case, Lewis failed to use the
   intelligence he received from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
   that would have easily allowed him to direct the SWAT team to the target
   house. The DEA alerted Lewis that the house number was painted on the
   curb and affixed to a wooden pole on the deck, and that the target house was
   the thirteenth one on the block. Despite having this information, Lewis did
   not even check the number of the house before instructing the SWAT team
   to execute the warrant on the Jimersons’ home—separated from the target

           _____________________
           1
            It’s worth noting that one of our colleagues recently suggested that “the Supreme
   Court’s original justification for qualified immunity—that Congress wouldn’t have
   abrogated common-law immunities absent explicit language—is faulty because the 1871
   Civil Rights Act expressly included such language.” Rogers v. Jarrett, 63 F.4th 971, 980 (5th
   Cir. 2023) (Willett, J., concurring); see also Alexander A. Reinert, Qualified Immunity’s
   Flawed Foundation, 111 CAL. L. REV. 201, 207–08 (2023) (arguing that “the problem with
   current qualified immunity doctrine is not just that it departs from the common law
   immunity that existed when Section 1983 was enacted,” but also that “no qualified
   immunity doctrine at all should apply in Section 1983 actions, if courts stay true to the text
   adopted by the enacting Congress and other evidence of legislative intent”).

                                                12
Case: 22-10441        Document: 00517065342                Page: 13        Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                           No. 22-10441

   house by more than one 2 residence—by deploying a flash bang, breaking all
   their front windows using the “break and rake” technique, and forcing open
   the front door. Lewis wrote in an incident report that he “believed” the
   numbers on the Jimersons’ home to be that of the target house, despite the
   fact that he admitted his view was obscured because the Jimersons “had a
   brightly glowing porch light directly above them that was causing a reflection
   on the siding of the house.” Regardless of Lewis’ ability to see the numbers
   on the home, the search warrant alerted him that the target house number
   was written on the curb in front of the house and on a wooden pole supporting
   the house—not on the front of the house like at the Jimerson residence. Even
   more glaring are the notable physical distinctions between the two houses:
   while there is a prominent wheelchair ramp that protrudes from the Jimerson
   house with railings that appear to be waist-high, the target house had no such
   ramp and featured a chain-link fence around the perimeter of the property—
   differences evident from the photographs of the target house provided to
   Lewis before the execution of the warrant.
           Though it is undisputed that Lewis violated the Jimersons’ Fourth
   Amendment rights in executing a SWAT-style entry into their home without
   a warrant, the majority finds that the Jimersons’ claim fails because the
   unlawfulness of Lewis’ actions were not clearly established law. 3 Specifically,
           _____________________
           2
            As the majority opinion acknowledges, the SWAT team initially assembled on the
   front porch of the wrong house. After Lewis recognized that the SWAT team was at the
   wrong house, he instructed the SWAT team to execute the warrant on the Jimerson
   residence, which was in the opposite direction of the target residence.
           3
               We have sometimes described the second prong of the qualified immunity
   analysis as an inquiry into whether an official’s “actions were objectively unreasonable in
   light of clearly established law.” See, e.g., Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 2021)
   (Willett, J.). The different phrasing is of no moment because, of course, violating a clearly
   established right is objectively unreasonable. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 151 (2017);
   see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 653 (1987) (“Reliance on the objective
   reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established

                                                 13
Case: 22-10441        Document: 00517065342              Page: 14       Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                          No. 22-10441

   the majority concludes that there is not enough legal authority supporting the
   Jimersons’ contention that Lewis’ efforts to locate the target residence were
   constitutionally deficient. While the majority is certainly correct that “[a]
   clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable
   official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right,”
   Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015), they nonetheless unfairly limit the
   legal authority the Jimersons may rely on in rebutting Lewis’ assertion of
   qualified immunity. The “focus” of the qualified immunity analysis is
   whether the officer had “fair notice” that his conduct was unlawful, and here
   the clearly established law gave Lewis ample warning of the constitutionally
   sufficient efforts required to ensure he directed the SWAT team to the
   correct residence. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (noting that
   the “focus” of qualified immunity analysis is “whether the officer had fair
   notice that her conduct was unlawful”).
           Contrary to the majority’s assertion that there is no clearly established
   law that would have put Lewis on notice of the unlawfulness of his actions,
   the Supreme Court has stated that officers must make “a reasonable effort to
   ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning
   of the Fourth Amendment.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987).
   In Garrison, officers mistakenly executed a search warrant on the wrong
   apartment because they believed that the third floor of an apartment complex
   contained only one rather than two apartments. Id. There, the Supreme
   Court found that the officers made a reasonable effort to identify the correct
   apartment because “[t]he objective facts available to the officers at the time
   suggested no distinction between McWebb’s apartment and the third-floor
   premises.” Id. Specifically, those officers made a “reasonable effort” to
           _____________________
   law[.]”); Horvath v. City of Leander, 946 F.3d 787, 800 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J., concurring)
   (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 222, 232 (2009)).

                                               14
Case: 22-10441     Document: 00517065342            Page: 15   Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                     No. 22-10441

   identify the target residence where they: (1) went to the premises to see if it
   matched the description given by an informant; (2) checked with the
   Baltimore Gas and Electric Company to ascertain in whose name the third
   floor apartment was listed; and (3) checked with the Baltimore Police
   Department to make sure that the description and address of the suspect
   matched the information provided by the informant. Id. at 81–82, 85–86 n.10.
          Moreover, Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995) “aptly
   illustrates the established right” at issue in the Jimersons’ claim against
   Lewis. See id. at 955 (recognizing as “clearly established law” that “absent
   probable cause and exigent circumstances, a warrantless search of a residence
   violates the Fourth Amendment, unless the officers engage in reasonable
   efforts to avoid error”); see also Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 525 (5th Cir.
   2016) (explaining that where a case “does not constitute clearly established
   law for purposes of QI” it may still “aptly illustrates the established right”).
   In Hartsfield, the Eleventh Circuit denied qualified immunity where an
   officer “had the warrant in his possession” yet “did not check to make sure
   he was leading the other officers to the correct address” Hartsfield, 50 F.3d
   at 955. There, the officers’ efforts to identify the target of the search warrant
   were insufficient where: (1) the numbers were clearly marked on the houses;
   (2) the houses were separated by at least one other residence; and (3) the
   houses were physically distinguishable; (4) there were no exigent
   circumstances; and (5) the raid occurred during the daytime. Id. at 952–55.
   Here, similarly, the numbers on the houses were clearly marked (despite it
   being nighttime), the houses were separated by at least one residence and
   were physically distinguishable, and there were no exigent circumstances.
   While Lewis arguably did more to identify the correct residence than the
   officer in Hartsfield, who “did nothing to make sure he was leading the
   officers to the correct residence,” Lewis nonetheless could have easily
   avoided the mistaken entry by “simply checking” the house number or using

                                          15
Case: 22-10441        Document: 00517065342              Page: 16       Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                          No. 22-10441

   other information at his disposal to identify the correct residence. Id. at 955.
   In light of Hartsfield’s guidance interpreting the clearly established law in
   Garrison, the Jimersons rebutted Lewis’ assertion of qualified immunity.
           Our unpublished decision in Rogers v. Hooper, 271 F. App’x 431 (5th
   Cir. 2008) also supports the denial of qualified immunity to Lewis. In Rogers,
   we affirmed a grant of qualified immunity to an officer who mistakenly led his
   team to the wrong house where: (1) the two houses were next to each other;
   (2) the officer had previously been at the correct house twice; and (3) the
   minor differences between the houses were “less noticeable at night.” Here,
   in contrast, the houses were not next to each other, and Lewis could have
   easily checked the number of the target house that was painted on the curb
   and affixed to a wooden beam supporting the home’s porch. Moreover, the
   obvious physical distinctions between the houses would have been noticeable
   even at night; while the target house had a chain-link fence around it, the
   Jimerson house did not have any fence and featured a wheelchair ramp with
   waist-high railings along it. Because Lewis did not take the same steps 4 as the
   officer in Rogers to identify the correct residence, our nonprecedential case
   law supports the denial of qualified immunity.
           In light of the efforts identified as adequate by the Supreme Court in
   Garrison and elaborated on by circuit courts, Lewis had “fair notice” of the
   minimum efforts required to comply with the Fourth Amendment when
           _____________________
           4
              Notably, the officers in Rogers and Garrison each previously visited the correct
   houses as part of their efforts to identify the target of the search warrant, whereas here
   Lewis made no such attempts. See Rogers, 271 F. App’x at 433–43 (noting that the officers
   “had been at the correct house at least twice before”); Garrison, 480 U.S. at 86 n.10 (“The
   officer went to [the target residence] and found that it matched the description given by the
   informant.”). WPD Police Chief Wade Goolsby even testified that after this incident, the
   WPD implemented additional procedures requiring officers to “get[] eyes on the location
   so that [the officer] not only sees the target, but the surrounding homes” before executing
   a search warrant.

                                                16
Case: 22-10441     Document: 00517065342           Page: 17   Date Filed: 02/15/2024

                                    No. 22-10441

   identifying a house for the purposes of executing a search warrant. Brosseau,
   543 U.S. at 198; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 731 (2002) (“Qualified
   immunity operates to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers
   are on notice that their conduct is unlawful.”). As announced in Garrison and
   elucidated in Rogers and Hartsfield, it is “beyond debate” that Lewis’ efforts
   to identify the target house were constitutionally deficient. Ashcroft v. al–
   Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). The panel should affirm the district court’s
   denial of Lewis’ assertion of qualified immunity.

                                         17