Court Opinion

ID: 9846223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:37:05.330618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:35.471026
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Justice,
specially concurring.
¶ 18 I disagree with the analysis applied and therefore write separately.
¶ 19 The basis for my disagreement with the majority’s analysis is well set forth in the court of appeals’ opinion in State v. Root, 193 Ariz. 442, 973 P.2d 1203 (App.1998), and need not be repeated here. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reached a conclusion similar to that in Root in State v. Alexander, 214 Wis.2d 628, 571 N.W.2d 662 (1997). The Wisconsin court held that when the defendant offers to stipulate to a prior status offense and the state rejects the offer for no purpose other than to present propensity evidence, hoping to stir up whatever prejudice may result when the jury learns of the defendant’s prior convictions, the trial judge has discretion to withhold the evidence under evidence rules similar to ours. See Rules 403 and 404, Ariz.R.Evid.
¶20 In my view, these rules are not trumped by Rule 19.1, Ariz.R.Crim.P., which was promulgated just to avoid prejudice in situations similar to that in the present case. Rule 19.1 was intended to cover cases in which, to avoid unnecessary prejudice, the defendant offered to stipulate to the fact of conviction. Its text does not deal with the present situation but, rather, with trial of contested issues regarding prior convictions. I therefore believe Rule 19.1 co-exists with Rule 403 and, as recognized by Root, the trial judge may accept the stipulation and withhold evidence of the prior convictions from the jury. If Rule 19.1 prevents this, it should be changed.
¶ 21 By enacting the current statute, the legislature changed prior convictions in DUI cases from sentence enhancers to elements of *13the crime. This, of course, does not overcome the provisions of Rule 403 permitting judges to exclude relevant evidence when probative value is outweighed by prejudice. The legislature cannot, by the simple expedient of changing labels, interfere with the court’s rule-making power. State ex rel. Napolitano v. Brown, 194 Ariz. 340, 982 P.2d 815 (1999). The provisions of article VI, § 5(5) of the Arizona Constitution, which give the court the power to make procedural rules, including the Rules of Evidence, is designed to ensure that courts will operate in a manner that will ensure a fair trial for everyone. Root, 193 Ariz. at 445, 973 P.2d at 1206-07. In the situations presented by the eases before us, this can only be accomplished by recognizing the trial judge’s discretion to handle the case under Rule 403. Id.
¶22 But the issue the court chooses to address in these cases is whether Defendants were entitled to a bifurcated trial under Rule 19.1. Believing that rule inapplicable to these cases, I join in the narrow holding that Defendants were not entitled to a bifurcated trial.