Court Opinion

ID: 9657955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:42:06.428688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:49.842810
License: Public Domain

Beilfuss, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. It is my belief that under the facts of this case the question of apportionment of the negligence was a jury issue and that there is evidence and reasonable inferences which support the 70-30 percent finding.
*470I have no quarrel with this court’s rejection of the contention that “a left-turning driver’s negligence in turning into a private driveway in the path of an approaching car from the opposite direction is as a matter of law at least 50 percent of the total negligence.” 1 I do object, however, under the facts of this case, to the court’s rejection of a factual finding of the jury that the left-turning driver was 70 percent negligent.
The majority of the court, without saying so, passes on the credibility of the witnesses and states the “testimony supports the conclusion that Huck was negligent as to speed, lookout, and management and control.” If we must reject Huck’s testimony that he was going 45 to 50 miles per hour and find him negligent as to speed, it does not follow that he was negligent as to management and control. Nor is it a verity that he was negligent as to lookout. The evidence that Hammang had activated his turn signal and that Huck did not timely see the Hammang car is meager and speculative.
The undisputed testimony was that there was at least one-half mile of clear view for both drivers. Hammang had no right to invade his left lane if he knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known there was another vehicle traveling toward him in that lane and there was danger of a collision. The traveled portion of the road was 22 feet wide. Hammang had to cross only 11 feet to avoid danger — he had over 2500 feet to view the approach of the other vehicle or vehicles and calculate whether he could safely cross in front of the approaching vehicle.
The comparative causally negligent contribution of the two drivers was clearly a jury issue and the finding that Hammang was guilty of 70 percent of such negligence was within the province of the jury.
*471I would affirm the judgment.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice CONNOR T. Hansen and Mr. Justice Robert W. Hansen join in this dissent.

 Bruno v. Biesecker (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 305, 313, 162 N. W. 2d 135.