Court Opinion

ID: 9400064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 14:08:14.788589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:41.367316
License: Public Domain

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21-P-916                                                Appeals Court

                  COMMONWEALTH    vs.   WILLIAM EARL.

                              No. 21-P-916.

           Suffolk.       December 9, 2022. – June 7, 2023.

             Present:    Rubin, Massing, & D'Angelo, JJ.

Homicide. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.
     Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Admissions and
     confessions, Voluntariness of confession, Harmless error.
     Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Harmless
     error, Identification. Evidence, Admissions and
     confessions, Identification, Authentication, Medical
     record. Error, Harmless. Identification.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on February 12, 2014.

     Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Robert
N. Tochka, J., and the cases were tried before Linda E. Giles,
J.

     Joanne T. Petito for the defendant.
     Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

    MASSING, J.       A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant,

William Earl, of murder in the second degree of Samuel Constant
                                                                     2

and of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, a knife, upon

Faniesha Hunter.    The jury heard evidence that minutes after the

murder, the defendant confessed that he had just killed someone

for "running his mouth."   The defendant argues that his

confession was the product of custodial interrogation because a

special police officer chased, tackled, handcuffed, and pat

frisked the defendant before questioning him, and that the

confession should have been suppressed because he was not given

Miranda warnings.   We agree.   Because evidence of the

defendant's confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt, we reverse the judgments.    We also address the

defendant's claims with respect to issues that are likely to

recur in any new trial.

    Background.     The evidence at trial showed that one evening

in January 2014, Hunter returned from work to her apartment in

the Georgetowne Homes complex, located in the Hyde Park section

of Boston.   She found Constant, whom she was dating at the time,

in her apartment with the defendant.    Hunter did not know the

defendant, and his behavior made her uneasy, so she gestured to

Constant to follow her into one of the bedrooms.    The defendant

followed them into the room, where he pulled a knife from the

waistband of his boxer shorts and lunged at Hunter.       Constant

intervened and began to struggle with the defendant, wrestling

him back into the living room.    While the defendant and Constant
                                                                       3

fought, Hunter went to the kitchen to look for something to use

as a weapon.   She grabbed the first thing she could find, a

kitchen utensil, and used it to hit the defendant.    The

defendant swung his knife at her but missed, then stumbled out

the open front door of the apartment, still struggling with

Constant.   A Georgetowne Homes maintenance supervisor noticed

two men running; one of them, Constant, fell to the pavement,

face down, and the other ran off.    Constant was breathing with

difficulty and bleeding from his mouth and nose.     The

maintenance supervisor called 911 and attempted to perform

cardiopulmonary resuscitation.   Hunter went outside and found

Constant lying in the parking lot.

    Shortly thereafter, the defendant was apprehended nearby by

Vincent Tranfaglia and Jean Thermitus, two uniformed security

guards certified as special Boston police officers and employed

by Longwood Public Safety, a private security company contracted

to patrol Georgetowne Homes and the surrounding area.      Thermitus

saw the defendant running down the middle of Crown Point Drive

in heavy traffic, knocking on the windshields of passing

vehicles and attempting to stop them.   As yet unaware of the

stabbing, Thermitus activated the lights of his marked vehicle,

parked in the middle of the street, and approached the

defendant, who was bleeding heavily from his ear.    Upon seeing

Thermitus, the defendant fled.   Thermitus ran after him, tackled
                                                                     4

him from behind, placed him in handcuffs, and pat frisked him.

Thermitus then asked the defendant, "[W]hat was going on, why he

took off."   The defendant responded, "I just killed somebody,"

and added, "If you walk straight ahead you will find something."

When Thermitus asked him "why," the defendant answered,

"[B]ecause he was running his mouth."

    Tranfaglia, who had arrived on the scene and helped

Thermitus secure the defendant, requested help from the Boston

police and medical assistance for the defendant.     About this

time, the maintenance supervisor approached, yelling and

gesturing for Tranfaglia's attention.    Tranfaglia followed the

maintenance supervisor to an area where Constant was lying on

the ground, cradled in Hunter's arms.    Constant had been stabbed

in the face, head, shoulder, and chest, and had no pulse.     By

the time emergency medical personnel arrived, Constant was dead.

    The defendant was transported to the emergency room at

Brigham and Women's Hospital (hospital), where he was treated

for lacerations to his head and neck.    Members of the Boston

police homicide unit, who had arrived at the crime scene,

arranged for Hunter to be taken to the hospital for an

identification procedure.   As soon as Hunter entered the

emergency unit, she identified the defendant from across the

room.   The defendant was arrested and taken from the hospital to

the police station for questioning.     In a videotaped (recorded)
                                                                     5

interview, he claimed not to understand why he was under arrest

and that he had been the victim of an attack.1

     The day after the murder the police recovered a "KA-BAR"

brand folding knife near the murder scene.   A metal fragment

from the knife was found in one of Constant's fatal stab wounds,

and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analyses of blood found on the

knife's blade and knife's handle were consistent with the DNA

profiles of Constant and the defendant, respectively.    The

statistical probability of random matches was infinitesimally

small.

     A letter the defendant wrote to Constant's mother from jail

two years after the murder was admitted in evidence.     In the

letter, the defendant "apologize[d] about what happened to your

son," claimed that "it was not [his] intention to murder your

son," but that he was being attacked and the only way he could

escape the apartment was "by assaulting your son and stabbing

him twice in his chest area."   He added that he used "a kabar

pocket knife."

     The defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the

first degree and assault by means of a dangerous weapon.       The

murder charge was submitted to the jury on theories of

     1 We set forth the circumstances of the defendant's roadside
confession, the hospital identification, and the recorded
interview in greater detail below in connection with the
discussion of the defendant's motions to suppress.
                                                                       6

deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity and cruelty.       The

defendant's primary defense was that he acted in self-defense.

The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the second

degree and assault by means of a dangerous weapon.

    Discussion.     A.   Motions to suppress.   Prior to trial, the

defendant filed a motion to suppress statements -- his initial

roadside confession and his subsequent recorded interview at the

police station -- and a motion to suppress Hunter's hospital

identification.    After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the motion

judge denied the motion to suppress the identification from the

bench; he later issued written findings denying the motion to

suppress statements.     On appeal, the defendant argues that both

motions were wrongly decided.

    When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we are

bound by the judge's subsidiary findings of fact, unless they

are clearly erroneous; "[h]owever, where the ultimate findings

and rulings bear on issues of constitutional dimension, they are

open for review.   Our appellate function requires that we make

our own independent determination on the correctness of the

judge's application of the constitutional principles to the

facts as found" (quotations and citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211 (2001).      Accord

Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 651-652 (2018)

(voluntariness of defendant's Miranda waiver and statements
                                                                     7

during custodial interrogation); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 473

Mass. 594, 602 (2016) (identifications arising from police

procedures); Commonwealth v. Carnes, 457 Mass. 812, 818-819

(2010) (whether defendant was subject to custodial

interrogation).   But see Johnson, supra (motion judge's

assessment of suggestiveness of identifications without police

wrongdoing under common-law principles of fairness reviewed for

abuse of discretion).    We "review de novo any findings based

entirely on a video recording."     Commonwealth v. Yusuf, 488

Mass. 379, 385 (2021).

    We address the suppression motions in chronological order

by subject matter:   the roadside confession, the hospital

identification, and the recorded interview.

    1.   The roadside confession.    a.   Motion judge's findings.

The defendant argues that his incriminating statements to

special police Officer Thermitus should have been suppressed

because Thermitus failed to give him Miranda warnings.     We set

forth the facts found by the motion judge, supplemented with

uncontroverted testimony from the suppression hearing that does

"not detract from the judge's ultimate findings."     Commonwealth

v. Garner, 490 Mass. 90, 93-96 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v.

Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015).

    As noted above, Thermitus and Tranfaglia were security

guards employed by a private security company and certified as
                                                                     8

special Boston police officers.    They are State actors for

Miranda purposes.    See Commonwealth v. Leone, 386 Mass. 329,

334-335 (1982).     Thermitus was patrolling the Georgetowne Homes

area in a marked "Longwood" cruiser around 5:45 P.M. on an

"extremely cold" January night when he saw the defendant in the

middle of Crown Point Drive, in heavy traffic, knocking on the

windshields of passing vehicles.     Thermitus activated his

cruiser's lights, radioed for assistance, stopped in the middle

of the street, and then approached the defendant on foot.      The

defendant was bleeding from his ear.    Seeing Thermitus, the

defendant took off his sweatshirt and threw it to the ground,

leaving himself shirtless, took two "aggressive" steps toward

Thermitus, and then turned and ran into a wooded area.

Thermitus ran after him.

     Special police Sergeant Tranfaglia arrived at the scene in

response to Thermitus's radio call.    Tranfaglia saw Thermitus

yelling at the defendant to stop.2    Thermitus tackled the

defendant to the ground and immediately placed him in handcuffs.

     2 Tranfaglia testified that to assist Thermitus, he took out
his pepper spray and yelled multiple times to the defendant,
"I'm going to spray." The judge's findings do not mention this
testimony, which suggested a more coercive atmosphere than the
judge found. Rather than address whether this factual omission,
which detracts from the judge's ultimate finding, see Garner,
490 Mass. at 95-96, is clearly erroneous, we do not consider
this aspect of Tranfaglia's testimony in our analysis.
                                                                     9

Then, with Tranfaglia's help, Thermitus sat the defendant

against a tree beside the road and pat frisked him; the

defendant was unarmed.

     According to Tranfaglia, "the defendant stated that he had

been shot down the street," although neither officer saw any

evidence of gunshot wounds.     Tranfaglia stepped away to request

assistance from the Boston police and emergency medical

services.     Thermitus remained with the defendant and asked him

"why he ran," to which the defendant replied, "I just killed

somebody, and if you walk straight ahead you will find

something."    Thermitus asked the defendant, "[W]hy?"   The

defendant responded that "this person was running his mouth, so

I did what I had to do."3    Thermitus remained with the defendant,

who was still handcuffed, until an ambulance arrived and the

Boston police took over.

     3 Thermitus testified that the defendant confessed to the
killing before saying that he had been shot, although Thermitus
wrote in his police report that the defendant said he had been
shot first. Tranfaglia testified that after he helped Thermitus
handcuff the defendant, the officers were trying to figure out
"what was going on" when the defendant stated that he had been
shot. At that point Tranfaglia went to call for Boston police
backup and emergency medical assistance. The judge found that
Tranfaglia left Thermitus with the defendant while he went to
radio for help and returned about two minutes later. The
judge's findings imply that the defendant confessed during the
two-minute interval he was left alone with Thermitus.
                                                                  10

     The motion judge found that the defendant was not in

custody when he made the incriminating statements and that

Thermitus's questioning did not amount to interrogation.

     b.   Custody.   "It is well settled that Miranda warnings are

necessary only when a defendant is subject to custodial

interrogation, Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 688 (1995),

and that it is the defendant's burden to prove custody,

Commonwealth v. Larkin, 429 Mass. 426, 432 (1999)."

Commonwealth v. Vellucci, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 274, 277 (2020).

     "An interview is custodial where 'a reasonable person in

the suspect's shoes would experience the environment in which

the interrogation took place as coercive.'"    Commonwealth v.

Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 617 (2018), quoting Larkin, 429 Mass.

at 432.   "The crucial question is whether, considering all the

circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position

would have believed that he was in custody.   Thus, if the

defendant reasonably believed that he was not free to leave, the

interrogation occurred while the defendant was in custody, and

Miranda warnings were required" (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Damiano, 422 Mass. 10, 13 (1996).4

     4 In the context of whether a police officer had "seized"
the defendant, for which reasonable suspicion of criminal
conduct is required, the Supreme Judicial Court observed that
"because civilians rarely feel 'free to leave' a police
encounter," Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 360 (2019),
"the more pertinent question is whether an officer has, through
                                                                   11

    In a myriad of cases assessing custody, "the court

considers several factors:   (1) the place of the interrogation;

(2) whether the officers have conveyed to the person being

questioned any belief or opinion that that person is a suspect;

(3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the

interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in

its contours by the person being interviewed; and (4) whether,

at the time the incriminating statement was made, the person was

free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the

interrogation or by asking the interrogator to leave, as

evidenced by whether the interview terminated with an arrest."

Groome, 435 Mass. at 211-212.   The so-called "Groome factors,"

see Carnes, 457 Mass. at 819, are not exclusive; the court must

consider the totality of the circumstances.   See Commonwealth v.

Medina, 485 Mass. 296, 301 (2020).   The Groome factors merely

provide a framework for assessing the ultimate question:

"whether the defendant was subjected to 'a formal arrest or

words or conduct, objectively communicated that the officer
would use his or her police power to coerce that person to
stay," id. at 362. "The custody and seizure inquiries, however,
are not identical." Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 698
(2020). While the Matta decision did not alter the custody
analysis, see Evelyn, supra at 698-699; Commonwealth v. Lugo,
102 Mass. App. Ct. 170, 179 n.10 (2023), both tests focus on
"the objective circumstances of the encounter" and "attempt to
ascertain whether, considering the totality of the
circumstances, an individual has been compelled to interact with
the police." Evelyn, supra. In this case, the defendant has
never claimed that the initial seizure was unjustified.
                                                                  12

restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated with a

formal arrest.'"   Medina, supra, quoting Thompson v. Keohane,

516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).

    In concluding that the defendant was not in custody, the

motion judge focused on the first three Groome factors.     The

judge found, first, that "[t]he questioning took place on a

neutral site near a public road" and not in a "police-dominated

atmosphere."   Second, the special police officers did not convey

to the defendant that he was suspected of Constant's murder;

indeed, the officers had not yet learned of the stabbing.

Third, "the questioning was informal and investigatory, and not

aggressive, accusatory, or coercive."   In light of these

factors, the judge did not consider the fact that the defendant

was handcuffed to be a sufficient restraint on his freedom to

turn the encounter into the equivalent of a formal arrest.     Our

independent review of the facts as found by the motion judge

leads to the opposite conclusion.

    We begin, rather than end, by recognizing that restraints

on the defendant's freedom of movement defined his encounter

with the special police officers:   in response to the

defendant's erratic conduct in the middle of a busy street, the

officers chased him down, tackled him, handcuffed him, and pat

frisked him before seating him by the side of the road for

questioning.   Such conduct would typically be perceived as
                                                                   13

coercive.   Cf. Commonwealth v. Portee, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 829,

833 (2012) (after troopers "sought to subdue [defendant] and

prevent him from fleeing, a reasonable person in the defendant's

circumstances would have understood that the troopers were in

the process of effecting an arrest" for purposes of proving

crime of resisting arrest).

    The Groome factors, which derived in part from Commonwealth

v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729 (1984), were developed because often

"the problem whether interrogation has taken place in custodial

circumstances is a vexing one, susceptible to resolution . . .

only by close scrutiny of the particular questioning session."

Bryant, supra at 736.   A nuanced analysis of the Groome factors

is unnecessary, however, for "obvious cases in which a suspect

has been formally arrested or otherwise deprived of his physical

freedom by police agents."    Bryant, supra.   To illustrate the

point, if a defendant is under arrest, the second and third

Groome factors, which go to the nature of the communications

between the officers and the defendant, are irrelevant:     even if

the arresting officer's questions are conversational and not

accusatory, the defendant is no less in custody.     Simply put, in

this case it is obvious that a reasonable person in the

defendant's position would not have believed that he was free to

leave.
                                                                    14

    Notwithstanding the Groome factors' questionable utility

here, we address them in the interest of completeness.

    i.   Place of the interrogation.    The fact that questioning

takes place on the street or in a public area often weighs

against a finding of custody.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Tejada, 484 Mass. 1, 9, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 441 (2020)

(fact that "interrogation was in a public parking lot, not in a

police station or other secluded area" weighed against

determination that defendant was in custody); Vanhouton v.

Commonwealth, 424 Mass. 327, 331 n.7, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 834

(1997), quoting Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 10 (1988)

("traffic stops commonly occur in the 'public view,' in an

atmosphere far 'less "police dominated" than that surrounding

the kinds of interrogation at issue in [Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966)] itself'"); Commonwealth v. Smith, 35 Mass. App.

Ct. 655, 657-658 (1993) (defendant not in custody where police

stopped his car to investigate motor vehicle accident and asked

preliminary "street-side" questions).

    But the defendant was not questioned in connection with a

traffic stop, which generally does not rise to the level of

custodial interrogation.   See Vellucci, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 277

("As a general rule, persons temporarily detained during an

ordinary traffic stop are not in custody for purposes of

Miranda, even though they may not feel free to leave").      Nor
                                                                     15

could the questioning of the defendant be characterized as a

routine "field investigation" as in Smith, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at

658, and the defendant did not initiate the encounter as in

Tejada, 484 Mass. at 8.      Here, prior to questioning, two

uniformed officers positioned the defendant against a tree next

to the side of the road on a cold winter night, after one of

them had chased him, tackled him, placed him in handcuffs, and

pat frisked him.      "To determine if the location of an

interrogation contributed to a coercive environment, we consider

the circumstances 'from the point of view of the defendant.'"

Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 618, quoting Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430

Mass. 139, 144 (1999), S.C., 443 Mass. 60 (2004).      From the

defendant's point of view, the officers' actions objectively

created a coercive and police-dominated environment, even if it

was not in a police station.

       ii.   Conveying that defendant was a suspect.   Questioning

that conveys the message that the defendant is suspected of a

crime lends to a coercive environment and typically supports the

conclusion that the defendant is in custody.      See Cawthron, 479

Mass. at 619; Commonwealth v. Jones, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 378, 382

(l997).      Brief, preliminary questions asked in an effort to

confirm or dispel suspicion of criminal activity typically do

not.    See Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 311 (2007).    An

open-ended preliminary question such as "What happened?" does
                                                                   16

not convey suspicion of wrongdoing.    See Commonwealth v.

Callahan, 401 Mass. 627, 630 (1988).

     Here, the judge erroneously focused on the officers'

subjective point of view, emphasizing that they did not yet know

about the murder and that "Thermitus placed handcuffs on the

defendant in order to find out what was going on.    The defendant

was not under arrest."    "[C]ustody must be determined based on

how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would

perceive his circumstances, not on the subjective views harbored

by either the interrogating officers or the person being

questioned" (citations omitted).    Medina, 485 Mass. at 303.5

After being forcefully detained, the first statement that the

defendant made was that he had been shot.    The officers did not

respond by asking neutral questions such as "what happened" or

where he had been shot.    Instead, Thermitus asked "why he ran."6

From Thermitus's perspective, the question may have been

     5 The judge, who decided the motion to suppress in April
2016, did not have the benefit of the Medina decision.

     6 Tranfaglia in fact did testify that he asked the defendant
neutral, preliminary questions before the tenor of the
questioning became more pointed. According to Tranfaglia, after
the defendant said he had been shot, Tranfaglia asked,
"[W]here?," and the defendant said, "[W]ay down the street."
Tranfaglia responded, "You were shot down there? What are you
doing all the way up here?" The defendant then said, "Fuck you,
. . . fuck this, get me EMS," prompting Tranfaglia to go back to
his cruiser and radio for help. However, the motion judge
omitted this part of Tranfaglia's testimony from his findings,
and we do not consider it in our analysis. See note 2, supra.
                                                                  17

neutral, but from the defendant's perspective, it may have

implied that if he had done nothing wrong, he would have had no

reason to run.   A reasonable person in the defendant's position,

having been pursued and tackled by a police officer, then asked

why he had attempted to flee, would likely perceive that the

officer suspected him of criminal activity.   That Thermitus did

not believe the defendant to be under arrest, or that he

detained the defendant just so he could "find out what was going

on," is immaterial if his words and actions conveyed something

else.   See Groome, 435 Mass. at 212 n.13 ("an officer's

subjective suspicions are relevant to the custody inquiry only

if those suspicions have been communicated to the defendant").

Cf. Damiano, 422 Mass. at 13 ("The question whether the

defendant was in protective custody is not controlling.    The

crucial question is whether, considering all the circumstances,

a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have

believed that he was in custody").

     iii.   Nature of the interrogation.   The nature of the

questioning was also consistent with a custodial atmosphere.     As

we have already noted, even after the defendant said he had been

shot, Thermitus questioned him about "why he ran."    The follow-

up question -– "why" the defendant had "just killed somebody" -–

was even more clearly intended to gather inculpatory evidence.

Even if Thermitus's questioning was "not aggressive, accusatory,
                                                                 18

or coercive," as the motion judge found, it was hardly a

"friendly chat" with the defendant's "voluntary acquiescence."

Bryant, 390 Mass. at 737.

    iv.     Defendant's freedom to end the encounter.    From

beginning to end, the special police officers' interaction with

the defendant communicated to a reasonable person in the

defendant's position that he was not at liberty to end the

interview and leave.    After using force to prevent the defendant

from running away, the special police officers did not leave his

side, nor remove the handcuffs, until Boston police detectives

took over and the defendant was transported by ambulance to a

hospital.   The defendant was later formally arrested.     The

fourth Groome factor, whether the defendant "was free to end the

interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking

the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview

terminated with an arrest," Groome, 435 Mass. at 212, supports a

finding of custody.

    v.    Totality of the circumstances.   Viewed in their

totality, the facts as found by the motion judge depicted a

coercive environment.    Moreover, the judge erroneously

discounted the officers' use of handcuffs to restrain the

defendant throughout the encounter.    Placing a suspect in

handcuffs is usually considered a physical restraint on freedom

tantamount to arrest.    See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pinney, 97
                                                                  19

Mass. App. Ct. 392, 396-397 (2020); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47

Mass. App. Ct. 825, 827 (1999).   Conversely, the absence of

handcuffs is usually cited to negate a finding of custody.     See,

e.g., Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 618 (defendant not in custody where

questioning occurred "in a public parking lot, during the

daytime, and the defendants were neither handcuffed nor

otherwise physically restrained"); Commonwealth v. Lopes, 455

Mass. 147, 163 (2009) ("defendant was not in custody after his

handcuffs were removed and he was told he was not under

arrest"); Commonwealth v. Burbine, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 148, 152

(2009) (interrogation of defendant not custodial where officers

"did not place him under arrest, handcuff him, or physically

restrain him by placing him in a cruiser or escorting him into

the station").

    Although "[i]t is not dispositive that the defendant was

handcuffed," Commonwealth v. Williams, 422 Mass. 111, 118

(1996), cases holding that a handcuffed suspect was not in

custody usually arise where the defendant had been detained to

allow officers to complete a threshold inquiry justified by

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.   Where handcuffing

the suspect is considered a reasonable step to ensure officer

safety or to prevent flight, it does not transform an

investigative stop into an arrest.   See, e.g., id. at 117-119;

Vellucci, 98 Mass. App. Ct. at 277, 279; Commonwealth v. Dyette,
                                                                  20

87 Mass. App. Ct. 548, 556-557 (2015); Commonwealth v. Andrews,

34 Mass. App. Ct. 324, 329-330 (1993).   The motion judge found

that the officers were confronted with "a volatile situation

that occurred quickly and unexpectedly"; however the evidence

did not suggest,7 nor did the judge find, that the officers were

in any danger or that the defendant presented a threat to public

safety that might excuse the failure to give Miranda warnings.

See Pinney, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 397, quoting New York v.

Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) ("The United States Supreme

Court has stated that, in some circumstances, 'the need for

answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the

public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule

protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-

incrimination'").

     While our independent analysis of the Groome factors

supports our view that the defendant's detention by the special

police officers was custodial, as discussed supra, it is largely

beside the point:   it is obvious that a reasonable person in the

defendant's position would have experienced the interaction as

coercive, would not have believed that he was free to leave, and

would have perceived the restraint on his freedom of movement as

     7 Thermitus testified, repeatedly, that he had no concern
for his own safety, and any hint of danger was quickly dispelled
when he pat frisked the defendant.
                                                                   21

the equivalent of that associated with a formal arrest.    Because

we conclude that the defendant was in custody, we turn to the

question whether he was subjected to interrogation.

    c.   Interrogation.   "Miranda warnings are required when a

person is subjected to 'custodial interrogation,' i.e.,

'questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a

person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his

freedom of action in any significant way.'"   Commonwealth v.

Doyle, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 786, 792 (1981), quoting Miranda, 384

U.S. at 444.   The defendant was subject to "express questioning"

beyond that "normally attendant to arrest and custody."    Rhode

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980).    See Commonwealth

v. Kacavich, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 941 (1990).   After taking

the defendant into custody, Thermitus asked him "why he ran,"

and when the defendant responded that he had just killed

somebody, Thermitus asked, "Why?"

    The motion judge, however, did not consider Thermitus's

questioning to amount to "interrogation" because the judge

viewed the questions as "preliminary in nature and directed to

discovering who the defendant was and what had happened to him."

In so concluding, the judge erroneously relied on Commonwealth

v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 9 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926

(2006) ("Questioning by law enforcement agents to secure a

volatile scene or establish the need for or provide medical care
                                                                    22

is not colloquially understood as interrogation . . . .     Rather,

such questioning is considered part of the government's

peacekeeping or community caretaking function" [emphasis

added]).     This language was taken from the court's discussion of

whether statements made to law enforcement agents are to be

considered "testimonial" under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

36 (2004).     The court made it clear that it was not relying on

"definitions of interrogation found throughout the Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 44 (1966), case law, but rather on everyday,

common understandings of the term."     Gonsalves, supra at 7.8

     The Commonwealth's reliance on Kirwan, 448 Mass. at 311

(officer's "questioning was generally of a fact-finding nature,

intended to verify or dispel a reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity, for which Miranda warnings are not required"), is also

misplaced.     This language was taken from the Kirwan court's

analysis of the Groome factors and concerned whether the

defendant was in custody, not whether he was subjected to

interrogation.     See Kirwan, 448 Mass. at 313.9

     8 Although at the hearing on the motion to suppress the
Commonwealth relied on the quoted language from Gonsalves to
argue that questions asked in the course of community caretaking
are not interrogation, on appeal the Commonwealth makes no
argument concerning community caretaking. Accordingly, we need
not decide whether community caretaking was involved here or, if
it was, whether that would be relevant to any issue before us.

     9 Similar language from Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 Mass.
1, 4 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977) ("The questions
                                                                    23

     The questioning here was much like that found to be

interrogation in Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. at 826, where the

arresting officer was "attempting, he testified, to calm [the

defendant] down, and asked what she was doing in the area at

that early hour (5:15 A.M.)."   "The fact that [Thermitus's]

question was introductory does not automatically cause it to be

classified as merely 'preliminary' and not interrogatory for

Miranda purposes."   Id. at 828 (distinguishing cases in which

preliminary questioning did not amount to custodial

interrogation).   See Damiano, 422 Mass. at 13 ("The fact that

the trooper's initial questioning was not hostile and was

undertaken simply to find out what the defendant knew about what

had happened does not excuse the failure to give Miranda

warnings").

     The defendant was subject to custodial interrogation.

Because he was not given Miranda warnings, his motion to

suppress his statements to Thermitus should have been allowed.10

     d.   Harmless error analysis.   The question remains whether

the improper admission of the defendant's statements was

were preliminary, directed to discovering who the defendant was
and what he knew about the circumstances"), likewise concerned
the issue whether the questioning was custodial, see id. at 4-5.

     10Because we conclude that the defendant's roadside
confession should have been suppressed on this ground, we need
not address the defendant's separate contention that it was not
voluntary.
                                                                   24

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   See Chapman v. California,

386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273,

287-289 (2012).    Other than the defendant's confession, the

Commonwealth presented no evidence of motive, and the

inferential evidence of the defendant's intent to kill Constant

was not overwhelming.   Indeed, according to Hunter's version of

the events, the defendant's actions, which began with an attempt

to stab her, were inexplicable.    The defendant claimed that he

acted in self-defense, as he maintained in his letter to

Constant's mother, and the jurors were also instructed on

voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.    The evidence that the

defendant admitted, shortly after the crime, that he had "just

killed somebody" because that person was "running his mouth" was

the strongest evidence offered at trial to provide a motive for

the defendant's actions, to disprove his self-defense claim, and

to prove malice.   The prejudicial impact of this evidence was

"too strong to be considered harmless."    Commonwealth v. Howard,

469 Mass. 721, 737 (2014), S.C., 479 Mass. 52 (2018).    See

Commonwealth v. Harris, 371 Mass. 462, 473 (1976) (referring to

"the almost conclusive effect of any defendant's confession on a

jury").   Accordingly, the defendant's convictions must be

reversed.11

     11As the defendant was impliedly acquitted of murder in the
first degree, any retrial of the murder indictment must be
                                                                    25

    2.   Hospital identification.    The defendant claims that

Hunter's identification of him in the hospital should have been

excluded because the procedure was unreliable and unnecessarily

suggestive.   At the suppression hearing, Boston police

Detectives Francis McLaughlin and Robert Kenney, whose testimony

the motion judge "found to be truthful in all respects,"

testified that the identification proceeded as follows.

    McLaughlin accompanied Hunter, in the back seat of a police

cruiser, as she was transported to the hospital.     He explained

that there was a person at the hospital who might or might not

have been involved in the stabbing of Constant -- the police did

not know -- and that it was important to determine if this

person was or was not involved.     Before bringing Hunter into the

emergency room, McLaughlin asked the police officers standing

near the defendant to move away; he intended to walk Hunter

around the perimeter of the emergency room, past the partitioned

areas where the patients were being treated, to see if she

recognized anyone.   However, as soon as McLaughlin and Hunter

rounded the corner from the hallway to the treatment area,

Hunter saw the defendant across the room and said, "That's him,

that's him.   He's the one."   At the time, the defendant had just

treated as a trial for murder in the second degree. See
Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 228 (2014);
Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 455 (1980).
                                                                    26

received treatment for head wounds, and his face was illuminated

by a surgical light.

    The motion judge found that the police did "an exemplary

job of trying to make sure the identification procedure was done

fairly and orderly," that it was conducted promptly after the

incident, and that the lighting did not make the procedure

"unduly suggestive."     We agree.

    "Although one-on-one showup identification procedures are

generally disfavored as inherently suggestive, they only raise

due process concerns if it is determined that the procedure was

unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive" (quotation and

citation omitted).     Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 811-

812 (2018).   Moreover, showup identifications are appropriate

"if there is 'good reason' to secure prompt identification of a

suspect."   Id. at 812, quoting Commonwealth v. Dew, 478 Mass.

304, 306 (2017).     See Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357,

361-362 (1995); Commonwealth v. Travis, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 607,

613 (2022).   The burden is on the defendant to prove not only

that the identification procedure being challenged "was

suggestive, but [also] that it was 'unnecessarily suggestive.'"

Johnson, 473 Mass. at 597, quoting Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470

Mass. 228, 235 (2014).

    Here, the police had good reason to conduct the hospital

identification promptly, during the investigation of a violent
                                                                   27

crime, to determine whether to arrest or release the defendant.

The defendant does not argue otherwise.    Rather, he focuses on

two factors that he characterizes as "especially suggestive

circumstances":   the fact that his head was illuminated by a

surgical light, and "Hunter's knowledge that she hit the

assailant in the head with a metal object."

    As to the lighting, which was the result of medical rather

than a police procedure, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the judge's determination that it did not create "highly or

especially suggestive circumstances" that would render the

identification unreliable.   Johnson, 473 Mass. at 598, 602.

Even when suspects are illuminated as the result of police

procedure during a showup, this circumstance does not make an

identification impermissibly suggestive.   See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Meas, 467 Mass. 434, 442, cert. denied, 574 U.S.

858 (2014); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 452 Mass. 617, 628-629

(2008).   The defendant's suggestion that Hunter positively

identified the defendant based on the wound to his head is mere

speculation.   Moreover, the appearance of a suspect based on his

recent involvement in the crime under investigation is part of

the inherent suggestiveness of a showup procedure, not a special

element of unfairness.   See Commonwealth v. Chotain, 31 Mass.

App. Ct. 336, 341-342 (1991) (hospital identification reliable

notwithstanding officers' statement to witness "that the man he
                                                                   28

would see had a gash on his head in the same place that [the

witness] had struck the intruder").12

     3.   Recorded interview.   The defendant argues that his

recorded interview at the police station following his arrest

should have been suppressed because the Commonwealth failed to

show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his waiver of his Miranda

rights, and the statements themselves, were voluntary.     See

Tremblay, 480 Mass. at 655-656, 661-662 ("Due process requires a

separate inquiry into the voluntariness of [a defendant's

statement] apart from the validity of the Miranda waiver"

[citation omitted]).   Because the motion judge's ruling on the

defendant's motion to suppress the recorded interview was based

entirely on his review of the recording and not drawn from any

live testimony, our review is de novo, without deference to the

motion judge's findings of fact.   See Yusuf, 488 Mass. at 385;

Tremblay, supra at 646-647, 656-657.

     The recorded interview begins with the defendant walking

into the interview room, taking a seat, standing up when

directed to a different chair, remaining standing as an officer

removes his handcuffs, and then sitting again, all without

assistance.   The defendant listened and responded appropriately

     12Because Hunter's unequivocal out-of-court identification
of the defendant was admissible, she was properly permitted to
identify him in court. See Dew, 478 Mass. at 315.
                                                                    29

as McLaughlin asked for identifying information and then went

through the defendant's Miranda rights one by one; the defendant

followed along on a written Miranda waiver form, initialed each

as it was read to him, and then signed the form.    The tone of

the interview was cordial and conversational throughout.    After

waiving his Miranda rights, the defendant said, "I won't answer

any questions until I gain a full understanding of what's going

on."   McLaughlin explained that a man had been stabbed in Hyde

Park and that the defendant was under arrest as a result of the

police investigation.   The defendant responded, "I still have no

idea why I'm here," and during the interview he maintained not

only that he did not understand what was going on, but also that

he had been the victim of an attack.    At one point, he asserted,

"You guys don't have the crucial evidence to put me away."

Toward the end of the interview, the defendant said, "I had

nothing to do with anything, I don't understand why I'm in the

police station, where's the guy who could have attacked me?"

Kenney answered, "It could be the guy that's dead," to which the

defendant responded, "Somebody did a good job then."    Soon

thereafter the defendant said he was done answering questions,

and the detectives promptly ended the interview.

       Although "[t]he voluntariness of the waiver on the basis of

Miranda and the voluntariness of the statements on due process

grounds are separate and distinct issues," Commonwealth v.
                                                                  30

Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 673 (1995), the defendant's argument

does not distinguish between the two.   He argues that his

"incoherent" responses to questions, his statements that he did

not know what was going on, and his voluntary consumption of

substances13 rendered his waiver and statements involuntary.    In

any event, both issues are "determined in light of the totality

of the circumstances and they share many of the same relevant

factors."   Id.   These include the defendant's conduct, his "age,

education, intelligence and emotional stability, . . . his

physical and mental condition, . . . and the details of the

interrogation, including the conduct of the police."

Commonwealth v. St. Peter, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 517, 519 (2000).

See Commonwealth v. Welch, 487 Mass. 425, 438 (2021).    "The

Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable

doubt, in the totality of the circumstances, that a defendant's

waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and that his

statements were voluntary."    Commonwealth v. Auclair, 444 Mass.

348, 353 (2005).

     Having conducted an independent review of the recorded

interview, we agree with the motion judge that the defendant's

waiver and statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

     13During the interview, the defendant asserted that could
not answer the detectives' questions about his earlier
activities because he had been "trippin' balls all day" on
marijuana and crystal methamphetamine.
                                                                   31

The defendant is a high school graduate and had completed one

year of college.   Although he at times appeared lethargic, his

responses were coherent, consistent, and even calculated.   His

repeated assertion that he did not understand what he was doing

in the police station was not a statement about his orientation

with respect to place, time, or situation, but rather had to do

with the quantum of evidence the police had against him.    His

comments regarding smoking marijuana tainted with crystal

methamphetamine pertained to his alleged lack of memory of the

events that took place earlier that day, not his inability to

engage in a conversation.14   "[T]he mere influence of drugs or

alcohol on the defendant will not transform otherwise voluntary

statements into involuntary ones."   Welch, 487 Mass. at 439.

"[T]he defendant was not demonstrating confusion" during the

interview, Commonwealth v. Rivera, 482 Mass. 259, 267 (2019),

and it does not appear that his waiver or statements "are

attributable in large measure to [his] debilitated condition,"

Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 Mass. 131, 141 (2015), cert. denied,

579 U.S. 906 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 395 Mass.

448, 455 (1985).   To the contrary, his comportment and behavior

     14We note that the recorded interview took place
approximately five hours after the defendant was first
apprehended, and any use of substances must have occurred prior
to that time.
                                                                      32

"indicate a rational understanding of the situation and a

voluntary decision to speak to police."    Bell, supra at 142.15

    B.   Authentication of letter from jail.    The defendant

contends that the trial judge erred in admitting, without

sufficient authentication, the handwritten letter received by

Constant's mother.    To admit the letter in evidence, the judge

had to make a preliminary determination that the jury could find

it more likely than not that the defendant was the author.      See

Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 447 (2011); Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 195, 200-201 (2023); Mass. G.

Evid. §§ 104(b), 901(a) (2022).    "In the context of written

letters, where a witness has received a letter and cannot

identify the writer's handwriting or signature, evidence that

the writer identified himself as a particular individual is not

sufficient to authenticate the letter."    Purdy, supra at 449.

However, "where other confirming circumstances are present, a

letter can be authenticated and properly admitted in evidence"

(citation omitted).   Id.   Authentication of an item may be

    15 As the motion judge, acting on the defendant's motion to
suppress, reviewed the recorded interview and ruled on the
defendant's claim that his Miranda waiver and statements were
involuntary, there was no need, as the defendant contends, for
the trial judge to conduct a second voir dire on the same issue
prior to admitting the recorded interview in evidence. See
Bryant, 390 Mass. at 745. In addition, the trial judge gave a
"humane practice" instruction contemporaneously with the
admission of the interview and again in the final charge.
                                                                    33

proved by the contents of the item itself.   See id. at 447-448,

quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 901(b)(1), (4) (2011) ("Evidence may be

authenticated by direct or circumstantial evidence, including

its '[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or

other distinctive characteristics'").   See also Welch, 487 Mass.

at 441 (confirming circumstances included content of text

messages, "replete with details of the defendant's and the

victim's lives, including the tensions within their

relationship, aspects of their living arrangements, and the

suspension of the defendant's driver's license from his

[operating while under the influence of alcohol] charge");

Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 547 (2011)

(airline documents authenticated by their use of "several

distinctive internal codes"); Commonwealth v. Gilman, 89 Mass.

App. Ct. 752, 759 (2016) (electronic communications

authenticated by evidence that "the conversations were replete

with personal references, including pet names the defendant and

victim used for each other, and references to events in which

the two alone participated").

    Abundant confirming circumstances were present here.      The

letter was mailed from the Nashua Street jail, where the

defendant was being detained prior to trial, and his name was

handwritten in the return address corner of the envelope.     The

letter contained details that only someone familiar with the
                                                                       34

facts of the murder would know.     The author referred to Constant

and Hunter by name and stated that the assault originated in

Hunter's bedroom, that Hunter hit him on the back of the head

with a spatula, and that he used "a kabar pocket knife."      The

judge did not abuse her discretion in finding sufficient

confirming circumstances that would allow the jury to determine,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant wrote the

letter.16

     C.     Defendant's medical records.   The defendant also argues

that the trial judge abused her discretion in excluding medical

records regarding his two-week admission to Carney Hospital, six

months before the murder, for what the records describe as a

"psychotic break associated with significant aggression."        The

records of that admission also state that the defendant

experienced "auditory hallucinations and paranoia" and that his

history was "complicated by marijuana usage."     At the final

pretrial conference, the defendant argued that the evidence

could be relevant to his ability to form the requisite intent

for deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity and cruelty.

The judge granted the Commonwealth's motion "to preclude

testimony about any alleged mental health diagnosis of

     16When the letter was admitted, the judge instructed the
jury that it was for them to decide whether the letter came from
the defendant.
                                                                  35

defendant," reasoning that the records in question were not

relevant because the defendant had not made any showing or

proffered any evidence that he was suffering from the same

mental condition at the time of the crime.17

     The records were excluded in the context of a trial for

murder in the first degree.   Any new trial will be on a charge

of murder in the second degree.   See note 11, supra.   As the

evidence of the defendant's prior mental illness may have

different relevance at any new trial, and as it was excluded

based on the deficiencies of the defendant's particular showing

at the time of the first trial, we decline to address whether

the trial judge abused her discretion in excluding the records.

Before any new trial, the defendant is free to renew his attempt

to introduce relevant, admissible evidence of his mental health

status prior to the murder.

                                    Judgments reversed.

                                    Verdicts set aside.

     17As the Commonwealth correctly notes in its brief, the
defendant had previously waived the defenses of lack of criminal
responsibility and diminished capacity in open court, and at the
final pretrial conference he made no reference to calling a
mental health expert at trial; the judge's ruling, therefore,
related only to medical records.