Court Opinion

ID: 9657043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:11:29.347399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:40.121269
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
After the test results had been admitted as evidence, over general objections, at the beginning of the hearing, Officer Busch testified on direct examination:
And then I pressed the start test switch and then the Intoxilyzer says to insert the test record. I inserted the test record and then I made sure after that ... well I had been checking him all *602along that he didn’t have anything in his mouth.
* * * * * *
Then after the first subject test, then I come to the part where I blew through the simulator, attached the simulator, recorded the simulator temperature blow, and then I depressed the start test switch again. And then ... the simulator temperature was 34.1 degrees, which is in the proper tolerance. And then I disconnected the simulator after the standard solution test. Depressed the start test switch again. Then a clean mouthpiece was used and disposed of after the second subject test.
Officer Busch then testified to the test results, without objection.
Later, on cross-examination, Officer Busch testified:
MR. SCHOPPERT: Just for shorthand purposes that’s the card. Now, did you look at the machine prior to the insertion of the card?
TROOPER BUSCH: Yes.
MR. SCHOPPERT: And the display time would have expired and you put the card in, right?
TROOPER BUSCH: When it’s time to put the card in it says insert test record or something like that.
MR. SCHOPPERT: So the display time would have expired, right?
TROOPER BUSCH: Yeah, it wasn’t on there then.
MR. SCHOPPERT: Did you reprint this card at all?
TROOPER BUSCH: No.
The hearing officer found that “Busch ... properly performed ... the Intoxilyzer tests.”
Prom this skimpy record, the majority opinion concludes that “[w]e cannot say, without expert advice, that the failure to follow the portion of the approved method governing the timely insertion of the test record could not affect the test results.” To me, that is weighing the evidence, not reviewing an abuse of discretion by the hearing officer in admitting the Intoxilyzer test result.
The majority continues to confuse the foundation for evidence with the weight of evidence. Minor deviations in procedure may arguably affect the evidentiary weight of alcohol test results, but they should not affect competence. My reasons for this position have been repeatedly explained in my dissents to similar majority opinions in Moser v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner, 369 N.W.2d 650 (N.D.1985); Schirado v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner, 382 N.W.2d 391 (N.D.1986); State v. Reil, 409 N.W.2d 99 (N.D.1987); State v. Nygaard, 426 N.W.2d 547 (N.D.1988); State v. Schwalk, 430 N.W.2d 317 (N.D.1988); Glaspey v. Backes, 462 N.W.2d 635 (N.D.1990). See also State v. Vogel, 467 N.W.2d 86, 91 (N.D.1991). In this case, the deviation was minor, if a deviation existed at all.
The majority has effectively amended NDCC 39-20-07(5) to read that a test result can be admitted only “if the test is shown to have been [‘scrupulously’] performed according to methods ..: approved by the state toxicologist....” Yet, the standard for admission of evidence before an administrative agency only requires “evidence of probative value.” NDCC 28-32-06. See Schwind v. Director, Dept. of Transp., 462 N.W.2d 147, 149 (N.D.1990). Therefore, I believe that the majority opinion improperly applies a weighing standard, not an abuse of discretion standard, to admission of blood alcohol tests in agency proceedings.
Ordinarily, if the commissioner has not made an adequate record at the hearing, I would not favor allowing the agency another opportunity “for rehearing and the presentation of additional evidence” under NDCC 39-20-06. However, because I believe that the majority has gone so far astray in its evidentiary review, I reluctantly join in the Chief Justice’s separate dissent calling for a remand “for the receipt of evidence on the effect of the deviation” in this case. If appellate review is going to fuss over such a trivial detail, without clear evidence of a disqualifying effect, a re*603mand for expert testimony to clarify serves public policy better.