Court Opinion

ID: 9904768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 20:02:07.657375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:25.208509
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/27/23 P. v. Viveros CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084608
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                           (Kern Super. Ct. No. BF181346A)
                    v.

 MARCOS VIVEROS,                                                                          OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Brian M.
McNamara, Judge.
         David W. Beaudreau, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Kari R.
Mueller, Amanda D. Cary, and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                    INTRODUCTION
       A jury convicted defendant and appellant Marcos Viveros of attempted murder
(count 1; Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664), finding true it was deliberate and
premediated (§ 189, subd. (a)); assault with a firearm (count 2; § 245, subd. (a)(2));
criminal threats (count 3; § 422); grossly negligent discharge of a firearm (count 4;
§ 246.3, subd. (a)); being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 5; § 29800,
subd. (a)(1)); unlawful possession of ammunition (count 6; § 30305, subd. (a)(1)); two
counts of inflicting corporal injury on a person in a dating relationship (counts 7 and 10;
§ 273.5, subd. (a)); robbery (count 8; § 212.5, subd. (a)); and stalking (count 9; § 646.9,
subd. (a)). The jury found true appellant used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53,
subd. (b)) and discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) in count 1 and that he used a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in counts 2, 3, and 7.
       Appellant raises three challenges to his sentence on appeal. First, appellant claims
the trial court gave a legally erroneous jury instruction on voluntary intoxication that
precluded the jury from considering voluntary intoxication evidence as it relates to
premeditation and deliberation. Second, appellant claims his felony conviction for
count 10 should be reversed since it was charged as a misdemeanor for all purposes
pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(4). Third, appellant claims the trial court violated
the Sixth Amendment by relying on aggravating circumstances to impose upper term
sentences that were not found true beyond a reasonable doubt and do not comply with
section 1170, subdivision (b).
       We conclude the voluntary intoxication instruction was legally erroneous but that
the error was harmless; the court erred when it accepted the People’s motion to amend
count 10 to a felony after they chose to charge it as a misdemeanor under section 17,
subdivision (b)(4) for all purposes; and that the imposition of the upper terms violated the

       1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.

                                             2.
Sixth Amendment and do not comply with section 1170, subdivision (b). Therefore, we
vacate the sentence, modify count 10 to reflect a misdemeanor and remand for full
resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.     April 3, 2019 Incident
       A.R. was in a dating relationship with appellant. She testified that during her
relationship with appellant, he would drink beer every other day, and they smoked weed
together every day. A.R. did not drink.
       On April 3, 2019, A.R. woke up to appellant pulling her off the bed and saying,
“[W]ake up bitch.” A.R. described appellant as being in an extreme state of anger.
Appellant saw messages on A.R.’s cell phone that appeared to be between A.R. and
another man. Appellant did not believe A.R.’s explanation that the messages were
forwarded from her friend. Appellant told A.R. he was going to kill her and himself.
Appellant grabbed a handgun from somewhere in the room. He sat on the bed with the
gun in his hand while A.R. stood about three feet in front of him. Appellant then pointed
the gun at A.R. and said, “I’m gonna f[**]kin’ kill you bitch.” A.R. saw appellant’s
fingers curl around the trigger. When appellant’s fingers moved, A.R. hit his arm and
pushed the gun up and to the side. The gun discharged next to A.R.’s right ear. A.R.’s
face was bright red, and the side of her face hurt. The gunshot impacted A.R.’s hearing.
       A.R. testified she knew what appellant was like when he was drunk or “stoned”
and said he was maybe stoned but not drunk on the night of the incident. The officer who
transported appellant after arrest said that he looked at appellant to see if he had been
drinking alcohol, and he did not appear to be drinking alcohol or under the influence of
narcotics.
II.    March 23, 2020 Incident
       A neighbor saw appellant and A.R. walking to a store and saw appellant “pick
[A.R.] up by [her] throat.” Appellant was holding A.R. by her neck, “kind of in a

                                              3.
headlock,” cussing and giving her commands like which way he wanted her walking.
A.R. pushed back against the headlock but did not give a lot of resistance. Appellant
appeared intoxicated as he was stumbling and fumbling while he walked. The neighbor
called the police, but A.R. denied appellant hurt her. After the police left, appellant and
A.R. started arguing and physically fighting. Appellant pushed, punched, and kicked
A.R. Appellant took money out of A.R.’s wallet and left.
III.   Stipulation
       Appellant stipulated that he was previously convicted of a felony before these
incidents.
IV.    Information and Verdict
       Appellant was charged with the following: attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a),
664; count 1) alleging the attempted murder was deliberate and premeditated (§ 189,
subd. (a)), that appellant used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)) and
that he discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2); count 2) alleging appellant used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); criminal
threat (§ 422; count 3) alleging appellant used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a));
discharging a firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3, subd. (a); count 4); unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5); unlawful possession
of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 6); two counts of inflicting
corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 7 & 10) alleging appellant used a firearm in
count 7 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); first degree robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (a); count 8); and
stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a); count 9). The prosecutor elected to charge count 10 as a
misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(4).
       Before trial, the prosecutor moved to amend the information to strike the election
under section 17, subdivision (b)(4) to make count 10 a felony. Appellant objected, but
the trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion and amended the information, making

                                             4.
count 10 a felony. Appellant was arraigned on the amended information and pled not
guilty.
          On August 12, 2021, a jury convicted appellant of all counts and found true all
allegations. On June 29, 2022, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of seven
years to life, plus a determinate term of 26 years eight months. Specifically, the court
imposed life in prison with the possibility of parole after seven years on count 1, plus 20
years for discharging a firearm for count 1; imposed and stayed pursuant to section 654
the upper term on counts 2 through 7; a six-year upper term on count 8; and a consecutive
eight-month term on count 9.
                                        DISCUSSION

I.        The Trial Court Erred by Precluding Premeditation and Deliberation in the
          Voluntary Intoxication Instruction, but the Error Was Harmless
          Appellant contends the premeditation and deliberation allegation should be
reversed because the court’s voluntary intoxication instruction precluded the jury from
considering evidence of appellant’s intoxication when deciding premeditation and
deliberation. The People first argue appellant forfeited this claim by failing to request an
instruction relating voluntary intoxication to premeditation and deliberation. Second, the
People argue that the evidence of intoxication was so weak that no instruction was
warranted, and any error could not have prejudiced appellant. We agree that the court
erred by precluding premeditation and deliberation in its voluntary intoxication
instructions, but conclude the error was harmless.
          A.     Relevant Background
          At trial, A.R. described appellant’s daily habits, which included drinking beer
every other day and smoking marijuana. A.R. did not think appellant was “drunk” during
the incident but thought he might have been “stoned.”
          After the close of evidence, the trial court asked defense counsel whether there
were instructions the court was going to read that he requested the court not read; or

                                               5.
instructions he requested the court to read but refused to read. Defense counsel
responded “no” to both inquiries. The court asked the prosecutor about the voluntary
intoxication instruction, and the prosecutor asked the court not to read the instruction
because he “felt there was insufficient evidence to bring this to the attention of the jury,”
and that it could be handled in argument. The court reminded the parties that this
instruction was not a sua sponte instruction, but one given upon request. Defense counsel
affirmed that he requested the voluntary intoxication instruction and was still comfortable
with the instruction. The court determined the evidence of intoxication “weaved in and
out” and accepted the instruction.
       The court gave the following instruction regarding voluntary intoxication:

              “You may consider evidence if any of the [appellant]’s voluntary
       intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence only in
       deciding whether the [appellant] acted or failed to do an act with the
       required specific intent in Count[] 1 .… [¶]

                “A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated
       by willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance knowing
       that it could produce an intoxicating effect or willingly assume the risk of
       that effect.

              “In connection with the charge of attempted murder Count [1] … the
       People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
       [appellant] acted with the intent to kill. If the People have not met this
       burden, you must find the [appellant] not guilty of attempted murder .…
       [¶] … [¶]

             “Do not consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for any other
       purpose. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the crimes charged in
       Counts Two, Four, Five, Six, Seven or Ten or the lessor included offense of
       Penal Code Section 243(E)(1) in Counts Seven and Ten.”
       During closing arguments, defense counsel did not argue that premeditation and
deliberation were affected by voluntary intoxication.

                                              6.
       B.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       Section 29.4, subdivision (a) states that “[n]o act committed by a person while in a
state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in that
condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity
to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose,
intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the
accused committed the act.”
       “Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or
not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with
murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice
aforethought.” (§ 29.4, subd. (b).) “Voluntary intoxication includes the voluntary
ingestion, injection, or taking by any other means of any intoxicating liquor, drug, or
other substance.” (Id., subd. (c).)
       With the statutory elimination of diminished capacity as a defense, there is no sua
sponte duty to instruct on the effect of voluntary intoxication on the mental states
required for attempted murder. (§ 28, subd. (b); People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103,
1119–1120 (Saille); People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 [includes attempted
murder] (Castillo).) Voluntary intoxication is now more like a “pinpoint” instruction to
which a defendant is entitled upon request. (Saille, at p. 1119.) Such instructions are
required to be given only upon request when there is evidence supportive of the theory,
but they are not required to be given sua sponte. (Ibid.; People v. Ricardi (1992)
9 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1432 [no sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary intoxication but
must give this instruction on request]; Castillo, at p. 1014.)
       Evidence of voluntary intoxication is “ ‘admissible solely on the issue of whether
or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated,
or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.’ ” (Castillo,
supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1013; Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1111–1112; § 29.4,

                                              7.
subd. (b).) Although voluntary intoxication is not an affirmative defense to a crime, the
jury may consider evidence of voluntary intoxication and its effect on the defendant’s
required mental state. (§ 29.4; People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 982–986
[relevant to knowledge element in receiving stolen property]; People v. Mendoza (1998)
18 Cal.4th 1114, 1131–1134 [relevant to mental state in aiding and abetting].)
       We review de novo a claim of instructional error. (People v. Posey (2004)
32 Cal.4th 193, 218 [“[t]he independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in
assessing whether instructions correctly state the law”].)
       C.     Analysis
       Appellant argues the court’s instruction on voluntary intoxication was an incorrect
statement of law because it “improperly precluded the jury from considering evidence of
voluntary intoxication when deciding whether [appellant] acted with premedication and
deliberation as charged in count 1.” The People argue appellant’s claim is forfeited
because the court did not have a sua sponte duty to give the pinpoint instruction on
premeditation and deliberation and appellant failed to object to the court’s instruction.
However, appellant contends forfeiture does not apply where the court fails to give a
correct statement of law.
       Generally, because the trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on the pinpoint
instruction for voluntary intoxication, failing to raise the issue in the trial court may result
in forfeiture. (See People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1260 [failure to object to
instruction forfeits claim on appeal]; People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970,
1037 [same].) Here, appellant requested the instruction on voluntary intoxication but
contends the court erred when it did not instruct that “voluntary intoxication evidence
was relevant to two distinct mental states: the intent to kill required for the attempted
murder charge and the premeditation and deliberation required for the separate
allegation.” However, appellant did not request the specific pinpoint instruction relating
voluntary intoxication to premeditation and deliberation.

                                               8.
       In Saille, “the instructions given (CALJIC No. 4.21) related voluntary intoxication
only to the question of whether defendant had the specific intent to kill” and did not
include the mental state for premeditation and deliberation. (Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at
p. 1117.) The defendant contended that the court should have instructed sua sponte that
the jury could consider his voluntary intoxication in determining whether he had
premeditated and deliberated the murder. (Ibid.) The court noted that “[t]he abolition of
the defense of diminished capacity had eliminated the need for a sua sponte instruction
relating mental illness or voluntary intoxication to the required mental states.” (Id. at
pp. 1117, 1119.) The court concluded the court did not err in failing to instruct sua
sponte on premeditation and deliberation since evidence of intoxication does not involve
a “ ‘general principle of law.’ ” (Id. at p. 1120.)
       Here, the trial court gave the CALCRIM equivalent to the instruction given in
Saille on voluntary intoxication, similarly telling the jury they may consider evidence of
appellant’s voluntary intoxication “only in deciding whether the defendant acted or failed
to do an act with the required specific intent .…” (See CALCRIM No. 3426; CALJIC
No. 4.21.) Like in Saille, the instruction did not relate voluntary intoxication to mental
state or premeditation and deliberation. Appellant requested the voluntary intoxication
instruction but did not request the specific pinpoint instruction relating voluntary
intoxication to premeditation and deliberation. On this point, the court did not err in not
adding the premeditation and deliberation portion of the voluntary intoxication
instruction where appellant did not request it.
       However, knowing that the trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct
on the pinpoint instruction on premeditation and deliberation, appellant claims that the
instruction the court gave regarding voluntary intoxication was legally incorrect. As the
People point out, under the doctrine of invited error, appellant could be barred from
challenging the instruction since it was appellant who requested the voluntary
intoxication instruction. The Supreme Court, in People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79,

                                              9.
explained that the “doctrine of invited error bars [an appellant] from challenging a jury
instruction given by the trial court when the [appellant] has requested the instruction
based on a ‘ “ ‘ “conscious and deliberate tactical choice.” ’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 138.)
However, unlike in DeHoyos, where the defendant was barred from challenging the
instruction he requested, appellant is not challenging the voluntary intoxication
instruction, but claiming that the court erred by giving an incorrect statement of law when
it gave the instruction. As our Supreme Court has recognized, when a court “does choose
to instruct, it must do so correctly.” (Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1015; People v.
Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 325.) As such, appellant’s claim that the instruction was
legally incorrect is not forfeited. (See People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 875,
fn. 11, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104 [“[w]here,
however, defendant asserts that an instruction is incorrect in law an objection is not
required”]; People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1012 [no forfeiture where trial
court gave incorrect statement of the law]; People v. Smith (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766,
778, fn. 5 [no forfeiture of argument that instruction incorrectly stated the law].)
       Specifically, here, appellant claims that the instruction unlawfully precluded the
jury from considering voluntary intoxication as it relates to premeditation and
deliberation. However, “[e]vidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the
issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when
charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored
express malice aforethought.” (§ 29.4, subd. (b).) As such, appellant’s claim is
cognizable on appeal.
       Our Supreme Court, in Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th 1009 and People v. Hughes
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, provides some guidance on the issue of whether the court’s
instruction on voluntary intoxication was misleading when it failed to include the mental
state of premeditation and deliberation. In Hughes, the defendant claimed that his
convictions should be reversed because the jury instruction on voluntary intoxication,

                                              10.
delivered at defense counsel’s request, “ ‘eviscerated’ ” the defendant’s voluntary
intoxication defense to those charges. (Hughes, supra, at p. 340.) The trial court had
instructed the jury that the defendant’s intoxication should be considered in determining
whether the defendant possessed the “ ‘specific intent and/or mental state’ ” required.
The defendant did not request the specific pinpoint instruction on premeditation and
deliberation. (Id. at p. 342.) The Hughes court found no error, holding that “ ‘by relating
intoxication to “mental state,” a reasonable jury would have understood deliberation and
premeditation to be “mental states” for which it should consider the evidence of
intoxication.” (Ibid.)
       In Castillo, the appellate court criticized the instruction given on voluntary
intoxication because it did not include “mental state,” which it felt would have been
required for premeditation and deliberation. (Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1016.)
Even though the appellate court recognized no request was made by the defendant, it
found the instruction “misleading because ‘when the first sentence of the version of
CALJIC No. 4.21 that was read to the jury referred to “the specific intent to kill” and was
completely silent as to mental state, [it felt] a conscientious juror would have understood
it to pertain only to the charge of attempted murder, and not to the concept of
premeditation as to either the attempted or the … actual murder[].’ ” (Ibid.)
       However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court and concluded
“[t]he instructions as a whole … were not misleading.” (Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at
p. 1016.) “ ‘[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire
charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular
instruction.’ ” (Ibid.; People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538.) “ ‘ “The absence
of an essential element in one instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of
the instructions as a whole.” ’ ” (Castillo, at p. 1016; Burgener, at p. 539.) Even though
the trial court did not include “mental state” when it told the jury what voluntary
intoxication could be considered for, it did relate voluntary intoxication to “ ‘specific

                                             11.
intent or mental state’ ” elsewhere in the instructions. (Castillo, supra, at p. 1016.) The
instructions correctly explained that, for the jury to find the defendant guilty of first
degree murder, it must find he acted with “ ‘deliberation and premeditation.’ ” (Ibid.)
The court further explained that the defendant’s deliberation and premeditation to kill
“ ‘must have been formed upon preexisting reflection and not upon a sudden heat of
passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation .…’ ” (Ibid.) “A
reasonable jury would have understood deliberation and premeditation to be ‘mental
states’ for which it should consider the evidence of intoxication as to either attempted
murder or murder.” (Ibid.) Therefore, “[a]lthough the trial court might have adapted the
first paragraph of CALJIC No. 4.21 to refer to both the specific intent necessary for
murder and the additional mental state necessary for first degree murder, its failure to do
so did not mislead the jury in light of the rest of the instructions.” (Id. at p. 1017.) Since
the trial court expressly stated the jury could consider intoxication “ ‘where a specific
intent or mental state is an essential element of the crime’ ” (ibid., italics added by
Castillo), the Castillo court held that “[n]o reasonable juror would understand the
instructions to permit the jury to consider intoxication in determining whether defendant
specifically intended to kill but to prohibit it from considering that same intoxication in
determining whether he premeditated and deliberated.” (Ibid.) The Castillo court
concluded the trial court “did not breach its duty to instruct correctly once it decided to
instruct on voluntary intoxication.” (Id. at p. 1018.)
       Here, even when considering the court’s instructions as a whole, the trial court
failed to expressly instruct anywhere that the jury could consider intoxication “ ‘where a
specific intent or mental state is an essential element of the crime.’ ” (Castillo, supra,
16 Cal.4th at p. 1017, italics added by Castillo [“Premeditation and deliberation are
clearly mental states”].) The court only linked voluntary intoxication to specific intent
and did not direct the jury that it could also consider voluntary intoxication in regard to
mental states. Rather, the court instructed the jury that they may “not consider evidence

                                              12.
of voluntary intoxication for any other purpose.” We agree with appellant that because
the court did not expressly tell the jury they could consider voluntary intoxication for
mental states, and then told the jury they may not consider voluntary intoxication for any
purpose other than specific intent, the court effectively precluded the jury from being able
to consider evidence of voluntary intoxication for premeditation and deliberation. By
telling they jury they may not consider intoxication for any other purpose, other than
specific intent, it is reasonably likely the jury misconstrued the instructions as precluding
it from considering the evidence of intoxication in deciding the degree of the murder.
(See ibid.) Therefore, we cannot conclude that “[n]o reasonable juror would understand
the instructions to permit the jury to consider intoxication in determining whether
defendant specifically intended to kill but to prohibit it from considering that same
intoxication in determining whether he premeditated and deliberated.” (See ibid.)
       However, the instructional error was harmless under the Watson2 standard of
review. (See People v. Pearson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 325 [applying “reasonable
probability” standard of prejudice to failure to give voluntary intoxication instruction];
People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1134–1135 [error in voluntary intoxication
instruction subject to state law standard of review]; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at
pp. 836–837.) The jury was properly instructed on voluntary intoxication as it related to
appellant’s ability to form the specific intent to kill. By finding appellant guilty of
attempted murder, the jury necessarily rejected any theory that appellant’s intoxication
prevented him from forming the specific intent to kill. We also agree with the People
that the evidence of intoxication was not strong. A.R. testified that on the night of the
incident appellant was maybe stoned but not drunk. The officer who arrested appellant
the day of the incident and transported him to jail said appellant did not appear to be

       2 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson)

                                             13.
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. And A.R. did not tell police appellant was under
the influence on the night of the incident.
       Aside from the minimal evidence of intoxication, there was also no evidence that
the voluntary intoxication had any effect on appellant’s mental state. (See People v.
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677–678 [no instruction for voluntary intoxication
required where evidence of intoxication was scant]; People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th
799, 848 [evidence did not require requested voluntary intoxication instruction where the
record did not support conclusion that at time of offense defendant was unable to
premeditate or form intent to kill].) Evidence of appellant’s statement to A.R. that “I’m
gonna f[**]kin’ kill you bitch,” followed by appellant’s decision to then point his gun at
A.R. and pull the trigger demonstrates appellant had the mental state to premeditate his
actions. Defense counsel himself did not even assert voluntary intoxication as a
mitigating consideration to premeditation and deliberation during closing arguments.
Therefore, on this record, we cannot conclude the error in the voluntary intoxication
instructions prejudiced defendant under either standard. (See People v. Watson, supra,
46 Cal.2d at p. 837 [reasonably probable that a result more favorable would have been
reached absent the error]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [harmless
error].) Accordingly, we reject appellant’s first claim.

II.    The Felony Conviction on Count 10 Should be Reduced to a Misdemeanor
       Since it was Charged as a Misdemeanor for All Purposes Under Section 17,
       Subdivision (b)(4).
       Appellant contends that count 10 should be reduced to a misdemeanor because the
prosecutor elected to charge it as a misdemeanor “for all purposes” under section 17,
subdivision (b)(4). Appellant argues the judgment should be reversed and the matter
remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The People agree that the court erred, and
the felony should be reduced to a misdemeanor. However, the People argue that remand
is not necessary since count 10 is stayed and reduction of the sentence does not create

                                              14.
changed circumstances to trigger application of the full resentencing rule. Appellant
disagrees and asserts that full resentencing is required. We modify count 10 to reflect a
misdemeanor and remand for full resentencing.
       A.     Relevant Background
       In the complaint and information, appellant was charged in count 10 with corporal
injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), filed as a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b)(4).
Before trial, the People filed a motion to amend count 10 to dismiss the section 17
enhancement in order to make the offense a felony. Defense counsel objected but the
trial court granted the amendment and struck the enhancement. The jury convicted
appellant of felony corporal injury in count 10.
       B.     Applicable Law
       Under section 17, subdivision (b)(4), “When a crime is punishable, in the
discretion of the court, either by imprisonment in the state prison or imprisonment in a
county jail under the provisions of subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or by fine or
imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following
circumstances: … When the prosecuting attorney files in a court having jurisdiction over
misdemeanor offenses a complaint specifying that the offense is a misdemeanor, unless
the defendant at the time of arraignment or plea objects to the offense being made a
misdemeanor, in which event the complaint shall be amended to charge the felony and
the case shall proceed on the felony complaint.”
       C.     Analysis
       Once the prosecuting attorney files a complaint specifying that the offense is a
misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b)(4), it is a misdemeanor for all
purposes unless the defendant objects. (§ 17, subd. (b)(4); People v. Park (2013)
56 Cal.4th 782, 789, fn. 4.) An election to treat a charged offense as a misdemeanor for
all purposes means that it is binding throughout the course of the proceeding. (See
People v. Hannon (1971) 5 Cal.3d 330, 334–335, 340.) In Hannon, the defendant pled

                                            15.
guilty to two counts of statutory rape (§ 261, subd. (1)) and was committed to the Youth
Authority, which classified his offenses as misdemeanors for all purposes under
section 17, subdivision (b)(2). (Hannon, at p. 332.) After serving almost two years, the
commitment was terminated pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1737.1,
and the defendant was returned to trial court and sentenced to state prison. (Hannon, at
p. 332.) The defendant argued that “the trial court did not have discretion to impose
felony punishment upon him, the court having previously denominated his offense a
misdemeanor when it committed him to the Youth Authority.” (Id. at p. 333.) The court
concluded that nothing in section 17, subdivision (b) indicates that classification of a
crime as a misdemeanor is conditioned upon defendant’s behavior or subject to
defeasance for later misconduct. (Hannon, at pp. 334–335.)
       On the other hand, in Necochea v. Superior Court (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 1012, the
court held that dismissal of the misdemeanor charges in the complaint did not bar a
second prosecution of the charges as a felony by indictment or information. (Id. at
pp. 1015–1016.) The court stated, “There is accordingly no relationship between first
and second proceedings when the first is aborted by a dismissal, other than in the narrow
sense of … section 1387. Under that section an order of dismissal is a bar to ‘any other
prosecution for the same offense if it is a misdemeanor, but not if it is a felony.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1015.) Subsequently, the California Supreme Court in Burris v. Superior Court (2005)
34 Cal.4th 1012 (Burris) affirmed that the dismissal of a misdemeanor complaint did not
bar further prosecution for a felony charge based on the same conduct. (Id. at p. 1015.)
       Here, unlike Burris or Necochea where the prosecutor moved to dismiss the
complaint and refile the charges as felonies in a separate complaint, the prosecutor moved
to strike the section 17, subdivision (b) enhancement within the same proceedings in
order to go to trial on a felony charge. However, once the prosecutor elected to charge
the offense as a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b)(4), it became a
misdemeanor for all purposes for the entirety of the proceedings. (See People v. Hannon,

                                             16.
supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 334–335 [misdemeanor designation is binding throughout the
course of the proceeding].) As such, the trial court erred when it granted the prosecutor’s
motion striking the section 17, subdivision (b) enhancement as to count 10 and allowing
that count to proceed to trial as a felony offense. And we order count 10 reduced to a
misdemeanor.
       The remaining issue is whether we should remand to the lower court for full
resentencing. “[W]hen part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for
resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ” (People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425
[“[T]he full resentencing rule allows a trial court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions
when resentencing a defendant”].) Even when only a single “ ‘subordinate count[] of a
felony conviction’ ” is reversed, “ ‘the trial court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect
of the defendant’s sentence on the counts that were affirmed, including the term imposed
as the principal term.’ ” (Buycks, at p. 893.) The People’s argument that full resentencing
does not apply to stayed terms because they would have no practical effect is unsupported
by their cited authority, People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1217. We note that
even though the sentence on count 10 is stayed, the trial court must still exercise its
discretion in imposing a new misdemeanor sentence for count 10. As such, remand for
full resentencing is appropriate. (Buycks, at p. 893.)
       Therefore, we order count 10 modified to a misdemeanor and remand the matter to
the trial court for a full resentencing as to all counts.

III.   Trial Court’s Upper Term Sentence Violates the Sixth Amendment and Does
       Not Comply with Section 1170, Subdivision (b)
       Appellant contends the trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances to
increase his punishment beyond the middle term for counts 2 through 8 and 10 and the
firearm enhancements attached to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 were based on facts not proven

                                               17.
beyond reasonable doubt, which violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Appellant contends the error was prejudicial and the sentence should be reversed, and the
matter remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The People claim appellant forfeited this
claim because he did not object to the imposition of the upper term at sentencing.
Appellant contends there can be no forfeiture when an express waiver is required. The
People also contend that any error was harmless. We conclude the court’s imposition of
the upper terms was unauthorized and remand for resentencing.
       A.     Relevant Background
       The sentencing hearing was on June 29, 2022. The court was aware of the
changes in section 1170, subdivision (b) and had reviewed a sentencing brief from the
People based on the Legislature’s changes. The sentencing brief explained that the court
could rely on the following aggravating factors: that the crime involved great violence or
bodily harm, under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), which was based on
appellant’s attempted murder conviction; andt that appellant was armed with a firearm,
under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2), which was proven true by the jury.
And although the People stated in the sentencing brief that they would be prepared to
provide a certified record of conviction for appellant, there is nothing in the record
indicating that one was provided by the People at sentencing. At sentencing, the defense
counsel submitted on the probation report but stated, “[W]e believe that [appellant]
should be sentenced to the midterm of any determinate sentencing charges .…”
       The court considered the sentencing brief and the probation report, adopted one
circumstance in mitigation that appellant was under the age of 26 years old and found
four factors in aggravation. The court identified the following four aggravating
circumstances: (1) “[appellant’s] prior sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency
proceeding[s] and prior convictions are numerous and of increasing seriousness”; (2) he
“served a prior commitment, pursuant to … [section] 1170(h)(5)”; (3) his “prior
performance in juvenile and felony probation [was not] satisfactory in that he violated the

                                             18.
terms and re-offended”; and (4) he “has engaged in violent conduct which indicates a
serious danger to society based on the current offense.”
       The trial court relied on all four aggravating circumstances when it sentenced
appellant to the upper term for all determinate crimes, base terms, and enhancements with
a triad. The court explained, “In this case, the [appellant’s] first three cited aggravating
factors were related solely to recidivist behavior as shown by his record of conviction.
People have not pled or proven the aggravating factors, which was not required at the
time of the initial sentencing hearing. [⁋] Penal Code’s 1170(b) change has been deemed
retroactive by the higher court, thus the [appellant’s] aggravating factors can be
considered for the upper term as to the base crimes, but not for the enhancements to the
triad. [⁋] The fourth factor is supported by the record of conviction and for the crimes
which the [appellant] was convicted in this case and will be considered for all purposes.
However, only the portion that has been pled and proven will be considered. That’s
[e]nhancement [f]our.”
       Later, the trial court stated, “After review of the factors in aggravation versus one
in mitigation, the upper term will be imposed for all determinate crimes, base terms,
enhancements with a triad.” The court then imposed the upper term of six years on count
8, plus imposed and stayed the upper term on counts 2 through 7 and count 10, as well as
on the firearm enhancements attached to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7.
       B.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       On appeal, an issue that presents a question of law is reviewed de novo. (People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961 [statutory interpretation]; People v. Prunty (2015)
62 Cal.4th 59, 71.)
       Under the former version of section 1170, subdivision (b), when a judgment of
imprisonment was to be imposed, and the statute specified three possible terms (lower,
middle, and upper), the trial court had broad discretion to select the term that best served
the interests of justice and was required to specify the reasons for its sentencing decision.

                                             19.
(§ 1170, former subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 4.420(e); People v. Sandoval
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 846–847.) In making its selection, the trial court could consider
the circumstances in aggravation or mitigation (as defined by rules 4.421 & 4.423) “and
any other factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision.” (Former rule 4.420(d).)
The court could rely on “the case record, the probation officer’s report, other reports and
statements properly received, statements in aggravation or mitigation, and any evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.” (Ibid.)
       Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170, subdivision (b) was amended by Senate
Bill No. 567 to create a “presumption of sentencing judgment not to exceed the middle
terms.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill
No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 20, 2021, p. 3.) As amended, a trial
court may only impose an upper term when the facts underlying the aggravating
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable
doubt by the jury or the court acting as the fact finder. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); People v.
Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 402, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655; People v.
Lewis (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1131, review granted May 17, 2023, S279147.)
Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), the trial court “may consider the defendant’s
prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction
without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3); Dunn, at
p. 402.)
       C.     Analysis
       Appellant argues that the court’s imposition of the upper term violates his Sixth
Amendment jury trial right by using facts not found true beyond a reasonable doubt to
increase his maximum sentence. Appellant contends the error was prejudicial and the
sentence should be reversed, and the matter remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The
People claim appellant forfeited this claim because he did not object to the imposition of
the upper term at sentencing. Appellant contends there can be no forfeiture when an

                                             20.
express waiver under the Sixth Amendment is required. The People agree that the court
relied on aggravating circumstances that were neither admitted by the appellant nor
proven true beyond a reasonable doubt but contend any error was harmless. In his reply,
appellant asserts that if the matter were remanded for full resentencing based on his
second claim regarding count 10, this claim would be rendered moot.
       Appellant was sentenced on June 29, 2022, which was after the changes to
section 1170, subdivision (b) took effect. The record shows all parties were aware of the
changes in the law and the court’s newly limited discretion, which was discussed at
sentencing. Although defendant did not object to the trial court’s imposition of the upper
term, the People were aware of the changes in the law and prepared a sentencing brief for
the court, and the court was also aware of the changes in the law. Therefore, the purpose
for requiring an objection so that the issue could be raised and considered was served in
this case. (See People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 906; People v. Partida (2005)
37 Cal.4th 428, 435 [“A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an
analysis it was not asked to conduct”]; see Partida, at p. 434 [“to further these purposes,
the requirement must be interpreted reasonably, not formalistically”].)
       Further, claims regarding an unauthorized sentence can be raised at any time.
(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) “[A] sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’
where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.”
(Ibid.; People v. Brach (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 571, 578 [sentence “ ‘could not lawfully
be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case,’ for example, ‘where the court
violates mandatory provisions governing the length of confinement’ ”].) Here, defendant
claims that the imposition of the upper term violates his Sixth Amendment right and fails
to comply with section 1170, subdivision (b), which would render his sentence
unauthorized. Therefore, defendant’s claim is not forfeited.
       As amended, section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) provides that in order “to increase
the punishment beyond this middle term maximum, a trial court must now rely on

                                            21.
separate aggravating-circumstance findings that it concludes justify upward departure
from the presumptive maximum middle term.” (People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
911, 933, review granted Sept. 13, 2023, S281242 (Falcon).) As such, “Sixth
Amendment jury-trial-right principles attach to all facts legally essential to imposing an
increased sentence” beyond the middle term maximum. (Ibid.; Blakely v. Washington
(2004) 542 U.S. 296, 313 [the constitutional requirement of a jury trial and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt applies to a fact that is “legally essential to the punishment”]
(Blakely).) We note amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) “incorporates this jury
trial right by requiring that all aggravating circumstance findings relied on to impose a
sentence beyond the middle term be found true by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Falcon, at p. 933; Blakely, at p. 313.) The statute creates two types of exclusions from
this constitutional jury trial right: aggravating facts stipulated to by the defendant may be
considered without a jury finding (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); Falcon, at p. 933; see Blakely, at
p. 303 [facts admitted by the defendant excepted]) and the sentencing court may also
consider prior convictions based on certified records of conviction (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3);
Falcon, at p. 933; see People v. Sallee (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 330, 337, review granted
Apr. 26, 2023, S278690; People v. Flowers (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 680, 685, review
granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276237; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [fact
of a prior conviction excepted] (Apprendi).)
       Upon review of the record, it shows that the aggravating factors relied upon by the
trial court were neither stipulated to by the appellant nor found true beyond a reasonable
doubt by a jury or judge in a court trial. While the record shows appellant stipulated to a
prior felony conviction, no other information regarding the conviction was given. As
such, it alone does not support either of the aggravating circumstances relied on by the
court. Nor does the record demonstrate the aggravating circumstances were in some way
supported by a certified record of conviction. While the court relied on the probation
report in assessing appellant’s criminal record, a probation report is not a certified record

                                             22.
of conviction and cannot be used to support imposition of the upper term under section
1170, subdivision (b)(3). (People v. Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 401, review
granted [probation report is not a certified record of conviction].) Thus, the trial court’s
findings on the aggravating factors rest on facts that have not been submitted to a jury or
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, violating the Sixth Amendment. (See Falcon, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 933, review granted [all aggravating circumstance findings relied on
to impose a sentence beyond the middle term must be found true by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt]; Blakely, supra, 542 U.S. 296 at p. 313.)
       We also note that the fourth factor in aggravation, that appellant “engaged in
violent conduct which indicates a serious danger to society based on the current offense,”
cannot be based in part on the current convictions on the charged offenses and
enhancements. “[Any] fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) Here, the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment
by relying on the current convictions to impose punishment exceeding the middle term
sentences authorized by those convictions. (Apprendi, at p. 483, fn. omitted [explaining
that a jury must find any fact that “exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding
the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury
verdict alone”].) The jury’s verdicts authorized no more than middle terms. (See
§§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)–(3), 1170.1, subd. (d)(1)–(2).) As such, the trial court erred when it
imposed the upper terms based on facts that were not proven true beyond a reasonable
doubt by a trier of fact. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
       Here, defendant was sentenced after the changes to section 1170, subdivision (b)
took effect and the trial court’s error created an unauthorized sentence. (People v. Smith
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852 [an unauthorized sentence is one that “ ‘could not lawfully be
imposed under any circumstance in the particular case’ ”].) We reject the People’s
argument that the error was harmless since defendant’s sentence is unauthorized and not

                                             23.
subject to harmless error review. (See ibid. [unauthorized sentence cannot be lawfully
imposed]; In re Birdwell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 926, 930 [unauthorized sentence not
subject to harmless error review].) The People’s reliance on Dunn, People v. Zabelle
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098 and People v. Berdoll (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 159 are readily
distinguishable in that they address retroactive application of the changes to section 1170,
subdivision (b) and whether the resulting sentencing error was harmless. Consequently,
we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with section 1170,
subdivision (b).3
                                      DISPOSITION
       We vacate the sentence, order count 10 modified to reflect a misdemeanor
conviction and remand for full resentencing in accordance with this opinion. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                          POOCHIGIAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

DE SANTOS, J.

       3 We reject appellant’s claim that double jeopardy bars the court from considering
the recidivist-related aggravating circumstances at resentencing. Appellant’s reliance on
People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535 is misguided as the Seel court held the double
jeopardy clause barred retrial of a prior conviction allegation after an appellate finding of
evidentiary insufficiency. (Id. at p. 541.)

                                             24.