Court Opinion

ID: 9861096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:41:05.875999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:12.759761
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE McNAMARA dissenting: I must respectfuUy dissent. I believe that there was a factual basis for defendant’s plea of guilty. Supreme Court Rule 402(c) provides: “The court shaU not enter final judgment on a plea of guilty without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea.” The Committee Comments regarding Rule 402(c) state: “Such inquiry is not uncommon in current practice, but heretofore has not been specifically required by law. The language of paragraph (c) is based upon the recent revision of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and, as is true under the Federal rule, no particular kind of inquiry is specified; the court may satisfy itself by inquiry of the defendant or the attorney for the government, by examination of the presentence report, or by any other means which seem best for the kind of case involved.” S.H.A. ch. 110A, Committee Comment to § 402(c) (pocket part 1974). The quantum of proof necessary to determine that there is a factual basis for the plea of guilty is less than that necessary to sustain a conviction after a full trial. The reasonable doubt standard is inapplicable. (People v. Hudson (1972), 7 Ill.App.3d 800, 288 N.E.2d 533; People v. Arnold (1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 95, 309 N.E.2d 406.) Indeed, in Hudson, cited by the majority, the court went so far as to hold that the standard for a factual basis was not even a preponderance of evidence that defendant committed the offense, so long as there was a basis for the court to connect defendant’s acts and intent with which he acted and the acts and intent required to constitute the offense. (Also see People v. Ballauer (1974, No. 59126), 23 Ill.App.3d 711.) This court has also held that a trial judge may use any portion of the record, even facts brought out at the hearing in aggravation and mitigation after acceptance of the plea, to find a factual basis for the plea. People v. Warship (1972), 6 Ill.App.3d 461, 285 N.E.2d 224; People v. Kinsley (1973), 10 Ill.App.3d 326, 293 N.E.2d 627. In the present case, after 2 or 3 days of trial, but before the State had rested, the trial court had heard three witnesses testify concerning defendant’s extrajudicial confession of guilt. The court had also heard defendant’s in-court statement through counsel that the only way she could have possibly harmed her child would have been if her child had provoked her or had done something to make her angry. These facts appear to me to more closely comply with the mandate of Rule 402(c) than the facts found in our per curiam decision in Kinsley. In holding that the trial court had substantially compfied with that provision of the rule in that case, we noted that when defendant had been asked by the trial judge if he had in fact shot his wife, he answered “I must have * # * [pjeople said I did. I had the gun, and she said, ‘Oh, my God, I am dying.’ ” While, in a trial, a corpus delicti must be proved, independent of a confession, beyond a reasonable doubt, it need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt nor independent of a confession where the judicial inquiry is one of factual basis for a guilty plea. The Committee Comments on Rule 402(c) make clear that an admission by defendant is sufficient to establish a factual basis for a plea. Under the Rule, the evidence of marks on the victim’s head and the testimony, although hearsay, that the cause of death was “unnatural” also could be considered by the judge in determining a factual basis. In my judgment, there was an adequate factual basis for defendant’s plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter. There was substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 402(c), and I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.