Court Opinion

ID: 9403219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 18:03:44.937746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:05.514042
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/20/23 In re V.G. CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 In re V.G., a Person Coming                                  2d Juv. No. B317112
 Under the Juvenile Court                                 (Super. Ct. No. 21JV00359)
 Law.                                                       (Santa Barbara County)

 SANTA BARBARA COUNTY                                     OPINION ON TRANSFER
 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL                                     FROM SUPREME COURT
 SERVICES,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 FRANK G.,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      Frank G. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings and dispositional orders declaring V.G. a dependent
child and placing her with father with family maintenance
services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.)1 He does not challenge the
jurisdictional findings based on allegations against V.G.’s mother,
who is not a party to this appeal. While father’s appeal was
pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and
granted father sole physical and legal custody of V.G.2 After
requesting supplemental briefing from the parties, we dismissed
the appeal as moot.
       The California Supreme Court granted father’s petition for
review and subsequently transferred the matter to us with
directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in
light of In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266. (In re V.G. (Apr. 19,
2023, S276496).) We have done so. Because we can provide no
effective relief to father, that is, relief that “‘can have a practical,
tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status,’” father’s
appeal is moot. (In re D.P., at p. 277.) After considering the
factors identified in In re D.P., we decline to exercise our
discretion to consider the moot appeal.
                  Facts and Procedural Background
       V.G. was born prematurely with a heart condition in July
2021. By early August 2021, the Santa Barbara County
Department of Social Services (department) began receiving
multiple referrals reporting concern for V.G. and her 11-year-old
brother, I.G. based on possible domestic violence between father
and mother.

      1 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

      2 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the minute
order dated June 16, 2022, issued by the juvenile court in this
matter. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (a), 459.)

                                   2
       In late August 2021, the department received a request for
immediate response to the Public Health Department after
mother reported ongoing domestic violence. She told staff she
feared for her safety, as well as the children’s safety. She also
told the social worker that father was verbally and emotionally
abusive to both her and I.G., and she felt unsafe.
       Meanwhile, V.G. was diagnosed with failure to thrive and
had to be hospitalized. While under hospital supervision, V.G.
gained an appropriate amount of weight and was discharged
after five days. Mother took V.G. and stayed in a domestic
violence shelter for approximately two months before returning
home.
       The day after mother left the shelter, the department
received a call from father reporting that mother was acting
erratically and was likely under the influence of a controlled
substance. When police arrived, mother admitted using
methamphetamine and was arrested. When she was released
several hours later, she returned to father’s house and began
banging on the door, demanding to be let in. She also called
father and allegedly threatened his life.
       In October 2021, the department filed a protective custody
warrant for V.G.’s removal from mother after it determined
mother was actively using drugs. Two days later, the department
filed a petition on behalf of V.G. pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).
       At the detention hearing, the juvenile court removed V.G.
from the care and custody of her parents but placed her in the
home of father.
       After a contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing,
the juvenile court sustained all the allegations in the amended

                                3
petition, ordered V.G. to remain in the home with father, and
further ordered the department to provide father with family
maintenance services.
       While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court
terminated its jurisdiction and awarded father sole physical and
legal custody of V.G. We requested supplemental briefing from
the parties.
       In his supplemental brief, father contended his appeal was
not moot because the sustained jurisdictional findings could
prejudice him in future dependency or family court proceedings,
and because the sustained allegations subjected him to inclusion
in the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI) with its attendant
stigmatizing and negative consequences.
       In its supplemental brief, the department contended that
dismissal of the matter in the juvenile court rendered the appeal
moot. The department also contended that father misstated the
nature of CACI reporting because the allegations against him did
not include any of the subsections it reports for CACI purposes.
The department also confirmed that it had not reported father’s
conduct.
       Neither father nor the department filed a supplemental
brief, as permitted by California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b),
following the Supreme Court’s transfer of the case to us for
reconsideration in light of In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266.
                             Discussion
       Our California Supreme Court recently addressed mootness
in the context of dependency appeals in In re D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th 266, and explained that an appeal is moot when the
reviewing court cannot provide effective relief if it should decide
in favor of the appellant. (Id. at p. 276.) “For relief to be

                                4
‘effective,’ two requirements must be met. First, the [appellant]
must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the
[appellant] seeks.” (Ibid.) Where the appellant “has not
demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that would
be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings,” the
appeal is moot. (Id. at p. 273.)
       In In re D.P., the juvenile court found that the child had
suffered or there was a substantial risk the child would suffer
serious physical harm or illness resulting from the parents’
failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect the child
pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). (In re D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 272.) The parents appealed the jurisdictional
finding, but while the matter was on appeal, the juvenile court
terminated its jurisdiction without issuing any order that
continued to impact the parents. (Id. at pp. 272, 277.) The father
contended his appeal was not moot because the jurisdictional
finding was stigmatizing. (Id. at p. 278.)
       The Court recognized the critical factor in deciding whether
a dependency appeal is moot is whether effective relief can be
granted if we find reversible error. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at pp. 276-277.) “[R]elief is effective when it ‘can have a practical,
tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.]
It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the [appellant]
must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change
in legal status. Although a jurisdictional finding that a parent
engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally stigmatizing,
complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to sustain an appeal.
The stigma must be paired with some effect on the [appellant’s]

                                  5
legal status that is capable of being redressed by a favorable
court decision.” (Id. at p. 277.)
        The Court in In re D.P. found that the appeal was moot
because the father, “though asserting that the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional finding is stigmatizing,” had “not demonstrated a
specific legal or practical consequence that would be avoided
upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings.” (In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 273.)
        But a case is not moot where a jurisdictional finding forms
the basis for an order that continues to impact a parent’s rights.
(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) “For example, a case is
not moot where a jurisdictional finding affects parental custody
rights [citation], curtails a parent’s contact with his or her child
[citation], or ‘has resulted in [dispositional] orders which continue
to adversely affect’ a parent [citation].” (Id. at pp. 277-278.)
Speculative future harm is not sufficient to avoid mootness. (Id.
at p. 278.)
        Notwithstanding mootness, the Court explained that
appellate courts “may exercise their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach
the merits of the dispute.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
282.) Whether to exercise that discretion is decided on a case-by-
case basis based on various broad principles and a nonexhaustive
list of factors, including any consequences to the appellant
beyond jurisdiction, whether a finding may impact the child’s
placement or family law proceedings, whether the jurisdictional
finding is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing
conduct, and why the appeal became moot. (Id. at pp. 285-287.)
        No single factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a
court should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal. (In
re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) The overarching goals of the

                                 6
dependency system – safeguarding children with a focus on
preserving the family and the child’s well-being – are the
ultimate guides in deciding whether to exercise discretionary
review. (Ibid.)
       Here, father acknowledges that the allegations involving
mother were sufficient for the juvenile court to have taken
jurisdiction over V.G. “[W]here jurisdictional findings have been
made as to both parents but only one parent brings a challenge,
the appeal may be rendered moot.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 283.) Nonetheless, father contends his appeal is not moot,
even after the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over V.G.,
because he is still at risk of future adverse consequences.
Specifically, he contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings subject him to registration on CACI, which is
stigmatizing and will have a negative impact on his ability to
participate in his children’s extracurricular activities and his
future employment opportunities.
       But father’s concern about inclusion in CACI does not
amount to a “tangible legal or practical consequence of the
jurisdictional finding[s] that would be remedied by a favorable
decision on appeal.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278.)
Although inclusion in CACI may be stigmatizing to the person
listed, a complaint of stigma alone is insufficient to sustain an
appeal. (Id. at pp. 277, 279.)
       Furthermore, our Supreme Court explained in In re D.P.,
when a child protective agency forwards a substantiated report of
abuse or neglect to the California Department of Justice for
inclusion in CACI, it must provide written notice to the person
whose conduct was reported. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
279.) Here, father has not shown that he received such notice, or

                                 7
that the allegations at issue are reportable. According to the
department, they are not. To the extent father contends he is
subject to CACI inclusion at some point in the future should the
department change its reporting policy, this contention is too
speculative to survive a mootness challenge. (Id. at p. 280.)
      Father also contends that the jurisdictional findings could
prejudice him in future dependency or family court proceedings.
But the Court expressly rejected this argument in In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th 266 and held, “speculative future harm is
[in]sufficient to avoid mootness.” (Id., at pp. 277-278.)
      Because we cannot grant effective relief to father, his
appeal is moot. For the same reasons discussed above, we
conclude discretionary review is not warranted. We recognize
that father’s prompt compliance with his case plan favors
discretionary review. However, no single factor is dispositive.
We must consider all the relevant factors and the totality of the
evidence in the record. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.)
Having done so, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider
the merits of father’s moot appeal.
                            Disposition
      The appeal is dismissed as moot.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                                 YEGAN, J.
We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                                 8
                   Arthur A. Garcia, Judge
           Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
              ______________________________

     Darlene Azevedo Kelly, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

     Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Lisa A. Rothstein,
Senior Deputy, for Plaintiff and Respondent.