Court Opinion

ID: 9624865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:20:01.535563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:55.937789
License: Public Domain

*567PICKETT, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
My Associates agree that the complaint filed herein should be dismissed, but differ on the reasons therefor. As I understand their positions, Judge Kerr thinks we should abstain from deciding the ease, and Judge Barrett is convinced that Alcala, as a prisoner in the Wyoming State Penitentiary, does not have standing to maintain an action of this nature. The essence of Judge Barrett’s position is, I think, that the injury to Alcala by the existence of the alleged unconstitutional statute is neither immediate nor irreparable.
The record shows that Alcala is a competent and qualified barber and has been denied a license to practice his occupation solely upon the basis that he has been convicted of a felony. It is agreed that under a so-called “work release program” Alcala is not actually confined in the Penitentiary at Rawlins, Wyoming, but is employed in a garage at Casper, Wyoming. It is also undisputed that if he had a Wyoming Barber’s License he could now be employed in that trade.
The questioned provision of the Wyoming Barber Code flatly prohibits the issuance of a barber’s license to anyone who has been convicted of a felony. The validity of this type of statute could, of course, be determined in the state courts, but it is settled that federal courts should not sidestep their responsibility in a case of this kind merely because it might be adjudicated in another forum. Zwickler v. Koota, 398 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). I think the argument that Alcala cannot maintain this action because he should be considered as in actual confinement in the State Penitentiary is contrary to the existing facts. It may be that he could be returned to the Penitentiary at the election of the Warden, but the fact remains that he is not there and cannot work at his trade because of the challenged statute. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the rule that a constitutional right shall not be determined on the question of whether the benefit to a person is characterized as a “right” or “privilege” or is one of grace. The test is “not merely the ‘weight’ of the individual’s interest, but whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ language of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971).
Any notions that may have existed to the effect that states have the absolute right to prohibit individuals from engaging in employment within the boundaries of a state has, I think been put to rest by recent decisions of the Supreme Court. Sugarman v. McL. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973). These cases dealt with the rights of aliens, but seem to me to be clearly analogous to the question here. The issue is squarely presented in this action and I think we should dispose of it.