Court Opinion

ID: 9750013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:12:19.226499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:01.449051
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the order of the Commonwealth Court assessing attorney’s fees and costs against court appointed counsel in these cases. The majority holds that despite the constitutional right to counsel in an appeal from a parole revocation, such an assessment may be made against court appointed appellate counsel for the filing of a frivolous appeal. I would not impose costs and fees against court appointed counsel for the filing of an appeal, even if it is found to be frivolous, because it is counsel’s function to represent the defendant for the purposes of pursuing the appeal and it is done at the direction of the court.
The majority appears to acknowledge the distinction between court appointed counsel’s obligation to assist his client in his role as an advocate and counsel’s responsibility to inform the court of the frivolous nature of the appeal after he has made such a determination. Its statement of the holding in the case disregards this distinction, however, and is subject to an interpretation that court appointed appellate counsel may be assessed attorney’s fees and costs merely on the basis that an appeal has been filed in a case later determined to be frivolous. While I agree with the majority that counsel should advise the court of those instances in which his conscientious examination of his client’s case discloses that the case is wholly frivolous, I do not agree that the filing of the appeal itself is a basis for the imposition of costs and fees. Counsel should not be penalized for his role in assisting his client’s pursuit of constitutional rights.
There is merit to the Appellant’s argument that there is no material difference between offering an advocate’s brief *513setting forth the arguments advanced by the client and the procedure prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). The majority perceives this argument as reflecting a fundamental misconception of our judicial process, but I perceive it as a practical reflection. No less effort is required of counsel in preparing an Anders brief than in preparing a brief in support of his client’s position. The majority is intent then on penalizing counsel for failing to disclaim the validity of his client’s position.
I do not see what is to be gained by penalizing counsel for what he is directed by the court to do — pursue the appeal. The appeal itself is not abandoned by counsel or his client even when an Anders brief is filed, but Rule 2744 was clearly intended to penalize the filing of a frivolous appeal and not counsel’s failure to disclaim the merit of his client’s position. The impact of Rule 2744 is in the disincentive to file a frivolous appeal, not to invite counsel’s statement of its relative merits. Penalizing appellate counsel in cases in which the appeals will nevertheless be taken does nothing to accomplish the purpose of the rule.
It is for this reason that the Commentary to Rule 2744 expressed a concern over whether an exception should be drafted for criminal cases in which the defendant has a constitutional right to appeal. Rule 2744 does not contain that exception because it was believed that right would be taken into consideration. The majority has failed to do so and its oversight is the flaw in its analysis. Even if I were to agree that the imposition of costs and attorney’s fees could be appropriate in such cases, I would make the ruling prospective only to cases arising after the opinion was filed.
LARSEN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.