Court Opinion

ID: 9516786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:52:22.698103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:15.486628
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.

(dissenting).

i

The majority has today replaced the trial judge’s discretionary authority to advance the truth-seek*660ing process with its own view of the proper use of impeachment evidence. The majority’s opinion would, for example, categorically prevent an accused drug seller from being impeached with evidence of prior convictions of the sale of drugs, and a defendant accused of sexual offenses from being impeached with prior convictions of sexual offenses. As a result, the majority’s limitation of trial-judge discretion will multiply the opportunity for even the guilty defendant to escape punishment and make the discovery of truth more difficult.
The majority imposes this policy choice on the criminal justice problems of this state on the basis of its "perception” of the need for a new rule. It does so with a citation to the law of West Virginia and on the basis of social science studies of mock jurors, without analysis of the impact on the factual accuracy of jury verdicts and without consideration of existing safeguards protecting the innocent. If our "relatively low regard for truth-seeking is perhaps the chief reason for the dubious esteem in which the legal profession is held,” today’s decision will provide further reason "to question our service in the quest for truth,” Frankel, The search for truth: An umpireal view, 123 U Pa L R 1031, 1040, 1041 (1975):
The prosecution must be held to the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and safeguards must exist permitting postconviction review of claims of erroneous conviction. The issue here, however, does not involve a question of effectuating a constitutional right or of assuring review of a claim of innocence. The only issue addressed today is that of a new policy regarding impeachment with prior convictions. I disagree with the majority’s determination to impose upon our jurisprudence a policy that automatically ex-*661eludes or includes1 categories of prior convictions for impeachment. In my judgment, a policy rule that takes relevant and reliable evidence away from the factfinder is justifiable only if it advances countervailing interests equal or superior to the truth-finding function. The revised interpretation of MRE 609 here announced and the new version of MRE 609 here adopted do not attempt such an analysis and perforce do not meet that burden.
The rules of automatic exclusion and admission and the artificially circumscribed discretion adopted today create a conclusive presumption against the admission of certain prior convictions and a conclusive presumption in favor of the admission of others. Despite the failure to establish a deficiency in the system that requires this result,2 the opinion suppresses relevant and unquestionably reliable evidence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the commission of a prior felony by the defendant.
Because the "clarified” balancing test is applied to cases which antedate today’s decision, validly obtained convictions will be reversed, and appellate resources will be taxed as the parameters of the new "rules” are developed. Neither this clarification nor the bright-line rules can, in good faith, be justified by rule-making authority. No comment, no input, no weighing of policy concerns by *662the bench and bar, has been allowed. The Court has simply created new law not even argued by the parties in these cases. Cases are reversed today and will be reversed hereafter, not because our current rule was violated, or because the constitution was violated, or because juries have returned verdicts that are not supported by the evidence. These cases will be reversed solely because a majority of this Court believes that trial judges cannot be trusted to appropriately exercise Rule 609 discretion and lay jurors inevitably misuse prior-conviction evidence.
As with other experiments, the system will stagger and lurch through a period of adjustment silently attended by the human and social costs that are the price of today’s undertaking. In the interim, before the imperatives of the system gain the approval of a new majority of this Court, today’s opinion will have impeded truth finding and undermined the institutional integrity of the trial judiciary and of the jury system.
The suggestion that these per se rules advance "the integrity of fact finding” is on an intellectual par with a claim that book burning advances knowledge. The essence of every censor’s position is that readers cannot be trusted to properly use the knowledge they might obtain.
ii
Cross-examination, "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,” 5 Wig-more, Evidence (Chadbourn rev, 1974), § 1367, p 32, is derailed today because of a policy decision that eschews legal analysis in favor of the majority’s "perception” of the need for a new rule. The result is the replacement of trial-judge discretion with the majority’s value system; the cost is making the discovery of truth more difficult.
*6631
The deficiency in the majority’s jurisprudential approach to this issue is aptly illustrated by Professor Grano’s explanation of the analogous objectives of rules of criminal procedure:
When the guilty are convicted and the innocent are acquitted, the result does "accord with substantive law,” but when the innocent are convicted or the guilty escape, the substantive law is defeated. Truth, therefore, must be the primary goal of procedure. Indeed, truth must be the goal of any rational procedural system, whether accusatorial or inquisitorial. Reasonable persons may disagree about the better method of determining truth, but no rational person touts a procedural system because it makes discovery of truth more difficult.
Complexity is introduced, however, by an unavoidable dilemma: "the easier it is ... to prove guilt, the more difficult does it become to establish innocence.” While the prevalence of truth is preferable, if error is inevitable, a guilty person should escape before an innocent one is convicted. Thus, despite the desire for truth, we sometimes deliberately increase the risk of error to ensure that the innocent are acquitted. For example, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt undoubtedly helps more guilty than innocent defendants. Nevertheless, we appropriately would resist any effort to lower the burden of proof, for the overall gain in the number of correct verdicts would come at an unacceptable cost.
[T]he appropriate focus must be on the anticipated benefits to be derived from the rule, the scope of the risk [of convicting innocent persons], and the existence of other safeguards to counter the risk. . . .
Because truth is the primary goal, we should prefer those procedures for protecting the innocent that do not increase the risk of erroneous acquit*664tal. [Grano, Implementing the objectives of procedural reform: The proposed Michigan rules of criminal procedure — part I, 32 Wayne LR 1007, 1011-1012, 1014-1015 (1986).]
The majority does not attempt to evaluate truth seeking against competing concerns or consider alternative safeguards for both truth seeking and a competing concern. It wholly fails to acknowledge the fact that the legal system presumes that juries will follow instructions, and that, where that presumption has been overcome, it has been where the inadmissible evidence contained elements of unreliability or unlawfulness and was offered in the case in chief to create an "overwhelming probability” of improper substantive use. Jackson v Denno, 378 US 368; 84 S Ct 1774; 12 L Ed 2d 908 (1964).
Thus, in Bruton v United States, 391 US 123; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968), the Court rejected the government’s argument that in a joint trial use of a confession to prove the confessor’s guilt promoted truth, because severance was an alternative means to achieve truth, because arguments of speed, economy, and convenience were insufficient to justify infringement on the nontestifying defendant’s right of confrontation, and because evidence of the confession became "intolerably” unreliable when the confessing accomplice did not testify.
The balancing analysis produced a different result in the Court’s unanimous opinion in Tennessee v Street, 471 US 409; 105 S Ct 2078; 85 L Ed 2d 425 (1985), where the Court held that the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by the introduction of the accomplice’s confession. Here, by contrast with Bruton, and as in this situation, the evidence was not *665introduced in the case in chief. Rather, the defendant took the stand and testified that his own confession had been coercively derived from the accomplice’s statement. The state called the sheriff who testified in rebuttal that respondent was not read the accomplice’s confession and then read that confession to the jury. The trial judge instructed the jury that the confession was not admitted for the purpose of proving its truthfulness, but solely for the purpose of rebuttal. The Court noted that, because the accomplice’s confession was not introduced in the case in chief on the issue of guilt, the only similarity to Bruton was the fact that the confession could have been misused by the jury as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The jury, however, was "pointedly” told not to consider the truthfulness of the statement. Thus, the critical question for the Court was "whether, in light of the competing values at stake, may we rely on the 'crucial assumption’ that the jurors followed the 'instructions given them by the trial judge?’ ”
The Court concluded:
Had the prosecutor been denied the opportunity to present Peele’s confession in rebuttal so as to enable the jury to make the relevant comparison, the jury would have been impeded in its task of evaluating the truth of respondent’s testimony and handicapped in weighing the reliability of his confession. Such a result would have been at odds with the Confrontation Clause’s very mission — to advance "the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials.” [Tennessee v Street, supra, p 415.]
Moreover, unlike the situation in Bruton, in Street there were no alternatives that would have both assured the integrity of the trial’s truth-seek*666ing function and eliminated the risk of the jury’s improper use of evidence.
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Street does not come to grips with the fact that the evidence there was not offered in the case in chief or that the Court concluded that the jurors could be relied upon to follow instructions. The fact is that the defendant had denied the truth of his confession, and it is simply incorrect to assert that the evidence provided little if any inculpatory information "that was not already before [the jury] in defendant’s own confession.” Ante, p 573, n 10. The improper purpose prohibited by the instruction was the jurors’ misuse of the accomplice’s confession implicating the defendant. That is, the potential prejudice to the defendant was that the jury would use the accomplice’s confession not solely to find that defendant’s denial was untrue, but also to conclude that the accomplice’s statement was substantive evidence of defendant’s guilt. To use the majority’s terminology, the veracity of defendant’s denial of his confession had to be "mediated” through the knowledge that the absent accomplice had confessed and incriminated the defendant as an active participant in the decedent’s hanging, an obviously far more damaging "independent and improper basis for a guilty verdict,” ante, p 572, n 10, than the situation presented by impeachment with prior convictions.
The Court has also upheld the efficacy of limiting instructions and concluded that evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence enhancement, so long as the jury is instructed it could not be used to determine guilt, Spencer v Texas, 385 US 554; 87 S Ct 648; 17 L Ed 2d 606 (1967).
In Spencer, supra, p 561, Justice Harlan noted that the "conceded possibility of prejudice” was *667"outweighed by the validity of the State’s purpose in permitting introduction of the evidence” and that "[t]he defendants’ interests are protected by limiting instructions . . . and by the discretion residing with the trial judge to limit or forbid the admission of particularly prejudicial evidence . . . Justice Harlan further noted that instructions to a jury limiting the proper use of evidence elicited on cross-examination of defense witnesses as to defendant’s character and a prior conviction "are no more difficult to comprehend or apply than those upon various other subjects,” id., p 563. The Court has also permitted illegally seized evidence, Walder v United States, 347 US 62; 74 S Ct 354; 98 L Ed 503 (1954), and improperly obtained confessions, Harris v New York, 401 US 222; 91 S Ct 643; 28 L Ed 2d 1 (1971), to be used by the jury in assessing credibility, so long as the jury is properly instructed. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has created a narrow exception to the rule that juries are presumed to follow instructions where there is an "overwhelming probability” that the jury cannot follow the instruction and the result would be devastating to the defendant’s case, Richardson v Marsh, 481 US —; 107 S Ct 1702; 95 L Ed 2d 176 (1987), a proposition that the majority has here failed to demonstrate.
These cases illustrate that a proper approach to the problem of potential prejudice requires an inquiry as to: whether the possibility of prejudice is protected by trial-judge discretion and limiting instructions; whether there is no alternative short of suppression of evidence to uphold the competing concern; and whether, if alternatives exist, the value underlying the competing concern has been fairly served. Application of these principles to the question of potential prejudice from impeachment with prior convictions demonstrates that there are *668existing safeguards against the misuse of prior convictions, and that there is no alternative to the suppression of truthful evidence relevant to the credibility question other than trial-judge discretion and the limiting instruction.
It might be observed, as the majority at one point does, ante, p 572, n 10, that the law is itself rendered irrelevant because this decision is based not on constitutional grounds, but on policy. The majority does not, however, evaluate the very factors most crucial to the adoption of a wise policy. The majority’s policy does not balance the negative effect on the truth-finding function against the benefit of the elimination of potential prejudice. Nor does the majority evaluate the significant alternative barriers to the improper use of "bad man” evidence that the system has erected,3 barriers that both protect against the risk that innocent persons are convicted and insure that the fact-finding process is not emasculated.
The majority does not weigh the fact that a magistrate must determine that there is probable cause to believe a defendant is guilty, that a trial judge must assure through motion practice that the evidence has been obtained through lawful means, that Rule 404(a) precludes the use of "bad man” evidence as substantive proof of guilt, that the prosecutor must present in the case in chief evidence sufficient to permit a rational jury to find *669guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or be directed out of court, People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354; 285 NW2d 284 (1979), and Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307; 99 S Ct 2781; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979), that the prosecutor may not comment on the defendant’s failure to testify, Griffin v California, 380 US 609; 85 S Ct 1229; 14 L Ed 2d 106 (1965), and that a trial court has discretion to grant a new trial where it has concluded that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, People v Hampton, supra, p 375.
The majority further fails to focus on the fact that it is only where a defendant exercises a right that a defendant alone possesses, and elects to testify, that the credibility issue is presented. Before this point in the process, the safeguards in the system assure us of that which every trial judge and lawyer knows, that "the preponderant majority,” Frankel, supra, p 1037, of defendants are guilty of the charged offense or a lesser or related offense. At the point in a trial where the issue is the credibility of the defendant’s testimony, the prosecution has carried the burden of proving guilt in the case in chief without resorting to prior record evidence, and the risk of convicting an innocent person has been tempered. Reliance on the discretion of the trial judge and the limiting instruction to curb a potential for prejudice more effectively advances the goal of protecting the innocent while not increasing the risk of erroneous acquittal than suppressing truthful evidence relevant to the very issue the jury must decide.
The cogent analysis of the United States Supreme Court teaches that when a reason for erecting a barrier against truth is advanced, the burden on truth seeking and the risk of erroneous conviction must be evaluated. The majority simply ignores the fact that when the prosecution has *670carried the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without resort to the use of prior conviction evidence, the risk of convicting the innocent through misuse of the evidence has been diminished, and the issue is whether the factfinder should be deprived of relevant and reliable evidence when á defendant takes the stand and denies guilt.
The majority’s lack of assessment of the alternative means to suppressing reliable and relevant evidence also explains the failure to acknowledge that the Legislature of this state has given defendants an additional protection against the possibility that a lay jury might misuse evidence of prior convictions. In Michigan, the defendant has the sole right to select a bench trial or a trial by jury, MCL 763.3; MSA 28.856; People v Stoeckl, 347 Mich 1; 78 NW2d 640 (1956). Given the choice between a judge who until today was presumed to have the ability to limit prior conviction evidence to its proper purpose or an untrained and inexperienced jury, it is simply illogical and unfair to permit a defendant to select a lay jury and then to claim that its inability to properly assess reliable evidence requires suppression.
Each exception to the truth-finding function bears a heavy burden. Contrary to the majority’s assumption, the fact that one exception exists is no evidence that another should be created. The majority itself slides along the "slippery slope” from the exclusion of prior convictions in the case in chief to exclusion of convictions on cross-examination without a clear understanding of the protection already afforded a defendant, or a persuasive answer to the question as to why, even if jurors might in a given case not be able to restrict use of prior conviction evidence to the issue of credibility, *671truthful evidence should be subject to generic suppression in the forum that exists for its determination.
In sum, the majority does not carry the burden of establishing the need for rules which generally exclude classes of evidence. If that need is indeed established by the jury’s inability to "mediate” a proper use through a potential misuse, the need is revealed as an attack on the fact-finding system itself because, clearly, both jurors and judges as factfinders are called upon to "mediate” in every situation where evidence is admitted for a limited purpose.
The majority has ignored the policy expressed in a state statute, distorted the rule-making process, and rejected the approach to this issue which is followed by the overwhelming majority of other states,4 by the federal courts, and by this state until today.
The majority has not only failed to consider the protections against potential prejudice that exist in our system, it has wholly failed to balance the likelihood of a negative effect on the judicial system, the risk of erroneous acquittal, against the systemic gains to be achieved by the new rules. The majority analysis indicates that of the twenty-five cases in abeyance, eighteen defendants were to *672be, or were, impeached with bright-line5 excludable convictions.
The majority accuses the dissent of "[assuming . . . that the defendant is almost certainly guilty . . . .” (Ante, p 603.) I have not assumed that any given defendant is guilty, but, rather, have attempted to urge the majority to a rational examination of the implications of its new policy6 *673for the criminal justice system.
If an innocent person is convicted despite all the current protections of the system, the system has, in that instance, failed. Thus, a just system must provide a method to insure that an arguably wrongfully convicted individual has an avenue for redress. By contrast, the majority has converted a potential for an undesirable and deplorable consequence in individual instances into a presumption of prejudice mandating a systemic revision that prevents juries from learning of generic types of prior convictions.
The rules announced today impede the task of weighing and evaluating the truth of testimony. Here, unlike the situation in Bruton, or in Cruz v New York, 481 US —; 107 S Ct 1714; 95 L Ed 2d 162 (1987), the prosecutor’s obligation to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in the case in chief, Rule 404 itself, and the right to waive a *674jury, provide alternative means to protect the legitimate interest in avoiding misuse of "bad man” evidence. Categorical denial of impeachment evidence impedes the jury "in its task of evaluating the truth of respondent’s testimony” in opposition to "the Confrontation Clause’s very mission— to advance 'the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials.’ ” Tennessee v Street, supra, p 415.
2
The majority’s preference for bright-line rules also constricts the trial court’s responsibility to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth . . . .” MRE 611; see MRE 102. To a person who is or has been a trial judge, this is the most disturbing aspect of the new rules, and the dimension of the rules most revealing of the majority’s lack of experience with the trial court’s role.
The majority fails to understand that the principal business of the trial judge in a jury trial is ruling on evidence. With few exceptions, these rulings are not either/or decisions. Relevancy decisions are judgment calls committed to the trial court’s discretion. The rules of the game would consume the purpose of a trial if trial judges did not assess the purpose and value of the evidence in the evolving context of the trial. To a trial judge, the trial is not an abstraction, but an evolving process requiring ongoing evaluation. It was to that evolving reality that Justice Ryan spoke in observing that, as with other rulings on relevancy, the Rule 609 decision requires assessment of "[t]he importance to the truth-seeking process, not *675merely the prospects for acquittal, of obtaining the defendant’s version of the events in question.” People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95, 116; 341 NW2d 68 (1983).
Skillful lawyers on both sides of the counsel table know that advance bright-line rulings from a trial judge can benefit their client’s theory of the case. The responsibility of the trial judge, however, is not to monitor the gladiators’ battle, but rather to assure that the advocates’ perspectives do not unfairly blindside the truth-finding process. The trial judge occupies an area within the arena of effective representation by defense counsel and zealous but evenhanded presentation by the prosecution. In this area, the primary obligation of the judge is not to the adversaries, but to the trial process and to the twelve persons who are sworn to determine the truth.
As the Supreme Court explained in Luce v United States, 469 US 38, 41-42; 105 S Ct 460; 83 L Ed 2d 443 (1984),
The ruling [regarding impeachment] is subject to change when the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was contained in the defendant’s [in limine] proffer. Indeed even if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.
The majority’s failure to appreciate the role of a judge in a jury trial is more remarkable because it squarely contradicts the rationale of a case on which the majority purportedly relies, Gordon v United States, 127 US App DC 343, 348; 383 F2d 936 (1967). In Gordon, Judge Warren Burger wrote that an admission of prior convictions for impeachment was proper, partially
*676because the case had narrowed to the credibility of two persons — the accused and his accuser — and in those circumstances there were greater, not less, compelling reasons for exploring all avenues which would shed light on which of the two witnesses was to be believed.
Thus, in the very case in which a prior conviction’s relation to credibility is most important to the truth-seeking process, the majority would ban it.7 It is true that in a credibility contest the "prejudice” to the defendant of such a prior conviction will be high. However, in many such contests, the Court now mandates that the full dimension of the credibility issue can never be disclosed to the jury.8_
*677The majority prevents the trial judge from evaluating the context and purpose of the cross-examination and leaves the jury to falsely conclude that since it has not learned of a prior conviction of the defendant, defendant’s crime-free life entitles his testimony to more credibility than that of the impeached witness. This result contravenes, as described by Judge Burger, "the very nature of judicial discretion [which] precludes rigid standards for its exercise . . .9 Gordon v United States, supra, p 348. In these situations the majority dictates that only the need to include the testimony and never the need to permit impeachment can be considered. The result is obvious: the trial court is stripped of its authority, the jury is barred from access to the facts, and the victim and society lose.
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, it is not the dissent which "strip[s] the probative/prejudice balance of any real meaning,” ante, p 602. It is the majority’s inhibition of the trial judiciary that drastically limits the authority to evaluate the proffered impeachment evidence in the context of the purpose and situation in which it is offered.10 *678The result is exclusion of generic classes of evidence regardless of probativeness in a given case and inclusion of generic classes of evidence regardless of existential prejudice in a given case. In effect, these rules determine probativeness without regard to prejudice and prejudice without regard to probativeness.
Rule 609 reflected the decision of a committee of lawyers and judges adopting the common-sense premise that any past felony committed by a witness is to some extent relevant to credibility. This premise was as simple and as profound as the observation that if the far more imperative social obligation not to commit crime does not prevent criminal conduct, a defendant is far less likely to have inhibitions against lying.11_
*679While it has not been proven, it may be safely assumed that some jurors misuse prior conviction evidence admitted only for credibility. Rule 609 thus does not guarantee that an innocent person will never be convicted. It is one thing, however, to provide a procedure to protect against the possibility of an erroneous conviction in isolated cases;12 it is quite another to create a rule on the basis of supposition or personal perception that suppresses logically relevant evidence and increases the risk of erroneous acquittal.
Nonetheless, because of the perceived "low probative value” of all bright-line excludable convictions, the majority denies a relationship between believability and prior felonious conduct and refuses to allow judges the discretion to permit lay factfinders to draw an inference that a person who has previously flaunted society’s conventions by violating the criminal law of the state may also be willing to lie under oath.13
The majority’s answer to a potential for juror misuse is the creation of an analytical rule.14 On *680the basis of speculation as to the effect on the process caused by jurors’ inability to follow a limiting instruction, the majority imposes an administrative solution for what is in fact an existential problem. This solution ignores the fact that these problems are quintessentially ad hoc and call for ad hoc solutions. Therefore, the wise course for an appellate court is to recognize a wide discretion in the trial court with a correspondingly narrow scope of appellate review. As the United States Supreme Court instructs, fixed and arbitrary rules that suppress truth should be adopted only for compelling constitutional or societal reasons.
I am persuaded that the vast majority of the trial judiciary believes that it is desirable that a defendant have a fair opportunity to present a defense, and that it is frequently appropriate to limit attack on a defendant in order to encourage him to take the stand. I would trust these judgments, made with a "vision not vouchsafed to us, as we scan the printed page . . . .” People v Stoeckl, supra, 7 (Smith, J., dissenting), to the integrity of trial judges, their fidelity to the rules we have already created, and to the wisdom of juries.15_
*6813
The majority has looked to empirical studies16 of mock jurors by behavioral psychologists to design these new rules. The very use of the concept that jurors "mediate”17 their conclusions through other perceptions bespeaks the majority’s application of behavioral decision theory to the jury system. The majority fails to acknowledge, however, that simu*682lations of the jury process are conceded even by proponents of "psycholegal” research to be "imperfect tools for answering empirical questions,” Kerr & Bray, The Psychology of the Courtroom (New York: Academic Press, 1982), p 318. Notwithstanding such reservations and ignoring the fact that the prosecution must introduce sufficient evidence in the case in chief to support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the majority states that it is much easier for a jury to conclude that "a person is bad than that he did something bad,” ante, p 568, and then flatly asserts that the limiting instructions do not accomplish their purpose.
One study the majority believes deserves consideration involves forty-eight mock jurors being advised of seven prior similar convictions, Doob & Kirshenbaum, Some empirical evidence on the effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon an accused, 15 Crim LQ 88, 93 (1972-73). It is this study which provides the "halo effect” explanation in the majority opinion.18
*683The second study cited used both individual verdicts and four-person mock juries and was performed with forty individuals and thirty four-person groups who read a hypothetical burglary scenario in which half the persons were informed that the defendant had a prior conviction for burglary and were given a single written instruction that read:
"[T]he accused person’s prior criminal record should not be used to determine whether or not the defendant is guilty. Prior record should be used only to determine the credibility of the defendant, that is, whether he is to be believed as a witness.” [Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the deliberations of simulated juries, 18 Crim L Q 235, 240 (1975-76).]
The results from the individual verdicts "did not replicate” Doob & Kirshenbaum’s original findings, that is, the presence of a record did not seem to make a difference in the percentage of guilty verdicts when the verdicts were made individually. The presence of the record did appear to make a difference in the four-person groups, in which forty percent of the group knowing of a record found the defendant guilty and none of the fifteen groups not advised of a record found the defendant guilty. In evaluating the results, the authors conclude that *684knowledge of a previous conviction biases a jury against the defendant. They also note, however, that in the absence of a record, the "No Record groups discredited the evidence significantly and consistently more per unit time than Record groups did.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., p 245. While crediting the portion of the study that supports its result, the majority has failed to observe, as it formulates new policy for this state, that without any factual basis in the hypothetical problem the no-record mock jurors were more likely to be biased against the state by observing that the law was biased against the defendant, that police line-ups were biased, or that the evidence was only circumstantial.19
*685The most recent study cited by the majority is based on observations of 160 persons approached in Laundromats, supermarkets, bus terminals, and private homes who were asked to determine guilt or innocence of a hypothetical defendant from a two-page case summation. This study concludes that mock jurors are more likely to convict a defendant when advised of conviction of a prior similar crime, not, as the majority implies, of any prior conviction — a result that supports the current approach of our jurisprudence to this category of case, People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35; 268 NW2d 275 (1978). Similarly, the study’s observation that the participants’ rating of the hypothetical defendant’s credibility did not vary as a function of prior conviction is used by the majority to support its conclusion that a limiting instruction has no effect on how jurors use prior conviction *686evidence. It is obvious even to the untutored, however, that the fact that there was no significant variation in the mock jurors’ evaluation of the "defendant’s” credibility is equally explained by the fact that there was no real defendant to evaluate. As the authors of this study themselves note:
One should be cautious in generalizing from the results of this study to jurors in a real trial. First, the ratio of trial evidence to prior conviction information is much lower in simulations than in actual trials. In an actual trial, the greater richness of evidence and actors probably provides jurors with more bases for forming credibility judgments than the subjects in our simulation had. [Wissler & Saks, On the inefRcacy of limiting instructions: When jurors use prior conviction evidence to decide on guilt, 9 Law & Human Behavior 37, 46 (1985).]
Finally, not only was there no real defendant, no actual deliberation or explanation of the limiting instruction, the most telling indication of the absence of persuasive weight in this study is the fact that the observation the majority finds most important, ante, p 577, that is, that all else being the same, the "conviction” rate was higher where the impeaching crime was murder, is a conclusion drawn from a survey of twenty people, fourteen of whom opined that the defendant was guilty.20_
*687The Kalven & Zeisel study, The American Jury (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1966), which is the only attempt to measure the decisional processes of actual juries does not support the majority’s result and is, therefore, not dealt with in the survey of empirical studies. Given the majority’s reliance on hypotheticals presented to mock jurors to support its assumptions, and because The Amer*688ican Jury is the seminal study of actual jurors, it is appropriate to examine its findings in depth.
The Kalven & Zeisel study measured the trial judge’s assessment of guilt against the jury’s verdict in 3,576 jury trials and assumed the performance of the judge as a baseline of expertise in understanding the facts and applying the law. The importance of the study for purposes of examining the majority’s conclusion that there is a "likelihood” that jurors convict the innocent is that in 3,576 trials there was overwhelming judge and jury agreement; in sixty-four percent of the cases both would convict, and in fourteen percent both would acquit. The study found that judges and jurors reached contradictory results in twenty-two percent of the cases. Of this twenty-two percent, in nineteen percent the judge would convict where the jury would acquit, and in three percent the judge would acquit where the jury would convict.
The study concludes that the jury’s disagreement is "massively in one direction,” that is, for acquittal. Id., p 58. The Kalven & Zeisel work does provide evidence that jurors are influenced by personal characteristics of defendants and witnesses and by perceptions that do not relate to the issue of guilt or innocence. The study does not prove that juries are more likely than a judge to convict where the defendant takes the stand and is impeached, but, rather, supports the view that jurors are twice as likely to reach what the study assumes are outcomes that are not controlled by formal law or professional evaluation of evidence because of jury sentiments about the law and the defendant. Thus, Kalven & Zeisel substantiate the view that where juries do not reach "correct” results, they are engaged in the historic function of jury equity, erring on the side of acquittal.
Nor does the Kalven & Zeisel study support the *689majority’s observation that it is "much easier” for a jury "to conclude that a person is bad than that he did something bad.” Ante, p 568. The majority fails to observe that Kalven & Zeisel do not suggest that the jurors’ higher acquittal rate is because the defendant is innocent. The majority thus erroneously implies that because a jury finds guilt at a higher rate where prior records are introduced, the verdicts are less likely to be factually accurate. In fact, as noted, the Kalven & Zeisel statistics assume the judge’s evaluation as the standard of competence. Where judges and juries disagree (as they do less in cases of prior records) the disagreement describes not a factual inaccuracy suggesting conviction of innocent defendants, but a jury sentiment toward equity for a defendant despite factual accuracy and the rules of law.21
Having noted the phenomenon and the direction of judge and jury disagreement, the focus of the study turns to identification of the source and cause of the disagreement. The majority opinion neglects one entire chapter of the study devoted to the credibility hypothesis (chapter 13, pp 168-181). This chapter explores and rejects the existence of a defendant’s repudiated confession as a source of *690disagreement (p 174), it explores and rejects the effect of accomplice testimony as a source of disagreement (p 177), and it examines in detail the precise issue raised by the majority in this opinion, the "defendant-as-witness,” ante, p 567, that is, the effect of the credibility of the defendant as a source of disagreement.
The study proves in table 56, p 179, that twenty-three percent of all disagreements in these trials are attributable to a defendant’s taking the stand and testifying where either he had no record or his record had been suppressed. Specifically, in twenty-three percent of all cases of disagreement, the judge would have convicted, but the jury acquitted, where the defendant did not have a record or his record had been suppressed. Table 57, p 180, proves that the bulk of the effect of this defendant factor stems from the defendant having been charged with a serious crime. In other words, the more serious the crime, the more likely the jury is to disagree with the judge.
The jury’s broad rule of thumb here, presumably, is that as a matter of human experience it is especially unlikely that a person with no prior record will commit a serious crime, and that this is relevant to evaluating his testimony when he denies his guilt on the stand. [Id., p 179.]
Thus, assuming the factual accuracy of the trial judge’s verdict,22 the credibility hypothesis suggests *691that jurors are likely to give disproportionate weight to an unblemished record to reach incorrect results. Id., p 180.
The study also focuses on the credibility issue in the evaluation of the "cross-over phenomenon”— cases in which the judge is more lenient than the jury. Id., p 375. The issue here is whether there are cases in which a jury convicts and a judge would acquit that are statistically traceable to the use of a record for impeachment. Assuming, as the majority does, ante, p 568, n 8, that the study’s grouping23 produces data relevant to our debate, *692the study concluded that in a total of five cases out of 3,576 trials, a jury convicts where a judge would have acquitted either because a defendant testified and was impeached with a criminal record or did not testify at all (whether he had a record or not).
This study deals, of course, only with trials and not with all cases. However, if the Kalven & Zeisel results are applied on the basis of current data of all cases at the adjudicative level, fifteen percent will result in a trial, see discussion, n 12.
In the world of Kalven & Zeisel, there would be 23,840 defendants at the adjudicative level, of which 20,264 would admit guilt and plead guilty. Of the remaining 3,576 cases, even assuming all defendants chose a jury trial, in five cases, a defendant would be convicted by a jury who would have been acquitted by a judge (whether that result is attributable to the fact that the defendant testified and was impeached with a criminal record or did not testify).
Thus, the study proves that the risk of “errone*693ous” conviction by a jury due to use of a criminal record for impeachment (whether by use of a criminal record or by the defendant not taking the stand) is .0013982 or .13982 percent of the cases. Applied to all cases at the adjudicative level, the risk of erroneous conviction is .0002097 or .02097 percent of all cases. In fact, the study supports the conclusion that in roughly one out of a thousand trials,24 the jury may misuse the evidence.
The data cited by Kalven & Zeisel25 not only refutes the majority’s proposition that it is "likely” that misuse of the evidence leads to conviction of innocent defendants, but flatly contradicts it both ways. The study demonstrates that the risk of erroneous acquittal is greatest where a criminal record is suppressed and that the risk of erroneous conviction where a prior record is used is roughly one in a thousand cases.26
Finally, one additional matter, also neglected by the majority, is the role of the trial judge, id., ch 32, p 411. As earlier noted, a trial judge must dismiss a case at the close of the prosecution’s proofs if the prosecution has failed to carry its constitutional burden. The issue may be raised *694again at the close of the case prior to jury submission. After a jury renders a verdict, the issue of sufficiency of the evidence can be raised by motions for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Moreover, and most importantly, in this state, although not constitutionally required, the trial judge may grant a new trial even when the evidence is constitutionally sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Hampton, supra.
Thus, there is a last resort to prevent the unjust conviction of the innocent. Chapter 32 of the Kalven & Zeisel study shows that of the cases in which the jury convicted and the judge would have acquitted, the judge respected the jury verdict in only forty-eight percent of the cases. The judge either set aside the verdict or gave a minimum penalty in over half the cases. In the forty-three cases involving serious crimes, the trial judge either set aside the verdict or gave a minimum penalty in sixty-one percent of the cases.27
The study concludes its analysis of the cross-over phenomenon as follows:
In the end the institutional arrangement is impressive. It gives the jury autonomy to do equity on behalf of the criminal defendant. Where the *695jury’s freedom leads to "illegally” harsh results, the judge is at hand, ready to erase them. [Id., p 413.]
For purposes of examining the premises of the majority’s new policy, the most significant observations in The American Jury can be summarized as follows: If there is a bias in the system by juries, it is massively toward acquittal; the bias leads to erroneous acquittals if the standard for "erroneous” is whether the trial judges’ presumptive competence represents a valid judgment that the defendant’s guilt has been factually established in accordance with law; the likelihood of "erroneous” acquittal is greatest where the defendant testifies and does not have a record or the record is suppressed; the risk of erroneous conviction by a jury is seventy-seven out of 3,576 trials, or 2.2 percent; in only five of these trials was the result traceable to impeachment with a criminal record (or the defendant’s failure to testify); and the risk of error is offset by the trial judge’s intervention at the postconviction stage in over half of the cases in which the jury presumably erroneously convicted.
It is not surprising that the majority has chosen to ignore these observations. The American Jury study does not support what the majority does today; indeed, it contradicts every assumption in which the majority indulges.
The fact is that there is no demonstrable evidence that juries resolve doubtful cases on the basis that the defendant is a "bad man” and should be punished, that juries lower the burden of proof even if a guilty verdict would be incorrect, that juries convict because of a belief that the defendant’s convictions indicate that he is probably guilty of the crime charged, or that juries incorrectly convict where a defendant does not *696take the stand because of fear of impeachment.28 Thus, there is no basis other than the majority’s preference for its own rules for the statements that there is an "overwhelming tendency for jurors ... to misuse prior conviction evidence,” ante, p 579, or that MRE 609 presents a "likelihood that innocent persons may be convicted.”29 (Ante, p 569.)
*697The majority uses decisionmaking theory to support its result while ignoring the only actual evidence30 of juror performance and federal law, as well as the law in the overwhelming number of sister states. That it has done so can only be understood as the measure of its determination to impose its values on the legal process.
The obvious risk in such an approach is the threat of a loss of faith in the system itself. Legal rules must appear to function both to advance factual accuracy and to reflect the normative values of society, not the values of the lawgivers themselves. Thus, to the extent that jury verdicts are attributable not to factual accuracy, due process requirements, or mercy dispensation, but to rules of law that do not reflect society’s normative values, the jury process becomes more alien and more suspect to the citizenry.
Among the societal values the American legal system has consistently reflected is the value in a *698trial by one’s peers and the value of a crime-free life. While the majority may assume that the experience of other jurisdictions with impeachment by prior convictions represents an absence of enlightenment, the fact that forty-six other jurisdictions have adopted rules of inclusion or trial-judge discretion may instead represent a collective understanding that the societal value of a crime-free life must be reflected in rules of law.
The rules of the system cannot be dictated by popular opinion. The vitality of the institution is, however, appropriately gauged by the community’s judgment that the law is reflecting values that are not merely those of the decisionmakers. See, generally, Tribe, Trial by mathematics: Precision and ritual in the legal process, 84 Harv L R 1329, 1392-1393 (1971).
hi
The majority classifies prior convictions into three categories: the automatically admissible, the automatically excluded, and those requiring an exercise of modified discretion by the trial court. Those offenses which would be automatically admissible are offenses involving dishonesty or false statement. Those offenses which are automatically excluded are all other offenses, except theft offenses which would fall in a mid-range balancing area. In my judgment, the majority has seriously erred in disallowing the trial-judge discretion to exclude the former or admit the latter.
In a given case, a crime involving dishonesty or false statement could be so unfairly prejudicial as to require exclusion from a sense of justice, despite probative bearing on veracity. Similarly, crimes other than theft could, in a given case, be more probative of veracity than prejudicial. Rule 609 as
*699currently drafted recognizes that there are cases in which a trial court must, for the sake of justice, have the discretion to balance probativeness against prejudice. Without such discretion, the trial process will surely produce exceptions to the rules in order to admit or exclude evidence because the facts in a certain case seem to demand it. See, e.g., note, Prior conviction impeachment in the District of Columbia: What happened when the courts ran out of luck?, 35 Cath U L R 1157 (1986). The purpose of retaining any discretionary element is to avoid possible injustice under a given set of facts. To secure truth while screening prejudice, one should seek to broaden the scope of discretion and avoid the wooden strictures that a "bright-line” test creates.
When the Michigan Rules of Evidence were adopted, the question of a trial judge’s discretion in relation to impeachment by prior convictions was clearly presented and considered. MRE 609(a), as originally proposed,31 and as ultimately adopted, *700included a protection for criminal defendants that was not part of FRE 609(a)32: Under MRE 609(a), prior convictions of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement were not automatically admissible. Instead, the trial judge was entrusted with the discretion to exclude even these convictions when prejudice outweighed the probative value. As adopted by this Court, the balancing approach was applied not just to criminal defendants, but to all witnesses in civil and criminal cases faced with impeachment with prior crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. Wade & Strom, Michigan Courtroom Evidence, R 609, p 234.
Requiring the exercise of discretion before admitting either felonies or crimes of theft, dishonesty or false statement, has been described as an improvement over the Federal Rules by the Chairman of this Court’s Committee on Rules of Evidence, James K. Robinson, because of the trial judge’s control over unfair prejudice:
For example, MRE 609 . . . solved several drafting problems of the counterpart federal rule and authorized the trial judge to exercise more control over unfairly prejudicial prior convictions offered for impeachment. [Robinson, Current issues in Michigan evidence law, 61 Mich B J 330, 333 (1982).]_
*701This very innovation over FRE 609(a) is swept away by the proposed "bright line” rule requiring automatic admission, regardless of the amount of prejudice, of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.33
iv
The concerns discussed above are the tip of the iceberg.
Although the newly adopted "bright line” rule will be solely prospective in operation, the majority applies the "clarified” balancing test to the "cases at hand” on the ground that the balancing test does not represent a "clear break” in our jurisprudence. The Court thus creates a rule of general application in a field of law which results in the greatest percentage of appeals and which could affect virtually every trial begun in the years these cases have been pending and not concluded on direct appeal. The introduction of the low probative/presumptive exclusion analysis which is the heart of both the "bright line” and "non-bright line” tests is a substitute for the abuse of discretion standard which the trial judges of *702this state have relied upon in hundreds and perhaps thousands of cases.
Moreover, the new "vintage” analysis is a heretofore unknown MRE 609 consideration. It simply cannot fairly be said that today’s decision is simply a clarification of MRE 609. This fact demonstrates that the decision should be given purely prospective effect. This fact also demonstrates that the "modification” of Rule 609 should have been accomplished through the rulemaking process, making application wholly prospective. When the Court creates a rule, all courts of this state, including this Court, are bound by it. To pronounce this "clarification” of Rule 609 by case decision is, in fact, to retroactively amend a rule which bound us, no less than the Court of Appeals and trial court. The result is that cases that were unquestionably correctly decided under the rule the lower courts were duty-bound to follow now contain error. If the lower courts cannot rely on this Court to uphold them when they comply with our rules, the process of rulemaking is undermined. If the purpose of the rule is to encourage defendants to take the stand, that purpose can be effected without retroactive application. The reliance by the trial judiciary on Rule 609 is clear, as is the burden on the administration of justice of judicial reexamination of all nonfinal cases in which the impeachment issue has been raised, People v Nixon, 421 Mich 79; 364 NW2d 593 (1984).34
Prospective application would have been accomplished through the rulemaking procedure. An honest appraisal of the effect of applying the "clarified” balancing test would dictate prospective application. The cost to society due to reversed con*703victions and the concomitant strain on victims, witnesses, and public resources occasioned by retrials would be avoided, and the bench and bar would be allowed an opportunity to accommodate the change in procedure.
v
In resolving the appeals in the instant cases, I agree with Chief Justice Riley’s holding that we should address the issue whether this Court should adopt the rule in Luce v United States, 469 US 38; 105 S Ct 460; 83 L Ed 2d 443 (1984), and hold that, "to preserve a claim of error as to the admission of evidence of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, a defendant must testify,” ante, p 637. I also agree that MRE 609(a) is the appropriate test governing the admissibility of prior convictions for impeaching a witness’ credibility.

A. PEOPLE v GRAY

I agree with Chief Justice Riley’s reasoning and result with regard to Gray. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing impeachment with the defendant’s prior convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and possession of heroin. While the facial relation of these offenses to credibility is not as great as others, the value of the evidence was great. As the Chief Justice states, "the value of such evidence to the truth-seeking process was critical because the trial had boiled down to a swearing contest between two opposing witnesses.” Ante, pp 641-642.
B. PEOPLE VALLEN
I also agree with Chief Justice Riley’s reasoning *704and result in Allen. In Allen, as in Gray, the question of guilt or innocence rested upon the credibility of the complainant and the defendant. The sexual act was admitted by the defendant— the question was whether the act was consensual. This is the epitome of the one-to-one swearing contest in which credibility of the witnesses is crucial. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

C. PEOPLE v SMITH

I concur with Chief Justice Riley’s determination that the trial court erred in failing to state the factors it considered in admitting the defendant’s prior conviction of manslaughter for impeachment, and I agree that the error was harmless. However, because the error is a nonconstitutional evidentiary error, I believe that the proper standard for determining whether error which requires reversal occurred is "whether the defendant was unfairly prejudiced by the evidence.” People v Allen, 424 Mich 109, 110; 378 NW2d 481 (1985). In light of the otherwise overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, there was no unfair prejudice to the defendant. I concur in Chief Justice Riley’s resolution of the remaining issues. Thus, I also would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

D. PEOPLE vPEDRIN

In this case, the defendant, charged with breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, was impeached with evidence of a prior conviction of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny. The trial judge decided that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighed its preju*705dicial effect. Because I see no abuse of the trial court’s discretion, I would affirm the conviction.
The prior offense included the intent to commit larceny, a theft offense. As the trial judge noted, the prior offense involved dishonesty. While the prejudicial effect of impeachment with a conviction of the same prior offense is appreciable, the balance is, in the first instance, properly placed in the hands of the trial judge. This Court, when it adopted MRE 609(a) in 1978, acknowledged the probativeness of theft offenses by adding theft offenses to those misdemeanors which can be used for impeachment under the rule. The trial judge acknowledged the prejudicial effect, and balanced prejudice and probative value, noting that the defendant’s credibility upon testifying would be a very important issue because his proposed testimony presented a story with no other corroboration or support. Thus, the need for the testimony was heightened. Under these circumstances, I see no abuse of discretion.

E. PEOPLE v BROOKS

While I am not convinced that the impeachment in this case was error, I agree that any error was harmless. Therefore, I would affirm the conviction in this case.
CONCLUSION
The "bright-line” rule of automatic admission and exclusion of certain prior convictions, combined with the drastically circumscribed discretion allowed trial judges in relation to remaining offenses, will not serve the fair administration of justice in this state.
Riley, C.J., concurred with Boyle, J.
Griffin, J., took no part in the decision of these cases.
*706[[Image here]]
*707[[Image here]]
*708[[Image here]]

 While I have focused the first two sections of this dissent on bright-line exclusion because of its potential effect on factual accuracy, I wish to state at the outset that I also do not regard bright-line rules of inclusion as wise policy for our jurisprudence. Both rules artificially restrict the appropriate functions of juries and trial judges, see part ii(3).

 The Court posits a deficiency in the current application of Rule 609 and proceeds to remedy it despite the facts that we have a standing committee on the Rules of Evidence and that we have just completed the comment phase of our rulemaking process with regard to other amendments. The Court has thus interdicted the expression of other views and the self-education that the rulemaking process contemplates.

 Some of the analysis in the majority opinion is apparently the result of the failure to understand the distinct purposes of MRE 404 and MRE 609. MRE 404(a) prevents the use of character evidence as substantive proof of guilt. Where the evidence is sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict, MRE 404(a) interests have been served, the rule of exclusion has been satisfied, and the general rule of admission of relevant evidence again obtains (subject to MRE 403 considerations). Properly understood, there is no basis for a contention that there is a "practical contradiction” between MRE 404(a), which applies to the use of character evidence for the substantive purpose of proving guilt and MRE 609, which governs the use of evidence offered to impeach credibility.

 The majority seems to suggest that the favored view among the states is to restrict the admission of criminal conviction impeachment evidence. Careful examination of the relevant statutes and rules of evidence points to a contrary conclusion. In fact, it appears that the federal rule and the rule in forty-five states permit the type of impeachment the majority here precludes, Beaver & Marques, A proposal to modify the rule on criminal conviction impeachment, 58 Temple L Q 585 (1985). With narrow exceptions, the clear majority of states employing bright-line rules favor the admission of prior conviction evidence. When viewed in the aggregate, the overwhelming majority of states have favored bright-line tests of inclusion or have left to the discretion of the trial judge the task of probative/prejudice balancing.

 The majority view has also failed to consider the effect of "bright line” rules on the system which, as we have seen with the rule in People v Kreiner, 415 Mich 372; 329 NW2d 716 (1982), and the rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10), frequently have the effect of compelling the judiciary to evade the harshness of a "bright line” rule that smacks of injustice in a particular application to reality.

 Justice Brickley appears to take issue with the assumption that ninety percent of those charged are guilty of some offense related to the facts upon which they are charged. Judge Frankel’s observation that the "preponderant majority” are guilty does not stand alone. In one study of the attitudes of public defenders, Mather, Some determinants of the method of case disposition: Decision-making by public defenders in Los Angeles, 8 Law & Society 187, 209-210 (1973), they reported that, " '[m]ost of the cases we get are pretty hopeless — really not much chance of an acquittal.’ ” These cases were described as "deadbang,” that is, no credible defense could even be devised.
In the most recent compilation of national data from thirty-seven urban jurisdictions, including three counties in Michigan, Wayne, Ingham, and Kalamazoo, Boland & Sones, The prosecution of felony arrests, 1981, U S Dep’t of Justice (July, 1986), for every one hundred felony arrests disposed of in felony court, seventeen are dismissed, two are diverted, sixty-eight result in a guilty plea, and thirteen go to trial. Of the trials alone, nine are convicted and four are acquitted. Id., p 2.
Of critical importance is the explanation of the dismissals. Dismissals occur not only on the basis of insufficient evidence, but primarily because a plea was taken on another case, the complainant refused to prosecute, referral for different charges on the same case, evidence was illegally seized, and there were witness problems in general. Id., pp 12-19.
Of all cases after screening which reach the adjudicative level of determining the guilt of the defendant, that is, the very cases with which we are dealing in this opinion, eighty-four percent of all defendants admit their guilt, and ninety-five percent are found guilty by trial or plea.
Nor is the data significantly different for Detroit Recorder’s Court which handles a vastly disproportionately higher percentage of criminal cases than other jurisdictions within this state. Attached is a table compiled from the published annual reports of that court. (See *673appendix A.) The table would have been carried forward, but official publicly published reports are not available after 1979.
As the table clearly indicates, in Recorder’s Court, over a ten-year reporting period, eighty-six percent of all defendants at the adjudicative stage admit their guilt and ninety-four percent of all defendants at that stage are found guilty. The local data do not vary from the national data.
One can only speculate from studying the table as to why the percentage of persons pleading guilty, the conviction rate at trial, and the overall conviction rate tended to drop over the ten years. Perhaps, judicial intervention at the "policy making” level changes the fulcrum of values for decisionmaking by defense counsel, see Boland & Sones, supra, p 27.
One thing is clear. "Deadbang” cases become less "deadbang” as a result of today’s decision. A "credible” defense can always be devised in a jury trial if the defendant is allowed to present it and the jury is deprived of truthful evidence by which to test his credibility.
Today’s decision portends the following consequences: the percentage of persons pleading guilty will decline, the percentage opting for a jury trial over a bench trial will increase, the percentage found guilty by a jury will decline, and the overall percentage of persons found guilty will decline, all of which has nothing to do with whether defendants are guilty or not, and, in the face of national and local data, that at least ninety-four percent of those charged at the adjudicative level are guilty.

 Justice Brickley has rewritten history by reading Rule 609 as if it were a rule of exclusion. In 1974, the Court had indicated in People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), that it was disposed to limit the admission of prior convictions. In the atmosphere created by Jackson, this Court’s committee, on which I served, clearly refused to limit admissibility and promulgated a rule of general admission giving authority for the evidentiary decision to the trial judge to be tested on review by an abuse of discretion standard. Justice Brickley’s insistence that the rationale in People v Kelly, 66 Mich App 634; 239 NW2d 691 (1976), cannot be squared with Rule 609 thus rests on his incorrect view of 609 as a rule of limitation.

 People v Kelly focused resolution of the impeachment issue on the effect on the truth-seeking process itself, "not merely the prospects for acquittal,” People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95, 116-117 (1983).
The focus of Kelly and Wakeford is not the effect on the defendant if the defendant is impeached, but the effect on the jury if it does not hear all that it can properly be told in a one-to-one credibility situation. While the majority states that it is not the defendant’s need for the evidence that is to be evaluated in the new balancing process, it is apparent from the majority’s analysis of the cases before us that that is the definition of "effect on the decisional process.” Indeed, while purportedly resolving a split in the Court of Appeals on the propriety of impeachment in a one-to-one credibility situation, the majority’s resolution of these cases in fact reveals that this rule is far more than a clarification of the existing balancing test. Error is found, not only in the one-to-one credibility situation (Gray), but also where there are two defense witnesses against one complainant (Allen), and where there are four prosecution witnesses against the defendant (Brooks and Smith). What the trial court judge is apparently to conclude from these results is that the effect on the decisional process is defined by a defendant’s need for the testimony.

 This approach becomes even more problematic given the majority’s failure to agree on adoption of the Luce rule, Luce v United States, 469 US 38; 105 S Ct 460; 83 L Ed 2d 443 (1984). As Justice Ryan noted in People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 117,
In the absence of some indication as to what the defendant’s testimony would have been, we can only speculate as to how the trial would have been different and the "decisional process” affected . . . had the defendant testified.

 The majority also appears to overrule two prior pronouncements of this Court establishing the parameters for impeachment of nondefendant witnesses. People v Atkins #2, 406 Mich 958 (1979); People v Tait, 136 Mich App 475; 356 NW2d 33 (1984). The question of the proper rule for nondefendant witnesses has neither been briefed nor argued here. Like the rule adopted by the Court today for criminal defendants, the rule adopted for nondefendant witnesses is informed by the rare air of the appellate forum rather than an understanding of the reality of the trial court arena.

 In fact, if we are to look for guidance to the behavioral sciences, lying is one of the diagnostic characteristics of persons classified as having antisocial (criminal) personalities.
The diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder is reserved for persons whose behavior is said to demonstrate a persistence into adult life of a pattern of childhood antisocial behaviors. These behaviors include lying, stealing, fighting, and resisting authority; they are behaviors any moderately observant mother should be able to identify. In adulthood, the person with antisocial personality is described as having [among many other characteristics] an inconsistent work performance, an inability to maintain interpersonal attachments, . . . unlawful behavior, [and] lying .... [Kaplan & Sadock, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry (4th ed, 1985), p 1866.]
It is true that people engaging in these behaviors may be useful and even successful citizens. The fact remains that the medical approach to understanding crime supports the intuitive lay sense that there is a relationship between the behaviors, Halleck, Sociopathy: Ethical aspects of diagnosis and treatment, 20 Current Psychiatric Therapies 167 (1981).
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed) (dsm iii r) of the American Psychiatric Association also lists among the diagnostic criteria "(2) fails to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior, as indicated by repeatedly performing antisocial acts that are grounds for arrest (whether arrested or not), e.g., destroying property, harassing others, stealing, pursuing an illegal occupation, (3) is irritable and aggressive, as indicated by *679repeated physical fights or assaults (not required by one’s job or to defend someone or oneself) including spouse- or child-beating . . ., (b) has no regard for the truth, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or 'conning’ others for personal profit or pleasure.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed), (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1987), p 345.

 Indeed, existing rules of procedure, including MCR 2.610 — Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and MCR 2.611 — New Trials, provide the accused with protection against erroneous conviction. See, also, Proposed Michigan Court Rule 6.412(A), 422A Mich 170 (no time limit on motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence). These rules stand not merely as surplusage to the rules of evidence, but rather as additional shields to the wrongfully convicted.

 If, generically, a class of evidence has no probative value to attack credibility, the absence of the identical class of evidence has no probative value in support of credibility. Of course, the majority’s observation that perfect symmetry (read fairness to both sides) cannot be obtained can in a future case explain why absence of conviction is relevant to support credibility, but proof of conviction is not relevant to impeach credibility.

 The flaw in the majority’s faith in bright-line rules is already *680evidenced in the opinion that creates the rules. The majority adopts a bright-line rule which by definition excludes trial court evaluation of the issue. At the same time, the majority is forced to recognize in ns 34 and 37 the existence of an “independent problem” trial courts will be required to resolve without guidance from this Court. To formulate a rule based on the principle that there are no exceptions and to recognize in the same opinion that there may be some exceptions is to reveal the ultimate fallacy of bright-line tests. The noted problem itself demonstrates that "always” cannot mean always and "never” cannot mean never. The problem noted is direct evidence that bright-line rules should not be adopted.

 Trusting the jury to follow instructions which limit the use of the prior convictions accords with what Justice Scalia, in Richardson v Marsh, 107 S Ct 1707, has recently described as "the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions . . . .”
*681As Justice Rehnquist observed, if it is pointless to give a jury limiting instructions, it is "pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed.” Parker v Randolph, 442 US 62, 73; 99 S Ct 2132; 60 L Ed 2d 713 (1979). See, also, Cruz v New York, supra.

 If the studies were deemed to be reliable by the majority, they would no doubt form the basis for the conclusion that there is an "overwhelming probability” for jurors to misuse prior conviction evidence. If they are not reliable, they do not deserve consideration and should not be cited. In fact, they appear to have been included because, as the majority observes, they "support our view.” Indeed, as the majority ultimately acknowledges, the conclusion that there is an "overwhelming probability” that jurors misuse evidence rests solely on the majority’s "perception” of the "obvious.”
The statement that the "standard of appellate review prevents correction of error” itself refutes the majority’s "perception” of the obvious. Prejudicial misuse is defined by the majority as a "likelihood” of conviction of the innocent. The standard of review permits reversal when after a review of the other evidence of guilt, the appellate court can say the conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice. People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551; 194 NW2d 709 (1972). The standard of review establishes that, apart from the "error,” the conviction is supported by other evidence, sufficient to convince the reviewing tribunal that a conviction of an innocent person has not occurred.
I do not suggest that jurors universally avoid improper consideration of prior-conviction evidence. Rather, what I suggest is that it is not sound policy to impose this burden on the legal system given the existing protection of the innocent and the effect on the truth-finding function.

 Since the majority defines low probative value and strong potential for prejudice by reference to whether the factfinder is able to understand a permissible consideration by first recognizing the impermissible consideration, it should logically follow that any evidence admitted for a limited purpose will have low probative value and strong potential for prejudice. If this result does not follow, it must be because there is a distinction between direct mediation and indirect mediation that the majority has as yet not explained.

 The majority quotes at length from this study, ante, pp 575-576. Forty-eight persons were individually approached in and around various public buildings. Each was read a four-hundred-word description of a case of breaking and entering. Each was asked, "How likely do you think it is that he is guilty?” Each was asked to respond on a scale that ran from one (definitely guilty) to seven (definitely not guilty). Points three and five were labeled as "probably guilty” and "probably not guilty,” respectively.
Twelve persons read the case and rated (Group 1); twelve persons read, in addition, that the defense attorney decided not to put his client on the stand because there was no purpose (Group 2); twelve persons were told that the defendant testified "but did not give any important evidence” and that the defendant was impeached with five prior felonies for breaking and entering an occupied dwelling and twice for possession of stolen property (Group 3); and twelve persons were told, in addition to the convictions, the limiting instruction of the judge (Group 4). The results were:
Average Ratings of Guilt
Group 1 4.00
Group 2 4.33
Group 3 3.25
Group 4 3.00
*683The study concludes on the basis of the data that the presence of a record has a dramatic effect. I would expect that random disagreement in so small a sample could account for all of the difference, but, regardless, this study can hardly be urged as support for the majority’s result.
There is simply no real basis for comparison between the methodology of this study and that of the courtroom. These are forty-eight individual ratings without a trial, evidence, voir dire, argument, witnesses, instructions, or deliberation, and the prior conviction evidence is overwhelming and unrepresentative.

 This study, in one respect, comes closer to reality. It has four-person groups actually deliberate. In all other respects, it shares the defects of the other studies: No voir dire, no live witnesses to evaluate, no evidence as we understand the term, no cross-examination, no argument, no instructions — in a word, no trial. It is difficult to analytically measure effects of evidence in a trial when there is no trial.
The description of the case for individual jurors and four-person groups was as follows. A woman’s home had been broken into and two-hundred dollars had been stolen. As the woman arrived home, she saw the burglar fleeing through the back yard. While the time was brief, she saw the burglar turn around while he was on the fence giving her a view of his face. She immediately reported the crime and the defendant’s description. The police arrested a man in the vicinity of the crime who matched the description and who had two-hundred dollars in the glove compartment of his car. The woman positively identified the man in a line-up.
The survey participants were told that, at the trial, the defendant and his girlfriend testified that they were at the movies at the time of the burglary. Half of the subjects received the fact that the defendant had previously been convicted of burglary and a limiting instruction.
The results of both individual and group "verdicts” are as follows, p 243:
PERCENTAGES OF GUILTY VERDICTS IN EACH OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS
Individual Group
verdict verdict
Record condition 45% 40%
(N=20) (N=15 groups)
*685No Record
condition 40% 0%
(N=20)_(N=15 groups)
The study analyzes this data as well as tapes of deliberations and concludes that what is a "weak manipulation (one prior conviction) in the individual verdict condition proves to be a strong manipulation in the group verdict condition.” It concludes that there is little doubt that knowledge of a previous conviction biases a case against the defendant.
What the data above illustrates is that conviction rates fall as between individual verdicts and group verdicts regardless of record or no record condition, that is, the jury is more disposed as a group to acquit than individuals are.
Second, the data suggest that on the facts given, hardly a weak case, all four-person groups will acquit absent a record and that tapes of their deliberations reflect distortions of fact unrelated to the evidence.
Third, on the evidence and the criminal record, only forty percent of the four-person groups convicted, a percentage likely to drop substantially where unanimous twelve-person groups are required.

 I would not make reference to a study based on a two-page summary for formulation of a rule interdicting trial court discretion. Since the majority does, the study should be explained.
Eighty persons received an auto theft case, and eighty persons received a murder case. For each crime, the groups were subdivided into groups of twenty for tabulation of four different record conditions: 1) no record, 2) previous conviction of the same crime, 3) previous conviction of a dissimilar crime (murder in the auto theft case and auto theft in the murder case), and 4) previous conviction of perjury.
*687The subject would read the two pages and answer, essentially, whether the defendant was guilty or not, why he had reached that verdict, and whether the defendant’s prior conviction had influenced his guilty/not guilty verdict.
The results were as follows:
CONVICTION RATE
CASE
PRIOR CONVICTION AUTO THEFT MURDER
None 35% (7 of 20) 50% (10 of 20)
Same 80% (16 of 20) 70% (14 of 20)
Dissimilar 70% (14 of 20) 35% (7 of 20)
Perjury 70% (14 of 20) 50% (10 of 20)
Thus, in all auto theft cases under a variety. of prior record conditions, eighty persons split fifty-one to twenty-nine for conviction, and, in all murder cases under similar conditions, eighty persons split forty-one to thirty-nine for conviction.
The study’s disclaimer (see ante, p 568) is an enormous understatement. These are not mock jurors. This is a public opinion survey.
There was no trial, no evidence, no witnesses, no voir dire, no instructions, no deliberation, and, most importantly, no adverse effect on a living person.
If the study produced reliable results, it suggests that impeachment by a perjury conviction in a murder case means nothing, but, in an auto theft case, it doubles the conviction rate. It suggests that use of a conviction of auto theft in a murder trial lowers the conviction rate by a third. That these surprising results are selectively ignored by the majority underscores the paucity of the relied upon data.
In truth, this study has no value for policymaking in this area. The number in the sample is so low, the margin for error so high, and the conditions so removed from those in an actual jury trial, that the majority cannot be serious in placing any reliance on this slender reed.

 While the study does indicate that the rate of conviction of defendants who either were impeached with a prior conviction or did not take the stand is higher than that of those who were not impeached either because they had no record or because their record was suppressed (see n 23), the missing element in this analysis, as in all juror research, is obvious: How many of the defendants were, in fact, guilty? Various estimates of this number exist. Assuming that ninety percent are guilty of the offense charged or a related offense, see n 6, these results are, in fact, an argument against the majority result. Read in the light of that assumption, what the statistics prove is that jurors deprived of evidence that bears on credibility are twice as likely (forty-two percent to twenty-five percent) to acquit a guilty defendant. Moreover, if twenty-five percent of juries who heard former conviction evidence acquit, the presumption of prejudice espoused by the majority is refuted. This figure demonstrates that jurors do require the prosecution to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Kalven & Zeisel study does not support the conclusion that juries convict the innocent.

 The Kalven & Zeisel study does not in terms state that it assumes that the trial judge’s verdict is correct, that is, that all defendants found guilty by a judge were, in reality, guilty. It does proceed from the assumption that judges follow the law and assess the facts with a degree of competence that calls for examination of the reasons for the difference between judge and jury. Thus, as the authors observe "as a matter of both theoretical interest and methodological convenience, we study the performance of the judge as a baseline .... The result is a systematic view of how often the jury *691disagrees with the judge, of the direction of such dissent, and an assessment of the reasons for it,” id., p 10. Of course, if, as the majority suggests, we are now to reject the assumption that judges have special competence in applying the law to the facts, there is no empirical measure for evaluating the likely accuracy of jury verdicts since neither mock studies nor Kalven & Zeisel provide meaningful information on the question. These studies are used by the majority to the extent they "support” the majority view and are rejected where they do not.
I did not introduce them into this discussion, and I do not rely on them. I have undertaken this critique only because the majority has asserted that the studies deserve consideration, in the hope that close analysis would prompt the majority to a more rigorous examination of the premises and the potential consequences of its new rules.

 First, the purpose of table 52, p 160, and the companion table, p 162, was not to demonstrate erroneous reliance on impeachment evidence. The authors of the study used both tables as evidence that "the jury by and large does understand the case and get it straight . . . .” Id., p 162.
The table distributes all trials in sample n (1191) into nine cells by strength of the prosecution’s case vertically and by balance of contradictions horizontally. Thus, the weakest case for the prosecution is in the upper left cell and the strongest is in the bottom right cell. Each cell is further subdivided by the factor "No record/stand” and "Record/no stand.” The two groups are composed of the following: 1) The first group is comprised of all cases in which the defendant took the stand and had no record or had his record suppressed plus those cases in which the defendant did not take the stand but the jury learned that he had no prior criminal record. 2) The second group is comprised of all cases in which the defendant did testify and was impeached with his record or did not take the stand at all.
This grouping blunts the effectiveness of drawing conclusions on the basis of impeachment alone. Moreover, the total differential acquittal rate is forty-two percent versus twenty-five percent on the basis of all cases in the cells.
*692By comparing the jury acquittal rate with the judge acquittal rate, in no cell does the jury convict at a higher rate than the judge even where the jury learns of a prior criminal record. See appendix b.
Finally, the study concludes its examination of the defendant’s credibility as affected by the absence of a record or by its suppression by concluding that twenty-three percent of all disagreements between a jury and a judge (a jury acquittal versus a judge conviction) are due to the jury’s attachment of weight to an unblemished record. Id., p 180.
On the second point, ante, p 568, n 8, the majority places reliance upon the data which reflect that while ninety-one percent of all defendants without a record testify, only seventy-four percent of those with a record do so. The majority mistakenly attributes the difference to the existence of the record alone. If the value or need for the defendant’s testimony were as great as the majority assumes and the damage of impeachment so great, one would expect a significantly greater differential.
It must be assumed that all factors which operate in the matrix of values for decisionmaking which keeps record-free defendants off the stand similarly operate for those with records. Thus, the existence of a prior record is a cumulative factor whose value is not arithmetically deducible by simple subtraction.

 The majority’s resort to the accusation that I have resorted to statistics, n 30, is ironic. Unable to find support in law for what it does, the majority introduces statistics. When confronted with the fact that the studies either do not withstand scrutiny or refute the majority’s premises, the majority responds by asserting that trial judges are as corrupted by the taint of the evidence as it assumes juries are. When challenged to consider the impact on the fact-finding process in light of the protections surrounding the competing value at stake, the majority retreats to the proposition that its view advances the integrity of fact finding. The majority thus ultimately reveals its only basis — the conviction that its views should be imposed on the system.

 Id, pp 160,162, and 389.

 While it is a hallowed principle of our system that it is better that ten guilty persons go free than that one innocent person is convicted, it is another matter entirely to formulate policy on a basis that suggests that 999 guilty persons should go free rather than one innocent person be convicted.

 It may be legitimately observed that imposition of a minimum penalty is scant comfort to an innocent defendant. It must be remembered, however, that The American Jury study was conducted before the United States Supreme Court held that evidence sufficient to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in the case in chief was constitutionally required, see discussion, § 11(1), ante, pp 668-669. Thus, the current law provides the accused with additional protection against erroneous conviction. Moreover, our current rules of procedure, MCR 2.610 and MCR 2.611, provide for postconviction relief, which, assuming the good faith of our trial judiciary, stand as additional barriers against even the arguably incorrect jury verdict. See also Proposed Michigan Court Rule 6.412(A), 422A Mich 170 (no time limit on motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence).

 In fact, if the majority premise is correct that Rule 609 presents a "likelihood” that innocent persons are convicted, it should logically follow that all prior convictions for impeachment should be eliminated. As Judge Weinstein observed in commenting on a proposal to limit impeachment to those crimes which indicate a direct tendency to falsify,
While this approach possibly ensures that the conviction will have a higher probative value re credibility, it does nothing to lessen prejudice to the defendant who is being tried for a crime involving an element of falsehood, since the jury may well assume that he is guilty again. [3 Weinstein, Evidence, ¶ 609[02], pp 609-62 to 609-63.]
There are only two wholly logical alternatives to this approach, all in or all out. Thus, if it is "absurd to suggest that jurors will be able to avoid improper consideration of a defendant’s criminal character once it has become known to them,” it is "absurd” to permit the introduction, with limiting instructions, of bright-line inclusions or theft offenses, since a jury presumably is, in these cases, equally unlikely to follow instructions, and thus, equally likely to convict innocent defendants.
That the majority apparently finds the logical consequence of its own rationale too great a burden to impose on the system underscores the arbitrary nature of the "solution” that today replaces trial court discretion.

 The intuitive sense that jurors may misuse evidence, like the presumption that jurors follow instructions, makes the rule of trial court discretion a sometimes uneasy compromise, rooted finally in the belief "that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal justice process,” Richardson v Marsh, 481 US —, —; 107 S Ct 1702, 1709; 95 L Ed 2d 176 (1987).
Until today, however, only the courts of Hawaii and West Virginia have had such confidence in the wisdom of their perceptions that they would create a policy that systemically skews factual accuracy and prevents the trial court from protecting a defendant against undue prejudice.
The issue at last comes down to this: Assuming a potential for prejudice from misuse of prior conviction evidence, what law, data, studies, or experience, support the proposition that there is an "over*697whelming probability” that jurors misuse the evidence to "convict innocent persons?” The majority’s assertion that "it is absurd to suggest that jurors will be able to avoid improper consideration” is, in fact, a rhetorical substitute for a lack of substance both in its premise (that there is an "overwhelming probability” that jurors misuse evidence) and its conclusion (that innocent persons are convicted); a proposition the majority tautologically proves by resort to its perceptions.

 The majority accuses me of having argued that rules should be formulated on the basis of statistics. What has been suggested is, that if the majority opts to resort to scientific data to support its new rules, that mode of analysis, which I would not adopt, should at the least accord consideration to the current operation of the system (including both the existing data, and the existing legal protections against misuse of evidence). It would seem more logical to determine rules in the context of what we know about our own system, rather than on the basis of three studies of simulated jurors or alternatively, on unsupported perceptions. I have not suggested that we should "first and foremost” consider what percentage of defendants are guilty. I have advanced the modest proposition that procedural rules should be formulated with concern for the burden on factual accuracy, see ante, p 604.

 MRE 609(a) as originally proposed to this Court provided as follows:
Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime.
(a) General rule.
(1) Criminal defendants. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness-accused in a criminal case, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
(A) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted or
(B) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment, and
(C) the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence on the issue of credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect on the witness-accused.
(2) All witnesses other than criminal defendants. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness other than a witness-accused in a criminal case, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or *700established by public record during cross-examination but only if
(A) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence on the issue of credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect or
(B) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. [399 Mich 987-988 (1977).]

 For a discussion of the battle over judicial discretion in relation to FRE 609(a), see note, Impeachment with prior convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1): A plea for balance, 63 Wash U L Q 469, 474-478 (1985).

 It should be noted, also, that while the majority has ostensibly created a category of automatically admissible convictions, it has narrowed significantly the admissibility of both felonies and misdemeanors involving dishonesty, or false statement. The majority defines as automatically admissible crimes which involve dishonest or false statements as an "actual element of the offense in question.” (Ante, p 594, n 15.) No authority is cited in support of the requirement that the dishonesty and false statement category include only those crimes "where dishonesty or false statement is an actual element of the offense . . . .” Id. While it is suggested that the federal rule requires dishonesty or false statement as an actual element of the impeaching offense, the meaning of the terms "dishonesty” or "false statement” in FRE 609(a)(2) is an issue that has divided the federal circuits, United States v Wilson, 536 F2d 883, 885 (CA 9, 1976); United States v Smith, 179 US App DC 162; 551 F2d 348 (1976); Weinstein, Evidence, ¶ 609[04], The majority has thus imposed additional limitations on impeachment evidence for the avowed purpose of limiting trial court discretion.

 The newly announced witness rule is such a clear break with prior jurisprudence that the parties in those cases never thought of nor argued it.