Court Opinion

ID: 9734326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:31:59.715358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:47.928962
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
Because I believe that we do not have jurisdiction to reach the merits of this appeal, I dissent. For the reasons which follow, I would quash the appeal.
First, I agree with the majority that the order appealed from is interlocutory. Additionally, the majority correctly notes that this appeal is not authorized by any statute, and that the trial court did not certify the appeal to our Court pursuant to section 702(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. *444§ 702(b).1 Nevertheless, the majority declares that “under our broad discretionary power of review, we have elected to entertain the instant appeal.” Majority op. at 444 n.2. In so holding, the majority has ignored the long established principle that because our Court derives its jurisdiction and powers solely from statute, no right of appellate review exists in our Court unless expressly authorized by statute. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Pa. 163, 171, 185 A.2d 586, 590 (1962); Bell Appeal, 396 Pa. 592, 598, 152 A.2d 731, 734 (1959); Commonwealth v. Guardiani, 226 Pa.Super. 435, 437, 310 A.2d 422, 423-24 (1973).
Section 503(a) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of July 31, 1970,2 provided in Part: “The failure of an appellee to file an objection to the jurisdiction of an appellate court . . . shall, unless the appellate court shall otherwise order, operate to perfect the appellate jurisdiction of such appellate court . ...” Pursuant to this provision, our Court held that although an appeal from an interlocutory order was not authorized by law and the trial judge did not certify the issue as a controlling issue of law, we have discretionary power to entertain the appeal if appellee did not object to our jurisdiction. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Bennett, 236 Pa.Super. 509, 345 A.2d 754 (1975); McConnell v. Schmidt, 234 Pa.Super. 400, 339 A.2d 578 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rucco, 229 Pa.Super. 247, 324 A.2d 388 (1974). Accordingly, if Section 503(a) governed this case, I would agree with the majority that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. This *445appeal, however, was filed after the Judicial Code went into effect.
Section 704 of the Judicial Code provides in part:
(a) General rule-The failure of an appellee to file an objection to the jurisdiction of an appellate court within such time as may be specified by general rule, shall, unless the appellate court otherwise orders, operate to perfect the appellate jurisdiction of such appellate court
(b) Exception— Subsection (a) shall not apply to any defect in the jurisdiction of an appellate court which arises out of:
. . . An attempt to take an appeal from an interlocutory order which has not been made appealable by law or pursuant to section 702(b) (relating to interlocutory appeals by permission).
42 Pa.C.S. § 704. A plain reading of section 704 demonstrates that under the Judicial Code an appellate court no longer has the discretion to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order which has not been authorized by law or certified by the trial court under section 702(b). Any doubt regarding the intent of the Legislature is dispelled by the official source note accompanying section 704, which states that section 704(b)(2) was intended to overrule Commonwealth v. Bennett, supra.3 Accordingly, because no statute authorizes this appeal, it should be quashed.4

. Section 702(b) provides:
When a court ..., in making an interlocutory order in a matter in which its final order would be within the jurisdiction of an appellate court, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter, it shall so state in such order. The appellate court may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such interlocutory order.

. P.L. 673, No. 223, art. V (repealed) (formerly codified at 17 P.S. § 211.503(a)). Section 503(a) has been replaced by section 704 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 704, which went into effect on June 27, 1978.

. The majority cites other language in that official source note as support for its conclusion that this Court has the discretionary power to entertain this appeal. The pertinent language is as follows: “The same relief will be available by petition for review of the refusal of the lower court to make the statement contemplated by 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b).” The majority’s reliance upon this language is misplaced because appellant did not request the trial court to certify its order.

. Assuming, arguendo, that we do have discretion to reach the merits on this appeal, this is an inappropriate case for exercising jurisdiction. The majority states that it has decided to entertain this appeal “because of the great importance ... of the issue presented and the guidance such a decision will provide to those trial courts struggling with the difficult area of the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act.” Majority op. at 444 n.2. This reasoning, however, *446is refuted by the majority’s citation of Smith v. Harleysville Insurance Co., 275 Pa.Super. 246, 418 A.2d 705 (1980) (reargument en banc denied, April 29, 1980). See Majority op. at 623 n.6. In Smith, a panel of this Court held that an insurance company which refuses to pay benefits to its insured under the No-fault Act cannot be held liable for punitive damages. Accordingly, because this case presents the same issue as in Smith, there is no need to reaffirm that decision.