Court Opinion

ID: 9382676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 16:00:42.243814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.082585
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1417     Document: 010110833833      Date Filed: 03/28/2023   Page: 1
                                                           FILED
                                               United States Court of Appeals
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS      Tenth Circuit

                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       March 28, 2023
                          _______________________________________
                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                         Clerk of Court
  KENNETH UEDING,

         Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                        No. 22-1417
                                                (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-02166-LTB-GPG)
  COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF                                     (D. Colo.)
  CORRECTIONS; THE ATTORNEY
  GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
  COLORADO,

         Respondents - Appellees.
                     _______________________________________

                                         ORDER
                          _______________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                _______________________________________

       Mr. Kenneth Ueding obtained a conviction in state court and asked a

 federal district court for habeas relief based on the delay in bringing him

 to trial. The district court denied habeas relief, and Mr. Ueding seeks a

 certificate of appealability so that he can appeal. 28 U.S.C.

 § 2253(c)(1)(A). We deny this request.

       Mr. Ueding based his habeas claim on both state law and the federal

 constitution. The district court concluded that (1) habeas relief is

 unavailable for violations of state law and (2) the constitutional claim is

 procedurally barred.
Appellate Case: 22-1417   Document: 010110833833   Date Filed: 03/28/2023   Page: 2

       For the state-law claim, we consider whether Mr. Ueding has made “a

 substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v.

 Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). Under this standard, any reasonable

 jurist would reject the state-law claim because it doesn’t involve a

 constitutional right. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991)

 (stating that habeas relief does not lie for the violation of state law). So

 the state-law claim doesn’t merit a certificate of appealability.

       For the constitutional claim, the district court declined to reach the

 merits based on a procedural default. So here we consider whether a

 reasonable jurist could debate the applicability of a procedural default.

 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In our view, the applicability

 of a procedural default is not reasonably debatable.

       A procedural default occurs when “a state court dismisses [a] federal

 habeas claim on the basis of noncompliance with adequate and independent

 state procedural rules.” Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133, 1144 (10th Cir.

 2012). A state procedural rule is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly

 followed and applied evenhandedly to all similar claims.” Id. (quoting

 Thacker v. Workman, 678 F.3d 820, 835 (10th Cir. 2012)). A rule is

 “independent” “if it relies on state law, rather than federal law, as the basis

 for the decision.” Simpson v. Carpenter, 912 F.3d 542, 571 (10th Cir.

 2018) (quoting Banks v. Workman, 692 F.3d 1133, 1145 (10th Cir. 2012)).

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Appellate Case: 22-1417   Document: 010110833833   Date Filed: 03/28/2023   Page: 3

       Here the federal district court concluded that the state court’s

 application of the plain-error standard constituted an adequate and

 independent defect. For this conclusion, the district court reasoned that the

 application of the plain-error standard

             was adequate because it had been evenhandedly applied and

             independent because it had been based on state law.

       In seeking a certificate of appealability, Mr. Ueding contests the

 existence of a procedural default, arguing that application of the plain-

 error standard was not independent because he had presented a

 constitutional claim when objecting to joinder.

       We disagree with Mr. Ueding’s interpretation of his objection in

 state court. There he argued that joinder would lead to the admission of

 unfairly prejudicial evidence. Here he’s asserting the denial of a speedy

 trial. Mr. Ueding did not say anything in his objection to joinder that

 would alert the state courts to a claim involving the denial of a speedy

 trial. So any reasonable jurist would reject Mr. Ueding’s reliance on his

 objection to joinder in state court. See Finlayson v. State, 6 F.4th 1235,

 1241 (10th Cir. 2021) (concluding that when a state court recognizes or

 assumes a constitutional error but denies relief because the error is not

 plain, the plain-error standard “serves as an independent state rule” for

 purposes of procedural default).

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Appellate Case: 22-1417   Document: 010110833833   Date Filed: 03/28/2023   Page: 4

       Given the procedural bar, we could consider the merits of the claim

 only if Mr. Ueding satisfies the requirements for one of two exceptions: (1)

 cause and prejudice or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice based on

 actual innocence. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Mr.

 Ueding has not invoked either exception.

       We thus deny Mr. Ueding’s request for a certificate of appealability

 and dismiss the appeal. 1

                                     Entered for the Court

                                     Robert E. Bacharach
                                     Circuit Judge

 1
       Mr. Ueding also requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
 release on his own recognizance pending the appeal. We grant leave to
 proceed in forma pauperis, but our dismissal moots the request for release
 pending the appeal.

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