Court Opinion

ID: 9553799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:35:23.147668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:16.837822
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I dissent. Regretfully, if the concurrence requirement is unconstitutional, the entire statute must fall.
The majority dismisses the severability issue with the comment that “essentially the same issue” was resolved in People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248 [102 Cal.Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481], (Ante, p. 68.) The concurrence requirement held unconstitutional but severable in Navarro limited the court’s power to commit otherwise ineligible persons to the narcotic addict treatment program (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 3000 et seq.). Section 3052 of the Welfare and Institutions Code makes persons con*69victed of certain crimes ineligible for the program. The disqualification was absolute until the forerunner of Welfare and Institutions Code section 3051 was amended to provide that, in unusual cases where the interests of justice would be served, the court could—with the concurrence of the district attorney—commit persons otherwise ineligible under section 3052.1
An unconstitutional provision is severable from a statute if the remainder is “complete in itself” and would have been adopted without the severed provision. (People v. Navarro, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 260; In re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 498 [122 P.2d 22].) Having reviewed the legislative history, this court conceded: “[I|t is possible that the Legislature would not have authorized the court to make commitments, notwithstanding section 3052, without the concurrence of the district attorney.” (People v. Navarro, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 262, italics added.) Actually, since the Legislature completely withheld the power initially and then only granted it subject to the express restriction, it is probable that the Legislature would not have conferred the power on the courts without the concurrence requirement. Nevertheless, this court held the requirement severable because the will of the Legislature to the contrary was not “manifest.” {Id.)
While a presumption in favor of severability may ordinarily be appropriate, the contrary presumption should prevail when severance would render a conditional judicial power unconditional. Lest the separation of powers doctrine becomes a guise for judicial arrogation, we should not remove a statutory restraint on a judicial power unless it is clear the Legislature would have conferred the power without it.
The program of diverting narcotics defendants from the criminal process is so revolutionary that the Legislature approved it only tentatively.2 Therefore, it is certainly not “manifest” that the Legislature would have enacted it without safeguarding the interest of the People by requiring district attorney concurrence.3

See former Penal Code sections 6450 and 6451. (Added by Stats. 1961, ch. 850, § 2; amended Stats. 1963, ch. 1704, §§ 1, 2, ch. 1705, §§ 1, 2, ch. 1706, §§ 7, 8; repealed by Stats. 1965, ch. 1226, § 1.)

The statute repeals itself on 1 January 1975. (Pen. Code, § 1000.4.)

The judiciary’s rigid refusal to share such powers as diversion may be justified by extension of the separation of powers doctrine to conferred as well as inherent powers (see Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119, 127 [95 Cal.Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140]), but it tends to stifle the legislative innovation required to solve changing social problems.