Court Opinion

ID: 9613466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:17:12.676474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:56.305022
License: Public Domain

ALLEGRUCCI, J.,
concurring and dissenting: I concur with the majority that the award for past and future loss of services is not subject to subrogation. I do not agree with the majority that recovery for pain and suffering is subject to subrogation by the employer.
*340The majority correctly interprets K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 44-504(b) to allow an employer to be subrogated to that which is compensable under workers compensation. Subrogation by the employer is permitted if the recovery by the worker from a third party does duplicate the compensation and medical aid provided by the employer. As the majority notes: “Subrogation is permitted to prevent double recovery by the employee.”
The majority then points out that, historically, pain and suffering is not compensable under workers compensation. Logic dictates the inquiry should stop there. If recovery is based upon that which is compensable under workers compensation and pain and suffering is not compensable, the logical conclusion is that recovery for pain and suffering is not subject to subrogation by an employer.
The majority, however, citing Trowbridge v. Wilson & Co., 102 Kan. 521, 170 Pac. 816 (1918), for authority, concludes that workers compensation does compensate for pain and suffering if it interferes with the ability to perform labor. The decision in Trowbridge does not support such a conclusion. The award in Trowbridge was for loss of wages based on “four weeks’ total incapacity for labor, and 208 weeks’ partial incapacity.” 102 Kan. 521. Trowbridge claimed loss of wages because the pain resulting from her injury prevented her from working, but she did not claim or recover damages for pain. The court clearly found that she did not recover for the pain suffered, reasoning that “[c]ompensation for loss of wages, or for loss of ability to earn wages, although that loss may be caused by pain, is not the same as damages for the pain.” 102 Kan. at 523.
I would affirm the district court.