Court Opinion

ID: 9688287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:42:34.285521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:49.999396
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
Appellant, on application for rehearing, contends that our original opinion has abrogated the settled law of Workmen’s Compensation as stated by the Supreme Court in that we held that an injury is compensable without a showing of un*252usual circumstances, aggravated conditions or increased risk proximately connected with the employment. We did not so hold. We applied the rule stated in Gulf States Steel Co. v. Christison, supra. We quoted the applicable rule, and appellant has quoted it again in its brief on rehearing. It is apparent there is a difference in understanding as to its meaning. We refer to the quotation on page 41 of our opinion. The aggravated risk or unusual condition arising out of employment is determined by a comparison of the conditions existing at the place of employment with those existing in the same general locality, but unassociated with the place and performance of the employment.
The fact that other employees so exposed did not become sensitized to allergens or suffer injury therefrom is not compelling. Does the fact that other employees, working alongside, did not succumb to heat exhaustion make Christison’s injury less compensable in the Gulf States Steel case? We do not think so. However, such is the position taken by appellant in brief on rehearing when it said as follows:
“ * * * When an employee is exposed only to the risks, circumstances and conditions to which all similarly employed workmen are exposed and yet encounters a physical ailment when no other employees have so encountered a physical ailment that particular, peculiar employee should bear the risk of his own particular and peculiar physical structure.”
Following .appellant’s argument to its illogical conclusion, if one suffers physical ailment or injury due to conditions of employment, he must before claiming compensation show that others so employed have suffered similar ailment or injury.
Fortunately, appellant’s position is not the law of Workmen’s Compensation. It was clearly stated in Gadsden Iron Works v. Beasley, supra, that “ * * * compensation is not limited to those in perfect health. The test is, was the accident a proximate contributing cause acting upon the particular individual to produce death, whether directly or through disease? New River Coal Co. v. Files, 215 Ala. 64, 109 So. 360. * * * Neither contributory negligence nor assumption of risk is a defense in workmen compensation cases,—Section 254, Title 26, Code; * *
We attempted to point out in our original opinion the seeming inconsistencies in Workmen’s Compensation cases. These have arisen because the courts have become entangled in the difficulties of applying the sudden, unforeseen, unusual' circumstances and aggravated or increased risk criteria- to cause or effect. We think the actual determination of recovery under the Workmen’s Compensation law in any case must ultimately be based upon the factual premise as stated by Justice Simpson in the case of Reynolds Metals Co. v. Gray, 278 Ala. 309, 178 So.2d 87 as follows:
“ * * * We recognize that the workmen’s compensation statute as enacted in this state does not write a life insurance-policy covering every employee covered under it, but we think in cases where it is-established that the job killed the worker, the legislature intended that his widow and minor children would be compensated.” (Emphasis ours.)
With these, additional comments, we deny-application for rehearing by both appellant, and appellee and adhere to our original', opinion.
Opinion extended.
Application of appellant for rehearing; denied.
Application of appellee denied.