Court Opinion

ID: 9743545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:36:10.916904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.742989
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
The majority opinion is fairly to be understood as adopting the position that the statements given to the probation officer by the appellant and later used on rebuttal for impeachment purposes were taken and used in violation of the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694. In so doing, I believe they are correct, since the record of the proceeding does not show that the appellant was advised by the trial court at the time he entered his plea of guilty of his privilege against self-incrimination, nor does it show that the probation officer advised him of the privilege. The majority opinion holds that the statements of this appellant to the probation officer would *690not be admissible in the State’s case-in-chief, and in so holding I believe the majority is correct.
Unlike the majority, I am unwilling to adopt the restricted view of the privilege against self-incrimination taken by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. New York (1971), 401 U. S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, and vote to adopt the rule for Indiana, that statements taken in violation of Miranda requirements are inadmissible for impeachment purposes. The State is correct in pointing out to this Court in its brief, that we are free to establish stricter constitutional requirements in the reception of evidence than those created by the United States Supreme Court. I would do just that in this case.
If this Court were to adopt the proper view of the privilege against self-incrimination, we would need only to continue to apply the procedural safeguards erected by Miranda in cases such as this. Miranda is already an ingrained part of our police procedures. The implementation of the Miranda requirements in Indiana has come about at considerable cost. One of the purposes of those requirements was to insure that the constitutional rights of the poor and uneducated would be as real and tangible as the constitutional rights of the rich and educated. And I for one would not start Indiana on the road back into the murky waters of pre-Miranda procedures where dangers to the poor, the unwary, and the innocent, lurk.
Prentice, J., concurs with separate opinion.