Court Opinion

ID: 9477575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:26:29.845707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:56.688008
License: Public Domain

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the district court in dismissing the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
This case was tried, by agreement of the parties, before a United States Magistrate. In lieu of using a court stenographer, the proceedings were tape recorded. Plaintiff’s counsel, being unfamiliar with this procedure, promptly indicated his desire to order a transcription and inquired of the magistrate by letter, with a copy to the district court, as to how he might obtain a transcription of the tape. Both the magistrate and the district court simply ignored the letter. Later, due to the absence of a transcript, the plaintiff’s motion was dismissed, in accordance with Local Rule 20(e), for failure to prosecute.
The power to dismiss for failure to prosecute, which may be exercised with or without notice or opportunity to be heard, rests in the discretion of the trial court and is part of its inherent authority “to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in its docket.” Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-89, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). I do not and cannot disagree with the majority’s clear affirmation of the power of district courts to promulgate local rules, especially where, as here, the local rules facilitate the court’s acquisition of the materials necessary for the efficient processing of the matters on its docket. And, indeed, a district court does have authority to provide for the ultimate sanction of dismissal for noncompliance with a local court rule. Hall v. C.I.R. (Dept. of Treasury), 805 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir.1986). I recognize also that dismissal for failure to prosecute is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. Sauers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 771 F.2d 64 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1162, 106 S.Ct. 2286, 90 L.Ed.2d 727 (1986).
While mindful of these principles, I choose to begin my analysis with the general principle that “it is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice require it.” American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532, 539, 90 S.Ct. 1288, 1292, 25 L.Ed.2d 547 (1970). It is for the district court to determine what departures from its rules “are so slight and unimportant that the sensible treatment is to overlook them.” Allen v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 342 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.1965); see also Braxton v. Bi-State Development Agency, 728 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir.1984). Even though local court rules are valid and binding on parties, their enforcement must be tempered with due consideration of circumstances. Cohen v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 782 F.2d 923 (11th Cir.1986).
The mandate of Rule 20(e) can be only that if the district court chooses not to excuse noncompliance, then only one sanction — dismissal of the motion — is available. *1186The district judge appeared to be acting under the mistaken impression that, because of the mandatory language of the local rule, he had no discretion to entertain the motion regardless of the circumstances of the procedural default.
I consider it to be an inexcusable elevation of form over substance that the plaintiffs motion was dismissed without the slightest indication from the court that it would not honor in any way counsel’s timely request for assistance. Under these circumstances I would find an abuse of discretion or, at best, a failure to exercise any discretion at all. A district judge who fails to exercise discretion may be directed by the Court of Appeals to do so. I would at least give such a direction in this case. Magee v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.2d 899 (3d Cir.1954).
Our reported decisions consistently emphasize the extreme nature of a dismissal with prejudice or default judgment. Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867 (3d Cir.1984). I recognize that Poulis governs specifically only in cases of dismissal before trial where a party is deprived of a hearing in any forum. However, the general policy supporting decisions such as Poulis, while somewhat less compelling where as here the plaintiff has had a full trial on the merits, deserves at least a nod of recognition in this case as well. That policy is that only as a last resort should an innocent party be compelled to bear the brunt of its counsel’s dereliction. Id. at 869.
Serious consequences attach to this failure to comply with a precondition to the court's determination of this motion. By the rote application of this rule, the plaintiff’s appeal is effectively foreclosed despite his counsel’s good faith attempt to learn how to obtain the necessary transcript.1
Unfortunately, although his appeal is timely, appellant has not made clear his intent to appeal from the final judgment. He does not advance on appeal any contentions of error save the denial of his motion for a new trial. He requests in relief only that we vacate the district court’s dismissal of the motion for a new trial and remand to the district court for decision on the merits of the new trial motion. I doubt that the majority would disagree that it is the better practice to raise claims of error first before the district court. Nevertheless, by the majority’s affirmance of this failure to exercise any discretion before ordering this dismissal, the plaintiff is deprived of consideration by any court of his claims of error.
The effort to achieve the expeditious administration of justice must be a cooperative one. Generally it is furthered by the court’s promulgation of rules of procedure and their conscientious observance by counsel and by the parties. Sanctions are appropriate when counsel fails to comply with the rules.
I fail to see how this dismissal does anything to foster respect for or protect the integrity of the court rules. The rule can be interpreted easily as failing to provide for the circumstance encountered. Counsel’s timely inquiry and request for assistance indicates a purpose to observe the rules and the clear intent to prosecute. It would have required only a de minimis effort on the part of the court to instruct *1187that the usual local rules apply in proceedings before a magistrate or even simply to indicate that the requested assistance would not be forthcoming.
The district court’s need to expedite its docket must be balanced against the interest in the fair disposition of cases. The local rule does not permit discrimination among various sanctions. A good faith attempt to obtain clarification of a rule produces the same severe consequences as a complete lack of diligence, professional incompetence, or callous disregard for the rules of procedure. In view of the harshness of such a rule, I consider the district court to have abused its discretion by dismissing the motion for failure to prosecute without at least giving timely notice that it would not honor the request for assistance.
I would vacate the dismissal of the motion and, at minimum, order the district court to exercise its discretion in considering whether the circumstances of this case justify giving plaintiffs counsel another chance to provide the requisite transcript.

. The procedural default resulting in dismissal of his motion for a new trial would not necessarily preclude appellate review of the plaintiffs claim of trial error. Claims of error properly preserved by objections to rulings made at trial or by motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are ripe for review upon timely appeal from a final order whether or not they are raised on motion for a new trial. Trout v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 300 F.2d 826 (3d Cir.1962).
The notice of appeal in this case purports to be from the order denying a motion for a new trial. Generally, an order denying a motion for a new trial is not appealable as such, but is reviewable when that decision comes before the court as part of the appeal from the final judgment. A timely filed motion for a new trial tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. Fed. R.App.P. 4(a)(4); Fairview Park Excavating Co., Inc. v. Al Monzo Const. Co., Inc., 560 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir.1977). An appeal from an order denying a new trial will be treated as one taken from final judgment when the appeal is timely taken in regard to the final judgment and the appellant's intent to appeal from the final judgment is clear. Paluch v. Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 387 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.1968).