Court Opinion

ID: 9570992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:28:13.947572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:52.690400
License: Public Domain

*653DISSENTING OPINION OF
RICHARDSON, C.J., WITH WHOM MARUMOTO, J„ JOINS
I dissent.
I. The majority correctly states that “In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), greatly circumscribes distinctions between juveniles and adults in terms of constitutional protections.” Indeed, Gault and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), have extended important procedural due process rights to juveniles. Although these cases have “circumscribed” the distinctions between juveniles and adults, certain constitutional distinctions remain, even in the area of due process. As Mr. Justice Blackmun opined for the majority, “The Court . . . has not yet said that all rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime also are to be enforced or made available to the juvenile . . . .” McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 533 (1970).
Even greater distinctions are allowed in the area of substantive rights. The state classification discriminating between adults and juveniles remains a valid one. The classification of juveniles is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (1945). The distinction between juveniles and adults is a natural classification based on a compelling state interest in protecting juveniles.
Juveniles as a class are subject to different regulations and restrictions than adults. The curfew ordinance is but one of many restrictions that are validly applied to juveniles. Many of these regulations restrict the juveniles’ freedom of movement. Juveniles are not allowed to enter bars or places where pornographic material is displayed. They are not allowed to drive until they reach the age of 15. Nor are they allowed to loiter without parent or guardian between the hours of 10 p.m. and sunrise. All of these restrictions on juvenile freedom of movement are valid when balanced against the compelling state interest in protection of juveniles.
Gault held that the state’s interest did not extend to *654deprivation of important Fifth and Sixth Amendment procedural rights. The regulation of juvenile activity by the application of different substantive law remains a valid discriminatory action by the state.
II. An overbroad statute is one which proscribes both constitutionally protected and unprotected conduct. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); Territory v. Anduha, 31 Haw. 459, 462 (1930). In the past “loitering” and “vagrancy” statutes have been held unconstitutional because their broad sweep included both protected and unprotected conduct. See Territory v. Anduha, supra, and State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 480 P.2d 148 (1971).
The case at hand may be distinguished from Anduha and Grahovac in that we are here dealing with a curfew statute for minors, not a law of general application as in Anduha and Grahovac. The statutes in those two cases were constitutional because they proscribed conduct which was protected to adults under the Constitution.
It is clear that state restriction of the procedural due process rights of minors is limited. In re Gault, supra. It is also clear that because the state has a most compelling interest in the activities of minors the state may restrict certain substantive rights of minors that may be constitutionally protected to adults. Because the police power of the state is more encompassing with regard to minors, I do not feel that the use of the word “loiter” in the context of a curfew statute is overbroad.
Limitations on freedom of movement may be over-broad as to adults but when balanced against a higher standard of state interest in the welfare of juveniles such limitations are valid as applied to juveniles. An ordinance that limits the nighttime freedom of movement of minors is not overbroad. It does not proscribe protected conduct because the state has the power to restrict the nighttime activities of minors.
*655III. The terms “vagueness” and “overbreadth” are often heard together. Perhaps that is because a vague statute is of necessity overbroad. When the conduct proscribed is unclear then the statute in question has swept too broadly. The converse, however, is not true. A statute that is overbroad is not always vague. Perhaps because of the close relationship of the two concepts there exists a tendency to label that which is overbroad as vague. This has resulted in an overuse of the limited concept of vagueness. Void for vagueness is too often added as frosting on the cake when the statute is in fact only overbroad.
The test for vagueness should be whether the “terms [are] so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Connolly v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) cited in State v. Miller, 54 Haw. 1, 3, 501 P.2d 363 (1972). I am not convinced that because a term which may be overbroad as applied to adults is used in a juvenile curfew statute that statute becomes vague. Nor am I convinced that juveniles of common intelligence do not understand the word “loiter” in the context of the curfew statute.
IV. I would uphold the ordinance on the grounds that the state has a high interest in protecting juveniles. Because of this interest, juvenile conduct may be more strictly regulated than adult conduct. Because of this greater power, restrictions which may be overbroad as to adults are not necessarily overbroad when applied to minors. Although the term “loiter” may be overbroad as a restriction on adult activity it does not proscribe conduct protected to juveniles. Nor is the word “loiter” vague in the context of a juvenile curfew ordinance. As in State v. Miller, supra, “[t]he statute in question requires a person to conform his conduct to a comprehensible standard measured by common understanding.” Surely juveniles in the State of Hawaii are capable of understanding and conforming to R.O.H. sec. 13-3A.1.