Court Opinion

ID: 9684102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:46:39.214254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.770011
License: Public Domain

RALEIGH BROWN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. To be held negligent, Sears had to have reason to anticipate the injury to the Blacks as a foreseeable consequence of the alleged design defect. I hold that there is no such evidence.
The Texas Supreme Court, in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S.W. 162 (1896), declared:
[I]t ought not to be deemed negligent to do or to fail to do an act when it was not anticipated, and should not have been anticipated, that it would result in injury to any one. To require this is to demand of human nature a degree of care incompatible with the prosecutions of the ordinary avocations of life.... If a man fires a gun across a road where he may reasonably anticipate that persons will be passing, and hits some one, he is guilty of negligence, and liable for the injury he has caused; but if he fires in his own woods, where he cannot reasonably anticipate that any one will be, he is not liable to any one whom he shoots, which shows that what a person may reasonably anticipate is important in considering whether he has been negligent_(Em-phasis added)
In Houston Lighting & Power Company v. Brooks, 161 Tex. 32, 336 S.W.2d 603 (1960), the Texas Supreme Court, quoting from City of Dallas v. Maxwell, 248 S.W. 667 (Tex.Comm’n.App.1923, opinion adopted), stated:
In this state it is now a settled doctrine that anticipation of consequences is a necessary element in determining not only whether a particular act or omission is actionably negligent, but also whether the injury complained of is proximately caused by such act or omission.
It was further stated in Brooks:
If the reason to anticipate injury is not established, then no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury.
* * * * * *
There is no evidence that petitioner in this instance had actual knowledge of probable danger to respondent, and there are no facts in the record upon which to base constructive notice to petitioner.
See also Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 324 S.W.2d 201 (1959); Quinius v. Estrada, 448 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Shell Oil Company v. Mahler, 385 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dawkins v. Van Winkle, 375 S.W.2d 341 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco), dis’m w.o.j., 377 S.W.2d 830 (1964); Panhandle & Santa Fe Railway Company v. Walker, 364 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Comet Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. *929Holmes, 203 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
In 40 TEX.JUR.2d Negligence sec. 32 (1976), it is stated that:
Negligence ... depends on a reason to anticipate injury and a failure to perform the duty arising on account of that anticipation. The ability to have foreseen and prevented the harm is determinative of responsibility.
The foundation of the duty to use due care is knowledge, actual or constructive, and a question regarding the sufficiency of the measures that appear to have been taken by a defendant is to be resolved by a showing as to his knowledge of the danger or injury.... [UJntil he has this knowledge, the duty to exercise the requisite degree of care does not arise.
An injury is not actionable if it was not foreseen, or could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated, as a consequence of the act or omission. In other words, though one’s act or omission may have caused injury or damage, he is not to be held responsible or negligent if he could not have foreseen the harmful occurrence or situation. (Emphasis added)
The majority holds that the Blacks’ expert witness’ testimony to the effect “that a faulty electrical contact in the washing machine’s switch lead to the overheating which caused the fire to occur” and his conclusion “that there was a faulty design because if the switch housing had been metal instead of plastic, the mobile home fire could have been prevented” is some evidence that Sears knew or should have known that the design of the washing machine was faulty. I disagree.
The testimony of the Blacks’ expert witness is nothing more than mere conclusions regarding the existence of a faulty electrical contact and a faulty design of the switch housing. Such testimony neither states nor infers that Sears knew or should have known of the alleged defects. Knowledge or the anticipation of consequences from an act should not be so arbitrarily imputed. See Houston Lighting & Power Company v. Brooks, supra.
The Texas Supreme Court decision in Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.1978) indicates the type of evidence which is generally sufficient to establish knowledge in a negligence design case. In Gonzales, the Court held that there was some evidence to support the jury finding that the tractor step was negligently designed. The evidence of knowledge set out in the Court’s opinion included: (1) evidence that “no particular instructions regarding the safety of the step were given to the design engineer;” (2) evidence that “no tests as to the safety of the step were made;” (3) evidence that design guidelines were available to the chief engineer of the tractor, but no action was taken in light of the guidelines; and (4) evidence that the supervising engineer of the tractor was aware that the tractor step would accumulate mud and debris which would adhere to the step due to its design.
In addition to the evidence found in Gonzales, 63 AM.JUR.2d Products Liability sec. 375 (1984) indicates the kind of evidence which is sufficient to establish the anticipation of consequences needed in a negligent design case:
Improper design is evidenced by proof of another accident or accidents involving a similar product made by the defendant, which is of the same or similar design, and by proof of repair orders, involving the injury-causing product.... Evidence of other models of the product, put out by the same manufacturer, is admissible on the issues of design alternatives, and on the existence of a potential hazard. Similarly, evidence of competitive designs by other manufacturers of the same kind of product has been held admissible to be considered by the jury in determining the ultimate issue of design negligence based on the legal standard of ordinary care. ...
In the case at bar, there is no evidence of that which is found in the Texas Supreme Court’s decision of Gonzales or of that stated in American Jurisprudence. Noth*930ing in the record states or infers the anticipation of consequences which is essential in proving the duty owed by Sears. The only evidence in the record is the conclusions of the Blacks’ expert witness and the fact that an accident did occur. It is an established principle of law that negligence is never presumed and the mere happening of an accident is no evidence of the existence of negligence. See, e.g., Wells v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 140 Tex. 2, 164 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Comm’n App.1942, opinion adopted); Trio Transport, Inc. v. Henderson, 413 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Patrol Valve Company v. Farrell, 316 S.W.2d 92 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.). I would further note, as did the court in Trio Transport, Inc., that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to the analysis of the present case.
Additionally, it is an established rule that a presumption of a fact cannot rest upon a fact presumed; rather, the fact relied upon to support the presumption must be proved. See East Texas Theatres, Inc. v. Rutledge, 453 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.1970); Schlumberger Well Surveying Corporation v. Nortex Oil and Gas Corporation, 435 S.W.2d 854 (Tex.1968); Texas Sling Company v. Emanuel, 431 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.1968); New York Underwriters Insurance Company v. Trustees of First Baptist Church of Ranger, 603 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The only circumstance in the case at bar to show that Sears had reason to anticipate the consequences of its actions in designing an allegedly defective washing machine is the fact that the washing machine allegedly failed. To reach the result that Sears should have anticipated the consequences of its actions requires two presumptions. First, it must be presumed that evidence indicating only a failure of the electrical switch imputes knowledge to Sears that the switch was defective. It must also be presumed that mere evidence of the failure of the switch housing to contain the fire imputes knowledge to Sears that the switch housing was defective. “An ultimate fact is too conjectural and speculative to support a judgment when that fact is ascertained by pyramiding one inference upon another.” New York Underwriters Insurance Company v. Trustees of First Baptist Church of Ranger, supra; see also Wells v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., supra.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment that the Blacks take nothing. I do agree that the Blacks are not entitled to a penalty under TEX.R.CIV.P. 435 or 438.