Court Opinion

ID: 9746589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:28:32.562519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:15.193382
License: Public Domain

RAKER, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that, based on the rule of lenity, § 286(f) and § 293 of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Article 27,1 may not be applied to enhance simultaneously the same count of a criminal sentence. Maj. op. at 676. Such an interpretation contradicts the plain meaning of the statutory provisions at issue. In addition, the result reached by the majority offends settled principles of statutory construction. Accordingly, I dissent.
Our focus properly turns to the plain language of § 286(f) and § 293. In pertinent part, the language of the base enhancement provision of § 293 states:
*678§ 293. Second or subsequent offenses.
(a) More severe sentence.—Any person convicted of any offense under this subheading is, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense, punishable by a term of imprisonment twice that otherwise authorized____
The “Health—Controlled Dangerous Substances” subheading encompasses §§ 276-313, inclusive. Thus, the scope of § 293 unambiguously extends to § 286(f).
Subsection 286(f)(1) provides that if a person commits certain offenses involving specified quantities of controlled dangerous substances, that person will be subject to the penalties provided in subsection 286(f)(3)(i). Subsection 286(f)(3)(i) provides in pertinent part:
A person convicted of violating paragraph (1) of this subsection is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced as otherwise provided for in this section, except that it is mandatory upon the court to impose no less than 5 years’ imprisonment, and neither that term of imprisonment nor any part of it may be suspended.
Nothing in the plain language of § 286(f) indicates that § 293 is inapplicable to a sentence imposed under that subsection. Simply stated, because § 286(f) is codified under the same subheading as § 293, the General Assembly has clearly demonstrated that the latter statutory provision may enhance a criminal sentence imposed under § 286(f).
Scott correctly observes that § 286(f) is an integral component of § 286, and that all statutory components of § 286 must be construed in harmony with one another. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436, 639 A.2d 675, 678-79 (1994). Scott also accurately notes that § 293 is an enhancement provision based on prior criminal history, and that § 286 already contains three enhancement provisions based on prior criminal history: § 286(c), the “two-time loser” enhancement provision, § 286(d), the “three-time loser” enhancement provision, and § 286(e), the “four-time loser” enhancement provision. Hence, Scott argues, the framework of § 286 manifests the legislative intent that a sentence imposed under § 286 may be *679enhanced only by subsection (c), (d), or (e), if such an enhancement is based upon prior criminal history.
Scott’s contention does not withstand scrutiny when examined in light of the evolution of § 286. When § 286 originally was enacted in 1970, that section contained only two subsections, § 286(a) and § 286(b). As this Court observed in Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 654, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998):
Subsection (a) of § 286 codifies the offense of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with the intent to distribute that substance, and § 286(b) provides the garden variety penalty for violating § 286(a).
These two subsections and § 293 were enacted during the same legislative session. 1970 Maryland Laws ch. 403, at 896-97, 900. Consequently, when § 293 took effect on July 1, 1970, it unambiguously applied to a sentence imposed under § 286(a).
Current subsection (c) of § 286, the first sentencing enhancement provision of § 286 based upon prior criminal history, was not enacted until 1982. 1982 Maryland Laws ch. 470, at 3046-18.2 Scott argues that § 293 may not enhance a sentence imposed under either § 286(a) or § 286(f); rather, any enhancement based on prior criminal history may be made only under subsection (c), (d), or (e) of § 286.
Under Scott’s interpretation, from 1970 until 1982, § 293 could validly enhance a sentence imposed under § 286(a). Under that same interpretation, after 1982, § 293 could no longer be used to enhance a sentence imposed under § 286(a). Such a result was not expressly contemplated by the plain language of the amendments to § 286 in 1982, and there is no indication in the legislative history of those amendments which demonstrates any intent to preclude the application of § 293 to a sentence imposed under § 286(a). It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that repeal by implication is *680not favored. State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39, 607 A.2d 552, 555 (1992). The majority’s reasoning in this ease flatly contradicts this principle.
Scott argues that this Court’s decision in Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 689 A.2d 610 (1997), controls the outcome in this case. Rather than reach a fair, logical result in light of the Gardner holding, the majority’s opinion in this case contorts Gardner and reaches an unsound result. In Gardner, the Court held that § 286(c) and § 293 could not be imposed simultaneously to enhance a single criminal count. Id. at 644-45, 689 A.2d at 611. The majority in Gardner relied in part on the fact that another subsection of § 286, subsection (g)(5), contained specific language authorizing the application of § 293 to the offense contained in that subsection.3 The Court stated:
Subsection [286](g)(5) expressly authorizes the enhancement of that sentence pursuant to § 293(a). If the [S]tate were correct that the enhancement statutes are clear both in their language and application, inclusion of that provision would have been unnecessary.
Id. at 650, 689 A.2d at 614. According to Gardner, the express reference to § 293 in § 286(g) led to the inference that by not referring to § 293 in § 286(c), the General Assembly did not intend the doubling provisions of § 293 to apply to § 286(c).
If the reasoning in Gardner were extended to its logical end, the result would be contrary to the Legislature’s intent. As noted, the majority in Gardner reasoned that the favorable reference in § 286(g) to § 293 necessarily implied that the Legislature did not intend for § 293 to enhance a sentence simultaneously with § 286(c). If extended logically, it would follow from this premise that the reference in § 286(g) to § 293 necessarily excluded § 293 from simultaneously enhancing any sentence imposed under any other subsection of *681§ 286. Indeed, Scott makes that argument before this Court. It is significant to note, however, that nothing in the plain language or legislative history of § 286 or § 293 reflects the intent to exclude all of § 286, save subsection (g), from the enhancing provisions of § 293.
Moreover, logic dictates that the preclusive effect of indiscriminately applying the canon expressio unius est exelusio alterius would extend beyond merely § 286. By its express terms, § 293 applies to the entire controlled dangerous substances subheading. The fair extension of the argument Scott makes in this case is that by including a reference to § 293 in § 286(g), the drug kingpin subsection, the General Assembly intended to exclude § 293 from simultaneously enhancing any other statutory provision in the entire controlled dangerous substance subheading. For instance, in this case, Scott’s conviction for importing cocaine into the State of Maryland in violation of § 286A(a)(2) could not be enhanced by § 293. Such an interpretation effectively engrafts § 293 as a separate paragraph under § 286(g), without any indication of such an intent expressed in the plain language, legislative history, or other surrounding circumstances of either provision. To avoid this unwarranted result, this Court should interpret Gardner to stand for the following proposition: When based upon the same underlying factual predicate (i. e., prior criminal history), to infer an intent that multiple sentencing enhancement provisions in the same statutory scheme will be applied simultaneously to a single count, the statutory language must expressly reflect that intent. Such a principle is consistent with the holding of Gardner and makes sense.
In this case, § 286(f) enhances a sentence based upon the quantity and type of controlled substance involved, while § 293 enhances a sentence based upon prior criminal history. The underlying factual predicate for these enhancement provisions is distinct. See Wadlow v. State, 335 Md. 122, 128-29, 642 A.2d 213, 216 (1994) (“In Maryland, ... we have generally drawn a distinction between sentence enhancement provisions that depend upon prior conduct of the offender and those that depend upon the circumstances of the offense.”).
*682Gardner was based on the premise that the General Assembly might have implicitly intended for only one sentencing enhancement provision to apply when multiple enhancement provisions were based upon the same underlying factual predicate, and accordingly, the rule of lenity applied. Gardner, 344 Md. at 651-53, 689 A.2d at 614-15. Whereas here, multiple enhancement provisions are based upon different factual predicates, no such danger reasonably exists, absent legislative intent to the contrary.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court did not err in sentencing Scott to twenty-eight years under § 286(f) and § 293. In distinguishing Gardner from the instant case, that court reasoned:
Section 286(c), unlike section 286(f), is a subsequent offender provision. In Gardner, the trial court enhanced defendant’s sentence twice: once by the subsequent offender provision of section 286(c), and once by the subsequent offender provision of section 293. In the instant case, however, in order to invoke the mandatory minimum term under section 286(f), the State had to specifically charge and prove that the crime involved a certain quantity of the drugs as set forth in section 286(f). Once the State had proven the amount as an element of the crime, the court could apply the sentencing provisions requiring the five year mandatory minimum. Section 286(c), in contrast, is purely a subsequent offender provision invoked after trial during the sentencing phase, as is section 293. What the Court of Appeals found illegal in Gardner, namely enhancing the sentence on a single count twice under two subsequent offender provisions, did not occur in the instant case. The court here enhanced appellant’s sentence as a subsequent offender only after the State proved that appellant possessed more than fifty grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute it.
(Internal citation omitted). The Court of Special Appeals was correct. We should affirm the judgment.
*683Whatever one may think of the wisdom of mandatory sentencing, I believe the policy decision is one for the General Assembly, and not for this Court. We should not create an ambiguity where none exists in order to apply the rule of lenity. Accordingly, I dissent.
Judge RODOWSKY and Judge WILNER have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed herein.

. Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references herein shall be to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Article 27.

. Subsection 286(f) was enacted by Chapter 287 of the Acts of 1989 as a part of the "Drug Kingpin Act.” See 1989 Maryland Laws ch. 287, at 2415-16.

. Subsection 286(g)(5) reads in relevant part:
Nothing contained in this subsection prohibits the court from imposing an enhanced penalty under § 293 of this article.