Court Opinion

ID: 9522147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:32.996393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:20.329308
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 29. dissenting. No lawyer in the State of Vermont has the obligation to ensure that this plaintiff, or any other person, obtains access to the courts for purposes of presenting a meritorious or arguably meritorious case. Lawyers are private actors who extend, or refuse to extend, legal services based on many considerations, including economic reward and ability to get along with the client. Even lawyers in publicly-funded agencies created to extend legal services to the indigent have the ability to refuse to accept prospective clients for reasons not based on the merits of the Ghent’s case. The sanction in this case, even as diluted by the majority, fundamentally transfers the responsibility of the Vermont Judiciary to provide “right and justice” to “every person” to private actors who do not have to honor the constitutional mandate and against whom plaintiff has no remedy if they fail to assist plaintiff’s access to the courts. See Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4. As the initial decision in Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1985), observed, the restrictive injunction used in this case “is an ominous abandonment of judicial responsibility, the iniport of which far exceeds the actual abuse attrib*231utable even to the exceptional [pro se] litigant.” The sanction can be, and will be, the functional equivalent to a prohibition of the use of the courts within its terms, a clear violation of Article 4. This is the fundamental reason for this dissent.
¶ 30. The majority upholds the restrictive injunction because “the superior court’s order here is measured and the least restrictive answer to the reasonably anticipated ongoing violation of the rules by [plaintiff] if left to his own devices.” Ante, ¶ 23 (emphasis added). In fact, the injunction issued here is the most restrictive sanction possible exactly because it limits plaintiff’s access to the courts with no judicial review. In facing what it deemed similar circumstances involving litigation by this plaintiff, the United States District Court for the District of Vermont imposed a less restrictive sanction of requiring judicial approval of plaintiff’s filings before they are accepted. See Zorn v. Brown, File No. 1:05-CV-297 (D. Vt. Nov. 30, 2005) (doc. 50). Exactly because that sanction involves court review of plaintiff’s filings to ensure they are not frivolous or otherwise unmeritorious, it is significantly less restrictive than the one imposed in this case. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the sanction of requiring lawyer representation as a prerequisite to future filings because it unduly burdened litigants’ access to the courts.1 See Procup v. Strickland, *232792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc); Procup, 760 F.2d at 1116.
¶ 31. While the foregoing paragraphs represent the fundamental reason for my disagreement with the majority decision, it is not the only reason. I agree that plaintiffs actions warrant a sanction for violation of Rule 11. I also agree that under the Safir factors the case has reached the point where a restrictive injunction may be necessary. See Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986). In my judgment, however, sanctions should occur earlier and escalate to a restrictive injunction only if lesser sanctions fail. I think this point is particularly appropriate in this very unusual case.
¶ 32. In stating my disagreement, I start with the fundamental principles that have to govern our actions. Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2) authorizes a sanction for violation of its requirements but limits the sanction “to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct.” (Emphasis added.) This means that the court must chose a sanction that is the “least restrictive, but effective, means of protecting the courts.” Brady v. Marks, 7 F. Supp. 2d 247, 255 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). Restricting a litigant’s access to the courts is a particularly severe remedy that must be used rarely and with great caution. See Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Such a drastic remedy must be used sparingly, . . . consistent with constitutional guarantees of due process of law and access to the courts.”). This is especially true when, as here, the litigant proceeds pro se. Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1980) (explaining that “use of [prefiling injunction] against a pro se plaintiff should be approached with particular caution” and should “remain very much the exception to the general rule of free access to the courts”). Generally, a court should start with a less restrictive sanction and escalate its sanction response only once those other methods are proven ineffective. See Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1988) (assessing costs against pro se plaintiff for filing frivolous repetitive appeals and warning that “further frivolous appeals will result in escalating sanctions”).
*233¶ 33. Because it presents circumstances rarely, if ever, present in cases involving sanctions for frivolous filings, this is a very unusual case in three ways. First, it. started as a clearly meritorious case. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against a lawyer for malpractice and proceeded to try to enforce it. While plaintiffs pro se maneuvering was ineffective and counterproductive, and the judgment may have become stale, this was not a frivolous case against the original defendant, S. Scott Smith.
¶ 34. Second, plaintiff has been a frequent, and often successful, pro se litigant in the Vermont courts. Plaintiff here instigated fourteen other cases, filed during the period from July 1989 through July 2005.2 In all but one of these cases, plaintiff appeared pro se. In eight of the fourteen cases, he won a favorable judgment, usually for a relatively small monetary amount. He prevailed in one of two cases brought as small claims.
¶ 35. Third, plaintiff has not appeared in forma pauperis in this or any of the other cases. He has paid considerable money in filing fees over the years and continues to pay those fees. Thus, there is every indication that he is capable of paying a monetary sanction, but that form of sanction was never imposed upon him.
¶ 36. In a fourth way, the case is not unusual. Plaintiffs filings have become more and more incoherent and erratic in recent years. This is not the only case in which such behavior has occurred. As a consequence, the same trial judge issued a similar order against plaintiff in another case. Zorn v. Ryan, No. 327-7-05 Wrcv (Vt. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2008). In a nonprecedential order, a *234three-justice panel of this Court upheld the order, in part because plaintiff did not explicitly challenge it. Zorn v. Ryan, No. 2008-445 (Vt. April 15, 2009) (unpub. mem.), available at http://www. vermontjudiciary.org/d-upeo/eo08-445.pdf.
¶ 37. Finally, I think we also have to acknowledge a fifth factor because it is obvious although unstated by the trial court or by the majority. Whenever someone has tried to help plaintiff, that person has ended up as the latest defendant in plaintiffs latest amended complaint. For example, Superior Judge Harold Eaton, when reviewing a recusal motion against a trial judge in this case, went out of his way to explain exactly what plaintiff should do to enforce his judgment. Plaintiff never acted on the advice but added Judge Eaton to the list of alleged conspirators against plaintiff. In these circumstances, no lawyer is likely to step forward to represent plaintiff.3 The order the majority affirms, even as modified, is thus de facto a prohibition on any further filings in this case, which is impermissible. See Peoples v. State, 531 So. 2d 323, 326 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (concluding that an order that prohibited filing any motion or pleading in three cases was overbroad and remanding for a less-restrictive sanction); Holt v. State, 232 P.3d 848, 855 (Kan. 2010) (“Blanket prohibitions, however, would deny a party’s future access to the courts and constitute an over extension of the inherent authority.”); Switzer v. Switzer, 641 S.E.2d 80, 84 (Va. 2007) (“[Ajppellate courts generally are in agreement that courts may not completely prohibit future pro se filings by litigants who have filed repeated frivolous cases or motions.”). The superior court stated in its decision that the sanction would “help to ensure prospective compliance with the requirements of Rule 11(b) and deter repetitive filings, while permitting Mr. Zorn continued access to the courts.” I do not think that the last phrase of that rationale can be squared with the reality of the circumstances before us.
¶ 38. This point puts ¶ 24 of the majority decision in perspective. In essence, the majority is saying that no alternative sanction is appropriate because the alternatives do not make plaintiff go *235away, never to be seen (at least by the judge) again. Thus, the court says a filing preapproval requirement is inappropriate because it “requires additional court time devoted to evaluating, again, the substance of filings.” Ante, ¶ 24. Under this philosophy the most restrictive possible sanction becomes the least restrictive possible sanction because the sanction must ensure that the trial judge never has to see the pro se litigant again and has no responsibility for whether the litigant has access to justice for a meritorious claim. In my judgment, this is a fundamental abandonment of judicial responsibility that cannot be squared with plaintiffs constitutional right of access to the courts in Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution.
¶ 39. The majority claims that the sanction is not unduly restrictive because courts “rely daily on attorneys to file pleadings and papers that are not entirely wasteful of courts’ time.” Ante, ¶ 25. The truth of this statement does little to alleviate my concerns. While lawyers are certainly obligated to ensure that any filing they make is not frivolous, there is no reverse obligation. That is, lawyers are not required to file everything that is nonfrivolous. The fact remains that plaintiff may have a legitimate complaint, but be unable to find an attorney to represent his interests, and therefore his access to the courts will be denied.
¶ 40. In this case, the superior court did not act when plaintiff started to commence frivolous filings and finally acted to employ the most restrictive sanction possible with no consideration of a less restrictive sanction. I recognize that these five considerations make this a hard case, perhaps the textbook case on the pitfalls of dealing with pro se litigants. But several other options were available to the court, particularly if the court had acted earlier. The en banc decision in Procup contains a summary description of the types of sanctions that have been employed by courts in circumstances comparable to those present here.4 See Procup, 792 F.2d at 1072-73. The most common sanction for a violation of Rule 11 is monetary. Rule 11(c)(2) specifically authorizes the court to order the offending party “to pay a penalty into court.” Especially early in the escalation of plaintiffs filings, it is possible that a monetary sanction would have deterred plaintiffs conduct. See *236Golyar v. McCausland, 738 F. Supp. 1090, 1098 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (imposing monetary sanction against pro se plaintiff for filing repetitive frivolous law suit). For example, the court could have required plaintiff to pay escalating monetary sanctions as a condition of further filings. As long as plaintiff had the ability to pay those amounts, such a sanction would be far less restrictive than that ultimately imposed.
¶ 41. As an alternative, the court could have imposed a leave-to-file requirement on plaintiff. Procup, 792 F.2d at 1073 (listing as a sanction option having the court review pleadings prior to filing). As noted above, the United States District Court for the District of Vermont sanctioned plaintiff in this manner in a different case by restricting him from filing new cases or pleadings in eases without prior approval of the court. See Zorn v. Brown, File No. 1:05-CV-297 (D. Vt. Nov. 30, 2005) (doc. 50). There is no good reason why such a sanction could not have been used here. The majority’s conclusion that such lesser sanctions would have been “futile” is nothing more than conjecture. Ante, ¶ 24. Rather than speculate on the outcome, especially about a right as important as access to the courts, plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate compliance. Further, I am not persuaded by the majority’s assessment that preapproval is not an option because of the drain on judicial resources. I cannot believe that a summary review of plaintiffs attempted filings to ensure there is a new and arguably meritorious claim contained therein is such a drain on judicial resources that it will interfere with the processing of other cases in the court.
¶ 42. In sum, I dissent because the sanction upheld, even as narrowed by the majority, is the most restrictive sanction a court can impose short of an outright prohibition on future access to the court and in this case is de facto such a prohibition. It is inconsistent with the right of access for all litigants contained in Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution. It was imposed with no consideration of less restrictive alternatives, and less restrictive alternatives exist in this case. I would reverse and remand for consideration of those alternatives.
¶43. I am authorized to state that Justice Johnson joins this dissent.

 I recognize that some courts have upheld preffling restrictions of this type, although generally on records more extreme than the one before us. See People v. Spencer, 524 P.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Colo. 1974); Attwood v. Eighth Circuit Court, 667 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam) (upholding injunction against further pro se filings as necessary due to litigant’s daily incomprehensible and frivolous filings); Spremo v. Babchik, 589 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1023-24 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that the right of access is not unlimited and must bend when litigant’s repetitive and frivolous filings “deprives other litigants of their proper share of judicial resources”). Apart from the differences in the controlling facts, these decisions differ in two respects. First, several are based on the reasoning that the judiciary can control the conduct of lawyers, but not pro se litigants, so that the proper remedy must involve the presence of a lawyer. See Spremo, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 1025. The 1984 amendment to Rule 11, which made self-represented litigants subject to the rule and imposed the same standards of conduct on them as on lawyers, was intended to respond to this perceived limitation. See Reporter’s Notes — 1984 Amendment, V.R.C.R 11. Both the 1984 and 1996 amendments to the rule made the sanctions more flexible and meaningful. See id:, Reporter’s Notes — 1996 Amendment, V.R.C.P. 11. The strengthening of Rule 11 weakened this justification for requiring the appearance of a lawyer as a sanction. Second, courts imposing a required-lawyer sanction do not generally adhere to the policy that any sanction must be the least restrictive possible. Some say so explicitly. See *232State ex rel. Bardacke v. Welsh, 698 P.2d 462, 467 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that “less restrictive method of regulating access is not required when the facts show a pattern of conduct which is either vexatious, oppressive or for the purpose of harassment”). Even as recognized by the majority, Vermont law requires that a sanction be “the least restrictive” means available. See ante, ¶ 23.

 This information comes from Vermont Courts On-Line which has docket sheets for civil and small claims cases filed in twelve of the fourteen superior courts in Vermont. This information is publicly accessible from the Vermont Courts On-Line website. See https://secure.vermont.gov/vtcdas/user. A number of decisions have held that a trial court must gather this kind of information before issuing a restrictive filing injunction of the type before us now, see, e.g., Jordan v. State, 110 P.3d 30, 43 (Nev. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670 (Nev. 2008), but the superior court never did so. Although the issue arose in an adversary proceeding, defendant did not offer any substantive argument regarding the injunction, and therefore the parties have not provided this Court with the relevant information. In these circumstances, the trial court and this Court must be free to go to the public records to determine the issue.
The court’s order in this case precedes court unification in Vermont that eliminated the district and family courts so at the time the superior court’s jurisdiction was over only civil and small claims cases. Therefore, I interpret the order on appeal as covering only these case types and have looked only at them.

 This Court referred plaintiff to Vermont Legal Aid, Inc. and requested the Vermont Volunteer Lawyers Project (VVLP) to find a volunteer lawyer to represent plaintiff in this Court. VVLP was unable to find a pro bono lawyer who would take the case. This Court was not informed of the result of the referral to Vermont Legal Aid, but no lawyer from that program entered an appearance for plaintiff.

 Procup involves eases filed by prisoners so its facts are significantly different from those in this ease. Nevertheless, the policy issues and the application of the proper policy are the same.