Court Opinion

ID: 2963966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:18:15.211235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:53.477943
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          April 15, 1996    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                       
                              _________________________

          No. 95-2129

                                   TROY E. BROOKS,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                         NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT, ET AL.,
                                Defendants, Appellees 

                                                        
                              __________________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The  opinion  of  the court  issued  on  April  8, 1996,  is
          corrected as follows:

               Replace  footnote  4, page  6, to  read  in its  entirety as
          follows:

                    Although several  courts have applied an  abuse of
               discretion  standard  in  reviewing Younger  abstention
                                                   _______
               cases,  see, e.g.,  Martin Marietta  Corp. v.  Maryland
                       ___  ____   ______________________     ________
               Human Relations  Comm'n, 38  F.3d 1392, 1396  (4th Cir.
               _______________________
               1994); O'Neil v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 790
                      ______    ____________________
               (3d  Cir. 1994), cert. denied,  115 S. Ct. 1355 (1995);
                                _____ ______
               Ramos  v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 564 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980),
               _____     ____
               cert.  denied, 450  U.S.  1041 (1981),  context is  the
               _____  ______
               determining factor.  Where an attempt is made to  apply
               the   Younger   doctrine    under   oddly    configured
                     _______
               circumstances, in a  way that threatens  the legitimate
               interests of the national government,  then the federal
               court  may   exercise  a  modicum  of  discretion,  and
               appellate  review is for abuse of that discretion.  See
                                                                   ___
               Chaulk Servs., Inc.  v. MCAD, 70  F.3d 1361, 1368  (1st
               ___________________     ____
               Cir.  1995).   But  for  purposes  of what  the  Chaulk
                                                                ______
               majority  called the  "customary case"    of  which the
               case  at bar  is a  prototype    the Supreme  Court has
               spoken peremptorily, see  Colorado River,  424 U.S.  at
                                    ___  ______________
               816  n.22,  and  intermediate  appellate   courts  are,
               therefore, spinning  wheels by  probing for abuse  of a
               discretion  that  does  not exist.    Nonetheless,  the
               district court's findings of fact, in contradistinction
               to   its   ultimate   legal  conclusion   as   to   the
               applicability  vel  non of  the  Younger doctrine,  may
                              ___  ___          _______
               evoke a more deferential standard of review.

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-2129

                                   TROY E. BROOKS,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                         NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                   [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                              _________________________

               Philip T. Cobbin for appellant.
               ________________
               Stephen J. Judge,  Senior Assistant  Attorney General,  with
               ________________
          whom  Jeffrey R.  Howard,  Attorney General,  was  on brief,  for
                __________________
          appellees.

                              _________________________

                                    April 8, 1996
                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.  Balancing responsibility between
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          federal  and  state  governments   in  a  republic  that  assigns

          interlocking sovereignty to each often requires federal courts to

          walk an unsteady  tightrope.  From a federal court's perspective,

          this special sort of judicial funambulism always  must proceed in

          the spirit  of cooperative  federalism tempered, however,  by the

          need to avoid the  pitfalls inherent in blind deference  to state

          autonomy.

                    The   case  at   hand   implicates   the  division   of

          responsibilities between federal  and state judicial systems  but

          does not require us to walk a very high wire.  We need only tread

          on solid  ground, previously paved  by the United  States Supreme

          Court, and apply  the Court's teachings  to the peculiar  factual

          and legal  terrain  that underlies  this  appeal.   Because  that

          exercise persuades  us that the district court performed its task

          in  step with the principles  enunciated by the  Court, we affirm

          the order from which the plaintiff appeals.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    We supply a thumbnail sketch of the relevant facts.  In

          1992,  plaintiff-appellant Troy  E. Brooks  and Erica  Bodwell, a

          member  of  the  New  Hampshire  bar,  engaged  in   an  intimate

          relationship during a  period when Bodwell was separated from her

          husband.  Bodwell  became pregnant.   She obtained  a divorce  in

          late 1992, but the  final decree made no provision for her unborn

          child.

                    Bodwell gave birth  to a  son in February  of 1993  and

                                          3

          subsequently initiated  a paternity suit against  Brooks in which

          she maintained that he  was the boy's biological father.   Brooks

          acknowledged paternity and the  court entered a provisional order

          covering matters such as support, custody, and visitation.

                    Shortly thereafter,  Bodwell  reconciled with  her  ex-

          husband, moved to discontinue  the paternity action, and, relying

          on the  fact that  the child  was conceived while  she was  still

          married,  sought refuge in the presumption of legitimacy.  Brooks

          objected  to the proposed dismissal of the paternity suit and set

          out to  confirm his  legal status  as the  boy's  father.   After

          numerous skirmishes  concerning  paternity (not  relevant  here),

          Brooks  filed complaints  with  the New  Hampshire Supreme  Court

          Professional  Conduct Committee  (the  Committee)  against  three

          attorneys,  including Erica  Bodwell, accusing  them  of flouting

          various ethical canons in  their handling of the paternity  suit.

          The  Committee  dismissed  the  complaints  after  conducting  an

          investigation.

                    Brooks  then sought to put to use in the paternity suit

          both the  fact that a disciplinary complaint  had been instituted

          against Erica  Bodwell and  certain evidence  to which  he became

          privy during  the course of  the Committee's investigation.   His

          efforts were  thwarted by  a rule  prohibiting the disclosure  of

          knowledge  obtained during  the course  of attorney  disciplinary

          proceedings.  See  N.H. Sup.  Ct. R. 37(17)(a)  (1984).1   Brooks
                        ___
                              
          ____________________

               1The  rule  in  effect  at  the  time,  with exceptions  not
          relevant  here,   provided  that  all   records  and  proceedings
          involving   allegations  of   attorney   misconduct   "shall   be

                                          4

          retorted by filing a pro se petition in the New Hampshire Supreme
                               ___ __

          Court  (the  NHSC) in  which  he  contended that  Rule  37(17)(a)

          abridged  his First Amendment right to free speech and asked that

          the rule be invalidated.

                    On March 23, 1995, the NHSC agreed to entertain Brooks'

          petition.  The court  scheduled briefing and oral argument  (with

          the proviso that all matters connected with the proceeding remain

          confidential).  Brooks then  retained counsel, Philip Cobbin, who

          filed a brief  on his behalf.   The court accepted the  case on a

          paper record once Brooks and his attorney refused to  participate

          in oral  arguments behind closed doors.   The case has  yet to be

          decided. 

                    After the  matter  had  been  taken  under  advisement,

          Brooks, acting as his own attorney, sued the  members of the NHSC

          and of the Committee (and others, for good measure, including the

          state bar association) in New Hampshire's federal district court.

          His complaint  sought declaratory and injunctive  relief aimed at

          halting the enforcement of  Rule 37(17)(a).  In what  amounted to

          anticipatory  disregard of that rule,  he attached a  copy of the

          NHSC's order  (agreeing to  entertain his  petition, but  only in

          camera)  to  his  federal   court  complaint.    Attorney  Cobbin

          subsequently  entered an  appearance  for Brooks  in the  federal

                              
          ____________________

          confidential  and  shall not  be disclosed."    N.H. Sup.  Ct. R.
          37(17)(a).  The same rule also provided that "participants in the
          proceedings  shall  conduct  themselves  so as  to  maintain  the
          confidentiality  mandated   by  this   rule,"  and   warned  that
          "[v]iolation  of this duty shall constitute an act of contempt of
          the supreme court."  N.H. Sup. Ct. R. 37 (17)(g).

                                          5

          court and  moved for  a  preliminary injunction  designed (a)  to

          freeze  the paternity suit until  the federal court  had ruled on

          Brooks' constitutional  claim, (b) to  force the NHSC  to dismiss

          Brooks' petition without prejudice, and (c) to prevent that court

          from exercising its contempt  powers under Rule 37(17)(g) against

          Brooks.    Without  requesting the  district  court  to  seal the

          record, Attorney  Cobbin included in the motion a copy of a brief

          filed in the confidential proceeding.  Not surprisingly, the NHSC

          promptly directed  the Committee to determine  whether the lawyer

          had violated Rule 37(17)(a).

                    The  district  court  refused  to  issue a  preliminary

          injunction.   The court reasoned  that the proceeding  pending in

          the NHSC called into  play the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401
                                                     _______    ______

          U.S. 37 (1971); that Brooks' claim implicated  an important state

          interest, namely, the administration of the attorney disciplinary

          system; that Brooks  could obtain a full and fair  hearing on his

          federal constitutional claim before the state tribunal; and that,

          therefore, the Younger doctrine  disabled the district court from
                         _______

          granting the requested relief.  This appeal ensued.2

          II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
          II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

                    Technically, this  is an appeal  from the  denial of  a
                              
          ____________________

               2Following   oral  argument   on   this  appeal,   the  NHSC
          substantially revised Rule 37(17).   See N.H. Sup. Ct.,  Order of
                                               ___
          March  7,  1996 &  appendices.   The  amendments take  some steps
          toward meeting Brooks' objections by relaxing the confidentiality
          restrictions  applicable  to  attorney disciplinary  proceedings.
          But because the amendments  are without retroactive effect    the
          Order  specifically   provides  that  the  amendments   shall  be
          effective as to complaints filed on or after March 7, 1996   they
          have no significant impact on this appeal.

                                          6

          preliminary   injunction,3  and   therefore  the   lower  court's

          decision     assuming  that  it  applied  the  appropriate  legal

          standard       ordinarily  must   stand   unless   the  appellant

          demonstrates an  abuse  of  discretion.   See,  e.g.,  Weaver  v.
                                                    ___   ____   ______

          Henderson,  984 F.2d  11,  12-13 (1st  Cir.  1993).   If  Younger
          _________                                                 _______

          applies, however,  abstention is  mandatory,  see Colorado  River
                                                        ___ _______________

          Water Conserv. Dist.  v. United  States, 424 U.S.  800, 816  n.22
          ____________________     ______________

          (1976); Trust  & Investment  Advisers, Inc. v.  Hogsett, 43  F.3d
                  ___________________________________     _______

          290, 293-94  (7th Cir. 1994);  Fresh Int'l Corp.  v. Agricultural
                                         _________________     ____________

          Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1356 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986), and
          ___________________

          we must  review de  novo the  essentially legal  determination of

          whether  the requirements  for  abstention have  been met.   See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Trust & Investment  Advisers, 43 F.3d at 294;  Kenneally v.
          ____  ____________________________                   _________

          Lungren, 967 F.2d  329, 331  (9th Cir. 1992),  cert. denied,  506
          _______                                        _____ ______

          U.S. 1054  (1993); Traughber v.  Beauchane, 760 F.2d  673, 675-76
                             _________     _________

          (6th  Cir.  1985).4    That  standard  supervenes  the  abuse  of
                              
          ____________________

               3Despite   Brooks'   importuning,  we   have   no  appellate
          jurisdiction over  the district court's  denial of the  flurry of
          temporary restraining orders that he sought prior to the district
          court's disposition  of his motion for  a preliminary injunction.
          See  United States v.  Miller, 14 F.3d  761, 764  (2d Cir. 1994);
          ___  _____________     ______
          Massachusetts Air Pollution & Noise Abatement Comm'n v. Brinegar,
          ____________________________________________________    ________
          499 F.2d 125, 125 (1st Cir. 1974).

               4    Although  several  courts  have  applied  an  abuse  of
                    discretion  standard  in  reviewing Younger  abstention
                                                        _______
                    cases,  see, e.g.,  Martin  Marietta Corp.  v. Maryland
                            ___  ____   ______________________     ________
                    Human Relations  Comm'n, 38  F.3d 1392, 1396  (4th Cir.
                    _______________________
                    1994); O'Neil v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 790
                           ______    ____________________
                    (3d Cir. 1994), cert.  denied, 115 S. Ct. 1355  (1995);
                                    _____  ______
                    Ramos  v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 564 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980),
                    _____     ____
                    cert.  denied, 450  U.S.  1041 (1981),  context is  the
                    _____  ______
                    determining factor.  Where an attempt is made  to apply
                    the   Younger   doctrine    under   oddly    configured
                          _______
                    circumstances, in  a way that threatens  the legitimate

                                          7

          discretion  inquiry, and  applies foursquare  even though  we are

          reviewing the district court's denial  of injunctive relief.  See
                                                                        ___

          Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 743 (6th Cir. 1996) (exercising de
          ______    ______

          novo  review in kindred  circumstances); Goldie's Bookstore, Inc.
                                                   ________________________

          v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1984) (similar).
             ______________

                    This usurpation  of the  customary  standard of  review

          does not create an awkward  anomaly.  The primary integer  in the

          preliminary injunction calculus is the plaintiff's probability of

          success on the merits.   See, e.g., Narragansett Indian  Tribe v.
                                   ___  ____  __________________________

          Guilbert,  934  F.2d 4,  5  (1st  Cir. 1991).5    This means,  of
          ________

          course, that the  plaintiff must show a  likelihood of succeeding

          in the  pending proceeding.   When Younger applies,  the district
          __________________________         _______

          court must refrain  from reaching the  merits of the  plaintiff's

          claims  and, thus, there  is no  real possibility    let  alone a

                              
          ____________________

                    interests of the national  government, then the federal
                    court   may  exercise  a  modicum  of  discretion,  and
                    appellate  review is for abuse of that discretion.  See
                                                                        ___
                    Chaulk Servs., Inc.  v. MCAD, 70  F.3d 1361, 1368  (1st
                    ___________________     ____
                    Cir.  1995).   But  for  purposes  of what  the  Chaulk
                                                                     ______
                    majority  called the  "customary case"    of  which the
                    case  at bar  is a  prototype    the Supreme  Court has
                    spoken peremptorily,  see Colorado  River, 424  U.S. at
                                          ___ _______________
                    816  n.22,  and  intermediate  appellate   courts  are,
                    therefore, spinning  wheels by  probing for abuse  of a
                    discretion  that does  not  exist.    Nonetheless,  the
                    district court's findings of fact, in contradistinction
                    to   its   ultimate   legal  conclusion   as   to   the
                    applicability  vel non  of  the Younger  doctrine,  may
                                   ___ ___          _______
                    evoke a more deferential standard of review.

               5The  other  integers  in   the  calculus  include  (1)  the
          likelihood of irreparable injury in  the absence of a preliminary
          injunction, (2) the relative balance of hardships if the order is
          issued or denied,  and (3) the  effect on the public  interest of
          granting  or   withholding  interim  injunctive   relief.     See
                                                                        ___
          Narragansett Indian Tribe, 934 F.2d at 5.
          _________________________

                                          8

          likelihood   that the  plaintiff will succeed  in his action.   A

          fortiori,  there can  be no  abuse of  discretion in  refusing to

          grant preliminary injunctive relief.

          III.  ANALYSIS
          III.  ANALYSIS

                    Against this  backdrop, we  turn to a  consideration of

          whether Younger  abstention is  appropriate in  this  case.   Our
                  _______

          analysis unfolds in four layers.

                                          A.
                                          A.
                                          __

                    The Younger doctrine welds principles of federalism and
                        _______

          comity  into a fulcrum that can then  be used to achieve a proper

          balance  between  sensitive federal  and  state  interests.   See
                                                                        ___

          Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.  Based on these principles, the  Younger
          _______                                                   _______

          Court articulated the  federal judiciary's obligation  to refrain

          from adjudicating the  merits of  federal claims where  to do  so

          would  needlessly  inject  federal   courts  into  ongoing  state

          criminal prosecutions.   See id.   Doctrinal  evolution over  the
                                   ___ ___

          next  quarter-century  brought  other  types   of  ongoing  state

          proceedings,   including   civil   actions   and   administrative

          adjudications,  within the  ambit  of Younger  abstention.   See,
                                                _______                ___

          e.g., New Orleans  Public Serv., Inc.  v. Council of City  of New
          ____  _______________________________     _______________________

          Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1989); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v.
          _______                               ________________________

          Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986).
          ___________________________

                    Perhaps the  most revealing elucidation of  the balance

          that  the Younger Court wished  to achieve is  found in Middlesex
                    _______                                       _________

          County  Ethics  Comm. v.  Garden State  Bar  Ass'n, 457  U.S. 423
          _____________________     ________________________

          (1982).   There  the New  Jersey  Ethics Committee  instituted  a

                                          9

          disciplinary proceeding  against a  defense lawyer who,  during a

          criminal  trial,  had  made  statements  vilifying  the  judicial

          system.  See  id. at 428.   The lawyer  sued in federal court  to
                   ___  ___

          block  the  disciplinary  proceeding   on  the  ground  that  the

          standards of  professional conduct  relied upon by  the committee

          abridged  his  First  Amendment   rights.    The  district  court

          abstained, concluding that the  lawyer could raise his  claims in

          the disciplinary  proceeding and  on subsequent  judicial review.

          The Third Circuit reversed  on the basis that a  bar disciplinary

          proceeding did not provide a suitable forum for the  adjudication

          of the lawyer's constitutional claims.  643 F.2d 119.

                    The  Supreme  Court  reinstated  the  district  court's

          ruling.   457 U.S. at 437.   In the process the Court established

          the  basic   analytical  framework  that  still  governs  Younger
                                                                    _______

          abstention.   Under this paradigm,  a federal court  must abstain

          from reaching the merits of a case over which it has jurisdiction

          so long as  there is  (1) an ongoing  state judicial  proceeding,

          instituted  prior  to  the  federal  proceeding  (or,  at  least,

          instituted  prior  to any  substantial  progress  in the  federal

          proceeding), that (2) implicates an important state interest, and

          (3)  provides an adequate opportunity for  the plaintiff to raise

          the claims advanced in his federal lawsuit.  See id. at 432.
                                                       ___ ___

                                          B.
                                          B.

                    The next step in  the pavane requires us to  apply this

          tripartite framework to the case at bar.

                    1.  Two of  the three proceedings that Brooks  seeks to
                    1.

                                          10

          enjoin    his petition questioning the  constitutionality of Rule

          37(17)(a)  and the paternity suit in which  he is embroiled   are

          pending before  duly constituted state courts  and are undeniably

          ongoing  state  judicial proceedings.    See  New Orleans  Public
                                                   ___  ___________________

          Serv., 491 U.S. at 371 (listing rudiments of a judicial inquiry).
          _____

          The third proceeding    the embryonic contempt proceeding against

          Cobbin  (which  Brooks,  in  all  events, may  lack  standing  to

          contest)   is also judicial in nature.  Middlesex itself involved
                                                  _________

          a  First Amendment  challenge  to a  state's  system of  attorney

          discipline, and the Supreme Court held that attorney disciplinary

          proceedings are  judicial  proceedings for  purposes  of  Younger
                                                                    _______

          abstention.   See Middlesex, 457  U.S. at 433-34.   Consequently,
                        ___ _________

          the first prerequisite for Younger abstention is satisfied.
                                     _______

                    2.   It  is  evident that  New  Hampshire has  a  vital
                    2.

          interest in regulating the  subject matter of Brooks' claims.   A

          state's judicial system is  an important cog in  its governmental

          apparatus, and  no judicial  system can function  smoothly unless

          the attorneys who participate in it are held to high standards of

          professionalism and accountability.   See id.  at 434-35.   Thus,
                                                ___ ___

          regulating   attorney  conduct  comprises   a  significant  state

          interest  for purposes of Younger abstention.6  See id.; see also
                                    _______               ___ ___  ___ ____
                              
          ____________________

               6The defendants represent  the state's interest.   By way of
          illustration,   the   NHSC   is  charged   with   the   paramount
          responsibility of establishing procedures and standards governing
          attorney discipline  "that are emblematic of the character of the
          profession."  Petition of Burling, 651 A.2d 940, 944 (N.H. 1994);
                        ___________________
          see also N.H. Const., pt. II, art. 73-a.  To achieve that mission
          ___ ____
          the court relies upon the Committee to investigate  and determine
          the  propriety of  attorneys'  conduct.   See  N.H. Sup.  Ct.  R.
                                                    ___
          37(3)(c); see also Burling, 651 A.2d at 941-42.
                    ___ ____ _______

                                          11

          Fieger,  74  F.3d at  745; Hirsh  v.  Justices of  Calif. Supreme
          ______                     _____      ___________________________

          Court, 67 F.3d 708, 712-13 (9th Cir. 1995).
          _____

                    In the same vein,  the confidentiality rule comprises a

          central  element  of   the  regulatory  scheme.    The  NHSC  has

          identified no fewer than four  noteworthy purposes that the  rule

          serves:   (1)  protecting attorneys' reputations;  (2) protecting

          complainants' anonymity; (3) maintaining the integrity of pending

          investigations;  and (4)  preventing profligate  disclosures that

          might endanger the interests of those sources from whom the state

          obtained  information  on a  confidential  basis.   See  State v.
                                                              ___  _____

          Merski, 437 A.2d 710, 715 (N.H. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943
          ______                                 _____ ______

          (1982).  Since  the rule's  proper operation is  itself of  great

          moment  to New  Hampshire  citizens, the  second requirement  for

          Younger abstention is satisfied.7
          _______

                    3.   We also believe that the pending state proceedings
                    3.

          allow an ample opportunity for Brooks to raise his constitutional

          challenge.    The clearest  illustration  of  this  point is  the

          proceeding presently pending  before the NHSC (in  which the very

          issue that forms the centerpiece of Brooks' federal complaint  is

          raised,  briefed, and teetering on  the brink of  decision).  Any

          other assessment  would defile  the basic presumption  that state

          courts are  fully capable of safeguarding  federal constitutional

          rights.  See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431; Bettencourt v. Board  of
                   ___ _________                   ___________    _________

                              
          ____________________

               7Although  the  NHSC recently  amended  the  version of  the
          confidentiality rule that is at issue here, see supra note 2, the
                                                      ___ _____
          state nevertheless  retains a  strong interest in  preserving the
          expectations of confidentiality created by the former regime.

                                          12

          Registration in Medicine, 904 F.2d 772, 776 (1st Cir. 1990).
          ________________________

                    Here, the  presumption is  reinforced because  the NHSC

          has demonstrated unequivocally that  it takes questions anent the

          confidentiality provisions  seriously.   See,  e.g., Petition  of
                                                   ___   ____  ____________

          Burling,  651  A.2d  940  (N.H.  1994).     Indeed,  when  Brooks
          _______

          interposed his objections to the confidentiality rule, the NHSC  

          which  could have  brushed  aside his  petition  as a  matter  of

          discretion   elected to entertain the objections, and did so in a

          proceeding that affords Brooks an adequate opportunity to present

          his constitutional arguments.

                    Though Brooks  maintains  that the  NHSC proceeding  is

          less  than adequate  because of  its confidential  character, the

          Supreme  Court  has  never  suggested  that  having  an  adequate

          opportunity  to present  a  federal claim  requires the  parallel

          state  proceeding be  open to  the public.   Rather, the  test is

          whether  "state  law  clearly   bars  the  interposition  of  the

          constitutional  claims."   Moore v.  Sims,  442 U.S.  415, 425-26
                                     _____     ____

          (1979).   Nothing in the  confidential nature of  the state court

          proceeding  constitutes such  a  bar.8    The third  (and  final)

          requirement for Younger abstention is therefore satisfied.
                          _______

                                          C.
                                          C.
                                          __

                    Fulfillment  of  the  three  requirements  for  Younger
                                                                    _______

          abstention usually  ends the  federal inquiry.   See Bettencourt,
                                                           ___ ___________
                              
          ____________________

               8For what it may be worth, we note that, if the NHSC follows
          past practice, its eventual  disposition of Brooks' petition will
          be embodied  in a published,  publicly accessible opinion.   See,
                                                                       ___
          e.g.,  Petition of  Burling, 651  A.2d  940 (N.H.  1994); Astles'
          ____   ____________________                               _______
          Case, 594 A.2d 167 (N.H. 1991). 
          ____

                                          13

          904  F.2d at 779-80.   But even  if the Younger  requirements are
                                                  _______

          satisfied, a federal  court may nonetheless intervene  to halt an

          ongoing state judicial  proceeding if the plaintiff  demonstrates

          "bad  faith,  harassment,  or  any  other unusual  circumstance."

          Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.  Brooks suggests that his case trips the
          _______

          exception.   He bases this suggestion broadly, but the only point

          that bears extended discussion  is his allegation that  the state

          tribunal is incompetent by reason of bias.

                    Judicial  bias  is  a recognized  basis  for  derailing

          Younger abstention, see, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
          _______             ___  ____  ______    _________

          577-79  (1973), but  the claim  requires more  than the  frenzied

          brandishing of  a  cardboard  sword.   Brooks'  claim  is  pasted

          together  from various  bits  and pieces  of marginally  relevant

          information.   For example, he notes that several Justices of the

          NHSC   have   advocated   confidential  treatment   of   judicial

          disciplinary  proceedings; that  certain Justices  have testified

          before legislative committees  in opposition  to restrictions  on

          the Chief  Justice's rulemaking  power; that  the NHSC  will only

          hear  oral argument on his petition behind closed doors; and that

          in  the  state  court  proceeding  the  Committee  has  staunchly

          defended the validity of the confidentiality rule.  We think that

          such snippets, individually and collectively, are insufficient to

          show cognizable bias.

                    In the first place,  the bias exception to the  Younger
                                                                    _______

          abstention doctrine  is  inapposite if  an  ostensibly  aggrieved

          party  fails  to  employ  available  procedures  for  recusal  of

                                          14

          allegedly  biased  judges.    See  Middlesex,  457  U.S.  at 435;
                                        ___  _________

          Bettencourt,  904  F.2d at  780;  Standard  Alaska Prod.  Co.  v.
          ___________                       ___________________________

          Schaible,  874 F.2d 624, 629  (9th Cir. 1989),  cert. denied, 495
          ________                                        _____ ______

          U.S.  904 (1990).   Brooks  has never sought  the recusal  of any

          individual Justice.  While he  attempts to justify this  omission

          on the basis of  various tactical considerations and by  claiming

          that  the NHSC's  standard recusal  mechanism is  inapplicable to

          proceedings  that  fall  within its  original  jurisdiction,  his

          explanations lack force.   For this reason alone, his  claim must

          fail.

                    In  the  second place,  the  baseline  showing of  bias

          necessary  to trigger  Younger's  escape mechanism  requires  the
                                 _______

          plaintiff to offer some  evidence that abstention will jeopardize

          his  due process right to an impartial adjudication.  See Gibson,
                                                                ___ ______

          411  U.S. at 577; Bettencourt,  904 F.2d at  780.  The "evidence"
                            ___________

          that  Brooks presents does not approach this benchmark.  At most,

          Brooks'  claim depends on a purely conclusory allegation that the

          Justices of the NHSC are predisposed to uphold their own policies

          and  rules.    But an  entire  group  of  adjudicators cannot  be

          disqualified  wholesale  solely  on   the  basis  of  an  alleged

          institutional  bias in favor of  a rule or  policy promulgated by

          that group.   See, e.g., Doolin Security  Savs. Bank v. FDIC,  53
                        ___  ____  ___________________________    ____

          F.3d 1395, 1407 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 473  (1995);
                                      _____ ______

          Hammond v. Baldwin, 866 F.2d 172, 177 (6th Cir. 1989).
          _______    _______

                    To   implicate   due   process,   claims   of   general

          institutional  bias must be  harnessed to a  further showing, see
                                                                        ___

                                          15

          Gibson,  411 U.S.  at  579,  such  as  a  potential  conflict  of
          ______

          interest, see, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 56,
                    ___  ____  ____    ______________________

          60 (1972), or a pecuniary stake in the outcome of the litigation,

          see, e.g.,  Bettencourt, 904 F.2d  at 780 n.10.   For aught  that
          ___  ____   ___________

          appears,  the  Justices' interest  (if  any)  in maintaining  the

          privacy of attorney disciplinary proceedings appears to be purely

          Platonic.9  At least,  Brooks has not produced any  evidence that

          the  NHSC  or  any individual  Justice  stands  to  gain or  lose

          depending  on  whether   attorney  disciplinary  proceedings  are

          conducted in public or private, nor has he revealed the existence

          of any particularized  interest in the outcome  of his litigation

          that might tend to undermine the Justices' impartiality.

                    In the third  place, to the extent that Brooks contends

          that any individual Justice is  actually biased or has  prejudged

          his case, he offers  no concrete evidence to that  effect.  Thus,

          he bumps up against the historic presumption that judges are "men

          [and women] of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of

          judging a particular controversy  fairly on the basis of  its own

          circumstances."   Withrow  v.  Larkin,  421  U.S. 35,  55  (1975)
                            _______      ______

          (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The presumption

          of  judicial impartiality  cannot  be  trumped  by  free-floating

          invective, unanchored to specific facts.  See Kenneally, 967 F.2d
                                                    ___ _________

          at 333; Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 780 n.10.
                  ___________
                              
          ____________________

               9The structural bias claims, weak in all events, are further
          undermined by the recent  amendments to the confidentiality rule.
          See supra note 2.   Those amendments, adopted without  dissent by
          ___ _____
          the Justices, liberalize the rule  in such a way as to  provide a
          strong indication that the Justices are not wed to secrecy.

                                          16

                                          D.
                                          D.
                                          __

                    We add brief comments  concerning two other claims that

          Brooks seems to make.

                    1.    To the  extent that  Brooks  invites us  to forgo
                    1.

          Younger  abstention because his attorney is the subject of a bad-
          _______

          faith prosecution by the NHSC (arising out of disclosures made in

          violation  of Rule  37(17)(a)  whilst  representing  Brooks),  we

          decline  the invitation.   The NHSC's investigation  of Cobbin is

          not  an  enforcement  proceeding brought  without  any  realistic

          expectation of finding a violation of a rule; and, therefore, the

          investigation does  not catalyze  the bad-faith exception  to the

          Younger doctrine.   See Younger, 401 U.S. at  48; Fieger, 74 F.3d
          _______             ___ _______                   ______

          at 750; see also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
                  ___ ____ __________    _______

                    2.   In  something of  a non  sequitur, Brooks,  citing
                    2.

          Younger,  claims  that  the threat  of  disciplinary  proceedings
          _______

          against   him   and   his   attorney  for   violations   of   the

          confidentiality rule  chills the exercise of  his First Amendment

          rights,  and   that   the  confidentiality   rule  is   therefore

          "flagrantly  and patently  violative  of  express  constitutional

          prohibitions  in every  clause,  sentence and  paragraph, and  in

          whatever manner and against  whomever an effort might be  made to

          apply it."  Younger,  401 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson  v. Buck,
                      _______                              ______     ____

          313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).  But Younger itself belies this claim.
                                          _______

          The Younger Court declared that "a `chilling effect,' even in the
              _______

          area  of  First Amendment  rights,  has never  been  considered a

          sufficient  basis,  in  and  of  itself,  for  prohibiting  state

                                          17

          action."  Id. at 51; accord Fieger, 74 F.3d at 750.  Here, Brooks
                    ___        ______ ______

          has posited no other legally tenable basis for his challenge.

          IV.  CONCLUSION
          IV.  CONCLUSION

                    We  need  go no  further.   Although  Brooks  raises an

          important question  about the interplay  between New  Hampshire's

          attorney  disciplinary  system  and  the  First  Amendment,  that

          question is  presently pending  before the New  Hampshire Supreme

          Court in  a judicial  proceeding that Brooks  himself instituted.

          If, in  the end, Brooks  is not content  with the result  of that

          adjudication, he may then seek certiorari in the Supreme Court of

          the  United States.  He may not, however, rewardingly request the

          federal district court to enjoin the state proceedings.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                                          18