Court Opinion

ID: 9469444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:40:42.338166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:23.421219
License: Public Domain

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Parts I, II-A and III of the majority opinion. I agree that federal diversity jurisdiction extends to the tort of “childnapping,” that the District Court in this case had in personam jurisdiction over *1045Mrs. Bennett pursuant to the District of Columbia Long Arm Statute, and that the District Court abused its discretion when it refused to grant Mr. Bennett leave to amend his complaint to clarify the source of the court’s in personam jurisdiction. I cannot agree, however, that Mr. Bennett is required to waive his claim for injunctive relief, based on the same alleged misdeeds as his claim for damages, in order to proceed in federal court. With all respect, I believe that the majority’s distinction is supported neither by law nor by logic.
The majority correctly notes that federal courts generally lack “the power to determine the custody of children.” (Emphasis added.) It simply does not follow from this premise, however, that a federal court is powerless to enforce an otherwise valid state custody decree in a diversity action. Enforcement of a valid and final state decree does not require a federal court to inquire into the present best interests of minor children; rather, the federal court need only give effect to the binding decision of a state court. Admittedly, a federal court may occasionally have to decide which of two conflicting state decrees is valid; but, as the majority concedes in its discussion of appellant’s claim for damages, “the task of determining such validity and effect is . . . not beyond the competence of the federal courts.”1
The majority opinion also engenders an ironic result. Under the majority’s analysis, Mr. Bennett properly may sue for the unlawful childnapping of his son Steven and, assuming that the facts stated in his complaint are true, Mr. Bennett may recover monetary damages. Presumably, if Mrs. Bennett does not return Steven and a period of time passes, Mr. Bennett may sue again for additional monetary damages arising from Mrs. Bennett’s continued tor-tious conduct. At no time, however, could Mr. Bennett recover the lawful custody of Steven. In effect, under the decision we issue today, Mrs. Bennett may purchase the unlawful custody of Steven by tendering periodic payments to Mr. Bennett — much as one might rent an automobile or an apartment.2
The award of damages will provide Mr. Bennett little, if any, solace for the absence of his son. And assuming, as we must, that the District of Columbia Superior Court properly concluded that Steven’s best interests will be served if he lives with his father, the majority’s decision promises no relief at all to Steven. Finally, the majority’s decision allows Mrs. Bennett to continue to flout the valid custody decree of the Superior Court. Thus, the majority is undoubtedly correct when it states that “[t]his case is profoundly sad.”
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that Mr. Bennett must waive his claim for injunctive relief.

. Nor can the majority’s denial of injunctive relief be supported by a distinction between the federal courts’ legal and equitable powers. Notably, the federal courts have exercised their equitable powers in the realm of domestic relations by requiring future payments of alimony, as well as requiring the payment of amounts already accrued. E.g., Keating v. Keating, 542 F.2d 910, 911 12 (4th Cir. 1976); Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571, 573-74 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896, 75 S.Ct. 217, 99 L.Ed. 704 (1954).

. In this case, Mr. Bennett may be denied even the inadequate remedy of monetary damages if, as the record suggests, Mrs. Bennett is judgment-proof.