Court Opinion

ID: 9957786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 14:07:43.377456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:39.378181
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 29, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0565-MR

MATTHEW LEE MERGENS                                                    APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE DEANNA WISE HENSCHEL, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 22-CI-00533

EMILY GRACE CARTWRIGHT                                                   APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND CALDWELL, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Matthew Lee Mergens (“Appellant”) appeals from

an amended supplemental decree and final hearing order of the McCracken Circuit

Court in a dissolution of marriage proceeding filed by Emily Grace Cartwright

(“Appellee”). Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in restricting his

visitation with the parties’ minor child (“Child”); in granting Appellee the right to
claim Child as a dependent for tax purposes; and, in awarding an attorney fee in

favor of Appellee. After careful review, we affirm the order on appeal.

                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             Appellant and Appellee were married on May 25, 2019. The marriage

produced a child who was born in 2021, and the parties were divorced by a decree

of dissolution entered on October 14, 2022.

             During Appellee’s pregnancy, Appellant admitted himself to Mercy

Health Lourdes psychiatric unit for treatment of suicidal ideation. He was

diagnosed with a mood disorder and a cannabis use disorder, prescribed with

psychiatric medications and directed to follow up with mental health treatment.

Appellant acknowledged having suicidal thoughts and anger issues. Thereafter,

Appellant began mental health treatment at Four Rivers Behavioral Health. He

was referred to six months of counseling which he did not complete.

             During the parties’ separation, but prior to dissolution, Appellant

moved to Nashville, Tennessee for employment. Appellee was Child’s sole

caregiver. She testified that she was concerned about Appellant’s ability to

provide care for Child during Child’s visits to Nashville, and that Appellant

terminated three of five visits early. Evidence was adduced that Appellant did not

pursue additional visits with Child during the pendency of the proceedings.

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             In adjudicating the parties’ custody and visitation issues, the circuit

court determined that it was in Child’s best interest for the parties to have joint

custody, with Appellee designated as the primary residential custodian. The court

found that the presumption of equal timesharing was overcome by the inconsistent

and minimal contact that Appellant had with Child. Based on the statutory factors,

and due to Appellant’s failure to follow through with his mental health treatment

and failure to pursue meaningful and consistent contact with Child, the circuit

court ordered a graduated visitation plan spanning 18 months.

             For the first six months, the court granted Appellant seven hours of

daytime visitation on alternating Saturdays, in addition to daily video calls of five

minutes. After six months, and upon Appellant’s completion of counseling,

Appellant’s visitation with Child was increased to overnight visits in Kentucky on

alternate Saturdays. After an additional six months, the overnight visits would be

allowed in Tennessee. Finally, after another six months, if Appellant remained

consistent with his visitation, he would be granted more liberal visitation per the

McCracken County Family Court Standard Visitation Guidelines.

             The court went on to find that because Child lived primarily with

Appellee, she would be allowed to utilize Child as a dependent on her income

taxes. The court determined that such a designation also benefitted Child. And

finally, the circuit court awarded Appellee attorney fees in the amount of

                                          -3-
$5,000.00. It based this award on the disparity in the parties’ incomes. This

appeal followed.

                         ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

             Appellant first argues that the McCracken Circuit Court erred in

restricting his visitation without making any findings that Appellant would

endanger seriously Child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health as required

by Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 403.320. He asserts that Kentucky law

creates a presumption that visitation is in a child’s best interest and the court may

not restrict visitation without such findings. Appellant argues that the circuit court

failed to properly cite or consider KRS 403.320, and that the case law holds that a

visitation schedule should be crafted to provide the child with as much time with

both parents as possible. Appellant contends that the circuit court’s decree is not

consistent with the principles set out in the statutory law and case law. He seeks an

opinion reversing the amended supplemental decree and final hearing order on

appeal, and remanding the matter for proceedings consistent with the law of the

Commonwealth.

             KRS 403.320 addresses visitation and states in relevant part:

             (1) A parent not granted custody of the child and not
             awarded shared parenting time under the presumption
             specified in KRS 403.270(2), 403.280(2), or 403.340(5)
             is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court
             finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger
             seriously the child’s physical, mental, moral, or

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             emotional health. Upon request of either party, the court
             shall issue orders which are specific as to the frequency,
             timing, duration, conditions, and method of scheduling
             visitation and which reflect the development age of the
             child.

             (2) If domestic violence and abuse, as defined in KRS
             403.720, has been alleged, the court shall, after a hearing,
             determine the visitation arrangement, if any, which
             would not endanger seriously the child’s or the custodial
             parent’s physical, mental, or emotional health.

             (3) The court may modify an order granting or denying
             visitation rights whenever modification would serve the
             best interests of the child; but the court shall not restrict a
             parent’s visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation
             would endanger seriously the child’s physical, mental,
             moral, or emotional health.

             Thus, Appellant is entitled to “reasonable visitation” unless the court

finds, after a hearing, “that visitation would endanger seriously the child’s

physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.” Id. The first question for our

consideration, then, is whether Appellant received reasonable visitation. If that

question is answered in the affirmative, then no subsequent finding of serious

endangerment was required.

             “What constitutes ‘reasonable visitation’ is a matter which must be

decided based upon the circumstances of each parent and the children, rather than

any set formula.” Drury v. Drury, 32 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Ky. App. 2000). Trial

courts “should not give undue weight to the terms of a ‘standard’ visitation order”

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and “must make a de novo determination of what amount of visitation is

appropriate[.]” Id. at 524-25. “[T]he trial court has considerable discretion” in

adjudicating child visitation. Id. at 525.

             After considering the issues presented, the McCracken Circuit Court

ordered an incremental visitation plan which increased over time in concert with

Appellant’s successful visitation and his ongoing participation in counseling. As

noted above, it began with Saturday daytime visitation twice a month and daily

video calls, increasing to overnight visits in Kentucky, then overnight visits in

Tennessee, and culminating in visitation per the McCracken County Family Court

Standard Visitation Guidelines. This graduated visitation plan was not arbitrarily

entered into, but was reasonably fashioned to balance the various considerations

including Appellant’s statutory right to visitation, Child’s best interest, and

Appellant’s personal history. The circuit court exercised its considerable

discretion and granted visitation based on all relevant factors rather than any set

formula. We conclude that the McCracken Circuit Court granted reasonable

visitation to Appellee per KRS 403.320 and Drury. As such, no finding of serious

endangerment was required.

             Appellant next argues that the circuit court erred in permitting

Appellee to claim the child tax credit per Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)

regulations. He asserts that the credit can reduce a taxpayer’s bill on a dollar-for-

                                             -6-
dollar basis up to $2,000 per child. Appellant argues that because Appellee had no

income at the time of the decree, he should have been awarded the tax credit.1

              This argument is not preserved for appellate review per Kentucky

Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 32(A)(4); therefore, we will review it for

manifest injustice only. Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky. App. 2010)

(citing Elwell v. Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. App. 1990)). Manifest injustice

requires a showing that a different result was probable, or that the error in the

proceeding was of such magnitude as to be “shocking or jurisprudentially

intolerable.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3-4 (Ky. 2006).

              In support of his argument, Appellant directs our attention to various

provisions of the IRS code in support of his claim that Appellee, who was a college

student at the time of dissolution, could not claim Child as a dependent on her

taxes because she had no income. He also contends that the IRS code allows him

to claim Child as a dependent even though he is not the custodial parent. While

these claims may be true, the McCracken Circuit Court’s award of the child tax

credit in favor of Appellee was clearly prospective in nature. The court found that

Appellee was in her last semester of school at the time of the decree and

anticipated employment as a teacher in the 2023-24 school year. The court noted

1
 The circuit court did not use the phrase “child tax credit” nor reference the Internal Revenue
Service Code. Rather, the supplemental decree granted to Appellee “the right to claim the minor
child for tax purposes each year[.]”

                                              -7-
that Appellee would be allowed to claim Child on her taxes “each year[.]” Thus,

even though Appellant correctly asserts that Appellee had no income at the time of

the decree, the award of the credit in favor of Appellee was made in anticipation of

her earning income beginning in 2023. Further, while Appellant has set forth the

reasons that he would benefit from the credit, he has not cited any Kentucky statute

or case law demonstrating that the award in favor of Appellee was erroneous. We

find no manifest injustice on this issue and thus no error.

             Lastly, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in awarding

$5,000.00 in attorney fees to Appellee. He maintains that it was improper to make

an award of attorney fees based on the financial disparity of the parties. He also

contends that the court erred in failing to consider such factors as the type and

amount of the services rendered, the time and trouble involved, and other

considerations as set out in Boden v. Boden, 268 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1954). He

argues that without an itemized reckoning of the work performed by Appellee’s

counsel, it was impossible to determine if the fees were reasonable and

appropriate. In response, Appellee notes that Appellant did not raise this issue

below, and failed to provide a statement at the beginning of the written argument,

per RAP 32(A)(4), showing if and how the issue was preserved. Lack of

preservation aside, Appellee argues that the award of attorney fees fell within the

sound discretion of the circuit court and was proper.

                                         -8-
             KRS 403.220 states:

             The Court from time to time after considering the
             financial resources of both parties may order a party to
             pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of
             maintaining or defending any proceeding under this
             chapter and for attorney’s fees, including sums for legal
             services rendered and costs incurred prior to the
             commencement of the proceeding or after entry of
             judgment. The court may order that the amount be paid
             directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his
             name.

             “The amount of an award of attorney’s fees is committed to the sound

discretion of the trial court[.]” Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 938 (Ky. 1990).

In assessing attorney fees, a finding of financial disparity is sufficient. Nothing

more is required. Id. at 937.

             The McCracken Circuit Court found a financial disparity between the

parties, as Appellant was then earning about $95,000.00 per year and Appellee was

an unemployed student. This finding is supported by the record. The award of

attorney fees in favor of Appellee did not constitute an abuse of discretion and we

find no manifest injustice on this issue.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For these reasons, we affirm the amended supplemental decree and

final hearing order of the McCracken Circuit Court.

                                            -9-
          ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Bard K. Brian             Tiffany Gabehart Poindexter
Paducah, Kentucky         Paducah, Kentucky

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