Court Opinion

ID: 9919425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 15:08:57.110558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:13.475169
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

1825 Rt. 309 Allentown, LLC,             :
                        Appellant        :
                                         :
             v.                          :
                                         :
Zoning Hearing Board of                  :
South Whitehall Township                 :   No. 487 C.D. 2022
and Landston Equities, LLC               :   Submitted: December 4, 2023

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                                   FILED: January 18, 2024

             This matter returns following our remand for a more expansive opinion
from the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (common pleas court)
explaining its analysis of the pertinent factors relating to a grant of zoning relief
requested by Landston Equities, LLC (Applicant) from the Zoning Hearing Board
(ZHB) of South Whitehall Township (Township). In an appeal by 1825 Rt. 309
Allentown, LLC (Objector), which intervened in the action, the common pleas court
denied and dismissed Objector’s appeal from the ZHB’s decision granting
Applicant’s request for a special exception and dimensional variances. Having now
reviewed the common pleas court’s supplemental opinion as well as the rest of the
record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the common pleas court’s order.
                                   I. Background
             Before the ZHB, Applicant appealed from the denial of a special
exception and variances and sought zoning relief in support of its proposed
development of a commercial property. Relevant to this appeal, Applicant sought
dimensional variances related to the placement of the two driveway entrance points
needed for the proposed development.
             Objector opposed the requested relief. After the ZHB had completed
the hearing process, Objector asked to have the record reopened in order to present
expert testimony in opposition to Applicant’s requested zoning relief. The ZHB
refused to reopen the record and granted both special exception and variance relief
to Applicant.
             Objector appealed to the common pleas court, requesting two
alternative forms of relief. First, Objector sought reversal on the merits, arguing that
Applicant failed to sustain its burden of proving entitlement to zoning relief.
Reproduced Record (RR) at 45a-46a. In the alternative, Objector asked the common
pleas court to remand the matter to the ZHB to reopen the record for additional
testimony of Objector’s expert witness and then issue a new decision. Id.
             The common pleas court accepted briefs and held oral argument but
took no additional evidence. In its brief and argument before the common pleas
court, Objector preserved its argument that Applicant’s evidence before the ZHB
was insufficient to sustain its burden of proving entitlement to zoning relief. RR at
89a-94a & 137a-40a. Objector continued to make clear that it was seeking a remand
for additional evidence only in the event that the common pleas court determined
Applicant’s evidence was otherwise sufficient to support the ZHB’s decision. Id.

                                              2
               The common pleas court affirmed the ZHB’s decision. Its supporting
opinion accompanying its order, however, focused almost exclusively on Objector’s
request to reopen the record.1 See Objector’s Br., Ex. B. The common pleas court
posited that Objector’s request for reversal on the merits was “not based on the
record and overlap[ped] its remand request by suggesting that additional expert
testimony would reveal the inadequacy of Applicant’s evidence.”                         Id. at 4.
According to the common pleas court, Objector had not argued that Applicant failed
to meet its burden of proof. Id. As a result, the common pleas court offered no
analysis of the merits beyond bare statements that the ZHB analyzed all the elements
required for zoning relief and that its conclusions were supported by substantial
evidence. Id. at 4-5.
               On appeal, unlike the common pleas court, we concluded that Objector
had preserved its challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we
directed the common pleas court to provide a supplemental opinion analyzing the
applicable factors required for a special exception and dimensional variances and
applying those factors to the evidence presented in the case.2

       1
         We observe that, on appeal before this Court, Objector has not renewed in its brief any
argument that the ZHB should have reopened the record. See generally Objector’s Br.
Accordingly, that argument is waived and we will not consider it. See Dobson Park Mgmt., LLC
v. Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 203 A.3d 1134, 1139 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).
       2
          Where, as here, the common pleas court has not taken additional evidence in a zoning
appeal, this Court reviews the ZHB’s decision for an error of law or a manifest abuse of discretion;
such an abuse of discretion occurs only where the ZHB’s findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. Artisan Constr. Grp., LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Pottsgrove Twp., 275 A.3d
80, 84 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). Further, the ZHB’s findings are owed deference, especially as to
whether a variance applicant satisfied the unnecessary hardship criterion, in light of the ZHB’s
expertise and knowledge regarding local conditions. Marshall v. City of Phila., 97 A.3d 323, 333
(Pa. 2014); Azoulay v. Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 194 A.3d 241, 249 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)

                                                     3
                                         II. Discussion
                                     A. Special Exception
               The Township’s zoning ordinance provides for special exceptions “in
particular areas . . . after review, public hearing, and approval by the [ZHB].” S.
WHITEHALL TWP., PA., CODE § 350-05(d) (2017).                       There is no dispute that
Applicant’s proposed development, a Wawa convenience market, is a motor vehicle
service facility as defined in the Township’s zoning ordinance and, as such, is
permitted by special exception in the Township’s zoning district where the property
at issue is located. See id., § 350-48(m)(9)(A) & (C). A special exception is allowed,
“absent a showing of a detrimental effect on the community,” provided that the
requisite standards are met. Tower Access Grp., LLC v. S. Union Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 192 A.3d 291, 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Thus, an applicant bears the
initial burden of showing that its proposed development meets the specified criteria
for a special exception. Id. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to an
objector to show that a detrimental effect will result from the proposed development.
Id.
               Here, the zoning ordinance expressly requires conformity with all
applicable ordinance requirements in order to qualify for a special exception. S.
WHITEHALL TWP., PA., CODE § 350-16(d)(1)(d) (2017). Objector observes that
variances are required in order to allow the driveway placement as proposed by
Applicant and, thus, to render the proposed development compliant with the

(stating that “[a]n administrative agency’s interpretation of the statute it is charged to administer
is entitled to deference on appellate review absent fraud, bad faith, abuse of discretion or clearly
arbitrary action”); Tidd v. Lower Saucon Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 118 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2015).

                                                     4
ordinance’s requirements. Objector asserts that the ZHB should have denied the
variances, as discussed in the next section. Therefore, Objector reasons that because
Applicant was not entitled to the variances, it had no way to comply fully with all
ordinance requirements in order to qualify for a special exception.
               By definition, where a variance is needed for a particular use, that use
cannot be deemed to comply with the applicable zoning ordinance in the absence of
the variance. Here, Objector offers no separate reason why Applicant has failed to
show that it qualifies for a special exception; nor does Objector argue that the
proposed development will have any detrimental effect. Therefore, Objector’s
challenge to the ZHB’s grant of a special exception depends wholly on its related
challenge to the grant of dimensional variances. Because, as discussed in the next
section, we reject Objector’s challenge to the variances, we likewise reject its
challenge to the special exception.

                                B. Dimensional Variances
               The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)3 sets forth the
standards for granting a variance request. Section 910.2(a) of the MPC, added by
the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, provides:
               (a) The [zoning] board shall hear requests for variances
               where it is alleged that the provisions of the zoning
               ordinance inflict unnecessary hardship upon the applicant.
               The [zoning] board may by rule prescribe the form of
               application and may require preliminary application to the
               zoning officer. The [zoning] board may grant a variance,
               provided that all of the following findings are made where
               relevant in a given case:

      3
          Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202.

                                                   5
                   (1) That there are unique physical circumstances or
                   conditions, including irregularity, narrowness, or
                   shallowness of lot size or shape, or exceptional
                   topographical or other physical conditions peculiar
                   to the particular property and that the unnecessary
                   hardship is due to such conditions and not the
                   circumstances or conditions generally created by
                   the provisions of the zoning ordinance in the
                   neighborhood or district in which the property is
                   located.
                   (2) That because of such physical circumstances or
                   conditions, there is no possibility that the property
                   can be developed in strict conformity with the
                   provisions of the zoning ordinance and that the
                   authorization of a variance is therefore necessary to
                   enable the reasonable use of the property.
                   (3) That such unnecessary hardship has not been
                   created by the [applicant].
                   (4) That the variance, if authorized, will not alter the
                   essential character of the neighborhood or district in
                   which the property is located, nor substantially or
                   permanently impair the appropriate use or
                   development of adjacent property, nor be
                   detrimental to the public welfare.
                   (5) That the variance, if authorized, will represent
                   the minimum variance that will afford relief and
                   will represent the least modification possible of the
                   regulation in issue.
53 P.S. § 10910.2(a). The same criteria apply whether the applicant seeks a use
variance or a dimensional variance, but our Supreme Court has held that in
considering whether the applicant has established the requisite hardship for a
dimensional variance, “courts may consider multiple factors, including the economic
detriment to the applicant if the variance was denied, the financial hardship created
by any work necessary to bring the building into strict compliance with the zoning

                                              6
requirements and the characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood.” Hertzberg
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Pittsburgh, 721 A.2d 43, 50 (Pa. 1998).
            Here, Applicant has requested two dimensional variances.           The
Township’s zoning ordinance requires a minimum distance of 300 feet between the
centerline of the development’s driveway and the centerline of the intersections of
any adjacent roads. See S. WHITEHALL TWP., PA., CODE § 350-42(d)(4)(B)(i) (2017).
However, because of the property’s dimensions and its location adjacent to three
roads, the centerline of the proposed driveway would be located 249 feet from the
centerline of the intersection of Pennsylvania Route 309 and Chapmans Road and
174 feet from the centerline of the intersection of Chapmans Road and Grammes
Road.
            As we have explained,
            this Court may not substitute its interpretation of the
            evidence for that of the ZHB . . . . It is the function of a
            ZHB to weigh the evidence before it . . . . The ZHB is the
            sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight
            afforded their testimony . . . . Assuming the record
            contains substantial evidence, we are bound by the ZHB’s
            findings that result from resolutions of credibility and
            conflicting testimony rather than a capricious disregard of
            evidence . . . . A ZHB is free to reject even uncontradicted
            testimony it finds lacking in credibility.
Davis-Haas v. Exeter Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 166 A.3d 527, 545 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2017) (citing Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 873 A.2d 807 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2005)). Objector maintains that the ZHB failed to make sufficient express
findings supported by substantial evidence in support of its decision to grant the
special exception and variances. The common pleas court disagreed, as do we.

                                            7
             Citing specific portions of the ZHB hearing transcript, the common
pleas court pointed to testimony that, regardless of where the driveway would be
located on the property, it could not be made to conform to the minimum separation
distance requirements of the Township’s zoning ordinance. See Original Record
(O.R.) at 276-77, 287 & 298 (Notes of Testimony (N.T.) 11/22/21 at 29-30, 40 &
51). The common pleas court also posited that the property’s dimensions and
location constitute unique physical circumstances or conditions that are peculiar to
the property, create an unnecessary hardship, were not created by Applicant, and
prevent development of the property in strict conformance with the Township’s
zoning ordinance. Accordingly, the common pleas court agreed with the ZHB that
Applicant satisfied the MPC’s hardship criteria for variance relief.
             Next, the common pleas court cited record evidence that the
dimensional variances will not impede appropriate business or commercial use or
development of nearby properties, alter the character of the area, or create a
detriment to the public health, safety, or welfare. See O.R. at 269 & 317-18 (N.T.
11/22/21 at 22 & 70-71). The common pleas court also pointed to record testimony
by Applicant’s expert witness, a traffic engineer, that the proposed full access
driveway on the property is necessary and will be beneficial to traffic circulation and
safety. See O.R. at 286-87 & 302 (N.T. 11/22/21 at 39-40 & 55). Thus, the common
pleas court concluded there had been no showing that the requested variances would
be contrary to the public interest.
             Finally, the common pleas court acknowledged record evidence that the
requested variances represented the minimum reduction in separation distance that
would afford relief, and thus, the minimum possible modification of the

                                              8
requirements of the Township’s zoning ordinance. See O.R. at 277-78 & 298 (N.T.
11/22/21 at 30-31 & 51).
            In summary, the common pleas court was satisfied that the record
contains substantial evidence in support of the ZHB’s decision.       We agree.
Therefore, we affirm the common pleas court’s order denying and dismissing
Objector’s appeal from the ZHB’s decision.

                                III. Conclusion
            Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the common pleas court’s
order.

                                     ___________________________________
                                     CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                             9
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

1825 Rt. 309 Allentown, LLC,           :
                        Appellant      :
                                       :
            v.                         :
                                       :
Zoning Hearing Board of                :
South Whitehall Township               :   No. 487 C.D. 2022
and Landston Equities, LLC             :

                                    ORDER

            AND NOW, this 18th day of January 2024, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Lehigh County, dated April 12, 2022, and entered upon the docket
on April 13, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

                                     ___________________________________
                                     CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge