Court Opinion

ID: 9890947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 22:03:16.020105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:11.173677
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/16/23 Zhang v. Escovar CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

JEFF BAOLIANG ZHANG,                                            B325735

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                     21STCV27602)

STEVE ESCOVAR,

         Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Maurice Leiter, Judge. Affirmed.
      Jeff Baoliang Zhang, pro per, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Nemecek & Cole, Kenny C. Brooks and Daniel L. Reback,
for Defendant and Respondent.

                             ____________________________
      In September 2015, appellant Jeff Baoliang Zhang, while
represented by respondent Steve Escovar, pleaded no contest to
felony assault after admittedly firing a gun at the Chinese
consulate building. In October 2015, Zhang was sentenced to
nine years in state prison, and respondent’s representation came
to an end. In July 2021, Zhang sued respondent for breach of
contract and related torts arising from respondent’s
representation of Zhang.
      The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint
without leave to amend, ruling all causes of action were barred by
the applicable statutes of limitations. The court thereafter
entered judgment in favor of respondent. We affirm.

          PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
A.     Factual Background1
       On March 20, 2014, Zhang was charged with two felony
counts of assault under Penal Code sections 245(b) and 246.
Initially, Zhang was represented by a public defender, but
respondent substituted in as private counsel in December 2014.
On September 3, 2015, Zhang pleaded no contest to both counts,
and the court accepted the plea.2 On October 8, 2015, Zhang was

1      We grant respondent’s motion to augment the record with
documents omitted from the clerk’s transcript, including the demurrer,
judicially noticed documents, and the trial court’s rulings. Our
summary of facts is derived from the first amended complaint, the
operative pleading, and the judicially noticed documents submitted
with respondent’s demurrer.

2      The minute orders from the underlying criminal case reflect
Zhang also admitted the truth of a firearm use enhancement
allegation.

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sentenced to a total term of nine years in state prison, and
respondent’s representation terminated at that time.3
       At the sentencing hearing, Zhang stated the following: “It
is my plea, your honor - - I’m Jeff Zhang. I deeply regret having a
serious crime of shooting an inhabited building, namely the
Chinese Consulate, December 15th.” He further stated, “It was
under extreme circumstances that made me protest that day.
After they removed my protest sign, I lost my mind and then
fired some shot [sic] at the closed side door of the consulate. . . .
However, due to the ricocheting of the bullet, it hit a rear[-]side
window of a booth that stood before the consulate for the gate
keeper, so there were broken glasses [sic] in the place. I feel very
sorry that my shooting caused a lot of panic to the gate keeper[.]”
“I’m very sorry, and it was wrong for me to make the shooting
with my weapon at the Chinese Consulate in L.A. on
December 15th, 2011.”
       On July 28, 2021, nearly six years after Zhang was
sentenced and respondent terminated his representation, Zhang
filed a civil complaint against respondent. On March 17, 2022,
the court sustained a demurrer with leave to amend, and Zhang
thereafter filed his First Amended complaint.

B.   First Amended Complaint
     On April 5, 2022, Zhang filed his First Amended Complaint
(FAC), the operative complaint, asserting claims for (1) Breach of

3      The minute orders reflect Zhang was to receive a 10-year
sentence for his plea but was subsequently sentenced to nine years in
state prison. Consistent with these minutes, Zhang states in his FAC
his plea deal was for a 10-year sentence, but he was sentenced to a
term of nine years.

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Contract; (2) Intentional Tort; (3) Elder Abuse; (4) “Bill of Rights”
violations; and (5) Violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
       In support of these claims, Zhang alleged that respondent
represented him from November 2014 to October 2015. Zhang
asserted that during the course of the representation, respondent
began working for Zhang’s “opponent” the “Chinese communist
government.” Respondent allegedly caused an improper mental
health evaluation to be performed on Zhang in April and June of
2015. Respondent allegedly told Zhang he would receive 19 years
in prison if he proceeded to trial, coerced Zhang into taking a plea
deal with a 10-year prison term, and rushed Zhang through the
change of plea hearing in September 2015. Respondent further
allegedly harmed Zhang by convincing the judge to deny “parole”
and sentence Zhang to nine years in prison at Zhang’s sentencing
hearing on October 8, 2015.
       According to Zhang, respondent’s misconduct resulted in an
excessive prison sentence and caused Zhang, who indicates he is
elderly, to suffer beatings from inmates and additional insults as
a result of his incarceration status. Zhang sought $200,000,000
in damages and other relief as deemed just.
       Although Zhang alleged in his complaint he was innocent of
the felony to which he pled and the acts he admitted, he also
stated he “did the shooting only at the closed side-door of the
empty Chinese consulate building after the consulate staff
illegally removed all [his] protest sign[ ]boards to the
trashcan . . . .” Zhang further alleged that the incident “was the

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first time” he “use[d] a firearm in a public place” and he did so
“under extreme circumstances.”4

C.    Demurrer
      On May 10, 2022, respondent filed a demurrer, arguing
that all five causes of action were time-barred. Respondent
further argued that Zhang could not maintain a legal malpractice
action arising out of a prior criminal prosecution without first
obtaining postconviction relief in the underlying criminal case.
In conjunction with the demurrer, respondent requested judicial
notice of documents related to Zhang’s underlying criminal
action.

D.    Trial Court Ruling
      On November 4, 2022, the trial court sustained the
demurrer to the FAC without leave to amend, ruling all of
Zhang’s causes of action were time-barred.5 On December 1,
2022, the court entered judgment in favor of respondent.

                          DISCUSSION
A.    Standard of Review
      A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual
allegations contained in the operative complaint. “We
independently review the superior court’s ruling on a demurrer
and determine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts

4       In his opening brief on appeal, Zhang similarly admits he “used
[his] legal weapon and fired some shots at the closed side-door of the
empty consulate building to express [his] strong protest.”

5      The court granted respondent’s request for judicial notice as to
the existence of the documents submitted.

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sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete
defense.” (Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 181, 190 (Stella); accord, Ivanoff v. Bank of America,
N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725 (Ivanoff).) “We assume the
truth of properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that
reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and
matters that are judicially noticeable.” (Genis v. Schainbaum
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1015; accord, Ivanoff, supra, 9
Cal.App.5th at p. 725.) “‘A complaint disclosing on its face that
the limitations period has expired in connection with one or more
counts is subject to demurrer.’” (Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250, internal citations omitted.)
Moreover, the trial court’s judgment must be affirmed “‘if any one
of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken.’” (Aubry v. Tri-
City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
       Applying these well-established principles, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment in favor of respondent.

B.    The Claims Were Properly Dismissed as Time-Barred
      A demurrer lies where the dates alleged in the complaint
show “clearly and affirmatively” that the action is barred by a
statute of limitations. (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City
and County of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781.) The
statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action
“accrue[s].” (Code Civ. Proc. § 312.) A cause of action “accrues”
when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done or the
wrongful result occurs, and the consequent liability arises.
(Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397.)

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      Here, the causes of action were time-barred under
California Code of Civil Procedure sections 340.6 and 338.6

       1.    Section 340.6
       Section 340.6 provides: “An action against an attorney for
a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in
the performance of professional services shall be commenced
within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the
wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the
wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.” (§ 340.6.)
       The statute of limitations under section 340.6 applies “not
only to actions for professional negligence but to any action
alleging wrongful conduct, other than actual fraud, arising in the
performance of professional services.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61
Cal.4th 1225, 1236.) As such, section 340.6 applies to those
“claims whose merits necessarily depend on proof that an
attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of
providing professional services.” (Id. at pp. 1236–1237.) The fact
that a complaint alleges something other than professional
negligence does not preclude application of section 340.6. (Ibid;
see Austin v. Medicis (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 577, 587; Stoll v.
Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1366 [section 340.6
sets forth one-year statute of limitations “for all legal malpractice
save actual fraud”], original italics].)

6     All further statutory refereces are to the Code of Civil
Procedure, unless otherwise specified.

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       All of Zhang’s claims other than his intentional tort (i.e.,
fraud) claim are subject to the limitations period provided in
section 340.6. The FAC allegations are based on respondent’s
alleged wrongful acts and omissions in connection with his
representation of Zhang in the underlying criminal action. The
FAC does not allege any wrongful conduct by respondent outside
of this context or independent of that representation.
       Zhang acknowledges he was sentenced in October 2015 and
that respondent’s representation terminated at that time.
Further, as Zhang recognizes, the facts giving rise to his
complaint were discovered or known by him before the
termination of representation. For example, respondent
purportedly used coercive tactics to induce Zhang to change his
plea in September 2015 and allegedly made statements at the
October 2015 sentencing hearing dissuading the court from
granting Zhang “parole.” Section 352.1, subdivision (a), allows
for a maximum tolling of two years if at the time a cause of action
accrued, the plaintiff was “imprisoned on a criminal charge.”
(§ 352.1, subd. (a).) At the time of the events alleged by Zhang,
he was housed in county jail, not in prison. (Austin v. Medicis,
supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 597.) However, even assuming
section 352.1 subdivision (a) applies, it limits any tolling to a
maximum of two years. In other words, even if the statute of
limitations was tolled due to Zhang’s incarceration, it was only
tolled until October 2018. As Zhang’s complaint was filed in
July 2021, the action was commenced far beyond the applicable
statute of limitations period. (Rose v. Hudson (2007) 153
Cal.App.4th 641, 657; Carlson v. Blatt (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 646,

                                 8
649.) Accordingly, all claims, except for actual fraud, were time-
barred under section 340.6.7

       2.    Section 338
       Assuming Zhang’s second cause of action for “intentional
tort” can be properly construed as an actual fraud claim8, it is
subject to the three-year limitation in section 338. Section 338
provides that “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or
mistake” must be commenced “within three years” of “discovery,
by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or
mistake.” (§ 338, subd. (d); Foxen v. Carpenter (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 284, 293–294; Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. Berger
Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 303, 322.) However, even with the
benefit of section 338, plus the two-year tolling provision of
section 352.1, Zhang’s action remains untimely. That is, Zhang
discovered the alleged wrongs no later than October 2015. Three

7      To the extent Zhang’s assertion that respondent “harmed
[Zhang] all the time in the past decade” is an attempt to invoke the
continuous accrual doctrine, that doctrine does not apply here. (See
State of California ex rel. Metz v. CCC Information Services, Inc. (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 402, 418 [discussing and explaining continuous
accrual rule and circumstances to which it applies]; cf. Alexander v.
Exxon Mobil, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1250–1251 [explaining
when cause of action is deemed to accrue].)

8      Zhang relies on, and repeats, a portion of the same underlying
facts for his intentional tort claim and specifically alleges that
respondent’s insistence on obtaining mental health evaluations
resulted in “false” reports and that respondent “collaborated with his
accomplices” in preventing Zhang’s self-representation or substitution
of counsel. We express no opinion on whether these allegations satisfy
the elements of actual fraud but assume so solely for purposes of our
discussion.

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years after October 2015 was October 2018, and if two years are
added due to Zhang’s incarceration, the deadline for him to file
his complaint was in October 2020. Because Zhang did not
commence his action until July 2021, it was properly dismissed
as time-barred. (Foxen v. Carpenter, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 294–295.)

C.    The Claims are Also Barred by Zhang’s Failure to
      Obtain Post-Conviction Relief
      The California Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff in a
legal malpractice action arising out of a prior criminal
prosecution, must plead they were “actual[ly] innocen[t]” of the
charges alleged against them and that they were exonerated
through post-conviction relief. (Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1199 (Coscia); Wiley v. County of San
Diego (1998) 19 Cal.4th 532, 545.)9 When it is clear the plaintiff
cannot in good faith plead actual innocence or exoneration,
dismissal on demurrer is appropriate. (Genis v. Schainbaum,
supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015; Wilkinson v. Zelen (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 37, 49.)
      Here, Zhang has not made factual allegations showing
actual innocence or exoneration through post-conviction relief
and provides no basis to show that he can do so in good faith.
The demurrer was therefore properly sustained. (Genis v.

9      The California Supreme Court in Coscia gave several examples
of requisite post-conviction relief, such as acquittal after retrial,
reversal on appeal with directions to dismiss the charges, reversal
followed by a refusal to continue the prosecution, or a grant of habeas
corpus relief. (Coscia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1205.)

                                   10
Schainbaum, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1017; Ovando v. County
of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 42, 68–69.)

D.     Leave to Amend
       If we conclude a demurrer was properly sustained, we
review the decision to deny leave to amend under the abuse of
discretion standard. (Smith v. County of Kern (1993) 20
Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830.) “Ordinarily it is an abuse of discretion
to sustain a general demurrer to a complaint without leave to
amend if there is a reasonable possibility the defect in the
complaint can be cured by amendment.” (Ibid.)
       Here, Zhang has failed to show any amendment could cure
the defects alleged in the complaint. We therefore conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the demurrer
without leave to amend. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’
Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43–44, 53.)

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                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his
costs on appeal.

                                        MORI, J.

     We concur:

           COLLINS, Acting P.J.

           ZUKIN, J.

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