Court Opinion

ID: 9478194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:42:50.887637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:17.782134
License: Public Domain

BALDWIN, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the result reached by the majority, and therefore respectfully dissent.
As the Supreme Court stated in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976), “[t]he question, of course, is not whether this Court * * * would as an original matter have dismissed the action; it is whether the [Claims] Court abused its discretion in so doing.” Here, as in National Hockey, there was ample support in the record for the learned trial judge’s findings. After many years of litigation and extensive time for the government to identify the facts upon which it intended to rely, the trial judge rightfully inferred bad faith from the government’s terribly inadequate interrogatory answers. The most blatant example of the government’s noncompliance came in response to interrogatory number 16. That interrogatory requested the government to identify those parts of the proceedings before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) upon which the government would rely. The response of “the whole proceeding,” the records of which exceed ten thousand pages in testimony alone, is sorely deficient.
As the majority points out, the trial judge did not believe that government counsel had acted “contumaciously.” 13 Cl.Ct. at 716. However, such stubborn disobedience is not a necessary predicate to the imposition of sanctions under rule 37. It is enough that there was “fault” or “bad faith” on the government’s part. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1095-96, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958). The record amply supports the trial judge’s finding that the government’s failure to answer the interrogatories was not a good faith action. The fact that the trial judge believed the government’s failure intimated it lacked the requisite evidence to proceed on its fraud defenses and counterclaims does not alter the findings. Rather, they act to support those findings. The trial judge noted, “[i]f the government had particular facts available to it, it would, if it were operating on established notions of good faith, disclose them in compliance with the spirit of the discovery process.” 13 Cl.Ct. at 773. Thus, the judge surmised that the government’s actions were taken in bad faith not because it was deliberately hiding evidence, *1456but because government counsel could not point to anything upon which it could rely to support its fraud allegations. This, the trial judge felt, constituted a waste of judicial resources and an abuse of the discovery process. The bad faith that was inferred was in the government’s unwillingness to fish or cut bait.
Bad faith has long been recognized as sufficient grounds to impose sanctions under rule 37. See Societe International, supra. We, as a reviewing court, should not replace the trial court and succumb to pleas for leniency such as that made here. The Supreme Court, in National Hockey, 427 U.S. at 642-43, 96 S.Ct. at 2780-81, warned against courts of appeals substituting their judgment for those of the trial court in situations like this:
There is a natural tendency on the part of reviewing courts, properly employing the benefit of hindsight, to be heavily influenced by the severity of outright dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order. It is quite reasonable to conclude that a party who has been subjected to such an order will feel duly chastened, so that even though he succeeds in having the order reversed on appeal he will nonetheless comply promptly with future discovery orders of the district court.
But here, as in other areas of the law, the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent. If the decision of the Court of Appeals remained undisturbed in this case, it might well be that these respondents would faithfully comply with all future discovery orders entered by the District Court in this case. But other parties to other lawsuits would feel freer than we think Rule 37 contemplates they should feel to flout other discovery orders of other district courts.
I believe this case is an example of what the Supreme Court cautioned against.
Secondly, I cannot agree that the government was confused about the scope of its discovery obligations or if it was, that this is grounds for reversal. Ante at 1451. At the status conference from which the second order to comply was issued government counsel had ample opportunity and time to inform the court that it could not answer the interrogatories without guidance from the court. Instead, counsel merely asserted that it would take a little longer than originally thought to answer the interrogatories due to institutional drift and changes in personnel.
At one point in the status hearing government counsel specifically requested that Litton “identify the nine interrogatories we’re talking about so we don’t have a misunderstanding.” Government counsel did not request Litton, or the court, to identify specific deficiencies in the government’s answers. While a party should not always be required to request such an explanation, from the colloquy at the status conference, there was no indication by the government that compliance with the order to answer would not be possible for any reason, let alone because the government required guidance. The government cannot now justify all of its flagrant disregard for the discovery process through a simple plea of ignorance. If government counsel was confused, it needed only to come into court and request the guidance it now says excuses its responses.
Finally, the trial court’s failure to warn government counsel that a sanction tantamount to dismissal would follow noncompliance was not, and should not be held, necessary. Government counsel are experienced litigators familiar with the federal rules, and the rules of the United States Claims Court. The opinions cited by the majority, Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448 (D.C.Cir.1987) and Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Webster, 802 F.2d 1448 (D.C.Cir.1986), seem split on this issue. Hull completely supports the action taken in this case: “Since appellants were never warned by the district judge that their failure to name an expert witness would lead to de facto *1457dismissal of their case, it is argued, the sanction was so harsh as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We disagree.” 825 F.2d at 451. In Founding Church of Scientology, the court, in a footnote, expressed its strong approval of the warning issued by the trial judge prior to ordering dismissal for noncompliance with a discovery order. That approval is not expressed as any sort of absolute requirement, and is better understood as a factor to be considered when determining whether the trial judge abused his discretion. No such prerequisite exists in rule 37 of the federal rules or of the Claims Court, and none should be read into the rule.
There is no dearth of authority in support of dismissal, or sanctions tantamount to dismissal, in cases similar to this where parties do not comply with discovery orders. In Weisberg v. Webster, 749 F.2d 864 (D.C.Cir.1984) the sanction of dismissal was affirmed where the plaintiff refused to answer interrogatories propounded by the other side. Similarly, in G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency, 577 F.2d 645 (9th Cir.1978), dismissal was upheld where the plaintiff delayed production of certain documents the trial judge had ordered produced. The trial court, “to protect the integrity of its orders,” granted defendant’s motion for sanctions, and dismissed plaintiffs case despite plaintiff’s subsequent production of the documents. Id. at 647. The Ninth Circuit sustained the dismissal.
In neither Weisberg, Hull, nor G-K Properties did the trial court issue warnings that dismissal would follow noncompliance. No other Circuit has required such a warning, and several have explicitly rejected the idea. See Hull, supra; Batson v. Neal Spelce Associates, Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 515 (5th Cir.1985) (upholding dismissal “although the court’s order did not recite that sanctions would follow a refusal to comply”). Such a warning is simply not required by the rule, and there is no reason for injecting such a requirement. Nor has this court ever required a warning before sanctions may be imposed by the trial court. Because the trial judge made the necessary findings to support his conclusions, and because sanctions tantamount to dismissal are within the trial judge’s discretion, I would affirm the decision.