Court Opinion

ID: 9724484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:58:22.235231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:00.743604
License: Public Domain

HOMEYER, Judge
(dissenting). I would not reverse. The measure of damages in condemnation cases on a partial taking has been fixed by our decisions. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Brink, 16 S.D. 644, 94 N.W. 422; Schuler v. Board of Supervisors, 12 S.D. 460, 81 N.W. 890; State Highway Commission v. Fortune, 77 S.D. 302, 91 N.W.2d 675. It is the difference between the fair market value of the farm or ranch before the taking and its fair *409market value after the taking. In the application of this rule severance damages, if any, to the remaining property are included in an award without being designated as such. The amount allowed by a jury for the property taken as distinguished from the damage to the remainder is not separated. Severance damage to me does not mean that all parts of the remaining property must have been damaged equally. In fact some parts of an operating unit may not have sustained any damage. In my opinion under our rule it is for the jury to determine the damage to the Olson farm by giving consideration to the many( divergent factors which reflect themselves in a final determination of what is its fair and reasonable market value.
Physical contiguity of tracts in a farm or ranch is not essential to it being considered as one unit. In Fortune we said: "We recognize that separate parcels or tracts of land held in one ownership will be considered as contiguous and may constitute one parcel of land within the meaning of the condemnation statutes if the parts are devoted to a single use." See annotation 6 A.L.R.2d 1197. We also said: "When there is no dispute in the facts, the question whether physically separated parcels of land constitute one parcel because of common use, is a question of law for the Court." My interpretation of the language used is that it is for trial court to determine as a matter of law if sufficient common usage has been shown to qualify noncontiguous tracts as parts of a single unit. If the trial court so concludes, opinion evidence will be received from qualified persons on the before and after value of such unit. If the court does not so conclude, such evidence is not received. The receipt of such evidence does not mean that the trial court has decided as a matter of law that all parts of a farm or ranch have been damaged or that a jury must accept as a fact that each tract included within a farm or ranch has sustained some damage or that each acre has sustained the same dollar damage. A similar situation exists when comparable sales of property are permitted in evidence. In such instances, the trial court determines as a matter of law whether such sales are sufficiently close in time and distance and alike in physical characteristics to serve either as evidence of value, or as the foundation for an opinion on value.
*410A farmer or rancher seldom sells or buys an operating unit piecemeal. He either buys or sells as a unit and each portion of the unit, be it cultivated land, hay land, pasture, shelter or buildings, are parts of the whole and contribute to the total value in varying amounts. If all parts are contiguous, the total value may be greater and each part may contribute proportionately more. If separated by one mile or fifteen miles, each may contribute proportionately less, or may contribute nothing to enhance the total value. It is a matter ^f common knowledge that a landowner's investment in improvements is generally spread over as many acres as he uses within his operating unit, whether or not contiguous, and this has the reciprocal effect of increasing or decreasing the per acre valuation depending on the acreage within the unit. Of course, a unit may be so large as to make unrealistic a determination of damage by a per acre diminution of value resulting in excessive damages. See McGinley v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation Dist., 133 Neb. 420, 275 N.W. 593. However, no such contention has been made in this case and the amount oí the award has not been questioned either by motion for new trial or other appropriate procedure.
As I view the evidence, sufficient common usage of the non-contiguous tracts was shown to permit the 1659 acres to be considered as a single operating farm unit. Such determination is primarily for the trial court and I cannot say that it erred in that regard.
There is a second reason why I would not reverse. The valuation witnesses for the defendants consisted of Joe Olson, one of the landowners, and two experts, Oscar Knudson and Craig Lerud. No question is raised as to qualification's of the last two named. A landowner by reason of his ownership is entitled to give an opinion on value. McCaffery v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 22 N.D. 544, 134 N.W. 749; Orgel on Valuation under Eminent Domain, Second Edition, Volume 1, § 132. However, such testimony has been said to have limited probative value in either sustaining or rejecting jury awards in condemnation cases. See Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Hensley, 313 Ky. 98, 230 S.W.2d 464; State v. Burk, 200 Or. 211, 265 P.2d 783; Lyons v. United States, D.C., 99 F.Supp. 429.
*411The witnesses Knudson and Lerud used the inventory or summation method in arriving at fair market value. This is a recognized method of land appraisal and consists of the witness valuing the component parts of the farm or ranch and arriving •at a total before and after value figure. These two witnesses •testified in detail how they arrived at the before and after value giving explicit reasons for the diminution of value of the component parts. I summarize these valuations.
Oscar Knudson
Before taking value:
434.80A Crop land near home place @ $60 per A.............$26,088
744.22A Hay and pasture land @ $32.50 per A................. 24,187
480.00A Bullhead land @ $40 per A..................................... 19,200
Farm buildings........................................................... 20,000
1659.02A Total before value $89,475
After taking value:
429.80A Crop land near home place @ $55 per A.............$23,639
740.36A Hay and pasture land @ $27.50 per A................. 20,359
480.00A Bullhead land @ $40 per A..................................... 19,200
Farm buildings......................................................... 20,000
1650.16A Total after value $83,198
Total before value (rounded to) $89,475
Total after value (rounded to) 83,198
Damage $ 6,277
*412Craig Lerud
Before taking value:
10.00A Building site @ $75 per A.........................................$ 750
40.00A Crested wheat grass near bldgs. @ $50 per A. 2,000
271.(50)A Crop land north of hwy. @ $60 per A..................... 16,290
163.30A Crop land south of hwy. @ $55 per A................... 8,981
694.22A Hay and pasture @ $30 per A............................... 20,827
480.00A Bullhead land @ $40 per A..................................... 19,200
Farm buildings ............................................................ 20,000
1659.02A Total before value $88,048
After taking value:
10.00A Building site @ $75 per A.........................................$ 750
40.00A Crested wheat grass near bldgs. @ $30 per A. 1,200;
266.50A Crop land north of hwy. @ $45 per A................... 11,992
163.30A Crop land south of hwy. @ $55 per A..................... 8,981
690.36A Hay and pasture @ $30 per A................................. 20,711
480.00A Bullhead land @ $40 per A..................................... 19,200
Farm buildings........................................................... 20,000
1650.16A Total after value $82,834
Total before value (rounded to) $88,000
Total after value (rounded to) 82,800
Damage $ 5,200
The fulcrum of the majority opinion is that the court erred in permitting the landowner Olson and his witnesses to treat the Bullhead land, a noncontiguous tract located about 15 miles *413from the other tracts, as a part of the farm unit. The landowners' witnesses Knudson and Lerud so treated it, but as conclusively appears from the above analysis of their testimony they considered its value the same before and after the taking and thus it sustained no severance damage. In their opinion the damage sustained by the landowners was the same whether the 480 acres was included or omitted from the farm unit.
The landowner Olson testified to a before taking value of his farm of $65 per acre and an after taking value of $60 per acre, a net damage of $5 per acre, or a total damage of about $8,295. I do not conceive that he intended by this testimony to imply to either the court or jury that all parts of the farm were damaged equally. To me he intended to convey that if and when he sold his farm, in the manner in which farms are customarily sold, that is, as an entire operating unit, the fair market value was $65 per acre before the taking. However, after the taking, its fair market value as a unit and without segregating its component parts was $60 per acre. To attach to this testimony under the circumstances the significance to necessitate a reversal as the majority does is unwarranted by this record. Even assuming the trial court should have excluded this 480 acres from consideration as a part of the farm unit and erred in not so doing, I do not see prejudicial error and we have repeatedly said that error without prejudice does not warrant a reversal. Alberts v. Mutual Service Casualty Co., 80 S.D. 303, 123 N.W.2d 96; Dwyer v. Christensen, 77 S.D. 381, 92 N.W.2d 199.
There is a third reason why I would not reverse. Error is assigned on failure to give state's requested Instruction 1 A. This instruction does little except to elaborate on Instruction 12 set forth in the majority opinion. In a few concise words the latter instruction tells the jury that the state had previously acquired a 100 foot right of way for highway purposes "the darm ages resulting from which is not to be considered by you in awarding damages". There is no error in refusing instructions requested if the matters embodied therein are substantially covered by other instructions.
*414Another assignment of error relates to giving Instructions 4 and 13 set forth in the majority opinion wherein the court charged the jury that the sole issue was the amount of damages and that the jury could consider inconveniences in fixing damages. In the settlement of the instructions, counsel for the state objected to the court's proposed instructions as misleading and not a correct statement of the law in that they would permit the jury to speculate on damages other than those resulting to the land from the acquisition of the right of way and are also misleading in that the jury may speculate "as whether inconvenience would mean inconveniences during construction."
SDC 1960 Supp. 33.1318 expressly provides that it "shall be insufficient to state generally that an instruction does or does not state the law, but it shall be necessary to specify clearly wherein any instruction, or part thereof objected to, is insufficient or does not state the law." This rule imposes the burden, on the objecting party to fairly inform the trial court of the particular ground or grounds upon which he objects to proposed instructions. Lang v. Burns, 77 S.D. 626, 97 N.W.2d 863; Englebert v. Ryder, 77 S.D. 333, 91 N.W.2d 739. These grounds cannot be enlarged on appeal.
The majority opinion states: "While the instructions given, had the merit of being brief and some of them stated legal principles generally, and the objections to those given and refused were no model of clarity or preciseness, the references to the 'entire unit' could have only been understood by the jury to include the 1659 acres farmed by defendants. This, coupled with the whole tenor of defendants' evidence and the court's rulings on it, that the 1659 acres — the 1179 acre home place and the 480 acre tract 15 miles away — was the entire unit or whole unit to be considered in assessing damages was erroneous. If not a direction to the jury to so consider it, the instruction was- confusing and misleading; that is a misdirection and available on appeal even assuming no proper objection was made." The majority conclude that misdirection is available on appeal even though no proper objection in the trial court was made. With these conclusions, I do not agree. The verdict of a jury will not ordinarily be set aside for error not brought to the attention of *415the trial court. Chambers v. Wilson, 67 S.D. 495, 294 N.W. 180. In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, this court may perhaps notice errors to which no exception has been taken if the errors are obvious. No such case is presented Iiere.
The Fortune case cited supra and State Highway Commission v. Bloom, 77 S.D. 452, 93 N.W.2d 572, when analyzed do not support the extended application credited by the majority. In Fortune, the State Highway Commission commenced separate condemnation actions against R. A. Fortune and Howard Fortune, on land under separate ownership of each of them. Additionally each had 'separate leases on government land. The defendants, father and son, held fee title to about 4,200 acres and leased about 8,000 acres. In four sections the highway crossed tracts owned by the defendants which were completely surrounded by leased land. At the trial the cases were consolidated and it was 'stipulated that the entire acreage constituted a single operating ranch unit and severance damage was to be awarded in one amount on the whole unit "as though the fee ownership of the lands was joint" and the defendants agreed to make "between themselves a division of such total award". This was the stage for this court's ruling of misdirection in the trial court instructions and consequent prejudicial error by referring to the "entire unit" and the "entire tract". This court said: "(T)his principle by which separate parcels of land are deemed contiguous because of a unified or common use is not applicable to lands owned by different parties. Since the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the property before the taking and its value after the taking, which includes a proper allowance for severance, the damages to be awarded the separate owners must be determined separately." Instructions without proper explanation which permitted leased lands to be considered as a part of a unit were held to be erroneous. The foundation for the reversal was the application of an incorrect rule of law on measure of damages premised on a stipulation of counsel.
*416The Bloom case decided a few months later recognizes the distinction and explicitly calls attention to the fact of single ownership and a delineation of the function and limitation of leased land on value of an operating unit. In Bloom, a isingle ownership tract of 4,040 acres of land was involved of which 640 acres, was noncontiguous. This court affirmed the award except it directed a conditional remittitur of a computed severance allowance on 280 acres. As to this acreage it said: "The defendant failed to establish that the physically separated 240 acre tract was so used with the base ranch as in effect to be considered a part thereof under the principle of unitary use." The opinion does not define when a physically separated tract is or is not a part of an operating unit or what evidence is required to sustain a trial court's decision in that regard. In my opinion in the instant case the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that it was part of the operating unit. Whether the physically separated tract was damaged is another question. This I would leave for jury determination. Cross examination in most instances will reveal that witnesses in determining value, proportion the same on degree of separation, methods of access, nature of use, and the myriad factors which enter into the valuation of property.
The effect of the majority holding it appears to me will be that henceforth in condemnation actions when there is a partial taking and when the landowner has noncontiguous tracts in his operating unit, the trial court must proceed at its peril when it allows testimony of before and after fair market value, if physically separated tracts are included in such valuation. The same uncertainty will be prevalent when the parties and their witnesses prepare for trial.
I am authorized to say that ROBERTS, P. J„ concurs in this dissent.