Court Opinion

ID: 9522701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:31:12.237752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:42.548949
License: Public Domain

RATLIFF, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. However, I wish to make additional comments concerning the matter of attorney's fees.
Our decisions in Berkemeier v. Rushville National Bank, (1982) Ind.App., 438 N.E.2d 1054; and US. Aircraft Financing, Inc. v. Jankovich, (1980) Ind.App., 407 N.E.2d 287, trans. denied, have questioned seriously the power of a trial judge to fix attorney’s fees based upon his own alleged expertise and have put severe limits upon the exercise of that power. As we said in Berkemeier, an action on a promissory note and to foreclose a real estate mortgage and security agreement involving a principal amount in excess of $200,000, “save for routine cases involving relatively small amounts, awards of attorney’s fees in cases of this nature must be supported by evidence.” 438 N.E.2d at 1058.
Here, the majority says there is scant evidence as to amount, adequacy, or reasonableness of the attorney’s fees. In my view, there was no proper evidence before the court on any of those matters. The only evidence here was testimony by the plaintiff that her attorneys had charged her $15,482.57 and that she felt the sum was reasonable. In Parrish v. Terre Haute Savings Bank, (1982) Ind.App., 431 N.E.2d 132, on rehearing 438 N.E.2d 1, this court clearly held that a client’s statement of how much his lawyer charged was insufficient to show the reasonableness of his fees. That Parrish was a jury case makes no difference. If evidence is required to support an award of attorney’s fees, it makes no difference whether the trier is court or jury. In neither case would the client’s testimony of the amount charged by his attorneys suffice.