Court Opinion

ID: 9951548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 14:08:45.455619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:30.217316
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3736-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOHN RAMIREZ, a/k/a JUAN
RAMIREZ, JOHN R. IREZ,
JUAN R. RAMIREZ and
BLESSED JOHN JOHN,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

                   Submitted March 12, 2024 – Decided March 18, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 13-07-
                   0593.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).

                   Jennifer   Webb-McRae,                         Cumberland               County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for                        respondent            (Stephen
            Christopher Sayer, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
            on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant John R. Ramirez appeals from the Law Division's June 8, 2022

order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

                                       I.

      We incorporate herein the procedural history and facts set forth in our

decision affirming defendant's convictions and sentence on direct appeal in State

v. Ramirez, No. A-0060-14 (App. Div. Jan. 12, 2018) (slip op. at 3-10), certif.

denied, 233 N.J. 366 (2018). The following facts are pertinent to the present

appeal.

      After midnight on the morning of the offenses involved in this case,

Octaviano Contreras, Luis Reyes-Quinones, and Adrian Nolasco-Cruz were

drinking beer on a porch. Id. at 3. Two men approached them. Id. at 4. One

of the men was dressed in grey and the other was in black. Ibid. The man

wearing black demanded that the men on the porch turn over their money and

he threatened them with a gun when they refused. Ibid. The men on the porch

began handing over their property. Ibid. However, Contreras told the man in

black to "'[s]top playing with that pistol' and hit his gun wielding hand." Ibid.

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(alteration in original). "The gun fired, shooting Contreras in the face at close

range." Ibid. Contreras died at the scene. Id. at 6.

      The man in grey fled. Ibid. Reyes-Quinones gave the man dressed in

black two twenty dollar bills. Ibid. The shooter ordered Reyes-Quinones to

search Contreras' pockets for more money but he found none. Ibid. The shooter

then ran into a yard across the street. Ibid.

      Nearby, Officer Joseph Cooper was investigating a separate report of a

suspicious person in the area. Ibid. Cooper saw a man wearing a black hooded

sweatshirt and black pants standing in front of a house. Ibid. The man matched

the description of the reported suspicious person. Id. at 5. Cooper ordered the

man to stop, but the man fled into an open garage. Ibid. Cooper later identified

the man he saw as defendant. Id. at 6-7.

      Cooper ran to his car to get a flashlight and returned to the driveway where

he had seen defendant. Id. at 5. He saw that defendant was now climbing over

a fence in the back of the house. Ibid. At this point, Reyes-Quinones and

Nolasco-Cruz approached Cooper and began yelling and pointing at defendant.

Ibid. The two victims then led Cooper back to Contreras' body. Id. at 5-6.

      More officers arrived at the scene. Id. at 6. One of the officers saw

defendant break into the back door of a house and go inside. Ibid. The officers

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pursued defendant into the house. Ibid. They found defendant, sitting on a

bathroom toilet, wearing only his underwear. Ibid. He was extremely sweaty.

Ibid. The officers arrested defendant and removed him from the house. Ibid.

      During the arrest, the police found a "'pile of clothing'" on the floor of a

bedroom a few feet from where the officers were restraining defendant. Ibid.

The police found a dark pair of pants and a black hooded sweatshirt in the pile.

Ibid. The clothing was "'damp'" and "'moist.'" Ibid. One of the officers also

found "'a wave cap' wrapped around four live .357 caliber bullets protruding

from the pants pocket." Ibid.

      The police applied for a search warrant. Ibid. The police found three

twenty dollar bills and a cell phone lying in the driveway where defendant ran

into the garage, a .357 caliber revolver inside the garage, and a black and gold

baseball cap near the handgun. Id. at 7-8. The handgun had five live rounds

and one spent shell in the chamber. Id. at 8.

      The State's fingerprint comparison expert found defendant's fingerprint on

the barrel of the handgun. Id. at 9. The State's "ballistics expert testified that

the bullet recovered from Contreras' autopsy was fired from the handgun." Ibid.

In the presence of police officers, defendant also made spontaneous statements

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"that 'his life was over'" and "that 'he let his children down' and that 'this would

not have happened if he didn't get into an argument with his girl.'" Id. at 8.

      Following a multi-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree

aggravated manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, first-degree

felony murder, first-degree robbery, fourth-degree aggravated assault with a

firearm, second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, and

second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon. Id. at 1. The trial court

sentenced defendant to an aggregate extended term of life imprisonment, subject

to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Ibid.

                                        II.

      After we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, he filed a timely

petition for PCR. On June 10, 2020, the PCR judge conducted oral argument by

Zoom on defendant's petition. The hearing lasted thirty minutes.

      At the beginning of the subsequently-prepared transcript, the transcriber

noted:    "(Whereupon the hearing, conducted via Zoom, causing some

inaudibility to statements throughout due to recording quality, commenced at

this time at 1:05:13 p.m., as follows)." By our count, there were forty -six

instances where the recording was "inaudible." We are unable to decipher how

much of the argument and the judge's decision were lost due to the forty

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separately-identified "recording issues" that occurred during the short

proceeding.

      Defendant raised five arguments in support of his petition. The only one

that was not affected by the inaudibility issues was defendant's first argument in

his hearing brief and at oral argument. In Point I of that brief, defendant argued

that his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to stick to the defense he

and defendant had agreed upon while preparing for the trial. Defendant was

originally charged with first-degree murder. However, defense counsel told

defendant it was likely the State would obtain a superseding indictment adding

a first-degree felony murder count. Because defendant insisted he was not

present at the scene and had nothing to do with Contreras' murder, defendant

and his attorney planned to argue that the State had misidentified him as the

shooter.

      When the State obtained the superseding indictment and the matter

proceeded to trial, defendant argued that his attorney should have continued to

make this same argument. However, defendant alleged that in defense counsel's

summation to the jury, the attorney also argued that even if defendant was

present at the scene, he did not intentionally shoot the gun that killed Contreras.

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Instead, defendant claimed the gun could have gone off by accident when

Contreras hit the shooter's hand.

      According to defendant, this defense might have been appropriate if

counsel was attempting to persuade the jury to find defendant guilty of a lesser -

included offense to first-degree murder. However, defendant was also charged

with felony murder. In light of that additional charge, defendant argued that

defense counsel's concession that defendant may have been at the scene was

tantamount to admitting he participated in the robbery during which Contreras

was killed and, therefore, that he was guilty of the felony murder charge.

Defendant asserted that if he knew that his attorney was going to change the

game plan, he would have pled guilty prior to trial in an attempt to avoid a life

sentence.

      At the conclusion of the argument, the PCR judge determined that an

evidentiary hearing was needed to resolve defendant's contention concerning his

attorney's alleged change in trial strategy. We will return to this issue shortly.

                                        III.

      Defendant raised four other issues in his petition. Defendant alleged his

trial counsel was ineffective because he did not object when one of the police

officers testified that defendant did not provide him with a permit allowing him

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to possess the handgun. Defendant argued that this testimony improperly shifted

the burden of proof to him. Defendant also claimed his appellate counsel was

ineffective for not raising this issue on direct appeal.

      Defendant next argued that his trial counsel was ineffective because he

did not object to arguments the prosecutor made in summation about defendant

being in possession of a cellphone that did not belong to defendant or Contreras.

Defendant asserted the prosecutor's statement violated N.J.R.E. 404(b) by

implying the phone the defendant possessed must have been stolen. Defendant

also contended his appellate attorney was ineffective for not raising this issue

on direct appeal.

      In his third argument, defendant alleged that his attorney should have

objected when the prosecutor referred to the existence of photographs that were

not introduced in evidence during closing arguments. Finally, defendant argued

that a new trial was necessary because of the cumulative effect of his attorney's

ineffective representation.

      As set forth in the June 19, 2020 transcript, the PCR judge began to

address these four issues by stating they were "going to be denied for the

following reasons." The judge then recounted the procedural history of the case

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and the arguments defendant raised on direct appeal. 1         After providing a

description of the applicable law governing PCR petitions, the judge noted that

defendant had raised some claims in his original PCR petition that were not

addressed in the brief his attorney filed on his behalf prior to oral argument. The

judge therefore stated, "There's nothing further added to these arguments. They

are bold assertions."

      At that point in the transcript, it appears that the judge was about to

address the four remaining issues raised in defendant's trial brief. However, the

transcript merely states:

            (inaudible – recording issue) is denied as to a prima
            facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel as to the
            other claims. For those reasons or for that reason, the
            [c]ourt's going to deny the [PCR] relief on those claims.

      The judge made no further findings concerning the four issues until near

the conclusion of the hearing, where he was summarizing his ruling on the need

to hold an evidentiary hearing on defendant's first claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel. The judge stated:

            For those reasons, the [c]ourt is going to grant
            [defendant] an evidentiary issue on that issue. As to the
            other issues, again, I find no deficiency in the trial.

1
   None of the arguments defendant raised on direct appeal addressed the
ineffective assistance of counsel arguments defendant raised in his PCR petition.
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                                        9
            The Appellate Division has already ruled on all those
            issues regarding the trial and I'm going to deny
            [defendant's] claims on the balance . . . of the issues
            presented.

      Again, however, the transcript contains no explanation for the judge's

decision to deny PCR on defendant's four remaining claims. As noted above,

and contrary to the judge's final comment, we did not address any ineffective

assistance of counsel claims on defendant's direct appeal. The judge did not

issue an order memorializing either his decision to direct an evidentiary hearing

on Point I of defendant's petition, or his decision to deny an evidentiary hearing

and PCR on his four remaining contentions.

                                       IV.

      On May 26, 2022, a different judge conducted the evidentiary hearing.

Defendant and his trial attorney testified. Defendant repeated his contention

that his attorney effectively invited the jury to find him guilty of felony murder

by implying that even if he had been the shooter, he did not intend to kill

Contreras because the gun went off by accident.

      At the hearing, however, defense counsel pointed to the argument he

actually made during his summation at the trial. In his closing argument, the

attorney told the jury:

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There's just one area that I want to talk to you about
briefly because it's kind of . . . a legal issue but I think
it's something that I asked questions about during the
course of the case and it's one of the charges in the
[i]ndictment.

So, I think we have to talk about it because one of the
charges in the [i]ndictment, matter of fact the first
charge, is the charge of purposeful [m]urder, meaning
whoever did the murder intentionally or purposefully
killed Mr. Contreras.

In other words, it was in their intention, it was their
purpose to kill him when this event happened . . . and
the [j]udge is going to explain the law to you with
respect to the charges.

But part of that is also if somebody purposely inflicts
serious bodily injury on somebody that results in death,
they can be guilty of that.

Regardless of who did the shooting in this case, I'd
argue that the State hasn't made out a case of purposeful
[m]urder and the reason I say that is because of the
testimony that you heard basically in three areas.

And that's why I asked these questions, which is why
I'm explaining it to you. One is, is you heard [the two
robbery victims] talk about that pushing of the hand,
they said.

And if you remember in the original statement, I think
it was Mr. Nolasco said that he made a movement
towards the [pistol] . . . .

And you have Dr. Hood testifying with respect to the
injury to the tip of the finger. There's like a small
bruising on the finger of the victim.

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                            11
            If it wasn't the hand that he pushed but it was the gun –
            and I think Dr. Hood even testified that that injury could
            have happened, and he went like this, by a grabbing
            motion.

            And that gun, you heard about basically, Detective
            Burkhart . . . didn't say that it had a hair trigger. He
            said most companies won't categorize their guns as
            having hair triggers or whatever.

            But he said this is a light trigger and the bullets inside
            the gun had been hit, struck before and not fired.

            I would argue that whoever did this crime, there's no
            proof that it was intentional, based on those
            circumstances. There's no proof that if was an intention
            [sic] or a purposeful homicide.

            [(emphasis added)].

      Thus, contrary to defendant's argument, defense counsel never told the

jury that defendant was present at the scene. Rather, his comments regarding

the possibility that the gun might have gone off accidentally were directed to

"whoever did the crime," not to defendant.

      In his June 8, 2022 written decision, the judge determined that defense

counsel had a sound tactical reason for making this argument to the jury. The

judge explained:

            [Defense counsel] never argued nor suggested to the
            jury that "if you think he did it, then it only happened
            by accident." [Defense counsel] testified that he

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            believed that this argument, which was a very small part
            of his nearly hour-long closing, was an attempt to
            soften the jury. Per his testimony, he believed that the
            State was painting a picture of an assailant who was
            cruel, harsh and ambivalent to the victim's death.
            Further, as with much of his closing and cross-
            examination, trial counsel attempted to portray the
            State as overreaching.

The judge continued:

            Through cross-examination and closing, [defense
            counsel] attempted to point to and exploit weaknesses
            in the State's proofs. Through cross-examination of the
            gun expert, he got the expert to agree that accidental
            discharge was a possibility. This allowed him to argue
            at closing that again, the purposeful murder that the
            State was vigorously pursuing was an overreach as its
            own expert conceded that the firearm could have gone
            off accidentally. If [defense counsel] was successful in
            convincing [the jury of] the overreaching or
            "overselling" the strength of their evidence by the State,
            then the jury may be willing to accept his argument that
            the weaknesses of the State's proofs amounted to
            reasonable doubt.

      The judge concluded that defense counsel's explanation of his strategic

choice was credible and that the attorney did not provide ineffective assistance

to defendant in connection with his closing statement as claimed by defendant

in Point I of his PCR petition. 2 This appeal followed.

2
  Because the first judge had limited the scope of the evidentiary hearing to
defendant's argument in Point I of his petition, the second judge did not further
address the four other arguments defendant raised in the petition.
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                                     V.

     On appeal, defendant raises the same five contentions he presented in his

PCR petition. He asserts:

           POINT I – AS DEFENDANT HAD ESTABLISHED
           THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE LEGAL
           REPRESENTATION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY
           PRESENTED A CLOSING ARGUMENT WITH AN
           INCONSISTENT DEFENSE OF AN ACCIDENTAL
           SHOOTING AND, WITHOUT CONSULTING WITH
           OR GAINING THE APPROVAL OF THE
           DEFENDANT, SUGGESTED TO THE JURY THAT
           IT COULD FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF
           AGGRAVATED       MANSLAUGHTER,     THE
           DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED THEREBY
           BECAUSE THERE WAS A REASONABLE
           PROBABILITY THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE
           TRIAL WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT HAD
           TRIAL COUNSEL STUCK WITH THE SINGLE
           DEFENSE OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE.

           POINT II – THE PCR COURT ERRED IN FAILING
           TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE
           OTHER ISSUES RAISED IN DEFENDANT'S PCR
           PETITION.

           (A) AS DEFENDANT HAD PRESENTED A PRIMA
           FACIE CASE THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
           INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO
           EVIDENCE THAT CLEARLY SHIFTED THE
           BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT, THE
           PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE
           CLAIM    WITHOUT  FIRST  HOLDING    AN
           EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THAT ISSUE.

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                                    14
            (B) AS DEFENDANT HAD PRESENTED A PRIMA
            FACIE CASE THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
            INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO
            EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS PURSUANT TO
            N.J.R.E. 404(b), THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT
            DENIED THE CLAIM WITHOUT FIRST HOLDING
            AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THAT ISSUE.

            (C) AS DEFENDANT HAD PRESENTED A PRIMA
            FACIE CASE THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
            INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE
            PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS ON FACTS NOT IN
            EVIDENCE AND PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE NOT
            PRESENTED TO THE JURY, THE PCR COURT
            ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE CLAIM WITHOUT
            FIRST HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
            ON THAT ISSUE.

            (D) POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WAS REQUIRED
            BECAUSE OF THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
            THE ERRORS AND THE INEFFECTIVENESS SET
            FORTH ABOVE.

                                        A.

      We begin by addressing the argument defendant raises in Point I. These

are the arguments that the second judge addressed following the evidentiary

hearing and in his June 8, 2022 written decision.

      When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish, by a

preponderance of the credible evidence, that he or she is entitled to the requested

relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451,

459 (1992). To sustain that burden, the defendant must allege and articulate

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specific facts that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its

decision." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

      To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the

defendant is obligated to show not only the particular manner in which counsel's

performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency prejudiced his right to a

fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz,

105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). Under the first prong of this test, the defendant must

demonstrate that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Under the second prong, the defendant must show

"that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,

a trial whose result is reliable." Ibid. That is, "there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different." Id. at 694.

      There is a strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance

and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment." Id. at 690. Because prejudice is not presumed, Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52,

a defendant must demonstrate with "reasonable probability" that the result

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                                        16
would have been different had he received proper advice from his trial attorney.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

      Moreover, the acts or omissions of counsel of which a defendant

complains must amount to more than mere tactical strategy. Id. at 689. As the

Supreme Court observed in Strickland,

            [a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires
            that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
            effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
            counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
            conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.
            Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
            evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption
            that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
            reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
            defendant must overcome the presumption that, under
            the circumstances, the challenged action "might be
            considered sound trial strategy."

            [Ibid. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101
            (1955)).]

      Where, as here, the judge conducts an evidentiary hearing, we must

uphold the judge's factual findings, "so long as those findings are supported by

sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440

(2013) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). Additionally, we

defer to a trial judge's findings that are "substantially influenced by [the trial

judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the

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case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Ibid. (alteration in original)

(quoting Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15).

      Having considered defendant's contentions in Point I of his brief in light

of the record and these well-established principles, we discern no basis for

disturbing the second judge's June 8, 2022 determination that defendant failed

to satisfy the Strickland test with regard to these assertions. Accordingly, we

affirm the judge's denial of defendant's arguments concerning his attorney's

closing statements substantially for the reasons detailed at length in the judge's

well-reasoned and comprehensive written opinion.

                                        B.

      We reach a different conclusion with respect to defendant's claims in Point

II of his brief. These are the contentions that were rejected by the first judge in

the truncated oral decision rendered on June 10, 2020.

      As discussed in Section II of our opinion, the judge's explanation for his

decision on these four issues was completely inaudible and is missing from the

transcript. We therefore have no inkling why the judge rejected defendant's

arguments concerning defense counsel's alleged failure to object to testimony

about the lack of a gun permit; the possible improper introduction of other crime

and photographic evidence into the record; appellate counsel's decision no t to

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                                       18
raise two of these issues on direct appeal; and the cumulative effect of the

alleged incidents of ineffective assistance. We also do not know why the judge

decided not to conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning any of these issues.

      It should go without saying that we cannot consider an issue on appeal

without some understanding of why a trial judge has rendered a particular ruling.

See Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980) (requiring trial court to

clearly state its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal

conclusions); See also R. 3:22-11 (requiring a court to "state separately its

findings of fact and conclusions of law" when making a final determination of a

PCR petition). Unfortunately, that is the situation we face here.

      Neither of the parties addressed the deficient transcript in their respective

briefs. Apparently, they believe an appellate court can consider PCR petitions

de novo. However, this is not the case. As we have previously made clear, "our

function as an appellate court is to review the decision of the trial court, not to

decide [a matter] tabula rasa." Estate of Doerfler v. Federal Ins. Co., 454 N.J.

Super. 298, 301-02 (App. Div. 2018).

      In light of the deficiencies in the transcript and, therefore, in the oral

decision rendered by the first judge, we reverse that judge's denial of defendant's

PCR petition as it relates to the contentions defendant raises in Point II of his

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                                       19
brief. We remand these four issues to the trial court for reconsideration. On

remand, we are confident that the court will clearly state its "factual findings

and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions." Curtis, 83 N.J. at 569-

70.

      Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded. We do not retain

jurisdiction.

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