Court Opinion

ID: 9905464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 16:11:47.331674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:35.744515
License: Public Domain

270                 November 29, 2023              No. 612

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

              In the Matter of J. M.-S.,
                  aka J. G., a Child.
        DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                Petitioner-Respondent,
                           v.
                        L. T. G.,
               aka L. G., aka L. T. G.,
              aka L. T. S., aka L. S.-G.,
                       Appellant.
           Multnomah County Circuit Court
                22JU04321; A181083

  Patrick W. Henry, Judge.
  Submitted October 23, 2023.
   Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, and Holly Telerant, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Erin K. Galli, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  ORTEGA, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 329 Or App 270 (2023)                                             271

           ORTEGA, P. J.
         Mother appeals from a judgment terminating her
parental rights in her absence. She contends that her counsel
was inadequate for failing to move for a continuance based on
mother’s absence and for failing to argue that the court should
not proceed in mother’s absence and that counsel’s failures
denied her a fair trial. Because the record does not support
mother’s arguments, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.1
         When reviewing an inadequate-assistance claim,
we look at the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the claimant “was denied a fair trial” because of
the alleged inadequacies or failures, including tactical deci-
sions that counsel “could have made” or “should have made
better.” State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist, 310 Or 176, 191, 796
P2d 1193 (1990). In doing so, we consider whether the record
is sufficient for us to resolve the claim. Dept. of Human
Services v. T. L., 358 Or 679, 703-04, 369 P3d 1159 (2016). As
described below, the record here is sufficient to do so, and we
can discern no reason to remand for an evidentiary hearing
as provided in T. L. See id.
         Mother challenges the assistance she received in
the context of a trial to terminate her parental rights (TPR)
to her child, J.2 At the end of the initial hearing on the TPR
petition, the juvenile court issued a written order setting
dates for a pretrial hearing, a call hearing, and TPR trial.
That order required mother to “appear in person” at each of
those proceedings and stated that if she failed to appear, the
court could, “without further notice” and “in [her] absence,”
“immediately terminate” her parental rights, and that it
was mother’s responsibility to keep trial counsel advised
of her whereabouts. See ORS 419B.819(7) (so providing).
Mother “acknowledge[ed]” in writing that she “recei[ved] a
copy” of the order.
         Mother appeared at the pretrial hearing but failed
to appear for the call hearing. Trial counsel asked the court
to postpone “until Monday to allow [mother] a little bit more
     1
       Mother does not otherwise challenge the judgment terminating her paren-
tal rights beyond her inadequate-assistance claim.
     2
       DHS alleged that mother was unfit, ORS 419B.504, and neglected J’s needs,
ORS 419B.506.
272                            Dept. of Human Services v. L. T. G.

time because of her being homeless.” The court granted that
request. That same afternoon, the court issued a written
order finding that “[m]other appeared remotely after going
to the wrong courthouse” and “was admonished” about her
“required appearance at the [TPR] trial and the conse-
quences if she were to not appear.”
         On the day set for the TPR trial, which was the
Monday following the call hearing, mother was not present
at the 9:00 a.m. start time. Trial counsel asked the court to
wait a few minutes to give mother a bit more time to arrive
and confirmed that he had not been in contact with mother
that morning. At 9:17 a.m., the court decided to allow DHS
to proceed in mother’s absence. Trial counsel did not object
and stated, “I asked [the court’s] staff” to check and they
reported that no one “with mother’s description” had entered
the courtroom. As authorized by the court, DHS presented
a prima facie case. The court granted DHS’s TPR petition,
observing that it was 10:06 a.m., “over an hour” after the
TPR trial had been set to begin, and mother was still absent.
         On appeal, mother argues that trial counsel was
inadequate, first for failing to move for a continuance based
on mother’s absence, and second for failing to argue that
the court should decline to proceed with the TPR trial in
her absence. In a combined argument, mother contends that
the record shows that trial counsel knew that she wanted to
contest the TPR petition and that she struggled with getting
to the courthouse because she was experiencing homeless-
ness. She further argues that the record establishes that
those failures prejudiced her by denying her a fair trial.
Particularly, mother argues that counsel’s failures deprived
her of specific statutory rights, including the right to par-
ticipate in the trial and to contest the TPR petition. Based
on those arguments, mother asks us to reverse the TPR
judgment and remand for a new trial. We decline to do so
because the record does not demonstrate that counsel had
any legal or factual basis on which to seek a continuance
and, thus, mother has not established that she was denied
adequate assistance or suffered prejudice.3
    3
      A month after filing this appeal, mother moved the juvenile court to set
aside the termination judgment. The court denied that motion in a written order
that included findings about the circumstances of mother’s absence at the TPR
Cite as 329 Or App 270 (2023)                                                273

         A parent seeking relief on the basis that inade-
quacy of counsel rendered the parent’s trial fundamentally
unfair “must show not only that trial counsel was inade-
quate, but also that the inadequacy prejudiced the parent’s
rights.” T. L., 358 Or at 702. To find that trial counsel was
inadequate, we must “affirmatively find[ ] that no adequate
counsel” would have acted as the counsel did “under the cir-
cumstances” and that the counsel’s actions or lack thereof
“reflected an absence or suspension of professional skill and
judgment.” Geist, 310 Or at 190-91 (emphasis in original).
         Here, the record does not support such a determina-
tion in this case. As an initial matter, it is undisputed that
the information known to counsel at the relevant time was
that mother had received notice of the date and place of the
TPR trial, was aware of the consequences of her absence,
and had been admonished of those consequences four days
before trial. Further, though counsel was aware that mother
was experiencing houselessness, counsel was unaware of
the specific reason for mother’s absence at the TPR trial,
had no information about her whereabouts, and so had no
basis for asserting good cause as a basis for a continuance
or for asking the court not to proceed in mother’s absence.
Under those circumstances, we cannot find that “no ade-
quate counsel” would have proceeded in the same manner.
Geist, 310 Or at 190. This conclusion obviates the need to
address mother’s prejudice argument.
           Affirmed.

trial. That order is not part of the record of this appeal and none of its findings
impacts the facts known to trial counsel at the relevant time. Hence, nothing in
that order affects our review of the tactical decisions that counsel “could have
made” or “should have made” under the circumstances. Geist, 310 Or at 191.