Court Opinion

ID: 9557803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:57:46.323418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:11.263608
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GROVES
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The statute, adopted in 1972, reads:
“(1) Where a witness in a criminal trial has make a previous statement inconsistent with his testimony at the trial, the previous inconsistent statement may be shown by any otherwise competent evidence and is admissible not only for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of the witness, *574but also for the purpose of establishing a fact to which his testimony and the inconsistent statement relate, if:
“(a) The witness, while testifying, was given an opportunity to explain or deny the statement, or the witness is still available to give further testimony in the trial; and
“(b) The previous inconsistent statement purports to relate to a matter within the witness’s own knowledge.” Section 16-10-201, C.R.S. 1973. (emphasis added).
As I read the majority opinion, the foundation, represented by sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), is required only upon use of evidence to establish the substantive fact, and not when merely impeachment is involved. To me, however, the wording is perfectly plain to the effect that evidence is admissible (1) not only for the purpose of impeachment, (2) but also for the substance, if the two conditions in (a) and (b) are met. It is inconceivable to me how the “if’ can be held to relate only to the establishment of fact, but not to impeachment.
Colorado Jury Instructions (Criminal) 4:8 (using inconsistent statements solely for the basis of impeachment) was the law before legislation was adopted in this area. Through the years, it has been well known that pragmatically it is a fiction to think the jury is going to consider an inconsistent statement solely for the purpose of impeachment and exclude the substantive facts from consideration. It is apparent that the General Assembly concluded to do away with this fiction, by allowing the use of impeachment testimony for both purposes or none at all. The majority opinion would perpetuate the fiction with the further fiction of interpretation of the statute to have subparagraphs (a) and (b) relate only to establishing facts and not to impeachment.
I have no quarrel with the exceptions noted in footnote 1 of the majority opinion. I cannot escape the thought, however, that the statutory construction employed by the majority is based upon the way the majority thinks the law should be, and not upon what the General Assembly plainly said and meant.
MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON joins in this dissent.