Court Opinion

ID: 2964140
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:21:08.909328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:51.411837
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1918

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                Petitioner, Appellee,

                                          v.

                            STURM, RUGER & COMPANY, INC.,

                                Respondent, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                   [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                               Selya, Stahl and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                              _________________________

               Richard   D.  Wayne,   with   whom  Willard   Krasnow,  Lara
               ___________________                 _________________   ____
          SanGiovanni, and  Hinckley, Allen  & Snyder  were  on brief,  for
          ___________       _________________________
          appellant.
               Frederick  D. Braid,  Walter J.  Johnson, Sharon  N. Berlin,
               ___________________   __________________  _________________
          Rains & Pogrebin,  P.C., Daniel J. Popeo,  and David A.  Price on
          _______________________  _______________       _______________
          brief for Washington Legal Foundation, amicus curiae.
               John Shortall, Attorney, United  States Dep't of Labor, with
               _____________
          whom Joseph M. Woodward and Ann Rosenthal, United States Dep't of
               __________________     _____________
          Labor, Paul M. Gagnon, United States Attorney,  and Gretchen Leah
                 ______________                               _____________
          Witt,  Assistant  United  States  Attorney, were  on  brief,  for
          ____
          appellees.

                              _________________________

                                     May 14, 1996

                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.  On the surface this case appears
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          to  touch a  sensitive nerve:   how  the Occupational  Safety and

          Health Act  (OSH Act), 29  U.S.C.     651-678 (1994),  interfaces

          with the field of  ergonomics (the study and design  of workplace

          environments and job tasks and their effects on employee health).

          Indeed, the respondent-appellant,  Sturm, Ruger &  Co. (Sturmco),

          and   the  amicus,   the  Washington   Legal   Foundation  (WLF),

          deliberately  frame the appeal in these terms; they entreat us to

          declare that  the Occupational  Safety and  Health Administration

          (OSHA)  lacks  the  authority   to  regulate  ergonomics  in  the

          workplace  through  the medium  of  the  OSH Act's  general  duty

          clause,  id.    654(a)(1),  and to  reverse the  district court's
                   ___

          order  on that basis.  We turn  a deaf ear to these blandishments

          because close perscrutation of the record discloses that they are

          premature.  This is no more than a run-of-the-mine administrative

          subpoena  enforcement proceeding  which  presents  no  legitimate

          opportunity to dwell on cosmic truths.

                    Deeming it unwise  to make  a long prologue  and to  be

          short in  the story  itself, cf.  2 Maccabees  2:32, we  omit any
                                       ___

          further introduction and proceed directly to the particulars.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    In  August  1993  an  OSHA  representative  arrived  at

          Sturmco's factory  in  Newport, New  Hampshire, to  look into  an

          employee complaint about air  quality.  But the visitor  did more

          than test for  air contaminants;  he also informed  Sturmco of  a

          Local Emphasis Program (LEP) inaugurated by OSHA's area director.

                                          2

          The LEP identified certain New Hampshire employers, based on  the

          incidence  of particular  types of  workers' compensation  claims

          filed  with a state agency, whom the area director believed might

          have  an  unusually  high  number  of  employees  afflicted  with

          multiple  movement disorders.   The  OSHA emissary  reported that

          Sturmco had  been so identified and requested that it voluntarily

          produce  certain  records  detailing  work-related  injuries  and

          illnesses.  Sturmco complied.

                    In  November of  the  same year,  the OSHA  functionary

          returned  to  videotape employees  engaged  in  one of  Sturmco's

          manufacturing operations.  He requested that the company complete

          a questionnaire that related to ergonomic issues at  the factory.

          Sturmco  took  the  matter  under  advisement  and,  in  January,

          informed OSHA that it would not answer the questionnaire.

                    OSHA  then served  a  subpoena  demanding that  Sturmco

          produce a myriad of documents concerning manufacturing processes,

          employee training,  and on-the-job injuries.   The company fenced

          with  the agency, saying that  it would comply  with the subpoena

          only  in  the event  that  OSHA  agreed not  to  use  any of  the

          resultant information to impose  punitive sanctions.  Refusing to

          accede to this  condition, OSHA  invoked 29 U.S.C.    657(b)  and

          obtained  enforcement of  the  subpoena in  the federal  district

          court.  See Reich v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 903 F. Supp. 239 (D.N.H.
                  ___ _____    __________________

          1995).  Sturmco appeals.  We affirm.

          II.  SUBPOENA ENFORCEMENT
          II.  SUBPOENA ENFORCEMENT

                    Although the  parties   especially  the respondent  and

                                          3

          the amicus   expend a great deal of energy debating the merits of

          ergonomic  research  and  regulation, this  exegesis  is  largely

          beside  the point.  The  principal question before  this court is

          much  more mundane:   did  OSHA have the  authority to  issue the

          administrative subpoena?  We hold that it did.

                                          A
                                          A

                    An administrative subpoena is not self-executing and is

          therefore   technically  not  a  "search."    It  is  at  most  a

          constructive search, amounting to no more than a simple direction

          to produce documents, subject to judicial review and enforcement.

          See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195 (1946);
          ___ _______________________    _______

          In  re Grand Jury Subpoena  Served Upon Simon  Horowitz, 482 F.2d
          _______________________________________________________

          72, 75-79 (2d Cir.),  cert. denied, 414 U.S.  867 (1973).   Thus,
                                _____ ______

          unlike  the  subject  of an  actual  search,  the  subject of  an

          administrative  subpoena  has  an opportunity  to  challenge  the

          subpoena  before yielding the information.  In the course of that

          resistance, the  Fourth Amendment is available  to the challenger

          as a defense against enforcement of the subpoena.  See Donovan v.
                                                             ___ _______

          Lone Steer, Inc.,   464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984);  see generally Jack
          ________________                               ___ _________

          W. Campbell IV, Note, Revoking the "Fishing License," 49 Vand. L.
                                _______________________________

          Rev. 395, 408-09 (1996).

                    The requirements for  enforcement of an  administrative

          subpoena are not onerous.1   In order to obtain  judicial backing

                              
          ____________________

               1We  note  that  the  subpoena  at  issue  here  seeks  only
          corporate  documents, and thus does not raise any of the concerns
          discussed in In re Subpoena of Roger Gimbel, 77 F.3d 593, 596-600
                       ______________________________
          (2d Cir. 1996).

                                          4

          the  agency must  prove that  (1)  the subpoena  is issued  for a

          congressionally authorized purpose, the information sought is (2)

          relevant to the authorized  purpose and (3) adequately described,

          and  (4)  proper procedures  have  been employed  in  issuing the

          subpoena.   See United States v.  Morton Salt Co., 338  U.S. 632,
                      ___ _____________     _______________

          652 (1950); Oklahoma  Press, 327  U.S. at 208;  United States  v.
                      _______________                     _____________

          Comley, 890 F.2d 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1989).  As long as the agency
          ______

          satisfies  these  modest requirements,  the  subpoena  is per  se

          reasonable and  Fourth Amendment  concerns are  deemed satisfied.

          See Oklahoma Press,  327 U.S. at 208.   These standards  apply to
          ___ ______________

          OSHA  subpoenas  in  exactly the  same  way  that  they apply  to

          subpoenas  issued  by  other  agencies.    See,  e.g.,  Reich  v.
                                                     ___   ____   _____

          Manganas, 70 F.3d  434, 437  (6th Cir. 1995);  Reich v.  National
          ________                                       _____     ________

          Eng'g &  Contr'g Co., 13  F.3d 93,  98 (4th Cir.  1993); Dole  v.
          ____________________                                     ____

          Trinity  Indus., Inc., 904 F.2d 867, 871 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
          _____________________                               _____ ______

          498 U.S. 998 (1990); Donovan v.  Union Packing Co., 714 F.2d 838,
                               _______     _________________

          840 (8th Cir. 1983).

                                          B
                                          B

                    The  respondent's central  thesis  boils down  to this:

          the  subpoena  should not  be  enforced  because OSHA  issued  it

          pursuant  to an inspection scheme  (the LEP) that  did not derive

          from  within  OSHA's statutory  authority.    Sturmco casts  this

          proposition  in two modes.   First, it focuses  on the inspection

          scheme in the forlorn  hope that we will  apply to this  subpoena

          the  more stringent test  applicable to  administrative searches,

          namely,  the requirement  that  on-site inspections  be conducted

                                          5

          pursuant to "reasonable legislative or administrative standards."

          Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978).
          ________    ______________

                    We  will  not  dance  to  the  respondent's  tune.   At

          present,  OSHA is  not seeking  to conduct  an inspection  or any

          other physical search of  Sturmco's premises, but, rather, merely

          to  enforce a subpoena duces tecum.2   The Supreme Court has made

          it pellucid that subpoenas    as opposed to inspections  or other

          administrative searches   are subject to the minimal standards of

          Oklahoma Press and its progeny, not to the more rigorous Barlow's
          ______________                                           ________

          criteria.  See  Lone Steer, 464 U.S. at 414.  Thus, to the extent
                     ___  __________

          that  Sturmco's animadversions  are directed  at whether  the LEP

          drew its essence from  a reasonable administrative standard, they

          have no bearing on the question we must decide.

                                          C
                                          C

                    In  view  of the  frailty  of  its first  asseveration,

          Sturmco's  appeal  necessarily  stands  or falls  on  its  second

          argument, namely, whether issuing  the subpoena was within OSHA's

          statutory authority.  We think that it falls.

                    1.   The  Statutory Scheme.   The  OSH Act  imposes two
                    1.   The  Statutory Scheme.
                         _____________________

          distinct duties on employers.   First, employers must comply with

          specific  workplace health  and safety  standards  established by

                              
          ____________________

               2It  is simply not true,  as Sturmco seems  to suggest, that
          OSHA may only  issue subpoenas pursuant  to inspections based  on
          employee complaints.  As  the Eighth Circuit has observed:   "The
          statute does not mandate  an inspection of the premises  in order
          to enforce a  limited subpoena  to determine whether  there is  a
          probable  violation of the law.  Indeed, the Secretary should not
          be  expected to do more  than the circumstances  require."  Union
                                                                      _____
          Packing, 714 F.2d at 840 (citation omitted).
          _______

                                          6

          OSHA.  See 29  U.S.C.   654(a)(2).   To this end, the Act  grants
                 ___

          OSHA authority to  promulgate such  standards.3  See  id.    655.
                                                           ___  ___

          Second,  to fill whatever gaps may  exist after rules delineating

          specific  standards have  been  promulgated, the  Act imposes  on

          employers  a general duty to  provide "employment and  a place of

          employment  which  are  free from  recognized  hazards."    Id.  
                                                                      ___

          654(a)(1).   OSHA  enforces this  general duty  clause, as  it is

          called, through case-by-case adjudicative proceedings.  See id.  
                                                                  ___ ___

          661(i)  (establishing   administrative  adjudication  mechanism);

          Puffer's Hardware, Inc.  v. Donovan,  742 F.2d 12,  17 (1st  Cir.
          _______________________     _______

          1984) (holding that  the Secretary does not  abuse his discretion

          by  issuing  citations  in  adjudicative  proceedings  under  the

          general duty clause as opposed to establishing specific standards

          via rulemaking); see also  Reich v. Montana Sulpher &  Chem. Co.,
                           ___ ____  _____    ____________________________

          32  F.3d  440,  445 (9th  Cir.  1994)  (noting  "OSHA's statutory

          obligation  to  enforce  the general  duty  clause  as a  minimum

          standard"), cert.  denied,  115 S.  Ct.  1355 (1995);  Matter  of
                      _____  ______                              __________

          Establishment  Inspection of Kelly-Springfield  Tire Co., 13 F.3d
          ________________________________________________________

          1160,  1167  (7th  Cir.  1994)  (acknowledging  the   Secretary's

          authority to  enforce the  general duty  clause); UAW  v. General
                                                            ___     _______

          Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1577 (D.C. Cir.) (limning
          _______________________

          the standards OSHA must meet to prove  a violation of the general
                              
          ____________________

               3Although OSHA  has  never  established  health  and  safety
          standards relating specifically to  ergonomics, the agency at one
          point issued an advance proposed notice of rulemaking, requesting
          information  and comments on  ergonomics from interested parties.
          See  57  Fed. Reg.  34,192  (Aug.  3, 1992).    OSHA  has yet  to
          ___
          promulgate an official notice of proposed rulemaking  adumbrating
          specific ergonomic standards.

                                          7

          duty clause), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987).
                        _____ ______

                    OSHA asserts as authority  for the instant subpoena its

          power  to investigate  possible  violations of  the general  duty

          clause.  It is  by now apodictic that enforcement  of the general

          duty clause is a  purpose properly authorized by Congress.   See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Montana Sulpher, 32 F.3d at 449; Kelly-Springfield, 13 F.3d
          ____  _______________                  _________________

          at 1166-67.

                    2.  "Recognized Hazards".  In  an effort to make an end
                    2.  "Recognized Hazards".
                        ____________________

          run around these holdings, Sturmco  and WLF question the validity

          of OSHA's  purpose by  positing  that ergonomic  hazards are  not

          "recognized  hazards"  within the  purview  of  the general  duty

          clause.    This  initiative   features  two  decisions  in  which

          administrative  law  judges  (ALJs)  under the  auspices  of  the

          Occupational Safety  and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) refused

          to enforce  citations for particular ergonomic  hazards under the

          general  duty clause.  See  Beverly Enters., Inc.,  OSHRC No. 91-
                                 ___  _____________________

          3344  (A.L.J. 1995);  Pepperidge  Farm, Inc.,  OSHRC No.  89-0265
                                ______________________

          (A.L.J.  1993).  Sturmco and WLF insist that these decisions show

          that OSHA lacks the  rudimentary authority to regulate ergonomics

          under  the  general duty  clause.   In  the  absence of  any more

          specific  regulatory   authority,  they  conclude,   OSHA  cannot

          demonstrate  a proper  purpose for  the issuance  of  the instant

          subpoena.

                    This  conclusion is  built on  shifting sands.   In the

          first place, neither of  the cited ALJ decisions holds  that OSHA

          lacks authority in all instances to regulate ergonomics under the
                          ________________

                                          8

          general duty clause.4  They therefore fail to provide  convincing

          support for the proposition that OSHA will not be able to prove a

          violation of the general duty clause in this case.  In the second

          place      and  more   important     the   respondent's  argument

          misconstrues  the   scope  of   the  judicial  inquiry   that  is

          appropriate at this stage.

                    We have repeatedly admonished that questions concerning

          the  scope of an  agency's substantive authority  to regulate are

          not  to be resolved in subpoena enforcement proceedings.  See FTC
                                                                    ___ ___

          v. Monahan, 832  F.2d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
             _______                                      _____ ______

          U.S. 987  (1988); FTC v. Swanson,  560 F.2d 1, 2  (1st Cir. 1977)
                            ___    _______

          (per  curiam);  SEC v.  Howatt, 525  F.2d  226, 229-30  (1st Cir.
                          ___     ______

          1975).    Subpoena enforcement  proceedings  are  designed to  be

          summary in nature, see Comley, 890 F.2d at  541, and an "agency's
                             ___ ______

          investigations should not be  bogged down by premature challenges

          to its regulatory jurisdiction," Swanson, 560 F.2d at 2.  As long
                                           _______

          as  the   agency's  assertion  of  authority   is  not  obviously

          apocryphal, a procedurally sound subpoena  must be enforced.  See
                                                                        ___

          id.; see  also EEOC  v. Kloster  Cruise Ltd.,  939 F.2d  920, 923
          ___  ___  ____ ____     ____________________

          (11th Cir. 1991).

                    Refined to bare essence, the respondent's argument runs

                              
          ____________________

               4Both  decisions are presently  on review before  OSHRC.  In
          any event, because the cases are merely first-tier ALJ decisions,
          they are  entitled to no precedential value before this tribunal.
          See  Matter of  Establishment Inspection  of Cerro  Copper Prods.
          ___  ____________________________________________________________
          Co.,  752 F.2d  280,  284  (7th  Cir.  1985)  (per  curiam)  ("An
          ___
          unreviewed  ALJ decision  does not  bind OSHRC  or the  courts as
          precedent.")  (citing cases).   Their  utility  depends solely on
          the persuasive power, if any, of their reasoning.

                                          9

          along the  following lines.  As  part of its burden  of proving a

          violation  of the  general duty  clause, OSHA  must show  that an

          employer failed to keep its workplace free of a recognized hazard

          that  caused (or was likely  to cause) death  or serious physical

          injury.    See  General  Dynamics,  815  F.2d at  1577;  Puffer's
                     ___  _________________                        ________

          Hardware, 742 F.2d at 18.  Ergonomic hazards, Sturmco argues, are
          ________

          not such "recognized hazards,"  and, therefore, OSHA cannot carry

          its  burden.   Given  the early  stage  of the  proceedings, this

          argument falters.

                    To  be sure, a debate  rages in both  legal and medical

          circles over the dangers posed by, for example, multiple movement

          disorders, as well  as over  the optimum method(s)  by which  so-

          called ergonomic dangers can be alleviated.  But uncertainties of

          this sort do  not provide  a cognizable basis  for concluding  at
                                                                         __

          this stage that OSHA would not be able to issue a citation.  This
          __________

          is  especially  true when,  as now,  a  subpoena is  "designed to

          produce the very  information that  may be needed  to shed  light

          upon those questions."  Howatt, 525 F.2d at 230.
                                  ______

                    3.  A Variation on the Theme.  WLF comes at the problem
                    3.  A Variation on the Theme.
                        ________________________

          from another angle.  It asserts that once a subpoena  is enforced

          the  chance for  an effective  challenge evaporates  because most

          employers  are likely  to settle  with OSHA  rather  than proceed

          through the rigors of the administrative litigation  process.  As

          an initial matter, we doubt that this argument is properly before

          us.    While amicus  briefs are  helpful in  assessing litigants'

          positions, an amicus cannot introduce a new argument into a case.

                                          10

          See  Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871  F.2d 166, 175 (1st Cir. 1989)
          ___  ____    ________________

          (explaining  that an amicus may not "interject into a case issues

          which the litigants, whatever their reasons might be, have chosen

          to ignore"); accord Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 36
                       ______ _________________    _________

          (1st Cir. 1993).

                    In  all events, WLF's argument fails on the merits.  It

          offers no empirical  or statistical  evidence in  support of  its

          conclusions  about settlement rates.   Moreover, it  points to no

          case   holding  that   the  prospective   burden  of   litigation

          constitutes a cognizable injury sufficient to breathe life into a

          pre-enforcement  challenge to  agency action  notwithstanding the

          guaranteed availability of judicial review following final agency

          action.  Put bluntly, WLF asks us to buy  a pig in a poke, and we

          refuse to do so.

                    At  any  rate,  we  have  already  rejected  a  similar

          argument in repudiating an estoppel-based collateral attack on an

          OSHA citation.    In Northeast  Erectors  Ass'n v.  Secretary  of
                               __________________________     _____________

          Labor, 62  F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1995), we  held that a party did not
          _____

          suffer substantial harm from being required to raise defenses  to

          a citation  only after the citation  had issued.  See  id. at 40.
                                                            ___  ___

          We  also  warned  that   permitting  parties  to  circumvent  the

          administrative process  by bringing collateral challenges  in the

          district  court would  "subvert  Congress's intent  to have  such

          claims  reviewed  through the  OSH Act's  detailed administrative

          procedure."  Id.
                       ___

                    4.  Recapitulation.   We  need go no  further.   OSHA's
                    4.  Recapitulation.
                        ______________

                                          11

          authority  to  investigate  ergonomic  conditions  in  search  of

          possible  general  duty  clause   violations  easily  passes  the

          undemanding  test   for  the  enforceability   of  administrative

          subpoenas.   Were we to  succumb to the  siren song that  Sturmco

          sings  and  stop  the  subpoena for  want  of  some sophisticated

          standard  for systemically specifying ergonomic hazards, we would

          in  effect  be requiring  OSHA to  "charge first  and investigate

          later."   Montana Sulpher, 32  F.3d at 444.   This tergiversation
                    _______________

          would stand  the administrative  enforcement process on  its head

          and in  the bargain  would both  defy the  will  of Congress  and

          ignore the teachings  of the  Court.   We will  not encourage  so

          resupinate an exercise.

                                          D
                                          D

                    We must attend to a final detail.  While the respondent

          does not  seriously contend that  the documents requested  in the

          subpoena are irrelevant  to OSHA's asserted  purpose or that  the

          subpoena was issued  in a procedurally irregular manner,  it does

          attempt to argue that enforcement  should be withheld because the

          subpoena  is abusive  and overbroad.   On appeal,  Sturmco's sole

          stated basis for  this contention  is that, because  there is  no

          ergonomic  standard   or  definition  of  ergonomic  hazard,  any

          document request must  necessarily be abusive.   This is  nothing

          more than a cross-dressing  of the argument, previously rejected,

          that  OSHA lacks  authority to  issue a  subpoena pursuant  to an

          investigation of ergonomic hazards for possible violations of the

          general duty clause.  We  can conceive of no reason to  give this

                                          12

          importuning further attention.  Accordingly, the subpoena must be

          enforced.

          III.  CITATION ENFORCEMENT
          III.  CITATION ENFORCEMENT

                    In  July of 1994, while the respondent was in the midst

          of  contesting the  subpoena's validity,  OSHA issued  a citation

          charging the  company with failure to  produce certain subpoenaed

          documents.   The  respondent  requested that  the district  court

          prohibit  enforcement of the citation.  The court refused, citing

          a perceived lack of jurisdiction.  See Sturm, Ruger, 903  F. Supp
                                             ___ ____________

          at 250.

                    As the district court recognized,  id. at 249-50, it is
                                                       ___

          questionable whether OSHA citations  issued for failure to comply

          with   a  subpoena  that  the  employer  is  in  the  process  of

          challenging may be enforced.  See, e.g., Lone  Steer, 464 U.S. at
                                        ___  ____  ___________

          415 (explaining that an employer may "question the reasonableness

          of [a] subpoena, before  suffering any penalties for  refusing to
                           ________________________________________________

          comply  with  it,  by raising  objections  in  an  action in  the
          ________________

          district court") (emphasis supplied); See v. City of Seattle, 387
                                                ___    _______________

          U.S. 541, 544-45  (1967) (similar); Brock  v. Emerson Elec.  Co.,
                                              _____     __________________

          834  F.2d  994, 997  (11th  Cir. 1987)  (similar).    But as  the

          district court  also recognized, Sturm,  Ruger, 903  F. Supp.  at
                                           _____________

          250, the law lodges exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to the

          validity  of citations with OSHRC, subject to review by the court

          of appeals.  See 29 U.S.C.    659(c) & 660(a); see also Northeast
                       ___                               ___ ____ _________

          Erectors,  62 F.3d at  39-40 (explaining jurisdictional structure
          ________

          of OSH Act  and holding  that the district  court lacked  subject

                                          13

          matter jurisdiction  over a pre-enforcement challenge  to an OSHA

          citation).

                    The  OSH Act  provides  only a  few  limited bases  for

          original jurisdiction in  the district court,  and none of  those

          bases exists here.  The administrative review and appeals process

          thus remains  "the exclusive procedure through  which an employer

          can obtain  review of  OSHA [citation] enforcement  proceedings."

          Northeast Erectors, 62  F.3d at 39.5  Consequently,  the district
          __________________

          court  did not  err in  refusing, on  jurisdictional grounds,  to

          entertain Sturmco's complaint anent the citation.

          IV.  CONCLUSION
          IV.  CONCLUSION

                    There is much less  to this appeal than meets  the eye.

          Because  OSHA had authority to  issue the subpoena to investigate

          possible  violations of the  general duty clause,  we must affirm

          the judgment  below.  In so  doing, we leave for  another day the

          question  whether  OSHA  will ultimately  be  able  to enforce  a

          citation  against Sturmco (or  anybody else, for  that matter) on

          the ground  that ergonomic hazards are  recognized hazards within

          the meaning of the OSH Act's general duty clause.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                              
          ____________________

               5Sturmco is currently contesting the  citation before OSHRC,
          and  it will  be  entitled to  all  appropriate defenses  against
          enforcement  there and on any ensuing appeal.  See, e.g., Emerson
                                                         ___  ____  _______
          Elec., 834  F.2d at 997  (affirming OSHRC's vacation  of citation
          _____
          issued for failure to produce documents).  That route is the only
          available avenue of protest vis-a-vis the citation.

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