Court Opinion

ID: 9940207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:21:59.526464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:43:14.996422
License: Public Domain

I concur in the order affirming the judgment but I do so on different grounds from those set forth in the majority opinion.
It is there held that the various proclamations of the mayor were justified in that an emergency in fact existed within the meaning of section 25 of the charter, and that under that section the mayor possesses the vast and practically unlimited powers described in the majority opinion. The results of such a holding are far reaching indeed. It means that if the mayor determines that there is an emergency, and if the evidence of the existence of such emergency is conflicting, the mayor has unlimited and unrestricted power by proclamation and executive fiat to set aside and to disregard every ordinance passed by the lawmaking body, even though the lawmaking body is then available in session, and even though all departments of government, including the lawmaking body are then functioning, and to set aside and to disregard every other provision of the charter limiting the mayor's powers. In a very real sense such a holding means that during the existence of such *Page 136 
an emergency the mayor, and the mayor alone, constitutes the entire government of the city. If it be assumed that the charter confers such unusual and extraordinary powers on the mayor (and I have grave doubts that section 25 was ever intended to have the broad effect given to it by the majority) it is quite clear that the provision should not be called into operation unless an emergency of the gravest nature exists.
In the present case the fundamental question presented was whether the Market Street employees, when the Market Street system was taken over by the city and county, were entitled to "parity" pay, or were entitled to beginner's pay. There was no doubt an extremely grave situation presented when the Market Street platform and other operating employees threatened not to accept employment with the city and county unless they were granted "parity" pay. Had that portion of the streetcar system been forced to cease operations during that critical war period it would have been a catastrophe not only to the city but to the nation. But that grave situation did not call for the declaration of an emergency within the meaning of section 25, and the setting aside of the normal functions of government, because, in my opinion, as a matter of law, quite independent of the mayor's proclamations, the Market Street operating employees were entitled to parity pay.
Section 125 of the charter provides, in part, that: "All persons employed in the operating service of any public utility hereafter acquired by the city and county, at the time the same is taken over by the city and county, and who shall have been so employed for at least one year prior to the date of such acquisition, shall be continued in their respective positionsand shall be deemed appointed to such positions, under, andentitled to all the benefits of, the civil service provisions ofthis charter; provided, however, that no person who is not a citizen of the United States shall be so continued in or appointed to his position. . . ." (Italics added.)
There can be no doubt at all that under this section the Market Street operating personnel had a charter right to be blanketed into civil service. But the charter does not merely give these employees the right to be employed as beginners. It provides that they shall be "continued in their respective positions" and "shall be deemed appointed to such positions" and entitled to "all the benefits" of civil service. That language clearly and without ambiguity provides that the positions these employees had with Market Street shall be continued, *Page 137 
and that in such positions such employees shall be entitled to the civil service rights attaching to those positions. The charter itself gives the employees this right without the necessity of further action by the mayor, the board of supervisors, or the civil service commission. The charter guarantee is to a position substantially similar in kind and degree to the one held by them under Market Street. The language quoted is capable of no other reasonable construction.
This construction is not mine alone but is the exact construction given to section 125 by the unanimous opinion of this court in the recent case of Handlon v. Wolff, 72 Cal.App.2d 53
[164 P.2d 46], where at page 58 it is stated: "In effect section 125 provides that if one has been employed for one year in an acquired utility such employee shall be deemed appointed to such position and entitled to `all benefits' of the service under the municipality. `Such position' if not the identical position should be interpreted as meaning a similar position in kind and degree — one that in salary, authority, duties, etc. is reasonably comparable to the employee's former position. If no comparable position exists then it appears that `such position' by the terms of the charter is `continued.' The `position' in the private utility is adopted as a city position. The legislative or administrative means of continuing the employee in his position is a mechanical problem subordinate to the declaration in the freeholder's charter that he `shall be continued' in his position."
It seems too clear to require extended argument that an employee with important senority rights attaching to his position with Market Street is not "continued" in his "respective" position, nor in the words of the Handlon case, has he been appointed to "a similar position in kind or degree — one that in salary, authority, duties, etc. is reasonably comparable to the employee's former position," if after working for Market Street for many years he is offered a beginner's job with no seniority benefits with the city, and at beginner's pay. Such a holding would mean that the Market Street employee would not be given substantially the same position with the city that he had with Market Street, but would be offered a position substantially, materially and realistically lower in rank.
Appellant contends that such a construction would mean that the Market Street employees would be entitled to the retirement benefits provided for city and county employees. *Page 138 
That conclusion by no means follows. The retirement system is a contributive one. The Market Street employees have not contributed for the period they were working for Market Street. Retirement benefits are not civil service benefits per se. They are the result of a special charter enabling provision, and statutes passed pursuant thereto. They have no relation to the "kind" or "degree" of position involved.
For these reasons I believe the judgment should be affirmed, not because there was an emergency within the meaning of section 25, but because the Market Street employees were entitled to all the benefits purportedly granted them by the mayor's proclamation by virtue of section 125 of the charter.
A petition for rehearing was stricken from the files on July 26, 1946, for the reason that it contained statements that were untrue and must have been known to the petitioner to be untrue. Appellant's petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 22, 1946. Carter, J., voted for a hearing.