Court Opinion

ID: 9613556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:17:58.736529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:29.943065
License: Public Domain

McFarland, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: I believe the facts in Tomlinson v. Celotex Corp., 244 Kan. 474, 770 P.2d 825 (1989), distinguish it from the case before us and that, accordingly, the majority’s overruling of Tomlinson is inappropriate.
The statement of facts accompanying the certified question in Tomlinson stated:
“From 1965 through September 1986, Mr. Tomlinson worked as an insulator. Up until 1971, he applied asbestos-containing products and other products to steam lines, boilers and other vessels having very hot and searing temperatures. At times, he also removed asbestos-containing insulation from steam lines during maintenance of the lines.
“During his deposition, Mr. Tomlinson identified products manufactured by defendants which he claims he used on specific job sites. Mr. Tomlinson’s last exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured by any of the defendants occurred in 1971.”
Eight different manufacturers of asbestos products were named as defendants. When the manufacturers produced the products Tomlinson used was not an issue — only the time period Tomlinson was exposed to such products was involved. Tomlinson’s last exposure to any of the products was more than ten years prior to the commencement of his action. In unanimously holding that Tomlinson’s action was barred by K.S.A. 60-513(b), we reasoned:
“The ten-year limitation and the other provisions contained in K.S.A. 60-513(b) apply to those causes of action listed in the section. Subsection (a) currently lists seven different types of actions including, under paragraph (4), ‘[a]n action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.’ Thus, by its express terms, the statute makes the ten-year limitation provision contained in subsection (b) applicable to all personal injury actions, whether based upon negligence or strict liability. . . .
“Whether the ten-year limitation contained in K.S.A. 60-513(b) applies to the plaintiffs cause of action must be resolved by an analysis of the Kansas statute. As noted in Judge Kelly’s order of certification, the federal district court decisions interpreting subsection (b) have yielded different results. The plaintiff, citing Colby v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 589 F. *324Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1984), argues that the ten-year limitation does not begin until the person bringing the action has received a substantial injury. Thus, he argues that the ten-year limitation did not begin to run upon his last exposure to asbestos in 1971, but upon the diagnosis of his asbestos-related injury in 1986.
“The ten-year limitation contained in K.S.A. 60-513(b) begins at ‘the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.’ In Colby, this phrase was interpreted to mean the date on which the plaintiff received a substantial injury and not the date of the defendant’s action.
“Chief Judge Earl E. O’Connor reached a different conclusion in Cowan by Cowan v. Cederle Laboratories, 604 F. Supp. 438 (D. Kan. 1985). In Cowan, the court, citing the analysis of Judge Rogers in Purcell v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 81-4237 (D. Kan., unpublished, June 2, 1982), held that the phrase ‘the act giving rise to the cause of action’ meant the date of the exposure of the injured party to the allegedly harmful substance, and not the date of the subsequent substantial injury.
“In Cowan, plaintiffs had brought an action for the physical and mental damages allegedly caused by the discoloration of their daughter’s teeth due to her ingestion of tetracycline produced by the defendant. After quoting the earlier interpretation of the statute in Colby, the court stated:
‘If the latter (gerund) construction is correct, then “the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action” might be better phrased as “the time when the cause of action accrued.” One would then look to the opening lines of K.S.A. 60-513(b), which state that “. . . the cause of action in this action [section] shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury.” In other words, “the act giving rise to the cause of action” would be the causing of substantial injury — here, the discoloration of Lisa’s teeth. Plaintiffs would then have up to ten years after that in which to file suit (but no more than two years after the fact of Lisa’s injury had become reasonably ascertainable).
‘If one looks only at the portion of K.S.A. 60-513(b) which follows the last comma, this latter construction seems entirely reasonable. As Judge Rogers noted, however, this construction gives the phrase “act giving rise to the cause of action” two different meanings within the same subsection. Where it first appears in that subsection, the phrase could not possibly be construed as a gerund. Rather, it must refer to the time of ingestion of tetracycline. Recause that construction is equally reasonable as to the second appearance of this phrase, we decline to assume that the legislature intended the phrase to have two different meanings within- the same subsection. Therefore, both appearances of the phrase “act giving rise to the cause of action” must refer to Lisa Cowan’s ingestion of tetracycline.’ 604 F. Supp. at 443.
“While it is possible to interpret the last clause of subsection (b) in isolation so that the ten-year maximum limitation period does not commence until the time of substantial injury, this interpretation requires separate and different interpretations of the phrase ‘the act giving rise to the cause of action.’
*325“ ‘It is the duty of courts to reconcile various provisions of an act in order to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible if that can be done without doing violence to plain provisions therein contained.’ State, ex rel., v. Kalb, 218 Kan. 459, 464, 543 P.2d 872 (1975), modified 219 Kan. 231, 546 P.2d 1406 (1976). The various provisions of a statute should be construed together to result in consistency rather than inconsistency, if it is reasonably possible to so construe them. Terrill v. Hoyt, 149 Kan. 51, 55, 87 P.2d 238 (1939). In the present case, a consistent interpretation of the phrase ‘the act giving rise to the cause of action,’ as the phrase is used in the separate clauses of K.S.A. 60-513(b), requires interpreting the phrase to mean the defendant’s wrongful act, rather than the occurrence of a substantial injury.
“Applying this interpretation to the instant case, we conclude that the ten-year limitation contained in subsection (b) began, at the latest, upon the last exposure of the plaintiff to asbestos produced, sold, and distributed by the defendants in 1971.” 244 Kan. at 479-81.
In the case before us, plaintiffs were first exposed to the allegedly toxic substance from the furnace in 1981 and last exposed sometime after November 24, 1985 (the date plaintiffs contend they discovered the furnace was improperly vented). This action was filed on November 16, 1987, less than two years later.
Thus, there is nothing in Tomlinson that would bar the action herein and there is no reason to overrule Tomlinson. This court in Tomlinson discussed Ruthrauff, Administratrix v. Kensinger, 214 Kan. 185, 519 P.2d 661 (1974), and held its rule applied to Tomlinson. The Tomlinson court found nothing inconsistent between its holding and that of Ruthrauff. Yet the majority herein finds it necessary to overrule Tomlinson in order to uphold Ruthrauff.
Except for the majority’s discussion of and its overruling of Tomlinson, I concur with the balance of the majority opinion.