Court Opinion

ID: 9516444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:42:35.539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:15.334916
License: Public Domain

Marilyn Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The exclusion of all violations of the Mich*152igan Vehicle Code from the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (hyta) violates the equal protection clause. US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 2; MCL 762.11 et seq.; MSA 28.853 (11) et seq.
When the Legislature amended the hyta, it did not articulate its purpose. The majority opinion uses a state senate staff analysis to conclude that the underlying goal of the amendment was the exclusion of all driving offenses from application of the hyta. House Legislative Analysis, HB 4596, December 17, 1987. Yet, although the analysis relied upon mentions that the amendment comprises more than drunk driving offenses, its thrust is undeniably drunk driving.
Under the section entitled "Rationale,” we find:
[Y]ouths charged with alcohol-related driving offenses . . . [are being assigned] to the [hyta] status, thereby circumventing the drunk-driving laws’ provision for felony charges upon the third offense.
The section called "Supporting Arguments” states:
The bill would preclude the use — whether intentional or inadvertent — of the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act as a way of avoiding the progressive sanctions of the State’s drunk driving laws, which include license suspension upon a drunk driving conviction and felony charges upon the third offense.
I cannot but conclude that the bill’s purpose was so dominantly aimed at drunk driving felonies that inclusion of other traffic offenses, although presumably knowingly done, was at best tangential. Moreover, it was irrational and arbitrary.
The majority also presumes that the public pol*153icy of holding minors driving vehicles to an adult standard of Care must have been one object of the Legislature in enacting 1988 PA 4. This public policy has never been described in detail, having been announced by our Supreme Court in a peremptory reversal. Constantino v Wolverine Ins Co, 407 Mich 896; 284 NW2d 463 (1979). Its only usage appears to have been in determining the standard of care applicable to a minor involved as a driver in a traffic accident; it has had no application in sentencing questions. See Osner v Boughner, 180 Mich App 248, 254-257; 446 NW2d 873 (1989); Cornack v Sweeney, 127 Mich App 375, 378; 339 NW2d 26 (1983).
Assuming the Legislature intended to expand the policy into sentencing, the overly broad amendment is not rationally related to the reasonable governmental purpose of holding youthful motorists to an adult standard. See, e.g., Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 216; 102 S Ct 2382; 72 L Ed 2d 786 (1982); Pioneer State Mutual Ins Co v Allstate Ins Co, 417 Mich 590, 600; 339 NW2d 470 (1983).
Defendant makes clear through examples the extent to which the classification is irrational and arbitrary: Martinez might have waited at the scene until police arrived and then fled leading them on a high speed chase. He would have been eligible for youthful trainee status simply because the failure to obey an officer and/or fleeing and eluding is an offense contained in the Michigan Penal Code. MCL 750.1 et seq.; MSA 28.191 et seq.1
A violator charged with reckless driving2 would be automatically ineligible for youthful trainee status. However, if a person is killed as a result of such driving and the youthful offender is charged *154with felonious driving,3 negligent homicide4 or manslaughter,5 hyta status is available.
If an offender forges a motor vehicle certificate of title,6 the offender may not be a youthful trainee; but the forgery of almost any other type of document7 would not disqualify the person from youthful trainee status.
A person whose vehicle contains a firearm8 may become a youthful trainee, while someone whose vehicle is equipped with a siren, bell or whistle9 may not.
Finally, hyta status may be granted to someone discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle;10 it cannot be used for the youthful offender who merely discharges cargo he or she is transporting in a motor vehicle.11 I cannot reasonably conceive of any set of facts that provides a rational basis for the broad exclusion of all traffic offenses from the HYTA.
In conclusion, the 1988 amendment excluding all traffic offenses from the purview of the hyta is not rationally related to the object of excluding youthful drunk drivers from hyta protection. Alternatively, exclusion from the hyta of all traffic offenses is not rationally related to a reasonable governmental purpose. Accordingly, this Court should find the exemption unconstitutional._

 MCL 750.479a; MSA 28.747(1)

 MCL 257.626; MSA 9.2326

 MCL 752.191; MSA 28.661

 MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556

 MCL 750.321; MSA 28.553

 MCL 257.257; MSA 9.1957

 MCL 750.248; MSA 28.445

 MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424

 MCL 257.706; MSA 9.2406

 MCL 750.234a; MSA 28.431(1)

 MCL 257.720; MSA 9.2420