Court Opinion

ID: 9391576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 17:11:54.226755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:42.301065
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 36

            SUPREME COURT            OF   WISCONSIN
                                                       NOTICE
                                           This order is subject to further
                                           editing and modification.    The
                                           final version will appear in the
                                           bound volume of the official
                                           reports.

No.   2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382

Jeffrey Becker, Andrea Klein and A Leap Above
Dance, LLC,

           Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                                                FILED
      v.                                                   May 2, 2023
Dane County, Janel Heinrich and Public Health                Sheila T. Reiff
                                                         Clerk of Supreme Court
of Madison & Dane County,                                      Madison, WI

           Defendants-Respondents.

      The Court entered the following order on this date:

      ¶1   The   court   having   considered   plaintiffs-appellants-

petitioners Jeffrey Becker, Andrea Klein, and A Leap Above Dance,
LLC's motion for reconsideration;

      ¶2   IT IS ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is

denied without costs.
                                            No.   2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh

     ¶3     BRIAN    HAGEDORN,   J.   (concurring).      The     motion   for

reconsideration does not meet our standards; I join the court's

order denying it.1     I write separately to address the petitioners'

suggestion    that      my   "text-and-history"       approach     to     the

nondelegation challenge in this case was novel, and they should

have the opportunity to brief it.

     The petitioners challenged a statutory scheme with roots

dating back to the first laws enacted after the adoption of the

Wisconsin    Constitution.        Early   legislative    enactments       are

obviously relevant to the original understanding of the Wisconsin

Constitution.2      Indeed, scholarship surrounding the nondelegation

doctrine looks at precisely this kind of evidence to determine the

scope of judicially-enforceable nondelegation principles.3

     1 The dissent spends many pages in the hopes of relitigating
this case, raising arguments new and old. It does not, however,
accurately represent the arguments I made in my concurrence in the
underlying case. But the nature of this motion does not demand a
re-airing of the legal issues; therefore, I will not do so.
     2 See Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67,
¶64, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 ("Early enactments following
the adoption of the constitution are appropriately given special
weight . . . because these enactments are likely to reflect the
original public meaning of the constitutional text.").
     3 As the movants are no doubt aware, there is a significant
scholarly debate over these matters. Some have argued that little
historical evidence supports some of the more robust theories of
nondelegation.    See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas
Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (2021);
Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist
Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from
the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 Yale L.J.
1288 (2021); Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History of Delegation
at the Founding, 56 Ga. L. Rev. 81 (2021). Other scholars have
argued that history reflects general agreement about nondelegation
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                                         No.    2021AP1343 & 2021AP1382.bh

     It is true that some have attempted to propound a kind of

general theory to govern nondelegation challenges.             But as I

explained in my concurrence, there is no need to resort to a

judicially-created all-purpose test if history provides sufficient

assistance. Analyzing the historical record to assess how specific

nondelegation   claims   may   have   been     understood    should     be

uncontroversial.   This is particularly important here because the

dangers of judicial usurpation are great.          Justice Scalia has

suggested that where possible, the rule of law should be a law of

rules.4   A nondelegation framework that is ill-defined or too

abstract runs the risk of operating simply as a means by which

judges find whatever they're predisposed to find.           If a general

framework is appropriate, it should offer reasonable clarity, and

always be subject to a case-specific check rooted in an honest,

faithful inquiry into the original understanding of the Wisconsin

Constitution.

     In this case, the petitioners asked us to revise our approach

to nondelegation questions, but they did not present an originalist
case for their proposed rule rooted in the relevant history.          That

failure is not a good reason to give them another opportunity to

do so now.   I respectfully concur.

as a principle, even if its precise contours were subject to debate
and not particularly consistent.        See, e.g., Ilan Wurman,
Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 Yale L.J. 1490 (2021).
     4 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989).

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      ¶4     REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.         (dissenting).

      I like bats much better than bureaucrats. I live in the
      Managerial Age, in a world of "Admin."     The greatest
      evil is not now done in those sordid "dens of crime"
      that Dickens loved to paint. . . . [I]t is conceived
      and ordered (moved, seconded, carried, and minuted) in
      clean, carpeted, warmed and well-lighted offices, by
      quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and
      smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their
      voices. Hence, naturally enough, my symbol for Hell is
      something like the bureaucracy of a police state or the
      office of a thoroughly nasty business concern.
C.S. Lewis, Preface to The Screwtape Letters 3–4 (1961) (1942).

      ¶5     The people of Wisconsin protected themselves from the

evils of bureaucracy by ratifying a constitution under which only

elected    officials,   directly     accountable      to   the   voters,    could

prescribe or proscribe the activities of the people. In this case,

the   four    members   of    the    majority    effectively      amended    the

constitution to ordain a fourth branch of government, although the

people never agreed to be governed by it.1            The damage done to the

constitutional separation of powers is bad enough, but in order to

rubber stamp the diktats of the bureaucrats, the majority also
bastardized history.         The petitioners highlighted the error in

their motion for reconsideration, but the majority refuses to admit

its mistake, much less correct it.               Such acknowledgement may

embarrass    the   majority,   but    better    the    majority   endure    some

mortification than the people suffer an affront to their liberty.

      ¶6     The petitioners argue two grounds for reconsideration.

First, the petitioners seek an opportunity to brief Justice Brian

      1Becker v. Dane County, 2022 WI 63, 403 Wis. 2d 424, 977
N.W.2d 390.

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K.   Hagedorn's     novel   approach     to       analyzing       the     nondelegation

doctrine.     As the petitioners explain, neither this court nor the

United States Supreme Court has ever resolved a nondelegation issue

using this method, nor did any member of this court join the

concurrence       proposing      it.         While        the     first     basis    for

reconsideration       is      grounded       in     the         justices'    different

philosophical approaches to constitutional law, the second basis

for reconsideration highlights a fundamental error contaminating

the majority's entire analysis.              Although neither party——nor any

of the seven amici——even mentioned it, the majority heavily relied

on   an    1849   statute   as    supposed        historical        evidence    of   the

legislature delegating extraordinarily broad rulemaking authority

to a single, unelected public-health official.                            The majority

omitted from its analysis the pivotal portion of that statute,

under which the legislature purported to delegate the power to

promulgate public health orders to elected officials.                       Nothing in

the statute authorized unelected bureaucrats to order the people

do anything.      As the petitioners point out, the majority was dead
wrong.

      ¶7     While the majority's oversight is troubling, its current

obstinacy is unjustifiable.            "To err is human, and judges are

nothing if not human[.]"         Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶202, 393

Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685 (Kelly, J., concurring/dissenting);

see also State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 196, 204

N.W. 803 (1925) ("Perfection is an attribute solely of the Supreme

Ruler of the universe[.]").            The availability of reconsideration
represents a judicial recognition of our own fallibility.                             By
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rejecting this motion for reconsideration, the majority does "more

damage to the rule of law" than by "admit[ting] [its] error[.]"

State    v.    Roberson,           2019   WI 102,    ¶49,     389   Wis. 2d 190,    935

N.W.2d 813 (quoting Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau,

2003 WI 108, ¶100, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257).                      In doing so,

the majority endorses revisionist history, eroding a bedrock on

which civilized society rests——truth.                  I dissent.

                       I.    THE MAJORITY'S ERROR IN BECKER

     The      majority's       rejection      of    the     nondelegation    principle

relied heavily on its selective reading of an 1849 statute.                        That

statute's first section stated:

     The justices of the peace of every town, the president
     and trustees of every incorporated village, and the
     mayor and aldermen of every incorporated city in this
     state, shall be boards of health, and as such shall
     exercise all the powers, and perform all the duties
     provided in this chapter, within the limits of the towns,
     villages, and cities respectively, of which they are
     such officers.
Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 26, § 1 (1849).                       Neither the majority/lead

opinion2      nor   Justice        Hagedorn's      concurrence      acknowledged   this

section       (i.e.,        they     "overlooked"      it),     which    defined    the

composition of a local board of health.                     Critically, all members

of such local boards were elected officials, directly accountable

to the people.          The reasoning of both opinions depends on other

sections of the statute, which the majority misconstrued to grant

     2 Wis. S. Ct. IOP III.G.4 ("If . . . the opinion originally
circulated as the majority opinion does not garner the vote of a
majority of the court, it shall be referred to in separate writings
as the 'lead opinion[.]' ").

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unelected local boards significant rulemaking authority.                          See

infra Parts II, IV.

     ¶8     Because        neither    the    majority/lead      opinion    nor    the

concurrence seemed to notice the first section of the 1849 statute,

the majority mistakenly assumed that members of local boards of

health were unelected bureaucrats.                   Only by ignoring the first

section of the 1849 statute could the majority (erroneously)

conclude    that        broad   delegations       of   rulemaking    authority     to

bureaucrats        do    not    offend      the   Wisconsin     Constitution,     as

originally understood.          The 1849 statute——to the extent it has any

relevance——actually stands for the opposite proposition:                         the

constitution does not permit delegations of legislative authority

to unelected bureaucrats.            To the extent the statute delegated any

rulemaking    authority,         duly    elected       officials   were   the    only

permissible delegees.           The statute declared that members of local

boards "shall be" elected officials; bureaucrats could not serve

on those boards.          See Wis. Rev. Stat. ch. 26, § 1 (1849).

     ¶9     In section 2, the 1849 statute distinguished between
local     boards    of     health    and     local     public   health    officers,

reinforcing that the powers of the two were purposefully kept

separate:

     Every board of health may take such measures and make
     such rules and regulations, as they may deem most
     effectual for the preservation of the public health, and
     for that purpose may appoint a physician, who shall be
     the health officer of the territory within the
     jurisdiction of the board, and who shall hold his office
     during their pleasure; they may also appoint so many
     persons to aid them in the execution of their powers and

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      duties, as they think proper, and shall regulate the
      fees and charges of every person so employed by them.
Id.   § 2.        While    the   1849    statute   may    have    given   rulemaking

authority to local boards, it cannot fairly be read to have granted

any such authority to health officers, who performed an executive,

not legislative, function.          The legislature statutorily authorized

local boards to "make such rules and regulations, as they may deem

most effectual for the preservation of the public health[.]"                      Id.

The legislature did not so authorize health officers.                        See id.

Section      3     permitted     local     boards——not         health    officers——to

implement orders, and section 4 declared that the local boards——

not health officers——had to first publish those orders for them to

be enforceable.           Id. §§ 3–4.     A health officer who tried to make

law unilaterally and then enforce it acted without authority.                      As

the petitioners explain in their motion for reconsideration, "this

statute['s plain language] does not provide any support whatsoever

for   the        proposition     that    the    power     to     issue    enforceable

restrictions can be delegated to a single, unelected official at

the local level.          If anything, it cuts the other way."
      ¶10    The majority misunderstood the historical context in

which the 1849 statute existed.                For decades after the statute's

enactment, "local boards of health and appointment of [local

public-]health officers were optional."                    Wis. Legis. Council,

Staff Report to the Public Health Committee on Public Health

Services 14 (1960). Much to the medical profession's lament, local

boards were generally found only in large cities.                         William C.
Rives, The Importance and Essential Needs of Local Boards of

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Health, 13 JAMA 403, 403 (1889).       According to an 1883 report, "in

more than one [Wisconsin] town where Small Pox made its appearance

it spread solely because there was no one authorized to take the

prompt and efficient measures that the emergency demanded[.]"

State Bd. of Health, Annual Report of 1882 102 (1883).            A similar

report a few years later explained:

     Local Boards . . . have long had a legal existence in
     the State of Wisconsin, certain officials elected for
     other purposes having by the statutes been declared to
     be also Boards . . . . As a matter of fact, however,
     these Boards, though invested with ample powers, have,
     except in a very few of the larger cities, seldom had
     more than a nominal existence, have rarely ever
     met . . . , have more rarely appointed Health Officers,
     and have practically almost wholly ignored their duties
     as guardians of Public Health.
State Bd. of Health, Biennial Report for the Period from Nov.,

1882 to Sept. 30, 1884 27 (1885).           After smallpox devastated

Wisconsin in the early 1880s, the legislature responded by enacting

a law mandating the formation of local boards.                 Wis. Legis.

Council, Staff Report to the Public Health Committee on Public

Health Services, at 14–15.

     ¶11   The legislative history of the 1883 statute reveals a

serious policy concern with unelected bureaucrats serving on local

boards of health.    The 1882 report contains a copy of the bill as

first introduced; it had been prepared by the State Board of

Health.    The bill stated, in relevant part:

     Section 1. Every town board, village board, or common
     council of every town, village or city in this state
     shall hereafter, within thirty days after each annual
     election, organize themselves into a Board of Health, or
     shall appoint from their own members or otherwise, a

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     suitable number of competent persons, who shall organize
     by the election of a chairman and clerk, and exercise
     all the powers and perform all the duties of a Board of
     Health in and for such town, village or city: provided,
     that no special health department shall have been
     established or constituted by the charter or other act
     of incorporation of any such town, village or city. And
     every board of health organized, appointed or elected
     under the provisions of this act . . . .
State Bd. of Health, Annual Report of 1882, at 104 (emphasis

added).    Ostensibly, this bill would have authorized bureaucrats

to serve on local boards; however, the legislature removed the
emphasized language, maintaining the historical requirement that

all members of local boards must be elected officials.              See § 1,

ch. 167, Laws of 1883.

     ¶12   The    majority's    failure    to   fully   consider   the   1849

statute is particularly striking given the central role it played

in the decision.       Appendix 1 reproduces the instances in which it

was cited or discussed.       Also noted are instances in which members

of the majority advanced the theory that the 1849 statutes are

especially important.       Appendix 1 illustrates the significance of

the 1849 statute to the court's decision, especially for Justice

Hagedorn——whose vote was necessary to uphold the validity of orders
issued by local health officials.           Also evident in Appendix 1,

despite extensive discussion of the statute by all members of the

majority, none of them mentioned the first section of the statute—

—only sections 2 through 4.

                II.    THE CONCURRENCE'S ANALYTICAL ERRORS

     ¶13   In    his    concurring   opinion,   Justice   Hagedorn    placed
substantial, if not controlling, emphasis on the 1849 statute.             He

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wrote,    "[t]hese        1849    statutes    offer     significant      evidence    of

original understanding in this case."                 Becker v. Dane County, 2022

WI 63,    ¶65,      403    Wis. 2d 424,       977     N.W.2d 390     (Hagedorn,     J.,

concurring);        see    also    id.,    ¶39      (majority/lead     op.)    ("[T]he

original understanding of our constitution's separation of powers

was that the constitution allows grants of broad public health

authority      to   local    governments          substantively    similar    to    that

delineated in Wis. Stat. § 252.03.").                  He continued:

       Our earliest statutes provide particularly important
       evidence of how the Wisconsin Constitution was
       originally understood.    The Revised Statutes of 1849
       were written and adopted by legislators who observed or
       participated in the constitutional convention first
       hand.    Shortly after it convened, Wisconsin's first
       state legislature quickly created a commission to assist
       in drafting our first statutes. The commission's task
       was to compile and recommend an initial set of laws based
       upon territorial rules and practice, omitting those that
       were obsolete, as well as those repugnant to the newly
       drafted constitution. The commission's recommendations
       were then debated and voted on by the legislature,
       ultimately creating the Revised Statutes of 1849.
Id.,     ¶62    (Hagedorn,        J.,     concurring);       see    also     id.,   ¶38

(majority/lead        op.)       ("Bolstering        our    conclusion      that    the

substantive nature of Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and Dane County Ordinance

§ 46.40 do not upset our constitutional separation of powers is

founding-era grants of similar public health authority to local

governments.        Wisconsin's first state legislature saw no conflict

between the constitution's separation of powers and the grant of

broad    public     health       authority    to    local    governments.").        For

support, Justice Hagedorn cited a secondary source, a book on
Wisconsin legal history by Attorney Joseph A. Ranney.                      In addition

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to misinterpreting the statute by neglecting to consider its first

section, Justice Hagedorn also misunderstood how the revised 1849

statutes were created.        Neither primary sources nor Attorney

Ranney's    findings     support     Justice      Hagedorn's    analytical

foundation.

     ¶14   The 1849 Assembly Journal contains a report from the

committee on revision, which compiled the revised 1849 statutes.

This report chronicles the struggles of the committee, which felt

overworked.     Expressing concern, it wrote:

     The act authorizing the election of commissioners to
     revise the laws seems to contemplate that they should
     suggest in writing, by reports or notes accompanying the
     acts   revised,  the   contradictions,   omissions,   or
     imperfections which might appear therein, and the mode
     in which the same might be reconciled, supplied, or
     amended, and their reasons for advising the repeal of
     any act which in their judgment ought to be repealed.——
     With this provision the commissioners have been wholly
     unable to comply.       It must be obvious that the
     performance of such a labor would consume much time[.]
J. 2d Sess. Assemb. State Wis. 788–89 (1849) (emphasis added).

The early legislature was similarly overworked, so it generally
deferred to the committee.     See Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing

to Providence:     A History of Wisconsin's Legal System 76 (1999)

("[T]he commissioners were a legislature unto themselves:             their

revisions to the laws were subject to legislative approval but

ultimately were adopted largely intact."); W. Scott Van Alstyne,

Jr., Land Transfer and Recording in Wisconsin:         A Partial History—

—Part I, 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 44, 54 (explaining the committee's

drafts   "met   some   opposition"   but   that   "a   comparison   of   the
legislative result with the final drafts confirms the notations in

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[a committee member]'s diary that the drafts finally passed with

amazingly few amendments of any significance").

     ¶15   Attorney   Ranney,     on    the    same   page   Justice   Hagedorn

cited, explained:

     The commissioners met in the late summer of 1848 and
     soon realized that the task was too big for them alone.
     The 1839 codification of territorial laws eased their
     task somewhat, but the large body of laws enacted since
     1839 had to be compiled and organized.     In addition,
     existing statutes failed to cover many important areas
     of the law and filling in the gaps was a huge task.

     The commissioners decided to concentrate first on laws
     essential to the basic administration of the state. By
     January of 1849, they had prepared code sections
     covering the organization of state and local government,
     taxes, transportation, public health, corporations, and
     trade and commercial regulation. The 1849 legislature
     adopted these laws largely without change and appointed
     a   special   legislative    committee   to   help   the
     commissioners with their remaining work.
Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence, at 76.               The 1849 statute

was based primarily on a territorial law (under a system of

government with a different separation of powers) and appears to

have been adopted by the legislature prior to the formation of the
special legislative committee, which was created to assist the

committee on revision.     See Wis. Stats. p. 125 (1839).              Attorney

Ranney's work is hardly an endorsement of using the revised 1849

statutes   as   a     guidepost        to     constructing     the     Wisconsin

Constitution's original meaning.

     ¶16   Justice Hagedorn also erred by failing to consider other

sources of original meaning.            "We may look to 'three primary
sources in determining the meaning of a constitution provision:

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[1] the plain meaning, [2] the constitutional debates and practices

of the time, and [3] the earliest interpretations of the provision

by the legislature, as manifested through the first legislative

action following adoption.' "           Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2016 WI

47, ¶54, 369 Wis. 2d 272, 882 N.W.2d 333 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley,

J., concurring) (quoting Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle,

2006 WI 107, ¶19, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (modifications in

the original)).      "The ordering of these sources reflect[s] their

legal weight, i.e., plain meaning is most important while early

statutory enactments are least indicative."                  Becker, 403 Wis. 2d

424, ¶105 n.18 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (citation

omitted).   Justice Hagedorn barely considered plain meaning or the

constitutional debates, focusing almost exclusively on an early

statutory enactment while ignoring the very statutory provision

that undercuts the majority's analysis altogether.

                     III.    RECONSIDERATION STANDARDS

     ¶17    To the extent this court reflexively denies this (or any

other) reconsideration motion based on its nonbinding internal
operating procedures (IOPs), the court errs.                    Wisconsin Stat.

§ (Rule)    809.64     (2019–20)        states,       "[a]    party     may     seek

reconsideration of the judgment or opinion of the supreme court by

filing a motion under s. 809.14 for reconsideration within 20 days

after the date of the decision of the supreme court."                  No rule of

appellate   procedure       specifies    the   criteria      this    court    should

consider    when   determining      whether       to    grant    a    motion    for

reconsideration.      This court's IOPs provide some guidance.                 Part
III, Section J notes, in relevant part:
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       Reconsideration, in the sense of a rehearing of the case,
       is seldom granted.         A change of decision on
       reconsideration will ensue only when the court has
       overlooked controlling legal precedent or important
       policy considerations or has overlooked or misconstrued
       a controlling or significant fact appearing in the
       record. A motion for reconsideration may result in the
       court's issuing a corrective or explanatory memorandum
       to its opinion without changing the mandate.
Wis.    S.   Ct.     IOP   III.J.     This     statement,      however,   is   not

controlling.       The introduction to the IOPs notes the IOPs "are not

rules of appellate procedure."             Id. at Intro.        The introduction
also declares, "[i]t should be reemphasized that these are not

rules. They do not purport to limit or describe in binding fashion

the    powers   or    duties   of   any   Supreme      Court   personnel."     Id.

(emphasis added).          The IOPs do not contemplate a majority of the

court committing a serious error of the sort permeating its

analysis in this case, and the non-exhaustive examples of grounds

for reconsideration contained in non-binding IOPs do not constrain

the court from correcting its mistakes.                 Declaring that "policy

considerations" warrant reconsideration, but grievous errors in

pronouncing the law do not, would be an extraordinary position

indeed for the state's highest court to take.                  "The court should
have the courage to correct its own mistakes.                    The motion for

reconsideration affords the court this opportunity."                 Collison v.

City of Milwaukee Bd. of Rev., No. 2018AP669, unpublished order,

at 5 (Aug. 16, 2021) (Roggensack, J., dissenting from the denial

of the motion for reconsideration).

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 IV.    THE MAJORITY'S FOUNDATIONAL ERRORS COMPEL RECONSIDERATION

       ¶18   The    majority's    misapplication         of    the      1849    statute

overlooked the text's dispositive distinction between elected

officials and unelected bureaucrats, an axiom of early Wisconsin

government.        To reject the distinction is to equate a technocracy

with a democratic republic.             "What is a republican government?

There is or can be but one answer to the question.                      It is a state

in   which   the     exercise    of   the    sovereign    power      is    lodged    in

representatives       elected    by   the    people."         J.   B.    Jillson,    An

Abolitionist Subscriber's Views (1847), reprinted in The Struggle

over Ratification, at 639, 640 (Milo M. Quaife ed., Wis. Hist.

Soc'y 1920); see also Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. __, 139

S. Ct. 2116, 2134 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("Restricting

the task of legislating to one branch characterized by difficult

and deliberative processes was also designed to promote fair notice

and the rule of law, ensuring the people would be subject to a

relatively stable and predictable set of rules.                    And by directing

that legislating be done only by elected representatives in a
public process, the Constitution sought to ensure that the lines

of accountability would be clear: The sovereign people would know,

without ambiguity, whom to hold accountable for the laws they would

have to follow.").         Indirect accountability (i.e., a bureaucrat's

accountability to elected officials who are in turn accountable to

the people) is no substitute for direct accountability.                        See Clean

Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Nat. Res., 2021 WI 72, ¶56, 398

Wis. 2d 433,        961    N.W.2d 611       (Rebecca     Grassl         Bradley,    J.,
dissenting)        ("The    people      never     imparted         any     power     on
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administrative bureaucrats insulated from any democratic oversight

by the people.").

       ¶19   The       nondelegation       principle         is     firmly       rooted    in

Wisconsin's history as well as the structure of the constitution.

"The people have a right to expect and demand at the hands of their

representatives a full and fair discharge of their duties. Elected

by their votes for the attainment of specified and well-known

objects, their powers are limited and they are acting in the

capacity of agents and cannot transcend instructions."                           Selections

from   the   Milwaukee        Courier:          Views   of    a    "Democrat"        (1846),

reprinted in The Struggle over Ratification, at 196, 196 (Milo M.

Quaife ed., Wis. Hist. Soc'y 1920).                     The very process by which

bureaucrats make decisions is distinct from the approach of elected

officials (at least those who would like to continue serving).                             "A

'technocratic' approach to government 'drains public discourse of

substantive moral argument and treats ideologically contestable

questions as if they were matters of economic efficiency, the

province of experts.' "              Becker, 403 Wis. 2d 424, ¶147 (quoting
Michael J. Sandel, The Tyranny of Merit:                          What's Become of the

Common Good 20 (2020)).

       ¶20   This       distinction        is    ingrained         in      the    Wisconsin

Constitution,         and    early   pronouncements          of     the     nondelegation

principle exist in this court's precedent.                         Well over a century

ago, this court unequivocally stated that "the power to make the

law    cannot    be     delegated     to   any    board      or     body    not    directly

responsible to the people."                State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge, 95
Wis. 390,       404,    70    N.W. 347      (1897)      (emphasis          added).        The
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majority/lead       opinion    in     Becker   never     addressed     Burdge,   and

Justice Hagedorn stated in his concurrence that "Burdge supports

the conclusion that the authority to issue local health orders may

be    conferred   by   the     legislature     on   local     health    official,"

exhibiting    his    failure     to    apprehend    the     distinction    between

elected officials and unelected bureaucrats.                    See Becker, 403

Wis. 2d 424, ¶66 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).

       ¶21   More recently, in a case analogous to Becker, the court

thrice noted that Secretary-Designee Andrea Palm was an unelected

bureaucrat in its majority opinion striking down her safer-at-home

order as an unlawful exercise of power.                 Wisconsin Legislature v.

Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶1, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 ("This case

is about the assertion of power by one unelected official, Andrea

Palm, and her order to all people within Wisconsin to remain in

their homes, not to travel and to close all businesses that she

declares are not 'essential' in Emergency Order 28."); id., ¶24

("If we were to read the definition of 'Rule' as Palm suggests,

one    person,    Palm,   an    unelected      official,      could    create    law
applicable to all people during the course of COVID-19 and subject

people to imprisonment when they disobeyed her order."); id., ¶28

("Rulemaking exists precisely to ensure that kind of controlling,

subjective judgment asserted by one unelected official, Palm, is

not imposed in Wisconsin."            (citation omitted)).         My concurrence

in that case expounded upon this distinction:                      "As a general

principle, it is the duty of the legislature to create the law,

and any delegation of lawmaking responsibility to administrative
agencies . . . must be carefully circumscribed in order to avoid
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the people being governed by unelected bureaucrats."                        Id., ¶78

(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring); see also Tavern League

of Wis., Inc. v. Palm, 2021 WI 33, ¶17, 396 Wis. 2d 434, 957

N.W.2d 261            (lead         op.)         ("Rulemaking            'ensure[s]

that . . . controlling,            subjective    judgment        asserted     by   one

unelected    official'        is   not    imposed     by   agencies     through    the

abandonment      of   rulemaking         procedures."        (quoting     Palm,    391

Wis. 2d 497, ¶28 (majority op.) (modifications in the original)));

Gymfinity, Ltd. v. Dane County, No. 2020AP1927-OA, unpublished

order, at 3 (Wis. Dec. 21, 2020) (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting)

("[W]hen it is presented to us that fundamental personal liberty

is suppressed by an unelected official, we must act.").                            The

majority in Becker never addressed Palm; not a single member of

the majority in this case joined the majority in Palm, and three

of them dissented from it.               E.g., Becker, 403 Wis. 2d 424, ¶136

(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) ("The majority silently

overrules Palm, a decision from which three members of the majority

in this case sharply dissented.             Only a change in court membership
enables    the   current       majority     to   discard       this   quite    recent

precedent.").

     ¶22     To the extent the 1849 statute has relevance, it lends

historical credence to the dissent I authored in Becker.                           See,

e.g., id., ¶74 ("Under our state constitution, the people of

Wisconsin authorized particular elected officials to exercise

power over them.         But the people never consented to that power

being given away."); id., ¶75 ("Not surprisingly, when the people
consented to the rules that will govern society, they carefully
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confined the exercise of such awesome power to those whom they

elect.     Should others attempt to rule over the people, their

actions are beyond the law, even if they bear the imprimatur of a

legislative body. Legislators have no power to anoint legislators;

only the people do."); id., ¶76 ("The people adopted an exception

permitting the legislature to delegate lawmaking power to county

boards    (the       members    of   which    are    elected),      but     those   local

governmental entities may not give the power to anyone else.");

id., ¶77 ("The constitution does not give the Dane County Board of

Supervisors      any      authority     to        empower    a     single,    unelected

bureaucrat to restrict the liberty of the people of Dane County.");

id., ¶108 ("Burdge goes on to explain the authority the legislature

may confer on local boards (not unelected bureaucrats)[.]"); id.,

¶128 ("If the lawmakers may not re-delegate their delegated power

even to the people, it is logically impossible for county boards

to redelegate their delegated power to an unelected bureaucrat.");

id., ¶133 ("This duty becomes imperative when governmental actors

conspire to collapse the carefully calibrated separation of powers
among the three branches in favor of consolidating power in a

single,    unelected           bureaucrat.");       id.,     ¶147     ("The     majority

displaces the constitutional design for the exercise of lawmaking

power    with    a    'technocracy'     the       majority       favors."      (citation

omitted)).           Substantial     precedent       reinforces       the     difference

between the constitutional exercise of power by elected officials

and the unlawful exercise of power by unelected bureaucrats.                          See

id., ¶¶118–32 (summarizing many cases).

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     ¶23    The majority owns its error; neither the parties nor any

of the seven amici briefed the statutory history on which the

majority relied.        Some members of the majority have warned us of

the detrimental consequences of violating the party presentation

principle.       See, e.g., Town of Wilson v. City of Sheboygan, 2020

WI 16,    ¶78,    390   Wis. 2d 266,      938    N.W.2d 493     (Hagedorn,        J.,

concurring) ("I believe we would be best served by adversarial

briefing and argument.         A full hearing on the merits of this

important issue would help ensure that we are not missing anything

and that the consequences of our decision are fully fleshed out

beforehand.").       The consequences in this case are particularly

grave because the majority tampered with the very constitutional

structure of the government.            When judges conduct independent

historical research without the benefit of adversarial briefing,

they have an obligation to use the sources they find "faithfully,"

which    necessarily     requires   judges      to   thoroughly    review       them.

Skylar Reese Croy & Alexander Lemke, An Unnatural Reading:                        The

Revisionist History of Abortion in Hodes v. Schmidt, 32 U. Fla. J.
L. & Pub. Pol'y 71, 81 (2021).            Citing historical sources out of

context is antithetical to the originalist approach.                 Id.

     ¶24    The     denial    of    the      motion      for    reconsideration

demonstrates at least some members of the majority never cared

about a legitimate historical inquiry into the meaning of the

Wisconsin     Constitution.         Justice      Hagedorn      claimed     in    his

concurrence      that   "[r]egardless     of    judicial     philosophy,        every

member of this court is interested in . . . what the historical
evidence reveals about the text."               Becker, 403 Wis. 2d 424, ¶72
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(Hagedorn, J., concurring).    If that were true, the majority would

correct its blatant error.

                          V.   CONCLUSION

     ¶25   "This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples

of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing

when one story too many is added."     Douglas v. City of Jeannette,

319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J., separate op.).        In Becker,

the majority added a fictional story to the already disintegrating

temple of the nondelegation principle.    The majority is happy with

the result its story produced, so it denies this motion for

reconsideration without explanation.    The majority's errors injure

the constitutional separation of powers as well as this court's

reputation.   Although the oversight in Becker may have been an

honest mistake, today's denial is not.      I dissent.3

     3 The majority/lead opinion and the concurrence are replete
with other examples of poor statutory history analysis. As just
one example, the majority/lead opinion truncated a quote from a
1919 enactment. Below is the full section of the statute quoted
in paragraph 17 of the majority/lead opinion, with strikethrough
indicating the portions omitted from the quote:

     SECTION 1. There is added to the statutes a new section
     to read: Section 1411-5. The local board of health of
     each township, incorporated village or city with the
     consent of the state board of health shall have power to
     establish quarantine and to order and execute what is
     reasonable and necessary for the prevention and
     suppression of disease; to forbid public gatherings when
     deemed necessary to control epidemics, and to condemn
     and abate conditions causative of disease by means of
     rules and regulations which shall be consistent with the
     state law and the rules and regulations prescribed by
     the state board of health.

§ 1, ch. 159, Laws of 1919. The struck-through portions of the
statute indicate local boards of health could issue orders only
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     ¶26    I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE

KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this

dissent.

Appendix 1: Instances in Which the Majority/Lead Opinion or the
        Concurrence Cited or Discussed the 1849 Statute

Paragraph/Footnote                   Reference
Majority/lead op., ¶16 Similarly, Wisconsin's first state
¶164               legislature granted the local power to "take"
                   measures "deem[ed] most effectual for the
                   preservation   of    the    public    health."
                   Importantly, this law distinguished the power
                   to "take such measures" for the preservation
                   of public health from the power to "make such
                   rules and regulations" for the same purpose.
                   See Wis. Stat. ch. 26, § 2 (1849).        That
                   distinction   indicates    that   "take   such
                   measures" included action not by rule or
                   regulation but by order, as subsequent
                   sections of that same law recognized.      See
                   Wis.   Stat.    ch.    26,    §§ 3–4    (1849)
                   (differentiating between an "order" and a
                   "regulation").

with the express approval of the state board of health, which would
seem to be a significant procedural safeguard. The petitioners
referenced the struck-through language in their reply brief, and
they complain in their motion for reconsideration that the majority
overlooked this language. See Pet'rs Reply Br. at 6 ("Respondents
cite a statute . . . which, they claim, gave local health officers
'the power to order and execute what is reasonable and necessary
for the prevention and suppression of disease.' . . . The law
they cite, however, applied to 'local board[s] of health'——not
individual health officers——and any 'orders' required the 'consent
of the state board of health.' ").
     4   This paragraph was joined by four justices.

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Majority/lead op., ¶38 Bolstering our conclusion that the
¶38                substantive nature of Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and
                   Dane County Ordinance § 46.40 do not upset
                   our constitutional separation of powers is
                   founding-era grants of similar public health
                   authority to local governments. Wisconsin's
                   first state legislature saw no conflict
                   between the constitution’s separation of
                   powers and the grant of broad public health
                   authority to local governments.        The first
                   state code enacted just months after our
                   constitution's ratification authorized local
                   boards of health the authority to "take such
                   measures,    and    make     such    rules   and
                   regulations, as they may deem most effectual
                   for the preservation of the public health."
                   Wis. Stat. ch. 26, § 2 (1849). A violation
                   of board of health "order or regulation"
                   constituted      a     criminal      misdemeanor
                   punishable by up to $100 (over $3,000 in 2022
                   dollars) or three months in prison.         Wis.
                   Stat. ch. 26, § 3 (1849).
Majority/lead op., ¶39 We see two upshots from this original
¶39                grant of public health authority to local
                   governments.          First,     the    original
                   understanding      of     our     constitution's
                   separation    of    powers     was    that   the
                   constitution allows grants of broad public
                   health   authority     to   local    governments
                   substantively similar to that delineated in
                   Wis. Stat. § 252.03.          And second, our
                   constitution’s separation of powers also
                   allows public health orders enforceable by
                   criminal penalties that far exceed the civil
                   citations authorized by Dane County Ordinance
                   § 46.40. As such, Wis. Stat. § 252.03 and
                   Dane   County   Ordinance     § 46.40    do  not
                   substantively    offend    our    constitution's
                   separation of powers.

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Concurrence, ¶62   ¶62    Our      earliest     statutes      provide
                   particularly important evidence of how the
                   Wisconsin     Constitution      was    originally
                   understood.      The Revised Statutes of 1849
                   were written and adopted by legislators who
                   observed      or      participated      in     the
                   constitutional       convention    first     hand.
                   Shortly after it convened, Wisconsin's first
                   state    legislature      quickly     created    a
                   commission to assist in drafting our first
                   statutes.      The commission's task was to
                   compile and recommend an initial set of laws
                   based upon territorial rules and practice,
                   omitting those that were obsolete, as well
                   as those repugnant to the newly drafted
                   constitution.              The       commission's
                   recommendations were then debated and voted
                   on by the legislature, ultimately creating
                   the Revised Statutes of 1849.
Concurrence, ¶63   ¶63   These    laws    therefore    have    unique
                   relevance to an analysis focused on the
                   original understanding of the constitutional
                   text. This is particularly true when we find
                   laws on the books today that either descended
                   from these early statutes or do similar
                   things. When the constitutionality of such
                   a law is challenged, the historical context
                   provided by those early laws must weigh
                   heavily in the analysis.         Does this mean
                   these 1849 laws represent the final word on
                   a statute's constitutionality?          No.    But
                   unquestionably, they provide very strong
                   evidence of the constitution's original
                   understanding.
Concurrence,   ¶63 State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 138, 341
n.35               N.W.2d 668 (1984) ("[B]ecause the Revised
                   Statutes of 1849 are the first of our
                   statutes    to    be   enacted    following    the
                   constitution, it is reasonable to rely on
                   those statutes as reflecting the practice
                   when the constitution was adopted to assist
                   our interpretation of a word used by the
                   authors of the constitution in 1848."
                   (quoting another source)).
Concurrence,   ¶63 We have long employed this interpretive
n.36               technique in constitution interpretation.
                   See State ex rel. Pluntz v. Johnson, 176

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                   Wis. 107, 114–15, 186 N.W. 729 (1922) (noting
                   that    a   statute   "first    appeared    in
                   the . . . Revised Statutes of 1849" and
                   concluding     that     it     "amounts     to
                   contemporaneous legislative construction of
                   this    constitutional     provision,    which
                   construction    is    entitled     to    great
                   deference"); Payne v. City of Racine, 217
                   Wis. 550, 558, 259 N.W. 437 (1935) (same);
                   Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 572, 247
                   N.W.2d 141 (1976) (noting the persuasive
                   force of "the contemporaneous construction
                   evidenced" a provision of the "Revised
                   statutes of 1849").
Concurrence, ¶64   ¶64 One such 1849 statute is especially on-
                   point in this case. Chapter 26 in the Revised
                   Statutes of 1849 was entitled "Of the
                   Preservation of the Public Health."       That
                   statute is significant for our purposes
                   because it established local boards of health
                   and gave them duties and responsibilities
                   quite similar to the statutes challenged in
                   this case.    In relevant part, the statute
                   provided: "Every board of health may take
                   such measures, and make such rules and
                   regulations, as they may deem most effectual
                   for the preservation of the public health."
                   It then provided that "every person who shall
                   violate any order or regulation, made by any
                   board of health . . . shall be deemed guilty
                   of a misdemeanor, and punished by a fine not
                   exceeding   one   hundred   dollars,   or   by
                   imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding
                   three months." In other words, not only did
                   Wisconsin's first state government authorize
                   local health authorities to issue orders, it
                   criminalized the failure to follow those
                   orders.
Concurrence,   ¶64 Wis. Stat. ch. 26 (1849).
n.37
Concurrence,   ¶64 Wis. Stat. ch. 26 (1849).
n.38
Concurrence,   ¶64 Wis. Stat. ch. 26, § 2 (1849).
n.39
Concurrence,   ¶64 Wis. Stat. ch. 26, § 3 (1849).
n.40

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Concurrence, ¶65   ¶65 These 1849 statutes offer significant
                   evidence of original understanding in this
                   case.   When the Wisconsin Constitution was
                   ratified, those participating in state
                   government did not appear to understand the
                   constitution to forbid giving local officials
                   charged with protecting public health the
                   authority to issue at least some orders of
                   indeterminate   character.        Nor   was   it
                   understood to be problematic if those orders
                   were   enforceable.      That     same   general
                   statutory authority has been amended and
                   modified many times, but it continues in
                   today's Wis. Stat. § 252.03.            If this
                   arrangement on its face did not run afoul of
                   the constitutional separation of powers in
                   1849, it is hard to see why it would today.
                   Whatever theoretical nondelegation framework
                   may be found in the Wisconsin Constitution,
                   this kind of empowerment of local health
                   officials does not appear to violate it.
Concurrence,   ¶65 See Wis. Stat. ch. 26, §§ 2, 3 (1849); Wis.
n.41               Stat. ch. 32 §§ 2, 3 (1858); Wis. Stat. ch.
                   57, §§ 1412, 1413 (1878); Wis. Stat. ch. 76e
                   § 1412 (1921); Wis. Stat. § 143.03 (1923–24);
                   Wis. Stat. § 252.03 (1993–94).
Concurrence,   ¶71 Based on the historical record, I conclude
(third sentence)   the   legislature   did    not     impermissibly
                   delegate legislative power to local health
                   officers by authorizing them to issue orders
                   under Wis. Stat. § 252.03.
Concurrence, ¶72   ¶72 I close with a word to litigants.
                   Regardless of judicial philosophy, every
                   member of this court is interested in what
                   the text says and what the historical
                   evidence reveals about the text. Therefore,
                   parties who come to us advancing legal
                   theories    grounded    in     the     Wisconsin
                   Constitution should make every effort to
                   present arguments focused on the original
                   understanding of our constitution.         While
                   such briefing is always welcome, arguments
                   of this type are especially helpful when
                   analyzing   novel   claims     or    considering
                   challenges to our precedent. This is not a
                   new invitation; it is made in earnest.

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1