Court Opinion

ID: 9409536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 16:09:25.063694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:51.347049
License: Public Domain

J-A12021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.Y., A MINOR :        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                   :             PENNSYLVANIA
                                   :
 APPEAL OF: T.Y., MOTHER           :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :        No. 2819 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0000992-2020

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.D.Y.T., A        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
                                        :
 APPEAL OF: T.Y., MOTHER                :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :   No. 2820 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the Decree Entered September 26, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000247-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                  FILED JULY 18, 2023

     The learned Majority vacates the trial court’s order terminating the

parental rights of T.Y. (“Mother”) and changing the permanency goal of S.Y.

(“Child”) to adoption and remands this case to the trial court to determine

whether Attorney Irene Levy may represent both the best interests and the

legal interests of Child. As I believe that remand is unnecessary and that
J-A12021-23

termination of the parental rights of Mother was appropriate, I would affirm

the trial court. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

      As articulated more fully by the Majority, Child was born in September

2020 at 33 weeks of gestation weighing three pounds and eight ounces. Upon

Child’s birth, she tested positive for marijuana and oxycodone. Mother tested

positive for various drugs and was diagnosed with various mental illnesses.

Mother had a history of unstable housing and was living in a hotel at the time

of Child’s birth.   On September 18, 2020, the Philadelphia Department of

Human Services (“DHS”) obtained a protective custody order and placed Child

in a pre-adoptive home with T.M. Child has been living with T.M. since her

birth in September 2020.

      On September 21, 2020, the trial court appointed Attorney Claire Leotta

to serve as Child’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”). On November 17, 2020, Child

was adjudicated dependent and placed in the care of DHS.

      On April 13, 2022, DHS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental

rights to Child and to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. On August

30, 2022, Attorney Levy was appointed as Child’s GAL. On September 26,

2022, a hearing was held on DHS’s petition following which the trial court

entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing Child’s

permanency goal to adoption. Mother filed this timely appeal raising only one

issue: whether termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves Child’s

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare as required by 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Appellant’s Brief at 4.

                                     -2-
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      The Majority does not address the merits of Mother’s claim. Instead,

the Majority notes that, although the trial court appointed a GAL for Child, the

trial court failed to appoint legal counsel. Majority at *6. Relying on In re

Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020), the Majority finds that the

trial court erred in failing to ascertain whether Attorney Levy can represent

both the best interests and the legal interests of Child. Hence, the Majority

vacates the trial court’s order and remands for the trial court to make an

express determination as to whether there is a conflict between Child’s legal

interests and best interests and to appoint separate legal counsel if such a

conflict is found to exist. Majority at **5-6.

      Although my colleagues acknowledge that Child was only two years old

at the time of the termination hearing, they find that the failure to have an

express determination by the trial court that Child was too young to articulate

a preference was fatal. Id. at *6 n.3. I disagree with this conclusion.

      In In re: T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa. 2018), the parental rights of a mother

were terminated as to her two children. The children were ages two and three

at the time of the termination proceedings. The trial court appointed a GAL

to represent the children but did not appoint separate legal counsel.        On

appeal, appellant argued, inter alia, that the children should have been

represented by appointed counsel separate from the GAL.         In framing the

issue, the Supreme Court noted that the parties agreed that the young ages

of the children prevented them from forming “a subjective, articulable

preference to be advanced by counsel during the termination proceedings.”

                                      -3-
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Id. at 1089. Thus, “[t]he question [] becomes whether the requirement of

[23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a)], that counsel be appointed to ‘represent the child’ in

a contested [termination of parental rights] proceeding, can be deemed to

have been fulfilled by an attorney-GAL who has already been appointed and

is present in those proceedings, advocating for the child’s best interests.” Id.

at 1089. In deciding this issue, the High Court looked at Section 6311 of the

Juvenile Act for guidance. The Court noted that this section,

      initially states that the [GAL] is to “represent the legal interests
      and the best interests of the child.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6311(a). It
      then specifies that the [GAL] must “[a]dvise the court of the child’s
      wishes to the extent that they can be ascertained and present to
      the court whatever evidence exists to support the child’s wishes.”
      42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6311(b)(9). By straightforward implication, if the
      wishes of the child cannot be ascertained, the GAL has no duty to
      “advise the court” of such wishes. For purposes of the proceeding,
      such wishes do not exist.

Id. at 1089-1090 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).            The Court

concluded that “if the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of

ascertainment because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be

no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests.”

Id. at 1092. Hence, the statutory mandate under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) that

counsel be appointed to represent the child is satisfied where the court has

appointed an attorney-GAL who represents the child’s best interests during

the termination proceedings. Id. at 1092-1093; see also In re M.M.R., 287

A.3d 894 (Pa. Super. 2022) (non-precedential decision) (GAL can represent

both legal and best interests of four-year-old child in accordance with In re:

                                      -4-
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T.S.); In re D.F., 220 A.3d 679 (Pa. Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision)

(same involving three and one-half year-old child).1

       In this case, Child had just turned two years-of-age at the time of the

termination proceedings.        In her brief filed with this Court, Attorney Levy

stated that she met virtually with Child and T.M days before the termination

hearing. GAL’s Brief at 13. T.M. informed Attorney Levy that Child had just

started to speak. Id. Attorney Levy observed during this session that Child

was too young to understand termination and adoption. Id. In light of Child’s

pre-verbal age and inability to articulate any preference, I believe that, in

accordance with our High Court’s holding in In re: T.S., there can be no

conflict between Child’s legal interests and her best interests. Accordingly,

there is no need to remand this case and further delay its final adjudication.2

       Instead, I believe that there is no merit to Mother’s claim on appeal. As

previously noted, Mother’s only issue argued on appeal is whether the trial

court erred in finding that there is no bond between Mother and Child and that

____________________________________________

1 Pursuant to § 65.37(B) of the Superior Court Operating Procedures, non-
precedential memorandum decisions of the Court filed after May 1, 2019 may
be cited for their persuasive value. See also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

2 I note that Attorney Levy was present at and participated in the termination
proceedings and joined in DHS’s recommendations that Mother’s parental
rights be terminated and that the permanency goal be changed to adoption.
Notes of Testimony, 9/6/26, at 86. Attorney Levy also filed a brief with this
Court setting forth her arguments in support of the trial court’s order.

                                           -5-
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termination best serves the developmental, physical and emotional needs and

welfare of Child as required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

      In addressing the bond between Mother and Child, the trial court stated:

      There was compelling testimony that [] Child would not suffer
      harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated and that Child
      was significantly bonded with her foster mother [T.M.] who she
      has lived with since birth. Mother testified that Child called T.M.
      her mother and that Child does not really know her. However,
      Mother believes Child is bonded to her, but she failed to offer any
      evidence establishing the existence of a parent-child bond.
      Mother has never contacted [Community Umbrella Agency] for
      updates on Child or provided financial support for Child.
      Additionally, the testimony demonstrated that Child’s foster
      mother meets all of her medical and emotional needs. In
      determining that termination would best serve the needs and
      welfare of [] Child, [the trial c]ourt considered that Mother has not
      been able to meet [] Child’s emotional, physical, and
      developmental needs for over two years prior to the termination
      hearing.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/23, at 15-16 (citations omitted).          The record

supports the trial court’s findings thus warranting affirmance. In re Adoption

of T.M.F., 573 A.2d 1035, 1044 (Pa. Super. 1990) (appellate review of a

termination order is limited to whether the trial court’s order is supported by

competent evidence; unless the trial court has abused its discretion or

committed an error of law, the order must stand); see In the Interest of

K.T., ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 4092986 (Pa. 2023) (determination of a child’s

particular developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must be

made on a case-by-case basis and include intangibles such as love, comfort,

security and stability; court must also consider whether child is in a

pre-adoptive home and has a bond with foster parent).

                                      -6-
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      As I believe that remand is unwarranted and that the trial court properly

terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child, I respectfully dissent.

                                     -7-