Court Opinion

ID: 9943497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:11:03.164327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:05.932429
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  OMAR SHABAZZ                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2776 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 17, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001518-2021

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 23, 2024

       Omar Shabazz appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, following his convictions of

one count each of firearms not to be carried without a license,1 possession

with   intent   to   deliver—methamphetamine        (PWID—methamphetamine),2

persons not to possess firearm,3 two counts of criminal attempt,4 and three

counts of conspiracy.5 After careful review, we conclude that we are bound

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).

4 Id. at § 901(a).

5 Id. at § 903(a).
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by Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709 (Pa. Super. 2023), and remand

for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D).

       In light of our disposition, a detailed recitation of facts is unnecessary.

In summary, the Montgomery County Detective Bureau and the Pottstown

Borough Police Department were investigating an individual named Andrew

Pignoli. During the course of the investigation, Detective Cameron Parker of

the Montgomery County Detective Bureau began acting in an undercover

capacity and began exchanging text messages and phone calls with Pignoli.

Pignoli agreed to sell Detective Parker two ounces of methamphetamine in

exchange for $1,000 and a firearm. At this point, Shabazz became involved

and told Detective Parker that he also wanted additional ammunition for the

firearm.    Detective Parker agreed, and Shabazz informed him that Pignoli

would be contacting Detective Parker to coordinate the sale.

       On October 7, 2020, Detective Parker met with Pignoli and Shabazz to

exchange the two ounces of methamphetamine for $1,000 and a firearm, as

well as additional ammunition.         Police arrested Shabazz as a result of this

exchange, recovered a different firearm on Shabazz’s person, and discovered

additional methamphetamine in his vehicle.            Shabazz was charged, via

criminal complaint, on October 8, 2020.6

____________________________________________

6 As we discuss in detail infra, Shabazz was arrested during the suspension

of Rule 600 by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to
various COVID-19 emergency orders.

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       On April 12, 2022, Shabazz filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

600. On May 10, 2022, Shabazz filed a motion to compel identity of informant

and, on May 12, 2022, filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his

person and his vehicle.         On June 6, 2022, the trial court conducted a

consolidated pre-trial hearing. On June 7, 2022, the trial court denied the

three motions. In particular, the trial court determined that Shabazz’s Rule

600 mechanical run date did not begin on October 8, 2020, when Shabazz

was charged. Rather, the trial court concluded that Shabazz’s mechanical run

date was calculated from August 31, 2021, when the Montgomery County

Court of Common Pleas’ COVID-19 emergency orders expired. See Trial Court

Opinion, 6/29/23, at 8-10.           As a result, the trial court concluded that

Shabazz’s mechanical run date was August 31, 2022, denied Shabazz’s Rule

600 motion as premature, and did not conduct an analysis of whether the

Commonwealth had acted with due diligence. See id.

       On June 13-14, 2022, the trial court held a bifurcated jury trial on the

above-mentioned PWID—methamphetamine offense, the firearms not to be

carried without a license offenses, two of the conspiracy offenses, and one of

the criminal attempt offenses.7 The remaining charges were heard by the trial

court, sitting without a jury.

____________________________________________

7 Two of Shabazz’s conspiracy offenses were related to the PWID—
methamphetamine and firearms not to be carried without a license charges.
One of Shabazz’s criminal attempt offenses was related to the PWID—
methamphetamine charge.

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       At trial, the jury found Shabazz guilty of the above-mentioned PWID—

methamphetamine, firearms not to be carried without a license, and related

offenses. The trial court subsequently found Shabazz guilty of the remaining

offenses. The trial court deferred sentencing and ordered the preparation of

a pre-sentence investigation report.

       On October 17, 2022, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of

78 to 156 months in prison. Shabazz did not file post-sentence motions.8

       On October 27, 2022, Shabazz filed a timely notice of appeal. On that

same date, Shabazz’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw. The trial court

granted the motion to withdraw and appointed new appellate counsel. The

____________________________________________

8 We observe that on October 31, 2022, the trial court filed an amended
sentencing order. See Order, 10/31/22. Additionally, on November 1, 2022,
the trial court filed an “Order Modifying Sentence.” See Order Modifying
Sentence, 11/1/22, at 1-2. Both orders are identical and state that a
scrivener’s error failed to denote that Shabazz’s conviction of firearms not to
be carried without a license was to run concurrently with his sentence for
persons not to possess firearms. See id.; see also N.T. Sentencing Hearing,
10/17/22, at 11 (trial court stating that Shabazz’s conviction of firearms not
to be carried without a license was to run concurrently with his sentence for
his conviction of persons not to possess firearms).

We observe that trial courts generally do not have jurisdiction to modify a
judgment of sentence after a notice of appeal has been filed; however, our
Supreme Court has recognized that a trial court’s inherent authority to correct
a patent error is not limited by the fact that an appeal is pending before the
appellate court. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 65 (Pa.
2007); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. Instantly, as summarized above, the
trial court modified the sentencing order to correct a scrivener’s error.
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its authority
to correct a patent error in the judgment of sentence, and it does not impede
our review. See Holmes, supra.

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trial court further ordered that Shabazz file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal. However, appellate counsel filed

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) notice of intent to file a brief pursuant to Anders.9

Consequently, the trial court did not file a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

       During the pendency of Shabazz’s appeal, and prior to counsel’s filing

of an Anders brief, this Court decided Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d

709 (Pa. Super. 2023).10 In Lear, this Court concluded that the Montgomery

County Court of Common Pleas COVID-19 emergency orders categorized the

suspension of Rule 600 as court postponements.            See id. at 719-20.

Consequently, under Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2021),

the trial court was required to analyze whether the Commonwealth had acted

with due diligence during those court postponements. See Lear, 290 A.3d at

719-20.

       As a result of our decision in Lear, Shabazz’s appellate counsel filed an

Application for Remand on April 30, 2023, in which counsel requested that the

case be remanded for the preparation and filing of a nunc pro tunc Rule

1925(b) concise statement preserving Shabazz’s Rule 600 claim for appeal.

See Application for Remand, 4/30/23, at 1-3.          This Court granted the

____________________________________________

9 Anders v. California, 368 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.
McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).

10 On October 3, 2023, our Supreme Court granted review of this Court’s
decision in Lear. See Commonwealth v. Lear, 305 A.3d 541 (Pa. 2023)
(Table).

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Application for Remand, remanded the matter to the trial court for the

preparation and filing of a nunc pro tunc Rule 1925(b) concise statement

followed by a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Order, 6/6/23. On June

22, 2023, Shabazz filed the nunc pro tunc Rule 1925(b) concise statement,

and on June 29, 2023, the trial court filed its responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      Shabazz now raises the following claims for our review:

      1. Did the trial court err in finding the emergency orders related
      to the COVID-19 emergency constituted a suspension of Rule 600,
      as opposed to court-postponement for the purposes of Rule 600?

      2. Did the trial court err in failing to analyze whether the
      Commonwealth exercised due diligence for the purposes of Rule
      600?

Brief for Appellant, at 4.

      We address Shabazz’s claims together, as they are both related, and

answered by this Court’s precedential decision in Lear. Shabazz contends

that the trial court improperly denied his Rule 600 motion as premature

because, under the language of Montgomery County’s COVID-19 emergency

orders, his mechanical run date should have been calculated as October 8,

2021, or one year after he was arrested and charged on October 8, 2020.

See id. at 11-13. Shabazz further asserts that the trial court was required,

under Lear and Harth, to analyze whether the Commonwealth acted with due

diligence at all times during the court postponements. See id.

      The Commonwealth argues that the trial court properly excluded the

time set forth in Montgomery County’s COVID-19 emergency orders.           See

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 10-15.       The Commonwealth contends that this

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Court’s decision in Lear misinterpreted the Montgomery County COVID-19

emergency orders. See id. However, the Commonwealth acknowledges that

we are bound by the Lear decision. See id. at 15 (citing Commonwealth v.

Pepe, 897 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“It is beyond the power of a

Superior Court panel to overrule a prior decision of the Superior Court[.]”)).

Consequently, the Commonwealth concedes that, under Lear, remand for a

Rule 600 hearing is necessary.

     “In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review . . . is whether

the trial court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d

1234, 1238 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

     The proper scope of review . . . is limited to the evidence on the
     record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the
     trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most
     favorable to the prevailing party.

        Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this
        Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind
        Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally important functions:
        (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and
        (2) the protection of society. In determining whether an
        accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated,
        consideration must be given to society’s right to effective
        prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty
        of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the
        administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to
        insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution
        delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

                                    ***

        So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
        Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental
        speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be

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         construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to
         punish and deter crime.

Id. at 1238-39 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Rule 600 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

      (A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

                                     ***

         (2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

            (a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed
            against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from
            the date on which the complaint is filed.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). “Rule 600 generally requires the Commonwealth

to bring a defendant . . . to trial within 365 days of the date the complaint

was filed.” Hunt, 858 A.2d at 1240. To obtain relief, a defendant must have

a valid Rule 600 claim at the time he files his motion for relief. Id. at 1243.

      “The mechanical run date is the date by which the trial must commence

under Rule 600.”    Commonwealth v. McNear, 852 A.2d 401, 406 (Pa.

Super. 2004).

      It is calculated by adding 365 days (the time for commencing trial
      under Rule 600) to the date on which the criminal complaint is
      filed. The mechanical run date can be modified or extended by
      adding to the date any periods of time in which delay is caused by
      the defendant.      Once the mechanical run date is modified
      accordingly, it then becomes an adjusted run date.

Id.

      In determining whether any time constitutes excludable delay under

Rule 600, a trial court must determine whether the time is a “delay in

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proceedings,” and whether the delay should be excluded based on an analysis

of the Commonwealth’s due diligence. Commonwealth v. Mills, 162 A.3d

323, 325 (Pa. 2017). Time that is “necessary to ordinary trial preparation” or

“attributable to the normal progression of a case simply is not a ‘delay’ for the

purposes of [R]ule 600.” Id. If time is a “delay,” it is excludable when it falls

under the “wide variety of circumstances [encompassed by Rule 600] under

which a period of delay was outside the control of the Commonwealth and not

the result of the Commonwealth’s lack of diligence.”       Commonwealth v.

Armstrong, 74 A.3d 228, 236 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and quotation

marks omitted).

      “A Rule 600 motion requires a showing of due diligence by a

preponderance of the evidence for the Commonwealth to avail itself of an

exclusion.” Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010)

(citation omitted). “Due diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-

case; it does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a

showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.”                 Id.

Reasonable effort includes such actions as the Commonwealth listing the case

for trial prior to the run date to ensure that the defendant was brought to trial

within the time prescribed by Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Aaron, 804

A.2d 39, 43-44 (Pa. Super. 2002); Commonwealth v. Hill, 736 A.2d 578,

592 (Pa. 1999).

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      Trial courts “must exercise judgment in distinguishing between delay

attributable to the court and that which should be allocated to a party.” Mills,

162 A.3d at 325. Judicial delays “arising out of the court’s own scheduling

concerns . . . where a trial[-]ready prosecutor must wait several months due

to a court calendar . . . should be treated as ‘delay’ for which the

Commonwealth is not accountable.” Id. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth

must act diligently through all stages of a case, and its due diligence must be

assessed before determinations regarding judicial delay.      See Harth, 252

A.3d at 617-18 (adopting Justice Wecht’s concurrence in Mills).

      Relevantly, in Lear, this Court stated as follows:

      If an order unambiguously suspends Rule 600 without
      qualification, then the period of the suspension is added to the run
      date without considering the Commonwealth’s [due] diligence.
      [See Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 751 (Pa. Super.
      2022)]. Alternatively, if an order characterizes a delay as a court
      postponement, then that period is only excluded if the trial court
      determines after a hearing that the Commonwealth exercised due
      diligence through the life of the case. [See Harth, 252 A.3d at
      618].

      The relevant local emergency orders are as follows. On March 16,
      2020, Montgomery County declared a judicial emergency and
      ordered that the operation of Rule 600 would be suspended
      “during the period of the local judicial emergency.” Declaration,
      3/16/20. On March 31, 2020, Montgomery County extended the
      judicial emergency to April 30, 2020, again ordering Rule 600 to
      be suspended. Declaration[,] 3/31/20. On April 14, 2020,
      Montgomery County extended the judicial emergency to May 31,
      2020.

      On May 5, 2020, Montgomery County entered an order rescinding
      its previous orders effective May 31, 2020. Order, 5/5/20, at 1. .
      ..

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     On May 28, 2020, Montgomery County declared that the local
     judicial emergency would be extended “until further Order of
     Court.” Declaration, 5/28/20. It ordered that its declaration
     included the provisions of the order from May 5, 2020. Id.

     On June 3, 2020, Montgomery County ordered “that any
     postponement of criminal case scheduling caused by the
     declaration of this judicial emergency, from March 12, 2020
     through the expiration of the judicial emergency, shall be
     considered a court postponement and shall constitute
     excludable time for purposes of the application of Rule []
     600.” Order, 6/3/20. This lasted until August 31, 2021. See
     Order, 8/30/21.

Id. at 719-20 (emphasis added).

     Instantly, the trial court addressed this claim as follows:

     [B]eginning in March of 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
     issued emergency orders suspending Rule 600 statewide through
     June 1, 2020.       See In re General Statewide Judicial
     Emergency, 228 A.3d 1283, 1287 (Pa. [] 2020); In re General
     Statewide Judicial Emergency, 230 A.3d 1015, 1019 (Pa. []
     2020). When the statewide judicial emergency ended, the Court
     expressly empowered each judicial district’s president judge to
     enter self-effectuating declarations of judicial emergency, which
     could “[s]uspend statewide rules pertaining to the rule-based right
     of criminal defendants to a prompt trial.”        In re General
     Statewide Judicial Emergency, 234 A.3d 408 (Pa. [] 2020)[.]

     In light of the Supreme Court’s orders, on March 16, 2020,
     President Judge Thomas M. DelRicci of the Montgomery County
     Court of Common Pleas declared a judicial emergency, noting,
     amongst other things, that effective immediately and until further
     notice, all jury and non-jury trials were cancelled. See Judicial
     Emergency Order, 3/16/20. On that same date, P.J. DelRicci also
     issued a declaration which explicitly suspended the operation of
     Rule 600 from March 12, 2020 through April 14, 2020. See
     Declaration, 3/16/20. On March 31, 2020, P.J. DelRicci extended
     the judicial emergency through April 30, 2020. The Declaration
     stated, “[t]he operation of Rule [] 600 shall be suspended in the
     38th Judicial District during the period of the local judicial
     emergency.” See Declaration, 3/31/20. On April 14, 2020, P.J.
     DelRicci extended the judicial emergency to May 31[,] 2020.

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     Th[at] Declaration stated, “[a]ny postponement of criminal
     case scheduling caused by the declaration of this judicial
     emergency shall be considered a court postponement and
     shall constitute excludable time for the purposes of the
     application of Rule [] 600.” See Declaration, 4/14/20. On May
     28, 2020, P.J. DelRicci declared that the local judicial emergency
     would be extended “until further order of court.” See Declaration,
     5/28/20. On June 3, 2020, P.J. DelRicci ordered “that any
     postponement of criminal scheduling caused by the declaration of
     this judicial emergency, from March 12, 2020 through the
     expiration of the judicial emergency, shall be considered a
     court postponement and shall constitute excludable time
     for purposes of the application of Rule [] 600.” See Order
     6/30/20.

     On June 21, 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered that
     Pennsylvania courts would return to pre-pandemic status effective
     July 6, 2021. . . . On August 30, 2021, P.J. DelRicci issued an
     Order vacating . . . his June 30, 2020 Order. . . . See Order,
     8/30/21.

     Here, on October 8, 2020, the Pottstown Borough Police
     Department filed a criminal complaint with respect to [Shabazz]
     and his trial commenced on June 13, 2022. Thus, the time
     between the filing of the complaint and [Shabazz]’s trial was 613
     days. The criminal complaint was filed during the time period
     when Montgomery County was operating under a judicial
     emergency.     On October 15, 2020, [Shabazz]’s preliminary
     hearing was continued by request of the Magisterial District Court.
     On December 3 and 10, 2020, [Shabazz]’s preliminary hearing
     was continued by request of the defense. On January 21, 2021,
     [Shabazz]’s preliminary hearing took place and all charges were
     held for the Court of Common Pleas. On June 22, 2021, [Shabazz]
     entered a not guilty plea during his formal arraignment. On that
     same date, the Commonwealth filed the bills of information in this
     matter.

     On April 21, 2022, following the first and only pre-trial conference
     in this matter, the [trial] court moved the case to the call of the
     trial list scheduled for April 27, 2022. During the call of the trial
     list on April 27, 2022, the [trial] court scheduled a jury trial to
     commence on June 8, 2022. On June 6, 2022, the [trial] court
     held the Rule 600 hearing. Due to a scheduling conflict, the [trial]
     court issued an order on June 8, 2022, which continued the jury

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     trial to June 13, 2022. Except for [Shabazz]’s requests for
     continuances of the preliminary hearings scheduled for December
     3 and 10, 2020, neither party requested any continuances during
     the pendency of this matter. The Commonwealth never indicated
     it was not prepared to proceed to trial at any point following its
     filing of the bills of information.

     During the Rule 600 hearing on June 6, 2022, the Lear decision
     had not been issued and the [trial] court was operating under the
     belief that P.J. DelRicci had unambiguously suspended Rule 600
     without qualification for the time period [between] March 12, 2020
     through August 31, 2021. Consequently, the [trial] court had
     reason to conclude that the time period from the filing of the
     criminal complaint on October 8, 2020 to August 31, 2021
     constituted excludable time in which an examination of the
     Commonwealth’s exercise of due diligence was not required.
     Further, this conclusion caused the [trial] court to utilize
     September 1, 2021 as the starting time for the mechanical run
     date calculation, which resulted in a mechanical run date of
     September 1, 2022, prior to any adjustments. Considering the
     trial was going to commence well in advance of the September 1,
     2022 date, the [trial] court viewed [Shabazz]’s Rule 600 motion
     as premature and denied it without the development of an
     evidentiary record regarding the Commonwealth’s exercise of due
     diligence.

     The Lear holding would effectively change the starting time for
     the mechanical run date calculation to the filing of the complaint
     on October 8, 2020, which would result in a mechanical run date
     of October 8, 2021[,] prior to any adjustments. Thus, the June
     13-14, 2022 [bifurcated] trial occurred well after the mechanical
     run date. . . . In the event the holding in Lear is upheld by the
     Pennsylvania Supreme Court, this court concedes that this matter
     would likely need to be remanded for a hearing pursuant to [Rule]
     600[] in order to determine whether the Commonwealth exercised
     due diligence throughout the life of this case. The [trial] court
     notes, however, that due to the judicial emergency and prohibition
     on jury trials for an extended period of time, the Montgomery
     County Court of Common Pleas was left with a significant backlog
     of cases which continues to severely impair its ability to schedule
     cases prior to any imminent Rule 600 deadlines. The backlog
     resulted in this matter not being scheduled for a pre-trial
     conference for nearly one year following [Shabazz]’s formal

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       arraignment and impaired the court’s ability to schedule this
       matter for trial prior to October 8, 2021.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/29/23, at 6-11 (emphasis added, some citations

omitted).

       After review, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Shabazz’s

mechanical run date was October 8, 2021. See id. at 10-11. Further, we are

bound by the Lear Court’s determination that Montgomery County’s COVID-

19 emergency orders constituted court postponements. See Lear, supra.

Therefore, as the trial court did not analyze whether the Commonwealth acted

with the requisite due diligence, we are constrained to remand for the trial

court to conduct a hearing pursuant to Rule 600(D).11         See Lear, supra;

Commonwealth v. May, 271 A.3d 475, 482 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“This panel

is bound by existing precedent and, therefore, lacks the authority to overturn

another panel decision.”) (citation omitted). If the trial court determines, after

the hearing, that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden to show due

diligence, then it should vacate Shabazz’s judgment of sentence and his

convictions, dismiss the charges, and discharge Shabazz. However, if the trial

court determines that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence, then it

____________________________________________

11 We appreciate the trial court’s candor and the difficulties trial courts have

had navigating Rule 600 during, and in the aftermath of, the pandemic.
Nevertheless, we are bound by the precedential decision announced by this
Court in Lear, and we are constrained to conclude that the trial court was
required to analyze whether the Commonwealth acted with the requisite due
diligence. See Lear, supra. As we emphasized in Lear, P.J. DelRicci’s orders
expressly noted that the Rule 600 suspensions were to qualify as court
postponements. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/29/23, at 6-8; see also Lear,
supra; Mills, supra.

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should deny Shabazz’s motion to dismiss; Shabazz’s judgment of sentence

would remain extant, and Shabazz would be able to appeal the Rule 600

determination.

     Case remanded for Rule 600(D) hearing. Jurisdiction Relinquished.

Date: 2/23/2024

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