Court Opinion

ID: 9850042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:51:22.127177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.822653
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from the judgment because under the law and the teims of the insurance policy sued on an action for negligence will not lie directly against the insurance company. The policy provides: “No action shall be against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the teams of this policy nor until the aanount of the insured’s obligation to pay shall have finally been deteranined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial, or by written agreeanent of the insured, the claimant and the company. . .” The act of 1949 does not expressly provide that an action may be instituted directly against the insurance company nor did it prescaibe the terms of the policies. In view of the fact that neither a school *719board nor a political subdivision could be sued in matters involving a governmental function, it was ruled in Krasner v. Harper, 90 Ga. App. 128 (82 S. E. 2d 267) that an action would lie directly against the insurance company. In my opinion the act of 1955, supra, was passed for three purposes: (1) to authorize further protection to the public from the negligent operation of vehicles even when driven in connection with a governmental function, and (2) to provide that political subdivisions shall be subject to suit to the extent of the insurance coverage on their vehicular operations whether governmental or not, and (3) to impliedly, at least, provide against a direct action against an insurance company for negligence. This conclusion is inescapable from the provisions of the act of 1955 (Ga. L. 1955, pp. 448, 449; Code, Ann., §§ 56-1013, 56-1014), as follows: “56-1013. Authorization of municipal corporations, county or political subdivision to acquire automobile liability insurance.—A municipal corporation, a county or any other political subdivision of the State is authorized in its discretion to secure and provide insurance to cover liability for damages on account of bodily injury or death resulting therefrom to any person, or for damage to property of any person, or both, arising by reason of ownership, maintenance, operation, or use of any motor vehicle by the municipal corporation, county, or any other political subdivision of the State, under its management, control or supervision, whether in a governmental undertaking or not, and to pay premiums therefor. (Acts 1955, pp. 448, 449). 56-1014. Same; governmental immunity waived to extent of amount of insurance; pleading immunity as defense prohibited; reduction of verdict in excess of amount of insurance.—Whenever a municipal corporation, a county, or any other political subdivision of the State shall purchase such insurance the negligence of any duly authorized officer, agent, servant, attorney, or employee in the performance of his official duties, its governmental immunity shall be waived to the extent of the amount of insurance so purchased. Neither the municipal corporation, county or political subdivision of the State, as the case may be, nor the insuring company shall plead such governmental immunity as a defense and may make only such defenses as could be made if the insured were a private person. The municipal corporation, county *720or any other political subdivision of the State shall be liable for negligence as herein provided only for damages suffered while said insurance is in force, but in no case in an amount exceeding the limits or the coverage of any such insurance policy. No attempt shall be made in the trial of any action brought against a municipal corporation, county or any other political subdivision of the State to suggest the existence of any insurance which covers in whole or in part any judgment or award which may be rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and if the verdict rendered by the jury exceeds the limits of the applicable insurance, the court shall reduce the amount of said judgment or award to a sum equal to the applicable limits stated in the insurance policy. (Acts 1955, pp. 448, 449)”. The statement in the majority opinion that the act of 1955 does not apply to school boards because they are not subject to suit is correct in that the act does not expressly subject a school board to suit, and it may not do so by implication. However, the 1955 act subjects political subdivisions to suits in a field where they were immune to suit before the act, and since the boards were authorized to procure insurance as agents for the political subdivisions they represented, the act of 1955 rendered the political subdivisions subject to suit on the contracts of their agents and the necessity for suing the insurance companies directly was obviated, and I think the General Assembly so intended.