Court Opinion

ID: 9690303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:04:02.795095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:55.132175
License: Public Domain

DIANE S. SYKES, J.
¶ 38. (concurring). This case is controlled by this court's interpretation in Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. LIRC, 2003 WI 106, 264 Wis. 2d 200, 664 N.W.2d 651, of the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the disability discrimination provisions in the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (WFEA), Wis. Stat. § 111.34. In Crystal Lake, this court concluded that compliance with the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the WFEA as it pertains to disability discrimination may require an employer to alter the job responsibilities associated with the employee's or prospective employee's job. Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶ 52. The court held that "[a] change in job duties may be a reasonable accommodation in a given circumstance." Id.
¶ 39. In reaching this conclusion in Crystal Lake, this court addressed and specifically rejected an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 111.34 that would have reconciled the language of subsection (l)(b) of the statute with subsection (2) (a) of the statute, as argued by Justice Roggensack in dissent here. Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶ 34-52. Subsection (l)(b) of Wis. Stat. §111.34 defines disability discrimination as including "[Refusing to reasonably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's disability." However, subsection (2) (a) of the statute provides that "it is not employment discrimination ... to refuse to hire, employ,... or terminate . . . any individual. . . [on account of disability] if the disability is reasonably related to the individual's *421ability to adequately undertake the job-related responsibilities of that individual's employment."
¶ 40. The employer in Crystal Lake argued that these two sections of the WFEA, read together, meant that the "reasonable accommodation" requirement of the statute was confined to accommodations that would permit the disabled employee to perform the existing responsibilities of employment as determined by the employer. Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶ 33-35. The court rejected this interpretation, instead holding that "a reasonable accommodation is not limited to that which would allow the employee to perform adequately all of his or her job duties." Id., ¶ 52. That is, the court held that the "reasonable accommodation" requirement may compel an employer to alter the responsibilities of employment — that is, to redefine the job, or create a new job — in order to avoid committing disability discrimination under the WFEA. The statute allows an employer to defend against a disability discrimination claim by showing that the "accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer's program, enterprise or business," see Wis. Stat. § 111.34(l)(b); the court in Crystal Lake affirmed LIRC's conclusion that the employer had not carried its burden of demonstrating hardship. Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶ 79-80.
¶ 41. Also important to the outcome here, the court in Crystal Lake held that LIRC's determinations of "reasonable accommodation" and "hardship" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 111.34 were entitled to great weight deference on judicial review. Crystal Lake, 264 Wis. 2d 200, ¶¶ 28-30.
¶ 42. I disagreed with the court's resolution of these issues in Crystal Lake, agreeing instead with the analysis in Justice Prosser's dissent. Id., ¶¶ 84-136 (Prosser, J., dissenting). Here, Justice Roggensack has *422identified some of the flaws and consequences of an interpretation of the WFEA that fails to reconcile the language of Wis. Stat. § 111.34(l)(b) and (2)(a). These arguments, however, were made by the employer in Crystal Lake and discussed at length in Justice Prosser's dissent, which I joined.
¶ 43. Crystal Lake is applicable and binding precedent, and I cannot distinguish its interpretation of the WFEA's reasonable accommodation requirement as Justice Roggensack has done here. Crystal Lake did not define "reasonable accommodation" as an accommodation that would permit the employer to have the job-related responsibilities of the individual's employment met or permit an employer to implement a valid management decision. Dissent, ¶¶ 1, 10, 13, 18-22. To the contrary, Crystal Lake broadly held that an employer may indeed be required to alter an employee's job responsibilities in order to comply with the WFEA, and that LIRC's determinations of "reasonable accommodation" in this regard are entitled to great weight deference. As such, although I disagreed with Crystal Lake, I am bound by it, and join the court's application of it in this case. Any remedy will have to come from the legislature.
¶ 44. I am authorized to state that Justice JON E WILCOX joins this concurrence.