Court Opinion

ID: 9566486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:39:59.372816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:47.220563
License: Public Domain

DOYLE, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in all that is said in the majority opinion because case law is clear that when no other order has been entered in a case, the five-year period for calculating the date on which a case will be dismissed for want of prosecution begins when the complaint is filed, not when service is perfected.1 As set forth in the majority opinion, the renewed complaint was filed on November 17, 2003, and no order *394was entered until five years and one month later, on December 17, 2008. Thus, pursuant to OCGA §§ 9-11-41 (e) and 9-2-60 (b), the case was dismissed by operation of law on November 17, 2008.2
However, I write separately to emphasize that this is an overly harsh and unfair result in a case that had not been delayed unnecessarily and whose continued pendency would not serve to “only clutter the dockets.”3 In the year subsequent to the case’s filing, the parties filed motions,4 engaged in discovery, and in October 2004, the defendants filed a Stipulation to Jury Trial Calendar. For reasons unknown,5 the court did not place the case on the trial calendar, and on July 26, 2007, the plaintiffs filed their Stipulation to Jury Trial Calendar and Request for Entry of Pretrial Order. Between July 26, 2007 and December 17, 2008, the defendants filed a proposed pretrial order, issued several notices of hearing for the court,6 and filed notices relating to the use of medical narratives; the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint and a notice relating to the use of medical narratives to which the defendants objected.
This is simply not a case that had languished in the court, was not prosecuted by the plaintiffs, or had been abandoned by both parties. Rather this case is being dismissed because the parties resolved their motions without resort to the court and because the plaintiffs did not insist that the court issue an order for a pretrial conference instead of allowing defense counsel to simply prepare the notice(s).
While a plaintiffs duty to obtain and file an order is mandatory, no plaintiff can force a judge to sign an order. And it is unfortunate that “[o]nce a case has been dismissed by operation of law, ‘(t)he trial court is without authority to order the action reinstated.’ ”7 This is the type of case that should be able to be reinstated.
*395Decided February 16, 2010.
Claxton & Claxton, William P. Claxton, Darcy S. DuVal, for appellants.
Harper, Waldon & Craig, Russell D. Waldon, Sebastian C. Suma, for appellees.

 See Goodwyn v. Carter, 252 Ga. App. 114, 116 (555 SE2d 474) (2001) (“The five-year period is computed from the date of filing.”); Intl. Longshoremen’s Assn. &c. v. Saunders, 182 Ga. App. 301, 302 (1) (355 SE2d 461) (1987).

 See Republic Claims Svc. Co. v. Hoyal, 264 Ga. 127, 128 (441 SE2d 765) (1994).

 Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 396 (658 SE2d 567) (2008) (“The legislative intent in enacting the precursor statute in 1953 ‘was to remove from trial courts those cases whose continued pendency only clutter the dockets.’ ”).

 As parties are encouraged to do, both the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on statute of limitation grounds and the plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery were resolved between the parties and did not require court action.

 Neither party argues dilatory conduct on the part of the other or the court between October 14, 2004 and July 26, 2007, and the plaintiff indicates that in addition to the filings on record with the court, the parties pursued their positions behind the scenes by exchanging written discovery, appointing an administratrix of the deceased injured party in Texas, and conducting depositions.

 Instead of the court issuing an order scheduling a pretrial conference, defense counsel prepared notices of hearing that were sent to plaintiffs’ counsel. The first such notice was sent on April 15, 2008, scheduling a pretrial hearing for May 28, 2008. It is unclear why the hearing did not take place at that time, but it was eventually rescheduled and heard on December 17, 2008.

 Goodwyn, 252 Ga. App. at 116.