Court Opinion

ID: 9756668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:46:36.829101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:27.573311
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent to Part IV of the majority opinion, in which the majority concludes, like the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court), that, because Michael A. Nutter resigned his City Council seat and “would not be prohibited from serving in office if he were elected Mayor,” the cross-appeal filed by John Dougherty is moot. (Majority op. at 61.) The majority states that, with Nutter’s resignation, there is no longer a case or controversy. However, Dougherty argues that, despite Nutter’s resignation, Nutter still is prohibited from serving in office if he is elected Mayor this year. Thus, there is a controversy, and Dougherty’s cross-appeal certainly is not moot.
In Count I of his counterclaim, Dougherty sought an order directing that Nutter resign his City Council seat and enjoining Nutter from running for Mayor. Dough-erty claimed that Nutter is ineligible for any City office under Section 10-107 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter.1 (R.R. at 31a, Counterclaim, ¶ 15.) In its September 27, 2006, order dismissing Count I as moot, the trial court stated:
Plaintiff Nutter resigned from his Council seat on July 7, 2006. Assuming ar-guendo that he had violated Section 10-107 of the Home Rule Charter prior to this date, the sanction that could be imposed would make him ineligible to hold a public office in the City of Philadelphia for a period of one (1) year, commencing arguably on July 6, 2006 (day before resigning) to July 5th, 2007. Plaintiff Nutter is now an announced candidate for the office of Mayor of the City of Philadelphia. The term of office for the new Mayor would commence in January 2008, which is well after any prohibition from holding such office would have expired.
Therefore, Count I of Counterclaimant Dougherty’s Counterclaim is dismissed for mootness.
(Trial ct.’s 9/27/2006 order; Dougherty’s brief, ex. A) (emphasis added).
Dougherty argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Nutter would be eligible to hold office in January 2008. Dougherty notes that to run in the May 2007 primary, Nutter is required to file a candidate’s affidavit with his nomination petition on or before the tenth Tuesday before the May 2007 primary. See Sections 910 and 913 of the Election Code, Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §§ 2870 and 2873. A candidate’s affidavit must state that “he is eligible” for the office he is seeking. 25 P.S. § 2870 (emphasis added). Moreover, “the affidavit ... necessarily speaks from the moment the oath was administered.” Nomination Petition of Cianfrani, 467 Pa. 491, 493-94, 359 A.2d 383, 384 (1976). Dough-erty contends that, because Nutter would not be eligible to hold office until July 2007, Nutter could not file a truthful candidate’s affidavit prior to that time. I *70agree with Dougherty. See Cianfrani (holding that statements in a candidate’s affidavit must be true when the affidavit is taken).
The majority, in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Dougherty’s counterclaim based on mootness, apparently agrees with the trial court that Nutter can legally hold office in January 2008. Thus, the majority implicitly holds that the statement of eligibility in a candidate’s affidavit means that, although the candidate may not be eligible for office at the time the candidate files the affidavit, the candidate will be eligible by the time he or she takes office. However, such an interpretation is contrary to Cianfrani and to the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. Moreover, our supreme court has stated that the “requirements of sworn affidavits are to insure the legitimacy of information crucial to the election process. Thus, the policy of the liberal reading of the Election Code cannot be distorted to emasculate those requirements necessary to assure the probity of the process.” Cianfrani, 467 Pa. at 494, 859 A.2d at 384. Finally, if the legislature intended the words “is eligible” in Section 910 of the Election Code to mean “will be eligible,” the legislature should amend the statutory provision.2
Accordingly, instead of concluding that the matter is moot, I would address the issue and reverse.

. Section 10-107(5) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter states that "[n]o officer or employee of the City, except elected officers running for re-election, shall be a candidate for nomination or election to any public office unless he shall have first resigned from his then office or employment.” Section 10-107(6) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter states that any officer or employee who violates Section 10-107(5) shall be ineligible for any office or position within the City for one year.

. Moreover, the majority’s position would allow a City officer to take advantage of his or her office while running for another office, as long as the City officer resigned a year before the start of the term of the new office. This would defeat the purpose of the resignation rule, i.e., to eliminate political patronage and the appearance of impropriety within City government.