Court Opinion

ID: 9393697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 20:03:43.214521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:54.862144
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
          in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 200271-U

                                  Order filed May 9, 2023
     ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                      2023

     IN THE MATTER OF THE DONALD LEE              )             Appeal from the Circuit Court
     ROPP, SR. LIVING TRUST, under agreement      )             of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
     dated May 19, 2016                           )             Henry County, Illinois.
                                                  )
     (Larry L. Ropp, as Trustee of THE DONALD LEE )             Appeal Nos. 3-20-0271, 3-20-0272,
     ROPP, SR. LIVING TRUST, under agreement      )             3-20-0273, 3-20-0274, 3-20-0275,
     dated May 19, 2016,                          )             3-20-0276
                                                  )
            Petitioner-Appellant,                 )             Circuit Nos. 19-CH-57, 17-P-117,
                                                  )             20-P-8, 20-P-7, 19-P-114, 17-CH-27
     Donald L. Ropp, Jr. and Sena Ropp,           )
                                                  )             The Honorable Mark A. VandeWiele,
            Respondents-Appellees).               )             Judge, Presiding.

     ___________________________________________________________________________

           JUSTICE McDADE 1 delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices Albrecht and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
     ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1        Held: The trial court had jurisdiction to enter its July 20, 2020, order, clarifying
                a prior ruling. We also uphold the July 20 order on its merits because
                appellant Raymond L. Ropp has failed to offer a valid legal basis for
                overruling the order after he was removed as trustee.

          1
              This case was administratively reassigned to Justice McDade on December 19, 2022.
¶2           This interlocutory appeal arises out of a family’s protracted litigation over the living trust

     of Donald Ropp, Sr. The underlying cases were consolidated in the trial court. In this appeal, a

     former trustee of the trust, Raymond L. Ropp, contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

     enter an order clarifying a prior ruling and that the clarification was legally erroneous on its

     merits. After reviewing the appeal in light of one of our recent decisions in this case, we affirm

     the trial court's clarification order.

¶3                                            I. BACKGROUND

¶4           In an unpublished decision, this court recently recited the lengthy and complex factual

     and procedural history leading up to the June 24, 2020, decision of the Henry County circuit

     court to remove Raymond L. Ropp as the trustee of the living trust created by his father, Donald

     Ropp, Sr. (Don Sr.), due to Raymond’s material breach of duty. Ropp v. Ropp, 2023 IL App (3d)

     200227-U, ¶¶ 4-20. Accordingly, we need not restate the case’s extensive history in its entirety.

¶5           For purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to note that the underlying proceedings involve

     a highly contentious family dispute over the control and construction of Don Sr.’s trust after his

     death. Those cases implicate the interests of Don Sr.’s now-deceased wife, Reba F. Ropp, as well

     as his four adult children, Donald Ropp, Jr. (Don Jr.), Sena Ropp, Larry L. Ropp, and Raymond

     L. Ropp, who were all named as beneficiaries of the trust.

¶6           After a lengthy hearing, the trial court removed Raymond as trustee on June 24, 2020,

     finding that he had improperly “ ‘failed to provide an accounting as required by statute, the terms

     of the trust, and the order of this court,’ ” despite roughly $250,000 in cash remaining

     unaccounted for, an outstanding debt of $40,000 in legal fees, and no mention of Raymond's

     personal debt to Don Sr. Id. ¶ 17. The order concluded that Raymond “ ‘is incapable of being

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     impartial as required by 760 ILCS 3/803 causing him to materially fail in his fiduciary duties.’ ”

     Id. ¶ 18. The court named Blackhawk State Bank as successor trustee and a retired Rock Island

     circuit court judge as alternate successor trustee. In addition, the trial court retained jurisdiction

     to appoint another successor trustee, if necessary. Finally, Raymond was ordered to file a written

     accounting with the court to conclude his duties as trustee.

¶7           Prior to his June 24 removal, Raymond had filed a number of appeals in his official

     capacity as trustee, and several of those appeals remained pending at the time of Raymond’s

     removal. On June 30, the respondents in the instant appeal 2 filed a “Joint Motion for

     Clarification” of the court’s June 24 removal order, seeking to address the scope of Raymond’s

     continuing authority to participate in the pending appeals. The joint motion noted that Raymond

     had filed an interlocutory appeal immediately after the entry of the June 24 removal order in

     which he argued both that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order and that the ruling

     was wrongly decided on its merits.

¶8           The June 24 order stated that Raymond “has authority to pursue matters currently on

     appeal but is prohibited from using trust assets to fund said appeal.” To address questions that

     arose after the entry of that order, the responding parties filed their joint motion, requesting

     “clarification as to the capacity in which Raymond and [his counsel] may continue to pursue

     pending appeals.” (Emphasis in original.) Specifically, the joint motion sought to clarify: (1)

     whether the June 24 order “authorizes Raymond to pursue pending and future appeals only in his

     individual capacity and not as Trustee, now removed;” (2) “whether all appeal determinations

     relative to the Trust are the dominion of the post-Raymond Trustee;” and (3) “whether only the

             For purposes of this appeal, the respondents are Donald L. Ropp, Jr., Sena M. Ropp, and Donald
             2

     E. Mortenson, Jr., as executor of the Estate of Reba F. Ropp.
                                                        3
       post-Raymond Trustee is authorized to engage Califf & Harper, P.C. as counsel for the Trust and

       until the post-Raymond Trustee takes affirmative steps to do so whether Calif & Harper, P.C. is

       barred from engaging in any further representation of the Trust.”

¶9            On July 20, 2020, the trial court issued an order clarifying that Raymond could pursue

       pending appeals in his individual name only; he could not pursue those appeals as the trustee of

       Don Sr.’s trust. Although Raymond challenged both the trial court’s June 24 and July 20 orders,

       his 38-page notice of appeal in the instant case involves only the July 20 order.

¶ 10                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11          Raymond presents three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to

       enter the July 20 order clarifying its June 24 order removing Raymond as trustee; (2) whether the

       July 20 order erroneously barred Raymond from pursuing pending trust appeals as trustee,

       asserting that he could participate only in his individual capacity; and (3) if this court resolves

       the appeal in Raymond’s favor, whether all further proceedings in the ongoing litigation should

       be reassigned to a different judge of the Henry County circuit court.

¶ 12                                             A. Jurisdiction

¶ 13          We review de novo the question of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue its July

       20 order. In re John C.M., 382 Ill. App. 3d 553, 558 (2008). Critically, this court recently

       decided a closely related question: whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter its June 24

       order removing Raymond as trustee. Ropp, 2023 IL App (3d) 200227-U. In our unpublished

       order upholding the June 24 ruling, we conducted an extensive review of the parties’

       jurisdictional arguments, arguments that are largely renewed in the instant appeal.

¶ 14          Raymond makes two primary jurisdictional arguments here. First, he contends that the

       trial court improperly asserted its jurisdiction based on other cases filed during this protracted

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       litigation. More specifically, he contends the trial court cannot assert jurisdiction based on prior

       proceedings in: (1) a lawsuit filed by Don Jr. in March 2017, seeking a temporary restraining

       order and preliminary injunction; (2) an action Raymond filed seeking judicial confirmation of

       the special co-trustee’s findings, including the conclusion that Don Jr., Sena, and Reba’s estate

       were all disinherited pursuant to the terms of Don Sr.’s trust; and (3) four other probate and adult

       guardianship matters filed during the course of this litigation. In the alternative, Raymond asserts

       that the existence of pending appeals filed by the trust divested the trial court of any jurisdiction

       it may have possessed.

¶ 15          In our recent unpublished order addressing the propriety of the June 24 removal order, we

       declined to adopt very similar arguments, holding that the trial court both possessed subject-

       matter jurisdiction over the case and had not been divested of that jurisdiction by a pending

       appeal. Id. ¶¶ 27, 32. As we explained, the trial court retained jurisdiction during the pendency of

       the appeal “to hear and decide other collateral or supplemental issues, including the removal of

       Raymond as trustee.” Id. ¶ 32. Our analysis and holdings in that decision apply equally here

       under the law of the case doctrine.

¶ 16          “ ‘The law of the case doctrine generally bars relitigation of an issue previously decided

       in the same case. People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 395 [276 Ill. Dec. 343, 794 N.E.2d 238]

       (2002). Thus, the determination of a question of law by an appellate court in the first appeal may

       be binding on the court in a second appeal. Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541, 552 [308 Ill.

       Dec. 302, 861 N.E.2d 633] (2006).’ ” People v. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 20 (quoting People v.

       Sutton, 233 Ill. 2d 89, 100 (2009)). Because our prior decision rejected Raymond’s jurisdictional

       arguments and held that the trial court had jurisdiction to remove Raymond as trustee on June 24,

       we are bound by that holding as the law of this case.

                                                         5
¶ 17           Because we have not previously considered the question of whether Raymond’s appeal of

       the trial court’s June 24 removal order divested that court of jurisdiction to enter its July 20

       order, we now apply the same analytical framework used in our prior decision. As we explained

       there, “ ‘the trial court retains jurisdiction on matters collateral or supplemental to the judgment.’

       In re N.L., 2014 IL App (3d) 140172, ¶ 23. ‘Collateral or supplemental matters include those

       lying outside the issues in the appeal or arising subsequent to delivery of the judgment appealed

       from.’ Town of Libertyville v. Bank of Waukegan, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1073 (1987).” Ropp,

       2023 IL App (3d) 200227-U, ¶ 30.

¶ 18           We begin our analysis by examining the scope of the trust’s appeal from the June 24

       removal order, concluding that the appeal challenged only the propriety of Raymond’s removal.

       Next, we consider whether the trial court’s July 20 order involved “matters collateral or

       supplemental to the” propriety of the removal order. In re N.L., 2014 IL App (3d) 140172, ¶ 23.

       If so, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter the July 20 order during the pendency of the

       June 24 appeal. Ropp, 2023 IL App (3d) 200227-U, ¶ 30.

¶ 19           In the June 24 appeal, our review was limited to the trial court’s jurisdiction and whether

       the removal order was an abuse of its discretion. Id. ¶¶ 29, 39. We upheld both the trial court’s

       jurisdiction and Raymond’s removal after determining that the evidence supported the court’s

       factual findings that Raymond “ ‘materially breached his duty to account under 760 ILCS

       3/813.1 [760 ILCS 3/813.1 (West 2020)]’ and ‘is incapable of being impartial as required by 760

       ILCS 3/803 [760 ILCS 3/803 (West 2020)] causing him to materially fail in his fiduciary

       duties.’ ” Id. ¶ 40. Thus, the only matters addressed in the June 24 appeal related directly to the

       propriety of the removal order. Those matters, however, are far different from the one addressed

       in the trial court’s July 20 order.

                                                         6
¶ 20          The July 20 order did not reexamine or alter the removal order, which simply addressed

       Raymond’s status as trustee. Rather, it resolved questions that arose between the parties

       subsequent to the entry of that order. Those questions involved the effects that Raymond’s

       removal had on his participation in the ongoing trial and appellate proceedings, issues not

       addressed in the June 24 appeal. “ ‘[O]rders entered after the filing of the notice of appeal are

       valid if the substantive issues on appeal are not altered so as to present a new case to the

       reviewing court. R.W. Dunteman Co., 181 Ill. 2d at 162.’ ” Id. ¶ 31. We conclude that the July 20

       order supplemented, rather than supplanted, the June 24 removal order.

¶ 21          Because trial courts retain “ ‘jurisdiction on matters collateral or supplemental to the

       judgment’ ” on appeal (id. ¶ 30 (quoting In re N.L., 2014 IL App (3d) 140172, ¶ 23)), we hold

       that the trust’s appeal of the June 24 removal order did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to

       enter its supplemental order on July 20.

¶ 22                                    B. Propriety of the July 20 Order

¶ 23          Raymond next argues that the respondents’ “ ‘Joint Motion for Clarification of Court

       Order’ in reality requests an injunction against Raymond regarding his ability to exercise his

       appeal rights as to the Circuit Court’s May 26, 2020 and June 24, 2020 Orders, in his capacity as

       Trustee.” This court’s recent decision affirming the trial court’s June 24 removal order once

       again provides valuable guidance for our review.

¶ 24          Because this court upheld Raymond’s removal as trustee, he is no longer the trustee of

       the Don Sr. trust, as a matter of law. The pending appeals Raymond cites were undoubtedly

       brought in his official capacity as trustee, not in his individual capacity. He has failed to present

       this court with any argument asserting that he should be permitted “to exercise his appeal rights

       *** in his capacity as Trustee” after he no longer was entitled to perform the functions of that

                                                         7
       role. It is indisputable that he no longer possesses the “capacity as Trustee” that is vital to his

       argument because he no longer embodies the role of trustee and has lost all authority to perform

       its associated functions. If Raymond wishes to continue his pursuit of the pending appeals, he

       may seek to participate in his individual capacity, as suggested in the trial court’s July 20 order.

       Because Raymond has failed to offer any legal basis for disturbing the July 20 order in light of

       his removal as trustee, we affirm that judgment.

¶ 25                                           III. CONCLUSION

              For the reasons stated, we affirm the Henry County circuit court’s July 20, 2020,

       judgment, clarifying Raymond’s participation in the then-pending proceedings. Because we

       uphold the trial court’s jurisdiction, findings, and conclusions, we need not address the merits of

       Raymond’s claim that all subsequent proceedings should be reassigned to another judge of the

       Henry County circuit court due to the present judge’s “deep seated antagonism toward” him.

¶ 26          Affirmed.

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