Court Opinion

ID: 9865322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:31:49.117843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:28.264137
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hays
dissenting.
I dissent from the court’s opinion in this case because of the prejudicial error which intervened, as I view it, by reason of the admission in evidence of proof of two unrelated and disconnected crimes alleged to have been committed by defendant in Michigan subsequent to the one involved herein.
We have held that such evidence should be admitted, if at all, with great caution and only in cases where it is clearly relevant to some issue involved (Dockery v. People, 74 Colo. 113, 115, 219 Pac. 220), or where it “tends to prove some element of the one for which the accused is being tried.” Jaynes v. People, 44 Colo. 535, 543, 99 Pac. 325; Coates v. People, 106 Colo. 483, 488, 106 P. (2d) 354.
In Wood v. People, 60 Colo. 211, 213, 151 Pac. 941, evidence was admitted of other transactions and wé reversed the judgment because such evidence was “wholly irrelevant, for the simple reason that their proof was not essential, or in any wise necessary * * In Reppin v. People, 95 Colo. 192, 34 P. (2d) 71, we said that “incompetent and irrelevant evidence should b;e excluded” and, quoting from Jaynes v. People, supra, stated, “that such evidence [of other offenses] tends to create a prejudice in the minds of the jury; but of this he will not be permitted to complain if the evidence is competent and his rights are safeguarded in the manner we have suggested.”
The above rule has been stated in various ways, but never more clearly set forth than in Hamilton v. People, 87 Colo. 307, 310, 287 Pac. 651, where Mr. Justice Burke, now chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “The true rule is that evidence of former convictions or other offenses may not, in the first instance, be *561directly or indirectly introduced if not material and relevant to the fact in issue.”
Concerning the same rule, Judge Bliss, speaking for the supreme court of Iowa, in State v. Rand (Iowa), 170 A.L.R. 289, 300, 25 N.W. (2d) 800, said: “The basic reason [for excluding proof of other crimes] is that the commission of another crime ordinarily has no proper relevance to the commission of the crime for which the defendant is being tried. One may be an habitual criminal and yet innocent of the crime for which he is indicted and being tried. And yet the proof of an independent crime while logically of no relevance, may incline the mind of a juror more readily to the belief that the defendant might have committed the crime with which he is under charge. For this reason courts should be vigilant in the exclusion of such evidence when it is without relevance or there is fair doubt of its relevance. It is thus seen that the admissibility of such testimony is all a■ matter of relevance. The test of admissibility is the connection and relevance of the facts proved with the offense charged—whether it fairly tends to prove that particular offense or an essential element thereof.” (Italics supplied)
In 20 Am. Jur., 298, section 316, we find: “In a prosecution for one crime proof of another direct substantive crime is never admissible unless there is some legal connection between the two, upon which it can be said that one tends to establish the other or some essential fact in issue. The courts stress the importance of this requisite due to the nature and prejudicial character of such evidence. The question of relevancy is obviously one to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances in the particular case.” Section 311, id., contains the statement: “The rule excluding evidence of the commission of other offenses by the accused in a criminal case for the purpose of showing the commission of the particular offense with which he is charged does not deprive the state of its right to make out its whole *562case against the accused on any evidence which is otherwise relevant upon the issue of the defendant’s guilt of the crime with which he is charged. In making proof, it is competent for the prosecution to put in evidence all relevant facts and circumstances which tend to establish any of the constituent elements of the crime with which the accused is charged, even though such facts and circumstances may prove or tend to prove that the defendant committed other crimes.”
In 22 C.J.S., page 1105, section 686, it is said: “ * * * where intent is not of the essence of the offense charged, or is not an element thereof, or is immaterial or not involved, or where accused is not shown to have some connection with the other offenses, or where the nature of the offense is such that proof of its commission as charged carries with it an implication or presumption of criminal intent, the act charged characterizing the offense, evidence of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of other like offenses is inadmissible, * *
The exclusion of similar-fact evidence is the subject of an extensive and scholarly article by Julius Stone in 51 Harvard Law Review, 998, wherein the origin and development of the rule of exclusion is carefully treated, and leading authorities analyzed. It is there pointed out that the “perplexing variety of holdings” by many courts is due to “disregard of the basic test of the original rule, namely — is this evidence relevant to an issue other than propensity?”
In the light of the foregoing authorities it is thoroughly established that admissibility of evidence concerning other convictions or offenses depends upon whether or not such evidence proves or tends to prove some essential element in the case on trial.
In the present case defendant confessed not only to committing the Colorado crime, but also the two alleged Michigan crimes, and Justice Alter, in delivering the opinion of the court, said in effect: “the only question for our determination is whether the entire confession is ad*563missible or whether only that part of the confession, directly pertaining to Ford’s murder, was admissible with that part of the confession pertaining to other murders deleted therefrom. In determining this case we have read and carefully considered all decisions called to our attention by defendant as well as many other decisions. We find that there is great diversity of opinion as to the admissibility of the entire confession, but have concluded that in this and some other jurisdictions the question has been determined adversely to the defendant’s contention.
As to whether or not there is diversity of opinion elsewhere with respect to the admissibility of the entire confession, we are not, as I see it, concerned. The question is set at rest in Colorado by the above decisions of this court, which are consistent with the weight of judicial authority elsewhere, to the effect that all relevant portions of said confession are admissible and all irrelevant parts thereof inadmissible. No other test than relevancy is justified or permitted under our decisions.
The court in the majority opinion cites the case of Reppin v. People, supra, as authority for the proposition that all of said confession must be admitted and that none thereof may be excluded. I do not so interpret that case; in fact, as I view it, the Reppin case is in direct conflict with the opinion of the court in this case as I will now show.
In that case the chief of police testified concerning a conversation he had with the defendant, wherein defendant confessed to the making of certain plans with respect to a holdup of the Broadmoor Hotel in Colorado Springs; that he had been arrested in New Jersey for conspiracy; and that he had gone to a place called the Pot and Spigot with the intention of holding it up, and to other matters of similar character. In reference to this confession of the defendant, as related by the chief of police, we said:
“The court erred in permitting the chief of police to *564testify, over the defendant’s objection, to the defendant’s statements with reference to his ‘vision’ concerning a holdup at the Broadmoor Hotel, and those with reference to the Pot and Spigot incident. No holdup occurred, nor was one even attempted. That testimony does not come within any exception to the rule excluding evidence of other offenses. The error was prejudicial and reversible.
“For the same reason it was prejudicial and reversible error to admit that part of the confession that related to the defendant’s arrest in 1931, in New Jersey, for conspiracy.”
There were three separate incidents recited in the confession of the defendant, which we held to be irrelevant to any issue in the case, and, as a result, the admission of evidence concerning them was prejudicial to defendant, and constituted reversible error. Other parts of the confession found to be relevant to the issues were properly admitted in evidence.
There is nothing in Williams v. People, 114 Colo. 207, 158 P. (2d) 447, or in any of the other authorities cited by the court in support of its opinion, contrary to the above statement or which requires the admission of irrelevant and incompetent evidence even though it forms a part of an “entire confession.”
The sole and only remaining question herein, is whether or not proof of the Michigan crimes is relevant to some issue in the instant case. The determination of this question requires at the outset an examination of the applicable statute, section 32, chapter 48, ’35 C.S.A., which provides: “All murder * * * which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any * * * robbery, * * * shall be deemed murder of the first degree.” Under our decisions, the killing during the perpetration of a robbery without further proof constitutes murder of the first degree. Jones v. People, 93 Colo. 282, 285, 26 P. (2d) 103; Reppin v. People, supra. There are consequently but two elements of the crime of mur*565der under the above provision of the statute, namely, the killing and the robbery.
In the trial court’s instruction set forth in full in the majority opinion, it was stated that the evidence of the Michigan crimes was “admitted solely for the purpose of showing intent, motive, plan, or design, of the defendant in the alleged commission of the act charged in the information.”
In overruling defendant’s motion for new trial, the trial court observed, inter alia: “I think it then becomes important to determine what the defendant intended at the time he struck the blow. I think that the evidence as admitted, of the subsequent acts where the same instrument was employed and where death resulted, was properly admitted to establish the fact that at the time he struck the deceased in this case, he intended to accomplish his death, and did in fact accomplish it.”
While “motive, plan or design” are expressly mentioned in the instruction given, there was no specific reference thereto in the findings of the trial court at the time of the overruling of the motion for new trial, and it is clear from such findings that the evidence concerning the Michigan crimes was admitted only for the purpose of showing “intent,” and not to show “motive, plan, or design.” In passing, it is interesting to note that the trial court found the evidence of the Michigan crimes was not admissible for the purpose of establishing “identity” because, “I felt that the identity of the defendant had been sufficiently established.” No doubt by the same token if the court had been convinced that “intent” had been “sufficiently established” he would have excluded evidence of the Michigan crimes altogether.
It is a serious matter when the life of a twenty-two year old boy, now in death row at the penitentiary, depends in all probability, upon the trial court’s determination as to whether or not “intent” has been “sufficiently established” in the case, especially in view of the *566following remark in the findings of said court: “I consider that the question of the admissibility of evidence as to other crimes is a troublesome one, and it was only after considerable thought that the evidence objected to and referred to in the motion for new trial was admitted.”
It is evident from the above that the trial court entertained grave doubts as to the admissibility of such evidence. Under the authorities the benefit of such doubts should always be resolved in favor of the accused.
This leads naturally to the inquiry as to whether or not, in any event, “intent” is an essential element of the crime here charged; was it necessary to show such intent by proof of other alleged crimes; did the fact that “he [defendant] intended to accomplish his [Ford’s] death” have any bearing upon the issues herein? A con-' elusive answer to all of such questions is found in Reppin v. People, supra, where we said: “But if, as in this case, the uncontradicted evidence is to the effect that the murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery, the murder is declared by our statute to be of the first degree, and the court, as we shall see, is required to submit to the jury the sole question of the penalty to be fixed.”
Nothing is said to the effect that intent must be shown by other evidence. It necessarily follows that defendant herein is, under the statute and above decisions, guilty of murder of the first degree irrespective of his intention and the fact that he entertained the most vicious intent imaginable, and that he “intended to accomplish his [Ford’s] death” when he struck the fatal blow, is wholly outside the scope of the issues in the case. The crime is fully established by showing the killing and robbery, and under the statute the introduction of unrelated and disconnected crimes in another state is a mere subterfuge and can have no. effect except to inflame the minds of the jurors and cause them to impose the death penalty instead of a sentence of life’imprisonment. As *567stated by us in the Reppin opinion, quoting from an Illinois case: “The legislature has seen fit to clothe juries with a wide discretion in fixing the punishment to be inflicted upon one convicted of murder. Every defendant on trial for that crime is entitled to the full benefit of the statute. When all else has failed him, he has a right to stand before a jury unprejudiced by incompetent, irrelevant evidence, and appeal to them to spare his life.”
It is quite uniformly held that where, as here, intent is not an essential element of the crime charged, or where it is established by proof of the commission of the acts constituting the crime (killing and robbery), evidence of other crimes is inadmissible. Such was the holding of the supreme court of Oregon in State v. Willson, 113 Ore. 450, 498, 233 Pac. 259, 271, where it said:
“The evidence of other offenses in this case only tend to blacken the character of the defendant. They are not admissible to show intent for that is completely and conclusively established by the act itself if the testimonly introduced by the state is to be believed. It is contrary to the reason of the law to admit the objectionable testimony of other crimes.”
In State v. Smith, 103 Wash. 267, 174 Pac. 9, the supreme court of Washington said: “There is no more insidious and dangerous testimony than that which attempts to convict a defendant by producing evidence of crimes other than the one for which he is on trial, and such testimony should only be admitted when clearly necessary to establish the essential elements of the charge which is being prosecuted. To establish guilty intent, unlawful motive, or criminal knowledge, it is permissible to show that the act charged against the defendant was one in a series of similar ones; but beyond this, the state cannot go and, for the purpose of securing a conviction, show the perpetration of other similar acts, even though committed in furtherance of a general scheme, where there is no proof required to establish intent, mo*568tive or knowledge, other than proof of the act charged itself. In other words, where the act charged against the defendant itself characterizes the offense, the guilty-intent is proven by proving the act. Here the proof of giving of dry morphine on a prescription calling for morphine in solution was proof of the intent and nothing more was necessary to establish criminality.”
In People v. Hobbs, 297 Ill. 399, 130 N.E. 779, 782, it is stated: “The general rule is that proof of any other offense than that for which the accused is being tried, although of a similar character, is inadmissible. Where the intent is not required to be specifically proved, or from the nature of the offense under investigation proof of its commission as charged necessarily establishes the criminal intent, or the intent is a necessary conclusion from the act done, evidence of the perpetration of other like offenses should not be admitted.”
In State v. Brown, 3 Boyce (Del.) 499, 85 Atl. 797, 800, the court said:
“But, wherever the intent with which an alleged offense was committed is a material element of the charge, and such intent becomes an issue at the trial, proof of other similar offenses, within certain reasonable limits, is admissible, as tending to throw light upon the intention of the accused in doing the act complained of.
* * *
“Where, however, the intent is not required to be specifically proved, or from the nature of the offense under investigation proof of its commission as charged necessarily establishes the criminal intent, or the intent is a necessary conclusion from the act done, evidence of the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of other like offenses, should not be admitted.”
It is said in State v. Cragun, 85 Utah 149, 38 P. (2d) 1071, 1078, 1079:
“Where the state is able to prove, as it did in the case at bar, the commission of the act and that its performance was not necessary to save the life of the woman, *569then the criminal intent of the defendant has been shown, and evidence of other abortions on other and entirely different women is not relevant nor competent. If the defendant, although he had pleaded not guilty, claimed that the act was necessarily performed in an effort to save the life of the woman, then in rebuttal of such claim the state might well offer evidence of other abortions attempted or committed by the defendant for the purpose of disproving such claim and showing his intent in the performance of the acts for which he is being tried.
“Cases may arise where the state would be unable to prove the intent of the defendant without proving the commission, or attempted commission, by him on other women of separate and distinct offenses. Should such a case arise, then, for the purpose of proving a criminal intent, the state should be permitted to introduce such evidence on its main case, although a plea of not guilty had been entered by the defendant; but, where the state, as was the case here, .can prove the intent without relying upon separate and distinct offenses committed by the defendant, it should do so.
❖ ❖ ❖
“It necessarily follows that the admission of this evidence was error, and that a new trial should be granted. The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.”
(Italics supplied)
In Tinsley v. United States, 43 F. (2d) 890, 893, the Circuit Court of Appeals stated the rule as follows: “If no question of a defendant’s intent is involved, unless there is some connection between such offenses and those charged, it is manifestly unfair and unjust that evidence of like offenses to those charged in the indictment should be introduced.”
It is contended in the briefs that Hillen v. People, 59 Colo. 280, 149 Pac. 250, cited in the court’s opinion, is authority for permitting evidence of other offenses to be *570introduced to prove intent. That was a murder case involving another provision of the same statute here under consideration. The defendant was convicted of murder of the first degree for killing one Chase in an attempt to perpetrate a highway robbery. The court admitted evidence of other robberies alleged to have been committed by the defendant before and after the act for which he was being tried. The evidence “showed that the defendant commanded deceased [Chase] to throw up his hands, and an instant later fired the fatal shot.” We said: “No attempt at actual robbery was made, the defendant running away as soon as the shot was fired; and aside from the order to Chase to throw up his hands, there was nothing to characterize defendant’s action as an attempt to rob. It was necessary, therefore, to establish his intent to commit robbery, and for that purpose evidence of other offenses is admissible, if showing or tending to show intent.”
It was necessary in the above case to prove the intent to rob, and consequently, evidence of other robberies by the same individual was competent to show that his intent in the case on trial, was to rob the deceased. Evidence of other offenses was relevant to that issue. In the instant case it is conclusively shown by the evidence, not an attempt to rob as in the Hillen case, but that the defendant did actually rob Ford, and that part of the loot was found in his possession. In the Hillen case the question of intent was an essential element of the crime for which defendant was on trial, whereas, in the instant case, the intent is established by proof of the commission of the act. The Hillen case is clearly not in point.
In conclusion I again quote from the Reppin case: “It is impossible for us to know what the jury in this case would have done but for the introduction of this incompetent evidence, much less is it our province to say what they should have done.”
Mr. Justice Hilliard concurs in this dissent.