Court Opinion

ID: 9714759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:45:01.54379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:28.368726
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the majority. However, since the dismissal of appellee’s first lawsuit by Judge Hannon occurred after the first Pennsylvania judgment had been vacated, appellee’s request for enforcement of that judgment had become moot. See Robeson v. Acheson, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 228, 198 F.2d 985, 986 (1952) (when there is no subject matter upon which the judgment of a court can operate, the case is moot); Spencer v. NLRB, 548 F.Supp. 256, 258 (D.D.C.1982) (mootness “may occur when events transpiring after the challenged action obviate or preclude the possibility of meaningful relief”), aff'd, 229 U.S.App.D.C. 225, 712 F.2d 539 (1983), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 1908, 80 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984); cf. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 & n. 1, 71 S.Ct. 104, 106-07 n. 1, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950) (when an issue has become moot while a case is pending a decision on the merits, the established practice is to reverse or vacate the judgment entered and remand for a dismissal). Therefore, I would hold that dismissal was not on the merits, and that appellee is not barred by res judicata from seeking to enforce the second Pennsylvania judgment.