Court Opinion

ID: 9562105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:21:44.682264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:12.608626
License: Public Domain

Judge BECTON
dissenting.
Considering that (a) the right to counsel is among the most closely guarded of all trial rights, State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 271 S.E. 2d 252 (1980); (b) waiver of right to counsel will not be presumed from a silent record, State v. Coltrane, 307 N.C. 511, 299 S.E. 2d 199 (1983); and (c) jury selection is one of the most important parts of the trial, I find the trial court’s action in allowing the prosecutor to question and pass on the jury in the absence of defendant’s counsel so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. In my view, the trial court’s action deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance of counsel during a critical stage of a criminal trial; it improperly placed more emphasis on the expedient disposition of cases than on the effective protection of defendant’s rights.
The facts in this case compel a new trial. Defendant was represented by retained counsel of his choice. Defendant’s attorney resided in Yadkin County; defendant’s case was tried in Wilkes County. The case was called for trial in the middle of winter, February 19, 1981. The court had been informed that defendant’s attorney was on his way to court at the time it ordered jury selection to begin.
The law compels a new trial. The peremptory challenge is “one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused.” Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408, 38 L.Ed. 208, 214, 14 S.Ct. 410, 414 (1894). “The denial or impairment of the right is reversible error without a showing of prejudice. [Citations omitted.] ‘For it is, as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose.’ ” Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 13 L.Ed. 2d *768759, 772, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835 (1965) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378, 36 L.Ed. 1011, 1014, 13 S.Ct. 136, 139 (1892) (emphasis added). Further, this Court, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, and the United States Supreme Court have recognized the importance of jury selection. A defendant has a right to be present during the entire selection of the jury. Lewis v. United States; State v. Hayes, 291 N.C. 293, 230 S.E. 2d 146 (1976); and State v. Shackleford, 59 N.C. App. 357, 296 S.E. 2d 658 (1982). Indeed, in Shackleford, this Court held that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because his attorney, without objecting, conducted the jury selection while defendant was not in court. This case presents the “flip side” of the situation facing the Hayes and Shackleford courts —the defendant was personally present, but without counsel. If jury selection is so important as to require the defendant’s presence, then I believe it equally important to have defendant’s counsel present. Compare State v. Coltrane, in which the order revoking defendant’s probation was reversed because defendant’s attorney was not present at the probation revocation hearing.
Separate and apart from the facts and law which, in my view, compel a new trial, are the practical reasons why defendant’s counsel should be present during jury selection. A defendant needs counsel not only to speak for him in court, but also to observe and protect defendant from the sometimes intentional, but more often unintentional, improprieties that would adversely affect defendant’s right to a fair trial. Now, I realize that there is no record of what the prosecutor or the potential jurors said, but that is no reason to assume that the jury selection procedure was “harmless.” The fact that there is no record points out that the uncounseled defendant obviously did not know that the jury selection proceeding could have been recorded. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1241(b) (1978).
The following quote is instructive:
While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable. [Citation omitted.] It is often exercised upon the ‘sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt *769to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another. . .
Swain, 380 U.S. at 220, 13 L.Ed. 2d at 772, 85 S.Ct. at 836 (quoting Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376, 36 L.Ed. at 1014, 13 S.Ct. at 138). The practical view of human nature set forth in Lewis in 1892 is still valid today.
It is not uncommon for trial judges to be inattentive, or even to absent themselves from the courtroom, during jury selection. The trial lawyer who views jury selection as the most important part of the trial does not enjoy that luxury. The trial lawyer, at least on a subconscious level — and without regard to what has been labeled scientific jury selection techniques — evaluates jurors not only on what is said, but also on nuances and on how and when something is said. The manner in which jurors respond to opposing counsel’s questions on voir dire is as important as the manner in which jurors respond to the questioning attorney. Was the juror too hesitant? Too eager? Too assertive? Too opinionated? Too conservative? Too liberal?
Verbal, as well as nonverbal, behavior is critically important when the trial attorney seeks to make a reasonably intelligent decision about exercising peremptory challenges during jury selection. Trial lawyers may not categorize their thought processes in terms of (a) paralinguistic cues (for example, speech disturbances, speed of speech, breath rate, pauses, and latencies); (b) kinesic cues (for example, eye contact, facial cues, and body postures and movements), or even (c) verbal cues, but we all use such communication cues in making evaluations about people.1
In this case, when defendant’s attorney arrived, the State had concluded its examination of the jurors and had passed the panel. I find the trial court’s decision to proceed, in the absence of defense counsel, harmful error, and I vote for a new trial.

. See generally Suggs and Sales, Using Communication Cues to Evaluate Prospective Jurors During the Voir Dire, 20 Ariz. L. Rev. 629, 632-38 (1978).