Court Opinion

ID: 9551273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:50:30.597744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:25.660870
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in much of the dispositive portions of the majority opinion. However, I respectfully dissent from that portion which allows appellant Ann Mifflin $1,-500.00 attorney’s fees “for the prosecution of this appeal.”
The majority opinion directs that upon remand the lower court shall “set off the amount of community debts to be charged against the community interest in the property” and also directs to be set off against the community interest in the property “the amount of all attorney fees awardable to Ann Mifflin, both at trial and on appeal.” For this direction the majority opinion cites no statutory authority nor is any rationale suggested as a basis for so construing any common law authority.
Following a 20-month marriage, Ann Mifflin by way of counterclaim sought and obtained a divorce which terminated the marriage relationship. I would assume in the absence of extraordinary circumstances that any debt, including attorney’s fees, contracted by either of the parties prior to the dissolution of the marriage relationship would constitute community indebtedness. Therefore presumptively attorney’s fees at trial should and were directed to be paid from community property interests. Such, however, does not explain how indebtedness contracted by one of the parties following the dissolution of the marriage relationship can or should be charged against *899community property interests. Implicit throughout the majority opinion, including the denial of alimony, is the ability of appellant to support herself. She obviously was self-supporting and owned property prior to the marriage and it is apparent that she came out of the 20-month relationship with more than she entered. Where, as here, the rights of or duties toward children are not in issue and the relationship of marriage has long since been terminated, I see no reason in logic or law why one party should bear the cost of attorney’s fees for the other. At best if the community property interests are to bear the costs of an ex-wife’s attorney’s fees, then I think equally the ex-husband’s attorney’s fees should likewise be paid from the community property interests. Also, since in my judgment neither party prevailed upon appeal, no costs should be allowed.
McFADDEN, C. J., concurs.