Court Opinion

ID: 9391617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 19:01:48.02126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.713567
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10849    Document: 28-1     Date Filed: 05/02/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10849
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       FRANKIE SHEARRY, JR.,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 7:19-cr-00042-WLS-TQL-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10849

       Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Frankie Shearry, Jr. appeals his sentence of 188 months’ im-
       prisonment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He
       argues that the District Court plainly erred in finding his four prior
       Georgia cocaine convictions qualified as serious drug offenses un-
       der the Armed Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”), 18 U.S.C.
       § 924(e). Because there is no binding precedent holding that
       Shearry’s prior convictions do not qualify as serious drug offenses,
       the District Court did not plainly err. We affirm.
                                         I.
               On August 15, 2019, a grand jury in the Middle District of
       Georgia indicted Frankie Shearry, Jr. on one count of possession of
       a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)
       and 924(e). The indictment included a notice that Shearry had
       prior convictions in Georgia that triggered a mandatory minimum
       sentence of 15 years imprisonment under the ACCA. Shearry
       pleaded guilty.
              The presentence investigation report (the “PSR”) indicated
       that multiple agencies began investigating Shearry after receiving
       an anonymous fax that he was using drugs. Based on that tip, law
       enforcement personnel searched Shearry’s home as part of a
       county-wide operation focusing on certain probationers based on
       their criminal history or current status as probationers. They
       found two .380 caliber semi-automatic pistols, as well as drugs.
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       22-10849                Opinion of the Court                         3

       Shearry admitted to possessing the firearms for protection, despite
       the fact that he was prohibited from owning them. He also admit-
       ted to possessing drugs.
              The PSR identified the base offense level for a violation of
       § 922(g)(1) as 24 and assessed Shearry a four-level increase for pos-
       sessing the firearms in connection with another felony offense. As
       relevant here, the PSR noted that Shearry qualified as an armed ca-
       reer criminal because he had four prior convictions for serious drug
       offenses. Applying the ACCA enhancement, Shearry’s adjusted of-
       fense level was 34. The PSR then applied a three-level deduction
       for acceptance of responsibility.
              Shearry’s criminal history included a 1995 conviction for
       possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and two convic-
       tions for possession of cocaine in 1999 and 2002. As relevant for
       the ACCA enhancement, the PSR indicated that Shearry had prior
       convictions in Georgia for possession of cocaine with the intent to
       distribute in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2009. Shearry’s prior criminal
       history resulted in a total criminal history score of 16 and a criminal
       history category of VI.
              Finally, the PSR explained that § 924(e)(1) carried a mini-
       mum term of imprisonment of 15 years and a maximum term of
       life. The guideline range was 188 to 235 months. Shearry did not
       file any objections to the PSR, nor did he object to the PSR at the
       sentencing hearing.
            The District Court sentenced Shearry to 188 months’ impris-
       onment—the lowest possible guideline sentence—followed by
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10849

       three years of supervised release. When the Court asked if there
       were any objections to the sentence, Shearry’s attorney made a
       “substantive reasonableness objection to the sentence under the
       theory that although we understand [18 U.S.C. §] 924(e) and what
       the statutes require we do think that’s unreasonable.” Sent’g Tr.,
       Doc. 95 at 14–15. The District Court overruled that objection.
              Shearry timely appealed. On appeal, Shearry argues the Dis-
       trict Court committed plain error in finding that his prior cocaine
       convictions qualified as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. His
       argument in his initial brief was based on this Court’s original deci-
       sion in United States v. Jackson (“Jackson I”), 36 F.4th 1294 (11th Cir.
       2022), and his initial brief was filed before that decision was va-
       cated. Shearry’s argument was that Georgia’s definition of cocaine
       was broader than the federal definition—just like Florida’s defini-
       tion of cocaine in Jackson I. According to Shearry, Georgia’s defini-
       tion of cocaine, like Florida’s, defined cocaine to include ioflupane,
       but the federal definition excluded ioflupane as a controlled sub-
       stance. After Shearry filed his initial brief, this Court vacated its
       decision in Jackson I—the sole opinion Shearry relied on to establish
       that the District Court’s error was plain.
                                          II.
              We review de novo whether a prior state conviction qualiﬁes
       as a serious drug oﬀense under the ACCA. United States v. Jackson
       (“Jackson II”), 55 F.4th 846, 849–50 (11th Cir. 2022), petition for cert.
       ﬁled, (U.S. Jan. 26, 2023) (No. 22-6640). Federal law governs the
       meaning of terms in the ACCA and state law governs the elements
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       22-10849                Opinion of the Court                          5

       of state-law crimes. Id. at 850. But when, as here, a defendant does
       not raise a sentencing issue before the district court, we review for
       plain error. United States v. Jones, 743 F.3d 826, 828 (11th Cir. 2014).
       To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error, (2)
       that was obvious, (3) that aﬀected the defendant’s substantial
       rights, and (4) that seriously aﬀected the fairness, integrity, or pub-
       lic reputation of the proceedings. United States v. Aguilar-Ibarra, 740
       F.3d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 2014). Before an error is subject to correc-
       tion under the plain error rule, it must be plain under controlling
       precedent or the language of a statute or rule. Id. at 592 (quoting
       United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 842 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation
       marks and brackets omitted)). It is enough that the error is plain at
       the time of appellate consideration. Johnson v. United States, 520
       U.S. 461, 468, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997).
              The ACCA requires that any person who violates 18 U.S.C.
       § 922(g) serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years when
       the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felonies or se-
       rious drug oﬀenses committed on occasions diﬀerent from one an-
       other. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA deﬁnes a “serious drug
       oﬀense,” in relevant part, as “an oﬀense under State law, involving
       manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufac-
       ture or distribute, a controlled substance (as deﬁned in section 102
       of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)).” Id.
       § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act de-
       ﬁnes a “controlled substance” as any substance on the federal con-
       trolled substances schedules. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812. The cur-
       rent version of the federal drug schedules expressly excludes
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10849

       ioﬂupane. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4)(ii). However, the federal drug
       schedules included ioﬂupane until 2015. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 851
       & n.4.
              Georgia law prohibits possession with intent to distribute
       any controlled substance. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-30(b). In its cur-
       rent controlled substances schedules, Georgia includes:
              Cocaine, coca leaves, any salt, compound, derivative,
              stereoisomers of cocaine, or preparation of coca
              leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, stereoiso-
              mers of cocaine, or preparation thereof which is
              chemically equivalent or identical with any of these
              substances, but not including decocainized coca
              leaves or extractions which do not contain cocaine or
              ecgonine.
       Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-26(1)(D). It does not speciﬁcally include or
       exclude ioﬂupane. Id. The versions of the deﬁnition of cocaine in
       eﬀect in 2003, 2007, and 2009 contained the same wording. See id.
       (amendments eﬀective from 2000 to May 28, 2007; May 29, 2007 to
       May 5, 2008; and Apr. 21, 2009 to June 2, 2010).
              We apply the categorical approach to determine whether a
       defendant’s state conviction is a serious drug oﬀense under the
       ACCA. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 850. Under the categorical approach,
       we consider the statutory deﬁnition of the state oﬀense rather than
       the facts of the crime itself. Id. A state conviction qualiﬁes only if
       the state statute under which the conviction occurred deﬁnes the
       oﬀense in the same way as, or more narrowly than, the ACCA’s
       deﬁnition of a serious drug oﬀense. Id.
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       22-10849               Opinion of the Court                        7

              In Jackson, we initially vacated and remanded a defendant’s
       ACCA-enhanced sentence, holding that the appellant’s Florida co-
       caine-related oﬀenses did not qualify as serious drug oﬀenses under
       the ACCA. Jackson I, 36 F.4th at 1306. We determined that the fed-
       eral controlled substances schedules that deﬁned a serious drug of-
       fense under the ACCA were those in eﬀect when the defendant
       committed his federal oﬀense and that those schedules did not
       cover ioﬂupane at the time he committed his federal oﬀense. Id. at
       1299–1302. Since the relevant Florida statute covered ioﬂupane
       when he was convicted of his prior cocaine-related oﬀenses, the
       Florida statute’s controlled-substance element was broader than
       the relevant version of the federal controlled substances schedules,
       and his prior cocaine-related convictions thus did not qualify as se-
       rious drug oﬀenses. Id. at 1303–04.
               We vacated our decision in Jackson I and, in Jackson II, held
       that the appellant’s Florida cocaine-related convictions qualiﬁed as
       serious drug oﬀenses. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 861–62. We held that
       the ACCA’s deﬁnition of a serious drug oﬀense incorporates the
       version of the federal controlled substances schedules in eﬀect
       when the defendant was convicted of the prior state drug oﬀense.
       Id. at 854. We concluded that the appellant’s 1998 and 2004 Florida
       cocaine-related convictions qualiﬁed because Florida’s controlled
       substances schedules included ioﬂupane until 2017 and the federal
       controlled substance schedules also included ioﬂupane until 2015.
       Id. at 851 & nn.3–4. We concluded the Florida controlled sub-
       stances schedules included ioﬂupane because Florida later
       amended its schedules to exclude ioﬂupane. Id. at 851 n.3.
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       8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10849

               Under our prior precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding is
       binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or
       undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or
       this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249, 1265
       (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 142
       S. Ct. 1376 (2022). A subsequent panel cannot overrule a prior
       panel even if it is convinced the prior panel was wrong. United
       States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
              Here, the District Court did not plainly err in ﬁnding that
       Shearry’s prior Georgia cocaine-related convictions were serious
       drug oﬀenses because there is no binding precedent holding that
       they do not qualify as serious drug oﬀenses. Moreover, Shearry
       concedes that his argument that his Georgia convictions were not
       serious drug oﬀenses relied on Jackson I—which was vacated and
       superseded by Jackson II—and that his argument is foreclosed by
       Jackson II. Aside from Jackson I, Shearry does not point to any other
       precedent from this Court or the Supreme Court to show that the
       District Court’s alleged error was plain. We are bound by our hold-
       ing in Jackson II. Shearry’s argument that Jackson II was wrongly
       decided is not enough to overcome the prior panel precedent rule.
       See Steele, 147 F.3d at 1317–18. Because an error must be clear un-
       der binding precedent or the language of a statute or rule in order
       to be “plain,” Shearry’s argument does not satisfy the second prong
       of plain error review. Accordingly, we aﬃrm.
              AFFIRMED.