Court Opinion

ID: 9606056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:46:12.708661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:32.019609
License: Public Domain

GUTHRIE, Justice,
dissenting, in which RAPER, Chief Justice, joins.
I join in Chief Justice Raper’s dissent and additionally deny the propriety of considering the issue discussed under point two and suggest that in pursuing such discussion and deciding upon this point that the majority ignores one of the most firmly established rules of the court, i. e., that they will not consider an issue not supported by proper citation of authority and cogent argument. Otte v. State, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1361 (1977); Moore v. State, Wyo., 542 P.2d 109 (1975); Connor v. State, Wyo., 537 P.2d 715 (1975); Deeter v. State, Wyo., 500 P.2d 68 (1972); Alcala v. State, Wyo., 487 P.2d 448 *1009(1971); Kennedy v. State, Wyo., 470 P.2d 372 (1970); Ballinger v. State, Wyo., 437 P.2d 305 (1968); Valerio v. State, Wyo., 429 P.2d 317 (1967); Drummer v. State, Wyo., 366 P.2d 20 (1961). The sole authority cited by the appellant in support of this contention and in his brief in no manner considers or involves this evidentiary rule; nor is there any discernible connection between the principles discussed in that case and the instant case which would assist in the disposal of the question presented. This writer would normally content himself with this statement and eschew further discussion. However, because of the fact that I view this holding as far-reaching and one which will create confusion and without any basis in the law, I shall proceed further in this demonstrating the reason if, arguendo it is properly before the court that the rule asserted by the majority is completely improper.
To arrive at this disposal, the majority failed to recognize the finality of an unap-pealed judgment based upon a guilty plea in the lower court and would allow and has commanded that the trial court allow the defendant to contradict and impeach this final judgment in an entirely collateral proceeding with resultant confusion.
This raises a most interesting and important question to which there appear no answers in the opinion of the majority, but demonstrates to this writer the incipient confusion which can result from such holding. If the issue is properly submitted and placed in the area of the jury’s consideration, it would seem axiomatic that the State must then be allowed to rebut and meet this issue. State v. Lee, Mo.App., 536 S.W.2d 198, 199 (1976). This will not only be time-consuming but by virtue of such procedure, this court will have assigned to the jury, in addition to its heavy duty of the determination of the guilt or innocence of this defendant, the burden of determining if the action of the trial judge in accepting the guilty plea was proper, for if the defendant is correct in his asserted contention, there is no factual basis for the acceptance of such plea.
To demonstrate the basis for this writer’s view, illustrative citations only will be set out with no effort at exhaustive citations.
A conviction until set aside must be considered a verity. State v. Johnson, 99 Ariz. 52, 406 P.2d 403, 404, 16 A.L.R.3d 723 (1965). Particular reference is made to the voluminous note appended to that opinion. The application of this rule alone forbids the widespread exploration contemplated by this defendant and particularly would forbid any attempt to explore if there were a factual basis for this guilty plea which is the apparent desire of the appellant and which would apparently be permissible under this opinion. The guilt or innocence of either of these witnesses which were proffered by the defendant is clearly immaterial in this case and collateral to the issue of whether this defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The receipt of the evidence of the conviction of a prior felony is based upon and received solely as an attack upon the credibility of the witness (Rule 609(a), W.R.E.) and in no manner can it be introduced or presented in this case or any other case for any other purpose which is certainly a collateral matter. Mr. Justice Holmes in 1897 and while he was still a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case of Lamoureux v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 169 Mass. 338, 47 N.E. 1009, 1010 (1897), made a rather clear and short discussion of the reason why these convictions must be left unexplained with the observation that “obviously, the guilt of the witness cannot be retried.” The Massachusetts court had considered this problem, both before and after Lamoureux, supra, and in the cases of Commonwealth v. Galligan, 155 Mass. 54, 28 N.E. 1129 (1891), and in Commonwealth v. Gettigan, 252 Mass. 450, 148 N.E. 113, 120-121 (1925), observed that it was proper to exclude such evidence directly in explaining the criminal record because that record “was conclusive evidence of the conviction and could not be controlled or explained ⅝ * ‡ f)
The case of United States v. Plante, 1st Cir., 472 F.2d 829 (1973), certiorari denied *1010411 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 1932, 36 L.Ed.2d 411, discusses this rule at some length and sets out a preferable and majority rule. Although citing some authority that is a discretionary matter with the court, we find particular recognition of the rule that neither party should be allowed to develop such details or to allow a witness to deny his guilt, because to permit the party so to do would lead to the development of a collateral issue with one party or the other frequently being at disadvantage. See further, 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 498, p. 480 (13th Ed.) for a statement of this rule and authorities supporting same.
This writer is unable to discern any applicability of the cases of Kwallek v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1372 (1979), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), insofar as they would serve as a basis for the disposal proposed by the majority in part two of this opinion. This writer joined in Kwallek and agreed wholly therewith. It seems not improper to assert that the holding of Kwallek is narrow and holds that it is improper for the prosecution as part of its case in chief to inject evidence of a guilty plea of a jointly charged defendant. It is authority for no more or no less and in no manner can be construed as touching the question of the proper cross-examination or proper rehabilitative questions of a witness who has admitted the conviction of a felony. Alford, which is a habeas corpus proceeding holding that a plea of guilty to second-degree murder cannot be considered involuntary if defendant had entered the plea to avoid the possibility of conviction of a higher degree of the crime with the possible death penalty, has no apparent applicability to the matter discussed.
This writer sees no tension or conflict with Rule 609, W.R.E., and believes that in those few cases which then might arise, and none of which presently occur to this writer, the trial judge could and would properly protect the defendant by invoking Rule 403, W.R.E., and that it would be improper for an appellate court, as the majority seeks to do, to substitute its discretion. It may be further suggested that if defense counsel had deemed that the evidence of this guilty plea might be prejudicial that he should have asked the court to restrict the scope of this evidence at the time it was given pursuant to Rule 105, W.R.E., which would have been mandatory. Channel v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1145, 1150 (1979).