Court Opinion

ID: 9696878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:00:54.570989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:27.397269
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 49. (<dissenting). I agree with much of the majority opinion. I agree that the test for whether a substantial change in circumstances has occurred is the same regardless of whether the original maintenance order resulted from a stipulation or from a contested hearing.1 I agree that expenses incurred for an adult child's post-secondary education may properly be considered in a party's budget in a maintenance award.2 I agree that the fairness objective is applicable in a postdivorce maintenance modification case and that any language to the contrary in any case should be withdrawn.3
¶ 50. I write separately for three reasons: (1) the majority opinion unnecessarily muddies the already *630unclear waters of maintenance modification by setting forth what purports to be a different standard than the courts have used in past modification cases; (2) a circuit court should use great care before excluding expenses for an adult child's post-secondary education; and (3) I disagree with the majority opinion that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in this case when it terminated the indefinite maintenance award.
i — 1
¶ 51. The majority opinion correctly states that the threshold test used in past maintenance modification decisions has been to determine whether there has been a substantial change in the parties' circumstances " 'such that it would be unjust or inequitable to strictly hold either party to the judgment.' "4 The majority opinion then proceeds in the text of the opinion, in contrast to a footnote comment,5 to "emphasize that we have moved away from those terms ['unjust' and 'inequitable']" and adopts a new "correct" test for determining whether to modify a maintenance award, holding that courts must consider the "fairness [of a modification] to both of the parties under all of the circumstances."6
¶ 52. The majority opinion cites two oases in support of this proposition, neither of which supports its claim. Hefty v. Hefty, 172 Wis. 2d 124, 493 N.W.2d 33 *631(1992), is not a modification case and therefore not relevant. Although LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987), did involve both an initial maintenance determination and a modification, the case does not discuss the standard for modification but merely makes clear that maintenance has both support and fairness objectives.7
¶ 53. The majority opinion's apparent attempt to distinguish between an order that is "unjust or inequitable" and one that is "unfair" forges a semantic distinction without a difference. The words "just," "equitable," and "fair" are commonly understood to be synonyms.8 The majority opinion states that the "unjust or inequitable" standard is "qualitatively different than the fairness standard, since it seems, in practice, to focus primarily on a single party," while the fairness standard focuses on both parties.9
¶ 54. The majority opinion's reasoning fails for several reasons. First, the majority opinion cites no cases in which the unjust or inequitable standard resulted in a circuit court's focusing on only one party instead of on both parties. The majority opinion instead focuses on a statement made by Rohde-Giovanni's counsel at oral argument, in which she argued that no reasonable court could find on the record of the present case that it would be unjust or inequitable for Baum-*632gart to continue paying the maintenance amount ordered at the time of the divorce.10 The majority opinion does not explain how a single statement from oral argument, read in isolation, leads to the conclusion it appears to reach — that the "unjust or inequitable" standard, in practice, has been improperly applied by the courts and has resulted in some sort of unfairness.
¶ 55. Second, the cases using the phrase "unjust or inequitable" in maintenance modification situations explicitly state that the court should examine the circumstances of both parties: "the substantial or material change in the circumstances should be such that it would be unjust or inequitable to strictly hold either party to the judgment."11
¶ 56. Third, an "unjust or inequitable" analysis necessarily requires a court to evaluate the circumstances of both parties. It would be impossible to look only at a maintenance payor's circumstances, or only at a maintenance recipient's circumstances, and determine whether the maintenance order was unjust or inequitable.
¶ 57. I see no reason to add to the confusion surrounding the proper standard to be applied in maintenance modification by announcing a "new" standard that is actually no different from the established standard.12
*633I — I HH
¶ 58. Although I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that a court may, in an appropriate case, consider expenses incurred for an adult child's education in a party's budget when modifying a maintenance award, I would advise circuit courts to use great care before excluding such expenses.
¶ 59. The majority opinion concludes that the circuit court properly excluded those expenses from Rohde-Giovanni's budget because the parties had not formally agreed to pay for their children's education beyond age 18. A formal agreement is not always necessary, however.
¶ 60. An analysis of a maintenance award addresses the marital standard of living prior to the divorce and the standard of living the parties "could anticipate enjoying if they stayed married."13 The standard of living, including the family's income, educational background, and aspirations, may very well include an adult child's post-secondary education. I agree with Rohde-Giovanni that even if courts cannot order parties to pay for the education of adult children,
[i]t cannot be disputed that contributions to an adult child pursuing post-secondary education are part of the lifestyle that many couples enjoy in years leading up to a divorce or would have anticipated enjoying had they remained married. Thus, given the right facts, expenses for an adult child pursuing post-secondary education may be an integral part of the marital standard *634of living or anticipated standard of living and therefore a proper consideration in an maintenance determination.14
¶ 61. It is significant that the purpose of a maintenance award is to allocate disposable income fairly between the parties and not to direct the manner in which each party spends discretionary funds. No prior case law restricts a spouse from making reasonable and legitimate discretionary expenditures consistent with the parties' marital standard of living.
¶ 62. The court of appeals' decision in this case acknowledged that its conclusion to consider Rohde-Giovanni's payments for her adult child's post-secondary education expenses differently from its consideration of other discretionary expenses, like vacations, hobbies, or charitable contributions,15 presented a "curious juxtaposition."16 Oddly, however, although the court of appeals did not consider negatively the maintenance payor's large budget for clothing, travel, and hobbies, it did consider negatively the maintenance recipient's expenditures for her adult children. I agree that its decision on this issue is problematic. The circuit court should, in my opinion, reexamine this issue on remand.
*635I — I I — I J — i
¶ 63. Finally, I dissent because I conclude that the circuit court's termination of the maintenance award after two years was an erroneous exercise of discretion.
¶ 64. The appropriate standard of review in evaluating whether a circuit court properly terminated an indefinite maintenance award is whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. This court has often said that "a discretionary determination must be the product of a rational mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and are considered together for the purposes of achieving a reasonable determination."17 An appellate court will affirm a circuit court's discretionary decision as long as the circuit court "examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."18 Therefore, the record on appeal must "reflect the circuit court's reasoned application of the appropriate legal standard to the relevant facts in the case."19 "If a judge bases the exercise of his discretion upon an error of law, his conduct is beyond the limits of discretion."20
*636¶ 65. According to our case law, a circuit court should consider three factors in granting limited maintenance: (1) the ability of the recipient spouse to become self-supporting at a standard of living similar to that enjoyed before the divorce; (2) the ability of the payor spouse to continue the obligation of support for an indefinite time; and (3) the need for the court to continue jurisdiction regarding maintenance.21 The circuit court and court of appeals only considered the first factor in this case: whether Rohde-Giovanni would be self-supporting at the marital standard.
¶ 66. Because the circuit court failed to consider the second two factors in this case, I cannot agree that it properly exercised its discretion. However, even to the extent that the circuit court did consider the first factor, I conclude that it erred in doing so.
¶ 67. The record shows that even if the expenditures for the parties' adult child's education are excluded from Rohde-Giovanni's budget, she still cannot meet the marital standard of living as it existed at the time of divorce, let alone the standard of living that the parties would have enjoyed if they had remained married, she had obtained a degree, and his salary continued to rise.
¶ 68. The circuit court's conclusion that Rohde-Giovanni could achieve the marital standard of living without maintenance if she eliminated financial sup*637port for her adult children22 is clearly erroneous. The marital standard of living is properly updated by taking Rohde-Giovanni's budget at the time of divorce, subtracting from it the expenditures she made on the couple's children, and multiplying the result by 26.33%, the cost of living multiplier stipulated to by the parties.23 Performing these calculations yields the following results:
5149.56 (budget at divorce)24
-2078.75 (amount spent on adult and minor children)25
3070.81
x .2633 (cost of living multiplier)26
808.54
+3070.81
$3879.35 (updated marital standard of living)
¶ 69. Rohde-Giovanni's total gross monthly income from her full-time teaching job and her part-time counselor job at the time of the modification hearing was $4834.96.27 Her net monthly income from both jobs was $3596.60, precisely $282.75 per month less than the standard she enjoyed at the time of divorce.
*638¶ 70. Rohde-Giovanni asserts that she was required to liquidate retirement assets to pay for routine living expenses, cannot afford repairs to her home, has had to work two jobs to support herself, and cannot meet her monthly budget. All of this she has done to the detriment of her health, which was in a fragile condition at the time of her divorce. The circuit court commented that if Ms. Rohde-Giovanni "tighten[ed] up [her] budget" she would be living at the marital standard, but the record belies this conclusion.28 Even if Ms. Rohde-Giovanni "tightened" her budget, she is still worse off in real dollars than she was on the day of the divorce. These circumstances have to be considered in modifying maintenance.
¶ 71. The circuit court, the court of appeals, and the majority opinion ignore the ex-husband's income, expenses, and higher standard of living, his increased ability to pay maintenance after his child support was reduced, and his ex-wife's contributions to the marriage and care of the children. In applying the fairness test, the circuit court and court of appeals failed to consider the same statutory factors that govern the initial determination of maintenance.29 They ignored the ex-husband's increase in income and decrease in expenses as well as the noneconomic contributions of both parties. The fairness test focuses not only on the economic circumstances of the parties but also on the noneco-*639nomic contributions made by the spouses during the marriage.30 During the 19-year marriage Rohde-Giovanni was primarily responsible for the care of the four children while Mr. Baumgart pursued his career development and provided financial support. After the divorce she continued to be the primary caregiver for the children. Her many years of contributing to the domestic responsibilities, as the initial circuit court found, permanently affected her ability to generate income.
¶ 72. If the majority opinion has considered, as it claims to have done, the "fairness to both of the parties under all of the circumstances," why isn't there any real discussion of the husband's circumstances? The majority opinion's failure to look with the same intensity at both parties skews the outcome of this action in favor of the ex-husband.
¶ 73. The unfortunate effect of the majority opinion is to penalize a spouse who improves her own earning ability and reduces her expenses to help an adult child achieve post-secondary education. How can that be the result of a proper exercise of discretion?
¶ 74. I conclude that because the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion, "the correct course of action is to reverse the award and remand the case to the circuit court,"31 to reinstate the indefinite maintenance, and to set an amount of maintenance that is consistent with both the support and fairness objectives of maintenance modification.
¶ 75. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
*640¶ 76. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.

 Majority op., ¶ 38.

 See majority op., ¶ 31 (withdrawing language from Johnson v. Johnson, 217 Wis. 2d 124, 576 N.W.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1998) (Johnson I), suggesting that postdivorce maintenance modification cases are not subject to the fairness standard).

 Majority op., ¶ 32 (quoting Miner v. Miner, 10 Wis. 2d 438, 441-42, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960)). See also Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 195, 327 N.W.2d 674 (1983); Moore v. Moore, 89 Wis. 2d 665, 699, 278 N.W.2d 881 (1979); Murray v. Murray, 231 Wis. 2d 71, 74, 604 N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1999).

 See majority op., ¶ 32 n.5.

 Majority op., ¶ 32; see also majority op., ¶ 32 n.6.

 LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987)

 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 622, 655, 979 (3d ed. 1992), defines "just" as "[h]onorable and fair in one's dealings and actions . .. See [s]ynonyms at fair." "Equitable" is defined as "[mjarked by or having equity; just and impartial." "Fair" is defined as "[j]ust to all parties; equitable."

 Majority op., ¶ 32.

 Majority op., ¶ 32 n.6.

 Fobes v. Fobes, 124 Wis. 2d 72, 81, 368 N.W.2d 643 (1985); Moore v. Moore, 89 Wis. 2d 665, 669, 278 N.W.2d 881 (1979) (emphasis added).

 For the court of appeals' discussion of the confusing law, see Rohde-Giovanni v. Baumgart, 2003 WI App 136, ¶ 7 n.1, 266 Wis. 2d 339, 667 N.W.2d 718 (case law on maintenance is not a paragon of clarity).

 Hefty v. Hefty, 172 Wis. 2d 124, 134, 493 N.W.2d 33 (1992).

 Brief and Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner at 34-35. For cases considering an adult child's college expenses in the parties' budgets and in maintenance awards, see Finley v. Finley, 2002 WI App 144, ¶ 30, 256 Wis. 2d 508, 648 N.W.2d 536; Hubert v. Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d 803, 820, 465 N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1990).

 Rohde-Giovanni, 266 Wis. 2d 339, ¶ 12.

 Id., ¶ 17 n.5.

 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).

 Long v. Long, 196 Wis. 2d 691, 695, 539 N.W.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1995). See also State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 541, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985); Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 177-78, 325 N.W.2d 321 (1982).

 State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 281, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999).

 State v. Hutnik 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 (1968); see also In re Settlement for Personal Injuries of Konicki 186 Wis. 2d 140, 150, 519 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[A] trial *636court erroneously exercises its discretion when its decision is based on a misapplication or erroneous view of the law.").

 Bentz v. Bentz, 148 Wis. 2d 400, 406, 435 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1988).

 See Brief and Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner at B29 (Transcript of Judge Patrick J. Fiedler's Oral Decision of October 8, 2001).

 See R. 45 at 172.

 See R. 17-2, ex. 1.

 See id.

 See R. 45 at 172.

 See R. 41-2, ex. 14 (Wife's Financial Disclosure Statement).

 The court of appeals complains that the factual record is flawed. It does not, however, determine which party has the burden of proof or explain what additional evidence was needed. Rohde-Giovanni, 266 Wis. 2d 339, ¶ 24 n.6.

 The statutory factors are set forth in Wis. Stat. § 767.26 (1999-2000). See, e.g., Poindexter v. Poindexter, 142 Wis. 2d 517, 531-32, 419 N.W.2d 223 (1988); Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 198, 327 N.W.2d 674 (1982).

 LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 37-38.

 King v. King, 224 Wis. 2d 235, 254, 590 N.W.2d 480 (1999).