Court Opinion

ID: 9774297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:14:12.976917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:05.140027
License: Public Domain

VOLLERS, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that there is fundamental error in the indictment in this cause. I disagree. Section 31.03 V.T.C.A. Penal Code, as it was in effect at the time of the commission of this offense and the plea thereto provided that:
“(a) a person commits an offense if, with intent to deprive the owner of property:
(1) he obtains the property unlawfully; or
(2) he exercises control over the property, other than real property, unlawfully.
(b) Obtaining or exercising control over property is unlawful if:
(1) the actor obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’s effective consent; or
(2) the property is stolen, the actor obtains it from another or exercises control over the property obtained by another knowing it was stolen.”
From a reading of this statute it is very clear that the elements of the offense are that a person commits an offense if
(1) with the intent to deprive the owner of property
(2) he obtains the property unlawfully, or exercises control over the property, other than real property, unlawfully.
Subparagraph (b) of Section 31.03, supra, merely sets out the conditions under which the obtaining or exercising of control over property is unlawful.
I agree that this Court in Ex Parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266 and in Reynolds v. State, 547 S.W.2d 590 determined that there are four different ways in which Section 31.03, supra, could be violated; I cannot agree that they were rightly decided and that this indictment is fundamentally defective. This is especially true in light of the provisions of Section 31.03, V.T.C.A. Penal Code where the legislature specifically stated that Section 31.03 of the Code was to constitute a single offense superseding all of the various separate offenses previously known as various forms of theft. In spite of that admonition by the legislature this Court concludes that even though there is only one form of theft you must plead it in one of four different ways or the indictment is fundamentally defective.
Where the indictment alleges that a person, with intent to deprive the owner of property, obtained the property unlawfully or exercised control over it unlawfully, it alleged by very definition of the statute itself that the obtaining or exercising of control was without the owner’s effective consent because it was unlawful. The further detailed allegations which this Courts requires, if a defect at all, would be a defect going to notice to the person charged as to the manner in which the offense was committed and would be subject to an exception or motion to quash. See American Plant Food Corporation v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598.
When we declare an indictment to be “fundamentally” defective we should limit such a declaration to fundamental defects and not defects which go to notice. Obviously, the appellant in this case was aware of the charge and was given sufficient notice by this indictment because he plead guilty and never questioned the sufficiency thereof.
I dissent.
DOUGLAS, J., dissents.