Court Opinion

ID: 9738247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:46:38.656423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:04.817268
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the result reached by the majority. Initially, I must part from my colleagues’ conclusion that we are compelled to accept the version of events contained in Kirk’s affidavit as true. See op. p. 141. In fact, I believe that Kirk, herself, offered the trial court two differing versions of events: (1) jury deliberations that were tainted by the allegedly improper events, as described in the affidavit; and (2) jury deliberations that were fair, proper, and normal, as implicit in Kirk’s acts of standing before the trial court during the polling of the jurors in open court, raising no complaints, and affirmatively telling the trial court that she agreed with the rest of the jury. I believe that it was for the trial court to weigh this conflicting evidence and determine whether Kirk was telling the truth in open court or, instead, in her affidavit.
Furthermore, even if I were to accept the majority’s conclusion that we must take the version of events in the affidavit as true, I do not believe that the events described by Kirk therein warrant a reversal. The events relied upon by the majority in reversing include: (1) the statement made by the bailiff to the jurors regarding a unanimous verdict; (2) the statement made by a juror during a cell phone call that she “would get to class as soon as she could,” appellant’s app. p. 48; and (3) the actions of the alternate juror, which included tapping the table and making other, nonverbal gestures.
A panel of this court very recently considered a criminal case—in which the defendant faced sixty-five years of imprisonment—involving the following jury conduct: (1) jurors who indicated that, before the trial began, they had already reached conclusions about the defendant’s guilt and connection to the case; (2) jurors who impermissibly used cell phones and watched television; and (3) jurors who consumed alcoholic beverages at some points during the relevant period of time. Myers v. State, 887 N.E.2d 170 (Ind.Ct.App. May 30, 2008). In affirming the trial court, this court cautioned that “[t]he trial court was in a better position than we are to gauge the jurors’ comportment at trial and their representations regarding their ... behavior.” Id. at 195.
I do not believe that the alleged events that occurred during deliberations herein rise to the level of those described in Myers. In my opinion, it could not be *146clearer that the facts that an alternate juror tapped the table or a juror commented on the phone that she hoped to be able to leave soon do not meet the high bar such that a reversal is warranted. And while I acknowledge that if, in fact, the bailiff informed the jurors that they had to reach a unanimous verdict, the situation was not ideal, I simply do not find it sufficient to take the radical act of reversing a jury verdict and remanding for a new trial. For all of the reasons stated herein, I disagree with the majority’s resolution of this issue and would proceed to address the other arguments made by Henri on appeal.