Court Opinion

ID: 9720376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:28:28.631039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:24.616022
License: Public Domain

POCHÉ, J.
I respectfully dissent.
This is not a situation where the suspect invoked his right to counsel. Instead, it is an absolutely straightforward invocation of his right to remain silent.
The uncontradicted testimony on the question of whether defendant invoked the right to remain silent is contained in the tape recording of the confession; Officer: “Mr. Dreas, again. I want to advise you of your rights. You have a right to remain silent, a right to an attorney. That anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. If you can’t afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questions are asked. You understand that? [1] A. Yes sir. [f] Q. Okay. Having your rights in mind, do you want to speak to me? [f] A. Well, only, you know, like sir, you know, if I could just call those guys, [f] Q. Yes, friends of yours, [f] A. Yes. [1] Q. Yeah, I told you you could call those. I want to get this interview on.”
That there is no doubt about what the officer meant is nailed down by the officer’s testimony: “Q. So you did not allow him to make any phone calls until the interview was completed; is that right? [f] A. That is correct.”
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], set down the rules, the warnings that must be given persons in custodial surroundings and then spelled out the procedure required after the warnings have been given: “Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the *638individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. [Fn. omitted.] At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise, . . .” {Id., at pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 723].)
Any words or conduct which reasonably appear “ ‘inconsistent with a present willingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case freely and completely with police at that time [fn. omitted] ’ [citation] must be held to amount to an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. ” {People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 382 [99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793], quoting People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 956 [83 Cal.Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114], italics in original.)
All that is required is an indication of the suspect’s unwillingness to continue to talk with the police or an indication of the suspect’s desire for help in how to conduct himself with police in order for the request to constitute an invocation of the privilege. {People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 383.) That in haec verba is the situation here. Therefore the People had the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that such was not the desire on the part of defendant. {People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 957.) The People did not meet that burden, nor did they attempt to do so.
In such a situation: “. . . The police must cease custodial interrogation immediately upon exercise of the privilege. The police did not so cease in this case, the confession obtained by the subsequent questioning was inadmissible, and, therefore, the admission of such confession was prejudicial per se and compels reversal of the judgment on all counts. [Citation.] The admission of this confession constitutes reversible error even though it was subsequently preceded by a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege, as we held under identical circumstances in Fioritto, Ireland and Randall, because: ‘After the initial assertion of the privilege, the defendant is entitled to be free of police-initiated attempts to interrogate him. Any statements made by a defendant in response to such questioning cannot be characterized as voluntary.’ [Citation.]” {People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 384, italics added.)
The denial of the invocation of defendant’s right to remain silent violated the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. “I want to get this interview on” is, as I understand it, just the kind of police pressure that *639Miranda was designed to cleanse from the American system of criminal justice. For these reasons I would reverse the judgment.* 1
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 11, 1984. Poché, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 14, 1984. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

It is also worth noting that even apart from the violation of defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to remain silent, the officers also violated his statutory right to place the telephone calls he requested “immediately upon request, or as soon as practicable.” (Pen. Code, § 851.5, subd. (c); unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
At the hearing on the voluntariness of the confession it was not disputed that defendant had requested three or more times to make calls to his friends. Nor was it disputed that if a violation of the statute had transpired it would be at the very least a factor to be considered by the trial court in determining whether the confession was voluntary. However the trial court found that no violation of section 851.5 had taken place. Apparently the trial court read section 851.5 as conferring no right to place calls if the officers complied with the time limits imposed by a superseded version of the statute (i.e., immediately upon booking or within three hours of arrest unless physically impossible). That is a misreading of section 851.5 which at all times here relevant provided: “(a) Immediately upon being booked, and, except where physically impossible, no later than three hours after arrest, an arrested person has the right to make at least two completed telephone calls, as described in subdivision (b).  The arrested person shall be entitled to make at least two such calls at no expense if the calls are completed to telephone numbers within the local calling area. [f] (b) At any police facility or place where an arrestee is detained, a sign containing the following information in bold block type shall be posted in a conspicuous place: [1] That the arrestee has the right to free telephone calls within the local dialing area, or at his own expense if outside the local area, to two of the following: [f] (1) An attorney of his choice or, if he has no funds, the public defender or other attorney assigned by the court to assist indigents, whose telephone number shall be posted. This phone call shall not be monitored, eavesdropped upon, or recorded, [f] (2) A bail bondsman. [f] (3) A relative or other person, [t] (c) These telephone calls shall be given immediately upon request, or as soon as practicable. [1] (d) This provision shall not abrogate a law enforcement officer’s duty to advise a suspect of his right to counsel or of any other right, [f] (e) Any public officer or employee who willfully deprives an arrested person of any right granted by this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.” (Added by Stats. 1975, ch. 1200, § 2, p. 2966, italics added.)
Formerly section 851.5 had provided only: “(a) Any person arrested has, immediately after he is booked, and, except where physically impossible, no later than three hours after his arrest, the right to make, at his own expense, in the presence of a public officer or employee, at least two telephone calls from the police station or other place at which he is booked, one completed to the person called, who may be his attorney, employer, or a relative, the other completed to a bail bondsman. [|] (b) Any public officer or employee who deprives an arrested person of the rights granted by this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.” (Repealed by Stats. 1975, ch. 1200, § 1, p. 2966.)
The legislative history of the present version of section 851.5 demonstrates that one of the reasons for the new statute was to ensure “that the calls may be made immediately upon being brought to a police facility rather than immediately after booking; ...” (Legislative Counsel’s Dig. of Assem. Bill No. 1199, 2 Stats. 1975 (Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 325, italics added.) Thus, in the instant case a violation of the statute is established and at the very least the cause should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether these repeated violations affected the voluntariness of the confession. It should be noted that provisions strikingly similar to section 851.5 are enforced under the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure by forbidding any use of statements taken *640in substantial violation of the code. (See §§ 130.1 -150.2, pp. 27-66 (Official Draft, 1975).) However, since I would reverse on the basis of the defendant’s right to remain silent, I express no opinion with respect to the appropriate remedy for the denial of defendant’s statutory right to place the calls “immediately.” (§ 851.5, subd. (c).)
It is also not necessary to determine whether defendant was also denied his right to prompt arraignment. Article I, section 14 of the California Constitution mandates that persons accused by felony complaint “be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate” in the county where the felony is triable. Section 825 requires that “[t]he defendant must in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within two days after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays; ...” (Cf. People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 329 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].)