Court Opinion

ID: 9861714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:21:23.545416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:51.720192
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JIGANTI, dissenting: Although Shefner did not have an express contract or a contract implied in fact, I believe that under the facts of this case a contract should be implied in law. A contract implied in law is equitable in nature and arises from facts and circumstances independent of an agreement or consent of the parties. (See generally D. Dobbs, Remedies sec. 4.2, at 235 (1973).) It is based upon principles of restitution and provides that one should not be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. (Partipilo v. Hallman (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 806, 807; Edens View Realty & Investment, Inc. v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 480, 486, 408 N.E.2d 1069; see also Restatement of Restitution sec. 1, at 10 (1937).) The concept focuses on the enrichment of the defendant and the fact that it would be unjust for the defendant to receive a benefit without paying for it. Edens View Realty & Investment, Inc. v. Heritage Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 480, 408 N.E.2d 1069; Dickerson Realtors, Inc. v. Frewert (1974), 16 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 307 N.E.2d 445; see also 3 G. Palmer, Restitution sec. 14.19 (1978). Courts have taken differing views on whether an attorney who has conferred a benefit by performing services for a person who is not his or her client should be allowed to recover fees from that individual. The courts declining to award such fees base their decisions upon the notion that attorneys are not entitled to fees from a person who was not their client and with whom they had no employment agreement, express or implied. See, e.g., Felton v. Finley (1949), 69 Idaho 381, 209 P.2d 899; O’Doherty & Yonts v. Bickel (1915), 166 Ky. 708, 179 S.W. 848; Pepper v. Pepper (1907), 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 460, 98 S.W. 1039. Conversely, other courts have applied the principles of unjust enrichment to require the beneficiary of legal services to compensate the attorney. These decisions are founded upon the idea that one who preserves or protects a common fund works for others, as well as for himself, and those others who benefit should bear their just share of the expenses, including reasonable attorney fees. Additionally, these courts have found it repugnant to fundamental principles of equity to allow a party to reap where they have not sown. Consequently, the courts have implied a promise on the part of the party benefited to compensate the attorney who provided the services. (See, e.g., Lyons v. City of Shreveport (La. App. 1976), 339 So. 2d 466; Kimbrough v. Dickinson (1949), 251 Ala. 677, 39 So. 2d 241; Petition of Crum (1941), 196 S.C. 528, 14 S.E.2d 21; In re Engebretson’s Estate (1941), 68 S.D. 255, 1 N.W.2d 351.) I agree with this line of reasoning and would apply it to the facts of this case. The undisputed facts before us reveal that the respondents each received a one-fifth share in the intestate property as a result of Shefner’s conduct. But for the efforts of Shefner, the respondents would have received nothing. Under these facts, I believe the respondents were unjustly enriched by Shefner’s actions and therefore, a contract should be implied in law so as to require the respondents to compensate Shefner for the benefit he conferred upon them. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.