Court Opinion

ID: 9400643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 18:04:34.323077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:24.964542
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/8/23 Dominguez v. Iconiq Capital Management CA1/3

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                DIVISION THREE

 MARLEY DOMINGUEZ,
      Plaintiff and Appellant,
      v.                                                              A165287 & A165791
 ICONIQ CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,
 LLC,                                                                 (San Francisco City &
                                                                      County Super. Ct. No. CGC-
      Defendant and Respondent.
                                                                      21-589700)

           Marley Dominguez sued Iconiq Capital Management, LLC (Iconiq or
company) for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing after it refused to pay him a finder’s fee pursuant to the
parties’ Fee Agreement (agreement). The trial court granted Iconiq’s
summary judgment motion — concluding Dominguez failed to fulfill a
condition precedent to being owed the fee — and it entered judgment for the
company. Thereafter, the court awarded Iconiq attorney fees and costs under
the agreement. Dominguez appeals the judgment and the fees and costs
order. We affirm.

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                               BACKGROUND
      Iconiq — a privately held investment firm with a real estate portfolio —
has a business relationship with Oxford Capital Group, LLC (Oxford), a real
estate investment firm.1 Jeffrey Felder, Iconiq’s managing director of real
estate investments, periodically communicates with Oxford employee Sarang
Peruri about “potential opportunities” for the companies.
      In 2019, Iconiq was interested in purchasing an apartment building
owned by Oxford on Michigan Avenue in Chicago (the property). For several
months in early 2019, Felder and Peruri negotiated a potential acquisition on
behalf of their respective companies; during that process, Iconiq toured the
property, conducted market research, and engaged in “due diligence and
underwriting using financial information provided by Oxford.” By mid-May,
however, negotiations stalled because the two companies couldn’t agree on
a purchase price. The company planned to “revisit acquiring the [property]
over the next year or two.”
      In 2020, Dominguez — an experienced real estate professional —
expressed interest in working at Iconiq. The company did not offer him a job,
but it retained him as independent advisor to identify properties for
acquisition. On July 10, the parties entered into the agreement; Felder
testified its purpose was to incentivize Dominguez to provide the company
with information it “did not already have, and to identify new properties.”
Section 1(a) of the agreement requires Dominguez to use his “best efforts,
skill, judgment and abilities to identify” so-called “Target Properties” —

      1 In the trial court, Dominguez objected to some of the evidence
summarized here, but the court did not rule on the objections and he has not
renewed his objections on appeal. Accordingly, the evidence is properly
before us. (See Wellsfry v. Ocean Colony Partners, LLC (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
1075, 1082 & fn. 3.)
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properties in specific locations meeting certain acquisition criteria — and to
effectuate prospective purchases of those properties by providing “customary
and reasonably requested services required in connection therewith,”
including property valuations and due diligence. Additionally, section 1(e) of
the agreement requires Dominguez to “cooperate and lend full assistance” to
the company in connection with its purchase of properties “sourced by
another advisor.”
      The agreement sets forth the terms and conditions upon which the
company will pay Dominguez a fee if it purchases a “Target Property
procured through” him. (A target property procured through Dominguez and
purchased by the company under the terms and conditions outlined in the
agreement is an “Acquired Property.”) Under sections 1(c) and 4(a),
Dominguez’s entitlement to a fee “with respect to any Acquired Property is
expressly conditioned on, and the fee shall be earned by and paid to
[Dominguez] for services rendered, . . . if and only if” three conditions are
met. (Italics added.) The agreement refers to these conditions as “ ‘Fee
Payment Conditions.’ ” (Bold face omitted.)
      First, Dominguez must “specifically” identify a target property for
Iconiq’s consideration in writing and provide the company with “all relevant
information in [his] possession or control that would enable [the company] to
evaluate such property.” Second, if the company “wishes to pursue the
acquisition of such Target Property,” it must notify Dominguez in writing.
This notification — a “Preliminary Expression of Interest with respect to
such Acquired Property” — must acknowledge “whether the Target Property
identified by [him] is a marketed property or an off-market property.” Third,
Iconiq must close “on the acquisition of such Acquired Property.” Section

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11(e) entitles the prevailing party in any legal action to enforce the
agreement to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs.2
      On July 22, 2020, Dominguez called Peruri, mentioned he “was working
with a potential buyer,” and asked whether Peruri would “be interested in
selling” the property. In response, Peruri said Oxford and Iconiq had
discussed a potential sale in 2019 (and Iconiq had performed underwriting on
the property), but that the two companies could not agree on a purchase
price. Peruri offered to reach out to the company to inquire about a potential
acquisition. Thereafter, Peruri emailed Felder — forwarding their 2019
email exchange — to see if the company would be interested in purchasing
the property. Peruri indicated he had received “a random call from a mutual
friend,” but that he wanted to discuss a potential deal “directly with” Felder.
Immediately thereafter, the two companies resumed negotiations for the
purchase of the property, with Iconiq relying in part on the underwriting and
diligence it had conducted in 2019.
      On July 29, 2020 — about a week after his call with Peruri and
immediately after his call with Kim — Dominguez emailed Felder, Kim,
and another Iconiq employee. The email’s subject line contained the
property’s name; the body of the email listed the property’s “implied

      2 Shortly after executing the agreement, Felder told Dominguez he
would receive a fee only if Iconiq purchased properties “sourced or originated”
by Dominguez; he also encouraged Dominguez to share properties of potential
interest so the company could compare those properties to its “pipeline and
narrow the list of prospective acquisitions to discuss.” During two mid-July
2020 phone calls with Don Kim, Jr., the company’s vice president of real
estate investments, Dominguez did not mention the property even though he
was familiar with it and knew Oxford would eventually want to sell it.
During a third call on July 29, Kim mentioned properties about which the
company was already aware — including the property — and asked for
Dominguez’s feedback on it.
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stabilized RevPar” — revenue per available room — and stated, “[t]his isn’t
the exact audited number, but it is pretty close.” In mid-August, Iconiq asked
Dominguez for information on underwriting expenses and profit margins in
Chicago. He agreed to provide the information. Later that month, the
company told Dominguez it had exchanged letters of intent with Oxford
regarding the property; the company noted it might contact him for
additional details if the two companies came “to agreement on price.” He
responded, “[g]ood to hear,” then provided information regarding another
property. On August 31, Dominguez inquired about his entitlement to a fee.
Two days later, Felder responded that he hadn’t “forgot[ten] about this. We
just don’t know if [the property] goes our way yet.” Felder also noted the
companies were close to reaching an agreement in part because Iconiq had
negotiated favorable acquisition terms.
      On September 4, 2020, Iconiq and Oxford signed a letter of intent for
the purchase of the property; escrow closed in October. During this time
period, Dominguez did not communicate with the company. After the deal
closed, however, he demanded a fee of nearly $1 million. The company
refused to pay it. Thereafter, Dominguez filed a lawsuit for breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for
failing to pay the “fee he earned.” As relevant here, the operative complaint
alleged “the three Fee Payment Conditions were satisfied.”
      Iconiq moved for summary judgment. Over Dominguez’s opposition,
the trial court granted the motion. It concluded Dominguez failed to fulfill
a condition precedent to earning the fee — to identify the property as
a “target property” in writing. As the court observed, his “cursory” email
referencing the property’s revenue per available room did not “specifically”
indicate the property was a “target property.” Instead, Dominguez’s “helpful

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conduct” was “consistent with his obligations under section 1(e)” of the
agreement, which required him “to ‘cooperate and lend full assistance’ as to
properties sourced by another.” The court also determined the company
“never delivered the required Preliminary Expression of Interest” as to the
property to Dominguez, and that there “was no substantial compliance with
either of these conditions.” Finally, the court found he failed to present clear
and convincing “evidence demonstrating a triable issue of material fact that
[the company] waived” the conditions precedent. The court entered judgment
for the company, and subsequently awarded it $500,000 in attorney fees and
costs under the agreement.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Dominguez’s principal contention is the trial court erred by granting
Iconiq’s summary judgment motion. We review the grant of summary
judgment according to familiar principles. Summary judgment is proper
when — as here — the defendant shows “ ‘that one or more elements of the
cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense
to that cause of action’ ” and the plaintiff fails to “ ‘show that a triable issue of
one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense
thereto.’ ” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) We
independently review the order granting summary judgment. (Gonzalez v.
Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 39.)
      To prevail on claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must prove they
“performed all conditions on [their] part” or that they were “excused from
performance.” (Consolidated World Investments, Inc. v. Lido Preferred Ltd.
(1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 373, 380; Merced Irrigation Dist. v. County of Mariposa
(E.D.Cal. 2013) 941 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1280.) When “a defendant’s duty to

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perform under the contract is conditioned on the happening of some event,
the plaintiff must prove the event transpired.” (Consolidated World
Investments, Inc., at p. 380.) This circumstance is known as a condition
precedent — an action “ ‘that must be performed or an uncertain event
that must happen before the contractual right accrues or the contractual
duty arises.’ ” (Estate of Jones (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 948, 953; see Civ. Code,
§§ 1436, 1439.) A party’s failure to perform a condition precedent precludes
a breach of contract claim. (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
1182, 1192; Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990)
222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1389.)
      Here, it is undisputed the agreement contained express conditions
precedent to Iconiq’s obligation to pay Dominguez a fee. (Estate of Jones,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 953.) The first condition — delineated in sections
1(c) and 4(a) — required him to “specifically” identify a target property for
the company’s consideration in writing and to provide “all relevant
information in [his] possession or control that would enable [the company] to
evaluate such property.” He did not, as a matter of law, satisfy this
condition. Even viewing Dominguez’s evidence in the light most favorable to
him (see Aguilar v. Atlantic Ritchfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843), we
conclude his July 29, 2020 email listing the property’s revenue-per-room
statistics neither “specifically” identified the property as a target property
nor provided “all relevant information” necessary to enable the company to
evaluate it.
      Because Dominguez did not satisfy the first condition precedent, Iconiq
was not required to pay him a fee under the agreement. (Richman v. Hartley,
supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192 [vendor’s failure to provide required
transfer disclosure statement excused purchaser’s performance]; Alki

                                        7
Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 592
[defendant’s contractual obligation to perform “was excused for failure of the
condition precedent”]; McDorman v. Moody (1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 136, 140
[tender of stock “was a necessary condition precedent” to assignee’s right to
“enforce payment of the unpaid balance”].) That Dominguez’s email may
have provided the company with “notice” of the property is of no moment —
and it conveniently elides the fact that Iconiq had known of the property
since 2019 — he concedes the agreement required him to, at minimum,
classify the property as a target property. He did not do so, and we cannot
rewrite the agreement’s “ ‘plain and unambiguous’ ” language to sweep in his
conduct. (Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 900,
923.)
        Summary judgment was proper for an additional reason: Iconiq did not
deliver a “Preliminary Expression of Interest” to Dominguez. Sections 1(c)
and 4(a) of the agreement provide that if the company wished “to pursue the
acquisition of such Target Property,” it had to notify Dominguez in writing
and acknowledge “whether the Target Property identified by [him] is a
marketed property or an off-market property.” It is undisputed the company
did not satisfy this condition precedent — the company did not notify him in
writing whether the property was listed for sale. In an effort to create a
triable issue, Dominguez points to emails the company sent him in late
August and early September 2020 updating him on the status of the deal.
But neither email satisfies the explicit requirements of this condition
precedent, even when considered in light of the nondisclosure clause in the
letter of intent. (See Christina C. v. County of Orange (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th
1371, 1379 [on summary judgment, “only material factual disputes bear any
relevance”].)

                                       8
      We reject Dominguez’s contention that a jury could conclude Iconiq
waived this condition. “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right after knowledge of the facts. [Citations.] Ordinarily it is a question for
the trier of fact. However, where there are no disputed facts and only one
reasonable inference may be drawn, the issue can be determined as a matter
of law.” (Gill v. Rich (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1264, fn. 10.) The burden
is on the party claiming waiver “to prove it by clear and convincing evidence
that does not leave the matter to speculation, and doubtful cases will be
decided against a waiver.” (Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Co. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1148, internal quotation marks
omitted.) Dominguez has not satisfied this demanding standard. Felder’s
email stating he hadn’t “forgot[ten] about” Dominguez’s request for a fee does
not amount to clear and convincing evidence the company waived compliance
with the “Preliminary Expression of Interest” requirement. Thus,
Dominguez has not demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material
fact with respect to waiver. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
      Finally, we agree with the trial court that Dominguez failed to show
a triable issue of fact as to whether he substantially complied with the
agreement. “ ‘[S]ubstantial performance is sufficient, and justifies an action
on the contract, although the other party is entitled to a reduction in the
amount called for by the contract, to compensate for the defects.’ [Citation.]
‘What constitutes substantial performance is a question of fact, but it is
essential that there be no willful departure from the terms of the contract,
and that the defects be such as may be easily remedied or compensated, so
that the promisee may get practically what the contract calls for.’ ” (Magic
Carpet Ride LLC v. Rugger Investment Group, L.L.C. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th

                                        9
357, 364.) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the “plaintiff must
produce ‘substantial’ responsive evidence. . . . ‘[R]esponsive evidence that
gives rise to no more than mere speculation cannot be regarded as
substantial, and is insufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact.’ ”
(Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 411, 415,
brackets in original.)
      The purpose of the agreement was to identify properties for Iconiq, not
to revisit those of which it was already aware. It is undisputed the company
knew about the property well before entering into the agreement; indeed, it
had an ongoing business relationship with Oxford, it had engaged in
negotiations to acquire the property in 2019, and it planned to revisit a
potential acquisition in 2020 or 2021. And the company negotiated the deal
with minimal assistance from Dominguez. He may or may not have been
responsible for reviving the company’s interest in the property, but it cannot
be said his modest assistance resulted in the company getting “ ‘practically
what the [agreement] calls for.’ ” (Magic Carpet Ride LLC v. Rugger
Investment Group, L.L.C., supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 364; cf. Cline v.
Yamaga (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 239, 245–246 [expiration of broker license
when lawsuit was filed did not preclude recovery where broker was licensed
when services were rendered].) Dominguez does not establish error with
respect to the trial court’s conclusion that he failed to show substantial
compliance.
      In sum, we conclude summary judgment was properly granted. Given
our conclusion, we reject Dominguez’s cursory and derivative challenge to the
attorney fee award.

                                        10
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment and the order awarding attorney fees and costs are
affirmed. Iconiq is entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(2).)

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                                 _________________________
                                 Rodríguez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

_________________________
Petrou, J.

A165287 & A165791

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