Court Opinion

ID: 9863160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:08:30.792031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:47:46.092420
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice RABNER,
dissenting.
Defendant Jeremiah Hupka pleaded guilty to criminal sexual contact for conduct he engaged in while he was employed as a Hunterdon County Sheriffs officer and a part-time local police officer. To establish a factual basis for the plea, he admitted in open court that, m the community where he worked as a law enforcement officer, he victimized a nineteen-or twenty-year-old woman by having sexual contact with her without consent. He admitted touching her “intimate parts, including her buttocks.” He also conceded that he did so for his own sexual gratification.
The Presentence Report (PSR) revealed more: the victim had been drinking; defendant arrived at her apartment afterward with another man; the victim fell asleep on her couch; and she felt ill the following morning, and saw male ejaculate in her underwear and felt soreness in her vaginal area. When the victim confronted defendant and the third person, both denied having sex with her. After she later learned that she was pregnant, DNA tests established that there was a 99.9% probability that defendant was the father.
I agree with the majority that trial courts may consider facts beyond those contained in a defendant’s plea allocution to evaluate a collateral civil motion for forfeiture. A hearing should be held to resolve disputed material facts on which a court may wish to rely. *244The majority, however, offers little guidance as to what facts may be considered in this ease to test defendant’s conduct against the standard for disqualification contained in the forfeiture statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(d). Instead, the majority concludes that no facts presented, whether in dispute or not, warrant disqualification from public office here.
Because the offense defendant committed involved and touched on his public positions and directly relates to his performance as a law enforcement official, his conduct should subject him to disqualification. For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority properly notes that facts outside of a plea allocution or conviction may be considered to determine whether an offense involved or touched on a defendant’s public office or directly related to the person’s performance in that particular office. Ante at 241—42, 1 A.3d at 652-53. Practices followed at sentencing proceedings offer some guidance as to the type of facts that may be evaluated at a forfeiture hearing.
Judges routinely consider facts beyond those admitted during a defendant’s plea allocution to determine the proper sentence. They have wide discretion in assessing the details of the offense and the full background of the offender. State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 472, 878 A.2d 724 (2005); State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 407, 846 A.2d 569 (2004); State v. Marzolf, 79 N.J. 167, 180, 398 A.2d 849 (1979); State v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 563-72, 303 A.2d 312 (1973). All relevant information is to be considered, including reliable hearsay. Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 486, 878 A.2d 724 (noting rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing) (citation omitted). Even prior arrests that did not result in convictions may be relied on. Green, supra, 62 N.J. at 563-72, 303 A.2d 312. In short, the sentencing process should entail an inquiry “ ‘broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information that may be considered, or the source from which it may come.’ ” State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 620, 477 A.2d 308 (1984) (quoting United *245States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592, 596 (1972)).1
The Appellate Division noted that “[wjhen a trial court imposes a sentence based on defendant’s guilty plea, the defendant’s admissions or factual version need not be the sole source of information for the court’s sentencing decision.” State v. Hupka, 407 N.J.Super. 489, 497, 971 A.2d 1102 (App.Div.2009) (quoting State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 293, 526 A.2d 1015 (1987)). Sainz went on to explain that when a court goes beyond that information, it should “not sentence defendant for a crime that is not fairly embraced by the guilty plea.” Sainz, supra, 107 N.J. at 293, 526 A.2d 1015 (citation omitted). That language, though, must be considered in the context of the Court’s decision, which itself affirmed the use of facts beyond those admitted by the defendant in his guilty plea. Id. at 294, 526 A.2d 1015 (finding trial court properly considered larger quantity of drugs and other drug activity not admitted in factual basis). Any facts relied on at sentencing must be “grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence.” State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363, 471 A.2d 370 (1984) (citation omitted).
The forfeiture statute, to be sure, is not a criminal law, nor is forfeiture of public office a penal sanction. Rather, the law imposes a civil remedy, which is a collateral consequence of a conviction. Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 570, 575, 796 A.2d 182 (2002); Old Bridge Pub. Workers & Sanitation Union v. Twp. of Old Bridge, 231 N.J.Super. 205, 209-10, 555 A.2d 639 (App.Div.1989).
That distinction is important. Collateral civil proceedings are not subject to the “full panoply of rights applicable to a criminal proceeding.” In re Registrant, C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 94, 679 A.2d 1153 (1996) (citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 34, 662 A.2d 367 *246(1995)) (discussing nature of hearing to determine tier classification and manner of notification under Megan’s Law). As at sentencing proceedings, the rules of evidence do not necessarily apply at hearings to determine collateral civil penalties. Id. at 94-96, 679 A.2d 1153. Reliable hearsay evidence may be accepted. Id. at 95-96, 679 A.2d 1153. In addition, civil remedies that are not based on convictions have been upheld. Id. at 91, 662 A.2d 367.
In evaluating what type of information may be considered under the forfeiture law, the statute is the proper starting point. Its text, which does not explicitly answer the question, and its overall purpose inform the discussion.
The applicable part of the forfeiture law provides that in addition to punishment for the offense, “any person convicted of an offense involving or touching on his public office, position or employment shall be forever disqualified from holding” a public position. N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(d). The statute defines “ ‘involving or touching on his public office, position or employment’ ” to “mean[ ] that the offense was related directly to the person’s performance in, or circumstances flowing from, the specific public office, position or employment held by the person.” Ibid.
Because the statute does not specify what evidence to consider, the law’s purpose should be examined. See N.J.S.A 2C:l-2(e) (“[W]hen the [statutory] language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further ... the special purposes of the particular provision involved.”).
The aim behind the forfeiture statute is plain: to bar “those who have once violated the public trust from [having] a second opportunity.” Cedeno v. Montclair State Univ., 163 N.J. 473, 477, 750 A.2d 73 (2000) (alteration in original, citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The statute is “designed to protect the public, not the offender.” Id. at 477-78, 750 A.2d 73.
Consistent with that aim, the statute specifically limits the ability of courts to stay forfeiture orders. N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(b) & *247(c). It directs that forfeiture take place “immediately” upon a jury’s finding of guilt or a plea of guilty unless a court, for good cause shown, orders a stay “pending a hearing on the merits at the time of sentencing”; otherwise, no advance notice or hearing is provided. N.J.S.A 2C:51-2(b)(l). The statute empowers successors in office to void official actions taken by a convicted person, which would go into effect -within sixty days of a forfeiture order, N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2(c). It tightly restricts waiver of forfeiture proceedings. N.J.S.A 2C:51-2(e). It also bars defendants from bidding for public work if they have been convicted of certain listed offenses. N.J.S.A 2C:51-2(f). Thus, the law’s overarching approach is to protect the public’s interest over the offender’s. That principle should inform decisions about the breadth of facts that may be considered in applying the law.
The statute and prior case law also provide guidance as to when an offense involves or touches upon a public office and requires forfeiture. In Moore v. Youth Correctional Institute, this Court affirmed the removal and forfeiture of office of an off-duty corrections officer convicted of harassing his supervisor. 119 N.J. 256, 259, 574 A.2d 983 (1990). The Court outlined the following inquiry to determine “whether an offense involves and touches on employment”: “First, there is a need to assess the gravity of the crime as revealed by its nature, its context, and the identity of the victim. Second, there is a need to assess the qualifications required of the employee’s public employment.” Id. at 269, 574 A.2d 983.
In 2001, in McCann v. Clerk of Jersey City, 167 N.J. 311, 771 A.2d 1123 (2001), the Court again addressed when a conviction involves or touches upon a public office. The Court concluded that a candidate for the office of mayor of Jersey City, who had previously served in that position, was not disqualified under the forfeiture statute as a result of certain federal offenses he committed when he was out of office. Id. at 316, 323-24, 771 A.2d 1123. The Court explained that section 2(d) of the forfeiture law “limit[ed] the scope of the disqualification provision to crimes that are related directly to an individual’s performance in, or circumstances *248flowing from, a specific public office or position held by that individual.” Id. at 321, 771 A.2d 1123.
McCann did not reject or overturn Moore. It distinguished Moore on its facts. Id. at 322, 771 A.2d 1123. In 2007, the Legislature, without commenting on Moore, adopted the language in McCann quoted above and added it to section 2(d). L. 2007, c. 49, § 5. On that record, the majority concludes that the Legislature apparently preferred the analytical framework adopted in McCann, see ante at 234-36, 1 A.3d at 648-49, despite the Legislature’s silence on that point. The majority also does not demonstrate why the two cases, which are not inconsistent, cannot be harmonized.
The majority instead highlights a passage from McCann that sharpens the issue presented. The Court noted that McCann’s behavior “reveal[ed] qualities that are relevant to his fitness for” office but nonetheless did not disqualify him because they did not “touch on” or disclose a “direct relationship” with the office of Mayor. McCann, supra, 167 N.J. at 322, 771 A.2d 1123 (emphasis added). That passage makes clear that it is not proper to confuse or blend the notion of “general fitness” for office with a person’s direct inability to perform the duties of a specific office. A public employee’s misconduct should be considered with the latter concept in mind.
The Appellate Division’s decision in State v. Rodriguez, 383 N.J.Super. 663, 893 A.2d 60 (App.Div.2006), is both relevant and instructive on that very point. Rodriguez involved an off-duty police officer who drove through a red light and hit a pedestrian who later died. Id. at 665, 893 A.2d 60. Defendant did not stop; he turned off his lights and drove to a nearby garage close to his residence. Ibid.
Although Rodriguez preceded the 2007 amendment to the forfeiture statute, it applied this Court’s decision in McCann and found as follows:
In light of the fact that reporting to accident scenes and attending to the safety of the public are important parts of any police officer’s duties, we think it plain that *249defendant’s off-duty behavior that resulted in his conviction of this offense sufficiently involved and touched upon his position that future disqualification was appropriate.
[Id. at 669, 893 A.2d 60.]
II.
That backdrop invites the following related questions: Does defendant’s behavior “involve! ] or touch! ] on his public office” or “relate!] directly to this] performance” as a sheriffs officer or police officer? That can be analyzed on a number of levels. Certainly, the limited, undisputed facts from defendant’s plea allocution may be considered. Defendant admitted to criminal sexual contact. He acknowledged that he touched a woman’s “intimate parts, including her buttocks” without her consent, for his own sexual gratification.
In light of defendant’s admissions, how could he, in his role as a sheriffs or police officer, officially respond to allegations of criminal sexual contact, domestic violence, sexual assault, or related accusations? How could he serve and enforce restraining orders in cases involving similar claims? Those acts fall squarely within the kinds of duties sheriffs officers and police officers are regularly called on to perform. Those responsibilities, in other words, relate directly and substantially to defendant’s law enforcement posts.2 In light of defendant’s admissions, could anyone—supervi*250sor, victim, or bystander—have confidence in his ability to carry out those tasks?
The next analytical step would be to consider facts embraced by the plea which were not expressly part of the allocution. Here, defendant admitted to touching intimate parts of his victim, including her buttocks. The statute nowhere limits a judge’s review to the sanitized phrases used by a defendant to describe his criminal offense of conviction. And there is no reason to bar a fact finder from considering facts like those and others which are embraced by a plea. In this case, that includes, at the very least, consideration of which other “intimate part” or “parts” defendant touched. To the extent there is a material dispute, the judge should conduct an appropriate review of the facts—including the victim’s account and the DNA evidence, as well as contrary evidence defendant may present—and make relevant findings after a hearing. Once that is permitted, as it should be, the case for forfeiture here becomes even more compelling.
In light of the facts in this matter, it is not necessary to go to the next level and look beyond what is embraced by the plea, or even to decide precisely which of the remaining facts fall on either side of that line. To be sure, if all of the facts in the PSR were sustained, defendant’s permanent disqualification from public employment would be even harder to avoid.
The trial court considered one disputed fact in deciding that defendant’s offense warranted disqualification, namely, that the victim was incapacitated. Prior to doing so, the court should have conducted a hearing and made relevant findings. The proper remedy, then, should be a remand to the trial court for it to conduct such a hearing and then apply credible facts to the test in the forfeiture statute.
*251The majority skips over that consideration and concludes that defendant’s offense did not touch on his office. The majority, thus, in effect rules as a matter of law that no set of facts would warrant disqualification in this case—neither the facts defendant admitted to, nor any other relevant but disputed facts in the PSR. Those findings do not square with the broad purpose underlying the forfeiture law or the statute’s directive that conduct that touches on or directly relates to one’s performance in public office should lead to debarment.
III.
Police officers perform a valuable public service, and the vast majority of them do so honorably. To be effective, they must not only enforce but also obey the law. “That duty is essential to the preservation of a free society.” State v. Stevens, 203 N.J.Super. 59, 65, 495 A.2d 910 (Law Div.1984). Because defendant’s specific behavior in this case failed to live up to that responsibility, he relinquished both of his law enforcement posts. In light of the facts about his offense, the forfeiture statute disqualifies him from other public positions as well.
For the reasons outlined above, I respectfully dissent.
For affirmance—Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA and WALLACE—3.
For reversal—Chief Justice RABNER and Justice HOENS—2.
Not Participating—Justices ALBIN and RIVERA-SOTO.

 A judge's exercise of discretion at sentencing must of course comport with the principles of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), Natale, and their progeny.

 Under the statute, police and sheriffs officers would inevitably be disqualified in more situations than some other public employees because of the requirements of those offices. A public works employee who maintains public grounds, or an information technology officer at a sheriff's department, would likely not be disqualified if convicted of the same offense as defendant's. That said, disqualification would not be automatic for police officers in all cases, as the majority mistakenly predicts. See ante at 239 n. 8, 1 A.3d at 651 n. 8. Conviction of a federal offense unrelated to an officer's responsibilities to enforce state and local laws, for example, would not necessarily lead to disqualification. Nor would every speeding ticket automatically lead to disqualification. See ibid. An officer convicted of a single instance of exceeding the speed limit, with no proof that he or she intended to violate the law, should be looked at differently than someone with a dozen speeding convictions, accumulated in only a few *250years, where there is ample proof of intent. In other words, misconduct has to be carefully measured, in each case, against the standard set forth in the forfeiture statute.