Court Opinion

ID: 9959694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 15:02:03.372439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:45.070222
License: Public Domain

Rel: April 12, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

   SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

                               OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                   _________________________

                                         SC-2023-0394
                                   _________________________

                      S&M Associates, Inc., and Doyle Sadler

                                                      v.

                            Players Recreation Group, LLC

                        Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
                                  (CV-15-902552)

WISE, Justice.

        S&M Associates, Inc. ("S&M"), and Doyle Sadler, the plaintiffs

below, appeal from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, which was

entered on remand from this Court.
SC-2023-0394

                             Background

     Some of these parties have been before this Court before in Sadler

v. Players Recreation Group, LLC, 374 So. 3d 683 (Ala. 2022). This Court

previously set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as

follows:

          "This case involves a dispute among Players Recreation
     Group, LLC, an Alabama limited-liability company ('the
     LLC'); three of its members, Jason L. McCarty ('Jason'), Felix
     McCarty ('Felix'), and Doyle Sadler; and S&M Associates, Inc.
     ('S&M'), a company owned by Sadler. On appeal, Sadler
     asserts that the trial court erred insofar as it entered a
     judgment against him on the counterclaims asserted against
     him by the LLC, Jason, and Felix.1…

           "….

           "The LLC, which was established in 1999, presently
     owns and operates a bowling alley known as 'the Super Bowl.'
     In 2002, the LLC's certificate of formation was amended to
     reflect the membership interests in the LLC at that time,
     which were as follows: Jason (40%), Felix and Judy McCarty
     ('Judy') (25%), Sadler (25%), and Scott Montgomery (10%).2
     The LLC has no written limited-liability-company agreement
     ('LLC agreement'), formerly known as an operating
     agreement. In 2003, S&M, a company owned by Sadler,
     loaned the LLC $150,000, which is evidenced by a promissory
     note; there is no dispute that the note is valid, binding, and
     enforceable. In 2006, the Super Bowl began incurring
     substantial losses, and the LLC ultimately defaulted on the
     promissory note payable to S&M. In July 2015, S&M and
     Sadler, in his capacity as a member of the LLC and as a
     designated agent for S&M, sued the LLC and the other
     members of the LLC, asserting a breach-of-contract claim and
                                   2
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    a claim seeking an accounting.3 In August 2015, the LLC,
    Jason, and Felix filed an answer and a counterclaim, alleging
    that Sadler had breached his duty of loyalty and his duty of
    care to the LLC.

           "The case proceeded to a bench trial. The parties
    initially stipulated that the LLC owed S&M a total of
    $310,139.66 on the promissory note; the trial court ultimately
    entered a judgment against the LLC for that amount based
    on the parties' stipulation. The case was then tried solely on
    the counterclaims asserted against Sadler by the LLC, Jason,
    and Felix ('the counterclaimants'), which alleged that Sadler
    had breached his duty of loyalty and his duty of care to the
    LLC because, the counterclaimants asserted, when the Super
    Bowl began incurring substantial debt, Sadler had refused to
    work there on a full-time basis and had also failed to make a
    contribution to the LLC for his share of that debt. During the
    trial, the counterclaimants also asserted for the first time that
    Sadler had breached the implied covenant of good faith and
    fair dealing.

          "As previously indicated, the LLC did not have a written
    LLC agreement. According to Jason, the members had orally
    agreed upon the LLC's fundamental operating terms.
    Specifically, Jason testified that all the members of the LLC
    were self-employed but that they had each agreed to perform
    work for the Super Bowl: Jason, who was a certified public
    accountant, agreed to be the general manager of the Super
    Bowl and to handle the LLC's taxes and other financial
    matters; Felix, who owned a window shop, agreed to be in
    charge of handling mechanical and maintenance issues
    arising at the Super Bowl; Sadler, who was an electrical
    contractor, also agreed to be in charge of handling mechanical
    and maintenance issues arising at the Super Bowl;
    Montgomery, who was a meter reader, agreed to help in the
    kitchen and to be in charge of the vending machines; and
    Judy, who was a licensed real-estate agent, agreed to be the
    bar manager and office assistant. Jason, Felix, and Judy were
                                   3
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    the only members who had ever received salaries from the
    LLC. As for Sadler, Jason conceded that Sadler's job as an
    electrical contractor required him to travel out of town.
    However, Jason stated that Sadler had agreed that, when he
    was in town, he would perform work for the Super Bowl.
    Sadler did, in fact, perform work for the Super Bowl,
    presumably until he commenced this case. According to Jason,
    beginning in 2006 and continuing thereafter, the Super Bowl
    incurred significant losses because of, among other things,
    new competition in the area, the economic recession of 2008,
    and the closing of other businesses adjacent to the Super
    Bowl. Jason stated that, at some point in either 2007 or 2008,
    Sadler's electrical-contracting business experienced 'a
    slowdown' and that he had 'petitioned' Sadler to work at the
    Super Bowl on a 'regular' basis. Jason stated that Sadler had
    repeatedly told him that he could not afford to work at the
    Super Bowl on a regular basis because he was looking for 'odd
    jobs' in the area. Jason testified that, in 2010, the LLC
    stopped making payments to S&M under the promissory note
    so that the LLC could continue to pay its debt secured by a
    mortgage on the Super Bowl. Jason also testified that, from
    2006 until 2020, the LLC had incurred $2,713,230.33 in debt;
    he claimed that the debt was based on unpaid compensation,
    loans, reimbursements, expenses, and purchases that were
    allegedly owed by the LLC to Jason, Felix, and Judy. The
    obligation to S&M under the promissory note was not
    included in the $2,713,230.33 debt amount. Finally, Jason
    stated that he had orally requested that Sadler contribute to
    the LLC's debt. However, there was no evidence indicating
    that Sadler had agreed to make any contribution to the LLC
    for its debt.

           "At the close of the counterclaimants' evidence, Sadler
    filed a motion for a judgment on partial findings, which the
    trial court denied. See Rule 52(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. After the
    trial resumed, Sadler testified regarding his understanding of
    the agreement among the members of the LLC. Sadler stated
    that, to 'save money,' all the members had decided 'to pitch in'
                                   4
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    and perform work at the Super Bowl relative to his or her
    trade. Sadler testified at length regarding the work, including
    electrical work, that he had performed at the Super Bowl
    without compensation. Sadler further explained that, in
    2010, his electrical-contracting business had 'slacked' and
    that he had approached Jason about working at the Super
    Bowl on a regular basis. He testified that he had told Jason
    that he did not want to get paid but, rather, that he wanted
    to work solely for health-insurance benefits. According to
    Sadler, Jason said that he would get back with him but never
    did.

          "After hearing all the evidence, the trial court entered a
    judgment against the LLC in the amount of $310,139.66,
    based on the parties' stipulation that the LLC owed that
    amount on the promissory note payable to S&M. The trial
    court then entered a judgment against Sadler on the
    counterclaims, based on its findings that Sadler had breached
    not only a duty of loyalty and a duty of care to the LLC, but
    also the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed
    to the LLC. The trial court assessed damages against Sadler
    in the amount of $368,167.92. Specifically, the trial court
    concluded that the LLC had incurred $2,713,230.33 in debt
    related to the management and operation of the Super Bowl
    and that Sadler's 25% share of that debt was $678,307.58. As
    a set off, the trial court deducted the amount that the LLC
    owed on the promissory note to S&M from the amount Sadler
    allegedly owed the LLC for its debt, leaving a balance of
    $368,167.92 to be paid by Sadler. The trial court indicated
    that Sadler could satisfy the judgment against him by
    tendering his membership interest in the LLC and by holding
    the LLC harmless for any additional sums owed to S&M on
    the promissory note. This appeal followed.

    "________________________

          "1Although both S&M and Sadler were listed on the
    notice of appeal, the issues raised on appeal involve only the
                                   5
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     propriety of the trial court's judgment regarding the
     counterclaims asserted against Sadler. We have therefore
     amended the style of the appeal accordingly.

          "2Neither Montgomery nor Judy are parties to this
     appeal. According to the parties, Montgomery 'abandoned'
     the LLC in 2006 and Judy died in 2019.

          "3The claim for an accounting was ultimately dismissed.
     The breach-of-contract claim was asserted against the LLC
     and Jason, in his alleged capacity as the managing member of
     the LLC; ultimately, that claim was dismissed as to Jason."

Sadler, 374 So. 3d at 684-86.

     On appeal to this Court, Sadler argued that "the trial court erred

insofar as it entered a judgment against him on the counterclaims

asserted against him by the LLC, Jason, and Felix." Sadler, 374 So. 3d

at 684. This Court agreed and concluded as follows:

     "[T]he trial court's judgment, insofar as it held that Sadler
     had breached the duty of loyalty and the duty of care to the
     LLC by refusing to work at the Super Bowl on a full-time basis
     and by failing to contribute $678,307.58 to the LLC's debt, is
     not supported by the evidence and is, therefore, due to be
     reversed. ...

           "….

           "… [T]he trial court's judgment, insofar as it held that
     Sadler had breached the implied covenant of good faith and
     fair dealing, is unsupported by the evidence and is, therefore,
     due to be reversed.

           "….
                                   6
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          "We reverse the judgment entered against Sadler on the
     counterclaims asserted against him because there was no
     evidence to support findings that Sadler had breached the
     duty of loyalty and the duty of care owed to the LLC or the
     implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and we
     remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a judgment
     consistent with this opinion."

Sadler, 374 So. 3d at 689-90.

                     On Remand to the Trial Court

     On remand, on October 24, 2022, S&M and Sadler filed a motion

for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. In that motion, S&M asserted

that, pursuant to the promissory note, it was entitled to the attorney's

fees and costs it had incurred on appeal. Additionally, Sadler asserted

that, pursuant to the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act ("the

ALAA"), § 12-19-270 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, he was entitled to attorney's

fees and costs relating to the trial on the counterclaims.

     On December 13, 2022, Players Recreation Group, LLC ("the LLC"),

filed a motion for relief on remand and an opposition to the requests for

attorney's fees. In that motion, the LLC requested that the trial court

disassociate and expel Sadler and Scott Montgomery from the LLC. It

also stated: "There also remains to be determined what priority the

claims of other … members [of the LLC] have over Mr. Sadler's claim.
                                     7
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The other members' contribution of their services was a direct substitute

for the payment [on a mortgage debt owed] to Mr. [Ferris] Ritchey." With

regard to the request for attorney's fees by Sadler, the LLC argued:

           "11. The trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule
     upon [an ALAA] claim after it has entered a final judgment
     on the underlying claim, unless it has specifically reserved
     jurisdiction to hear the [ALAA] claim. Terminix Int'l Co. v.
     Scott, 142 So. 3d 512 (Ala. 2013).

           "12. Simply because the Alabama Supreme Court
     reversed this Court (even under the ore tenus standard) does
     not make [the LLC's] counterclaims '...frivolous, groundless in
     fact or law, or vexatious ...' as stated in Alabama Code § 12-
     19-271. It is the trial court's duty to make that finding, and
     such was not the case because of this Court's order of July 9,
     2021 …

           "13. The [ALAA] is a defense that should have been
     pleaded when this matter was originally before this Court. It
     has no place to now be claimed because an appellate court has
     substituted its judgment of the facts for the judgment of this
     trial Court."

On December 14, 2022, S&M and Sadler filed a response to the LLC's

motion and opposition.

     On April 19, 2023, the trial court entered its order on remand. In

its order, the trial court found as follows:

           "The judgment in the amount of $368,167.92 entered
     against Doyle Sadler ('Mr. Sadler') and in favor of [the LLC]
     is set aside as directed by [Sadler v. Players Recreation
     Group, LLC, 374 So. 3d 683 (Ala. 2022)].
                                      8
SC-2023-0394

          "At trial, the parties stipulated that the unpaid
    principal and accrued interest on the promissory note owed by
    [the LLC] to S&M … is $258,028.50 as of March 2, 2020. The
    parties further stipulated that $27,284.00 in attorney’s fees
    and $11,325.00 of accounting fees have been spent by S&M …
    in its efforts to collect on the note. As of the date of said
    stipulations, March 2, 2020 to the continuation and
    completion of the trial of this action on May 19, 2021, an
    additional amount of interest has accrued, pursuant to the
    promissory note, and stipulated to by the parties in the
    amount of $13,502.16. Accordingly, the total amount of
    stipulated damages as to Count two, breach of contract, of the
    Plaintiffs' complaint is $310,139.66 owed by [the LLC] to S&M
    ….

         "[The] motions for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses
    are denied for the reasons set forth below.

          "Denial of … Motions for Attorney's Fees Either
          Pursuant to Contract or the Alabama Litigation
                        Accountability Act

          "As set forth … above, the stipulated damages for breach
    of contract by [the LLC] is $310,139.66. That stipulation by
    the parties included an award of attorney's fees for the breach
    of contract. No additional amount is due.

          "This Court does not have jurisdiction to rule upon [an
    ALAA] claim after it has entered a final judgment on the
    underlying claim, unless it has specifically reserved
    jurisdiction to hear the [ALAA] claim. Terminix Int'l Co. v.
    Scott, 142 So. 3d 512 (Ala. 2013).

          "This Court finds that [the LLC's] counterclaim[s] did
    not lack substantial justification, or that the action or any
    part thereof was interposed for delay or harassment, or that
    an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceedings
    by other improper conduct, including but not limited to,
                                  9
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     abuses of discovery procedures or availability under the
     state's rules of civil procedure.

           "Simply because the Alabama Supreme Court reversed
     this Court does not make [the LLC's] counterclaims '...
     frivolous, groundless in fact or law, or vexatious ...' as stated
     in Alabama Code § 12-19-271. It is this Court's duty to make
     that finding, and such is not the case.

                 "Priority of Debt Owed by [the LLC] to
                  Jason L. McCarty and Felix McCarty

           "In its order of July 9, 2021, this Court found that [the
     LLC had] incurred $2,713,230.33 in expenses without
     contribution by Mr. Sadler or Scott Montgomery. That finding
     was not disturbed on appeal and has become the law of the
     case. The Court takes judicial notice that Jason and Felix
     McCarty have perfected, as the remaining members of [the
     LLC], that claim or debt by filing a second mortgage with the
     Probate Court of Jefferson County (Instrument No.
     2022115615, filed November 10, 2022) which second mortgage
     is inferior to the mortgage held by the late Ferris Ritchey’s
     real estate company, and the perfection of this claim makes it
     a priority over and superior to the claims of other creditors,
     including S&M ….          See, Foster v. Porterbridge Loan
     Company, Inc., 27 So. 3d 481 (Ala. 2009)."

                                Discussion

                                     I.

     S&M argues that the trial court erred in denying its request for

attorney's fees and costs on appeal. In its order on remand, the trial court

rejected S&M's claim, reasoning as follows:

                                    10
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           "At trial, the parties stipulated that the unpaid
     principal and accrued interest on the promissory note owed by
     [the LLC] to S&M … is $258,028.50 as of March 2, 2020. The
     parties further stipulated that $27,284.00 in attorney's fees
     and $11,325.00 of accounting fees have been spent by S&M …
     in its efforts to collect on the note. As of the date of said
     stipulations, March 2, 2020, to the continuation and
     completion of the trial of this action on May 19, 2021, an
     additional amount of interest has accrued, pursuant to the
     promissory note, and stipulated to by the parties in the
     amount of $13,502.16. Accordingly, the total amount of
     stipulated damages as to Count two, breach of contract, of the
     Plaintiffs' complaint is $310,139.66 owed by [the LLC] to S&M
     ….

           "….

           "As set forth … above, the stipulated damages for breach
     of contract by [the LLC] is $310,139.66. That stipulation by
     the parties included an award of attorney's fees for the breach
     of contract. No additional amount is due."

     The record before us supports the trial court's findings.         Also,

although S&M sought attorney's fees and costs on appeal, when the

matter was previously before us, we noted: "Although both S&M and

Sadler were listed on the notice of appeal, the issues raised on appeal

involve only the propriety of the trial court's judgment regarding the

counterclaims asserted against Sadler." Sadler, 374 So. 3d at 684 n.1. It

does not appear that S&M actually pursued claims in that first appeal.

                                   11
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For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying S&M's request

for attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

                                    II.

     Sadler also argues that the trial court erred in denying his request

for fees and costs pursuant to the ALAA. In its order on remand, the trial

court rejected Sadler's claim, reasoning as follows:

           "This Court does not have jurisdiction to rule upon a [an
     ALAA] claim after it has entered a final judgment on the
     underlying claim, unless it has specifically reserved
     jurisdiction to hear the [ALAA] claim. Terminix Int'l Co. v.
     Scott, 142 So. 3d 512 (Ala. 2013).

           "This Court finds that [the LLC's] counterclaim[s] did
     not lack substantial justification, or that the action or any
     part thereof was interposed for delay or harassment, or that
     an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceedings
     by other improper conduct, including but not limited to,
     abuses of discovery procedures or availability under the
     state's rules of civil procedure.

           "Simply because the Alabama Supreme Court reversed
     this Court does not make [the LLC's] counterclaims '...
     frivolous, groundless in fact or law, or vexatious ...' as stated
     in Alabama Code § 12-19-271. It is this Court's duty to make
     that finding, and such is not the case."

     The record supports the trial court's findings. Sadler argues that,

in his answer to the LLC's counterclaim, he "affirmatively pled the

Alabama Litigation Accountability Act for the frivolous nature of the

                                    12
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allegations made by the counterclaim." S&M and Sadler's brief at p. 30.

However, in its original judgment entered on July 9, 2021, the trial court

did not expressly rule on Sadler's ALAA claim. "Alabama courts have

held that a trial court's entry of a judgment without specifically reserving

jurisdiction over an ALAA claim constitutes an implied denial of that

claim. See McGough v. G&A, Inc., 999 So. 2d 898, 903 (Ala. Civ. App.

2007)." Edwards v. Ford, 93 So. 3d 99, 103 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). The

record before us does not indicate that the trial court reserved

jurisdiction to hear and rule on an ALAA issue before it entered its

judgment on July 9, 2021. Thus, that judgment constituted an implied

denial of Sadler's ALAA claim. Sadler did not challenge the trial court's

implied denial of his ALAA claim on appeal in Sadler. Also, in our

decision in Sadler, this Court did not reverse the trial court's implied

denial of Sadler's ALAA claim or include instructions for the trial court

to consider that claim on remand. Therefore, Sadler's attempt to pursue

the issue on remand from this Court came too late, and the trial court did

not err in denying Sadler's motion.

                                    III.

                                      13
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     Finally, S&M and Sadler take issue with the portion of the order on

remand that is entitled "Priority of Debt Owed by [the LLC] to Jason L.

McCarty and Felix McCarty."

                                    A.

     First, S&M and Sadler argue that "[t]he trial court's 'finding' that

[the LLC] incurred $2,713,230.33 was reversed by the order of this

Court." S&M and Sadler's brief at p. 37. However, as the trial court

correctly noted on remand, in our opinion in Sadler, we expressly stated

that the only portion of the trial court's judgment that was being reversed

was the judgment entered against Sadler on the counterclaims asserted

against him. Therefore, the trial court's original finding that the LLC

had incurred $2,713,230.33 in expenses remained valid.

                                    B.

     Next, S&M and Sadler argue that the trial court erred in taking

judicial notice of a mortgage executed by the LLC in favor of Jason

McCarty and Felix McCarty and that it did not have jurisdiction to hold

that Jason and Felix had recorded the mortgage the LLC had executed

in their favor (and thereby perfected their lien) and to enter an order

                                    14
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stating that that mortgage would take priority over the claims of S&M.

We agree.

                  " 'It is the duty of the trial court, on remand,
            to comply strictly with the mandate of the
            appellate court according to its true intent and
            meaning, as determined by the directions given by
            the reviewing court. No judgment other than that
            directed or permitted by the reviewing court may
            be entered .... The appellate court's decision is final
            as to all matters before it, becomes the law of the
            case, and must be executed according to the
            mandate, without granting a new trial or taking
            additional evidence ....'

     "5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 991 (1962)."

Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 431 So. 2d 151, 155 (Ala. 1983).

     In Sadler, we reversed the judgment the trial court had entered

against Sadler on the counterclaims that had been asserted against him.

In this Court's remand instructions, we did not authorize the trial court

to do anything other than enter a judgment consistent with that opinion.

This Court did not address any issue regarding the mortgage executed by

the LLC in favor of Jason and Felix. In fact, that mortgage was not

recorded until after this Court had released its decision in Sadler.

Therefore, when it took judicial notice of the mortgage executed by the

LLC in favor of Jason and Felix and when it purported to determine the

                                      15
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priority of that mortgage, the trial court exceeded the scope of our remand

instructions.

            " 'It is well settled that "any act by a trial court
            beyond the scope of an appellate court's remand
            order is void for lack of jurisdiction." Anderson v.
            State, 796 So. 2d 1151, 1156 (Ala. Crim. App.
            2000)(opinion after remand), citing Ellis v. State,
            705 So. 2d 843, 847 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)(stating
            that on remand, "the trial court had no jurisdiction
            to modify the original or base sentence imposed or
            to take any action beyond the express mandate of
            this court").'

      "Smith v. State, 852 So. 2d 185, 189-90 (Ala. Crim. App.
      2001)."

Jackson v. State, 177 So. 3d 911, 939 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014). Accordingly,

the portion of the trial court's order on remand that addresses the LLC's

mortgage executed in favor of Jason and Felix and its purported priority

is void for lack of jurisdiction.

                                    Conclusion

      For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court's order on

remand insofar as it denied S&M's and Sadler's requests for attorney's

fees and costs, reverse the order insofar as it addressed the LLC's

mortgage executed in favor of Jason and Felix and its purported priority,

and remand this case with instructions for the trial court to set aside that

                                       16
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portion of its order that addressed the LLC's mortgage and its purported

priority.

      AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

      Parker, C.J., and Stewart and Cook, JJ., concur.

      Sellers, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

                                     17
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SELLERS, Justice (concurring specially).

     As the author of Sadler v. Players Recreation Group, LLC, 374 So.

3d 683 (Ala. 2022) ("Sadler"), I concur with the main opinion that the trial

court had no jurisdiction to take any action beyond (1) vacating the

judgment entered against Doyle Sadler on the counterclaims asserted

against him by Players Recreation Group, LLC ("the LLC"), and its

members, Jason McCarty and Felix McCarty, alleging that Sadler had

breached the duty of loyalty and duty of care owed to the LLC or the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and (2) entering a

judgment in favor of Sadler on those counterclaims. On remand, the trial

court vacated the original judgment and entered a judgment in Sadler's

favor as directed. However, in addition, the trial court improperly took

judicial notice of a mortgage that had been executed by the LLC in favor

of Jason and Felix and purported to determine the priority of that

mortgage.   That action essentially reinstated the trial court's initial

determination and neglected the logical conclusion of our decision as if

Sadler had not appealed. Although the main opinion correctly points out

that the mortgage was not an issue on appeal and, in fact, was not

recorded until after this Court had released its decision in Sadler, I write

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specially to add that, according to Sadler, the trial court was never asked

to take judicial notice of the mortgage; neither the mortgage nor its

contents were introduced at the hearing on remand; and Sadler had no

knowledge of the mortgage until after the trial court had referenced it in

its order on remand and, thus, had no opportunity to dispute its validity.

I am troubled by the trial court's actions in both acknowledging the

existence of the mortgage and determining its priority over the judgment

this Court required the trial court to enter.      While an unrecorded

mortgage may have priority over a judgment lien, in this situation, in

which the purported creditors were members of the LLC and, unlike

Sadler, had full knowledge of the mortgage's existence, the creditors

could not, after the judgment had been entered, record a mortgage to

claim priority over the judgment. Rather, the creditors and members of

the LLC, with knowledge that the mortgage existed, were required to

plead the existence of the mortgage so that the case could be fully

resolved, i.e., so that all monetary disputes between the parties could be

properly reviewed, resolved, and finally concluded. In this case, the

recording of the mortgage after the issuance of this Court's decision in

Sadler in an attempt to gain priority over other creditors renders the

                                    19
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mortgage subject and subservient to the judgment entered in favor of

Sadler.

                                20