Court Opinion

ID: 9829819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:39:09.024181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:03.185008
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
We believe we correctly disposed of the questions involved in this appeal on original hearing.
Appellee has asked us to find certain additional facts. We do find that the .evidence sustains the conclusion that the deceased, prior to the alleged injury which preceded his death, had been suffering from some pain in his appendieital region. But we do not find that he had a developed case of appendicitis. It is a matter of common knowledge that one may have soreness or tenderness in this part of his anatomy, and yet.live to a ripe old age. Perhaps one so afflicted should exercise care and caution to avoid strains and causes of constipation. A strain-may cause the appendix to become swollen and to burst. One may be liable for the death of another suffering from a disease, and even an incurable disease. In 8 Ruling Case Law, § 11, p. 437, it is said:
“Where a personal injury aggravates an existing ailment or disease, or develops a latent one, the person whose negligence caused the injury is liable to respond in damages for the results of the disease as well as of the original injury. In such case the injury is the prime cause which opens the way to and sets in motion the other cause, and the latter cannot be regarded as an independent cause of injury or damage, nor can the wrongdoer be allowed to apportion the measure of responsibility to the initial cause. It has been held that the mere fact that the injured person has an organic tendency to disease, which is developed by the injury, does not necessarily show that the diseased condition is not a direct damage naturally flowing from the injury. The defendant must respond in damages for such part of the diseased condition as his negligence has caused, and if there can be no apportionment, or if it cannot be said that the disease would have existed apart from the injury, then he is responsible for the diseased condition. Thus the defendant is responsible for a cancer where the injury received by his negligence superinduced and contributed to its production or development, or for death resulting from a disease, where the injury rendered the system of the injured party susceptible to such disease and liable to be attacked thereby as a natural consequence.”
Undoubtedly the same rule as enunciated in the foregoing quotation, as applied to injuries arising by reason of negligence of defendant, would hold in cases like the one under consideration. We do not think the fact, if it be a fact, that the deceased had a predisposition towards appendicitis, and that the lifting of heavy objects in the regular course of his employment caused the swollen *900or enlarged or tender' appendix to burst, would preclude recovery by tbe plaintiffs in this case.
Appellee urges that we erred in bolding that section 4a, art. 8307, Vernon’s Ann. Tex. Statutes of 1925, provides that in case of death of an employee, or in tbe event of bis physical or mental incapacity, notice may be •given at any time, within six months after tbe death or tbe removal of such mental or physical incapacity.
In Georgia Casualty Co. v. Little (Tex. Civ. App.) 281 S. W. 1092, Manuel Brown died in Navarro county, as tbe result of an alleged injury. At tbe time of bis injury and death bis wife resided in another county, probably Kaufman. After Brown’s injury he was unconscious for some time and helpless to tbe time of bis death. His wife did not know of bis injury or bis death until months afterwards. Nor did she know for whom be was working of where. She first learned of bis death in December, and be died in August. Tbe claim for compensation was filed with the Industrial Accident Board on February 8tb. The board considered tbe claim and allowed damages. The insurance company filed suit in Navarro county to set aside tbe award of tbe Industrial Accident Board, and, in discussing tbe question of time of notice, tbe Austin Court of Civil Appeals held that tbe Industrial Accident Board was authorized to consider the application under amendment to article 5246 — 43, Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918 (Act March 28, 1917, c. 103, pt. 2, § 4a), which reads as follows:
“Provided that for good cause the board may, in meritorious eases, waive the strict compliance with the foregoing limitations as to notice, and the filing the claim before the board.”
The court said:
“In view of these facts and circumstances, we are not prepared to disturb the holding of the board and of the trial court that good cause was shown for the delay of 17 days over the 6-month period allowed by law for filing such claims.”
In another case which we have read, the beneficiary, the wife of the deceased, was living in a foreign country at the time of his accidental death. And the court properly, we think, in that case held that good cause was shown for the delay in filing the claim for compensation. But as before held in the original opinion, we think that the statute does not require notice to be given or the claim to be filed, in a case where the injured party dies or has suffered mental or physical incapacity, within 30 days, but does expressly provide that in such case the beneficiary has six months in which to comply with the law.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.