Court Opinion

ID: 9516726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:50:32.33774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:03.898321
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority that the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on count III of the plaintiffs second amended complaint, which alleges breach of contract. I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that summary judgment is not also appropriate on count I, which alleges institutional negligence. The majority opinion correctly notes that the defendant makes no argument against extending the doctrine of institutional negligence to health maintenance organizations, such as the defendant. 191 Ill. 2d at 293. In this regard, Justice Rathje’s separate opinion would grant the defendant more extensive relief than the defendant itself requests, by ruling in its favor on an issue much broader than the one actually raised by the HMO, and for that reason I cannot join his partial concurrence and dissent. The defendant does argue, however, that summary judgment was proper on count I because there is no evidence of a causal connection between the number of patients assigned to Dr. Jordan by the defendant and the doctor’s failure to schedule an immediate appointment to see the plaintiffs daughter. Reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority accepts the plaintiffs assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the number of patients assigned by the defendant to Dr. Jordan was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. In support of this result, the majority states, “We can easily infer from this record that Dr. Jordan’s failure to see Shawndale resulted from an inability to serve an overloaded patient population. A lay juror can discern that a physician who has thousands more patients than he should will not have time to service them all in an appropriate manner.” 191 Ill. 2d at 301. The majority emphasizes Dr. Trubitt’s deposition testimony, in which Dr. Trubitt stated that 6,000 to 6,500 patients would be an unusually large load for a doctor to carry. The majority ignores Dr. Trubitt’s further testimony on this subject, however, in which he explained that the number of patients formally assigned to a particular doctor may be expanded, if there are additional doctors in the office and the hours of operation for the office are increased. But even this testimony is insufficient to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact, for the plaintiff presents no support for the allegation that the injury was proximately caused by the number of patients assigned by the defendant to Dr. Jordan. As the trial judge reasoned in granting summary judgment to the defendant on this portion of the plaintiffs second amended complaint: “[Plaintiffs counsel] comes up with some theories. He comes up with some numbers. But, you know, there’s no nexus. There’s no expert testimony to show how these claimed theories and numbers, omissions, or failures had any impact on the doctor’s decisions in this case.” The appellate court made the same point, similarly noting the absence of any evidence in the record specifically linking the size of Dr. Jordan’s patient load in January 1991 with the negligence alleged by the plaintiff, the failure to schedule an immediate appointment for her daughter. 301 Ill. App. 3d 103, Ill. Whether Dr. Jordan and the other physicians in his practice together served 1,000 patients, 3,000 patients, 5,000 patients, or more, the majority cites nothing in the record before us from which one may infer that Dr. Jordan’s failure to schedule an immediate appointment to see the plaintiffs daughter on the day in question was the result of the number of patients assigned to and served by his office. I believe that summary judgment in the defendant’s favor was proper on count I, and therefore I would affirm that portion of the judgment below.