Court Opinion

ID: 9505314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:03:24.296575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:23.532016
License: Public Domain

RUCKER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe Corcoran is not competent to waive his right of post-conviction review.
At his sentencing hearing several years ago, the trial court found that Corcoran "has proved the mitigating cireumstance that he was under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance at the time the murders were committed on July 26, 1997." Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ind.2002). Although this cireum-stance was assigned little weight, the trial court nonetheless found that "Dr. Engum's opinion at trial was consistent with the opinions of the Court appointed experts that the Defendant suffered from a personality disorder, either paranoid personality disorder, or schizotypal personality disorder." Id. It is apparent that since July 1997 Corcoran's mental state has deteriorated significantly. So much so that his personality disorder has now developed into full-blown paranoid schizophrenia. In short, Corcoran is seriously mentally ill. And how does his mental illness manifest itself? Corcoran is under the paranoid delusion that prison guards are torturing him with sound waves. As a result, Cor-coran wants the State to execute him in order to end the pain. I am not willing to accommodate him.
The majority places great weight on Corcoran's own representation that he is not incompetent and wishes to forgo further judicial review, not because of his paranoid delusions, but rather because he is guilty of murder and should be punished. According to the majority, "Corcor-an's awareness of his legal position and his ability to formulate a rational justification for forgoing further post-conviction review make him competent to waive such review ..." Op. at 662.
In Rees v. Peyton, the Supreme Court declared 'that in the context of a party's ability to waive his right to further appeals a court must determine, "whether [the petitioner] has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises." 384 U.S. 312, 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) (per curiam) (emphasis added). This test is slightly different than the one announced in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed2d 824 (1960) (per curiam), where the Court considered the standard for determining competency to stand trial In Dusky the Court stated that the "test [for competency] must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id. at 402.
In my view, the ability to consult with one's lawyer and to have an understanding of the legal proceedings is not quite the same as the ability to make a rational *666decision to forgo additional judicial review. It is not inconceivable that a defendant may have the ability to consult with counsel and have complete understanding of the proceedings against him and yet, because of a mental disease or defect, make an irrational decision regarding the pursuit of further litigation. See, e.g., Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 888 n. 4 (9th Cir.2004) (maintaining that the proper Rees question as applied to a defendant suffering a mental illness but understanding the court proceedings is: "If the person is suffering from a mental disease or defect which does not prevent him from understanding his legal position and the options available to him, does that disease or defect, nevertheless, prevent him from making a rational choice among his options?") (emphasis added) (citing Rumbaugh v. Procumier, 753 F.2d 395; 898 (5th Cir.1985)).
In any event, even assuming the two tests are indistinguishable, the fundamental requirement underlying any notion of competency still must be one of rationality. See, e.g., Matheney v. Anderson, 377 F.3d 740, 747 (7th Cir.2004) (Under Dusky, a defendant may not be tried unless he has "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.") (citations omitted); Budge, 378 F.3d at 890 ("'The question under Rees ... is not whether mental illness substantially affects a decision, but whether a mental disease ... substantially affects the prisoner's capacity to appreciate his options and make a rational choice among them.") (citations omitted); Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir.1989) (Under Rees, the question is "whether [the defendant] had the capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational decision ...."). .
In this case, the three mental health professionals testifying at Corcoran's competency hearing concluded that Cor-coran was not competent to make a rational decision concerning his litigation. Their testimony on this point should be given credence. The first mental health professional to testify was Doctor Robert G. Kaplan, a clinical psychologist. After reviewing voluminous documents, including the psychological reports of several other doctors, and after interviewing Cor-coran himself for approximately four hours, Dr. Kaplan reached certain conclusions. I recount the following exchange in some detail:
[Defense Counsell Okay. Do you think Mr. Coreoran has the capacity to appreciate the legal position in any of these things?
[Dr. Kaplan] No.
[Defense Counsel] Why are you saying that?
[Dr. Kaplan] I believe that he is delusional, that there are, that he is suffering from a severe mental illness, paranoid schizophrenia that is causing him to believe things about his situation that has affected his ability to make appropriate decisions regarding his defense and how to proceed.
[Defense Counsel] What is this delusion?
[Dr. Kaplan] He has actually two delusions. The first delusion is that the guards are operating an ultrasound machine that is causing him, his body to twitch and move uncontrollably, that it is causing him pain as well. Um, and he has another delusion in which he believes that he is saying things, um, without, um, knowing what he is saying that is causing other people to, to um, become angry at him, to make fun of him.
(Super. Ct. Hr'g Tr. at 11-12).
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[Defense Counsel] Okay. Does Mr. Cor-coran have the capacity to make a ra*667tional choice with respect to abandoning litigation?
[Dr. Kaplan] No.
[Defense Counsel] Why is that?
[Dr. Kaplan] Again, he has, he has-he has a psychosis which is paranoid schizophrenia that is leading him to believe that, you know, one of the reasons that he wants to die is because he doesn't want to continue with this speech disorder that he really doesn't have. And another reason he wants to die is because he doesn't want to continue to be a victim of the guards' ultrasound machine. And that is a highly bizarre belief that is not likely to be in existence either.
(Super. Ct. Hr'g Tr. at 14).
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[Defense Counsel] Is Mr. Corcoran suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect?
[Dr. Kaplan] He is suffering from a very severe mental disease and defect.
[Defense counsel] What mental disease is that?
[Dr. Kaplan] Paranoid schizophrenia.
[Defense Counsel] Does that mental disease affect his capacity to make a rational choice in abandoning this litigation?
[Dr. Kaplan] Could you repeat the question?
[Defense Counsell Does his paranoid schizophrenia affect his capacity to make a rational choice to abandon further litigation?
[Dr. Kaplan] Yes.
[Defense Counsel] At the risk of being repetitive, how, how does his paranoid schizophrenia affect his rational choice?
[Dr. Kaplan] His paranoid schizophrenia is creating a reality in his mind that doesn't exist, and on the basis of the reality that doesn't exist, he is making the decision about whether he wishes to proceed with his defense against the death penalty or not. In addition to that, the paranoid schizophrenia is also affecting his ability to think logically.
(Super. Ct. Hr'g Tr. at 16-17).
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[Defense Counsel] So, is [Mr. Corcoran}, um, pretending to be mentally ill?
[Dr. Kaplan] No. I, I also administered tests of malingering, psychological tests of malingering. And they clearly showed he was not malingering any mental disorder. Again, if anything, they showed that he was trying to cover up his psychological symptoms and tried to look better than he really was.
(Super. Ct. Hr'g Tr. at 28).
The defense also called to the stand Doctor George Parker, a forensic psychiatrist at the Indiana University School of Medicine. Like Dr. Kaplan, Dr. Parker examined numerous documents containing the evaluations of other mental health professionals and conducted clinical interviews with Corcoran on two separate occasions. His testimony was consistent with that of Dr. Kaplan.
[Defense Counsel] Does [Mr. Corcoran] have a mental disease that affects his capacity to make rational choices to abandon further litigation?
[Dr. Parker] Absolutely.
[Defense Counsel] And how?
[Dr. Kaplan] His diagnosis is schizophrenia, and the symptoms that lead to that diagnosis have a direct bearing on his thought process and why he believes that his execution would be, as he says, a blessed relief. The daily torment of his symptoms of psychosis, his lack of understanding of the emotional conse*668quence to that decision make that a very irrational thought process.
(Super. Ct. Hr'g Tr. at 55-56).
With respect to whether Corcoran may appear to be normal, lueid and in control of his faculties, the following exchange is instructive.
[Dr. Parker] Um, so, he does his best to minimize the severity of his symptoms, to downplay that he might have any mental disorder. That has been a consistent theme throughout this process.... Um, he has a real desire to appear bad rather than mad. So, he wants to be-it is better for him psychologically to appear that he is criminally responsible, than to admit that he has a serious mental illness that may have contributed to his behavior in the past. It speaks to how powerful the stigma is against serious mental illness, that he would rather be executed than admit that schizophrenia might be contributing to his desire to die.
[Defense Counsel] When someone is trying to appear normal or more normal or bad, I mean, would you need to spend more time with that person in order to come across these delusions?
[Dr. Parker] Well certainly, I think Mr. Corcoran did, if you did a brief interview of him, might be able to convince someone things are actually okay. He presents that way. He is very calm. He is organized in his thought process. He is not stupid. He is a bright man. He knows a lot of things. He speaks well for himself. Um, but just because he speaks well and in an organized way and understands sort of the nature of what is going on, the proceedings that are going against him, doesn't mean that he has got an understanding at its foundation that is logical. And the more time you spent with him, the more time you begin to understand how his thought process is a little bit skewed. And, in fact, the deeper you go, the more skewed it appears. And you can begin to understand how he might feel that execution might be preferable to life as he currently experiences in [sic].
(Super. Ct. Hr'g Tr. at 56-57).
Finally, defense counsel called to the stand Doctor Edmund Haskins, a clinical neuropsychologist. Similar to the approach of the other two testifying doctors, Dr. Haskins also examined Corcoran's vo-medical records and conducted a clinical interview, which lasted two to three hours, a few weeks before the hearing. Portions of Dr. Hasking' testimony follow.
[Defense Counsel] Okay. Does Joe-Mr. Corcoran have a capacity to make a rational choice with respect to abandoning his litigation?
[Dr. Haskins] I don't believe so.
[Defense Counsel) And why?
[Dr. Haskins] The reason is, that in order to make a rational decision, one has to adequately hold in mind the available options one is considering. You have to consider the options. You have to make reasoned judgments, weighing the pros and cons of both options or whatever the options happen to be. In Mr. Corcoran's case, in the context of this particular decision about, um, waiving his right to post-conviction review, I believe that his psychoses do not permit him to reason and make a reasoned decision in that way. I have to perhaps add that in reviewing the results of the neuropsychological testing that was done with Mr. Engum back with, Dr. Engum back in 1999, clearly, he did very well on that testing. His ability to perform on tests of memory, tests of attention and concentration, even tests of reasoning, was intact at that time.
*669Um, but that is not really the issue that we are dealing with here. We are dealing with his ability to make a reasoned decision in this particular case. In the context of a neuropsychological evaluation, um, when doing puzzles or doing other kinds of, of nonemotional [sic] tasks, um, academic intellectual type tasks, he can do very well with that. He is a very bright man. He has good cognitive ability.
Unfortunately, his paranoid schizophrenia, however, is preventing him from being able to put that to use in this particular case. So, rather than being able to consider all the options and weigh all of the alternatives, he is choosing only that alternative which will most inexorably lead to his own death, and he is doing that on the basis of this paranoid delusion that he is being persecuted and tormented.
(Super. Ct. Hr'g Tr. at 66-67). Each of the three mental health professionals testifying at Corcoran's competency hearing explained that Corcoran's individual thought processes have been affected by his mental illness. Such competency determinations involve a thorough assessment of a person's mental capabilities, taking into account the impact that mental illness has on those capabilities.
I acknowledge that the existence of delusions and a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia do not necessarily preclude rational decision-making and competence. However, all three experts unanimously concluded that Corcoran's decision to welcome and hasten his own death is based on his delusional perception of reality and has no basis in rational thought whatsoever. The majority as well as the trial court dismiss the mental health experts' conclusions on the basis of Corcoran's own representation that his decision to die is based upon the fact that he murdered four people and therefore deserves the ultimate sanction. However, as Dr. Parker explained:
[It is better for him [Corcoran] psychologically to appear that he is criminally responsible, than to admit that he has a serious mental illness that may have contributed to his behavior in the past. It speaks to how powerful the stigma is against serious mental illness, that he would rather be executed that admit that schizophrenia might be contributing to his desire to die.
(Super. Ct. Hr'g Tr. at 56-57). Obviously, Corcoran is a man of considerable intelligence and expressive powers. But the fact that he offers what otherwise might be considered a rational explanation for his decision to die is itself intricately related to his mental illness.
Although I remain opposed to the execution of the seriously mentally ill, see Corcoran, 774 N.E.2d at 502 (Rucker, J., dissenting), that is not the precise issue before us today. Rather, defense counsel merely seeks the opportunity to pursue post-conviction relief on Corcoran's behalf. The uncontroverted evidence that Coreor-an is a delusional paranoid schizophrenic is, in my view, insufficient to support a finding of competence as contemplated by the test articulated in either Rees or Dusky. Thus, I am of the view that Cor-coran is in no position to waive his right of post-conviction relief and that this cause should be remanded to the post-conviction court for its review of the claims counsel makes on Corcoran's behalf.