Court Opinion

ID: 9492932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:53:40.677051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:33.558798
License: Public Domain

RYMER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The real riddle in this case is: When is a record no longer a record?
The majority opinion cites no fewer than two web sites, one computer software user’s guide, one book, two dictionary definitions, and six newspaper or magazine articles — none of which was referred to, introduced, validated, used or argued in the district court or to us. While it makes for interesting reading, I have no idea whether the parties’ intent was shaped by the existence of a “cottage industry dedicated to helping people im*1126prove their family photos by sending that better — forgotten ex-spouse down the oubliette of history,” much less colorized pictures of snowboarders with green hair and bright pink tongues. These things were not in the record, and I don’t even know whether they existed at all when the contract was forfned in 1991. In any event, these data are not the usual stuff of contract interpretation.
I would instead use more conventional tools to ascertain what the parties meant when they allowed Winterland to make “illustrations.” See Cal. Civil Code §§ 1636, 1647; City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 349 (1998). Hunter argues that the scope of the copyright license was limited to “cartoon-style” or “graphic” illustrations. He also contends that the parties did not intend for Winterland to use computer-scanned images of his photographs. I don’t agree. While it is clear that the parties intended the term “illustrations” to be limited to “graphic” illustrations (thereby excluding photographic reproductions), the evidence does not support Hunter’s further limitation to “cartoon-style” illustrations. Nor does it support the exclusion of computer-scanned images as “guides, models, and examples” for computer-created artwork. The contract allows Winterland to “use whatever illustration process it finds most appropriate.” Winterland had the technology (albeit less sophisticated) to scan and manipulate images at the time of the contract; thus, this case is distinguishable from Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.1988), in which the relevant technology, home videocassette recorders, did not exist in any form at the time of the contract. Further, Winterland could have used the same technology to produce simple line drawings that Hunter admits are within the scope of the license.
As I see it the issue is not “when does a photograph stop being a photograph,” rather it is whether this particular digitally-scanned and manipulated image is within the scope of the license. Having reviewed the record and exhibits, I am not firmly convinced that the district court erred in finding that the “Cross Sails” image is within the scope of the license. Winterland’s manipulation of the photograph was significant. It was flipped horizontally, one sail was elongated, colors were changed dramatically, the sky was redrawn, and it was posterized in such a way as to destroy and compress tonality. While the resulting image is obviously based on the photograph, it is not the photograph. Rather, the photograph was used as a guide or model to produce a graphic illustration of sailing.
Given that Winterland did not infringe upon Hunter’s license, I do not believe that the district court erred in finding that the San Diego Yacht Club was not liable for infringement. I would, therefore, affirm.