Court Opinion

ID: 9884339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:53:40.33264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.800335
License: Public Domain

GILBERT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority reasons that the manufacturer should not be held liable because Trent Whiteford was not using the Snoscoot, which was stationary and not being operated at the time of the accident, and because the danger was too remote to impose a duty and was not one which Yamaha was required to anticipate. This reasoning ignores the statutory definition of a mechanical hazard contained in Minn.Stat. § 325F.081 and places undue reliance on cases from other jurisdictions relating to parked cars. In so doing, the majority resolves numerous factual disputes that are traditionally decided by a jury.
First of all, this accident is not similar to accidents involving parked cars. Rather, it involved the use of a snowmobile by the 8-year-old brother of the injured 5-year-old Trent Whiteford. The Snoscoot was being used on a hill in the back of the family’s 10-acre yard, while other children were tobog*920ganing down the same hill. In contrast to the parked car precedents from Texas, California and the Eighth Circuit on which the majority relies, this junior-size snowmobile was not parked and unattended. It is undisputed that the driver was still sitting on the snowmobile at the time of the accident, although there is disputed evidence as to whether the Snoscoot’s engine was on or off at the time of the accident. It was quite foreseeable that other winter recreational activities such as tobogganing may have been taking place near the snowmobile.
The Whiteford family was enjoying the Snoseoot until Trent Whiteford’s toboggan ran into the front of it as he was sliding down the hill. Trent Whiteford’s face struck the sharp horizontal section of the Snoseoot under the carriage between the skis. This metal bracket was unguarded and was sharp enough to slice off Trent Whiteford’s nose and deeply lacerate his face.
Trent Whiteford offered expert testimony from Dr. Tarold Kvalseth of the University of Minnesota Department of Mechanical Engineering. Dr. Kvalseth testified that the protruding metal edge is extraneous to the design of the bracket and that the mechanical function served by the design of the bracket could have been achieved with a safer design. He further concluded that the design was negligent and created a substantial danger of injury to anyone coming in contact with it.
At oral argument, Yamaha stated that the use of a stationary snowmobile on a hill, in the family’s backyard where other children were sledding, was “not normal.” Yamaha further admitted that if the snowmobile had been moving at the time of the accident, this would be a “tougher case” and the issue of foreseeability would create a more difficult question. Yamaha further conceded that foreseeability is virtually always a question of fact rather than a question of law.
The injury also appears to have been clearly exacerbated by the design of the Snoseoot. A second or more serious injury occurred to Trent Whiteford as a result of the Snoscoot’s design.
Accordingly, at a minimum, a fact question has been created. As the majority points out in its opinion, close cases involving the questions of foreseeability are for the jury to decide rather than the court.2 The majority also correctly points out that Yamaha’s duty was to protect Snoseoot users and those who might be injured by such a use or misuse from foreseeable dangers. The hazardous toy statute clearly applies to the facts. The statute was passed to protect children under the age of 14 and the injured party in this case was 5 years old. The Snoseoot also had protrusions, surfaces, or edges that at least one expert said were negligently designed and presented an unreasonable risk of personal injury.
Rather than let a jury decide these issues, the majority summarily decided the above factual disputes and concluded that this accident was not reasonably foreseeable. However, Yamaha’s advertising brochure suggests use of the Snoseoot in backyards, and the machine was designed for children’s use. Indeed, the accident occurred in a backyard amidst other normal winter recreational activities of children and family members. Additionally, Yamaha advertised in its brochure that the Snoseoot was made to start and handle easily. Starting and stopping a snowmobile is a normal occurrence as individuals stop to rest, observe, stretch, or talk to those around them while riding a snowmobile.
We have long held that a “breach of a statute gives rise to negligence per se if the persons harmed by that violation are within the intended protection of the statute and the harm suffered is of the type the legislation was intended to prevent.”3 The hazardous toy statute imposes a fixed duty of care; therefore, breach of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence. Trent Wdiiteford was one of the individuals this statute was intended to protect.
The majority also dismisses the applicability of Minn.Stat. § 325F.08 based on Trent WTiiteford’s failure to raise the statute as an issue at the trial court or court of appeals. However, Trent Whiteford’s theories of the case included strict liability based on design *921defect and negligent design and manufacture of the Snoseoot. He also argued this statute in support of his position in his briefs to our court. This was appropriate becaiise we have held that at the early pretrial stages of a ease a party need not plead with particularity the theory of the case, but is entitled to have the case tried on any theory reasonably supported by the facts alleged in the complaint, regardless of whether such a theory is specifically labeled in the complaint.4. There were sufficient facts set forth in the pleadings that “speak for themselves and no labeling ⅜ ⅜ * is essential to its validity nor need the legal conclusions to be drawn therefrom be stated.”5 Absent a grant of summary judgment, Trent Whiteford could have appropriately used the hazardous toy statute as one of his instructions to the jury and argued the hazardous toy statute at trial. Accordingly, his failure to specifically address the hazardous toy statute as a part of his already presented theory of the case does not preclude consideration of the statute by this court.
There is evidence supporting Trent White-ford’s theories of the case, including a breach of the hazardous toy statute. There is also evidence that the person harmed, a 5-year-old boy sliding near his brother on the same hill in the family’s backyard, was within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect. In conclusion, this case should not be decided on whether or not the snowmobile was moving at the time of the accident. It should rather-be decided under the factual record presented.

. See also Minn. R. 2630.0100, subp. 12 (1997) ("Administering Safe Toys Act”).

. See Lundgren, 354 N.W.2d at 28.

. See Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558 (Minn.1977).

. Siats v. Western Union Tel. Co., 251 Minn. 412, 415-16, 88 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1958); Wilson v. Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389, 394-95 (Minn.1984).

. Siats, 251 Minn, at 415, 88 N.W.2d at 202.