Court Opinion

ID: 9493387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:06:33.205063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:48.696400
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Dubria did not get a fair trial. The trial judge allowed the state, in its case-in-chief, to place into evidence a tape of a pre-arrest interview of Dubria. On that tape, Detective Detar made highly inflammatory statements in an effort to elicit information from Dubria about the circumstances surrounding Jennifer Mapper’s death. Later, a transcript of the tape was given to the jury. Because I believe that admitting the tape and transcript of the pre-arrest interview into evidence violated Dubria’s due process right to a fair trial, I respectfully dissent.
The pre-arrest interview of Dubria contained in the tape and transcript was not innocuous. During the interview, Detective Detar repeatedly: (1) stated that he believed that Dubria was responsible for Mapper’s death; (2) told Dubria that the judge and jury would not believe his story; and (3) stated that other witnesses and evidence existed that proved that Dubria was responsible for Mapper’s death. Indeed, the tape and transcript of the pre-arrest interview included long narratives during which Detective Detar reiterated his opinion that Dubria was responsible for Mapper’s death. For example, the interview included the following exchanges:
Detar: I think, that this was probably just an accident, okay. But there’s no question ...
Dubria: But detective ...
Detar: But listen. Wait, wait, wait ... let me finish, let me finish.
Dubria: Okay.
*1005Detar: There’s no question. The evidence is conclusive.
Dubria: No.
Detar: That your [sic] responsible. Okay?
Dubria: No.
Dubria: Okay, detective, can I ask you a question ... unintelligible ...
Detar: Sure.
Dubria: Because your [sic], you saying that I had something to do with her death. What, what’s the evidence that you [sic] telling me that I have to do it ...
Detar: Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait a minute, wait a minute. I’m not here to play any kind of game.
Dubria: I understand.
Detar: I want you to understand something. You know what happened there and, and I know what happened there ...
Dubria: Okay.
Detar: So now this is the opportunity for you to come clean, for you to do something good for you to day ... (sound of sigh), look guys I need to tell you something.
Dubria: Um-hum.
Detar: ... a, this is what happened.
Dubria: Um-hum.
Detar: Um, I messed up and I’m sorry.
Dubria: Um-hum.
Detar: Um, I believe and there’s no doubt in my mind.
Dubria: Um-hum.
Detar: That you caused her death. And I don’t think that your [sic] a murderer or anything like that ...
Dubria: Uh.
Detar: But a, I have no doubt that, that you caused her death. Okay?
Dubria: That’s a, that’s a strong accusation ...
Detar: So what I’m asking this, you know, I’m not accusing you of anything. I’m stating what I feel the facts are.
Dubria: Right.
Detar: And the facts show that your [sic] responsible for it....
Detar: I, I’m just flabbergasted, I, to be honest with you Sam, I think your [sic] digging yourself in a hole ...
Dubria: Um-hum.
Detar: ... that is going to cause you more grief cause I’ll tell you something. What’s gonna happen is ... either “A” your [sic] a cold blooded murderer ...
Dubria: No, I’m not.
Detar: Listen to me. Listen to me. This is important for you to understand. I want you to grasp this because I do care. Okay, if you lie to us, then the jury and everybody else in the world is gonna say, he’s a cold blooded murderer. Okay? Listen to me I’m not done yet. Okay. Now listen to me.
Dubria: Alright.
Detar: Either “A”, that’s what [sic] gonna happen, or “B” it’s gonna come across like, he made a mistake. It was an accident. He didn’t mean to kill her, as a matter of fact he was so distraught and upset about the fact, that he did CPR, he called the paramedics, it was a mistake, it was an accident. The jury and the judge will believe that. They’re not going to believe all these lies.
As evidenced by the excerpts, for long periods of time during the interview Detective Detar simply stated his opinion about what happened to Klapper and did not ask Dubria any questions. At one point, Detar explained to Dubria his theory about what occurred the night Klapper died. When Dubria protested that Detective Detar was “putting words in [his] mouth,” Detar replied, “I really believe this.” Additionally, Detective Detar repeatedly told Dubria that no one on the jury would believe his story:
Detar: I [can write down your version of the events w]hich everybody in the *1006world is gonna know is a lie, or I can tell them the truth about the issue. That there was a mistake, that it was an accident ...
* * *
Detar: They’re not gonna believe that you have no clue as to how she died. Think about it!
* * *
Detar: Sam, I want you to think about what your [sic] saying. I want you to think, you gotta get something good going for you. If you tell that story man, there ain’t nobody that’s going to believe that.
* * *
Detar: I realize what your story is. What I’m trying to tell you is, it’s obvious to everybody that that’s not the truth.
Moreover, several times during the interview Detective Detar referred to other “evidence” that established that Dubria was responsible for Klapper’s death. This other “evidence” was not introduced at trial because it did not exist. Detar simply referred to such evidence as an interrogation tactic to get Dubria to admit that he was guilty. But the jury heard the tape and read the transcript and thus was given the distinct impression that other evidence, apart from the evidence admitted at trial, proved that Dubria was guilty. For example, the tape and transcript included the following exchanges:
Detar: Okay. If I told you someone said you were responsible for her death, what would you say?
Detar: Talked to a lot of people.
Dubria: Um-hum.
Detar: And a, pretty much, we’ve determined that you aré responsible for her death.
Detar: You don’t have any access to chloroform?
Dubria: No.
Detar: So all the people that I talked to that say that chloroform is all over the hospital, will say, are liars?
* * *
Detar: We’ve got experts, medical examiners, toxicologist ...
Dubria: Um.
Detar: They did all the tests Sam!
Dubria: Um.
Detar: She died of chloroform poisoning. There were [sic] no other causation, absolutely zip. She died of an overdose of chloroform.
* * *
Detar: Yeah. Let me tell you something. It’s not just the chloroform intoxication that points to you.
Dubria: Okay.
Detar: There’s a lot of other things that point right at you.
The State proffered the unedited tape of the interview in its case-in-chief to show that Dubria had no explanation for the presence of chloroform in Klapper’s body. Although only a small portion of the interview actually dealt with the presence of chloroform in Klapper’s body, the entire interview was entered into evidence. None of Detar’s inflammatory statements were excised from the tape before it was played to the jury. Later, over Dubria’s counsel’s objection, a transcript of the interview was given to the jury. Like the tape, the transcript was not edited at all.
The majority opinion concludes that, “viewed in its entirety,” the tape and transcript merely show an “unremarkable interview” because, according to the majority, “[t]here was nothing in Detective Detar’s statements that suggested evidence or theories of the case that were not presented at trial.” See Maj. Op. at 1001. I disagree. In the interview, Detective Detar did suggest that other evidence existed that was not presented at trial. Specifically, Detar falsely stated that other individuals had claimed that Dubria was responsible for Klapper’s *1007death, that all of the state’s experts did “all the tests” and determined that Klap-per positively died from chloroform poisoning, and that chloroform was “all over the hospital” where Dubria worked. Thus, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the interview as “unremarkable.”
Additionally, the introduction of the tape and transcript of the pre-arrest interview is particularly troubling because the prosecution’s evidence against Dubria was far from overwhelming. By entering into evidence the tape and transcript, the prosecution was able to present the jury with Detective Detar’s theory of how and why he thought that Dubria killed Klapper. The long narratives by Detective Detar only served to inform the jury of Detar’s otherwise inadmissible opinion that he had no doubt that Dubria had caused Klapper’s death, and that no one — not the judge or jury — would believe Dubria’s version of events. It is unrealistic to believe that such prejudicial evidence did not impact the jury’s ability to evaluate, fairly and objectively, the evidence against Dubria.
Moreover, it is also significant that the inflammatory statements, which the jury heard and read, were made by Detective Detar, an investigating officer in the case. We have repeatedly acknowledged the inherent danger in admitting opinion testimony of law enforcement officers because we recognize that such testimony “carries an aura of. special reliability and trustworthiness.” United States v. Gutierrez, 995 F.2d 169, 172 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 612 (9th Cir.1987)). Indeed, in United States v. Harber, 53 F.3d 236 (9th Cir.1995), we noted that the admission of an investigating officer’s opinion about the defendant’s guilt is a “classic example of presumptive prejudice.” 53 F.3d at 241. And in Har-ber we held that “extrinsic material consisting of a governmental official’s summary of the prosecution’s evidence, and his recommendation that an indictment should be requested because the accused is guilty, is inherently or presumptively prejudicial where it is read and relied upon by the jury.” Id. (emphasis added). I see no valid basis for distinguishing Harber from the present case. In both cases the jury read and relied on extrinsic evidence that consisted of an investigating officer’s opinion that the defendant was guilty. Consequently, I believe that admitting the tape and transcript of the pre-arrest interview in this case was “presumptively prejudicial.”
Given the highly inflammatory content of the tape and transcript, and that the statements were made by an investigating officer, I conclude that the admission of the evidence “so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair.”- Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.1991). The trial judge did give the jury cautionary instructions. But, in light of the extremely prejudicial nature of Detar’s statements, as well as the fact that a transcript of the interview was also later given to the jury, see United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that juries may put undue emphasis on particular testimony if provided with transcripts), I cannot conclude that the instructions cured the impact of Detar’s statement on the fairness of Diibria’s trial, see United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 4/75, 479 (9th Cir.1988) (finding under the circumstances that “the trial court’s curative instruction to the jury was not sufficient to obviate the prejudice.”).
Additionally, in contrast to the majority opinion, I believe that Dubria’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim has merit. Dubria’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on his trial counsel’s failure to object during closing argument when the prosecutor called Dubria a “piece of garbage” and suggested that he had personal knowledge of other bad acts committed by Dubria. The prosecutor stated:
But to get up here and get oh the stand and look at you people and tell you that story that he told you in front of the family, this piece of garbage, making up every bit of it, he’s the biggest liar *1008you’ve ever encountered. He’s a lot worse than that. I’m not going to tell you. You can imagine some of the things I would tell you what he really is. I’m not going to tell, because you know. You know in your hearts what else.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Dubria must demonstrate that his counsel’s failure to object was deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced Dubria’s defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Clearly, Dubria’s counsel’s failure to object was deficient. The prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he suggested that Dubria was a “piece of garbage.”1 See United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1225 (9th Cir.1999) (prosecutor commits misconduct when denigrating the defense as a sham); United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th Cir.1991) (prosecutor may not express his opinion of the defendant’s guilt or his belief in the credibility of the government’s witnesses). And the prosecutor disregarded his obligation “to avoid improper suggestions, insinuations, and especially assertions of personal knowledge,” United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir.1998), when he told the jury that Dubria: “is a lot worse than [the biggest liar you’ve ever encountered]. I’m not going to tell you. You can imagine some of the things I would tell you what he really is.” There was certainly no tactical advantage to be gained by Dubria by allowing the prosecutor to make such improper comments. Therefore, I would find that Dubria’s counsel’s failure to object to closing argument fell below the objective standard of reasonable representation.
Whether the ineffective assistance prejudiced Dubria’s defense is a closer question. To demonstrate prejudice, Dubria “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Although Dubria’s counsel’s deficient performance alone may not have altered the outcome of Dubria’s trial, I conclude that the cumulative impact of the prejudice from this harm and that harm caused by the admission of the unredacted tape and transcript of Dubria’s pre-arrest interview, deprived Dubria of his right to a fair trial. See Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 622 (9th Cir.1992).
Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s denial of Dubria’s habeas petition.

. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the prosecutor was simply referring to Dubria’s story when he stated “this piece of garbage.” Nonetheless, if the prosecutor had indeed been referring to Dubria’s story when he said "this piece of garbage,” an objection from the defense would have resulted in clarification for the jury. The statement is certainly unclear, and a reasonable person could conclude that the prosecutor was calling Dub-ria "a piece of garbage.”