Court Opinion

ID: 9827924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:56:11.976216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:39.298669
License: Public Domain

LEVY, J.
(after stating the facts as above). [1,2] The written contract of sale provides for a conveyance by deed by Clark and Stone to A. L. Boynton of, besides other property, “1,000 acres of pine timber,” which was, as the writing states, “situated about six miles south of Hallsville in Harrison county, Texas, on the land of Ben Waldron.” The sole difference between the parties pertains to the “1,000 acres of pine timber.” And in view of the pleading and evidence the conclusion to be reached, in order to determine the differences, was that of whether or not both the parties have made a valid oral agreement free from mistake pertaining to the pine timber, but a mistake in expressing its terms has been made in reducing it to writing. The question as submitted by the court seems to restrict the jury’s inquiry to the understanding of A. L. Boynton only as to the terms of the agreement respecting pine timber. Whether, though, the question properly submitted the issue is immaterial for discussion here, since no objection thereto is made on this appeal. The limitation, however, placed on the question by the special charge given and excepted to and made the basis of assignment of error is, in the record, material error this court concludes. The special charge informs the jury that if Mc-Gonico, “the agent of the defendant A. L. Boynton,” “understood” the agreement to be that Clark and Stone were to make conveyance to A. L. Boynton of all the pine timber on the 1,000-acre tract of land of Ben Wal-dron, then A. L. Boynton would, as a matter of law, be held to have “understood” or agreed to that term of the contract. The legal doctrine involved in this special charge has application when the contract has been negotiated and a final agreement effected through an agent acting in behalf of his principal. Sykes v. Speer, 112 S. W. 422; Harrell v. Brooks, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 334, 113 S. W. 961 ; Irvine v. Grady, 85 Tex. 120, 19 S. W. 1028. But the legal proposition involved in the special charge has no application, we firmly conclude, to the facts of this case. It is admittedly shown that the written instrument, purporting to be the prior oral agreement, was signed by A. L. Boynton in person, and not by Mr. MeOonico as agent for A. L. Boynton, A.nd there is no evidence in the record, or pointed out in the briefs, that authorizes a finding of fact that Mr. Boynton never authorized or agreed that Mr. McConico should in behalf of A. L. Boynton buy the property, or negotiate for its purchase, or fix terms of purchase, or consummate a verbal or written agreement of any kind with Clark and Stone for the property; or any part of it Mr. Me-*513Conico, as proven, was engaged by A. L. Boynton to look over the property offered for sale by Clark and Stone, and to make investigation and report to Boynton the result and opinion of the investigation concerning the property. A. L. Boynton and Clark and Stone, each in person, conducted the negotiations and effected whatever agreement was made between them concerning the sale and purchase, of all the property. At the time all the parties went to the law office to have the agreement reduced to writing a real firm “trade” or agreement had been made by Boynton and Clark and Stone, each in person; and this oral agreement, already entered into was the agreement, to be written up. The evidence eliminates any question of agency, and makes pertinent a decision only of whether or not the parties have made a Valid oral agreement or contract free from mistake, but a< mistake -in expressing its terms has been made in reducing it to writing. Mr. McConico was'merely, at most, rendering a gratuitous service or in legal effect merely in the attitude of testifying as a witness to an oral agreement when informing the attorney as to the terms of the agreement previously negotiated and finally agreed upon by the parties in person and without the intervention of any agent. And in any event, in the record, Mr. MeConieo’s “understanding” of the terms of an oral contract, which was previous to its being reduced to writing, negotiated, and consummated entirely by the parties themselves, each in person, would not, as- a matter of law, conclusively bind A. L. Boynton. The “understanding” of Mr. McConico of the contract is merely a matter of evidence to be considered by the jury along with all the evidence as would be the testimony given by any witness present at the trial and hearing the parties finally agree on the particular terms of an oral agreement.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial.