Court Opinion

ID: 9720025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:13:06.521653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:29.580669
License: Public Domain

*217Dissenting Opinion
Prentice, J.
I do not agree with the test applied by the majority opinion with respect to whether to hold a competency hearing. The issue before us on appeal is not whether there was “sufficient evidence [for the trial judge] to find that the defendant had sufficient comprehension to stand trial,”1 but rather whether the trial court had before it “indicators sufficient to establish reasonable grounds to believe the defendant to be legally incompetent.” Evans v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 148, 300 N.E.2d 882; Tinsley v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 577, 298 N.E.2d 429.
So long as the evidence before the court raises a “bona fide doubt” as to a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the judge on his own motion must conduct a competency hearing pursuant to Burns Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1706a, IC 35-5-3-2. Pate v. Robinson (1966), 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815.
The trial judge, therefore, has much less discretion with respect to refusing to grant a competency hearing than he does in determining competency at a hearing. If this Court determines that there were sufficient indicators to establish a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competency, the failure to grant a competency hearing is error.
Furthermore, the statement in the majority opinion that “actual attempted waiver is a circumstance bearing on the decision whether or not to hold a competency hearing” is untenable in light of Pate v. Robinson, supra. An attempted waiver is a factor reflecting on defendant’s demeanor at trial. And while “demeanor at trial might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on that very issue.” 383 U.S. at 386, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 822.
We must therefore look to the facts presented to the trial *218court to determine if they could properly have been deemed dispositive on the issue of defendant’s competence to stand trial in 1972.
Defendant’s long history of mental problems was properly before the court, as was the 1966 determination that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Standing alone, this evidence would mandate a trial judge to order a competency hearing at a later trial. However, a letter dated May 27, 1969, from the Medical Director of the Norman Beatty Hospital Maximum Security Division certified that Defendant was competent to stand trial at that time, but that he remained “extremely susceptible to mental stress which could cause a reoccurrence of mental illness.” A trial in 1969 without another competency hearing would then be justified; but the certification of competency in 1969, in light of Defendant’s history of mental illness, could hardly be deemed dispositive at a trial some three years later. A letter to the trial judge from Drs. E. Rogers Smith and Ronald H. Hull verified that Defendant was in a remission period of his illness in 1969, but indicated a high probability of recurrence of the mental condition, that he was fundamentally insane, dangerous, and should be retained in maximum security.
In addition to this evidence, the trial court had before it the testimony of four doctors at the 1972 trial. Drs. Smith and Hull testified as court-appointed physicians on the issue of Defendant’s insanity at the time of the commission of the crime, but both made statements that they believed Defendant to be in a state of remission of his mental illness at the time of trial. They did not say how extensive this remission was, and said nothing about Defendant’s ability at or immediately prior to trial to aid in the preparation of his defense.
Dr. Samuel A. Farnsworth testified that Defendant was suffering from amnesia at the time of trial and could not remember events relating to the commission of the crime.2 *219It would seem that this uncontroverted evidence of amnesia would be such an indicator of incompetence to stand trial as would compel a competency hearing at the 1972 trial, for there is a grave question whether a defendant suffering from amnesia could have “comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the criminal action against him and the proceedings thereon and to make his defense” as required by Burns § 9-1706a.
With respect to the issue of amnesia, the majority cites Reagon v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 143, 251 N.E.2d 829. I do not believe that Reagon dispenses with the requirement to hold a competency hearing where uncontroverted evidence of amnesia is submitted to the trial court.
“In consideration of the question before us we must draw a distinction between a mental condition of insanity, which is a valid defense to a criminal charge, and a mental incapacity, such as amnesia, which may or may not prevent a defendant from aiding his counsel in making a valid defense. In this connection the rule has been generalized to the following extent:
“ ‘In determining a defendant’s capacity to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to co-operate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed * * *.’ 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law, § 63, p. 144.” Reagon v. State, 253 Ind. at 146. (Emphasis added.)
In Reagon, the defendant by his attorney had made a motion for a continuance, contending that his loss of memory precluded him from aiding his attorney in his defense. A hearing on the motion for continuance was held, and testimony was heard. The evidence adduced at this hearing was to the effect that the defendant comprehended and understood the proceedings against him and that he could reason and communicate with his attorney. This Court upheld the denial of the motion *220for continuance on the basis of this testimony and also the certification of competency filed just two months before trial by the Superintendent of the State Hospital.
I do not think that the holding in Reagon dispenses with the hearing requirement where amnesia is alleged. The certification of competency in the case at bar was received about three years prior to the trial, and indicated that defendant was still extremely susceptible to minimal stress which could cause a reoccurrence of mental illness at any time. The testimony of Drs. Smith and Hull reveals that Defendant’s mental illness was in a remission stage at the time of trial, but they did not refute the testimony of Dr. Farnsworth regarding amnesia. Moreover, there was no evidence introduced whereby it could be determined by the trial court that Defendant’s form of amnesia could nevertheless allow him to fully aid counsel in making his defense at the time of trial. Furthermore, the fact that Defendant was currently in a remission stage of his illness does not necessarily mean that he would be able to aid in making his defense.
In light of the foregoing, I believe there were sufficient indicators before the trial court to raise a “bona fide doubt” as to the defendant’s competence to stand trial. For this reason, I believe that it was error for the trial judge not to hold a hearing to determine the competency of Defendant at the time of trial, and to this extent, I dissent from the majority opinion.
Hunter, J., concurs.
Note.—Reported at 314 N.E.2d 45.

. That would be the test if the defendant appealed from a determination of competency following a competency hearing.

. The fourth doctor testified for the State that he had never seen a case of amnesia following shock treatment last as long as Dr. Farnsworth *219testified that Defendant had been suffering from it. However, we do not believe that to be credible evidence that Defendant himself was not suffering from it.