Court Opinion

ID: 9390468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 17:03:39.438831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:34.726452
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DRIT LP,                                )
                                        )
            Plaintiff,                  )
                                        )
                  v.                    ) C.A. No. N16C-07-218 WCC CCLD
                                        )
GLAXO GROUP LIMITED                     )
and HUMAN GENOME                        )
SCIENCES, INC.,                         )
                                        )
            Defendants.                 )

                          Submitted: September 6, 2022
                            Decided: April 27, 2023

             Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss Count III
                  of the Amended Complaint: GRANTED

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gregory P. Williams, Esquire, Chad M. Shandler, Esquire, and Nicole K. Pedi,
Esquire, Richards, Layton, & Finger P.A., One Rodney Square, 920 North King
Street, Wilmington, DE 19801. Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Keith R. Hummel, Esquire, Karin A. DeMasi, Esquire, Adam I. Rich Esquire,
Cravath, Swaine, & Moore LLP, Worldwide Plaza, 825 Eighth Avenue, New York,
NY 10019. Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Philip A. Rovner, Esquire, and Jonathan A. Choa, Esquire, Potter Anderson &
Corroon LLP, Hercules Plaza, P.O. Box 951, Wilmington, DE 19899. Attorneys for
Defendants.

Matthew M. Wolf, Esquire, John E. Nilsson, Esquire, Soumitra Deka, Esquire,
Bridgette Boyd Esquire, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, 601 Massachusetts
Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20001. Attorneys for Defendants.

CARPENTER, J.
         The Court here resolves Defendants Glaxo Group Limited (“GGL”) and

Human Genome Sciences, Inc.’s (“HGS”) (together, “Defendants” or “GSK”)

Renewed Motion to Dismiss DRIT LP’s (“DRIT” or “Plaintiff”) Count III breach of

contract claim. The Motion seeks to dismiss Count III under Civil Rule 12(b)(6).

For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is GRANTED and DRIT’s companion

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I.       FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         This litigation arises out of a Patent License and Settlement Agreement

(“Settlement Agreement”) entered into on October 28, 2008, as amended August 24,

2012, between GSK and non-party Biogen Idec MA Inc., (“Biogen”).1               The

Settlement Agreement arose from a patent dispute between GSK and Biogen over

the proper owner of inventions related to the use of antibodies for the treatment of

lupus. The Settlement Agreement gave GSK ownership of inventions. It also

obligated GSK to pay royalties to Biogen for the U.S. sales of the lupus drug

Benlysta, and all Licensed Patents.2 On December 6, 2011, the United States Patent

and Trademark Office (“PTO”) issued Patent No. 8,071,092 (“the ‘092 patent”) from

1
    Compl. ¶ 1.
2
    Id. ¶ 3.

                                         2
an application submitted by GSK.3 On August 24, 2012, DRIT purchased Biogen’s

royalty rights under the Settlement Agreement.4

       On April 27, 2015, Defendants filed a “statutory disclaimer” of the ‘092 patent

using the PTO’s standard form for statutory disclaimers.5 Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §

1.321(a)(4), the patent holder must pay a fee to the PTO to statutorily disclaim any

claim of a patent.6 GSK’s patent attorney filled out a C.F.R. § 1.321(a) statutory

disclaimer form, and selected the fifth payment option, which states, “The Director

is hereby authorized to charge any fees which may be required or credit any

overpayment to Deposit Account No. [blank].”7 The PTO recorded the disclaimer

in the official prosecution history of the ‘092 Patent, dated April 27, 2015. However,

the PTO never charged GSK’s deposit account the $160 fee, and the receipt from

PTO sent to Defendant’s counsel reflected that no payment had been made. On July

16, 2015, GSK realized the error and remedied the PTO’s omission by paying the

$160 fee.

       DRIT filed its Complaint on July 28, 2016, alleging GSK breached the

Settlement Agreement as a result of their refusal to pay DRIT royalties and interest

3
  Id. ¶ 38.
4
  Id. ¶ 45.
5
  Defs.’ Opening Br. in Support of their Renewed Mot. to Dismiss Count III of the Am. Compl.
(hereinafter “Defs.’ Br.”) at p. 3.
6
  37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (2013) sets forth the requirements for a disclaimer to be effective, including
that it “[b]e accompanied by the fee set forth in § 1.20(d).”
7
  Id. (citing Disclaimer in Patent Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a), (Ex. A.)).

                                                3
on U.S. sales of Benlysta since April 27, 2015.8 It is Plaintiff’s position that GSK’s

disclaimer was ineffective until July 16, 2015, thus, GSK’s nonpayment of royalties

from April 27, 2015, through July 16, 2015, was a breach of contract.9 Sales of

Benlysta between those dates totaled $68,939,000.10 According to Defendants, their

contractual royalty obligation ceased when they filed the statutory disclaimer on

April 27, 2015.

       On March 3, 2021, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld this Court’s dismissal

of the breach of contract claim but found that GSK had not breached the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing as previously determined at trial. Therefore,

the only remaining issue to be decided in this case is DRIT’s Count III breach of

contract claim subject to DRIT’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and GSK’s

Motion to Dismiss. The parties stipulated to a single round of supplemental

briefing,11 and the Court subsequently held oral argument.12

II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       A party may move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

on which relief can be granted.13 In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court

(1) accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint; (2) credits

8
  Compl. D.I. 1 (July 28, 2016).
9
  DRIT’s Ans. Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss. (hereinafter “Pl.’s Br.”) at 2-3.
10
   Id.
11
   Letter from Defs., D.I. 378 (May 6, 2022).
12
   Judicial Action Form, D.I. 382 (Sept. 1, 2022).
13
   Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).

                                               4
vague allegations if they give the opposing part notice of the claim; and (3) draws

all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant.14                Dismissal is

inappropriate unless “under no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged could

the complaint state a claim for which relief might be granted.”15

       DRIT’s Count III breach of contract claim is determinative upon whether

GSK’s request to charge its deposit account as payment for the $160 disclaimer fee,

was sufficient to complete the disclaimer filing even though PTO did not process

any payment when the disclaimer was filed. In other words, whether additional

action was required by GSK to satisfy the disclaimer when no payment had been

processed by PTO.

III.   PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

       The parties agree that GSK provided the PTO with authorization to charge

their deposit account on April 27, 2015; however, the $160 fee was not paid until

July 16, 2015, when GSK noticed that the PTO had not charged their account as

requested. Subsequently, GSK paid the fee by check.

       GSK argues DRIT’s breach of contract claim should be dismissed as a matter

of law because the effective date of GSK’s disclaimer of the ‘092 patent is April 27,

14
   Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011).
15
   Unbound Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Invoy Holdings Inc., 251 A.3d 1016, 1023 (Del. Super. 2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

                                              5
2015.16 GSK asserts it did not breach the Settlement Agreement by ceasing royalty

payments to DRIT after the April 27, 2015, effective date of GSK’s disclaimer of

the ‘092 patent.17

       In support of its argument, GSK cites to 37 C.F.R. § 1.25(b), which states in

part: “. . . post-issuance fees may be charged against these accounts if sufficient

funds are on deposit to cover such fees.”18 Defendants allege the account it kept at

the PTO was equivalent to having a debit card on file.19 GSK says it followed the

legal requirements for disclaimer by filling out the PTO’s form and selecting the

fifth payment option.20 The fifth option authorizes the director to charge any fees

which may be required to a deposit account.21

       In response, DRIT argues the Defendants did not successfully disclaim their

rights to the ‘092 patent until July 16, 2015, because statutory disclaimer is only

effective with payment, which was not received by the PTO until July 16. 22 DRIT

says GSK, not the PTO, made the mistake, and the fee was not properly paid. DRIT

further alleges that because the disclaimer was not effective until July 16, 2015, the

16
   Id.
17
   Id.
18
   37 C.F.R. § 1.25(b) (2021).
19
   Mot. Tr. at 7. Sept. 1, 2022.
20
   The PTO’s 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a) statutory disclaimer form provides five (5) options for payment
of the disclaimer fee set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(d), including check, credit card, or by
authorization to charge a deposit account.
21
   Defs.’ Br. Ex. 1-3.
22
   Id. at 5-6.

                                               6
‘092 patent was still in effect and GSK was earning royalties until the fee was paid

on July 16, 2015.

IV.    DISCUSSION

       (a)    Disclaimer Procedure

       Under the Patent Act, “[a] patentee may, on payment of the fee required by

law, make disclaimer of any complete claim, stating therein the extent of his interest

in such patent.”23 “Such disclaimer shall be in writing, and recorded in the Patent

and Trademark Office; and it shall thereafter be considered as part of the original

patent to the extent of the interest possessed by the disclaimant and by those claiming

under him.”24

       The Code of Federal Regulations also states that a patentee may disclaim any

claims in a patent, and for the disclaimer to become effective and recorded in the

PTO, (1) it must be signed by the patentee, (2) identify the patent and complete

claim(s), (3) state the present extent of the patentee’s ownership, and (4) be

accompanied by the fee set forth in § 1.20(d).25 The PTO form used to file a

disclaimer lists five ways to pay the required fee, three of which are applicable to

this situation. They are by check, by credit card, or by charging the fee to a Deposit

23
   35 U.S.C. § 253(a).
24
   Id.
25
   37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (2013). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.20 (2020), which states the filing fee for each
statutory disclaimer under § 1.321 is $170.00. At the time of the disclaimer the fee was $160.00.

                                               7
Account that has been established at PTO. There is no dispute that GSK properly

completed the disclaimer form and checked the box on the form that authorized the

fee to be paid from an established account at PTO. There is also no dispute that the

Deposit Account had sufficient funds to cover the $160 fee.

       (b)      Deposit Account Authorization

       37 C.F.R. § 1.25 sets forth regulations governing PTO deposit accounts.

Subsection (b) specifically indicates that post-issuance fees may be charged using

these accounts and as long as there are sufficient funds in the account to cover the

fee, payment will be considered effective on the date the authorization is filed.26 In

spite of the clear language of § 1.25(b), DRIT argues that a deposit account cannot

be used to pay for a disclaimer. It asserts that a complete reading of subsection (b)

reflects that it is limited to general authorizations of fees, which was not utilized by

GSK, or fees associated with Section 1.16 through Section 1.18 of the CFR

regulation.27

       GSK responds to this argument by explaining that the general authorization

language relates to patent applications that are pending approval and does not modify

the post-issuance language contained in the first sentence of subsection (b).28 GSK

further asserts that it did not rely on a “general authorization,” but instead, made a

26
   37 C.F.R. § 1.25(b) (2021).
27
   Pl.’s Br. at 6-7.
28
   Defs.’ Br. at 3.

                                           8
specific request on PTO’s own statutory disclaimer form.29 This form explicitly

authorizes the PTO to charge the statutory disclaimer fee to the patentee’s account.30

          The Court finds that DRIT is misconstruing the language of 37 CFR § 1.25(b).

While the second sentence of § 1.25(b) does specifically reference §§ 1.16 through

1.18, there is nothing to suggest that this language limits application of subsection

(b) to only those provisions. The Court finds that the use of deposit accounts for

fees associated with post-issuance applications is clearly authorized by this section.

This is further evidenced by its inclusion on the PTO’s own disclaimer form. While

the argument is a clever attempt by DRIT to find support for its position, it simply

is not supported by a fair reading of the 37 C.F.R. § 1.25.

          (c)    Fee Transmittal Form

          DRIT next argues that while GSK filed the disclaimer form on April 27, 2015,

they failed to file the Electronic Patent Application Fee Transmittal form which they

argue is a required accompanying document to complete the disclaimer process.

They assert that since this form was not provided to PTO, the deposit account was

not charged, nor was any payment received to finalize the disclaimer until July 16,

2015, when the error was noticed and corrected.

          First, the Court agrees that GSK’s experienced patent counsel failed to include

29
     Id.
30
     Id. See Ex. 2.

                                             9
the Electronic Patent Application Fee Transmittal form with the Disclaimer Form.

As best as the Court can surmise, the transmittal document is a standard form of

PTO, and its purpose is to electronically document the payment of the fee. It

includes only basic information about the patent and a fee code for the action that is

being taken by the patent holder. To compound the problem, GSK’s patent counsel

failed to notice that the subsequent electronic receipt received by him in which PTO

acknowledged receiving the disclaimer form indicated that the necessary fee had not

been provided. These are mistakes that should not have occurred and have provided

an avenue for DRIT to now assert that they are entitled to an additional several

months of royalties worth millions of dollars. So, the key question for the Court to

decide is whether the Application Fee Transmittal form is required to be filed to

effectuate the disclaimer.

      Clearly the form facilitates the payment process, but the question is whether

there is a regulation, manual section, or code provision that mandates its use. From

the evidence presented to the Court and questions by the Court of counsel during

oral argument, the answer appears to be no. The Court has not been provided any

reason or explanation for the PTO’s failure to charge the $160 from the deposit

account, and the Court is unwilling to find that the failure to file the transmittal form

was the cause particularly when no fee was actually transmitted. Here, all that was

                                           10
required was to debit the Deposit Account that was in place and funded at PTO.31

As a result, the Court can only find that the disclaimer form filed on April 27, 2015,

authorized that the fee be charged to GSK’s deposit account was sufficient to

effectuate the disclaimer and the patent was disclaimed as of that date.

V.        CONCLUSION

          This Court finds the disclaimer was appropriately filed on April 27, 2015, and

not July 16, 2015, pursuant to C.F.R. Title 37 section 1.321. The plain reading of

the statutes permits a patentee to charge its PTO deposit account as payment for the

$160 disclaimer fee given sufficient funds are on deposit to cover such fees. For the

foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss Count III of the

Amended Complaint is hereby GRANTED and DRIT’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is DENIED.

          IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                              /s/ William C. Carpenter, Jr.
                                              Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.

31
     President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. Lee, 589 Fed. Appx. 982 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

                                                11