Court Opinion

ID: 9914243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 20:09:08.937317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:48.207604
License: Public Domain

J-S39044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                :
                v.                              :
                                                :
                                                :
    DAKOTA AUSTIN COLE                          :
                                                :
                       Appellant                :   No. 1560 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 21, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-60-CR-0000160-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                    FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2023

       Dakota Austin Cole (Appellant) appeals from the order entered in the

Union County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition filed under the

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),1 which sought relief from his jury

convictions of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) - threat of forcible

compulsion, indecent assault - forcible compulsion, indecent assault - threat

of   forcible   compulsion,      terroristic   threats,   unlawful   restraint,   false

imprisonment, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person2

(REAP). On appeal, he argues trial counsel was ineffective on several grounds,

including failing to properly impeach the victim or present certain evidence.

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(2), 3126(a)(2), (3), 2706(a)(1), 2902(a)(1),
2903(a), 2701(a)(3), 2705, respectively.
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Appellant’s present counsel, K. Michael Sullivan, Esquire, has filed a motion to

withdraw, citing      Anders v. California,          386    U.S.   738   (1967), and

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981). While we note

the proper procedures for withdrawing in a PCRA matter are set forth in

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc), we grant Attorney

Sullivan’s petition and affirm the PCRA court’s order.

       The relevant underlying facts of this case are as follows. Appellant was

engaged to Katelin Bedosky (Victim). N.T. Jury Trial, 10/27/20, at 24. On

April 11, 2019, Victim and Appellant ended their relationship and immediately

thereafter, Appellant retrieved a gun from his car, and forced Victim to

perform oral sex on him. Id. at 25-26, 30. Eventually, Victim was able to

call the police, who arrived and arrested Appellant at the scene. Id. at 32.

       Appellant was charged with rape by forcible compulsion, rape by threat

of forcible compulsion, strangulation, IDSI -forcible compulsion, IDSI - threat

of   forcible   compulsion,      terroristic   threats,    unlawful   restraint,   false

imprisonment, simple assault, REAP, indecent assault - forcible compulsion,

and indecent assault - threat of forcible compulsion.3 This matter proceeded

to a one-day jury trial on October 27, 2020, where Appellant was represented

by Steve Buttorff, Esquire (Trial Counsel).

____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3121(a)(2), 2718(a)(2), 3123(a)(1), respectively.

                                           -2-
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     Relevant to Appellant’s claims on appeal, Victim testified to the following

details of the incident. On April 11, 2019, she was staying at her mother’s

home on Reber Road in Mifflinburg, Union County, Pennsylvania. N.T. Jury

Trial at 24, 81. Appellant went there that day to see their dog, and during

that same visit, they ended their relationship. Id. at 24-25. Appellant became

upset and Victim was “really worried that he would hurt himself[.]” Id. at 25.

     Victim went to her bedroom to use the restroom, and when she came

out Appellant was in the room. N.T. Jury Trial at 26. Appellant told her he

“had something for [her] in his car[,]” and left the house.     Id.   When he

returned to Victim’s bedroom, she saw “he had a magazine in one hand and

his gun in the other[.]” Id. Victim testified she was not sure whether the gun

was loaded. Id. at 28. There were two dogs there and Appellant ushered

them out of the room and shut the door. Id. at 26. Victim cried and pleaded

with Appellant to “not do whatever he was planning on doing.” Id. at 27.

Victim grabbed the magazine out of Appellant’s hand and opened the door to

throw it out of the room. See id. Appellant went to retrieve the magazine

and while he was distracted, Victim knocked the gun out of his hand, causing

it to fall “behind some boxes.” Id. at 27-28. Appellant “slammed the door on

[Victim’s right] hand,” “grabbed [Victim] by the neck[,]” and said she

“shouldn’t have fucking done that.” Id. at 28.

     Appellant retrieved the gun and Victim again grabbed the magazine and

threw it out her bedroom window. N.T. Jury Trial at 28. Appellant told Victim

“he was going to tie [her] hands behind [her] back [with his belt] so [she]

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couldn’t call anybody or get away.” See id. at 29. Victim testified that she

complained the belt was hurting her, so Appellant loosened it, but she was not

able to free herself. Id. Appellant then told Victim he “could do something .

. . to make [her] really hate him” and took off his clothes. Id. Appellant took

off Victim’s pants and underwear and threw her phone across the room, where

it landed behind her dresser. Id. Appellant instructed Victim to get on her

knees and “shoved his penis in [her] mouth.” Id. at 29-30. He then pushed

Victim onto the bed where he placed his knees on her shoulders. Id. at 30.

Victim described that Appellant was “crushing” her. Id.

      When Appellant got off Victim, he went to retrieve her phone by the

dresser. N.T. Jury Trial at 30. Victim grabbed the gun from his hand and ran

outside to her car, but realized it was locked and she did not have the keys.

Id. At this point, Appellant also went outside to get the magazine, and thus

Victim ran back inside and locked the door.     Id.   Once inside, she locked

herself in her bathroom, but Appellant was able to get back into the home.

Id. at 31.

      Appellant started reading text messages from Victim’s phone and

screamed at her. N.T. Jury Trial at 31. Victim described that she was “afraid

for [her] life” and she put the gun inside a makeup bag and put that bag inside

a backpack. Id. She then opened the door and “hit [Appellant] with [the]

backpack[,] but not hard” because she did not want to further upset him. Id.

Victim “pried [Appellant’s] fingers from [her] phone” and ran upstairs. Id. at

32. She returned downstairs to get one of the dogs before going upstairs

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again and calling the police. Id. Victim initially told the police Appellant did

not hurt her, but after a female officer asked her again, Victim told them about

the assault. Id. at 41.

      After the police arrived and arrested Appellant, Victim went to the

hospital, where sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE nurse) Hannah

McDowell interviewed her and took photos of her injuries. See N.T. Jury Trial

at 32-33, 103. Victim also testified that she left the belt Appellant used to

restrain her “in front of [her] bed just kind of laying on the floor.” Id. at 33.

Pertinent to Appellant’s claim on appeal, and as discussed further below, Trial

Counsel extensively cross-examined Victim about differences between

statements she gave to police and the SANE nurse and her testimony at trial.

      The Commonwealth also presented Pennsylvania State Police Corporal

Joshua Kendrick, who testified that he spoke with Victim at the hospital. N.T.

Jury Trial at 93. The next day, he went to Victim’s home, where he recovered

the belt, which was “still on the floor[.]” Id. at 94-95. He testified he had no

reason to think the belt was “adjusted or manipulated in any way” and it was

“still in a loop [that was] just big enough for [Victim’s] hands to have

escaped[.]” Id. at 95. Trial Counsel then cross-examined Corporal Kendrick

about the statement Victim made to him and his recovery of the belt.

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       Lastly, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of SANE Nurse

McDowell, who examined and interviewed Victim.4               N.T. Jury Trial at 103.

Nurse McDowell testified she wrote “down exactly what [Victim] sa[id].” Id.

at 110.     Relevant to Appellant’s argument, Trial Counsel similarly cross-

examined Nurse         McDowell regarding          inconsistencies between Victim’s

statement and trial testimony.

       Appellant testified in his own defense and denied that he assaulted

Victim.    N.T. Jury Trial at 144.         He stated that after they ended their

relationship, he retrieved his gun from his car to give to Victim, so that he

would not harm himself. Id. at 137. Appellant detailed that after getting the

gun, Victim initiated oral sex with him. Id. at 144. Appellant also stated that

he accidentally caused some of her injuries, both dogs were “jumpy,” and one

“playfully nips” when you interact with him. See id. at 133, 141. He further

explained that after oral sex, Victim allowed him to restrain her with his belt

because “[s]he kept grabbing and pulling, and [he] didn’t want either one of

[them] to get hurt.”        Id. at 147.        About three to four minutes later, he

removed the belt from Victim and threw it on her bed. Id. at 148-49.

       At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of IDSI - threat

of forcible compulsion, indecent assault - forcible compulsion, indecent assault

- threat of forcible compulsion, terroristic threats, unlawful restraint, false

____________________________________________

4 Nurse McDowell was certified as a SANE expert at trial.          N.T. Jury Trial at
103.

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imprisonment, simple assault, and REAP, and not guilty of strangulation. The

jury could not come to a verdict as to the two counts of rape and one count

of IDSI - forcible compulsion, and the trial court declared a mistrial at these

charges. Order, 10/29/20.

       On January 28, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate sentence of 57 to 180 months’ incarceration. Appellant filed a post-

sentence motion, which the trial court denied on February 9, 2021. Order,

2/9/21.

       Appellant did not file a direct appeal, but instead, on January 6, 2022,

filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.           He raised claims of Trial Counsel’s

ineffective assistance for failing to: (1) “properly impeach” Victim with her

prior inconsistent statements; (2) object to the Commonwealth’s closing

argument because it was “outside the realm[ ] of fairness[;]” and (3) present

a defense and expert witness testimony regarding Appellant’s mental health.5

Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition, 1/6/22, at 3-4.

       The PCRA court appointed Michael O’Donnell, Esquire, to represent

Appellant.    Order, 1/19/22.        Attorney O’Donnell did not file an amended

petition, but instead on May 2, 2022, filed a motion to withdraw. Attorney

O’Donnell explained Appellant wished to raise claims that Trial Counsel’s

cross-examination of Victim: (1) “did not adequately address concerns with
____________________________________________

5 Appellant also checked the box on his pro se petition indicating he was raising

a constitutional violation. Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition at 3. However, he
does not allege any claims under this argument.

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the belt[;]” (2) “did not adequately argue chain of custody” of the belt; and

(3) “did not address the inconsistencies” in Victim’s statement to the SANE

nurse.      Attorney     O’Donnell’s     Motion     for   Leave   to   Withdraw   from

Representation, 5/2/22, at 4 (unpaginated).               Further, Attorney O’Donnell

presented claims on behalf of Appellant: that Trial Counsel was ineffective

when he did not call character witnesses, did not know the grading of an

offense at sentencing, and failed to play the 911 call recording at trial. Id.

Attorney O’Donnell stated most of these claims could have been addressed on

direct appeal as weight claims. Id. at 2, 4, 7. However, Appellant chose not

to file a direct appeal because Trial Counsel “advised him he could ultimately

be retried [on the counts on which the jury could not agree] and face a more

severe sentence.” See id. at 2. Attorney O’Donnell then concluded all of

Appellant’s claims were either waived or meritless. See id. at 7.

       On May 6, 2022, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of

dismissal. On May 18th,6 Appellant responded with a pro se motion requesting

leave to amend his PCRA petition.              On July 22nd, the PCRA court granted

Appellant’s motion, and stayed Attorney O’Donnell’s petition to withdraw.

Order, 7/22/22. However, Appellant did not file an amended petition and on

____________________________________________

6 Appellant mailed his motion for leave to amend on May 18, 2022, but the

PCRA court did not receive the document until June 15, 2022, after the time
for filing a response expired. However, under the prisoner mailbox rule, when
a pro se defendant is incarcerated, courts “deem a pro se document filed on
the date it is placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing.”
Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011).

                                           -8-
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October 21st, the PCRA court dismissed his petition and granted Attorney

O’Donnell’s petition to withdraw, but directed Attorney O’Donnell to perfect

Appellant’s appeal, should he request one. Order, 10/21/22.

       On November 7, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. On

November 10th, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement

of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).                Even

though Attorney O’Donnell had been granted leave to withdraw from

representation on December 2nd, he filed a statement of intent to file a

Turner/Finley letter in lieu of a concise statement pursuant to Rule

1925(c)(4).

       On April 26, 2023, Appellant filed a pro se application for remand to

represent himself pro se. See Appellant’s Application for Remand to Lower

Court for Appellant To Proceed Pro Se, 4/26/23 (unpaginated).                 In this

application, Appellant again asserted Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing

to challenge the chain of custody of the belt and not objecting during the

Commonwealth’s closing.          Id. at 2.     He also raised, for the first time, the

following additional claims that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1)

“request expert instruction[;]” (2) “request false in one false in all jury

instruction[;]” and (3) request a jury instruction on inconsistent statements.7

Id.

____________________________________________

7 Appellant asserted in this motion that the PCRA court did not respond to his

June 15, 2022, motion for leave to amend his PCRA petition. See Appellant’s
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       On May 9, 2023, this Court remanded the matter to the PCRA court to

clarify Appellant’s representation status. Order, 5/9/23. On June 15th, after

a hearing,8 the PCRA court again granted Attorney O’Donnell leave to

withdraw and appointed present counsel, Attorney Sullivan, to represent

Appellant.     Order, 6/15/23.        On August 2nd, Attorney Sullivan filed an

Anders9 brief and on August 4th, filed an Anders motion for leave to

withdraw from representation.

____________________________________________

Application for Remand To Lower Court for Appellant to Proceed Pro Se at 3.
However, as stated above, the PCRA court filed an order granting his motion
on July 22nd and sent it to Attorney O’Donnell, who was still counsel of record,
as well as Appellant. See Order, 7/22/22.

8A copy of this hearing transcript was not included in the certified record.
This does not impact our review.

9 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185, 1187. To
withdraw from representation during PCRA proceedings, counsel must file a
Turner/Finley petition and conclude all of the petitioner’s purported claims
are meritless. Alternatively, when petitioning to withdraw from direct appeal
representation, counsel must file an Anders brief and petition, which argues
an appellant has no non-frivolous claims.

       Here, Attorney Sullivan’s brief relied on Anders and its progeny. See
Anders Brief at 6. However, he has concluded Appellant’s claims are both
“frivolous” under Anders, as well as “meritless,” which comports with the
correct Turner/Finley standard for PCRA withdrawals. See id. at 6, 18. In
any event, we determine Attorney Sullivan substantially complies with the
requirements of Turner/Finley. See Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d
816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating Anders provides higher protections
than Turner/Finley, and thus a brief and petition that complies with Anders
also complies with the Turner/Finley standard).

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       We surmise the following claims from Attorney Sullivan’s brief — that

Trial Counsel failed to:10 (1) properly impeach Victim with prior inconsistent

statements; (2) object to the chain of custody of the belt used to restrain

Victim;    (3)    object    to    “prejudicial     incendiary   comments”   in   the

Commonwealth’s closing argument; (4) present a defense and expert witness

with respect to Appellant’s mental health; (5) call character witnesses at trial;

(6) play the 911 call recording at trial; (7) know the grading of one of

Appellant’s convictions at sentencing; (8) request a “False in one, False in All”

jury instruction; and (9) request an expert witness jury instruction.            See

Anders Brief at 11-13.11

       Preliminarily, we address Attorney Sullivan’s motion to withdraw as

counsel. In a PCRA matter, an application to withdraw as counsel must comply

with the Turner/Finley requirements:

       Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must
       proceed . . . under [Turner and Finley, and] must review the
       case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must then submit a “no-
       merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal to this Court,
       detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the
       case, listing the issues which petitioner wants to have reviewed,
       explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and requesting
       permission to withdraw.

____________________________________________

10Attorney Sullivan did not include a “questions presented” section in his
Anders brief.

11 Attorney Sullivan also recognized that Appellant attempted to raise a
constitutional claim, but concluded it fell under an ineffectiveness argument.
See Anders Brief at 11.

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            Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the
      “no merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to
      withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to
      proceed pro se or by new counsel.

Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).     If this Court determines counsel has satisfied these technical

requirements, we “must then conduct [our] own review of the merits of the

case. If [we] agree[ ] with counsel that the claims are without merit, [we]

will permit counsel to withdraw and deny relief.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Here,     Attorney   Sullivan   has      satisfied    the   above   procedural

requirements.     In his brief, he discusses Appellant’s potential claims, the

relevant case law and supporting documents, and the reasons why the issues

are without merit. Attorney Sullivan has also submitted a motion for leave to

withdraw, stating he sent copies of the brief and “an advisory letter” to

Appellant. Motion for Leave to Withdraw From Representation, 8/4/23, at 2

(unpaginated); Letter From Attorney Sullivan to Appellant, 8/4/23. Attorney

Sullivan attached a copy of the letter, which advised Appellant of his

conclusion the appeal would lack arguable merit, and Appellant’s right to

retain alternative counsel or proceed pro se.              Appellant has not filed a

response to the motion to withdraw or brief. Thus, we proceed to conduct an

independent review of the record to determine if the appeal lacks merit. See

Doty, 48 A.3d at 454.

      Our standard of review under the PCRA is limited to “whether the PCRA

court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Small, 238

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A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa. 2020). Appellant raises several claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Attorney Sullivan and the PCRA court both agree that

most of Appellant’s claims are waived as they should have been raised on

direct appeal as challenges to the weight of the evidence. Anders Brief at

11; see PCRA Ct. Op., 10/21/22, at 3-4.                The court then stated that,

alternatively, each of the claims are without merit. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 4.

As Appellant has presented each of his claims under the purview of ineffective

assistance of counsel, we will review them as such.

       Counsel     is   presumed      to    have    rendered   effective   assistance.

Commonwealth v. Urwin, 219 A.3d 167, 172 (Pa. Super. 2019). To succeed

on a claim otherwise, the petitioner must plead and prove:

       his underlying legal claim has arguable merit; counsel’s actions
       lacked any reasonable basis; and counsel’s actions prejudiced
       him. Failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test
       requires dismissal of the claim. . . .

Id.

       We note that Appellant raises two claims for the first time on appeal —

that Trial Counsel failed to: (1) request a “False in one, False in All” jury

instruction; and (2) request an expert witness jury instruction.12 Anders Brief

at 13. Neither of these claims were presented in Appellant’s original pro se

PCRA petition or Attorney O’Donnell’s motion to withdraw, wherein he raised
____________________________________________

12 Appellant also raised a claim that Trial Counsel failed to request jury
instructions on inconsistent statements. See Appellant’s Application for
Remand to Lower Court For Appellant to Proceed Pro Se, at 2. It appears he
has abandoned this claim on appeal.

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additional claims on Appellant’s behalf. Appellant raised these claims for the

first time in his application to proceed pro se, which he filed after his petition

was dismissed. See Appellant’s Application for Remand to Lower Court For

Appellant to Proceed Pro Se at 2. We conclude these claims, concerning Trial

Counsel’s failure to request jury instructions, are waived.       See Pa.R.A.P.

302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.”).

      Next, we address Appellant’s purported claims that Trial Counsel did not

properly impeach Victim, and did not properly cross-examine Victim or other

witnesses about the chain of custody and “preservation” of the belt.         See

Anders Brief at 12. In the Anders Brief, Attorney Sullivan suggests Trial

Counsel did address each of these claims during trial. Id. at 13-14. We agree

with Attorney Sullivan.

      At trial, Trial Counsel extensively cross-examined Victim. See N.T. Jury

Trial at 48-49 (Victim’s statement about where Appellant had his hands prior

to the assault), 51-52 (Victim testifying that she was not sure if Appellant’s

gun was loaded, but she told the SANE nurse and previously testified at a prior

proceeding the gun was not loaded), 53-57 (Victim’s differing statements as

to whether she thought Appellant was only going to harm himself or also harm

her and whether Appellant purposefully or accidentally slammed her hand in

the door), 59 (Victim did not initially tell the SANE nurse or police that

Appellant prevented her from calling for help), 66 (Victim’s differing

statements as to whether it was easy to grab her phone back from Appellant

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or if she had to pry it out of his hands), 67-69 (Victim testifying inconsistently

with her prior statements regarding how hard she hit Appellant with her

backpack).

      Trial   Counsel   also   cross-examined    Corporal   Kendrick   regarding

inconsistencies between Victim’s statement to him and his observation of the

placement of the belt in Victim’s home when he secured it into evidence. See

N.T. Jury Trial at 97 (the officer agreeing he did not “know if anything was

moved around or if [the belt remained in the same place] between the time

[he] investigated and the time of the . . . incident[.]”), 98 (Victim never

reported that Appellant threw her phone or grabbed her neck). Lastly, Trial

Counsel cross-examined the SANE nurse about Victim’s statement. See id.

at 121 (pointing out Victim’s left hand was injured instead of her right hand;

Victim had no neck injuries despite claiming Appellant “grabbed” her there),

122-124 (Victim did not report that Appellant’s “knees were crushing her

shoulders[,]” that he threw her phone, or that he grabbed her arm or leg;

Victim only told the nurse that Appellant “pushed her back on the bed[;]”

Victim told the nurse Appellant’s gun was not loaded, and did not tell the nurse

that she had to use the bathroom before Appellant retrieved his gun), 125

(Victim did not tell the nurse that she tried to go outside to her car or that

Appellant was locked out), 125-26 (Victim stated she ran upstairs and her dog

followed her).

      The record demonstrates that Trial Counsel conducted a detailed cross

examination of not only Victim, but of two other witnesses regarding the

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inconsistencies in her prior statements and trial testimony.      Further, Trial

Counsel questioned Corporal Kendrick regarding preservation of the belt,

specifically, whether the evidence was tampered with before he arrived at

Victim’s home. Appellant does not allege what further evidence Trial Counsel

could have elicited during cross-examination and does not address the

detailed lines of cross-examination Counsel did pursue at trial.      Appellant

merely implies he was not satisfied with Counsel’s performance. As Appellant

has not demonstrated any of the prongs of a proper ineffectiveness claim, no

relief is due. See Urwin, 219 A.3d at 172.

      Next, Appellant claims Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to “prejudicial incendiary comments” the Commonwealth made during its

closing argument.   Anders Brief at 16.      Attorney Sullivan suggests in his

Anders brief that the Commonwealth’s closing was not “outside the realm of

fairness” and Trial Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.      Id.

Notably, Appellant has not pointed to specific comments made by the

Commonwealth that he believed were inflammatory.

      Upon review of the record, we summarize that in its closing argument,

the Commonwealth argued Victim was a credible witness despite some

inconsistencies in her prior statements, Appellant’s testimony was not

credible, and that it presented evidence of each of the elements of the charged

crimes. See N.T. Jury Trial at 185-89. Appellant has failed to identify any

particularly objectionable comment in the Commonwealth’s argument, nor has

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he explained how the purported comments prejudiced him. For this reason,

no relief is due. See Urwin, 219 A.3d at 172.

      Appellant’s next claim is that Trial Counsel was ineffective when he did

not present a mental health-based defense or call an expert witness regarding

Appellant’s mental health. Anders Brief at 12. Attorney Sullivan contends

that Trial Counsel did address Appellant’s mental health throughout trial and

Appellant has not alleged what other evidence could have been presented.

Id. at 16-17.

      We note Trial Counsel questioned Victim about Appellant’s mental

health. See N.T. Jury Trial at 46 (asking Victim if she said she “couldn’t marry

someone who might shoot themselves some day”), 50 (asking Victim if

Appellant told her “he didn’t know if he could keep his promise not to hurt

himself”), 52 (Appellant told Victim “this would be his final good-bye”), 53-

54, (Trial Counsel asked Victim if she was “pleading with [Appellant] not to

kill himself” and if she was “willing to do anything” to prevent Appellant from

hurting himself), 57 (asking Victim if she was concerned whether Appellant

was going to kill himself), 71 (Victim told the 911 dispatcher she was scared

Appellant was going to hurt himself).         Further, Trial Counsel’s closing

highlighted, inter alia, that: (1) Appellant had “mental health struggles[;]” (2)

he had a history with “threaten[ing] harm on himself[;]” (3) he intended to

kill himself and give his “final good-bye” that day; and (4) Victim knew that

“he[ was] on the verge of ending his life.” See id. at 177-81, 184.

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        We emphasize Appellant also testified about his own mental health at

trial. See N.T. Jury Trial at 131 (Appellant stating Victim was concerned for

his mental health and on the day of the incident he was “struggling with a lot

of self-harm and suicidal thoughts”), 135-37 (Victim told Appellant on the day

of the incident — and he agreed — that he needed to get help for his mental

health), 138-39 (Appellant stating he did not yet decide whether he was going

to commit suicide and describing the gun as his “only option”), 142 (Appellant

told Victim it was “the last time” that she or her family would see him), 156

(Appellant stated he called a friend to “talk [him] off the ledge” after the

incident), 158 (Appellant loaded the gun and “started to contemplate . . .

pulling the trigger[;]” Appellant checked himself into the hospital that same

day).

        We note:

        [I]t is well settled that the “failure to call [an expert] witness is
        not per se ineffective assistance of counsel as such decision
        generally involves a matter of trial strategy.” A claim that counsel
        was ineffective for failing to call a potential expert witness to
        testify at trial requires a petitioner to “establish that the witness
        existed and was available, that counsel was informed of the
        witness’ existence, that the witness was ready and willing to
        testify[,] and that the absence of the witness prejudiced the
        defendant to a point where the defendant was denied a fair trial.”

Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 793 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations

omitted).

        Contrary to Appellant’s purported claim, Trial Counsel presented his

mental health as a central factor of the trial. Trial Counsel elicited testimony,

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from both Appellant on direct examination and Victim on cross-examination,

that Appellant generally struggled with his mental health, and specifically did

so on the day of the assault.    In his closing argument, Trial Counsel also

focused on Appellant’s mental state prior to and during the incident. Thus,

the record belies Appellant’s claim that Trial Counsel did not present this

defense. Regarding his claim that Trial Counsel should have called an expert

witness, Appellant has not alleged that he has found a potential expert who

would have testified on his behalf, nor what additional evidence the witness

would present. For these reasons, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that

Trial Counsel was ineffective related to this claim and no relief is due. See

Urwin, 219 A.3d at 172; Smith, 167 A.3d at 793.

      Appellant next claims Trial Counsel was ineffective when he failed to call

character witnesses at trial. Anders Brief at 12. Attorney Sullivan states in

his Anders brief that Appellant has not identified any potential character

witnesses. Id. at 15.

      An attorney’s failure to call certain witnesses is not ineffectiveness per

se. Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 A.2d 666, 693 (Pa. 2009). To establish

ineffectiveness under such a claim, the petitioner must establish:

      (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
      for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
      the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
      for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
      witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
      trial.

Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 277 (Pa. 2008).

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         As Attorney Sullivan argued in his brief, Appellant has not identified any

character witnesses Trial Counsel should have presented at trial.                  Thus,

Appellant has failed to establish any of the prongs of ineffectiveness and this

claim must fail. See Urwin, 219 A.3d at 172; Puksar, 951 A.2d at 277.

         Appellant next claims Trial Counsel was ineffective for appearing not to

know the grading of one of his convictions during sentencing. Anders Brief

at 12.

         Relevant to this argument, the following interaction occurred at the

sentencing hearing:

         [Commonwealth: C]learly here the main charge is [IDSI - threat
         of forcible compulsion]. That’s the [first-degree felony].

                                      *     *      *

         [Trial Counsel: I] just need to point out, I don’t think [IDSI - threat
         of forcible compulsion] was a [first-degree f]elony[.] Obviously
         there is a disagreement on the facts.

         [Trial Court]: Yeah, it is. [That charge] is a[ first-degree felony].

N.T. Sentencing, 1/28/21, at 6-7.

         Appellant has not explained, and this Court is not aware, how this

interaction caused him prejudice at any stage of his proceedings. Because

Appellant did not establish he was prejudiced by this exchange, his claim must

fail and no relief is due. See Urwin, 219 A.3d at 172.

         Lastly, Appellant claims Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to play

a recording of Victim’s 911 phone call. See Anders Brief at 12. Attorney

Sullivan avers that at trial, Trial Counsel adequately cross-examined Victim

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about the contents of the call, and thus provided a reasonable basis for his

conduct. See id. at 15-16.

      Regarding the reasonable basis prong of the ineffectiveness test:

      [T]he PCRA court does not question whether there were other
      more logical courses of action which counsel could have pursued;
      rather, [the court] must examine whether counsel’s decisions had
      any reasonable basis. Where matters of strategy and tactics are
      concerned, [a] finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable
      basis is not warranted unless it can be concluded that an
      alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially
      greater than the course actually pursued. . . .

Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 618 (Pa. 2015) (citations &

quotation marks omitted).

      When determining what is reasonable, counsel is strongly
      presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all
      significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
      judgment. . . . Counsel’s judgment must be reviewed from
      counsel’s perspective at the time and should not be second-
      guessed if it falls within the realm of professional reasonableness.
      ...

Commonwealth v. McClellan, 887 A.2d 291, 300 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(citations omitted).

      Relevant to this claim, Trial Counsel highlighted that when Victim called

911, she only told the dispatcher she was afraid Appellant was going to hurt

himself. N.T. Jury Trial at 71. Victim confirmed during cross-examination that

she did not tell the dispatcher that she was harmed, that she was “forced into

sex[,]” she was “scared for [her] life or in any physical danger[,]” and when

the dispatcher asked her if there was a “dispute[,]” Victim told them “not

really[.]” Id. at 70-72. Trial Counsel also explained during closing arguments

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that he did not play the 911 phone call because Victim “admitted to everything

[he] would have played [on] the audio.” Id. at 183.

      As Attorney Sullivan points out in his brief, Trial Counsel explained

during his closing argument why he did not play the 911 recording.         See

Anders Brief at 15; see also N.T. Jury Trial at 183. The PCRA court concluded

Appellant failed to demonstrate Trial Counsel acted without a reasonable

basis. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 4. We agree. Trial Counsel specifically stated

there was no reason to play the audio because Victim “admitted” she did not

tell the dispatcher Appellant assaulted her, that she was in danger, or that she

was afraid for her own safety. See N.T. Jury Trial at 70-72, 183. Appellant

has not demonstrated that Trial Counsel’s chosen strategy lacked any

reasonable basis, or an alternative strategy would have offered higher

potential for success. See Mason, 130 A.3d at 618. Thus, Trial Counsel’s

actions fell “within the realm of professional reasonableness” and no relief is

due. See Urwin, 219 A.3d at 172; McClellan, 887 A.2d at 300.

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     In conclusion, we determine Appellant has waived his claims regarding

Trial Counsel’s failure to request jury instructions because he did not raise

them before the PCRA court, and his remaining claims of ineffectiveness are

meritless. Further, our independent review of the record reveals there are no

non-meritless issues to be raised on appeal. Accordingly, we grant Attorney

Sullivan’s petition to withdraw and affirm the PCRA court’s Order dismissing

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/29/2023

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