Court Opinion

ID: 9532740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:24:26.811019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:49.947807
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion herein.
Both contracts were executed on printed forms. These forms provided for two signature lines opposite the designation “Grower.” Roger C. Earle’s signature was subscribed on one of these signature lines and that of defendant Althea Taylor Earle was subscribed on the other on both contracts. Thus, we have a situation where, although defendant’s name is not listed in the body of the instrument as a contracting grower, nevertheless her signature purports to have been made in that capacity.
Therefore, a patent ambiguity clearly exists with respect to whether defendant is bound by the contract as a contract*468ing party. This being the case, parol evidence is necessary to resolve this ambiguity. The complaint expressly alleges that both Roger C. Earle and Althea Taylor Earle “executed and entered into” these two contracts. Under the liberal interpretation of pleadings rule followed by this court, this allegation is to be interpreted as alleging that both Roger and Althea were contracting parties. Under the ambiguity existing in the contracts, true copies of which also constitute part of the complaint, together with such allegation, the complaint should be construed to spell out a cause of action against defendant.
The majority opinion cites no past decision of this court which requires that we reach the opposite result and hold that the complaint is insufficient. I see no reason to reach out and apply the formalistic rule, that some other courts have applied, to the effect that any ambiguity as to the capacity in which a person signs a contract must be resolved from the instrument itself.
Upon referring to each of the cases cited by footnote in 17 C. J. S., Contracts, p. 803, sec. 346, and 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, p. 552, sec. 61, to support the quotations therefrom contained in the instant majority opinion, we find no case in which it affirmatively appears that the party sought to be held under the contract had signed on a line expressly designated for the signature of a party rather than a witness. In such of these cases in which the place of the signature of the party sought to be charged is shown, it appears that the place of such signature was not expressly indicated as being for the signature of a party. This factual difference which exists between those cited cases and the instant one is sufficient to render the rule set forth in C. J. S. and Am. Jur. inapplicable to this case.
The conclusion of the majority, that defendant signed as a witness and not a party, seems patently unrealistic in view of the fact that she signed on a line designated for the *469signature of a party, and not on one of the two lines expressly indicated for the signatures of witnesses.
The approach of the New York appellate division would seem to be much more desirable. That court, in Schonberger v. Culbertson (1931), 231 App. Div. 257, 258, 247 N. Y. Supp. 180, 181, stated:
“The general rule is that the rights of the parties to a contract should be determined by its terms, and that where a signature of another person appears on an instrument the text of which contains nothing to indicate that he is a party, it will not be regarded as binding on him. However, there is an exception to that rule, and under certain circumstances a person signing such a contract may become bound thereby. It is difficult to determine on a motion to dismiss whether parol evidence may or may not be admissible.’ (New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Mobinco Brokerage Co., Inc., 219 App. Div. 486, 489.)
“If defendants would not enter into the contract unless the infant plaintiffs father signed as principal, then oral testimony may be admitted to establish that fact.”
The majority opinion and mandate intimate a different result might be reached if the complaint had specifically alleged facts to show that defendant intended to be bound as a party by subscribing the contracts as “Grower,” and that plaintiff entered into the contract with this understanding. For reasons already stated, I submit that the complaint ought to be held sufficient as it now stands.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Fairchild joins in this dissent.