Court Opinion

ID: 9890523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 14:07:25.205262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:22.881108
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1099-MR

CAREY KITTS                                                         APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-00357

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND JUSTICE AND PUBLIC
SAFETY CABINET                                                       APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Appellant, Carey Kitts (Kitts), alleges that he was wrongfully

terminated by his employer, the Department of Criminal Justice Training (DCJT).

DCJT is a department within the Appellee, the Kentucky Justice and Public Safety

Cabinet (Cabinet). Kitts filed a Complaint in Franklin Circuit Court pursuant to
the Kentucky Whistleblower Act (the KWA), codified in KRS1 Chapter 61. Kitts

alleged that he made two protected disclosures, one regarding DCJT Commissioner

Alex Payne’s dismissal, and one regarding the appointment of the new

Commissioner, Nicolai Jilek. The Cabinet filed a motion for summary judgment,

which was granted. Kitts now appeals as a matter of right. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

                “Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and the

existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer

to the trial court’s decision and will review the issue de novo.” Lewis v. B&R

Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001) (citations omitted).

                       In order to demonstrate a violation of KRS 61.102,
                an employee must establish the following four elements:
                (1) the employer is an officer of the state; (2) the
                employee is employed by the state; (3) the employee
                made or attempted to make a good faith report or
                disclosure of a suspected violation of state or local law to
                an appropriate body or authority; and (4) the employer
                took action or threatened to take action to discourage the
                employee from making such a disclosure or to punish the
                employee for making such a disclosure. The employee
                must show by a preponderance of evidence that the
                disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel
                action.

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -2-
Davidson v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Mil. Affs., 152 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Ky. App.

2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In its order granting

summary judgment, the circuit court made the following findings:

             [T]he parties agree that the first two (2) elements are
             satisfied. The parties contest the remaining two (2)
             elements. Defendant filed the underlying motion seeking
             summary judgment. Defendant contends that Plaintiff
             did not make a protected disclosure to an appropriate
             body and was not terminated as the result of his alleged
             disclosures. Plaintiff argues that he aided, supported, and
             substantiated Payne’s claim and thus he has established a
             viable claim under the KWA. Plaintiff’s response does
             not make any mention of his second alleged protected
             disclosure related to Jilek’s presence in the [DCJT]
             building. The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff
             has failed to establish a prima facie case for a KWA
             violation.

Regarding the information that was the subject of the alleged protected disclosures,

the court specifically determined:

             the information was widely known and discussed, and
             corrective action was already underway.

                    . . . [Plaintiff] did not disclose information that the
             KWA was created to prevent such as mismanagement,
             fraud, waste, abuse of authority, or danger to the public.

In careful consideration of the foregoing, the circuit court ultimately held:

                    Because Plaintiff did not make an unknown good
             faith report or disclosure of a suspected violation of state
             or local law to an appropriate body or authority, he has
             failed to establish an essential element of a prima facie
             claim under the KWA. Because a viable claim under the
             KWA requires satisfying all four (4) elements, it is

                                          -3-
                impossible for Plaintiff to demonstrate that he was
                terminated because of his statements as they were not
                protected disclosures. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to
                establish a viable claim under the KWA and Defendant is
                entitled to summary judgment.

                Based upon our review of the record, we find no error in the trial

court’s analysis. We agree that appellant did not make a protected disclosure that

was covered by the KWA nor was appellant’s employment terminated for the

purported disclosure. Accordingly, the circuit court’s conclusion that there was no

genuine issue or dispute as to any material fact is supported by the record below.

See CR2 56.03.

         For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s September 1, 2022

order granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment.

                ALL CONCUR.

    BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

    Thomas E. Clay                           Leah Boggs
    Louisville, Kentucky                     Erritt Griggs
                                             Robin Cornette
                                             Frankfort, Kentucky

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           -4-