Court Opinion

ID: 9497759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:59:22.784566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:24.077391
License: Public Domain

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the language in United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir.2000), that applies the doctrine of consent once removed to an informant is dicta. In addition, I believe that the majority has properly recognized the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[t]he Court has often heard, and steadfastly rejected, the invitation to carve out further exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches of the home.” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). But the majority then proceeds to disregard this admonition in the case before us, compelling me to dissent. For the reasons set forth below, I would REVERSE the judgment of the district court, VACATE Yoon’s sentence, and REMAND the case for further proceedings.
I. ANALYSIS
A. Extension of the consent-once-removed doctrine to informants
As noted by the majority, the Seventh Circuit has ■ extended the doctrine of consent once removed to civilian informants. See United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir.1986) (holding that the doctrine of consent once removed “extends to the case where the initial, consensual entry is by a confidential informant”); see also United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir.1987) (noting that the doctrine applies' “only where the agent (or- informant) [who] entered at the express invitation of someone with authority to consent ... established the existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest or search, and immediately summoned help from other officers”). Subsequent Seventh Circuit cases have followed Paul and Diaz. See United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir.1995) (upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless search conducted by the police after an informant had been given consent to enter); United States v. Jachimko, 19 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that the district court erred in failing to apply the rule announced in Paul and Diaz to a warrantless search based upon a signal from an informant granted access to the residence).
Several other courts, both federal and state, have adopted the doctrine of consent once removed, but almost all of these cases, like our own case of Pollard, have actually applied the doctrine only to police officers rather than to informants. See, e.g., United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478-79 (9th Cir.1996) (adopting the doctrine of consent once removed to determine the constitutionality of a search based on consent given to an undercover police officer); State v. Henry, 133 N.J. 104, 627 A.2d 125, 130-131 (1993) (upholding the constitutionality of an arrest effected after an undercover police officer gained consent to enter and then briefly exited the apartment to summon backup help). Although most of these cases contain dicta similar to that in Pollard, I have found only one outside of the Seventh Cir*812cuit that has applied the concept to an informant. See Baith v. State, 89 Md.App. 385, 598 A.2d 762, 766-68 (Md.1991) (upholding the constitutionality of a search based on consent given to an informant, but not explicitly discussing the doctrine of consent once removed). Because I find the reasoning of such cases unpersuasive and contrary to Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding warrantless searches and seizures, I would have the Sixth Circuit reject this extension of the consent-once-removed doctrine.
B. The majority’s severance of probable cause from the warrant requirement is unjustified
As stated by the majority, the informant’s signal to the police “established the necessary probable cause to effectuate an arrest.” Maj. Op. at 5. The opinion fails to note, however, that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the existence of probable cause simply entitles the police to obtain a warrant to enter a home, not to charge inside without a warrant. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1980) (“The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.”). Indeed, if this were not the law, there would be no need for the warrant requirement at all — police officers could simply invade homes whenever they deemed that probable cause existed, without the intervention of a neutral magistrate. Such a severance of probable cause from the warrant requirement is completely unjustified.
C. Expanding the doctrine of consent once removed to informants ignores the conceptual basis of the doctrine and improperly gives police powers to suspect informants
The doctrine of consent once removed is made conceptually possible by law-enforcement powers that have been granted to the police, but never to civilians. These powers consist of (1) the ability of police officers to lawfully seize incriminating evidence in plain view, and (2) the theory of collective knowledge, under which the knowledge of one law enforcement officer can be imputed to another if the other is working on the same investigation. The Supreme Court’s enunciation of the “plain-view doctrine” explicitly assumes that the evidence is in the plain view of police officers. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (“It is ... an essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed.”) (emphasis added).
Likewise, courts have imputed collective knowledge about criminal investigations to law enforcement officials, not to the general public. See Collins v. Nagle, 892 F.2d 489, 495 (6th Cir.1989) (noting that “[m]any circuits, including our own, have determined that probable cause may be established from the collective knowledge of the police rather than solely from the officer who actually made the arrest”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 260 (6th Cir.1976) (describing the collective knowledge theory as imputing mutual knowledge to “a group of agents in close communication with one another [who] determine[ ] that it is proper to arrest an individual.... ”).
Indeed, this circuit has made an explicit distinction between imputing the knowledge of law enforcement officials to each other and imputing the knowledge of an informant to law enforcement officials: “The danger of [a law enforcement official’s] having falsified his information is simply not as great as with an unnamed *813criminal informer who may be seeking favorable treatment from the government or revenge against the suspect.” United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236, 246 (6th Cir.1979) (imputing knowledge of an SEC official about suspicious securities transactions to other law enforcement officials).
I have no problem with the proposition that a suspect who voluntarily consents to the entry of a law enforcement officer waives the right to insist on a search warrant. Nor do I question the wisdom of the consent-once-removed doctrine that imputes collective knowledge among law enforcement officers. What gives me grave concern is the extension of the doctrine to lay informants, because the extension entrusts to ordinary civilians law-enforcement powers previously given only to the police.
Furthermore, these powers are entrusted to a suspect class of civilians — informants who themselves often have criminal charges pending and therefore have every reason to curry favor with the police in the hope of receiving lenient treatment for their own wrongdoing. Thus, by not recognizing the conceptual basis for the consent-once-removed doctrine, the majority effectively deputizes the very criminals from whom law enforcement officials should be protecting law-abiding citizens.
D. As Yoon’s case illustrates, an expansion of the consent-once-removed doctrine is unnecessary
The Supreme Court has vigorously affirmed the importance of the warrant requirement and has long since warned against attempts to undercut it. In addition to Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), see Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948), in which the Court held that “the inconvenience to the officers and ... slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate” is not a sufficient reason to abrogate the warrant requirement. As the facts of Yoon’s case well illustrate, the majority’s invitation for the police to avoid the inconvenience of the warrant requirement by having informants obtain consent to enter homes is entirely unnecessary.
Here, for example, there was no justifiable reason for the- police not to- seek a warrant before entering Yoon’s apartment. “[Tjhere can be no claim that immediate police action was needed to prevent the destruction of vital evidence or thwart the escape of known criminals.” United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that the warrantless entry and search of the defendant’s home was illegal because, “[ajbsent exigent circumstances, police officers may not enter an individual’s home or lodging to effect a warrantless arrest or search”); see also United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729, 734 (6th Cir.1977) (holding that a warrant-less entry could not be justified on the ground that the suspect might escape, where he “was not known to be dangerous and no grave offense or crime of violence was threatened or indicated”).
The only exigent circumstances- in this case were created by the police themselves. According to the testimony of TBI Officer Margie Williams, the police did. not give Kim enough money to complete the drug deal, and concern for Kim’s safety was one reason for the raid. But, as noted in Morgan, “[pjolice officials ... are not free to create exigent circumstances to justify their warrantless intrusions.” 743 F.2d at 1163. What the police gained from this entry — and what the majority holds to be of greater importance than the warrant requirement — was thus nothing more than the avoidance of “the inconvenience to the officers,” Johnson, 333 U.S. at 15, 68 S.Ct. 367, in obtaining a warrant.
*814E. Citizens’ power of arrest
The majority also points out that a Tennessee citizen can legally arrest another whom he or she has reasonable cause to believe has committed a felony. See T.C.A. § 40-7-109(a) (2004) (“A private person may arrest another ... [w]hen a felony has been committed, and the arresting person has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested committed it.”). From this premise, however, the majority makes the unwarranted assertion that a private citizen who witnesses a felony in a person’s home can give the police permission to burst into the home without a warrant in order to assist in the arrest. Op. at 807, n. 2. No authority is cited in support of this novel proposition other than this court’s dicta in Pollard. Id.
The majority’s assertion ignores the difference between the restrictions that the Fourth Amendment places on state actors, such as police officers, and the restrictions it places on private citizens. Even if a private citizen in Kim’s position could enter Yoon’s home and arrest him, the consent given to that private citizen would not permit the police to engage in a warrant-less arrest inside the home absent exigent circumstances or consent specifically given to a police officer. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (holding that “a search or seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of exigent circumstances”) (emphasis added).
F. Sentencing issues
Because I would reverse Yoon’s conviction, I would also vacate his sentence. See United States v. Jenkins, 345 F.3d 928 (6th Cir.2003) (“Because we reverse [the defendant’s] conviction, we need not address her argument that the district court erred in denying her a two-level reduction ... or her argument that the district court erred in failing to sentence her pursuant to [the Guidelines’] safety-valve provisions.”) Yoon’s argument that his sentence is unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2536-37, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), is similarly moot in my view.
II. CONCLUSION
In sum, I believe that the majority’s decision to expand the doctrine of consent once removed to informants seriously chips away at the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures. By severing probable cause from the warrant requirement and deputizing the lawless, the majority invites police officers to evade the warrant requirement for reasons no more pressing than mere convenience. This is directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s admonition in Coolidge that a seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances. I therefore respectfully dissent.