Court Opinion

ID: 2965100
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:26.224216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:05.465014
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 96-2311

                                BIW DECEIVED, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                         LOCAL S6, INDUSTRIAL UNION OF MARINE
                         AND SHIPBUILDING WORKERS OF AMERICA,
                               IAMAW DISTRICT LODGE 4,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                       [Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
                                          ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                              _________________________

               Jed  Davis, with  whom Linda  Christ,  Jim Mitchell  and Jed
               __________             _____________   _____________________
          Davis, P.A. were on brief, for appellants.
          ___________
               Ralph  L. Tucker,  with  whom James  W.  Case and  McTeague,
               ________________              _______________      _________
          Higbee,  McAdam,  Case,  Watson  and  Cohen  were on  brief,  for
          ___________________________________________
          appellee.

                              _________________________

                                  December 30, 1997
                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.   In this  procedural motley,  a
                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.
                           ______________

          band of  plaintiffs    the eponymous BIW  Deceived    locks horns

          with Local S6 of the  Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding

          Workers (the Union) over issues pertaining to removal and remand.

          The peculiarities  of this engagement  impel us to  adumbrate our

          necessarily circuitous  decisional path.   After delineating  the

          relevant facts  and procedural  history, we  address whether  the

          plaintiffs have waived  their right to appeal  either by inviting

          the judgment or by failing to seek our intervention at an earlier

          date.   Finding no default, we proceed to  the merits   a journey

          that requires  us to touch  upon doctrinal aspects  of preemption

          under  federal labor  law  and  to explore  a  question of  first

          impression   concerning   the   exercise  of   federal   question

          jurisdiction in the context of  the artful pleading doctrine.  At

          journey's  end,   we  conclude  that  the  plaintiffs'  complaint

          presents  a colorable federal  question and that,  therefore, the

          district court did  not err when it refused to return the case to

          a state venue.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    Because this  action stumbled near  the starting  gate,

          the record is  stunted and the  facts before us  are sparse.   We

          present them as best they present themselves.

                    In  the fall  of 1995,  Bath Iron  Works (Bath  or BIW)

          hired  a  number  of electricians  and  pipefitters.   The  Union

          participated in  the job interviews  pursuant to the terms  of an

          existing   collective  bargaining  agreement   (the  CBA).    The

                                          2

          plaintiffs allege  that during  these interviews  the Union  told

          them that they  would "be employed at least  until the expiration

          of the current  Union contract [August 1997]" and "probably until

          the  end  of   the  decade;"    that  Bath  "had  more  work  for

          electricians and pipefitters than it could handle;" and that Bath

          "was hiring fewer electricians and pipefitters than it needed, so

          that  the employees would  be assured of  continuing employment."

          The  plaintiffs  further   allege  that  they  relied   on  these

          blandishments, accepted offers of employment, and left other jobs

          to move to Maine and work for Bath.  But, the plaintiffs say, the

          Union had led them down a primrose path; they were laid off early

          in 1996.

          II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
          II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                    Angered by  this  fecklessness,  the  former  employees

          joined together  to form  "BIW Deceived" and  sue the Union  in a

          Maine  state   court.1    Their  complaint   alleged  negligence,

          fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, infliction

          of   emotional   distress,   loss   of  consortium,   intentional

          nondisclosure, and unjust enrichment.  The Union promptly removed

          the action  to the federal  district court.  When  the plaintiffs

          sought remand on the ground  that their suit involved only state-

          law  claims,  the  Union  responded  by  asserting that  all  the

          plaintiffs'  claims were subject to preemption under the National

                              
          ____________________

               1Two of the plaintiffs are former employees' spouses.  Since
          their claims for  loss of consortium are derivative,  we refer to
          the informal plaintiff class as if it were composed solely of ex-
          employees.

                                          3

          Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29  U.S.C.   151 et seq.,  and/or the
                                                       __ ____

          Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C.   185 et seq.
                                                                 __ ____

                    Judge Carter resolved the removal/remand dispute in the

          Union's favor.  He denied  the plaintiffs' motion, asserting in a

          two-page  order that  "the claims  for  relief set  forth in  the

          Complaint  are  all  derivative  from  and  dependent  for  their

          resolution  upon duties defined and imposed by federal law, which

          law occupies  the field and,  by mandate of Congress,  closes the

          field to state regulation."

                    That order produced a strange reaction:  the plaintiffs

          moved for entry of final judgment in the defendant's favor.  They

          reasoned  that, in  refusing to  remand, the  district  court had

          "conclu[ded] that  federal law  preempts all  state claims,"  and

          that  this conclusion  "le[ft] nothing  more to be  litigated" in

          that court.  Judge Carter denied this motion without elaboration.

                    Shortly  thereafter,  Magistrate Judge  Cohen  presided

          over  a status conference during which the plaintiffs represented

          that they had "no interest in [pressing] any federal-law  claims"

          and  that they desired  the entry of  final judgment  in order to

          "appeal the  [district court's]  preemption ruling."   The  Union

          agreed not to  oppose the entry  of judgment in  its favor.   The

          next day, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration  and for entry

          of final judgment, specifically "abandon[ing] any and all federal

          claims."  This time Judge Carter granted their motion and entered

          final judgment,  without prejudice  to the  plaintiffs' right  to

          seek review.  This appeal followed.

                                          4

          III.  APPELLATE JURISDICTION
          III.  APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    It is a federal court's obligation to assure  itself of

          the existence  of subject  matter jurisdiction  even if no  party

          presses  the question.   See American  Policyholders Ins.  Co. v.
                                   ___ _________________________________

          Nyacol  Prods., Inc.,  989  F.2d  1256,  1258  (1st  Cir.  1993).
          ____________________

          Consequently, we consider  whether the odd procedural  posture of

          this case undermines our appellate jurisdiction.

                    In several circuits  a party who consents  to the entry

          of judgment  forfeits any  right  to appeal  from that  judgment.

          See, e.g., Tel-Phonic  Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int'l,  Inc., 975 F.2d
          ___  ____  ________________________    ________________

          1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1992); Clapp v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 1396,
                                      _____    ____________

          1398  (9th   Cir.  1989).     We  have  taken  a   slightly  more

          latitudinarian  approach:   while  acknowledging that,  with  few

          exceptions, "a party  to a consent judgment is  thereby deemed to

          waive any objections  it has to matters  within the scope  of the

          judgment,"  Coughlin v.  Regan, 768  F.2d  468, 469-70  (1st Cir.
                      ________     _____

          1985),2 we nevertheless have suggested that "it is possible for a

          party to consent to  a judgment and still preserve [its] right to

          appeal" a previous ruling on  a contested matter in the case,  as

          long as  it "reserve[s] that  right unequivocally."  Id.  at 470.
                                                               ___

          Such a reservation occurred here.  The record makes manifest that

          the plaintiffs  sought  the entry  of  final judgment  solely  to

          facilitate an  appeal of the  district court's refusal  to remand

                              
          ____________________

               2The  specific  exceptions mentioned  by the  Coughlin court
                                                             ________
          involve "a  showing of  either lack of  actual consent,  fraud in
          obtaining consent,  lack  of federal  jurisdiction, or  mistake."
          768 F.2d at 470.

                                          5

          the suit.  Their initial motion for entry of final judgment asked

          the  court  to  enter  a  "final  and  appealable judgment;"  the

          magistrate's report  of the  status conference  related that  the

          plaintiffs "simply seek the entry  of final judgment so that they

          may appeal the court's preemption ruling;" and the renewed motion

          for  entry of  final judgment  solicited  the entry  of a  "final

          judgment,  without prejudice  to the  plaintiffs'  right to  seek

          appeal."

                    This evidence clearly shows the plaintiffs' unequivocal

          intention.   Under Coughlin, then,  we have discretion  to accept
                             ________

          the appeal  insofar as  it relates to  a prior  (contested) order

          notwithstanding the plaintiffs' later consent to the entry of the

          final judgment  itself.  See Coughlin, 768 F.2d  at 470.  In this
                                   ___ ________

          instance, we  are inclined  to exercise  that  discretion in  the

          plaintiffs' favor.

                    Even  so, our appellate  jurisdiction is not  free from

          doubt.    The  parties  treat  this appeal  as  if  Judge  Carter

          dismissed the  suit because  the  various causes  of action  were

          preempted, but  this is  an inaccurate  characterization of  what

          actually transpired.  There was no dismissal:  while Judge Carter

          expressed  his belief that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted,

          the  only ruling that he made  on a contested matter consisted of

          denying the  plaintiffs' motion to  remand.  This ruling  did not

          require a finding of preemption;  it only required a finding that

          the Union had  made a colorable showing of  federal jurisdiction.

          See infra Part  V.  That the  judge's remarks swept  more broadly
          ___ _____

                                          6

          does  not alter  the reality  of events.    It is  settled beyond

          peradventure that a  party can appeal only from  an adverse order

          or judgment, not from a judge's ruminations.  See Logue  v. Dore,
                                                        ___ _____     ____

          103 F.3d 1040,  1047 (1st Cir. 1997);  In re Admin.  Warrant, 585
                                                 _____________________

          F.2d  1152, 1153  (1st Cir.  1978).   The  plaintiffs could  have

          waited until the Union filed  a dispositive motion (say, a motion

          to dismiss or for summary judgment), but they chose not to do so.

          Thus, the district  court's order denying the  plaintiffs' motion

          to remand is  the only order that is  even potentially reviewable

          in this proceeding.

                    The district court entered that order on July  3, 1996,

          and  the plaintiffs  did not  file their  notice of  appeal until

          October 25, 1996.   In some circuits, a  disappointed suitor must

          appeal  the denial  of a  motion  to remand  within the  standard

          appeal period (here,  thirty days, see Fed. R.  App. P. 4(a)(1)),
                                             ___

          or else forever hold  his peace.  See Marshall v.  Manville Sales
                                            ___ ________     ______________

          Corp., 6 F.3d 229,  231 (4th Cir.  1993) (noting that the  Fourth
          _____

          Circuit will not  "disturb a district  court's final judgment  on

          the basis of a defective  removal when the plaintiff ha[s] failed

          to seek  an interlocutory appeal  of the order  denying remand");

          Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach  & Assocs., 903 F.2d 709, 713 (9th
          _________    ____________________________

          Cir.  1990)  (holding  that  an  objection  to  removal  "is  not

          preserved unless an interlocutory appeal is filed challenging the

          district  court's order  denying  remand").    Other  circuits   

          including this one   generally consider orders refusing remand to

          be  interlocutory orders,  and  thus  a  plaintiff  whose  remand

                                          7

          request has been rebuffed possesses no immediate right of appeal,

          but retains the right to press his point by taking an end-of-case

          appeal after the entry of final judgment.  See Neal v. Brown, 980
                                                     ___ ____    _____

          F.2d 747, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
                                          ________    ____________________

          893  F.2d  98,  100  n.2   (5th  Cir.  1990);  Brough  v.  United
                                                         ______      ______

          Steelworkers, 437 F.2d  748, 749 (1st  Cir. 1971).   Accordingly,
          ____________

          the  entry  of final  judgment in  this  case paved  the  way for

          appellate consideration of the order denying the motion to remand

          and BIW Deceived's timely appeal is properly before us.

          IV.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
          IV.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

                    There are three  interlocking pieces to the  applicable

          legal framework.  We trace their contours.

                                   A.  Preemption.
                                   A.  Preemption.
                                       __________

                    In the labor-law  arena, preemption    the displacement

          of  state  law  by the  force  of  federal law     is  a familiar

          phenomenon.   Several different strains of preemption flourish in

          this field,  each possessing  somewhat different  roots and  each

          casting a uniquely  configured shadow.   Two of these  preemption

          theories bear upon the instant case.

                                          1.
                                          1.
                                          __

                    Section  301  of the  LMRA,  29 U.S.C.     185, confers

          federal  jurisdiction over  "[s]uits for  violation  of contracts

          between  an  employer  and   a  labor  organization  representing

          employees in an industry affecting commerce."   From this austere

          beginning, the Supreme Court determined that it had the authority

          to craft  a federal  common law that  would effect  section 301's

                                          8

          objectives.  See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
                       ___ _____________________    _____________

          448, 451  (1957).  The  Court subsequently declared  that section

          301 preempts a state-law claim "if the resolution of [that] claim

          depends upon the  meaning of a collective-bargaining  agreement."

          Lingle v. Norge  Div. of Magic Chef,  Inc., 486 U.S. 399,  405-06
          ______    ________________________________

          (1988).

                    We  recently visited this corner of the law in Flibotte
                                                                   ________

          v. Pennsylvania  Truck Lines, ___  F.3d ___ (1st Cir.  1997) [No.
             _________________________

          97-1197].  Citing  United Steelworkers v.  Rawson, 495 U.S.  362,
                             ___________________     ______

          369 (1990), and Allis-Chalmers Corp.  v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220
                          ____________________     _____

          (1985), respectively,  we explained  that a  state-law claim  can

          depend  upon the meaning of  a collective bargaining agreement in

          either of two distinct ways:  on the one hand, a claim can allege

          the violation of a duty that  arises from the CBA itself, or,  on

          the  other hand,  a claim  can  require a  court  to interpret  a

          specific provision of  the CBA.   See Flibotte,  ___ F.3d at  ___
                                            ___ ________

          [slip op. at  9].  "If a state-law claim depends upon the meaning

          of the collective bargaining agreement  in either of these ways  

          that is, under  Rawson's `duty' rubric or  under Allis-Chalmers's
                          ______                           ______________

          `interpretation' rubric   it is preempted."  Id.
                                                       ___

                    Though  section 301 is omnipotent within its sphere, it

          is not endlessly expansive.  The Court has warned that it "cannot

          be read  broadly to  pre-empt nonnegotiable  rights conferred  on

          individual  employees  as  a matter  of  state  law," Livadas  v.
                                                                _______

          Bradshaw,  512 U.S.  107, 123  (1994),  and that  "purely factual
          ________

          questions  about an employee's  conduct or an  employer's conduct

                                          9

          and  motives do not  require a court  to interpret any  term of a

          collective-bargaining  agreement,"  Hawaiian  Airlines,  Inc.  v.
                                              _________________________

          Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 261 (1994) (citation and internal quotation
          ______

          marks  omitted).   These  cautions  do not  shrink  the scope  of

          section 301 preemption, but simply emphasize that, for a claim to

          arise under federal  law, it must depend upon  the meaning of the

          collective bargaining agreement.

                                          2.
                                          2.
                                          __

                    Preemption also can occur by operation of the so-called

          duty  of  fair representation  (DFR).    A  union acting  in  its

          representative  capacity owes this duty to  those on whose behalf

          it  acts.   See  Ford Motor  Co.  v. Huffman,  345 U.S.  330, 337
                      ___  _______________     _______

          (1953).  The  duty derives from the union's  status qua exclusive
                                                              ___

          bargaining agent.   It implicates section 9(a) of  the NLRA,3 and

          "includes a statutory  obligation to serve  the interests of  all

          members  without  hostility  or  discrimination  toward  any,  to

          exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and

          to avoid arbitrary conduct."   Vaca v. Sipes,  386 U.S. 171,  177
                                         ____    _____

          (1967).

                              
          ____________________

               3Section 9(a) provides in pertinent part:

                    Representatives  designated  or  selected for
                    the purposes of collective  bargaining by the
                    majority of  the employees . . . shall be the
                    exclusive   representatives   of    all   the
                    employees  .   .  .   for  the   purposes  of
                    collective bargaining in respect to rates  of
                    pay,  wages, hours  of  employment, or  other
                    conditions of employment . . . .

          29 U.S.C.   159(a).

                                          10

                    A complaint that states a DFR claim "allege[s] a breach

          by the Union  of a duty  grounded in federal  statutes and .  . .

          federal law  therefore  governs  [the] cause  of  action."    Id.
                                                                        ___

          Consequently, state law is preempted whenever a plaintiff's claim

          invokes   rights  derived   from   a   union's   duty   of   fair

          representation.  See  Condon v. Local 2944, 683  F.2d 590, 594-95
                           ___  ______    __________

          (1st Cir. 1982)  (stating that "[a] union's rights  and duties as

          the   exclusive    bargaining   agent   in   carrying   out   its

          representational  functions"  collectively  comprise  a field  in

          which "the  policy of  the law is  so dominated  by the  sweep of

          federal statutes  that legal  relations which  [those rights  and

          duties] affect must be deemed  governed by federal law having its

          source  in those statutes,  rather than by  local law") (citation

          and internal quotation marks omitted).

                               B.  Standard of Review.
                               B.  Standard of Review.
                                   __________________

                    Although the parties gloss over the point, we emphasize

          that the  only appealable order  that the district  court entered

          during  the short  life of  this case  is the  order  denying the

          plaintiffs' motion to remand.  The denial of a motion to remand a

          removed case  to the state  court involves a question  of federal

          subject  matter jurisdiction and  thus engenders de  novo review.

          See Rivet  v. Regions Bank,  108 F.3d 576, 582  (5th Cir.), cert.
          ___ _____     ____________                                  _____

          granted  on other  grounds, 118 S.  Ct. 31 (1997);  County of St.
          _______  __ _____  _______                          _____________

          Charles v. Missouri Family Health Council, 107 F.3d 682, 684 (8th
          _______    ______________________________

          Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 160 (1997).
                 _____ ______

                    In this instance,  the Union effected removal  under 28

                                          11

          U.S.C.    1441(b) (permitting the  removal of civil  actions over

          which  United  States  District   Courts  have  original  federal

          question jurisdiction).  Hence, our review must focus on "whether

          the federal district  court would have had  original jurisdiction

          of the case had it  been filed in that court."  Grubbs v. General
                                                          ______    _______

          Elec. Credit Corp.,  405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972);  accord Chicago v.
          __________________                              ______ _______

          International College of  Surgeons, 66 U.S.L.W. 4041,  4043 (U.S.
          __________________________________

          Dec.  15, 1997).   In the  course of  this inquiry,  the removing

          party bears  the burden of persuasion vis- -vis  the existence of

          federal jurisdiction.   See  Dukes v.  U.S. Healthcare,  Inc., 57
                                  ___  _____     ______________________

          F.3d 350, 359 (3d Cir. 1995).

                          C.  Federal Question Jurisdiction.
                          C.  Federal Question Jurisdiction.
                              _____________________________

                    Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over

          "federal question"  cases    that is,  cases  "arising under  the

          Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."  28 U.S.C.

              1331.    The  gates  of  federal  question  jurisdiction  are

          customarily patrolled by a steely-eyed sentry   the "well-pleaded

          complaint rule"    which, in general,  prohibits the exercise  of

          federal  question jurisdiction if no federal claim appears within

          the four corners of the  complaint.  See International College of
                                               ___ ________________________

          Surgeons, 66  U.S.L.W. at  4043; Gully v.  First Nat'l  Bank, 299
          ________                         _____     _________________

          U.S. 109, 113 (1936).  At first blush, this rule appears to augur

          well  for the  plaintiffs,  who  maintain  that  their  complaint

          alleges only state-law  claims.  Appearances, however,  often are

          deceiving.

                    Whereas preemption  by federal  law is  a defense  that

                                          12

          ordinarily does not  give rise to federal  question jurisdiction,

          see  Caterpillar, Inc.  v.  Williams, 482  U.S. 386,  392 (1987),
          ___  _________________      ________

          "Congress  may so completely pre-empt  a particular area that any

          civil   complaint  raising  this   select  group  of   claims  is

          necessarily  federal in character," Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
                                              __________________________

          Taylor,  481  U.S.  58, 63-64  (1987).    Section 301  preemption
          ______

          operates in  this way.   No  less an  authority than the  Supreme

          Court  has declared that  "the pre-emptive force  of    301 is so

          powerful as  to displace entirely  any state cause of  action for

          violation   of  contracts  between   an  employer  and   a  labor

          organization."    Franchise Tax  Board  v.  Construction Laborers
                            ____________________      _____________________

          Vacation  Trust, 463  U.S. 1,  23 (1983)  (citation  and internal
          _______________

          quotation marks omitted).  The upshot  is that any such suit must

          be regarded as "purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding

          the fact that  state law would provide  a cause of action  in the

          absence of   301."  Id.
                              ___

                    This   powerful   preemption    principle   propels   a

          significant  exception to the  well-pleaded complaint rule    the

          artful pleading doctrine.   The doctrine empowers  courts to look

          beneath the face of the complaint to divine the underlying nature

          of  a claim,  to determine  whether the  plaintiff has  sought to

          defeat  removal  by  asserting a  federal  claim  under state-law

          colors, and to act accordingly.  See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc.
                                           ___ ____________________________

          v. Moitie,  452 U.S. 394, 397  n.2 (1981) (explaining that  in an
             ______

          appropriate  case "the  removal  court  will  seek  to  determine

          whether the  real nature of  the claim is federal,  regardless of

                                          13

          plaintiff's  characterization")  (quoting  14 Wright,  Miller,  &

          Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure   3722 at  564-66 (1976)).
                  ______________________________

          In other  words, a plaintiff may not,  by the expedient of artful

          pleading,  defeat a  defendant's legitimate  right  to a  federal

          forum.  See Milne Employees Ass'n v. Sun Carriers, Inc., 960 F.2d
                  ___ _____________________    __________________

          1401,  1406 (9th  Cir.  1992)  (discussing  the  artful  pleading

          doctrine in the context of section 301 preemption).  If the claim

          appears to  be  federal in  nature    that is,  if  it meets  the

          applicable  test for one that arises under federal law   then the

          federal court must  recharacterize the complaint to  reflect that

          reality  and affirm the removal despite the plaintiff's professed

          intent  to pursue only state-law  claims.  See Metropolitan Life,
                                                     ___ _________________

          481 U.S. at 64.

                    In   this  respect,  we  believe  that  DFR  preemption

          operates  in  much the  same fashion  as section  301 preemption.

          While we  have not  heretofore inquired  whether DFR  preemption,

          like  section 301  preemption, works  an exception  to the  well-

          pleaded  complaint rule,  the  answer  seems  obvious.    Because

          federal law  completely governs the  duties owed by  an exclusive

          collective  bargaining   representative  to   those  within   the

          bargaining  unit, see  Vaca, 386  U.S. at  183, and  because this
                            ___  ____

          manifestation   of  congressional   will  so   closely  parallels

          Congress's intentions  with regard to section 301, see Avco Corp.
                                                             ___ __________

          v.  Aero Lodge  No.  735,  390 U.S.  557,  561-62 (1968)  (citing
              ____________________

          Lincoln Mills, 353  U.S. at 457),  we hold that a  district court
          _____________

          possesses federal question jurisdiction when a  complaint, though

                                          14

          garbed  in   state-law  raiment,  sufficiently  asserts  a  claim

          implicating the duty of fair representation.   We also hold, as a

          logical corollary,  that DFR  preemption warrants  resort to  the

          artful   pleading   doctrine.     Accord  Richardson   v.  United
                                            ______  __________       ______

          Steelworkers, 864 F.2d 1162, 1169  (5th Cir. 1989) ("We hold that
          ____________

          where  the  NLRA   federal  law  duty  of   fair  representation,

          actionable in federal court, preempts a state-law claim, the suit

          asserting such a claim . . . may be removed to federal court just

          as the suit asserting state law claims preempted by section 301 .

          . . may be removed under Avco and its progeny.").
                                   ____

          V.  THE LITMUS TEST 
          V.  THE LITMUS TEST

                    The foregoing articulations of complete preemption, the

          standard of review, and the artful pleading doctrine are helpful,

          but they  do not  tell us  how certain a  court must  be that  an

          artfully  pleaded complaint  contains a  federal question  before

          denying  a motion  to  remand.   Although  our  research has  not

          revealed any  ready-made solution  to this  dilemma, we  conclude

          that the  artful pleading  doctrine permits  a district  court to

          recharacterize a putative state-law claim as a federal claim when

          a review of the complaint,  taken in context, reveals a colorable

          federal question within a field  in which state law is completely

          preempted.    We  summarize the  reasoning  that  undergirds this

          conclusion.

                    As  a matter  of  common  practice,  a  district  court

          confronted with a question of subject matter jurisdiction reviews

                                          15

          a plaintiff's complaint not to judge the merits, but to determine

          whether the court has the  authority to proceed.  When conducting

          this inquiry, the  court only asks whether the  complaint, on its

          face, asserts a colorable federal claim.  See Aldinger v. Howard,
                                                    ___ ________    ______

          427 U.S. 1, 7  (1976) ("[W]here federal jurisdiction is  properly

          based on a colorable  federal claim, the  court has the right  to

          decide all  the questions  in the case  . .  . .")  (citation and

          internal quotation marks omitted);  Northeast Erectors Assoc.  v.
                                              _________________________

          Secretary of Labor, 62 F.3d 37, 39 n.1 (1st Cir. 1995) (observing
          __________________

          that "federal question jurisdiction exists once the plaintiff has

          alleged even a colorable federal claim").  As colorability is the

          litmus  test  for the  existence  vel  non  of  federal  question
                                            ___  ___

          jurisdiction,  we see  no reason  why  a court  should not  apply

          precisely the same standard when called upon to determine whether

          a complaint  demands recharacterization under the artful pleading

          doctrine.   Indeed, because  the critical inquiry  when reviewing

          the denial of a motion to remand is "whether the federal district

          court would  have had  original jurisdiction of  the case  had it

          been filed in  that court," Grubbs, 405  U.S. at 702, the  use of
                                      ______

          any other standard would be incongruous.4
                              
          ____________________

               4Siler  v. Louisville  & Nashville  R.R. Co.,  213 U.S.  175
                _____     _________________________________
          (1909), is not to the contrary.  Though the Siler Court stated in
                                                      _____
          dictum that "the Federal question must not be merely colorable or
          fraudulently set up  for the mere purpose of  endeavoring to give
          the court jurisdiction,"  id. at 191-92, the Court  used the word
                                    ___
          "colorable" in a  different sense than we do  today.  "Colorable"
          has two definitions:   it may mean "seemingly  valid or genuine,"
          or it may  mean "intended to deceive."   Webster's New Collegiate
                                                   ________________________
          Dictionary  220 (1981).  The  Siler Court unquestionably used the
          __________                    _____
          word in the latter sense,  in a discussion about spurious claims.
          See Siler, 213 U.S. at 191-92; compare Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
          ___ _____                      _______ _______________________

                                          16

                    This  formulation  is   reinforced  by  the  principles

          articulated in Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804
                         ________________________    ________

          (1986).  There,  the Supreme Court stressed  that "determinations

          about  federal  jurisdiction  require sensitive  judgments  about

          congressional  intent, judicial power,  and the  federal system."

          Id. at 810.   Employing  the colorability  standard soothes  such
          ___

          sensitivities,  for  where there  is  complete preemption,  there

          necessarily has  been a triad  of judicial determinations:   that

          Congress intended federal law to occupy the whole of a regulatory

          field;  that federal judicial  power properly extends  to actions

          originally filed  in state courts  to the extent that  they touch

          upon that field; and that the exercise of such federal power does

          not  offend principles of  federalism.  See  Franchise Tax Board,
                                                  ___  ___________________

          463 U.S. at 23.

          VI.  THE MERITS
          VI.  THE MERITS

                    Having  fashioned the standard  by which we  must gauge

          the propriety of removal and  remand, we conclude without serious

          question  that the instant complaint reveals a colorable question

          of federal  law and that,  therefore, the district court  did not

          err when it denied the motion to remand.

                    We  start with the plaintiffs' negligence claim and its

          relationship to section 301 of the LMRA.  This  claim can survive

          Rawson-based preemption under section 301 only if the Union acted
          ______
                              
          ____________________

          Austin, 168 U.S.  685, 695 (1898) (noting  appellate jurisdiction
          ______
          wherever  there is  a  claim  that a  state  law contravenes  the
          Constitution, as  long as the  claim is "real and  colorable, not
          fictitious and fraudulent").   We use the word  in the "seemingly
          valid or genuine" sense.

                                          17

          "in a way that might violate the duty of reasonable care  owed to

          every person in  society."  Rawson, 495  U.S. at 371.   The claim
                                      ______

          asserts  that,  during  the  recruitment  interviews,  the  Union

          breached its duty of care to the interviewees.  At oral argument,

          counsel for  BIW Deceived gave  this a gloss,  acknowledging that

          the Union participated in  the interview process pursuant  to the

          CBA.  This being  so, it is plausible  (indeed, likely) that  the

          CBA details the nature and limits of the Union's participation in

          the interview  process and that the Union,  therefore, would have

          had a duty of care separate from any duty owed by  third parties.

          So  viewed, the Union stands accused  of violating a duty of care

          that flowed to it pursuant to the CBA, and the plaintiffs' state-

          law   negligence   claim,   when  recharacterized,   passes   the

          colorability test.   It is thus arguably preempted.   See Rawson,
                                                                ___ ______

          495 U.S. 371-72 ("Pre-emption by federal law cannot be avoided by

          characterizing  the Union's negligent performance of what it does

          on behalf of  the members of the bargaining  unit pursuant to the

          terms  of  the  collective-bargaining  contract  as  a  state-law

          tort.").

                    Even were  we to assume  for argument's  sake that  the

          plaintiffs'  negligence  claim, so  recharacterized  in light  of

          section 301, does  not raise a colorable federal  claim, we still

          would be bound to affirm the district court's denial of remand on

          the ground that the claim also is arguably preempted via the duty

          of fair  representation.  The  fact that the plaintiffs  were not

          members of the  Union at the time  the statements were  made does

                                          18

          not command a contrary conclusion for a union owes a duty of fair

          representation   to    nonmembers   whom   it    has   undertaken

          constructively  to represent.  See,  e.g., Steele v. Louisville &
                                         ___   ____  ______    ____________

          Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944); Nedd v. United Mine
          __________________                            ____    ___________

          Workers, 556  F.2d 190, 200  (3d Cir. 1977);  Amalgamated Transit
          _______                                       ___________________

          Union Div.  822, 305 N.L.R.B.  946, 949-50 (1991).   Here, taking
          _______________

          the facts as limned by the plaintiffs, the Union plainly acted in

          a  representational  capacity  during  the  recruitment  process.

          Indeed, the plaintiffs, in their complaint, speak of the "special

          relationship" that existed between them  and the Union, and their

          theory of the case seemingly hinges on their ability to establish

          a  symbiotic relationship of advocacy  and dependence at the time

          of the  interviews.   Under these  circumstances, the  negligence

          claim, when recharacterized,  sufficiently resembles a  DFR claim

          to pass  the colorability test  and thus support the  exercise of

          federal question jurisdiction.

                    Let us be perfectly clear.  Because of the nearly empty

          record,  we cannot  say  with  certitude  whether we  would  find

          ultimately that federal  preemption applies in the  instant case.

          At  this stage of the  proceedings, however, we  need not go that

          far; to uphold  the district court's exercise of federal question

          jurisdiction, we need only conclude that, despite the plaintiffs'

          state-law  stylings,  the  complaint  articulates  at  least  one

          colorable   federal   claim.     Properly   recharacterized,  the

          plaintiffs' complaint falls into this category.

                    To  this  point, we  have  trained  our sights  on  the

                                          19

          negligence claim.   While we believe that, for the most part, the

          other  claims contained  in the  plaintiffs' complaint  similarly

          state claims that, when recharacterized, are colorably federal in

          nature, we need not probe the point too deeply.  A  federal court

          that  exercises federal question jurisdiction over a single claim

          may  also assert  supplemental  jurisdiction over  all  state-law

          claims that arise from  the same nucleus of operative facts.  See
                                                                        ___

          28 U.S.C.   1367(a); see  also International College of Surgeons,
                               ___  ____ _________________________________

          66 U.S.L.W. at 4043-44; Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
                                  _____    _______________________________

          81  F.3d  249, 256  (1st  Cir.  1996).   Therefore,  removal  was

          appropriate.

          VII.  CONCLUSION
          VII.  CONCLUSION

                    We need go no further.   For the reasons stated herein,

          we conclude in  the course of  de novo review  that the  district

          court correctly exercised federal  question jurisdiction when  it

          denied  the  plaintiffs'  motion to  remand.    Consequently, the

          judgment to which the plaintiffs consented must stand.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                                          20