Court Opinion

ID: 9626138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:03:19.650124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:21.923413
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.,* Dissenting.
Accepting the facts and law as adjudged by the majority I would affirm the judgment of conviction.
The majority hold: “Applying this [the theretofore defined] test to the instant case, we find the possession of the altered baseball bat, taped at the smaller end, heavier at the unbroken end, carried about in the car, obviously usable as a ‘billy,’ clearly not transported for the purpose of playing baseball, violates the statute.
“We recognize that the presence of suspicious circumstances attendant to possession of the proscribed object does not forge an ironclad case against defendant. He may be able to demonstrate an innocent usage of the object but the burden falls upon him to do so.”
*623Clearly, the case against this defendant is prima facie established by the circumstances which were matters of record or manifest to the eyes of the officers. Although those circumstances did “not forge an ironclad case against defendant” the burden was on him “to demonstrate [or at least raise a reasonable doubt as to] an innocent usage of the object.”
I find nothing whatsoever adduced by defendant, or otherwise in the record, which could reasonably support a not guilty verdict or, on this appeal, justify our concluding that the guilty verdict works a miscarriage of justice. Defendant simply did not overcome the basic ease against him; nor does he (or the majority opinion) point to any evidence which within reason justifies a doubt as to his guilt. His fabricated exculpatory story whereby he sought to negate knowing (notwithstanding actual) possession of the billy was manifestly implausible. Such a story tends more to accentuate moral cognizance of guilt than to weaken the inferences indubitably following from the corporeal factors which are undisputed and which, unless overcome, demonstrate guilt. In these circumstances I do not understand how this court can find—• even if a majority declare technical error—that “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Absent such an affirmative finding we are unequivocally forbidden by California Constitution, article YI, section 4½1 to “set aside” the judgment or grant a new trial. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 12, 1966. Mosk, J., did not participate therein. McComb, J., Burke, J., and Schauer, J.,* were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

'' Section 4½. No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any ease, on the ground of mis-direction of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. ’ ’

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.