Court Opinion

ID: 9729747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:48:02.538953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.968639
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the opinion of my colleagues. I believe the defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel and should be granted a new trial. I also believe the order of the trial court directing that defendant was not entitled to credit for time served on probation against the sentence is improper because not made at the time sentence was imposed and consequently, defendant is entitled to the credit by operation of the statute. It is well settled a person accused of a criminal offense is entitled to be represented by counsel and is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792.) What constitutes effective assistance of counsel is a troublesome question depending as it does on its application in an infinite variety of circumstances. As applied to appointed counsel, as in the instant case, ineffective assistance of counsel is actual incompetence of counsel, as reflected by the manner of carrying out his duties as a trial attorney, which results in substantial prejudice without which the outcome would probably "have been different. (People v. Goerger (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 403, 288 N.E.2d 416, People v. Dudley (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 305, 263 N.E.2d 1.) As applied to privately retained counsel, the court in the recent case of People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 421, 436, 381 N.E.2d 677, 685, approved the standard that “<0 * ° the court will not reverse a conviction because of the incompetency of counsel unless the representation is of such a low caliber as to amount to no representation at all or reduces the court proceedings to a farce or sham.’ ” As is pointed out in the special concurring opinion in Murphy, there is some question about the propriety of the rationale establishing two standards of effective assistance of counsel depending on whether the attorney is appointed or privately retained. Whether the differences in the standards are merely semantic or have substantive differences, the courts in announcing such standards seem to require a higher standard of competent representation where counsel is appointed than when privately retained. In People v. Murphy (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 421, 381 N.E.2d 677, the defendant endeavored to have the court apply the Federal standard of effective assistance of counsel as announced in such cases as United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey (7th Cir. 1975), 510 F.2d 634. According to the Twomey case, “[T]he Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant legal assistance which meets a minimum standard of professional representation.” (510 F.2d 634, 641.) The court in Murphy declined to adopt or approve the Federal standard, but then proceeded to hold the attorney’s conduct met both standards. Even though the language of the Federal standard was not approved, I have great difficulty in believing a defendant has received the effective assistance of counsel when such counsel has not exercised a minimum standard of professional representation. By whatever standard is applicable, the record in this case demonstrates the defendant did not receive effective assistance of his appointed counsel. As the majority points out, the defendant has not claimed on this appeal the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. At the time the motion was presented, I agree the trial court in the exercise of its discretion could properly hold the circumstances did not justify the continuance. In this respect two circumstances are of paramount importance. First, the prosecution had its witnesses in court ready to testify at the time the motion was made. Second, the attorney making the motion was aware of the reasons for seeking a continuance well in advance of the trial date and no reason appears from the record why his motion could not have been made at a time advantageous to its allowance. Thus, on the date of trial with the prosecutions witnesses in court, the attorney for the first time seeks a continuance because he has been unable to interview his client, engaged in no pretrial discovery or investigation, and is unprepared for trial. It is not the unpreparedness of defendant’s counsel which is the gist of what I believe to be the ineffective assistance of counsel, but rather the compounding failure of the attorney to undertake the proper procedure which would have probably secured the needed continuance. After his continuance was denied, defense counsel had no alternative than to accept the procedure mandated by the trial court, i.e., immediate commencement of the case with defendant permitted to present his defense some four weeks later. To suggest, as does the majority, that this course of procedure was agreed to by the defendant does not seem an appropriate characterization. Absent any preparation before the trial commenced, it was not possible to make a pretrial motion to suppress the oral confession or to know anything of the circumstances surrounding its making. Defense counsel did make an objection relating to this confession, which the majority seems to have disregarded when it observes the issue was waived by the lack of a timely objection. While the objection made during the trial is somewhat incomplete and falls short of a comprehensive motion to suppress the confession, the major problem is that because of defense counsel’s lack of preparedness there is an inadequate basis for considering the suppression issue. See United States v. DeCoster (D.D.C. 1973), 487 F. 2d 1197. In summary, I am unable to approve, as does the majority, the level of legal representation which the defendant received in this case. If what the attorney did in this case is sufficient to provide meaningful representation to a defendant, then the right to be represented by competent counsel is but a shell without substance. This brings me to the sentence issue and my disagreement with the majority of the court which approves the subsequent increase of an earlier imposed legal sentence. In my opinion the statute means what it says. Section 5 — 8—1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—1(d)) allows a trial court 30 days from the date of sentence to reduce, but not to increase, the length of a sentence. I have great difficulty in understanding how this statutory prohibition against increasing the sentence, which is the only statute mentioning the subject, is or can be authority for increasing a sentence. Nor does the majority cite any cases, either before or after enactment of the statute, which have approved the authority of the trial court to increase a legal sentence once it has been imposed. To construe this statute expressly prohibiting the increase of a sentence as a basis for allowing such an increase fails to accord language its usual and customary meaning, is a tortuous effort at statutory construction, and is illogical. The majority lays some stress on the portion of the statutory provision which indicates that the jurisdiction of the court is not enlarged for any other purpose. I do not find that this language poses any special problem. This statute was passed in 1973 and it had no antecedent provision of similar import. Prior to the enactment of the statute in 1973, there was no statutory authority for reducing a sentence. Where there is a new statute covering new subject matter, limitation of jurisdiction to the subject matter contained in the new provision is understandable. An examination of the Council Commentary in Smith-Hurd (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—1(d), Council Commentary, at 461 (SmithHurd 1973)) is illuminating. It provides: “Subparagraph (d) provides that the court may reduce the length of sentence any time within 30 days after the sentence is imposed. This subparagraph permits the court to reduce the sentence to probation, conditional discharge, periodic imprisonment, or a fine.” As indicated by the Council Commentary, this statute is in accord with statutes from other states including a reference to ABA Sentencing Standards, section 6.1. (ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, §6.1 (1968).) Since the standards were approved in 1968, it well may be that they provided the rationale for the enactment of this present statute. The standards in subsection (a) of section 6.1 recommend that a specific period of time be designated in which a sentence may be reduced for good cause shown. The comments to this section emphasize the necessity of good cause and do not approve reduction of sentences in the absence of good cause. Furthermore, subsection (b) specifically announces that under no circumstances are increases in sentences to be permitted. From the comments relating to this subsection, it appears this rule is well settled. There is nothing in the statute, the Council Commentary or in the ABA Standards which in any way suggests that this statute was adopted by the legislature in response to or with concern for the rules relating to loss of a court’s jurisdiction because of the execution of the judgment or the commencement of a sentence. I believe the statute was intended to mean what it said, and it was not enacted with any other intent than that the authority to reduce and the prohibition against increasing sentence should exist for the full 30 days as a matter of legislative policy and not in response to any limitations established by legal precedent or other powers of the court. I think one of the principal cases relied upon by the majority, People v. Heil (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 458, 376 N.E.2d 1002, indicates strongly that the execution of a judgment in a criminal case by commencement of sentence is no longer a viable rule even though it is dicta in the case. In the Heil case, the defendant, after hearing, was discharged because he had not received a speedy trial. Admittedly, this judgment was fully executed, and if the execution of judgment rule was appropriate as a bar to the modification of this judgment for good cause within 30 days, then the subsequent modification would have been without effect. The court found no merit in the rule as applied in a criminal case limiting jurisdiction of the court to modify its order to that period prior to the execution of thé judgment. In view of the court’s observation in the Heil case questioning the commencement of sentence rule, I doubt the court would reach the same result as it did in People v. Hamel (1946), 392 Ill. 415, 64 N.E.2d 865. The other case referred to by the majority, People v. Watson (1946), 394 Ill. 177, 68 N.E.2d 265, merely supports die general rule that the trial court may not modify its judgment more than 30 days after rendition, and it has no reference to what a court can or cannot do within 30 days from imposition of sentence. In summary, I believe the defendant should have been granted a new trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel, and I also believe the defendant’s sentence was improperly increased.