Court Opinion

ID: 9900442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:59.936466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.589894
License: Public Domain

No. 280                June 7, 2023                     237

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 In the Matter of J. D. B.,
                         a Youth.
                  STATE OF OREGON,
                       Respondent,
                            v.
                         J. D. B.,
                        Appellant.
                Lane County Circuit Court
                   21JU00348; A175772

  Debra E. Velure, Judge.
  Argued and submitted April 19, 2023.
   Christa Obold Eshleman argued the cause for appellant.
Also on the briefs was Youth, Rights & Justice.
   E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause
for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
  KAMINS, J.
  Reversed and remanded.
238   State v. J. D. B.
Cite as 326 Or App 237 (2023)                                                 239

           KAMINS, J.
         Youth appeals from a judgment finding him within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court based on acts that, if
committed by an adult, would constitute assault in the first
degree, ORS 163.185. In the adjudicatory proceeding, youth
asserted that he had stabbed the victim (D) in self-defense,
an argument the juvenile court ultimately rejected. In his
first assignment of error, youth now contends that the juve-
nile court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on
the insufficiency of the evidence, and maintains that the
state failed to disprove his claim of self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.1 In his second and third assignments of
error, he argues the juvenile court erred when it denied his
motion to dismiss based on the state’s violation of due pro-
cess under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 83 S Ct 1194,
10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963). We reverse and remand.
        According to youth, he was being sexually abused by
D since 2019 when youth was 16 and D was in his mid-30s.
On January 24, 2021, youth stabbed D multiple times with
a knife, and the state initiated delinquency proceedings,
asserting that youth engaged in conduct that, if committed
by an adult, would constitute assault in the first degree,
ORS 163.185. Youth raised the defense of self-defense, and
during the adjudicatory proceeding moved to dismiss on the
basis that the state had failed to disprove his self-defense
claim. The juvenile court denied youth’s motion and adju-
dicated him for acts that, if committed by an adult, would
constitute assault in the first degree.
        We reject youth’s first assignment of error that
the evidence was insufficient, because the evidence in the
record permitted the factfinder to conclude that the state
had disproved youth’s claim of self-defense beyond a reason-
able doubt. Although the record also would have supported
the opposite conclusion, that is not enough for us to reverse
     1
       During the factfinding proceeding, youth referred to his motion as a motion
for judgment of acquittal. However, the proper mechanism for challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding is a motion to dismiss, rather
than a motion for judgment of acquittal. See State v. G. L. D., 253 Or App 416, 424
n 4, 290 P3d 852 (2012), rev den, 354 Or 597 (2013) (so stating). As in G. L. D., we
treat the motion for judgment of acquittal as a motion to dismiss. Id.
240                                           State v. J. D. B.

based on the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Olson,
296 Or App 687, 691-92, 439 P3d 551 (2019) (“[I]f established
facts can support multiple reasonable inferences, it is for the
factfinder to decide which inference to draw.” (Citation and
internal quotation marks omitted.)).
         Turning to youth’s second and third assignments
of error, we lay out the procedural facts as they occurred
in some detail. In February, before the factfinding hearing,
youth filed a motion for pretrial production of D’s cellphones
and in camera review for evidence that D had sexually abused
youth. According to youth, the phones contained potentially
exculpatory material in the form of recordings of sexual acts
between youth and D as well as suggestive text messages,
which was relevant evidence of youth’s and D’s states of
mind and was also relevant for impeachment purposes. The
state objected to the motion, asserting that that evidence
would not be useful or relevant for cross-examination of D,
and also that because it did not have the phones, nor did
it have access to the phones, Brady was inapplicable. The
juvenile court ultimately granted youth’s motion for pretrial
production with a protective order.
         At the hearing, the state suggested that the court
appoint counsel for D if it granted the motion to compel
material that could potentially incriminate him, and the
court agreed. Youth served D with the subpoena duces
tecum ordering the production of the cell phones, and D,
with the aid of counsel, moved to quash the subpoena on
the basis that it would violate his state and federal rights
against self-incrimination. The state filed a response in sup-
port of D’s motion. The juvenile court ultimately granted the
motion to quash the subpoena.
         A few days before the factfinding proceeding in
March, a detective interviewed youth as part of a criminal
investigation into his allegations of sexual abuse against D,
at which point youth discovered that the police were attempt-
ing to obtain a search warrant for D’s phones. The day before
factfinding, youth filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
the state violated his right to due process by helping D to
successfully quash youth’s subpoena, while simultaneously
working to obtain a search warrant for the same evidence
Cite as 326 Or App 237 (2023)                                                241

to be used in its prosecution of D.2 The state requested
more time to respond, and the juvenile court granted that
request. The parties addressed the motion to dismiss a cou-
ple of weeks after the adjudicatory proceeding.
        As it turned out, the police had executed the search
warrant for D’s phones on the day of youth’s factfinding pro-
ceeding in March, ultimately coming into possession of the
phones in the middle of the adjudicatory proceeding.3 The
juvenile court denied the motion to dismiss, determining
that any evidence of sexual abuse contained in the phones
was not material to the outcome of the proceeding.
         On appeal, youth argues that the state violated his
Brady rights by failing to disclose that it had obtained D’s
phones because the evidence of D’s abuse of youth was mate-
rial to his claim of self-defense.4 The state maintains that
any evidence of sexual abuse contained in the phones would
not have been material, and therefore no Brady violation
occurred.5
        As an initial matter, the disclosure requirements
outlined by Brady apply in the context of juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. Juvenile proceedings must “comport
with the fundamental fairness demanded by the Due Process
Clause.” Schall v. Martin, 467 US 253, 263, 104 S Ct 2403,

    2
      D was ultimately convicted of three counts of sexual abuse against youth.
    3
      The factfinding proceeding was held on March 12, 2021, from 9:01 a.m. to
4:10 p.m., and the return of the search warrant shows that the warrant for the
phones was executed that day at 1:24 p.m.
    4
      We reject youth’s argument that the state violated Brady by not disclosing
the warrant and affidavit for D’s phones without discussion.
    5
      The state also contends that youth’s arguments below focused on the state’s
failure to disclose the affidavit in support of the search warrant to obtain the
phones, rather than the phones themselves, and therefore his arguments as to
the phones are unpreserved. We disagree. Youth’s need to have access to the
information on D’s phones was the subject of most of the motion to dismiss pro-
ceeding, as well as previous hearings handled before the adjudication, and the
state had adequate opportunity to respond to those arguments. Moreover, the
juvenile court did rule on the merits of the contention—whether the evidence of
sexual abuse was material. Altogether, the record demonstrates that the policies
underlying preservation were served. See State v. Parkins, 346 Or 333, 341, 211
P3d 262 (2009) (“Ultimately, the preservation rule is a practical one, and close
calls * * * inevitably will turn on whether, given the particular record of a case,
the court concludes that the policies underlying the rule have been sufficiently
served.”).
242                                                         State v. J. D. B.

81 L Ed 2d 207 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
There is no question that it is a fundamental violation of due
process for the state to withhold evidence that is favorable to
an accused where the evidence is material to either guilt or
punishment. Brady, 373 US at 87.6
          We agree with youth that, once the police executed
the search warrant for D’s phones, the state’s failure to dis-
close its possession of the phones during the factfinding pro-
ceeding violated due process, because they likely contained
content that was material to youth’s self-defense claim. See
Turner v. United States, 582 US 313, 324, 137 S Ct 1885,
198 L Ed 2d 443 (2017) (evidence is material under Brady
when there is a “reasonable probability that, had the evi-
dence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would
have been different” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). Evidence of sexual abuse was relevant to youth’s
self-defense theory; that is, whether youth’s subjective fear
of the victim was objectively reasonable. See ORS 161.209
(“a person is justified in using physical force upon another
person for self-defense * * * from what the person reasonably
believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical
force, and the person may use a degree of force which the
person reasonably believes to be necessary for the purpose”);
State v. Beisser, 258 Or App 326, 334, 308 P3d 1121 (2013)
(“When a defendant raises the defense of self-defense, evi-
dence of the alleged victim’s prior violent acts toward the
defendant is admissible under OEC 404(1).”). Without that
evidence, the factfinder did not have a complete picture of
the relevant circumstances between youth and D, thereby
undermining confidence in the outcome of the adjudicatory
proceeding. See Turner, 582 US at 324 (“A reasonable prob-
ability of a different result is one in which the suppressed
evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”

    6
      In this appeal, the state has not argued that the requirements of Brady do
not apply to juvenile proceedings, and it does not appear to be in dispute nation-
ally that Brady applies to juveniles. See, e.g., J. E. v. Superior Ct, 223 Cal App
4th 1329, 1335, 168 Cal Rptr 3d 67, 70 (2014) (“The Brady disclosure requirement
applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings as well as criminal proceedings.”);
State ex rel L. V., 66 So 3d 558, 561-62 (La Ct App 2011) (addressing merits of
juvenile’s Brady claim); Anna Vancleave, Brady and the Juvenile Courts, 38 NYU
Rev L & Soc Change 551, 552 (2014) (“There is no question that the Brady right
exists in juvenile court.”).
Cite as 326 Or App 237 (2023)                            243

(Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.)); State v.
Bray, 363 Or 226, 238-39, 422 P3d 250 (2018) (reasoning
that “to prove a due process violation based on a deprivation
of evidence, a defendant must demonstrate that the loss of
evidence was so material and favorable that it prevented a
fair trial”).
         We observe that the speed at which juvenile pro-
ceedings take place is in part responsible for the violation,
and in fact, is a structural barrier to Brady litigation for
juveniles generally. See Anna Vancleave, Brady and the
Juvenile Courts, 38 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 551, 554
(2014) (describing the fact that “the life of a juvenile case
is significantly shorter than that of an adult criminal case”
as a structural aspect of juvenile court proceedings that
“create[s] a poor platform for Brady litigation and make[s] it
unlikely that Brady violations will come to light”). The total
time that elapsed between the offense and the date of adju-
dication was 47 days. The police were still in the beginning
of their investigation into youth’s claims of sexual abuse by
D when the case against youth was concluded.
         Even so, the state knew a month before the adjudi-
catory proceeding of the potential evidence contained in the
phones and given the fact that the police began their inves-
tigation into youth’s allegations soon after youth’s motion to
compel production, it should have anticipated the possibil-
ity that it would come into possession of D’s phones during
the adjudicatory proceeding. As such, it should have been
prepared to disclose that it had obtained the phones and
the contents of the phones as soon as they came into the
state’s possession. Such anticipation is especially import-
ant because the state’s discovery obligations do not end
with the beginning of the adjudicatory proceeding. See ORS
135.845(2) (declaring that if “a party finds, either before or
during trial, additional material or information which is
subject to or covered by these provisions, the party must
promptly notify the other party of the additional material
or information”); ORS 419C.270(6) (ORS 135.845 applies in
juvenile proceedings); American Bar Association’s Juvenile
Justice Standards Relating to Pretrial Court Proceedings
(1979), Standard 3.15 (there is a continuing duty to disclose
to the other party, and if additional material is discovered
244                                                         State v. J. D. B.

during trial, the court should also be notified). Furthermore,
the state has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known
to the police. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US 419, 437, 115 S Ct
1555, 131 L Ed 2d 490 (1995). That responsibility is all the
more important in the juvenile context, where compressed
timelines make it less likely that Brady violations will be
litigated pre-adjudication.
        “[T]he legislative purpose of the juvenile code is ref-
ormation, not punishment.” State v. B. Y., 319 Or App 208, 217,
510 P3d 247, rev allowed, 370 Or 455 (2022). Nevertheless,
the state treated youth as a danger to be aggressively and
punitively prosecuted, despite knowledge of potential miti-
gating information.7
         Having determined that the juvenile court erred,
we must determine the appropriate remedy. Youth pre-
sented the issue in the context of a motion to dismiss the
adjudication and argues on appeal that the state’s conduct
was so egregious as to merit that remedy. We disagree both
that the state’s conduct required such a remedy and that
dismissal was the juvenile court’s only permissible option.
See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 276, 666 P2d 1316 (1983)
(a retrial is barred under the state constitution when mis-
conduct is “so prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot
be cured by means short of a mistrial, and * * * the official
knows that the conduct is improper and prejudicial and
either intends or is indifferent to the resulting mistrial or
reversal”). Although the state’s conduct was certainly inap-
propriate, the record does not contain the information nec-
essary to determine that a retrial would be barred under
the state constitution. See State v. Mays, 269 Or App 599,
617, 346 P3d 535, rev den, 358 Or 146 (2015) (to bar a retrial,
“[t]he official * * * must have acted with knowledge of the
improper and prejudicial nature of the conduct and with at
least indifference to the resulting mistrial” and negligence,
    7
      We observe that the state at trial downplayed the sexual abuse (which the
state was simultaneously criminally investigating) by characterizing it as a “sex-
ual relationship,” which minimized the importance of the Brady material. As a
minor, youth was incapable of consenting to any sexual contact with an adult
more than twice his age. See ORS 163.415(1)(a)(B) (sexual abuse in the third
degree occurs when the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being under 18
years of age).
Cite as 326 Or App 237 (2023)                                245

“gross or otherwise, is not enough”) (emphasis and internal
quotation marks omitted).
         As youth is not entitled to outright dismissal, we
conclude that the proper remedy is to reverse and remand
for a new factfinding proceeding. See State v. Deloretto, 221
Or App 309, 321, 189 P3d 1243 (2008), rev den, 346 Or 66
(2009) (“It is not legally permissible for a trial court to deny a
new trial for a Brady violation if there is a ‘reasonable prob-
ability’ that the suppressed evidence would have resulted
in a different outcome[.]” (Quoting United States v. Bagley,
473 US 667, 682, 105 S Ct 3375, 87 L Ed 2d 481 (1985))); see
Turner, 582 US at 324 (defining “a reasonable probability of
a different result” as one in which “the suppressed evidence
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
         Reversed and remanded.