Court Opinion

ID: 9746225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:09:16.671291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:44.600912
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
HARRELL, J.
For the reasons stated in my concurring and dissenting opinion in State v. Wilkins, 393 Md. 269, 900 A.2d 765 (2006), I disagree with the reasoning of the Majority opinion here. I nonetheless would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed, on the merits, the Circuit Court’s denial of Pollard’s Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.
I believe that a sentencing judge commits error if he or she refuses to acknowledge his or her power to suspend completely or partially a sentence imposed. Williamson v. State, 284 Md. 212, 215, 395 A.2d 496, 497 (1979); State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 117-18, 352 A.2d 829, 832 (1976). The allegation of error in the present case, like the allegation of error in Wilkins, is the imposition of a sentence in a manner that *55violates a statute.1 Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 641A. “Hence, if made manifest on the record, the judge’s refusal to recognize his or her power to suspend all or part of an imposed sentence results in an illegal sentence because the deficiency inheres in the sentence.” State v. Wilkins, 398 Md. at 288-89, 900 A.2d at 776-77. Because the allegation of error proposed by Pollard inheres in the sentence itself, I would reach the merits of the case.
Pollard argues that the trial judge erred on 26 July 1974 when he imposed a life sentence without expressly recognizing that the entire sentence, or a portion of it, could have been suspended. Pollard contends that the record of the exchange between the trial judge and himself at the guilty plea proceeding earlier on 28 May 1974 demonstrates that the trial judge was unaware two months later of his discretion to suspend all or a portion of the life sentence ultimately imposed. Evidence of this, he claims, can be found when the court outlined the range of possible sentences that it could impose, as required before accepting a guilty plea, but failed to state expressly that it could suspend all or any part of such a sentence:
THE COURT: Do you understand that if the Court accepts this plea that you could, in the discretion of the Court, either receive a life sentence, that is to be ordered to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction for a period of your natural life, or in the alternative, that you might receive anywhere from eighteen months to twenty-one years in prison, do you understand that?
*56[MR. POLLARD]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand that if the Court accepts this plea it cannot promise you what the sentence may be? [MR. POLLARD]: Yes, sir.
We recently considered a similar claim in State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179, 825 A.2d 452, 458 (2003). In 1978, two years after Wooten was decided, Chaney was sentenced in the Circuit Court for Calvert County to life imprisonment for a conviction of first-degree murder. Chaney, 375 Md. at 171, 825 A.2d at 453. Twenty-two years after his sentencing, Chaney moved in the Circuit Court for a new sentencing proceeding, arguing that the sentencing judge had not considered suspending any part of his sentence, as was allowed by Article 27, § 641A, which was in effect in 1978. Id. Chaney, like Pollard, cited the absence of an affirmative statement by the sentencing judge acknowledging contemporary awareness of the discretion to suspend part or all of the sentence. Chaney, 375 Md. at 173, 825 A.2d at 456. We reversed the Court of Special Appeals’s decision to grant a new sentencing hearing. Chaney, 375 Md. at 177, 825 A.2d at 457. Applying the established principle that judges are presumed to know the law, we stated:
Chaney fails to provide us with any evidence sufficient to rebut this presumption. There is nothing in the record to negate the presumption that the sentencing judge knew and properly applied the law. He did not misstate the law. In fact, as both we and the intermediate appellate court agree, he correctly stated that the only sentence available under Art 27, § 413 and Bartholomey [v. State, 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972) ] was life imprisonment under these facts. The Wooten decision, clarifying that life sentences were subject to possible subsequent suspension, was decided two years prior to Chaney’s conviction. Nothing has been presented that rebuts the presumption that the sentencing judge was aware of that decision. (Emphasis in original).
Chaney, 375 Md. at 184, 825 A.2d at 461. Pollard contends that, because he was sentenced two years before Wooten was *57decided, we should not apply to his case the presumption that the sentencing judge knew of and exercised properly his sentencing discretion.
I would conclude that Pollard’s argument fails. The sentencing judge’s possible lack of prescience in 1974 in foreseeing Wooten is not material.2 Our decision in Wooten merely “clarif[ied] that life sentences were subject to possible subsequent suspension,” notwithstanding the unambiguous language of the statute to that effect. Chaney, 375 Md. at 184, 825 A.2d at 461. The statute was in existence and effective before Wooten was decided. More importantly, Article 27, § 641A was in effect when the court sentenced Petitioner in 1974. We characterized, in Wooten, the language of Article 27, § 641A as “clear, unambiguous and unqualified.” Wooten, 277 Md. at 117, 352 A.2d at 831. Under the principle that judges are presumed to know the law and apply it properly, I would presume that the sentencing judge knew of Article 27, § 641A in 1974 and considered it during sentencing.
I would conclude also that Pollard’s argument to rebut this presumption finds no support in the record. The inquiry at the plea acceptance stage between the sentencing judge and Pollard, when the sentencing judge correctly stated the law regarding the available range of finite sentences for a conviction of rape, does not indicate necessarily, by negative implication, a lack of awareness of Article 27, § 641A. As we noted in Chaney, “temporally, one must pass a sentence before one can suspend it.” Chaney, 375 Md. at 179, 825 A.2d at 458. Although the sentencing judge did not state expressly that he was excising his discretion not to suspend or even to refuse to consider suspension, we do not require him to do so. Id. (“The issue before us, therefore, is whether the sentencing judge’s failure expressly and consecutively to acknowledge the existence of a second statute permitting a suspension of that sentence, [Article 27, § 641A], [ ] is sufficient to infer that he *58was unaware of its potential application to the sentence he imposed in the case sub judice. We conclude that it is not.”).3 Here again, “we shall not draw negative inferences from this silent record.” Chaney, 375 Md. at 184, 825 A.2d at 461; see also id. (“It is well-settled that, on appeal, the burden of establishing error in the lower court rests squarely on the appellant.”) (quoting Bradley v. Hazard Technology Co., 340 Md. 202, 206, 665 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1995)).
Moreover, even though not critical to the analysis, I would emphasize that the record includes some arguable indicia of support for application of the presumption that the sentencing judge knew that he could suspend all or a portion of the sentence. Following acceptance of the guilty plea, the sentencing judge postponed imposition of sentence for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence investigation that would assist the court in “mak[ing] a more appropriate sentence than might otherwise be made.” Also, immediately prior to imposing sentence, the sentencing judge inquired: “Mr. Pollard, is there anything that you wish to say in your own behalf, any reason that you wish to give to the Court why it should be lenient in imposing sentence upon you.” Pollard responded: “I would like to say that I am sorry for what I done.” Of course, this colloquy equally may be argued to support an inference that the sentencing judge was considering only whether to sentence Pollard somewhere in the lower portion of the range of 18 months to 21 years of incarceration, versus life imprisonment. The point remains, however, that the record does not disclose any clear indication that the judge was unaware of, or unreasonably resistant to, consideration of suspension of sentence as an option. I would agree with the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals that “[t]he request for a presentence investigation, coupled with the judge’s inquiry, demonstrate^] that [the trial judge] was well aware of the discretion he possessed.”
*59I would also conclude that Williamson v. State, 284 Md. 212, 395 A.2d 496 (1979), is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Here, the sentencing judge uttered no comment that would lead us to conclude that he refused arbitrarily or unreasonably to recognize his discretionary power to suspend all or part of Pollard’s life sentence. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

. Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 641A provided, in pertinent part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having jurisdiction, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. The court may impose a sentence for a specified period and provide that a lesser period be served in confinement, suspend the remainder of the sentence and grant probation for a period longer than the sentence but not in excess of five years.
Unless otherwise provided, all statutory references are to Article 27, § 641A.

. In a small twist of irony, the sentencing judge in Pollard’s case was later specially assigned to this Court in 1978 and participated in deciding Wooten.

. In Chaney, we discussed the purposes and implications of the established principle that judges are presumed to know and properly apply the law, which remain relevant today. See generally State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179-84, 825 A.2d 452, 458-61 (2003).