Court Opinion

ID: 9959526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 21:04:47.892541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:44.504472
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (4th) 190915-U
            NOTICE                                                            FILED
This Order was filed under                                                   April 11, 2024
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is              NO. 4-19-0915
                                                                             Carla Bender
not precedent except in the                                              4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed     IN THE APPELLATE COURT
                                                                               Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                          OF ILLINOIS

                                       FOURTH DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                        )       Appeal from the
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                              )       Circuit Court of
            v.                                               )       Macon County
 ANTONIO D. SIBLEY,                                          )       No. 13CF553
            Defendant-Appellant.                             )
                                                             )       Honorable
                                                             )       Jeffrey S. Geisler,
                                                             )       Judge Presiding.

                JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
                Justices Steigmann and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER
¶1     Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding postconviction counsel did not provide
             unreasonable assistance.

¶2              In July 2018, defendant, Antonio D. Sibley, filed a pro se postconviction petition,

which advanced to the second stage of proceedings after 90 days. In April 2019, the State filed a

motion to dismiss the petition, which the trial court granted. On appeal, defendant argued (1) his

postconviction petition made a substantial showing of actual innocence and (2) postconviction

counsel provided unreasonable assistance. We affirmed. People v. Sibley, 2022 IL App (4th)

190915-U.

¶3              In September 2023, the Illinois Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for

leave to appeal. However, the supreme court vacated our judgment and ordered us to consider

the effect of its decision in People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, 217 N.E.3d 1011, on the issue of
whether defendant received reasonable assistance from postconviction counsel. People v. Sibley,

No. 128409 (Sept. 27, 2023) (supervisory order). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

¶4                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶5                               A. Jury Trial and Direct Appeal

¶6             After a shooting on April 29, 2013, the State charged defendant with aggravated

discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2012)), unlawful possession of a weapon

by a felony (UPWF) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2012)), and aggravated unlawful use of a

weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(A) (West 2012)). The matter proceeded to a jury trial,

after which defendant was found guilty of aggravated discharge of a firearm and UPWF. The

trial court sentenced defendant to 18 years’ imprisonment for aggravated discharge of a firearm

and 5 years’ imprisonment for UPWF, to be served concurrently. We affirmed defendant’s

convictions and sentence on direct appeal. People v. Sibley, 2017 IL App (4th) 150725-U.

¶7                            B. Postconviction Petition Proceedings

¶8             On July 2, 2018, defendant filed a postconviction petition, alleging that he

received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel and that he was “actually

innocent of the crimes for which he was charged and convicted.” Defendant argued trial counsel

was ineffective for several reasons, including neither calling Rajiv Rice as a witness nor using

Rice’s August 2013 affidavit to corroborate defendant’s testimony that he did not shoot at Rice.

The petition described Rice’s affidavit as “readily available.” Defendant’s actual innocence

claim relied on Rice’s affidavit and testimony at the hearing on defendant’s motion to reduce his

sentence, which reiterated the affidavit’s contents. Specifically, Rice’s affidavit and testimony

asserted defendant did not possess a firearm or shoot at Rice during the incident. Defendant

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attached to his pro se petition Rice’s affidavit, a transcript of Rice’s testimony, and his own

affidavit asserting counsel did not discuss affirmative defenses with him.

¶9             Appointed counsel filed a certificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c)

(eff. July 1, 2017), asserting he “examined the record of the proceedings at the plea of guilty and

the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing.” In support of defendant’s postconviction

petition, appointed counsel filed another affidavit from Rice, filed March 14, 2019, in which

Rice declared he previously told several people, including police officers, he did not know who

was shooting during the incident. Rice claimed he did not provide this information sooner

because he “feared for [his] son’s mother.” Appointed counsel did not file an amended

postconviction petition.

¶ 10           After 90 days, the petition advanced to the second stage of postconviction

proceedings and the State moved to dismiss the petition. In relevant part, the State argued trial

counsel could not have used Rice’s affidavits to impeach officer Timothy Wittmer and

investigator Ed Culp because the affidavits did not attack the credibility of their testimony and

the affidavits could not be used substantively because they were inadmissible hearsay. The State

also argued trial counsel was not ineffective for not calling Rice as a witness to testify to the

contents of his affidavits because Rice was charged as a codefendant, so his privilege against

self-incrimination shielded him from testifying. Neither of Rice’s affidavits indicated he would

have waived that privilege. Finally, the State asserted Rice’s affidavits were not newly

discovered or of such conclusive character that they would probably change the outcome on

retrial.

¶ 11           On July 2, 2019, postconviction counsel told the trial court, “I’m gonna have to

file an amended petition” because he believed he “ha[d] to include some additional things that

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were not in the original petition.” Postconviction counsel subsequently filed an affidavit from

Kadaris Britt, which stated Britt would testify he did not see defendant possess or fire a gun

during the shooting. Postconviction counsel also filed a new affidavit from defendant, in which

defendant insisted trial counsel knew prior to trial Rice made a statement that defendant “was not

the person who had fired a handgun towards [Rice].” In the new affidavit, defendant also

repeated his assertion trial counsel did not discuss with him the possibility of raising

self-defense. Defendant “discussed these issues with his assigned Appellate Defender and said

Attorney failed to raise these issues or [sic] appeal.” Postconviction counsel filed a second Rule

651(c) certificate certifying “he examined the Record of Proceedings at the Petitioner’s trial,”

“consulted with Petitioner both by mail and by phone to ascertain his contentions of deprivation

of constitutional rights,” and “made the amendments to the Petitioner’s pro se petition that were

necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.”

¶ 12            After conducting a hearing on December 12, 2019, the trial court granted the

State’s motion to dismiss the petition. The court rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance of

trial counsel claims, finding the decisions at issue were matters of trial strategy and defendant

was not prejudiced. The court found Rice’s affidavit and testimony would have had “little or no”

impact on the case, especially because Officer Wittmer previously testified to the contrary.

Regarding defendant’s actual innocence claim, the court found Rice’s affidavit and testimony

was not newly discovered evidence and was not of “such conclusive character that it would have

probably changed the results on a retrial.” The court further found Britt’s affidavit was unreliable

and would not alter the trial’s result.

¶ 13            We affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding the court did not err in dismissing

defendant’s postconviction petition at the second stage of proceedings, and postconviction

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counsel provided reasonable assistance. Sibley, 2022 IL App (4th) 190915-U, ¶¶ 41-63.

Specifically, we found defendant’s petition did not make a substantial showing of actual

innocence because the affidavits attached to the petition were not so conclusive as to probably

change the trial’s result. Sibley, 2022 IL App (4th) 190915-U, ¶¶ 45-48. We noted defendant

provided “detailed confessions” on two separate occasions and signed a written confession.

Sibley, 2022 IL App (4th) 190915-U, ¶ 48. Regarding defendant’s unreasonable assistance claim,

we found postconviction counsel did not fail to make necessary amendments to the petition.

Sibley, 2022 IL App (4th) 190915-U, ¶¶ 56-60.

¶ 14           On April 21, 2022, defendant filed a petition seeking leave to appeal to the Illinois

Supreme Court. The supreme court denied the petition but entered a supervisory order directing

us to vacate our judgment in Sibley, 2022 IL App (4th) 190915-U, and consider the effect of the

supreme court’s recent decision in Addison, 2023 IL 127119, on the issue of whether defendant

received reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel. Sibley, No. 128409 (Sept. 27, 2023)

(supervisory order). We now comply with our supreme court’s order and reconsider defendant’s

unreasonable assistance claim under its recent decision in Addison.

¶ 15                                     II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16                                   A. Actual Innocence

¶ 17           At the outset, we observe the order vacating our prior judgment does not mention

defendant’s actual innocence claim. The supreme court instructed us to “consider the effect of

[the Illinois Supreme Court’s] opinion in People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, on the issue of

whether defendant received reasonable assistance of post-conviction counsel and determine if a

different result is warranted.” Sibley, No. 128409 (Sept. 27, 2023) (supervisory order). In our

prior judgment, we affirmed the trial court because “the newly discovered evidence is not of such

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a conclusive character that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would find

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” particularly in light of defendant’s verbal

confessions, his written confession, and the evidence corroborating those confessions. Sibley,

2022 IL App (4th) 190915-U, ¶ 54. After reviewing Addison, we find it does not impact our

finding regarding defendant’s actual innocence claim. Accordingly, we reach the same

conclusion and affirm the trial court’s ruling on that issue.

¶ 18                  B. Unreasonable Assistance of Postconviction Counsel

¶ 19           Turning to defendant’s unreasonable assistance claim, defendant argued on appeal

that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance because (1) counsel’s initial Rule

651(c) certificate erroneously referred to “the record of the proceedings at the plea of guilty,”

when defendant did not enter a guilty plea and (2) counsel made no amendments to defendant’s

pro se postconviction petition, despite deficiencies in Rice’s affidavit, which the State identified

in its motion to dismiss. After analyzing the case sub judice under Addison, we affirm for the

following reasons.

¶ 20                                         1. Addison

¶ 21           In Addison, our supreme court found the defendant received unreasonable

assistance where postconviction counsel did not amend the defendant’s pro se postconviction

petition to include allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Addison, 2023 IL

127119, ¶¶ 23-25. The defendant’s pro se petition raised 15 issues, and it asserted, inter alia,

appellate counsel failed to raise 14 of those issues on direct appeal. Addison, 2023 IL 127119,

¶ 23. Because those issues were not raised on direct appeal, they would be forfeited unless the

petition, as amended by postconviction counsel, alleged appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance in not raising them. See People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 413, 719 N.E.2d 725, 729

                                                -6-
(1999) (“If petitioner’s counsel had amended the post-conviction petition to allege ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise petitioner’s claims on direct appeal, these

claims would not have been barred by waiver.”). However, when postconviction counsel

purportedly made necessary changes to the pro se petition, the amended petition “did not assert

any claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and nowhere alleged any way in which

appellate counsel was ineffective.” Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 24. The court denounced

postconviction counsel’s performance, asserting, “[W]e are faced with the unusual situation in

which postconviction counsel, in one significant sense, made the pro se petition worse by

amending it.” Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 24. The court described the circumstances thusly:

               “[T]he trial court advanced the petition to the second stage because it determined

               that it stated the gist of a meritorious claim. Postconviction counsel reviewed the

               petition and determined that five claims were worth pursuing. However, counsel

               failed to shape the claims into the proper form. We fail to see how it can be

               reasonable assistance of counsel for an attorney to identify claims worth pursuing

               but then fail to shape them into proper form.” Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 26.

¶ 22           The supreme court found postconviction counsel provided unreasonable

assistance and remanded the matter for compliance with Rule 651(c) without considering

whether the petition’s claims had merit. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 33; see People v. Suarez,

224 Ill. 2d 37, 47, 862 N.E.2d 977, 982 (2007) (“This court has consistently held that remand is

required where postconviction counsel failed to fulfill the duties of consultation, examining the

record, and amendment of the pro se petition, regardless of whether the claims raised in the

petition had merit.”).

¶ 23                                        2. This Case

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¶ 24           Here, defendant argued postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance

because (1) counsel’s initial Rule 651(c) certificate erroneously claimed counsel “examined the

record of the proceedings at the plea of guilty” and (2) counsel attached two affidavits to

defendant’s pro se petition without rectifying potential procedural problems with the affidavits,

even after those potential problems were identified by the State in a motion to dismiss.

¶ 25           Postconviction counsel’s initial Rule 651(c) certificate did contain an error;

defendant did not plead guilty, so counsel could not have examined the report of proceedings at

the guilty plea. However, counsel later filed a corrected certificate, which properly certified

counsel examined the report of proceedings at defendant’s trial. See Sibley, 2022 IL App (4th)

190915-U, ¶ 57. The corrected certificate, which superseded the original version, created a

rebuttable presumption of reasonable assistance. See People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307,

¶ 19, 974 N.E.2d 813. The corrected certificate did not contain errors rebutting this presumption.

While the original petition mistakenly referenced a “plea of guilty,” which defendant did not

enter, the original petition was no longer in effect once counsel entered his corrected certificate.

Therefore, defendant did not receive unreasonable assistance where postconviction counsel’s

initial Rule 651(c) certificate incorrectly stated he reviewed the record of the guilty plea because

he subsequently filed a corrected Rule 651(c) certificate, which contained no errors rebutting the

presumption of reasonable assistance.

¶ 26           Defendant next argues postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance

by not amending the pro se postconviction petition, and defendant insists the record rebuts the

compliance presumption created by counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate. See Profit, 2012 IL App

(1st) 101307, ¶ 19. Specifically, defendant contends counsel failed to present the pro se

petition’s claims such that they overcame procedural bars. Defendant argues (1) Rice’s affidavit,

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which counsel attached to the amended petition, averred defendant’s innocence, but it did not

aver Rice would testify accordingly if called as a witness and (2) Britt’s affidavit did not address

the “newly discovered” element of actual innocence. Defendant insists Rule 651(c) required

counsel to amend Rice’s affidavit to aver Rice would testify in accordance with the affidavit if

called as a witness and to amend Britt’s affidavit to address each element of an actual innocence

claim.

¶ 27           This case is distinguishable from Addison because the changes defendant

proposes were not necessary under Rule 651(c). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). In

Addison, the postconviction counsel failed to present the defendant’s pro se arguments in a form

that would survive the procedural bar of forfeiture. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶¶ 24-25. Here,

postconviction counsel’s purported failings did not risk forfeiting defendant’s postconviction

petition’s claims.

¶ 28           As we noted in our prior judgment, Rice’s affidavit indicated Rice was competent

to testify if called as a witness and it identified the substantive evidence to which he would

testify. Sibley, 2022 IL App (4th) 190915-U, ¶ 58. Further, defendant attached a transcript of

Rice’s testimony during the hearing to reduce his sentence to the pro se petition. Sibley, 2022 IL

App (4th) 190915-U, ¶ 58. We cannot say postconviction counsel failed to make a necessary

amendment to the pro se petition when he did not amend Rice’s affidavit to state, explicitly, that

Rice would testify in accordance with the affidavit’s contents if called as a witness. Under these

circumstances, the record does not rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance created by

counsel’s second Rule 651(c) certificate. See Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 19.

¶ 29           Regarding Britt’s affidavit, the amendment defendant proposes on appeal was not

necessary under Rule 651(c) because the record clearly demonstrates the affidavit was newly

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discovered. An actual innocence claim must be based on evidence that is newly discovered.

People v. Joiner, 2023 IL App (1st) 211553, ¶ 82, 218 N.E.3d 561. “Evidence is newly

discovered if it has been discovered since trial and could not have been discovered sooner

through due diligence.” Joiner, 2023 IL App (1st) 211553, ¶ 82. Britt did not testify at trial, nor

did he present the information contained in his affidavit until October 15, 2019, long after the

trial’s conclusion. As we recognized in our prior judgment, the record shows Britt was involved

in the shooting, and he risked incriminating himself if questioned about the incident. Sibley, 2021

IL App (4th) 190915-U, ¶ 60 (quoting People v. Prater, 158 Ill. App. 3d 330, 337, 511 N.E.2d

842, 846-47 (1987)). Because no amount of diligence could force Britt to testify at the trial

below against his will, his affidavit constituted newly discovered evidence, as it was discovered

after the trial and it could not have been discovered sooner through due diligence. See Joiner,

2023 IL App (1st) 211553, ¶ 82. Therefore, the record undercuts defendant’s argument that

counsel failed to address the “newly discovered” element of actual innocence, as the record

shows Britt’s affidavit constituted newly discovered evidence. Postconviction counsel did not

fail to make a necessary amendment to the postconviction petition. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff.

July 1, 2017); Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶¶ 18-19.

¶ 30           The case law defendant cites to support his arguments is inapt. In People v.

Guzman, 2014 IL App (3d) 090464, ¶¶ 38-40, 24 N.E.3d 831, the defendant received

unreasonable assistance where postconviction counsel filed an amended petition but failed to

move to withdraw the notice of appeal, so the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the

amended petition. In People v. Nitz, 2011 IL App (2d) 100031, ¶¶ 17-19, 959 N.E.2d 1258,

postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by not submitting a properly notarized

affidavit supporting the petition. Finally, in People v. Ross, 2015 IL App (3d) 130077, ¶¶ 16-17,

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40 N.E.3d 461, overruled on other grounds by People v. Young, 2018 IL 122598, 115 N.E.3d

194, postconviction counsel attached a sworn statement from the defendant rather than an

affidavit, and counsel did not have the defendant testify to the sworn statement’s contents. In all

these cases, unreasonable assistance occurred where the postconviction counsel did not remedy

procedural or structural errors, either by failing to withdraw a notice of appeal to allow the trial

court to consider an amended petition (Guzman, 2014 IL App (3d) 090464, ¶ 39), failing to

attach an affidavit that was notarized (Nitz, 2011 IL App (2d) 100031, ¶ 19), or failing to present

the defendant’s argument in the proper form via an affidavit or sworn testimony (Ross, 2015 IL

App (3d) 130077, ¶¶ 16-17). This case is distinguishable. Here, postconviction counsel properly

shaped defendant’s postconviction claims to avoid structural or procedural deficiencies. While

defendant argues counsel failed to amend his petition’s claims to overcome the procedural bars,

those arguments are meritless for the foregoing reasons.

¶ 31           In Addison, the defendant received unreasonable assistance where his

postconviction counsel failed to preserve his arguments from the procedural bar of forfeiture. See

Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶¶ 23-25; Turner, 187 Ill. 2d at 413. There, counsel’s amendments

worsened the petition and failed to shape the defendant’s arguments into the proper form.

Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶¶ 24, 26. Conversely, postconviction counsel here shaped

defendant’s arguments to avoid forfeiture. The amendments defendant suggests were not

necessary, as Rice’s affidavit indicated Rice was competent to testify and identified the

substantive evidence to which he would testify and the record shows Britt’s affidavit constituted

newly discovered evidence. Therefore, we find defendant did not receive unreasonable assistance

and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition.

¶ 32                                    III. CONCLUSION

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¶ 33   For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 34   Affirmed.

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