Court Opinion

ID: 9793381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:46:38.872399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:40.179918
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Justice,
specially concurring.
I agree with both the court’s analysis and the conclusion which it reaches. I write because I believe we should go further.
As the court indicates, the defendant has a due process right to a fair and impartial presentation of the evidence to the grand jury. Whether included in this or separate from it, in my view he also has a right to an independent grand jury.
The very purpose of the requirement that a man be indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge....
... The right to have the grand jury make the charge on its own judgment is a substantial right which cannot be taken away ....
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218—19, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273-74, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (footnote omitted).
The grand jury is neither an arm nor a servant of the prosecution. It has an independent responsibility to determine whether there is probable cause to believe a particular crime has been committed. A further function is to protect citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 617, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). These principles are not confined to the federal system. This court has recently held that *44the initiation and control of inquiries into public offenses “rests with the grand jury and not the prosecutor.” Gershon v. Broomfield, 131 Ariz. 507, 509, 642 P.2d 852, 854 (1982). We stated further that the prosecutor’s discretion, is to be used “in assisting the grand jury.” Id. The prosecutor’s powers “are derived from the grand jury; it is the grand jury that possesses the broad investigative powers, and ... that must be the decisionmaker” in exercising those powers. Id.
These concepts are embodied in the statute which provides that when the grand jury has “reasonable ground to believe that other evidence, which is available, will explain away the contemplated charge, they may require the evidence to be produced.” A.R.S. § 21-412. It is for this reason also that the American Bar Association Standards relating to the prosecution function require the prosecutor to “give due deference to [the grand jury’s] status as an independent legal body.” 1 American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Ch. 3, Standard 3-3.5(a) (2d ed. 1980).
Thus, the prosecutor is present to assist the grand jury in performing its functions, including that of protecting citizens from overzealous prosecution. In proceedings before the grand jury, “the prosecutor operates without the check of a judge or a trained legal adversary, and virtually immune from public scrutiny.” United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir.1979). We must bear in mind the potential for abuse and the “devastating personal and professional impact that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo,” id., when the prosecutor is allowed to exercise control “over a cooperative grand jury.” United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir.1979).
I would hold, therefore, that there is prosecutorial misconduct in the case at bench. Of course, what is required to make a “fair presentation” to the grand jury, as well as what constitutes manipulation of the grand jury, will vary from case to case. Certainly, however, where the defendant has indicated his willingness to waive his right to remain silent and has volunteered to discuss the case with the prosecutor, one might assume there is a reasonable possibility that he would waive the fifth amendment and testify before the grand jury. The prosecution here failed to notify defense counsel that the case was going to the grand jury and also failed to notify the grand jury that the defendant might be willing to appear and testify. The prosecution thereby deprived the defendant of the right to make a written request of the grand jury to allow him to appear (see Ariz.R.Crim.P. 12.6) and deprived the grand jury of its right to determine whether the defendant’s testimony might be “other evidence, which is available, [and] will explain away the contemplated charge .... ” The rule, the statute, and the concept of an independent grand jury give the grand jury, not the prosecution, the right to make these determinations.
The prosecutor also usurped the grand jury’s role in failing to inform them of relevant facts and law. The circumstances of this case raise obvious and crucial issues of fact and law with respect to whether defendant made a citizen’s arrest under A.R.S. §§ 13-3884,13-3889 and 13-3900, or had illegally restrained the alleged victim with the specific intent necessary to commit kidnapping under A.R.S. § 13-1304. The intent to make a citizen’s arrest negates the intent necessary to kidnap. If defendant made a proper citizen’s arrest, he committed no wrong. If he made a citizen’s arrest without probable cause, he would be liable in tort. If he made a citizen’s arrest with unnecessary force, he would be liable in tort and might also be subject to prosecution for assault. However, if all he intended was to make a citizen’s arrest, justified or unjustified, he did not have the specific intent1 required by the kidnapping statute. A first-year law student should see this crucial issue; by failing to so inform the grand jury and by failing to provide it with the facts (which the prosecution had in its own files) and legal advice needed to resolve *45that issue, the prosecutor controlled the result and ensured an indictment on an extremely serious charge. No other outcome was possible because the grand jury has no means of obtaining information except through the offices of the prosecutor who is its assistant and advisor.
By withholding important factual information and necessary legal advice in a case which presented obvious issues of fact and law relevant to the determination of probable cause, the prosecution deprived the defendant of his right to an independent grand jury and effectively controlled the result.
I would dismiss the indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v. Samango, supra.

. A. A person commits kidnapping by knowingly restraining another person with intent to:
*451. Hold the victim for ransom, as a shield or hostage; or
2. Hold the victim for involuntary servitude; or
3. Inflict death, physical injury or a sexual offense on the victim, or to otherwise aid in the commission of a felony; or
4. Place the victim or a third person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury to the victim or such third person.
5. Interfere with the performance of a governmental or political function.
6. Seize or exercise control over any airplane, train, bus, ship or other vehicle.
A.R.S. § 13-1304(A) (emphasis supplied).