Court Opinion

ID: 9443019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:07:42.971778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:20.177279
License: Public Domain

PICKETT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The facts in this case are not in dispute. The plaintiff was in the employ of the United States as a meat inspector assigned to defendant’s packing plant at Ogden, Utah. For the purpose of performing his duties he had access to the entire plant but his principal duties confined him to what is known as the killing floor. He had been working there for a considerable length of time and his duties required him to be constantly on and off a platform *619twenty-three inches high. The floor of this room was necessarily wet and slippery 1 at all times and was a condition which was to be expected on the killing floor of any meat packing plant. • The plaintiff wore boots with heavy treaded soles to prevent slipping. No claim is made that the defendant was negligent in permitting the floor to become wet and slippery. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the negligence of the defendant to be the maintenance of the platform above the slippery floor and failing to provide an intermediate step to assist his ascending to and descending from it. There is no denial that whatever dangers there were in the killing room were open, obvious and known to the plaintiff.2
Although the plaintiff’s work required him to be on the premises of the defendant he was not in its employ nor was he working under the direction of the defendant. He was free to get on and off the platform in any manner which he saw fit. He was no more than an invitee.3 The defendant owed him the duty to which an invitee was entitled. That duty ordinarily is that the owner or occupant of the premises will keep and maintain them in a reasonably safe condition and warn the invitee of latent defects or dangerous conditions-upon the property. The basis of this liability lies in the supposed superior knowledge of the dangerous condition of the premises on the part of the owner or occupant. By the overwhelming weight of authority recovery is not permitted where the danger is as obvious and as well known to the invitee as to the owner or occupant.4 This rule was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Knox v. Snow, *620Utah, 229 P.2d 874. There the owner or occupant of the premises operated .a gasoline and automobile service station. The plaintiff came in to the station desiring to purchase an automobile tire. After some discussion with the owner, the plaintiff proceeded oh through the station in to the grease room to inspect some tire inter liners. It was in broad daylight. The plaintiff slipped and fell into a grease pit and was injured. Recovery was denied upon the grounds that the plaintiff, a business invitee, was guilty of contributory negligence in not taking reasonable and sufficient precaution to avoid an obviously dangerous condition.
It is of little concern whether the defense is termed assumption of risk, contributory negligence, incurred risk or volenti non fit injuria, we arrive at the same conclusion when the dangerous condition is obvious or known to the invitee. 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 174.
Actually the effect of the majority opinion is that the defendant did not furnish the plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work which is the duty it owed to its own employees. Under Utah law án employee is deemed to have assumed the risk of all known and obvious dangers which he encounters in his employ.5 Thus if the plaintiff is to be classified as an employee of the defendant it would be necessary and logical that we apply the law of assumption of risk as though he were an employee. I think, however, that regardless of whether the duty required was that due to an employee or an invitee the plaintiff should not recover. If the duty owing was that due .an employee he is barred in Utah by the .assumption of risk doctrine. If he is an •invitee he cannot recover because the admitted facts are that the dangerous conditions were obvious and known to him.
I would reverse the judgment.

. The plaintiff described the floor to be “very slippery, and especially at that time of day, at quitting time. There is quite a bit of fat on the floor and a film of oil, practically like you would spray motor oil. It is just naturally slippery all over the floor, but in the gutter it is a little bit more, because the water carries particles of fat down there, and that is really the dirtiest part of the floor, is where the water is conveyed to that drain.”

. As to knowledge of this condition the plaintiff testified:
“Q. So that you had stepped on and off it hundreds of times, then before the day in question, hadn’t you? — A. I wouldn’t say hundreds of times up until that time.
“Q. At least a hundred? — A. We will say a hundred.
“Q. How did you get on this platform when you came to work; what was your usual method? — A. Well, I generally just took a big step on the platform. I guess it is the east end.
“Q. That is, you would step from the floor up on the platform? — A. Yes.
“Q. And then when you left the platform how would you customarily do that? —A. Step down. It is quite a stop. It is almost a little jump, to get down. At that time it was.- You could hardly call it a step. It was more of a jump; just a short jump.
“Q. And you knew the conditions there and you knew how far it was, in a general way? — A. Oh, yes.
“Q. You could see? — A. Yes.
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“Q. You mentioned, Mr. Schuster, the fact that the floor in this area was wet. That is customarily the case in a slaughter-house, isn’t it? — A. Yes.
“Q. And it is a condition that can be expected- at all times ? — A. Yes.
“Q. And you knew of that condition?—
A. At that time I recognized it very-well. I come out of a very cleanly operated plant, at Los Angeles, and then the-first thing I noticed, they didn’t have-enough janitor service there.
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“Q. So that you knew the way that this floor was being taken care of; you knew that? — A. Yes.
5! - * * *
“Q. So, of course, when you stepped off there you knew that that floor was-wet, didn’t you? — A. Yes.
“Q. And you knew that customarily it was somewhat slick? — A. It depends on how your foot hits it.
“Q. I say, you knew that? — A. It is-slick at all times.”

. Cudahy Packing Co. v. McBride, 8 Cir., 92 F.2d 737; Middleton v. P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 5 Cir., 213 F. 6; Hayward v. Downing, 112 Utah 508, 189 P.2d 442.

. Henry W. Cross Co. v. Burns, 8 Cir., 81 F.2d 856; McCready v. Southern Pac. Co., 9 Cir., 26 F.2d 569; Middleton v. P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 5 Cir., 213 F. 6; Hayward v. Downing, 112 Utah 508, 189 P.2d 442; Caron v. Grays Harbor County, 18 Wash.2d 397, 139 P.2d 626, 632, 148 A.L.R. 626; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Sec. 97; 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 50.

. Miller v. Western Pac. R. Co., 73 Utah 442, 274 P. 945; Laub v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co., 47 Utah 155, 152 P. 467; Dunn v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 28 Utah 478, 80 P. 311; Roth v. Eccles, 23 Utah 456, 79 P. 918; Higgins v. Southern Pac. Co., 26 Utah 104, 72 P. 690.