Court Opinion

ID: 9642410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:57:04.656364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:47.124670
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I agree with the disposition of this case and with what is said in the opinion of Judge SUTTON. In my opinion we have here presented' an estoppel ■ against an es-toppel. The Scharbauer’s deed with the covenant of general warranty operates against them. The contract on the part of Benge contained in the deed estops him and his successors in title from questioning the right of the Scharbauers to three-eighths of the bonuses, royalty, etc.
As recognized in the case of Duhig v. Peavey-Moore Lumber Company, 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878, a covenant of general warranty of title operates by the way of an estoppel. This covenant operates as an es-toppel against the Scharbauers. By the *240same token the contract contained in the reservation operates as an estoppel against Benge and his successors.
Benge availed himself of this offer, availed himself with full knowledge of all facts. The title to ⅛ of the minerals was clearly reserved by the reservation clause. Benge availing himself of this right is es-topped to deny the ⅜ interest in the royalty which was provided should be reserved for the Scharbauers. Corpus Juris Secun-dum states the rule as follows:
“An estoppel against an estoppel sets the matter at large; so, the setting up of an estoppel by deed may be prevented or offset by another such estoppel, or a different form of estoppel, against the party seeking to set it up.” 31 C. J.S., Estoppel, § 12, page 196.
See also Bigelow on Estoppel, 6th Ed. p. 392.
In the opinion of the writer Benge and his successors have estopped themselves from setting up the estoppel of the warranty as to the ⅜ interest involved herein. The Benge defendants are estopped by reason of their agreement — estopped themselves by availing themselves of the privilege contained in the reservation clause of the conveyance to them. No good reason appears why they should not be bound in the manner they attempted to bind themselves. No fraud appears, and the grantees in the deed from the Scharbauers had notice, constructive i'f not actual, of the outstanding one-fourth mineral interest. There is here exhibited a very typical case of estoppel to rely on an estoppel. See Jennings v. Russell, 209 Ark. 71, 189 S.W. 2d 656.
McGILL, J., concurs.