Court Opinion

ID: 9580579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:06:22.408897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:22.488211
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J., Dissenting.—
I
We have witnessed greater expansion of procedural due process in the last 7 years than in the previous 180-year period following ratification of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing” (1975) 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1267, 1273.) As this expansion has occurred, the response in one area after another has been to say, “If there, why not here?” Indeed, now that the United States Supreme Court has held that a child must be given “oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story” before he may be temporarily suspended from school (Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 581 [42 L.Ed.2d 725, 739, 95 S.Ct. 729]), it is probably too late in the day to argue that a child does not have the right to a “due process hearing” before being committed to a mental institution.
However, granting that Roger is entitled to due process, the question .remains, in the now hackneyed formula, “What process is due?” (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481 [33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494, 92 S.Ct. 2593].) Unlike- the majority, I do not believe that due process requires trial-type procedure here. To the contrary, I am convinced that the present system could with very little modification meet appropriate standards.
Due process does, as the majority contend, require that the hearing be held before a “neutral factfinder.” However, contrary to the majority’s assumption, this requirement does not narrow the list of eligibles to judges and administrative hearing officers. In Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254 [25 L.Ed.2d 287, 90 S.Ct. 1011], the high court “pointedly did not require that the hearing on termination of [welfare] benefits be *942conducted by a judicial oEcer or even before the traditional ‘neutral and detached’ officer; it required only that the hearing be conducted by some person other than one initially dealing with the case.” (Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. 471, 486 [33 L.Ed.2d 484, 497].) Accordingly, the court held in Morrissey that in the parole revocation context due process would be satisfied if the prerevocation hearing were held by a parole oEcer not previously involved in the case and if the revocation hearing were held by the parole board. (408 U.S. at pp. 486, 489 [33 L.Ed.2d at pp. 497-499]; see Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 570-571 [41 L.Ed.2d 935, 959, 94 S.Ct. 2963] [prison oEcials may conduct hearing on disciplinary infraction which may result in loss of “good time” credit].)
The present system was established by legislative and executive action. It is not our prerogative to insist on greater changes in the system than are constitutionally required. Therefore, we should uphold existing procedure by recognizing that the mental health professionals on the hospital staff qualify as “neutral factfinders.” Aside from the fact that a hearing by hospital staff would occur after admission, a point discussed below, the majority’s only objection to such a hearing is that “the diametrically opposed views to which precommitment and postadmission evaluation led in the instant case” allegedly demonstrate that “evaluation by the hospital staff is [not] adequate to avoid misdiagnosis.” {Ante, p. 937.) This argument, of course, proves too much. When a case is heard by the superior court, Court of Appeal, this court and the United States Supreme Court, the 20 judges may be evenly divided on the applicable principles of law. But that would not demonstrate their incompetence. The judicial robe is not a magic cloak. It should be obvious—but apparently it is not—that neither judges nor administrative hearing oEcers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments. (Cf. In re Bye (1974) 12 Cal.3d 96, 107 [115 Cal.Rptr. 382, 524 P.2d 854] (“[A] revocation decision in a civil addict program is often a medical one and as such is necessarily less subject to objective scrutiny by a lay hearing oEcer.”).)
As to timing, due process does not require that the hearing be held prior to the minor’s admission to the hospital. The majority quote the statement in Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371, 379 [28 L.Ed.2d 113, 119, 91 S.Ct. 780], that due process requires a person be given “ ‘an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.’ ” {Ante, p. 937.) Upon reading this quotation one is *943inclined to conclude, as the majority urge, “Surely, the individual’s interest in personal liberty can be accorded no less protection.” (Ante, p. 937.) However, one then recalls that in parole revocation proceedings due process is satisfied if the hearings, even the so-called “prerevocation” hearing, are held after the parolee has been deprived of his conditional liberty. As this court stated in People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 460 [105 Cal.Rptr. 305, 503 P.2d 1313], “[W]e read Morrissey as applicable only in those instances where an actual seizure of the individual has occurred. It is this loss of liberty which compels the procedures set forth in Morrissey.” A child’s interest in liberty is qualified for very different reasons than is a parolee’s, but it is qualified, nevertheless, as the majority recognize. (Ante, p. 934.)
Moreover, even assuming that Boddie states the applicable rule, this case comes within the declared exception. Roger’s life may have been at stake. He had allegedly threatened to kill himself. Surely the state had a sufficient interest in preventing this disturbed youngster from taking his own life to justify postponing the hearing until he had been admitted to the hospital and helped through this crisis. The safeguards against abuse built into existing procedure are ample. Roger’s mother, who presumptively has his best interests at heart, initiated admission proceedings and a community mental health professional, after consultation with hospital staff, concluded that Roger was in need of treatment that could not be provided within the community.
Finally, due process does not require that the minor be represented by counsel. It is popularly held “Under our adversary system the role of counsel is not to make sure the truth is ascertained but to advance his client’s cause by any ethical means. Within the limits of professional propriety, causing delay and sowing confusion not only are his right but may be his duty.” (Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing” (1975) 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1267, 1288; see Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View (1975) 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1031.) In Wolffy. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [41 L.Ed.2d 935, 94 S.Ct. 2963], the high court recognized in the prison context that “[t]he insertion of counsel into the disciplinary process would inevitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further correctional goals.” (418 U.S. at p. 570 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 959].) The court thus declined to hold that inmates had a right either to appointed or even to retained counsel, instead indicating that where an illiterate inmate was involved, or where the issues were sufficiently complex to make the inmate unable “to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehen*944sion of the case,” he should be permitted to seek the aid of fellow prisoners, or if that is prohibited, to have “adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff.” (Id.) As the questions presented in this proceeding do not involve guilt or innocence, but necessity and availability of treatment, the youngster should be assisted not by a lawyer but by a mental health professional from his own community having ready access to witnesses and familiarity with community resources.
The judiciary is developing a messianic image of itself. It is coming to believe that salvation for society’s ills lies in adversary hearings. I cannot subscribe to that view.
II
Resting the decision in this case upon both the state and the federal Constitutions is inconsistent with our stated policy that “we do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us.” (People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 667 [128 Cal.Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000]; see People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 481, 484-485 [82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580]; Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 65-66 [195 P.2d 1]; Estate of Johnson (1903) 139 Cal. 532, 534 [73 P. 424].) Clearly, we are not required to reach federal constitutional questions to dispose of this matter if, as the majority hold, the state Constitution accords petitioner the very rights which he asserts have been denied him. Holding that current state procedure for admission of minors to state hospitals denies minors 14 years of age and older due process under article I, section 7(a) of the California Constitution should end the matter; there is no continuing actionable state conduct to be examined under the federal due process clause.
Professor Hans Linde argues that when the constitutionality of state action is challenged in state court under both state and federal constitutions and the action is nullified on the basis of the state constitution, it is not only unnecessary but “illogical” to proceed to the federal constitutional question. “The state constitution is part of the state law, and decisions applying it are part of the total state action in a case. When the state court holds that a given sta,te law, regulation, ordinance, or official action is invalid and must be set aside under the state constitution, then the state is not violating the fourteenth amendment.
*945“The point is obvious when a conclusion such as ‘Regulation X denies defendant’s rights under the fourteenth amendment and the corresponding section of [the state constitution]’ is broken down into its component parts. When a judgment holds with the defendant that the regulation is invalid under the state constitution, it cannot move on to a second proposition invalidating the state’s action under the federal Constitution. By the action of the state court under the state constitution, the state has accorded the claimant the due process and equal protection commanded by the fourteenth amendment, not denied it. While a defendant may have both a state and a federal constitutional claim to present, legally these are not cumulative but alternative: ‘If this official action is not forbidden by the state constitution, as I claim it is, then the state denies me a federal right.’ ” (Linde, Without “Due Process”—Unconstitutional Law in Oregon (1970)49 Ore.L.Rev. 125, 133-134.)
Alternatively, it has been argued that when state action is challenged as violative of both state law and the United States Constitution, a state court should first address the federal constitutional question, and if it be resolved against the state, inquire no further. “As the [federal Constitution] expressly prohibits the described state of conduct, we need not inquire further and to do so only emphasizes matters which should be of no concern to us. [fj There is no stronger statement of governing policy considerations in any particular circumstance than an express declaration embodied in our federal Constitution. Where, as here, such a declaration is manifestly dispositive of the single issue.no good purpose is served by a concurrent examination of state or federal policies, or legislative histories, in an attempt to ascertain that the supreme law of the land must be adhered to because lesser policy considerations likewise require the same result.” (Jolicoeur v. Mihaly (1971) 5 Cal.3d 565, 583 [96 Cal.Rptr. 697, 488 P.2d 1] (Wright, C. J., concurring).)
However, the majority’s failure even to pay lip service to our policy against reaching constitutional issues “unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us” is the lesser of their derelictions. A matter of greater concern is that by relying on both the state and federal Constitutions this court, in effect, prevents any other institution, state or federal, from reconsidering the issues presented by this case. By invoking the state Constitution this court insulates itself from review by the United States Supreme Court. (See Jankovich v. Toll Road Comm’n. (1965) 379 U.S. 487, 491-492 [13 L.Ed.2d 439, 442-443, 85 S.Ct. 493]; Herb v. Pitcairn (1945) 324 U.S. 117; 125-128 [89 L.Ed. 789, 794-796, 65 S.Ct. 459]; see also Gee v. Brown (1975) 14 Cal.3d 571, 576-577 [122 Cal.Rptr. *946231, 536 P.2d 1017] (Clark, J., dissenting).) By resting its decision on the federal Constitution as well this court severely inhibits political review through the legislative or initiative process. No court should presume that it is so immune from error that it may foreclose every means of challenging its decisions.
“Decisions based on independent state and federal grounds may substantially discourage any effort to use the state political process to change the relevant state law, because amendment to the state constitution or laws cannot correct the federal defect and therefore cannot change the result of the state court’s decision. Of course, the citizens or the legislature may proceed with an amendment to the state laws with the notion that another court test involving only the federal question can be instituted once the state law is changed. But it would seem to require a very high degree of organization and commitment to achieve political reform in such circumstances; rather than changing the effect of the state court decision, all reform of state law will accomplish is a ‘clear deck’ upon which a new law suit may be brought. The presence of the federal ground will therefore produce an insulation from the political process beyond that which a state court would otherwise enjoy when it interprets the provision of state law in a fashion unsatisfactory to a substantial portion of the state’s citizens. ... [U] If a state court bases a decision on independent state and federal grounds to gain this ‘insulation effect,’ its action is illegitimate. Such action uses the limitations of the power of federal courts in the federal system to increase the state court’s decision-making power vis-a-vis other branches of state government, perhaps beyond the effective control of even a super-majority of the state’s citizens.” (Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground (1972) 45 So.Cal.L.Rev. 750, 757-758.)
As the Attorney General observed, “Not only does the invocation of both constitutions to end review betray a distrust of other institutions, it is also shortsighted. Possessed of neither the purse nor the sword, the power and influence of this Court are in direct proportion to the respect which its decisions command. Decisions which this Court renders unreviewable will undermine public trust and confidence in the long run.”
Moreover, this court has been unpredictable in determining whether to base a decision on the state or the federal Constitution, or both. Decisions involving search and seizure claims now routinely cite both charters. (See, e.g., People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 268 [127 *947Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333]; People v. Scott (1976) 16 Cal.3d 242, 250 [128 Cal.Rptr. 39, 546 P.2d 327].) By contrast, one significant equal protection decision relied solely on the United States Constitution. (Bakke v. Regents of University of California (1976) 18 Cal.3d 34, 38, 63 [132 Cal.Rptr. 680,553 P.2d 1152], cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 [51 L.Ed.2d 535, 97 S.Ct. 1098].) This uncertainty makes constitutional litigation difficult for the parties, who can only guess which constitutional document will be interpreted. One commentator has decried this court’s failure to apply the independent state ground doctrine in a “principled fashion.” (The Supreme Court of California 1975-1976: Criminal Procedure: Impeachment with Constitutionally Infirm Evidence (1977) 65 Cal.L.Rev. 393, 405; see also Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution (1977) 29 Stan.L.Rev. 297.) The point is well taken. This unpredictability reveals an absence of principle.