Court Opinion

ID: 9844597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:05:12.314241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:38.535818
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it determines to reverse and remand this cause on the basis that issues of material fact remain for determination on appellants’ second claim relating to the existence of contracts for the sale and conveyance of Harbaugh Motor Company. As to that portion of the majority opinion which relates to the claim of appellants based on the guardianship, I dissent.
I.C. § 15-5-210 provides in pertinent part, “A guardian’s authority and responsibility terminates * * * upon the minor’s * * * attainment of majority
*299As pointed out in the majority opinion, such termination does not effect his liability for his acts as guardian or his obligation to account to the ward. Herein, one of the wards, Myron Edward Harbaugh, reached the age of majority, and the guardian’s authority and responsibility terminated, 20 years before the filing of the instant complaint. As to Bert D. Harbaugh, he reached the age of majority, and thus terminated the guardian’s authority and responsibility, 15 years prior to the filing of the complaint.
Inexplicably, the majority does not discuss cases cited and relied upon by the respondents, such as Southern Surety Co. v. Beal, 134 Okl. 118, 272 P. 375 (1928), wherein it was said:
“The moment a ward is emancipated from the authority of his guardian, by reaching the age prescribed by law, his cause of action is complete and the statute of limitations begins to run. The reason assigned for this is, that instantly upon his arriving at age, he is emancipated from the control of the guardian, and the trust ceases to be a subsisting trust by its own limitation. From the moment the ward reaches the age when the law makes him free, what the guardian owes the ward becomes a debt for which he may immediately sue. All money due him and the property belonging to him are from that moment legally demandable, and he may sue the guardian on his bond for its payment and delivery. The right of action being then ‘complete,’ the statute begins to run from that time.” At 377.
See also Rorem v. Rorem, 244 Iowa 980, 59 N.W.2d 210 (1953); Courson v. Tollison, 226 Ala. 530, 147 So. 635 (1933); Sweet v. Lowry, 123 Minn. 13, 142 N.W. 882 (1913); In re Rahm’s Estate, 219 Pa. 203, 68 A. 186 (1907); Wycoff v. Michael, 95 Iowa 559, 64 N.W. 608 (1895).
Hence, I believe the case at bar is readily distinguishable from those Idaho cases cited in the majority opinion in that, in accordance with the above cited cases, there is a distinct difference between the ordinary trust situation and that of a guardian-ward. Rather clearly, in a trust situation, the duty as trustee to the beneficiary continues by operation of law until the trust is terminated. In the guardian-ward situation, the relationship is terminated by operation of law at the time the ward reaches majority.
In Olympia Mining & Milling Co. v. Kerns, 24 Idaho 481, 135 P. 255 (1913), the court was dealing with a trust and the court held that not only was the statute of limitations applicable, but also a defense of laches was available.
In Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676 (1935), the court was dealing with property held under a constructive trust brought about by the “perfidy of his son.” The court held that in cases involving fraud a cause of action was not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud, but nevertheless in that fact situation, the court applied a three year period of limitation and held that the cause of action was barred.
The case of Shepherd v. Dougan, 58 Idaho 543, 76 P.2d 442 (1937), indicates little but that since the trustee continued to accept monies from the beneficiary of the trust and actively continued the trust in operation, no right of action accrued until the trust was repudiated and the action therein was filed within four months of the repudiation of the trust. Further, on rehearing, a four member court filed four separate opinions.
As to Young v. Young, 201 Ark. 984, 147 S.W.2d 736 (1941), the court there was careful to note that the action was commenced within three years of the time that the ward reached the age of majority. In Bagwell v. Hinton, 205 S.C. 377, 32 S.E.2d 147 (1944), the court said only “[wjhile the statute of limitations is not applicable in an action between a cestui que trust and a fiduciary, so long as that relationship exists, a claim may be barred by laches, but the application of the principle of laches must be determined by the facts in each individual case.” At 156 (Emphasis added.) In Bagwell the guardian had died prior to the ward attaining majority and there was no administration had on the estate of the *300guardian for six years. Less than one year after the administration of the estate of the guardian was commenced, the ward brought action and such was not held to be barred by the statute of limitations. The majority places reliance on the case of In re Walls’ Guardianship, 179 Misc. 924, 38 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sur.Ct.1942), and that case does indeed support the opinion of the majority herein. I would only note that such opinion was issued by a surrogate court (roughly equivalent to our magistrate court) and cited no authority in concrete support of its holding.
In cases which admittedly involve different relationships, i. e. heirs and state administration, the Idaho court has spoken to the disability of minors and the running of statute of limitations upon the attainment of the majority. In Chapin v. Stewart, 71 Idaho 306, 230 P.2d 998 (1951), the court discussed the imputation of knowledge resulting from documents of public record. It was there stipulated that the plaintiffs did not know of their interest until about one year before the initiation of the action. The court stated:
“At the time of the conveyance by the joint tenants to Daniel Kennedy, and the payment to appellants’ [plaintiffs’] mother of their share of the proceeds, the appellants were minors, 12, 15 and 17 years of age. The statute of limitations, of course, did not commence to run against them until they reached majority. * * * The youngest came of age in 1927, 22 years before they appeared to assert their rights in this action. Even though they were nonresidents of the state, that is too long a period of sleeping on their rights, to permit them now to assert that they did not have notice of the character of the possession of their uncle and aunt, Daniel and Pearl Kennedy, or that they were ignorant of their rights or of any fraud or mistake that may have been involved in the distribution or sale of the estate of their uncle William. The record fully supports the findings and judgment of the trial court that the appellants’ claims are barred not only by limitations, but by laches as well.” At 311, 230 P.2d at 1001.
See also Coe v. Sloan, 16 Idaho 49, 100 P. 354 (1909).
In summary, I would hold that in accordance with the authorities, the guardianship terminated at the time that the wards here reached the age of majority. As of the time of attainment of majority the statute of limitations began to run. I would hold that the assertion of the appellants that they never obtained actual knowledge of the existence of the guardianship until, and fortuitously, after the death of their father should be rejected on the basis that they are held to have constructive notice of the public records of the county. I would affirm the action of the trial court insofar as it relates to the guardianship.
DONALDSON, J., concurs.