Court Opinion

ID: 9790602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:55:46.728995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.504720
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING
JACKSON, Justice.
In a Petition for Rehearing, plaintiffs Peevyhouse have raised certain questions not presented in the original briefs on appeal.
*117They insist that the trial court excluded ■evidence as to the total value of the premises concerned, and, in effect, that they have not had their “day in court”. This argument arises by reason of the fact that their farm consists not merely of the 60 acres covered by the coal mining lease, but ■includes other lands as well.
Plaintiffs originally pleaded two causes of action against the defendant mining company. The first one was for damages for breach of contract; the second one was for damages to the water well and borne of plaintiffs, because of the use of excessively large charges of dynamite or blasting powder in close proximity to the home and well.
Numbered paragraph 2 of plaintiffs’ petition alleges that they own and live upon 60 acres of land which are specifically described. This is the only land described in the petition, and there is no allegation as to the ownership or leasing of any other lands.
Page 4 of the transcript of evidence reveals that near the beginning of the trial, plaintiff Peevyhouse was asked a question concerning improvements he had made to his property. His answer was “For one thing I built a new home on the place in 1951, and along about that time I was building a pasture. And I would say ninety percent of this 120 acres is in good grass.” (Emphasis supplied.) Mr. Watts, defense counsel, then objected “to any testimony about the property, other than the 160 acres”. (It is obvious that he means “60” instead of “160”.) Further proceedings were as follows:
“The Court: The objection will be sustained as to any other part. Go ahead.
“Mr. McCornell (attorney for plaintiffs) : Comes now the plaintiff and dismisses the second cause of action without prejudice.”
It thus appears that plaintiffs made no complaint as to the court’s exclusion of evidence concerning lands other than the 60 acres described in their petition.
Pages 7 and 8 of the transcript show that later during direct examination of Mr. Peevyhouse, the following occurred:
“Q. (By Mr. McConnell) Now, Mr. Peevyhouse, I ask you to step down here and I ask you if you are familiar with this sketch or drawing?
⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅜
“A. Yes. I’ve got about 40 acres here, and here would be 20, and there would be 20 on this sketch. And I’ve got leased land lying in here, 80 acres. “Mr. Watts: If your Honor please, I object to anything except the 60 acres involved in this lawsuit.
“The Court: Sustained.
“Q. (By Mr. McConnell) Will you point out to the jury, the boundary line shown of your property?
* * * * * *
“A. That blue is where the water is actually standing at the present time. Up until a short time ago this area here cáme over that far. And this spring all of it would run, come in here out this way and through here, spreading over this land and all below it. And at the present time this is washed out here.
“Mr. Watts: If your Honor please, I object to that as not the proper measure of damages.
“The Court: The obj ection will be sustained.”
This testimony of Mr. Peevyhouse is difficult for us to follow, even with the exhibits in the case before us. However, no complaint was made by plaintiffs, or any suggestion that the court was in error in excluding this testimony.
The defendant offered the testimony of five witnesses in the trial court; four of them testified as to “diminution in value”. They were not cross examined by plaintiffs.
In their motion for new trial, plaintiffs did not complain that they had been prevented from offering evidence as to the diminution in value of their lands; on the *118contrary, they affirmatively complained of the trial court’s action in admitting evidence of the defendant on that point.
In the original brief of plaintiffs in error (Peevyhouse) filed in this court there appears the following language at page 4:
“ * * * Near the outset of the trial plaintiffs dismissed their second cause of action without prejudice: further, it was stipulated * * *. It was further stipulated that the only issue remaining in the lawsuit was the proof and measure of damages to which plaintiffs were entitled * * (Emphasis supplied.)
In the answer brief of Garland Coal & Mining Co., at page 3, there appears the following language:
“Defendant offered evidence that the total value of the property involved before the mining operation would be $60.00 per acre, and $11.00 per acre after the mining operation (60 acres at $49.00 per acre is $2940.00). Other evidence was that the property was worth $5.00 to $15.00 per acre after the mining, but before the repairs; and would be worth an increase of $2.00 to $5.00 per acre after the repairs had been made (60 acres at $5.00 per acre is $300.00) (Tr. 96-97, 135, 137-138, 138-141, 143-145, 156, 158).”
At page 18 of the same brief there is another statement to the effect that the “amount of diminution in value of the land” was $300.00.
About two months after the answer brief was filed in this court, plaintiffs filed a reply brief. The reply brief makes no reference at all to the language of the answer brief above quoted and does not deny that the diminution in value shown by the record amounts to $300.00. On the contrary, it contains the following language at page 5:
“ * * * Plaintiffs in error pointed out in their initial brief that this evidence concerning land values was objectionable as being incompetent and refused to cross-examine or offer rebuttal for the reason that they did not choose to waive their objections to the competency of the evidence by disproving defendant in error’s allegations as to land values. We strongly urged at the trial below, and still do, that market value of the land has no application * *
Our extended reference to the pleadings, testimony and prior briefs in this case has not been solely for the purpose of showing that plaintiffs failed to complain of the court’s rulings. Our purpose, rather, has. been to demonstrate the plan and theory upon which plaintiffs tried their case below, and upon which they argued it in the prior briefs on appeal.
The whole record in this case justifies the conclusion that plaintiffs tried their case upon the theory that the “cost of performance” would be the sole measure of damages and that they would recognize no other. In view of the whole record in this case and the original briefs on appeal, we conclude that they so tried it with notice that defendant would contend for the “diminution in value” rule. The testimony to which they specifically refer in the petition for rehearing shows that the trial court properly excluded defendant’s evidence concerning lands other than the 60 acres described in the petition because such evidence was not within the scope of the pleadings. At no time did plaintiffs ask permission to amend their petition, either with or without prejudice to trial, so as to describe all of the lands they own or lease, and no evidence was admitted which could broaden the scope of the petition.
Plaintiffs’ petition described 60 acres of land only; plaintiffs offered no evidence on the question of “diminution in value” and objected to similar evidence offered by the defendant; their motion for new trial contained no allegation that they had been prevented from offering evidence on this question; in their reply brief they did not controvert the allegation in defendant’s answer brief that the record showed a “dim*119inution in value” of only $300.00; and in view of the stipulation they admittedly made in the trial court, their statement in petition for rehearing that the court’s instructions on the measure of damages came as a “complete surprise” and “did not afford them the opportunity to prepare and introduce evidence under the ‘diminution in value’ rule” is not supported by the record.
We think plaintiffs’ present position is that of a plaintiff in any damage suit who has failed to prove his damages — opposed by a defendant who has proved plaintiff’s damages; and that plaintiffs’ complaint that the record does not show the total “diminution in value” to their lands comes too late. It is well settled that a party will not be permitted to change his theory of the case upon appeal. Knox v. Eason Oil Co., 190 Okl. 627, 126 P.2d 247.
Also, plaintiffs’ expressed fear that by introducing evidence on the question of “diminution in value” they would have waived their objection to similar evidence by defendant was not justified. Vogel v. Fisher et al., 203 Okl. 657, 225 P.2d 346; 53 Am.Jur. Trial, Sec. 144.
It is suggested in a brief of amici curiae that our decision in this case has resulted in an impairment of the obligation of the contract of the parties, in violation of Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States, and in that connection the only case cited is Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat 122, 17 U.S. 1229, 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819). In their brief, amici curiae quote language from the Lawyer’s Edition notes of Mr. Stephen K. Williams, in which he summarized the “points and authorities” of one of the counsel appearing before the U. S. Supreme Court.
Sturges v. Crowninshield was an early case in which the Supreme Court considered the power of a state to enact bankruptcy laws, and the extent, if any, to which such power is limited by Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution. The contracts concerned consisted of promissory notes executed in March, 1811, and the bankruptcy law under which the promisor claimed a discharge was not enacted until April 3, 1811. In a memorable opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall, the court held that insofar as the bankruptcy law purported to discharge the obligations of contracts executed before its enactment, it was unconstitutional and void.
The same situation does not exist here. 23 O.S.1961 §§ 96 and 97, cited in our original opinion, were a part of the Revised Laws of 1910 (R.L.1910) Sections 2889 and 2890) and have been in force, in this state, in unchanged form, since that codification was adopted by the legislature in 1911. The lease contract concerned in the case now before us was not executed until 1954.
 Nor do we agree that our decision itself (as opposed to the statutes cited therein as controlling) impairs the obligations of the contract concerned. It may be conceded that at one time there was respectable authority for the proposition that the “contract” clause was violated by a judicial decision which overruled prior decisions, upon the strength of which contract rights.had been acquired. In this connection, it should be noted that our decision overrules no prior holdings of this court upon which the contracting parties could be said to have relied. Even if it did,
“ * * * it is now definitely and authoritatively settled that such prohibition in federal and state constitutions relate to legislative action and not to judicial decisions. Thus, they do not apply to the decision of a state court, where such decision does not expressly, or by necessary implication, give effect to a subsequent law of tire state whereby the obligation of the contract is impaired. * * * ” 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 280.
To the same effect, see 12 Am.Jur. Constitutional Law, Sec. 398.
Our decision herein overrules no prior holdings of this court, and it does not give effect to a subsequent law of this state. It therefore cannot be said to impair the *120obligations of the contract of the parties here concerned.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
HALLEY, V. C. J., and WELCH, DAVISON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
BLACKBIRD, C. J., and WILLIAMS, IRWIN and BERRY, JJ., dissent.