Court Opinion

ID: 9916941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 21:00:58.88744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:10.459997
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11787   Document: 86-1      Date Filed: 01/10/2024   Page: 1 of 49

                                                             [PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-11787
                         ____________________

        YOUNG ISRAEL OF TAMPA, INC.,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        HILLSBOROUGH AREA REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

                                                   Defendant-Appellant,

        ADELEE LE GRAND, et al.,

                                                            Defendants.
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11787

                              ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-00294-VMC-CPT
                            ____________________

        Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and GRIMBERG, * District
        Judge.
        JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
               The Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Authority has a
        policy which prohibits placing, on its vehicles and property, adver-
        tisements that “primarily promote a religious faith or religious or-
        ganization.” Young Israel of Tampa, Inc., an Orthodox Jewish syn-
        agogue, sued HART in federal court, alleging that its rejection of a
        proposed Chanukah on Ice advertisement was unconstitutional.
               The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
        Young Israel on two grounds. First, HART’s policy violated the
        Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because it discrimi-
        nated on the basis of viewpoint. Second, even if HART’s policy
        was viewpoint neutral, it was unreasonable because it lacked ob-
        jective and workable standards and its application and enforcement
        were inconsistent and haphazard.

        * The Honorable Steven D. Grimberg, United States District Judge for the
        Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
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        22-11787                Opinion of the Court                          3

               Based on these rulings, the district court permanently en-
        joined HART from rejecting any advertisement on the ground that
        it primarily promotes a religious faith or religious organization.
        The injunction covered not only HART’s current policy, but also
        any future policies.
               In its appeal, HART asks us to overturn the district court’s
        summary judgment order and hold that its policy prohibiting ad-
        vertisements that primarily promote a religious faith or religious
        organization is a permissible content (i.e., subject-matter) regula-
        tion of a nonpublic forum, and does not constitute improper view-
        point discrimination. We decline to answer this question of first
        impression—which has generated a small circuit split—because we
        affirm the district court’s alternative ruling that HART’s policy,
        even if viewpoint neutral, is unreasonable due to a lack of objective
        and workable standards.
                                           I
               At summary judgment, we review the record in the light
        most favorable to HART, and draw all reasonable inferences in its
        favor. See Carrizosa v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 47 F.4th 1278, 1328
        (11th Cir. 2022). Having said that, the relevant facts in this case are
        largely undisputed.
                                           A
               HART, a public transit agency, provides mass transportation
        in the City of Tampa and Hillsborough County. For a fee, it places
        advertisements on its vehicles and property. In 2013, HART
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                     22-11787

        adopted a policy prohibiting advertisements that “primarily pro-
        mote a religious faith or religious organization.” The policy does
        not define the word “religious” or the term “primarily promote.” 1
               HART refuses to accept primarily religious advertisements
        because of its “interests in ensuring safe and reliable transportation
        services and operating in a manner that maintains demand of its
        service to multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and religiously diverse rid-
        ership, without alienating any riders, potential riders, employees,
        or advertisers.” HART’s policy is “intended to maintain a safe en-
        vironment on its vehicles without unnecessary controversy, risks
        of violence, or risks of vandalism while maintaining employee mo-
        rale.” According to HART, religious advertisements could “be
        deemed either controversial” or “create a bad experience for [its]
        customers,” particularly “if somebody didn’t agree with [it] and . .
        . they’re upset about it.” HART, however, admits that it does not
        know “what would specifically upset customers on religious ads,”
        and concedes that it has no record of disruptions, vandalism, or
        threats of violence attributable to any advertisement. 2

        1 The policy contains other content-based prohibitions, including bans on par-

        tisan political advertisements and advertisements containing profanity, dis-
        criminatory messages, or depicting violence. Those aspects of the policy are
        not at issue here.

        2 The record does reference at least one instance of some limited complaints

        in 2013 when HART was considering running advertisements from the Coun-
        cil on American-Islamic Relations Florida deemed the #MyJihad campaign
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        22-11787                  Opinion of the Court                                5

                Pursuant to its policy, HART has selected a contractor to
        conduct an initial review of proposed advertisements. The con-
        tractor is “responsible for the administration of the HART adver-
        tising program consistent with HART’s adopted policies and guide-
        lines.” If a dispute remains unresolved after the contractor has de-
        termined that an advertisement is inconsistent with the advertising
        policy, then an “appeal may be made to the CEO or [COO] of
        HART or his/her designee for final resolution.” The “[a]pplication
        of HART’s advertising guidelines are fact specific and analysis of a
        permissible ad[vertisement], once brought to the CEO (or her de-
        signee), is done on a fact-specific basis, with assistance from coun-
        sel, when necessary.”
                Significantly, HART acknowledges that “there is no specific
        training or written guidance to interpret its . . . policy.” Laurie
        Gage, an employee of HART’s advertising contractor, testified
        that, outside of HART’s written policy itself, there are no guidance
        documents, advisory opinions, or other materials available to help
        her implement or interpret the policy. Ms. Gage has never re-
        ceived any training on how to apply the policy, and she explained
        that if there was ever any question or concern about whether an
        advertisement was permissible under the policy, she would for-
        ward the issue to HART.

        and the CAIR-FL Diversity campaign. HART concedes that these limited com-
        plaints did not amount to disruptions, incidents of vandalism, or threats of vi-
        olence.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11787

               Tyler Rowland, HART’s communication and creative ser-
        vices manager and corporate representative, is responsible for re-
        viewing proposed advertisements. Like Ms. Gage, he testified that
        HART does not provide any guidance documents, advisory opin-
        ions, or other materials to help interpret or apply the policy. He
        also confirmed that HART does not provide training on the policy.
        When determining whether an advertisement “primarily pro-
        mot[es]” a religious faith or organization, he acts on a case-by-case
        basis, depending on the advertisement’s “design and . . . messag-
        ing.”
                HART concedes that its policy allows “different people in
        the same roles [to] have different methodologies.” Although
        HART says that it is “not part of [its] practice” to review organiza-
        tional websites to determine if an advertisement is primarily reli-
        gious, Ms. Gage testified that she might review a religious organi-
        zation’s website to determine if an advertisement is primarily reli-
        gious depending on “[w]hat was going on with [her] day.” She ex-
        plained that the application of the policy varies based on her under-
        standing of the symbolism in an advertisement as religious. For in-
        stance, an advertisement featuring an image of Jesus Christ would
        result in her asking the organization whether it wanted to “pursue”
        the matter further, because she knows that “Jesus Christ is associ-
        ated with religion.” But if she “didn’t know that,” “then [she] prob-
        ably wouldn’t have a conversation, and [she] would just submit
        [the matter] to HART.”
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        22-11787              Opinion of the Court                       7

                                        B
                For more than 14 years, Young Israel has hosted a Chanukah
        on Ice celebration, which it has historically promoted through ad-
        vertising in Jewish media and on Facebook. Young Israel’s Chanu-
        kah on Ice event begins with an hour of ice skating with Jewish
        music playing and Jewish food available. Then the rabbi lights a
        large ice menorah and offers blessings. Attendees sing Jewish songs
        and the rabbi speaks about the Chanukah miracle—oil in the holy
        temple, which was meant to last only one day, lasted eight days.
        Chanukah on Ice is a “very big event” with “at least 200 people”
        typically in attendance. The event is part of the synagogue’s out-
        reach to the community and “offers a crucial opportunity to foster
        Jewish identity during a season many associate with Christmas.”
                In October of 2020, Young Israel sent HART a proposed ad-
        vertisement for its Chanukah on Ice event at the Advent Health
        Center Ice Rink, which is near the synagogue on a HART bus line.
        The advertisement included—in addition to time, place, and con-
        tact information—images of a menorah, a dreidel, and skaters, and
        stated that the event would “featur[e] lighting of a sculpted Grand
        Ice Menorah and ice skating to Jewish music around the flaming
        menorah.” For the reader’s benefit, we reproduce the advertise-
        ment here.
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11787

        Young Israel wanted the advertisement to run in the HART transit
        system from late November through December.
                Ms. Gage rejected Young Israel’s advertisement because
        “HART does not allow religious affiliation advertising[.]” Young
        Israel appealed, and HART’s CEO, communications manager, and
        legal counsel met to discuss the rejection of the Chanukah on Ice
        advertisement. They collectively concluded that, “[b]ased off . . .
        legal counsel’s knowledge of what the menorah meant,” the adver-
        tisement primarily focused on a “religious-based icon.” As a result,
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        22-11787                  Opinion of the Court                           9

        Young Israel’s advertisement violated HART’s prohibition on reli-
        gious advertisements.
              Mr. Rowland then sent an email to Young Israel with “sug-
        gested edits.” Those edits consisted of removing the image of the
                                                           3
        menorah and all uses of the word “menorah.”
               Young Israel replied that HART’s proposed changes were
        both “offensive and not possible to make” because “the lighting of
        the menorah is a central aspect of the Orthodox Jewish celebration
        of Chanukah.” Young Israel requested that HART approve its
        “ad[vertisement] as originally designed.” But the following day,
        HART formally refused to run the Chanukah on Ice advertisement.
        HART said that its decision was “consistent with prior determina-
        tions involving similar advertisement requests under th[e] policy.”
                                             C
               Young Israel responded to HART’s rejection of its advertise-
        ment with a federal lawsuit. Its complaint asserted claims for vio-
        lations of the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
        Amendment, as well as claims for violations of the Due Process and
        Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Follow-
        ing discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment.
              Young Israel argued that it was entitled to summary judg-
        ment because HART’s policy violated the First Amendment’s Free
        Speech Clause in several ways. First, it discriminated on the basis

        3 Mr. Rowland testified that if HART had known more about Judaism, it would

        have proposed eliminating the dreidel as well.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-11787

        of viewpoint. Second, even if it was viewpoint-neutral, the policy
        constituted an unreasonable content-based restriction. Third, it
        was standardless and arbitrary. Young Israel also asserted that
        HART’s policy violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
        clause because it singled out religion for disfavored treatment.
                HART, on the other hand, maintained that summary judg-
        ment should be granted in its favor on all of Young Israel’s claims.
        With respect to the claims based on the Free Speech Clause, HART
        made several arguments. First, its property and vehicles were non-
        public forums where speech could be reasonably restricted. Sec-
        ond, its policy was a reasonable content-based restriction. Third,
        its policy had not been arbitrarily or inconsistently applied.
              The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
        Young Israel. It held that HART’s advertising policy violated the
        Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and found it unneces-
        sary to address Young Israel’s other claims. See Young Israel of
        Tampa, Inc. v. Hillsborough Area Regional Transit Auth., 582 F. Supp.
        3d 1159 (M.D. Fla. 2022).
               In the district court’s view, the policy discriminated on the
        basis of viewpoint because HART allowed advertisements for a
        secular holiday event with ice skating and seasonal food, but disal-
        lowed an ice skating event with seasonal food that was in celebra-
        tion of Chanukah. HART’s prohibition on advertisements that
        “primarily promote a religious faith or organization” targeted the
        “specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
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        22-11787                  Opinion of the Court                               11

        speaker” because HART “expressly suggested edits to [Young Is-
        rael’s] ad[vertisement] that removed all references to and images
        of the menorah, which both parties agree[d] is considered a Jewish
        religious symbol.” Id. at 1171. Those proposed edits suggested to
        the district court that HART “impliedly would have allowed an ad-
        vertisement of the exact same event if presented with secular sym-
        bols or emphasizing a secular viewpoint, but it was not allowed if
        presented with religious symbols or emphasizing a religious view-
        point.” Id. (emphasis in original).
                In reaching its conclusion that HART’s advertising policy
        discriminated on the basis of viewpoint, the district court relied on
        a trilogy of cases from the Supreme Court addressing viewpoint
        discrimination with respect to religion. See id. at 1170–71 (citing
        Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
        386–90 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
        U.S. 819, 829 (1995); and Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
        U.S. 98, 105–06 (2001)). The district court also discussed the con-
        flicting opinions of the D.C. and Third Circuits applying the trilogy
        of Supreme Court cases in the context of restrictions on religious
        advertisements in public transit. See 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1170–72. 4

        4 Compare Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 897 F.3d 314,

        321–29 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (upholding a public transit authority policy banning
        issue-oriented advertisements—including political, religious, and advocacy ad-
        vertisements—against a challenge by a Catholic archdiocese because the pol-
        icy regulated content, not viewpoint), with Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. Cty. of
        Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d 424, 432–37 (3d Cir. 2019) (reversing a judg-
        ment in favor of a public transit system that had enacted a policy prohibiting
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                    22-11787

                The district court acknowledged that the parties disagreed
        about whether it had to make a threshold forum analysis determi-
        nation for the advertising space on HART’s vehicles and property.
        But it was persuaded by the Third Circuit’s analysis that “‘no mat-
        ter what kind of property is at issue, viewpoint discrimination is
        out of bounds.’” Id. at 1168 (quoting Freethought, 938 F.3d at 432).
        The district court also concluded that the Third Circuit’s approach
        “better conforms to the prevailing Supreme Court caselaw on the
        issue of religious viewpoint discrimination.” Id. at 1170. The dis-
        trict court explained that Young Israel’s Chanukah on Ice event was
        “a means of outreach to the community and an expression of Jew-
        ish identity.” Id. at 1171. According to the district court, although
        HART “disallowed this statement of organizational existence, iden-
        tity, and outreach,” it “allowed outreach messages from Alcoholics
        Anonymous (“Is Alcohol a Problem? Call Alcoholics Anony-
        mous.”), the Ronald McDonald House Charities (“Joy Is One of the
        Best Gifts You Can Give.”), and Florida Healthy Transitions
        (“We’re here to help. You are not alone.”).” Id. Thus, the district
        court concluded that HART’s advertising policy, both on its face
        and as applied, violated Young Israel’s right to free speech under
        the First Amendment. See id. at 1172.
               Applying Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876
        (2018), the district court alternatively held that even if HART’s ad-

        religious messages because it constituted viewpoint discrimination in viola-
        tion of the First Amendment).
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        22-11787               Opinion of the Court                         13

        vertising policy was “viewpoint neutral,” it was unreasonable be-
        cause it lacked workable norms. See 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1173. As-
        suming that the prohibition on certain types of religious advertise-
        ments served permissible ends, HART’s policy lacked objective,
        workable standards. For example, the word “religious” was “una-
        dorned and unexplained” in the policy and is a word that has a
        “range of meanings and can be interpreted differently by different
        people.” Id. The district court noted HART’s admission that, other
        than the policy itself, “there [wa]s no additional written guidance
        or training . . . on how to interpret” the policy. See id. The district
        court also observed that HART conceded that “different people in
        the same roles [could] have different methodologies for reviewing
        submitted advertisements’ compliance” with the policy. See id. at
        1174 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in the original).
        In the district court’s view, the summary judgment record estab-
        lished that HART’s application and enforcement of its policy vio-
        lated the First Amendment because it was “inconsistent and hap-
        hazard.” Id. at 1175.
                                          D
               After entry of the summary judgment order, the parties sub-
        mitted a proposed declaratory judgment and permanent injunction
        as required by the district court. See D.E. 74. Young Israel and
        HART agreed on the proposed language of the permanent injunc-
        tion except with respect to the breadth of the injunction.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11787

              The injunction language submitted by the parties, with
        Young Israel’s requested additional language in bold, was as fol-
        lows:
               The Court therefore GRANTS Young Israel’s request
               for a permanent injunction. HART, its agents and em-
               ployees, and all those acting in concert with any of
               them, are ENJOINED, on a permanent basis, from re-
               jecting any advertisement on the ground that the ad-
               vertisement primarily promotes a religious faith or re-
               ligious organization or employs religious language,
               imagery, or symbols, whether under Section 4(e) of
               its Advertising Policy eﬀective as of December 2,
               2013, or otherwise.
        Id. at 7–8 (emphasis added). Essentially, Young Israel requested the
        additional language because it did not want the injunction limited
        to HART’s current policy. HART, on the other hand, wanted the
        injunction to apply only to the current policy.
                After supplemental brieﬁng and oral argument, the district
        court resolved the dispute in Young Israel’s favor. The district
        court enjoined HART “from rejecting any advertisement on the
        ground that the advertisement primarily promotes a religious faith
        or religious organization, whether under Section 4(e) of its Adver-
        tising Policy eﬀective as of December 2, 2013, or in any future adver-
        tising policy that HART might adopt and implement.” D.E. 86 at 1–2
        (emphasis added). According to the district court, its chosen lan-
        guage was “tailored to ﬁt the violation because it pertains directly
        to the language of the Advertising Policy, which was the focus of
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        22-11787               Opinion of the Court                         15

        [its] . . . summary judgment order” and it “takes into account the
        possibility of future HART advertising policies.” Id. at 2.
              After the district court entered its ﬁnal judgment and perma-
        nent injunction, HART appealed. We set the case for oral argu-
        ment.
                                          II
               The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
        Young Israel is subject to de novo review. See Williams v. Radford,
        64 F.4th 1185, 1188 (11th Cir. 2023). The same plenary standard
        applies to the constitutionality of HART’s policy. See Benning v.
        Comm’r, Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 71 F.4th 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2023).
                                          III
               HART seeks reversal on three grounds. First, it argues that
        the district court erred in following the Third Circuit’s approach in
        Freethought, 938 F.3d at 432–37, and in concluding that its policy
        constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination. Second, it as-
        serts that its policy is reasonable under the Supreme Court’s deci-
        sion in Mansky. Third, relying on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
        White Coat Waste Project v. Greater Richmond Transit Co., 35 F.4th
        179 (4th Cir. 2022), it contends that the permanent injunction con-
        stitutes an abuse of discretion because it applies to any future pol-
        icy that might restrict advertising on religious faith or religious or-
        ganization grounds.
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11787

                                           A
                The First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting any
        law “abridging the freedom of speech.” See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
        It applies to the states (and their political subdivisions) through the
        Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Edwards v.
        South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (“It has long been estab-
        lished that [ ] First Amendment freedoms are protected by the
        Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the states.”).
               HART says that this case “presents an interesting question
        on balancing the competing interests of the First Amendment
        against [its] right to regulate the content of its advertising in a non-
        public forum.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. It urges us to follow the D.C.
        and Fourth Circuits, both of which consider the type of forum at
        issue before addressing the nature of the restriction, see, e.g.,
        WAMATA, 897 F.3d at 321–29, and to reject the approach of the
        Third Circuit in Freethought, 938 F.3d at 432–36, which examines
        the question of viewpoint discrimination without first performing
        a forum analysis. Although it takes a different position on the mer-
        its, Young Israel also asks us to weigh in on this First Amendment
        question and hold that HART’s policy discriminates on the basis of
        viewpoint. See Appellee’s Br. at 23; Audio of Oral Arg. at 32:38.
               We have not been asked to apply the Supreme Court’s tril-
        ogy—Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News—to a government
        prohibition on advertisements that “primarily promote a religious
        faith or religious organization.” But in a 2019 case involving a First
        Amendment challenge to a state prohibition on prayers at high
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        22-11787                Opinion of the Court                         17

        school football games, we stated that “[t]he first critical step in the
        analysis is to discern the nature of the forum at issue.” Cambridge
        Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athl. Ass’n, Inc., 942 F.3d 1215,
        1236 (11th Cir. 2019). If we addressed the forum/viewpoint dis-
        crimination issue here—as the parties urge us to do—we would
        have to consider not only the impact of our decision in Cambridge
        Christian but also the different approaches taken by the D.C. and
        Fourth Circuits on the one hand and by the Third Circuit on the
        other. Compare, e.g., WMATA, 897 F.3d at 321–29, and White Coat,
        35 F.4th at 196–98, with Freethought, 938 F.3d at 432–36.
                To borrow language from a Supreme Court case, “we resist
        the pulls to decide the constitutional issues involved [here] on a
        broader basis than the record before us imperatively requires.”
        Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581 (1969). The district court ruled
        in the alternative that, even if HART’s advertising policy was view-
        point neutral, it was constitutionally unreasonable because it
        lacked objective and workable standards. As explained below, we
        agree with the district court on this point, and that provides a suf-
        ficient basis on which to affirm its judgment. See Harbourside Place,
        LLC v. Town of Jupiter, Fla., 958 F.3d 1308, 1322 (11th Cir. 2020)
        (“[T]his is a good opportunity for us to practice judicial minimal-
        ism, and decide no more than what is necessary to resolve [the]
        appeal.”).
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11787

                                          B
                Though the analysis would not change one way or another,
        we’ll assume, without deciding, that the HART vehicles and prop-
        erty at issue here are nonpublic forums as opposed to limited public
        forums. Even so, when the government restricts speech in nonpub-
        lic forums, it “must avoid the haphazard and arbitrary enforcement
        of speech restrictions in order for them to be upheld as reasonable.”
        Cambridge Christian, 942 F.3d at 1243. Although a restriction need
        not be narrowly tailored, the government must offer a “sensible
        basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay
        out.” Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1882.
               In Mansky, the Supreme Court addressed a First Amend-
        ment challenge to a Minnesota law banning voters from wearing
        political apparel at polling places. See id. at 1883. The Court treated
        polling places as nonpublic forums, and concluded that Minnesota
        had pursued permissible ends because it could reasonably seek to
        reinforce the solemnity of voting. See id. at 1887–88.
               The Supreme Court then turned to whether Minnesota had
        “draw[n] a reasonable line.” Id. at 1888. The Court held that Min-
        nesota had not used reasonable means to implement its ends be-
        cause the ban on political apparel was not “capable of reasoned ap-
        plication.” Id. at 1892. Due to the ambiguity of the word “politi-
        cal”—despite a list of examples Minnesota had provided—the
        Court ruled that the ban on political apparel could not be objec-
        tively applied. Indeed, the ban gave election judges at each polling
        place too much discretion to decide what qualified as “political.”
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        22-11787               Opinion of the Court                       19

        Id. at 1891. According to the Court, that discretion had to be
        “guided by objective, workable standards.” Id. The Court held
        that the ban violated the First Amendment, explaining that the
        states “must employ a more discernible approach than the one
        Minnesota offered [there].” Id.
                We have not yet had an occasion to apply Mansky in the con-
        text of advertising in a public transportation setting. We have held,
        however, that a Christian school plausibly alleged that a state ban
        on prayer over a loudspeaker at a high school football game was
        applied arbitrarily and haphazardly in violation of Mansky. See Cam-
        bridge Christian, 942 F.3d at 1243–44. Based on the allegations in
        the complaint, the state’s decision to prohibit the prayer appeared
        arbitrary, capricious, and haphazard because the prohibition was
        enforced inconsistently—on at least four other occasions prayers
        during football games had been allowed. See id. at 1246. We ex-
        plained that “[p]ermitting certain speech on Monday, Tuesday,
        Wednesday, and Thursday, and barring precisely the same mes-
        sage on Friday without any credible explanation of what may have
        changed is the essence of arbitrary, capricious, and haphazard—
        and therefore unreasonable—decisionmaking.” Id. at 1244.
               Several of our sister circuits have applied Mansky in the pub-
        lic transportation/advertising context. Although their cases in-
        volved restrictions on political rather than religious advertise-
        ments, the decisions are consistent with our ruling in Cambridge
        Christian. See White Coat, 35 F.4th at 199–201 (transit company’s
        ban on “political” advertisements failed under Mansky because
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11787

        there was no formal definition of “political” and “no written guide-
        lines clarifying how the standard is to be applied”); Am. Freedom Def.
        Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Trans., 978 F.3d 481,
        493–98 (6th Cir. 2020) (similar holding); Ctr. for Investigative Report-
        ing v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 975 F.3d 300, 315–17 (3d Cir.
        2020) (applying Mansky to invalidate a policy prohibiting advertise-
        ments which were “political” or which expressed an “opinion, po-
        sition, or viewpoint on matters of public debate about economic,
        political, religious, historical or social issues”).
                 The district court here correctly applied Mansky. It properly
        concluded that HART’s advertising policy is unreasonable because
        it fails to define key terms, lacks any official guidance, and vests too
        much discretion in those charged with its application.
               HART’s policy prohibits “[a]dvertisements that primarily
        promote a religious faith or religious organization,” but does not
        define what is a “religious faith” or “religious organization.” D.E.
        1-1 at 146. Although the policy defines certain terms, including
        “commercial advertisement,” “governmental entity public service
        announcements,” and “governmental entity,” id. at 144–145, “the
        word ‘religious’ is unadorned and unexplained[.]” Young Israel, 582
        F. Supp. 3d at 1173.
               The word “religious” here, like the word “political” in Man-
        sky, has a range of meanings. “Religious,” for example, is defined
        as “[h]aving or showing belief in and reverence for God or a deity,”
        as well as “[o]f, concerned with, or teaching religion.” The Amer-
        ican Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1474 (4th ed.
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        22-11787                Opinion of the Court                         21

        2009). See also id. (defining “religion” as a “[b]elief in and reverence
        for a supernatural power or powers as creator and governor of the
        universe”). Although the word “religious” is used as an adjective in
        the policy to modify “faith” and “organization,” the lack of any def-
        inition whatsoever is constitutionally problematic.
                In addition, the term “primarily promote” is also left unde-
        fined in the policy. Although the word “primarily” may not gener-
        ally be difficult to understand on its own, see In re Stewart, 175 F.3d
        796, 808 (10th Cir. 1999) (defining the word as meaning “for the
        most part” or “more than fifty percent”), here it modifies the word
        “promote” for purposes of a “religious faith” or “religious organi-
        zation.” Does “primarily promote” equate to proselytization? If it
        can be something less, how much less? We are left to guess. As
        the Supreme Court said when faced with similarly expansive lan-
        guage, we simply do not know the reach, or limits, of the term
        “primarily promote” in this context. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836
        (“The prohibition on funding on behalf of publications that ‘pri-
        marily promot[e] or manifes[t] a particular belie[f] in or about a de-
        ity or an ultimate reality,’ in its ordinary and commonsense mean-
        ing, has a vast potential reach.”).
               Given the inherent ambiguity of the word “religious,” the
        uncertainty and potential breadth of the term “primarily promote,”
        and the lack of any definitions, we agree with the district court that
        the policy fails to provide any objective or workable standards.
        The policy therefore fails under Mansky. See Am. Freedom Def. Initi-
        ative, 978 F.3d at 494 (“SMART cannot rely on its Advertising
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11787

        Guidelines’ unadorned use of the word ‘political’ to create worka-
        ble standards by itself. The word has a range of meanings.”). Cf.
        WMATA, 897 F.3d at 340 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (“Guideline 12 is
        . . . readily distinguishable from the [law] struck down in Mansky.
        WMATA’s prohibition on advertisements that ‘promote or oppose
        any religion, religious practice or belief,’ is narrower and more pre-
        cise than simply a general ban on ‘religious’ or ‘political’ speech.”).
               HART’s policy is also completely devoid of “any official
        guidance to create workable standards.” Am. Freedom Def. Initiative,
        978 F.3d at 495. As the district court aptly noted, “HART admits
        that, outside of the [p]olicy itself, there is no additional written
        guidance or training given by HART on how to interpret the [p]ol-
        icy.” Young Israel, 582 F. Supp. 3d at 1173.
               This lack of guidance, as the district court explained, has
        caused inconsistency in how HART’s agents and employees define
        and interpret the policy. For example, Ms. Gage testified that she
        would forward to HART for approval an advertisement containing
        Easter eggs because it was “possible” that there is a secular compo-
        nent to Easter. See D.E. 60-6 at 80. But, according to Ms. Gage, if
        an advertisement said “Easter,” that would “maybe” necessitate a
        conversation with the advertiser. See id. at 81.
               As a result, the policy vests too much unchecked discretion
        in HART’s agents and employees. Indeed, HART concedes that
        “different people in the same roles [could] have different method-
        ologies” for reviewing submitted advertisements’ compliance with
        the policy. See D.E. 60-8 at 96. Such ad hoc decision-making is far
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        22-11787               Opinion of the Court                         23

        from the “objective, workable standards” that must guide the dis-
        cretion of those who enforce HART’s policy. See Mansky, 138 S.
        Ct. at 1891.
               Take Mr. Rowland’s view on how the policy operates. For
        Mr. Rowland, an advertisement promoting the reading of the Bible
        would be prohibited, while an advertisement touting the Book of
        Mormon would be fine because he does not know what that is and
        to him it would be “an ad about selling a book.” D.E. 60-8 at 33.
        The Book of Mormon is, of course, a volume of sacred scripture
        for members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
        And one would think that it would (and should) be treated like the
        Bible under Mr. Rowland’s view, but that does not seem to be the
        case. To make matters more difficult for someone like Mr. Row-
        land, The Book of Mormon is also the name of a musical parody which
        premiered on Broadway in 2011. See Trey Parker, Matt Stone, and
        Robert Lopez, The Book of Mormon (2011). If The Book of Mormon
        had a two-week run in Tampa, it is unclear to us whether HART
        would run or prohibit an advertisement promoting the musical.
        That is a big problem under Mansky.
               The concern about inconsistent application of the policy is
        not conjectural. As the district court explained, see Young Israel, 582
        F. Supp. 3d at 1175, HART rejected an advertisement from St. Jo-
        seph’s Hospital based on information that the Hospital was
        “[f]ounded as a mission by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegany,” but
        said it would accept the advertisement if the Hospital used the
        name of its parent company, Baycare. See D.E. 60-38. Yet HART
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11787

        ran advertisements from St. Leo University—the oldest Catholic
        institution of higher education in Florida (established in 1889 by the
        Order of Saint Benedict of Florida)—without any changes because
        St. Leo is an “institution of higher learning, not a religious organi-
        zation.” D.E. 60-18; D.E. 60-37. By that logic, why wasn’t St. Jo-
        seph’s Hospital considered a medical institution rather than a reli-
        gious organization?
               HART’s erratic application of its policy mirrors the prob-
        lems identified by the Supreme Court in Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1891,
        and demonstrates that it is not capable of reasoned application.
        HART’s reference to some undefined abstract guidance that might
        have been (but was not) provided is insufficient to establish reason-
        ableness. “We cannot infer the reasonableness of a regulation from
        a vacant record.” Cambridge Christian, 942 F.3d at 1246 (internal
        quotation marks and citation omitted).
               In sum, HART has failed to define the word “religious” and
        the term “primarily promote,” has not provided guidance that sets
        out “objective, workable standards” for its agents and employees,
        and has vested too much discretion in those who apply the policy.
        These deficiencies are fatal. See Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1891. Assum-
        ing without deciding that a prohibition on certain types of religious
        advertisements may serve permissible ends, HART has failed to
        create the necessary standards for “reasoned application” of its pol-
        icy. See id. at 1891–92.
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        22-11787                Opinion of the Court                           25

                                            C
                HART concedes that its advertisement policy is not reason-
        able as applied to Young Israel, but maintains that it is reasonable
        on its face. See Appellant’s Br. at 31 n.1. HART argues that its pol-
        icy is “capable of reasonable application” and “[w]ith well-defined
        guidance on exactly ‘what can come in the forum and what must
        stay out’ [the] policy is certainly capable of reasonable application.”
        Appellant’s Reply Br. at 15–16. HART thus contends that the dis-
        trict court erred in ruling that its policy was unconstitutional on its
        face under Mansky.
                At one level, we understand where HART is coming from.
        After all, the Supreme Court has sometimes said that a successful
        facial challenge requires a showing that the law in question is un-
        constitutional in all of its applications. See, e.g., United States v. Sa-
        lerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). And it has stated that a “plaintiﬀ
        who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
        complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
        others.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18–19 (2010)
        (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Village of
        Hoﬀman Estates v. Flipside, Hoﬀman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497
        (1982) (‘To succeed [on a facial vagueness challenge] the complain-
        ant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of
        its applications.”).
              In terms of Mansky reasonableness we can imagine a reli-
        gious advertisement which clearly falls within the ban in HART’s
        policy—think of an advertisement for a well-known faith which
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                    22-11787

        singularly declares that it is the only true religion and urges readers
        to become believers (“___ism is the only way to salvation, so come
        worship at ______ and convert now before it is too late”). Such an
        advertisement would “primarily promote” a “religious faith” and
        would not be vague as applied. 5
               The problem for HART is that in its more recent cases the
        Supreme Court has cut back on the broad statement in Salerno, at
        least when vagueness is the constitutional vice. See, e.g., Sessions v.
        Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212, 1218–23 (2018) (civil immigration
        statute providing for removal); Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591,
        602–03 (2015) (criminal sentencing statute). At the end of the day,
        we are not persuaded by HART’s argument that the policy is un-
        constitutional only as applied to Young Israel.
                First, the reasonableness holding in Mansky concerned the
        facial validity of the Minnesota statute, as the as-applied claim in
        the case was not before the Supreme Court. See Mansky, 138 S. Ct.
        at 1885 (“MVA, Cilek, and Jeﬀers . . . petitioned for review of their
        facial First Amendment claim only.”). No wonder, then, that our
        sister circuits treat Mansky reasonableness challenges as facial. See
        Ostrewich v. Tatum, 72 F.4th 94, 105–06 (5th Cir. 2023); White Coat,

        5 We mean only that this hypothetical advertisement would be prohibited by

        HART’s policy. We express no view on whether such a prohibition would be
        constitutional.
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        22-11787                 Opinion of the Court                             27

        35 F.4th at 204; Zukerman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 961 F.3d 431, 436 (D.C.
        Cir. 2020). We do the same here. 6
                Second, as a logical matter, a law (or, as here, a policy) found
        to be constitutionally unreasonable under Mansky due to lack of
        standards and guidance is by deﬁnition facially invalid. See Kolender
        v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (“We conclude [that the statute]
        is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encourages arbi-
        trary enforcement by failing to describe with suﬃcient particularity
        what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute.”); City of
        Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988) (the First
        Amendment problem of placing “unbridled discretion” in the
        hands of government oﬃcials “can be eﬀectively alleviated only
        through a facial challenge”). Our “conclusion that [HART’s] policy
        is incapable of reasoned application does not depend on [Young Is-
        rael’s] identity or the advertisement it wished to run; it depends on
        the vagueness and imprecision of [HART’s] policy in a vacuum, so
        the policy is facially unconstitutional.” White Coat, 35 F.4th at 204.
                                             IV
              The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges,
        though sometimes diﬃcult to discern, generally “goes to the
        breadth of the remedy.” Citizens Utd. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558

        6 Some have suggested that the “animating logic” of Mansky comes from a line

        of vagueness cases concerned with “arbitrary enforcement,” even though the
        Supreme Court did not mention the vagueness doctrine by name. See Note,
        The Supreme Court 2017 Term—Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 132 Harv. L.
        Rev. 337, 344–46 (2018).
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        28                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11787

        U.S. 310, 331 (2010). So we turn to the scope of the permanent
        injunction.
                To obtain a permanent injunction, a plaintiﬀ must show (1)
        that he has suﬀered an irreparable injury; (2) that his remedies at
        law are inadequate; (3) that the balance of hardships weighs in his
        favor; and (4) that a permanent injunction would not disserve the
        public interest. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
        391 (2006). The district court here did not err in issuing a perma-
        nent injunction. See Six Star Holdings, LLC v. City of Milwaukee, 821
        F.3d 795, 803 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[A] facial challenge usually invites
        prospective relief, such as an injunction[.]”). Indeed, no one dis-
        putes that a permanent injunction was appropriate. The parties’
        disagreement is about whether the injunction should be limited to
        HART’s current policy (HART’s position) or should encompass any
        future policies prohibiting advertisements that “primarily promote
        a religious faith or religious organization” (Young Israel’s position).
               Given its ruling that the policy constituted impermissible
        viewpoint discrimination, we can see why the district court crafted
        the permanent injunction the way that it did. But our aﬃrmance
        on Mansky reasonableness grounds—the district court’s alternative
        and more narrow ruling—changes the calculus for the breadth of
        the injunction.
               A permanent injunction “must be tailored to ﬁt the nature
        and extent of the established [constitutional] violation.” Gibson v.
        Firestone, 741 F.2d 1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 1984). In other words, the
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        22-11787                Opinion of the Court                         29

        injunction “must be no broader than necessary to remedy the con-
        stitutional violation.” Newman v. Ala., 683 F.2d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir.
        1982). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial
        Challenges, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 915, 923 n.31 (2011) (“When a court pro-
        nounces a statute facially invalid, the force of its holding inheres
        entirely in the doctrines of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and
        precedent as well as in the scope of any injunction that the court
        issues to enforce its judgment.”).
                We have declined to address whether HART’s policy consti-
        tutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination, and have held only
        that the policy is unreasonable under Mansky. Our ruling “means
        that there is no circumstance in which this particular ban on [reli-
        gious] advertising could ever be lawful,” White Coat, 35 F.4th at 204,
        but it does not constitute a holding that any future variation of the
        policy—no matter how phrased and regardless of how words and
        terms might be deﬁned and what guidance might be provided—
        would necessarily be unconstitutional. See Ctr. for Investigative Re-
        porting, 975 F.3d at 317–18 (holding that certain provisions of a pub-
        lic transportation authority’s advertising standards were unreason-
        able under Mansky and instructing the district court to issue an in-
        junction “barring enforcement” of the challenged provisions of the
        “current” advertising standards).
               Given our more narrow resolution of the case, the perma-
        nent injunction needs to be revised to apply only to HART’s cur-
        rent policy. As we have done in similar cases, we will remand the
        case to the district court for that purpose. See Barrett v. Walker Cnty.
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        30                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11787

        Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1230 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The district court
        did not abuse its discretion in granting a permanent injunction. But
        because we aﬃrm the district court’s entry of summary judgment
        with respect to only the facial unbridled discretion claim, the dis-
        trict court must alter the scope of the injunction on remand so that
        the injunction remedies only the harm created by the unconstitu-
        tional grant of unbridled discretion that we have previously dis-
        cussed.”). See also Wollschlaeger v. Governor, Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1319
        (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“The record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-
        harassment provisions of FOPA violate the First Amendment, but
        the anti-discrimination provision, as construed, does not. The dis-
        trict court’s judgment is aﬃrmed in part and reversed in part, and
        the case is remanded so that the judgment and permanent injunc-
        tion can be amended in accordance with this opinion.”).
                                           V
               We affirm the district court’s order granting summary judg-
        ment in favor of Young Israel on the ground that HART’s advertis-
        ing policy was unreasonable under Mansky. We remand the case
        to the district court to limit the scope of its permanent injunction
        to HART’s current policy.
              AFFIRMED AS TO THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
        REMANDED FOR PURPOSES OF REVISING THE PERMANENT
        INJUNCTION.
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        1                      Newsom, J., Concurring                  22-11787

        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
              This is an easy case. Lurking just beneath the surface,
        though, is an almost unfathomable mystery that underlies—but if
        taken seriously, would seem to undermine—existing First Amend-
        ment doctrine as applied to regulations of “religious” speech:
        What, exactly, is religion?
                                            I
               First, though, the easy part: HART’s policy, which prohibits
        advertisements that “primarily promote a religious faith or organi-
        zation,” violates the Free Speech Clause for at least two independ-
        ent reasons. First, as the majority holds, the policy “fails to deﬁne”
        or provide any “oﬃcial guidance” regarding key terms—most no-
        tably, “religious”—and thus “vests too much discretion in those
        charged with its application.” Maj. Op. at 20. Accordingly, the pol-
        icy violates the settled rule that speech restrictions—even those op-
        erative in non-public and limited public fora—must be “capable of
        reasoned application” and “guided by objective, workable stand-
        ards.” Minnesota Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1891–92
        (2018).
               Second, and separately, HART’s policy is self-evidently—in
        fact, bunglingly—viewpoint-discriminatory. By its plain terms, the
        policy doesn’t just prohibit speech “about” religion, it singles out
        speech that “promotes” religion. And to be clear, the lopsidedness
        of the policy’s religious-speech restriction isn’t just patent, it’s con-
        spicuous: Other provisions of HART’s advertising policy, for exam-
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        2                     Newsom, J., Concurring                 22-11787

        ple, neutrally prohibit advertising “containing profane language, ob-
        scene materials or images of nudity,” Hillsborough Transit Author-
        ity Policy Manual § 810.10(4)(b), Doc. 1-1 at 145 (emphasis added),
        or advertising that “contain[s] discriminatory materials and/or mes-
        sages,” id. § 810.10(4)(c) (emphasis added). Whatever the constitu-
        tionality of those provisions, a speech restriction that prohibits only
        the “promot[ion]” of a religious faith or organization constitutes
        viewpoint discrimination, plain and simple.
                                          II
               Now for the hard part. Underlying both issues that I’ve
        ﬂagged is a question that, I fear, neither policymakers nor judges
        are particularly well-equipped to answer: What is religion? Let me
        explain.
                                          A
                Consider ﬁrst what I’ll call the “Mansky issue”: As already
        explained, today’s majority correctly holds that HART’s policy vio-
        lates the First Amendment because it fails to deﬁne or explain the
        phrase “religious faith or organization” or otherwise guide oﬃcials’
        discretion in applying it. See Maj. Op. at 18–24. And again, I agree.
        It seems to me, though, that an even more fundamental problem
        looms. I’m not sure that any religious-speech restriction could sur-
        vive a reasonableness inquiry under Mansky—because I’m not sure
        that any policymaker could deﬁne or identify “religious” speech us-
        ing “objective, workable standards.” 138 S. Ct. at 1891.
              The majority opinion says that the word “religious” has a
        “range of meanings.” Maj. Op. at 20. That’s true, but colossally
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        21-12106             Newsom, J., Concurring                        3

        understated. Closer to the mark, I think, is the majority opinion’s
        recognition that the term “religious” is “inherent[ly] ambigu[ous].”
        Id. at 21. Pretty much any criterion one can imagine will exclude
        faith or thought systems that most have traditionally regarded as
        religious. Consider, for instance, one deﬁnition of “religious” that
        the majority opinion posits: “‘[h]aving or showing belief in and rev-
        erence for God or a deity.’” Id. at 20–21 (quoting The American
        Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1474 (4th ed. 2006)).
        That, as I understand things, would eliminate many Buddhists and
        Jains, among others. Or another: “‘[b]elief in and reverence for a
        supernatural power or powers as creator and governor of the uni-
        verse.’” Id. at 21 (quoting the same source’s deﬁnition of “reli-
        gion”). Again, I could be wrong, but I think many Deists and Uni-
        tarian Universalists would resist that explanation. And so it goes
        with other deﬁning characteristics one might propose. Belief in the
        afterlife? I’m pretty sure that would knock out some Taoists, and
        presumably others, as well. Existence of a sacred text? My research
        suggests that at least in Japan, Shintoism has no oﬃcial scripture.
        Existence of an organized “church” with a hierarchical structure?
        Neither Hindus nor many indigenous sects have one. Adherence
        to ritual? Quakers don’t. Existence of sacraments or creeds? Many
        evangelical Christians resist them. A focus on evangelization or
        proselytizing? So far as I understand, Jews typically don’t actively
        seek to convert non-believers.
              Relatedly, what truly distinguishes “religious” speech from
        speech pertaining to other life-ordering perspectives? Where does
        the “religious” leave oﬀ and, say, the philosophical pick up? Is
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        4                         Newsom, J., Concurring                        22-11787

        Randian Objectivism “religious”? See Albert Ellis, Is Objectivism a
        Religion? (1968). My gut says no, but why? How about “Social
        Justice Fundamentalism”? See Tim Urban, What’s Our Problem?: A
        Self-Help Book for Societies (2023). Same instinct, same caveat. Sci-
        entology? TM? Humanism? Transhumanism? You get the picture.
                Bottom line: No matter how hard they try—no matter how
        many deﬁnitions they supply, and no matter how much guidance
        they provide—I’m doubtful that policymakers can deﬁne “reli-
        gious” speech in a suﬃciently principled and comprehensive way
        to satisfy Mansky. “What is religion?” just isn’t a question that they
        are particularly well-suited to answer. 1 Cf. Kondrat’yev v. City of Pen-
        sacola, 949 F.3d 1319, 1336 (11th Cir. 2020) (Newsom, J., concurring)
        (“[C]an it really be that I—as a judge trained in the law rather than,
        say, neurology, philosophy, or theology, am charged with distin-
        guishing between ‘psychological’ injury, on the one hand, and ‘met-
        aphysical’ and ‘spiritual’ injury, on the other?”).

        1 Notably, this is the very inquiry that free-exercise jurisprudence eschews. See

        Watts v. Florida Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We need
        not delve far into philosophy, however, because the Supreme Court has at
        least twice instructed us not to engage in any ‘objective’ test of whether a par-
        ticular belief is a religious one.”) (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp.
        Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965));
        see also Employment Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887
        (1990) (quoting Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“[I]t is not within
        the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
        faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”).
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        21-12106              Newsom, J., Concurring                          5

                                           B
                Separately, the parties here vigorously dispute whether
        transit advertising policies that (like HART’s) restrict “religious”
        speech regulate on the basis of content or viewpoint. See Br. of Ap-
        pellant at 29–31; Br. of Appellee at 23–27. And it’s understandable
        why that’s such a ﬂashpoint: The categorization matters given the
        standards that apply to speech in the various First Amendment
        “fora.” Reasonable content-based distinctions are permissible, for
        instance, in both limited public and non-public fora. See Cornelius
        v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
        (non-public fora); Keister v. Bell, 29 F.4th 1239, 1252 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (limited public fora). But “‘viewpoint discrimination’ is forbidden”
        no matter the forum classiﬁcation. Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 243
        (2017); see also Cook v. Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 1313, 1321
        (11th Cir. 2005) (observing that “even in a non-public forum,” the
        law is “clearly established that the state cannot engage in viewpoint
        discrimination”).
               For its part, Young Israel insists that HART’s policy consti-
        tutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination—and not just be-
        cause (as already explained) it targets speech that “promotes” reli-
        gion, but rather, and more broadly, because any restriction on reli-
        gious speech is, ipso facto, viewpoint-discriminatory. See Br. of Ap-
        pellee at 23 et seq. And under existing free-speech precedent, I think
        Young Israel may well be right about that. It points to what it calls
        a “trilogy” of Supreme Court decisions that invalidated educa-
        tional institutions’ policies that speciﬁcally forbade the use of
        school facilities or resources for “religious” purposes. See Lamb’s
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        6                      Newsom, J., Concurring                     22-11787

        Chapel v. Center of Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387
        (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S.
        819, 831–32 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98,
        109, 120 (2001). Young Israel particularly emphasizes the following
        passage from the opinion in Rosenberger, zeroing in on the last sen-
        tence:
               It is, in a sense, something of an understatement to
               speak of religious thought and discussion as just a
               viewpoint, as distinct from a comprehensive body of
               thought. The nature of our origins and destiny and
               their dependence upon the existence of a divine being
               have been subjects of philosophic inquiry throughout
               human history. We conclude, nonetheless, that here
               . . . viewpoint discrimination is the proper way to in-
               terpret the University’s objections to [a student-run
               religious magazine]. By the very terms of [its] prohi-
               bition, the University does not exclude religion as a
               subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment
               those student journalistic eﬀorts with religious edito-
               rial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of inquiry,
               but it also provides . . . a speciﬁc premise, a perspective, a
               standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be dis-
               cussed and considered.

        515 U.S. at 831 (emphasis added).
               That passage, Young Israel says—and, again, especially the
        concluding sentence—indicates the Supreme Court’s verdict that
        “religion” is a distinct viewpoint and, it follows, that any restriction
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        21-12106                  Newsom, J., Concurring                                 7

        on “religious” speech constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrim-
        ination.
                I tend to think that Young Israel has correctly read Rosen-
        berger, and the “trilogy” more generally. Although the Rosenberger
        Court nodded at the possibility that religion might be a general
        “subject matter,” it certainly seemed to land on a narrower, more
        speciﬁc view. And Good News Club, decided several years later, like-
        wise described religion as “the viewpoint from which ideas are con-
        veyed.” 533 U.S. at 112 n.4 (emphasis added). Notably, others have
        since interpreted the trilogy the same way, including in cases re-
        markably similar to this one. See, e.g., Northeastern Pennsylvania
        Freethought Soc’y v. County of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d 424,
        437 (3d Cir. 2019) (invalidating a transit-system policy prohibiting
        “religious” ads and emphasizing that “[r]eligion is not only a sub-
        ject” but “a worldview through which believers see countless is-
        sues”). 2

        2 In Archdiocese of Wash. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., the D.C. Circuit

        read the trilogy diﬀerently and held that a similar restriction on “religious” ads
        regulated only content, not viewpoint. See 897 F.3d 314 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The
        Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari drew a sharp dissent. See Archdiocese of
        Wash. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 140 S. Ct. 1198, 1199 (2020) (Gor-
        such, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“[WMATA’s religious speech
        ban] is viewpoint discrimination by a governmental entity and a violation of
        the First Amendment. In fact, this Court has already rejected no-religious-
        speech policies materially identical to WMATA’s on no fewer than three occa-
        sions over the last three decades.” (citing Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 98; Ros-
        enberger, 515 U.S. at 819; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384)).
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        8                     Newsom, J., Concurring                 22-11787

               The upshot, it seems to me, is that the Supreme Court has
        eﬀectively merged content and viewpoint—at least for purposes of
        religious speech. Religion, the Court appears to have said, is both
        (and simultaneously) a general, content-based category and a more
        particular viewpoint. And the result of that move, I think, is to
        render any formulation of a religious-speech restriction—whether
        blanket or promotion-only—an exercise in unlawful viewpoint dis-
        crimination.
                I understand the impulse—the “distinction” between con-
        tent and viewpoint, after all, “is not a precise one.” Rosenberger, 515
        U.S. at 831. I’m skeptical, though, for two reasons. For starters, it’s
        inconsistent with how the Supreme Court has treated other forms
        of core First Amendment expression. Most notably, perhaps, the
        Court has assiduously enforced the content-viewpoint distinction
        with respect to political speech, despite the fact that it “occupies
        the highest, most protected position” in the First Amendment hi-
        erarchy. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens,
        J., concurring); see also, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420, 426
        (1988) (observing that “[c]ore political speech” is where “First
        Amendment protection is ‘at its zenith’”). The Court has held, for
        instance, that laws regulating political content are permissible in
        non-public fora, while those regulating on the basis of political
        viewpoint aren’t. See, e.g., Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1885–86; Greer v.
        Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 831, 837–39 (1976). In fact—and somewhat
        closer to home—the Court has speciﬁcally held that local transit
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        21-12106              Newsom, J., Concurring                         9

        authorities can prohibit general “paid political advertising” in pub-
        lic streetcars without violating the Free Speech Clause. See Lehman
        v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 299, 304 (1974) (plurality).
                More fundamentally, I’ll confess that I’m just not sure that
        it’s accurate to characterize religion as “a speciﬁc premise, a per-
        spective, a standpoint.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. Perhaps it’s
        just that I’m not sure what that means. Is the suggestion that there
        is a single all-encompassing religious “premise, perspective, [or]
        standpoint”? Or is “religion,” in the way the Supreme Court is us-
        ing the term, a general umbrella-like descriptor that houses multi-
        ple sect-speciﬁc viewpoints? Or maybe the Court means to say that
        a “religious” viewpoint can just be deﬁned on a case-by-case basis
        in contrast to some “secular” comparator? Any of these, I think, is
        a fair reading of Rosenberger, but all, I fear, entail complications.
               The religion-as-a-single-overarching-viewpoint reading may
        be intuitive—we ﬁgure we know a “religious” viewpoint when we
        see one—but I think it masks important nuance and complexity.
        Can we really say, for instance, that there’s a single “religious” per-
        spective about anything? The death penalty? Climate change? The
        good life more generally? I’m doubtful.
                What about the notion that “religion” is a category that
        comprises various “religious” viewpoints? Maybe, but doesn’t that
        just land us right back where we started? What qualiﬁes a particu-
        lar viewpoint as suﬃciently “religious” that it’s entitled to protec-
        tion as “religious speech” under the trilogy—supreme beings, af-
        terlives, creeds, catechisms, etc.? See supra at 2–3. And relatedly—
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        10                    Newsom, J., Concurring                22-11787

        I mean in a metaphysically inextricable sense—what is it about, say,
        “philosophical” speech that disqualiﬁes it from “religious” status
        and the accompanying protection?
                There’s one more possibility, I suppose: Maybe the Supreme
        Court means that “religious” viewpoints can be identiﬁed on an ad
        hoc basis vis-à-vis some “secular” comparator. So, for instance, in
        Lamb’s Chapel, the Court held that a school district had impermissi-
        bly discriminated on the basis of viewpoint when it opened its
        premises for all “social, civic, or recreational purposes” but refused
        to allow their use to screen a ﬁlm that addressed “family issues and
        child rearing” from a “religious perspective.” 508 U.S. at 391–94.
        At ﬁrst blush, that seems pretty straightforward. But I wonder
        whether it’s too easy—and maybe even tautological? Does the
        mere existence of a non-religious or irreligious alternative auto-
        matically transform any regulation of religious content into a re-
        striction of the “religious” viewpoint? If so, why doesn’t the same
        logic hold in the political-speech context? Imagine a “content”-
        based ban on political advertising on city buses—which, again,
        would be permissible under existing doctrine. See Lehman, 418 U.S.
        at 304. Couldn’t an advocacy group simply repackage its challenge,
        complaining that the prohibition discriminates on the basis of
        viewpoint because it permits ads about, say, gas prices from com-
        mercial perspectives but not political ones?
               However you slice it, I’m just not sure the religion-as-ipso-
        facto-viewpoint approach holds up very well. I fear that it may
        cause more confusion than it’s worth.
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                                        * * *
                One last thing: Wouldn’t cases like this be better handled
        under the Free Exercise Clause? At the very least, the analysis
        seems pretty free-exercise-y to me. Justice Scalia made a similar
        point in his concurring opinion in Good News Club. There, in the
        course of agreeing with the Court’s free-speech-based disposition,
        he said that he didn’t “suppose it matter[ed]” whether the re-
        striction at issue was “characterized as viewpoint or subject-matter
        discrimination.” Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 122 (Scalia, J., concur-
        ring). The reason, he explained—conspicuously citing free-exercise
        precedents—is that “excluding the Club’s speech . . . ‘because it’s
        religious’ will not do.” Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
        v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–33, 546 (1993); Employment Div.,
        Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990)). I
        suspect that under modern free-exercise doctrine, litigants like
        Young Israel will rack up the wins. But, if free-exercise logic is “do-
        ing the work,” we might be better oﬀ just deciding the cases on
        those grounds.
                                          III
               I’m not sure there’s an easy answer to any of this. In fact,
        I’m pretty sure there isn’t. The diﬃculty, I think, is inherent in the
        nature of religion—and particularly in using “religion,” or “reli-
        gious”-ness, as a constitutional measuring stick. We use those
        terms daily, and I think it’s probably fair to say that we have a rough-
        and-ready sense of what they entail. But as is so often the case, the
        devil (or in this case the deity) is in the details. And the deeper one
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        12                   Newsom, J., Concurring                22-11787

        probes, the harder it becomes to settle on a precise, necessary-and-
        suﬃcient deﬁnition of “religion,” and thus of “religious” speech.
        Truth is, there is no one deﬁning characteristic of “religion”; there
        are arguably—and a thoroughly argued—many. Accordingly, the
        lines separating “religious” from philosophical and even political
        traditions (and expression) are hazy at best. At the end of the day,
        I fear that the terms “religion” and “religious” are exactly as the
        majority describes them, “inherent[ly] ambigu[ous],” Maj. Op. at
        21, and thus particularly precarious foundations on which to build
        free-speech doctrine.
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        1                      Grimberg, J., Concurring                  22-11787

        GRIMBERG, District Judge, Concurring:
               I join Parts I, II, III.B, and III.C of the Court’s opinion. I write
        separately because I would have gone farther. In my view, our anal-
        ysis should not have stopped at the obvious Mansky violation if
        HART’s policy is incapable of ever being applied constitutionally. It
        cannot be. The policy’s inability to be applied reasonably should
        not inoculate it from its more severe and incurable constitutional
        ﬂaw. By constructing a policy that is so clearly and completely in-
        capable of reasonable application, HART has successfully evaded a
        ruling on the viewpoint-versus-subject-matter dispute that is at the
        heart of this case. And that evaded ruling, in my view, has long
        been settled by the Supreme Court’s “trilogy” of cases: Lamb’s
        Chapel v. Center of Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384,
        387 (1993), Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,
        515 U.S. 819, 831–32 (1995), and Good News Club v. Milford Central
        School, 533 U.S. 98, 109, 120 (2001). Even if HART drafted a policy
        in theoretically perfect compliance with Mansky (although I share
        Judge Newsom’s skepticism that this is even possible), I believe the
        trilogy is fatal to HART’s religious ad prohibition.
               A review of the trilogy cases is in order. In Lamb’s Chapel, a
        school district allowed use of facilities for “social, civic, or recrea-
        tional” purposes, but not “religious purposes.” On that basis, it de-
        nied the use of its facilities to a church that wanted to show a ﬁlm
        series on family values and childrearing. The government argued
        that the school’s ban was a permissible subject matter exclusion ra-
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        2                     Grimberg, J., Concurring               22-11787

        ther than a denial based on viewpoint. The Supreme Court disa-
        greed. According to the Court, the subjects—family values and
        childrearing—were permissible, and the school therefore engaged
        in viewpoint discrimination by excluding the church from address-
        ing the topics from its Christian viewpoint.
                  Next came Rosenberger. There, the University of Virginia sub-
        sidized the costs of some student publications but declined to fund
        those that “primarily promot[ed] or manifest[ed] a particular be-
        lie[f ] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” The Supreme Court
        held that this constituted viewpoint discrimination since it pre-
        cluded a religious perspective, or viewpoint, as to subjects that
        could otherwise be discussed and considered from a secular per-
        spective. The Court noted that “religion may be a vast area of in-
        quiry, but it also provides…a speciﬁc premise, a perspective, a
        standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and
        considered.” Id. at 831.
               Finally, in Good News Club, a local Christian organization ap-
        plied for use of a school cafeteria, a space open for community use,
        to hold the group’s weekly afterschool meetings. But, the school’s
        community use policy, which foreclosed use “by any individual or
        organization for religious purposes,” barred the group’s request.
        The Supreme Court held that this constituted impermissible view-
        point discrimination. The unconstitutional nature of the policy
        was rooted in its acceptance of groups that would promote the
        moral and character development of children, but its exclusion of
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        21-12106                Grimberg, J., Concurring                           3

        the Club’s activities—which also promoted the moral and charac-
        ter development of children—because they were religious in na-
        ture. The Court held that “speech discussing otherwise permissible
        subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum on the
        ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.”
        533 U.S. at 112.
                The trilogy cases have been applied to public transportation
        systems at least twice—with opposing results. In Archdiocese of
        Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 897 F.3d 314 (D.C. Cir.
        2018), the public transportation system (WMATA) rejected a pro-
        posed advertisement from the Catholic Church bearing the silhou-
        ette of three shepherds and sheep, along with the words “Find the
        Perfect Gift” and a church website URL, based on a policy prohib-
        iting religious advertisements. The D.C. Circuit determined that
        the policy, materially identical to the policy before us today, did not
        constitute unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination but rather an
        appropriate subject matter prohibition. The Supreme Court denied
        certiorari. 1 Justice Gorsuch, however, dissented from the denial of
        cert, noting that in his view this case was wrongly decided under
        the trilogy. While that statement of course bears no precedential
        value, the logic is sound and deftly articulates my position in this
        case. As Justice Gorsuch pointed out, “[n]o one dispute[d] that, if
        Macy’s had sought to place the same advertisement with its own
        website address, [WMATA] would have accepted the business

        1 The full Court could not hear the case because then-Circuit Court Judge Ka-

        vanaugh participated in the appellate decision.
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        4                       Grimberg, J., Concurring                     22-11787

        gladly. Indeed, WMATA admit[ted] that it views Christmas as hav-
        ing ‘a secular half ’ and ‘a religious half,’ and it has shown no hesi-
        tation in taking secular Christmas advertisements.” Archdiocese of
        Washington v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 140 S. Ct. 1198,
        1199 (2020). Where the same advertisement, with the same content is
        welcomed when references to religion are removed and replaced
        with secular ones, I see no way around concluding, based on the
        trilogy, that the public transportation system engaged in unconsti-
        tutional viewpoint discrimination. 2
               That is precisely what happened in this case. When pre-
        sented with Young Israel’s ad, HART suggested that it would run
        the advertisement if Young Israel removed references in the ad to
        Judaism—the menorah and the word Chanukah, for example.
        HART essentially asked Young Israel to remove the religious angle
        of the ad, but not otherwise change the content. What’s more,
        HART previously had accepted ads for secular holiday events that
        involved ice skating and seasonal décor. I read the trilogy of cases
        as concluding that this is precisely what HART cannot do—permit
        advertising on “a subject sure to inspire religious views”—holiday
        events—“and then suppress those views” while allowing a secular
        analogue. Archdiocese of Washington, 140 S. Ct. at 1200.

        2 The other post-trilogy public transportation case is Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y

        v. Cnty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d 424, 432–37 (3d Cir. 2019), where
        the Third Circuit determined that the Lackawanna Transit System violated the
        First Amendment when it enacted a policy with prohibitions on religious mes-
        sages, ﬁnding that the policy and its application constituted religious view-
        point discrimination.
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        21-12106              Grimberg, J., Concurring                        5

                The majority opinion rightly notes that our circuit’s holding
        in Cambridge Christian School, Inc. v. Florida High School. Athletic
        Ass’n, 942 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2019), must be considered in any
        viewpoint discrimination analysis. Maj. Op. at 17–18. In Cambridge
        Christian, a case decided on a motion to dismiss, the Florida High
        School Athletic Association (FHSAA) rejected two Catholic
        schools’ requests to read a prayer on the loudspeaker before a foot-
        ball game. This Court determined that the FHSAA’s restriction was
        content-based, not viewpoint-based, because the complaint was
        clear “that the FHSAA relied on the nature of the proposed mes-
        sage as a prayer when it decided not to grant the schools’ request....
        The complaint [did] not allege, for instance, that Christian prayer
        was prohibited but that Jewish or Muslim prayer would have been
        allowed, which would present an obvious case of viewpoint dis-
        crimination.” Id. at 1242. The Court explicitly did not rule out the
        possibility of discovery revealing that the prayer prohibition was
        discriminatory of a viewpoint if, for example, “a secular act of sol-
        emnization or invocation of some sort would have been permitted
        by the state at the outset of the game.” Id. at n.8. In other words,
        if the content of the prayer could otherwise have been invoked for
        a secular purpose, the schools would have a “strong” case that the
        prohibition constituted viewpoint discrimination.
               For this reason, I believe Cambridge Christian oﬀers little guid-
        ance for our purposes. We have far more facts presented here, at
        the summary judgment stage, than the Cambridge Christian Court
        had before it when ruling on the motion to dismiss. In fact, we have
        precisely the facts that the Cambridge Christian Court indicated
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        6                     Grimberg, J., Concurring               22-11787

        would make a strong case for viewpoint discrimination— speciﬁ-
        cally, a secular comparator. The facts and procedural posture of our
        case cleave far closer to those in the trilogy cases. I see no material
        diﬀerence between the facts in the trilogy cases and the facts here.
        HART’s policy constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimina-
        tion, and there is no change in the way its policy is administered
        and applied that can ﬁx this fundamental constitutional ﬂaw.
               Of course, my position provides no solution to the legiti-
        mate concerns posed in Judge Newsom’s concurrence about the
        inherent diﬃculty of drawing a religious-based viewpoint/subject
        matter distinction in the ﬁrst instance. I share his skepticism that
        there can ever be a coherent categorical determination that reli-
        gious speech is ipso facto an expression of one’s viewpoint rather
        than a subject matter. Even with respect to my position, I
        acknowledge that the logical distinction is not precise—it matters
        greatly how we deﬁne the scope of a policy and prohibition. For
        example, in Lamb’s Chapel, the Court determined the subject mat-
        ter to be “family issues/childrearing” and the viewpoint to be reli-
        gious. However, it could just as easily have determined that the sub-
        ject matter was “religious ﬁlms” and gone the other way. Here,
        HART’s position that the subject matter of Young Israel’s advertise-
        ment was “Chanukah on Ice” is a reasonable one. The subject mat-
        ter/viewpoint distinction can arguably be drawn in favor of either
        party.
               That said, the Supreme Court has drawn this line so that it
        favors Young Israel in this case. Putting aside broader concerns
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        21-12106             Grimberg, J., Concurring                       7

        about the nature of religion, to decide this case we must work with
        and within current Free Speech doctrine and I believe the trilogy
        answers the viewpoint/subject matter dispute here loudly and
        clearly. So much so that I would have reached that question in the
        majority opinion, as the district court did. Otherwise, and as it cur-
        rently stands, HART can continue drafting viewpoint discrimina-
        tory policies while also failing to reasonably apply them—perpetu-
        ally evading review of the ultimate constitutional ﬂaw.