Court Opinion

ID: 9782543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:55:59.572995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:05.324202
License: Public Domain

Jones, J.
(dissenting in part). I agree with the majority’s dismissal of the reckless endangerment count. However, I dissent *364from that portion of the majority’s opinion upholding defendant’s conviction for manslaughter in the second degree (count seven of the indictment) because I do not believe this conviction was supported by legally sufficient evidence.
In a legal sufficiency inquiry, this Court’s role is limited to determining whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 [1979]; see also People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]). Where the evidence adduced at trial establishes “any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences [that] could lead a rational person” to convict, then the conviction survives sufficiency review (People v Williams, 84 NY2d 925, 926 [1994]). “A sufficiency inquiry requires a court to marshal competent facts most favorable to the People and determine whether, as a matter of law, a jury could logically conclude that the People sustained its burden of proof’ (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]).
Penal Law § 125.15 (1) provides that a “person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when . . . [h]e recklessly causes the death of another person” (emphasis added). Penal Law § 15.05 (3) defines the term “recklessly” as follows:
“A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”
Thus, the elements of second-degree manslaughter are “the creation of a substantial and unjustifiable risk [of death]; an awareness and disregard of the risk on the part of defendant; and a resulting death” (People v Licitra, 47 NY2d 554, 558 [1979]).
Our case law makes clear that causation is “an essential element which the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt” in a second-degree manslaughter prosecution (People v Stewart, 40 NY2d 692, 697 [1976]). That is, “the defendant’s actions must be a sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death” (id.). If . the evidence only establishes a possible or probable connection between defendant’s acts and the victim’s death, the evidence is not legally sufficient to support a conviction for second-degree manslaughter (see id.).
*365Defendant Alicia Lewie is not alleged to have herself ever physically abused her child. She is accused of recklessly causing the death of her eight-month-old son by repeatedly leaving him in her live-in boyfriend’s (Michael Flint) unsupervised care during a 45-day period prior to the child’s death (between October 1, 2007 and November 14, 2007), despite being aware that Flint was physically abusing the child. Because she is a “passive” defendant charged with reckless manslaughter, this Court’s decision in People v Wong (81 NY2d 600 [1993]) has application. In Wong, both caretakers of an infant who died of shaken baby syndrome were convicted of first- and second-degree manslaughter and endangering the welfare of child, even though there was no evidence as to which of the caretakers shook the child. In reversing the convictions, this Court held that the prosecution had to establish that the passive defendant was personally aware that the physical abuse had taken place and “that such abusive conduct created a risk that the infant would die without prompt medical treatment” (Wong, 81 NY2d at 608 [emphasis added]; see People v Northrup, 83 AD2d 737 [3d Dept 1981]). In Northrup, defendant mother was convicted in Otsego County Court of depraved indifference murder stemming from the death of her son at the hands of her live-in boyfriend, who physically abused the child. Defendant was charged with causing her son’s death by unjustifiably and inexcusably failing to obtain or provide medical care or assistance for him. In reversing this conviction on legal sufficiency grounds, the Appellate Division wrote:
“Evidence is lacking that this 23-year-old woman, without medical training or knowledge, was cognizant of that risk [of death] and consciously disregarded it. Although the external injuries were serious, [her son] ceased crying and walked about without complaining shortly after [her boyfriend] left. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the injury causing his death was an internal one, not detectable from observing the boy’s body. In our view, this record does not support a finding that defendant acted recklessly” (Northrup, 83 AD 2d at 738 [emphasis added]).
The Northrup court further stated, “[s]ince reckless conduct is also a requisite for manslaughter in the second degree, one of the lesser included offenses which was charged, defendant’s conviction of that crime must likewise be ruled out” (83 AD2d at 738).
*366The prosecution here built its reckless manslaughter case around the allegation that sometime during the stated 45-day period, defendant actually became aware that Flint was physically abusing her son and chose to ignore the grave risk this conduct posed for the child by repeatedly leaving him in Flint’s unsupervised care. To make out its case, the prosecution had witnesses testify that defendant told them that Flint, on numerous occasions, had physically abused her and was physically abusing her child in her absence. Further, the prosecution proffered medical evidence which confirmed that defendant’s son had been repeatedly abused during the period of time that defendant left him in Flint’s unsupervised care.
While this evidence may have shown that defendant was criminally negligent in leaving her child with Flint, it did not establish the elements necessary to support a reckless manslaughter conviction.* The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, established that the acts of abuse took place while defendant was at work — i.e., defendant could not know the severity of the abuse to the child; it was not possible for defendant to know that the injuries sustained by her child were life-threatening or could contribute to his death because to the naked eye they only appeared to be marks or bruises; hospital personnel were only able to determine the extent of the child’s internal injuries after multiple X rays and blood tests were performed; and the internal injuries that caused the child’s death were only detected upon the medical examiner’s internal inspection of the child’s remains during the postmortem examination. Further, while the evidence established that the child’s death resulted from trauma to the head, the medical examiner was unable to pinpoint precisely when the trauma was inflicted upon the child. He could only opine that the fatal injuries were sustained within four days prior to his death (which occurred on November 14, 2007).
While the evidence adduced at trial established that defendant was aware of a risk of abuse to her son, the prosecution did not meet its burden of establishing defendant’s awareness and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of her son’s death. There was no evidence to establish at what point *367during the stated 45-day period defendant actually perceived that her child was exposed to a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death. We know from the unchallenged dismissal of the reckless manslaughter count under count six of the indictment that the jury could not rationally find that defendant perceived this risk during the last three days of her son’s life, the last three days of the stated 45-day period. We further know from the dismissal of count six that the jury could not rationally find that defendant perceived this risk when during the three days covered by that count she left her child in Flint’s care when she left for work. Nor was there evidence that defendant would have disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk to her child’s life even had one been apparent. Her actions — on November 12 and 13, 2007 — with respect to her child — i.e., attempting to treat him with over-the-counter medications, feeding and playing with him, checking on him throughout the night, and when it became apparent that his condition worsened, calling 911 and taking him to the hospital — belie the allegation that she would have consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk to her child’s life.
Moreover, the evidence adduced by the prosecution did not prove that defendant was aware that Flint’s abusive conduct created a risk that defendant’s child would die without prompt medical treatment (see Wong, 81 NY2d at 608). As stated supra, it was not possible for defendant to know that the injuries sustained by her child were life-threatening or could contribute to his death. Further, there was no proof demonstrating that defendant’s acts (of leaving the child with Flint) or omissions were a sufficiently direct cause of the child’s death (see Stewart, 40 NY2d at 697).
In upholding defendant’s reckless manslaughter conviction, the majority concludes that the jury could logically find, based on the evidence adduced at trial, that defendant knew a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death existed and consciously disregarded it (see majority op at 357). But, in support of the inference it claims the jury could make, the majority points to evidence of defendant’s awareness of a risk of physical abuse, not death. Stated differently, the majority, without support, equates knowledge of a risk of physical abuse with knowledge of a risk of death. In effect, the majority has held that once a parent is aware his/her child has been physically abused by someone with whom they regularly leave the child, even where the abuse occurs outside the presence of the parent, and even *368where any injuries sustained appear to be superficial, that parent may be held criminally liable for reckless manslaughter if the child dies at the hands of the abusive caregiver. Such a ruling marks an unwarranted departure from our jurisprudence and a drastic diminution of the proof required to make out reckless manslaughter in a case involving a passive defendant parent. Indeed, the majority’s holding appears to read the very stringent direct causation requirement out of the reckless manslaughter statute in cases involving passive defendant parents.
For the foregoing reasons, I would modify by dismissing count seven of the indictment charging reckless manslaughter and by dismissing count eight of the indictment charging reckless endangerment.
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read and Pigott concur with Judge Smith; Judge Jones dissents in part and votes to modify by dismissing count seven of the indictment charging manslaughter in the second degree and by dismissing the count charging reckless endangerment, in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman concurs.
Order, insofar as appealed from, modified, etc.

 Viewing this evidence in conjunction with the trial court’s supplemental instruction to the jury explaining recklessness in terms of what defendant saw, what defendant should have seen, and what defendant disregarded, a reasonable argument could be made that the jury convicted defendant of reckless manslaughter based on proof of criminally negligent homicide.