Court Opinion

ID: 9778294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:59:04.356706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:07.089063
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, dissenting. I would affirm the judgment of the lower court. I have a consuming curiosity about the content of appellant’s written statement, but this is not a proper basis for reversal. In considering whether reversible error was committed we should consider the entire record in the case and the actions of appellant and his attorney in regard to this particular statement. Appellant first filed a motion to suppress, stating that it was a mere written summary of what he had told the police officers, without having been advised of his constitutional rights. This motion was denied, hut appellant’s motion for new trial assigns this denial as error. When the sheriff took the witness stand, appellant objected'to his relating an oral statement, contending that if the statement was taken down in writing, the writing would be the best evidence'. It was then established that the oral statement to the sheriff had not been reduced to writing. The prosecuting attorney stated that, in general, the oral and written statements were the same. Appellant’s abstract does not reveal any request for inspection of the written statement. On cross-examination appellant’s attorney determined that the sheriff had possession of a copy of the written statement. He moved its introduction after the sheriff testified that only the first part of the written statement was made in.his presence. This motion was denied. Appellant’s attorney did not ask for permission to inspect the statement at that time and did not make any proffer for the record. The defendant, in testifying, stated that he was willing for the statement to be introduced. He also said that it was substantially the same as his testimony, except that his testimony was in more detail. On cross-examination, defendant stated that only the prosecuting attorney and his secretary were present when the written statement was made. Although the prosecuting attorney asked defendant how it happened that there was no mention of his wife’s call to him to come home in his written statement, the defendant never answered the question and never was called upon to answer. After an objection by appellant’s attorney; this question was never repeated. The statement was not offered by the prosecution to contradict defendant’s testimony. The sheriff was called by the state in rebuttal to contradict testimony of defendant’s witness Thomas. On cross-examination he stated that he had in his possession the written statement of Tommy Ray Thomas and appellant. Appellant’s counsel then specifically asked to see the statement of Thomas and asked its in-treduction. No objection was offered to inspection of this statement by appellant’s attorney. When an objection was made to introduction of the Thomas statement, appellant’s counsel proceeded without a ruling by the court and inquired of the sheriff about the absence of a part of Thomas’ testimony from this statement. He did not ask to be permitted to see the statement of appellant nor did he ask that it be introduced at this time. There is no' reason to believe that any objection would have been raised to examination of the statement by appellant’s attorney. If the statement was favorable to appellant, it was not admissible as it would have been a self-serving declaration and not contemporaneous with the statement made to the sheriff. Butler v. State, 34 Ark. 480. Selfserving statements cannot be offered in rebuttal of proof of incriminating statements. Patterson v. State, 179 Ark. 309, 15 S. W. 2d 389. Such statements are not rendered competent merely because they differ from statements testified to by other witnesses. Reece v. State, 125 Ark. 597, 189 S. W. 60. If it were admissible to impeach the testimony of the officers as to the content of appellant’s oral statement, then it could not be introduced through one who was not present when it was made. Appellant never at any time called either the prosecuting attorney or his secretary to testify as to this statement, as he might have done. Neither did he indicate that he desired to offer the written statement to impeach the testimony of the officers or lay the foundation to do so. But the most fatal defect of all is that the statement was never proffered for the record. This being the case, we are not at liberty to consider its admissibility or possible prejudice in the refusal to admit. Misenheimer v. State, 73 Ark. 407, 84 S. W. 494; Latourette v. State, 91 Ark. 65, 120 S. W. 411; Jones v. State, 101 Ark. 439, 142 S. W. 838; Baldwin v. State, 119 Ark. 518, 178 S. W. 409; Simmons v. State, 124 Ark. 566, 187 S. W. 646; Fowler v. State, 130 Ark. 365, 197 S. W. 568; Powell v. State, 133 Ark. 477, 203 S. W. 25; Lassiter v. State, 137 Ark. 273, 208 S. W. 21. I do not agree with the trial judge that the matter of introduction of the written statement lay wholly within the province of the prosecuting attorney. I agree that it is reversible error for the prosecuting attorney to withhold evidence favorable to a defendant. I do not agree that this rule requires him to introduce a defendant’s self-serving statements, nor do I agree that we should act on the admissibility of evidence without knowing what that evidence is. We can only speculate as to the content of the statement. There simply is no evidence that anything favorable to the defendant was withheld. It is a novel idea to suggest that an attorney is required to offer his entire conversation with a witness in evidence because he asks the witness why some fact revealed in the witness’ testimony was not disclosed in the conversation. The majority’s holding that this statement was admissible regardless of its content is unique to say the least.