Court Opinion

ID: 9466943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:33:22.17538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:03.529380
License: Public Domain

WALD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Parts I to IV of Judge Tamm’s opinion for the court. As for Part V, I would affirm the district court’s protective conditions imposed upon the enforcement of the FTC subpoenas.
The district court’s conditions were, as to Congressional requests for access to asserted trade secret data, (1) that the FTC “verif[y] that the request is made in accordance with the requirements of the controlling congressional rule,” and (2) that the FTC immediately notify, by telephone and in writing, the owner of the asserted trade secrets when such requests are made. J.A. 12. I believe that the first condition simply implemented the mandate this court laid down for the FTC in Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582, 592-94 (D.C.Cir.1978), and that there is substantial material in the record of the hearing before the district court to justify the second. See J.A. 39-49. At that same hearing, FTC counsel appeared for the most part to agree as to the appropriateness of the conditions (see id. at 39-41 & 46-47), even though he attempted to dissuade the district court from imposing them.
I. THE VERIFICATION CONDITION
In Exxon this court held, following Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C.Cir.1976), that Congress is entitled to access to material subpoenaed by the FTC, including “trade secrets” protected from public disclosure under § 6(f) of the FTC Act. The court was careful to point out, however, that such trade secrets should “be disclosed only upon valid formal requests of Congress *976or its committees.” 589 F.2d at 588 (emphasis in original). The court refused to impose any mandatory notice period before disclosure in response to such requests, because it “would skirt dangerously close to being at least the temporary ‘equivalent to an order quashing [the official request or subpoena] which is generally an impermissible frustration of the congressional power to investigate . . . .’ ” Id. (bracketed material in original). But the court nevertheless emphasized:
[W]e feel that there is ample justification for insisting that the Commission only reveal statutorily protected trade secrets when it has indeed received such a proper request or subpoena.
Id. at 592 (emphasis in original). The court noted that the separation of powers doctrine, which prevents the courts from interfering with Congressional demands for data, comes into play only for formal Congressional requests for access.
. Election to the Congress does not give an individual subpoena power over whatever information he may happen to be interested in, and particularly not over trade secrets, whose oftentimes enormous value may be forfeited by disclosure to the public.
. [A]s Congress itself has manifested a concern to prevent the issuance of subpoenas by individual members as opposed to committees, subcommittees or duly authorized committee chairmen, it is appropriate to require the FTC to take steps to ascertain the validity of a subpoena (or the formal requests it treats as subpoenas) before it releases data it is required by statute to be kept [sic] confidential.
. Accordingly, although we do not require the FTC to observe the procedures proposed by the appellants to limit the manner in which the Commission responds to formal requests for trade secrets from Congress or its committees[,] it is nothing more than common sense for the FTC to not disclose trade secrets except upon legally authorized requests therefore and to verify that fact before delivery. Trade secrets, by statute, are in a different position than ordinary non-confidential information within the possession of the Commission.
Id. at 593 (emphasis in original).
The Exxon court also noted that the FTC had, in January 1978, initiated a rulemaking proceeding to consider protection of the confidentiality of such data and declared: “It would seem that the rule should provide that in all instances the party will be notified immediately whenever Congress makes a proper request for trade secrets.” Id. at 590 n.16. Two years later, however, we do not yet have any rule on confidentiality; nor could the FTC counsel at oral argument enlighten the court as to when such a rule might eventuate.1
In the specific enforcement proceeding involved here, the district court made several inquiries as to FTC practices with regard to responses to Congressional requests. The FTC, in answer to requests for prior notice by owners of subpoenaed trade secret material before release to Congressional committees or to a court, will promise only that it will give “as much notice as possible under the circumstances.” J.A. 42; see, e. g., id. at 168. It will advise the requestor that the owner believes the material to be confidential, but nothing is promised about checking on the “official” nature of the request. See FTC Operating Manual, Ch. 15.1.3 (1978) (J.A. 718); 16 C.F.R. § 4.11 (1979) (“[Requests for disclosure of records” from the FTC).
An affidavit in this case from an FTC employee, Barry R. Rubin, who handles such requests, alleges that “[o]nly requests from Congressional Committees and Subcommittees are treated as official requests of Com gress” (J.A. 78?); in no instance has the *977FTC been “aware” that any such request to which it has responded was not properly authorized. Id. at 783. That affidavit further states that in “nearly every instance” the FTC “has been able” to provide ten days’ notice when it has agreed to attempt to do so. Id. Although this may be the FTC’s predominant practice, only the requirement for as much notice as “possible” is incorporated in its written assurances, and the language in the Rubin affidavit quoted above at least suggests that the FTC may not be “able” to give the full ten days’ notice, or indeed any advance notice, in all instances.
In only one instance, the affidavit asserts, was notice provided as late as the day of release (id.), but the Rubin affidavit also warns:
In all instances where a congressional committee or subcommittee has indicated that access is requested to Commission information prior to the end of the notice period, the Commission has accepted that representation, has had no reason not to accept that representation and has granted access.
Id. at 783-84 (emphasis supplied).
FTC counsel in this case opined in the hearing before the district court that the Exxon mandate to the FTC — i. e., to verify that a Congressional request was “formal” —was vague, but he also admitted that the FTC’s own practice of honoring only an “official request” from Congress (as set forth in the Rubin affidavit, J.A. 782) was just as indefinite:
The problem here is that Congress works in different ways; that is, some committees authorize their chairman to make official requests for information. So sometimes the chairman, acting alone, can do it. Some work by subpoenas; some work by other documental requests, compulsory process and aids. The putting in words, precise words exactly, what the Commission is obliged to respond to, exactly what duties it has to verify the requests, the validity of the requests, this is very difficult. I think that a general obligation on the part of the Commission to be confident, to be certain that the request is, at least, on its face an official request is appropriate; but to say that the Commission can go over to an ordinate [sic] branch of Government and start asking questions about “Who are you?” and “What is your authority in . .”
J.A. 46-47 (elipse in original).
The distinct impression I (and apparently the district court) glean from those remarks is that no attempt to “verify” whether a request is in conformity with applicable rules for relevant Congressional committees or subcommittees, or even with the general rules of the House or the Senate, is currently being made.2 The district court’s reaction to this disclosure was expressly to require such a verification in accordance with the Exxon mandate, without in any way telling the FTC how it should do its job. The rules of the House of Representatives and the Senate dealing with subpoenas are a matter of public record and easily ascertainable. Even as to nonsubpoena requests which, as the Rubin affidavit implicitly concedes, are sometimes made by tele*978phone,3 some verification of the official nature of the request seems not only commonsensical but essential if the strictures of Exxon are to have any effect at all.
The majority opinion’s footnote 16, suggesting that a single Congressman’s request for confidential information protected by § 6(f), even though the request is unauthorized by any committee or subcommittee of Congress, may stand on the same footing as a duly authorized committee or subcommittee request, is especially troubling. In the exercise of its administrative discretion, even the FTC has not gone that far; it purportedly treats request for access to trade secrets from individual Congressmen as “unofficial,” and thus akin to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), requests from the public. J.A. 782. Frankly, I find the majority’s suggestion surprising in view of their opinion’s overriding emphasis on agency discretion in these matters.
I cannot agree with the majority’s citation of Murphy v. Department of the Army, 613 F.2d 1151 (D.C.Cir.1979) (Greene, J.), to support their position. Murphy dealt with the Army’s disclosure to a Congressman of material otherwise exempt from mandatory disclosure to the public under the FOIA. The court invoked 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)4 as authority that Congress did not mean the FOIA exemptions to impede its own access to such material and found that granting such access to an individual Congressman did not amount to a waiver of the material’s exempt nature. But here we deal with material specifically protected by statute from any disclosure to the public,5 not a situation like Murphy where disclosure is left to the discretion of the government.6
Duly authorized Congressional requests were judicially recognized as a narrow exception to the § 6(f) statutory ban in Exxon, 589 F.2d at 592-94; therefore, it is doubly important to insure that these requests are authorized ones. The majority too casually dismisses Exxon in this regard. No Member of Congress, acting on his own, has yet been judicially declared to have access rights to subpoenaed trade secret material for his own individually-defined legislative purposes, no matter how legitimate his interest.
To suggest that Murphy may expand Exxon’s limited access to cover any Member acting individually is to seriously dilute the protections of § 6(f), and even to undermine the duly constituted authority and processes of Congress. The Legislative branch oper*979ates in the sensitive area of trade secret disclosure with its coordinate branch, the Executive, through the structure and delegated powers of Congressional committees and subcommittees. Only if the Executive and the courts honor that structure will the Legislature itself, as well as agencies, be able to assure subpoenaed parties that their trade secret material is not subject to indiscriminate disclosure to any or all of the 535 Members of Congress with diverse political and legislative interests. That is what I think this court’s 1978 Exxon opinion was all about. And, in fact, just recently in United States v. Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d 70, (D.C.Cir. 1980) (per curiam), this court affirmed a district court opinion enforcing a Department of Energy (DOE) subpoena in which the district court imposed protective conditions upon all requests for access, including those of individual Members of Congress, except those made “pursuant to a request formally authorized by a committee or subcommittee of Congress with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the documents or information requested . . .. ” 628 F.2d 77.7
II. THE NOTIFICATION CONDITION
During his questioning of FTC counsel, the district court was told that the FTC already had a policy of immediately notifying owners of data in the FTC’s possession upon receipt of a Congressional request for access. J.A. 40. FTC counsel stated that this was set out in the Rubin affidavit (id.), but in fact that affidavit does not speak of any such notification policy and petitioner’s counsel disputed that any such policy was in effect. Id. at 49. FTC counsel, in answer to the district court’s question whether the FTC would be willing to notify the companies upon receipt of a Congressional request in this case, said “I think so.” Id. at 41. He later pulled back to suggest that the FTC might have difficulty in giving that notification “immediately,” because requests come into personnel all over the Commission (even secretaries), but FTC counsel without equivocation stated that “at the point in [sic] which the request is funnelled to the person who knows about this case, who knows about the documents, at this point notice will be given.” Id. at 42.8 It subsequently developed that all *980Congressional requests are channelled into the Office of General Counsel at the FTC and that decisions are made upon them by the Commission. Id. at 92-93; cf. FTC Operating Manual, ch. 15.1.3 (1978) (J.A. 718).
Under these circumstances, I believe the district court was justified in probing further as to how the FTC intended to comply with its “promise” to give as much notice as possible. The Supreme Court recently recognized for example, in rejecting a National Labor Relations Board decision to require an employer to disclose certain aptitude testing materials to union officials, that agency determinations on confidentiality are not sacrosanct. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 99 S.Ct. 1123, 59 L.Ed.2d 333 (1979). There the Court held:
. [T]he rule of deference to the Board’s choice of remedy does not constitute a blank check for arbitrary action. The role that Congress in § 10(e) [of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(e) (1976)] has entrusted to the courts in reviewing the Board’s petitions for enforcement of its orders is not that of passive conduit.
Id. 99 S.Ct. at 1132 (citation omitted).
No one disputes that if the owners of trade secrets do not know in time of the likelihood of release of their material to Congress, they can neither attempt to dissuade the FTC from releasing the data,9 nor *981seek judicial relief.10 Additionally, they cannot negotiate on their own with the legislators requesting access to honor the owners’ pleas of confidentiality, and they are at a disadvantage in taking timely precautions if the material should be subsequently released to the public by Congress.11
The district court has fairly — and reasonably — required that the trade secret owner be notified of a Congressional request for access upon its receipt by the person at the FTC charged with the responsibility of dealing with such requests. The district court’s order need not be read (as the FTC apparently does) to require notice upon the mere physical receipt by anyone at the FTC of a Congressional request for access, even when it is received by FTC personnel who know nothing about the case. The purpose of the district court’s notice condition is simply to give the trade secret owners notice of Congressional requests at the point the FTC begins to consider them.
III. THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
I do not doubt the district court’s authority to act as it did here. In FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 291, 85 S.Ct. 1459, 1468, 14 L.Ed.2d 383 (1965), the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of conditions imposed on a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) investigation by a district court, finding that “[t]he question for decision was whether the exercise of discretion by the Commission was within permissible limits, not whether the District Judge’s substituted judgment was reasonable.” (Emphasis in original). Schreiber concerned an FCC investigation of the television industry in which the Music Corporation of America, Inc. (MCA), unsuccessfully sought FCC assurances that certain subpoenaed data would be kept confidential. Following that rejection, MCA — again without success — requested that all its data and even testimony of its representatives not be publicly disclosed. Id. at 286, 85 S.Ct. at 1465. In subsequent enforcement proceedings, the district court required that all MCA testimony and documents received by the FCC be held in confidence and made public only after the conclusion of the investigation and upon a showing of “good cause” by the FCC to the court. Id. at 287 n.14, 85 S.Ct. at 1465-1466.
The Supreme Court upheld the agency’s right to fashion its own investigative procedures, including deciding whether hearings would be public or closed, because agencies are “familiar with the industries which they regulate and will be in a better position than federal courts or Congress itself to design procedural rules adapted to the peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency involved.” Id. at 290, 85 S.Ct. at 1467. The Court cautioned against judicial *982second-guessing of an agency’s “procedural rule, establishing a presumption in favor of public proceedings . . . Id. at 293, 85 S.Ct. at 1469. That rule itself, however, made provision for individualized appeals to the FCC for confidential treatment of particular documents, and the Court noted that “[i]f and when information was demanded which if disclosed might in fact injure MCA competitively, there would be ample opportunity to request that it be received in confidence, and to seek judicial protection if the request were denied.” Id. at 296, 85 S.Ct. at 1470 (citation omitted). This is precisely what is happening here.
This is a subpoena enforcement proceeding involving specific documents as to which the owners have asserted a § 6(f) privilege and as to which the owners seek protective conditions which the FTC has already rejected.12 Thus, we are at the point which had not been reached in Schreiber, i. e., the data owners here have “request[ed] that [their trade secret data] be received in confidence,” and they are now “seeking] judicial protection [since their] . . . requests] were denied.” Id. This is not a pre-enforcement action where there might be uncertainty as the FTC’s position on whether and to what extent it will enforce its subpoenas, nor is this case like Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1980), where the FTC “has yet to take a position on which documents should be subject to what type of confidential treatment.” At 667.
Wearly in fact supports the data owners here. Although the Third Circuit there found a pre-enforcement proceeding premature, it noted:
In acting on [a] petition [by an agency for an order enforcing a subpoena] the district court’s role is not that of a mere rubber stamp, but of an independent reviewing authority called upon to insure the integrity of the proceeding. “The system of judicial enforcement is designed to provide a meaningful day in court for one resisting an administrative subpoena.” In the discharge of that duty, the court has the power to condition enforcement upon observance of safeguards to the respondent’s valid interests.
Id. at 665 (citation omitted; footnote omitted). Cf. FTC v. Johns-Manville Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 62,830 at 78,792-93 (D.Colo.1979) (holding that Schreiber was not controlling in an FTC subpoena enforcement action because in Schreiber the FCC acted pursuant to a validly promulgated regulation while the FTC had not adopted such a rule regarding the confidentiality of subpoenaed material).
The FTC has itself provided the “10 day notice” assurance with respect to the release of these same documents to other — i. e., non-Congressional — requestors, thereby preliminarily validating the documents’ eligibility for some protection from disclosure. Since the FTC cannot assure 10 days’ prerelease notice for Congressional requests, it seems only reasonable that the FTC should *983do what it can to provide notice at the earliest possible time, i. e., when a request comes in. Requiring notice at the receipt of a request for access seems clearly necessary if the trade secret owners are to have any opportunity to plead their case at the FTC level about what is to be released under what conditions or assurances. Otherwise, by the time “reasonable” notice of the FTC’s decision to release data to Congressional committees comes, the agency position will have hardened and any dialogue between the agency and the owner about disclosure will be frozen or futile, or the documents may already have been released.
Since Schreiber, courts have continued to impose protective conditions on enforcement of agency subpoenas in appropriate circumstances. This court’s recent Exxon opinion regarding DOE’s subpoena enforcement powers reaffirms this authority: “Since the enforcement of a subpoena is an independent judicial action, and not merely an action ancillary to an earlier agency action, ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894), a court is free to change the terms of an agency subpoena as it sees fit. Flotill Products, Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. I960).” Exxon, 628 F.2d 75 (emphasis supplied). That principle is by no means novel, as Judge Robinson recognized in SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1032-33 (D.C.Cir.1978):
Enforcement of administrative subpoenas has long been committed, not to administrative tribunals themselves, but instead to the courts. Power to enforce subpoenas ... is cast in this traditional mold, without limitation on the court’s discretion to set terms ensuring that the enforcement order does not become an engine of oppression. Stated somewhat differently, judicial authority to temper enforcement with fairness stems inexorably from congressional entrustment of subpoena enforcement to the judiciary.
(Citations omitted). The Arthur Young panel noted that the subpoena enforcement court, “in formulating protective conditions for administrative subpoenas, may resort analogously to techniques conventional to judicial subpoena[s] . . . .” Id. at 1033. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(7) (permitting protective orders insuring “that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way”).13 Furthermore, in reviewing the imposition or rejection of such protections, the standard for review is whether the district court exercised sound discretion, taking Schreiber's mandate into consideration. FTC v. Lonning, 539 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C.Cir.1976) (“[t]he decision as to the type and scope of any protective order rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and must be determined on a case by case basis”) (footnote omitted); accord, EEOC v. Packard Elec. Div., GM Corp., 569 F.2d 315, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Friedman, 352 F.2d 545, 547 (3d Cir. 1965) (standard of review is “whether or not there was an abuse of [the district court’s] discretion”), quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 122 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 1941).
*984Schreiber of course requires that due deference must be given to the agency’s own judgment of what kind of protective conditions are appropriate in view of its practices and any potential abuses.14 But the reality is that the agency seeking enforcement of its own subpoenas will almost inevitably wish them enforced with the least number of conditions or restrictions on what it may do with the material. Here the FTC has in effect agreed that the notice condition is reasonable and feasible, and asserted that it is actually provided in most cases. J.A. 42. The FTC simply did not want to be required to provide that notice in all cases by court order. Id. But post-Schreiber district courts have imposed conditions, not unlike those at issue here, that confidential subpoenaed material not be disclosed to competitors, FTC v. Continental Can Co., 267 F.Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y.1966), and that sensitive information in documents not be given over to any third party (except grand juries) without ten days’ notice in order to let the parties apply to the court for relief, SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 404 F.Supp. 651 (D.D.C.1975).15
The district court here was similarly exercising its discretion; it is the propriety of its actions which we should be evaluating. I do not believe that the rationale of Schreiber compels so absolute a deference to the FTC’s self-imposed disclosure provisions that a district judge retains no discretion to provide the owner of statutorily-protected material with reasonable assurances of immediate notice and verification when Congressional requests are made for access to that material.
*985The district court here, furthermore, examined the practical burdens that its two prescribed conditions would impose. It apparently concluded (and I agree) that the burden of both conditions on the FTC is small since the FTC currently channels all Congressional requests to the General Counsel’s office for decision by the Commission itself. As to the notification condition, the following colloquy is instructive:
THE COURT: Yes. So they [i. e., Congressional requests for access] all go to the General Counsel?
MR. GRIMES [FTC counsel]: That’s correct, and the Commission is the body that finally decides whether to grant that request from Congress. The Ashland Oil case .
THE COURT: If that’s so, then there is no practical reason why the General Counsel can’t advise these people at the time they get the request, is there? It’s centralized, so therefore, you’ve got a mechanism.
MR. GRIMES: I would agree, as soon as the .
THE COURT: He can just pick up the telephone and tell them as soon as he hears about it.
MR. GRIMES: As soon as the General Counsel knows about it, we certainly would be aware of it in this case.
THE COURT: Sure. They wouldn’t have the question of people away on vacation, or his secretary needs to come in.
J.A. 93 (elipses in original). As to the requirement of ascertaining that Congressional requests are authorized, that too, as the district court concluded, should not be unduly burdensome, again because of the FTC’s practice of channeling such requests to the General Counsel’s office. Compare id. at 47-48 with id. at 93.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the district court’s conditions appear to be entirely reasonable in view of the present practices of the FTC as disclosed at the hearing before the district court, and in view of this court’s mandate to the FTC in our 1978 Exxon opinion. Nor is there any ground to believe that those conditions impose any undue burden on the FTC. It may be that as a result of its rulemaking proceeding, the FTC will propose different or better solutions to the problem of implementation of the “trade secret” provision, but for now it has none except its “as much as possible” notice promise. Nor do I find persuasive the argument that there is no need to impose the district court’s minimal protections unless or until the FTC releases data pursuant to an unauthorized Congressional request or without as much prior notice as “possible.” This proceeding involved many alleged trade secret documents, and if the owners have any enforceable rights with respect to these documents, protective conditions must precede, not follow, unauthorized releases.
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court here in all respects.

. Over a year ago in the district court hearing, FTC counsel was asked about the status of the rulemaking proceeding and answered: “The Commission has not yet ruled on that. I happen to have personal knowledge of the fact that the staff is in the process of preparing the final recommendations to the Commission . . . .” J.A. 39 (elipse in original). FTC counsel at oral argument before us was unable to be more specific.

. As counsel for Owens-Coming remarked in the hearing before the district court, without contradiction by FTC counsel:
. . The Commission, itself, even admits that technological trade secrets fall in this class, but they refuse to classify them as trade secrets and we are told now under the proposed rule that if we turned these over, we may never get notice as to Congress because the only obligation under the rule and the letter which was read to Your Honor is to give notice after the decision to release is made, not at the time the request comes in. As you say, the request may come in to any number of different places in the Commission from any direction.
Also, the Exxon case in this Circuit has made it clear that the Commission has a duty to make a determination as to whether the request from Congress is an official request, was it issued pursuant to committee vote, and so on. The present Commission practice is not to do so. If a letter from a chairman of a committee on his stationery comes in, they treat it as official, whether or not official, and it may even be a telephone call.
Id at 55.

. The Rubin affidavit states that “nearly all” Congressional requests for subpoenaed data in the FTC’s possession are written. Id. at 782.

. That provision provides in pertinent part that “[the FOIA] is not authority to withhold information from Congress.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976).

. The Murphy decision makes no reference to the Privacy Act of 1974 which follows the FOIA in the statute books and provides, in relevant part:
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be—
(9) to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction, any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or subcommittee of any such joint committee.
Id. § 552a(b)(9) (emphasis supplied).

. Pending amendments to the FTC Act which passed the Senate on February 7, 1980 would, inter alia, expand the protections accorded trade secrets in § 6 of the Act to also cover “confidential commercial or financial information” and exempt all such materials from mandatory release to the public under the FOIA. S. 1991, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3 & 15 (1980) (passed as the Senate version of H.R. 2313); 126 Cong.Rec. SI 177-1242 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1980); see S.Rep. No. 500, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5, 6, 26-27, 37 & 50-53 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Report]. Those pending amendments also emphasize that “[n]othing” in the confidentiality protections that they would place on data in the FTC’s possession (see note 11, infra) “is intended to prevent disclosure to either body of the Congress or to any authorized committee or subcommittee of Congress . . . .” 1979 Senate Report at 51 & 52 (emphasis supplied).

. The confidentiality protections in the recent Exxon opinion were put forth by the FTC as a basis for settlement, as were the protections imposed in FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974, 97 S.Ct. 2939, 53 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1977) (see infra), but that merely reinforces the view that imposing such protections on the FTC was not unreasonable.

. The relevant portions of that colloquy were:
THE COURT: . . . What reason is there why there should not be in connection with this order a directive from me that immediately upon a request for any trade secret document that you receive, a formal or proper request from Congress or by reason of a court subpoena, that you will give telephonic and written notice to the parties? Now I meant to say immediately. What is the problem with that as a practical working arrangement?
MR. GRIMES [FTC counsel]: It has been the Commission’s policy to do, essentially, that.
THE COURT: Well, then, that encourages me to think that it’s possibly, a good idea.
******
THE COURT: It’s not advanced notice. [Repeating] It’s not advanced notice. You get forthwith requests. Congressmen call up and say, “I want it down here noon tomorrow; bring your staff, we’re going to have a hearing.”
MR. GRIMES: You may want to look at the Respondent’s Exhibit 22, which is an affidavit filed by a Commission staff attorney who is directly involved with these kind of requests over the years and that was an affidavit filed in the Anderson proceeding before Judge Flannery. In that affidavit, he discusses what the Commission has done in past cases and he indicates that in situations like this, the Commission has immediately advised respondents by telephone.
THE COURT: You’d be willing to do that here?
MR. GRIMES: I think so. Now my problem is any time you’re asking me whether my agency should be subjected to a court order like that, it seems to me you’re calling into question the presumption of good faith that we would do that anyway. You are also subjecting us . . .
THE COURT: Well, your rules don’t say
MR. GRIMES: Well, I think there is a good reason why the rules don’t say that and that is that if, for example, a request under FOIA *980comes in — they generally come into the secretary’s office at a very low level — the request may come in, say, today
THE COURT: I’m not talking about the FOIA. I’m talking about Congress. .
******
MR. GRIMES: Ultimately, notice will be given in this case. The problem is supposing the request comes in to someone’s secretary and the person is out, obviously, the documents will not be produced without giving them as much notice as possible, but the Commission is a big organization and . . .
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. GRIMES: ... at the point in which the request is funneled to the person who knows about this case, who knows about the documents, at that point notice will be given. But I can’t — For example, if you were to commit us in a court order and say that that will be immediately after receipt of the request, the person might be out that day, someone might be on vacation, and I think what the Commission is committed to doing is giving as much notice as possible under the circumstances, and certainly, if a request comes in from Congress or the court that documents should be turned over immediately, we have committed ourselves in our policy to give as much notice as possible. That means as soon as the person who knows about this gets that notice that the person wants the documents, he immediately is on the phone and the respondent is telling him that.
Now I don’t see how we can commit ourselves to do any more than that, really.
******
THE COURT: So you say you are committed to giving as much notice as possible?
MR. GRIMES: I believe the term is something like, “as much notice as reasonably possible,” or “ . . . as possible,” or something like that.
THE COURT: Well, I did remember that, “reasonably.” “Reasonably” is one of the most convenient weasels in the administrative law.
MR. GRIMES: Well, I think . . .
THE COURT: “Reasonably,” that has no bite to it. It’s all deliberate speed. I mean, it isn’t anything that talks about telling them— You see?
I’m sure you don’t intend that, and I am not trying to cabal [sic] with you, but I’m trying to pin it down.
J.A. 39-43 (elipses in original).

. The description of a Congressional request for data from the FTC or any federal agency as “official” or “formal” as opposed to “unofficial” or “informal” is misleading. Any Congressional request short of subpoena is technically just that: a “request.” Such “requests” to the Executive are often followed by extensive negotiations between the department or agency and Congress as to what material will be disclosed to the Congressional investigator and under what conditions of confidentiality. It is only at the point that such negotiations break down that a subpoena is resorted to. Even where Congressional subpoenas have been issued, substantial negotiations before production as to the manner of compliance are commonplace. For example, in United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 385-88 (D.C.Cir.1976), on appeal after remand, 567 F.2d 121, 123-25 (D.C.Cir.1977), there were extensive negotiations between the Justice Department and Representative John Moss, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, over conditions to be imposed on AT&T’s response to a subpoena from the Subcommittee asking for *981materials on FBI wiretaps. It is obviously in the negotiation period between a Congressional request and the FTC’s decision to release that the data owner can best use his arguments with the agency and even with Congress to deter or condition release, but he can do that only if he knows that the request has been made.

. Both Ashland and Exxon leave open the possibility of judicial intervention to block the FTC’s release to Congress of data containing trade secrets, if the owners of that data can establish that it is likely that Members of Congress or Congressional employees will act irresponsibly, such as by demonstrating a history of past releases by them to the public of data containing trade secrets. As the Exxon court remarked:
This court cannot assume that Congress will act irresponsibly in regulating or disclosing appellants’ trade secrets. Barring the imminence of such disclosure, appellants’ constitutional rights are not in fact jeopardized by delivery of their secrets to Congress. On this record there is no justification for this court to interfere with the operations of the legislative branch ....
589 F.2d at 590 (emphasis supplied; citations omitted).

. The pending amendments to the FTC Act would also require, as to materials obtained by the FTC pursuant to an investigation into possible statutory violations, or as to other materials in the FTC’s oossession which the owner or provider designates as confidential, that the FTC “immediately notify the owner or provider of any such information” when Congress requests it. 1979 Senate Report at 51 & 52; see also id. at 27.

. The documents here were turned over to the FTC after the district court entered its order enforcing the subpoenas and this court denied the data owners’ request for a stay pending appeal. But several months before the FTC brought this action the companies unsuccessfully moved the FTC to quash or impose protective provisions on the subpoenas, see e. g., J.A. 177-97, and after this court’s Exxon opinion in December 1978 the companies specifically offered, again without success, to comply with the subpoenas if, inter alia, the FTC would not release the data to Congress except pursuant to a formal request and if the FTC would give the data owners immediate notice of any Congressional request for access. See id. at 566a, 566b, 837 & 841.
As the FTC concedes, “[t]he documents withheld by the respondent companies were made available to Commission staff attorneys for inspection at the offices of [the data owners’] counsel . . . .” Gov’t Br. 3 n. 3. Although limited, the “focus” of that examination was:
[T]o determine whether respondents had made a prima facie showing that the information falls within the scope of “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person or privileged or confidential” (5 U.S.C. § 552), so as to warrant a Commission pledge of ten day notice protection.
Id. (emphasis in original).

. The Second Circuit in United States v. GAF Corp., 596 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979), appears to have reached the same result. That case dealt with the question of whether a civil investigative demand (CID) of the Department of Justice, similar to a subpoena, could be enforced against a party for documents it obtained from the target of a government antitrust investigation. GAF had obtained documents from Kodak, the target of the government investigation, in a private antitrust action subject to an order of the district court in the private action that GAF would not disclose the documents to anyone else. In upholding enforcement of the CID, the court of appeals relied upon the sound discretion of the district court in the government action to protect the parties’ interests: “We uphold the power of the District Court . to superimpose upon any enforcement orders such protective orders as may be required to safeguard the interests of the parties in the particular circumstances.” Id. at 76,758 (citation omitted). The Second Circuit concluded that “[aln enforcement order in this case, accordingly, should specifically prohibit the government from any further disclosure without the consent of Kodak as the ‘producer’ of documents under [the CID statute] . . . .” Id. at 76,757.

. In Schreiber the Court noted, contrary to the situation here, that “neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals inquired into the validity of the Commission’s exercise of its rulemaking authority. Instead the District Court devised procedures to be followed by the Commission on the basis of the court’s conception of how the public and private interests could best be served.” 381 U.S. at 291, 85 S.Ct. at 1468. The district court here conducted an inquiry into how the FTC proposed to insure confidentiality under § 6(f) and the Exxon mandate, and imposed nothing more than what the FTC effectively conceded was appropriate and already being done in large part.

. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., supra, note 7, cited by the majority opinion, is not contrary to the result I would reach here. The subpoenaed parties there had not supplied the material at issue at the time of the court’s opinion, and the FTC had not ruled on specific requests for confidential treatment. In contrast, here the FTC has all the documents it requested and it has refused the trade secret owners’ pleas for an Exxon verification requirement and notice upon receipt of a Congressional request for access. Additionally, although the Texaco court eschewed adopting a general notice rule, it adopted a condition put forth by the FTC itself for settlement purposes and required the FTC to give ten days’ notice even before releasing the subpoenaed material to Congress. The making of that offer by the FTC indicates at the very least that it is not universally opposed to any interference with its ability to respond immediately to Congressional requests for access to subpoenaed data. See note 7, supra. The Texaco court noted that “[s]uch a procedure would, of course, provide an opportunity for judicial review at some later date, if the [subpoenaed parties] . . believe that a particular proposed disclosure is improper.” Id. at 884-85. The district court’s requirement here for notice upon the FTC’s receipt of a Congressional request simply provides a similar opportunity for trade secret owners to seek judicial review of, and perhaps to provide substantive input into, the FTC’s decision to release data to Congress.
This court’s opinion in Appeal of FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 362, 58 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), in which Judge Bazelon (the author of the opinion for the court in Texaco) joined, directly cuts against the majority’s invocation of Schreiber and Texaco for the proposition that we must concern ourselves only with whether the FTC has abused its discretion and not with whether the district court’s imposition of protections was appropriate. The lower court in Line of Business had imposed a ten day notice requirement on the FTC’s release of Corporate Patterns Reports (CPR) data, “[s]ince the CPR appellants’ claims involve the potential release of their individual company data.” Id. at 707. A ten day notice provision was necessary, the district court found, “ ‘[i]n order to protect the corporate parties from any precipitous action on the part of the FTC’ before appellants could exhaust their administrative remedies.” Id. As this court concluded when reviewing that decision: “Although we stated expressly in Texaco that such an order is not required as a general rule, we think the District Court’s issuance of a protective order under the circumstances at bar was well within its discretion.” Id. (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted).