Court Opinion

ID: 9956855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 06:12:09.470165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:56.310835
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED; and Opinion Filed April 1, 2024.

                                    S  In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-23-00306-CR
                                No. 05-23-00452-CR
                     KEVIN SCOTT CHATLEY, Appellant
                                  V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court
                            Collin County, Texas
            Trial Court Cause Nos. 380-81904-2021; 380-81905-2021

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Nowell, Miskel, and Kennedy
                           Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      On our own motion, we withdraw our February 28, 2024 memorandum

opinion, vacate our judgment of same date, and substitute this opinion in its place.

      Appellant Kevin Scott Chatley appeals his convictions for indecency with a

child. In nine issues, appellant challenges various evidentiary rulings of the trial

court, and he asserts the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury and erred in

assessing duplicative costs. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R.

APP. P. 47.4.
                                   BACKGROUND

      In two indictments, appellant was charged with five counts of indecency with

a child by sexual contact, each a second-degree felony.           TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 21.11(a)(1), (e). Three of the counts involved complainant B.W., and two of the

counts involved complainant H.P. Appellant pleaded not guilty to all five counts,

and the cases proceeded to trial before a jury.

      At the time of the alleged offenses, appellant was 28 years old and resided in

Overland Park, Kansas. Appellant’s half brother lived in McKinney, Texas, and was

a friend of B.W.’s and H.P.’s parents. Appellant’s half brother’s family hosted a party

on Christmas day 2019 at their McKinney home. B.W.’s family and appellant

attended that party. B.W. was 11 years old at the time. B.W. testified that at some

point in the evening, he was alone with appellant in the game room. They were

sitting on a bean bag chair watching TikTok videos, when appellant put his hand in

B.W.’s pants and fondled him. B.W. told him to stop, and he did so. B.W. also

indicated that on that occasion, appellant showed him some pornographic videos on

his phone.

      On New Years’ Eve 2019, appellant’s brother’s family hosted another party at

their home. Among the guests at this party were B.W.’s family, H.P.’s family, and

appellant. H.P. was 13 years old at that time, and the party was the first and only

time he met and hung out with appellant.

                                         –2–
      H.P. testified that at the party he found out appellant was a doctor, so he told

him about a medical condition he has having with his testicles. H.P. and appellant

went into the upstairs bathroom, where appellant looked at and touched H.P.’s

testicles and advised H.P. to seek further medical attention. After they came out of

the bathroom, it was getting close to midnight, so they joined the other guests

downstairs. Later on, appellant, H.P. and B.W. went back upstairs, and appellant

suggested that they go into a closet that was off of the game room. Inside the closet,

appellant showed them pornography involving females on his phone, talked about

masturbating, pulled his pants down, and started touching himself. Appellant then

told them they should go to the attic for a little more privacy. The door that went to

the attic was at the end of the closet. They went into the attic, where H.P. and B.W.,

at the urging of appellant, exposed themselves. Appellant was touching himself and

telling H.P. and B.W. they should likewise touch themselves. Appellant touched

H.P.’s and B.W.’s penises and told them to touch his. They did not want to touch

him, so appellant grabbed their hands and made them do so. H.P. said appellant told

him that he would hurt him if he ever told his parents what had happened. H.P. also

admitted that he peed on B.W.’s back while they were in the attic, but claimed he

was just joking around.

      According to B.W., at the New Year’s Eve party, appellant showed H.P. and

him pornography while they were in the game room and everyone else was

downstairs. B.W. recalled that the pornography involved both males and females.

                                         –3–
He recalled that at appellant’s suggestion they went into the closet before midnight

where appellant showed them his privates. B.W. testified appellant asked him and

H.P. to touch his penis and they did so. Then, at appellant’s direction, he and H.P.

lowered their pants, and appellant touched them. B.W. indicated he and H.P. then

played in the attic. B.W. testified he did not tell anyone what had happened until his

father questioned him because appellant told him not to tell.

      B.W.’s family spent the night at appellant’s brother’s home, and H.P.’s family

went home. According to B.W., as he was going to sleep on the bean bag chair in

the game room, appellant came upstairs and scratched his back.              B.W. felt

uncomfortable and asked appellant to stop.

      After the New Year’s Eve party, appellant stayed in touch with both boys. He

texted B.W. and contacted H.P. via Snapchat, a social media application. H.P.

testified that the Snapchat messages eventually became sexual. Appellant would ask

H.P. how often he would masturbate and if he would ejaculate. Appellant sent

pictures of his penis and of ejaculated sperm and videos of him masturbating.

Appellant requested photos and videos of H.P. masturbating. H.P. sent appellant

videos of himself masturbating, and he and B.W. sent appellant a photo of their

penises.

      According to B.W., appellant sent H.P. videos of himself masturbating and

ejaculating. B.W. said he and H.P. sent appellant a picture of their penises only after

appellant requested one.

                                         –4–
      Two or three months after the New Year’s Eve party, H.P. told his father some

of what had happened at the party. His father called B.W.’s father and apprised him

of what H.P. said transpired. B.W.’s father asked B.W. if there was anything he

wanted to talk about in regard to the New Year’s Eve party and appellant. B.W. told

his father that he, H.P. and appellant went into a storage closet upstairs, where they

exposed themselves and “participated in kind of like masturbation.” B.W. told his

father that appellant touched his penis. He then told his father that, on Christmas

Day, appellant had reached down into his pants and “fondled” him.

      H.P. and B.W. were then interviewed at the Collin County Children’s

Advocacy Center. During his interview, H.P. drew a picture of the second floor of

appellant’s brother’s house and identified where they watched pornography and

where appellant touch his penis.

      After the interviews, McKinney Police Detective Jennifer Grounds secured an

arrest warrant for appellant. At her request, Detective Christopher Moore of the

Overland Park, Kansas Police Department executed the warrant and arrested

appellant at his home in Kansas on April 3, 2020, and seized his cell phone.

Detective Moore obtained the passcode for the phone from appellant and sent the

phone to Detective Grounds by certified mail. She then obtained a search warrant

for the phone and extracted information from it, including text messages. Detective

Grounds found text messages between B.W. and appellant, but there were no pictures

                                         –5–
in the messages. She did not recall seeing any pornography in the search history

from appellant’s phone for December 31, 2019.

      Based on information from the phone and from H.P.’s parents, Detective

Grounds eventually got search warrants for Snapchat and Discord records for

accounts she believed belonged to appellant. Because Snapchat images typically

disappear after they are viewed, Detective Grounds did not receive any records from

Snapchat to present as evidence of extraneous offenses at trial in this case.

      Before trial, the State gave notice of its intent to introduce the Discord and

text-message records as extraneous-offense evidence. During the guilt–innocence

phase of appellant’s trial, the State introduced evidence that appellant had committed

the extraneous offenses of online solicitation of a minor and possession of child

pornography.    More particularly, the State introduced messages and files that

appellant exchanged with two different usernames on the Discord social media

application, which will be referred to herein as username 1 and username 2, as

evidence of online solicitation of a minor. Appellant’s communications with

username 1 are contained in State Exhibits 1 and 2, and his communications with

username 2 are contained in State Exhibits 4 and 5. In addition, the State introduced

text messages and photos that appellant exchanged with two different contacts in his

phone, which will be referred to herein as contact 1 and contact 2, as evidence of

possession of child pornography. Appellant’s communications with contact 1 are

contained in State Exhibit 7 and his communications with contact 2 are contained in

                                         –6–
State Exhibits 8, 9 and 10.1 Before the State introduced this evidence, at appellant’s

request, the court held a hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine whether the

Discord and text messages were admissible under article 38.37, section 2 of the

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

        At the hearing, Detective Grounds testified that “some” of the Discord records

“dealt with [appellant] talking with potentially underaged children.” State’s Exhibits

1 and 4 were spreadsheets obtained from Discord that included, among other things,

usernames, message contents, attachments, and time stamps.

        State’s Exhibit 1 was an exchange between username “kevbot#0337” and

username 1, while Exhibit 2 was a picture attached to one of the messages sent by

“kevbot#0337.”          Detective Grounds identified “kevbot#0337” as appellant’s

username on Discord. She obtained his username from the Discord app on his

phone. State’s Exhibit 4 was an exchange between username “kevbot#0337” and

username 2, while Exhibit 5 was a picture attached to one of the messages sent by

“kevbot#0337.”

        Appellant objected to Exhibits 1, 2, 4, and 5 asserting they were not admissible

under article 38.37, section 2 because the State had presented no evidence that

username 1 or username 2 were “minors,” or that any of the messages were sent or

    1
      State Exhibits 8 and 9 are the same text message in different formats. Exhibit 10 is a picture of a
penis that Detective Grounds described as belonging to a child.
                                                  –7–
received in Texas.2 The court overruled appellant’s objections and found that

Exhibits 1, 2, 4, and 5 were adequate to support a jury finding that the defendant

committed the offense of online solicitation of a minor, or attempted online

solicitation of a minor, beyond a reasonable doubt.3                             Then the trial judge

“withdr[e]w” his finding and said that he would make the finding when the exhibits

were introduced during trial because the rule requires that a finding be made when

the evidence is introduced and because there may be additional evidence that

supports those documents.

          When the exhibits were offered into evidence during trial, the court overruled

appellant’s objections and admitted exhibits 1, 2, 4 and 5 as evidence that appellant

committed an offense under Section 33.021 of the penal code, namely online

solicitation of a minor or attempted solicitation of a minor and exhibits 7 through 10

as evidence he committed an offense under Section 43.26 of penal code; namely,

possession of child pornography or attempted possession of child pornography.

          Through State Exhibit 1 and Detective Grounds’ testimony, the State

established that the following exchange occurred between kevbot#0337 and

username 1 via Discord on December 21, 2019:

          kevbot#0337:             So have you started getting much bigger there yet[?]
          ...

    2
      Appellant argued that these extraneous offenses were inadmissible because the State could not prove
that either appellant or the recipients of his messages were physically located in the State of Texas when
the conduct occurred. Based on this, appellant argued that his conduct could not constitute “committing an
offense” under Texas law because the State lacked territorial jurisdiction over his conduct.
    3
        The trial court did not make a finding at the hearing on Exhibits 7 through 10.
                                                     –8–
      username 1:       I don’t know[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Well, Has it gotten any bigger[?]
      username 1:       No clue[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Lol. Have you got much hair there?
      username 1:       I’m uncomfortable[.]
      kevbot#0337:      That’s fine[.]
      username 1:       No it’s not[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Sorry little bro[.]
      ...
      username 1:       Too many weird questions about my dick[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Got it. Sorry bro. I just don’t care. If you were really my
                        bro you would see me walking around naked a lot lol[.]
      username 1:       [symbol] But you’re also kind of my dad[.]
      ...
      kevbot#0337:      Its just a dick. You should feel free to ask me whatever
                        about it and but [sic] feel embarrassed[.]
      ...
      username 1:       I guess Im like a five or four[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Inches?
      username 1:       Yeah[.]
      kevbot#0337:      That’s not bad at all bro[.]
      username 1:       Alright[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Its but. You’ll keep getting bigger[.]
      username 1:       Gotcha[.]
      username 1:       All I know is that I got a bunch of pubes[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Especially if you’re anything like your brodad[.]

The conversation then turned to the amount and location of pubic hair and then

appellant indicated username 1 could take a picture if he wanted him to see, and

username 1 responded, “no Im fine”. About twelve hours later, the following

exchange occurred:

      username 1:       Can i see a picture of you?
      kevbot#0337:      If I can see one of you too[.]
      username 1:       Sure[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Cool then yea[.]

                                      –9–
       kevbot#0337:            [blank]4

       The exchange continued:

       username 1:             Cute [not going to lie.]
       kevbot#0337:            Thanks bro[.]
       username 1:             [blank]
       kevbot#0337:            You too[.]
       username 1:             Thanks[.]
       kevbot#0337:            Did you wanna see anything else[?]
       username 1:             Nah, its cool[.]

       Detective Grounds testified that there was a file attached to the blank message

from username 1, but she did not have a copy of that file and did not know what it

was. She said that the conversation then turned to “cuddling” and sexual matters

and State Exhibit 1 contained the following exchange:

       username 1:             We don’t have ac here, we use the fireplace and space
                               heaters[.]
       kevbot#0337:            Oooo damn. You need someone to cuddle with lol[.]
       username 1:             no[.]
       kevbot#0337:            Lol. Just up warm up I’m saying[.]
       username 1:             Ik i just don’t like cuddling too much[.]
       kevbot#0337:            How come[.]
       username 1:             I only cuddle with my cat[.]
       kevbot#0337:            You’re my little bro. I would keep you warm[.]
       username 1:             Makes sense[.]
       kevbot#0337:            What do you wear to bed[.]
       username 1:             A pair of shorts and a t-shirt[.]
       kevbot#0337:            O nice. I usually just wear boxers[.]
       username 1:             Cool, i would get cold[.]
       kevbot#0337:            Not if I was with you[.]
       username 1:             Go into detail?
       kevbot#0337:            I’d hold you and keep you warm against my chest, arms
                               wrapped around you[.]

   4
     The blank message from “kevbot#0337” had a picture of appellant attached to it, which was State’s
Exhibit 2.
                                               –10–
username 1:    Cute, i would most likely wrap myself around you[.]
kevbot#0337:   I know doesn’t seem to make sense, but we would get
               warm quicker if we didn’t wear anything[.]
username 1:    Body heat it makes sense[.]
kevbot#0337:   Exactly[.]
kevbot#0337:   I’d hold you tight[.]
username 1:    Mhm, id sleep[.]
username 1:    Anything else?
kevbot#0337:   Would you wanna be resting on my chest or on your side
               with your back to me[?]
username 1:    On my Side with my back to you[.]
kevbot#0337:   Perfect. You’d feel my junk against you. That ok?
username 1:    I guess, its just a dick[.]
kevbot#0337:   Yea. It would probably be right against your ass[.]
username 1:    Oh[.]
username 1:    Okay[.]
kevbot#0337:   Just laying that way. That ok?
username 1:    Yeah[.]
kevbot#0337:   It might get stiff occasionally too[.]
username 1:    It happens[.]
kevbot#0337:   Yea. Yours probably would too[.]
username 1:    Alright[.]
kevbot#0337:   That would be nice rn[.]
username 1:    Rn?
kevbot#0337:   Right now[.]
username 1:    Ik, but why rn?
username 1:    Cold? Hard?
kevbot#0337:   Both[.]
kevbot#0337:   You?
username 1:    I’d be asleep. Would you be willing to fuck me? I’m sorry
               it just came up in my Mind[.]
kevbot#0337:   If you wanted[.]
username 1:    Maybe[.]
kevbot#0337:   It would just be between us. And we could go slow, maybe
               just feel each other and stroke the first time[.]
username 1:    Alright[.]
kevbot#0337:   You hard?
username 1:    no[.]
kevbot#0337:   O ok[.]
username 1:    Mhm[.]
kevbot#0337:   Maybe we should see what each other has[.]

                            –11–
      username 1:        What?
      kevbot#0337:       Like maybe we should see more of each other, with less
                         on[.]
      username 1:        no[.]
      username 1:        Sorry[.]
      kevbot#0337:       That’s ok[.]
      username 1:        Mhm[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Would you want me to fuck you like how we were
                         cuddling[?]
      username 1:        Maybe[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Cool[.]
      username 1:        Ye[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Would go slow. Playing with yours while I do[.]
      username 1:        Do you want to[?]
      kevbot#0337:       As long as you do[.]
      username 1:        No I mean like, given me an answer, yes or no?
      kevbot#0337:       If you want to, yes[.]
      ...
      kevbot#0337:       I don’t wanna do anything you wouldn’t wanna do[.]
      username 1:        Alright[.]
      kevbot#0337:       But yes. Do you?
      username 1:        Sure?
      kevbot#0337:       Lol. Yes or no[?]
      username 1:        *1[.]

      Detective Grounds next testified that State’s Exhibit 4 was a Discord exchange

between “kevbot#0337” and username 2. Detective Grounds told the jury that

appellant and username 2 exchanged messages on Discord between August and

November 2019. On August 4, the following exchange took place.

      username 2:        yo[.]
      kevbot#0337:       What’s up[?]
      username 2:        when u getting on[.]
      kevbot#0337:       When you send that pic[.]

The rest of the communication that day was about computer games. At the end of

September, the conversation became sexual in nature.

                                       –12–
      username 2:        bitch[.]
      kevbot#0337:       lol what[?]
      username 2:        bitch[.]
      kevbot#0337:       You want me to be your bitch or something[?]
      username 2:        nah i dont need any more[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Your hand is enough?
      username 2:        i didnt expect that xD[.]
      kevbot#0337:       What for being a smart ass back?
      username 2:        ima play Minecraft[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Always good[.]
      username 2:        or something else[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Or what[?]
      username 2:        or play a different game[.]
      username 2:        WHY CANT I OPEN STEAM[.]
      kevbot#0337:       It was having issues earlier[.]
      username 2:        it still is[.]
      kevbot#0337:       But it was working a few minutes ago[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Just go jackoff instead[.]
      username 2:        why??
      kevbot#0337:       Why not[?]
      username 2:        cause i dont want to[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Then don’t[.]
      username 2:        I planned on that[.]
      username 2:        ima play fagnite cause im a faggot[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Lol. Prove it[.]
      username 2:        prove what[?]
      username 2:        that im playing fangite[?]
      kevbot#0337:       That you’re a faggot[.]
      username 2:        nah[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Lame ass[.]
      username 2:        oh okay[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Lol. Snap[.]
      username 2:        what about it[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Send them[.]

      A month and a half after that, on November 15, username 2 indicated that he

was 15 years old, but appellant kept the exchange going:

      username 2:        ‘;lur a fag[.]
      kevbot#0337:       I mean I want your cock... So...

                                      –13–
username 2:        thats how u catch a case[.]
kevbot#0337:       Catch a case?
username 2:        u dumb?
kevbot#0337:       Maybe[.]
username 2:        yuh is only 15[.]
username 2:        and u are like 500[.]
username 2:        bish nibba[.]
kevbot#0337:       Lol. False. But snap me loser[.]
username 2:        buy me a game bitch[.]
kevbot#0337:       Come visit and I will[.]
username 2:        where u be at baby[.]
kevbot#0337:       You know you like me anyways. Don’t lie[.]
kevbot#0337:       Kansas City[.]
username 2:        nah to far[.]
kevbot#0337:       Be my bf[.]
kevbot#0337:       No one else needs to know[.]
username 2:        i dont think my girlfriend would approve[.]
kevbot#0337:       She wouldn’t need to know[.]
username 2:        im on ft with her rn[.]
kevbot#0337:       She still wouldn’t need to know[.]
username 2:        but she already does[.]
kevbot#0337:       Lol how[.]
kevbot#0337:       You know you wanna be my bf in secret[.]
username 2:        i think id rather fuck my girlfriend then u[.]
kevbot#0337:       I would give you better head. And make you cum harder.
                   Plus I’d be just as horny as you and want to more[.]
kevbot#0337:       And, you know you like me[.]

Then, according to Detective Grounds, the discussion turned to pictures:

kevbot#0337:       You hard?
username 2:        yeah u know it[.]
kevbot#0337:       Let’s see on snap[.]
kevbot#0337:       Or here[.]
username 2:        [blank]
kevbot#0337:       Send it on snap[.]
username 2:        why[?]
kevbot#0337:       Cause it’s better quality[.]
username 2:        nah[.]
kevbot#0337:       Come on. Or send a video[.]
username 2:        naah fam u send[.]

                                –14–
      kevbot#0337:      [blank]

      According to Detective Grounds, there was an attachment to the blank

message from username 2, but she did not have it and did not know what it was.

Attached to the blank message from appellant was a picture of appellant’s erect

penis. The exchange continued:

      username 2:       ðŸ¤¢ ðŸ¤®
      kevbot#0337:      You like it[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Send a real one of yours[.]
      username 2:       i kinda cant rn[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Why[?]
      username 2:       cause my gf is riding my dick[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Show me[.]
      username 2:       this is a memory for us not for u and us CAUSE
                        PERIOD!!!!!!!
      kevbot#0337:      Lol ok. Just be hot to see you fuck her[.]
      username 2:       and i oop[.]
      kevbot#0337:      It would be[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Plus. I don’t think you really are rn[.]
      username 2:       how would u know[?]
      kevbot#0337:      I wouldn’t. But you’re messaging on here[.]
      username 2:       we keep pausing for me to respond to u[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Lol. Sure you do[.]
      username 2:       on our relationship[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Lol. I don’t believe you[.]
      username 2:       fack off[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Lol. You know I’m right[.]
      username 2:       byeeee[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Don’t leave me babe[.]
      username 2:       dont call me babe[.]
      kevbot#0337:      You called me it earlier[.]
      username 2:       yeah as a joke xD[.]
      username 2:       im going to bed[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Lol. I know[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Let me see you first[.]
      username 2:       nah to tired[.]
      kevbot#0337:      Tomorrow?

                                     –15–
      kevbot#0337:       I like seeing you[.]

      Twelve hours later, the exchange resumed with username 2 asking for a video

game and appellant asking for pictures and videos:

      username 2:        u should buy me the new modern warfare[.]
      kevbot#0337:       You should actually show me[.]
      username 2:        u should buy me the new modern warfare[.]
      kevbot#0337:       If I did, then you would be mine for real[.]
      username 2:        wym by be mine[?]
      kevbot#0337:       Send me pics of whatever, videos, be my “bf”[.]
      username 2:        bruv how old are u[?]
      kevbot#0337:       You’ve seen me. Your at least attracted to me[.]
      username 2:        im attracted to u[.]
      username 2:        im not tho[.]
      kevbot#0337:       What does that mean[.]
      username 2:        u said im attracted to u when im not[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Sure[.]
      username 2:        buy me the new modern warfare xD[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Lol why[?]
      username 2:        cause yuh boy is tried of playing bf5[.]
      username 2:        i need something new[.]
      kevbot#0337:       My boy never sends me anything[.]
      username 2:        cause yuh boy is 15[.]
      kevbot#0337:       You still could on snap[.]
      username 2:        how old are u[?]
      kevbot#0337:       Why[?]
      username 2:        jw[.]
      kevbot#0337:       It doesn’t matter though. If you don’t want to, it’s fine. But
                         I’m not buying you a game[.]
      username 2:        damn can a person not wonder what ur age is[?]
      kevbot#0337:       Lol.
      username 2:        u know my age[.]
      kevbot#0337:       I didn’t ask[.]
      username 2:        yeah but i still told u[.]
      kevbot#0337:       True. But still[.]
      username 2:        oml just fucking tell me[.]
      kevbot#0337:       Lol. Nah. Don’t want you to somehow use it against me[.]
      username 2:        bruv[.]

                                       –16–
      Detective Grounds testified that State’s Exhibit 7 was a text conversation

between appellant’s cell phone and a phone number saved in appellant’s phone that

we refer to herein as contact 1. The following exchange took place:

      contact 1:         Ok. Promise[.]
      appellant:         Good[.]
      contact 1:         Yea[.]
      appellant:         How old are they[?]
      contact 1:         14, 14, 15, 12, 11[.]
      contact 1:         Young. Lol[.]
      appellant:         Lol. How young[?]
      contact 1:         I just said. Haha[.]
      appellant:         O nice. The guys 14 14 and 15?
      contact 1:         No, girls. The guys are 12 and 11[.]
      appellant:         Ooo.. nice. Not even hit puberty yet[.]
      contact 1:         Lol ikr[.]
      appellant:         Lol. Kinda wonder if they even have pubes yet[.]
      contact 1:         Lol omg[.]
      appellant:         Lol. They need to learn how to j/o[.]
      contact 1:         Lol ok[.]
      appellant:         Lol they do[.]
      contact 1:         Ok. Haha[.]
      appellant:         Lol I’d teach them[.]
      appellant:         [blank]
      contact 1:         Omg. Haha[.]
      appellant:         Lol might as well. They would be impressed with mine at
                         least[.]
      contact 1:         Ok. Haha[.]
      appellant:         Lol. You are[.]
      contact 1:         O hush[.]
      appellant:         Lol. You know I’m right[.]

      Next, Detective Grounds testified that State’s Exhibits 8 and 9 were a text

conversation between appellant’s phone and contact 2, and that State’s Exhibit 10

contained two photos from the conversation, including a single photo of a penis. The

text conversations were as follows:

                                       –17–
       appellant:              Hey it’s Kevin[.]
       contact 2:              Heyy[.]
       appellant:              Whose that[?]
       contact 2:              A dude I kind of like[.]
       appellant:              And you kissed lol[.]
       contact 2:              Yes[.]
       appellant:              Are you out to people[.]
       contact 2:              No[.]
       appellant:              Cool. Same. How did that happen then[.]
       contact 2:              Well he kissed me and took a pic[.]
       appellant:              Lol. But how did he know you would want to[.]
       contact 2:              I told him[.]
       appellant:              Ooo cool. Why don’t you date him[.]
       contact 2:              He’s dating my ex girlfriend[.]
       appellant:              Oooo. He’s bi?
       contact 2:              Yes me too[.]
       appellant:              Me to y Too*
       contact 2:              Lol[.]
       appellant:              Threesome with a girl and you would be hot[.]
       contact 2:              Yes[.] We should have a threesome when we meet[.]
       appellant:              Idk. I kinda wanna just have you at first[.]
       contact 2:              Yea same[.]
       appellant:              Like take you on a date. End up in bed with you.
       appellant:              We have plenty of time to have threesomes after. But first
                               I just want you.
       contact 2:              Yes[.] Can I be honest[.]
       appellant:              Go for it[.]
       contact 2:              I’m 14[.]
       appellant:              Like I said, I’m fine with it as long as you are[.]
       contact 2:              Ok[.]
       appellant:              Have you been with anyone?
       contact 2:              Yes[.]
       appellant:              Idc if not Guys or girls[.]
       contact 2:              Both[.]
       appellant:              All the way?
       contact 2:              Yes[.]
       [image sent]5
       appellant:              Damn. You have a nice cock[.] Sorry I’m still at work[.]

   5
      Detective Grounds testified this image, depicted in State Exhibit 10, was sent from contact 2 to
appellant and was a picture of a child’s penis.
                                               –18–
      contact 2:          Thx[.] Lol[.]
      appellant:          I’ll send a saved pic on snap. That cool?
      contact 2:          Yea[.]
      appellant:          Did you get it[.]
      contact 2:          Oh yeah hold on[.] I’m watching Netflix lol[.]
      appellant:          Cool[.]

      The State’s remaining witnesses were B.W.’s father, who testified as an outcry

witness, Detective Chris Meehan, who testified about digital forensics, and Eligio

Molina, a forensic interviewer, who testified about the interview process and his

interview of H.P. Appellant called Dr. Aaron Price, who practices in forensic mental

health, to testify about sex offenders and their behavior patterns and about false

allegations.

      The trial court gave the jury its charge, and the jury returned a guilty verdict

on each count. During the punishment phase of trial, the State’s witnesses were

Chris Meehan and the mother of another minor who alleged he was in a relationship

with appellant. Appellant called his father to testify on his behalf. The jury assessed

punishment at 20 years’ confinement for each count. The trial court ordered the

sentences to run concurrently. Appellant filed a motion for new trial and an amended

motion for new trial. The amended motion was overruled by operation of law. This

appeal followed.

                                        –19–
                                       DISCUSSION

   I.       Evidentiary Rulings

            A. Extraneous-Offense Evidence

        In his first five issues, appellant challenges the trial court’s rulings on the

admissibility of State’s Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10, the extraneous-offense

evidence.

        Evidence of extraneous offenses is generally inadmissible to prove character

conformity. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). But in prosecutions for certain sexual offenses

against children, including indecency with a child, evidence that the defendant

committed sex crimes against children other than the victim of the alleged offense

may be admitted “for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including

the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character

of the defendant.” CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2(a), (b); Dies v. State, 649 S.W.3d 273,

284 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, pet. ref’d). Before evidence may be admitted for this

purpose, the State must give 30 days’ notice of its intent to introduce the evidence.

CRIM. PROC. 38.37, § 3. The trial court must then hold a hearing outside the presence

of the jury and “determine that the evidence likely to be admitted at trial will be

adequate to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the separate

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. art. 38.37, § 2-a. “Adequate” means legally

sufficient. Romano v. State, 612 S.W.3d 151, 159 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2020, pet. ref’d). At the hearing, the trial court acts as the factfinder and is the judge

                                           –20–
of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Deggs v.

State, 646 S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet. ref’d).

             1. Territorial Jurisdiction

      In his first two issues, appellant asserts the trial court erred in admitting the

Discord and text messages under article 38.37. Appellant contends that evidence of

extraneous offenses is admissible under article 38.37, section 2 only if Texas would

have territorial jurisdiction over the separate offenses.       See PENAL § 1.04(a)

(addressing territorial jurisdiction over offenses). Appellant acknowledges that there

is no authority, persuasive or binding, to support this assertion and that he is

requesting that this Court adopt his reasoning as a case of first impression. For the

reasons set forth herein, we decline to do so.

      Appellant contends the Discord and text messages were inadmissible because

the State did not prove that either he or the recipients of his messages were physically

located in Texas when the messages were sent. Thus, claims appellant, the conduct

could not constitute an offense under the Texas Penal Code. The State responds

asserting article 38.37, section 2 does not require the State to prove that it would

have territorial jurisdiction over the separate offenses, it only has to prove the

conduct satisfies the essential elements of the extraneous offense as set forth in the

Texas Penal Code.      We agree with the State because appellant conflates the

requirement that either a conduct element or a result element occurred inside the

state in order for the State to have jurisdiction to prosecute an individual for the

                                         –21–
commission of an offense enumerated in the penal code—see Texas Penal Code

Section 1.04(a)–with article 38.37’s evidentiary standards.

      Statutory construction questions are questions of law that we review de novo.

Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). When

interpreting statutes, we look to their literal text and attempt to discern their fair,

objective         meaning           at          the       time           of       their

enactment. Herron v. State, 625 S.W.3d 144, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).          If the

language is clear and unambiguous, our analysis ends. Id. Courts do not add or

subtract from such a statute. Id.

      Courts presume that the legislature used every word for a purpose and

intended for the entire statutory scheme to be effective. Id. Thus, courts should give

each word, phrase, clause, and sentence effect if reasonably possible and will not

choose a construction that renders a statutory provision superfluous. Id.; State v.

Schunior, 506 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

      Article 38.37, section 2 provides:

      (a) Subsection (b) applies only to the trial of a defendant for:

             (1) an offense under any of the following provisions of the Penal
             Code:

                    (A) Section 20A.02, if punishable as a felony of the first
                    degree under Section 20A.02(b)(1) (Labor or Sex
                    trafficking of a Child or Disabled Individual);

                    (B) Section 21.02 (Continuous Sexual Abuse of Young
                    Child or Disabled Individual);

                                         –22–
                   (C) Section 21.11 (Indecency With a Child);

                   (D) Section 22.011(a)(2) (Sexual Assault of a Child);

                   (E) Sections 22.021(a)(1)(B) and (2) (Aggravated Sexual
                   Assault of a Child);

                   (F) Section 33.021 (Online Solicitation of a Minor);

                   (G) Section 43.25 (Sexual Performance by a Child); or

                   (H) Section 43.26 (Possession or Promotion of Child
                   Pornography), Penal Code; or

             (2) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described by
             Subdivision (1).

      (b) Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, and
      subject to Section 2-a, evidence that the defendant has committed a
      separate offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2) may be admitted
      in the trial of an alleged offense described by Subsection (a)(1) or (2)
      for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the
      character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the
      character of the defendant.

CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2.

       Appellant contends that had the legislature intended that an offense

 occurring outside of Texas be included in article 38.37, section 2 it would have

 used the phrase “an offense under the laws of another state that are substantially

 similar” to the elements of Texas offenses as it has done on other occasions in the

 penal code and other statutes. The fact that the legislature did not include similar

 language in article 38.37, section 2 highlights the fact that to be admissible the

                                        –23–
conduct must meet the elements of a separate offense described by the Texas

Penal Code, not the laws of another state.

      Section 1.04 of the Penal Code establishes the State’s territorial

jurisdiction. It defines the State’s ability to prosecute and punish conduct. PENAL

§ 1.04. In the present case, the State was not trying to prosecute appellant for the

extraneous offenses of online solicitation and possession of child pornography.

Rather, the State was offering proof of these offenses pursuant to a code of

criminal procedure provision that the legislature enacted to give prosecutors

additional resources to prosecute sex crimes committed against children,

recognizing that children often are targeted for these crimes, in part because they

tend to make poor witnesses. Harris v. State, 475 S.W.3d 395, 402 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Senate Comm. on Criminal Justice,

Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 12, 83d Leg. R.S. (2013)). That provision merely

requires legally sufficient proof that the person committed the offense as

described by the Penal Code, not that the State of Texas could prosecute the

individual for same. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2-a(1); Romano, 612 S.W.3d

at 159.

      When, as here, the statute is clear and unambiguous, the legislature must

be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add or

subtract from such a statute. See Miles v. State, 506 S.W.3d 485, 487 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016). To require territorial jurisdiction before admitting evidence of these

                                       –24–
 offenses under article 38.37 would add language beyond that which is in the

 statute. Territorial jurisdiction is simply not a prerequisite to the admission of

 evidence of an extraneous offense under article 38.37, section 2.

      Appellant contends that the court of criminal appeals’ decision in Lee v. State

supports his assertion that the State of Texas must have territorial jurisdictional over

the separate offense in order for evidence concerning same to be admissible under

article 38.37, section 2. 537 S.W.3d 924, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Appellant’s

reliance on Lee is misplaced because the issue in that case was whether the

commission of an out-of-state aggravated sexual assault will support a conviction

for continuous sexual abuse of a child, not whether evidence of same was admissible

under article 38.37, section 2. Id. at 925. Thus, Lee is not controlling and does not

inform our decision here.

      We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling

appellant’s objections to the Discord and text messages on territorial jurisdiction

grounds. We overrule appellant’s first two issues.

             2. Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence

      In his third and fourth issues, appellant contends the trial court abused its

discretion in overruling his Rule 403 objections to the Discord and text messages

because the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and undue delay

substantially outweighed any probative value that the messages may have had.

                                         –25–
                   a. Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence, including

evidence of extraneous offenses, for an abuse of discretion. Devoe v. State, 354

S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). As long as the trial court’s decision was

within the zone of reasonable disagreement and was correct under any theory of law

applicable to the case, it must be upheld. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391

(Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). This is so because trial courts are usually in

the best position to make the determination as to whether certain evidence should be

admitted or excluded. Winegarner v. State, 235 S.W.3d 787, 790 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007).

                   b. Applicable Law

      Evidence admitted under article 38.37 is still subject to Rule 403’s balancing

test. Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d 214, 228 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d).

Under Texas Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting

cumulative evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 403. Even so, Rule 403 “should be used

sparingly to exclude relevant, otherwise admissible evidence that might bear on the

credibility of either the defendant or complainant in such ‘he said, she said’ cases.”

Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Rule 403 envisions

exclusion of evidence “only when there is a clear disparity between the degree of
                                        –26–
prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative value.” Id. at 568. Accordingly,

“the plain language of Rule 403 does not allow a trial court to exclude otherwise

relevant evidence when that evidence is merely prejudicial.” Pawlak v. State, 420

S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Indeed, “all evidence against a defendant

is, by its very nature, designed to be prejudicial.” Id. This Court will reverse a trial

court’s determination under Rule 403 “rarely and only after a clear abuse of

discretion,” recognizing that the trial court is in a superior position to gauge the

impact of the evidence. Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. Crim. App.

2022).

      When a trial court conducts a Rule 403 balancing test,

      it must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of
      evidence along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against
      (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper
      basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury
      from the main issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given
      undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the
      probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation
      of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely
      repeat evidence already admitted.

Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In any

given case, “these factors may well blend together.” Id. at 642.

                    c. Application of Law to Facts

      With respect to the first factor in the balancing test, evidence of a separate

sexual offense against a child admitted under a article 38.37, section 2(b) is probative

of a defendant’s character or propensity to commit a sexual offense against a child.
                                         –27–
See, e.g., Bradshaw v. State, 466 S.W.3d 875, 883 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015,

pet. ref’d). Appellant stood accused of touching two young boys on their genitals

and causing the young boys to touch appellant on his genitals. The State had to

prove that he: (1) intentionally or knowingly; (2) with intent to arouse/gratify the

sexual desire of any person; (3) engaged in sexual contact; (4) with a child younger

than 17 years of age. See PENAL § 21.11(a). Appellant’s defensive theory was that

the allegations were false, the story was implausible, and the children were not

credible.

       The Discord conversations with username 16 and username 2 (who claimed to

be 15 years old) as well as appellant’s text conversations with contact 2 (who

claimed to be 14 years old) demonstrate that appellant has a sexual interest in

underage boys. The trial court could reasonably conclude that this was strong

propensity evidence and helped establish his intent to arouse/gratify sexual desire.

See Dies, 649 S.W.3d at 285–86. Appellant’s text conversation with contact 1

demonstrates a sexual interest in boys aged 11–12, and specifically an interest in

teaching them how to masturbate. This behavior is similar to the conduct that

appellant was accused of engaging in with H.P. and B.W. The trial court could

reasonably conclude that this evidence helped establish that his actions were

intentional or knowing; that he intended to arouse/gratify sexual desire; and his

   6
     Although username 1 did not claim to be a minor, a reasonable juror could infer that fact from the
context of the conversation.
                                                –28–
propensity to do so. See Fisk v. State, 510 S.W.3d 165, 174 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2016, no pet.) (similarities between extraneous and charged conduct

strengthen the probative force). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court could have

reasonably concluded that the evidence of appellant engaging in or attempting online

solicitation of a minor and possession of child pornography had significant probative

value in determining his guilt for the charged offenses of indecency with a child.

      With respect to the second factor, we find that the State demonstrated its great

need for the evidence.      By adopting article 38.37, section 2, the legislature

recognized that in child sex offenses, “there is typically very little evidence to assist

prosecutors with proving their cases.” Bradshaw, 466 S.W.3d at 884 (quoting

Senate Comm. on Criminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 12, 83d Leg., R.S.

(2013)). The only direct evidence that the State had of appellant committing

indecency with a child was the testimony of H.P. and B.W. In these situations, court

routinely conclude this factor weighs in favor of the State. Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at

561–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Denson v. State, No. 03-21-00262-CR, 2023 WL

3396628, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin May 12, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication); Mason v. State, No. 05-21-00491-CR, 2023 WL 2033778, at *3

(Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Portwood v. State, No. 14-19-00377-CR, 2020 WL 6072721, at *5

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 15, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication); Duran v. State, No. 14-18-00686-CR, 2020 WL 3697736, at *4

                                         –29–
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication); Fox v. State, No. 04-15-00618-CR; 2017 WL 96160, at * 5 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Jan. 11, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Cox v. State, 495 S.W.3d 898, 909 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2016, pet. ref’d); McCulloch v. State, 39 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

2001, pet. ref’d). Appellant tries to minimize the State’s need for this evidence by

urging that the evidence could not rebut any notion that H.P. and B.W. were lying

because the State presented it before H.P. and B.W. testified. But appellant ignores

the fact that during opening statement defense counsel stated, “this is a case about

false accusations.” It was apparent from the start that appellant’s defensive position

was that the conduct never occurred. In such a case, evidence of similar extraneous

acts may be necessary to corroborate the victim’s account and rebut the defensive

theory. See Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 888–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

Appellant presents no case law or legal authority, nor have we found any, for the

premise that a complainant has to testify prior to the admission of extraneous-offense

evidence. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the second factor also weighed in

favor of admission.

      With respect to the third factor, the evidence that appellant engaged in or

attempted online solicitation of a minor and possession of child pornography was

clearly prejudicial to his case, but the question in a Rule 403 analysis is whether the

evidence was unfairly prejudicial. See Bradshaw, 466 S.W.3d at 883 (noting that

                                        –30–
Rule 403 does not allow exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence when evidence is

merely prejudicial). The focus of Rule 403 is to assure that the danger of unfair

prejudice is not substantially outweighed by the probative value of proffered

evidence. Given article 38.37, section 2 was designed, at least in part, to allow the

State to introduce evidence of the accused’s prior or subsequent bad acts to show the

accused’s propensity to commit the charged offense, the calculus of what is unfair

and what is probative has materially changed. Price v. State, No. 05-18-00243-CR,

2019 WL 2223600, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 23, 2019, pet. ref’d) (not

designated for publication). Appellant does not identify any particular facts in the

Discord and text messages that make them uniquely or unfairly prejudicial. See

Alvarez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 362, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet.

ref’d). Thus, we conclude the third factor weighed only slightly against admission.

      As to the fourth factor, the ultimate issue in this case was whether appellant

had committed the sexual offenses against H.P. and B.W. as alleged in the State’s

indictments.   The trial court mitigated the tendency of the extraneous-offense

evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issue at trial by instructing

them orally when the evidence was admitted and in the jury charge that such

extraneous-offense evidence could only be considered if the jury determined,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the extraneous offenses were committed and for its

bearing on any relevant matter, including the character of the defendant and any acts

in conformity with the character of the defendant. Thus, the trial court twice

                                       –31–
instructed the jury in accordance with the statute. We presume that the jury follows

the trial court’s instructions in the manner presented. Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d

221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). An appellant may refute this presumption, but he

must rebut it by pointing to evidence that the jury failed to follow the

instruction. Id. Appellant has not identified any such evidence in this case. We find

the fourth factor weighed in favor of admission.

      The fifth factor refers to evidence such as highly technical or scientific

evidence that might mislead the jury because it is not equipped to weigh the

probative force of the evidence. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. Here, the

evidence in question was neither scientific nor technical and pertained to matters

including victim credibility that could easily be understood by a jury. Appellant

urges the jury was misled into believing he committed the extraneous offenses

relying once again on his 38.37 argument regarding territorial jurisdiction, which we

have rejected. We find the fifth factor weighed in favor of admission.

       With respect to the sixth factor, appellant asserts that the presentation of

 the evidence took nearly half of the guilt–innocence phase of trial causing the

 probative value of the messages to be substantially outweighed by their unfair

 prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, and undue delay. We

 consider direct, cross, and redirect examination when calculating the time spent

 developing evidence. See Newton v. State, 301 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. App.—

 Waco 2009, pet. ref’d). Only one of the State’s six witnesses testified to

                                       –32–
appellant’s extraneous offenses: Detective Grounds. Of the approximate 750

pages of the record containing trial testimony before the jury, her direct testimony

regarding appellant’s Discord messages with the username 1 took up 12 pages of

the record. Her direct testimony regarding appellant’s Discord messages with the

username 2 took up 23 pages of the record. Her direct testimony about appellant’s

text interactions with contact 2 took up 24 pages of the record. Her direct

testimony about appellant’s conversations with contact 1 took up 12 pages of the

record. In calculating the number of pages in the record devoted to extraneous-

offense evidence appellant counts 176 pages of his own cross-examination of

Detective Grounds; 70 pages of his objections to the evidence; and 14 pages of

his own voir dire examinations of Detective Grounds. Because we consider

direct, cross and redirect examination in calculating the time spent developing the

evidence, we conclude this factor weighed against admission, although it is highly

unlikely the trial court anticipated the parties would spend the amount of time

they did when it decided to admit the extraneous-offense evidence.

      Given our standard of review, the presumption in favor of admissibility,

and the factors discussed above, and concluding four of the factors weighed in

favor of admission, one weighed slightly against, and one weighed against, we

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by overruling

appellant’s Rule 403 objection and admitting the extraneous-offense

evidence. See Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 568 (explaining that exclusion under

                                       –33–
 “Rule 403 . . . should be used sparingly, especially in ‘he said, she said’ sexual-

 molestation cases that must be resolved solely on the basis of the testimony of the

 complainant and the defendant”).

      We overrule appellant’s third and fourth issues.

      3. Authentication of Evidence

      In his fifth issue, appellant contends that the text messages between appellant

and contact 1 and contract 2 were inadmissible over his chain-of-custody objection.

He claims that to authenticate physical evidence or the results of scientific testing,

the State must prove both the beginning and end of the chain of custody. Appellant

admits that the text messages came from an extraction of his cell phone, but contends

the State failed to prove the beginning of the chain of custody for that phone, and

thus, failed to properly authenticate the messages. The State responds urging

Detective Grounds adequately linked the cell phone to appellant for authentication

purposes.

      We review a trial court’s ruling on authentication issues under an abuse of

discretion standard. Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

This deferential standard requires us to uphold a trial court’s admissibility decision

when that decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. A trial court

judge is given considerable latitude with regard to evidentiary rulings. Id. Different

trial judges may “reach different conclusions in different trials on substantially

similar facts without abusing their discretion. Id.

                                        –34–
      If the trial court’s ruling that a jury could reasonably find proffered evidence

authentic is at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we should not

interfere. Id. It is the jury’s role ultimately to determine whether an item of evidence

is indeed what its proponent claims; the trial court need only make the preliminary

determination that the proponent of the item has supplied facts sufficient to support

a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic. Id. This

has been described as a “liberal standard of admissibility.” Id.

      The Texas Rules of Evidence do not specifically address chain of custody.

Instead, Texas Rule of Evidence 901 governs the authentication requirement for the

admissibility of evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 901. To satisfy the requirement of

authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it

is. Id. Conclusive proof of authenticity before allowing admission of disputed

evidence is not required. See Reed v. State, 811 S.W.2d 582, 587 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991) (citing United States v. Jimenez Lopez, 873 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1989)). Rule

901 “merely requires some evidence sufficient to support a finding that evidence in

question is what the proponent claims.” Id.

      Authenticity may be established with evidence of “distinctive characteristics

and the like,” which include “[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns,

or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the

circumstances.” Id. If the party seeking admission cannot identify the evidence

                                         –35–
“through distinctive markings . . . or if the evidence is fungible, as are drugs or tests

results,” proof of chain of custody is required. Davis v. State, 992 S.W.2d 8, 10–11

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.) (citing Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d

699, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)). The chain-of-custody requirement generally

applies to indistinguishable objects. See Foley v. State, No. 01-11-00113-CR, 2012

WL 1564685, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 3, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (sample of heroin); Frasier v. State, No. 03-09-

00354-CR, 2010 WL 3058256, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 5, 2010, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (bag of methamphetamine); Clemens v.

State, No. 03-05-00156-CR, 2008 WL 2065986, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Austin May

15, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (samples of gasoline);

      At trial, Detective Grounds testified, without objection, that, at her request,

Detective Moore seized appellant’s cell phone when he arrested appellant and

delivered it to her via certified mail. In addition, Detective Grounds indicated that

she obtained a search warrant for the phone and was able to unlock it because she

was given the passcode for same. She found identifiers in the phone that matched

appellant, including text messages between appellant and B.W. and appellant’s

usernames on Discord and Snapchat. She was confident that it was appellant’s

phone. The facts the State developed through Detective Grounds are similar to those

in Berhe v. State, where the testifying officer received a cell phone from the task

force that arrested the defendant and otherwise identified the phone as having the

                                         –36–
defendant’s phone number. See No. 01-17-00540-CR, 2018 WL 4781070, *3 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] Oct. 4, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). The Houston Court determined that the cell phone was properly

authenticated despite the fact that the arresting officers did not testify as to the

seizing the phone, concluding that the testifying officer presented sufficient

circumstantial evidence to overcome a chain-of-custody objection. See id.

      The situation presented here can be analogized to a circumstance where Texas

courts routinely find that the State has sufficiently proven the beginning of a chain

of custody: contraband that a non-testifying informant delivered to police following

a drug buy. See, e.g., Cain v. State, 501 S.W.3d 172, 175—76 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2016, no pet.); Watson v. State, 421 S.W.3d 186, 192 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d); Hawkins v. State, No. 10-18-00270-CR, 2020 WL

5938818, *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 10, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated

for publication). In these cases, the contraband has been properly authenticated

despite the sponsoring officers not personally witnessing the non-testifying

informant receive the contraband from the defendant. See e.g., Cain, 501 S.W.3d at

175–76; Watson, 421 S.W.3d at 192; Hawkins, 2020 WL 5938818 at *3.

      Detective Grounds’s testimony about how she received the cell phone from

the arresting officer, along with the passcode for the phone, and her discovery of

identifiers matching appellant on this phone, constitute sufficient circumstantial

evidence to place the text messages’ authenticity (including the first step in the chain

                                         –37–
of custody) within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See generally Berhe, 2018

WL 4781070 at *3. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting messages extracted from the cell phone over appellant’s chain-of-custody

objection.

      Appellant contends Detective Grounds never testified that the extraction

accurately copied what was on the phone. Instead, she simply testified that the

printed reports were accurate copies of the extraction. Appellant contends Detective

Ground’s testimony left unresolved the question of whether the extraction was an

accurate copy of the phone, and it therefore failed to authenticate the extraction itself,

as required by Wright and Villareal-Garcia. Villareal-Garcia v. State, 671 S.W.3d

791 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.); Wright v. State, 618 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2021, no pet.). Appellant did not object to the evidence on the basis that

the State did not authenticate the Cellebrite extraction. Thus, we do not address this

argument here. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

      We overrule appellant’s fifth issue.

          B. Ruling on Hearsay Objection

      In his sixth issue, appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in

overruling his hearsay objection to the drawing depicted below that H.P. made of the

                                          –38–
second floor of appellant’s brother’s home during his interview with Eligio Molina.

      In response to his objection, the State urged that the defense opened the door

to its admission into evidence during its questioning of Molina. During cross

examination, defense counsel asked Molina if he used “drawings” during the

forensic interview. Molina responded that he asked H.P. “to draw a layout of the

area.” On redirect examination, the State offered the drawing as State’s Exhibit 44,

arguing that the defense had “opened the door” because “they asked the witness

about the drawing, which included comments by H.P. as to where appellant showed

“porn videos” and “touched [his] private parts.” The State further urges that the

drawing was admissible under the rule of optional completeness. See TEX. R. EVID.

                                       –39–
107. Appellant contends that there is no “open-door” exception to the hearsay rule

and that drawing was not admissible under the rule of optional completeness.

      We need not determine whether appellant opened the door to the admission of

the drawing or whether the drawing was admissible under the optional completeness

rule because we conclude appellant was not harmed by the admission of same. The

erroneous admission of hearsay is non-constitutional error. Taylor v. State, 268

S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). This Court disregards such errors unless

the error effects a defendant’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b);

Macedo v. State, 629 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Error does not affect

a substantial right, and is thus harmless, if it has no more than a slight effect on the

jury’s verdict. See Macedo, 629 S.W.3d at 240. In determining an error’s effect,

this Court considers the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered

in connection with other evidence; the nature, existence, and degree of evidence

supporting the verdict; and whether the State emphasized the error. Id.

      Appellant contends that he suffered harm because H.P.’s and B.W.’s accounts

of where appellant showed pornography to them and where the alleged offense

occurred were inconsistent, and H.P.’s hand-drawn floorplan helped to resolve those

inconsistencies.

      But the drawing did not resolve the inconsistencies, such as they were. B.W.

and H.P. testified before the drawing was introduced into evidence through the

forensic interviewer. B.W. recalled that they viewed pornography in the game room

                                         –40–
and H.P. maintained they viewed same in the closet. With respect to where the

offenses occurred, B.W. stated that the offenses occurred in the closet and H.P.

recalled they occurred in the attic. While the drawing was consistent with H.P.’s

testimony at trial, it did not alter or in any way effect B.W.’s testimony.

         Moreover, notwithstanding the slight variations in H.P.’s and B.W.’s

recollections of where certain events occurred, the forensic interviewer explained he

looks for general and sensory details in determining whether abuse occurred, and the

boys were able to give that detail, including a description of appellant’s penis and

H.P.’s testimony that the color of appellant’s pubic hair was “ginger.” Furthermore,

the jury had already seen significant propensity evidence from appellant’s

extraneous solicitations of minors and his possession of child pornography, which

we have concluded was properly admitted into evidence. The State mentioned the

floorplan in closing arguments, but simply pointed out that H.P.’s account of the

events remained consistent over time. On the record before us, we conclude that the

admission of the hand-drawn floorplan did not have more than a slight effect on the

jury and did not affect appellant’s substantial rights.

          We overrule appellant’s sixth issue.

   II.      Jury Charge

         In his seventh and eighth issues, appellant asserts there were errors in the jury

charge.

                                           –41–
      A. Standard of Review

      The trial court must provide the jury with a written charge distinctly setting

forth the law applicable to the case. CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14. The purpose of the

charge is to inform the jury of the applicable law, guide them in its application to the

case, and to prevent confusion. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007).

      Review of alleged jury-charge error is a two-step process: first, the reviewing

court must decide whether error exists; second, if error exists, it must decide whether

the appellant was harmed by the erroneous charge. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738,

743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). If a defendant objects to a jury charge at trial, an error

is reversible if the record shows that the defendant suffered “some harm.” Reeves v.

State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d

157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Under this standard, the record must reveal

“actual” and not merely “theoretical” harm. French v. State, 563 S.W.3d 228, 235

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018). To determine whether “some” harm exists, this Court

considers the error in light of the four Almanza factors: (1) the entire jury charge, (2)

the state of the evidence, (3) the jury arguments, and (4) any other relevant

information as revealed by the record as a whole. Id. at 235–36. Neither party bears

the burden to show harm. Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App.

2022).

                                         –42–
      B. Definition of Individual

      In his seventh issue, appellant asserts there was jury charge error in the court’s

article 38.37, section 2 instruction because it incorrectly defined the offense of online

solicitation of a minor.

      The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant is on trial solely for the

charges contained in the indictment. It further instructed:

      If there is any evidence before you in this case that this defendant
      committed an offense under Section 33.021 of the Penal Code, namely
      Online Solicitation of a Minor, an offense under Section 43.26 of the
      Penal Code, namely Possession of Child Pornography, or an attempt to
      commit either of these offenses, and you unanimously find beyond a
      reasonable doubt that this defendant committed such offenses, you may
      consider such evidence for its bearing on any relevant matters,
      including the character of the defendant and acts performed in
      conformity with the character of the defendant.

The trial court then instructed the jury regarding the elements of Online Solicitation

of a Minor, which include communicating in a sexually explicit manner with a

minor, distributing sexually explicit material to a minor, or soliciting a minor to meet

with someone with the intent that the minor engage in sexual contact or intercourse.

The trial court then defined a “minor” as “an individual who is younger than 17 years

of age or an individual whom the actor believes to be younger than 17 years of age.”

This is the statutory definition of the word “minor.” PENAL § 33.021. Appellant

contends that because the definition of “minor” includes the term “individual,” the

jury charge should have included Penal Code section 1.07’s definition of

                                         –43–
“individual” as a human being who is alive. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26).7

The trial court denied appellant’s request to include this definition. Appellant

contends that the trial court should have included this definition so that the jury could

consider the possibility that appellant was communicating with chatbots rather than

human beings.

         Even it we assume, without deciding, the trial court erred in refusing to

include appellant’s requested instruction, we cannot conclude that he suffered some

harm therefrom. The common understanding of the term individual means a human

being even without the statutory definition. In addition, the definition of minor itself

being an individual who is younger than 17 years of age, likewise establishes the

reference is to a human being, rather than a chatbot. The definition of sexual contact

includes the words “another person” which also indicates the reference is to a human

being.     Moreover, in addition to the testimony of B.W. and H.P. describing

appellant’s acts of indecency with a child, there was evidence of the extraneous

offense of possession of child pornography, which was not the subject of appellant’s

request for an instruction on the definition of individual. Accordingly, we conclude

appellant did not suffer any actual harm by the trial court’s refusal to include his

requested instruction on the term “individual.” We overrule appellant’s seventh

issue.

    7
     Section 1.07(a)(26) defines “individual” as “a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at
every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.” PENAL § 1.07(a)(26).
                                                 –44–
      C. Territorial Jurisdiction Instruction

      In his eighth issue, appellant urges the article 38.37, section 2 instruction in

the jury charge erroneously failed to instruct the jury that Texas must have

jurisdiction over an offense for it to be an offense under the Penal Code. This issue

is effectively a restatement of appellant’s first and second issues, which we have

resolved against him. We, likewise, and for the same reasons, resolve appellant’s

eighth issue against him.

   III.   Modification of Judgments

      In his final issue, appellant asserts the trial court improperly assessed court

costs in four of the five judgments. The State agrees.

      “In a single criminal action in which a defendant is convicted of two or more

offenses or of multiple counts of the same offense, the court may assess each court

cost or fee only once against the defendant.” CRIM. PROC. art. 102.073(a). For

purposes of this rule, a person convicted of two or more offenses in the same trial or

plea proceeding is convicted of those offenses in a “single criminal action.” See

Garcia v. State, No. 05-21-01134-CR, 2022 WL 5113172, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Oct. 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Hurlburt

v. State, 506 S.W.3d 199, 201–04 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, no pet.)). If the

convictions are for the same category of offense and the costs are the same, the costs

should be assessed in the case with the lowest trial court cause number. See Thomas

v. State, No. 05-20-00114-CR, 2021 WL 2948550, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June

                                        –45–
30, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing CRIM. PROC.

art. 102.073(b); Johnson v. State, No. 05-19-00641-CR, 2020 WL 4745552, at *5

(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication)).

      Here, appellant was convicted of five second-degree felony offenses in a

single trial. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.11(d) (indecency with child by sexual

contact). Court costs, therefore, should have been assessed only once in the case

with the lowest trial court cause number, 380-81904-2021 Count I.

      The record shows that appellant was not only assessed court costs in the

amount of $455 in trial court cause number 380-81904-2021 Count I, but he was

also assessed court costs in the amount of $455 in trial court cause number 380-

81904-2021 Counts II and III, and in trial court cause number 380-81905-2021

Counts I and II, even though the counts were tried together. Because the fees

charged in trial court cause numbers 380-81904-2021 Counts II and III, and in trial

court cause numbers 380-81905-2021 Counts I and II, were already assessed in trial

court cause number 380-81904-2021 Count I, those fees are duplicative. We sustain

appellant’s nineth issue and modify the judgments in trial court cause number 380-

81904-2021 Counts II and III, and cause number 380-81905-2021 Counts I and II,

to delete the $455 in duplicative costs in each judgment.

                                       –46–
                                  CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgments as modified.

                                         /Nancy Kennedy/
                                         NANCY KENNEDY
                                         JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47

230306F.U05

                                      –47–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                    JUDGMENT

KEVIN SCOTT CHATLEY,                          On Appeal from the 380th Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. 380-81904-
No. 05-23-00306-CR          V.                2021.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Kennedy. Justices Nowell and Miskel
                                              participating.

      Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court in
cause number 380-81904-2021 Count I is AFFIRMED and the judgment of the trial
court in cause number 380-81904-2020 Counts, II and III are MODIFIED as
follows:

      delete court costs of $455.

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 1st day of April, 2024.

                                       –48–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                    JUDGMENT

KEVIN SCOTT CHATLEY,                           On Appeal from the 380th Judicial
Appellant                                      District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. 380-81905-
No. 05-23-00452-CR           V.                2021.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                   Kennedy. Justices Nowell and Miskel
                                               participating.

      Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court in
cause number 380-81904-2021 Counts I and II are MODIFIED as follows:

      delete court costs of $455.

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 1st day of April, 2024.

                                        –49–