Court Opinion

ID: 9618751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:16:44.413651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:49.743502
License: Public Domain

PARKER, C.J.,
dissenting: The common law recognizes no right of action for wrongful death. A right of action for wrongful death exists in this State by virtue of G.S. 28-173 et seq. This Court, in Reeves v. Hill, 272 N.C. 352, 158 S.E. 2d 529, stated: “Nor is it essential that direct evidence of the earnings of a deceased adult be offered in order for there to be recovery of damages. Evidence of his health, age, industry, means and business are competent to show pecuniary loss.” The evidence shows that Maxine Greene Nichols, at the time of her death, was a 15-year-old wife. There is nothing to show that she was in bad health. “Soundness of mind is the natural and normal condition of men, and therefore everyone is presumed to be sane until the contrary is made to appear.” S. v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697, 28 S.E. 2d 232. Nothing in the record shows that Maxine Greene Harris at the time of her death was not of sound mind.
The realistic trend of the modern decisions recognizes the fact that a wife, as an individual, has a personal right to work and earn ■money, whether she is gainfully employed or not at the time or engaged merely in the performance of household duties; and, where a 15-year-old wife has been wrongfully killed, her estate has suffered a definite, substantial pecuniary loss. This is particularly true in view of the fact that married women in increasing numbers are engaging in business pursuits and employments as do men, and, like men, whether so employed or not, have a potential capacity to la*30bor and earn money. Johnson v. Lewis, 251 N.C. 797, 112 S.E. 2d 512; Annot. 151 A.L.R. 511.
In Russell v. Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191, the Court sustained a verdict of $1,000 damages for the wrongful death of a child five-months old. The Court in its opinion said:
“There is another view of the question that forces itself upon our minds which perhaps we are not called on to consider, but unless forced to do so by the overwhelming weight of authority or the inexorable logic of legal conclusion, we would be reluctant to admit that a human life, however lowly or feeble, had no value in the contemplation of a common carrier. Even a newborn colt or calf has an actual value entirely dependent upon its future usefulness or salability. It is a matter of common knowledge that during the days of slavery a healthy negro child, even at the breast, was considered as worth at least $100. Let us consider the contrast. A helpless negro baby, lying upon the floor along which he could not crawl, and bom to a state of hopeless bondage, was worth to the owner at least $100 as a chattel; and yet another baby, with generations of inherent qualities behind him and the magnificent possibilities of American citizenship before him, is not worth to himself, or to the country whose destinies he might one day have shaped, even the penny necessary to carry the cost. This view is entirely too incongrous to strike our fancy.
“Upon the greater and better weight of authority, as well as our own convictions of natural justice and of public policy, we are constrained to hold that the plaintiff can recover substantial damages in the case at bar.”
In Armentrout v. Hughes, 247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E. 2d 793, 69 A.L.R. 2d 620, the Court by a divided vote denied recovery. In that case plaintiff’s complaint alleged that his deceased intestate at the time of her death was 80 years of age.
In Scriven v. McDonald, 264 N.C. 727, 142 S.E. 2d 585, the recovery was denied for the wrongful death of an eleven-year-old boy. Plaintiff’s evidence and other portions of Dr. Mangum’s testimony not in conflict therewith showed that the boy, from birth until death, was mentally retarded and thereby severely handicapped. He could not fasten buttons. He could put on his shoes but could not tie them. In closing its opinion, the Court used this language:
“. . . Absent substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, tending to show a reasonable probability Anthony could or might overcome his handicap, the only reasonable conclusion to *31be drawn from the evidence is that he would continue to be a dependent person rather than a person capable of earning a livelihood. The burden of proof is upon plaintiff to show pecuniary loss to the estate on account of Anthony’s death. In our view, plaintiff’s evidence negatives rather than shows such pecuniary loss.”
The case of Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E. 2d 531, filed this date, is an action for damages for wrongful death. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the ground that plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to show that the estate of his intestate has suffered pecuniary loss on account of the death of his intestate. Plaintiff alleged: “John Edward Stetson could not swallow and therefore had to be fed by the use of a tube. That a thick mucus formed in and about the mouth and nose and had to be removed by the use of a suction device, and the baby had no eye blink.” That decision is sound.
In an endeavor to distinguish this case from Russell v. Steamboat Co., supra, the majority opinion says that the plaintiff offered evidence that this five-months-old boy “had never- been sick.” In my opinion there is a reasonable inference of fact that a 15-year-old woman who marries is in good health. It would be unrealistic to believe that a man would marry a 15-year-old girl who was a bedridden invalid.
The majority opinion states this: “In Hines v. Frink, 257 N.C. 723, 127 S.E. 2d 509, an action for wrongful death in which this Court sustained a judgment of nonsuit, it was said that no discussion of negligence or proximate cause was necessary because -plaintiff had offered no evidence as to the age, health, habits, or earning capacity of his intestate.” (Emphasis mine.) In the instant case we have proof that Maxine Greene Nichols was 15 years of age.
The majority opinion cites in support of its position Nunn v. Smith, 270 N.C. 374, 154 S.E. 2d 497. As I read that case, it was not an action for damages for wrongful death and is not remotely relevant to this case.
The majority opinion cites Spruill v. Insurance Co., 120 N.C. 141, 148, 27 S.E. 39, 42. That was an action to recover the amount of a life insurance policy and the question of suicide was involved. As I read the case, the principles of law there laid down have no relevancy with the instant case.
The majority opinion cites Roberts v. Freight Carriers, Inc., 273 N.C. 600, 160 S.E. 2d 712. That case involved .an action for property damages arising out of a collision between plaintiff’s dump truck *32and defendant’s tractor-trailer. As I read the case, it has no relevancy whatever in respect to the instant case.
2 McIntosh, N. C. Practice and Procedure, § 1516, cited in the majority opinion, is in respect to directing a verdict.
The majority opinion states that plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury that Nichols was the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff’s intestate met her death, and that Nichols was guilty of actionable negligence in causing her death. In the instant case, considering plaintiff’s evidence in the light most favorable to him and giving to him every reasonable inference of fact to be drawn therefrom, it would permit a jury to find that defendant’s actionable negligence in operating an automobile wrongfully and unlawfully killed a 15-year-old married woman; that, nothing appearing to the contrary, she was presumed to be sound of mind, and that under the conditions of modern society with most women working a reasonable inference of fact could be found by the jury that she was healthy and capable of earning money. In my opinion, the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence tending to show that his intestate was potentially capable of earning money in excess of that which would be required for her support, and I vote to send the case to the jury.
The defendant has won a Pyrrhic victory for the simple reason that all the plaintiff has to do to carry his case to the jury is to institute in apt time another suit and sufficiently allege and prove on the trial that his intestate was in good health and able to earn money.
Higgins, J., joins in the dissenting opinion.