Court Opinion

ID: 9489424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:15:37.887058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:31.676077
License: Public Domain

RYMER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
It may be that my colleagues are absolutely correct, that Sanders’s psychological impairment associated with his cancer is not a “disability” under the ADA because it wasn’t bad enough and didn’t last long enough, but I have trouble finding support for (or against) this conclusion in the record. There is no evidence about whether the condition was cured, was in remission, or was just sufficiently controlled that Sanders could return to work on April 5. Nor does the record shed light on whether Sanders’s psychological disorder, which was associated with his cancer, is so related that it is — or must be treated as — a “disability” because his cancer was a “disability,” or is so distinct that it shouldn’t be. Likewise, the record is unclear as to whether the cancer, or the psychological impairment that followed in its wake, may recur. In short, we know next to nothing about its characteristics. For this reason, it seems to me that the record has to be more fully developed before it can be concluded as a matter of law that Sanders suffered no disability for purposes of the Act.
Both parties agree that Sanders was disabled in the sense that he could not work at all between December 19 and April 5. Equally, both agree that Sanders did work, and worked well, before his leave for cancer surgery October 26, 1992; no one quibbles about that leave. He came back, on a part-time basis, for a couple of weeks before receiving leave with full pay for his psychological reaction to the cancer. To me, this focuses the question on whether extending the psychological disability leave beyond March 1 was a reasonable accommodation to enable Sanders to perform the essential functions of his job.
Because there is evidence that Sanders wasn’t terminated until after Dr. Purviance wrote Ameson that Sanders could return to work April 5,1 think there are triable issues whether terminating Sanders instead of extending his leave was discriminatory. While it may turn out that continuing to give Sanders a full, paid leave was not reasonable or was an undue hardship, see Kirnbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 879 n. 10 (9th Cir.1989) (questioning whether second leave is required if first leave proves unsuccessful), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814, 111 S.Ct. 53, 112 L.Ed.2d 28 (1990); August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.1992) (no violation when employee given several leaves is still unable to do job at time of termination); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.1995) (suggesting that reasonable accommodation does not require the employer to wait indefinitely for medical conditions to be corrected, rather that it must be construed as that which “presently” or “in the immediate future,” enables employee to perform the job), I cannot say that Sanders has failed to show that it is at least “plausible” that continuing his leave would have given him an opportunity to get through the psychological episode and return to work. Kimbro, 889 F.2d at 879.
I would, therefore, reverse and remand for further proceedings.