Court Opinion

ID: 9860792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:32:49.954807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:41.771953
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring: I agree with the decision to affirm but write separately on the issue of defendant’s impeachment by his prior convictions for three reasons: (1) defendant waived this issue, and the admission of defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment does not constitute plain error; (2) the trial court could have — and should have — avoided the error the majority found by handling defendant’s prior convictions differently, and more appropriately; and (3) I disagree with the majority’s reading of Williams and reject defendant’s argument on the merits. I. NO PLAIN ERROR This court should take the supreme court at its word: plain error exists only in exceptional circumstances in which a true injustice may have resulted, or as recently stated, when " 'the error is of such magnitude that the commission thereof denies the accused a fair and impartial trial.’ ” (People v. Robinson (1995), 167 Ill. 2d 53, 67, quoting People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 47, 538 N.E.2d 461, 471.) Plain error is not a "catchall” to be used — as defense counsel increasingly use it on appeal — for any claim of error that counsel can possibly find when combing the record. Nor should this court find plain error, as the majority does, merely "due to the potential for unfairness” (276 Ill. App. 3d at 206). See Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 67. II. THE "MERE FACT” APPROACH TO IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION The trial court could have avoided any error. Almost six years ago, the specially concurring opinion in People v. Kunze (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 708, 728-36, 550 N.E.2d 284, 297-303 (Steigmann, J„ specially concurring), described, in detail, a procedure that trial courts, in their discretion, could use for handling prior convictions for impeachment purposes that would inform the jury only of the "mere fact” that the defendant was a convicted felon, not of the specific offense of which he was convicted. (Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 550 N.E.2d at 303 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring); see also People v. Taber (1995); 271 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580, 648 N.E.2d 342, 344-45 (wherein a panel of this court directed the "mere fact” approach be used on retrial).) Trial courts have increasingly used the "mere fact” method of impeachment and no court of review has ever found error when a trial court has done so. Regrettably, the trial court here did not use the "mere fact” method, instead permitting the jury to learn that defendant, charged with armed violence, had previously been convicted of two other crimes of violence, aggravated battery and unlawful restraint. By doing so, the trial court maximized the potential prejudice to defendant. The "mere fact” method is not inconsistent with the concerns expressed in Williams about the need for trial courts to engage in the Montgomery balancing test. As stated in the special concurrence in Kunze, the "mere fact” method should be utilized only when the trial court has already determined such evidence is admissible under Montgomery. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 731, 550 N.E.2d at 299 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring). III. POST-WILLIAMS IMPEACHMENT OF TESTIFYING DEFENDANTS A. Williams'. Analysis in Context In Williams, the supreme court criticized the indiscriminate admission of prior felonies for impeachment purposes. The precedential scope of a decision is, of course, limited to the facts before the court. (People v. Flatt (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 250, 261, 412 N.E.2d 509, 515.) Bearing this precept in mind, I note the argument the supreme court faced in Williams'. "Defendant asserts that, in violation of the rule announced in [Montgomery], the trial court [(1)] not only failed to weigh the prejudicial effect against the probative value of the evidence but, [(2)] in fact, admitted it for the very purpose that prior convictions may not be admitted, i.e., to show defendant’s propensity for violent criminal behavior.” Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 33-34, 641 N.E.2d at 309. The court reviewed the origin and rationale of the Montgomery rule, disapproved its increasingly mechanical application, and then in the case before it (a direct appeal in a death case), noted the trial court’s remarks: " 'it’s of great probative value in a case of this nature,’ ” and " 'it[’]s highly probative of the nature of the offense’ ” (Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 40, 641 N.E.2d at 312). These remarks revealed that the trial court admitted defendant’s 1983 voluntary manslaughter conviction for an improper purpose, namely, as relevant to defendant’s guilt of the 1987 murder for which he was on trial, rather than his credibility. (Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 40-41, 641 N.E.2d at 312-13.) However, although the court found error, it did not reverse because evidence of defendant’s guilt was so overwhelming that admission of the prior conviction could not have been a material factor in the verdict. B. Montgomery Balancing: What’s a Court To Do After Williams? The court’s language and approach in Williams have become the subject of disagreement between panels and districts of the appellate court. In People v. Fomond (1995), 273 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1068, 652 N.E.2d 1322, 1332, a first district panel construed Williams narrowly, "as holding that a judge may not admit past felonies for the purpose of showing a defendant’s propensity to commit a crime.” In People v. Elliot (1995), 274 Ill. App. 3d 901, 909-10, 654 N.E.2d 636, 646-47, Justice Wolfson outlines the split of authority, including the third district (Housh v. Bowers (1995), 271 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1006-08, 649 N.E.2d 505, 506-07 (reversible error in denying motion in limine and permitting use of prior drug conviction against personal injury plaintiff)). The Elliot court read Williams much more expansively than did the Fomond panel, stating Williams established at least three requirements, with the first being the following: "First, the prior conviction must bear on the defendant’s truthfulness as a witness. Crimes involving deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing press heavily on the probative value side of the scale. Crimes of violence, on the other hand, ' "generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity.” ’ (Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 37, quoting Gordon v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1967), 383 F.2d 936, 940.) That is, if the trial court determines the prior conviction is a pure act of violence, and has no element of dishonest conduct, it should not be placed on the scale at all.” (Emphasis added.) Elliot, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 908-09, 654 N.E.2d at 642. In Maxwell, this court read Williams far differently than the Elliot court, stating: "From our examination of Williams, we conclude the Supreme Court of Illinois was not abandoning the well-settled interpretation given Montgomery, which provides in the first prong that all felonies may be used for impeachment, and in the second prong allows nonfelonies to be used for impeachment if they relate to truth or veracity. Both the first and second prongs are subject to the third prong, which provides for a determination that the impeaching offense has a probative'value not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. *** *** Williams also warns that close attention should be given to whether prior felonies actually have the ability to impeach veracity — and this should be done when determining whether the probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect.” (Emphasis added.) Maxwell, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 62, 650 N.E.2d at 301-02. As this discussion demonstrates, uncertainty abounds in the appellate and trial courts regarding the message of Williams. Because this issue of impeachment by prior conviction arises in a large percentage of all felony trials, clarification of Williams is needed on two distinct points. 1. Is the First Prong of Montgomery Still Valid? In the 24 years since Montgomery, trial, courts have permitted impeachment by prior conviction in thousands of cases when those convictions did not directly reflect the defendant’s "dishonesty or false statement” — the "second prong” of Montgomery — as would, for example, convictions for perjury and deceptive practices. Note that Montgomery identified two separate bases — or "prongs” — for possible admission of a prior conviction to impeach a testifying defendant: (1) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment. (Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d at 698.) Did the supreme court in Williams really mean to render all "first prong” prior convictions — such as for felony drug offenses and crimes of violence — henceforth unusable per se to impeach a testifying defendant? Such a ruling would be a dramatic change in Elinois law, and surely the supreme court would state it emphatically and clearly. Williams did not do so. At issue in Williams was the use of the defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter at his trial for first degree murder. Although the supreme court held that "[ujnder the rationale of Montgomery, evidence of defendant’s conviction of voluntary manslaughter should not have been admitted at trial,” the court also stated: "We do not hold that there are no circumstances under which a voluntary manslaughter conviction may be admitted at a murder trial.” Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 41, 641 N.E.2d at 313. In context, the supreme court seems to be saying there are some circumstances under which a voluntary manslaughter conviction may be admitted at a murder trial to impeach the testifying defendant. If the court was considering some context other than Montgomery for admitting a defendant’s voluntary manslaughter conviction at his murder trial (and I can think of none), then the placement of that sentence in the middle of a Montgomery discussion is peculiar. On the other hand, if the court was speaking in a Montgomery context and specifically rejecting the argument that there are no circumstances under which a voluntary manslaughter conviction may be admitted at a murder trial to impeach defendant, that observation appears inconsistent with everything the court said previously in its analysis of Montgomery. In other words, if trial courts should focus solely upon felony convictions involving "dishonesty or false statement” because only such second-prong convictions "bear upon the defendant’s truthfulness as a witness” (Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 39, 641 N.E.2d at 312), then how could a voluntary manslaughter conviction possibly be either? 2. What Is the Rationale for Permitting Impeachment of a Defendant by Prior Conviction? The Williams court also seems to disapprove of the rationale that felony convictions evince a disrespect for societal order and thus adversely affect the defendant’s veracity. In People v. Medreno (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 449, 453, 425 N.E.2d 588, 591, then-appellate Justice Heiple specifically rejected a first district decision (People v. Siebert (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 895, 390 N.E.2d 1322) that required a prior conviction, even for a felony offense, to bear a direct relationship to the honesty of the witness (the "second prong” of the Montgomery criteria). The Medreno court cited approvingly a decision of this court which held that a defendant’s prior rape conviction was probative of his likelihood to commit perjury because a serious felony conviction "evinces a disrespect for societal order and thus adversely affects his veracity.” Medreno, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 452, 425 N.E.2d at 591, citing People v. Warfel (1979), 67 Ill. App. 3d 620, 385 N.E.2d 175. The rationale for impeachment by prior conviction was also discussed in the concurring opinion in Kunze: "Another way of looking at this issue is to view it as one of expectations. A jury may reasonably expect that a person who takes the witness stand and is sworn to tell the truth will feel moral and societal pressures to do so. Telling a jury that a witness has a prior felony conviction informs the jury that on some occasion in the past, this witness has seriously violated societal (and probably moral) rules, thereby permitting the jury to infer, if it so chooses, that this witness may feel fewer moral and societal pressures to tell the truth than would be felt by a witness who has no prior felony conviction. If the jurors draw this inference, they may use it along with all the other evidence in the case as they evaluate the credibility of that witness. In sum, a convicted felon may be less worthy of belief solely because of that felony conviction than a witness who is not a convicted felon.” (Emphasis in original.) (Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 735, 550 N.E.2d at 302 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring).) (See also People v. Armstrong (1995), 275 Ill. App. 3d 503, 507, 655 N.E.2d 1203, 1206.) The Kunze special concurrence also quoted from Campbell v. Greer (7th Cir. 1987), 831 F.2d 700, 707, in which the Seventh Circuit discussed the rationale underlying impeachment by prior conviction: "Rule 609 and the common law tradition out of which it evolved rest on the common-sense proposition that a person who has flouted society’s most fundamental norms, as embodied in its felony statutes, is less likely than other members of society to be deterred from lying under oath in a trial by the solemnity of the oath, the (minuscule) danger of prosecution for perjury, or internalized ethical norms against lying. If so, this is something a jury should be permitted to take into account in evaluating a witness’s believability.” If the supreme court were to reject a principle of law — namely, the mere possibility that a defendant’s prior "first prong” felony conviction could be used to impeach him if he testifies at trial— which has for decades been part of the fabric of this State’s law, then again not only would it do so clearly and explicitly, but surely it would provide an explanation for why it repudiates the "common law tradition” and the "common-sense proposition” (in the Seventh Circuit’s words) upon which this long-standing legal doctrine rests. C. Application of Montgomery to the Present Case Defense counsel suggested at the instruction conference that the court and counsel go through the Montgomery process. The prosecutor then advised the court of defendant’s prior convictions and that he would tender authenticated copies of his convictions. Defense counsel argued that the offenses did not involve veracity, truth, or moral turpitude and asked the court to exclude both convictions, but if they were found admissible, to advise the jury of only one. In response, the prosecutor argued that the probative value was not so outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and asked that both convictions be admitted. The court ruled that if defendant testified, the exhibits would be admitted. The crux of this case was the credibility of the complaining witness versus that of defendant and his alibi witness, another convicted felon. In closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized these prior convictions as important factors to use when the jury assessed the believability of the witnesses. A trial judge’s remarks should be taken in context, including the context of the arguments of counsel. (People v. Ward (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 516, 526-27, 499 N.E.2d 422, 425-26.) We generally do not assume the trial judge failed to engage in the proper analysis simply from a lack of his recitation of particular words. In fact, the supreme court rejected an argument that the trial court did not perform the requisite balancing test where counsel argued it and the trial court merely said it understood the appropriate test and ruled that all the convictions could be introduced. People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 188, 449 N.E.2d 821, 826. Here, the Montgomery balancing test was invoked and no one suggests the trial court expressly stated the prior convictions would be admitted for any legally improper reason. Thus, the record shows no error. The prosecutor’s argument that defendant’s prior convictions affected his believability came within the scope of permissible argument. Further, the prosecutor said not one word about the nature of the convictions of defendant and his alibi witness, focusing solely on their effect on the witnesses’ believability relative to that of the victim. We also note that the court correctly instructed the jury with Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 3.12 (impeachment of a witness by a prior conviction) and 3.13 (impeachment of a defendant by previous convictions) (3d ed. 1992). Reviewing courts ought not presume error by the trial court from a lack of "magic words.” Williams does not require a contrary result; nor does it mean that the State cannot impeach a testifying defendant with prior felony convictions other than those going directly to truth and veracity.