Court Opinion

ID: 9790730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:58:44.020887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.209415
License: Public Domain

Judge ROY
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
*1178I concur that the matter must be remanded for further findings or proceedings. I differ with the majority with respect to how a stipulation of the parties is to be treated upon remand and on any subsequent motion to modify child support. The majority would have the stipulation treated as a circumstance for the court to consider in determining whether to depart from the child support guideline and increase father’s child support. In my view, so treating the stipulation would adversely impact amicable settlements of parenting time and child support matters to the detriment of the children and the parties. Thus, I would enforce the stipulation in accordance with its terms unless its application becomes inequitable, unjust, or inappropriate. While our differences may impact the evidence to be presented, their primary and practical impact relates to the burden of proof.
I have concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, the parties have, by their stipulation which was approved by the court, adopted a modified child support guideline. In my view, such guideline is not contrary to public policy and is, therefore, enforceable subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth.
The marriage between the parties was dissolved in 1990. Shortly after the entry of the final decree, father moved from Boulder to Nederland. As an accommodation to father, the parties stipulated to an increase in father’s visitation adding overnights which permitted father to return the children on Monday or Tuesday morning, instead of the respective Sunday or Monday evening, after weekend visitations. The parties’ stipulation provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
[Father] agrees that the extra overnights he will have shall not be used as a basis for reducing his child support obligation.
The trial court found that stipulation to be in the children’s best interests, approved it, and made it an order.
Mother commenced these proceedings to increase child support based solely on changes in the parties’ incomes. At the hearing, the magistrate refused to hear testimony from the mother with respect to the intent of the parties in entering the stipulation. The magistrate concluded that the application of the stipulation was limited to restricting father from seeking a reduction in child support based solely on the increased parenting time and that the petition to increase child support filed by mother was “a brand new ball game.” On that basis, and following the child support guideline, the magistrate ordered father to pay $639.97 per month as child support, a reduction of $.03 per month from the previously ordered support.
The district court, upon review, and without a hearing, concluded that the magistrate erred in not implementing the prior approved stipulation, recalculated father’s child support obligation to be $790 per month, and modified the magistrate’s order accordingly. In this resulting appeal, father argues that the district court misinterpreted the stipulation and improperly deviated from the child support guideline. I perceive no apparent impropriety in the trial court’s ruling.
The Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act states, as the public policy of Colorado, that: “[I]t is in the best interest of all parties to encourage frequent and continuing contact between each parent and the minor children of the marriage after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.” Section 14-10-124(1), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B); In re Marriage of Lester, 791 P.2d 1244 (Colo. App.1990). Thus, parenting time is to be determined and amended in accordance with the best interests of the children. Section 14-10-129(2), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.).
With respect to child support, it is the public policy of Colorado that it be set in an amount reasonable or necessary to support the child. In determining child support, the court is to consider the financial resources of all the parties, including the child, and the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved. Section 14-10-115(1), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B). Child support is amendable upon a showing of a substantial and continuing change in circumstance. Section 14-10-122(l)(a), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.); § 14-10-108(5)(b), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B).
*1179It is also the public policy of Colorado that matters relating to dissolution of marriage be resolved amicably. Sections 14-10-102, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B) and 14-10-104.5, C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.). Agreements between the parties are binding on the court except those relating to child custody, support, and parenting time which are subject to approval by the court. Section 14-10-112, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B); In re Marriage of Miller, 790 P.2d 890 (Colo.App.1990).
In 1986, the General Assembly, without modifying the underlying public policy, adopted extensive amendments to the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act relating to child support, the principal aspect of these amendments was to establish a guideline, a detailed mathematical formula, for determining a presumptive child support order. Section 14-10-115(3), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B). The guideline creates a rebuttable presumption as to the amount of monthly child support from which the court, in its discretion, may depart if the resulting order is inequitable, unjust, or inappropriate and the reasons for departure must be stated in writing. Section 14 — 10—115(3)(a); In re Marriage of Marshall, 781 P.2d 177 (Colo.App.1989). The guideline is also applicable to amending an existing child support order. If the child support computed in accordance with the guideline results in a change from the existing order of less than 10%, it must be deemed not to be a substantial and continuing change in circumstance. Section 14-10-122(1)(b), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B).
The guideline introduced the concept of “shared custody” which at the time of these proceedings was defined as that circumstance in which “each parent keeps the children overnight for more than twenty-five percent of the year [now ninety-two overnights] and that both parents contribute to the expenses of the children in addition to the payment of child support.” Section 14-10-115(8), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B); In re Marriage of Redford, 776 P.2d 1149 (Colo.App.1989). Shared custody impacts the computation by reducing the monthly child support obligation, sometimes substantially. Section 14-10-115(14)(b), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.).
In adopting the shared custody concept, the General Assembly linked two issues, child support and parenting time, which are premised on different public policies and which are to be determined and modified on wholly different grounds. While stability is a hallmark with respect to child custody and parenting time matters, flexibility is desirable in child support matters. It should come as no surprise that parents, and counsel in advising parents, will consider each in light of the other. That is, presumably, what occurred here.
The parties have, by a stipulation approved by the court, unlinked, or partially unlinked, child support and parenting time to the extent of the agreed upon increased parenting time. This unlinking has the effect of increasing father’s child support obligation and does not infringe upon the purposes for which the guideline was adopted. See § 14-10 — 115(3)(e), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6B). It is not contrary to the public policy of encouraging frequent and continuing contact between each parent and the minor children of the marriage, of fostering amicable resolution of disputes, and of providing child support in an amount reasonable or necessary to support the child. Indeed, in my view, taken in combination, this stipulation fosters these frequently conflicting policies.
When the amount of parenting time for the noncustodial or nonresidential parent approaches, reaches, or exceeds the threshold of 92 overnight visits per annum, agreeing to additional overnights may well have financial implications for both parties. The party having sole custody, or the primary residential custodian in a joint custody arrangement, and receiving child support may become reluctant to agree to additional overnights because of the effect on the child support obligation. The reluctance of the custodial parent, in my view, is increased by the fact that the increased parenting time will become the status quo and, absent agreement, very difficult legally and practically to reduce. Child support is, on the other hand, relatively easy to modify.
The unlinking, or partial unlinking, of child support and parenting time here fosters consideration of parenting time based solely on *1180the best interests of the child or children. In addition, such unlinking, in my view, fosters amicable settlements of custody and parenting time issues.
I would, therefore, remand the matter to the trial court for further findings or proceedings consistent with my views. I would require the court to apply the stipulation to this and any future proceeding relating to child support unless the court concludes that its application is, or has become, inequitable, unjust, or inappropriate. See § 14-10-115(3)(a). The burden of demonstrating the inequity, injustice, or inappropriateness of the stipulation would rest on the party asserting it, in this instance the father.