Court Opinion

ID: 9689029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:16:57.815559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:43.531510
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent and would follow our prior opinion in this matter.
Without question, the applicable period of limitations for wrongful death actions is the three-year time period formerly set forth in MCL 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7). Ruhle v Armstrong, 20 Mich App 573; 174 NW2d 292 (1969), aff'd 384 Mich 709; 187 NW2d 223 (1971). The general rule regarding wrongful death actions is that this three-year period begins to run on the date of the decedent’s death. Coury v General Motors Corp, 376 Mich *707248; 137 NW2d 134 (1965). This general rule, however, has no application in this case.
Under the provisions of MCL 600.5833; MSA 27A.5833:
"In actions for damages based on breach of a warranty of quality or fitness the claim accrues at the time the breach of the warranty is discovered or reasonably should be discovered.”
Plaintiff’s suit against defendant General Electric Company is premised upon a breach of warranty of fitness. Therefore, it falls squarely within the statutory language that neither admits of ambiguity nor exception on account of the wrongful death statute.
Statutes that relate to particular matters or questions control over contrary general law. Mayor of Port Huron v City Treasurer of Port Huron, 328 Mich 99; 43 NW2d 77 (1950). Thus, for instance, in Weiss v Bigman, 84 Mich App 487; 270 NW2d 5 (1978), this Court held that a complaint brought under the wrongful death act, but which was based upon an allegation of medical malpractice, was required to be filed within the period of limitations pertaining to medical malpractice actions. See MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). See also Olijnyk v Harrison Community Hospital, Inc, 80 Mich App 366; 263 NW2d 33 (1977).
Plaintiff has properly pleaded a cause of action for breach of warranty. The fact that her decedent had the misfortune of dying rather than suffering severe physical injury in no way affects the validity of her claim for breach of warranty. Nor is this fact of any import under MCL 600.5833; MSA 27A.5833. I dissented in this Court’s opinion in Rach v Wise, 46 Mich App 729, 733; 208 NW2d *708570 (1973) (T. M. Burns, J., dissenting), and I do so here. This Court is not in the business of redrafting a litigant’s pleadings to fit our artificial rules of procedure.
I dissent and would affirm the circuit court’s denial of defendant General Electric Company’s motion for accelerated judgment.