Court Opinion

ID: 9690293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:03:32.310607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:55.042824
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 60. {concurring) . The decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed. The court of appeals correctly concluded that the Labor & Industry Review Commission's (LIRC's) interpretation of Wisconsin's odd-lot doctrine did not comply with Wisconsin law and therefore was erroneous.
¶ 61. I write separately to express my disagreement with the reasoning of the majority opinion on two issues:
(1) The majority opinion errs in characterizing the odd-lot doctrine explained in Balczewski v. DILHR1 as a "judge-made adjunct to the law of worker's compensation,"2 as "a judge-made exception to the general rule that permanent total disability awards under worker's compensation law are based on proof of total loss of earning capacity,"3 and as a court-created (apparently out of whole cloth and not derived from the Worker's Compensation Act) rule of evidence to be used by LIRC.41 conclude that the Balczewski case adhered to prior case law and correctly characterized the odd-lot doctrine (and its application, including the burden-shifting framework) as an interpretation of the meaning of the *175phrases "total disability"5 and impliedly "loss of earning capacity" as used in Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation Act (WCA).
(2) The majority opinion errs by characterizing LIRC's interpretation of the odd-lot doctrine as an interpretation of the Balczewski case not entitled to any deference. I conclude that LIRC's interpretation of the odd-lot doctrine is an interpretation and application of the WCA (including this court's interpretations of the WCA) and is entitled to great weight deference.
¶ 62. Although the agency's determination in this case should be given great weight deference, I conclude, for many of the reasons set forth in the majority opinion and in the opinion of the court of appeals,6 that LIRC's interpretation of the law is erroneous and therefore is unreasonable. Accordingly, this court should not affirm the agency's interpretation of the law, but should, as the court of appeals did, reverse and remand this matter.
¶ 63. The majority opinion errs in characterizing the odd-lot doctrine explained in Balczewski as a "judge-made adjunct to the law of worker's compensation,"7 as "a judge-made exception to the general rule that permanent total disability awards under worker's compen*176sation law are based on proof of total loss of earning capacity,"8 and as a court-created (apparently out of whole cloth and not derived from the WCA) rule of evidence to be used by LIRC.9
¶ 64. A careful examination of the Balczewski decision demonstrates that Balczewski's adoption of the Larson treatise language did not create a new judge-made common-law rule for the WCA. The Balczewski decision interpreted the WCA, identified and labeled prior case law as the famed "odd-lot" doctrine, and distilled and developed prior case law into a two-step, burden-shifting interpretation of the WCA, a more clearly enunciated interpretation of the WCA that the court had adopted in prior cases. The Balczewski court clearly understood, and explicitly stated, that it was taking this approach.
¶ 65. The Balczewski court unambiguously viewed the odd-lot doctrine as an interpretation of the WCA, stating as follows: "We think it clear that what Larson refers to as the 'odd-lot' doctrine is a statement of the Wisconsin law as it has existed at least since the 1923 amendments to the Worker's Compensation Act."10 " 'Total disability' in compensation law is not to be interpreted literally . .. ."11
¶ 66. The existing Wisconsin case law interpreting the WCA and repeatedly referred to by the Balcze-wski court12 began in the 1917 McDonald v. Industrial *177Commission13 case, one of the earliest Wisconsin cases considering whether claimants with injuries that permit them to work sporadic, odd-lot jobs nonetheless qualify for permanent total disability benefits under the WCA. The McDonald court affirmed a finding of permanent total disability under the WCA despite medical testimony that the injured worker could perform work if it did not involve much walking or stooping.14 In deciding whether to affirm such a finding, this court considered whether the claimant's substantial but not total loss of earning capacity qualified as a compensable injury under the then permanent total disability statute.15 This court concluded that it did.
¶ 67. In 1944, in Milwaukee Western Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, this court continued looking at loss of actual earning capacity, although the opinion did not cite McDonald or the statute interpreted therein.16 This court affirmed a permanent total disability award even though the claimant was able to shovel snow, run errands, and work for short periods of time until dizziness and weakness took hold.17
¶ 68. In 1972, in Kurschner v. DILHR, 18 a case expressly relied upon by Balczewski, this court again recognized that, in cases of non-schedule industrial *178injuries, the crucial factor in establishing permanent total disability is proof of impairment of actual earning capacity in the industrial labor market.19 The Balcze-wski court noted that Kurschner does not stand alone. Rather, stated the Balczewski court, the Kurschner case is merely "the culmination of a long line of cases interpreting the basis of compensation for nonschedule injuries under the Wisconsin Workmen's [now Worker's] Compensation Act."20
¶ 69. Finally, in 1972, in Transamerica Insurance Co. v. DILHR,21 this court again spoke on the odd-lot doctrine, although again not specifically labeling the doctrine as such. In Transamerica, the court affirmed a finding of permanent total disability because the claimant was permanently and totally disabled from performing labor at his trade, as well as being permanently and totally disabled from performing manual or other labor in another "suitable" employment22 Furthermore, this court declared loss of earning capacity as "one important measuring stick as to degree of disability."23 For both propositions, the Transamerica court cited the cases discussed above.
¶ 70. Not only did the Balczewski court view prior cases as adopting the rationale of the odd-lot doctrine as a matter of statutory interpretation, but also both the claimant and the Attorney General (representing the *179agency) agreed in Balczewski that the odd-lot doctrine was part of the WCA, just not by that name. The claimant's brief in Balczewski stated that "it has long been recognized in Wisconsin Workers' Compensation law that a finding of total disability for industrial purposes can be proper despite the fact that a claimant is capable of... miscellaneous light work."24 The Attorney General's brief in Balczewski states that DILHR and the State "agree with the claimant that [the odd-lot doctrine] is implicit" in the WCA, that the doctrine is but another statement of existing Wisconsin law, and that DILHR has made findings of permanent total disability based on the odd-lot doctrine.25
¶ 71. By identifying, distilling, and labeling the developing statute-based rule of the McDonald line of cases, the Balczewski court was interpreting the foundational legal terms of art in the WCA: "total disability" and "loss of earning capacity." The Balczewski court concluded that" '[t]otal disability' in compensation law is not to be interpreted literally as utter and abject helplessness. Evidence that claimant has been able to earn occasional wages ... does not necessarily rule out a finding of total disability nor require that it is to be reduced to partial."26
¶ 72. Balczewski is, without doubt, a statutory interpretation case. Indeed, even the cases from which Professor Larson's odd-lot doctrine emerges are cases interpreting workers' compensation acts.
*180¶ 73. For example, the Balczewski court referenced Lee v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co.,27 a case Professor Larson thinks exemplary and representative of odd-lot doctrine cases.28 That case expressly interpreted a phrase of Minnesota's Workers' Compensation Act: "working at an occupation which brings him an income."29 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the phrase implies "at least a reasonable degree of continuity of occupational capacity," and that sporadic work for short periods of time is not enough, on its own, to negate a permanent total disability determination.30
¶ 74. Again citing the Larson treatise, the Balcze-wski court described the origins of the name "odd-lot."31 Professor Larson attributes the doctrine name to the British case of Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, a case discussed in the majority opinion.32 Again, this case interpreted a statute, this time the British Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 and the phrase "earning or.. . able to earn."33
*181¶ 75. Finally, the Balczewski court looked to Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo although not cited by the Larson treatise for further guidance in expressing the odd-lot doctrine.34 That case, Jordan v. Decorative Co.,35 was also a statutory interpretation case, discussing the parameters of the phrase "wage earning capacity" in the New York workers' compensation statute.36
¶ 76. I therefore conclude that Balczewski and the odd-lot doctrine are judicial interpretations of the WCA, not judge-made rules that are adjunct to the WCA or an exception to the WCA.
¶ 77. LIRC perceived Wis* Stat. § 102.17(7)(a), Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34, and Professor Larson's text (§ 84.01[4]) as altering the Balczewski line of cases interpreting the WCA. I therefore turn to the question of whether LIRC's interpretation of the odd-lot doctrine of the WCA is entitled to great weight deference.
t — 1 Í-H
¶ 78. I agree with the court of appeals that LIRC's interpretation of the odd-lot doctrine is entitled to great weight deference. Thus this court will not overturn LIRC's determination unless it is unreasonable. I agree with the court of appeals that because LIRC did not adhere to the WCA as interpreted by the court, LIRC's determination was unreasonable.
A
¶ 79. Wisconsin courts must afford great weight deference to LIRC's statutory interpretation of the odd-lot doctrine in the present case because the follow*182ing conditions have been met:37 (1) the agency is charged with administration of the particular statute at issue;38 (2) its interpretation is one of long standing;39 (3) it employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in arriving at its interpretation;40 and (4) its interpretation will provide uniformity and consistency in the application of the statute at issue.
¶ 80. The majority opinion concludes that no deference at all is owed to LIRC in the present case. The majority opinion reaches this conclusion because it erroneously conflates a court's deference to the agency's interpretation of a statute with a court's determination of the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation of a statute. A court may give an agency great weight deference and yet conclude that the agency's determination of law is unreasonable and should be reversed.41
*183¶ 81. The majority opinion's discussion of the appellate standard of review for LIRC's decision in the present case42 is apparently based on the premise that the odd-lot doctrine is a judge-made doctrine created by this court in Balczewski and that the odd-lot doctrine is not based on the WCA or on prior case law interpreting the WCA, but is based on the common practice of other states (as set forth in Professor Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law).43
¶ 82. Using this faulty underlying assertion, the majority opinion summarily concludes that even if LIRC's interpretation of Balczewski is of long standing, no deference is owed to LIRC because LIRC is interpreting a decision of this court, not a statute or administrative rule.44 Not only does the majority opinion refuse to accord the agency's interpretation of the WCA any deference, but the majority opinion also goes even further and expansively asserts that "we need not defer to agency interpretations of our own decisions."45
¶ 83. As support for its erroneous broad legal proposition, the majority cites Local 60, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. WERC.46 The court of appeals in Local 60 opined that "it is well established that the general deference given to an agency's application of a particular statute does *184not apply when the agency's determination conflicts with prior case law established by our supreme court." The Local 60 court of appeals cited Doering v. LIRC47 as authority for this proposition, and Doering in turn cites the Pabst48 and Klusendorf49 cases.
¶ 84. Neither Pabst nor Klusendorf supports the statement of law set forth in Local 60, in Doering, and in the majority opinion. Rather, both Pabst and Klusen-dorf (cases decided before this court adopted the levels of deference) stated the law correctly: "[C]ourts should not substitute their judgment for the agency's application of a particular statute to the found facts if a rational basis exists in law for the agency's interpretation and it does not conflict with the statute's legislative history, prior decisions of this court, or constitutional prohibitions."50
¶ 85. I agree that if an agency's interpretation of law conflicts with prior decisions of this court interpreting the law, then, even with great weight deference, the agency's interpretation is not rational and a court need not follow the interpretation regardless of the deference accorded the agency's determination.51
*185¶ 86. The court of appeals recently refused to follow the "no deference rule" pronounced in Local 60 and Doering and granted great weight deference to a DWD determination based on a court case, reasoning as follows:52
The fact that the [DWD] also looked to the supreme court's discussion in [.Richland School District v. DILHR, in addition to a statutory provision] in deciding this [claim] does not mean that we may deprive the department of the deference it is due on account of its expertise, experience and legislatively delegated authority.53
¶ 87. The standard of review in the majority opinion and Local 60 is not supported by Wisconsin law and is simply illogical and wrong. Agencies interpret and apply court interpretations of statutes all the time. By failing to afford LIRC the proper level of deference in such cases, the majority opinion enables the courts of this state to usurp legislative power.54 The majority *186opinion's change in the level of deference afforded an agency's interpretation of a statute undermines the stability and uniformity that is necessary in the administration of the WCA.
B
¶ 88. The majority opinion's characterization of LXRC's determination as one based purely on Balczewski and § 84.01[4] of Larson's Workers' Compensation Law,55 and one that "does not purport to interpret a statute or administrative rule,"56 is erroneous. LIRC,57 Beecher,58 the court of appeals,59 and I interpret the LIRC decision as relying on Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a), Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34, case law interpreting *187the WCA (Balczewski), and the Larson treatise. The majority opinion protests.60
¶ 89. The majority opinion parses the LIRC decision to reinterpret it so that it does not rely on anything but Balczewski and the Larson text to justify according the LIRC decision no deference.
¶ 90. Not only does a reading of the LIRC decision itself demonstrate the majority opinion's error,61 but numerous LIRC cases that preceded the present case regularly rely on Wis. Admin Code § DWD 80.34, Balc-*188zewski, and Larson,62 as supporting the proposition that "to make the prima facie case of odd-lot unemploy-ability, the commission requires applicants undertake reasonable efforts to find work."63
*189c
¶ 91. Under the great weight deference standard of review this court's task should have been to determine whether LIRC's conclusion of law that an injured worker must demonstrate that he or she made a reasonable post-injury job search as part of his or her prima facie odd-lot case is a reasonable interpretation of Balczewski, Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a), and Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34. Great weight deference requires this court to sustain LIRC's interpretation of the law "even if an alternative view of the law is just as reasonable or even more reasonable," but requires this court to overturn LIRC's determination if LIRC's interpretation of the law is unreasonable.64
¶ 92. Great weight deference is not a result-oriented standard of review and its use does not mean that a court must rubber-stamp an agency decision. *190Applying the "great weight" deferential standard of review, I agree with the court of appeals and the majority opinion that LIRC's interpretation of the odd-lot doctrine cannot be sustained. For substantially the same reasons as the court of appeals and the majority opinion set forth, I conclude that LIRC's interpretation is unreasonable.
¶ 93. For the reasons set forth, I would affirm the court of appeals decision. I write separately in order to clarify the statutory basis of the odd-lot doctrine and the level of deference that the majority opinion should have afforded LIRC's statutory interpretation.
¶ 94. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this concurrence.

 Balczewski v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 487, 251 N.W.2d 794 (1977).

 Majority op., ¶ 2. See also id., ¶ 56.

 Id., ¶ 44.

 See id., ¶¶ 3, 32.

 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 493 (quoting 2 Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 57.51, at 10-107) (" 'Total disability1 in compensation law is not to be interpreted literally as utter and abject helplessness.")).

 See majority op., ¶¶ 34-47; Beecher v. LIRC, 2003 WI App 100, ¶¶ 17-26, 264 Wis. 2d 394, 663 N.W.2d 316.

 Majority op., ¶ 2. See also id., ¶ 56.

 Id., ¶ 44.

 See id., ¶¶ 3, 32.

 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 495-96.

 Id. at 493 (quoting 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 57.51, at 10-107) (emphasis added).

 See, e.g., Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 495-96.

 McDonald v. Indus. Comm'n, 165 Wis. 372, 162 N.W. 345 (1917).

 Id. at 373.

 Id. at 372. The provision of the WCA considered in McDonald was section 2394-9, subdivision 2(d), and reads materially the same as the current Wis. Stat. § 102.44(2).

 Milwaukee W. Fuel Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 245 Wis. 334, 13 N.W.2d 919 (1944).

 Id. at 336.

 Kurschner v. DILHR, 40 Wis. 2d 10, 161 N.W.2d 213 (1968).

 Id. at 19-20.

 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 492.

 Transamerica Ins. Co. v. DILHR, 54 Wis. 2d 272, 195 N.W.2d 656 (1972).

 Id. at 277 (citing McDonald, 165 Wis. at 375-76; Milwaukee W. Fuel Co., 245 Wis. at 335-36).

 Transamerica Ins. Co., 54 Wis. 2d at 277 (citing N. States Power Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 252 Wis. 70, 76, 30 N.W.2d 217; Kurschner, 40 Wis. 2d at 18-20; Kohler Co. v. DILHR, 42 Wis. 2d 396, 405-06, 167 N.W.2d 431 (1969)).

 Brief of Appellant at 13.

 Brief of Respondents, Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations and the State of Wisconsin at 4. See also Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 496.

 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 493 (quoting 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 57.51, at 10-107) (emphasis added).

 Lee v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 41 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 1950).

 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 493 (quoting 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 57.51, at 10-107). Professor Larson describes the case as "the rule followed by most modern courts."

 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.11, subd. 5. This section has been renumbered as Minn. Stat. Ann. § 176.101, subdivision 5 (2004).

 Lee, 41 N.W.2d at 436-37 (quoting Green v. Schmahl, 278 N.W. 157, 158 (Minn. 1938) (also interpreting Minnesota's Workers' Compensation Act)).

 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 494.

 Cardiff Corp. v. Hall, 1 K.B. 1009, 1911 WL 15472 (K.B. 1911).

 Cardiff Corp., 1 K.B. at 1017-18, 1025-27.

 Balczewski, 76 Wis. 2d at 494-95.

 Jordan v. Decorative Co., 130 N.E. 634 (N.Y. 1921).

 Id. at 635-36.

 Brown v. LIRC, 2003 WI 142, ¶ 16, 267 Wis. 2d 31, 671 N.W.2d 279 (2003) (citing Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis. 2d 650, 660, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995); Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis. 2d 499, 505, 493 N.W.2d 14 (1992)).
"In other words, when a legal question calls for value and policy judgments that require the expertise and experience of an agency, the agency's decision, although not controlling, is given great weight deference." Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 16 (citing Harnischfeger Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 659; Nottelson v. DILHR, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 117, 287 N.W.2d 763 (1980); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. LIRC, 138 Wis. 2d 58, 64, 405 N.W.2d 684 (Ct. App. 1987)).

 See Wis. Stat. §§ 102.14(1), 102.15; Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 17 n.17.

 As the majority opinion noted, since 1982, when the WCA was amended by Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a), LIRC has interpreted Balczewski 72 times in odd-lot cases. See majority op., ¶ 25 n.6.

 Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶¶ 12, 16.

 Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 19.

 Majority op., ¶¶ 22-26.

 2 Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 57.51, at 10-107. As the majority opinion explains, majority op., ¶ 3 n.2, the cited Larson passage has been renumbered and now appears at 4 Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 83.01, at 83-2 (2003).

 Majority op., ¶¶ 25-26.

 Id., ¶ 26.

 Local 60, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. WERC, 217 Wis. 2d 602, 579 N.W.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1998).

 Doering v. LIRC 187 Wis. 2d 472, 523 N.W.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1994).

 Pabst v. Dep't of Taxation, 19 Wis. 2d 313, 323-24, 120 N.W.2d 77 (1963).

 Klusendorf Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., v. LIRC, 110 Wis. 2d 328, 328 N.W.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1982).

 Pabst, 19 Wis. 2d at 323-24; see also Klusendorf, 110 Wis. 2d at 331-32.

 "When an agency's conclusions of law are entitled to great weight deference ... [a]n agency's conclusion of law is unreasonable and may be reversed by a reviewing court if it directly contravenes the words of the statute or the federal or state constitution, if it is clearly contrary to the legislative intent, *185history, or purpose of the statute, or it is without rational basis." Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 19 (citing Harnischfeger Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 662; Barron Elec. Coop. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 212 Wis. 2d 752, 766, 569 N.W.2d 726 (Ct. App. 1997)).

 Kraft Foods, Inc. v. DWD, 2001 WI App 69, 242 Wis. 2d 378, 625 N.W.2d 658.

 Id., ¶ 8 n.8.

 See majority op., ¶ 24 (stating that "the basis for judicial deference is a sense of respect for the legislature's prerogative in conferring power on an agency" and "[b]y according less than the appropriate level of deference, a court invades, albeit indirectly, the province of the legislature"). In its opinion, the majority recognizes the individualized nature of disability determinations, and even notes the flexibility and discretion needed for agencies to effectively administer the program: "Given the highly individualized nature of such *186injuries, and a job market that is constantly transformed by economic and technological change, predicting how an injury will affect future earning capacity is not an exact science. For this reason, workers' compensation law has evolved to give claimants ... more flexibility to build a case for total permanent disability, and to give agency judges more discretion to rule on the merits of such claims." Majority op., ¶ 30.

 4 Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers' Compensation Law § 84.01[4] (2001).

 Majority op., ¶ 26.

 See Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner LIRC at 14 — 16.

 See Brief and Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant Ralph E. Beecher at 34-37.

 See Beecher v. LIRC, 2003 WI App. 100, ¶¶ 9, 16, 264 Wis. 2d 394, 663 N.W.2d 316 (2003).
In their Worker's Compensation Handbook (5th ed. 2003) at April 2004 Summary-1, John D. Neal and Joseph Danas, Jr., view the court of appeals decision in Beecher as offering guidance in odd-lot cases as to the impact of statutory and administrative code amendments enacted after Balczewski.

 See majority op., ¶ 25 n.7.

 See Beecher v. Outokumpu Cooper Kenosha Inc., No. 1997028765, at 9 (LIRC, Dec. 18, 2001), available at www.dwd.state.wi.us/lire/wcdecsns/726.bLtm. In the section of LIRC's decision entitled "Extent of permanent disability on a vocational basis," LIRC stated, citing § 84.01[4] of the Larson treatise, that "while the applicant has made some effort to find work, the work restrictions set out in the November FCE suggest he could have made more of an effort, a factor that may be considered against him in determining whether he has established a prima facie case of odd-lot unemployability. In short, the commission cannot conclude that the applicant has made a prima facie case."
LIRC's decision then summarized the testimony of an employer's witness who estimated a 35% loss of earning capacity and concluded that the witness underestimated the obstacles to Beecher finding employment.
LIRC then concluded this section of its decision as follows: "In short, after considering the factors set out in Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34 and giving the reports of the vocational experts due weight under Wis. Stat. § 102.17(7)(a), the commission concludes that the applicant has sustained a loss of earning capacity at 60 percent." See Beecher, No. 1997028765, at 9 (LIRC, Dec. 18, 2001).

 These LIRC decisions consistently quote § 57.61(d) of the Larson text (1993 and 1998) as follows (rather than § 84.01[4], a newly numbered section of the Larson treatise (2001) that is referred to in Beecher):
"Professor Larson has noted that in odd-lot cases 'it is not unreasonable to place the burden of proof on [the employee] to establish the unavailability of work to a person in his circumstances, which normally would require a showing that he has made reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment.'"
See, e.g., Herdt v. Lincoln Wood Products, No. 1979018557 (LIRC, June 30, 1999), available at www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/ wcdecsns/345.htm; Krezman v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., No. 1993016147 (LIRC, Nov. 20, 1998), available at www.dwd-.state.wi.us /lirc/wcdecsns/267.htm. In the present case, the LIRC decision refers to a newer edition of Larson and to § 84.01[4].
I have made attempts through the late Professor Larson's editors and publishers to locate a full copy of § 57.61(d) (1993 and 1998) and to track the revisions made to and renumbering of that section. No copy of the old text was found. As best as I can determine, § 57.61(d) is now encompassed in § 84.01[4],

 Herdt, No. .1979018557 (LIRC, June 30, 1999), available at www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/wcdecsns/345.htm. See also Krez-man, No. 1993016147, available at www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/ wcdecsns/267.htm; Morford v. Pub. Instruction Dep't, No. 92073132 (LIRC, Oct. 3, 1996), available at www.dwd-.state.wi.us /lirc/wcdecsns/32D135Fmor.htm.
Some LIRC decisions do not cite the Larson treatise at all, relying only on Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34 and Balczewski. See, e.g., Cole v. Roadmaster Corp., No. 1996022902 (LIRC, July 29, 1999), available at www.dwd.state.wi.us/lirc/ wcdecsns/355.htm.
*189For a LIRC case subsequent to the court of appeals decision in the present case, explaining the two meanings of prima facie case and applying both, and using Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 80.34 in determining whether the worker has made the prima facie case, see Istvanek v. County of Kenosha, No. 2000045183 (LIRC, March 25, 2004), available at www.dwd.state.wi.us/ lirc/wcdecsns/804.htm.

 Brown, 267 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 19. See also UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 287, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996); Harnischfeger Corp., 196 Wis. 2d at 660.
The levels of deference were an attempt by this court to reduce the confusion arising from our prior statements of the standard for review of agency interpretations of statutes in Wisconsin. For an explanation and criticism of the court's "formalistic" approach, see Salvatore Massa, The Standards of Review for Agency Interpretations of Statutes in Wisconsin, 83 Marq. L. Rev. 597 (2000) (supporting a test of institutional competence).