Court Opinion

ID: 9734659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:41:31.971251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:50.054750
License: Public Domain

DUNIWAY, J.
tance. My reluctance is based upon the fact that this case is, to me, another illustration of the utter absurdity of the present California rule regarding the granting of a nonsuit in an action which is tried by the court without a jury. At the conclusion of the argument on the nonsuit, Judge Perry made an oral summing up of the testimony which occupies some eight pages of the transcript. In it he indicated very clearly his conviction that the evidence, offered on behalf of the plaintiff, was not substantial and that some of it, particularly the testimony of the plaintiff and her husband that they did see Elsie’s will after her death, which was flatly contrary to the testimony they had given on their depositions, was unworthy of belief. A careful review of the transcript leads me to the same conclusion. Nevertheless, by reason of the present rule regarding the granting of a nonsuit by the court, this court is compelled to reverse the judgment and send the case back for another trial. The decision turns upon the form of words used *139by counsel and the court, and not at all upon the question whether the court was basically right in its views as to the sufficiency and credibility of the evidence. This is the type of rule which justifies the frequent lay criticism of the overtechnicality of the courts and of rules of legal procedure.
The defects in the present rule were ably and fully outlined by Mr. Presiding Justice Shinn in the case of Lasry v. Lederman, 147 Cal.App.2d 480 at pages 488-490 [305 P.2d 663], and there is little I can add to his criticism of the rule. Mr. Justice Draper, in Stewart v. Miranda, 170 Cal.App.2d 373 [338 P.2d 941], expresses his concurrence with the views of Mr. Presiding Justice Shinn in the Lasry case. See also Mr. Presiding Justice Shinn’s comments in White v. Shultis, 177 Cal.App.2d 641, 646 [2 Cal.Rptr. 414], The present rule is judge made. Having been made by judges, it can be changed by them. However, in view of the many cases in which the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the rule, this court is in no position to change it.
I suggest, however, that the rule stated in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 41(b), is a far more sensible and practical rule. That rule provides: "After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. In an action tried by the court without a jury the court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. ’ ’ This provision gives full effect to the fact that in a nonjury case, the court is the judge as to the credibility of witnesses, and permits him to dispose of the case on the merits at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case whenever he determines, on the merits, that the evidence is insufficient.
It may be said that under the California rule the defendant can protect himself against its operation by not moving for a nonsuit but, instead, submitting the case without offering any evidence, following which the court can decide the ease in his *140favor on the merits. This is playing games. Such a procedure, moreover, can be a trap, as counsel may not be in any position to know, without first having made a motion for a nonsuit, what the judge’s views are as to the sufficiency of the evidence, and he may find himself in the embarrassing position of having lost his case when, if he had produced evidence to contradict that of the plaintiff, he would have won it. The federal rule does not force a defendant into this kind of Hobson’s choice. Based upon personal experience, I am convinced that the federal rule has saved a good deal of time and useless effort on the part of both trial and appellate courts in the federal system. The adoption of a similar procedure in California either by our Supreme Court, which has the undoubted authority to change the present rule, or, by the Legislature, if the Supreme Court is unwilling to act, would have the same beneficial effect.
At the oral argument counsel for respondent suggested that under the circumstances of this ease the court should apply section 4% of article VI of the Constitution and determine that the error of Judge Perry in granting a nonsuit has not resulted in a miscarriage of justice. That section is limited to cases involving misdirection of the jury, and improper admission or rejection of evidence, error as to a matter of pleading, or error as to a matter of procedure. The only one of these categories under which the present case could be said to fall is that of an error of procedure, and it is certainly arguable that that is what is here involved. If Judge Perry, instead of granting the nonsuit, had indicated to the defendant’s counsel that he would grant a judgment on the merits without hearing further evidence, and defendant’s counsel had then submitted the matter on the merits, and Judge Perry had then proceeded to decide the ease on the merits, making findings of fact against the appellant, that judgment would be unassailable on this record. It is certainly arguable that the difference between what Judge Perry did and what he could have done is solely a difference in procedure and that the error, therefore, is an error of procedure. And it is apparent that it is not “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
I have been able to find no ease in which section 4% of article VI has been invoked by counsel on an appeal from an order granting a nonsuit in a case tried by the court without *141a jury; so it can be argued that the question is an open one in this state. However, section 4% has been in the Constitution since October 10, 1911. Since that time the Supreme Court has twice held and the District Court of Appeal has nine times held1 that a judgment should be reversed when based upon the granting of a nonsuit in a case tried by the court without a jury where there is any evidence that would support a judgment for the plaintiff. No doubt there have been numerous cases in which the same rule has been applied and judgment has been reversed without discussion of the fact that the same rule has been held applicable in such eases as in eases where there was a jury. Examples are cited in the margin.2
Under these circumstances, I do not feel that it would be proper for this intermediate appellate court to affirm the judgment in reliance upon section 4% of article VI of the Constitution in this case, although I believe that such decision would be correct. The contrary rule has so often been applied that it seems to me that only the Supreme Court could properly so hold today.
Tobriner, Acting P. J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 19, 1960. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Grummet v. Fresno Glazed Cement Pipe Co. (1919), 181 Cal. 509 [185 P. 388]; Szopieray v. West Berkeley etc. Co. (1924), 194 Cal. 106 [227 P. 720]; Wilson v. Wallace (1931), 113 Cal.App. 278 [298 P. 86] ; Biurrun v. Elizalde (1923), 61 Cal.App. 675 [215 P. 690]; Hale v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1954), 129 Cal.App.2d 124 [276 P.2d 118]; Cullen v. Spremo (1956), 142 Cal.App.2d 225 [298 P.2d 579]; Lasry v. Lederman (1957), 147 Cal.App.2d 480 [305 P.2d 663] ; Bunch v. Henderson (1959), 167 Cal.App.2d 112 [333 P.2d 813]; White v. Shultis (1960), 177 Cal.App.2d 641 [2 Cal.Rptr. 414]; Stewart v. Miranda (1959), 170 Cal.App.2d 373 [338 P.2d 941]; City of Santa Cruz v. MacGregor (1960), 178 Cal.App.2d 45 [2 Cal.Rptr. 727].

Perkins v. Maiden (1940), 41 Cal.App.2d 243 [106 P.2d 232] (nonjury—ques. not considered); Singleton v. Singleton (1945), 68 Cal.App.2d 681, 699 [157 P.2d 886]; Croslin v. Scott (1957), 154 Cal.App.2d 767 [316 P.2d 755].