Court Opinion

ID: 9746252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:10:04.023687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:11.256294
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J., Concurring.
I concur.
The imposition of a monetary obligation upon conviction pursuant to a Penal Code provision would seem to be a penalty that is subject to the ex post facto laws. (U.S. Const., art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.) I believe the obligation results in a punishment. Defendant is not a voluntary user of the court facility.
Nevertheless, the authorities support the conclusion of the majority. Even the dissenters in Smith v. Doe (2003) 538 U.S. 84 [155 L.Ed.2d 164, 123 S.Ct. 1140], appear to acknowledge that some sanctions may not be subject to the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. Justice Ginsburg, in disagreeing with the majority that a sex registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause, said, “What ultimately tips the balance for me is the Act’s excessiveness in relation to its nonpunitive purpose.” (Id. at p. 116.) Here, the provision involves a modest sum. Justice Stevens, also dissenting in Smith v. Doe, stated, “In my opinion, a sanction that (1) is imposed on everyone who *880commits a criminal offense, (2) is not imposed on anyone else, and (3) severely impairs a person’s liberty is punishment.” (Id. at p. 113.) The fee here does not satisfy all of those criteria.
The court in People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211], held that California’s sex offender registration provision did not violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and California Constitutions. A dissent stated, “as the lead opinion itself states, ‘two factors appear important in each case: whether the Legislature intended the provision to constitute punishment and, if not, whether the provision is so punitive in nature or effect that it must be found to constitute punishment despite the Legislature’s contrary intent.’ ” (Id. at p. 806 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Justice Mosk concluded that the sex offender registration provisions was a penal sanction because it was sufficiently punitive in nature or effect. It is tenable that the provision here is not “ ‘so punitive in nature or effect that it must be found to constitute punishment despite the Legislature’s contrary intent.’ ” (Ibid, italics omitted.)
The court in People v. Rivera (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 705, 711 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 703], said, “The fact that the fees come into play only upon a criminal conviction is a factor which can be viewed as punitive. However, an alternative view is that this simply reflects a legislative determination that those who are not convicted are involuntary users of the jail system who should not have to pay for services for which they did not choose to avail themselves; whereas those who are convicted in effect ‘chose’ to use the jail services when they chose to commit an unlawful act.”
I have some difficulty with the idea that by committing a crime, a defendant “chose” to use the services of the criminal justice system, although perhaps that use is what he or she should expect. Also, as the court in People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192 [15 Cal.Rptr. 3d 148] (High) noted in holding that the imposition of a state court facilities construction penalty upon a convicted defendant violated the state and federal ex post facto clauses, if the monetary charge “were a user fee, there would be a rational relationship between the amount of the assessment and the extent of the individual’s] use.” (Id. at p. 1198.) Here, the $20 charge is imposed no matter how long the defendant is in trial or even if he pleads guilty.
Nevertheless, unlike in High, in which the charge is labeled a “penalty,” the charge here is referred to as a “fee.” (High, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.) The other points in the majority opinion also are compelling. Accordingly, I conclude that the current state of the law requires a conclusion that the fee in question does not violate ex post facto provisions.
*881The increasing imposition of monetary sanctions upon those convicted of crimes to solve budgetary problems or to impose greater punishment could be counterproductive. Saddling with debt those who are serving or have served their criminal sentences is neither rehabilitative nor a deterrent. Also, the fees, even if collected, may not be worth the effort in view of the expense entailed in implementing and enforcing such programs.