Court Opinion

ID: 9850785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:58.444317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:43.317000
License: Public Domain

Mallett, J.
(dissenting). Justice Levin would hold that "when a prosecutor enters into a sentence agreement with a defendant, he may seek to withdraw from the agreement if the court departs below the agreed-upon sentence.” Ante at 519. Thus, Justice Levin essentially would hold that a sentencing judge is without authority to deviate from a sentencing agreement entered into by the prosecution and a defendant who has pleaded guilty. We disagree.
Instead, we abide by MCL 333.7401(4); MSA 14.15(7401)(4) and would hold, that the sentencing authority is within the exclusive purview of the judiciary. The judiciary is always allowed to depart from mandatory minimum sentences when there are substantial and compelling reasons.
The trial judge has exclusive authority with respect to sentencing. People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276, 281; 505 NW2d 208 (1993); People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 651; 461 NW2d 1 (1990); People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189, 207; 330 NW2d 834 (1982). The Legislature has specifically conferred discretion upon trial judges when sentencing defendants.1
*539A judge of a court having jurisdiction is authorized and empowered to pronounce judgment against and pass sentence upon a person convicted of an offense in that court. [MCL 769.1(1); MSA 28.1072(1).]
The Legislature has further empowered trial court judges with the ability to deviate from mandatory minimum sentences when confronted by substantial and compelling reasons.
The court may depart from the minimum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (2)(a)(ii), (iii), or (iv) if the court finds on the record that there are substantial and compelling reasons to do so. [MCL 333.7401(4); MSA 14.15(7401)(4).]
See also People v Fields, 448 Mich 58; 528 NW2d 176 (1995).
Even where there is a sentence agreement, the trial court is required to exercise discretion when imposing a sentence. People v Killebrew, supra; People v Pool, 183 Mich App 191, 193; 454 NW2d 121 (1989). "[T]he judge may not abdicate this function by allowing sentence agreements to control the sentencing process.” People v Cobbs, supra at 281. In addition, this Court has specifically stated that the prosecution cannot dictate a sentence through agreements or recommendations.
If the judge divorces himself from the sentencing process completely, he has abdicated a statutory function. The prosecuting attorney through negotiated sentence "agreements” and recommendations then becomes the sentencing authority contrary to statute. [People v Killebrew, supra at 205.]
It is certain that the trial court has exclusive discretion when sentencing a defendant and only *540the Legislature may circumscribe a trial judge’s sentencing authority. Thus, it is wrong to suggest that a trial judge invades the prosecutor’s charging authority when he imposes a lesser sentence because the defendants fully cooperated with law enforcement officials.
In these cases, the prosecution agreed that in exchange for cooperation with law enforcement officials the defendants would be charged with a lesser crime. Further, in all three of these cases, the defendants’ cooperation was exemplary. The prosecution received that for which it bargained. The prosecution had full cooperation that allowed the prosecution to inform the judge that a sentencing agreement had been reached. As this Court indicated in People v Fields, supra at 77, cooperation with law enforcement officials can provide a substantial and compelling basis for deviation from the imposition of a mandatory sentence. Thus, in these cases, where the defendants fully cooperated, the trial judge was empowered to impose lesser sentences on each defendant.
. Because no agreement entered into by a defendant and the prosecution can diminish the judiciary’s sentencing authority, the sentences imposed by the trial courts should have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. .Sentencing authority is under the exclusive purview of the judiciary and only the Legislature through a properly enacted statute can diminish that authority.
If the prosecution wanted to debate the sentences imposed by the trial judge, its sole remedy should have been to appeal on the ground that the trial court deviated from the mandatory minimum sentences without substantial and compelling reasons. Fields, supra. This the prosecution did not *541do, and thus, we would uphold the sentences imposed by the trial judges.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Mallett, J.

 See Const 1963, art 4, § 45, that delegates indeterminate sentencing authority to the Legislature.