Court Opinion

ID: 9381898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 05:04:52.444661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:35.459568
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                             STATE OF MICHIGAN

                              COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                       UNPUBLISHED
In re BULLARD, Minors.                                                 March 23, 2023

                                                                       No. 362065
                                                                       Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                       Family Division
                                                                       LC No. 2021-000703-NA

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and RIORDAN and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to the
minor children, CGB and DMB, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and
custody) and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent).1 Respondent pleaded no
contest to the jurisdictional allegations in the petition and the statutory grounds for termination. A
separate best-interests hearing was held. The trial court found that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). On appeal, respondent
contends that the evidence was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction or support a finding of clear
and convincing evidence on the statutory grounds for termination. Respondent further argues that
the trial court clearly erred by terminating his parental rights at the initial disposition without
offering services for reunification because there were no aggravated circumstances to support
termination at the initial disposition. Finally, respondent contends that the trial court clearly erred
by finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests and
when it failed to determine the best interests of each child individually. Finding no merit to
respondent’s arguments, we affirm.

                                  I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

       On May 1, 2021, CGB’s mother (the mother) filed a police report (Inkster Police report),
which stated that, on April 29, 2021, respondent became angry because he did not think the mother
moved fast enough when he told her to leave. He struck her in the face multiple times with a
closed fist, pulled her by her hair, and then took her spare set of car keys. The next day, she

1
    The parental rights of the mother were not terminated and she is not a party to this appeal.

                                                  -1-
witnessed respondent steal her vehicle. On May 20, 2021, CGB was in the car with respondent
and the mother, who was nine weeks pregnant, when an argument occurred between respondent
and the mother, which ended when respondent shot the mother. Medical records from Beaumont
Dearborn Hospital confirmed the gunshot wounds and the pregnancy. The medical records
showed that the mother was shot at least five times. There was one gunshot wound to her right
lower abdomen, one gunshot wound to her groin, and three gunshot wounds to her right sternum.
The mother told conflicting stories at the hospital and to the police, but eventually confessed to
the police that she and respondent were arguing in the car, and when respondent got out of the car,
he pulled his gun and shot her twice from the passenger side of the car. On July 30, 2021,
respondent admitted to a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker that he had an unregistered
handgun in the car the night of the incident and did not have a license to carry the firearm. He
further told the CPS worker that he and the mother got into a verbal altercation in the car on the
way to drop him and CGB off at the paternal grandmother’s home. As he was getting out of the
car and gathering his belongings, he handed the mother the gun to hold. When he attempted to
retrieve the handgun, he believed the mother “unknowingly pulled the trigger and was shot.” The
mother drove off as he attempted to help her.

        The police charged respondent with several crimes as a result of the shooting. However,
because the mother did not want to pursue any charges against respondent and did not show up for
the criminal hearings, the criminal charges against him were dropped.

        On August 13, 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a
petition for permanent custody, jurisdiction, and removal of CGB and the mother’s other child.2
The petition sought termination of respondent’s parental rights on the basis of the domestic
violence incidents and shooting. Removal was sought pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(2)
(neglected/refused to provide proper care, and children were at a substantial risk of harm to their
mental well-being) and (b)(3) (the home, because of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or
depravity, is unfit for the children), and the petition alleged that CGB was at risk of harm in
respondent’s care. At the preliminary hearing, the trial court found that respondent’s behavior had
“escalated to the highest form of domestic violence” because it involved a weapon, and he had
shot “his unborn child’s mother in the presence of his son.” CGB was placed with the DHHS,
which placed him in the home of the maternal grandmother, where the mother was also living.
The trial court ordered that respondent shall have no contact “whatsoever” with any of his children,
including being present at the birth of the unborn baby, and must not be within 500 yards of them.

        DMB was born on December 12, 2021, and a new permanent custody petition regarding
DMB was filed on January 31, 2022. Petitioner requested that the trial court authorize the petition,
exercise jurisdiction over DMB, and place her with the mother in the home of the maternal
grandmother, with supervised visitation for the mother. The petition requested that, on the basis
of the same facts alleged against respondent in the initial petition, that respondent’s parental rights
to DMB be terminated.

        At a hearing on February 3, 2022, respondent waived his right to a contested trial on the
allegations in both petitions and pleaded no contest to the jurisdiction allegations and the statutory

2
    That child is not respondent’s child and is not involved in these proceedings.

                                                  -2-
grounds for termination. The parties stipulated to a separate best-interests hearing and a Clinic for
Child Study (CCS) report on the best interests. The parties also stipulated that the criminal charges
had been dismissed. The factual basis for respondent’s admissions and no-contest plea was the
Inkster Police report and the mother’s certified medical records. Following respondent’s no-
contest plea, the trial court exercised jurisdiction over the children and found that there was clear
and convincing evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination.

        The best-interest hearing was held on March 14, April 11, and May 18, 2022. A CPS
supervisor testified that the DHHS believed that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in
the best interests of the children because of respondent’s escalating domestic violence, which
culminated in the “most egregious” shooting of the mother multiple times while she was pregnant
and in front of their one-year-old child. The DHHS believed that the children would be at risk of
harm with respondent, and that services would not rectify the risk of harm to the children.

        A CCS forensic family clinician interviewed respondent on March 4, 2022, to evaluate him
and write a report, the CCS report, for the court’s consideration regarding best interests. She had
reviewed the records in respondent’s case, including the Inkster Police report and the certified
medical documents, and understood that respondent had shot the mother of his children. He told
the clinician that “the gun went off,” but he did not say who caused the gun to go off. It was more,
“this happened, it was an accident.” The clinician thought that he was very “matter of fact” about
the shooting, did not think it was a “big deal,” and that everyone should just get over it and move
on. The clinician stated that respondent showed no concern or remorse for the victim. She thought
that respondent was evasive, dishonest, and deceptive. For example, when she asked respondent
about his history of domestic violence, respondent denied that he had a history of domestic
violence. On the basis of the records that she had received and reviewed, she knew that
respondent’s denial was not truthful. Therefore, she did not ask him about the domestic violence
incident in the Inkster Police report.

        The mother, who was the victim of the shooting, testified that respondent had been a good
father to CGB and her other child, provided financial support, and had never harmed the children.
She believed that it would be traumatic if CGB never saw respondent again. She also believed
that the shooting was an accident and not intentional. She was in the driver’s seat and CGB was
in the back seat behind her. She said that she was reaching for the firearm when respondent was
trying to get out of the car. She testified that she was shot only once and the other three holes in
her abdomen were from the one bullet ricocheting. She testified that she told conflicting stories
because she was afraid of getting into trouble. She was not afraid of respondent. However, on
cross-examination, she was surprised to learn that respondent had spent time in prison for a
stabbing. She acknowledged the facts in the Inkster Police report. She agreed that the children
would not be safe in the presence of the kind of behavior that respondent had exhibited. She was
not happy to learn that the criminal charges had been dismissed because she did not appear for the
proceedings.

        The maternal grandmother, who had custody of the mother’s three children, testified that
she knew the mother had been shot because she had received a call from the State Police informing
her, but she did not know the circumstances of the shooting. The mother had never told her about
any violence in the relationship. At the time of the hearing, however, the maternal grandmother
was concerned about respondent being with the children.

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        Finally, respondent’s mother, the paternal grandmother, testified that whenever she saw
respondent with the children, it was always a loving situation. She had never observed an argument
or altercation between respondent and the mother. She believed that this case had been a learning
situation for respondent. She saw a strong bond between respondent and CGB and believed that
being a parent had made respondent a better person. The paternal grandmother knew that there
had been a shooting, but she had never been informed that respondent was responsible. She was
told “that a gun went off.” Respondent told her that it was an accident.

        Following the testimony and the parties’ arguments, the trial court found that the mother
and the child could have died if the gun had been pointed just an inch in a different direction and
concluded that the risk of harm posed by respondent was so high that there was no service that
respondent could complete that could assure the trial court that the children would be safe around
him. The trial court found that, despite relative placement, the risk of harm was too high. In the
order following the hearing to terminate parental rights, the trial court stated: “[I]t is in each child’s
best interests to terminate [respondent]’s parental rights due to the extreme danger he posed to his
children.”

 II. JURISDICTION, STATUTORY GROUNDS, AND AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES

        First, respondent contends that the evidence was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction by
a preponderance of the evidence or support a finding of clear and convincing evidence on the
statutory grounds because the evidence showed that the shooting was not an intentional act. This
issue is waived.

        Respondent entered a no-contest plea to the statutory grounds for termination. The plea
indicated that respondent was directly and intentionally responsible for placing the mother and
children in serious danger by gunfire. Therefore, respondent’s argument is directly contrary to his
plea of no contest and the issue is waived. See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d
115 (2011). “Respondent may not assign as error on appeal something that [he] deemed proper in
the lower court because allowing [him] to do so would permit respondent to harbor error as an
appellate parachute.” Id. See also Holmes v Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 588; 760 NW2d 300
(2008) (“A party cannot stipulate a matter and then argue on appeal that the resultant action was
error.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

         Respondent next contends that the trial court erred by terminating his parental rights at the
initial disposition because reasonable efforts toward reunification must be made in all cases except
if the court finds aggravated circumstances, and respondent contends the evidence did not rise to
the level of aggravated circumstances. Therefore, he argues, he should have been provided with
services. See In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010) (explaining that “reasonable
efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases except those involving aggravated
circumstances”) (cleaned up).

         Absent aggravated circumstances, the DHHS “has an affirmative duty to make reasonable
efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500
Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). Aggravated circumstances are defined in MCL
722.638(1)(a), which provides that aggravated circumstances exist when a parent has “abused the
child. . . and the abuse included 1 or more of the following”:

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       (i) Abandonment of a young child.

       (ii) Criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration, or
       assault with intent to penetrate.

       (iii) Battering, torture, or other serious physical harm.

       (iv) Loss or serious impairment of an organ or limb.

       (v) Life threatening injury.

       (vi) Murder or attempted murder. [MCL 722.638(1)(a)(i)-(vi).]

Further, MCL 712A.19a(2) provides, in relevant part:

               The court shall conduct a permanency planning hearing within 30 days after
       there is a judicial determination that reasonable efforts to reunite the child and
       family are not required. Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be
       made in all cases except if any of the following apply:

               (a) There is a judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child
       to aggravated circumstances as provided in section 18(1) and (2) of the child
       protection law, 1975 PA 238, MCL 722.638. [MCL 712A.19a(2)(a).]

        Arguably, respondent waived this issue by entering his no-contest plea. Respondent’s
contention that reasonable services were not offered relates to the sufficiency of the evidence for
aggravated circumstances. Because respondent entered a no-contest plea to the statutory grounds,
his argument is seemingly contrary to his plea of no contest. See Hudson, 294 Mich App at 264.

        More importantly, the record shows that services were offered to respondent, but he
declined them because he had already started services on his own. Thus, this issue is waived for
that reason as well.

         Following his no-contest plea, respondent raised the issue that he be permitted visitation.
The trial court remarked that the therapist had recommended that respondent engage in services
for anger management, domestic violence, and therapy before there would be a review of
visitation. The trial court stated that it “would be happy” to order those services for respondent
“right now.” Respondent’s attorney replied that respondent was already engaged in services.
Respondent was then sworn in and testified that he was receiving services through Hegira in
Westland. He had started those services within the last month and his counseling sessions were
scheduled around availability. He testified that he was enrolled for mental health, which included
anger management, but did not address domestic violence. He would inquire if they could include
that service, and, he was open for other recommendations for services. The trial court then stated:

       I would include in today’s Order those services that are outlined in that letter from
       the therapist for [respondent]. It sounds like a lot of them are in place already, but
       there’s got to be progress, measurable progress in those services and I'm going to
       require therapist approval before there’s any contact.

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       The trial court also ordered a CCS evaluation. In the adjudication order following the
hearing, the trial court ordered reasonable efforts “shall be made to preserved and reunify the
family.” The worker requested the records from Hegira. Those records were received and
admitted into the record at the best-interests hearing.

        Respondent waived any issue of services when he declined the trial court’s offer to order
services. See Hudson, 294 Mich App at 264. The trial court did not need to make any judicial
determination regarding services. It had offered services to respondent. Respondent had declined
the offer on the record because he had already sought services from Hegira outside of the court’s
jurisdiction. The record further reveals that respondent’s involvement in outside services and the
records of that involvement were clearly explained and made part of the record. Respondent’s
argument on appeal is directly contrary to his on-the-record statements declining the offer of court-
ordered services. “Respondent may not assign as error on appeal something that [he] deemed
proper in the lower court because allowing [him] to do so would permit respondent to harbor error
as an appellate parachute.” Id.

                                       III. BEST INTERESTS

       Finally, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding, pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(5), that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. He
contends that none of the witnesses offered any testimony to support the trial court’s findings. We
disagree.

       MCL 712A.19b(5) provides:

               If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights
       and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall
       order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for
       reunification of the child with the parent not be made.

        “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that
termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts
Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “[W]hether termination of parental rights
is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re
Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court’s ruling regarding best
interests is reviewed for clear error. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408; 890 NW2d 676
(2016). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special
opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Moss, 301 Mich App at 80 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

        The trial court must weigh the evidence available on the whole record in determining the
child’s best interests. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713-714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). It may
consider such factors as “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s
need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s
home.” Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). Other considerations include the
length of time the child has been in foster care or placed with relatives, the likelihood that “the

                                                  -6-
child could be returned to her parent’s home within the foreseeable future, if at all[,]” and
compliance with the case service plan. In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569
(2012). In addition, the trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence and
the parent’s visitation history. White, 303 Mich App at 713-714. In Moss, 301 Mich App at 89,
this Court explained:

       [O]nce a statutory ground for termination is established, i.e., the parent has been
       found unfit, the focus shifts to the child and the issue is whether parental rights
       should be terminated, not whether they can be terminated. Accordingly, at the best-
       interest stage, the child’s interest in a normal family home is superior to any interest
       the parent has. [Id. (emphasis omitted).]

         In support of his argument, respondent presents only selective testimony given by the
mother and maternal grandmother that respondent was a good father and that they never saw any
inappropriate behavior or parenting from respondent. However, once the mother and maternal
grandmother were presented with the actual facts of the shooting at the hearing, their attitudes
changed. The mother agreed that it was not safe for her children to be around respondent “with
this kind of behavior,” and then qualified her statement that she thought the children would be safe
with respondent by adding, “if he completed his treatment thing and showed . . . improvement.”
The maternal grandmother realized that she had not been told the truth about the shooting. She
testified that she did not know the circumstances or that respondent had a weapon. Having learned
about the shooting and the earlier violence that was revealed in the Inkster Police report, the
maternal grandmother was now concerned about respondent being with the children.

         We acknowledge that respondent’s mother testified positively on his behalf. However,
during cross-examination, it became clear that respondent had not been honest with his mother.
She testified that she knew that there had been a shooting, but she was never told that respondent
“did it, I was informed that a gun went off.” Respondent’s mother realized that she did not receive
“all the details.” Respondent had told her it was an accident. This testimony clearly showed that
respondent had not been truthful about the incident.

        The record contains sufficient testimony to support the trial court’s decision. In addition
to the certified medical records and the Inkster Police report, the testimony of the foster care
specialist, the CPS supervisor, and the CCS forensic family clinician clearly supported a finding
that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children by a
preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, respondent had a history of domestic violence,
threatened the lives of the mother and his children by discharging a firearm at or near them in a
closed area, and apparently refused to accept any responsibility for that incident. Instead,
respondent told others implausible stories about the shooting being a mere accident. Given his
unwillingness to even admit his wrongdoing in that regard, we agree with the trial court that there
are no assurances that the children “would be safe around [respondent]” in the future.

        Next, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it failed to determine the
best interests of each child individually. In Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 42, this Court held that
“the trial court has a duty to decide the best interests of each child individually.” In termination
cases, each child must be treated as an individual and it is “incumbent on the trial court to view
each child individually when determining whether termination of parental rights is in that child’s

                                                 -7-
best interests.” Id. However, in White, 303 Mich App at 715-716, this Court distinguished the
facts in Olive/Metts, by stating that, in Olive/Metts:

       [T]he trial court clearly erred by failing to distinguish between two groups of
       children—the younger children, who were placed with relatives, and the older
       children, who were not. . . . The younger children’s placement with relatives was
       a significant basis for distinguishing them from the older children because a trial
       counsel must address a child’s placement with realities.

                 We conclude that this Court’s decision in In re Olive/Metts stands for the
       proposition that, if the best interests of the individual children significantly differ,
       the trial court should address those differences when making its determination of
       the children’s best interests. It does not stand for the proposition that the trial court
       errs if it fails to explicitly make individual and—in many cases—redundant factual
       findings concerning each child’s best interests. [Cleaned up.]

        In this case, the trial court did not address each child individually on the record. However,
given that CGB and DMB were similarly aged and situated with respect to respondent, their
interests did not significantly differ. Any bond that existed between respondent and CGB was
clearly outweighed by the risk of harm presented by respondent, as demonstrated by the fact that
respondent shot the mother five times while CGB was in the back seat of the car and pregnant with
DMB. There was absolutely no bond between respondent and DMB, who was approximately five
months old at the time of the best-interests hearing and never had contact with respondent. The
interests of both children were the same—to live in a safe environment absent violence, dissention,
and risk of harm. Both children were in the home of the maternal grandmother where the mother
resided, and there was no evidence that the mother’s parental rights were terminated. Therefore,
adoption was not a consideration. The trial court did not clearly err. It spoke of each child in its
termination order and, in any case, there was not a significant difference between each child’s best
interests.

                                        IV. CONCLUSION

       There were no errors warranting relief. We affirm.

                                                               /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                               /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                               /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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