Court Opinion

ID: 9405198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-27 19:02:12.027873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:20.245109
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11939     Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 06/27/2023   Page: 1 of 27

                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 22-11939
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        KENNETH EARL HOOKS,

                                                     Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket Nos. 2:18-cr-00249-LSC-JHE-1,
                             2:19-cr-00136-LSC-JHE-1
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        2                   Opinion of the Court                 22-11939

                          ____________________

                          ____________________

                                 No. 22-11942
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        KENNETH EARL HOOKS,

                                                   Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeals from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket Nos. 2:19-cr-00136-LSC-JHE-1,
                              2:18-cr-00249-LSC-1
                           ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
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        22-11939                 Opinion of the Court                              3

               Following a remand for resentencing, Kenneth Hooks
        appeals his total sentence of life imprisonment, imposed after he
        pleaded guilty in two cases pursuant to two written plea
        agreements, to four counts of production of child pornography,
        one count of coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in
        sexual activity, and one count of transportation of a minor for
        sexual purposes. Hooks argues that (1) the district court
        procedurally erred by misconstruing our mandate on remand;
        (2) the district court procedurally erred by failing to adequately
        explain the basis for its sentence and failing to consider his
        arguments in mitigation; and (3) the sentence imposed was
        substantively unreasonable. 1 The government, in turn, argues that
        the district court complied with our mandate on remand, and that
        Hooks’s remaining arguments are waived by the sentence-appeal
        waiver in his plea agreements. In response, Hooks argues that the
        appeal waivers are not enforceable because the district court failed
        to adequately explain the waiver to him during the plea colloquy
        and he did not understand the implications of the waiver. We
        conclude that the district court complied with our mandate and
        that that the sentence-appeal waivers are valid and enforceable and
        bar Hooks’s sentencing-related challenges.               Moreover,
        notwithstanding the waiver, his claims fail on the merits.
        Accordingly, we affirm.
                                     I.     Background

        1Hooks also argues that his case should be reassigned to a different judge on
        remand.
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11939

               During a forensic search of a computer obtained from
        Hooks’s residence pursuant to a search warrant issued as part of an
        investigation into an unrelated incident that occurred in California
        involving Hooks’s girlfriend Sarah Morris, law enforcement
        discovered numerous still images and a ten-minute video depicting
        child pornography. Some of the images portrayed a sleeping
        female prepubescent minor approximately 4 or 5 years old with her
        pajama bottoms pulled back to expose her genitals, and another
        image depicted the sleeping prepubescent female minor’s hand
        touching Hooks’s penis. 2 Other still images depicted Hooks sitting
        in a chair nude, touching the genitals and buttocks of a nude
        prepubescent male approximately 5 or 6 years old—later
        determined to be one of Morris’s sons. The ten-minute video
        depicted Hooks sexually assaulting, both vaginally and orally, a
        teenage female minor. Authorities later determined the teenage
        female was one of Hooks’s daughters, and Hooks and Morris had
        moved the teenager from Mississippi to Alabama to live with them
        at the time of the video. During the video, the teenage female is
        depicted crying, screaming “no,” attempting to resist, and is
        physically restrained by Hooks. Law enforcement determined that
        the images and video in question were produced in Alabama and
        the minor victims resided in Alabama.
              Based on the images involving the prepubescent male
        minor, Hooks and Morris were each indicted in the Northern

        2 In total, 59 images of this female minor in various stages of undress were
        discovered on the computer.
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        22-11939               Opinion of the Court                          5

        District of Alabama on one count of production of child
        pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e), and 2,
        and one count of coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in
        sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (“Case #1”).
               Hooks was also charged by Information in the Middle
        District of Alabama with three counts of production of child
        pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e), and one
        count of transporting a minor for the purpose of engaging in sexual
        activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (“Case #2”), based on
        the images involving the prepubescent female minor and the video
        of the sexual assault on the teenage female minor.
               Hooks pleaded guilty to all six charges stemming from both
        of his cases, pursuant to a written plea agreement in each case.3
        The plea agreements reflected that each of the production of child
        pornography counts (four counts in total) carried a statutory
        minimum term of 15 years’ imprisonment and a statutory
        maximum term of 30 years’ imprisonment. The plea agreements
        also reflected that both the enticement of a minor count and the
        transportation of a minor count carried a statutory minimum term
        of ten years’ imprisonment and a statutory maximum term of life
        imprisonment.

        3Hooks consented to the transfer of Case #2 from the Middle District of
        Alabama to the Northern District of Alabama.
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11939

              Both plea agreements contained identical sentence-appeal
        waivers. The waivers stated as follows:
              In consideration of the recommended disposition of
              this case, I, Kenneth Earl Hooks, hereby waive and
              give up my right to appeal my conviction and/or
              sentence in this case, as well as any ﬁnes, restitution,
              and forfeiture orders, the court might impose.
              Further, I waive and give up the right to challenge my
              conviction and/or sentence, any ﬁnes, restitution,
              forfeiture orders imposed or the manner in which my
              conviction and/or sentence, any ﬁnes, restitution,
              and forfeiture orders were determined in any post-
              conviction proceeding, including, but not limited to,
              a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and any
              argument that (1) the statute(s) to which I am
              pleading guilty is or are unconstitutional or (2) the
              admitted conduct does not fall within the scope of the
              statute(s).

              The defendant reserves the right to contest in an
              appeal or post-conviction proceeding any or all of the
              following:

                 (a) Any sentence imposed in excess of the
                     applicable statutory maximum sentence(s);

                 (b) Any sentence imposed in excess of the
                     guideline sentencing range determined by the
                     court at the time sentence is imposed; and

                 (c) Any claims of ineﬀective assistance of counsel.
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        22-11939                   Opinion of the Court                       7

                  The defendant acknowledges that before giving up
                  these rights, the defendant discussed the Federal
                  Sentencing Guidelines and their application to the
                  defendant’s case with the defendant’s attorney, who
                  explained them to the defendant’s satisfaction. The
                  defendant further acknowledges and understands
                  that the government retains its right to appeal where
                  authorized by statute.

                  I, KENNETH EARL HOOKS, hereby place my
                  signature on the line directly below to signify that I
                  fully understand the foregoing paragraphs, and that I
                  am knowingly and voluntarily entering into this
                  waiver.

        Hooks signed each page of the plea agreements, including the
        pages containing the sentence-appeal waivers, and he signed the
        paragraph in each agreement stating that he understood the appeal
        waiver and was entering into it knowingly and voluntarily. Hooks
        signed the plea agreement in Case #1 on January 25, 2019, and,
        approximately a month later on February 26, 2019, he signed the
        plea agreement in Case #2.
               At the plea hearing in Case #1, Hooks confirmed that he had
        not had any alcoholic beverages, drugs, or medications that would
        interfere with his ability to understand the proceeding.4 He also
        confirmed that he did not have any physical, mental, or emotional
        impairments that would interfere with his ability to understand the

        4   Hooks had an eighth-grade education.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-11939

        proceeding. The district court then asked Hooks whether it was
        his initials and signature on the plea agreement, and Hooks
        confirmed that it was and that he had read the document. He also
        confirmed that his lawyer had reviewed the plea agreement with
        him, and that he understood the information in the agreement.
        The district court reviewed the charged offenses with Hooks and
        the potential punishments, including that Hooks faced the
        possibility of life imprisonment, and Hooks confirmed that he
        understood.
               With regard to the sentence-appeal waiver, Hooks
        confirmed that it was his signature under the paragraph
        acknowledging the waiver, and he agreed with the court’s
        statement that by signing the waiver, he acknowledged that he was
        “waiving or giving up [his] right to appeal or file a post-conviction
        petition except under certain circumstances listed above [his]
        signature.” Hooks confirmed that he was pleading guilty freely and
        voluntarily because he was in fact guilty, and the district court
        accepted his plea in Case #1.
               Similarly, at the plea hearing in Case #2, Hooks confirmed
        that he had initialed and signed the plea agreement, read it, and
        discussed it with his counsel. He also confirmed that, although he
        was now taking various prescription medications, he understood
        the proceedings and he was not under the influence of anything
        that would interfere with his ability to understand the proceedings.
        The district court reviewed the charged offenses with Hooks and
        the potential punishments, including that Hooks faced the
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        22-11939                   Opinion of the Court                                9

        possibility of life imprisonment, and Hooks confirmed that he
        understood. With regard to the sentence-appeal waiver, Hooks
        confirmed that it was his signature under the paragraph
        acknowledging the waiver, and he agreed with the court’s
        statement that by signing the waiver, he had “waived or given up
        [his] right to appeal or file a post-conviction petition except in the
        limited circumstances [listed] above [his] signature.” Hooks
        confirmed that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily
        because he was in fact guilty, and the district court accepted his plea
        in Case #2.
               The district court set a combined sentencing hearing for
        both of Hooks’s cases. Hooks’s applicable guidelines range was life
        imprisonment. 5 In terms of Hooks’s background and personal
        history, his presentence investigation report (“PSI”) indicated that
        Hooks’s parents divorced when he was young and he was raised by
        his father. He suffered both physical and sexual abuse by multiple
        members of his family. Hooks’s stepfather confirmed that Hooks
        was raped repeatedly and abused by multiple family members.
        Additionally, the PSI indicated that Hooks suffered from post-
        traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, depression, and anxiety.

        5Hooks filed a motion for a downward variance, requesting that the district
        court impose concurrent terms of 60 years’ imprisonment in each case. Hooks
        asserted that “[a]s a 36 year old man, who will be 87 if he lives to serve 85% of
        a 720 month sentence, [such a sentence] is sufficient, but not greater than
        necessary to accomplish the stated purposes of sentencing as set forth in 18
        U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                22-11939

        And at the time of his arrest, Hooks was using methamphetamine
        daily.
                At Hooks’s initial sentencing hearing, the district court
        viewed the video depicting the child pornography and a selection
        of still images presented by the government. Thereafter, the
        defense called forensic psychologist Dr. Sarah Boyd to testify as to
        her evaluation of Hooks. Dr. Boyd testified that Hooks was
        anxious during the evaluation and he cried a lot. While Hooks did
        not make any statements that directly minimized his conduct, he
        indicated that Morris was the “driving force behind why the focus
        would be on younger children, prepubescent children.” Hooks
        expressed remorse and shame during the interview. Dr. Boyd
        explained that, in her expert opinion, Hooks suffered from
        (1) complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD)—otherwise
        known as developmental trauma—(2) a substance abuse disorder,
        with the primary substance being methamphetamine, and (3) also
        possibly bipolar disorder. She confirmed that Hooks’s CPTSD and
        his substance abuse disorder were likely strong contributing factors
        to his offense conduct because individuals who have been
        victimized themselves sometimes go on to victimize other
        individuals in a similar manner and methamphetamine increases
        impulsivity and sexual interest and impairs judgment. On cross-
        examination, Dr. Boyd confirmed that she could not give an
        opinion as to whether Hooks would have committed the offenses
        but for his drug use and his traumatic childhood experiences. A
        letter from one of Hooks’s children was also submitted on his
        behalf.
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        22-11939              Opinion of the Court                       11

               Hooks then made a brief statement to the court, apologizing
        for his actions and asking for mercy. The grandmother of the
        minor male victim made an oral statement to the court, asserting
        that Hooks traumatized her grandson, not only by sexually abusing
        him, but also by physically “whipping him with a switch,” “making
        him stay outside,” and being “mean” to him. She explained the
        male minor was in counseling and would “probably be in
        counseling the rest of his life.” The teenage female minor depicted
        in the video submitted a written victim impact statement, stating
        that Hooks and Morris drugged her using a date rape drug and got
        her to use methamphetamines, that Hooks repeatedly raped her,
        and that he made her watch and participate in sexual encounters
        with young boys.
               Before pronouncing Hooks’s sentences, the district court
        stated as follows:
              You know, there is not a lot of diﬀerence between a
              life sentence and 720 months. There is a little bit of
              diﬀerence. But it seems like the majority of the brief,
              the motion, maybe I just read too much into it, was
              that 720 month sentence, you would be very elderly
              and have a chance to get out of prison. Well, the
              prison has opportunities for individuals to get out
              when their health deteriorates and such. But I don’t
              think that a sentence that is under the guideline range
              is appropriate in this case.

              The guideline range is life. The conduct in this case
              was horrendous. It’s always very diﬃcult to see
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                       22-11939

               conduct where an individual takes and abuses a child
               in that kind of manner. It’s hard to see it, and I
               couldn’t imagine experiencing it on the child’s side.
               The factors that I am charged with the responsibility
               of enforcing are those in the sentencing statutes. And
               I believe that when you consider the nature and
               circumstances of the oﬀense and your history and
               characteristics, as well as the need to protect the
               public from crimes that you might commit again,
               well, it calls out for a guideline sentence, which is life.
        The district court then imposed the statutory maximum of a life
        sentence as to each of the enticement of a minor and transportation
        of a minor counts, and a 30-year sentence as to each of the
        production of child pornography counts, all terms to run
        consecutively. Hooks’s counsel objected to the sentences as “being
        exceptionally unreasonable,” and the district court noted in
        response that “this is a guideline sentence.” The district court also
        noted in its statement of reasons that it imposed a sentence within
        the guideline range.
               Hooks appealed the sentence to this Court, arguing, in
        relative part, that the district court failed to adequately explain the
        reasons for the sentence imposed. 6 United States v. Hooks, 829 F.
        App’x 948, 948 (11th Cir. 2020) (Hooks I). On appeal, we concluded

        6 In Hooks’s initial appeal, because the district court ordered the sentences to
        run consecutively, the government noted that “the total sentence arguably
        was imposed in excess of the guideline sentencing range,” which was one of
        the exceptions to the sentence-appeal waivers. Therefore, the government
        stated that it would not seek to enforce the appeal waivers.
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        22-11939                   Opinion of the Court                               13

        that “there [was] tension between” the district court’s statements
        that it imposed a guideline sentence and the total sentence
        imposed—two consecutive life sentences plus 120 years’
        imprisonment—“which we [could not] reconcile based on the
        record before us.” Id. at 949. Accordingly, we vacated Hooks’s
        sentences and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. We noted
        that, on remand, “[r]egardless of the sentence imposed, the district
        court must clarify if it is imposing a guidelines sentence or a
        variance. If it imposes a variance, the district court must state its
        reasons for imposing such sentence on the record in order to
        facilitate meaningful appellate review.” Id. at 949 n.1.
               On remand, Hooks filed an updated sentencing
        memorandum and a motion for downward variance. Hooks again
        requested a total sentence of 60 years (720-months), arguing that it
        was the “only reasonable sentence in this case.” Hooks argued that
        the sentence would maintain parity between himself, Morris,7 and

        7 Morris pleaded guilty to five counts related to the child pornography, and
        her guidelines range was also life. At her sentencing, the government filed a
        motion for downward departure based on her substantial assistance, pursuant
        to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, recommending concurrent sentences of 197 months’
        imprisonment in both cases. After hearing testimony from a law enforcement
        officer regarding Morris’s cooperation and thorough efforts to aid the
        prosecution in apprehending and prosecuting Hooks and entertaining
        arguments of counsel and a statement by Morris, the district court granted the
        motion and imposed the government’s recommended sentence to be followed
        by a lifetime of supervised release. The district court noted that but for her
        substantial assistance, Morris “would have received a life sentence . . . because
        the conduct is horrendous.”
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        14                    Opinion of the Court                 22-11939

        other similarly situated defendants, and was supported by the
        relevant § 3553(a) factors. Hooks also attached a number of
        documents to his motion, including a follow-up psychological
        assessment by Dr. Boyd.
                The government requested that Hooks “spend the rest of his
        life in prison” so that he would never be “free to prey on children
        again.” It noted that the court could either impose a guidelines
        sentence of life, with all sentences running concurrently, or impose
        the same sentences that it did before, but that such a sentence
        would constitute an upward variance.
               At the start of the resentencing hearing, the district court
        stated that “the Eleventh Circuit remanded with directions that I
        either sentence the defendant concurrently for the two life
        sentences and 120 month sentence, or that if I run them
        consecutive[,] I further explain my decision. So, that’s what we are
        here for.” The following colloquy then occurred:
              [Hooks’s counsel]: And your Honor, if I could
              disagree slightly with the court’s interpretation of the
              mandate. Our position at this resentencing is that it’s
              a complete resentencing. We understand that the
              court’s not going to hear evidence that we could have
              presented at the original sentencing hearing, but the
              court can consider evidence of [Hooks’s]
              rehabilitation over the past two years. And the court
              is not limited to the two options of either consecutive
              life sentences—
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        22-11939                  Opinion of the Court                               15

                [District Court]: I was expressing what I thought the
                Eleventh Circuit, but I certainly understand what you
                are saying. It is a resentencing. . . .[ 8] I assume what
                you are referring to is I could vary down below the
                guideline range.

                [Hooks’s Counsel]: Correct, Your Honor.

                [District Court]: I will listen to anything you have to
                present. Do not go over evidence that we had before.
                I remember the case.

        Hooks’s counsel then called Dr. Boyd as a witness, stating that Dr.
        Boyd was going to supplement the testimony that she provided at
        the initial sentencing hearing.
                Dr. Boyd explained that, at the time of her initial evaluation,
        Hooks had been using large amounts of methamphetamine for
        years, and there was a possibility that he might also have “a
        diagnosis of something like a schizophrenia spectrum disorder or
        bipolar disorder co-occurring with the methamphetamine
        substance abuse disorder.” However, now that Hooks had been in
        jail for some time and no longer had access to methamphetamine,
        it had
               become clear that he does, in fact, have a co-
               occurring, separate disorder. It has—with mood

        8 During  this colloquy, the district court confirmed that neither Hooks nor the
        government had any objection to the PSI as originally calculated, adopted the
        PSI in full, and determined that the guideline range was life imprisonment.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-11939

              features, as well as psychosis type features. It does
              appear to have a fusion of sorts with his trauma
              related symptoms in that a lot of his mood and
              anxiety and psychosis type symptoms are associated
              with preoccupations about victimization, about
              people posing threats perhaps to him or threatening
              him in the facility, and being very hyper vigilant about
              that.

              So he does—at this point I think we can say with
              signiﬁcantly more conﬁdence that there is a separate
              disorder in him; that the mental health symptoms
              that he was experiencing are not solely attributable to
              methamphetamine              intoxication            or
              methamphetamine eﬀects that tend to be more
              persistent even after someone stops taking the drug.

        She then opined that Hooks’s bipolar disorder could have
        contributed to the underlying offenses because people with bipolar
        experience manic episodes, which can manifest in impulsivity, self-
        destructive behavior, and “an increase for many people in risky
        sexual behavior and libido.” She further opined that “the trauma
        history in his life contributed not only to the development of
        bipolar disorder but how it actually manifest[ed] in him in terms of
        including risky sexual behavior, and . . . the kind of fusion between
        trauma related symptoms and mood symptoms.” In her opinion,
        Hooks’s methamphetamine use was “partly a consequence of the
        mental disorder,” and the methamphetamine use increased
        Hooks’s chances of experiencing “mood episode[s].” Thus, both
        his methamphetamine use and his bipolar disorder were “relevant
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        22-11939               Opinion of the Court                        17

        factors in terms of understanding what happened with respect to
        the offense conduct.” She noted that Hooks had been responding
        well to psychiatric medications in jail and was actively engaged in,
        and enthusiastic about, his participation in psychotherapy,
        counseling, and a drug education program. She then detailed
        additional treatments that she thought Hooks would benefit
        from—many of which she explained were not available in
        institutional settings.
                Hooks then made a brief statement to the court, apologizing
        to the court and his victims “for all of the harm and terrible things”
        he did, and stating that he “accept[ed] the responsibility and
        consequences of [his] actions.” He explained that“[i]t was never
        [his] intention[] to harm anyone” and that he had “been battling . . .
        both physical and mental abuse.” He begged the court for
        forgiveness and mercy and to not sentence him to life.
               Hooks’s counsel argued for a 60-year sentence, emphasizing
        that such a sentence was appropriate in light of the 16-year
        sentence Hooks’s codefendant, Morris, received for similar
        conduct. The district court pointed out that Morris cooperated and
        that she also stated that Hooks had provided her drugs, raped her,
        and forced her to do some of the things that she did related to the
        child pornography. Hooks’s counsel stated that those were self-
        serving statements that she made only after she was arrested and
        after initially lying to police about her involvement. Hooks’s
        counsel also argued that the court should consider the fact that
        Hooks pleaded guilty and saved the government and the victims
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        18                    Opinion of the Court                22-11939

        from a jury trial and accepted responsibility for his actions.
        Hooks’s counsel further emphasized that the court should consider
        Hooks’s “extreme history of trauma” and mental health and
        substance abuse because “a life without parole sentence doesn’t
        give any weight to the fact that there were reasons why he ended
        up he way he did.” Finally, Hooks’s counsel noted that Hooks was
        “treatable,” citing Dr. Boyd’s testimony and reports.
                The government stated that, although it was a good thing
        that Hooks was no longer using drugs and was getting treatment
        in prison, “he still need[ed] to be accountable for his egregious
        crimes against three innocent children who trusted him.”
        Accordingly, the government requested concurrent sentences of
        life in Case #1 and 60 years in Case #2.
              The district court then sentenced Hooks to concurrent
        terms of life for each count in Case #1 and concurrent terms of life
        in Case #2 as to Counts 1, 2 and 3, and 120 months’ as to Count 4,
        with all the sentences running concurrently with each other. It
        noted that it was inclined to vary upward as it did before based on
        Hooks’s conduct, but in light of government’s position, it would
        impose a guideline sentence. It stated that it had considered the
        § 3553(a) factors, including “the conduct of this defendant and the
        need to protect society from his offenses, the nature and
        circumstances of the offense, and his history and characteristics.”
              Hooks’s counsel objected to the sentence, arguing that the
        sentence was substantively unreasonable and that the district court
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        22-11939               Opinion of the Court                      19

        failed to adequately explain the reasons for the sentence imposed
        and why it rejected Hooks’s arguments in mitigation.
               In response, the district court stated that the sentence was
        based on Hooks’s conduct and the “way he manipulated . . . the
        victims in this case,” including his own daughter. The court also
        noted the method in which Hooks orchestrated Morris’s
        participation in the criminal conduct. The court noted that it did
        not accept Dr. Boyd’s opinion as to Hooks’s low risk of reoffending.
        And, in any event, Dr. Boyd’s testimony was not “sufficient to
        counter the need to protect society from [Hooks’s] offenses and
        conduct, the need to punish him for his criminal conduct, [and]
        [Hooks’s] absolute ability to manipulate people.” The court then
        explained that Hooks could appeal the sentence, but that he may
        have waived his right to appeal if there was a sentence-appeal
        waiver in his plea agreement, and if he believed the waiver was
        unenforceable he should make that argument on appeal. Hooks
        timely appealed.
                                   II.    Discussion
           A. The district court complied with this Court’s mandate
                Hooks argues that the district court procedurally erred
        when it misconstrued our mandate on remand “to require a life
        sentence[] be re-imposed and treating the Guidelines sentencing
        range as a mandatory floor.” He maintains that the district court’s
        statements at the start of the resentencing hearing demonstrate
        that it thought that it was precluded from varying downward from
        the guidelines.
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        20                        Opinion of the Court                   22-11939

               We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and
        application of our mandate in Hooks I. United States v. Amedeo, 487
        F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). “[A] district court when acting under
        an appellate court’s mandate, cannot vary it, or examine it for any
        other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief[.]”
        United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996)
        (quotations omitted).
                Hooks’s claim is belied by the record. The record confirms
        that the district court did not treat the guidelines as a “mandatory
        floor,” nor did it believe it was required to impose a life sentence.
        The record also demonstrates that the district court was well aware
        that it could vary upward or downward from the guidelines range,
        and the district court heard extensive argument from Hooks as to
        why a downward variance of 60 years’ imprisonment from the
        guidelines range of life was appropriate. However, the district
        court did not find Hooks’s arguments persuasive and it denied his
        motion for a downward variance, and it explained why it sentenced
        him to a guidelines sentence of life. Accordingly, he is not entitled
        to relief on this claim.
             B. Hooks’s challenges to his sentence are barred by the sentence-
                appeal waivers in his plea agreements
              Hooks argues that his total life sentence is procedurally
        unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain
        the basis for the sentence, failed to consider his arguments in
        mitigation, and failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors. Relatedly,
        he argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because
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        there is a disparity between his sentence and the sentence Morris
        received as well as other individuals who have committed the same
        child pornography offenses, and that the § 3553(a) factors
        supported his requested sentence of 60 years’ imprisonment. In
        response, the government argues that Hooks’s sentencing-related
        claims are barred by the sentence-appeal waivers in his plea
        agreements. Hooks, in turn, argues the sentence-appeal waivers
        are unenforceable because the district court did not thoroughly
        explain or discuss the appeal waiver at either plea hearing and,
        based on the court’s questioning, Hooks did not understand
        whether he was waiving his right to appeal his sentence as opposed
        to just his conviction.
               “We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de
        novo.” United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008).
        We enforce appeal waivers that are made knowingly and
        voluntarily. See United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th
        Cir. 2006); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir.
        1993). To demonstrate that a waiver was made knowingly and
        voluntarily, the government must show that either (1) the district
        court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver
        during the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the
        defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.
        Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.
              Hooks’s argument that the sentence-appeal waivers are
        unenforceable because they were not explained to him adequately
        and he did not understand he was waiving his right to appeal his
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        22                       Opinion of the Court                     22-11939

        sentence is refuted by the record. The appeal waivers in each plea
        agreement were identical and stated unequivocally that, by
        entering the plea agreement, Hooks waived his “right to appeal
        [his] conviction and/or sentence in this case.” Each appeal waiver
        then set forth the exceptions to the waiver, explaining that Hooks
        could appeal if his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or
        exceeded the guidelines range, and that he could pursue
        ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claims. Hooks initialed each page
        of each of the plea agreements, including the appeal waiver, and he
        signed the statement proclaiming that that he “fully under[stood]”
        the waiver and that he “knowingly and voluntarily enter[ed] into
        [the] waiver.” Then, during both plea colloquies, he confirmed
        that he read the plea agreement, that his counsel also read the
        agreement to him, and that he understood it. Additionally, the
        district court questioned Hooks about the appeal-waiver
        paragraph, and he confirmed that, by signing the waiver, he waived
        his right to appeal. Thus, the record conclusively refutes Hooks’s
        contention that he did not understand or knowingly and
        voluntarily enter the appeal waiver. 9
              Consequently, the record establishes that Hooks’s sentence-
        appeal waivers were knowingly and voluntarily made and are
        enforceable. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351; see also United States v.

        9We also note that Hooks signed his plea agreements approximately a month
        apart and he had the benefit of two different change-of-plea hearings, and at
        no time did he indicate that he had a question about or otherwise did not
        understand the sentence-appeal waiver.
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        22-11939                Opinion of the Court                       23

        Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (enforcing an appeal
        waiver where “the waiver provision was referenced during [the
        defendant’s] Rule 11 plea colloquy and [the defendant] agreed that
        she understood the provision and that she entered into it freely and
        voluntarily”). Hooks’s claims that his guideline sentence is
        procedurally and substantively unreasonable fall squarely within
        the scope of the appeal waiver. Accordingly, Hooks’s claims are
        barred by the appeal waiver.
           C. Alternatively, Hooks’s claims fail on the merits
               Even assuming, arguendo, that the appeal waivers were
        unenforceable, Hooks’s claims are meritless. As discussed
        previously, Hooks argues that his total life sentence is procedurally
        unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain
        the basis for the sentence, failed to consider his arguments in
        mitigation, and failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors. Relatedly,
        he argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because
        there is a disparity between his sentence and the sentence Morris
        received as well as other individuals who have committed the same
        child pornography offenses, and that the § 3553(a) factors
        supported his requested sentence of 60 years imprisonment.
               We review a sentence for both procedural and substantive
        reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.
        See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The burden rests on
        the party challenging the sentence to show “that the sentence is
        unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                22-11939

        the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United States
        v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
                With regard to his procedural challenges to the sentence, the
        district court explained its reasons for sentencing Hooks to life
        imprisonment, noting that the sentence was warranted due to the
        nature and circumstances of the offense, Hooks’s history and
        characteristics, the need to protect the public from future crimes,
        and the need to adequately punish Hooks. Those reasons
        correspond with the § 3553(a) factors that the district court is
        instructed to consider when determining the appropriate sentence.
        See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although Hooks may disagree with how
        the district court weighed the relevant factors, the weight given to
        a particular § 3353(a) factor “is committed to the sound discretion
        of the district court,” and it is not required to give “equal weight”
        to the § 3553(a) factors. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254 (quotation
        omitted). Moreover, “[w]e will not second guess the weight given
        to a § 3553(a) factor so long as the sentence is reasonable under the
        circumstances.” United States v. Butler, 39 F. 4th 1349, 1355 (11th
        Cir. 2022).
               The district court also expressly noted that it considered the
        mitigation-related testimony of Dr. Boyd, but that it was not
        persuaded by it. The fact that the district court did not address
        Hooks’s mitigation arguments in further detail does not mean that
        the district court failed to consider them. See Amedeo, 487 F.3d at
        833 (explaining that the district court’s failure to discuss the
        defendant’s mitigating evidence does not “mean[] that the court
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        22-11939                   Opinion of the Court                               25

        erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evidence in
        determining [the] sentence”). Thus, Hooks is not entitled to relief
        on his claim that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.
                Hooks’s argument that his sentence is substantively
        unreasonable is similarly unpersuasive. Although Morris was
        convicted of some of the same offenses and received a lesser
        sentence, there is no concerning sentencing disparity between
        Hooks and Morris. 10 Morris received a lesser sentence based on the
        substantial assistance she provided the government. Furthermore,
        there are potentially mitigating facts in Morris’s case—that Hooks
        provided her drugs, raped her, and forced her to take some of the
        actions she took—that are not present in Hooks’s case. More
        importantly, while Morris may have filmed and helped otherwise
        facilitate the conduct in this case, Hooks was the perpetrator of the
        sexual acts in the images and the video. Thus, Hooks is not
        similarly situated to his codefendant. See United States v. Johnson,

        10  Hooks cites to a number of other child pornography-related cases in which
        defendants received lesser sentences. All Hooks has offered regarding those
        cases are the crimes of conviction, the resulting sentences, and a few
        barebones factual allegations; even taken together, that minimal information
        is insufficient for us to make a proper comparison for purposes of evaluating
        any alleged sentencing disparity. See United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1048
        (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that courts “need[ ] to have more than the crime
        of conviction and the total length of the sentences to evaluate alleged
        disparities” and that “[t]he underlying facts of the crime and all of the
        individual characteristics are relevant”). Thus, Hooks has not carried his
        burden to show specific facts establishing that he is similarly situated to the
        defendants in the referenced cases. Id.
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                   22-11939

        980 F.3d 1364, 1386 (11th Cir. 2020) (rejecting disparity claim
        because “[d]efendant ha[d] not carried his burden to show specific
        facts establishing that any codefendants are similarly situated”).
               While the district court imposed the statutory maximum
        sentence in this case, that sentence is within the applicable advisory
        guidelines range and is substantively reasonable in light of the
        § 3553(a) factors. Hooks’s conduct in this case was particularly
        egregious—Hooks sexually assaulted his own daughter to produce
        child pornography in addition to the other images that involved
        very young children. We have expressed that “the more serious
        the criminal conduct is the greater the need for retribution and the
        longer the sentence should be.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1206 (en banc).
        Further, as we have repeatedly emphasized, “[c]hild sex crimes are
        among the most egregious and despicable of societal and criminal
        offenses.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sarras,
        575 F.3d 1191, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009)). And “[w]hen child
        pornography is produced in conjunction with the sexual abuse of
        children, as it was here, the harm to the child victims is magnified
        and perpetuated.” Id. at 1208; see also United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d
        1179, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing the impact that child
        pornography has on the victims). As a result, we have frequently
        upheld lengthy sentences in cases involving child sex crimes. See,
        e.g., United States v. Hall, 965 F.3d 1281, 1297–99 (11th Cir. 2020)
        (upholding as reasonable a 480-month sentence for receipt of child
        pornography, which was an upward variance of 300 months from
        the guideline range); United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1254,
        1264 (11th Cir. 2012) (upholding as reasonable life sentences for
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        22-11939               Opinion of the Court                        27

        engaging in a child exploitation enterprise), abrogated on other
        grounds by Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014); Sarras, 575
        F.3d at 1196, 1220–21 (upholding as substantively reasonable a total
        1,200 month sentence for three counts of knowingly persuading a
        minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct and one count of
        knowingly possessing child pornography); United States v. Johnson,
        451 F.3d 1239, 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding as reasonable
        consecutive sentences totaling 140 years for producing and
        distributing child pornography). Under the circumstances of this
        case, we cannot say that the district court’s decision to impose the
        statutory maximum of life imprisonment was an abuse of
        discretion.
              AFFIRMED.