Court Opinion

ID: 9386961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 07:02:51.501257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:10.095464
License: Public Domain

REL: March 24, 2023

         Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter
Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                      Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                                   OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
                                    _________________________

                                              CR-21-0393
                                       _________________________

                                             Benjamin Young

                                                          v.

                                             State of Alabama

                              Appeal from Colbert Circuit Court
                                        (CC-16-339.60)

KELLUM, Judge.

        Benjamin Young appeals the circuit court's summary dismissal of

his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.

Crim. P., attacking his capital-murder conviction and sentence of death.
CR-21-0393

     In February 2018, Young was convicted of murdering Ki-Jana

Freeman by shooting Freeman while he was in a vehicle, an offense

defined as capital by § 13A-5-40(a)(17), Ala. Code 1975, and assault in

the first degree for shooting Tyler Blythe, a violation of § 13A-6-20(a),

Ala. Code 1975. 1 The jury recommended by a vote of 11 to 1 that Young

be sentenced to death. The circuit court sentenced Young to death for the

capital-murder conviction and to 20 years' imprisonment for the assault

conviction. This Court affirmed Young's convictions and sentences. See

Young v. State, [Ms. CR-17-0595, August 6, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.

Crim. App. 2021). The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review.

See Ex parte Young, (No. 1210291, October 21, 2022).

     In July 2020, Young filed a Rule 32 petition attacking his capital-

murder conviction and sentence of death. (C. 7-107.) The State filed its

response and moved to dismiss the petition.           (C. 120-221.)   Young

responded to the State's motion.         (C. 222.)   In January 2022, the

postconviction court issued a 124-page order summarily dismissing

     1Blythe     was shot 13 times but survived his injuries. He testified at
Young's trial.
                                     2
CR-21-0393

Young's petition. (R. 640-763.) Young then filed a timely notice of appeal

to this Court. (C. 780.)

                     Section 13A-5-53.1, Ala. Code 1975

        The postconviction petition in this case was filed in compliance with

§ 13A-5-53.1, Ala. Code 1975, and while Young's direct appeal from his

capital-murder conviction was pending in the Alabama appellate courts.

That statute specifically provides that Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P.,

which governs the limitation period in which to file a postconviction

petition, does not apply to death-penalty cases or to any defendant

sentenced to death after August 1, 2017. See § 13A-5-53.1(j), Ala. Code

1975.       Pursuant to § 13A-5-53.1(c), Ala. Code 1975, a defendant

sentenced to death shall have 365 days from the date the appellant's first

brief was filed on direct appeal to file a timely postconviction petition.

Also, the circuit court, for good cause, may grant one 90-day extension in

which to file that postconviction petition. See § 13A-5-53.1(d), Ala. Code

1975.

                                    3
CR-21-0393

     Based on this Court's records,2 Young's first brief on direct appeal

was filed on April 10, 2019. Young sought and was granted a 90-day

extension to file his postconviction petition. Young's petition was due to

be filed by July 8, 2020, and was timely filed on July 7, 2020. See § 13A-

5-53.1, Ala. Code 1975. See Ex parte Marshall, 323 So. 3d 1188 (Ala.

2020); Stanley v. State, 335 So. 3d 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).

                                  Facts

     In August 2021, this Court affirmed Young's capital-murder

conviction and his sentence of death. In our opinion, we summarized the

facts surrounding Young's convictions:

           "On March 1, 2016, Young attended a meeting of a gang
     called the 'Almighty Imperial Gangsters' held by Thomas
     Hubbard, the leader of the gang, in Hubbard's bedroom at his
     mother's house on Midland Avenue in Muscle Shoals. Other
     members at the meeting were Peter Capote, Dewayne Austin
     Hammonds, Riley Hamm III, De'Vontae Bates, and Michael
     Blackburn. Two days earlier the Hubbards's house had been
     burglarized while Hubbard was attending his grandmother's
     funeral. Several items were stolen from the house, including
     a television, an Xbox game console, a PlayStation game
     console, and some cash. Hubbard reported the burglary to the
     Muscle Shoals Police Department. Officer Raymond Schultz
     of the Muscle Shoals Police Department, who responded to the
     burglary call, testified at trial that Hubbard was upset and
     angry about the burglary. (R. 463.)

     2This Court may take judicial notice of its own records. See Hull v.
State, 607 So. 2d 369, 371 n. 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
                                  4
CR-21-0393

           "Hubbard told everyone in the meeting on March 1 that
    he wanted to find and kill the person who burglarized his
    house. Hubbard asked the gang for help. Bates testified that
    in the meeting they developed a plan to find out who broke
    into Hubbard's house and then 'lure him to a place' and kill
    him. (R. 749.)
           "Hammonds, who owned the Xbox game console stolen
    from Hubbard's house, testified that he told Hubbard at the
    meeting that [Ki-Jana] Freeman might have taken the Xbox.
    Hammonds knew Freeman from working with him in the
    past, and he had seen a Facebook post by Freeman
    advertising an Xbox for sale. The gang developed a plan for
    Hammonds to meet with Freeman to see if the Xbox Freeman
    was offering to sell was Hammonds's Xbox. Although the plan
    changed throughout the meeting, the gist of the plan was that
    Hammonds (either alone or with Hamm) would meet with
    Freeman and, if the Xbox was the one stolen from Hubbard's
    house, Hammonds would signal to or call Young and Capote,
    who would take Freeman somewhere to interrogate and kill
    him. Hammonds testified that Young, Capote, and Hubbard
    planned to use Hubbard's SKS rifle and a pistol to kill
    Freeman. (R. 815.) Bates testified that besides the SKS rifle,
    Hubbard owned a .22-caliber revolver and a .45-caliber
    handgun. The State introduced an undated photograph
    showing Hubbard standing in his bedroom holding an SKS
    rifle.

          "Hammonds testified that he sent a message to Freeman
    on Facebook Messenger about the Xbox. Hammonds and
    Freeman communicated throughout the day about
    Hammonds purchasing the Xbox from Freeman. Hammonds's
    Facebook Messenger exchange with Freeman was introduced
    at trial.

        "A little before 9:00 p.m., Young and his girlfriend,
    Meagan, along with Capote and his girlfriend, Bridgette, left
    Hubbard's house to buy ammunition for the SKS rifle.

                                5
CR-21-0393

    Meagan testified that Young drove Meagan's car to the
    Gander Mountain outdoor retail store in Florence. Young
    asked Meagan to buy the ammunition, and he told her what
    kind of ammunition to buy. The State introduced surveillance
    footage from Gander Mountain showing Meagan's car pulling
    into the Gander Mountain parking lot. Surveillance footage
    from inside the store showed Meagan buying the ammunition
    at 9:01 p.m., and a receipt from the store showed that Meagan
    bought a box of 7.62X39-millimeter ammunition. The
    surveillance footage showed Meagan returning to the car and
    the car leaving the parking lot. Meagan testified that after she
    bought the ammunition Young drove them back to Hubbard's
    house.

          "Around the time Young, Capote, Meagan, and
    Bridgette got back to Hubbard's house from Gander
    Mountain, Hammonds left to go to work at a Wal-Mart in
    Florence. At 9:28 p.m., Hammonds sent Freeman a message
    asking him to call him, and he gave Freeman his cellular
    telephone phone number. Freeman did not call Hammonds
    but sent a message asking if Hammonds still wanted the
    Xbox. Hammonds testified that he never arranged a meeting
    with Freeman and that when he left for work around 9:30
    p.m., the plan was for Bates to 'handle it' by setting up
    Freeman. (R. 823.) Hammonds said that Young, Capote,
    Hubbard, Bates, Hamm, and Blackburn were at Hubbard's
    house when he left for work and that the plan was for them to
    use 'the white Ram' to 'go kill him.' (R. 826-27.) The State
    introduced Hammonds's timecard from Wal-Mart showing
    that Hammonds clocked in to work a little before 10:00 p.m.
    on March 1 and clocked out a little after 6:00 a.m. the next
    morning.

         "Around the time Hammonds left for work, Bates sent
    Freeman a message on Facebook Messenger asking him if he
    had '11 hits' of acid he could purchase. (R. 757-58.) Bates
    explained that he volunteered to lure Freeman to the Spring
    Creek Apartments by asking Freeman if he could buy some

                                 6
CR-21-0393

    acid from him. Bates admitted he knew he was setting up
    Freeman so that the others could kill him.

           "A little after 10:30 p.m., Young, Capote, Hubbard, and
    Hamm left Hubbard's house in a white pickup truck. Young
    was driving and Capote was in the front passenger's seat.
    Hubbard and Hamm were in the backseat. They had with
    them two large black garbage bags. Bates testified that he
    stayed at Hubbard's house and continued exchanging
    messages with Freeman. Bates relayed all the information he
    received from Freeman to one of the gang member's
    girlfriends, who was at the house with Bates, and the
    girlfriend relayed the information to Young, who was in the
    truck on the way to the Spring Creek Apartments.

         "The State introduced surveillance video from the
    Spring Creek Apartments showing a white four-door Dodge
    pickup truck pulling into the apartment complex around
    10:47 p.m. Several minutes later Freeman sent Bates a
    message: 'Boutta pull in. Just passed Fred's.' Bates asked,
    'What kinda car u in cause im in the back.' (C. 479.) Freeman
    responded at 10:58 p.m., 'Blue Mustang. Pulling in now. The
    back on the right road or the left road.' The surveillance video
    shows a blue Mustang vehicle pulling into the parking lot of
    the Spring Creek Apartments at 10:58 p.m.

         "Haley Burgner, Freeman's girlfriend, testified that on
    the afternoon of March 1 she and Freeman were
    communicating on Facebook Messenger. Freeman told her he
    planned to meet "Dewayne" to sell him an Xbox. (R. 508.)
    Freeman told Burgner that Tyler Blythe was with him in case
    anything 'goes down.' Later Freeman told Burgner that he
    was heading to meet 'Vonte' to get some money that Vonte
    owed him. At 10:58 p.m., Freeman sent a message to Burgner
    that he was 'getting my cash r[ight] n[ow].' The Facebook
    Messenger exchange between Freeman and Burgner was
    admitted into evidence.

                                 7
CR-21-0393

           "Blythe testified that on March 1 he was with Freeman
    when Freeman asked him to ride with him to the Spring
    Creek Apartments to meet Bates. Blythe testified that
    Freeman pulled into the parking lot of the Spring Creek
    Apartment complex and parked the car. Blythe asked
    Freeman why they were there, and Freeman told Blythe they
    were there to sell some acid strips.
           "While they were sitting in Freeman's car in the parking
    lot, Blythe and Freeman turned around in their seats to look
    at a white pickup truck that had backed up in the parking lot.
    Blythe testified that they had just turned back around when
    Freeman looked in the rearview mirror and said something to
    Blythe and then, Blythe said, 'they started shooting.' (R. 556.)
    Freeman and Blythe were each shot several times. Blythe did
    not know how many shooters there were, but, he said, 'it
    seemed like more than one.' (R. 559.) Freeman was
    unresponsive at the scene and was pronounced dead a short
    time later. Blythe was taken by ambulance from the scene and
    airlifted to Huntsville Hospital, where he underwent surgery
    and was hospitalized for seven days.

          "Jodi Bohn testified that around 11:00 p.m. on March 1
    she was looking out of her apartment window at the Spring
    Creek Apartments when she saw a white pickup truck back
    out of a parking space and stop next to a curb. Bohn saw the
    doors of the truck open. The driver and the front-seat
    passenger got out of the truck and started walking toward the
    back of the truck. Bohn heard gunfire that she thought came
    from more than one weapon, so she moved away from the
    window. Bohn described the driver of the pickup truck as 'big
    and heavy.' (R. 592.) The record shows that Young was 6 feet
    4 inches tall and weighed 270 pounds. (C. 72.)

          "In March 2016 Dale Springer lived in an apartment at
    the Chateau Orleans apartments in Muscle Shoals. Shortly
    after midnight on March 2, Springer went outside to smoke a
    cigarette. Springer saw a white Dodge pickup truck with a
    double cab pull into the parking lot of the Chateau Orleans

                                 8
CR-21-0393

    complex 'pretty fast' and back into a parking space. (R. 624.)
    Two men got out of the truck. Springer saw a 'light silver' or
    'light gold' four-door automobile pull into the parking lot. The
    driver of the truck spoke with someone in the car, and the car
    left. The two men from the truck walked away, staying in the
    dark area of the apartment complex. Later that morning
    Springer heard on the radio that police were looking for a
    white Dodge pickup truck involved in a shooting, so Springer
    called the police. Law-enforcement officers learned that the
    white truck had been stolen earlier that year.

          "Det. [Wes] Holland testified that, after interviewing
    Burgner the morning after the shooting, he began looking for
    Hammonds and Bates. He interviewed Bates on March 3 and
    Hammonds on March 4. Hammonds viewed the surveillance
    video from the Spring Creek Apartments and identified
    Young as the driver of the white truck and Capote as the
    passenger. Hammonds told Det. Holland that, after the
    shooting, Young told him that there were '15 shots that fired
    off' and that he 'took care of it.' (R. 830.) At trial both
    Hammonds and Bates testified that they had seen the
    surveillance video from the Spring Creek Apartments and
    that Young was the driver of the white pickup truck.

          "During his interview with Det. Holland on March 4,
    Hammonds provided Young's and Capote's names and
    Hubbard's name and address. Hubbards' house was located
    about one block from Chateau Orleans, where two days earlier
    law-enforcement had located the white pickup truck. Det.
    Holland and Captain Stuart Setliff of the Tuscumbia Police
    Department immediately went to Hubbard's house to set up
    surveillance. They saw Young leave the house in a silver car.
    When other law-enforcement officers tried to stop Young,
    Young 'accelerated to a high rate of speed.' (R. 933.) Young
    led officers from several law-enforcement agencies on a chase
    across state lines into Tennessee, where Young eventually
    wrecked the car and was arrested.

                                 9
CR-21-0393

          "Det. Holland took a DNA swab from Young, and
     Young's DNA matched the DNA on a soda can found in the
     white pickup truck. DNA from a cigarette butt found in the
     pickup truck matched DNA from a swab taken from Capote.

            "Shawn Settles testified that, from August 2015 to May
     2016, he was in the Colbert County jail awaiting trial on a
     second-degree-robbery charge and a fraudulent-use-of-a-
     credit-card charge. In March 2016 Hubbard, who had been
     arrested for Freeman's murder, became Settles's cellmate.
     Capote, who had also been arrested for Freeman's murder,
     was placed in a nearby cell. Settles testified that Hubbard and
     Capote communicated with each other and with Settles about
     the details of Freeman's murder. Settles helped Hubbard and
     Capote pass notes back and forth to each other, and, rather
     than destroy the notes for Hubbard as Hubbard thought
     Settles was doing, Settles secretly kept the notes. Settles
     testified at trial that he had been convicted of second-degree
     robbery and fraudulent use of a debit card and that he was
     testifying at trial based on an agreement with the State.

           "Based on information from Settles, law-enforcement
     officers got a search warrant for property in Franklin County,
     Alabama. Law-enforcement officers found an SKS rifle and a
     black magazine for the SKS buried in two black garbage bags
     on the property."

Young, ___ So. 3d at ___ (footnotes omitted).

     Two of Young's accomplices have been convicted for their roles in

the murder of Freeman and the assault of Blythe. Peter Capote was

convicted of capital murder and assault in the first degree and was

sentenced to death.    This Court affirmed his conviction and death

sentence on direct appeal. See Capote v. State, 323 So. 3d 104 (Ala. Crim.

                                  10
CR-21-0393

App. 2020).   Thomas Hubbard was convicted of capital murder and

assault in the first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole. This Court affirmed his conviction and

sentence on direct appeal. See Hubbard v. State, 324 So. 3d 855 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2019).

     As noted above, two of Young's accomplices testified at Young's trial

-- Austin Hammonds and De'Vontae Bates. Hammonds testified that at

the time of Young's trial he had not been charged with any offense related

to the murder and assault. (Trial R. 840-43.) Bates testified that he had

been convicted of conspiracy to commit murder but was awaiting his

sentence for that conviction. In exchange for Bates's truthful testimony

at Young's trial, Bates said, the State would recommend that his sentence

for that conviction be 20 years. (Trial R. 722.)

                           Standard of Review

     Young filed this postconviction petition attacking his capital-

murder conviction and sentence of death. According to Rule 32.3, Ala. R.

Crim. P., Young bears the sole burden of pleading all of his claims in his

petition.

          "The petitioner shall have the burden of pleading and
     proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts

                                  11
CR-21-0393

     necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The state shall
     have the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion, but
     once a ground of preclusion has been pleaded, the petitioner
     shall have the burden of disproving its existence by a
     preponderance of the evidence."

     According to Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P., a circuit court may

summarily dismiss a petition:

           "If the court determines that the petition is not
     sufficiently specific, or is precluded, or fails to state a claim,
     or that no material issue of fact or law exists which would
     entitle the petitioner to relief under this rule and that no
     purpose would be served by any further proceedings, the court
     may either dismiss the petition or grant leave to file an
     amended petition. Leave to amend shall be freely granted.
     Otherwise, the court shall direct that the proceedings
     continue and set a date for hearing."

     Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., further provides:

          "The petition must contain a clear and specific
     statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought,
     including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds.
     A bare allegation that a constitutional right has been violated
     and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to warrant
     any further proceedings."

     In regard to the pleading requirements of Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,

this Court has stated:

           " 'Rule 32.6(b) requires that the petition itself disclose
     the facts relied upon in seeking relief.' Boyd v. State, 746 So.
     2d 364, 406 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). In other words, it is not
     the pleading of a conclusion 'which, if true, entitle[s] the
     petitioner to relief.' Lancaster v. State, 638 So. 2d 1370, 1373

                                  12
CR-21-0393

     (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). It is the allegation of facts in pleading
     which, if true, entitle a petitioner to relief. After facts are
     pleaded, which, if true, entitle the petitioner to relief, the
     petitioner is then entitled to an opportunity, as provided in
     Rule 32.9, Ala. R. Crim. P., to present evidence proving those
     alleged facts."
Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113, 1125 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).

     We have characterized the burden of pleading in regard to a

postconviction petition as a heavy burden. Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344,

356 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).

           "Although postconviction proceedings are civil in
     nature, they are governed by the Alabama Rules of Criminal
     Procedure. See Rule 32.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. The 'notice
     pleading' requirements relative to civil cases do not apply to
     Rule 32 proceedings. 'Unlike the general requirements
     related to civil cases, the pleading requirements for
     postconviction petitions are more stringent....' Daniel v.
     State, 86 So. 3d 405, 410-11 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). Rule
     32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., requires that full facts be pleaded in
     the petition if the petition is to survive summary dismissal.
     See Daniel, supra. Thus, to satisfy the requirements for
     pleading as they relate to postconviction petitions,
     Washington was required to plead full facts to support each
     individual claim."

Washington v. State, 95 So. 3d 26, 59 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).

           " 'An evidentiary hearing on a [Rule 32] petition is
           required only if the petition is "meritorious on its
           face." Ex parte Boatwright, 471 So. 2d 1257 (Ala.
           1985). A petition is "meritorious on its face" only
           if it contains a clear and specific statement of the
           grounds upon which relief is sought, including full
           disclosure of the facts relied upon (as opposed to a

                                  13
CR-21-0393

           general statement concerning the nature and
           effect of those facts) sufficient to show that the
           petitioner is entitled to relief if those facts are true.
           Ex parte Boatwright, supra; Ex parte Clisby, 501
           So. 2d 483 (Ala .1986).'

     "Moore v. State, 502 So. 2d 819, 820 (Ala. 1986)."

Bracknell v. State, 883 So. 2d 724, 727-28 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).

     The majority of the claims raised by Young involve allegations that

his counsel's performance at his capital-murder trial was deficient.

When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the

standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

           "First, the defendant must show that counsel's
     performance was deficient. This requires showing that
     counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
     functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
     Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
     deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
     showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
     defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
     Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said
     that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
     breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result
     unreliable."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

     Regarding claims that counsel's performance was deficient, this

Court has stated:

                                    14
CR-21-0393

           "To sufficiently plead an allegation of ineffective
     assistance of counsel, a Rule 32 petitioner not only must
     'identify the [specific] acts or omissions of counsel that are
     alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional
     judgment,' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104
     S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), but also must plead specific
     facts indicating that he or she was prejudiced by the acts or
     omissions, i.e., facts indicating 'that there is a reasonable
     probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
     result of the proceeding would have been different.' 466 U.S.
     at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A bare allegation that prejudice
     occurred without specific facts indicating how the petitioner
     was prejudiced is not sufficient."

Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344, 356 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).

     A postconviction petition may also be summarily dismissed on the

merits of the claims raised in the petition.

     " ' "Where a simple reading of the petition for post-conviction
     relief shows that, assuming every allegation of the petition to
     be true, it is obviously without merit or is precluded, the
     circuit court [may] summarily dismiss that petition." ' Bishop
     v. State, 608 So. 2d 345, 347-48 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis added)
     (quoting Bishop v. State, 592 So. 2d 664, 667 (Ala. Crim. App.
     1991) (Bowen, J., dissenting)). See also Hodges v. State, 147
     So. 3d 916, 946 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (a postconviction claim
     is 'due to be summarily dismissed [when] it is meritless on its
     face')."

Bryant v. State, 181 So. 3d 1087, 1102 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).

     Last, "[t]his Court may affirm the judgment of the circuit court for

any reason, even if not for the reason stated by the circuit court." Acra

v. State, 105 So. 3d 460, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).

                                  15
CR-21-0393

     At trial, Young was represented by attorneys Ben Gardner, Jr.,

Nathan Johnson, and Leigh Anne Landis.

                           Guilt-Phase Issues

                                    I.

     Young argues that the postconviction court erred in summarily

dismissing his claims that his counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase

of his capital-murder trial because, he says, counsel failed to adequately

investigate and present evidence that he was not guilty. Young raises

numerous claims regarding this issue -- we review each claim

individually.

     Initially, Young argues that, when summarily dismissing his

claims, the postconviction court confused the burden of pleading with the

burden of proof and incorrectly dismissed his claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

     This Court has discussed the distinction between the burden of

pleading and burden of proof in relation to a postconviction proceeding:

           " '[A]t the pleading stage of Rule 32 proceedings, a
           Rule 32 petitioner does not have the burden of
           proving his claims by a preponderance of the
           evidence. Rather, at the pleading stage, a
           petitioner must only provide "a clear and specific
           statement of the grounds upon which relief is

                                  16
CR-21-0393

           sought." Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P. Once a
           petitioner has met his burden of pleading so as to
           avoid summary disposition pursuant to Rule
           32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P., he is then entitled to an
           opportunity to present evidence in order to satisfy
           his burden of proof.'

     "Ford v. State, 831 So. 2d 641, 644 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001). A
     claim may not be summarily dismissed because the petitioner
     failed to meet his burden of proof at the initial pleading stage,
     a stage at which the petitioner has only a burden to plead.
     See Smith v. State, 581 So. 2d 1283, 1284 (Ala. Crim. App.
     1991) ('When the State does not respond to a petitioner's
     allegations, the unrefuted statement of facts must be taken as
     true. Chaverst v. State, 517 So. 2d 643, 644 (Ala. Crim. App.
     1987). Further, when a petition contains matters which, if
     true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, an evidentiary
     hearing must be held. Ex parte Boatwright, 471 So. 2d 1257,
     1258 (Ala. 1985).')."

Johnson v. State, 835 So. 2d 1077, 1079–80 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001). For

the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the postconviction

court did not confuse the burden of pleading with the burden of proof.

See Bryant v. State, 181 So. 3d 1087, 1102 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).

     Young further argues that the postconviction court erred in

considering his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims individually and

not cumulatively as, he says, the law mandates. "When considering

whether the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were sufficiently

pleaded, the circuit court correctly considered each claim individually."

                                  17
CR-21-0393

Washington v. State, 95 So. 3d 25, 58 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012). "[T]o satisfy

the pleading requirements of Rule 32, each claim of a petition must

contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds for relief and the

underlying facts that, according to the petitioner, provide the basis for

the grounds for relief. Even ineffective assistance of counsel claims must

be pleaded sufficiently." Taylor v. State, 157 So. 3d 131, 139-40 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2010). Nothing in the postconviction court's order reflects

that it considered the wrong burden of proof or that it violated this

Court's holding in Washington, supra. Thus, this claim is meritless.

     The State first asserts that the majority of the issues raised by

Young in his brief to this Court are waived, pursuant to Rule 28(a)(10),

Ala. R. App. P., because Young's brief is substantially the same as the

postconviction petition that Young filed in the Colbert Circuit Court.

The State relies on this Court's decision in Morris v. State, 261 So. 3d

1181 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016), to support this argument. In Morris, we

stated:

     "Morris's obligation as the appellant was to present an
     argument in support of his position on appeal, and his
     argument on appeal is that the circuit court erred when it
     dismissed the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. With
     respect to that issue, Morris was required to set out the
     reasons supporting his argument that the circuit court erred,

                                  18
CR-21-0393

     with citations to legal authorities supporting that argument,
     and citation to parts of the record relied on as support for his
     claim of error. Morris's argument that the trial court
     improperly dismissed the 19 claims of ineffective assistance of
     counsel is unsupported by any of the above. The mere
     repetition of the claims alleged in the Rule 32 petition does
     not provide any analysis of the circuit court's judgment of
     dismissal; obviously there was no judgment of dismissal until
     after the petition was filed."

Morris, 261 So. 3d at 1194-95. Young's postconviction petition is 104

pages in length and his brief is 98 pages. While some issues raised in

Young's postconviction petition are very similar to the arguments made

on appeal, they are not identical. Indeed, the State does not make this

argument for every issue that Young raises in his brief to this Court.

Accordingly, we will consider Young's arguments on appeal.

                                   A.

     Young first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to interview Colton Vickery, "a peer of Austin Hammonds," and for failing

to present Vickery's testimony at Young's trial. (Young's brief at p. 58.)

Young pleaded in his postconviction petition that Vickery told an

investigator that he and De'Vontae Bates planned to kill both Freeman

and Blythe.    Young pleaded that Vickery's testimony "would have

suggested to the jury that Hammonds was more involved than he

                                  19
CR-21-0393

portrayed and would have controverted Bates's testimony, thus

undermining the State's case." (C. 131.)

     When addressing Young's claim that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to interview Vickery, the postconviction court made the

following findings:

           "Young fails to state a valid claim for relief or present a
     material issue of fact or law under Rule 32.7(d) of the
     Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Testimony from
     Vickery that Bates and Hammonds targeted Blythe and
     Freeman would have been cumulative to the testimony
     presented at trial. Bates testified that he targeted Freeman
     for the theft of Hubbard's Xbox and intended Freeman's
     death.    Hubbard likewise testified that Freeman was
     targeted. '[A] petitioner cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of
     the Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] test with
     evidence that is merely cumulative of evidence already
     presented at trial.' Benjamin v. State, 156 So. 3d 424, 453
     (Ala. Crim. App. 2013).

           "Moreover, Young fails to satisfy the specificity and full
     factual pleading requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the
     Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Young fails to
     sufficiently plead how failure to interview Vickery and
     present his testimony fell below any standard of professional
     norm.      Young suggests that counsel's actions were
     unreasonable as compared to those of Capote's and Hubbard's
     counsel, because in their trials, Vickery testified. However,
     the Court notes that Capote was convicted and sentenced to
     death and Hubbard was convicted and sentenced to life
     without the possibility of parole. In light of this fact, Young's
     failure to explain how the testimony of Vickery would have
     changed the result of his own case is significant.

                                  20
CR-21-0393

            "Furthermore, Young fails to plead how counsel's
     'failure' was not part of a reasonable trial strategy. Calling
     Vickery to testify would have exposed the jury to another
     witness connected to gang activity. Distancing Young from
     further unnecessary, cumulative gang activity is a reasonable
     trial strategy in a case predicated on gang activity. Young
     likewise fails to plead how counsel's actions actually
     prejudiced him in light of the testimony given by Bates and
     Hammonds. Thus, Young fails to plead facts that, if true,
     would prove either Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
     (1984),] prong. Such 'bare claims' are insufficient to warrant
     further proceedings. Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P."

(C. 657-58.)

     To sufficiently plead a claim regarding counsel's failure to call a

witness, this Court has stated that

     "a Rule 32 petitioner is required to identify the names of the
     witnesses, to plead with specificity what admissible testimony
     those witnesses would have provided had they been called to
     testify, and to allege facts indicating that had the witnesses
     testified there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
     the proceeding would have been different."

Mashburn v. State, 148 So. 3d 1094, 1151 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013).

     Summary dismissal of this claim was proper because Young failed

to plead how he was prejudiced, i.e., that there was a "reasonable

probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different"

had Vickery testified. Mashburn, 148 So. 3d at 1151.

                                 21
CR-21-0393

     Also, several witnesses testified that Hammonds targeted Freeman

because he had stolen an Xbox from Hubbards's house and that the gang

planned to lure Freeman to the parking lot of an apartment complex to

kill him.

     "The fact that there were other witnesses available who could
     have testified ... does not demonstrate that counsel was
     ineffective in choosing the theory and strategy that was
     presented at the penalty phase.' Barnhill v. State, 971 So. 2d
     106, 116 (Fla. 2007). '[C]omplaints of uncalled witnesses are
     not favored in federal habeas corpus review because the
     presentation of testimonial evidence is a matter of trial
     strategy and because allegations of what a witness would
     have stated are largely speculative.' Day v. Quarterman, 566
     F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 2009). 'Whether to present certain
     testimonial evidence is a matter of trial strategy, and
     complaints of uncalled witnesses are generally disfavored.'
     Sanders v. United States, 314 Fed. App'x 212, 213 (11th Cir.
     2008)."

Walker v. State, 194 So. 3d 253, 291 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).

     Indeed, the evidence against Young was compelling.         The State

presented evidence indicating that Young's girlfriend purchased

ammunition on the night of the shootings. Several people who lived

nearby testified that a white pickup truck drove into the area right before

the shooting started; one witness said that the driver, who was big and

heavy, got out and walked toward another car. DNA evidence discovered

on a soda can found in the truck matched Young's DNA. Surveillance

                                  22
CR-21-0393

video showed a white truck come into the complex and a heavy set man 3

exit the driver's side of that truck. Finally, two of Young's accomplices

testified that Young was one of the two men shooting at the two victims.

       In a one-paragraph argument in this section of Young's brief, Young

argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain

information from Hammonds's cellular telephone that had been turned

over to police during the investigation. Young's pleadings on this claim

merely consist of the following: "Counsel knew that Hammonds had

identified Freeman as a target and initiated the plan to contact and lure

Freeman to the site where he was killed. Counsel knew that this phone

was obtained by the State yet sought no discovery of its contents." (C.

24.)

       In finding that this claim had no merit and was insufficiently

pleaded, the postconviction court stated:

             "Young fails to state a valid claim for relief or present a
       material issue of fact or law under Rule 32.7(d) of the
       Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Information obtained
       from Hammonds's phone that he targeted and initiated a plan
       to lure Freeman to his death would have been cumulative to
       the evidence presented at trial. …

       3"Young was 6 feet 4 inches tall and weighed 270 pounds," at the
time of the shootings. Young, ___ So. 3d at ___.
                                    23
CR-21-0393

          "Moreover, Young fails to satisfy the specificity and full
     factual pleading requirements of Rule 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the
     Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Young fails to plead
     what specific, relevant, and admissible evidence could have
     been obtained from Hammonds's phone. "

(C. 659.)

     Young failed to plead what evidence was on Hammonds's cellular

telephone that counsel failed to obtain and failed to plead how he was

prejudiced by the failure to obtain that evidence. Young failed to plead

the full facts to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 32.6(b),

Ala. R. Crim. P. Therefore, summary dismissal was proper, and Young

is due no relief on this claim.

                                   B.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to develop and present a coherent defense theory. He makes several

different arguments in support of this claim.

                                    1.

     First, Young argues that his trial counsel failed to offer an adequate

opening statement. Specifically, Young pleaded that defense counsel's

opening statement was incoherent and that in that statement counsel

told the jury that the defendant had not been present at the shootings

                                  24
CR-21-0393

but had no evidence to support that assertion and did not present any

such evidence at trial.

     In summarily dismissing this claim, the postconviction court made

the following pertinent findings:

           "It is plain from the face of the record that, as [Ben]
     Gardner indicated he would do during his opening, counsel
     questioned Hammonds and Bates as to their own involvement
     in the murder, motives to lie and point the finger at Young,
     plea deals, and ability to identify Young from the Spring
     Creek Apartments security footage despite the quality of the
     video. And as Young acknowledges in his petition, counsel
     introduced the idea that Hammonds and Bates could not be
     trusted to give accurate, truthful, and unbiased testimony
     during opening statements. Notably, trial counsel returned
     to that theory in closing arguments. Moreover, this strategy
     served to remind the jury that the prosecutor's passionate
     opening statement was not evidence, but rather, what
     mattered most was the credibility of the witnesses.
     Consequently, it is clear on the face of the record that trial
     counsel presented a reasonable defense theory, challenged the
     State's theory, and developed the defenses discussed in
     opening statements.

           "Moreover, Young fails to satisfy the specificity and full
     factual pleading requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the
     Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State's theory of
     the case was that Young was present at, and helped commit,
     the murder of Freeman. Trial counsel refuted this theory by
     asserting Young's innocence: 'He didn't do it. He wasn't
     there.' … Young fails to name any witness that counsel could
     have called, what questions counsel could have asked that
     witness, and if that witness would have been willing to testify.
     …

                                    25
CR-21-0393

           "Young likewise fails to plead any other reasonable
     strategy counsel should have utilized. Three key pieces of
     evidence presented by the State against Young were the
     testimony of Hammonds, Bates, and their identification of
     Young in the security video. To undercut the State's theory
     that Young was there and was one of the shooters, it was a
     reasonable strategy on counsel's part to undermine the
     testimony and credibility of Hammonds and Bates. Young
     does not specify any other coherent defense strategy counsel
     could have introduced during opening statements."

(C. 661-64.)

     Young asserted bare allegations that counsel was deficient in his

opening statement. In fact, his entire pleadings consist of what Young

maintains counsel did wrong. Young failed to plead what a "coherent

defense" or opening would have consisted of or what counsel should have

stated in opening statement.     Also, Young did not plead any facts

indicating that there was an alternative defense involving an alibi.

     "[The appellant] made bare and conclusory allegations that
     counsel failed to put forth a coherent defense theory and to
     challenge the State's case during opening and closing
     statements, but he failed to allege in his petition what he
     believed counsel should have said during opening and closing
     statements."

Stanley v. State, 335 So. 3d 1, 43 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).

     Moreover, opening statements are typically matters of trial

strategy. " '[T]here is no constitutional rule that counsel must employ

                                  26
CR-21-0393

any particular rhetorical technique in the opening statement.' Cirincione

v. State, 119 Md. App. 471, 498, 705 A.2d 96, 108 (1998)." Washington v.

State, 95 So. 3d 26, 65 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).

     In regard to Young's claim that his trial counsel failed to keep a

promise made in opening, this Court has stated:

     "[N]umerous courts have held that counsel's failure to keep a
     promise made in opening statements rarely constitutes
     ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hampton v. Leibach, 290
     F. Supp. 2d 905, 928 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ('An attorney's failure to
     fulfil promises made in opening statement is not often a
     successful basis for an ineffective assistance claim. The
     decision to change strategy during trial is often forced upon
     defense counsel by the vagaries of the courtroom arena.');
     United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169, 177
     n. 19 (3d Cir. 1976) ('We do not intimate ... that a lawyer of
     normal competence could not promise to produce evidence in
     this opening statement and then change his mind during the
     course of the trial and not produce the promised evidence.').
     See also Fayemi v. Ruskin, 966 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2020)
     ('[T]he Supreme Court has never hinted at a per se rule that
     defense lawyers must keep all promises made in opening
     statement, even if a mid-trial change in circumstances alters
     the defense strategy.')."

State v. Lewis, [Ms. CR-20-0372, May 6. 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.

Crim. App. 2022).

     Based on the cases cited above, we agree with the postconviction

court that there was no material issue of fact or law that would have

entitled Young to relief on this claim. Summary dismissal was proper.

                                  27
CR-21-0393

See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.      For these reasons, Young is due no

relief on this claim.

                                     2.

      Young next argues that his trial counsel failed to adequately cross-

examine key State witnesses.

      " '[D]ecisions regarding whether and how to conduct cross-
      examinations and what evidence to introduce are matters of
      trial strategy and tactics.' Rose v. State, 258 Ga. App. 232,
      236, 573 S.E.2d 465, 469 (2002). ' " '[D]ecisions whether to
      engage in cross-examination, and if so to what extent and in
      what manner, are ... strategic in nature.' " ' Hunt v. State, 940
      So. 2d 1041, 1065 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), quoting Rosario–
      Dominguez v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 500, 515
      (S.D.N.Y. 2005), quoting in turn, United States v. Nersesian,
      824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir. 1987). 'The decision whether to
      cross-examine a witness is [a] matter of trial strategy.' People
      v. Leeper, 317 Ill. App. 3d 475, 483, 740 N.E.2d 32, 39, 251 Ill.
      Dec. 202, 209 (2000)."

A.G. v. State, 989 So. 2d 1167, 1173 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007).

      To sufficiently plead a claim that counsel was ineffective in cross-

examination of a witness, or lack of cross-examination, a Rule 32

petitioner must plead what "questions would have resulted" in an

adequate cross-examination and further "plead any facts indicating that

counsel's decision not to cross-examine [the witness] was not sound trial

strategy." A.G. v. State, 989 So. 2d at 1173.

                                   28
CR-21-0393

                                     a.

     Young first asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in its cross-

examination of Hammonds because, he says, counsel failed to cross-

examine Hammonds concerning the inconsistencies in his multiple

statements to police, his plans to lie to authorities, and his plan with

Bates to set up Freeman and Blythe. Young further pleaded that counsel

was ineffective for playing Hammonds's videotaped statement to the jury.

     When summarily dismissing this claim, the postconviction court

stated:

     "The jury certainly heard Hammonds's admission and was
     therefore aware that he had lied to police. Moreover, trial
     counsel was able to remind the jury of that fact during closing
     arguments. Similarly, counsel made sure that the jury saw
     Hammonds's videotaped statement, which showed his
     demeanor, his pleas for leniency, and his shifting statements.

           "….

           "Young next claims that counsel were ineffective for
     failing to cross-examine Hammonds about his initial plan
     with Bates to lie to authorities. …

           "Young fails to satisfy the specificity and full factual
     pleading requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the
     Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. As for the coverup
     effort by Bates and Hammonds, Young fails to plead how such
     testimony would have made a difference in his trial, especially
     considering that Hammonds had already admitted to lying to
     the police, he testified that he had lied at Bates's request, and

                                  29
CR-21-0393

    he testified that he and Bates had spoken about lying to
    police. Moreover, Young fails to plead how Hammonds's
    answers would have saved Young from conviction when they
    did not save Hubbard from conviction of capital murder. …

         "….

          "Young next claims that counsel was ineffective for
    failing to ask Hammonds about his plan with Vickery to set
    up Freeman and Blythe.

          "As addressed above, Young fails to state a valid claim
    for relief or present a material issue of fact or law under Rule
    32.7(d) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.
    Testimony from Vickery that Hammonds targeted Blythe and
    Freeman would have been cumulative to the testimony
    presented at trial. Bates and Hubbard both testified that
    Freeman was targeted and marked for death. Further,
    Hammonds testified that he contacted Freeman directly as
    part of the plan to set him up. …

          "Finally, Young claims that introducing Hammonds's
    videotaped statement was ineffective. … Young's claim
    focuses entirely on the alleged negative impact of trial
    counsel's strategic decision to play the videotape of
    Hammonds's statement and entirely fails to account for the
    positive ways in which trial counsel made use of it.        As
    discussed above, trial counsel was able to reference Young's
    statement during closing arguments to point out Young's
    inconsistencies, pleas for leniency, and his consistent
    preoccupation with avoiding arrest. Counsel made use of that
    evidence to portray Hammonds as a liar who would say
    anything to stay out of prison. Considering how counsel
    actually used this evidence, Young fails to explain why trial
    counsel's decision to play the video was not a matter of sound
    trial strategy. Similarly Young fails to plead facts showing
    that the benefits of the videotape were outweighed by the
    disadvantages of doing so. Thus, Young has failed to plead

                                 30
CR-21-0393

     facts that, if true, would establish either Strickland [v.
     Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),] prong."

(C. 666-72.)

     Young failed to plead what counsel should have asked on cross-

examination and did not plead any facts that suggested that counsel's

actions were not strategic. A.G. v. State, 989 So. 2d at 1173. Summary

dismissal of this claim was proper.

     Moreover, the trial record shows that the State questioned

Hammonds about his first statement to police and that Hammonds

admitted that he had lied to police. (Trial R. 836.) The State also elicited

testimony from Hammonds that Bates had asked him to lie. The cross-

examination by defense counsel shows that counsel chose to concentrate

on the fact that, of the individuals involved in the shooting, Hammonds

was the only one that had not been charged with any offense, and that,

he thus had a great motivation to lie at Young's trial. (Trial R. 841.)

     Also, trial counsel's decision to play Hammonds's videotaped

statement to the jury was clearly a strategic decision. The jurors could

see for themselves by viewing the tape and viewing Hammonds's trial

testimony that he had lied to police.    Thus, there was also no material

                                   31
CR-21-0393

issue or fact or law that would entitle Young to relief. See Rule 32.7(d),

Ala. R. Crim. P. Accordingly, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                      b.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to adequately cross-examine Bates. Specifically, he pleaded that trial

counsel should have cross-examined Bates concerning the terms of his

plea agreement with the State and should have questioned him about his

inconsistent statements to police.

     In summarily dismissing this claim, the postconviction court stated:

           "Young does not plead how counsel could have
     discredited Bates with further questioning. Indeed, Young
     does not specify a single question counsel should have asked
     to discredit Bates, Bates's response, or how Bates's response
     would have further discredited him. Moreover, Young fails to
     plead how counsel's alleged failures actually prejudiced him,
     especially considering that, since the jury watched the same
     video, it could determine the quality of the video and give
     Bates's identification of Young its due weight. Thus, Young
     has failed to plead facts, that, if true, would establish either
     Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),] prong. …

           "Young next claims that counsel failed to question Bates
     about the inconsistencies between his first and second
     statements to law enforcement. Young claims that if counsel
     had questioned Bates about his inconsistent statements to
     police, the jury would have learned that Bates and
     Hammonds were the only two in the gang that knew Freeman
     and Blythe, and that Hammonds and Hubbard had
     engineered the shooting.

                                     32
CR-21-0393

          "…This testimony would have been cumulative at best,
    as Bates had already testified on direct that none of the people
    involved in the shooting, other than himself and Hammonds,
    knew Freeman. Bates had already testified on direct that
    Hammonds and Hubbard engineered the shooting, and that it
    was Bates's job to set Freeman up for the shooting. Bates had
    likewise already testified on direct that, during his first
    meeting with police, he told officers that he was at the
    shooting.

         "….

          "Young next claims that counsel failed to adequately
    cross-examine Bates about his plan with Hammonds to
    concoct a story to police, which Young claims would have
    made Hammonds look just as culpable and devious.

         "…Young's claim hinges on the assumption that Bates
    would have given a different answer to defense counsel than
    he gave on direct. But Young fails to plead facts showing that
    Bates would have given a different response. …

          "…Young's specific contention that the jury would have
    known that Bates's proffer agreement and plea deal were in
    evidence without defense counsel's guidance is meritless, as
    the jury had the ability to review all pieces of evidence
    presented at trial. Though defense counsel did not publish
    the deal and agreement to the jury, counsel did introduce
    them into evidence, and, thus, they were available to the jury
    during deliberations. Moreover, during closing arguments,
    defense counsel pointed out to the jury that Bates had lied to
    the police, and the jury heard Bates give this testimony on
    direct. Young fails to specify any other particular lie counsel
    should have chosen to highlight during closing, or why
    counsel's decision to address the lies collectively was
    unreasonable. Moreover, Young fails to plead how counsel's
    strategy actually prejudiced him. Thus, Young has failed to

                                 33
CR-21-0393

     plead facts that, if true, would establish either Strickland
     prong."

(C. 672-77.)

     Young failed to plead what counsel should have asked Bates on

cross-examination; thus, we agree with the postconviction court that

Young failed to plead the full facts necessary to survive summary

dismissal on this claim. See Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.

     Moreover, the trial record shows that before Bates testified a

lengthy hearing was held outside the presence of the jury.      Young's

counsel moved to suppress Bates's testimony. The trial court noted that

it had granted Young's motion to suppress all statements that Bates

made on July 7, 2017. On voir dire and outside the presence of the jury,

Young's counsel then questioned Bates about the specific terms of his

plea agreement with the State, and the facts and introduced that

agreement. (Trial R. 712-17.) When the jury was brought back into the

courtroom, the prosecutor questioned Bates extensively about the terms

of his plea agreement with the State, that he had pleaded guilty to

conspiracy to commit murder, that he was currently incarcerated in

Colbert County jail, and that he had an agreement with the State that in

exchange for his truthful testimony the State would recommend a

                                 34
CR-21-0393

sentence of 20 years. (Trial R. 722-24.) The jury was aware of the terms

of the State's plea agreement with Bates; therefore, any further

discussion on that subject would have been repetitive. The record also

shows that the State questioned Bates about his statement to police and

that Bates testified that he lied to police and that he had asked

Hammonds to lie for him. On cross-examination counsel questioned

Bates concerning his ability to identify Young from the video given the

condition of the videotape.

     The trial record shows that the issues Young pleaded were not

presented to the jury were, in fact, presented to the jury. Thus, summary

dismissal of this claim was also proper because it failed to present an

issue of fact or law that would entitle Young to relief. See Rule 32.7(d),

Ala. R. Crim. P. Accordingly, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                    c.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to adequately cross-examine Megan Bryant about Young's drug use on

the day of Freeman's murder.4      Specifically, he asserts that counsel

     4InYoung's postconviction petition, this witness's name is spelled
"Megan"; in the trial transcript her name is spelled "Meagan."
                                  35
CR-21-0393

should have questioned Bryant about the fact that Young took drugs

throughout the day and was intoxicated at the time of the shooting.

Young further asserts that counsel should have questioned Bryant about

her losing custody of her child and whether the State had indicated it was

going to help her regain custody.

     The postconviction court made the following findings on this claim:

           "Young fails to plead how counsel's decision not to
     question Bryant on Young's drug use was not a matter of
     sound trial strategy. The jury had already heard testimony
     that the gang was involved in the drug trade. By refraining
     from asking Bryant questions about Young's drug use, the
     jury did not hear testimony, offered by Young's own defense
     team, that could have tainted their opinion of Young. In the
     same vein, had counsel questioned Bryant on her breakup
     with Young, Bryant might have testified, as Young
     acknowledges, that Young had cheated on her, or, at the very
     least appeared to be straying from their relationship. This
     information could have painted Young as a dishonest person,
     which in turn, could have tainted the jury's opinion of him.
     Young fails to plead why no reasonable attorney in counsel's
     position would have done the same. …

            "Furthermore, Young claims there were indications that
     Bryant lost custody of her child, but Young does not provide
     any information in support of this contention. Young fails to
     plead on what days she lost her child, in what county, and for
     what reason Bryant lost custody of her child. Young likewise
     fails to plead facts that, if true, would establish that Bryant
     could not regain custody of her child without cooperating with
     law enforcement and the District Attorney's Office. Thus,
     Young fails to plead facts that, if true, would establish either
     Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] prong."

                                    36
CR-21-0393

(C. 677-80.)

     Young failed to plead the full facts in regard to this claim. Young

made a bare assertion that counsel did not question Bryant about

Young's drug use but failed to plead any facts surrounding his supposed

drug use on the day of the shootings. Nor did Young plead any facts

surrounding his assertion that the State was going to assist Bryant with

her child-custody problems.

     A review of the trial record shows that defense counsel extensively

cross-examined Bryant about her drug use on the day of the shootings in

a clear effort to discredit her testimony:

     "[Defense counsel]: Now, what was it that you were taking?

     "[Bryant]: To start, I smoked weed, I took Xanax. In the
     evening time, I have a prescription for Remeron, Prednisone,
     and Ambien that I would take.

     "….

     "[Defense counsel]: And just tell us what all you did the rest
     of the day. What all drugs did you do that day?

     "[Bryant]: I mean, I can't exactly be sure what all drugs I took
     that day. I had a very deep addiction and would take anything
     that      I       could      get       my       hands        on.

     "….

                                   37
CR-21-0393

     "[Defense counsel]: That is your testimony that all of the
     things that you just testified under oath that you said and did,
     heard other folks did, you were high off of drugs when that
     happened; is that correct?

     "[Bryant]: Yes, sir."

(Trial R. 900-902.)

     Counsel's cross-examination of Bryant was both thorough and

extensive. Clearly, counsel chose to focus on the fact that Bryant had

taken many drugs on that day and, thus, that her testimony was suspect.

" ' "[T]he scope of cross-examination is grounded in trial tactics and

strategy, and will rarely constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." ' "

Stanley v. State, 335 So. 3d 1, 37 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020), quoting Bonner

v. State, 308 Ga. App. 827, 828, 709 S.E.2d 358, 360 (2011), quoting in

turn Cooper v. State, 281 Ga. 760, 762, 642 S.E.2d 817, 820 (2007).

     For the above reasons, this claim was properly summarily

dismissed, and Young is due no relief.

                                     d.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to adequately cross-examine Shaun Settles because, he says, Settles was

                                   38
CR-21-0393

in possession of critical evidence, a note/letter, indicating that Young was

being used as a scapegoat.5

      Settles testified that he was in jail on unrelated charges at the same

time as Capote and Hubbard, that Hubbard was his cell mate, and that

Capote was in a nearby cell. He said that Capote and Hubbard would

pass notes between the two cells and he would hand the notes between

the two men. Settles said that he kept the notes. In one note, Capote

wrote:      "Listen gee I killed that nigga but f___ [Young] I'll ask for

immunity if I tell him who killed [Freeman] and tell him [Young] did it."

(C. 36.)     Through the contact with Capote and Hubbard and the notes,

Settles led police to the location of the SKS rifle that had been used to

kill Freeman.

      In finding that this claim failed to state a material issue of fact or

law that would entitle Young to relief, the postconviction court stated:

      "While the letter certainly implicates Capote as one of
      Freeman's killers, it does not exonerate Young. Indeed, the
      State traveled under an accomplice liability theory for Young,
      as it was Capote's SKS bullets that killed Freeman. Just
      because Capote admits to killing Freeman in this letter does
      not prove that Young was not also there shooting right
      alongside Capote.

      5InYoung's postconviction petition, this witness's name is spelled
"Shaun"; in the trial transcript his name is spelled "Shawn."
                                   39
CR-21-0393

            "…Young claims that if counsel had introduced this
     evidence, the jury would have had proof that members of the
     conspiracy sought to make Young a scapegoat. On its face,
     the letter does not state that Capote would 'frame' Young, nor
     is there any indication that Capote would have needed to lie
     to place Young at the scene. Young fails to plead, then, how
     counsel's failure to introduce the letter, and then cross Settles
     on it was not part of a reasonable trial strategy. On direct,
     Settles gave limited testimony, briefly explaining that, from
     the letters between Capote and Hubbard, he learned the
     location of the SKS rifle Capote used to shoot Freeman. This
     information was then used by law enforcement to retrieve the
     rifle. This testimony is exceedingly narrow, and if anything,
     only further implicated Capote, not Young. If counsel had
     introduced the letter and crossed Settles on its contents,
     counsel could have opened-up Young to damaging testimony
     from Settles on cross and on re-direct. Thus, Young fails to
     plead facts that, if true, would establish either Strickland [v.
     Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),] prong."

(C. 680-82.)

     As the postconviction court stated, the note did not establish

Young's innocence. The State maintained throughout the proceedings

that two shooters were involved and that the fatal shot was fired from

the SKS rifle that had been fired by Capote. It is also clear that counsel

was given a copy of this note during discovery. Clearly, counsel made a

strategic decision to not present the note. Accordingly, there was no

material issue of fact or law that would entitle Young to relief under

                                  40
CR-21-0393

Strickland. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P. Thus, summary dismissal

of this claim was proper.

                                    e.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in its cross-

examination of Investigator Wes Holland because, he says, counsel failed

to adequately question him about the unreliability of the surveillance

video of the parking lot where the shooting occurred.

     The postconviction court stated the following:

     "Young fails to plead how a reasonable attorney in counsel's
     position would have continued to question Investigator [Wes]
     Holland about the video's quality despite the already
     favorable testimony he gave on re-cross. Indeed, on re-cross,
     Investigator Holland testified that he could not tell if the
     persons in the video were black or white. Thus, counsel
     established the difficulty in making an identification from the
     video. Moreover, Young fails to plead how counsel's failure to
     further question Investigator Holland actually prejudiced
     him. Thus, Young has failed to plead facts that, if true, would
     establish either Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
     (1984),] prong."

(C. 682-83.)

     The trial record shows that the surveillance videotape was played

to the jury. On re-cross, Holland was asked about whether he could tell

from the tape if the driver of the vehicle was black or white. Holland

indicated that he could not. (Trial R. 704.) Clearly, the jury could make

                                  41
CR-21-0393

its own assessment concerning the reliability of the video as it viewed

that video. There was no material issue of fact or law that would entitle

Young to relief under Strickland. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P. Thus,

summary dismissal was proper, and Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                      3.

     Young next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to present

an adequate closing argument.        Specifically, he asserts that in closing

argument trial counsel conceded that Young was guilty of capital murder.

     The postconviction court found that this issue was not supported by

the record and that Young thus was not entitled to relief. (C. 683.)

     Indeed, the trial record shows that during closing argument defense

counsel stated that based on the burden of proof in a civil case the

evidence might point to Young's guilt but that this was a criminal case

and the burden of proof required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Trial

R. 1274.) Counsel did not concede Young's guilt in closing argument;

therefore, this claim is not supported by the record. Accordingly, there

was no material issue of fact or law that would entitle Young to relief.

See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.

     Moreover,

                                     42
CR-21-0393

     " '[c]losing argument is an area where trial strategy is most
     evident.' Flemming v. State, 949 S.W.2d 876, 881 (Tex. Ct.
     App. 1997). '[S]pecial deference is due to an attorney's closing
     argument strategy because it is 'an inherently subjective
     task." ' Johnson v. State, 612 So. 2d 1288, 1299 (Ala. Crim.
     App. 1992) (quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447,
     1455 (11th Cir. 1986)."

Clark v. State, 196 So. 3d 285, 315 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). For these

reasons, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                    C.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not

challenging evidence presented by the State indicating that Young was a

high-ranking gang member involved in the narcotics trade.

     The postconviction court stated: "The Court of Criminal Appeals

addressed this issue on direct appeal and found 'no error, much less plain

error, in the circuit court's admission of evidence of Young's gang

affiliation.' Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless

objection." (C. 684.)

     In this Court's opinion on direct appeal, we held that evidence of

Young's gang affiliation and position in the gang was admissible and

relevant to the circumstances surrounding the murder. We stated:

           "The evidence at trial showed that Young was a member
     of the Almighty Imperial Gangsters. Although Young was a

                                   43
CR-21-0393

     top-ranking member of the gang, Hubbard was the leader of
     the gang and was above Young in the hierarchy. After
     Hubbard's house was burglarized, Hubbard had a 'business
     discussion' with the members and told them that he wanted
     to find and kill the person who broke into his house. (R. 744.)
     He asked the gang for their help. This meeting, which Young
     attended, took place in Hubbard's bedroom, where, according
     to testimony, Hubbard generally conducted gang-related
     business. When Hammonds told Hubbard that Freeman
     might be the person who broke into Hubbard's house,
     Hubbard and the other members of the gang planned to kill
     Freeman. This evidence of Young's gang affiliation -- and
     especially his rank in the gang below Hubbard -- was relevant
     to show Young's motive for participating in killing Freeman
     at Hubbard's behest."

Young, ___ So. 3d at ___. Therefore, the underlying claim that supported

Young's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel had no merit.

            " '[B]ecause the underlying claims have no merit, the
     fact that [the petitioner's] lawyer did not raise those claims
     cannot have resulted in any prejudice to [the petitioner].'
     Magwood v. State, 689 So. 2d 959, 974 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
     See also Commonwealth v. Walker, 613 Pa. 601, 614, 36 A.3d
     1, 9 (2011) ('Since all of appellant's underlying claims of trial
     counsel's ineffectiveness fail, his claims of appellate counsel's
     ineffectiveness are necessarily defeated as well....'); Jackson
     v. State, 133 So. 3d 420, 453 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). Many
     other states have applied this same standard. See Walker v.
     State, 863 So. 2d 1, 11 (Miss. 2003) ('Because we have held
     that the underlying claims are without merit, Walker cannot
     show the requisite deficient performance and resulting
     prejudice necessary to establish the various claims of
     ineffective assistance of counsel.'); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205
     Ill. 2d 444, 466, 275 Ill. Dec. 838, 854, 793 N.E.2d 609, 625
     (2002) ('Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and
     on direct appeal are evaluated under the standard set forth in

                                  44
CR-21-0393

     Strickland [v. Washington,] 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064,
     80 L.Ed.2d at 693 [(1984)], which requires the defendant to
     demonstrate both deficient performance by counsel and
     resulting prejudice. Accordingly, if the underlying claim has
     no merit, no prejudice resulted, and petitioner's claims of
     ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal
     must fail.')."

White v. State, 343 So. 3d 1150, 1174 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019). For these

reasons, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                 D.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to the admission of "unreliable videotape evidence without a

proper foundation." (Young's brief, p. 80.) Specifically, Young pleaded

that counsel should have objected when the videotape made by

surveillance cameras of the parking lot where the shooting occurred was

introduced and admitted into evidence.

     The postconviction court found that, on direct appeal, this Court

addressed the underlying issue and found no error, much less plain error;

therefore, there was no material issue or fact or law that would entitle

Young to relief. (C. 690.) In this Court's opinion on direct appeal, we

held that the videotape was admissible under the "silent witness theory"

                                  45
CR-21-0393

because the State had satisfied the requirements of Voudrie v. State, 387

So. 2d 248 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). See Young, ___ So. 3d at ___. 6

     The trial record shows that the State called Mary Sumerel, the

property manager at Spring Creek Apartments, as a witness to establish

the foundation for the admission of the videotape. Sumerel testified that

the apartment complex had video surveillance cameras and that the

cameras were working at the time of the shootings. (Trial R. 530.) She

testified as to when those video cameras were installed, that the video

was stored on a flash drive, and that the video of the shooting had not

been altered in any way while it was in her possession. (Trial R. 534.)

Sumerel's testimony was sufficient to establish a proper foundation for

the admission of the videotape. This Court in Capote specifically found

that the same video was admissible against a claim that there had not

been a proper foundation for its admittance.7 See Capote v. State, 323

So. 3d at 131. Also, the poor quality of the video did not affect its

     6See Ex parte Fuller, 620 So. 2d 675 (Ala. 1993), recognizing the
modified Voudrie test.

     7Sumerel's testimony in Capote's trial was very similar to her
testimony at Young's trial.

                                 46
CR-21-0393

admissibility but rather its weight. "The quality of the tape was a factor

for the jury's consideration in determining the weight to be given the

evidence, rather than a factor concerning its admissibility." Davis v.

State, 529 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).

     Because the underlying claim had no merit, summary dismissal

was proper. See White, supra. For these reasons, Young is due no relief

on this claim.

                                   E.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to adequately challenge the admission of evidence of Young's DNA that

had been discovered on a soda can in the white pickup involved in the

shooting. In summarily dismissing this claim, the postconviction court

stated:

     "Young claims that trial counsel should have objected to the
     DNA evidence on relevance grounds. However, the presence
     of Young's DNA inside the vehicle driven by the shooters was
     clearly relevant and admissible because it tended to make it
     more likely that Young was present at the murder scene,
     creating a definite link between Young and the vehicle used
     to commit the crime. While Young makes much of the fact
     that the DNA evidence cannot pinpoint the time that he was
     present in the truck, that is nearly always the case with DNA
     evidence and it would not have been grounds for error. …
           "….

                                  47
CR-21-0393

           "Moreover, Young fails to satisfy the specificity and full
     factual pleading requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the
     Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Young fails to
     specifically plead any arguments, or authority, that trial
     counsel could have relied on to further challenge the
     admissibility of DNA evidence."

(C. 691-93.)

     First, this claim was properly dismissed because Young pleaded no

grounds upon which the DNA evidence should have been challenged by

his trial counsel. Young failed to plead the full facts to support this claim.

See Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.

     Moreover, Angela Fletcher, a forensic biologist with the Alabama

Department of Forensic Sciences, testified that she conducted DNA tests

on several items that were discovered in the truck involved in the

shootings. The DNA on the soda can, she said, was consistent with

Young's DNA. Also, DNA from a cigarette butt was consistent with

Capote's DNA. On cross-examination, counsel questioned Fletcher about

transferring DNA by coughing or sneezing, made the point that there was

no way to determine how long the DNA had been present, and indicated

that the soda can that contained the DNA could have been moved from

another location and placed in the truck. (Trial R. 1075.) The record

shows that counsel did question the DNA expert. Thus, this claim also

                                     48
CR-21-0393

presented no issue of fact or law that would entitle Young to relief. Thus,

Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                    F.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to various items of evidence that, he says, were inadmissible.

     " '[E]ffectiveness of counsel does not lend itself to
     measurement by picking through the transcript and counting
     the places where objections might be made. Effectiveness of
     counsel is not measured by whether counsel objected to every
     question and moved to strike every answer.' Brooks v. State,
     456 So. 2d 1142, 1145 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). As we recently
     stated in Hooks v. State, 21 So. 3d 772 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008):

           " ' " 'Decisions concerning whether or when to make
           objections at trial are left to the judgment of
           counsel.' State v. Suarez, 867 S.W.2d 583, 587 (Mo.
           App. 1993). 'Ineffective assistance of counsel is not
           to be determined by a post-trial academic
           determination        that   counsel     could    have
           successfully objected to evidence in a given
           number of instances.' Id. 'The failure to object to
           objectionable evidence does not establish
           ineffective assistance of counsel unless the
           evidence resulted in a substantial deprivation of
           the accused['s] right to a fair trial.' Id. 'Counsel's
           failure to object to particular evidence can
           constitute mere "trial error" not arising to
           constitutional proportions and thus not cognizable
           in a post-conviction motion.' Id." '

     "Quoting State v. Radley, 904 S.W.2d 520, 525 (Mo. App.
     1995)."

                                  49
CR-21-0393

Bush v. State, 92 So. 3d 121, 161 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).

                                    1.

     First, Young argues that his trial counsel failed to object to a

photograph that was admitted in the guilt phase that showed the victim

and his girlfriend because, he says, the photograph constituted

inadmissible victim-impact evidence.

     In finding that Young failed to plead sufficient facts to support this

claim, the postconviction court stated:

      "Young does not explain how this picture was improper victim
      impact evidence. Young fails to plead why no reasonable
      attorney would have failed to object to this picture. Moreover,
      Young completely fails to plead how counsel's actions
      prejudiced him. Indeed, Young makes a conclusory allegation
      that counsel's actions were deficient, but does not explain
      how, had counsel objected, the outcome of his trial would have
      likely been different. Thus, Young fails to plead facts that, if
      true, would establish either Strickland [v. Washington, 466
      U.S. 668 (1984),] prong."
(C. 694.)

     Moreover, "[v]ictim-impact statements typically 'describe the effect

of the crime on the victim and his family.' " Turner v. State, 924 So. 2d

737, 770 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).

     "As for Brooks's claim that his counsel were ineffective for
     failing to object to the picture of Brett in a karate uniform and
     a picture of Forest and Brett together, as explained above, 'it
     is generally agreed that the photograph of the victim of the

                                   50
CR-21-0393

     homicide, taken before the alleged murder, is admissible for
     the purpose of identification.' Russell [v. State,] 272 So. 3d
     [1134] 1165 [(Ala. Crim. App. 2017)] (citations and quotations
     omitted). Thus, Brooks's counsel were not ineffective for
     failing to object to the admission of those photographs as
     victim-impact evidence."

Brooks v. State, 340 So. 3d 410, 465 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).

     "[A]t least one court has noted the rarity of finding a counsel's
     performance ineffective for failing to object to photographs:

           " 'A competent lawyer familiar with the most
           recent pronouncements of this Court on the subject
           and familiar with the trial record would not
           perceive that admission of the photographs was an
           obvious basis for reversal of the appeal. No case is
           cited or found where trial counsel was held
           ineffective for failing to object to such photographs
           or holding that appellate counsel was ineffective
           for not asserting error in the admission of such
           photographs." '

Thompson v. State, 310 So. 3d 850, 874 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018), quoting

Hall v. State, 16 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Mo. 2000). There was no material issue

or fact or law that would entitle Young to relief. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.

Crim. P. Accordingly, summary dismissal was proper, and Young is due

no relief on this claim.

                                  2.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to a hearsay statement made by a police officer that Young was

                                   51
CR-21-0393

"possibly armed with a rifle" when he was arrested. (Young's brief at p.

83.)

       In summarily dismissing this claim, the postconviction court stated:

       "This statement was not hearsay as it was not an out of court
       statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
       This statement was not offered to prove that Young was
       armed with a rifle, but rather, was offered to inform the jury
       of the officer's mindset when in pursuit of Young. … Even if
       this statement was hearsay, Young fails to plead that it was
       not otherwise admissible. Young fails to plead how, if counsel
       had objected, there is a reasonable probability the entire
       outcome of his case would have been different. Thus, Young
       fails to plead facts that, if true, would establish either
       Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] prong."

(C. 694-95.)

       The trial record shows that Officer Derrick Thomas of the Loretto

Police Department testified that on March 4, 2016, he was in pursuit of

Young. The following occurred:

       "[Prosecutor]: Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the
       jury what information you had about the pursuit or the
       subject involved in the pursuit at that point?

       "[Officer Thomas]: We were monitoring the pursuit coming
       into Lauderdale County. Our radios allow us to monitor the
       Lauderdale County Sheriff's Department. From that, we
       learned that it was a silver Ford car. When it was apparent
       that it was coming into Lawrence County, their dispatch
       contacted ours and they relayed to us that Mr. Young was
       wanted for a homicide in Tuscumbia and was possibly armed
       with a rifle."

                                   52
CR-21-0393

(Trial R. 960-61.)

     Clearly, the above evidence was introduced to show the

circumstances surrounding Young's arrest and was not hearsay.

          " ' "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
     declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
     evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' Rule
     801(c), Ala. R. Evid. However, ' "[a] statement offered for some
     other purpose other than to prove the truth of its factual
     assertion is not hearsay." ' Montgomery v. State, 781 So. 2d
     1007, 1019 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Thomas v. State,
     408 So. 2d 562, 564 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981))."

Capote v. State, 323 So. 3d 104, 127 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).

     Accordingly, any objection that this evidence was hearsay would

have been overruled. "Because the substantive claim underlying the

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has no merit, counsel could not

be ineffective for failing to raise this issue." Lee v. State, 44 So. 3d 1145,

1173 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). Summary dismissal was proper, and Young

is due no relief on this claim.

                                      3.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to testimony from Officer Steven Benson concerning the

apprehension of Young's codefendants, Capote and Hubbard, at a traffic

                                   53
CR-21-0393

stop.    Young's entire argument on this issue in brief consists of the

following statement: "As Mr. Young also pleaded, counsel also failed to

object to irrelevant and inadmissible testimony from Steven Benson

concerning the apprehension of both Capote and Hubbard in a traffic

stop." (Young's brief at pp. 83-84.)

        In finding that Young failed to plead sufficient facts to support this

claim, the postconviction court stated:

        "Young makes a conclusory claim that this testimony was not
        relevant or admissible, but he fails to explain how. Young
        fails to plead how this was not part of a reasonable trial
        strategy. The testimony presented no harm to Young as it did
        not implicate him in any illegal activity. Rather, the
        testimony distanced Young from Capote and Hubbard as
        Young was not with the pair when they were arrested.
        Moreover, Young completely fails to explain how he was
        actually prejudiced."

(C. 696.)

        Young failed to plead why the testimony concerning the arrest of

two of his codefendants was irrelevant and inadmissible.          Nor did he

plead how he was prejudiced by the officer's testimony. Accordingly,

Young failed to meet his burden of pleading the full facts in regard to this

claim and summary dismissal was proper. Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.

Accordingly, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                     54
CR-21-0393

                                     4.

     Young further argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the introduction of 34 autopsy photographs of the

victim because, he says, the photographs were prejudicial.

     The postconviction court found that this claim was without merit

because this Court, on direct appeal, addressed the admissibility of the

autopsy photographs and held that the photographs were admissible. (C.

697.) On direct appeal, we stated:

     "Although unpleasant to view, the autopsy photographs were
     relevant and admissible to show the location and the extent
     of the wounds to Freeman's body. The State had the burden
     of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Young intended to
     kill Freeman 'by or through the use of a deadly weapon while
     the victim is in a vehicle.' § 13A-5-40(17), Ala. Code 1975.
     Among other things, the photographs showed the number and
     the location of the gunshot wounds to Freeman's body. Thus,
     the photographs were relevant to show Young's intent that
     Freeman be killed and to show that Freeman was seated in
     his vehicle when he was shot. We also note that the
     photographs of the injured vital organs showed 'only so much
     of the surrounding dissected body area' as was 'reasonably
     necessary to furnish visual aid to the jury.' See McKee v.
     State, 33 Ala. App. 171, 177, 31 So. 2d 656, 661 (1947). For
     these reasons, we find no error, much less plain error, in the
     admission of the autopsy photographs."

Young, ___ So. 3d at ___.

                                 55
CR-21-0393

     When addressing the admission of the same photographs in the

trial of one of Young's codefendants, this Court further stated:

           "This Court has thoroughly reviewed all the autopsy
     photographs. As Capote contends, photographs that depict
     distortions of the subject matter, such as massive mutilation
     or extreme magnification, are objectionable. See Malone v.
     State, 536 So. 2d 123 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). Nonetheless,
     photographs that accurately depict the nature of a victim's
     wounds are admissible even if they are gruesome or
     cumulative. Acklin v. State, 790 So. 2d 975 (Ala. Crim. App.
     2000).     The autopsy photographs were relevant and
     admissible to show the extent of the wounds to Freeman's
     body. Each photograph was identified and explained to the
     jury. Although they are certainly unpleasant to view, they are
     not unduly gruesome, and this Court concludes that their
     prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh their
     probative value. Therefore, this Court finds no error, much
     less plain error, in the admission of the autopsy photographs.
     Accordingly, Capote is not entitled to any relief on this claim."

Capote v. State, 323 So. 3d at 126-27.

     Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise an issue that has

no merit. Lee v. State, 44 So. 3d at 1173.

     Moreover,

     "At least one court has noted the rarity of finding a counsel's
     performance ineffective for failing to object to photographs:

                " 'A competent lawyer familiar with the most
           recent pronouncements of this Court on the subject
           and familiar with the trial record would not
           perceive that admission of the photographs was an
           obvious basis for reversal of the appeal. No case is

                                  56
CR-21-0393

           cited or found where trial counsel was held
           ineffective for failing to object to such photographs
           or holding that appellate counsel was ineffective
           for not asserting error in the admission of such
           photographs.' "

Thompson v. State, 310 So. 3d 850, 874 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018), quoting,

in part Hall v. State, 16 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Mo. 2000). For these reasons,

Young was due no relief on this claim and summary dismissal was

proper.

                                     G.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to conduct any meaningful voir dire relevant to the unique issues

presented by a death-penalty case.

     In finding that Young failed to plead the full facts concerning this

claim, the postconviction court stated:

     "Young claims that counsel asked 'basic' questions, but he
     fails to plead what questions counsel asked that were
     problematic. Young likewise fails to specifically plead what
     questions counsel should have asked.            Finally, Young
     completely fails to plead how counsel's alleged failure actually
     prejudiced him, considering the State's own questions
     concerning the death penalty and the juror's answers. Thus,
     Young fails to plead facts that, if true, would establish either
     Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),] prong."

(C. 697-98.)

                                  57
CR-21-0393

     As the postconviction court stated, Young failed to plead what

questions counsel should have asked during voir dire that would have

constituted more than "basic" questions. Also, Young failed to plead how

he was prejudiced by counsel's actions during voir dire. Therefore, the

full facts concerning this claim were not pleaded. Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.

Crim. P.

     Moreover, the trial record shows that the prospective jurors were

death-qualified by the circuit court. In fact, this claim was raised on

direct appeal and this Court upheld the death-qualifications questions

posed to the prospective jurors. Young, ___ So. 3d at ___. In regard to

voir dire examination, this Court has stated:

           " 'Generally, "[a]n attorney's actions during voir
           dire are considered to be matters of trial strategy,"
           which "cannot be the basis" of an ineffective
           assistance claim "unless counsel's decision is ... so
           ill chosen that it permeates the entire trial with
           obvious unfairness." '

     "Neill v. Gibson, 263 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting
     Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1349 (10th Cir. 1997)).
     'Counsel, like the trial court, is granted "particular deference"
     when conducting voir dire.' Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662,
     676 (6th Cir. 2006)."

                                  58
CR-21-0393

Washington v. State, 95 So. 3d 26, 64 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012). For these

reasons, summary dismissal of this claim was proper, and Young is due

no relief on this claim.

                                 H.

     Young argues that two of his trial attorneys suffered from a conflict

of interest because, he says, his attorney Ben Gardner represented Shaun

Settles's girlfriend, Robyn Green, on an unrelated charge and another of

his attorneys, Nathan Johnson, had previously represented Settles.

Young also pleaded that his attorneys shared information with

Hubbard's investigator.

     This portion of Young's petition is confusing and sparse. Young

pleaded that Shaun Settles testified in exchange for a lenient sentence in

an unrelated case and for a more lenient sentence for Green in that same

unrelated case.    He further pleaded that Gardner had represented

Settles's girlfriend and that at one point Johnson had represented

Settles. Green did not testify at Young's trial.

     In summarily dismissing this claim, the postconviction court stated:

           "Young fails to satisfy the specificity and full factual
     pleading requirements of Rule 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the
     Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. To establish a conflict-
     of-interest claim, a petition 'must establish that an actual

                                  59
CR-21-0393

       conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
       performance …. Thus, the mere possibility of a conflict is not
       enough to upset a conviction; the [petitioner] must identify an
       actual conflict that impeded his lawyer's representation.' …
       Young has failed to do this. It is not enough to establish an
       actual conflict by simply stating that counsel also represented
       someone else who was tangentially connected to this case.
       Young likewise fails to plead how this 'conflict' impeded his
       representation, especially considering counsel's vigorous
       cross-examination of Settles.      As for Young's claim that
       counsel shared information with Hubbard's investigator,
       Young fails to plead what information was shared and how
       such action, if true, prejudiced him. Indeed, Young does not
       plead how the information given to the investigator was used
       against him at trial and impacted its outcome. Rather, Young
       makes only a conclusory allegation that counsel erred. Thus,
       Young's claim as pleaded is insufficient to overcome
       Strickland's strong presumption of effective assistance."

(C. 699.)

       Young failed to plead the full circumstances surrounding his

attorneys' prior representations.       Indeed, no facts concerning those

representations were pleaded in Young's petition. Nor did Young plead

what    counsel    supposedly   shared     with   Hubbard's   investigator.

"Conclusions unsupported by specific facts will not satisfy the

requirements of Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). The full factual basis must

be included in the petition itself." Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d at 356.

       Moreover, the trial record shows that before Settles testified,

Young's counsel objected and argued that Settles's testimony should be

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excluded because the State attorneys who signed the agreement with

Settles would be called to testify. The trial record further shows that

neither Gardner nor Johnson represented Settles when he signed the

plea agreement.     The plea agreement that was entered into evidence

shows that at the time that the plea agreement was signed, Settles's

attorneys were Jeff Austin and Pride Tompkins. (Trial C. 43-49.)

     For these reasons, summary dismissal of this claim was proper.

Accordingly, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                  I.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to the State's lack of corroboration of his accomplices' testimony.

     The postconviction court noted that this Court, on direct appeal,

addressed the underlying claim and then found that, even if Young had

objected, there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of his

accomplices. On direct appeal, this Court held that the testimony of

Hammonds and Bates was corroborated. We stated:

          "Even without Hammonds's and Bates's testimony of
     Young's involvement in the murder of Freeman and the
     shooting of Blythe, the State presented sufficient evidence
     tending to connect Young with those offenses.

                                   61
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          "The State presented evidence that two days before
    Freeman was murdered Hubbard reported a burglary at his
    house on Midland Avenue in Muscle Shoals. The responding
    officer said that Hubbard was angry about the burglary, and
    Young's girlfriend, Meagan, testified that she and others had
    to calm down Hubbard. (R. 896.) Meagan testified that two
    days later she was at Hubbard's house when Young and
    several others went into Hubbard's bedroom. When Young
    came out of the bedroom 10-15 minutes later, he went with
    Meagan, Capote, and Capote's girlfriend to the Gander
    Mountain store in Florence. Young asked Meagan to buy some
    ammunition and he told her what kind of ammunition to buy.
    Meagan bought a box of 7.62x39mm ammunition from Gander
    Mountain at 9:01 p.m. on March 1. After Meagan bought the
    ammunition, Young drove everyone back to Hubbard's house.

          "Surveillance footage from the Spring Creek
    Apartments in Tuscumbia shows a white Dodge four-door
    pickup truck arriving at the apartment complex around 10:47
    p.m. on March 1. A blue Mustang arrived about 10-11 minutes
    later. The time stamps from the surveillance footage showing
    Freeman's blue Mustang arriving at the Spring Creek
    Apartments corresponded with the time stamps from
    Burgner's Facebook Messenger exchange with Freeman in
    which Freeman told her that he was 'getting my cash r[ight]
    n[ow]' that 'Vonte' owed him.

           "[Jodi] Bohn, who lived at the Spring Creek Apartments,
    testified that she looked out of her apartment window and saw
    two men get out of a white Dodge pickup truck. The man who
    got out of the driver's side was 'big and heavy.' The record
    shows that Young is 6 feet 4 inches tall and weighed 270
    pounds.

          "Law-enforcement officers found several shell casings at
    the scene. The State produced evidence that the shell casings
    found at the scene were 7.62x39mm -- the same type of

                                62
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    ammunition Young directed Meagan to buy from Gander
    Mountain two hours before Freeman was murdered.

          "Shortly after midnight, [Dale] Springer [a resident of
    the Chateau Orleans apartments] saw a white Dodge pickup
    truck park at the Chateau Orleans apartment complex in
    Muscle Shoals near Hubbard's house. He saw a silver or gold
    four-door car pull up. The driver of the pickup truck talked
    with the driver of the car before the car sped away. The two
    men who had gotten out of the pickup truck walked away and
    left the truck parked at the Chateau Orleans apartment
    complex.

          "Meagan testified that when she woke up at Hubbard's
    house on March 2, Young 'thought it was best' that they leave
    Hubbard's house that day. Meagan testified that Young had
    in the past driven a white Dodge pickup truck. DNA from a
    grape soda can found in the white Dodge pickup truck parked
    at the Chateau Orleans apartment complex matched DNA
    from a cheek swab taken from Young.

         "Three days after Freeman was murdered law-
    enforcement officers were watching Hubbard's house when
    they saw Young leave Hubbard's house driving a silver car.
    When law-enforcement officers tried to stop Young, Young led
    several law-enforcement agencies on a chase through
    northern Alabama and into Tennessee.

           "Based on information Settles provided them, law-
    enforcement officers later found an SKS rifle matching the
    description of one that Hubbard owned. Forensic scientists
    tested the rifle and found that the 7.62x39mm-shell casings
    found at the scene, as well as the projectiles recovered from
    Freeman's body during the autopsy, were fired from the SKS
    rifle.

       "The State's evidence, independent of Bates's and
    Hammonds's testimony, tended to connect Young to the

                               63
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     commission of the offenses for which the jury convicted him.
     Thus, the State produced sufficient evidence corroborating
     Bates's and Hammonds's accomplice testimony."

Young, ___ So. 3d at ___.

     Because this Court addressed the underlying claim and concluded

that there was sufficient evidence to corroborate Young's accomplices'

testimony, there was no material issue of fact or law that would entitle

Young to relief. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P. Therefore, summary

dismissal was proper. For these reasons, Young is due no relief on this

claim.

                                    J.

     Young next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to his conviction for shooting into a vehicle when that offense was

part of the capital offense of shooting into an occupied vehicle. The

postconviction court found that this claim was without merit based on

the record. (C. 703.)

     The trial record shows that Young was convicted of murder made

capital because it was committed by shooting into an occupied vehicle, of

assault in the first degree, and shooting or discharging-a-firearm into an

occupied vehicle. (Trial C. 344.) However, before sentencing, the State

                                  64
CR-21-0393

moved that the discharging a firearm conviction be set aside because, it

argued, that crime was encompassed in the capital-murder conviction.

(Trial C. 346-47.)    The circuit court granted the State's motion. (Trial

C. 348.) Thus, Young could not establish any prejudice in regard to this

claim because the conviction was vacated.        This issue presented no

material issue of fact or law that would entitle Young to relief. See Rule

32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P. Therefore, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                    K.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to pursue remedies when a juror indicated his fear of participating as a

juror on Young's case.      The pleadings on this claim consist of one

paragraph. (C. 55.)

     The postconviction court made the following findings:

     "Though trial counsel moved for a mistrial, Young claims that
     if trial counsel had made an effort to gather more information
     from juror B.M., counsel could have presented a more
     'coherent basis' for the motion being granted.

           "….

          "Young fails to plead what questions counsel should
     have asked, what answers juror B.M. would have given, and
     how those answers would have supported a motion for
     mistrial. … Without the above information, Young cannot

                                   65
CR-21-0393

     show that a mistrial was necessary to prevent 'manifest
     injustice.'

            "… Regardless of counsel's strategy, however, Young
     fails to plead how such decision actually prejudiced him. Thus,
     Young fails to plead facts that, if true, would overcome
     Strickland's strong presumptions. Such 'bare claims' are
     insufficient to warrant further proceedings. Rule 32.6(b), Ala.
     R. Crim. P."

(C. 703-706.)

     The trial record shows that on the morning of the last day of trial,

a matter was brought to the circuit court's attention. The following

occurred:

     "THE COURT: Let the record reflect that Juror [B.M.] and
     Bailiff Ernest Bechard, both just came in the courtroom.

     "It is my understanding -- the Court's understanding that you
     noticed some suspicious activity in your neighborhood last
     night which made you uneasy and concerned you that there
     may be some relation to this case. You appropriately
     contacted the sheriff's department, which is absolutely what
     you should have done.          And it is also the Court's
     understanding that the sheriff's office took your call seriously
     and investigated and dealt with your concern and your call.
     And at this time, I have asked the Sheriff to come in here and
     explain to you what was done in response to the conduct.

     "….

     "[Sheriff Williamson]: I didn't want to talk to you last night
     because I didn't want to be unethical or get in the way of these
     folks that have worked hard on this case. So what I wanted
     to talk to you about was, we checked this guy out, and you did

                                  66
CR-21-0393

       good by getting us a tag number. And what we think that --
       we don't think it has anything to do with this case. We think
       that it has to do with the break-ins that are going on out there
       right now. So I just wanted you to feel at ease so that you
       could do your job today."

(Trial R. 1349-51.) The circuit court then asked juror B.M. if the sheriff's

comments had put his mind at ease. B.M. indicated that they did. (Trial

R. 1351-52.)    There is no indication that this juror was in fear because

he was serving on Young's jury. This claim was not supported by the

record and was properly summarily dismissed. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.

Crim. P. Accordingly, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                     L.

       Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to pursue "adequate remedies" when a juror slept through portions of the

trial. The sparse pleadings on this claim consist of one paragraph. (C.

55.)

       In summarily dismissing this claim, the postconviction court made

the following findings:

             "Young fails to satisfy the specificity and full factual
       pleading requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) of the
       Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Young fails to plead
       why remedial measures were needed. Moreover, Young fails
       to plead what remedial measures counsel should have taken
       and on what grounds those requested remedial measures

                                    67
CR-21-0393

     would have been granted. Furthermore, Young fails to plead
     why a mistrial was necessary to prevent 'manifest injustice.'
     … Young's claim amounts to 'counsel should have done
     something' -- but Young does not plead what counsel should
     have done. Finally, Young fails to plead how there is a
     reasonable possibility that, but-for counsel's failure, the
     outcome of his trial would have been different. Such 'bare
     claims' are insufficient to warrant further proceedings. Rule
     32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P."

(C. 707.)

     The record of Young's trial shows that the following occurred:

     "[Defense counsel]: For the record, there's been a juror this
     morning, he's the gentlemen to your right on the front row.
     His eyes have been closed more than open. I wanted to note
     that for the record.

     "THE COURT: Well, I just want to know, would you like to
     take any action or make any motion?

     "[Defense counsel]: Not at this time, but after the break after
     lunch, we may be doing so."

(Trial R. 1050-51.)

     First, Young pleaded that trial counsel should have moved for

"remedial action."    However, he failed to plead what he considered

"remedial action." Nor did Young plead the identity of this juror.     The

full facts were not pleaded regarding this claim; thus, summary dismissal

was proper. Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.

                                 68
CR-21-0393

     Moreover, at least one court has held that not moving to replace a

sleeping juror may be considered a sound strategic decision. The Utah

Court of Appeals in State v. Marquina, 437 P. 3d 628, 638 (Utah App.

2018), stated:

     "[W]e must presume Marquina's defense counsel's conduct fell
     'within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'
     [State v.] Calvert, 2017 UT App 212, ¶ 22, 407 P.3d 1098
     [(2017)] (quotation simplified). Jury selection and retention
     are 'more art than science,' [State v.] Litherland, 2000 UT 76,
     ¶ 21, 12 P.3d 92 [(2000)], and Marquina's counsel was able to
     observe the jurors, including the alternate, over the course of
     three days. Everything from the jurors' demeanors to their
     reactions to testimony may have played a role in counsel's
     decision not to insist on replacing the sleepy juror. He may
     have simply preferred the jury he had. Even if this choice
     seems 'counterintuitive,' counsel may have reasonably
     thought that a sleepy juror would 'overcompensate' and would
     be reluctant to convict. See id. ¶ 22 (quotation simplified).
     Moreover, counsel's choices are viewed objectively; '[t]he first
     prong of the Strickland standard ... requires that a defendant
     rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances,
     the challenged action might be considered sound trial
     strategy.' Id. ¶ 19 (emphasis added) (quotation simplified). …
     Because Marquina has not demonstrated his counsel was
     objectively deficient, he has not established ineffective
     assistance of counsel."

State v. Marquina, 437 P.3d 628, 638 (Utah App. 2018). For the foregoing

reasons, this claim was properly summarily dismissed. Therefore, Young

is due no relief on this claim.

                                  69
CR-21-0393

                                    II.

     Young next argues that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. Specifically,

he argues that the State failed to disclose the contents of Hammonds's

cellular-telephone records and failed to disclose the plea agreement that

it had with Robyn Green, Shaun Settles's girlfriend.

     The postconviction court found that this claim was procedurally

barred because it could have been raised at trial or on appeal but was

not. Rule 32.2(a)(3) and Rule 32.2(a)(5), Ala. R. Crim. P. 8 The court also

found that this claim was not sufficiently pleaded because Young failed

to plead what the contents of Hammonds's cellular telephone would show

and/or whether those contents were favorable to Young's case. He also

failed to plead how the plea agreement with Green was suppressed, given

that Young also pleaded that one of his attorneys, Ben Gardner, signed

Green's plea agreement. (C. 757-59.)

     8This  Court has frequently held that a Brady claim may be
procedurally barred in a postconviction proceeding. See Madison v.
State, 999 So. 2d 561 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d
344 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); Duncan v. State, 925 So. 2d 245 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2005); Barbour v. State, 903 So. 2d 858 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).

                                  70
CR-21-0393

     In the postconviction petition, Young pleaded, in part:

      "Hammond's phone and contents were critical to impeaching
      Hammonds at trial. Hammonds likely used this phone to
      coordinate the setup of Freeman and to contact De'Vontae
      Bates to concoct a fake story about their involvement in the
      case."
(C. 100.) (emphasis added). Young's entire pleadings on this claim are

based on speculation. " 'Speculation is not sufficient to satisfy a Rule 32

petitioner's burden of pleading.' " Peraita v. State, [Ms. CR-17-1025,

August 6, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2021), quoting

Mashburn v. State, 148 So. 3d 1094, 1125 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013).

     Moreover, "to sufficiently plead a Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963)]; Giglio [v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1982)] claim, a petitioner

must allege facts that, if true, would establish that the prosecution

suppressed evidence that was favorable to the defendant and material."

Reynolds v. State, 236 So. 3d 189, 201 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). Young did

not plead how Green's plea agreement was suppressed.                As the

postconviction court stated: "Young affirmatively acknowledges in his

petition that trial counsel [Gardner] was aware of the plea agreement

and had actually signed it. Considering these facts, it is clear on the face

of the petition itself that no Brady suppression occurred."       (C. 759.)

                                   71
CR-21-0393

Thus, summary dismissal of this claim was proper, and Young is due no

relief on this claim.

                                     III.

      Young next argues that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial

when juror W.F. failed to disclose during voir dire examination that he

knew Investigator Wes Holland and Officer Stuart Setliff.         He further

argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object when juror B.M.

had contact with the Colbert County Sheriff's Office.

      The postconviction court made the following findings on this claim:

            "Young claims that W.F. knew Investigator [Wes]
      Holland and Officer [Stuart] Setliff but fails to plead how the
      three knew each other. Young fails to plead, for instance, if
      the three were friends or if the three had casually met. Young
      likewise fails to plead that W.F. purposefully withheld this
      information. Indeed, if W.F. had met the men briefly a few
      years ago, he may not have remembered meeting them.
      Moreover, Young claims that a new trial is warranted where
      the defendant 'might have been prejudiced,' but Young fails to
      plead how he might have been prejudiced. … It is not enough
      to plead that W.F. knew these officers -- Young must also
      plead how that fact, if true, might have actually prejudiced
      him. For these reasons, this claim is summarily dismissed.

            "Young next claims that he was deprived of an impartial
      jury because of juror B.M.'s contact with the Colbert County
      Sheriff's Office.

           "This claim fails to satisfy the specificity and full factual
      pleading requirements of Rules 32.3and 32.6(b) and it fails to

                                   72
CR-21-0393

     state a valid claim for relief or present a material issue of fact
     or law under Rule 32.7(d) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal
     Procedure. After the guilt-phase verdict, juror B.M. contacted
     the Sheriff's Office about suspicious activity on his street that
     he was concerned was linked to Young's case. In a colloquy
     with the trial court, Sheriff Williamson said:

           " 'I didn't want to talk to you last night because I
           didn't want to be unethical or get in the way of
           these folks that have worked hard on this case. So
           what I wanted to talk to you about was, we checked
           this guy out, and you did good by getting us a tag
           number. And … we don't think it has anything to
           do with this case. We think that it has to do with
           the break-ins that's going on out there right now.
           So I just wanted you to feel at ease that you could
           do your job today.'

     "(R. 1351.) When the Court asked juror B.M. if 'the Sheriff's
     explanation put [his] mind at ease,' B.M. responded, 'correct.'

           "Young claims that the trial court improperly disallowed
     B.M. from saying anything further, and did not identify the
     deputies involved, the license plate number, and Sheriff
     Williamson's role. The trial court did not forbid B.M. from
     saying anything further, but rather, cautioned juror B.M. on
     his words. Young also claims that the trial court's statement
     was improper ex parte communication that was not fully or
     adequately disclosed to counsel. The claim is meritless on its
     face, as the attorneys were in the courtroom for this
     discussion. "

(C. 760-62.)

     While Young pleaded the name of the juror who, he says, failed to

disclose that he knew two officers, he pleaded no other facts as to how

                                  73
CR-21-0393

W.F. supposedly knew the two police officers. Young failed to plead the

full facts to support this claim. Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.

     Moreover, as noted above, juror B.M. had no improper contact with

law enforcement.      B.M. telephoned the police when there was a

disturbance in his neighborhood late one night during the trial. There is

absolutely nothing that suggests that that disturbance was related to

Young's case. This claim presented no material issue of fact or law that

would support relief. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P. Therefore, Young

is due no relief on this claim.

                           Penalty-Phase Issues

                                    IV.

     Young next argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance

of counsel at the penalty phase of his capital-murder trial.

     To properly evaluate the claims pleaded by Young, we must

consider the mitigation evidence that his counsel did present during the

penalty-phase hearing. " 'Although petitioner's claim is that his trial

counsel should have done something more, we first look at what the

lawyer did in fact.' " Ray v. State, 80 So. 3d 965, 979 (Ala. Crim. App.

                                   74
CR-21-0393

2011), quoting Chandler v. United States, 218 F. 3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir.

2000).

     At the penalty phase, defense counsel presented the testimony of

Young's maternal aunt, Treena Sidebottom, and Dr. Carol Walker, a

psychologist who evaluated Young and who had done extensive research

into Young's background and upbringing.

     Sidebottom testified at trial that her sister, Debra Louise Syesta, 9

was Young's mother, that her sister ran away when she was 16 years old

because of the abuse in their household, that when Debra was pregnant

with Young she was in jail, that when she gave birth to Young her father

brought Debra and Young back to Florence, that Debra was an addict,

and that Debra was frequently in trouble with law enforcement and was

in and out of jail, and that Debra tried to commit suicide several times

and that in one instance Young found her on the bathroom floor

unresponsive and called for help.     (Trial R. 1416.)   When asked to

described Young's home life, Sidebottom testified:

     "[B]efore Johnny Vandiver was in the picture, [Debra] was in
     government assistance and her home was always clean.
     [Young] was thriving and doing okay. They were struggling.

     9In Young's postconviction proceedings his mother's name is spelled
"Debra"; in the trial transcript her name is spelled "Deborah."
                                 75
CR-21-0393

    They didn't have a whole lot of money, but when I would go
    over there things -- things appeared to be okay.

          "But when Johnny Vandiver came into the picture,
    that's when they got kicked out of the Section 8 or government
    assistance, and that's when I started noticing -- they moved
    from government assistance and Section 8 house, and then
    they moved into another house. And they moved in, and it
    was just dirty. And I asked [Debra] if I could help her clean,
    and she said no. But basically they just moved in the house
    and it was already dirty. But I tried to talk to her about it,
    but she didn't want to talk about it. So that's when I started
    noticing the house wasn't -- the house was not clean, that
    [Young] was sometimes not clean, that [Young] sometimes
    didn't have what he needed.

          "Sometimes they would ask -- Debbie would ask for
    money, although we weren't real sure where the money would
    go to. She said they were turning the utilities off, or they
    didn't have money to eat or whatever. So what I tried to do in
    the alternative was take [Young] out of the house and try to
    help him and clean his clothes and let him spend some time
    with me sometimes. And I would try to take [Debra] to the
    grocery store and let her buy food so that she wouldn't use
    that money to buy things. They -- Debbie and Johnny would
    do drugs and alcohol, and that's where their money was going.

         "….

          "My earliest recollection of when [Young] was probably
    about three or four years old, and for some reason they had a
    Chucky doll -- the Chucky doll like from the movie. And
    [Young] was scared to death of that doll, and Johnny would
    just terrorize him just relentlessly with that doll. And I got
    on to him, and I couldn't understand why someone would
    make a child so scared and be so hurtful. I didn't understand.
    And not long after that I found out that he was a sex offender

                                76
CR-21-0393

     and that he had done time in prison for sexual -- sexual abuse
     of a child."

(Trial R. 1428-32.) She further testified that she had seen Vandiver

verbally abuse Young. (Trial R. 1432.)

     Dr. Walker testified that she interviewed Young for over 16 hours

and that she had conducted extensive research into his background and

upbringing by talking to many of his relatives and obtaining many of his

records.   She testified that she looked at Young's juvenile-court-

adjudication records and that included partial records of Department of

Human Resources services. She also evaluated jail-incident records from

the Colbert County jail and performed cognitive testing on Young and did

a neurological assessment and an academic assessment on him. She then

reviewed documentation of his stepfather, Johnny Vandiver's status as a

registered sex offender.   (Trial R. 1452-53.)      She said that she

interviewed Treena Sidebottom, Young's maternal aunt, for 11 hours;

Matt and Nicole Syesta, Young's maternal aunt and uncle, for 2 hours;

Alice Syesta, Young's maternal grandmother, for 2 hours; and Carolyn

                                 77
CR-21-0393

Parrot, William Young's sister, 10 for one hour. (Trial R. 1455.) Dr.

Walker further testified:     "I wasn't able to speak with some family

members because they refused to talk with me. They didn't want to be

involved." (Trial R. 1456.)   Dr. Walker testified:

     "[Dr. Walker]: According to what I was told, [Young] was
     diagnosed with ADHD, and his behavior was consistent with
     that. He was impulsive. He was hyperactive. And Carolyn
     Parrot said he didn't seem like he was fearful of anything, and
     that's consistent with the impulsivity of ADHD. Everybody
     described him as extremely close to his mother, and even
     though she was -- she was abandoning him for all practical
     purposes, he loved her dearly. And the other thing that I
     learned was that he was bullied while he was in school. It's
     not something that he likes to talk about, but he was bullied
     because of his living situation and also because of his weight."

(Trial R. 1469-70.) Dr. Walker explained that Young's witnessing of the

violence in his home made him "more likely to be violent." (Trial R. 1472.)

     "[Defense counsel]: In the course of your interviews, did you
     learn about any other ways that [Young's] mother and
     stepfather were negative role models for him?

     "[Dr. Walker]: They -- his stepfather stole from the neighbors.
     When somebody new would move in, he would either go -- he
     would go steal from them. They fought with the neighbors.
     They used drugs in front of [Young]. And the most egregious
     to me was when [Young] was nine years old, his mother
     started smoking marijuana with him."

     10Young    believed that William Young was his father. Dr. Walker
testified that there was "conflicting information" as to who was Young's
biological father. (Trial R. 1458.)
                                  78
CR-21-0393

(Trial R. 1474-75.)

     Her investigation, Dr. Walker said, showed that Young had an

aggressive disorder, a conduct disorder, and ADHD. (Trial R. 1478.) Dr.

Walker further testified that Young told her that when he was a teenager

he used: "marijuana, methamphetamine, ice, cocaine, Suboxone, which

is a drug that started out being used to treat addiction. Opiates and

benzodiazepines or benzos, most people know them as Xanax or Valium."

(Trial R. 1484.) Dr. Walker then explained the effect those drugs could

have on a young person. (Trial R. 1484-90.) She further testified:

     "According to what his aunt told me, she estimated that
     [Young's] family moved 30 times in ten years. So he didn't
     have any kind of a neighbor that might have intervened.
     There weren't neighbors who got to know the family well
     enough because, number one, they didn't like them because
     they were thieves. They never got the chance to intervene.
     As I mentioned before, they weren't involved in any kind of
     church family. During the time that his mother was with the
     Jehovah Witnesses, my understanding was that they did not
     socialize with nonmembers. So I don't know if [Young] had
     any involvement with the group.

           "There was a lack of commitment to school, even though
     [Young], as I gave y'all his intelligence level, he was plenty
     smart to go to school and to be able to do things. But his
     mother didn't even wake him up to go to school or prepare him
     for the day. And if you let a kid stay up as late as they want
     to at night, they are not going to be able to wake up on their
     own in the morning, for the most part.

                                 79
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           "The fact that his mother smoked marijuana with him,
     I would say that was very aggrievance to me because it's
     giving the sanction to drug abuse to a young child by the most
     important person in his life. There was no restriction against
     any kind of drug use in the home. They lived in poor areas.
     He was exposed to delinquency and violence and associated
     with irresponsibility and associated with a delinquency
     environment.
           "He had no father in the home. No contact with any
     paternal role model other than [his stepfather] who was a
     registered sex offender who abused his mother, was a drug
     dealer and drug addict."

(Trial R. 1497-99.)

     Indeed, the sentencing court found the evidence so compelling that

the court made the following statement in its sentencing order:

     "The Court heard testimony from [Young's] maternal aunt,
     [Treena] Sidebottom and Dr. [Carol] Walker outlining the
     horrible family life upon which [Young] was exposed and
     brought up in. The Court heard testimony of the poverty and
     chaos of his home, that both mother (whom he loved very
     much) and his stepfather were often engaged in criminal
     activity and were both drug abusers, addicts, and dealers,
     that [Young] smoked marijuana with his mother when he was
     only 9 years old, and he has continued to use illegal drugs
     throughout his life. The testimony regarding [Young's] family
     life and upbringing was very sad and compelling testimony."

(Trial C. 359.)       The sentencing court found that Young's "family

background" was a mitigating circumstance. (Trial C. 360.)

                                  80
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                                    A.

     First, Young argues that his trial counsel failed to investigate and

present mitigating evidence that would have supported a sentence of life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole.      He makes several

different allegations concerning this claim.

     The trial record shows that defense counsel moved for expenses to

hire an investigator and that that motion was granted. (Trial C. 39, 66.)

Counsel also moved for expenses to hire a mitigation specialist and filed

a supplemental motion requesting more funds for that expert. (Trial C.

42, 78, and 241.) The circuit court approved expenses in the amount of

$10,000 for that expert. (Trial C. 272.) Counsel also filed an extensive

motion requesting that the State reveal any possible mitigating

circumstances:    Young's criminal history, any information that the

offense was committed while Young was under the influence of any

substance, any information regarding Young's culpability in the offense,

any information that Young acted under extreme duress or under the

domination of another, and numerous other possible mitigating evidence.

(Trial C. 100-104.)

                                  81
CR-21-0393

     "Trial counsel is not ineffective for delegating the responsibility of

investigating mitigation evidence to subordinates." Marshall v. State,

182 So. 3d 573, 601 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014).

            "Moreover, 'counsel's method of presenting mitigation ...
     [is] clearly trial strategy.' Hertz v. State, 941 So.2d 1031,
     1044 (Fla. 2006). See also People v. Ratliff, 41 Cal. 3d 675,
     697, 224 Cal. Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665, 678 (1986) ('[T]he
     manner of presenting evidence [is] one of trial tactics properly
     vested in counsel.'). '[T]he presentation of mitigating evidence
     is a matter of trial strategy.' State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d
     514, 530, 684 N.E.2d 47, 63 (1997). 'Matters of trial tactics
     and trial strategy are rarely interfered with or second-guessed
     on appeal.' Arthur v. State, 711 So. 2d 1031, 1089 (Ala. Crim.
     App. 1996), aff'd, 711 So. 2d 1097 (Ala. 1997)."

Clark v. State, 196 So. 3d 285, 315-16 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).

                " 'The inquiry of whether trial counsel failed
           to investigate and present mitigating evidence
           turns upon various factors, including the
           reasonableness of counsel's investigation, the
           mitigation evidence that was actually presented,
           and the mitigation evidence that could have been
           presented.' "

McMillan v. State, 258 So. 3d 1154, 1168 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017), quoting

Commonwealth v. Simpson, 620 Pa. 60, 100, 66 A.3d 253, 277 (2013).

     With these principles in mind, we review the claims raised by

Young in this section of his brief to this Court.

                                   82
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                                   1.

     Young first argues that his trial counsel failed to investigate and

present evidence concerning his mother's mental illness, his mother's

suicide attempts, his mother's inability to take care of him, and the

impact of his upbringing and his mother's suicide attempts on Young's

life. Specifically, Young asserts that counsel should have conducted an

adequate investigation and obtained a copy of his mother's medical

records from Riverbend Center for Mental Health ("Riverbend").

     In summarily dismissing this claim, the postconviction court made

the following findings:

           "Young claims Debra's Riverbend records were
     'essential for any meaningful evidentiary presentation related
     to Debra Vandiver's mental health and treatment.' Young
     also alleges that those records would have proved that Debra's
     illnesses were significant and persuasive.

            "…. Once again, Young makes a conclusory claim that
     these records were essential when Dr. Walker and
     [Sidebottom] gave extensive insight into Debra's mental
     health issues. Young similarly fails to explain how the
     evidence presented at trial about Debra's mental illness was
     not significant and pervasive. [Sidebottom] testified that
     Debra cut herself, tried to commit suicide multiple times, and
     that several of Debra's attempts resulted in hospitalization.
     Dr. Walker likewise testified that Debra was likely bipolar
     and made several serious suicide attempts. Moreover, Young
     fails to explain how documents covering the same facts would
     not have been cumulative.

                                 83
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          "Young claims these records reveal that Debra was
     diagnosed with depressive disorder, obesity, borderline
     personality disorder, and was told that she needed to
     establish a better home life for Young.

          "…. Dr. Walker testified that Debra had depressive
     disorder and likely had bipolar disorder. Moreover, Dr.
     Walker testified, when speaking of obesity, that Debra was
     reported to be between 300-500 pounds. Finally, evidence was
     presented that Debra did not provide a good home life for
     Young. Additional evidence of the same would have been
     cumulative.

           "Young claims these records reveal Debra's inability to
     keep a job, her Social Security disability benefits, and her lack
     of an income.

            "… Young fails to explain how documentary evidence
     that Debra could not hold a job, received government benefits,
     and lacked an income was necessary and not cumulative when
     testimony was given to the same effect. Indeed, Dr. Walker
     testified that Young lived in poor areas. [Sidebottom] also
     testified that Young and Debra lived in government housing.
     Dr. Walker testified that Debra did not support herself with a
     job 'as there was not an emphasis placed on self-support.
     They stole.' Moreover, Dr. Walker testified that Debra and
     Young lived off government benefits as she received social
     security or social security disability benefits. Failure to
     present additional evidence of the same would have been
     cumulative."

(C. 727-29.)

     In relation to Young's mother's suicide attempts, the postconviction

court stated:

                                  84
CR-21-0393

     "[Sidebottom], Debra's sister, testified that Debra cut herself
     and was once found unresponsive on the floor after an
     apparent suicide attempt. According to [Sidebottom], Debra
     had to be taken to the hospital.         [Sidebottom] likewise
     testified that on other occasions, Debra's suicide attempts
     resulted in hospitalization. Dr. Carol Walker, Young's hired
     clinical psychologist, also described Debra's suicide attempts
     as serious. [Sidebottom] and Dr. Walker both testified that
     Debra tried to commit suicide 'many times.' Furthermore, Dr.
     Walker testified that Debra died of an intentional overdose.
     Thus, counsel knew, as did the jury, that Debra had tried to
     commit suicide several times, that her attempts were serious,
     and that she had likely died of an overdose, and records of
     these events would have been merely cumulative.

           "Young claims that Debra's records from Riverbend
     would have documented that she attempted suicide when
     Young was an infant, four years old, and eight years old, the
     last of which he witnessed. According to Young, counsel failed
     to elicit testimony from [Sidebottom] about Young's
     witnessing of Debra's suicide attempt. …

           "Regarding Debra's suicide attempt that Young actually
     witnessed, Young fails to satisfy the specificity and full factual
     pleading requirements of Rule 32.3 and 32.6(b) and to state a
     valid claim for relief or present a material issue of fact or law
     under Rule 32.7(d) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal
     Procedure. Young claims that the jury did not learn how
     severe this attempt was, but Young fails to plead how
     knowing this information likely would have changed his
     sentence. Furthermore, Young claims that he saw this suicide
     attempt, but he does not plead how this impacted his
     development."

(C. 713-15.)

                                  85
CR-21-0393

     As stated above in the synopsis of the evidence presented at the

penalty phase, a great deal of the mitigating evidence that Young asserts

was not presented concerning Young's mother was, in fact, presented at

sentencing through the testimony of Sidebottom and Dr. Walker.

"Counsel cannot be ineffective for not presenting evidence that counsel

did, in fact, present." Clark v. State, 196 So. 3d 285, 318 (Ala. Crim. App.

2015).   " '[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to

investigate and present mitigation evidence will not be sustained where

the jury was aware of most aspects of the mitigation evidence that the

defendant argues should have been presented.' " Walker v. State, 194 So.

3d 253, 288 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015), quoting Frances v. State, 143 So. 3d

340, 356 (Fla. 2014).

           " 'A trial court may summarily dismiss a post-
           conviction petition [on a claim of ineffective
           assistance of counsel] when it is clear upon the face
           of the petition itself or the exhibits or material
           from prior proceedings that there are no facts upon
           which the petitioner could prevail. Robertson v.
           State, 669 So. 2d 11 (Miss. 1996). See also Taylor
           v. State, 782 So.2d 166, 168 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App.
           2000).'

     "Fairley v. State, 812 So. 2d 259, 262 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). 'A
     petitioner's failure to "show how, but for the attorneys' errors,
     the results of the proceedings would have been different"
     justifies a district court's decision to summarily dismiss the

                                   86
CR-21-0393

     ineffective assistance of counsel claim.' Everett v. State, 757
     N.W.2d 530, 535 (N.D. 2008) (quoting Hughes v. State, 639
     N.W.2d 696, 699 (N.D. 2002)). '[F]ailing to introduce
     additional mitigation evidence that is only cumulative of that
     already presented does not amount to ineffective assistance.'
     Jalowiec v. Bradshaw, 657 F.3d 293, 319 (6th Cir. 2011)
     (citing Nields v. Bradshaw, 482 F.3d 442, 454 (6th Cir. 2007)).

           " ' "[I]n order to establish prejudice, the new
           evidence that a [postconviction] petitioner
           presents must differ in a substantial way -- in
           strength and subject matter -- from the evidence
           actually presented at sentencing." Hill v. Mitchell,
           400 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
           1039, 126 S.Ct. 744, 163 L.Ed.2d 582 (2005). In
           other cases, we have found prejudice because the
           new mitigating evidence is "different from and
           much stronger than the evidence presented on
           direct appeal," "much more extensive, powerful,
           and corroborated," and "sufficiently different and
           weighty." Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 328,
           331 (6th Cir. 2011). We have also based our
           assessment on "the volume and compelling nature
           of th[e new] evidence." Morales v. Mitchell, 507
           F.3d 916, 935 (6th Cir. 2007). If the testimony
           "would have added nothing of value," then its
           absence was not prejudicial. [Bobby v.] Van Hook,
           [558 U.S. 4, 12,] 130 S.Ct. [13,] 19 [ (2009)]. In
           short, "cumulative mitigation evidence" will not
           suffice. Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 930
           (6th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed (Apr. 4, 2011)
           (10-9911).'

     "Foust v. Houk, 655 F.3d 524, 539 (6th Cir. 2011).

Stallworth v. State, 171 So. 3d 53, 79-80 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013).

                                   87
CR-21-0393

           " ' "[T]he failure to present additional mitigating
     evidence that is merely cumulative of that already presented
     does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Nields
     v. Bradshaw, 482 F.3d 442, 454 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
     Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 410 (6th Cir. 2006)).' Eley v.
     Bagley, 604 F.3d 958, 968 (6th Cir. 2010). 'This Court has
     previously refused to allow the omission of cumulative
     testimony to amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.'
     United States v. Harris, 408 F.3d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 2005).
     'Although as an afterthought this [defendant's father]
     provided a more detailed account with regard to the abuse,
     this Court has held that even if alternate witnesses could
     provide more detailed testimony, trial counsel is not
     ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence.' Darling
     v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 377 (Fla. 2007)."

Daniel v. State, 86 So. 3d 405, 429-30 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).

     This claim was properly summarily dismissed because there was no

material issue of fact or law that would entitle Young to relief. See Rule

32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.

     Furthermore, Young was 28 years of age at the time of the

shootings.    Many courts have discussed the effectiveness of presenting

testimony concerning a troubled childhood when the defendant was an

adult when the murder was committed.

             " '[T]rial counsel's decision not to investigate and
             present evidence regarding Francis's family
             background does not amount to deficient
             assistance. Under certain circumstances, trial
             counsel's decision not to investigate family
             childhood background may legitimately be the

                                    88
CR-21-0393

           product of a reasoned tactical choice. See Stanley
           v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 970 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
           denied, 467 U.S. 1219, 104 S.Ct. 2667, 81 L.Ed.2d
           372 (1984). Given the particular circumstances of
           this case including, among other things, the fact
           that Francis was thirty-one years old when he
           murdered Titus Waters, evidence of a deprived
           and abusive childhood is entitled to little, if any,
           mitigating weight. See Francois v. Wainwright,
           763 F.2d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 1985).
           Consequently, trial counsel cannot be faulted for
           expending his limited time and resources on other
           vital areas.' "

Washington v. State, 95 So. 3d 26, 44-45 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012), quoting

Francis v. Dugger, 908 F.2d 696, 703 (11th Cir. 1990).

     This is not a case where counsel failed to conduct any mitigation

investigation or where counsel failed to present any mitigation. The

mitigation that was presented was compelling as stated by the

sentencing judge. For the forgoing reasons, this claim was correctly

summarily dismissed. Accordingly, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                    2.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because of

the "weak testimony" counsel presented concerning Young's having been

diagnosed with ADHD when he was a child.

                                  89
CR-21-0393

     The postconviction court found that there was no material issue of

fact or law that would entitle Young to relief. In dismissing this claim,

the court stated:

     "While Dr. Walker testified that there was no evidence in the
     records that she received indicating that Young had received
     treatment for ADHD, she testified that she had been told by
     family members that Young was taking stimulant medication
     for his ADHD. Dr. Walker also testified that Young was given
     a conditional diagnosis of disruptive disorder, conduct
     disorder, and ADHD, as well as received medication for mood
     swings, while at Three Springs treatment facility [when he
     was a teenager]. Thus, this information was presented to the
     jury, and additional evidence of the same, whether it be
     through records or the testimony of [Sidebottom], would have
     been cumulative."

(C. 730.)

     As the record shows, counsel chose to present evidence of Young's

ADHD through the testimony of Sidebottom and Dr. Walker.             Dr.

Walker's testimony was based, in part, on records that she had examined

from Three Springs treatment facility. 11      " '[C]ounsel's method of

presenting mitigation … [is] clearly trial strategy.' Hertz v. State, 941

So. 2d 1031, 1044 (Fla. 2006)." Clark v. State, 196 So. 3d 285, 315 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2015).

     11Three  Springs was a juvenile treatment facility that housed young
juvenile offenders.
                                 90
CR-21-0393

     "A trial strategy decision may only serve as a basis for
     ineffective counsel if the decision is unreasonable. Zink [v.
     State], 278 S.W.3d [170] at 176 [(Mo. 2009)]. The choice of one
     reasonable trial strategy over another is not ineffective
     assistance. Id. '[S]trategic choices made after a thorough
     investigation of the law and the facts relevant to plausible
     opinions are virtually unchallengeable.' Anderson [v. State],
     196 S.W.3d [28] at 33 [(Mo. 2006)] (quoting Strickland, 466
     U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052)."

McLaughlin v. State, 378 S.W.3d 328, 337 (Mo. 2012).         "[A]   tactical

decision will not form the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim unless it was 'so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney

would have chosen it.' " Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902, 909, 708 S.E.2d 294,

301 (2011).    For these reasons, this claim was properly summarily

dismissed, and Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                    3.

     Young next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

present testimony concerning Johnny Vandiver's violence and cruelty

toward Young.    Specifically, Young argues that counsel should have

presented the testimony of Scott Dishon, Julian Smith, and Joseph

Young concerning Vandiver's treatment of Young.

     Young pleaded that Dishon would have testified that he was a

childhood friend of Young's from the age of 10 to 12 and that Young's

                                  91
CR-21-0393

stepfather was a "psycho" who frequently cursed at Young. Smith would

have testified that he frequently witnessed Young's stepfather yelling at

Young and at Young's mother. Joseph Young would have testified that

he went to visit Young when he was 11 years old and left after "Vandiver

was physically violent with" him. (C. 76.) Young did not plead what

Vandiver did to Joseph Young that caused him to leave.

     The postconviction court found that this claim was not sufficiently

pleaded because Young failed to plead that the witnesses were willing

and able to testify at Young's trial. (C. 731-32.)

     Moreover, the trial record shows that Sidebottom testified that

Vandiver was physically abusive to her sister, that she had witnessed

him restrain her, that she had witnessed him hit her in the face, that she

had witnessed him grab her by the hair, and that she had witnessed him

verbally abuse her.    She further testified that she had also witnessed

Vandiver verbally abuse Young. (Trial R. 1432.) She detailed a specific

instance:

           "My earliest recollection of when [Young] was probably
     about three or four years old, and for some reason they had a
     Chucky doll -- the Chucky doll like from the movie. And
     [Young] was scared to death of that doll, and Johnny would
     just terrorize him just relentlessly with that doll. And I got
     on to him, and I couldn't understand why someone would

                                   92
CR-21-0393

     make a child so scared and be so hurtful. I didn't understand.
     And not long after that I found out that he was a sex offender
     and that he had done time in prison for sexual -- sexual abuse
     of a child."

(Trial R. 1431-32.) Thus, evidence was presented that Vandiver was

verbally abusive and cruel to Young.

     "[T]his Court has held that even if alternate witnesses could
     provide more detailed testimony, trial counsel is not
     ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence. See
     Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1106 (Fla. 2002); Sweet v.
     State, 810 So. 2d 854, 863-64 (Fla. 2002). Therefore, trial
     counsel was not ineffective for failing to call Carlton as a
     witness during the penalty phase to present evidence which
     was generally presented by others."

Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 377 (Fla. 2007). Accordingly,          there

was no material issue of fact or law that would entitle Young to relief on

this issue, thus, summary dismissal was proper. Young is due no relief

on this claim.

                                    4.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to investigate and present physical records of Johnny Vandiver's sexual-

assault conviction.

     In dismissing this claim, the postconviction court stated:

     "Young fails to satisfy the specificity and full factual pleading
     requirements of Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b) and to state a valid

                                  93
CR-21-0393

     claim for relief or present a material issue of fact or law under
     Rule 32.7(d) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.
     Young claims that this information was easily and readily
     available, but he fails to explain how the records were easily
     available. Young likewise fails to plead facts showing that
     these records would have been admissible as relevant.
     Introducing the facts about another, unrelated case would
     likely have received an objection from the State on relevance
     grounds. … Young fails to explain how evidence of Johnny's
     sexual abuse against his stepdaughter is at all relevant when
     Young does not claim that Johnny also sexually abused him.
     Moreover, Young fails to plead why the details of Johnny's
     sexual assault case were necessary and not cumulative when
     the jury heard multiple times that Johnny had sexually
     abused his stepdaughter."

(C. 733-34.)

     The trial record shows that on numerous occasions during

Sidebottom's and Dr. Walker's testimony they stated that Vandiver had

a prior sexual-abuse conviction. Trial counsel's decision to present this

through testimony instead of physical records was clearly a strategic

decision.   Thus, there was no material issue of fact or law that would

entitle Young to relief on this claim. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.

Accordingly, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                    5.

                                  94
CR-21-0393

     Young next argues that his counsel failed to investigate and present

evidence of abuse and mental illness in Young's extended family

specifically, that Young's maternal uncle had mental problems.

     In dismissing this claim, the postconviction court stated:

     "Young failed to plead how, and from where, counsel could
     have obtained the private records of a private patient of
     Young's non-immediate family. Young likewise fails to
     explain how these records would have been admissible and
     what witness could have properly laid the foundation for these
     records when Patrick and Paul[12] did not testify. Moreover
     Young fails to explain why records of Patrick's mental health
     were necessary and not cumulative when [Sidebottom]
     testified to Patrick's mental health issues, including that he
     was put in a mental health facility. …

           "Regarding the abuse of Paul, Dr. Walker testified that
     there were many members of Young's family that refused to
     talk to her. Young fails to plead that Matthew was not one of
     those people. Young likewise fails to plead that Matthew was
     available and willing to testify in this case when Matthew has
     been completely absent from Young's life. Furthermore,
     Young fails to explain why records of Paul's abuse were
     necessary when the jury heard about Alice's mental health
     issues and abuse of her family."

(C. 734-36.)

     The trial record shows that defense counsel asked Sidebottom if any

of her siblings had mental problems. (Trial R. 1423.) She testified that

     12Paul    is Sidebottom's oldest brother; Patrick is another brother.
                                    95
CR-21-0393

her oldest brother, Paul, was abusive and violent and that another

brother, Patrick, had been put in a mental-health facility in Tarrant

County in Fort Worth. Patrick had also tried to commit suicide at that

facility and when he was sent home, he again tried to commit suicide by

overdosing on Xanax. (Trial R. 1425.) Testimony was presented about

Young's extended family's mental health. Thus, summary dismissal of

this claim was proper; therefore, Young was due no relief on this claim.

                                   6.

     Young next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate and present evidence indicating that Young's grandfather

was supportive of his mother and that Young lost his mother and

grandfather within weeks of each other.

     In dismissing this claim, the postconviction court stated:

     "Dr. Walker testified that Paul [Young's grandfather] was
     supportive of Debra. Young fails to plead how it is not obvious
     from this testimony that by supporting Debra, Paul also
     supported Young. Young likewise fails to plead who would
     have, or could have, testified that Paul encouraged Young to
     participate in the family.

           "Young claims that [Sidebottom] could have testified
     about his relationship with Paul and about the fact that Paul
     died within weeks of his mother's suicide and within days of
     Young's release from prison. However, Young fails to explain
     the significance of this event. Importantly, Young does not

                                 96
CR-21-0393

     claim that the timing of Paul's death, or that Paul's death in
     general, had a negative impact on his psychological well-
     being. Young likewise fails to plead how [Sidebottom] would
     have testified that once Young was released from prison, he
     had no support from family, when [Sidebottom] herself
     testified that she loves Young. Such 'bare claims' are
     insufficient to warrant further proceedings."

(C. 735-37.)

     Young pleaded that counsel should have presented evidence

indicating that Young's grandfather was supportive of him but failed to

plead the identity of any individual who could have provided such

testimony. Nor did Young plead how the death of Young's mother and

grandfather affected him. The full facts were not pleaded in regard to

this claim. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.

     Moreover, the record shows that testimony was presented that

Young's grandfather was supportive of Young's mother.        Sidebottom

testified that when Debra had Young, her father moved her and the baby

back into their house in Florence. (Trial R. 1415.) It was clear from

Sidebottom's testimony that her father had been helpful to his children

and that her mother was the one that was abusive. Dr. Walker testified

that "Paul Syesta was supportive of Debbie. …" (Trial R. 1459.) Thus,

summary dismissal was proper, and Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                  97
CR-21-0393

                                       7.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to present an expert on trauma and its impact on child development.

Young pleaded that Dr. Paul O'Leary, a psychiatrist, was willing to

testify concerning the effect that Young's traumatic childhood had on his

development. (C. 81.)

     In finding that this claim was meritless, the postconviction court

made the following findings of fact:

            "Young does not explain how Dr. [Carol] Walker, the
     defense's expert, was not qualified to testify on such subjects,
     and thus, why another expert was needed. Indeed, Dr.
     Walker has a Ph.D. in medical clinical psychology. She is also
     board certified in clinical neuropsychology. Dr. Walker
     explained that neuropsychology 'looks after those
     relationships between the brain and behavior.'              And,
     importantly, Dr. Walker explained that she has been qualified
     as an expert to discuss cognitive issues related to trauma and
     neurodevelopmental disorders. … Dr. Walker testified that
     Young had an attachment to his mother, explaining that he
     ran away from a treatment facility to be with her. Dr. Walker
     testified that Young had problems with mood swings and had
     to be on medication for it. Dr. Walker testified that Young has
     been unable to maintain long-term relationships in his life,
     that all of his relationships were short-term, and that, in some
     of his relationships, Young would propose after having known
     his girlfriend for a few weeks. The record reflects that Dr.
     Walker walked through the trauma that Young had
     experienced in his life, including his mother's serious suicide
     attempts and mental illnesses, poverty, his learning
     disabilities, his mother and stepfather's life of crime, his

                                  98
CR-21-0393

     chaotic and unstable home, as well as the verbal abuse and
     neglect he received. Then after explaining the trauma of
     Young's life, Dr. Walker testified to some of the symptoms of
     that trauma seen in Young's personal, social, and academic
     life. … Dr. Walker's testimony addressed the impact the
     trauma in Young's life had on his development and its relation
     to this crime, and Young fails to plead that Dr. [Paul]
     O'Leary's testimony would have been different. The fact of
     the record, then, reveals that Young's claim is meritless."

(C. 737-41.)

     As stated above when discussing Dr. Walker's testimony, her

testimony detailed the trauma Young suffered in his childhood and its

impact on his life. "[C]ounsel 'is not ineffective for failing to shop for an

expert that would testify in a particular way." Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d

463, 484 (Mo Banc 2007). Therefore, this claim presented no material

issue of fact or law that would entitle Young to relief. See Rule 32.7(d),

Ala. R. Crim. P. Accordingly, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                     B.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in opening

and closing statements in the penalty phase because, he says, counsel did

not articulate a coherent theory as to why Young should be sentenced to

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

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     The postconviction court made the following findings when

dismissing this claim:

           "The record clearly reflects that counsel mentioned
     specific examples of Young's traumatic childhood. Counsel
     stated that Young's mother abused drugs and was not stable,
     [that] Young never had a sense of community, [that] his only
     male role model was a sex offender, [that] his stepfather
     abused drugs and his mother, and [that] he lost his mother
     who he dearly loved. Though counsel does not mention
     Debra's suicide attempts and Paul's passing, Young fails to
     plead how counsel's 'failure' render counsel's statements
     incoherent.

            "Young claims that counsel failed to challenge the
     State's two aggravating circumstances in opening statements,
     instead opting to argue these points in closing, thus
     eliminating the State's burden of proof, but Young fails to
     explain how counsel's decision to address the State's
     aggravating circumstances in closing rather than in opening
     statements eliminated the State's burden of proof. Young
     fails to plead how this was not a matter of sound trial strategy,
     ensuring that the jury focused on the trauma of Young's life
     by talking about it in opening statements. Moreover, Young
     fails to explain how counsel's strategic decision actually
     prejudiced him.

          "Young claims that counsel's closing argument was
     haphazard and offered only a cursory list of his traumatic life
     experiences, but Young completely fails to specify what
     counsel should have said instead. Nor does Young explain
     how counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of
     reasonableness. Moreover, Young does not specifically plead
     how there is a reasonable probability that he would not have
     been sentenced to death but-for counsel's alleged errors.
     Rather, Young presents a conclusory allegation that he was

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     prejudiced. Such 'bare claims' are insufficient to warrant
     further proceedings. Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P."

(C. 742-43.)

     The record shows that trial counsel had a coherent closing

argument that discussed many mitigation factors.        That argument

stated, in part:

            "[Young's] father figure, Johnny Vandiver, he was a
     registered sex offender. He used drugs and participated
     regularly in criminal activity. [Young] had no parental roots.
     His mother abused drugs, quite possibly while she was
     pregnant with [Young]. [Young] witnessed parental drug use
     while growing up. She began smoking marijuana with him
     when he was nine years old. [Young's] family moved a lot and
     never established placement in a community. He never had a
     place. I grew up in Ford City, and many of you probably know
     where that is. That's my home. [Young] can't say where his
     home is. [Young] witnessed domestic violence against his
     mother. There's no family commitment to education, and he
     missed a lot of school. [Young] spent a lot of time in group
     homes and boot camps, and his mother didn't even come to
     visit with him. [Young] has ADHD, and that's another issue.
     [Young's] family had a lack of family unity. [Young] never saw
     anyone in his home keep a steady job. You know the older I
     get it seems to me the more important that is. For kids to see
     somebody working, doing something with themselves.

     "And another one that we haven't talked about here that has
     come out in the guilt-phase trial, [Young] didn't shoot Mr.
     Freeman. Now, is he guilty of capital murder? Yes. Okay. But
     a mitigating factor is, [Young] did not shoot him. There is no
     evidence whatsoever that the gun that [Young] had even hit
     the car. As a matter of fact, [the prosecutor] even made

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     mention of that in his closing statement, if you do recall. That
     is a mitigating factor."

(Trial R. 1555-56.)   Also, the argument was so effective that the

sentencing court found that Young's childhood was a mitigating

circumstance. For the above-stated reasons, summary dismissal of this

claim was proper, and Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                   C.

     Young argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately

prepare and elicit testimony from Dr. Carol Walker. Specifically, Young

pleaded that Dr. Walker should have given more detail about his

mother's mental illness and more detail about his childhood.

     The postconviction court made the following findings on this claim:

           "The record reflects that Dr. Walker presented effective
     testimony concerning Debra's illnesses. Dr. Walker testified
     twice that Debra likely died of suicide. Dr. Walker testified
     that Debra had a history of depression and likely had bipolar
     disorder. Dr. Walker testified that everyone she spoke to told
     her that Debra made several serious suicide attempts. Dr.
     Walker explained that Debra had tried multiple times to
     commit -- one such time Young witnessed. Finally, Dr.
     Walker testified that Debra was treated for her mental
     conditions. Young fails to plead why more information about
     Debra's mental health was needed for counsel to effectively
     prepare Dr. Walker's testimony about this subject.

          "Young claims that Dr. Walker's testimony about his
     trauma was incoherent and non-specific, but Young fails to

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     explain which parts of her testimony were problematic and he
     fails to provide examples of how her testimony could have
     been more specific. He claims that Dr. Walker gave damaging
     testimony about his intellectual capability, but he fails to
     explain how her testimony could have been tempered with
     further preparation with trial counsel. Dr. Walker performed
     an intellectual assessment on Young that showed he was of
     average to above average intelligence, and she testified to this
     fact. Young fails to plead how counsel could have avoided the
     results of this assessment or how counsel could have better
     coached Dr. Walker in her answers in this regard -- the
     assessment reveals what it reveals.

            "Young claims that Dr. Walker failed to give effective
     testimony regarding the ongoing impact of his trauma
     because the jury did not hear specifics, was not given dates,
     and was not presented with a meaningful timeline. However,
     the record reflects that Dr. Walker shared the trauma that
     Young had experienced in his life, including his mother's
     multiple, serious suicide attempts, his mother's mental
     illnesses, poverty, learning disabilities, his mother and
     stepfather's life of crime, his mother's likely suicide, his
     chaotic and unstable home, and the verbal abuse and neglect
     he received. After explaining the trauma seen in Young's
     personal, social, and academic life. Then, at the end of her
     testimony, Dr. Walker explained how the trauma of Young's
     life, or 'effective factors,' could have played a part in Young
     committing this crime. Young fails to plead how such
     testimony, despite the absence of dates, was not effective or
     meaningful."

(C. 744-46.)

     First, Young did not plead what counsel should have done in order

to "properly" prepare Dr. Walker to testify. Second, defense counsel's

examination of Dr. Walker was very thorough and effective. A review of

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the penalty phase shows that counsel's presentation of the evidence was

effective. Accordingly, this claim was properly summarily dismissed, and

Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                    D.

     Young next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

effectively prepare and question Treena Sidebottom, Young's maternal

aunt who testified at the penalty phase.

     The pleadings on this claim consist of the following, in part:

       "[C]ounsel's failure to adequately investigate and obtain all
      relevant records including Debra Vandiver's Riverbend
      records and talk to numerous witnesses prior to preparing
      and presenting Sidebottom's testimony prejudiced Young.
      Counsel failed to elicit important information that Sidebottom
      could have shared with the jury."
(C. 87.)

     The postconviction court, in dismissing this claim, stated:

     "Young fails to plead why Debra's Riverbend records were
     necessary for [Sidebottom] to give adequate testimony about
     Debra's mental illnesses. [Sidebottom] testified that Debra
     tried to commit suicide, indicating that Debra was depressed.
     Young likewise fails to explain why further testimony from
     [Sidebottom] was needed when Dr. Walker testified that
     Debra had depression and likely had bipolar disorder and
     obesity. Nor does Young plead how [Sidebottom] could have
     testified about Debra's mental illnesses further when the trial
     court instructed her that she could not 'testify to diagnosis
     and that type of thing.'

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            "Young similarly fails to adequately plead why
     knowledge that [Sidebottom] tried to assist Debra four times
     after her suicide attempts was necessary when [Sidebottom]
     testified generally that she tried to assist Debra after her
     suicide attempts.       The record likewise reflects that
     [Sidebottom] was so concerned about her sister that she
     thought about adopting Young, but worried about what that
     would do to her sister's mental health.

           "Furthermore, Young claims that 'it was critical [on re-
     direct] to elicit testimony from Sidebottom to explain
     Sidebottom's different outcome in adult life compared to her
     sister Debra's.' Young fails to plead how counsel could have
     done this or what counsel should have asked. The record
     reveals, however, that [Sidebottom] gave this testimony.
     Indeed, [Sidebottom] gave testimony highlighting the
     differences in her adult life and Debra's adult life despite their
     rough upbringing. Moreover, Young's claim that [Sidebottom]
     did not testify about the different mental and psychiatric
     realities of the sibling pairs is without merit. Young fails to
     explain how [Sidebottom] could have given any more detail
     than what she did, considering the trial court's order limiting
     her testimony on the subject."

(C. 748-50.)

     Sidebottom's testimony was detailed and effective. Young's

mitigation expert, Dr. Walker, testified that she spent 11 hours talking

with Sidebottom. There was no material issue of fact or law that would

entitle Young to relief under Strickland. See Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim.

P. Thus, summary dismissal of this claim was proper, and Young is due

no relief on this claim.

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                                    E.

     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to challenge the State's case in aggravation. He makes several different

arguments in support of this contention.

                                    1.

     First, Young argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate his prior felony conviction for robbery in the third degree. He

also argues that trial counsel was ineffective in not challenging his

conviction at this trial for discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle

because, he says, the jury was free to consider that felony as an

aggravating circumstance.

     In summarily dismissing this claim, the postconviction court stated:

     "Young fails to explain how knowing the underlying facts of
     his third-degree robbery conviction would have tempered the
     State's aggravation case. Indeed, Young was convicted of a
     violent felony, and he does not plead facts that show
     otherwise. Such 'bare claims' are insufficient to warrant
     further proceedings.

           "….

          "Moreover, Young's claim that the jury was invited to
     consider his conviction for discharging a firearm into an
     occupied vehicle as an additional felony during sentencing is
     without merit. Indeed, the trial court specifically instructed
     the jury that it could only consider as aggravating

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      circumstances Young's prior felony convictions for robbery in
      the third degree and assault in the second degree. For this
      reason, a special instruction and verdict form were not
      necessary or warranted."

(C. 751-53.)

      First, Young pleaded no circumstances surrounding his prior

conviction for robbery in the third degree except that he had stolen a

bicycle.   No other facts surrounding that conviction were pleaded in

Young's petition. Young merely pleaded "bare fact" in support of this

claim; thus, summary dismissal was proper. See Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.

Crim. App.

      Second, the circuit court's jury charge in the penalty phase stated

that the jury could consider as aggravating circumstances only Young's

conviction for robbery in the third degree and his conviction for assault.

(Trial R. 1566.) The jury was not invited to consider an improper felony

in aggravation. Thus, this claim presented no material issue of fact or

law that would entitle Young to relief. Accordingly, Young is due no relief

on these claims.

                                    2.

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     Young next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to challenge the aggravating circumstance that Young's conduct of

shooting in a parking lot created a great risk of death to many persons.

     The postconviction court found that this claim was due to be

dismissed because the underlying argument in support of the ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claim had been addressed by this Court on direct

appeal. This Court stated, in part:

           "The evidence at trial showed that after Young parked
     the white pickup truck at the Spring Creek Apartments and
     got out of the vehicle with Capote, one or both of them shot at
     Freeman at least 15 times. Det. Holland testified that after
     the shooting there were shell casings scattered 'all over the
     parking lot.' The surveillance footage shows several vehicles
     in the parking lot near the shooting. Less than a minute after
     the shooting a man can be seen on the surveillance footage
     opening an apartment door and peering outside. Lt. Wear,
     who arrived at the Spring Creek Apartments less than five
     minutes after the shooting, testified that when he arrived
     there were '[a] lot of people' at the scene, and two or three
     witnesses told him that a white truck had left the scene.
     Captain Setliff testified that when he arrived at the scene less
     than 30 minutes after the shooting there were people '[a]ll the
     way around the parking lot.' He estimated there were 'at least
     75 to 100' people in the parking lot. Sumerel, the apartment's
     property manager, testified that there are 60 units in the
     Spring Creek Apartments with a total capacity of 224 people.
     She testified that in March 2016 at least 55 of the 60 units
     were full, mostly of women and children.

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           "This evidence, showing that there were people in the
     residential area where the shooting happened, was enough for
     the circuit court to submit to the jury the question whether
     Young 'knowingly created a great risk of death to many
     persons,' and for the jury to find – and the circuit court to
     consider and weigh – that aggravating circumstance."

Young, ___ So. 3d at ___.

     The trial record reflects that defense counsel did present some

argument against this aggravating circumstance. In the circuit court's

order sentencing Young to death, the court referenced this argument:

"The Court heard defense counsel argue that the aggravating

circumstance of defendant knowingly creating a great risk of death to

many persons being weak in this case, and that had the deceased not

been sitting his car but standing outside of his car it would not have been

capital murder." (Trial C. 350-51.)

     Thus, this claim was correctly summarily dismissed because the

underlying claim had no merit. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing

to raise a claim that has no merit. See Bush v. State, 92 So. 3d 121 (Ala.

Crim. App. 2009). For these reasons, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                      V.

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     Young next argues that the postconviction court erred in denying

his motion for discovery. The record shows that Young filed two motions

for discovery. His argument on this claim does not identify which motion

Young is challenging on appeal. (Young's brief at p. 95.)

     The record shows that Young filed a "motion for discovery of

prosecution files, records, and information necessary for a fair Rule 32

proceeding." (C. 253.) At the same time, Young also filed a "motion for

discovery of institutional, files, records, and information necessary for a

fair Rule 32 proceeding."      (C. 274.)    The State moved that the

postconviction court first dispose of the motion to dismiss the Rule 32

petition that was pending before disposing of the motions for discovery.

(C. 295.)

     In Alabama, there is no inherent right to discovery in a

postconviction proceeding. The Alabama Supreme Court has held that

to be entitled to discovery in Rule 32 proceedings, a petitioner must

establish "good cause" for the requested discovery. See State v. Martin,

69 So. 3d 94 (Ala. 2011), and Ex parte Land, 775 So. 2d 847 (Ala. 2000).

          "Morris was not entitled to discovery, because the claims
     for which he sought discovery were either insufficiently
     pleaded, procedurally barred, or meritless, and they were
     dismissed. We have held in the previous sections of this

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     opinion that the circuit court did not err by summarily
     dismissing Morris's claims, and it follows that Morris did not
     meet the good-cause standard for obtaining postconviction
     discovery. Accordingly, the circuit court did not commit error
     when it denied Morris's postconviction discovery requests.
     See, e.g., Davis v. State, 184 So.3d 415, 447 (Ala. Crim. App.
     2014)."

Morris v. State, 261 So. 3d 1181, 1202 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016). Likewise,

the postconviction court did not err by failing to grant Young's motion for

discovery. Accordingly, Young is due no relief on this claim.

                                   VI.

     Last, Young argues that the postconviction court's wholesale

adoption of the State's summary-dismissal order violates State and

federal law.   He argues that aside from the deletion of one paragraph,

the final order is the same as the State's proposed order and that it

suffers from the same typographical errors.

     Young filed a lengthy objection to the postconviction court's

wholesale adoption of the State's order. (C. 764.)

     "[T]he general rule is that, where a trial court does in fact
     adopt the proposed order as its own, deference is owed to that
     order in the same measure as any other order of the trial
     court. In Dobyne v. State, 805 So. 2d 733, 741 (Ala. Crim.
     App. 2000), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

           " ' " ' While the practice of adopting the state's
           proposed findings and conclusions is subject to

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           criticism, the general rule is that even when the
           court adopts proposed findings verbatim, the
           findings are those of the court and may be reversed
           only if clearly erroneous.' " '

     "805 So. 2d at 741 (quoting other cases; emphasis added). In
     McGahee v. State, 885 So. 2d 191, 229-30 (Ala. Crim. App.
     2003), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that 'even when
     a trial court adopts verbatim a party's proposed order, the
     findings of fact and conclusions of law are those of the trial
     court and they may be reversed only if they are clearly
     erroneous.' Cf. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376
     U.S. 651, 656, 84 S.Ct. 1044, 12 L.Ed.2d 12 (1964) (expressing
     disapproval of the 'mechanical' adoption of findings of fact
     prepared by a party, but stating that such findings are
     formally those of the trial judge and 'are not to be rejected out-
     of-hand')."

Ex parte Ingram, 51 So. 3d 1119, 1122-23 (Ala. 2010).         The Alabama

Supreme Court has found error in the adoption of a proposed order when

the court adopted one of the pleadings of the State, Ex parte Scott, 262

So. 3d 1266 (Ala. 2011), and when the court adopted an order that

incorporated statements that the findings were based on personal

knowledge of the judge when the judge issuing the order did not preside

over the trial. See Miller v. State, 99 So. 3d 349 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).

This Court has not reversed a court's adoption of a proposed order when

that order contained merely typographical errors. See Ex parte Ingram,

supra.

                                  112
CR-21-0393

     In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the order adopted from

the State's proposed order was not the judge's own independent judgment

or that it was "merely an unexamined adoption of the proposed order

submitted by the State." Mashburn, 148 So. 3d at 1113. We find that

the postconviction-court's findings are not clearly erroneous.       Thus,

Young is due no relief on this claim.

     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's summary

dismissal of Young's postconviction petition attacking his capital-murder

conviction and sentence of death.

     AFFIRMED.

     Windom, P.J., and McCool, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.

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