Court Opinion

ID: 9475613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:32:45.659031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:49.139555
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The issue in this case, which arises under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982), is whether plaintiff complied with a jurisdictional prerequisite for bringing an age discrimination action. Unlike the majority, I believe that plaintiff did comply with 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), and I therefore dissent.
Section 626(d) provides in pertinent part: “No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.” The question on appeal is whether plaintiff’s actions were sufficient to constitute “filing a charge” under this provision of the Act with respect to plaintiff’s 1979 demotion.
The requirement of “filing a charge” under Section 626(d) should be construed broadly in light of the statutory purpose of the Act and the legislative history of this particular provision. Numerous cases have held that the Act is a broad remedial statute and should be construed liberally. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 765, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2076, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir.1976) (the Act is “remedial and humanitarian legislation and should be liberally interpreted to effectuate the congressional purpose of ending age discrimination in employment”), aff’d per curiam, 434 U.S. 99, 98 S.Ct. 600, 54 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977); and Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221, 1229-30 (3rd Cir.1978) (courts should liberally construe statute and be “chary about creating unnecessary procedural bars which may, at the outset, require the dismissal of other*689wise meritorious age discrimination claims”). The Supreme Court has also stated that the purposes of the Act should not be frustrated by procedural technicalities. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527, 92 S.Ct. 616, 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972) (“Such technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.”)
The legislative history of Section 626(d) reinforces the view that this provision is to be construed broadly. The Congressional conference report relating to the 1978 amendments to the Act explicitly identifies the purpose of Section 626(d):
... the basic purpose of the notice requirement ... is to provide the Department [of Labor] with sufficient information so that it may notify prospective defendants and to provide the Secretary with an opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices through informal methods of conciliation. Therefore, the conferees intend that the “charge” requirement will be satisfied by the filing of a written statement which identifies the potential defendant and generally describes the action believed to be discriminatory. (emphasis added)
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 504, 534.
In light of the statutory purpose and legislative history, I believe that Vinson did “file a charge” for purposes of Section 626(d). Vinson should not be held to a higher standard than a pro se litigant in federal court insofar as pleading requirements. Under notice pleading, a pro se litigant would not be required to specify each transaction at issue; complaining of the overall wrongful conduct would be sufficient.
Vinson mentioned the 1979 demotion in the employee personal interview statement with the EEOC. Under the notice pleading analogy, this should be sufficient to constitute “filing a charge” with respect to the 1979 demotion. Such a construction is consistent with the requirements that courts broadly construe the Act. Moreover, it is supported by the particular legislative history of Section 626(d). In sum, if the statutory scheme is to work as Congress intended, then a layman such as Vinson must not be barred from bringing age discrimination actions under the Act by mere technicalities.
Accordingly, I dissent.