Court Opinion

ID: 9849548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:42:27.74961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:17.551094
License: Public Domain

Pearson, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent from the conclusion of the majority, that failure to instruct the jury on the federal regulation constituted prejudicial error. It should be pointed out that the safety regulations were not offered *558as an exhibit during the trial, although had they been offered, the cases of Provenza v. American Export Lines, Inc., 324 F.2d 660 (4th Cir. 1963) and Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1968) would certainly have required their admission. The matter of the safety regulations was brought up after both parties had rested, when plaintiff’s attorney moved the court to take judicial notice of the regulations. Presumably the only reason for the court to take judicial notice of the safety regulations was so that a proper instruction could be prepared and given to the jury. The majority opinion is correct in its holding that the court must take judicial notice of federal regulations in an admiralty action, where such regulations are pertinent to the subject matter of the action. See Provenza.
However, it is my view that a proposed instruction concerning the federal regulations should inform the jury what the legal effect of violation of the regulations would be. Otherwise, the jury is given the safety regulations in a vacuum. The instruction proposed by the plaintiff stated:
You are instructed that there are Federal regulations dealing with “Safety and Health Regulations for Long-shoring”. (29 CFR 1504). Those regulations provide in part as follows: “1504.25 (A). There shall be at least one safe and accessible ladder for each gang working in a hatch . . .”
(C) Straight ladders of adequate strength and suitably secured against shifting or slipping shall be provided as necessary where fixed hold ladders do not meet the requirements of Paragraph (A) of this section.
No other proposed instruction or any given instruction referred to the federal safety regulations or to the legal effect of a failure to adhere to the standards prescribed. Assuming that Venable holds that a violation of a safety regulation renders a vessel unseaworthy, the jury was not, by the proposed instruction, informed of the effect of violation. It is my view that to establish prejudicial error on the trial court’s refusal to give a proposed instruction, such instruction not only must contain a correct statement of the *559law, but it must correctly reflect the theory of liability embodied in its statement of the law. See Provins v. Bevis, 70 Wn.2d 131, 422 P.2d 505 (1967). Of course, the effect could be included in a companion instruction, but none was proposed.
The majority opinion relies upon Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wn.2d 431, 392 P.2d 317 (1964), which holds that a party is entitled to have his theory presented to the jury by proper instruction when there is evidence to support it, and that a general instruction does not suffice. I believe that rule is being misapplied in this case, where the theory relied upon is not contained in the proposed instruction. I also believe that rule is not applicable where other instructions given by the court adequately instruct on the plaintiff’s theory. For these reasons, I do not believe the refusal to give the proposed instruction constituted prejudicial error.
The majority opinion states:
We believe that it would have been better to state the manner in which the safety regulation should be considered by the jury in the safety regulation instruction, but in construing the regulation with either instruction 9 or 11 the purpose would be apparent.
I agree that the effect of the safety regulation should have been included in the instruction, but I do not agree that instructions 9 or 11 supply the deficiency, since they do not refer to the safety regulations. However, it is my view that instructions 9 and 11 inform the jury precisely what the standard of unseaworthiness is in the case of ladders and those instructions also properly inform the jury of the legal effect of an improperly secured ladder. The majority opinion contends that the requirement in the safety regulation that the ladder be “suitably secured against shifting or slipping” is significantly different than the statement of the rule in instructions 9 and 11. In instruction 9, the court used the words “properly secured” and instruction 11 provided, “A ladder, even though structurally sound, is unsea-worthy if it is unsecured aboard the vessel in such a way as *560not to be reasonably suitable and fit to be used for the purpose or use for which provided or intended.”
■The semantics are admittedly different and in some instances such differences might constitute prejudicial error, but with respect to the ladder involved in this case, the sole issue was whether or not the vessel was unseaworthy because of the manner in which it was secured. A “properly secured” ladder will not “shift or slip.” The converse is also true. The ladder which “shifts or slips” is not properly secured. The distinction made by the majority seems to me to be without difference.
In my view, the contents of the safety regulations were satisfactorily communicated to the jury by instructions 9 and 11 and the majority is engaging in quibbling with semantics in holding otherwise. Litigants are entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. The type of error claimed here does not, in my view, reach the prejudicial character which we normally require in upsetting a jury verdict. Furthermore, the deficiency in the proposed instruction renders the claimed error harmless, if not meaningless.
Therefore, I dissent.
Petition for rehearing denied May 27, 1970.