Court Opinion

ID: 9397366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 14:07:05.809777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:23.682619
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Wells, 2023-Ohio-1753.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                            No. 112354
                 v.                               :

ELLORD WELLS,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 25, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-11-554092-A

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Katherine E. Mullin, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Ellord Wells, pro se.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

                Defendant-appellant Ellord Wells, pro se, brings the instant appeal

challenging the trial court’s denial of several motions relating to jail-time credit.

After a thorough review of the facts and law, we reverse and remand with

instructions to award 23 additional days of jail-time credit to Wells.
                       I. Factual and Procedural History

             Wells was indicted in September 2011 and charged with breaking and

entering in violation of R.C. 2911.13(A), vandalism in violation of R.C.

2909.05(B)(1)(a), theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), and resisting arrest in

violation of R.C. 2921.33(A). Wells accepted a plea deal and pled guilty to breaking

and entering and resisting arrest and was sentenced to one year of community-

control sanctions, which included three months at the Harbor Light Complex

(“Harbor Light”).

             While completing his community-control sanctions, Wells was indicted

in a separate case, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-12-568017-A1 and charged with rape and

kidnapping. As a result of this new indictment, the court found that Wells had

violated the terms of his community-control sanctions. He was subsequently

sentenced to one year in prison, to run consecutive to the sentence imposed in CR-

12-568017-A. The judgment entry provided that Wells was entitled to 199 days of

jail-time credit.

             In January 2020, December 2020, March 2022, and July 2022, Wells

filed motions for jail-time credit. In the January 2020 and December 2020 motions,

Wells argued that he was entitled to an additional 121 days of jail-time credit, citing

the 24 days spent in jail after his initial arrest before he posted bond, the seven days

he spent in jail awaiting transport to Harbor Light, and the three months (90 days)

       1This court affirmed Wells’s convictions in CR-12-568017-A on appeal. State v.
Wells, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100365, 2014-Ohio-3032.
that he spent at Harbor Light. In support of his motion, Wells referred the trial court

to the docket.

             Wells’s March 2022 motion asked for the same 121 days, but included

a note to the trial court arguing that because he was unable to leave Harbor Light

and because Harbor Light is a lockdown facility, the 90 days spent at Harbor Light

should be considered confinement and therefore, count towards his jail-time credit.

             In the final motion from July 2022, Wells asked for 122 days, adding

another day onto the time spent in jail waiting for transport to Harbor Light. The

state did not respond to any of Wells’s motions for jail-time credit. In September

2022, the trial court issued a judgment entry noting that it was granting Wells’s July

2022 motion, awarding Wells 90 days of jail-time credit.

             Twenty-one days later, in October 2022, Wells filed a “Motion for

Reconsideration of Jail Time Credit Motions Previously Filed,” asking the trial court

to award him the additional “30 days the defendant was entitled to”2 as well as

another motion for jail-time credit delineating these days, noting that “the docket

reflect[s] the defendant was incarcerated on these days.” Wells also filed a “Motion

to Notify the Clerk to Send the 9/14/2022 Decision to BOSCO,” asking the trial court

to send its judgment entry awarding him 90 days of jail-time credit to the Bureau of

Sentence Computation.

       2 In all of his jail-time credit motions, Wells requested either 121 or 122 days. The
court awarded him 90, so all his motions left either 31 or 32 additional days outstanding.
In his reconsideration motion, Wells argued that he spent 23 days in jail before posting
bond and another seven days in jail awaiting transport to Harbor Light, for a total of 30
days.
             In January 2022, the trial court issued judgment entries (1) granting

Wells’s motion to notify BOSCO; (2) denying Wells’s motion for jail-time credit as

moot; and (3) denying Wells’s motion for reconsideration as moot.

            Wells appeals the denial of his October 2022 motions for jail-time

credit and reconsideration, assigning a single error for our review:

      The trial court abused its discretion when it denied the appellant’s
      renewed JTC motion and reconsideration motion as moot.

                              II. Law and Analysis

              “‘An error in the computation of jail-time credit is subject to review

under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).’” State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110412, 2021-

Ohio-4175, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hearn, 6th Dist. Erie Nos. E-19-067, E-19-076, E-

19-077, and E-19-078, 2021-Ohio-86, ¶ 6. Appellate courts may increase, decrease,

modify, or vacate and remand a disputed trial court sentence “if it clearly and

convincingly is demonstrated that either the record of evidence does not support

applicable statutory findings or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” R.C.

2953.08(G)(2). On appeal, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a

trial court erred in its calculation of jail-time credit. State v. Watkins, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 105625, 2017-Ohio-8322, ¶ 7.

             R.C. 2967.191(A) mandates that prison terms shall be reduced

pursuant to related days of confinement. The section pertinently mandates that

      [t]he department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the
      prison term of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the
      prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for
      which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, including
       confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial, confinement for
       examination to determine the prisoner’s competence to stand trial or
       sanity, confinement while awaiting transportation to the place where
       the prisoner is to serve the prisoner’s prison term * * *[.]

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) directs trial courts, during sentencing, to notify the

offender of the total days that their sentence shall be credited based on days already

confined. Courts have continuing jurisdiction to correct this calculation, and an

offender may raise the issue of credit “at any time after sentencing.”                     R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii).

               On appeal, Wells argues that the trial court erred in only granting him

90 days of jail-time credit for the 90 days spent at Harbor Light and “forgot” to

include “the 22 days[3] spent in jail before the appellant made bond and the 8 days

spent in jail waiting to go to Harbor Lights [sic] after sentencing.” Wells argues that

the 199 days credit given at sentencing were from when “the appellant sat in the

county from 12/14/2012 to 7/1/2013, which equals 199 days exactly,” the time that

Wells was jailed after violating his community-control sanctions.

               The state responds that the trial court’s grant of an additional 90 days

to the 199 days initially credited to Wells was incorrect because “[b]y the state’s

count, Wells was only entitled to 230 days of jail time credit. He has already received

more than he should have.” The state did not explain how it arrived at 230 days nor

       3 On appeal, Wells argues for the first time that he is entitled to22 days rather than
23 or 24 days for the time served prior to posting bond. We recognize that Wells, in all of
his motions, maintains that he is entitled to jail-time credit for the days spent in jail before
he posted bond, regardless of the fact that the number changes throughout.
did it explain why 90 days of credit was error.4 Further, the state did not appeal the

trial court’s decision granting Wells an additional 90 days, so that issue is not

properly before this court.

               Wells’s contention that he was not properly credited the time before

he posted bond is meritorious. The record reflects that Wells was initially arrested

on August 29, 2011, and posted bond on September 21, 2011, a total of 23 days. After

the court determined that Wells was in violation of his community control, a capias

was issued and Wells was arrested on December 14, 2012, and remained in jail until

the community-control violation hearing on July 1, 2013, for a total of 199 days.

Plainly, Wells was not credited for the time served before he posted bond and,

pursuant to R.C. 2967.191, he is unequivocally entitled to receive jail-time credit for

such time.

               However, the docket does not reflect the seven or eight days that Wells

“spent in jail waiting to go to Harbor Lights [sic] after sentencing.” On January 5,

2012, Wells was sentenced to community-control sanctions, which included the

three-month remand to Harbor Light. Despite Wells’s continuous references to the

docket for evidence of these transportation days, we were unable to find an entry on

       4 We speculate that the state’s contention that Wells has already received more
days of credit than he is entitled to stems from a belief that Wells was not entitled to 90
days for his time served at Harbor Light but was entitled to the 23 days he was jailed prior
to posting bond and presumably, 8 days for the time spent awaiting transfer to Harbor
Light for a total of 31 days. Nonetheless, the state never appealed the trial court’s award
of 90 days of jail-time credit nor did it set forth any arguments as to why Wells was not
entitled to 90 days of credit for his time spent at Harbor Light, so the issue of jail-time
credit received for Wells’s time spent at Harbor Light is not properly before us.
the docket reflecting any jail time served prior to transportation to Harbor Light. It

is not clear from the record before us if, or when, Wells was transported to Harbor

Light. Wells has never submitted any documentation reflecting the eight days he

believes he is entitled to before transport to Harbor Light, such as his jail admission

records, Harbor Light admission records, transportation records, or any other

documentation that could demonstrate Wells’s entitlement to these days.

Accordingly, Wells has not satisfied his burden requiring him to clearly and

convincingly demonstrate that he is entitled to these transportation days.

              Nonetheless, the record clearly supports that Wells was entitled to

credit for the 23 days spent in jail before he posted bond. We therefore find that

Wells is entitled to an additional 23 days of jail-time credit and partially sustain his

sole assignment of error.

                                  III. Conclusion

              Wells’s sole assignment of error is sustained as it relates to the 23 days

of jail-time credit that Wells served before posting bond. We therefore remand the

instant matter with instructions for the trial court to award an additional 23 days of

jail-time credit to Wells.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________________
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR