Court Opinion

ID: 9960409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 13:03:33.198695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:26.037654
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: April 16, 2024

                    S24A0092. HENDERSON v. THE STATE.

        ELLINGTON, Justice.

        A DeKalb County jury found Gavin Henderson (“Henderson”)

guilty of malice murder, cruelty to children in the first degree, and

possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in connection

with the fatal stabbing of his sister, Kiara Henderson. 1 Henderson

contends the trial court erred in admitting prior-acts evidence,

        1On September 11, 2018, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted
Henderson for malice murder (Count 1); felony murder (Counts 2-3);
aggravated assault (Count 4); cruelty to children in the first degree (Counts 5
and 7); and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 6).
Following a jury trial that ended on July 9, 2021, the jury found Henderson
guilty on all counts. On that same date, the court sentenced Henderson to life
in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder; 20 years in prison
for cruelty to children in the first degree (consecutive to Count 1); five years in
prison for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (consecutive
to Count 5); and 20 years in prison for cruelty to children in the first degree
(consecutive to Count 6). The felony murder counts were vacated by operation
of law, and the aggravated assault count merged with the malice murder count.
Henderson filed a motion for a new trial on August 3, 2021, and new counsel
amended it on June 1, 2023. Following a hearing held on June 21, 2023, the
trial court denied the motion for a new trial on July 10, 2023. Henderson filed
a notice of appeal on July 12, 2023. The case was docketed in this Court to the
term beginning in December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
failing to charge the jury on the law of voluntary manslaughter, and

committing cumulative errors that require reversal. Because

Henderson’s claims of error are without merit, we affirm the trial

court’s order denying Henderson’s motion for a new trial.

     The evidence adduced at trial shows the following. In June

2018, 27-year-old Henderson lived in the Lacota Apartments in

DeKalb County with his mother, Trayshelle Henderson, and his

three siblings, 21-year-old Ceaira Henderson, 15-year-old Kiara,

and 11-year-old Z. G. On June 18, Trayshelle and Ceaira left for

work, leaving Kiara and Z. G. at home with Henderson. That

afternoon, Henderson went to use the only bathroom in the

apartment, but Kiara was in it. When Kiara did not leave the

bathroom immediately, the siblings argued. Z. G., who was in a

nearby bedroom, heard the argument.

     As Henderson tried to force the bathroom door open, he wedged

a clipboard (to which his cell phone was attached) between the door

and the door frame. Kiara pushed the door closed, which knocked

Henderson’s cell phone to the floor, damaging it. When Kiara left

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the bathroom, the argument with Henderson escalated. Henderson

told the police that, at some point during the argument, he went to

his bedroom to retrieve a knife. Z. G. heard the argument and heard

Kiara threaten to call their mother; Kiara called her sister, Ceaira,

instead and told her that Henderson had hit her. Z. G. then heard

Kiara scream, so she left her room to see what was happening. Z. G.

followed the sound of screaming to the apartment’s front door.

     When Z. G. peered outside to the apartment’s breezeway, she

saw Henderson striking Kiara in the abdomen with a “black metal

thing.” Z. G. yelled for her brother to stop, then she called the police

and her mother. Neighbors also called the police. The neighbors

reported hearing screaming in the breezeway and Kiara knocking

on their doors for help. When officers responded to the apartment

complex, they found Kiara lying on the breezeway floor. Her body

was covered in stab wounds, and she was surrounded by large pools

of blood.

     Officers also received a 911 call from the manager of a

convenience store located about a half mile from the apartment

                                   3
complex. The store manager said that Henderson, who had walked

into his store covered in blood and holding a bloody knife, told the

manager to call the police because he had just “killed someone.”

After the manager called the police, Henderson put the knife on the

store’s front counter and began wandering around inside the store.

When Henderson heard the sirens of the approaching police cars, he

walked out of the store with his hands raised, surrendering.

     As he was taken into custody, Henderson told the police to “just

take him straight to county” and that if anyone in jail tried to “mess[]

with him there, he would kill them, too.” Officers retrieved the

bloody knife – an all-black Bowie hunting knife with a 10-inch-long

blade – from the store. Officers took Henderson to the precinct,

where he later waived his Miranda rights and agreed to be

interviewed. When the interviewing detective informed Henderson

that his sister did not survive, he responded: “Thank God.”

Henderson went on to tell the detective that he had “blacked out”

and was “in a trance” during the stabbing; however, he recounted in

detail events leading up to and following the stabbing. He said that

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Kiara threw a glass bottle at him during their argument and that

when Z. G. called his name, he came out of his trance. Photographs

of the scene admitted at trial showed an unbroken bottle on the floor.

     The medical examiner documented 47 major stab wounds

covering Kiara’s entire body, including two to her face and several

on her back. The medical examiner testified that the wound pattern

indicated that Kiara was stabbed with rapid, repetitive motions. The

shape of some of the wounds also indicated that the blade had been

twisted while inside Kiara’s body, either from her movements or her

assailant’s. The medical examiner also observed extensive defensive

wounds to Kiara’s hands and legs. The cause of death was

determined to be multiple stab wounds to the face, torso, and

extremities. The manner of death was homicide.

     The State also presented evidence through the testimony of

Ceaira and her mother that Henderson had violently attacked

Ceaira a few months prior to the attack against Kiara. Ceaira

testified that, after she had apparently offended Henderson by

ignoring him, he argued with her, punched her, threw her to the

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floor, and then left the room briefly. When he returned, he was

holding a black hunting knife. Ceaira went to her bedroom and tried

to call her mother, but Henderson followed her, took her phone, and

put the knife to her face. Henderson then told Ceaira to “call the

police, he was ready to go.” When Ceaira started crying, Henderson

left the apartment.

     Trayshelle returned to the apartment when Ceaira called her

and told her that Henderson had attacked her. When Trayshelle

learned what had happened, she called Henderson back to the

apartment and told him that Ceaira could press charges against

him. Henderson, who was holding the knife he had used to threaten

Ceaira, started “raging.” Trayshelle took the knife from him and told

him he could not be in the house with a weapon. She hid his knife,

as well as the kitchen knives, in her bedroom closet.

     1. Henderson contends that the trial court erred by admitting

evidence of the previous “unrelated altercation” between Henderson

and his sister Ceaira pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404

(b)”). Because evidence that Henderson had assaulted Ceaira with a

                                 6
knife following a petty argument two months prior to the charged

offense was admissible for purposes of proving Henderson’s intent,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. 2

      “We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence

pursuant to Rule 404 (b) for a clear abuse of discretion.” Hood v.

State, 309 Ga. 493, 499 (2) (847 SE2d 172) (2020). “Rule 404 (b) is a

rule of inclusion, but it does prohibit the introduction of other acts

evidence when it is offered for the sole purpose of showing a

defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit a crime.” Booth

v. State, 301 Ga. 678, 682 (3) (804 SE2d 104) (2017). Therefore, “[i]t

is well established that other acts evidence is not admissible ‘to

prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity

      2 Henderson also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in

allowing the prior act evidence to be admitted for the purposes of showing
absence of mistake or accident. However, before Trayshelle and Ceaira
testified, the trial court noted that it had not heard anything during the
pretrial motion-in-limine hearing demonstrating how the proffered evidence
was relevant for the purposes of showing absence of mistake or accident;
consequently, it ruled that the evidence would be admitted only for the purpose
of showing Henderson’s intent. The court gave the jury limiting instructions
consistent with this ruling prior to both Trayshelle’s and Ceaira’s testimony.
Thus, Henderson’s arguments on this point are not supported by the record
and are without merit.
                                      7
therewith,’” but “such evidence is admissible for other purposes,

including ‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” Hood, 309

Ga. at 499 (2) (quoting Rule 404 (b)).

      A party offering evidence pursuant to Rule 404 (b) must
      demonstrate three things: (1) that the evidence is
      relevant to an issue in the case other than the defendant’s
      character; (2) that the evidence’s probative value is not
      substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; and (3)
      that sufficient proof exists for a jury to find by a
      preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
      committed the other act.

Id.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

evidence for the purpose of proving intent. “Because [Henderson]

entered a plea of not guilty, [he] made ‘intent a material issue, and

the State may prove intent by qualifying Rule 404 (b) evidence

absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent as an

issue.” Hood, 309 Ga. at 499-500 (2). “The relevance of other acts

evidence offered to show intent is established when the prior act was

committed with the same state of mind as the charged crime.”

                                  8
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 500 (2). “Where the intent

required for the charged offenses and other acts is the same, and

intent is at issue, the first prong of the Rule 404 (b) test is satisfied.”

Booth, 301 Ga. at 683 (3).

     In this case, in addition to malice murder, Henderson was

charged in the indictment with committing an aggravated assault

against Kiara by assaulting her and stabbing her with a knife, “an

object which when used offensively against a person did result in

serious bodily injury.” See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (“A person

commits the offense of aggravated assault when he . . . assaults . . .

[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object . . . which, when used

offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in

serious bodily injury[.]”).3 Henderson’s prior incident with Ceaira

also involved acts which would constitute an aggravated assault

with a knife, an “object . . . which, when used offensively against a

     3 OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) defines a simple assault as when a person either:

“(1) Attempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2)
Commits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of
immediately receiving a violent injury.”
                                    9
person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.”

Id. The acts as alleged in the aggravated assault count of the

indictment and the acts as testified to by Ceaira concerning the prior

assault against her have in common the same general intent.

Although aggravated assault can be charged in other ways that

make the offense a specific intent crime, the way it was charged here

is a general intent crime, requiring proof only that Henderson had

the intent to (1) assault Kiara (2) with a knife, an object which, when

used offensively against a person, is likely to or does result in serious

bodily injury. See Booth, 301 Ga. at 684 (3). That Henderson

intentionally assaulted another sister with a knife, a weapon which

is likely to cause serious bodily injury, was relevant to show that he

committed a similar act with the same sort of intent as alleged in

the instant indictment. Because the intent required for the prior act

and the charged offense of aggravated assault is the same, the first

prong of the Rule 404 (b) test was satisfied. Id. at 686 (3).

     Having concluded that the other-acts evidence satisfies the

first prong of the Rule 404 (b) test, we turn to the test’s second prong,

                                   10
which is controlled by OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”).

     Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence
     where “its probative value is substantially outweighed by
     the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
     misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay,
     waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
     evidence.” In other words, other acts evidence should be
     excluded if it constitutes matter of scant or cumulative
     probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its
     prejudicial effect. Factors to be considered in determining
     the probative value of other act evidence offered to prove
     intent include its overall similarity to the charged crime,
     its temporal remoteness, and the prosecutorial need for it.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hood, 309 Ga. at 500-501 (2).

     We recognize that the other-acts evidence was certainly

prejudicial to Henderson, given that he was not charged with any

crimes arising from his assault on Ceaira, which can increase the

prejudicial impact of this evidence. See Hood v. State, 299 Ga. at 105

(noting that the admission of other-acts evidence poses greater

danger where “the extrinsic activity was not the subject of a prior

conviction” because “the jury may feel that the defendant should be

punished for that activity even if he is not guilty of the offense

charged”). “But in a criminal trial, inculpatory evidence is

                                 11
inherently prejudicial; ‘it is only when unfair prejudice substantially

outweighs probative value that the rule permits exclusion.’”

(Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Anglin v. State, 302 Ga.

333, 337 (3) (806 SE2d 573) (2017). “Rule 403’s exclusionary force is

meant to be applied sparingly – primarily when the other-acts

evidence has scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the

heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” (Citations and

punctuation omitted.) Hounkpatin v. State, 313 Ga. 789, 796 (2) (a)

(2022).

     In this case, the prior-acts evidence was not required to be

excluded under Rule 403 because it was not substantially

outweighed by unfair prejudice. The prosecutorial need was

significant because Henderson claimed to have “blacked out” during

the aggravated assault. He also argued that Kiara provoked him by

attacking him with a bottle. Thus, the State needed evidence from

which the jury could infer that his acts were intentional rather than

defensive or committed while “blacked out” or “in a trance.” See

Harrison v. State, 310 Ga. 862, 868 (3) (855 SE2d 546) (2021).

                                  12
Further, the prior-acts evidence had significant probative value in

showing Henderson’s criminal intent to violently assault his sister

with a deadly weapon. The similarity of the acts against Ceaira to

the charged crimes was strong – Henderson overreacted to petty

arguments with his sisters by assaulting both with a large hunting

knife. Finally, the prior act was not temporally remote. The incident

with Ceaira occurred less than two months prior to the charged

crimes. Given the strong probative value of the evidence in showing

Henderson’s intent and in rebutting any claim of self-defense, we see

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that the probative

value of the other-acts evidence was not substantially outweighed

by any unfair prejudice. See Harrison, 310 Ga. at 868 (3). “This is

particularly true given that the trial court instructed the jury, both

prior to [Trayshelle’s and Ceaira’s] testimony and at the close of the

evidence, that this evidence was to be considered only for the limited

purposes for which it was admitted.” Id.

     As to the third and final prong of the Rule 404 (b) test, Ceaira’s

and Trayshelle’s testimony was sufficient to establish by a

                                  13
preponderance of the evidence that Henderson did in fact commit

the acts about which they testified. Thus, we see no clear abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s admission of the other-acts evidence.

See Harrison, 310 Ga. at 869 (3). This claim of error therefore fails.

     2. Henderson contends the trial court erred in refusing to

charge the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary

manslaughter is the killing of another person under circumstances

that would otherwise be murder when the killer “acts solely as the

result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from

serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable

person[.]” OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). 4 At trial, Henderson submitted a

written request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter.

     4 OCGA §16-5-2 (a) provides in full:

     A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he
     causes the death of another human being under circumstances
     which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result
     of a sudden violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious
     provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable
     person; however, if there should have been an interval between the
     provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and
     humanity to be heard, of which the jury in all cases shall be the
     judge, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge and be
     punished as murder.
                                     14
Following arguments made by the defense and prosecution during

the charge conference, the trial court denied Henderson’s request.

After the jury was charged, Henderson renewed his objection.

Because there was no evidence that would support giving an

instruction on voluntary manslaughter, the trial court did not err in

denying the request.

     “A trial court is required to grant a defendant’s request for a

charge on voluntary manslaughter if there is any evidence, however

slight, supporting the theory of the charge.” O'Neal v. State, 316 Ga.

264, 267 (1) (a) (888 SE2d 42) (2023). “It is a question of law for

courts to determine whether the defendant has presented sufficient

evidence to warrant a requested charge.” Hudson v. State, 308 Ga.

443, 445 (2) (841 SE2d 696) (2020). Although slight evidence will

support giving the requested charge, “neither fear that someone is

going to pull a weapon nor fighting are the types of provocation that

demand    a   voluntary   manslaughter     charge.”   (Citation   and

punctuation omitted.) Id. Further, “words alone are generally not

sufficient provocation to excite the passion necessary to give rise to

                                 15
voluntary manslaughter.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

Additionally, this Court has held that “the voluntary manslaughter

statute establishes an objective standard; the provocation required

to mitigate malice is that which would arouse a heat of passion in a

reasonable person.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in

original.) Watkins v. State, 313 Ga. 573, 577 (2) (872 SE2d 293)

(2022).

     Henderson contends that the following evidence is sufficient to

warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter: 15-year-old Kiara

argued with Henderson about his efforts to oust her from the

bathroom; when Henderson tried to force open the door, Kiara

caused his cell phone case to break; during the argument, Kiara

threw a bottle at him; and, Henderson believed Kiara was going to

the kitchen to get a knife with which to attack him, which is why he

got his own knife. He also contends that the “extreme” and “frenzied”

nature of his conduct in stabbing Kiara 47 times in a public area

suggests that he was “not acting out of conscious deliberation, but

rather out of intense anger or rage, which also would support a

                                 16
voluntary manslaughter conviction.”

     Although this evidence may have supported Henderson’s

motive for attacking Kiara, it is not sufficient as a matter of law to

establish the slight evidence required to support giving a charge on

voluntary manslaughter. The evidence does not show a “sudden,

violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation

sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.” OCGA §16-

5-2 (a). That Henderson and Kiara argued prior to the stabbing

about access to the bathroom is not the type of provocation used to

support voluntary manslaughter under Georgia law. Therefore, this

heated exchange of words, without more, is insufficient provocation

to warrant a jury charge on voluntary manslaughter. See Johnson

v. State, 297 Ga. 839, 844 (2) (778 SE2d 769) (2015) (“As a matter of

law, angry statements alone ordinarily do not amount to ‘serious

provocation’ within the meaning of OCGA §16-5-2 (a).” (citation and

punctuation omitted)). Nor was Kiara’s act of knocking a clipboard

and cell phone out of Henderson’s hand the kind of act that would

excite the level of irresistible passion required under the law. See id.

                                  17
at 842-844 (2). Further, there is no evidence that Kiara possessed or

used a weapon against Henderson. Even if Kiara threw a bottle at

Henderson and he acted to defend himself, “acting out of fear of

bodily harm is not the same as acting in the heat of passion, and

only evidence of the latter supports a voluntary manslaughter

conviction.” Burke v. State, 302 Ga. 786, 790-791 (2) (809 SE2d 765)

(2018).

     Because Henderson has not pointed to any evidence that 15-

year-old Kiara provided any serious provocation that would have

resulted in a reasonable person committing such a deadly act, we

conclude that the trial court properly found that “[t]he argument

between [Henderson] and his teenage sister over the use of the

bathroom . . . was insufficient to generate in a reasonable person a

sudden and irresistible passion to kill.”

     3. Finally, Henderson contends that the trial court’s

cumulative errors were not harmless and require reversal. To

demonstrate cumulative prejudice that warrants a new trial,

Henderson must show that “at least two errors were committed in

                                  18
the course of the trial; [and] considered together along with the

entire record, the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation

that they denied [Henderson] a fundamentally fair trial.” (Citation

and punctuation omitted.) State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21 (4) (838

SE2d 808) (2020). Because Henderson has not carried his burden of

showing that at least two errors were committed during the trial,

this claim must fail. See id. We note that, because Henderson has

failed to demonstrate any trial court error, we need not decide what

type of error has been alleged, whether prejudice or harm has been

shown under the standard applicable to that type of error, or how

those standards may interact under a cumulative error review

involving different types of errors. See id.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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