Court Opinion

ID: 9756510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:31:41.144462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:24.285593
License: Public Domain

RAY Thornton, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The rule in Arkansas has long been that local governments are generally immune from tort liability. Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301 (Repl. 1996). However, this unlimited immunity was modified in 1968 to permit recovery for damages in Parrish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968), where the plaintiff was injured when her vehicle was stuck as a result of negligence on the part of a city’s garbage truck driver. The Legislature’s response to Parrish was Act 165 of 1969, which provided that all local governments “shall be immune from liability and suit, except to the extent that they may be covered by liability insurance, for damages.” Id. This act also provided that all political subdivisions carry liability insurance or become self-insurers to the legal requirement of $25,000. Based on these enactments we have allowed recovery for damages when a municipal vehicle is involved in an accident. See Sturdivant v. City of Farmington, 255 Ark. 415, 500 S.W.2d 769 (1973). This is the first case in Arkansas presenting the issue whether immunity from suit is waived when a municipal vehicle is pursuing a suspect’s vehicle in accordance with the officer’s duty under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-52-203 (Repl. 1998). Notwithstanding the duty to apprehend a fleeing suspect, and the statutory authorization for an emergency vehicle to exceed speed limits under certain circumstances, the majority’s decision imposes liability upon the City of Caddo Valley for the actions of the city’s employees where the city’s vehicles were not involved in the collision itself. Faced with a similar issue, our neighboring courts in Oklahoma and Kansas have determined that a city emergency vehicle may not be held responsible for an accident caused by a fleeing suspect. In adopting their rule, these states accepted the general rule expressed by New Jersey in Roll v. Timberman, 229 A.2d 281, cert. denied 232 A.2d 147 (1967), and I agree that the views of the New Jersey Superior Court are very persuasive. That court stated: The decisive issue in this case is whether a police officer is hable for damage caused by a vehicle operated by a fleeing law violator who is being pursued by the officer in the performance of his duty. The precise question has not been dealt with in any of the reported decisions in our State. However, the majority view expressed in other jurisdictions in similar cases holds that the police officer is not hable. Id. (citations omitted). The New Jersey Superior Court opinion points out that: When Officer Martin observed Timberman violate the motor vehicle laws it became the officer’s duty to apprehend him. When he pursued Timberman the officer was exempt from speed regulations. He was performing his duty when Timberman, in gross violation of the motor vehicle laws, crashed into plaintiff’s car. To argue that the officer’s pursuit caused Timberman to speed may be factually true, but it does not fohow that the officer is hable at law for the results of Timberman’s neghgent speed. Police cannot be made insurers of the conduct of the culprits they chase. Id. (citations omitted). Similar analysis has been made by many other jurisdictions. Contrary to the opinion issued today by the majority, the general rule relative to the liability of municipalities in such circumstances is that a municipality responsible for the conduct of a police officer is nevertheless not liable for personal injuries, death, or property damage inflicted by a vehicle being pursued by a police vehicle where the police vehicle is only involved to the extent that it was being driven in pursuit of the fleeing vehicle which actually causes the injury or damage complained of. See Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655 (1983). See e.g., Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky.Ct.App.1952); Morris v. Coombs’ Adm’r, 304 Ky. 187, 200 S.W.2d 281 (Ct.App.1947); Pagels v. City and County of San Francisco, 135 Cal.App.2d 152, 286 P.2d 877 (D.Ct.App.1955); Draper v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal.App.2d 315, 205 P.2d 46 (D.Ct.App.1949); United States v. Hutchins, 268 F.2d 69, 83 A.L.R.2d 447 (6 Cir. 1959); Wrubel v. State of New York, 11 Misc.2d 878, 174 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Ct. Claims 1958). To extend the test of due care to include acts of fleeing motorists whom an officer is attempting to apprehend has the effect of making the officer, and the municipality, the insurer of the fleeing violator — or, in this case, the insurer as well of the actions of another police department. As the Kansas court noted in Thornton, supra, “who can say whether the greater harm would result from the imposition or nonimposition of a duty upon municipalities to refrain from pursuing a lawbreaker already engaged in reckless and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle on the public streets?” The reasoning underlying the rejection of liability in these cases is twofold: (1) “[I]t is the duty of a police officer to apprehend those whose reckless driving makes use of the highway dangerous to others; (2) the proximate cause of the accident is the reckless driving of the pursued, notwithstanding recognition of the fact that the police pursuit contributed to the pursued’s reckless driving.” Thornton, supra. Here, the proximate cause of the accident also included the actions of the Arkadelphia police in setting up the roadblock (though they were not named as defendants in the underlying complaint). The Caddo Valley officers were engaged in pursuit as required of them by statute, but, according to their own testimony, they had begun backing off the pursuit for safety considerations. Our inquiry should be whether the officer’s pursuit was so extreme or outrageous as to pose a higher threat to public safety than that ordinarily incident to a high-speed chase. I would hold that the actions of the Caddo Valley officers, under this analysis, did not meet the test of negligent conduct and that a directed verdict in favor of Caddo Valley should have been granted. Lastly, even if the majority is not mistaken in adopting the rule that the city becomes the insurer for a fleeing violator, I cannot understand the reasoning leading to the majority’s decision that the insurance policy limits should be applied to both police cars. The trial judge had determined that the real party in interest was the city of Caddo Valley, and there was absolutely no showing that the pursuit by two cars rather than one caused the fleeing suspect to travel any faster or drive more recklessly. As the majority has determined that liability is to be imposed, I would affirm the trial court’s determination that there was only one occurrence. For the above stated reasons, I respectfully dissent.