Court Opinion

ID: 9772584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:23:17.707031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:45.915388
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
joined by GAMMAGE and OWEN, Justices concurring.
I concur with the Court’s order remanding this case to the trial court. Dismissing Den-ton’s suit violated his due process rights and impermissibly sanctioned Denton. I disagree that TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding), and Republic Insurance Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.1993) (orig. proceeding), supply the standards by which to rule in this case. Therefore, I decline to join the Court’s opinion. Our case law regarding sanctions for resisting discovery orders should not be applied to this case, in which Denton asserted his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Also, I disagree that Denton attempted an “offensive use” of his privilege against self-incrimination as we defined it in Ginsberg v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 686 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex.1985) (orig. proceeding).1 For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 862 S.W.2d 785.
The Court today assumes that the offensive use doctrine applies to an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination, and that an offensive use of a privilege is sanc-tionable as an abuse of discovery. 897 S.W.2d 757, 760-62. The offensive use doctrine bars a plaintiff who seeks affirmative relief from asserting a privilege to avoid disclosing information pertinent to an action or a defense to it. See Ginsberg, 686 S.W.2d at 107. The doctrine applies to the rules of privilege created under state law which are subject to exceptions and to waiver. See, e.g., Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 503(d), 504(d), 508(c), 509(d)-(e), 510(d), 511. The offensive use doctrine does not apply to the privilege against self-incrimination, because the privilege does not have its source in the state rules but in the state and federal constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. V; Tex. Const, art. I, § 10; Tex.R.CivEvid. 501 (recognizing the constitutions as sources of privileges apart from the rules of civil evidence). The trial court erred in automatically dismissing Denton’s claims upon finding that his assertion of the privilege was an offensive use. In my opinion, this Court similarly errs in subjecting Denton’s assertion of a constitutional privilege to analysis as an offensive use and an abuse of discovery, and by concluding that Denton’s conduct was sanctionable.
The extended analysis of TransAmerican and Republic Insurance attempts but fails to justify what the Court allows today — that trial courts may affirmatively penalize a party who asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege so long as the assertion meets the definition of an offensive use. Because Denton was entitled to resist discovery by asserting his constitutional freedom against self-incrimination, he should not be sanctioned. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514-15, 87 S.Ct. 625, 627-28, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967) (stating that a court may not penalize a party who asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege). A better course would be to adopt the balancing test the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals developed in Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.1979). Under Wehling, a court balances the hardships caused to the parties when one of them asserts a constitutional privilege, but does not threaten sanctions to compel the party to waive his privilege. See id. at 1088.
The dangers of compelling Denton or any prospective criminal defendant to testify are real. A prosecutor could use the discovery responses the trial court ordered Denton to make against him in a criminal proceeding. See United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 291 (5th Cir.) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109,106 S.Ct. 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986); Woods & Hair, Criminal Law Issues in Civil Litigation: Fifth Amendment Considerations for the Civil Practitioner, Management of Parallel Proceedings and Pitfalls of Money Laundering Statutes, 17th Annual Advanoed Civil Trial Course U-l, U-l (1994) (citing S.E.C. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 529, 66 L.Ed.2d 289 (1980)). *765Denton’s testimony might give a prosecutor a dress rehearsal of Denton’s defense to criminal charges. See Woods & Hair, supra, at U-l. Also, the scope of discovery allowed in a civil trial may exceed what a prosecutor would be permitted in a criminal proceeding. Id. at U-4. Therefore, compelling Denton to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination could prejudice his right to a fair trial in a subsequent criminal case. See id. For this Court to ask the trial court to second-guess Denton’s fear of prosecution by “[ajttempting to assess how state and federal prosecutors and their successors will exercise their discretion” is a request for it to engage in idle speculation. See Heidt, The Conjurer’s Circle — The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 Yale L.J. 1062, 1092 (1982).
The trial court’s dismissal of Denton’s claims because he asserted the privilege against self-incrimination was a disproportionate response. The trial court forced Denton to choose between his right to a day in court and the right to avoid self-incrimination. The Court’s opinion does not relieve the punitive pressure on Denton to waive his privilege. Upon remand, the trial court will again make him choose between asserting his constitutional right to be silent at the cost of the right to prosecute his claims. See Wehling, 608 F.2d at 1088 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), and Spevack, 385 U.S. at 515, 87 S.Ct. at 628) (stating that assertion of one constitutional right should not be at the cost of another).
I concur with the Court’s general proposition that in some circumstances a trial court may craft remedies if a party’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege constitutes an abuse or causes hardship to the opposing party. 897 S.W.2d at 763; see Wehling, 608 F.2d at 1089 (noting that a court should “be free to fashion whatever remedy is required to prevent unfairness to [the] defendant”). A party may only assert the Fifth Amendment privilege in good faith. Asserting the privilege could be in bad faith, such as if Denton is asserting the privilege and at the same time prolonging the time that criminal proceedings are pending. I would allow Denton to assert his privilege for as long as he does so in good faith. When a civil plaintiff asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege, a trial court should steer wide of judicially compelling waiver of the privilege. It should not force him to choose between giving up his constitutional right against self-incrimination or forgoing his claims.
For these reasons, I join the Court’s order remanding this ease to the trial court, but I would do so for the reasons set forth in the court of appeals’ opinion.

. I agree with the court of appeals "that Denton did not use the self-incrimination privilege as a sword to thwart the discovery process or the civil proceeding as a whole.” 862 S.W.2d 785, 790.