Court Opinion

ID: 9909606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 19:02:56.55612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:15.078437
License: Public Domain

FOURTH DIVISION
                                 DILLARD, P. J.,
                          MILLER, P. J., and RICKMAN, J.

                      NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                      physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                      days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                                 https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                    December 13, 2023

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1258. HARRIS v. THE STATE.

      MILLER, Presiding Judge.

      This is Shalita Harris’s second appearance before this Court following her

conviction for homicide by vehicle in the first degree. See Harris v. State, 360 Ga.

App. 695 (859 SE2d 587) (2021) (“Harris I”). Harris appeals from the judgment and

sentence and the denial of her motion for new trial based on juror misconduct.

Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the State

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct did not contribute to the

verdict, we affirm.

      The following facts are taken from Harris I, supra, 360 Ga. App. at 696-697:

      On January 29, 2018, Harris, a school bus driver for Houston County
      schools, was driving on Forest Park Drive as part of her afternoon
      drop-off route. She was carrying 33 elementary school students, ranging
in age from pre-kindergarten to fifth grade, and one adult school bus
monitor. One section of the road went downhill at a gradient of
approximately 11.9 percent, and in the downhill portion there was a
sharp turn to the left. The posted speed limit for the road was 25 miles
per hour (“mph”), but the suggested speed for the curve, as displayed on
a yellow traffic sign, was 15 mph. It was common for children to throw
their hands up as they entered this part of the route, “as if they were on
a roller coaster,” and yell “hands up”; this day was no different.

According to testimony at trial, Harris had previously driven the bus on
this stretch of road without issue. However, the bus monitor testified
that on this day the bus’s front wheels left the road as it entered the
curve, and Harris was unable to regain control. The bus left the road,
struck nearby trees and a dirt embankment, and flipped over on its right
side. Six-year-old A. H., who was sitting behind Harris and near the
aisle, was ejected from the bus during the crash and suffered fatal
injuries. A. H. was transported to the hospital, but ultimately died from
the trauma she sustained during the crash.

At trial, Harris’s brother testified that he had spoken with her just after
the crash, and that she had stated “I was going too fast.” Additionally,
a student who rode on the bus that day stated that although it did not feel
“much faster than the previous times,” it did feel fast that day.

Both the State and Harris offered expert testimony regarding key details
surrounding the crash. The State’s expert testified that the speed at
which a school bus could safely navigate the curve on the road was

                                    2
      between 17 and 20 mph. He testified that at the time the bus left the
      road, however, it was traveling between 29 and 35 mph. He concluded
      that “the bus had to [have been] traveling at least 24.516 [mph] to cover
      the distance from the roadway exit point to the first major impact.” In
      contrast, Harris’s expert testified that he believed the bus was traveling
      approximately 17.75 mph when it entered the curve, and approximately
      24 mph when it left the road.

We add here that a post-crash inspection of the bus did not discover any mechanical

issues that could have contributed to the crash.

      Harris was charged with one count each of homicide by vehicle in the first

degree (OCGA § 40-6-393 (a)), reckless driving (OCGA § 40-6-390 (a)), speeding

(OCGA § 40-6-181), and driving too fast for conditions (OCGA § 40-6-180), and two

counts of homicide by vehicle in the second degree (OCGA § 40-6-393 (c)). The

charge of first-degree vehicular homicide alleged that Harris caused the death of A.

H. by engaging in reckless driving. One of the charges of second-degree vehicular

homicide alleged that Harris caused the death of A. H. by speeding, while the other

such charge alleged that Harris caused the death of A. H. by driving too fast for

conditions. The trial court directed a verdict of acquittal on the charge of driving too

fast for conditions and the charge of second-degree vehicular homicide based on

driving too fast for conditions.

                                           3
      The jury found Harris guilty of first-degree vehicular homicide and reckless

driving but acquitted her of speeding and second-degree vehicular homicide based

on speeding. The reckless driving count merged with the first-degree vehicular

homicide count for sentencing purposes, and the trial court sentenced Harris to ten

years, with the first three years to be served in prison and the remainder to be served

on probation.

      Immediately after the trial, Harris’s counsel spoke with two jurors and learned

that during deliberations some of the jurors had obtained extrajudicial information

about the difference in the severity of the charges. Harris filed a motion for new trial,

arguing, among other things, that jurors had engaged in misconduct during

deliberations by researching the available sentences for her charges.

                                           4
      All 12 jurors testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial.1 Juror C. S.

testified that she “Googled the difference between first and second degree” during a

recess from deliberations and that she informed other jurors that first-degree vehicular

homicide was a felony and second-degree vehicular homicide was a misdemeanor.

      1
        As the Supreme Court of Georgia noted in a prior appeal in this case, the trial
court correctly recognized the limitation imposed upon inquiry into the jury’s
deliberations by OCGA § 24-6-606 (b), which provides that:

      Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror shall
      not testify by affidavit or otherwise nor shall a juror’s statements be
      received in evidence as to any matter or statement occurring during the
      course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the
      jury deliberations or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing
      the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
      concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith;
      provided, however, that a juror may testify on the question of whether
      extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the juror’s
      attention, whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
      upon any juror, or whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict
      onto the verdict form.

(Citation and emphasis omitted.) Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 51, 55 & n. 3 (2) (875 SE2d
649) (2022). Specifically, the trial court instructed counsel that they were limited to
asking jurors about “whether extraneous prejudicial information was brought to their
attention” and that counsel could not ask them “how or if that [information]
influenced their verdict.”

                                           5
C. S. testified that based on her Google search she knew “what the sentence range

was, and . . . how much time Ms. Harris could get in prison.” C. S. denied sharing the

sentencing range with other jurors.

      Juror S. E. testified that during a recess from deliberations she “used Google

to determine first degree versus second degree” and that based on the Google search

and her general knowledge she knew that some of the charges were more serious than

others in terms of punishment. Other jurors testified that during deliberations a juror

informed them that first-degree vehicular homicide was a felony and carried a harsher

sentence than second-degree vehicular homicide, which was a misdemeanor. Some

jurors testified that their knowledge that certain charges were more serious than

others came from the indictment and their general knowledge. Juror A. J. provided

conflicting testimony as to whether he knew the sentencing ranges for the charged

offenses during deliberations. With the exception of C. S. and A. J., the jurors denied

having known such ranges.

      The trial court denied the motion for new trial, ruling that (1) the presumption

of prejudice, which had previously applied upon a finding of juror misconduct, did

not survive enactment of the current Evidence Code, and (2) there was no reasonable

probability that the verdict was influenced by the extrajudicial information. This

                                          6
Court affirmed on appeal, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

because the jurors’ improper actions were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Harris I, supra, 360 Ga. App. at 699 (1). This Court explained that the extrajudicial

information obtained by some of the jurors had to do with the difference in the

severity of the crimes as opposed to the underlying substantive law or evidence. Id.

at 698-699 (1).

       Harris subsequently sought certiorari review with the Supreme Court of

Georgia, which concluded that the trial court erred in (1) ruling that the presumption

of prejudice arising from a showing of juror misconduct no longer applied, and

(2) failing to determine whether the State proved that the misconduct was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 51, 54-55 (2) (875 SE2d 649)

(2022) (“Harris II”). The Supreme Court further concluded that while this Court

properly recognized the presumption of prejudice and the State’s burden in rebutting

it, this Court “erred when it concluded as a matter of law that, while extrajudicial

information obtained by a juror about the underlying substantive law or evidence

could prejudice a defendant, extrajudicial information about the difference in the

severity of the crimes had no potential to cause prejudice.” (Citation and punctuation

                                          7
omitted.) Id. at 56 (2). The Supreme Court noted the well-established prohibition on

jurors’ consideration of punishment in reaching a verdict, stating that

      the concern with injecting sentencing considerations into the
      guilt-innocence phase of a trial is that, if the jury can discern what
      sentence(s) the defendant on trial is facing, it might use that knowledge
      to fashion a verdict that will result in the sentence the jury wishes to see
      imposed upon the defendant being tried, rather than deciding the
      defendant’s guilt or innocence based on the evidence and underlying
      substantive law provided by the court.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 58 (2). Accordingly, the Supreme Court

vacated this Court’s decision and instructed that the trial court should apply the

proper legal principles in ruling on Harris’s juror misconduct claim. Id.

      On remand, the trial court again denied Harris’s motion for new trial. The court

found that “[o]nly one juror [A. J.] suggested he knew the sentencing range for either

charge,” but “[h]is testimony was conflicting and unclear and . . . he was not aware

of any specifics until after the verdict was rendered.” The court also found that:

extrajudicial information was procured by or shared with some jurors regarding the

difference in the seriousness of some of the charges; two jurors “Googled” the

charges for the definition of first and second degree, resulting in their belief that one

charge was more serious than the other; and some jurors knew one charge was a

                                           8
felony and one charge was a misdemeanor. The court acknowledged that this created

a presumption of prejudice but concluded that the State overcame the presumption by

establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred in that there was no

reasonable possibility that the misconduct contributed to the verdict.

      The trial court explained that because it was prohibited from inquiring about

the extrajudicial information’s impact on the jury, prejudice had to be assessed by

reference to its type, how it was relevant to the issues decided by the jury, and

whether it impacted some fundamental principle of criminal law. The court stated that

although two jurors “Googled” first and second degree, the statutory descriptions of

the crimes were on the indictment and these descriptions were the basis of several

jurors’ belief about the nature of each crime. The trial court acknowledged that

“jurors might be more likely, if they knew a potential sentence, to reach a verdict as

a result of sympathy or retribution,” but it concluded that simply knowing one charge

is more serious than another “far expands this reasoning.” Jurors’ knowledge about

the seriousness of a charge cannot be eliminated, and jurors who are faced with multi-

count indictments often know, without engaging in misconduct, which charges are

more serious as a result of the conduct alleged or by simply being aware of the law.

                                          9
The court further reasoned that the extrajudicial information here was neither

evidentiary nor related to the application of the law.

      The trial court emphasized that it had specifically charged the jury (1) about the

different underlying charges when defining first-degree and second-degree vehicular

homicide, and (2) that the jurors were only to concern themselves with guilt or

innocence. The court explained that the jurors’ questions during deliberations —

requesting to watch a video recording from inside the bus that had been played at

trial, asking if there were photographs of tire marks left by the bus on the road, and

requesting the definition of “reckless” — revolved directly around the contested

issues regarding whether Harris engaged in reckless driving or was speeding, and

focused on evaluating the experts’ testimony and applying the appropriate law to the

facts. This appeal followed.

      In her sole enumeration of error, Harris argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying her motion for new trial because the State did not prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that she was not harmed by the juror misconduct. We disagree.

      A trial court “has the superior vantage point from which to evaluate juror

misconduct.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Ifediba, 46 F.4th

1225, 1241 (III) (B) (11th Cir. 2022). And a trial court’s ruling based on such

                                          10
misconduct is “entitled to great deference.” Lockridge v. State, 260 Ga. 528, 529 (397

SE2d 695) (1990). More specifically, “[a] motion for new trial because of improper

juror conduct is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and unless there

is an abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not upset the trial court’s

determination.” Dorsey v. State, 279 Ga. 534, 544 (5) (615 SE2d 512) (2005).

Whether juror misconduct has been shown “is a question of fact for the trial judge,

whose findings we will not disturb unless clearly erroneous or wholly unsupported

by the evidence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Byrd v. State, 251 Ga. App. 83,

85 (2) (553 SE2d 380) (2001).

      “It has long been recognized by the courts of this state that the guarantee of a

fair and impartial jury is a central safeguard to a fair trial in our system of criminal

justice.” Lockridge, supra, 260 Ga. at 529. A juror’s study of “law” other than that

charged by the trial court constitutes misconduct. Steele v. State, 216 Ga. App. 276,

278 (2) (454 SE2d 590) (1995), disapproved of on other grounds by Kennebrew v.

State, 267 Ga. 400, 404 n. 2 (4) (480 SE2d 1) (1996).

      “To set aside a jury verdict solely because of irregular jury conduct, a court

must conclude that the conduct was so prejudicial that the verdict is inherently

lacking in due process.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris II, supra, 314 Ga.

                                          11
at 53 (2). “When irregular juror conduct is shown, there is a presumption of prejudice

to the defendant, and the prosecution carries the burden of establishing beyond a

reasonable doubt that no harm occurred.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

      To establish that the juror misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable
      doubt, the State must show based on the record evidence that there is no
      reasonable possibility that the juror misconduct contributed to the
      conviction. This will be the case where the State establishes that juror
      misconduct was an immaterial irregularity without opportunity for
      injury.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 54 (2).

      Because OCGA § 24-6-606 (b) prohibits direct inquiry about how the

extrajudicial information affected the jury, in the instant case prejudice must be

assessed by considering such factors as “the type of extrajudicial information at issue

(e.g., whether the information concerned sentencing or the underlying substantive

law)” as well as

      how the extrajudicial sentencing information might have been relevant
      to the issues decided by the jury, whether the record evidence suggested
      that this sentencing information would affect the jury’s decision on guilt
      or innocence, and whether the [trial] court had charged the jury that
      sentencing was an issue outside the province of the jury.

                                          12
(Punctuation omitted.) Harris II, supra, 314 Ga. at 56 n. 4 (2).2

       Here, as an initial matter, we conclude that the trial court’s factual findings are

not clearly erroneous. Specifically, the court found that while some jurors were

subjected to extrajudicial information that first-degree vehicular homicide was a more

serious offense and carried a harsher sentence than second-degree vehicular

homicide, the jurors were not subjected to extrajudicial information regarding the

sentencing ranges for these offenses during deliberations. Although juror C. S.

testified that she knew such ranges based on a Google search and juror A. J. provided

conflicting testimony as to whether he knew such ranges, “[c]redibility of witnesses

and the weight to be given their testimony is a decision-making power that lies solely

with the trier of fact. The trier of fact is not obligated to believe a witness even if the

testimony is uncontradicted and may accept or reject any portion of the testimony.”

Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 56 (3) (440 SE2d 646) (1994).

       We usually assume that trial judges have done their job, and especially
       where, as here, the trial court has made extensive findings of fact, we
       generally must presume that the absence of a finding of a fact that would

       2
        The Supreme Court noted in Harris II that the trial court correctly considered
these factors here. 314 Ga. at 56 n. 4 (2).

                                            13
      tend to undermine the conclusion of the trial court reflects a considered
      choice to reject the evidence offered to prove that fact[.]

Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 747 (1) (770 SE2d 636) (2015). Given the trial court’s

extensive findings of fact, it is apparent that the court rejected C. S. and A. J.’s

testimony that they knew the sentencing ranges and accepted the testimony of the

other jurors that they were not aware of such ranges. See Burney v. State, 309 Ga.

273, 293 n. 16 (5) (845 SE2d 625) (2020) (“In reaching its ruling, the trial court

appears to have credited the testimony given by [a juror] at the hearing on the motion

for new trial and disregarded her statement to the investigator to the extent it

conflicted with her hearing testimony. Because the trial court was sitting as a trier of

fact in determining what transpired during jury deliberations, we defer to its

resolution of this and any other conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence

presented.”); Miller v. State, 288 Ga. 286, 289 (2) (702 SE2d 888) (2010) (“[T]he trial

court may have chosen not to include any mention of the evidence forming the basis

of the dissent’s decision because the trial court rejected that portion of the officers’

testimony.”) (emphasis omitted).

      Turning to the trial court’s ultimate ruling, we conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that there was no reasonable possibility that the

                                          14
juror misconduct contributed to the conviction. Most importantly, the court was

authorized to find that, even without the extrajudicial information, the jurors were

already aware that first-degree vehicular homicide was a more serious crime and

carried a harsher punishment than second-degree vehicular homicide. Such awareness

was reasonably based on the jurors’ general knowledge, the description of the crimes

in the indictment, and the obvious relative meaning of the terms “first degree” and

“second degree.” While a juror’s accessing extrajudicial information regarding a

crime’s sentencing range may cause the juror to fashion a verdict based on the desired

sentence rather than the evidence, see Harris II, supra, 314 Ga. at 58 (2), the trial

court did not clearly err in finding that the jurors did not access such information

here. Cf. Steele, supra, 216 Ga. App. at 278-279 (2) (new trial was required where

juror shared with other jurors an encyclopedia entry stating the “usual penalty in the

U.S.” for the charged crimes, which differed from the penalty in Georgia); Moore v.

State, 172 Ga. App. 844, 847 (324 SE2d 760) (1984) (new trial was required where

jury accessed extrajudicial definition of voluntary manslaughter, which was

misleading in that it was “closely akin to self-defense, or at least involuntary

manslaughter by self-defense using more force than necessary”).

                                         15
      As the trial court recognized, a juror’s knowledge that one crime is more

serious than another often cannot be eliminated. “External matters include publicity

and information related specifically to the case the jurors are meant to decide, while

internal matters include the general body of experiences that jurors are understood to

bring with them to the jury room.” (Punctuation omitted.) Warger v. Shauers, 574

U. S. 40, 51 (IV) (135 SCt 521, 190 LE2d 422) (2014). While the actions of the two

jurors here in independently researching the meaning of “first degree” and “second

degree” were improper, the actions were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in that

the information they revealed — that one crime was more serious than the other —

was already known to the jury. See Burney, supra, 309 Ga. at 292-294 (5) (juror’s use

of an online search engine to look up the terms “malice” and “malice murder” during

deliberations did not warrant a new trial); see also Smith v. Nagy, 962 F.3d 192, 204

(III) (A) (6th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he jurors could have reached the mistaken conclusion

that felony murder carries a relatively light sentence based simply upon preconceived

notions or beliefs about the legal system. In other words, the jurors’ information about

[the defendant’s] possible sentence falls within the realm of general information that

jurors bring with them into deliberations.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

                                          16
      Furthermore, while it is but one factor in our analysis, the jurors’ independent

research simply went to the relative seriousness of the charged crimes and did not

touch upon Harris’s guilt or innocence. See Harris II, supra, 314 Ga. at 56 n. 4 (2)

(stating that “whether the information concerned sentencing or the underlying

substantive law” is relevant in analyzing Harris’s juror misconduct claim); Boles v.

State, 168 Ga. App. 904, 908 (2) (310 SE2d 741) (1983) (concluding that a juror’s

actions in accessing extrajudicial information were harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt because the information “did not go at all to the sole issue determinative of

guilt or innocence”). And the potential of any improper juror considerations flowing

from the extrajudicial information was diminished by the trial court’s instruction that

sentencing was an issue outside the province of the jury. See Harris II, supra, 314 Ga.

at 56 n. 4 (2) (stating that whether the trial court “had charged the jury that sentencing

was an issue outside the province of the jury” is relevant in analyzing Harris’s juror

misconduct claim); see also Womac v. State, 302 Ga. 681, 683 (2) (808 SE2d 709)

(2017) (“[Q]ualified jurors are presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court.”)

(citation omitted).

      The record evidence does not suggest that the extrajudicial information

regarding the relative seriousness of the crimes affected the jury’s decision on guilt

                                           17
or innocence. See Harris II, supra, 314 Ga. at 56 n. 4 (2) (stating that “whether the

record evidence suggested that this sentencing information would affect the jury’s

decision on guilt or innocence” is relevant in analyzing Harris’s juror misconduct

claim) (punctuation omitted). As the trial court recognized, the jury’s questions

displayed a focus on the evidence and the law regarding Harris’s manner of driving

rather than a preoccupation with punishment. And the State’s evidence that Harris

engaged in reckless driving was strong. Specifically, the suggested speed for the

sharp downhill turn was 15 mph, but the State’s expert testified that the bus was

traveling between 29 and 35 mph when it left the road, and Harris’s own expert

testified that the bus was exceeding 15 mph when it entered the curve. Both Harris

and a student on the bus stated after the crash that Harris had been driving fast, and

a post-crash inspection of the bus did not reveal any mechanical issues.

       Harris’s emphasis on the fact that the State did not present its own evidence or

witnesses at the motion-for-new-trial hearing is unavailing. The State was entitled to

rely on the available record evidence to show that there was no reasonable possibility

that the juror misconduct contributed to the conviction. See Harris II, supra, 314 Ga.

at 54 (2). Finally, contrary to Harris’s assertion, the trial court did not fail to analyze

                                            18
the specific evidence in this case, as it assessed how the extrajudicial information and

the jury’s questions related to the evidence at trial.

      In conclusion, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Harris’s juror misconduct claim, we affirm the trial court’s order denying her motion

for new trial.

      Judgment affirmed. Dillard, P. J., and Rickman, J., concur.

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