Court Opinion

ID: 9550046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:28:23.673282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:14.819953
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I concur in denying the writ, but dissent from holding section 11501 of the Health and Safety Code authorizes cruel and unusual ment in violation of article I, section 6 of the California Constitution.
The majority holds section 11501 unconstitutionally cruel on the ground the statute excludes an offender with a prior drug conviction from parole consideration for the minimum term of 10 years “without regard to the existence of such possible mitigating circumstances as the addict status of the offender, the quantity of narcotics involved, the nature of the purchaser, or the purposes of the sale.” (Ante, p. 929.) I cannot accept the majority’s conclusion for this reason: the sentencing judge possesses the *934power—inherent as well as conferred—to strike prior convictions if the majority’s mitigating circumstances lead him to believe the interest of justice would be furthered by not subjecting a defendant to the recidivist provisions of section 11501. (See People v. Benn (1972) 7 Cal.3d 530 [102 Cal.Rptr. 593, 498 P.2d 433]; People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89 [89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993]; People v. Burke (1956) 47 Cal.2d 45, 49-53 [301 P.2d 241].)
In People v. Burke, supra, this court considered the foundations of the judicial power to strike prior convictions not only where the conviction has not been legally established but, also where the court concludes the interest of justice would not be furthered by subjecting the defendant to the increased punishment entailed by finding the conviction true. Reasoning that the power to dismiss the whole includes the power to strike a part, we held that the Legislature authorized courts to strike prior convictions when it provided in section 1385 of the Penal Code that: “The court may, either on its own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.” (People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d at pp. 50-51.)
The People had argued in Burke that the power to strike prior convictions, granted by section 1385, was withdrawn by section 11712 of the Health and Safety Code because the latter provided that if a prior conviction “is admitted by the defendant, he shall be imprisoned in the state prison.” Rejecting that argument, we suggested the Legislature could not constitutionally divest the courts of their inherent power to strike prior convictions. “The statutes in question do validly—and in respect to constitutionally vested judicial power they neither purport to nor validly could do more than—prescribe the sentence which must be imposed upon the appropriate adjudication of guilt of the substantive crime and judicial determination of the factor which results in increased punishment. Such adjudication and judicial determination are inherently and essentially the province of the court . . . .” (People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 52; see People v. Valenti (1957) 49 Cal.2d 199, 206 [316 P.2d 633].)
In 1959 the Legislature sought to restrict the judicial power to strike prior convictions by adding section 11718 to the Health and Safety Code, making the exercise of that power contingent on a motion by the district attorney.1 In People v. Sidener (1962) 58 Cal.2d 645 [25 Cal.Rptr. 697, *935375 P.2d 641], this court rejected the argument that section 11718 violated article VI, section 1, and article III of the California Constitution, which vest the judicial power in the judiciary and proclaim the separation of powers. Any statements or implications in People v. Burke and People v. Valenti to the contrary were said to be unnecessary to the holdings in those cases and were disapproved. (People v. Sidener, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 647.) Sidener was overruled by People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89 [89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993], Having been declared invalid in Tenorio because it encroached upon the constitutional province of the judiciary and violated the doctrine of separation of powers (Cal. Const., art. III; art. VI, § 1), section 11718 was repealed when the Uniform Controlled Substances Act was added to the Health and Safety Code in 1972. (Stats. 1972, ch. 1407, § 2, p. 2987.)
Since the sentencing court clearly has power to strike prior convictions alleged against a defendant convicted of violating section 11501—if it finds failure to do so would result in the imposition of cruel punishment in the circumstances of a particular case—the real question is whether the trial court here abused its discretion by denying petitioner’s motion to strike his prior conviction. The majority would find an abuse of discretion of constitutional significance in refusal to strike prior convictions where the recidivism is “attributable solely to a psychological and/or physiological compulsion arising from an addiction to contraband.” (Ante, p. 922.)
The record in this case, like the record in Powell v. Texas (1968) 392 U.S. 514 [20 L.Ed.2d 1254, 88 S.Ct. 2145], is “utterly inadequate to permit the sort of informed and responsible adjudication which alone can support the announcement of an important and wide-ranging new constitutional principle.” (Powell v. Texas, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 521 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 1261], plurality opinion.)2 The trial court here did not find, nor is *936there any evidence in the record to support a finding, that petitioner’s recidivism was “attributable solely to a psychological and/or physiological compulsion arising from” addiction. Indeed, the entire thrust of petitioner’s entrapment defense was that he furnished heroin to Holmes, the police agent, solely because of his sympathy for Holmes’ withdrawal sufferings.
Just because petitioner was heroin-dependent to an uncertain extent, the majority assumes he was “compelled” to furnish heroin to Holmes in order to obtain some for himself. But drug dependence actually forms a continuum, “from lesser to greater, from minimum to compulsive.” “[I]t is important to discard the undimensional concept of individual loss of self-control which has long dominated scientific and lay concepts of ‘addiction.’ Most people who use psychoactive drugs do not succumb entirely to the pharmacologic properties of the drugs. [The nature of the drug, the method, dose and frequency of administration, the personality of the user and the nature of the environment] interrelate in distinctly different fashions with different individuals under different circumstances.” (Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective, Second Report of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, GPO (1973) pp. 135, 138-139.) Since the formulation of social policy concerning drug dependence must reflect its complexity and relativity (id. at p. 139), it is instructive to examine petitioner’s explanation of his conduct, discounting its self-serving character.
Although he first started using heroin in 1947, petitioner “stayed clean” from 1962 until the year before his arrest in 1971. Even after he began using heroin again he “never really got too far strung out,” i.e., addicted, because he had “learned to exercise a little control” over the years. When Holmes approached him to obtain heroin petitioner was engaged in “kicking” his dependence. Far from having lost all control over his conduct, petitioner was capable of voluntarily undergoing withdrawal simply because his wife was “on his back” about his dependence “causing trouble with our sex relations.”
Since he knew his own withdrawal symptoms—“similar to having the flu”—would soon subside, petitioner repeatedly refused to purchase heroin *937for Holmes even though Holmes offered to give him “a bag to help me kick my habit.” It was sympathy for Holmes’ suffering from withdrawal, not his own dependence, that finally made petitioner agree to serve as Holmes’ purchasing agent on five occasions, despite initially refusing to do so each time. Petitioner’s testimony revealed it was not a combination of drug dependence and economic necessity that prompted him to furnish heroin to Holmes. In fact, on one occasion petitioner had just cashed his unemployment check and grandly offered to pay the bill himself. Purchasing heroin for another in return for some of it was not part of the pattern of petitioner’s heroin dependence. Indeed, petitioner claimed he had never engaged in such conduct before.
The foregoing summary of petitioner’s testimony clearly establishes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike petitioner’s prior conviction. The record reveals that petitioner has not been punished cruelly, but the record is inadequate to support any broader conclusion. Since petitioner’s drug dependence did not compel him to furnish heroin to Holmes, this case simply fails to present the question whether it is unconstitutionally cruel to apply the recidivist provisions of section 11501 to a defendant whose recidivism was “attributable solely to a psychological and/ or physiological compulsion arising from” drug dependence.
In holding the recidivist provisions of section 11501 unconstitutional on the ground they are “considerably more harsh than penalties imposed for far more serious crimes in California” (ante, pp. 925-928), the majority invades the province of the Legislature. The punishment prescribed for a crime manifests a legislative judgment as to the relative seriousness of the offense. The Legislature has impliedly rejected the majority’s view that crimes of violence “clearly present more serious violations of the penal laws” than petitioner’s crime. (Ante, p. 926.) The Legislature’s judgment is shared by, among others, former Governor Rockefeller of New York. In calling upon the New York Legislature to enact mandatory life sentences without possibility of parole for drug dealers, Governor Rockefeller said “The hard-drug pusher is a cold and cynical destroyer of lives as much as any killer.” (N.Y. Times (11 Jan. 1973) p. 24, col. 4.) Since reasonable men differ as to whether the punishment here is proportionate to the crime we must defer to the Legislature, for it has the “broadest discretion possible . . . in specifying punishment for crime.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 [105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921]; People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628, 640 [100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880].)
As the majority reveals, the recidivist provisions of section 11501 are not unusually severe when compared with similar sentences imposed for repeated violations of other provisions of the Health and Safety Code relat*938ing to drug abuse. (See ante, p. 927; fn. 12.) Noting the various provisions of the Health and Safety Code precluding parole consideration for the mandatory minimum term were all enacted in 1961 as part of an “overall legislative reaction to the increasing problems of drug abuse,” the majority dismisses the legislation as the product of “ ‘honest zeal’ . . . generated in response to transitory public emotion,” or even “hysteria.” (Ante, p. 927, fn. 13.) This court should not dismiss the legislative expression of the People’s will so lightly. The penalties for repeated offenses involving a narcotic other than marijuana adopted in 1961 were reenacted without change in 1972 with the passage of the Uniforai Controlled Substances Act (Stats. 1972, ch. 1407, § 3), after a decade in which they had been attacked in the courts as cruel and unusual (see, e.g., People v. Clark (1970) 3 Cal.3d 97, 99 [89 Cal.Rptr. 253, 473 P.2d 997]) and periodically reconsidered by the Legislature (see, e.g., 22 Assem. Interim Com. Rep. No. 9, Narcotics Control (Jan. 1967) pp. 16-17, 23, 2 Appendix to Assem. J. (1967 Reg. Sess.).)
Since capital punishment was authorized by statute in 41 states when held unusual in People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628, 648 [100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880], the fact that the penalty imposed by section 11501 is “more severe than that imposed by the vast majority of the states of the Union {ante, p. 928) is surely of negligible constitutional significance. Admittedly, the Advisory Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice recommend against mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment {ante, pp. 928, 929), but their recommendations were made to state legislatures on policy grounds—not to state courts on constitutional grounds. (Model Sentencing Act, 9 Crime & Delinquency 339, com. on § 13; Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, Approved Draft, com. on § 3.2.)
The provision of Health and Safety Code section 11501 precluding parole consideration for petitioner for a minimum of 10 years is neither cruel nor unusual.
McComb, J., concurred.

“In any criminal proceeding for violation of any provision of this division no allegation of fact which, if admitted or found to be true, would change the penalty for the offense charged from what the penalty would be if such fact were not alleged and admitted or proved to be true may be dismissed by the court or *935stricken from the accusatory pleading except upon motion of the district attorney.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 11718; added Stats. 1959, ch. 1772, p. 4256, § 1; repealed Stats. 1972, ch. 1407, § 2, p. 2987.)

In Powell v. Texas, the trial court expressly found the defendant was a chronic alcoholic whose public drunkenness was the product, not of his own volition, but of a compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism. (392 U.S. at pp. 521, 557 [20 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1261, 1281].) Relying on these, “findings” the dissenters in Powell declared punishment of a chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness unconstitutionally cruel and unusual on the ground “a person may not be punished if the condition essential to constitute the defined crime is part of the pattern of his disease and is occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of the disease.” (392 U.S. at p. 569 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 1288]; Portas, J., dissenting.) Rejecting the trial court’s “findings,” Justice Marshall held one could not conclude “on the state of this record or on the current state of medical knowledge, that chronic alcoholics in general and Leroy Powell in particular, suffer from such an irresistible compulsion *936to drink and to get drunk in public that they are utterly unable to control their performance of either or both of these acts and thus cannot be deterred at all from public intoxication.” (392 U.S. at p. 535 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 1269], plurality opinion.) Although he suggested chronic alcoholics who were homeless or so intoxicated as to have lost control of their movements might be unable to avoid being drunk in public, Justice White concurred in affirming the conviction on the ground “nothing in the record indicates that [Powell] could not have done his drinking in private or that he was so inebriated at the time that he had lost control of his movements and wandered into the public street.” (392 U.S. at p. 553 [20 L.Ed.2d at p, 1279]; White, J., concurring.)