Court Opinion

ID: 9627131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:35:21.899776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:40.120521
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice QUINN
specially concurring:
I specially concur in the judgment. The defendant attempted to qualify Robert Lantz as an expert witness in firearms identification for the purpose of eliciting an opinion that the bullet found at the crime scene was too badly damaged to be matched to a particular weapon. The trial court ruled that Lantz, who was permitted to testify on other matters as an expert witness in analytical chemistry, was not qualified to testify as an expert witness in firearms identification. Because the question of the adequacy of Lantz’s qualifications is extremely close, I believe deference to the trial court’s resolution on the issue is required.
The question in this case is not whether expert testimony on the feasibility of scientifically matching the bullet to a particular weapon would have assisted the jury in resolving this case — clearly it would have. Rather, the question is whether Lantz was qualified to offer an opinion on that subject. Whether a witness is qualified as an expert on a particular subject is a preliminary question of fact to be determined by the trial court pursuant to CRE 104(a). Although liberality in evaluating the qualifications of a proffered expert witness normally should be the rule, the final determination of the competency of a witness to testify as an expert rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. E.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2903, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); People v. DeLuna, 183 Colo. 163, 165, 515 P.2d 459, 460 (1973); White v. People, 175 Colo. 119, 123, 486 P.2d 4, 6 (1971); M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 702.3, at 612-13 (2nd ed. 1986). The often stated rule is that a court abuses its discretion only if, based on the particular circumstances confronting it, its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. E.g., King v. People, 785 P.2d 596, 603 (Colo.1990); People v. Hampton, 758 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Colo.1988); People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199, 1207 (Colo.1987).
In this case, Lantz acknowledged that the Association of Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners was a professional organization comprised of experts dealing with the kind of scientific testing involved in this case but that he was not a member of that organization. The trial court, in ruling on the prosecution’s objection to Lantz’s prof-erred testimony, remarked that it was at a loss to determine whether Lantz subscribed to any recognized standards, and whether he had operated within such standards, in conducting his examination of the bullet. I cannot say with any degree of assurance that the trial court’s ruling on the competency of Lantz to testify as an expert constituted an abuse of discretion. I therefore concur in the reversal of the judgment of the court of appeals.