Court Opinion

ID: 9580086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:01:42.121388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:01.349428
License: Public Domain

*64Marilyn Kelly, P.J.
(dissenting). I agree fully with the standard of review developed in the majority’s opinion and similarly conclude that the law in question is ambiguous and a proper subject of judicial construction. However, I reach the opposite result. The construction of MCL 600.8511(d); MSA 27A.8511(d) which best accomplishes its object permits a district court magistrate to issue search warrants on the basis of a blanket authorization.
MCL 600.8511(d); MSA 27A.8511(d) must be read in pari materia with MCL 780.651(1); MSA 28.1259(1)(1) and MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3). It then becomes clear that the Legislature did not intend to limit the authorization of § 8511(d) solely to the issuance of the search warrant sought.
Language in § 651(1) refers to "[w]hen an affidavit is made on oath to a magistrate authorized to issue warrants.” The prosecution argues that this language assumes that the magistrate already has authorization to issue the warrant when the oath is made. Moreover, pursuant to § 653, a magistrate’s finding of probable cause must be made based on all facts related in the supporting affidavits. Therefore, the prosecution asserts, a district court magistrate must have the ultimate authority to decide whether to issue the search warrant. No statutory provision indicates a need for the magistrate to obtain authorization from a district court judge to issue a specific warrant either before or after deciding to do so.
It is true that the definition of "magistrate” under the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically excludes a district court magistrate. MCL 761.1(f); MSA 28.843(f). However, the Code also provides that a district court magistrate may exercise the powers, jurisdiction and duties of a "magistrate”, where explicitly provided. Id. Therefore, district *65court magistrates are included within the definition of "magistrate” under MCL 780.651(1); MSA 28.1259(1X1) and MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3); they have explicit authority to issue search warrants when authorized to do so by a district court judge.
Reading MCL 600.8511(d); MSA 27A.8511(d) to allow a blanket authorization is consistent with both the language and rationale underlying MCL 780.651(1); MSA 28.1259(1)(1) and MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3). A district court magistrate must have authority from a district court judge before undertaking to determine whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant. Granting a magistrate authority to issue a search warrant is not the equivalent of determining whether sufficient evidence exists to establish probable cause for the search. Since authorization must be given before the district court magistrate makes a probable cause determination, a case-by-case authorization does not necessarily better ensure that the warrant is properly issued. Therefore, a blanket authorization has the same result and also saves judicial time and energy.
Defendant argues that to allow a blanket authorization is to eliminate any discretion on the part of district court judges. He asserts that, if the Legislature intended blanket authorizations, it would have given district court magistrates the power to issue search warrants without limitation. He points out that, in fact, the Legislature did grant district court magistrates unlimited power to fix bail and accept bond. See MCL 600.8511(c); MSA 27A.8511(c).
Allowing a blanket authorization for the issuance of search warrants does not eliminate any exercise of discretion by district court judges. In this case, the judges made the initial decision *66whether any one or more of their magistrates would be authorized to issue search warrants. The magistrates selected were not given the unlimited discretion to issue search warrants that they had in fixing bail and bonds under MCL 600.8511(c); MSA 27A.8511(c); they could issue search warrants only if the judges of the district court had exercised their discretion giving them the authority.
MCL 600.8511; MSA 27A.8511 was added to the Revised Judicature Act (rja) in 1968. 1968 PA 154. The purpose of 1968 PA 154 was "to develop a lower court structure better adapted to the needs of the people and the ends of justice.” Convention Comment, Const 1963, art 6, § 26. The Legislature accomplished this objective in part by giving district court judges the discretion to lessen their work loads by transferring statutorily specified duties to their magistrates. Now to read MCL 600.8511; MSA 27A.8511 to require case-by-case authorization for search warrants reburdens the judges through the very acts by which the Legislature sought to relieve them. I am at a loss to see how the court structure is in any way improved or the judges assisted from how they functioned before the legislation, given the majority’s construction of it.
The most probable and reasonable intent of the Legislature was to allow district court magistrates to issue search warrants based on a blanket authorization. Otherwise, one would expect that the Legislature would have stated specifically that a case-by-case authorization is necessary. It would then have provided a procedure for district court judges to follow when issuing case-by-case authorizations. It did not do so. I decline to read into the statute that which was not manifestly within the intention of the Legislature. Jefferson Schools v *67Detroit Edison Co, 154 Mich App 390, 393; 397 NW2d 320 (1986).
Furthermore, I reject the implication in the majority opinion that constitutional rights are endangered by the practice. No evidence has been presented that abuse is rampant in those areas where district court magistrates currently issue warrants under blanket authorizations. Also, it is not apparent from the record that the warrant in this case was faulty in structure or content. Finally, significant safeguards to protect the implicated constitutional rights are firmly established in our criminal legal system.
The circuit court judge involved in this case testified that, during the eighteen years he served as a district court judge, magistrates sought authorization on a case-by-case basis. The comments were largely anecdotal. They reflect on a period of tremendous change in our judicial history. The population and incidents of crime along with the resultant burdens on the courts all increased at a staggering rate. Consequently, I do not find the judge’s comments as persuasive or convincing as does the majority.
Nor am I persuaded that the advent of modern technology alleviates difficulties law enforcement personnel experience communicating with district court judges concerning the issuance of warrants. Technology alone cannot solve the problems inherent in requiring a case-by-case authorization in remote areas of the state or in districts besieged by heavy dockets.
In summary, the majority acknowledges that this decision places additional burdens on district court judges. With that, I agree. It observes that it is the Legislature that is responsible for authorizing expansions in the duties' of district court magistrates. I agree again but conclude that the Legis*68lature has already done so. When the statutes under consideration here are construed together, it becomes manifest that the Legislature has given the district courts the power to preauthorize their magistrates to issue search warrants. It has taken that step without endangering constitutional rights. In so doing, it has made the judicial system more responsive to the needs of the citizens and ultimately better able to sustain its workload. The majority now undoes that accomplishment. I would reverse.