Court Opinion

ID: 9858801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:42:15.387156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:06.157944
License: Public Domain

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur with the majority opinion in its decisions concerning the issues raised in this appeal under this record.
I write further, however, to express my views concerning the meaning of “legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an ... underinsured motor vehicle” in Iowa Code section 516A.1 (1991) in an action by an insured against an underinsured motorist (UIM) insurer.
A claim for UIM benefits, such as the claim asserted by the plaintiff here, is a melding of contract and tort principles. Although the basis of the suit itself against the UIM insurer may be contractual in nature, the insurer stands in the shoes of the alleged tortfeasor, and basically can defend the claim as the tortfeasor would.
The reason is that under section 516A.1 plaintiff can only recover from the UIM insurer damages that plaintiff would be “legally entitled to recover” from the underinsured tortfeasor. Accordingly, the UIM carrier should be able to assert the same defenses the tortfeasor could assert in defense of a direct suit by plaintiff against the tortfeasor. These defenses could include lack of fault, comparative fault, and applicable tort statutes of limitations.
I would allow UIM insurers to assert the two-year tort statute of limitations that would be available to alleged tortfeasors. The purpose of our statutes of limitations is to spare courts the burden of adjudicating stale claims after memories have faded, witnesses have died, and evidence has been lost. Schulte v. Wageman, 465 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Iowa 1991). This purpose explains why the limitation on an action on a written contract is longer than the limitation on an action in tort; generally, the evidence surrounding a tort claim is more likely to disappear or become less reliable over time than the evidence surrounding a written contract. Cf. Motherly v. Hanson, 359 N.W.2d 450, 457 (Iowa 1984) (observing the policy reasons for a shorter limitations period on unwritten contracts than on written contracts).
Here, for instance, the plaintiff has made a claim for loss of consortium nine and a half years after the alleged loss occurred. Although the proximate basis of her claim is her insurance policy, the policy itself presumably required proof of the occurrence of the loss. Unfortunately, we never had the opportunity to examine the contract because it was lost in the intervening decade.
The majority apparently concedes that the insurer may assert other defenses available to the tortfeasor, such as comparative fault or lack of damages. Section 516A.l’s use of the term “legally entitled to recover damages” seems to allow the UIM insurer in lieu of the tortfeasor to assert a tort limitations defense in addition to the other defenses the majority allows. See also Bocek v. Inter-Ins. Exch., 175 Ind.App. 69, 369 N.E.2d 1093, 1097-98 (1977); Vaughn v. Collum, 136 Ga. *663App. 677, 222 S.E.2d 37, 39 (1976) (noting that it would be “gross error to allow the plaintiff to awaken from his long five-year sleep and suddenly come alive and secure service and relief from his inexcusable neglect”); Brown v. Lumbermens Mid. Cas. Co., 285 N.C. 313, 204 S.E.2d 829, 834 (1974); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wharton, 88 Nev. 183, 495 P.2d 359, 361 (1972).
The majority says the defendant should not have been granted summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff did not have capacity to sue the tortfeasor. When the case gets to trial, however, most defenses available to the alleged tortfeasor should be available to the UIM insurer in defending the UIM claim.
ANDREASEN, J., joins this special concurrence.