Court Opinion

ID: 9627855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:57:15.22523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:45:21.889272
License: Public Domain

VOLLACK, Justice,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s holding that the deputy was justified in conducting a *1219pat-down search that included removing all objects from the defendant’s coat pockets. However, I disagree with the majority’s further holding that the deputy violated the protective custody statute, or the defendant’s constitutional rights, when he opened the package to identify the probable weapon. I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly states that the purpose and rationale of the Colorado Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act [hereinafter Alcoholism Act or Act] focus on concern for the safety and protection of the individual, rather than investigation of allegedly criminal conduct. However, I believe that this rationale does not justify a defendant’s use of the Act as a shield to prevent prosecution when a legal search reveals contraband. The issue is one of first impression: what search and seizure standards apply to a protective custody detainee under the Alcoholism Act?
I.
CUSTODIAL SEARCH
Because the civil protective custody statute does not contain provisions specifying how, when, or to what extent searches may be conducted, I believe the appropriate analysis is whether the defendant’s protection from unreasonable police intrusion under article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution and the fourth amendment of the federal constitution was violated here.
The defendant here had been taken into civil protective custody pursuant to the Alcoholism Act, and the Act expressly states that “[a] taking into protective custody under this section is not an arrest.” § 25-1-310(1), 11 C.R.S. (1982). However, I believe the language of the statute also makes it clear that the decriminalization of intoxication in the Act has a different purpose: to encourage treatment, and to ensure that a party will not suffer the consequences of an arrest record or criminal record simply because he has been taken into temporary custody for intoxication. However, the Act also clearly states:
(4) The fact that a person is intoxicated or incapacitated by alcohol shall not prevent his being arrested or prosecuted for the commission of any criminal act or conduct not enumerated in subsection (1) of this section.
(5) Nothing in this part 3 shall be construed as a limitation upon the right of a police officer to make an otherwise legal arrest, notwithstanding the fact that the arrested person may be intoxicated or incapacitated by alcohol.
§ 25-1-316(4), (5), 11 C.R.S. (1982).
Accordingly, I believe that the majority goes too far in holding that the statutory language “not an arrest” was intended to not only protect the detainee from the stigma of a criminal arrest record, but also limits law enforcement from conducting a thorough search of the defendant. Even though civil protective custody under the Act is not an arrest for purposes of charging or reporting a criminal act, I believe that once an intoxicated individual has been taken into custody, the principles that apply to search and seizure incident to a custodial arrest should apply.
A custodial arrest is “a police officer’s seizure of a person for the purpose of taking that person to the station house for booking procedures and the filing of criminal charges.” People v. Bischofberger, 724 P.2d 660, 662 n. 4 (Colo.1986). To make a legal custodial arrest, the arresting officer must have probable cause to believe the person has committed a criminal offense. Id. In contrast, law enforcement officers can take temporary custody of a person under the Alcoholism Act and require that the detainee go to an approved treatment facility, or be detained in an emergency medical facility or jail. § 25-1-310(1), 11 C.R.S. (1982). The officer can take an individual into temporary custody under the Act if the officer has “probable cause” to believe the party is “intoxicated or incapacitated by alcohol and clearly dangerous to the health and safety of himself or others.” Id. Other language in the statute calls for this limited interpretation of the “not an arrest” distinction. For example, section 25-1-310(6) states that when a person is involuntarily detained under the Act, he must be advised of his right to challenge *1220the detention, the right to counsel at every stage, and the right to court-appointed counsel.1
Based on this interpretation of the Alcoholism Act, I believe that searches conducted pursuant to protective custody detentions under section 25-1-310(1) should be analyzed by the same standards that apply to searches incident to a lawful arrest.
II.
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST/DETENTION
Once the defendant here was taken into protective custody, I agree with the majority that the arresting officer was entitled to conduct a pat-down search for the discovery of weapons. A “pat down or frisk for weapons is the very type of limited, protective intrusion authorized during an investigatory stop when the officer has reason to suspect the person with whom he is dealing might be armed and dangerous.” People v. Savage, 698 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Colo.1985). In contrast with the majority opinion, I also believe that the officer had authority to conduct a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. The scope of such a search “is quite broad ... [and] need not be limited to a mere pat-down of the arres-tee’s outer clothing, but may extend to pockets and other containers, opened or closed, found on the person of the arrestee or within his immediate reach.” People v. Bischofberger, 724 P.2d 660, 664 (Colo.1986). A searching officer “may seize and examine weapons, contraband, or other articles which the officer reasonably believes to be related to criminal activity even though these articles do not directly relate to the offense for which the arrest itself was effected.” Id. at 665. In Bischofber-ger, law enforcement officers searched the defendant incident to a custodial arrest and, as part of the search, they opened a container found in the defendant’s shirt pocket and found contraband. We reversed the trial court’s suppression of this evidence by expressly holding that the seizure of the container’s contents “complied with recognized Fourth Amendment standards relating to a search incident to an arrest.” Id. See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (custodial search of a suspect under arrest is a reasonable intrusion under the fourth amendment).
In the analogous situation of a search incident to a warrantless arrest, the test under our state constitution is whether the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant. People v. Cunningham, 194 Colo. 198, 570 P.2d 1086 (1977). In this particular area, we have adopted the language of the U.S. Supreme Court iii United States v. Robinson: “[an] intrusion [based on probable cause] being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 326, 608 P.2d 342, 345 (Colo.1980), on appeal after remand, 625 P.2d 991 (Colo.1981).
Here, the statute requires that a detaining officer have probable cause to believe a person is intoxicated and a danger to himself or others before taking the individual into protective custody. While this is not the same probable cause requirement as required for a criminal arrest, I believe the correct analysis is to permit a full search, pursuant to taking an individual into temporary custody, for the safety of the detaining officer, the detainee, and the public. The necessary result is that the officer *1221here had authority to conduct a thorough search of a detainee in protective custody. He had probable cause, as defined in the Alcoholism Act, to believe that the defendant was intoxicated and a danger to himself or others. Based on this statutory probable cause requirement, he detained the defendant in protective custody. He then conducted a pat-down search for weapons. When he emptied the pockets of the defendant’s jacket, he discovered the folded paper packet. Suspecting that it might contain a razor blade, the officer opened the packet and found contraband.
III.
PAT-DOWN SEARCH
Even if the officer was only entitled to perform the pat-down search for weapons, I believe the officer’s actions during the pat-down were justified, and reasonable under Colorado law. The test is:
In determining the reasonableness of a search in the situation where the search is not full blown but is rather just a protective search for weapons, the inquiry is a dual one: (1) was the officer’s action justified at its inception, and (2) was the search reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place?
People v. Burley, 185 Colo. 224, 226, 523 P.2d 981, 982 (1974). In People v. Casias, we found no constitutional violation had occurred when a tin-foil package was seized from the defendant’s pocket pursuant to what began as a pat-down search by the officer for the protection of the officer. 193 Colo. 66, 75, 77, 563 P.2d 926, 932, 934 (1977). Based on the facts, we held that the search of the package was not unreasonable. Id. at 78, 563 P.2d at 935. See also People v. Burley, 185 Colo. 224, 523 P.2d 981 (1974) (officer’s use of flashlight to scan part of defendant’s car in search for weapon held reasonable because “the scope of the search was reasonably related to the officers’ fear that the defendant might have a weapon concealed beneath the car seat.” Id. at 227, 523 P.2d at 982 (emphasis added)).
Because I believe that even in the context of a pat-down search for weapons, this search was not violative of the defendant’s constitutional rights, I would also reverse based on this line of Colorado law.
IV.
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
I agree with the People’s assertion that the “inevitable discovery” rule applies, and calls for admission of the seized contraband. We have adopted the inevitable discovery rule, which states that:
[T]he exclusionary rule does not compel the suppression of evidence that the prosecution can show would have been inevitably discovered absent the police misconduct or mistake: “If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).
People v. Briggs, 709 P.2d 911, 922 (Colo.1985) (emphasis added). We have clarified the inevitable discovery rule by stating that “the central focus should be on what investigatory measures necessarily or inevitably would have been taken.” People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948, 951 (Colo.1983) (evidence held not admissible under inevitable discovery rule because the record “lacks even a hint of an independent route” by which the evidence could have been constitutionally obtained. Id.) The court of appeals has attempted to limit application of the rule to derivative evidence, as distinguished from primary evidence, in People v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo.App.1985), and we granted certio-rari on this issue in Schoondermark (cert. granted, April 7, 1986). Based on current Colorado law, I believe the contraband here is admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.
The majority, in footnote 5, concludes that the record does not justify application of this rule. I disagree, based on the testimony of the detoxification center director *1222that when a detainee is admitted, the person’s clothing and personal possessions are thoroughly searched for contraband as well as weapons, in the presence of the police officer. Containers and folded pieces of paper like the one found in the defendant’s pocket here would have been opened at the detoxification center, and it necessarily follows that the contraband would then have been discovered. If the detainee objected to the search by personnel at the center, then the police officer would be called upon to perform a thorough search of the detainee.
Based on this testimony from the record, the fact that the officer found the contraband while searching the defendant at the scene of the stop rather than after transporting him to the center does not invalidate the search. Even if the search was unlawful, the contraband would have been discovered shortly thereafter during the inventory search at the facility, so the inevitable discovery rule applies.
Finally, I dissent for reasons stated by the United States Supreme Court in Colorado v. Bertine: “reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure.” Colorado v. Bertine, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 738, 742, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987). I believe the distinction set forth by the majority is impractical. The majority concludes that the initial pat-down search was permissible and that removal of objects from the defendant’s coat pockets was a permissible extension of the pat-down. However, the majority then creates a test that I feel is illogical; it seems to say that if a package is confiscated and appears to be a probable weapon, the officer must make a distinction and refrain at that point from further investigation. The required distinction, to identify confiscated packages as being probable weapons — or not probable weapons — is not a standard that can be practically applied or effectively reviewed. “ ‘[A] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.’ ” New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981).
V.
UNIFORM ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT
I do not believe that the cases from other jurisdictions which have adopted the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act mandate the result reached by the majority. While twelve states have adopted similar or identical versions of the Act,2 few have addressed this issue.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the admission into evidence of contraband seized during a protective custody search of an intoxicated party. The court held that “the police acted legitimately in searching the defendant’s pockets because they could have contained a small object or substance dangerous to the officers or to the defendant himself. Thus the removal of the plastic bag was consistent with the policies of the protective custody statute.” State v. Donovan, 128 N.H. 702, 705, 519 A.2d 252, 254 (1986). In so doing, the court distinguished its earlier holding in State v. Harlow, where it held that search of the detainee’s wallet did violate the protective custody statute. The court had held in Harlow that “[i]t may be necessary, in some cases, to determine whether a container holds some object which might injure someone,” 123 N.H. 547, 552, 465 A.2d 1210, 1213 (1983), and relied on this distinction as well as the fact that the marijuana in Donovan’s pocket was stored in a transparent bag.
The majority cites State v. Perry in support of its statement that the Act alone does not provide justification for a criminal *1223custodial arrest, absent probable cause. In State v. Perry, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Act alone does not support a search, but was careful to render a narrow decision, based on the specific facts detailed in the case. The court said: “[i]t is important to be precise about the exact situation that this case presents. It concerns the propriety of police opening for inventory purposes luggage belonging to a person who is being held solely for detoxification. ... The state does not claim the police had probable cause or reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime.... The police lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the suitcases contained evidence of a crime, contraband or weapons.” 298 Or. 21, 24, 688 P.2d 827, 829 (1984) (emphasis added).
Another case cited by the majority is Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1268 (Alaska 1975). That holding also turned on the particular facts, which involved information obtained by the police from an informant prior to the defendant being found in an allegedly intoxicated state and detained. The Alaska Supreme Court held that, under the Uniform Act, the officer “may have had a duty to take him into protective custody” and went on to hold that:
[a]n officer transporting a person incapacitated by drink has a valid reason to make a limited search for possible weapons which might be used to injure him. Accordingly, any items discovered by [the officer] as a result of such a search made prior to transporting [the defendant] to jail were not the product of an illegal search.
Id. at 1272 (emphasis added). The court suppressed evidence seized during a more detailed search conducted when the defendant was jailed. Id. at 1272-73.
Based on the analysis above, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding.
I am authorized to state that ROVIRA, J., joins in this dissent.

. This court has taken a similar approach in the area of juvenile law. One of the express purposes of the Children’s Code, sections 19-1-101 to -11-110, 8B C.R.S. (1986), is to serve the best interests of the child and to "assist him in becoming a responsible and productive member of society.” § 19-l-102(d), 8B C.R.S. (1986). Rather than filing criminal charges against a juvenile offender, the prosecution generally files a "petition in delinquency.” § 19 — 3—101(l)(b). When an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a child has committed "an act which would be a felony, misdemeanor" or ordinance violation if committed by an adult, the officer takes the child “into temporary custody';” under section 19-2-101(l)(a), rather than arrest. Search of a juvenile, incident to his being taken into “temporary custody,” is controlled by the same search and seizure principles that apply to adult arrests, People v. B.M.C., 32 Colo.App. 79, 506 P.2d 409 (1973), with the exception of consent searches, which are specifically addressed elsewhere in the Children's Code. People v. Reyes, 174 Colo. 377, 483 P.2d 1342 (1971).

. The following states have adopted versions of the Act: Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington and Wisconsin. Maine also adopted the Act, but repealed it in 1981.