Court Opinion

ID: 9920873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 00:02:25.371965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:34.921582
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION SEVEN

 RUTH CAMPBELL et al.,                B322619

         Plaintiffs and Appellants,   (Los Angeles County
                                      Super. Ct. No. BC576604)
         v.

 FPI MANAGEMENT, INC.,

         Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment and postjudgment order of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
      The Law Offices of Alan Himmelfarb, Alan Himmelfarb;
Parisi & Havens, David C. Parisi, Suzanne Havens Beckman;
and Thomas W. Kielty for Plaintiffs and Appellants Ruth
Campbell, Jair Campbell, Alexis Gray and Sheila Handy.
      Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Jeffrey A. Miller, Jon P.
Kardassakis, Brittany B. Sutton, and Michael K. Grimaldi for
Defendant and Respondent.
            _____________________________________
       The central issue in this appeal is whether tenants in
subsidized low-income housing developments have standing to
bring suit under the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200 et seq.) against a property management company
that terminated their tenancies prematurely pursuant to legally
deficient notices. We hold that they do.
       Plaintiffs Ruth Campbell, Jair Campbell, and Alexis Gray
(collectively the HOME plaintiffs) lived in housing managed by
FPI Management, Inc. (FPI) that was federally subsidized
pursuant to the HOME Investment Partnerships Program
(HOME) of the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing
Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12701 et seq.). Under that program, the
government provides money to housing owners, and in return it
requires the owners to rent apartments to low-income tenants
and to follow laws protecting those tenants’ rights—including by
giving at least 30 days’ notice before terminating a tenancy. FPI
terminated the HOME plaintiffs’ tenancies after providing just
three days’ notice. Plaintiffs allege that FPI’s termination of
their tenancies with insufficient notice is an unfair business
practice actionable under the UCL.
       The trial court granted summary judgment to FPI, ruling
that the HOME plaintiffs did not suffer an injury in fact as is
required to confer standing under the UCL because they
remained in possession of their apartments for more than 30 days
after receiving the three-day termination notices. However, the
HOME plaintiffs have shown that they were prematurely
deprived of property rights and subjected to imminent legal peril
when FPI provided legally deficient termination notices. The
HOME plaintiffs faced these consequences even as they remained
in possession of their apartments for more than 30 days. We hold

                                2
that the HOME plaintiffs’ loss of property rights and exposure to
legal peril amount to an injury in fact sufficient to confer
standing under the UCL.
      A different analysis applies to plaintiff Sheila Handy and
the class she represents (collectively, the Section 8 plaintiffs),
who lived in housing managed by FPI that was subsidized by
section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended
(42 U.S.C. § 1437f) (Section 8). The trial court ruled that FPI was
not required to provide 30 days’ notice before terminating a
Section 8 tenancy. The Section 8 plaintiffs fail to demonstrate
that this was error.
      In this appeal, plaintiffs contest the trial court’s orders
granting FPI’s motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiffs’
motion for summary adjudication, and awarding costs to FPI as
the prevailing party. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Plaintiffs, a group of low-income housing tenants, first
brought suit in 2015 alleging a variety of claims against
27 property owners and managers. In the intervening years, the
parties and claims have been significantly revised and narrowed.
       At issue in this appeal is plaintiffs’ claim in the operative
fifth amended complaint that FPI, their former property
manager, terminated their tenancies through unlawful notices of
termination of tenancy, an unfair business practice under the
UCL.

                                 3
     A.    FPI Terminates Plaintiffs’ Tenancies with Less than
           30 Days’ Notice
           1.    Ruth and Jair Campbell
      Between 2011 and 2016, Ruth Campbell and her grandson
Jair Campbell lived in a federally subsidized apartment in a 49-
unit building known as Casa De Angeles in Los Angeles,
California.
      The owner of Casa De Angeles, AMCAL Casa De Angeles
Fund, LP, had received approximately $3.5 million from the City
of Los Angeles in 2007 for the purpose of purchasing the property
and constructing the building. The City’s subsidy was paid from
HOME funds it had received from the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development. In exchange for its receipt
of those funds, the property owner agreed to make a certain
number of units available to and affordable for low-income
households and to abide by the terms of the HOME program.
      In March 2009, the property owner retained FPI to manage
and lease Casa De Angeles. In November 2011, FPI, acting on
behalf of the owner, agreed to rent a HOME-subsidized
apartment at Casa De Angeles to the Campbells.
      The Campbells allege that during their tenancy, their only
source of income was government assistance that came in
three separate payments each month. They also allege that, with
the knowledge of the building’s management, they regularly had
to pay rent late because of the timing of their receipt of the
assistance payments.
      On March 10, 2015, FPI served the Campbells with a three-
day notice to pay rent or quit. The Campbells allege that shortly
thereafter the sprinkler system in an upstairs unit flooded their
apartment, causing mold and significant damage to their

                                4
personal property. They further allege that building
management refused to offer alternative accommodations or
replace their ruined property.
       On April 6, 2015, FPI served the Campbells with another
three-day notice to pay rent or quit. The Campbells allege they
had the ability to pay the demanded rent and attempted to make
a partial payment, but FPI would not accept it. Although it
acknowledges the partial payment attempt, FPI asserts that the
Campbells never tendered the full amount of back rent it alleges
they owed. On April 16, 2015, an unlawful detainer action was
filed against the Campbells on behalf of the property owner. The
parties ultimately resolved the matter with a stipulation entered
on November 18, 2015. Under the stipulation, the Campbells
agreed to vacate the unit by January 9, 2016, in exchange for
waiver of the alleged back rent.
           2.    Alexis Gray
      In 2016, Alexis Gray lived in a federally subsidized low-
income unit in the Terracina Apartments in Los Angeles,
California.
      The owner of the Terracina Apartments, AMCAL Terracina
Fund, L.P., received approximately $5.8 million from the County
of Los Angeles’s HOME funds to finance the apartment building
in 2012. The owner later retained FPI to manage the property.
      In January 2016, Alexis Gray entered a lease to live in
one of the HOME-subsidized units on the property. Like the
Campbells, Gray’s unit was subject to affordability restrictions
that were imposed as part of the property owner’s receipt of the
HOME funds.
      On February 4, 2016, FPI served Gray with a three-day
notice to pay rent or quit. She paid the demanded rent on

                                5
February 8. FPI served Gray with another three-day notice to
pay rent or quit on March 4, 2016. Gray alleges that she later
sent management a letter explaining that she was down on her
luck, her car was towed, she was working part-time and unable to
secure full-time work, and she loved her apartment and wanted
to stay there.
        FPI served Gray additional three-day notices to pay rent or
quit on April 4, May 4, and August 4, 2016. Gray alleges she was
turned away when she attempted to pay her August rent. FPI
denies this. On August 12, 2016, an unlawful detainer was filed
against Gray on behalf of the property owner. After Gray failed
to file an answer, the court entered a default judgment and later
issued a writ of possession. The sheriff’s department issued a
notice requiring Gray to vacate by September 21, 2016. Gray
moved out on October 4, 2016.
            3.    Sheila Handy
       Sheila Handy moved into an apartment at Casa De Angeles
after signing a lease in September 2009. Handy’s rent was
subsidized by Section 8.
       On March 10, 2015, FPI served Handy with a three-day
notice to pay rent or quit. Handy alleges that she attempted to
pay her rent that month, but the mailbox where she regularly
deposited rent had been removed and there was no one in the
management office to pay. On April 6, 2015, FPI served Handy
with another three-day notice to pay rent or quit. Handy alleges
that FPI refused her attempt to pay the demanded rent within
three days of receiving the notice. FPI denies this and asserts
Handy had not paid rent for three months. On April 16, 2015, an
unlawful detainer was filed against Handy on behalf of the

                                 6
property owner. Handy ultimately moved out in July 2015, and
the action was dismissed.
      B.    Plaintiffs Bring Suit Against Property Owners and
            Managers
       On March 24, 2015, two tenants filed a class action lawsuit
against 27 property owners and managers, including FPI,
alleging claims under the UCL and claims for unjust enrichment,
injunctive relief, and fraudulent concealment. As the case
evolved, the original plaintiffs were eventually replaced by
others, including the four plaintiffs who bring this appeal, and
the claims were significantly revised.
       On January 23, 2019, plaintiffs filed the operative
fifth amended complaint, which alleges that FPI and other
defendants imposed improper late fees and terminated class
members’ tenancies unlawfully with less than 30 days’ notice.
On April 10, 2019, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ request to
dismiss their late fee claims, as well as the associated plaintiffs
and defendants. This left only the plaintiffs who bring this
appeal and their allegations that the defendants’ practice of
terminating tenancies without 30 days’ notice amounts to an
unfair business practice under the UCL, violates the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.), and
constitutes wrongful termination of tenancies. These causes of
action were brought on behalf of three putative classes composed
of former HOME tenants, Section 8 tenants, and tenants whose
tenancies were subject to publicly recorded federal regulatory
agreements between local housing authorities and business
owners.
       On January 25, 2019, the trial court certified the HOME
class. On September 26, 2019, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion

                                 7
to certify the Section 8 and regulatory agreement classes. On
January 16, 2020, the court decertified the HOME class. On
April 20, 2021, we granted plaintiffs’ petitions for writ of
mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying
class certification, vacate its order decertifying the HOME class,
and issue a new order certifying the Section 8 and regulatory
agreement classes. (Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc. (Apr. 20,
2021, B302664) [nonpub. opn.].)
      C.    Plaintiffs and FPI File Cross-motions for Summary
            Judgment, and the Court Denies Both
       On September 14, 2021, FPI and the remaining named
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment or in the
alternative summary adjudication. The defendants concurrently
filed a motion for a no merits determination as to plaintiffs’ claim
under the CLRA. On January 12, 2022, plaintiffs filed a motion
for summary adjudication of their UCL claim on behalf of the
HOME and Section 8 classes. The matters were heard together.
       On March 30, 2022, the trial court granted the defendants’
no merits motion as to the CLRA claim and denied without
prejudice the defendants’ motion for summary judgment or
adjudication on procedural grounds.
       The same day, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for
summary adjudication. The court found that the Section 8
plaintiffs had not shown that they were legally entitled to
30 days’ notice, negating their claim of an unfair business
practice. As for the HOME plaintiffs, the court held that even if
30 days’ notice was required, the HOME plaintiffs lacked
standing under the UCL because they remained in their
apartments for more than 30 days after FPI served termination
notices.

                                 8
      D.    FPI Renews Its Motion for Summary Judgment, and
            the Court Grants the Motion
       On May 16, 2022, FPI renewed its motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ UCL claim and
claim for wrongful termination of tenancy.1 On June 21, 2022,
the trial court granted summary judgment to FPI. As in its order
denying plaintiffs’ summary adjudication motion, the court ruled
that the UCL claim failed because the Section 8 tenants were not
legally entitled to 30 days’ notice and the HOME tenants lacked
standing for want of an injury in fact. The court also ruled that
plaintiffs’ claim for wrongful termination of tenancy was not
recognized under California law.
       On July 13, 2022, the trial court entered judgment for FPI.
Plaintiffs timely appealed. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the
order denying their motion for summary adjudication and the
order granting FPI’s motion for summary judgment, but only as
those orders relate to the UCL claim.
       After judgment was entered, FPI submitted a
memorandum of costs, and plaintiffs moved to strike or tax costs.
On November 4, 2022, the trial court granted the motion in part
and denied it in part, awarding costs to FPI in the amount of
$42,710.42. Plaintiffs timely appealed this order as well. We
granted plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to consolidate the appeals.

1     In its motion, FPI did not specifically address the claims of
the certified regulatory agreement class. The trial court likewise
did not address the regulatory agreement class claims in its
ruling on FPI’s motion, and the parties make no argument about
these claims on appeal. Accordingly, we do not address these
claims.

                                 9
                          DISCUSSION
      A.    Standard of Review
       “A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication
is properly granted only when ‘all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”
(Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
570, 582; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c) & (f); Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607,
618.) We review a ruling on summary judgment or summary
adjudication de novo and “decide independently whether the facts
not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving
party or a determination a cause of action has no merit as a
matter of law.” (Soria, at p. 582.) In so doing, we liberally
construe the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion
and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in their favor.
(Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Board of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th
593, 606; Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428,
1444.)
       “A defendant may bring a motion [for summary judgment]
on the ground the plaintiff cannot prove one of the required
elements of the case or there is a complete defense to the action.”
(Luebke v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2020)
59 Cal.App.5th 694, 702; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o)(1),
(2) & (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 849.) “To carry its initial burden when the motion is
directed to the plaintiff’s case rather than an affirmative defense,
a defendant must present evidence that either ‘conclusively
negate[s] an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action’ or ‘show[s]
that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,’

                                 10
evidence necessary to establish at least one element of the cause
of action.” (Luebke, at p. 702.) “Only after the defendant carries
that initial burden does the burden shift to the plaintiff ‘to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the
cause of action or a defense thereto.’” (Id. at pp. 702-703; see
Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
       On the other hand, “when a plaintiff moves for summary
adjudication, the plaintiff meets ‘his or her burden of showing
that there is no defense to a cause of action’ if the plaintiff
‘prove[s] each element of the cause of action entitling the party to
judgment on the cause of action.’” (Donohue v. AMN Services,
LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58, 80 (Donohue); see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).) When plaintiffs bear the burden of proof by
a preponderance of evidence at trial, they “‘must present evidence
that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find any
underlying material fact more likely than not—otherwise, [they]
would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would
have to present [their] evidence to a trier of fact.’” (Quidel Corp.
v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 155, 164 (Quidel).) “If
the plaintiff meets [their] burden, the defendant must set forth
specific facts showing a triable issue of material facts exist.”
(Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)
      B.    The Trial Court Erred in Summarily Adjudicating
            the HOME Plaintiffs’ UCL Claim in FPI’s Favor
      Plaintiffs allege that FPI engaged in unfair competition
under the UCL when it terminated the HOME plaintiffs’
tenancies with insufficient notice.
      Business and Professions Code section 17200 defines unfair
competition as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act
or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading

                                 11
advertising and any act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing
with Section 17500).” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) Relevant to
plaintiffs’ action, the “unlawful” prong of the UCL “‘borrows’
violations from other laws by making them independently
actionable as unfair competitive practices.” (Korea Supply Co. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143.) In other
words, “a violation of another law is a predicate for stating a
cause of action under the UCL’s unlawful prong.” (Berryman v.
Merit Property Management, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544,
1554.) The predicate alleged by the HOME plaintiffs is FPI’s
violation of the HOME statute, title 42 United States Code
section 12755(b).
            1.    The HOME statute requires 30 days’ notice
                  before terminating a tenancy
      The federal HOME Investment Partnerships Program
(42 U.S.C. §§ 12741-12756) was enacted by Congress in 1990
pursuant to the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing
Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12701 et seq.). It authorizes the
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development “to make funds available to participating
jurisdictions for investment to increase the number of families
served with . . . affordable housing and expand the long-term
supply of affordable housing.” (42 U.S.C. § 12741.) A property
owner who accepts HOME funds must abide by statutory and
regulatory measures that are meant to ensure HOME-assisted
housing is occupied by low-income tenants and landlords protect
the rights of those tenants. As relevant here, the HOME statute
prohibits fund recipients from terminating tenancies with less
than 30 days’ notice: “An owner shall not terminate the
tenancy . . . of a tenant of rental housing assisted under this

                                12
subchapter except for serious or repeated violation of the terms
and conditions of the lease, for violation of applicable Federal,
State, or local law, or for other good cause. Any
termination . . . must be preceded by not less than 30 days by the
owner’s service upon the tenant of a written notice specifying the
grounds for the action. Such 30-day waiting period is not
required if the grounds for the termination . . . involve a direct
threat to the safety of the tenants or employees of the housing, or
an imminent and serious threat to the property (and the
termination . . . is in accordance with the requirements of State
or local law).” (42 U.S.C. § 12755(b).)
       The requirement of 30 days’ notice is reiterated in the
HOME program regulations: “An owner may not terminate the
tenancy . . . of a tenant of rental housing assisted with HOME
funds, except for serious or repeated violation of the terms and
conditions of the lease; for violation of applicable Federal, State,
or local law; for completion of the tenancy period for transitional
housing or failure to follow any required transitional housing
supportive services plan; or for other good cause. . . . To
terminate . . . tenancy, the owner must serve written notice upon
the tenant specifying the grounds for the action at least 30 days
before the termination of tenancy.” (24 C.F.R. § 92.253(c) (2023).)
            2.    FPI violated the 30-day notice requirement
      The owners of the apartment buildings where the HOME
plaintiffs lived received more than $9 million in federal funds
under the HOME program to provide housing to low-income
residents. Having received these subsidies, the owners were
bound to follow the HOME program rules, including the rule
requiring 30 days’ notice prior to terminating a tenancy. The
owners engaged FPI to provide property management.

                                 13
Thereafter, FPI served the HOME plaintiffs with notices that
gave the plaintiffs three days to pay rent or quit the premises.
The HOME plaintiffs’ tenancies were terminated when the
three-day notice periods expired. (Downing v. Cutting Packing
Co. (1920) 183 Cal. 91, 95-96 (Downing) [when a tenant is served
with a three-day notice to pay or quit and fails to pay or quit
within three days, the tenancy terminates at the conclusion of the
third day]; Gersten Companies v. Deloney (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d
1119, 1128-1129 (Gersten Companies) [same].)
       FPI argues that its three-day notices did not terminate the
HOME plaintiffs’ tenancies because a tenancy terminates only
when the tenant gives up possession of the property. But the
notices that FPI served on the HOME plaintiffs say just the
opposite: They warn that the tenants must pay money or vacate
the premises within three days, and they state that if the tenants
fail to timely comply the lease is forfeited. Thus, the notices
effectuated the termination of the tenancies at the conclusion of
the third day. (Downing, supra, 183 Cal. at pp. 95-96.)2 By
providing just three days’ notice instead of the legally required
30 days’ notice, FPI violated the HOME statute. (42 U.S.C.
§ 12755(b).)
       FPI contends that the HOME statute’s 30-day notice
requirement does not apply where, as here, a tenant has failed to
pay rent. Nothing in the statute or its accompanying regulation
supports that contention. To the contrary, the statute provides
that the “30-day waiting period” shall apply to a termination of
tenancy unless “the grounds for the termination . . . involve a

2     To be sure, a court could ultimately declare such
termination invalid, but until that occurs the lease is forfeited
and the tenancy is terminated.

                                 14
direct threat to the safety of the tenants or employees of the
housing, or an imminent and serious threat to the property.”
(42 U.S.C. § 12755(b); see also 24 C.F.R. § 92.253(c).) That
exception does not apply here, because FPI did not terminate the
HOME plaintiffs’ tenancies for any threat.
       FPI also argues that the HOME statute’s 30-day notice
requirement conflicts with the three-day notice requirement of
Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision 2, and that
applying the HOME statute here would require finding that the
federal law “silently preempts” the state statute. Not so. Code of
Civil Procedure section 1161 generally requires a landlord to
provide three days’ notice with an opportunity to cure before
terminating a tenancy for nonpayment of rent. However, it does
not preclude a longer notice period, and our courts have long
recognized a tenancy may be subject to a longer notice period or
multiple notice requirements that do not conflict. (See
Devonshire v. Langstaff (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 369, 372 [parties to
a lease may require notice that is different from and longer than
the statutory notice requirement]; Gersten Companies, supra,
212 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1129-1130 [state and federal notice
requirements may both apply, with their respective notice
periods running concurrently].) Such was the case here. Because
the property owners received federal subsidies under the HOME
program, they were bound to comply with the terms of the HOME
program. Nothing prevented FPI from complying with the
HOME statute’s 30-day notice requirement and also, after
27 days had elapsed, serving a three-day notice and opportunity
to cure pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161.
       Finally, we reject FPI’s claim that it cannot be held liable
for a violation of the HOME statute because it was merely an

                                15
agent of the property owners. The HOME plaintiffs do not seek
to hold FPI responsible for the actions of the owners; they allege
FPI itself engaged in the unlawful acts giving rise to liability in
this case. Specifically, they contend (and it is undisputed) that
FPI served them with the unlawful termination notices. FPI may
be held liable for its unlawful actions even if it undertook those
actions pursuant to its agency relationship with the owners.
(Civ. Code, § 2343 [“[o]ne who assumes to act as an agent is
responsible to third persons as a principal for his acts in the
course of his agency . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [w]hen his acts are wrongful in
their nature”].)
             3.    The HOME plaintiffs lost property rights and
                   were exposed to legal peril as a result of FPI’s
                   failure to provide the required notice
      The trial court found that the HOME plaintiffs did not
suffer injury because they remained in possession of their
apartments for more than 30 days after receiving FPI’s three-day
notices to pay rent or quit, during which time they did not pay
the demanded rent. This takes too narrow a view of the HOME
plaintiffs’ injury. The injury alleged by the HOME plaintiffs is
not only the loss of property possession, but also the loss of
property rights. As we explain, an action that deprives a tenant
of property rights—and further subjects the tenant to imminent
legal peril—can confer standing under the UCL.
      When FPI terminated the HOME plaintiffs’ leases upon
only three days’ notice, the HOME plaintiffs suffered a material
change in their legal rights to the property where they lived.
While they remained in possession, they no longer had the
property rights of lawful tenants. To understand the distinction
between loss of possession of property and loss of property rights,

                                  16
some background on the nature of the landlord-tenant
relationship is necessary. That relationship is governed by both
the contractual rights conferred by the lease itself, and by state
property law, which affords additional rights and obligations to
tenants. (Avalon Pacific-Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair &
Remodel, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1190 [“[a] lease is
both a conveyance of an estate in real property and a contract
between the lessor and the lessee for the possession and use of
the property in consideration of rent”].) Under state property
law, a valid tenancy pursuant to a lease “gives the lessee the
exclusive possession of the premises against all the world,
including the owner, for the term of the lease.” (Ibid.) “Thus, the
lessee has the right during the term of the lease to the full use
and enjoyment of the leased property limited only by a restriction
not to commit waste and by the terms of the lease. [Citation.]
Every lease includes an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment
protecting the lessee from any act or omission by the lessor which
interferes with the lessee’s right to use and enjoy the premises for
the purposes contemplated by the lease.” (Id. at pp. 1190-1191.)
       Once the tenancy is terminated, however, the tenant loses
both contractual rights and property rights under state law. This
loss occurs even when the tenant remains in possession of the
property. A “tenancy at sufferance” or “holdover tenancy” is
created when a tenant who previously had the right of occupancy
continues in possession without the landlord’s consent after
termination of the tenancy. (Gartlan v. C.A. Hooper & Co. (1918)
177 Cal. 414, 426; Multani v. Knight (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 837,
852 (Multani).) With a holdover tenancy, there is no consensual
relationship between landlord and tenant. (Aviel v. Ng (2008)
161 Cal.App.4th 809, 820 (Aviel).)

                                 17
       A holdover tenant no longer has rights pursuant to the
covenant of quiet enjoyment. (Multani, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at
p. 855.) And as a result, a holdover tenant has far fewer
protections if their home or property is destroyed. For example, a
holdover tenant lacks any right to sue for nuisance. (Id. at
pp. 855-856.) Thus, in Multani, the holdover tenant had no cause
of action against her landlord for nuisance even after a sewage
spill contaminated the premises. (Ibid.) Additionally, with a
holdover tenancy, the lease is no longer effective to define the
contractual obligation to pay rent, and the landlord may demand
from the tenant a payment to account for the value of the
property. (See Colyear v. Tobriner (1936) 7 Cal.2d 735, 742-743;
Aviel, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 820.) As a result, a landlord
may require a holdover tenant to pay more in rent than the
landlord could have demanded under the prior lease. (See
Colyear, at pp. 742-743.) Finally, a holdover tenant may incur
liability for damages to the landlord; if a landlord signs a lease
with a new tenant and the new tenant is unable to move in
because the holdover tenant is still there, the holdover tenant
may be liable for intentional interference with contractual
relations. (Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care
Enterprises (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1131-1132.)
       Once a landlord terminates a tenancy, therefore, a person
who remains in possession of the property as a holdover tenant
loses significant property rights and is immediately subject to
legal peril that did not exist under the tenancy.
       The serious consequences that flow from termination of a
tenancy underscore the critical nature of a proper and timely
notice in advance of termination. Had FPI given the HOME
plaintiffs the legally required 30 days’ notice before terminating

                                18
their tenancies, the plaintiffs would have had several weeks in
which they would have enjoyed the full panoply of property rights
associated with lawful tenancy. During those weeks, the
plaintiffs would have been entitled to quiet enjoyment and
exclusive use of their properties. They would have been free from
the risk of losses to their own personal property that may be
caused by negligence or nuisance, and from the imminent threat
of liability to the landlord for the value of the property and other
damages. And they could have located alternative housing
without the cloud of an imminent eviction proceeding. FPI’s
three-day notice unlawfully deprived the HOME plaintiffs of
their property rights and put them in jeopardy at a time when
they should have enjoyed all the legal rights of tenants.
            4.    The HOME plaintiffs’ injuries confer standing
                  under the UCL
       “Historically, the UCL authorized any person acting for the
interests of the general public to sue for relief notwithstanding
any lack of injury or damages.” (Sarun v. Dignity Health (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166 (Sarun).) That changed in 2004 with
the electorate’s approval of Proposition 64. (California Medical
Assn. v. Aetna Health of California Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1075,
1086 (California Med. Assn.).) Business and Professions Code
section 17204 now extends private party standing only to “a
person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or
property as a result of the unfair competition.” (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17204.) “To satisfy the narrower standing requirements
imposed by Proposition 64, a party must now (1) establish a loss
or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury
in fact, i.e., economic injury, and (2) show that that economic
injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business

                                 19
practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.”
(Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 322
(Kwikset).)
       “While Proposition 64 clearly was intended to abolish the
portions of the UCL . . . that made suing under [it] easier than
under other comparable statutory and common law torts, it was
not intended to make [its] standing requirements comparatively
more onerous.” (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 335.) Thus,
“[o]ur cases . . . teach that economic injury for purposes of UCL
standing, even after Proposition 64, is not limited to out-of-pocket
expenditures for which no value has been received, or to
objectively determined overpayments.” (California Med. Assn.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1089.) Rather, “‘“‘an identifiable trifle is
enough for standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle
is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the
motivation.’”’” (Sarun, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1167,
quoting Kwikset, at p. 325, fn. 7.)
       As is the case here, UCL actions often proceed as class or
representative actions. (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th
298, 313 (Tobacco II).) “‘[C]onsumer class actions and
representative UCL actions serve important roles in the
enforcement of consumers’ rights. [They] make it economically
feasible to sue when individual claims are too small to justify the
expense of litigation, and thereby encourage attorneys to
undertake private enforcement actions.’” (Ibid., quoting Kraus v.
Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 126.)
When a UCL case proceeds as a class action, the class
representatives must demonstrate standing. (Tobacco II, at
p. 315.)

                                 20
       In Kwikset, consumers who purchased locksets in reliance
on an allegedly false “‘Made in U.S.A.’” label brought a collective
action against the lock manufacturer. The Court held that the
plaintiffs “ha[d] ‘lost money or property’ within the meaning of
Proposition 64” even though the products were not objectively
defective and the plaintiffs, “while they had spent money, [had]
‘received locksets in return.’” (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
pp. 317, 331.) The plaintiffs were not “out of pocket” for a lockset
that lacked value, but they had purchased products they would
not have bought had the products been accurately labeled. (Id. at
pp. 329-330.) This was sufficient to afford them standing under
the UCL. As the court observed, “There are innumerable ways in
which economic injury from unfair competition may be shown,”
including, among others, by demonstrating that a plaintiff had
“a present or future property interest diminished.” (Id. at p. 323,
italics added.)
       Indeed, California courts have regularly held that plaintiffs
have standing to bring suit under the UCL when they are
subjected to an invasion of economic or property rights, or face
imminent legal peril, even when they do not suffer actual out-of-
pocket financial damages or loss of tangible property. For
instance, in Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 788
(Clayworth), the Supreme Court held that retail pharmacies had
standing under the UCL to assert claims against drug makers
allegedly engaged in price fixing, even though the plaintiff
pharmacies did not lose any money from the alleged price-fixing
scheme because they had passed on any overcharges to their
customers. The Court rejected the contention that the plaintiff
pharmacies “suffered no compensable loss because they were able
to mitigate fully any injury by passing on the overcharges.” (Id.

                                 21
at p. 789.) “While [defendants] argue that ultimately [plaintiffs]
suffered no compensable loss because they were able to mitigate
fully any injury by passing on the overcharges, this argument
conflates the issue of standing with the issue of the remedies to
which a party may be entitled. That a party may ultimately be
unable to prove a right to damages (or, here, restitution) does not
demonstrate that it lacks standing to argue for its entitlement to
them.” (Ibid.)
       In Sarun, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pages 1167 to 1169,
this court held that the plaintiff had alleged an injury sufficient
to confer standing to sue a healthcare provider under the UCL for
unlawful billing practices based solely on the plaintiff’s receipt of
an unlawfully inflated medical bill. This was so even though the
plaintiff alleged he “‘had no intention of paying or seeking
financial aid in order to pay an outlandish bill . . . .’” (Id. at
p. 1164.) The bare fact that the plaintiff had been overbilled
constituted sufficient injury: “[T]he existence of an enforceable
obligation, without more, ordinarily constitutes actual injury or
injury in fact.” (Id. at p. 1167.) Indeed, “upon receipt of this bill
Sarun faced at least an imminent invasion of a legally protected
interest.” (Id. at p. 1169.) Once the plaintiff received the bill, he
would have had to take steps to remedy the situation created by
the unlawful overbilling. Although he did not actually take those
steps, “[t]he tangible burden” of the process for applying for a
reduction in the bill “is far more than the ‘identifiable trifle’
required to confer injury in fact standing.” (Ibid.)
       The court reached a similar result in Hale v. Sharp
Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1373 (Hale). There, the court
found a plaintiff was injured sufficient to state a UCL claim when
she alleged she had received a hospital overcharge. (Id. at

                                 22
pp. 1383-1384.) At the time of her suit, Hale had only paid $500
of her $14,447.65 medical bill. (Id. at p. 1383.) Even so, the court
found that Hale had suffered an injury in fact. Notwithstanding
the lack of full payment, the plaintiff was obligated to pay the
account balance: “Thus, she faces at least an imminent invasion
or injury to a legally protected interest.” (Id. at pp. 1383-1384.)
That risk was imminent because it was “‘ready to take place,’
‘hanging threateningly over one’s head,’ and ‘menacingly near.’”
(Id. at p. 1384.) The obligation to pay and the existence of a legal
threat were sufficient to confer standing on the plaintiff. (Ibid.)
       Other courts have similarly found that plaintiffs have
suffered an injury in fact for purposes of UCL standing when,
even without actual expenditure of money or loss of tangible
property, they face imminent financial or legal perils. (See Rubio
v. Capital One Bank (9th Cir. 2010) 613 F.3d 1195, 1204 [plaintiff
adequately alleges standing when credit card company gave
choice to either pay off balance and cancel account or accept a
fraudulently imposed higher interest rate]; Rex v. Chase Home
Finance LLC (C.D.Cal. 2012) 905 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1147 [standing
adequately alleged where defendants damaged plaintiff’s credit
by reporting false information to credit reporting bureaus]; Lane
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. June 21, 2013, No. C 12-
04026 WHA) 2013 U.S.Dist. Lexis 87669, pp. *31-32 [borrowers
who had not yet paid allegedly improper expense charged by the
defendant had standing].)
       In the case at hand, the trial court ruled that the HOME
plaintiffs lacked standing under the UCL because they had
remained in possession of their properties and did not pay rent
for more than 30 days after FPI served them with termination
notices. According to the court, the HOME plaintiffs did not

                                 23
change position “in any way cognizable under the UCL as a result
of receiving only 3-days’ notice” and “the only loss of money
arguably involved is defendant’s lost rental income from the
various months of delinquent payment.” FPI makes a similar
argument on appeal. This contention fails to account for the
other injuries suffered by the HOME plaintiffs when they lost
property rights because of FPI’s premature termination notices.
Even while they temporarily remained in possession of their
properties, the HOME plaintiffs were transformed into holdover
tenants and they faced imminent eviction. The fact that the
HOME plaintiffs were able to stay in their apartments for some
time did not erase these injuries; it merely mitigated them. A
plaintiff’s ability to mitigate losses does not deprive the plaintiff
of standing. (Clayworth, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 789.)
       Nor is it dispositive that the HOME plaintiffs were behind
on their rent. To be sure, rent payments could be one measure of
economic injury, but failure to make such payments does not
prove an absence of injury. The plaintiffs in Sarun and Hale
suffered an injury in fact even though they did not pay the
amount of their overcharged medical bills, the pharmacies in
Clayworth suffered an injury in fact even though they passed on
any potential loss to their customers, and the HOME plaintiffs
suffered an injury in fact even though they did not pay the
demanded rent. The HOME plaintiffs—like their counterparts in
these cases—were subjected to a “tangible burden” (Sarun, supra,
232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169) and faced “an imminent invasion or
injury to a legally protected interest” (Hale, supra,
183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1383-1384) sufficient to constitute an
injury in fact. The HOME plaintiffs’ “burden” was to their
property rights, and the “imminent invasion or injury” they faced

                                 24
was the result of being improperly transformed into holdover
tenants. They lost full use and enjoyment of their properties.
They had to live in their apartments under risk of financial
liability for damages in addition to rent. And they faced an
immediate threat of eviction and all the collateral consequences
that an eviction can have for future rental opportunities. We
hold this surpasses the “identifiable trifle” needed to show injury
in fact for UCL standing. (See Sarun, at p. 1167; Kwikset, supra,
51 Cal.4th at pp. 324-325 & fn. 7.)
       FPI asserts that the HOME plaintiffs were not injured by
its actions because the plaintiffs would inevitably be evicted for
nonpayment of rent regardless of the amount of notice given. FPI
cites cases holding that a plaintiff cannot sue under the UCL if
they did not suffer injury, or if their injury was not caused by the
defendant. (See Trujillo v. First American Registry, Inc. (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 628, 639 [plaintiff who suffered no injury as a
result of defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct lacks standing
under the UCL]; Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court
(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 36, 43-44 [plaintiffs who did not rely upon
defendant’s alleged misrepresentation lack standing under the
UCL]; Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank NA (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3d
1145, 1151 [plaintiffs who cannot show that their injury was
caused by defendant lack standing under the UCL].) Even if FPI
were able to conclusively demonstrate that plaintiffs would have
been evicted for nonpayment of rent notwithstanding the amount
of notice, their argument misses the mark because the HOME
plaintiffs have demonstrated both that they suffered an injury
(loss of property rights and exposure to imminent legal peril) and
that their injury was caused by FPI’s unlawful conduct (the
premature termination of tenancy). Had FPI given the legally

                                 25
required 30 days’ notice, rather than merely three days’ notice,
the HOME plaintiffs would have enjoyed the full panoply of
property rights associated with their leasehold tenancy for an
additional 27 days. Across those 27 days, they would have been
shielded from the liability that a holdover tenant faces, and they
would have had more time to avoid an eviction action. That is
sufficient injury to confer standing under the UCL.
            5.    The HOME plaintiffs may seek equitable relief
                  against FPI
       FPI contends that the judgment should be affirmed on the
alternative ground that the HOME plaintiffs have no viable
remedy under the UCL. This contention is unavailing. The
HOME plaintiffs seek restitution, a form of equitable relief that
is available in a UCL action. (Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 312.) The trial court rejected FPI’s argument regarding an
absence of remedies, finding that “[p]laintiffs are entitled to seek
restitution” before explaining that any determination of whether
there is “restitution to be had” is a question that it did not need
to address given its rejection of the HOME plaintiffs’ claim on
standing grounds.
       FPI asserts that no restitution could ever be appropriate in
this case because it was merely an agent of the owner and thus
unable to restore the HOME plaintiffs’ rent money or possession.
This contention rests on a mischaracterization of the restitution
claim. The HOME plaintiffs are not seeking to recover rent
payments, nor do they expect to be able to reobtain possession of
their former apartments. Rather, they seek a restitution award
based on the monetary equivalent of the loss of property rights
they suffered as a result of FPI’s unlawful termination of their
tenancies, and to disgorge profits that FPI earned from its

                                 26
unlawful management practices. To that end, a plaintiff may
recover monetary restitution for the loss of rental property when
the court lacks the ability to make the plaintiff whole by
restoring the property interest. (See Beach Break Equities, LLC
v. Lowell (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 847, 853 [tenant subject to
unlawful eviction may seek monetary restitution from defendant
when it is not possible to obtain an award of possession]; Munoz
v. MacMillan (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 648, 657-662 [same].) It
follows that the HOME plaintiffs may be entitled to restitution to
redress harms suffered as a result of FPI’s unlawful termination
of their tenancies. While the HOME plaintiffs have not yet
demonstrated what specific harms they suffered as a result of
FPI’s actions, how such harms can be given a monetary value for
purposes of establishing a restitution award, or how FPI profited
from its unlawful management practices, those questions can be
decided at a later stage in the case.3
       Because the trial court erred in ruling that the HOME
plaintiffs lack standing, and FPI has failed to show that the order
should be affirmed on alternative grounds, the order granting
summary judgment to FPI on the HOME plaintiffs’ UCL claim
must be reversed.

3     For example, if FPI’s premature termination of the
Campbells’ tenancy and the attendant unlawful termination of
the right to quiet enjoyment prevented the Campbells from
recovering compensation for the plumbing leak that allegedly
damaged their property, such harm may support a claim for
monetary restitution. On remand, the HOME plaintiffs may
demonstrate any specific harms they suffered as a result of FPI’s
actions.

                                27
            6.    The trial court did not err in denying the
                  HOME plaintiffs’ motion for summary
                  adjudication
       Although we hold that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to FPI on the HOME plaintiffs’ UCL claim, it
does not necessarily follow that the court should have granted
plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication of that claim. A
plaintiff moving for such relief must prove each element of the
cause of action. (Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 80.) On
appeal, we review the motion de novo and “independently assess
the correctness of the [trial court’s] ruling, applying the same
legal standard as the trial court to determine if there are genuine
issues of material fact.” (Quidel, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at
p. 164.)
       The HOME plaintiffs have not proven every element of
their UCL cause of action. To be sure, plaintiffs have
demonstrated that their loss of property rights caused by FPI’s
unlawful notice was sufficient to give them standing to bring suit
under the UCL. For this violation, restitution is a potential
remedy. As noted above, however, plaintiffs have not
demonstrated specific harms suffered for which they are entitled
to restitution. (See Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 335-336
[“the standards for establishing standing under [Business and
Professions Code] section 17204 and eligibility for restitution
under section 17203 are wholly distinct”].) The HOME plaintiffs
urge that the proper amount of any restitution is a question for a
later proceeding. (See People ex rel. Feuer v. Superior Court
(Cahuenga’s the Spot) (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1374.) Even
so, to be entitled to summary adjudication, plaintiffs would need
to demonstrate that they are affirmatively entitled to restitution,
which they did not do in their moving papers. Accordingly, we

                                28
affirm the trial court’s denial of the HOME plaintiffs’ motion for
summary adjudication.
      C.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Rejecting the
            Section 8 Plaintiffs’ Claim
       The Section 8 plaintiffs’ claim is similar to that of the
HOME plaintiffs. They contend that tenants whose rent was
subsidized through Section 8 are entitled to 30 days’ notice before
their tenancies can be terminated. They further argue that FPI’s
failure to provide such notice to the Section 8 plaintiffs
constituted an unlawful business practice in violation of the UCL.
The trial court rejected this argument, ruling that the Section 8
plaintiffs had not shown they were legally entitled to 30 days’
notice. We agree.
       Unlike the HOME plaintiffs, the Section 8 plaintiffs do not
identify a statute that would have required FPI to give them
30 days’ notice before terminating their tenancies, and we are not
aware of any such statutory authority.4 Instead, they assert that
their right to 30 days’ notice is established in three cases: Anchor
Pacifica Management Co. v. Green (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 232
(Anchor Pacifica); Mitchell v. Poole (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1
(Mitchell); and Gallman v. Pierce (N.D.Cal. 1986) 639 F.Supp.
472 (Gallman). According to plaintiffs, these cases show that
“California law requires a minimum 30 days written notice by the
owner specifying the grounds for the termination of tenancy.”

4     In 2020, Congress enacted a statute requiring landlords to
provide 30 days’ notice prior to terminating certain types of
federally supported tenancies, including Section 8 tenancies.
(See 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c).) Because the enactment postdates the
events giving rise to the Section 8 plaintiffs’ claims, it does not
apply here.

                                 29
       The cases do not stand for that proposition. Each involved
a landlord’s attempt to terminate a federally subsidized tenancy
after providing at least 30 days’ notice but without specifying a
reason for the termination. (Anchor Pacifica, supra,
205 Cal.App.4th at p. 238; Mitchell, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d Supp.
at p. 3; Gallman, supra, 639 F.Supp. at p. 474.) State law
generally permits the termination of a month-to-month tenancy
with notice of this kind. (Civ. Code, § 1946.) The cases cited by
plaintiffs held that a Section 8 subsidy is a government
entitlement and its termination is a government action; thus,
pursuant to due process principles, a Section 8 tenancy can only
be terminated if the notice specifies good cause for the
termination. (Anchor Pacifica, at p. 247; Mitchell, at p. 3;
Gallman, at p. 485.) Absent notice specifying good cause, the
tenants in Anchor Pacifica, Mitchell, and Gallman were entitled
to judgment in their favor because their tenancies had not been
legally terminated. (Anchor Pacifica, at pp. 247-248; Mitchell, at
p. 3; Gallman, at p. 485.) These decisions do not require that a
30-day notice be used in all cases where a landlord terminates a
Section 8 tenancy; rather, they provide that if a landlord seeks to
terminate a Section 8 tenancy, the notice (regardless of its
duration) must set forth good cause for the termination.
       Because the Section 8 plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that
FPI was required to provide them with 30 days’ notice before
terminating their tenancies for failure to pay rent, the trial court
did not err in summarily adjudicating the Section 8 plaintiffs’
UCL claim in FPI’s favor.

                                 30
      D.    Appeal from Order Awarding Costs
       Plaintiffs also appeal from the trial court’s order awarding
costs to FPI. Costs were awarded incidental to the judgment.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1032.) Because we reverse the judgment, the
cost order is moot. (Evans v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1378, 1388.)
                         DISPOSITION
       The judgment and postjudgment order on costs are
reversed. The order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary
adjudication is affirmed. The order granting FPI’s motion for
summary judgment or summary adjudication is affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The cause is remanded with directions to
the trial court to vacate its order granting summary judgment
and to enter a new order that denies FPI’s motion for summary
judgment and grants FPI’s motion for summary adjudication only
with respect to the Section 8 plaintiffs’ UCL claim and plaintiffs’
claim for wrongful termination of tenancy. The parties shall bear
their own costs on appeal.

                                          EVENSON, J.*
      We concur:

            FEUER, Acting P. J.           MARTINEZ, J.

*     Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                                31