Court Opinion

ID: 9363365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 23:01:25.76003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:31.510298
License: Public Domain

Rel: January 13, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                        1210016
                                _________________________

                                            Ed Davis

                                                  v.

                                    City of Montevallo

                        Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
                                (CV-2017-000495)

MITCHELL, Justice.

       Employer-employee relationships sometimes sour and lead to

claims that one side or the other has breached a contract. Occasionally,
1210016

we have held that an employee handbook created the contract that was

breached.   We have reached that result only when -- as here -- the

handbook's text required it. In this case, Ed Davis sued the City of

Montevallo ("the City") in the Shelby Circuit Court, claiming that the

City was in breach of contract because, in terminating his employment

with the City, it failed to follow certain discharge procedures set out in

an employee handbook it had issued to him. The City responded by

arguing it was not required to follow the handbook's procedures because

Davis was an at-will employee. After entertaining motions for summary

judgment from both sides, the trial court ruled in favor of the City. Davis

now appeals. We reverse the judgment and remand the case for further

proceedings.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     In May 1998, the Montevallo Recreation Board Number Two ("the

Golf Board"), which administered the Montevallo Golf Course ("the Golf

Course") on behalf of the City, hired Davis to manage the Golf Course.

     In December 2007, Davis received a copy of the City's Employee

Handbook ("the Handbook").       Shortly after receiving the Handbook,

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Davis signed an acknowledgment of receipt and acceptance of its terms,

which reads:

     "I acknowledge having been given a City of Montevallo
     Personnel Handbook and have been asked to carefully read it.
     I have been informed that I may ask my supervisor any
     questions that I do not understand. I understand that
     nothing in this Handbook can be interpreted to be a contract
     for employment for any specified period of time or to place a
     limitation on my freedom or the City's freedom to terminate
     the employment relationship at any time. I also understand
     that the City retains the freedom to change the Policies and
     Procedures with the approval of the Mayor and City Council."

The Handbook has been amended over the years, and it was last

amended in 2014.

     In July 2015, the City issued an ordinance dissolving the Golf Board

and assuming direct and exclusive responsibility for the administration

of the Golf Course and its employees. The ordinance gave Davis the

opportunity to remain employed with the City on an "at-will" basis, under

the direct supervision of the City's Mayor.

     That August, Mayor Hollie Cost determined that Davis had

violated several provisions of the Handbook. As a result, she terminated

Davis's employment. The City later concluded that, under the Handbook,

Davis would not receive payment for his accrued leave and personal time.

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     Davis sued the City, claiming that the City had breached its

contract with him by failing to follow certain discharge procedures in the

Handbook when it terminated his employment.           The City answered

Davis's complaint and later moved for summary judgment. Davis then

filed his own motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court

granted the City's motion and denied Davis's. Davis timely appealed.

                           Standard of Review

     "We review the trial court's grant or denial of a summary-judgment

motion de novo, and we use the same standard used by the trial court to

determine whether the evidence presented to the trial court presents a

genuine issue of material fact." Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

952 So. 2d 342, 346 (Ala. 2006). A motion for summary judgment should

be granted only when the evidence demonstrates that "there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Ala. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see

also Reichert v. City of Mobile, 776 So. 2d 761, 764 (Ala. 2000). To defeat

a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must present

substantial evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. See

Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168 (Ala. 2003). Substantial

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evidence is "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons

in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence

of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of

Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).

                                Analysis

     This case presents two issues: (1) whether the City was bound to

follow the procedures provided in the Handbook when it terminated

Davis's employment and (2) if so, whether the City followed those

procedures. Resolution of these issues turns on the language of the

Handbook, which we examine below. That examination requires us to

hold that the City was contractually bound to follow the Handbook's

discharge procedures. But, because the trial court has not yet addressed

the factual issue of whether the City followed those procedures, we

remand the case for the court to make that determination.

     A. The City's Motion for Summary Judgment

     We begin by considering whether, as a matter of law, the Handbook

created a unilateral contract between Davis and the City. Davis argues

that, based on a reasonable reading of the Handbook, it did. We agree.

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      "[T]he rule is well settled in Alabama that an employee contract at

will may be terminated by either party with or without cause or

justification." Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728

(Ala. 1987). That is, either party may terminate an at-will employment

relationship for a good reason, a wrong reason, or for no reason at all. Id.

But, regardless of an employer's reason for terminating the relationship,

"[t]his Court has recognized that an employee handbook can represent a

binding contract obligating an employer to satisfy certain conditions

precedent to dismissing an employee." Harper v. Winston Cnty., 892 So.

2d 346, 351 (Ala. 2004).

      To determine whether an employee handbook constitutes an offer

to create a unilateral contract, we apply a three-part test. Hoffman-La

Roche, 512 So. 2d at 735. First, the language in the handbook must be

"specific enough to constitute an offer." Id. Second, "the offer must have

been communicated to the employee by issuance of the handbook, or

otherwise." Id. And third, "the employee must have accepted the offer

by retaining employment after he has become generally aware of the

offer." Id.

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     No one disputes that the second and third requirements are

satisfied here; the parties' sole disagreement is whether the language of

the Handbook was specific enough to constitute an offer. That inquiry is

objective: " 'Whether a proposal is meant to be an offer for a unilateral

contract is determined by the outward manifestations of the parties, not

by their subjective intentions.' " Id. at 731 (citation omitted). A handbook

containing discharge procedures is thus specific enough to constitute an

offer when the parties' outward manifestations are "clear enough that an

employee … could reasonably believe that, as long as he worked within

the guidelines set out in the handbook, he would not be terminated until

all procedures set out in the handbook had been followed." Id. at 736-37

(footnote omitted).

     We thus turn to the language of the Handbook. Article 1 states that

its "rules, regulations, and other administrative provisions for personnel

administration are established for the information and guidance of all

concerned," but also states that "[t]he rules herein established shall apply

to all regular full-time, part-time, and classified employees of the City."

Article 9 then specifies that "[t]he following procedures shall be followed

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when the Department Head or Mayor proposes to … dismiss a regular,

classified employee." 1

     Under Article 9, the City must first provide "written notice" that

"shall advise the employee" of several aspects of what it calls a

"Determination Hearing." The City must notify the employee that (1) "a

Determination Hearing will be held and the date, time and place of such

hearing"; (2) "the Determination Hearing will be held to consider the

charges against the employee and the intent of the disciplinary action

being taken against the employee"; and (3) "at the Determination

Hearing the employee may be accompanied by anyone of his choosing and

will be afforded the opportunity to respond to the charges orally or in

writing."

     Once the employee receives "written notice setting forth the charges

against him/her and the intent of the disciplinary action," 2 the City has

     1Itis undisputed that Davis was a "regular, classified employee,"
which the Handbook defines as persons who "are appointed/discharged
based on recommendation by the Department Head and approved by the
Mayor and City Council."

     2Itwas suggested at oral argument that, because these provisions
guarantee procedures relating to "charges" against an employee, no at-
will employee could reasonably believe that they apply to him. But this

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five working days to conduct a Determination Hearing, during which "the

evidence against the employee shall be explained and the employee shall

be afforded opportunity to respond orally or in writing." The Mayor then

has three working days from the conclusion of the hearing to issue her

decision, which "shall be promptly delivered to the employee." That

decision must advise the employee (1) "[o]f the decision"; (2) "[o]f the date

on which the discipline to be imposed, if any, is to become effective"; and

(3) "[if] the decision is to … dismiss the employee, that the employee has

a right to appeal such action" in writing within five working days of the

employee's receipt of the decision, according to appellate procedures also

included in Article 9. If the employee fails to appeal within that time,

"all rights to appeal are extinguished."

     Article 9 also applies to employees, such that the tenure "of every

employee shall be conditioned on satisfactory conduct of the employee

argument confuses procedural and substantive guarantees.                 For
instance, if an employer guarantees each employee a monthly statement
of income earned by that employee, that guarantee applies even when the
statement reads: "$0.00." Likewise, a guarantee of notice of charges
against an employee is not empty or illusory just because the employer
could state to its at-will employee: "There are no charges." This is
especially true when, as here, such notice is a step along the path to other
procedural guarantees, like an appeal.
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and continued satisfactory performance of assigned duties and

responsibilities." And it is "the duty of each employee to maintain high

standards of conduct, cooperation, efficiency, economy and performance

in work for the City."

     The Handbook's pervasive use of "shall" demonstrates that the

discharge procedures in Article 9 are binding. See Ex parte Brasher, 555

So. 2d 192, 194 (Ala. 1989) ("The word 'shall' … usually indicates that the

requirement is mandatory."); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 11 at 112

(Thomson/West 2012) ("Mandatory words impose a duty; permissive

words grant discretion."). And the mandatory meaning of "shall" here is

made clear by examining it alongside the Handbook's use of "may." See

Ex parte Mobile Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 61 So. 3d 292, 294 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2010) ("Ordinarily, the use of the word 'may' indicates a

discretionary or permissive act, rather than a mandatory act."). For

instance, Section 4 of Article 9 provides a list of disciplinary actions that

"may be implemented by the Department Head or his/her designee, or

the Mayor." (Emphasis added.) One such disciplinary action is demotion:

"An employee may be demoted from his/her existing position for cause

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after consultation of the Mayor." (Emphasis added.) That is, the Mayor

has discretion to demote or not. But, "[i]n such event, the procedure set

forth below in Article 9, Section 5 shall be followed, and any such

demotion shall not be subject to the grievance procedure set forth in

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE SECTION."                 (Capitalization in original;

emphasis added.)     The Handbook's precise use of mandatory and

permissive language demonstrates that the City knowingly chose to draft

some provisions that are binding and others that are nonbinding. The

use of "shall" in the discharge procedures in Article 9 thus indicates that

the City was bound to follow them.

     An employee, faced with such exhaustive, mandatory language,

"could reasonably believe that, as long as he worked within the guidelines

set out in the handbook, he would not be terminated until all procedures

set out in the handbook had been followed." Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So.

2d at 736-37 (footnote omitted). While the Handbook was "established

for the information and guidance of all concerned," it strains common

sense to read its step-by-step procedures as a nonbinding "mere general

statement of policy," and a reasonable employee would not do so. Id. at

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734. Accordingly, the Handbook was specific enough to constitute an

offer.

         The City makes several arguments in the alternative that it was

nonetheless not bound to follow the discharge procedures in the

Handbook. Each of these arguments is unavailing.

              1. The Fact that Davis's Employment Remained At-Will

         The City argues that there could not have been a contract with

Davis because he was undisputedly an at-will employee. But whether

the relationship was at-will is irrelevant to whether the City had to follow

certain procedures if it decided to terminate his employment. That is,

the reason for terminating an employment relationship is distinct from

the means used to terminate that relationship. An employer and an

employee are free to contract regarding procedures that each will follow

when terminating the relationship without also agreeing to terminate

that relationship only for just cause. Indeed, the Handbook's language

suggests that it was drafted to achieve this result.       It states: "The

following are examples of causes that shall be sufficient cause for

reprimand, suspension, demotion or dismissal." Although it qualifies its

list of causes for discharge as a nonexclusive list of "examples," it does

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not likewise qualify the procedures for discharge. Cf. Campisi v. Scoles

Cadillac, Inc., 611 So. 2d 296, 299 (Ala. 1992). Our decision today thus

leaves untouched our longstanding rule "that an employee contract at

will may be terminated by either party with or without cause or

justification." Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 728. But, at the same

time, we emphasize that, where the language of an employee handbook

sufficiently provides, "an employee handbook can represent a binding

contract obligating an employer to satisfy certain conditions precedent to

dismissing an employee." Harper, 892 So. 2d at 351.

           2. Whether the City Disclaimed the Existence of a Contract

     The City next contends that the Handbook could not have created

a contract because, it says, the acknowledgment that Davis signed after

receiving the Handbook contained language that unambiguously

disclaimed that the Handbook was a contract. As the City notes, an

employer that "does not wish the policies contained in the employee

handbook to be construed as an offer for a unilateral contract ... is free to

so state in the handbook." Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 734. Nor

can a handbook that expressly disclaims the existence of a contract

"reasonably be construed to constitute a unilateral contract of

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employment, as a matter of law." Abney v. Baptist Med. Ctrs., 597 So.

2d 682, 683 (Ala. 1992).

     Indeed, this Court has repeatedly held that no contract exists when

the employee handbook contains an unambiguous disclaimer of a

contract. In McCluskey v. Unicare Health Facility, Inc., 484 So. 2d 398

(Ala. 1986), our Court held that an offer did not exist when the employees

signed an acknowledgment stating that " '[t]his Handbook and the

policies contained herein do not in any way constitute, and should not be

construed as a contract of employment between the employer and the

employee, or a promise of employment.' " Id. at 400. This Court later

spotlighted the disclaimer from McCluskey as an exemplar of the kind of

unambiguous statement that an employer should make "if the employer

does not wish the policies contained in an employee handbook to be

construed as an offer for a unilateral contract." Hoffman-La Roche, 512

So. 2d at 734. And in Abney v. Baptist Medical Centers, this Court held

that an employer had successfully disclaimed a contract by providing that

" '[t]he policies in this booklet are not an expressed or implied contract of

employment.' " 597 So. 2d at 682 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, if the

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City is correct that the acknowledgment disclaims any contract

whatsoever, then the acknowledgment would knock out Davis's claim.

     But the disclaimer at issue here bears little resemblance to the

sweeping disclaimers in McCluskey and Abney. The text of the signed

acknowledgment does not disclaim the existence of any contract. Rather,

it uses qualifying language to disclaim only certain kinds of contracts.

The acknowledgment first states that "nothing in this handbook can be

interpreted to be a contract for employment for any specified period of

time." (Emphasis added.) The qualifying language "for any specified

period of time" indicates that the City sought to disclaim a contract for a

certain duration of employment -- not any contract affecting the terms of

the employment relationship. And this Court has refused to find " 'the

indefinite nature of the time period for performance to be a bar to

enforcement of a unilateral contract.' " Stinson v. American Sterilizer

Co., 570 So. 2d 618, 621 (Ala. 1990) (quoting Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So.

2d at 734). This language is thus not probative of whether a contract to

follow the Handbook's discharge procedures exists.

     The acknowledgment also states that the Handbook cannot be

interpreted to "place a limitation on [Davis's] freedom or the City's

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freedom to terminate the employment relationship at any time." If this

provision is read in isolation from the Handbook to which it refers, it

could be understood to mean that, at the drop of a hat, the City could

discharge Davis as its employee with no or minimal notice. But " 'we

must examine the [text] as a whole and, if possible, give effect to each

section.' " City of Pinson v. Utilities Bd. of Oneonta, 986 So. 2d 367, 371

(Ala. 2007) (quoting Ex parte Exxon Mobil Corp., 926 So. 2d 303, 309

(Ala. 2005)). And " '[t]he provisions of a text should be interpreted in a

way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.' " State ex rel.

Allison v. Farris, 194 So. 3d 214, 219 (Ala. 2015) (quoting Scalia &

Garner, Reading Law at 180). When we read the "place a limitation"

statement in conjunction with the procedures the City promised to use to

terminate   the   employment     relationship,   it   is   clear   that   the

acknowledgment reserves merely the parties' right to terminate the

relationship according to the Handbook's provisions at any time. Because

the City need not give up its "freedom to terminate the employment

relationship at any time" in order to follow the Handbook's discharge

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procedures, sound interpretation precludes us from reading those

procedures out of the contract.3

     If the City wanted to disclaim a contract outright, it easily could

have. The simplest way would have been to adopt the disclaimer used in

McCluskey and reiterated in Hoffman-La Roche. But the City chose to

disclaim only a contract for a certain duration or a contract that altered

the at-will nature of the employment relationship, neither of which the

Handbook's discharge procedures affect. The acknowledgment thus does

not disclaim those procedures as contractually binding.

            3. Whether the City's Promise Was Illusory

     Finally, the City contends that the Handbook is not a contract

because the City reserved the right to change its terms unilaterally when

it provided in the acknowledgment that "the City retains the freedom to

change the Policies and Procedures with the approval of the Mayor and

City Council." But when an at-will employee continues employment after

receiving a handbook with procedural guarantees, " 'the employer is

     3The  City suggested at oral argument that Article 9 might still be
relevant to the extent that it applies to a class of non-at-will employees.
But the City did not make that argument below and has not identified
any evidence in the record suggesting that such a class of non-at-will
employees exists.
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bound by those policies insofar as they have accrued to an employee for

performance rendered while they were in effect and have not been

excluded or modified by another valid contractual arrangement.' "

Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 735 (quoting Langdon v. Saga Corp.,

569 P.2d 524, 527 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976)). Consequently, "[t]he ability to

later modify handbook provisions does not justify a disregard of currently

valid provisions." Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215, 1219 (Ala. 1997).

Rather, " '[l]anguage in the handbook itself may reserve discretion to the

employer in certain matters or reserve the right to amend or modify the

handbook provisions.' " Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 735 (citation

omitted).

     The City points out that this Court has occasionally refused to

recognize the existence of a contract when an employer retains the right

to unilaterally change its procedures. See, e.g., Harper, 892 So. 2d at

351-52; Stinson, 570 So. 2d at 621-22. Thus, the City argues, its right to

change the Handbook's procedures precludes any inference that those

procedures are binding. But, in Harper and Stinson, any promises made

in the handbook proved to be illusory because the handbook's language

left the employer free to unilaterally deviate from the handbook's

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provisions. See Harper, 892 So. 2d at 351 (" 'The working rules and

conditions set [out] herein are a guide and may vary slightly with the

occasion as all problems vary.' "); Stinson, 570 So. 2d at 621 (" 'Because of

the great variety of the situations which may arise …, [the Company]

reserves the right to make decisions related to employment in a manner

other than as provided in this handbook.' "); cf. Campisi, 611 So. 2d at 300

(" 'Individual circumstances may dictate varying courses of action, the

important thing is to be fair and even handed.' " (emphasis added in

Campisi)). It was thus unreasonable for the employees in those cases to

believe that the employer was offering to be bound by the handbook's

provisions or that the employer would not terminate the relationship

except according to those provisions.

     The right to deviate from a handbook's discharge procedures --

which the employers in Harper and Stinson expressly reserved -- is

different from the right to amend or modify such procedures, which is all

the City reserved here. Unlike the language in the handbooks in Harper

and Stinson, the acknowledgment by Davis indicated that the City

retained the "freedom to change the Policies and Procedures with the

approval of the Mayor and City Council." That is not the same as the

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right to unilaterally deviate from written "Policies and Procedures" at

any time as circumstances may dictate.     Because "[t]he ability to later

modify handbook provisions does not justify a disregard of currently valid

provisions," Graham, 702 So. 2d at 1219, the Handbook "may be

characterized … as follows: 'I promise I will not dismiss you … without

exhausting specified procedures[] unless I change this policy before you

are discharged.' " Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 735 (quoting H.

Perritt, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice 150 (1984)). The City's

right to change the Handbook thus does not render it unenforceable as a

contract.4

     B. Davis's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

     4The  City also cites Mack v. Arnold, 929 So. 2d 480 (Ala. Civ. App.
2005), a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals. We are, of course, not
bound by Mack. But we find the City's use of it unpersuasive in any
event. First, the analysis on which the City relies is dicta. As the Court
of Civil Appeals made clear in the opinion, even if the employee had a
winning contractual argument, he was always due to lose because the
employer whom he sued -- the county sheriff -- was an officer of the State
and therefore cloaked with State immunity. Id. at 484 n.2. Second, the
county's modification right was immaterial to the central merits question
in Mack -- whether the sheriff "entered into an employment contract with
[the employee] by indicating that he would follow the termination
procedures in the personnel manual." Id. at 483.
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     Davis filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue

whether the City followed the procedures found in the Handbook. The

court below did not reach the merits of Davis's motion for summary

judgment because it held that the Handbook did not create a unilateral

contract.   Because we hold instead that the Handbook created a

unilateral contract, the issue whether the City followed the procedures

remains unresolved. We decline to consider that issue and leave it for

the trial court to consider in the first instance on remand.

                               Conclusion

     We reverse the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the City.

The Handbook was an offer for a unilateral contract, which Davis

accepted by continuing his employment with the City.           Because the

Handbook constitutes a unilateral contract, we reverse the trial court's

denial of Davis's motion for partial summary judgment and direct the

trial court on remand to determine whether, in fact, the City violated the

Handbook's terms.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

     Bolin, Shaw, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.

     Parker, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion.

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    Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise and Bryan, JJ., join.

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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).

     I concur in reversing the judgment because the way in which the

City of Montevallo ("the City") frames this case is untenable. Below and

on appeal, the City has framed the issue as whether the City's Employee

Handbook ("the Handbook") created a contract. The Handbook did, for

the reasons in the main opinion.

     The real issue here is what the terms of that contract were --

specifically, whether the Handbook's termination provisions were part of

that contract. They ultimately were not, for reasons I will explain. But I

cannot vote to affirm on that basis, because it has not been argued by the

City here or below. Due process dictates that it is generally improper to

affirm on a substantive basis relied on by neither the appellee nor the

trial court. Cf. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health

Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003). On the other hand,

I cannot fully concur in the main opinion, because its angle of response

to the City's all-or-nothing position leads to a position that I believe

cannot be sustained.

     Under Alabama common law, at-will employment has two essential

aspects: The employer may terminate it (1) at any time and (2) without

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cause. See Allied Supply Co. v. Brown, 585 So. 2d 33, 35 (Ala. 1991)

("Employees at will ... can be terminated by their employer[] at any time,

with or without cause or justification."). Moreover, the "at any time"

aspect necessarily implies that "an employee at will can be discharged ...

without prior notice," id.

     Here, the Handbook's termination provisions are irreconcilable

with both aspects of at-will employment. First, the provisions foreclose a

right of the City to terminate at any time because they require

pretermination    notice-and-hearing     procedures.    Necessarily,   those

procedures require time and thus prevent the City from terminating at

any time, i.e., immediately and without prior notice.

     Second, the termination provisions are incompatible with a right to

terminate without cause. As quoted by the main opinion, the provisions

fundamentally and pervasively presume that the proposed termination

is based on "charges" -- i.e., cause. On this point, the main opinion tries

to thread the needle by positing that the provisions' guarantees have a

procedural aspect and a substantive aspect. See ___ So. 3d at ___ n.2. On

that view, the termination procedures are still required even though no

"charges" are needed. The problem is that, without any "charges," the

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procedures here simply cannot be satisfied: There is nothing to "consider"

at the Determination Hearing, there is no basis for "disciplinary action,"

there is nothing for the employee to "respond to," and there is nothing to

show by "evidence against the employee." And there is no point in the

subsequent procedural guarantee of an appeal, because there is no basis

for an underlying termination decision, nor any basis for asserting error

on appeal. The particular termination procedures here are simply

nonsensical without the requirement of cause; it is thoroughly embedded

in them. And these provisions are not like a requirement of a monthly

income statement, which does not presume that the content of the

statement will be a positive number. Rather, these provisions are like the

Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, whose procedural guarantee

of "due process of law" presumes that its substantive object -- "life, liberty,

[and] property" -- has real, nonillusory content.

      Therefore, the Handbook's termination provisions necessarily

rendered Davis's employment not at-will -- absent a disclaimer. There

was a disclaimer here, of course; the question is its effect.

      The acknowledgment disclaimer provided: "[N]othing in this

Handbook can be interpreted … to place a limitation on … the City's

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freedom to terminate the employment relationship at any time." That

language expressly or implicitly incorporated both aspects of at-will

employment. It expressly asserted the City's right to terminate "at any

time." And "at any time" necessarily implied "without cause," because it

meant that the City could terminate before any cause arose.

     Hence, the termination provisions and the acknowledgment were

in direct conflict. Whereas the termination provisions would fully entomb

at-will employment, the acknowledgment would fully revive it. The main

opinion attempts to harmonize the two terms by positing that the City

did not give up its freedom to terminate at any time, only its freedom to

terminate without pretermination procedures. But as I have explained,

the freedom to terminate at any time is precisely what the procedures

would foreclose. Procedures cannot occur in a timeless world of legal

abstraction; they require time. 5

     5To  be fair, a similar attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable seems
to have been present in an unnecessary passing comment in this Court's
seminal case. See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725,
735 & n.4 (Ala. 1987) ("[A] unilateral offer made by [an] employer may be
characterized ... as follows: 'I promise I will not dismiss you without cause
(or without exhausting specified procedures) unless I change this policy
before you are discharged.' " "Thus, in a very real sense, the employee is
still an employee 'at-will.' He may still be dismissed for any reason, good

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     Accordingly, in my view, there is no way to reconcile the

termination     provisions   with        the    acknowledgment.       Under   the

irreconcilability canon of interpretation, the two knocked each other out

of the handbook. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 189-90 (Thomson/West 2012). Without

a contractual provision on point, the general rule of at-will employment

applied. See Howard v. Wolff Broad. Corp., 611 So. 2d 307, 310-11 (Ala.

1992). Thus, Davis's employment remained at-will.

     Importantly, this result obtains because the acknowledgment

specifically contradicted the Handbook's termination provisions. Unlike

in many prior cases, as the main opinion explains, the acknowledgment

did not generally disclaim that the Handbook was a contract. Moreover,

unlike    a   unilateral   right    to    deviate    from   a   handbook,     the

acknowledgment's provision of a unilateral right to amend the Handbook

did not render its requirements illusory. Notably, in recognizing that

deviation/amendment        distinction,        the   main   opinion     implicitly

disapproves this Court's contrary dicta in Harper v. Winston County, 892

or bad, as long as the provisions found in the company handbooks are
followed ...." (citation omitted)).
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So. 2d 346, 351 (Ala. 2004) ("If the employer reserves in the employee

handbook the right to change policies unilaterally, its reservation

operates as a disclaimer to negate any inference that the handbook

constitutes an enforceable contract.").

     To summarize: Davis's employment is at-will, not because the

Handbook is not a contract, but because the specific at-will provisions of

the acknowledgment and the specific termination provisions of the

Handbook are irreconcilable such that they cancel each other out. If the

City had so framed its argument, perhaps the result would have been

different. At least my vote would have been.

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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).

     I respectfully dissent. Alabama is a right-to-work state and

employment is at-will; this means that "an employee contract ... may be

terminated by either party with or without cause or justification."

Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1987).

However, under certain limited conditions, "an employee handbook can

represent a binding contract obligating an employer to satisfy certain

conditions precedent to dismissing an employee." Harper v. Winston

Cnty., 892 So. 2d 346, 351 (Ala. 2004). But, "if the employer does not wish

the policies contained in an employee handbook to be construed as an

offer for a unilateral contract, he is free to so state in the handbook."

Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 734. Here, the employer did just that.

The City of Montevallo ("the City") hired Ed Davis to manage the

Montevallo Golf Course. Several years later, Davis received a copy of the

City's Employee Handbook ("the Handbook"). The Handbook contained

an acknowledgment, which Davis signed, stating in pertinent part:

     "I understand that nothing in this Handbook can be
     interpreted to be a contract for employment for any specified
     period of time or to place a limitation on my freedom or the
     City's freedom to terminate the employment relationship at
     any time. I also understand that the City retains the freedom

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     to change the Policies and Procedures with the approval of the
     Mayor and City Council."

The plain language of the acknowledgment disclaims both the creation of

any contract and the placement of any limitation on the City's freedom to

terminate Davis's employment. Utilizing any rules of grammar, canons

for interpreting contracts, or the common usage of the relevant words and

phrases yields the same result: the employer and employee are free to

terminate their relationship at any time for any reason.

     However, the main opinion seizes upon the phrase "for any specified

period of time" in the acknowledgment, arguing that the City's concerns

were merely durational. I disagree. First, disclaiming a contract "for any

specified period of time" does not imply a contract "for no specified period

of time." Additionally, the quoted provision is immediately followed by

language maintaining the City's freedom "to terminate the employment

relationship at any time" and to change the Handbook's procedures

without the consent or knowledge of the employee. Read as a whole, the

acknowledgment conforms with established Alabama law6 and fully

     6We    have consistently held that including an unambiguous
disclaimer or acknowledgment in a handbook is sufficient to avoid the
creation of a contract. See McCluskey v. Unicare Health Facility, Inc.,

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removes any cause of action an employee might have against the City

occasioned by any provisions in the Handbook in its totality. Although in

isolation the durational language may be construed ambiguously, that

ambiguity fades when it is read, as we must read it, in the context of the

entire provision. Having read and signed the acknowledgment, Davis

could not reasonably interpret the Handbook as creating a contract to

establish a cause of action against the City for failing to follow the

Handbook's termination procedures. 7

     Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that the acknowledgment

preempted only contracts of specific duration, the City was still free to

deviate     from   the   Handbook's    termination     procedures.    The

acknowledgment's language on this point is clear, straightforward, and

direct, stating that "nothing in this Handbook can be interpreted … to

place a limitation on my freedom or the City's freedom to terminate the

484 So. 2d 398 (Ala. 1986); Hoffman-La Roche, 512 So. 2d at 734; Abney
v. Baptist Med. Ctrs., 597 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1992); and Ex parte Beasley,
712 So. 2d 338 (Ala. 1998).

     7The   City's ordinance promulgated in 2015 disposes of any lingering
doubt Davis may have harbored regarding his employment status. That
ordinance explicitly stated that Davis was an at-will employee,
specifically abrogating any contractual obligation that might have bound
the City to follow the procedures in the Handbook.
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employment relationship at any time." The main opinion concludes that

this provision preserves the parties' right to terminate the employment

relationship at any time, but only pursuant to the Handbook's

procedures. But, that is not what the acknowledgment says. Adding

language not included in the acknowledgment to impose the Handbook’s

provisions related to termination appears to be based on the principle

that " '[t]he provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that

renders them compatible, not contradictory.' " State ex rel. Allison v.

Farris, 194 So. 3d 214, 219 (Ala. 2015) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan

A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 27 at 180

(Thomson/West 2012). However, rather than resolving a contradiction,

the main opinion creates one to animate and apply the Handbook’s

procedures to prevent at-will termination of employment. The term "any

time" is unambiguous and would include periods before and during the

termination proceedings. If an employee cannot be terminated during

those times, then that is inherently a limit on the City's freedom to

terminate employment "at any time," directly contradicting the

acknowledgment. I see no need for such a strained interpretation of such

clear language.

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     Reading the acknowledgment as a whole and interpreting its

provisions with an eye toward compatibility, the acknowledgment

disclaims the Handbook's creation of any contract or any limitation on

the City's freedom to terminate the employment relationship. Although

the Handbook's procedures provide guidance on the method of

termination, the City, per the terms of the acknowledgment, is not bound

by them. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court

granting the City's motion for a summary judgment.

     Wise and Bryan, JJ., concur.

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