Court Opinion

ID: 9894709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 17:10:41.384519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:27.687582
License: Public Domain

J-S26031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: K.K.S., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: L.S., MOTHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 3140 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the Decree Entered November 8, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000130-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: K.A.W., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: L.S., MOTHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 3141 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the Decree Entered November 8, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000131-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                   FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2023

      L.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees terminating her parental rights

as to her minor children, K.K.S. and K.A.W. (collectively, “Children”). Mother’s
J-S26031-23

counsel has filed an Anders1 brief and a motion to withdraw as counsel. We

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the termination decrees.

        A panel of this Court previously summarized the background of this

case:

        On January 22, 2021, the Philadelphia Department of Human
        Services (“DHS”) received a general protective services (“GPS”)
        report alleging concerns about Mother’s behavioral health and
        inappropriate discipline of [Children]. On that same date, the
        police were called to the home for an incident involving Mother
        and an older sibling of [Children]. While in the home, [Children]
        whispered to the police that they were afraid and asked them not
        to leave. [Children] stated that Mother kept a gun in the home,
        which she had used to threaten them. Pursuant to a search
        warrant, Mother produced the firearm and the police took
        possession of it.

        While the police were still at Mother’s home, the DHS investigator,
        Kim Hightower, arrived and interviewed [Children]. [C]hildren
        reported to her that Mother deprives them of food as a form of
        punishment and hits them with sticks and canes. In addition,
        [K.K.S.] explained that she was truant from school because
        Mother made her clean the house. During the ensuing hearing,
        Ms. Hightower testified that [Children] “appear[ed] to be very
        thin[, a]s if they were emaciated[.]” Moreover, she stated that
        Mother neglected to feed K.[A.W.] through a nasogastric tube as
        was required daily.

Interest of K.S., Nos. 1367 & 1368 EDA 2021, 272 A.3d 473 (Table), 2022

WL 122444, at *1 (Pa.Super. filed Jan. 13, 2022) (unpublished memorandum)

(citations omitted).

____________________________________________

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d

1267, 1275 (Pa.Super. 1992) (holding Anders protections apply to appeals
of involuntary termination of parental rights).

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      The trial court adjudicated Children dependent and removed them from

Mother’s home. Id. at *2. Mother filed an appeal of the order of adjudication

and we affirmed. Id. at *1.

      On February 28, 2022, DHS filed a petition for involuntary termination

of Mother’s parental rights. A hearing on the petition was held on November

8, 2022. At the time of the hearing, Children were 13 and 17 years old. N.T.,

11/8/22, at 17. Although Mother was served with notice of the termination

hearing, she did not appear at the hearing. Id. at 4.

      At the hearing, DHS presented the testimony of the Community

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) Case Manager, Jared Burr. Burr testified that

Mother’s single case plan objectives remained the same throughout the case.

They were: maintain contact with CUA, supervised line of sight/hearing

visitation at the agency at Children’s discretion, complete a parenting capacity

evaluation, sign all necessary consents, undergo a Behavioral Health Services

(“BHS”) assessment and evaluation, participate          in family therapy if

appropriate, attend the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for parenting,

and submit to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for drug screens and

assessment. Id. at 10-11. Of those objectives, Mother only completed a

parenting program at ARC and submitted to one drug screen, which was

negative. Id. at 11-15, 53, 57. Burr did not know Mother’s current housing

situation or where she was living. Id. at 27. Mother also had not been involved

in providing any therapeutic care for Children or meeting their educational

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needs, nor had she inquired about those needs throughout the life of the case.

Id. at 17-18.

      Burr further indicated that Mother has not had contact with Children

because Children do not want to see her. Id. at 16. Burr testified that Children

did not want any type of contact with Mother “[d]ue to the trauma they’ve

experienced prior to being adjudicated.” Id. at 16, 27-28, 33-34. He stated

that Children have a PTSD diagnosis due to past trauma from Mother. Id. at

17. Burr testified that there have been multiple stay-away orders entered in

this case ordering Mother not to have any contact with Children, outside of

arranged visitation. Id. at 27. The court also had entered stay-away orders

for Mother to stay away from the previous CUA case manager and supervisor

due to Mother’s behaviors. Id. at 29-30.

      Burr further testified that Children are in kinship care with S.G., who is

a family friend. Id. at 19. He stated that S.G. wants to adopt Children and

treats them like her own family. Id. at 19, 21. Burr indicated that S.G. meets

all of Children’s educational, medical, and therapeutic needs and provides

them with love, safety, stability, and support. Id. at 19-20. He stated that

Children refer to S.G. as “Mom” and have their primary parent-child

relationship with her. Id. at 20, 34. Since being placed with S.G., Children

have excelled in school and extracurricular activities, and K.A.W. no longer

needs to be fed through an NG tube. Id. at 34-35. Burr also stated that

Children’s adult brother lives at S.G.’s home so they can be a family unit there.

Id. at 35-36. Burr opined that it was in Children’s best interest to be adopted

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by S.G. and it would cause Children significant harm if they were removed

from S.G.’s home. Id. at 21, 37. Conversely, he testified that Children have

not suffered any irreparable harm from their lack of contact with Mother

throughout this case. Id. at 19-20.

      Both Children testified at the termination hearing. They both indicated

that it was their desire and intention to be adopted by S.G. Id. at 62-63.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated Mother’s parental

rights. Id. at 69. This appeal followed.

      Counsel’s Anders brief identifies the following issues:

      1. Whether this Honorable Court should grant the request of
         undersigned counsel to withdraw pursuant to Anders v.
         California.

      2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and/or erred
         as a matter of law by finding the Philadelphia Department of
         Human Services established by clear and convincing evidence
         the grounds for termination of parental rights pursuant to 23
         Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8).

      3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and/or erred
         as a matter of law by holding that the developmental, physical,
         and emotional needs and welfare of the Children as set forth
         in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) would be best served by terminating
         Mother’s parental rights.

Anders Br. at 4-5 (suggested answers omitted).

      Before we consider whether the appeal is frivolous, we must first

determine whether counsel has followed the procedures for withdrawing as

counsel. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa.Super.

2007) (en banc) (stating that “[w]hen faced with a purported Anders brief,

this Court may not review the merits of any possible underlying issues without

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first examining counsel’s request to withdraw”). To withdraw pursuant to

Anders, counsel must: 1) “petition the court for leave to withdraw stating

that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has

determined that the appeal would be frivolous;” 2) furnish a copy of the brief

to the client; and 3) advise the client that he or she has the right to retain

other counsel or proceed pro se. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d

1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc).

      Additionally, in the Anders brief, counsel seeking to withdraw must:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
      counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
      counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
      counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
      Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
      case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
      that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). If counsel

meets all the above obligations, “it then becomes the responsibility of the

reviewing court to make a full examination of the proceedings and make an

independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly

frivolous.” Id. at 355 n.5 (quoting Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d

1185, 1187 (Pa. 1981)).

      Here, we find that counsel has complied with the above technical

requirements. In her Anders brief, counsel has provided a summary of the

procedural and factual history of the case with citations to the record. Further,

counsel’s brief identifies issues that could arguably support the appeal, as well

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as counsel’s assessment of why the appeal is frivolous, with citations to the

record. Additionally, counsel served Mother with a copy of the Anders brief

and advised her of her right to proceed pro se or to retain a private attorney

to raise any additional points she deemed worthy of this Court’s review. See

Motion to Withdraw, 6/9/23, at ¶ 4, Ex. A. Mother has not responded to

counsel’s motion to withdraw. As counsel has met the technical requirements

of Anders and Santiago, we will proceed to the issues counsel has identified.

      The issues raised in counsel’s Anders brief challenge the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting termination of Mother’s parental rights under 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) and (b).

      We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an

abuse of discretion. In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa.Super. 2018). In

termination   cases,    we   “accept   the   findings   of   fact   and   credibility

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47

A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012)). “If the factual findings have support in the record,

we then determine if the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of

discretion.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 2018).

We will reverse a termination order “only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” In re Adoption of

S.P., 47 A.3d at 826.

      A party seeking to terminate parental rights has the burden of

establishing grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re

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Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d at 473. Clear and convincing evidence means

evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is controlled by section 2511 of the

Adoption Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). Under this

provision, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis prior to

terminating parental rights:

      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
      termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
      needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
      of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. (citations omitted). To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court

need only affirm the trial court’s decision as to any one subsection of section

2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).

      Here, the court found termination proper under subsections 2511(a)(1),

(2), (5), and (8), as well as under Section 2511(b). See Order, 11/8/22. As

only one basis for termination under 2511(a) is necessary, we will focus on

the court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights under subsection

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2511(a)(1). That subsection provides that a parent’s rights to a child may be

terminated if:

      [t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six
      months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has
      evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a
      child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).

      Under subsection 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce clear and

convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to

the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental

duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008). A parental

obligation is a “positive duty which requires affirmative performance” and

“cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of the child.”

In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Indeed,

      [p]arental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with
      good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in
      order to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his
      or her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize
      all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
      must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in
      the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
      rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
      convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
      others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional
      needs.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

      Here, the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to the termination

of Mother’s rights pursuant to subsection (a)(1) is frivolous. The trial court

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found that Mother demonstrated a settled purpose of relinquishing her

parental claim to Children and failed to perform her parental duties for a period

of at least six months preceding the filing of the termination petition. See Trial

Court Opinion, filed 4/25/23, at 11. The record supports the court’s finding.

With the exceptions of completing parenting at ARC and submitting to one

drug screen, Mother failed to comply with her single case plan objectives. She

did not maintain contact with CUA, complete a parenting capacity evaluation,

sign necessary consents, undergo a BHS assessment and evaluation, or obtain

a CEU assessment. Additionally, Mother has shown no interest or involvement

in Children’s needs throughout the life of the case. We perceive no non-

frivolous basis on which to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support

the finding of termination under subsection 2511(a)(1).

      We next consider the court’s finding that termination was warranted

pursuant to section 2511(b). Under section 2511(b), the trial court must

consider “the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the

child” to determine if termination of parental rights is in the best interest of

the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This inquiry involves assessment of

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability[.]” In re C.M.S.,

884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005). The court must also examine the

parent-child bond, “with utmost attention to the effect on the child of

permanently severing that bond.” Id. The court must also examine any pre-

adoptive home and any bond between the child and the foster parents. In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

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      Here, the court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was

in Children’s best interests. We again find no basis in the record on which to

challenge the court’s finding. The evidence clearly showed that Children are

secure, loved, and thriving in S.G.’s home. Children refer to S.G. as “Mom”

and have their primary parent-child bond with her. Conversely, the

uncontroverted evidence was that Children are fearful of Mother and do not

want any contact with her due to the past trauma they experienced under her

care. Thus, there was no reasonable basis on which to challenge the findings

that Children do not have a parental bond with Mother and they would suffer

no detrimental harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated.

      To summarize, we find that the issues raised in counsel’s Anders brief

are wholly frivolous. Further, after an independent review of the record, we

conclude that no other, non-frivolous issue exists. We therefore grant

counsel’s motion to withdraw. Having determined that the appeal is wholly

frivolous, we affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

      Motion to withdraw as counsel granted. Decrees affirmed.

Date: 11/2/2023

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