Court Opinion

ID: 9477342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:20:59.603061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:49.808111
License: Public Domain

*1020McKAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with all the majority has said except its treatment of the hearsay issue. Perhaps no rule of law has so bedeviled lawyers and judges nor been so uniformly misunderstood by both. Of course, it has been difficult for those of us educated in former times to accept the fact that hearsay is whatever Fed.R.Evid. 801 says it is. The key part of that rule for present purposes is 801(e). It provides:
(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
It is clear from the text of the rule itself that a hearsay objection always involves a two-step analysis. The first step is to determine if it was an out-of-court statement. No one disputes that in this case. The second (and mandatory) step is to see if it was “offered” for the truth of the matter asserted. No one can really dispute that the “offer” in this case was to show state of mind, not the truth of the matter asserted. The majority suggests that the trial court made an “implicit determination” that the “offer” was to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
It is not up to the trial judge to “implicitly determine” that it was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The duty of the trial court is to consider the party’s offer and determine whether it is admissible as offered. The trial court cannot change the offer. Here the trial court did not rule that state of mind was not at issue or that this offer did not show state of mind. If there was another basis for excluding the evidence, the trial court did not rely on it; and we may not rely on it either.
The same statement can be hearsay in one trial and nonhearsay in another because the purpose for which it is offered determines whether the statement is hearsay. A statement not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather to indirectly infer a party’s state of mind or to show the effect of a statement on a party has long been recognized as nonhearsay. The subject matter of the assertion is not an express articulation of state of mind; instead the declarant’s state of mind may be inferred from the fact that the assertion was made. Whether the actual subject matter of the assertion is true or not is irrelevant. For example, the defendant in United States v. Herrera, 600 F.2d 502 (5th Cir.1979), was convicted of transporting illegal aliens. At trial, she mounted a duress defense, claiming that a Ms. Escam-illa had threatened her with physical harm in a telephone conversation if she did not cooperate. The trial court refused to admit testimony regarding the contents of the telephone conversation on hearsay grounds. The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court, holding that the conversation was not hearsay.
The threatening statements made by Es-camilla during the conversation were not offered to prove that Escamilla would actually carry through the threats, but rather to show Herrera’s state of mind in consequence of the statements. The trial court instructed the jury on the duress defense; therefore, the jury was entitled to consider Escamilla’s statements and Herrera’s reaction to them in resolving the issue of criminal intent.
Id. at 504. See also United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 514 (10th Cir.1984); United States v. Wright, 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C.Cir.1986); United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864, 100 S.Ct. 133, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979); United States v. Kostoff, 585 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam); United States v. Cline, 570 F.2d 731, 734-35 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Pate, 543 F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir.1976); United States v. DeCarlo, 458 F.2d 358, 363-64 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843, 93 S.Ct. 112, 34 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 251 n. 8 (2d Cir.1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969).
The exception to the hearsay rule enunciated in Rule 803(3) only comes into play when the statement is undeniably hearsay because it is a direct and explicit declaration of state of mind, i.e., it is offered to *1021prove the truth of the substance of what the declarant said. For example, “I intended to kill John” is hearsay if it is offered to prove the declarant’s mens rea of intent. Unlike the nonhearsay described in Herrera, no extrapolation from the subject matter of the assertion is necessary in order to infer the declarant’s state of mind, and the truth of the subject matter of the assertion is the critical inquiry. The contemporaneous requirement in Rule 803(3) is the putative circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness that justifies allowing the trier of fact to consider the substance of the hearsay utterance as proof of the declarant’s state of mind at the time he or she commented on it. The advisory committee notes on the rules make this clear when they state, “Exception (3) is essentially a specialized application of Exception (1) [present sense impression], presented separately to enhance its usefulness and accessibility.”
The statement in the present case is to the effect that Mr. Pando was threatened with physical harm on the morning of his arrest if he failed to cooperate and transport the contraband.* At trial, Mr. Pando sought to introduce this evidence in support of his defense that he lacked criminal intent because he performed the acts for which he was charged under mental duress and coercion. The statement was not offered to prove the truth of the substance of what was told to him, i.e., that someone was going to kill both him and his family. Mr. Pando could have misconstrued what was told to him or even imagined the threats. Rather, just as in Herrera, the statement was offered to demonstrate that Mr. Pando believed he was threatened with bodily harm, acted because of the impact of this statement, and thus lacked the requisite criminal intent. The statement was offered to indirectly establish his state of mind, the essence of his coercion defense. Hearsay analysis thus dictates that because the statement was not offered to prove the truth of what was said, it is nonhearsay and admissible without resort to the hearsay exception in Rule 803(3). I am persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the taped statement on the grounds of hearsay. See Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir.1984) (eviden-tiary ruling will only be reversed on a showing that the trial court abused its discretion).
The Government essentially argues that failure to admit the statement, if erroneous, was harmless error because it was cumulative of other evidence supporting Mr. Pando’s duress defense. Mr. Pando called two police officers as well as a deputy sheriff who testified that Mr. Pando had reported prior threats on his life both in June of 1986 and July 4 or 5 of 1986. One incident involved a shooting at a cafe where Mr. Pando, apparently the intended victim, appeared to be very frightened. Mr. Pando had told the police that those who were threatening him believed him to be an “informant.”
The excluded evidence pertained to his state of mind the very morning of Mr. Pando’s arrest and was therefore not cumulative of the police officers’ testimony relating to the two prior incidents. Moreover, the defendant’s own tape-recorded statement made the morning of the arrest was critical evidence of his duress defense for the crime committed that same day and for which he was being tried. The nexus between the state of mind in question and the crime committed that day was compelling; there was no indication that the prior threats testified to by the officers had any direct connection to, much less actuated, the crime for which Mr. Pando was arrested. The erroneous exclusion of this evidence was not harmless. I would remand for retrial.

 Mr. Pando told Officer Sena that on the morning of his arrest he had been confronted by armed men and told to drive toward Hobbs, New Mexico, with the contraband. The men allegedly told Mr. Pando that he would be stopped somewhere along the way, and the cocaine would be unloaded. He was warned that he would be watched and that if he failed to do as he was told, his family would be harmed.