Court Opinion

ID: 9613042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:13:40.448357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:24.465542
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
dissenting.
At the outset I must state that I agree with the majority to the extent it disagrees that Robinson v. State, 261 Ga. 698 (410 SE2d 116) (1991) changed the longstanding rule that where the case against the defendant is composed solely of circumstantial evidence, it is error to fail to charge the jury on OCGA § 24-4-6, even in the absence of a request to do so. Like Chief Judge Pope, I believe that if the court had intended to overrule such a longstanding rule, it surely would have done so with unmistakable clarity.
I disagree with the majority with respect to its contention that there was direct evidence that Yarn sold and possessed cocaine. Evidence that Yarn drove another individual to the motel is not direct evidence of either charge. The State concedes its only “direct” evidence is Yarn’s statement that he knew what was going on (i.e., he knew that he was going to get gas and cigarettes in exchange for providing transportation). Such is hardly direct evidence of either charge. This obvious point is further underscored by the trial court’s skepticism and extended questioning on the issue, particularly when the court asked the State how it “had proved that this man had anything to do with this crime” during Yarn’s motion for a directed verdict. For these reasons, I believe the charge should have been given and the conviction reversed. Accordingly, I dissent.