Court Opinion

ID: 9763385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:43:44.997817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:42.184538
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although I concur in the majority’s decision that sufficient evidence supported the conviction, I dissent from their holding with regard to point of error five. I would hold that trial on the merits commences with the reading of the indictment to the impaneled, sworn jury. *343Accordingly, I would not reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Like the majority, I have not found a definition of “trial on the merits” as used in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 28.10. Usage in factual discussions in opinions indicates that jury selection is not part of the trial on the merits. See Joines v. State, 482 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Crim.App.1972);1 see also Decker v. State, 717 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).2,3 This distinction is supported by the structure of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Jury selection and trial before jury are contained in a group of nine chapters called “Trial and its Incidents.” TexCode Crim.Proc.Ann. Chs. 32-39 (Vernon 1989). Jury selection is governed by Chapter 35, entitled “Formation of the Jury.” Tex.Code CRIM.PROcAnn. art. 35.01, et seq. (Vernon 1989). The succeeding Chapter 36, entitled “The Trial Before the Jury,” begins with a chapter called “Order of proceeding in trial.” Tex.Code Crim.PROG.Ann. art. 36.01 (Vernon Supp.1993). That article provides in part as follows:
A jury being impaneled in any criminal action, except as provided by Subsection (b) [addressing order of opening statements] of this article, the cause shall proceed in the following order:
1. The indictment or information shall be read to the jury by the attorney prosecuting.
Tex.Code Crim.ProcAnn. art. 36.01(a). I would hold that article 36.01 describes the trial on the merits. Trial on the merits commences, therefore, with the reading of the indictment to the impaneled, sworn jury.
My proposed exclusion of jury selection from the definition of “trial on the merits” would neither ignore the concerns expressed in Sodipo nor contravene the purpose of article 28.10 of protecting defendants from surprise amendments to indictments. See Sodipo, 815 S.W.2d at 556. I differ from the majority only as to which court activity marks the division between procedure under article 28.10(a) and article 28.10(b).
The divergence between my interpretation and the majority’s holding is pronounced where, as here, jury selection is divorced temporally from the Chapter 36 trial on the merits. Under the majority’s interpretation, on the day that jury selection begins, the prosecution is locked into pursuing an inaccurate indictment, even though the impaneled, sworn jurors have not heard it and may not hear it for days.4 I believe that, in such cases, what the jurors don’t know can’t hurt the defendant; but what the prosecutor knows, and can’t change, can impair justice and hurt society. My interpretation would allow the prosecution to amend the indictment up until the day before the impaneled, sworn jurors actually hear the indictment. This greater opportunity to present a correct indictment to the jury carries with it the defendant’s ability to request and receive as of right up to a ten-day continuance under article 28.10(a). My interpretation preserves the right of the defendant to demand adequate preparation time, but enhances the ability of society to accurately prosecute alleged crimes.
Here, the court amended the indictment on the day of voir dire — the day before the indictment was read to the impaneled, sworn jury. Hinojosa objected to the amendment, but did not request a continuance.
Under my interpretation that the court’s amendment occurred on the day before trial on the merits commenced, subsection (a) of article 28.10 would control. Under subsec*344tion (a), the court was within its power to allow amendment over Hinojosa’s objection. Cases in which courts erroneously allowed, over defendants’ objection, an amendment on or after the date trial on the merits commenced are governed by subsection (b) and are inapposite. See Sodipo, 815 S.W.2d 551; see also Boutte v. State, 824 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). Since Hinojosa did not request a continuance following the amendment, eases in which timely amendments were allowed, but requested continuances were erroneously denied, are inapposite. See Beebe v. State, 811 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The court did not err in failing to sua sponte order a continuance following amendment, because the statute imposes no such duty on the court.
I would overrule point five. I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ decision to the contrary.

. “The record reflects that on April 19, 1971, the Hon. Frank H. Crain presided over the proceedings, which included hearings on several motions, and the voir dire examination of the veniremen. On April 20, 1971, trial on the merits commenced, the Hon. Joe E. Kelly presiding.” Joines, 482 S.W.2d at 207 (emphasis added).

. "The jury selection continued, the State and defense made their peremptory challenges, the jury was sworn, and excused for lunch. After lunch but before the trial on the merits commenced, there was a hearing in which LJ. Rich, the juror who had been selected, impaneled, and sworn, testified." Decker, 717 S.W.2d at 904.

. The court reporter who prepared the statement of facts in the instant case used separate headings for "voir dire” and “trial on the merits” on the covers of the separate volumes.

. In making this statement, I assume that, as here, the defendant objects to the amendment.