Court Opinion

ID: 9776887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:48:00.817054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:44.433297
License: Public Domain

MILLIKEN, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority opinion because I think the prevailing practice in the trial of recidivist cases in this state violates procedural due process, but I agree that the Court’s opinion correctly reflects the established procedure in this state in criminal trials of persons who have been convicted of other offenses.
I believe a much fairer trial is afforded by limiting the use of the defendant’s past convictions to the issue of his punishment and not to the issue of his guilt, and so I would not let the jury know of the defendant’s criminal record (where the defendant does not take the witness stand) until the jury has made its finding as to whether the defendant is guilty of the crime for which he is being tried. If he is found guilty, his *710past criminal record is very pertinent to the extent he should he punished. If the defendant testifies in his own defense then, of course, his past criminal record is pertinent to whether he should be believed, but in trials where the defendant does not take the witness stand, for whatever reason, it seems to me that it would be much fairer procedure to require a jury to find him guilty or not guilty on the same procedural basis accorded a defendant who had no criminal record to haunt him.
I do not believe there can be any serious doubt about the tendency of human beings serving on juries being like the rest of us —more ready to believe a person who has been convicted of a crime is more likely to commit another crime than is one who has no criminal record, but guilt should not be determined by jury’s tendencies but by proof. In the Court’s opinion, Judge Williams has quoted the Connecticut Supreme Court’s opinion descriptive of the practice I believe Kentucky should adopt in the trial of recidivist cases. Tennessee recently did. Harrison v. State (1965), Tenn., 394 S.W.2d 713, and also see Miller v. State (1965), Ark., 394 S.W.2d 601.