Court Opinion

ID: 2963853
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:16:16.505184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:42.105735
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1922

                                 PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBE,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                               STATE OF MAINE, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                     [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                               Selya, Boudin and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                              _________________________

               Thomas N.  Tureen, with  whom Gregory  W.  Sample, Tureen  &
               _________________             ___________________  _________
          Sample, Richard B.  Collins, David Overlock Stewart,  and Ropes &
          ______  ___________________  ______________________       _______
          Gray were on brief, for appellant.
          ____
               Francis  A. Brown on brief for City of Calais, Maine, amicus
               _________________
          curiae.
               Thomas  D. Warren,  Assistant  Attorney  General, with  whom
               _________________
          Andrew  Ketterer, Attorney  General,  and Wayne  Moss,  Assistant
          ________________                          ___________
          Attorney General, were on brief, for appellees.

                              _________________________

                                   February 9, 1996
                              _________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.   The  Passamaquoddy Tribe  (the
                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.
                            _____________

          Tribe)  sued   to  compel  Maine   and  the  governor   of  Maine

          (collectively,  Maine or  the  State) to  recognize its  asserted

          right to avoid the prohibitions of Maine's criminal code, see 17-
                                                                    ___

          A  Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.    953-954, and conduct high-stakes casino

          gambling behind the shield  of the Indian Gaming Regulatory  Act,

          25  U.S.C.    2701-2721, 18 U.S.C.    1166-1168 (the Gaming Act).

          The federal district court  decided that the Gaming Act  does not

          extend to Maine, and  denied relief.  See Passamaquoddy  Tribe v.
                                                ___ ____________________

          Maine, 897 F. Supp. 632 (D. Me. 1995).  We affirm.
          _____

          I.  THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
          I.  THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

                    In order  to put this  appeal into  perspective, it  is

          necessary to juxtapose the Gaming Act and the Maine Indian Claims

          Settlement  Act of 1980,  25 U.S.C.     1721-1735 (the Settlement

          Act).

                    In the early 1970s, the Tribe began earnestly to pursue

          claims  to nearly  two-thirds of  Maine's land  mass.   See Joint
                                                                  ___ _____

          Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp.
          _________________________________________    ______

          649,  651-53,  667-69  (D.  Me.)  (reviewing  dispute's history),

          aff'd, 528  F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).  After years of strife, the
          _____

          Tribe  and the State negotiated  a settlement of  the land claims

          under  federal  auspices.     The  arrangement  was  designed  to

          transform the legal status of the Maine tribes (the Passamaquoddy

          Tribe  and   the  Penobscot  Nation),  and  to  create  a  unique

          relationship between  state and tribal authority.   See Penobscot
                                                              ___ _________

          Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478, 488-89 (Me.), appeal dismissed,
          ______    ________                              ______ _________

                                          2

          464 U.S.  923 (1983).    The Passamaquoddies  and the  Penobscots

          ratified the  provisional pact  and Maine's  legislature followed

          suit.  See P.L. 1979, c. 732, codified at 30 Me.  Rev. Stat. Ann.
                 ___                    ________ __

             6201-6214.  In 1980, Congress cemented the terms of the accord

          by passing the Settlement Act.  The  federal statute incorporated

          the  parties' agreement  and  established the  ground rules  that

          henceforth would  govern matters  of common political  concern to

          the State and the two tribes.

                    Among other things, the Settlement Act rid the State of

          all  Indian land  claims and  submitted the  Passamaquoddies, the

          Penobscots, and  their tribal lands to  the State's jurisdiction.

          See  25 U.S.C.      1721(b)(4),  1723(b)  &  (c),  1725(a).    In
          ___

          addition,  section 16(b) of the  Settlement Act gave  the State a

          measure of security against  future federal incursions upon these

          hard-won gains.  It stated:

                    The  provisions  of any  federal  law enacted
                    after October 10, 1980 [the effective date of
                    the  Settlement  Act],  for  the  benefit  of
                    Indians, Indian nations,  or tribes or  bands
                    of Indians, which would affect or preempt the
                    application  of  the  laws of  the  State  of
                    Maine, . . . shall not apply within the State
                    of  Maine,  unless  such  provision  of  such
                                _________________________________
                    subsequently    enacted   Federal    law   is
                    _____________________________________________
                    specifically made applicable within the State
                    _____________________________________________
                    of Maine.
                    ________

          25 U.S.C.   1735(b) (emphasis supplied).  The Tribe received fair

          consideration for  its agreement:   the Settlement  Act confirmed

          its title to  designated reservation lands, memorialized  federal

          recognition of its  tribal status, and  opened the floodgate  for

          the influx of millions  of dollars in federal subsidies.   See 25
                                                                     ___

                                          3

          U.S.C.   1733.

                    Approximately  eight years later,  Congress enacted the

          Gaming Act.   This statute establishes  a three-tiered regulatory

          paradigm in respect to  gambling activities on Indian lands.   We

          described  these three  layers  in Rhode  Island v.  Narragansett
                                             _____________     ____________

          Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d  685, 689-90 (1st Cir.), cert.  denied, 115
          ____________                                   _____  ______

          S. Ct.  298 (1994), and it  would be pleonastic  to rehearse that

          description here.  We focus instead on the third tier:  Class III

          gaming (a category that encompasses casino gambling).

                    The Gaming Act provides that, unless a state imposes an

          outright ban on  all Class III  gaming (and  Maine does not),  it
                           ___

          must, upon  the  request  of  a federally  recognized  and  self-

          governing Indian tribe, negotiate a compact stipulating the terms

          and conditions  under  which the  tribe can  introduce Class  III

          gaming on  Indian lands.  See  25 U.S.C.   2710(d).   The statute
                                    ___

          contains a series of fail-safe mechanisms designed to ensure that

          states  do  not stall  the negotiations  or  conduct them  in bad

          faith.  See, e.g., id.   2710(d)(7).
                  ___  ____  ___

                    The  Settlement  Act  and  the Gaming  Act  are  vastly

          different  in scope.  From a geographic standpoint, the former is

          narrower in the sense that it  applies only in Maine whereas  the

          latter has  national implications.  From  a political standpoint,

          however, the Settlement  Act is  broader in that  it purposes  to

          cover  virtually the  entire field  of relationships  between the

          State  and the Indian tribes  based there whereas  the Gaming Act

          concentrates exclusively on a  particular kind of activity, i.e.,

                                          4

          gambling.

          II.  THE GENESIS OF THE APPEAL
          II.  THE GENESIS OF THE APPEAL

                    Mindful  of  the  meteoric  success  of  other  Indian-

          sponsored  casinos, the Tribe decided in the early 1990s to climb

          aboard the  bandwagon.   It chose  Calais,  a Maine  municipality

          located near the Canadian  border, as the preferred site  for its

          nascent  enterprise.  Because  the Gaming Act  requires Class III

          gaming  to   be  conducted  on   "Indian  lands,"  25   U.S.C.   

          2710(d)(3)(A),  the Tribe  sought to add  a designated  parcel of

          real estate  to its inventory of  tribal lands.  See  30 Me. Rev.
                                                           ___

          Stat. Ann.    6205 (authorizing  incremental land  acquisitions).

          When formally apprised  of the Tribe's plans, the State concluded

          that the Gaming Act  did not apply within Maine's  boundaries and

          scotched  the  proposed  casino.    As  a  lagniappe,  the  state

          legislature passed a bill  that allowed tribal land in  Calais to

          be used  for such a purpose  (1) if the Tribe  secured the city's

          blessing and the Governor of Maine thereafter agreed to negotiate

          a tribal-state  compact under 25  U.S.C.    2710(d), or (2)  if a

          court  of competent  jurisdiction  declared that  the Gaming  Act

          extended to Maine.  See Me. Laws 1993, ch.  713,   1, codified at
                              ___                               ________ __

          30 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.   6205(1)(c).

                    After  some procedural maneuvering,  not material here,

          the Tribe sued to  compel the commencement of negotiations  for a

          compact.  The  defendants moved  for judgment  on the  pleadings,

          Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), asserting that the Gaming Act did not hold

                                          5

          sway within Maine.   The Tribe opposed the  motion.  It contended

          among  other  things  that  the  Gaming  Act  reached  Maine,  as

          elsewhere, because Congress had impliedly repealed the Settlement

          Act vis-a-vis gaming activities  conducted by Indian tribes, and,

          in  all events, had  made the Gaming  Act specifically applicable

          within Maine.

                    Unimpressed  by the  Tribe's armada  of  arguments, the

          district  court ruled that the  Gaming Act lacked  force in Maine

          and entered judgment in the defendants' favor.  See Passamaquoddy
                                                          ___ _____________

          Tribe, 897 F. Supp. at 635.  This appeal followed.
          _____

          III.  ANALYSIS
          III.  ANALYSIS

                    Our discussion of the issues proceeds in four parts.

                                          A
                                          A

                    This   case  turns   on   a   question   of   statutory

          interpretation.   By  its  terms, the  Gaming  Act, if  taken  in

          isolation, applies to any  federally recognized Indian tribe that

          possesses  powers of self-governance.   See 25  U.S.C.   2703(5).
                                                  ___

          Consequently, if we were to  start and stop with the  Gaming Act,

          the Tribe    which is federally  recognized and self-governing   

          would be home free.  But this case cannot be confined within such

          narrow margins.  The  chief objective of statutory interpretation

          is to give  effect to  the legislative  will.   See Negonsott  v.
                                                          ___ _________

          Samuels,  113 S.  Ct. 1119,  1122-23 (1993);  Narragansett Indian
          _______                                       ___________________

          Tribe, 19  F.3d at 691.   To achieve this objective  a court must
          _____

          take  into   account  the  tacit  assumptions   that  underlie  a

          legislative enactment,  including not only  general policies  but

                                          6

          also preexisting statutory provisions.  See Ohio ex rel. Popovici
                                                  ___ _____________________

          v.  Agler, 280  U.S.  379, 383  (1929);  Greenwood Trust  Co.  v.
              _____                                ____________________

          Massachusetts,  971 F.2d 818, 827 (1st  Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
          _____________                                       _____ ______

          113  S. Ct. 974 (1993).   Put simply,  courts must recognize that

          Congress does not legislate  in a vacuum.  See  Thinking Machines
                                                     ___  _________________

          Corp. v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp. # 1 (In  re Thinking Machines),
          _____    _______________________________________________________

          67 F.3d 1021, 1025 (1st Cir. 1995).

                    Taking this  haploscopic view brings us  immediately to

          section  16(b) of the Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C.   1735(b), quoted

          supra  p.3.   At first  glance, the  conditions precedent  to the
          _____

          applicability of section 16(b) are  plainly satisfied.  The Tribe

          does  not dispute     nor could  it    that the  Gaming Act  is a

          "federal law enacted after  October 10, 1980, for the  benefit of

          Indians,  Indian nations, or  tribes or  bands of  Indians, which

          would  affect or preempt the application of the laws of the State

          of  Maine."1    25 U.S.C.     1735(b).    In such  circumstances,

          section  16(b) provides  that Maine  will be  exempt from  such a

          statute  unless  Congress  has  "specifically  made" the  statute
                   ______

          "applicable  within the State of Maine."  In other words, section

          16(b) is  a savings clause that serves  two related purposes.  It

          acts as a warning signal to  later Congresses to stop, look,  and

          listen before  weakening the  foundation on which  the settlement

          between Maine  and the Tribe rests.  At the same time, it signals

          courts that, if a later Congress  enacts a law for the benefit of
                              
          ____________________

               1Among other  things, the Gaming  Act, if it  applied, would
          preempt various provisions of Maine's criminal law, including 17-
          A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.    953-954.

                                          7

          Indians and intends  the law  to have effect  within Maine,  that

          intent will be made manifest.  In view of these dual purposes, we

          cannot decide the question  of whether the Gaming Act  extends to

          Maine withoutfactoring section 16(b) intothe decisional calculus.

                    This realization gets the grease  from the goose.   The

          text  of the  Gaming Act  contains  not so  much as  a hint  that

          Congress intended to make that Act specifically applicable within

          Maine.   Where,  as here,  Congress enacts  a statute  of general

          applicability (e.g., the  Gaming Act) with full  knowledge that a

          preexisting statute (e.g., the Settlement Act) contains a savings

          clause warning pointedly that a specific reference or a similarly

          clear expression of legislative intent will be required  to alter

          the  status quo, the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn

          from  the later Congress's  decision to omit  any such expression

          from the text of the new  statute is that Congress did not desire

          to  bring  about such  an  alteration.   See  Narragansett Indian
                                                   ___  ___________________

          Tribe,  19 F.3d  at 704  n.21 (observing  that when  an "enacting
          _____

          Congress is  demonstrably aware of the earlier law at the time of

          the later law's enactment,  there is no basis for  indulging" any

          other presumption).

                    The  Tribe's principal  rejoinder is  on constitutional

          grounds.  It posits  that giving effect to section 16(b)  in this

          fashion  is  tantamount  to  binding a  successor  Congress  to a

          predecessor's   will,   and    therefore   careens   beyond   the

          constitutional  pale.  See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
                                 ___  ____  ___________    ______

          530,  534  (1962); Reichelderfer  v.  Quinn,  287  U.S. 315,  318
                             _____________      _____

                                          8

          (1932); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135  (1810).  We
                  ________    ____

          believe that this rejoinder distorts the reality of events.

                    Section 16(b) does  not prohibit a subsequent  Congress

          from  writing a new statute  reflecting new policies and applying

          it  to the Indian  tribes in Maine.   Congress could  make such a

          statute fully  effective in  Maine through  the  use of  explicit

          language, by otherwise offering a patent indication of its intent

          to accomplish that result, or, indeed, by first repealing section

          16(b).  Thus,  section 16(b)  is purely an  interpretive aid;  it

          serves both  to limn  the  manner in  which subsequently  enacted

          statutes should be written to accomplish a particular goal and to

          color the way in  which such statutes thereafter should  be read.

          In fine, section  16(b) binds subsequent  Congresses only to  the

          extent that they choose to be bound.

                    The sockdolager is that  the Court regularly has upheld

          and given effect to such provisions, see, e.g., Warden, Lewisburg
                                               ___  ____  _________________

          Penit.  v. Marrero,  417 U.S.  653,  659-60 n.10  (1974) (earlier
          ______     _______

          statute barred repeal of  certain penalties "unless the repealing

          Act shall  so expressly  provide"); Shaughnessy v.  Pedreiro, 349
                                              ___________     ________

          U.S.  48,   52  (1955)  (earlier  statute   directed  that  "[n]o

          subsequent legislation  shall  .  .  . supersede  or  modify  the

          provisions of  [the earlier  statute] except  to the extent  such

          legislation  shall do  so expressly");  Posadas v.  National City
                                                  _______     _____________

          Bank,  296 U.S.  497, 501  (1936) (earlier statute  directed that
          ____

          subsequent  laws  "shall not  apply  to  the Philippine  Islands,

          except when  they specifically  so provide"); Great  Northern Ry.
                                                        ___________________

                                          9

          Co.  v. United  States,  208 U.S.  452,  456 (1908)  (similar  to
          ___     ______________

          Marrero); United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398, 401-02 (1888)
          _______   _____________    _________

          (similar to Marrero), and we see nothing that  distinguishes this
                      _______

          case from the mine-run.  This means, of course, that we must read

          the Settlement Act and the  Gaming Act in pari passu.   Doing so,
                                                    ____ _____

          and giving effect to  their plain meaning, we are  led inexorably

          to  the  conclusion that  the latter  lacks force  within Maine's

          boundaries.

                                          B
                                          B

                    The  Tribe  generates several  other  responses  to our

          tentative conclusion  that Congress  did not  intend to  make the

          Gaming  Act  operative  in  Maine.    Its  most ferocious  attack

          suggests that section 16(b) need not be considered at all because

          the Gaming  Act  impliedly repealed  it  insofar as  gambling  on

          tribal lands is concerned.  The attack is easily repulsed.

                    We   are  unequivocally   committed  to   "the  bedrock

          principle   that   implied  repeals   of  federal   statutes  are

          disfavored."  Narragansett  Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d  at 703; accord
                        __________________________                   ______

          Rodriguez  v. United  States, 480  U.S. 522,  524 (1987);  TVA v.
          _________     ______________                               ___

          Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978); United States v. Borden  Co., 308
          ____                            _____________    ___________

          U.S.  188,  198 (1939).    The  general rule  is  that "when  two

          statutes  are capable  of  coexistence, it  is  the duty  of  the

          courts, absent  a clearly  expressed congressional intent  to the

          contrary, to regard each  as effective."  Morton v.  Mancari, 417
                                                    ______     _______

          U.S.  535, 551 (1974).   The only other  satisfactory basis for a

          repeal  by   implication  (apart  from  a   clear  expression  of

                                          10

          Congress's  intent to repeal) is  a finding that  the earlier and

          later  statutes are irreconcilable.   See Hill, 437  U.S. at 190;
                                                ___ ____

          Morton,  417 U.S. at 550;  Narragansett Indian Tribe,  19 F.3d at
          ______                     _________________________

          703-04.   "[I]f the  two [acts]  are  repugnant in  any of  their

          provisions,  the  latter  act,  without  any  repealing   clause,

          operates  to the  extent  of the  repugnancy as  a repeal  of the

          first."   United States  v.  Tynen, 78  U.S.  (11 Wall.)  88,  92
                    _____________      _____

          (1870).

                    Of course, statutes can be irreconcilable even short of

          outright repugnancy.   Thus, a repeal may  be implied if  a later

          statute  covers  the  entire  subject matter  "and  embraces  new

          provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as  a substitute

          for  the first act."  Id.; see  also Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503-04;
                                ___  ___  ____ _______

          Narragansett   Indian  Tribe,  19   F.3d  at  703-04.     But  an
          ____________________________

          irreconcilable  conflict  does  not   exist  merely  because  the

          application of  a later statute would  "produce differing results

          when applied  . . ., for  that no more than  states the problem."

          Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976).
          __________    _________________

                    These  precepts fit  without  special tailoring  in the

          Indian law  context.   See, e.g.,  Narragansett Indian  Tribe, 19
                                 ___  ____   __________________________

          F.3d at 704;  Blackfeet Indian  Tribe v. Montana  Power Co.,  838
                        _______________________    __________________

          F.2d  1055, 1058 (9th Cir.),  cert. denied, 488  U.S. 828 (1988).
                                        _____ ______

          In  this case, they  defeat the Tribe's  attack.  The  Gaming Act

          contains no evidence of  an intention to repeal section  16(b) of

          the Settlement Act,  let alone  a patent expression  of any  such

          design.  Indeed, when the 100th Congress passed the Gaming Act it

                                          11

          was  fully  cognizant  of   the  Settlement  Act  and  apparently

          contemplated that the new  statute would not in any  way displace

          the old:

                    [I]t  is the intention  of the Committee that
                    nothing  in  .  .  . [the  Gaming  Act]  will
                    supersede   any   specific   restriction   or
                    specific  grant  of   Federal  authority   or
                    jurisdiction   to  a   State  which   may  be
                    encompassed   in  another   Federal  statute,
                    including the . .  . [Maine] Indian  Claim[s]
                    Settlement Act.

          S. Rep. No. 446, 100th Congress, 2d Sess. 12 (1988), reprinted in
                                                               _________ __

          1988  U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3082.2   The  absence of  any suggestive

          guideposts in the Gaming  Act, coupled with the easy  integration

          of the two laws, effectively dispatches  the argument for implied

          repeal.

                    Our opinion in Narragansett Indian  Tribe is not to the
                                   __________________________

          contrary.   There, we  concluded  that Congress,  in passing  the

          Gaming Act, had impliedly repealed the Rhode Island Indian Claims

          Settlement Act of  1978, 25  U.S.C.    1701-1716,  to the  extent

          that  it  touched upon  gambling  activities.   See  Narragansett
                                                          ___  ____________

                              
          ____________________

               2We  found this passage  of no  help in  the context  of the
          Rhode  Island  Indian  Claims  Settlement   Act  of  1978.    See
                                                                        ___
          Narragansett  Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d  at 700.   The version of the
          __________________________
          bill to which the report applied originally contained a provision
          that explicitly  exempted  Rhode Island  from  the reach  of  the
          Gaming  Act,  yet,  prior  to  enactment,  Congress  removed  the
          exonerative provision.   In that circumstance,  we concluded that
          the  report "shed[] no  light on Congress's  intent regarding the
          law  it actually  enacted."   Id.   By  contrast, the  draft bill
                                        ___
          appended  to the  report  did not  contain  any similar  language
          regarding Maine (presumably because the legislators knew that the
          Settlement  Act included  a savings  clause making  such language
          unnecessary).    Thus, unlike  in the  case  of Rhode  Island, no
          telltale chain of events taints the report's reference in respect
          to Maine.

                                          12

          Indian Tribe,  19  F.3d at  704-05.   But  the  Rhode Island  Act
          ____________

          contained no  provision comparable  to section  16(b); therefore,

          the  literal terms  of  the two  statutes created  incoherence by

          subjecting Indian  gaming  to two  mutually exclusive  regulatory

          environments.  Because we could find no feasible way to give full

          effect  to both  acts, we  concluded that  an implied  repeal had

          transpired.  See id.
                       ___ ___

                    Here,  in  contradistinction  to  the   situation  that

          obtained in Rhode Island, section 16(b) satisfactorily harmonizes

          the  Settlement  Act  and  the  Gaming  Act,  and  prevents   any

          incoherence.  The Settlement Act governs the State's relationship

          with the Tribe and will continue to do so without dilution unless

          and  until Congress, by later enactment, makes a new law touching

          upon  the  same  subject  matter  in  one   or  more  particulars

          specifically applicable within Maine.  As the Gaming Act does not

          meet  this benchmark,  the Settlement  Act remains  inviolate and

          precludes  the operation of the Gaming  Act in Maine.  See Ysleta
                                                                 ___ ______

          del  Sur Pueblo  v. Texas,  36 F.3d  1325,  1335 (5th  Cir. 1994)
          _______________     _____

          (holding that the Gaming  Act did not impliedly repeal  a federal

          statute  granting Texas  jurisdiction over Indian  gaming because

          Congress  never indicated in the  Gaming Act that  it intended to

          rescind the previous grant of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 115 S.
                                                       _____ ______

          Ct. 1358 (1995).

                    To  sum up, we do not find  it surprising that the lack

          of any express indicium of a contrary congressional intent in the

          text  of  the Gaming  Act  means  different  things in  different

                                          13

          settings.   Without a  savings  clause like  section 16(b),  this

          omission may indicate an intent to apply the Act across the board

             especially  if,  as  in Narragansett  Indian  Tribe,  Congress
                                     ___________________________

          weighed,  and decided to discard, a specific exemption.  But when

          a savings  clause is in play,  as in this case,  the omission can

          only  mean that Congress desired the terms of the earlier statute

          to prevail.  In the final analysis, the differing outcomes in the

          two New England states bear witness to the truism that, "[i]n the

          game  of  statutory  interpretation, statutory  language  is  the

          ultimate trump card."  Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d at 699.
                                 _________________________

                                          C
                                          C

                    The Tribe has a fallback position.   It maintains that,

          even if  we give  full force  and  effect to  section 16(b),  the

          Gaming Act controls because  it is "specifically made applicable"

          within Maine.  In its most primitive form, this thesis embodies a

          contention  that because  the  Tribe satisfies  the Gaming  Act's

          general   definitional  requirement     federal  recognition  and

          governmental  power    a  court can  infer  Congress's intent  to

          bestow the  benefices of  the Gaming  Act upon  the  Tribe.   The

          problem  with this  contention is  that it  entirely  ignores the

          Settlement Act.  Once  that flaw is revealed, it  becomes readily

          apparent  that the Tribe's contention is no more than a back-door

          effort   to   reintroduce   the   notion   of   implied   repeal.

          Consequently, we reject it.

                                          14

                    In a  related vein, the Tribe postulates  that the very

          comprehensiveness  of the Gaming Act is itself enough to meet the

          demands of section 16(b).  This asseveration depends heavily upon

          the correctness of the  proposition that the rule of  Marcello v.
                                                                ________

          Bonds,  349 U.S.  302  (1955), permits  minimal particularity  of
          _____

          expression  to satisfy savings clauses like section 16(b).  We do

          not believe that the proposition withstands scrutiny.

                    In   Marcello,  a   provision  of   the  Administrative
                         ________

          Procedure Act (APA) stipulated that statutes which purport either

          to supersede or modify the APA's judicial review modalities  must

          do so  "expressly."   See  id.  at 305  (quoting  APA    12,  now
                                ___  ___

          codified at  5  U.S.C.    559).   A  later  Congress enacted  the

          Immigration  and Nationality Act of 1952 (I&N Act).  Although the

          I&N  Act did not override the APA's judicial review modalities in

          so many  words, the  Supreme Court  concluded  that the  neoteric

          statute's  deportation  procedure superseded  the  APA's judicial

          review  modalities because (1) the presence  in the I&N Act of an

          extensive  review scheme,  similar  in material  respects to  the

          APA's review mechanisms, would otherwise be rendered meaningless,

          and  (2) the  I&N Act  contained an  explicit provision  that the

          procedure which  it prescribed "shall  be the sole  and exclusive

          procedure for determining  the deportability of  an alien."   See
                                                                        ___

          Marcello,  349 U.S. at 308-09.  These factors, together with some
          ________

          instructive legislative history, formed the basis for the Court's

          determination   that  the  subsequent  Congress  had  "expressly"

                                          15

          superseded  the APA's  judicial review  modalities in  respect to

          deportation.3  Id. at 310.
                         ___

                    The Tribe's  reliance on Marcello  is mislaid.   To  be
                                             ________

          sure,  the Gaming Act, like the I&N  Act, is a statute of general

          applicability that arguably constructs a comprehensive regulatory

          regime for a defined  subject.4  But this single  similarity does

          not  provide  a  particularly  persuasive  parallel  for  present

                              
          ____________________

               3The Court wrote that it could not

                    ignore the background of the 1952 immigration
                    legislation, its laborious adaptation  of the
                    Administrative    Procedure   Act    to   the
                    deportation process, the  specific points  at
                    which  deviations   from  the  Administrative
                    Procedure  Act were made,  the recognition in
                    the  legislative  history  of  this  adaptive
                    technique and of  the particular  deviations,
                    and  the direction  in the  statute  that the
                    methods  therein prescribed shall be the sole
                    and   exclusive  procedure   for  deportation
                    proceedings.

          Marcello, 349 U.S. at 310.  The Court then concluded:
          ________

                    Unless  we  are  to require  the  Congress to
                    employ   magical   passwords   in  order   to
                    effectuate    an     exemption    from    the
                    Administrative  Procedure  Act, we  must hold
                    that the present statute expressly supersedes
                    the hearing provisions of that Act.

          Id.
          ___

               4The  State argues that the  Gaming Act is not comprehensive
          in  the conventional sense.  This argument is not totally without
          merit; the Gaming Act  has no application  to tribes that do  not
          seek  and  attain formal  federal  recognition, see  25  U.S.C.  
                                                          ___
          2703(5),  tribes that  do  not exercise  jurisdiction over  their
          territories,  see  id.    2710(b)(1)  &  (d)(3)(A), tribal  lands
                        ___  ___
          located  in  states  that  proscribe  Class  II  and  III  gaming
          activities  altogether, see id.   2710(b)(1)  & (d)(1), or tribal
                                  ___ ___
          lands on  which  federal  law  pretermits  gambling,  see  id.   
                                                                ___  ___
          2710(b)(1).  We need not probe the point too deeply.  For present
          purposes,  we simply  assume, favorably  to the  Tribe, that  the
          Gaming  Act,  like  the  I&N  Act,  constitutes  a  comprehensive
          regulatory regime.

                                          16

          purposes.      Here, the  Tribe points to nothing  of consequence

          beyond  the comprehensive nature of  the Gaming Act.   Unlike the

          deportation  procedure delineated  in  the I&N  Act, none  of the

          provisions  of the Gaming Act will be rendered meaningless if the

          Act  excludes Maine.  Moreover,  unlike in the  I&N Act, Congress

          has  not declared  the  Gaming Act  to  be "exclusive"  of  other

          potentially applicable legislation.   And, finally, unlike in the

          legislative history of the  I&N Act, there are no  signposts writ

          large in the debate over the Gaming Act.  These differences serve

          both to distinguish the instant case from Marcello and to put the
                                                    ________

          holding of that case  into perspective.  See Great  Northern, 208
                                                   ___ _______________

          U.S. at 466 (explaining  that the comprehensiveness of subsequent

          legislation,  without more, will not  satisfy a savings clause in

          an earlier statute).  The point is not that Congress was derelict

          in employing  one particular collocation  of words as  opposed to

          another, but, rather, that it chose  not to include in the Gaming

          Act any indication that it meant to make the statute specifically
              ___

          applicable within Maine.5

                    Though their  arguments are unavailing  when weighed on

          an evenly calibrated scale, the Tribe seeks to tip the balance by
                              
          ____________________

               5We find puzzling the  Tribe's reliance on a line  of cases,
          see, e.g. Sims v. CIA, 471 U.S. 159, 167 (1985), decided under an
          ___  ____ ____    ___
          exemption  from  the  disclosure  provisions of  the  Freedom  of
          Information Act,  5 U.S.C.    552(b)(3) (providing  that agencies
          need  not divulge  matters  that are  "specifically exempted"  by
          statute), to support its ipse dixit that Congress need only enact
                                   ____ _____
          a comprehensive statute to mute the  call of section 16(b).  That
          exemption merely incorporates by reference the secrecy provisions
          of  other   statutes,  and,   unlike  section  16(b),   plays  no
          discernible role in construing  the application of a subsequently
          enacted statute.

                                          17

          altering the calibration.   To this end, it  invites us to depart

          from the  usual canons  of construction  and chart  the statutory

          interface between the Gaming Act and the Settlement Act by resort

          to  a  special interpretive  preference  that  the law  sometimes

          accords to Indian tribes.  See, e.g., Amoco Prod'n Co. v. Village
                                     ___  ____  ________________    _______

          of Gambell, 480 U.S.  531, 555 (1987); South Carolina  v. Catawba
          __________                             ______________     _______

          Indian Band, Inc., 476  U.S. 498, 506 (1986)  (collecting cases);
          _________________

          Rosebud Sioux  Tribe v. Kneip, 430  U.S. 584, 586-87 (1977).   We
          ____________________    _____

          decline the invitation.

                    The  rule of  construction to  which the  Tribe alludes

          reflects  a  strong  federal  interest  in   safeguarding  Indian

          autonomy.  See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux, 430 U.S. at 586-87.  But the
                     ___  ____  _____________

          rule is  apposite  only  when Congress  has  blown  an  uncertain

          trumpet.    If  ambiguity  does   not  loom,  the  occasion   for

          preferential  interpretation never  arises.   See Catawba  Indian
                                                        ___ _______________

          Band,  476  U.S.  at 506;  Rosebud  Sioux,  430  U.S. at  587-88;
          ____                       ______________

          Narragansett  Indian  Tribe,  19 F.3d  at  691.    When, as  now,
          ___________________________

          Congress  has  unambiguously  expressed  its  intent through  its

          choice of statutory language, courts must read the relevant  laws

          according  to  their unvarnished  meaning,  without any  judicial

          embroidery.    So  it  is  here:   since  there  is  no statutory

          ambiguity,  the principle  of  preferential  construction is  not

          triggered.

                                          D
                                          D

                    The Tribe's last argument has a  different spin.  Under

          the Gaming Act, Class II gaming conducted on tribal lands must be

                                          18

          sanctioned by  the National  Indian  Gaming Commission.   See  25
                                                                    ___

          U.S.C.   2710(b).   While this litigation was pending,  the Tribe

          adopted  an ordinance authorizing the conduct  of bingo and other

          Class II gaming activities on its reservation lands and submitted

          this  proposal  to  the  Commission.    The  Commission  asserted

          jurisdiction and granted the request.  The approval took the form

          of  a letter  dated  July 19,  1995,  in which  the  Commission's

          chairman opined that the Gaming Act  applied in Maine.  The Tribe

          asked  the district court to  take judicial notice  of, and defer

          to,  that determination.   See generally  Chevron U.S.A.  Inc. v.
                                     ___ _________  ____________________

          Natural  Resources Defense  Council, Inc.,  467 U.S.  837, 842-43
          _________________________________________

          (1984)  (discussing  deference  due to  agency  interpretations);

          Strickland v. Commissioner,  Me. Dep't of  Human Servs., 48  F.3d
          __________    _________________________________________

          12, 16 (1st Cir.) (similar), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 145 (1995).
                                       _____ ______

          The  district court  demurred.   The  Tribe  assigns error.    We

          discern none.

                    It  is  transpicuously clear  that,  under  Chevron, no
                                                                _______

          deference is due if Congress has spoken directly to the question.

          See Strickland,  48 F.3d at 16.   Here, we read  section 16(b) of
          ___ __________

          the  Settlement Act  as  a clear  and  unambiguous expression  of

          congressional intent.   Furthermore,  in light of  section 16(b),

          the Gaming  Act's failure  to mention  Maine makes that  statute,

          too, compelling evidence of  Congress's intent that it should not

          apply in Maine.6
                              
          ____________________

               6The Tribe  construes the Gaming  Act's silence as  a latent
          ambiguity.   We do not agree.  Given the tenor of the preexisting
          statute,  the sound  of silence  here is  pregnant  with meaning.

                                          19

                    In  this instance,  moreover,  there  is another  valid

          reason  for declining to defer  to the Commission.   Deference is

          appropriate  under  Chevron  only  when an  agency  interprets  a
                              _______

          statute  that it administers.   See CFTC v.  Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
                                          ___ ____     _____

          845 (1986).  Here, the question of the Gaming Act's applicability

          cannot  be addressed  in a  vacuum, and the  Commission, whatever

          else  might   be  its  prerogatives,  does   not  administer  the

          Settlement  Act.   That  role belongs  to  the Secretary  of  the

          Interior, see, e.g., 25 U.S.C.    1725, 1727(a), and has not been
                    ___  ____

          delegated  by  the  Secretary  to  the  Commission.    Though the

          Commission may have expertise in the conduct of gaming activities

          on tribal lands, see,  e.g., Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community
                           ___   ____  ____________________________________

          v. Hope, 16 F.3d 261, 264 (8th Cir. 1994), we cannot take it upon
             ____

          ourselves to assume, without any evidence, that Congress intended

          to  entrust the  Commission with  reconciling the Gaming  Act and

          other statutes in the legislative firmament.

                    If more  were needed   and we do not believe that it is

             we  note that  deference  is  inappropriate when  an  agency's

          conclusion  rests  predominantly  upon  its  reading  of judicial

          decisions.  See, e.g., Director,  OWCP v. General Dynamics Corp.,
                      ___  ____  _______________    ______________________

          980  F.2d 74,  78-79 (1st  Cir.  1992).   In  this instance,  the

          Commission's jurisdictional analysis  depends almost  exclusively

          on  decrypting  and  applying Marcello  and  Narragansett  Indian
                                        ________       ____________________

          Tribe.    As  courts, not  agencies,  have  special  expertise in
          _____
                              
          ____________________

          Taken  in  context,  that silence  logically  denotes  Congress's
          intent  not to make the Gaming Act specifically applicable within
          Maine.

                                          20

          interpreting case law, we  are loath to defer to  a determination

          that amounts  to little more than  the Commission's understanding

          of judicial precedents.

          IV.  CONCLUSION
          IV.  CONCLUSION

                    To recapitulate, the Tribe and the State negotiated the

          accord  that is  now  memorialized in  the  Settlement Act  as  a

          covenant  to  govern  their  future relations.    Maine  received

          valuable consideration  for the accord, including  the protection

          afforded  by section  16(b).   The Tribe  also received  valuable

          consideration, including land,  money, and  recognition.   Having

          reaped  the  benefits,  the  Tribe cannot  expect  the  corollary

          burdens  imposed under  the  Settlement Act  to disappear  merely

          because they have become inconvenient.

                    We need go no further.   We hold that Congress did  not

          make  the Gaming  Act specifically  applicable within  Maine, and

          that, therefore, the Tribe is not entitled to an order compelling

          the State to negotiate a compact for Class III gaming.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed
          ________

                                          21