Court Opinion

ID: 9941219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 06:07:04.846121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:21.725632
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                   February 15, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  No. 361028
                                                                   Ingham Circuit Court
BRANDON MICHAEL WILLIAMS,                                          LC No. 21-000097-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals by right his jury convictions of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC-III) (person at least 13 but under 16 years of age), MCL 750.520d(1)(a), and concealing or
tampering with evidence, MCL 750.483a(6)(b). Defendant was sentenced to serve concurrent
terms of 6 to 15 years’ imprisonment for his CSC-III conviction and 199 days in jail for his
evidence-tampering conviction. We affirm.

                                I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       The victim met defendant through an internet game, where they communicated through
chat boxes. Ultimately, she and defendant became “friends” on the social media website Facebook
and communicated there. She described her relationship with defendant as “[l]ike friends” and not
“more than friends.” When she was 13 years old, the victim packed a bag, snuck out of her house,
and arranged to meet defendant at a nearby middle school. At the middle school, the victim was
picked up by defendant, who was in a black car. Inside the car with defendant were the driver, a
woman defendant referred to as his adoptive mother, and her son. The group drove from the
victim’s home near Grand Rapids, and the victim and defendant were dropped off at a house in
Lansing. The victim learned that she was in Lansing because that was what defendant told her.1

1
 At trial, the driver of the vehicle gave a more specific location of where in Lansing she dropped
off defendant and the victim, describing it as about two blocks east of Pennsylvania Avenue by

                                               -1-
        The victim testified that there were several people in the house. Meanwhile, the victim’s
father had discovered that she was missing. After unsuccessfully searching the local area for the
victim, the father learned from a friend that the victim may have gone away with someone. The
father contacted the police, and a review of the victim’s Facebook messages occurred. Through
Facebook, the father and a police officer contacted defendant, but the victim indicated that she was
responding. The officer testified that he was unable to determine the victim’s location through
their communications. The victim indicated that these contacts caused defendant to be upset with
her, yet he did not make arrangements to take her home.

        After these Facebook contacts, the victim testified that defendant handed her a “blunt” that
smelled like marijuana, and that she took several hits from it. The victim did not think that the
blunt would affect her, but she started to feel dizzy, woozy, nauseated, and as if she was going to
pass out. She went to another part of the room, and defendant joined her and offered to provide
blankets for her to sleep on. She stated that she “blacked out” but remembered feeling excruciating
pain and that defendant’s penis was inside her vagina. On cross-examination, the victim agreed
that she was testifying at trial about details she had not shared at a preliminary examination or
during an examination by a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE).

       The victim testified that, when she woke up, defendant was “spooning” her. They were
asked to leave the house and they went to the driver’s home, where the victim showered and
defendant washed her clothes. The parties disputed whether defendant asked the victim to shower
or whether she asked to take a shower. Defendant agreed that he had asked the victim if she wanted
him to wash her clothing, and he testified that her clothing smelled like she had been around people
who had been smoking.

       According to defendant, he did not have sex with the victim or put his penis in her vagina.
He denied that he used his Facebook account to admit to a friend that he had had sex with the
victim. Rather, defendant explained that other people had access to his account, one of whom had
previously tried to get him in trouble.

        The forensic scientist who compared deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) samples, including the
victim’s SANE swabs, testified that the cells from the victim’s vulvar swab contained both skin
cells and seminal fluid, and that it was “at least 460 sextillion times more likely” that defendant
was a contributor to the DNA profile than another man. Although defendant denied engaging in
sexual intercourse with the then 13-year-old victim, he was convicted as charged.

the highway. Defendant stated that the home had been on Marcus Street. The next day, defendant
and the victim were given a ride approximately 1.5 miles away to the driver’s home, located on
Jewel Street, where they were permitted to shower and do laundry. At the time of trial,
MRE 201(c) and (e) provided that judicial notice may be taken at any stage of a proceeding
regardless of whether there is a request or not. References to a map establish that these locations
are well within Ingham County.

                                                -2-
                        II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

        Defendant’s claims on appeal relate solely to the effectiveness of defendant’s trial counsel.
In a motion before the trial court, defendant sought a new trial or evidentiary hearing on the basis
that defense counsel had provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to impeach the victim with
inconsistent statements she had made during police and forensic interviews regarding the CSC-III
and evidence-tampering charges, (2) stipulating that venue was proper in Ingham County at the
preliminary examination, and (3) failing to challenge improper vouching by the SANE nurse. The
trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial and his motion for an evidentiary hearing in
accordance with People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).2 We conclude
that the trial court properly rejected defendant’s claims.

                                 A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

        A defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of fact and
constitutional law. People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 47; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). The appellate
court “reviews for clear error the trial court’s findings of fact and reviews de novo questions of
constitutional law.” Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, this
Court is definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Swenor,
336 Mich App 550, 563-564; 971 NW2d 33 (2021). When the appellate court engages in de novo
review, the review of the issue occurs without deference to the lower court. People v Bruner, 501
Mich 220, 226; 912 NW2d 514 (2018).

        This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision regarding whether
to hold an evidentiary hearing. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 216-217; 749 NW2d 272
(2008). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable
and principled outcomes. People v Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 722-723; 835 NW2d 399 (2013). “A
trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Id. at 723.

                                    B. LEGAL STANDARDS

       A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to the effective assistance of counsel. US
Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 653; 104 S Ct 2039;
80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984). The United States Supreme Court has observed that the rights to counsel,
due process, and a fair trial are intertwined:

       [T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect
       the fundamental right to a fair trial. The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through
       the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely
       through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel

2
 This Court also denied defendant’s motion for a remand to the trial court that reserved the case
call panel’s right to remand for a hearing. People v Williams, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered April 18, 2023 (Docket No. 361028).

                                                -3-
       Clause[.] [Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 684-685; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed
       2d 674 (1984).]

“In order to obtain a new trial, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.” Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 51
(citations omitted).

        A party asserting ineffective assistance has the burden to establish the factual predicate of
his or her claim. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). A defendant may be
entitled to an evidentiary hearing when that defendant seeks to support an ineffective-assistance
claim with matters outside the record:

               A defendant who wishes to advance claims that depend on matters not of
       record can properly be required to seek at the trial court level an evidentiary hearing
       for the purpose of establishing his claims with evidence as a precondition to
       invoking the processes of the appellate courts except in the rare case where the
       record manifestly shows that the judge would refuse a hearing; in such a case the
       defendant should seek on appeal, not a reversal of his conviction, but an order
       directing the trial court to conduct the needed hearing. [Ginther, 390 Mich at 443-
       444.]

When a defendant moves to remand the matter to the trial court for the development of a factual
record, the motion must be supported by an affidavit or offer of proof addressing the facts to be
established at the hearing. MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a). Although defendant moved for a remand to the
trial court, it was not supported with an affidavit or offer of proof.

                              C. INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS

        Defendant alleges that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to introduce unsworn
statements that the victim made during her previous police and forensic interviews to support his
claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to impeach the victim with
these statements. We disagree.

        There are several valid reasons why defense counsel may decide not to cross-examine a
sexually abused child, including trial strategy, avoidance of the appearance of bullying the victim,
undermining the victim through the testimony of other witnesses, and avoidance of elaboration of
damaging testimony. See People v Gioglio, 296 Mich App 12, 26; 815 NW2d 589 (2012), vacated
in part and remanded on another ground 493 Mich 864; 820 NW2d 922 (2012). Additionally,
counsel need not impeach a witness on each and every contradictory aspect of the witness’s
testimony. People v McFadden, 159 Mich App 796, 800; 407 NW2d 78 (1987). A decision not
to delve into all contradictions may be deemed trial strategy that is not to be second-guessed by
the courts. Id. Although counsel’s failure to impeach a witness may constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel, the evaluation may not occur with the benefit of hindsight. People v Horn,
279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008).

       The right to present a defense pertains only to relevant and material evidence. People v
Danto, 294 Mich App 568, 604; 822 NW2d 600 (2011). And, there is a general prohibition of the

                                                -4-
impeachment of a witness by extrinsic evidence addressing collateral, irrelevant, or immaterial
evidence. MRE 608(b); People v Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 644; 658 NW2d 504 (2003),
overruled in part on other grounds People v Barrera, 500 Mich 14; 892 NW2d 789 (2017).
Evidence is not deemed to be collateral if the facts directly relate to the substantive issues in the
case, such as guilt or innocence, the facts demonstrate bias and interest, or where the witness’s
account of the background and circumstances of a material event would not be mistaken if the
story of the event were true considering the human experience. See People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich
575, 589-590; 640 NW2d 246 (2002); People v Rosen, 136 Mich App 745, 759; 358 NW2d 584
(1984).

       “When a witness claims not to remember making a prior inconsistent statement, he [or she]
may be impeached by extrinsic evidence of that statement.” People v Jenkins, 450 Mich 249, 256;
537 NW2d 828 (1995). “The purpose of extrinsic impeachment evidence is to prove that a witness
made a prior inconsistent statement-not to prove the contents of the statement.” Id. “Extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an
opportunity to explain or deny the same[.]” MRE 613(b).

         In the present case, the victim gave unsworn statements during an interview with the
forensic examiner.3 On appeal, defendant proffers that there was no strategic reason to fail to
present to the jury impeachment evidence of contradictions between the forensic interview and
trial testimony addressing (1) the location of defendant in relationship to the victim when she woke
up, (2) the inability to recall the sexual penetration during the forensic interview, (3) the victim’s
failure to mention blood in her underwear, (4) the victim’s request to take a shower, (5) the victim’s
apparent failure to highlight that she lied about her age, and (6) the victim’s admission to lying to
defendant to get his attention over others.

        However, a review of the record reveals that trial counsel extensively explored the victim’s
contradictions and omissions between her preliminary examination testimony and her trial
testimony. To again highlight the contradictions between the victim’s statements in the forensic
interview and her trial testimony would have been cumulative and redundant and would have
caused trial counsel to appear to be bullying the witness. Gioglio, 296 Mich App at 26. Indeed,
during trial, defense counsel impeached the victim with her preliminary examination testimony.
The trial court advised defense counsel to approach the bench, but the sidebar discussion was not
preserved in the record. When the trial resumed, defense counsel stated to the victim, “[M]y
apologies if I’m coming across in a certain way to you. But let’s just go back and let’s review
again some of your responses about a year ago, okay. Because the version you just gave a few
moments [ago] was very different in 2021, isn’t that true?” The victim affirmatively stated, “Yes,”
acknowledging the contradictions in her statements. A short time later, defense counsel apologized

3
  Appellate defense counsel indicated that the police interview would be submitted. However,
only the forensic interview was submitted for our review. But, counsel only claimed two possible
impeachment events from the police interview, the victim’s failure to mention blood in her
underwear and her claim to be 19 years old. The presence of blood is a collateral matter. And, as
defendant acknowledges in his brief, mistake of age is not a defense to this CSC-III. See People
v Cash, 419 Mich 230; 351 NW2d 822 (1984).

                                                 -5-
for “yelling” at the victim, explaining that her current version of events was a “big surprise.”
Within a few minutes, the trial court requested that counsel approach the bench but the sidebar
discussion again was not delineated in the record. It is apparent from the record that continued
impeachment through the forensic or police interviews may have caused the jury to conclude that
defendant was merely bullying the victim. Id.

        Additionally, when extrinsic evidence is used to impeach a witness, the witness must be
given the opportunity to explain or deny the same. MRE 613(b). If defense counsel impeached
the victim with portions of her forensic interview, the prosecutor may have sought to play the
entire video for the jury which would not have boded well for the defense. In this video, the victim
relayed information that indicated that defendant groomed and manipulated her. The victim
expressed that defendant gave her favorable attention and praise that she did not receive from
others and was concerned, not with the pain she was experiencing and the need for medical
treatment, but with defendant’s anger toward her. While the victim claimed that the blunt she was
given had negative effects on her and her memory, it was equally apparent and plausible from the
forensic interview that the victim declined to give specific details in an attempt to protect
defendant.

        On appeal, defense counsel did not provide evidence that trial counsel was unaware of
evidence pertinent to the trial but merely identified additional opportunities for impeachment that
were not exercised. But, the availability of additional impeachment evidence and the decision not
to delve into all contradictions does not demonstrate ineffective assistance. See McFadden, 159
Mich App at 800. Instead, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 51.
Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance and must provide an affidavit
or offer of proof to warrant the remand for an evidentiary hearing. See Hoag, 460 Mich at 6;
MCR 7.211(C)(1)(ii). He failed to meet this burden, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying his request. Unger, 278 Mich App at 216-217.4

4
  Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach the victim regarding
the conversation that led to washing her clothes and taking a shower. Irrespective of the victim’s
failure to quote the exact conversation with defendant, trial counsel’s questioning of the victim on
cross-examination led to her admission that she was not compelled or forced to take a shower or
have her clothes laundered. Nonetheless, defendant was convicted of the evidence tampering
charge. Record evidence to support a claim of ineffective assistance was not demonstrated. Hoag,
460 Mich at 6. Additionally, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different, Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 51, in light of the DNA evidence despite defendant’s
testimony denying any sexual contact with the victim.

                                                -6-
                                            D. VENUE

       Defendant also asserts that, had defense counsel not stipulated to venue being proper, the
case would have been dismissed at the conclusion of the preliminary examination, and therefore,
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance.5 We disagree.

        This Court reviews de novo the existence of venue in a criminal prosecution. People v
McBurrows, 504 Mich 308, 312; 934 NW2d 748 (2019). “Venue is part of every criminal
prosecution and must be proved by the prosecutor beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Webbs,
263 Mich App 531, 533; 689 NW2d 163 (2004). “The general venue rule is that defendants should
be tried in the county where the crime was committed.” People v Houthoofd, 487 Mich 568, 579;
790 NW2d 315 (2010). However, if an offense is committed on the boundary line between two
counties or within one mile of the county dividing line, it may be prosecuted in either county.
MCL 762.3(1).

        The purpose of a preliminary examination is “to determine whether a felony was committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed it.” People v Yost, 468
Mich 122, 125-126; 659 NW2d 604 (2003). Probable cause requires evidence that is “sufficient
to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief
of the accused’s guilt.” Id. at 126 (quotation marks and citation omitted). An error in the venue
determination at the preliminary examination stage is examined under a harmless error analysis.
Houthoofd, 487 Mich at 593.

        In the present case, defense counsel stipulated to venue for purposes of the preliminary
examination only. At the conclusion of the prosecution’s proofs at trial, defense counsel submitted
that Officer Bradley Hagman merely testified that the victim was located in the city of Lansing,
but he failed to identify an address location in Lansing, Ingham County. Defense counsel moved
for a directed verdict premised on venue, stating that “if there’s no testimony” to address venue,
then dismissal was warranted on that ground. In opposition to this motion, the prosecutor noted
that the victim testified that the offense occurred in Lansing in light of defendant’s representation.

        The trial court determined that there was sufficient testimony that the criminal offenses
occurred in Lansing to submit the issue to the jury. It also noted that to the extent Lansing extended
into other counties, the one-mile rule may apply, see MCL 762.3(1). The trial court also denied
defendant’s motion for a new trial challenging venue, determining that the victim’s belief that she
was taken to Lansing, under these facts, presented sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury
to conclude that venue was proper in Ingham County.

        In light of the record evidence, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not
supported by the record because venue was proper in Ingham County, and counsel was not
ineffective for stipulating to venue at the preliminary examination. At trial, the driver that picked
up the victim from the middle school indicated that she brought the victim and defendant to
Lansing. She specifically testified that she dropped the two off at a home east of Pennsylvania

5
 There is no indication that defendant sought to introduce additional evidence at an evidentiary
hearing to support this claim.

                                                 -7-
Avenue near the freeway. The next day, the driver stated that the victim and defendant appeared
at her home, identifying her address on Jewel Street. She believed that the victim and defendant
apparently walked the estimated 1.5 miles from the drop off location to her home because they
appeared to be out of breath. The driver gave defendant permission to use her home to take
showers and do laundry. Thus, the claim that defendant tampered with evidence by washing the
victim’s clothes and by having the victim take a shower occurred in Lansing located within Ingham
County. Additionally, the victim testified that defendant told her that they were in Lansing. And,
then-Lansing Police Officer Hagman described the locations he visited in Lansing in an attempt to
locate the victim before finding her at the driver’s Jewel Street home. Contrary to trial counsel’s
motion for directed verdict and appellate counsel’s motion for new trial, there was record evidence
to establish that the offenses occurred in Lansing within the confines of Ingham County, such that
venue was proper. Accordingly, the stipulation to venue at the preliminary examination did not
negatively impact the trial and did not demonstrate the requirements of ineffective assistance.

        Defendant’s appellate brief claimed that the “only testimony at trial to establish the location
of the home” was defendant’s representation to the victim that they were in Lansing, and this
information was insufficient to establish venue. This representation is contrary to the trial
testimony wherein two specific locations in Lansing were identified. Because defendant simply
made blanket assertions about a lack of venue evidence, he failed to meet his burden of establishing
the factual predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance. Hoag, 460 Mich at 6.6

        Regardless, even presuming that defense counsel made an unprofessional error by
stipulating to venue when parts of Lansing fall outside Ingham County, this error did not prejudice
defendant under the ineffective-assistance standard. The defendant must also show that “but for
counsel’s deficient performance, a different result would have been reasonably probable.”
Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 56 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A reasonable probability is
“a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 US at 694.
“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v
Richter, 562 US 86, 112; 131 S Ct 770; 178 L Ed 2d 624 (2011) (citation omitted).

       At trial, witnesses testified about the location at which defendant and the victim were
dropped off. Reference to a map establishes that this area is firmly within the boundaries of
Ingham County.7 There is no basis from which to conclude that the prosecution could not or would
not have produced at the preliminary examination the witness who dropped off defendant and the
victim had counsel not stipulated to venue. While it is possible that defendant would not have

6
  Indeed, it appears that defendant’s brief failed to comport with MCR 7.212(C)(6), requiring
disclosure of “[a]ll material facts, both favorable and unfavorable,” that must be “fairly stated
without argument or bias.”
7
  At the time of defendant’s trial, MRE 201(b)(2) provided that facts are subject to judicial notice
if they are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.” MRE 201’s amendment, effective January 1, 2024, would not
alter the result.

                                                 -8-
been bound over had defense counsel not stipulated to venue, such a result is not substantially
likely.

                                          E. VOUCHING

       Defendant submits that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object
when the SANE nurse improperly vouched for the victim’s testimony.8 We disagree.

        The trial court did not clearly err when it found that defense counsel did not provide
ineffective assistance. Furthermore, even if counsel’s performance was deficient, it was not
reasonably probable that a different result would have occurred but for defense counsel’s failure
to challenge this testimony. Defense counsel is not required to make meritless or futile objections.
People v Putman, 309 Mich App 240, 245; 870 NW2d 593 (2015).

        An expert opinion will not be excluded “simply because it concerns the ultimate issue,”
but a physician may not testify about whether a complainant has been sexually assaulted when the
opinion is based only on the doctor’s opinion that the victim told the truth. People v Thorpe, 504
Mich 230, 255; 934 NW2d 693 (2019). Evidence of behavioral patterns in sexually abused
children is admissible to explain to the jury that it is actually consistent with behavior displayed
by abuse victims. Id. at 558. And, testimony that the victim’s behavior was consistent with the
behavior of other child abuse victims is admissible to rebut a challenge to the victim’s credibility.
Id. However, when a defendant does not argue that the victim’s behavior was inconsistent with
that of an abuse victim, an expert improperly vouches for the veracity of a child by testifying that
only a small percentage of children lie about sexual abuse. Id. at 258-259. Accordingly, testimony
that only about 2% to 4% of children lie about sexual abuse is not permissible. Id. at 259.
Similarly, testimony that a doctor diagnosed a child with “probable pediatric sexual abuse” is not
permissible if there was no physical evidence of a sexual assault. Id. at 261-262 (quotation marks
and citation omitted).

        In this case, the SANE nurse testified that a SANE exam took place in “a special room for
that in our hospital, that’s set aside from the Emergency Department.” She explained that
“emergency departments can be really busy and chaotic places, and somebody who has undergone
a trauma such as a sexual assault, we like to remove them from that environment just so it doesn’t,
you know, add to any of their fears.” Additionally, the room was “under lock and key” so that
only SANE nurses could enter. The following exchange then took place:

               Q. And is that part of your treatment protocol for this type of diagnosis
       that’s come in?

               A. Yes.

       The nurse did not testify that the victim was a victim of sexual assault; rather, she testified
about the examination process generally. The SANE nurse did not testify that she diagnosed the

8
  Consistent with defendant’s venue argument, defendant did not seek to introduce new evidence
at an evidentiary hearing to support this claim.

                                                 -9-
victim with sexual assault or sexual abuse, and she did not opine that the victim had been sexually
assaulted. The SANE nurse’s general testimony is patently different than the impermissible
testimony addressed in Thorpe. Accordingly, defense counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance because an objection to this testimony would have been futile. Putman, 309 Mich App
at 245.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Anica Letica
                                                            /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                            /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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