Court Opinion

ID: 9640119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:57:45.273648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:26.601831
License: Public Domain

RICKHOFF, Justice,
concurring.
I must concur in the majority opinion. I write only to urge the legislature to abandon our paternalistic “accomplice witness rule.” See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14 (Vernon 1979). Pursuant to this rule, “[a] *861conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed.” Id. This is a rule that never found acceptance at common law. See 7 John HenRY Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2056 (Chad-bourn rev. ed.1978). From this record, one can surmise that it was the potential application of this rule that, in part, resulted in the interminable delay in preparing this case for trial and the resulting injustice of either an innocent man confined or, as this jury found, a guilty man now freed.
Although many states, including Texas, eventually adopted the accomplice witness rule by statute, it has apparently never been the majority rule in the United States. See id. (noting that at one time nearly half of the states had enacted some form of an accomplice witness statute). In recent decades, many jurisdictions have abandoned their statutory accomplice witness rules. By my count, only fourteen jurisdictions other than Texas still retain such a rule by statute. See AlaCode § 12-21-222 (1997); Alasea Stat. § 12.45.020 (Miehie 1996); ArkCode Ann. § 16-89-lll(e) (Miehie 1987); CalPenal Code § 1111 (West 1985); GaCode Ann. § 24-4-8 (1995); Idaho Code § 19-2117 (1997); Iowa Code Ann. § 813.2, Rule 20 (West Supp.1997); Minn.Stat. Ann. § 634.04 (West 1983); Nev.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 175.291 (Miehie 1997); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.22 (McKinney 1992); N.D. Cent.Code § 29-21-14 (1991); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 742 (West 1992); Or.Rev.Stat. § 136.440 (1995); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-22-8 (Miehie 1988). Even among jurisdictions that retain the rule, we are alone in the strictness with which we apply it. Only in Texas is a person indicted for the same offense as the accused considered to be an accomplice as a matter of law. See Smith v. State, 897 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (Mansfield, J., dissenting to refusal of State’s petition for discretionary review). At other times, our courts seem willing to find the smallest detail sufficient to abandon the rule. See Graham v. State, 643 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).
Moreover, this rule wrongly intrudes upon the jury’s province. We routinely ask jurors to resolve life’s most difficult issues in criminal cases. See H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 928 S.W.2d 197, 204 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, writ granted) (Rickhoff, J., dissenting). Particularly inconsistent is our trusting juries to have the most open sentencing authority yet restricting their view of the witnesses. Issues of credibility and weight of testimony have been deemed particularly appropriate for jury determination. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1966) (providing that “[t]he jury, in all cases, is the exclusive judge of the facts proved, and of the weight to be given to the testimony”). In this case there was a vehicle full of accomplice witnesses. What if there were a bus full? Should a dozen accomplice witnesses testifying identically be ignored? There is no rule that the jury must regard highly all traditionally unsuspeet witnesses such as clergy. In our culture, jurors are sophisticated enough to discern that the highest to the lowest members of society are capable of telling in court a truth or a lie. The entire purpose of impaneling a jury is for them to determine the facts based upon the weight that should be accorded the testimony of all the witnesses. If the concern is that evaluating the credibility of an accomplice is too difficult for a jury, the accomplice witness rule provides no solution. As one commentator aptly noted, “[T]he legislative creation of a rule of law, by introducing detailed refinements of definition to be applied by the jurors, has merely tended to confuse them with sounds of words, and to place in the hands of counsel a set of juggling formulas with which to practice upon the chance of obtaining a new trial.” See Wig-more, supra, § 2058.
In the interest of justice, it is time for our legislature to abandon our statutory accomplice witness rule and trust local juries to evaluate the credibility of all the witnesses appearing before them.