Court Opinion

ID: 9604769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:26:37.408819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:23.899401
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF WAKATSUKI, J.
I respectfully dissent.
In my opinion, the language of 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a) (13) (i) (E) is of a clearly mandatory nature. The regulation says; “Prompt recovery of an overpayment: A State must take one of the following three actions by the end of the quarter following the quarter .. . .” (emphasis added). The plain and natural meaning of this provision is that if the State doesn’t take action by the end of the relevant quarter, it is barred from recouping.
I recognize that in certain cases even “[s]eemingly absolute time periods for administrative action [are] considered mere guides for [conduct].” Perry v. Planning Commission, 62 Haw. 666, 675, 619 P.2d 95, 103 (1980). As the majority notes, however, such time periods are mandatory if “disregard of the relevant provision would injuriously affect public interests or private rights.” Id.
Here, Ms. Cudal was in no way responsible for the improper payment. To require her to pay back the benefits she received a significant time ago, and more likely than not already spent, penalizes the innocent and not the offender. Furthermore, such a harsh requirement offends the public’s sense of fairness as well. To allow the state to recoup after the deadline is to encourage careless *348administration of the AFDC program. More significantly, the burden of properly administering the AFDC program is shifted onto the recipients which is not the intent of this program. In addition, the recipients must now be responsible for the administrator’s stale claims of error. Finally, there are other regulations that are designed to protect the recipient from the potentially harsh consequences of recoupment. See e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(13)(i)(A)(2) (mandating that recoupment not leave the recipient with resources of less than 90% of the minimum monthly entitlement). Equitable administration of the program requires prompt recoupment of overpayments.
The majority is correct in concluding that federal regulations do not bar recoupment of the food stamps in this case. Nevertheless, I believe recovery of the food stamps could be barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The majority’s reliance on the fact that Ms. Cudal was not legally entitled to the food stamps and the federal regulation does not prohibit delayed recovery is misplaced. The crucial issue underlying equitable estoppel is whether delayed recoupment of food stamps erroneously given to Ms. Cudal through no fault of her own would create a manifest injustice. Cf. Filipo v. Chang, 62 Haw. 626, 618 P.2d 295 (1980). A strong claim of estoppel would exist, for example, if Ms. Cudal had spent the food stamps and recoupment at this time would leave her without means to purchase adequate food. The record before us and the circuit court’s findings of fact, however, are not adequate to support such a conclusion. I would therefore remand for further proceedings to resolve the estoppel claim.