Court Opinion

ID: 9771036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:29:35.96987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:56.793005
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
concurring in part/dissenting in part.
I concur in the Majority Opinion as regards jury selection errors and error in using the word “recommend” to describe the jury’s role in setting the death penalty. I dissent insofar as it holds there were no other substantial errors requiring reversal. There are four other assignments of error which should have been sustained.
I. CHANGE OF VENUE
This is another case involving a gruesome murder in a sparsely populated, rural county, with high visibility coverage of the details. “The grisly stabbing death of a 75-year old neighbor” was front-page news in the local newspaper, the “Troublesome Creek Times, Voice of Knott County.” A complete account of Morton’s statement to the police blaming Thomas, with extensive quotations, was published on the day they were indicted, and press coverage followed the progress of the ease through the courts.
On January 28, 1988, the Petition for Change of Venue based on this pretrial publicity was overruled. The required affidavits stated the accused could not be afforded a fair trial. Seven articles from the Troublesome Creek Times were attached to the motion. The argument was that the newspaper accounts relied upon Morton’s version of what happened, and jurors would be more inclined to believe it to be true when they heard the story repeated at trial. The court stated counsel could renew the motion after voir dire examination.
The voir dire revealed that all but two of 67 prospective jurors who were questioned on the record were knowledgeable about this case: had read or heard about it through the media or talk in the community, or both. One prospective juror stated that “everybody” had heard about the case and another that many he had talked to thought the two defendants “had done it.” Juror Larry Dixon repeated the details of the crime, a complete picture, from what he had heard and read.
Of the 67 prospective jurors, the trial court struck 24 for cause because they admitted they could not be fair, or expressed an opinion based on pre-trial publicity. Defense counsel unsuccessfully moved to strike ten more jurors for cause on grounds that they admitted they had read the details of this case in the paper. This included two of the jurors who actually sat on this case, Marvis Short and Helen Ratliff.
Notwithstanding that voir dire confirmed the pervasive nature of the pre-trial publicity, and the need for a change of venue, when defense counsel renewed its motion for a *262change of venue at the end of voir dire, the motion was overruled. What is the point in telling the defense it can renew the motion after voir dire, if, when the answers on voir dire confirm the need for a change of venue, the motion is nevertheless overruled?
Failure to change venue was an abuse of discretion in the circumstances. The case should be reversed on this ground and the trial court directed to grant a change of venue for the next trial.
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961), involved a jury permeated by newspaper publicity in circumstances remarkably similar to the present one. The United States Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction for failure to grant a change of venue, stating the defendant was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury. The Court held the fact that it is ultimately possible to seat a jury of citizens who disclaim knowing or intentional bias does not resolve the problem, nor cure the error:
“Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind.” 366 U.S. at 724, 81 S.Ct. at 1643.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965), recognizes a showing of actual prejudice is unnecessary if the “procedure employed by the state involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process.”
Our Kentucky Constitution, See. 11, requires “trial by an impartial jury,” and, to insure it, it requires “the general assembly may provide by a general law for a change of venue ... to the most convenient county in which a fair trial can be obtained.” The General Assembly has so provided in KRS 452.210-.220, and the time is past due for us to take this constitutional provision seriously and insist it be carried out. Certainly, it is much easier now to move cases from one county to another than it was 200 years ago when the right to trial by an “impartial jury” was first guaranteed by our Kentucky Constitution. If anything, there is more reason now, rather than less reason, to demand trial judges move a ease from a community where the circumstances of the offense have been widely reported on and discussed. The constitutional guarantee of a neutral jury means one that will decide the case on the evidence presented in open court rather than the knowledge and opinions that the jurors bring in with them to court, even if the jurors are willing to disclaim such knowledge and opinions.
We should direct a change of venue for retrial of this case.
II. LIMITING CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MORTON, THE KEY PROSECUTION WITNESS
Cross-examination was limited in two ways: (1) the trial court refused to allow defense counsel to identify Morton’s previous juvenile adjudications as burglary convictions, and (2) the trial court unduly restricted defense counsel’s cross-examination into the circumstances surrounding Morton’s plea of guilty.
First, with reference to suppressing the evidence Morton had on two previous occasions been convicted of burglary:
Obviously impeachment on grounds of pri- or conviction of a felony has nothing to do with the issue before us. See KRE 609 and Commonwealth v. Richardson, Ky., 674 S.W.2d 515 (1984). Indeed, unlike Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d), in Kentucky evidence of juvenile adjudications are inadmissible to impeach a witness even if the crime is the equivalent of a felony.
However, the point of this cross-examination was not to impeach Morton’s credibility by proof he was a convicted felon; it was to disprove critical facts asserted' in Morton’s testimony, to wit: that Thomas took the lead in this enterprise and Morton was a relatively blameless juvenile accomplice. Since Morton had been shielded from having to identify his adjudications, the prosecutor could argue, and did argue, that Thomas planned these crimes and was the principal perpetrator; that Morton was only a boy whom Thomas had led astray. A reasonable juror might have received a significantly different impression of Morton’s credibility, and of the extent of his participation, had counsel been permitted to identify Morton’s previous adjudications.
*263As stated in Sparks v. Commonwealth, 193 Ky. 180, 235 S.W. 767, 770 (1921), the fact that these offenses could not be identified under the rule related to impeachment for conviction of a crime does not “exempt[] a witness from interrogation in regard to circumstances and facts which, when developed, will disclose his interest in the controversy, his motives and prejudices, with the view of enabling the jury to place a proper estimate on his testimony.”
The key case on this issue is Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), holding that refusal to allow a defendant to cross-examine a key prosecution witness to show his probation status following an adjudication of juvenile delinquency denied the defendant his constitutional right to confront the witness, notwithstanding the state’s policy protecting anonymity of juvenile offenders. The question here is the reliability of the witness’ testimony regarding certain specified facts. This evidence was relevant to discredit specific testimony regarding the relative culpability of Morton and Thomas without regard to its admissibility under the rule related to impeachment by proof of conviction of a crime.
For similar reasons, the trial court erred in excluding cross-examination as to the details of the discussions between Witness Morton and his attorney regarding the plea negotiations in his case. Morton pled guilty before Thomas was tried, and the question was to what extent Morton was testifying out of conscience and to what extent his testimony was influenced by the deal he had made. Morton’s testimony was that his reason for confessing, and then testifying, was remorse rather than escaping punishment. Evidence regarding the details of his attorney’s rather extensive plea negotiations as conveyed to Morton may well have tended to refute this claim. The counsel he had received in making this deal may have had a direct bearing on the testimony he now offered against Thomas, and his plea of guilty obviated any need for further consideration of the attorney/client privilege. This was legitimate cross-examination under Davis v. Alaska, supra. Also, it qualifies as having denied the defendant “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,” as discussed in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986).
III. ERROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THOMAS TO IDENTIFY MORTON’S PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS FOR BURGLARY AT THE PENALTY STAGE
This evidence was offered to show that Morton was a seasoned criminal in the same context as Thomas, i.e., two prior burglary convictions, and since Morton got a deal for 30 years, the death penalty for Thomas would represent disparity in sentencing.
Defense counsel argued that the identification of Morton’s juvenile adjudications as burglary was necessary to rebut the prosecution’s closing argument at the guilt phase that these crimes never would have occurred if the appellant had not “led Morton into this burglary” and had not led “this young man astray.” Counsel further argued that since the jury was “going to receive evidence that Mr. Thomas committed two prior burglaries,” the jury should know that Morton also previously committed two burglaries. While disproportionate sentencing is not a statutory mitigating factor specifically enumerated in KRS 532.025(2)(b), when the evidence relates to a co-defendant, such evidence should be admitted. First, it is a reasonably implied corollary to statutory mitigator # 5:
“The defendant was an accomplice in a capital offense committed by another person and his participation in the capital offense was relatively minor_”
Secondly, KRS 532.025(2), in covering mitigating circumstances which the jury may consider, does not confine mitigation to the enumerated mitigating circumstances, but calls for consideration of “any mitigating circumstances.”
Finally, the fact that KRS 532.075(3)(c) requires the Supreme Court, on review of a death penalty case, to consider “whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,” strongly suggests the probity of evidence of the sentencing disposition of a confederate as mitigating evidence.
*264IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S VERDICT FORM
Although this error was not preserved, it is one that should be addressed because this case is being reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The only place on the forms of verdict provided to the jury at the penalty phase to write in its finding that “aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist in this case” was on the same verdict forms (Nos. 3 and 4) which, when completed, provided for confinement in the penitentiary for either (1) life without benefit of probation or parole until the defendant has served a minimum of twenty-five (25) years (LWOP/25) or (2) the death sentence. There was no way to complete and sign either of the verdict forms finding an aggravating circumstance without fixing an aggravated penalty.
KRS 532.030(1) covers the range of penalties available “when a person is convicted of a capital offense,” and in addition to death or LWOP/25, it provides for lesser sentencing options of “a sentence of life, or to a term of not less than twenty (20) years,” as authorized sentences.
This is not at all clear from the verdict forms provided, although it is contradicted by Instruction No. 1, “Authorized Sentences.” The potential that the jury was misled by the verdict form remains unresolved. Cf. Franks v. State, Ok.Crim., 636 P.2d 361, 366-67 (1981), where the court decided that “the act of using the death sentence verdict form to indicate [the jury’s] findings could have resulted in a failure to fully consider mitigating circumstances and led to an erroneous recommendation of the death sentence.”
The verdict forms used here conformed to those prescribed in 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal), Sec. 12.10 (1993 ed.), but if the verdict forms are misleading, it is no legal answer to say it was copied out of Cooper’s book, and it serves no purpose to perpetuate this abuse. There is no reason why separate verdict forms should not be provided: (1) one upon which the jury would write in whether and what aggravating circumstances it has found, which duly notes “the finding of an aggravating circumstance authorizes but does not require an aggravated sentence of confinement in the penitentiary for life without benefit of probation or parole for a minimum of 25 years or death,” and (2) two more separate, different forms for the jury to execute if they elect either LWOP/25 or death.
Otherwise the jury has been funnelled into fixing one of the aggravated penalties, rather than retaining the option to fix a lesser penalty.
COMBS, J., joins this opinion. STEPHENS, C.J., joins parts II and III of this opinion.