Court Opinion

ID: 9586082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:06:58.948653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:20.083930
License: Public Domain

EASTAUGH, Justice,
with whom CARPENETI, Justice, joins, dissenting.
This court holds that the superior court erred. As a remedy, it reverses Raphael’s conviction and remands for a new trial. I disagree with that result, and therefore dissent. Although the superior court’s acts cannot be condoned, I would not reverse outright, but remand to determine whether Raphael’s attorney’s failure to object was a tactical decision.
The proper result turns on our analysis of the plain error doctrine. Raphael’s trial attorney did not object to the procedure the superior court followed in jailing I.W. The state argues here, as it did before the court of appeals, that Raphael’s failure to object could have been a tactical decision precluding a finding of plain error. The state theorizes that Raphael could have hoped that I.W.’s incarceration would make her hostile to the prosecution and cause her to slant her testimony in Raphael’s favor.
The court of appeals unanimously agreed that there was no plain error. That court wrote:
One element of plain error is that the defendant must show that there was no apparent tactical reason to withhold an objection. See Potts v. State, 712 P.2d 385, 394 n. 11 (Alaska App.1985). Here, the record reveals a reasonable possibility that Raphael’s attorney withheld objection for tactical reasons. The defense attorney might reasonably have anticipated that [I.W.], if she remained in jail until she testified, might be feeling substantial antagonism toward the state by the time she took the stand at Raphael’s trial, and that consequently [I.W.] would slant her testimony against the state to retaliate for her perceived ill-treatment. In other words, Raphael had a plausible tactical reason for letting [I.W.] languish in jail for as long as possible. This being so, Raphael cannot claim plain error now.[1]
This court rejects the state’s argument because, the court reasons, nothing in the record shows that Raphael’s attorney knew of the nature of the ex parte hearing.2 The court notes that the state did not demonstrate, although asked by us to do so, that *1017the record contained any evidence that the defense attorney “knew of the nature of the ex parte hearing and yet deliberately chose not to object. To the contrary, the record shows that the trial court did not fully inform Raphael’s attorney of the nature or content of the hearing.”3
Certainly the superior court did not fully reveal to defense counsel what had occurred. But what the superior court did reveal should have set off alarms for experienced defense counsel, inevitably triggering further inquiry. Counsel could have asked the court to elaborate, requested a brief recess, listened to the tape recording of the ex parte proceeding, or asked the prosecutor to explain what had happened. That counsel made no inquiry on the record permits a reasonable inference that defense counsel already knew enough to think that I.W.’s incarceration might provide Raphael a tactical advantage that would be lost if Raphael moved for a mistrial or sought some other remedy.4
Of course, that is not the only permissible explanation for counsel’s silence. Possibly counsel was just not alert to the potential implications of the superior court’s inadequate explanation. But I read the explanation, despite its patent inadequacy, to be the sort that would provoke prompt inquiry from experienced and capable defense counsel. That there was none on the record makes a tactical choice more probable.
The record in this case does not resolve this question.5 Its silence is consistent with both possibilities. If counsel made a deliberate choice, it is unlikely he would have memorialized the full extent of his knowledge on the record. I think substantial knowledge is most consistent with counsel’s and the record’s silence. If there was a deliberate tactical choice, the failure to preserve a claim of error is fatal to Raphael’s appeal.6 The court of appeals gives three policy reasons for this rule: (1) a defendant should not be permitted to switch his tactics after an unfavorable outcome, (2) a tactical decision not to object by defense counsel is an indication that prejudice to the defendant is unlikely, and (3) the lack of an objection precludes the trial court from taking measures to correct the error.7
Therefore, in my view the better course is to remand to establish a record in this case about what defense counsel knew. That will permit a reasoned determination about whether there was a deliberate choice, and therefore, whether there was plain error which we may review. The court’s remedy, reversal of the conviction and remand for new trial, is premature.
My view regarding the appropriate relief on remand in part reflects Raphael’s efforts to set aside his conviction. In oral argument to this court, his appellate attorney revealed that Raphael has applied for post-conviction *1018relief,8 and that a deposition had been or would be taken from Raphael’s trial attorney to support Raphael’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I am not suggesting that Raphael’s only remedy for I.W.’s incarceration lies in an ineffective assistance claim for post-conviction relief. But because the critical facts — what defense counsel knew and was told — have been or will be revealed in the record of another superior court proceeding, our reversal today is premature and may be proved to have been wrong. Indeed, the dispositive facts may already have been preserved. And if they have not, delay in determining facts can be avoided by requiring that the remand and post-conviction relief proceedings be consolidated and by imposing strict deadlines for taking counsel’s deposition.

. Raphael v. State, Mem. Op. & J. No. 3799 at 11-12, 1998 WL 191159 (Alaska App., April 22, 1998).

. See Slip Op. at 28.

. See id.

. Even before the court told defense counsel that it had incarcerated I.W., defense counsel asked the court the following question: "What is the status of the children and [I.W.], what's going on with that?” The prosecutor had also told the court that he had spoken with defense counsel about I.W.’s daughter's placement with DFYS. This suggests that defense counsel may have already learned at least something about I.W.’s incarceration before trial resumed that day. The state did not call I.W. to testify until the next day. After defense counsel finished cross-examining I.W., the prosecutor asked the court to "keep her under ice until this afternoon” because she might be needed for rebuttal. The superior court agreed. Defense counsel again raised no objection.

.That does not mean the facts have not been preserved. As I note below, they may already have been preserved in Raphael's post-conviction relief proceeding.

. See Henry v. State, 861 P.2d 582, 589 (Alaska App.1993) (stating court would not find plain error when there appeared to be tactical reason to withhold objection); Robison v. State, 763 P.2d 1357, 1358 (Alaska App.1988) (noting that strategic reasons for foregoing remedy precluded finding of plain error or ineffective counsel); Potts v. State, 712 P.2d 385, 394 n. 11 (Alaska App.1985) (noting that finding of plain error is virtually equivalent to finding of ineffective counsel: one will rarely exist absent the other, and rarely will either be found if counsel’s actions were tactical); Barry v. State, 675 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Alaska App.1984) (stating that plain error is rarely found where counsel may have had strategic reasons for conduct).

. See Clemans v. State, 680 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Alaska App.1984).

. See Alaska R.Crim. P. 35.1.