Court Opinion

ID: 9353124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 22:02:56.30423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:45.398449
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                   2023 IL App (4th) 210037-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                          FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                NO. 4-21-0037                            January 10, 2023
not precedent except in the                                                            Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                                      4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                    IN THE APPELLATE COURT                               Court, IL

                                             OF ILLINOIS

                                         FOURTH DISTRICT

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )      Appeal from the
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                                )      Circuit Court of
             v.                                                 )      Coles County
  DEONTE T. MOORE,                                              )      No. 18CF306
             Defendant-Appellant.                               )
                                                                )      Honorable
                                                                )      James R. Glenn,
                                                                )      Judge Presiding.

                  PRESIDING JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
                  Justices Zenoff and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

 ¶1       Held: (1) It was not error for the trial court to consider defendant’s answers in a bond
                report and to a pretrial services officer as aggravating despite the report not being
                a source of information mentioned in section 5-4-1(a) the Unified Code of
                Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a) (2020)); the court did not abuse its discretion by
                treating the answers as an accurate source of information regarding defendant’s past
                criminal activity.

                  (2) The trial court did not treat as aggravating defendant’s failure to assist in the
                  presentencing investigation or his failure to make a statement in allocution and thus
                  did not violate defendant’s fifth amendment rights (see U.S. Const., amend. V).

                  (3) The record does not show defense counsel provided ineffective assistance to
                  defendant by misstating the number of defendant’s children, by failing to seek the
                  application of a newly applicable form of a factor in mitigation, or by failing to
                  subpoena a witness to testify to defendant’s relationship with his children.

                  (4) No cumulative error or deprivation of rights occurred.
¶2             Defendant, Deonte T. Moore, pleaded guilty to one count of armed robbery (720

ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2018)). The trial court sentenced him to a term of 12 years’ imprisonment

and 3 years’ mandatory supervised release.

¶3             On appeal, defendant argues he was deprived of a fair sentencing hearing for four

reasons. One, the trial court improperly considered in aggravation that he had a history of prior

criminality when, he contends, no reliable evidence existed he had been convicted of anything.

Two, as a matter of plain error, the trial court violated his fifth amendment rights (see U.S. Const.,

amend. V) by treating as aggravating his failure to participate in the presentencing investigation

and his failure to make a statement in allocution. Three, defense counsel was ineffective for

(a) failing to tell the court defendant had two children, not one; (b) failing to ask the court to apply

the newly applicable version of the factor in mitigation relating to the effect of incarceration on a

defendant’s children (see Pub. Act. 101-471, § 5 (eff. Jan.1, 2020) (amending 730 ILCS

5/5-5-3.1)); 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(18) (West 2020)); and (c) failing to present evidence a longer

sentence would adversely affect those children. Four, the cumulative effect of these flaws in the

sentencing process deprived defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. We affirm.

¶4                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶5             The Mattoon police arrested defendant on May 31, 2018. According to the affidavit

of the arresting officer, the police responded to a call to an apartment on 21st Street in Mattoon.

Occupants of the apartment reported, “[S]everal black males, all armed with firearms, unlawfully

entered the apartment and proceeded to beat the resident [(elsewhere identified as Anthony Sims)]

while demanding money and drugs.” The perpetrators took cash and cannabis. Sims “suffered

abrasions and bruising during the incident.” As the perpetrators left the apartment, one “turned and

fired two (2) rounds at a female who followed them out.”

                                                 -2-
¶6             Approximately 12 hours after the incident, the police took defendant into custody.

After he received Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), defendant

told the interviewing officer he knew the other perpetrators were planning an armed robbery, and

he had agreed to drive them to the targeted apartment. He claimed he remained in the car during

the robbery and did nothing more until the other perpetrators reentered the vehicle. He further told

the officer he had seen one perpetrator fire shots at the female victim. He admitted he received

stolen cannabis for his role in the robbery.

¶7             On June 1, 2018, a pretrial services officer (PTSO) prepared a pretrial services

evaluation form. The form included a checklist of risk factors, one of which was, “Adult criminal

history includes at least one misdemeanor or felony conviction.” The PTSO placed a check next

to this this factor, adding a handwritten note: “([Defendant] Reports Cook Co Crim Trespass, poss

of cannabis[.)]”

¶8             Defendant completed a bond report form, which was appended to the evaluation

form. In a section of the form captioned “Prison,” defendant checked “Yes” in response to the

question, “Have you ever been to the Department of Corrections [(DOC)]?” He checked “No” to

the question, “As a juvenile?” and checked “Yes” to the question, “As an Adult?” He reported the

relevant “County/State” as “Cook County,” the “Date of Sentence” as “August,” and the “Offense”

as “Being in abanded [sic] building Trepassing [sic] and Smoking some weed.” Defendant, who

was born on September 27, 1996, and who was thus 21 years old on the day of the incident,

reported he began using “drugs/alcohol” at age 13. His last use of cannabis was on the day of the

incident. He reported being married to and living with Keywana Torry⸻who was a

codefendant⸻and supporting their son.

¶9             At defendant’s initial bond hearing, counsel represented:

                                               -3-
              “[Defendant] resides in Charleston with his wife and one-year-old

              child. He was about to begin a job at RuffaloCODY’s this coming

              Monday. He has no current income. He last worked about two

              months ago.”

The State argued for a high bond based on “the extreme danger to the public that [defendant]

represents,” given “the recent *** conviction out of Cook County” and defendant’s “minimal

connection with Coles County.” The court set bond at $200,000.

¶ 10          On June 29, 2018, defense counsel filed a motion to reduce defendant’s bond in

which counsel represented:

              “3. Defendant has no prior felony convictions. Defense counsel has

              not yet received discovery to confirm his criminal history through

              LEADS [(Law Enforcement Agencies Data System)]. Defendant

              reports he made a mistake while completing his pretrial evaluation

              and incorrectly reported he had been to the Illinois [DOC].

                                              ***

              6. Defendant has a one year old child and is expecting another child

              with his girlfriend [sic].”

With the State’s agreement, the trial court reduced defendant’s bond to $50,000.

¶ 11          Defense counsel filed a motion for a further reduction of bond on August 10, 2018,

and, on October 11, 2018, a motion seeking a furlough to allow defendant to attend his

mother-in-law’s funeral. Both motions again noted defendant’s lack of felony convictions. The

first motion noted Torry’s pregnancy with the couple’s second child. The trial court denied both

motions.

                                              -4-
¶ 12           Defense counsel filed a third motion to reduce bond on February 13, 2019. Counsel

alleged:

               “3. Defendant has a newborn baby that resides with [Torry,] his

               wife[,] in Chicago, Illinois. [Torry] needs defendant’s assistance in

               caring for the child.

               4. Defendant will reside with his family at 10835 Wabash, Chicago,

               Illinois.”

At a February 14, 2019, hearing on the motion, counsel represented:

                       “To my knowledge, my client has no prior felony history. He

               would be residing in Chicago with [Torry] and [their] newborn

               child. *** [Torry] needs him to care for that child.”

The trial court denied this motion in part because of defendant’s intention to live in Cook County.

¶ 13           On October 24, 2019, the State filed an amended information charging defendant

with two counts of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2), (a)(3) (West 2018)) and eight counts

of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2018)). The counts described an incident

in which defendant⸻or a person for whose conduct he was accountable⸻while armed with a

firearm, entered the home of Sims, struck Sims, took cell phones from Sims, Emily Peterson, and

Hilary Baker, and took cash from James Lawrence and Baker.

¶ 14           On November 15, 2019, defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count of armed

robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2018)). The original count at issue alleged defendant, while

armed with a long gun, took Sims’s cell phone. The parties agreed to amend this count to remove

the reference to a long gun. The amended count thus alleged defendant was armed with a

“dangerous weapon,” not a firearm. The parties further noted they agreed the sentence would have

                                               -5-
a floor of nine years, but no cap. The factual basis the State presented paralleled the affidavit of

the arresting officer except for the omission of references to firearms. The State also represented

Torry told the police she had knocked on Sims’s apartment door, and, when a resident answered,

three armed perpetrators, among them defendant, entered the apartment. Further, police had

interviewed Chelsie Langenhorst, a codefendant, who admitted both she and defendant had

participated in planning the robbery. Finally, the police interviewed Cameron Scott, another

codefendant, who admitted he and defendant entered Sims’s apartment while armed with

dangerous weapons. The trial court accepted the parties’ agreement and directed defendant to

cooperate with the probation office in its preparation of the presentencing investigation report

(PSI). The trial court provided not only absentia warnings for defendant should he fail to appear,

but expressly referenced the fact that his failure to appear on time would not delay the hearing.

This was after defendant had appeared late at several previous hearings since being released on

bond.

¶ 15           According to the PSI, dated January 9, 2020, defendant posted bond and was

released on March 1, 2019. After entering his guilty plea, he “reported to pre-trial and was told to

report for an interview on December 10 at 2 p.m.” The officer preparing the report made repeated

attempts to remind defendant of the interview, but defendant appeared neither at the appointed

time nor at a rescheduled December 27, 2020, interview date. The PSI thus contained only the

information contained in the pretrial services evaluation. Notably, the PSI did not state defendant

had any prior convictions, juvenile adjudications, or other criminal adjudications.

¶ 16           Defendant did not appear at his January 24, 2020, sentencing hearing. The State

declined to present evidence. Neither party suggested relevant corrections to the PSI. Defendant

                                               -6-
offered in evidence cooperation agreements with codefendants Torry, Langenhorst, and Melvin

Galloway as indicators of potentially comparable sentences.

¶ 17           In its argument, the State contended three statutory factors in aggravation should

apply. First, defendant’s “conduct caused or threatened serious harm” (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1)

(West 2020)). Second, defendant had “a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity” (730

ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(3) (West 2020)). It asserted, “You can see that [history] *** in the pretrial

services evaluation *** where the defendant self-admitted to having previously been to the [DOC]

in Cook County for being in an abandoned building trespassing and smoking some weed.” Third,

it contended a sentence of more than nine years was “necessary to deter others from committing

the same crime” (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(7) (West 2020)). Based on these statutory factors in

aggravation, defendant’s failure to appear for the presentencing investigation interview or the

sentencing hearing, and what the State argued was a lack of mitigating factors, the State urged the

court to impose a 15-year sentence. Finally, it argued the situations of the codefendants who had

cooperation agreements were not comparable.

¶ 18           Defense counsel, disagreeing with the State, contended that the statutory mitigating

factor of “defendant [having] no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or [having] led a

law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime” (730

ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(7) (West 2020)) should apply. Counsel argued it was “unclear” if the incident

to which defendant admitted in the pretrial evaluation “was a juvenile offense or what, and nothing

else has been presented today.”

¶ 19           Defense counsel further argued the statutory factor in mitigation, “[t]he

imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to his dependents [(730 ILCS

5/5-5-3.1(a)(11) (West 2018))]”, should apply. Counsel did not cite the then-newly applicable

                                               -7-
version of this factor in mitigation, which stated, “[Among] the grounds [which] shall be accorded

weight in favor of withholding or minimizing a sentence of imprisonment” is “defendant is the

parent of a child or infant whose well-being will be negatively affected by the parent’s absence,”

and which sets out six factors the court is to consider. Pub. Act. 101-471, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020)

(amending 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1); 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(18) (West 2020). Further, counsel

mentioned defendant’s “child, his dependent,” rather than referring to defendant’s two children.

¶ 20            Defense counsel also noted the cooperation agreements showed Galloway, who

was armed when he entered Sims’s apartment, was to receive a nine-year sentence. Counsel argued

Galloway’s circumstances were comparable to defendant’s.

¶ 21            The trial court accepted the State’s argument concerning defendant’s criminal

history. It further ruled it had insufficient information about defendant’s relationship with “the

child” to treat hardship to a dependent as an applicable factor. It sentenced defendant to 12 years’

imprisonment:

                “With regard to various factors, I am considering perhaps *** that

                the defendant’s criminal conduct was induced or facilitated by

                someone other than the defendant [(730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(5) (West

                2020))]. I’m not giving great weight to it because *** I don’t have

                [defendant] today to explain it ***. With regard to [the mitigating]

                factor *** that the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or

                criminal activity[,] I’m not able to find that based on the

                representation made in the Pretrial Risk Assessment where he

                checked the box yes for have you been in the [DOC], and it may

                have been the *** evaluating officer that checked that, but he

                                               -8-
checked yes on [DOC]. No on as a juvenile. Yes as an adult. And it

was this offense in August of being in the abandoned building

trespassing or smoking some weed. Because I have that information,

and I realize that that’s not sworn testimony, I can’t find [the factor

of no criminal history] to exist, and with regard to Factor 11, and I

believe that’s now factor 18, regarding the dependent,*** the only

information I have is that he is married and has one child, but I don’t

have any information as to the relationship with the child or support

provided for the child, so I don’t find that [factor applies] either.

        With regard to factors in aggravation, I do find *** the

defendant’s conduct either causing or threatening serious harm to

another. With regard to [the criminal history factor], I am going to

find that he has a history of prior criminal activity. It’s either

delinquency or criminal activity based on the limited information

that I’ve been provided with, and I also find *** the deterrent factor,

so I find those factors to exist in aggravation.

        It is important to be consistent with other cases. None of

those cases have been concluded, but we do have Cooperation

Agreements which gives a roadmap as to where they may end up.

[Defendant] did have an opportunity to follow this Court’s order and

cooperate with the preparation of the [PSI], and he did not do so,

and he did have an opportunity to come here today and present

evidence or at least give a statement of allocution. Considering all

                                 -9-
               of those factors and the items that I have reviewed I’m going to

               sentence the defendant to 12 years in the Illinois [DOC] with

               mandatory supervised release of 3 years and credit for 275 days

               served.”

   ¶ 22        Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, which stated, in relevant

       part:

                       “4. The sentence imposed is not in keeping with the

               Defendant’s past history or criminality, age, mental history, medical

               condition,     family   situation,   economic      status,   education,

               occupational or personal habits.

                       5. This court erred by finding [the] mitigat[ing] factor ***,

               no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity, did not apply.

               No criminal history was listed in the [PSI]. This court relied on the

               pretrial services report. The record is unclear as to what prior

               convictions, if any, defendant has.” (Emphasis added.)

By the time of the hearing on the motion, defendant was back in custody. Neither party offered

any argument on the motion. Defendant made no effort to explain his absence, correct the trial

court’s rendition of his criminal history, or further explain his family circumstances. The trial court

denied the motion, stating:

               “I did not consider the mitigating factor of no prior history; instead,

               I found that as a factor in aggravation and I did look at the pretrial

               report which indicated that [defendant] had been incarcerated in the

               [DOC] at a prior time.”

                                                - 10 -
This appeal followed.

¶ 23                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24           Defendant argues on appeal he was deprived of his rights at sentencing in four

ways. One, he contends the trial court improperly considered unreliable evidence and statutorily

unacceptable evidence to conclude he had a history of criminal activity or delinquency. Two, he

contends, as a matter of plain error, the trial court violated his rights under the fifth amendment by

treating as aggravating his failure to participate in the PSI’s preparation and his failure to give a

statement in allocution. Three, he argues defense counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to tell the

court defendant had two children, not one; (b) failing to ask the court to apply the newly applicable

version of the factor in mitigation relating to the effect of incarceration on a defendant’s children;

and (c) failing to present evidence a longer sentence would adversely affect those children. Four,

he argues, “The cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors and counsel’s ineffectiveness deprived

[him] of a fair sentencing hearing.” We address defendant’s initial three claims in turn, concluding

each is meritless. We therefore necessarily conclude his fourth claim is without merit.

¶ 25            A. Use of Inaccurate Information to Show a History of Criminality

¶ 26           Defendant argues first the trial court erred in relying on the bond report to find

applicable the third statutory factor in aggravation: “the defendant has a history of prior

delinquency or criminal activity” (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(3) (West 2020)). He contends (1) “the

bond report was not a proper consideration in fashioning a sentence under the Illinois Unified Code

of Corrections [(Code)]” and (2) “the information in the bond report could not be considered in

aggravation because it merely listed a potential prior arrest without any demonstration of the

information’s accuracy or reliability.” We consider these arguments in turn.

¶ 27           1. Whether the Bond Report Was a Proper Source of Information Under the Code

                                                - 11 -
¶ 28           Defendant argues section 5-4-1(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a) (2020)) lists

all sources of information the trial court may consider in imposing sentence. The version of the

sentence applicable in 2020 lists 12 sources the court was required to consider. Pub. Act 101-105,

§ 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3/1); 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a) (West 2020).

Defendant contends only one could have applied to his statement in the bond report: the court is

to “consider evidence and information offered by the parties in aggravation and mitigation” (730

ILCS 5/5-4-1(a)(4) (2020)). Defendant argues the bond report was not offered by either party.

Quoting People v. Freddie Jackson, 103 Ill. App. 2d 209, 224, 243 N.E.2d 551, 558 (1968), he

states, “When evaluating [the] factors, ‘the sentencing judge is limited by what the parties present

for consideration.’ ” He asserts, “The State did not offer any evidence in aggravation at the

sentencing hearing, let alone evidence of past criminal activity.” (Emphasis in original.)

               “Simply put, there was no statutory basis for the trial court to

               consider information contained in the bond report at the sentencing

               hearing⸻the bond report was not a [PSI one of the sources of

               information section 5-4-1(a) requires the court to consider

               regardless of whether a party raises it (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a)(2)

               (2020))], and neither party presented [the report] at the sentencing

               hearing.” (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, he asserts, the court erred in considering it.

¶ 29           Replying to the State’s contention his statement in the bond report was nonhearsay

under Illinois Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015) (providing a statement is not hearsay

if it is “offered against a party and is *** the party’s own statement” (emphasis added)), defendant

                                                - 12 -
contends the State did not offer the report. He thus argues the nonhearsay status of the statement

was irrelevant to the court’s ability to consider it.

¶ 30            Defendant’s argument concerning the court’s ability to consider his statement rests

on interpretations of section 5-4-1(a)(4) of the Code and Rule 801(d)(2). Our review is therefore

de novo. See, e.g., People v. Wise, 2021 IL 125392, ¶ 23, 182 N.E.3d 656 (stating issues of

statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review).

¶ 31            Defendant’s interpretation of section 5-4-1(a) would prevent the trial court from

taking note of the court record (other than the PSI and any trial evidence (see 730 ILCS

5/5-4-1(a)(1) (2020)) unless a party formally seeks to have that part of the record admitted into

evidence. This interpretation is absurd. It would, for instance, prohibit a court from considering

the factual basis for a guilty plea, a source of information not mentioned in section 5-4-1(a), unless

a party somehow formally “offered” it. But parties are always free to raise matters in the record in

argument to the court without formally seeking admission of the record of the same proceeding.

See People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 66, 695 N.E.2d 391, 409 (1998) (“[A] court will take judicial

notice of its own records.”). Therefore, either (1) section 5-4-1(a) is not an exclusive list of the

matters a court may consider at sentencing or (2) under section 5-4-1(a)(4), a party may “offer” a

section of the record by mentioning it in argument. We suggest the first alternative is clearly

correct. The court should not be limited by the parties’ arguments in considering the whole record

at sentencing. However, under either alternative, defendant’s argument fails.

¶ 32            The rule in Freddie Jackson, which held, under an earlier statutory scheme, “the

sentencing judge is limited by what the parties present for his consideration” (Freddie Jackson,

103 Ill. App. 2d at 224), would not have barred consideration of defendant’s statement in the bond

                                                 - 13 -
report. The State presented the statement for the court’s consideration by taking note of it in its

argument.

¶ 33           2. Whether the Bond Report Was of Sufficient Accuracy for Use at Sentencing

¶ 34           Defendant next argues, “[t]he information in the bond report could not be

considered in aggravation because it merely listed a potential prior arrest without any

demonstration of the information’s accuracy or reliability.” He contends the bond report “merely

listed a prior arrest [which] was unsupported by any other evidence the parties presented at the

sentencing hearing.” He argues evidence of “bare arrests” may not be considered at a sentencing

hearing, and “a mere list of arrests and charges unsupported by live testimony or other evidence

does not meet the [accuracy] standard [for consideration at sentencing].” He concedes, under

People v. LaPointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 498 431 N.E.2d 344, 351 (1981), the “ ‘relevancy and accuracy

of the information submitted[,]’ [is] more important than ‘[w]hether a defendant had been

prosecuted and convicted for other misconduct[.]’ [Citation.]” But he argues the court erred in

considering the statement in the bond report because the court “had no basis on which to decide if

the offense was actually committed,” and because no other evidence supported the existence of a

conviction.

¶ 35           We note defendant concedes the Illinois Rules of Evidence do not apply at

sentencing hearings (see Ill. R. Evid. 1101(b)(3) (eff. Sept 17, 2019)) and, further, “ ‘[t]he source

and type of admissible information [at sentencing] is virtually without limits’ ” (quoting People v.

Sims, 403 Ill. App. 3d 9, 23, 931 N.E.2d 1220, 1233 (2010)).

¶ 36           In response, the State contends the bond report was proper evidence of a prior

conviction. It argues, although the Illinois Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing, the

statements to the PTSO and in the bond report would otherwise be admissible nonhearsay under

                                               - 14 -
Illinois Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). In other words, statements such as those

contained in the bond report would be admissible against defendant at trial under Rule 801(d)(2),

and thus, a fortiori should be admissible at the sentencing hearing.

¶ 37           The State further argues the pretrial services evaluation and the bond report contain

admissions of a conviction, not merely an arrest. It points to the handwritten note in the pretrial

services evaluation as an admission by defendant to the PTSO defendant had been convicted in

Cook County of trespass and possession of cannabis. It further points to defendant’s response to a

question in the bond report as an admission he had been to the DOC as an adult for being in an

abandoned building and smoking cannabis. According to the State, these statements, which

defendant “never denied,” “demonstrated an adult criminal history that included at least one

misdemeanor or felony conviction.” In particular, it contends defendant admitted in the bond report

he had received a “ ‘sentence’ ” and “had been to the [DOC],” and the statement was reliable

because it was an admission against his interest. Further, defendant did not dispute the existence

of his criminal record, but merely that it was not a felony.

¶ 38           In reply, defendant makes three arguments. First, he contends his statements do not

satisfy the relevancy and admissibility requirements of Illinois Rule of Evidence 401 (eff. Jan 1,

2011) (concerning relevance generally) and Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(b) (eff. Jan 1, 2011)

(concerning admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts). He argues his

admission “would not have been relevant to establishing the charged conduct,” namely, the armed

robbery, “or any other fact of consequence.” Second, citing Rule 801(d)(2) , he reiterates his

contention the court’s consideration of his statement in the bond report was improper because

neither party offered the report in evidence. Third, he recapitulates his argument asserting the bond

report was evidence only of an arrest.

                                               - 15 -
¶ 39           We conclude defendant’s statements in the pretrial services evaluation and the bond

report were an accurate basis for the trial court to determine defendant had previously engaged in

criminal activity. “The determination of admissibility of evidence at the aggravation/mitigation

stage of sentencing lies within the discretion of the trial court.” People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467,

505, 708 N.E. 2d 309, 328 (1998); see also LaPointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 498 (stating the “relevancy and

accuracy of the information submitted” at a sentencing hearing is “initially determined by the trial

judge in the exercise of an informed discretion”). Accordingly, our review of this part of

defendant’s claim is for an abuse of discretion.

¶ 40           Initially, we note the parties’ arguments contain two red herrings. One, the

discussion of the Illinois Rules of Evidence leads to a dead end. Defendant’s discussion of the

rules is in defiance of his previous admission the rules are inapplicable at sentencing. The State’s

discussion of Rule 801(d)(2) fairly points out admissions are typically treated as reliable, but it

does not answer defendant’s contention an admission of a conviction cannot be reliable in the

absence of the other expected evidence the conviction exists. Two, whether defendant had a

conviction based on his smoking cannabis in an abandoned building is not a dispositive issue.

Under LaPointe, a sentencing court may consider other offenses a defendant has committed,

including uncharged offenses, if the information is relevant and accurate. LaPointe, 88 Ill. 2d at

498. This usually means testimony of such an offense by a live witness with firsthand knowledge.

See People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 547, 561 N.E.2d 57, 77 (1990), (stating evidence of

uncharged criminal conduct was admissible at a sentencing hearing when the evidence was

relevant and reliable and the witness was subject to cross-examination); see also People v.

Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 460-61, 457 N.E.2d 31, 41-42 (1983) (stating evidence of prior offenses

met the standards of LaPointe when it was presented through witnesses and subject to

                                                - 16 -
cross-examination). However, defendant’s objection here to the use of his statements in the pretrial

services evaluation and the bond report is not based on the lack of live testimony, but rather is

based on the assertion they described a mere arrest.

¶ 41           We accept, for the purposes of argument, “the mere listing of prior arrests, not

resulting in convictions, in a [PSI] does not satisfy the accuracy requirement of LaPointe.” People

v. Robert Thomas, 111 Ill. App. 3d 451, 454, 444 N.E.2d 288, 290 (1983). But, as we discuss,

applying the rule in Robert Thomas would not make defendant’s admission he committed offenses

based on trespassing and possession of cannabis unreliable.

¶ 42           Based on these considerations, we take defendant’s actual claim to be, given the

lack of independent evidence of a conviction, the trial court abused its discretion in treating

defendant’s statements in the pretrial services evaluation and the bond report as accurate evidence

of previous criminal conduct. We conclude no abuse of discretion occurred. Defendant’s words on

the bond form⸻“Being in abanded [sic] building Trepassing [sic] and Smoking some weed”⸻are

not the language of someone describing a mistaken arrest. Defendant also checked boxes on the

form indicating he had been to the [DOC] as an adult but not as a juvenile (a fact he would later

deny, and which could easily have been due to his confusion over having been in jail). He identified

his “date of sentence” for the Cook County offense as “August.” Although defendant argues we

cannot necessarily rely on the accuracy of this information, at the same time, defendant clearly

indicated on the same form he had not been previously adjudicated a delinquent, was not then on

adult probation or parole, and had no criminal convictions from another state, all of which we

assume defendant would suggest were accurate. It was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion

to rely on the accuracy of defendant’s own entries on the bond form, as well as the information

represented to the PTSO.

                                               - 17 -
¶ 43           Defendant suggests, because no independent evidence existed of any adjudication

or sentence associated with trespass or cannabis possession, his statement must have referred only

to an arrest. This does not follow. To be sure, the record strongly suggests defendant was mistaken

when he admitted he had been sentenced to the DOC as an adult. In his June 29, 2018, motion for

reduction of bond, defendant denied having been to the DOC. The State opposed the motion but

did not contest his claim he had not been in the DOC, something it could have easily disproved if

it were false. Moreover, no sentence to the DOC appeared in defendant’s PSI. The DOC has readily

available online records. Those records are treated as of sufficient accuracy to permit courts to take

judicial notice of them. People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶ 54, 182 N.E.3d 728. Given the

“missing” evidence of a sentence to DOC, we deem it probable defendant lacked a full grasp of

the legal outcome of the incident he was trying to describe in the bond report. But this confusion

does not turn defendant’s admission of what he did do⸻smoke cannabis in an abandoned

building⸻into a mere description of an arrest. Thus, regardless of the kind of adjudication (or

lack thereof) associated with the incident, it was within the court’s discretion to deem defendant’s

statement in the bond report to be an accurate admission of his possession of cannabis and his

possible commission of a criminal trespass. It thus did not err in treating the admission as

establishing defendant had “a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity” (730 ILCS 5/5-5-

3.2(a)(2) (West 2020)).

¶ 44                   B. Violation of Defendant’s Fifth Amendment Rights

¶ 45           Defendant next argues, as a matter of second-prong plain error, the trial court

violated his fifth amendment rights by deeming as aggravating his “failure to assist in the

preparation of a [PSI] and failure to give an allocution statement.” He asks us to consider the

court’s comment:

                                                - 18 -
               “[Defendant] did have an opportunity to follow this Court’s order

               and cooperate with the preparation of the [PSI], and he did not do

               so, and he did have an opportunity to come here and present

               evidence or at least give a statement of allocution.”

He analogizes the court’s comments to those in People v. Maggio, 2017 IL App (4th) 150287, 80

N.E.3d 72, in which the court commented negatively on the defendant’s refusal to participate in

the presentencing investigation, and in People v. Matute, 2020 IL App (2d) 170786, 168 N.E.3d

673, in which the court deemed aggravating a defendant’s failure to use his opportunity to make a

statement in allocution to express remorse.

¶ 46           In response, the State contends the trial court “drew no negative inference from

defendant’s silence.” It argues the trial court was explaining, because it had not heard anything

from defendant and thus had no supporting evidence, it could not give much weight to the

mitigating factor of defendant’s “criminal conduct [being] induced or facilitated by others.” It

further argues the court’s reasoning was similar concerning the weight it gave the codefendants’

cooperation agreements: because defendant had not cooperated, it could not treat the cases

involving cooperation agreements as comparable to defendant’s.

¶ 47           In reply, defendant contends the structure of the court’s ruling shows it treated his

failure to assist with the PSI and failure to make a statement in allocution as aggravating. He breaks

the ruling down into three parts: (1) factors in mitigation, (2) factors in aggravation, and (3) “other

considerations and conclusion.” He contends the court’s placement of the comments at issue in the

final section after its discussion of the cooperation agreements shows the court was “not reverting

to its discussion of the factors in mitigation,” but rather was “discussing why it believed that [he]

did not deserve a minimized sentence like his codefendants,” namely, “he had refused to provide

                                                - 19 -
additional information at all turns, including during the pre-sentence investigation and at the

sentencing hearing.”

¶ 48            Defendant concedes he has forfeited this argument by failing to make a

contemporaneous objection to the court’s comments and by failing to raise the issue in his

postsentencing motion. See People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544, 931 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (2010)

(“It is well settled that, to preserve a claim of sentencing error, both a contemporaneous objection

and a written postsentencing motion raising the issue are required.”). However, he contends, under

the plain error rule, we may notice plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights although they

were not brought to the attention of the trial court. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).

¶ 49            The plain error doctrine serves as a “narrow and limited exception” to our standard

rules for preserving error. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Ahlers, 402 Ill. App. 3d

726, 733, 931 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (2010). As our supreme court has explained in, among other

cases, People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 20

                “[T]he plain error rule allows reviewing courts discretion to review

                forfeited errors under two alternative prongs: (1) when a clear or

                obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that

                the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the

                defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error [(first-prong

                plain error)], or (2) when a clear or obvious error occurred and the

                error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial

                and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the

                closeness of the evidence [(second-prong plain error)].”

                                                  - 20 -
“Errors that fall within the purview of the second prong of the plain error rule are ‘presumptively

prejudicial errors—errors that may not have affected the outcome, but must still be remedied’

because the error ‘deprive[d] the defendant of a fair trial.’ ” Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 24 (quoting

People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 185, 830 N.E.2d 467, 479 (2005)). However, regardless of the

type of plain error a defendant claims, “[t]he first analytical step under the plain error rule is to

determine whether there was a clear or obvious error.” Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 22. Here, no clear

or obvious error occurred.

¶ 50           Whether a trial court relied on an improper factor in imposing a defendant’s

sentence is a question of law; when a defendant has preserved the issue, review is thus de novo.

People v. Williams, 2018 IL App (4th) 150759, ¶ 18, 99 N.E.3d 590. However, when an appellate

court reviews such a question, “[t]here is a strong presumption that the trial court based its

sentencing determination on proper legal reasoning, and a court of review should consider the

record as a whole, rather than focusing on a few words or statements by the trial court.” People v.

Canizalez-Cardena, 2012 IL App (4th) 110720, ¶ 22, 979 N.E.2d 1014. A defendant claiming the

use of an improper factor bears the burden to establish an improper factor affected the sentence.

Williams, 2018 IL App (4th) 150759, ¶ 18.

¶ 51           The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution⸻which is applicable to the

states by action of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S.

364, 368 (1986))⸻provides, in relevant part, “No person *** shall be compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., amend. V. The fifth amendment right against

self-incrimination applies during the sentencing phase. Maggio, 2017 IL App (4th) 150287, ¶ 48.

Defendants therefore have the right to remain silent during the presentence investigation, and

“invocation of the right cannot be used as an aggravating factor at sentencing.” Maggio, 2017 IL

                                               - 21 -
App (4th) 150287, ¶ 49. By the same reasoning, a court may not treat as aggravating a defendant’s

decision to forgo making a statement in allocution.

¶ 52           We find nothing in the trial court’s explanation of defendant’s sentence sufficient

to overcome the presumption it based its determination on proper reasoning. Defendant subjects

the court’s sentencing statement to a close reading more appropriate to statutory analysis than to

the interpretation of an oral ruling. This approach is inconsistent with the presumption the court

“based its sentencing determination on proper legal reasoning.” Canizalez-Cardena, 2012 IL App

(4th) 110720, ¶ 22.

¶ 53           In his reply brief, defendant summarizes his argument the court improperly used

his nonparticipation against him:

                      “To start, the court’s sentencing analysis can easily be

               broken down into three parts, with each corresponding to a distinct

               piece of the three-paragraph ruling: (1) factors in mitigation;

               (2) factors in aggravation; and (3) other considerations and

               conclusion. This compartmentalization is important because *** it

               shows that the court was not explaining its application of mitigating

               factors or a lack of evidence pertaining thereto when it faulted [him]

               in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.

                      ***

                      The court then moved on to the factors in aggravation. ***

               But, immediately after pointing to [the cooperation agreements], the

               court stated:

                                               - 22 -
                                      ‘[Defendant] did have an

                              opportunity to follow this Court’s

                              order    and    cooperate    with    the

                              preparation    of    the    Presentence

                              Investigation Report, and did not do

                              so, and he did have an opportunity to

                              come here today and present evidence

                              or at least give a statement of

                              allocution. Considering all of those

                              factors and the items that I have

                              reviewed I’m going to sentence

                              [defendant] to 12 years in the Illinois

                              [DOC][.]’ ([E]mphasis added[.])

                       Matching the overall structure of the analysis, this paragraph

               demonstrates that the court separately considered ‘all of those

               factors’ it had discussed in aggravation in mitigation, as well as ‘the

               items’ it reviewed such as the failure to participate and present

               evidence, before arriving at the 12-year sentence. Thus, as argued in

               the opening brief, the trial court drew negative inferences in

               violation of the Fifth Amendment.”

¶ 54           Defendant reads an excessively formal structure into the trial court’s ruling⸻a

structure which, we note, is created in part by the paragraph breaks inserted by the court reporter.

Defendant uses this somewhat arbitrary structure to suggest his lack of participation was at the

                                               - 23 -
core of the court’s sentencing decision. However, when we assume the court applied proper legal

reasoning, we cannot give the court’s comments the sort of close reading found in defendant’s

argument. We must read the court’s comments as a whole and without the implausible assumption

the court structured its comments as if in a formal essay. We recognize the trial court is ruling from

the bench, immediately after hearing arguments of counsel, and without the 20/20 editing hindsight

defendant presupposes. Properly read, the court’s statement defendant failed to use his

“opportunity to *** cooperate with the preparation of the [PSI]” and failed to use his opportunity

to “at least give a statement of allocution” relates to the court’s comments about its lack of

information about the possible mitigating factors of the influence of others and the effect on his

dependents as well as perhaps clear up, for purposes of mitigation as well, exactly what his criminal

record proved to be. We thus conclude defendant has not shown an improper consideration of his

decision to remain silent influenced the court’s sentencing decision.

¶ 55           The trial court’s comments here were distinguishable from those in Maggio and

Matute, on which defendant relies. In Maggio, the trial court explicitly considered the defendant’s

refusal to answer the questions of the court services officer [CSO] as a sign of poor rehabilitative

potential:

                       “ ‘It is significant to this court and troubling that when [the CSO] went out

                       to interview the defendant in jail, he refused to cooperate with the interview

                       and refused to fill out the social form and the history that was necessary,

                       *** knowing [the CSO] *** was an arm of the court, and he still refused

                       twice to be interviewed and did not fill out the social history form. ***

                       [T]hat certainly speaks volumes about his attitude, and is something the

                                                - 24 -
                       court takes into consideration in measuring rehabilitative potential.’ ”

                       Maggio, 2017 IL App (4th) 150287, ¶ 49.

This was the comment the Maggio court “conclude[d] ***[was] an improper comment on

defendant’s fifth amendment right to remain silent during the presentence investigation.” Maggio,

2017 IL App (4th) 150287, ¶ 49. Here, by contrast, rather than considering defendant’s

nonparticipation as aggravating, the court merely noted his nonparticipation as the basis for the

lack of information preventing it from potentially applying factors in mitigation.

¶ 56           An error akin to the one in Maggio occurred in Matute. The trial court in Matute

commented:

                       “ ‘I find [it] a little bit disturbing that the defendant has not

               offered any allocution whatsoever and even changed the story when

               [it] came to statements [that defendant] made to the probation officer

               which [vary] significant[ly] from the video confession that this

               defendant has given.’ ” Matute, 2020 IL App (2d) 170786, ¶ 56.

The trial court also added, “ ‘I also considered heavily the defendant’s lack of remorse and the

defendant’s now recent denial.; ” Matute, 2020 IL App (2d) 170786, ¶ 57. The Matute court held

the trial court violated defendant’s fifth amendment rights when it used the defendant’s silence to

infer a lack of remorse. Matute, 2020 IL App (2d) 170786, ¶ 59. Again, no such improper inference

occurred here; the court merely explained defendant’s silence deprived it of evidence to support

two potentially applicable factors in mitigation.

¶ 57           As defendant has not shown error, a fortiori, he has not shown clear or obvious

error. We therefore need not proceed further in the plain error analysis. See Moon, 2022 IL 125959,

¶ 22.

                                                - 25 -
¶ 58                           C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 59           Defendant argues defense counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to tell the court

defendant had two children, not one; (b) failing to ask the court to apply the version of section

5-5-3.1(a) of the Code effective on January 1, 2020, which would have allowed the court to give

deeper consideration of the effect of his incarceration on his dependent children; and (c) failing to

present evidence a longer sentence would adversely affect those children. He contends, given the

representations counsel previously made to the court concerning defendant’s family, the record

shows counsel could have presented evidence sufficient to allow the court to treat defendant’s

relationship with his two children as mitigating and certainly could have avoided telling the court

defendant had one, not two, children.

¶ 60           In response, the State contends defendant’s argument is unsupported by the record

and thus based on mere conjecture. It notes the court declined to deem mitigating defendant’s

status as a father on the basis it lacked evidence of the nature of the parent-child relationship. It

further argues, given defendant’s absence, defense counsel had no way to offer appropriate

evidence. Finally, it points out the court explicitly noted the applicability of the newly effective

version of section 5-5-3.1(a) of the Code. It thus contends defendant could not have been

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to advocate for the applicability of the amendment.

¶ 61           Replying, defendant first contends the number of a defendant’s children is

necessarily relevant to the hardship that defendant’s incarceration will impose on those children.

He next argues the record shows defense counsel could have presented evidence of defendant’s

relationship with his children. He points to filings in which defense counsel noted the birth of

defendant’s second child, his desire to attend his mother-in-law’s funeral, and his stated intention

to live with his wife and children when released on bond. Further, he suggests, despite his absence

                                               - 26 -
from the sentencing hearing, defense counsel could have established the strength of his relationship

with his children by subpoenaing Torry as a witness in mitigation. It takes a special level of

audacity for a defendant to fail to appear for his own sentencing, after failing to cooperate at all

with his own presentence investigation, and then claim trial counsel could have done more on his

behalf.

¶ 62           The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to effective assistance of

counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding (U.S. Const., amend. VI; People v. Hughes,

2012 IL 112817, ¶ 44, 983 N.E.2d 439), including sentencing (People v. Lawrence Jackson, 205

Ill. 2d 247, 258-59, 793 N.E.2d 1, 9 (2001)). A defendant may properly raise a claim of

ineffectiveness of counsel for the first time on appeal. People v. Jefferson, 2021 IL App (2d)

190179, ¶ 26, 190 N.E.3d 323. In such appeals, our review is equivalent to de novo review. People

v. Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 88, 129 N.E.3d 755.

¶ 63           We analyze a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the

two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Veach,

2017 IL 120649, ¶ 29, 89 N.E.3d 366. To prevail on such a claim, “a defendant must establish that

his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was

prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.” People v. Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 25, 102

N.E.3d 205. The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is measured by “an objective standard

of competence under prevailing professional norms.” People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93, 708

N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (1999). A reviewing court applies a strong presumption “counsel’s conduct

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance”; a reviewing court must presume

a purportedly unreasonable action was the product of sound trial strategy. People v. Manning, 241

Ill. 2d 319, 334, 948 N.E.2d 542, 547 (2011). Concerning prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show

                                               - 27 -
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different; a “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

¶ 64           A claim of ineffective assistance fails unless the defendant satisfies both prongs of

the Strickland test. Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 88. Consequently, if a defendant fails to

show prejudice, a reviewing court need not decide whether counsel’s performance was deficient.

Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 94.

¶ 65           Defendant fails to show prejudice. First, the parties do not dispute the court’s

acknowledgment of the applicability of the new amendments to section 5-5-3.1(a). Therefore, it

requires no further discussion to conclude defense counsel’s failure to ask the court to apply the

amended section had no effect on the proceeding’s outcome. Second, as we will discuss, defendant

cannot show defense counsel could have presented evidence which would have had a reasonable

probability of changing the outcome at sentencing.

¶ 66           Initially, we agree with defendant’s assertion defense counsel missed several

opportunities at sentencing to present information relevant to defendant’s importance to his family.

A sentencing court “ ‘may search anywhere, within reasonable bounds, for other facts which tend

to aggravate or mitigate the offense’ ” provided it “exercise[s] care to insure the accuracy of

information considered’ ” LaPointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 494-95 (quoting People v. Adkins, 41 Ill. 2d 297,

300-01, 242 N.E.2d 258, 260 (1968)). As defendant notes, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule

137(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), “The signature of an attorney *** constitutes a certificate by him that he

has read the *** motion***; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after

reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact.” Thus, motions filed by defense counsel bear some

presumption of accuracy. Further, “a court will take judicial notice of its own records.” Jackson,

                                                - 28 -
182 Ill. 2d at 66. Therefore, we think it was within the court’s discretion to consider attorney

representations in defense motions as bearing on factors in mitigation. Defense counsel thus could

have pointed to his (1) August 18, 2018, motion seeking a bond reduction in which he noted,

“Defendant will reside [in Chicago] with his grandmother, aunt, wife and child,” and, “His wife is

also pregnant”; (2) October 9, 2018, motion in which he sought a furlough for defendant to attend

his mother-in-law’s funeral; or (3) February 13, 2019, motion for reduction of bond in which he

stated, “Defendant has a newborn baby that resides with his wife in Chicago, Illinois,” and, “His

wife needs [his] assistance in caring for the child.” Certainly, the record shows defense counsel

knew defendant had two children, not one. Counsel could and should have said so to the court.

¶ 67           Nevertheless, the record does not establish enough about defendant’s relationship

to his children to have allowed the court to treat possible harm to them from defendant’s

incarceration as mitigating. The relevant portion of the then-applicable version of section 5-5-3.1

provides, among the “grounds [to be] *** be accorded weight in favor of withholding or

minimizing a sentence of imprisonment” (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a) (West 2020)), are:

                      “(18) The defendant is the parent of a child or infant whose

               well-being will be negatively affected by the parent’s absence.

               Circumstances to be considered in assessing this factor in mitigation

               include:

                                      (A) that      the   parent   is

                              breastfeeding the child;

                                      (B) the age of the child, with

                              strong consideration given to avoid

                              disruption of the caregiving of an

                                                 - 29 -
                             infant, pre-school or school-age child

                             by a parent;

                                     (C) the role of the parent in

                             the   day-to-day     educational    and

                             medical needs of the child;

                                     (D) the relationship of the

                             parent and the child;

                                     (E) any     special    medical,

                             educational, or psychological needs

                             of the child;

                                     (F) the role of the parent in the

                             financial support of the child.

                      Under this Section, the defendant shall have the right to

              present a Family Impact Statement at sentencing, which the court

              shall consider prior to imposing any sentence *** Unless the court

              finds that the parent poses a significant risk to the community that

              outweighs the risk of harm from the parent’s removal from the

              family, the court shall impose a sentence in accordance with

              subsection (b) that allows the parent to continue to care for the child

              or children.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(18) (West 2020).

¶ 68          None of the information defense counsel might have presented to the trial court

would have established any of the six circumstances in section 5-5-3.1(a)(18) as mitigating.

Breastfeeding obviously is not a consideration. Nothing in the record establishes defendant had a

                                               - 30 -
role in caregiving. To be sure, defendant expressed a desire to be a caregiver when he was seeking

release on bond. However, the record is devoid of anything to show the nature and extent of his

relationship to his children after his March 1, 2019, release. Given the absence of evidence

defendant would in fact act as a caregiver, that he had two children, not one, is immaterial to the

harm his children would suffer from his incarceration. Next, nothing in the record established

defendant had had any day-to-day role in the education of his children or in meeting their medical

needs. Nothing suggests either child had any special needs. Moreover, nothing in the record

suggests defendant had any role in the financial support of his children. The closest the record has

to such an indication is defense counsel’s representation about defendant’s employment at the

original bond hearing: “[Defendant] was about to begin a job at RuffaloCODY’s this coming

Monday. He has no current income. He last worked about two months ago.” This representation

does not suggest defendant was a reliable source of financial support for his family. Given the lack

of evidence defendant was providing financial support for one child, his role in providing financial

support for a second child was not established. Therefore, although defense counsel certainly

should have given the trial court correct information about the number of defendant’s children,

and although defense counsel could have asked the court to note portions of the record suggesting

some relationship between defendant and his family, neither of those actions would have changed

the outcome at sentencing. Defendant’s argument conveniently ignores the fact that, under any

circumstance, defendant was going to be incarcerated for at least 9 years under the terms of the

plea and wound up with a sentence only 3 years higher than the minimum and 3 years lower than

recommended by the State. Measuring the impact of the last 3 years of incarceration after serving

the required 9 seems an exercise in futility. The record thus does not allow defendant to make the

showing of prejudice Strickland requires. Defendant argues counsel should have subpoenaed Torry

                                               - 31 -
to testify to the relationship between defendant and his children. Defendant incorrectly expects us

to presume such testimony would be mitigating and ignores the reality of his required sentence in

the first place. He presumes such testimony would establish the applicability of at least one of the

factors in section 5-5-3.1(a)(18). A claim defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call a

witness typically must be supported by an affidavit (or equivalent evidence) from the proposed

witness setting out what his or her testimony would have been. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 2019

IL App (4th) 170261, ¶ 14, 141 N.E.3d 1 (stating the affidavit of a proposed witness is necessary

to support a claim in a postconviction petition that counsel was ineffective for failing to call that

witness). The record contains no such affidavit or any evidence which could substitute for such an

affidavit. Defendant thus cannot demonstrate prejudice based on counsel’s failure to call Torry as

a witness. The same applies to any other nonrecord evidence defendant might suggest counsel

could have presented.

¶ 69                                   D. Cumulative Error

¶ 70           Finally, defendant asserts the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors and of

defense counsel’s ineffectiveness deprived him of a fair sentencing hearing. As we have held

defendant has shown neither error by the trial court nor ineffectiveness by counsel, we necessarily

conclude no such cumulative effect occurred.

¶ 71                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 72           For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 73           Affirmed.

                                               - 32 -