Court Opinion

ID: 9525097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:00:00.314613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:55.454745
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
(dissenting.) I dissent because I conclude that the majority’s reliance on the plain meaning rule quoted in State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. WCCJ, 73 Wis. 2d 237, 241, 243 N.W.2d 485, 487 (1976) is misplaced. In Madison and Mueller v. Town of Fitchburg, No. 87-1218 slip op. (Wis. April 26, 1983), a majority of the court adopted a new rule by which we examine legislation. We no longer are bound by the plain meaning of a statute because “the spirit or intention of a statute should *20govern over the literal or technical meaning of the language used.” Id. at 10. This court has held that the court of appeals is bound by the prior decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Livesey v. Copps Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 577, 581, 280 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Ct. App. 1979). This court serves an error-correcting function in our appellate system. State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 665-66, 307 N.W.2d 200, 216-17 (1981). We are therefore required to determine whether the trial court erred, using the new method of statutory construction adopted in Town of Fitchburg, supra. Using that method, I conclude it did not.
I would affirm the trial court because I conclude that the spirit or intention of sec. 70.47(8) (e), Stats., is to make a record of Board of Review proceedings available for the use of the public and for judicial review. This is not possible unless a stenographer or recording device is used.