Court Opinion

ID: 9802415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 14:10:12.70077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:19.145402
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Solmaria Laboy-White,                       :
                           Petitioner       :
                                            :
             v.                             :   No. 692 C.D. 2022
                                            :   Submitted: April 28, 2023
Unemployment Compensation                   :
Board of Review,                            :
                    Respondent              :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS                                                FILED: August 31, 2023

             Solmaria Laboy-White (Claimant), appearing pro se, has petitioned this
Court to review an adjudication of the Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review (Board).        The Board determined that Claimant was ineligible for
unemployment benefits under Section 401(d)(1) of the Unemployment
Compensation Law (the Law).1 After careful review, we affirm.
                                 I. BACKGROUND2
             Claimant was employed as a direct care worker for Patriot Home Care
(Employer) from May 2018 through November 2021. Following the birth of her
twins, Claimant resigned her position to care for them.               Claimant declined
Employer’s offer of on-call work.

      1
         Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §
801(d)(1).
       2
         We adopt the factual background for this case from the Board’s decision, which is
supported by substantial evidence of record. See Bd.’s Dec., 5/2/22.
               Claimant filed for unemployment benefits, which the UC Service
Center denied. Following a hearing, a Referee agreed that Claimant was ineligible.
Upon further appeal, the Board affirmed, concluding that Claimant was ineligible
under Section 401(d)(1) of the Law.3 In so doing, the Board specifically resolved a
testimonial dispute in favor of Employer.
               Claimant timely petitioned this Court for review.
                                            II. ISSUE
               Essentially, Claimant challenges the Board’s denial of her application
for unemployment benefits. See generally Claimant’s Br. at 1-12. Although her
arguments lack development and are difficult to parse, Claimant specifically rejects
Employer’s evidence that it had offered Claimant on-call work following the birth
of her twins.4, 5 Id. at 8-9.

       3
          Section 401(d)(1) provides that, to be eligible for compensation, an employee must be
“able to work and available for suitable work.” 43 P.S. § 801(d)(1).
        4
          The Board contends that Claimant waived all arguments on appeal due to her failure to
develop them in her brief. See Bd.’s Br. at 5. Claimant’s brief is inadequate: she cites no case law
and does not develop a legal argument. Accordingly, she risks waiver. See Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a)
(“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall
have at the head of each part . . . the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion
and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 A.2d 580, 585
n.5 (Pa. 1998) (holding that failure to develop issue in appellate brief results in waiver); Browne
v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 A.2d 429, 435 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (“At the appellate level, a party's failure
to include analysis and relevant authority results in waiver.”). Nevertheless, because we are
generally inclined to construe pro se filings liberally, we decline to find waiver in this case. See,
e.g., Richardson v. Pa. Ins. Dep’t, 54 A.3d 420, 425-29 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).
        5
          Claimant also contends that she either filed an additional claim for unemployment or an
additional appeal, which was first denied for fraud, and then approved for 52 weeks of
unemployment benefits. See Claimant’s Br. at 1, 4-5. The certified record does not contain either
of these determinations and accordingly, we may not consider them in our disposition of this
appeal. See City of Pittsburgh Comm’n on Hum. Rels. v. DeFelice, 782 A.2d 586, 593 n. 10 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2001) (noting that appellate court is limited to considering only those facts that have been
duly certified in the record on appeal and, for purposes of appellate review, that which is not part
of the certified record does not exist).

                                                 2
                                     III. DISCUSSION6
               To be eligible for unemployment benefits, Section 401(d)(1) provides
that an employee must be “able to work and available for suitable work.” 43 P.S. §
801(d)(1). The burden of proving availability for suitable work is on the claimant,
and a claimant who registers for unemployment is presumed to be able and available
for work. See Rohde, 28 A.3d at 243 (citations omitted).
               The presumption is rebuttable by evidence that a claimant’s physical
condition limits the type of work she is able to accept, or that she has voluntarily
placed other restrictions on the type of job she is willing to accept. See id. Once the
presumption is rebutted, the burden shifts to the claimant to produce evidence that
she is able to do some type of work and that there is a reasonable opportunity for
securing such work. See Winchek v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 439 A.2d
890, 892 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982). “The real question is whether [the c]laimant has
imposed conditions on [her] employment which so limit [her] availability as to
effectively remove [her] from the labor market.” Harwood v. Unemployment Comp.
Bd. of Rev., 531 A.2d 823, 826 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
               Additionally, in an unemployment matter, “the Board is the ultimate
fact finder and is, therefore, entitled to make its own determinations as to witness
credibility and evidentiary weight” as well as to “resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
See Rohde, 28 A.3d at 242.

       6
         Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
whether an error of law was committed, or whether the findings of fact were unsupported by
substantial evidence. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 280 A.3d
1125, 1127 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence upon which a
reasonable mind could base a conclusion.” Rohde v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 28 A.3d
237, 242 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

                                                3
              At the hearing in this matter, Claimant conceded that she had very
limited work availability because she was caring for her newborn twins. Notes of
Testimony (N.T.) Hr’g, 1/26/22, at 8, 9. Nevertheless, she insisted that she remained
available to work two to three hours per day in the evening. Id. at 9. For its part,
Employer presented testimony that it had offered Claimant on-call work to
accommodate her availability. See id. at 10-11. According to Employer, Claimant
declined this offer.7 Id.
              The Board resolved this conflict in Employer’s favor, crediting
Employer’s testimony and thus concluding that Claimant was not able and available
for work. See Bd.’s Decision at 1-2. Moreover, the Board specifically rejected
Claimant’s testimony that she was available for limited work in the evenings. Id. at
2.
              As there is substantial evidence supporting the Board’s findings, we
decline to disturb those findings on appeal. See Rohde, 28 A.3d at 242. Further, we
discern no legal error in the Board’s conclusion that Claimant was ineligible for
unemployment benefits.          The credited evidence from Employer rebutted the
presumption that Claimant was available for suitable work. See id. at 243. Because
Claimant declined Employer’s offer of on-call work, Claimant effectively removed
herself from the labor market. See Harwood, 531 A.2d at 826. Accordingly, we
affirm the Board.8

                                     LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

       7
           Claimant also declined unpaid leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-2620, 2631-2636, 2651-2654. N.T. Hr’g at 10.
         8
           As the Board noted, Section 401(d)(1) of the Law is week-to-week. See Bd.’s Decision
at 2 (citing 43 P.S. § 801(d)(1)). Claimant may reapply for benefits when she re-enters the labor
market.

                                               4
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Solmaria Laboy-White,                  :
                        Petitioner     :
                                       :
           v.                          :   No. 692 C.D. 2022
                                       :
Unemployment Compensation              :
Board of Review,                       :
                    Respondent         :

                                     ORDER

     AND NOW, this 31st day of August, 2023, the order of the Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, entered May 2, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

                              LORI A. DUMAS, Judge