Court Opinion

ID: 9644433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:56:19.458042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:13.595529
License: Public Domain

BROOKSHIRE, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion reverses the judgment on the accused’s Ground of Error Number Fourteen. I respectfully dissent from that reversal based on that ground of error. That ground of error avers that the admission of State’s Exhibit No. 3, which was a photograph, and State’s Exhibit No. 4, which was money, were immaterial, irrelevant and the introduction thereof was highly prejudicial.
First, I would point out that this alleged ground of error is not properly briefed or argued. No authority is cited. Next, I would point out that the only argument set forth, under this ground of error is one sentence taken from the argument of the prosecution. The sentence is:
“I think I’ll leave it up to you to consider what that cash is doing in there and where it came from.”
The so-called argument does not comply or comport with Ground of Error Number Fourteen. The closing argument of the State consists of a number of pages. No objection was made to the above quoted sentence. The Appellant fails to cite any case, or other authority, to support his argument. I think that this ground of error presents nothing for review.
In Corker v. State, 691 S.W.2d 744 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, no pet.), the court wrote at 746:
"... For two reasons, this ground of error presents nothing for review. First, appellant cites no authority for this proposition as required by TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 40.09(9) (Vernon Supp. 1985). McWherter v. State, 607 S.W.2d 531, 536 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)....”
The Corker case boldly and unequivocally holds that where the appellant cites no authority for his ground of error proposition then nothing is presented for review.
In McWherter v. State, 607 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), the court wrote, at 536, as follows:
“The appellant does not brief the ground of error, does not cite any authority and merely calls the matter to our attention. The brief does not comply with Article 40.09, sec. 9, V.A.C.C.P., and presents nothing for review....”
It must be remembered that Lloyd Dale Martin and his wife, Martha June Martin [sometimes called “June Martha Martin”], were tried together. It is clear to me that the argument complained of was directed against Lloyd Dale Martin and, from a careful reading of the entirety of the arguments, it is clear that the argument was not directed against Martha June Martin.
Furthermore, the State had a right, and a duty, in my opinion, to introduce these exhibits in order to carry its burden of proof against Lloyd Dale Martin.
I would hold that the State had a right to make this argument, which was directed against Lloyd, under the authority of Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Crim.App.1973)
The charge against Martha June Martin was that she did, intentionally and knowingly, possess a controlled substance, to-wit: methamphetamine. The record before us definitely demonstrates that Martha June Martin had in her possession a rather large bag or purse. This purse was placed beside her as she was sitting on a sofa or divan. Almost immediately after the law enforcement officer entered the room in which Martha June Martin was located, she grabbed this purse from her side and put it in her lap.
This was done in a suspicious and furtive manner. The officer, under the facts, had a right to examine this rather large purse to search for weapons in order to protect his life. The officer also had a right to preserve contraband and evidence. Immediately upon opening the large purse, a rather large bag containing methamphetamine was observed, located in the very upper part of Martha June’s purse. This purse, containing the contraband, was located on her lap and she was clutching and *33protecting the purse and its contents in such a mode or manner so as to invite the examination of the same by an enforcement officer. A search warrant existed. The record reflects that there had been a search warrant issued to search the house of one Ron Yarbrough, on Sweetgum Lane, in Conroe, Montgomery County. Martha June Martin was in the Yarbrough’s house.
The officers had to act quickly because they were under a duty, acting, of course, in good faith, to prevent the destruction of relevant evidence, such as contraband, narcotics or constrolled substances, because this kind of evidence can be easily destroyed or removed by flushing the same down a toilet or by similar action. Mrs. Martin definitely acted as if she was trying to conceal her purse or its contents. When her purse was opened, immediately a strong, distinctive odor was noticed. This odor was definitely recognized as the strong, pungent odor of methamphetamine. The expert chemist who testified swore that methamphetamine gave off a definite, distinctive, strong, pungent odor. The evidence glaringly shows that the officers actually recovered the contraband directly from the person of Martha June Martin.
Again, it should be stressed that when the one sentence argument was spoken by the State’s attorney, there was absolutely no objection made to it. There was no motion to strike that sentence. There was no motion to disregard the one sentence. There was no motion for a mistrial. The busy, diligent trial judge had absolutely no chance to pass upon that one sentence.
I think the evidence in this case is overwhelming against Martha June Martin. I think that this is a correct and accurate summation of the facts taken from the argument of Texas:
“I think, from the evidence, you’re not going to have any problem finding June Martha Martin guilty of the offense of possession of methamphetamine. You heard all the evidence presented showing that she had this large bag, nearly two ounces of methamphetamine sitting right on top of her purse which was right next to her or on her lap at the different times material to the events we’re talking about here. She had the stuff in her hands. If that’s not possession, there’s no such thing as possession.
“There is a little bit different case which I will get to in a minute with reference to Mr. Martin_” (Emphasis added)
I have reread Vernon Lee Rose v. State, the OPINION ON COURT’S OWN MOTION FOR REHEARING, authored by Judge Judge Campbell, delivered June 15, 1988, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). (Opinion on Rehearing, 752 S.W.2d 552), the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“Tex.R.App.Pro. 81(b)(2) provides the general harmless error test to be applied by appellate courts in criminal cases.
“If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.
Tex.R.App.Pro. 81(b)(2). This rule has been applied in a variety of contexts,5 and it has been specifically applied to the denial of state and federal constitutional rights. Erwin v. State, 729 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (compulsory process for defendant). Because there is no countervailing procedural rule or statutory provision, the harm analysis codified in Rule 81(b)(2) is applicable to the error in this case.”
In my opinion, the immediate, above quote applies to the appeal of Mrs. Martin, if any error has been shown. I would vote to affirm her conviction.

"5 Murphy v. State, (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (Motion for rehearing pending) (evidence of extraneous bad acts); Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (improper jury argument); Bennett v. State, 742 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (appointment of psychiatrist to examine defendant solely for the purpose of determining future dangerousness[) ].” ___ .