Court Opinion

ID: 9352071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 20:06:49.905896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:52.243256
License: Public Domain

J-A24009-22

                         2023 PA Super 1

 RICHARD SHELLENBERGER AND          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 PAMELA SHELLENBERGER, H/W          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 KREIDER FARMS                      :
                                    :   No. 455 EDA 2022
                                    :
 RICHARD SHELLENBERGER AND          :
 PAMELA SHELLENBERGER, H/W          :
                                    :
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 CLARK-RELIANCE CORPORATION,        :
 INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR      :
 IN INTEREST TO JERGUSON GAGE &     :
 VALVE COMPANY DURAMETALLIC         :
 MANUFACTURING COMPANY FULTON       :
 BOILER WORKS, INC. PFIZER, INC.,   :
 AS THE PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR       :
 THE QUIGLEY COMPANY, INC.          :
 ROWLANDS SALES COMPANY, INC.       :
                                    :
                                    :
 RICHARD SHELLENBERGER AND          :
 PAMELA SHELLENBERGER, H/W          :
                                    :
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 KREIDER DAIRY FARMS, INC.,         :
 INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR      :
 TO NOAH W. KREIDER, D/B/A          :
 KREIDER FARMS, NOAH W. KREIDER     :
 AND SONS, AS SUCCESSOR TO          :
 KREIDER DAIRY FARMS, INC. AND      :
 AS SUCCESSOR TO NOAH W.            :
J-A24009-22

 KREIDER, D/B/A KREIDER FARMS,             :
 PECORA CORPORATION                        :
                                           :
                                           :
 APPEAL OF: PAMELA K.                      :
 SHELLENBERGER, EXECUTRIX OF               :
 THE ESTATE OF RICHARD M.
 SHELLENBERGER, DECEASED, AND
 INDIVIDUALLY AS WIDOW IN HER
 OWN RIGHT

             Appeal from the Order Entered November 27, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 171103049,
                          181000745, 181100973

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                         FILED JANUARY 4, 2023

      Pamela K. Shellenberger, executrix of the estate of Richard M.

Shellenberger, deceased, and individually as widow in her own right

(“Appellant”), appeals from the order entered on November 27, 2019, in the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which granted summary

judgment in favor of the appellees, Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc., individually and

as successor to Noah W. Kreider, d/b/a Kreider Farms, and Noah W. Kreider

& Sons, LLP, as successor to Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. and as successor to

Noah W. Kreider, d/b/a Kreider Farms (collectively “Kreider Farms” or

“Appellees”).   After careful consideration, we reverse and remand with

instructions.

      This appeal arises from an asbestos-related personal injury action

commenced by Richard and Pamela Shellenberger, husband and wife, on

November 8, 2018, at docket no. 1811-00973, in the Court of Common Pleas

                                     -2-
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of   Philadelphia    County,       against    Appellees,      in    their    capacity       as   Mr.

Shellenberger’s      employers,1       and     Pecora    Corporation          (“Pecora”),        the

manufacturer        of   an   asbestos-containing          furnace          cement   that        Mr.

Shellenberger       worked    with    while    employed        by     Appellees.2,      3        The

Shellenbergers       essentially     averred    that    Mr.        Shellenberger     developed

malignant mesothelioma as a result of his exposure to asbestos while working

at Kreider Farms, and alleged negligence on the part of Appellees as a result

of, inter alia, their failure to warn and protect Mr. Shellenberger from the

dangers of asbestos that existed at the worksite. See Complaint, 11/8/18, at

¶¶ 6-8, 11-27.4
____________________________________________

1 Appellees provide that Noah W. Kreider & Sons, LLP, is a Pennsylvania limited
partnership formed in 1956, Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc., is a Pennsylvania
corporation formed in May of 1975, and “Kreider Farms” is a trade name. See
Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”), 9/17/19, at Exhibit B
(“Certification of Ronald E. Kreider”). Ronald E. Kreider certified that he is a
partner of Noah W. Kreider & Sons, LLP, and that he is a shareholder and the
current president of Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. Id.

2 For the purposes of litigation, the trial court consolidated this action with
prior related actions commenced by Mr. and Mrs. Shellenberger on November
30, 2017, at docket no. 1711-03049, against Kreider Farms, and on October
5, 2018, at docket no. 1810-00745, against Clark-Reliance Corporation,
Durametallic Manufacturing Company, Fulton Boiler Works, Inc., Pfizer, Inc.,
and Rowlands Sales Company, Inc.

3 Pecora filed a motion for summary judgment on September 17, 2019, which
was denied by the trial court on November 26, 2019. The parties subsequently
reached a settlement as to the claims against Pecora. Pecora is not a party
to this appeal.

4 Mr. Shellenberger died on January 21, 2019, after the commencement of
this action, leaving Ms. Shellenberger, as executrix of the estate of Richard
Shellenberger and in her own right, as the sole plaintiff.

                                             -3-
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      More specifically, the complaint averred the following: As the general

manager of dairy plant operations employed by Kreider Farms from 1972

through September 1980, Mr. Shellenberger worked directly with and was

proximately exposed to asbestos and/or asbestos-containing products on a

regular and frequent basis.     Id. at ¶¶ 6, 12, 14.      Mr. Shellenberger was

diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in May of 2017. Id. at 8. Appellees

knew or reasonably should have known of the hazardous, dangerous, and

harmful conditions created by the asbestos maintained on their property. Id.

at ¶ 18. Mr. Shellenberger was neither aware nor should have been expected

to be aware of such hazardous conditions. Id. at ¶ 19. Appellees failed to

exercise reasonable care to protect Mr. Shellenberger from the dangers of the

asbestos on their property. Id. at ¶ 20. Mr. Shellenberger’s injuries “were

due proximately to the carelessness, recklessness, and negligence” of

Appellees.   Id. at ¶ 21.     Said carelessness, recklessness, and negligence

consisted of the following:

      a.     Failing to maintain the premises in a safe manner;

      b.     Permitting the premises to remain unsafe, hazardous and
             harmful for any person, including [Mr. Shellenberger], to set
             upon without sustaining personal injuries;

      c.     Failing to employ reasonable prudence and care to keep the
             premises in a safe condition;

      d.     Failing to protect the rights, safety and position of [Mr.
             Shellenberger], who was lawfully upon said premises;

      e.     Failing to properly instruct its agents, servants, workmen
             and employees;

      f.     Permitting a dangerous condition to exist;

                                      -4-
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       g.     Failing to inspect and maintain said premises;

       h.     Failing to remove and permit to remain hazardous and
              dangerous conditions on said premises;

       i.     Failing to give proper and adequate notice of the dangerous
              and hazardous conditions on said premises;

       j.     Failing to warn [Mr. Shellenberger] of the dangerous
              conditions of the premises;

       k.     Allowing said dangerous and hazardous conditions to exist
              on said premises for an unreasonable length of time after
              [Appellees] had knowledge or should and could have had
              knowledge of the aforesaid conditions;

       l.     Violating the applicable laws of the Commonwealth of
              Pennsylvania;

       m.     Otherwise failing to use due care under the circumstances;

       n.     Was negligent as a matter of law;

       o.     Was otherwise negligent in other ways as shall appear in the
              course of discovery to be conducted pursuant to the
              Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure or at the trial of the
              instant matter.

Id. at ¶ 21. Appellees’ conduct was a factual cause of Mr. Shellenberger’s

losses and damages. Id. at ¶ 27.5
____________________________________________

5 We acknowledge that this action was properly brought against Appellees,
pursuant to Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2013), in which our
Supreme Court determined that claims for an occupational disease which
manifests outside of the 300-week period prescribed by Section 301(c)(2) of
the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. §§ 1-104.1; 2501-2626 (the “Act”),
do not fall within the purview of the Act and, therefore, the exclusivity
provision of Section 303(a) does not apply to preclude an employee from filing
a common law claim against an employer. Id. at 855. The Court explained:

       Employers, like any other entity not covered by the Act, will be
       subject to traditional tort liability requiring a showing by the
       plaintiff of, inter alia, negligence on the part of the employer, and
       employers will retain all of their common law defenses. Plaintiffs,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -5-
J-A24009-22

       Mr. Shellenberger was deposed on December 10, 2018, approximately

one month before his death. His testimony provides further background and

was summarized by the trial court as follows:

       [Mr.] Shellenberger testified that[,] in 1972[,] he was approached
       by Noah Kreider, Jr.[,] about building a dairy processing plant and
       retail store for the family’s farming business. Noah Kreider, Jr.
       was one of two sons of the business’s founder….

       Mr. Shellenberger testified that when he began work [sic] the
       dairy processing plant and dairy store did not yet exist — “it was
       meadow.” Mr. Shellenberger was to be the “clerk of the works”
       who was to “make sure it’s built as expected.” Mr. Shellenberger
       “was there during the whole construction of the plant.” After the
       structure was finished in June 1972, Mr. Shellenberger was
       responsible for managing [the] day-to-day operations of the plant,
       a position he held throughout the 1970s.

       Mr. Shellenberger was asked “whether anyone at Kreider[ Farms]
       had any specialized knowledge” of operating the milk plant and he
       answered, “They did not, other than they knew how to produce
       milk.” But Mr. Shellenberger had no experience overseeing a
       construction project or operating a dairy project either.

       Mr. Shellenberger testified that all the equipment for the
       processing plant was supplied by a company called Rowlands
       Sales. This includes the plant’s boiler that was the alleged source
       of his exposure to asbestos. Mr. Shellenberger was involved in
       ordering the equipment for the processing plant. Rowlands Sales
       made recommendations about products and design for the plant.
       Mr. Shellenberger believed that Kreider [Farms] was relying on
       Rowlands Sales for its expertise. Mr. Shellenberger testified that,
       as general manager, he ordered gauge glass gaskets, handhold

____________________________________________

       in turn, will bear the higher burden of proof in terms of causation
       and liability.

Id. at 865. See Complaint at ¶ 25 (stating that Mr. Shellenberger’s injuries
accrued more than 300 weeks after his last date of employment with Kreider
Farms).

                                           -6-
J-A24009-22

      gaskets, sight glass gaskets, clean-out door gaskets, and furnace
      cement from Rowlands Sales.

      Mr. Shellenberger testified that he believed he was exposed to
      asbestos while working on the boiler at Kreider[ Farms’] dairy
      processing plant. The boiler required daily, monthly, and semi-
      monthly maintenance. Every day the boiler had to be “blown
      down” to remove any scale or “junk” that had collected there. The
      blow-down process could sometimes cause the boiler’s “gauge
      glass” (used to inspect the boiler’s water level) to leak. When this
      occurred, the gaskets on the gauge glass had to be replaced. The
      gaskets he used were marked “asbestos.” Mr. Shellenberger
      testified he would have to replace the gaskets “usually weekly” for
      eight years. Mr. Shellenberger also testified he was exposed to
      asbestos from the boiler through the removal and installation of
      handhole gaskets, handling asbestos insulation, and cleaning the
      sight glass gaskets. Mr. Shellenberger testified that at the time
      he worked at Kreider [Farms,] he was not concerned about seeing
      the word “asbestos” on the packaging of the products he used[,]
      as he did not become aware that asbestos was dangerous until
      sometime in the mid-to-late 1980s.

      Mr. Shellenberger testified that plant safety was part of his duties
      “[t]o a point. To a very minor point.” Noah W. Kreider, Jr. would
      direct Mr. Shellenberger on some aspects of the work Mr.
      Shellenberger did, but Mr. Kreider “had very little to say about the
      boiler room.” Mr. Shellenberger admitted that no one at Kreider
      [Farms] was more knowledgeable than himself about the boiler,
      its parts, and the cleaning process. Mr. Shellenberger stated he
      had no facts to support that Mr. Kreider knew the asbestos-
      containing parts that Mr. Shellenberger worked with were
      hazardous, although Mr. Shellenberger testified that he expected
      Mr. Kreider would have known more about the asbestos-
      containing materials than he did.

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 5/17/22, at 1-5 (citations to record omitted).

      On September 17, 2019, Appellees filed a motion for summary

judgment, averring that there are no material facts in dispute, that Appellant

failed to produce evidence to support her negligence claim against them, and

that Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See MSJ at 6.

                                     -7-
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Appellees stated there was no evidence that they ever breached any duty to

Mr. Shellenberger and emphasized that they had no knowledge regarding the

dangers of asbestos during the time Mr. Shellenberger was employed at their

dairy processing plant. Id. at 5-7. Appellant filed an answer in opposition to

Appellees’ motion, arguing that Appellees owed Mr. Shellenberger a duty, as

his employers, to provide a safe work environment and that, by exposing him

to asbestos, when they knew or should have known that it posed a danger to

his health, Appellees breached that duty. Answer to MSJ, 10/4/19, at 1-2.

Appellant argued that Appellees were not entitled to summary judgment as a

matter of law, as she adduced sufficient facts and evidence to establish a

prima facie case of negligence against them.             Moreover, she attached Mr.

Shellenberger’s deposition transcript and additional documents to her

response that she claims raise genuine issues of material fact, precluding the

entry of summary judgment.           Id.       On November 27, 2019, the trial court

entered an order granting Appellees’ request for summary judgment and

dismissing all claims and cross-claims against Appellees with prejudice.

Appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration of the order, which the trial

court denied on December 9, 2019.

       On February 10, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal,6

followed by a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of

____________________________________________

6We deem Appellant’s notice of appeal from the November 27, 2019 order to
be timely, as the order did not become final and appealable until January 14,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
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matters complained of on appeal. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion

on May 17, 2022. Appellant now presents the following issue for our review:

       When the evidence is viewed in accordance with the applicable
       standards, did the trial court err in granting [Appellees’] motion
       where … the trial court’s order was directly contrary to: (a) the
       evidence presented by way of both [Appellees’] motion and
       [Appellant’s] opposition to motion for summary judgment…; (b)
       the law governing the duty that [Appellees] — as a matter of law
       — owed to Richard Shellenberger as a Kreider [Farms] employee;
       and (c) the legal standard governing the consideration of motions
       for summary judgment?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (cleaned up).

       Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is well-

settled:

       We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
       party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
       material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only
       where there is no material fact and it is clear that the moving party
       is entitled to judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment
       be entered. Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting
       or denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of
       review is clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where
       it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused
       its discretion.

____________________________________________

2022, upon the trial court’s entry of an order declaring the case settled as to
all non-bankrupt parties, with the exception of the dismissal of one defendant
without prejudice to be reopened as an arbitration matter. See Quinn v.
Bupp, 955 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[I]nterlocutory orders that
are not subject to immediate appeal as of right … become reviewable on
appeal upon the trial court’s entry of a final order.”); Harahan v. AC & S,
Inc., 816 A.2d 296, 297 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“A trial court order declaring a
case settled as to all remaining parties renders prior grants of summary
judgment final for [Pa.R.A.P.] 341 purposes, even if the prior orders entered
disposed of fewer than all claims against all parties.”) (citation omitted).

                                           -9-
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Siciliano v. Mueller, 149 A.3d 863, 864 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

      Moreover, we recognize that:

      “Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an
      issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order
      to survive summary judgment.” Babb v. Ctr. Cmty. Hosp., 47
      A.3d 1214, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted), appeal
      denied, … 65 A.3d 412 ([Pa.] 2013). Further, “failure of a non-
      moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential
      to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof establishes
      the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of
      law.” Id.

         Thus, our responsibility as an appellate court is to determine
         whether the record either establishes that the material facts
         are undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of facts to
         make out a prima facie cause of action, such that there is
         no issue to be decided by the fact-finder. If there is
         evidence that would allow a fact-finder to render a verdict
         in favor of the non-moving party, then summary judgment
         should be denied.

      Id.[ (]quoting Reeser v. NGK N. Am., Inc., 14 A.3d 896, 898
      (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted)[)].

Truax v. Roulhac, 126 A.3d 991, 997 (Pa. Super. 2015).

      Instantly, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of Appellees, as sufficient evidence has been

presented to establish a prima facie case of negligence. It is well-settled that

in order to establish a viable cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must

demonstrate the following four elements:

      (1) a duty or obligation recognized by the law that requires an
      actor to conform his actions to a standard of conduct for the
      protection of others against unreasonable risks; (2) failure on the
      part of the defendant to conform to that standard of conduct, i.e.,
      a breach of duty; (3) a reasonably close causal connection
      between the breach of duty and the injury sustained; and (4)
      actual loss or damages that result from the breach.

                                     - 10 -
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Gutteridge v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 804 A.2d 643, 654 (Pa. Super.

2002) (citation omitted). Thus, the mere fact that a party was injured is not

enough to entitle that person to damages.      “A plaintiff must show that a

defendant owed a duty of care, and that this duty was breached. Indeed, the

issue of whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff is the

primary question in a negligence suit.” Id. at 655.

      In support of her argument, Appellant avers that she proffered sufficient

legal authority and factual evidence to establish the following: Appellees owed

Mr. Shellenberger a duty to provide him with a safe working environment;

Appellees breached that duty by exposing him on a regular, frequent, and

proximate basis, to asbestos-laden dust created by the daily, monthly, and

semi-annual maintenance work that Mr. Shellenberger was required to

perform on the boiler at the dairy processing plant; Appellees knew Mr.

Shellenberger was working with asbestos-containing boiler components;

Appellees should have known, with the exercise of reasonable care, that

exposure to asbestos presented a significant risk to the health and safety of

exposed workers; and as a direct and proximate result of Appellees’ exposing

Mr. Shellenberger to the asbestos-laden dust, Mr. Shellenberger developed —

and ultimately died from — asbestos-related malignant mesothelioma.

Appellant’s Brief at 52-53.

      Appellees counter that summary judgment was proper because:

Appellees hired Mr. Shellenberger to oversee the construction of the dairy

processing plant, as they lacked such experience; Appellees relied upon

                                    - 11 -
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suppliers to make recommendations on the necessary components to run the

dairy processing plant; Mr. Shellenberger ordered many parts and supplies for

the dairy processing plant; Mr. Shellenberger was in charge of safety at the

dairy processing plant; Appellees had very little to say about the boiler room;

Appellees had a good track record for safety; Mr. Shellenberger was not

concerned about the word “asbestos” on packaging; Mr. Shellenberger did not

become aware of the dangers of asbestos until the late 1980s; no one was

more knowledgeable about the boiler, its parts, and the cleaning process than

Mr. Shellenberger; and Mr. Shellenberger had no facts to support that

Appellees knew the asbestos-containing parts of the boiler were hazardous.

Appellees’ Brief at 17-18.7
____________________________________________

7 While Appellees’ argument focuses on their lack of experience in the dairy
processing industry and their lack of knowledge regarding the dangers of
asbestos, we note that they also raised in a footnote the defense that Kreider
Dairy Farms, Inc. owed no duty to Mr. Shellenberger, as there is no proof that
Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. ever employed him. See id. at 13 n.1. Appellees
suggest, rather, that Mr. Shellenberger would have been employed only by
Noah W. Kreider & Sons, LLP. Id. at 5. Contra Appellant’s Brief at 9 n.1
(indicating that Mr. Shellenberger was employed by Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc.
during the relevant period of 1975 to 1980). We therefore deem the issue
regarding if and when Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. employed Mr. Shellenberger
to be a disputed issue of material fact for the fact-finder to decide. For our
purposes of reviewing the trial court’s granting of summary judgment, we view
the record in the light most favorable to Appellant. Siciliano, 149 A.3d at
864. Instantly, Appellant produced certified records from the Social Security
Administration, which indicate Mr. Shellenberger’s employer as “Noah W.
Kreider” from 1972 to 1975, “Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc.” from 1975 to 1983,
and “Noah W. Kreider & Sons, LLP” from 1983 to 1999. See Answer to MSJ
at Exhibit A (“Statement of Earnings”); Appellant’s Reply Brief at 16 n.2.
Hence, we conclude that Appellant met her burden of establishing each of
Appellees’ status as Mr. Shellenberger’s employers with sufficient evidence to
survive a motion for summary judgment. Truax, 126 A.3d at 997.

                                          - 12 -
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      The trial court agreed with Appellees and granted their motion for

summary judgment.      In support of its decision, the trial court stated that

Appellant’s claims “fail as a matter of law owing to the unique circumstances

of this case.” TCO at 7. The court reasoned:

      Under traditional negligence principles, it cannot be maintained
      that [Appellees] acted unreasonably in failing to warn Mr.
      Shellenberger of the dangers of asbestos. The evidence plainly
      showed that Mr. Shellenberger was hired both to build and
      manage the dairy processing plant. This included the boiler that
      Mr. Shellenberger was responsible for servicing and maintaining.
      There was no evidence that [Appellees] possessed any knowledge
      of the dangers of asbestos. No binding appellate authority exists
      to justify the imposition on [Appellees] of a higher duty to discover
      this danger for the purposes of protecting [their] employee[,] to
      prevent him [from] installing a boiler with asbestos-containing
      products[,] or to warn him of the need to take additional
      precautions if he did.

      Even if the duty to provide a safe workplace is “nondelegable,” as
      Ms. Shellenberger urges, it would stretch the concept of
      negligence too far to say that [Appellees] violated a duty to Mr.
      Shellenberger. The workplace provided to Mr. Shellenberger was,
      according to his own testimony, a “meadow” on which he was
      tasked with building a dairy processing plant. There is no evidence
      that either party was aware of the dangers posed by asbestos,
      and it would not further any policy of the law to select [Appellees]
      to bear the costs of Ms. Shellenberger’s alleged asbestos
      exposure.

Id. at 8 (citations to record omitted).

      Based on the foregoing, it is clear that in reaching its decision, the trial

court held Appellees to a standard of conduct which imposed on them only a

duty to protect their employees from known dangers. Whereas the crux of

Appellant’s argument is that, as employers and landowners, Appellees owed

Mr. Shellenberger a heightened duty of care to not only protect him from

                                     - 13 -
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known dangers, but also from dangers that could have been discovered with

reasonable care. Hence, it is essential that we determine whether the trial

court applied the appropriate standard in this matter.

       At common law, “[t]he standard of care a possessor of land owes to one

who enters upon the land depends upon whether the latter is a trespasser,

licensee, or invitee.” Gutteridge, 804 A.2d at 655 (citing Emge v. Hagosky,

712 A.2d 315, 317 (Pa. Super. 1998)).8 Pennsylvania law defines “invitee” as

follows:

       (1)    An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.

       (2)    A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain
              on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which
              the land is held open to the public.

       (3)    A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or
              remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected
              with business dealings with the possessor of land.

Id. at 655-56 (quoting Updyke v. BP Oil Co., 717 A.2d 546, 549 (Pa. Super.

1998)).9

       The duty of care owed to a business invitee (or business
       visitor) is the highest duty owed to any entrant upon land.
       The landowner must protect an invitee not only against
       known dangers, but also against those which might be

____________________________________________

8As neither party asserts that Mr. Shellenberger was a trespasser or licensee
and Appellant’s theory of negligence is predicated on his status as an “invitee”
or “business visitor,” we need not delve into the definitions of a trespasser
and/or a licensee.

9 Our law uses the terms “business visitor” and “business invitee” almost
synonymously. Id. at 656.

                                          - 14 -
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       discovered with reasonable care. Our case law sets forth the
       duty that a possessor of land owes to business invitees as follows:

          A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm
          caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only
          if, he

          (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
          discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an
          unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

          (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
          danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

          (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against
          the danger.

Id. at 656 (quoting Summer v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 743 A.2d 498, 506

(Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc) (internal citations omitted; emphasis added)).

“With respect to the employer/employee or master/servant relationship, a

servant, whether an industrial employee or a domestic servant, is a business

visitor at common law.” Geier v. Board of Public Education of the School

District of Pittsburgh, 153 A.3d 1189, 1199 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citing

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 cmt. j. (1965)).10 “If the invitee is an

____________________________________________

10 We recognize that “a decision of the Commonwealth Court is not binding
precedent upon this Court; however, it may be considered for its persuasive
value.” Holland ex rel. Holland v. Marcy, 817 A.2d 1082, 1083 n.1 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Moreover, we agree with the trial court that
the decision in Geier is apposite here, as Geier similarly involved a negligence
action brought by an employee and her husband against her former employer,
alleging injury from exposure to asbestos dust during her time of employment.
See TCO at 7 (citing Geier, 153 A.3d at 1194). In discussing the duty owed
by the former employer to its employee, the Court determined that under
common law, the employee “would have been entitled to the protections
afforded a business invitee while on the [employer’s] premises[.]” Geier, 153
A.3d at 1200.

                                          - 15 -
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industrial employee, the purpose of his entry is directly connected with the

business which the possessor conducts upon the land.” Id.

      Additionally, Chapter 14 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency sets

forth the rules which determine the liability of a master to a servant, or an

employer to an employee.      “In creating and maintaining the conditions of

employment, the master has a duty to his servants to have precautions taken

which reasonable care, intelligence and regard for the safety of his servants

require.”   Restatement (Second) of Agency § 493 (1958).       Comment a to

Section 493 states in part:

      In creating the conditions under which his servants are to work,
      the master must conform to the conduct of the ordinary[,] prudent
      person having the special knowledge which, as stated in Section
      495, the employer is required to have. The employer is not an
      insurer. The precautions he is required to take vary with the
      dangers of the enterprise in which his servants are engaged.
      Thus, in a simple business not involving substantial likelihood of
      harm, the precautions required are correspondingly small.
      Insofar as the work is conducted on his premises, his duties
      to his employees are, in most cases, substantially the same
      as those of a landowner to any business visitor.

Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 493 cmt. a (1958) (emphasis added).

      Moreover, “[a] master is subject to a duty to his servants to conduct his

business in the light of knowledge which he has, and of such knowledge as

to the conditions likely to harm his servants as persons experienced

in the business and having special acquaintance with the subject

matter have.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 495 (1958) (emphasis

added). As explained in the comments to Section 495:

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     Ordinarily, a servant has reason to believe that his employer is
     himself an expert or has employed experts who have the special
     knowledge requisite to create safe conditions of employment,
     including the maintaining of safe structures, the supplying of
     proper instrumentalities, the orderly arrangement of the business,
     and the other matters as to which the employer has special duties
     to his servants. If the servant so believes, the master is subject
     to liability unless his plant, equipment, and methods are
     reasonably safe in view of what is generally known by experts in
     his business.
                                     ***

     The knowledge which is required of an employer includes
     a knowledge of generally known scientific discoveries and
     inventions applicable to conditions of safety in his business.
     He is required to inform himself of current advances and of
     the progress in industries of the same nature as his own….
     He is also under a duty to realize the limits of knowledge of those
     whom he employs, so that he can guard them against dangers
     which he is required to know, but of which he should know they
     may[]be unaware.

Id. at cmt. a, c (emphasis added).

     Regarding notice to a master or employer of dangerous conditions,

Section 496 provides:

     For the purpose of determining whether or not due care has been
     used in the performance of the non-delegable duties of the master
     to his servants, the master has notice of facts affecting the safety
     of his servants if notice of such facts comes to him, or to a servant
     or other person whose duty it is to act upon them in the
     performance of the master’s duty to protect his servants.

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 496 (1958).         Under Section 496, “[a]

master has a duty to take care to ascertain facts which would indicate

danger to his servants, and to take action upon them, if discovered.”

Id. at cmt. a (emphasis added).       “Likewise, if he ascertains facts which

indicate danger, although he was under no antecedent duty to ascertain them,

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or even though the exercise of due care would not necessarily have

ascertained them, he is under a duty to take suitable action.” Id.

       Applying the foregoing principles, we agree with Appellant that

Appellees must be held to a heightened duty of care. As employers, Appellees

owed their employees, including Mr. Shellenberger, a duty to protect them not

only from known dangers, but also from those which might be discovered with

reasonable care. See Gutteridge, 804 A.2d at 656; Geier, 153 A.3d at 1199;

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 cmt. j. (1965). Moreover, Appellees had

a duty to their employees to create and maintain a safe work environment,

conforming to the conduct of an ordinary, prudent person who has special

knowledge as a person experienced in the business.         See Restatement

(Second) of Agency §§ 493; 493 cmt. a.; 495 (1958). This includes taking

steps to protect their employees from conditions likely to cause them harm.

See id. at § 495. Additionally, Appellees were required to have knowledge of

generally known scientific discoveries, to take care to ascertain facts which

would indicate danger to their employees, and to take appropriate action if

discovered. See id. at §§ 495 cmt. c.; 496 cmt. a.

       While the trial court seemingly adopted the appropriate, heightened

standard of care for determining the duty owed by Appellees in this matter,11

____________________________________________

11See TCO at 7 (citing Geier, 153 A.3d at 1200 (acknowledging that the
employee is a business invitee as defined in Gutteridge and, thus, owed a
duty to be protected not only against known dangers, but also against those
dangers that might be discovered with reasonable care)); id. (quoting Geier,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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we discern that it erred in its application of this standard.    Rather than

determining whether the record contained any evidence to support Appellant’s

claim that Appellees should have known of the hazardous conditions created

by the asbestos-containing boiler parts, the trial court considered only

whether Appellant had established that Appellees had actual knowledge of the

hazards of asbestos. See id. at 7-8 (holding that Appellant’s claims fail as a

matter of law and reasoning that “[t]here was no evidence that Kreider

[Farms] possessed any knowledge of the dangers of asbestos”). This was a

clear error of law.

       Having determined that Appellees, as a matter of law, owed a

heightened duty to exercise reasonable care to protect Mr. Shellenberger from

the hazards of asbestos contained on the worksite, the relevant question then

becomes whether Appellees knew or should have known of such hazards. We

agree with the trial court that the record is lacking evidence to prove that,

during the relevant time period of Mr. Shellenberger’s exposure, Appellees

had actual knowledge that asbestos posed a danger to their employees’

health.    However, we believe the record before the trial court contained

sufficient evidence from which a jury could have concluded that Appellees

should have known of the dangers of asbestos.

____________________________________________

154 A.3d at 1204 (stating “an employer is charged with such knowledge as to
the conditions likely to harm its servants as persons experienced in the
business and having special acquaintance with the subject matter have”)).

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      Appellant presented evidence in the form of expert reports, as well as

medical journals and publications from the Pennsylvania Department of Labor

and the Pennsylvania Department of Health, establishing that the dangers of

asbestos were generally known in the 1960s.             For instance, Appellant

produced an expert report prepared by Gerald E. Markowitz, Ph.D., and David

Rosner, Ph.D., in which they conducted a historical review of the relevant

medical, scientific, and industrial literature, as well as other publicly available

information, to determine, inter alia, when it was known and therefore

knowable that breathing dust containing asbestos could cause cancer. Answer

to MSJ at Exhibit M (“Expert Report”). Markowitz and Rosner concluded that,

beginning in the 1930s, there was a suspected link between breathing

asbestos dust and cancer, and that the link was acknowledged by many

medical researchers by the mid-1940s. See Expert Report at 4. By the early

1960s, they reported that the range of diseases and cancers associated with

asbestos exposure, including mesothelioma, were widely acknowledged and

documented. Id. at 5. See also Answer to MSJ at Exhibit N (“Report of Barry

I. Castleman, Sc.D.”) (discussing the known risks to individuals who were

exposed to asbestos dating back to the 1940s); Id. at Exhibit P

(“Chronological List of Relevant Articles”) (providing summaries of numerous

publications, ranging from 1918 through 1978, regarding asbestos and its link

to cancer); Id. at Exhibit R & S (“Special Bulletins”) (Pennsylvania Department

of Labor’s special bulletins nos. 37 and 42, published in 1934 and 1935,

respectively, regarding “asbestosis”); Id. at Exhibit T (“Act No. 552”)

                                      - 20 -
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(reflecting the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Compensation Act, 77

Pa.C.S. § 1101 et seq., effective January 1, 1938, which supplemented the

Workers’ Compensation Act by including occupational diseases, such as

asbestosis, within the scope of the Act).    In July 1964, the Pennsylvania

Department of Health’s Occupational Division issued a hygienic information

guide regarding asbestos, in which it noted the growing accumulation of

evidence that exposure to asbestos fibers may cause cancer of the lung, see

id. at Exhibit X (“Hygienic Information Guide No. 7”), and in the fall of 1965,

it warned of the link to lung cancer and mesothelioma from occupational

exposure to airborne asbestos dust. See id. at Exhibit Y (“News & Views”).

      Significantly, Appellant also pointed out that in June 1972, the same

month that Kreider Farms’ dairy processing plant began operating, the

Occupational Safety    and Health     Administration   (“OSHA”)   enacted   its

regulations regarding workplace exposures to asbestos. Appellant’s Brief at

45 (citing Answer to MSJ at Exhibit BB (“Standard for Exposure to Asbestos

Dust”)).   These regulations required employers, within six months of their

publication, to begin monitoring any place of employment where asbestos

fibers were released to determine if each of its employee’s exposure to

asbestos fibers was below the allowable limit. Id. at 45-46. The regulations

further established methods of compliance, including the adoption of safer

work practices, the provision of personal protection equipment and changing

rooms, posting caution signs in areas where airborne concentrations of

asbestos fibers may exceed the permissible exposure limits, and imposing

                                    - 21 -
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restrictions on the disposal of asbestos waste. Id. at 46-47. Appellant asserts

that despite these federally mandated requirements, Appellees failed to

monitor the asbestos levels at the plant and failed to implement any

procedures to protect their employees from exposure to asbestos. Id. at 68-

69.

       We believe the foregoing evidence viewed in a light most favorable to

Appellant would enable a reasonable jury to conclude that Appellees should

have known of the dangers of asbestos and the risk that the asbestos-

containing boiler components posed to Mr. Shellenberger’s health, and that

Appellees therefore had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect him from

said hazardous conditions. Thus, the trial court should not have decided this

issue as a matter of law. See Gutteridge, 804 A.2d at 660 (concluding that

summary judgment was not appropriate where the plaintiff averred facts

sufficient to create a material dispute as to whether the defendant landowner

had superior knowledge concerning the hazards posed by invisible asbestos

contamination and, thus, breached its duty to the plaintiff, a business invitee).

       Moreover, while “[t]he existence of a duty is a question of law for the

court to decide[,12] … the determination of whether an act or failure to act

____________________________________________

12 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B (1965) (providing, in relevant
part, that “[i]n an action for negligence the court determines: (a) whether the
evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which the jury may reasonably
find the existence or non-existence of such facts; (b) whether such facts give
rise to any legal duty on the part of the defendant; (c) the standard of conduct
required of the defendant by his legal duty”).

                                          - 22 -
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constitutes negligence … in view of all the evidence has always been

particularly committed to a determination by a jury.” Straw v. Fair, 187 A.3d

966, 983 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing R.W. v. Manzek, 888 A.2d 740, 76 (Pa.

2005); Snead v. SPCA, 929 A.2d 1169, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2007)).13 Thus,

the trial court erred in determining that Appellees’ failure to warn Mr.

Shellenberger of the dangers of asbestos did not constitute negligence. See

TCO at 8 (“Under traditional negligence principles, it cannot be maintained

that [Appellees] acted unreasonably in failing to warn Mr. Shellenberger of the

dangers of asbestos.”).         We believe that Appellant presented sufficient

evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact that Appellees’ failure to

protect Mr. Shellenberger from exposure to asbestos constituted a breach of

the duty they owed him as their employee. Accordingly, this issue should

have been submitted to the jury, and we conclude that summary judgment

was inappropriate.

       Finally, we disagree with the trial court’s statement that “it would not

further any policy of the law to select [Appellees] to bear the costs of Mr.

Shellenberger’s alleged asbestos exposure.” TCO at 8. To the contrary, this

Commonwealth has a well-established, long-standing public policy of

recognizing that the responsibility for workplace safety rests with the

employer.     See Tooey, 81 A.3d at 857 (recognizing the Commonwealth’s
____________________________________________

13 “It is an issue that may be removed from consideration by a jury and
decided as a matter of law only where the case is entirely free from doubt and
there is no possibility that a reasonable jury could find negligence.” Snead,
929 A.2d at 1183 (citations omitted).

                                          - 23 -
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adoption of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, which “was

designed to compensate claimants for earnings loss occasioned by work-

related injuries”); City of Erie v. W.C.A.B. (Annuziata), 838 A.2d 598, 601

(Pa. 2003) (“The goal of the workers’ compensation legislative scheme is to

relieve the employee from the economic consequences of his injury and make

those consequences a part of the cost of operation of business, to be paid

ultimately by the consuming public.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted); Ross v. Walker, 21 A. 157, 158 (Pa. 1891) (“It is the duty of an

employer to provide his laborers with a suitable place to work, with suitable

tools and machinery to use, with suitable materials….”).

      Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s November 27, 2019 order

granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees and remand this matter for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/04/2023

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