Court Opinion

ID: 9629113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:37:17.828594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:36.354962
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The result obtained here by the majority is as abhorrent to my sense of justice as the result obtained by the majority in Sherwood & Roberts v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 535, 650 P.2d 677 (1982). The majority opinion in that case precipitated separate dissenting opinions by Justice McFadden and myself. That case, too, involved this Court’s review of a gross misapplication of one of this Court’s many highly technical rules — reminiscent of the niceties and pitfalls of common law pleading. The majority opinion in that case, as in this case authored by Justice Bakes, notwithstanding a documented record to the contrary, observed that “the defendant failed to file a written notice of appearance or the appointment of new counsel within the prescribed time limit. “This failure to comply with I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3)1 justifies a presumption that he “abandoned his defense.” Justice McFadden, in his opinion, pointed out that “Riplinger had amply shown his intention to defend the action brought against him, but was prosecuting a substantial counterclaim.” 103 Idaho at 547, 650 P.2d at 689. Nevertheless, the undaunted majority ruled on the motion to set aside the default which had been entered, that:
“The right to grant or deny relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b) is a discretionary one. Thus, absent a showing of arbitrary disregard for the relevant facts and principles of law by the court below, this Court will affirm the lower court’s decision to deny or grant relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b). Johnston v. Pascoe, 100 Idaho 414, 419, 599 P.2d 985, 990 (1979); Lisher v. Krasselt, 96 Idaho 854, 857, 538 P.2d 783, 786 *6(1975). We see no such arbitrary disregard in the present case, and therefore affirm the order denying relief.”
103 Idaho at 541, 650 P.2d at 683.
As I wrote in the Riplinger case:
“In days gone by, the default judgment involved in this case would have been set aside out-of-hand:
“1 “The object of statutes and rules regulating procedure in the courts is to promote the administration of justice ____ [Procedural regulations should not be so applied as to defeat their primary purpose, that is, the disposition of causes upon their substantial merits without delay or prejudice.” ’ ”
(Quoting from Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 711, 587 P.2d 1245, 1246 (1978)) (The underlined words were not original with me, but the language of justice C.J. Taylor,. with Justices Givens, Porter, and Keeton concurring.)
My complaint today is as it was in the Riplinger case. The trial bench and bar well appreciate that a district court faced with passing on an ever-increasing multitude of motions is not going to make the correct ruling in every instance. The time is short, and there are other cases. But, this Court sits to review those rulings which are alleged to be in error, and this Court has no excuse for being both wrong and inconsistent.
There is nothing to be gained by repeating that which I wrote at length in Riplinger. It is readily available. The considerable authorities cited there stand monumentally for the proposition that there is error where the absolute sanction goes far beyond what is necessary to further the lawsuit.

. When Idaho became blessed with the "Federal Rules" of Civil Procedure in November of 1958, there was not, and apparently to this day is not, a comparable federal rule. At that time the rule, 11(b), read: "In the event an attorney ceases to act or a substitute attorney appears, or a party heretofore represented by attorney appears without attorney, written notice must be given thereof as provided by Rule 5." But, compare that to Rule 11(b) today.