Court Opinion

ID: 9913563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 09:10:42.650379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:02.636771
License: Public Domain

In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                        Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                         No. 07-22-00307-CV

              TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, APPELLANT

                                                    V.

                               DAVID P. SONEFELD, APPELLEE

                           On Appeal from the 153rd District Court
                                    Tarrant County, Texas
             Trial Court No. 153-290895-17, Honorable Susan H. McCoy, Presiding

                                        December 21, 2023
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       Is a four to six inch deep, six to seven inch wide, and up to two-hundred-foot-long

separation in the road a special defect? Holding that such a separation is a special defect,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.1 Appellant, Texas Department of Transportation

(“TXDOT”), presents two issues challenging the trial court’s judgment in favor of Appellee,

David P. Sonefeld. By its first issue, TXDOT argues a take-nothing judgment should be

       1 This is a premises liability action arising from a motorcycle accident in Tarrant County, Texas.
rendered because the lane separation at issue was not a special defect and Sonefeld

failed to obtain a finding on one or more essential elements of an ordinary premises defect

claim. By issue two, TXDOT argues there is no evidence of how long the condition existed

in the state it was in at the time and place of the crash. We affirm.2

                                            BACKGROUND

        On October 8, 2016, Sonefeld was driving his 2003 Honda motorcycle northbound

in the 10700 block of South Freeway Service Road in Tarrant County, Texas when he

encountered a separation between two lanes of travel as he changed from the outside

lane to the inside lane to access the on ramp to northbound Interstate 35. The separation

was six to seven inches wide, two to four inches deep, extended northward for some 100

to 200 feet, and sufficient to trap the tires on his motorcycle causing Sonefeld to fall over

and sustain injuries.

        After filing suit against TXDOT, Sonefeld moved for summary judgment contending

the separation in the road between the two lanes of traffic is a special defect and,

accordingly, TXDOT owed him a higher duty of care (the duty owed to an invitee) than

that owed in a premises defect case (the duty owed to a licensee). The trial court granted

Sonefeld’s motion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to a jury trial based

upon the special defect. The jury returned a verdict for Sonefeld.

        2 Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by

the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.
Should a conflict exist between precedent of the Second Court of Appeals and this Court, this appeal will
be decided in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

                                                    2
                                      APPLICABLE LAW

         Generally, the State of Texas and its agencies retain sovereign immunity from suit

unless the Legislature clearly and unambiguously waives it. Univ. of Tex. at Austin v.

Hayes, 327 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Tex. 2010). The Texas Tort Claims Act waives sovereign

immunity for personal injuries caused by a condition of real property. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021(2), 101.025(a). If a plaintiff’s claim arises from a premises

defect, then the government’s duty is generally limited to “the duty that a private person

owes to a licensee on private property.” Id. at § 101.022(a), (c). The duty owed is the

duty to warn the licensee of a dangerous condition or to make the condition reasonably

safe, but only when the owner is aware of the dangerous condition and the licensee is

not. Fraley v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 664 S.W.3d 91, 98 (Tex. 2023) (citing State Dep’t of

Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992)).

         But this limitation on the government’s duty does not apply to the duty to warn of

special defects, a subset of premises defects likened to excavations or obstructions on

roadways. §§ 101.022(b), 101.060(c). For special defects, the government owes a duty

to warn that is the same as a private landowner owes an invitee. Fraley, 664 S.W.3d at

96 (citing Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237); Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116 (citing § 101.022(b)).

Thus, for a special defect, the duty is to warn of an unreasonable risk of harm that the

premises condition creates when the government owner knows or reasonably should

know of that condition. Id. at 98 (citing Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237). A premises-defect

claim examines the knowledge of the landowner and the condition of the premises at the

time of the alleged injury. See City of Corsicana v. Stewart, 249 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Tex.

2008).

                                             3
ISSUE ONE—IS THE LANE SEPARATION A SPECIAL DEFECT?

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

      TXDOT’s first issue challenges the trial court’s summary judgment finding the lane

separation was a “special defect.” Whether the road condition in question is a “special

defect” under the Texas Tort Claims Act is a question of law, and we review the trial

court’s determination de novo. Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116. A plaintiff is entitled to

summary judgment on a cause of action if it conclusively proves all essential elements of

the claim. Robles v. Cox Ins. Grp., No. 02-21-00088-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 407, at

*4–5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 20, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted). Once

the plaintiff produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the

defendant to present controverting evidence that raises a fact issue. Id.

                                        ANALYSIS

      The Texas Tort Claims Act does not define “special defect,” but does give guidance

by likening special defects to “excavations or obstructions.” Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116

(citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(b); County of Harris v. Eaton, 573

S.W.2d 177, 178–80 (Tex. 1978)). To determine whether a condition is a special defect,

the Texas Supreme Court has “considered characteristics of the class of special defect,

such as (1) the size of the condition, (2) whether the condition unexpectedly and

physically impairs a vehicle’s ability to travel on the road, (3) whether the condition

presents some unusual quality apart from the ordinary course of events, and (4) whether

the condition presents an unexpected and unusual danger to the ordinary users of the

                                            4
roadway.” Hayes, 327 S.W.3d at 116 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. York, 284 S.W.3d

844, 847 (Tex. 2009)).

      As part of his summary judgment evidence, Sonefeld attached the deposition

excerpts from the testimony of several witnesses evidencing the characteristics and

features of the lane separation, which we summarize here:

          •   Paul Ruscelli, an experienced motorcycle rider who worked at the
              church located opposite the scene of the accident and is familiar with
              the condition of the access road:

                 -   the lane separation ran down the center and was seven
                     inches wide and three to four inches deep;

                 -   the separation is big enough to trap the front wheel of a
                     motorcycle;

                 -   TXDOT has repaired the separation several times, but the
                     separation recurred after each repair;

                 -   it is not a condition a motorcycle rider in Fort Worth would
                     expect to encounter;

          •   Ram Gupta, a TXDOT assistant engineer, agreed the lane
              separation is a safety hazard which requires monitoring and repair;

          •   Ralph Garza, a TXDOT maintenance supervisor whose job duties
              includes maintenance of roadways inside Tarrant County:

                 -   there have been issues with the lane separation on the access
                     road;

                 -   the road has to be monitored because of cracks and
                     separation;

                 -   the road was “built many, many years ago” and susceptible to
                     deterioration if it is not monitored and repaired;

                 -   in maintaining the road, all uses of the road are considered,
                     including use by motorcycles;

                                            5
       -   the lane separation presents a hazard for a motorcycle;

•   Justin Derden, a maintenance crew chief for TXDOT who worked on
    the access road where the lane separation was located, confirmed
    the lane separation could cause a problem for a motorcycle;

•   Santos Reco Chazerreta, Jr., an assistant maintenance supervisor
    with TXDOT for 36 years who lives in the area and is familiar with the
    road where the lane separation was located:

       -   TXDOT monitors the roadway at least once a month;

       -   the road was designed to be maintained through patching and
           “hot mix” treatments regularly;

       -   the road was originally constructed before Chazerreta was
           born;

       -   the lane separation is a “problem area” worse than other
           “longitudinal joint separations” he has seen;

       -   the separation is the worst in the Tarrant County area;

       -   the reason “joint separations” like the lane separation are
           repaired/treated is because they present hazards to users of
           the roadway;

•   Jeffrey Milburn, a licensed professional engineer and traffic engineer
    hired by TXDOT as an expert witness, stated he has never seen a
    “longitudinal separation” wider than the separation encountered by
    Sonefeld;

•   Faisal Abdel-Qader, a licensed professional engineer employed by
    TXDOT for the Fort Worth District:

       -   a gap six to eight inches wide and three to four inches deep

              ▪   requires immediate repair,

              ▪   can impede a motorcyclist from changing lanes, and

              ▪   is an unexpected condition for an ordinary user of the
                  roadway;

       -   roadways are designed with motorcycles as anticipated users;

                                  6
                    -   the access road with the lane separation was designed at
                        least as far back as 1972 and the design of the road and the
                        way in which it was constructed, combined with increased
                        use, weight of vehicles, and population growth, has caused
                        the lane separation and deterioration;

                    -   a three or four-inch gap is an issue for motorcycles, depending
                        on tire size, and a six or eight-inch gap, “even for [] cars, would
                        be hazardous”;

            •   David P. Sonefeld, Appellant, an experienced motorcycle rider who,
                until this incident, did not have an accident:

                    -   there were no mechanical or other issues with the motorcycle
                        which would have caused the accident;

                    -   the weather was clear on the day of the accident, with no rain
                        or other inclement weather which could have been a factor in
                        the accident;

                    -   he was unfamiliar with the road where the accident occurred;

                    -   the accident occurred as he made a lane change to enter the
                        onramp onto the freeway;

                    -   he did not see the lane separation before the accident; and

                    -   the disruption of the motorcycle was so jarring and severe, he
                        was disoriented and briefly lost consciousness.

        In addition, Sonefeld attached pictures of the lane separation introduced during the

depositions. Under the Hayes factors:

        (1) the lane separation was seven inches wide and three to four inches deep
            running down the middle of the access road between the lanes for an
            appreciable distance before the entrance ramp to I-35;3

        3 Sonefeld did not introduce any summary judgment evidence regarding the length of the

separation. But TXDOT, in its response, attached and incorporated into its facts the police report from the
accident, which states “there is a very long groove between [the lanes] that is several inches wide and
several inches deep.” TXDOT also attached and incorporated into its facts Sonefeld’s original petition,
which described the lane separation as “a very long excavated area” and “extended for some distance
down the road.”

                                                    7
       (2) the lane separation can suddenly, unexpectedly, and physically impair a
           motorcycle’s ability to travel by trapping the tires of the motorcycle;

       (3) the lane separation is unusual because it requires frequent repair; is on
           a road over fifty years old which was not designed for the current amount
           of traffic or population; and is the worst such lane separation in the
           Tarrant County area; and

       (4) the separation presents an unexpected and unusual danger to
           motorcyclists, who are ordinary users of the roadway, and, as
           demonstrated by Sonefeld’s own experience, can cause severe injuries
           requiring emergency care.

The characteristics of the lane separation are similar to an “excavation,” and the evidence

weighed by the Hayes factors leads us to conclude the lane separation was a “special

defect” under the Texas Tort Claims Act. See e.g., Morse v. State, 905 S.W.2d 470, 475–

76 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1995, writ denied) (six inch drop off at the side of the road

prevented vehicle’s tires from coming back onto the road after leaving it a special defect);

Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 566 S.W.3d 18, 24–25 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018,

pet. denied) (shoulder drop-off three times larger than permitted by TXDOT manual and

preventing car from coming back onto road a special defect).

       Sonefeld conclusively proved the lane separation was a “special defect” under the

Texas Tort Claims Act. Thus, the burden then shifted to TXDOT to present issues

precluding summary judgment in his favor. Supra.

       TXDOT does not dispute the above evidence, and the only additional evidence it

offered was a copy of Sonefeld’s original petition and a copy of the police report of the

accident, which do not contradict Sonefeld’s evidence.        Rather, on appeal, TXDOT

suggests Sonefeld’s evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to conclusively establish

the lane separation was a special defect for the following reasons:

                                             8
            -   the separation did not physically impair the ability to travel down the
                road because Sonefeld could have avoided it;

            -   Sonefeld could have negotiated the separation by driving at a
                steeper angle; and

            -   the separation only poses a danger to motorcyclists and therefore
                does not pose a danger to “ordinary users of the roadway.”

        Of the above arguments, however, the only one TXDOT presented to the trial court

in response to Sonefeld’s motion for summary judgment was Sonefeld could have

avoided the lane separation. “Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written

motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for

reversal.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). “A non-movant must present its objections to a

summary[-]judgment motion expressly by written answer or other written response to the

motion in the trial court or that objection is waived.” Zemos Logistics, LLC v. BKT Enters.,

No. 02-23-00049-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 9191, at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec.

7, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (quoting D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd., v. Markel Intern. Ins. Co.,

300 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. 2009)). An issue not raised in a summary-judgment response

remains waived on appeal even if the non-movant subsequently raised it in a motion for

new trial. Id. (citing Kelley-Coppedge, Inc. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 980 S.W.2d 462, 467

(Tex. 1998)). Having failed to argue in its summary judgment response Sonefeld could

have traveled over the separation or that motorcycles are not “ordinary users of the

roadway,” TXDOT waived those arguments for consideration on appeal.4

        4 TXDOT’s argument regarding motorcycles not being “ordinary users of the roadway,” even if we

were to consider it, is without merit. Motorcycles are well-regulated vehicles which are entitled to share the
road with other vehicles in Texas, and therefore they are necessarily “ordinary users of the roadway.” See
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 502.001 et seq.; 521.001 et seq.; 541.001 et seq. As such, a condition
presenting an unexpected and unusual danger to motorcycles is also a danger to “ordinary users of the
road” and may constitute a special defect within the meaning of the Act.

                                                      9
        For its preserved argument, the separation could be avoided, TXDOT relies

exclusively on City of Denton v. Paper, 376 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. 2012) for this proposition.

In Paper, the City of Denton excavated a portion of a street in order to install a sewer line

and repaired the hole after the installation. The repair created a hole in the middle of the

street with a depth equal to the length of a pencil just below the street’s surface. Later, a

bicyclist rode over the hole and lost control of her bike causing her injury. She sued

Denton for negligence alleging the duty owed under a special defect.                               Following

discovery, Denton filed a mixed motion for summary judgment based on: (1) the condition

was not a special defect; and (2) the bicyclist knew of the condition. The trial court’s

denial of the summary judgment was affirmed on appeal, but the Texas Supreme Court

reversed after determining the repair did not create a “special defect” under the Texas

Tort Claims Act. In making its determination, the Texas Supreme Court examined the

class of defects similar to “excavations and obstructions” and noted “[i]t does not include

common potholes or similar depressions in the roadway.”                          Id. at 766.      The Court

determined the defect was more akin to a pothole, and it was not so large the bicyclist did

not have enough room to safely avoid it without going into the other lane of oncoming

traffic.5 TXDOT concluded in its response because Sonefeld “could very easily [have]

avoided the joint separation between lanes without moving into the other lane of traffic,

and thus the joint separation was not a special defect.”6

        5 The bicyclist admitted she did not pay attention to the road immediately ahead of her, but instead

focused on the stop sign at the end of the street, and thus accidentally steered her bicycle into the “pothole.”
Id.

        6 In further support of its argument, on appeal, TXDOT cites the trial testimony of Jeffrey Milburn,

who testified there were 1,400 feet between the intersection and the onramp in which Sonefeld could have
avoided the separation. This evidence was not before the trial court during the summary judgment, and we
may not consider it now. Supra.

                                                      10
        Unlike the defect in Paper, however, here the defect is in the middle of the road,

and is an impediment to a motorcyclist, an “ordinary user of the roadway,” who wishes to

change lanes. Whereas the “pothole” in Paper was in the middle of the lane, but with

enough space for the bicyclist to move around it, there is no way for a motorcyclist to

avoid the lane separation if he has to make a lane change. TXDOT argues Sonefeld

could have avoided the lane separation by simply choosing not to change lanes. The

problem with TXDOT’s reasoning is the road where the separation is located is a busy

access road next to I-35, and TXDOT cannot predict when and where drivers will make

lane changes.        Depending on traffic conditions, there are myriad reasons why a

motorcyclist would be forced to make a lane change at the site of the separation, and

simply avoiding it may not be an option due to other safety concerns.

        Issue one is overruled.

ISSUE TWO—NO EVIDENCE TXDOT KNEW OF THE DANGER

                                        STANDARD OF REVIEW

        TXDOT’s second issue challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the jury’s verdict.7 In a legal sufficiency challenge, we consider all the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prevailing party, make every reasonable inference in that

party’s favor, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not

        7 TXDOT filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and preserved its legal sufficiency

challenge; however, it failed to file a motion for new trial, and therefore waived its factual sufficiency
challenge. See Int. of D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 75 (Tex. 2021) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2); Aero Energy,
Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. 1985)). Accordingly, we construe its pleadings
based on “no evidence” as only a legal sufficiency challenge to the jury’s verdict. See generally City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005) (traditionally, legal sufficiency challenges were “no-
evidence points”).

                                                    11
disregard that evidence. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). A

legal sufficiency challenge may only be sustained when the record discloses (a) a

complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of

evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the

evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla of evidence, or (d)

the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact in question. Id. at 810.

Evidence does not exceed a scintilla if it is so weak as to do no more than to create a

mere surmise or suspicion that the fact exists. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d

598, 601 (Tex. 2004). A party challenging the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on

an issue on which it did not have the burden of proof must demonstrate that there is no

evidence to support the adverse finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348

S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011).

                                         ANALYSIS

       TXDOT argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to demonstrate the

lane separation “existed for long enough for [TXDOT] to (1) reasonably discover the

existence of the condition and (2) make the condition reasonably safe.” We disagree.

       In special-defect cases, the government’s duty is that of a private landowner to an

invitee. Fraley, 664 S.W.3d at 96 (citing Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237). Generally, a

premises owner has a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to either “make safe

or warn against any concealed, unreasonably dangerous conditions of which the

[premises owner] is, or reasonably should be, aware but the invitee is not.” Austin v.

Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 203 (Tex. 2015). TXDOT argues Sonefeld put forth

                                             12
no evidence of the duration of the lane separation’s existence at trial and has pointed to

no such evidence on appeal. TXDOT claims there is no evidence to support a finding on

constructive knowledge.

         Constructive knowledge may be proven via the “time-notice rule,” which allows

knowledge to be imputed to an owner after a reasonable period of time passes to discover

and remedy the defect. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex.

2002).       What amounts to a reasonable opportunity for discovery depends on the

circumstances, including, proximity, conspicuity, and longevity of the defect. See id.; Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates, 186 S.W.3d 566, 567–68 (Tex. 2006). In a narrow category

of cases, knowledge may otherwise be inferred even absent a sufficient showing of actual

or constructive notice. Under Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.

1993), the requirement may be satisfied by knowledge of the risk of “foreseeable harm

from some course of conduct or method of operation,” rather than “knowledge of one

specific hazard.” See id. at 296; Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex. 1992).

Sonefeld argues this case fits into this narrow category. We agree with Sonefeld.

         A trial, Sonefeld’s attorneys played the video of the depositions of several

witnesses for the jury, including Santos Reco Chazerreta, Jr., the aforementioned

assistant maintenance supervisor for TXDOT, who was responsible for the repair of the

access road where the lane separation was located. In the video played for the jury, he

testified:

             •   “It’s not a big pothole. It’s a gap that opened up”;

             •   “It opens, closes a bit, opens and closes because of the design”;

                                               13
          •   “I’ve been here 36 years, and I hate this road right here from point A
              to point B . . . it’s an engineering issue, if you ask me, when the road
              was designed”;

          •   “I mean, that’s not a repair that we can do. I mean, the road was
              built like that from the ‘50s or ‘40s, whenever it was built. So basically
              we would just monitor this”;

          •   he does not consider the patching/filling of the lane separation a
              “repair” because “it’s winter/summer cracks open up, they close. And
              like I said, that’s been there awhile”;

          •   “I hate repeating myself about that but, you know, I’ve been here 36
              years, seen a lot of road, and this one really chaps my you-know-
              what”;

          •   “We monitor this roadway”;

          •   “Every road we have, though, is subject, you know, to us checking it
              every day”;

          •   the condition presents a risk to motorcycles;

          •   the condition has been there for the 36 years he has worked for
              TXDOT; and

          •   the portion of the road where the accident occurred is the worst lane
              separation he has seen in the Tarrant County area.

Chazerreta’s supervisor, Rafael Garza, also testified the condition has to be monitored

because it presents a hazard, and TXDOT’s repairs of any condition considers making it

safe for all types of vehicles, including motorcycles. TXDOT’s two engineers, Ram Gupta

and Faisal Abdel-Qader, agreed the condition presents an unacceptable hazard to

motorcycles, and possibly cars as well. Paul Ruscelli, who had been working at the

church opposite the site of the accident for eighteen months at the time, witnessed

TXDOT fill in the lane separation several times and the separation opening up again after

each treatment. Finally, Justin Derden, the TXDOT equipment operator who assisted in

                                             14
performing the repair after the accident, appeared at trial and testified the lane separation

was a defect the traveling public should not expect to encounter and presented a “risky

condition, it could be dangerous.”

       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is more than

a scintilla of evidence TXDOT knew of the risk of foreseeable harm from the defect, if not

specific knowledge of existence of the defect on the day of the accident:

           •   TXDOT knew about the defect for decades before the accident;

           •   its employees determined the condition to be unsafe, and
               continually attempted to repair/remedy it through patching and filling
               in the separation;

           •   its employees knew the repair/remedy treatment was temporary;

           •   the road was poorly designed when it was built decades ago;

           •   the road was monitored a month before the accident;

           •   the road is subject to being checked every day.

In this case, the evidence fits squarely within the Corbin rubric. The defect had been

occurring for years, is a seasonal occurrence, and TXDOT’s employees knew and

understood the measures they employed to remedy the lane separation were temporary

at best. The roadway requires and has constant monitoring. Chazerreta confirmed

TXDOT employees were in the area of the lane separation on the access road in

September 2016, but a repair was not initiated until two weeks after the accident in late

October 2016. The jury had sufficient evidence to infer the lane separation “existed for

long enough for [TXDOT] to reasonably discover the existence of the condition and make

the condition reasonably safe.”

                                             15
Issue two is overruled.

                                CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                             Alex Yarbrough
                                                 Justice

                                     16