Court Opinion

ID: 9752454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:09:11.246856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:16.571126
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
This proceeding was initiated on May 19, 1977 with the filing of a petition for support and private criminal complaint by Janice Atkins, appellee, charging the defendant, George H. Singleton, appellant, with neglect to support a bastard under 18 C.P.S.A. Section 4323,1 for the child, Karanja, born May 31, 1972. Appellant denied paternity and elected to proceed criminally in a non-jury trial that was heard on October 25, 1977 before ZALESKI, J. of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. The verdict of the court was entered on December 8,1977 finding appellant guilty and suspending sentence. Written post—trial motions were filed and argued, and subsequently denied. A support hearing was held on February 8, 1979, and an order was entered on February 9, 1979 awarding $22.50 per week for the support for child. Appellant’s motion to vacate and reconsider sentence was denied after argument on March 9, 1979.
The issues raised by the appellant will be discussed seriatim and will not be limited to a small segment of the testimony but to the entire spectrum.
The appellee testified she is a single woman who met the appellant in 1968 at Temple University and began a sexual relationship with him in December of 1969 which continued on a regular basis through November of 1971, even after *398appellant was living with another woman (N.T. 13-15). The appellee traveled to Africa with the appellant, his common law wife and another man during the summer of 1971; the appellee had sex with appellant on one occasion during the journey (N.T. 18).
Appellee testified she did not have sexual relations with any man other than the appellant during the period of December, 1969 through November, 1971 (N.T. 14).
Appellee, to make certain she was pregnant, saw Dr. George Eminetti in November and learned she was pregnant eight or nine weeks (N.T. 20). She discussed her pregnancy with appellant. At that time, appellee was living with her mother (N.T. 21a) and appellant convinced appellee to move from her mother’s home, with whom she was living, and get an apartment (N.T. 21a) as it might be easier for him to see appellee. Even though she was pregnant, she continued to have sexual relations with appellant (N.T. 22a).
“He seemed to like discussing my pregnancy, and he seemed to enjoy the changes that my body went through and he seemed interested in what was going on and knowing that a body was growing and he seemed proud of it (N.T. 22a). He chose the name Karanja. The name Karanja Ketema means God of the Valley, as we had taken a trip to Africa we travelled in the Rift Valley, which is a very beautiful, scenic place, so for that reason he chose the name” (N.T. 23a).
Appellant chose Pennsylvania Hospital, helped with the admission, helped with the hospital bills, gave appellant money (N.T. 24a). After the child was born, appellant helped pay the apartment rent for a few months, as well as the food and other things (N.T. 26). He was playful, he was fatherly, he would “joust him about” and look after him (N.T. 26a). He continued to have sexual relations with appellee (N.T. 26a). He bought gifts for the child, and one item appellee remembered was a gift of some plain wooden blocks. The last time that appellant did anything for Karanja was a meeting at Woolworth’s and buying lunch for appellee and child, Karanja, in the summer of 1975, and that *399“he behaved as a father would towards Karanja” (N.T. 28a). Appellant had also taken Karanja to the orthopedist sometime during 1972.
Appellee testified on cross-examination that appellant assumed the responsibility as the father, he has never denied being the father until this case came up (N.T. 46a). Appellant helped out financially several months after the child was born (N.T. 48a). Appellant had gotten fired from his job, money was tight, he was having a problem helping out financially (N.T. 48a).
Appellee further testified on cross-examination that she would ask appellant for money when she would see him and he would continue to help in small ways (N.T. 49a); she did not continue to harass him about money (N.T. 51a); she told her mother and friends appellant was the father (N.T. 54a).2
*400The quoted testimony is but a thumbnail review of the entire record which supports appellee’s position that appel*401lant voluntarily contributed to the support of the child. Furthermore, appellant accepted and recognized that he is the father of Karanja and responsible for his support.
18 Pa.C.S. 4323(b) provides, inter alia, “. . . the reputed father shall have voluntarily contributed to the support of the child, ...” Neither the legislature nor the reported cases define the quantity or quality of the contribution. We, as a court, should not legislate that “a lunch for us,” or that $20 (as in the Young case) or any amount, or act or deed, is not a sufficient contribution. Lacking a legislative restriction or definition, it is our view that any such contribution, of whatsoever kind or amount, is sufficient to comply with the intent of the statute.
The court (N.T. 91a) stated, for the record, he has observed the child identified as Karanja, he observed the physical characteristics and coloration of the appellant, he observed appellee, Janice Atkins, her physical characteristics and coloration; the court found appellant to be the father by his observations. The Assistant District Attorney pointed out that the child’s eyebrows, the nose and the mouth, are particularly striking in their recognition to those features of the putative father (N.T. 92a).
Appellant testified (commencing N.T. 94a) he had known appellee since 1967, had sexual relations with her until April or May, 1970. He discussed her pregnancy with her around the holidays of 1971 (N.T. 97a); he consented to help her financially (N.T. 98a); he gave her between $380 and $400 around the time the child was born (N.T. 98a).
Between birth of child, May, 1972 and 1976 (when he received correspondence from her attorney) he had “fairly reasonable contact with appellee.”
Appellant further testified he got married on August 20, 1970, but formal ceremony was not held until September of 1971 (N.T. 117), and he continued a social relationship with appellee until after her child was born, May, 1972 (N.T. 94-96). He continued seeing appellee and the child on occasion through 1976 (N.T. 100-101).
*402The Opinion of SPAETH, J. is limited to one incident and excludes all other testimony which establishes paternity and support for the child and relies on the statute of limitations in a very limited and ultra strict construction.
18 C.P.S.A. Section 4323(b) limitations of actions:
“All prosecutions under this section must be brought within two years of the birth of the child, except where the reputed father shall have voluntarily contributed to the support of the child, ... in which case a prosecution may be brought at any time within two years of any such contribution or acknowledgment by the reputed father.”
The lower court found from the evidence that appellant voluntarily contributed to the support of the child from birth to purchasing lunch in the summer of 1975, thus eliminating the necessity of passing on whether the “statute of limitations” barred the claim of appellee.
18 C.P.S.A. Section 105 governs the principles of construction which reads as follows:
“The provisions of this title shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing construction it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this title and the special purposes of the particular provision involved.”
Given this guideline, the lower court found the appellant did voluntarily buy lunch for the mother and child during the summer of 1975, and that such purchase, coupled with other contributions, constituted support for the child was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The appellant did not deny he bought lunch for his son. The lower court further found, upon review of the record and weighing the credibility of the witnesses, that the elements of the crime charged have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant-appellant did not deny he voluntarily bought lunch for appellee and child. The Commonwealth is, of course, entitled to have the evidence examined in the light most favorable to it: Commonwealth v. Holmes, 482 Pa. 97, 393 A.2d 397 (1978).
*403In the instant case, the court found appellee’s testimony established all the elements of the charge of neglect to support a bastard child: (1) appellant’s status as parent; (2) the illegitimacy of appellant’s child; (3) appellant’s assistance in the support of his child from birth; (4) voluntary purchase of lunch for child during the summer of 1975, coupled with other contributions, tolled the statute of limitations: Commonwealth v. Parrish, 250 Pa.Super. 176, 378 A.2d 884 (1977). The lower court saw and heard the witnesses and the credibility of the parties was within the exclusive control of the lower court. A judge who sees and hears the witnesses in a case such as this is in better position than we to decide the issue on the merits: Goldstein v. Goldstein, 105 Pa.Super. 194, 160 A. 158.
Absent any overriding equities in favor of the putative father, such as fraud, the law cannot permit a party to renounce even an assumed duty of parentage, when, by so doing, the innocent child would be victimized: Gonzalez v. Andreas, 245 Pa.Super. 307, 313, 369 A.2d 416, 419.
In a very recent Opinion of this court, Commonwealth v. George Young, Appellant, 275 Pa.Super. 588, 419 A.2d 57 (1980), a brief comment of the facts points out the prosecution was initiated more than two years following the birth of Tamika. The court, PRICE, J., said:
“Obviously, the prosecution here was initiated more than two years following the birth of Tamika. At trial, however, Ms. Bennett testified that appellant gave her $20 in November of 1976, a time within two years of the filing of the indictment. Although appellant would argue that Ms. Bennett did not state that he specifically paid the money for the support of Tamika, this measure of specificity is not required. Immediately prior to inquiring about the $20 payment, the prosecuting attorney had extensively questioned Ms. Bennett on appellant’s contribution for Tamika’s support, [footnote omitted] Viewing her answer in context, it is clear that Ms. Bennett was referring to a payment for the child’s upbringing.”
*404George Singleton, appellant, admitted he had continuous sexual relations with appellee; that he did contribute to the support of the child. Appellee testified she did not have sexual relations with any other man; that appellant never denied being the father of the child. He admitted he voluntarily contributed to the support of the child. This case has more elements establishing appellant’s voluntarily contributions to the support of the child than that in which appears the Young case, supra.
Dr. Lyndall Molthan was called to testify by the Commonwealth concerning the blood grouping studies that she performed on the parties on May 6,1977. Dr. Molthan testified the appellant “cannot be excluded as the father of the child on the basis of the tests performed.” The doctor further testified that based upon the results obtained and population statistics, 9.3% of the black males could have fathered the child, or there is a 90.7% probability that the defendant-appellant is the father of the child. (N.T. 125, 130-131). The finding that appellant cannot be excluded as the father of the child cannot be challenged by appellant.
The Commonwealth met the burden of establishing paternity as charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 220 Pa.Super. 31, 279 A.2d 251 (1971). The evidence reveals that the birth of the child in relation to appellee’s pattern of intercourse with appellant, and the date of her last menstrual, period, is within the period of gestation. Commonwealth v. Young, 163 Pa.Super. 279, 60 A.2d 831 (1948).
We question the imposition of statutory time limits on determinations of paternity where such limits are only imposed upon non-marital children. That this is an unconstitutional deprivation of due process rights has been posited most cogently by the Florida Supreme Court in Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services on Behalf of Gillespie v. West, 378 So.2d 1220, 6 FLR 2005 (1980). After a comprehensive review of the applicable decision by the United States Supreme Court, the Florida Court stated:
*405“Generally, statutes of limitations are enacted to bar stale claims which have been dormant for a number of years but which have not been enforced. The state’s objective to avoid stale claims, however, is not valid justification for the discrimination it inflicts on illegitimates since their right to support is a continuing right renewing itself until the child becomes eighteen. An action to determine paternity is not a stale claim when employed as a prerequisite to an illegitimate’s obtaining of continuing, recurring support. This right has never become dormant, and for the statute of limitations to act to preclude this right on the basis that it is stale is illogical.
“Furthermore, this statute bears at best a tenuous relationship to the interest it seeks to advance of ensuring the availability of adequate proof of paternity. The arbitrary determination that paternity can only be proved in four years creates an impenetrable barrier to an illegitimate child’s right to seek support without considering alternatives which deal directly with the problem of proof. Although proof of paternity may become more difficult with the passage of time, this mere possibility cannot be allowed to work an unconstitutional discrimination against illegitimate children.”
Here, again, the introduction of the HLA blood test serves to minimize the effect of the passage of time on paternity determinations by shifting the weight of the evidence to one side. (See 42 Pa.C.S. 6136). However, our treatment of the statutory issues makes the constitutional question academic.
Taking the relevant facts into consideration, the formerly effective law on the subject should not be construed as limiting the remedies available to appellee nor as preventing an action to determine/prove paternity.
The question of paternity is more than support for the child, for the courts and the legislatures of the several states have allowed children born out of wedlock to share in the putative father’s estates. We cite only a few examples: Workmen’s compensation and unemployment benefits, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 *406(1968); sharing in claims for wrongful death, Glona v. American Guarantee, 391 U.S. 73, 88 S.Ct. 1515, 20 L.Ed.2d 441 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164, 92 S-Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); granting rights to support of illegitimate children, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973); permitting illegitimate to inherit from their fathers, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1972).
I would sustain the lower court’s order and direct appellant to pay the award of $22.50 per week for the support of Karanja, retroactive to October 12, 1979.
Accordingly, I dissent from the Opinion of Judge Spaeth reversing the lower court, and I would reinstate the lower court’s Opinion and affirm the decision of the court below.

. 18 C.P.S.A. Section 4323 repealed, 1978 April 28, P.L. 106, No. 46 Section 3, effective in 60 days Section 3(a) of Act 1978, April 28, P.L. 106, No. 46 provides that prosecutions already commenced under this section on the effective date of such act shall not be affected by the repeal of this section.

. Page 23:
“Q. What part, if any, did George Singleton have in the admission and selection of the hospital?
A. Well, as far as the-he helped as far as the admission and selection of the hospital. He helped-he helped me with the bills; he helped to pay my hospital bills.”
Pages 25 and 26:
“Q. Did he-after the child was bom, in addition to this money for the hospital bills, did he give you anything for the child?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What did he give you?
A. Well, he helped to pay for my rent for a few months, as well as the food and other things that I needed.
Q. Did he visit you and the child after you left the hospital?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. How often did he visit?
A. He would visit about once a month, sometimes more frequently, sometimes less frequently.
Q. And what was his attitude with regard to the child when he visited?
A. Well, he was very playful with him, he was friendly, he was fatherly. He would joust him about and look after him.”
Page 27:
“Q. In addition to paying for your apartment rent and the food and things for the child, did he buy any gifts for the child?
A. Yes, he did.”
Page 28:
“Q. And how-when was the-has George Singleton continued to give you anything for the child, to the present time?
A. Not to this present time.
Q. When was the last time that he did anything for Karanja?
*400A. The last time was the meeting at Woolworth’s when he bought lunch for us when we saw him.
Q. And when was that?
A. That was around the summer of 1975.
Q. Was that-how did that meeting come about?
A. Well, I was at the bank, in the drive-in section, with Karanja in the car, and he walked up to us and said hi, how about some coffee. And so I said okay. And we selected Woolworth’s because it was close by.”
Page 45a-Cross-examination:
“Q. Just try to answer my question. Did you ever tell him (George Singleton) that you thought he was the father of the child?
A. Yes, I didn’t feel there was a need. I talked with him about it. I discussed it. And he assumed the responsibility as though he was the father and there was never any question. He has never denied it until this case has come up, ever ...”
Pages 46a—47a:
“A. There was not a need to say to him, George you are the father, because he never questioned it.
Q. And I believe you said he bought a gift for the child on his second birthday?
A. That’s right.
Q. Well, then, do I understand that Mr. Singleton was not making regular gifts or contributions to your support or the child’s?
A. Well, he helped out for several months.
Q. But that is several months before the child was born or several months after.
A. After he was born.”
Page 48a:
“A. I wondered why he didn’t help out for a longer time.
A. I started asking him I guess several months after Karanja was bom.
A. Well, for one thing he had gotten fired from his job and he didn’t-he said that money was getting tight, he was having a problem helping out financially.
A. He said things were hard right now for him and that he was having some difficulties.”
Page 49:
“Q. When was the next time that you asked him for money?
A. After that, whenever I would see him I would ask him if he could help out in some way, and he would continue to help in small ways-”
Page 52:
“Q. Did you ask him for money for the child after you understood he was working full time?
A. I did.”