Court Opinion

ID: 9352535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:23.655008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:40.806990
License: Public Domain

J-S02037-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 ALLAN LESLIE SINANAN JR.             :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 498 EDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 17, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division
                    at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000169-2017,
                         CP-48-CR-0004301-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 ALLAN LESLIE SINANAN JR.             :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 499 EDA 2021

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 17, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division
                    at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000169-2017,
                         CP-48-CR-0004301-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                   FILED JANUARY 6, 2023
J-S02037-22

        Allan Leslie Sinanan, Jr. (Appellant) appeals pro se from the orders1

entered in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his

first, timely Post Conviction Relief Act2 (PCRA) petition.     A jury convicted

Appellant of eight counts each of possession of a controlled substance and

possession with intent to deliver (PWID), three counts of criminal use of a

communication facility, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.3

The court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 11 to 22 years’ incarceration.

Appellant now raises a myriad of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. After

careful review, we affirm.

        As the parties are well acquainted with the facts of this case, which are

fully set forth in the PCRA court’s February 17, 2021, order, we need not recite

____________________________________________

1 Appellant filed two separate notices of appeal for both criminal dockets.
Therefore, he has complied with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969,
977 (Pa. 2018) (separate notices of appeal must be filed when a single order
resolves issues arising on more than one trial court docket), overruled in part,
Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021) (reaffirming that
Pa.R.A.P. 341 requires separate notices of appeal when single order resolves
issues under more than one docket, but holding Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits
appellate court to consider appellant’s request to remediate error when notice
of appeal is timely filed). On June 14, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se application
for consolidation. This Court granted the order on July 12, 2021. See Order
Granting Application for Consolidation, 7/12/21.

2   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

335 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (30); 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a); 35 P.S. § 780-
113(a)(32), respectively.

                                           -2-
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them herein. See Order, 2/17/21, at 2-3.4 The pertinent procedural history

is as follows. Appellant was charged at Criminal Docket No. CP-48-CR-4301-

2016 (Docket No. 4301-2016) with three counts of PWID, three counts of

possession of a controlled substance, and three counts of criminal use of a

communication facility. Additionally, he was charged at Criminal Docket No.

CP-48-CR-0169-2017 (Docket No. 169-2017) with five counts of PWID, five

counts of possession of a controlled substance, one count of drug

paraphernalia, and one count of possession of a firearm prohibited.5 Id. at 1-

2.

       Appellant was represented by several attorneys throughout various

stages of the criminal proceeding. Assistant Public Defender Rory B. Driscole,

Esquire, represented him at both of his preliminary hearings.          See Order,

2/17/21, at 3. Appellant requested that Attorney Driscole be removed from

the matter, and the court eventually granted his request via a motion to

withdraw by counsel. See id. at 3-4. Then, Alexander J. Karam, Jr., Esquire,

was appointed to represent Appellant. See id. at 4. Attorney Karam filed two

pre-trial motions, including a motion to suppress, but Appellant expressed

dissatisfaction with his representation as well. See id.       Attorney Karam also

____________________________________________

4The PCRA court’s February 17, 2021, Order is, in actuality, a 60-page opinion
which addresses Appellant’s PCRA claims.

5 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).                 The firearms possession offense was
subsequently nolle prossed.

                                           -3-
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filed a motion to withdraw, which was granted. See id. Consequently, Brian

M. Monahan, Esquire, was assigned as legal counsel.       See id.    Attorney

Monahan represented Appellant at the suppression hearing.            See id.

However, shortly before his trial, Appellant “expressed his reluctance to move

forward with Attorney Monahan and requested another attorney.” Id. at 5.

The trial court held a hearing regarding the matter, and denied Appellant’s

request to appoint new counsel. See id.

      Appellant’s jury trial began on September 6, 2017. Two days later, the

jury convicted him of all charges. On September 22, 2017, the court imposed

the following sentence: (1) at Docket No. 4301-2016, Appellant received a

six-to-12-month sentence on each count of possession of a controlled

substance; 12 to 24 months on each count of PWID, and 12 to 24 months on

each count of criminal use of a communication facility; and (2) at Docket No.

169-2017, Appellant received 5 to 10 years on the count of PWID (cocaine),

27 to 33 months on the count of PWID (methylenedioxy-methamphetamine

or MDMA), six to 12 years on the count of PWID (Oxycodone), 12 to 18 months

on the count of PWID (Xanax), six to 16 months on the count of PWID

(marijuana), and six to 12 months on each of the five counts of possession of

a controlled substance. Appellant also received a sentence of probation on

the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. All of the sentences were to

run concurrent to each other, with the exception of two PWID counts (cocaine

and Oxycodone), which were to run consecutive to each other and to all other

                                    -4-
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counts. Appellant subsequently “filed post-sentence motions and requested

that he represent himself moving forward.” See Order, 2/17/21, at 5. On

October 11, 2017, Attorney Monahan filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.

The court held a Grazier6 hearing and permitted counsel to withdraw and

Appellant to proceed pro se. See id.

       Appellant filed a direct appeal with this Court,7 which affirmed his

judgment of sentence on January 23, 2019.           See Commonwealth v.

Sinanan, 578 EDA 2018 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. Jan. 23, 2019). The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s subsequent petition for

allowance of appeal on January 7, 2020, and the United States Supreme Court

denied his petition for writ of certiorari on March 9, 2020.              See

Commonwealth v. Sinanan, 305 EAL 2019 (Pa. Jan. 7, 2020), cert. denied,

140 S.Ct. 1546 (U.S. 2020).

       On February 5, 2020, Appellant filed a “Motion to Address Illegal

Sentence,” which the court treated as a first PCRA petition and appointed

counsel. See Order, 2/17/21, at 5-6. Thereafter, Appellant filed numerous

____________________________________________

6 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) (requiring on the
record inquiry to determine whether waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary).

7Appellant raised four claims concerning the trial court’s purported failure to
suppress certain evidence and the search warrant.

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pro se supplemental motions8 relating to requests for “PCRA relief and relief

from a collateral forfeiture action by the Commonwealth.” Id. at 6 (footnote

omitted). “As a general[ ] summary, in his various filings [Appellant] raised

ineffective assistan[ce] of counsel claims against each of his appointed

attorneys, in addition[ ] he raised claims of various constitutional violations

committed by the Commonwealth including attacking his warrantless arrest,

the issuance of the search warrant, and the quality of the evidence introduced

against him at trial.” Id. The PCRA court held another Grazier hearing on

June 22, 2020, and granted Appellant “relief by allowing him to proceed by

self-representation.” Id. at 6-7.

        The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on October 9, 2020. At the

proceeding, Appellant and all three of his past attorneys appeared and

testified.   See Order, 2/17/21, at 7.           Thereafter, Appellant continued to

inundate the court with numerous pro se filings.9 On February 17, 2021, the

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition.           Appellant timely appealed and

complied with the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors

complained of on appeal.         On March 22, 2021, the court filed a Pa.R.A.P.

____________________________________________

8A review of the docket reveals that from the date Appellant filed his PCRA
petition to the day of the evidentiary hearing, Appellant submitted
approximately 30 motions and petitions with the PCRA court.

9   Appellant filed approximately ten additional motions with the court.

                                           -6-
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1925(a) opinion, which relied, in part, on its February 17, 2021, order. See

PCRA Ct. Op., 3/22/21, at 1-2.

     Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

     1) Whether the findings of the “P.C.R.A. Court” are supported by
     the record and free of legal error, where all three trial counselors
     were ineffective, for failure to present argument and defense to
     [Appellant]’s warrantless arrest and the lack of probable cause,
     because under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions:
     (1) [Appellant] was improperly stopped and searched, requiring
     suppression of any evidence seized as a result of the search and
     (2) the police action was not based on an exception to the
     requirement that an ARREST be based on a WARRANT issued by
     a neutral magistrate, after a determination that probable cause
     has been demonstrated?

     2) Whether the “P.C.R.A. Court” erred, by failing to adequately
     address a P.C.R.A. petition when it dismissed the petition, and
     that such error requires relief, where all three trial counselors
     were ineffective in neglecting to assert under the United States
     and Pennsylvania Constitutions: (1) that the prosecution and the
     magistrate circumvented policy and procedure, where procedural
     due process protections preclude prosecutors and magistrates
     from establishing a prima facie case at a Preliminary Hearing
     utilizing only hearsay testimony evidence that would not be
     admissible at trial, and (2) is therefore categorically incapable of
     demonstrating that the prosecution later will be able to prove
     [Appellant]’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

     3) Whether the findings of the “P.C.R.A. Court” are supported by
     the record; free of legal error; and adequately addressed when it
     dismissed the petition, where all three trial counselors were
     ineffective, for failing to move to suppress all evidence obtained
     from the Warrantless Arrest Affidavit (11/04/2016); Search
     Warrant Affidavit (11/04/2016); and the Warrantless Arrest
     Affidavit (12/27/2016), arguing that Officers established the
     Affidavits in violation of “Franks V. Delaware” because: (1) the
     Affiant omitted material information about the reliability of the
     unregistered confidential source, who was the primary source of
     the information, used to establish probable cause; (2) the Affiant
     omitted material facts to surveillance, video, and cell phone
     evidence, with the intent to make the affidavit misleading; and (3)

                                    -7-
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     the Affiant included material information knowingly and
     intentionally, to a bag/jacket with drugs, being thrown on
     November 4th, the day of arrest?

     4) Whether the “P.C.R.A. Court” erred, by failing to adequately
     address a P.C.R.A. petition when it dismissed the petition, and
     that such error requires relief, by neglecting [Appellant]’s claim,
     of whether [Appellant] received ineffective assistance of trial
     counsel, where “Brian M. Monahan,” failed to impeach DEA Agent
     Joseph Labenberg, by introducing his testimony at trial from an
     earlier hearing (Suppression/Habeas Corpus), in which DEA Agent
     Joseph Labenberg gave two different testimonies to material
     evidence?

     5) Whether the “P.C.R.A. Court” erred, by failing to adequately
     address a P.C.R.A. petition when it dismissed the petition, and
     that such error requires relief, by neglecting [Appellant]’s claim,
     of whether “Brian M. Monahan”, was ineffective for failing, to
     object to the admission of Detective Michael Mish’s expert
     testimony, regarding the fact to whether drugs were actually
     distributed and whether it was witnessed by the detectives on
     three . . . occasions; and was “Brian M. Monahan”, ineffective for
     intentionally eliciting Detective Michael Mish’s otherwise
     inadmissible expert testimony at trial, that the jacket and
     everything in it was [Appellant’s], because that expert testimony
     was unduly prejudicial?

     6) Whether the findings of the P.C.R.A. Court are supported by
     the record and free of legal error, where defense counsel “Brian
     M. Monahan” was ineffective, for failing to object to the admission
     of police testimony at trial, regarding allegedly being familiarized
     with [Appellant] in prior investigations going back to 2007, was
     prejudicial as it raised an adverse inference of guilt?

     7) Whether the “P.C.R.A. Court” erred, by failing to adequately
     address a P.C.R.A. petition when it dismissed the petition, and
     that such error requires relief, where trial counselors “Alexander
     J. Karam Jr. and Brian M. Monahan,” were ineffective for failing to
     make a suppression motion with an argument that would have
     been meritorious, that since the police knew of the presence of
     the four . . . automobiles in question and planned all along to seize
     all four . . ., there were no exigent circumstances or automobile
     exception justifying their failure to obtain a valid warrant, and the
     fruit of the unconstitutional seizure of the four . . . automobiles

                                     -8-
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        were inadmissible, and that the doctrine of plain view could not
        justify the police seizure of [Appellant]’s four . . . automobiles
        under the circumstances of the present case?

        8) Whether the “P.C.R.A. Court” erred, by failing to adequately
        address a P.C.R.A. petition when it dismissed the petition, and
        that such error requires relief, where [Appellant] should be
        awarded a New Trial, because the recantation of silence by
        Detective Brent Lear at the Forfeiture Hearing, fits squarely within
        the test for non-Brady[10] after-discovered evidence claim, and it
        is clear that Detective Brent Lear’s silence about these facts
        throughout Pre-Trial testimony was due solely to ineffective
        assistance of trial counsel?

        9) Whether the findings of the “P.C.R.A. Court” are supported by
        the record and free of legal error, where trial counselor “Brian M.
        Monahan” was ineffective, for failing to object to an illegal
        sentence, because the P.W.I.D. drug convictions under [Docket
        No. 169-2017], had to merge for sentencing purposes to 42
        Pa.C.S. § 9765?

        10) Whether the findings of the “P.C.R.A. Court” are supported by
        the record and free of legal error, where trial counselor “Brian M.
        Monahan” was ineffective, for failing to do basic legal research and
        to object to erroneously calculated prior record score, as. it
        pertains to prior New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Federal offenses?

Appellant’s Brief at viii – xii (some bracketing omitted).

        We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

        Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited
        to examining whether the court’s determination is supported by
        the evidence of record and free of legal error. This Court grants
        great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record
        contains any support for those findings. Further, the PCRA court’s
        credibility determinations are binding on this Court, where there
        is record support for those determinations.

____________________________________________

10   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

                                           -9-
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Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation

omitted). Moreover, because Appellant’s claims concern ineffective assistance

of counsel, we consider the following:

      Counsel is presumed effective, and to rebut that presumption, the
      PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance
      was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.             In
      Pennsylvania, we have refined the Strickland [v. Washington,
      466 U.S. 668 (1984)] performance and prejudice test into a three-
      part inquiry. See [Commonwealth v.] Pierce[, 527 A.2d 973
      (Pa. 1987)]. Thus, to prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner
      must show that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2)
      counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3)
      the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result. If a petitioner
      fails to prove any of these prongs, his claim fails. Generally,
      counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he
      chose a particular course of conduct that had some reasonable
      basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. Where matters
      of strategy and tactics are concerned, a finding that a chosen
      strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted unless it can
      be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for
      success substantially greater than the course actually pursued. To
      demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a
      reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
      errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A
      reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to
      undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.

Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citation omitted).   Moreover, “[a] court is not required to analyze the

elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any particular order of priority; instead,

if a claim fails under any necessary element of the ineffectiveness test, the

court may proceed to that element first.” Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101

A.3d 736, 747 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

                                     - 10 -
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      At the outset, we emphasize that “[a]lthough this Court is willing to

construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys

no special benefit.” Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa.

Super. 2017). As such, “any layperson choosing to represent [himself] in a

legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that [his]

lack of expertise and legal training will prove [his] undoing.” Commonwealth

v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation omitted). Here,

we point out that Appellant’s lengthy brief consists of long-winded and, at

times, disjointed, accusations of PCRA court error, which focus more on the

underlying argument than developing any ineffective assistance of counsel

analysis.

      Additionally, before we may dispose of Appellant’s substantive claims,

we must address several appellate procedural concerns.           First, Appellant’s

brief, excluding exhibits, is 90 pages long and does not contain a word count.

This is an obvious and blatant violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 2135, which states, in relevant part:

      (a) Unless otherwise ordered by an appellate court:

      (1) A principal brief shall not exceed 14,000 words. . . . A party
      shall file a certificate of compliance with the word count limit if the
      principal brief is longer than 30 pages . . . when prepared on a
      word processor or typewriter.

                                   *     *      *

      (d) Certification of compliance. Any brief in excess of the stated
      page limits shall include a certification that the brief complies with

                                       - 11 -
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       the word count limits. The certificate may be based on the word
       count of the word processing system used to prepare the brief.

Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1), (d).11

       Notably, Appellant’s brief does not contain "a certificate of compliance

with the word count limit," as required by Rule 2135(a)(1) and (d).12 “The

certification requirement is not limited to counsel: Pro se litigants, too, are

obliged to provide a certification for a primary brief that exceeds thirty pages.”

Commonwealth v. Spuck, 86 A.3d 870, 873 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

       Moreover, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2101 “underscores

the seriousness with which we take deviations from our rules of procedure.”

Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1041 n.19.              Rule 2101 states:   “Briefs . . . shall

conform in all material respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly

as the circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be

suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief . . . of the appellant and are

____________________________________________

11   As this Court has previously noted:

       Former Rule 2135 limited an appellate brief to 50 pages. It was
       changed in 2013 to limit the number of words in the principal brief
       to 14,000 and in the reply brief to 7,000. If a principal brief
       exceeds 30 pages, or a reply brief exceeds 15 pages, the brief
       must contain a certificate of compliance with this Rule.

Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1041 n.19 (Pa. Super. 2018).

12 Additionally, it is worth mentioning Appellant failed to attach his court
ordered concise statement to his brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(11).

                                          - 12 -
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substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.”

Pa.R.A.P. 2101.13 Indeed, we could dismiss Appellant’s appeal for his lengthy

brief alone.

        Nevertheless, we continue to our second observation — the question of

whether Appellant has complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

1925(b). Appellant’s concise statement consists of ten issues and is 37 pages

in length.14    See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, Errors Complained of on

Appeal, 3/15/21.

        This Court has previously recognized that “Rule 1925 is a crucial

component of the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify

and focus on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Kanter v.

Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).                “The

____________________________________________

13   As emphasized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:

        The briefing requirements scrupulously delineated in our appellate
        rules are not mere trifling matters of stylistic preference; rather,
        they represent a studied determination by our Court and its rules
        committee of the most efficacious manner by which appellate
        review may be conducted so that a litigant’s right to judicial review
        as guaranteed by Article V, Section 9 of our Commonwealth’s
        Constitution may be properly exercised. Thus, we reiterate that
        compliance with these rules by appellate advocates who have any
        business before our Court is mandatory.

Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 343 (Pa. 2011).

14It merits mention that the concise statement reads like an appellate brief
with analysis following every issue.

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[concise s]tatement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the

appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent

issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). Nevertheless, the filing of a

timely concise statement alone “does not automatically equate with issue

preservation.” Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Moreover, “[e]ven if the trial court correctly guesses the issues [a]ppellant

raises on appeal and writes an opinion pursuant to that supposition, the

issue[s are] still waived.” Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 911

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

      As the Tucker Court opined:

      [T]his Court has held that when appellants raise an outrageous
      number of issues in their [Rule] 1925(b) statement, the appellants
      have deliberately circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule
      1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively precluded appellate review
      of the issues they [now] seek to raise. We have further noted that
      such voluminous statements do not identify the issues appellants
      actually intend to raise on appeal because the briefing limitations
      contained in Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) make[ ] the raising of so many
      issues impossible.     Further, this type of extravagant [Rule]
      1925(b) statement makes it all but impossible for the trial court
      to provide a comprehensive analysis of the issues.

Id. at 346 (citations & internal quotation marks omitted; some brackets in

original). As such, “the [Rule] 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently concise

and coherent such that the trial court judge may be able to identify the issues

to be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not suggest the existence

of bad faith.”   Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super.

2008). See also Vurimindi, 200 A.3d at 1038-43 (applying Kanter, Tucker,

                                    - 14 -
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and Jiricko to a criminal matter); Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037,

1041 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2022) (same).

      Here, the PCRA court found that Appellant’s concise statement was

“overly prolix[,]”, and it was “unable to easily decipher the complaints and/or

respond with any reasonable detail.” See PCRA Ct. Op., 3/22/21, at 1. The

court further stated:

            However, upon cursory review of . . . Appellant’s [concise
      statement], we note that the [s]tatement contains ten sections,
      some of which apparently blend multiple complaints. Much of
      Appellant’s complaints were carefully analyzed in our 60 page
      Order denying PCRA relief and require no further support. Other
      sections of Appellant’s [s]tatement appear to contain extensive
      legal argument, address the weight of trial evidence and
      testimony, or address the District Attorney’s forfeiture petition
      which was resolved under a different docket number in a civil
      action. We submit that those complaints are not appropriate for
      including in Appellant’s [Rule] 1925(b) [s]tatement. We submit
      that any claim[s] not raised at the PCRA hearing or addressed in
      Appellant’s PCRA brief are waived on [a]ppeal.

            Finally, we feel comfortable that our 60 page Order of
      February 17, 2021 carefully analyzed and addressed all cognizable
      constitutional issues properly raised at the PCRA hearing and/or
      argued in Appellant’s PCRA brief. No further support is necessary.

Id. at 1-2.

      We agree with the PCRA court’s findings.      Nevertheless, we will not

dismiss Appellant’s brief at this time, as the violations do not substantially

impede our ability to conduct meaningful and effective appellate review. See

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“when

defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review,

we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived”).

                                    - 15 -
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Nevertheless, we warn Appellant against violating our appellate rules in the

future.

       We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the relevant law, the certified

record, and the PCRA court’s February 17, 2021, order. We conclude that

Appellant is entitled to no relief, and the PCRA court’s order correctly disposes

of Appellant’s properly preserved issues15 on appeal, especially considering

his sparse ineffective assistance of counsel analysis. Therefore, we affirm on

the basis of the court’s order and adopt it as our own. In any future filing with

this or any other court addressing this decision, the filing party shall attach a

copy of the PCRA court’s February 17, 2021, order.

       Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s orders dismissing Appellant’s

petition and denying him any relief.

       Lastly, Appellant filed two applications for relief with this Court on

August 22, 2022, and December 12, 2022 — both generally requesting that a

ruling be made in this appeal.            Based on our decision, we deny those

applications as moot.

       Orders affirmed. Applications for Relief (8/23/22 & 12/13/22) denied

as moot.

____________________________________________

15 We note that issues two, four, five, and seven are either not cognizable
under the PCRA or waived for failure to properly preserve them with the PCRA
court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2) (setting forth types of cognizable errors
for which PCRA provides relief); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b) (waiver);
Pa.R.A.P. 302 (waiver).

                                          - 16 -
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/6/2023

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Circulated 12/29/2022 11:33 AM