Court Opinion

ID: 9765411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:02:08.271399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.695089
License: Public Domain

ENOCH, Justice,
joined by GONZALEZ and HECHT, Justices,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the Court’s judgment only to the extent that it remands the Trapnells’ claims against the non-potato whitener defendants. I agree that there is a fact issue as to causation that precludes summary judgment in favor of the hash brown and apple pie filling defendants.
I also agree with the Court that the Trap-nells had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the federal lawsuit the issue of the presence of potato whitener in the fruit salad. See supra, at 799. I disagree, however, with the Court’s conclusion that collateral estoppel does not apply to preclude any of the Trapnells’ claims. Collateral estoppel cannot apply to the hash brown and apple pie filling defendants because they were not parties in the prior litigation or in privity with any parties in the prior litigation. See Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex.1990). However, there is no principled reason why collateral estoppel should not apply to preclude the Trapnells’ claims against Sysco and Hoechst, the potato whitener defendants. The Court’s misapplication of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is motivated by nothing more than the Court’s desire to avoid what it perceives is an unfair result. The perceived unfairness, in fact, results from the Trapnells’ failure to carry their burden of proof in the federal lawsuit, when, as the Court concedes, the Trapnells had every incentive in the world to fully litigate their claims regarding the potato *806whitener and its presence in the fruit salad. See supra, at 799. The Court’s pronouncements today abandon any principled application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and confuse the fundamental precepts of the doctrine. I dissent.
Were Hoechst and Sysco the only defendants in this case, there can be little question that collateral estoppel would apply to preclude the Trapnells from relitigating the presence of potato whitener in the fruit salad. As perfunctorily professed by the Court, collateral estoppel applies to promote judicial efficiency and prevent multiple lawsuits and inconsistent findings. See supra, at 801. Judicial economy is served by precluding the Trapnells from relitigating facts that were essential to their judgment against the Navy, namely the presence of potato whitener in the fruit salad, and that are essential to their claims against Hoechst and Sysco in this case. Contrary to the Court’s assertion that judicial economy is served only when collateral estoppel protects a party from defending multiple suits, supra, at 801, judicial economy is served by saving the courts’ time and judicial resources from unnecessary relit-igation of identical issues. Michael Kimmel, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1010, 1013 (1967). When, as in this case, collateral estoppel is asserted by a nonparty as a bar against a party to the prior litigation, judicial economy may be served only by preventing the waste of judicial time and resources on relitigating identical issues. Id.
Similarly, were Hoechst and Sysco the only defendants, they would face liability on inconsistent judgments. The federal court found that potato whitener had not been added to the fruit salad. Hoechst and Sysco may be liable only if the jury finds that potato whitener had been added to the fruit salad. Collateral estoppel in its most fundamental application must apply “when relit-igation could result in an inconsistent determination of the same ultimate issue.” Tarter v. Metropolitan Savings & Loan Ass’n, 744 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Tex.1988). While the presence of potato whitener in the fruit salad is not an ultimate issue as to the non-potato whitener defendants in that their liability is not predicated on whether the potato whitener was added to the fruit salad, the presence of potato whitener is an ultimate issue for Hoechst and Sysco. These defendants, who would but for some unexplained reason otherwise be entitled to rely on collateral estop-pel, cannot and face liability on inconsistent determinations of the same ultimate issue.
The Court not only ignores this potential for conflicting findings but also offhandedly dismisses the prejudice to the potato whitener defendants that results if they cannot assert collateral estoppel as a defense. If, contrary to the federal court’s finding, the jury concludes that potato whitener had been added to the fruit salad, Sysco and Hoechst cannot seek contribution from the Navy. See supra, at 804, n. 14. The Court ignores this unfairness stating only that it must be concerned with unfairness to the Trapnells, the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted. Considering Hoechst and Sysco, where is the harm to the Trapnells in precluding them from relitigating against those defendants whose liability is predicated on the presence of potato whitener in the salad that which the Trapnells failed to prove in their first lawsuit?
Ignoring all of the precepts and stated goals of collateral estoppel, the Court gives no principled explanation for its departure today from the traditional application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel concerning the Trapnells’ claims against Hoechst and Sysco. I would hold that Hoechst and Sysco were entitled to summary judgment on their defense of collateral estoppel. On remand, the remaining parties may litigate the presence or absence of potato whitener in the fruit salad without restriction and the jury may find that Susan Trapnell’s death was caused by one or more of the sulfite containing products. It is only if the jury finds that potato whitener was the sole cause of Susan Trapnell’s death that the Trapnells will recover nothing. There is nothing inherently unfair in precluding recovery against the potato whitener defendants in this action when the Trapnells failed to carry their burden of proof after a full and fair opportunity to *807litigate the potato whitener issue in the prior litigation.
Because I conclude that collateral estoppel precludes the Trapnells’ claims against Hoechst and Sysco, I would also reach and decide the Trapnells’ argument that application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in this case violates the right to a jury trial under the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 15; art. V, § 10. I would hold that a prior federal court determination may have preclusive effect such that relit-igation of the issue before a jury in a state court may be foreclosed and that this estop-pel does not violate the right to trial by jury. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 335-37, 99 S.Ct. 645, 653-55, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1978).