Court Opinion

ID: 9635958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:11:05.63722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:27.046586
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Raphael and Callins
UNPUBLISHED

              COREY LANCE HILL
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1744-22-1                                        PER CURIAM
                                                                                AUGUST 22, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
                                               John W. Brown, Judge

                              (Brett P. Blobaum, Senior Appellate Attorney; Virginia Indigent
                              Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; David A. Stock, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Corey Lance Hill (“appellant”) challenges the sentence the trial court imposed after

              revoking his previously suspended sentence. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its

              discretion in weighing his mitigating evidence and imposing an active sentence of two years and ten

              months. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral

              argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a);

              Rule 5A:27(a). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     “On appeal, ‘[w]e “view the evidence received at [a] revocation hearing in the light most

              favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, including all reasonable and legitimate

              inferences that may properly be drawn from it.”’” Green v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 69, 76

              (2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 266, 274 (2018)).

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
        In June 2007, the trial court convicted appellant of felony eluding and possessing cocaine,

and in May 2008, sentenced him to a total of ten years’ incarceration with eight years and two

months suspended, and placed him on supervised probation. In 2010, appellant admitted to

violating the conditions of probation, including absconding from probation, and the trial court

revoked the previously suspended sentences and resuspended five years and two months. In 2014,

appellant again admitted that he had violated the conditions of his probation, including absconding

from probation and receiving new convictions, and the trial court revoked and resuspended the

previously suspended sentences.

        In March 2017, the trial court found that appellant had received new convictions, revoked

his previously suspended sentences, and resuspended four years and eight months. A November

2017 major violation report alleged that appellant had failed to report for multiple drug screens and

office appointments and tested positive for cocaine and other drugs on three occasions. In 2018,

after appellant admitted to violating the conditions of probation, the trial court revoked the

suspended sentences and resuspended three years and two months. Finally, a December 31, 2019

major violation report and October 2022 addendum alleged that appellant had failed to report to the

probation officer as instructed, attempted to adulterate a urine sample, admitted to using cocaine and

marijuana, failed to provide a valid address to the probation officer, and absconded from probation

beginning December 12, 2019. Appellant was arrested on a capias on September 9, 2022.

        At the revocation hearing on October 18, 2022, appellant admitted that he violated the

conditions of his probation as alleged in the major violation report. Appellant testified that after the

previous violations, he went to a “sober living house” in Harrisonburg to avoid being around his

“old friends” and “old ways” of living. He spent four months there, then returned to his home area,

“got back with the same friends,” and “fell back into [his] old ways.” Appellant maintained that he

“slipped up” on his “first appointment,” then “got high,” and “it was too late.” He stated that he was

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“supporting [his] family the best way” he was able and had earned his commercial driver’s license

(CDL). Appellant, who was 46 years old at the hearing, testified that he had struggled with

addiction since he was approximately 23 years old. He denied any current drug use, said that he had

“a strong faith” and knew he had “a family” and “children” who were “depending on” him, and

asserted that he was “done with [drug use].”

        The Commonwealth argued that appellant had “a history of violating probation.” The

Commonwealth emphasized appellant’s extensive criminal record, including at least eight felonies

and ten probation violations. The Commonwealth argued that if appellant were put on probation

again, he would simply “continue to violate.” The Commonwealth acknowledged that appellant

had struggled with addiction but argued that the trial court should revoke all of his remaining

suspended sentence.

        Appellant’s counsel argued that he now had “his mind right” and needed to be able to “take

care of his family.” He emphasized that appellant had obtained his CDL, had benefitted from being

in the sober living house, and asked the trial court to impose no more than six months’ active time to

give him the opportunity to work. In allocution, appellant maintained that he had been “try[ing] to

get back on the right track” when he was in Harrisonburg, was “clean” and “sober,” “saving

money,” and “[e]verything was great” before he returned to his home area and “messed up.” He

said that he accepted responsibility and was ready to “get back to society” and be off of probation.

He admitted an addiction problem but maintained that he was handling that “every day” and was

“ready to deal with it.”

        After argument by counsel, the trial court found that appellant had absconded from

probation not because of one missed appointment, as appellant had testified, but because he had

decided every day for two years not to “turn [him]self in.” The trial court acknowledged that

“everybody wakes up” to what is needed in life “at a different time,” but emphasized that the

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current proceeding was for appellant’s fifth probation violation. The trial court revoked the three

years and two months of the previously suspended sentence and resuspended two years and ten

months.

        The trial court convened another revocation hearing on October 28, 2022, to address a

discrepancy between what the trial court had intended to impose and the revocation order as

entered. At this hearing, the trial court allowed appellant to present additional mitigation evidence.

Appellant’s sister, Noelia Coe, came to the hearing from California and testified that her

relationship with appellant had “gotten better over time” and he would be welcome to stay with her

or with their mother in Virginia upon his release. According to Coe, appellant’s family members

were “very supportive” and had noticed that he was “doing something different” recently, such as

“enroll[ing] to get a CDL.” Coe further testified that appellant had “made a turnaround” from his

“history of drugs.” Coe had contacted the school where appellant had been enrolled and testified

that he would be welcome to attend again once he was released. Coe asserted that appellant’s

“actions were different this time” from times in the past when he would claim that he was going to

do better. She also testified that she talked with appellant “every day now,” as opposed to earlier

times when he would be “distant.”

        The Commonwealth once again urged the trial court to impose the full sentence.

Appellant’s counsel argued that the trial court could believe that appellant had changed and asked

for one more opportunity, suggesting that the trial court give appellant probation with special

conditions instead of an active period of incarceration. In allocution, appellant stated that he

“look[ed] at things” differently now. He emphasized his family relationships and the support they

were giving and maintained that distance from his family had been “the number one reason” for his

past violations. Appellant asserted that he was “definitely ready for a change” and would “be a

better man.”

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        After argument by counsel, the trial court found that appellant had been given opportunities

to avoid incarceration previously and had not taken advantage of them. The trial court found that it

had imposed special conditions in 2018 but appellant absconded only three months after being

placed on probation and was gone for two years and nine months. The trial court also found that

appellant had absconded from probation before and knew “every day that he woke up that he

needed to turn himself in” but decided not to. The trial court acknowledged that appellant claimed

to have “turned the corner” but found that two years and ten months was an appropriate sentence

under the circumstances.1 By order entered November 16, 2022, the trial court revoked three years

and two months of the previously suspended sentence, resuspended four months, and removed

appellant from supervised probation. Appellant appeals, arguing that the sentence constitutes an

abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

                                             ANALYSIS

        On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court improperly weighed his mitigating evidence

and erroneously focused on the period during which he absconded. In support of this claim, he

notes that the trial court fashioned a sentence that corresponded to that period. Appellant asserts

that the General Assembly did not “create[] a formulaic rubric for determining” that the appropriate

sentence for a probationer who has absconded is the length of time that he was gone. Thus,

appellant argues, the trial court abused its discretion by not properly weighing his mitigating

evidence against his absence. We disagree.

        “In revocation appeals, the trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed

unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Green, 75 Va. App. at 76 (quoting Jacobs

v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535 (2013)). “[T]he abuse of discretion standard requires a

        1
         The trial court indicated it believed an appropriate sentence was two years and nine
months, equal to the period he absconded, and one additional month for the other violations of
probation.
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reviewing court to show enough deference to a primary decisionmaker’s judgment that the

[reviewing] court does not reverse merely because it would have come to a different result in the

first instance.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 73 Va. App. 121, 127 (2021) (alterations in original)

(quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 212 (2013)). This Court will find an abuse of

discretion only when “reasonable jurists could not differ.” Hicks v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App.

255, 275 (2019) (quoting Campos v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 690, 702 (2017)).

        After suspending a sentence, a trial court “may revoke the suspension of sentence for any

cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation period, or within

the period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). Under the statute in effect

when the probation officer filed the 2019 major violation report, when a trial court revokes a

suspended sentence, “the original sentence shall be in full force and effect. The court may again

suspend all or any part of this sentence and may place the defendant upon terms and conditions

or probation.” Hill v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 206, 214 (2021) (quoting Code

§ 19.2-306(C)), aff’d, 301 Va. 222 (2022).

        “When coupled with a suspended sentence, probation represents ‘an act of grace on the part

of the Commonwealth to one who has been convicted and sentenced to a term of confinement.’”

Hunter v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 582, 587 (2010) (quoting Price v. Commonwealth, 51

Va. App. 443, 448 (2008)). Appellant failed to make productive use of the grace that had been

extended to him by continuing to use illegal drugs, absconding from probation for a significant time,

and the other violations documented in the record. Appellant does not dispute that the court had

good cause to revoke his suspended sentence. Indeed, he conceded at the revocation hearing that he

had attempted to adulterate a urine sample, failed to report as instructed, failed to provide a valid

address, admitted to cocaine and marijuana use, and absconded from probation.

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       While appellant presented mitigation evidence, such as his family’s support, that he had

earned his CDL, and his declarations that he had changed and intended to “be a better man,” it

was within the trial court’s purview to weigh any such mitigating factors. See Keselica v.

Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000). Balanced against that evidence, however, were

appellant’s significant and repeated violations of the conditions of his suspended sentence, and

the fact that this constituted his fifth violation. Though the trial court found the length of

appellant’s abscondence from probation significant, that does not mean that the trial court

focused on that factor to the exclusion of his mitigation. “Barring clear evidence to the contrary,

this Court will not presume that a trial court purposefully ignored mitigating factors in blind

pursuit of a harsh sentence.” Bassett v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 580, 584 (1992). To the

contrary, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered appellant’s mitigating evidence.

       We cannot find that the trial court failed to adequately weigh appellant’s mitigation.

Instead, the trial court placed greater weight on the fact that this was appellant’s fifth revocation

and his third act of absconding. Therefore, we hold the sentence imposed to be a proper exercise

of the trial court’s sentencing discretion. See Alsberry v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 314,

321-22 (2002) (holding the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the previously

suspended sentence in its entirety “in light of the grievous nature of [the defendant’s] offenses

and his continuing criminal activity”). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                          CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                             Affirmed.

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