Court Opinion

ID: 9384304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 14:05:33.907347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.579721
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-539

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                CARMELO MEDINA.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Boston

 Municipal Court of assault and battery; the victim was his

 workplace supervisor.1       Because we are not persuaded that any

 error in the evidentiary rulings made by the trial judge

 resulted in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, see

 Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 398 (2010), we affirm the

 defendant's conviction.

       1.   References to "assault" in victim's medical records.

 The Commonwealth alleged that the defendant attacked and injured

 the victim while both men were at work.            Shortly after the

 incident, the victim went to the emergency room at a nearby

 hospital where he was treated and released.            On the day of

 1 He was acquitted of a separate charge of strangulation or
 suffocation against the same victim.
trial, the prosecutor moved in limine to offer the records of

the victim's medical treatment as evidence at trial.   The

defendant objected to any references in those records to the

victim's being "choked" and "ambushed from behind"; the judge

allowed the Commonwealth's motion subject to the redaction of

any references to the victim's being "ambushed from behind."2    In

several places, the records, as redacted, included references to

the victim's primary complaint as being "assault."   The records

as introduced also included a "patient education" entry defining

"[g]eneral [a]ssault" to include "any behavior or physical

attack -- whether it is on purpose or not -- that results in

injury to another person[.]"

     On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in

admitting the records referencing the victim's "assault" because

the statements' probative value was substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice and, in the case of the patient

education materials, because the definition of assault included

in them would have confused the jurors.   See Mass. G. Evid.

§ 403 (2021).

     The defendant did not object at trial to the references in

the treatment notes to the victim's report of "assault," and we

are not persuaded that the admission of those statements in

2 Counsel indicated that they would undertake the necessary
redactions and provide "a fresh copy" for the jury.

                                2
evidence created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

See Dargon, 457 Mass. at 398.    First, the statements were no

more than repetitions of "the victim's descriptions of the acts

[he] claims occurred," and so "constitute[d] 'fact-specific

references to the reported cause of [his] injuries' made for

purposes of obtaining medical treatment."     Id. at 396, quoting

Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. 233, 242 (1998).     "[T]hese

statements were thus admissible even though 'incidental to

liability.'"   Dargon, supra.   Second, at trial, the defendant

did not seriously challenge that he fought with the victim or

that he caused the injuries described by the victim and depicted

in the trial exhibits; rather, he argued that the attack was the

result of the victim's provoking him, and that he acted in self-

defense.   The references in the medical records to the victim's

report of an "assault" added nothing to the facts the defendant

had effectively conceded at trial -- that the victim reported

the altercation as an assault -- and to the extent that the jury

may have considered them, their substance was not inconsistent

with the theory offered by the defense.

    We agree with the defendant that the educational materials

on "general assault" should not have gone to the jury but,

again, discern no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice

created by their admission.     Neither party highlighted the

discharge instructions at trial, and, as we have noted, there

                                  3
was no objection to their admission.       Importantly, the judge

clearly and correctly instructed the jury on the fact that she

was the source of the governing law in the case, and on the

elements of assault as charged in the case on which they were

deliberating.   We presume that the jury followed the judge's

instructions, notwithstanding the materials on "general assault"

included in the medical records.       See Commonwealth v. Silva, 482

Mass. 275, 290 (2019) ("The jury are presumed to follow all

instructions they are given").

     2.    Evidence defendant "found guilty" by union.     As we note

above, the incident giving rise to the charges against the

defendant occurred while the defendant and the victim were

together at work.    On direct examination, the following exchange

took place between the prosecutor and the victim:

     Q.: "Are you aware, is [the defendant] still employed
     with the . . .[c]ompany?"

     A.:   "No, he's not."

     Q.:   "Okay."

     A.: "He was found guilty by the union and he was
     released."

     There was no objection to this unsolicited statement about

the union action; a trial judge is not obligated to strike

unobjected-to hearsay evidence.3       See Commonwealth v. Pimental,

3 The parties disagree whether the victim's statement was
inadmissible hearsay. Given our conclusion that the admission

                                   4
54 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 330 (2002).    While the jury should not

have heard the victim's unsolicited statement about the union's

decision, it was not referred to again during the trial.4   We are

satisfied that in the circumstances here, the statement does not

raise a "serious doubt whether the result of the trial might

have been different had the error not been made" (quotations

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Curran, 488 Mass. 792, 794 (2021),

quoting Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 189 (2014).

Accordingly, we are satisfied that the admission of that

statement did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice, whether considered in isolation or together with any

other errors in the case.

     Conclusion.   The conviction is affirmed.

                                     Judgment affirmed.

                                     By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                       Rubin & Hand, JJ.5),

                                     Clerk

Entered:    April 3, 2023.

of the victim's statement did not create a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice, we assume for the sake of argument that
it was.
4 We also consider it unlikely that the jury would conclude that

"the union" could render a criminal verdict.
5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                 5