Court Opinion

ID: 9610159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:37:19.046935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:56.917159
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
While concurring with the judgment of affirmance of the trial court, this writer offers two observations.
1. In Division 1, the majority opinion relies upon Minter v. Leary, 181 Ga. App. 801 (354 SE2d 185) (1987), which has no precedential value concerning the issue of instructing the jury on exagger*102ated damages, because Minter was in that regard only a two-judge case. (One judge concurred specially without concurring with the majority opinion’s disposition of that issue.) I agree with the proposition of law for which the majority opinion cites Minter, having authored Jackson v. Miles, 126 Ga. App. 320 (190 SE2d 565) (1972) which was relied upon in Minter. However, this court should give Minter precedential value with a full-panel approval of the case, rather than presenting it as binding authority.
Decided April 28, 1988
Rehearing denied May 11, 1988
J. Converse Bright, for appellant.
F. Thomas Young, Daniel L. Studstill, James B. Thagard, for appellee.
2. In Division 4, the majority opinion, quoting from Parr v. Pinson, 182 Ga. App. 707 (356 SE2d 740) (1987), states that “‘[q]uestions of negligence, diligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are peculiarly matters for the jury . . .’” Without more, this quotation may mistakenly suggest that the law of contributory negligence is in effect in this state rather than that of comparative negligence. See Ohio S. Express Co. v. Beeler, 110 Ga. App. 867, 868 (140 SE2d 235) (1965). The present legal status of the doctrine of contributory negligence is that of “defensive concept.” See Edwards v. Trammell, 187 Ga. App. 22 (369 SE2d 288) (1988).