Court Opinion

ID: 9408388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 17:02:14.267892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.570614
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LANDSTAR RANGER, INC.,

               Plaintiff,

       v.                                              Civil Action No. 23-13 (TJK)

M X 26 HELP & LINKK CORPORATION,

               Defendant.

                                         MEMORANDUM

       After obtaining the Clerk of Court’s entry of Defendant’s default, Plaintiff now moves for

default judgment for a sum certain. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion and

enter default judgment in the amount requested.

       Plaintiff filed a one-count breach-of-contract complaint against Defendant. See ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff for shipping services, that Plaintiff invoiced

Defendant for $163,950.01, that Defendant accepted the “invoices and underlying paperwork with-

out objection or protest,” but that Defendant failed to pay. Id. ¶¶ 9–15. Plaintiff timely filed proof

of service on Defendant. See ECF No. 7. When Defendant did not appear within 21 days, see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i), Plaintiff filed an affidavit supporting default, see ECF No. 8. Thus,

the Clerk of Court entered Defendant’s default. ECF No. 9; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

       Plaintiff now moves for a $163,950.01 default judgment against Defendant. ECF No. 10.

It describes that amount as a “sum certain . . . excluding interest and costs.” Id. at 2. It also sup-

ports that motion with affidavits by its lawyer, who asserts that service was proper and that De-

fendant has not contacted him, see ECF No. 10-1 at 1–2, and a custodian of its business records,
who asserts that Plaintiff provided the services for which it billed Defendant, see ECF No. 10-2

at 1–2. Plaintiff also filed documents detailing the services it says it provided. See id. at 3–113.

       Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 creates a “two-step procedure” for obtaining a default

judgment. Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2015). First,

after a defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend,” the plaintiff may request that the Clerk

of the Court enter default against that defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after default is

entered, the plaintiff may move for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). An entry of

default “establishes the defaulting party’s liability for the well-pleaded allegations of the com-

plaint.” Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2011) (collecting

cases). But this “does not automatically establish liability in the amount claimed by the plaintiff.”

Carazani v. Zegarra, 972 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2013).

       After an entry of default, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(1) authorizes the Clerk of

Court to enter default judgment “[i]f the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be

made certain by computation.” “In all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default

judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). In those cases, the Court “is required to make an independent

determination of the sum to be awarded,” Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v.

R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2002). But even on claims for sums

certain, courts may enter default judgment although the rules permit the Clerk of Court to do so

instead. See, e.g., Marell v. Plummer, No. 18-CV-354 (TFH), 2018 WL 6329397, at *1 (D.D.C.

Dec. 4, 2018). 1

1
 Even with an absent party, a court has an “affirmative obligation” to determine that it has subject-
matter and personal jurisdiction before entering a default judgment. See James Madison Ltd. ex
rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Karcher v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
396 F. Supp. 3d 12, 21 (D.D.C. 2019). The Court has no trouble concluding that it has both here.

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       Plaintiff’s claim, which is established by well-pleaded allegations, is for a sum certain. A

sum certain is an amount for which, “once the fact of liability is established, the dollar amount of

that liability follows with mathematical certainty.” Combs v. Coal & Min. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 105

F.R.D. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1984). For example, a dollar amount that appears on the face of a finan-

cial instrument is a sum certain, even if the relevant liability rule requires calculations based on

that number. See Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d 692, 693–94 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Here, Plaintiff’s

claimed amount is the sum of unpaid invoices that it alleges Defendant was contractually obligated

to—but did not—pay. See ECF No. 1-2; ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 9–15. Because Defendant’s “default es-

tablishes [its] liability” for those amounts, Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v.

Auxier Drywall, LLC, 531 F. Supp. 2d 56, 57 (D.D.C. 2008), the only remaining operation has

“mathematical certainty,” see Combs, 105 F.R.D. at 474.

       Thus, the Court need not inquire further. See Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17

(D.D.C. 2001) (“[T]he court is required to make an independent determination of the sum to be

awarded . . . unless the amount of damages is certain . . . .”). The Court will enter final default

judgment for Plaintiff, Landstar Ranger, Inc., and against Defendant, M X 26 Help & Linkk Cor-

poration, in the amount of $163,950.01. A separate order will issue.

                                                               /s/ Timothy J. Kelly
                                                               TIMOTHY J. KELLY
                                                               United States District Judge

Date: July 12, 2023

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges (1) that Plaintiff is a citizen of Delaware and Florida, (2) that Defend-
ant is a citizen of New York, and (3) that Defendant failed to pay contractual obligations exceeding
$75,000. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 3, 13. Thus, the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that Defendant signed the relevant contract through
its office in the District of Columbia. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 7; ECF No. 1-1. That contact with this
forum is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See, e.g., Clements Distrib.
Co. of Va. v. Celebrity Prods., Inc., 699 F. Supp. 322, 322–23 (D.D.C. 1988).

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