Court Opinion

ID: 9723340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:12:07.207419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:47.216052
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). Hendrick was convicted in October, 1971 of breaking and entering1 and in December, 1971 of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder,2 both charges growing out of the same incident, and was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of 9-1/2 to 10 years.
Immediately after sentencing the prosecutor filed a supplemental information charging Hendrick with being an habitual offender based on the two 1971 Michigan convictions and three out-of-state convictions: a 1966 Washington burglary, a 1966 North Dakota robbery, and a 1968 escape from a North Dakota prison. He was convicted on the supplemental information as a fourth felony offender and sentenced to life imprisonment.3
*422Hendrick had moved to quash the supplemental information on the ground that before his conviction on the assault charge the prosecutor was aware that he was a prior offender and, therefore, under People v Stratton, 13 Mich App 350; 164 NW2d 555 (1968), approved in People v Hatt, 384 Mich 302; 181 NW2d 912 (1970), the prosecutor was obliged, if he wished to charge him as a prior offender, to file a supplemental information before conviction on the assault charge.
At the hearing on the motion to quash, the prosecutor stated that on December 8, 1971, a week before the trial on the assault charge, he had received an FBI rap sheet which disclosed the three out-of-state convictions. He said that he might have been aware even earlier of Hendrick’s prior record.
Defending his failure to file the supplemental information before the trial on the assault charge, the prosecutor said that it "would be foolish to rely solely upon a rap sheet for information, and I did not. It took me some three weeks to track this down and find witnesses, whether he had these records and whether or not we could prove them; and I would say that I moved as speedily as I possibly could.”
Hendrick was convicted on his plea of guilty of the breaking and entering charge on October 21, 1971. Accordingly, the prosecutor knew that Hendrick was a prior offender two months before the trial on the assault charge. The prosecutor was also then aware of the aggravating circumstances that may have impelled the prior offender charge subsequently lodged against Hendrick.
*423The assault charge for which Hendrick was tried was assault with intent to commit murder, an offense punishable by imprisonment for life or any number of years.4 The victim was a state policeman. Hendrick was convicted by the jury of the lesser offense of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years.
Hendrick’s counsel did not seek an evidentiary hearing on the asserted factual basis for the delay in filing the supplemental information.
I
While the habitual offender provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not create a separate offense, providing rather for enhanced punishment for the current offense, fairness requires notice to the offender that he may face enhanced punishment where the prosecutor is aware, in advance of the trial on the current offense, of the offender’s prior record.
The severity of the potential punishment that may be imposed is often reflected in the processing and disposition of charges against offenders. Minor offenders often are not cited; if cited they may be permitted to dispose of the matter informally, paying a predetermined fine. Accused persons aware that they will be placed on probation often plead guilty without appointment of counsel or offering a defense. Counsel need not be appointed for indigent offenders who are charged with minor offenses not subject to incarceration.5
Increased resources are generally devoted to the *424prosecution and defense of persons charged with serious offenses carrying long sentences. The law recognizes in many ways that the amount of process required by ordinary notions of fairness depends in part on the potential impact on the accused of the conviction.
The nature of the accused’s response, the care with which he prepares to defend himself, will often depend on the severity of the potential punishment. It is overwhelmingly important to an accused whether upon conviction of a fourth felony, say of carrying a concealed weapon, the maximum sentence is five years6 or life.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that persons sentenced as habitual offenders are not eligible for parole before the expiration of the minimum term without the sentencing judge’s approval.7
II
A prosecutor is not obliged to charge as an habitual offender an accused who has a prior felony record nor is the judge obliged, if the accused is convicted as an habitual offender, to impose enhanced punishment.
If the prosecutor wishes to charge the accused as an habitual offender, he does so by adding a charge in the information or by supplemental information.
The section of the statute under which Hendrick was charged as an habitual offender provides that "[i]f at any time after conviction and either before or after sentence it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted *425of crimes as set forth in any of the 3 foregoing sections, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such conviction was had, in his discretion, may file a separate or supplemental information in such cause accusing the said person of such previous convictions.”8 The three preceding sections of the statute are those providing for enhancement of the punishment upon conviction as a second, third or fourth offender.9 The immediately preceding section10 provides: "A person to be punishable under this and the last 2 preceding sections need not have been indicted and convicted as a previous offender in order to receive the increased punishment therein provided, but may be proceeded against as provided in the following section.”
Reading the four habitual offender sections together, the Court of Appeals, in Stratton, supra, p 356, declared that the statute contemplates two "separate situations and procedures to be followed when the prosecutor desires to make possible the meting out of an increased penalty pursuant to the habitual criminal sections of the code of criminal procedure. The procedure set forth in section 13 is to be followed whenever it appears to the prosecutor ’after conviction’ of the current charge that the felon has a prior felony record. However, where it appears to the prosecutor before conviction of the current charge that the accused person is a prior felon, the accused person is to be informed against as a prior offender prior to conviction on the current charge; the procedure set forth in section 13 need not be followed”. (Emphasis by the Court.)
That concept was earlier suggested by this Court *426in In re Brazel, 293 Mich 632, 639-640; 292 NW 664 (1940).11
In Hatt, supra, p 309, this Court declared that the procedures for dealing with a recidivist charge, as delineated in Stratton, "are approved”.12
Ill
The Court adopts the prosecutor’s argument that it "would be foolish to rely solely on a rap sheet for information” and concludes that the prosecutor acted properly in this case.
Prosecutors often rely on rap sheets for information. In People v Sanders, 394 Mich 439, 441; 231 NW2d 639 (1975), we declared that the prosecutor had acted in apparent good faith in attempting to impeach a defendant on cross-examination by ref*427erence to arrests, which did not result in convictions, appearing in a rap sheet:
"The cross examination appears to have been in good faith. The defendant’s conviction preceded Falkner and Rappuhn13 A 'rap sheet’ appeared at first glance to show that defendant had been convicted and imprisoned for a robbery committed in Trenton, New Jersey, in 1966.”
In this case the prosecutor on his own statement had time for more than a "first glance”. He had at least seven days to check the out-of-state convictions. He was already aware of the Michigan breaking and entering conviction.
At the trial on the assault charge, Hendrick’s counsel elicited from him that he had been convicted of the four prior offenses. Since the credibility of a witness, including the accused when he takes the stand, may generally be impeached by reference to a prior conviction record,14 defense counsel often brings out the entire record on direct examination in an effort to lessen the impact on the jury of this adverse information.
Hendrick’s counsel must have expected the prosecutor to "be foolish” and to rely on imperfect information during cross-examination. In truth, the prosecutor would have been foolish not to rely on the rap sheet, as is generally done.
*428Prosecutors, judges, most persons, rely on imperfect information in taking even important steps affecting their own lives and the lives of others.
A prosecutor aware, on the basis of imperfect information, before the trial that the accused person has a prior conviction record may by promptly filing a supplemental information both protect his right to charge the defendant as an habitual offender and satisfy the need to inform the accused of the enhanced punishment he may face. If the prosecutor later determines that he cannot verify the convictions he need not proceed to hearing on the supplemental information.
IV
The construction of the statute and standard set forth in Stratton, approved in Hatt, earlier suggested in Brazel, of "where it appears to the prosecutor before conviction of the current charge that the accused person is a prior felon” protects both the accused’s need for advance notice and the prosecutor’s right to charge him as a recidivist.
Applying that standard in this case, the prosecutor, aware of the prior Michigan conviction and of the out-of-state convictions for over a week before the trial, could properly be expected to have filed a supplemental information giving notice, before the commencement of the trial on the assault charge, to the accused that upon conviction he faced enhanced punishment.
I would vacate the defendant’s conviction as a prior offender and amend the judgment of conviction and sentence accordingly.

 MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305.

 MCLA 750.84; MSA 28.279.

 If an accused person is charged as an habitual offender, on conviction of the currently charged offense the judge may enlarge the punishment otherwise prescribed by law to not more than one-and-one-half times the longest term otherwise prescribed for the current offense if it is a second conviction (MCLA 769.10; MSA 28.1082), to not more than twice the longest term otherwise prescribed for the current offense if it is a third conviction (MCLA 769.11; MSA 28.1083), or to imprisonment for life if either (i) the current offense is one for which the offender might be imprisoned for a maximum term *422of five years or more and is a fourth conviction (MCLA 769.12; MSA 28.1084), or (ii) the current offense is one for which the offender might be imprisoned for life. MCLA 769.10, 769.11; MSA 28.1082, 28.1083.

 MCLA 750.83; MSA 28.278.

 Cf. Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 481; 92 S Ct 2593; 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972).

 MCLA 750.227; MSA 28.424.

 MCLA 769.12; MSA 28.1084.

 MCLA 769.13; MSA 28.1085.

 See fn 3 for statutory references to these three sections.

 MCLA 769.12; MSA 28.1084, concerning fourth convictions.

 "We must conclude that prior convictions can be charged in an information for a subsequent offense where the prosecutor has knowledge thereof on filing the information, or later in separate proceedings by a supplemental information under 3 Comp Laws 1929, § 17341 (Stat Ann § 28.1085), where such officer acquires such knowledge or information subsequent to conviction.” In re Brazel, 293 Mich 632, 639-640; 292 NW 664 (1940).

 "Finally, in People v Stratton (1968), 13 Mich App 350, Judge Levin carefully analyzed the procedures to be followed by a prosecutor (1) where it appears to him before conviction of the current charge that the accused was a prior felon and (2) where such information does not come to the attention of the prosecutor until after conviction of the current charge.
"In this case, the prosecuting attorney for Genesee County, with commendable candor, has stated in his brief:
" It may well be that the procedure suggested in People v Burd, and People v Stratton, supra, as well as MSA 28.1085 is the better means of determining and punishing a second offender. Most assuredly it has the effect of eliminating possible prejudice created by an allegation of previous convictions coupled with an allegation of the commission of a current offense.’
"The constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination will not permit a man’s past record of offenses to be used in such a manner as to imply guilt of the offense charged or to dnfairly prejudice the jury against him. The procedures for dealing with a recidivistic charge, as delineated by Judge Levin in People v Stratton, are approved.” People v Hatt, 384 Mich 302, 309; 181 NW2d 912 (1970).

 "In People v Falkner, 389 Mich 682; 209 NW2d 193 (1973), and People v Rappuhn, 390 Mich 266; 212 NW2d 205 (1973), this Court held that the credibility of a witness may not be impeached by reference to an arrest which does not result in conviction. In People v Renno, 392 Mich 45; 219 NW2d 422 (1974), this Court held that the credibility of a defendant in a criminal case may not be impeached by reference to 'municipal ordinance or misdemeanor convictions.’ ” People v Sanders, 394 Mich 439, 440; 231 NW2d 639 (1975).

 But see People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323, 336; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), recognizing a discretion in the trial judge to exclude such evidence.