Court Opinion

ID: 9939574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:11:10.358372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:25.133051
License: Public Domain

J-S26005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ACHELE HINDS                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1602 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 19, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0005826-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED FEBRUARY 08, 2024

       Appellant, Achele Hinds, appeals from her sentence of two years’

probation for aggravated assault, simple assault and possession of an

instrument of crime (“PIC”).1 We affirm Appellant’s judgments of sentence

for aggravated assault and PIC. We affirm Appellant’s conviction for simple

assault, but we vacate the judgment of sentence because it merged with her

conviction for aggravated assault for sentencing purposes.

       On June 29, 2019, the victim, Tara Jenkins, who was pregnant, was at

the home that she rented from Appellant. The home had a basement and an

attached garage. At around 2:30 p.m., Jenkins investigated a noise and found

Appellant’s son, Damir, in the garage. Damir had entered the garage without

permission and was attempting to use an ice machine that Appellant stored

there.
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 2701 and 907, respectively.
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        Jenkins told Damir to leave, but he refused. She tried to shut the ice

machine, but Damir pushed her. When she pushed him back, he swung a

metal chain at her that was used to lock the ice machine. Jenkins called the

police, but Damir grabbed her phone and threw it out of her reach. Jenkins

fled the home and went to a corner store a few blocks away.               N.T.,

12/10/2021, at 18-26.

        About twenty minutes later, Jenkins returned to the house and noticed

two cars parked behind her garage. Appellant’s sister, Michele, and Michele’s

son, Kalief, were sitting in one of the cars. Damir and Appellant were standing

next to the other car. Jenkins asked where her phone was and walked to the

driver’s side of Michele’s car, where the two began to argue. Kalief reached

across Michele and punched Jenkins in the face, and Jenkins hit Michele in the

face.

        Appellant, who was standing behind Jenkins, removed a two-by-four

from the backseat of her car and hit Jenkins on the back of her head and on

her back. Appellant testified that the two-by-four was a wooden stick with a

nail in it. When Jenkins turned around, and Appellant hit her in the face with

the two-by-four, Jenkins fell backwards into the backseat of Appellant’s car,

and Appellant fell on top of her. Jenkins held Appellant by her hair so that

Appellant’s body would protect Jenkins’ stomach.       Michele began hitting

Jenkins in the legs with the two-by-four. The police arrived, separated the

women, and recovered the two-by-four. Id. at 26-32, 38-44, 104.

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      Jenkins went to the hospital. Her shirt was torn, and she had bruises

and cuts all over her face, arms, and legs. There were also signs of recent

trauma on her cervical spine, ankle, leg and chest. Doctors recommended

that she wait five days before returning to work.

      Appellant was charged with aggravated assault, graded as a second-

degree felony, and related charges.     During Appellant’s non-jury trial on

December 10, 2021, the parties stipulated that in 2013, Jenkins had been

convicted of a crime involving dishonesty (crimen falsi). Following the close

of the Commonwealth’s case, defense counsel claimed that a previous

assistant district attorney agreed to stipulate that Appellant had a reputation

of law-abidingness, truthfulness and peacefulness.       The Commonwealth

responded that the previous prosecutor did not agree to such a stipulation,

and that there were no emails or file notations documenting one.           The

Commonwealth did, however, agree to stipulate to             Appellant’s law-

abidingness. Defense counsel asked the court to “bifurcate” the trial, i.e.,

continue the trial until later date so that he could present character evidence

of Appellant’s truthfulness and peacefulness. The trial court denied counsel’s

request but accepted the stipulation as to Appellant’s law-abiding reputation.

Defense counsel stated, “That’s fine.      Stipulation that my client has a

reputation for being law abiding. That’s all I would need.” Id. at 117-19.

      During closing arguments, defense counsel argued that Appellant struck

the victim in defense of her sister.     The trial court rejected Appellant’s

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justification defense and found her guilty of aggravated assault, simple

assault, and PIC. Id. at 145.

       On May 19, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to concurrent

terms of two years’ probation on all charges. Without filing post-sentence

motions, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.            This Court initially

dismissed her appeal due to her failure to timely file a docketing statement.

On October 6, 2022, we reinstated Appellant’s appeal on condition that she

file   a   docketing   statement   within   fourteen   days   from   the   date   of

reinstatement, and Appellant did so.          Both Appellant and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant raises four issues in this appeal:

       1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
       discretion in not granting the Appellant a bifurcation of trial to call
       character witnesses where defense counsel proffered that he had
       entered a stipulation with a prior Assistant District Attorney and
       there would be no prejudice to the Commonwealth by bifurcating
       the matter, where the Appellant has a right to put forth relevant
       character evidence as she has no prior criminal record for any
       crimes of violence?

       2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
       discretion in finding self-defense not credible wherein [Appellant]
       never raised self-defense but instead raised the justification
       defense of “defense of others” which requires the Commonwealth
       to disprove “defense of others” beyond a reasonable doubt and
       the trial court’s reasoning specifically addressed the incorrect
       justification defense and the record supports that the complainant
       punched or punched at Appellant’s sister who was sitting in the
       driver's seat of a parked car?

       3. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to convict
       Appellant of Aggravated Assault, Simple Assault, and Possession
       of an Instrument of Crime wherein the Appellant had a valid

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      justification defense and the Commonwealth failed to disprove the
      justification by proof beyond a reasonable doubt?

      4. Was the verdict against the weight of evidence wherein the
      complainant’s testimony was contradicted severely by the rest of
      the admissible evidence including the medical records, testimony
      of the arresting officer, and stipulation of crimen falsi convictions
      such that it shocks one’s [conscience] and sense of justice?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

      In her first argument, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying her request to continue trial so that her attorney could

obtain character witnesses concerning her reputation for truthfulness and

peacefulness. We disagree for several reasons.

      Although defense counsel initially requested a continuance, the

Commonwealth agreed to stipulate to Appellant’s law-abidingness, and

defense counsel accepted this stipulation as sufficient. N.T., 12/10/21, at 119

(counsel’s statement, “That’s fine. Stipulation that my client has a reputation

for being law abiding. That’s all I would need”) (emphasis added). Through

this statement, counsel communicated that the Commonwealth’s stipulation

to Appellant’s law-abidingness obviated any need for a continuance to obtain

character testimony. Cf. Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 486 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to the authenticity of evidence

where defendant stipulated to its authenticity during trial). Further, since the

parties stipulated as to Appellant’s reputation for law-abidingness, evidence

of peacefulness likely would have been cumulative, since we see little, if any,

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difference between a reputation for law-abidingness and a reputation for

peacefulness.

      Finally, when deciding a motion for continuance to secure a witness, the

trial court should consider (1) the necessity of the witness to strengthen the

party’s case; (2) whether the witness is essential to the party’s case; (3) the

diligence exercised to procure the witness’s presence at trial; (4) the facts to

which the witness could testify; and (5) the likelihood that the witness could

be produced at the next term of court. Commonwealth v. Norton, 144 A.3d

149, 143-44 (Pa. Super. 2016). Appellant failed to satisfy these standards

because she failed to explain whom she would have called as a character

witness, whether this witness existed, whether this witness was willing to

testify, or what this witness would have said about Appellant’s reputation for

peacefulness or truthfulness. For these reasons, the denial of a continuance

does not entitle Appellant to relief.

      Next, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her

convictions for aggravated assault, simple assault and PIC, because the

Commonwealth failed to prove the elements of the charged offenses or

disprove Appellant’s defense of justification. We disagree.

      We apply the following standards to challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence:

      We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and
      all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light
      most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support
      the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is

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      sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element
      of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the
      sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.

      The evidence established at trial need not preclude every
      possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all,
      part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the
      province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our
      judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s burden
      may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt
      about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact[-]finder
      unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter
      of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
      circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 302 A.3d 117, 120 (Pa. Super. 2023).

      At the outset, we note that the record should have been clearer as to

which subsection of the aggravated assault statute the trial court found

Appellant guilty of violating. The information charged Appellant with violating

seven of the nine subsections of the aggravated assault statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A.

2702(a)(1) through (a)(7). At the conclusion of trial, the court stated that

Appellant   was   guilty   of   aggravated   assault   without   specifying   the

subsection(s) of Section 2702 that Appellant violated. It is clear, however,

that the evidence fits only one of the seven subsections charged in the

information: Section 2702(a)(4). Subsections (a)(1) and (2) are inapposite

because they are graded as first-degree felonies, and Appellant’s information

charged her with committing a second-degree felony. Subsections (a)(3), (6)

and (7) are inapposite because they pertain to assault against 39 categories

of “officers” (e.g., police officers, firefighters), and there is no evidence that

Jenkins fits within these categories. Subsection (a)(5) is inapposite because

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it concerns assault against schoolteachers or other school officials, and there

is no evidence that Jenkins fits within these categories.

      The evidence does, however, satisfy the remaining subsection, 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4), which provides that a person is guilty of aggravated

assault if he “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily

injury to another with a deadly weapon.” Id. The evidence demonstrates

that Jenkins, the victim, called the police after she found Appellant’s son in

her garage without her permission. Jenkins left her house after calling the

police and returned twenty minutes later to find Appellant and other

individuals waiting for her.

      An altercation ensued in which Appellant struck Jenkins in the head,

back, and face with a two-by-four that had a nail in it. Jenkins was unarmed

and twenty weeks pregnant at the time of this incident. She suffered bruises

and cuts all over her face, arms, and legs, and she required treatment at the

hospital. Appellant’s actions demonstrate that she attempted to cause Jenkins

serious bodily injury. See Commonwealth v. Pandolfo, 446 A.2d 939, 941

(Pa. Super. 1982) (blows to vital portions of body such as head show intent

to inflict serious bodily injury); Commonwealth v. Davidon, 177 A.3d 955

(Pa. Super. 2018) (evidence of bruising from physical attack proves defendant

caused bodily injury). Furthermore, a two-by-four may constitute a deadly

weapon when used to strike the victim’s head. Commonwealth v. Johnson,

326 A.2d 315, 317 (Pa. 1974) (where defendant struck victim’s head with

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two-by-four and killed victim, evidence was sufficient to show that defendant

used deadly weapon; conviction for voluntary manslaughter affirmed).

      Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that she was not justified in using force against Appellant.

She claims that her actions were justified to protect the other persons at the

scene of the altercation.

      The Crimes Code provides:

      The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable
      to protect a third person when:

      (1) the actor would be justified under [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 505
      (relating to use of force in self-protection) in using such force to
      protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened to
      the person whom he seeks to protect;

      (2) under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be, the
      person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such
      protective force; and

      (3) the actor believes that his intervention is necessary for the
      protection of such other person.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 506.

      Under Section 505, self-defense is properly raised as a defense only if

there is evidence to support findings that the defendant (1) reasonably

believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and

that it was necessary to use deadly force against the victim to prevent such

harm; (2) did not provoke the use of force against himself; and (3) did not

violate any duty to retreat. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(b)(2); Commonwealth v.

Jones, 271 A.3d 452, 458 (Pa. Super. 2021). The Commonwealth sustains

its burden of disproving self-defense or defense of others

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       if it proves any of the following: (1) that the [defendant] was not
       free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty which
       resulted in the offense; (2) that the [defendant] did not
       reasonably believe that [he or another] was in imminent danger
       of death or great bodily harm, and that it was necessary to
       [engage in self-defense or defense of others] to save himself or
       another therefrom; or (4) that the [defendant] violated a duty to
       retreat or avoid the danger.

Commonwealth v. Allen, 260 A.3d 169, 2021 WL 3183689, *5 (Pa. Super.,

Jul. 28, 2021) (unpublished memorandum).2            Moreover, a claim of self-

defense can be negated by establishing that the defendant “used more force

than reasonably necessary to protect against death or serious bodily injury.”

Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 599 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc).

It is the province of the factfinder to determine whether the defendant’s belief

was reasonable, whether she was free of provocation, and whether she had a

duty to retreat. Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1229 (Pa.

Super. 2005).

       Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence

shows that Appellant was not justified in hitting Jenkins with a two-by-four

that had a nail in it. Jenkins punched Appellant’s sister, Michele, once in the

face after Michele’s son punched Jenkins.          Since Jenkins was unarmed,

standing outside of Michele’s car, and pregnant, Appellant could not have

____________________________________________

2 Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) provides that a non-precedential memorandum decision of

this Court filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for its persuasive value. We
regard Allen and the other non-precedential memoranda cited below as
persuasive authorities.

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reasonably believed that Michele was in “imminent danger of death or great

bodily harm.” Thus, Appellant could not have reasonably believed that she

had to protect Michele by striking Jenkins repeatedly with the nailed two-by-

four.3

         Further, even if Appellant had believed that Michele was in imminent

danger, Appellant used more force than was reasonably necessary. Whereas

Jenkins was unarmed and used her fist to punch Michele, Appellant struck

Jenkins in the head and back with a two-by-four with a nail in it. Her use of

a   deadly    weapon     under    these    circumstances   was   unwarranted   and

unreasonable. Truong, 36 A.3d at 599 (evidence was sufficient to support

conclusion that defendant used more force than necessary to defend himself,

negating self-defense claim in third degree murder prosecution; defendant

was seven inches taller than victim, yet he stabbed victim 19 times over front

and back of his torso, he was uninjured, and he denied anything was wrong

when police responded to the scene).

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3 See Commonwealth v. Green, 273 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(evidence did not establish that defendant reasonably believed he was in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, one of the elements
required to establish self-defense; defendant only faced non-deadly force, saw
no gun, and eluded any attempt by victim to strike him, so his belief that he
needed to defend himself with deadly force when faced with unarmed man
was unreasonable in light of the facts as they appeared to him, and he made
it clear that victim died because he would not return defendant’s cell phone,
not because defendant acted out of an honest, bona fide belief that he was in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury).

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       Finally, the evidence establishes that Appellant was not free from fault.

Jenkins initially was assaulted by Appellant’s son in Appellant’s garage.

Jenkins fled to a nearby store after calling the police. When she returned to

the house, Appellant and her family members were waiting for her. Jenkins

began arguing with Michele, and Michele’s son punched Jenkins. These facts

permit a reasonable inference that Appellant and her family members went to

Jenkins’ home with the intent to fight her.

       For these reasons, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s

conviction for aggravated assault and to refute her justification defense.

       The same evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for

simple assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1) (a person is guilty of simple

assault if he “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly

causes bodily injury to another”).4 Moreover, this evidence was sufficient to

____________________________________________

4 See id.  Once again, the record could have been clearer as to which kind of
simple assault the trial court found Appellant guilty of violating. Neither the
information, nor the judgment of sentence, specify any of the four types of
simple assault enumerated in Section 2701. Nevertheless, Section 2701(a)(1)
is the only subsection that applies to this case. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(2)
proscribes “negligently inflicting bodily injury to another with a deadly
weapon.” Id. Appellant’s state of mind was intentional, not negligent. 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3) prohibits “attempting by physical menace to put
another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” Id. Examples of “physical
menace” include pointing a gun at the victim, Commonwealth v. Reynolds,
835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. 2003), or leaning into the victim’s face and
screaming invective, Commonwealth v. Neely, — A.3d —, 2023 WL
6239065, *3 (Pa. Super., Sep. 26, 2023). Appellant approached Jenkins from
behind, so there is no evidence Jenkins noticed Appellant before the attack.
Thus, Appellant did not engage in “physical menace” designed to place
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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sustain Appellant’s conviction for PIC. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907 (“A person

commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of

crime with intent to employ it criminally”). We recently held:

       While a wooden board or a two-by-four may have many lawful
       uses, striking a person across the face and throwing the object at
       a person’s head do not constitute lawful uses. Here, Appellant
       possessed the board and intended to—and did—employ it
       criminally. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881,
       887 (Pa. Super. 2016) (evidence sufficient to find iron pipe, which
       was swung at victim, breaking his arm, was an instrument of
       crime).

Commonwealth v. Warren, 2020 WL 974921, *3 (Pa. Super., Feb. 28,

2020) (unpublished memorandum).                The same reasoning applies here.

Appellant approached Jenkins from behind and repeatedly struck her with a

nailed two-by-four on her head, neck and face, conduct that constituted

criminal use of this instrument.

       Finally, the same evidence that refutes Appellant’s justification defense

to aggravated assault also refutes her justification defense to simple assault

and PIC.      Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence is devoid of merit.

       In her final argument, Appellant asserts that the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence. Appellant has waived this argument. The defendant

____________________________________________

Appellant in fear of imminent bodily harm. Lastly, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(4)
prohibits the defendant from concealing or attempting to conceal a
hypodermic needle on his person and penetrating a law enforcement or
correctional officer with the needle during an arrest or search. These
circumstances obviously were not present here.

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must preserve a weight of the evidence challenge either in a written post-

sentence motion or verbally at the time of sentencing. Commonwealth v.

Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 490 (Pa. Super. 2014). Failure to take either of

these measures will result in waiver, even if the trial court addresses the issue

in its opinion. Id. at 490-91. Here, Appellant failed to raise a verbal challenge

to the weight of the evidence during her sentencing hearing, and she also

failed to file post-sentence motions. Therefore, even though the trial court

addressed her weight claim in its Rule 1925 opinion, Appellant has waived this

argument.

      Before concluding, we must address whether Appellant’s sentences for

aggravated assault and simple assault merge for sentencing purposes.

Although Appellant did not raise this issue on appeal, we may address this

issue sua sponte, as it implicates the legality of her sentence.            See

Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 941 (Pa. Super. 2020) (questions

concerning merger implicate legality of sentence and may be raised by this

Court sua sponte); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 960 (Pa.

Super. 2016) (“[a]n illegal sentence must be vacated” (citation omitted)).

      When reviewing the legality of a sentence, “our standard of review is de

novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Tighe, 184

A.3d 560, 584 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted).

      Section 9765 of the Sentencing Code provides as follows:

      No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes
      arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory

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      elements of one offense are included in the statutory
      elements of the other offense. Where crimes merge for
      sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only
      on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9765 (emphasis added). With regard to the bolded language of

this provision, “Section 9765 does not require an evaluation of the specific

facts as applied to the elements. Had the General Assembly so required, it

would have included language instructing us so. Instead, the Legislature's

guidance dictates that our analysis begins and ends with the statutory

elements of each offense.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 256 A.3d 1130,

1137 (Pa. 2021).

      As explained above, Appellant stands convicted of simple assault under

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1) and aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

2702(a)(1).    Section 2701(a)(1) provides that a person is guilty of simple

assault if he “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly

causes bodily injury to another[.]” Id. Section 2702(a)(1) provides that a

person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause serious bodily

injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human

life[.]” Id.   The elements of simple assault under Section 2701(a)(1) are

subsumed within the elements of aggravated assault under Section

2702(a)(1). Commonwealth v. Lopez, 248 A.3d 520, 2021 WL 306208, *5

(Pa. Super., Jan. 29, 2021) (unpublished memorandum).          Moreover, both

simple assault and aggravated assault arose in this case from Appellant’s

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single act of intentionally striking Jenkins with a two-by-four and attempting

to cause her serious bodily injury. Thus, the trial court imposed an illegal

sentence for simple assault because it merged with aggravated assault for

sentencing purposes.

      Although we do not disturb Appellant’s conviction for simple assault, we

vacate the sentence imposed for that conviction. Tucker, 143 A.3d at 958

(affirming conviction but holding that illegal sentence must be vacated). We

need not remand for re-sentencing because our decision does not upset the

trial court’s sentencing scheme, which consisted of entirely concurrent

sentences. See Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 570 (Pa. Super.

2006) (appellate court need not remand for resentencing when it can vacate

illegal sentence without upsetting trial court’s overall sentencing scheme).

      Judgments of sentence for aggravated assault and PIC affirmed.

Conviction for simple assault affirmed. Sentence for simple assault vacated.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 2/8/2024

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