Court Opinion

ID: 9957088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 17:02:38.05042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.182525
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/3/24 P. v. Baca CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098052

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                          (Super. Ct. Nos.
                                                                                    STKCRFE19970006131,
           v.                                                                            SC061757C)

 LOUIS BACA,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Louis Baca was convicted of special-circumstance murder in 1997 and
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. He appeals from the trial
court’s denial of his request, pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 and
In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, to hold a hearing to make a record of evidence relevant
at an eventual youth offender parole hearing. The trial court ruled that Penal Code1

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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section 3051, subdivision (h) makes defendant ineligible for a youth offender parole
hearing because he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole and
was not a juvenile at the time of the murder. As a result, the trial court denied
defendant’s request for a Franklin hearing.
       On appeal, defendant contends section 3051, subdivision (h) violates:
1) provisions in the United States and California Constitutions that guarantee equal
protection of the laws, and 2) the ban on cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Our Supreme Court recently rejected one
of defendant’s equal protection arguments. We will affirm.
                                     BACKGROUND
       In 1997, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and the appropriate
fact finder found true the special circumstance that defendant had perpetrated the murder
by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. (§§ 187, 189, subd. (a), 190.2,
subd. (a)(21).) Defendant was 19 years old when he committed the murder. The trial
court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus 10 years for
personally using a firearm
       In 2023, defendant filed a motion requesting a Franklin hearing, at which he could
augment the record to include mitigating evidence that would be relevant at an eventual
youth offender parole hearing. (People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 261; In re
Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 439; § 3051.) In the motion, defendant claimed he was
entitled to a youth offender parole hearing because, by denying youth offender parole
hearings to young adults convicted of special-circumstance murder, like him,
section 3051, subdivision (h) violated his right to equal protection of the law. The trial
court summarily denied his motion, finding defendant was ineligible for a youth offender
parole hearing pursuant to section 3051, subdivision (h). Defendant appealed.

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                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                                      Equal Protection
       Defendant argues section 3051, subdivision (h) violates article I, section 7 of the
California Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
because the provision treats him unequally to similarly situated individuals who either
were younger than him at the time of their offenses or committed less serious murders.
Section 3051 entitles individuals incarcerated for a crime committed when they were less
than 18 years old, and most individuals incarcerated for a crime committed when they
were 18 to 25 years old, to a youth offender parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th
year of their incarceration. (§ 3051, subd. (b); People v. Hardin (Mar. 4, 2024, S277487)
___ Cal.5th ___, ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis 1076 at pp. *3-*4].) But, “[t]he statute excludes,
among others, offenders who are serving sentences of life in prison without the
possibility of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18.” (Hardin, at p. ___ [2024
Cal. Lexis 1076 at p. *4]; see § 3051, subd. (h).)
       Both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution guarantee
equal protection of the laws, which “ensures that the government does not treat a group of
people unequally without some justification.” (People v. Hardin, supra, ___ Cal.5th at
p. ___ & fn. 2 [2024 Cal. Lexis 1076 at pp. *20-*21 & fn. 2]; see People v.
Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 288.) “[W]hen a statute involves neither a suspect
classification nor a fundamental right, the ‘general rule is that legislation is presumed to
be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.’ ” (Hardin, at p. ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis 1076 at
p. *21.) “A court applying this standard finds ‘a denial of equal protection only if there is
no rational relationship between a disparity in treatment and some legitimate government

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purpose.’ ” (Ibid.)2 The burden is on the party challenging the law to show that the
challenged difference in treatment is not justified. (Id. at p. ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis 1076 at
p. *28].)
       Defendant first contends section 3051 treats offenders like him unequally to
juvenile offenders sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for crimes
they committed before turning 18 years old. Section 3051 entitles these juvenile
offenders to youth offender parole hearings while excluding defendant and offenders with
the same sentence who were at least 18 years old at the time of their offenses. (§ 3051,
subds. (b)(4), (h).) Defendant concedes that no case has held this distinction violates the
right to equal protection of the laws. Rather, many courts have held to the contrary. (See
People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, 285-286, revd. on another ground People v.
Hardin, supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis 1076]; People v. Sands (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347; People v.
Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 196-198; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
769, 779-780.) We agree with these courts that “[t]he Legislature had a rational basis to
distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their
age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may violate the Eighth
Amendment. . . . [T]he Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional
sentences but go no further.” (Sands, at p. 204.)
       This leads to the second category of offenders who defendant contends are given
irrational special treatment: individuals who were 18 to 25 years of age at the time they
committed a murder without special circumstances. Defendant relies upon People v.
Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at page 273, which held that the denial of youth offender

2 “[C]ourts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether the two groups are similarly
situated for purposes of the law in question.” (People v. Hardin, supra, ___ Cal.5th at
p. ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis 1076 at p. *28].)

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parole hearings to those offenders 18 to 25 years old based on their sentences of life in
prison without the possibility of parole violated their right to equal protection. (Id. at
p. 291.) Our Supreme Court recently reversed this decision, holding: “It was not
irrational for the Legislature to exclude from youth offender parole eligibility those
young adults who have committed special circumstance murder, an offense deemed
sufficiently culpable that it merits society’s most stringent sanctions.” (People v. Hardin,
supra, ___ Cal.5th at p. ___ [2024 Cal. Lexis 1076 at pp. *54-*55].) Accordingly, we
also reject defendant’s argument and conclude section 3051, subdivision (h) does not
violate defendant’s right to equal protection of the laws.
                                              II
                              Cruel and Unusual Punishment
       Defendant next contends that denying youth offender parole hearings to young
adult offenders sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole violates the
Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishments. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.) The People argue defendant forfeited this
argument by not raising it in the trial court. Defendant acknowledges this argument was
not raised but contends we should address it anyway. Without deciding whether
forfeiture applies, we opt to address the merits here. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that a death sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment for murderers who were at
least 18 years old at the time of the offense. (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429;
People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347,
405.) “If the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a sentence of death for [offenders who
were at least 18 years old], then most assuredly, it does not prohibit the lesser [life in
prison without the possibility of parole] sentence.” (In re Williams (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 427, 439.)

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                                             III
                                     Franklin Hearing
       Because we reject defendant’s challenges to section 3051, subdivision (h), we
conclude the trial court correctly determined that defendant is not eligible for a youth
offender parole hearing. “It follows that there is no need for a Franklin hearing.”
(People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 127.) We conclude the trial court did not err
in denying defendant’s request for a Franklin hearing.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                    /s/
                                                   Wiseman, J.*

We concur:

 /s/
Duarte, Acting P. J.

 /s/
Boulware Eurie, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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