Court Opinion

ID: 9894176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 19:00:45.232875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:54.191091
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12507    Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 10/31/2023   Page: 1 of 15

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12507
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        RICO LAPRINCE SOUTHALL,

                                                   Defendant- Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00289-ELR-JEM-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12507

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
              Rico Southall appeals his above-guidelines sentence of 84
        months’ imprisonment imposed after he pleaded guilty to
        possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argues that the
        sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court
        improperly weighed the relevant sentencing factors and failed to
        provide a sufficient justification for the upward variance. After
        review, we affirm.
                                  I.    Background
               In 2021, police officers in Cobb County, Georgia responded
        to a report of an armed person, who was later determined to be
        Southall, shooting at vehicles. One of the victims, V.F., was
        married to Southall’s cousin. According to Southall, he and V.F.
        had a prior conflict, he felt threatened by V.F. and her husband, and
        Southall had moved from Paulding County to Cobb County to get
        away from V.F. However, on April 1, 2021, Southall and V.F. were
        driving in the same area in Cobb County, and when Southall saw
        her, he began pursuing her vehicle and shooting at it. Southall
        struck V.F.’s car five times—one bullet hit her driver’s side mirror,
        two bullets hit the back window, and two hit the passenger side.
        Additionally, Southall struck another vehicle of a bystander
        traveling on the same road—the bullet entered the trunk and
        passed through to the rear passenger seat. No one was physically
        injured.
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        22-12507                  Opinion of the Court                                3

               While officers spoke with V.F., Southall drove by and
        officers initiated a traffic stop. Officers discovered two firearms:
        (1) a Glock Model 22 with an attached extended magazine and (2)
        a Taurus Raging Judge Model 513, which had been reported stolen.
        Southall’s girlfriend and their son were also in his vehicle. Officers
        arrested Southall. Southall subsequently made unsolicited
        statements, including that he and his girlfriend had a restraining
        order against V.F., but he saw V.F. drive past his home, and “he
        lost control.” He stated that “he did not do it to hurt V.F., but he
        wanted ‘to let her know not to fuck with’ him.” He also admitted
        that he knew he was a convicted felon and that he should not have
        any firearms.1
              Thereafter, a grand jury indicted Southall on one count of
        possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and he entered an
        open non-negotiated plea of guilty to the charge.
               Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office filed
        a presentence investigation report (“PSI”), in which it determined
        that Southall’s base offense level was 20 because the offense
        involved a firearm with an extended magazine. It then added two
        points because one of the firearms involved was stolen and four
        points because Southall used a firearm in connection with the

        1 Southall had the following prior felony convictions in Georgia: (1) 2006—

        Violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act and possession of cocaine
        with intent to distribute on or near a housing project; (2) 2009—possession of
        a Schedule II controlled substance; and (3) 2014—purchase/possession of a
        controlled substance. He also had a number of misdemeanor convictions
        involving drugs, criminal trespass, statutory rape, assault, battery, and a DUI.
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                        22-12507

        felony offense of aggravated assault. After deducting three points
        for acceptance of responsibility, Southall’s total offense level was
        23, which when combined with his criminal history category of III,
        resulted in a guidelines range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment.2
               The government filed a sentencing memorandum,
        requesting that the district court vary upward and sentence
        Southall to 84 months’ imprisonment based on Southall’s “violent
        and reckless conduct” in the instant offense, which “placed
        innocent people and the general public in peril,” and his history of
        both violent and drug offenses. In terms of his criminal history, the
        government pointed to Southall’s convictions for: possession of
        cocaine and reckless driving in 2009; statutory rape in 2009; simple
        assault and criminal trespass in 2009; reckless conduct and criminal
        trespass in 2014; 3 possession of a controlled substance in 2014; and
        battery and criminal trespass in 2016. The government maintained
        that a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment would reflect the
        seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide
        adequate deterrence and a just punishment.

        2 Southall objected to the calculation of his criminal history score, arguing that

        his criminal history category should only be II, which the district court
        overruled at sentencing. Southall does not appeal that determination.
        3 The government pointed out that the 2014 misdemeanor convictions for

        reckless conduct and criminal trespass had been “reduced from felony
        aggravated assault and criminal damage to property charges arising from an
        incident where defendant struck an individual with a figurine and damaged
        that same person’s property.”
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        22-12507                Opinion of the Court                          5

               Southall also filed a sentencing memorandum in which he
        requested a within-guidelines sentence of 57 months’
        imprisonment. In terms of his personal history and characteristics,
        Southall emphasized that his childhood was “marked by trauma
        and neglect” as both of his parents abused drugs and alcohol. At
        the age of 7, the Department of Children and Family Services
        removed him and his four siblings from the home because of
        neglect and abuse. They were initially placed in an emergency
        shelter and then in separate foster homes, which caused him great
        distress. Eventually, a distant relative in Virginia took in all five of
        the children, but once there, they were subjected to physical abuse
        and “treated like second-class citizens.” Later, around his middle
        school years, his father regained custody and the family moved in
        with their grandmother, but his grandmother was physically
        abusive as well. Then, when Southall was in high school, his
        mother was released from prison and rejoined the family. At that
        time, things went “downhill again” because his mother started
        using drugs frequently, and Southall learned that his father was
        involved in the drug business.
               Meanwhile, Southall had ADHD, but never received proper
        treatment, which led to struggles in school, and he ultimately
        dropped out. Southall began dealing drugs as a teen, drinking, and
        gambling, and he ended up in various legal troubles. However, in
        recent years, he had made concerted efforts to “turn his life around,
        so that he could be a present and involved father to [his son].”
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                     22-12507

               Turning to the underlying offense, Southall explained that
        there was ongoing conflict between himself, V.F., and her husband,
        which had led Southall to moving away from the family property
        in Paulding County and moving in with his girlfriend and their son
        in Cobb County. He and his girlfriend had applied for a restraining
        order to keep V.F. away from them. And, on the date of the
        shooting, when he saw V.F. driving not far from his home, “he
        believed she was there to harm him and his family.” He explained
        that he suffers from PTSD as a result of his childhood trauma,4 and
        it contributed greatly to his irrational reaction to seeing V.F. near
        his home.
                He emphasized that given his personal history and
        characteristics and the fact that he immediately took responsibility
        for his conduct, a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines was
        sufficient to satisfy the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. He
        also noted that the guidelines already accounted for the fact that
        one of the firearms was stolen and one of the firearms possessed an
        extended magazine, such that these aggravating factors did not

        4 In support of his PTSD diagnosis and its effect on his behavior, Southall

        submitted a psychological evaluation report from Dr. Amy Gambow. Dr.
        Gambow opined that Southall’s PTSD “created difficulties with impulse
        control, trouble identifying and appreciating potential consequences, and poor
        judgment in response to his emotions throughout his life.”
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        22-12507                  Opinion of the Court                         7

        warrant going above the guidelines—particularly because he also
        faced state charges on these matters. 5
               At sentencing, the district court adopted the guidelines
        range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment as set forth in the PSI. The
        government then requested an “upward variance” sentence of 84
        months’ imprisonment, reiterating its position that such a sentence
        was warranted based on the “egregious” facts of the case—that
        Southall had two firearms (one with an extended magazine and one
        that was stolen), and he fired numerous times on a public road,
        hitting two different vehicles—which demonstrated Southall’s
        reckless disregard for the general public and human life. The
        government further emphasized Southall’s criminal history, which
        included violent offenses and a demonstrated pattern of escalation.
        Finally, the government argued that an 84-month sentence would
        promote respect for the law, provide adequate deterrence, reflect
        the seriousness of the offense, and provide just punishment.
               Southall’s counsel, in turn, argued for a bottom of the
        guidelines sentence of 57 months’ imprisonment. She argued that
        although there were aggravating factors in the case in terms of the
        firearm with the extended magazine and the stolen firearm, those
        factors were already accounted for in the guidelines calculation.
        Furthermore, Southall faced state charges related to the same
        offense and would therefore be held accountable in state court. In
        other words, his counsel argued that the district court did not need

        5 In addition to his sentencing memorandum, Southall submitted several

        supportive letters from his family and a family friend.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12507

        to address the aggravating conduct and should focus solely on the
        possession of a firearm offense before the court. Counsel also
        noted that Southall promptly accepted responsibility and pleaded
        guilty following his indictment.
               Next, counsel addressed Southall’s criminal history,
        emphasizing that he had “predominately misdemeanor offenses,”
        and, in the preceding five-year period, had not had any new
        offenses. She disputed the government’s characterization of
        Southall’s record as demonstrating an escalating pattern of
        violence. Finally, she emphasized the mitigating circumstances in
        his case—namely, Southall’s childhood trauma and PTSD—and
        urged the court to give significant weight to the mitigating factors
        when fashioning a sentence.
               Southall then made a brief statement in which he apologized
        to the court and his family. He stated that he knew he had “messed
        up” and had “to face the consequences.”
                 The district court then explained that, even though Southall
        faced separate charges in state court, that fact would not factor into
        the court’s sentencing decision because the district court did not
        know whether the state would continue prosecuting Southall or
        dismiss the state case once he was sentenced in this parallel federal
        proceeding. In terms of Southall’s acceptance of responsibility, the
        district court stated that it was not surprised that Southall accepted
        responsibility so soon after the offense because “the conduct was
        so egregious and his admissions [of guilt] were [so] immediate
        that . . . he didn’t have much in terms of defense anyway.” Turning
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        22-12507                     Opinion of the Court                         9

        to the government’s request for a variance, the district court noted
        that it “normally” does not agree to variances and instead imposes
        a guidelines sentence, but this case was an exception because it
        “showed a total disregard for human life.” The court emphasized
        that Southall “fire[d] a gun at least six times” at a person who was
        unarmed and not firing at him, and he could have easily killed V.F.
        or other innocent people. Accordingly, the court concluded that,
        even if it did not consider the aggravating factors accounted for by
        the guidelines—that one firearm had an extended magazine and
        the other was stolen—“this [was] a case where a variance above the
        guideline range is still warranted.” Consequently, the court
        imposed a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment to be followed by
        3 years’ supervised release. The court explained that it considered
        the § 3553(a) factors and that the sentence was appropriate based
        on “the egregiousness of this crime” and Southall’s criminal
        history, which demonstrated an escalation in violence. Southall
        objected to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the
        sentence.6 This appeal followed.
                                        II.   Discussion
              Southall argues that his sentence is substantively
        unreasonable because the district court failed to weigh the

        6 Southall concedes that he is not challenging the procedural reasonableness

        of his sentence on appeal.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                       22-12507

        § 3553(a) factors properly and failed to provide sufficient
        justification for the above-guidelines sentence. 7
                We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a
        deferential abuse of discretion standard, asking whether the
        sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
        circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The
        district court must issue a sentence that is “sufficient, but not
        greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of
        § 3553(a)(2), which include the need for a sentence to reflect the
        seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
        punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from
        future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must
        also consider the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the
        history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need to
        avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with

        7 Southall also asserts that the criteria for an upward departure under U.S.S.G.

        § 4A1.3(a) were not satisfied in this case. We need not address this argument
        because the district court did not impose an upward departure under § 4A1.3.
        Instead, it imposed an upward variance, which is different from an upward
        departure and not subject to the same requirements or criteria set forth in
        § 4A1.3. See United States v. Hall, 965 F.3d 1281, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2020)
        (explaining that a variance is “when the court determines that a guidelines
        sentence will not adequately further the purposes reflected in . . . § 3553(a)”
        while a departure, which requires advance notice to the parties, is “a term of
        art under the Guidelines and refers only to non-Guidelines sentences imposed
        under the framework set out in the Guidelines” (quotations omitted)). Thus,
        § 4A1.3 had no application in this case.
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        22-12507               Opinion of the Court                        11

        similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Id.
        § 3553(a)(1), (6).
                Importantly, the weight given to a particular § 3353(a) factor
        “is committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and it
        is not required to give “equal weight” to the § 3553(a) factors.
        United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015)
        (quotations omitted). “We will not second guess the weight given
        to a § 3553(a) factor so long as the sentence is reasonable under the
        circumstances.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th
        Cir. 2022).
               A district court “imposes a substantively unreasonable
        sentence only when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant
        factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight
        to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
        judgment in considering the proper factors.” Rosales-Bruno, 789
        F.3d at 1256 (quotations omitted). The burden rests on the party
        challenging the sentence to show “that the sentence is
        unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and
        the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” Id.
               No presumption of reasonableness or unreasonableness
        applies to a sentence that lies outside the advisory guidelines range.
        Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. “Upward variances are imposed based
        upon the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. “A district court has considerable
        discretion in deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a
        variance and the extent of one that is appropriate.” United States v.
        Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12507

        omitted). “[A] district judge must give serious consideration to the
        extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain his
        conclusion that an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh
        sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient
        justifications.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.
               In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence outside the
        guidelines range, we “may consider the extent of the deviation, but
        must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the
        § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id.
        at 51. “The fact that [we] might reasonably have concluded that a
        different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal
        of the district court.” Id. Rather, we will “vacate the sentence if,
        but only if, we ‘are left with the definite and firm conviction that
        the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
        the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the
        range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.’”
        United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
        (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)).
               Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in varying
        upward from the applicable guidelines range of 57 to 71 months’
        imprisonment and imposing a sentence of 84 months’
        imprisonment.      Southall argues that the guidelines range
        accounted adequately for the aggravating factors in this case and
        because of that those factors did not support a sentence above the
        guideline range. However, the district court was entitled to
        consider the aggravating factors and conduct present in this case
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        22-12507                Opinion of the Court                         13

        even if this information was already part of the guidelines
        calculation. United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 639 (11th Cir.
        2013) (explaining that “a district court can rely on factors in
        imposing a variance that it had already considered in imposing [a
        guideline] enhancement” (alteration in original)).
                Next, Southall argues that there was “no basis” for the
        district court to conclude that this case was atypical from other
        firearm-possession offenses. We disagree. The district court
        explained adequately why it considered this case to fall outside the
        mine-run firearm-possession case, particularly because Southall
        opened fire on an unarmed person on a public road and fired at
        least six shots, endangering the lives of many. We agree with the
        district court that these facts are egregious, and we discern no error
        in the district court’s reliance on these facts in determining that this
        case was atypical from the mine-run possession of a firearm by a
        convicted felon case. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109
        (2007) (explaining that a district court’s decision to vary from the
        guidelines may merit the “greatest respect” when the sentencing
        judge finds the case to be “outside the heartland” of cases
        contemplated by the Sentencing Commission (quotations
        omitted)).
               Although Southall also challenges the district court’s
        determination that an upward variance was warranted based on his
        criminal history, that determination was well within the court’s
        discretion. Specifically, the district court may “impose an upward
        variance if it concludes that the [g]uidelines range was insufficient
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                   22-12507

        in light of a defendant’s criminal history. When doing so, [the]
        district court[] [is] afforded broad leeway in deciding how much
        weight to give to prior crimes the defendant has committed.”
        Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355–56 (quotations and internal citation
        omitted); see also United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir.
        2021) (“Courts have broad leeway in deciding how much weight to
        give to prior crimes the defendant has committed, and [p]lacing
        substantial weight on a defendant’s criminal record is entirely
        consistent with § 3553(a) because five of the factors it requires a
        court to consider are related to criminal history.” (alteration in
        original) (quotations and internal citation omitted)).
                Additionally, while Southall quarrels with the weight the
        district court gave to the § 3553(a) factors and maintains that the
        district court failed to consider his mitigating circumstances, the
        weight given to any one of the § 3553(a) factors was within the
        district court’s discretion. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254.
        Furthermore, Southall’s allegation that the district court failed to
        consider his mitigating evidence is undermined by the record. The
        district court stated that it considered Southall’s sentencing
        memorandum, which detailed the mitigating circumstances in
        great length, and Southall’s counsel also discussed the mitigating
        circumstances during the sentencing hearing. Thus, the district
        court considered the mitigating circumstances, even though it did
        not mention that evidence when imposing Southall’s sentence. See
        also United States v. Amodeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007)
        (“[A]lthough the district court’s sentencing order made no mention
        of evidence that arguably mitigated in [the defendant’s] favor
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        22-12507                  Opinion of the Court                               15

        under § 3553(a), we cannot say that the court’s failure to discuss
        this ‘mitigating’ evidence means that the court erroneously
        ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evidence in determining [the
        defendant’s] sentence.”).
               Finally, Southall’s contention that the district court failed to
        provide a sufficient justification for the upward variance is
        unpersuasive. The district court made clear that it varied upward
        and imposed an 84-month sentence because a variance was
        warranted in light of the particularly egregious facts of this case and
        Southall’s criminal history. Those considerations are proper
        § 3553(a) factors that the court should consider when imposing a
        sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Accordingly, we are not “left
        with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
        committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a)
        factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
        reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”8 Irey, 612
        F.3d at 1190 (en banc) (quotations omitted). Consequently, we
        conclude that Southall’s sentence is substantively reasonable, and
        we affirm the district court.
               AFFIRMED.

        8 We also note that, at the time of the offense, Southall faced a statutory

        maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)
        (2021). And his 84-month sentence is well-below this statutory maximum,
        which is another indicator of reasonableness. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550
        F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a sentence that is below the
        statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness).