Court Opinion

ID: 9555984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:12:03.738486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:14.675455
License: Public Domain

J-S25022-23

  NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  STEVEN TAFT                                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2017 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 12, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                 Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0000818-2017

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                             FILED AUGUST 15, 2023

       Steven Taft (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his first

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

       On November 9, 2018, a jury convicted Appellant of sexual assault.1

The female victim (“complainant” or “victim”) testified at trial that Appellant

raped her while she slept in his bedroom following a party at his apartment.

See Commonwealth v. Taft, 241 A.3d 356 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished

memorandum at 1-3).            Appellant testified to the contrary, but the jury

“rejected Appellant’s claim [that the victim] consent[ed] ….”       Taft, supra

(unpublished memorandum at 4) (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/19, at 4).

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1.
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      Following trial, the jury convicted Appellant of sexual assault, and

acquitted him of indecent assault and aggravated indecent assault. On March

1, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 2 – 4 years in prison, followed

by one year of probation.

      Appellant filed an appeal in which he challenged the sufficiency and

weight of the evidence. See generally Taft, supra. This Court affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Id. Appellant did not seek allowance of

appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

      Appellant timely filed the instant PCRA petition pro se on September 21,

2021. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition

on March 2, 2022. In the amended petition, Appellant alleged trial counsel

“was ineffective for failing to call a crucial witness,” Jereme Green (“Mr. Green”

or “Green”). Amended PCRA Petition, 3/2/22, at 4. Appellant claimed:

      [Appellant] has submitted [in his September 21, 2021, PCRA
      petition] an affidavit detailing proposed testimony by [Mr. Green
      (Green Affidavit)]…. Although Mr. Green was not in the bedroom
      when the incident took place, his testimony as to the conduct of
      the complainant prior to the bedroom [incident] was crucial. …
      Mr. Green’s proposed testimony will demonstrate Mr. Green had
      direct contact with the complainant prior to the incident. He states
      in [his] affidavit that the complainant was walking around the
      house in nothing but panties and a t-shirt and was visibly
      intoxicated. She was flirting with Mr. Green and touching his body
      and attempted to kiss him.

Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended PCRA Petition, 3/2/22, at 14-15

(citation to Green Affidavit and paragraph break omitted); see also id. at 16

(stating, “[t]he only person called to testify as to what took place by trial

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counsel at [Appellant’s] trial was [Appellant] himself.”). Appellant asked the

PCRA court to “grant [Appellant] an evidentiary hearing, as he has presented

a claim of arguable merit ….” Amended PCRA Petition, 3/2/22, at 4.

      On August 12, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition

without a hearing. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the PCRA

court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents the following questions for review:

      I.   Whether the PCRA court erred in not granting relief on the
           PCRA petition alleging [trial] counsel was ineffective for failing
           to call Jereme Green as a fact witness[?]

      II. Whether the PCRA court erred in not granting an evidentiary
          hearing[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

      Appellant first argues the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition

because he established trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to call Green

as a witness. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-17. According to Appellant:

      Mr. Green existed and was available to testify for the Appellant.
      Trial counsel knew of the witness and Mr. Green wrote [in the
      Green Affidavit] that he was willing to testify on behalf of the
      Appellant. The absence of this witness[’s] testimony was so
      prejudicial to the Appellant that he was deprived of a fair trial.
      The jury in this case announced prior to its verdict that they were
      deadlocked[,] and Mr. Green’s testimony would likely have led to
      a different verdict. Mr. Green’s proposed testimony would have
      undermined the credibility of the Commonwealth’s witnesses,
      weakened the prosecution’s version of events, and changed the
      outcome of the trial.

                                       -3-
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Id. at 16 (citation to Green Affidavit omitted).        Appellant further claims

Green’s “proposed testimony was not irrelevant and was not abusive.” Id. at

17.

      The Commonwealth counters that the PCRA court correctly dismissed

Appellant’s petition, as he failed to establish trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for

failing to call Green. See Commonwealth Brief at 6-8. The Commonwealth

argues:

      Green’s proposed testimony relating to the victim allegedly flirting
      with him was both inadmissible and irrelevant. Whether the victim
      made advances toward Green was irrelevant to whether she
      consented to any sexual activity with [Appellant]. Moreover, it
      would have contradicted [Appellant’s] testimony that he believed
      the victim was [romantically] interested in him because she only
      “flirted” with [Appellant] and exhibited no apparent interest in the
      “other guys.” (N.T. 11/8/2018, 23-27, 38).

Id. at 8 (italics omitted).

      Pennsylvania law presumes counsel is effective; a PCRA petitioner bears

the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130,

150 (Pa. 2018).

      [A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by
      a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
      resulted from[, inter alia,] the “ineffective assistance of counsel
      which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined
      the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt
      or innocence could have taken place.”

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (quoting 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii)).      When evaluating an ineffectiveness claim,

“judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”

                                       -4-
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Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 380 (Pa. 2011) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

      To establish a claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner must plead and

prove:

      (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
      basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) he
      suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice
      measured by whether there is a reasonable probability the result
      of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v.
      Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (employing ineffective
      assistance of counsel test from Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527
      A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987)). … Additionally, counsel cannot be
      deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Finally,
      because a PCRA petitioner must establish all the Pierce prongs to
      be entitled to relief, we are not required to analyze the elements
      of an ineffectiveness claim in any specific order; thus, if a claim
      fails under any required element, we may dismiss the claim on
      that basis.

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (citations

modified).

      Regarding the prejudice prong, a “petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different.”            Commonwealth v.

Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). We

have observed:

      A defendant raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
      required to show actual prejudice; that is, that counsel’s
      ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it “could have
      reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the
      proceedings.”

Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Pierce, 527 A.2d at 977).

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      Further, to prevail on a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel

for failure to call a witness, a PCRA petitioner must establish:

      (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
      for the defense; (3) counsel knew, or should have known, of the
      existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for
      the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness
      was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 231 A.3d 981, 992 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations

omitted).

      Instantly, the PCRA court thoroughly explained why it denied relief:

            [Appellant’s] claim fails on the prejudice prong of the Pierce
      test because part of Mr. Green’s proposed testimony as to the
      victim’s alleged sexual advances towards him (Mr. Green), would
      have been inadmissible under the Rape Shield Law[, 18
      Pa.C.S.A. § 3104,] and [was] irrelevant as to what occurred
      between [Appellant] and the victim in [Appellant’s] bedroom.

                                     ***

             The purpose of the Rape Shield Law is to prevent a trial from
      shifting its focus from the culpability of the accused toward the
      virtue and chastity of the victim. Commonwealth v. Jerdon,
      229 A.3d 278, 280 (Pa. Super. 2019). The Rape Shield Law is
      intended to exclude irrelevant and abusive inquiries regarding
      prior sexual conduct of sexual assault complainants.              Id.
      Pennsylvania’s Rape Shield Law provides in pertinent part:

            a. General Rule: Evidence of specific instances of the
            alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, opinion evidence of
            the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, and reputation
            evidence of the alleged victim’s past conduct shall not be
            admissible in prosecutions under this chapter except
            evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct with
            the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at
            issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant
            to the rules of evidence.

      18 Pa.C.S. § 3104[(a)].

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              In … Jerdon, … the Commonwealth appealed to the
       Superior Court after a trial court granted a defendant’s pre-trial
       motion to allow the alleged sexual conduct between a victim and
       a third-party witness into evidence. The Superior Court held that
       the trial court erred by allowing sexual conduct between the victim
       and the third-party witness into evidence because the sexual
       relationship between the victim and third-party was irrelevant to
       the issue of the victim’s bias, motive, and credibility; the
       prejudicial impact of the sexual relationship between the victim
       and third-party far outweighed the probative, exculpatory value;
       and because the evidence served no purpose other than to shift
       the fact-finder’s focus from the culpability of [p]etitioner toward
       the virtue and chastity of the victim, amongst other reasons.
       Jerdon, at 279.

             Here, like Jerdon, evidence of the alleged sexual conduct
       between Mr. Green and the victim was irrelevant as to the bias,
       motive or credibility of the victim, and the prejudicial impact
       far outweighed the probative, exculpatory value.
       Additionally, “prior sexual conduct with third persons is ordinarily
       inadmissible to attack the character of the [victim] in sex offense
       cases.” Commonwealth v. Black, 587 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa.
       Super. 1985). Part of Mr. Green’s proposed testimony alleged
       that the victim was flirting with him and touching Mr. Green’s body
       while attempting to kiss him before he excused himself. Amended
       PCRA Petition, 3/21/22, at 21. This proposed evidence did not
       exculpate [Appellant] because whether or not the victim made
       advances towards Mr. Green was irrelevant and in no way
       probative as to whether the victim consented to any sexual
       activity with [Appellant2]. In fact, the specific instances of the
       victim’s alleged sexual conduct with Mr. Green were more
       prejudicial to the victim because Mr. Green, a third-party, was not
       present in [Appellant’s] bedroom at the time of the sexual
____________________________________________

2 We remind Appellant that this Court previously rejected his challenges to the

sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Taft, 241 A.3d 356 (unpublished
memorandum at 5-11); see also Commonwealth v. Strutt, 624 A.2d 162,
164 (Pa. Super. 1993) (stating “[t]he testimony of a sexual assault victim
standing alone is sufficient weight to support a conviction.”), and
Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 768 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“even
the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness may alone be sufficient to
convict a defendant.” (citation omitted)).

                                           -7-
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       assault[,] which he explicitly makes clear in his proposed
       testimony. Id.

              This proposed testimony served no purpose other
       than to shift the fact-finder’s focus from the culpability of
       [Appellant] toward the virtue and chastity of the victim[,]
       which is exactly what the Rape Shield statute prohibits.
       Therefore, Mr. Green’s proposed testimony of the victim’s alleged
       sexual conduct towards him would have been inadmissible and
       irrelevant as to what happened between [Appellant] and the
       victim in [Appellant’s] bedroom that night. And for that reason,
       this portion of Mr. Green[]’s testimony would not have been
       admitted, and trial counsel was not ineffective because
       [Appellant] was not prejudiced.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/27/22, at 5-7 (emphasis added; italics omitted;

footnote added).

       The PCRA court’s reasoning is supported by the record and law. Further,

there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that “Mr. Green’s proposed testimony is

relevant and admissible under the Rape Shield Law….” Appellant’s Brief at 16.

As Appellant failed to          prove prejudice, his claim of trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness fails.3    See Charleston, supra; see also Treiber, supra.

Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief.

       In his second issue, Appellant claims the PCRA court erred in dismissing

his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. See Appellant’s Brief at

17-19. Appellant asserts:

____________________________________________

3 The PCRA court also determined that Appellant failed to satisfy the
reasonable basis prong. PCRA Court Opinion, 10/27/22, at 7-9. However, as
noted, a petitioner’s failure to establish any one of the three prongs is fatal.
See Treiber, supra.

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      Although the right to an evidentiary hearing is not absolute, a
      court may not summarily dismiss a PCRA Petition when the facts
      alleged in the petition, if proven, would entitle the Appellant to
      relief.

Id. at 18 (citing Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 819 A.2d 81, 85 (Pa. Super.

2003) (stating although “[i]t is true that the right to an evidentiary hearing

on a PCRA petition is not absolute,” a “court may not summarily dismiss a

PCRA petition … when the facts alleged in the petition, if proven, would entitle

the petitioner to relief.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).

      To the contrary, the Commonwealth argues:

      [Appellant] failed to demonstrate to the PCRA court the existence
      of a disputed issue of material fact necessary to warrant an
      evidentiary hearing, and the claim he asserts on appeal is utterly
      meritless. Thus, he did not demonstrate that the [PCRA] court
      abused its discretion by declining to grant an evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth Brief at 9.

      This Court has explained:

              The right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction
      petition is not absolute. It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to
      decline to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently
      frivolous and has no support either in the record or other evidence.
      It is the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine
      each issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record
      certified before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in
      its determination that there were no genuine issues of material
      fact in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an
      evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations and

brackets omitted).

      Here, the PCRA court explained it

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     did not conduct an evidentiary hearing as to the issue pertaining
     to Mr. Green’s proposed testimony because there were no
     genuine issues of material fact for the court to decide the
     PCRA [petition]. The PCRA court was able to determine the
     merits of the case without having a hearing because even if
     the court were to accept as true the proposed testimony of Mr.
     Green, the PCRA [petition] would not have been granted because
     [Appellant] failed to establish the claims in the PCRA petition.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/27/22, at 10 (emphasis added).

     Again, the record and law support the PCRA court’s rationale.       As

Appellant failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to warrant an

evidentiary hearing, Wah, supra, his second issue lacks merit.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023

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