Court Opinion

ID: 9782073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:57:04.789229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:47.168666
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, P.J.:
Concur in Results.
1 I concur in the result reached in this opinion, but my analysis differs slightly with the majority opinion. ©
12 Under the plain language of 21 O.S8. 2001, § 652(C), there are four different ways to commit assault and battery upon another: first, an assault and battery "by means of any deadly weapon;" second, an assault and battery "by such other means or force as is likely to produce death;" third, an assault and battery that "in any manner attempts to kill another;" and fourth, as assault and battery "in resisting the execution of any legal process." Only one of these methods-option number three-expressly requires an intent to kill.
13 Using a straightforward, common sense approach to this statutory language, the State does not have to prove a specific intent to kill when a person assaults and batters another "by means of a deadly weapon" or "by such other force as is likely to produce death." That is, the act of using the deadly weapon or unreasonable foree makes proving an intent to kill superfluous, as one's general intent to commit the act in question suffices to bring about the necessary criminal sane-tions.
T4 Furthermore, under the final category, a person who commits an assault and battery against another while "resisting the execution of any legal process" need not have an intent to kill that person. Obviously, our Legislature has determined that one's attempt to thwart justice in such manner and the possible ramifications to our legal system are alone sufficient to make one criminally liable.
T5 Under the third category, however, it would seem that an intent to kill is required. How could one accomplish an assault and battery upon another that "in any manner attempts to kill" that person, without an intent to kill? However, I have questions about the language of this third option, in that it appears to conflict with other statutory prohibitions against attempted murder. Therefore, I would construe this option as prohibiting any assault and battery that includes a specific intent to kill.
T6 Here, Appellant was charged with two counts of committing an assault and battery *586under the first option "by means of a deadly weapon." Therefore, the trial judge did not err by deleting the fourth element listed in our current OUJI instructions for this offense: "with the intent to take a human life." 1 That intent to take a human life was no longer necessary, because Oklahoma's Legislature determined that an assault and battery that occurs when one fires a gun into a home that the shooter knows is occupied is a very serious criminal offense, worthy of greater punishment than a simple battery.

. It was error, however, to substitute that element with another element, "likely to produce death," as that is not required under the statute. However, that error is harmless, as it benefited Appellant by increasing the State's burden of proof.