Court Opinion

ID: 9790204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:48:47.115815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:27.354195
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.
In 1911, by an amendment to the Constitution, the People of California declared that they “reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls independent of the Legislature, ...” Election laws are to be liberally construed, and a proposed initiative measure should have a place upon the ballot unless, considering the fundamental purpose of the constitutional reservation of power, it may fairly be said that the requirements for such legislation have not been met. Indeed, courts should protect the right of the people to initiate and vote upon a measure which, in the opinion of some electors, would advance social or economic conditions, with the same regard for democratic principles as is demanded when the right of free speech is under consideration. Yet by the decision in the present case, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution does not directly limit the time within which a petition to place a proposed measure on the ballot may be circulated, because of general provisions specifying the procedure to be followed in connection with the verification of voters’ signatures by the county election officials, the People are denied the right to vote upon “The Betirement Life Payments Amendment.” I cannot subscribe to such a narrow construction of the Constitution.
Certainly paragraph 2 of the constitutional provision is unfortunately worded. It declares; “Upon the presentation to the Secretary of State of a petition certified as herein provided to have been signed by qualified electors, equal in number to eight per cent of all the votes cast for all candidates for Governor at the last preceding general election, *815at which a Governor was elected, proposing a law or amendment to the Constitution, set forth in full in said petition, the Secretary of State shall submit the said proposed law or amendment to the Constitution to the electors at the next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition, or at any special election called by the Governor in his discretion prior to such general election.” (Const., art. IV, sec. 1.) The use of the word “presentation” in the quoted sentence gives rise to the principal difficulty in this case, for the Constitution also specifies: “A petition shall be deemed to be filed with the Secretary of State upon the date of the receipt by him of a certificate or certificates showing said petition to be signed by the requisite number of electors of the State.” But when all of the constitutional provisions are read together, it is clear that a petition, as distinguished from a section of a petition, is presented to the Secretary of State only when it bears a sufficient number of signatures to qualify the proposed measure for a place upon the ballot.
The constitutional provision specifying the procedure for the qualification and submission of an initiative or referendum measure uses the word “presentation” or “presenting” or “presented” nine times. The word “file” or “filing” or “filed” appears eleven times. The use of each of these words, when considered in connection with its context, shows a discriminating choice of language. For example: “Any initiative or referendum petition may be presented in sections, but each section shall contain a full and correct copy of the title and text of the proposed measure.” Certainly the word “presented” as here used is not synonymous with “filed,” for an initiative measure “shall be deemed to be filed” with the Secretary of State only when he has received a certificate or certificates signed by the requisite number of electors.
Other sentences also show that the Constitution’s draftsman clearly understood the meaning of the words he selected. The sponsors of an initiative measure are defined as the persons “presenting” a request to the attorney general for the preparation of a title and summary of it. By another provision the persons who shall “prepare and present” arguments for and against each measure shall be selected by the presiding officer of the Senate. In a subsequent paragraph relating to the rights of proponents, there is a restriction eon*816cerning any section or supplement “presented for filing.” A use of the word in the same manner appears in the requirement as to the printing of the title, “Initiative measure to be presented to the Legislature.” Here are instances of a precise use of the word “present” in its customary and usual meaning, which is: “To lay before, or submit to, a person or body for consideration or action; as to present a memorial, petition or indictment.” (Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d ed.) But the filing of a paper or document connotes the finality of official action which follows presentation.
Applying these definitions to the constitutional provisions, it clearly appears that the “presentation” to the Secretary of State of a petition certified as having been signed by the required number of qualified electors is not a single act. “Any initiative . . . petition may be presented in sections,” the Constitution reads. Each county clerk or registrar of voters must examine the signatures upon each section of a petition filed with him. As soon as he completes such examination, he shall “forthwith” attach his certificate to a copy of the petition, except the signatures, “and shall forthwith transmit said petition, together with his said certificate” to the Secretary of State. Obviously, in practice, these documents will be received at different times, and, of necessity, the “presentation” to the Secretary of State of a petition by sections can only be made by the delivery to him, through a county clerk or registrar of voters, of a copy of the petition with a certificate made by the local election officer that it has been signed by a stated number of electors, qualified to do so. Other than to receive the sections, the Secretary of State has no duty to perform unless and until the aggregate of the number of signers certified in the several sections amounts “to eight per cent of all the votes cast for all candidates for Governor at the last preceding general election at which .a Governor was elected.” If and when the number of signatures as certified to him total that amount, the petition “shall be deemed to be filed” and he shall “submit the said proposed law or amendment to the Constitution to the electors. . . .”
Under this construction, there is no time limit within which the qualification of an initiative petition must be completed. Sections of the petition may be circulated indefi*817nitely in any county. But upon the filing of a section or sections with a county clerk or registrar of voters, all further action in that county must be completed within seventy days. There is no prohibition, however, against circulation of the petition in any other county, and signatures may be obtained until the aggregate of them, as certified by the local election officials, reaches the required number.
Admittedly with no limitation of time for the qualification of a proposed measure except the requirements as to circulation in a particular county, a law or constitutional amendment might be submitted to electors many years after the petition for its enactment was signed by some of them. But a court may not place restrictions upon the procedure for direct legislation which are not found either in the Constitution or in any statute enacted to facilitate its operation. Certainly section 45 of the Elections Code, which is relied upon by counsel for Gage, makes no requirement as to the time when an initiative measure must be placed upon the ballot. Based upon section 1083a of the Political Code, a predecessor statute, it declares that only one who is a registered qualified elector may sign an initiative petition, and that he must also write the date of signing and his place of residence. In Chester v. Hall, 55 Cal.App. 611 [204 P. 237], the Political Code section was upheld as legislation which facilitates the operation of the constitutional plan and places safeguards around the exercise of the right to have a proposed law or constitutional amendment voted on by the people. (See, also, Boggs v. Jordan, 204 Cal. 207, 214 [267 P. 696].) But the statute cannot reasonably be construed as a requirement either that each signer of an initiative petition be a qualified elector both at the time of affixing his signature and on the date of the election at which the proposition is submitted to a vote, or as a restriction upon the time within which such a petition may be presented to the Secretary of State.
As another ground for the issuance of a writ of mandate in this proceeding, it is insisted that the gubernatorial election which fixes the number of signatures required for a petition is the one which immediately precedes every step in the initiative procedure including presentation. In support of that construction, reference is made to provisions of the Constitution and of the Elections Code with relation *818to the preparation of a title and summary for any proposed measure.
Section 1452 of the Elections Code allows any one interested in direct legislation, “at any time prior to one hundred thirty days before the election at which the measure is to be voted upon, ’ ’ to request a ballot title for it. As construed by counsel for Gage, this means that the request must be made prior to 130 days before the next general election. But the language cannot be so limited. By the express terms of the statute, the election at which the proposed measure is to be voted upon need not necessarily be the next one after the request for a title is made, and the proponents of the constitutional amendment which is the subject of the present proceeding, more than 130 days before the date of any election to be held in the year 1943, complied with the requirement regarding entitlement.
The constitutional mandate directing the attorney general to preserve the written request for a title and summary “until after the next general election” (art. IV, see. 1, par. 8), also relied upon by counsel for Gage, is more to the point. From this language it is argued that the initiative process must be commenced and completed between two consecutive general elections. Certainly the direction to the attorney general affords some basis for believing that the draftsman of the Constitution intended that the record of the request for entitlement be kept only until the electors had voted upon the measure, and that this would occur at “the next general election.” But such a conclusion is largely surmise, and in construing constitutional provisions concerning a matter so important to the public interest as the legislative power reserved to the people, a limitation of time may not be implied where none is expressed. Both constitutional and statutory provisions relating to direct legislation should be liberally construed with a purpose to protect the reserved right of the citizen. (Uhl v. Collins, 217 Cal. 1 [17 P.2d 99, 88 A.L.R. 1371]; Ley v. Dominguez, 212 Cal. 587 [299 P. 713].)
And as I read the opinion in State ex rel. Ilg v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 171 [187 N.E. 301], the decision supports the position of the Secretary of State in the present case. Under the Ohio Constitution, the court held, the “preceding election” to be used as a base for computing the qualification of *819an initiative petition “is clearly the election immediately preceding the filing of the petition.” The record showed that the date of filing was one day prior to the gubernatorial election of 1932. Subsequent to that election the Secretary of State ascertained that, based upon the vote cast for Governor in 1930, which was the election for Governor next preceding the filing of the petition, there were insufficient signatures to qualify the measure. Thereafter additional signatures were procured and filed. Upon the basis of the vote cast at the election of 1930, the petition then had the necessary number to qualify the proposal. According to the election of 1932, it still lacked the number fixed by the Constitution as requiring submission to the electors. The court decided that the election of 1930 governed.
Apparently in Ohio, although a petition is circulated for signature in separate parts, all of the parts are filed with the Secretary of State who ascertains the number of signatures which are valid. The date upon which the petition was filed, said the court, determined the “preceding election” which must be used as a base in determining its qualification although another gubernatorial election had intervened during the time allowed for securing additional signatures. Using the date of filing as the decisive factor in the present proceeding, “the last preceding general election at which a Governor was elected” is the one of 1942.
To me, the action of the Legislature of 1911 fortifies this conclusion, for the statutes enacted at that time, as I read them, show a purpose to place a limitation upon the circulation and qualification of a county and a city initiative measure which does not apply to one to be submitted to the electors of the entire state. In that year, section 4058 of the Political Code was enacted. It made provision for the submission to the electors of a county of either an initiative or a referendum measure, and declared that any petition for that purpose which was found insufficient should be returned to “the person filing the same, withqut prejudice, however, to the filing of a new petition to the same effect.” Other legislation related to the procedure for initiative and referendum measures in cities and towns and also directed that any petition found insufficient should be returned to its proponent. (Stats. 1911, p. 359.) Subsequently, by action at the extra session of 1911, the Legislature declared that in lieu of re*820turning an insufficient petition, it should remain on file as a public record. (Stats. Ex. Sess. 1911, p. 125 as to county-measures ; p. 131 as to city or town proposals.)
Certainly the legislative action shows an awareness that the Constitution does not limit the time for the circulation and qualification of a proposed initiative measure and a determination that there should be a restricted period during which a petition may be signed by electors and submitted to a vote in a county, a city or a town. The enactment of 1943 also indicates legislative cognizance that the Constitution does not set any particular period for the circulation of an initiative petition (other than that relating to the examination of signatures by local election officials), and the qualification of the proposal. Article IV, section 1, of the Constitution is self-executing, “but legislation may be enacted to facilitate its operation, but in no way limiting or restricting either the provisions of this section or the powers herein reserved.” In connection with the declaration of the Constitution, it may be noted that this court, in accordance with what it declared to be the uniform rule, has upheld the power of the Legislature “to enact statutes providing for reasonable regulation and control of rights granted under the constitutional provisions.” (Chesney v. Byram, 15 Cal.2d 460, 465 [101 P.2d 1106].) Other cases to the same effect include First M. E. Church v. Los Angeles County, 204 Cal. 201 [267 P. 703], and Chester v. Hall, supra.
For these reasons and, in particular, giving effect to the cardinal rule of construction that every intendment of the constitutional provisions and of statutes enacted to facilitate their operation is in favor of the qualification of an initiative measure, I believe that the electors of the state are entitled to vote upon “The Retirement Life Payments Amendment.”
Interveners’ petition for a rehearing was denied April 17, 1944. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing.