Court Opinion

ID: 9591875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:08:29.938982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:12.778046
License: Public Domain

TRAYNOR, J.
I dissent.
The problem whether a carrier is a common carrier involves questions of fact and of law. It is for the jury to determine what the facts are; whether the facts establish that a carrier is a common carrier is a question of law for the court. If there is conflicting evidence as to the relationship between the parties, the court must instruct the jury as to the operative facts that legally fix the status of common carrier and private carrier and instruct them that if they find the existence of certain facts they must find that the carrier is a common carrier, but if they find the existence of certain other facts they must find that the carrier is a private carrier. After finding the facts, the jury must follow the instructions of the court, and if there is evidence that reasonably warrants the conclusion reached, their verdict is controlling. If the facts are undisputed and not reasonably susceptible of conflicting in*795ferences, it is the sole responsibility of the court to determine whether the status of common carrier exists, and it is not only unnecessary but improper to instruct the jury as to the distinction between a common carrier and a private carrier. The evidence in the present case as to the relationship between Seaboard and Rampone Brothers is without conflict and not reasonably susceptible of conflicting inferences. It was therefore a question of law for the court whether or not Rampone Brothers were acting as a common carrier. In my opinion they were not. Since Rampone Brothers did not perform the services in question as a common carrier, their liability can be predicated only upon their negligence or the negligence of their driver, and the question whether they acted as a common carrier or private carrier should not have been presented to the jury. No harm was done, however, by doing so, since the jury, as demonstrated by its verdict, did not find that Ram-pone Brothers acted as a common carrier. The jury was properly instructed as to the negligence issue, and since it determined that issue in favor of Rampone Brothers, there was no ground for granting a new trial.
It is settled that a common carrier may contract to render special services as a private carrier. (Gornstein v. Priver, 64 Cal.App. 249, 254 [221 P. 396] ; Santa Fe, P. & P. R. Co. v. Grant Bros. Const. Co. 228 U.S. 177, 185 [33 S.Ct. 474, 57 L.Ed. 787] ; Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. Co. v. Voight, 176 U.S. 498 [20 S.Ct. 385, 44 L.Ed. 560] ; Northern P. R. Co. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440 [24 S.Ct. 408, 48 L.Ed. 513]; Long v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 130 F. 870 [65 C.C.A. 354] ; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174, 186 [23 L.Ed. 872]; New York. C. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 357, 377 [21 L.Ed. 627] ; Wilson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 129 F. 774, aff’d, 133 F. 1022 [66 C.C.A. 486] ; Cushing v. White, 101 Wash. 172, 181 [172 P. 229] ; Claypool v. Lightning Delivery Co., 38 Ariz. 262, 269 [299 P. 126] ; Bernardi Greater Shows Inc. v. Boston & Maine R. R., 86 N.H. 146, 154 [165 P. 124] ; Jackson Arch. Iron Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N.Y. 34, 37 [52 N.E. 665, 70 Am.St.Rep. 432] ; Kimball v. Rutland etc. R. Co., 26 Vt. 247, 255 [62 Am.Dec. 567]; State v. Boyd Transfer & Storage Co., 168 Minn. 190, 192 [209 N.W. 872]; Mengel Co. v. Inland Waterways Corp., 34 F.Supp. 685, 692; see 13 C.J.S. 32; 9 Am.Jur. 436; 48 L.R.A.N.S. 990.) In all these eases it was determined as a matter of law whether or not the engage*796ment in question was so different from the services offered to the public that the carrier was not a common carrier. As the United States Supreme Court declared in Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174, 186 [23 L.Ed. 872] : “We do not deny that a contract may be made which will put a common carrier on the same level with a private carrier for hire, as respects his liability for loss caused by his acts or omissions of others. . . . But what we have to decide in these cases is, whether the contract proved has that operation.” (See Kimball v. Rutland etc. R. Co., 26 Vt. 247, 255 [62 Am.Dec. 567] ; Jackson Arch. Iron Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N.Y. 34, 37 [52 N.E. 665, 70 Am.St.Rep. 432].) The rule is stated in 13 C.J.S. 32, as follows: “The question whether a contract of carriage changes the relation of the carrier from that of a common carrier to that of a private carrier is one of law. ’ ’ The cases decided by this court cited in the majority opinion do not hold to the contrary. In Haynes v. MacFarlane, 207 Cal. 529 [279 P. 436], a common carrier sought to escape liability as such by designating himself a private carrier in his contracts and by reserving ‘1 all of the privileges and rights of a contract carrier.” Since public policy prevents a common carrier’s repudiating his liability as such with respect to transactions in which he is “in substance and reality a common carrier,” this court held that such a contract did not protect the carrier against claims based on his obligations as a common carrier. “The fact that the defendant in his contract called himself a ‘private carrier’ could not make him such in the light of the undisputed facts to the contrary.” (207 Cal. 529, 534.) In that case the question whether the carrier acted as a common carrier was determined as a question of law by this court. The statement in the decision: “Whether the status of a freight auto truck operator is public or private in character is primarily a question of fact in each ease,” means that the legal conclusion whether a carrier has acted in the capacity of a common carrier depends on what he actually did rather than on the language of the contract that he made with the shipper. In People v. Duntley, 217 Cal. 150 [17 P.2d 715], the court was concerned with the question whether a tax imposed upon common carriers was properly imposed upon the defendant. It was held that the findings of the trial court as to the transactions undertaken in the conduct of defendant’s business were supported by the evidence and that from these findings the legal conclusion could reasonably be drawn *797that defendant was not a common carrier. In George v. Railroad Com., 219 Cal. 451 [27 P.2d 375], the conclusion of the commission that petitioners were common carriers was sustained by the same reasoning.
In the present case the unconflicting evidence shows that Rampone Brothers undertook to furnish Seaboard with trucking equipment and a driver for the transportation of goods entrusted to Seaboard by the United States Army whenever Seaboard lacked sufficient equipment to transport such goods. Rampone Brothers reserved the right, however, to refuse compliance with Seaboard’s request if they needed the equipment for their regular business. The driver furnished by Ram-pone Brothers was concerned with neither the loading nor the delivery of the goods. He reported to Seaboard’s dispatcher at an army camp and was not present while the merchandise was loaded. When the truck and other equipment were loaded, Seaboard delivered to the driver the original and a copy of a “dray tag” and requested him to sign another copy as a receipt. The dray tag was issued on a form furnished by Seaboard. Under the agreement between Seaboard and Rampone Brothers the latter received compensation that was about 20 per cent less than the compensation the army paid Seaboard. Rampone Brothers’ driver was subject to Seaboard’s instructions as to the handling and transportation of the goods. He was not even to take part in the loading or delivery of the goods, although such services formed an important part of the duties of Rampone Brothers with regard to their other business. Seaboard determined what part of the goods entrusted to it was to be carried by its own equipment, by that furnished by Rampone Brothers or by other subhaulers. These undisputed facts demonstrate that the services that Rampone Brothers rendered to Seaboard were substantially different from the services for which they held themselves out to the public as a common carrier. If the services in question were those of a common carrier, it would follow that Rampone Brothers were under obligation to furnish their equipment and drivers to anyone upon the same conditions they were furnished to Seaboard. It is not the duty of a common carrier, however, to place his equipment and personnel under the control of another carrier.
An inference that Rampone Brothers acted as a common carrier in rendering the services in question cannot be drawn from the mere fact that they were licensed, and upon other *798occasions operated, as a radial highway common carrier. It was shown by the uncontradicted evidence that the special services rendered Seaboard were entirely different from the services rendered the public generally as a common carrier. To hold that such an inference could be drawn despite the uncontradicted evidence as to the special nature of the services is equivalent to holding that the jury could disregard the rule that a common carrier may contract to render services as a private carrier. It is also immaterial that as a common carrier Rampone Brothers sometimes carried commodities other than fruit, vegetables, and canned goods, for the determination of their status in this case depends, not on the kind of goods carried, but upon the circumstances under which the services were rendered.
It is unnecessary to determine whether Rampone Brothers merely leased their equipment to Seaboard or whether they acted as a contract carrier. In neither event would they be liable as a common carrier.
The order granting a new trial should be reversed, and the judgment should be affirmed.
Plaintiffs and Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied April 10, 1947. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.