Court Opinion

ID: 9663054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:26:52.53475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:45.279688
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Were this a case of first impression, I believe there are strong, perhaps even compelling, arguments to conclude that public policy ought not to allow persons to absolve themselves contractually from liability for their own future negligence. The Court today affirms that Missouri law recognizes freedom of contract and, therefore, the freedom of parties to agree that one or both parties will not be liable to the other for acts of future negligence. Given the long line of authority supporting that notion generally, I agree with the premise from which the majority begins.
If contracts permitting persons to absolve themselves of future liability in negligence are permitted, it seems to me that the only issue left for the Court is one of contract: whether the language of the contract between Vic Tanny and Charles Alack absolves *343Vic Tanny from liability for its future negligence resulting in injury to Charles Alack. As the majority notes, Alack does not claim that he did not see the exculpatory language in the contract when he entered it, only that he believed the language applied solely to his own negligence. Alack’s understanding of the meaning of the contract is legally significant only if the contract itself is ambiguous. A contract is not rendered ambiguous because the parties disagree on its interpretation. J.E. Hathman, Inc. v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon, 491 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Mo. banc 1973).
The relevant language in the contract between Vic Tanny and Charles Alack provides:
By the use of the facilities of Seller [Vic Tanny], and/or by attendance at any of the gymnasiums owned by Seller, the Member [Charles Alack] expressly agrees that Seller shall not be liable for any damages arising from personal injuries sustained by the Member ... in, on, or about the premises of said gymnasiums or as a result of ... using the facilities and the equipment therein. By the execution of this agreement Member assumes full responsibility of any such injuries or damages which may occur to Member ... Member assumes full responsibility for any injuries, damages or losses which may occur to Member ... in on or about the premises of said gymnasiums and does hereby fully and forever release and discharge Seller and all associated gymnasiums, their owners, employees and agents from any and all claims, demands, damages, rights of action, or causes of action, present or future whether the same be known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, resulting from or arising out of the Member’s ... use or intended use of the said gymnasium of the facilities and equipment thereof.
(Emphasis added.)
In construing contracts, courts must consider the parties’ intent. Courts ascertain the intent of unambiguous contracts by giving the specific language used its “natural, ordinary, and common sense meaning” and by looking to the contract as a whole. Wilshire Const. Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 463 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Mo.1971). Courts should also consider the “object, nature and purpose” of the contract. Id. Thus, the contract must be analyzed in its entirety to determine whether the contractual language is sufficiently clear to notify Alack that he could not sue Vic Tanny for injuries he might sustain due to Vic Tanny’s future negligence. A contract is ambiguous if its language is susceptible to more than one meaning. Sigma Alpha Epsilon, 491 S.W.2d at 264. Said another way, ambiguity exists “where there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the words used in the contract.” Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. banc 1991).
The contract plainly alerts Alack:
1. “Seller will not be liable for any damages arising from personal injuries. ...”
2. “Member assumes full responsibility of any such injuries or damage which may occur to the Member....”
3. “Member assumes full responsibility for any injuries ... which may occur to Member....”
4. “[Member] does hereby fully and forever release and discharge Seller ... from any and all claims, demands, damages, rights of action, present or future ... resulting from or arising out of the Member’s ... use ... of said gymnasium or the facilities and equipment thereof.”
The majority concedes that “[i]n a theoretical vacuum the words ‘any and all’ might appear unambiguous.” (Op. at 337). What does this mean? It can mean one of two things. First, it can mean that the contractual language is patently ambiguous and in need of interpretation. Second, it can mean that there is a latent ambiguity in the contract in need of construction.
Authoritative commentators, including those cited by the majority, draw a distinction between interpretation and construction of contracts. Interpretation “is the process of applying the ordinary legal standard to the words ... used in order to determine their meaning....” 4 Williston on Contracts, § 602 (3d ed.). The “ordinary legal standard” means that courts give words “their ordinary meaning.” Id. The ordinary meaning of words is found in the dictionary.
On the other hand, construction of a contract permits courts to give special meaning *344to language “other than the normal meaning of the words.” Id. Construction is permitted “only when the primary standard of interpretation leaves the meaning of the contract ambiguous.” Id. Courts of this state (with the exception of this Court in this case) have generally recognized this distinction. “A court will not resort to construction where the intent of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language for there is nothing to construe.” Sigma Alpha Epsilon, 491 S.W.2d at 264. “When the language of a contract is plain, there can be no construction by the court because there is nothing to construe.” Grantham v. Rockhurst Univ., 563 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo.App.1978); Sigma Alpha Epsilon, 491 S.W.2d at 264.
There is no need for interpretation in this case. The language used in the contract is unambiguous. It could not be any more clear, intelligible or unmistakable. “All” means “[e]very.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 54 (1976). A “claim” is “[a] cause of action.” Black’s Law Dictionary 247 (6th ed. 1990). A “right of action” is “[t]he right to bring suit.” Id. at 1325. Surely the words “all claims” and “all rights of action” include claims for negligence. Moreover, the cases of this Court have consistently read “all” to mean “every” in similar contexts. In St. Louis & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 187 S.W. 836 (Mo.1916), a contractor brought suit against a contractee seeking indemnification for damages paid a subcontractor’s employee for injuries caused by the contraetee’s negligence. The contract provision stated: “The contractor shall assume all risk of accident to ... workmen or persons engaged in or about the build-ing_” Id. at 837. This Court held that the phrase “all risk of accident” absolved the contractee for liability resulting from the eontractee’s own negligence.
In Terminal Ry. Ass’n. of St. Louis v. Ralston-Purina Co., 352 Mo. 1013, 180 S.W.2d 693 (1944), a widow filed suit against a railroad company under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act following her husband’s death. The husband met his demise when he was crushed between a box car and a structure that Ralston-Purina built closer to the track than an agreement between the railroad and Ralston-Purina permitted. After settling the widow’s suit, the railroad company sued Ralston-Purina, seeking indemnification. The contract between Ralston-Purina and the railroad company provided, among other things, that: “The Industry [Ralston-Purina] shall save and hold harmless the Railroad from all loss, damage, injury or death caused by obstructions being closer to the Industrial track than specified herein.” Id. 180 S.W.2d at 694. The railroad conceded that its negligence contributed to the husband’s death. Nevertheless, this Court held that the language “[a]ll loss, damage, injury or death” in the contract “is susceptible of only one reasonable construction” and held for the railroad company. Id. 180 S.W.2d at 697.
The majority ignores Stewart and Ralston-Purina, preferring Poslosky v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 349 S.W.2d 847 (Mo.1961). But Poslosky offers little aid. That ease announces the rule that “a contract provision exempting one from liability for his or her negligence ... must be clearly and explicitly stated.” Id. at 850. As the majority concedes, this Court’s decision in Poslosky turns on the absence of clear language releasing Firestone for liability for its own negligence. However, nothing in Poslosky equates the clear and explicit statement of an exemption from liability with the use of the word “negligence” or “fault.” Nor is there any language in Poslosky that supports the notion that “all” means less than “every.” Thus, Poslosky stands only for the proposition that ambiguous language will not relieve a party of liability for future negligence — a proposition with which no one argues. Pos-losky, however, implies just the opposite, that clear and explicit contractual language is effective to exonerate a party from liability for future negligence even if the word “negligence” is not employed for that purpose.1
Since there is no patent ambiguity in the language used in the contract, and no basis for interpretation, the majority must mean that the contract contains a latent ambiguity and invites itself to begin construction of the language. There is a latent ambiguity, the *345majority imagines, for two reasons. First, the majority says the contract is ambiguous “because it did not state that a member was releasing Vic Tanny for its future negligence.” (Op. at 337). Second, the majority claims the contract is ambiguous because “one may never exonerate oneself from future liability for intentional torts or for gross negligence_” (Op. at 337).
The first “latent ambiguity” is a restatement of the rationale in Hornbeck v. All Am. Indoor Sports, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 717 (Mo.App.1995). Hombeck found an exculpatory clause relieving All American from “any and all claims” ineffective. Hombeck “reasoned” that general language which clearly and explicitly absolves a party from its own negligence must be “specific” so as to avoid ambiguity. Stated another way, Hombeck says that all-inclusive language is too broad to be effective. One would hope that the majority is unwilling to apply this rationale across the legal board. If it did, the Fourteenth Amendment’s application to “all persons” might be ineffective without a more specific list of the persons to whom “all” refers. And if “all” means “every” only some but not all of the time, how does anyone know when “all” means “every” and when it means something less?
There is simply no latent ambiguity in the all-inclusive language in this contract.
Second, a latent ambiguity arises where some collateral fact renders the meaning of the language uncertain. Royal Banks of Missouri v. Fridkin, 819 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Mo. banc 1991); 4 Williston on Contracts, § 627 (3d ed.). Where a latent ambiguity justifies a court’s decision to begin constructing, the ambiguity must arise under the facts applicable to the contract sub judice. The fact that a party (or in this case the Court) might conjure up an ambiguity that would exist in some other circumstance does not render the contract ambiguous in every circumstance.
The majority is not talking about an ambiguity at all. The general rule of law that courts will properly refuse to give effect to exculpatory clauses for intentional torts is not a rule governing interpretation and construction. It is part of the substantive law of contracts. “[A] rule of law which forbids effect being given to that [clear] meaning is part of the substantive law of contracts which comes into play after interpretation and construction have finished their work.” 4 Willi-ston on Contracts, § 602 (3d ed.). Thus, courts refuse to enforce such exculpatory clauses not on the basis of ambiguity and not as a matter of contractual interpretation or construction, but as a matter of public policy. The clear language of the contract, if enforced, exonerates the tortfeasor. There would be no point in declaring such an exculpatory clause contrary to public policy if it were merely ambiguous and could be construed away. It is the clarity of the language that causes the court to resort to public policy as a justification for its holding. The court simply refuses to honor the effect of the clear language.
*346There is no latent ambiguity created in this contract by the refusal of the substantive law to recognize exculpatory clauses purporting to relieve a party of liability for intentional torts.
Judge Limbaugh correctly understands the majority’s jurisprudential standard in this case when he says that the majority invents an ambiguity where none exists “in order to avoid harsh results.” The judicial viscera is no substitute for the application of time-honored principles on which courts ought to found their decisions.
The public policy of Missouri permits parties to agree contractually to relieve one or both of them from liability for future negligence. That the contractual language under scrutiny might not exonerate Vic Tanny from willful torts does not create an ambiguity where the issue is whether the contractual language shields Vic Tanny from liability for its negligent acts. As to the issue before the Court in this case, the language of the contract is clear — whether one considers it in a theoretical vacuum or in the practical application of the facts to this case.

. Phoenix Assur. Co. of N.Y. v. Royale Inv. Co., 393 S.W.2d 43 (Mo.App.1965), holds that the phrase ”[t]he Hotel assumes no responsibility” is too ambiguous, too cryptic, to absolve a bailee of liability for its negligence. This seems obvious. Meyer Jewelry Co. v. Professional Bldg. Co., 307 *345S.W.2d 517 (Mo.App. 1957), involved an exculpatory clause that read:
The Lessor ... shall not be liable for any damage done to property or any person in said building at any time ... or from any damages arising from the acts or negligence of co-tenants or other occupants of the same building, or any of owners or occupants of adjacent or contiguous property.
Id. at 520. The contractual provision expressly spoke only to the negligence of co-tenants, other occupants, or owners or occupants of adjacent property. Consequently, the court of appeals held the language of the lease did not "in plain terms exonerate the appellant-landlord from its own acts of negligence.” Id. at 521. The court reasoned that the law’s strict construction of exculpatory clauses proceeded from the belief that in the absence of clear and explicit language, “the minds of both parties probably never intended such absolution.” Id. at 521. It was not, however, the failure of the exculpatory clause to use the word "negligence” that justified the holding in Meyer lewelry. Rather, the ambiguous language of the contract — language that included the word "negligence" — led to the court's decision. Thomas v. Skelly Oil Co., 344 S.W.2d 320 (Mo.App.1960), relies on Meyer Jewelry and Ralston-Purina. Thus, Thomas properly focuses on the specific language of the exculpatory clause to determine its effect, id. at 321-22, not on the presence of the word "negligence.” Carefully read, Thomas does not dispute that the word “all” is sufficient if the language of the clause is otherwise clear and explicit.
The majority also cites to Vergano v. Facility Management of Missouri, Inc., 895 S.W.2d 126 (Mo.App.1995). Vergano stands only for the proposition that a contract that contains language plainly indicating that a party intends to exonerate itself from liability for its own future negligence is effective.