Court Opinion

ID: 9723533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:18:50.189076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:06.357485
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
The majority reverses solely upon grounds that the trial court’s findings did not set forth the evidence upon both sides of the liability issue. I agree that the findings are inadequate in this respect and insofar as the trial court determined that “as to the issue of liability, [the verdict] was against the weight of the evidence.”
To be sure, the Thirteenth Juror principle is a fixture and a reality in our law. However, the unrestricted exercise of the discretion afforded by the principle is to be avoided. See Weenig v. Wood (1976) 2d Dist., 169 Ind.App. 413, 349 N.E.2d 235, 256-57, trans. denied. Were it otherwise, the right of trial by jury would be severely compromised, if not destroyed. Weenig v. Wood, supra. In this regard, the purpose of the principle must be kept in mind. As enunciated in Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First National Bank (1976) 265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d 974, 978:
“The purpose of authorizing the trial judge to grant a new trial, when the *177judge considers the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence, is to erase the occasional unsupportable jury verdict. It is to supplant that which is irrational with something that is rational.”
The ruling which granted plaintiffs a new trial was not solely premised upon an “against the weight of the evidence” rationale. It would appear from the all-inclusive breadth of the trial court’s findings that the trial court was attempting to utilize either as alternative bases, or in combination, all possible grounds for the new trial, i.e., (1) against the weight of the evidence — at least as to liability; (2) clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence; and (3) clearly erroneous as not supported by the evidence.
To the extent that the verdict was deemed by the trial court to be clearly erroneous, the findings are also inadequate. The trial court apparently read Rule 59(J)(7) to require a finding as to why he did not grant a judgment upon the evidence to plaintiffs at a time prior to or immediately following the rendering of the jury verdict. If so, the court was in error. The rule contemplates a finding by the trial court as to why, in response to a Motion to Correct Error, a new trial is ordered as opposed to vacating the jury verdict and entering of a different judgment or a judgment for the opposing party. The trial court did not state in its findings why it did not enter judgment for the plaintiff in response to the plaintiffs’ Motion to Correct Error. It would appear that the trial court was inclined to do so as to the issue of defendants’ liability but could not do so under existing law. If a verdict is set aside as against the weight of the evidence when the evidence is in conflict or when conflicting inferences are permissible, a new trial must be ordered. Elsperman v. Plump (1983) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 446 N.E.2d 1027, 1030. Even if the court could have entered partial judgment for plaintiffs as to liability, the court could not have entered a full and complete judgment fixing the amount of damages. See Coffel v. Perry (1983) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 452 N.E.2d 1066; Weenig v. Wood, supra, 349 N.E.2d at 256-57.
Here, had the findings of the trial court been adequate and had the findings been supported by the record, the relief afforded in the form of a new trial would be appropriate. Because the findings are not proper, I concur in reversal and in ordering reinstatement of the verdict for defendants. State v. White (1985) Ind., 474 N.E. 2d 995.
RATLIFF, C.J., concurs.