Court Opinion

ID: 9919424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 15:08:56.510864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:14.303300
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Christine A. Farmbry,                     :
                  Petitioner              :
                                          :      No. 1359 C.D. 2022
              v.                          :      Submitted: October 10, 2023
                                          :
City of Philadelphia (Workers’            :
Compensation Appeal Board),               :
                   Respondent             :

BEFORE:       HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
              HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
              HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT                                 FILED: January 18, 2024

              Christine A. Farmbry (Claimant) petitions for this Court’s review of the
November 9, 2022, adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(Board) that modified Claimant’s total disability benefits to partial on the basis of
an impairment rating evaluation (IRE) performed pursuant to Act 111 of 2018 (Act
111).1 Claimant contends that Act 111 is unconstitutional because it violates the
remedies clause of our Pennsylvania Constitution2 as well as separation of powers.
Discerning no merit to these arguments, we affirm the Board’s adjudication.
              The facts of the case are not in dispute. On March 28, 2017, Claimant
sustained work-related injuries to her left elbow, forearm, shoulder, and rotator cuff
as a police officer with the City of Philadelphia (Employer). Employer issued a

1
  Section 306(a.3) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as
amended, added by the Act of October 24, 2018, P.L. 714, No. 111, 77 P.S. §511.3.
2
  PA. CONST. art. I, §11.
Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP) and amended NCPs, which all recited a
weekly compensation rate of $995 and that Employer paid salary continuation
benefits under what is known as the Heart and Lung Act3 in lieu of workers’
compensation. On July 2, 2019, the parties executed a supplemental agreement
modifying Claimant’s compensation rate to $258.39 based upon her June 5, 2019,
return to work at light duty.
              On February 3, 2021, Lynn Yang, M.D., who is board certified in
physical medicine and rehabilitation, conducted an examination of Claimant and
issued a report in which she concluded that Claimant had a whole-person impairment
rating of 16% based on the American Medical Association’s Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides), Sixth Edition (second printing
April 2009). Based on this determination, Employer filed a modification petition.
After a hearing, the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) modified Claimant’s
workers’ compensation disability benefits, from total to partial, as of February 3,
2021. Claimant appealed to the Board, and in an adjudication dated November 9,
2022, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision. Claimant then petitioned for this
Court’s review.
              On appeal,4 Claimant argues that the Board erred because Act 111 is
unconstitutional. A change to workers’ compensation benefits may be applied only
to injuries that occur after Act 111’s effective date of October 24, 2018. Retroactive
application of Act 111 deprived Claimant of her “due process rights to the property
interest in [her] benefits.” Claimant Brief at 12. In addition, Claimant argues that

3
 Act of June 28, 1935, P.L. 477, as amended, 53 P.S. §§637-638.
4
  We review the Board’s adjudications to determine whether errors of law were made, whether
constitutional rights were violated, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence. Lehigh County Vo-Tech School v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board
(Wolfe), 652 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. 1995).

                                            2
Act 111 effects an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to private
persons rather than governmental agencies, a defect identified in Protz v. Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017).
Claimant acknowledges that this Court rejected these very arguments in Pierson v.
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Consol Pennsylvania Coal Company, LLC),
252 A.3d 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 261 A.3d 378 (Pa. 2021), but she
argues that we should reconsider Pierson and invalidate Act 111.
             Employer responds that the Board properly modified Claimant’s
disability benefits from total to partial under Act 111. Claimant’s constitutional
arguments have been considered and rejected by this Court on numerous occasions.
Further, the General Assembly can adopt, as its own, a particular set of standards
already in existence, and it did so in Act 111 by choosing the standards in the Sixth
Edition of the AMA Guides. This is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority. Employer Brief at 9 (citing Hutchinson v. Annville Township (Workers’
Compensation Appeal Board), 260 A.3d 360 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)).
             We begin with a review of the applicable legal principles. Act 111
states, in pertinent part, as follows:
             (1) When an employe has received total disability
             compensation pursuant to clause (a) for a period of one hundred
             four weeks . . . the employe shall be required to submit to a
             medical examination . . . to determine the degree of impairment
             due to the compensable injury, if any. The degree of impairment
             shall be determined based upon an evaluation by a physician . . .
             pursuant to the most recent edition of the [AMA Guides], 6 th
             edition (second printing April 2009).
             (2) If such determination results in an impairment rating that
             meets a threshold impairment rating that is equal to or greater
             than thirty-five per centum . . . the employe shall be presumed to
             be totally disabled and shall continue to receive total disability
             compensation benefits . . . . If such determination results in an

                                          3
               impairment rating less than thirty-five per centum impairment . .
               . the employe shall then receive partial disability benefits under
               clause (b)[.]

Section 306(a.3) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), 77 P.S. §511.3.5 In sum,
where a claimant has collected total disability for 104 weeks, she may be required
to undergo an impairment rating. Unless the claimant has an impairment of at least
35%, the claimant’s disability benefits can be modified to partial disability.
               In her first issue, Claimant argues that Act 111 deprived her of a vested
property right to total disability benefits in violation of the remedies clause of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
known as the Remedies Clause, states, in pertinent part, as follows:
               All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him
               in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by
               due course of law, and right and justice administered without
               sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the
               Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases
               as the Legislature may by law direct.

PA. CONST. art. I, §11.
               We reject Claimant’s premise that she has a vested right to total
disability benefits. Section 413(a) of the Act states, in relevant part, as follows:

5
 Section 3 of Act 111 further provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
        (1) For the purposes of determining whether an employee shall submit to a medical
        examination to determine the degree of impairment and whether an employee has
        received total disability compensation for the period of 104 weeks under section
        306(a.3)(1) of the act, an insurer shall be given credit for weeks of total disability
        compensation paid prior to the effective date of this paragraph. This section shall
        not be construed to alter the requirements of section 306(a.3) of the act.
         (2) For the purposes of determining the total number of weeks of partial disability
        compensation payable under section 306(a.3)(7) of the act, an insurer shall be given
        credit for weeks of partial disability compensation paid prior to the effective date
        of this paragraph.
77 P.S. §511.3, Historical and Statutory Notes.

                                                  4
              [The WCJ] . . . may, at any time, modify, reinstate, suspend, or
              terminate a notice of compensation payable, an original or
              supplemental agreement or an award of the [D]epartment [of
              Labor and Industry] or its [WCJ], upon petition filed by either
              party . . . , upon proof that the disability of an injured employe
              has increased, decreased, recurred, or has temporarily or finally
              ceased[.]

77 P.S. §772. In Perillo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Extended
Healthcare Services, Inc.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 649 C.D. 2020, filed March 3, 2021)
(unreported), this Court held that a claimant has no vested right to workers’
compensation benefits by reason of Section 413(a) of the Act.6 Accordingly, Act
111 does not offend the remedies clause. See also Pennsylvania AFL-CIO v.
Commonwealth, 219 A.3d 306 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), aff’d per curiam, (Pa., No. 88
MAP 2019, filed August 18, 2020).
              In Pierson, 252 A.3d at 1179, we addressed the retroactive application
of Act 111 as follows:
              While [the c]laimant, here, argues that he has a right to benefits
              as calculated at the time of injury, there are reasonable
              expectations under the Act that benefits may change. We
              acknowledge that a claimant retains a certain right to benefits
              until such time as he is found to be ineligible for them. However,
              claimants, such as the one in the matter before us, did not
              automatically lose anything by the enactment of Act 111. Act
              111 simply provided employers with the means to change a
              claimant’s disability status from total to partial by providing the
              requisite medical evidence that the claimant has a whole body
              impairment of less than 35%, after receiving 104 weeks of
              [temporary total disability] benefits.

6
 An unreported decision, issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value in
accordance with Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210
Pa. Code §69.414(a).

                                               5
In short, we held that “[the c]laimant’s ‘vested rights’ have not been abrogated by
Act 111.” Pierson, 252 A.3d at 1180.
               Next, Claimant asserts that Act 111 violates the separation of powers
required by the Pennsylvania Constitution.7 However, this issue has also been
addressed by this Court in Pierson, where we quoted Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, 219
A.3d 306. Specifically, in Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, we explained as follows:
               The non-delegation doctrine does not prohibit the General
               Assembly from “adopting as its own a particular set of standards
               which already are in existence at the time of adoption.” That is
               what the General Assembly did here – it adopted the Sixth
               Edition, second printing, which PA AFL-CIO admits was in
               existence when Section 306(a.3) was enacted, “as its own.”
               When such an adoption occurs, the General Assembly is
               exercising its legislative and policy making authority by deciding
               that it is those particular standards that will become the law of
               this Commonwealth. It is not delegating its authority to legislate.
               The General Assembly made a policy decision regarding the
               standards that will apply to IREs in the Commonwealth going
               forward.

Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, 219 A.3d at 316 (quoting, in part, Protz, 161 A.3d at 838)
(emphasis in original omitted).

               By reason of Section 413(a) of the Act, Claimant does not enjoy a
vested right to workers’ compensation benefits. Pierson and Pennsylvania AFL-
CIO established that the application of Act 111 to injuries that occurred prior to the
effective date of October 24, 2018, is constitutional, and the legislature did not
delegate its legislative authority in adopting, as its own standards, the Sixth Edition
(second printing) of the AMA Guides.

7
 Article II, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that “[t]he legislative power of this
Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives.” PA. CONST. art. II, §1.

                                                 6
             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the adjudication of the Board,
which affirmed the WCJ’s decision to modify Claimant’s workers’ compensation
disability benefits, from total to partial, effective February 3, 2021.

                             ____________________________________________
                             MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

                                           7
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Christine A. Farmbry,              :
                  Petitioner       :
                                   :     No. 1359 C.D. 2022
            v.                     :
                                   :
City of Philadelphia (Workers’     :
Compensation Appeal Board),        :
                   Respondent      :

                                 ORDER

            AND NOW, this 18th day of January, 2024, the November 9, 2022,
adjudication of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, in the above-captioned
matter, is AFFIRMED.

                          ____________________________________________
                          MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita