Court Opinion

ID: 9682519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:12:29.624601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:39.829611
License: Public Domain

CRANDALL, Presiding Judge.
I respectfully dissent. The evidence was .insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the appellant knew or believed the property in question was stolen. There was no direct evidence presented on that element of the offense. Further, there was no circumstantial evidence adduced to satisfy the statutory rules of evidence relating to appellant’s mental state.1 I do not mean to *866suggest that these statutory methods of proving a defendant’s mental state are exclusive. Certainly there may be circumstantial evidence other than that suggested by § 570.080.2, RSMo (1978), from which the jury could infer that appellant knew or believed the goods in his possession were stolen. Suspicious conduct, deceptive behavior or false statements by a defendant to police officers may also give rise to the inference of a defendant’s guilty knowledge or belief. State v. Hayes, 597 S.W.2d 242, 248 (Mo.App.1980). However, the circumstantial evidence offered by the State to support the inference of a defendant’s guilty knowledge or belief must necessarily be relevant to the defendant’s mental state before it can be considered probative on that issue. The majority acknowledges that possession of recently stolen property does not give rise to an inference that the possessor is guilty of the offense of receiving stolen property. The additional evidence recited by the majority in support of the appellant’s guilty knowledge or belief is not probative of the appellant’s mental state. Appellant’s mental state, guilty or otherwise, cannot be inferred from the fact that a microwave oven is easily transportable or from the fact that it was facing the wall in appellant’s kitchen and was not in use at the time of his arrest. Although the jury could have disbelieved the appellant’s explanation of his possession of the property, their disbelief is not the equivalent to affirmative proof of the contrary. State v. Woods, 434 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Mo.1968); State v. Taylor, 422 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Mo.1968). The conclusion by the majority that appellant staged an attempted burglary to dispel suspicion from himself raises no more than a suspicion that appellant possessed goods he knew or believed were stolen. See State v. Woods, 434 S.W.2d at 469.
I believe the State has failed in its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite mental state of the offense charged. I would reverse the conviction and order the appellant discharged.

. Section 570.080.2(l)-(3), RSMo (1978), provides that:
Evidence of the following is admissible in any criminal prosecution under this section to prove the requisite knowledge or belief of the alleged receiver:
*866(1) That he was found in possession or control of other property stolen on separate occasions from two or more persons;
(2) That he received other stolen property in another transaction within the year preceding the transaction charged;
(3)That he acquired the stolen property for a consideration which he knew was far below its reasonable value.