Court Opinion

ID: 9372038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 17:07:49.826908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:31.949023
License: Public Domain

J-S42028-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JOSEPH DAVID SUPIK                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 394 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 7, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-16-CR-0000293-2021,
              CP-16-CR-0000294-2021, CP-16-CR-0000295-2021,
              CP-16-CR-0000296-2021, CP-16-CR-0000297-2020,
              CP-16-CR-0000297-2021, CP-16-CR-0000298-2020,
                           CP-16-CR-0000299-2020

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 17, 2023

        Appellant, Joseph David Supik, appeals from the February 7, 2022

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Plea of Clarion County

after the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of five to ten

years’ incarceration upon Appellant pleading guilty but mentally ill to eight

counts of terroristic threats.1 We affirm.

        The record demonstrates that, on November 8, 2021, Appellant pleaded

guilty but mentally ill to eight counts of terroristic threats. Trial Court Order,
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

118 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1). Appellant pleaded guilty but mentally ill to one
count of terroristic threats at each of the eight trial court dockets listed in the
caption supra.
J-S42028-22

11/15/21.     The criminal charges stemmed from Appellant sending letters

containing terroristic threats to various Clarion County employees, as well as

Clarion County District Attorney Drew Welsh (“District Attorney Welsh”) and a

Clarion County magisterial district judge, while Appellant was incarcerated in

a state correctional institution. At the November 8, 2021 plea hearing, the

trial court, upon reviewing Appellant’s psychological assessment and based

upon the stipulations of the parties, found that Appellant “is suffering from a

mental illness that contributed to [the] offenses.” Id.

       On February 7, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of five to ten years’ incarceration and ordered Appellant to

pay the costs of prosecution.2 Sentencing Order, 2/8/22, at ¶1. At the time

of sentencing, the trial court also found Appellant to be “severely mentally

disabled and in need of treatment pursuant to the provisions of the Mental

Health Procedures Act,” 15 P.S. §§ 7101 – 7503, as well as 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9727 (setting forth the disposition of a person pleading guilty but mentally

ill). Sentencing Order, 2/8/22, at ¶2. As part of the sentencing order, the

trial court directed the Department of Corrections to provide Appellant “with

____________________________________________

2 The caption of the trial court sentencing order listed all eight trial court
docket numbers as follows:

       297 – 299 CR 2020
       293 – 297 CR 2021[.]

See Sentencing Order, 2/8/22.

                                           -2-
J-S42028-22

such treatment as is psychiatrically and psychologically indicated for his

mental illness.” Id.

       On February 14, 2022, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration,

asking the trial court to reconsider the sentence. Motion for Reconsideration,

2/14/22, at ¶¶1-6. The motion for reconsideration also included a request to

withdraw Appellant’s guilty plea. Id. at ¶¶7-17. The trial court ordered the

Commonwealth to file a response.               Counsel for the Pennsylvania Office of

Attorney General, for reasons discussed more fully infra, filed a response on

February 24, 2022, and District Attorney Welsh filed a response on February

25, 2022. On March 4, 2022, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for

reconsideration and the request to withdraw his guilty plea.             This appeal

followed.3
____________________________________________

3 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The
Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General filed an appellate brief, addressing
Appellant’s second issue. District Attorney Welsh filed an appellate brief,
stating that he relied on the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, as well as his
response filed in opposition to Appellant’s motion for reconsideration to
address Appellant’s issues.

In his notice of appeal, Appellant listed all eight trial court docket numbers on
a single notice of appeal. A copy of the notice of appeal was filed at each trial
court docket. Our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d
969 (Pa. 2018) held that, “the proper practice under [Pa.R.A.P.] 341(a) is to
file separate appeals from an order that resolves issues arising on more than
one docket.” Walker, 185 A.3d at 977; see also Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) and official
comments. This Court, however, has held that the requirements of Walker
and Rule 341 may be overlooked where there is a breakdown in the judicial
system and a defendant is misinformed or misled regarding his or her
appellate rights. Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 354 (Pa. Super.
2020) (en banc), appeal denied, 251 A.3d 773 (Pa. 2021).

                                           -3-
J-S42028-22

       Appellant raises the following issues for review:

       1.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
              [Appellant’s] post-sentence motion seeking leave to
              withdraw his guilty plea due to a conflict of interest with the
              Clarion County District Attorney's Office?

       2.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
              [Appellant] to an aggregate sentence of [five to ten years’]
              incarceration upon acceptance of his plea of guilty but
              mentally ill to eight [] counts of terroristic threats [] for
              letters written to various individuals while incarcerated?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

       In his first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his

post-sentence motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant’s Brief at

13-16.

       “It is well-settled that the decision whether to permit a defendant to

withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court” and, as

such, this Court reviews a trial court order denying a motion to withdraw a

____________________________________________

In the case sub judice, the trial court sentencing order contains eight trial
court docket numbers in the case caption, as detailed supra. Moreover, eight
trial court docket numbers appear on the “post-sentence rights – rights after
sentencing” form executed by Appellant and his counsel. Finally, the trial
court order denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration also contains eight
trial court docket numbers on a single order. See Trial Court Order, 3/4/22.
Under these circumstances, we find the use of eight trial court docket numbers
on the aforementioned trial court orders and forms was misleading and
constitutes a breakdown in court operations. Therefore, although we do not
condone counsel’s filing of a single notice of appeal listing eight trial court
docket numbers, we decline to quash Appellant’s appeal on the ground the
notice of appeal does not comply with the mandates of Walker and its
progeny, as well as Rule 341.

                                           -4-
J-S42028-22

guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d

660, 664 (Pa. Super. 2017), relying on Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980

A.2d 124 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 992 A.2d 885 (Pa. 2010).

      Although no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea exists in
      Pennsylvania, the standard applied differs depending on whether
      the defendant seeks to withdraw the plea before or after
      sentencing. When a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea after
      sentencing, he[, or she,] must demonstrate prejudice on the order
      of manifest injustice. [A] defendant may withdraw [the] guilty
      plea after sentencing only where necessary to correct manifest
      injustice. Thus, post-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject
      to higher scrutiny since the courts strive to discourage the entry
      of guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices.

Hart, 174 A.3d at 664 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

      “Manifest injustice occurs when the plea is not tendered knowingly,

intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly.” Id. (citation omitted).

      In determining whether a plea is valid, the court must examine
      the totality of circumstances surrounding the plea. Pennsylvania
      law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of
      what he[, or she,] was doing, and the defendant bears the burden
      of proving otherwise.

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Here, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his request

to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing on the ground that a conflict of

interest existed in District Attorney Welsh’s prosecution of three of the eight

criminal cases and because District Attorney Welsh was permitted to make a

victim impact statement at Appellant’s sentencing hearing. Appellant’s Brief

at 13-16. Appellant contends,

                                     -5-
J-S42028-22

      an actual conflict of interest was established once charges were
      filed that named District Attorney Welsh as the victim in [three]
      separate cases [(CP-16-CR-0000293-2021 (“CR-293-2021”),
      CP-16-CR-0000294-2021                (“CR-294-2021”)           and
      CP-16-CR-0000295-2021 (“CR-295-2021”))]. That conflict was
      acknowledged by the Clarion [County] District Attorney's Office,
      when those [three] cases, in addition to [two] other cases
      [(CP-16-CR-0000296-2021               (“CR-296-2021”)          and
      CP-16-CR-0000297-2021 (“CR-297-2021”))] were referred [] to
      the [Pennsylvania] Office of [] Attorney General.           District
      Attorney[ Welsh's] decision to continue prosecuting the three
      [remaining] cases [(CP-16-CR-0000297-2020 (“CR-297-2020”),
      CP-16-CR-0000298-2020               (“CR-298-2020”),           and
      CP-16-CR-0000299-2020 (“CR-299-2020”))] was erroneous, as
      the conflict was still ongoing. Further, of the three [] cases that
      District Attorney Welsh chose to continue prosecuting, two [] of
      these cases named [] a detective employed by the Clarion County
      District Attorney's Office, as the victim. District Attorney Welsh
      spoke to his concern over threats made to his office and its
      employees during [Appellant’s] sentence hearing. [Appellant]
      submits that District Attorney Welsh's decision to petition the
      [trial] court for consecutive sentences in [a] state [correctional
      institution] further supports an inference of prejudice resulting
      from the apparent conflict.

Id. at 15 (record citations, extraneous capitalization, and paragraph

formatting omitted).

      In denying Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea after

sentencing, the trial court stated,

      [Appellant] claims that the comments made by District Attorney
      Welsh at [Appellant’s] sentence[ing] hearing created a "conflict of
      interest." At no time prior to the filing of his post[-]sentence
      motion did [Appellant] object to the Clarion County District
      Attorney's [O]ffice handling the prosecution of [three of] his
      cases. [Appellant] was aware at all times leading up to his plea
      hearing and his sentence[ing] hearing that [three of] the cases
      were being prosecuted by District Attorney Welsh and that
      [District] Attorney Welsh would be present at all hearings. The
      comments made by District Attorney Welsh at the time of the
      sentence[ing] hearing did not go beyond typical comments made

                                      -6-
J-S42028-22

       by a prosecutor at a sentence[ing] hearing or those offered by a
       victim of a crime. Furthermore, there was no agreement that
       District Attorney Welsh would stand silent at the time of the
       sentenc[ing] hearing. The fact that District Attorney Welsh made
       comments at [Appellant’s] sentenc[ing] hearing does not provide
       grounds for a withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing as
       [District Attorney Welsh’s actions] in no way resulted in
       [Appellant] entering his plea unknowingly, unintelligently, or
       involuntarily.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/26/22, at 3-4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).4

       A review of the record demonstrates, and Appellant concedes, that

counsel from the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General served as the

prosecutor in CR-293-2021, CR-294-2021, CR-295-2021, CR-296-2021, and

CR-297-2021, while District Attorney Welsh remained the prosecutor in

CR-297-2020, CR-298-2020, and CR-299-2020. See 71 P.S. § 732-205(a)(3)

(stating, “The Attorney General shall have the power to prosecute in any

county criminal court the following cases[ . . . u]pon the request of a district

attorney . . . who represents that there is the potential for an actual or

apparent conflict of interest on the part of the district attorney or his[, or her,]

office”); see also Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 956 (Pa. Super.

2002) (stating, a conflict of interest exists when a district attorney has a direct

financial interest or a non-economic, personal interest in the outcome of the

prosecution), relying on Commonwealth v. Eskridge, 604 A.2d 700 (Pa.

1992) and Commonwealth v. Balenger, 704 A.2d 1385 (Pa. Super. 1997).

____________________________________________

4 For ease of reference, we assigned page numbers to the trial court’s
unpaginated Rule 1925(a) opinion.

                                           -7-
J-S42028-22

After Appellant pleaded guilty but mentally ill to eight criminal charges of

terroristic threats, District Attorney Welsh, in his capacity as prosecutor in the

three aforementioned cases, made the following statement at Appellant’s

sentencing hearing:

      Your Honor, . . . I will speak at this moment addressing the cases
      which I’m prosecuting, not the cases in which I may be a victim
      in any way.

      [Appellant], I think, I would imagine, presents a difficult situation
      for the [trial] court in trying to craft a sentence. Obviously, this
      is a guilty but mentally ill sentence in this situation. I know the
      law is clear [] that it should be the same sentence, but requires
      him to get certain mental health treatment aspects.

      I know from my experience in dealing with [Appellant,]
      prosecuting his cases, he does know the difference between right
      and wrong. It’s not a question that he can’t control his actions.

      But with the letters that he sent to various individuals – and you
      look at the [pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report], you can
      see numerous, numerous other counties and other individuals
      where letters [were] sent or threats [were] made [] in some sort
      of way.

      I know looking at the sentencing options and things I would
      recommend, that there are various factors you look at. We are
      looking at deterren[ce] and we’re looking at rehabilitation and
      we’re looking [at] all these different things.

      And I can understand that part of the thinking could be, well, a lot
      of time he was in state prison for a sentence when he sent these
      letters, so seemingly that’s not working.

      We have also had [Appellant] in the county jail, and we’ve had
      issues at the county jail with new criminal charges. And we’ve
      had him on probation where there’s been [probation] violations.

      So over and over again, it seems to be that nothing is working.
      At this point[,] my hope would be that the sentence under guilty
      but mentally ill does [require Appellant] to get treatment at some
      point, but I also think there is a compelling reason for there to be

                                      -8-
J-S42028-22

      a protection of the public here with the various amounts of threats
      that are at issue.

      So the sentences – I think there’s eight cases pending – I do not
      represent him [sic] in all of those [cases], but each of those cases
      all have the restorative sanctions to less than 12 months sentence
      [option]. I do think it would be appropriate under this guilty but
      mentally ill sentence to confine [Appellant] to additional time for
      state incarceration[. ]I don’t believe that probation is appropriate
      at this point – and that the sentences [should] run consecutively
      to each other.

N.T., 2/7/22, at 5-7 (extraneous capitalization omitted). After explaining that

the sentences for the three cases he was prosecuting warranted confinement

in a state correctional institution coupled with the opportunity to receive

mental health treatment, District Attorney Welsh spoke about the personal

impact of the terroristic threats in the three cases where he was the victim

but that were being prosecuted by the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General

as follows:

      I will just speak for a second in the cases in which I don’t represent
      the Commonwealth, but I will say, it’s easy to gloss
      over – [Appellant] has so many letters that he sent, a number of
      people that have been threatened, and it’s easy to say to kind of
      roll with it.

      But I will say when someone does threaten you with the specificity
      that [Appellant] threatened me with [in] letters, it is concerning.
      You have concerns for your safety [and] your family[’s safety.
      Appellant] made threats towards [the District Attorney’s Office]
      and questioned the office employees.

      So while I understand that [Appellant] does have mental health
      issues, I don’t think anything should diminish the seriousness of
      the effect it does have on people when they are threatened in a
      serious manner such as I have and such as many other people
      have.

                                      -9-
J-S42028-22

       So[,] I know the [trial] court has probably considered a lot of
       factors and I will defer to your discretion as far as the sentence.
       Thank you.

Id. at 7-8 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

       Counsel for the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General went on to make

the following statement regarding Appellant’s sentence:

       Very briefly, Your Honor, and I just incorporate a lot of [District
       Attorney] Welsh’s comments as far as sentencing goes. But as
       the [trial] court may be aware, following [Appellant’s] crimes
       across Western Pennsylvania has become sort of a full-time job
       for me. I have cases before this [trial] court. I also have cases
       with [Appellant] for the same type of behavior in Somerset
       County, Forest County, and there’s an investigation into one in
       Armstrong County. And they are – all the crimes are of [a] similar
       nature, this letter-writing campaign in which [Appellant] terrorizes
       people [while he is incarcerated]. And some of the victims in the
       cases are [trial] court employees and district attorneys and [trial
       court] judges and [magisterial district judges] and sheriffs, but
       there are also civilian victims in some of his other cases. Clearly,
       very clearly, a mental health component has to be a part of the
       [trial] court’s sentence. I would defer to the [trial] court’s
       discretion as it relates to the sentence that is imposed on
       [Appellant] today. Thank you.

Id. at 8-9 (extraneous capitalization and paragraph formatting omitted).5

       In fashioning Appellant’s sentence, the trial court was permitted to

consider any evidence it deemed relevant, including District Attorney Welsh’s

victim impact statement.         Commonwealth v. King, 182 A.3d 449, 455

(Pa. Super. 2018) (stating, the “purpose of victim impact statements is to

personalize the crime and to illustrate the human effects of it”). Moreover,
____________________________________________

5Appellant’s counsel also made a statement regarding Appellant’s sentence.
See N.T., 2/7/22, at 9-15.

                                          - 10 -
J-S42028-22

Appellant was aware, pursuant to the trial court scheduling order, which listed

the eight trial court docket numbers, that he was being sentenced on eight

criminal convictions at a single sentencing hearing and that District Attorney

Welsh would be present at the sentencing hearing because he represented the

Commonwealth in three of the criminal cases.           See Trial Court Order,

11/16/21.

       Upon review, we concur with the trial court, and the record supports,

that Appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice on the order of a manifest

injustice.6   Appellant was aware throughout the eight criminal proceedings

that District Attorney Welsh represented the Commonwealth in three of the

cases while counsel from the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General

represented the Commonwealth in the remaining five cases, including the

three cases in which District Attorney Welsh was a victim. After pleading guilty

but mentally ill in each criminal case, Appellant was aware that his sentencing

hearing would involve eight criminal cases at a single hearing and that District

Attorney Welsh would be at the sentencing hearing.           At the sentencing

____________________________________________

6 There was no support in the certified record demonstrating a conflict of
interest claim in the three cases that District Attorney Welsh prosecuted.
These three cases (CR-297-2020, CR-298-2020, and CR-299-2020) involved
a detective from the District Attorney’s Office and a probation officer. District
Attorney Welsh did not have an economic or financial interest in the
prosecution or a personal, familial interest in the three cases. See Lutes,
supra. District Attorney Welsh was not the victim in the three cases, and the
victims were not members of his family. Therefore, pursuant to appliable
caselaw and statutory authority, there was no conflict of interest in his
prosecution of these cases and, thus, no basis to claim a manifest injustice.

                                          - 11 -
J-S42028-22

hearing, District Attorney Welsh offered argument, as the prosecuting

attorney in three of the cases, supporting consecutive sentences in a state

correctional institution coupled with the opportunity for Appellant to receive

mental health treatment while incarcerated.        District Attorney Welsh also

offered a statement, distinct from his argument as prosecutor, as to the

impact Appellant’s threats had on District Attorney Welsh as the victim in three

of the cases. Although we can find no case on-point with this set of unique

circumstances, we concur with the trial court that District Attorney Welsh’s

argument as prosecutor and his victim impact statement “did not go beyond

typical comments made by a prosecutor at a sentenc[ing] hearing or those

offered by a victim of a crime.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/26/22, at 4. Therefore,

we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s

request to withdraw this guilty plea after sentencing.

      Appellant’s second issue raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects

of his sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by making

“no findings on the record explicitly specifying the reasons for either the

consecutive sentences” or “why [each individual sentence] justified [an]

aggravated range sentence[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 19.

      It is well-settled that “the right to appeal a discretionary aspect of
      sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d
      1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where an appellant
      challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, we should
      regard his appeal as a petition for allowance of appeal.
      Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. Super.
      2007). As we stated in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162
      (Pa. Super. 2010):

                                     - 12 -
J-S42028-22

         An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his
         sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying
         a four-part test:

         We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         appellant [] filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
         902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
         at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
         sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's
         brief has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4)
         whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
         appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
         Code, [see] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

      [Moury, 992 A.2d] at 170. We evaluate on a case-by-case basis
      whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about
      the appropriateness of sentence. Commonwealth v. Kenner,
      784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2019) (original

brackets omitted). If an appellant fails to raise a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of a sentence either by presenting a claim to the trial court at the time

of sentencing or in a post-sentence motion, then the appellant’s challenge is

considered waived.      Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371

(Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 75 A.3d 1281

(Pa. 2013).    A substantial question exists when the appellant presents a

colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either (1) inconsistent with

a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or (2) is “contrary to the

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth

v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 585 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 14 A.3d

825 (Pa. 2011).

      It is well-established that

                                     - 13 -
J-S42028-22

     the imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences
     lies within the sound discretion of the sentencing court.
     Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 878 A.2d 867, 873 (Pa. Super.
     2005)[,] citing Commonwealth v. Hoag, [] 665 A.2d 1212, 1214
     ([Pa. Super.] 1995)). Long standing precedent of this Court
     recognizes that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 affords the sentencing court
     discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to
     other sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences
     already imposed. Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 612
     (Pa. Super. 2005)[,] citing Commonwealth v. Graham, [] 661
     A.2d 1367, 1373 ([Pa.] 1995)). A challenge to the imposition of
     consecutive rather than concurrent sentences does not present a
     substantial question regarding the discretionary aspects of
     sentence. Lloyd, 878 A.2d at 873. We see no reason why a
     defendant should be afforded a “volume discount” for his crimes
     by having all sentences run concurrently.

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quotation

marks and original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa.

2015). “While a bald claim of excessiveness does not present a substantial

question for review, a claim that the sentence is manifestly excessive,

inflicting too severe a punishment, does present a substantial question.”

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 227 (Pa. Super. 2016), citing

Commonwealth v. Haynes, 125 A.3d 800, 807-808 (Pa. Super. 2015),

appeal denied, 167 A.3d 1287 (Pa. 2017). This Court has recognized that,

     a sentence can be so manifestly excessive in extreme
     circumstances that it may create a substantial question. When
     determining whether a substantial question has been raised, we
     have focused upon whether the decision to sentence consecutively
     raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face to
     be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct in this case.

Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 133-134 (citations omitted). An assertion of an excessive

sentence coupled with allegations that the trial court failed to consider

                                    - 14 -
J-S42028-22

mitigating factors and failed to state sufficient reasons on the record for

consecutive sentences raises a substantial question.       Commonwealth v.

Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      Here, the record reflects that Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal,

properly preserved challenges to the discretionary aspects of his sentence in

his post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief.

Appellant’s Brief at 11-12. As such, Appellant complied with the technical

requirements to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Hill, 210

A.3d at 1116. Therefore, we review Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to see

if he presents a substantial question.

      In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant argues that the trial court

provided an insufficient basis on the record for sentencing Appellant in the

aggravated sentencing range when it sentenced Appellant to one to two years’

incarceration at each of the eight criminal dockets. Appellant’s Brief at 11.

Appellant contends that his eight individual sentences of one to two years’

incarceration, five of which were set to run consecutively for an aggregate

sentence of five to ten years’ incarceration, were excessive considering the

significant role Appellant’s mental health contributed to his actions. Id. at 12.

In so arguing, we find that Appellant raises a substantial question regarding

the trial court’s alleged failure to consider his mental health needs prior to

imposing consecutive sentences and the alleged failure to state sufficient

reasons on the record for sentencing Appellant in the aggravated sentencing

range. Brown, 249 A.3d at 1211. Therefore, we will address Appellant’s

                                     - 15 -
J-S42028-22

claim challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence based on the trial

court’s alleged failure to consider the impact of his mental health needs and

to state sufficient reasons on the record for imposing consecutive sentences

in the aggravated sentencing range.

       Appellant asserts that the trial court “made no findings on the record

explicitly specifying the reasons for either the consecutive sentences on five

[] of the [trial court] dockets or why [each individual sentence] justified [an]

aggravated range sentence[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant submits that

“his mental health diagnosis played an extensive role in contributing to his

criminal conduct” but that the trial court failed to consider his mental health

needs “when crafting an appropriate sentence.” Id.

       It is well-established that “[w]hen imposing a sentence, a [trial] court

must    consider   the   factors   set     forth   in   42   Pa.C.S.A.   § 9721(b).”

Commonwealth v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 383 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal

denied, 963 A.2d 467 (Pa. 2008). Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code,

in pertinent part, states,

       the [trial] court shall follow the general principle that the sentence
       imposed should call for total confinement that is consistent with
       [S]ection 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection
       of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
       on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
       rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The [trial] court shall also
       consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted
       by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect
       under [S]ection 2155 (relating to publication of guidelines for
       sentencing, resentencing and parole, risk assessment instrument
       and recommitment ranges following revocation).

                                         - 16 -
J-S42028-22

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (footnote omitted). “The [trial] court is not required

to parrot the words of the Sentencing Code, stating every factor that must be

considered under Section 9721(b).      However, the record as a whole must

reflect due consideration by the [trial] court of the statutory considerations.”

Feucht, 955 A.2d at 383 (citations omitted).

      Additionally,

      [i]n imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider the
      particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
      defendant. The trial court should refer to the defendant's prior
      criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for
      rehabilitation. However, where the [trial court] had the benefit of
      a [PSI] report, it will be presumed that [the trial court] was aware
      of the relevant information regarding the defendant's character
      and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory
      factors. Additionally, the [trial] court must state its reasons for
      the sentence on the record. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The
      sentencing judge can satisfy the requirement that reasons for
      imposing sentence be placed on the record by indicating that he
      or she has been informed by the [PSI] report; thus properly
      considering and weighing all relevant factors.

Commonwealth v. Conklin, 275 A.3d 1087, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2022) (case

citation omitted), appeal denied, 285 A.3d 883 (Pa. 2022).

      Appellate review of a trial court’s sentencing determination is governed

by Section 9781(c) of the Sentencing Code.

      Section 9781(c) specifically defines three instances in which the
      appellate courts should vacate a sentence and remand: (1) the
      [trial] court applied the guidelines erroneously; (2) the sentence
      falls within the guidelines, but is “clearly unreasonable” based on
      the circumstances of the case; and (3) the sentence falls outside
      of the guidelines and is “unreasonable.”

                                     - 17 -
J-S42028-22

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2009), citing

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c).

     At the sentencing hearing, prior to imposing the aforementioned

sentence on Appellant, the trial court stated the following reasons for its

sentence:

     I [(trial court)] have reviewed the facts and circumstances of all
     of your cases. I’ve also reviewed your [PSI] report, and I’ve also
     reviewed the [psychological] assessment[.] I have taken into
     consideration that your plea in this case is to eight counts of
     terroristic threats and is an open plea. The guidelines for your
     offenses provide for a sentence anywhere in the range of
     probation, standard guidelines, to less than one year with an
     aggravated range of less than 15 months.

     I think obviously what stands out to me is that you have continued
     to engage in a course of conduct where you have threatened
     several members of the justice system in Clarion County, a
     [magisterial district] judge, our district attorney, correction
     officers, probation – people affiliated with the probation
     department. And not only did you do it once, but you did it eight
     times. And also, your threats were of a very specific nature,
     indicating the actions that you wanted to carry out to harm these
     people – that’s very concerning – and the specifics that you went
     to as to how you intended to harm these people. It’s certainly
     concerning for those individuals. It’s scary for them to receive
     information, knowing someone is having these thoughts about
     them.

     Obviously, I have taken into consideration that information
     that’s been provided to me that you are suffering from
     mental illness. From the information that’s been provided, it
     doesn’t look like you’ve received any treatment to help you deal
     with that. So, I do think based on the information that has been
     provided to me, that you are in need of treatment that can be
     provided by a mental health facility. So[,] I am willing to accept
     your plea of guilty but mentally ill, because I do think your
     mental health has played a significant role in the crimes
     you have committed. Apparently not only here, but throughout
     the Commonwealth.

                                   - 18 -
J-S42028-22

      Having said that, I think you understand, as [District] Attorney
      Welsh pointed out, right from wrong, and I think that you know
      what you did was wrong. The concern to me, and its something I
      have taken into consideration to determine what your appropriate
      sentence is, is whether [] you have the propensity or desire to
      actually carry out any of these threats that you’ve made. That’s
      certainly concerning. I don’t know if they are empty threats or if
      they’re something you would intend to do if you were released
      from incarceration and had the ability to carry these things out.
      So[,] I have certainly taken that into consideration, protection to
      the public, in addition with your need for rehabilitative services.

      So having said that, I want your sentence to reflect the
      seriousness of the threats that you have made. I want it to be
      extensive enough that you have sufficient time under the
      authority of the Department of Corrections to receive whatever
      mental health services you need to make sure that you get your
      mental health under control, and that if you do have any thoughts
      or continued thoughts about causing harm to any of these
      individuals, that that is substantially addressed by mental health
      providers to make sure that when you are released from
      incarceration and when you are released from a treatment facility,
      that you have been able to significantly address your mental
      health needs and that you will not carry out these threats against
      these individuals. And I want the individuals threatened to be able
      to feel safe in knowing that you received that treatment and have
      been incarcerated long enough that you have been able to address
      these issues that you are having. Because certainly, their state
      of mind when you are released at some point in the future is to
      be important, as well.

N.T., 2/7/22, at 15-18 (extraneous capitalization omitted, paragraph

formatting modified, emphasis added).

      The record indicates that, prior to sentencing Appellant, the trial court

was in receipt of, and considered, Appellant’s PSI report, as well as the

psychological assessment detailing Appellant’s mental health needs. The trial

court acknowledged the seriousness of Appellant’s terroristic threats, noting

the specificity contained within the threats, and the need to protect the public

                                     - 19 -
J-S42028-22

from Appellant carrying out those threats.     The trial court also considered

Appellant’s history of making these types of terroristic threats against persons

involved in the judicial system.   The trial court further acknowledged that

Appellant needed mental health treatment in order to rehabilitate himself and

to prevent him from carrying out his threats. Finally, the trial court noted the

standard sentencing guidelines of restorative sanctions to less than 12

months’ incarceration and the aggravated sentencing range of restorative

sanctions to less than 15 months’ incarceration.     In fashioning Appellant’s

individual sentences in the aggravated sentencing range, and running five of

those sentences consecutively, the trial court explained the need to provide

Appellant sufficient time to obtain treatment for his mental health needs in

order to rehabilitate Appellant and provide protection to the public.

      Upon consideration of the record, as a whole, and based upon the trial

court’s consideration of the PSI report and psychological assessment, we

discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in Appellant’s sentence. As such,

Appellant’s claim challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence is

without merit.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

                                     - 20 -
J-S42028-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/17/2023

                          - 21 -