Court Opinion

ID: 9675275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:47:46.030297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:33.070940
License: Public Domain

McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting).
After a further consideration of this case, I am convinced that the trial judge was correct in granting plaintiff a specific performance of the lease option contract dated January 2, 1951. In that agreement plaintiff was given the option of purchasing the leased property “at any time during the period commencing August 1, 1953 and ending August 1, 1958 providing this property is under the present lease agreement at the time this option is exercised.” Although the essential price of $55,000 cash was not contained in the option, it was later supplied by Schiro in his letter to plaintiff *929of November 27, 19511 and reaffirmed by his letter of June 11, 1952, in which he offered plaintiff another option and then stated:
“If the above option and sale is not consummated prior to this 90 day period this agreement shall become null and void and the terms and conditions shall revert back to the agreement of the original lease signed January 2, 1951 between ourselves, giving you the understanding that the sale price although not stipulated in the lease shall be for $55,000.” (Italics mine).
Clearly, the new option tendered in this letter being conditioned upon plaintiff’s failure to exercise it within the time required, the offer by its very terms became null and void, the original option remaining in full force and effect.
The majority opinion seems to be predicated on the construction given by plaintiff’s attorney to this option offer of Schiro of June 11, 1952, it being deduced that, since plaintiff tendered a 10% deposit in an abortive attempt to exercise the additional option for immediate purchase (tendered in the letter) after it had expired, the contract should be interpreted, in view of Article 1956 of the Civil Code, as one providing for the giving of earnest money.
But this Article has no application to the case, in my opinion, for, according to its provisions, it may be employed as a rule of interpretation only “When the intent of the parties is doubtful,”.
Since the language of the agreement contained in the letter of June 11, 1952 is plain, the applicable codal provision is Article 1945, that legal agreements have the effect of law upon the parties and that “ * * * none but the parties can abrogate or modify them.” In the third paragraph of this Article is provided the rule of construction governing this case, viz., “That the intent is to be determined by the words of the contract, when these are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences;”.
Furthermore, I am convinced that the earnest money provisions of the Civil Code are inapplicable to options for the reasons stated by TATE, J., in his dissenting opinion this day filed.