Court Opinion

ID: 9466153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:07:03.537335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:34.753492
License: Public Domain

HUG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The question presented by this appeal is whether it was necessary for the Government to prove that Maloney intended to deprive Mrs. McCray of her property permanently in order to convict him of larceny under 28 U.S.C. § 1153.
It is clear that the “intent to deprive permanently” is a requisite element of the common law crime of larceny. See Loman v. United States, 243 F.2d 327, 329 (8th Cir. 1957); 50 Am.Jur.2d, Larceny, § 2; 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 1(1). It is also clear that the crime with which Maloney is charged is “larceny” under § 1153. There is no jurisdiction to charge Maloney with violating § 661 as a substantive crime, for § 661 enters the picture only as a definitional statute. Thus, only if § 661 can be held to define “larceny” does it become applicable.
The majority holds, however, that one of the requisite elements of the common law crime of larceny — the intent to deprive permanently — has been eliminated by a redefinition of the crime of larceny in § 661. Yet, § 661 does not purport to define larceny. It never mentions the term.
Section 661 simply specifies certain conduct to be criminal, without reference to whether the statute is redefining the crime of larceny, or defining a new, more encompassing theft crime, including within its ambit conduct that would not have constituted common law larceny.
When Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act in 1885, the common law offense of larceny was listed as one of the offenses which, when committed by one Indian against another Indian in Indian Country, could be prosecuted in the federal courts. Where a federal statute uses a common law term of established meaning, without otherwise defining it, the term is given its common law meaning. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411, 77 S.Ct. 397, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1956). See also Morissette v. United *232States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), quoted by the majority in n.ll. The Supreme Court early acknowledged that the offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act were common law offenses. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 377-78, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886).
As the majority acknowledges, there is substantial authority that would lead to the conclusion that § 661 only defines common law larceny and thus that the “intent to deprive permanently” is, in fact, a requisite element of the crime defined by § 661. Several cases interpret the key phrase “takes and carries away, with [the] intent to steal or purloin” to be a codification of the common law crime of larceny. LeMasters v. United States, 378 F.2d 262, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1961); United States v. Posner, 408 F.Supp. 1145 (D.C.Md.1976).
In fact, the legislative history of § 661 and Senate debates, cited by the majority, lend credence to that argument. Were this the interpretation of § 661,1 would have no difficulty in finding that “larceny”, as used in § 1153, is defined and punished by § 661. If § 661 does simply codify common law larceny, this would also account for those cases cited by the majority which state that § 661 defines the crime of larceny in § 1153.
Most of the cases cited by the majority as supporting the position that § 661 defines the crime of larceny in § 1153 are cases where the court merely makes a casual reference to, or an enumeration of, those crimes in § 1153 which are defined by federal law. This is sound if § 661 is, in fact, interpreted as a codification of common law larceny. In those cases, the court was not faced with the question of whether § 661 can be held to define larceny for purposes of § 1153 when § 661 is given an expanded interpretation. In nearly all of these cases, there is no indication that the court is interpreting § 661 as other than common law larceny. The majority cites a separate line of cases which the Opinion states hold that § 661 defines larceny for purposes of § 1153. I respectfully disagree and submit that only one district court case does so.1
Given the strict construction required of criminal statutes, it is difficult to see how the majority can take one leap over two steps to find that § 661 defines § 1153 larceny and, in the same breath, find that § 661 has provided for a broader theft crime. The missing step is that nowhere in § 661 does the statute state that the broader theft crime is larceny.
The majority finds support for its interpretation of § 661 in the placement of that section in Chapter 31 of Title 18 under the heading of “Embezzlement and Theft”. The majority finds that “[t]he implication *233from the titles and the placement of § 661 in Chapter 31 of Title 18 is that the statute was not enacted with the definitional refinements of the particular crime of larceny in mind, but rather with an intent to broaden the offense.” This highlights my point. If, in fact, Congress sought, by § 661, to define an expanded crime of “theft”, we may not then turn to that section to define the offense of “larceny” under § 1153.
It must be emphasized that § 1153 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 3242, provide limited jurisdiction in the federal courts to prosecute an Indian for a crime against another Indian in Indian Country. As the majority notes, the very reason for the passage of the Major Crimes Act in 1885 was a reaction to Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), which had held that there was no jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear such offenses. The Major Crimes Act of 1885 provided jurisdiction for a limited group of crimes enumerated therein. Other crimes were left to the Indian tribes.
Originally, the Act enumerated only seven crimes (murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary and larceny). This has been since expanded to the fourteen currently included in § 1153. Over the years, the following specific offenses were added: assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, incest, robbery, carnal knowledge, assault with intent to commit rape and kidnaping. Had it been the intent of Congress to make all of the substantive crimes applicable in federal enclaves also applicable to Indian Country, it could have done so easily, by amending 18 U.S.C. § 1152 to eliminate the second paragraph. The section provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
Congress did not elect to do so. Instead, federal jurisdiction for offenses committed by one Indian against another Indian in Indian Country continued to be restricted to those crimes enumerated in § 1153. Other crimes were added to the list only when Congress deemed it to be appropriate.
With this history of restricted federal jurisdiction as to offenses committed by one Indian against another Indian in Indian Country, I cannot concur in the majority’s opinion that § 661 both expands the offense to a broader theft crime and yet defines larceny for purposes of § 1153.
There is no doubt that Congress can redefine the crime of larceny as it chooses. Had § 661 stated that the crime described therein was larceny, then § 661 would certainly be applied to define and punish the crime of larceny under § 1153. I agree with the majority that the common law meaning of the crimes enumerated in § 1153 are not fixed, but may be redefined by Congress in other federal enclave laws. The point, however, is that Congress has not done so with respect to larceny.
If, as the majority holds, § 661 is to be interpreted as a different crime, which departs from common law larceny, then I do not see how we can find that § 661 defines and punishes “larceny” under § 1153, absent some expression of Congress that this new crime is “larceny” under federal law.
There are in my opinion three choices available to us in strictly construing this criminal law of larceny under § 1153, all of which require that the jury should have been instructed that the accused must have had “the intent to deprive permanently” in order to be convicted of larceny.
1. We could hold that § 661 is the codification of common law larceny, as the legis*234lative history suggests and several cases hold;
2. We could find that § 661 does not define and punish larceny and thus look to the applicable state law, being that of Arizona. Under the state law, the intent to deprive permanently is requisite; 2 or
3. We could hold that § 661 defines and punishes common law larceny as well as other conduct, in which “the intent to deprive permanently” is not requisite, but that for the purposes of § 1153 only, the common law larceny aspect of that crime may be punished.
Any of the three alternatives requires reversal.
Lest it be thought that the failure to give the requested instruction was simply harmless error, I note that the central issue of the trial was Maloney’s intent. It was admitted that Maloney left Mrs. McCray’s house with the money. The question was his intent in doing so. The trial took only one and one-half days, and the jury deliberated over eight hours in reaching the verdict. During its deliberations, the jury requested the rereading of the instruction defining “intent” and “steal and purloin.” There was evidence which could well have raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether Maloney intended to permanently deprive Mrs. McCray of her property. There was error; it was not harmless; and I would reverse.

. Of the line of cases cited by the majority as specifically holding that § 661 defines larceny for purposes of § 1153, the only case which actually does so is the district court case from the Western District of South Dakota, United States v. Gilbert, 378 F.Supp. 82 (W.D.S.D.1974). The remainder of the cases do not.
In Quinn v. United States, 499 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1974), which does involve an Indian in Indian Country, the issue was solely whether failure to give an instruction on a lesser included offense was cognizable in a postconviction proceeding. The statements that larceny in § 1153 is defined by § 661 are clearly dicta. England v. United States, 174 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1949) does not involve an Indian, but involves simply a charge under § 661 of a non-Indian on a federal military base and the opinion includes a reference that larceny within § 661 may be of any personal property of another, whether of the United States or anyone else. The case has no bearing upon whether § 661 defines larceny under § 1153, since it does not involve an Indian or Indian Country. It also has no bearing upon whether § 661 requires an intent to deprive permanently, since that was not an issue in the case. In Dunaway v. United States, 170 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1948), likewise, neither an Indian nor Indian Country is involved. The case involves acts committed on lands within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. The pertinent holding was simply that a charge of stealing and carrying away money was a charge within 18 U.S.C. § 466 (the predecessor to § 661). Again, the case has no bearing upon whether § 661 defines larceny under § 1153, since it does not involve an Indian or Indian Country, and it has no bearing upon the question of whether § 661 required an intent to deprive permanently, since it was not an issue in the case.

. Under Arizona law the crime of larceny requires proof of an intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently. State v. Wood, 7 Ariz.App. 22, 435 P.2d 857, 859 (1968); State v. Marsin, 82 Ariz. 1, 307 P.2d 607, 608 (1957); Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 181 P.2d 822, 823 (1947).