Court Opinion

ID: 9956924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:07:49.850004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:59.500483
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3552-21

FAITH HAINES,

          Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,

     Respondent.
__________________________

                   Submitted February 28, 2024 – Decided April 3, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier and Susswein.

                   On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
                   Corrections.

                   Faith Haines, appellant pro se.

                   Mathew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (Sara M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney
                   General, of counsel; Leah E. Traub, Deputy Attorney
                   General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Petitioner, Faith Haines, appeals from a final agency decision by the

Department of Corrections (DOC) affirming the disciplinary hearing finding she

committed sexual harassment against another inmate at Edna Mahan

Correctional Facility. Haines argues she was denied her due process right to

cross-examination and confrontation. She also contends the sexual harassment

regulation, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(iv), is unconstitutionally vague and

overbroad as applied in this case. After carefully reviewing the record in light

of the governing legal principles, we affirm.

                                       I.

      We discern the following pertinent facts and procedural history from the

record. Haines and Taralyn Buckner are inmates at Edna Mahan Corrections

Facility. On March 26, 2022, Buckner filed a grievance stating:

            Hi [I]'m writing because [I] have a[n] issu[]e with
            inmate FAITH HAINES. [I] have been relocated to
            cottage because of the move and . . . inmate FAITH
            HAINES is starting a lot of pro[blem]s down here with
            me and other inmates . . . me and the other inmates like
            it here and we be talking and FAITH HAINES be
            coming and starting with us is there any way she can be
            moved somewhere else [I] already talked to lots of
            officers and [sergeants] and [lieutenants] about her[]
            thank you so much[.]

      The record consists of several letters Haines sent Buckner. A letter dated

March 21, 2022 states "we can kiss passionately. . . . " and "[d]o you ever think

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about the days we kissed, days where I touched and sucked your private areas. .

. ." A March 22, 2022 letter states, "[y]ou could always shut me up by putting

me up against the wall or pushing me on the bed getting on top of me reminding

me whose woman I am."

      In another March 22, 2022 letter, Haines asked Buckner, "how am I a

threat to you?" This letter also stated,

            we need time by ourselves without nosy people around
            so we can flirt and talk about relationship related things
            since you don't want your friends/sister to know about
            us. Also let them both know that I don't bother you and
            that you're ok around me that they don't need to
            bodyguard you.

      In a different letter from that date, Haines stated "I really. . . truly love

you plus want a future with you. Apparently it seems you don't want a future

with me. We need to talk a[n]d you need to get . . . them to back off of me."

      Buckner filed additional grievances on April 7, 2022, April 11, 2022,

April 14, 2022, April 15, 2022, and June 6, 2022. The June 6, 2022 grievance

states:

            [H]I on 6-6-22 . . . at approximately 1:15 p.m. [F]aith
            [H]aines was walking out of north hall while [I] was
            sitting on the benches.            [S]he called me a
            "dumbB***H" and kept trying to put her hands on me.
            I tried to resist her but she was extremely p[er]sist[e]nt.
            She sat down next to me and began saying that she was
            telling people that she and I were girlfriends she

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            continued to harass me further with, physical
            interactions. [S]he began touching my face, then my
            shoulders. [S]he was hugging me. [S]he kissed me
            three times and [I] was trying desperately to get her to
            stop. [S]he finally stopped after [officer] [V]ega came
            out around 2:00 p.m. and forced her to leave. I believe
            it was all caught on camera. [I] have rep[e]atedly told
            custody that she has and you guys how she is
            harass[ing] me in this matter. [M]ay [I] please get a
            keep separate issued so she leaves me alone [I']m very
            pissed off right now thank you.

      On June 3, 2022 Investigator R. Cora filed a disciplinary report against

Haines charging her with violating prohibited act .057 (sexual harassment). 1 A

disciplinary hearing was held June 7, 2022. Haines requested and received a

counsel substitute. According to the "adjudication of disciplinary charge" form,

Haines was "offered" the ability to confront/cross-examine adverse witnesses

but "declined."    Haines's counsel substitute signed the "adjudication of

disciplinary charge" form.

      Haines pled not guilty, contending she and Buckner were in a romantic

relationship from February 27, 2022 until June 6, 2022. The evidence presented

at the hearing consisted of reports from Cora, emails, letters, and witness

1
  Prohibited act .057 provides, "[s]exual harassment involves repeated and/or
unwelcomed sexual advances, request for sexual favors, or verbal comments,
gestures, or actions of a derogatory or offensive sexual nature." N.J.A.C.
10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(iv).
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statements, Buckner's messages and statements, and Haines's mental health

records.

      Two inmates gave verbal statements at Haines's request. One inmate

stated she knew Haines and Bucker were in a relationship at one point and saw

them pass each other letters and food. However, she believed the relationship

ended, adding "inmate Haines can be a bit much and overbearing in trying to

repair the relationship that [inmate] Buckner no longer wishes to be in." The

other inmate stated Haines and Buckner were together at one point, but did not

know whether they were still in a relationship.

      The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) determined the evidence

supported a determination of guilt, finding Haines "has been sexually harassing

[Buckner] via written communications." The DHO imposed a fifteen-day loss

of phone, commissary, email, and media download privileges. The hearing

officer noted Haines previously received a disciplinary charge in February 2022.

      Haines appealed, arguing she and Buckner were in a "convivial

relationship," that infraction .057 is unconstitutionally vague, and the DHO

denied Haines the opportunity to confront/cross-examine witnesses. The DOC

upheld the decision of the DHO and concluded the sanctions were proportionate

to the offense.

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      This appeal follows. Haines raises the following contentions for our

consideration:

            POINT I
            THE FINDING OF GUILTY SHOULD BE SET
            ASIDE BECAUSE INMATE HAINES WAS DENIED
            HER DUE PROCESS RIGHT OF FACE-TO-FACE
            CROSS-EXAMINATION AND CONFRONTATION.

                  A. DUE PROCESS WAS DENIED BECAUSE
                  THE DHO DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY THE
                  REQUEST      TO     CROSS-EXAMINE
                  WITNESSES INV[ESTIGATOR] CORA AND
                  INMATE BUCKNER WAS DENIED.

                  B. THE FAILURE OF THE DHO TO ALLOW
                  FACE-TO-FACE      VERBAL     CROSS-
                  EXAMINATION VIOLATED DUE PROCESS
                  REQUIREMENTS.

            POINT II
            THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT DISCIPLINARY
            INFRACTION AT N.J.A.C. 1OA:4-4.1(a)[(3)(iv)]AS
            APPLIED     IN      THIS       CASE          IS
            UNCONSTITUTIONALLY        VAGUE           AND
            OVERBROAD AND VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
            CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH.

      Haines raises the following contentions in her reply brief:

            POINT I

            RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANT
            WAS             NEVER        OFFERED
            CONFRONTATION/CROSS-EXAMINATION   AT
            THE HEARING IS INCORRECT.

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            POINT II
            POINT TWO: APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT
            N.J.A.C.10[A]:4-4.1(a)[(3)(iv)]     IS
            UNCONSTITUTUIONALLY VAGUE IS VALID.

                                       II.

      The scope of our review is narrow. As a general matter, we will disturb

an agency's adjudicatory decision only upon a finding that the decision is

"arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable," or is unsupported "by substantial

credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81

N.J. 571, 579-80, (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 39 N.J. 556,

562 (1963)).

      Our deference to the adjudicatory decisions made by the DOC is

especially appropriate in view of that agency's important mission to safeguard

prison safety and security. See Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 461 N.J. Super.

231, 238-39 (App. Div. 2019) (cautioning that a reviewing court should "not

substitute its own judgment for the agency's. . . .").       In Blanchard, we

emphasized that "[p]risons are dangerous places, and the courts must afford

appropriate deference and flexibility to administrators trying to manage this

volatile environment." Id. at 238 (quoting Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J.

Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 1999)).

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                                        III.

      We first address Haines's argument her due process rights were violated

because she was denied the right to confrontation and cross-examination. Prison

disciplinary hearings are "not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full

panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply." Avant

v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

480 (1972)). Prisoners are nonetheless entitled to certain procedural protections

before being subjected to disciplinary sanctions. Blanchard, 461 N.J. Super. at

240-41.

      N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.14(a) provides:

            The      opportunity      for     confrontation     and
            cross-examination of the accuser(s) and/or the State's
            witness(es), if requested, shall be provided to the
            inmate or counsel substitute in such instances where the
            [DHO] or Adjustment Committee deems it necessary
            for an adequate presentation of the evidence,
            particularly when serious issues of credibility are
            involved.

      "[U]nder   the   New     Jersey    Constitution,   cross-examination     and

confrontation must be available to the inmate when 'necessary for an adequate

presentation of the evidence, particularly when serious issues of credibility are

involved.'" McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 198 (1995) (quoting Avant, 67

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N.J. at 530). "That State regulation provides more protection than the federal

constitution." Id. at 197.

      Haines argues her due process rights were violated because the DHO

failed to explain why her request to confront and cross examine two witnesses—

Cora and inmate Buckner—were denied. In support of her contention, Haines

provides in her appendix a list of questions intended for Cora and Buckner on

cross-examination.

      However, as we have noted, the record indicates Haines declined her right

to cross-examination.        Specifically, the adjudication document includes a

section that states, "[l]ist of adverse witnesses the inmate requests to

confront/cross-examine including those requested through the investigator."

After the "[n]ame of adverse witness" line it states in handwritten ink "offered."

The line below that, titled "[r]eason" states "declined."

      On the next page, the adjudication document states "[i]nmate or counsel

substitute acknowledges that the information in lines [one through fifteen]

accurately reflects what took place at the inmate disciplinary hearing." Haines's

counsel substitute signed this section.

      Haines argues in her brief "[i]t is the practice of this DHO to have the

charged inmate (or their counsel substitute) sign [l]ine [sixteen] at the outset of

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the hearing. . . ." Haines contends, "[t]his questionable practice results in the

charged inmate then being vulnerable to any inaccuracies which this DHO might

insert into the written adjudication report."     She argues the DHO inserted

inaccurate information about Haines being offered and declining cross-

examination. However, Haines has not provided a certification that the DHO

included incorrect information on the form by stating confrontation/cross -

examination was offered and declined or that the DHO had the counsel substitute

sign the form prior to the form being completed.          On this record, we are

unpersuaded that Haines's right of cross-examination was violated.

                                        IV.

      We next address Haines's contention the sexual harassment disciplinary

infraction, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(iv), is overbroad as applied in this case,

violating her constitutional right to free speech. The New Jersey Constitution's

free speech clause reads, "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish

his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No

law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."

N.J. Const. art I, ⁋ 6. "Because New Jersey courts 'ordinarily interpret our State

Constitution's free speech clause to be no more restrictive than the federal free

speech clause, . . . "[w]e rely on federal constitutional principles in interpreting

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the free speech clause of the New Jersey Constitution."'" Pryor v. Dep't of Corr.,

395 N.J. Super. 471, 489 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Hamilton Amusement Ctr.

v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 264 (1998)).

      In Turner v. Safley, the United States Supreme Court explained, "when a

prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is

valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 482 U.S. 78,

89 (1987). The Court identified four factors to "determin[e] the reasonableness

of the regulation at issue": (1) "there must be a 'valid, rational connection'

between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put

forward to justify it," (2) "whether there are alternative means of exercising the

right that remain open to prison inmates[,]" (3) "the impact accommodation of

the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on

the allocation of prison resources generally[,]" and (4) "the absence of ready

alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation." Id. at 89-

90. See In re Rules Adoption Regarding Inmate Mail to Att'ys, 120 N.J. 137,

147 (1990) ("[T]he DOC regulations affecting incoming mail should be analyzed

under Turner's reasonableness standard.").

      Here, as for factor one, the prohibition set forth in N.J.A.C.

10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(iv) decreases the likelihood of sexual harassment, which leads

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                                        11
to protection of inmates and reduces the likelihood of retaliation. As for factor

two, consensual, non-harassing, sexual speech between inmates is allowed. As

for factor three, sexual harassment against inmates and guards would be

reduced, leading to increased safety. As for factor four, alternatives are limited.

Prohibiting sexual harassment is far less burdensome than keeping inmates

completely separate or prohibiting interactions more broadly.

      Finally, with respect to Haines's overbreadth challenge, she relies on

Grayned v. City of Rockford for the proposition "[a] clear and precise enactment

may nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally

protected conduct." 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). Haines argues, "[p]rotected

conduct includes the right to send and receive correspondence to and from

another with whom one has a relationship." But here, Haines was charged with

sending unwelcomed, sexually explicit letters, as we explain in Section V.

      In sum, we conclude N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(iv) is related to legitimate

penological interests and does not violate Haines's free speech rights.

                                        V.

      We likewise reject Haines's contention the regulation is unconstitutionally

vague as applied in this case. "A statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied

if it 'does not with sufficient clarity prohibit the conduct against which it [is]

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                                       12
sought to be enforced.'" Jenkins v. N.J. Dept. of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 256

(App. Div. 2010) (quoting State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 593 (1985)). The

doctrine's purpose is to give "'fair warning' of prohibited conduct." Id. at 257

(quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)). "Because the party

claiming that a law is vague as applied may only challenge the law as applied to

his or her own conduct . . . it is only necessary to give the party 'fair warning'

that his or her conduct is prohibited." Ibid. Such warning is sufficient when "'a

person of ordinary intelligence may reasonably determine what conduct is

prohibited so that he or she may act in conformity with the law.'" Ibid. (quoting

State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509, 520-21 (App. Div. 1997)).

      Applying those principles, the challenged regulation is not vague as

applied to Haines's interactions with Buckner. As noted, the regulation prohibits

"repeated and/or unwelcomed sexual advances, request for sexual favors, or

verbal comments, gestures, or actions of a derogatory or offensive sexual

nature." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(iv). The letters introduced at the disciplinary

hearing contained unwelcomed sexual language.          The evidence establishes

Haines knew the conduct was unwanted, as shown in Haines' letter asking

Buckner how she considered her a "threat" and another letter in which Haines

stated Buckner did not need others to "bodyguard" her.

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     In sum, the record shows Haines was afforded the full panoply of rights

required by Avant, including the assistance of a counsel substitute for the

hearing, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12(a). Substantial evidence supports the finding

Haines committed prohibited act .057. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a).

     Affirmed.

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