Court Opinion

ID: 9668518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:17:12.746225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:45.841819
License: Public Domain

FONES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I would adopt what my research convinces me is the better and perhaps the majority rule, to wit: that where the proof of the other crime is clear and convincing and tends to show a common scheme or plan of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, or to show absence of mistake or accident, such evidence is admissible, but defendant must be allowed to prove that he was tried and acquitted of that alleged offense.
Among our sister states respectable authority can be found supporting the two views, the first allowing the admission of both the prior crime and the acquittal, and the second view adopted by the majority that excludes for any purpose evidence of a prior crime if defendant has been acquitted of that crime.
In 86 A.L.R.2d 1132, the annotator summarized the status of the various views on this issue as follows:
“The numerical weight of authority has adopted the rule that the acquittal of a defendant of another offense does not render proof of that offense inadmissible at a later criminal trial where such proof is otherwise competent. Most courts following that rule hold that where proof of another offense has been admitted, the defendant is entitled to prove his acquittal. But strangely enough, there is also authority to the contrary.
On the other hand, a few authorities take the view that, as a general proposition, evidence as to another offense of which the defendant was acquitted is not admissible. This view rests primarily on the persuasive ground that defendant’s acquittal of an offense should relieve him from having to answer again, at the price of conviction for that offense or another, *414evidence which amount to a charge of a crime of which he has been acquitted.” 86 A.L.R.2d at 1135-36.
In People v. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 459, 58 Cal.Rptr. 107, 426 P.2d 507 (1967) the Court addressed the issue under consideration here as follows:
“Regardless of its probative value, evidence of other crimes always involves the risk of serious prejudice, and it is therefore always ‘to be received with extreme caution.’ [citations omitted] Indeed, for this very reason some courts have concluded that an acquittal so attenuates the weight that may properly be given evidence of another crime as to require the exclusion of such evidence altogether, [citations omitted] Our rule does not go that far, but instead is fair to both the prosecution and the defense by assisting the jury in its assessment of the significance of the evidence of another crime with the knowledge that at another time and place a duly constituted tribunal charged with the very issue of determining defendant’s guilt or innocence of the other crime concluded that he was not guilty.” 58 Cal.Rptr. at 111, 426 P.2d at 511.
Other cases supporting the admission of the prior crime and acquittal are, e. g. Ex parte Bayne, 375 So.2d 1239 (Ala.1979), Jenkins v. State, 147 Ga.App. 21, 248 S.E.2d 33 (1978), State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 532 P.2d 9 (1975), Womble v. State, 8 Md.App. 119, 258 A.2d 786 (1969), State v. Calloway, 268 N.C. 359, 150 S.E.2d 517 (1966), State v. Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 219 P. 1106 (1923), State v. Millard, 242 S.W. 923 (Mo.1922), and Koenigstein v. State, 101 Neb. 229, 162 N.W. 879 (1917).
The Court of Criminal Appeals observed that if Mr. Jenkins had testified in the prior case involving Ms. Morgan’s watch, the trial judge obviously would not have granted a directed verdict. I agree. While that circumstance alone would not justify adoption of the rule I suggest, it strongly supports the wisdom of allowing the jury to hear and give such weight and credit to the evidence of defendant’s alleged similar offense and acquittal thereof as they deem appropriate.