Court Opinion

ID: 9569224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:11:37.523004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:50:31.544900
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority first holds that appellant’s confession “should have been excluded from evidence as the fruit of an unlawful arrest.” (Majority opinion, page 459.) The majority then holds that, absent the confession, the evidence would not be sufficient to authorize appellant’s conviction. In so doing, the majority acts in excess of its jurisdiction. Whether or not appellant’s confession was the fruit of an ar*464rest which was unsupported by probable cause has heretofore never been raised as an issue in this case. Accordingly, that issue is not one which this court is now authorized to consider and to rule upon. When consideration is limited to only those issues in this case which are properly before this court, appellant’s conviction must be affirmed.
Accordingly, I must dissent.
Appellant never filed a pre-trial motion wherein he asserted the underlying illegality of his arrest under the Fourth Amendment and sought the suppression of his confession as the fruit thereof. Appellant only sought, during the course of the trial, a Jackson v. Denno hearing to determine the voluntariness of his confession. Accordingly, only a ruling by the trial court as to a violation of appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights was invoked. “We view the purpose of a JacksonDenno hearing and the requirement for the giving of Miranda warnings, as one allowing the trial court in the first instance, as a matter of law, and the jury, ultimately, as a matter of fact, to assure themselves of the voluntariness of a statement made by an individual and offered as a truthful but inculpatory admission against interest, and thus not violative of the constitutional prohibition of involuntary self-incrimination.” (Emphasis supplied.) Farley v. State, 145 Ga. App. 98, 100 (1) (243 SE2d 322) (1978). Thus, the trial court has never had occasion to consider the Fourth Amendment issue that is addressed by the majority. As appellant had requested, the trial court simply conducted a Jackson v. Denno hearing and, after giving proper consideration to the totality of those circumstances which surrounded the subsequent confession rather than those which surrounded the initial arrest, found that appellant had voluntarily given his inculpatory statement to the officers. See generally Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 (226 SE2d 922) (1976). It is only this Fifth Amendment issue of the voluntariness of appellant’s confession that is before this Court, not the Fourth Amendment issue of the probable cause for appellant’s arrest that is addressed by the majority.
Apparently unlike the majority, appellant himself recognizes that the underlying lawfulness of his arrest is not, and cannot be, a viable issue on this appeal. The admission of the confession is not enumerated as error on the ground that it was the product of appellant’s unlawful arrest. Appellant enumerates as error only the trial court’s finding that the “alleged confession was freely and voluntarily given.” The majority simply ignores this enumeration of error, choosing instead to exceed its jurisdiction to hold that appellant’s confession was erroneously admitted for a totally unenumerated reason which has never been raised in or ruled on by the trial court. “ ‘The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction for the trial and correction of errors of law. . . . ([Cit.]) The Appellate Practice Act of 1965 ([OCGA § 5-6-*46540]) provides that the appellant shall file with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals “an enumeration of the errors, which shall set out separately each error relied upon.” . . . We do not know of any law or rule of practice and procedure that authorizes the Court of Appeals ... to examine the entire record and grant a new trial upon a ground of [its] own making and not upon a ground specified by the appellant. The duty of the appellate court is to correct errors alleged to have been made in the trial court and not to manufacture them.’ [Cit.] Thus we can not consider any error alleged to have been made unless there is an enumeration of it as provided in [OCGA § 5-6-40], nor can we consider and reverse on an error enumerated unless it is supported in the record and shown to have been ruled on by the trial judge.” (Emphasis supplied.) Craig v. State, 130 Ga. App. 689, 692-693 (6) (204 SE2d 307) (1974). Although under Rule 35 (b) of the Rules of this Court, Craig, in and of itself is a physical precedent only, the authorities cited therein remain quite viable. Moreover, Craig was cited with approval in a 1983 case of this Court which likewise held that “the issue underlying this enumeration, not being raised at trial, cannot be considered on appeal. [Cit.]” Kent v. Hunt & Assoc., 165 Ga. App. 169, 171 (7) (299 SE2d 123) (1983).
The statement in the majority opinion that appellant himself urges a Fourth Amendment violation is simply the majority’s own erroneous interpretation of the Fifth Amendment argument that is advanced in appellant’s brief in legitimate support of his enumeration of error. However, even if the majority were correct in its interpretation of the nature of appellant’s argument, appellant’s brief would not provide this court with the jurisdiction needed to address the Fourth Amendment issue. Appellant’s failure to raise a Fourth Amendment issue in the trial court or to enumerate any error as to such an issue on appeal serves to preclude this court from addressing the merits of any argument made in his brief as to that issue. See generally Craig v. State, supra. “An enumeration of error cannot be enlarged to include other issues not made therein. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Reese v. State, 139 Ga. App. 630, 631-632 (3) (229 SE2d 111) (1976). This court will “not reach the matter raised in [appellant’s] brief ... [if] the issue was not enumerated as error.” (Emphasis supplied.) Irvin v. Askew, 241 Ga. 565, 566 (2) (246 SE2d 682) (1978).
It is unclear what part of the record the majority relies upon for the recited facts supporting its finding of the lack of probable cause for appellant’s arrest. Presumably, the majority relies upon the evidence which was adduced at the Jackson v. Denno hearing. However, since the Jackson v. Denno hearing involved only the Fifth Amendment voluntariness of appellant’s subsequent confession, the State was never required to introduce any evidence as to the Fourth Amendment probable cause for appellant’s initial arrest. Accordingly, *466it should not be surprising that the majority finds a lack of evidentiary support for the existence of probable cause for appellant’s arrest. The majority, in effect, finds reversible error because the State failed to produce evidence as to an issue which was never raised in the trial court and because the trial court failed to exclude appellant’s confession for a reason which was never presented to that court. The evidence which was produced at the Jackson v. Denno hearing, although conflicting, clearly authorized the trial court, acting as the trier of fact, to find that appellant’s confession had been freely and voluntarily given. “The trial court’s determination that [appellant’s] confession was voluntary and therefore admissible for the jury’s consideration was supported by a preponderance of the evidence . . . and was not error.” Thomas v. State, 233 Ga. 237, 240 (2) (210 SE2d 675) (1974). When proper consideration is given to all of the admissible evidence, including appellant’s confession, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. “ ‘A confession of guilt, freely and voluntarily made by the accused, is direct evidence of the highest character and sufficient to authorize a conviction when corroborated by proof of the corpus delicti. [Cits.]’ [Cit.]” Fields v. State, 232 Ga. 723 (2) (208 SE2d 822) (1974). I would affirm the conviction and, therefore, I dissent.
Decided March 18, 1988.
John R. Thigpen, Sr., for appellant.
Harry D. Dixon, Jr., District Attorney, Margaret M. Edwards, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this dissent.