Court Opinion

ID: 9905412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 15:07:43.823408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:23.280678
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3626-21

R.A.M., III,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

R.O.,1

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Submitted October 31, 2023 – Decided November 29, 2023

                   Before Judges Mayer and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
                   Docket No. FV-04-3276-22.

                   R.O., appellant pro se.

                   Law Offices of Lynda L. Hinkle, LLC, attorney for
                   respondent (Lynda L. Hinkle, on the brief).

1
     We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant appeals from a June 9, 2022 final restraining order (FRO),

entered against her and in favor of plaintiff, pursuant to the Prevention of

Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Because we conclude the

record does not permit meaningful appellate review we reverse and remand.

      Moreover, on appeal, not argued before the trial judge, defendant asserts

that the trial judge should be recused because of a conflict of interest. Given

our remand, and because defendant never filed a recusal motion before the trial

judge, we decline to consider the issue.

                                        I.

      We recite the facts from the trial record. Plaintiff and defendant had a

dating relationship and have a child in common. On April 25, 2021, defendant

and the child had a Zoom call. After the call ended, defendant sent plaintiff a

message and asked about bruising on the child's face. Plaintiff replied that there

was no bruising and took a photograph "just to have." That evening, the police

arrived at plaintiff's house to check on the child. The child became upset when

the police arrived.

      Plaintiff testified that there were seventeen "specific incidents" where the

police were contacted from January 26, 2020 to April 25, 2021. Moreover, when

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the police came to the house, the child's "behavior . . . [wa]s very erratic" and

he had "meltdown[s]" the next day. Also, plaintiff testified: defendant accused

him of "making multiple false allegations of abuse against her"; defendant filed

two "reckless driving complaint[s] against" him; and "the Division c[a]me out."2

      Plaintiff posits that defendant is "trying to . . . push [him] into returning

custody of the child to her or just making everything as difficult as possible."

Plaintiff testified that defendant's actions have made him "look bad," having "the

police coming out all the time," and "it[ is] mentally draining." He believes he

requires a restraining order, otherwise "she's just going to keep doing it."

      Defendant testified that she took two "screenshot[s]" of the child during

the April 25, 2021 Zoom call. She noticed "red[ness] and what look[ed] like

bruising on his forehead." She contacted plaintiff but was not satisfied with his

response "because there were clear marks" and "[e]ventually, she went to the

police." Because she is "employed by a school district," plaintiff explained that

she is a "mandatory reporter" for suspected child abuse. Defendant admitted

2
 The record refers to Division and DCP&P, we understand the references to
mean the Division of Child Protection and Permanency.

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previously contacting DCP&P more than the police, but did not recall the exact

number of times.

                                        II.

      The judge found plaintiff established the predicate act of harassment.

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13). Specifically, the judge found defendant violated

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) that provides "a person commits . . . [harassment] if, with

purpose to harass another, [s]he: [e]ngages in any other course of alarming

conduct or repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy

such other person."

      The judge determined there was "clear[] proof of a course of conduct

. . . showing harassment, to annoy, . . . to worry, trouble, or offend." She found

the conduct was of a "repetitive nature" over "the course of two years" and

included seventeen calls to the police and more to DCP&P. On "each and every

time" "there has been no sign of harm to the child." The judge found "most

troubling . . . the harm that defendant's actions [we]re causing" the child.

      The judge noted the parties' "extensive prior history . . . ," observing "this

is the fifth . . . temporary restraining order" (TRO).

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      The judge determined that an FRO was necessary "for the harassment"

because "the well-being of both [plaintiff] and [the child] is in danger if this

is[ not] put to an end."

                                       III.

      We review questions of law determined by the trial court de novo. Smith

v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 387 (2016) (citing Manalapan Realty,

L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

      Our review of a trial judge's factual findings is limited. Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "The general rule is that findings by the trial court

are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible

evidence." Id. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65

N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).     Moreover, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special

jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, [we] . . . accord deference to family

court fact[-]finding." Id. at 413. Such deference is particularly proper "when

the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Id. at

412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).

      Nonetheless, family "judges are under a duty to make findings of fact and

to state reasons in support of their conclusions." Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super.

337, 347 (App. Div. 1996) (citing R. 1:7-4(a)). "Meaningful appellate review is

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inhibited unless the judge sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion." Strahan

v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Salch v. Salch,

240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990)). "Naked conclusions do not satisfy

the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980).

      "[T]he task of a judge considering a domestic violence complaint, where

the jurisdictional requirements have otherwise been met, 3 [is] . . . two-fold."

Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (App. Div. 2006). "First, the judge

must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the

credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A.

2C:25-19a has occurred." Ibid. "The second inquiry, upon a finding of the

commission of a predicate act of domestic violence, is whether the court should

enter a restraining order that provides protection for the victim." Id. at 126; see

also J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 475-76 (2011) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b))

(an FRO should not be issued without a finding that "relief is necessary to

prevent further abuse"). "[T]he guiding standard is whether a restraining order

is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a(1)

3
  The judge established jurisdiction finding the parties have "a child in common"
and had "a dating relationship." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d).
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– 29a(6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or prevent future

abuse." Id. at 127.

                                         IV.

      Here, the incomplete factual record regarding the judge's Silver analysis

precludes our appellate review. The record lacks any evidence of the context

surrounding defendant's history of admitted calls to the police and DCP&P and

refers to materials that are not part of the actual trial record.

      In undertaking her Silver analysis, the judge found defendant committed

the predicate act of "harassment," prong one, and there was an "extensive prior

history" and "the well-being of both [plaintiff] and [the child] is in danger if this

is[ not] put to an end," prong two.

      However, absent from the record is any evidence regarding the nature of,

or circumstances surrounding, the calls that gave rise to the judge's finding of

harassment. Instead, aside from the number of calls, we are left to speculate that

the calls were made "with purpose to harass" and through "repeatedly committed

acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy" plaintiff. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c).

"It is not the role of the trial court or this court to fill in the gaps in plaintiff's

proofs or make decisions that are not supported by sufficient credible evidence."

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Bank of New York Mellon v. Corradetti, 466 N.J. Super. 185, 212 (App. Div.

2020).

      Moreover, our review of the record reveals that certain information, not

actually in the record, may have been considered by the trial judge. For instance,

the judge referenced four prior TROs. Upon our review of the trial record, it

appears that the restraining orders and the dispositions of these matters were not

part of the record. The prior restraining orders may be relevant, see T.M. v.

J.C., 348 N.J. Super. 101, 106 (App. Div. 2002); J.F. v. B.K., 308 N.J. Super.

387, 392 (App. Div. 1998), however neither the trial court nor this court can

make that determination because they were not entered in the record.

      Furthermore, the record reflects other information that was not part of the

record: (1) "[T]his case has dealt with a lot of photographs and police reports

in the past. . . . I[ a]m not going to present them again. Your honor recalls those.

I know it has[ not] been that long ago, and some of them are part of the record;

some are not"; (2) "I do want the record to reflect that this . . . matter . . . with

these exact same allegations, have been before me. So I am well aware of the

past history in this case"; (3) "So do you want to go through all of the past

history again? Although we did it the last time we were here"; (4) "[W]hen you

called the police . . . did you consider [the judge previously] telling you that you

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should stop doing that?"; (5) "[Y]ou testified the last time we were here to - - to

a number of specific incidents. And I[ a]m just going to state for the record the

dates that you spoke of . . ."; and (6) "I do not believe that she is concerned for

her child because there is nothing to be concerned about. Experts have all

proven that."

      "It is error to rest a decision on matters not appearing in the record."

Second Reformed Church v. Bd. of Adjustment of Borough of Freehold, 30 N.J.

Super. 338, 341 (App. Div. 1954.) (citing Giordano v. City Comm. of City of

Newark, 2 N.J. 585 (1949)). Moreover, our review "is limited to whether the

trial court's decision is supported by the record . . . ." New Jersey Div. of Youth

and Family Services v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278 (2007) (citing R. 2:5-4). We

cannot conduct our review if the decision is supported by information not

disclosed in the record. A judge's familiarity with issues based on prior dealings

with the same litigants does not obviate the need to have a complete record for

our appellate review.

      Because we conclude the record does not permit meaningful appellate

review, we are compelled to vacate the FRO, reinstate the TRO and remand the

matter to the Family Part to develop a complete record.

      Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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