Court Opinion

ID: 9908628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 15:04:54.195735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:21.821380
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-179

                                       A.S.

                                       vs.

                                       B.S.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a hearing, a judge of the District Court extended

 an abuse prevention order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 209A (209A

 order) against the defendant, B.S.           The defendant appeals,

 contending that the judge erred because (1) the plaintiff, A.S.,

 did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was

 reasonably in fear of an imminent threat of physical harm, and

 (2) the District Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a custody

 order due to a pending divorce proceeding in the Probate and

 Family Court.     We affirm.

       1.   Background.     The parties were married on April 28,

 2018, and share one child.        On November 13, 2021, the plaintiff

 applied for and received an emergency 209A order from the on-

 call judge.     Among other things, the 209A order awarded custody

 of the parties' child to the plaintiff.            The plaintiff then
appeared in the District Court on November 15, 2021, seeking an

extension of the 209A order.   The defendant appeared with

counsel.   After an evidentiary hearing at which both parties

testified, a judge extended the 209A order for one year, until

November 15, 2022.   The defendant did not appeal from that

order.

     During the evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff testified

that she "felt threatened" by the defendant "every time [she]

tried to contest his opinion on something" and that during their

initial separation, the defendant threatened that the plaintiff

"better get the cops involved" if she did not allow him to take

their child, which the plaintiff understood to mean "he was

going to physically harm [the plaintiff]."   She also expressed

her belief that the defendant was inappropriate with their

child, and that there was an ongoing child sexual abuse

investigation related thereto.

     On November 19, 2021, the defendant filed a complaint for

divorce in the Probate and Family Court.   On May 18, 2022, the

defendant was arraigned in the District Court on charges of

violating the 209A order and failing to surrender a firearm

pursuant to the 209A order.

     On November 15, 2022, before a different judge, both

parties appeared with counsel, and the plaintiff requested a

further extension of the 209A order.   The hearing proceeded on

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representations of counsel, although the plaintiff answered

several questions asked of her by the judge.   The plaintiff's

counsel represented that the plaintiff "still [had] a reasonable

fear of imminent physical harm" based on the allegations

presented in the initial affidavit, including allegations of

sexual abuse against the parties' daughter; allegations that the

defendant took and sent sexually explicit pictures and videos of

the plaintiff without her consent, for which criminal charges

were filed; and the criminal charges on which the defendant was

arraigned in May 2022.   At the hearing, the defendant's counsel

represented that following a fair hearing, the Department of

Children and Families (DCF) had reversed "the supported

allegations of sexual abuse" because "they [were] not made with

a reasonable basis for support," and that the charges for

violation of a restraining order and failure to surrender a

firearm were to be dismissed.

     The judge noted that "[t]he standard at this stage of the

proceeding is by a fair preponderance of the evidence, [fifty

percent] plus one" and extended the 209A order for one year

until November 15, 2023.   The defendant timely appealed from

that order.

     2.   Extension of the 209A order.   The defendant argues that

the plaintiff did not meet her burden to establish that she

reasonably feared imminent physical harm by the defendant at the

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time of the extension hearing.   "We review the issuance of a

c. 209A order for an abuse of discretion or other error of law."

Idris I. v. Hazel H., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 787 (2022).

"The inquiry at an extension hearing is whether the plaintiff

has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that an extension

of the order is necessary to protect her from the likelihood of

'abuse' as defined in G. L. c. 209A, § 1."       Iamele v. Asselin,

444 Mass. 734, 739 (2005).   Under G. L. c. 209A, § 1, the

definition of abuse includes "placing another in fear of

imminent serious physical harm."       The "same statutory

definition[s] [apply] in the context of . . . extended . . .

orders."   Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 479,

485 (2005).

     As discussed supra, the November 15, 2021 order was based

on the plaintiff's affidavit and testimony that the defendant

was "verbally and emotionally abusive for most of [their]

relationship . . . [and that] [h]is behaviors and emotions can

be unpredictable if [she does not] submit to his requests or

disagree with him in general so [she] fear[ed] for [her]

safety."   The plaintiff's counsel represented that "she ha[d]

the same fear of imminent physical harm that she had when she

moved for the order initially," and that the ongoing civil and

criminal litigation related to the parties' relationship

contributed to the plaintiff's fear of imminent physical harm.

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     The defendant opposed extension of the 209A order, citing

the DCF fair hearing decision and the dismissal of some of the

criminal charges.   However, that DCF reversed the finding of

sexual abuse is not outcome-determinative for purposes of a 209A

order.   That is because "[i]n evaluating whether a plaintiff has

met her burden, a judge must consider the totality of the

circumstances of the parties' relationship. . . .       The judge is

to consider the basis for the initial order . . . [and] [o]ther

factors . . . [including] ongoing child custody or other

litigation that engenders or is likely to engender hostility."

Iamele, 444 Mass. at 740.

     Here, the judge properly considered "the totality of

conditions that exist[ed] at the time that the plaintiff

[sought] the extension," Iamele, 444 Mass. at 740, and,

therefore, did not commit an error of law or abuse his

discretion in finding that the plaintiff was "in fear of

imminent serious physical harm."       G. L. c. 209A, § 1.   These

conditions included the ongoing criminal and divorce cases that

could be a source of friction between the parties.       See Iamele,

supra.   Moreover, "[t]he fact that abuse has not occurred during

the pendency of an order shall not, in itself, constitute

sufficient ground for denying or failing to extend the order."

G. L. c. 209A, § 3.    See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 62 Mass. App. Ct.

769, 773-774 (2005).

                                   5
     3.   Custody order.   The defendant next contends that the

judge did not have jurisdiction to enter the custody order as

part of the extension of the 209A order because a custody order

had issued in the ongoing Probate and Family Court case. 1

General Laws c. 209A, § 3, permits "[a] person suffering from

abuse from an adult . . . [to] file a complaint in the court

requesting protection from such abuse, including, but not

limited to . . . awarding the plaintiff temporary custody of a

minor child."   Where there is a pending action in the Probate

and Family Court, "an order issued in the . . . district . . .

court department[] of the trial court pursuant to this chapter

may include . . . orders for custody . . . ; provided . . . that

such order may be superseded by a subsequent custody . . . order

issued by the probate and family court department."    G. L.

c. 209A, § 3 (d).

     Here, the defendant contends that there is a Probate and

Family Court custody order.    Although the Probate and Family

1 The defendant also argues that the extension of the abuse
prevention order as to the child was improper because "the
record is insufficient to demonstrate that the child was or
remained reasonably in fear of imminent serious physical harm."
However, the 209A order in this case was between the plaintiff
and the defendant; the complaint was not filed on behalf of the
minor child. Where the judge may "award[] the plaintiff
temporary custody" as a remedy under G. L. c. 209A, § 3 (d),
there is no requirement to show that the child is reasonably in
fear of imminent serious physical harm.

                                  6
Court docket reflects action on motions, 2 it does not reflect the

entry of custody orders, and neither party has included such an

order in the record appendix.   We note that as the appellant, it

is the defendant's burden to provide us with a complete record

on appeal.   See Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a) (1), as appearing in 491

Mass. 1603 (2023).   See also Baker v. Gray, 57 Mass. App. Ct.

618, 626-627 & n.5 (2003).

     Although G. L. c. 209A, § 3 (d), provides that the Probate

and Family Court has final jurisdiction over custody orders,

that does not mean "district . . . court judges are prohibited

or discouraged from ordering all other necessary relief or

issuing the custody . . . provisions of orders pursuant to this

chapter for the full duration permitted."    Cf. Quilla Q. v. Matt

M., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 241-242 (2023) (District Court order

for child support pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, § 3 [e], "does not

usurp the authority of the Probate and Family Court" and is a

"proper exercise of judicial discretion").

     The defendant further argues that even if the District

Court had jurisdiction to extend the custody order, the judge

was required to make factual findings as to the best interests

of the child.   This argument misses the mark as G. L. c. 209A,

2 At oral argument, the defendant claimed that the July 26, 2022
order on the defendant's amended motion for temporary orders and
for appointment of a guardian ad litem was an order regarding
custody of the minor child. The record does not reveal that.

                                 7
§ 3 (d), requires such findings in any case brought in the

Probate and Family Court, not where the order was issued by a

District Court judge.      And whether a request for custody is made

in the District Court or the Probate and Family Court, the best

interests of the child is the touchstone inquiry.      See Custody

of Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 595 (1996).      Where, as here, the

plaintiff requested custody as part of her application for a

209A order, the judge did not err by extending the custody

order, and he was not required to make detailed factual

findings. 3

                                        Order dated November 15,
                                          2022, extending G. L. c.
                                          209A order, affirmed.

                                        By the Court (Green, CJ.,
                                          Blake & Henry, JJ. 4),

                                        Clerk

Entered:      December 11, 2023.

3 The plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs is
denied.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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