Court Opinion

ID: 9951144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 17:03:21.255766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:17.639342
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 Estate of Delauter CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 Estate of Carole L. Delauter,
 Deceased.

 THOMAS DELAUTER,
                                                                        A163634
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
 v.                                                                     (Contra Costa County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. MSP19-00811)
 CHRISTOPHER PATRICK
 MALOHN DELAUTER,
           Objector and Appellant.

         In this probate proceeding, Christopher Patrick Malohn Delauter (Son)
appeals following the trial court’s judgment on his stepfather’s spousal
property petition and petition to probate the will of Son’s mother. We affirm.
                                                   BACKGROUND
         Decedent Carole L. Delauter1 died on December 13, 2016. In June
2019, her surviving husband, respondent Thomas Delauter (Husband), filed a
petition to probate Carole’s will dated December 10, 2016 (First Will). In the

         1 To avoid confusion, we refer to the decedent by her first name.                                           No
disrespect is intended.

                                                               1
First Will, Carole left “all my worldly possessions to my Husband & my
youngest son,” and named Husband as the executor. Husband also filed a
spousal property petition, seeking a community property interest in certain
real property (the Property).
      In October 2019, Son, who is Carole’s youngest son from a prior
marriage, filed a will contest on the ground that Carole executed a
subsequent will on December 12, 2016 (Second Will), which left all her
possessions to Son and named him executor.2 In December, Son filed an
opposition to Husband’s spousal property petition, arguing the Property was
Carole’s separate property, titled solely in her name and purchased before
her marriage to Husband.
      Over multiple days in January and February of 2021, the trial court
held a consolidated trial on Son’s will contest and Husband’s spousal property
petition.
      In July 2021, the court issued a statement of decision. As to the will
contest, the court found the First Will was executed in the presence of
Husband and Son while Carole was hospitalized with throat cancer, after her
substantial pain medications had been reduced to allow her to coherently
discuss her treatment plan with her doctors. The Second Will was executed
two days later while only Son was present, after Son prompted Husband and
Carole’s granddaughter to leave the hospital, and there was no evidence her
pain medication had been reduced. The court found the Second Will was the
product of undue influence and invalidated it; found the First Will valid; and
ordered the estate distributed according to the terms of the First Will.

      2 Son also filed a petition to probate the Second Will.
                                                           This petition was
dismissed without prejudice. Son did not appeal this dismissal or file a new
petition.

                                       2
      As to Husband’s spousal property petition, the court found that,
although title to the Property was in Carole’s name and she purchased it
before her marriage to Husband, she did not accrue significant equity before
the marriage and community property paid for the entire mortgage as well as
capital improvements made during the marriage. The court found Husband
therefore held a 50 percent interest in the Property, and the First Will
distributed Carole’s 50 percent interest in the Property, and the court
accordingly distributed the Property 75 percent to Husband and 25 percent to
Son. Judgment subsequently issued.
                                  DISCUSSION
I.    Pretrial Order
      Son first challenges a January 2021 minute order, issued before trial
began, granting Husband’s petition for probate of the First Will and
appointing Husband as executor. Son argues it was error for the trial court
to issue the order before trial on his will contest.
      As an initial matter, Son fails to demonstrate prejudice from any error.
Trial began shortly after the January 2021 minute order issued and Son was
not denied an evidentiary hearing on his will contest.3
      In any event, as Husband argues, the January 2021 order was
separately appealable. (Prob. Code,4 § 1303, subds. (a)–(b) [order “[g]ranting
. . . letters to a personal representative” or “[a]dmitting a will to probate” is
appealable].) “ ‘The orders listed as appealable in the Probate Code must be

      3 We reject Son’s suggestion that the outcome of trial was

predetermined by the January 2021 minute order. The trial court’s detailed
factual findings indicate its careful consideration of the evidence presented at
trial.
      4 All undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.

                                         3
challenged timely or they become final and binding.’ ” (Estate of Reed (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 1122, 1127.) Son did not timely appeal from this order and
therefore may not challenge it now.
II.   Undue Influence Finding
      Son argues the trial court erroneously found a presumption of undue
influence applied to the Second Will. We reject the challenge.
      In finding the Second Will to be the product of undue influence, the
trial court reasoned, “a contesting party can claim a presumption of undue
influence where there is (1) [a] confidential relationship between the decedent
and the alleged undue influencer, (2) the alleged undue influencer was active
in the procurement or execution of the Will, and (3) the alleged undue
influencer unduly benefits from the Will.”
      The court cited section 21380 for this proposition. Section 21380,
subdivision (a), sets forth a different test for finding a presumption of undue
influence. (§ 21380, subd. (a) [presumption of undue influence where
donative transfer made to certain enumerated persons, including “The person
who drafted the instrument” and “A person who transcribed the instrument
. . . and who was in a fiduciary relationship with the transferor when the
instrument was transcribed”].) Son argues, and Husband properly agrees,
that the section 21380 presumption does not apply here. (See § 21382 [with
exceptions not relevant here, § 21380 does not apply to “a donative transfer to
a person who is related by blood or affinity, within the fourth degree, to the
transferor”].)
      However, the factors identified by the trial court state the common law
test for a presumption of undue influence. (Estate of Sarabia (1990) 221
Cal.App.3d 599, 605 [“The presumption of undue influence arises only if all of
the following elements are shown: (1) the existence of a confidential

                                       4
relationship between the testator and the person alleged to have exerted
undue influence; (2) active participation by such person in the actual
preparation or execution of the will, such conduct not being of a merely
incidental nature; and (3) undue profit accruing to that person by virtue of
the will.”]; Keading v. Keading (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1127 [“Sarabia
describes the common law test for undue influence, and . . . addresses when a
presumption of undue influence arises.”].) That the court cited the wrong
authority for this presumption is immaterial. (See Young v. Fish & Game
Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1192–1193 [“if a judgment is correct on any
theory, the appellate court will affirm it regardless of the trial court’s
reasoning”].)5

      5 For the first time in his reply brief, Son challenges the court’s finding

that the three prongs of the common law test were met. Arguments made for
the first time in a reply brief are forfeited. (Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc.
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 (Tellez).) In any event, the challenge is
unavailing. Son does not dispute he had a confidential relationship with
Carole, but simply asserts, with no citation to authority, that this “should not
be held against him.” Son argues the trial court’s finding that he was an
active participant lacks substantial evidence, complaining primarily that the
court erroneously excluded from evidence handwritten notes written by
Carole during her hospitalization. Assuming this exclusion was in error, Son
fails to demonstrate prejudice. As the court noted when excluding the notes,
it had before it “a great deal of testimony” as to the content of the notes,
which had been admitted without objection. Further, most of the pages Son
characterizes as conclusive were undated, and therefore were not conclusively
written on the day the Second Will was executed. Son argues the testimony
of Carole’s granddaughter about who told her she could leave the hospital the
night the Second Will was executed was equivocal, but the granddaughter
testified, “My uncle Chris [Son] assured me that it was okay [to leave the
hospital]. He would take care of my grandmother, and I could go take a
break.” Finally, with respect to the court’s finding that Son unduly
benefitted from the Second Will, Son points to a 2001 will executed by Carole
and Husband naming Son as their sole beneficiary. Husband testified this
will was written before he and Carole took a trip to ensure that if they both

                                         5
III.   Jurisdiction to Issue July 2021 Statement of Decision
       Son argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the July 2021
statement of decision. We disagree.
       A.    Additional Background
       On March 15, 2021, after trial concluded, the court issued a written
order revoking the Second Will as the product of undue influence, ordering
the estate distributed in accordance with the First Will, and dismissing
Husband’s spousal property petition as moot in light of the order validating
the First Will. The order was entitled, “Judgment of the Court.”
(Capitalization altered.) Both parties filed requests for a statement of
decision.
       On April 5, 2021, the court issued an order entitled “Statement of
Decision.” (Capitalization altered.) Husband subsequently filed a motion to
modify the statement of decision or for a new trial, arguing the spousal
property petition was not moot because it would determine how much of the
Property Carole could convey under the First Will. Son filed objections to
“the Court’s Proposed Statement of Decision,” and opposed Husband’s motion
as premature because judgment had not yet been entered. The court
overruled Son’s objections because the April order “is the final Statement of
Decision.”
       On July 28, 2021, following a hearing on Husband’s motion, the court
granted the motion to modify, granted Husband’s spousal property petition,
and issued a statement of decision titled “Modified Statement of Decision.”
(Capitalization altered.)

died, their property would pass to Son. The existence of this prior will does
not render the court’s undue benefit finding lacking in substantial evidence.

                                        6
      B.     Analysis
      Son argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the July 28
statement of decision because it issued more than 75 days after Husband’s
motion to modify or for a new trial. As Son argues, under Code of Civil
Procedure section 660, subdivision (c), “the power of the court to rule on a
motion for a new trial shall expire . . . 75 days after the filing of the first
notice of intention to move for a new trial,” if notice of entry of judgment has
not been given.
      To resolve the challenge, we must first determine the nature of the
multiple orders issued by the trial court. Although the March 15 order was
captioned as a judgment, the parties agree it did not constitute the judgment
because they were entitled to request a statement of decision (Code Civ.
Proc., § 632), which both subsequently did. We agree. The parties also agree
the April 5 order was not the final statement of decision, despite the court’s
characterization, because the court was required to first issue a proposed
statement of decision to which they could make objections. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1590(f)–(g).)6 We again agree.
      The parties’ dispute centers on the nature of Husband’s motion to
modify the statement of decision or for a new trial. Son argues the filing of
the motion triggered the 75-day period in which the court could rule on it
under Code of Civil Procedure section 660 and, because the July 28 statement
of decision issued after this time elapsed, the order is invalid. Husband

      6 In Husband’s response brief on appeal, Husband argued that Son’s

opening brief did not contend the trial court erred in refusing to consider
Son’s objections to the April 5 proposed statement of decision, and that Son
therefore forfeited such a claim. In his reply brief, Son did not respond to this
argument, contend the trial court so erred, or demonstrate he was prejudiced
by any such error. This issue is therefore not before us.

                                          7
argues his motion should instead be construed as objections to the April 5
proposed statement of decision.
      We agree with Husband. Parties have “statutory rights to object to the
court’s statement of decision.” (Bay World Trading, Ltd. v. Nebraska Beef,
Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 135, 140.) Thus, “[a] statement of decision issued
by the court cannot automatically constitute a final decision for purposes of
entry of judgment . . . because Code of Civil Procedure section 632 and
California Rules of Court, [former] rule 232 contemplate that a court may
amend its statement of decision after it receives objections from affected
parties.” (Id. at p. 141.) Because the April 5 order was a proposed statement
of decision, Husband was statutorily entitled to file objections. That he
captioned his objections as a motion to modify or for a new trial is not
determinative. “The caption, title, or label of a pleading or other document
does not determine its nature or legal effect. [Citations.] Rather, ‘it is what
is contained in the [document] itself that is significant.’ ” (Stiger v. Flippin
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 646, 654.) Accordingly, Husband’s filing is properly
characterized as objections to the court’s proposed statement of decision, and
any statutory time periods associated with new trial motions were not
triggered. The trial court had jurisdiction to issue the July 28 statement of
decision.7

      7 For the first time in his reply brief, Son argues that even if the Code

of Civil Procedure section 660 time period was not triggered by Husband’s
motion, the trial court had to file the judgment within 50 days after issuing
the tentative decision pursuant to California Rules of Court rule 3.1590(l).
Son has forfeited this belated argument and in any event provides no
authority the deadline is jurisdictional; to the contrary, as Son acknowledges,
the rule provides noncompliance may be excused for good cause. (Id., rule
3.1590(m).)

                                        8
IV.   Spousal Property Petition
      Son challenges the trial court’s order granting Husband’s spousal
property petition. We reject the challenge.
      The trial court determined that, even though Carole held sole title to
the Property, “the entire Property was paid for with community property
wages,” and Husband therefore held a 50 percent interest in the Property
under the Moore/Marsden rule. “When community property is used to
reduce the principal balance of a mortgage on one spouse’s separate property,
the community acquires a pro tanto interest in the property. [Citations.]
This well-established principle is known as ‘the Moore/Marsden rule.’ ”
(Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1421–1422.) “[T]he rationale of
the Moore/Marsden rule applies with equal force to capital improvements.”
(Id. at p. 1423.)
      The court made extensive fact-findings on this issue. Carole and her
prior husband purchased the Property for $6,000 in 1975. In 1978, Carole’s
prior husband transferred his interest in the Property to Carole and Carole
executed a deed of trust securing a debt to her prior husband of nearly
$9,000. In 1979, Carole married Husband. Based on these facts, the trial
court found that “Carole did not accrue significant equity in the Property
prior to her marriage to [Husband].”8

      8 In his opening brief, Son does not specifically challenge the trial

court’s finding that Carole did not accrue significant equity before marrying
Husband, nor does he argue Husband should be allocated a less than 50
percent share in the Property to reflect any small equity accrued by Carole
before their marriage. To the extent Son raises any such challenges in his
reply brief, they are forfeited. (Tellez, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066 [“On
appeal we need address only the points adequately raised by [appellant] in
his opening brief on appeal.”].)

                                        9
      After their marriage, Husband testified that he, Carole, and Carole’s
prior husband agreed Husband would take over the prior husband’s child
support obligations to pay off his contributions towards the purchase of the
Property. Carole’s 1978 debt to her prior husband was paid off in 1986, and
in the same year Carole took out a new mortgage for nearly $14,000 to make
improvements on the Property. Both mortgages were paid off with
Husband’s community property earnings. In 2008, Husband withdrew
$90,000 from his retirement account to make additional improvements to the
Property.
      The court found, “[Husband’s] wages paid for an estimated total of
$22,968.40 of principal mortgage plus the accrued interest and $90,000.00 . . .
spent towards capital improvements. This home was initially purchased for
$6,000.00, with a mortgage that exceeded that amount when it was
quitclaimed to Carole prior to her marriage to [Husband]. Based on these
significant contributions, even if Carole had any equity in the property prior
to marriage, under the Moore/Marsden Rule, [Husband] would receive the
maximum 50% community property interest in the property. Thus, given
that the entire Property was paid for with community property wages,
[Husband] is entitled to a pro tanto reimbursement interest in the Property,
which results in a maximum fifty percent (50%) interest in the Property, as
the surviving spouse.”
      Son argues there is no competent evidence that community property
was used to pay the mortgages. The claim fails. Son does not dispute that
Husband was the primary income earner during the marriage, or that any
income Carole earned was also community property. The only evidence of
separate property obtained by Carole during the marriage that Son points to
is an inheritance Carole received in the 1990s—after the first mortgage was

                                      10
paid off—and which Husband testified Carole spent on a car and other
personal items but not the mortgage. Ample admissible evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that the entire purchase price of the house and
improvements were paid for with community property.
      Son’s argument that Husband was at most entitled to reimbursement,
not transmutation, is also unavailing. The court found under the
Moore/Marsden rule that the community had acquired an interest in the
Property; and further found that, under the facts of this case, the interest
acquired by the community was 100 percent. Substantial evidence supports
this finding.
V.    Judicial Bias
      Son argues the trial court was biased against him in violation of his
constitutional due process rights. As evidence of bias, Son points to rulings
against him during the proceedings (some we have affirmed and the rest Son
does not challenge on appeal), rebukes to Son’s counsel during witness
examination, and purported errors in the court’s factual findings.
      “[T]he due process clause should not be routinely invoked as a ground
for judicial disqualification. Rather, it is the exceptional case presenting
extreme facts where a due process violation will be found.” (People v.
Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1005.) “Numerous and continuous rulings
against a party are not grounds for a finding of bias.” (Schmidt v. Superior
Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 589.) “ ‘[O]ur role . . . is not to determine
whether the trial judge’s conduct left something to be desired, or even
whether some comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we
must determine whether the judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it
denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” (People v. Snow

                                       11
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78.) Son has failed to demonstrate a due process
violation.9
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on
appeal.

                                                  SIMONS, Acting P.J.

We concur.

BURNS, J.
CHOU, J.

(A163634)

      9 We therefore need not and do not decide whether the claim is

forfeited, as Husband contends. Son’s request that the matter be remanded
to a different bench officer is denied.

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