Court Opinion

ID: 9579970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:00:29.477812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:56.063636
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe the self-executing provision modifying visitation in this *738case was permissible and a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In Scott v. Scott, 276 Ga. 372 (578 SE2d 876) (2003), this Court held that self-executing change of custody provisions are not expressly prohibited by statutory law and that they may be upheld so long as they properly consider the best interests of the child at the time the self-executing change would become effective. Id. at 375. Of course, we must look to the best interests of the child in determining both custody and visitation matters. See OCGA §§ 19-9-3 (a) (2); 19-9-22 (1); 19-9-41. See also Patel v. Patel, 276 Ga. 266, 267 (577 SE2d 587) (2003); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 272 Ga. 485, 486 (531 SE2d 714) (2000). However, when it comes to visitation, the best interests of the child test can be fulfilled simply by ensuring that the child is given an opportunity to form a reasonable relationship with the noncustodial parent. See Woodruff, supra. Thus, unlike custody, visitation may be granted under very flexible terms and gives rise to a greater discretion in the trial court. This Court recognized as much when it noted that it is “inappropriate to apply rigid or bright line rules developed within the context of custody to matters of visitation.” (Punctuation omitted.) Patel, supra.
A myriad of variables must be considered to modify custody following the relocation of a custodial parent which are inapplicable to the relocation of a noncustodial parent. For example, in determining whether the best interests of the child have been affected by the move of a custodial parent, a court must consider changes in school district and neighborhood safety. Scott, supra at 376. However, these changes are of almost no import when the move is made by the noncustodial parent because the child will not attend school in the district in which the noncustodial parent resides. Furthermore, whereas a distant move by a custodial parent may improve the child’s schooling, a distant move by a noncustodial parent who has visitation privileges during the school week would negatively impact the child’s ability to attend and excel in school.
Of course, the best interests of the child prevail over notions of judicial economy. Scott, supra at 377. However, judicial economy and the best interests of the child need not be mutually exclusive. With few exceptions, Georgia’s Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, OCGA § 19-9-40 et seq., provides that the court which made the initial custody determination will retain exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of the matter. Given the broad discretion of trial courts in regard to visitation and their continuing jurisdiction under most circumstances, it is reasonable to accommodate the *739concept of judicial economy in a self-executing visitation order so long as actions in the name of judicial economy comport with the best interests of the child.
Decided November 23, 2004.
Harmon, Smith, Bridges & Wilbanks, Archer D. Smith III, Fred P. Anthony, Jr., for appellant.
Alembik, Fine & Callner, Joseph M. Winter, Michelle G. Harrison, Kenneth W. Krontz, for appellee.
Reductions in the number of times parents drag visitation issues into court should ensure both predictability and continuity so that the “dynamic character of the children’s growth and development is not prejudiced ... by delayed change of [visitation] when that is needed or by the insecurity of inconclusiveness if [visitation] is to remain the same.” Scott, supra at 377, n. 5. When a trial court can accurately predict the effect of a future event on the best interests of the children, all parties will benefit from the security and conclusiveness of a self-executing order modifying visitation rights.
“Modification of child visitation rights is a matter of discretion with the trial court.” Parker v. Parker, 242 Ga. 781, 781 (251 SE2d 523) (1979). In the exercise of its discretion, a trial court must look to the unique situation of each individual case. Scott, supra at 373. In this case, the noncustodial parent testified that if she were awarded physical custody of the children she would take them back to Birmingham. She also testified that she was raised in Birmingham and that her family continued to live there; that she visited there almost every weekend; and that she continued to take her children there for regular medical and dental care. Asked if she would move to Birmingham if she was not awarded physical custody, the noncustodial parent could only say she was not sure. In addition, the guardian ad litem averred that in her opinion, the children would be impacted negatively if the noncustodial parent were to move to Birmingham and extended visitation privileges were to continue. Given these facts, I would hold that the self-executing visitation modifications were reasonably designed to comport with a highly likely and significant change in residence of the noncustodial parent and the resulting effects of this relocation on the education, well-being, and best interests, of the children.
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears and Justice Carley join in this dissent.