Court Opinion

ID: 9704095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:21:44.104042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:56.360384
License: Public Domain

Kelly, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority for a number of specific reasons. Because I believe that at least part of § 23 is a valid proposal, no irreparable injury is caused by permitting the entire proposal *240to be judged first by the people. I would reverse the lower court and dissolve the injunction.
1. A serious question arises in my mind concerning the standing of HRA to bring this suit. HRA is not a taxpayer. According to Minn. St. 462.575, it must pay a percentage of its rent revenues to the city for various services and facilities.' If a small suburb were to purchase police and fire protection from its large neighboring city, could it be said that the purchase of such services makes the suburb a “taxpayer”? HRA is a creation of the state and has no business wearing the cloak of a taxpayer.
HRA certainly has no standing in this case other than that based on the questionable claim that it is a taxpayer. To attack proposed or enacted legislation, a party must demonstrate that the legislation affects his personal rights in an unlawful manner. It is not sufficient that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.1 As to provisions 23(a) and 23(b), HRA has no possible claim to standing. As to provision 23(c), HRA has not sustained nor is it in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury from enforcement of this provision. Thus, in Lott v. Davidson, 261 Minn. 130, 143, 109 N. W. 2d 336, 345 (1961), Mr. Justice Murphy stated:
“* * * It is sufficient to say that it is an elementary doctrine of constitutional law that one who invokes the power of the court to declare a statute to be unconstitutional must be able to show not only that the statue is invalid but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury resulting from its enforcement and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”
While the individual plaintiffs as residents, voters, and taxpayers might have standing at some future time in the event the amendments are adopted and they sustain or are in immediate *241danger of sustaining injury because of some action taken under the authority thereof, they do not at this time have any right to attack their constitutionality.
2. The majority indicates that the matter of enjoining municipal elections “is one of judicial propriety” and infers that such power should be used only when a proposal is “manifestly unconstitutional.” This doctrine of restraint is abandoned when the majority strikes provision 23(b) in its entirety because it exceeds statutory authority and might create “chaotic” situations in city government. It is, of course, entirely possible that 23(b), which would give 5,000 citizens the power to call for a vote of the electorate on “any action” of the city, exceeds the home rule provisions of Minn. St. 410.20. I would prefer, however, to make that determination when the facts of a specific case are before the court. I am adverse to invalidating legislation (or in this case a charter amendment), proposed or enacted, which is in part within the authority of the policy makers. If a case arises which demonstrates the overbreadth of the proposal, it should be declared invalid only as it applies to the facts involved in that litigation if it may be valid as to other fact situations.2
While some legislation might be declared invalid for over-breadth because of “chilling effect” or for other compelling reasons, no such effect or reasons are apparent as to 23(b). Invalidating legislation or a proposed charter amendment because it exceeds the authority of the legislators or voters cannot help but create friction between the judiciary and the legislative body or voters. The act of a court in thwarting the will of the policy makers of the government is pretentious at best and should be exercised in an exact and restrained fashion. The act of denying more than 15,000 people the right to merely propose a law to their fellow citizens is a serious matter.
A second reason for judicial restraint is that any other course *242may lead the court into matters uncharted by the experience of the parties before them. To judge statutes and proposals in terms of hypothetical applications is to risk decisions founded on conjecture and uninformed by a record, briefs, and argument which shed light upon the practical application of the proposal.
When a law appears to exceed constitutional or statutory authority, a reviewing court should adopt a restrictive construction which will save the enactment. If provision 23(b) were properly before us, the court could hold that, as applied to an ordinance, the provision is valid. This restrictive construction would be preferable to striking the proposal in toto. As this court stated in City of St. Paul v. Dalsin, 245 Minn. 325, 330, 71 N. W. 2d 855, 859 (1955):
“* * * a legislative act may be unconstitutional and void in its application to some persons or separable subject matters and constitutional as to others.”3
3. The withdrawal of provision 23 (a) from public consideration is even more characteristic of impropriety. No one suggests any shortcoming of 23 (a), which allows proposals accompanied by 5,000 signatures to be voted upon by the general electorate. The question before the court is whether the petitioners would seek to have 23(a) alone be submitted to the public. The majority states that “[w]e cannot search the minds of those who signed the petition to ascertain their intent.” Yet, provision 23(d) clearly states:
“The provisions of Section 23 shall be severable and the invalidity of any one provision shall not affect the validity of the remainder of Section 23.”
To me, the intent of the 15,000 people who signed the petition for submission of the proposed amendment containing 23(d) is that provisions (a), (b), and (c) are separate and independent. The petitioners would rather that all of § 23 become law. That *243failing, provision 23(d) demonstrates that the enactment of anyone provision is to be preferred to none at all.
Provision 23(a) is not “emasculated” by the absence of either or both (b) and (c). The object of 23(a) is to permit a proposal signed by 5,000 people to go before the voters in an election. Minn. St. 410.20 expressly provides that a city may adopt such a procedure, commonly referred to as initiative. Why it should be struck down because of the removal of certain related measures is difficult to understand. While the three provisions may have been part of a certain goal, the severability clause of 23(d) demonstrates a specific intent which should not be ignored.
Since the lower court should not have enjoined the city from presenting provisions 23(a) and 23(b) to the public, no irreparable injury is caused by the presentation of provision 23(c). I would dissolve the injunction.
Mr. Justice MacLaughlin, not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

 Minnesota Assn. of Public Schools v. Hanson, 287 Minn. 415, 178 N. W. 2d 846 (1970); Lott v. Davidson, 261 Minn. 130, 109 N. W. 2d 336 (1961).

 See, generally, Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844; 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 147,194.

 See, also, State ex rel. Young v. Standard Oil Co. 111 Minn. 85, 126 N. W. 527 (1910); 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 194, note 16.