Court Opinion

ID: 9375974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 16:02:49.441857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.324343
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                         Opinion filed March 1, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                              No. 3D22-398
                       Lower Tribunal No. 17-26083
                          ________________

                             Maria Mesa, et al.,
                                Appellants,

                                     vs.

               Citizens Property Insurance Corporation,
                               Appellee.

      An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto
Diaz, Judge.

      Giasi Law, P.A., Melissa A. Giasi and Erin M. Berger (Tampa), for
appellants.

    Dutton Law Group, PA, and Rebecca Delaney and Scott W. Dutton
(Tampa), for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ.

     SCALES, J.
         In this first-party property insurance case, appellants Maria Mesa and

Roxana De Leon (“Insureds”), the plaintiffs below, appeal a final judgment

for appellee Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (“Citizens”), the

defendant below, rendered after a jury found that rainwater damage suffered

by Insureds’ home was not covered under Insureds’ property insurance

policy with Citizens. Underlying the jury’s verdict was a policy provision

excluding coverage for a loss caused by rainwater unless a covered peril

first damaged the home causing an opening in the home’s roof through which

the rainwater entered. Because Citizens’ primary rebuttal evidence

supporting the jury’s verdict on this pivotal fact issue was the inadmissible

hearsay testimony from Citizens’ corporate representative who, admittedly,

had no personal knowledge of the facts about which she was allowed to

testify, and because we are unable to conclude that such error was

harmless, we are compelled to reverse the judgment and remand for a new

trial.

         I.   RELEVANT BACKGROUND

         Citizens issued a property insurance policy for Insureds’ home for the

policy period between June 24, 2017, and June 24, 2018. The policy

provided coverage for a physical loss to the dwelling but, as relevant here,

excluded coverage for “loss . . . [c]aused by . . . [r]ain . . . unless a covered

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peril first damages the building causing an opening in a roof . . . and the rain

. . . enters through this opening.” On July 16, 2017, Insureds’ home was

damaged when rainwater entered through the home’s roof and damaged the

home’s interior.

      Insureds reported the loss to Citizens and, on August 1, 2017, Citizens’

field adjuster inspected the property. The field adjuster took photographs of

the roof and prepared a report that documented the field adjuster’s findings.

Based solely on the field adjuster’s documentation of wear and tear, and the

field adjuster’s determination that there was no wind-created opening in the

roof, Citizens denied coverage for the claim on August 14, 2017.

      On November 9, 2017, Insureds filed this first-party action against

Citizens in the Miami-Dade County circuit court seeking coverage for their

loss. Citizens’ amended answer and affirmative defenses denied that there

was coverage, in part, based on the above referenced policy exclusion. The

trial court held a three-day jury trial on November 1-3, 2021. The primary

issue at trial was whether, on July 16, 2017, wind (the covered peril) had

created an opening in the insured home’s roof through which the rainwater

then entered.

      To this end, both sides presented expert testimony from a

meteorologist and an engineer. Insureds also presented the testimony of

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their public adjuster, who had inspected the property on November 21, 2019,

nearly two years after the loss. Importantly, Citizens’ field adjuster did not

testify at trial. Nor did Citizens seek to introduce the field adjuster’s report

into evidence as a business record. Rather, Citizens presented the testimony

of Alicia Wright, who identified herself as “the corporate representative for

Citizens.” Wright testified that she had reviewed the claim file and, as “the

voice of Citizens,” had “come to advise [the jury] what happened throughout

the claim.”

      Over Insureds’ counsel’s objection that “the witness does not have

personal knowledge,” the trial court permitted Wright to testify as to the

contents of the field adjuster’s report. Specifically, Wright testified that, after

viewing the field adjuster’s photos (that were admitted at trial) and the field

adjuster’s “documented . . . findings within the file” – including documentation

of “wear and tear, prior repairs to the roof, deteriorated areas on the roof[,] .

. . water pooling on the roof” and “no evidence of wind damage to the roof”

– Citizens had agreed with the field adjuster’s determination that “during his

inspection, he didn’t find any covered loss to the roof.”

      At the close of the evidence and consistent with the subject policy

exclusion, the trial court instructed the jury that “Plaintiffs have the burden of

proof by the greater weight of the evidence that their property incurred a

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direct physical loss for a covered peril on July 16, 2017 and that a covered

peril caused an opening in the roof which allowed rain to enter and that

opening caused damage to the interior of the property.” The jury returned a

verdict in favor of Citizens. Insureds thereafter filed a motion for new trial

arguing, among other things, that a new trial was warranted because the trial

court erred in permitting Wright, over the objection that Wright lacked

personal knowledge, to testify as to the contents of, and relay to the jury the

opinions contained within, the field adjuster’s report. The trial court denied

the motion for new trial and entered the challenged judgment that Insureds

have timely appealed.

      II. ANALYSIS1

      A. Inadmissible Hearsay Testimony

      We agree with Insureds that the trial court abused its discretion by

permitting what was clearly inadmissible hearsay testimony from Citizens’

corporate representative, Alicia Wright. See §90.604, Fla. Stat. (2021)

(“Except as otherwise provided in s. 90.702, a witness may not testify to a

matter unless evidence is introduced which is sufficient to support a finding

1
  “Our standard of review on a trial court’s evidentiary rulings is abuse of
discretion.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Ledoux, 230 So. 3d 530, 536 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2017). We also review the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial
for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 538.

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that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”); § 90.801(1)(c), Fla.

Stat. (2021) (“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted.”). Indeed, in its answer brief, Citizens seems to

concede the error, citing as authority for the testimony only Florida Rule of

Civil Procedure 1.310(b)(6). 2 While this rule permits a corporation to

designate an individual to appear at a deposition to “testify about matters

known or reasonably available to the organization,” Id., Citizens cites to no

authority that this discovery rule is tantamount to a trial hearsay exception.

2
  Governing “Depositions Upon Oral Examination,” rule 1.310 provides, in
relevant part:

      (b) Notice; Method of Taking; Production at Deposition.

            ....

      (6) In the notice a party may name as the deponent a public or
      private corporation, a partnership or association, or a
      governmental agency, and designate with reasonable
      particularity the matters on which examination is requested. The
      organization so named must designate one or more officers,
      directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to
      do so, to testify on its behalf and may state the matters on which
      each person designated will testify. The persons so designated
      must testify about matters known or reasonably available to the
      organization. This subdivision does not preclude taking a
      deposition by any other procedure authorized in these rules.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(6).

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In fact, it is well established that a trial court reversibly errs by allowing a

witness to testify as to the contents of a business record when the business

record itself is not entered into evidence. See Mace v. M&T Bank, 292 So.

3d 1215, 1220 ( Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (“[T]he Bank did not present any

testimony by a witness with personal knowledge that the [default] letter was

mailed. . . . [Rather,] any information she did have came from conversations

she had with someone . . . and her review of Bank records that were not

offered or admitted into evidence. It should go without saying (1) that

testimony by a witness without personal knowledge is inadmissible, and (2)

that testimony based on what other people or documents say, when offered

for the truth of the matter, is hearsay and, when unaccompanied by any

showing that an exception to the hearsay rule applies, is inadmissible.”)

(citations omitted); Roberts v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co., 337 So. 3d 889, 891 (Fla.

2d DCA 2022) (“But ‘[w]hile the business-records exception . . . allows the

admission of ‘[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,’ it does

not authorize hearsay testimony concerning the contents of business

records which have not been admitted into evidence.” (quoting Thompson v.

State, 705 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998))).

      Absent Citizens’ introduction of its field adjuster’s report at trial as a

business record, Wright was only competent to testify from her personal

                                       7
knowledge of the condition of the home’s roof. See Roberts, 337 So. 3d at

892 (“Because Direct General did not offer any records from the underwriting

file, the trial court’s reliance on the business records exception in

establishing the admissibility of Robison’s deposition testimony was

misplaced. Nevertheless, we affirm the trial court's entry of final summary

judgment based on our conclusion that Robison’s testimony was admissible

because she was competent to testify from personal knowledge. Robison is

the manager of Direct General’s underwriting department, and her testimony

reflected her familiarity with Direct General’s underwriting guidelines, the

program used to calculate insurance premiums, and the process for running

additional premium quotes. And prior to her deposition, she reviewed the

underwriting file in this case. This provided a sufficient basis for Robison to

testify from personal knowledge on this issue.”) (citations and footnote

omitted). Citizens did not seek to establish that Wright possessed such

personal knowledge at trial, nor did Wright’s testimony reveal that she was

testifying based on personal knowledge; 3 therefore, the trial court erred by

3
   When asked, at trial, to explain her role as Citizens’ corporate
representative, Wright testified that “throughout the claim process, there may
be many individuals that review the claim, adjust the claim, things of that
nature” and that “instead of calling all of those individuals in, I’m more of the
voice of Citizens and I come to advise [the jury] what happened throughout
the claim.”

                                       8
permitting Wright’s testimony as to the contents of, and opinions contained

within, the field adjuster’s report.

      B. Harmless Error Analysis

      We also do not see how the trial court’s error in permitting Wright’s

hearsay testimony was harmless. See § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (2021); R.J.

Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hamilton, 316 So. 3d 338, 342 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021)

(“Errors in evidentiary rulings in civil cases are subject to harmless error

analysis.”). “To test for harmless error [in a civil case], the beneficiary of the

error has the burden to prove that the error complained of did not contribute

to the verdict. Alternatively stated, the beneficiary of the error must prove

that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the

verdict.” Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251, 1256 (Fla. 2014).

“As the appellate court evaluates whether the beneficiary of the error has

satisfied its burden, the court’s obligation is to focus on the effect of the error

on the trier-of-fact and avoid engaging in an analysis that looks only to the

result in order to determine harmless error.” Id.

      At trial, the parties agreed that the subject “policy was in effect when

the loss was incurred,” and that a policy “exclusion applied as the loss

occurred due to rain causing water damage to the interior of the home.”

Empire Pro Restoration, Inc. v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 322 So. 3d 96, 98

                                        9
(Fla. 4th DCA 2021). Insureds, therefore, bore the trial burden of establishing

an exception to the policy exclusion for there to be coverage for their loss,

i.e., that a covered peril (wind) caused an opening in the roof of their home

through which the rainwater entered. Id.; see also Fla. Windstorm

Underwriting v. Gajwani, 934 So. 2d 501, 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)

(recognizing, with respect to a similar policy provision, that “the insured has

the burden to prove an exception to an exclusion contained within an

insurance policy”).

      Citing to “conflicting testimony from two or more witnesses as to

whether [Insureds] had suffered a covered loss,” Citizens’ answer brief tacitly

concedes that Insureds – through the testimony of Insureds’ expert

witnesses and their public adjuster – presented sufficient evidence below to

submit this coverage issue to the jury. We agree. Tellingly absent, though,

from Citizens’ briefing to this Court is any argument suggesting that the

erroneous admission of Wright’s hearsay testimony was harmless in light of

Insureds’ evidence. We conclude that, on the facts of this case, the

erroneous admission of Wright’s hearsay testimony was not harmless.

      Insureds’ property incurred water damage on July 16, 2017. Citizens’

field adjuster inspected the roof on August 1, 2017. Citizens denied the claim

on August 14, 2017. According to Wright’s testimony, Citizens denied the

                                      10
claim based solely on the field adjuster’s determination that the roof had

wear and tear and that wind did not create an opening in the roof that allowed

the rainwater to enter the property’s interior. While Citizens did present

expert witnesses at trial to support its argument that there was no wind-

created opening in the roof, those experts did not have the opportunity to

inspect the roof near the time that Insureds made their claim 4 and their expert

opinions did not have an impact on Citizens’ decision to deny the claim. On

this record, Citizens failed to prove that there is no reasonable possibility that

Wright’s hearsay testimony contributed to the jury verdict in Citizens’ favor.

See Hamilton, 316 So. 3d at 342-43 (concluding that the erroneous

admission of hearsay testimony was not harmless because, “considering the

strong evidentiary value of Mrs. Hamilton’s statement, it cannot be said there

is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict”).

4
  At trial, Citizens introduced the deposition testimony of the roofer whom
Insureds had hired to repair the roof near the time that Insureds discovered
the roof leak. At his deposition, the roofer testified to the general condition of
the roof, the location of the leak, and the roof repairs that he had performed.
Aside, however, from a vague question asking whether “there was damage
from some sort of storm,” – the roofer answered “no” – the roofer was not
asked to explain the basis for his “no” answer or whether the roof had a wind-
created opening. This vague deposition testimony did not render harmless
the erroneous introduction of Wright’s testimony.

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      We are therefore compelled to reverse the final judgment for Citizens

and remand for a new trial. 5

      Reversed and remanded.

5
 Given our resolution, we need not, and therefore do not, reach the other
appellate issues raised by Insureds.

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