Court Opinion

ID: 9385159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 00:00:25.191157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.286119
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50092         Document: 00516702410             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/05/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                          April 5, 2023
                                       No. 22-50092
                                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________
                                                                                             Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Brandon Corey Cunningham,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 2:19-CR-2051-1
                      ______________________________

   Before King, Jones, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Brandon Cunningham was convicted of conspiring to transport illegal
   aliens and sentenced to 45 months in prison. On appeal, Cunningham argues
   his sentence was wrongly enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6) for
   intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily
   injury. We affirm.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50092     Document: 00516702410             Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/05/2023

                                      No. 22-50092

                                           I.
          In the middle of the night on August 10, 2019, United States Border
   Patrol agents saw a Jeep Grand Cherokee pass by, abruptly turn around, and
   come to a stop near the agents. The agents made contact with the Jeep,
   identifying Cunningham as the driver and co-defendant Angel Alexander De
   Leon as the passenger. The agents observed that the Jeep’s back seats were
   folded down flat and heard a cell phone ringing in the brush nearby. After one
   of the agents pointed a flashlight towards the ringing sound, De Leon took off
   running, while telling Cunningham to “run, motherf--ker, run.”
   Cunningham remained seated and was detained.
          Upon locating the ringing phone, the agents discovered “WhatsApp”
   messages with GPS coordinates to a location a few hundred yards away. They
   went there and found several people hunkered down in the brush. The people
   scattered once the agents identified themselves as Border Patrol. One
   woman, who admitted to being a Guatemalan citizen illegally present in the
   United States, was apprehended. And after a brief search, three more of the
   individuals—also illegal aliens—were apprehended. On the way to the
   Border Patrol station, the agents found De Leon walking along the road and
   placed him under arrest as well.
          Border Patrol questioned the apprehended aliens, who all explained
   that they paid $3,000 to $5,000 each to be smuggled into the United States.
   Apparently, their foot guide had disappeared and abandoned the group alone
   in the brush. The group became lost and ran out of water, with one woman
   becoming ill and passing out. The investigation revealed that the group had
   not been in contact with the individuals who were going to pick them up and
   were unable to identify them. Eventually, though, agents located phone calls
   and text messages between Cunningham and De Leon, as well as between
   Cunningham and an unidentified individual—all of which referred to the

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   illegal alien smuggling venture. As it turns out, Cunningham was going to be
   paid $3,500 and De Leon $400 to drive the aliens to a Sonic restaurant in
   Uvalde, Texas.
             Cunningham insisted on a jury trial. At trial, further details of the
   scheme came to light. De Leon testified that, on the day he and Cunningham
   were arrested, he had taken cocaine and Cunningham had consumed sleeping
   pills. He reported that when they pulled over to the side where they
   subsequently encountered the Border Patrol agents, they were supposed to
   switch drivers. The reason for this was that Cunningham had been swerving
   in the vehicle after taking the sleeping pills. The jury found Cunningham
   guilty.
             The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) assigned Cunningham a
   total offense level of 20, which included a six-point increase under U.S.S.G.
   § 2L1.1(b)(6). That provision calls for a sentencing enhancement when “the
   offense involved intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death
   or serious bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6). The PSR explained that
   factors contributing to this designation included: the foot guide’s
   disappearance; the group’s running out of water and an alien’s becoming ill;
   and the fact that De Leon and Cunningham were under the influence of
   cocaine and sleep medication, respectively. This yielded a guideline
   imprisonment range of 41 to 51 months.
             Cunningham filed written objections to the PSR, which he re-urged at
   sentencing. He argued that the § 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement should not apply
   because neither he nor his co-defendant caused the illegal aliens to run out of
   water or become ill. He also observed that he had taken only the sleep
   medication, not the cocaine. The district court overruled Cunningham’s
   objections. While not disclaiming reliance on the other factors underlying the
   PSR’s § 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement, the court focused primarily on

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   Cunningham’s “being under the influence and driving while intoxicated.”
   Cunningham received a within-guidelines sentence of 45 months in prison,
   along with three years of supervised release.
          Cunningham timely appealed.
                                           II.
          “We review a district court’s interpretation or application of the
   Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and its factual findings for clear error.”
   United States v. Muniz, 803 F.3d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 2015). Any reasonable
   inferences drawn from these factual findings are reviewed for clear error as
   well. United States v. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 2014).
   “Under the clearly erroneous standard, we will uphold a finding so long as it
   is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Ibid. (quoting United States v.
   Ekanem, 555 F.3d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 2009)). Sentencing enhancements must
   be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Luyten, 966
   F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 2020). And “[w]e may affirm on any ground
   supported by the record.” Ibid.
                                          III.
          Section 2L1.1(b)(6) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a two-level
   enhancement to the base offense level for smuggling, transporting, or
   harboring an illegal alien if the offense “involved intentionally or recklessly
   creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another
   person.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6). But where, as here, the resulting offense
   level is less than level 18, the offense level is increased to 18. Ibid.
          The commentary to this guideline provides non-exhaustive and
   illustrative examples of conduct warranting the enhancement. Luyten, 966
   F.3d at 333. These examples include:

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          [1] transporting persons in the trunk or engine compartment of
          a motor vehicle;
          [2] carrying substantially more passengers than the rated
          capacity of a motor vehicle or vessel;
          [3] harboring persons in a crowded, dangerous, or inhumane
          condition; or
          [4] guiding persons through, or abandoning persons in, a
          dangerous or remote geographic area without adequate food,
          water, clothing, or protection from the elements.
   U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1 cmt. n.3. Although the commentary and caselaw can
   provide useful examples such as these, this court has “avoided creating
   bright-line rules for this provision.” United States v. Maldonado-Ochoa, 844
   F.3d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 2016). This is because applying § 2L1.1(b)(6)
   “requires a fact-specific inquiry.” United States v. Mata, 624 F.3d 170, 174
   (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Zuniga-Amezquita, 468 F.3d 886,
   889 (5th Cir. 2006)). The provision is intended, after all, to apply to “a wide
   variety of conduct.” Ibid. (quoting U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual
   § 2L1.1 cmt. 5 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2009)). So, while we consider
   examples, we focus primarily on the “specifics of the situation.” United
   States v. Mateo Garza, 541 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 2008).
          Cunningham argues that the district court erred by adopting a per se
   rule that merely ingesting a sleep aid creates a substantial risk of death or
   serious bodily injury. He relies primarily on Mateo Garza, in which the
   district court “premised its ruling on the notion that transporting aliens
   through the brush necessarily and always involves subjecting them to a
   substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.” Ibid. Our court responded
   that it was “not enough to say . . . that traversing an entire geographical
   region is inherently dangerous.” Ibid. Other facts, such as the heat, if

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   considered in tandem, may have justified the enhancement. See id. at 295.
   But because “[t]he court did not specifically base its sentence on those facts
   but instead on the very fact of traveling through the brush,” our court found
   that relying on a single factor improperly created a per se rule, and so reversed.
   Ibid. Cunningham analogizes Mateo Garza’s logic to this case, arguing the
   district court inappropriately created a per se rule focused on his taking sleep
   aids to the exclusion of any other factor.
          We disagree. The district court did not create a per se rule about sleep
   aids alone but rather considered that fact as applied to the specific contours
   of this case. See United States v. Solis-Garcia, 420 F.3d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 2005)
   (“Defining the contours of this enhancement is dependent upon carefully
   applying the words of the guideline in a case-specific analysis.”). For
   example, the district court observed that, after Cunningham took the sleep
   aid, “he was starting to fall asleep and he was swerving on the road.” In other
   words, the sleep aid actually had an effect on Cunningham, which resulted in
   his dangerous driving. Cf. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008)
   (“Drunk driving is an extremely dangerous crime.”). What’s more, contrary
   to Cunningham’s suggestions, the district court did not disclaim reliance on
   other factors identified in the PSR—including the foot guide’s
   disappearance, the aliens’ running out of water, and an alien’s becoming ill.
   The district court only stated that it was relying on the “driving while
   intoxicated more than anything” and that it was “not so much relying on” the
   other factors. It did not disclaim them altogether. Accordingly, we reject
   Cunningham’s argument.
          Cunningham further argues that there is insufficient evidence to
   suggest that his conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily
   harm. He cites the PSR, which stated that “Cunningham began to fall asleep
   and was swerving on the road, and [the co-defendants] pulled over to the side
   where they were subsequently encountered by [Border Patrol] agents.”

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   Cunningham suggests this is not enough because he “was not speeding, off-
   roading, fleeing . . . or the like.” United States v. Ramirez, 37 F.4th 233, 237
   (5th Cir. 2022) (finding an application of § 2L1.1(b)(6) to be improper). Nor
   were there illegal aliens in the Jeep at the time of the misconduct.
          We again disagree. “The actual results of the defendant’s conduct are
   irrelevant.” United States v. Ruiz-Hernandez, 890 F.3d 202, 212 (5th Cir.
   2018). What matters is the risk of harm, not actual harm. Ibid. (“[T]he
   enhancement applies for creating a risk of harm; no harm at all need actually
   occur to warrant its application.”). But for the Border Patrol’s intervention,
   Cunningham would have presumably continued to transport the illegal aliens
   to their destination while swerving and nodding off late at night. That
   Cunningham and De Leon intended to switch driving duties only adds to the
   risks; De Leon’s driving would likely have been similarly impaired by his
   cocaine use. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in enhancing
   Cunningham’s sentence under § 2L1.1(b)(6).
                                                                   AFFIRMED.

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