Court Opinion

ID: 9553979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:38:34.090412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:42.115427
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
dissenting,
with whom LEHMAN, Justice, joins.
I respectfully dissent. This case serves to highlight several concerns I have about summary judgment decision-making with respect to claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The concerns, which are inter-related, have to do with the court’s role in determining the sufficiency of the evidence and the court’s establishment and principled application of standards relating to the nature of the actor’s alleged conduct and to the level of severity of the plaintiffs alleged emotional reaction to the alleged conduct.
In this case, the dispositive issues are (1) whether an impartial jury could reasonably view Officer Lawson’s alleged conduct, as described by Ms. Garcia, as extreme and outrageous, and (2) whether an impartial jury could reasonably view Ms. Garcia’s emotional reaction to Officer Lawson’s alleged conduct, as described by Ms. Garcia, as severe. Having concluded as a matter of law that Officer Lawson’s alleged conduct “was not ... what we would characterize as being beyond all possible bounds of decency, atrocious, or utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” the majority does not address the second issue of Ms. Garcia’s severe emotional distress. (Emphasis added).
*1169Focusing on the first issue, then, what is the legal standard of measurement used by the court to characterize Officer Lawson’s alleged conduct? I find no standard stated in the opinion. Is the standard objective or subjective? Is “outrageousness” in the eye of the beholder? A few years ago we had a similar problem in Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo.1994). In that case, against my dissent, this court reversed a summary judgment in favor of an employer, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning the employer’s conduct, before and after termination of employment, toward an employee and concerning the employee’s emotional reaction to that conduct. One searches that opinion in vain for a standard against which to measure the employer’s conduct. Should the standard established and applied in an employer-employee case be the same as the standard established and applied in a police officer-citizen/crime victim case? It seems to me we must establish useful and helpful standards against which to measure conduct and emotional reaction to conduct because we strive to make principled decision-making in order to treat similarly situated citizens similarly. The result in this case must be better explained than to say Officer Lawson’s conduct was not outrageous because a majority of this court’s members are not sufficiently offended by it. The result in Wilder must be better explained than to say the employer’s conduct was outrageous because a majority of this court’s members were sufficiently offended by it. We must have a rule of law, not a rule of man. I fear what others have feared:
[T]he Court embarks on what I predict will be an endless wandering over a sea of factual circumstances, meandering this way and that, blown about by bias and inclination, and guided by nothing steadier than the personal preferences of the helmsmen, who change with every watch.
Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex.1993) (Hecht, Justice, concurring).
With respect to the establishment and application of standards in this area of the law, several courts have risen to the task. From these cases, an analytical framework emerges, one that uses several factors to assist the court in determining whether the particular conduct in question is outrageous in nature under the circumstances:
1. The actor is in a position of authority and trust. Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 154 Vt. 284, 576 A.2d 441, 448 (1990) (abuse of authority in employer-employee setting); Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312-17 (D.C.App.1994) (police officer); Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill.2d 374, 204 Ill.Dec. 274, 641 N.E.2d 498, 507-08 (1994) (police officer).
2. The plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress and the actor knows, or should know, of that condition. Doe, 204 Ill.Dec. 274, 641 N.E.2d at 507-08; Drejza, 650 A.2d at 1312-17; Denton v. Chittenden Bank, 163 Vt. 62, 655 A.2d 703, 707 (1994); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 204 Ill.App.3d 235, 149 Ill.Dec. 549, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (1990).
And see generally Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 Md. L.Rev. 183, 200-207 (1995); and Angela M. Elsperger, Comment, Damages — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Workplace: Defining Extreme and Outrageous Conduct in North Dakota’s Job Description, 70 N.D. L.Rev. 187, 194-95 (1994).
Applying the above and foregoing factors to the evidence taken in the light most favorable to Ms. Garcia, I conclude that reasonable persons could differ in their conclusion as to whether Officer Lawson’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. As an investigating police officer, he was in a position of authority and trust with respect to Ms. Garcia. He knew Ms. Garcia was particularly susceptible to emotional distress because of the violent crimes of which she was the victim. Considering the demeaning manner in which he dealt with her, his reference to another woman’s breasts, and his expression of interest in initiating a personal relationship with Ms. Garcia, an average member of the community would no doubt resent a police officer who treated a sexual assault victim in a rude and demeaning way and would *1170consider such conduct as extreme and outrageous.
With respect to the evidence of Ms. Garcia’s emotional distress, I have considered it in the light most favorable to Ms. Garcia, as I must, and have concluded that it passes muster for jury consideration.
I would reverse the summary judgment and remand for trial.