Court Opinion

ID: 9409398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 00:00:35.321611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.198560
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30446      Document: 00516823315          Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/17/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                             FILED
                                                                      July 17, 2023
                                   No. 21-30446
                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________
                                                                          Clerk

   Robert Parker,

                                                               Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                        versus

   James M. LeBlanc, Secretary of Department of Public Safety and
   Corrections,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Louisiana
                             USDC No. 3:18-CV-1030
                   ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:
          Robert Parker filed a Section 1983 civil rights suit in Louisiana state
   court against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
   Secretary James LeBlanc. Among other claims, Parker argues that LeBlanc
   violated his constitutional rights by misclassifying him as a sex offender and
   thereby illegally extending his detention in prison for 337 days past his release
   date. LeBlanc sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, but the district
   court denied the motion. On this interlocutory appeal, we AFFIRM.
Case: 21-30446     Document: 00516823315           Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                    No. 21-30446

          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          On December 21, 2016, Parker was arrested while on probation and
   placed in the Orleans Parish Prison. On March 27, 2017, a Louisiana state
   court sentenced Parker to two years of imprisonment for violating his
   probation but awarded him credit for the months he served in the parish
   prison. Three days later, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
   Corrections (“DPSC”) assumed custody of Parker.
          On May 4, 2017, a DPSC employee identified as “L. Cato”
   determined that Parker had a “Must Serve” date of October 9, 2017. Parker
   alleges he should have been released on that date. Sometime in September
   2017, however, DPSC employee Brenda Acklin reviewed Parker’s file,
   crossed out the October 9, 2017, date, then wrote above it an acronym for
   “unapproved sex offender registry plan.” Under Louisiana law, the DPSC
   must verify the legality of sex offenders’ post-release residences before they
   can be released from prison. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:543.
          During the course of his imprisonment at Richwood Correctional
   Center, Parker submitted several inmate request forms. In his first two
   requests, Parker asked to meet with Warden Ray Hanson about his release
   date. He filed two other forms in an attempt to provide the DPSC with
   addresses detailing where he could reside upon his release. Parker also
   consistently disputed that he was a sex offender.
          On August 24, 2018, a public defender, Aaron Zagory, who had
   previously represented Parker, emailed the reentry program manager for the
   DPSC probation and parole division. Zagory’s email stated that he did not
   “believe Mr. Parker has a conviction that requires him to register as a sex
   offender.” Zagory did note that Parker had been convicted in 1997 of
   indecent behavior with a juvenile and unauthorized entry into an inhabited

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   dwelling, but that Parker “was permitted to withdraw that plea and pleaded
   guilty to a single amended count of simple burglary.”
          Rebecca Ikner, the reentry program director for the DPSC probation
   and parole division, responded that she was not involved in sex offender cases
   or time computation.      Ikner copied her supervisor on the reply, who
   forwarded it to Charles Romero, the sex offender unit coordinator of the
   DPSC’s probation and parole office in New Orleans. Twelve days later, on
   September 5, 2018, Romero acknowledged the “honest mistake in the
   investigation” and explained that it had been corrected. Romero stated that
   “Mr. Parker can be released immediately (assuming there is nothing else
   holding him there)” and noted that Romero had informed the DPSC that
   Parker was not a sex offender. Parker was held an additional five days, until
   September 10, 2018, when he was finally released from prison.
          Parker filed a civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against the
   DPSC, Secretary of the DPSC James LeBlanc, Ray Hanson, Brenda Acklin,
   “Does 1-10,” and ABC Insurance Companies. Parker alleged that the
   defendants violated his constitutional rights by detaining him past his release
   date. He also claimed that the defendants committed similar violations
   against other state inmates. LeBlanc and the other defendants removed the
   case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction, specifically the
   claims Parker raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
          Parker filed a First Amended Complaint in April 2019. Hanson
   moved to dismiss the claims against him based upon misjoinder. The district
   court denied the motion but ordered Parker “to amend the operative
   complaint to add specificity and cure any deficiencies therein.” Parker then
   filed a Second Amended Complaint in November 2019.
          LeBlanc, the DPSC, and Acklin filed a motion to dismiss Parker’s
   claims against them. LeBlanc and Acklin argued that Parker failed to state a

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   claim upon which relief could be granted because they were entitled to
   qualified immunity. The district court again granted Parker leave to amend
   his complaint after holding that Parker’s Second Amended Complaint lacked
   sufficient detail and that Parker had not adequately alleged deliberate
   indifference in “fail[ing] to allege, even on information and belief, that
   LeBlanc was aware” of the deficiencies in the prison systems.
          Parker filed a Third Amended Complaint in August 2020. In his
   Third Amended Complaint, Parker cited three pieces of evidence to establish
   LeBlanc’s knowledge of deficiencies in the way the DPSC calculated and
   implemented release dates: (1) testimony by DPSC employees in unrelated
   cases regarding problems with the over-detention and release of inmates; (2)
   a 2018 newspaper opinion-editorial by Louisiana Attorney General Jeff
   Landry regarding the same issue; and (3) a legislative audit report. These had
   also been cited in his Second Amended Complaint. In his Third Amended
   Complaint, however, Parker alleged for the first time on information and
   belief that Defendant LeBlanc was aware of the deficiencies in the system and
   the specific evidence cited in the complaint. LeBlanc again moved to dismiss
   under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to cure the
   main deficiency identified by the district court in its previous order —
   namely, the lack of a pattern of similar constitutional violations.
          The district court denied in part LeBlanc’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion
   because Parker had “adequately pled that there were sufficiently similar prior
   incidents in sufficient number and of which LeBlanc was aware to overcome
   qualified immunity at this stage.” The court found that LeBlanc could not
   “seriously dispute (1) that the prior incidents were sufficient in number and
   (2) that LeBlanc did not have actual knowledge of them, particularly
   considering the allegations on information and belief that he knew about the
   Legislative Auditor’s report, Attorney General op-ed, and state court
   testimony.” LeBlanc filed a timely notice of appeal.

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                                   DISCUSSION
            We have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to
   review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified
   immunity when the resolution turns on an issue of law. See Orr v. Copeland,
   844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016); Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir.
   2008).
            Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissals when a complaint fails “to state a
   claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). This court
   reviews Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, “accepting all well-pleaded facts as
   true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.”
   Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and
   citation omitted). “In an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified
   immunity, we have jurisdiction to consider only whether a certain course of
   conduct would, as a matter of law, be objectively unreasonable in light of
   clearly established law.” Brown, 519 F.3d at 236 (quotation marks and
   citation omitted). A claim has facial plausibility “where a plaintiff pleads
   factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
   defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Morris, 739 F.3d at 745
   (quotation marks and citation omitted).
            “To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a
   violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States
   and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
   acting under color of state law.” Pratt v. Harris Cnty., 822 F.3d 174, 180 (5th
   Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).            The Fourteenth
   Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty,
   or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
   “Our precedent establishes that a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are
   timely released from prison.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir.

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   2011). Quite recently, and addressing the liability of this same defendant, we
   held that “it is without question that holding without legal notice a prisoner
   for a month beyond the expiration of his sentence constitutes a denial of due
   process.” Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 188 (5th Cir. 2022).
          This analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we examine whether Parker
   has sufficiently alleged supervisory liability against LeBlanc. Second, we
   determine whether LeBlanc’s alleged conduct violated a clearly established
   constitutional right.
          I.     Has Parker sufficiently alleged supervisory liability?
          “Section 1983 does not create supervisory or respondeat superior
   liability.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002). Nonetheless,
   “[s]upervisory officials may be liable under § 1983 for their failure to adopt
   policies if that failure causally results in a constitutional injury.” Crittindon,
   37 F.4th at 186. “Liability only arises when the officials act, or fail to act,
   with ‘deliberate indifference,’ a ‘disregard [for] a known or obvious
   consequence of [their] action[s].’” Id. (quoting Porter, 659 F.3d at 446)
   (alterations in original). “[A] plaintiff must show either the supervisor
   personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that there is a
   sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the
   constitutional violation.” Evett v. Deep E. Tex. Reg’l Narcotics Trafficking
   Task Force, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citation
   omitted).
          To show a causal connection between the wrongful conduct of a
   supervisor and a constitutional violation, the plaintiff “must introduce
   evidence that each Defendant had ‘actual or constructive notice’ that their
   failure to adopt policies would result in constitutional violations.”
   Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186 (quoting Porter, 659 F.3d at 447). “A pattern of
   similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily

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   necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference.” Connick v. Thompson, 563
   U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Without notice
   that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers
   can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will
   cause violations of constitutional rights.” Id.
          As noted, Parker’s Third Amended Complaint cited three pieces of
   evidence to support his allegations that LeBlanc implemented deficient
   policies evinced by a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
   employees. See id. They are: (1) an October 2017 legislative audit report on
   the Louisiana DPSC entitled “CFE Management of Offender Data:
   Processes for Ensuring Accuracy Department of Corrections”; (2) a 2018
   editorial by Senator John Kennedy and Attorney General Landry entitled,
   “Criminal Justice Reform Actually Hurting Public Safety,” published in the
   newspaper “The Advocate”; and (3) testimony by DPSC employees
   admitting to rampant over-detention in a similar suit in Louisiana state court,
   Chowns v. LeBlanc, La. 37th JDC 26-932. Parker also alleges on information
   and belief that Defendant LeBlanc was aware of the three items we just
   enumerated.
          LeBlanc argues that this complaint did not adequately allege the
   requisite “pattern” of constitutional violations by untrained employees
   “ordinarily necessary” under Connick to establish deliberate indifference for
   purposes of failure to train. See 563 U.S. at 62. He contends that Parker’s
   allegations “identify issues of an entirely different kind than the one that
   allegedly caused Parker to spend too much time incarcerated.” Essentially,
   LeBlanc insists that there is a meaningful distinction between Parker’s over-
   detention due to his alleged misclassification as a sex offender, as opposed to
   over-detention due to miscalculations of his sentence or his status being
   generally lost in the system.

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          The district court “decline[d] to draw the line as finely as LeBlanc
   advances and limit the types of problems involved solely to those instances
   where individuals have been misclassified as sexual offenders.” The court
   noted that the real problem alleged in the Legislative Audit report was the
   Department “not knowing when [inmates’] proper release date was” and
   that “inmate sentences have been ‘done wrong’” as stated in testimony from
   Chowns v. LeBlanc. We agree with the district court’s assessment.
          In a similar case about over-detention — against the same defendant
   — the plaintiff also relied on a study to show a pattern of constitutional
   violations and allege supervisory liability. See Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186–87.
   We held that “a reasonable jury could find that Defendants knew of a
   ‘pattern of similar constitutional violations,’ such that their inaction
   amounted to a disregard of an obvious risk.” Id. at 187. The court there
   noted that LeBlanc was “in a position to adopt policies that would address
   this delay” and that he could not “avoid the evidence that the study exposed
   unlawful detentions of prisoners.” Id. Much of the same is true here, though
   unlike in Crittindon, this case is merely at the 12(b)(6) stage, rather than a
   motion for summary judgment. See id. at 185. What LeBlanc may have done
   to comply with his supervisory obligations is not yet part of the record.
   Further, Parker has not had the opportunity to conduct discovery. His
   complaint alleges that
          despite his release date being properly calculated on the jail forms, he
          was not released for 337 days. For some unknown reason, when his
          properly calculated release date arrived, he was not released despite
          his numerous attempts to correct the issue. One possible reason for
          the over-detention is mistakenly classifying him as a sex offender and
          then failing to release him even after he provided the addresses
          requested.
          The allegations in the complaint are that there is a “pattern of over-
   detention” that renders Parker’s own case “neither unique nor even

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   unusual.” The standard for deliberate indifference requires only a “pattern
   of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees,” rather than an
   exact duplication. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added). Parker has
   alleged that he was detained for 337 days past his release date and has cited
   three pieces of evidence to support his allegations that LeBlanc was aware of
   the deficiencies of implemented policies that routinely led to errors like the
   one that violated his constitutional rights. See id.
           On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we accept “all well-pleaded facts as true
   and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Morris,
   739 F.3d at 745 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim has facial
   plausibility when a plaintiff has pled “factual content” that allows us “to
   draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
   alleged.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree with Parker
   that his complaint sufficiently alleges the requisite “pattern” of
   constitutional violations by untrained employees to establish deliberate
   indifference for purposes of failure to train. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. We
   therefore hold that his complaint should proceed to the next stage of
   litigation, i.e., tailored discovery. See Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th
   Cir. 2022).
           II.     Did LeBlanc allegedly violate a right that was “clearly established”
                   at the time of the alleged misconduct?
           Qualified immunity involves answering two questions: (1) “whether
   the officer violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “whether the ‘right at
   issue was “clearly established” at the time of [the] alleged misconduct.’” 1

           _____________________
           1 There is variance in this circuit’s caselaw when articulating the second part of the

   analysis for qualified immunity. An objective-unreasonableness component, dating from
   some of our older caselaw, is sometimes applied to require a finding that “the defendant’s
   actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the

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   Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pearson v.
   Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (alterations in original)). To determine
   whether a right is “clearly established,” we “first look[] to Supreme Court
   precedent and then to our own.” Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186 (quotation marks
   and citation omitted). “Ultimately, the touchstone is fair warning: The law
   can be clearly established despite notable factual distinctions between the
   precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior
   decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated
   constitutional rights.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
           Analyzing the first part of the test is not difficult here: the Fourteenth
   Amendment guarantees that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty,
   or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
   “Detention of a prisoner thirty days beyond the expiration of his sentence in
   the absence of a facially valid court order or warrant constitutes a deprivation
   of due process.” Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980). Parker
   was detained 337 days past his release date. His pleading also adequately
   alleged supervisory liability for LeBlanc. See infra.
           The second part of the test is “whether the right at issue was clearly
   established at the time of [the] alleged misconduct.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874

           _____________________
   violation.” See Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. That language is a vestige of older case law that
   predates the Supreme Court’s current test adopted in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001),
   and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). See, e.g., Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918
   F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1990). Another circuit has similar language in some of its
   precedents but rejected it: “the test for qualified immunity has only two prongs — whether
   the defendant violated a constitutional right and whether the right at issue was clearly
   established; there is no separate ‘objective unreasonableness’ prong.” See Brown v. Lewis,
   779 F.3d 401, 417 (6th Cir. 2015). We cannot precedentially resolve conflicting caselaw
   today, but we mention one of our recent decisions that also opined there is no “standalone
   ‘objective reasonableness’ element to the Supreme Court’s two-pronged test for qualified
   immunity.” See Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 251 n.10 (5th Cir. 2023).

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   (quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). LeBlanc
   argues that the district court committed reversible error by not delineating
   between the two parts of the test for qualified immunity in its ruling or citing
   a case that would have put LeBlanc on notice that his conduct violated clearly
   established law. As support, he cites our decision in Joseph on behalf of Estate
   of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2020). In that case, on a motion
   for summary judgment, the district court had denied qualified immunity to a
   group of police officers in a failure to intervene claim. Id. at 328. We
   reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to
   demonstrate that the law was clearly established because the plaintiffs had
   failed to “identify a single case to support the argument that any reasonable
   officer would have known to intervene under these circumstances.” Id. at
   345. We explained that “[w]ith no briefing and no district-court analysis to
   review, we cannot justify a denial of qualified immunity on the grounds that
   clearly established law shows that every officer acted unconstitutionally in
   this case.” Id. at 346.
          Parker counters that this case is distinguishable because, here, “[t]he
   law is clear that a jailer like LeBlanc has a duty to ensure inmates are timely
   released from prison,” citing Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. We agree. Unlike the
   plaintiffs in Joseph, Parker identified cases in his district court briefing, as well
   as in his briefing to this court, that addressed the clearly-established-law
   prong of the qualified immunity analysis. In his complaint, Parker also stated
   that “[a]ccording to black-letter law, jailors may not imprison inmates longer
   than their sentences,” and that “[r]ecent Fifth Circuit precedent recognized
   that ‘There is a Clearly Established Right to Timely Release from Prison,’”
   again citing Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. We agree that there is sufficient clearly
   established law regarding the constitutional right to a timely release from
   prison and that Parker has sufficiently argued a violation of the right.

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          Finally, as he does with the question of supervisory liability, LeBlanc
   contends that defining the clearly established right as “timely release from
   prison” is overbroad. We have already rejected that argument above in the
   supervisory liability context, and we do so here as well. In Crittindon, we held
   that the defendants had “‘fair warning’ that their failure to address this delay
   would deny prisoners like Plaintiffs their immediate or near-immediate
   release upon conviction” because the defendants knew of the delays in
   prisoners’ timely releases. 37 F.4th at 188. Parker’s Third Amended
   Complaint cured the deficiency of his Second Amended Complaint in that he
   alleged on information and belief that LeBlanc was aware of DPSC
   employees’ testimonies in Chowns v. LeBlanc regarding the regular pattern of
   over-detentions, and that LeBlanc was aware of Attorney General Jeff
   Landry’s op-ed and the Legislative Auditor report regarding the DPSC’s
   problem in not knowing inmates’ proper release date. Parker’s complaint
   sufficiently alleges that LeBlanc violated a right that was clearly established.
          Construing these allegations in the light most favorable to Parker, we
   agree they are sufficient to support the argument that LeBlanc had “‘fair
   warning’ that [his] failure to address this delay would deny prisoners like
   [Parker] their immediate or near-immediate release upon conviction.” See
   Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 188.
          We close with a reminder. This appeal is from the denial of a motion
   to dismiss solely on the pleadings. LaBlanc’s defense is yet to be stated. It
   remains to be seen what an evidentiary record will show as to LeBlanc’s
   efforts to deal with the widespread problems in determining and enforcing
   release dates.
          AFFIRMED.

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