Court Opinion

ID: 9735340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:09:43.601854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:57.303081
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LEWIS, dissenting: I find myself reluctantly dissenting respectfully from my colleagues. The facts in this case as to the relationship between the plaintiff and his co-worker, the driver of the truck, are not disputed. Given the facts in this case, we do not need a jury to tell us what is really a matter of law. The majority points out that "[f]ellow servants are defined as those who are directly cooperating with each other in a particular task at the time of the injury.” (271 Ill. App. 3d at 939.) Plaintiff and defendant’s truck driver had a particular task, the task of delivering hogs. In fact, the even more particular task at the moment of the injury was the unloading of the hogs. Were plaintiff and defendant’s truck driver cooperating? The majority points out that "[plaintiff’s job was to raise the truck’s gate and release the hogs after Fred had backed the truck up against an unloading ramp.” (271 Ill. App. 3d at 937.) Plaintiff could not do his job without Fred backing the truck up to the unloading ramp, and Fred could not complete his job of delivering the hogs without plaintiff raising the truck’s gate and releasing the hogs. What more cooperation could you have? Plaintiff could not help Fred drive the truck, and apparently, Fred did not need to assist plaintiff with raising the gate. If this case is not a classic example of fellow servants, then there isn’t such a thing. If three workers were given the task of digging a hole, surely the courts would not require that all the workers have hold of the same shovel before we would find as a matter of law that the workers were fellow servants. It may be one person’s duty to shovel the dirt into a bucket, another person’s duty to raise the bucket up to ground level, and a third person’s duty to empty and return the bucket. "[A]ll reasonable and intelligent persons must reach the same conclusion,” according to the majority, before we can say as a matter of law that the workers were fellow servants. (271 Ill. App. 3d at 939.) Surely, there should be no doubt that the workers digging the hole were fellow servants, nor should there be any doubt that if two persons deliver the same hogs, at the same time, at the same place, for the same employer, and using the same truck, they are fellow servants as a matter of law. Finally, if you read the cases cited by the majority, in which the supreme court decided that facts presen ted a question for the jury, it is easily discernible that the workers involved had different jobs with different goals and purposes and were using entirely different equipment. See Bennett v. Chicago City Ry. Co. (1909), 243 Ill. 420, 90 N.E. 735; Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Morgenstern (1883), 106 Ill. 216. Plaintiff and the other corporate officers sought to avoid the cost of workers’ compensation insurance while they engaged in a very hazardous job, farming. While we may sympathize with plaintiff, we cannot let our sympathies cause a windfall for the plaintiff, an increase in liability for corporations, and an increase in insurance premiums to all Illinois corporations for general liability policies. Corporations and insurance companies should not be saddled with unanticipated increased risks of coverage for corporate officers injured while performing ordinary labor for the corporation. You have to pay for what you get.