Court Opinion

ID: 9592468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:14:35.382511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:03.152808
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
concurring.
I concur in Parts I and III of the majority opinion. Because I believe a caveat is necessary with respect to Part II, I concur in that part only with the following reservation.
The final decree of divorce recited that the wife “is awarded Seventeen (17%) Percent of [the husband’s] United States Air Force Retirement Pay if and when it is received by [the husband] without any limit on the total dollar amount received.” The retirement pay that a court may equitably distribute is limited, however, by federal law to that portion of the total monthly retired pay that is “disposable retired or retainer pay.” 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4).
[T]he Former Spouses’ Protection Act . . . authorizes state courts to treat “disposable retired or retainer pay” as community property [or property subject to equitable distribution]. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1). “‘Disposable retired or retainer pay’ ” is defined as “the total monthly retired or retainer pay to which a military member is entitled,” minus certain deductions. § 1408(a)(4) (1982 ed. and Supp. V).
Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 584-85 (1989) (footnote omitted). Thus, the final decree of divorce may not be read to subject the husband’s total retirement pay to the award of seventeen percent to the wife.
“[U]nder the Act’s plain and precise language, state courts have been granted the authority to treat disposable retired pay as . . . property [subject to equitable distribution]; they have not been granted the authority to treat total retired pay as . . . property [subject to equitable distribution].” Id. at 581. In creating benefits to counteract the decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), Congress also “place[d] limits on state courts *733designed to protect military retirees.” Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594. That limit may not be exceeded by an order of a state court. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979). Accordingly, because the final decree cannot confer a benefit that exceeds the authority granted by Congress in 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4), I concur in Part II only to the extent that the term “Retirement Pay” in the final decree is read to mean “disposable retired . . . pay.” Id.