Court Opinion

ID: 9899709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 16:07:09.092784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:47.414323
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                            No. 125,687

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                        STATE OF KANSAS,
                                            Appellee,

                                                  v.

                                     FRANCISCO V. ROBLES,
                                          Appellant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CHRISTOPHER M. MAGANA, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed November 17, 2023. Affirmed.

       Sam S. Kepfield, of Hutchinson, for appellant.

       Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before MALONE, P.J., GARDNER and CLINE, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: In December 2021, the State charged Francisco V. Robles with a
misdemeanor offense for violating a protective order. The district court held a hearing in
February 2022 to decide this case and to determine sentencing in two other cases. Robles
pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense, and the district court sentenced him to one
year in jail but granted him probation for one year.

       In April 2022, the State filed a probation violation warrant, alleging that police
arrested Robles for committing new crimes, including arson and possession of drug

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paraphernalia. The State also charged Robles with three felony offenses in a separate
case, and Robles pleaded guilty to those charges in May.

       The district court held a hearing in July 2022 to consider the State's violation
warrant and to sentence Robles in his new felony case. It found Robles had 30 previous
convictions and committed 3 new felonies while on probation. The district court also
found that Robles' criminal history spanned more than 22 years and included various
offenses including drug, property damage, and violent crimes. Based on these findings,
particularly the commission of new felony offenses, the district court revoked Robles'
probation and imposed his original sentence.

       Robles timely appeals the district court's revocation decision, arguing that the
court erred by not first imposing an intermediate sanction.

General Legal Principles

       Once a defendant receives probation, the defendant has a liberty interest in
remaining on probation and may have it revoked only if the defendant violates the
conditions of probation. State v. Hurley, 303 Kan. 575, 581, 363 P.3d 1095 (2016). Once
a probation violation is established, a district court has discretion to revoke probation
unless the court is otherwise limited by statute. State v. Tafolla, 315 Kan. 324, 328, 508
P.3d 351 (2022); see K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3716(b) and (c) (requiring graduated
sanctions before revocation at times). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion
if: (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law; or (3) it
is based on an error of fact. State v. Levy, 313 Kan. 232, 237, 485 P.3d 605 (2021).
Robles bears the burden of proving his claimed abuse of discretion. See State v. Crosby,
312 Kan. 630, 635, 479 P.3d 167 (2021).

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No Abuse of Discretion Shown

       Robles argues that the district court based its decision to revoke on an error of law
because it did not impose intermediate sanctions and did not reference any statute which
would allow it to bypass them. The State correctly contends that K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-
3716(b)(3)(B) governs this issue and does not require intermediate sanctions.

       Robles erroneously relies on K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3716(c) in arguing that the
district court's decision was legally flawed. Yet that subsection mandates intermediate
sanctions only when the original crime of conviction is a felony. And it provides an
exception, permitting revocation without an intermediate sanction if the probationer
commits a new crime while on probation, as Robles did here. See K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-
3716(c)(7)(C). But because Robles' original crime of conviction was a misdemeanor,
K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 22-3716(b)(3)(B) applies. Under that statute, once a probation
violation is established, the district court generally has discretion to continue or modify
probation, impose a jail sanction, or revoke probation and require the defendant to serve
their sentence. State v. Hunter, No. 117,304, 2017 WL 6062922, at *2 (Kan. App. 2017)
(unpublished opinion). No intermediate sanction was necessary. The district court thus
acted according to the authority provided under the applicable statute when it revoked
Robles' probation without first imposing intermediate sanctions.

       Robles does not challenge the district court's decision for any other reason. Thus,
finding no legal error, we affirm.

       Affirmed.

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