Court Opinion

ID: 9956921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:07:47.790119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:58.920882
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NOS. A-1387-22
                                                                    A-1395-22

S.H.S.,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.B.,

          Defendant-Appellant.

S.H.S.,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

P.S.,

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Submitted March 12, 2023 – Decided April 3, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Puglisi.
            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
            Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
            Docket Nos. FV-09-0385-23 and FV-09-0386-23.

            Dao Law, LLC, attorneys for appellants A.B. and P.S.
            (Phuong Vinh Dao, on the joint briefs).

            S.H.S., respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

      In these appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated for purposes

of this opinion, defendants A.B. and P.S. 1 appeal from the December 15, 2022

final restraining orders (FRO) entered against them in favor of plaintiff S.H.S.

pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

17 to -35. We affirm.

      Plaintiff and her husband P.B. were married in November 2021.

Defendants in this case are plaintiff's sister-in-law and brother-in-law. A.B. is

P.B.'s sister and P.S. is A.B.'s husband. Plaintiff and P.B. lived in defendants'

home in Jersey City from October 2021 to February 2022, when they moved to

their own apartment.

1
  We use initials to protect the parties' privacy and the confidentiality of the
proceedings in accordance with Rule 1:38-3(d)(10).

                                                                           A-1387-22
                                         2
      Plaintiff's testimony at the FRO hearing was as follows. On February 25,

2022, defendants came to plaintiff's apartment and told her she had to go with

them to their home for her safety. Defendants called her parents in India who

told her she had "no option" but to go with them. Upon arriving at defendants'

home, her husband and A.B. accused her of having an extramarital affair and

interrogated her about a phone call she had made a few weeks before while in

defendants' home. They told her they had recorded the phone conversation and

it would cost her $5,000 to delete the recording. The next morning, A.B. again

interrogated plaintiff about the phone call and accused her of having an affair,

which plaintiff denied. Plaintiff, who does not have a driver's license or a car,

repeatedly requested to go home or to her aunt's house but was denied.

Throughout the interrogation, defendants repeatedly called plaintiff's father,

imploring him to make plaintiff tell the truth.

      Later that day, plaintiff received notification that someone was trying to

access her MacBook without her permission. The interrogation continued and

plaintiff maintained her position that she was telling the truth. That evening,

plaintiff told defendants she wanted to go home to get books she needed to study

for her physical therapy exam. A.B. told plaintiff that she could not leave the

                                                                           A-1387-22
                                        3
house, but that her husband would bring her books. The interrogation continued

until around 10:30 p.m., when plaintiff went to bed.

      The next day, P.B. and A.B. told her that she could only leave the house

if she called her alleged paramour that night and pretended she was alone while

they listened in on the conversation. They also said she could only leave the

house if she left her phone behind.         Eventually, plaintiff agreed to those

conditions and left for home with her husband, leaving her phone behind.

      At their apartment, plaintiff began vomiting and P.B. called A.B., who

told him to bring plaintiff back to her home and not to call 911. P.B. took

plaintiff back to defendants' home to pick up her phone before going to plaintiff's

aunt's house. When they arrived at defendants' home, plaintiff's phone was not

in the bedroom where she had left it. She eventually found it in P.S.'s office,

where it was connected to his computer. P.B. then took plaintiff to her aunt's

house and took her apartment keys from her.

      Plaintiff reached out to P.B. during the next week but was unsuccessful.

Defendants told plaintiff and her parents to come to their home on March 5, and

plaintiff's parents immediately flew from India. When they arrived, P.B. again

confronted plaintiff about the alleged affair. Defendants then showed plaintiff's

parents photographs and text messages involving sexual content, which they had

                                                                             A-1387-22
                                        4
taken from plaintiff's phone, allegedly evidencing her affair. When plaintiff

tried to speak with P.B. alone, A.B. rushed into the room and spewed insults at

plaintiff.

       A few minutes later, P.S. presented plaintiff's parents with a document he

had prepared outlining the terms of plaintiff's separation from P.B. and

demanding money from plaintiff and her father. Defendants told her that if she

and her family "[would] not accept their demands, they [would] publish all [her

phone's] contents on social media." Defendants further threatened that they

would "tell everyone in India about [plaintiff's] character."      Among their

demands were that plaintiff could not leave the United States until the divorce

was final, and the marital property would be transferred to defendants.

       Plaintiff's father questioned the payment owed on the marital home, which

was listed as $26,000, and P.S. reduced it to $15,000. Plaintiff signed the

document under pressure because she was afraid of what defendants would do.

       As the divorce proceedings ensued, P.S. hired an attorney to represent

both plaintiff and P.B. When the attorney failed to contact plaintiff, she told

P.B. she wanted to hire her own attorney. She then received a call from P.B.,

who threatened to call 911 with the allegations of adultery and publish all of

plaintiff's phone contents if she obtained independent counsel.

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                                        5
      In April 2022, plaintiff's father received another call from P.B.,

demanding money and threatening to publish plaintiff's phone contents. On

April 14, defendants sent the contents of plaintiff's phone to both families in

India, including plaintiff's eighty-seven-year-old grandfather.

      On July 28, 2022, plaintiff sought and was granted a temporary restraining

order (TRO) against A.B. based on criminal coercion, harassment, and cyber-

harassment and against P.S. for criminal coercion and harassment. 2 An amended

TRO was issued on August 9, 2022.

      On September 23, 2022, the court began the FRO hearing on both matters

because they arose from the same incident. The hearing continued on November

29, 2022, with both defendants making motions for a directed verdict. The court

denied both motions, finding that plaintiff had established a prima facie showing

that the elements of harassment, coercion, and cyber-harassment had been

satisfied.

      On December 15, 2022, Judge Stevie D. Chambers rendered his oral

decision on the record.     The judge found plaintiff credible because she

maintained eye contact, told a consistent story and did not embellish pertinent

2
 Plaintiff was also granted a TRO against P.B., but her application for an FRO
was denied as to him.
                                                                           A-1387-22
                                        6
parts of her testimony. He also found plaintiff's parents to be credible because

they provided logical, detailed and consistent testimony. The judge found both

defendants' testimony to be illogical and contradictory. He found not credible

A.B.'s testimony that plaintiff handed A.B. her cell phone and that defendants

knew plaintiff's password because family members routinely shared their

passwords. The judge also noted A.B.'s testimony was illogical and in part,

contradicted by P.S.'s testimony.

      The court found both defendants had committed predicate acts of

harassment and criminal coercion, but not cyber-harassment, and an FRO was

necessary to protect plaintiff from further harm. The court noted the contents

of plaintiff's personal cell phone were inappropriately retrieved by both

defendants and then disseminated to third parties without her consent. The judge

found that absent the protection of an FRO, defendants may continue to circulate

the personal material. Although the judge noted most of the other six factors

under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) were not applicable to this case, he was persuaded

"the predicate act alone" necessitated the issuance of an FRO. Accordingly, the

judge entered an FRO against A.B. and P.S.

      Defendants raise the following issues for our consideration in both

appeals, arguing:

                                                                          A-1387-22
                                       7
POINT I

THE ENTRY OF AN FRO WAS UNSUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, AND
THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFF DID
NOT CONSTITUTE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
SUBJECT TO PROTECTION UNDER THE NEW
JERSEY PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
ACT.

      1.    There was no predicate act of domestic
violence, and the trial [c]ourt failed to address the intent
element.

      2.    There were no substantial or credible
evidence that [A.B.] and [P.S.] inappropriately
accessed [p]laintiff’s phone nor did they [make] any
threats.

POINT II

THERE COULD BE NO CRIMINAL COERCION
UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5(a) BECAUSE TRUTH IS
AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND THE SEXUAL
TEXT MESSAGES BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND
[A.S.] PROVED THAT SHE WAS CHEATING ON
[P.B.], AND PLAINTIFF AND HER FATHER
FREELY     NEGOTIATED       THE   DIVORCE
SETTLEMENT.

POINT III

THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT AN FRO WAS
NECESSARY TO PROTECT PLAINTIFF FROM
FUTURE ACTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.

                                                               A-1387-22
                             8
      We disagree and affirm for the reasons articulated in Judge Chambers's

comprehensive and well-reasoned decision. We add the following comments.

      Our review of a trial judge's fact-finding function is limited. Cesare v.

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). The trial court's findings of fact are binding

"when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at 411-12.

"We review the Family Part judge's findings in accordance with a deferential

standard of review, recognizing the court's 'special jurisdiction and expertise in

family matters.'"   Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016)

(quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413).       Thus, "we accord great deference to

discretionary decisions of Family Part judges." Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J.

Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012). "We defer to the credibility determinations

made by the trial court because the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes

the witnesses, and hears them testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a

reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222

N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412).

      Legal decisions of family part judges are reviewed under the same de novo

standard applicable to legal decisions in other cases. Rowe v. Bell & Gossett

Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019); Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197

(App. Div. 2020).

                                                                            A-1387-22
                                        9
      "In adjudicating a domestic violence case, the trial judge has a 'two-fold'

task." J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306, 313 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting

Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (App. Div. 2006)). First, the court

must "determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the defendant committed one of the predicate acts referenced in

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)." Ibid. Then, the court must "assess 'whether a restraining

order is necessary . . . to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to

prevent further abuse.'" Ibid. (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 475-76

(2011)).

      We find unavailing defendants' arguments the record did not establish

predicate acts of harassment and criminal coercion and the intent to commit

these acts. Plaintiff's credible testimony established defendants accessed her

cell phone without her consent and distributed her personal, sexually-oriented

text messages and photographs to her family members and acquaintances, and

then threatened to publish the information on social media. The judge was

entitled to use "common sense and experience" and inferences made from the

evidence to determine whether the requisite intent was established, and did so

here. H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 327 (2003).

                                                                           A-1387-22
                                      10
      We also reject defendants' claim that they were entitled to truth as

affirmative defense to coercion. It is an affirmative defense "that the actor

believed the accusation or secret to be true . . . and that his purpose was limited

to compelling the other to behave in a way reasonably related to the

circumstances which were the subject of the accusation." N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5(a).

Even if the information on plaintiff's cell phone "proved" her infidelity,

defendants' coercive use of that information and threats to publish it on social

media were in no way reasonably related to any legitimate purpose.

      Lastly, we are unpersuaded by defendants' contention the judge erred in

his determination a FRO was necessary. The judge acknowledged that many of

the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) were inapplicable to this case.

However, these factors must be evaluated "in the context of whether the

defendant is likely to continue his course of abusive behavior." J.D., 475 N.J.

Super. at 315. We agree with the judge's assessment that defendants would have

continued the publication and threat of publication of plaintiff's personal

information, as evidenced by their threats to do so.

      To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by

defendants, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(e).

                                                                             A-1387-22
                                       11
Affirmed.

                 A-1387-22
            12