Court Opinion

ID: 9475196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:19:38.947781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:33.686765
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This is a case that ought never to have been brought, certainly not in the United States District Court. It involved conduct by two Louisiana lawyers that would merit severe disciplinary action by either the Louisiana Bar or the Louisiana courts, or both. And, indeed, it was the revulsion of the distinguished District Judge to these flagrant transgressions of elemental legal ethics that brought down his strong condemnation in the form of a conviction for violation of the Hobbs Act because of the interference of these local activities with interstate commerce.
Critical to the judge’s factual finding of federal culpability was his rejection of Armstrong’s insistence that the reason he, the prosecutor, declined further prosecution was that prosecution was prescribed under the Louisiana one year time limit. My analysis demonstrates that the judge was flatly wrong on this question of Louisiana law.
Here, Armstrong strenuously urged that the reason he recalled Bums’ arrest warrant was, not because of any payment or the expectation of any payment from Wright, but because the case against Bums had prescribed under the Louisiana law which requires prosecution within one year. The trial judge, himself experienced as a Louisiana practitioner followed by years as a Louisiana United States District Judge, rejected this out of hand on what turns out to have been a flagrant error in Louisiana law.
Unlike the possibility of an ordinary error in state law which would likely not adversely affect the Court’s judgment, this case is much different. Had the judge, in this judge trial, not made this critical error — had he realized that prosecution was indeed barred — it is clear the judge could not have found these attorneys guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In its effort to prove a substantive violation of the Hobbs Act, the government placed all of its prosecutorial eggs in the basket of William Bums’ DWI prosecution, or more accurately, the lack thereof. Unfortunately, the government, the District Court, and now the majority overlook the fact that Burns’ DWI prosecution was prescribed as a matter of law through the combined operation of La.C.Crim.Proc. arts. 578(3), 382, and 385. With Armstrong’s valid argument for not prosecuting Bums, the government’s entire case unravels.
La.C.Crim.Proc. art. 578(3) states that “[ejxcept as otherwise provided in this Chapter, no trial shall be commenced ... [i]n misdemeanor cases after one year from the date of institution of the prosecution.” (West 1981). The Court’s opinion concludes that the one-year statute of limitations contained in article 578(3) never began to run because Bums’ prosecution was never instituted. I disagree. *255La.C.Crim.Proc. art. 382 spells out the various methods of instituting criminal prosecutions.
A prosecution for an offense which may be punished by death shall be instituted by indictment by a grand jury. Other criminal prosecutions in a district court shall be instituted by indictment or by information. A prosecution for violation of an ordinance shall be instituted by affidavit. Other criminal prosecutions in a city court and prosecutions in a parish court shall be instituted by affidavit or information. Criminal prosecutions in a juvenile court or family court shall be instituted by affidavit, information, or indictment.
(West 1981). Under the plain terms of article 382, any prosecution of Burns in the Monroe City Court would have to be instituted by information or affidavit. Article 385 defines affidavit as “a written accusation of crime made under oath and signed by the affiant. It must be filed in open court in a court having jurisdiction to try the offense, or in the office of the clerk thereof ” La.C.Crim.Proc. art. 385 (West 1981) (emphasis added). See State v. Kimble, 411 So.2d 430, 433 (La.1982) (accusations in traffic ticket printed in affidavit form may be sufficient to institute prosecution if made under oath or sworn to); City of Pineville v. Robinson, 260 La. 415, 256 So.2d 427 (1972) (affidavit form traffic ticket instituted prosecution where properly sworn to, subscribed before the clerk of the court, and contained sufficient information to inform the accused of the nature of the offense charged).
The record reveals that Patrolman Herbert Otwell of the Monroe Police Department executed arrest and prosection warrants of William Burns on December 3, 1980. The warrants were sworn under oath and signed by Patrolman Otwell. They were filed with Frances O’Neal, a commissioned Deputy Clerk of the Monroe City Court. The statutory requirements for instituting Bums’ prosecution were met on December 3, 1980, and the one-year prescriptive clock began ticking on that date. When Armstrong ordered the arrest warrant of Bums withdrawn in March 1982, much more than one year had passed since the prosecution was instituted. The prosecution was therefore prescribed.
The Court’s opinion erroneously relies on State v. Jones, 443 So.2d 639 (La.App. 1983), and State v. Gladden, 260 La. 735, 257 So.2d 388 (1972), for the proposition that only the filing of a bill of information or the return of a grand jury indictment is sufficient to institute a prosecution. For a criminal prosecution in Louisiana District Court — such as was involved in both Jones and Gladden — an information or indictment is required; the second sentence of article 382 says as much. But the fourth sentence of article 382 says that a criminal prosecution in city court may be instituted by affidavit. The courts in Jones and Gladden were not faced with a criminal prosecution in city court and their holdings cannot be interpreted to override the unambiguous statutory language of article 382.
I also write separately to express my inability to accept the presence of this prosecution in federal court. The tawdry activities brought to light at trial were undoubtedly unethical, probably criminal, and should not be tolerated in a democratic society. But not every case of small-town corruption is an appropriate target for federal prosecution, and the Hobbs Act appears to be a particularly inappropriate vehicle for the present prosecution.
The case law under the Hobbs Act requires that it is the illegal act — here the extortion — which must affect interstate commerce. See United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir.1978) (“more than a speculative attenuated ‘one step removed’ kind of effect”). I do not take issue with the Court’s conclusion that only a minimal connection between the extortion and the effect on interstate commerce is required, but the tenuous connection between “fixed” DWI prosecutions in Monroe, Louisiana and interstate commerce in this case strains even the sturdy lines with which we suspend the legal fictions termed “interstate commerce analysis.” Since it *256must be the effect which the extortion has on interstate commerce, not all of the farfetched contingent consequences, I think we should sound once and for all to United States Attorneys and District Courts not to reach out to the Hobbs Act to bring every crooked small-town officeholder to justice.