Court Opinion

ID: 9535094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:45:24.805128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:10.165373
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
BRETT, Judge:
Upon petition for rehearing, and on behalf of the State of Oklahoma, the Attorney General’s office urges this Court to overrule Johnson v. State, 665 P.2d 815 (Okl.Cr.1983), and reinstate Monte Lee Eddings’ sentence of death, or, in the alternative, to apply a rational basis analysis and distinguish Johnson —a case tried by jury — from judge-tried cases. We' decline to do either.
In Johnson v. State, this Court interpreted the intent of the Legislature in regard to our death penalty statutes and concluded that “[h]ad the Oklahoma Legislature intended to provide for retrial of the sentencing proceeding only, as did Georgia, then it could have enacted a similar procedure.” 665 P.2d at 826. In his dissent in the instant case, Judge Bussey states his belief that
the majority in Johnson v. State, 665 P.2d 815 (Okl.Cr.1982), incorrectly interpreted our statute to prohibit the remanding of a case for a resentencing hearing when the only error occurred during the sentencing stage. The instant case would provide an excellent opportunity to expressly overrule Johnson, supra, and carry out the clear legislative intent.
When this Court handed down its decision in Johnson — February 8, 1983— the Oklahoma Legislature was still in session. The Oklahoma Legislature could have then, or in its most recent session, enacted a procedure for resentencing had it *347felt that this Court had misinterpreted the legislative intent. The Oklahoma Legislature did not do this. Thus, we must conclude that the Johnson interpretation was correct, and that we have carried out the clear legislative intent. Our decision upon rehearing Johnson is therefore reaffirmed.1
Arguing that there is no claim of a fundamental right violation in the present case, the Attorney General argues that a rational basis analysis should be applied rather than strict judicial scrutiny. We deem strict scrutiny essential in examining a law that would afford greater protection to one class of citizens — those who are sentenced to death by jury — than another— those who are sentenced to death by the court. Therefore, we do not consider the State’s argument to be persuasive.
As the State has offered no compelling justification for the distinction urged, the sentence of death must be, and is, MODIFIED. The court clerk is ordered to issue the mandate forthwith.
PARKS, J., specially concurs.

. This holding does not affect our ruling in Nipps v. State, 626 P.2d 1349 (Okl.Cr.1981), wherein the case was remanded for resentenc-ing after the enhancement provision under which the defendant was sentenced was determined to be unconstitutional and the crime provided no minimum sentence. In the present case there is a minimum sentence, that is, life imprisonment. Furthermore, as a death penalty case is unique in its severity and punishment, the courts are particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).