Court Opinion

ID: 9945084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 00:01:41.346194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:21.757971
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/26/24
                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

TANIA MOLINAR et al.,                        D081431

       Plaintiffs and Appellants,

       v.                                    (Super. Ct. No. 37-20-00034682-
                                            CU-BC-CTL)
21ST CENTURY INSURANCE
COMPANY,

       Defendant and Respondent.

       APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Carolyn M. Caietti, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
       Law Offices of Brandon M. Smith and Brandon M. Smith for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
       Horvitz & Levy, Mitchell C. Tilner, Cameron Fraser,
Steven Fleischman; Demler, Armstrong & Rowland, James P. Lemieux, and
David W. Jennings for Defendant and Respondent.

       When adult children still live with their parents, it is not unusual for
the parents to keep them on their automobile insurance policies and provide
coverage for vehicles owned by the children. If the parents fail to pay the
premiums, however, their adult children face the risk of becoming uninsured
when the insurer cancels the policy for nonpayment.
      The question presented here is whether an automobile insurer had a
duty to give advance notice of cancellation not only to the parents as
policyholders, but also to an adult daughter who was named as an insured
driver on her parents’ policy and whose vehicle was also insured under the

policy. Under Insurance Code 1 section 662, subdivision (a), we conclude that
the answer is yes. Because the insurer did not give advance notice of
cancellation to the adult daughter, the policy was still legally in effect when
she got into an accident driving her covered vehicle without knowledge of the
purported cancellation. We therefore reverse the trial court’s summary
judgment in favor of the insurer on claims arising out of its refusal to defend
or indemnify the daughter in a lawsuit brought against her by one of the
accident victims.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Plaintiffs Silvia Escarcega and Alberto Molinar live in Jamul. They
have been married since 1992 and have three children, including plaintiff
Tania Molinar, their youngest child who was born in 1995.
      In 2006, Silvia and Alberto purchased an automobile insurance policy
from defendant 21st Century Insurance Company (21st Century). In July
2013, shortly after Tania turned 18 years old, Silvia contacted 21st Century
to add Tania to the policy. She provided all the information 21st Century
requested about Tania to add her to the policy. Silvia was not familiar with
the term “rated driver” and had no conversation with the 21st Century
representative about adding Tania as a “rated driver.”

1     All further statutory references are to the Insurance Code.
                                        2
      21st Century agreed to add Tania to the policy, increased the premium
to cover her, and sent a new declarations page to Silvia and Alberto. In
determining the new premium, 21st Century considered Tania’s driving
record, the kind of vehicle she was driving, the year of the vehicle, and how
many miles she drove per year. 21st Century also gave her a good student
discount.
      Under “Named Insured and Mailing Address,” the new declarations
page listed Silvia and Alberto at their address in Jamul. The declarations
page also identified Silvia, Alberto, and Tania as “Rated Driver[s].” The
policy itself did not define the terms “named insured” or “rated driver.”
According to the testimony of 21st Century’s representatives, a “rated driver”
is “a person in the household or persons in the household who are insured for
purposes of driving a vehicle.” A “rated driver” who is listed on the
declarations page is “insured” to drive any of the vehicles listed on the
declarations page and is “covered the same way” as a named insured when
driving one of those vehicles. Under 21st Century’s internal underwriting
guidelines (which are not part of the policy), there can be no more than two
people designated as named insureds for a single policy, and if there are two,
they must be spouses who live in the same household.
      In 2016, Tania purchased a 2009 Mazda for herself. Alberto contacted
21st Century to add Tania’s Mazda to the policy. He informed 21st Century
that Tania was the registered owner and would be driving the Mazda. 21st
Century added the Mazda to the policy and updated the declarations page
and monthly premiums to reflect the change. 21st Century also issued an
insurance identification card in Tania’s name.
      Effective January 31, 2017, 21st Century renewed the policy for six
months. Under “Named Insured and Mailing Address,” the declarations page

                                       3
for the renewed policy continued to list Silvia and Alberto at their Jamul
address. It also continued to list Silvia, Alberto, and Tania as “Rated
Driver[s]” and Tania’s Mazda as one of the covered vehicles.
      Beginning in 2012, Silvia and Alberto paid the monthly policy premium
to 21st Century by automatic debit withdrawal from Silvia’s Wells Fargo
account. The premium payments were due by the end of each month. In
March 2017, Wells Fargo issued Silvia a new debit card. As a result, Wells
Fargo was unable to process the monthly payment on March 31, 2017. Silvia
and Alberto were not aware of the nonpayment.
      On April 3, 2017, 21st Century mailed a letter to Silvia and Alberto at
their correct address informing them that the March 31, 2017 payment had
not gone through and asking them to make payment arrangements. Three
days later, 21st Century mailed a notice of cancellation of the policy to Silvia
and Alberto at their correct address as shown on the policy’s declarations
page. The notice of cancellation explained that the policy would be cancelled
on May 1, 2017 due to nonpayment of the premium. The notice was only
addressed to Silvia and Alberto. 21st Century did not send a separate notice
to Tania. At the time, Tania was 21 years old and lived with her parents at
their Jamul residence.
      Silvia and Alberto do not recall receiving or reading the April 3, 2017
letter or April 6, 2017 notice of cancellation. Tania also never saw the notice.
Tania did not open mail that was addressed to her parents. Because Silvia
and Alberto did not contact 21st Century to make the missed premium
payment, 21st Century deemed the policy cancelled as of May 1, 2017.
      Four days later, Tania caused a serious car accident resulting in grave
injuries to her passenger and another driver, James Dodson. Tania’s

                                        4
passenger died from his injuries. At the time of the accident, Tania and her
parents were still unaware that the 21st Century policy had been cancelled.
      In February 2018, Dodson filed a complaint against Tania alleging
general and special damages exceeding $7.5 million. After Tania tendered
the lawsuit to 21st Century, its counsel responded with a letter denying
Tania a defense or indemnity on the basis that the policy had been validly
cancelled four days before the accident. The letter did not discuss whether
21st Century had an obligation to give advance notice of cancellation to Tania
as a covered insured.
      As a territory manager for 21st Century, Elizabeth Mancilla was
involved in the investigation of Tania’s claim and was the person most
knowledgeable on the denial of her claim. According to Mancilla, Tania did
not receive a notice of cancellation because she was not the named insured on
the policy, and she was only designated as a rated driver. Mancilla did not
conduct any research on the issue and was not aware of anyone else
researching whether this conclusion was consistent with California law. She
did not investigate whether Tania should have been sent notice of
cancellation.
      Tania and her parents sued 21st Century for breach of contract and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After
completion of discovery, 21st Century moved for summary judgment
primarily on the ground that it had validly cancelled the policy before Tania’s
accident. Plaintiffs opposed the motion on the basis that 21st Century did
not properly cancel the policy because it never provided Tania with notice of
cancellation as required by the policy and section 662, subdivision (a).
      The trial court granted summary judgment for 21st Century. As to the
breach of contract claim, the court found that 21st Century was not required

                                       5
to give Tania advance notice of cancellation because she was not a “named
insured, lienholder or additional interest” within the meaning of section 662,
subdivision (a). The court concluded that 21st Century effectively cancelled
the policy by mailing the notice of cancellation to Silvia and Alberto at the
address shown on the declarations. The court further concluded that because
there was no coverage under the policy due to its cancellation, plaintiffs could
not maintain a claim for bad faith and could not recover punitive damages.
      The court entered judgment for 21st Century based on the summary
judgment order. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
      We must decide whether 21st Century validly cancelled the policy after
giving notice to Silvia and Alberto, but not Tania. Plaintiffs argue that 21st
Century was required both by statute (§ 662, subd. (a)) and the specific terms
of the policy to give advance notice to Tania. Applying a de novo standard of
review, we agree with their statutory argument. (See Gonzalez v. Mathis
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 39 [de novo review for summary judgment rulings];
Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 857 [de novo review for statutory
interpretation].)
      The Insurance Code permits cancellation of an automobile insurance
policy for nonpayment of premiums. (§§ 660, subd. (f), 661, subd. (a)(1).)
Section 662, subdivision (a) provides: “A notice of cancellation of a policy shall
not be effective unless mailed or delivered by the insurer to the named
insured, lienholder, or additional interest at least 20 days prior to the
effective date of cancellation; provided, however, that where cancellation is
for nonpayment of premium, at least 10 days’ notice of cancellation
accompanied by the reason for the cancellation shall be given.” Section 664
provides: “Proof of mailing of notice of cancellation . . . to the named insured

                                        6
at the address shown in the policy or to the named insured’s last known
address, shall be sufficient proof of notice.”
      “California courts require strict adherence to a statutory mandate
regarding transmittal of cancellation notices.” (Kotlar v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1120 (Kotlar).) “Termination of coverage can
only be accomplished by strict compliance with the terms of any statutory
provisions applicable to cancellation.” (Mackey v. Bristol West Ins. Services of
Cal., Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1258 (Mackey).) “If a cancellation is
defective, the policy remains in effect even if the premiums are not paid.”
(Kotlar, at p. 1121.)
      Plaintiffs do not contend that Tania was a “lienholder” or “additional
interest” within the meaning of section 662, subdivision (a). Thus, the only
question is whether Tania was entitled to notice of cancellation as “the
named insured.” (§ 662, subd. (a).) 21st Century argues that “the named
insured” includes only the policyholders, Silvia and Alberto. Plaintiffs
contend that “the named insured” includes anyone who is covered as an
insured and identified by name in the policy, including Tania.
      In Kotlar, the court faced a similar question of statutory interpretation
for a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. There, a
commercial lessee (Meir) agreed to maintain liability insurance for the
benefit of its landlord (Kotlar). Meir purchased a CGL policy from Hartford
Insurance Company (Hartford), naming Meir and Kotlar as insureds. Kotlar
received a certificate of insurance informing him that he was an additional
insured on the policy. But Hartford later cancelled the policy after Meir
failed to pay the premiums. Hartford sent advance notice of its intent to
cancel the policy to Meir as the policyholder, but not to Kotlar as the
additional insured. After the policy was cancelled without Kotlar’s

                                         7
knowledge, one of Meir’s customers slipped and fell on the property, suffering
a fractured hip. The customer sued Kotlar for premises liability. Kotlar
tendered defense of the action to Hartford, which refused to defend or
indemnify him on the ground that the policy had been cancelled for
nonpayment of premiums before the accident. (Kotlar, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1119.)
      Kotlar then brought a breach of contract and bad faith action against
Hartford. Kotlar argued that Hartford owed a duty to provide advance notice
of the policy’s cancellation to him under section 677.2, subdivision (b). This
statute provides that notice of cancellation of a CGL policy must be sent “to
the named insured at the mailing address shown on the policy.” (§ 677.2,
subd. (b).) Kotlar asserted that he qualified as a “named insured” because
“he was named as an insured under the policy . . . .” (Kotlar, supra, 83
Cal.App.4th at p. 1121.) In response, Hartford argued that the statutory
phrase “the named insured” referred to only a single person or entity, and
that Meir was the named insured “because he was the person who purchased
the policy and is referred to in the policy as the ‘first named insured.’ ” (Ibid.)
      The Court of Appeal agreed with Kotlar. Because the Insurance Code
provides that “the singular number includes the plural” (§ 13), the court
concluded that the statutory phrase “the named insured” (§ 677.2, subd. (b))
was “not limited to a single ‘named insured’ but applies to all insureds named
in the policy including Kotlar.” (Kotlar, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121.)
The court acknowledged that “additional insureds” who are not identified by
name in the policy, but who fall within a more general “omnibus” definition
(such as all employees of the named insured), “are not entitled to notice of
cancellation under section 677.2.” (Id. at p. 1121, fn. 3.) But it concluded
that any insured identified by name in the policy was entitled to notice of

                                        8
cancellation: “An ‘additional named insured,’ on the other hand would be
entitled to notice because he or she is ‘named’ in the policy. ‘Additional
named insureds’ generally are persons who are added as insureds after the
policy issues.” (Ibid., italics added.)
      The Kotlar court further concluded that its interpretation was
“supported by the public policy underlying the statutory notice provision.”
(Kotlar, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121.) “The clear purpose of section
677.2 is to protect named insureds from losing insurance coverage due to a
cancellation of the policy without notice.” (Id. at p. 1122.) “However, in this
case it appears Kotlar was left without insurance coverage because Hartford
failed to provide him with a notice of cancellation due to nonpayment of
premiums. Had Kotlar received an advance notice of cancellation, he could
have protected his rights by paying the premium due or obtaining another
insurance policy.” (Ibid.) “Putting the burden on Hartford to send Kotlar a
notice of cancellation is not unreasonable. Instead of making two copies of
the notice it merely has to make three and purchase one additional stamp.”
(Ibid.)
      The Kotlar court also relied on two cases from other jurisdictions,
including one involving cancellation of an automobile insurance policy.
(Kotlar, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1122, citing Accardo v. Clarenton Nat’l
Ins. Co. (La.Ct.App. 2000) 751 So.2d 975, 978.) As described in Kotlar, “[t]he
court in Accardo held that where there is more than one named insured, the
insurer must send a notice of cancellation to all named insureds when one
insured cancels a policy.” (Kotlar, at p. 1122.)
      We conclude that the reasoning of Kotlar applies here. The statute
governing notice of cancellation of an automobile insurance policy also
requires notice to “the named insured.” (§ 662, subd. (a).) “Where the same

                                          9
term or phrase is used in a similar manner in two related statutes concerning
the same subject, the same meaning should be attributed to the term in both
statutes unless countervailing indications require otherwise.” (Dieckmann v.
Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 345, 356.) We discern no reason the
statutory phrase “the named insured” would carry differing meanings for
these two parallel Insurance Code provisions governing notice of cancellation.
Consistent with Kotlar, we therefore conclude that the phrase “the named
insured” as used in section 662, subdivision (a), refers to “all insureds named

in the policy,” not just the policyholder. 2 (Kotlar, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1121.)
      21st Century admits that Tania was an “insured” under the policy.
There is also no dispute that Tania was identified by name on the
declarations page, and 21st Century knew she was the registered owner of
the covered Mazda. Under the reasoning of Kotlar, therefore, she qualifies as
an “insured[] named in the policy” who was entitled to notice of cancellation
under the statute. (Kotlar, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121; see also Black’s
Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019), p. 962, col. 1 [defining “additional insured” as
someone who “is covered by an insurance policy but who is not the primary
insured”]; ibid. [defining “named additional insured” as an additional insured
who is “specifically named in the policy”].) The mere fact that 21st Century
labeled Tania as a rated driver does not alter her status as an “insured” who
was covered and specifically “named in the policy.” (Kotlar, at p. 1121.)

2     Because Tania was an adult, we need not and do not decide whether an
insurer would have to provide notice of cancellation to a minor who is covered
as an insured driver on her parents’ policy and lives in the same household.
Specifically, we do not decide whether notice to the parent may be imputed to
the minor child in such circumstances.
                                       10
      As in Kotlar, this result is supported by public policy considerations.
The purpose of requiring advance notice of cancellation is to protect the
insured against unintended termination of coverage based on a missed
premium payment, and to provide an opportunity for the insured to make the
payment or obtain other insurance. (Mackey, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1261.) California’s financial responsibility laws also reflect a strong public
policy against having uninsured drivers on the roads. (See Veh. Code,
§ 16000 et seq.; Nat’l Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Cal. Casualty Ins. Co.
(1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 336, 340 [“Public policy certainly favors a system
under which motorists will not be operating their vehicles without the benefit
of public liability coverage”].) Critically, the purpose of these requirements is
not just to protect the insured: “Our state’s financial responsibility laws were
enacted to provide monetary protection to the public.” (Mercury Casualty Co.
v. Chu (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1454–1455.)
      As courts in other jurisdictions have observed: “ ‘Notice of motor vehicle
liability insurance cancellation touches an area of public interest far beyond
the scope of the parties before us. The dangers of driving uninsured vehicles
are obvious. Not only may one be subjected to the risk of a large financial
liability at the hands of the negligently injured person, but the opportunity
for that other injured party to gain a reasonable amount of damages for his
injury is considerably lessened. It is for the benefit of every driver and
passenger on our roads today, as well as ourselves, that we carry liability
insurance.’ ” (Hansen v. U.S.A.A. Casualty Ins. Co. (Neb. 1980) 291 N.W.2d
715, 718 (Hansen), quoting United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adams
(Ind.Ct.App. 1969) 251 N.E.2d 696, 698.)
      Requiring an automobile insurer to give notice of cancellation to “all
insureds named in the policy” furthers these public policies. (Kotlar, supra,

                                       11
83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1121.) It is particularly important that the insurer give
notice to all named insureds known to have an ownership interest in any
covered vehicle, so that they do not continue to put themselves and others at
risk by driving the vehicle without the required coverage. (See Hansen,
supra, 291 N.W.2d at pp. 150–156 [holding as a matter of public policy that
before cancelling an automobile insurance policy, the insurer must give notice
of cancellation to all known owners of covered vehicles even if they are not
designated on the face of the policy as the named insured].) “Victims among
the public are poorly protected if the liability insurance on a car can be
terminated while the offending owner drives on in ignorance.” (Government
Employees Ins. Co. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. (1976) 387
N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (GEICO).)
      These public policies are directly implicated here. Tania was covered
as an insured under the 21st Century policy; 21st Century issued an
insurance identification card in her name for the Mazda; and 21st Century
knew she was the registered owner of the covered Mazda. Because she never
received notice of the cancellation, however, Tania became uninsured without
her knowledge. Tania continued driving the Mazda unaware of her
uninsured status, leaving herself exposed to calamitous consequences.
“Worse it left accident victims subject to injury at [her] hands without the
insurance protection our laws mandate.” (GEICO, supra, 387 N.Y.S.2d at
p. 53.) If Tania had received advance notice, she “could have protected [her]
rights by paying the premium due or obtaining another insurance policy”
(Kotler, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1122), and the accident victims would
have had the protection contemplated by our financial responsibility laws.
      We are not persuaded by 21st Century’s arguments to the contrary.
21st Century attempts to distinguish Kotlar by arguing “it was undisputed

                                       12
that both parties were named insureds, and the question was whether one or
both were entitled to notice of cancellation under section 677.2.” This is not
accurate. The insurer in Kotlar made the same argument 21st Century is
making here—that only the policyholder “who purchased the policy” qualified
as “the named insured” under the statute. (Kotlar, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1121.) The Kotlar court rejected this argument by holding that an
additional insured who was specifically named in the policy—but was not the
actual policyholder and was not responsible for payment of the premiums—
also qualified as “the named insured” and was therefore entitled to notice of
cancellation. (Id. at pp. 1121–1122.)
      21st Century further argues that in Kotlar, “the insurer agreed—
separately from the policy and in writing—to provide the plaintiff with ‘30
days’ advance notice of cancellation of the policy’ and then failed to do so.” It
is true that in its summary of the factual background, the Kotlar court
mentioned that the certificate of insurance issued to Kotlar “contained a
provision in which Hartford promised it would ‘endeavor’ to give Kotlar 30
days’ advance notice of cancellation of the policy.” (Kotlar, supra, 83
Cal.App.4th at p. 1119, italics added.) But the court did not mention the
certificate of insurance again or rely on it at all in its legal analysis of the
cancellation issue—it relied solely on the statutory notice requirement of
section 677.2. (Id. at pp. 1120–1122.) Nor could the court have relied on the
certificate of insurance. A certificate of insurance is merely evidence of the
coverage; it does not create additional rights or obligations beyond the policy.
(§ 384, subd. (a); Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bell (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th
1410, 1423, fn. 25.)
      21st Century asserts that plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation would lead
to absurd results for two reasons. First, it claims that insurers would have to

                                         13
mail multiple notices of cancellation to the same address or possibly even
different addresses when children covered by their parents’ policies move
away from home. But there is nothing absurd or unduly onerous about
mailing more than one notice. (See Kotlar, supra, Cal.App.4th at p. 1122
[rejecting similar argument].) Car insurance policies generally require that
covered children share the same permanent address as their parents.
According to Mancilla, a rated driver must be a member of the same
household as a 21st Century policyholder. Moreover, the statute by its terms
allows any such notice to be mailed “to the named insured at the address
shown in the policy or to the named insured’s latest known address . . . .”
(§ 664.) These addresses would already be known to the insurer. The extra
burden of sending such a notice to all insureds named in the policy is
insignificant in comparison to the importance of giving notice to covered
drivers and vehicle owners that they are about to become uninsured.
      Second, 21st Century argues that this result would allow anyone who is
named as a rated driver on the declarations page to change or cancel the
policy as a “named insured,” even a teenage child covered on her parents’
policy. (§ 667.5.) We disagree. Section 667.5 states in relevant part: “Unless
a policy specifically provides otherwise, the cancellation of a policy, or any
change in the policy, executed by an insurer, at the request of the named
insured designated on the declarations page of the policy, shall be binding
upon any other insured or named insured.” (Italics added.) By its terms, this
statute only refers to changes or cancellations requested by someone who is
designated as the named insured on the declarations page, such as Silvia and
Alberto. It does not permit changes or cancellations by someone like Tania
who is identified by name as an insured, but not specifically designated as
the named insured on the declarations page.

                                       14
      If anything, section 667.5 demonstrates that the Legislature knows
how to refer to a person or entity specifically “designated” as the named
insured on the declarations page of a policy. But the Legislature did not use
similar language in the notice of cancellation provision. Instead, it merely
required advance notice to “the named insured.” (§ 662, subd. (a).) When the
Legislature uses materially different language in statutory provisions
addressing the same subject or related subjects, the normal inference is that
the Legislature intended a difference in meaning. (Turner v. Victoria (2023)
15 Cal.5th 99, 115.)
      Finally, the two California cases cited by the trial court (Berendes v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 571 (Berendes) and Giovanna
v. Vigilant Ins. Co. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 368 (Giovanna)) do not assist 21st
Century. In Berendes, the question was whether a pedestrian who was
struck and killed by a car was entitled to underinsured motorist coverage
under three automobile insurance policies issued to her father as the named
insured. Applying the definition of “insured” in the Insurance Code provision
governing underinsured motorist coverage (§ 11580.2, subd. (b)), the court
concluded that the decedent did not fit within any of the statutory categories
because her father was the named insured, “[s]he was neither the named
insured nor the spouse of the named insured,” “she did not live in the same
household” as her father, and “she was a pedestrian at the time of the
accident, so she was not engaged in an activity related to one of the covered
vehicles.” (Berendes, at p. 576.) Although the decedent had paid an
additional premium to be listed and covered as a rated driver under one of
her father’s policies (id. at p. 574), there is no suggestion in the opinion that
anyone argued this made her a “named insured” within the meaning of the

                                        15
underinsured motorist statute—and the court made no mention of the Kotlar
decision.
      As 21st Century acknowledges, whether someone is a named insured
for purposes of section 11580.2 is “irrelevant to this appeal, because this case
has nothing to do with uninsured motorist coverage.” Even if it were
relevant, however, one federal court applying California law has concluded
that someone who is named as an “additional driver” on the declarations page
of her parents’ car insurance policy is a “named insured” within the meaning
of section 11580.2, subdivision (b), because this provision simply defines
“named insured” to mean “ ‘the individual or organization named in the
declarations of the policy . . . .’ ” (Lewis v. Gov’t Emples. Ins. Co. (S.D.Cal.
2020) 458 F.Supp.3d 1214, 1219 (Lewis).) We need not decide this issue
because it is not before us, but Lewis demonstrates that any reliance on the
definition of “named insured” in section 11580.2 would not necessarily favor
21st Century.
      In Giovanna, the second case cited by the trial court, the daughter of
the policyholder Giovanna got into an accident while driving a vehicle not
covered by the policy. (Giovanna, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at p. 369.) The
insurer argued that two policy exclusions for non-covered vehicles applied.
(Id. at p. 370.) Giovanna argued that one of the exclusions did not apply to
the group of persons described as “you” in the policy, which purportedly
included her daughter. (Id. at p. 370.) The policy defined “you” to mean “ ‘the
“named insured” shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a resident of the
same household.’ ” (Ibid.) In arguing that her daughter was a “named
insured,” Giovanna relied on the following phrase appearing on the
declarations page: “Change name insured—add driver No. 2, 3.” (Ibid.)
However, the only person whose name appeared on the policy was Giovanna,

                                        16
who was identified as the named insured on the declarations page. (Id. at
p. 371.) Her daughter’s name did not appear anywhere on the declarations
page or elsewhere in the policy, and the declarations page only described her
by sex and birthdate under “Driver Information.” (Ibid.) The Court of
Appeal concluded that the phrase “change named insured—add driver No. 2,
3” merely reflected “the addition of appellant’s daughters as drivers of the
automobile, and appellant’s own name change from Naumann to Giovanna.”
(Ibid.) The court ruled that the mere use of this unique phrase on the
declarations page did not make the daughter a “named insured.” (Ibid.) And
it further concluded that the second exclusion eliminated coverage for all
insureds, including named insureds. (Ibid.)
      Giovanna is not helpful here. It did not involve notice of cancellation; it
involved the applicability of policy exclusions for non-covered vehicles. In
contrast to this case, the policyholder’s daughter was not identified by name
anywhere in the policy or the declarations page, and the policyholder was
relying on an unusual notation on the declarations page to argue that her
daughter was nevertheless a named insured. (See Lewis, supra, 458
F.Supp.3d at p. 1218 [distinguishing Giovanna on the ground that the
daughter’s name did not appear anywhere on the declarations page or
elsewhere in the policy].) Moreover, the Giovanna court ultimately found
that a policy exclusion eliminated coverage even if the daughter was a named
insured. And Giovanna was decided long before the Kotlar court ruled that a
named additional insured who is not the actual policyholder qualifies as a
“named insured” entitled to notice of cancellation under the Insurance Code.
(Kotlar, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121–1122 & fn. 3.)
      We therefore conclude that section 662, subdivision (a) required 21st
Century to give Tania “advance notice of its intent to cancel the policy, and

                                       17
its failure to do so nullified the cancellation.” (Kotlar, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1122.) Accordingly, we need not decide whether the specific terms of the
policy separately required 21st Century to give advance notice to Tania.
      In its summary judgment motion, 21st Century also argued that it was
entitled to judgment on the bad faith claim based on the genuine dispute
doctrine. Because of its ruling that the policy was properly cancelled, the
trial court granted summary judgment without deciding whether the genuine
dispute doctrine applied. Even if we were to decide this issue in 21st
Century’s favor, it would apply only to the bad faith claim and further
proceedings would still be required on the contract claim. We therefore
decline to address this argument in the first instance, and instead, remand to
the trial court to decide the issue. (See State Farm General Ins. Co. v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1119–1120; Adams v. Pacific

Bell Directory (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 93, 100–101.) 3

3     We deny plaintiffs’ motion for judicial notice of the insurance policies at
issue in Berendes and Lewis. These documents are not relevant or necessary
to our decision.
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                                DISPOSITION
      The summary judgment order and judgment are reversed. The matter
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Appellants are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.

                                                              BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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