Court Opinion

ID: 9353793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 20:02:08.02293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:11:57.106838
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/11/23 P. v. Stewart CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B313986

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. TA151337)
         v.

DARNELL TREALL STEWART,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
      Charles Thomas Anderson, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Stacy Schwartz and Colleen M.
Tiedemann, Deputies Attorney General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                       __________________________________
                       INTRODUCTION

      Darnell Treall Stewart appeals from an order for the
execution of a previously imposed four-year state prison sentence.
The trial court suspended execution of that sentence after
Stewart pleaded guilty in July 2020 to one count of assault with a
deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)).1 For the next
year, Stewart failed to comply with virtually any conditions of
probation. In March 2021, Stewart admitted to violating the
terms and conditions of his probation in a different courthouse
before a different judge from the one who imposed the original
sentence. In July 2021, Stewart appeared in the original
courthouse on an additional probation violation. That judge
found Stewart in violation of probation and executed the state
prison sentence. Stewart contends the sentence violated his plea
bargain with the People at the prior March 2021 probation
hearing. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

   1. Stewart’s Underlying Offense and Sentence
      By information filed March 13, 2020, the People charged
Stewart with kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 1), assault with
a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), injuring a spouse,
dating partner, or co-parent (§ 273.5; count 3), and making
criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 4). As set forth in a
February 28, 2020, probation report, these charges arose from an
incident on February 3, 2020, between Stewart and Vanessa

1    Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.

                                2
Ruiz, his dating partner of 10 months. Stewart and Ruiz argued
in a motel room when Ruiz questioned whether Stewart “had
been sleeping with other women.” In the course of the argument,
Ruiz left the room, and Stewart followed. He pushed her to the
ground, took her cell phone out of her purse, and threw it to the
ground, breaking it. Stewart then kicked Ruiz and stomped on
her legs. As she tried to escape, Stewart picked her up off the
ground and held a knife to her abdomen, stating, “If you keep
trying to run, I’m going to kill you.” Stewart forced Ruiz back to
the motel and began to undress her. She then escaped. Stewart
was on parole at the time of these events.
      On July 1, 2020, Stewart appeared in the Los Angeles
County Superior Court in the South Central District courthouse
in Compton. Given Stewart’s lengthy and violent criminal
record, the probation report recommended “a sanction that will
act as a deterrent against this type of behavior,” and suggested a
state prison sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition,
Stewart pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly weapon
(count 2). As part of the stipulated sentence, instead of the
prison sentence recommended by the probation report, Stewart
agreed that the court would sentence him to the upper term of
four years in state prison, with execution of that sentence
suspended. Stewart further agreed to a five-year probation term,
with certain conditions. Among them, Stewart agreed to
complete a 52-week domestic violence prevention program, abide
by a 10-year protective order, and abide by all terms and
conditions of probation including, relevant here, to “obey all laws
and orders of the court.”

                                 3
       The court emphasized to Stewart the importance of
complying with probation: “You are embarking on a
responsibility, commitment to the court that you are going to
comply with the terms and conditions of probation . . . . I want to
make sure that you understand that you have a responsibility.
This is a fantastic offer that’s been made by the People, crafted by
your smart lawyer. But you [are going to] have to comply with
this. If you don’t, then you [are going to] be standing right there
in yellow.” Stewart responded, “All right.” After the court said,
“Make sure you understand me,” Stewart’s public defender
confirmed with Stewart, “You understand?” to which Stewart
replied, “Yes, sir.”
       Later in the plea proceeding, the court summarized
Stewart’s obligations and warned again that any probation
violation would result in execution of the state prison sentence:

      “Court: Now I read, I’m sure, a mouthful. It’s a lot for you
      to digest, understand, absorb. But there are the fines and
      fees and terms and conditions of probation. And the two
      major ones – really three – are to report to probation as you
      are supposed to, go to the [domestic violence] program, and
      stay away from Ms. Ruiz. You violate any terms and
      conditions of probation and you’ll be back in jail again, sir.
      I want to make sure you understand that. And you’ll be
      going to state prison.

      “[Stewart]: Yes.”

      A short time later, Stewart’s lawyer again emphasized the
point: “Also, I want to remind him that I filled out a little

                                 4
probation referral form with a lot of information, my number,
what he’s pled to, that he’s going to prison for four years if he
even jaywalks.” After some further comments from his lawyer,
and additional colloquy, the court again confirmed, “You
understand all of that? Mr. Stewart, you understand all of that?”
to which Stewart replied, “Yes, Sir.” Finally, the court offered
one last blunt reminder: “The last thing you want to do is see
Ms. Ruiz or don’t go that program or don’t go to the probation
department and you [are going to] have a bad day. You [are
going to] be standing right there in yellow and you are going to
state prison.”
      Stewart received credit for time served of 147 actual days
in custody.

   2. Stewart’s Initial Performance on Probation
      Stewart next appeared in court on July 31, 2020, when he
provided proof of enrollment in the domestic violence program.
The court ordered him to ensure probation approved the
program, and to return on November 9, 2020, with a progress
report from the program. Stewart failed to appear as ordered on
November 9, resulting in revocation of probation and the
issuance of a no-bail bench warrant. The next day the court
recalled and reissued the warrant, holding it until November 18,
after Stewart reportedly came to court but left ill before his
counsel arrived. Stewart appeared on November 18, but without
the ordered proof of enrollment in the domestic violence
counseling program. The court ordered him to appear on
December 22 with proof of enrollment. On December 22 Stewart
appeared late but with the requisite proof of enrollment,

                                5
resulting in the reinstatement of probation and an order to
appear with a progress report on March 22, 2021.

    3. Stewart Resolves a New Case in a Different Courthouse
       On February 9, 2021, Stewart failed to appear for his
arraignment in the El Monte courthouse on a new misdemeanor
charge for violating the protective order prohibiting contact with
Ruiz and a corresponding petition to revoke probation in the
instant case. The court summarily revoked probation and set a
probation violation hearing for February 23.
       After several continuances, Stewart appeared on March 10,
2021, in El Monte. The court had before it a probation report
prepared for the February 9 court date. The report characterized
Stewart’s performance on probation as “poor,” citing his new
arrest, his failure to stay in contact with probation since
December 2020, and his failure to progress in his domestic
violence counseling requirement.2 It recommended a jail sanction
if the court found Stewart in violation of probation.
       In another negotiated disposition, Stewart admitted the
probation violation for an agreed 90-day jail sentence and
dismissal of the new misdemeanor case. As the court explained:

      “What you’ll be doing today is if you admit to the felony
      violation, the People are willing to dismiss your open
      misdemeanor here. You’ll have to serve 90 days in the
      county jail, and, upon release, you will remain on felony

2    The report’s additional reference to a failure to enroll in an
anger management program appears to arise from confusion over
the way the sentencing court characterized the domestic violence
counseling program.

                                 6
       probation. You’ll have to reenroll in the domestic violence
       counseling and just be mindful that on this felony case you
       have four years suspended.”
       The court then took Stewart’s plea. Stewart admitted to
“failing to abide by the terms and conditions [of probation],
specifically violating the protective order and picking up this new
misdemeanor case.” After taking Stewart’s plea, the court
modified probation to include the stipulated 90-day jail sentence,
reinstated probation “under the same terms and conditions,” and
confirmed with Stewart that he “accepted and understood” those
terms and conditions. At the request of Stewart’s lawyer, the
court set a remand date for April 9, 2021, and directed Stewart to
appear at his existing March 22 date in Compton. Because only
the Compton court purportedly could vacate the March 22 date,
and because Stewart practically could not reenroll in the
domestic violence counseling class until after he completed his
90-day jail sentence, he needed to ask the Compton court for a
future date for that purpose. As the court put it after taking the
probation violation admission:

      “You need to go to Compton on March 22nd, 2021. And just
      let them know, I’ll note it in the file as well, that you have a
      surrender date on April 9th, and that you’ll need a future
      court date so that you can return to get reenrollment
      paperwork, if necessary, or show proof of reenrollment in
      your domestic violence counseling class so that you are
      letting the Court know that you are abiding by the terms
      and conditions of probation by being in your domestic
      violence counseling class.”

                                  7
   4. The Compton Court Orders Execution of the Four-year
       Suspended Sentence Based on Stewart’s Probation
       Violations
       On the morning of March 22, 2021, the day set by both the
Compton and El Monte courts for Stewart to appear in the
Compton courthouse, Stewart failed to appear. The court
revoked probation and issued a bench warrant. Then at 1:30 p.m.
that day, Stewart’s counsel appeared remotely and represented
that Stewart was “in the hallway as he does not feel well.” The
court recalled and reissued the warrant, holding it until April 6.
The probation report prepared for the March 22 appearance
again characterized Stewart’s performance on probation as
“poor,” referencing Stewart’s failure to communicate with
probation since December 2020, Stewart’s failure to keep an
appointment with probation on February 8, and his “unknown”
status in the domestic violence program. The report
recommended community service, an admonishment to complete
domestic violence counseling, and monthly telephonic contact
with his probation officer.
       On April 6, 2021, Stewart again failed to appear, resulting
in the issuance of a no-bail bench warrant. Stewart did appear
for his jail remand on April 9, 2021, to serve the probation
sentence pursuant to his March 10 plea agreement in the
El Monte courthouse.
       Stewart then appeared in custody at the Compton
courthouse for a bench warrant hearing on May 3, 2021. The
court recalled the warrant and ordered a supplemental probation
report. After a further continuance, Stewart requested a
probation violation hearing, which the court set for July 8, 2021.

                                8
       On July 8, Stewart appeared, still in custody, for the
probation violation hearing. The supplemental probation report
ordered by the court deemed Stewart’s progress on probation
“unsatisfactory.” It recounted that Stewart had “failed to make
any contact with this [probation] officer or the probation
department” prior to his April 9 remand, was terminated from his
domestic violence class in December 2020, and failed to provide
proof of anger management counseling. The court read and
considered this report.
       Stewart’s lawyer essentially conceded the violation: “the
only reason the court would be imposing prison would be for his
failure to return to the court date before he surrendered. And
that’s a valid concern,” and Stewart “accepts he has not met his
obligation . . . . He shouldn’t get a free pass.”3 Stewart’s counsel
agreed “there’s a risk to safety,” but he urged that the
“extenuating circumstances” of Stewart’s condition on March 22
should result in reinstatement and modification of probation to
include a new substance abuse treatment program. Counsel
explained that when Stewart arrived to court several hours late
on March 22, he “was having some type of either illness or mental
health episode based on some new medication,” which “then led
to some serious confusion about the next court date.” Stewart’s
counsel offered to call the bailiff as a witness to Stewart’s
condition on March 22.

3      At the hearing, the People seemed to agree that the
violation before the court involved Stewart’s failure to appear,
stating, “I believe the scope of the probation violation hearing
that the court was considering was just that Mr. Stewart did not
return to court.”

                                 9
      The court stated it did not need the bailiff’s testimony, and
accepted counsel’s representation of what happened on March 22,
noting (as to the failure to appear) “[a]nd that’s one aspect of why
we’re here.” The court then found Stewart in violation of his
probation, explaining:

      “[Stewart] did not come to court the last court appearance
      in our matter, but I do understand the extenuating
      circumstances that were described to me. However, the
      culmination of things here, the picking up of the new case
      but which was already addressed, but in our supplemental
      report he simply never checked in with probation. It’s been
      a year to date, thereabouts, and nothing was done in this
      matter. And I am very concerned about the public safety
      issue as well.”

      The court then invited comments regarding sentencing.
Stewart’s counsel urged the court not to impose the state prison
sentence because Stewart already had admitted to the violation
that led to the new misdemeanor case and had served that
sentence. Instead, Stewart’s counsel suggested the court “just
impose some custody time” and allow Stewart to attend the
treatment program counsel had arranged. The district attorney
submitted on his prior comments that “I’m going to submit at
what the court had indicated at the previous court date as to
what to do today,” and that looking at Stewart’s performance on
probation overall, he did not see Stewart as “a good candidate for
any new terms of probation” because “he hasn’t shown any
indication that he will complete those.”

                                10
      In ordering execution of the four-year state prison sentence,
the court acknowledged “the issues that Mr. Stewart had
suffered,” but weighed those issues against “the safety concerns I
have here at least for the public” and a “second chance, a third
chance, and a fourth chance” that the court felt Stewart had
while on probation without success.
      Stewart timely appealed.

                            DISCUSSION
    1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       Neither party addresses the proper standard of review. To
the extent Stewart challenges the probation revocation decision,
we apply a substantial evidence standard of review. (People v.
Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 773, citing People v. Superior
Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 681 [“We review a probation
revocation decision pursuant to the substantial evidence
standard of review.”].) In doing so, we accord “great deference” to
the trial court’s decision because “the granting and revocation” of
probation lies “‘entirely within the sound discretion of the trial
court.’” (Urke, at p. 773.) “On appeal, we must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (See People v. Jones
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
       To the extent Stewart challenges the sentence,
“[s]entencing choices such as the one at issue here, whether to
reinstate probation or sentence a defendant to prison, are
reviewed for abuse of discretion. ‘A denial or a grant of probation
generally rests within the broad discretion of the trial court and
will not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the

                                11
court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious
manner.’” (People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909.)
The defendant has the burden to demonstrate an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Vanella (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 463, 469.)
       Section 1203.2 permits the court to terminate probation “if
the interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment,
has reason to believe from the report of the probation officer or
otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of his
or her probation.” (§ 1203.2, subd. (a).) The court may revoke
“upon its own motion” or a petition by the probation officer,
among others. (Id. at subd. (b)(1).) “Upon any revocation and
termination of probation . . . if the judgment has been pronounced
and the execution thereof has been suspended, the court may
revoke the suspension and order that the judgment shall be in
full force and effect. (Id. at subd. (c).)
       “‘[A] negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract and is
interpreted according to general contract principles.’” (K.R. v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 295, 304, citing Doe v. Harris
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 69.) “Experience and practice can, in some
circumstances, lead courts to recognize the incorporation of
implied terms to a contractual agreement.” (K.R., at p. 304,
citing Retired Employees Assn. of Orange County, Inc. v. County
of Orange (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1171, 1178-–1179.) If contractual
language is clear and explicit, it governs. (People v. Shelton
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.) However, if the contract terms “‘“are
in any respect ambiguous or uncertain”’” the court must then
interpret the contract “‘“in the sense in which the promisor
believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee understood
it”’” based on “‘objective manifestations of the parties’ intent.’”
(Ibid., citations omitted.) In determining the parties’ mutual

                                12
intent, the court considers the “‘surrounding circumstances under
which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the
object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the
subsequent conduct of the parties.’” (Ibid., citations omitted.)

   2. The March 10 Plea Bargain Extinguished Stewart’s
       Violations as of That Date
       Stewart concedes he had violated the conditions of his
probation several times by March 10. However, he argues that
when he admitted the probation violation for violating the
domestic violence restraining order on March 10, it necessarily
and impliedly immunized him for any other violation up to that
point even if not expressly part of his admission.
       The People disagree that Stewart’s March 10 plea bargain
included any implied terms. The People contend the “bargain”
meant the court would dismiss Stewart’s misdemeanor case in
exchange for his probation violation admission, but the
agreement did not address or include terms regarding his other
probation violations. Stewart has the better argument.
       The People acknowledge that a plea bargain can contain
implied terms if “supported by the record.” Here, the People
argue, the March 10 plea bargain must be limited to its express
terms because the parties did not discuss other prior probation
violations. The People cite only to People v. Paredes (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 496 in support of this interpretation of events.
In Paredes, the sentencing court agreed to recommend against
deportation. (Id. at p. 498.) After a post-sentencing change in
federal law resulted in removal proceedings, the defendant
asserted his plea bargain included an implied term protecting
him from deportation. (Ibid.) The circumstances of the plea in

                               13
Paredes did not support a finding that anyone had made a “no
deportation” promise. To the contrary, the prosecutor denied
expressly making such a promise, and “the trial court
admonished Paredes that he could be deported as a result of his
plea.” (Id. at p. 511.) Finally, the fact that the prosecutor did not
have the legal power to bind the federal government further
supported the conclusion that the plea agreement included no
such promise, express or implied. (Id. at p. 512.)
      The circumstances here differ for several reasons. First,
although the parties did not expressly address the effect of
Stewart’s admission on his other outstanding violations, the
parties and the court did discuss Stewart’s other violations at the
March 10 hearing. Stewart’s counsel initially requested that the
court vacate the March 22 date in Compton because Stewart
could not serve his 90-day sentence and simultaneously remain
enrolled in a domestic violence class. When advised that only the
Compton court could modify the March 22 date, the court agreed
to “note it in the file” that Stewart had an April 9 surrender date
so Stewart could appear in the Compton court on March 22 to
“get reenrollment paperwork, if necessary, or show proof of
reenrollment in your domestic violence counseling class.” This
discussion implies that the court contemplated reenrollment in
the class, not further violation proceedings relating to it. The
court also reinstated Stewart’s probation, incorporating the prior
terms and conditions, which a court would not typically do if it
anticipated further violation proceedings. Finally, Stewart
admitted to “failing to abide by the terms and conditions [of
probation], specifically violating the protective order and picking
up this new misdemeanor case.” Although the court “specifi[ed]”
the protective order violation, it also made general reference to

                                 14
Stewart’s failure to abide by the “terms and conditions.” To the
extent this language is ambiguous, the court’s actions in
reinstating probation and directing Stewart to reenroll in
domestic violence classes after his 90-day jail sentence, taken
collectively, strongly suggest the parties “mutually intended” that
the admission would address Stewart’s failures up to that point.
(See K.R. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 304.) The
“subsequent conduct” of the parties corroborates this
interpretation. The prosecutor made no mention of, and took no
steps to pursue, additional violation proceedings until Stewart
later failed to comply with an order to appear in court. (People v.
Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 767.)

    3. The July 8 Sentence Did Not Violate the Implied Agreement
        from March 10
        Stewart contends that the July 8 sentence in Compton
violated an implied term of the plea bargain he reached on
March 10 in El Monte by using pre-March 10 violations to find
Stewart in violation of probation. The People argue that the
court properly could rely on all violations identified in the
supplemental probation report it ordered, which included
Stewart’s termination from the domestic violence program on
December 22, 2020, and his failures to communicate with his
probation officer. The People further contend that even if the
March 10 El Monte plea agreement prevented the Compton court
on July 8 from relying on any pre-March 10 violations, Stewart
still committed additional violations between March 10 and
July 8 sufficient to support the trial court’s findings. We find
that sufficient evidence supports the finding of a probation

                                15
violation on July 8 and that the court did not abuse its discretion
in ordering execution of the state prison sentence.

              a. Substantial evidence supports the probation
                  violation finding at the July 8 hearing
        A trial court need only find a violation of probation by a
preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Rodriguez, supra,
51 Cal.3d at p. 442.) But “the evidence must support a conclusion
the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the
terms and conditions of probation.” (People v. Galvan (2007)
155 Cal.App.4th 978, 982.) Where evidence is uncontroverted
that a probationer did not fail to appear due to “irresponsibility,
contumacious behavior or disrespect for the orders and
expectations of the court,” the trial court may abuse its discretion
if it uses that failure to appear as the basis to revoke probation.
(People v. Zaring (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 362, 379.)
        The court’s July 8 recitation of reasons to find Stewart in
violation of his probation references both pre-March 10 and post-
March 10 conduct. After discussing the failures to appear, the
court refers to “the culmination of things here,” going on to list
“the picking up of the new case but which was already
addressed,” and the “supplemental report he simply never
checked in with probation.” Stewart contends the court’s
consideration of pre-March 10 violations invalidates its finding
that Stewart violated probation.4 When discussing the failures to

4      The People argue Stewart forfeited any challenge to the
court’s consideration of these violations by failing to object in the
trial court. However, the People confuse the failure to object to
consideration of these factors at sentencing (which the court could
validly do), with consideration of them as the basis for the

                                 16
appear and the reasons for them, the court stated, “And that’s
one aspect of why we’re here.” Although not a model of clarity,
that comment and the other references do not necessarily imply
the court relied on pre-March 10 violations when finding Stewart
in violation of probation on July 8. But even if the court did so,
we only look to whether substantial evidence supports the court’s
decision. If it does, it is harmless error that the court may also
have relied on improper material.
       The record contains evidence of three possible probation
violations after March 10—failures to contact his probation
officer and two failures to appear—all referenced by the court at
the probation revocation hearing. The probation report prepared
for the March 22 hearing indicated that Stewart should
telephonically contact his probation officer monthly. The
supplemental report ordered by the court on April 6 indicates
that Stewart “failed to make any contact” with his probation
officer before his remand to county jail on April 9. Thus, Stewart
failed to contact his probation officer for approximately one
month.
       Stewart points to language differences between the
supplemental probation report and earlier reports to suggest
probation did not instruct him to contact probation after the
March 10 hearing. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People, as we must, the more reasonable
interpretation is that probation instructed Stewart to report to
his probation officer monthly, but he consistently failed to do so –
right up until the July 8, 2021, hearing. It makes no sense that
after Stewart failed to report to probation between December 23,

violation itself. Thus, People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356,
cited by the People, does not apply.

                                 17
2020 and his March 10, 2021, plea bargain, probation would not
instruct him to report regularly from that point forward. The
March 22, 2021, report suggests that instruction was to report
monthly. He did not, according to the supplemental report,
contact probation in the month between the March 10, 2021,
hearing and his April 9, 2021, remand to county jail (a span that
includes his failure to appear on March 22 and April 6). The trial
court specifically referenced Stewart’s failure to report when
finding him in violation of probation on July 8, 2021. At a
minimum, the trial court could “reasonably deduce from the
evidence” that Stewart failed to report as directed after March 10,
and we therefore must presume the existence of that fact.
(People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 314.) This failure alone
would constitute substantial evidence in support of the court’s
finding on July 8 that Stewart violated probation after March 10.
      In addition, Stewart failed to appear in court twice after
March 10, 2021: first on March 22 (though he appeared later
that day), and then again on April 6. Stewart’s counsel
essentially conceded these failures, as he had to. However,
Stewart’s counsel offered uncontradicted evidence, including a
proffer of the bailiff’s testimony, that Stewart had mental health
issues caused by medication on March 22 that made him late and
prevented him from entering the courtroom. The court accepted
counsel’s representations as true. In its findings, the court
explained that on March 22 Stewart “did not come to court . . .
but I do understand the extenuating circumstances that were
described to me.”

                                18
      Stewart argues these comments indicate the court made a
finding that the “extenuating circumstances” excused Stewart’s
failure to appear and rendered the failure not willful. Except
that the court never expressly found that Stewart’s failure was
not willful. Understanding the extenuating circumstances does
not exclude a finding that Stewart willfully failed to appear.
Both could be true. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People, the court had no obligation to find
Stewart’s failure to appear resulted from “irresponsibility,
contumacious behavior or disrespect for the orders and
expectations of the court” before concluding that the failure was
willful.5 (People v. Zaring, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 379.)
      But even if the uncontradicted evidence proffered by
Stewart required the court to excuse Stewart’s failure to appear
on March 22, the same evidence does not excuse his next failure
to appear on April 6. Stewart’s counsel argued that Stewart’s
issues on March 22 then “led to some serious confusion about the
next court date.” However, the evidence proffer of the bailiff’s
testimony did not extend to the reasons why Stewart failed to
appear on April 6. The bailiff only observed Stewart on
March 22. Stewart’s counsel’s argument that Stewart’s condition

5      In People v. Zaring, supra, 8 Cal.App.4th 362, the court
held that an order revoking probation was erroneous. Although
the defendant appeared 22 minutes late for a court-ordered
appearance, she presented uncontradicted evidence at her
probation revocation hearing that unforeseen circumstances out
of her control and parental responsibilities prevented her from
appearing on time. (Id. at p. 379.) The facts here are quite
different. Stewart had a record of failing to appear, never
appeared in the courtroom on March 22, and offered no evidence
why he failed to appear on April 6.

                               19
on March 22 somehow affected his ability to appear on April 6
relies on sheer speculation. Thus, even if we excuse the March 22
failure to appear as a basis to revoke probation, substantial
evidence supports a finding that the April 6 failure to appear was
willful and a proper basis to revoke probation. Given the
multiple failures to appear, and the nature of the evidence
submitted by Stewart, this is not the “very extreme case” where
we should “interfere” with the trial court’s decision to revoke
probation. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 443.)

             b. The court did not abuse its discretion when it
                imposed the state prison sentence
      Because substantial evidence supports the finding that
Stewart violated his probation, the court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering executing of the state prison sentence. The
court warned Stewart in clear terms that any violation could
result in execution of the sentence. That, too, was the bargain
Stewart made. The court properly considered Stewart’s overall
poor performance on probation and the public safety concerns
acknowledged as a valid concern by Stewart’s counsel. Stewart
has not met his burden to show the court abused its discretion.
(People v. Vanella, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d at p. 469.)

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                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.

                                    HOWARD, J.*

We concur:

     PERLUSS, P. J.

     FEUER, J.

*     Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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