Court Opinion

ID: 9677719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:57:56.991681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:57.969915
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
The employer appeals from the district court’s ruling, which held that the deputy industrial commissioner imposed a higher burden of proof than is legally required on the claimant, that the deputy improperly minimized the weight to be given expert testimony, and which remanded the case to the industrial commissioner for a redetermi-nation of disability using the correct principles of law. We affirm the district court’s ruling.
The claimant was injured on September 9, 1975, during a fight with his foreman. He sustained physical injuries to his finger and back. He also alleges, and presented expert psychiatric testimony to prove, that he was permanently and totally disabled due to psychiatric problems resulting from the fight.
A deputy industrial commissioner found that the claimant was injured in the course of his employment and granted him healing period benefits to December 16, 1975. The only psychiatrist to testify stated that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled due to psychological problems which were triggered by the fight on September 9, 1975. The deputy recognized this, then stated that a number of factors detracted from the finding that the claimant was totally disabled by the fight. The deputy held the claimant’s psychiatric condition was only partially brought about by the September 9, 1975, injury. The deputy then found claimant’s industrial disability to be 25 percent of the whole man.
The claimant appealed to the industrial commissioner, who affirmed the deputy’s decision. The claimant then appealed to the district court, which ruled that: (1) the deputy improperly minimized the weight to be given the psychiatrist’s testimony; and (2) the deputy imposed a higher burden of proof on the claimant than is required by law. The court remanded the case to the industrial commissioner. The employer appealed that ruling.
We find that Langford v. Kellar Excavating & Grading Inc., 191 N.W.2d 667 (Iowa 1971) is controlling. Here, as in Langford, taking into account the doctor’s testimony and giving it full effect, the conclusion is inescapable as a matter of law that the claimant’s disability is directly traceable to the injury of September 9, 1975, without which it would not now exist. This is all the claimant need prove. Langford.
Defendant and the Commissioner claim that a number of factors detracted from the finding that the claimant was totally disabled. One factor was that there was a preexisting anxiety. Another factor was the existence of a prior work-related injury. We cannot agree that these are of great significance. When he was informed of them, Dr. Shafer took them into consideration, conceding they may have contributed to the end result, but expressing the unshaken opinion that claimant’s present disability relates to the 1975 injury. At no time did Dr. Shafer retreat from his statement that the 1975 injury was the precipitating cause of the claimant’s condition.
We know of no reason to vary from the rule that the employer takes the employee as he finds him in physical injury incidents and apply a different rule in psychiatric injuries. See Gosek v. Garmer & Stiles Co., 158 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1968) IB Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 42.22.
We therefore affirm the trial court and remand the case to the industrial commissioner for a determination of the extent of claimant’s disability under the record made in the hearing on claimant’s petition.
*636AFFIRMED AND REMANDED TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER.
All judges concur except CARTER, J., who dissents.