Court Opinion

ID: 9622803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:23:50.896169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:20.578028
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in that portion of the majority’s opinion deeming defendant to have abandoned his assignment of error regarding 05 CRS 51915 and that there is no error in the verdicts or the consolidated judgments entered thereon. The majority’s opinion also holds the correction to the indictments allowed by the trial court “was a substantial alteration of the original charge” in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-923(e) and vacates the judgments and sentences of five counts of First Degree Sexual Offense entered upon five indictments and jury verdicts. I find no prejudicial error in the trial court’s discretionary decision to allow the State’s motion to correct the indictments. I respectfully dissent.
I. Issue
Defendant presents one issue on appeal: whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to dismiss five indictments charging him with committing a first-degree sexual offense and allowing the State to amend those indictments after the close of the State’s evidence.
A. Standard of Review
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must decide whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied. Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences.
State v. King, 178 N.C. App. 122, 130-31, 630 S.E.2d 719, 724 (2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-923(e) (2005), “a bill of indictment may not be amended.” “[T]he term ‘amendment’ under N.C.G.S. § 15A-923(e) [means] ‘any change in the indictment which would substantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment.’ ” State v. *224Snyder, 343 N.C. 61, 65, 468 S.E.2d 221, 224 (1996) (quoting State v. Price, 310 N.C. 596, 598, 313 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1984)). The trial court’s discretionary allowance of correction of an indictment does not constitute reversible error unless the item amended was an essential element of the offense. State v. May, 159 N.C. App. 159, 162, 583 S.E.2d 302, 304 (2003).
B. Analysis
The majority’s opinion holds “the trial court’s decision to allow the State to correct the indictments did not cure a mere clerical defect, but fundamentally changed the nature of the charge against defendant.” I disagree.
“The indictment need not cite by number the pertinent statute.” State v. Page, 32 N.C. App. 478, 481, 232 S.E.2d 460, 462 (held the defendant’s argument that the indictment was defective because it failed to identify statutes by number had no merit), cert. denied, 292 N.C. 643, 235 S.E.2d 64 (1977). “A change in an indictment does not constitute an amendment where the variance was inadvertent and defendant was neither misled nor surprised as to the nature of the charges.” State v. Campbell, 133 N.C. App. 531, 535-36, 515 S.E.2d 732, 735, disc. rev. denied, 351 N.C. 111, 540 S.E.2d 370 (1999). An indictment must provide “sufficient detail to put the defendant on notice as to the nature of the crime charged and to bar subsequent prosecution for the same offense in violation of the prohibitions against double jeopardy.” State v. Burroughs, 147 N.C. App. 693, 695-96, 556 S.E.2d 339, 342 (2001).
The North Carolina General Assembly has authorized the use of “short-form” indictments for certain crimes. State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 259, 307 S.E.2d 339, 350 (1983). Short-form indictments are authorized as a charging instrument for statutory sex offense. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15444.2(b) (2005); State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 505, 528 S.E.2d 326, 342, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1018, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000). Our Supreme Court has held short-form indictments are “sufficient to allege an offense even though not all of the elements of a particular crime are required to be alleged” therein. Jerrett, 309 N.C. at 259, 307 S.E.2d at 350.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15444.2(b) (2005) provides the approved “short-form” essential allegations for an indictment charging sex offense:
If the victim is a person under the age of 13 years, it is sufficient to allege that the defendant unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously *225did engage in a sex offense with a child under the age of 13 years, naming the child, and concluding as aforesaid. Any bill of indictment containing the averments and allegations herein named shall be good and sufficient in law as an indictment for a sex offense against a child under the age of 13 years and all lesser included offenses.
The indictments at issue alleged that the victim was under the age of thirteen, named the victim, and averred that defendant “unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did engage in a sex offense . . . .” These indictments clearly met the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144.2(b) and were therefore “good and sufficient in law as an indictment for a sex offense against a child under the age of 13 years and all lesser included offenses.” Id.
The majority’s opinion relies on State v. Miller to support their holding that the State’s correction of the indictments amounted to a substantial alteration of and amendment to the original charge. 159 N.C. App. 608, 583 S.E.2d 620 (2003), aff'd per curiam, 358 N.C. 133, 591 S.E.2d 520 (2004). “[T]he indictments in [Miller] allege[d] that defendant’s alleged conduct with [the victims] violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.7A, while judgment and commitment was actually entered upon defendant’s conviction for violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(l).” 159 N.C. App. at 612, 583 S.E.2d at 622.
In Miller, this Court:
“conclude [d] that, under the very narrow circumstances presented by this case, the use of “short-form” language authorized under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144.2(b) in the indictments [was] not sufficient to cure the fatal defects found therein.. .. [T]he indictments cite[d] one statute, and defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced under another statute.”
159 N.C. App. at 614, 583 S.E.2d at 623 (emphasis supplied).
Here, the five indictments each contained sufficient information to charge defendant with a statutory first-degree sexual offense. Unlike Miller where the indictments at issue were never amended, the indictments at bar were amended to cite the correct statute at the close of the State’s evidence following the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. Defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced under the statute listed on the amended indictments. Defendant was not convicted or sentenced under any other statute. The facts before *226us do not fit “the very narrow circumstances presented by [Miller].” Id. at 614, 583 S.E.2d at 623.
The corrections allowed by the trial court did not “substantially alter” the nature of the charges against defendant. Snyder, 343 N.C. at 65, 468 S.E.2d at 224. The trial court’s decision to allow the State to correct the indictments cured a mere clerical defect and the correction did not fundamentally change the nature of the charges against defendant. If defendant needed or required additional information on the nature of the specific sexual act with which he stood charged, he could, and should have, moved for a bill of particulars. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-925(a) (2005) (“Upon motion of a defendant under G.S. 15A-952, the court. . . may order the State to file a bill of particulars . . . and to serve a copy upon the defendant.”); State v. Edwards, 305 N.C. 378, 380, 289 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1982) (An indictment drafted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-144.2(b) without specifying which sexual act was committed was sufficient to charge the crime of first-degree sexual offense and to inform the defendant of such accusation.).
II. Conclusion
Defendant was given adequate notice of the charges brought against him and the statutorily required essential elements of first-degree sexual offense were alleged in each indictment. Defendant failed to show any prejudicial error in the trial court’s order allowing the State’s motion to amend to vacate the judgments against him at the close of the State’s evidence.
The short-form indictments provided “sufficient detail to put the defendant on notice as to the nature of the crime charged and to bar subsequent prosecution for the same offense in violation of the prohibitions against double jeopardy.” Burroughs, 147 N.C. App. at 695-96, 556 S.E.2d at 342. The amendment of the statute number in the indictments was not an essential element of the offense and did not prejudice defendant to constitute reversible error. May, 159 N.C. App. at 162, 583 S.E.2d at 304. Miller, by its own terms is “very narrow,” and does not support the majority’s conclusion to vacate defendant’s convictions under these facts. 159 N.C. at 614, 583 S.E.2d at 623.1 find no prejudicial error in defendant’s convictions and the judgments entered thereon. I respectfully dissent.