Court Opinion

ID: 9782054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:54:28.512537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:45.863739
License: Public Domain

Justice EID,
dissenting.
Today, the majority holds that the Colorado Constitution conveys to a home rule municipality the authority to condemn land outside its territorial boundaries for open space, striking down an act of the General Assembly that prohibits such condemnations. Because I believe our constitution does not convey to home rule municipalities such exclusive extraterritorial condemnation authority, I would uphold section 88-1-101(4)(b), C.R.S. (2007), against Telluride's constitutional challenge. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion.
Section 1 of article XX of the Colorado Constitution, adopted in 1902, gives the City of Denver the authority to condemn land, "within or without its territorial limits," for the purpose of "water works, light plants, power plants, transportation systems, heating plants, and any other public utilities or works or ways local in use and extent." Section 6 of article XX, which was added in 1912, gives home rule municipalities the powers of section 1 and "all other powers necessary, requisite or proper for the government and administration of its local and municipal matters." In a number of cases, we have noted that condemnations by home rule municipali*173ties must be for a "local and municipal purpose." See, eg., Fishel v. City & County of Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 583, 108 P.2d 236, 240 (1940) (stating that home rule municipalities have the power to condemn for "any lawful, public, local and municipal purpose").
Historically, however, we have been quite cautious with regard to condemnations that are extraterritorial in nature. Indeed, the extraterritorial uses we have found to be "local and municipal" in character have hewn closely to the purposes initially enumerated in article XX section 1. Seq, eg., City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 194 Colo. 526, 575 P.2d 382 (1978) (water rights for water project); Toll v. City & County of Denver, 139 Colo. 462, 340 P.2d 862 (1959) (flowage easements for sewer project); City & County of Denver v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 113 Colo. 150, 156 P.2d 101 (1945) (airport); Fishel, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P.2d 236 (air corps technical school and bombing field); see also maj. op. at 166 (citing the foregoing cases). Unlike the majority, I would continue our cautious stance towards extraterritorial condemnations in the case before us today.
In my view, our caution has been justified by article XX section 6 itself, which draws a distinction between territorial and extraterritorial actions taken by a municipality. It provides that ordinances passed by a home rule municipality's governing body "shall supersede within the territorial limits ... of said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith." (Emphasis added). Thus, section 6 plainly states that a home rule municipality's ordinance, such as the one giving Telluride the authority to condemn land outside its boundaries for open space, can supersede conflicting state law-here, section 88-1-101(4)(b)-only within its own boundaries. By definition, an extraterritorial condemnation implicates land that may be located in a neighboring municipality-precisely the sort of subject matter that has traditionally concerned the General Assembly. See generally Howard C. Klemme, The Powers of Home Rule Cities in Colorado, 36 U. Colo. L.Rev. 821 (1968-64) (discussing the historical development of our home rule jurisprudence).
The majority glosses over section 6's clear limitation on extraterritorial actions by stating that we have permitted extraterritorial condemnations in the past. Maj. op. at 166. Yet again, these exterritorial condemnations have been few and far between, and have been closely related to the enumerated purposes in section 1. These narrow precedents hardly compel the conclusion reached by the majority today: that the General Assembly cannot limit a home rule municipality's extraterritorial condemnation authority to those purposes listed in article XX section 1.
Justice Coats' concurrence notwithstanding, the effect of today's ruling is to cut out the General Assembly from regulating extraterritorial condemnations. The majority holds that a home rule municipality has the constitutional authority to condemn property outside of its boundaries essentially for any valid purpose-a broad standard indeed. Maj. op. at 168-169. This holding necessarily prevents the General Assembly from prohibiting or substantially limiting such extraterritorial condemnations. While the General Assembly could, if it chose to do so, abrogate or modify section 38-1-101(4)(b), today's decision takes such an action out of its hands.
I agree with the majority and amici that open space is a vital resouree that Colorado must protect. The question here, however, is whether our constitution gives home rule municipalities that exclusive authority, rendering section 38-1-101(4)(b) unconstitutional, with regard to extraterritorial condemnations. In my view, it does not. I therefore respectfully dissent.