Court Opinion

ID: 9679889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:12:27.90043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:23.055768
License: Public Domain

SPECTOR, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the majority mis-characterizes the damages awarded Saenz by the jury, I respectfully dissent. While recognizing that the “instructions make plain that ■the jury was to find the future medical costs that Saenz would incur as a result of Fidelity’s wrongfully inducing her to settle,” 925 S.W.2d 613, the majority nevertheless concludes that Saenz is not entitled to damages because Fidelity’s “fraud and bad faith did not cause Saenz any physical injury.” Id. I believe, however, that Saenz’s uncompensated future medical expenses were caused by Fidelity’s misconduct and, therefore, should be upheld.
Saenz brought an action for common-law fraud and bad faith, not for an increase in *618benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. This is not a rescission claim; instead it is a claim for torts that this Court has recognized exist apart from a claim under the Workers Compensation Act. See Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212-18 (Tex.1988). The Act does not cover intentional torts such as fraud and bad faith. See Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 213-14; Porter v. Downing, 578 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Saenz’s uncompensated future medical expenses should be recoverable as damages for Fidelity’s tortious conduct. See Kneip v. Unitedbank-Victoria, 734 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
We first recognized the duty of good faith and fair dealing because the unequal bargaining power between the parties would “allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insured’s misfortunes in bargaining for settlement or resolution of ... claims.” Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex.1987). In this ease, that is exactly what happened: Recognizing that “[Saenz’s] condition could deteriorate and eventually result in a condition of imbecility,” Fidelity fraudulently induced Saenz to settle in order to escape the possibility the company could be saddled with “statutory lifetime compensation [and] medical benefits.”
I would hold that the Act does not preclude Saenz’s damages for uncompensated future medical expenses flowing from Fidelity’s tortious conduct. By holding otherwise, the majority leaves injured workers whose workers compensation carriers take advantage of their superior bargaining position with little meaningful recourse. See 865 S.W.2d 103, 122 (Hinojosa, J., dissenting). Therefore, I dissent.