Court Opinion

ID: 9744902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:22:19.246922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:53.213623
License: Public Domain

MARGULIES, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I have no quarrel with the majority’s conclusion that Good, as a past sex offender, is a person required to provide a DNA sample under Penal Code section 296.1 What the majority overlooks, however, is that collection of a DNA sample under the DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998 (Stats. 1998, ch. 696, § 2) (Act) does not follow automatically from a past offender’s qualification under section 296. Rather, the Act very specifically delineates, and therefore limits, the circumstances under which a DNA sample may be collected. Those limitations preclude local law enforcement officials from ordering the appearance of a person to provide a DNA sample just because he or she qualifies under section 296.
Section 296.1, subdivision (a) is the primary statute governing when and where DNA samples are to be collected. It states that “[t]he specimens, samples, and print impressions required by this chapter shall be collected from persons described in subdivision (a) of Section 296 for present and past qualifying offenses of record as follows . . . .” It then specifies, in six separate paragraphs, when samples are to be collected. All of these paragraphs share one common attribute; they apply only to persons who have some current involvement with the criminal justice system through arrest, incarceration, parole, or probation.2 Because there is no evidence Good has had a recent arrest or conviction, section 296.1 does not apply to him.
*1512Good is, however, a registered sex offender, and he is therefore required to report once a year to his local police station for registration. Although the police department letter directing Good to report for sampling does not appear to have been timed to coincide with his annual registration, the requirement of annual registration does involve Good with the criminal justice system in a current, if limited, way. Section 296.2, subdivision (c) authorizes the collection of a DNA sample from past sex offenders at the time of their annual registration, if the offender has not provided a DNA sample previously. Section 296.2, however, expressly states that it applies only to persons who are required to register as the result of a felony sex offense. Under “ ‘the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ ” (Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 944-945 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 162 P.3d 569]), which holds “that the expression of one thing in a statute ordinarily implies the exclusion of other things” (In re J. W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 897, 57 P.3d 363]), this express restriction of DNA sampling to felony sex offenders requires us to construe section 296.2 to preclude the sampling of past misdemeanant sex offenders, like Good, at the time of their annual registration.
While the majority acknowledges the foregoing statutory restrictions, it errs in expressly deciding to disregard them. The majority recognizes that the requirement for current sampling of past misdemeanant sex offenders cannot conclusively be derived from section 296 itself, since Proposition 69 did not insert a retroactivity provision in that section. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1506.) Because it contains no retroactivity provision, amended section 296—viewed in isolation—retains the ambiguity that permitted People v. Brewer (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1298 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 293] (Brewer) to conclude that the Act is not retroactive. (87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303.)3
Given the ambiguity of section 296, the best source for meaning is the remaining provisions of the Act. (People v. Allegheny Casualty Co. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 704, 708-709 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 689, 161 P.3d 198].) The majority turns first to section 296.1, which it accurately characterizes as “a provision to implement the goals of section 296” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1507), i.e., by describing the manner in which the samples authorized in section 296 are to be collected. Rather than recognizing the importance of the limitation placed by section 296.1 on section 296, however, the majority simply dismisses it, concluding, “Section 296.1 does not deal with sex offender registrants, and never did.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1507.)
*1513Unable to find an answer in section 296.1, the majority jumps to the conclusion that “a one-time sample collection at the next registration from one required to register annually does not need a statutory directive . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1507.) Of course, as discussed ante, there is such a “statutory directive.” Section 296.2 authorizes the collection of samples from sex offenders at the time of sex registration, but it applies only to felons. Accordingly, section 296.2 must be interpreted as excluding collection of DNA samples from past misdemeanant sex offenders, thereby conclusively answering the question posed by the ambiguity of section 296. Rather than acknowledge the implications of this limitation, the majority decides, instead, not to place “overriding importance” on section 296.2. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1510.)
Proposition 69’s failure to amend section 296.2 cannot be so easily sidestepped. Because section 296.2 expressly excludes the majority’s construction, its implications can be disregarded only if the failure to delete the restriction to past felony sex offenders can be characterized as a drafting error. Yet under People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 980 P.2d 829], courts must refrain from presuming a drafting error “when the statute is reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that harmonizes all its parts without disregarding or altering any of them.” (Id. at p. 6.) Plainly the interpretation put forward in this dissent—that the statute means what it says—is just such a harmonizing interpretation. As a result, the voters’ failure to amend section 296.2 to square with the majority’s interpretation cannot be dismissed as a mere oversight.
The majority makes selective use of other interpretive tools as well. Their decision quotes the analysis of the Legislative Analyst, circulated to voters, as concluding that “ ‘[t]he expanded list of qualifying offenses would be retroactive regardless of when the person was convicted ....’” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1508.) Yet the next sentence of the analysis, which the majority omits, states, “As a result, DNA would be obtained from adults and juveniles already serving time in correctional facilities as well as those who are on parole or probation for these offenses.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2004) analysis of Prop. 69 by Legis. Analyst, pp. 60-61, italics added.) In other words, the Legislative Analyst never believed, and voters were never informed, that past misdemeanant sex offenders, despite having no further connection with law enforcement, could be recalled at any time by the police to provide DNA samples.
Accordingly, the majority’s interpretation finds no support in any of the sources considered most important in interpreting legislation—related statutory provisions and the contemporary legislative history materials. Section 296 itself is unrevealing, since the majority acknowledges that, standing alone, it *1514is ambiguous. Section 296.1 is ruled out, since the majority believes it has nothing to do with sex offenders. Section 296.2 actually contradicts the majority’s position, as does the analysis of the Legislative Analyst.
The majority is forced to cobble together support from less favored sources of statutory intent and from “the nature of, and the policies behind, sex offender registration.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1509.) Yet even these sources are unhelpful. Section 295, subdivision (b)(2), for example, which states that it is the intent of the people to require DNA samples “from all persons, including juveniles, for the felony and misdemeanor offenses described” in section 296, does not even mention past offenders, let alone state that the Act is intended to apply to all past offenders, rather than only those who have reoffended. The other indications of statutory intent and purpose relied on by the majority are similarly silent on the precise question before us.
My reading of the statute does not ignore Proposition 69 and its impact on the Act. The timing and language of Proposition 69’s retroactivity provisions make clear that their purpose was to overrule Brewer, nothing more. Brewer held that if a person who committed a past qualifying offense under section 296 once again commits a crime, and therefore comes within the collection provisions of section 296.1, a DNA sample may not be collected unless the new crime is also a qualifying offense. Following Proposition 69, if a past qualifying offender once again commits a crime, and therefore comes within section 296.1, a DNA sample must be collected regardless of the nature of the new crime.
In construing a statute, “[o]ur objective is to determine the drafter’s intent.” (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 902 [55 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 152 P.3d 1109].) This is a structured search. “[W]e look first to the statutes’ words, as these ‘ “generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” ’ ” (Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794, 804 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 248, 139 P.3d 1196].) “ ‘If the language contains no ambiguity, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs.’ ” (People v. Allegheny Casualty Co., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 709.) Viewed as a whole, the language of the Act gives very clear instruction. Although a wide range of past offenders are covered by section 296, police are authorized to collect DNA samples from those offenders only if they reoffend (or are arrested for certain crimes) or are past felony sex offenders. Because Good does not fit these categories, the police exceeded their authority when they ordered him to appear at the station to provide a DNA sample.
*1515Our deferential duty in interpreting legislation was summed up in People v. Castille (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 469, 490 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 489] (judg. vacated and cause remanded sub nom. Shields v. California (2004) 541 U.S. 930 [158 L.Ed.2d 352, 124 S.Ct. 1653]): “We will not, and cannot, do what the Legislature could have, but did not do.” In passing Proposition 69, what the voters did was overrule Brewer. They manifestly did not approve the general recall of past qualifying offenders authorized by the majority’s decision, which would have required the effective repeal of sections 296.1 and 296.2, subdivision (c). The majority does today what the voters could have, but did not do in 2004. Unlike the voters, however, the majority lacks the legislative authority to make such a change.
On February 1, 2008, the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Petitoner’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 23, 2008, S160271. George, C. J., did not participate therein. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

 Pursuant to section 296.1, subdivision (a), DNA sample collection is to occur (1) upon arrest for certain felonies; (2) from persons held in custody; (3) from persons on “probation, parole, or other release”; (4) from parole violators returned to custody; (5) from persons accepted into custody in California from other states; and (6) from federal prisoners. (§ 296.1, subd. (a)(1)—(6).)

 As discussed post, Proposition 69’s inclusion of a retroactivity provision in section 296.1 removed this ambiguity in the circumstances described by Brewer—that is, when a past offender is once again detained. Section 296.1 does not, however, address or resolve Good’s situation.