Court Opinion

ID: 9381309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 17:03:53.945237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.515713
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                             :
                                               :           ID No. 2201001944
                                               :
                 v.                            :
                                               :
                                               :
KYLE LEONARD,                                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                  Defendant.                   :

                                Submitted: March 13, 2023
                                Decided: March 22, 2023

                                          ORDER
                Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence – DENIED

       On this 22nd day of March 2023, after considering the evidence presented at
a suppression hearing on March 13, 2023, and the submissions and arguments of the
parties, it appears that:
       1.     Defendant Kyle Leonard’s trial for Murder First Degree and Possession
of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony is scheduled to begin on May 22,
2023. The State alleges that Mr. Leonard shot and killed his mother inside their
home in January 2022 after an argument. The State further alleges that shortly after
Mr. Leonard shot her, he called a 9-1-1 dispatcher and reported the incident. As a
result, members of the Delaware State Police (“DSP”) arrived at the scene, asked
Mr. Leonard to exit the home, and arrested him.             DSP officers then entered the
residence to perform a protective sweep for safety purposes,1 and when they

1
 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334–35 (1990) (recognizing that a protective sweep is an
exception to the warrant requirement justified by an emergency, and that the scope of the search
concluded the sweep they waited in the residence’s kitchen until a detective secured
a search warrant. When a magistrate at the Justice of the Peace Court No. 2 issued
the warrant at 9:19 p.m., the detective who secured it then emailed it to a detective
onsite.
       2.       At the outset, both parties agree that the warrant justified a daytime
search of Mr. Leonard’s residence.2 They further stipulate that the warrant did not
justify a nighttime residential search because it did not meet the requirements of 11
Del. C. § 2308 (“Section 2308”). In relevant part, Section 2308 provides:
            [a] search warrant shall not authorize the person executing it to
            search any dwelling house in the nighttime unless the judge . . . is
            satisfied that it is necessary in order to prevent the escape or removal
            of the person or thing to be searched for, and then the authority shall
            be expressly given in the warrant. For purposes of this section[,] the
            term “nighttime” shall mean the period of time between 10:00 p.m.
            and 6:00 a.m.3

The parties agree, and the probable cause affidavit confirms, that the detective
recited no facts to demonstrate the necessity for a nighttime search as required by
Section 2308 (hereafter a “nighttime search” or relatedly a “nighttime warrant”).4
Nor did the issuing magistrate grant authority for such a search when he approved
the warrant.5
       3.       Accordingly, Mr. Leonard’s suppression motion turns on the timing of
execution – that is, whether the police began their search of Mr. Leonard’s residence
during the day or at night, as Section 2308 defines those terms. If the police
conducted a nighttime search with a daytime warrant in hand, they unlawfully
executed the warrant. If that is the case, the Court must suppress the evidence unless

does not include a full search of the premises, but rather is permitted only as a cursory inspection
to secure occupant safety).
2
  Def.’s Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A.
3
  11 Del. C. § 2308.
4
  Def.’s Mot. to Suppress, Ex. A.
5
  Id.
                                                 2
an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Furthermore, the warrant must
meet heightened 2308 standards only when the police begin the search after 10:00
p.m., and before 6:00 a.m.6 Accordingly, there is no nighttime search if the police
start a search before 10:00 p.m. that extends into the early morning hours.7
       4.      Delaware decisional law does not address challenges to the lawful
execution of warrants to the extent that it addresses other search and seizure issues.
For instance, it is well settled that a challenge to the sufficiency of a warrant for lack
of probable cause to support the warrant permits only a four-corners review of the
affidavit of probable cause (a “four corners review”).8               In those cases, the Court
cannot consider extrinsic evidence. When a suppression motion challenges a
warrantless search or seizure (a “warrantless search”), however, the Court holds an
evidentiary hearing that includes extrinsic evidence, including testimony.9
       5.      Mr. Leonard’s motion poses a different question because it straddles
these two categories. Superior Court Criminal Rule 41(f) impliedly acknowledges
that the Court may consider extrinsic evidence when deciding Mr. Leonard’s
challenge to the execution of a search warrant even though the contents of the
warrant are central to his motion.10 Here, Mr. Leonard justified, and the State has
conceded, the need for an evidentiary hearing.              Because the Court agreed to hear

6
  Johnson v. State, 676 A.2d 904, 1996 WL 69829, at *1 (Del. Feb. 9, 1996) (TABLE).
7
  See State v. Herhal, 307 A.2d 553, 556–57 (Del. Super. 1973) (considering the issue as a matter
of first impression in Delaware and recognizing that federal law on the issue recognizes that a
daytime warrant is sufficient so long as the search begins during the daytime, even if it continues
through the night).
8
  Jensen v. State, 482 A.2d 105, 110–13 (Del. 1984) (quoting Henry v. State, 373 A.2d 575, 577
(Del. 1977)).
9
  State v. Lambert, 2015 WL 3897810, at *3 (Del. Super. May 29, 2015), aff’d, 149 A.3d 227 (Del.
2016).
10
   See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 41(f) (providing that the court generally shall not hear extrinsic evidence
on execution or veracity of search warrants without an accompanying affidavit, unless its absence
is satisfactorily explained); see also Dunfee v. State, 346 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1975) (examining
the lawfulness of warrant execution based upon extrinsic evidence).
                                                   3
evidence, the undersigned sat as the finder of fact, assessed witness credibility, and
made findings based upon a preponderance of the evidence.11
       6.       At the hearing, the Court raised an unanswered procedural question
regarding who holds the burden of proof when a defendant challenges the execution
of a warrant. Delaware law provides clear answers to the burden of proof questions
when there is a four-corners review or a warrantless search at issue. Namely, the
defendant bears the burden of proof in a four-corners review.12 On the other hand,
the State bears the burden of proof if there was a warrantless search or seizure.13
       7.      When the Court asked the parties’ positions regarding who held the
burden in this situation, they agreed that the State should bear it.                 Neither party
identified Delaware or persuasive authority for the premise, however.                            For
expediency purposes and because the parties did not fully develop the issue, the
Court elects to assign the burden of proof to the State by party stipulation. The
Court does so while recognizing that (1) there is no mandatory or Delaware
persuasive authority on the issue, and (2) there is a split of authority in other
jurisdictions regarding the question.14
       8.      After settling on procedure, the Court next examines the parties’
arguments. Mr. Leonard contends that the search did not begin until one of the
detectives began cataloging and collecting evidence. For that premise, Mr. Leonard
relies on an entry in Detective Lowe’s written report that records that the search
began when he started to collect evidence after 10:00 p.m.

11
   State v. Hopkins, 2016 WL 6958697, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 23, 2016) (citing Turner v. State,
957 A.2d 565, 570–71 (Del. 2008)).
12
   State v. Sisson, 883 A.2d 868, 875 (Del. Super. 2005), aff’d, 903 A.2d 288 (Del. 2006).
13
   Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560 (Del. 2001).
14
   See, e.g., United States v. Vigo, 413 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1969) (recognizing that the defendant
has the burden of proof when challenging the execution of a warrant); c.f., e.g., State v. Stephenson,
245 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Minn. 1976) (recognizing that under Minnesota law, the State bears the
burden when there is a challenge to the execution of a warrant).
                                                    4
       9.      The State counters that the search began almost immediately after the
magistrate issued the warrant. It relies on the dictionary definition of a search and
applies the facts to that definition. To this end, it alleges that DSP’s search began
when Sergeant Cox, an evidence collection officer, began looking about the
residence after the police received the warrant. The State contends that the search,
by any common and ordinary definition, began immediately after 9:19 p.m. and was
well underway before 10:00 p.m.
       10.     After considering the parties’ arguments and the evidence presented at
the hearing, the Court makes the following findings of fact.                  First, DSP officers
arrived at Mr. Leonard’s residence at approximately 7:30 p.m. on the evening of
January 7, 2023, after Mr. Leonard called 9-1-1 to report that he had killed his
mother.      The police then arrested him and performed a protective sweep of the
residence. When performing the sweep, they observed certain items in plain view,
including Ms. Leonard’s body in a living room chair, bullet holes, expended
cartridges, blood spatterings, and a 9 MM pistol in a bedroom. After the officers
finished a lawful protective sweep, they waited for a warrant before performing a
full search of the residence.15 The onsite officers took no other relevant action until
they received the signed warrant.

15
   Mr. Leonard’s motion identified one basis to suppress evidence: the lack of a nighttime warrant.
As a result, his filings fairly raised no other issues. After the conclusion of the evidence, however,
the Court raised a separate issue with the parties and will provide further comment on the matter.
Namely, the police remained in the home for more than an hour after they completed their
protective sweep. The Court asked the parties whether doing so exceeded the scope of the
emergency-justified search. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 336 (holding that the sweep may last no longer
than necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and, in any event, no longer than it
takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises). To the extent that DSP officers exceeded
the lawful scope of a protective sweep by remaining in the premises, the facts in this case are
indistinguishable, in relevant part, from those in Lambert, 2015 WL 3897810, at *3, which applied
the inevitable discovery doctrine. In this case, as in Lambert, the discovery of the evidence
became inevitable once the police lawfully secured the home after the protective sweep. Here,
Ms. Leonard’s body remained in the home, and the police arrested and committed Mr. Leonard to
pre-trial custody. Although the inevitable discovery doctrine would otherwise apply under these
circumstances, it does not come into play because (1) there was a lawfully executed warrant, as
                                                     5
       11.     At 9:19 p.m., Justice of the Peace Court No. 2 issued a warrant that
authorized a daytime search, not a nighttime one.             The detective who had secured
the warrant emailed it to an onsite DSP detective within minutes after its issuance.
DSP Sergeant Cox was in the kitchen with the detective who received the warrant
and began his search shortly thereafter.          Detective Lowe, an evidence collection
technician for DSP’s homicide unit, arrived at the scene at 10:05 p.m. By the time
he arrived, Sergeant Cox had already finished his initial search. At that point,
Detective Lowe catalogued and collected the physical evidence that Sergeant Cox
showed him. Given these findings, the Court applies a commonsense inference that
Sergeant Cox (and other officers) began their search well before 10:00 p.m.                    An
entry and exit log for the unit maintained by another trooper supports that finding.16
Namely, her log recorded that Sergeant Cox remained in the residence from 9:10
p.m. to 9:34 p.m.17 He then returned inside the unit at 9:52 p.m. and left again before
10:00 p.m.18
       12.     Given these findings, no nighttime warrant was necessary because the
State met its burden of demonstrating that the search began before 10:00 p.m.19
Multiple DSP officers remained in the home after the protective sweep and waited
for the warrant to arrive. It would strain common sense to conclude that DSP’s
officers, some of whom responded after standard working hours, would delay their
search for forty minutes after they received the warrant.20

explained infra, (2) the police observed nearly all the evidence in plain view during their initial
sweep, and (3) Mr. Leonard did not fairly raise the issue in his motion, so the State did not have
fair notice that they needed to present additional evidence on the issue.
16
   See Suppression Hr’g State’s Ex. 1 (DSP crime scene entry and exit log).
17
   Id.
18
   Id.
19
   See Johnson, 1996 WL 69829, at *2 (recognizing that a search that commenced at 9:30 p.m.,
and extended past 10:00 p.m., did not constitute a nighttime search pursuant to Section 2308).
20
   The Court does not question the good faith basis for Mr. Leonard’s motion by making this
reference to commonsense. To the contrary, Mr. Leonard filed his motion in reasonable reliance
on Detective Lowe’s report, which recorded the search as beginning at 10:05 p.m. The evidence
                                                  6
       13.    As a final matter, Mr. Leonard’s argument that the search began when
Detective Lowe started to collect and catalog the evidence is not persuasive. The
dictionary definition of a search is “[t]o make a thorough examination of or look
over.”21 Here, the police were in the home, ready to go, and commenced their search
when they began to “look over” the premises after they received the warrant. Mr.
Leonard’s contention that Detective Lowe first executed the warrant conflates the
concept of search with seizure. Here, although the seizure of evidence began after
10:00 p.m. when Detective Lowe started collecting the evidence, the search began
before 10:00 p.m. For these reasons, the fact that Detective Lowe first began to
collect and catalog the evidence after 10:00 p.m. is of no import.
       WHEREFORE, for the reasons explained above, Defendant Kyle Leonard’s
motion to suppress is DENIED. The DSP officers began their search of Mr.
Leonard and his mother’s home prior to 10:00 p.m. and then seized the challenged
evidence pursuant to a lawfully executed warrant.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                            /s/Jeffrey J Clark
                                                             Resident Judge

oc: Prothonotary
sc: Counsel of Record

adduced at the hearing, however, provides a more complete picture and drives the Court’s
inference that other officers began their search before 10:00 p.m.
21
   Search, The American Heritage Dictionary (2d ed. 1982); see also Search, Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th ed. 1991) (defining a search to include “[a]n examination of a person’s house or
other buildings or premises . . . with a view to the discovery of . . . some evidence of guilt”).
                                                   7