Court Opinion

ID: 9470742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:15:04.48176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:05.473538
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
I concur in the remand on the Section 1983 claim, but respectfully dissent as to the age discrimination claim on the jury trial point.
In respect to the age discrimination claim, I believe that Washington, as a pro se claimant, was entitled to a jury trial. A pro se claimant should not be deemed to waive a demand for jury trial absent a procedure by which he is made aware of his constitutional right to trial by jury. There is no showing in this case that Washington was informed of his right to a jury trial and of the necessity of making a written demand under Fed.R.Civ.P. 38.
The majority cites Cascone v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 702 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.1983), which held, following Higgins v. Boeing Co., 526 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.1975) (per curiam), in a removed case, that the district court has discretion to permit the untimely filing of a jury demand. See also Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138, 144 (5th Cir.1979). It is true that the Second Circuit as in Noonan v. Cunard Steamship Co., 375 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir.1967), has taken a view that the district court’s discretion is exercisable only where there are special circumstances. excusing the untimely demand. This is as opposed to the broader view held by some other courts that the court should grant a jury trial in the absence of strong and compelling reasons to the contrary, see 9 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2334, at 113 (1971). Nevertheless even under a narrow view it seems to me that the paradigm case for permitting untimely filing is that of a pro se plaintiff, at least one who is not himself a lawyer or should not otherwise be presumed to have familiarity with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is within the spirit not only of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), but of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). It also adheres more closely to our own Cascone v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., supra, and it is a very simple matter as pointed out in the majority opinion, footnote 5, for the pro se claimant to be provided with the information necessary to claim or waive jury trial.
So far as I know this is the first case in this circuit passing upon waiver of a jury trial on the part of a pro se plaintiff. The Rules, I recollect, are to be construed “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. In this day of six person juries, less-than-unanimous verdicts and facile waiver, I fear that I am one of those old-fashioned few who still believes that the emphasis of Rule 38(a) should be maintained on its last five words: “The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.”