Court Opinion

ID: 9499208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:40:51.573992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:20.873056
License: Public Domain

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion’s discussion of Bah’s claims of political persecution and agree that we should deny Bah’s petition for review. I differ from both of my panel colleagues, however, in my analysis of the FGM claim.
Judge Lawson interprets the IJ’s oral opinion as basing its rejection of the FGM claim on a generalized determination that Bah was not credible in her accounts of political persecution and therefore not credible with respect to her FGM claim. Although the IJ’s opinion is not entirely clear on this point, I believe a closer reading reveals that the IJ first concluded that Bah could not prevail on her claim based on the fact that she had undergone FGM because she had faded to prove it was forced. Then the IJ found her claim based on her fears for her children not to be credible because he believed she was the ultimate decisionmaker with respect to whether her daughters would undergo FGM. Finally, the IJ noted that there was a better chance that Bah’s wishes would control her daughters’ fate if she returned to Guinea.
Judge Siler’s opinion treats the FGM claim as resting entirely on Bah’s assertion that she has a well-founded fear that her four daughters, who remain in Guinea, will be persecuted by undergoing FGM. While I agree that Bah regards this aspect of her claim as most important, based on language in her brief, she also apparently asserts a claim of persecution based on the fact that she herself has undergone FGM. Her discussion of this claim is quite conclu-sory, however, and largely amounts to a challenge to the IJ’s finding that she had to prove that she physically resisted FGM.
Analyzing the two FGM claims separately and interpreting the IJ opinion in this way leads me to several points. First, the IJ made a legal error in assuming that Bah had to prove that she forcibly resisted FGM at the time the procedure was performed on her when she was eight years old in order to establish her claim based on the fact that she had undergone FGM. An eight year old girl’s failure to physically resist a procedure performed by medical personnel1 and endorsed by her mother hardly establishes her consent or renders the procedure unable to be categorized as persecution. Because the IJ went astray at this first step of his analysis, he gave no *644further consideration to Bah’s claim of persecution on this basis.
Though the IJ erred in concluding that Bah was not eligible for asylum because she failed to resist FGM, this error does not necessarily require remand. Assuming that Bah was subject to persecution based on FGM,2 a finding of past persecution gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that Bah will be subject to future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)®. Here, however, Bah makes no argument that the government did not rebut this presumption, thereby conceding that “there is no chance that [Bah] would be personally [persecuted] again by the [FGM] procedure.” Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir.2003).3 Instead, all of Bah’s discussion of future persecution focuses on her children. Because Bah has not argued that the government has not rebutted the presumption, further discussion of Bah’s claim based on her own FGM is unnecessary.
Second, in considering Bah’s claim with respect to her fears for her children, I agree with Judge Siler that the IJ’s credibility determination was hardly supported by overwhelming evidence. But I also agree with him that Bah’s evidence did not compel a contrary result. Bah testified that she could not prevent her daughters from undergoing female circumcision,4 except by removing them from the country because “they do it to all of the children in the country.” This conelusory testimony was her sole offering on this subject. She did not indicate that she had communicated her wishes regarding female circumcision to any family member or explain how her wishes as a parent of minor children would be disregarded by her family or medical personnel. She did not discuss the views of the children’s father, and the evidence indicates that he is not with the children. Other evidence makes clear that FGM, although widespread, is illegal in Guinea and calls into question Bah’s assertion that it is performed on all children. Bah also did not elaborate on her comment about removing children from the country. There is no indication that she considered this option in the case of her own children.
I also agree with Judge Siler’s comments that Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir.2004), does not provide much support for Bah’s position. Abay was decided after Bah’s hearing before the IJ. Perhaps if Bah had the benefit of reviewing Abay before her hearing, she would have formulated an argument that its reasoning should extend to her situation and justify a grant of asylum to her.5 But *645while this particular case was not available, Bah did raise the general issue of her fears for her children as a basis for granting her asylum, and she had every opportunity to develop a factual record concerning this issue before the IJ. Applying new case law would not alter the IJ’s credibility determination, which cannot be overturned given our standard of review. For this reason, I disagree with Judge Lawson that remand to permit the IJ and the BIA to apply Abay is required.

. While FGM may not always be performed by medical personnel, Bah testified that in her experience it was done in a hospital or by doctors who came to the home.

. Because FGM may amount to persecution, at least in many of its forms, see Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 638 n. 1 (6th Cir.2004) (discussing the types of FGM), I simply assume for ease of analysis that clitoral excision, the type of FGM to which Bah was subjected, qualifies as persecution. I also do not resolve the issue of whether the FGM described by Bah relates to one of the five categories required for a grant of asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(a).

. In several cases asylum applicants have successfully produced evidence indicating a risk of further mutilation. See Tunis v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 547, 550 (7th Cir.2006) (noting applicant could reasonably fear repetition of the procedure because the initial excision was incomplete); Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 800-01 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that petitioner was potentially at risk of further genital mutilation because 80 percent of all Somalian women, and particularly members of minority clans, are subject to infibulation in addition to excision). Here Bah does not contend that she fears or is at risk of any future harm related to FGM.

. This was the term used for FGM at the hearing before the IJ.

. As Judge Lawson notes, the children of an alien granted asylum may be admitted into the United States as derivative asylum beneficiaries.