Court Opinion

ID: 9628142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:09:25.531315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:01.124532
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
At issue is the correctness of the trial court’s refusal to vacate a default judgment in § 1031 proceedings.1 The judgment under challenge was against an Arizona corporation — unlicensed in this state. Its suability in Oklahoma for the liability sought to be imposed was predicated on a single transaction alleged to have the constitutionally requisite “minimum contacts” with the state. Our opinion condemns as falling short of the fundamental law’s mandate both our statute 2 and the process pursuant to which the foreign defendant was haled *770into court. While I fully concur in this appraisal of the applicable legal norm, I cannot join in the court’s judgment. As I view the record, the out-of-state entity in suit — though notice to it was concededly constitutionally deficient — was nonetheless amenable to the district court’s jurisdiction. This is so because it had entered a voluntary appearance in the case when its president and legal counsel were both present, before answer date, at the taking of merits depositions in Phoenix, Arizona and the president allowed himself, then and there, to be deposed without any objection of counsel in attendance.
When the-motion to vacate was reached for disposition below the defendant’s prior voluntary appearance in the case was not shown “of record” by a proper recital in the journal entry nor was it otherwise apparent from the face of the judgment roll. The judgment was therefore void on the face of the roll and subject to attack — direct or collateral — within a statutorily unlimited time span.3 Aside from want of a showing with respect to the defendant’s voluntary appearance in the case prior to answer date, another procedural infirmity crept into the process of procuring the judgment sought to be vacated. When seeking the default judgment under challenge the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 10, Rules for the District Court.4 That rule provides that before a motion for default judgment may be heard against one who previously has made an appearance in the case, notice of at least five days must be given by the mov-ant.
There exists no legal impediment at this time to a correction of the record nunc pro tunc by showing, on remand, the defendant’s prior voluntary appearance.5 A defendant who has never been served with summons may, by voluntary appearance, submit himself to the court’s jurisdiction. A recital to that effect would cure the fatal jurisdictional defect here under challenge.6
When the concept of “voluntary appearance” as a substitute for legal process service was making its debut on our legal scene, some early judicial expressions seemed to require that “to constitute an appearance, there must be some formal entry, or plea, or motion, and this must be of record, and can be tried only by the record.”7 This notion was no doubt a carryover from the earlier common-law approach which regarded “appearance” not as mere presence in court but as an act “of record”, such as, giving bail upon arrest or “safe pledges” for one’s appearance.8 The early view is now firmly superseded by modern notions of procedure. These notions regard appearance as no more than knowledge of the pending proceedings coupled with acts from which intention to submit to the jurisdiction may be inferred.9 A writing “spread upon the record” is no longer the required abracadabra of appearance.10 The doctrine of voluntary appearance applies to *771both persons within the jurisdiction as well as to “ ‘the defendant [who] is a nonresident and servable only in a particular place.’ ”11
The out-of-state corporate defendant in this case unquestionably had knowledge of the pending Oklahoma suit in advance of the time depositions were to be taken in Phoenix. Its president’s act of appearance with counsel pursuant to previous notice for that proceeding and of allowing himself to be deposed on the merits of the action without any objection12 by counsel in immediate attendance must, without a doubt, be deemed a voluntary appearance which, under 12 O.S.1971 § 162, is to be viewed as “equivalent to service” of constitutionally acceptable court process. One’s presence and participation at deposition-taking may constitute an appearance “to the merits” of the controversy.13 This much was settled by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Bentz v. Eubanks14 before our adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure from that state. In Bentz defendant’s presence was held to be an involuntary appearance because it took place after service of summons. Here the attendance at, and active participation in, deposition-taking occurred before any process was served upon the corporate entity. There could be hence no coercive element present in the president’s attendance. Although Bentz is, as shown, distinguishable on the facts, its holding firmly supports the view that a defendant’s attendance at a deposition hearing on the merits of the controversy constitutes an appearance in the case which — depending on the circumstances — may be characterized either as voluntary or involuntary. This much of Bentz —and not an iota more — has survived intact all subsequent Oklahoma statutory amendments to the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure and is still binding precedent.15
The effect of defendant’s voluntary appearance cannot be avoided by its “reservation” of objections in the stipulation that preceded the taking of the deposition.16 The objections so reserved were confined to those which govern the admissibility of the testimony given. The stipulation as a whole is utterly inconsistent with the notion of a reserved challenge to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court. This is so because it reserves all objections “until the time of trial”. Neither is the defendant aided by the Oklahoma “Rules of Civil Procedure” to which ■ reference was made in the stipulation. Our law provides in 12 O.S.1971 § 434 that a pending challenge to the validity of service is not waived by a party’s appearance at deposition taking. There was no pending challenge on file in this case when defendant’s president attended and gave testimony. Moreover, in 12 O.S.Supp.1979 § 390.1 the statute provides that the party “obliged” to attend a deposition hearing is one “who has been legally served with summons or entered an appearance in the *772case.”17 It is therefore clear that the defendant was not compelled by our rules of civil procedure to make its appearance at the deposition-taking if it did not choose so to do.
In summary, the firm contours of the applicable Oklahoma legal norm which emerge from a review of our statutes and the uninterrupted line of decisional law are that a defendant’s pre-service attendance and participation at deposition-taking addressed to the merits of the controversy,' when unprotected by a filed and pending jurisdictional challenge or by some appropriate reservation in the stipulation entered into before the deposition hearing, constitutes a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of constitutionally-acceptable court process within the meaning of 12 O.S.1971 § 162.18
Defendant’s motion to vacate, when considered in the light of its voluntary appearance [not shown earlier on the face of the judgment roll], presented but a single ground for vacation — that of “irregularity in obtaining a judgment.”19 While the defendant’s motion was in this one respect meritorious and timely made within the three-year limit provided by 12 O.S.1971 § 1038, it did not entitle it to a release from the action but only to a vacation of the challenged default judgment.
I would therefore hold that [a] the out-of-state corporate defendant is in court as a result of its prior voluntary appearance, [b] the order refusing to vacate the judgment should be reversed on the grounds of “irregularity” in its procurement, within the meaning of 12 O.S.1971 § 1031, subdiv. 3, due to a violation of Rule 10 and [c] cause should be remanded for further proceedings.

. 12 O.S.1971 § 1031.

. 18 O.S.1971 § 1.204a.

. When the judgment roll fails to disclose that defendant was brought into court by process that is constitutionally due him, the judgment rendered in the case is void on the face of the record proper. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Young, Okl., 264 P.2d 757, 762 [1953]. It is subject to both direct or collateral attack “at anytime”. 12 O.S.1971 § 1038; Farmers’ Union Coop. Royalty Co. v. Woodward, Okl., 515 P.2d 1381, 1384 [1973].

. 12 O.S.Supp.1973, Ch. 2, App.

. Nunc pro tunc amendment of the record may be made at any time to make it speak the truth. Stevens Expert Cleaners & Dyers v. Stevens, Okl., 267 P.2d 998, 1000 [1954].

. 12 O.S.1971 § 162; May v. Casker, 188 Okl. 448, 110 P.2d 287, 290 [1940].

. Scott v. Hull, 14 Ind. 136 [1860]; State ex rel. Cronkhite v. Belden, 193 Wis. 145, 211 N.W. 916, 57 A.L.R. 1218 [1927]; 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appearance, § 12, p. 488; anno. 68 A.L.R. 385, 388.

. Koffler and Reppy, Common Law Pleadings; Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 74 [1952].

. A telephone call may constitute an appearance. Perdue v. Sherman, 246 N.W.2d 491, 494 [N.D.1976].

. Rand v. Nash, 174 Okl. 525, 51 P.2d 296, 297 [1935]; Matthies v. Union Products Co., 140 Kan. 232, 36 P.2d 89 [1934].

. Lieuallen v. Young, 115 Okl. 153, 241 P. 342, 344 [1925].

. The “stipulation” contained in the deposition’s transcript did not preserve defendant’s challenge or objection to the Oklahoma court’s jurisdiction. In pertinent part the stipulation provides:
“. . . deposition . . . [is] taken pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure and that all objections except as to form of questions or answers are reserved until the time of trial. All other formalities required by law for the taking and returning of depositions are waived with the exception that the deponent may read and sign said deposition.” [emphasis added]

. Froelich v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 39 N.D. 307, 167 N.W. 366 [1918].

. 32 Kan. 321, 4 P. 269 [1884].

. A statute adopted from another state which, when carried into our law, had received a construction by the highest court of that state, is presumed adopted as so construed. Conwill v. Eldridge, 71 Okl. 223, 177 P. 79 [1918]; Byrd v. State, 99 Okl. 165, 226 P. 362 [1924]; In re Fletcher’s Estate, Okl., 308 P.2d 304 [1957]. Kansas decisions are well-nigh conclusive on interpretation of early statutes adopted from that state. Chesmore v. Chesmore, Okl., 484 P.2d 516, 518 [1971].

. See the text of the stipulation, supra note 12.

. Although the deposition appearance of defendant’s president occurred before the enactment of 12 O.S.Supp.1979 § 390.1, the applicable terms of that statute, paraphrased in the text, were merely declaratory of pre-existing case law and hence govern in this case.

. There is no federal due-process infirmity in state-law recognition that one’s voluntary presence and participation in court proceedings may constitute voluntary appearance equivalent to service of process. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22 [1940].

.Failure to comply with Rule 10 may be deemed “an irregularity” within 12 O.S.1971 § 1031, subdiv. 3; Le Roi Co. v. Grimes, 193 Okl. 430, 144 P.2d 973 [1944].