Court Opinion

ID: 9912917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 15:04:32.494694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:10.654963
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-24

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                GEORGE BRADLEY.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant

 was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the

 influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), fifth offense. 1              He filed

 a motion for a new trial in which he alleged that he had been

 denied the effective assistance of counsel.            The motion was

 denied without a hearing in a detailed and well-reasoned

 memorandum of decision and order.           The defendant's appeal from

 the denial of the new trial motion was consolidated with his

 direct appeal.      For the following reasons, we affirm the

 1 The judge found the defendant guilty of the fifth offense
 portion of the OUI charge in a subsequent jury-waived trial.
 The defendant was also charged with reckless operation of a
 motor vehicle and unlawful possession of ammunition. Those
 charges were nolle prossed prior to trial.
conviction and the order denying the defendant's motion for a

new trial. 2

     Background. 3   On April 4, 2019, at approximately 10 A.M.,

the defendant left Limington, Maine, and headed to Lowell in his

pickup truck.     Around noon, he was driving on Lowell Street in

Peabody when he attempted to pass a vehicle by driving on the

opposite side of the road into oncoming traffic.       Although the

defendant was speeding, he could not complete the pass in time,

so he swerved back into his lane and in doing so struck the

vehicle in front of him.     That car was severely damaged.    The

defendant kept driving for another seventy-five yards or so

before stopping.     A number of witnesses reported the accident to

the police, who arrived quickly.       When the officers approached

the truck, they found the defendant leaning against the driver's

side door, which was open.     The defendant was sitting on the

floor with his back against the driver's seat.       The defendant

told the officers that his left leg was injured, and he had

difficulty taking his foot off the gas pedal and putting it on

the brake.     The officers noted that the defendant's speech was

slurred, and his breath smelled of alcohol.       He was unsteady on

2 The defendant's arguments on appeal only concern the denial of
his new trial motion.
3 We summarize the facts as set forth by the judge in her

memorandum of decision and order, supplemented where necessary
with references to the transcript.

                                   2
his feet, his eyes were red and bloodshot, and he was

argumentative and uncooperative.       In response to the officers'

questions, he denied drinking any alcohol.

     After assisting the defendant to the passenger side of the

truck, the police conducted two field assessment tests that did

not involve walking, both of which the defendant failed to

perform satisfactorily.   One officer opined that the defendant

was "hammered," and another testified that he was "drunk."        The

defendant was arrested and transported to the police station,

where he continued to be combative and belligerent.       Eventually,

the defendant was taken to the hospital.       His antagonistic

behavior did not abate, and he was restrained by officers, who

handcuffed him to the hospital bed.

     There were three passengers in the defendant's truck at the

time of the accident, Tina Harmon, the defendant's then

girlfriend, Joseph Denehy, the defendant's son, and Denehy's

girlfriend.   Harmon told officers at the scene that she had been

asleep during the entire trip.   However, a few days later,

Harmon was interviewed by the police in York, Maine, and

provided a different version of events.       According to Harmon,

the defendant bought liquor along the way from Maine and

consumed it while driving.   He also had stopped at a bar in

Peabody, where he consumed more alcohol.

                                   3
     Although Harmon was on the Commonwealth's witness list, the

Commonwealth did not expect her to appear.    Harmon had

maintained little contact with the Commonwealth, and she had

also been criminally charged in Massachusetts with theft based

on a report by the defendant's mother that she stole some

jewelry and a cell phone from the defendant.    As it turned out,

however, on the second day of trial, Harmon voluntarily arrived

at the courthouse to the surprise of the prosecutor and defense

counsel. 4   Ultimately, Harmon did testify and her testimony was

consistent with the statement she had given to the police in

Maine.

     At trial, the defendant did not contest that he caused the

accident.    He contended that, while he was responsible, he was

not impaired by alcohol.    To this end, he presented testimony

from his son, who claimed that the defendant did not have any

alcohol throughout the trip from Maine, and from his mother, who

saw the defendant at the police station shortly after the

accident and testified that the defendant was not intoxicated.

Defense counsel outlined this theory of the defense, that the

defendant was not intoxicated when he caused the accident, in

his opening statement.    In addition, based on the assumption

that Harmon would not testify, he informed the jury, "There's no

4 The record reflects that the Commonwealth did not expect Harmon
to appear and did not mislead defense counsel in this respect.

                                  4
witness that's going to come in here and say, I saw this person

drinking, I saw him having this drink, I saw him at this

particular bar."

     Discussion.   A judge may grant a new trial "if it appears

that justice may not have been done."       Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b),

as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).       "[T]he decision to allow

or deny [a motion for a new trial] rests within the sound

discretion of the motion judge."       Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 482

Mass. 823, 826 (2019).   Where a motion for a new trial is based

on ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show

that the behavior of counsel fell "below that . . . [of] an

ordinary fallible lawyer" and that such failing "likely deprived

[him] of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence."

Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).       "[A]rguably

reasoned tactical or strategic judgments" do not amount to

ineffective assistance of counsel unless they were "manifestly

unreasonable" when made.   Commonwealth v. Rondeau, 378 Mass.

408, 413 (1979), quoting Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722,

728 (1978).

     The defendant first argues that his counsel was ineffective

when he told the jury in his opening statement that no witness

would testify that they had seen him drinking prior to the

accident, when, in fact, counsel knew about the statement Harmon

                                   5
had given to the police in Maine. 5   To begin with, as the judge

correctly observed, defense counsel's decision in this regard

was a tactical one and, as such, the defendant bore the burden

of showing that the decision was "manifestly unreasonable" when

it was made.   See Commonwealth v. Martin, 484 Mass. 634, 641

(2020).   We agree with the judge's conclusion that the defendant

did not meet this burden.

     Although we recognize that predictions made in opening

statements can have "drastic ramifications," the fact that

counsel's expectations turned out to be incorrect does not

retroactively make his decision manifestly unreasonable.

Commonwealth v. McMahon, 443 Mass. 409, 425 (2005).    Here, the

record is clear that, at the time defense counsel gave his

opening, neither party expected Harmon to appear.    She was

living in Maine at the time the trial commenced and was no

longer dating the defendant.   There was a case pending against

her in Peabody District Court for which she was subject to

arrest, and the Commonwealth had had little contact with her.

Given these circumstances, the judge did not abuse her

discretion in concluding that the promise made in counsel's

5 We need not address the defendant's argument that the judge
erred by considering his failure to provide an affidavit from
defense counsel as detrimental to his claims because we reach
our conclusion that he is not entitled to a new trial without
drawing a negative inference from the absence of an affidavit
from trial counsel.

                                 6
opening statement was not manifestly unreasonable at the time it

was made.   See Commonwealth v. Sin, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 179-

180 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Morales, 453 Mass. 40, 45

(2009) ("the judge was in the best position to evaluate

counsel's decision and . . . performance," and we "defer to her

assessment that trial counsel's strategic choice was not

manifestly unreasonable").

     Furthermore, even if we were to assume that defense

counsel's performance fell measurably below that which might be

expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer, we cannot say that

the failure to fulfill the promise deprived the defendant of an

otherwise available, substantial ground of defense.    In light of

the overwhelming evidence that the defendant was intoxicated and

that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired, we

have little difficulty concluding that counsel's unkept promise

could not have influenced the jury in reaching their verdict.

See Martin, 484 Mass. at 642 (counsel's statements in opening

that certain witness would testify was manifestly unreasonable,

however, such ineffective assistance requires new trial only if

it created substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice,

that is, only if it was reasonably likely to have influenced

jury's conclusion).   Moreover, the jury was properly instructed

that openings are not evidence.   We further note that counsel

did not abandon the primary theory of the defense.    Throughout

                                  7
the trial and in closing argument, he asserted that what

occurred was an accident and not a crime.    See Commonwealth v.

Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 111 (2001) (despite unkept promise that

defendant would testify, "[d]efense counsel did not abandon the

defendant's alibi defense").    Lastly, the Commonwealth did not

exploit the issue in its closing.     Id.

     Next, the defendant contends that his counsel was

ineffective because he was not prepared for Harmon to testify

and consequently his cross-examination was ineffective.    The

judge properly rejected this claim as well.    While it is true

that defense counsel had failed to obtain certified copies of

Harmon's prior convictions, as the Commonwealth notes in its

brief, there is no evidence that Harmon had been convicted of a

crime for which she could be properly impeached under G. L.

c. 233, § 21.   Counsel sought to introduce two prior convictions

from the State of Maine, one for "theft by unauthorized

transfer," and one for criminal trespass.    Neither met the

criteria for admissibility.    Accordingly, counsel's failure to

obtain certified copies was inconsequential.    Furthermore, and

more importantly, defense counsel did impeach Harmon with her

prior conviction for criminal trespass and he also questioned

Harmon about her pending case in Peabody.    Counsel then used

this testimony to the defendant's advantage in his closing

argument and suggested that Harmon was biased.    Counsel stated,

                                  8
"She [Harmon] has an open case here in Massachusetts that's

being prosecuted by this office.       Might tell you something about

why she's here."    Thus, even if we assume, as the defendant

asserts, that counsel was not prepared to cross-examine Harmon,

ultimately, he impeached her credibility and used that testimony

to argue in closing that Harmon had a motive to testify falsely.

Accordingly, the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying

the defendant's motion for a new trial on this ground.

                                        Judgment affirmed.

                                        Order denying motion for new
                                          trial affirmed.

                                        By the Court (Vuono, Singh &
                                          Englander, JJ. 6),

                                        Clerk

Entered:    December 26, 2023.

6   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                   9