Court Opinion

ID: 9450487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:50:33.517446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:21.508533
License: Public Domain

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING
Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, and McLaughlin, kalodner, stal-EY, HASTIE, GANEY, SMITH and FREEDMAN, Circuit Judges.
KALODNER, Circuit Judge.
Upon consideration of the respondent’s Petition for Rehearing and the li-bellants’ Answer thereto, it seems appropriate to supplement our Opinion in the instant case, filed December 9, 1964. There we limited our discussion to the respondent’s specific challenges to the trial court's fact-finding that the fatal airplane crash “was the result of a prolonged overspeed and inability to feather the propeller, leading to a decoupling, fire and separation of the propeller,1 and its holding that the respondent had breached “a continuing duty to improve its [the] propeller system in view of the factor of human safety involved.” 2
In limiting our discussion to the issues as presented by the respondent we regretably did not declare that the undisputed evidence required an explicit finding by the trial judge that the respondent was negligent on July 15, 1955, *241when it supplied a propeller system of a design which it knew 3 had earlier caused 10 serious accidents of decoupling, fire or separation,4 and 57 accidents of lesser degree (engine fires or engine failures.)5, 6 *The finding that the respondent was negligent on July 15, 1955, is implicit in the trial court’s expressed finding that the defective design and manufacture caused the accident on June 20, 1956.
We should also have declared that the undisputed evidence required an explicit finding that the respondent was negligent in failing to notify LAV, owner and operator of the doomed plane, of the numerous malfunctionings of its propeller system both before July 15, 1955 and June 20, 19567
On the score of these required findings of negligence it must be pointed out that the libellants charged the respondent with (1) a defect in the design of the propeller system in the respect that it was unable to feather overspeeds; (2) knowledge that the system was unable to feather overspeeds, and (3) failure to notify LAV of the frequency of failures to feather overspeeds.
It should be noted parenthetically that the issue of “continuing duty” was not raised by either the Libel or Answer, filed in 1958, and that it was first injected into this case by the respondent in 1962 in the pre-trial proceedings in its statement of “Issues of Law to be litigated.” 8
The testimony adduced at the trial with respect to the issue of “continuing duty” developed that there was, in accordance with normal practice, a continuing relationship between the respondent and LAV from the delivery of the propeller system on July 15, 1955 to the plane crash on June 20, 1956. ■ In the course of that relationship the respondent’s field service department advised LAV with regard to the maintenance, overhaul and operation of the propeller system and supplied it with service bulletins supplementing manuals of instruction. The respondent’s own expert witness, Walter Thomas Grady, testified that a manufacturer “has to look at the performance of his product as it now stands, examine the statistics on it, and also examine the type of failures. * * * If * * * he sees demonstrated that catastrophies can result from the equip*242ment as it now stands, then obviously he would be obligated to take remedial action.” (emphasis supplied) 9
The foregoing affords more than ample support for the trial judge’s holding that the respondent was under a “continuing duty” here. His conclusion that the respondent breached that duty- in failing to make available Pitch Lock10 for use on the doomed plane prior to its crashing on June 20, 1956, is supported by the undisputed testimony, that the respondent failed to act despite its knowledge of four serious accidents attended by decoupling, fire or propeller separation, and 23 lesser serious mishaps, all resulting from inability to feather overspeeds which occurred subsequent to July 15, 1955 when it delivered the faulty propeller system.
The sum of what has been said here, and in' our Opinion of December 9, 1964, is that the trial judge’s determination that the ' respondent was negligent is soundly premised on any or all of these grounds:11 (1) it delivered a propeller system on July 15, 1955 which was defective in design; (2) it failed to discharge its duty to warn LAV of numerous malfunctionings of its propeller system before July 15, 1955 and before June 20, 1956, and (3) it breached its “continuing duty” to make available to LAV Pitch Lock prior to June 20, 1956.
For the reasons stated the petition for rehearing will be denied.

. 219 F.Supp. 556, 566 (D.Del.1963).

. Id. at page 574.

. The respondent’s knowledge on July 15, 1955, of the inability of its propeller systems to control overspeeds, and the possibility of a plane’s loss as a consequence, is established by the trial court’s fact-findings that “As early as 1950, United was aware of inabilities to feather * * and that “LX64 [libellant’s exhibit]- dated March, 1954 * * * reveals Mr. Pond, a responsible official of United, advising Mr. Thorell of the Woodward Governor Co. (a wholly-owned subsidiary) that a plane could be lost as the result of governor failure.” 219 F.Supp. at p. 568.

. The dates of these 10 accidents and four others which occurred between July 15, 1955 and the fatal airplane crash on June 20, 1956, are set forth in footnote 21, 219 F.Supp. at page 568.

. A list of these 57 accidents prior to July 15, 1955 and 23 others between that date and June 20, 1956, appears in the Appendix to the District Court’s opinion at pages 576 to 580.

. United Aircraft Corp. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 199 A.2d 758, 759 (Supreme Ct. of Del. 1964).

. “The duty to warn of known danger inherent in a product, or in its contemplated use, has long been a part of the manufacturer’s liability doctrine.” Comstock v. General Motors Corporation, 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627, 634, 78 A.L.R. 2d 449 (1959) ; Butler v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623, 625 (2 Cir. 1961); Tomao v. A. P. De Sanno & Sons, 209 F.2d 544, 546 (3 Cir. 1954); Hopkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930, 933 (3 Cir. 1952); § 388 Restatement, Torts, “Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use”.

. The issue was stated by the respondent as follows:
“2. Is there any duty after the sale on the part of such a supplier [of appliances to an airline operator] to pursue possible developments of his products?
“3. Is there any duty on such a supplier after the sale to adapt possible developments to his products?”

. Appendix of the respondent, Volume 2, page 696b.

. Pitch Lock is a mechanism which limits overspeeds. The trial judge found that the respondent manufactured and supplied Pitch Lock for use on Douglas planes in January 1956 and that “Apparently it could, have teen developed simultaneously for J>oth Douglas and Lockheed planes”. (emphasis not ours)

. “A district court’s finding of fact should be construed liberally and found to be in consonance with the judgment, so long as that judgment is supported by evidence in the record.” Zimmerman v. Montour Railroad Company, Inc., 296 F.2d 97, 98 (3 Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U.S. 828, 82 S.Ct. 845, 7 L.Ed.2d 793 (1962).