Court Opinion

ID: 9743208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:28:26.398668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:39.964569
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent to the majority opinion in this case. I fully agree with Justice DeBruler that the general rule regarding the timing of a constitutional challenge of a statute defining a crime should be subject to an exception when the criminal statute is challenged as invalid upon its face.
This being the case, I conclude that a public indecency statute which prohibits nudity in any public place is unconstitutionally overbroad. My reasons for so concelud-*226ing have already been articulated in State v. Baysinger, (1979) 272 Ind. 236, 397 N.E.2d 580 (Hunter and DeBruler, JJ., dissenting). Moreover, the position taken in dissent now finds firm support in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, (1981) 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671, where Justice White, for the Court, reasoned that nude dancing is entitled to some First Amendment protection (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., (1975) 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648).