Court Opinion

ID: 9955869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 17:00:48.052675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:34.833422
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1148     Document: 010111024162       Date Filed: 03/29/2024    Page: 1

                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          March 29, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  GRACE BIBLE FELLOWSHIP; JOEY
  RHOADS,

        Plaintiffs - Appellants,

  v.                                                          No. 23-1148
                                                 (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-02362-DDD-NRN)
  JARED POLIS, in his official capacity as                     (D. Colo.)
  Governor, State of Colorado; JILL
  HUNSAKER RYAN, in her official
  capacity as Executive Director, Colorado
  Department of Health and Environment;
  WELD COUNTY DISTRICT
  ATTORNEY, in his official capacity,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MORITZ, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Grace Bible Fellowship and its pastor, Joey Rhoads, appeal the district court’s

 order dismissing their amended complaint.1 Because we agree that plaintiffs fail to

 demonstrate the injury required for constitutional standing as to most of their claims,

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its
 persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
        1
          Rhoads is the only remaining plaintiff from the original complaint: the
 district court allowed Grace Bible Fellowship to substitute for Community Baptist
 Church, and the remaining plaintiffs withdrew. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c).
Appellate Case: 23-1148     Document: 010111024162         Date Filed: 03/29/2024     Page: 2

 that one of their claims is moot, and that they fail to state their remaining claim, we

 affirm.

                                       Background

        Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in August 2020, challenging various

 COVID-19 restrictions imposed by Colorado and the federal government’s award of

 COVID-19 relief funds to Colorado. Plaintiffs also moved to preliminarily enjoin

 Colorado from enforcing its executive and public-health orders and to prohibit

 various federal agencies from approving or providing any future monetary assistance

 to the state. The district court largely denied plaintiffs’ motion, ruling that they failed

 to make the required strong showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the

 merits. See Denver Bible Church v. Azar, 494 F. Supp. 3d 816, 822–23 (D. Colo.

 2020).2

        Plaintiffs appealed, but by the time the case reached oral argument in

 November 2021, Colorado no longer imposed any COVID-19 restrictions on

 plaintiffs, so we dismissed most of their claims as moot. See Cmty. Baptist Church v.

 Polis, No. 20-1391, 2022 WL 200661, at *1, 7 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 2022)

 (unpublished). And on plaintiffs’ facial free-exercise challenge to the Colorado

 Disaster Emergency Act (CDEA), Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-33.5-701 to 24-33.5-717,

        2
         The district court did issue a relatively narrow preliminary injunction against
 Colorado’s numerical occupancy limitation and masking requirement for worship
 services. See Denver Bible Church, 494 F. Supp. 3d at 843–44. Colorado initially
 appealed that order but then voluntarily dismissed its appeal. See Denver Bible
 Church v. Polis, No. 20-1377 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2020) (order granting motion to
 voluntarily dismiss appeal).
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 we affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction because plaintiffs were unlikely to

 succeed on the merits. Id. at *7.

        On remand, the district court dismissed the moot claims, and plaintiffs filed an

 amended complaint challenging “the State’s authority to impose any sort of public-

 health restrictions . . . on houses of worship[] and . . . assert[ing] that certain state

 statutes that authorize the issuance of such public-health orders impermissibly treat

 secular institutions more favorably than religious ones.” App. vol. 3, 645. The

 amended complaint listed 14 claims, alleging that both the CDEA and certain public-

 health statutes that govern the CDPHE, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1.5-101 and

 25-1.5-102, (1) are unconstitutionally overbroad and violate plaintiffs’ free-speech

 rights both facially and as applied; (2) are unconstitutionally vague both facially and

 as applied; and (3) violate equal protection both facially and as applied. Plaintiffs

 also reasserted two claims from their original complaint, contending that the CDEA

 violates their free-exercise rights both facially and as applied. For relief, plaintiffs

 requested a “declaratory judgment and permanent injunctive relief . . . declaring

 [their] rights under [the] CDEA and the [p]ublic[-h]ealth [s]tatutes and prohibiting

 [d]efendants . . . from issuing, enforcing[,] or threatening to enforce . . . any

 executive orders and/or public[-]health orders issued” under those laws. App. vol. 1,

 36.

        Defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them for lack of subject-

 matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

 12(b)(1) and (6), arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing, that their claims were moot,

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 and that they failed to state a claim. In support, defendants submitted affidavits and

 evidence demonstrating that no executive or public-health orders issued under the

 challenged statutes were currently in effect.

        The district court granted defendants’ motions and dismissed the amended

 complaint, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their newly asserted

 claims because plaintiffs failed to allege the required injury. As to the reasserted

 claims, the district found that the as-applied CDEA free-exercise claim was moot, as

 we had previously ruled, and that plaintiffs’ facial CDEA free-exercise claim failed

 to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.3

        Plaintiffs now appeal the dismissal of their claims for prospective declaratory

 relief.4

                                         Analysis

        Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their claims. Our

 review is de novo, except that we review any jurisdictional findings of fact for clear

 error. See Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 871 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting

 de novo review of Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal and clear-error review of jurisdictional

 fact findings); Serna v. Denver Police Dep’t, 58 F.4th 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2023)

 (noting de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal); Rio Grande Found. v. Oliver, 57

 F.4th 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2023) (noting de novo review of standing and mootness).

        3
          The district court also granted in part plaintiffs’ motion for interim attorney
 fees based on their success in obtaining partial, preliminary injunctive relief.
        4
          Plaintiffs do not appeal the attorney-fee ruling or the dismissal of their claims
 for a permanent injunction.
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       As an initial matter, plaintiffs argue that the district court procedurally erred

 by considering evidence outside the complaint when dismissing their newly asserted

 claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). To be sure,

 defendants factually attacked the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction by

 submitting evidence showing the absence of any existing executive or public-health

 orders issued under the challenged statutes. And the district court considered that

 evidence when ruling that plaintiffs failed to establish any current and ongoing or

 imminent injury, as required to obtain the requested prospective relief on their newly

 asserted claims. But it did not err in doing so.

       A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can

 take two forms: a facial or a factual attack. Baker, 979 F.3d at 872. “A facial attack

 assumes the allegations in the complaint are true and argues they fail to establish

 jurisdiction.” Id. By contrast, “[a] factual attack goes beyond the allegations in the

 complaint and adduces evidence to contest jurisdiction.” Id. And when faced with a

 factual attack on subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court has “wide discretion to

 allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve

 disputed jurisdictional facts.” Id. (quoting Stuart v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 271

 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001)). The district court’s “exercise of such discretion

 does not convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion into a summary[-]judgment motion unless

 ‘resolution of the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits,’” which is not

 the case here. Id. (quoting Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995),

 abrogated in part on other grounds by Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S.

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 425 (2001)). Additionally, although plaintiffs suggest in passing that the district court

 further erred by failing to conduct a hearing, they never asked for a hearing below

 and do not explain on appeal how failing to conduct one here was an abuse of

 discretion. See id. (noting “wide discretion” to allow evidentiary hearing on

 jurisdictional facts). We therefore reject plaintiffs’ procedural challenge to the

 district court’s jurisdictional rulings.

        Turning to the merits of the jurisdictional matters, Article III of the

 Constitution confines the federal judicial power to deciding “[c]ases” and

 “[c]ontroversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This constitutional limitation requires “a

 genuine, live dispute between adverse parties, thereby preventing the federal courts

 from issuing advisory opinions.” Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. 53, 58 (2020). “The

 doctrines of standing and mootness aim to ensure federal courts stay within Article

 III’s bounds throughout the litigation.” Rio Grande, 57 F.4th at 1159–60. To

 establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate “a concrete and

 particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct[] and is likely

 to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Carney, 592 U.S. at 58 (quoting

 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013)). And a case becomes moot

 “[w]hen it becomes impossible for a court to grant effective relief.” Rio Grande, 57

 F.4th at 1165 (quoting Kan. Jud. Rev. v. Stout, 562 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir.

 2009)).

        Like the district court, we consider plaintiffs’ claims in two groups, beginning

 with the claims asserted for the first time in the amended complaint. The district

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 court found that plaintiffs lacked standing as to these new claims based on their

 failure to allege the injury component. An injury is “an invasion of a legally

 protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) ‘actual or

 imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,

 155 (1990)). “[A] grievance that amounts to nothing more than an abstract and

 generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in the proper application of the law does not

 count as an ‘injury[-]in[-]fact.’”5 Carney, 592 U.S. at 58.

       Plaintiffs first argue, as they did below, that they “were injured by complying

 with unconstitutional orders or violating them at the risk of prosecution.” Aplt. Br.

 30. Stated differently, plaintiffs say that they “suffered [an] actual injury-in-fact by

 enduring the State’s months-long invasion of the [c]hurch’s First and Fourteenth

 Amendment interests” via the orders imposing COVID-19 restrictions on them. Rep.

 Br. 3. But as the district court explained, that alleged injury has come and gone: the

 complained-of orders imposing COVID-19 restrictions on plaintiffs are no longer in

 force. This is critical because plaintiffs seek prospective—not retrospective—relief.

       5
          Standing is typically assessed as of the date the complaint is filed. See Rio
 Grande, 57 F.4th at 1161. The district court concluded that the appropriate point of
 reference for the newly asserted claims is the date that plaintiffs filed their amended
 complaint. Plaintiffs do not challenge that conclusion, so we accept it for purposes of
 this appeal. See Atlas Biologicals, Inc. v. Kutrubes, 50 F.4th 1307, 1322 (10th Cir.
 2022) (explaining that it is plaintiffs’ burden to establish jurisdiction and “a federal
 court is not obliged ‘to conjure up possible theories’ to support subject-matter
 jurisdiction” (quoting Raley v. Hyundai Motor Co., 642 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir.
 2011))).
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 See Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Plaintiffs have the

 burden to demonstrate standing for each form of relief sought.” (quoting Lippoldt v.

 Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006))). That is, plaintiffs do not seek relief for

 their asserted past injuries; instead, they ask for a declaration about the legality of

 certain statutes going forward. See PeTA, People for the Ethical Treatment of

 Animals v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining that

 declaratory relief is retrospective only “to the extent that it is intertwined with a

 claim for monetary damages that requires us to declare whether a past constitutional

 violation occurred”). And even though “plaintiff[s] may present evidence of a past

 injury to establish standing for retrospective relief, [they] must demonstrate a

 continuing injury to establish standing for prospective relief.”6 Jordan v. Sosa, 654

 F.3d 1012, 1019 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphases added); see also PeTA, 298 F.3d at

 1202–03 (noting that plaintiffs may “lose their standing for claims for prospective

 relief” if, during litigation, “an event occurs that heals the injury”). Thus, plaintiffs’

 alleged past injuries do not “demonstrate a continuing injury to establish standing for

 prospective relief,” which is the only kind of relief plaintiffs seek.7 Jordan, 654 F.3d

        6
          Plaintiffs purport to challenge this legal proposition, contending that a claim
 seeking prospective declaratory relief can be based on a past injury. But we have
 expressly held to the contrary, explaining that even though “a complaint for nominal
 damages [for a past injury] could satisfy Article III’s case[-]or[-]controversy
 requirements, . . . a functionally identical claim for declaratory relief will not.” Utah
 Animal Rts. Coal. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004).
        7
          Plaintiffs briefly assert that their past injuries resulted in “a continuing injury
 due to the fact [that] some church members never returned after the lockdown.” Aplt.
 Br. 27. But even assuming that the loss of church members could constitute a
 continuing injury (a proposition that plaintiffs fail to develop or provide authority
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 at 1019.

        To be sure, a slightly lower threshold applies when assessing injury for pre-

 enforcement First Amendment claims. See Peck v. McCann, 43 F.4th 1116, 1129

 (10th Cir. 2022). Under this lower standard, a plaintiff must allege an intention to

 engage in constitutionally protected conduct proscribed by statute and a credible

 threat of future prosecution, plus ongoing injury resulting from this chilling effect.

 See id. But here, as the district court concluded, “the amended complaint contains no

 plausible allegations that . . . plaintiffs are avoiding engaging in any activity they

 have previously engaged in based on an objectively justified fear of future

 enforcement.” App. vol. 3, 656. Nor have plaintiffs “adequately alleged that they are

 subject to a credible threat of enforcement of any public-health restrictions that may

 proscribe protected religious or expressive conduct in the future.” Id. at 654. And

 there is nothing in the challenged statutes themselves “that prohibits or restricts . . .

 plaintiffs from engaging in religious activities.” Id. at 656.

        Plaintiffs do not dispute these propositions on appeal. In fact, they seemingly

 disavow any reliance on imminent injuries and disclaim any pre-enforcement First

 Amendment challenge, stating that their amended complaint “is not a

 ‘pre[-]enforcement action.’” Aplt. Br. 30. In other words, plaintiffs do not seek to

 establish standing under the lower First Amendment threshold and instead stake

 for), plaintiffs do not allege that such loss is traceable to defendants’ conduct or that
 it is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision, as they must to establish
 standing. See Carney, 592 U.S. at 58.
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  standing on their alleged actual injuries, which occurred in the past, are not ongoing,

  and do not establish standing for the prospective relief they seek.

          In sum, that plaintiffs’ newly asserted claims challenge various existing state

  statutes is not enough to confer standing: the “mere presence on the statute books of

  an unconstitutional statute . . . does not entitle anyone to sue.” Winsness v. Yocom,

  433 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2006). This is true even for plaintiffs’ newly asserted

  facial challenges because we have made clear that “[a] plaintiff bringing a facial

  challenge to a statute . . . must . . . establish an injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy

  Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1267

  (10th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs have not done so here, so they lack standing for such

  claims.

          We next consider plaintiffs’ reasserted claims challenging the CDEA on free-

  exercise grounds. For the as-applied claim, we agree with the district court that such

  claim is moot, as we previously held. See Cmty. Baptist Church, 2022 WL 200661, at

  *6–7.

          For the facial claim, we agree with the district court that plaintiffs fail to state

  a claim. In so holding, the district court determined (as we suggested in deciding

  plaintiffs’ prior appeal, see id. at *8–9) that the CDEA was neutral, generally

  applicable, and survived the resulting rational-basis review. See Grace United

  Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir. 2006)

  (explaining rational-basis review of neutral, generally applicable laws, as compared

  to strict-scrutiny review of laws or policies that are not neutral or generally

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  applicable).

        Plaintiffs dispute only the general applicability of the CDEA, relying for

  support on the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Kennedy v. Bremerton School

  District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022). But that case doesn’t help plaintiffs. There, the Court

  held that the challenged practice (prohibiting a football coach from leading a prayer

  on the field after a game) was “neither neutral nor generally applicable” because the

  defendant school district “sought to restrict [the coach’s] actions at least in part

  because of their religious character.” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 526. Such facts sharply

  contrast with plaintiffs’ allegations about the CDEA. As the district court put it, the

  “amended complaint does not allege that the law is discriminatorily motivated or

  constitutes an official expression of hostility to religion.” App. vol. 3, 651 n.4; see

  also Grace United, 451 F.3d at 649–50 (“A law is neutral so long as its object is

  something other than the infringement or restriction of religious practices.”); Axson-

  Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1294 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that rule motivated

  by discrimination is not neutral or generally applicable). To be sure, the CDEA

  contains some limited secular exemptions, but we previously explained why those

  exemptions were far less broad than plaintiffs would have it. See Cmty. Baptist

  Church, 2022 WL 200661, at *9. And plaintiffs advance no reason to question our

  prior reasoning. Indeed, although plaintiffs baldly assert on appeal that the CDEA

  “allow[s them] to be punished for ‘personal religious observance,’” Aplt. Br. 36

  (quoting Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 543), they “have not pointed to any part of the law that

  . . . prohibits any religious conduct or burdens their religious practice in any way,”

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  App. vol. 3, 651 n.4. We therefore agree with the district court that plaintiffs fail to

  state a claim that the CDEA facially violates the Free Exercise Clause.

                                         Conclusion

        Plaintiffs’ newly asserted claims are not justiciable because plaintiffs fail to

  show the requisite injury for Article III standing. As for plaintiffs’ reasserted free-

  exercise challenges to the CDEA, their as-applied claim is moot, and they fail to state

  a facial claim. We thus affirm the district court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’

  amended complaint.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Nancy L. Moritz
                                               Circuit Judge

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