Court Opinion

ID: 9751317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:20:52.621964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:42.586833
License: Public Domain

EAGEN, Justice
(dissenting).
It is clear to me that Section 301 of the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, Act of July 19, 1974, P.L.-, No. 176, 40 P.S. § 1009.101 et seq. limits the amount a victim of another’s negligence may recover in damages, and hence, is violative of Art. Ill, Section 18 of the Constitution of this Commonwealth.
I agree with the Chief Justice that the historical background of Art. Ill, Section 18 is necessary for a complete understanding of its proscriptions. Let us explore this background in more detail.
By the Act of April 4, 1868, P.L. 58, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania limited the maximum amount recoverable by a plaintiff in a negligence action against a common carrier to $3000 for personal injuries and $500 for injuries resulting in death. To nullify this unfair restriction on the amount recoverable for injuries caused by the negligence of common carriers, the Constitutional Convention of 1872-1873 adopted Art. Ill, Section 21, the predecessor to the present Art. Ill, Section 18. It provided as follows:
“No Act of the General Assembly shall limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property; and, in case of death from such injuries, the right of action shall survive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such actions shall be prosecuted. No act shall prescribe any limitations of time within which suits may be brought against corporations for injuries to persons or property, or for other causes, different from those fixed by general laws regulating actions *409against natural persons, and such acts now existing are avoided.” [Emphasis added.]
There is no question but that the above constitutional provision was primarily aimed at and concerned with the Act of 1868, supra. However, the debates at the Constitutional Convention clearly demonstrate that the framers of this constitutional provision also intended by this provision to prevent the General Assembly from ever again enacting legislation which would impinge upon the right of one injured through the negligence of another to full recovery for the losses suffered.
“You cannot say that a man who has suffered an injury at the hands of another shall not recover full compensation without committing an outrage upon the elementary principles of justice.” 2 Convention Debates, p. 740 (Comments of Mr. J. S. Black).
“The very fact that juries are disposed to give, as he calls it, ‘excessive’ damages, shows that there is a feeling among the people that something should be done in cases of railroad accidents, to compel the companies, through fear of heavy verdicts against them, to keep their roads in such a condition that these accidents would not be continually occurring.” 2 Convention Debates, p. 730 (Comments of Mr. Campbell).
“It is but another way of expressing the same thing, and the remedy that is desired to be applied here, is to prevent the passage of an Act of Assembly hereafter, or to prevent any present act of Assembly from limiting the amount of damages . . . . ” 2 Convention Debates, p. 743 (Comments of H. White) [Emphasis added].
In fact, if the members of the Constitutional Convention were merely concerned with invalidating the Act of 1868, they could have simply repealed that statute. But *410they did not restrict themselves to this for they were also concerned with any legislation in the future which would attempt to impose restrictions akin to those enacted in the Act of 1868. And this Court as early as 1883, in Lewis v. Hollahan, 103 Pa. 425, recognized this and ruled that the intent of Art. Ill, Section 21, was not only to nullify any then existing legislation limiting the amount recoverable for personal injury or death caused by the negligence of another, but also to prevent any future legislation to the same effect. In Lewis v. Hollahan, supra, we said:
“The purpose' of the twenty first section of the third Article of the Constitution was to nullify, as far as possible, then existing legislation limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property, as well as that limiting the time within which suits could be brought against corporations for injuries to persons or property or for other causes, so far at least as said limitation of time differed from that fixed by general laws regulating actions against natural persons; and, at the same time, prevent all such legislation in the future. The phraseology of the section as well as the discussion that took place during the course of its adoption clearly indicates that such was the intention of the framers of the Constitution. It commences by declaring, ‘No Act of the general assembly shall limit the amount,’ &c. The language thus employed cannot be fairly restricted to future legislation alone. It is quite as applicable to then existing as it is to prospective legislation. . It is equivalent to saying: No Act of the general assembly now in force or hereafter to be passed shall limit, &c.” [Emphasis added.] 103 Pa. at 430.
On November 2, 1915, Art. Ill, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was amended (and became Art. Ill, Section 18) to permit the enactment of a workmen’s com*411pensation law. A constitutional amendment was deemed necessary because such a law would limit the amount recoverable by employees of negligent employers, and hence, would be violative of Art. Ill, Section 21.1 This was recognized by this Court in De Jesus v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 439 Pa. 180, 268 A.2d 924 (1970), when we stated at 184, 268 A.2d at 926:
“[T]he purpose of [Art. Ill] Section 18, as amended, was to permit the General Assembly to enact a workmen’s compensation program, but to preclude the enactment of general legislation covering injuries other than those arising in the course of employment.”
See also Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch Company, 397 Pa. 114, 152 A.2d 887 (1959).2
The resulting constitutional provision, Art. Ill, Section 18, which remains intact today provides as follows:
“The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the payment by employers, or employers and employes jointly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to employes arising in the course of their employment, and for occupational diseases of employes, whether or not such injuries or diseases result in death, and regardless of fault of employer or employe, and fixing the basis of ascertainment of such compensation and the maximum and minimum limits thereof, and providing special or general remedies for the collection thereof; *412but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property, and in case of death from such injuries, the right of action shall survive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such actions shall be prosecuted. No act shall prescribe any limitations of time within which suits may be brought against corporations for injuries to persons or property, or for other causes different from those fixed by general laws regulating actions against natural persons, and such acts now existing are avoided." [Emphasis added.]
The basic provision in Art. Ill, Section 21, prohibiting limits on the amount to be recovered for injuries to persons or property or for death remained unchanged in Art. Ill, Section 18, except it is significant to note, these words were added “but in no other cases”. This change in language in the 1915 amendment strengthens the conclusion that Art. Ill, Section 18, is a prohibition on any limits of recovery in any statute (other than workmen’s compensation) dealing with injuries to persons or property, no matter how lofty its objectives.
But say the Chief Justice in his opinion announcing the judgment of the Court and Mr. Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion, Section 301 of the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, supra, does not place any limitation on the amount of damages that are recoverable in tort actions. Say they, the Act merely abolishes the right of a particular class of motor vehicle accident victims to recover in tort. Let us examine this position.
I admit that nothing in Art. Ill, Section 18, prevents the Legislature from abolishing or modifying a cause of action. Cf. Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 117 A.2d 899 (1955). I also admit, at least for present purposes, that the purported purpose of the Pennsylvania No-Fault Act is to abolish partially tort liability for personal inju*413ries resulting from motor vehicle accidents and to set forth new liability standards for personal injury compensation without regard to fault. But, it is clear as day to me that the effect of the Act is to limit the amount recoverable as damages for pain and suffering whether under a tort or no-fault standard of liability.
Section 301(a) of the Act purports to abolish tort liability for pain and suffering. So far so good. If the Act stopped at this point, I would agree with the position of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts. But the Act does not. It goes on to make an exception for cases involving death, serious and permanent injury, certain impairments, and where medical expenses exceed $750. Thus the Act continues to recognize pain and suffering as a substantive loss but limits the situations in which an injury is deemed serious enough to justify an award for it. I submit that this is proscribed by Art. Ill, Section 18. This constitutional provision speaks to the amount to be recovered for “injuries” and the phrase has been interpreted to mean legally cognizable injury. See Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 106 A. 238 (1919). Accordingly, if the Legislature removes the legal recognition of a certain injury by abolishing the cause of action completely, there would be no violation of Art. Ill, Section 18. However, where the injury is still recognized such as in the Pennsylvania No-Fault Act, and the Legislature changes the amount of compensation recoverable therefor, such as in the No-Fault Act and in the workmen’s compensation cases, then Art. Ill, Section 18, does apply. The fact that the standard of liability is changed does not affect the fact that the injury is still legally cognizable.
In conclusion, no-fault automobile accident insurance may or may not be in the public good. Time will tell. Regardless, if it is to be effectuated in Pennsylvania, let it be done in a permissible manner.
I dissent.

. In this connection it is interesting to note that the key provisions of the no-fault concepts for motor vehicle accidents are similar to the workmen’s compensation laws. Under the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, an employee is compensated for his injuries without regard to fault and a set schedule limits the damages recoverable for those injuries. I repeat, to accomplish this a constitutional amendment was necessary.

. In Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch Company, supra at 124, 152 A.2d at 893, we said the limited recovery in a workmen’s compensation case was valid only because of Art. Ill, Section 21, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that “[i]n all ‘other cases’ nothing less than full actual damage” would satisfy the provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.