Court Opinion

ID: 9723085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:02:01.509744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:44.487521
License: Public Domain

JOHN H. WOOD, Jr., District Judge,
dissenting:
Forewarned by other Supreme Court reversals of the majority in this very case, but still undaunted, this Court again sallies forth into the political thicket on another legislative reapportionment expedition. Again, the majority in this, its latest Opinion, without rhyme, reason, logic, foundation, fact or judicial precedent, has maneuvered an absolutely 180 degree about-face and has completely and totally reversed its earlier decision in this case approving the original State’s Plan under which the last Texas legislative elections were conducted. This erratic and inconsistent vascillation in this case, which has been before the Supreme Court for over six years, constitutes another unconstitutional usurpation of the rights of the sovereign State of Texas. The only lame argument made for this reversal by my colleagues is that they doubt that the State plan, which up to this time has been the Court’s approved plan, is in fact really a State plan since it may not have the imprimatur of the State and particularly the Texas Legislature.
When this Court adopted the State’s plan instead of the plaintiffs’ plan on February 19, 1976, the State’s plan did not have at that time the imprimatur of the State Legislature and other branches of the Texas government that it now enjoys.1 After H.B. 1097 was enacted voluntarily in 1975 by the Texas Legislature which eliminated all multi-member districts in the State after the Supreme Court had granted its Petition for Certiorari and after the Supreme Court had recertified this case back to this Court for us to decide if this State action had rendered this case “moot”, the State of Texas submitted House Bill 1097 for clearance under Section 5 of Voting Rights Act to the Attorney General of the United States. By letter of January 23, 1976, the United States Attorney General interposed objections to the single-member district lines of three of the districts contained in House Bill 1097, including District 32 of Tarrant County which is involved here.
Therefore, this Court reconvened on February 9, 1976, only a short time before the April 3, 1976 elections, to consider the three remaining districts. Two of the districts were resolved by agreed Order of the parties. No compromise was reached with regard to Tarrant County. However, the State did come forward with the proposal which was adopted by the Court on February 19, 1976 and thus this Court rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed plan which the majority now prefers.
The present State plan which is now under attack before this Court was originally prepared by State Representative Tom Schieffer and was endorsed by the 1976 Tarrant County legislative delegation. It was presented to this Court as the State’s *574Plan by the Texas Governor and Attorney General.
On February 19, 1976, as stated, this Court adopted the State’s proposed plan as amended by the Tarrant County legislative delegations as its own single-member district plan for District 32 in Tarrant County and thereafter the plaintiffs appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court and sought to stay the Judgment of the District Court. Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell referred the plaintiffs’ appeal to the full Supreme Court on March 1, 1976 and the action of this Court was in all things affirmed.
Thereafter, under such plan, the 1976 elections in Texas were conducted under the Reapportionment Plan adopted by this Court and approved by the Supreme Court.
It is obvious, therefore, that when this Court adopted the State’s plan on February 19, 1976 (that is now in existence as the Court approved plan), the State’s plan did not have the formal approval of the State Legislature and other branches of government, as well as the other local subdivisions of government in Tarrant County with which the existing plan is now endowed as will be demonstrated later. While the Court had some reservation in 1976 as to whether or not this plan had the imprimatur of the State of Texas, particularly that of the Legislature, this plan was adopted by this Court as one intended by the State to eliminate any possible constitutional infirmities that had heretofore been raised by the plaintiffs or the Attorney General of the United States and this Court agreed, in adopting this plan as its own, in the following language on February 19, 1976:
“The 1970 Census data supplied to the Court as well as the testimony adduced at the recent hearing in this suit, DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT EITHER OF THE TWO PLANS (I. E., SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT RESPECTIVELY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Both plans provide for a primary district in which minority voters constitute a clear majority.” (Emphasis added.)2
Not only does the State Plan which was adopted as the Court Plan in our earlier decision now have the State’s legislative and executive imprimatur, but also enjoys the stamp of approval of all the democratically elected City Council and other local governmental bodies within the County of Tarrant as well as the imprimatur of this Court and the Supreme Court. This is the present existing plan upon which the State of Texas and its local subdivisions have relied in preparing voting lists, precinct lines and in making expensive preparations to carry out a plan that this Court has heretofore held “did not possess any constitutional infirmities”.3
The majority gives lip service endeavoring to ascertain State policy and legislative intent of the State as follows:
“We of course recognize our duty to respect state apportionment policy. See, e. g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971).”
It takes but the most cursory reading of the majority’s Opinion and findings to determine that its duty with regard to respecting State apportionment policy has been totally and absolutely ignored.
Even if we follow the majority’s erroneous finding that the defendants’ plan is not a legislatively adopted or State approved plan and microscopically examine the two plans for indications of State policy and legislative intent, we must conclude that defendants have established the existence *575of identifiable and legitimate State goals and the closer congruence of the present plan to those goals. Since the present representatives were elected from the existing districts, final adoption of the present plan avoids pairing any representatives and maintains existing member-constituent relationships. Minimizing contests between incumbents is acceptable State policy. See White v. Weiser, supra; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973); Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 92 S.Ct. 1980, 32 L.Ed.2d 648 (1972); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n. 16, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966). Plaintiffs’ plan would pair six of the nine representatives.
The majority ironically states that because its selection of the current districting plan for Tarrant County, Texas which was adopted in 1976 by this Court was “guided in no small way by constraints of time and practicability” it was an inconvenience to the political subdivisions of the State charged with conducting the elections for the Texas Legislature. The majority ignores the undisputed trial facts that these same conditions persist and are even worse at this time. The Court overlooks the evidence that the adoption of the plaintiffs’ plan would affect the integrity of over seventy precincts in Tarrant County, while retaining the present Court plan would not cause any additional precinct charges. The voting precincts are, of course, the smallest political subdivisions with which voters identify.
The United States Supreme Court recently has acknowledged the possibility of using precincts to draw legislative districts. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1838, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977). Adoption of plaintiffs’ plan also would affect the integrity of the single-member district lines now existing in the City of Fort Worth. The preservation of political subdivision lines and historical boundaries has long been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as a rational and legitimate State goal. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 87 S.Ct. 569, 17 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964).
The evidence further establishes that the adoption of plaintiffs’ plan would make it virtually impossible for Tarrant County to comply with certain requirements of State election laws. Although the spring 1978 elections could probably be carried out on schedule, such a result could not be accomplished without great difficulty. A Court should not require precipitate changes that could make embarrassing demands on State election machinery. See Reynolds v. Sims, supra. Maintenance of the integrity of State election laws and their requirements certainly are legitimate State interests that would be served by permanent adoption of the present Court plan.
Defendants established that considerable voter confusion followed implementation of single-member district lines in Tarrant County as a result of the 1976 Order of this Court. Precincts with over the 3,000 voter limit established by State law were commonplace. Long lines at polling places resulted. Some voters were simultaneously registered in more than one precinct. Some candidates for election offices actually filed in the wrong precincts. The resolutions of the City Council of the City of Arlington and the Tarrant County Mayors' Council both cite the probability of more voter confusion and voter disenchantment on adoption of plaintiffs’ plan as a reason for this Court to retain its present plan.
Now, single-member districts are in place under our previous Court adopted plan and Tarrant County has taken care during the past year to eliminate the over-large precincts and to reduce the voter confusion that occurred last year on implementation of those districts. Avoiding voter confusion and encouraging voter participation is a legitimate State goal and retaining existing districts to avoid extreme disruption of the *576election process is acceptable. See Chapman v. Meier, 407 F.Supp. 649, 653 (D.N.D. 1975) on remand from 420 U.S. 1, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975).
While I coricur in the majority’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ claim that the State’s Plan unconstitutionally dilutes the voting strength of the County’s minority community and thereby denies minorities equal access to the electoral process, I strenuously disagree with the holding of the majority that the present State’s Plan, which is now the adopted plan of the Court, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection requirement that legislative districts be “as nearly of equal population as is practicable”.
Apparently, the majority is basing its decision as to the second point on the proposition that the present plan is not in fact the State Plan and that since “reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislative or other body” the “mere endorsement of the plan adopted by this Court is insufficient to cause this Court to defer to such legislative effort” and states:
“That deference contemplates a studied and thoughtful approach to the process of legislative apportionment, whereby the resulting legislation may be presumed to embody the legitimate concern of the general public.”
This is incredible reasoning. To what extent must the Federal Courts police the minutes, the hours, the days and time that the legislative bodies spend in fashioning a redistricting legislative plan for Tarrant County which is merely one of 254 in the State of Texas?
It is true that after this Court adopted the State Plan in 1976 the Texas Legislature did meet and adjourn without introducing or passing any new redistricting lines for Tarrant County. The majority criticizes this absence of legislative action which I respectfully submit is totally unwarranted. If in our 1976 Order we had in fact instructed the Legislature to enact legislation, or even if we had suggested that it do so (and the Federal Courts are required to give the respective States every opportunity to correct their alleged mistakes4) there is little doubt that the State would have complied with such suggestion as it has always in the past. However, in view of this Court’s 1976 Order adopting the Plan of the State of Texas and providing for further hearings only if the Plan failed to remedy constitutional deprivations suffered by minorities, the Legislature’s lack of action must be viewed as approval sub silentio of the Court adopted plan. Of course, if the State were displeased with the present Court adopted plan, the State could have passed legislation establishing new districts. Finally, thereafter though, as heretofore observed whatever doubt might have existed previously as to the State’s legislative intent, it was clearly dispelled by the adoption of two separate resolutions of the Texas Legislature, one by the Texas House of Representatives and another by the Texas Senate, expressly setting forth State policy embodied in the defendants’ plan which the Court had previously adopted as its own. This is conclusive of the State’s legislative intent, especially where the resolutions specifically prescribed the districts presently existing in Tarrant County.
Plaintiffs’ response to the onslaught of evidence of legislative intent, State goals and policy offered by the defendants is twofold. First, they suggest that the existence of H.B. 1097, as amended, House Resolution No. 3 and Senate Resolution No. 2 (resolutions adopting the present Court plan as that of the Texas Legislature), the Resolution of the Tarrant County Mayors’ Council, consisting of all 31 Mayors from 31 cities in Tarrant County, the Commissioners of the County of Tarrant and the Resolutions of the Fort Worth and Arlington City Councils should be ignored because they are all the result of malignant motives or ill-consideration. Plaintiffs are, in effect, ask*577ing this Court to conclude that all of the elected State Representatives, State Senators, Mayors and County Commissioners in Tarrant County as well as members of the Arlington City Council are guided in their official acts in petitioning this Court for approval of the present Court adopted plan by motives of discrimination or are in the habit of adopting official resolutions or acts without appropriate study, conception or consideration. I refuse to make such an outrageous assumption and I respectfully submit further that the endorsement by all of these bodies who are vitally concerned with this reapportionment problem refutes the contention of the majority that there was a failure to conduct “a studied and thoughtful approach to the process of legislative apportionment”. Second, plaintiffs suggest, and apparently the majority agrees, that this Court is not required to pay any heed to such clear legislative intent and mandate.
In urging this result, plaintiffs and the majority seem to rely on a somewhat similar passage in Wallace v. House, 538 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir., 1976). This case has no applicability to this “single-member” reapportionment case involved here since the complete passage in that case is that “the Court may pay no heed to legislative preference FOR AT-LARGE DISTRICTS”, (which are no longer involved here), id. at page 1140 (Emphasis added.) See also East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall.5
In Graves v. Barnes No. 1, supra, my colleagues in this very case also criticized the entire State’s plan in 1971 because it was allegedly not a product of legislative action, but rather was the action of a “Board of five members, only one of whom is a member of the Legislature”. Under the Texas Constitution, the Board is authorized to act to reapportion if the Legislature fails to do so. The Board attacked by the majority in this case consisted of the Lt. Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Land Commissioner and the Comptroller of Public Accounts, which Board acted in this case under the advice and counsel of the Attorney General of Texas. Here again, the majority concluded, “We have serious doubt that this Board did a sort of deliberate job contemplated by Reynolds v. Sims as worthy of judicial abstinence.”6 The Supreme Court obviously rejected this finding of the majority in holding that the Board’s actions in this reapportionment case did constitute valid State action and the redistricting plans under attack by the majority were affirmed in keeping with my Dissenting Opinion in that case.
At a time in the distant past, the test of constitutionality of State action seemed to depend on whether or not it could be shown that the action was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. As Mr. Justice Brandéis stated in the case of O’Gorman and Young, presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the action.7 See also “The Presumption of Constitutionality”, 31 Col.L.Rev. 1136, (1931).8
After the majority adopted the State Plan on February 19, 1976 and rejected the plaintiffs’ plan, all of which action the Supreme Court affirmed, the majority in this decision have now changed their minds and have decided that the plaintiffs’ plan is preferable. Why? Certainly not because the State’s Plan is unconstitutional since the majority readily concedes that both plans are absolutely constitutional, but rather base their decision on the new and unheard-of concept solely on “EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS”. (Emphasis added.) This is totally contrary to the holding in *578Whitcomb v. Chavis9 and its progeny which holds:
“But we have insisted that the challenger carry the burden of proving that multi-member districts unconstitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial or political elements.”
The Supreme Court further concludes in this case that there is “no evidence that all of the multi-member districts were conceived as purposeful devices to further racial or economic discrimination”.10
This dictatorial and unconstitutional usurpation of political power by this type of “government by judicial decree” demonstrates the reasons that Federal Judges are being constantly reminded by State officials, constitutional lawyers, editorial writers, newspapers, television, radio and other media that our system of government was designed by our founders to be a democratic one . . . that this country by the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights and the Constitution itself, divorced itself from monarchs, life tenured despots and tyrants and they further contend that this should include the arbitrary, unwarranted and unconstitutional intrusion of Federal Judges into the democratic process of the State governments.
In this particular case, after adopting the Plan submitted by the State of Texas in 1976, the majority again failed to respond to the inquiry submitted to us by the Supreme Court as to whether or not this case was, by the adoption of single-member districts, rendered “moot”. Instead, the majority followed its past policy and attempted to keep continuing jurisdiction over this case as it had in the past, in effect retaining the power to manage every detail of the affairs of the State of Texas in reapportionment matters as it has done during the past almost seven years, and it again opted in 1976 to endeavor to retain control over the administration of this State’s legislative, executive and local subdivisions of government in Tarrant County. Apparently, the majority has an inordinate determination to continue its domination of the sovereign State of Texas in this reapportionment case by such perpetual unconstitutional intrusion in and usurpation of those democratic processes which are clearly and unequivocally reserved by the Constitution of the United States to all of the sovereign States. How can the Judiciary expect others to abide by the Constitution and support it when the Federal Judges flagrantly violate it in this fashion?
As I pointed out in Graves v. Barnes No. 2, it cannot be denied that this type of legislative reapportionment civil rights case is an emotionally charged one in which competing political philosophies and methods often clash and unrestrained and electrifying charges of racial or other ethnic discrimination are heatedly made.11 This is an area in which the Federal Judiciary must, indeed proceed with extreme caution.12
The remedy of imposing Court drawn single-member districts is the most radical that equity could require and is one which should be imposed only after setting aside on supportable grounds other alternatives found adequate. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at page 160, 91 S.Ct. 1858, supra.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that the District Courts “. should not pre-empt the legislative task nor ‘intrude upon State policy more than necessary . . .’” White v. Weiser, supra, 412 U.S. at page 795, 93 S.Ct. at page 2355. Thus, “. . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.” Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 586, 84 S.Ct. at 1394. See also White v. *579Weiser, supra, 412 U.S. at pages 794-795, 93 S.Ct. at page 2348. Furthermore, the approval of these plans by the representatives from each district is a clear expression of legislative intent. Also, assuming even that plaintiffs’ plan is preferable, which I dispute, judicial courtesy would require the adoption of a plan which has been previously approved as constitutional by this Court and adopted by separate distinct resolutions of the two Houses of the State Legislature as well.
Since the sole and only reason that the Supreme Court returned this case to us was to determine whether or not the State’s voluntary adoption of “single-member” to replace “multi-member” legislative districts throughout the State was now moot, I feel that we should address ourselves to this question, although the majority has not done so. In this connection, I respectfully submit that in Texas the single-member districts created in all of the 254 Counties now provide all of the body politic and voters with effective access to the political process and having attained these goals it is now time for the surrogate Federal Courts to step aside and again let Democracy run its course.
From the beginning the Supreme Court has recognized that reapportionment is solely a matter for State determination, usually by the State Legislature, and determination and judicial relief becomes appropriate only when the legislative intent to reapportion according to Federal constitutional standards and requirements is not met. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). In White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 at page 795, 93 S.Ct. 2348 at page 2355 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held:
“Just as a federal district court, in the context of legislative reapportionment, should follow the policies and preferences of the State, as expressed in statutory and constitutional provisions or in the reapportionment plans proposed in the State legislature, whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution, we hold that a district court should similarly honor state policies in the context of congressional reapportionment. In fashioning a reapportionment plan or in choosing among plans, a district court should not pre-empt the Legislative task nor intrude upon state policy any more than necessary.” (Emphasis added.)
It must also be observed that the Mexican-American community in Tarrant County favors neither plan, but has submitted a third plan for consideration by the Court.
In a situation like the present one, where alternative reappdrtionment plans are before the Court, we are obligated to choose the plan that most nearly approximates the reapportionment plan of the State Legislature, while satisfying constitutional requirements. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 at 797, 93 S.Ct. 2348.
The instant case is unique in many ways from the cases establishing the standards to be applied in the area of one-man, one-vote, one of which is that it marks the only occasion known to this Court when the one-man, one-vote principle has been applied to only a few districts involved in the selection of the representative body. The nine State representatives elected from the districts in question will be only nine of the 150 members of the Texas House of Representatives. Whatever plan we adopt, the people of Tar-rant County will find themselves in districts that are both larger and smaller than other legislative districts in the State, which is permissible as affording reasonable guarantees of equal protection to the voters of the entire State under White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973).
Last year in this very case in adopting the State’s plan, we approved redistricting plans that were drawn for legislative districts in Jefferson County and Nueces County in the same manner as described by Representative Schieffer for Tarrant County, i. e., district lines were redrawn in an effort to resolve objections raised by the United States Attorney General. The devi*580ation among districts approved by this Court for Jefferson County was 8.1% and Nueces County was 10%.
As we noted in 1976, it would seem beyond dispute that 7.7% deviation in an apportionment plan adopted by a State legislature does not violate the Federal constitutional requirements of one-man, one-vote. Graves v. Barnes, 408 F.Supp. 1050, 1053 (1976) . Also, as the United States Supreme Court in 1973 made clear by correcting us in this same case, not all population deviations must be justified by “acceptable reasons” grounded in State policy. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 761, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). It is also clear that the present plan does embody legitimate and identifiable State policy and the legislative intent is crystal clear.
Of course, a Court-ordered plan “must be held to higher standards than a State’s own plan”. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975). Unless there are persuasive justifications, a Court-ordered reapportionment plan of a State legislature must ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, supra, 420 U.S. at 26-27, 95 S.Ct. 751. Substantial population deviations such as 19.3% and 16.5% for legislative districts, “simply cannot be tolerated in a court-ordered plan in the absence of some compelling justification”. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 at page 417, 97 S.Ct. 1828 at page 1835.
Even ignoring the imprimatur of the Texas Legislature and the local subdivisions within Tarrant County as to the State plan, it is interesting to observe that the plan’s deviation of 7.7% is certainly not of the magnitude of the ones in Connor or the 20.14% found in Chapman v. Meier, supra, and does not require a compelling justification. Apparently, no Court has ever found a deviation of 7.7% to be unacceptable in a court-ordered plan. To the contrary, we have ourselves previously approved plans of 8.1% and 10% for districts in Texas and other Courts have approved plans with similar deviations. E. g., Perry v. City of Opelousas, 515 F.2d 639 (5th Cir., 1975) (6.2%); Chapman v. Meier, 407 F.Supp. 649 (D.N.D. 1975) , on remand from 420 U.S. 1, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975) (6.6%).
This Court is left, however, with the task of deciding whether the present plan’s deviation of 7.7% is beyond the threshold of plans that are acceptable without any justification. See Parnell v. Rapides Parish School Board, 425 F.Supp. 399 (W.D.La. 1976) . The situation is not unlike the one we initially confronted in this very case in 1972 when we read the cases to require the State of Texas to justify its deviation of 9.9%. The Supreme Court corrected us in this very case in that error. White v. Regester, supra.
The results of the 1976 election under the State Court’s adopted present plan which is now under attack are undisputed. Of the nine members elected, one is Black, the remaining are Anglo. Strictly in terms of proportional representation, by race, the result is that the Black population, which makes up approximately 11.7% of the total population of Tarrant County, has elected a member of the Texas Legislature who represents 11.1% of the total population. There is no Mexican-American Representative, but it has been acknowledged that the 6% Mexican-American population is scattered throughout Tarrant County. This mechanistic method of determining equality of access by proportional representation, however, is inappropriate. White v. Regester, supra, 412 U.S. at 765, 93 S.Ct. 2332; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, 403 U.S. at 149, 91 S.Ct. 1858; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 554 F.2d 139, 143 (1977). The real determiner is whether members of the group in question can participate in the political processes and elect legislators of their choice, whatever may be their race. White v. Regester, supra.
In arguing that the present plan is unacceptable as a court-ordered plan, plaintiffs rely exclusively on Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 554 F.2d 139 *581(1977) (en banc) and the full meaning of this case remains uncertain while it awaits United States Supreme Court review.
This case was originally instituted by other plaintiffs in 1971 and, as previously noted has been before the Supreme Court since 1972 in one form or another. There is little wonder, after the Supreme Court had granted its latest Petition for Certiorari in this case in 1976 (after the State had voluntarily adopted single member districts to replace its multi-member districts), the Supreme Court promptly remanded this case back to this Court “for reconsideration in light of the recent Texas Reapportionment legislation and for dismissal if the case is, or becomes, moot.” White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935, 95 S.Ct. 2670, 45 L.Ed.2d 662 (1975). It is paradoxical' that the majority has not once since this case was referred,, back to this Court in 1976 even addressed itself to the Supreme Court's Mandate to determine “mootness” which was the only reason for its return to us.
Seemingly, the majority is determined to continue this as a perpetual case always open to new charges, additional suits and other controversies and complaints from anyone and everyone, apparently desirous of having this 1971 ease “go on and on” ad infinitum, somewhat like Tennyson’s proverbial “Brook”.
As heretofore observed, the Supreme Court has recognized that reapportionment is exclusively and solely the responsibility of the States, primarily the legislative bodies thereof. Judicial relief becomes appropriate only when the challenging plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the State has failed to create a plan that meets constitutional requisites. Whitcomb v. Chavis, Reynolds v. Sims and White v. Weiser, supra. The challenger has the burden to establish and prove that the State Plan “UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OPERATE TO DILUTE OR CANCEL THE VOTING STRENGTH OF RACIAL OR POLITICAL ELEMENTS.” (Whitcomb v. Chavis, emphasis added.) If, in fact, the Court does find the plan unconstitutional, it must then use “equitable discretion” and “principle” to fashion a new plan for the district. However, the Court cannot use “equitable discretion ” or “determine whether it may stand as a matter of principle” (emphasis added) to determine the plan’s validity, vel non, as the majority has done in this case, since this first threshold question must be determined solely and exclusively on constitutional grounds before it reaches the equitable question of fashioning a plan. (Whitcomb v. Chavis, Reynolds v. Sims and White v. Weiser, supra.)
The implications of this novel and latest extension of judicial management into the purely State and local reapportionment affairs (WHERE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE ADMITTEDLY NOT CONTROLLING) are shocking and perhaps are monumental in scope. If these new standards adopted by the majority stand as unchallenged judicial precedent in Texas and in other sovereign States, the thicket in this thorny legal area will indeed become totally impenetrable. Such unparalleled and unprecedented “Government by Judicial Decree” is unfortunate and contemplates and encourages the spawning of endless and uncertain needless litigation in this very sensitive and controversial field of State-Federal relations.
CONCLUSION
1. Since even the majority holds that the present plan does not unconstitutionally “dilute or cancel the minority” voting strength or access to the political process, the present plan which has the imprimatur of the State Legislature and all of the political and governmental subdivisions in Tar-rant County as well as the prior approval of this Court, which action was affirmed by the Supreme Court, this Three Judge Court has the obligation and responsibility to adopt the present plan as a final plan.
2. While the present single-member district reapportionment plan for Tarrant County is sufficient as a State legislatively adopted plan, it also conforms to all the *582requirements for a Court-ordered reapportionment plan under all judicial precedent.
3. Since the plaintiffs, as the challengers, have not sustained their burden to establish the State’s Plan, which is also this Court’s adopted Plan, to be an unconstitutional Plan, it must be reaffirmed and readopted by this Court.
4. In response to the specific inquiry of the Supreme Court, I would find that the Texas Reapportionment Plan now in existence is constitutional and would, therefore, HOLD THIS CASE IS NOW MOOT.

. See, e. g. Escalante v. White, D.C., 408 F.Supp. 1050. This Court’s adoption of the State Plan was affirmed by inference by the Supreme Court when this case was returned to this Court for a determination of mootness. It has occurred to me that I might comment on the fact that if the Courts continue to take over and manage the reapportionment duties of the various States and adopt a Plan, the parties should be able to rely on the integrity and fairness of the U.S. Courts to adopt and maintain well-considered districting plans. Litigants should be able to rely on the Supreme Court as a Court of final jurisdiction whose decisions are final and consistent. Litigants should not, in making plans for the future involving heavy financial and business commitments, be relegated to the sorry proposition that litigation before the Federal Courts is decided by case-by-case ticket and a decision like a railroad ticket is good for this trip and this trip only. The majority of this Court should submit to the decision of the Supreme Court and proceed, as directed, to a determination of the mootness issue.

. Graves v. Barnes (Graves III), 408 F.Supp. 1050 (W.D.Tex.1976) (3-judge court). Reference to this earlier opinion will reflect, in pertinent part, the history of this protracted litigation. See also, Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F.Supp. 704 (W.D.Tex.1972); Graves v. Barnes (Graves II), 378 F.Supp. 640 (W.D.Tex. 1973).

. Graves v. Barnes (Graves III) supra.

. Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F.Supp. 704 (1972).

. 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976).

. Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), supra.

. O’Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 51 S.Ct. 130, 75 L.Ed. 324.

. Graves v. Barnes (Graves I), 343 F.Supp. 749.

. 403 U.S. 124, 144, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971).

. Graves v. Barnes (Graves III) supra.

. 378 F.Supp. 640 (1974).

. Graves v. Barnes (Graves II), supra, at pages 683-684.