Court Opinion

ID: 9374040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:16:46.041753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:44.356152
License: Public Domain

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SJC-12751

              COMMONWEALTH   vs.   KELLY D. RIDLEY, JR.

     Barnstable.       December 9, 2022. - February 17, 2023.

   Present:    Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ.

Homicide. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon.
     Witness, Expert. Evidence, Expert opinion, Relevancy and
     materiality. Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor,
     Instructions to jury, Jury and jurors, Question by jury,
     Presumptions and burden of proof, Sentence, Capital case.
     Jury and Jurors. Constitutional Law, Sentence.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on December 21, 2016.

     The cases were tried before Robert C. Rufo, J., and a
motion for a new trial, filed on May 21, 2021, was considered by
Thomas J. Perrino, J.

     Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant.
     Mary Nguyen, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

    LOWY, J.    At a house party, in the early morning hours of

October 22, 2016, a series of verbal and physical fights broke

out between a number of party attendees, including the eighteen
                                                                      2

year old defendant, Kelly D. Ridley, Jr., and the twenty-six

year old victim, Thomas Russell.   During a brawl between the

defendant and the victim, the defendant stabbed the victim nine

times in the torso and leg, ultimately killing him.     Following a

jury trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first

degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.1    Following

his convictions, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial,

which was denied.

     In this consolidated appeal, the defendant argues that a

new trial is required because (1) the judge excluded expert

testimony on late adolescent brain development; (2) the

prosecutor misstated the law of voluntary manslaughter during

closing argument; (3) the judge failed to provide an instruction

on involuntary manslaughter; and (4) the judge abused his

discretion in responding to a jury question.   Additionally, the

defendant contends that, in light of his age at the time of the

crimes and the current research on late adolescent brain

development, we should extend the principles underlying Miller

v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its State law counterpart,

Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass.

655 (2013), S.C., 471 Mass. 12 (2015) (Diatchenko I), and

conclude that his sentence of life without the possibility of

     1 The defendant also was convicted of two counts of assault
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.
                                                                      3

parole violates art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.    Finally, the defendant asks us to exercise our

authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and reduce his conviction

of murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree or

voluntary manslaughter.

    We conclude that there was no reversible error.      After

thorough review of the record, we further discern no reason to

exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E,

to reduce the verdict to a lesser degree of guilt or order a new

trial.

    Background.    1.    Trial.   We recite the facts as the jury

could have found them.

    On the evening of October 21, 2016, the victim and his

cousin, David Gonsalves, went to a local bar and met up with a

group of the victim's friends, including Joseph France and

Magnum Desouza.   Priscilla Coelho, a friend of both the victim

and the defendant, also was at the bar that night.      She invited

the victim and his group of friends to a house party hosted by

the defendant.

    The group proceeded to the defendant's house after the bar

closed.   A dispute arose in the kitchen shortly after the victim

arrived at the party, which ultimately caused a disagreement

between the victim and another party attendee, Ricky Powell.
                                                                     4

This disagreement eventually escalated to a physical altercation

between the victim and Powell outside in the street in front of

the house.    A crowd of people followed the two outside to watch

them fight.

    At some point during the fight between the victim and

Powell, the defendant attempted to jump into the fray.

Gonsalves eventually became involved as well, and a physical

altercation ensued between the defendant and Gonsalves; the two

wrestled each other on the ground, throwing punches, while

"talking trash."   France ultimately broke up the fight between

the victim and Powell, and Desouza separated the defendant and

Gonsalves.    In doing so, Desouza attempted to calm the defendant

down, but he appeared "determined."

    After both physical altercations seemingly ended, the

victim walked up the driveway toward the house.   The defendant

then "came out of nowhere" and struck the victim on his head or

upper back with a metal scooter.    The defendant remarked, "How

do you like that, bitch?"    Upon being struck with the scooter,

the victim appeared "shocked."    He stumbled a bit, turned

around, and threw the defendant in the bushes, stating words to

the effect of, "Go inside little man."    The defendant ran to the

steps of the house and started shouting that he was going to get

his gun.   Gonsalves returned the shouting, "calling [the
                                                                    5

defendant's] bluff," and taunting the defendant that he was not

going to follow through.

     As the victim, Desouza, and Gonsalves walked down the

driveway to leave, the defendant came out of the house, now

shirtless, holding a five to six inch bladed knife in his right

hand.    The defendant began waving the knife around, asking, "Who

wants it?"   The defendant proceeded to the end of the driveway

and chased Gonsalves into the middle of the street with the

knife.   The victim, who had walked farther away at this point,

turned and ran toward the defendant.   The defendant still was

holding the knife; the victim was unarmed.    The victim threw a

punch at the defendant, and a physical fight between the two

followed.    During this fight, the defendant swung both of his

fists repeatedly into the victim's midsection, including the

fist that was holding the knife.    The defendant stabbed the

victim nine times, striking both the torso and the left leg.

Michael James, a "father-like figure" to the defendant,2

attempted to break up the fight by grabbing the defendant, and

the defendant stabbed James in the stomach.    Once the defendant

and the victim were separated, the defendant ran inside the

house.

     2 None of the witnesses at trial knew or testified to the
precise familial relationship between the defendant and James,
but defense counsel in closing referred to James as the
defendant's uncle.
                                                                      6

       The victim took a couple steps before falling to the ground

and exclaiming, "I got stabbed."     Desouza and France came to his

aid.   The victim's abdomen and pants were covered in blood, and

there was a hole in his stomach and groin area.      His intestines

were protruding from his body.     The victim still was awake, with

his eyes wide open, and he was holding his stomach.      He looked

France in the eyes, while France held his hand.      France

attempted to talk to the victim and keep him awake, but the

victim, struggling to breathe, could not respond.      The victim

remained conscious for a period of time, but when police and

paramedics arrived, the victim was unconscious and

nonresponsive.    The paramedics transported the victim to a

hospital, where he later died of his stab wounds.     An autopsy

revealed that all nine stab wounds contributed to his death, but

two had the potential to be fatal to the exclusion of the

others.

       At some point before police and paramedics arrived at the

scene, the defendant fled out the back door of the house.      He

traveled to a number of locations before eventually being found

by police the next day while being treated for minor injuries at

the same hospital where the victim died.

       2.   Prior proceedings.   The defendant was indicted by a

grand jury on charges of murder in the first degree of the

victim, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon
                                                                    7

(metal scooter) against the victim, and assault and battery by

means of a dangerous weapon (knife) against James.   Before

trial, the defendant moved in limine to admit expert testimony

regarding the general characteristics of adolescent brain

development.   The judge excluded the testimony, and trial

commenced in October 2018.

     At trial, the defendant conceded that he stabbed and killed

the victim,3 but argued that the killing was voluntary

manslaughter based on heat of passion induced by reasonable

provocation or sudden combat.   The defendant was found guilty on

all of the indictments and sentenced to life without the

possibility of parole on the charge of murder in the first

degree, as statutorily required, G. L. c. 265, § 2, and to two

concurrent sentences of from eight to ten years on the charges

of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.    The

defendant timely appealed.   Following his conviction, the

defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the judge erred in

responding to a jury question about the Commonwealth's burden of

proof, that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

object to the judge's response, and that his sentence of life

without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional.     The

defendant's motion was denied, and his appeal from the denial of

     3 The defendant also conceded that he was guilty of both
counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.
                                                                   8

his motion for a new trial was consolidated with his direct

appeal.

     Discussion.    1.   Expert testimony.   Prior to trial, the

defendant filed a motion in limine to admit expert testimony by

Dr. Frank DiCataldo on adolescent brain development "to provide

the jury with some background of the general mental development

of someone in their late adolescence," to assist them in

determining whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent

to commit murder.    In support of his motion, the defendant

submitted a transcript of DiCataldo's testimony on adolescent

brain development from another criminal case in which the

defendant also was eighteen years old at the time of his

offense.   The Commonwealth moved to exclude the proposed

testimony on the basis that DiCataldo had not conducted an

individualized examination of the defendant or a review of his

records, and that expert testimony regarding the general

characteristics of adolescent brain development would not assist

the jury in determining the defendant's guilt.     Following a

hearing, the judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion to exclude

the testimony.4

     The defendant argues on appeal that the judge abused his

discretion in excluding DiCataldo's testimony and that he was

     4 The judge allowed the motion "without prejudice."     The
defendant did not renew the motion.
                                                                    9

deprived of the right to present a defense under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art.

12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.   We conclude that

the judge did not err in excluding the proposed expert

testimony.

     Generally, expert testimony may be admissible whenever "the

expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue."5   Mass. G. Evid. § 702(a) (2022).

     5 To the extent that we have at times stated that this
standard requires that the expert testimony be beyond the common
knowledge or experience of jurors to be admissible, we clarify
that the primary focus of admissibility is whether the expert
testimony will help the trier of fact, even where the subject
matter of the testimony "may be within the knowledge or common
experience of the trier of fact." Commonwealth v. Little, 453
Mass. 766, 768 (2009). Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence similarly uses a "helpfulness standard." See P.C.
Giannelli, Understanding Evidence 316 (5th ed. 2018)
(Giannelli). See also Fed. R. Evid. 702(a) (expert testimony
may be admissible where "the expert's scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"). This
standard is a more liberal formulation of the common-law
standard, which asked whether expert testimony was necessary
because the subject matter was beyond the ken or comprehension
of lay persons. Giannelli, supra. Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence rejects the necessity test: "The question
under Rule 702 is not whether the jurors know something about
this subject, but whether the expert can expand their
understanding in a relevant way." Id. at 316 n.9, quoting Coble
v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert.
denied, 564 U.S. 1020 (2011). The same standard applies under
our common-law rules of evidence.
                                                                    10

See Commonwealth v. Little, 453 Mass. 766, 768 (2009).      "This

condition goes primarily to relevance."    Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).    "Evidence is relevant

if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable

than it would be without the evidence and (b) the fact is of

consequence in determining the action."    Mass. G. Evid. § 401.

"Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case

is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful" (citation omitted).

Daubert, supra.   See Ready, petitioner, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 171,

179 (2005) (expert testimony on sexual interest diagnostic test

properly excluded where test did not concern issues before

jury).   "The decision to exclude expert testimony rests in the

broad discretion of the judge and will not be disturbed unless

the exercise of that discretion constitutes an abuse of

discretion or other error of law."   Commonwealth v. Fernandes,

487 Mass. 770, 778 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 831 (2022),

quoting Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 104 (2006).

    The defendant contends that we approved of the admission of

this type of expert testimony on the general principles and

characteristics of adolescent brain development in Commonwealth

v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 66-67 (2015).     We did not; the

defendant's reliance on Okoro is misplaced.    In Fernandes, we

emphasized that our conclusion in Okoro hinged on the connection

made between the expert testimony on adolescent brain
                                                                  11

development and the individual defendant in that case.     See

Fernandes, 487 Mass. at 781-782 ("The ability of an expert to

testify with respect to the individual defendant specifically is

critical").   Specifically, in Okoro, supra at 66, the expert

testified about how the development of adolescent brains "could

inform an understanding of [the] particular juvenile's capacity

for impulse control and reasoned decision-making" (emphasis

added).    To the extent that the expert in Okoro testified in

general terms about the adolescent brain, he did so to compare

the defendant's specific condition of "'borderline deficient'

cognitive functioning" to that of adolescents generally.     Id. at

53 & 64 n.21.   Indeed, in Okoro we concluded that, although

expert testimony specific to the defendant was admissible

because it offered the jury assistance in determining whether

the defendant was able to form the requisite intent at the time

of the incident, "the trial judge was correct to preclude the

defendant from putting forward evidence that would have

suggested it was impossible for anyone the defendant's age to

formulate the necessary intent to commit this crime" because

"the Legislature has clearly indicated that youth in the

defendant's age group are considered capable of committing

murder."   Id. at 65.   See Commonwealth v. Ogden O., 448 Mass.

798, 805 n.6 (2007) ("respect for the legislative process means

that it is not the province of the court to sit and weigh
                                                                   12

conflicting evidence supporting or opposing a legislative

enactment" [citation omitted]).

    Applying those principles in Fernandes, we held that a

judge "may allow the introduction of expert testimony solely

with respect to 'general principles and characteristics of the

undeveloped adolescent brain' only when it is accompanied by

other evidence, such as testimony by a different expert, or

medical or school records, specific to the defendant."

Fernandes, 487 Mass. at 782.   We explained that, without

evidence pertaining to the particular defendant, "evidence of

the 'general principles and characteristics of the undeveloped

adolescent brain' . . . is inadmissible" because "the expert's

testimony would present the jury with the impermissible

situation discussed in Okoro, 471 Mass. at 65-66," namely, by

allowing the jury to conclude, based on the testimony, that any

person in the defendant's age group could not form the requisite

intent for murder.   See Fernandes, supra at 782 & n.10.    Because

such a conclusion would impermissibly contradict a determination

already made by the Legislature, the expert testimony would not

assist the jury in resolving a fact in issue.   Distilled to its

essence, expert testimony on adolescent brain development in

general is not helpful because it is not relevant.   While

arguably probative of intent, it is not material -- whether

generally a person in the defendant's age group can form the
                                                                   13

requisite intent for murder is not at issue.   The Legislature

has spoken definitively on the matter.    See G. L. c. 265, § 2.

    Here, the defendant proffered no other evidence specific to

himself to accompany the proposed expert testimony by DiCataldo

regarding the general principles and characteristics of late

adolescent brain development.   The proposed testimony thus was

inadmissible, and the judge properly excluded it.

    2.   Closing argument.   The defendant next argues that the

prosecutor misstated the law of voluntary manslaughter during

closing argument.   Because the defendant did not object, we

review to determine whether any error created a substantial

likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.   See Commonwealth v.

Muller, 477 Mass. 415, 431 (2017).

    "In closing argument, '[l]awyers shall not and must not

misstate principles of law.'"   Commonwealth v. Bins, 465 Mass.

348, 367 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545,

557 (1977), S.C., 398 Mass. 806 (1986).   Prosecutors "may,

however, argue 'forcefully for a conviction based on the

evidence and on inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the

evidence.'"   Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 19 (2014),

quoting Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516 (1987).

"Remarks made during closing arguments are considered in the

context of the entire argument, and in light of the judge's

instructions to the jury and the evidence at trial."   Carriere,
                                                                  14

supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass.

224, 231 (1992).

     During closing argument, the prosecutor made the following

statements, the underlined portions of which the defendant now

challenges:6

     "And think about it. Reasonable provocation. You get
     punched. To believe that that's reasonable provocation,
     anytime there was a fist fight, you would have the ability
     and the right to eviscerate someone? I suggest not. . . .

     "Respectfully suggest to you that all of this evidence of
     going the opposite direction of Cape Cod Hospital, not
     going to the hospital, going in the opposite direction
     right after the crime, and then not going there for another
     seven hours and then being seen to have superficial
     injuries,[7] that sudden combat, a reasonable person would
     not be overcome to the point of not being able to think by
     being punched. . . .

     "I'm going to ask you to use your common sense, use your
     life experience and consider what would a reasonable person
     feel or do in that situation? A punch, then warranting the
     taking of a life, transporting you to a heat of passion
     where you don't know what you're doing? The evidence shows

     6 The defendant specifically challenges the emphasized
statements. We place the challenged statements in context, as
we must. See Carriere, 470 Mass. at 19.

     7 We do not view the prosecutor's reference to the
defendant's injuries as "superficial" as a misstatement of law
that a defendant must be seriously injured to support a verdict
of voluntary manslaughter. As the defendant argues, "even a
single blow from the victim can constitute reasonable
provocation," Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 444
(2006), but the prosecutor here was entitled to argue that the
evidence that the defendant's injuries were minor suggested the
blows he sustained would not sufficiently provoke a reasonable
person in the circumstances, see Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski,
363 Mass. 311, 321 (1973) (evidence of scratches on defendant's
face insufficient for reasonable provocation).
                                                                     15

    Mr. Ridley knew what he was doing.    He was murdering Thomas
    Russell." (Emphases added.)

    We have little trouble concluding that the latter two

statements, viewed in context, were not assertions of law by the

prosecutor but, rather, were forceful arguments that the

evidence in this case did not support a verdict of voluntary

manslaughter based on reasonable provocation or sudden combat.

See Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 257 (2022),

S.C., 491 Mass. 247 (2023) ("Reasonable provocation is

provocation [deemed adequate in law] by the person killed . . .

that would be likely to produce such a state of passion, anger,

fear, fright, or nervous excitement in a reasonable person as

would overwhelm his capacity for reflection or restraint and did

actually produce such a state of mind in the defendant"

[citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Brea, 488 Mass. 150, 157

(2021) ("Sudden combat is a form of reasonable provocation.     It

involves a sudden assault by the person killed . . . and the

defendant upon each other" [quotations and citations omitted]).

    The first statement, however, is a closer call, and it is

difficult to discern the statement's meaning.   It is phrased

broadly enough that it could be interpreted as stating that a

finding of reasonable provocation is equivalent to a conclusion

that the killing was justified, which is an incorrect statement

of law.   See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 482 Mass. 259, 271 (2019),
                                                                      16

citing Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 842 (2011)

(justification and mitigation "have distinct meanings in the

law"; "justification defense . . . could result in acquittal,

and mitigation defense, such as heat of passion, . . . at best

yields conviction of lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter").8

Nevertheless, this statement was isolated.       The jury were told

on several occasions that the judge provides the instructions of

law.       And the judge's instructions properly stated the law of

voluntary manslaughter, including reasonable provocation.       We

presume that the jury followed these instructions.       See Rivera,

supra.      We conclude, as a result, that this passing statement

did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of

justice.9

       Legal justification for a killing renders an intentional
       8

homicide noncriminal. See Commonwealth v. Nardone, 406 Mass.
123, 130-131 (1989). Examples of legal justification include,
inter alia, "accident, mistake, self-defense, and defense of
another." Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 506, 514 n.7
(2000). The defendant did not assert a justification defense at
trial.

       As a result, the defendant's claim that his counsel was
       9

ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's closing
argument fails. Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 192-
193 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Gulla, 476 Mass. 743, 745-
746 (2017) ("In the review of cases involving murder in the
first degree, '[r]ather than evaluating an ineffective
assistance claim under the traditional standard of Commonwealth
v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 [1974], . . . we apply the
standard of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether there was
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice'"). See
Commonwealth v. Kosilek, 423 Mass. 449, 457 (1996), quoting
Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 (1996) ("[I]f an error
                                                                    17

    3.   Involuntary manslaughter instruction.    The defendant

claims that the judge erred in denying his request for an

instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on the evidence

that he brought a knife into the situation by carrying it down

the driveway.   "Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful homicide

unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes such a

disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to

amount to wanton or reckless conduct."    Commonwealth v. Lopez,

485 Mass. 471, 484 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 483

Mass. 269, 275 (2019).   "An instruction on involuntary

manslaughter is required where any view of the evidence would

permit a finding of manslaughter and not murder."    Commonwealth

v. Moseley, 483 Mass. 295, 303 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v.

Pierce, 419 Mass. 28, 33 (1994).    "When it is obvious, however,

that the risk of physical harm to the victim created a plain and

strong likelihood that death will follow, an instruction on

involuntary manslaughter is not required."    Moseley, supra,

quoting Pierce, supra.   "When determining whether such an

instruction was required, we consider the evidence in a light

most favorable to the defendant."   Commonwealth v. Tague, 434

Mass. 510, 518 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1146 (2002).

not objected to by trial counsel does not create a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice . . . , a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to such error
will not succeed").
                                                                   18

    Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the defendant, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction

on involuntary manslaughter.   The killing was not the result of

the defendant merely bringing out the knife and carrying it down

the driveway.   Rather, the evidence was that the defendant swung

the knife nine times into the unarmed victim's leg and abdomen.

The act of doing so clearly created a plain and strong

likelihood that death would follow.    See Commonwealth v.

Concepcion, 487 Mass. 77, 92, cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 408

(2021).   See also Lopez, 485 Mass. at 485 ("Because it is

obvious that stabbing the victim created a plain and strong

likelihood that death would follow, an involuntary manslaughter

instruction was not warranted").   There was no error.

    4.    Response to jury question.   Approximately two and one-

half hours into deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge

with several questions and statements.   Relevant here, one such

statement asserted:   "Jury in agreement with charge with the

exception of whether or not Commonwealth has proven without

reasonable doubt there were mitigating circumstances."   After

the judge read the jury's note to the prosecutor and defense

counsel at sidebar, he provided each with a copy of the note and

ordered a brief recess for both to consider their proposed

responses.
                                                                  19

    When counsel reconvened at sidebar, the judge suggested

that the relevant statement needed "further clarification"

because it was "not . . . worded in accordance with the

[c]ourt's instruction."   Specifically, the judge commented that,

contrary to the jury's note, the Commonwealth must "prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that there were no mitigating circumstances.

Not that there were, [but] that there were no."   See

Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 427 Mass. 714, 716 (1998) (correct rule

is that Commonwealth must prove absence of mitigating

circumstances).   The prosecutor remarked that the jury had an

audio recording of the jury instructions with them in the

deliberation room.   Notably, the jury also were provided an

outline of the audio recording, which listed the time in the

recording that each individual instruction could be located.

    The prosecutor proposed that the judge respond to the

jury's statement by advising the jury of their ability to replay

the judge's instructions.   Defense counsel agreed, stating, "I

think that makes some sense to instruct them where to listen,

and they could listen to it as a group, play it, stop it, play

it, stop it."   The judge, however, expressed some hesitancy in

telling the jury where exactly in the recording they should

begin listening because, in addition to the instruction on

voluntary manslaughter, other instructions, such as the

instructions on murder in the first degree, also stated that the
                                                                 20

Commonwealth has the burden to prove that there were no

mitigating circumstances.   Defense counsel, in response,

proposed that the judge ask the jury to "listen to those

portions of the instructions . . . beginning at first degree and

through voluntary manslaughter.    That way, we're not putting our

thumb anywhere to push them in one direction or the other."

Thereafter, the judge called the jury into the court room to

respond to their note.

    In addressing the statement at issue, the judge instructed

the jury as follows:

    "With the exception of whether or not the Commonwealth has
    proven without reasonable doubt there were mitigating
    circumstances. So I'm just reading what you wrote. And
    what I respectfully suggest, and this is why I did it, is
    that you take some time and listen to the instructions on
    the audio tape, and don't tell me whether you have or not.
    But our court monitor has given you an outline that refers
    you back to the time within the CD so you can fast forward
    it, and . . . you can quickly go to those sections that you
    want to listen to, understanding that my instructions as a
    whole are important, all of my instructions are equally
    important as I told you that.

    "So, I, again, don't want to presuppose what you're asking,
    and I'm not being critical. Please forgive me. I just am
    not able to answer the question, because it needs further
    clarification."

The judge instructed the jury to continue their deliberations,

emphasizing once again that the Commonwealth bears the burden to

prove all the elements of the charged offenses.    The judge

concluded:   "At this juncture, I'd ask you to go back, listen to

the recording if that's helpful.    If you have further questions,
                                                                   21

I'm happy to receive them from you.   If you want to ask

questions right away before listening, you can do that as well."

The jury returned to the deliberation room and asked no

additional questions prior to returning verdicts of guilty the

following day.

    On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge abused his

discretion in responding to the jury's statement.    Specifically,

he argues that, faced with the jury's misstatement that the

Commonwealth must prove, rather than disprove, mitigating

circumstances, the judge was required to forcefully reinstruct

the jury on voluntary manslaughter and alert them explicitly of

the Commonwealth's burden of proof.

    "The proper response to a jury question must remain within

the discretion of the trial judge, who has observed the evidence

and the jury firsthand and can tailor supplemental instructions

accordingly."    Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 427 Mass. 484, 488

(1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 807 n.11

(1996).   See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 840 (1997)

("The necessity, scope, and character of a judge's supplemental

jury instructions are within his or her discretion").   "[B]efore

a judge responds to a jury communication of legal significance

. . . , counsel should be given the opportunity to assist the

judge in framing an appropriate response and to place on record

any objection they might have to the course chosen by the
                                                                  22

judge."   Commonwealth v. Nelson, 468 Mass. 1, 16 (2014), quoting

Commonwealth v. Floyd P., 415 Mass. 826, 833 (1993).     Here,

defense counsel was given such an opportunity; he agreed with

the judge's course of action and lodged no objection to the

judge's response to the jury question.   Thus, we review to

determine whether there was error and, if so, whether the error

created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

See Commonwealth v. Scott, 428 Mass. 362, 366 (1998), S.C., 437

Mass. 1008 (2002).

    We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion.     "The

judge's discretion to formulate a response is broad,"

Monteagudo, 427 Mass. at 488, and "[w]e evaluate the adequacy of

a supplemental instruction in the context of the entire charge,"

Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 804 (2021).   It is

undisputed that the jury instructions given at the close of

evidence, which were memorialized verbatim in the audio

recording, accurately and thoroughly conveyed that the

Commonwealth bore the burden to prove that there were no

mitigating circumstances.   In fact, this precise instruction was

repeated no less than seven times during the main jury charge.

See Watkins, 425 Mass. at 840 ("We presume that a jury follow

all instructions given to [them] . . .").

    Based on the jury's statement that they were "in agreement

with charge" except as to "whether or not Commonwealth has
                                                                    23

proven without reasonable doubt there were mitigating

circumstances," the judge could not discern confidently which

offense their statement concerned; the given instructions on

murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and

voluntary manslaughter each contained statements addressing the

Commonwealth's burden to disprove mitigating circumstances.    The

judge therefore concluded that the jury's statement needed

clarification.

    Rather than provide a specific instruction on voluntary

manslaughter, as the defendant now argues he should have, the

judge agreed with defense counsel's suggestion to not "push [the

jury] in one direction" and instead pointed the jury to the

audio recording as a whole, guided by the outline.    The outline

contained headings for each offense and the accompanying

instructions, including headings entitled "No Mitigating

Circumstances" under each theory of murder in the first degree,

and "What is a Mitigating Circumstance?" under voluntary

manslaughter.    This allowed the jury to direct themselves to the

portion of the instructions giving them pause.    Significantly,

the judge encouraged the jury to clarify their statement or ask

additional questions, if they had them, after listening.     It was

within the judge's considerable discretion to respond in this
                                                                  24

manner.10   See Scott, 428 Mass. at 367 (no abuse of discretion

where "judge was unclear what the jurors were asking and, rather

than confuse them, the judge sought further clarification of the

question which concerned the jurors").

     The defendant argues that, because the judge used the word

"suggest" when he initially told the jury to listen to the

recording, we cannot know whether the jury actually listened to

the recording of the judge's instructions, and a substantial

likelihood of miscarriage of justice therefore resulted.     We

disagree.   Considering all of the judge's statements to the jury

together and in context, rather than in isolation, his response

clearly reflected an instruction for the jury to clarify their

statement by listening to the audio recording.    See Commonwealth

v. Stokes, 440 Mass. 741, 750 (2004), S.C., 460 Mass. 311 (2011)

("adequacy of instructions is determined by their over-all

impact on the jury").   The absence of any follow-up questions or

clarification from the jury "suggests that their confusion was

dispelled."   Monteagudo, 427 Mass. at 489.   "The jurors may

withdraw a question or return a verdict before a question is

     10Contrary to the defendant's argument, it was sufficient
for the judge to use an audio recording of the instructions,
rather than a written version, especially where, as here, the
jury were provided the outline. See Commonwealth v. Baseler,
419 Mass. 500, 505 (1995) ("a tape recording is not only a
reasonable procedure by which to make the judge's instructions
available to the jury, but also is comparable to written
instructions").
                                                                   25

answered."   Scott, 428 Mass. at 367.    The jury were "in the best

position to determine whether the additional instruction was

necessary," and by returning their verdicts without clarifying

their statement, they demonstrated that they did not need

further response from the judge.   Id.

     The jury's misstatement in this case -- that the

Commonwealth is required to prove mitigating circumstances

beyond a reasonable doubt -- is not unfamiliar or surprising.

The concept that the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove

mitigating circumstances is difficult to frame, and we have

decided a number of cases where judges have stated the concept

incorrectly during jury instructions.11    However, even where a

judge has misstated the Commonwealth's burden in the very same

manner as the jury did here, we have not found a substantial

likelihood of a miscarriage of justice where "the center of

gravity" of the judge's instructions was not "strongly on the

     11This error -- where a judge instructs the jury that the
Commonwealth must prove mitigating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt -- has been referred to as the Acevedo error.
See Acevedo, 427 Mass. at 716 (judge instructed jury that
Commonwealth "must prove three elements beyond a reasonable
doubt," including that "the defendant injured [the victim] as a
result of sudden combat or in the heat of passion or using
excessive force in self defense"). See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Brum, 441 Mass. 199, 205 (2004); Commonwealth v. Lynch, 439
Mass. 532, 543, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1059 (2003); Commonwealth
v. Sirois, 437 Mass. 845, 857 (2002); Commonwealth v. Lapage,
435 Mass. 480, 484-486 (2001); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434
Mass. 570, 589 (2001).
                                                                  26

side of the misstatement" (citation omitted).   Commonwealth v.

Fickling, 434 Mass. 9, 20 (2001).   See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Lynch, 439 Mass. 532, 543-544, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1059

(2003) (judge provided two correct instructions and two

incorrect instructions, but "repeatedly emphasized that the

Commonwealth bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt

on all the elements of the crime charged"); Fickling, supra at

19-20 (two correct instructions sandwiched between two incorrect

instructions, but it was clear that correct instructions carried

more weight).   Contrast Acevedo, 427 Mass. at 716-717 (new trial

required where judge incorrectly instructed on burden of proof

as to provocation in main charge twice, with one correct

instruction, and repeated incorrect instruction in supplemental

charge).

    In these circumstances, where the jury were correctly,

consistently, and repeatedly instructed in the main charge that

the Commonwealth bears the burden to prove that there were no

mitigating circumstances, were provided an audio recording of

those instructions, and were encouraged to clarify their

statement or ask additional questions after listening to the

recording, but did not do so, it would be entirely speculative,

and remote in the extreme, to conclude that the jury applied an

incorrect burden of proof in reaching their verdict.   See

Watkins, 425 Mass. at 841.   See also Commonwealth v. Torres, 420
                                                                   27

Mass. 479, 490-491 (1995) ("Reviewing the whole charge,

including the judge's emphatic and repeated statements that only

the Commonwealth -- and never the defendant -- bore any burden,

we believe that the jury could not have concluded that the

judge's misstatement created an unconstitutional presumption

relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a

reasonable doubt of every element of deliberately premeditated

murder in the first degree").   We discern no substantial

likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.12

     5.   Constitutionality of life sentence without possibility

of parole.   The defendant argues that, considering his age of

eighteen at the time of crimes and the surrounding

circumstances, the reasoning in Diatchenko I, 466 Mass. at 667-

671, and Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-480, commands a conclusion that

his sentence of life without the possibility of parole is

unconstitutional under art. 26 and the Eighth Amendment.     Since

we concluded in Diatchenko I that a life sentence without the

possibility of parole for individuals under the age of eighteen

violates art. 26, "we repeatedly have declined to extend its

holding to individuals over eighteen years of age."

Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 755 (2020).

     12Therefore, the defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance based on counsel's failure to object to the judge's
response is unavailing. See Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 192.
                                                                   28

    Recently, however, in Watt, we concluded that "it likely is

time for us to revisit the boundary between defendants who are

seventeen years old and thus shielded from the most severe

sentence of life without the possibility of parole, and those

who are eighteen years old and therefore exposed to it."      Id. at

755-756.   In order to do so, we determined that it was necessary

for there to be "an updated record reflecting the latest

advances in scientific research on adolescent brain development

and its impact on behavior."     Id. at 756.   We therefore remanded

that case to the Superior Court for a development of the record

to "allow us to come to an informed decision as to the

constitutionality of sentencing young adults to life without the

possibility of parole."   Id.

    The defendant acknowledges that any decision we make based

on a developed record regarding the constitutionality of a life

sentence without the possibility for parole for individuals over

eighteen years of age will be applicable to him.      See

Commonwealth v. Penn, 472 Mass. 610, 628 (2015), cert. denied,

578 U.S. 925 (2016) (rules announced in Miller and Diatchenko I

given retroactive effect).      Nonetheless, he contends that we

should make this constitutional determination on the record

before us.   Because the record in this case does not contain the

necessary information for us to "come to an informed decision"
                                                                     29

on this important constitutional question, we decline to do so

here.     See Watt, 484 Mass. at 756.

     6.    Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   The defendant

asks us to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278,

§ 33E, to reduce his conviction of murder in the first degree to

murder in the second degree or voluntary manslaughter based on

the lack of evidence of extreme atrocity or cruelty.

     The defendant was tried before we prospectively changed the

requirements of finding extreme atrocity or cruelty in

Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 865-867 (2020).     As a

result, the jury were instructed that a finding of extreme

atrocity or cruelty must be based on at least one of the so-

called Cunneen factors.     See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass.

216, 227 (1983).     "These include '[1] indifference to or taking

pleasure in the victim's suffering, [2] consciousness and degree

of suffering of the victim, [3] extent of physical injuries, [4]

number of blows, [5] manner and force with which delivered, [6]

instrument employed, and [7] disproportion between the means

needed to cause death and those employed.'"     Commonwealth v.

Gonsalves, 488 Mass. 827, 834 (2022), quoting Cunneen, supra.

     Based on the evidence that the defendant stabbed the victim

-- who was unarmed -- nine times with a knife, causing his

intestines to protrude from his body while he lay on the ground

conscious and waiting for medical aid, a finding of extreme
                                                                    30

atrocity or cruelty was supported by several of the Cunneen

factors.   See Gonsalves, 488 Mass. at 834-835 (finding of

extreme atrocity or cruelty supported where defendant stabbed

victim five times and in vital areas, and where, after stabbing,

victim was conscious and attempted to speak to friends);

Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 461 Mass. 100, 104-105 (2011)

(finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty supported where

defendant stabbed unarmed victim seven times with "significant

force" in "areas in the body that were likely to cause serious

injury and pain"); Commonwealth v. Libby, 405 Mass. 231, 237

(1989), S.C., 411 Mass. 177 (1991) (evidence sufficient to prove

extreme atrocity or cruelty where defendant stabbed victim nine

times).

    The defendant compares this case to Castillo, 485 Mass. at

867-868, where we reduced a verdict of murder in the first

degree based on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty to

murder in the second degree, pursuant to our authority under

G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   Castillo is inapposite.   There, the

defendant fired a single gunshot in the victim's back, and the

only evidence that supported a finding of extreme atrocity or

cruelty was the victim's consciousness of suffering.    Id. at

860, 867-868.   The same is not true here.   See Libby, 405 Mass.

at 236 ("Had there been but one stab wound, we might well have

regarded this case as one of a class not typically involving
                                                                   31

murder in the first degree").   Our "authority to reduce a

conviction of murder in the first degree in the interest of

justice 'should be used sparingly and with restraint.'"

Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 619-620 (2020),

quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 824 (2017), cert.

denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018).   We decline to exercise that

authority in these circumstances.13

     Conclusion.   We affirm the defendant's convictions and the

order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.

                                      So ordered.

     13The defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the
errors requires a new trial. "Here, 'the cumulative [effect of
the] errors . . . [was] no more prejudicial than any individual
errors, which had minimal impact, if any.'" Commonwealth v.
Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 805 n.15 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v.
Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 107 (2001).