Court Opinion

ID: 9928849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 01:00:49.077515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:40.408426
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30335      Document: 00517051719         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/31/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                                 FILED
                                                                        January 31, 2024
                                  No. 23-30335
                                                                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                Summary Calendar                              Clerk
                                ____________

   J. Cory Cordova

                                                                        Plaintiff,

   Christine M. Mire,

                                                                       Appellant,

                                       versus

   University Hospital & Clinics, Incorporated;
   Lafayette General Medical Center, Incorporated;
   Lafayette General Health System, Incorporated,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 6:19-CV-1027
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:
          This is the third appeal from a sanctions order entered under Federal
   Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). The Appellant for this appeal is the Plaintiff’s
   attorney. The district court entered sanctions against the Appellant for
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   presenting frivolous arguments regarding the Defendants’ potential liability
   as the Plaintiff’s purported employer. We AFFIRM.
          In this court, the Defendants filed a motion for damages, attorney fees,
   and costs. See FED. R. APP. P. 38 That motion is GRANTED, and we RE-
   MAND to calculate damages.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          We detailed the factual and procedural background of the case the last
   time it was before us. See Cordova v. La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. Bd.
   of Supervisors, No. 22-30548, 2023 WL 2967893, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 17, 2023)
   (“Cordova II”). We repeat only some of this history.
          This case arose from Dr. J. Cory Cordova’s non-renewal from a
   medical residency program run by Louisiana State University at the Lafayette
   General Hospital. Following his departure from the program, Cordova filed
   suit in state court in March 2019 against Louisiana State University, the
   program director Dr. Karen Curry, the department head Dr. Nicholas Sells,
   and the director of graduate medical education Kristi Anderson (collectively,
   “LSU Defendants”). Cordova also sued University Hospital & Clinics, Inc.,
   Lafayette General Medical Center, Inc., and Lafayette General Health
   System, Inc. (collectively, “Lafayette General Defendants”), who operated
   the hospital where Cordova was a resident. Additional defendants included
   Cordova’s former counsel, Christopher Johnston, and the Gachassin Law
   Firm, who previously represented Cordova in state court.
          Cordova alleged that the LSU and Lafayette General Defendants
   violated his right to due process under the federal and state constitutions by
   their non-renewal of his residency, committed a breach of contract, and
   sabotaged his efforts to apply to other residency programs. He brought his
   constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cordova contended that
   Johnston and the Gachassin Law Firm were liable under state malpractice

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   law for failing to disclose a purported conflict of interest through their prior
   representation of the Lafayette General Defendants.              Cordova was
   represented by Appellant, Christine M. Mire, and five attorneys from the
   Bezou Law Firm when he brought these claims.
          In August 2019, the LSU Defendants validly removed the case to
   federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because Cordova’s claims raised
   questions of federal law. The district court dismissed some of the claims
   without prejudice. The LSU Defendants and Lafayette General Defendants
   then moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims.
          In December 2020, the district court granted those summary
   judgment motions and amended its prior order to dismiss those claims with
   prejudice because of Cordova’s failure to amend his pleadings. With respect
   to the Lafayette General Defendants, the district court held Cordova failed
   to allege any state action or any direct act or omission that would make them
   liable under Section 1983. The district court held Cordova’s breach of
   contract claims failed because none of the Lafayette General Defendants
   were in a contractual relation with him.
          The LSU and Lafayette General Defendants next moved for entry of
   final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The LSU
   Defendants also filed a motion for costs and attorney fees. Five days after the
   district court ruled against him on summary judgment, Cordova moved to
   remand the case to state court, arguing that the district court’s dismissal of
   his Section 1983 claims meant that his complaint never raised a federal
   question and thus left the district court without jurisdiction. At this point,
   the five attorneys from the Bezou Law Firm withdrew as counsel for
   Cordova, leaving only Mire. The district court referred the parties’ motions
   to a magistrate judge, who recommended the court remand Cordova’s only
   remaining claims, which were for legal malpractice claims against Johnston

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   and the Gachassin Law Firm. The district court adopted the magistrate
   judge’s report and recommendation, remanded the malpractice claims, and
   certified its rulings as final by judgment dated March 24, 2021. On April 14,
   2021, the district court issued an order denying the LSU Defendants’ motion
   for attorney fees but granting costs in the amount of $1,068.60.
          On April 27, 2021, Cordova appealed both orders. Because Cordova’s
   notice of appeal of the March 24 order was filed 34 days after its entry, we
   held that his appeal was untimely and that we lacked jurisdiction to review
   the district court’s dismissal on the merits. See Cordova v. La. State Univ.
   Agric. & Mech. Coll. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 21-30239, 2022 WL 1102480, at
   *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2022) (“Cordova I”). We also rejected Cordova’s
   challenge to the district court’s order awarding costs to the LSU Defendants
   because “he [did] not even attempt to press, let alone substantiate, his
   argument that the district court erred in taxing costs against him.” Id. at *1.
   Finally, we denied Cordova’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion
   for relief from judgment because he did not file such a motion in district court
   and failed to raise the issue in briefing before us. Id. at *2.
          In July 2022, Cordova filed a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the district
   court’s prior judgments, arguing the Defendants “engaged in fraud and/or
   misrepresentations” in the court’s prior proceedings.             Cordova also
   contended the Lafayette General Defendants conceded that they were
   Cordova’s employers in a new state action Cordova filed after our May 2022
   mandate. Cordova further alleged the Bezou Law Firm failed to disclose a
   purported conflict of interest because counsel for the Lafayette General
   Defendants was representing the Bezou Law Firm and its attorneys in an

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   unrelated disciplinary proceeding. 1 The Defendants opposed Cordova’s
   motion and filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1)–(3) and
   28 U.S.C. § 1927.
           In August 2022, the district court denied Cordova’s Rule 60(b)
   motion as untimely, finding Cordova’s allegations of misrepresentation or
   fraud and “new evidence” relating to Cordova’s employment status barred
   by Rule 60(b)’s one-year limitation period.                The district court further
   determined that Cordova’s claims regarding the Bezou Law Firm were
   untimely under Rule 60(b)(6) because they were not brought within a
   “reasonable time.” Nonetheless, the district court also addressed the merits
   of Cordova’s Rule 60(b) motion. The district court explained that even if
   Cordova could show that the Lafayette General Defendants were his true
   employers and that they were contracting parties or joint actors with the LSU
   Defendants, neither showing would change the court’s prior rulings.
   Regardless of who Cordova’s employer was, the court held there was no
   breach of contract or denial of due process in the non-renewal of Cordova’s
   residency.     The district court then awarded attorney fees to the LSU
   Defendants “due to plaintiff’s unreasonable attempts at continuing this
   litigation.”
           Cordova timely appealed the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b)
   motion and the award of attorney fees to the LSU Defendants. Cordova II,
   2023 WL 2967893, at *1. We affirmed and remanded the case for the district
   court to calculate sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.
   See id. at *1–3. We also denied Cordova’s motions to disqualify counsel and
   for sanctions, damages, attorney fees, and costs. Id. at *2–3. We issued our
           _____________________
           1
             The same conflict of interest claim was first raised in briefing before us in 2021.
   See Cordova I, 2022 WL 1102480, at *2; Cordova II, 2023 WL 2967893, at *2. Cordova did
   not bring the issue to the district court’s attention until July 2022.

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   mandate in May 2023 and the district court awarded Defendants $50,664.74
   in frivolous appeal costs.
          In February 2023, while Cordova’s appeal was pending, the district
   court granted the Lafayette General Defendants’ Rule 11(b) motion for
   sanctions but declined to issue sanctions under Section 1927. Similar to its
   denial of Cordova’s Rule 60(b) motion, the district court again rejected
   Cordova’s attempt to relitigate the issue of who his employer was. As it
   stated previously, “the court clearly found no merit to the breach of contract
   claims” even if the Lafayette General Defendants were Cordova’s
   employers. Thus, because the evidence Cordova and Mire persistently
   attempted to introduce and litigate would not affect the district court’s
   decision on the merits, “the futility of any arguments relating to the Lafayette
   General [D]efendants’ status as employer reflects counsel’s bad faith in
   attempting to make an issue of it.” Although the court declined to sanction
   Mire over her arguments regarding the Bezou Law Firm’s potential conflict
   of interest and the timeliness of Cordova’s Rule 60(b) motion, it found her
   “meritless arguments” on the Lafayette General Defendants’ employer
   status to be “so unfounded as to amount to violations of Rule 11(b)(1)–(3).”
   The district court therefore sanctioned Mire, but not Cordova, “to deter any
   more frivolous arguments or filings.”
          Following the submission of the Lafayette General Defendants’ bill of
   costs, the court awarded $29,100.00 in attorney fees and $529.70 in costs.
   Mire timely appealed.
                                   DISCUSSION
          We review the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs for
   abuse of discretion. See Loftin v. City of Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 779 (5th Cir.
   2022). “A district court abuses its discretion if it (1) relies on clearly
   erroneous factual findings; (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law; or (3)

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   misapplies the law to the facts.” Id. (quoting Fessler v. Porcelana Corona de
   Mex., S.A. de C.V., 23 F.4th 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2022)). Mire argues that we
   should apply de novo review because the district court’s Rule 11 sanctions
   violate her First Amendment rights. Because we hold that this case does not
   implicate First Amendment rights and Mire’s arguments to the contrary are
   frivolous, our decision would be the same even under de novo review. Abuse
   of discretion is therefore all that is necessary.
             I.     The district court’s imposition of sanctions
             Rule 11 requires attorneys certify that their papers are not filed “for
   any improper purpose” and any “claims, defenses, and other legal
   contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
   extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). In doing so, attorneys certify that they “have
   conducted a reasonable inquiry and have determined that any papers filed
   with the court are well grounded in fact, legally tenable, and not interposed
   for any improper purpose.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
   393 (1990) (quotation marks and citation omitted). An attorney’s conduct is
   judged under an objective standard of reasonableness governed by the
   “snapshot” rule, which focuses on the “the instant the attorney affixes his
   signature to the document.” Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833
   F.3d 512, 528 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp.,
   Inc., 960 F.2d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1992)). “[T]he central purpose of Rule 11 is
   to deter baseless filings in district court and thus . . . streamline the
   administration and procedure of the federal courts.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S.
   at 393.
             Much of Mire’s brief attempts to relitigate the issues of Cordova’s
   employment status and a potential conflict of interest. We previously
   explained why Mire’s arguments cannot succeed in a Rule 60(b) motion to

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   vacate. See Cordova II, 2023 WL 2967893, at *1–2. Under the law of the case
   doctrine, “an issue of law or fact decided on appeal may not be reexamined
   either by the district court on remand or by the appellate court on a
   subsequent appeal.” Gene & Gene, LLC v. BioPay, LLC, 624 F.3d 698, 702
   (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fuhrman v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir.
   2006)). Mire does not argue that any of the exceptions to this doctrine apply,
   and she therefore forfeits any argument to the contrary. See id. (explaining
   the exceptions); Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021).
          In fact, Mire appears to recognize the merits of the issues she attempts
   to relitigate are irrelevant to this appeal. She acknowledges the district court
   did not impose sanctions for pressing arguments relating to a potential
   conflict of interest or for filing Cordova’s Rule 60(b) motion late. Instead,
   Mire was sanctioned for continuing to argue Cordova’s actual employer was
   the Lafayette General Defendants after the district court repeatedly
   explained why that possibility would not change the outcome of the case.
   The district court repeatedly stated that even if the Lafayette General
   Defendants employed Cordova, either solely or as joint actors with the LSU
   Defendants, or entered into agreements with Cordova directly, Cordova’s
   underlying claims still lacked merit. Sanctions were therefore imposed on
   Mire for continuing to press arguments that had clearly been rejected.
          Mire asserts “this appeal was filed because the district court
   overlooked the ample and unrefuted evidence . . . that the Lafayette General
   Defendants do have potential liability as employer for Dr. Cordova in this
   case.” None of this evidence, however, demonstrates the Lafayette General
   Defendants’ potential liability because the district court found there was
   nothing for them to be liable for. The time to challenge these conclusions has
   long passed.

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           The imposition of sanctions is the only matter properly before us.
   Mire asserts the district court abused its discretion for three reasons:
   (1) Mire presented a novel argument regarding the employment relationship
   between Cordova and the Lafayette General Defendants and therefore
   sanctioning her would violate the First Amendment; (2) Mire’s sanctions
   impose a “chilling effect” on future attorneys to report attorney misconduct;
   and (3) the district court was without jurisdiction to impose sanctions or
   accept “new evidence” as to the employment relationship between Cordova
   and the Lafayette General Defendants. These arguments are frivolous.
           We begin with the First Amendment. 2 Mire argues attorneys have a
   First Amendment right to make nonfrivolous arguments to the court and her
   arguments that the Lafayette General Defendants were Cordova’s true
   employer were not frivolous. Instead, the district court described them as
   “novel.”      We agree the First Amendment covers novel, nonfrivolous
   arguments, but many frivolous arguments are also novel. 3 We expect, indeed
   hope, that a large number of frivolous arguments are new, i.e., have never
   been made before. We realize a “misapplication of Rule 11 can chill counsel’s
           _____________________
           2
            Mire’s First Amendment arguments are likely forfeited because she did not press
   them below. Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397. Mire argues to the contrary by identifying a single
   paragraph in her memorandum in opposition to sanctions. This paragraph, however, states
   general propositions about the proper role of an attorney in our judicial system. Although
   this paragraph may imply certain First Amendment arguments, “to be preserved, an
   argument must be pressed, and not merely intimated.” Stanford v. Comm’r, 152 F.3d 450,
   462 n.18 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, in the interest of finally putting
   this matter to rest, we address Mire’s First Amendment arguments.
           3
             See Anderson v. Williams, No. 95-10055, 1995 WL 295914, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 24,
   1995) (unpublished) (presenting the novel yet frivolous argument that printing a name and
   trademark on postage is a Fourth Amendment violation); see also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sweeney
   Corp., 792 F.2d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (imposing sanctions for pursuing a “novel” yet
   unsupported proposition); Anderson v. Steers, Sullivan, McNamar & Rogers, 998 F.2d 495,
   596 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting as frivolous an argument that presented a “novel” question);
   In re Burbank, 790 F. App’x 226, 229 (1st Cir. 2019) (same).

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   ‘enthusiasm and stifle the creativity of litigants in pursing novel factual or
   legal theories,’ contrary to the intent of its framers.” Snow Ingredients, 833
   F.3d at 529 (quoting CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc., 989 F.2d 791,
   794 (5th Cir. 1993)). Even so, we agree with a prior panel’s conclusion that
   “there is no First Amendment exception to a Rule 11 violation.” Fuller v.
   Donahoo, No. 93-1447, 1994 WL 486931, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 1994)
   (unpublished); King v. Fleming, 899 F.3d 1140, 1151 n.17 (10th Cir. 2018).
   This is because, in judicial proceedings, “whatever right to ‘free speech’ an
   attorney has is extremely circumscribed. An attorney may not, by speech or
   other conduct, resist a ruling of the trial court beyond the point necessary to
   preserve a claim for appeal.” Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071
   (1991). This serves Rule 11’s primary purpose of deterring baseless filings
   and streamlining the administration of justice. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393.
          Despite Mire’s contentions, the First Amendment is not a bar to the
   sanctions imposed in this case. Mire was not sanctioned because her novel
   arguments were frivolous, but because it was frivolous to continue to make
   the rejected novel arguments. As the district court stated, “I ruled on the
   merits in the initial summary judgment. On the 12(b)(6) I re-addressed them.
   I addressed them again in my ruling on the Rule 60B motion. I don’t change
   my position on that.” The court on three separate occasions ruled that the
   underlying claims were meritless, regardless of who employed Cordova.
   Therefore, continuing to argue who was Cordova’s actual employer would
   not change that.
          Accordingly, it was unreasonable for Mire to continue to press an
   issue that the district court had already decided. See Snow Ingredients, 833
   F.3d at 528. Such conduct is indeed sanctionable “either because [it was]
   made for an improper purpose regardless of its merits or because . . . even [if]

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   made in good faith, [it was] legally indefensible.” Id. (emphasis added). 4 It
   was therefore not a subjective belief that Mire’s new “statutory employer”
   theory was frivolous that led to sanctions. Instead, it was the objective view
   that it was improper for Mire to continue to attempt to relitigate an issue
   thrice rejected. See id.
           Mire’s second argument is that the court’s imposition of sanctions
   “will result in a chilling effect on the duty of lawyers to report
   judicial/attorney misconduct.” We are puzzled as to how this helps Mire’s
   position, as she insists in her reply brief she was not sanctioned for raising the
   issue of a potential conflict of interest. Whether aimed at reporting a
   potential conflict of interest or at her multiple other claims of professional
   and criminal misconduct, her argument lacks merit because she was not
   sanctioned for raising these issues. Because she fails to address the basis for
   the district court’s decision to impose sanctions, we need not entertain this
   argument further. See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813
   F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987) (refusing to discuss legal issues that do not
   address the grounds for the district court’s decision).
           Mire’s third argument is that the district court was without
   jurisdiction when it imposed sanctions because her appeal of the court’s Rule
   60(b) decision was pending. “As a general rule the effective filing of a notice
   of appeal transfers jurisdiction from the district court to the court of appeals
   with respect to all matters involved in the appeal.” Thomas v. Capital Sec.

           _____________________
           4
            The Lafayette General Defendants argue that Mire continues to press the issue
   of Cordova’s employer as a tactic to delay an unfavorable res judicata ruling in state court.
   Mire all but admitted to this in the Rule 60(b) motion by stating “[i]t is the pending
   exception of res judicata in state court that leaves Dr. Cordova with no choice but to file the
   foregoing motion.” Although we do not decide whether Mire’s motive was improper, her
   persistence in litigating an issue that does not change the merits lends credence to the
   Lafayette General Defendants’ claim.

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   Servs., Inc., 812 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, an “exception is
   that . . . the district court retains jurisdiction to entertain and resolve a
   motion requesting attorney’s fees or sanctions. The basis for this exception
   is that attorney’s fees/sanctions are matters collateral to the merits of the
   action.” Id. Mire fails to address this longstanding precedent, despite the
   Lafayette General Defendants raising it in their brief.                 Mire “is
   unquestionably obligated to recognize contrary authority.”             Johnson v.
   Lumpkin, 76 F.4th 1037, 1038 (5th Cir. 2023). The district court had
   jurisdiction to impose sanctions.
          Mire also argues the court improperly accepted new evidence during
   the sanctions hearing, which “encompassed issues that were pending on
   appeal that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide.” She contends
   the district court’s use of this evidence to find she acted in bad faith violated
   due process and the “snapshot rule” that evaluates an attorney’s actions at
   the time they were taken. The new evidence was Cordova’s 2017 and 2018
   W-2 forms, which purportedly showed that Cordova was not paid by any of
   the Lafayette General Defendants while a resident. Mire argues it was error
   to consider this evidence because the Lafayette General Defendants “did not
   lay the proper foundation to establish” that Mire possessed or knew about
   these documents at the time she filed the untimely Rule 60(b) motion.
          Mire’s argument mischaracterizes the scope of the “snapshot” rule
   and how it relates to the reasonableness of attorneys’ conduct. When
   evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney’s factual inquiry under Rule 11,
   courts assess various factors, including “the time available to the signer for
   investigation . . . [and] the feasibility of a prefiling investigation.” Smith, 960
   F.2d at 444. Mire has been representing Cordova in this matter since at least
   2018. Mire filed the untimely Rule 60(b) motion in July 2022. Thus, at least
   three or four years had elapsed from the time the W-2s came into existence
   and could easily have been obtained by Mire and/or Cordova at the time Mire

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   filed the Rule 60(b) motion. Under the “snapshot” rule, Mire had ample
   time to investigate the identity of Cordova’s true employer, including to
   review relevant documents such as W-2s and paystubs, before signing the
   Rule 60(b) motion. See id. The Lafayette General Defendants were not
   required to lay a foundation to establish that Mire possessed or knew about
   these documents when she filed the Rule 60(b) motion. Instead, it was
   Mire’s lack of inquiry, as evidenced by the W-2s and other record evidence,
   that made her conduct objectively unreasonable. 5 This was well within the
   district court’s discretion to consider.
           The district court did not err in its sanction order.
           II.     The Lafayette General Defendants’ Appellate Rule 38 motion
           The Lafayette General Defendants have moved for damages under
   Appellate Rule 38. Rule 38 provides that “[i]f a court of appeals determines
   that an appeal is frivolous, it may . . . award just damages and single or double
   costs to the appellee.” Fed. R. App. P. 38.
           Almost a year ago, we wrote that “Cordova has repeatedly refused to
   heed the district court’s warnings about ‘unreasonable attempts at
   continuing this litigation’ with an untimely and also meritless Rule 60(b)
   motion.” Cordova II, 2023 WL 2967893, at *3. That appeal was frivolous.
   Id. Despite our warning, frivolous arguments to the district court continued.
   In its Rule 11 order, the district court again warned that Cordova “may
   expose himself to liability if he continues to seek justifications to reopen this
   suit.” The district court further warned both Cordova and Mire that
   although it refrained from sanctioning them under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, “the

           _____________________
           5
             Even if the district court erred in considering the W-2s specifically, the district
   court also considered other documentation in Cordova’s LSU residency file, on the record
   since the summary judgment stage, that demonstrate Mire’s lack of reasonable inquiry.

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   standard might be met with further abusive litigation tactics.” It awarded
   attorney fees and costs in the hope that this would “deter any more frivolous
   arguments and filings.”
          Unfortunately, the Rule 11 sanctions did not deter yet another
   frivolous appeal.
          We GRANT the Lafayette General Defendants’ Rule 38 motion. As
   before, “[w]e believe the district court is in the best position to set an
   appropriate sanction.” Cordova II, 2023 WL 2967893, at *3. Therefore, we
   REMAND for the district court to determine the appropriate sanctions,
   attorney fees, and costs for this appeal.
          AFFIRMED, MOTION GRANTED, and case REMANDED.

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