Court Opinion

ID: 9548100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:57:26.962173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:27.644122
License: Public Domain

*448MR. JUSTICE SHEA
dissenting:
I would overrule our previous decision, thereby reversing the trial court, and hold that under the statute involved the defendants were not entitled to attorney fees because the security interests involved giving the plaintiff a right to attorney fees, were signed before the effective date of the statute providing for reciprocal attorney fees.
After remand of the first case, Belgrade State Bank v. Swainson (1977), 172 Mont. 350, 564 P.2d 174, each of the defense counsel involved admitted during the hearing to set attorney fees, that any agreement they were relying on was executed before the effective date of section 93-8601.1, R.C.M.1947, effective 1971. That section provides:
“Contractual right to attorney fees to be reciprocal. Whenever by virtue of the provisions of any contract or obligation in the nature of a contract, made and entered into at any time after the effective date of this act, one party to such contract or obligation has an express right to recover attorney fees from any other party to the contract or obligation in the event the party having that right shall bring an action upon the contract or obligation, then in any action on such contract or obligation all parties to the contract or obligation shall be deemed to have the same right to recover attorney fees, and the prevailing party in any such action, whether by virtue of the express contractual right, or by virtue of this act, shall be entitled to recover his reasonable attorney fees from the losing party or parties.” (Emphasis added.)
By its own terms this section limits recovery to situations where the contract providing for attorney fees was entered into after the effective date of the act. Here, it is agreed that the statute went into effect in 1971 but that the contracts involved were executed in 1969. Obviously, section 93-8601.1 did not apply to the benefit of the defendants.
It is also noteworthy that this Court, in the first Belgrade State Bank case, supra, relied on Crncevich v. Georgetown Rec. Corp. (1975), 168 Mont. 113, 541 P.2d 56, as the basis to hold that attor*449ney fees could be ordered under this factual situation. In relying on Crncevich, we stated:
Defendants, except Herbert Earl Swainson, are entitled to attorney fees by virtue of section 93-8601.1, R.C.M.1947. The statute is procedural in nature and applies to actions commenced after its effective date, even though such action arose out of the events occurring prior thereto. Crncevich v. Georgetown Rec. Corp., 168 Mont. 113, 541 P.2d 56; Anno. 18 A.L.R.3d 733, 736, 740.” Belgrade State Bank v. Swainson, supra, 564 P.2d 180.
This language gives the misleading impression that we interpreted section 93-8601.1 in Crncevich. This statute was not involved; in fact, it was not even mentioned. Moreover, it is plainly error to conclude that Crncevich stands for the proposition that the statute “is procedural in nature and applies to actions commenced after its effective date, even though such action arose out of the events occurring prior thereto.” (Emphasis added.)
The issue in Crncevich was entirely unrelated to the issue of attorney fees in this case. In that case there was a promissory note which called for attorney fees to the promisee if suit was brought to collect on the note. Suit was brought and the promisee prevailed, but the trial court denied attorney fees. This Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling holding that before attorney fees could be awarded, the promisee’s attorneys were required to present evidence as to the value of the legal services, which they had failed to do. That is the holding in Crncevich on the question of attorney fees —nothing more, and nothing less.
In refusing to change its first decision ordering attorney fees to be paid by Belgrade State Bank, the majority has relied on the doctrine of the “law of the case.” In the context of this case, where third parties will not be harmed, I fail to see the justice in applying this doctrine where we have manifestly committed an error in a previous decision allowing attorney fees and where it can be corrected without creating a procedural nightmare. In this case the error can be easily corrected with no harm to our procedure.
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the previous decision *450and held that the defendants are not entitled to attorney fees under section 93-8601.1, R.C.M. 1947.