Court Opinion

ID: 9856472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:48:09.594481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:50.277058
License: Public Domain

BROTHERTON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion permitting Wiggins to pursue a tort cause of action following his award of damages under the administrative procedures of the mine safety statutes.
I would hold that the remedy provided the appellant under the federal and state mine safety statutes1 was his exclusive remedy, barring an additional tort action in state circuit court.
The majority cites the opinion of this Court in Price v. Boone County Ambulance Auth., 175 W.Va. 676, 337 S.E.2d 913 (1985), for the proposition that an exception to the exclusivity principle exists where the available administrative remedy is inadequate.2 The majority distorts the exclusivity exception we recognized in Price.
The question in Price was whether a plaintiff may sue in circuit court to enforce the substantive provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act3 without complying with the Act’s administrative process. We “recognized that the administrative process established by our Human Rights Act was not achieving its intended purpose. ...” 175 W.Va. at 678, 337 S.E.2d at 916. We noted the exclusivity principle which provides that where a statute gives a new right and declares the remedy, the remedy may be only that provided in the statute. See syl. pt. 2, Lynch v. Merchants Nat’l Bank, 22 W.Va. 554 (1883). We noted, however, that “[cjourts have recognized an exception to this rule ... where there is no adequate administrative remedy.” 175 W.Va. at 678, 337 S.E.2d at 916. Concluding that the administrative process under the Human Rights Act was not achieving its intended purpose, we held that persons aggrieved by human rights violations had “the option to proceed in circuit court, as an alternative to initiating administrative action.” Id. We made clear, however, that those two avenues were mutually exclusive. Id. More importantly to the present case, we stated that damages awarded in an action in circuit court were limited to the statutory remedies set out in the Human Rights Act. Id.
Thus, while Price established an exception to exclusivity of statutory process, Price did not provide an exception to the exclusivity of statutory remedy. As the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia correctly stated:
[E]ven though the Price decision allows a party to initiate an action without exhausting administrative remedies, it does not sanction a suit wholly separate and apart from the statute.4
Yet the majority reads Price as allowing, not an alternative remedy, but an additional remedy for retaliatory discharge.
While Price might possibly be read to allow Wiggins a choice whether to bring his action pursuant to administrative process or in the circuit court, contrary to the majority’s opinion, this Court in Price did not create a mechanism to allow Wiggins double recovery in his employment discrimination action. I, therefore, dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice NEELY joins me in this dissent.

. See 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) & (3) (1986); W.Va. Code § 22A-lA-20(b) & (c) (1985).

. See 175 W.Va. at 678, 337 S.E.2d at 916.

. W.Va.Code § 5-11-9 (1987).

. Guevara v. K-Mart Corp., 629 F.Supp. 1189, 1192 (S.D.W.Va.1986).