Court Opinion

ID: 9849204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:36:08.471704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:06.931518
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring.
I concur in the majority’s decision affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal because no prejudicial instructional error appears. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 569-570.) I also wholeheartedly concur in the majority’s revision of CALJIC No. 3.18 that henceforth will absolve trial courts of the sua sponte obligation to tailor the standard accomplice *577cautionary instruction1 to state it has no application to portions of an accomplice’s testimony “favorable” to the defendant. That requirement derived from this court’s opinion in People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221] (Williams)—the so-called “third prong” requirement that where an accomplice is called as a witness by both the prosecution and the defense, “the instruction should be [sua sponte] tailored to relate only to his testimony on behalf of the prosecution.” (Id. at p. 1314.) The majority’s revision of CALJIC No. 3.18 is an improvement over Williams’ s “tailoring” requirement in that it lifts yet another unreasonable burden from the shoulders of our overworked trial courts—the sua sponte obligation to revise an instruction in a complex area of the law on a case-by-case basis—one that opens the door to reversal on appeal, with the “blame” then falling, in hindsight, on the overburdened trial court.
I further concur in the majority’s determination to remove the term “distrust” from the standardized accomplice cautionary instruction. Notwithstanding its long-standing use, I fail to see the wisdom of such an overpowering directive, which as a practical matter instructs the jury to find the testifying accomplice lacking in credibility, a directive that invades the province of the jury and pays no deference to the jurors’ collective wisdom, common sense and good judgment. There is presently no statutory requirement in California for retaining the specific term “distrust” in the standardized accomplice cautionary instruction, and indeed many states deem such an instruction, however worded, to be unnecessary, even when requested by the defense, because the corroboration requirement and general witness credibility instructions together serve as an adequate admonition to juries that accomplice testimony may be suspect. (See, e.g., Ladson v. State (1981) 248 Ga. 470 [285 S.E.2d 508, 514]; State v. Reese (Iowa 1981) 301 N.W.2d 693, 697; Blizzard v. State (1976) 30 Md.App. 156 [351 A.2d 443, 450]; State v. LaJambe (1974) 300 Minn. 539 [219 N.W.2d 917, 919]; People v. Ely (1990) 164 A.D.2d 442 [563 N.Y.S.2d 890, 891-892]; State v. Lind (N.D. 1982) 322 N.W.2d 826, 843; State v. Hutchison (Tenn. 1995) 898 S.W.2d 161, 172.)
I write separately only to indicate my uncertainty of the wisdom behind the requirement that the giving of an accomplice cautionary instruction such as that embodied in CALJIC No. 3.18 be made obligatory upon our trial courts in the first instance. (See Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1314; People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 399 [85 Cal.Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961].) As noted by Justice Brown, separate and apart from the cautionary admonition of CALJIC No. 3.18, “juries are more than adequately apprised of the *578pitfalls of accomplice testimony by a veritable slew of other standard jury instructions, including both the general witness credibility instructions and the extensive series of instructions given to implement the statutory accomplice corroboration requirement.” (Cone. & dis. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 579, fn. omitted.) Moreover, respondent’s brief cites numerous out-of-state decisions holding that an accomplice cautionary instruction such as that embodied in CALJIC No. 3.18 either need not be given even when requested (see cases cited ante, at p. 577), or in some jurisdictions is prohibited from being given altogether, because such a jury charge is deemed an improper comment on the evidence, one that improperly intrudes upon the jury’s role as fact finder. (See, e.g., Bates v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1986) 484 So.2d 1206, 1208; State v. Lucio (1979) 99 Idaho 765 [589 P.2d 100, 101]; Buxton v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) 646 S.W.2d 445, 446.)
In this case, however, respondent is not challenging the underlying rule requiring that when an accomplice is called as a witness by the prosecution, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury, in the language we approve today, that “testimony unfavorable to the defendant should be viewed with care and caution.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 561.) Nor has the matter been directly raised, addressed, or fully briefed by both parties to this case. As such, I will reserve my concerns and possible objection to the sua sponte nature of the instructional requirement for another day.
Chin, J., concurred.

The version applicable in this case was CALJIC No. 3.18 (5th ed. 1988). (Accord, CALJIC No. 3.18 (6th ed. 1996).)