Court Opinion

ID: 9416256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:35:33.835548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:23.444326
License: Public Domain

*44Johnson, J.
I concur in the decision given by the court in this case ; but there was a question suggested and commented on in the argument, which has not been noticed by the court, but which appears to me to merit ¡some consideration.
It was inquired by the counsel for the defendant, should the court adopt ■the principle that persistence for two years is to be substituted for an actual ¡settlement and residence, what is to be the effect of a partial prevention ? Is the warrantee to be subjected to the necessity of making good his settlement, should the prevention cease or commence at any point of time during 'the two years, without any, or under what, limitation ?
It is undoubtedly true, that any construction of a statute which will produce absurdities, or consequences in direct violation of its own provisions, is to be avoided. It were better not to depart from their literal signification, than to involve consequences so inconsistent with the nature and very idea ■of legislation. But it does not appear to me, that any embarrassment will .attend the construction of this act which the court has adopted; that the case of a partial duration of the existence of the preventing cause is not within the view of the proviso; that it is not excepted from the operation ■of the enacting clause. It would be absurd, to impose upon the warrantee the necessity of performing in a few months, perhaps, at the most inconvenient season of the year, a condition for which the act proposes to hold out to him an indulgence *of two years; when prevented too by a cause -* not within his control, and against which the state was bound to protect him. If such were the case now before the court, I should be of opinion, that we must resort to general principles for a decision. With regard to the performance of conditions, it is a well-known rule, that obstructions interposed by the act of God, or a public enemy, shall excuse from performance, so far as the effect of such preventing cause necessarily extends.
In cases of partial prevention, I should, therefore, be of opinion, that it would be incumbent upon the warrantee to satisfy the court that he had -complied with the conditions imposed by the act, so far as he was not nee-essarily prevented by the public enemy.
It may appear singular, that a deficiency of a single day, perhaps, should produce so material an alteration in the rights or situation of the warrantee. But the legislature of Pennsylvania were fully competent to make what statutory provisions they thought proper upon the subject; and the court is no further responsible for the effect of the words which they have used to ■express their intent, than to endeavor to give a sensible and consistent operation to them, in every case that can occur.