Court Opinion

ID: 9726605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:59:59.618877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:40.615366
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 48. (concurring). I agree with the majority opinion's conclusions about intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, property damage, and the issue of frivolousness. The only cause of action in this case is for property loss.
¶ 49. I wish to emphasize that this case is about the rights of a pet owner to recover in tort for the death of her dog. Scholars would not classify this case as one about animal rights.
¶ 50. Professor Martha Nussbaum has pointed out that one's love of a pet should not be mistaken for concern about the ethical rights of animals.1 Professor Nussbaum explains this error as follows:
*510Commonly, we conflate two sorts of people: animal lovers and people who are sensitive to the ethical rights of animals. This conflation is a great error. In human life, we can easily take its measure: men may be genuine lovers of women while treating them extremely badly. . . .Even people who treat well the particular women they love may not care at all about women's rights generally.2
¶ 51. Professor Nussbaum further explains the difference between animal lovers and proponents of animal rights by noting that while many of us have affectionate relationships with animals such as dogs and cats and horses, we also eat meat and eggs and wear leather, and we do not concern ourselves with the conditions under which these goods are produced.3
¶ 52. For purposes of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, this court treats the death of a dog the same as it treats injury to or death of a best friend, a roommate, or a nonmarital partner: It allows no recovery.
¶ 53. Having concluded that the plaintiffs only remedy is for loss of property, the majority opinion declines to give guidance to the circuit court and litigants about damages for the death of the dog. This issue was not briefed. At least one state has enacted a law that allows up to $4,000 recovery for non-economic damages such as loss of the reasonably expected companionship, love, and affection of a pet resulting from the intentional or negligent killing of the pet.4 Such a statute allows the legislature to make a considered policy judgment regarding the societal value of pets as *511companions and to specify the nature of the damages to be awarded in a lawsuit.5
¶ 54. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.

 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Book Review: Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, reviewing Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1506 (2001).

 Id. at 1544.

 Id. at 1509-10.

 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-17-403 (2001).

 See IDanB. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 5.15(3), at 898-900 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing courts' varied approaches toward damage awards in cases involving injuring or killing of a pet).