Court Opinion

ID: 9724822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:16:01.171396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:46.926942
License: Public Domain

GRIGNON, J.,
Dissenting.—Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 empowers a judicial officer to impose monetary sanctions payable to the county “for any violation of a lawful court order by a [witness, a party, or a party’s attorney], done without good cause or substantial justification.” Such sanctions may be imposed “on the court’s own motion after notice and opportunity to be heard.” The order imposing sanctions must be in writing and must set forth the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
Petitioner contends that respondent court improperly imposed sanctions in that (1) she did not receive adequate notice, (2) she did not have an opportunity to be heard, (3) respondent court’s order demanding that she remain in the courtroom was unlawful, (4) the sanctions order does not state that she had the ability to comply with the order, and (5) she did not willfully violate respondent court’s order. I concur with the majority’s conclusion that respondent court’s order to remain in the courtroom was lawful, that the sanctions order need not recite an ability to comply, and that section 177.5 does not require willfulness.
*1085I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that petitioner received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. The evidence is undisputed that she received notice of respondent court’s imposition of sanctions concurrently with the “hearing” on the matter and that she was given no meaningful opportunity to be heard.
The events leading to the imposition of sanctions pursuant to section 177.5 occurred between 10 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., on the morning of December 12, 1990. Sometime thereafter, respondent court prepared a “Notice of Sanctions Pursuant to CCP Sections 117 and 117.5 [sic].” The notice set forth respondent court’s version of the incident which took place on December 12, found that the conduct of petitioner, as set forth in the notice, constituted a willful disobedience of a lawful order of respondent court and imposed sanctions in the amount of $250. The concluding paragraph of the notice states:
“Accordingly, [petitioner is] hereby given notice that pursuant to sections 177(1), 177(2) and 177.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court hereby imposes sanctions against [petitioner] in the amount of $250.00. [Petitioner is] ordered to pay this amount to the clerk of [respondent court] by Tuesday, December 18, 1990.”
The next day, December 13, at 9 a.m., petitioner appeared in respondent court with counsel. She was handed and acknowledged receipt of the notice. She requested a hearing. Respondent court read into the record the notice just handed to petitioner. Counsel for petitioner then specifically requested a hearing. He indicated that his client disputed that the facts were as set forth in the notice, indicated that witnesses other than petitioner would substantiate petitioner’s version of the facts, and stated that at the very least there was a misunderstanding.
Respondent court replied: “All right, Mr. Menaster [petitioner’s counsel]. That’s sufficient. The order stands. ... HD If you have anything further to put on the record, do so and let me get on with the rest of my calendar. But the order stands.” Petitioner’s counsel again requested a hearing. Respondent court replied: “Who are you going to have this hearing before? [f] If it was before me, I have my recollection, and I think I know what transpired. If you have other people to come in who have seen or recollect differently, that’s not going to change because I was here and I think I know how it transpired. [1] . . . [I]t would be an act of futility to get into this kind of a debate in a formal hearing.”
It is undisputed that, “[a]dequate notice is mandated not only by statute, but also by the due process clauses of both the federal [citation], and state *1086[citation] Constitutions. [Citation.]” (Lesser v. Huntington Harbor Corp. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 922, 930 [219 Cal.Rptr. 562].)1 “[A]dequacy of notice should be determined on a case-by-case basis to satisfy basic due process requirements.” (Id. at p. 932.) Notice on the court’s own motion at midday, with a hearing ordered at 9 a.m. the next day is inadequate. (Ibid.) However, notice given concurrently with the “hearing” is adequate where the parties so stipulate. (Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 970, 974-975 [272 Cal.Rptr. 126].)
It is clear from the record that the notice given in this case was woefully inadequate. The notice was given concurrently with the hearing and petitioner did not stipulate that notice was adequate. She simply stated that she had received the notice. Indeed, it is obvious from the record that petitioner appeared in court on December 13, intending to obtain a future hearing date. She had insufficient time to interview or subpeona witnesses or prepare declarations of proposed testimony. Counsel for petitioner had briefly “chatted” with potential witnesses, but had insufficient time to prepare even an offer of proof.
More importantly, the so-called notice of intent to impose sanctions and opportunity to be heard was in fact nothing of the kind. The notice prepared by respondent court and served on petitioner on December 13, was notice that respondent court hereby imposed sanctions. There was no mention in the notice of a hearing. There was no need to notice a hearing, because the sanctions had already been imposed without notice and without an opportunity to be heard. This inescapable conclusion is buttressed by respondent court’s statement that the “order stands,” indicating that the sanctions order had already issued before petitioner had any notice or opportunity to be heard.
Nor does respondent court’s statement on December 12, “don’t make the court do something it doesn’t want to do,” constitute adequate notice of the court’s intention to impose sanctions against petitioner under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5. The total insufficiency for due process purposes of the court’s statement is readily apparent. It does not state that the court is considering the imposition of section 177.5 sanctions, it does not set forth the sanctionable conduct, and it sets no time for a hearing.
In addition to adequate notice, petitioner was also entitled to an opportunity to be heard. The nature and scope of the required hearing is not mandated by statute, but is within the sound discretion of the trial court as *1087circumscribed by due process requirements. “Nothing in section 128.5 precludes a party against whom sanctions are sought thereunder from subpenaing and producing evidence and witnesses or otherwise defending against the request; the scope of a hearing on an application for sanctions is within the trial court’s discretion, as with motions generally.” (Lavine v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1028 [215 Cal.Rptr. 708].)
It is neither necessary nor appropriate for an appellate court to specify with particularity the precise requirements of such a hearing in order to provide trial courts with a bright-line rule applicable for all time and under all circumstances. The parameters of the requisite hearing must be determined on a case-by-case basis, in light of the surrounding circumstances. At an absolute minimum, however, a person against whom sanctions may be imposed under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 must receive a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of sanctions. The trial court must conduct an objective hearing to determine whether a violation of a court’s lawful order was committed without good cause or substantial justification. (See Inniss v. Municipal Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 487, 490 [42 Cal.Rptr. 594, 399 P.2d 50].)
No such objective hearing took place in this case. It is clear that neither petitioner nor her counsel considered the proceedings of December 13 to be a “hearing,” since petitioner initially requested a hearing and petitioner’s counsel repeatedly requested a hearing virtually to the conclusion of the proceedings. Nor did respondent court consider that it was conducting a hearing. In response to petitioner’s counsel’s repeated requests for a hearing, the court asked: “Who are you going to have this hearing before?” Respondent court never stated in response to counsel’s requests that petitioner was in fact having a hearing, but instead concluded that any such hearing would be futile because the judge had already made up his mind.
Nor can one compare the conduct of petitioner in this case to an act of direct contempt. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1211, acts of direct contempt committed in the immediate presence of the trial court may be summarily adjudicated, although the offending party must be given an opportunity to appear and offer an excuse for his or her behavior. (Arthur v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 404, 410 [42 Cal.Rptr. 441, 398 P.2d 777]; Inniss v. Municipal Court, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 490.) Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, on the other hand, expressly requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Thus, the two statutes are not analogous on this issue. Moreover, the opportunity to be heard received by petitioner in this case would not be sufficient to satisfy the hearing requirements of even the direct contempt statute. (Inniss v. Municipal Court, supra.)
*1088The proceedings which took place on December 13 did not constitute a hearing for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5. Respondent court contends that it heard petitioner’s offer of proof and explanation for her actions, and then rejected them as inconsistent with respondent court’s own recollection and inadequate to justify her violation of its order. However, petitioner was never given a meaningful opportunity to present her side of the story. Petitioner’s counsel never attempted to make an offer of proof as to what his evidence would show. He simply attempted to obtain for petitioner the hearing to which she was entitled. Had he been made aware that his statement on December 13 would constitute all the hearing to which petitioner was entitled, he might have offered a more complete presentation of precisely what evidence he intended to produce on her behalf or requested a continuance of the “hearing” in order to obtain appropriate declarations.
Implicit in respondent court’s refusal to accord petitioner a hearing is the underlying assumption that a hearing would have been to no purpose. The judge was present when the incident occurred and, thus, knew that petitioner had violated his order to remain in the courtroom without good cause or substantial justification. The judge was of the opinion that no number of witnesses would persuade him that he was in error.
Since a hearing was not held, it is difficult to speculate as to just what petitioner’s evidence might have established. A hearing would not, however, necessarily have been an idle exercise. It is possible that respondent court would have concluded that it had seen or heard something incorrectly or had missed something altogether. It is possible that respondent court would have concluded that petitioner had genuinely misunderstood what respondent court required of her. If petitioner had been allowed to explain frilly the exact nature of the other court’s prior order to be present at 10:30 a.m. and why her presence was necessary, respondent court might have concluded that she was substantially justified in leaving the courtroom. At the least respondent court might have concluded that there was some justification for petitioner’s behavior and that she was contrite, thus mitigating the amount of sanctions to be imposed.
Due process, as well as the statute itself, requires that a person against whom Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 sanctions may be imposed be given adequate notice that such sanctions are being considered, notice as to what act or omission of the individual is the basis for the proposed sanctions, and an objective hearing at which the person is permitted to address the lawfulness of the order, the existence of the violation, and the absence of good cause or substantial justification for the violation. Petitioner did not receive such notice and opportunity to be heard. Sanctions were imposed prior to any notice or hearing. The proceedings which occurred after the *1089imposition of sanctions did not constitute an opportunity to be heard within the meaning of section 177.5. Petitioner was deprived of her right to due process, and sanctions were imposed in express violation of the statutory requirements for notice and opportunity to be heard.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 23, 1991, and petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 17, 1991.

Lesser concerned sanctions imposed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. The language of Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 177.5, concerning notice and opportunity to be heard, are identical.