Court Opinion

ID: 9375614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 15:05:39.502561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:00.400555
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13254

            COMMONWEALTH   vs.   HUBERT LEE SMITH, JR.

      Suffolk.      November 4, 2022. – February 28, 2023.

      Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker,
                         & Wendlandt, JJ.

Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Postconviction relief,
     District attorney. Time. Words, "Good cause," "Excusable
     neglect."

     Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court on
February 17, 1978.

     Following review by this court, 384 Mass. 519 (1981), a
motion for postconviction relief, filed on April 7, 2020, was
heard by Janet L. Sanders, J.

     A motion to dismiss a request for leave to appeal and a
motion to accept the request for leave to appeal as timely filed
were reported by Gaziano, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for
the county of Suffolk.

     Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
     Michelle Menken for the defendant.
     The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
     Stanley Donald, pro se.
     Robert F. Hennessy for Committee for Public Counsel
Services.
                                                                   2

     Katharine Naples-Mitchell for Families for Justice as
Healing.

    GAZIANO, J.   On July 6, 2022, the defendant was released on

parole after having served forty-four years in prison for his

conviction of murder in the first degree.   A Superior Court

judge granted the defendant's motion for postconviction relief

on the ground that the Commonwealth's 1978 package plea offer

violated the defendant's rights to due process.   The judge then

reduced the defendant's conviction from murder in the first

degree to murder in the second degree.   Following issuance of

the judge's order on August 4, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a

notice of appeal, but it did not file the requisite gatekeeper

petition under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, until five and one-half

months later, substantially exceeding the thirty-day filing

requirement set forth in Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 36

n.10 (2000).   The single justice initially granted the

Commonwealth's petition.   After the defendant sought

reconsideration, supplemental briefing was filed, the single

justice conducted a hearing, and he then allowed the

Commonwealth's gatekeeper petition, contingent upon the full

court's approval of the Commonwealth's motion for leave for late

filing.   The single justice then reserved and reported the

matter to this court.
                                                                    3

     To resolve the reported issues, we must decide whether the

Commonwealth had good cause to file its gatekeeper petition

pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, more than five months late.

Because the petition was not filed within the applicable thirty-

day period, and because there was no showing of good cause to

excuse the delay, see Mass. R. A. P. 14 (b), as appearing in 481

Mass. 1626 (2019), the Commonwealth's petition must be dismissed

as untimely.

     In addition, we conclude that the thirty-day deadline for

filing a gatekeeper petition set forth in Mains, 433 Mass. at 36

n.10, does not allow adequate time in which to develop and file

the substantive pleadings required for such a petition.

Accordingly, for petitions under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, filed

after the date of issuance of the rescript in this case, the

filing period shall be extended to sixty days.1

     1.   Background.   On February 10, 1978, Max Fishman, who was

making oil deliveries to customers in the aftermath of the so-

called "Great Blizzard of 1978," was shot and killed during a

robbery committed by the defendant and a codefendant.2    The two

were arrested, and on February 17, 1978, a grand jury returned

     1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Stanley
Donald, the Committee for Public Counsel Services, and Families
for Justice as Healing.

     2 At the time of the shooting, the defendant was twenty
years old and his codefendant was fifteen years old.
                                                                     4

indictments charging the defendant with murder in the first

degree, armed assault with intent to rob, unlawfully carrying a

firearm, and conspiracy to commit robbery.3

     Before trial, the prosecutor offered the defendant a plea

arrangement; the Commonwealth was willing to reduce the charges

against him from murder in the first degree to murder in the

second degree, if both the defendant and the codefendant agreed

to plead guilty to the same charges.4    The defendant told police

that he had used the gun involved in the shooting, and his

counsel indicated to the prosecutor that his client was

"anxious" to plead guilty to murder in the second degree.     The

codefendant, however, declined the plea offer, and the case

proceeded to a joint trial.

     During deliberations, the jury sent three questions to the

judge that indicated that they were likely to find the defendant

guilty of murder in the first degree and the codefendant guilty

of murder in the second degree.    After further consultation with

his counsel, the codefendant pleaded guilty to murder in the

second degree.    Counsel for the defendant argued vigorously that

his client should be offered the same plea agreement, but the

     3   The conspiracy charge was not pursued at the joint trial.

     4 This type of plea agreement also is referred to as a
package, contingent, linked, or wired plea. See United States
v. Mescual-Cruz, 387 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 1175 and 543 U.S. 1176 (2005).
                                                                    5

prosecutor declined to engage in further plea negotiations with

the defendant; the prosecutor asserted that all plea

negotiations had terminated when the jury began their

deliberations.   After the judge rejected the defendant's

attempted plea, the defendant was convicted of murder in the

first degree and sentenced to the statutorily mandated sentence

of life in prison without the possibility of parole.5

     In 1980, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in

the county court; he argued that he was entitled to a new trial

because he should have been permitted to plead guilty to murder

in the second degree, as the prosecutor initially had offered,

and as his codefendant later had done.   After the single justice

remanded the case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary

hearing, a Superior Court judge determined that there had been

no outstanding plea offer when the case was given to the jury.

The single justice then denied the defendant's motion, and the

defendant appealed from the denial of the motion for a new

trial; we consolidated that appeal with the defendant's direct

appeal.   We accepted the motion judge's finding that the plea

offer was no longer in effect once the jury received the case

and affirmed the convictions and the denial of the motion for a

     5 The defendant also was convicted of assault with intent to
rob, G. L. c. 265, § 18, and unlawfully carrying a firearm,
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).
                                                                      6

new trial.     See Commonwealth v. Smith, 384 Mass. 519, 523

(1981).

    The defendant subsequently filed two additional motions for

a new trial.    The second, filed in August of 1996, asserted that

the prosecutor's exercise of certain peremptory challenges had

been based on race and, thus, unconstitutional; that motion was

denied without a hearing.     The third motion for a new trial,

filed in September of 2007, argued that trial counsel had been

ineffective, the trial judge's decision to preclude the

defendant from cross-examining his codefendant was error, and

the plea agreement that had been offered to the defendant should

be enforced "in the interest of justice."     That motion also was

denied.

    In April of 2020, more than a decade later, the defendant

filed the instant motion to reduce the verdict from murder in

the first degree to murder in the second degree.     This time, the

defendant argued that the "locked plea" offered to him and his

codefendant violated his rights to due process under the Federal

Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

Hearings on the defendant's motion were held in February and

April of 2021.    On June 2, 2021, the motion judge issued a

memorandum and order in which the judge concluded that "the

locked plea offer was fundamentally unfair and in violation of

substantive due process," and ordered a hearing on the issue of
                                                                     7

remedy.   On June 9, 2021, the Commonwealth filed its first

notice of appeal.    The hearing on the appropriate remedy was

held on July 27, 2021.    Following the hearing, the parties

jointly filed a memorandum in which they agreed that, in light

of the judge's decision, the appropriate remedy would be to

reduce the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree

to murder in the second degree.    On August 4, 2021, the motion

judge reduced the verdict from murder in the first degree to

murder in the second degree, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim.

P. 25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995).

    The Commonwealth filed a second notice of appeal on

August 13, 2021.    In an e-mail message to defense counsel on

September 9, 2021, the appellate prosecutor indicated that she

was going to pursue the appeal as soon as she received

transcripts of the prior hearings, which had been handled by a

different prosecutor.    On September 15, 2021, the defendant was

resentenced, and he therefore became eligible for parole, as by

that point he had been incarcerated for forty-three years.     See

Commonwealth v. Perry, 389 Mass. 464, 470 (1983) ("parole

is . . . available to a person convicted of murder in the second

degree who has served fifteen years in prison"); G. L. c. 265,

§ 2; G. L. c. 127, § 133A.    The transcripts of the hearings were

ordered on November 5, 2021, and the prosecutor received them on

December 3, 2021.    Nothing further was filed until the
                                                                    8

prosecutor filed the instant gatekeeper petition on January 21,

2022.

    A hearing on the defendant's application for release on

parole ultimately was scheduled for January 27, 2022.     In

response to the Commonwealth's filing of its gatekeeper

petition, on January 27, 2022, the defendant filed an emergency

motion to dismiss the petition, citing its untimeliness.       On

that same day, the Commonwealth filed a motion to accept its

petition as timely filed due to delays in receiving the hearing

transcripts necessary for drafting the petition, absences

related to COVID-19 and vacation, and the unusually busy

workload in the district attorney's office during the filing

period.   Also on the same day, the single justice allowed the

motion for late filing, while the defendant's parole hearing

went forward as scheduled.

    Thereafter, the defendant sought reconsideration of the

single justice's allowance of the Commonwealth's motion for

leave for late filing of its gatekeeper petition.   See

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 469 Mass. 134, 144-145 (2014).    The

defendant argued that the Commonwealth had failed to demonstrate

excusable neglect or good cause, as required by Mass. R. A. P.

4 (c), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1606 (2019), or Mass. R. A. P.

14 (b).   Following a hearing and supplemental briefing, the

gatekeeper petition was allowed, contingent upon the full
                                                                    9

court's approval of the Commonwealth's motion for leave for late

filing; the matter then was reserved and reported to the full

court.

    2.   Discussion.   In reserving and reporting the matter, the

single justice posed two questions to the full court:

(1) "whether the defendant's right to due process or to the

protections against double jeopardy preclude reinstatement of a

conviction of murder in the first degree after the time in which

to file a gatekeeper petition challenging the reduction in the

verdict has expired"; and (2) "whether the thirty-day deadline

for filing set forth in [Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 n.10,] allows

adequate time in which to file a gatekeeper petition, or whether

a different period of time is warranted."

    a.   Filing deadline for petition pursuant to G. L. c. 278,

§ 33E.   The procedures set forth in G. L. c. 278, § 33E, govern

petitions for leave to appeal from postconviction motions in

capital cases, after this court has affirmed the defendant's

conviction.   See Commonwealth v. Francis, 411 Mass. 579, 583

(1992); Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 742 (1986).

General Laws c. 278, § 33E, however, does not specify a time

period in which such a petition must be filed.   Consequently,

this court has determined that "a gatekeeper petition pursuant

to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, [must] be filed within thirty days of
                                                                  10

the denial of a motion for new trial."   See Mains, 433 Mass.

at 36 n.10.

    The Commonwealth suggests that this thirty-day period of

time for filing a gatekeeper petition should be extended or,

alternatively, that the court should recognize that the filing

window may be enlarged, within the sound discretion of the

single justice.   The defendant maintains that the deadline set

forth in Mains is absolute.

    The thirty-day period set forth in Mains was adopted, in

part, in reliance on the rules of appellate procedure and, in

particular, Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b), as amended, 489 Mass. 1601

(2022).   Rule 4 (b) governs the filing of appeals in criminal

cases, and requires a notice of appeal to be filed within thirty

days of the issuance of the challenged decision.   See

Commonwealth v. White, 429 Mass. 258, 262 (1999) ("we have

concluded that the time limitations of rule 4 [b] apply to

circumstances other than those specified in that rule").

Pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b),

    "(1) In a criminal case, unless otherwise provided by
    statute or court rule, the notice of appeal required by
    Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the lower court
    within [thirty] days after entry of the judgment,
    appealable order, or adjudication appealed from, or entry
    of a notice of appeal by the Commonwealth, or the
    imposition of sentence, whichever comes last.

    "(2) If a motion for a new trial is filed under
    Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure 25 (b) (2) or 30
    within [thirty] days of the verdict, finding of guilt,
                                                                 11

    judgment, adjudication, or imposition of sentence, the
    period to appeal shall not terminate until [thirty] days
    from entry of the order disposing of the motion. If a
    motion is filed for reconsideration within [thirty] days of
    entry of the order disposing of the motion, the period to
    appeal shall not terminate until [thirty] days from entry
    of the order disposing of the motion for reconsideration.

    "(3) If a motion is filed for reconsideration within
    [thirty] days of an appealable order, judgment, or
    adjudication, the period to appeal from the decision for
    which reconsideration was sought shall not terminate until
    [thirty] days from entry of the order disposing of the
    motion for reconsideration."6

    Like other procedural rules governing filing periods, rule

4 permits an extension of time for filing.   Under rule 4 (c),

    "Upon a showing of excusable neglect, the lower court may
    extend the time for filing the notice of appeal or notice
    of cross appeal by any party for a period not to exceed
    [thirty] days from the expiration of the time otherwise
    prescribed by this rule. Such an extension may be granted
    before or after the time otherwise prescribed by this rule
    has expired; but if a request for an extension is made
    after such time has expired, it shall be made by motion
    with service upon all other parties."

Rule 14 (b) further provides for an enlargement of time,

    "The appellate court or a single justice of the appellate
    court in which the appeal will be, or is, docketed for good
    cause shown may upon motion enlarge the time prescribed by
    these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may
    permit an act to be done after the expiration of such time;
    but neither the appellate court nor a single justice may
    enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal beyond [one]
    year from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought
    to be reviewed, or, in a criminal case, from the date of
    the verdict or finding of guilt or the date of imposition
    of sentence, whichever date is later."

    6  In February 2022, after the Commonwealth filed its
gatekeeper petition, Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b) was amended to replace
rule 4 (b) (2) and to add rule 4 (b) (3). These changes are not
relevant to this case.
                                                                     12

    Thus, the approximately 140-day delay here was subject to

rule 14 (b).   Contrary to the defendant's argument that, once

filing was delayed thirty-one days past entry of the order

reducing his degree of guilt, any challenge exceeded the period

prescribed in Mains, and the single justice had no authority to

extend that period, the Commonwealth could have sought leave for

late filing of its gatekeeper petition at any point within the

140-day period of delay.

    We note that the type of filing contemplated by rule 4 (b)

when Mains was adopted was (and continues to be) a notice of

appeal, which requires significantly less than what is necessary

to write a gatekeeper petition.   Filing a notice of appeal

merely requires a one-sentence document indicating the party's

intent to appeal and the names of all parties.     See Mass. R. A.

P. 3 (c), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1603 (2019).    By contrast,

the petition that must be filed pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E,

requires extensive legal research and writing; a petitioner must

demonstrate that there is a "new and substantial" issue worthy

of review by the full court.   "[W]here the Commonwealth rather

than the defendant petitions the gatekeeper, 'the single

justice's primary focus should be on the meritoriousness or

"substantiality" of the Commonwealth's position on appeal and

less on the newness of the underlying issue.'"     Commonwealth v.
                                                                 13

Watkins (No. 1), 486 Mass. 801, 803 n.6 (2021), quoting

Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 318, 322 (2011).

    Moreover, a denial of a gatekeeper petition pursuant to

G. L. c. 278, § 33E, may not be appealed.   If the single justice

denies the petition, "that decision 'is final and

unreviewable.'"   See Commonwealth v. Wampler, 488 Mass. 1003,

1004 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson, 482 Mass. 1027,

1027 (2019).

    Thus, following issuance of the rescript in this case,

parties will have sixty days following the allowance or denial

of a postconviction motion within which to file a gatekeeper

petition pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   See Mandeville v.

Gaffney, 487 Mass. 308, 310 (2021) (Mains "thirty-day deadline

was imposed prospectively").   The extension of the filing

deadline will allow parties the time necessary to obtain

transcripts, conduct research, and craft arguments.   The

extension of the filing period will promote fairness and equity,

will serve the defendant's and the Commonwealth's interests in

an accurate verdict, and also will protect all parties'

interests in the finality of judgments.

    We turn to consider whether, here, there was good cause for

the delay in filing of the Commonwealth's petition.

    b.   Good cause.   As stated, because G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is

silent concerning the procedural restraints on filing such
                                                                    14

challenges, we analyze delays in filing gatekeeper petitions

under the appellate standards of "excusable neglect" and "good

cause."   See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (c), 14 (b).   The rules of

appellate procedure give "courts broad discretion and authority

to permit a deserving party, on showing of 'excusable neglect'

or 'good cause,' to prosecute an appeal notwithstanding [the]

failure to comply with a procedural time limitation."    Giacobbe

v. First Coolidge Corp., 367 Mass. 309, 315-316 (1975).

Rule 4 (c) allows a motion judge to grant an extension of time

of up to sixty days for filing a notice of appeal, upon a

showing of excusable neglect.    See Mass. R. A. P. 4 (c).

Excusable neglect, for purposes of late filing under rule 4 (c),

applies to situations that are "unique or extraordinary" and not

to any "garden-variety oversight."    Shaev v. Alvord, 66 Mass.

App. Ct. 910, 911 (2006), citing Feltch v. General Rental Co.,

383 Mass. 603, 613-614 (1981).   At the same time, rule 14 (b)

provides the single justice or an appellate court authority to

enlarge the time in which to file a notice of appeal to up to

one year, upon "good cause shown."    See Mass. R. A. P. 14 (b).

    Thus, for the Commonwealth's gatekeeper petition to be

timely filed, it would have had to have been filed by

September 3, 2021, or thirty days after entry of the judge's

decision and order on resentencing.   See Mandeville, 487 Mass.

at 310; Mass. R. A. P. 14 (a).   Rule 4 (c) only permits an
                                                                   15

extension of up to sixty days, which would have required the

Commonwealth to have filed its petition by October 4, 2021,

whereas the Commonwealth ultimately filed its petition on

January 21, 2022.   Accordingly, we analyze the Commonwealth's

delay under Mass. R. A. P. 14 (b), which permits the enlargement

of time in which to file a notice of appeal to up to one year,

upon a showing of good cause.

    The Commonwealth maintains that there were "unique and

extraordinary circumstances that caused the delay" and which

demonstrate the existence of good cause.   The appellate

prosecutor assigned to the case details four reasons in support

of her argument that there was good cause to excuse the

Commonwealth's delay.   First, the prosecutor avers that she was

"repeatedly misled" by other members of her office about

transcripts of the hearings on the defendant's motion to reduce

the verdict having been ordered; the prosecutor stated that

without those transcripts, it would have been unethical for her

to draft the gatekeeper petition, because she would not have

known what the previously assigned prosecutor had argued at the

hearings on the motion to reduce the verdict.   Second, at the

time that the gatekeeper petition should have been drafted, the

prosecutor's unit was missing five members, which led to an

overwhelming workload and the inability to reassign drafting of

the petition to anyone else in the unit.   Third, the prosecutor
                                                                       16

asserts that she followed the well-established practice for

filing a late-filed motion, based on advice from the county

clerk's office.    Finally, the prosecutor describes three periods

of time in which COVID-19-related absences required her to

quarantine herself and care for her children, and also cites

time she took off during her children's school vacations.

    Whether a party has established good cause to excuse a

delay is a determination within the sound discretion of the

reviewing court.    See Jordan, 469 Mass. at 144-145; Commonwealth

v. Barboza, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 183 (2007).

    "Excusable neglect, at least in theory, is something other

than, 'Oops, I forgot.'    It is meant to apply to circumstances

that are unique or extraordinary, not any 'garden-variety

oversight.'"     (Footnote omitted.)   Tai v. Boston, 45 Mass. App.

Ct. 220, 222 (1998), quoting Feltch, 383 Mass. at 613–614.       "It

seems clear that relief will be granted only if the party

seeking relief demonstrates that the mistake, misunderstanding,

or neglect was excusable and was not due to his own

carelessness. . . .     The party seeking the relief bears the

burden of justifying failure to avoid the mistake or

inadvertence."    Tai, supra at 223, quoting Reporter's Notes to

Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (1), Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Civil

Procedure, at 589 (1997).     See Scannell v. Ed. Ferreirinha &

Irmao, Lda., 401 Mass. 155, 158 (1987); Pasquale v. Finch, 418
                                                                    17

F.2d 627, 630 (1st Cir. 1969).    "Discretion is not granted to

the judge to allow late filing of a notice of appeal simply

because the matter is important to the parties, the issues to be

raised in the appeal are debatable, or the consequences to the

losing party are harsh.    Rather, such discretion must focus on

the nature of the acts or failures to act that are offered up as

excusable neglect."    (Footnote omitted.)   Shaev, 66 Mass. App.

Ct. at 911–912.

       "'[G]ood cause' is a standard no less exacting than

'excusable neglect.'"     Commonwealth v. Trussell, 68 Mass. App.

Ct. 452, 454 (2007), quoting Barboza, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 183-

184.   "The . . . function of [rule 14 (b)] is to care for cases

where for extraordinary reasons the party was unable to apply

for a [rule 4 (c)] extension within the time allowed in that

rule."   Trussell, supra at 454-455, quoting Bernard v. United

Brands Co., 27 Mass. App. Ct. 415, 418 n.8 (1989).     Therefore,

"we would not expect [rule 14 (b)] to depart substantially from

the rather exacting standard of [rule 4 (c)]" because "the time

to apply under [rule 14 (b)] can run for as much as a year."

Bernard, supra.   A lower threshold for good cause "would have

the anomalous effect of making it more difficult to obtain an

extension of thirty days than it would be to obtain an extension

from thirty-one to 365 days."    Trussell, supra at 455.
                                                                     18

    "[G]arden-variety oversight" does not constitute excusable

neglect and, therefore, does not establish good cause.       See

Feltch, 383 Mass. at 614, quoting Goldstein v. Barron, 382 Mass.

181, 186 (1980).    And, notably, the meaning of good cause does

not "cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is too busy."

Barboza, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 184, quoting Feltch, supra.

    Of course, in criminal cases, "there are additional

considerations that the appellate court or a single

justice . . . properly [may] consider in determining [whether]

'good cause'" exists.    Barboza, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 184,

quoting White, 429 Mass. at 264.    Specifically, both the

importance of the rights the defendant would lose and the

interests in judicial economy in allowing an appeal to proceed

are factors to be considered in the determination whether good

cause existed for late filing in a criminal case.       See White,

supra at 264-265.

    The defendant concedes that the ramifications of COVID-19

exposure and illness justified a portion of the prosecutor's

delay.   Nonetheless, only about twenty-two of the 140 days of

delay were attributable to COVID-19.    The remaining

approximately 118 days were due to miscommunications amongst

assistant district attorneys about whether transcripts had been

ordered, and the increased over-all workload in the office

because it was operating with five fewer assistant district
                                                                   19

attorneys than it would have had if the office had been at its

full complement.

    We do not doubt that the workload at the time this case was

assigned to this prosecutor was challenging.   Nonetheless,

miscommunications concerning whether transcripts have been

ordered, and an increased workload, do not constitute good cause

justifying the period of delay here.   See Barboza, 68 Mass. App.

Ct. at 184, quoting Feltch, 383 Mass. at 614 (justification for

delay "is not meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is

too busy, which can be used, perhaps truthfully, in almost every

case. . . .   It is [meant] to take care of emergency situations

only").   Furthermore, that the prosecutor relied on advice from

a clerk in deciding when and what to file also does not

constitute good cause justifying the delay here; it was the

attorney's duty to file the motion in a timely manner.    See

Brown v. Quinn, 406 Mass. 641, 645 (1990) ("The concept of

excusable neglect does not embrace '[a] flat mistake of counsel

about the meaning of a statute or rule" [citation omitted]).

    The Commonwealth contends that the applicable filing

deadline was confusing and that it was not clear whether the

deadline set forth in Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 n.10, was

applicable to the allowance of postconviction relief.    More

specifically, the Commonwealth argues, the language in Mains,

supra, only addressed denials of motions for new trials, not
                                                                  20

allowances of such motions, and therefore it was not clear

whether Mains applied in the circumstances here.   The

Commonwealth contends, therefore, that we should exercise our

discretion to decide its petition on the merits, notwithstanding

the lengthy delay in filing.   See Jordan, 469 Mass. at 145

(deciding Commonwealth's untimely appeal despite lack of good

cause for late filing because "there sometimes has been a lack

of clarity" by single justices in application of procedural

rules governing timeliness).

    The period within which to file a petition for

extraordinary relief set forth in Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 n.10,

unquestionably applied to petitions arising from both the

allowance and the denial of postconviction motions filed by

either the Commonwealth or the defendant.   In Francis, 411 Mass.

at 583, for instance, we concluded that G. L. c. 278, § 33E,

applies with equal force to the Commonwealth.   See Randolph v.

Commonwealth, 488 Mass. 1, 9 (2021) ("we have required both

defendants and the Commonwealth to file gatekeeper petitions in

order to appeal from decisions on a variety of motions").     Thus,

the procedural requirements imposed on defendants in filing

gatekeeper petitions also are applicable to the Commonwealth.

The language of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, itself supports the

proposition that, with respect to filing deadlines, the

Commonwealth would be subject to the limitations established in
                                                                   21

Mains.    General Laws c. 278, § 33E, provides that "no appeal

shall lie" unless it is allowed by a single justice of this

court; the statutory language does not state that only a

particular type of appeal, or a specific category of petitioner,

is subject to its requirements.

    Moreover, since our decision in Mains, the single justice

has dismissed as untimely a number of gatekeeper petitions filed

by the Commonwealth that sought to challenge a trial court

judge's allowance of a defendant's motion for postconviction

relief.    See, e.g., Commonwealth vs. Marrero, Supreme Judicial

Ct., No. SJ-2017-0441 (Suffolk County Feb. 1, 2018) (dismissing

Commonwealth's petition for leave to appeal from allowance of

defendant's motion for scientific testing as untimely);

Commonwealth vs. Lang, Supreme Judicial Ct., SJ-2016-0460

(Suffolk County Sept. 12, 2017) (denying Commonwealth's petition

for leave to appeal from trial court judge's allowance of

defendant's postconviction motion to contact members of jury,

because petition was untimely and did not otherwise raise

meritorious issue).

    Finally, the Commonwealth argues that even if there were no

good cause for its delay, this case presents a meritorious issue

that is worthy of appellate review and the court should exercise

its discretion to hear the appeal despite its untimeliness.

Because we address the constitutionality of package plea offers
                                                                    22

in a paired case, Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 491

Mass.       (2023), also released today, we see no need to excuse

the Commonwealth's unreasonable delays in filing here.

    3.      Conclusion.   The matter is remanded to the county court

for entry of an order dismissing the Commonwealth's gatekeeper

petition.

                                      So ordered.