Court Opinion

ID: 9737995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:39:50.240445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:02.674038
License: Public Domain

Wilkie, C. J.
(dissenting). I, would affirm. Retrial here would constitute a violation of the double jeopardy provision of both the United States 1 and the Wisconsin 2 Constitutions.
The prosecutor was in error in not giving to the defense the three exculpatory statements from the police file when they were requested by defense counsel in the pretrial discovery notice. The three statements definitely go to the principal defense contended for by counsel— self-defense. It does not matter whether the witnesses had also told their stories to defense counsel. These statements had independent value as exculpatory material. They would enhance the credibility of these three witnesses at the trial and they would serve to refresh recollections not only to those who made the statements, but also of the police officers to whom the statements were made.
Circuit Judge Hugh R. O’Connell, in granting the defense mistrial motion, stated:
“. . . my review of the documents . . . satisfies me that this is the type of matter which is encompassed by Brady and Giles and should have been produced to the defense at the appropriate stage of these proceedings, for it need not be that the matter tends to exculpate com*228pletely or is completely exculpatory of the guilt of the defendant, it is simply necessary that the matter is exculpatory or might tend to be exculpatory.
“It occurs to me further that this is material which very appropriately could have prompted cross-examination which, absent an opportunity to review the files in question, could not be conducted; and without saying too much further, it might also tend to show the foundation or lay the foundation for impeachment purposes.
“Consequently, my review indicates that it is material which the State had the duty to disclose to the defense. Now, what sanctions are to be imposed for a failure to comply with the rules set down in Brady and Giles I have never been quite sure of, but I am sure of this, that the only sanction that is applicable here in the interests of justice is to grant the motion for a mistrial made by Mr. Shellow, which I now do. Motion is granted.”
When the case was reassigned to Circuit Judge Max Raskin, he granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that retrial would violate the constitutional prohibitions against placing defendants in double jeopardy. He stated:
“The prosecutor knew the effect of the material in his possession. Failure to turn over the statements cannot be said to be due to negligence, inadvertence or excusable oversight. It was a deliberate act, the result of which had the effect of interfering with the defendant’s complete opportunity of cross examining State’s witnesses. His right to a fair trial and due process were therefore denied.
“To subject the defendant to another trial would place him in double jeopardy in violation of both the State and Federal Constitutions.”
Two reasons are given by the majority why the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions do not prevent retrial here: No. 1, the prosecutor acted in “good faith” in not turning over the statements, and No. 2, the fact that defendant had moved for a mistrial now bars him from asserting that double jeopardy bars the new trial.
*229The decisions of the United States Supreme Court are to the contrary. In the key case of Brady v. Maryland 3 the defendant’s due process right to examine exculpatory evidence in the prosecutor’s file was held to he a fundamental requisite of a fair trial. The court said the failure to release exculpatory evidence upon request to the defendant “violates due process . . . irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” (Emphasis supplied.)4 Thus, even conceding “good faith" of the prosecution here, that “good faith” would not excuse the prosecutor’s error and should not, therefore, justify a retrial of the defendant.
In the recent United States Supreme Court case of Illinois v. Somerville 5 a mistrial had been granted where there was a fatally defective indictment that could not under Illinois law be amended. The court said that where the mistrial was necessitated by “an obvious procedural error in the trial,” it would not serve “ ‘the ends of public justice’ ’’ to prohibit retrial.6 However, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the court, also said:
“. . . the declaration of a mistrial on the basis of a rule or a defective procedure that would lend itself to prosecutorial manipulation would involve an entirely different question, cf. Downum v. United States . . . .”7
In Downum 8 the prosecutor went to trial and when a key witness could not be found the trial court declared a mis*230trial at the prosecutor’s instance. The supreme court held retrial barred. Although the prosecutor apparently was aware that the witness was not present when the trial began, there was no discussion in Downum or in Somerville concerning the prosecutor’s good faith or bad faith.
The fact that defense counsel himself moved for mistrial does not mean he has waived the right to assert double jeopardy as a defense to retrial. In Gori v. United States, the supreme court held that retrial was permissible following a mistrial declared in the sole interests of the defendant. The majority heavily relies on this test. However, Gori was expressly repudiated in United States v. Jorn, where the court said that deciding double jeopardy questions based on:
“. . . an appellate court’s assessment of which side benefited from the mistrial ruling does not adequately satisfy the policies underpinning the double jeopardy provision. Reprosecution after a mistrial has unnecessarily been declared by the trial court obviously subjects the defendant to the same personal strain and insecurity regardless of the motivation underlying the trial judge’s action.” 9
In Jorn the defendant was charged with willfully assisting in the preparation of fraudulent income tax returns. The trial judge declared a mistrial sua sponte based on his belief that certain government witnesses, clients of defendant, had not been sufficiently warned about possible criminal liability flowing from their testimony. The United States Supreme Court held the mistrial improvidently granted and therefore ruled that the double jeopardy clause barred retrial.10 In that opinion, in dis*231cussing a defendant’s “ ‘valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal’ ” protected by the double jeopardy clause, the court indicated that ordinarily where the defendant himself moves for a mistrial he waives that right. In cases involving “prosecutorial or judicial overreaching,” however, a different result obtains.
“. . . where circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution even if the defendant’s motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error.” 11
The court added in a footnote:
“Conversely, where a defendant’s mistrial motion is necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial impropriety designed to avoid an acquittal, reprosecution might well be barred. Cf. United States v. Tateo . . . .”12
In United States v. Tateo,13 the supreme court held that a defendant whose guilty plea is overturned because not voluntary, but induced in part by comments of the trial judge, may be tried again. In dicta the court said, in part:
“. . . If Tateo had requested a mistrial on the basis of the judge’s comments, there would be no doubt that if he had been successful, the Government would not have been barred from retrying him.” 14
However, the court qualified this conclusion in a footnote :
*232“If there were any intimation in a case that prosecu-torial or judicial impropriety justifying a mistrial resulted from a fear that the jury was likely to acquit the accused, different considerations would, of course, obtain.” 15
Thus it is clear, as far as the United States Supreme Court is concerned, the determination of whether retrial is possible following mistrial is made by balancing the interests of the defendant and the state, not by application of mechanical rules. Ordinarily, where the defendant himself moves for mistrial, he waives any right to claim that retrial is barred. However, where his motion is necessitated by “prosecutorial or judicial overreaching,” there is no waiver. Retrial is prohibited where the prosecutorial or judicial action causing the mistrial was “designed to avoid an acquittal,” or where the rule or defective procedure leading to mistrial “would lend itself to prosecutorial manipulation.”
Clearly the knowing refusal to release exculpatory evidence prior to trial is this kind of procedure and I would hold that the defendant may not be retried. This severe sanction is necessary if the double jeopardy provisions of both the federal and Wisconsin constitutions are to have meaning, and if the basic constitutional rights of citizens accused of crime are to be protected. Dismissal is strong medicine, but as the United States Supreme Court said in Brady:
. . Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” 16
I have been authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hep-pernan joins in this dissent.

 U. S. Const. amend. V.

 Wis. Const. art. I, sec. 8.

 (1963), 373 U. S. 83, 83 Sup. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215.

 Id. at page 87. Accord: Nelson v. State (1973), 59 Wis. 2d 474, 208 N. W. 2d 410.

 (1973), 410 U. S. 458, 93 Sup. Ct. 1066, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425.

 Id. at page 464. For an example of the kind of error leading to mistrial that should not defeat retrial, see State v. Elkinton (1972), 56 Wis. 2d 497, 202 N. W. 2d 28.

 Id.

 Downum v. United States (1963), 372 U. S. 734, 83 Sup. Ct. 1033, 10 L. Ed. 2d 100.

 (1971), 400 U. S. 470, 483, 91 Sup. Ct. 547, 27 L. Ed. 2d 543.

 The supreme court said that the trial court insufficiently considered alternative procedures, such as a continuance, and thereby foreclosed “the defendant from a potentially favorable *231judgment by the tribunal” without a manifest public necessity to do so. Id. at pages 486, 487.

 Id. at page 485.

 Id. at page 485, note 12.

 (1964), 377 U. S. 463, 84 Sup. Ct. 1587, 12 L. Ed. 2d 448.

 Id. at page 467.

 Id. at page 468, note 3.

 Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U. S. 83, 87, 83 Sup. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215.