Court Opinion

ID: 9669347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:53:06.122996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:55.711520
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
¶ 35. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). A victim of a past sexual assault would probably not expect a trial court to use this traumatic experience as an aggravating factor justifying a harsher sentence for a crime the victim commits years later. But that is what happened here, and the majority finds this result proper. Indeed, the majority goes one step further. When the trial court in this case eventually realized that penalizing a person for being a sexual assault victim was wrong, and reduced the defendant's sentence, the majority finds this to be unreasonable, irrational and illogical, and reinstates the previous sentence.1
*654¶ 36. The majority concludes that because Grindemann's sentences were "well within the limits of the maximum permitted sentence," the trial court erred by reducing the sentences. While I agree that the trial court should have held a hearing before entering its order, I disagree with the majority's analysis of the standard by which we review a trial court's finding that its previous sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable.
*655¶ 37. The majority interprets two court of appeals cases, State v. Daniels, 117 Wis. 2d 9, 22, 343 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1983), and State v. Scaccio, 2000 WI App 265, ¶ 18, 240 Wis. 2d 95, 622 N.W.2d 449, as holding that a sentence "well within the limits of the maximum sentence" cannot be unduly harsh or unconscionable. While one could quibble with that interpretation, I conclude that those cases can be read to support the majority's conclusion.
¶ 38. The problem with doing so, however, is twofold. First, that interpretation reduces the concept of "harsh or unconscionable" to next to nothing. Maximum sentences occur, but rarely. Everything else can be "well within the limits of the maximum sentence." And the test itself is meaningless, and unsupported by common sense. Where is the dividing line between "within the limits of the maximum sentence" and "well within the limits of the maximum sentence?" And why is that a rational distinction to begin with?
¶ 39. The second difficulty with the majority's interpretation is more basic. It contravenes the methodology the supreme court has used when reviewing trial courts' decisions modifying or refusing to modify sentences under the "harsh or unconscionable" test. In Cresci v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 495, 499, 278 N.W.2d 850 (1979), the trial court reduced a sentence from consecutive to concurrent because it gave additional consideration to the fact that the defendant was unwilling to lie to the court and had chosen not to testify rather than lie. The supreme court concluded: "Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion when it modified the defendant's sentence from consecutive to concurrent." Id. at 504. And, in State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 480, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975), the court said:
*656[W]e perceive no valid reason why a trial court should not be permitted to review a sentence for abuse of discretion based upon its conclusion the sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable. If the sentence is to be reduced upon these grounds, the trial court must set forth its reasons why it concludes the sentence originally imposed was unduly harsh or unconscionable.
¶ 40. We followed Wuensch and Cresci in State v. Ralph, 156 Wis. 2d 433, 438-39, 456 N.W.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1990). There, we affirmed a trial court's sentence reduction because of sentence disparity. We concluded that this reason adequately supported the trial court's discretionary decision that the original sentence was unduly harsh.
¶ 41. The case in which the court initially concluded that a trial court could modify a previously imposed sentence, Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 106, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970), overruled on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973), involved a trial court's reduction of a defendant's previously imposed sentence. The reason given for the reduction was: "In the instant case the trial judge believed he was in error in imposing a ten-year sentence because he was misinformed at the time of the sentencing as to Hayes' previous criminal record." Id. at 106-07. Some of Hayes' prior offenses had occurred when he was a juvenile. Id. at 107. The supreme court concluded: "We think there was no abuse in discretion in modifying the sentence." Id.
¶ 42. There are a host of cases affirming a trial court's discretionary decision not to modify a previously imposed sentence. See, e.g., State v. Giebel, 198 Wis. 2d 207, 220-21, 541 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1995). In none of these cases did the courts use a methodology similar to the one the majority uses to overturn the trial court's *657finding that the sentences it previously imposed on Grindemann were unduly harsh or unconscionable. Instead, the cases concluded that the trial courts' refusals to modify sentences were not an erroneous exercise of discretion. What the majority has done in effect is impose a double standard of review, in which we defer to trial courts' determinations that a sentence is not too harsh, but review de novo a conclusion that it is.
¶ 43. In Wuensch, Ralph, and Hayes, the courts affirmed the trial court's reductions of sentences even though those sentences were "well within the limits of the maximum permitted sentence," the very factor the majority uses to reverse the trial court's reduction of Grindemann's sentence. The majority opinion becomes the only appellate decision in over thirty years to overturn a trial court's discretionary decision to reduce an unduly harsh or unconscionable sentence.2
¶ 44. The majority does not consider Hayes, Ralph or Cresci's analyses of trial courts' sentence modifications under the "unduly harsh or unconscionable" test. And yet, those are the very cases that provide the basis for the "application of proper legal standards," one of the cornerstones of a proper exercise of discretion. Instead, the majority relies on Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975). The test the majority derives from Ocanas is whether "the sentence is so excessive and unusual and so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public *658sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances." Id.
¶ 45. A wrong test usually leads to an incorrect conclusion. That is what has happened here. The court in Ocanas outlined the issues:
(1) Is the twenty-year sentence excessive and an abuse of discretion?
(2) Is the failure to modify his sentence in view of a three-year sentence given to his brother for the same offense and abuse of discretion and a denial of equal protection of the law?
Ocanas, 70 Wis. 2d at 181.
¶ 46. The majority's quote from Ocanas is, in reality, the test the Ocanas court used to address whether the trial court abused its discretion in originally sentencing the defendant. And I agree this is the correct test when considering the validity of an initial sentence. See State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 160, ¶ 10, 246 Wis. 2d 744, 632 N.W.2d 112. But it is not the test the Ocanas court used to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to modify its original sentence. And it is not the test used by Hayes, Ralph and Cresci to determine whether a trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by modifying a previously imposed sentence.
¶ 47. It is irrelevant that the trial court had previously denied Grindemann's motions to modify his sentence. Of course the trial court denied the motions. At the time it did so, it believed that Grindemann, as a child, had been a "willing participant in aberrant conduct." It was only later that the trial court concluded that Grindemann was not then a sexual deviant, but *659instead was the victim of another's sexual assaults. The majority cites no authority holding that a trial court may not hear or decide subsequent motions for sentence modification. While a trial court may decline to hear repetitive motions, I know of no rule preventing it from hearing a matter for a second or third time. What the majority is really doing by discussing Grindemann's previous motions is second-guessing the trial court by suggesting that a motion made previously and denied is not credible when made again. While that may often be true, this is a decision to be made by a trial court in the exercise of its discretion. It is not an appellate court's proper function to make that call.
¶ 48. Were I writing for a majority, I would use the "erroneous exercise of discretion" test the supreme court has applied for deciding motions to modify sentences alleged to be unduly harsh or unconscionable. I would not ignore the supreme court's admonition that there is a strong policy against interference with the discretion of a trial court in passing sentence, that an appellate court should not supplant the predilections of a trial judge with its own, and that we are to start with a presumption that the trial court acted reasonably. State v. Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d 662, 670, 335 N.W.2d 402 (1983); see also State v. Mata, 2001 WI App 184, ¶ 13, 247 Wis. 2d 1, 632 N.W.2d 872. I would conclude that insofar as Daniels and Scaccio use a different test, we are to resolve differences between court of appeals decisions and supreme court decisions in favor of the supreme court. State v. Clark, 179 Wis. 2d 484, 493-94, 507 N.W.2d 172 (Ct. App. 1993).
¶ 49. Were this a majority opinion, I would compare the factors the supreme court and this court have held to be proper factors supporting a trial court's exercise of discretion in modifying a sentence because it *660was unduly harsh or unconscionable. In Hayes, the sentence modification was based on "misinformation as to previous criminal record;" in Ralph, it was "sentence disparity;" and in Cresci, it was "defendant unwilling to lie." These were found to be acceptable reasons to modify sentences under the "unduly harsh or unconscionable" test.
¶ 50. Here, the trial court's conclusion that it mistakenly considered Grindemann, at ten years old, a willing participant in aberrant conduct rather than a victim of sexual abuse is no different from the mistakes the trial courts made in Hayes, Ralph, and Cresci. Indeed, a mistake of this nature seems more compelling than the mistakes the trial courts were permitted to remedy in those cases.3
¶ 51. I conclude that an analysis of this sort hews closer to the ideal of principled decisionmaking than the use of an analysis not followed by the supreme court, an analysis which itself suggests a near abandonment of the very notion of sentence modification because the original sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable.
*661¶ 52. An. inquiry limited to whether a sentence is "well within the limits of' the maximum permitted by statute may be expedient, but it prohibits trial courts from modifying anything but maximum or near-maximum sentences.
¶ 53. I concur that the trial judge should have heard the State's objections to modifying Grindemann's sentences before it entered its order doing so. I disagree that the trial judge could not modify his sentences. I would therefore remand so that the judge who modified Grindemann's sentences could have a hearing at which both Grindemann and the State could present their views on Grindemann's motion, and then make his decision. Because the majority does not do so, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

 We will sustain- a trial court's discretionary act if it logically interprets the facts and uses a rational process to reach *654a reasonable conclusion. See State v. Malcom, 2001 WI App 291, ¶ 12, 249 Wis. 2d 403, 638 N.W.2d 918.
The trial court's order did not explicitly find that its original sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable. Instead, it noted as follows:
"A trial Court may modify a sentence even though no new factors are presented. Jones (Hollis) v State, 70 Wis.2d 62, 72-73, 233 N.W.2d 441, 447 (1975). The Jones Court stated that State v Wuensch, 69 Wis.2d 467, 230 N.W.2nd 665 (1975), permits trial courts to review their own sentences to determine whether they are unduly harsh or unconscionable."
(quoting State v. Ralph, 156 Wis. 2d 433, 438-39, 456 N.W.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1990)),
"While the trial court may not revise a sentence merely upon "reflection", Scott v State, 64 Wis.2d 54, 59, 218 N.W.2nd 350 (1974), it may review its sentence for abuse of discretion based upon its conclusion that the sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable. State v Wuensch, 69 Wis.2nd 467, 480, 230 N.W.2nd 665 (1975)."
(quoting Cresci v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 278 N.W.2d 850 (1979)).
I conclude that the trial court intended to base its order on a finding that its previous sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable.

 In State v. Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 480, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975), the supreme court reversed the trial court's reduction of a sentence because the trial court failed to give reasons for its reduction. Here, the trial court explained that it was reducing Grindemann's sentence because "at the time of sentencing, it thought of the Defendant as being a willing participant in aberrant conduct, rather than a victim of sexual abuse."

 I also question whether, had Grindemann challenged his original sentence as being an abuse of discretion, we would have sustained it. Although sentencing is discretionary, the use of an improper factor is an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Martin, 100 Wis. 2d 326, 327, 302 N.W.2d 58 (Ct. App. 1981). In deciding Grindemann's sentence in 1985, the trial court stated that Grindemann had engaged in "sexual deviancy" as a ten year old, and displayed a "history of undesirable behaviors" that included a consensual relationship with another adult male. Had Grindemann complained initially that the trial court had considered both his status as a victim and his consensual relationship with an adult male as aggravating factors, we would have been hard pressed to sustain his sentence. See Wis. Stat. § 111.31 (1983-84) (declaring that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is against public policy).