Court Opinion

ID: 9457587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:26:38.755163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:24.959454
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
With deference to the majority, I perceive the crucial issue not to be whether a substantial question of coverage exists under the FECA, but who, the court or the Secretary, should make the determination of substantiality. They opt for court determination. I would reach a different result because as I view the case: (1) the answer to the question is not free from doubt, (2) a resolution of the significance of the work hazard relationship to the site of the accident involves administrative expertise, and' (3) there is no showing that repair to the Secretary would produce irreparable harm.
Congress has mandated that FECA coverage and tort claims liability be mutually exclusive. They each involve rights of nationwide applicability; therefore nationwide uniformity in their enforcement is implicitly desirable though not expressly required. However, the majority’s approach will almost inevitably lead to disparate decisions. The operation and maintenance of the laundry, the parking lot, and the surrounding streets of Fort Polk were all functions discharged by Mrs. Bailey’s employer. The Base as a whole is primarily dedicated to the military function. Mrs. Bailey had to traverse its confines to reach and leave the place where her primary work function was performed. It seems obvious to me that different district courts not only could, but would disagree as to whether a substantial question of coverage exists in this case. If the Secretary were allowed to interpret the Act, then results in California should not be different from the results in Louisiana. The division of the nation into federal districts and circuits cannot help but lead to varying results for different litigants similarly circumstanced. But here we do not have to accept such disparities. Congress has provided machinery through the FECA to inject a measure of uniformity into this area.
Lone Star Cement Corp. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1964), dealing with a related question, adopted a test recommended by a leading commentator in the field of administrative law. See 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 20.03 (1958). The factors in that test are: (a) the extent of injury from pursuit of administrative remedy; (b) the degree of apparent clarity or doubt about administrative jurisdiction; and (c) the involvement of specialized administrative understanding in resolving the question of jurisdiction.' 3 Davis, supra at 69. Professor Davis makes the following statement which clearly fits the case before us. “When the administrative proceeding involves neither abnormal expense nor other irreparable harm, and when the issue of jurisdiction is either doubtful or dependent upon specialized understanding in the agency’s field, requiring exhaustion is normally desirable. When expense or other irreparable harm is great and the issue of juridiction is easy for the court to determine, exhaustion normally should not be required.” (footnotes omitted) 3 Davis, supra at 69-70. Given my view of the coalescence of all of these factors in the case at bar, Mrs. Bailey and others in the future who may be similarly situated ought to be required to first pursue the exclusive and surer administrative remedy Congress has provided under FECA rather than being court compelled to hazard a tort attack on the fisc.