Court Opinion

ID: 9904847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 01:00:42.766929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.157241
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30238         Document: 00516979886             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/27/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                November 27, 2023
                                       No. 23-30238                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   Gregory James Bledsoe, on behalf of himself,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Dean Willis, in his individual capacity as Sergeant of the Shreveport Police
   Department; David McClure, in his individual capacity as Officer of the
   Shreveport Police Department,

                                              Defendants—Appellants.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 5:21-CV-4367
                      ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Gregory James Bledsoe brought
   malicious prosecution claims against Dean Willis and David McClure,
   members of the Shreveport Police Department, based on an alleged wrongful
   arrest without probable cause, which ultimately led to Bledsoe’s two-year
   incarceration for crimes he did not commit. The district court denied Willis
          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                          No. 23-30238

   and McClure’s motion to dismiss Bledsoe’s claims under Federal Rule of
   Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We AFFIRM.
                                                I.
           On August 4, 2015, McClure responded to a reported burglary at a
   residence, the Dalzell Street Property managed by Port City Realty. 1 After
   arriving to the scene, McClure interviewed the burglary victim and Dalzell
   Street Property tenant Sandra Robinson. Robinson told McClure that she
   had not been to the Dalzell Street Property since August 2, 2015, and that
   when she arrived back home, she noticed that the front door was unlocked,
   the window of the front door was broken, and certain items were missing. At
   that time, McClure collected fingerprints from the doorknobs and window.
   The fingerprints came back from the lab as “not identifiable.”
           Between August 4, 2015, and August 7, 2015, Port City Realty
   contracted with Bledsoe to repair the front-door window at the Dalzell Street
   Property. Port City Realty had previously contracted with Bledsoe to
   complete handyman repair projects at three different sites. Bledsoe alleges
   that he was cut by glass while repairing the front door window.
           On August 7, 2015, McClure returned to the Dalzell Street Property
   to conduct a follow-up interview with Robinson. The window was repaired
   before McClure’s follow-up visit. During McClure’s interview, Robinson
   said she had noticed blood near the fixed window. The blood had not been
   mentioned in McClure’s earlier August 4 narrative report. McClure took a
   sample of that blood and submitted it for analysis. The sample came back as

           _____________________
           1
              In reciting the following allegations from Bledsoe’s complaint, we “accept all
   facts as pleaded and construe them in the light most favorable to [Bledsoe].” See Guerra v.
   Castillo, 82 F.4th 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453,
   461 (5th Cir. 2022); Vardeman v. City of Hous., 55 F.4th 1045, 1049 (5th Cir. 2022)).

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   a match for Bledsoe. Willis later contacted Robinson, who said she neither
   knew Bledsoe nor gave Bledsoe permission to enter the property.
          Neither Willis nor McClure documented asking Robinson: (1)
   whether she owned the Dalzell Street Property; (2) whether she had
   personally repaired the broken front-door window, and if not, whether she
   knew who had repaired it; or (3) if any other items were damaged during the
   burglary.
          Willis sought the issuance of an arrest warrant based on the DNA
   match to the blood collected. The judge who issued Bledsoe’s arrest warrant
   relied on Willis’s affidavit and the facts stated therein from McClure’s
   investigation to conclude that probable cause existed to arrest Bledsoe.
   Bledsoe was arrested for simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling. He
   pleaded not guilty. While out on bond, Bledsoe failed to appear for a hearing
   on time and was arrested. Bledsoe was incarcerated for two years and spent
   an additional year on home confinement while awaiting trial. In January
   2021, after the charges were amended to the lesser offense of criminal
   trespass, a judge found Bledsoe not guilty because of a lack of evidence.
          On December 21, 2021, Bledsoe filed this suit pursuant to § 1983 and
   Louisiana state law. He brought several claims against Willis and McClure,
   Caddo Parish Assistant District Attorney Brittany Arvie, and Caddo Parish
   District Attorney James E. Stewart, Sr. Specifically, Bledsoe brought federal
   and state malicious prosecution claims against Willis and McClure, a federal
   malicious prosecution claim against Arvie, and two municipal liability claims
   against Stewart. Bledsoe contends that Willis and McClure “caused the
   arrest and commencement of criminal proceedings against [him] without
   sufficient probable cause based on a clearly deficient investigation.”
   Moreover, he seeks relief under § 1983 “based on the wrongful arrest, and
   reckless filing of a warrant without probable cause.” As it relates to this

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   appeal, Bledsoe’s complaint provides the following regarding his malicious
   prosecution claims:
         Neither Defendant McClure nor Defendant Willis wrote in
         their official narrative reports that the broken front door
         window had been repaired when Defendant McClure went to
         the Dalzell Street Property on August 7, 2015, during which
         visit he was directed to blood near the front door window.
         Neither Defendant McClure nor Defendant Willis wrote in
         their official narrative reports that Robinson was merely a
         rental tenant at the Dalzell Street Property.
         Neither Defendant McClure nor Defendant Willis contacted
         the Dalzell Street Property owner or property management
         company to inquire whether anyone, including Mr. Bledsoe,
         had permission to enter the Dalzell Street Property.
         Defendant Willis submitted an affidavit for an arrest warrant
         directed to Mr. Bledsoe based on the investigation by
         Defendant McClure and Defendant Willis.
         The affidavit omitted the key facts described above, specifically
         that Robinson was merely a rental tenant of the Dalzell Street
         Property, that a property management company was
         authorized to make repairs at the Dalzell Street Property, and
         that the broken window had been repaired between the dates
         Defendant McClure visited the Dalzell Street Property.
         Those omissions resulted from the wanton and reckless
         disregard by Defendant Willis and Defendant McClure for Mr.
         Bledsoe’s constitutional rights.
         Those omissions were material and were recklessly,
         intentionally, or knowingly omitted from the affidavit for
         arrest warrant.
         But for those omissions, an arrest warrant was issued for Mr.
         Bledsoe for simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, Louisiana
         R. S. 14:62.2.

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          The day trial began, the burglary charge was dropped and
          replaced with criminal trespassing, Louisiana R.S. 14:63, and
          misdemeanor theft, Louisiana R.S. 14:67B(4).
          Mr. Bledsoe was found not guilty on both charges at trial.
          The actions of Defendant Willis and Defendant McClure
          directly and proximately caused compensable injury to Mr.
          Bledsoe.
          Willis and McClure moved for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of
   Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds. The district court
   denied the motion. And Willis and McClure timely appealed. We have
   jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
                                           II.
          “This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant or denial of a Rule
   12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009).
   “To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts to state
   a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278,
   284 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Crane v. City of Arlington, Texas, 50 F.4th 453, 461
   (5th Cir. 2022)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads
   “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
   the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Martinez v. Nueces
   County, Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
   U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we must
   accept all facts as pleaded and construe them in the light most favorable to
   the plaintiff.” Guerra, 82 F.4th at 284 (quoting Crane, 50 F.4th at 461).
          A plaintiff may bring a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for
   malicious prosecution, even in the absence of “some affirmative indication
   of innocence.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022). “[T]he gravamen
   of the Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution . . . is the wrongful
   initiation of charges without probable cause.” Id. at 43. For decades, “it has

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   been clearly established that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are
   violated if (1) the affiant, in support of the warrant, includes ‘a false statement
   knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth’ and (2)
   ‘the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.’”
   Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 494 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Franks v.
   Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). After Thompson, this court clarified
   the six elements for a claim of malicious prosecution, including: “(1) the
   commencement or continuance of an original criminal proceeding; (2) its
   legal causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was defendant
   in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present
   plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice;
   and (6) damages.” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 278–79 (5th Cir. 2023)
   (citation and quotation omitted).
           “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from
   liability for civil damages ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
   established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
   would have known.’” Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2011).
          The issue of whether qualified immunity applies “should be resolved
   ‘at the earliest possible state in the litigation.’” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440,
   445 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
   We undertake a two-pronged analysis to determine whether a government
   official is entitled to qualified immunity, inquiring “(1) whether the officer’s
   alleged conduct has violated a federal right and (2) whether the right in
   question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged violation, such
   that the officer was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.”
   Bailey v. Iles, 78 F.4th 801, 807 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Cole v. Carson, 935
   F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019)). An officer is entitled to qualified immunity
   “if there is no violation, or if the conduct did not violate law clearly
   established at the time.” Id. (quoting Cole, 935 F.3d at 451).

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          For a right to be “clearly established,” “[t]he contours of the right
   must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
   what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640,
   (1987). The right can be clearly established either by the Supreme Court’s
   precedent or our own. Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir.
   2018). Ultimately, “[t]he central concept is that of ‘fair warning’: The law
   can be clearly established ‘despite notable factual distinctions between the
   precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior
   decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated
   constitutional rights.’” Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2004)
   (en banc) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)).
          When confronted with a qualified-immunity defense at the pleadings
   stage, the plaintiff must plead “facts which, if proved, would defeat [the]
   claim of immunity.” Guerra, 82 F.4th at 285 (quoting Waller v. Hanlon, 922
   F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019)) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
   The pleading standards remain “the same when a motion to dismiss is based
   on qualified immunity.” Id. “‘The crucial question is whether the complaint
   pleads facts that, if true, would permit the inference that Defendants are
   liable under § 1983, and would overcome their qualified immunity defense.’”
   Id. at 285 (quoting Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2021)). At
   the motion-to-dismiss stage, “[i]t is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate
   that qualified immunity is inappropriate.” Terwillinger, 4 F.4th at 280
   (alteration in original).

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                                            III.
                                             A.
          First, we consider whether Bledsoe sufficiently alleged facts for his
   malicious prosecution claims against Willis and McClure. 2 Turning to the
   six elements required for malicious prosecution, Willis and McClure argue
   that Bledsoe fails on the fourth and fifth elements, but they do not discuss the
   other elements. We agree with the district court’s determination that:
          When accepted as fact, [Bledsoe’s] allegations plausibly
          demonstrate that a criminal proceeding was commenced (the
          first element), the criminal proceeding was the direct result of
          information that Willis and McClure gathered during their
          investigation (the second element), and that the proceeding
          came to a natural conclusion (the third element).
          Furthermore, Bledsoe adequately pleads the sixth element by
          alleging that he has suffered economic damages, which include
          the loss of his social security benefits and the loss of his job,
          among others. The Court also finds that Bledsoe pleads the
          fourth element of probable cause with sufficient plausibility.
          On the absence of probable cause (the fourth element), Willis and
   McClure argue that the independent intermediary doctrine insulates them
   from liability. But as the district court explained, that doctrine does not apply
   here because the trial judge who issued the warrant for Bledsoe’s arrest relied
   on a defective affidavit. The independent-intermediary doctrine provides
   that “if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent
   intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision
   breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.”

          _____________________
          2
            Because the elements for the federal and Louisiana state malicious prosecution
   claims run coextensively, we analyze them simultaneously. See, e.g., Armstrong, 60 F.4th
   at 279.

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   Anokwuru v. City of Hous., 990 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal
   quotation marks and citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Guerra,
   82 F.4th 278. However, “[a]n officer can still be liable if the officer
   deliberately or recklessly provides false, material information for use in an
   affidavit or makes knowing and intentional omissions that result in a warrant
   being issued without probable cause.” Id. at 964 (emphasis added) (citations
   omitted); see also Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 494; Mayfield v. Currie, 976 F.3d 482,
   487 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised (Sept. 23, 2020) (clarifying that the
   independent-intermediary doctrine “is not absolute”). 3 “If the facts omitted
   from an affidavit are ‘clearly critical’ to a finding of probable cause, then
   recklessness may be inferred from the proof of the omission itself.” Hale v.
   Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 400 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
           Here, Bledsoe argues that Willis’s and McClure’s actions and
   omissions “tainted” the judge’s evaluation of whether to issue the warrant
   for Bledsoe’s arrest. See, e.g., Arizmendi v. Gabbart, 919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th
   Cir. 2019) (explaining that the independent intermediary doctrine does not
   apply “if . . . the ‘deliberations of the intermediary were in some way tainted
   by the actions of the defendant.’”) (quoting McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 689
   (5th Cir. 2017)). Specifically, Bledsoe’s complaint alleges, among other
   things: (1) failure to document who owned the Dalzell Street Property; (2)
   failure to document that Robinson was merely a tenant; (3) failure to

           _____________________
           3
              Our sister circuits have similarly considered whether the absence of probable
   cause defeats qualified immunity. See, e.g., Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999)
   (“An officer contemplating an arrest is not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence,
   even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing by itself) suggests that probable cause
   exists.”); Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) (“[P]robable
   cause may be defeated if the officer deliberately disregards facts known to him which
   establish justification.”); Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1023–24 (9th Cir.
   2009) (citation omitted) (holding that courts cannot ignore “facts tending to dissipate
   probable cause” because probable cause is a totality-of-the-circumstances determination).

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   document that the broken front-door window initially observed had been
   fixed before McClure returned to the scene; (4) failure to determine who
   fixed the broken front-door window; and (5) failure to contact the Dalzell
   Street Property owner or the property management agent to inquire whether
   anyone, including Bledsoe, had permission to enter the Dalzell Street
   Property. Further, Bledsoe contends that “[t]hose omissions were material
   and were recklessly, intentionally, or knowingly omitted from the affidavit for
   arrest warrant.”
          At this stage of the proceedings, Bledsoe has sufficiently alleged that
   the officers deliberately or recklessly omitted relevant information. Willis
   and McClure neither dispute that several pieces of information were absent
   from the officers’ reports and affidavit, nor provide copies of the warrant or
   affidavit to rebut Bledsoe’s allegations. Moreover, his allegations suggest
   that Willis and McClure had several chances to identify information that was
   “clearly critical” to a finding of probable cause. Hale, 899 F.2d at 400.
   “[R]ecklessness may be inferred from the proof of the omission itself.” Id.
   For example, when McClure returned to the Dalzell Street Property on
   August 7, he failed to note in his report that the broken window had been
   repaired. McClure only noted the “splatch” of blood that he and Robinson
   saw three days after the initial report. Then, eight months later, Willis made
   a supplemental report that again failed to include that the window was fixed.
   And, a month after that, Willis failed again to include this information in his
   supplemental report. Subsequently, Willis signed an affidavit for an arrest
   warrant identifying the broken window and Bledsoe’s blood sample.
          We construe Bledsoe’s complaint “in the light most favorable to the
   plaintiff.” Guerra, 82 F.4th at 284. “If proven, [Bledsoe’s] allegations
   would demonstrate the willful omission of exculpatory facts and statements
   that should have been presented.” Guidry v. Cormier, No. 20-1430, 2021 WL
   3824129, at *5 (W.D. La. Mar. 8, 2021).             Thus, the independent-

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   intermediary doctrine does not apply when, as here, “the Affidavit contained
   so many relevant omissions that it did not accurately present the probable
   cause issue to [the] Judge.” Id.
          On malice (the fifth element), Willis and McClure argue that Bledsoe
   must allege that the officers either knowingly or intentionally omitted
   exculpatory information from their incident report, or that their conduct
   arose from hate or private advantage. Willis and McClure contend that
   Bledsoe has not pleaded either and that his allegation concerning their
   “clearly deficient investigation” amounts to mere “negligence.” While it is
   true, at least at this preliminary stage, that Bledsoe has no allegations
   detailing how the officers knew of exculpatory information, one could still
   reasonably conclude that the officers failed to make the most basic inquiries
   that would have yielded such information, or recklessly disregarded the truth.
   We hold officers liable for “the intentional or reckless omission of material
   facts from a warrant application[.]” See, e.g., Hale, 899 F.2d at 400; Wilson
   v. Stroman, 33 F.4th 202, 211–12 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Reyna
   v. Wilson, 143 S. Ct. 425 (2022), and cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 426 (2022). And
   we have extended that liability to any “officer who has provided information
   for the purpose of its being included in a warrant application” and therefore
   “has assisted in preparing” it. Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 262 (5th Cir.
   2017) (en banc). Based on Bledsoe’s allegations, there is a plausible inference
   of reckless omission—and that is all he must show. Bledsoe therefore alleges
   with sufficient specificity at the 12(b)(6) stage that Willis and McClure acted
   recklessly by omitting facts material to the finding of probable cause.

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                                              B.
           Next, we address whether Willis and McClure are entitled to qualified
   immunity based on clearly established law. 4 As we must, we acknowledge
   this court’s recent decision in Guerra, 82 F.4th 278, that was issued after the
   district court’s decision. In Guerra, this court affirmed a district court’s
   12(b)(6) dismissal of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim “because this
   court’s caselaw explicitly disclaimed the existence of a constitutional claim
   for malicious prosecution at the time of [plaintiff’s] alleged conduct in 2018
   and 2019 [i.e., before Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022)].” Id. at 288-
   89. Nonetheless, as Guerra explained, this court has stated repeatedly that
   the “Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause
   is clearly established.” Id. at 286 (citing Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 286). Indeed,
   this court has found that an officer was “not entitled to qualified immunity”
   because the plaintiff alleged that the officer “violated the Fourth
   Amendment by signing objectively unreasonable arrest-warrant affidavits.”
   Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 491 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Winfrey v. San Jacinto County,
   481 Fed. App’x 969, 979 (5th Cir. 2012)). Long before the conduct at issue
   in this case, it was “clearly established that a defendant’s Fourth
   Amendment rights are violated if (1) the affiant, in support of the warrant,
   includes ‘a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
   disregard for the truth’ and (2) ‘the allegedly false statement is necessary to
   the finding of probable cause.’” Id. (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
   154, 155-56 (1978)). Accepting Bledsoe’s complaint as true, and determining

           _____________________
           4
             Bledsoe claims, pursuant to § 1983, that Willis and McClure violated his Fourth
   Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Willis and McClure
   moved for dismissal before the Supreme Court issued Thompson v. Clark and did not seek
   to revise their motion once that opinion was issued. Furthermore, on appeal, Willis and
   McClure do not discuss whether a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution
   under § 1983 is clearly established law for purposes of qualified immunity.

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   that Willis and McClure are not shielded by qualified immunity, the district
   court found the following:
           [T]he crux of Bledsoe’s claim is that the trial court judge was
           not privy to the full scope of information available during the
           criminal investigation and that this incomplete information was
           the direct result of Willis and McClure’s recklessness and
           failure to disclose material information. Bledsoe plausibly
           alleges that an arrest warrant would not have been issued but
           for the reckless investigation that omitted exculpatory
           evidence regarding the source of the blood and Bledsoe’s
           contract with Port City Realty.
           We agree with the district court based on the prevailing precedent in
   the Supreme Court and this circuit. Although this court did not recognize a
   “freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution” at
   the time of Willis’s and McClure’s investigation, we must recognize that
   “‘the initiation of criminal charges without probable cause may set in force
   events that run afoul of explicit constitutional protection—the Fourth
   Amendment if the accused is seized and arrested, for example.” Winfrey,
   901 F.3d at 491 (quoting Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945, 953 (5th Cir.
   2003) (en banc), overruled by Thompson, 596 U.S. at 36). 5
           Even before Thompson, the Supreme Court considered whether a
   plaintiff had plausibly stated a Fourth Amendment claim when he was
   arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance
   based on false reports written by a police officer and an evidence technician.
   See, e.g., Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 360 (2017). There, the

           _____________________
           5
            See, also e.g., Caskey v. Fenton, No. 22-3100, 2022 WL 16964963, at *11 (6th Cir.
   Nov. 16, 2022) (rejecting the qualified immunity defense regarding clearly established law
   for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims); Crider v. Williams, No. 21-13797, 2022 WL
   3867541, at *8 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2022) (same).

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   Court said the plaintiff’s “claim fits the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth
   Amendment fits [the plaintiff’s] claim, as hand in glove.” Id. at 364. And
   the Court held “that the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful
   pretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” Id. at 369. Here,
   Bledsoe’s claim turns on the Fourth Amendment because he alleges that
   Willis and McClure “caused the arrest and commencement of criminal
   proceedings against [him] without sufficient probable cause based on a
   clearly deficient investigation.” Thus, the Supreme Court’s and our court’s
   precedent clearly establish Bledsoe’s alleged constitutional violation for
   purposes of qualified immunity.
                                         IV.
         Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Bledsoe plausibly
   alleges federal and state claims of malicious prosecution against Willis and
   McClure, and that at the motion to dismiss stage, Bledsoe overcomes the
   qualified immunity defense.
         AFFIRMED.

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