Court Opinion

ID: 9409967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 21:01:20.013257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:54.499459
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12122     Document: 35-1     Date Filed: 07/19/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12122
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       CHRISTOPHER SCROGGINS,
                                                                Plaintiﬀ,
       VICTOR REVILL,
       appointed as personal represenatative of
       Christopher Scroggins’s estate,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       RICHARDSON,
       Oﬃcer,

                                                   Defendant-Appellant,
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                22-12122

       BIRMINGHAM, CITY OF,

                                                               Defendant.

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00553-GMB
                          ____________________

       Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and BRANCH, Cir-
       cuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Officer James Richardson appeals the denial of qualified im-
       munity from Christopher Scroggins’s claim of excessive force in vi-
       olation of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Victor Revill,
       as personal representative of Scroggins’s estate, moves to dismiss
       for lack of jurisdiction. Because Richardson’s argument turns on an
       evidentiary issue, which we lack jurisdiction to review on interloc-
       utory appeal, we dismiss this appeal.
              After midnight on September 19, 2019, Scroggins broke into
       a car in a parking lot. Richardson, an on-duty Birmingham police
       officer, answered a dispatch call for breaking-and-entering and
       found Scroggins in the car. Richardson approached Scroggins with
       his gun drawn and ordered him out of the car.
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       22-12122               Opinion of the Court                        3

              What happened next is in dispute. Revill asserts that Scrog-
       gins exited the car, and Richardson frisked him but found no
       weapon. Scroggins pulled away and began to run, but Richardson
       intentionally shot him in the back of the neck to stop him from
       getting away. Although Scroggins spoke to an officer at the hospital
       and made a recorded statement that the shooting was an accident
       and not Richardson’s fault, Scroggins stated in his deposition that
       he was on pain medication, still under the effects of anesthesia from
       surgery, and did not remember the conversation.
              Richardson has a different recollection. He contends that he
       had no time to search Scroggins, so he was concerned that Scrog-
       gins might have a weapon. After Scroggins pulled away and tried
       to run, a tussle ensued. When Richardson pulled Scroggins toward
       him, Scroggins’s neck made contact with Richardson’s gun, and
       Richardson stumbled on a concrete wheel stop. Richardson be-
       lieved that his gun discharged due to the tussle.
              Richardson moved for summary judgment on the exces-
       sive-force claim based on qualified immunity. The magistrate
       judge, whom the parties jointly consented to conduct the proceed-
       ings, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), denied Richardson qualified immunity be-
       cause of the disputed factual issue whether he intentionally shot
       Scroggins. The magistrate judge ruled that although “a reasonable
       juror viewing the video footage might see two men struggling and
       tripping over a parking block, resulting in an accidental discharge
       of Richardson’s gun, another juror watching the same recordings
       might fairly conclude that Richardson intentionally shot
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12122

       Scroggins.” The magistrate judge explained that, viewing the facts
       in the light most favorable to Scroggins, Richardson’s intentional
       use of deadly force was unreasonable because binding authority es-
       tablished that deadly force cannot be used against a fleeing, un-
       armed suspect who poses no immediate threat to officers or others.
       The magistrate judge also stated that “if Richardson’s use of force
       was constitutionally excessive but unintentional, he would be enti-
       tled to qualified immunity.”
              Revill moves to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction
       because the magistrate judge’s ruling turned on a factual issue—
       whether a reasonable jury could find that Richardson intentionally
       shot Scroggins—instead of a legal issue. We agree.
                The denial of qualified immunity is an appealable “final de-
       cision,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291, only insofar as it turns on an issue of law.
       Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). The collateral order
       doctrine provides that we have jurisdiction over an appeal if the
       order conclusively determines the disputed question, resolves an
       important issue completely separate from the merits, and is effec-
       tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Firestone Tire
       & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981). Although “a claim
       of immunity is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plain-
       tiff’s claim, purely factual questions of whether a defendant vio-
       lated the plaintiff’s rights are not separable from the merits of his
       claim,” so they do not meet the second requirement of the collat-
       eral order doctrine. Hall v. Flournoy, 975 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir.
       2020) (citation omitted). And we are barred from preliminarily
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       22-12122              Opinion of the Court                        5

       reviewing “whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’
       issue of fact for trial.” Id.
               Richardson contends that he is entitled to qualified immun-
       ity because he did not violate a clearly established constitutional
       right. Although his arguments are dressed up as legal challenges as
       to whether his conduct violated clearly established law, Richardson
       effectively argues that the evidence, when viewed in the light most
       favorable to him, does not support a finding that the shooting was
       intentional. See Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1163–64 (11th
       Cir. 2018) (“If a government official moves for summary judgment
       asserting entitlement to qualified immunity, then the relevant facts
       are construed in the light most favorable to the non-movant—i.e.,
       the plaintiff—and the court should decide the issue based on those
       facts.” (emphasis added)). For example, Richardson argues that his
       “accidental application of force” was reasonable under the totality
       of the circumstances because “[n]o reasonable jury could find that
       Scroggins was under control, not resisting, and obeying com-
       mands.” He contends that Revill failed to supply caselaw “that de-
       clares a Fourth Amendment violation when force is accidentally
       used on a suspect.” And he asserts that, “if after de novo review,
       [we] determine[] the shooting of Scroggins was accidental, [he] is
       entitled to qualified immunity.” To that end, Richardson also chal-
       lenges the magistrate judge’s determination that the videos do not
       clearly establish that Richardson had enough time to search Scrog-
       gins for a weapon.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                    22-12122

               Whether Richardson violated clearly established law turns
       on issues of fact. If Richardson intentionally shot Scroggins while
       he was trying to run away, not carrying a weapon, and posing no
       threat to Richardson or others, then Richardson violated clearly es-
       tablished law. See Bradley v. Benton, 10 F.4th 1232, 1243 (11th Cir.
       2021) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has “clearly established
       that an officer cannot use deadly force to stop an unarmed man
       who is not suspected of committing a violent crime from fleeing
       on foot.”); Cantu v. City of Dothan, Alabama, 974 F.3d 1217, 1230
       (11th Cir. 2020) (“[R]esisting arrest alone is not enough to justify
       the use of deadly force”). But if Richardson accidentally shot Scrog-
       gins during their tussle in the parking lot, then Richardson did not
       violate clearly established law. It is not for us to decide, at this junc-
       ture, whose version of the facts should prevail. See Simmons, 879
       F.3d at 1163. A jury will need to decide. We lack jurisdiction over
       this interlocutory appeal.
              We DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.