Court Opinion

ID: 9659778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:54:29.508702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.484318
License: Public Domain

M. F. Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). I must dissent. Although the sentencing judge is permitted broad discretion in probation matters, People v Gallagher, 55 Mich App 613, 620; 223 NW2d 92 (1974), the decision whether to terminate or revoke probation must be on the basis of the alleged probation violation alone. People v Elbert, 21 Mich App 677, 681; 176 NW2d 467 (1970). The sole ground for revocation in this cause was the defendant’s failure to pay the July, 1974, installment. However, by his action of August 1, the probation officer *559waived the timeliness of payment of the July installment and the defendant was prevented from making a timely payment later in August only by the probation officer’s refusal to accept. Thus, there could be no violation of a prior waived condition of timeliness.
For this reason, I would hold the revocation of probation to be an abuse of discretion and would reverse.