Court Opinion

ID: 9698273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:46:23.001416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:39.828306
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Chief Justice Bell :
Because the issues involved in this case are so important, it will be necessary to analyze and review at length our prior decisions and the basic reasons for the principles laid down therein.
In the first place, we note that it is the well-settled and long-established law that a person can be convicted of murder on circumstantial evidence alone—no eyewitness is necessary and no direct proof of the actual murder is required for conviction: Commonwealth v. Slavik, 437 Pa. 354, 358, 261 A. 2d 583; Commonwealth v. Simpson, 436 Pa. 459, 463, 260 A. 2d 751; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Pa. 227, 231-232, 239 A. 2d 354; Commonwealth v. Finnie, 415 Pa. 166, 171, 202 A. 2d 85; Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A. 2d 911; Commomoealth v. Hart, 403 Pa. 652, 170 A. 2d 850; Commonwealth v. Boden, 399 Pa. 298, 159 A. 2d 894; Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A. 2d 464; Commonwealth ex rel. Garrison v. Burke, 378 Pa. 344, 106 A. 2d 587; Commonwealth v. Libonati, 346 Pa. *22504, 31 A. 2d 95; Commonwealth v. Karmendi, 328 Pa. 321, 195 Atl. 62; Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 264 A 2d 661 (1970).
These well-settled principles of law have been overlooked or ignored by the Majority, and these principles apply to and control this case. This is the Majority’s first major error.
If (as we have seen) a conviction of murder can be legally sustained on circumstantial evidence alone— provided such evidence is sufficient to establish guilt of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt—it should be crystal clear and unquestionably obvious that sanity, which is the normal state of man, can legally be found and sustained by similar circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the present case is an even stronger case for the application of these principles of circumstantial evidence, because it is aided and supplemented by the presumption of sanity, which is so strong, so well established and so necessary for the protection and safety of Society that it cannot be ignored or swept under the rug or changed by Judicial ukase. This is especially so because insanity is an affirmative defense which must be proved by the accused by a fair preponderance of the evidence. It is, we repeat, clear as crystal that if a man can be convicted of murder on circumstantial evidence without direct testimony (if and when that evidence is sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt), a fortiori a man’s sanity can be established by circumstantial evidence without direct testimony or proof thereof.
The second major error of the Majority is that they have completely forgotten that this Court has countless times iterated and reiterated that the credibility of a witness is for the jury and not for the Court. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 431 Pa. 21, 27, 244 A. 2d 734; Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 242 A. 2d 237; *23Commonwealth v. Chambers, 367 Pa. 159, 79 A. 2d 201; and cases, infra.
With these principles in mind, we shall now review the relevant facts, as well as additional authorities, which are particularly applicable.
Dennis Yogel, while committing a robbery, shot and killed two persons. A jury found him guilty of armed robbery and on two counts of murder in the second degree. The Court sentenced Vogel (1) to imprisonment for a term of not less than ten nor more than twenty years (a) on one count of murder and (b) on another count of armed robbery, these prison terms to run consecutively; and (2) to life imprisonment on the second count of murder. Defendant’s motion for a new trial was dismissed by the lower Court. From the judgments of sentence, defendant took this appeal.
The Commonwealth proved that the defendant, a former employee of the Grant Store in Lock Haven, Clinton County, entered that store while it was closed for the luncheon hour, and shot and fatally wounded Atwood, the manager, and Mrs. Bechel, his secretary, who were the only persons in the store. Defendant then stole from the safe several money bags containing approximately |800, and the secretary’s pocketbook, and various items of merchandise from the store. Immediately thereafter, defendant returned to his home, where his wife and infant child were awaiting his arrival. The family then drove to Canada for a previously planned vacation. Defendant was arrested by Canadian officials in response to a radio communication from the Pennsylvania police. A search of defendant’s automobile disclosed a suitcase in the trunk of the car which contained the stolen money bags, and a box of cartridges in the glove compartment which were of the same caliber as those used in the murders. After his arrest by the Canadian authorities, defendant voluntarily agreed to return to the United States.
*24Vogel’s defense at Ms trial on the aforesaid indictments, and his principal contention in tMs appeal was that he was legally insane at the time of the commission of the crimes, and, therefore, could not be convicted of any crime.
The M’Naghten Rule has been the long and well-settled test of legal insaMty in Pennsylvania* and has been approved and restated in more than a score of cases, commencing in early times** and reiterated in the recent cases of Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A. 2d 276; Commonwealth v. Heller, 369 Pa. 457, 461, 87 A. 2d 287; Commonwealth v. Patskin, 375 Pa. 368, 371, 100 A. 2d 472; Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 211, 150 A. 2d 102; Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 250, 164 A. 2d 98; and Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311, 321, 218 A. 2d 561. Legal insanity has been defined in all of these cases (with some minutiae of difference in the express language used) as “inability from disease of the mind to understand the nature and consequences of his act or to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to it.”
Defendant introduced substantial evidence to prove his insanity. The first witness called by the defense was Officer Ray Merritts, one of the police officers who brought the defendant back to Lock Haven on the day following the commission of the crimes. Officer Merritts was asked what Vogel’s general attitude was at the time Merritts was bringing Mm back to Lock Haven. To this question, Officer Merritts replied: *25“A. ... At different times we talked to him and it just seemed that he was far removed from the area in which we were trying to talk to him about, which, naturally, would have been the shooting affair. Q. Would you say, during this period of time, Dennis [Vogel] ever associated himself with the crime? A. Not coming down from New York. He was very quiet. . . . Q. Did he or did he not ever show any remorse? A. No, he never showed any remorse.” Officer Merritts’ testimony, namely, that the defendant’s attitude was that of indifference without any remorse or fear of punishment, was substantiated by other members of law-enforcement agencies who had contact with the defendant in the days immediately following the commission of the crimes.
The defense then proceeded to call various members of defendant’s family, who testified as to the erratic and often bizarre conduct of the defendant since his childhood.*
*26The defense concluded their case by presenting testimony from four well-qualified psychiatrists. Three of the psychiatrists were employees of State hospitals, while the other was retained by the defendant upon the Court’s authorization. All of these psychiatrists testified that the defendant was suffering from schizophrenia and, in their respective opinions, was legally insane at the time of the commission of the crimes.
No psychiatric testimony and no direct affirmative testimony as to the defendant’s mental condition, i.e., his legal sanity, was offered by the Commonwealth. However, testimony had been given (a) during the Commonwealth’s case in chief and (b) in defendant’s case, from which the jury could justifiably infer and find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew what he was doing when he robbed and killed his victims, and knew the difference between right and wrong with respect to his actions. Such testimony consisted, inter alia, of the defendant’s having made prior threats to bill the deceased Atwood; his having debts and financial problems, thus showing a possible motive; his “casing” the Grant Store from across the street on the day before the killing, and his “casing” the store shortly before the robbery; his commission of the robbery and the murders after twelve o’clock noon, at a time when the store was closed to the public; his ransacking the safe and taking over $800 in cash and Mrs. Eechel’s pocketbook and other items from the store after he shot and killed Atwood and Mrs. Eechel; Ms throwing away, after the murders, a .22-caliber revolver which he had purchased sometime before these murders; his fleeing with his wife and child to Canada, within an hour after the murders; Ms warning his wife *27not to look into the trunk of his cwr where he had hidden most of the stolen items; and, as the police were coming into the restaurant in Canada where he and his wife had gone to eat, his attempt to pass a large roll of bills to his wife and, when she refused to take it, his attempt to place it in her blouse.
The most important question raised by defendant is this: Can a conviction be sustained when defendant produces direct affirmative evidence of his legal insanity and the Commonwealth offers no psychiatric or medical or direct affirmative lay testimony of the defendant’s sanity?*
In Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa. 190, 85 A. 2d 391, the Court said (page 199) : “As sanity is the legally recognized normal condition of human beings, its existence in any given instance is presumed. Consequently, the burden of proving insanity as a defense to a criminal charge is upon the one asserting it. It is incumbent upon him to establish the alleged defective mental condition by a fair preponderance of the evidence: Commonwealth v. lacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 68, 178 A. 823. Throughout, the issue remains one of fact for the jury to determine.** As recognized by this court in Commonwealth v. lacobino, supra,—‘The presumption of sanity, which is the normal condition of *28man, “holds good, and is the full equivalent of express proof until it is successfully rebutted [citing cases]”’; or, as otherwise stated in the lacobino case (p. 69),— ‘Where mental capacity at the time of the act is an issue, the Commonwealth is aided by the presumption of sanity, it is not required to prove affirmatively mental capacity to commit the act/”
We have previously been faced with a factual situation one step removed from the present one. In Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 413 Pa. 599, 198 A. 2d 534, we affirmed a conviction of murder in the first degree and held that the fact that the Commonwealth offered no expert, but only lay testimony to rebut defendant’s expert and lay witnesses did not preclude a conviction of murder. The Court said (pages 601, 602-603): “Two medical doctors, who specialize in the field of psychiatry, stated that in their opinion the defendant was legally insane at the time of the shooting, did not know the nature or quality of her act, and did not realize she was doing wrong. . . .
“The Commonwealth offered no medical testimony in refutation of that submitted by the defense. Counsel for the appellant, stressing the above fact and noting that post trial, the court had found on the basis of a report submitted by a psychiatrist that the defendant was mentally ill and required hospitalization, strenuously argues that the totality of the evidence manifests that the verdict of the jury was arbitrary and contrary to the weight of the testimony, requiring the grant of a new trial.
“. . . While the Commonwealth did not offer medical opinion testimony as to the defendant’s mental condition at the relevant time, it did submit substantial evidence through multiple witnesses strongly indicating that before the shooting and immediately thereafter, the defendant was in control of her senses and fully conscious of her acts. Further, her own spon*29taneous statements immediately following the occurence manifest an individual consciously remorseful of what she had done. Quite significantly, when questioned shortly after the shooting by an investigating police officer, she stated that the gun discharged accidentally while she and her husband were struggling for possession of it. When pressed for further details she declined to answer additional questions before talking to her lawyer. In view of the whole record, the issue of the defendant’s mental competency at the time of the homicide was properly for the jury’s determination.
“Since the sanity of an individual is always presumed, one who asserts insanity in defense of the commission of a crime has the burden of proving its existence by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa. 190, 85 A. 2d 391 (1952). As stated in Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823 (1935) at 68, ‘The presumption of sanity, which is the normal condition of man, “holds good, and is the full equivalent of express proof until it is successfully rebutted” (Citing cases) ; and again, at 69, ‘Where mental capacity at the time of the act is an issue, the Commonwealth is aided by the presumption of sanity, it is not required to prove affirmatively mental capacity to commit the act.’ ”
The function and dimension of the presumption of sanity is to prescribe a principle or rule of law that every person, including every person accused of a crime, is sane, in the absence of adequate evidence to prove the contrary. When sufficient or adequate evidence is presented to prove legal insanity, the presumption of sanity disappears as a rule of law and the question of sanity or insanity becomes one for the trier of the facts. Of. Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 413 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa., supra. This is the important and controlling fact which the Majority blindly ignore or overlook.
*30Defendant presented, as we have seen, substantial testimony which, if believed, was adequate to prove that he was legally insane at the time of the commission of the aforesaid murders and robberies. No single fact or set of facts can, as a matter of law, be conclusive proof of insanity, and therefore all the evidence, including the credibility of the witnesses, is for the jury (or the trial Judge if sitting without a jury). Commonwealth v. Lance, 381 Pa. 293, 113 A. 2d 290; Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa., supra; cf. also, Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525, 194 A. 2d 911; and Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 413 Pa., supra.
In Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 195 A. 2d 338, the Court said (page 58): “. . . [I]t is well settled that a jury or a trial Court can believe all or a part of or none of a defendant’s statements, confessions or testimony, or the testimony of any witness: Commonwealth v. Melton, 406 Pa. 343, 178 A. 2d 728; Commonwealth v. Tyrrell, 405 Pa. 210, 174 A. 2d 852; Commonwealth v. Ballem, 386 Pa. 20, 123 A. 2d 728; Commonwealth v. Donough, 377 Pa. 46, 50, 103 A. 2d 694; Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 153, 94 A. 2d 743; Commonwealth v. Phillips, 372 Pa. 223, 93 A. 2d 455.” Accord: Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73, 265 A. 2d 108 (1970).
No test, formula or standard exists by which an appellate Court, as distinguished from the jury (or the trier of facts), can overrule a jury (or the trier of facts) and decide that the accused defendant is or is not legally insane. Since the Commonwealth did not introduce any direct affirmative testimony as to defendant’s legal sanity, but relied upon (1) the legal presumption of sanity and (2) all inferences reasonably drawn from the facts and the evidence, had the jury believed defendant’s witnesses, it certainly could and would have acquitted him by reason of insanity. *31However, the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses, decided not to believe defendant’s witnesses.* Since this was the jury’s right, power and prerogative, its verdict must be sustained.**
A defendant is entitled to a new trial or to an arrest of judgment (as the case may be), no matter how justifiable the verdict of guilty appears from the evidence to have been, if, but only if, the trial Court committed a prejudicial error of law, or if the Commonwealth failed to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, if the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant is not entitled to a new trial if the trial Court or an appellate Court believes that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The sufficiency of the evidence is a matter for the Court, but the weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the jury. In other words, if the appeal involves a question of fact or credibility, including the question of insanity, the issue is *32exclusively a matter for the jury, and the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Commonwealth v. Wendt, 258 Pa. 325, 102 Atl. 27; Commonwealth v. Lance, 381 Pa., supra, page 297; Commonwealth v. Pasco, 332 Pa. 439, 444, 2 A. 2d 736. Cf. also, Commonwealth v. Updegrove, 413 Pa., supra, page 602; Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa., supra, pages 260-261; Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa., supra.
In Commonwealth v. Wendt, 258 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 328) : “On the appeal our first duty is to determine whether the evidence reasonably admits of the conclusion that the killing was wilful, deliberate and premeditated. If it so appears, the responsibility of determining the guilt rested exclusively with the jury. ‘We do not sit,’ said the court in McCue v. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. 185, 189, ‘as upon a motion for a new trial, to determine where the weight of evidence lies, but to determine whether the ingredients necessary to constitute murder of the first degree shall have been proved to exist. These being proved, the jury must determine the guilt or innocence of the prisoner.’ ”
In Commonwealth v. Pasco, 332 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 444): “In our opinion the testimony was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict, and it is well settled that in such cases the judgment of this Court will not be substituted for that of the jury: Com. v. Wendt, 258 Pa. 325 ....”
In Commonwealth v. Lance, 381 Pa., supra, the Court said (page 297) : “The jury chose to disbelieve the testimony of his expert witnesses, and the testimony being sufficient to sustain its verdict, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury: Commonwealth v. Pasco, 332 Pa. 439, 444, 2 A. 2d 736; Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa. 190, 206, 85 A. 2d 391.”
*33Second Offense
Appellant’s second contention is that Section 701 of The Penal Code of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, 18 P.S. §4701, as amended,* is not applicable to a defendant charged with committing multiple murders at or about the same time. I agree. Section 701 provides: “Whoever is convicted of the crime of murder of the second degree is guilty of a felony, and shall, for the first offense, be sentenced to undergo imprisonment by separate or solitary confinement not exceeding twenty (20) years, or fined not exceeding ten thousand dollars, or both, and for the second offense, shall undergo imprisonment for the period of his natural life.”
In my opinion, the term “second offense” means a subsequent murder which was committed after a conviction of a prior murder. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Swingle v. Banmiller, 398 Pa. 43, 156 A. 2d 520; Commonwealth v. Swingle, 403 Pa. 293, 169 A. 2d 871. Therefore, in order to increase the punishment for a second offense of murder (of the second degree), a prior conviction must precede the commission of the second murder.
For the reasons hereinabove set forth, I very vigorously dissent from the Court’s Opinion and its vacation of the judgment of sentence and the grant of a new trial on both counts of the murder indictment. I would affirm the judgment of sentence imposed upon defendant for the murder of Donald Atwood and for armed robbery, namely, imprisonment for the term of not less than ten nor more than twenty years for each of the aforesaid criminal acts. I would vacate the judgment of sentence imposed upon defendant for the (second) murder of Shirley Bechel, namely, life imprisonment, *34and I would remand the case to the Court below for imposition of a proper and legal sentence on the second count in the murder indictment.
Mr. Justice Eagen joins in this dissenting opinion.

 The M’Naghten Bule has been criticized widely and frequently, but Courts and scholars have been unable to agree upon a better and realistically wiser rule. See particularly the able analysis and discussion of this Bule and of psychiatric tests in Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa., supra.

 Many Courts have considered that it was first established in Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264.

 For example, (1) while in his early teens standing on a small hill near his parents’ home, he had thrown rocks at the front door for several hours, not allowing anyone to enter or leave the premises; (2) he was expelled from school because of his continued disruption of the classroom; (3) he screamed and yelled, in response to his father’s offer to take him hunting, “You keep away from me,” or “you are liable to find a stray bullet, too, up in the woods”; (4) he constantly kept the door of his bedroom locked and would stare at the floor for hours at a time; (5) after accompanying his father to Mass, he began to yell profane words at Mass, for no explained reason; (6) he woke his wife in the middle of the night and asked her to make cereal for him and, after she complied with his request and he had eaten the cereal, he beat her because he said the cereal made him sick— then he professed undying love for her; (7) he asked his wife to make hot tea for him and, after waiting for the tea to get cold before drinking it, beat her for making him cold tea; (8) he played war games with M & M candies—on one occasion his wife “reached down and grabbed . . . and popped an M & M in [her] mouth . . . [he] got furious at [her] because it ‘was not dead’ yet”; and (9) he had *26various other flights into imaginary worlds. This kind of testimony is often produced by the family of an accused, in order to try to save their loved one.

 With respect to defendant’s contention, some of our sister States, which also require a defendant to prove his insanity by a fair preponderance of the evidence, have reached diametrically opposite conclusions when confronted with this exact problem. Compare In Re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d 666, 335 P. 2d 657, with State v. King, 375 S.W. 2d 34 (Mo.). See also, Insanity—Proof, 17 A.L.R. 3d .146, 217-219. The Federal Courts have adopted the i>rinciple, in cases involving violations of Federal statutes, that sanity is an essential ingredient of criminal liability, which, when questioned, must he proved hy the State, as any other element of the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 713. Pennsylvania has always had a different rule.

 Italics throughout ours, unless otherwise noted.

 Section 410 of the Mental Health and Mental Betardation Act of 1966 provides: “Whenever any person is adjudged guilty of a crime punishable by sentence to a penal or correctional institution, the trial court may defer sentence and order an examination of the defendant for mental disability to guide it in determining' his disposition. Such action may be taken on the court’s initiative . . . .” Act of October 20, 1966, Spec. Sess. No. 3, P. L. 96, art. IV, §410. Therefore, had the trial Judge believed that the defendant was mentally disabled, as distinguished from legally insane, he surely would have utilized the aforesaid provision.

 Defendant is not without an adequate remedy. His sentence can be commuted by the Board of Pardons, or it can pardon him. Moreover, if he is really mentally disabled, the warden or other officer in charge of the detaining penal or correctional institution, or counsel for the defendant, may petition the Court which imposed sentence for commitment of a mentally disabled person to a facility, as set forth in the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966. Act of October 20, 1966, P. L. 96, art. IV, §411.

 Amended by the Act of December 1, 1959, P. L. 1621, §1, 18 P.S. §4701.