Court Opinion

ID: 9522785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:17.088063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:55.625308
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
¶ 48. dissenting. To provide petitioner with competent and effective assistance of counsel and to preserve this Court’s role as protector of his right to counsel, this Court should deny counsel’s motion to withdraw and require her to file a brief on petitioner’s behalf. Neither the majority’s solution of rubber-stamping the attorney’s conclusion that the case lacks merit, nor Justice Dooley’s suggestion to require an Anders-type affidavit from counsel adequately resolves the conflict between indigent petitioner’s need for effective and zealous representation and counsel’s own professional obligation to refrain from bringing frivolous cases. While I concur with the majority’s conclusion that an Anders-like procedure is not constitutionally required or particularly effective in protecting an indigent litigant’s rights, I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that assigned counsel may withdraw at any point in the course of representation based solely on counsel’s own, unreviewable conclusion that the case is not warranted by existing law or nonfrivolous argument. The grave consequences of a post-conviction proceeding and the critical requirement of robust representation at this proceeding require more. To solve this problem, I would instead require counsel, once appointed, to remain in the case and to advance her client’s claims notwithstanding that she deems them to be without merit. Because I would deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, I dissent.
¶ 49. I begin by outlining the process of assigning counsel to indigent persons, which involves provisions of both the Public Defender Act (PDA) and our own administrative rules. The PDA entitles a “needy person” to counsel in a post-conviction relief (PCR) proceeding “which may have more than a minimal effect on the length or conditions of detention.” 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3). The determination of whether a person qualifies as needy is determined by “the clerk of the court.” A.O. 4, § 5(a). Based on an application demonstrating financial need, the court notifies the public defender if a person qualifies for counsel, and either that office or court-appointed conflict counsel is assigned to the case. Id. § 3. Petitioners must apply separately for counsel on appeal.
¶ 50. The question of what types of PCR petitions merit counsel arose in In re Gould, 2004 VT 46, 177 Vt. 7, 852 A.2d 632, where *199we addressed the question of whether a petitioner was entitled to replacement counsel after the trial court had granted previous counsel’s motion to withdraw. We concluded that the petitioner was entitled to new counsel under the existing language of the statute, which granted counsel in proceedings “the attorney or the needy person considers appropriate.” Id. ¶ 19 (quotation and emphasis omitted). Following our decision in Gould, the Legislature amended the statute to direct that under the PDA indigent petitioners are granted counsel in a PCR “where the attorney considers the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions to be warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” 13 V.S.A. § 5233(a)(3). The Legislature appeared to intend to limit representation to nonfrivolous cases, but the Legislature did not remove the courts from involvement in both the assignment and withdrawal of attorneys.
¶ 51. The majority construes the amended language of § 5233(a)(3) as authorizing counsel to withdraw from a case at any point when the attorney decides that the client’s claims are frivolous. Under the majority’s interpretation of the statute, to effectuate this withdrawal, counsel must simply notify this Court of her assessment and the Court will grant counsel’s motion. I find no support for this view in the language of the statute. The statute does not mention withdrawal and, as Justice Dooley recounts, the legislative history indicates that the statute was enacted to address the question of appointment, not withdrawal. Indeed, the procedural rules for both the trial court and our appellate court give the courts full discretion on motions to withdraw. See V.R.C.P. 79.1(f); V.R.A.P. 45.1(f) (explaining that after an appeal is docketed, leave to withdraw is granted “only for good cause shown”); see Cameron v. Burke, 153 Vt. 565, 573, 572 A.2d 1361, 1366 (1990). Despite the majority’s assertion otherwise, there is no clear legislative intent underlying § 5233 to divest this Court of its discretionary authority over motions to withdraw. Nothing in the language or the legislative history of § 5233 demonstrates that the Legislature intended to supplant the court’s traditional role in overseeing motions to withdraw. Thus, I decline to read that intent into the statute. State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275, 682 A.2d 943, 946 (1996) (“It is inappropriate to read into a statute something which is not there unless it is necessary in order to make the statute effective.”).
*200¶ 52. Moreover, I agree with Justice Dooley that it is an abdication of our judicial role to certify an attorney’s withdrawal from a case without ever independently examining the basis for counsel’s assertion that the case is frivolous. This Court generally assumes that counsel does not make false representations, but there is nothing distrustful about engaging in an independent assessment of the evidence, and this Court routinely conducts its own research and analytical investigation before deciding if counsel’s conclusions are correct. My hesitation in blindly accepting counsel’s assertion that her client’s case is frivolous is not grounded in any inherent belief that counsel is intentionally misleading this Court; rather, I am concerned about this Court’s responsibility to ensure that indigent persons receive competent and complete representation. Even in civil cases involving much less than what is at stake in PCR proceedings, we require counsel to do more than simply state that he or she wishes to withdraw. See Chaker v. Chaker, 147 Vt. 548, 549-50, 520 A.2d 1005, 1006-07 (1986) (examining whether circumstances meet standard of good cause to withdraw).
¶ 53. The majority fails to explain how its decision can be reconciled with this Court’s responsibility for, and discretion in, evaluating motions to withdraw. The majority prefers to treat this case as one involving appointment rather than withdrawal because it contends that in that context the attorney has full discretion. To do so, the majority concludes that petitioner’s attorney was involved based wholly on a “pro forma referral.” Ante, ¶ 7. Therefore, the majority concludes that there was no real assignment of counsel, id. ¶ 18, and counsel does not require “this Court’s permission to determine whether to represent his or her client.” Id. ¶ 20. The majority’s assumption ignores the bare facts. However ministerial, it is undisputed that counsel was assigned to petitioner by the court; to withdraw, counsel must request permission from this Court. If there is indeed some “Catch-22,” ante, ¶ 19, created by the current system, it is up to the Legislature to redesign the appointment process, rather than for this Court to legislate a change that it infers should exist. Moreover, in this case, it trivializes counsel’s involvement in petitioner’s case to say that her representation was wholly a formality. Counsel represented petitioner for eight months, filed documents on his behalf and requested extensions of time for preparation of his case. Under these circumstances, I conclude that her representation *201was real and this Court continues to have a responsibility to evaluate her withdrawal.
¶ 54. The Defender General asserts in its brief that the merit of a case is determined by an internal screening process involving separate review by three attorneys. This information is supposed to reassure this Court that the attorney’s withdrawal is warranted. It does not, however, alleviate my concerns. Whatever the process the Defender General has designed for screening cases, it is not the court’s process, and it is hidden from our view. If we are to certify an attorney’s withdrawal, then we must independently evaluate the reasons for the withdrawal because, in essence, allowing counsel to withdraw is a predetermination by this Court that petitioner’s case is frivolous. While there may be strong policy reasons for limiting the right to counsel in PCR proceedings, the statute does not answer the question of when and how an appointed attorney may withdraw because she deems the claims frivolous. I express no opinion on Justice Dooley’s contention that the Defender General’s “secret, unreviewable process” for screening cases is not consistent with due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Ante, ¶ 46. Because this appeal involves the issue of withdrawal and not assignment of counsel, the legality of such a process is not before us. I conclude only that as far as the Defender General’s screening process relates to attorney withdrawal, it cannot dictate to the court that an attorney’s withdrawal is warranted. As long as the courts are involved in the process, we must be able to ensure that the grounds for withdrawal are substantiated before granting the motion.
¶ 55. Thus, the question remains of how to evaluate counsel’s request to withdraw. Justice Dooley contends that the best option is to require counsel to file an affidavit specifying petitioner’s claims, outlining the supporting law, and affirming that the claims are without merit, modeled upon the requirements set out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). I understand the laudable goals behind this process, but conclude that it is administratively difficult, places the court in an advocacy rather than judicial role and undermines the attorney-client relationship. See Gale v. United States, 429 A.2d 177, 183 (D.C. 1981) (Ferren, J., dissenting) (“Motions to withdraw under Anders . . . are agonizing for the lawyer, awkward for the judge, and perceived as collusive by the appellant.”).
*202¶ 56. First, although it is intended to save time, Anders is a time-consuming effort for both counsel and the court. See Commonwealth v. Moffett, 418 N.E.2d 585, 590 (Mass. 1981) (criticizing Anders process as “cumbersome and impractical” and “insufficiently responsive both to the position of the indigent and to the ethical concerns of appointed counsel”). Appointed counsel must first search the record for possible claims. Then counsel must prepare a brief outlining possible issues and explaining why those issues lack merit. “Anders in practice invites counsel who sees no appellate issue to file either a short withdrawal memorandum ... or a comprehensive withdrawal brief.” Gale, 429 A.2d at 181 (Ferren, J., dissenting). In either case, substantial time is spent either by counsel researching and presenting a comprehensive brief or by the court when counsel files a summary brief. Id.; see State v. McKenney, 568 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Idaho 1977) (per curiam) (“[L]ess of counsel and the judiciary’s time and energy will be expended in directly considering the merits of the case in its regular and due course as contrasted with a fragmented consideration of various motions, the consideration of which necessarily involves a determination of merits.”). Furthermore, if the court concludes that some legal points arguably have merit, then more time is taken by reassigning counsel and having the case briefed.
¶ 57. Second, Anders places counsel and the courts in unsuited roles. When counsel briefs a case against his client, it requires the courts to assume an adversarial rather than judicial role by inquiring as to whether the record supports any credible arguments. See Moffett, 418 N.E.2d at 590-91. In evaluating an Anders brief, the court must independently examine the record to determine if any claims exist that are nonfrivolous. This role reversal thus “forces either the court to undertake the role of the lawyer, or the lawyer to undertake the role of the court,” and “does not well serve the administration of justice.” Gale, 429 A.2d at 182 (Ferren, J., dissenting). Allowing a petitioner’s claims to be evaluated outside of the adversarial process also compromises a litigant’s rights. See Gould, 2004 VT 46, ¶21 (explaining that justice is best served through the adversarial process).
¶ 58. Third, the attorney-client relationship is compromised because defense attorneys are required to brief the case against their clients. Thus, petitioners are “sandbagged when the counsel appointed by one arm of the Government seems to be helping *203another arm to seal his doom.” Id. ¶ 20 (quotation and alterations omitted); see Moffett, 418 N.E.2d at 590 (rejecting Anders process as “insufficiently responsive both to the position of the indigent and to the ethical concerns of appointed counsel”). Anders places counsel in a difficult position because there is a conflict between counsel’s duties to his client for zealous representation and his responsibilities to the court to be truthful and honest. McKenney, 568 P.2d at 1214-15.
¶ 59. In PCR proceedings, Anders is even more burdensome to courts than in direct appeals. In a PCR proceeding, it can be very onerous to search the record for error because the record is by definition boundless. It “includes trial counsel’s notes, police reports, witness interviews, and miscellaneous materials which may be voluminous in quantity and virtually unintelligible in form.” Hertz v. State, 755 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), superseded by rule as stated in Griffin v. State, 18 P.3d 71, 72 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). While the record in an appeal is a finite set of facts, in PCR proceedings claims of error are generally supported by facts outside the trial court record and may require a diligent attorney to review “documents from police files, interview or depose witnesses, and fully interview the petitioner.” Griffin, 18 P.3d at 74. If an attorney asserts that no nonfrivolous issues exist, then the court faces the “arduous task” of reviewing this claim by searching through these items on its own. Id. This process requires the court to assume an “inquisitorial role” more akin to advocate than to the court’s proper adjudicative function. Id.
¶ 60. In addition, the Anders procedure closely resembles our traditional way of resolving PCR petitions and therefore has little extra time savings. In a normal PCR proceeding, the petitioner submits a motion outlining errors in his conviction and sentence, and the trial court reviews the brief and may dismiss the petition if it lacks merit. 13 V.S.A. §§ 7132, 7133. In the Anders situation, the petitioner’s attorney must still set out the petitioner’s claims, but in addition must explain why they lack merit. Thus, the court is required to make a similar determination in both cases, but in Anders, counsel becomes an amicus of the court rather than an advocate for her client. Griffin, 18 P3d at 74.
¶ 61. To avoid these problems, I propose an alternative solution. Once an attorney is assigned to represent a petitioner in an initial PCR proceeding, I would not entertain any motion to withdraw *204based on counsel’s assertion that the case lacks merit. Instead, counsel would be required to consult with her client and to submit a brief advancing the client’s claims to the best of her ability. This suggestion is hardly novel. Several states do not allow counsel to submit an Anders brief to withdraw in direct appeals. See, e.g., Huguley v. State, 324 S.E.2d 729, 731 (Ga. 1985); McKenney, 568 P.2d at 1214 (holding that once counsel is appointed to represent an indigent client in a criminal appeal, no withdrawal will be permitted on the basis that the appeal lacks merit); Moffett, 418 N.E.2d at 591 (appointed counsel may not withdraw solely on ground that the appeal is frivolous); State v. Cigic, 639 A.2d 251, 254 (N.H. 1994).
¶ 62. The ABA Standards for defense counsel on appeal also recommend that appellate counsel should not seek to withdraw from a case based solely on her determination that the appeal lacks merit. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function Standard 4-8.3 (3d ed. 1993). The Standards advise counsel to carefully reflect on whether an appeal is frivolous because “[i]n some instances, even when the existing doctrine does not support a case for reversal on appeal, there may be a sound basis for arguing for an extension, modification, or reversal of exiting law. In such a case, the appeal ground is not frivolous.” Id. cmt. The Standards explain that it is inappropriate for counsel to submit an Anders-type brief because counsel is forced to act as an adviser to the court. Instead, counsel should prosecute the appeal as best as she can without deceiving or misleading the court. Id.
¶ 63. This process is utilized in New Jersey for PCR proceedings, where the post-conviction rule states: “Assigned counsel may not seek to withdraw on the ground of lack of merit of the petition. Counsel should advance any grounds insisted upon by defendant notwithstanding that counsel deems them without merit.” New Jersey Rules of Court, Rule 3:22-6(d). The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that in these cases an attorney must communicate with her client and then “fashion the most effective arguments possible.” State v. Rue, 811 A.2d 425, 437 (N.J. 2002) (quotation omitted). The attorney must “advance the claims the client desires to forward in a petition and brief and make the best available arguments in support of them,” but is not required to “engage in expository argument” and may stand on the brief. Id. at 437. In this posture, counsel is not required to fabricate evidence or claims, but must file a brief that argues the *205petitioner’s ease as well as possible. See Cigic, 639 A.2d at 254. If the appeal is truly frivolous counsel’s summary of the facts and law will make that obvious. Id. In this way, the court, rather than counsel, becomes the ultimate arbiter of the petition’s merit. See Hertz, 755 P.2d at 409.
¶ 64. While this Court has not addressed the question directly, as a practical matter, we do not entertain Anders motions to withdraw in direct appeals. See M. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States: Some Appellants’ Equal Protection is more Equal than Others’, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 625, 651 n.212 (1996) (noting that Vermont is one of several states that have not used Anders motions in direct appeals). In all cases, counsel submits a brief presenting the client’s claims as best as counsel is able, and we evaluate the merit of those claims. There is no practical reason why we should treat PCR proceedings differently from direct appeals in deciding whether to require an Anders brief. Frivolous claims are just as likely to appear in appeals from a conviction as in appeals from a PCR proceeding.
¶ 65. Adopting this procedure would have several advantages. It would eliminate the need for this Court to blindly certify an attorney’s withdrawal without independently examining the merits of the petitioner’s case. It would also eliminate the Andersassociated problems. There would be no need for counsel to delineate the shortcomings of her client’s case. Moreover, instead of independently evaluating the merits of a petition based on counsel’s affidavit, the court would have the benefit of considering the merits of the petition through the adversarial process. This would better serve the client and the court. See Cigic, 639 A.2d at 253-54 (explaining that prohibiting withdrawal preserves the integrity of the attorney-client relationship and allows the appellate court to directly review merits of case); see Warner, supra, at 666 (“By refusing to allow counsel to withdraw, appellate courts are better served because they will receive a brief on the merits, regardless of the issues.”).
¶ 66. As amicus, the Defender General argues that it is necessary to allow attorneys to withdraw in frivolous cases to save its limited resources for cases with merit. I recognize that requiring attorneys to continue representation does not provide the resource savings that the Defender General seeks. As explained above, however, I cannot simply allow withdrawal without some judicial oversight of the decision. Moreover, I submit that once an *206attorney has researched and reviewed a client’s case sufficiently to determine that the claims are without merit, requiring the attorney to submit a brief would not require onerous additional amounts of time. See Hertz, 755 P.2d at 409. In addition, whatever time is spent preparing a brief would not exceed the time spent on an Anders-type affidavit. See Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 608 (Ind. 2009) (“Requiring counsel to submit an ordinary appellate brief the first time — no matter how frivolous counsel regards the claims to be — is quicker, simpler, and places fewer demands on the appellate courts.”). Certainly in a case, such as this one, where counsel has accepted appointment and has represented an indigent for a significant period of time, it is particularly prejudicial to the indigent client to allow counsel’s motion to withdraw. See People v. Demarest, 801 P.2d 6, 7 (Colo. App. 1990) (denying counsel’s motion to withdraw under court’s discretionary power where counsel represented petitioner for eleven months prior to moving to -withdraw). The better approach is to deny the motion to withdraw and to require counsel to file a brief.
¶ 67. Finally, I briefly address the Defender General’s concern about placing counsel in an ethical dilemma. Counsel is obligated under the Rules of Professional Conduct to “not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” V.R.Pr.C. 3.1. In addition, when representation would violate an ethical rule, the attorney is instructed to withdraw. V.R.Pr.C. 1.16(a)(1). Thus, the Defender General asserts that counsel must withdraw when she deems her client’s case to be frivolous. See Gould, 2004 VT 46, ¶ 23 (noting that counsel may fear entanglement with professional responsibility board where few viable issues are presented in a PCR petition). I recognize the real and serious responsibility that lawyers have not to advance frivolous law suits, but I think that this ethical dilemma is largely overstated.
¶ 68. To begin, I emphasize that the actual chance that an attorney will be forced to bring an appeal based on a truly frivolous claim is extremely rare. As other courts have stressed, the standard of Mvolousness is a high one. See, e.g., Cigic, 639 A.2d at 253 (defining when an action is frivolous). “There is a significant difference between making a weak argument with little *207chance of success . . . and making a frivolous argument with no chance of success.” Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d 829, 837 (7th Cir. 1999); see Ramos v. State, 944 P.2d 856, 858 (Nev. 1997) (per curiam) (“An action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client’s position will ultimately not prevail.”). Even in cases where counsel sees no grounds for reversal under current precedent, a good faith argument can be made to extend, modify or reverse existing law. Cigic, 639 A.2d at 253. Thus, the actual number of cases that would result in counsel being placed in this ethical bind would be very small. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 110 cmt. b (2000) (noting that disciplinary enforcement against frivolous litigation is rare).
¶ 69. Furthermore, to protect an attorney in the extraordinary situation where she is forced to bring a frivolous claim, this Court could create an exception to the professional conduct rule under its authority over attorney discipline. Vt. Const, ch. II, § 30 (granting Supreme Court administrative control over discipline of attorneys); see In re Farrar, 2008 VT 31, ¶ 5, 183 Vt. 592, 949 A.2d 438 (mem.) (recognizing that this Court has discretion in sanctioning attorneys); see also V.R.Pr.C. 1.16(c) (stating that a lawyer must continue representation if ordered to do so, even if there is good cause for terminating). Thus, attorneys would be freed from any possible ethical violation. Three other states, which have rejected Anders and do not allow counsel to withdraw in a criminal appeal, have created an exception to the ethical prohibition on raising frivolous issues. See Ramos, 944 P.2d at 858; Cigic, 639 A.2d at 254; Huguley, 324 S.E.2d at 731.
¶ 70. This exception would not undermine the purposes behind the rule on bringing frivolous claims, which are to prevent harassment of the opposition and to avoid wasting judicial resources. J. Duggan & A. Moeller, Make Way for the ABA: Smith v. Robbins Clears a Path for Anders Alternatives, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 65, 101 (2001).
The opposition — the state or federal government — incurs additional expense by being required to respond to a frivolous argument, but this hardly rises to the level of the harassment the ethical rule targets. In addition, the court’s resources are not being abused because, one way or another, the court will have to review the issues.
Id. Ultimately, I believe that it is more important to preserve an indigent’s right to effective counsel than to avoid having counsel *208continue representation because of a perceived ethical problem. See Warner, supra, at 667 (“Moreover, in the hierarchy of rights and obligations under our Constitution, the preservation of the right to counsel must have a higher priority than the nonconstitutionally based ethical dilemma that may arise occasionally for the attorney who finds no arguable error in an appeal.”). Resolving claims through the adversarial system is the best way to ensure effectiveness of counsel. See id. at 662.
¶ 71. In summary, I disagree with the majority’s decision to grant counsel’s motion to withdraw based solely on her assertion that the petition is without merit and, thus, to leave petitioner without counsel to advance his PCR claims. Instead, I would deny the motion to withdraw and require counsel to file a brief on her client’s behalf.