Court Opinion

ID: 9389826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 15:04:14.980223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.818097
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                         Opinion filed April 26, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D15-2815
                      Lower Tribunal No. F14-22311
                          ________________

                                John Garcia,
                                 Appellant,

                                     vs.

                           The State of Florida,
                                Appellee.

      An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Stephen T.
Millan, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Katryna Santa Cruz, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES and HENDON, JJ.

     SCALES, J.
      This case is on remand from the Florida Supreme Court for

reconsideration in light of Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179 (Fla. 2020). See

State v. Garcia, 338 So. 3d 847, 848 (Fla. 2022) (“Garcia II”). In Garcia v.

State, 276 So. 3d 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“Garcia I”), this Court (i) reduced

John Garcia’s conviction for second-degree grand theft to third-degree grand

theft, and (ii) reversed Mr. Garcia’s conviction for second-degree murder and

directed the lower court to enter an order of acquittal on the charge.

Importantly, in reaching its decision on Mr. Garcia’s second-degree murder

conviction, this Court applied the now-abandoned special standard of

appellate review for purely circumstantial evidence cases (“special

standard”).1 While Garcia I was pending review in the Florida Supreme

Court, however, our high court eliminated this special standard, so that, on

remand, our review is now limited to whether the State presented competent,

substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. See Bush, 295 So. 3d at

200. Consequently, in Garcia II, the Florida Supreme Court quashed Garcia

I and “remand[ed] with instructions that the Third District reconsider Mr.

1
  Under this now-abandoned special standard, in addition to determining
whether Mr. Garcia’s guilty verdict was supported by competent, substantial
evidence regarding each element of the charged crime, we were required to
determine “whether the State presented competent evidence from which the
jury could infer [Mr. Garcia’s] guilt for the crime charged to the exclusion of
all reasonable hypotheses of innocence.” Garcia I, 276 So. 3d at 866.

                                      2
Garcia’s appeal applying the competent, substantial evidence standard of

Bush.” Garcia II, 338 So. 3d at 848.

        With regard to Mr. Garcia’s theft conviction – to which we did not apply

the now-abandoned special standard in Garcia I – we are again compelled

to reduce Mr. Garcia’s conviction for second-degree grand theft to third-

degree grand theft because the State failed to present competent,

substantial evidence that the value of the property Mr. Garcia stole from the

victim, Larissa Macriello, met the $20,000 threshold for second-degree grand

theft. With regard to Mr. Garcia’s conviction for second-degree murder – to

which we did, in Garcia I, apply the now-abandoned special standard – we

conclude, under the Bush standard, that the State failed to present

competent, substantial evidence below that Ms. Macriello died through the

criminal agency of Mr. Garcia. Hence, we are again compelled to reverse Mr.

Garcia’s conviction on this count, and remand to the lower court with

directions to enter an order of acquittal on the charge. We do, however,

certify to the Florida Supreme Court a question of great public importance

regarding the continued viability, in light of Bush, of the general prohibition

against the pyramiding of inferences.

   I.      RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

   A. Relevant Background

                                        3
      In 1999, Larissa Macriello relocated to the United States from Panama.

Over the years, she lived in Rhode Island, Maryland, North Carolina and

Florida. In the summer of 2009, Ms. Macriello moved to Jacksonville Beach,

Florida to live with her brother, Roderik Mokillo. In early 2011, she moved to

Miami. In early June 2013, Ms. Macriello disappeared suddenly and without

a trace.

      Ms. Macriello was close to her family, staying in frequent contact with

her mother and siblings via telephone, email, text message and social media.

She last communicated with her brother, Mr. Mokillo, via text message in late

May of 2013, over Memorial Day weekend. She last spoke to her mother on

the telephone on June 1, 2013.

      Ms. Macriello’s landlord last saw and spoke to Ms. Macriello on June

3, 2013. Ms. Macriello told the landlord that she was waiting for her passport

to arrive so that she could return to Panama to visit her mother. On June 10,

2013, between noon and 2 p.m., the landlord heard Ms. Macriello’s car being

parked in Ms. Macriello’s usual parking spot in front of her apartment

building. The landlord did not, however, see the individual who drove the car.

That same day, June 10, 2013, around noon, a taxi driver picked up the

defendant, John Garcia, and an unknown woman (not Ms. Macriello) from a

convenience store located several blocks from Ms. Macriello’s residence.

                                      4
      After Ms. Macriello failed to respond to text messages, or to answer or

return telephone calls, Mr. Mokillo traveled to Miami on June 18, 2013, to file

a missing person report. That same day, with the assistance of the landlord,

officers from the Miami-Dade County Police Department (“MDPD”) gained

access to Ms. Macriello’s apartment to conduct a check on Ms. Macriello’s

welfare. Ms. Macriello was not inside the apartment. The police walk-through

of the apartment revealed no signs of a struggle, and nothing out of the

ordinary. The police did not see her purse, laptop computer, cellphone or car

keys in the apartment; these items were never found. The officers observed

Ms. Macriello’s car in the parking space outside the apartment building, but

did not search it beyond confirming that Ms. Macriello was not inside it. The

officers’ subsequent calls to hospitals and jails in Miami-Dade and Broward

counties revealed no information on Ms. Macriello’s whereabouts.

      Ms. Macriello had a checking and a savings account with Bank of

America (“BOA”). Although Ms. Macriello’s brother, Mr. Mokillo, was not an

authorized user on the BOA accounts, he was listed as the beneficiary on

the accounts. Mr. Mokillo visited a BOA bank branch and was able to learn,

generally, that withdrawals were being made out of her accounts in large

amounts. Mr. Mokillo relayed this information to the police, who subpoenaed

Ms. Macriello’s BOA account records.

                                      5
      The BOA account records revealed that, around the date of Ms.

Macriello’s disappearance (June 3, 2013), there was approximately $24,000

in her BOA checking account and $23,000 in her BOA savings account.

Beginning on June 5, 2013, and going through August 15, 2013, however,

the bulk of her BOA account balances was drained through a series of

transactions, all to the benefit of Mr. Garcia – specifically: (i) on June 5 and

12, 2013, Mr. Garcia made two ATM withdrawals from Ms. Macriello’s BOA

savings account, 2 using her ATM card and personal identification number

(“PIN”); (ii) Mr. Garcia deposited two $20,000 personal checks (dated June

5 and 10, 2013, respectively), written by Ms. Macriello to Mr. Garcia, into his

own BOA checking account; and (iii) multiple online transfers were made

from Ms. Macriello’s BOA checking account to Mr. Garcia’s BOA checking

account totaling $4,700. 3 Cumulatively, these transactions depleted Ms.

Macriello’s BOA accounts.

      The police subpoenaed the cellphone records for Ms. Macriello’s and

Mr. Garcia’s cellphone accounts, learning that there were frequent calls

2
 BOA surveillance video and still pictures from the BOA ATM evidenced Mr.
Garcia making these two ATM withdrawals, the first of which Mr. Garcia
made at a BOA drive-up ATM while driving Ms. Macriello’s vehicle.
3
 The BOA records custodian testified that the following online transfers were
made: $1,000 on June 5, 2013; $1,000 on June 26, 2013; $1,000 on July 5,
2013; $1,000 on July 17, 2013; and $700 on August 5, 2013.

                                       6
between Mr. Garcia’s and Ms. Macriello’s cellphones between the time Ms.

Macriello was last seen (June 3, 2013) and when her cellphone was shut off

(July 7, 2013). Other than calling voicemail, Ms. Macriello’s cellphone made

no outgoing calls to anyone other than Mr. Garcia. Moreover, during this

timeframe, numerous calls between Mr. Garcia’s cellphone and Ms.

Macriello’s cellphone “pinged” off the same cellular antenna, within the same

sector, indicating that the cellphones were within close proximity to each

other at the time of the calls.

      During their investigation, the police learned from Ms. Macriello’s sister

that Ms. Macriello had obtained a second cellphone number in late May

2013, just days before Ms. Macriello’s disappearance. The second cellphone

was never recovered. While MDPD requested the cellphone records for the

second cellphone number from the cellphone carrier, MDPD never received

the records. Mr. Garcia’s cellphone records, though, reflected incoming calls

from Ms. Macriello’s second cellphone number on June 4, 2013, and June

7, 2013.

      When MDPD crime scene investigators (“CSI”) processed and

inspected Ms. Macriello’s vehicle in mid-July 2013, they found that her car

was unlocked, smelled of cleaning agents, and was thoroughly clean inside.

The driver’s seat was positioned further back to accommodate a driver taller

                                       7
than Ms. Macriello. CSI sprayed the interior of the vehicle with luminol, which

reacts to hemoglobin in blood. The luminol reacted to a fluid in the trunk

(possibly detecting the outline of a purse) and to a fluid on the front

passenger floorboard (possibly detecting the outline of a hammer). The

affected area was removed and tested, but the results came back negative

for blood, and the fluid to which the luminol reacted remains unknown. CSI

found two strands of Mr. Garcia’s hair in the vehicle interior, and one DNA

sample matching Mr. Garcia on the car’s center console. CSI also found a

mixture of DNA on the vehicle’s steering wheel; Ms. Macriello’s DNA was

included in the mixture.

      In October 2014, Mr. Garcia voluntarily went to the police station to

discuss Ms. Macriello’s disappearance with an MDPD homicide detective. In

the interview, Mr. Garcia stated that he met Ms. Macriello on a dating

website. He admitted to having an ongoing sexual relationship with Ms.

Macriello. Mr. Garcia’s wife did not know Ms. Macriello or that Mr. Garcia had

a relationship with her. Mr. Garcia claimed that he had last seen Ms.

Macriello sometime between July 4 and August 2013.

      Mr. Garcia told the MDPD homicide detective that he had loaned

money to Ms. Macriello on occasion; but, Mr. Garcia did not tell the detective

about a specific loan to Ms. Macriello where she had executed a promissory

                                      8
note memorializing a $20,000 loan from him to her. Mr. Garcia made two

demonstratively false statements to the detective: (i) Mr. Garcia denied

having any access to, or taking any money from, Ms. Macriello’s BOA

accounts; and (ii) Mr. Garcia stated that he had only been in Ms. Macriello’s

car as a passenger.

      During the taped police interview, Mr. Garcia’s wife confronted Mr.

Garcia, and Mr. Garcia told his wife that he and Ms. Macriello were “just

friends”; he denied to his wife that he ever had sex with Ms. Macriello. Mr.

Garcia initially denied receiving any money from Ms. Macriello, but later

admitted to his wife that Ms. Macriello had given him two $20,000 checks

because Ms. Macriello owed him money. 4 Mr. Garcia told his wife that he did

not kill Ms. Macriello and that Ms. Macriello would show up some day. The

police arrested Mr. Garcia that same day.

    B. The Underlying Trial Court Proceedings

      The State charged Mr. Garcia by information with the first-degree

premeditated murder of Ms. Macriello, and one count of second-degree

4
   A warranted search of Mr. Garcia’s home revealed a handwritten
promissory note, purportedly in Ms. Macriello’s handwriting, that was found
in the back of a filing cabinet drawer. This note purported to evidence that
Mr. Garcia had loaned Ms. Macriello $20,000. During this search, the police
also found two firearms in Mr. Garcia’s home. See footnote 5, infra.

                                     9
grand theft. A Florida grand jury also indicted Mr. Garcia on these charges. 5

The case went to trial in November 2015.

      At trial, the State theorized that, on June 4, 2013, Mr. Garcia killed Ms.

Macriello in order to steal the money in her BOA savings and checking

accounts. At the close of the State’s case, the defense moved for a judgment

of acquittal as to the first-degree murder and second-degree grand theft

charges, arguing, in part, that the State had failed to present evidence to

rebut Mr. Garcia’s reasonable hypotheses of innocence to the charges. The

trial court denied Mr. Garcia’s motion.

      The jury found Mr. Garcia guilty of second-degree murder, a lesser

included offense of first-degree premeditated murder. The jury also found

Mr. Garcia guilty of second-degree grand theft, finding that the value of the

stolen property was “$20,000 or more but less than $100,000.” The trial court

sentenced Mr. Garcia to life in prison for second-degree murder and to fifteen

5
  The State also charged Mr. Garcia with, and indicted him for, two counts of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. These two counts were
eventually severed and Mr. Garcia pled guilty to both counts, reserving his
right to challenge the legality of the search on appeal. The trial court
sentenced Mr. Garcia to fifteen years in prison on each count of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, to run consecutively. The trial court later
vacated one of the firearm possession sentences. This Court affirmed Mr.
Garcia’s conviction for one count of possession of a firearm and the fifteen-
year sentence thereon. See Garcia v. State, 225 So. 3d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA
2017).

                                      10
years in prison for second-degree grand theft, with both sentences to run

consecutively. Mr. Garcia timely appealed his convictions and sentences to

this Court.

   C. Appellate Proceedings in Garcia I and Garcia II

      In his plenary appeal to this Court, Mr. Garcia argued that the trial court

had erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charges

of first-degree murder and second-degree grand theft. Garcia I, 276 So. 3d

at 867, 870. With regard to Mr. Garcia’s theft conviction, we concluded that,

while the State had presented competent, substantial evidence from which

a jury could conclude that Mr. Garcia’s two $500 ATM withdrawals from Ms.

Macriello’s BOA savings account constituted theft, there was no competent,

substantial evidence that supported the State’s allegations that the other

transactions constituted theft. Garcia I, 276 So. 3d at 867-68. Hence, this

Court reduced Mr. Garcia’s second-degree grand theft conviction to third-

degree grand theft. Id. at 870. To Mr. Garcia’s murder conviction, we applied

the then-appropriate special standard, and reversed the conviction,

concluding that the “the State failed to adduce sufficient, competent evidence

to rebut Mr. Garcia’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id.

      Relying upon the then-recently decided Bush case, the Florida

Supreme Court quashed Garcia I and remanded Mr. Garcia’s appeal to this

                                       11
Court for reconsideration in light of Bush’s elimination of the special

standard. Garcia II, 338 So. 3d at 848. We ordered supplemental briefing

from the parties and heard renewed oral arguments. Pursuant to Garcia II’s

remand instructions, we now undertake a review of the trial court’s denial of

Mr. Garcia’s motion for judgment of acquittal without regard to the special

standard that was abandoned by our high court in Bush.

   II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

         “When the defendant in a criminal appeal challenges the sufficiency of

the State’s evidence, the appellate court conducts a de novo review of the

trial record to ensure that the guilty verdict is supported by competent,

substantial evidence regarding each element of the charged crime.”

Rodriguez v. State, 335 So. 3d 168, 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). In conducting

its review of the record, the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence,

but simply determines whether competent, substantial evidence has been

presented by the State as to each element of the crime. See Durousseau v.

State, 55 So. 3d 543, 556 (Fla. 2010). This standard of appellate review

applies regardless of whether, at trial, the State presented only purely

circumstantial evidence of guilt as to the charge crime. Bush, 295 So. 3d at

200-01. While a jury may draw reasonable inferences from the State’s

evidence to reach the conclusion of guilt, “evidence is insufficient to support

                                       12
a conviction when it requires pyramiding of assumptions or impermissibly

stacked inferences.” Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198, 205 (Fla. 2007). 6

            In moving for a judgment of acquittal, the defendant “admits not only

the facts stated in the evidence adduced, but also admits every conclusion

favorable to the [State] that a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the

evidence.” Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 1974). “If, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact

could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction.” Pagan v. State, 830

So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). “The [trial court] should not grant a motion for

judgment of acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which the jury

may lawfully take of it favorable to the [State] can be sustained under the

law.” Lynch, 293 So. 2d at 45.

     III.     ANALYSIS

     A. Preservation for Appellate Review

            We first address the State’s claim that Mr. Garcia’s motion for judgment

of acquittal failed to adequately preserve Mr. Garcia’s appellate argument

that the State failed to establish each element of the crimes with competent,

substantial evidence. The State’s Supplemental Answer Brief on Remand

6
    See Section III. C. 1., infra.

                                           13
contends that Mr. Garcia’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the theft and

murder charges challenged only the State’s failure to present evidence that

was inconsistent with Mr. Garcia’s reasonable hypotheses of innocence,

neglecting to argue further that the State had failed to present competent,

substantial evidence to support an element of the charged crimes.

      Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.380(b) requires a motion for

judgment of acquittal to “fully set forth the grounds on which it is based.” “[A]

‘technical and pro-forma’ motion which requests a judgment of acquittal

without further argument is ‘totally inadequate to preserve a sufficiency of the

evidence claim for appellate review.’’” Young v. State, 141 So. 3d 161, 165

(Fla. 2013) (quoting Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 895 (Fla. 2000)). To

preserve for appellate review Mr. Garcia’s challenges to the sufficiency of

the evidence presented below, he was required, in moving for judgment of

acquittal at trial, to identify the element(s) of the second-degree grand theft

and first-degree murder charges “for which he contended the evidence was

lacking.” Rodriguez, 335 So. 3d at 172; see also Bradwell v. State, 300 So.

3d 325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (noting, in purely circumstantial evidence

cases, pre-Bush, that a claim the State failed to present legally sufficient

evidence to establish each element of the charged crime was a “legally

distinct issue[]” that must be raised below to preserve appellate review).

                                       14
      In moving below for a judgment of acquittal as to the first-degree

murder charge, defense counsel argued initially that the State had failed to

present evidence to rebut Mr. Garcia’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence,

pointing to the lack of any direct evidence that Ms. Macriello was dead, that

her death was caused by Mr. Garcia, or that the killing was premeditated.

Defense counsel, though, then went on to argue that there was “no

conclusive evidence establishing the scene of a crime”; that there was “no

conclusive evidence to support that [Ms. Macriello] is dead”; and that the

State had presented no evidence to support its theory that Mr. Garcia had

killed Ms. Macriello to steal her money. Defense counsel stated further that

“those arguments that I made also apply to the grand theft.”

      On this record, we conclude that defense counsel adequately

preserved for appellate review Mr. Garcia’s challenges to the sufficiency of

the evidence presented at trial as to both the murder and theft charges. See

Rodriguez, 335 So. 3d at 173 (“While no magic words are needed to make

a proper objection, the articulated concern must be sufficiently specific to

inform the court of the perceived error.” (quoting Murray v. State, 3 So. 3d

1108, 1117 (Fla. 2009) (internal quotations omitted))). We, therefore, now

turn to the merits of Mr. Garcia’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence

presented at trial for both of the charges of which Mr. Garcia was convicted.

                                      15
    B. The Second-Degree Grand Theft Conviction7

      The jury convicted Mr. Garcia of second-degree grand theft, accepting

the State’s theory that Mr. Garcia, through a series of transactions occurring

between June 4, 2013, and August 15, 2013, depleted $45,700 from Ms.

Macriello’s BOA savings and checking accounts. In moving below for a

judgment of acquittal on the grand theft charge, defense counsel

acknowledged that Mr. Garcia (i) deposited into his personal account two

$20,000 personal checks drawn on Ms. Macriello’s BOA’s checking account,

(ii) received a series of online transfers from Ms. Macriello’s BOA checking

account, totaling $4,700, and (iii) made two $500 ATM withdrawals from Ms.

Macriello’s BOA savings account. Rebutting the State’s theory, defense

7
  The Florida Supreme Court’s remand instructions require us to “reconsider
Mr. Garcia’s appeal applying the competent, substantial evidence standard
of Bush” without regard to the special standard of appellate review that Bush
abrogated. Garcia II, 338 So. 3d at 848. As we noted in Garcia I, though, with
respect to our appellate review of the trial court’s denial of Mr. Garcia’s
motion for judgment of acquittal regarding the grand theft charge, we did not
apply the special standard. See Garcia I, 276 So. 3d at 869, n.13. Without
applying the special standard, in Garcia I we concluded that “the State
presented competent, substantial evidence that the value of the property
Garcia stole from the victim, Larissa Macriello, was only $1,000.” Id. at 862-
63. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity and because Garcia II quashed the
entirety of Garcia I without differentiating between this Court’s treatment of
Mr. Garcia’s theft and murder convictions, we review anew the State’s
evidence regarding Mr. Garcia’s second-degree grand theft conviction under
Bush’s competent, substantial evidence standard.

                                     16
counsel argued that none of these transactions constituted “theft” because:

(i) Ms. Macriello had written the two $20,000 checks to Mr. Garcia, one of

which satisfied a personal loan that was memorialized in a promissory note;

(ii) the State had presented no evidence that Mr. Garcia had initiated the

$4,700 in online transfers; and (iii) Mr. Garcia had made the two $500 ATM

withdrawals with Ms. Macriello’s consent, as evidenced by Mr. Garcia having

Ms. Macriello’s PIN.

      Section 812.014(1) of the Florida Statutes (2013), Florida’s theft

statute, provides:

      (1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or
      uses,[8] or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another
      with intent to, either temporarily or permanently:

8
 Section 812.012(3) of the Florida Statutes (2013) defines “obtains or uses”
as any manner of:

      (a) Taking or exercising control over property.

      (b) Making any unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of
          property.

      (c) Obtaining property by fraud, willful misrepresentation of a
          future act, or false promise.

      (d)1. Conduct previously known as stealing; larceny; purloining;
      abstracting; embezzlement; misapplication; misappropriation;
      conversion; or obtaining money or property by false pretenses,
      fraud, or deception; or

      2. Other conduct similar in nature.

                                     17
      (a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit
      from the property.

      (b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use
      of any person not entitled to the use of the property.

      Hence, for each of the transactions that the State alleged constituted

Mr. Garcia’s theft of Ms. Macriello’s funds, the State was required to

establish, with competent, substantial evidence, that Mr. Garcia knowingly

obtained Ms. Macriello’s property with the specific intent either to deprive Ms.

Macriello of her right to the property or to appropriate the property to his own

use. We now analyze each transaction to determine whether the jury’s

verdict finding Mr. Garcia guilty of second-degree grand theft was supported

by competent, substantial evidence.

   1. The two $20,000 personal checks from Ms. Macriello to Mr. Garcia

      Mr. Garcia deposited two $20,000 checks – ostensibly signed by Ms.

Macriello, and made payable to him – into his own BOA checking account.

The State posited below that Mr. Garcia had somehow coerced Ms. Macriello

into writing and signing the two $20,000 personal checks by placing her

under duress, or, alternatively, that Mr. Garcia had forged Ms. Macriello’s

                                      18
signature on the checks. The State, however, presented no evidence to

support its theory. 9

      The State’s forensic document examiner testified that she compared

BOA machine copies of the two personal checks to known handwriting

samples of Ms. Macriello. Based on her comparisons, the forensic document

examiner opined that the two checks were “probably written by Larissa D.

Macriello.” The memo line of the check dated June 5, 2013, read “Repay

Loan #1.” The memo line of the check dated June 10, 2013, read “#2.” The

forensic document examiner also testified that she examined the original,

handwritten promissory note purportedly evidencing that Ms. Macriello owed

$20,000 to Mr. Garcia. Based on her comparison of the promissory note to

Ms. Macriello’s known handwriting samples, the forensic document examiner

testified that she was “able to identify Larissa D. Macriello as the writer of

that note.” When asked by the State whether the forensic document

examiner was able to determine whether a document was written under “any

kind of pressure” or “duress,” the forensic document examiner answered

each time, unequivocally, “No.”

9
  Notably, the State did not argue this theory to the jury during closing
argument.

                                     19
        Hence, the State presented no evidence that Mr. Garcia somehow

coerced Ms. Macriello into writing the two $20,000 personal checks or the

promissory note, or that Mr. Garcia had forged Ms. Macriello’s signature on

the documents. Without any evidence of forgery or coercion, the State’s

evidence establishes nothing more than Mr. Garcia’s depositing of checks

that were made payable to him. Thus, as we did in Garcia I, we conclude

that the State failed to present competent, substantial evidence that Mr.

Garcia knowingly obtained Ms. Macriello’s property ($40,000) with the

specific intent either to deprive Ms. Macriello of her right to the property or to

appropriate the property to his own use. See § 812.014(1), Fla. Stat. (2013).

     2. The $4,700 in online transfers from Ms. Macriello’s BOA checking
        account

        With regard to the series of online transfers, 10 the State maintained

below that Mr. Garcia stole money from Ms. Macriello’s BOA checking

account by making the numerous online transfers (between June 5, 2013

and August 15, 2013) from Ms. Macriello’s BOA checking account to Mr.

Garcia’s BOA checking account. The State, however, presented no evidence

at trial to support this theory.

10
     See footnote 3, supra.

                                       20
      BOA’s records custodian testified that BOA has the capability of

determining the origin of an online transfer – i.e., the geographic location of,

and the specific computer from whence, the electronic funds transfer

originated – by looking at the internet protocol (“IP”) address associated with

a particular online transaction. The BOA records custodian testified though,

that to his knowledge, MDPD never made an IP address request for the

subject online transactions.11 Because BOA did not process such a search

request, the IP address(es) – and origin information – for the online

transactions are unknown.

      The State presented no evidence that Mr. Garcia ever possessed, or

had access to, Ms. Macriello’s laptop computer, or that Ms. Macriello stored

the username and password for her BOA accounts on the laptop computer.

MDPD never recovered Ms. Macriello’s laptop computer after her

disappearance. The State also presented no evidence that Mr. Garcia had

learned Ms. Macriello’s username and password through other means, 12 nor

11
  The MDPD homicide detective testified that the IP addresses for the
subject online transactions were subpoenaed from BOA, but BOA never
complied with the subpoena.
12
   We note that Mr. Garcia’s possession of Ms. Macriello’s ATM card and
PIN did not establish that Mr. Garcia knew the username or password for
Ms. Macriello’s BOA accounts such that Mr. Garcia could initiate the online
transfers.

                                      21
did the State adduce any evidence of Mr. Garcia’s use of his own personal

computer with respect to the subject online transactions. In short, there was

no evidence presented to the jury that the online transfers were initiated by

Mr. Garcia.

      Given this lack of evidence, the State was unable to posit to the jury

any explanation for how Mr. Garcia allegedly accomplished the online

transactions in this case. Indeed, during the State’s closing argument, the

prosecutor commented:

      Now, we all know you have to have security codes to do these
      kinds of transfers. He got Larissa’s security code somehow. I
      can’t tell you how. I can’t tell you how. Even her family didn’t have
      them. Even her family didn’t have them. He got them somehow.

      Thus, we are compelled to conclude, as we did in Garcia I, that the

State failed to present competent, substantial evidence that Mr. Garcia

knowingly obtained, through online banking transactions, Ms. Macriello’s

property ($4,700) with the specific intent either to deprive Ms. Macriello of

her right to the property or to appropriate the property to his own use. 13 See

§ 812.014(1), Fla. Stat. (2013).

13
   We are cognizant that theft can be charged where there is a knowing and
intentional possession of recently stolen property. See § 812.014(1), Fla.
Stat. (2013); § 812.022(2), Fla. Stat. (2013); Smith v. State, 742 So. 2d 352,
354-55 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). The State, however, did not charge or indict Mr.
Garcia in this manner, nor was the jury instructed thereon.

                                       22
  3. The two $500 ATM withdrawals from Ms. Macriello’s BOA savings
     account

     With regard to the two $500 ATM withdrawals, we reach a different

conclusion because the State was able to establish that Mr. Garcia took Ms.

Macriello’s funds, and the State also presented sufficient evidence for the

jury to conclude that Mr. Garcia did so without Ms. Macriello’s consent.

     The State introduced, through the BOA records custodian, surveillance

video, still pictures and transaction records evidencing that: (i) on June 5,

2013, at 3:56 p.m., while driving Ms. Macriello’s vehicle, Mr. Garcia used Ms.

Macriello’s ATM card and PIN to withdraw $500 from her BOA savings

account at a BOA drive-up ATM located in Brownsville; and (ii) on June 12,

2013, at 4:05 p.m., Mr. Garcia used Ms. Macriello’s ATM card and PIN to

withdraw $500 from her BOA savings account at a BOA walk-up ATM located

in North Miami Beach. Thus, the State presented direct evidence that Mr.

Garcia had knowingly obtained Ms. Macriello’s property – i.e., the $1,000 he

withdrew from the BOA ATMs.

     The State also introduced circumstantial evidence from which the jury

could reasonably infer that Mr. Garcia’s ATM withdrawals occurred without

Ms. Macriello’s consent. Ms. Macriello’s brother, Roderick Mokillo, testified

that Ms. Macriello did not give anyone access to her BOA accounts. The

BOA records custodian testified that Ms. Macriello was the only legal signer

                                     23
on her BOA savings account. Further, the jury heard Mr. Garcia’s recorded

interview with police where Mr. Garcia falsely stated both that he had (i)

never taken any money from Ms. Macriello’s BOA accounts, and (ii) been in

Macriello’s car only as a passenger. By virtue of these false exculpatory

statements to the police, the jury was able to infer Mr. Garcia’s

consciousness of guilt for the ATM withdrawals. See Simpson v. State, 562

So. 2d 742, 745 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

   Notwithstanding this evidence, Mr. Garcia argues that the State failed to

present any evidence to prove that Mr. Garcia had the requisite specific

intent either to deprive Ms. Macriello of her property or to appropriate the

property to his own use. See § 812.014(1), Fla. Stat. (2013); Benitez v. State,

852 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“Grand theft requires proof of intent

to deprive the owner of property of its use or benefit.”). We disagree. “Intent,

being a state of mind, is often not subject to direct proof and can only be

inferred from circumstances.” Benitez, 852 So. 2d at 388 (quoting Jones v.

State, 192 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)). Unlike the grand theft

charges premised on the checks and online transfers, Mr. Garcia’s specific

intent to deprive Ms. Macriello of her property can be inferred under the

circumstances outlined herein. With regard to the two ATM withdrawals, we

conclude, as we did in Garcia I, that the State presented sufficient evidence

                                      24
to create a jury question as to whether Mr. Garcia had the intent either to

deprive Ms. Macriello of her property or to appropriate the property to his

own use.

   4. Mr. Garcia’s theft conviction must be reduced to third-degree grand
      theft

      The State charged and indicted Mr. Garcia with second-degree grand

theft, which requires that the property stolen be valued “at $20,000 or more,

but less than $100,000.” § 812.014(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). Whereas, the

charge of grand theft in the third degree requires the value of the property

stolen to be between $300 and $19,999. See § 812.014(2)(c)1.-3., Fla. Stat.

(2013). Because we conclude that the State established with competent,

substantial evidence only that the two ATM transactions (totaling $1,000)

constituted grand theft, Mr. Garcia’s theft conviction must be reduced to third-

degree grand theft. See § 924.34, Fla. Stat. (2013); Council v. State, 206 So.

3d 155, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“[W]e hold that the State failed to introduce

competent, substantial evidence showing that the value of the stolen

property exceeded $20,000, and we reverse and remand to the trial court to

impose a sentence for grand theft over $10,000 but less than $20,000, a

third-degree felony.”).

   C. The Second-Degree Murder Conviction

                                      25
     1. Gustine’s legal principle prohibiting the pyramiding of assumptions or
        inferences and certification of Gustine’s continued validity as a
        question of great public importance

       Because it is essential to our analysis and outcome determinative, we

first must address the State’s principal argument on remand: that Bush not

only eliminated the special standard, but that Bush also “effectively

abrogated” the related legal principle – first articulated in Gustine v. State,

97 So. 207 (Fla. 1923) – that a criminal defendant cannot be convicted based

on circumstantial evidence that requires the factfinder to engage in

pyramiding of assumptions or inferences 14 to reach the conclusion that the

defendant committed the essential elements of the charged crime.

       In Gustine, the defendant, who had attempted to steal a car, was

charged with attempted larceny. At trial, the State presented evidence that,

although the defendant had entered the vehicle and manipulated the wires

connected to the car’s start switch, the defendant did not succeed in starting

the car. Gustine, 97 So. at 208. Noting that the defendant had not

successfully started the vehicle and that, to be found guilty of attempted

larceny, the State was required to prove that the defendant had tried to

14
  “An inference is a logical deduction of fact that the trier of fact draws from
existence of another fact or group of facts.” Palmas Y Bambu, S.A. v. E.I.
Dupont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 881 So. 2d 565, 582 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
(quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 301.1, at 89-90 (2003)).

                                      26
permanently – rather than temporarily – deprive the owner of the vehicle, the

Florida Supreme Court stated that “[o]nly by pyramiding assumption upon

assumption and intent upon intent can the conclusion necessary for

conviction be reached.” Id. That is, the Gustine court explained, “[i]t must be

assumed, although he did not run it, that the defendant intended to run the

automobile. And it must be assumed that if he had been able to run the

automobile and thus deprive the owner of it, that he intended to deprive him

permanently of the possession of it.” Id. Such evidence, however, was “not

of the conclusive nature required to sustain the verdict.” Id.

      The State argues that the special standard abrogated by Bush is

inextricably intertwined with Gustine’s prohibition against the pyramiding of

assumptions or inferences, such that our high court’s abolition of the former

necessarily resulted in the elimination of the latter. The State notes that, prior

to Bush, the Florida Supreme Court, citing to Gustine, expressly declined to

eliminate the special standard, in part because “the circumstantial evidence

test guards against basing a conviction on impermissibly stacked

inferences.” Miller v. State, 770 So. 2d 1144, 1149 (Fla. 2000). Hence, the

State argues that Bush’s express elimination of the special standard

invalidated Gustine’s related principle prohibiting a conviction based on

                                       27
evidence that requires the factfinder to pyramid assumptions or inferences

to arrive at the conclusion of guilt.

      Though Gustine and its underlying legal principle were relied upon by

the Florida Supreme Court in Miller’s refusal to then eliminate the special

standard, we note that the Miller court characterized Gustine’s legal principle

as an “addition[al]” reason to keep the special standard, see Miller, 770 So.

2d at 1149, and not its exclusive reason. While Gustine’s prohibition against

the pyramiding of inferences is closely related to the special standard

abolished in Bush, the two principles are not always inextricably intertwined.

Indeed, in its Baugh decision, our Supreme Court concluded that Gustine’s

prohibition against inference pyramiding applied even where the State had

presented direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt. 15 Baugh, 961 So. 2d at

15
   The State charged Baugh with capital sexual battery on a child. Baugh,
961 So. 2d at 201. At trial, the State, under the child victim hearsay exception
found in section 90.903(23) of the Florida Statutes, introduced the child’s out-
of-court statements to the police recounting Baugh’s acts of sexual abuse.
Id. at 202. Because, however, the child recanted her out-of-court statements
to the police during her in-trial testimony, the State was required to provide
other evidence corroborating the child’s recanted statements to obtain a
conviction. Id. Determining that the State’s circumstantial evidence was
sufficiently corroborative, the Second District affirmed Baugh’s conviction,
but certified a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme
Court. Id. Noting both that the child’s out-of-court statements were direct
evidence and that the standard of appellate review was whether the State
had presented competent, substantial evidence to support the conviction, Id.
at 203-204, our Supreme Court reversed Baugh’s conviction, concluding that
the State’s circumstantial evidence was not sufficiently corroborative

                                        28
205. We, therefore, are compelled to conclude that Gustine’s legal principle

– prohibiting a conviction based on the pyramiding of inferences – remains

valid even after Bush eliminated the special standard.

      Supporting our conclusion is the well settled axiom that the Florida

Supreme Court does not overrule its own precedent sub silentio. See

Puryear v. State, 810 So. 2d 901, 905-06 (Fla. 2002) (“We take this

opportunity to expressly state that this Court does not intentionally overrule

itself sub silentio. Where a court encounters an express holding from this

Court on a specific issue and a subsequent contrary dicta statement on the

same specific issue, the court is to apply our express holding in the former

decision until such time as this Court recedes from the express holding.

Where this Court’s decisions create this type of disharmony within the case

law, the district courts may utilize their authority to certify a question of great

public importance to grant this Court jurisdiction to settle the law.”). The Bush

majority makes no mention of Gustine and its progeny or of the prohibition

against the pyramiding of inferences.

because of Gustine’s prohibition against the pyramiding of inferences. Id. at
205. (“Where the evidence creates only a strong suspicion of guilt or simply
a probability of guilt, the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.
Additionally, evidence is insufficient to support a conviction when it requires
pyramiding of assumptions or impermissibly stacked inferences.”) (citation
omitted).

                                        29
      Our conclusion also finds support from our sister courts. The Fourth

District recently reached the same conclusion in State v. Huntley, 310 So. 3d

418 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), review denied, SC21-458, 2021 WL 3870054 (Fla.

Aug. 30, 2021), a post-Bush, purely circumstantial evidence case. The

Huntley court affirmed an order granting the defendant’s motion for judgment

of acquittal because the appellate court could not “conclude that the

defendant committed an intentional act without impermissibly stacking

inferences.” Id. at 418. The last sentence of the opinion observed that “[i]n

light of Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179 (Fla. 2020), we are aware that the

jurisprudence regarding inference stacking may evolve, but at this point we

are bound to follow the dictates of precedent.” Id. at 419; see also Deamelio

v. State, 341 So. 3d 463, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (reversing the defendant’s

conviction for lewd and lascivious exhibition where the victim’s testimony

characterizing the defendant’s actions “amounted to no more than inferences

based on speculation”); Scott v. State, 330 So. 3d 562, 563 (Fla. 4th DCA

2021) (affirming the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal because “the

State put the evidence together like pieces of a puzzle, not by a stacking of

inferences”).

      Because our resolution of Mr. Garcia’s appeal hinges – and, no doubt,

other Florida appellate courts’ decisions will similarly hinge – on the

                                     30
continued validity of Gustine’s prohibition against the pyramiding of

assumptions or inferences to obtain a conviction, we certify the following

question to our Supreme Court as one of great public importance:

            In light of the Florida Supreme Court’s abandonment, in
      Bush, of the special standard of appellate review applied in
      purely circumstantial evidence cases, does Gustine’s legal
      principle – that a criminal defendant cannot be convicted based
      on circumstantial evidence that requires the factfinder to engage
      in pyramiding of assumptions or inferences to reach the
      conclusion that the defendant committed the essential elements
      of the charged crime – remain valid?

   2. Reconsideration of Mr. Garcia’s conviction for second-degree murder
      on remand under the competent, substantial evidence standard of
      Bush

      In moving for a judgment of acquittal on the homicide charge, defense

counsel argued that the State had failed to present sufficient evidence to

establish (i) the fact of Ms. Macriello’s death, or (ii) that Ms. Macriello had

died by the criminal act of anyone, much less by Mr. Garcia’s criminal

actions. While the trial court denied Mr. Garcia’s motion for judgment of

acquittal as to the first-degree murder charge, the jury found Mr. Garcia guilty

of second-degree murder, a lesser included offense. This Court, on remand,

now reviews the trial evidence anew to ensure that the State presented

competent, substantial evidence from which the jury, without improperly

pyramiding inferences, could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Garcia

was guilty of this crime. Specifically, we review the record to determine

                                      31
whether the State established the “corpus delicti” of Mr. Garcia’s second-

degree murder conviction. “The corpus delicti of a homicide consists of three

elements, i.e., ‘first, the fact of death; second, the criminal agency of another

person as the cause thereof; and third, the identity of the deceased person.’”

Golden v. State, 629 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Jefferson v. State,

128 So. 2d 132, 135 (Fla. 1961)).

      As explained below, we conclude that: (i) the State presented

competent, substantial evidence from which the jury could find that Ms.

Macriello was dead; but (ii) the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish

that Ms. Macriello’s death was due to the specific criminal agency of Mr.

Garcia.

      a. The State’s proof that Ms. Macriello died

      Though Ms. Macriello’s body was never found, the State could prove

the fact of her death through circumstantial evidence. See Crain v. State,

894 So. 2d 59, 72 (Fla. 2004). “Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain

facts and circumstances from which the trier of fact may infer that the ultimate

facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Baugh, 961 So. 2d at 203 n.5

(quoting Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1956)).

      Coupled with a person’s unexplained disappearance, circumstantial

evidence from which the factfinder can infer that a missing person has died

                                       32
includes an abrupt change in the person’s habits, the personal property the

person has left behind, and the person’s lack of communication with friends

and family members. See Meyers v. State, 704 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Fla.

1997); Thomas v. State, 693 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 1997). Based on the

circumstantial evidence presented below showing the abrupt changes in Ms.

Macriello’s normal behavior, the belongings she left behind, and her lack of

communication with her family after she was last seen, we agree with the

State that it presented sufficient evidence from which the jury, without

improperly pyramiding inferences, could infer beyond a reasonable doubt

that Ms. Macriello had died. 16

      b. The State’s proof that Mr. Garcia’s criminal acts caused Ms.
         Macriello’s death

      Our chief concerns with whether the State presented sufficient

evidence that Ms. Macriello died by Mr. Garcia’s criminal acts are that (i) the

State’s entire case rests on the foundational assumption that Ms. Macriello

died on June 4, 2013, and (ii) the State’s circumstantial evidence required

16
   We note that Mr. Garcia’s Supplemental Answer Brief on Remand does
not take issue with this Court’s comment, repeated throughout Garcia I, that
Ms. Macriello’s death was “apparent” from the record. Garcia I, 276 So. 2d
at 871-74. Nor does Mr. Garcia’s supplemental briefing make any argument
with respect to whether the State presented competent, substantial evidence
below that Ms. Macriello had died.

                                      33
the jury to pyramid inferences on top of this foundational, date-of-death

assumption. Before we address the pyramiding of inferences required for the

jury to conclude that Ms. Macriello’s death was caused by Mr. Garcia’s

criminal acts, though, we address the State’s argument that such inference

pyramiding was permissible here because the “established fact” exception

allows the pyramiding of inferences in this case. 17

      (i)   The “established fact” exception to Gustine’s prohibition against
            the pyramiding of inferences

       The State urges this Court to adopt the “established fact” exception

to the general rule prohibiting the pyramiding of inferences that is commonly

applied in the civil context. In civil cases, “when no contrary reasonable

inference may be indulged, such inference is elevated for the purpose of

further inference to the dignity of an established fact.” Voelker v. Combined

Ins. Co. of Am., 73 So. 2d 403, 407 (Fla. 1954). That is to say that, in a civil

case, “[i]nferences may be pyramided only if the initial inference is

established to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory.” Hurst v.

Astudillo, 631 So. 2d 380, 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

17
   This is a secondary argument of the State. As discussed in section III. C.
1., supra, the State’s principal argument is that Gustine’s prohibition against
inference pyramiding was impliedly abrogated by Bush.

                                      34
     The First and Second Districts have adopted and applied in criminal

cases this exception to the general rule against the pyramiding of inferences.

See Keys v. State, 606 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (adopting an

exception to the prohibition against the pyramiding of inferences to arrive at

a conclusion of guilt, explaining that “if no reasonable inference contrary to

the base inference may be indulged, the base inference may be elevated to

the dignity of an established fact for the purpose of drawing further

inferences”); Benson v. State, 526 So. 2d 948, 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)

(adopting the established fact exception in criminal cases, explaining that a

secondary “inference may be admissible into evidence, even though it is

based upon another inference, if the other inference has been shown to exist

beyond a reasonable doubt”).

      (ii)   The State’s argument that the June 4, 2013 date-of-death
             assumption should be elevated to an “established fact”

     In this case, the State claims that the only reasonable inference the

jury could reach below was that Ms. Macriello died on June 4, 2013, and,

therefore, that such inference should be elevated to an established fact.

Hence, according to the State, additional inferences drawn by the jury from

this date-of-death assumption are not violative of Gustine’s general rule

prohibiting the pyramiding of inferences.

                                     35
      Plainly, a jury certainly could reasonably infer from the evidence below

that Ms. Macriello died on June 4, 2013. But even if we were to adopt the

“established fact” exception, we disagree with the State’s assertion that the

only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that Ms.

Macriello died on June 4, 2013. Ms. Macriello’s body was never found to

pinpoint a time of death. There was no crime scene or other evidence to

establish the location, time, cause or manner of Ms. Macriello’s death. There

were no eyewitnesses to any crime, and Mr. Garcia did not confess to killing

Ms. Macriello. Indeed, it could just as easily be reasonably inferred that Ms.

Macriello was still alive after June 4, 2013, based on: (i) evidence that Ms.

Macriello’s cellphone made outgoing calls after June 4, 2013; (ii) evidence

that Mr. Garcia’s cellphone received a call from Ms. Macriello’s second

cellphone after June 4, 2013, coupled with the police’s failure to secure the

cellphone records for Ms. Macriello’s second cellphone; and (iii) the

numerous BOA account transactions occurring after June 4, 2013.

      Even in jurisdictions where the “established fact” exception has been

adopted, for the exception to apply – such that inferences may be pyramided

upon the “established fact” inference – the evidence must establish, beyond

any reasonable doubt, that no other inference is reasonable. Keys, 606 So.

2d at 674 (“[T]he trial court’s flight instruction erroneously elevated the base

                                      36
inference, from which the jury was to draw the ultimate inference of guilt, to

the dignity of an established fact notwithstanding other reasonable

inferences permissible under the circumstances proven in this record,

resulting in the impermissible pyramiding of inferences.”); Benson, 526 So.

2d at 953 (“[T]he evidence in its totality supports no contrary reasonable

inference. Under these circumstances the reason for the general rule against

the pyramiding of inferences – to avoid judgments based upon speculation

– does not exist.”) (citation omitted).

      Because other date-of-death inferences can reasonably be drawn from

the evidence, we disagree with the State that its foundational June 4, 2013

date-of-death assumption was elevated to the dignity of an established fact

such that other inferences may be permissibly pyramided upon it to draw the

ultimate inference of guilt. 18

       (iii)   The jury could not find that Mr. Garcia’s criminal acts caused Ms.
               Macriello’s death without impermissibly pyramiding inferences
               on the foundational date-of-death assumption

      We now explain why the jury could not reach the conclusion that Ms.

Macriello’s death was caused by Mr. Garcia’s criminal acts without

18
  For this reason, we need not, and do not, decide whether to join our sister
courts in adopting, for criminal cases, the “established fact” exception to
Gustine’s general rule against the pyramiding of inferences.

                                          37
impermissibly pyramiding inferences on the foundational assumption that

Ms. Macriello died on June 4, 2013.

      “An impermissible pyramiding of inferences occurs where at least two

inferences in regard to the existence of a criminal act must be drawn from

the evidence and then stacked to prove the crime charged; in that scenario,

it is said that the evidence lacks the conclusive nature to support a

conviction.” Kennedy v. State, 781 So. 3d 421, 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)

(quoting Graham v. State, 748 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).

While, under Gustine, a criminal conviction premised upon such pyramiding

of inferences is prohibited, where the State’s circumstantial evidence is not

pyramided, but can be “put . . . together like pieces of a puzzle,” such

evidence does not run afoul of Gustine, and is sufficient for the jury to arrive

at the conclusion of guilt. Scott, 330 So. 3d at 563; State v. Sephes, 262 So.

3d 811, 817 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). Unsurprisingly, Mr. Garcia argues that the

jury could not have found him guilty of Ms. Macriello’s murder without the

prohibited pyramiding of inferences, whereas the State argues the jury

merely put the evidence together like pieces in a puzzle, without any

inference pyramiding.

      (1) The State’s theory requires pyramiding of inferences

                                      38
      The State posited below that Mr. Garcia killed Ms. Macriello on June

4, 2013, and that he then took steps to make it appear that she was still alive

so that he could steal the money from her BOA accounts. The State argues

that the jury, without resorting to the pyramiding of inferences or

assumptions, was capable of linking the numerous pieces of circumstantial

evidence presented at trial together like a puzzle to reveal the full picture:

i.e., that Ms. Macriello died by a criminal act of Mr. Garcia. The State’s case

against Mr. Garcia, though, was missing significant pieces of evidence that

required the jury to resort to sheer conjecture and speculation in order to fill

in the major gaps in the State’s theory that Mr. Garcia’s alleged criminal

conduct caused Ms. Macriello’s death.

      To wit, Ms. Macriello’s body was never found to establish a time of

death, and there was no crime scene or other evidence to establish the

location, cause or manner of Ms. Macriello’s death. There was no murder

weapon, no eyewitness to a murder, and Mr. Garcia made no confession to

Ms. Macriello’s murder. Despite this missing evidence, the State invited the

jury to draw the following chronological inferences from the circumstantial

evidence, and to then pyramid these inferences atop the base assumption

that Ms. Macriello died on June 4, 2013, in order to arrive at the conclusion

that she died through the criminal agency of Mr. Garcia:

                                      39
   • Prior to June 4, 2013, Mr. Garcia either forged or coerced Ms.
     Macriello to write him (i) two $20,000 checks that were post-
     dated to June 5, 2013, and June 10, 2013, and (ii) a $20,000
     promissory note evidencing that Mr. Garcia made a personal
     loan to Ms. Macriello.

   • On June 4, 2013, Mr. Garcia killed Ms. Macriello – possibly with
     the “hammer” outlined by the luminol in the interior of Ms.
     Macriello’s car – and then used her vehicle to discard of the
     “hammer,” her “purse” (also outlined by the luminol), and possibly
     her body.

   •   After using Ms. Macriello’s vehicle to make the drive-up ATM
       withdrawal from Ms. Macriello’s BOA savings account on June 5,
       2013, Mr. Garcia – sometime between June 5, 2013 and June
       10, 2013 – took the car to have it cleaned to remove the blood
       left in the car, to hide the car’s complicity in Ms. Macriello’s
       murder, and to cover up for Mr. Garcia’s use of the vehicle after
       he killed her.

   •   On June 10, 2013, Mr. Garcia dropped off Ms. Macriello’s vehicle
       outside her apartment building to give the impression that she
       was alive and well at home.

   •   Mr. Garcia took Ms. Macriello’s cellphone after he killed her, kept
       her cellphone active, and used it to make phone calls until July
       7, 2013, all to give the impression to others that she was still
       alive.

   • Between June 5, 2013 and August 15, 2013, Mr. Garcia slowly
     and methodically stole the funds from Ms. Macriello’s BOA
     accounts.

       Further, in order to accept the State’s theory of events, the jury was

required to pyramid additional inferences upon these chronological

inferences. For example, in order to infer that Mr. Garcia used Ms. Macriello’s

car to accomplish or to hide the fact of the murder, the jury was required to

                                       40
infer that: (i) Mr. Garcia killed Ms. Macriello on June 4, 2013; (ii) the liquid

the luminol reacted to when CSI processed the car was blood; (iii) the “blood”

on Ms. Macriello’s “purse” and the “hammer” belonged to Ms. Macriello; and

(iv) Mr. Garcia had the vehicle cleaned to remove the “blood” and other

evidence of the murder, and to hide his use of the vehicle after the murder.

Similarly, to infer that Mr. Garcia used Ms. Macriello’s cellphone to cover up

the murder, the jury was required to infer that Mr. Garcia: (i) killed Ms.

Macriello on June 4, 2013; (ii) took Ms. Macriello’s cellphone and kept it; and

(iii) placed numerous calls between Ms. Macriello’s cellphone and his

cellphone, while both phones were on his person.

      Not only was the jury required to pyramid inferences to accept the

State’s chronology, but many of the underlying inferences were not

supported by any competent, substantial evidence. The State failed to

establish that Mr. Garcia committed theft by depositing the two $20,000

personal checks into his BOA checking account, or by receiving the $4,700

in online transfers to his BOA checking account, undercutting the State’s

posited motive for Mr. Garcia to commit murder. No actual blood was found

in Ms. Macriello’s car. No murder weapon was ever identified or recovered.

Her purse was never located. Nor was any evidence introduced at trial

describing the size and shape of her purse. Hence, the conclusions that the

                                      41
State asked the jury to infer – i.e., that the objects outlined by the luminol in

Ms. Macriello’s car were the murder weapon and Ms. Macriello’s purse – are

purely speculative.

      And we find it significant that the police never received the cellphone

records for Ms. Macriello’s second cellphone number that she had obtained

in late May 2013, just days before her disappearance. Mr. Garcia’s cellphone

records, though, reflected an incoming call from Ms. Macriello’s second

cellphone number on June 7, 2013, several days after the State theorizes

that Mr. Garcia killed her.

      Aside from the impermissible pyramiding of inferences drawn from the

circumstantial evidence discussed herein, the State presented no other

evidence at trial connecting Mr. Garcia to Ms. Macriello’s death. Because the

trial evidence was insufficient to establish that Ms. Macriello died by a

criminal act of Mr. Garcia, we are compelled to reverse Mr. Garcia’s

conviction for second-degree murder.

      (2) Mr. Garcia’s inconsistent and untruthful statements to the police

      Finally, we address the State’s argument that Mr. Garcia’s false

statements to the police constitute substantive evidence of Mr. Garcia’s

“consciousness of guilt” for Ms. Macriello’s murder. Certainly, a defendant’s

false exculpatory statements made to the police to avoid prosecution for a

                                       42
crime constitute “substantive evidence tending to affirmatively show a

consciousness of guilt on [the defendant’s] part” for committing that crime.

Simpson, 562 So. 2d at 745 (recognizing that the wife’s false exculpatory

statement to the police that her ex-husband had shot her husband was

admissible as substantive evidence that the wife was the actual shooter);

see also United States v. Holbert, 578 F. 2d 128, 129-30 (5th Cir. 1978)

(concluding that Holbert’s false exculpatory statement to the police

“explaining his presence at the scene of the crime” – i.e., a trailer with a

broken seal that contained a shipment of carpet – was admissible as

substantive evidence to prove Holbert’s guilt for breaking the seal on the

trailer and conspiring to steal its contents). The question here is: to what

extent do Mr. Garcia’s inconsistent and untruthful statements during the

course of the police investigation constitute substantive evidence of his

consciousness of guilt for killing Ms. Macriello?

      That Mr. Garcia lied about never driving Ms. Macriello’s car, and that

he gave inconsistent stories about how he obtained the money from Ms.

Macriello is surely substantive evidence of Mr. Garcia’s consciousness of

guilt for committing theft of her car (which was not charged) and theft of her

                                      43
money.19 Lacking, however, is any evidence providing a sufficient nexus

between the substance of Mr. Garcia’s false exculpatory statements and the

homicide of Ms. Macriello. As the Florida Supreme Court has observed,

whether a defendant’s conduct shows consciousness of guilt in a particular

case depends on whether there is “evidence that would allow the jury to

reasonably infer that the defendant was attempting to avoid prosecution for

the offense on trial.” Partin v. State, 82 So. 3d 31, 38 (Fla. 2011); see Adderly

v. State, 44 So. 3d 167, 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (concluding that the trial

court erred by “permitting the state to argue to the jury that it could infer that

Appellant’s giving of a false name and running from the officer [four months

after the crimes occurred] was evidence of his consciousness of guilt of the

offenses for which he was on trial”) (emphasis added).

      Mr. Garcia’s false exculpatory statements to the police are pieces of

circumstantial evidence, see Holbert, 578 F. 2d at 130, that are subject to

Gustine’s prohibition against the pyramiding of inferences. We conclude that

Mr. Garcia’s false exculpatory statements have the same failings as the other

circumstantial evidence presented by the State at trial. That is, without any

evidence providing a sufficient nexus between Mr. Garcia’s false exculpatory

19
   See our application of this “consciousness of guilt” inference with regard
to the ATM withdrawals in section III. B. 3., supra.

                                       44
statements and the homicide charge, only by the pyramiding of inferences

could the jury arrive at the conclusion that Mr. Garcia’s false exculpatory

statements showed his consciousness of guilt for killing Ms. Macriello.

   IV.     CONCLUSION

         On remand from the Florida Supreme Court, we again conclude that

the State presented competent, substantial evidence from which the jury

could find Mr. Garcia guilty of grand theft beyond a reasonable doubt for the

two $500 ATM withdrawals. The State failed, however, to present competent,

substantial evidence that Mr. Garcia committed theft by either: (i) depositing

the two $20,000 personal checks into his BOA checking account; or (ii)

receiving the $4,700 in funds through a series of online transfers from Ms.

Macriello’s BOA checking account. Because the value of the property stolen

is $1,000, we reduce Mr. Garcia’s conviction for second-degree grand theft

to third-degree grand theft and remand for resentencing. See § 924.34, Fla.

Stat. (2013); § 812.014(2)(c)1., Fla. Stat. (2013).

         Because the State failed to present competent, substantial evidence

from which the jury – without resorting to the pyramiding of assumptions or

inferences – could infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Garcia’s guilt for

second-degree murder, we reverse Mr. Garcia’s second-degree murder

                                      45
conviction and remand this case to the trial court with directions to enter a

judgment of acquittal on the homicide charge.

      We also certify the following question of great public importance to the

Florida Supreme Court:

            In light of the Florida Supreme Court’s abandonment, in
      Bush, of the special standard of appellate review applied in
      purely circumstantial evidence cases, does Gustine’s legal
      principle – that a criminal defendant cannot be convicted based
      on circumstantial evidence that requires the factfinder to engage
      in pyramiding of assumptions or inferences to reach the
      conclusion that the defendant committed the essential elements
      of the charged crime – remain valid?

      Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions;

question certified.

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