Court Opinion

ID: 9751543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:35:00.196001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:51.107024
License: Public Domain

SILLS, P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
While I concur the judgment must be affirmed, I respectfully disagree with the majority on the Wende issue. I am afraid Botticelli’s Venus is not quite the image that springs to mind when I contemplate the Wende doctrine. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 831.) One of Mr. Escher’s exasperating staircases to nowhere would be more like it.1
I agree with and would sign In re Kayla G. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 878 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 86], which another panel of this division is filing this day.2 Rather than recapitulate the points made by the Kayla G. majority, I will confine my observations to one of Wende’s unexamined assumptions—that competent appellate lawyers raise any issue which is “arguable.” The word “arguable,” as in “arguable issue,” appears no less than 10 times in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 [158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071], and it is the “arguable issue” which the appellate court is supposed to be looking for when it examines the “entire record.” (See id. at p. 438.) The assumption does not withstand critical analysis.3
It is amazing the degree to which appellate judges, when they focus on the nuts and bolts of appellate advocacy, regularly advise against raising every *862arguable issue on appeal. The truly effective appellate advocates confine their briefs to arguments which have a genuine chance of winning.
In his article The Wrong Stuff, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit lists the various ways in which a lawyer can torpedo his or her own appeal. (See Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff (1992) B.Y.U. L. Rev. 325.) Prime among these is to lard the appellant’s brief with every arguable issue: “So, if you do things right, you will submit an enormous brief with narrow margins and tiny type . . . .You can lose your appeal before the judge even reads the first word. [H But what if you think the judges might nevertheless read your brief and find a winning argument? You go to step two. Having followed step one, you already have a long brief, so you can conveniently bury your winning argument among nine or ten losers.” (Id. at pp. 326-327.)
Judge Friedman of the federal circuit made the same point, albeit without the rhetorical inversion, in a 1983 article entitled Winning on Appeal. (See Friedman, Winning on Appeal (1983) 9 No. 3 Litig. 15.) “Do not make every argument possible. A poor argument is easily demolished. Its very presence suggests weakness, on the theory that the lawyer’s case cannot be good if he is forced to rely upon unsound contentions.” (Id. at p. 17.)
*863Here is Judge Pierce of the Second Circuit: “Commonly, an appellate advocate will identify numerous issues that can be raised on appeal. When the issues are numerous, however, a wise course of action is to divide them into major and minor issues and then to elaborate only upon those that cry out to be addressed.” (Pierce, Appellate Advocacy: Some Reflections From the Bench (1993) 61 Fordham L. Rev. 829, 835.)
The point is not just recognized by federal appellate judges. Justice Dana of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recently wrote: “If you have preserved many points for appeal, cull through them and limit your appeal to the real gems. Do not throw in every possible point hoping the Court will latch on to one of them. It is not very complimentary to the people you are trying to persuade and it is possible that we will miss the needle in the haystack. It is not malpractice to disregard weak points in favor of strong ones and focus all of your guns on two or three errors.” (Dana & Mead, Effective Trial and Appellate Advocacy: Tips From the Bench (1995) 10 Me. B.J. 24, 26, italics added.) Amen.
Justice Nelson of the Montana Supreme Court even more recently wrote: “With the possible exception of a death penalty case, there is no benefit to ‘shot gunning’ the issues for review. You are much better off choosing one, two or, at the most three good, solid issues to appeal than two good ones, three that are so-so and five throw-aways.” (Nelson, How to Be Ready for Your Day in Court (Sept. 1995) 21 Mont. Law. 10, 11.)
Except for Judge Nelson’s possible exception in death penalty cases, there is no reason to distinguish between civil and criminal cases for purposes of effective appellate advocacy. The California Constitution provides that the standard for reversal of a trial court judgment is miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) An appeal in a criminal case is not a hunt for technicalities by which the guilty can beat the system. Indeed, the very reason the California Constitution embodies a miscarriage of justice standard is to prevent the guilty from using technicalities to beat the system. (See People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 532 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J., quoting Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends, to Cal. Const, with legislative reasons for and against adoption, Special Statewide Elec. (Oct. 10, 1911)) [“ ‘The object of this amendment is to enable our courts of last resort to sustain verdicts in criminal cases unless there has been a miscarriage of justice . . . . It is designed to meet the ground of common complaint that criminals escape justice through technicalities.’ ”].)
At the risk of restating the obvious, the purpose of appellate review in criminal cases is not to afford the opportunity for judges to meditate in print *864on arguable arguments for the better edification of the criminal bar. Rather, the right of appeal in criminal cases is to ensure that the accused receives a fair—not necessarily a perfect—trial and that there is sufficient evidence to sustain any conviction and punishment meted out by the state.
One of the most important ideas in criminal law is the harmless error doctrine—-judgments will not be reversed unless the error might have made a real difference. In discussing the harmless error doctrine, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 684-685, 106 S.Ct. 1431], that among its purposes is to “promote[] public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.” (Italics added.) By contrast, Wende review presupposes that the purpose of the appellate process is to seek error for its own sake.
The philosophical assumption behind Wende is that the Constitution requires the courts to double-check to make sure that every little technicality is litigated, regardless of merit or whether it makes any difference. But emphasizing points of law for their own sake, rather than the genuine justice of the matter, only confirms the public’s worst suspicions about the judicial system. It subliminally reflects the gamesmanship or “sporting” theory of the criminal law, in which it is considered good that a criminal defense counsel try every trick in the book to derail a just conviction. I do not buy it. The goal of the criminal justice system is to punish the guilty and acquit the innocent, not to furnish a playing field for lawyers to parade their skills. (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 681 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 684] [“the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence”].)
However, even if one did believe that criminal cases are somehow different, and that effective appellate advocacy entailed raising every arguable issue in criminal cases, one still could not make the leap to Wende review in juvenile dependency cases. While the criminal justice system litigates discrete events, the juvenile dependency system is itself a process which affects an ongoing outcome. It is like a conveyor belt (or flow chart or decision tree, name your metaphor). At virtually every point in the process, the law requires the child to be returned to his or her parents unless certain findings are made.
The court must establish jurisdiction or the child must be returned. Even if there is jurisdiction the court must return the child to the parents unless certain criteria are present. Six months later the child must be returned *865unless it would be detrimental to do so. Six months after that the child must be returned unless it would be detrimental to do so. Even if the child is not returned then, the juvenile court can hold out the possibility of a return six months later. Finally, even if the child is not returned after 18 months, parental ties may not be severed if severance would be detrimental.
California’s juvenile dependency statutes constitute a remarkable system of checks and balances, facilitated by the availability of counsel for indigent parents. The potential for a miscarriage of justice that will escape the notice of any minimally attentive appointed appellate counsel is so low as to be practically nil. And even that small possibility is obviated by the Anders requirement that appointed counsel prepare a brief. The very act of reviewing the record and putting the facts down on paper will reveal whether the juvenile court acted incorrectly in making some critical determination against the parent at a point in the process where it could make a difference on appeal.
On top of that, recent legislative changes in juvenile dependency law have undercut any need for Wende review. Since January 1, 1995, the issues which are typically critical in a juvenile dependency case—whether the findings made at the 12- or 18-month review are supported by substantial evidence—must be raised by petition for writ from that review. Appeals can only raise issues relating to the selection and implementation hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (the .26 hearing). The change means one of two things, neither supportive of Wende review.
On the one hand, assuming that Wende review was not imposed on the Courts of Appeal to completely waste their time, the new writ-it-or-lose-it procedure means that the Wende review should be confined to just the small part of a juvenile record dealing with the .26 hearing. That will, of course, alleviate much of the practical burden imposed by the doctrine on the courts, but create the anomaly of limiting this supposedly crucial review to just a small (and, comparatively speaking, less important) part of the record. If Wende review is not necessary for the important “writable” issues in juvenile dependency cases, then it is certainly not necessary for the (usually) less important appealable ones.
On the other hand, if Wende review is not limited to just the issues cognizable at .26 hearings, then Wende becomes a judicial theater of the absurd. Courts would review portions of files and transcripts with no purpose and where it would make no difference. That really would confirm Justice Gardner’s fear that Wende review is nothing more than a glorified “WPA” project. (See People v. Von Staich, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 175.)
*866The Court of Appeal exists to examine real cases and controversies, not comb through trial transcripts as if its judges were a group of law professors looking for exam questions or class hypothetical. Perhaps because of the experience of law students in their first weeks of law school, where some Kingsfieldian type peered over half-glasses and demanded that students cough up the issue, lawyers have acquired the wrongheaded notion that courts exist to pontificate on “issues of law.” Not so. Courts exist to decide cases.4
The proper role of the courts was delineated in Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 281-282 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 834 P.2d 119]. “The primary purpose of the public judiciary is ‘to afford a forum for the settlement of litigable matters between disputing parties.’ . . . We do not resolve abstract legal issues, even when requested to do so. We resolve real disputes between real people.” Indeed, it was precisely on the role of the courts where Justice Kennard disagreed with the Neary majority. (See id. at p. 286 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.) [“More than just a dispute resolution service . . . .”].) I agree with my colleagues who form the Kayla G. majority and with Justice Clark in his dissent in Wende. Forcing the appellate courts to search for arguable issues is a perversion of the judicial role.
*867Appendix
An overwhelming number of states—37, including California—accept the appellate court’s duty to independently review the record, per Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396] when appointed counsel in a criminal appeal pursued as a matter of right can find no arguable issues.1 One Mississippi decision has discussed appointed counsel’s duties in light of Anders, but failed to mention any reviewing court obligations. According to our research, six states (Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Tennessee) have not published any decisions concerning Anders briefs and the appellate court’s duty of independent review. Under the procedures established in Georgia, Idaho, and New Hampshire, it is unclear whether an appellate court in a direct appeal guaranteed by statute will independently review the record. (Although, as noted in footnote 1, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concedes that is what Anders requires.) The North Dakota Supreme Court has discussed Anders, but the policy it adopted is murky. Oregon is the only state to explicitly reject the notion of independent appellate review.
Alabama: In Peoples v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1992) 615 So.2d 99, 100 the Court of Criminal Appeals noted, “Following the requirements of Anders, we have reviewed the entire record of the trial and the proceedings below . . . .” (See also Sturdivant v. State (Ala. 1984) 460 So.2d 1210.)
Alaska: McCracken v. State (Alaska 1968) 439 P.2d 448, 449 signals the Alaska Supreme Court’s acceptance of and adherence to Anders, including the duty to “review [] the record.”
Arizona: Anders apparently has had virtually no impact on appellate procedure in Arizona, where case authority has long mandated that the reviewing court independently examine a record for error, even without a brief (see, e.g., Murdock v. Territory (Ariz. 1912) 123 P. 315), and statutes require the Supreme Court in capital appeals and the Court of Appeal in an appeal as of right to “search the record for error.” (State v. Shattuck (1984) 140 Ariz. 582, [684 P.2d 154, 158, fn. 7]; Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 12-120.21, 13-4031, 13-4035(B).) Nevertheless, the Arizona Supreme Court has reiterated Anders’s requirement, that “ ‘the court—not counsel— then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.’ ” (State v. Leon (1969) 104 Ariz. 297 [451 P.2d 878, 880].)
Arkansas: See Seals v. State (1974) 256 Ark. 11 [505 S.W.2d 202, 204], where the Supreme Court granted an appointed attorney’s motion to withdraw and affirmed defendant’s conviction, noting, “Pursuant to the Anders procedural blueprint we have made a full examination of all the proceedings.”
Colorado: In People v. Marquez (Colo.Ct.App. 1976) 37 Colo.App. 441 [548 P.2d 939, 940], the appointed attorney followed the Anders procedures and the reviewing court stated “carefully examined all of the proceedings in this case and agree with the position taken by counsel for defendant. We now find, upon our examination of the record and the law, that the [appeal] ... is without merit.”
Connecticut: The Supreme Court wrote in State v. Pascucci (1971) 161 Conn. 382 [288 A.2d 408, 410], “the record discloses that the court only ‘accepted’ the [brief] of the special public defender. The mere ‘acceptance’ of the [brief] falls short of compliance with the federal requirement as mandated in the Anders case . . . which specifies that ‘the court—not counsel. . . after a full examination of all the proceedings . . . decide[s] whether the case is wholly frivolous.’ [S]uch a specific judicial determination is required [and where] . . . [t]he *868record gives no indication that the court itself made the review and judicial determination which the Anders decision requires . . . [w]e must [] remand the case for such a judicial determination. [¶] . . . [S]o long as an indigent defendant can prosecute an appeal at public expense and without any possible detriment to himself there is nothing to protect the public purse or save the appellate courts from a flood of baseless appeals by indigent defendants except a properjudicial determination as to whether a proposed appeal at public expense may have some merit or is in fact frivolous. It is for this reason that in such cases as this the record should fully disclose that there has been full compliance with the federal requirements specified in [Anders].” See also Paulsen v. Manson (1984) 193 Conn. 333 [476 A.2d 1057], where the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed a conviction because the attorneys appointed for an indigent appellant did not provide a complete record and the Court of Appeal erroneously and prejudicially “permitted both attorneys to withdraw and concluded [defendant’s] appeal was frivolous without a full examination of prior proceedings, a portion of which was never made available to the court.” (Id. at p. 1061, fn. omitted.)
Delaware: Smith v. State (Del. 1968) 248 A.2d 146, 147 advises, “As the final step in our attempt to comply with the requirements of Anders ... we have read the record.”
Florida: In Jones v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1985) 468 So.2d 253, 254, the Second District Court of Appeal discussed the “court’s role in reviewing Anders briefs [and held, where] an Anders brief is filed, we review the arguable points raised by defense counsel. In addition, we examine the record of the proceedings sent to us. Our review includes making a determination of whether the defendant was charged with an offense under Florida law, the trial court had jurisdiction over defendant, and the judgment and sentence conform to the requirements of law.” Several years later the Florida Supreme Court affirmed not only the reviewing court’s duty to “conduct[] its own examination of the record to determine if the appeal is indeed wholly frivolous” (In re Order of the First Dist. Ct. of Appeal Regarding Brief Filed in Forrester v. State (Fla. 1990) 556 So.2d 1114, 1115, fn. 1), but also reiterated its authority to “order supplemental briefs in any case before it,” even if an Anders brief was originally filed. (Id. at p. 1117.)
Georgia: Georgia originally embraced Anders, including the duty of the reviewing “court to examine fully the record and transcript and determine whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” (Bethay v. State (1976) 237 Ga. 625 [229 S.E.2d 406, 407].) Nine years later, in Huguley v. State (Ga. 1985) 324 S.E.2d 729, 731, the Georgia Supreme Court determined it would no longer grant Anders motions to withdraw in direct appeals to that court: “[A] defendant is entitled to review of any claim which might afford him relief. In this case, as in every other in which an Anders motion has been filed, this court has reviewed the entire record and transcript with very little assistance from counsel who is in a far better position to perceive error than is an appellate court looking at a cold record.” The majority of a sharply divided Court of Appeals followed Huguley and announced Anders motions to withdraw would no longer be entertained there as well. Several of the dissenting justices seemed unsure concerning the future of independent review. (Fields v. State (1988) 189 Ga.App. 532 [376 S.E.2d 912].)
Idaho: In 1977, the Supreme Court labeled the “procedure outlined in the Anders dictum” as “impractical and illogical” and held, “once counsel is appointed to represent an indigent client during appeal on a criminal case, no withdrawal will thereafter be permitted on the basis that the appeal is frivolous or lacks merit.” (State v. McKenney (1977) 98 Idaho 551 [568 P.2d 1213, 1214].) But it is not clear from the decision whether the court was discussing an appeal as of right or a discretionary appeal. In any event, the court took “judicial notice of the files and records of this court and [found] no instance since the issuance of the Anders decision wherein this Court has permitted the withdrawal of appellate counsel in a criminal case on the basis the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit. . . . We further determine that if a criminal case *869on appeal is wholly frivolous, undoubtedly, less of counsel and the judiciary’s time and energy will be expended in directly considering the merits of the case in its regular and due course as contrasted with a fragmented consideration of various motions, the consideration of which necessarily involves a determination of merits.” (Ibid.)
Indiana: Dixon v. State (1972) 152 Ind.App. 430 [284 N.E.2d 102], overruled on another point in Music v. State (1986) 489 N.E.2d 949, preceded Wende by seven years and offers a mini-survey of various jurisdictions concerning whether appointed counsel who files an Anders brief must also request to withdraw. The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected that requirement for several reasons, not the least of which were the problems of appointing “new counsel should this court find merit to the appeal. . . and the additional cost of new counsel to the taxpayers.” (Id. at p. 107.)
Illinois: See People v. House (1975) 26 Ill.App.3d 330 [325 N.E.2d 69, 70], where the appellate court wrote, “We have examined those points [raised by defendant himself] and the record in this case and find no merit to [them] .... Our review of the record persuades us that appellate counsel is correct in his conclusion that this record is free of reversible error. Accordingly, the motion to withdraw is allowed. The conviction is affirmed.” (See also People v. Jones (1967) 38 Ill.2d 384 [231 N.E.2d 390, 392] [explaining the appellate court’s pre-Anders review of “the entire record ...['][]... substantially complied with Anders”].)
Iowa: In Toogood v. Brewer (Iowa 1971) 187 N.W.2d 748, 750, the court explained Iowa has adopted a rule of appellate procedure “based on the holding in Anders.” It provides for notice to the client that the attorney is seeking to withdraw and “that the appeal could be dismissed by the court after study of the entire record." {Ibid., italics added.) Pursuant to the rule, Toogood was advised the “Court has made a full examination of all the proceedings in the trial court, including a full transcript of what was there said and done. After doing so, this Court is satisfied that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit.” (Ibid.)
Kentucky: Fite v. Commonwealth (Ky.Ct.App. 1971) 469 S.W.2d 357, 358 reaffirms the reviewing court’s duty to “read the record and the testimony.”
Louisiana: This state, unlike California, does require appointed counsel who cannot find any arguable issues to move to withdraw. (State v. Benjamin (La.Ct.App. 1990) 573 So.2d 528.) The reviewing court’s options are as follows: “If the Court finds, after an independent review of the record, that the appeal is wholly frivolous, it may grant the motion and affirm the conviction or trial court judgment. If the Court finds any legal point arguable on the merits, it may either deny the motion and order the court-appointed attorney to file a brief arguing the legal point(s) identified by the Court, or grant the motion and appoint substitute appellate counsel.” (Id. at p. 530, italics added.) The court reiterated that appointed counsel’s request to withdraw, accompanied by an Anders brief, “will not be acted on until this court performs a thorough independent review of the record after providing the appellant an opportunity to file a brief in his or her own behalf. This court’s review of the record will consist of (1) a review of the bill of information or indictment to insure the defendant was properly charged; (2) a review of all minute entries to insure the defendant was present at all crucial stages of the proceedings, the jury composition and verdict were correct and the sentence is legal; (3) a review of all pleadings in the record; (4) a review of the jury sheets; and (5) a review of all transcripts to determine if any ruling provides an arguable basis for appeal. Under [Code of Criminal Practice, article] 914.1(D) this Court will order that the appeal record be supplemented with pleadings, minute entries and transcripts when the record filed in this Court is not sufficient to perform this review.” (Id. at p. 531, italics added.)
Maryland: Beckette v. State (1976) 31 Md.App. 85 [355 A.2d 515] held, “Under Anders . . . and Tippett v. Director, 2 Md.App. 465, 235 A.2d 314 (1967) [a juvenile wardship appeal], whenever an appeal is presented to us in such a posture [i.e., where the appointed *870attorney has “ ‘carefully scrutinized the record . . . (and) ... is unable to discover any reversible error’ ”], we are required to examine fully the record of the proceeding. We have, in the instant case, reviewed the suppression hearing, the voir dire, the transcript of the trial, including evidentiary rulings, as well as the trial judge’s jury instructions. We have searched the record in its entirety in order to find anything that is ‘arguable on the merits’ and we discover no such issue. This appeal is, as counsel noted, wholly frivolous.” (Id. at p. 523, italics added.)
Massachusetts: In Commonwealth v. Moffett (1981) 383 Mass. 201 [418 N.E.2d 585, 596], the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined an appointed attorney who can find no arguable issue will not be permitted to withdraw solely for that reason. The court adopted “guidelines” for appointed counsel, similar to those in Wende. For example, the attorney may advise the court the brief “is filed pursuant to Anders .... In that event, counsel must so notify the defendant, who will have thirty days to respond should he so choose. Beyond such a preface, counsel should not inject disclaimers of personal belief in the merits of the case or otherwise argue against the defendant’s interests.” (Id. at p. 596.) The briefing is followed by the court’s “independent review of the trial transcript.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Michigan: In People v. Jones (Mich. 1985) 376 N.W.2d 659, the Michigan Supreme Court wrote, “Upon full examination of all the proceedings, including the issues raised in the defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal, we believe that the determination made by the Court of Appeals that the defendant’s appeal was wholly frivolous was erroneous.” (Italics added.) (See also People v. Ramonez (Mich. 1985) 372 N.W.2d 324, where the Michigan Supreme Court issued a similar order that identified a potentially meritorious issue.) People v. Hoffman (1969) 382 Mich. 66 [168 N.W.2d 229] provides a unique spin on the issue. There, an attorney appointed to represent an indigent was held in contempt because he maintained his client’s appeal was frivolous and refused to file a brief.
Mississippi: The Mississippi Supreme Court has determined, “The Constitution and laws of the State of Mississippi require more” than does Anders. (Killingsworth v. State (Miss. 1986) 490 So.2d 849, 850.) The standards it established for appointed counsel are spelled out in the decision, but there is no mention of the reviewing court’s duty to independently review the record.
Missouri: Like Arizona, Missouri by statute requires the Supreme Court to independently review the record in all cases where the defendant was sentenced to death. (Mo.Ann.Stat. § 565.035 (Vernon).) In State v. Begley (Mo.Ct.App. 1976) 534 S.W.2d 632, the Missouri Court of Appeals remarked, “What has given us difficulty in this case is the state of the record, which we have tried—with minimal success—to call to the attention of the parties. . . . [I]t nevertheless seems to us that basic constitutional requirements, as indicated in Anders [] at least require this court to read the whole record, especially in view of the fact that defendant’s appeal to this court is his ‘appeal of right.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.)
Montana: In State v. Mason (1992) 253 Mont. 419 [833 P.2d 1058], the Montana Supreme Court quoted Anders’s passage concerning the duty of “the court—not counsel” to fully examine the “proceedings” (id. at p. 1062) and then announced, “This Court granted appellate counsel’s request to withdraw after following the procedures mandated by Anders." (Id. at p. 1063.)
Nebraska: This state has codified Anders and follows its mandates. (State v. Kellogg (1973) 189 Neb. 692 [204 N.W.2d 567].)
Nevada: Like California, Nevada does not require appointed counsel who files an Anders brief to request to withdraw. (Sanchez v. State (1969) 85 Nev. 95 [450 P.2d 793, 794].) Similarly, Nevada recognizes that “[njeither the district court nor counsel may decide whether *871the appeal is frivolous. [Citation.] Only this court can do that.” (Id. at p. 795.) And that determination comes after an independent review of the record. (Watkins v. State (1969) 85 Nev. 102 [450 P.2d 795, 796].)
New Hampshire: Last year in State v. Cigic (N.H. 1994) 639 A.2d 251, the New Hampshire Supreme Court abandoned Anders in favor of a policy prohibiting appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants from seeking to withdraw “on the basis of an appeal’s perceived frivolousness” and instead requiring them to file briefs raising “all arguable issues,” including, “on rare occasions ... a frivolous issue.” (Id. at p. 254.) This rule required the state’s high court to “create an exception to New Hampshire Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 for such conducts cautioning], however, that under the procedure we adopt today, appellate counsel is still otherwise absolutely obliged not to deceive or mislead the court.” (Ibid.) In announcing this rule, the New Hampshire Supreme Court acknowledged “that an independent judicial review of the record [is] guaranteed by Anders.” (Id. at p. 252.)
New Mexico: In State v. Franklin (1967) 78 N.M. 127 [428 P.2d 982], the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed a conviction because the trial judge (to whom the first appeal as a matter of right was directed) determined the appeal had no merit based on the investigation by appointed counsel instead of a “personal inspection of the files or records .... Accordingly, the case must be reversed with directions to vacate the order appealed from [and] to examine the [appeal] and pertinent files and records of the court.” (Id. at p. 984.)
New York: People v. Fuce (N.Y.App.Div. 1986) 498 N.Y.S.2d 1001 reiterates the court’s duty to review the record.
North Carolina: In State v. Washington (1994) 116 N.C.App. 318 [447 S.E.2d 799, 802], the North Carolina Court of Appeals wrote, “In accordance with Anders, we have fully examined the record to determine whether any issues of arguable merit appear therefrom or whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. We conclude the appeal is wholly frivolous. Furthermore, we have examined the record for possible prejudicial error and have found none. To assist this Court with its review of the record, counsel has addressed defendant’s four assignments of error . . . .” The North Carolina Supreme Court agrees: “[D]efendant’s counsel . . . stated in his brief that he found no merit in the assignments of error and requested this Court to review the record for any prejudicial error. This is tantamount to a conclusion that the appeal is wholly frivolous. . . . [“I Pursuant to Anders, this Court must now determine from a full examination of all the proceedings whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. In carrying out this duty, we will review the legal points appearing in the record, transcript, and briefs, not for the purpose of determining their merits (if any) but to determine whether they are wholly frivolous.” (State v. Kinch (1985) 314 N.C. 99 [331 S.E.2d 665, 666-667], italics added.)
North Dakota: Candidly, the North Dakota Supreme Court’s take on Anders in State v. Lewis (N.D. 1980) 291 N.W.2d 735 defies logic. There, both the prosecution and defense “stressed that it was the appellate court’s responsibility in this proceeding to examine the record and determine whether or not defendant’s appeal was in fact frivolous.” (Id. at p. 736.) But the Supreme Court, erroneously concluding a criminal defendant’s right to appeal in California is not “a matter of right,” (id. at p. 737, fn. 1) determined, “While we may be in complete agreement with the principles of law recited in the Anders decision, we do not think that the procedures applies [sic] to this State because under our constitution and statutes an appeal is as a matter of right which eliminates the need for an Anders proceeding.” (Id. at p. 737.) Instead, the Supreme Court announced “the proper procedure to be followed by the courts of this State in cases such as the one before us in which the court-appointed defense counsel believes that the indigent defendant’s appeal is without merit is to appoint another attorney to represent the defendant on appeal as soon after the initially appointed attorney makes his opinion as to frivolity known to the court as is practical.” (Id. at p. 738.) Having *872said this, the Supreme Court cautioned monetary sanctions “remain[] available should we determine that an appeal was frivolous after a full review on the merits which was presented with adequate assistance of legal counsel at all stages.” (Id. at p. 739.)
Ohio: Step (4) of the procedures mandated by the Ohio Court of Appeals when appointed counsel finds no arguable issues provides, “The court then undertakes a full examination of proceedings to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous, Anders v. California, id.” (State v. Duncan (Ohio Ct.App. 1978) 385 N.E.2d 323, 324.) Under step (6), the reviewing court may identify “legal points [that] are ‘arguable on the merits’ ” and ensure the appellant has counsel to assist in briefing them.” (Ibid.)
Oklahoma: It does not appear the appointed counsel who could not find any arguable issues moved to withdraw in Mapp v. Oklahoma (Okla. 1976) 557 P.2d 912; and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals treated the matter much as the Court of Appeal does in this state and affirmed the defendant’s conviction, “[a]fter a thorough review of the record and transcript of the case.” (Id. at p. 913.)
Oregon: Oregon is the only state to unequivocally hold that “review of the entire record by the appellate court in the direct appeal is not required.” (State v. Balfour (Ore. 1991) 814 P.2d 1069, 1081.) Balfour included a thorough discussion of the pertinent United States Supreme Court decisions and candidly conceded that court has consistently “reaffirmed the constitutional necessity of the procedures first described in Anders.” (Id. at p. 1077.) Somewhat ruefully, the Balfour court also noted Oregon’s first significant post-Anders decision (State v. Horine (Ore.Ct.App. 1983) 669 P.2d 797, 806), where the Court of Appeals announced it would “not search the record for error any more than we do in other criminal appeals,” proved to be a poor prognosticator of trends to come: “Penson [v. Ohio] made it clear that the tactical retreat from Anders anticipated by the Oregon Court of Appeals in State v. Horine had instead become an aggressive holding action.” (Balfour, supra, at p. 1076.) Nevertheless, the Balfour court concluded independent review of the record by the appellate court was unnecessary in every direct appeal where appointed counsel could find no arguable issues because, in those cases where nonfrivolous issues actually exist, they may eventually be addressed via a petition for habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Id. at p. 1081.)
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. McClendon (1981) 495 Pa. 467 [434 A.2d 1185] is one in an unbroken line of Pennsylvania authority applying and discussing the Anders mandates. After reiterating “the responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous” (id. at p. 1187), the court explained “[t]he core of Anders’ reasoning” as follows: “[Wjhere an accused is entitled to a counselled appellate review, that right should not be denied or diminished solely because of indigency. However, Anders does not require that counsel be forced to pursue a wholly frivolous appeal just because his client is indigent. The major thrust of Anders was to assure a careful assessment of any available claims that an indigent appellant might have. That end is achieved by requiring counsel to conduct an exhaustive examination of the record and by also placing the responsibility on the reviewing court to make an independent determination of the merit of the appeal.” (Id. at p. 1188, italics added.)
Rhode Island: State v. Desroches (1972) 110 R.I. 497 [293 A.2d 913] is the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s affirmation of the reviewing court’s duty to independently review the record.
South Carolina: In Watt v. State (1972) 259 S.C. 116 [190 S.E.2d 747, 748], the South Carolina Supreme Court granted appointed counsel’s request to withdraw and dismissed the appeal, noting, “The requirements set forth in Anders have been complied with. After a full *873examination of the record, we conclude that the appeal is manifestly without merit and wholly frivolous.”
South Dakota: Loop v. Solem (S.D. 1986) 398 N.W.2d 140, 143 is the South Dakota Supreme Court decision adopting Anders and the duty to independently review the record.
Texas: In Johnson v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) 885 S.W.2d 641, the Court of Criminal Appeals cited McCoy v. Court of Appeals (1988) 486 U.S. 429 [100 L.Ed.2d 440, 108 S.Ct. 1895] and Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75 and explained the reviewing court’s duties when appointed counsel filed an Anders motion to withdraw as follows: “[First] we examine the attorney’s brief for compliance with the rules as we have articulated them today. [Citation.] The second task requires, in effect, that this court brief the appeal itself, because we must conduct ‘a full examination of all the proceedings’ to determine if the appeal is wholly frivolous.” (Id. at p. 647; see also High v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1978) 573 S.W.2d 807, 811 [“[I]n the last analysis, it is up to the court, not counsel, ‘after a full examination of all proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.’ [An Anders brief] . . . aids the reviewing court in studying a cold record.”].)
Utah: In State v. Allgood (1972) 28 Utah 2d 119 [499 P.2d 269], the Utah Supreme Court followed Anders and dismissed the appeal “[a]fter a review of the record and reference to the legal authorities cited.” Almost a decade later, in State v. Clayton (Utah 1981) 639 P.2d 168, 170, the Utah Supreme Court broke the Anders requirements into eight steps. The sixth provided for the “court—not counsel . . . after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous." The court then added an interesting element: “With respect to steps 6, 7, and 8, this Court will grant counsel permission to withdraw and will affirm the conviction (rather than dismiss the appeal) in criminal appeals that are found to be wholly frivolous, but will do so only when the Court is unanimous in that decision. Otherwise, the appeal must be pursued on the merits.” (Ibid.)
Vermont: The appellate court in In re Mossey (Vt. 1971) 274 A.2d 473, 475-476, “reviewed the entire record within the precept of Anders,” denied the attorney’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed defendant’s conviction.
Virginia: In Kuzminski v. Commonwealth (1989) 8 Va.App. 106 [378 S.E.2d 632], the appellate panel first determined whether the brief filed by appointed counsel, in conjunction with his request to withdraw, “satisfies the Anders requirements” (id. at p. 633) and then “examined all of the proceedings in this case and [concluded] . . . there is nothing in the record that might arguably support this appeal.” (Ibid.) The court then authorized counsel’s withdrawal and dismissed the appeal.
Washington: The Washington Supreme Court adopted Anders in State v. Theobald (Wash. 1970) 470 P.2d 188. The more recent State v. Pollard (1992) 66 Wash.App. 779 [834P.2d 51] is significant in several respects. There, the Court of Appeals, after “reviewing the record to determine whether the issues raised by counsel were wholly frivolous, [concluded most were, but] . . . noted an additional issue that might not be frivolous.” (Id. at p. 53.) The reviewing court deferred a ruling on appointed counsel’s request to withdraw and asked for supplemental briefing. Oral argument was conducted; and, ultimately, the court determined one issue had merit, reversed the conviction, and remanded for a new restitution hearing. In a footnote, the court explained, “Although the panel of this court reviewing the previous challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence [in the original Anders brief] as to restitution considered the issue wholly frivolous, we review that issue anew here because of the special obligations imposed by the Anders process. This court has an independent obligation to ascertain to its satisfaction that there is no merit to the appeal.” (Id. at p. 54, fn. 3, italics added.) The Court of Appeals also rejected an argument by the “State [] that Anders . . . requires appellate counsel, after having identified potential arguments a client might advance, to analyze those arguments and discuss how they are wholly without merit.” (Id. at p. 55.)
*874West Virginia: The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Turner v. Haynes (W.Va. 1978) 245 S.E.2d 629, 631, wrote, “Applying the law of Anders ... to which we adhere . . . [i]t is not [appointed] counsel’s prerogative to determine finally the merits of an appeal, but, as directed in Anders, ‘the court—not counsel . . . decide[s] whether the case is wholly frivolous.’ ” This is accomplished by the court’s independent examination of the record. (Rhodes v. Leverette (W.Va. 1977) 239 S.E.2d 136, 139, fn. 1.)
Wisconsin: In Cleghorn v. State (1972) 155 Wis.2d 466 [98 N.W.2d 577, 581], the Supreme Court not only accepted its duty of independent review, but acknowledged that duty would require the consideration of potentially meritorious issues it may discover in that review: “[T]he court will make an independent review of the record, consider all issues raised and found, and may in a proper case summarily decide the appeal, as well as dismiss counsel.” (Italics added.)
Wyoming: Trujillo v. State (Wyo. 1977) 565 P.2d 1246, 1247 recognized Anders’s requirement for independent review: “Counsel for appellant advises that he has carefully reviewed the record and evidence and finds no basis or other grounds to support appellant’s appeal. This court has also made such an examination and is in agreement therewith.”

And for any appellate justice who has ever been faced with the task of performing a Wende review on a multivolume appeal, Munch’s The Scream would probably seem most apt.

As the majority point out, the Supreme Court has accepted review in two juvenile dependency cases involving Wende review. Pending that determination, and despite the differences in opinion among the various judges of this division, this court will continue to perform Wende reviews in all juvenile dependency cases where Wende briefs are filed. Hence, the Kayla G. decision and the instant case each affirm juvenile court judgments after a Wende review. By processing these cases as if Wende applied to juvenile dependency cases, no existing juvenile dependency judgment need be disturbed, regardless of what the high court does with the question.

The arguable issue requirement was lifted by the Wende court from People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444 [62 Cal.Rptr. 419, 432 P.2d 21], (See Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. *862440.) Feggans required the court to consider the impact of a “no-merit” letter in the aftermath of Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [18 L.Ed.2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396], which held that such letters were constitutionally insufficient. In interpreting Anders, the Feggans court laid down a series of rules for appointed appellate counsel to follow, including “argue all issues that are arguable.” (Feggans, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 447.) While the court did not attempt to justify the “all [arguable] issues” standard, one may gather from the context that the court was referring to issues that had a reasonable chance of changing the result. Thus the Anders brief was to “discuss the legal issues,” but only argue those that were “arguable," implying the latter were a select subset of the former. (See ibid.)
Feggans was later cited by In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192 [90 Cal.Rptr. 1, 474 P.2d 969] to justify concluding that appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance where the counsel had failed to raise any issues in a case which was “bristling with arguable claims of error.” (Smith, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 198 & 203.) Smith, in turn, was used in People v. Rhoden (1972) 6 Cal.3d 519 [99 Cal.Rptr. 751, 492 P.2d 1143] to again justify an ineffective assistance holding where counsel had failed to raise any of a number of possible errors which “might have resulted in reversal.” (Rhoden, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 529.) Unfortunately, both Smith and Rhoden contained dicta to the effect that the reason they had “catalogued" the arguments counsel had not made was to show ineffective assistance, not to demonstrate that the arguments were meritorious. (See Smith, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 202; Rhoden, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 529.) From this dicta, the court in People v. Scobie (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 97, 99 [111 Cal.Rptr. 600], would later extrapolate the rule that appellate counsel must raise “arguable-but-unmeritorious” issues on appeal.
The Wende arguable issues requirement is thus a case of perfect legal logic leading to a nonsensical result. It took Justice Gardner in People v. Von Staich (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 172 [161 Cal.Rptr. 448] to point out the emperor had no clothes: “Hopefully, we do not engage in a process of setting up straw men and then knocking them down in a search for ‘arguable’ issues.” (Id. at p. 175.) Unfortunately, that is precisely what Wende requires. (Ibid.)

Which is the whole point of the doctrines of mootness and justiciable controversy, as well as the disinclination of courts to render advisory opinions. Unless an issue actually makes a difference, courts should not decide it. They have better things to do than conjure legal questions and then debate them.

We count New Hampshire, whose Supreme Court acknowledge Anders imposes this duty, in this number. New Hampshire, however, has determined that Anders imposes a minimum standard and has created its own procedure. See post.