Court Opinion

ID: 9553840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:35:58.566869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:21.450372
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
BUSSEY, Judge:
On March 26, 1974, this Court affirmed defendant’s conviction of Concealing Stolen Property. From that opinion defendant has filed a Petition for Rehearing.
Defendant argues that our opinion on his appeal was in conflict with the decision rendered by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970), and with a decision cited therein, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969). In Turner, supra, the defendant was charged with knowingly receiving, concealing, and transporting heroin and cocaine which he knew had been illegally imported. He was also charged with knowingly purchasing, dispensing, and distributing heroin and cocaine not in or from the original stamped package.. The pertinent part of that opinion involved an instruction given by the trial court, in accord with several federal statutes, that defendant’s unexplained possession of heroin and cocaine would support an inference by the jury that he knew they had been illegally imported. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions as to heroin, but reversed them as to cocaine. The basis for the Court’s distinction between the two was founded upon its use of a “rational connection” test in analyzing the statutory presumptions arising from possession of each drug. Specifically, the Court found that there was a rational connection between possession of heroin and the twin presumptions that it had been illegally imported and that defendant had knowledge of such illegal importation. The Court found such a rational connection because of the fact that most domestically-possessed heroin was widely known to be imported, hence it was proper for the jury to make both of the above presumptions. On the other hand, because more cocaine is lawfully produced in the United States than is illegally imported, the same two presumptions as applied to cocaine were without a rational connection.
In Leary, supra, the Court found the presumption that a defendant knew that marijuana found in his possession had been illegally imported to be without rational connection. Due to the large amount of marihuana produced in the United States, the Court felt it was irrational to presume that a defendant in possession of the drug, knew that it was imported and not domestic.
In the argument presented in support of his Petition for Rehearing, defendant claims that the two above-cited cases should be considered by us to render the trial court’s Instruction # 3A an unconsti*832tutional shifting of the burden of proof from the State to the defendant. Defendant also reiterates the argument made in his appeal that the instruction placed a costly premium on the exercise of his right to remain silent.
We disagree. Both Turner and Leary involved statutory presumptions on which the jury was instructed. As we pointed out in our initial decision, the instruction in the instant case does not raise a presumption of guilty knowledge from the mere fact of possession. Rather, it allows the jury to take unsatisfactorily explained possession into account as a circumstance in determining guilt or innocence. In response to defendant’s argument over the alleged shifting of the burden of proof, we refer again to Miller v. State, Okl.Cr., 481 P.2d 175 (1969), cited in our opinion. As to his arguments concerning self-incrimination, we refer to our discussion of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965).
The cases cited by defendant in his Petition for Rehearing are thus, inapplicable, and we find our initial decision to be controlling.
The Petition for Rehearing is accordingly, denied, and the Clerk of this Court is directed to issue the Mandate forthwith.
BLISS, P. J., and. BRETT, J., concur.