Court Opinion

ID: 9779648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:31:07.015312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:37.384458
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: Aventine submits that this court’s jurisdiction is premised on Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1). Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(1) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). Rule 307 allows appeals as a matter of right from orders granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction. Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(1) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). Courts have expanded the rule to apply to orders that are injunctive in nature, such as those granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Chicago Hospital Risk Pooling Program, 372 Ill. App. 3d 104, 865 N.E.2d 317 (2007). Certain “stay orders” have also been held to be injunctive in nature and, therefore, appealable under Rule 307 as a matter of right. See Marsh v. Illinois Racing Board, 179 Ill. 2d 488, 689 N.E.2d 1113 (1997) (trial court’s order staying board’s order revoking a horse-racing license was injunctive in nature and appealable under Rule 307). Our supreme court, however, in Marsh, cautioned against courts summarily finding that all stay orders are the equivalent to an injunction and therefore appealable under Rule 307. Specifically, the Marsh court noted as follows: “ ‘To determine what constitutes an appealable injunctive order under Rule 307(a)(1) we look to the substance of the action, not its form. [Citation.] *** While we express no opinion as to the merits of these appellate court cases, they do reflect a policy of broadly construing the meaning of the term “injunction.” ’ [Citation.] In view of these expansive comments, it is not surprising, perhaps, that defendants urge us to simply deem the circuit court’s ‘stay’ an ‘injunction’ and hold that jurisdiction under Rule 307(a)(1) is proper. In fact, this is precisely what both of the appellate panels did in the opinions cited to us by defendants. [Citation.] In our view, however, such an approach oversimplifies the issue ***.” Marsh, 179 Ill. 2d at 491-92, quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 260-61, 537 N.E.2d 292 (1989). While the Marsh court ultimately found the stay at issue in that case was appealable given its injunctive nature, our supreme court has noted that other orders which appear injunctive (given the fact that they compel a party to take an action) are not appealable under Rule 307. In People v. Philip Morris, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d 87, 759 N.E.2d 906 (2001), the circuit court established an escrow account and compelled the parties to put 10% of all settlement payments in the account. Philip Morris, 198 Ill. 2d at 101. The State appealed, claiming the order was injunctive in nature as it compelled the parties to take an action and, as such, was appealable under Rule 307(a)(1). Our supreme court disagreed and stated: “ ‘Ministerial’ or ‘administrative’ orders of the circuit court, i.e., orders that regulate only the procedural details of litigation before the court, cannot be the subject of an interlocutory appeal. Such orders do not affect the relationship of the parties in their everyday activity apart from the litigation and, therefore, are distinguishable from traditional forms of injunctive relief.” Philip Morris, 198 Ill. 2d at 101-02. The Philip Morris court acknowledged that the establishment of the escrow account compelled action. However, it found it significant that the trial court correctly noted, “ ‘Nobody won here today, nobody lost here today ***,’ ” and, as such, ultimately held that the appellate court did not err in dismissing the State’s interlocutory appeal from the circuit court’s escrow order. Philip Morris, 198 Ill. 2d at 102. The Fifth District relied heavily on language from Philip Morris when holding an order of the circuit court compelling mediation was not an appealable order under Rule 307(a)(1). Short Brothers Construction, Inc. v. Korte & Luitjohan Contractors, Inc., 356 Ill. App. 3d 958, 828 N.E.2d 754 (2005). In Short Brothers, defendant appealed an order referring the lawsuit to mediation pursuant to a local circuit court rule that provided the circuit court discretion to refer any civil case it saw fit. Short Brothers, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 960. The appellate court held such an order was not appealable under Rule 307(a)(1). Short Brothers, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 960-61. Borrowing language from Philip Morris, the Short Brothers court noted: “Examples of such orders include subpoenas, discovery orders, and orders relating to the court’s own docket. [Citations.] Such orders can be considered noninjunctive because they did not form a part of the power traditionally reserved to courts of equity but, instead, were a part of the inherent power possessed by any court to compel witnesses to appear before it and give testimony and to control its own docket. [Citations.] Such orders do not affect the relationship of the parties in their everyday activity apart from the litigation, and they are therefore distinguishable from traditional forms of injunctive relief. [Citation.] We believe that the mediation order entered in the case at bar falls into this category of administrative, noninjunctive orders, which are not appealable under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1). It seems self-evident that the purpose of the mediation process, and the mediation order in the case at bar, is to streamline the judicial process by encouraging compromise and settlement, if not of the entire controversy then at least some portions of it, thereby reducing the workload of the circuit court and lessening the expense and burden to the parties. The mediation order is clearly related to the circuit court’s inherent authority to control its own docket. The mediation order is ministerial or administrative in nature, rather than injunctive in nature, because it is regulating the procedural details of the litigation, rather than affecting the rights of the parties. [Citation.] The mediation order relates only to the conduct of the litigation; it does not affect the relationship of the parties in their everyday activity apart from the litigation. Like the escrow order found to be nonappealable in People v. Philip Morris, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d 87, 102 (2001), a mediation order is an interim order, which does not establish or affect the rights of the parties but preserves them until those rights can be established.” Short Brothers, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 960. The trial judge in the case at bar very specifically stated: “The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every Court to control the disposition of the [cases] on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel and for litigations. And I think that applies wholeheartedly and perfectly and on point with these proceedings such that these proceedings should be stayed while the matter pends, at least pends putatively in the District Court proceedings in New York.” After denying Aventine’s motion to lift the stay, the trial court instructed the parties to “exchange correspondence with regard to any categories of evidence which each may want the other to preserve.” The court also directed the parties to return nine days later for a case management conference and set a hearing date for a status conference six months from the date of its order. Therefore, this “stay” is not even really a stay since discovery necessary to preserve evidence was to proceed. Other than blindly seeing the word “stay” and concluding that Rule 307(a)(1) is triggered in some Pavlovian type of reaction, there appears to be little to persuade me that we have authority to review this order. The court declared no winner, and no loser. No substantive ruling has been made as to whether or not the arbitration provision applies or does not apply. The court’s ruling simply stated it was staying this action pending further developments in a class action matter that all agree encompasses at least some of the issues in this case. The court limited discovery but it did not cut it off completely. It directed the parties to identify categories of evidence that needed to be preserved and set two future dates on which the parties were to return to discuss the status of the case. While the trial court used the term “stay,” its order appears to be one that merely regulates the procedural details of the litigation before it. The order does not affect the relationship of the parties in their everyday activity apart from the litigation. Therefore, it is distinguishable from traditional forms of injunctive relief and not appealable under Rule 307(a)(1). Philip Morris, 198 Ill. 2d at 101-02. Since I would dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent.