Court Opinion

ID: 9372535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 20:02:44.735577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.977655
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE                   )
ASSOCIATION, and USAA LIFE                   )
INSURANCE COMPANY,                           )
                                             )
                         Plaintiffs,         )
                                             )
                v.                           ) C.A. No. 2021-0296-NAC
                                             )
THE LIONS SHARE TRUST and                    )
KAREN A. ROULETTE,                           )
                                             )
                         Defendants.         )

                     ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
                       WITH LEAVE TO TRANSFER

      WHEREAS:

      1.    In 2017, Defendants filed a Uniform Commercial Code Financing

Statement with the Delaware Secretary of State (the “UCC-1”). Plaintiffs allege that

the UCC-1 is fraudulent and violates positive law because it records a fictitious

security interest in their assets. See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 10–16, 25–41 (“Compl.”).

      2.    Plaintiffs have identified statutory tools for correcting or terminating

the UCC-1. See id. ¶¶ 19, 22. And they seem to accept that a court could declare

the UCC-1 “invalid,” “void,” or “fraudulent.” See id. ¶ A. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs

also request (i) a mandatory injunction compelling the Secretary of State to

“expunge” the UCC-1; and (ii) a prohibitive injunction preventing Defendants “from

filing additional fraudulent documents” in the future. Id. ¶¶ B–C.
      3.     I ordered briefing on the question of whether this Court has subject

matter jurisdiction over this action. See Dkt. 23.1 Plaintiffs argue that their requests

for injunctive relief are sufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.

      NOW, THEREFORE, the Court having carefully considered Plaintiffs’

complaint, supporting exhibits, and oral and written arguments, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED, this 21st day of February 2023, as follows:

      1.     “The Court of Chancery is proudly a court of limited jurisdiction.”

Perlman v. Vox Media, Inc., 2019 WL 2647520, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2019).

Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to ground jurisdiction solely on a request for

injunctive relief, the plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate “the absence of an

adequate remedy at law.” In re COVID-Related Restrictions on Religious Servs.,

285 A.3d 1205, 1230 (Del. Ch. 2022). A legal remedy is adequate if it would afford

the plaintiff “full, fair, and complete relief.” El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. TransAmerican

Nat. Gas Corp., 669 A.2d 36, 39 (Del. 1995). In determining whether an adequate

legal remedy exists, the Court “focus[es] upon the allegations of the complaint in

light of what the plaintiff really seeks to gain by bringing [its] claim.” Candlewood

Timber Gp., LLC v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 997 (Del. 2004). Through

this exercise, the Court looks

1
 Although Defendants did not respond, jurisdictional questions cannot be waived. See Ct.
Ch. R. 12(h)(3). So I deemed the issue ripe for decision anyway. See Dkt. 30.

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         behind the “facade of prayers” to determine the “true reason” for which the
         plaintiff has brought suit . . . . [A] judge in equity will . . . not permit a suit to
         be brought in Chancery where a complete legal remedy otherwise exists but
         where the plaintiff has prayed for some type of traditional equitable relief as
         a kind of formulaic “open sesame” to the Court of Chancery.

Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Comdisco, Inc., 602 A.2d 74, 78 (Del. Ch. 1991) (citations

omitted). “If a realistic evaluation [of the complaint] leads to the conclusion that an

adequate legal remedy is available[,] this court . . . will not accept jurisdiction over

the matter.” McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 603 (Del. Ch. 1987).

         2.     Based on a realistic evaluation of their complaint, Plaintiffs truly seek

to correct or invalidate the UCC-1. At least three legal remedies would adequately

achieve that objective.

         3.     First, Plaintiffs may file an “information statement.” See 6 Del. C. § 9-

518. Under Article 9 of the Delaware Uniform Commercial Code, a person may file

an information statement if the person “believes that the existing record is inaccurate

or has been wrongly filed.” Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquid.

Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 103 A.3d 1010, 1016 n.25 (Del. 2014). Once filed,

an information statement effectively “give[s] public notice that the erroneously filed

record is unreliable.” Id. Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, as I must at this

stage,2 an information statement would adequately provide third parties with notice

that the UCC-1 records a non-existent security interest.

2
    See Diebold Comput. Leasing, Inc. v. Com. Credit Corp., 267 A.2d 586, 588 (Del. 1970).

                                               3
       4.     Second, Plaintiffs may seek monetary relief. Under Article 9, a putative

secured party must file a “termination statement” if, among other things, “the debtor

did not authorize the filing of the [challenged] financing statement.”

6 Del. C. § 9-513(c)(4). 3 Failure to file a required termination statement may give

rise to statutory damages. Id. § 9-625(e)(4). Here, Plaintiffs did not authorize

Defendants to file the UCC-1. So Plaintiffs demanded that Defendants file a

termination statement.      See Compl. ¶¶ 19–21.         Defendants did not respond.

Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, damages are available to compensate them

for resulting losses. Indeed, Plaintiffs have requested damages here. See id. ¶ D.

       5.     Finally, Plaintiffs may seek a declaratory judgment.              Under the

Declaratory Judgment Act, a court may “declare rights, status and other legal

relations[.]” 10 Del. C. § 6501. A court of law 4 thus may declare the UCC-1 invalid.

       6.     Plaintiffs have pleaded these legal remedies. Even so, Plaintiffs try to

portray them as inadequate. In their view, only an injunction would afford them

complete relief because an injunction would force the Secretary of State to

“expunge” the UCC-1 and prevent Defendants from filing another one. I disagree.

3
   A termination statement         invalidates   the   challenged   financing    statement.
See 6 Del. C. § 9-513(d).
4
  Although this Court may, under certain circumstances, exercise its jurisdiction solely to
issue a declaration, Plaintiffs do not argue that their request for a declaration, standing
alone, confers equitable jurisdiction over their claims.

                                            4
      7.     To begin, Plaintiffs’ expungement argument assumes that, without an

injunction, the Secretary of State would not remove a financing statement that has

been declared invalid by a court of law. But this theory imagines a “lawless society.”

Mennella v. Albence, 2023 WL 309042, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2023). This Court

presumes that government actors will obey declaratory judgments.5 As a result,

“injunctive relief is generally unavailable where the plaintiff’s proposed injunction

merely seeks to prospectively compel a government to conform with the

interpretation of the law reflected in [a] declaratory judgment.” Crown Castle Fiber

LLC v. City of Wilm., 2021 WL 2838425, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2021). Put

differently, injunctive relief is generally not necessary to compel government

compliance with a declaratory judgment until the government actor “actually refuses

to comply with the judicial declaration.” Christiana Town Ctr., LLC v. New Castle

Cnty., 2003 WL 21314499, at *4 n.19 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2003) (emphasis in original).

      8.     Here, Plaintiffs offer no reasonably conceivable basis for me to

conclude that, without an injunction, the Secretary of State would ignore a

declaration from a Delaware court of law deeming the UCC-1 invalid. In fact, the

opposite seems true. Understanding why involves some statutory perambulation.

5
 See, e.g., Middlecap Assocs., LLC v. Town of Middletown, 2023 WL 1815798, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 2, 2023); Delta Eta Corp. v. City of Newark, 2021-1106-MTZ (Del. Ch. Feb. 2,
2023); Mennella, 2023 WL 309042, at *2; COVID-Related Restrictions, 285 A.3d at 1233;
Birney v. Del. Dep’t of Safety & Homeland Sec., 2022 WL 16955159, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov.
16, 2022); Gladney v. City of Wilm., 2011 WL 6016048, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2011).

                                          5
         9.     To be legally “sufficient,” a financing statement must provide the name

of a “debtor” and “secured party” and indicate the “collateral.” 6 Del. C. § 9-502(a).

Section 9-102 of Article 9 defines these terms. See id. § 9-102(a)(12), (28), (73).

So a financing statement is not sufficient unless the financing statement identifies

parties and security interests that fit Section 9-102’s definitions.

         10.    Moreover, a “sufficient” financing statement is not necessarily an

“effective” one. Article 9 provides that the filing of a financing statement is

“effective only to the extent it was filed by a person that may file it under Section 9-

509.” Id. § 9-510(a). Under Section 9-509, a person may file a financing statement

“only if the debtor authorizes the filing in an authenticated record[.]” Id. § 9-

509(a)(1). Read as a whole, a financing statement is not “effective” under Section

9-509 unless properly authorized by a “debtor” defined under Section 9-102.6

         11.    Against this background, the “filing office,” which is defined to include

the Secretary of State, 7 is “not expected to make legal judgments” about the

“content” of a financing statement. Id. § 9-520 cmt. 2. Instead, the Secretary of

State generally will accept a financing statement that superficially appears valid. See

id. § 9-516(a). That means the Secretary of State may sometimes accept a financing

6
 The Delaware Supreme Court has held that Section 9-509 is unambiguous and should be
construed as part of the “statutory chain” linking Article 9 together. See Unsecured
Creditors of Motors Liquid. Co., 103 A.3d at 1014–15.
7
    See 6 Del. C. § 9-501(a)(2).

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statement that names persons who are not actually “debtors” or “secured parties”

under Section 9-102 or that was not “authorized by a debtor” under Section 9-509.

      12.    This is where the law may step in. Article 9 “cannot provide a . . .

complete solution to problems caused by . . . ‘bogus’ filings.” Id. § 9-518 cmt. 3.

So it created “nonjudicial means” for addressing inaccurate filings (e.g., information

and termination statements). Id. § 9-518 cmt. 2. And those nonjudicial means do

not “displace” judicial remedies. Id. To the contrary, Article 9 envisions “judicial

proceedings” for “correcting the public record” as well. Id. § 9-518 cmt. 3.

      13.    All this leads back to the adequacy of a declaratory judgment.

Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, it is possible that Plaintiffs are not “debtors”

and that Defendants are not “secured parties.” A court of law thus could possibly

declare that the UCC-1 is void ab initio due to infirmities in its contents. Such a

ruling would seem to require the Secretary of State to retroactively reject the UCC-

1 as “insufficient” or “ineffective.”8 That maneuver would “expunge” the UCC-1.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not need an injunction too.

      14.    Nor does Plaintiffs’ prospective injunction invoke jurisdiction. “An

injunction against future wrongdoing is generally not available.” Organovo Hldgs.,

8
 See id. §§ 9-520(a), (c) & cmt. 2, 9-516(b), 9-513(d), 9-502(a); see also id. § 9-522(b).
This analysis does not foreclose any other avenues for legal relief from adverse government
action, including a common law writ of mandamus. See, e.g., Mock v. Div. of State Police,
2022 WL 1744439, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2022).

                                            7
Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 114 (Del. Ch. 2017). So, to invoke equitable

jurisdiction on a prospective basis, the plaintiff must allege facts that “create a

reasonable apprehension of a future wrong.” McMahon, 532 A.2d at 606; accord

COVID-Related Restrictions, 285 A.3d at 1233. Here, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin

Defendants from filing “fraudulent documents” in the future. Compl. at ¶ C. 9 But

there are no facts creating a reasonable apprehension that Defendants will file a

document akin to the UCC-1 again. Indeed, the UCC-1 was filed in 2017. And

Plaintiffs have not reported any similar filings made over the last four years.10

Accordingly, on these facts, Plaintiffs’ concerns are too speculative to invoke

equitable jurisdiction.

         15.   To reach the opposite conclusion, Plaintiffs cite Green Tree Servicing

LLC v. Walker, 2009 WL 4768132 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2009). Green Tree is a post-

evidentiary-hearing order that granted the same relief Plaintiffs seek here. The

defendant did not appear in Green Tree,11 and the record suggests that neither the

9
  Plaintiffs do not seek a mandatory injunction compelling Defendants to take steps to
correct or remove the UCC-1 themselves. This Order therefore does not consider whether
such a request would be sufficient to invoke equitable jurisdiction.
10
  Indeed, my remedial analysis is likely colored by the fact that Plaintiffs waited four years
before seeking injunctive relief.
11
     See Dkt. 14, C.A. No. 5072-VCN (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2009).

                                              8
plaintiff nor the court raised subject matter jurisdiction. Green Tree, then, does not

alter my analysis.12

       16.    In sum, Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. So I lack jurisdiction

over their claims. Plaintiffs have requested that any dismissal be without prejudice

so that they could pursue their claims in the Superior Court of Delaware. Dkt. 25 at

13 n.30. Accordingly, I DISMISS the complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE to

Plaintiffs’ right to transfer this action to the Superior Court. See 10 Del. C. § 1902.13

                                                         /s/ Nathan A. Cook
                                                  Vice Chancellor Nathan A. Cook

12
   Plaintiffs acknowledge that Green Tree is the only Delaware decision they could locate
that exercised equitable jurisdiction to grant the relief sought here. See Dkt. 25 at 6.
Plaintiffs’ other Delaware authority stands for the proposition that this Court has
jurisdiction if a plaintiff requests equitable relief and lacks an adequate remedy at law. Id.
at 7–10. Here, however, Plaintiffs do have an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiffs also cite
limited federal decisions issuing injunctions requiring removal of fraudulent Article 9
filings. See id. at 10–12. Federal equitable rulings “must be considered cautiously in
Delaware,” Berkowitz v. MacPherson, 1995 WL 1799136, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 24, 1995),
where, unlike the federal structure—and in nearly all other states—there is a “historic and
constitutional separation of law and equity,” Monroe Park, L.P. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 457
A.2d 734, 738 (Del. 1983); see XRI Inv. Hldgs. LLC v. Holifield, 283 A.3d 581, 635–37
(Del. Ch. 2022); LG Elecs., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc’ns, Inc., 98 A.3d 135, 143 (Del.
Ch. 2014). Plus, I question whether, in the non-Delaware cases, damages, a declaration,
or even criminal penalties would have been inadequate. See 6 Del. C. § 9-518 cmt. 3. To
be sure, there may exist situations where this Court might issue an injunction, depending
on the facts and issues involved. For example, perhaps injunctive relief would be available
if the plaintiff pleaded facts creating a reasonable apprehension that the defendant has made
and will continue to make serial filings absent relief. As pleaded, however, that scenario
is not reasonably conceivable here.
13
  Failure to properly transfer this action to the Superior Court within the statutory period
will result in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.

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