Court Opinion

ID: 9849049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:33:43.379391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:58.273643
License: Public Domain

*872Frankum, Judge,
dissenting. I am constrained to dissent from the rulings made in Division 3 of the majority opinion.
Justice Mobley, speaking for the Supreme Court, stated two clear, settled rules governing the construction of contracts by the courts in Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Jack Jordan, Inc., 213 Ga. 299, 302 (99 SE2d 95): “It is well settled that the courts of Georgia, if there is any ambiguity in an insurance policy, will construe the contract most favorably to the insured. Benevolent Burial Assn. v. Harrison, 181 Ga. 230, 239 (181 SE 829); Christensen v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 197 Ga. 807, 813 (30 SE2d 471, 153 ALR 794); Mass. Benefit Life Assn. v. Robinson, 104 Ga. 256 (2) (30 SE 918, 42 LRA 261). But it is equally well settled that no construction is required or even permissible when the language employed by the parties in their contract is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation. In such an instance, the language used must be afforded its literal meaning and plain ordinary words given their usual significance, and this rule applies equally as well to insurance contracts as to any other contract. Golden v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 189 Ga. 79, 87 (5 SE2d 198, 125 ALR 838); Yancey v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 108 Ga. 349, 351 (33 SE 979); Wheeler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 129 Ga. 237, 240 (58 SE 709); Cato v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 Ga. 392, 398 (138 SE 787); Daniel v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 620 (2) (184 SE 366).”
The diversity of views between the one expressed in the ma-j ority opinion and the one expressed in this dissent is the inability of the members of this court to agree upon which one of the above rules is applicable to the facts in the instant case.
I cannot agree with the ruling made in Division 3 of the majority opinion because the words used in the double indemnity provision of the policy, namely, “after attaining age ten and prior to' attaining age sixty, and while the policy is maintained in full force and effect during the premium paying period” are not ambiguous and express conditions precedent to the company’s liability under the double indemnity provision. The majority view admits that the insured must have been at least ten years of age, and not more than sixty, at the time of his death as a con*873dition of liability of the insurer under the double indemnity provision of the policy. Following this condition is the phrase “and while the policy is maintained in full force and effect during the premium, paying period.” (Emphasis added). I am of the opinion that this phrase is also a condition of the double indemnity provision. The effect of the majority view is to render the words “during the premium paying period” nugatory.
. An endorsement attached to the policy shows it to be a “paid up” policy with no additional premiums to be paid. In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas interpreted the meaning of “premium paying period” in a double indemnity provision of an insurance policy in which benefits were conditional upon the event that the insured’s death occur during the premium period. The court construed the words “during the premium paying period” to mean that the provision for double indemnity in the event of accidental death was not in effect when the premiums had been paid in full, or, in other words, when the policy became a “paid up” policy. Hubach v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 228 Ark. 926 (311 SW2d 307). Likewise, in the instant case, the liability of the insurance company under the double indemnity provision is conditioned upon accidental death of the insured within the meaning of the policy “while the policy is maintained in full force and effect during the premium paying period.” It is undisputed that the premium paying period had expired prior to the death of the insured. Accordingly, the insurance company should not be held liable under the double indemnity provision of the policy.
In my opinion, the words in this double indemnity provision are not ambiguous and should be given their literal meaning and their usual significance.
I am authorized to state that Felton, C. J., concurs in this dissent.