Court Opinion

ID: 9665528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:50:36.282854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:15.840560
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Although there are many problems with the majority opinion, there are two issues which are dispositive of this appeal.
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
Points of error one and two allege the trial court erred in refusing to give the instruction appellant had requested in appellants motion “Number 4.” However, “Number 4” is not included in the record on appeal. Failure to bring forward a complete record on appeal waives the right to complain of a matter which is omitted from the record. Murillo v. State, 839 S.W.2d 485, 493 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, no pet).
The majority admits appellant did not comply with Article 36.15 because he failed to include his written request in the record and failed to “dictate” his requested instruction into the record. However, they cite a Dallas opinion to bootstrap appellant into a preservation of error via Article 36.14. Article 36.14 pertains to the “Courts Charge” and errors or omissions in the charge. However, it is Article 36.15, “Requested Special Charges,” that specifically deals with “instructions.” It is the failure to give an instruction that is the basis of appellant’s complaint. In Point of Error One, appellant starts by stating: “The court’s charge to the jury on guilt/innocenee contains no instruc-tion_” (emphasis added). Appellant ends by stating: “The trial court reversibly erred in overruling appellant’s objection to the failure of the charge to include an instruc-tion_” (emphasis added). In Point of Error Two, appellant begins by stating: “The Court’s charge to the jury ... contains no instruction ...” (emphasis added). Appellant concludes by stating: “The trial court reversibly erred in overruling appellant’s objection to the failure of the charge to include an instruction....” (emphasis added). The appellant mainly argues the issue of consent, or withdrawal of consent, entitled him to an instruction on the voluntariness of appellant’s consent to the taking of blood. Appellant never argues or cites Article 36.11!
*805Appellant complied with Article 36.15 by-submitting his requested instruction in writing; Defendants Motion “Number Four.” Appellant then argued to the court that he was entitled to his requested written instruction. The majority would find the trial court erred in denying the written request, without ever seeing what appellant requested. The majority reverses the trial court judgment simply because appellant argued that he was entitled to an instruction. This is not, has never been, and will never be the law. And the reason is simple — it opens the door wide to allow chicanery to enter. A criminal defense attorney could present the trial court with a written requested instruction that was clearly wrong and which would mislead and confuse the jury. The attorney could then argue his right to an instruction pursuant to the applicable statutes and articles. The trial court would obviously deny the written instruction, and if the defendant is convicted, the attorney has cleverly built in error upon which Appellate courts would reverse the conviction. All he has to do is omit the written instruction from the record on appeal.
The law is clear and logical — when you complain of error in the trial court’s failure to give the written instruction requested, and fail to include the written instruction in the record, error is waived. Murillo v. State, 839 S.W.2d 485, 493 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, no pet).
WAIVER
The second issue that is dispositive of this appeal is appellant’s waiver of his right to complain of the failure to instruct on involuntary consent to take a blood test. When the results of the blood test were offered into evidence by the State, the court asked the attorney for appellant; “any objections?” The attorney for appellant responded, “no objection.” If the blood sample was taken without his consent and in violation of appellant’s constitutional or statutory rights, the results of the test are inadmissible. However, if appellant fails to object to the introduction of the evidence, it is admissible. Whether it was taken voluntarily or against the appellant’s constitutional rights becomes moot. Therefore, there is no reason for an instruction to the jury as to whether appellant “voluntarily” consented. Failure to object to the introduction of the evidence complained of, waives appellant’s right to an instruction on the issue. Ramos v. State, 831 S.W.2d 10, 15-16 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, pet ref'd).
I would overrule points of error one and two, sustain point of error three regarding good time, give appellant the good time he requests, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.