Court Opinion

ID: 9403560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 15:02:51.892385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:07.978140
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2209    Document: 21     Page: 1   Filed: 06/08/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

      IN RE: WILLIAM HENRY STARRETT, JR.,
                      Appellant
               ______________________

                        2022-2209
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 15/299,124.
                   ______________________

                   Decided: June 8, 2023
                  ______________________

    WILLIAM STARRETT, JR., Richardson, TX, pro se.

    ROBERT MCBRIDE, Office of the Solicitor, United States
 Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee
 Katherine K. Vidal. Also represented by THOMAS W.
 KRAUSE, AMY J. NELSON, FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED,
 MICHAEL TYLER.
                 ______________________

     Before LOURIE, DYK, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
     William Henry Starrett, Jr., appeals from a decision of
 the United States Patent and Trademark Office Patent
 Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”) affirming an Exam-
 iner’s rejection of the pending claims of U.S. Patent
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 2                                            IN RE: STARRETT

 Application 15/299,124 (“the ’124 application”) as un-
 patentable based on various grounds. Ex parte William
 Henry Starrett Jr., No. 2021-002543, 2022 WL 1198959
 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 15, 2022) (“Decision”). For the following rea-
 sons, we affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
     The twenty-two claims of the ’124 application generally
 recite methods, systems, media, and machines for main-
 taining augmented telepathic data for telepathic communi-
 cation as a gadget-free extension of human senses. The
 claimed inventions allegedly maintain data structures rep-
 resenting categories of biological signals in a body such as
 “Nervous System” and “Sensory System.”
    Claim 1, reproduced in part below, is representative for
 purposes of this appeal:
     1. A non-transitory computer readable medium
     containing data representing either of or both data
     structures and program instructions for generat-
     ing, analyzing, extending, communicating, inte-
     grating, storing, converting, editing, encoding, or
     maintaining said data structures representing:
         [A.] one or more unit of category Nervous Sys-
         tem depicting referring expressions relating to
         nervous system cells, nerves, tissue, electrical
         or chemical impulses, and trace occurrences re-
         lated to signaling the communication of infor-
         mation and its processing in a biological body
         optionally with
             [i.] zero, one, or more unit of category Sen-
             sory System depicting referring expres-
             sions relating to sensory systems cells,
             nerves, tissue, electrical or chemical im-
             pulses, and trace occurrences related to sig-
             naling the communication of sensory
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 IN RE: STARRETT                                               3

            information for its interpretation or pro-
            cessing in a biological body and
            [ii.] zero, one, or more unit of category
            Brain and Nerve Activity optionally depict-
            ing referring expressions associating Nerv-
            ous System category units with Sensory
            System category units . . .
                   [d.] wherein each Brain and Nerve Ac-
                   tivity, Sensory System, Nervous Sys-
                   tem,     Communication,     Cognition,
                   Perception,    Experience,   Imagery,
                   Sound, Symbol, Stimulus, Behavior,
                   and People category unit consisting of
                      [1)] zero, one, or more members
                      with each member describing one
                      or more object, element, asset, act,
                      condition, process, or product rep-
                      resenting zero, one, or more event,
                      status, location, or hierarchical co-
                      ordinate system and having zero,
                      one, or more relationship, refer-
                      ence, property, description, or di-
                      mension of interest wherein
                          [A)] data structures represent-
                          ing one or more unit in one or
                          more category being generated
                          using
                              [i)] one or more referring
                              expression and zero, one, or
                              more hierarchical coordi-
                              nate system by a system in-
                              corporating
                                  [a)] at least one trans-
                                  mitter, artificial satel-
                                  lite, receiver, signal, or
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 4                                          IN RE: STARRETT

                               ambient field and zero
                               proximate, wearable,
                               or surgically implanted
                               devices,         sensors,
                               probes, or electrodes for
                               analyzing, obtaining,
                               and generating infor-
                               mation about biological
                               bodies;
                               [b)] configuration to re-
                               ceive, relay, transmit,
                               or distribute one or
                               more signal wherein at
                               least one signal com-
                               prising data repre-
                               sentative              of
                               information about one
                               or more biological body
                               wherein the processing
                               of biological systems
                               data using at least one
                               machine learning task
                               intelligibly recovering
                               perceived, experienced,
                               remembered, or imag-
                               ined imagery, sounds,
                               or feelings as one or
                               more     computational,
                               visual, auditory, tex-
                               tual, numeric, sym-
                               bolic, coordinate, or
                               haptic representation;
                               or
                               [c)] configuration to re-
                               ceive, relay, transmit,
                               or distribute one or
                               more signal wherein at
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 IN RE: STARRETT                                             5

                                  least one signal trans-
                                  mitting to one or more
                                  biological system in at
                                  least one biological
                                  body wherein one or
                                  more biological system
                                  recovering output sup-
                                  plying a biological body
                                  with at least one intel-
                                  ligible image, sound, or
                                  feeling . . . .
 ’124 application, claim 1 (formatting and bracketed mate-
 rial added by the Board in Decision at *1–3).
     The Examiner rejected all twenty-two claims for failing
 to comply with the written description and enablement re-
 quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) and for indefiniteness un-
 der 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).       Additionally, the Examiner
 rejected claims 15–22 for failing to meet the utility require-
 ment of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and rejected claims 1–14 as obvi-
 ous under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
     Starrett appealed to the Board, asserting that each of
 the Examiner’s rejections was improper and should be
 overturned.
     The Board selected claim 1 as representative for its
 analysis concerning written description and enablement
 under § 112(a), as well as obviousness under § 103. Deci-
 sion at *3–4. Similarly, the Board selected claim 15 as rep-
 resentative for its § 101 utility analysis. Id. at *4. The
 Board explained that it selected those representative
 claims because it found that Starrett did not argue each of
 the application’s claims separately. Id. at *3–4.
     In reviewing the Examiner’s § 112(a) enablement rejec-
 tion, the Board treated representative claim 1 as a genus
 claim after identifying that it contains forty-seven “or”
 clauses, thereby allowing it to cover over 140 trillion
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 6                                            IN RE: STARRETT

 embodiments. Id. at *7. The Board noted that the Exam-
 iner analyzed each of the relevant factors for assessing en-
 ablement identified in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed.
 Cir. 1988) and found that they weighed against a finding of
 enablement. Id. at *9. Although Starrett argued, regard-
 ing each Wands factor, that claim 1 was “fully enabled” by
 the application’s “laboriously detailed” specification, the
 Board disagreed with those assertions after finding them
 conclusory. Id. The Board noted that Starrett’s conten-
 tions essentially amounted to “argu[ing] that if an appa-
 ratus is well-known . . . , then any function that [the
 inventor] claims for that apparatus is also fully enabled.”
 Id. at *10. The Board held that this argument did not re-
 spond to the Wands factors analysis and affirmed the Ex-
 aminer’s rejection of the claims for lacking enablement. Id.
     The Board also affirmed each of the Examiner’s other
 rejections, and Starrett filed a request for rehearing, which
 the Board denied.
     Starrett appeals from the Board’s decision. We have
 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) and 35 U.S.C.
 § 141(a).
                         DISCUSSION
     We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo, In
 re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and the
 Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence, In re
 Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A finding
 is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind
 might accept the evidence as adequate to support the find-
 ing. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
     Starrett asserts that the Board procedurally erred by
 selecting and evaluating representative claims in its deci-
 sion, rather than comprehensively addressing each claim
 individually. Additionally, he argues that the Board erred
 by affirming each of the Examiner’s grounds of rejection.
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 IN RE: STARRETT                                            7

 We first address Starrett’s procedural contentions before
 considering his substantive arguments.
                               I
     Starrett contends that the Board erred in finding that
 he argued the ’124 application’s claims as a group with re-
 spect to the § 112(a) grounds of rejection, asserting that he
 comprehensively addressed each claim in his briefs to the
 Board. Appellant’s Br. at 9–10. We disagree.
     Regulations governing the Board permit the selection
 and analysis of representative claims in some circum-
 stances. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv):
     When multiple claims subject to the same ground
     of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by
     [an] appellant, the Board may select a single claim
     from the group or subgroup and may decide the ap-
     peal as to the ground of rejection with respect to
     the group or subgroup on the basis of the selected
     claim alone.
 That same regulation explains that “the failure of [an] ap-
 pellant to separately argue claims which [the] appellant
 has grouped together shall constitute a waiver of any argu-
 ment that the Board must consider the patentability of any
 grouped claim separately.” Id. Furthermore, a “statement
 which merely points out what a claim recites will not be
 considered an argument for separate patentability of the
 claim.” Id.
      Starrett’s appeal brief to the Board includes a section
 titled “3. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) Rejections (Claims 1–22).”
 SAppx 1 134. Although that section contains references to
 individual claims within the body of its text and subhead-
 ings that specifically identify subgroups of claims, those

     1   “SAppx” refers to the Supplemental Appendix filed
 by the government.
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 8                                           IN RE: STARRETT

 specific mentions do nothing more than summarize the Ex-
 aminer’s reasoning in rejecting the claims and identify
 what each claim or group of claims recites. Those refer-
 ences do not amount to separate arguments for each claim
 or subgroup of claims that preclude the selection of repre-
 sentative claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Addi-
 tionally, nothing in Starrett’s reply brief to the Board
 supports a finding that he addressed any of the claims sep-
 arately.
     Accordingly, the Board reasonably grouped all of the
 application’s claims together with respect to the § 112(a)
 grounds of rejection. The Board therefore did not err in
 applying 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) by selecting claim 1 as
 representative for its § 112(a) analysis and applying its
 analysis to all of the application’s claims. See In re Marco
 Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir.
 2018) (affirming the Board’s selection of a representative
 claim after holding that “the Board reasonably grouped all
 of the claims together”); In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1356–
 57 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the Board’s selection of rep-
 resentative claims after holding that “the Board has rea-
 sonably interpreted [37 C.F.R. §] 41.37 to require
 applicants to articulate more substantive arguments if
 they wish for individual claims to be treated separately”).
                              II
     Starrett argues that each ground of rejection should be
 overturned. We first address the Board’s § 112(a) enable-
 ment analysis, which applies to all of the application’s
 twenty-two claims. “[T]he absence of enablement is a legal
 conclusion based on underlying factual inquiries.” In re
 Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Enzo Bi-
 ochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
 1999)).
     On appeal, Starrett repeats the same contentions that
 he argued to the Board. Starrett argues that claim 1 is
 “fully enabled” and that components of the invention are
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 IN RE: STARRETT                                             9

 well known to persons of skill in the art without further
 argument or evidentiary support. Appellant’s Br. at 16.
 We disagree.
     As the Supreme Court recently explained, in affirming
 a decision of this court:
     If a patent claims an entire class of processes, ma-
     chines, manufactures, or compositions of matter,
     the patent’s specification must enable a person
     skilled in the art to make and use the entire class.
     In other words, the specification must enable the
     full scope of the invention as defined by its claims.
     The more one claims, the more one must enable.
 Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 143 S. Ct. 1243, 1254 (2023) (citations
 omitted).
     Here, much is claimed, and little is enabled. Although
 a finding of enablement is not precluded by a skilled arti-
 san’s needing to engage in some measure of experimenta-
 tion, the extent of that experimentation must be
 reasonable. Id. at 1255. The determination as to whether
 the extent of experimentation is undue or reasonable is in-
 formed by the eight Wands factors. In re Wands, 858 F.2d
 at 737.
      In this case, the Board’s factual findings underpinning
 its enablement determination are supported by substantial
 evidence. Nothing in the ’124 application’s specification or
 claims undermines the Board’s reliance on the Examiner’s
 Wands factors analysis or the Board’s determination that
 Starrett’s contentions were merely conclusory. The appli-
 cation’s disclosure of a broad and abstract organizational
 structure used to accomplish the maintenance of aug-
 mented telepathic data amounts to little more than a “re-
 search assignment” requiring a skilled artisan to
 undertake undue experimentation to discover what types
 of devices are encompassed by the claim limitations and
 how they would function. Amgen, 143 S. Ct. at 1256; see
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 10                                             IN RE: STARRETT

 also Enzo Biochem, 188 F.3d at 1374 (finding a lack of en-
 ablement after determining that “the specifications provide
 no more than a ‘plan’ or ‘invitation’ for those of skill in the
 art to experiment . . . ; they do not provide sufficient guid-
 ance or specificity as to how to execute that plan” (citations
 omitted)); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
 1336, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., additional views)
 (“[T]he overriding policy of patent systems requires both
 written description and enablement, and it is less critical
 to decide which statutory clause applies in a particular
 case, than to assure that both requirements are
 met. . . . [T]he threshold in all cases requires a transition
 from theory to practice, from basic science to its applica-
 tion, from research plan to demonstrated utility.”); Fiers v.
 Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that
 the written description requirement of § 112 requires dis-
 closing more than a mere “wish” or “plan”).
      Claim 1, as with other claims in the ’124 application, is
 rife with broad, vague concepts, including, but not limited
 to, “one or more unit of category Nervous System depicting
 referring expressions relating to nervous system cells,
 nerves, tissue, electrical or chemical impulses, and trace
 occurrences related to signaling the communication of in-
 formation and its processing in a biological body,” “a sys-
 tem incorporating at least one transmitter, artificial
 satellite, receiver, signal, or ambient field and zero proxi-
 mate, wearable, or surgically implanted devices, sensors,
 probes, or electrodes for analyzing, obtaining, and generat-
 ing information about biological bodies,” and a “configura-
 tion to receive, relay, transmit, or distribute one or more
 signal wherein at least one signal transmitting to one or
 more biological system in at least one biological body
 wherein one or more biological system recovering output
 supplying a biological body with at least one intelligible im-
 age, sound, or feeling.” ’124 application, claim 1.
    Hence, like the Board, we find Starrett’s arguments on
 enablement conclusory and unresponsive. Although a
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 IN RE: STARRETT                                                11

 skilled artisan’s familiarity with the components of a
 claimed invention is relevant under several Wands factors
 (e.g., nature of the invention, state of the prior art), it is not
 dispositive of enablement on its own. Furthermore, the Ex-
 aminer’s discussion of the Wands factors properly faulted
 the specification for failing to describe how the claim ele-
 ments function. SAppx 49, 51–52. As we have explained,
 “[a]lthough the knowledge of one skilled in the art is indeed
 relevant, the novel aspect of an invention must be enabled
 in the patent.” Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am.,
 Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Starrett’s argu-
 ments on appeal do not address how the ’124 application’s
 disclosures enable novel functions of allegedly well-known
 components, other than by facially asserting that claim 1
 is “fully enabled.” Moreover, Starrett fails to address any
 of the other Wands factors.
    Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s rejection of claims
 1–22 as lacking enablement under § 112(a).
                          CONCLUSION
      As we have affirmed a ground of rejection applicable to
 all of the claims in this appeal, we need not address Star-
 rett’s remaining arguments regarding the other grounds of
 rejection. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s
 rejection of claims 1–22 of the ’124 application.
                          AFFIRMED