Court Opinion

ID: 9824131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 10:26:26.150149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:34.293175
License: Public Domain

Dillon, J.P.,
concurs in part and dissents in part, and votes to affirm the judgment appealed from, with the following memorandum: I respectfully dissent from so much of the majority’s determination as reduced the defendant’s sentence as excessive, and vote to affirm the judgment of conviction.
In my view, the sentence imposed by the Supreme Court was not harsh or excessive (see People v Farrar, 52 NY2d 302 *984[1981]; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 85 [1982]), as it was in the middle of the permissible statutory range (see Penal Law § 70.06 [3] [b]), and was a provident exercise of the Supreme Court’s discretion under the circumstances of this case. The defendant was a second felony offender, arrested while on probation for an identical prior conviction, from which he had learned no lessons, and demonstrated disdain for the criminal justice system by absconding from the jurisdiction prior to his trial and sentence. This appeal is precipitated by the defendant having been arrested on a newer, unrelated charge in Florida, which resulted in his return to New York custody after 17 years as a fugitive.
The Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals reviewed and upheld an identical result in a similar matter, People v Diaz (177 AD2d 406 [1991], affd sub nom. People v Delgado, 80 NY2d 780 [1992]). In Delgado, the Court of Appeals, and the Appellate Division before it, affirmed three separate judgments where each defendant was sentenced, as here, as a second felony offender upon being convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. In the second of the Delgado appeals, the defendant, Julio Diaz, was sentenced, as here, to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 8 to 16 years (see People v Delgado, 80 NY2d at 781). While every sentence represents a balancing of factors that are unique to each case, here, the defendant proffers little argument that persuasively militates in favor of our Court’s leniency. Interestingly, in Delgado, the defendant, Diaz, did not abscond from the jurisdiction, and he was nonetheless sentenced to the identical indeterminate term of imprisonment as was the defendant in this matter.
Indeed, a defendant’s decision to abscond from the jurisdiction before or during trial is an important and appropriate consideration to take into account at the time of sentencing (see People v Herrera, 219 AD2d 511, 512 [1995]). Absconding from the jurisdiction evinces a lack of character, which was appropriately considered by the sentencing court at the time the discretionary sentence was imposed (see People v Latham, 35 AD2d 759, 760 [1970]). While arguments can be made that a sentence of an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 8 to 16 years would be excessive under more typical or milder circumstances, it is the act of the defendant’s absconding, known to the court at the time of sentencing, that appropriately elevates the sentence to the level imposed. The fact that the People had recommended an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 6 to 12 years requires no different result, as a sentenc*985ing court may impose discretionary penalties that exceed the People’s recommendation (see People v McCann, 303 AD2d 780, 781 [2003]; see also People v McKenzie, 28 AD3d 942, 943 [2006]; People v Moore, 270 AD2d 715, 716 [2000]; People v Anonymous, 130 AD2d 497 [1987]).
Finally, since the defendant is potentially eligible for a sentence reduction under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (see CPL 440.46), there is even less of a basis for this Court to modify the sentence on appeal, as the defendant is vested with a procedural mechanism for a review of his sentence that is more current, appropriate, and specific to the circumstances.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to affirm the defendant’s judgment of conviction.