Court Opinion

ID: 9625560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:44:47.632269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:11.008093
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in affirming the trial court’s order regarding Mr. Mashbum. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding regarding Mrs. Mashbum. No evidence was presented to show that Mrs. Mashburn abused or neglected her children.
Mrs. Mashbum’s parental rights are separate and distinct from those of Mr. Mashburn. The trial court erred by considering evidence of Mr. Mashburn’s abuse and neglect to determine whether Mrs. Mashbum abused or neglected her children.
I. Hearsay Evidence
Mrs. Mashburn contends the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence regarding the instances of sexual abuse. I note that Mr. Mashburn does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony. Appellate review is limited to those assignments of error set out in the record on appeal and properly presented and discussed in the party’s brief. Questions not properly raised and presented are deemed abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(a) (2003); N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (2003); see also In re Faircloth, 153 N.C. App. 565, 576, 571 S.E.2d 65, 73 (2002).
Rule 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” N.C.R. Evid. 801(c) (2003). Hearsay is inadmissible, unless it falls under an exception provided by statute or the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. N.C.R. Evid. 802 (2003).
A. Statements to Buncombe Countv and Yancev Countv DSS
Mrs. Mashburn contends the trial court erred by allowing Buncombe County DSS employee Linda Sweat to testify regarding specific instances of sexual abuse to the female child. Ms. Sweat received a report of abuse and neglect and began investigating the substantive matter of this report. She was allowed to testify, over Mrs. Mashburn’s objection, about the contents of the report that she used to begin her investigation:
The report was that the child had allegedly been molested by her stepfather. There were allegations that she might have been preg*400nant, so I went to the school and interviewed her. She subsequently disclosed to me — that she had been molested ....
The majority’s holding concludes that this testimony was offered for a non-hearsay purpose to explain why Buncombe County DSS began an investigation and to rebut the implication that the female child had fabricated the abuse allegations. I disagree. The report did not contain the female child’s description of the stepfather’s abuse as the majority’s holding concludes. Ms. Sweat testified that “[the female child] had woken up during the night to find Paul Mashburn on top of her . . . rubbing his genitals against her pubic area.” The trial transcript shows that Ms. Sweat did not learn this information regarding the alleged act until after she received the report, went to the school, and interviewed the female child. Ms. Sweat’s testimony describing the sexual act that the female child disclosed during the investigation was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted — that the alleged sexual abuse did occur. The trial court erred in admitting this testimony against Mrs. Mashburn.
Mrs. Mashburn also assigns error to the trial court allowing Ms. Sweat to testify, over Mrs. Mashburn’s objection, that the female child “was told that she would be beaten to death .... Paul Mashburn told her that.” The majority’s holding properly recognizes that this testimony was offered for the truth of the matter asserted and is not admissible under any hearsay exceptions. The majority’s holding concludes, however, that it was harmless error to admit the proffered testimony. I disagree. It was prejudicial against Mrs. Mashburn for the trial court to admit and consider this testimony. Although she is not implicated by this hearsay, the trial court did not exclude this testimony when it ruled on Mrs. Mashburn’s parental rights.
Mrs. Mashburn also asserts prejudice in the trial court’s error of allowing Ms. Sweat to testify regarding alleged sexual abuse by Mr. Mashburn to his granddaughters:
[B]oth of [Paul Mashburn’s grandchildren], who are five and six years old, disclosed sexual — a lot of sexual activity. The youngest one also disclosed specifically that she often is tickled [in the crotch] by her grandfather.
The majority’s holding concludes the trial court did not consider this testimony for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show the history and context of DSS’s interaction with Mr. Mashburn. The majority’s holding also concludes that it was not error for Ms. Debbie *401McKinney, with Yancey County DSS, to testify regarding the same sexual abuse allegations against Mr. Mashburn because Ms. McKinney’s testimony was offered to corroborate Ms. Sweat’s testimony. Bootstrapping hearsay upon hearsay is inadmissible and constitutes error.
In finding of fact number five, the trial court indicated that it considered the substance of the testimony and found “that a pending case is open with the North Carolina Yancey County Department of Social Services on [grandchildren of Paul Mashburn], [One granddaughter] disclosed sexualized behaviors at school; [another granddaughter] disclosed the ‘crotch tickle’ whereby Mr. Mashburn tickled her vaginal area . . . .” The substance of Ms. McKinney’s testimony regarding the grandchildren’s statements was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. This testimony does not fall within any hearsay exception to be admitted or considered against Mrs. Mashburn.
The trial court erred in considering this hearsay testimony to find abuse or neglect by Mrs. Mashburn. Ms. Sweat’s testimony was not offered to show the history and context of DSS interaction. Ms. McKinney’s testimony was not offered to corroborate the “history and context” of DSS’s interaction with Mr. Mashburn and does not show abuse or neglect by Mrs. Mashburn.
B. Statements to Dr. Cvnthia Brown
Mrs. Mashburn argues the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Cynthia Brown (“Dr. Brown”) to testify that the female child “disclosed that she had been tested for [sexual abuse] previously when she was younger and that the test was negative, and that since that time her mother had not believed her about any of this.”
The majority’s holding concludes this testimony is admissible under the medical diagnosis exception to the rule against hearsay. I disagree. “The veracity of the declarant’s statements to the physician is less certain where the statements need not have been made for purposes of promoting treatment or facilitating diagnosis in preparation for treatment.” State v. Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 286, 523 S.E.2d 663, 669 (2000) (quoting Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 952 (4th Cir. 1988) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Further, “[i]f the declarant’s statements are not pertinent to medical'diagnosis, the declarant has no treatment-based motivation to be truthful.” Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 289, 523 S.E.2d at 670.
*402Dr. Brown’s statement, “since that time her mother had not believed her” was not “reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment.” Id. at 288, 523 S.E.2d at 670. The trial court erred by considering Dr. Brown’s statement regarding the female child’s statements about what Mrs. Mashbum “believed.” This inadmissible hearsay was blatantly prejudicial and is the sole “evidence” of neglect by Mrs. Mashbum.
I concur in the majority’s resolution of the other assignments of error as they relate to Mr. Mashburn. As it related to Mrs. Mashburn, I would hold that the trial court erred in: (1) permitting and considering testimony concerning the female child’s statements and Mr. Mashburn’s statements to DSS, (2) considering hearsay evidence of Mr. Mashburn’s alleged abuse to his grandchildren, and (3) allowing Dr. Brown’s testimony of the female child’s hearsay statement regarding what Mrs. Mashburn “believed.”
II. Motion to Dismiss
Mrs. Mashburn contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss at the close of evidence. I conclude there was no evidence properly admitted to support a finding or conclusion of abuse or neglect to either the female or male child by Mrs. Mashburn. “Whether a child is neglected or abused is a conclusion of law.” In re Ellis, 135 N.C. App. 338, 340, 520 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1999). Abuse or neglect must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-805 (2003). A neglected juvenile is defined as:
A juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare; or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law. In determining whether a juvenile is a neglected juvenile, it is relevant whether that juvenile lives in a home where another juvenile has died as a result of suspected abuse or neglect or lives in a home where another juvenile has been subjected to abuse or neglect by an adult who regularly lives in the home.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2003). Our Courts require a showing of some physical, mental, or emotion impairment caused by the parents’ failure to provide proper care, supervision, or discipline before adjudicating a juvenile neglected. In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 283, 582 *403S.E.2d 255, 258 (2003) (citation omitted). “Our review of the numerous cases where ‘neglect’ or a ‘neglected juvenile’ has been found shows that the conduct at issue constituted either severe or dangerous conduct or a pattern of conduct either causing injury or potentially causing injury to the juvenile.” Id.
An abused juvenile is:
Any juvenile less than 18 years of age whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker:
a. Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the juvenile a serious physical injury by other than accidental means;
b. Creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the juvenile by other than accidental means;
c. Uses or allows to be used upon the juvenile cruel or grossly inappropriate procedures or cruel or grossly inappropriate devices to modify behavior;
d. Commits, permits, or encourages the commission of a violation of the following laws by, with, or upon the juvenile: first-degree rape, as provided in G.S. 14-27.2; second degree rape as provided in G.S. 14-27.3; first-degree sexual offense, as provided in G.S. 14-27.4; second degree sexual offense, as provided in G.S. 14-27.5; sexual act by a custodian, as provided in G.S. 14-27.7; crime against nature, as provided in G.S. 14-177; incest, as provided in G.S. 14-178 and G.S. 14-179; preparation of obscene photographs, slides, or motion pictures of the juvenile, as provided in G.S. 14-190.5; employing or permitting the juvenile to assist in a violation of the obscenity laws as provided in G.S. 14-190.6; dissemination of obscene material to the juvenile as provided in G.S. 14-190.7 and G.S. 14-190.8; displaying or disseminating material harmful to the juvenile as provided in G.S. 14-190.14 and G.S. 14-190.15; first and second degree sexual exploitation of the juvenile as provided in G.S. 14-190.16 and G.S. 14-190.17; promoting the prostitution of the juvenile as provided in G.S. 14-190.18; and taking indecent liberties with the juvenile, as provided in G.S. 14-202.1, regardless of the age of the parties;
e. Creates or allows to be created serious emotional damage to the juvenile; serious emotional damage is evidenced by a juvenile’s severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior toward himself or others; or
*404f. Encourages, directs, or approves of delinquent acts involving moral turpitude committed by the juvenile.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) (2003).
Here, DSS failed to produce any properly admitted evidence that Mrs. Mashburn abused or neglected either of her children. No evidence showed that Mrs. Mashburn was aware of, participated in, or condoned the abuse. Instead, evidence showed that the female child had previously exaggerated reports of sexual abuse and that she often lied as a result of her personality disorder. Upon her daughter’s allegation of sexual abuse, Mrs. Mashburn immediately responded by taking her daughter to a physician and disclosed the allegation.
A medical examination of the female child showed no physical evidence of abuse, other than a vaginal infection often present in women who are not sexually active. A medical examination of the male child failed to disclose any physical evidence of abuse. Mrs. Mashburn testified that her daughter had come to her with reports of sexual abuse only one time previously. Mrs. Mashburn immediately took her daughter to be tested and treated. The report was negative and the daughter informed Mrs. Mashburn that she had lied about the incident. Mrs. Mashburn testified that she had never seen Mr. Mashburn hit the male child on his feet or engage in any inappropriate discipline of the children. She also testified that after either child was disciplined by Mr. Mashburn, she would immediately check the children for injury. Mrs. Mashburn did not neglect or abuse either of her children. She acted as any responsible parent would have acted. Mrs. Mashburn is losing her children solely because of Mr. Mashburn’s actions and being considered “guilty” by association.
The evidence failed to show any abuse of or neglect by Mrs. Mashburn to her children. The evidence indicated Mr. Mashburn was the only perpetrator and that Mrs. Mashburn had no knowledge of his abusive practices. The trial court erred by failing to dismiss the petition against Mrs. Mashburn.
III. Separate Adiudication
Neither the trial court nor the majority’s opinion examines the evidence separately for each parent. A fatal flaw in the trial court’s order is its failure to make separate findings of fact and conclusions of law for Mr. Mashburn and Mrs. Mashburn during the adjudication stage. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807 (2003) requires that “[t]he adjudicatory order shall. . . contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.”
*405The adjudicatory order lists the findings of fact, including the erroneous findings based on inadmissible hearsay discussed above, and then makes separate conclusions of law for the female and male child. The trial court does not clearly state what evidence or facts it relied on to adjudicate whether Mrs. Mashburn abused or neglected her children. The trial court erred by using evidence of Mr. Mashburn’s abuse or neglect to find that Mrs. Mashburn abused and neglected either her daughter or son.
Our Courts have long recognized the “fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 144, 579 S.E.2d 264, 266 (2003) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 57 (2000)). Here, the trial court violated Mrs. Mashbum’s parental and constitutional rights by considering evidence of Mr. Mashbum’s abuse and neglect erroneously admitted against Mrs. Mashburn and concluding that she abused and neglected her children. Each parent holds separate and distinct parental rights and is entitled to a separate adjudication. Evidence of one parent’s abuse or neglect cannot be bootstrapped to support allegations against the other parent without showing complicity with or other independent clear and convincing evidence of abuse or neglect by the other parent.
IV. Conclusion
We all agree the trial court erred in admitting and considering hearsay evidence regarding allegations of Mr. Mashbum’s abuse and neglect. I conclude Mrs. Mashbum’s parental rights were prejudiced by allowing this testimony into evidence. The trial court erred by failing to dismiss the petition against Mrs. Mashburn on her motion. I vote to reverse the trial court as to the charges of abuse and neglect by Mrs. Mashburn on her two children. I respectfully dissent.