Court Opinion

ID: 9552894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:18:57.053045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:17.942540
License: Public Domain

KEETON, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to concur in the majority opinion. My reasons for dissenting are briefly as follows:
*194The instructions complained of in this case were probably, as abstract propositions of law, substantially correct. However, instructions relative to the law of the road and those given which might apply to an emergency, in case one existed, were in direct conflict with each other, and there was no clarifying instruction given.
Without explaining the situation to the jury and advising it that the law of the road, would not apply if an emergency were shown to exist, and the collision complained of occurred because of the peril in which the driver of the Goetz car was placed because of the negligent acts of the respondent in driving his truck on the wrong side of the road, it is reasonably probable to suppose that the jury could and did fall into error as to the real meaning of the conflicting or confusing instructions given.
It is error to give instructions that may tend to confuse or mislead the jury, especially where the evidence is conflicting and permits speculation, or contains only a partial statement of the law and. leaves the correct rule to be applied subject to speculation or argument. Conflicting instructions should not be given even though such instructions are proper in substance.
Instructions given by the court covering rights and liabilities where parties are engaged in a joint venture were erroneous for the reason that appellant and her son were engaged purely in a social and pleasure trip, which had nothing whatever to do with the farming enterprise in which Goetz, Jr., and Goetz, Sr., and others were engaged. The instructions are inapplicable to the case, hence confusing and misleading.
The instructions given by the trial court covering contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Goetz were also inapplicable to the cause. Just how the appellant, Mrs. Goetz, could have been guilty of contributory negligence which contributed in any degree to the damage and injury complained of, I am unable to determine.
From the time the emergency arose, a very few seconds could have elapsed, estimated by the appellants’ witness to be about four seconds, and there was neither time nor opportunity, under the circumstances presented, for Mrs. Goetz to do anything to avoid the collision. She called attention to the approaching car and did nothing further as she did not want to confuse the driver. There was no time to stop the car or protest further. There was no testimony to sustain the contention that she was, or could be, guilty of contributory negligence. She was not in control of the Goetz car at the time of the collision. Without some evidence, or reasonable inference therefrom, to show something she should or could have done to avoid the collision, tfhe instructions covering contributory negligence on her part were inapplicable to the case.
Instructions should be confined to the issues presented by the evidence and where there is no evidence upon an issue, or *195where the instruction covers matters not raised by the evidence, same should not be given even though such instructions may state correct abstract propositions of law. 64 C.J. 760, Sec. 657.
Clarifying instructions requested by the appellant were applicable to the cause and should have been given. The judgment should (be reversed.