Court Opinion

ID: 9564473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:01:22.291564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:27.289058
License: Public Domain

GARBARINO, Judge,
dissenting:
The facts are simple. Maldonado filed an untimely request for reconsideration of a determination disqualifying her from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. A hearing to consider the request was scheduled for March 12,1992. After receiving notice of the hearing to determine the untimeliness issue, she failed to appear on the day of the hearing. The Appeals Tribunal reviewed the record and upheld the deputy’s determination. Maldonado filed a timely application to reopen the case contending that she failed to appear on the day of the hearing because she confused her daughter’s counseling appointment with the hearing date. The Appeal Tribunal, after a hearing, concluded that Maldonado’s failure to appear and failure to notify the hearing officer were within her reasonable control and not grounds for reopening her case. Maldonado filed a timely petition for review with the Appeals Board. After granting review, the Appeals Board affirmed the decision of the Appeals Tribunal and after an additional review reaffirmed their earlier decision. Maldonado timely appeals that decision to this Court.
The issue before the Appeal Tribunal was not complicated. Was Maldonado’s excuse for failing to appear good cause to reopen the case? The determination was made and affirmed that Maldonado’s confusion was within her reasonable control and did not constitute good cause.
Simply stated, because it disagrees with the outcome, the majority finds that the agency’s interpretation of the wording of the AA.C. R6-3-1503(B)(3)(d) does not comport with its notion of fair play. Not being able to find that there was an abuse of discretion, the majority has decided to change the rules by interpreting the present rule to suggest something other than what is obviously meant by the rule. The majority attempts to make a black cow white by saying that black means white.
I would suggest that we make our decision based upon the record keeping in mind that we must determine if the Appeals Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Avila v. Arizona Dep’t of Economic Sec., 160 Ariz. 246, 248, 772 P.2d 600, 602 (App.1989). We must view the evidence in a light favorable to upholding the decision of the Appeals Board and must affirm the *480decision if it is supported by any reasonable interpretation of the record. Ross v. Arizona Dep’t of Economic Sec., 171 Ariz. 128, 129, 829 P.2d 318, 319 (App.1991).
The record supports the Appeals Board’s decision. Maldonado gave no reason why the calendaring was not within her reasonable control. Other than her “excuse,” she presented no other evidence of a mistake. The calendar was not evidence at the hearing. The decision was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.
Is it to be the rule that anyone who can invent a plausible excuse for failure to appear can now obtain a new hearing? Does this mean that the agency’s interpretation of a regulation placing a restriction on a claimant is too restrictive because we say it is too restrictive? Maldonado’s excuse, if accepted, paves the way for a panacea of excuses for failure to appear.
The majority’s answer, in addressing a case it feels unfairly decided, is to change the interpretation of the rules to achieve a result it feels is fair.
In this case, the majority contends that the rule as interpreted is too restrictive and undermines the remedial purpose of the Employment Security Act. However, it is well-settled that an administrative agency’s interpretation of statutes and of its own regulations is entitled to great weight. Capitol Castings, Inc. v. Arizona Dep’t. of Economic Sec., 171 Ariz. 57, 60, 828 P.2d 781, 784 (App.1992).
When a discretionary call is lacking in fairness, we do not change the rules. Our role is to provide guidance as to the use of discretion when applying the existing rules. There is nothing subversive about AA.C. R6-3-1503. It does not corrupt or undermine the Employment Security Act. Its application can be harsh or fair depending upon the exercise of discretion. If we have difficulty with the outcome of this case, our inquiry should not be directed at the interpretation of the rule but with the exercise of discretion.
The majority makes a good argument for a new interpretation of the rule by comparing AA.C. R6-3-1503 to Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 60(c), a rule adopted by our Supreme Court. However, I know of no authority for the proposition that agency procedural regulations are invalid merely because they are more restrictive than rules of procedure adopted by the courts.
I would affirm.