Court Opinion

ID: 2964030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:19:14.793459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:17.967249
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2092

                       EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                        COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Cyr and Boudin,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Pierce  O'Cray,  Assistant  Attorney General,  Government  Bureau,
            ______________
        with  whom Scott  Harshbarger,  Attorney General,  was  on briefs  for
                   __________________
        appellants.
            Samuel  A.  Marcosson,  with  whom  C.  Gregory  Stewart,  General
            _____________________               ____________________
        Counsel, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate General Counsel, and Vincent
                 _____________________                                 _______
        J. Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel, were on brief for appellee.
        ____________

                                 ____________________

                                    March 11, 1996
                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.   Chapter  32 of  the Massachusetts  General
                 __________

            Laws  establishes  the  Commonwealth's  statutory  retirement

            benefit plan  for its  state  and local  employees.   Section

            3(2)(f) of that chapter provides that "[n]o person who enters

            or who re-enters  the service of any governmental  unit as an

            employee after attaining  age sixty-five, and after  the date

            when  a  system  becomes operative  therein,  shall  become a

            member except  as otherwise  provided for  in this  section."

            This provision generally  prevents state and local  employees

            hired  after age 65 from participating in any public employee

            retirement system in  Massachusetts.  Francis C.  Coolidge, a

            part-time employee of  the Town of  Tewksbury who was  denied

            membership in the Middlesex  County Retirement System,  filed

            charges  challenging   section  3(2)(f)   before  the   Equal

            Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").

                 In due course the EEOC itself sued  the Commonwealth and

            the Middlesex County Retirement System in the district court,

            claiming  that section 3(2)(f)  violates and is  preempted by

            the  Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.

               623(a)(1) et. seq.  Both sides moved for summary judgment;
                         ________

            the district  court granted  the EEOC's  motion, ruling  that

            section 3(2)(f)  ran afoul  of 29  U.S.C.    623(a)(1), which

            makes it illegal for an employer to "discriminate against any

            individual   with   respect  to   his   compensation,  terms,

            conditions,  or privileges  of  employment, because  of  such

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            individual's age."       The   Commonwealth    now   appeals.

            Although the state statute plainly discriminates on the basis

            of age  regarding  benefits of  employment, the  Commonwealth

            argues  that  the  Massachusetts statute  is  shielded  by 29

            U.S.C.     623(f)(2)(B)(i),  which  permits  an  employer  to

            differentiate on the basis of  age "where for each benefit or

            benefit  package, the actual  amount of payment  made or cost

            incurred on  behalf of an older  worker is no less  than that

            made or incurred on behalf of a younger worker as permissible

            under  section 1625.10, title 29, Code of Federal Regulations

            (as in effect June 22,  1989)."  The Commonwealth claims that

            this provision effectively codifies a subsection of the cited

            regulation, 29  C.F.R.   1625.10(f)(1)(iii)(A)  (1989), which

            allowed  an employer  to  exclude from  a retirement  plan an

            employee who begins work after normal retirement age.  

                 As a matter of ordinary grammar, the statutory exception

            relied  on by  the  Commonwealth  does  not  protect  section

            3(2)(f) because  the Commonwealth concededly  does not  incur

            costs on behalf  of workers excluded from the  pension system

            at least  equal to  the costs incurred  on behalf  of younger

            workers.  The plain language of section 623(f)(2)(B)(i) makes

            clear that it  incorporates only those elements  of the cited

            regulation  that  conform to  this  equal  cost/equal benefit

            principle.   The Commonwealth's  argument that  the statutory

            provision   incorporates  the   regulation  wholesale,   even

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            portions of it--like 29 C.F.R.   16256.10(f)(1)(iii)(a)--that

            are plainly inconsistent  with the  equal cost/equal  benefit

            principle,  simply  cannot  be  squared  with  the  statutory

            language.

                 If legislative history is consulted, it too supports the

            EEOC  and  not the  Commonwealth.    As  the  district  court

            observed,  Congress enacted  the current  version of  section

            623(f) in  response to the Supreme Court's decision in Public
                                                                   ______

            Employees  Retirement Sys.  v. Betts,  492  U.S. 158  (1989),
            __________________________     _____

            which  determined  that the  ADEA  did  not  apply to  fringe

            benefits.  Congress then amended the statute to reinstate the

            equal  cost/equal benefit  rule and to  ensure that  the ADEA

            applied to  age-based discrimination  in benefit  plans.   S.

            Rep. No. 263,  101st Cong., 2d Sess. 18  (1990), reprinted in
                                                             ____________

            1990  U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509,  1523.    This  Senate  report  said

            explicitly that Congress  intended to incorporate only  those

            portions  of  the  regulation  consistent  with  the  amended

            statute.  Id.
                      ___

                 The Commonwealth argues that because the ADEA here would

            preempt a  state statute, we  must apply a  "clear statement"

            rule of interpretation,  e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft,  501 U.S.
                                     ____  _______    ________

            452  (1991), and  resolve in  favor of  the Commonwealth  any

            doubts  about  whether Congress  intended  to  incorporate 29

            C.F.R.   1625.10(f)(1)(iii)(a).  The EEOC  plausibly responds

            that  the clear  statement  rule  applies  only  in  deciding

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            whether  the  state  is  governed  by the  ADEA  and  not  to

            questions  concerning  the  substantive  reach of  the  ADEA,

            questions  whose answer affects  public and private employers

            alike.   Although  this precise  question may  not have  been

            decided,  we have  been  very  hesitant  in  closely  related

            contexts  to extend the clear  statement rule beyond its core

            application.   See Gately v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2
                           ___ ______    _____________________________

            F.3d 1221, 1230 (1st Cir.  1993); see EEOC v. Commonwealth of
                                              ___ ____    _______________

            Massachusetts, 987 F.2d 64, 68-70 (1st Cir. 1993).
            _____________

                 In all events, the meaning of the provision in this case

            is clear enough once the  technical jargon is unraveled.  The
            __

            statute   adopts  an   equal  cost/equal  benefit   test  for

            differentiations "as permissible" under the cited regulation,

            and  no one claims that the  Commonwealth's flat bar conforms

            to any  equal  cost/equal  benefit test.    Thus,  whether  a
               ___

            particular  equal cost/equal  benefit  differential would  be

            "permissible" under  the regulation does not even arise.  The

            subject  matter  is complex  but complexity  is not  the same

            thing as ambiguity.      Affirmed.
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