Court Opinion

ID: 9530534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:39.026295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:08.494068
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring: I agree with the result reached by the majority and with its analysis except for the reasoning concerning whether Illinois law provides Jones Act defendants with a right to trial by jury. I believe that other authority clearly exists supporting the existence of that right and, therefore, I write separately to explain my view. The majority has correctly concluded that “the availability of a jury trial in Jones Act cases is a question that is properly controlled by the normal laws of the forum.” 217 Ill. 2d at 94. The opinion, however, rejects the reasoning of the Hutton majority that section 2 — 1105 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) establishes a Jones Act defendant’s right to trial by jury. Instead, the majority adopts the argument of dissenting Justice Myerscough and holds that this section “merely provides the process by which a party may advise the court of its desire for a jury trial [citation], and says nothing about whether a party is entitled to a jury trial in any given action.” 217 Ill. 2d at 95. The plain language of section 2 — 1105 compels a contrary conclusion. The section provides in relevant part: “A defendant desirous of a trial by jury must file a demand therefor not later than the filing of his or her answer. Otherwise, the party waives a jury. *** If the plaintiff files a jury demand and thereafter waives a jury, any defendant *** shall be granted a jury trial upon demand therefor made promptly after being advised of the waiver ***.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1105 (a) (West 2000). The waiver provision would, of course, be meaningless unless the right of any party to a jury trial exists. The section uses the mandatory term “shall” in commanding the grant of a jury trial to a defendant asserting that right following a waiver by the plaintiff or another defendant. All of the provisions in article 2 of the Code apply to matters of procedure not regulated by other statutes. 735 ILCS 5/1 — 108(b) (West 2000). Neither the Jones Act nor any other statute purports to regulate procedure for demanding or waiving jury trial. Thus, section 2 — 1105 of the Code necessarily implies Jones Act defendants, like all tort litigants, have a right to a jury trial. In Stephens v. Kasten, 383 Ill. 127 (1943), this court expressly recognized the right of defendants to a jury trial in a tort action seeking money damages. The court found an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s failure to allow a late filing of a jury demand by defendants when good cause was shown for the delay, emphasizing the importance of protecting the “jealously guarded right of trial by jury.” Stephens, 383 Ill. at 135. The court noted that the right to trial by jury has been guaranteed in Illinois since the state’s organization and has been carried forward in each of our successive constitutions. Stephens, 383 Ill. at 132. The court accordingly reversed a substantial judgment for plaintiffs and remanded the cause for a new trial. Stephens, 383 Ill. at 135. The Stephens court drew no distinction between a plaintiffs and a defendant’s right to trial by jury, noting that section 5 of article II of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 “gives a litigant a right to a jury trial.” (Emphasis added.) Stephens, 383 Ill. at 132. Hence, I conclude that absent an express provision in the Jones Act limiting the right of jury trial to plaintiffs, the right may be exercised by both plaintiffs and defendants, just as in other Illinois tort remedies, whether statutory or at common law. As the majority observes, common law negligence claims of injured seamen were tried by juries long before the adoption of the “as heretofore enjoyed” provision in the 1870 constitution. 217 Ill. 2d at 95-96. There is no basis to conclude that Jones Act claims should be treated differently than common law negligence actions in the application of section 2—1105 of the Code. Thus, I agree with the majority’s holding, disagreeing only with a portion of its rationale.