Court Opinion

ID: 9757562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:46:25.559856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:40.927563
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
FORD ELLIOTT, J.:
¶ 1 While I join in the majority’s decision to quash this appeal as untimely and also its interpretation of Rule 720’s requirements regarding the timely filing of post-trial motions, I cannot join that part of the opinion which would require that an appeal be filed within 30 days of the imposition of sentence. I am concerned that such an interpretation creates a conflict with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.9
¶ 2 Rule 720 governs Post-Sentence Procedures and Appeal — however, the Rules of Appellate Procedure and 903 control what constitutes an appealable order and the timing of an appeal.
Pa.R.App.P. 301(a):
(a) Entry upon docket below. No order of a court shall be appealable until it has been entered upon the appropriate docket in the lower court. Where under the applicable practice below an order is entered in two or more dockets, the order has been entered for the purposes of appeal when it has been entered in the first appropriate docket.
Pa.R.App.P. 301(c):
(c) Nonappealable orders. A direction by the lower court that a specified judgment, sentence or other order shall be entered, unaccompanied by actual entry of the specified order in the docket, does not constitute an appealable order. Any such order shall be docketed before an appeal is taken.
Pa.R.App.P. 903(a):
(a) General rule. Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal required by Rule 902 (manner of taking appeal) shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.
¶ 3 The imposition of sentence language in 720 is identical to previous Rule 1410 which created the optional post-trial motion practice effective in 1994. Cases interpreting the language of the optional post-trial motions rules have required the entry of sentence to govern a timely appeal. Interestingly, in Commonwealth v. Ledoux, 768 A.2d 1124 (Pa.Super.2001), we reviewed the language of prior Pa.R.Crim.P. 1411 (now renumbered as 721) addressing the Commonwealth’s right to challenge a sentence in the trial court and on appeal:10
*624Where the defendant has not filed post-sentence motions, the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal is due within SO days of the entry of the order imposing sentence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1411(B)(2)(a)(ii). The Commonwealth may file post-sentence motions under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1411(A)(1) and such motions must be filed within 10 days of the date that sentence was imposed. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1411(B)(1). If the Commonwealth files a timely post-sentence motion, the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal is due 80 days after the trial court disposes of the motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1411(B)(2)(b)(ii).
Here, the record reflects that the judgment of sentence was imposed on October 22, 1999. The Commonwealth’s post-sentence motion was filed November 9, 1999. The court denied the motion on March 23, 2000. The Commonwealth’s notice of appeal was filed April 1, 2000. Since the Commonwealth’s post-sentence motion was filed beyond the 10-day limit, the post-sentence motion was untimely. Because the post-sentence motion was untimely, Rule 1411(B)(2)(b)(ii) (allowing the Commonwealth to file its notice of appeal 30 days after the court disposes of timely post-sentence motions) has not been triggered. In other words, under Rule 1411 the trial court has the discretion to treat untimely post trial motions as if they had not been filed at all. This is what the trial court did in the instant case. Under these circumstances, the Commonwealth’s appeal had to have been taken within 30 days of the entering of the sentence under Rule 1111 (B) (2)(a)(ii).
Id. at 1125 (emphasis added). Ledoux cites Commonwealth v. Rohrer, 719 A.2d 1078 (Pa.Super.1998), for this same proposition. It seems incongruous that the Commonwealth should be permitted potentially more time to file an appeal than the defendant given the parallel provisions of 720 and 721; without timely post-trial motions being filed by either party, the defendant has 30 days from imposition of sentence while the Commonwealth has 30 days from entry of the sentencing order. The language of Ledoux and Rohrer appears consistent with previous cases under the old post-trial motions practice which started the appeal clock at entry of sentence on the docket citing the Rules 301 and/or 903. Commonwealth v. Bartley, 395 Pa.Super. 137, 576 A.2d 1082 (1990); Commonwealth v. Hottinger, 370 Pa.Super. 527, 537 A.2d 1 (1987), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 614, 554 A.2d 507 (1988); Commonwealth v. Bogden, 364 Pa.Super. 300, 528 A.2d 168 (1987), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 595, 552 A.2d 249 (1988); Commonwealth v. Mays, 288 Pa.Super. 129, 431 A.2d 322 (1981).
¶4 It is also interesting to note that Darlington’s Pennsylvania Appellate Practice, the authority for many appellate practitioners, consistently states that under both pre- and post-1994 practice, entry of the judgment of sentence is required, citing the above-referenced cases as support:
*625If the defendant does NOT file a post-sentence motion, the time for filing an appeal remains 30 days from the imposition of sentence, that is, 30 days from the entry of the judgment of sentence on the docket.
G. Ronald Darlington et al., Pennsylvania Appellate Practice § 903:6, at 9-22 (2d ed. Supp.2003).
¶ 5 I agree that Commonwealth v. Bil-ger, as cited by the majority, thoroughly addresses the consequences of filing a late post-trial motion pursuant to 720. However, Bilger never deals with the actual entry date for the judgment of sentence. As Bilger reads, presumably the judgment of sentence was docketed the same day it was imposed. Therefore, on its face Bilger does not conflict with Ledoux or Rohrer or the Appellate Rules.
¶ 6 Clearly, the rationale for the requirement of entry of the judgment of sentence under the pre-1994 practice was as set forth in Commonwealth v. Dorman, 272 Pa.Super. 149, 414 A.2d 713, 716 (1979): “It is evident that clarity, certainty and ease of determination of the date of entry of an order are among the principal purposes of [Pa.R.App.PJ 108.”
¶ 7 While I do not disagree that the defendant is given full notice of appellate rights at time of sentencing in open court, I still believe that the majority’s interpretation of Rule 720 as it relates to an untimely appeal is in conflict with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, since it is clear that appellant in this case filed her notice of appeal more than 30 days following the entry of the sentence on the docket, I join in the quashal.

. "These rules govern practice and procedure in the Supreme Court, the Superior Court and the Commonwealth Court, including procedure in appeals to such courts from lower courts and the procedure for direct review in such courts of determinations of government units.” Pa.R.App.P. 103 (emphasis added).

. The relevant parts of prior Rule 1411, now 721, are as follows:
(A) Commonwealth Challenges to Sentence (1) The Commonwealth may challenge a sentence by filing a motion to modify sentence, by filing an appeal on a pre*624served issue, or by filing a motion to modify sentence followed by an appeal.
(B) Timing
(1) Motion for Modification of Sentence. A Commonwealth motion for modification of sentence shall be filed no later than 10 days after imposition of sentence.
(2) Appeal of Sentence.
(a) Appeal Directly from Order Imposing Sentence.
(ii) If the defendant has not filed a post-sentence motion, the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order imposing sentence.