Court Opinion

ID: 9519272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:12:51.930437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:12.007147
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DAVIS, dissenting: In the case of People v. Ridens, 59 Ill.2d 362 (Ridens II), the majority held that the Illinois obscenity statute, section 11 — 20 of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 11 — 20), and section 2 of the Moline obscenity ordinance are constitutional, as therein construed; that they incorporated parts (a) and (b) of the Miller standards; and that the changes in standards from Memoirs to Miller afford no impediment to the retroactive application of the statute and ordinance. I disagreed with the majority view and conclusion, and filed a dissent thereto. In this case, the majority affirms the convictions of the defendants herein, who were found guilty in the circuit court of Cook County of the offense of obscenity, and cites with approval Ridens II for the proposition that the Illinois obscentiy statute, in the light of Miller, remains constitutional. For the reasons stated in my dissent to Ridens II, I dissent herein and hereby incorporate said dissent by reference as my dissent to this majority opinion. As further reason for said dissent and in support thereof, I cite United States v. Wasserman* (5th Cir. 12/9/74), which appears to hold that Miller standards cannot be retroactively applied. Wasserman was referred to in 16 Crim. L. Rptr. 2258, the digest of which states: “Digest of Opinion: Defendants were indicted for mailing obscene material in violation of federal law during the period in which the Roth-Memoirs standards for obscenity were in effect. But at trial the court applied the new test set forth in Miller and its companions. The defendants contend that this was contrary to U.S. v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149, 14 CrL 2026, and violated the Due Process Clause. All the events in Thevis) including trial, took place prior to Miller. This court said that both definitions of obscenity should be considered in order to provide defendants any benefits to be derived from Miller. Thevis has no direct application to the contention of defendants here; but it does offer them some support, in view of the fact that the Thevis court refused to apply retroactively the detriments of Miller. In U.S. v. Jacobs, the Ninth Circuit held that due process bars measuring pre-Miller conduct against Miller’s expanded definition of obscenity, and we think Jacobs is correct. The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto applications of law has no application to judicial interpretations, but the policy considerations behind the constitutional provision are relevant here. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347. [Text] In Bouie, the black defendants entered a white restaurant and refused to leave when asked to do so by the management. The defendants were convicted under a trespass statute which prohibited ‘entry upon the lands of another *** after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry.’ The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld defendants’ conviction by interpreting this statute as prohibiting staying upon, as well as entering upon, after notice from the owner or tenant. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction and found a violation of the due process clause: ‘While such a construction is of course valid for the future, it may not be applied retroactively, any more than a legislative enactment may be, to impose criminal penalties for conduct committed at a time when it was not fairly stated to be criminal.’ 378 U.S. at 362 ***. Thus Bouie recognized the impropriety in punishing a man for acts which were not considered crimes at the time of their commission. *** Bouie is somewhat distinguishable in that the judicial interpretation in that case expanded the reach of the statute in an extreme and unpredictable way while the judicial opinion with which we are concerned [Miller] merely redefines ‘obscenity’ in a manner which in no way runs counter to the plain words of the statute. Miller did, however, represent a marked shift in the scope of material deemed to be obscene. Therefore in terms of notice to the defendant and the just application of criminal sanctions, we believe the effect on the defendant is the same. Prior to Miller, a distributor of sexually oriented material could not recognize that material which simply lacked ‘serious’ literary, artistic, political or scientific value could be constitutionally regulated. As far as such a distributor could determine, he was protected as long as the material was not utterly without redeeming social value. To convict Wasserman for the distribution of material which was protected under the Roth-Memoirs standard violates the rationale underlying Bouie. We do not go so far as to hold that the application of the Miller standard to Wasserman violated the due process clause. We do hold, however, that such a retroactive application is inappropriate without substantial justification outweighing the above discussed ex post facto considerations. Lacking such justification, the conviction must be reversed. [End Text] ”  Now reported at 504 F.2d 1012.