Court Opinion

ID: 9620577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:44:17.476691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:02.419124
License: Public Domain

ROACH, Justice.
I. Introduction
Appellant, Lloyd Knotts, was seriously injured in a construction accident while performing construction work under a contract for a company. He initiated a claim with the company’s insurer and later filed *514a personal injury action against the company. He subsequently filed a bad-faith suit against the company’s insurer for violations of Kentucky’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA). The suit included allegations of violations that occurred after the filing of his personal injury action. The lower courts rejected Knotts’s bad faith claim on grounds that the UCSPA is inapplicable to an insurance company’s conduct that occurs after the commencement of an underlying tort action. Because we hold that the UCSPA continues to apply during litigation, we reverse.
II. Background
In November 1992, Lloyd Knotts, a self-employed construction contractor, contracted with Lawson Mardon Flexible, Inc.1 to build an “aging room” at the company’s warehouse in Shelby County. On November 12, 1992, Knotts was working with an electric drill atop a thirty-foot high platform. The drill drew power through an extension cord that was tethered to the platform and ran across the warehouse floor to an electrical outlet. At the same time, Brian Lovings, a temporary employee of Lawson Mardon, was operating a forklift in the vicinity of the platform. As Lovings drove past the platform, the extension cord caught on the fork of the forklift, causing the platform to topple and Knotts to fall. Knotts suffered serious, permanent injuries and incurred significant medical expenses as a result. At the time of the accident, Lawson Mardon had a policy of general liability insurance with Zurich American Insurance Group.2
Knotts employed an attorney, Larry Franklin, who advised Lawson Mardon that he would be representing Lloyd Knotts and his wife. In his initial letter, dated November 30, 1992, Franklin asked Lawson Mardon to cover Knotts’s medical expenses, future therapy, and full payment for the job he was performing when injured. The letter also stated: “After Mr. Knotts reaches maximum medical improvement, we will negotiate conclusion of this matter. If this proposal is not satisfactory to you, please let us know so we can proceed with litigation.”
Lawson Mardon referred the matter to its insurer, Zurich, which began the claims adjustment process. On December 10, 1992, Zurich wrote Franklin a letter acknowledging his representation of Knotts. The letter also stated, in pertinent part:
We are in the initial stage of our investigation of this accident. Therefore, ... we are not in a position to discuss liability. However, we must advise you we do not find this to be a workers compensation exposure, as outlined by the Kentucky Workers Compensation Act. Thus, as we are not Mr. Knott’s [sic] workers compensation carriers, we cannot make payment of his medical expenses as you requested in your[ ] [letter] of November 30.
Naturally, once we have completed our investigations, we will be in further contact with you.
On December 18,1992, Franklin wrote a letter to Knotts that read simply: “I recommend beginning suit right away. It looks like they are going to stall us.” On January 14, 1993, Knotts filed suit in Shel*515by Circuit Court. At trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Knotts and awarded him damages of $1,202,104.29, reduced by 20% after apportionment of fault for Knotts’s own negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Knotts subsequently pursued a bad faith claim against Zurich. Specifically, Knotts claimed that Zurich had violated Kentucky’s UCSPA, KRS 304.12-230, in the course of litigating the underlying tort case and the resulting appeal. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of Zurich, holding that KRS 304.12-230 applied only to an insurer’s conduct before the commencement of litigation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted discretionary review.
III. Analysis
Zurich urges us to affirm the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both of which held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on an insurer by KRS 304.12-230 ends at the commencement of a tort action for which a claim under the insurance policy has been made. While such an approach has some instinctive appeal, especially given that the adversarial nature of litigation undoubtedly makes it difficult for an insurer to fulfill such a demanding duty to what amounts to an opposing party, we ultimately find that the statute simply cannot be read in such a limited manner.
KRS 304.12-230 imposes what is generally known as the duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by an insurer to an insured or to another person bringing a claim under an insurance policy. However, the statute does not lay out an amorphous, non-specific duty. Instead, it proscribes a list of particular acts and practices. The statute specifically provides the following:
It is an unfair claims settlement practice for any person to commit or perform any of the following acts or omissions:
(1) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to coverages at issue;
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims arising under insurance policies;
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies;
(4) Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information;
(5) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed;
(6) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;
(7) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds;
(8) Attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application;
(9) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of the insured;
(10) Making claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by statement setting forth the coverage *516under which the payments are being made;
(11) Making known to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration;
(12) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claimant, or the physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which submissions contain substantially the same information;
(13) Failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become reasonably clear, under one (1) portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage;
(14) Failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement; or
(15) Failing to comply with the decision of an independent review entity to provide coverage for a covered person as a result of an external review in accordance with KRS 304.17A-621, 304.17A-623, and 304.17A-625.
KRS 304.12-230.
Zurich argues that the use of the word “claim” in the statute means a pre-litigation, adjustable claim made against the insurance policy, thus the statute does not apply to any acts or omissions by the insurer after litigation commences. However, Zurich’s argument fails from too narrow a reading of the word “claim.” Like many words, “claim” is subject to multiple, subtly different definitions. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 264 (8th ed.2004) (defining “claim” as: “1. The aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court <the plaintiffs short, plain statement about the crash established the claim >. — Also termed claim for relief. 2. The assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even if contingent or provisional <the spouse’s claim to half the lottery winnings >. 3. A demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right; esp., the part of a complaint in a civil action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for.... 4. An interest or remedy recognized at law; the means by which a person can obtain a privilege, possession, or enjoyment of a right or thing; CAUSE OF ACTION (1) < claim against the employer for wrongful termination>.”). But at its most basic, the word means an assertion of a right, with the contours and specific nature of the right depending on context.
This general use is applicable to KRS 304.12-230. The “right” being asserted arises under the insurance policy and is the right to compensation for injuries for which liability has been established. Thus, “claim,” as used in the statute, means an assertion of a right to remuneration under an insurance policy once liability has reasonably been established. This is usually done by making the claim directly to the insurance company, which then engages in the claim adjustment process. But it may also be accomplished by instituting litigation, which is simply another means of asserting the right under the insurance policy. Though litigation is distinct from the claims adjustment process in that it specifically invokes the courts’ power to decide the issue of liability, both procedures are simply methods of pursuing claims under an insurance policy. It is often the case that both methods are em*517ployed, with litigation following (or preempting) the claim adjustment process.
The commencement of litigation by the filing of a complaint, even when the claim adjustment process is underway, however, does not change the fundamental nature of what the claimant seeks. The “claim” — for compensatory payment under the insurance policy — is the same as before the litigation began. The claimant has simply opted to seek satisfaction of the claim through a different procedure. Nothing in KRS 304.12-230 limits its applicability to pre-litigation conduct, and since the statute applies to “claims,” it continues to apply to an insurer so long as a claim is in play. As such, we hold that KRS 304.12-230 applies both before and during litigation.
Though the statute’s language is clear, we also note that this reading is consistent with the public policy underlying the statute. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky.1988) (“The Kentucky law is similar to those adopted by thirty-eight other states and is based on the 1971 amendment that the National Association of Insurance Commissioners made to its model ‘act relating to unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance.’ This statute is intended to protect the public from unfair trade practices and fraud. It should be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purpose.”). If KRS 304.12-230 were not applicable once litigation commenced, insurance companies would have the perverse incentive to spur injured parties toward litigation, whereupon the insurance company would be shielded from any claim of bad faith. Such a reading would undermine the statute’s fundamental purpose by allowing insurance companies to engage in whatever sort of practice — fair or unfair’— they see fit to employ. The remedial nature of the statute requires that we attempt to effectuate its purpose, which, in a situation like this one, requires applying the statute to conduct occurring after the commencement of litigation of a tort action.
We also note that this approach is consistent with that of almost every other jurisdiction to have addressed the issue. Those courts have consistently held that the duty of good faith, whether an inherent aspect of the insurance contract or a statutory construct, continues during any litigation that is brought to determine liability for the underlying tort. See, e.g., White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal.3d 870, 221 Cal.Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309, 316-17 (1985) (holding that the duty of good faith continues during litigation because the contractual relationship continues); Haddick v. Valor Ins., 315 Ill.App.3d 752, 248 Ill.Dec. 812, 735 N.E.2d 132, 133 (2000) (“We reverse and hold that an insurance company has a duty to act in good faith in settling a claim against its policyholder in a timely manner both before and after suit is filed.”); Harris v. Fontenot, 606 So.2d 72, 74 (La.Ct.App.1992) (‘We first note that nowhere in either statute is there an express distinction limiting the application to the pre-litigation conduct of the insurer.... [W]e believe that it is clear that the statute was enacted to impose a requirement of good faith and fair dealing on the insurer, requirements that are no less important after litigation has begun as before.”); Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 261 Mont. 91, 861 P.2d 895, 913 (1993) (“[A]n insurer’s duty to deal fairly and not to withhold payment of valid claims does not end when an insured files a complaint against the insurer.”); O’Donnell ex rel. Mitro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (“[W]e refuse to hold that an insurer’s duty- to act in good faith ends upon the initiation of suit by the *518insured.”); Barefield v. DPIC Companies, Inc., 215 W.Va. 544, 600 S.E.2d 256, 267 (2004) (“We therefore must conclude that the language of the UTPA does not restrict the scope of the conduct that is proscribed by the Act to that which occurred prior to the filing of a lawsuit.”).
Other jurisdictions, while not expressly addressing the issue of the viability of the duty of good faith after litigation, have implicitly approved the concept by allowing admission of evidence of the insurance company’s conduct that occurred after the commencement of litigation. See, e.g., T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1527 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law: “Certainly the litigation conduct of [the insurer] was relevant to the claim that [the insurer] or those acting on its behalf dealt dishonestly with [insured].”); Southerland v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 794 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Colo.Ct.App.1990) (holding that admission of evidence of post-filing conduct was not an abuse of discretion because the evidence helped establish a habitual pattern of dealing with the plaintiff); Home Ins. Co. v. Owens, 573 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (“[W]e concur with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co., 760 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.1985), ... a bad faith case, the court held that the insurance company’s litigation conduct was admissible, relevant evidence.”); Spadafore v. Blue Shield, 21 Ohio App.3d 201, 486 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (1985) (“[E]vidence of the breach of the insurer’s duty to exercise good faith occurring after the time of filing suit is relevant so long as the evidence related to the bad faith or handling or refusal to pay the claim.”). But see Parker v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 326 Ark. 1073, 935 S.W.2d 556, 562 (1996) (stating that “none of the conduct by Farm Bureau after the filing of the complaint, including legal positions asserted, can provide a basis for Parker’s bad-faith claim”); Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 257 (Wyo.2000) (holding that post-filing conduct is controlled by the Rules of Civil Procedure and disallowing the bad faith claim based on such conduct).
Recognizing the existence of a continuing duty of good faith, however, is not the end of our inquiry. We must also address the further question of what sorts of post-filing conduct by an insurer will be admissible in a bad faith action. This is truly an issue of first impression in this state, so we turn to other jurisdictions for guidance. Treatment of this issue can be divided broadly into two camps: (1) allowing only evidence of the insurance company’s settlement behavior and (2) allowing that evidence plus evidence of the litigation tactics, strategies, and techniques employed on behalf of the insurance company.3
The first approach appears to have developed initially in California, beginning with White v. Western Title Insurance Co., 40 Cal.3d 870, 221 Cal.Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309 (1985), which is considered the seminal case in this area of the law. In White, the California Supreme Court held that the admission of low “settlement offers and other matters occurring after commencement of litigation” could be used to prove *519bad faith. Id. at 316. The court declined a blanket exclusion of all litigation strategy, noting that while it was cognizant of the insurance company’s fear that jurors would not be able to distinguish between legitimate, though aggressive, litigation techniques and actual bad faith, it nonetheless “trust[ed] that the jurors will be aware that parties to a lawsuit are adversaries, and will evaluate the insurer’s conduct in relation to that setting.” Id. at 317. The court also noted that “[t]he trial court ... would retain the authority to exclude evidence of settlement offers or other conduct of the insurer if it concluded that in the case before it the prejudicial effect of such evidence would outweigh its probative value.” Id. at 317 n. 9.
Since White, however, California’s courts have not accepted the invitation to allow broader evidence of post-filing conduct. In fact, California courts have sharply limited the application of White so as to prohibit admission of evidence of the vast majority of post-ñling conduct, namely, litigation techniques and strategies. As one California appellate court has noted, “White stands for the proposition that ridiculously low statutory offers of settlement may be introduced .... as bearing on the issue of bad faith of the insurance company.” California Physicians’ Service v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.4th 1321, 12 Cal.Rpt.2d 95, 100 (1992). That same court further held:
Defensive pleading, including the assertion of affirmative defenses, is communication protected by the absolute litigation privilege. Such pleading, even though allegedly false, interposed in bad faith, or even asserted for inappropriate purposes, cannot be used as the basis for allegations of ongoing bad faith. No complaint can be grounded upon such pleading.
Id.; see also Nies v. National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co., 199 Cal.App.3d 1192, 245 Cal.Rptr. 518 (Cal.Ct.App.1988) (holding that insurers will be disabled from conducting a vigorous defense in a bad faith insurance action if their pleadings may be used to prove pre-existing bad faith); Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 25 Cal.App.4th 1766, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 224, 228 (1994) (claim for bad faith cannot be based on an insurer’s appeal from an adverse judgment). In essence, California’s approach has evolved to allow the introduction of unreasonable settlement behavior (specifically, low settlement offers) that occurs after suit has been filed while prohibiting the admission of litigation conduct, techniques, and strategies.
The other approach, though it pays lip-service to limiting the evidence of post-filing conduct, allows the introduction of litigation strategies and techniques as evidence of bad faith on the part of an insurance company. See Barefield v. DPIC Companies, Inc., 215 W.Va. 544, 600 S.E.2d 256, 271 (2004) (allowing the introduction of evidence of alleged misconduct by defense counsel during litigation, so long as the insurer knowingly encourages, directs, participates in, relies upon or ratifies such alleged wrongful conduct); Home Ins. Co. v. Owens, 573 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upholding admission of evidence of an insurer’s pleadings as well as the insurer’s failure to answer a request for admissions).
This permissive approach is unappealing for a variety of reasons, the most compelling of which have been addressed extensively by the Montana Supreme Court. Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 261 Mont. 91, 861 P.2d 895 (1993). Specifically, the court explained the overriding policy rationale for excluding evidence of litigation strategies and techniques and generally limiting evidence of *520an insurance company’s post-filing behavior:
Courts have held, and we agree, that an insurer’s duty to deal fairly and not to withhold payment of valid claims does not end when an insured files a complaint against the insurer. See, e.g., White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985), 40 Cal.3d 870, 221 Cal.Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309, 317. Several courts have considered whether evidence of an insurer’s conduct during litigation of the underlying suit is admissible in a subsequent bad faith action. After examining the reasoning of courts that have considered the issue, we conclude that the continuing duty of good faith does not necessarily render evidence of an insurer’s post-filing conduct admissible. See Palmer v. Ted Stevens Honda, Inc. (1987), 193 Cal.App.3d 530, 238 Cal.Rptr. 363, 366-69; White, 221 Cal.Rptr. at 517, 710 P.2d at 317 (as interpreted by both Nies v. National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co. (1988), 199 Cal.App.3d 1192, 245 Cal.Rptr. 518, 523-25, and California Physicians’ v. Superior Ct. (1992), 9 Cal.App.4th 1321, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d, 95, 99-100). Indeed, courts rarely should allow such evidence and we have adopted a balancing test for those rare circumstances.
Public policy favors the exclusion of evidence of an insurer’s post-filing litigation conduct in at least two respects. First, permitting such evidence is unnecessary because during the initial action, trial courts can assure that defendants do not act improperly. Next, and more importantly, the introduction of such evidence hinders the right to defend and impairs access to the courts.
The Rules of Civil Procedure control the litigation process and, in most instances, provide adequate remedies for improper conduct during the litigation process. Once the parties have assumed adversarial roles, it is generally for the judge in the underlying case and not a jury to determine whether a party should be penalized for bad faith tactics. Ted Stevens Honda, 193 Cal.App.3d 530, 238 Cal.Rptr. 363, 369, (citing White, 221 Cal.Rptr. at 525, 710 P.2d at 325 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting)).
An attorney in litigation is ethically bound to represent the client zealously within the framework provided by statutes and the Rules of Civil Procedure. These procedural rules define clear boundaries of litigation conduct. If a defense attorney exceeds the boundaries, the judge can strike the answer and enter judgment for the plaintiff, enter summary judgment for the plaintiff, or impose sanctions on the attorney. See White, 221 Cal.Rptr. at 525, 710 P.2d at 325, (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting). There is no need to penalize insurers when their attorneys represent them zealously within the bounds of litigation conduct. To allow a jury to find that an insurer acted in bad faith by zealously defending itself is to impose such a penalty.
The most serious policy consideration in allowing evidence of the insurer’s post-filing conduct is that it punishes insurers for pursuing legitimate lines of defense and obstructs their right to contest coverage of dubious claims. As discussed below, if defending a questionable claim were actionable as bad faith, it would impair the insurer’s right to a zealous defense and even its right of access to the courts.
Allowing evidence of litigation strategies and tactics would expose the insurer’s entire defense in a coverage action to scrutiny by the jury, unless the insurer won the underlying suit. The jury then, with the assistance of hindsight, and without the assistance of insight into litigation techniques, could “second *521guess the defendant’s rationales for taking a particular course.” White, 221 Cal.Rptr. at 524, 710 P.2d at 324 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting). In addition, the jury could consider evidence of the defendant’s litigation strategy and tactics without any showing that the insurer’s conduct was technically improper. Thus, insurers would be reluctant to contest coverage of questionable claims.
The case at hand exemplifies the warning given by Justice Lucas in his dissent to White. Justice Lucas warned that permitting evidence of the post-filing conduct of the insurer’s attorneys would allow juries to impose liability for litigation tactics which are in and of themselves proper, merely because a jury may conclude that the strategy and tactics in and of themselves amounted to bad faith. See White, 221 Cal.Rptr. at 523-24, 710 P.2d at 323-24 n. 4 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
In this case, as in White, the plaintiff did not contend that insurer’s tactics in and of themselves were improper, rather the implicit claim was that the litigation strategy and tactics amounted to bad faith. The jury was allowed to consider Farmers’ legitimate defense strategy and proper litigation tactics as evidence of bad faith, when the relevant inquiry should have been whether Farmers’ had a reasonable basis for denying the claim.
To permit evidence of insurers’ litigation strategies and tactics is to impede insurers’ access to the courts and right to defend, because it makes them reluctant to contest coverage of questionable claims. “Free access to the courts is an important and valuable aspect of an effective system of jurisprudence, and a party possessing a colorable claim must be allowed to assert it without fear of suffering a penalty more severe than typically imposed on defeated parties.” White, 221 Cal.Rptr. at 524, 710 P.2d at 324 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Young v. Redman (Cal.App.1976), 55 Cal.App.3d 827, 128 Cal.Rptr. 86, 93). Public policy dictates, therefore, that courts must use extreme caution in deciding to admit such evidence even if it is relevant to the insurer’s initial decision to deny the underlying claim.
This brings us to another crucial point, the relevance of the insurer’s post-filing conduct. In general, an insurer’s litigation tactics and strategy in defending a claim are not relevant to the insurer’s decision to deny coverage. Indeed, if the insured must rely on evidence of the insurer’s post-filing conduct to prove bad faith in denial of coverage, questions arise as to the validity of the insured’s initial claim of bad faith. One court has gone so far as to hold that “once litigation has commenced, the actions taken in its defense are not, in our view, probative of whether defendant in bad faith denied the contractual lawsuit.” Ted Stevens Honda, 238 Cal.Rptr. at 368.
After the onset of litigation, an insurer begins to concentrate on supporting the decisions that led it to deny the claim. The insurer relies heavily on its attorneys using common litigation strategies and tactics to defend against a debatable claim. Consequently, actions taken after an insured files suit are at best marginally probative of the insurer’s decision to deny coverage. See Randy Papetti, Note, Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith in the Context of Litigation, 60 Geo.Wash.L.Rev.1931, 1972 (1992).
In some instances, however, evidence of the insurer’s post-filing conduct may bear on the reasonableness of the insurer’s decision and its state of mind when it evaluated and denied the underlying *522claim. Therefore, we do not impose a blanket prohibition on such evidence.
Id. 913-15. Similar policy concerns have driven the decisions in a number of other jurisdictions to prohibit the introduction of litigation strategy and techniques. See, e.g., Timberlake Const. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 340-41 (10th Cir.1995) (“Allowing litigation conduct to serve as evidence of bad faith would undermine an insurer’s right to contest questionable claims and to defend itself against such claims ... [Permitting allegations of litigation misconduct would have a chilling effect on insurers, which could unfairly penalize them by inhibiting their attorneys from zealously and effectively representing their clients within the bounds permitted by law. Insurers’ counsel would be placed in an untenable position if legitimate litigation conduct could be used as evidence of bad faith. Where improper litigation conduct is at issue, generally the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide adequate means of redress, such as motions to strike, compel discovery, secure protective orders, or impose sanctions.”); Sims v. Travelers Insurance Co., 16 P.3d 468 (Okla.Civ.App.2000) (specifically adopting Timberlake’s rule disallowing use of litigation conduct and strategy); O’Donnell ex rel. Mitro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 908-09 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (prohibiting the introduction of evidence of improper discovery techniques). Those policy concerns are equally at play under Kentucky law.
We recognize that Montana’s Supreme Court has since retreated from what had appeared to be a strict rule against allowing the introduction of litigation conduct by an insurer. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 297 Mont. 33, 991 P.2d 915, 922-23 (1999) (allowing some litigation conduct, specifically meritless appeals, to be introduced as evidence of bad faith). This is, no doubt, because Palmer expressly left the door open for the admission of evidence of extraordinary post-filing conduct to support a bad faith claim, with the restriction that it should “rarely be admitted.” However, given the chilling effect that allowing introduction of evidence of litigation conduct would have on the exercise of an insurance company’s legitimate litigation rights, any exception threatens to turn our adversarial system on its head. We are confident that the remedies provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure for any wrongdoing that may occur within the context of the litigation itself render unnecessary the introduction of evidence of litigation conduct. This is particularly true given that the attorneys, who in fact control and perpetuate the litigation conduct on behalf of an insurance company, are subject to direct sanction under the Civil Rules for any improper conduct. Though it goes without saying, we also note that those attorneys have significant duties under the Rules of Professional Responsibility, which allow for further sanctions for unethical behavior. Thus, we think the better approach is an absolute prohibition on the introduction of such evidence in actions brought under KRS 304.12-230.4
Our preferred rule as to what evidence of post-filing conduct may be admissible in a bad faith action is best summed up as follows:
*523One should note a distinguishing factor between the insurer’s settlement behavior during litigation and its other litigation conduct. The Rules of Civil Procedure provide remedies for the latter. To permit the jury to pass judgment on the defense counsel’s trial tactics and to premise a finding of bad faith on counsel’s conduct places an unfair burden on the insurer’s counsel, potentially inhibiting the defense of the insurer. An insurer’s settlement offers, on the other hand, are not a separate abuse of the litigation process itself. If a litigant refuses to settle or makes low offers, his adversary cannot avail himself of motions to compel, argument, or cross-examination to correct his failure.
In principle, an insurer’s duty to settle should continue after the commencement of litigation. If the insurer were immunized for objectional settlement conduct occurring after litigation begins, the insured would be left without a remedy. It makes sense, therefore, to hold the insurer responsible for such conduct. The rules, however, provide litigants with protection against other forms of litigation [conduct], and for that reason a court could rationally exclude evidence of the insurer’s other misdeeds committed during the litigation process.
Stephen S. Ashley, Bad Faith Actions Liability and Damages § 5A:6 (2005).5
We must add, however, that such evidence is not automatically admissible. Evidence of post-filing conduct may often be of limited relevance to a claim of bad faith and raises distinct concerns about prejudice to the insurance company. While resolution of the tension between the competing considerations of probativeness and prejudice is an unquestioned requirement of the law of evidence, see KRE 403, we note that there has been heightened concern about this issue, as it applies to post-filing conduct, since courts began considering such evidence of bad faith. See White, 221 Cal.Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d at 317 n. 9. Thus, while it will no doubt further limit the admissibility of post-filing behavior, we want to emphasize that before admitting evidence of post-filing behavior, courts must be careful to weigh the probativeness of the proposed evidence against its potential for prejudice, as required by KRE 403. See Timberlake Const. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 341 (10th Cir.1995) (“In light of existing case law and the public policy concerns ..., ... while evidence of an insurer’s litigation conduct may, in some rare instances, be admissible on the issue of bad faith, such evidence will generally be inadmissible, as it lacks probative value and carries a high risk of prejudice. See Fed.R.Evid. 401, 403.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals is reversed.
LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur.
COOPER, J., dissents by separate opinion.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion in which SCOTT, J., joins.

. At the time of the accident, the company was called Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc. Because the name has since changed, we will employ the company’s current name, Lawson Mardon Flexible, Inc.

. This moniker appears to be an umbrella name used by the Appellees — Zurich Insurance Company, Zurich American Companies, and Zurich American Insurance Company of Illinois — to whom we refer collectively hereinafter as "Zurich.”

. There actually is a third approach, namely a blanket prohibition of the admission of post-filing conduct. Arkansas and Wyoming are representative of this rule. Parker v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 326 Ark. 1073, 935 S.W.2d 556, 562 (1996); Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 257 (Wyo.2000). This approach, however, amounts to the denial of the continuing existence of a duty of good faith once litigation begins. Because our statute applies both before and during litigation, we need not address this approach any further.

. We also note application of this approach means we need not address Zurich’s claims under the Kentucky Constitution, specifically that allowing introduction of such litigation conduct evidence would violate Section 116, which grants to the Court of Justice the sole power to regulate the practice of law, and would mean that UCSPA applies to attorneys (in addition to insurance companies), thus violating Section 51, which prohibits the General Assembly from enacting laws that relate to more than one subject.

. We also note, since Knotts alludes in his brief to the possibility of introducing such evidence, that evidence of improper or abusive tactics by an insurance company during litigation of the bad faith action itself are truly irrelevant to proof of bad faith in handling the underlying claim. Such evidence simply is inadmissible in the bad faith suit.