Court Opinion

ID: 9770701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:19:30.802921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:19.952509
License: Public Domain

GREENHILL,
Chief Justice, dissenting.
This is, in my opinion, a ease of direct contempt, contempt in the presence of the court. There is no problem, in my opinion, as to notice. Padrón was in court that morning with his attorney. He was told that the court would order him to sign the deed. When his attorney asked for time to examine the papers, the court recessed the hearing until 4:00 p. m. for that purpose. No objection was made as to this being an insufficient amount of time for the examination of the papers or for Padrón to be advised of his rights by his attorney.
As a result of the conference, Padrón was advised by his attorney to sign the deed; and the attorney so advised the court. The court, as he said in open court he would, ordered Padrón to sign the deed, and Pa-drón refused. No objection was raised as to the form or substance of the deed.
I can think of no reason why putting the judge’s order in writing would have helped Padrón, or due process, one bit. The matter was completely understandable and uncomplicated, and it had been fully explained to Padrón by the court in the morning session, and he had the assistance of counsel if there was any question in the matter.
This court’s holding that the trial court was without power to do what he did is unfortunate in that it thus reduces the power of trial judges.
History has taught us that it is necessary for trial judges to have sufficient power to carry out their orders in the administration of justice within the limits of due process. This power is recognized by the Legislature in Article 1911a. As indicated below, Pa-drón was not deprived of due process. It is the trial judges who are, in my opinion, being deprived of powers by the court’s opinion.
The question is not whether the trial judge acted wisely, or tactfully. The question is whether his order is so wanting in power as to be void. In my opinion, this Court has substituted its sense of fairness for that exercised by the trial judge. In doing so, it has deprived all trial judges of the power to do things under similar circumstances.
So that there may be no misunderstanding, it was Padrón who initiated the sale of the house in question. He asked for the receiver to sell the house, and his motion was granted. He also asked for possession of the house, rather than leaving his wife in possession. When his request was granted and he got possession, he refused even to let an appraiser of the receiver come on the premises to make an appraisal.
As I understand it, the house was appraised for $12,500; and the receiver found a buyer who would pay $12,500 provided there was a title policy. A policy of title insurance was part of the consideration. The court’s order of April 26 authorized the receiver to “handle” the sale “with the appropriate title company” and to consummate the contract “and title insurance papers.” Since Padrón was in possession, the title company would not issue a policy unless Padrón signed the deed.
If there is any good reason why Padrón refused to sign the deed, it has not been made known to the trial court or to us. There are no questions, so far as I know, about the title to the property. Padrón does not even contend that he and his wife did not own the property. No act outside of the presence of the court needed to be established. No witnesses needed to be called, and Padrón had, in my opinion, full knowledge and notice as to what the court *926would and did direct him to do, — and what his counsel advised him to do after full opportunity to study the matter.
The court, in open court, directed Padrón to sign. In the presence of the court, Pa-drón refused. He was advised that he would be held in contempt. He still refused. To me this is a plain direct contempt of court after due notice, and after Padrón had ample opportunity with the assistance of his lawyer to decide what he would do. His confinement was authorized under Article 1911a.
I would remand Mr. Padrón to the custody of the sheriff.
BARROW, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.