Court Opinion

ID: 9577548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:35:58.050761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:47.620947
License: Public Domain

TANZER, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur with the reasoning of the majority. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, borrowed *940from criminal procedure, is inappropriate in a mental hearing where the issue is the degree of probability of future possibilities rather than the existence of a past fact. Yet the legislature has directed that we apply that standard and, however difficult it may be to apply, we are bound to and will find ways to make it workable.
I also concur with the majority’s result, on this record. I disagree only in that I am not persuaded that the facts could not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt of mental illness if they were properly interpreted in light of psychological or psychiatric knowledge. The facts are in the record and the conclusions of the experts are in the record. The missing element is the rational nexus between facts and the required statutory conclusions. We require that link in administrative hearings, Home Plate, Inc. v. OLCC, 20 Or App 188, 530 P2d 862 (1975); it is no less appropriate in a judicial setting where the legislature has required great caution.
There are ample facts which indicate that the failure of this hearing may be procedural rather than substantive. For example, appellant’s discontinuation of her program of outpatient medication may have effects which are relevant on the issue of danger or ability to care for herself, but we are not informed of them. She explained her reason for discontinuation:
"Q. [by the court] What was the Stelazine doing for you?
"A. The Stelazine, at that time prior to this, was producing colour changes in the brain because of the pressure from Rudolph Heintz and I sensed that I should come off of Stelazine, at least, the dosages that I was on at that time.
"Q. You say colour changes in the brain, I don’t— I’m not familiar with that description?
"A. To me it was a case of pre-glaucoma.
"Q. Keep going.
"A: And had I — to me if I had continued on the *941dosage that I was on at that time I would have been in jeopardy of being blind.
"Q. Why do you say that?
"A. Because I could see when I looked outdoors, for instance, I could see reds and greens and then when I — how would I put it — distortions of reds and greens and then when I rested I was not able to get adequate rest and this to me was a pressure change in the brain.
"Q. (By Doctor Hall) Did you consult a physician concerning this?
"A. Concerning this particular symptom?
"Q. Yes.
"A. Yes, I did. But — I, let’s see — I did not indicate those changes at that time because at that time Rudolph became very violent and beat me up against a counter in a bathroom and I suffered a cracked or bruised rib and a hematoma. And that was the culmination of a previous years’ violence and the beginning of the next two years violence.
"Q. So, you made this decision on your own, you did not have a physicians’ advise about the colour changes?
"A. No.”
Her explanation gives cause to a lay judge for alarm and may be significantly symptomatic of some pathology, but there is no explanation allowing us to relate it to the ultimate statutory issue of danger to self or others. The same may be said of several other matters which were brought out during her examination and that of her family members. It is the lack of such an explanation, rather than a paucity of factual raw material, that makes this record deficient below and on trial de novo.
The judgment must be that of the court. It cannot be delegated to the expert examiners, however reliant upon their expertise the courts must be. To assure that the determination remains judicial, it is necessary that the record contain, probably but not necessarily in the form of expert testimony, an exposition of the relationship of the facts arising from testimony and observations to a conclusion of mental illness, as statutorily, not medically, defined. That is not imposs*942ible or even cumbersome. It does not require a detailed diagnosis. It would require only that a witness explain why the facts indicate danger or helplessness. Then the trial court can justify a decision; then we can perform our statutory obligation of trial de novo.
This requirement is consistent with my understanding of the reasoning of the majority, with which I concur. I stress its significance because I would reverse and remand on this sole ground.