Court Opinion

ID: 9538904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:43:42.793989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:14.383967
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting. The two conclusions reached in the scholarly opinion of the court are inconsistent. The opinion is a prime example of what can happen when a court painstakingly attempts to follow the tangled skein of the case law declaring constitutional rights without considering the results reached.
I am disturbed and incensed by the actions of this police officer in questioning the defendant in the hospital immediately after the accident. There was no compelling reason why this interrogation could not wait until a more appropriate time. The statements were elicited from the patient, newly admitted to the hospital, who was diagnosed as suffering from acute circulatory shock, mild brain concussion and a broken hand. He was experiencing pain, was confused, was somewhat irrational, and was under a sedative. The man’s statements to the officer under such conditions have little if any probative force and should be held inadmissible. Yet by following the tangled skein of constitutional case law the court arrives at the conclusion the man’s irrational statements were admissible in evidence.
*606On the other hand a blood test must be taken promptly if the results are to have probative force. There is a compelling reason for an officer to obtain a blood sample even though a person is in the hospital. The results of a blood test are accurate regardless of the man’s condition. Here again we follow the tangled skein of statutory and constitutional case law but we arrive at the opposite conclusion — the results of the blood test are inadmissible. If the written consent for the blood test was knowingly and voluntarily given the test was admissible. This was a decision for the trial court to be based upon the surrounding circumstances. The trial court concluded the consent was knowingly and voluntarily given. This court to be consistent in the opinion should hold that the record supports file trial court’s determination.
The crucial testimony in the record from which the trial court determined the voluntary nature of the written consent was set forth in the testimony of the officer. The testimony of the officer is summarized as follows:
“. . . he asked the defendant if he would give his written consent for a technician to draw a blood sample from him to determine the alcoholic content of his blood; that the defendant asked what would happen if he refused it and Ramsey told the defendant that if the test were refused a form would be sent to the Motor Vehicle Department, and his license could be suspended and the Defendant then said that he would sign the consent form; Ramsey advised the defendant that he didn’t have to sign if he didn’t want to and he didn’t have to take the blood test if he didn’t want to and if he did, it would probably be used against him in court; at that point, tire defendant consented to the taking of blood for the purpose of the alcoholic test and did sign a written consent form; . . .”
In following the tangled skein of statutory and constitutional case law the majority arrive at the conclusion “that Brunner’s purported consent must be regarded as involuntary because coerced by the unfounded threat of suspension.” Thus this court has apparently adopted a per se rule of exclusion which removes the question of the voluntary-involuntary nature of the consent from the Rial court.
As I view the tesümony of the officer his statement was not coercive, it was a half-truth. It failed to advise the defendant that the law required the officer to first arrest the defendant, which he could have done on the spot, and that the officer would then renew his request for the test, which if refused would eventually result in suspension of license. I can see no apparent attempt by the officer to mislead the defendant. This half-truth does not in my opinion amount to coercion per se.
*607I would arrive at opposite conclusions from those of the majority. The record on appeal in my opinion conclusively shows the statements of the defendant were not knowingly and voluntarily made. They should be held inadmissible. The results of the blood test were properly determined to be admissible by the trial court. Therefore I respectfully dissent.