Court Opinion

ID: 9714050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:29:33.561652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:23.013632
License: Public Domain

Boslatjgh, J.,
concurring.
I believe that the court has reached the correct result in this case. Therefore, I concur in the result although I do not agree with all of the statements which are contained in the opinion of the court.
The majority opinion states that if a time price is determined by applying a schedule of rates or charges to the cash price, the difference is necessarily interest. This statement is contrary to what the previous opinions of this court have declared to be the law.
In a number of decisions, commencing with Grand Island Finance Co. v. Fowler, 124 Neb. 514, 247 N. W. 429, this court has held that a time sale made in good faith at a price in excess of a cash price is valid even though the difference between the two prices exceeds the lawful interest for a loan. In Powell v. Edwards, 162 Neb. 11, 75 N. W. 2d 122, the court said: “It is also true that a time sale made in good faith at a price in excess of a cash price, even though the difference exceeds lawful interest for a loan, which price is arrived at by schedules furnished by a finance company which solicits contracts so entered into between a purchaser and a dealer, may not be regarded as being tainted with usury.” (Emphasis supplied.) In McNish v. General *785Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N. W. 2d 1, the court said that it was essential that the buyer actually be informed of and have the opportunity to choose between a time sale price and a cash sale price.
By a series of decisions this court has held that a time sale made in good faith is valid; that it is essential that the buyer be quoted a cash price and a time price; and that the time price may be computed by the use of schedules. The effect of the language in the majority opinion is to destroy the validity of all time sale contracts which were made in good faith in reliance upon previous decisions of this court. Such a result should be avoided if at all possible.
If the law is to be changed, I believe that the change should be made by legislative process. But, if the change is to be made by judicial decision, then the decision should operate prospectively only. In that respect I concur in Judge Brower’s remarks concerning the prospective operation of such a decision.