Court Opinion

ID: 9514793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:43.696663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.847528
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
[¶ 30.] I dissent on issue one.
[¶ 31.] Had the trial court concluded its comments after the first paragraph, as shown in paragraph seven of the majority opinion, there would have been no problem. On the other hand, when you state in open court in front of the jury “I know you’re going to tell the truth” (referring to the victim), the trial court lends its position to the testimony of the victim. That causes a problem in my mind.
[¶ 32.] I find the rationale and logic in the decision set forth in People v. Rush, 250 Ill.App.3d 530, 190 Ill.Dec. 1, 620 *160N.E.2d 1262 (1993), to be applicable to the present case. In Rush, the court stated,
Defendant contends that the trial court prejudicially invaded the province of the jury by stating to complainant, in the presence of the jury, “I know you were telling the truth.” The appellate court recently rested the principles applicable to review of trial court comments:
“[T]he trial judge himself must ... not make any comments or insinuations indicative of an opinion on the credibility of a witness. [Citation.]
One of the reasons behind the rule that the trial judge must exercise a high degree of care to avoid influencing the jury in any way [citation] is based on the belief that the trial judge has immense influence over the jury. [Citation.] Another very fundamental reason is that every defendant is entitled to a trial that is free from improper and prejudicial comments on the part of the trial judge.... For the comments or questioning by a trial judge to constitute reversible error, the defendant must demonstrate that they were a material factor in the conviction or that prejudice appears to have been the probable result.” People v. Brown (1990), 200 Ill.App.3d 566, 576-77, 146 Ill.Dec. 346, 558 N.E.2d 309.
These principles apply even when the witness is a minor. (See People v. Bradley (1984), 128 Ill.App.3d 372, 378, 83 Ill.Dec. 701, 470 N.E.2d 1121.) Although Illinois courts have not confronted trial court behavior possibly intended to calm a frightened testifying child, courts in other states have held that in these cases, as in any other criminal case, the trial judge must not, either by her words or acts, give the jury the impression that the judge finds the child’s testimony credible. (See State v. Suttles (Tenn.1989), 767 S.W.2d 403; State v. Zamorsky (1978), 159 N.J.Super. 273, 387 A.2d 1227.) We agree. The defendant has a right to a trial free from a judge’s comments bolstering the credibility of the State’s witnesses even where the judge might have intended his acts only to relax a frightened minor witness.
The State does not argue that the trial court’s comment was proper. Instead the State contends that the remark could not have prejudiced the jury against defendant.
In People v. Crane (1976), 34 Ill.App.3d 850, 341 N.E.2d 97, the State’s key witness in a burglary case was the defendant’s accomplice. On cross-examination the witness admitted that the State agreed to recommend probation for him in exchange for his guilty plea and his testimony against defendant, and he agreed to testify to escape incarceration. The trial court then asked the witness:
“[Y]ou understand the penalties of perjury, do you not?
A. Yes.
Q. And the answer which you have given to all questions put to you have been true and correct to the best of your knowledge?
A. Yes.
Q. Notwithstanding the reasons for the questions or the answers or the reasons for your giving this testimony, what you have said is absolutely true and correct?
A. Yes.” Crane, 34 Ill.App.3d at 853-54, 341 N.E.2d 97.
The appellate court held that the questions served to rehabilitate the witness “and lend the exalted weight of the court” to his credibility. (Crane, 34 Ill.App.3d at 854, 341 N.E.2d 97.) We find that the questioning by the trial court in this case, together with the comment that it knew the victim was telling the truth, improperly lent the exalted weight of the trial court to the victim’s testimony.
The State contends that the trial court in this case cured any error with his later comment that he did not intend to express any opinion on credibility, and the jury was to evaluate the credibility *161of the witnesses. In People v. Black (1970), 130 Ill.App.2d 996, 266 N.E.2d 458, aff'd (1972) 52 Ill.2d 544, 288 N.E.2d 376, the trial court recognized that he had made an improper remark and immediately admonished the jury to ignore it. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding that the immediate reaction partially cured the effect of the improper comment, and the error was not prejudicial because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.
190 Ill.Dec. 1, 620 N.E.2d at 1266-67.
[¶ 33.] The trial court’s comments “rang the bell” and no admonition by the court thereafter can unring it. Therefore, I would remand this case for a fair retrial, which in my opinion, was not the case on this maiden voyage.
[¶ 34.] I concur on the remaining issues.