Court Opinion

ID: 9901968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 19:02:21.13518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:42.401452
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 P. v. Pettijohn CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                     D080752

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                    (Super. Ct. No. SCE391848)

 DERWENT TUCKER PETTIJOHN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded
for resentencing.
         Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier, Kathryn Kirschbaum and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
         A jury convicted Derwent Tucker Pettijohn of seven counts of lewd acts
upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), and one count of forcible lewd act
upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)). Pettijohn now contends the trial
court erred: first, by admitting into evidence uncharged sexual offenses;
second, by improperly instructing the jury regarding expert testimony; third,
by failing to impose a stay on a concurrent sentence for two counts related to
a continuous course of conduct; and fourth, by failing to give a curative
instruction for alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, Pettijohn contends
that these errors, when considered together, rise to the level of cumulative
error. On these grounds, Pettijohn contends the judgment should be
reversed.
      We affirm the conviction, but agree that resentencing is required.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction but vacate the sentence
and remand the matter for resentencing.
                                       I.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The People charged Pettijohn with offenses based on allegations that he
had engaged in lewd and lascivious acts with his daughter (the daughter)
when she was under the age of 14.
A. Motion in Limine regarding uncharged conduct
      A few weeks before trial, the daughter met with the People to prepare
her for the trial. During that meeting, the daughter described sexual offenses
by Pettijohn against her that she had not previously disclosed. Using the
new information, the People served Pettijohn with a disclosure notice
detailing the uncharged offenses that the People intended to use as

propensity evidence under Evidence Code,1 section 1108.2 This disclosure

1    All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless
otherwise indicated.

2     The record does not contain a copy of the notice the People provided to
Pettijohn; references are drawn from other portions of the record.
                                       2
notice included: Pettijohn showing the daughter pornography3; Pettijohn

masturbating in front of the daughter4; Pettijohn propositioning the

daughter to touch his penis5; Pettijohn touching the daughter’s bare breast;

Pettijohn spooning the daughter naked6; Pettijohn masturbating the
daughter’s bare vagina; Pettijohn using a vibrator on the daughter; and
penis-to-vagina contact while the daughter was in Pettijohn’s bed.
      During the motions in limine hearing, Pettijohn objected to admitting
evidence of these disclosed uncharged offenses. Defense counsel
acknowledged that “in trial things happen, people blurt things out” and
planned to “deal with it at trial” through “a request for a continuance,”
“request for a mistrial,” or “vigorous cross-examination on the things not
previously said.”
      In evaluating the uncharged sexual offense evidence and balancing the
probative value against the prejudicial risk, the trial court explained that it
wanted the daughter “to be given the opportunity to tell this panel about this
relationship,” and that “this panel is entitled to know the entirety and the
extent of the relationship between this dad and his daughter.” Counsel

3    Pettijohn was previously charged for showing the daughter
pornography, but the charge was dismissed due to the statute of limitations.

4     Pettijohn had knowledge of the allegations of masturbating in front of
the daughter; the mother divorced Pettijohn after the daughter disclosed the
incident.

5     Pettijohn was previously charged for propositioning the daughter to
touch his penis, but the charge was dismissed; Pettijohn had actual
knowledge of the allegation that predated the disclosure notice.

6     Though included in the pretrial notice, no one testified about this
incident.
                                        3
offered extensive briefing on the law, and the trial court heard arguments
from the People and Pettijohn. The court concluded that while the testimony
was “certainly” prejudicial, the probative value of the information exceeded
the prejudicial effect, and ruled testimony on the uncharged offenses was
admissible. The trial court offered Pettijohn additional time to prepare for
this additional testimony and for trial; Pettijohn declined.
B. Trial Testimony
      At trial, the People introduced testimony from the daughter, Pettijohn’s
ex-wife (the mother), the forensic interviewer who interviewed the daughter,
the investigating detective, the district attorney investigator who performed
a cellphone data extraction and review, and Christina Shultz, an expert on
child sexual abuse myths and misconception. Pettijohn elected to testify in
his defense; his sister testified as a character witness.
      The evidence established that Pettijohn’s family, consisting of himself,
the mother, two sons, and the daughter, moved to Lakeside in approximately
2015 when the daughter was approximately seven years old. When the
daughter was approximately 10 years old, the mother began working and the
family moved to a home in Santee.
      1. The daughter’s testimony
      Through the course of her testimony, the daughter testified to three
categories of sexual offenses: 1) sexual offenses for which Pettijohn was
charged in the complaint; 2) sexual offenses that were included in the pretrial
disclosure notice from the People; and 3) sexual offenses that were discussed
for the first time at trial. We have separated the testimony out accordingly.

                                        4
              a. Charged Conduct
                   i. Lakeside
      While in the Lakeside home, Pettijohn began grooming and sexually
abusing the daughter. None of the Lakeside sexual offenses were charged.
                   ii. Santee
      Conduct at the Santee home forms the basis for the charged counts. On
one occasion, the daughter went upstairs to shower alone and Pettijohn
followed her up the stairs and pulled her pants down to her knees. During
separate incidents, Pettijohn touched the daughter’s inner thigh and her
breasts over her shirt. Pettijohn touched the daughter’s vagina on multiple
occasions. During another incident, Pettijohn approached the daughter on
the couch, picked her up, carried the daughter upstairs “like a baby,” threw
her on the bed in the master bedroom, closed the door, crawled up the bed,
grabbed the daughter’s legs, pushed her back down on the bed, and laid on
top of her. While holding the daughter in place, Pettijohn tried to pull her
pants down.
              b. Uncharged, Noticed Conduct
                   i. Lakeside
      In the Lakeside home, Pettijohn showed the daughter pornography
weekly, deleted pornographic websites from her search history, and taught
her how to hide what she viewed online via incognito browsing windows.
Pettijohn further allowed the daughter to access pornography on his phone.
Pettijohn told the daughter not to tell anybody about the things he did with
and to her.
      At the Lakeside home, Pettijohn asked the daughter to touch his penis
on at least one occasion and the daughter witnessed Pettijohn masturbating
in the master bedroom. On one occasion, Pettijohn used a vibrator from a

                                       5
dresser in the master bedroom between the daughter’s legs. On another
occasion, Pettijohn rubbed his penis back and forth on the daughter’s vagina
in his bed.
                   ii. Santee
      The daughter testified that during one incident, Pettijohn reached
inside her shirt to touch her bare breasts.
              c. Uncharged, Unnoticed Conduct
      At trial, the daughter testified to three additional unnoticed, uncharged
sexual offenses.
                   i. Lakeside
      The daughter testified to an incident during which Pettijohn touched
her bare body using a loofah while she was nude in the shower. During
another incident, Pettijohn had the daughter get undressed and sit on his
face while he licked her vagina.
                   ii. Santee
      On one occasion, Pettijohn instructed the daughter to remove her shirt,
sprayed whipped cream on her breasts, and licked the whipped cream.
      At the end of the daughter’s direct examination, defense counsel moved
for a mistrial, arguing that Pettijohn could no longer get a fair trial “based on
new information in front of the jury.” Counsel classified the conduct the
daughter testified to as “far more egregious than the charges” and “the 1108”
that was discussed at the motions in limine. Counsel argued that “without
adequate time to prepare and to respond” to the newly disclosed conduct,
Pettijohn could not have a fair trial; when the judge denied the motion for
mistrial, counsel neither requested additional time nor asked that the
testimony be struck from the record.

                                        6
      2. The mother’s testimony
      While in Lakeside, the mother once walked into the master bedroom
and discovered the daughter watching pornography on Pettijohn’s phone.
The daughter disclosed that Pettijohn taught her about incognito browsing,
that Pettijohn let her watch pornography and that he often watched it with
her. Pettijohn believed the daughter should not be a “prude” like her mother.
The daughter further disclosed that she witnessed Pettijohn masturbating.
Following this disclosure, the mother told Pettijohn not to come home, made
a report to Child Protective Services, and filed for divorce. The mother moved
out of the Lakeside home with the children.
      During her testimony, the mother confirmed the location and general
description of the vibrator the daughter described Pettijohn using at the
Lakeside home.
      The mother and Pettijohn briefly attempted to reconcile, but they
continued to experience disagreements and the mother again moved out. The
mother began to notice that the daughter “was changing the way that she
was dressing,” and “wasn’t showering.” After an outing with the mother, the
daughter explained that she didn’t want to go back to the Santee house,
where her father lived, because it was “yucky” there. The daughter disclosed
the abuse via text messages and the mother confronted Pettijohn.
      3. Pettijohn’s testimony
      Pettijohn elected to testify in his defense. During his testimony, he
explained that he wanted to “guide” the daughter in her access to
pornography. Pettijohn admitted discussing masturbation with the daughter
and that he described how women masturbate. Pettijohn believed that he and
the daughter were “experimenting” and that it was better she do it with him
“and not some crazy psycho.” Pettijohn was prepared to have sex with the

                                       7
daughter; he stopped because she said no and that she wanted to wait until
she was married.
      By his own admission, Pettijohn got drunk and he awoke with his hand
in the daughter’s crotch—he contends the daughter placed it there herself.
After this incident, he wanted another adult around if he planned to drink to
excess around the daughter.
      Pettijohn conceded it could have been possible he touched his daughter
while he was drunk, that he could have touched her vagina while he was
drunk, could have touched her breasts while drunk, and could have touched
her butt while drunk. He stopped drinking around the daughter
unsupervised because he didn’t want to put himself in “the bad position
curling up with her to snuggle on the couch and possibly being too drunk to
control [himself].” He didn’t know if “something happened again.”
      Pettijohn did not tell the mother about the pornography, masturbation
incident, or the conversations he had with the daughter. Further, he did not
tell the mother that he encouraged the daughter to experiment sexually with
herself or with him. Pettijohn believed the daughter wouldn’t talk about the
things they discussed or did together.
      Aside from rape, Pettijohn never specifically denied the allegations
made by text. Pettijohn told the mother he was “not as sick as [she thought]”
because he “didn’t know [he’d] fall in love with [his] daughter.”
      At the conclusion of the case, the court gave jury instruction CALCRIM
No. 1191, “Evidence of Uncharged Sex Offense,” and instructed the jury that
they “may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the
uncharged offense[s].” If they decided the defendant committed the
uncharged offenses, they could, but were not required, conclude that the

                                         8
defendant “was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses.” The jury was
also instructed that they could “not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public
opinion” influence their decision. The jurors sent three notes with questions
over the course of their deliberations.
      The jury convicted Pettijohn on all eight counts. Pettijohn waived
sentencing by jury and the trial court sentenced him to confinement for a
total term of 16 years as follows: eight years for count 1; a consecutive two-
year term each for counts 2, 3, 6, and 7; a concurrent six-year term each for
counts 4 and 8.
                                          II.
                                 DISCUSSION
A. Testimony as to Prior Sexual Offenses Was Properly Admitted
      Pettijohn argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
testimony to uncharged offenses as propensity evidence under section 1108.
Pettijohn argues that “almost 50%” of what the daughter testified to at trial
[were] uncharged sex offenses. This “enormous amount” of evidence he
argues, led the jury to convict him “for being a bad person and not someone

who committed specific bad acts.”7 He asserts that allowing any and all of
this testimony into evidence deprived him of a fair trial.

7     We note that defense counsel neither contemporaneously objected to
testimony regarding these incidents during direct examination nor moved to
strike the testimony. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial at the close of the
daughter’s direct examination. On appeal, Pettijohn does not argue that the
judge erred in denying the motion to mistrial but describes the motion for
mistrial as renewing his objection to the admission of all of the 1108
evidence.
                                          9
      1. Guiding Principles
      Except for purposes of impeachment (see § 1101, subd. (c)), “evidence is
inadmissible when offered by the opposing party to prove the defendant’s
conduct on a specified occasion (§ 1101, subd. (a)), unless it involves the
commission of a crime, civil wrong, or other act and is relevant to prove some
fact (e.g., motive, intent, plan, identity) other than a disposition to commit
such an act (§ 1101, subd. (b)).” (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903,
911; accord, People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 145.) Thus, in general, the
prosecution may not offer evidence of “other bad acts” not related to the
charged offense.
      The Legislature added section 1108 “to expand the admissibility of
disposition or propensity evidence in sex offense cases.” (Falsetta, supra, 21
Cal.4th at p. 911.) “[S]ection 1108 was intended in sex offense cases to relax
the evidentiary restraints section 1101, subdivision (a), imposed, to assure
that the trier of fact would be made aware of the defendant’s other sexual
offenses in evaluating the victim’s and the defendant’s credibility. In this
regard, section 1108 implicitly abrogates prior decisions of [the California
Supreme Court] indicating that ‘propensity’ evidence is per se unduly
prejudicial to the defense.” (Falsetta, at p. 911.) As our high court noted,
“ ‘[t]he Legislature has determined the need for this evidence is “critical”
given the serious and secretive nature of sex crimes and the often resulting
credibility contest at trial.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Section 1108 explicitly allows evidence of other sexual offenses to be
considered “ ‘ “as evidence of the defendant’s disposition to commit such
crimes, and for its bearing on the probability or improbability that the
defendant has been falsely or mistakenly accused of such an offense.” ’ ”
(Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 912.) The only limitation placed on the

                                           10
admission of propensity evidence in a criminal sexual offense case is as set
forth in section 352. (See § 1108, subd. (a).) Evidence of other sexual offenses
may not be admitted “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (§ 352.)
      Based on section 1108, the presumption is in favor of the admission of
other sex offense evidence; however, the evidence should not be admitted in
cases where its admission could result in a fundamentally unfair trial.
(People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 62; People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1152, 1163–1164; Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.)
      Although the trial court’s section 352 analysis depends on the unique
facts and issues of each case, “five factors stand out as particularly significant
in a[ ] . . . section 1108 case. These factors are (1) whether the propensity
evidence has probative value, e.g., whether the uncharged conduct is similar
enough to the charged behavior to tend to show the defendant did in fact
commit the charged offense; (2) whether the propensity evidence is stronger
and more inflammatory than evidence of the defendant’s charged acts;
(3) whether the uncharged conduct is remote or stale; (4) whether the
propensity evidence is likely to confuse or distract the jurors from their main
inquiry, e.g., whether the jury might be tempted to punish the defendant for
his uncharged, unpunished conduct; and (5) whether admission of the
propensity evidence will require an undue consumption of time.” (People v.
Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1117 (Nguyen).) “A trial court balances
this first factor, i.e., the propensity evidence’s probative value, against the
evidence’s prejudicial and time-consuming effects, as measured by the second
through fifth factors.” (Ibid.)

                                        11
      We review a challenge to the trial court’s admission of section 1108
evidence, including its section 352 determination, for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Dejourney (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1091, 1104–1105.) “We will not
find that a court abuse[d] its discretion in admitting such other sexual acts
evidence unless its ruling ‘ “falls outside the bounds of reason.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In
other words, we will not reverse a trial court’s exercise of discretion under
sections 1108 and 352 unless its decision was arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd and resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v.
Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1337.)
      2. Analysis
      Prior to the start of trial, Pettijohn received notice of most of the
uncharged acts and he was advised that the daughter was remembering and
disclosing more incidents as time went on. Defense counsel acknowledged
during the motions in limine that “in trial things happen, people blurt things
out” and planned to “deal with it at trial” through “a request for a
continuance,” “request for a mistrial,” or “vigorous cross-examination on the
things not previously said”, and noted that he had a plan to address
testimony regarding previously undisclosed, uncharged offenses. At trial, the
daughter testified to three sexual offenses that were not charged and were
not included in the pretrial notice.
      We see no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion when it
allowed the People to elicit testimony on uncharged acts of sexual offenses.
      In considering the factors outlined in Nguyen, uncharged offenses in
Pettijohn’s case involved the same victim, over the same discrete period, in
the same two locations as all the charged offenses—all testified to by the
victim herself. The People charged Pettijohn for repeatedly touching the
daughter’s vagina and breasts, for pulling her pants and underwear to her

                                        12
knees, and for pinning her to the bed, touching her body and trying to
undress her. Both the noticed conduct and the unnoticed and uncharged
conduct was substantially similar to the charged conduct and was not so
inflammatory that it denied Pettijohn a fair trial. The uncharged conduct
was neither remote in time nor irrelevant.
      We distinguish the instant case from the matter of People v. Harris
(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, upon which Pettijohn relies. There, the
erroneously introduced evidence inaccurately described uncharged sexual
offenses that occurred 23 years before Harris’s trial. The jury heard a
misleading redacted version of the facts from a police officer, not the victim.
(Id. at p. 733.) The victim of the uncharged sexual offense was attacked in
her home. Harris was on trial for breaching the trust of his position and
sexually assaulting emotionally and physically vulnerable patients at the
mental health care facility where he worked. In Harris, the court held that
evidence was “remote, inflammatory and nearly irrelevant.” (Id. at 741.) The
victims were dissimilar, the setting was dissimilar, and the offense was 23
years old.
      In this case, the testimony of additional uncharged sexual offenses was
the exact sort of evidence the legislature sought to allow when it enacted
section 1108. It gives the full context of the relationship and details the
“serious and secretive nature” of the acts that Pettijohn was alleged to have
committed against his daughter. It is undeniable that the testimony was not
favorable to Pettijohn; however, it did not cause the jurors to convict
Pettijohn merely for being a “bad person.” The jury was specifically
instructed that, if they concluded Pettijohn committed the uncharged
offenses, that was “not sufficient by itself to prove [Pettijohn] is guilty of the
counts set forth in 1 through 8.” The notes the jury sent demonstrated their

                                        13
careful consideration of the evidence before them. There is nothing on the
record to suggest that they did anything other than fully, carefully, and
appropriately consider Pettijohn’s case. The judge’s reasoned decision to
allow testimony regarding these uncharged sexual offenses was neither
arbitrary nor capricious and did not deny Pettijohn a fair trial. We hold the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting testimony from the
daughter on uncharged sexual offenses.
B. The Court Erred in Instructing the Jury Regarding the Testimony of the
Expert Witness, But the Error Was Harmless.

      Appellant asserts the trial court judge erred in instructing the jury
regarding an expert witness’s testimony on child sex abuse “myths and
misconceptions.” He claims the instruction minimized the prosecutor’s
burden of proof and functionally instructed the jury to believe the daughter if
they found the expert credible.
      1. Standard of Review
      In determining whether the court properly instructed the jury, we
consider the instructions as a whole and assume jurors are intelligent
persons, capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which
are given. (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.) Whether a
jury instruction correctly states the law is determined "under the
independent or de novo standard of review." (Ibid.)
      2. The Expert’s Trial Testimony
      At trial, Shultz testified as an expert as to best practices in conducting
forensic interviews of child sexual abuse victims, as well as the myths and
misconceptions surrounding child sexual abuse. Specifically, she testified
that perpetrators of molestation typically are people the child knows and
trusts and that perpetrators typically groom victims through a process of
desensitization. She testified that victims of child sexual abuse may engage
                                       14
in behaviors to make themselves less appealing to the perpetrator. She
indicated, however, that just because children begin to dress differently and
stop showering doesn’t mean they are experiencing sexual abuse.
      Shultz further testified extensively about disclosure patterns. She
explained that “the disclosure process is a process” and that “a child just
doesn’t come up and say everything immediately right away.” She discussed
patterns of incomplete disclosure, incremental disclosure, and delayed
disclosure. She further testified that younger children are less likely to
disclose than older children, and that children may be more comfortable
disclosing after they have been separated from the perpetrator. She
indicated that when there are false reports, which are rare, the most common
family dynamics involved ongoing custody disputes, problems between
parents, and divorce.
      Shultz testified after the daughter’s trial testimony. She testified that
she did not have knowledge of the underlying facts of Pettijohn’s case, had
never met the daughter and did not participate in the forensic interview of
the daughter
      3. The instruction given by the court.
      In the colloquy regarding jury instructions, as to the instruction
regarding expert testimony, the judge and counsel discussed the language of

CALCRIM No. 1193.8 Defense counsel argued that the court should modify

8     CalCrim No. 1193 is entitled “Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome” and the operative version at the time of
Pettijohn’s trial provided:

      “You have heard testimony from [expert] regarding child sexual abuse
      accommodation syndrome.
      “[¶] . . . [¶]
                                       15
the final line of the jury instruction to read, “[y]ou may consider this evidence
only in evaluating [the daughter’s] testimony,” deleting the word
“believability.” He requested a further instruction that the jury “can’t
consider [the expert’s statement] as answer[ing] whether or not” Pettijohn
sexually abused the daughter.
      Ultimately, the court modified the instruction, and instructed the jury
as follows:
      “You heard testimony from Christina Schultz about myths and
      misconceptions regarding child abuse. Christina's Shultz's
      testimony about myths and misconceptions regarding child
      sexual abuse is not evidence that the defendant committed any of
      the crimes charged in this case. You may consider that evidence
      only in evaluating the believability of [the daughter’s] testimony.”

      We note that this instruction modified CALCRIM No. 1193 by deleting
the phrase, “in deciding whether or not [alleged victim’s] conduct was
consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested.”
      4. Analysis
      Pettijohn argues that the jury instruction is inadequate because
through its use of the word “believability,” the instruction “effectively tells
the jury [that] the expert’s evidence may be used to determine whether the
victim’s claims are true.” In so doing, he asserts, the prosecution’s burden of
proof is lowered.

      “[Expert’s] testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation
      syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the
      crimes charged against (him/her) [or any conduct or crime[s] with
      which (he/she) was not charged].
      “You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not
      [victim’s] conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has
      been molested, and in evaluating the believability of the alleged
      victim.”

                                        16
      CALCRIM No. 1193 “accurately instructs the jury on the law: the
proper use—and the proper limitations on the use—of [Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome] evidence.” (People v. Lapenias (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 162, 176.) The pattern jury instruction, inclusive of
“believability,” does not misapply the burden of proof. (People v. Gonzales
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 503–504; accord, People v. Munch (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 464, 473–474.) Instructions analogous to CACLRIM No. 1193
with respect to the “believability” provision have also been upheld. (See
People v. Brackins (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 56, 70–72 [language of CALCRIM
No. 850 instruction as to intimate partner violence relating to victim’s
believability did not “ ‘prove the occurrence’ of the abuse.”]; People v.
Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1087 [battered woman syndrome evidence
properly relevant to credibility].)
      However, in the cases discussed above, the “believability” provision was
given in tandem with the “consistency” portion of CALCRIM No. 1193. In
this case, as given by the court, the instruction omitted the language
regarding consistency. Yet the consistency provision is critical to the
accuracy of the instruction and to properly contextualize the testimony from
the victim.
      Expert testimony of this nature was approved to “disabus[e] the jury of
some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may
evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths.” (People v.
Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 247–248 (Bledsoe).) Where a rapist suggested
that the conduct of a victim is inconsistent with having been raped, expert
testimony of this kind is permissible to “rebut such an inference” through
“recent findings of professional research on the subject of a victim’s reaction
to sexual assault.” (Id. at p. 247.) It would be improper, however, to use

                                        17
testimony of this nature to suggest that the assault actually occurred. (Ibid.)
This reasoning was extended to the use of expert testimony on child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) (See People v. Bowker (1988) 203
Cal.App.3d 385, 391–394 (Bowker)) and intimate partner abuse. (See People
v. Day (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 405, 416; People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th
at pp. 1088–1089.) The testimony is permissible only to confront
“misconceptions regarding the behavior of abuse victims, and may not be
used to corroborate the victim’s claims of abuse.” (People v. Housley (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 947, 957 (Housley), citing Bowker, at p. 394.) Some courts have
taken this further and require the court to instruct the jury that “(1) such
evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing the victim’s reactions
as demonstrated by the evidence are not inconsistent with having been
molested; and (2) the expert’s testimony is not intended and should not be
used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.” (Housley,
supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 959.)
      In People v. Sexton (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 457, 467 (Sexton), the
Appellant had challenged the use of the term “believability” in an instruction

very similar to CALCRIM No. 1193, namely CALCRIM No. 850,9 which
relates to expert testimony in the context of intimate partner battering.
Appellant there contended that the use of the term “believability” in the
instruction allowed the jury to infer “that because the expert had described
behaviors that matched those of [the victim] in this case, she must have been

9      CALCRIM 850 provides in pertinent part that: “testimony about
[intimate partner battering] is not evidence that the defendant committed
any of the crimes charged against [him]. . . . ¶ You may consider this evidence
only in deciding whether or not [the victim’s] conduct was consistent with the
conduct of someone who has been abused and in evaluating the believability
of (his/her) testimony.”
                                       18
telling the truth when she testified to abuse and lying when she denied it.”
(Sexton, at p. 467.) The court noted the importance of the entirety of the last
sentence of CALCRIM No. 1193’s instruction [“[y]ou may consider this
evidence only in deciding whether or not [the victim’s] conduct was consistent
with the conduct of someone who has been abused and in evaluating the
believability of [her] testimony”] in properly explaining the significance of
“believability”:
      “Read in context, the last sentence of the instruction contains a
      direction with specific and general aspects. Specifically, the jury is
      to use the expert testimony to help ground its analysis of the
      consistency of the complaining witness's conduct (by using a more
      informed reference point). The jury is then to use this “consistency”
      analysis in its general evaluation of the believability of the
      complaining witness's testimony. In isolation, the breadth of the
      language in the last phrase might allow for a question regarding
      the manner in which the expert's testimony ought to bear on the
      jury's evaluation of the believability of the witness, but the first
      part of the sentence effectively resolves any such confusion.
      Reasonable jurors would not understand the instruction to mean
      that if they find the characteristics of intimate partner battering
      to be satisfied, this indicates that [alleged victim] was necessarily
      telling the truth.” (Sexton, 37 Cal.App.5th 457, 467–468.)

      Here, the deletion of the “consistency” phrase of the instruction left the
“believability” provision “[i]n isolation,” leading to the concern that Appellant
asserts in this appeal.
      We agree that the instruction as given risked impermissibly running
afoul of the safeguards laid out in Bledsoe and Bowker. As established by our
Supreme Court, testimony of this nature is permissible for the limited
purpose of disabusing the jury of misconceptions and cannot be used to
demonstrate the abuse happened. (Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 247–248.)
To ensure the jury uses the testimony only for permissible reasons, “the jury
must be instructed simply and directly that the expert’s testimony is not

                                       19
intended and should not be used to determine whether the victim’s
molestation claim is true.” (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 394.)
Without the contextualization offered in the “consistency” phrase, it could be
possible for a jury to misapply the expert’s testimony and to use it to
determine the victim’s claim is true, instead of evaluating the victim’s
behavior in the context of behaviors typical to members of a class.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in its instruction.
      However, we conclude that the error was harmless under the standard

set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.10 Pettijohn cannot
establish that the jury would have returned a more favorable verdict had the
“consistency” phrase been included. Where the “expert testifies regarding the
behavior of abused children as a class, there is little, if any, chance the jury
will misunderstand or misapply the evidence.” (People v. Mateo (2016) 243
Cal.App.4th 1063, 1074.) As presented to the jury—that is, in full alongside
the rest of the applicable instructions and grounded in the facts of this trial—
the deficient instruction was not prejudicial. The trial court instructed the
jury with CalCrim No. 332, which instructed jurors that they “must consider
the opinions” offered by the expert, but that they were “not required to accept
them as true or correct.” Jurors could “disregard any opinion” they found
“unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.” Further, the
expert testified to trends and patterns in a class of child abuse victims; the
expert did not testify to whether the daughter fell into that class. There is no
logical reason for any juror to believe that this expert, who confirmed

10    Appellant also contends that the instruction’s use of the term
“believability” had the effect of reducing the prosecution’s burden of proof,
thereby violating Pettijohn’s rights under the United States Constitution.
We disagree with his conclusion. The jury was repeatedly instructed as to
the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
                                        20
multiple times on the record that she was not familiar with any of the
parties, the recorded forensic interview, or the underlying facts of the case,
could confirm whether the daughter experienced molestation or whether
Pettijohn was a perpetrator. There was no risk the jury would misapply the
expert testimony in this case. Further, the jury did not mechanically transfer
their assessment of the expert to the daughter’s believability. The jury sent
multiple notes during their deliberation, demonstrating a careful weighing of
the evidence and contemplation of the case before them. Nothing on the
record provides any indication that the jury failed to consider Pettijohn’s case
fully, carefully, and appropriately in arriving at their verdict.
      Finally, the People presented a solid case against Pettijohn and the
evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. The daughter’s testimony to the
charged conduct was consistent between the disclosure to the mother, the
forensic interview, the preliminary hearing and at trial. The mother testified
to the behavior and conduct known to her and confrontations with Pettijohn
regarding the incidents. His counsel admitted during motions in limine that
the People had “enough ammunition” without additional uncharged conduct
being admitted—that the People had “lots of evidence” including evidence
from Pettijohn himself.
      To that end, some of the most incriminating evidence came from
Pettijohn himself. He acknowledged at least one incident of contact and
characterized the sexual conduct with the daughter as better with him than
“some crazy psycho.” He asserted that his daughter was “curious and
exploratory” and that he let things “get out of hand.” Pettijohn believed his
minor daughter was coming on to him. He conceded there could have been
additional incidents he didn’t remember.

                                        21
      Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we hold it is not reasonably
probable that Pettijohn would have achieved a more favorable result if the
jury was instructed with the full CalCrim No. 1193.
C. The Sentences for Counts 1 and 4 Are Subject to Penal Code Section 654
and Require Resentencing.

      Pettijohn contends on appeal that counts 1 and 4 were part of one
overall act, and therefore the sentence as to one of those charges must be
stayed pursuant to section 654. Count 1 alleged a violation of Penal Code
section 288(b)(1), and specified that the alleged unlawful act involved
“holding [the daughter] down to touch her body, master bed.” Count 4 alleged
a violation of section 288(a), and specified that the alleged unlawful act
involved “hand to vagina, recliner chair.” During deliberations, the jury sent
two notes inquiring about how counts 1 and 4 were related. The first
question was whether “count 4 relate[d] to count 1[,] or are they two
sep[a]rate [instances]?” The court responded to the first by stating: “The act
charged in count 4 is a separate crime than the act charged in count 1. You
must consider each count separately and return a separate verdict for each
count.” To their second question, whether “count #4 [was] [in reference] to a
specific [incident] or is a general reference to any hand to vagina in the
master bedroom?” the court replied, in part, “Counts 1 and 4 are alleged to
have occurred during the same incident.”
      Penal Code section 654 provides in relevant part that an act or
omission may not be punished under more than one provision of law.
“Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible
course of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) When the
trial court is imposing sentence for a continuous court of conduct, a trial court
is required to “impose judgment on each count, which involves selecting a

                                       22
term, and then staying execution of the duplicative sentence.” (People v.
Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 380.)
      During the People’s sentencing argument, the prosecutor argued that
counts 1 and 4 were not a continuous course of conduct and California Penal
Code section 654 did not require the judge to stay either sentence. She

asserted these were two separate acts under Penal Code section 667.6.11
because when the daughter escaped from him, Pettijohn had an opportunity
to reflect and could have stopped instead of grabbing her again. In his
mitigation statement, Pettijohn argued that count 1 and 4 should be
considered “one overall act.”
      At sentencing, the trial court ordered the midterm sentence of eight
years for count 1 and the midterm sentence of six years for count 4, to be run
concurrently.
      The People now assert that counts 1 and 4 were from the same incident
and one continuous course of conduct. Accordingly, they concede that
“punishment imposed on either count 1 or count 4 should be stayed.”
      Particularly in light of the court’s instruction to the jury that counts 1
and 4 “occurred during the same incident”, we agree that the People’s
concession is appropriate. Therefore, we remand to the trial court for
resentencing to make an election regarding the stayed count.

11      At the time of Pettijohn’s sentencing in July 2022, California Penal
Code section 667.6(d)(2) read: “In determining whether crimes against a
single victim were committed on separate occasions under this subdivision,
the court shall consider whether, between the commission of one sex crime
and another, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon the
defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior.
Neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the
defendant lost or abandoned the opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of
itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred
on separate occasions.”
                                       23
D. The Prosecutor’s Comment that Pettijohn Appeared to be “Coached and
Lying” Does Not Constitute Prosecutorial Misconduct.

      At trial, during cross examination of Pettijohn, the prosecutor
introduced a text message between Pettijohn and the mother in which the
mother asked what Pettijohn had meant when he referred to a “bad position”
for him. Pettijohn did not answer the question during the text message
exchange. The prosecutor questioned Pettijohn about the text:
         “Q You didn’t answer this question?
         “A No.
         “Q It’s only now, three years later, you’ve developed an
         answer for those questions; right?”

      The court sustained an objection to the last question.
      She returned to this theme later, clarifying what Pettijohn did not
answer or did not explain when the mother confronted him with the
allegations of molestation:
         “Q You didn’t explain that to [the mother] in 2019 when
         this incident happened; right?
         “A Correct.
         “Q You didn’t tell her you were confused?
         “A Correct
         “Q You only just said that today; right?
         “A Correct.
         “Q Three years later?
         “A Correct.
         “Q After you have an attorney?”

      The court sustained an objection to the last question.
      During closing arguments, the prosecutor referred to Pettijohn’s
demeanor during his testimony and said “when he was talking it was
absolutely clear that he was coached and that he was lying.” Defense counsel

                                      24
objected to the statement. The court ruled that “[t]he first part will be

stricken. The last start of the statement can remain.”12
      Shortly thereafter, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel
renewed his objection: “Denigrating counsel is misconduct. Implying that I
coached testimony is misconduct, it’s improper.” Defense counsel asserted
that the prosecutor’s statement that Pettijohn was “coached” denoted
“significant and specific ethical violations.” He requested a curative
instruction that “ ‘[t]here is no evidence that defense counsel has coached any
witness.’ ” The People were willing to submit on such a curative instruction,
but the court denied the request, concluding that any instruction would “get
into attorney/client privilege” and would “simply highlight a situation that
does not need to be highlighted.” Pettijohn declined to make a formal
allegation of intentional prosecutorial misconduct and declined to move for
mistrial on those grounds.
      It is prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to attack “the integrity of
defense counsel” or cast “aspersions on defense counsel.” (People v. Hill
(1988) 17 Cal.4th 800, 832.) Misconduct denigrates defense counsel when it
directs the jury’s attention away from the evidence. (People v. Sandoval
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 183.) “A defendant’s conviction should be based on the
evidence adduced at trial, and not on the purported improprieties of his
counsel.” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 977.)
      In evaluating a claim of such misconduct, we determine “whether there
is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable
fashion.” (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 738.) Even when it is

12    Later, outside the presence of the jury, the court clarified the ruling:
“So the first part stricken was he had been coached. The last part, the
allegation he was lying remains.”
                                       25
reasonably likely that a jury will construe the remarks in an objectionable
fashion, it is harmless if the comment was “fleeting.” (Ibid.)
      “ ‘ “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks
to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury
understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or
erroneous manner. [Citation.] In conducting this inquiry, we ‘do not lightly
infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging
meaning from the prosecutor's statements.” ’ ” (People v. Adams (2014) 60
Cal.4th 541, 577.) The court must consider the challenged statements in the
context of the argument as a whole. (People v. Cowan (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
1152, 1159.)
      Here, we note that the court repeatedly admonished the jury that
arguments were not evidence and instructed the jury that “[n]othing that the
attorneys say is evidence.” The prosecutor made a fleeting comment that did
not make any mention of defense counsel when she argued that Pettijohn’s
testimony was “coached and lying.” She did not further elaborate on the idea
that Pettijohn was coached, and she did not return to the argument over the
course of her closing argument. Taken in the context of the rest of the trial,
the prosecutor was clearly referencing her line of cross examination that
Pettijohn had ample time to concoct an alternate explanation for the text
messages he sent to the mother when she confronted him with allegations
that he sexually abused the daughter. The single lapse in word choice does
not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct, particularly when the
argument did not suggest or imply that it was defense counsel who had
“coached” Pettijohn.

                                      26
        Had the People said Pettijohn was coached by his defense counsel, we
might find ourselves in a different position. However, those are not the facts
of the case before us.
E. There is No Cumulative Prejudice
        Pettijohn contends the cumulative impact of the alleged errors at trial
requires reversal. “Under the ‘cumulative error’ doctrine, errors that are
individually harmless may nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is
prejudicial.” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fn. 32.) “ ‘[A] series of
trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some circumstances rise
by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error.’ ” (People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th, 926, 1009.) “[T]he reviewing court must
‘review each allegation and assess the cumulative effect of any errors to see if
it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable
to [the] defendant in their absence.’ ” (People v. Williams (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 587, 646.) “The ‘litmus test’ for cumulative error ‘is whether
[the] defendant received due process and a fair trial.’ ” (People v. Cuccia
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795.) Where no serious error occurs that, “whether
viewed individually or in combination, could possibly have affected the jury’s
verdict”, reversal is not required. (People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673,
704.)
        As discussed above, we found none of the errors prejudicial.
Accordingly, we do not find cumulative error.

                                        27
                               DISPOSITION
      The conviction is affirmed, the sentence is vacated, and the matter is
remanded to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Following resentencing, the trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of
judgment and forward a copy of the amended abstract to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.

                                                                  KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                                      28