Court Opinion

ID: 9896642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 21:11:43.262087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:10.489054
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Holman v. Wiser, 2023-Ohio-4095.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              ASHTABULA COUNTY

ADAM HOLMAN, et al.,                            CASE NO. 2022-A-0117

                 Plaintiffs-Appellees,
                                                Civil Appeal from the
        - vs -                                  Court of Common Pleas

KOURTNIE A. WISER, et al.,
                                                Trial Court No. 2022 CV 00103
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                             OPINION

                                   Decided: November 13, 2023
                                       Judgment: Affirmed

Jason L. Carter, Carter Law, LLC, 16781 Chagrin Boulevard, Suite 287, Shaker Heights,
OH 44120 (For Plaintiffs-Appellees).

Barbara Quinn Smith, Law Offices of Barbara Quinn Smith, 9853 Johnnycake Ridge
Road, Suite 106, Mentor, OH 44060 (For Defendant-Appellant).

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Kourtnie A. Wiser (“Mrs. Wiser”), appeals the judgment of the

Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, following a bench trial, finding her and Cory

Wiser (“Mr. Wiser”) (collectively, “the Wisers”) liable for conversion of personal property

and awarding damages in the sum of $41,100 to appellees, Adam Holman (“Mr.

Holman”), Betty Holman (“Mrs. Holman”), RoLesia Holman, Trustee of the Adam Holman

and Betty R. Holman Irrevocable Trust (“RoLesia”), and Reginald Holman (“Reginald”)

(collectively, “the Holmans”).
       {¶2}   This matter involves a real property sale gone awry, where the Wisers

purchased a house from the Holmans but refused to return their personal property after

the sale closed early.

       {¶3}   Mrs. Wiser raises five assignments of error, contending (1) the trial court

erred as a matter of law in finding she was not entitled to possession of the premises

upon delivery of the deed; (2) the trial court erred by failing to consider whether the

personal property was abandoned; (3) the trial court erred as a matter of law in applying

a replacement cost valuation of the personal property; (4) the trial court’s valuation of the

personal property was not supported by sufficient evidence and is contrary to its manifest

weight; and (5) the trial court erred by precluding the Wisers from challenging the

Holmans’ valuation evidence.

       {¶4}   After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find Mrs. Wiser’s

assignments of error are without merit:

       {¶5}   (1) Although the trial court failed to apply the “merger by deed” rule, in which

the language of a deed controls over a conflicting purchase agreement, Mrs. Wiser did

not inform the trial court about the rule at trial or in her closing brief, despite the court’s

repeated requests for relevant legal authority. Even if we reviewed for plain error, the

record fully supports the trial court finding Mrs. Wiser liable for conversion based on her

failure to return the personal property and her disposal of items.

       {¶6}   (2) Mrs. Wiser cannot overcome the presumption the trial court considered

her abandonment defense. Implicit in the trial court’s express finding that the Holmans

owned the personal property was they had not abandoned it. To the extent Mrs. Wiser

contends the trial court’s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the record

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Case No. 2022-A-0117
is replete with evidence indicating the Holmans sought to retrieve their personal property

before, during, and after the deed transfer process.

         {¶7}   (3) The trial court’s valuation method is not contrary to law. The Holmans’

opinion of value was not based “solely” on the property’s “replacement value.” In addition,

a trial court is not required to use market value in all instances, and the trial court fully

explained its rationale for adopting the Holmans’ opinion of value.

         {¶8}   (4) The trial court’s valuation of the personal property was supported by

sufficient evidence. The Holmans, as the owners, were entitled to a presumption of

special knowledge.       In addition, Mrs. Wiser has not demonstrated the trial court’s

damages award put the Holmans in a better position.

         {¶9}   (5)   The trial court did not preclude the Wisers from challenging the

Holmans’ opinion of value. The trial court simply found the Holmans’ opinion of value

was more credible and reliable than the Wisers’ competing opinion of value.

         {¶10} Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common

Pleas.

                           Substantive and Procedural History

         {¶11} For nearly three decades, Mr. and Mrs. Holman lived in the house at 3559

Austinburg Road in Ashtabula, Ohio. The couple eventually relocated to an assisted living

facility. Their son, Reginald, continued to live in the house periodically. The house was

titled in the name of the Holmans’ irrevocable trust. The couple’s daughter, RoLesia,

served as trustee and as Mr. Holman’s attorney-in-fact.

         {¶12} Pursuant to a written purchase agreement dated August 30, 2021, Mr.

Holman agreed to sell the house to Mr. Wiser for $160,000. Both sides retained real

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Case No. 2022-A-0117
estate agents: the Holmans hired Tara Hawkins (“Ms. Hawkins”), and the Wisers hired

Teri Holtz (“Ms. Holtz”). The agents communicated with each other about the transaction

primarily through text messaging.

       {¶13} The original purchase agreement required the parties to deposit all funds

and documents in escrow “on or about” October 1, 2021, followed by transfer of title “on

or about” October 2, 2021, and delivery of possession on October 2, 2021, “provided the

title has transferred.” The parties subsequently signed three amendments extending

these dates to permit the completion of repairs required by the Wisers’ lender. The third

and final amendment required the parties to deposit all funds and documents in escrow

“on or before” November 22, 2021, followed by transfer of title “on or about” November

23, 2021, and delivery of possession on November 23, 2021, “provided the title has

transferred.”

       {¶14} The premises contained a large amount of personal property the Holman

family had accumulated during their long period of occupancy, including a vehicle, a

tractor, furniture, tools, books, memorabilia, antique dolls, and items of sentimental value.

The basement area contained clothing, jewelry, and other personal items owned by

Reginald. In November 2021, Reginald began removing the personal property from the

house.

       {¶15} On Friday, November 12, 2021, Ms. Hawkins texted Ms. Holtz to ask if the

Wisers would allow Reginald to retrieve items post-transfer.          Ms. Holtz expressed

annoyance the Holmans had not already moved out but stated the Wisers would allow it

if they “can get the keys today.” Ms. Hawkins stated RoLesia was signing the closing

documents at 3 p.m. Ms. Holtz replied, “So they won’t get the keys today or tomorrow

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Case No. 2022-A-0117
looks like it [the closing] won’t be till Monday so the brother [Reginald] should just be out

of the house.” Ms. Hawkins also informed Ms. Holtz there was a car in the driveway with

a dead battery, which the Holmans intended to move. Ms. Holtz replied, “You did not just

say that lol [laughing out loud].” She then expressed anger and stated she may have to

get her “broker” involved.

       {¶16} Later that day, RoLesia, as trustee, signed a warranty deed to transfer the

real property to the Wisers. Over the weekend, RoLesia was scheduled to attend a

relative’s funeral and travel out of state for work. According to RoLesia, she informed Ms.

Hawkins the closing of the sale was contingent on Reginald having access to the house

to remove the rest of the personal property. The warranty deed RoLesia signed contained

no written contingencies regarding post-transfer access.

       {¶17} On Saturday, November 13, 2021, Ms. Holtz conducted a final walk-through

of the house. She would later describe the house as “total chaos,” with many items of

personal property still remaining. She texted Ms. Hawkins, “I have no idea how they’re

gonna get all that stuff out of there by Monday morning.” Ms. Hawkins responded, “The

seller [RoLesia] told me that her belongings will be out by today – her brother [Reginald]

is supposed to be getting the rest.”

       {¶18} On the morning of Monday, November 15, 2021, Ms. Holtz asked Ms.

Hawkins to ensure the Holmans had removed all property from the premises. Ms.

Hawkins responded that RoLesia had indicated all of her belongings would be removed

and that Reginald had indicated he would remove everything else by the end of the week.

Ms. Holtz replied, “[A]s soon as title transfers I’ll let the [Wisers] know the lockbox number

so they can get over there.”

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Case No. 2022-A-0117
       {¶19} Later that day, the Wisers obtained the keys and took possession of the

house. At 12:06 p.m., Ms. Holtz texted Ms. Hawkins that the house was “packed full” and

Reginald had “not touched one thing since we left on Saturday.” Ms. Hawkins contacted

RoLesia, who was still on her work trip. She told Ms. Hawkins to contact Reginald. Ms.

Hawkins texted Ms. Holtz to contact Reginald. Ms. Holtz refused and indicated the Wisers

had changed the locks.

       {¶20} In the afternoon, Reginald and another person came to the house to pick

up items, but Mrs. Wiser denied them access. According to Reginald, Mrs. Wiser told

him to “get the hell off the property” and threatened to call the police, so he left. Ms. Holtz

texted Ms. Hawkins and suggested she “go over there and be the liaison.” Ms. Hawkins

responded, “I’m working on a solution.” No resolution occurred.

       {¶21} On Tuesday, November 16, 2021, the deed was recorded. According to

Mrs. Wiser, people continued to arrive at the house on behalf of the Holmans, but she

denied them access and refused to give them anything. She would later testify the police

told her everything belonged to her upon transfer. Mrs. Wiser subsequently had the

vehicle towed from the property, disposed of a freezer (because it purportedly contained

mold), and destroyed the contents of a filing cabinet.

       {¶22} The Holmans retained legal counsel, and, in March 2022, filed a complaint

against the Wisers in the trial court asserting claims for replevin, breach of oral contract,

fraud, and conversion. The Wisers appeared through counsel and filed an answer.

       {¶23} In May 2022, the parties and counsel appeared for a replevin hearing.

Counsel informed the court on the record that the Wisers agreed to prepare an inventory

of the items in their possession, and the parties would discuss transfer arrangements.

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The Wisers’ counsel was later permitted to withdraw, and no transfer of items occurred.

The Wisers eventually retained new counsel.

       {¶24} In September 2022, following an additional court hearing, Reginald was

permitted to retrieve items from the house with a trailer. Several items were excluded

from this transfer, although the parties disputed which items were in existence and/or

missing.

       {¶25} The matter was tried to the bench on November 15, 2022. The Holmans

presented testimony from Ms. Hawkins, RoLesia, Reginald, and, on cross-examination,

the Wisers. The Wisers presented testimony from Mrs. Wiser and Ms. Holtz. Both sides

presented documentary evidence.

       {¶26} Following the Holmans’ submission of evidence, the Wisers moved for a

directed verdict. The trial court asked if there was anything indicating the transfer of title

pursuant to the deed controlled over the date of possession stated in the purchase

agreement. Counsel stated there was nothing beyond what was presented. The trial

court denied the Wisers’ motion.

       {¶27} Following the Wisers’ submission of evidence, counsel agreed to submit

briefs in lieu of closing arguments. The trial court asked the Wisers’ counsel whether he

had any “contractual provision, statutory provision or case law that states the date of

possession moves up to the date the Deed was recorded.” Counsel stated his belief that

the signing of the deed “moved up the date of possession” and indicated he would

address that issue in his closing brief. Both parties subsequently filed closing briefs.

       {¶28} On November 30, 2022, the trial court filed a judgment entry finding the

Wisers liable for conversion and awarding damages to the Holmans in the sum of

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Case No. 2022-A-0117
$41,100. The trial court found the Wisers took physical possession of the house on

November 15, 2021, which was eight days before the amended purchase agreement

legally permitted them to do so. The trial court determined that the personal property

located in the house on November 15, 2021, legally belonged to the Holmans, and the

Wisers wrongfully precluded the Holmans from entering the house to recover it.

        {¶29} The trial court further found the Holmans’ opinion of value was the “best

estimate” because they acquired the property and were more familiar with its condition

and value. The court stated it would be wrong to allow the Wisers to benefit from their

denial of access to the property or to allow the Wisers to dispute the Holmans’ “good faith

appraisal based upon their memory and research.” The trial court determined that the

Holmans’ opinion of value was “the more credible and reliable value” of the property as

of November 15, 2021.

        {¶30} Mrs. Wiser appealed1 and raises the following five assignments of error:

        {¶31} “[1.] The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Finding That The Wisers

Were Not Entitled To Possession Of The Premises Until November 23, 2021.

        {¶32} “[2.] The Trial Court Erred By Failing To Consider Whether The Property

Had Been Abandoned.

        {¶33} “[3.] The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Applying A Replacement

Cost Valuation To Calculate Damages.

        {¶34} “[4.] The Trial Court Erred By Fixing The Value Of The Holmans’ Personal

Property At A Grossly Excessive Sum Not Supported By The Evidence And Contrary To

The Manifest Weight Of The Evidence.

1. Mr. Wiser is not an appellant in Mrs. Wiser’s notice of appeal, and he did not file a separate appeal.
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Case No. 2022-A-0117
       {¶35} “[5.] The Trial Court Erred By Refusing To Allow The Wisers To Challenge

The Holmans’ Testimony As To Value.”

                                    Standard of Review

       {¶36} “[O]n appeal from a bench trial we review the trial court’s factual findings

under the manifest weight standard of review * * *.” Ultimate Salon & Spa, Inc. v. Legends

Constr. Group, 2019-Ohio-2506, 139 N.E.3d 445, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). “Weight of the

evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in

a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. * * * Weight is not a question

of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.’” (Emphasis deleted.) State

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). “‘The [appellate] court, reviewing the entire record, weighs

the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its

way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be

reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175,

485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

       {¶37} “Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all

the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” C. E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54

Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), syllabus. “[A] court of appeals [must] be guided

by a presumption that the findings of the trier-of-fact were indeed correct. * * * The

underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the

knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their

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demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the

credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d

77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). “‘[I]n determining whether the judgment below is

manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every

reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts.

* * * If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing court is

bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most

favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’”      Id. at 80, fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio

Jurisprudence 3d, Section 603, at 191-192 (1978).

       {¶38} “[T]he trial court’s legal findings,” by contrast, “are reviewed de novo.”

Ultimate Salon at ¶ 30.       De novo review generally means the appellate court

independently reviews the record and affords no deference to the trial court’s decision.

In re Placement of A.R.V., 2016-Ohio-4929, 68 N.E.3d 410, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.).

                                  Right of Possession

       {¶39} In her first assignment of error, Mrs. Wiser contends the trial court erred as

a matter of law in finding she was not entitled to possession of the house until November

23, 2021, i.e., the date stated in the amended purchase agreement. According to Mrs.

Wiser, the trial court should have found she was entitled to possession on November 15,

2021, i.e., the date the deed was purportedly delivered.

       {¶40} As Mrs. Wiser accurately notes, the Supreme Court of Ohio has long

recognized the doctrine of “merger by deed,” which holds “[w]here a deed is delivered

and accepted without qualification pursuant to agreement, no cause of action upon the

prior agreement thereafter exists.” Fuller v. Drenberg, 3 Ohio St.2d 109, 209 N.E.2d 417

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(1965), paragraph one of the syllabus. Accord S.E. Baseball & Softball Assn. v. Deerfield

Twp., Bd. of Trustees, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2020-P-0079, 2021-Ohio-2887, ¶ 108.

Thus, “[u]nder the merger doctrine, upon closing of a real estate transaction, the parties

are limited to the express covenants in the deed.” Westwinds Dev. Corp. v. Outcalt, 11th

Dist. Geauga No. 2008-G-2863, 2009-Ohio-2948, ¶ 80.

       {¶41} Crucially, Mrs. Wiser raises the merger rule for the first time on appeal. She

did not inform the court about the rule during trial or in her closing brief, despite the trial

court’s repeated requests for relevant legal authority. “[T]he fundamental rule is that an

appellate court will not consider any error which could have been brought to the trial

court’s attention, and hence avoided or otherwise corrected.” Schade v. Carnegie Body

Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 210, 436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982). “Although in criminal cases ‘[p]lain

errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not

brought to the attention of the court,’ Crim.R. 52(B), no analogous provision exists in the

Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Emphasis sic.) Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116,

121, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997). The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[i]n appeals of

civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely

rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was

made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial

process itself.” Id. at syllabus.

       {¶42} Even if this matter qualified as an exceptional case, we would not find plain

error. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held “where the judgment is correct, a reviewing

court is not authorized to reverse such judgment merely because erroneous reasons were

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Case No. 2022-A-0117
assigned as the basis thereof.” Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275,

284, 58 N.E.2d 658 (1944). Rather, “[i]t is the duty of the reviewing court to affirm the

judgment if it can be supported on any theory, although a different theory from that of the

trial court.” Newcomb v. Dredge, 105 Ohio App. 417, 424, 152 N.E.2d 801 (2d Dist.1957).

“This is so because reviewing courts affirm and reverse judgments, not the reasons for

the judgments.” Geneva v. Fende, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2009-A-0023, 2009-Ohio-

6380, ¶ 33. “Thus, when a trial court has stated an erroneous basis for its judgment, an

appellate court must affirm the judgment if it is legally correct on other grounds, that is, it

achieves the right result for the wrong reason, because such an error is not prejudicial.”

State v. Payton, 124 Ohio App.3d 552, 557, 706 N.E.2d 842 (12th Dist.1997).

       {¶43} Mrs. Wiser’s argument involves the trial court’s finding that she is liable for

conversion. “[C]onversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to the

exclusion of the rights of the owner, or withholding it from his [or her] possession under a

claim inconsistent with his [or her] rights.” Joyce v. Gen. Motors Corp., 49 Ohio St.3d 93,

96, 551 N.E.2d 172 (1990). “The elements of conversion are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership

and right to possess the property at the time of the conversion; (2) the defendant’s

conversion by wrongful act of plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) damages.” Martin v.

MAHR Machine Rebuilding, Inc., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2015-L-101, 2017-Ohio-1101, ¶ 13.

       {¶44} Where conversion is premised on the unlawful retention of property, the

plaintiff must establish (1) he or she demanded the return of the property from the

possessor after the possessor exerted dominion or control over the property, and (2) the

possessor refused to deliver the property to its rightful owner. Fisher v. Clay, 11th Dist.

Trumbull No. 2011-T-0031, 2011-Ohio-6007, ¶ 22.

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Case No. 2022-A-0117
       {¶45} Mrs. Wiser fails to recognize the critical distinction between her right to

possess the real property after delivery of the deed and the Holmans’ right to possess the

personal property located in the house. The delivery of the deed entitled the Wisers to

possess the real property.      See Jones v. Timmons, 21 Ohio St. 596, 602 (1871)

(“Assuming the right of possession to be determinable by the deed, the plaintiff, on its

delivery, acquired a clear right to the possession, which the defendant, by his deed, was

estopped from questioning”); Turnbull v. Xenia, 80 Ohio App. 389, 392, 69 N.E.2d 378

(2d Dist.1946) (“[L]egal title draws to and carries with it the right of possession”). It did

not, however, transfer ownership of the personal property or entitle the Wisers to refuse

to return it. The evidence demonstrates the Holmans sought to retrieve their personal

property before, during, and after the deed transfer process, and the Wisers exerted

dominion and control over the personal property and even disposed of some of it.

Accordingly, despite the trial court’s failure to apply the merger rule, the record fully

supports the trial court finding Mrs. Wiser liable for conversion.

       {¶46} Mrs. Wiser’s first assignment of error is without.

                                       Abandonment

       {¶47} In her second assignment of error, Mrs. Wiser contends the trial court erred

by failing to consider whether the personal property had been abandoned.

       {¶48} “‘Abandoned property’ is defined as ‘“property over which the owner has

relinquished all right, title, claim, and possession with the intention of not reclaiming it or

resuming its ownership, possession or enjoyment.”’” Parkhill Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Economic

& Community Dev. Inst., Inc., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-021, 2019-Ohio-3444, ¶ 24,

quoting Perez Bar & Grill v. Schneider, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010076, 2012-Ohio-

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5820, ¶ 32, quoting Doughman v. Long, 42 Ohio App.3d 17, 21, 536 N.E.2d 394 (12th

Dist.1987). “‘One who has abandoned property forfeits any interest in it and has no say

over its subsequent disposition.’” Id., quoting Weaver v. Weaver, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 17759, 2000 WL 84655, *1 (Jan. 28, 2000). “[A]bandoned property is not subject to

conversion” and “constitutes a complete defense.” Bourland v. Town & Country Imports,

11th Dist. Geauga No. 975, 1982 WL 5855, *3 (Mar. 31, 1982).

       {¶49} Although the trial court did not specifically address abandonment, “[a]n

appellate court reviewing a lower court’s judgment indulges in a presumption of regularity

of the proceedings below.” Hartt v. Munobe, 67 Ohio St.3d 3, 7, 615 N.E.2d 617 (1993).

“A reviewing court must presume that the trial court applied the law correctly.” State v.

Coombs, 18 Ohio St.3d 123, 125, 480 N.E.2d 414 (1985). In finding Mrs. Wiser liable for

conversion, the trial court expressly determined that the Holmans owned the personal

property. Implicit in this finding was that the Holmans had not abandoned it. See Baldwin

v. Vogelsong, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-01-065, 2003-Ohio-683, ¶ 21 (“Insofar as the jury

awarded damages to the [plaintiffs] against the [defendants], it was implicit in the jury’s

verdict that it found the property was not abandoned”). Therefore, Mrs. Wiser cannot

overcome the presumption that the trial court considered her abandonment defense.

       {¶50} To the extent Mrs. Wiser contends the trial court’s finding is against the

manifest weight of the evidence, we disagree. “‘Abandonment requires affirmative proof

of the intent to abandon coupled with acts or omissions implementing the intent. Mere

non-use is not sufficient to establish the fact of abandonment, absent other evidence

tending to prove the intent to abandon.’” Interstate Petroleum Co. v. Young, 2013-Ohio-

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1943, 992 N.E.2d 468, ¶ 61 (11th Dist.), quoting Davis v. Suggs, 10 Ohio App.3d 50, 52,

460 N.E.2d 665 (12th Dist.1983).

       {¶51} Here, the record is replete with instances in which the Holmans sought to

retrieve their personal property. While their efforts may have been disorganized and

protracted, the evidence does not support Mrs. Wiser’s assertions that they “chose to

leave many items behind,” Durben v. Malek, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2013 AP 08 0032,

2014-Ohio-2611, ¶ 32, or “sat passively and did nothing to protect their interests.” Wright

v. Heller, 2018-Ohio-149, 102 N.E.3d 1285, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.).

       {¶52} Mrs. Wiser’s second assignment of error is without merit.

                                      Valuation Method

       {¶53} In her third assignment of error, Mrs. Wiser contends the trial court erred as

a matter of law in using a “replacement cost valuation” of the personal property instead

of a “market value measurement.”

       {¶54} In a conversion claim, the general rule for the measure of damages is the

value of the property at the time of conversion. Erie RR. Co. v. Steinberg, 94 Ohio St.

189, 113 N.E. 814 (1916), paragraph two of the syllabus. “Market value is the standard

which the courts insist on as a measure of direct property loss, where it is available * * *.”

Bishop v. East Ohio Gas Co., 143 Ohio St. 541, 546, 56 N.E.2d 164 (1944). “Market

value” or “fair value” is generally defined as “‘the price that a seller is willing to accept and

a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an arm’s-length transaction * * *.’”

Perez, supra, at ¶ 35, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1587 (8th Ed.2004).

       {¶55} However, a trial court is not required to use market value in all instances.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[m]arket value * * * is a standard not a shackle.”

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Case No. 2022-A-0117
Bishop at 546. “In a tort action, the measure of damages is normally that amount of

money which will compensate and make whole the injured party.” Columbus Fin., Inc. v.

Howard, 42 Ohio St.2d 178, 184, 327 N.E.2d 654 (1975). Therefore, “‘[t]he rule that the

market value is the measure of damages for the wrongful conversion of personal property

is subordinate to the fundamental rule that the owner must be fully compensated.’” Bishop

at 546, quoting McCormick on Damages 170. “When market value cannot be feasibly

obtained, a more elastic standard is resorted to, sometimes called the standard of value

to the owner. This doctrine is a recognition that property may have value to the owner in

exceptional circumstances which is the basis of a better standard than what the article

would bring in the open market.” Id. “[W]here the property converted by the defendant *

* * consists of articles for personal use, which have been used by the owner, and therefore

have little or no market value, the measure of damages is the reasonable value to the

owner at the time of conversion.” Erie RR. at paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶56} Contrary to Mrs. Wiser’s assertion, the Holmans’ opinion of value was not

based “solely” on the property’s “replacement value.” RoLesia testified that Mr. Holman,

Reginald, and she collectively sought to assign “fair amounts” based on a “combination”

of factors, including what Mr. Holman or Reginald knew they had paid, Googling

documents, and conducting due diligence. She testified that some items, such as the

yard tools, cans of paint, and the car battery, were “virtually new”; items like the circular

saws were not new but were in “good condition”; the antique dolls were “collector’s items”

that had no problems or damages; and other items were “decades old” and had

“sentimental value” that one could not “necessarily put a price to.” She acknowledged

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Case No. 2022-A-0117
the challenge of assigning values to items that were no longer in the Holmans’ possession

but indicated they “did the best [they] could.”

       {¶57} In addition, the trial court fully explained its rationale for adopting the

Holmans’ opinion of value. It found the Holmans acquired the property and, thus, were

more familiar with its condition and value. While they were denied access to the property

for valuation, the Holmans “conducted a good faith appraisal based upon their memory

and research.” Accordingly, the trial court’s valuation method is not contrary to law.

       {¶58} Mrs. Wiser’s third assignment of error is without merit.

                                   Damages Calculation

       {¶59} In her fourth assignment of error, Mrs. Wiser contends the trial court’s

damages calculation is not supported by sufficient evidence.

       {¶60} “‘“[S]ufficiency” is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied

to determine whether the case may go to the [finder of fact] or whether the evidence is

legally sufficient to support the * * * verdict as a matter of law.’” Thompkins, supra, at

386, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th Ed.1990). “Whether the evidence is legally

sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law.” Id.

       {¶61} Mrs. Wiser accurately recites the rule in Ohio that an owner is permitted to

testify concerning the value of his or her property without being qualified as an expert

because he or she is presumed to have special knowledge. Tokles & Son, Inc. v.

Midwestern Indemn. Co., 65 Ohio St.3d 621, 626, 605 N.E.2d 936 (1992). According to

Mrs. Wiser, however, a witness must additionally “show that he is familiar with the

property itself and that he has current sufficient knowledge of the value of the item by, for

example, demonstrating a firsthand knowledge of the characteristics of the property, its

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actual and potential uses and its condition or by showing other meaningful experience

dealing with the item.” Id. at 627. She contends the Holmans’ opinion of value is not

supported by sufficient evidence because they failed to present testimony regarding the

foregoing factors.

      {¶62} Mrs. Wiser’s argument misconstrues Tokles. In that case, the Supreme

Court of Ohio considered whether a shareholder/officer of a closely held corporation must

qualify as an expert in order to testify as to the value of corporate property. See id. at

626. The court answered this question in the negative, provided that the testifying

shareholder/officer establishes the above factors. See id. at 627. The court did not

impose them upon owners who are natural persons; thus, the general presumption of

special knowledge continues to apply in that context. Accordingly, the Holmans were not

required to establish the above factors.

      {¶63} Mrs. Wiser also contends that the trial court’s damages award is contrary to

the manifest weight of the evidence. According to Mrs. Wiser, since the values adopted

by the trial court “do not take into account usage or condition,” the damages award

constitutes a windfall to the Holmans.

      {¶64} “Although a party damaged by the acts of another is entitled to be made

whole, the injured party should not receive a windfall; in other words, the damages

awarded should not place the injured party in a better position than that party would have

enjoyed had the wrongful conduct not occurred.” Triangle Properties, Inc. v. Homewood

Corp., 2013-Ohio-3926, 3 N.E.3d 241, ¶ 52 (10th Dist.).

      {¶65} We disagree with the premise of Mrs. Wiser’s argument, i.e., that the

Holmans’ opinion of value did not consider usage or condition. RoLesia’s testimony, as

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summarized above, indicates the Holmans’ expressly considered such factors in

assigning values. Accordingly, Mrs. Wiser has not demonstrated that the damages award

placed the Holmans in a better position.

      {¶66} Mrs. Wiser’s fourth assignment of error is without merit.

                           Challenge to Valuation Evidence

      {¶67} Finally, in her fifth assignment of error, Mrs. Wiser contends the trial court

erred by refusing to allow her to challenge the Holmans’ valuation evidence. Specifically,

she quotes the following paragraph in the trial court’s judgment entry, which she

characterizes as “fundamentally wrong” and “without precedent”:

      {¶68} “The Court finds that the appraisal made by the Holman’s [sic] of the

personal property that was the [sic] legally theirs and that they were wrongfully denied

recovery, is the best estimate to be given to the value of the property, because they

acquired the property, and they are more familiar with the condition and value of the

property. It would be inherently wrong to allow the Wisers to benefit from denying access

to the Holmans of the property owned by the Holmans. It would also be wrong to allow

the Wisers to dispute the value given to the property by the Holmans, when the Holmans

conducted a good faith appraisal based upon their memory and research.” (Emphasis

added.)

      {¶69} Mrs. Wiser’s argument suggests the trial court precluded her from

submitting evidence at trial to challenge the Holmans’ opinion of value. This is not

accurate. The trial transcript demonstrates the Wisers cross-examined RoLesia and

Reginald about the proposed values, and the Wisers submitted evidence of their own

Blue Book valuation of the vehicle. The statement quoted above reflects the trial court’s

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rationale for adopting the Holmans’ opinion of value. This is confirmed by the trial court’s

very next statement, which Mrs. Wiser omits:

       {¶70} “Therefore, the Court finds that the appraisal made by the Holmans of the

personal property that belongs to them and that they have been wrongfully denied

possession of, is the more credible and reliable value to be given to the property.”

       {¶71} Mrs. Wiser cites no authority in support of her assertion that the trial court’s

reasoning was erroneous. On the other hand, it is well established that “[o]n the trial of a

case, either civil or criminal, the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the

witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230,

227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. “The choice between credible

witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact and an

appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.” State v.

Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986). “A fact finder is free to believe

all, some, or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it.” State v. Fetty,

11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0091, 2012-Ohio-6127, ¶ 58. Accordingly, the trial court

was well within its discretion to adopt the Holmans’ opinion of value over the Wisers’

competing opinion.

       {¶72} Mrs. Wiser’s fifth assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶73} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., concurs,

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.

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                               ____________________

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.

      {¶74} The trial court’s judgment found the Wisers converted the personal property

the Holmans left in the house. In finding that, the trial court determined there was no

evidence:

             that the Holmans were required to vacate the property prior to
             November 23, 2021 * * * [and] that none of the personal property was
             to remain in the house when possession transferred from the
             Holmans to the Wisers. * * * The Holmans fully complied with the
             agreement.

      {¶75} The Court further determined the Wisers:

             physically took over the house on November 15, 2021, eight days
             before they legally were entitled to obtain possession of the house.
             The Wisers blocked the Holmans from entering the house that the
             Holmans legally had a right to possess for eight more days. The
             Wisers blocked the Holmans from recovering their personal property
             that was in the house the Holmans legally had a right to possess.
             Therefore, the Court finds that all of the property in the house on
             November 15, 2021 when the Wisers entered the house, legally
             belonged to the Plaintiffs.

      {¶76} On this legal and factual basis, the trial court concluded that the property in

the house on November 15, 2021, still belonged to the Holmans and that the Wisers

converted that property.

      {¶77} “[O]n appeal from a bench trial we review the trial court’s factual findings

under the manifest weight standard of review, while the trial court’s legal findings are

reviewed de novo.” Ultimate Salon & Spa v. Legends Constr. Group, 2019-Ohio-2506,

139 N.E.3d 445, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.).

      {¶78} The majority correctly determined the merger by deed doctrine applied to

this matter. Nelson v. Nelson, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2007-G-2758, 2007-Ohio-6246, ¶
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22; Meyers Lake Sportsman’s Club, Inc. v. Meyers Lake Preserve, Inc., 5th Dist. No.

2012CA00198, 2013-Ohio-3227, 996 N.E.2d 1016, ¶ 34. (“The doctrine of ‘merger by

deed’ holds that whenever a deed is delivered and accepted without qualification pursuant

to a sales contract for real property, the contract becomes merged into the deed and no

cause of action upon said prior agreement exists.”).

       {¶79} The deed in this case had no express conditions in its language referencing

a later possession date or indicating that the Holmans would retain a right of access for

a period after title passed. Nor did the deed include any generalized provisions stating

that the obligations or agreements contained in the purchase agreement survive or

transfer to the deed.

       {¶80} Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined, pursuant

to the purchase agreement, that the Holmans were not required to vacate the real

property or remove their personal possessions until November 23. This means the

Holmans did not establish a claim for conversion on the basis of the purchase agreement

because they had no right of possession or access to the real property after November

15, 2021.

       {¶81} The trial court’s ruling was premised upon the Wisers committing a

conversion because the purchase agreement allowed eight more days for the Holmans

to recover their personal property and remove it from the house. As the trial court erred

as a matter of law, the only factual findings the trial court made on the issue of conversion

were (erroneously) grounded in the Holmans’ continued right to possess the real estate.

       {¶82} Conversion is an exercise of dominion or control wrongfully exerted over

property in denial of, or under a claim inconsistent with the rights of another. Joyce v.

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Gen. Motors Corp., 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 551 N.E.2d 172 (1990). The elements of

conversion are: “(1) plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property at the time

of conversion; (2) defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff’s

property rights; and (3) damages.”      18 American Jurisprudence 2d (1985) 146-147,

Conversion, Section 2; Dice v. White Family Cos., 173 Ohio App.3d 472, 2007-Ohio-

5755, 878 N.E.2d 1105, ¶ 17 (2nd Dist.); Floch v. Davis, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2013-T-

0021, 2013-Ohio-4968, ¶ 29. Where conversion is based on a claim of unlawful retention

of property, the plaintiff must establish: (1) a demand for the return of the property from

the possessor after the possessor exerted dominion or control over the property; and (2)

that the possessor refused to deliver the property to the rightful owner. Keybank Natl.

Assoc. v. Guarnieri & Secrest, P.L.L., 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 07 CO 46, 2008-Ohio-

6362, ¶ 15.

       {¶83} The Holmans transferred possession of the real property on November 15,

2021. On that date, they no longer had a right to access the personal property still on the

real property because the transfer granted the Wisers the right to deny access to the real

property.     The personal property the Holmans left behind came into the Wisers’

possession – but not ownership – upon the Holmans’ transfer of the real property.

       {¶84} Further, there is significant disparity in the testimony about the extent to

which the Holmans made a demand for the return of the property and whether the Wisers

exerted dominion or control over the property or merely came to possess it because of

the Holmans’ failure to remove it before transferring the real estate. The Wisers indicated

that the Holmans repeatedly came to the house unannounced and tried to enter the

residence to recover their property. The Holmans’ testimony indicated that Reginald went

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Case No. 2022-A-0117
to the house to assess how much still needed to be moved, how big of a truck to get, and

how many people were needed to perform the task.

       {¶85} Because there are significant questions of fact which a reviewing court is

not in the best position to answer, I would reverse and remand this matter to the trial court

to apply the facts to the correct legal standard and thereby determine whether a

conversion occurred. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

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Case No. 2022-A-0117