Court Opinion

ID: 9644595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:00:31.157692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:42.590861
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-7198

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        RICARDO DINNALL,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (4:02-cr-00060-FL-2)

        Submitted: August 7, 2023                                         Decided: August 21, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER, KING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Andrew DeSimone, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A.
        Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Nicholas Hartigan, Assistant United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               After a jury trial, Ricardo Dinnall was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and

        possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base and conspiracy to

        kidnap. He was sentenced to concurrent life sentences. Dinnall later moved for a sentence

        reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194,

        5222, which was opposed by the Government and denied by the district court. Dinnall

        appeals. We affirm.

               We review the district court’s resolution of a motion for a sentence reduction under

        the First Step Act for abuse of discretion. “A district court abuses its discretion if its

        decision to retain or reduce a sentence under the First Step Act is procedurally or

        substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Troy, 64 F.4th 177, 184 (4th Cir. 2023). A

        sentence is procedurally reasonable if the court properly calculated the relevant Guidelines

        range, treated the Guidelines as advisory, considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

        sentencing factors, did not make a factual error in choosing the sentence, and adequately

        explained the sentence. United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816, 820 (4th Cir. 2023). And “to

        be procedurally reasonable, a district court must consider a defendant’s arguments, give

        individual consideration to the defendant’s characteristics in light of the § 3553(a) factors,

        determine—following the Fair Sentencing Act—whether a given sentence remains

        appropriate in light of those factors, and adequately explain that decision.” Troy, 64 F.4th

        at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantive-reasonableness review requires us

        to consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court

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        abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth

        in § 3553(a).” Reed, 58 F.4th at 820.

               In the context of a First Step Act motion, district courts exercise their discretion in

        two steps. “First, they must recalculate the movant’s Guidelines range only to the extent

        it adjusts for the Fair Sentencing Act. Second, they may (and when raised by the parties,

        must) consider other legal and factual changes when deciding whether to impose a reduced

        sentence.” Troy, 64 F.4th at 184 (citing Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389,

        2396, 2402 n.6, 2043 n.8 (2022)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts

        “must generally consider the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments before it. Of course, a district

        court is not required to be persuaded by every argument parties make, and it may, in its

        discretion, dismiss arguments that it does not find compelling without a detailed

        explanation. Nor is a district court required to articulate anything more than a brief

        statement of reasons.” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404 (citation omitted). In fact, courts

        are not required to “expressly rebut” every argument advanced by the parties and can agree

        or disagree with any policy arguments. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “All that

        the First Step Act requires is that a district court make clear that it reasoned through the

        parties’ arguments.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               The broad discretion that the First Step Act affords to district courts also
               counsels in favor of deferential appellate review. As a general matter, it is
               not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the
               sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.
               Section 404(c) of the First Step Act confers particular discretion, clarifying
               that the Act does not require a court to reduce any sentence. Other than legal
               errors in recalculating the Guidelines to account for the Fair Sentencing Act's
               changes, appellate review should not be overly searching.

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        Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

               We acknowledge that the district court did not explicitly state the correct standard

        in considering nonfrivolous arguments in the context of a First Step Act motion.

        Nevertheless, upon our review, we conclude that the court sufficiently addressed all of

        Dinnall’s nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a sentence reduction. Dinnall asserts that the

        court failed to address his claim that his health warranted a reduced sentence. But Dinnall

        did not show that his health was any worse since his sentencing, when it was known that

        he had a heart murmur. For instance, he did not show that his health now required a

        doctor’s care or prescription medications. Dinnall’s claim that the court failed to consider

        his release plan may be relevant if the court was leaning toward reducing Dinnall’s sentence

        to time-served. It is clear from the court’s order that it had no intention of releasing Dinnall

        or significantly reducing Dinnall’s life sentences in light of his criminal history, serious

        offense conduct, and poor institutional adjustment.

               Dinnall also faults the district court for not considering the disparity between his

        life sentences and his codefendants’ lesser sentences. The court determined that Dinnall

        failed to show that he was similarly situated to his codefendants to properly consider

        whether his life sentences were out of line. On appeal, Dinnall highlights a codefendant

        who, Dinnall asserts, played a greater role in the drug trafficking organization. The

        codefendant served his sentence and was released. But Dinnall ignores the fact that the

        codefendant pleaded guilty to two drug trafficking offenses, agreed to cooperate with the

        Government, and testified at Dinnall’s trial. “First, a sentence is not unreasonable under

        § 3553(a)(6) merely because it creates a disparity with a co-defendant’s sentence. Second,

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        individuals who opt to go to trial are not similarly situated to those who plead guilty and

        cooperate with the government for purposes of § 3553(a)(6).” United States v. Gillespie,

        27 F.4th 934, 945 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 164 (2022) (citations and internal

        quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the court did not err in this regard.

               Dinnall contends that the district court erred as a matter of fact by finding that he

        was in his early twenties for most of his time in the drug conspiracy, when instead Dinnall

        was in his teens. Dinnall asserts that his age during most of the drug conspiracy supports

        his claim that his brain was not fully developed. But it is uncontradicted that Dinnall’s

        most egregious conduct occurring during the course of the drug conspiracy happened in

        Dinnall’s early twenties and all of his poor institutional conduct occurred during Dinnall’s

        adulthood. And the court acknowledged Dinnall’s argument that his brain had not fully

        developed, but determined that this and other factors where outweighed by his serious

        offense conduct and post-sentencing conduct. We conclude that there was no error.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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