Court Opinion

ID: 9789312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:34:03.883885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:16.039452
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Jr., Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part):
24 I concur with the principle portion of the majority's opinion, however, I feel that deciding the issue of inevitable discovery at this level without permitting the trial court the opportunity to consider it is unwise.
1125 I agree that the record presented to this court is insufficient on its face to support a conclusion of "inevitable discovery." However, I disagree with the decision to foreclose any further examination of this issue in the name of "judicial economy," particularly since, as the majority points out, it was not addressed below. The majority seems intent on establishing an ill conceived rule requiring the state to raise every possible argument in response to a motion to suppress. The majority would foreclose the possibility for additional evidence and additional argument directed at this specific question under the belief that the prosecution has had an opportunity to present such an issue, but chose not to, thereby surrendering the option to ever raise it again. '
126 In my experience, the question of "inevitable discovery" is often not ripe for discussion until and unless the trial court concludes that a violation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred. Further, until a trial court has reached such a conclusion, requiring such an effort would waste valuable resources for the parties and the trial courts.
127 I believe both wisdom and precedent support a more balanced approach permitting further exploration of questions like "inevitable discovery" after a trial court has determined that the Fourth Amendment has been violated. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 543, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2536, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (vacating the judgment and remanding the case for further hearings on the issue of the "independent source" doctrine, which had not been previously addressed); State v. Wagoner, 126 N.M. 9, 966 P.2d 176, (Ct.App.1998) (stating "[The district court made no findings, oral or written, regarding these issues. When the prosecutor began to argue for application of the inevitable-discovery exception, the district court cut him off by expressing its disapproyal of the exception. Consequently, we must remand to the district court to determine whether the inevitable discovery exception applies to this case."), rev'd on other grounds, 130 N.M. 274, 24 P.3d 306 (Ct.App.2001).1
128 Moreover, I also disagree with the majority's foray into findings of fact concerning this issue following our admission that the record is insufficient to fully address the issue. I believe that it is not our role to make findings of fact, and absent a proper finding of fact "application of the proper rule of law is difficult, if not impossible, and the reviewing function of this court is seriously undermined." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Utah 1979).
129 Accordingly, I make no judgment as to the ultimate determination of whether the evidence in this particular matter would have inevitably been discovered, but I would permit the trial court to receive additional evi*276dence and hear additional argument on the question. Moreover, I do not believe the majority is correct in stating that "remand would be a meaningless gesture that should be avoided in the interest of judicial economy." Therefore I dissent.

. If the trial court properly determines that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment, it would be wasted effort to also require that the court take evidence and make findings concerning inevitable discovery at the same time.