Court Opinion

ID: 9572196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:39:30.656768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:53.016529
License: Public Domain

Judge Clark
dissenting:
Plaintiff in his first action (34 N.C. App. 290, 237 S.E. 2d 918 (1977)), sought specific performance of the contract for sale of land requiring defendant to deliver “a good and sufficient deed, in fee simple, conveying said land and premises, free from all liens and encumbrances ... .” Though defendant’s wife was not a party to the contract, defendant was obligated to deliver such deed free of encumbrance, which required defendant to have the deed executed by his wife to convey her dower interest. There was nothing in the first action to indicate the defendant was unable to perform the contract. This is clear from the statement (quoted by the majority) made by Judge Morris at the conclusion of this court’s opinion in the first case.
Only after the determination of the first action on appeal to this Court did the plaintiff determine that defendant could not perform because of his wife’s refusal to execute a deed con*225veying her dower interest. In my opinion plaintiff could then elect as follows: (1) for specific performance and execution of a deed by defendant alone plus the cash value of the. inchoate right of dower of the wife; or, (2) for breach of contract and damages consisting of the difference in the contract price and the market value of the land.
I do not agree with the majority that plaintiff still relied upon specific performance after the second action was begun. The purpose of the contempt citation was to establish the breach by defendant before proceeding further with breach of contract action. Plaintiff does not seek both specific performance and damages for the breach. He seeks only damages for the breach after determining that specific performance was impossible.
The majority would require prevision on the part of the plaintiff, a burden rarely imposed by law. Too, it repudiates the quoted comment of this Court in its opinion that if defendant “cannot, or does not [execute and deliver a good and sufficient deed], the question of damages is the subject of another lawsuit.” Nor do I agree that the case before us is controlled by Bethell v. McKinney, supra. Bethell established the right of the vendee to enforce the contract, take such title as the vendor could give, and have an abatement of the purchase money for the right of dower left outstanding, but that opinion did not hold that such was the vendee’s exclusive right.
My colleagues of the majority are mountain men. The land in question is located in the mountains. It is possible that their opinion is based on “mountain law,” a body of law peculiar to western North Carolina which permeates the innermost recesses of the minds of those who live in that rarefied atmosphere and which may not be fully dispelled from the minds of some mountaineers despite exposure to law of general application throughout the State.