Court Opinion

ID: 9387694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 18:02:32.279067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.988385
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/18/23 P. v. Fleming CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B315836
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 19CR06812)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Santa Barbara County)

v.

SCOTT ROBERT FLEMING,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       Scott Robert Fleming appeals from the judgment entered
after a jury had convicted him of voluntary manslaughter based
on conscious disregard for human life. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd.
(a).)1 The victim suffered a fatal brain injury after appellant had
punched him in the face. The blow caused the victim to fall
backward, striking the back of his head against a hard surface.
       Appellant admitted one prior serious felony conviction
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and one prior strike within the meaning of
California’s “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,

         1   All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
subds. (a)-(d).) The trial court denied appellant’s motion to
dismiss the strike. He was sentenced to prison for 27 years: the
upper term of 11 years, doubled to 22 years because of the prior
strike, plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction.
       Appellant maintains that, during closing argument, the
prosecutor erroneously informed the jury that it must find “[t]he
natural consequences of [his] act were dangerous to human life.
Not the natural and probable [consequences].” Appellant claims
the prosecutor should have explained that “where a defendant is
charged with voluntary manslaughter [based on conscious
disregard for human life] . . . , the People must prove that the
[defendant’s] act had an objectively high probability of death.”
Appellant argues that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law
constituted prejudicial misconduct because “[t]his was . . . a close
case as to whether appellant’s act of punching [the victim] had an
objectively high probability of causing death.”
       Appellant also claims: (1) the trial court erroneously failed
to clarify the jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, and (2)
the matter must be remanded for resentencing because of recent
Penal Code amendments that apply retroactively to him. We
disagree and affirm.
                                  Facts
       Appellant and Eric Romero were friends. One night they
were drinking together with other friends at a pub. After leaving
the pub, appellant and one of his drinking companions (not
Romero) got into a fight. The fight broke up, and the drinking
companion walked away.
       Appellant “was still fired up.” Romero “was . . . trying to
calm him down.” They were standing “in front of each other” on
the sidewalk. A witness testified: Romero was “backing away”

                                 2
from appellant. Appellant threw “a sucker punch . . . really quick
. . . and hit [Romero] . . . right in the face.” “I don’t think
[Romero] saw it coming.”
        The witness continued: When Romero was hit, he was
standing “on the edge of the curb.” He “fell straight backwards
onto the street and hit his head.” The witness heard a “really
loud” “smack, a slap.” “[W]hat really stands out was the crack
when he hit the ground.” Romero went “totally limp.” Appellant
ran away.
        Romero sustained several skull fractures. The cause of
death was a “catastrophic irreversible brain injury from
malignant cerebral edema,” i.e., swelling of the brain.
        Appellant did not testify.
                       Voluntary Manslaughter
        “Manslaughter is ‘the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice.’ (§ 192.) A defendant lacks malice and is guilty
of voluntary manslaughter in ‘limited, explicitly defined
circumstances . . . .’” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 108.)
“[V]oluntary manslaughter requires either an intent to kill or a
conscious disregard for life.” (People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th
959, 970; see also People v. Parras (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 219,
224 [“voluntary manslaughter may . . . occur when one kills with
a conscious disregard for life but no intent to kill”].)
                  The Prosecutor Did Not Misstate
                 The Law During Closing Argument
        “Although counsel have broad discretion in discussing the
legal and factual merits of a case [citation], it is improper to
misstate the law.” (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 538.)
Appellant contends the prosecutor misstated the law during
closing argument when he said the People must prove that “[t]he

                                 3
natural consequences of the act [i.e., appellant’s punch to
Romero’s face,] were dangerous to human life. Not the natural
and probable. Just the natural consequences of the act were
dangerous to . . . human life.” Appellant asserts, “[W]here a
defendant is charged with voluntary manslaughter, . . . the
People must prove that the act had an objectively high
probability of death.”
       The prosecutor did not misstate the law or mislead the
jury. The prosecutor’s statement is in accord with CALCRIM No.
572, the instruction for voluntary manslaughter that was given to
the jury. It provides: “[T]he People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant intentionally committed an act that caused the death
of another person; [¶] 2. The natural consequences [not the
natural and probable consequences] of the act were dangerous to
human life; [¶] 3. At the time (he/she) acted, (he/she) knew the
act was dangerous to human life; AND [¶] 4. (He/She)
deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.”
(Italics added.)
       The prosecutor’s statement is also in accord with the
current version of the CALJIC instruction for voluntary
manslaughter, No. 8.40, which was not given to the jury: “The
phrase, ‘conscious disregard for life,’ as used in this instruction,
means that a killing results from the doing of an intentional act,
the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act
was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his or
her conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.” (West’s California Jury Instructions,
Criminal (Oct. 2022 update), italics added.)
       CALCRIM No. 572 is consistent with the law of implied
malice: “‘Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused

                                 4
by “‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to
life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows
that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.’”’” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53
Cal.4th 500, 507, italics added (Cravens).) Appellant
acknowledges that “[t]he threshold elements of implied malice
(i.e., conscious disregard) are . . . identical for murder and
voluntary manslaughter, with the distinction between the two
offenses turning on whether malice is mitigated,” i.e., malice is
mitigated for voluntary manslaughter but not for murder.
        We reject appellant’s assertion that “the mental state
required for implied malice, for both voluntary manslaughter and
murder, requires an act for which death is an objectively probable
result.” (Italics added.) (See Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p.
508, italics added [“we must determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to satisfy both the physical and the mental
components of implied malice, the physical component being ‘“the
performance of ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life,’”’ and the mental component being ‘“the
requirement that the defendant ‘knows that his conduct endangers
the life of another and . . . acts with a conscious disregard for
life’”’”], italics added.)
        In support of his argument that “the People must prove
that the act had an objectively high probability of death,”
appellant cites Justice Liu’s concurring opinion in Cravens,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 512-514.) Justice Liu noted that in a
concurring opinion in People v. Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470, 480,
Justice Traynor had “said implied malice is shown when ‘the
defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton
disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree

                                5
of probability that it will result in death.’” (Cravens, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 512, conc. opn. of Liu, J., italics added.) Justice Liu
referred to Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion as the “Thomas
formulation.” (Ibid.)
       But Justice Liu did not say that the Thomas formulation is
correct. He said: “Today’s opinion does not mention Thomas’s
formulation of the objective component. The court cites only
the Phillips formulation [People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574]
in ‘find[ing] sufficient evidence that the manner of the assault
and the circumstances under which it was made rendered the
natural consequences of defendant’s conduct dangerous to life.’
[Citation.] The court’s omission of the Thomas formulation
continues the erosion of that test . . . .” (Cravens, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 513.) “[B]y omitting the Thomas test when
defendant and the Court of Appeal have clearly relied on it,
today’s opinion suggests (but does not hold) that the Phillips
formulation matters in a close case such as this.”2 (Id. at p. 514.)
CALCRIM No. 572 follows the Phillips formulation.
       Appellant asserts that “the prosecutor clearly . . . misstated
the law by arguing that there was no element of probability for
voluntary manslaughter.” But the prosecutor correctly noted
that the element of probability applies to the issue of causation.
The prosecutor explained to the jury, “[A]n act causes the death if
the death is the direct and natural and probable consequence of
the act.” (Italics added.)
       The prosecutor’s explanation of causation is in accord with
CALCRIM No. 572, which provides: “An act causes death if the

      2Phillips was overruled on another ground as stated
in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, fn. 12.)

                                  6
death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act
and the death would not have happened without the act. A
natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person
would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.”
(Italics in original.)
       Accordingly, the prosecutor did not misstate the law on
voluntary manslaughter and therefore did not commit prejudicial
misconduct.
                       The Trial Court Was Not
                Required to Clarify CALCRIM No. 572
       Appellant concedes that the “[t]he jury instructions were
technically accurate . . . .” Nevertheless, he argues that the trial
court “erred by failing to clarify the jury instructions” because
CALCRIM No. 572, “combined with the prosecutor’s
misstatement of the law, created ambiguity as to the objective
element of probability for implied malice,” thus “impact[ing]
appellant’s fundamental rights.”
       During its deliberations, the jury requested that the court
provide “[c]lassical examples of voluntary manslaughter. For
example, hypotheticals taught in law school.” The court denied
the request. It suggested that the jury review CALCRIM No. 572
“as well as the entirety of the evidence that you have previously
received in the trial.” Appellant asserts: “[I]t is reasonable to
conclude that the prosecutor’s misstatement [of the probability
requirement] contributed at least indirectly to the jury’s desire
for further guidance. However, the trial court passed up the
opportunity to clarify the probability requirement or the source of
the jury’s confusion. Instead, the court redirected the jury to the
ambiguous instructions already given. . . . [¶] The trial court
thus erred by failing to adequately respond to the prosecutor’s

                                 7
misstatement of the law and the jury’s request for additional
instruction on voluntary manslaughter.”
       We disagree. As we have shown in the preceding section of
this opinion, the prosecutor did not misstate the law. Moreover,
the jury did not request additional instruction on the elements of
voluntary manslaughter. It requested “[c]lassical examples of
voluntary manslaughter,” such as “hypotheticals taught in law
school.”
       In any event, appellant forfeited the issue by inviting the
trial court to not grant the jury’s request but to instead refer the
jury to CALCRIM No. 572. Appellant’s counsel said, “The
defense position is just going to be to refer them back to the
instructions to look at [Calcrim No.] 572.” “The doctrine of
invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error
when ‘his own conduct induces the commission of error.’” (People
v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 549, fn. 3.) Furthermore, “[a] trial
court has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an
accurate statement of law without a request from counsel
[citation], and failure to request clarification of an otherwise
correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of
appeal.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638.)
       However, we “may also review any instruction given, . . .
even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if
the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”
(§ 1259.) Appellant has not shown that the trial court’s alleged
failure to clarify the “probability requirement” affected his
substantial rights. The prosecutor and CALCRIM No. 572
explained that this requirement applies to the causation element
of voluntary manslaughter. Appellant acknowledges “that the
jury instructions given here contained a paragraph about

                                 8
causation that included the terms ‘natural and probable’ and
correctly framed the probability element as an objective query.”
                   Appellant’s Claims Concerning
                   Recent Sentencing Amendments
       Appellant claims: “[T]his case must be remanded for
resentencing based on the retroactive application of Senate Bill
No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (‘SB 567’) and Assembly Bill No.
518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (‘AB 518’), both of which took effect
after the trial court sentenced appellant.” The People concede
that SB 567 and AB 518 apply retroactively to appellant.
                                 SB 567
       “‘Senate Bill No. 567 . . . amended section 1170, subdivision
(b), making the middle term of imprisonment the presumptive
sentence.’ [Citation.] ‘A trial court may impose an upper term
sentence only where there are aggravating circumstances in the
crime and the defendant has either stipulated to the facts
underlying those circumstances or they have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Berdoll (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 159, 163 (Berdoll).) But “the court may consider the
defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on
a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
       Appellant contends his upper term sentence must be
reversed because the jury made no factual findings as to
aggravating circumstances. In imposing the upper term, the trial
court relied on aggravating factors set forth in the probation
report and “highlighted” by the prosecutor. The court said it was
“in agreement” with “the sentencing factors that probation lays
out.”

                                 9
       According to the probation report, there are no mitigating
factors. The report lists the following aggravating factors: “1. The
crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great
bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness [citation]. [¶] The victim . . . was
trying to de-escalate the situation and calm the defendant down
when the defendant attacked him with a ‘sucker punch’ that
knocked him unconscious, and caused him to fall and suffer fatal
injuries. The strike was vicious and, since the victim was not
participating in the fighting and playing the role of peacemaker,
especially callous and cold-hearted. [¶] 2. The defendant has
engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to
society [citation]. [¶] 3. The defendant's prior convictions as an
adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings
are numerous or of increasing seriousness [citation]. [¶] 4. The
defendant has served a prior term in prison or county jail under
§1170(h) PC [citation]. [¶] 5. The defendant was on probation
when the crime was committed [citation]. [¶] 6. The defendant's
prior performance on probation and parole was unsatisfactory
[citation].”
       At the time of sentencing in October 2021, appellant was 32
years old. The trial court said the probation report “highlighted
some five full pages of criminal history . . . dating all the way
back to 2004 as a juvenile. . . . [O]f those 16 criminal matters
that were commented upon, eight . . . involved violence by
[appellant] upon another just as we had in the matter before this
Court regarding young Eric Romero.” No one disputes the
accuracy of the probation report.
       The People argue that any error in imposing the upper
term was harmless because “[i]t is evident beyond a reasonable

                                10
doubt that the jury would have found that appellant suffered the
alleged prior convictions and that appellant’s prior performance
on probation and parole was unsatisfactory.” Furthermore, “the
trial court relied on factors in aggravation that were supported by
the record, namely that appellant had an extensive criminal
history, prior prison terms, and poor performance on probation
and parole. [Citations.] Therefore, the record clearly indicates
that the trial court would not impose a more favorable sentence
upon remand . . . .”
       The probation report lists numerous sustained juvenile
petitions for criminal offenses. It enumerates the following adult
felony convictions: (1) 2008 – Assault with a deadly weapon.
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) This is both the prior strike and the serious
felony conviction. Appellant was placed on probation, but his
probation was revoked and he was sentenced to prison for four
years. (2) 2009 – Infliction of physical or mental suffering on an
elder. (§ 368, subd. (b)(1).) (3) 2012 – Assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) (4)
2013 – Resisting an executive officer. (§ 69.) Appellant was
sentenced to prison for two years, eight months. He was
subsequently convicted of misdemeanor offenses in 2017, 2018,
and 2019.
       “‘“[I]f a reviewing court concludes, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard, unquestionably would have found true at least a single
aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury,” the
error is harmless. . . .’” (Berdoll, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 163,
quoting from People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500.)
“On this record we are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, the
jury would have found true [more than] one aggravating

                                 11
circumstance. . . . Thus, remand for resentencing . . . is
unnecessary.” (Flores, supra, at p. 501.) “To remand would
achieve the same sentencing result and would be a waste of
judicial resources.” (Berdoll, supra, at p. 165.)3
                                AB 518
       The information consisted of three counts based on the
same act – appellant’s punch to Romero’s face. Count 1 was the
voluntary manslaughter charge. Count 2 charged assault by
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (§ 245, subd.
(a)(4).) Count 3 charged battery causing serious bodily injury.
(§ 243, subd. (d).) Appellant was convicted of all three offenses.
The trial court imposed upper-term sentences on counts 2 and 3
but stayed execution of the sentences pursuant to former section
654.
       AB 518 amended section 654, which “prohibits multiple
punishment for any single act or omission. If a single action or
course of conduct by a defendant violates multiple laws, ‘the
distinct crimes may be charged in separate counts and may result
in multiple verdicts of guilt, [but] the trial court may impose
sentence for only one offense. . . .’ [Citation.] Until recently, the

      3 Appellate courts are divided on the standard for assessing
prejudice when determining whether a case should be remanded
for resentencing in light of SB 567. (See, e.g., People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 465-466 [“In order to conclude that
the trial court’s reliance on improper factors that were not found
true by a jury or admitted by Lopez was not prejudicial, we would
have to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would
have found true beyond a reasonable doubt every factor on which
the court relied”].) The issue is pending before our Supreme
Court in People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.],
review granted Aug. 10, 2022, S274942.

                                 12
law required trial courts to impose sentence ‘under the provision
that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment.’
(Former § 654 . . . .) . . . Assembly Bill No. 518 . . . removes the
requirement to impose the longest prison term. As the preamble
to the bill explains, it allows ‘an act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different laws to be punished
under either of those provisions.’” (People v. Sek (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 657, 673.)
        Appellant maintains that, “[b]ecause Count 1 [voluntary
manslaughter] carried a longer sentence than Counts 2-3,
[pursuant to former section 654] the trial court . . . imposed the
sentence for Count 1 . . . and stayed the sentence for Counts
2-3 . . . .” Appellant argues, “[T]his case should be remanded so
that the trial court can exercise its newly granted discretion to
impose a lesser sentence among Counts 1-3.”
        “‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in
the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court.
[Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its
discretionary powers can no more exercise that “informed
discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have been based
on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
record.’ [Citation.] In such circumstances, we have held that the
appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the
record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached
the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such
discretion.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391
(Gutierrez).)
        The trial court did not say it was imposing the longer
sentence for voluntary manslaughter because it was required to
do so by former section 654. The record “clearly indicates” the

                                 13
court would have declined to exercise its discretion to lessen
appellant’s sentence had it been aware it had such discretion
under amended section 654. (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p.
1391.) If the court had wanted to lessen appellant’s sentence, it
could have done so by granting his motion to dismiss the prior
strike. Instead, the court denied the motion.
       The trial court was particularly disturbed that so many of
appellant’s offenses had involved violence and that he had
refused to accept blame for his actions: “[T]hroughout your adult
life, you are often blaming others for your actions.” “[I]t is very,
very difficult for you to ever acknowledge any blame for your
actions over the years. And that difficulty is really troubling to
the Court.” The court noted that “there were no mitigating
factors” but “[t]here were numerous aggravating factors.”
       The probation report clearly shows that the longer sentence
for voluntary manslaughter was warranted. In his closing
evaluation, the probation officer wrote: “To the defendant’s
detriment, the reckless and vicious aggression he demonstrated
at the time of the instant offense was not an isolated incident for
him, as his prior record illustrates. While an adult, he has
recklessly harmed strangers by throwing rocks at their vehicles
as they drove, causing injuries . . . ; he has viciously attacked an
elderly apartment manager when he was confronted for loitering,
causing injuries . . . ; he has viciously attacked a girlfriend’s ex-
boyfriend with the butt of a knife during a confrontation, causing
injuries . . . ; and he has attacked a woman at a bus stop in order
to steal her purse . . . , which speaks loudly to his pattern of
aggression and randomly attacking others unsuspectingly. These
prior instances of violence, like the instant offense, appear to
have been unprovoked and the result of the defendant’s

                                 14
willingness to needlessly harm others when angered. Despite . . .
having been afforded numerous Court-related interventions over
the years, the defendant has made no apparent rehabilitative
progress. Unfortunately, his prior incarcerations, probation
grants, and state prison commitments did not serve as effective
deterrents for him or inspire him to change his lifestyle and
attitude.”
                            Disposition
      The judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                               YEGAN, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                               15
                   Thomas R. Adams, Judge

            Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

                ______________________________

      Mark R. Feeser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.