Court Opinion

ID: 9698434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:50:22.406263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:40.986956
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
The record clearly demonstrates that the summary criminal contempt imposed by the judge in this case was a wholly unnecessary and impermissible action. I dissent.
Appellant stands convicted of criminal contempt and has been required to pay a $400.00 fine for missing, apparently by some few minutes, the routine call of the day’s trial list in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Regrettably, the majority is as unwilling as the trial judge to consider appellant’s reasons for having missed the call. Majority Opinion, Ante at 764 n.5. Most unfortunate, however, is the majority’s refusal to allow appellant even the fundamental procedural safeguard of an opportunity for a hearing at which to present evidence and create a record for appellate review. By condoning the summary criminal penalty in this case the majority abandons protections clearly required by fundamental principles of due process.
I acknowledge that summary contempt procedures are sometimes necessary to maintain the orderly functioning of our courts and to preserve the dignity of the judicial process. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971); see also Sacher v. United States, 343 *587U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1951). I refuse to believe, however, that they are warranted in the circumstances of this case:
The power to impose summary criminal contempt is available only for
“such conduct as created an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court and such flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public that, if not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority will follow.”
Jessup v. Clark, 490 F.2d 1068,1071 (3rd Cir. 1973) (quotation marks omitted); accord, Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536, 45 S.Ct. 390, 394-95, 69 L.Ed. 767, 773 (1925); United States v. Marra, supra, [482 F.2d 1196,] at 1201 [2 Cir. 1973)]. Only in such circumstances may a court subject a contemner to punishment without the procedural protections otherwise accorded the criminally accused.
Commonwealth v. Garrison, 478 Pa. 356, 366-67, 386 A.2d 971, 976 (1978) (plurality opinion). Surely, failure to appear at the call of the day’s list is neither “an open threat” to the court nor “flagrant defiance” of the judge. Nothing in this case demonstrates the need to impose judgment of sentence on appellant without affording him a hearing or an opportunity to prepare a defense.
Traditionally summary criminal contempt has been limited to situations where the challenged conduct occurred within the presence of the court. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202-205, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1428-84, 20 L.Ed.2d 522, 529-31 (1968). In the federal courts summary criminal contempt is permitted only if the judge “certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a).* When the challenged conduct occurs in the presence *588of the judge, summary procedures are justified because the judge is presumably able to observe and evaluate the conduct without need for further investigation or fact finding. But when the conduct does not occur in the presence of the court it is less likely that the judge possessed all relevant facts. In the latter case, it is also less likely that the conduct requires an immediate response. In such circumstances fairness requires that one whose conduct is challenged be afforded basic procedural safeguards. The majority finds primary support for its position in Cooke v. United State, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925). But as Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanimous Court in that case, said:
“Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation. We think this includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses to give testimony, relevant either to the issue of ’complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed.”
Id. at 537, 45 S.Ct. at 395, quoted in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 205, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1484, 20 L.Ed.2d 522, 530 (1968). I dissent from the majority’s summary denial of appellant’s established due process rights and would reverse judgment of sentence.

 See American Bar Associaton Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, The Function of The Trial Judge § 7.1 (Approved Draft, 1972).