Court Opinion

ID: 9829761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:36:08.720646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:05.812516
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In the original opinion this court sustained the action of the trial court in excluding as evidence the deed of Dick Rand to Ed Rand, offered in evidence by appellants as a muniment of title under which appellants claim title to the 6.4 acres of the land in controversy.
Appellees had offered in evidence a deed from Dick Rand to Ed Rand to the 6.4-acre tract of land in which deed appears the statement: “I hereby reserve all the mineral rights on the above described tract of land, it having already been leased to Dunlap & Beavers to drill for oil and gas.” That deed was dated January 10, 1918, and shows to have been recorded.
The deed offered in evidence by appellants was a sheriff's deed to the same tract of land sold under an order of sale issued out of the district court in a suit of the Citizens State Bank v. Ed Rand, under a judgment rendered in September, 1928. The sheriff’s deed, for description of the land sold, referred to the deed from Dick Rand to Ed'Rand as of record, giving volume and page. The deed as recorded is the identical land described in the deed offered by appellees. The deed referred to in the sheriff’s sale, and offered in evidence by appellants, is a deed from Dick Rand to Ed Rand dated January 10, 1918, and contains the following: “I hereby reserve one half of the mineral rights on the above described tract of land, it having already been leased to Dunlap & Beavers to drill for oil and gas, that is only one half of my interest in said lease is hereby conveyed. Inter-lineations made and corrected after signing with the consent of all parties concerned.”
In the two deeds, it appears that, in the deed offered by appellees, Dick Rand, in conveying to Ed Rand, reserved all minerals, and in the deed offered by appellants, Dick Rand, in conveying to Ed Rand, reserved one-half the minerals, with the further statement that the interlinea-tions were made and corrected after signing with the consent of all parties concerned.
When the deed was offered in evidence appellees’ objection was, “that which purports to be a deed is nothing more than a spoliated copy of a deed.” The legal effect of the objection made, we think, was that it was a change from a former deed, was a material change, and that before the deed could be offered the party offering it must declare upon the deed with allegations explaining the change or interlineation made in the instrument. That is what seems to be the practice. Hess et al. v. Schaffner, Tex.Civ.App., 139 S.W. 1024, and referred to in 2 Tex.Jur. p. 711, par. 20.
In offering in evidence an altered instrument, the general rule seems to be that the party offering it must account for its condition, and show by pleading and proof that the change made was with the consent of the parties.
Plaintiffs had not denied under oath the genuineness of the deed. Pope v. Taliaferro, 51 Tex.Civ.App. 217, 115 S.W. 309; Jacoby v. Brigman, Tex.Sup., 7 S.W. 366.
We have not found in the record any pleadings of appellants under which appellants could offer any evidence explaining the change or altered condition in ■the conveyance of land. Proof without pleading to sustain it is unavailing. The trial court concluded the evidence was not sufficient to admit the deed. Considering the reservations made in the two deeds, the pleadings in reference thereto, and the evidence offered in explanation without sufficient, pleading to admit it, we think the exclusion of the deed was not error. Appellees not having denied under oath the offered deed, it appearing on its face to be what it purports to be, it should under proper pleading have been admitted. Fitch v. Boyer, 51 Tex. 336.
The motion is overruled.