Court Opinion

ID: 9711258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:27:39.048521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:03.235162
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
Nearly thirteen years after defendant Donald Loftin was convicted by a jury of the murder of Gary K. Marsh and was sentenced to death, the majority now holds that the trial judge erred when it did not remove a non-deliberating juror from the jury mid-trial, and that such error was the result of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by defendant’s trial and appellate counsel. In the majority’s view, that conclusion warrants the reversal of defendant’s conviction and sentence, which were affirmed by this Court,1 and a remand for a new trial.
Because I cannot agree with either the conclusions reached by the majority or with the remedy it orders, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority agrees that the evidence that defendant murdered his victim was “overwhelming[.]” Ante at 180, 922 A.2d at 1214. The issue before us, however, is divorced from defendant’s guilt. *208Instead, it addresses directly the structural nature of criminal proceedings and how to insure their fairness. That is why the conduct of the proceedings is examined closely, with a view towards their ultimate fairness. That examination requires that we hew closely to the record below.
The majority summarizes fairly the events that led to the individual voir dire of a juror on the fourth day of trial: the trial court received a telephone call from one of the juror’s co-workers who claimed that the juror stated that “I’m going to the hardware store to get me a good rope so when we hang him, it won’t break.” Ante at 184, 922 A.2d at 1217. After speaking with the caller and another of the juror’s co-workers,2 the trial judge individually questioned the juror,3 an inquiry that merits setting forth at length:
THE COURT: Have a seat, [Juror No. 4].
I have asked you to come in because I was contacted and it was reported to the Court that you were heard making remarks, not about the facts of this ease, but about the fact that you were on your way to the hardware store to get a rope and you were going to make sure that it was a rope that did not break and these comments were made at [the juror’s employment] Friday and possibly Monday, early Monday morning of this week and I thought I will give you an opportunity to come in and, perhaps, you can shed some light on what, if anything, happened.
THE JUROR: Nothing did happen. It was just that everybody was harassing me at my job because they found out what I was doing from the letter you gave us to give to our employer. That’s all it was, simple harassment from my fellow [employees].
THE COURT: And did you respond? And what we were told specifically is that you did not discuss the case, but you made some—
THE JUROR: Right.
THE COURT: — What was viewed as smart remarks where you were on the way to the hardware store.
THE JUROR: Yes, just so that they would stop harassing me.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. In making that statement, have you formed an opinion with respect to the guilt or innocence of this defendant ?
*209THE JUROR: Oh, no. No.
THE COURT: Is there any particular reason you chose that language in addressing the harassment from your fellow employees?
THE JUROR: Well, you would have to know the people that were harassing me to understand it.
THE COURT: Well, I would. I’m trying to understand it. If you could shed a little bit of light on it for the record.
THE JUROR: The people that were harassing me would not let anything go, they will just keep harassing and harassing and harassing. So to stop the harassment and to tell them what they think I would say, that’s merely a statement that I made because they think they know me but they don’t.
THE COURT: Well, what are you saying they think they know you? What is it they think they know about you[?]
THE JUROR: Well, they think that I’m prejudiced.
THE COURT: Okay. So the people around whom — the people who are harassing you, you’re telling me are minorities?
THE JUROR: Yes, some of them, yes.
THE COURT: Some of them?
THE JUROR: Some are white.
THE COURT: And they think that you’re prejudiced?
THE JUROR: Oh, yeah.
THE COURT: And so what you’re saying is that you said that in an effort to—
THE JUROR: Stop them from keep coming at me.
[ (emphasis supplied).]
It was after that colloquy that one of defendant’s counsel first asserted that he thought the juror’s “comments are racist.”4
The trial judge’s comments immediately following the juror’s individual voir dire were telling, and merit review in full. After requesting that the juror excuse himself for a few moments and in the presence of counsel alone, she explained that her
*210comments off the record earlier about excusing him one way or the other were precipitous. I’m going to explain to you why the Court findings the Court made initially were precipitous. Number one, I have a specific recollection of the colloquy between the Court and most specifically Mr. [Jones] 5 who is the gentleman that had the conversation with [the juror] on Friday and Saturday. In fact, both Mr. [Jones] indicated that it was he and the other people who were approaching [the juror] to ask about the case and that [the juror] did not initially say anything to him. [The juror] just smiled and then this particular individual quoted another person and ... he did say [that] this person repeatedt ] to him the comment about getting the rope and it was then that Mr. [Jones] stated that he then went to [the juror] and questioned [the juror] about it.
He also indicated that at the end of [the juror]’s tour, he again approached [the juror] and asked him had he gotten the rope, had he been to the hardware store and what I ask[ed] him [was] what did he mean by that, he was saying he went out earlier in the morning and then at the end of the day he comes back in so they checked on the Saturday morning, Mr. [Jones] again indicates that he, in fact, went to [the juror] and approached him again about it.
Now, Mr. [Jones] indicates that he took offense to it and I don’t recall in any event, colloquy with the Court they at any time said anything to [the juror] about taking offense to what he was saying, but it’s clear to the Court that every conversation with [the juror] was initiated by Mr. [Jones], using that as a framework to reach the decision that I have reached, people within the work place often say things that are insensitive, whether they’re remarks made by one racial group in the context of another, not every racially insensitive remark is necessarily a racist remark nor did it reflect predisposition.
[The juror] does not deny he made the statement. He said he made the statement because he knew that’s what he wanted — that’s what they wanted to hear, that is he prejudice^] and is being prejudiced] by co-workers and coworkers basically go to him and he reacted in kind.
As a result, the trial judge concluded that she was “going to keep [the juror] on this jury, notwithstanding [defendant’s] objections.” She explained that there were not “enough facts from which this Court could conclude that this individual is predisposed[.]” The trial judge noted that she “ha[d] made inquiry of [the juror] and [the juror] has indicated that he is not predisposed[.]” Asking the juror to return and addressing the juror directly, the trial judge concluded as follows:
*211I appreciate your honesty in coming forward. The Court has made a decision to permit you to continue at this juncture as a juror in this matter. You have indicated quite candidly, in the opinion of the Court, that the circumstances under which this statement was made, you have indicated to the Court that you’re not predisposed and the Court is therefore satisfied with your answers at this point and ask[s] you [to] continue to serve as a juror.
As that record clearly discloses, the trial judge conducted an exhaustive inquiry of the non-deliberating juror in question, concluding that he was candid and was not predisposed towards guilt. For that reason alone, the majority’s holding that the trial judge erred when she failed to “interview the remaining members of the panel to confirm that the juror did not communicate to them any preconceived notions of defendant’s guilt[,]” ante at 179, 922 A.2d at 1214, is unsustainable. Despite that factual error, the majority nonetheless concludes that, “[bjecause the [trial] court made no effort to satisfy itself that the jury’s impartiality had not been compromised by the suspect juror, we can have no confidence that the verdict was the product of a fair trial____[Therefore,] we have no choice but to vacate defendant’s conviction and death sentence and remand for a new trial.” Ante at 180, 922 A.2d at 1214.
That conclusion is the product of unsupported speculation founded on a false premise: that the non-deliberating juror questioned had “preconceived notions of defendant’s guilt” that could have been communicated to his fellow jurors and, hence, required exploration. The record shows, in contrast, that the trial judge specifically found the contrary.
In that context, we have long held that “the trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers in determining the qualifications of jurors and that its exercise of discretion will ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal.” State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 160, 203 A.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 690, 13 L.Ed.2d 572 (1965). That deference has a common sense basis: “Trial courts conducting voir dire are best able to evaluate the credibility and sincerity of a prospective juror in a way that the record will never allow.” State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 629, 843 A.2d 974 (2004). We have explained the governing principle thusly: “Of necessity, a *212sound measure of discretion must be reposed in our trial courts to determine whether a given juror can well and truly discharge the grave responsibility entrusted or whether the juror’s views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially interfere with the performance of that duty.” State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 256-57, 524 A.2d 188 (1987). Accord State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 104, 803 A.2d 1074 (2002); State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 595, 751 A.2d 40 (2000) (noting that “[i]t has also been observed that this Court is ‘perhaps too far removed’ from the realities of the voir dire to appreciate the nuances concealed by a ‘bloodless record’; therefore deference to the trial court is usually prudent” (citation omitted)).
Against that backdrop, the majority’s lack of confidence in the fairness of defendant’s trial simply is not based on the clear findings in the record. The trial judge — an able, experienced and discerning judge — was in the best position to judge whether the juror was biased or predisposed towards guilt. Having had the opportunity to observe and question the juror, she satisfied herself that in fact the juror was not predisposed. Thus, one of the required logical underpinnings for the majority’s analysis is simply missing: the now-challenged juror was not predisposed in respect of defendant’s guilt and, thus, he could not have contaminated the remainder of the jury. Any presumption that reaches a different result is in error.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the questioned juror did not deliberate on defendant’s guilt. As the majority recognizes, in an abundance of caution and “without objection from counsel, the trial judge determined that [the questioned juror] would be designated as an alternate juror, removing any possibility that [the questioned juror] would sit as a deliberating juror.” Ante at 185, 922 A.2d at 1217-18 (footnote omitted). Yet, despite those prophylactic measures, the majority nonetheless presumes both predisposition and taint of his fellow jurors, a presumption that is *213unwarranted in this record. We are better guided by our longstanding rule:
No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility that it led to an unjust verdict. We say “possibility” and not “certainty,” for if it were certain that the error led to an unjust result, the reviewing court would be constrained to order the just result, which, on that hypothesis, would be an acquittal, except in the unusual case in which it could be said the error prevented the trier of facts from even reaching the merits. So, too, a “probability” that the error resulted in a false verdict should, if it were the standard for intervention, drive the appellate court to order the judgment which the jury “probably” would have reached but for that error. And since a reviewing court could rarely say an error either certainly or probably induced a false verdict, either test would disadvantage a defendant. Defendants fare better if a new trial may be ordered upon a “possibility” of injustice. Still, not “any” possibility can be enough for a rerun of the trial. The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.
[State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335-36, 273 A.2d 1 (1971).]
Because, on this record, it cannot be said that the unsubstantiated and rejected “possibility” of a non-deliberating juror’s predisposition somehow tainted those jurors who did deliberate and convict defendant, I cannot join the majority. Instead, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court denying defendant’s application for post-conviction relief.
II.
Even if one were to agree with the majority that the events surrounding the retention of the questioned but non-deliberating juror somehow required some species of relief — a proposition that escaped defendant’s experienced trial counsel or appellate counsel, as the issue was not raised in either post-trial motions or defendant’s direct appeal, as well as this Court in its plenary review of defendant’s conviction and sentence — the remedy the majority affords is needlessly overbroad. Explaining that “a remand to conduct a jury voir dire is not a feasible remedy[,]” the majority asserts that “[n]ow, almost thirteen years have passed since defendant’s guilt-phase trial” and that “[t]o reconvene the guilt-phase jury at this time, however appealing it may seem, is not practicable.” Ante at 199-200, 922 A.2d at 1226. According to the majority,
*214Even assuming that all the jurors are still alive and have not suffered an illness or condition that has affected their cognitive abilities, after the passage of so many years, we would have little faith that juror interviews could produce reliable recollections sufficient to satisfy us to uphold a death sentence. The recollection of the most dutiful and honorable juror, however seemingly certain, will be fraught with the potential for error because of the possibility that in the intervening years even important words exchanged between jurors have been forgotten. We can demand only so much of human memory, with all its known frailties, in attempting to reconstruct long ago proceedings, and therefore caution must be our guide when the stakes are so high. We must have a high degree of confidence in the results of a proceeding affirming a death sentence. That level of confidence will never be reached from juror interviews at this late date. However reluctantly we make this concession, we do so in the interest of justice.
[Ante at 200, 922 A.2d at 1226.]
The logic of that reasoning is overshadowed by its irony. If the passage of time alone renders it somehow unfair to remand the matter for a hearing on whether the questioned juror was predisposed and, if so, whether that predisposition tainted the jury, how can it be any less unfair to require an entirely new death penalty trial, one covering events that are older than those which occurred at the trial, and yet still have confidence in the outcome as sought by the majority? The question, of course, is rhetorical; no answer is expected of it.6
A far better procedure — a remand to voir dire the jury as a whole — is both available and not revolutionary. We have explained that
[w]here the court concludes there is a realistic possibility that information with the capacity to prejudice defendant’s right to a fair trial may have reached members of jury, it should conduct a voir dire to determine whether any exposure has occurred. If there is any indication of such exposure or knowledge of extrajudicial information, the court should question those jurors individually in order to determine precisely what was learned, and establish whether they are capable of fulfilling their duty to judge the facts in an impartial and unbiased manner, based strictly on the evidence presented in court.
*215[State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 86-87, 548 A.2d 846 (1988) (footnotes omitted).]
The procedure to be followed in those instances also is well-settled:
The court is obliged to interrogate the juror, in the presence of counsel, to determine if there is a taint; if so, the inquiry must expand to determine whether any other jurors have been tainted thereby. The trial court must then determine whether the trial may proceed after excusing the tainted juror or jurors, or whether a mistrial is necessary. The decision to grant a new trial based on jury taint resides in the discretion of the trial court[.]
[State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 558, 781 A.2d 37 (2001) (citations omitted).]
Standing alone, the passage of time is insufficient to justify jettisoning either a lengthy guilt-phase and penalty-phase trial, extensive appeals or the significant efforts expended on post-conviction relief proceedings. Juxtaposed against the expansive nature of the relief granted by the majority, a limited remand of the type proposed here is neither novel nor outside the heartland of what trial courts do everyday. Specifically, in New Jersey, post-trial limited remands have been ordered and used successfully in the past. See State v. Bisaccia, 319 N.J.Super. 1,16-20, 724 A.2d 836 (App.Div.1999) (holding that “the mere passage of time should not by itself preclude a remand” and remanding, six years after guilty verdicts, to determine whether hearing is feasible and, if so, extent of jury taint), appeal after remand sub nom. State v. De Stefano, 339 N.J.Super. 153, 771 A.2d 592 (App.Div.2001); State v. Reevey, 159 N.J.Super. 130, 135, 387 A.2d 381 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 471, 401 A.2d 228 (1978) (remanding for “hearing concerning the allegation that juror ... was sleeping during all or part of the summations and charge”).
Similar limited remands have been used in the federal courts. Porter v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 898, 900, 107 S.Ct. 298, 299, 93 L.Ed.2d 272, 274 (1986) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (stating that “[w]hen a substantial question of juror bias is presented to the trial court, as it was in this case, we have held that the defendant is entitled to a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120, 104 S.Ct. 453, 456, 78 L.Ed.2d 267, 274 (1983) (per curiam) (noting that, in matters concerning juror taint, *216“[p]ost-trial hearings are adequately tailored to this task”); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 89 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that, on remand, “[a] hearing permits counsel to probe the juror’s memory, his reasons for acting as he did, and his understanding of the consequences of his actions. A hearing also permits the trial judge to observe the juror’s demeanor under cross-examination and to evaluate his answers in light of the particular circumstances of the case”); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629 (6th Cir.1998); United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843 (9th Cir.1993).
In the final analysis, “questioning jurors after a trial is ‘an extraordinary procedure’ that should be invoked only when there is a strong representation that a defendant may have been harmed by juror misconduct.” State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 154, 716 A.2d 458 (1998). It is viewed as “an extraordinary procedure” because
due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable. The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. Such determinations may properly be made at a hearing like that ordered in Remmer and held in this case.
[Smith v. Phillips, supra, 455 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 946, 71 L.Ed.2d at 86 (footnote omitted).]
We do less harm if we approach defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a measured way. For that reason, if we were to conclude, as the majority does, that defendant’s trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective in respect of the retention of the non-deliberating juror, then the better approach would be to remand the cause to the same trial judge to conduct a fuller hearing.7
*217III.
In my view, the majority’s conclusions are without foundation in the record and the remedy it orders is not appropriately tailored to the harm the majority purports to address. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice ZAZZALI and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and HOENS — 6.
For affirmance — Justice RIVERA-SOTO — 1.

As the majority notes, "[tjhis Court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal, State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 318, 680 A.2d 677 (1996) (Loftin I), and upheld his sentence on proportionality review, State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 266, 724 A.2d 129 (Loftin II), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 897, 120 S.Ct. 229, 145 L.Ed.2d 193 (1999).” Ante, 191 N.J. at 179, 922 A.2d at 1214. Ironically, defendant’s direct appeal, in parts, focused on jury selection issues, Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 337-42, 680 A.2d 677, and defendant’s post-penalty phase request to interview the penalty-phase jurors, id. at 380-82, 680 A.2d 677.

 Those conversations occurred over a single, uninterrupted telephone call, with all counsel present, and were recorded and transcribed.

 That questioning occurred in camera the following day, with all counsel present, and it too was recorded and transcribed.

 Significantly, other than defense counsel's thoughts, there is nothing in this record on which to base a claim that the juror wished to “lynch" defendant. As a result, the majority’s leap from this juror’s exasperated comments to the emotionally charged specter of a lynching is without foundation and, ultimately, unnecessary. Ante at 187-88, 922 A.2d at 1219-20. Hanging, as a longstanding method of execution, is color-blind. See Michigan State University, "The Death Penalty,” available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.msu.edU/c/about/ methods/hanging.htm. In the context of a death penalty case, it is an unwarranted and unfair stretch to equate the juror’s comments with anything other than the hanging of an "overwhelming[ly proven]” murderer.

 I have followed the naming convention established by the majority in respect of the juror's two co-workers who were examined over the telephone. Ante at 208 n. 2, 922 A.2d at 1216 n. 2.

 Indeed, as a practical matter, it could well be said that because juiy service on a capital case is so unique and so taxing, it leaves an indelible impression on those jurors who served; few life experiences match up to the task of weighing another's guilt when the ultimate penalty may be death. For that reason, I am far less sanguine than the majority concerning the abilily to fairly and impartially question this jury on the issue of taint even at this time.

 The trial judge remains on the bench; she is currently assigned to the Appellate Division. That assignment should not prevent her from presiding over a limited remand in this case.