Court Opinion

ID: 9895562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 19:03:36.922377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:31.861830
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/7/23 P. v. Gaspar CA2/5

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B322428

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. TA151831)
           v.

 JUAN CARLOS GASPAR,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tammy Ryu, Judge. Affirmed.
      John A. Colucci, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Lance E.
Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan
Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and
Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

                              __________________________
       Juan Carlos Gaspar appeals from a judgment that
sentences him to 25 years to life in state prison for first degree
murder. Gaspar contends there was insufficient evidence the
murder was willful, deliberate, or premeditated. He also
contends the trial court’s imperfect self-defense instruction was
deficient. We affirm.
                                  FACTS
1.     The Crime
       On April 9, 2020, just before 7:00 p.m., Juan Gonzalez was
exiting the Home Depot parking lot in Carson with his wife, Luz
Gonzalez, when Luz drew his attention to a man “just stomping
and kicking” something on the ground.1 Juan turned back into
the parking lot to “see what was going on.” When the Gonzalezes
realized that it was a person lying on the ground, Luz urged Juan
to help the victim. At trial, the Gonzalezes identified Gaspar as
the perpetrator.
       Juan stopped their car approximately 20 or 30 feet away
and observed Gaspar continue to kick the victim in the head. The
victim lay on the ground, unmoving, with a bicycle between his
legs. Juan approached to within seven feet of Gaspar and said,
“Stop kicking him. You are going to kill him.” Gaspar responded,
“Fuck it. I’ll kill him.” Gaspar then rifled through the victim’s
backpack but did not take it from him and resumed kicking the
victim in the head. After Juan told him to stop a second time,
Gaspar asked if Juan “wanted to get down,” meaning fight. Juan
said, “Hey I’m not on the ground. Let’s do it.” But as Juan
walked closer, Gaspar backed away to a nearby bus stop, where
he remained until the police arrived.

1      For ease of reference, we refer to the Gonzalezes by their
first names as necessary. No disrespect is intended.

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        In the meantime, Luz called 911. The Gonzalezes
remained on the scene until the police arrived and arrested
Gaspar at the bus stop. After several weeks in the hospital, the
victim died.
        Gaspar was charged with one count of murder in violation
of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a).
2.      The Trial
        The prosecution presented testimony from the Gonzalezes,
the responding officers, and the medical examiner who conducted
the victim’s autopsy. The medical examiner testified the cause of
death was blunt force trauma to the head. Although the victim
had had a prior neurosurgical procedure to the left side of his
head that may have made him more susceptible to head injuries,
the medical examiner was of the opinion that the prior injury did
not contribute to his death. Surveillance video of the Home
Depot parking lot corroborated the Gonzalezes’ description of the
sequence of events. The original video and an enhanced version
(i.e., zoomed in to magnify the images) was shown to the jury
with the investigating officer narrating the events in the video.
Although grainy, the video depicts a person riding a bicycle in the
parking lot and stopping to speak to another person. There is
then an altercation between the two figures in the video; the
figure on the bicycle falls. The other person walks away from the
cyclist, who is now on the ground, and returns at least twice to
continue the altercation. A third person, presumably Juan
Gonzalez, arrives, stops and speaks to them, and the person who
is upright walks to the nearby street. The video ends with the
arrival of a police cruiser.
        Gaspar testified on his own behalf. He did not deny the
assault but asserted he acted in self-defense. He explained the

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victim was on a bicycle and approached him as he was waiting for
the bus. The victim said something about “Marlotta and a Leen
[sic],” which Gaspar did not understand. The victim also said he
had a gun and told Gaspar to give him his belongings. Gaspar
did not see a gun but believed it was in the victim’s backpack.
Gaspar hit the victim in the face and tried to pull the victim’s
backpack off him. At some point during their struggle, Gaspar
fell to the ground. He immediately got back up and began to kick
the victim, still fearing for his life.
        Gaspar initially believed Juan “was with” the victim
because he approached Gaspar from the back. Gaspar explained
that was why he challenged Juan to a fight. Gaspar denied
telling Juan, “Fuck it. I’ll kill him.” He testified he instead told
Juan in Spanish that the victim had a gun. Gaspar also claimed
he told the responding officer that the victim had a gun.
        On rebuttal, the prosecution presented testimony from two
officers on the scene who interacted with Gaspar. Neither
recalled Gaspar telling them about a gun or a robbery. Gaspar
later told a detective through a Spanish-speaking officer at the
police station that he was angry because the victim had been
making fun of him for “too long” about a person named Sharleen
but Gaspar did not know a Sharleen. During this interview,
Gaspar mentioned that he believed the victim had a gun in his
backpack but admitted the victim never reached into his
backpack and Gaspar never saw a gun. Nor did Gaspar say the
victim threatened him or tried to rob him. No weapons were
found on either Gaspar or the victim.
        The jury found Gaspar guilty of murder in the first degree.
The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life. The court
further ordered victim restitution in the amount of $7,472.04 to

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the California Victim Compensation Board as reimbursement for
the victim’s funeral expenses along with other fines and fees.
Gaspar timely appealed.
                              DISCUSSION
1.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s First
       Degree Murder Verdict
    Gaspar contends there was insufficient evidence to support a
first degree murder conviction and argues for a reduction to
second degree murder. We conclude the record reflects
substantial evidence of a willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing.
       A.    Standard of Review and Legal Principles
    “ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court ‘ “ ‘presumes in support
of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Morales
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88.)
    “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus,
with malice aforethought.” (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) If the
murder is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated,” it is first degree
murder. (Id., § 189, subd. (a).) “ ‘ “An intentional killing is

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premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of
preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or
rash impulse.” ’ [Citations.] ‘The true test is not the duration of
time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may
follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated
judgment may be arrived at quickly. . . .’ ” (People v. Potts (2019)
6 Cal.5th 1012, 1027 (Potts).) “[P]remeditation and deliberation
is not synonymous with malice aforethought . . . it requires
‘substantially more reflection.’ [Citation.] Clearly, there must be
some evidence that the defendant actually engaged in such
reflection, and not merely had the time to do so.” (People v.
Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1270.)
    The Supreme Court in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d
15, 26–27 identified three categories of evidence as “pertinent to
the determination of premeditation and deliberation:
(1) planning activity, (2) motive, and (3) manner of killing.”
(People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125, citing to Anderson,
at pp. 26–27.) The Anderson court observed that first degree
murder convictions may be upheld when there is “extremely
strong” evidence of planning or there is evidence of motive in
conjunction with planning or manner of killing. (Anderson, at
p. 27.)
    In the years since Anderson, the Supreme Court has
“ ‘emphasized that its guidelines are descriptive and neither
normative nor exhaustive, and that reviewing courts need not
accord them any particular weight.’ ” (People v. Rivera (2019)
7 Cal.5th 306, 324.) Anderson provides “a framework to aid in
appellate review,” but it does not “define the elements of first
degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder in any
way.” (People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125.)

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        B.    Analysis
     Gaspar argues there is no evidence of planning, manner of
killing, or motive. The record demonstrates otherwise.
       As to planning, Gaspar contends the evidence shows his
encounter with the victim was unforeseen: they simply happened
upon one another in the Home Depot parking lot; Gaspar was
unarmed; the assault came suddenly; and Gaspar did not know
the victim beforehand.
     While this is one interpretation of the evidence, it is one
rejected by the jury. We presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence. Here, Gaspar had time to engage in planning activity
during the altercation. The surveillance video showed Gaspar
walked away from the victim at least twice during the
altercation. Juan Gonzalez testified that he told Gaspar that
Gaspar would kill the victim, to which the latter replied, “Fuck it.
I’ll kill him.” Gaspar stopped his attack long enough to rummage
through the victim’s backpack, but shortly resumed kicking him
in the head.
        Given these circumstances, the jury could reasonably
conclude Gaspar “had ample opportunity to consider the deadly
consequences of his actions” and nevertheless formed the plan to
kill during the altercation. (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th
514, 544; see also People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 244
[that defendant’s acts occurred “in stages” demonstrated
premeditation and deliberation].) As to planning, courts have
found that planning activity can happen during an altercation
itself and “over a short period of time . . . .” (People v. Shamblin
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1, 13; People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th

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547, 563 [“The lack of evidence of extensive planning does not
negate a finding of premeditation”].)
    As to motive, Gaspar argues there was no evidence of motive
for the attack other than his claim of self-defense. Yet, Gaspar
admitted to the detective at the police station that he was angry
because “they’ve been making fun of him for too long” about
Sharleen, a woman he did not know.2 “ ‘Anger at the way the
victim talked to [the defendant] . . . may be sufficient’ ” to
demonstrate motive. (People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170,
1200; see People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 245 [“Defendant’s
pent-up resentment toward his victim [ ] establishes the prior
relationship from which the jury reasonably could infer a motive
for the killing[ ].”].)
    As to the manner of killing, Gaspar argues, without
evidentiary support, that a reasonable person would not have
expected sustained “stomping [on] and kicking” at the victim’s
head would result in death. According to Gaspar, the victim
would not have died but for his prior head injury. On the
contrary, the medical examiner testified she examined the
victim’s entire body and the only injuries he sustained were to his
head, leading to his death from blunt force trauma. She also

2      In his reply brief, Gaspar argues his conviction should be
reduced to second degree murder based on a theory of provocation
from the victim’s teasing. Gaspar has forfeited this argument,
having raised it for the first time in his reply brief. (People v.
Saucedo (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 505, 514 fn. 3.) In any event, the
jury was instructed on provocation under CALCRIM No. 522 and
rejected this theory by finding Gaspar guilty of first degree
murder. To the extent Gaspar contends the jury’s finding was
not supported by the evidence, we have addressed the sufficiency
of the evidence in the text.

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rejected the notion that the victim’s previous head injury
contributed to his cause of death. That Gaspar targeted a
vulnerable and vital part of the victim’s body supports a finding
of premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Cruz, supra,
26 Cal.3d at p. 245 [“the killings by blows to only the head and by
a shotgun blast in his wife’s face permit the jury to infer that the
manner of killing was so particular and exacting that defendant
must have killed intentionally according to a preconceived
design”]; see People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 112 [the
evidence “strongly” suggested an intent to kill as well as
premeditation where the defendant hit his victim in the head
with a baseball bat using “extreme force”].)
2.     The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury on
       Imperfect Self-Defense
    Gaspar additionally contends the trial court erred when it
failed to instruct the jury on its own motion that imperfect self-
defense applied if a defendant has an unreasonable belief in the
need to defend against a robbery. We conclude the trial court
properly instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense.
       A.    Proceedings Below
    The trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, on
perfect self-defense as follows: “The defendant acted in lawful
self-defense if: [¶] 1. The defendant reasonably believed that he
was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily
injury or was in imminent danger of being robbed [underlining
added.]” (CALCRIM No. 505.) Defense counsel requested the
addition of the underlined portion, which was a bracketed option
for CALCRIM No. 505 at the time of trial. The prosecutor
acquiesced in this addition.

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       The trial court also instructed the jury on voluntary
manslaughter arising from imperfect self-defense under
CALCRIM No. 571. “That instruction states that a killing that
would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter
if the defendant kills because of imperfect self-defense. It further
states that a defendant acts in imperfect self-defense if a
defendant (1) actually believes that he or she is in imminent
danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury and
(2) actually believes that the immediate use of deadly force is
necessary to defend against the danger, but (3) at least one of
those beliefs is unreasonable.” (People v. Morales (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 978, 995 (Morales).) As instructed, CALCRIM
No. 571 stated in pertinent part: “The defendant acted in
imperfect self-defense if: [¶] The defendant actually believed
that he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great
bodily injury[.]” Unlike CALCRIM No. 505, CALCRIM No. 571
did not contain a bracketed option to include an imminent danger
of being robbed as a ground for imperfect self-defense. Defense
counsel did not request that the robbery option be added.
       B.     Standard of Review
     “We review a claim of instructional error de novo.” (People v.
Barber (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 798.) “Generally, the trial
court is required to instruct the jury on the general principles of
law that are closely and openly connected with the evidence and
that are necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case.
[Citation.] It also has a duty to refrain from giving incorrect
instructions or instructions on principles of law that are
irrelevant and that would have the effect of confusing the jury or
relieving it from making findings on the relevant issues.”
(Barber, at p. 799.)

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    “[I]mperfect self-defense is not an affirmative defense, but a
description of one type of voluntary manslaughter,” a lesser
included offense of murder. (People v. Manriquez (2005)
37 Cal.4th 547, 581.) “[A] trial court errs if it fails to instruct,
sua sponte, on all theories of a lesser included offense which find
substantial support in the evidence. On the other hand, the court
is not obliged to instruct on theories that have no such
evidentiary support.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th
142, 154, disapproved of on a different ground by People v.
Schuller (Aug. 17, 2023, S272237) 15 Cal.5th 237, 2023 WL
5281984, at *13 fn. 7 (Schuller).) The requirement “to instruct on
lesser included offenses, unlike the duty to instruct on mere
defenses, arises even against the defendant’s wishes, and
regardless of the trial theories or tactics the defendant has
actually pursued.” (Breverman, at p. 162.)
       C.    Analysis
    Gaspar argues the trial court was required, on its own
motion, to append the phrase from CALCRIM No. 505—“or was
in imminent danger of being robbed”—to the end of CALCRIM
No. 571 so that it would read: “The defendant acted in imperfect
self-defense if: [¶] The defendant actually believed that he was
in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily
injury or was in imminent danger of being robbed.” Because he
was entitled to an instruction that an unreasonable but actual
belief in the need to defend against a robbery could reduce
murder to voluntary manslaughter, the trial court’s failure to so
instruct deprived him of the right to present a complete defense
and lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof.
    Relying on Morales, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at page 990, the
People argue that the robbery language was given in error to

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Gaspar’s jury as a basis for a perfect self-defense instruction, and
that error should not be extended to imperfect self-defense. We
agree with the People.
       On September 30, 2021, approximately eight months before
Gaspar’s trial began, the First District decided Morales. There,
the trial court denied the defendant’s request to add the
bracketed language that an imminent danger of robbery formed a
basis for perfect self-defense in CALCRIM No. 505 (the
underlined language given in this case). (Morales, supra,
69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 990–992.) On appeal, the court reasoned,
“we are not convinced that a mere robbery, without more, will
give rise to the right of self-defense with deadly force” since
“robberies are not always forcible and atrocious, as they cover a
wide scope of conduct.” (Id. at p. 992.) The Morales court
observed, for example, that a robbery may be effectuated by the
perpetrator politely tapping a person on the shoulder to indicate
she should step aside from a cash register. (Ibid., citing People v.
Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246.) “A robbery therefore
cannot trigger the right to use deadly force in self-defense unless
the circumstances of the robbery gave rise to a reasonable belief
that the victim would suffer great bodily injury or death.”3
(Morales, at p. 992.)

3     In the wake of Morales and after Gaspar’s trial had
concluded, that portion of CALCRIM No. 505 was revised so that
it now reads: “The defendant acted in lawful self-defense if: 1.
The defendant reasonably believed that he “was in imminent
danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury [or was in
imminent danger of being a victim of (____________<insert
inherently forcible and atrocious crime such as rape or
mayhem>/<insert noninherently forcible and atrocious crime

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      By Gaspar’s reasoning, the trial court had a sua sponte
duty to include the robbery language in CALCRIM No. 571 for
imperfect self-defense because the trial gave a parallel
instruction in CALCRIM No. 505 for perfect self-defense. At the
time of Gaspar’s trial, the portion of CALCRIM No. 505 that
indicated an imminent danger of being robbed was a basis for
perfect self-defense was not an accurate statement of the law.
(Morales, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at pp. 990–992.) We thus reject
Gaspar’s argument that we should extend this inaccurate
statement of the law to CALCRIM No. 571. (See Pen. Code,
§ 1127 [judge must refuse to give an incorrect instruction].)
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                       RUBIN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

                        BAKER, J.

                        KIM, J.

such as robbery> under circumstances in which (he/she)
reasonably believed that (he/she) would suffer great bodily injury
or death)].”

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