Court Opinion

ID: 9930815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 19:03:41.163791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:43.044333
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/24 P. v. Sosa CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                B324963

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. TA154790)
         v.

VICTOR SOSA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.

      John Lanahan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Defendant and appellant Victor Sosa (defendant) appeals
from his murder conviction, asserting the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his request to prohibit the prosecution from
referring to a “sexual assault kit” by that name. We find no
abuse of discretion and defendant has not established he suffered
prejudice from the use of the term. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment.

                          BACKGROUND
        Defendant was convicted of the murder of Daisy De La O in
violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a), and the
allegation that defendant personally used a dangerous and
deadly weapon, a knife, within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (b)(1) was found true. On August 2, 2022, defendant
was sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life, enhanced by
one consecutive year pursuant to section 12022, subdivision
(b)(1).
        Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the
judgment.
Trial evidence
        Daisy’s grandfather Juan De La O (Juan)1 testified that
prior to Daisy’s death he had lived with Daisy, her mother,
younger brother and other family members for a year or two in a
second floor apartment on Long Beach Boulevard. He had seen
Daisy with her boyfriend, whom he identified as defendant, but
had never spoken to him. On several occasions, Juan saw them
chatting, but not kissing or hugging, although they looked

1     As Juan has the same surname of the victim, we call them
both by their first names to avoid confusion.

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content together. Defendant occasionally came into the family
residence.
       On February 22, 2021, Juan got home from work at
5:00 p.m. He was in the living room watching TV and chatting
with Daisy, her mother and his brother-in-law, when he saw a
man he presumed was defendant at the window. Juan saw only
his eyes, as he was wearing a mask, cap, and a beanie. Both the
mask and the beanie were red, black, and white. About 10
minutes later, around 10:30 p.m., Daisy left after kissing her
mother and grandmother, saying goodbye and, “Mom, l’ll be back
later.” Later in his room, with the window open, Juan could hear
Daisy’s voice and a male voice, murmuring. He then closed his
window and went to bed.
       Fourteen-year-old Jeffrey T. lived downstairs from Daisy’s
family in the unit closest to the alley. Jeffrey saw Daisy around
their multibuilding apartment complex almost every day and had
seen her with her boyfriend, whom he identified as defendant.
He had seen them kiss. Jeffrey usually saw Daisy and defendant
every night between buildings in a grassy area near gas tanks
with a metal cover. On or about February 22 around 11:35 p.m.
Jeffrey was returning from his cousin’s apartment in a different
building across the courtyard from his, when he saw Daisy and
defendant in front of his building. Daisy was lying on her side
near the stairs and defendant was walking back and forth with
his head down, wearing his usual all black clothing. Defendant
did not acknowledge Jeffrey, and Jeffrey heard nothing. He could
not tell whether Daisy was awake or asleep. Jeffrey testified that
he was within five feet when he passed Daisy and defendant.
Daisy was not crying, but looked like she was resting. Jeffrey
could not see their faces and did not see a beanie, but he had seen

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defendant many times and recognized him that night by his long
black hair.
      Jeffrey then went into his apartment, brushed his teeth,
and went to his bedroom. The view from his bedroom window
was a sort of shortcut between buildings, where Jeffrey had
previously seen Daisy and defendant kissing. About an hour
after he had been in his room Jeffrey heard a noise like the sound
of dragging paper or wrappers on the floor for about 10 seconds.
He ignored it and went to bed. He heard no more noises after
that.
      The next morning the manager of the apartment complex,
Jose Tellez, saw a rug next to a trash container, the same rug he
had previously seen rolled up against one of the buildings. Inside
he found a dead body. Law enforcement arrived about 30
minutes later.
      Tellez had seen Daisy around the complex during the
previous six months and knew she lived there with her mother
and grandfather. He had also seen Daisy with a person he
thought was her boyfriend, because he saw them hugging and
kissing. One afternoon he saw them under a blanket on the
covering over the gas meters in the alley. It was the same alley
where he found the body. Tellez had told them they could not be
there because there were children around who he did not want to
see that.
      Another resident in the complex, Ben Montes, testified he
had installed a surveillance camera at the top of his building
above the alley because it was a high-crime area and there had
been thefts and prostitution there.2

2    A video recording of the night of February 22 and 23, 2021,
was admitted into evidence, but not made a part of the record on

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       Defendant’s mother Claudia Gutierrez testified that
defendant lived with her in February 2021 and that he was 24
years old at that time. Daisy was his girlfriend of about three
years, but Gutierrez was not sure whether they were still dating
in February 2021. She had met Daisy only a couple times.
       When defendant did not come home after February 22,
Gutierrez worried. On February 25, 2021, she filed a missing
person report with the local police department. She tried texting
defendant and Daisy but received no reply. Gutierrez’s niece told
her about Daisy’s death. About two weeks later defendant
phoned Gutierrez, and they met on the street. She asked him
whether he had killed Daisy and told him to do the right thing.
Defendant gave no response, but put his head down. He asked
for money to pay off some “stuff” he owed. Gutierrez gave him
$500. Defendant never again came home.
       Criminalists who collected evidence from Daisy’s body
testified about the collection or testing of swabs taken of bodily
fluid and epithelial cells in search of DNA evidence. Courtney
Castellino, a senior criminalist with the Los Angeles County
Department of Medical Examiner-Coroner, testified that a
“sexual assault kit” contains a standard set of swabs and was
used because Daisy’s pants were pulled down below her buttocks.

appeal. As the recording was shown to the jury the witness
pointed out shadows that could be seen. Defendant argues that
two people can also be seen in the video, but no testimony was
admitted to that effect. “[D]efendant has the burden of providing
a record adequate to support his arguments on appeal.” (People
v. Malabag (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1427.) “‘“(M)atters not
presented by the record cannot be considered on the suggestion of
counsel in the briefs.”’” (In re Rogers (1980) 28 Cal.3d 429, 437,
fn. 6.)

                                5
A criminalist took swabs from her hips, the anal opening and
rectal area, breasts, genital and pubic area. Swabs were also
taken from Daisy’s pants, clothing, hair, mouth, and neck. A
tampon was in place and collected for evidence, but Daisy’s
vagina was not swabbed. Other items found in the area that
were also swabbed or collected: a steak knife, a set of keys, a
yellow and blue beanie, and various bloodstains.
      The swabs and other items were tested for DNA. Daisy’s
DNA and the DNA of an unknown contributor were found on a
sample taken from the top of the rug, while a bloodstain from the
bottom of the rug contained Daisy’s and defendant’s DNA.
Defendant’s DNA was found in a bloodstain on the knife blade,
while the rear half of the knife handle contained Daisy’s DNA
and the DNA of an unknown individual. Both defendant’s and
Daisy’s DNA were found on the front part of the knife handle.
The DNA on the keys and key ring belonged to Daisy, defendant
and an unknown individual. The DNA in a bloodstain on one
wall was Daisy’s and on another wall belonged to defendant.
      An anal epithelial sample and an external genitalia
epithelial sample revealed Daisy’s and defendant’s DNA. There
was insufficient sperm on all swabs to prepare a profile except on
the tampon, which contained both Daisy’s and defendant’s DNA.
A criminalist explained that seminal fluid will still test positive
after being on the body for a few days, depending on how
frequently the person bathes or changes underwear.
      An autopsy was performed on Daisy, who was, at the time
of death, 19 years old, five feet tall, and weighed 137 pounds.
She suffered multiple sharp force type injuries on the right side
of her head and neck, and some bruises on her upper arms, which
occurred before death and appeared to be several hours old. The

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fatal wound was the sharp force injury on her neck. It was a long
incise wound, inflicted either from the front or behind, that went
from the left to right, measuring about five inches long and a
little over one inch deep. It was inflicted with a sharp
instrument, such as a knife, which cut the right common carotid
artery, the main branch of the jugular vein, the vagus nerves,
muscles, and the trachea. Fifty-eight shallow wounds to the head
of various different angulations and sizes were found, each with a
maximum length of one inch. Only the tip of the sharp
instrument penetrated the scalp.

                            DISCUSSION
       Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by
permitting the prosecution to refer to a sexual assault kit by that
name, despite the fact defendant was not charged with sexual
assault. Defendant argues the court should have required a more
neutral term for the kit because the term was “irrelevant and
unnecessary to either its admission or probative value.” As he
did below, defendant suggests that a term such as “physical
assault kit” would have been less prejudicial.
       Prior to jury selection defense counsel asked for an order
prohibiting the prosecution from asking witnesses questions
about rape or sexual assault, as defendant was not charged with
either crime. The court granted that request but noted “it seems
that it is relevant how the victim was found in regards to if there
was the testing for DNA, which I believe there was, and where
the testing occurred. So that seems to be relevant.”
       Following jury selection and prior to opening statements,
defense counsel asked the court to require the prosecution to

                                 7
refer to the sexual assault kit as a physical assault kit or just an
assault kit. The prosecutor replied there was no sexual assault
report, no sexual assault or rape charge against defendant, no
evidence of a sexual assault, and the criminalists would testify
that the kit was prepared because the body was found with her
pants pulled down, exposing the buttocks, and her sweatshirt
pulled up in front and back. The trial court denied defense
counsel’s request and allowed the kit to be called a “sexual
assault kit.”
       “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “‘We
review the trial court’s rulings on relevance and admission or
exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 . . . for
abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5
Cal.5th 442, 480, quoting People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158,
1198.) We do not disturb the trial court’s discretion unless the
court exercised it “‘“in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”’” (People v.
Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 668.) It is defendant’s burden to
demonstrate both the alleged abuse of discretion and the
resulting miscarriage of justice. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8
Cal.4th 1060, 1124.) The erroneous admission of evidence under
section 352 is reviewed under the prejudice test of People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Thomas (2023) 14
Cal.5th 327, 373-374.) Under the Watson test, it must appear
reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different

                                 8
result if the disputed evidence had been excluded. (Thomas, at
p. 374.)
        Defendant has not demonstrated that the court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner. In fact the court heard argument of counsel on two
occasions and carefully considered its ruling, as demonstrated by
the court’s explanation: “So my concern is in limiting that, then
it may lead to other confusing areas because the evidence is going
to come out how the victim was found. Thus, a particular exam
was done to try to collect evidence of which specimen came from.
I don’t mind if—I mean, there’s follow-up questions, and I’m not
sure if this would assist in what [defense counsel was] after, the
follow-up questions of this exam was done because of this and
that’s just the name of the exam because of the area in which the
exam is taking place. That’s why I’m hesitant in limiting what
the exam is called because it may lead to other issues depending
on how the evidence comes out in trial.”
        Defendant has also failed to demonstrate that a different
result would have been reasonably probable without calling a
sexual assault kit by that name. Defendant merely gives his
conclusion that the term added an emotional bias against him
that was irrelevant and unnecessary to either its admission or
probative value. Calling the kit by its usual name is not
inherently prejudicial. (See People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168,
213 [counsel not ineffective for using the term or for not objecting
to it].)
        During defendant’s two-week trial five criminalists and one
medical examiner testified regarding evidence gathering and
processing, but the term was used very little in their extensive
testimony. Criminalist Castellino testified she went to the place

                                 9
where the body was found because she was notified there was a
possible body dump case warranting a sexual assault kit. She
explained that a sexual assault kit contained a standard set of
swabs for processing a body for “potential sexual assault or body
swabs in general.” She also explained the kit was used to gather
evidence from Daisy’s body because her pants were pulled down
below her buttocks. Defendant has pointed to no testimony
suggesting this was anything other than a potential sexual
assault case at the beginning of the investigation.
       Defendant has suggested no reason to believe that the fact
a sexual assault kit was used before there was any suspect in the
case somehow suggested that defendant had assaulted or raped
Daisy. As the People point out, the fact that Daisy was found
face-down with her pants below her buttocks and her shirt lifted
up was far more suggestive of a sexual assault than the use of the
term, “sexual assault kit.” Thus calling the kit a “physical
assault kit” or just an “assault kit” would not change the
locations swabbed or the DNA findings, which along with the
partially undressed condition of the body, suggested sexual
assault as a possibility.
       Moreover, the evidence included DNA of an unknown
contributor on the knife handle, the bottom of rug, and the keys
found at the scene. Defense counsel took advantage of that
evidence to suggest that someone other than defendant
committed the crime.
       Furthermore, the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s
guilt precluded any reasonable probability of a different result.
Compelling circumstantial evidence gives rise to a reasonable
inference that Daisy died sometime between 11:30 p.m. on
February 22, 2021, and 12:30 a.m. on February 23, 2021. Shortly

                               10
before 10:30 on or about the night of February 22, Juan saw a
man looking into his living room window, wearing a mask, a cap,
and a beanie. Although he saw only his eyes, he recognized the
man as defendant, whom he knew was Daisy’s boyfriend. Also,
we infer from Daisy’s behavior of leaving their apartment about
10 minutes later after saying she would be back that Juan’s
identification was accurate. In addition, later when Juan went to
his room that night, he heard Daisy’s voice and a male voice
murmuring through the open window. Jeffrey too saw Daisy and
defendant together at 11:35 p.m., though it is unknown whether
Daisy was still alive then, as she lying on her side near the stairs,
and Jeffrey saw defendant walk back and forth with his head
down. About an hour later Jeffrey heard a dragging noise from
the alley, suggesting it was the sound of the rug being dragged
into the alley. This also gives rise to the reasonable inference
that defendant dragged Daisy’s body into the alley, noting both
his and Daisy’s DNA were found on the rug and the handle of the
knife, as well as on a wall near Daisy’s body. In sum, from about
10:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., Daisy was alive and with defendant, and
defendant was with Daisy or her body sometime thereafter in the
alley.
       Defendant then disappeared. Evidence of flight
immediately after the commission of a crime is relevant to show
consciousness of guilt. (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th
1005, 1054-1055.) Defendant did not return home after the night
of February 22-23, which prompted his worried mother to file a
missing person report just three days later. Defendant did not
reply to his mother’s texts or contact her for the next two weeks,
and then he met her away from their home, asking for money.
The inference that defendant was conscious of his guilt was

                                 11
strengthened by his arrest at the Mexican border more than four
months after Daisy was killed.
       When defendant met with his mother two weeks after
Daisy’s death, Gutierrez asked whether he had killed Daisy.
Defendant made no reply, but put his head down. “‘If a person is
accused of having committed a crime, under circumstances which
fairly afford him an opportunity to hear, understand, and to
reply, and which do not lend themselves to an inference that he
was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and he fails to
speak, or he makes an evasive or equivocal reply, both the
accusatory statement and the fact of silence or equivocation may
be offered as an implied or adoptive admission of guilt.’” (People
v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189.)
       Defendant argues that the response to his mother’s
question was ambiguous and could either have been an adoptive
admission of guilt or his frustration over his own mother
suspecting him of a crime he had not committed. He also argues
that his apparent flight to Mexico could have meant he was
attempting to avoid arrest because he was guilty or because he
was innocent and everyone including his own mother thought he
was guilty. Defendant suggests that Juan and Jeffrey were
mistaken in their identifications of defendant that night and that
another person killed Daisy. Defendant’s inferences are weak
when considered under all the circumstances.
       Therefore, we conclude defendant has not demonstrated a
reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a
different result if the sexual assault kit had been called by a
different name. We also conclude that if the trial court had

                                12
abused its discretion in denying defense counsel’s request to
rename the kit, we would find any such error to be harmless.

                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                    ________________________
                                    CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, J.

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