Court Opinion

ID: 9822603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 09:13:12.90235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:07.756272
License: Public Domain

Saxe, J.
(dissenting). On April 9, 2013, a vehicle owned and operated by plaintiff Carmelo Maisonet, and occupied by passenger plaintiff Miriam Cirera, was in the northbound lane of Jerome Avenue in the Bronx, stopped at a traffic light at East 176th Street behind two or three other cars, when it was struck from behind by a truck operated by defendant Michael Roman, which was also traveling northbound on Jerome Avenue.
Defendant Roman told a different, and somewhat inconsistent, story. He said he was driving 20 miles per hour northbound on Jerome Avenue, and was at its intersection with 176th Street with a green light at the intersection, traveling a safe distance behind the vehicle directly in front of him, when a southbound car suddenly turned left in front of him. In order to avoid that oncoming car, Roman says, he swerved to the right, but since there was a column to his right supporting the elevated subway, he was forced to immediately swerve back to the left, at which time he struck the back of plaintiffs’ vehicle, which he asserted was moving, not stopped.
It is undisputed that plaintiffs established a prima facie showing of negligence against defendant driver Roman with proof that he struck their vehicle in the rear (see e.g. Santos v Booth, 126 AD3d 506, 506 [1st Dept 2015]). The only question is whether defendant’s assertions created a triable issue of fact as to whether the emergency doctrine defense could be applied.
The defense may be invoked where a defendant was faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance and forced to make an immediate decision, such that the resulting collision is attributable to that circumstance rather than to any negligence on defendant’s part (see Lifson v City of Syracuse, 17 NY3d 492, 497 [2011]). To validly invoke the defense, a defendant must not only have been faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance forcing him to make a speedy decision, but the resulting collision may not be attributable to that defendant’s *127negligence (id.). Here, even accepting defendant’s unsupported assertion, there is no logic by which it may be concluded that the rear-end collision was caused by a sudden need to swerve around an intervening car, rather than by defendant’s own negligence.
Defendant relies on the bare assertion that another, unidentified vehicle suddenly turned left from the oncoming lane of traffic, appearing directly in front of him when he had the right-of-way, causing him to swerve first right, then left, after which he collided with the rear of plaintiffs’ vehicle. However, that asserted intervening vehicle is insufficient to justify the application of the emergency doctrine. Defendant always had the duty to maintain a safe distance between his vehicle and the vehicle in front of him, and to proceed at a rate of speed that would not alter that safe distance (see Forbes v Plume, 202 AD2d 821, 822 [3d Dept 1994]). If he had been going an appropriate rate of speed and had maintained a safe distance between his vehicle and plaintiffs’ vehicle in front of him — that is, leaving enough distance to allow for stopping if plaintiffs’ vehicle stopped — even the sudden need to swerve around a car that suddenly cut in front of him would not have caused him to crash into the back of plaintiffs’ vehicle.
Defendant does not claim, nor could he reasonably claim, that having to swerve around a vehicle that suddenly appeared in front of his vehicle caused his rate of speed to increase, or shortened the distance between his vehicle and plaintiffs’ vehicle. So, his inability to avoid rear-ending plaintiffs’ car, which was directly in front of him in the lane, was not caused by his claimed sudden need to swerve. Instead, it could only have been caused by his excess speed or the insufficient distance between his own vehicle and plaintiffs’ vehicle. Consequently, the sudden emergency situation he says confronted him does not entitle him to invoke the defense, because it is certain, not merely “plausible,” that his own negligence had caused or contributed to the collision.
Richter and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ., concur with Renwick, J.R; Andrias and Saxe, JJ., dissent in an opinion by Saxe, J.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County, entered March 27, 2015, reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motions denied.