Court Opinion

ID: 9598564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:09:55.272689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:49.612484
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. While the majority is properly concerned with an apparent loophole in the forfeiture statute, and while I have every reason to agree with the majority’s attempt to close that loophole, the attempt made here violates the plain language of the statute and places us in the position of rewriting the General Assembly’s requirements for forfeiture.
As Carr v. State of Ga., 212 Ga. App. 36 (441 SE2d 85) (1994), points out, the distinctions between the general forfeiture language of OCGA § 16-13-49 (d) and the exception created by OCGA § 16-13-49 (e) are significant. Subsections (d) (2) and (4) define property subject to forfeiture in such broad and general language as property “directly or indirectly . . . intended for use ... to facilitate” or “available for use ... to facilitate” a violation of the drug laws. No actual use need be shown; the property need only be intended or available to facilitate a violation. “Available” means simply “capable of being used,” or “that can be got, had, or reached,” while “intended” means “designed; purposed; planned” or “prospective; future.” Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1983).
In contrast, the exception created by subsection (e) provides: “A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture . . . for a violation involving . . . four ounces of marijuana or less unless said property was used to facilitate a transaction in or a purchase of or sale of a controlled substance or marijuana.” (Emphasis supplied.) This subsection requires, in the case of small amounts of drugs, that actual use, not availability or intention, be shown. Carr, supra, 212 Ga. App. at 37.
*881Decided June 26, 1996.
James P. Brown, Jr., for appellant.
Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, Gail M. Travillian, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
“In interpreting statutes, courts must look for the legislature’s intent, ‘keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy.’ OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). All words, except words of art, shall be given their ordinary significance. [Cit.] ‘(W)here a constitutional provision or statute is plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, the court has no authority to place a different construction upon it, but must construe it according to its terms.’ [Cit.]” Franklin v. Hill, 264 Ga. 302, 304 (2) (444 SE2d 778) (1994).
What the majority leaves unsaid is perhaps as important as what is stated. The majority says “the State should not be forced to wait until these marijuana plants grow another fraction of an inch and their total weight exceeds four ounces before making the arrest and proceeding with forfeiture.” But it must follow that the majority also is saying, at least implicitly, that the State “should not be forced to wait” until an individual attempts to sell marijuana plants in an immature state. By this reasoning, the distinctive language of OCGA § 16-13-49 (e) is obliterated, and the rule swallows the exception. If this result was intended by the General Assembly, it is for the legislature, not this Court, to say so. “It is not the function of this court to rewrite the laws enacted by our General Assembly.” Lam v. State, 208 Ga. App. 324, 325 (3) (430 SE2d 775) (1993).