Court Opinion

ID: 9882401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:09:18.365834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:18.189520
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Banks v. Banks, 2023-Ohio-3229.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 JOCELYN BANKS,                               :   APPEAL NO. C-230006
                                                  TRIAL NO. DR-2101477
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :

                                              :
   VS.                                              O P I N I O N.
                                              :

 KENNETH RAY BANKS,                           :

      Defendant-Appellant.                    :

Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 13, 2023

James J. Whitfield, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Tibbs Law Office and Sarah E. Michel, for Defendant-Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Judge.

       {¶1}   The parties here decided to part ways after over a decade of marriage.

While they reached a settlement agreement that resolved nearly all issues, they could

not come to terms on the equity in a residence located at 787 Cedarhill Drive. The trial

court sorted through the history of the Cedarhill property, determined that it

constituted the sole property of plaintiff-appellee Jocelyn Whitfield (formerly Banks),

and issued a divorce decree accordingly. Defendant-appellant Kenneth Ray Banks

appeals that judgment, maintaining that the trial court erred in its valuation and

characterization of the Cedarhill property. Based on a review of the record before us,

however, we agree with the trial court’s decision and affirm its judgment.

                                           I.

       {¶2}   The parties married in 2009 and came before the domestic relations

court seeking a divorce about 12 years later. In August 2008, prior to the parties’

marriage, Ms. Whitfield purchased the Cedarhill property. At a hearing on the division

of property, she testified that she maintained the Cedarhill property as her separate

property—paying the mortgage and all expenses—for 15 months. The parties agree

that, for a period after they were married, they paid the monthly mortgage payments

and renovation costs jointly and that Mr. Banks assisted, at least minimally, with some

renovations to the home. In 2012, the parties refinanced the property, and Mr. Banks

signed a quitclaim deed, conveying his interest in the property to Ms. Whitfield. The

record is silent on Mr. Banks’s motivation behind the quitclaim deed.

       {¶3}   In September 2021, Ms. Whitfield filed a complaint for divorce.

Eventually, after the parties focused their dispute on the Cedarhill property, the

magistrate issued a decision finding that Mr. Banks did not have any equity in the

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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

property. Mr. Banks objected to the magistrate’s order, but the trial court overruled

his objection, determining “the quitclaim deed relinquished any rights or interests

[Mr. Banks] had in the property.” Based on that determination, the trial court issued

a final decree of divorce in December 2022. Mr. Banks now appeals.

                                          II.

       {¶4}   In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Banks insists that the trial court

erred and abused its discretion in failing to award him any equity in the Cedarhill

property. In a divorce proceeding, the trial court “determine[s] what constitutes

marital property and what constitutes separate property” and then “divide[s] the

marital and separate property equitably between the spouses.” R.C. 3105.171(B).

       {¶5}   We review a trial court’s “ ‘equitable division of property for an abuse of

discretion.’ ” Boolchand v. Boolchand, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-200111 and C-

200120, 2020-Ohio-6951, ¶ 9, quoting McKenna v. McKenna, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.

C-180475, 2019-Ohio-3807, ¶ 9. “An abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere

error of judgment; rather, ‘it implies that the court’s attitude is arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unconscionable.’ ” Hayes v. Durrani, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

190617, 2021-Ohio-725, ¶ 8, quoting Boolchand at ¶ 9. An abuse of discretion occurs

when “a court exercis[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter

over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427,

2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

       {¶6}   Based on our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to award Mr. Banks equity in the Cedarhill property.

The evidence is undisputed that he transferred his interest in the Cedarhill property

by executing the quitclaim deed. Nevertheless, he insists this transfer should not have

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

any bearing on the classification of the property as separate or marital. Generally, the

party challenging the effectiveness of a deed, however, must prove that the deed was

not intended to effectuate a complete transfer of his or her interest in the property.

See, e.g., Pettry v. Pettry, 81 Ohio App.3d 30, 34, 610 N.E.2d 443 (10th Dist.1991)

(“[T]he burden is upon the person challenging the effectiveness of a deed executed in

accordance with statutory requirements to accomplish the conveyance set forth

therein.”); Galloway v. Galloway, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-21-043, 2023-Ohio-29, ¶ 15

(“[T]he burden of challenging the effectiveness of a deed executed in accordance with

statutory requirements rests with the person making the challenge.”); Maulis v.

Maulis, 11th Dist. Portage No. 96-P-0190, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3111, 6 (July 18,

1997) (“On appeal, the challenging party * * * has the burden of demonstrating that

the lower court abused its discretion in finding that the quitclaim deed was intended

to accomplish a conveyance of legal interests * * * to the transferee.”). Therefore, Mr.

Banks bore the burden to prove that “in some fashion the deed was not intended as an

outright complete transfer of all of [his] interest in the property.” Pettry at 34.

       {¶7}    As the record confirms, he failed to offer sufficient evidence

demonstrating that the deed was not intended as a full transfer of his interest in the

Cedarhill property. He did not present any alternative motivation behind the transfer

of his interest in the property. Nor did he question the validity of the deed at any point

during the proceedings.

       {¶8}    Notwithstanding that absence of evidence, Mr. Banks maintains that he

is entitled to equity in the property because he contributed to mortgage payments and

renovation costs and labor during a portion of the parties’ marriage. In this regard, he

points to several cases generally indicating that equity interest gained throughout the

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

course of a marriage is marital property. See, e.g., Kotch v. Kotch, 178 Ohio App.3d

358, 2008-Ohio-5084, 897 N.E.2d 1191 (5th Dist.); Middendorf v. Middendorf, 82

Ohio St.3d 397, 696 N.E.2d 575 (1998); Worthington v. Worthington, 21 Ohio St.3d

73, 488 N.E.2d 150 (1986). But these cases did not involve a transfer of the property

during the marriage. Unlike the parties in these cases, Mr. Banks relinquished any

interest he may have had by conveying the property to Ms. Whitfield by quitclaim

deed.

        {¶9}   He further argues that, because “the form of title is relevant to, but not

conclusive of, the classification of property,” Barkley v. Barkley, 119 Ohio App.3d 155,

161, 694 N.E.2d 989 (4th Dist.1997), the quitclaim deed did not terminate his right to

marital equity in the property. Barkley, however, involved the purchase of property

by joint deed during a marriage, not the transfer of property between spouses. Id. at

160. And regardless, based on the factual context, a trial court may determine

property should be classified consistent with its title. See id. at 161.

        {¶10} Because Mr. Banks transferred his property interest and failed to

challenge the substance or effect of the transfer, we cannot find an abuse of discretion

on this record.
                                     *       *      *

        {¶11} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule Mr. Banks’s assignment

of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed.
CROUSE, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., concur.

Please note:

        The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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