Court Opinion

ID: 9371947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 13:02:11.338138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:31.282867
License: Public Domain

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        MICHAEL R. FOSTER v. COMMISSIONER
                 OF CORRECTION
                    (AC 45132)
                       Cradle, Suarez and Clark, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crime
   of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance
   of his trial counsel. As a result of a head injury the petitioner sustained
   during the commission of the underlying offense, as well as his claims
   of amnesia both before and after the incident, the petitioner’s trial
   counsel requested that he be evaluated for competency to stand trial.
   Following a competency evaluation and hearing, the trial court found
   the petitioner competent to stand trial. Subsequently, the petitioner
   pleaded guilty pursuant to Alford v. North Carolina (400 U.S. 25), and
   was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement. In his habeas
   action, the petitioner alleged that his trial counsel’s representation of
   him was constitutionally deficient in that counsel failed to advise him
   not to plead guilty and that his guilty plea was not made voluntarily.
   The habeas court denied the petition, and, on the granting of certification
   to appeal, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas
   court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
   petitioner having failed to demonstrate that, but for his trial counsel’s
   conduct, he would not have pleaded guilty, thereby failing to prove that
   he suffered prejudice under Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668):
   the habeas court’s findings were supported by the evidence in the record,
   and this court was not left with the definite and firm conviction that a
   mistake had been committed, as, at the habeas trial, the petitioner
   testified that he did not want to put his wife and children through a
   trial because he believed his wife would have had to testify about weap-
   ons and illegal drugs in their home, his wife would go to jail as a result,
   and that his children would end up in the foster care system; moreover,
   the habeas court found that no credible evidence supported the petition-
   er’s bare assertion at the habeas trial that, had he been properly advised,
   he would have insisted on entering a conditional plea of nolo contendere
   in order to preserve an appeal of the trial court’s competency determina-
   tion, the habeas court having found the petitioner’s testimony in that
   regard not to be credible, and, as it was the habeas court’s function to
   weigh the evidence and determine credibility, this court gave great
   deference to its findings.
     Argued October 12, 2022—officially released February 21, 2023

                            Procedural History

  Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Tolland and tried to the court, Seeley, J.; judgment
denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the
granting of certification, appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
  Nicole P. Britt, assigned counsel, with whom, on the
brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for
the appellant (petitioner).
  James M. Ralls, special assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott,
state’s attorney, and David M. Carlucci, former assis-
tant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                          Opinion

   CRADLE, J. The petitioner, Michael R. Foster,
appeals following the granting of his petition for certifi-
cation to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the peti-
tioner claims that the habeas court incorrectly con-
cluded that his trial counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance by failing (1) to advise the petitioner to reject
the plea offer because it was effectively a life sentence,
(2) to advise the petitioner to reject the plea offer
because he would lose his right to appeal the trial
court’s determination that the petitioner was competent
to stand trial, and (3) to preserve the petitioner’s right
to appeal from the trial court’s determination that the
petitioner was competent to stand trial. We affirm the
judgment of the habeas court.
   The following facts, as set forth by the habeas court,
and procedural history are relevant to the petitioner’s
claims on appeal. On September 9, 2005, the petitioner
arrived at the victim’s house carrying a crowbar and
bug spray. The petitioner rang the victim’s doorbell,
and, when the victim came to the door, the petitioner
sprayed bug spray at her and beat her with the crowbar.
The victim fled from her home to her neighbors’ house,
but the petitioner followed her into the neighbors’ house
and continued the assault. One of the victim’s neighbors
intervened, threatening to shoot the petitioner if he did
not cease his attack on the victim. When the petitioner
did not relent, the neighbor fired his single-shot rifle at
the petitioner. Although the shot struck the petitioner
in the back of his head, the bullet did not penetrate his
skull, and he continued his attack. As the petitioner
continued to hit the victim with the crowbar, the neigh-
bor reloaded his rifle and fired again, this time striking
the victim. The victim died from her injuries. An autopsy
revealed the victim’s cause of death was both blunt
force trauma to the head—caused by the petitioner’s
attack with the crowbar—and a gunshot wound to
the heart.
   The petitioner left the neighbors’ residence and
returned to the parked vehicle that he had driven to
the victim’s home. Later, the police found the petitioner
sitting inside the vehicle. The police took the petitioner
into custody, and, upon discovering the petitioner’s
head injury, the petitioner was transported to a hospital
for medical treatment. While at the hospital, the peti-
tioner ‘‘reported some degree of post-traumatic amnesia
in relation to the events surrounding his injury.’’
  The petitioner was subsequently arrested and charged
with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a,1
among other offenses.2 Attorney Todd Edgington repre-
sented the petitioner throughout the criminal trial pro-
ceedings. In light of the head injury the petitioner sus-
tained during the commission of the underlying offense,
as well as the petitioner’s claims of amnesia, Edgington
referred the petitioner to David Lovejoy, a clinical neu-
ropsychologist, who performed an assessment on the
petitioner on March 16, 2006. Lovejoy determined that
the petitioner’s description of his memory loss indicated
more than twelve hours of anterograde amnesia—an
inability to recall postincident events—and two to three
hours of retrograde amnesia—an inability to recall pre-
incident events. Additionally, Lovejoy reported that the
last memory the petitioner had prior to the onset of his
amnesia was of leaving his home to buy a dehumidifier
for his wife. However, despite the petitioner’s traumatic
brain injury and resulting amnesia, Lovejoy concluded
that the petitioner had otherwise recovered and dis-
played no other psychological deficits.
   Edgington subsequently requested that the petitioner
be evaluated for competency to stand trial. On May 15,
2006, the trial court, Clifford, J., ordered a competency
evaluation of the petitioner pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 54-56d.3 A clinical team of three professionals
from the Office of Court Evaluations assessed the peti-
tioner and determined that he ‘‘was able to understand
the proceedings against him and was able to assist in
his own defense,’’ noting that ‘‘[h]is thinking is rational,
his communication abilities are intact and he is moti-
vated to defend himself.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)
   In August, 2006, the trial court, D’Addabbo, J., held
a competency hearing over three days during which
Edgington argued that the petitioner was not competent
to stand trial because he was unable to assist in his
own defense due to his memory loss during the time
period before and after the offense. On November 16,
2006, the court issued an oral decision finding the peti-
tioner competent to stand trial. In so doing, the court
applied the test adopted in State v. Gilbert, 229 Conn.
228, 640 A.2d 61 (1994),4 to determine the extent to
which the petitioner’s amnesia rendered him unable to
assist in his own defense. The court concluded that,
‘‘[u]nder the Gilbert analysis in this pretrial setting . . .
the claimed loss of memory does not prevent the state
from prosecuting the [petitioner] [and that] the [peti-
tioner] . . . [is] competent as he is able to understand
the proceedings against him and to assist in his own
defense.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
   Then, on November 20, 2007, the petitioner pleaded
guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine5, to murder in
violation of § 53a-54a. In exchange for his plea, the
petitioner agreed to a sentence of no greater than fifty
years of incarceration, with the right to argue for a
lesser sentence of forty years of incarceration. During
the court’s canvass, the petitioner acknowledged that,
had he gone to trial, there was a likelihood that he
would be convicted of the crime of murder, as well
as the other charged offenses, and possibly receive a
greater sentence thereafter.6 He further admitted during
the canvass that his reason for entering a guilty plea
was to avoid the risk of a longer sentence following a
trial. The court, Alexander, J., following a sentencing
hearing, sentenced the petitioner to a total effective
sentence of fifty years of incarceration on January 25,
2008. The state entered a nolle prosequi on the
remaining charges.
   On or about June 9, 2016, the petitioner filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus. After the petitioner was
appointed counsel, he filed an amended petition on
February 15, 2019, in which he claimed that Edgington’s
representation of him was constitutionally deficient in
that he failed to advise him not to plead guilty. He also
alleged that his guilty plea was not voluntary.7
    The petitioner’s claims were tried to the habeas court,
Seeley, J., on March 4, 2020.8 The habeas court filed a
memorandum of decision on October 4, 2021, in which
it found the following facts: ‘‘The petitioner’s trial coun-
sel in the criminal case was Todd Edgington, an experi-
enced criminal defense attorney who was employed
as a public defender at the time he represented the
petitioner. He had represented numerous clients over
his thirty year career in which competency was an issue.
After the trial court found the [petitioner] competent
to stand trial, Edgington consulted with attorneys
within the appellate unit of the Office of the Public
Defender regarding the viability of success on appeal
relating to the trial’s court’s finding of competency and
application of the Gilbert factors. He was told there
was no indication that the Connecticut Supreme Court
would revisit its decision in Gilbert. He also made a
determination that he did not believe the issue would
be successful on appeal.
   ‘‘Edgington had a positive relationship with the peti-
tioner throughout his representation of him. Edgington
did not have a plan to proceed to trial because from a
very early stage in his representation, the petitioner did
not want a trial. The petitioner recognized that there
was certain information that would have come out at
trial that would have been very damaging to his family.
The petitioner’s marriage with his wife was ‘good,’ he
‘worshipped’ her and there was no other woman for
him. The petitioner . . . did not want to put his wife
and children through a trial, nor did he want to expose
his wife to possible prosecution relating to illegal drugs
in their residence.9
  ‘‘Prior to the petitioner pleading guilty to murder,
Edgington met with the petitioner numerous times at
the correctional facility and never felt rushed. He dis-
cussed the state’s evidence with the petitioner, as well
as what the state would have to prove in order to obtain
a conviction at trial, and the maximum exposure he
would face if he proceeded to trial. Edgington deter-
mined that it was a strong case for the state in light
of witnesses who observed the petitioner repeatedly
striking the victim with a tire iron. It was Edgington’s
practice to explain the offer to his client, and then point
out the consequences if a client were to accept the offer
and enter a guilty plea, and the consequences if the
client rejected the offer and proceeded to trial. Further-
more, it was his practice to advise a client that by
pleading guilty, the client would lose his appellate
rights, as well as to discuss possible defenses. Edging-
ton discussed the necessary issues with the petitioner
over a period of time, and not just before the petitioner
entered his guilty plea. This court finds credible Edging-
ton’s testimony that he would have explained to the
petitioner that, by pleading guilty, he would be losing
his appellate rights, since that was part of his standard
advice when preparing a client to plead guilty.’’ (Foot-
note in original; footnote omitted.)
   On the basis of the foregoing facts, the habeas court
concluded, first, that ‘‘[t]he petitioner [had] not offered
any credible evidence that [Edgington’s] performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’’
Second, the habeas court concluded that the petitioner
failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984), because he ‘‘failed to establish a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty to the charge of murder
under the Alford doctrine, and would have insisted on
entering a nolo contendere plea pursuant to General
Statutes § 54-94a, conditioned on the right to appeal
the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.’’ The
court found that ‘‘[t]he credible evidence presented
establishes the petitioner entered his guilty plea under
the Alford doctrine because he did not want to run the
risk that the state would pursue charges against his
wife. There is no credible evidence presented that the
petitioner would have insisted on entering a conditional
nolo contendere plea so that he could have appealed
the trial court’s finding of competency.’’ Relying on
these independent grounds, the habeas court denied
the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The
habeas court thereafter granted certification to appeal,
and this appeal followed.
   The standard of review in a habeas corpus proceeding
challenging the effective assistance of trial counsel is
well settled. ‘‘When reviewing the decision of a habeas
court, the facts found by the habeas court may not be
disturbed unless the findings were clearly erroneous.
. . . The issue, however, of [w]hether the representa-
tion [that] a defendant received at trial was constitution-
ally inadequate is a mixed question of law and fact.
. . . As such, that question requires plenary review by
this court unfettered by the clearly erroneous standard.
. . . Under the Strickland test, when a petitioner
alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, he must estab-
lish that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced the defense because
there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the proceedings would have been different had it not
been for the deficient performance. . . . Furthermore,
because a successful petitioner must satisfy both
prongs of the Strickland test, failure to satisfy either
prong is fatal to a habeas petition. . . .
   ‘‘To satisfy the first prong, that his counsel’s perfor-
mance was deficient, the petitioner must establish that
his counsel made errors so serious that [counsel] was
not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the [peti-
tioner] by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. . . . The petitioner
must thus show that counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness considering all
of the circumstances. . . . [A] court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . Further-
more, the right to counsel is not the right to perfect
counsel.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 214
Conn. App. 199, 212–13, 280 A.3d 526, cert. denied, 345
Conn. 967, 285 A.3d 736 (2022).
  ‘‘To satisfy the prejudice prong, a claimant must dem-
onstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. . . . A reason-
able probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. . . . In its analysis, a
reviewing court may look to the performance prong or
to the prejudice prong, and the petitioner’s failure to
prove either is fatal to a habeas petition.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lance W. v. Commissioner
of Correction, 204 Conn. App. 346, 355, 251 A.3d 619,
cert. denied, 337 Conn. 902, 252 A.3d 363 (2021).
   The habeas court denied the petitioner’s petition on
the ground that he failed to satisfy both the performance
prong and the prejudice prong. In challenging that deter-
mination, the petitioner argues that the habeas court
incorrectly concluded that his trial counsel did not pro-
vide ineffective assistance by failing (1) to advise the
petitioner to reject the plea offer because it was effec-
tively a life sentence, (2) to advise the petitioner to
reject the plea offer because he would lose his right to
appeal the trial court’s determination that the petitioner
was competent to stand trial, and (3) to preserve the
petitioner’s right to appeal from the trial court’s deter-
mination that the petitioner was competent to stand
trial.
   On appeal, we need not decide whether the petition-
er’s trial counsel rendered deficient performance
because, even if we assume that the alleged perfor-
mance was deficient, all three claims raised by the peti-
tioner fail because the petitioner failed to prove that
he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s conduct. See
Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, 213 Conn.
App. 358, 366, 277 A.3d 924 (‘‘[b]ecause both [the defi-
cient performance and prejudice] prongs [of the Strick-
land test] . . . must be established for a habeas peti-
tioner to prevail, a court may dismiss a petitioner’s
claim if he fails to meet either prong’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 903, 282 A.3d
466 (2022).
  With respect to the prejudice prong, the petitioner
argues that, had trial counsel informed and advised
him appropriately, the petitioner would have pleaded
differently. We are not persuaded.
   In the context of a habeas petition claiming ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel where the petitioner pleaded
guilty, a petitioner satisfies the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test if he reasonably demonstrates that, but
for the conduct of counsel, the petitioner would not
have pleaded guilty. See Colon v. Commissioner of
Correction, 179 Conn. App. 30, 36, 177 A.3d 1162 (2017),
cert. denied, 328 Conn. 907, 178 A.3d 390 (2018). How-
ever, a petitioner ‘‘must make more than a bare allega-
tion that he would have pleaded differently’’ to demon-
strate prejudice; (internal quotation marks omitted) id.;
because ‘‘such a statement suffers from obvious credi-
bility problems and must be evaluated in light of the
circumstances the defendant would have faced at the
time of his decision.’’ Hooper v. Garraghty, 845 F.2d
471, 475 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 843, 109 S. Ct.
117, 102 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1988).
   ‘‘It is well established that [t]he habeas court is
afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings,
and those findings will not be disturbed [on appeal]
unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . Thus, [t]his
court does not retry the case or evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses. . . . Rather, we must defer to the
[trier of fact’s] assessment of the credibility of the wit-
nesses based on its firsthand observation of their con-
duct, demeanor and attitude. . . . The habeas judge,
as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility
of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testi-
mony. . . . Thus, the court’s factual findings are enti-
tled to great weight. . . . Furthermore, [a] finding of
fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in
the record to support it . . . or when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Santiago v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 213 Conn. App. 368–69.
  As noted earlier in this opinion, the habeas court
found that the petitioner entered his guilty plea under
the Alford doctrine because he did not want to run the
risk that the state would pursue charges against his
wife and did not want to put his family through a trial.
The habeas court further found that no credible evi-
dence supported his claim that he would have insisted
on entering a conditional plea of nolo contendere in
order to preserve an appeal of the trial court’s compe-
tency determination.
    Following our careful review of the record, we con-
clude that the habeas court’s findings are supported by
the evidence in the record, and we are not left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. At the habeas trial, the petitioner testified
that he ‘‘didn’t want to put [his] wife and children
through’’ a trial because he believed his wife would
have to testify about ‘‘weapons in [their] home, illegal
drugs in [their] home . . . which [the] prosecution will
charge her with. . . .’’ The petitioner further testified
that he did not want to proceed to trial because he
believed his wife would go to jail as a result, and that
his ‘‘children will end up in the foster care system.’’
Although the petitioner made a bare assertion at the
habeas trial that he would not have pleaded guilty if
he had known that, by doing so, he would lose his right
to appeal the court’s competency decision, the court
did not find the petitioner’s testimony in this regard to
be credible. See Barlow v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 343 Conn. 347, 357, 273 A.3d 680 (2022) (‘‘[b]ecause
it is the [habeas] court’s function to weigh the evidence
and determine credibility, we give great deference to
its findings’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
  On the basis of the foregoing, the petitioner’s claims
necessarily fail because he has not demonstrated that,
but for his trial counsel’s conduct, he would not have
pleaded guilty. The petitioner, therefore, has failed to
prove that he suffered prejudice under Strickland.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly
denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
    General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is
guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person,
he causes the death of such person or of a third person . . . .’’
  2
    The petitioner was also charged with felony murder in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes § 53a-54c, assault in the first degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-59, assault in the second degree in violation of General Stat-
utes § 53a-60d, assault in the second degree on a person over sixty years
old in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60b, possession of a pistol without
a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 53a-217c, and, two
counts of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev.
to 2005) § 53a-101.
  3
    General Statutes § 54-56d provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A defendant
shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while the defendant is not compe-
tent. . . . [A] defendant is not competent if the defendant is unable to
understand the proceedings against him or her or to assist in his or her
own defense. . . .
  ‘‘(c) If, at any time during a criminal proceeding, it appears that the
defendant is not competent, counsel for the defendant or for the state, or
the court, on its own motion, may request an examination to determine the
defendant’s competency. . . .’’
   4
     In Gilbert, our Supreme Court identified six factors, adopted from Wilson
v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1968), to assist courts in determining
the effect of amnesia on the trial’s fairness: ‘‘(1) the extent to which the
amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to consult with and assist his lawyer
[separate and apart from his memory loss]; (2) the extent to which the
amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to testify on his own behalf [on
matters other than the event that gave rise to his amnesia]; (3) the extent
to which the evidence in the suit could be extrinsically reconstructed in
view of the defendant’s amnesia, including evidence relating to the crime
itself as well as any reasonably possible alibi; (4) the extent to which the
government assisted the defendant and his counsel in that reconstruction; (5)
the strength of the prosecution’s case, with the most important consideration
pertaining to whether the government’s case is such as to negate all reason-
able hypotheses of innocence; and (6) any other facts and circumstances
that would indicate whether or not the defendant had a fair trial.’’ State v.
Gilbert, supra, 229 Conn. 233.
   5
     See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d
162 (1970).
   6
     At the habeas trial, Edgington testified that, prior to the plea hearing,
he informed the petitioner that he faced a maximum exposure of 135 years
of imprisonment if he was convicted at trial.
   7
     The petitioner also asserted in his petition a violation of his right to due
process. The habeas court concluded that the petitioner’s due process claim
was ‘‘inextricably interwoven with the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel’’ and resultantly rejected the due process claim for the
same reasons it rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The
petitioner does not challenge the denial of his due process claim on appeal.
   8
     The petitioner, Edgington, and the expert for the defense, Attorney John
Drapp, testified at the hearing. Drapp testified as to how Edgington could
have preserved the court’s competency decision for appeal.
   9
     ‘‘The petitioner testified that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had
known that by doing so, he would lose his right to appeal the court’s
competency decision. The [habeas] court does not find the petitioner’s
testimony credible.’’