Court Opinion

ID: 9748425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:01:24.277022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:35.195138
License: Public Domain

*252STOVER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result, but wish to note, in regard to point of error four, a different reading of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 477-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). There, as I read Jackson, the Court distinguishes between the following:
(1) the timing of the trial judge’s instruction to the jury regarding the limited purpose for which the jury may consider extraneous offense evidence, and
(2) the timing of the trial judge’s instruction on the “beyond reasonable doubt” burden of proof for extraneous evidence.
Previously, the Court of Criminal Appeals expressly held in Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 713 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), that, if requested, the limiting instruction detailing the purpose for which the jury may consider the extraneous offense evidence, i.e., to show motive or intent, must be given contemporaneously with its admission.
The analysis in Jackson reiterates the Rankin holding that the trial judge must give the limiting instruction on the purpose for which the extraneous offense is admitted contemporaneously with its admission. With regard to the limiting instruction on the burden of proof for extraneous offenses, however, Jackson holds that the trial judge is not required to contemporaneously give that instruction. Jackson, 992 S.W.2d at 478. Although the analysis in Jackson is in the context of the punishment phase of the trial, I believe the holding is not restricted to that phase, but is, instead, instructive on the timing of the burden of proof instruction on extraneous offenses for both phases of trial.
If Jackson is construed to apply to both the guilt/innocence and punishment phases, the trial judge herein did not err by failing to give the burden of proof instruction on the extraneous offenses when they were first admitted; the appropriate instruction was given in the court’s charge to the jury at the conclusion of the guilt/innocence phase. That being the case, no harm analysis would be necessary. I, therefore, concur in the majority’s overruling of point of error four, but note that Jackson may stand for the proposition that the trial judge is not required to give a limiting instruction on the burden of proof for extraneous offenses until the court’s charge.