Court Opinion

ID: 9367675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 16:08:04.643236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:02.149523
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                      In The Court of Appeals

           Amber Geohaghan, Appellant,

           v.

           South Carolina Department of Employment and
           Workforce and South Carolina Department of Social
           Services, Respondents.

           Appellate Case No. 2019-000995

                 Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
                Shirley C. Robinson, Administrative Law Judge

                             Opinion No. 5967
                Heard April 14, 2022 – Filed February 1, 2023

                                AFFIRMED

           Adam Protheroe, of South Carolina Appleseed Legal
           Justice Center, of Columbia, for Appellant.

           Eugene Hamilton Matthews, of Richardson Plowden &
           Robinson, PA, of Columbia, for Respondent South
           Carolina Department of Social Services.

           Todd Stuart Timmons and Benjamin Thomas Cook, both
           of Columbia, for Respondent South Carolina Department
           of Employment and Workforce.

VINSON, J.: Amber Geohaghan appeals the Administrative Law Court's (the
ALC's) order affirming the South Carolina Department of Employment and
Workforce's (the Department's) final decision determining Geohaghan was
indefinitely ineligible for receipt of unemployment benefits. Geohaghan argues the
ALC erred (1) in holding the question of whether she had good cause to resign was
a question of fact subject to substantial evidence review and (2) in affirming the
Department's finding she resigned without good cause when that finding was not
supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Geohaghan began working for the South Carolina Department of Social Services
(DSS) in March 2013. On or about March 2, 2018, Geohaghan resigned, effective
March 16, 2018, and she filed for unemployment benefits on March 9, 2018. In
response to the Department's fact-finding questionnaire, Geohaghan stated the
reason she gave DSS for resigning was that the "change [would] be beneficial to
[her] long-term career goals and objectives." Whereas the reason she gave on the
questionnaire for her resignation was an incident that occurred on January 31,
2018, involving verbal threats made to her by a client (the Client). Following a
review of her claim, the Department's claims adjudicator found that, effective
March 18, 2018, Geohaghan was indefinitely ineligible for unemployment benefits
because there were no significant changes to her working conditions and she left
her position voluntarily without good cause. Geohaghan appealed this decision to
the Department's Appeal Tribunal.

In support of her appeal, Geohaghan provided the Appeal Tribunal with a copy of
an email she sent to her Human Resources (HR) liaison, Cynthia Brown, on
February 12, 2018, and a letter addressed to the Appeal Tribunal explaining the
circumstances of the January 31 incident in more detail. In the email, Geohaghan
alleged the Client "verbally attacked" her by calling her a derogatory term and
"stupid." She noted a DSS staff member informed her the Client "made a comment
about a gun" while being escorted out of the DSS building. Geohaghan indicated
she had not had any further contact with the Client since the January 31 incident,
but expressed concern for her safety if she were required to conduct future
face-to-face visits with the Client at the Client's home. Geohaghan stated she had
reason to believe the Client owned a firearm and she believed it was in the best
interest of the Client for Brown to assign a new caseworker to the Client's case.

In her letter to the Appeal Tribunal, Geohaghan framed the Client's statement about
a gun as a threat directed toward her. Geohaghan stated her direct supervisor,
Gwendolyn Breeland, told her "to not follow '[the Client] up'" and that the Client
was "all bark no bite." She explained Breeland asked another caseworker to take
the Client's case, but the caseworker refused. Geohaghan questioned whether DSS
took appropriate action in notifying the agency director and the state office.

The Appeal Tribunal held a telephonic evidentiary hearing on June 8, 2018.
During the hearing, Geohaghan maintained the sole reason for her resignation was
the January 31 incident. She explained the incident arose out of a contentious
family meeting with the Client. According to Geohaghan, when security became
involved, the Client called her a "bitch," said she was stupid, and requested a new
case manager. As Geohaghan removed herself from the situation, the Client
continued to scream loudly and stated, "You better be glad I don't have my gun,"
which Geohaghan perceived as being directed at her because she was the Client's
case manager. Geohaghan's DSS performance coach directed her to remove
herself from the situation after the Client made the comment about the gun.
Geohaghan explained she was afraid of the Client because the Client had
threatened to confront one of her own family members with a gun four days prior.
Security informed Geohaghan that the Client would not be allowed on the premises
for the time being, but it was unclear to Geohaghan how long the ban would
continue. Brown and Breeland were both present for the January 31 incident.
Brown told Geohaghan she would notify the DSS county director and the state
office, as required under DSS policy, and instructed all of the witnesses to provide
a statement.

Geohaghan later discussed the incident with Breeland and raised her concerns
about continuing as the Client's case manager, including fears about her safety.
She specifically asked Breeland to reassign the Client's case to avoid any contact
with the Client on visits; however, the caseworker Breeland approached declined
the assignment based on the Client's behavior. Geohaghan reiterated that Breeland
and other employees assured her the Client was "all bark, no bite." After
discussing her concerns with Brown and Breeland, she did not receive any
"feedback" or an update on the matter. Geohaghan was not instructed to interact
with the Client but based on the lack of feedback she received, she believed she
would still be responsible for conducting home visits with the Client. Geohaghan
stated "nothing happened" between February 12 and her resignation and she did
not have any contact with the Client after the January 31 incident. She added that
she made Brown aware she had not contacted the Client during that time and she
"did not get penalized . . . for that. But [she] did not get any feedback."

Geohaghan did not contact Brown or HR after her February 12 email to Breeland,
nor did she contact state-level HR or the state office. Geohaghan specifically
named the individual at the state office she could have contacted and did, in fact,
contact in preparation for the hearing. She explained she did not reach out to
anyone before resigning because she believed DSS would not take any further
action. Geohaghan acknowledged she did not know the process for handling her
complaint or the timeframe in which DSS was required to complete its
investigation.

When asked what prompted her to resign, Geohaghan responded it was due to the
upward trend in gun violence, including an incident that occurred in another DSS
county office in 1994, and her concern that DSS was not addressing the January 31
incident. Subsequently, Geohaghan added she resigned because she felt as though
Brown had not adequately addressed her concerns about her safety and she had not
received any "feedback." Geohaghan stated that had she not resigned, she would
still have been employed.

Brown testified the Client used profanity and acted in an "irate" manner during the
January 31 incident but she did not hear the Client make a threat about a gun.
Brown requested that everyone who witnessed the incident draft a statement for
her to provide to the appropriate personnel. After receiving all of the statements in
April 2018, Brown contacted DSS's central HR employee relations unit and
submitted the statements to the critical response office. Brown testified she
followed all the proper protocols in gathering the witness statements but she did
not give the time frame in which she was required to notify critical response. She
met with the critical response program coordinator, who told her she would handle
the matter from that point forward. Brown confirmed that while the investigation
was ongoing, the Client would not be allowed on DSS premises and that the Client
was eventually served with a notice of no trespassing in April 2018.

When asked what an employee could do in a situation like Geohaghan's, Brown
explained an employee could submit an agency complaint, which required the
employee to go through their chain of command. Because Breeland was the acting
program coordinator, Brown stated Geohaghan should have reached out to the
regional administrator, who was the interim county director. Furthermore, Brown
stated that if Breeland or the interim county director were unresponsive,
Geohaghan should have notified her or directly contacted DSS's central HR
employee relations manager or director. When asked how she would have assisted
Geohaghan had she notified her prior to her resignation, Brown stated she would
have sought guidance from DSS's central employee relations unit. Brown was
unaware whether it was normal protocol to require Geohaghan to meet with a
client in this situation but as a supervisor, if one of her staff were threatened, then
she would not expect them to conduct monthly visits.
Nicole Foulks, the DSS regional director and interim county director, was unable
to recall if Geohaghan contacted her about the January 31 incident or her concerns
about the alleged inaction by her supervisors. Had Geohaghan contacted her,
Foulks explained there were several things she could have done to assist
Geohaghan, such as additional training, pairing her with another employee to
handle the Client's case, or reassignment of the case. She stated the particular
course of action would have been determined on a case-by-case basis. When asked
whether Geohaghan would have been held accountable for not meeting with the
Client, Foulks responded she would have been held accountable, but only if a plan
assisting Geohaghan had already been implemented. However, Foulks did not
know whether a plan had ever been put in place for Geohaghan.

The Appeal Tribunal affirmed the claims adjudicator's decision, finding
Geohaghan voluntarily quit without good cause. The Appeal Tribunal defined
"good cause" as used in section 41-35-120(1) of the South Carolina Code (2021)1
as "a material, substantial change in the conditions of employment, or other
circumstances directly attributable to the employment, which would cause a
reasonable person to become totally unemployed rather than continue working."
Although the Appeal Tribunal found Geohaghan's concerns about her safety were
justified, it nevertheless determined that "[t]he circumstances would not cause a
reasonable person to become totally unemployed rather than continue working,
given the time and distance from the precipitating incident and the additional
options available to [Geohaghan] to have [DSS] further address her concerns."
Geohaghan appealed the Appeal Tribunal's decision to the Department's Appellate
Panel. The Appellate Panel affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision, restating the
Appeal Tribunal's definition of good cause and finding Geohaghan failed to present
"specific credible evidence of circumstances directly attributable to the
employment which would cause a reasonable person to become totally
unemployed rather than continue working."

Geohaghan appealed the Appellate Panel's decision to the ALC. In her ALC brief,
Geohaghan included a paragraph in her argument section addressing the meaning
of good cause under section 41-35-120(1); it read:

             An employee who leaves employment voluntarily and
             without good cause is disqualified from receiving

1
  Section 41-35-120(1) provides "[a]n insured worker is ineligible for benefits . . .
[i]f the [D]epartment finds he left voluntarily, without good cause."
             unemployment benefits. S.C. Code Ann. § 41-35-120(1).
             "To constitute good cause, the circumstances which lead
             an employee to leave the job must be such as would
             cause a reasonable person to leave." 76 Am. Jur. 2d
             Unemployment Compensation § 102[ (2005)]. Good
             cause to leave must, generally, be attributable to or
             connected with the claimant's employment. See [Stone
             Mfg. Co. v. S.C. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 219 S.C. 239, 64
             S.E.2d 644 (1951)].

Geohaghan argued, "Here, it is undisputed that the events [that] caused [her] to
resign were attributable to or connected with her employment at DSS. Therefore,
the question presented in this case is whether [her] decision to resign in lieu of
placing her life in jeopardy was reasonable." She further argued the Department
"misapplied the good cause standard contained in [section] 41-35-120(1) and relied
upon findings which were irrelevant or unsupported by the record" in finding her
decision to resign was unreasonable.

Geohaghan asserted South Carolina appellate courts had not addressed the specific
situation presented in her case—"a threat of lethal violence against [Geohaghan]
under circumstances where [her] fear for her safety was clearly justified." She
cited to Scott v. Butler, 2 a Georgia Court of Appeals decision, for the proposition
that "whe[n] an employee is unnecessarily exposed to the actual threat of violence
due to circumstances entirely beyond their control, voluntary resignation would be
with due cause as a matter of law." Geohaghan contended section 41-35-710 of
the South Carolina Code (2010)3 did not independently support the conclusion that
the question of whether an employee left work voluntarily and with good cause
was a question of fact and several states "have recognized that the question of
whether an employee had good cause to resign is, to some degree, a question of
law." She claimed the ALC therefore need not defer to the Department's finding
she lacked good cause to resign. Geohaghan cited to additional case law from
other jurisdictions to support her proposition that threats of physical violence
"may" constitute good cause for resignation.

2
  759 S.E.2d 545 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
3
  Section 41-35-710 states the Department "may on its own motion affirm, modify,
or set aside a decision of an appeal tribunal on the basis of evidence previously
submitted in the case; direct the taking of additional evidence; or permit a party to
the decision to initiate further appeals before it."
Geohaghan concluded two propositions supported her claim of entitlement to
unemployment benefits: (1) "whether an employee has good cause to resign is, to
some degree, a question of law" and as a result, the ALC need not defer to the
Department's findings and (2) "threats of physical violence may constitute good
cause to resign." She also challenged five of the Department's factual findings as
being irrelevant or not supported by the record. In her reply, Geohaghan stated
"whether [she] had good cause to resign is, as numerous courts have recognized, a
question of law"; however, in her conclusion, Geohaghan again argued her
decision to resign was reasonable.

The ALC affirmed the Appellate Panel's decision without oral argument. In its
order, the ALC did not address Geohaghan's argument that whether an employee
had good cause to resign was a question of law but found substantial evidence
supported the Appellate Panel's finding Geohaghan voluntarily left employment
without good cause. The ALC did however include a section addressing the
definition of good cause under section 41-35-120(1). It stated:

            Good cause means "attributable to or connected with the
            employment." [Stone Mfg. Co., 219 S.C. at 247, 64
            S.E.2d at 647]. A claimant who terminates their
            employment voluntarily for good cause has the burden of
            proof on that issue. 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public
            Welfare § 417 [(2015)]. The claimant must show that the
            reason for voluntary termination was of a necessitous and
            compelling nature. Id. Basically, circumstances causing
            the voluntary termination must be "real, substantial, and
            reasonable, and which would compel a reasonable person
            under similar circumstances to act in the same manner.
            Id. For example, "intentional harassment by a supervisor
            may constitute good cause" to voluntarily leave
            employment. [Kowalski v. Dir. Of Div. of Emp. Sec., 460
            N.E.2d 1042, 1043 (Mass. 1984)]. However, a claimant
            must take measures to resolve the problem before
            quitting, unless such measures would only be futile
            gesture. See id. ("[T]he claimant has the burden of
            proving a reasonable attempt to correct those conditions
            of employment which [s]he now claims justified [her]
            leaving [the] employment, unless [s]he can show that
            such an attempt would have been futile."); [s]ee also 76
              Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 104
              [(2016)].

Geohaghan moved for reconsideration of the ALC's order, arguing the ALC failed
to rule on her argument that she had good cause to resign as a matter of law and
applied the incorrect standard of review. She asserted the ALC should have
applied a de novo standard of review to the question of whether she had good
cause to resign because it was a question of law. Geohaghan further asserted,
"threats of violence and a reasonable fear of bodily harm have repeatedly been held
to constitute good cause to resign as a matter of law." She asked that the ALC
either find she had good cause to resign as a matter of law, or in the alternative,
apply a de novo standard of review and find she had good cause to resign.
Geohaghan also argued the ALC improperly substituted its judgment on questions
of fact.

In its order denying Geohaghan's motion for rehearing, the ALC explained it
refrained from addressing Geohaghan's argument that whether she had good cause
to resign from her employment was a matter of law and that the ALC erred by
failing to employ a de novo standard of review because such argument was without
merit. Citing to Stone and 81 C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 417, the
ALC found the meaning of good cause as used in section 41-35-120(1) had already
been established, and thus, the Appellate Panel need only make factual findings
regarding the existence of good cause. The ALC further found that South Carolina
appellate courts had consistently treated the question of whether an employee had
good cause to resign as a question of fact, citing Sviland v. South Carolina Emp.
Sec. Comm'n, 300 S.C. 305, 387 S.E.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1989). As to its finding that
"[DSS] policy did not require its case workers to conduct monthly visits with
clients if they feel threatened," the ALC acknowledged the Appellate Panel did not
make such a finding but held the hearing testimony supported its finding as
permitted under SCALC Rule 40. 4 This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Did the ALC err in holding that whether Geohaghan had good cause to resign
was a question of fact subject to substantial evidence review?

4
    Rule 40 provides, "The administrative law judge may affirm any ruling, order or
judgment upon any ground(s) appearing in the Record and need not address a point
which is manifestly without merit."
2. Did the ALC err in affirming the Department's finding that Geohaghan resigned
without good cause when the ALC's findings were not supported by substantial
evidence?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

            The review of the administrative law judge's order must
            be confined to the record. The court may not substitute
            its judgment for the judgment of the administrative law
            judge as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
            fact. The court of appeals may affirm the decision or
            remand the case for further proceedings; or, it may
            reverse or modify the decision if the substantive rights of
            the petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding,
            conclusion, or decision is:

            (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

            (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

            (c) made upon unlawful procedure;

            (d) affected by other error of law;

            (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial
                evidence on the whole record; or

            (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
                discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of
                discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2022).

"[T]his Court's review is limited to determining whether the ALC's findings were
supported by substantial evidence or were controlled by an error of law."
Engaging & Guarding Laurens Cnty.'s Env't v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't
Control, 407 S.C. 334, 341, 755 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2014). "Questions of statutory
interpretation are questions of law, which we are free to decide without any
deference to the court below." CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cnty. Assessor, 395 S.C.
67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011). "The [c]ourt may not substitute its judgment
for the ALC's judgment as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact."
Engaging & Guarding Laurens Cnty.'s Env't, 407 S.C. at 342, 755 S.E.2d at 448.
"In determining whether the ALC's decision was supported by substantial
evidence, this court need only find that, upon looking at the entire record on
appeal, there is evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same
conclusion that the ALC reached." Id.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I.    ALC Review Standard

Geohaghan first argues the ALC erred in holding that whether she had good cause
to resign was a question of fact subject to substantial evidence review. She asserts
binding precedent holds the meaning of the term "good cause" as used in section
41-35-120(1) is a question of law; even if the meaning of good cause has been
defined by South Carolina case law such that it has become a question of fact, this
is only true in a limited context not applicable to this case; and, South Carolina
courts have not consistently treated the meaning of good cause as a question of
fact. We disagree.

"Judicial review of disputes arising from the [Department] is governed by the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)." Nucor Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Emp. &
Workforce, 410 S.C. 507, 514, 765 S.E.2d 558, 562 (2014). Section 1-23-380(4) to
(5) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2022) applies the same standard to the
ALC's review of agency decisions as the review standard set forth in section
1-23-610(B).

             An insured worker is ineligible for benefits for
             . . . [l]eaving work voluntarily. If the department finds he
             left voluntarily, without good cause, his most recent work
             prior to filing a request for determination of insured
             status or a request for initiation of a claim series within
             an established benefit year, with ineligibility beginning
             with the effective date of the request and continuing until
             he has secured employment and shows to the satisfaction
             of the department that he has performed services in
             employment as defined by Chapters 27 through 41 of this
             title and earned wages for those services equal to at least
             eight times the weekly benefit amount of his claim.
§ 41-35-120(1) (emphasis added).

In her appeal to the ALC, Geohaghan failed to directly challenge the Department's
definition of good cause as used in section 41-35-120(1), and therefore, we hold
the Department's definition is the law of the case. See Dreher v. S.C. Dep't of
Health & Env't Control, 412 S.C. 244, 249, 772 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2015) ("An
unappealed ruling is the law of the case and requires affirmance." (quoting
Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 403 S.C. 560, 573, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785
(2013))); id. at 250, 772 S.E.2d at 508 ("Thus, should the appealing party fail to
raise all of the grounds upon which a lower court's decision was based, those
unappealed findings—whether correct or not—become the law of the case."). In
her ALC brief, Geohaghan included a paragraph in her argument section
addressing the meaning of good cause under section 41-35-120(1), including a
citation to 76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 102 (2005) that read,
"To constitute good cause, the circumstances which lead an employee to leave the
job must be such as would cause a reasonable person to leave." She also included
a citation to Stone to support the proposition that "[g]ood cause to leave must,
generally, be attributable to or connected with the claimant's employment."
Geohaghan argued, "Here, it is undisputed that the events which caused [her] to
resign were attributable to or connected with her employment at DSS. Therefore,
the question presented in this case is whether [her] decision to resign in lieu of
placing her life in jeopardy was reasonable." (emphasis added). Geohaghan
further argued the Department's finding that her decision to resign was
unreasonable "misapplied the good cause standard contained in
[section] 41-35-120(1)." We conclude this argument did not raise a challenge to
the Department's definition of good cause because she framed the issue as one of
reasonableness. Further, she failed to challenge the Department's definition of
good cause in her motion to reconsider. Rather, she argued the ALC should have
applied a de novo standard of review to the question of whether she had good
cause to resign because it was a question of law. Geohaghan further asserted,
"threats of violence and a reasonable fear of bodily harm have repeatedly been held
to constitute good cause to resign as a matter of law." As such, we find Geohaghan
still did not challenge the Department's definition of good cause in her motion to
reconsider.

Furthermore, Geohaghan does not challenge the Department's or the ALC's
definition of good cause on appeal. Instead, she argues Stone does not adequately
define good cause for purposes of her case and the ALC therefore should have
applied a de novo standard of review in determining whether the legislature
intended the meaning of good cause to include a justified fear for one's safety that
is connected with the employment. Although Geohaghan argues the term good
cause as used in section 41-35-120(1) is ambiguous and therefore requires this
court to the apply the rules of statutory construction, she does not argue the
Department or the ALC incorrectly defined good cause. Based on the foregoing,
we hold the Department's definition of good cause is the law of the case.

Because Geohaghan failed to appeal the Department's definition of good cause to
the ALC, we hold the ALC properly applied the substantial evidence standard in
reviewing the Department's decision. See Boggero v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 414
S.C. 277, 280, 777 S.E.2d 842, 843 (Ct. App. 2015) ("Certain situations involve a
mixed question of law and fact." (quoting Hopper v. Terry Hunt Constr., 373 S.C.
475, 479, 646 S.E.2d 162, 165 (Ct. App. 2007), aff'd, 383 S.C. 310, 680 S.E.2d 1
(2009))); id. ("For example, '[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law.'"
(alteration in original) (quoting Hopper, 373 S.C. at 479, 646 S.E.2d at 165)); id.
("But whether the facts of a case were correctly applied to a statute is a question of
fact, subject to the substantial evidence standard." (quoting Hopper, 373 S.C. at
479, 646 S.E.2d at 165)). The ALC was free to determine whether substantial
evidence supported the Department's decision without the need to interpret the
meaning of good cause as used in section 41-35-120(1). We note the Department's
definition and the ALC's definition were not identical—the ALC's definition
included an additional requirement that the claimant take measures to resolve the
problem before resigning, unless such measures would be futile. Nevertheless,
both definitions incorporated our supreme court's holding in Stone and established
a reasonableness standard in determining whether an employee had good cause to
terminate their employment. While we agree with Geohaghan's argument that
Stone did not adequately define good cause for purposes of her case, we find her
assertion that this alone meant the ALC was required to review the Department's
decision under a de novo standard of review is unpersuasive when she failed to
challenge the Department's or the ALC's definitions of good cause. Based on the
foregoing, we hold the ALC did not err in applying a substantial evidence standard
of review because Geohaghan failed to challenge the Department's definition of
good cause in her appeal to the ALC.

II.   Substantial Evidence in Support of the ALC's findings

In the alternative, Geohaghan argues the ALC erred in affirming the Department's
finding she resigned without good cause because the ALC's findings were not
supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Applying the Department's definition of good cause under section 41-35-120(1),
we hold the ALC did not err in affirming the Department's determination that
Geohaghan resigned without good cause when substantial evidence supports the
Department's factual findings. See Milliken & Co. v. S.C. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 321
S.C. 349, 350, 468 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1996) ("It is well-settled that decisions of
administrative agencies should be upheld on appeal where they are supported by
substantial evidence."); Anderson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 343 S.C. 487, 492, 541
S.E.2d 526, 528 (2001) ("Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence,
but evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable
minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached."). We address each of
Geohaghan's arguments in turn.

First, we reject Geohaghan's contention that the Department's finding that the
nature of her job had not changed was irrelevant under the definition of good cause
in Stone. The Department's definition included language addressing "a material,
substantial change in the conditions of employment." Thus, this fact was relevant
to the Department's decision.

Second, the Department's finding that Geohaghan's job was not in jeopardy was
likewise relevant in the application of the Department's definition and supported by
substantial evidence. At the evidentiary hearing, Geohaghan testified that at the
time of her resignation, she had not been penalized for failing to meet with the
Client after the January 31 incident and acknowledged she would have still been
employed had she not resigned. Geohaghan merely speculated that she might have
been penalized for not meeting with the Client but confirmed she was not
instructed to meet with the Client. In addition, Brown testified that as a supervisor,
she would not require her staff to conduct monthly visits if they were threatened.
Foulks testified Geohaghan would have been held accountable for meeting with the
Client only if a plan assisting Geohaghan had already been implemented.
However, Foulks did not know whether a plan had ever been put in place for
Geohaghan. We find the foregoing constitutes substantial evidence to support the
ALC's finding Geohaghan's job was not in jeopardy.

Third, substantial evidence contradicts Geohaghan's claim that it was merely
"fortuitous" she was not confronted by the Client after the January 31 incident. In
her letter to the Appeal Tribunal, Geohaghan stated Breeland told her "to not
follow '[the Client] up.'" She testified security told her the Client would not be
allowed on DSS premises for the time being and she was not instructed to meet
with the Client nor was she penalized for not doing so. In addition, Brown
confirmed the Client would not be allowed on DSS premises until DSS completed
its investigation. Although DSS did not complete its investigation until after
Geohaghan's resignation, the outcome of that investigation resulted in the Client
being served with a notice of no trespassing. As to the Department's alleged
mischaracterization of her delay in resigning, we find Geohaghan's assertion she
was actively engaged with DSS to address the threat is without evidentiary support.
The incident involving the Client occurred on January 31, 2018, and Geohaghan
resigned on March 2, 2018. The only actions she took to address her concerns
before she resigned were discussing her concerns with Breeland and sending an
email to Brown on February 12, 2018. We find this constitutes substantial
evidence to support the Department's finding Geohaghan waited only a month to
resign after the January 31 incident.

Fourth, substantial evidence supports the Department's finding Geohaghan failed to
report her concerns up the chain of command in order to seek a quicker resolution
when DSS failed to respond to her concerns. By her own admission, Geohaghan
did not contact Brown or HR after her February 12 email to Breeland and she
failed to contact state level HR or the state office, even though she knew who she
could have contacted at the state office. Brown testified Geohaghan could have
submitted an agency complaint, which would have required Geohaghan to go
through her chain of command. Foulks added that had Geohaghan reached out to
her, she could have facilitated the implementation of a plan to address her
concerns. Accordingly, we find substantial evidence supports the Department's
finding Geohaghan failed to report her concerns up the chain of command.

Fifth, as to the Department's finding Geohaghan failed to avail herself of the
measures DSS could have put in place to ensure her safety, we find substantial
evidence supports this finding. Initially, we note the Department considered the
ways in which Geohaghan failed to take steps to address her concerns, not whether
DSS failed to act independently to implement safety measures to address her
concerns. Foulks testified she could have provided several services to Geohaghan,
including additional training, pairing her with another employee to handle the
Client's case, or reassignment of the case. Foulks explained, however, that DSS
would have determined a specific course of action on a case-by-case basis.
Accordingly, we find substantial evidence supports the Department's finding
Geohaghan failed to take adequate steps to address her concerns.

Further, as to Geohaghan's argument the ALC erred in finding DSS took
meaningful or timely steps to ensure her safety, we find substantial evidence
supports this finding. The record contains no evidence showing the time frame
within which DSS was required to complete its investigation. Brown testified she
followed all the proper protocols in gathering the witness statements but she did
not give the time frame in which she was required to provide them to the critical
response office. Moreover, Brown confirmed the Client would not be allowed on
DSS premises during the pendency of DSS's investigation of the January 31
incident. In addition, Breeland told Geohaghan "to not follow '[the Client] up'"
after the incident. We find the foregoing constitutes substantial evidence of DSS's
meaningful and timely steps to ensure Geohaghan's safety.

Finally, as to her argument that the ALC erred in finding DSS policy did not
require case workers to make monthly visits with clients if they felt threatened
when the Department did not make such a finding, we find Geohaghan
misconstrues our supreme court's holding in Grant v. South Carolina Coastal
Council. See 319 S.C. 348, 353, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1995) (holding "neither [an
appellate court] nor the [ALC] may substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact"). "[T]he ALC, sitting in its
appellate capacity, may not make its own factual findings." Stubbs v. S.C. Dep't of
Emp. & Workforce, 407 S.C. 288, 292, 755 S.E.2d 114, 116 (Ct. App. 2014).
"This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of an administrative agency
when the agency's factual findings [are] supported by substantial evidence . . . ."
Todd's Ice Cream, Inc. v. S.C. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 281 S.C. 254, 259, 315 S.E.2d
373, 376 (Ct. App. 1984). In its order denying rehearing, the ALC acknowledged
the Appellate Panel did not make this specific finding; however, the ALC reasoned
SCALC Rule 40 permitted it to rely on any evidence appearing in the record in its
review of the Appellate Panel's decision. The ALC's finding did not amount to
"judicial fact-finding"; rather, it constituted evidence the ALC considered under its
substantial evidence review. See Todd's Ice Cream, Inc. 281 S.C. at 258, 315
S.E.2d at 375 ("The substantial evidence rule does not allow judicial fact-finding,
or the substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment."); SCALC Rule 40
("The administrative law judge may affirm any ruling, order or judgment upon any
ground(s) appearing in the Record and need not address a point which is manifestly
without merit.").

Based on the foregoing, we hold substantial evidence supported the ALC's
affirmation of the Department's finding that Geohaghan lacked good cause to
resign.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ALC's order affirming the Department's
final decision determining Geohaghan was indefinitely ineligible for receipt of
unemployment benefits.

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS, J., concur.