Court Opinion

ID: 9854690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:11:59.696277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:16.089738
License: Public Domain

Harwell, Justice
(dissenting):
Allowing the trial judge to submit the issue of undue influence to the jury contravenes the agelong South Carolina policy of the individual’s freedom to dispose of his property as he desires. Furthermore, this result is inconsistent with our recent decision in Calhoun v. Calhoun, 277 S. C. 527, 290 S. E. (2d) 415 (1982).
In September 1977, Otto Byrd died testate in Marion County at the age of 76. His physician diagnosed cancer of the prostate approximately one year earlier. While his health was failing, the testator resided with his eldest son, the appellant, who lived next door to him. Respondents, the testator’s other heirs, allege that appellant unduly influenced Mr. Byrd to will him the greatest portion of the estate. Of the five respondents who testified at trial, none lived in Marion near the testator, two lived in Florence, two lived in Utah, and one in Virginia. Appellant, then, was the logical choice to take care of the testator.
Respondents’ evidence of undue influence and of the testator’s insufficient mental capacity on March 25,1977 consisted of the following:
(1) That after the will was executed, the respondents were not permitted to visit alone with the testator.
*433(2) That they were not allowed to talk on the phone with him.
(3) That the testator did not recognize them during their visits.
(4) That the testator would not converse with them during their visits.
(5) That appellant set an 8:00 P.M. curfew on respondent’s visits with the testator.
(6) That the testator became lost while driving his car.
The probate court and the jury properly determined that the testator had sufficient testamentary capacity to execute the March 25, 1977 will. However, there was not sufficient evidence of undue influence to submit to the jury. Although the record reflects that the testator drove his car until July, 1977, none of the respondents testified that he ever telephoned or visited them. However, the testator’s girlfriend testified that as late as July, the testator drove his car to see her. Therefore, the testator had the means to visit the respondents who lived in Marion and Florence had he so desired.
Furthermore, all but one of the testifying respondents stated that they had never requested to be alone with the testator. They all testified that they were never physically restrained from seeing their father.
The record shows that the testator, a retired farmer, was an independent, uneducated, self-made man who had accumulated a great deal of real estate. Witnesses testified that the testator manifested his independence through June and July 1977. He drove his car to the repair shop in April and June 1977, asked for specific repairs, and signed the checks for the work. The owner of the auto repair shop testified the testator came alone. A farmer who rented the testator’s land stated that the testator requested a rent increase during the 1977 season. The secretary of the testator’s Sunday School class produced the attendance records indicating that the testator attended the class through June 1977. The vice president of the testator’s bank testified that on July 16,1977, the testator signed the required form to get into his safe deposit box.
Witnesses also testified concerning the testator in March 1977, the month he executed the will. The testator’s attorney, who had represented him for over forty years, emphatically *434stated that the testator was competent on the day he executed the will. He testified that throughout the years, the testator had changed his will four to six times. On each occasion, the testator came to his office alone. Furthermore, he stated that the testator was hurt when his children moved away from him. “He loved them all, but there was one thing that hurt him; he wanted them all together and some had left him and that was a source of grief to him.” In the attorney’s opinion the testator definitely knew how he wanted to divide his property among his children. Additionally, both witnesses to the will stated the testator appeared mentally competent. Finally, the testator’s physician stated that when he examined him on March 23,1977, the testator was in good spirits. Based upon his medical experience and his knowledge of the testator’s medical history, he opined that the testator was rational two days later when he executed the will.
Recently, we discussed the essentials of proving undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity in Calhoun v. Calhoun, supra. When a will is admitted to probate, the contestants must carry the burden of proving undue influence. That influence must amount to a force and coercion which destroys the testator’s free will. Opportunity and motive to influence are not sufficient. We must uphold a testator’s will even though he may act unjustly toward his family in the disposition of his estate. Furthermore, when the testator has had the unhampered opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to any undue influence, but does not, we consider the effect of any testimony bearing upon undue influence in a large measure destroyed. The testator in the case at bar conducted business alone in the months after he made his will but did not choose to revoke the will.
The majority opinion in this case asserts that Calhoun is distinguishable because the chief beneficiary in Calhoun did not coerce or influence the testator. However, the beneficiary had visited the testator daily in the nursing home, she had asked a physician to examine him before he changed the will, and she drove him to the attorney’s office to prepare his new will. Someone overheard the testator say that she “wanted it all.”
In my opinion, under Calhoun and our previous decisions the issue of undue influence should not have been submitted to *435the jury. After a careful consideration of the record, I conclude that the trial judge should have granted appellant’s motion for a directed verdict. The jury found that the testator was competent when he executed his will. This Court has no right to undermine the testator’s intent to favor the child who cared for him during his dying days.
Accordingly, I would
Reverse.
Littlejohn, J., concurs.