Court Opinion

ID: 9889411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 14:07:08.439185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:11.781025
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-559

                                KAREN I. KOHAN

                                       vs.

                                  ARIEL KOHAN.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The husband appeals from a judgment, issued by a judge of

 the Probate and Family Court, adjudicating him guilty of civil

 contempt.    On appeal, the husband argues that the wife did not

 prove her case by clear and convincing evidence, and that the

 judge erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing and

 instead holding a trial based on oral representations that was

 prejudicial to the husband.         We affirm.

       Background.     Following divorce proceedings, a judge of the

 Probate and Family court incorporated the parties' separation

 agreement (agreement) into a judgment of divorce nisi (divorce

 judgment).     Exhibit E of the agreement, titled "Division of

 Assets," outlined how the husband and the wife would handle the

 division and exchange of household property.             The agreement

 provided, among other things, that the husband would leave the
wife's personal property in a storage facility, for her to

retrieve within twenty days of the judge's approval of the

agreement.

     On December 20, 2021, the wife's counsel notified the

husband's counsel that the husband had not complied with the

agreement because the wife had searched the storage unit and had

only found one photo, had found no photo albums, and had found

no business records or personal papers, among other things. 1       The

next day, on December 21, 2021, the wife filed a complaint for

civil contempt in the Probate and Family Court.      By his timely

answer, the husband maintained that he had provided each item

that the agreement required.

     A hearing was held on January 14, 2022, before a judge of

the Probate and Family Court.   At the hearing, the parties were

sworn in, counsel for each party made an argument to the judge,

and each party spoke.   The wife told the judge that the family

photos she was seeking held a lot of sentimental value because

she does not see her son at all.       She also said her personal

papers included (1) immigration documents, which were

"priceless" to her because if she did not have them she could be

1 The e-mail also stated that the husband had failed to return
most of the wife's jewelry, some footwear, "a vast collection of
cookbooks" (including a cookbook that the wife received from her
mother), part of a silver metal boat, a matching linen and
window treatment set, and a pottery set and basket, all of which
were included in the agreement.

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in legal trouble; and (2) her daughter's social security card,

which would be difficult to replace.        The husband told the judge

that the wife had previously picked up her personal documents at

the home and, while he did unsuccessfully search for the missing

items, he did not "flip the house upside down . . . just to find

the little things."

     On January 26, 2022, the judge entered a judgment finding

the husband in contempt and ordering him, within thirty days, to

produce "the wife's personal identification documents," "the

daughter's social security card," and "a copy of the family

photos in albums."      Failure to produce these items would result

in sanctions of $2,500 per item.        The judge also ordered the

husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees in the amount of

$2,500.   The judge issued findings of fact and conclusions of

law on May 26, 2022, in which she credited the wife's testimony,

and declined to credit the husband's testimony that he made a

good faith effort to find the wife's personal property.        The

husband timely appealed from all aspects of the judgment.

     Discussion.   1.    Civil contempt.     "'[A] civil contempt

finding [must] be supported by clear and convincing evidence of

disobedience of a clear and unequivocal command,' for which the

burden of proof rests with the plaintiff."        Martinez v. Lynn

Hous. Auth., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 702, 705 (2019), quoting

Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass. 837, 853 (2009).        For such a

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finding, "there must be [1] a clear and unequivocal command and

[2] an equally clear and undoubted disobedience."    Hoort v.

Hoort, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 363, 365 (2014).    "We review the

judge's ultimate finding of contempt for an abuse of

discretion."   Martinez, supra.

     a.   Unequivocal command.    The husband first argues that the

language in the agreement did not serve as a clear and

unequivocal command requiring him to provide the items listed to

the wife.   Specifically, he references the following language

contained in Exhibit E, section II(B), paragraph three:

     "The [h]usband has placed the [w]ife's property in storage
     . . . and provided permission for her to access [the
     storage unit]. Within twenty (20) days of the Court's
     acceptance of the within agreement, the [w]ife shall pick
     up her personal property from the storage facility. The
     property she is picking up is identified in the below
     paragraph four (4)."

Among the wife's personal property listed in paragraph four were

"[s]ome [f]ramed photographs of her children and family," "photo

albums," and "personal papers for herself and [her daughter]."

We view this language as sufficiently clear and unequivocal to

meet the standard for civil contempt.    A civil contempt finding

may be upheld "where, although the operative language was

facially unclear, the simple, straightforward, and undisputed

facts in the record . . . clearly showed not only what the

language meant but also that the parties shared a common

understanding of that meaning."    Sax v. Sax, 53 Mass. App. Ct.

                                   4
765, 772-773 (2002).   Additionally, "contempt findings have been

upheld in cases where the governing order, although requiring

some legal interpretation, was couched in terms that provided

clear notice of its boundaries" (quotation and citation

omitted).   Id. at 772.   See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts.,

Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 567 (1997), and cases cited.

     Both parties understood that the agreement served to divide

assets between them, including the wife's "personal property"

identified paragraph four.    The listed personal property

included the items that the wife alleged had not been returned

by the husband, i.e., family photographs and personal papers for

the wife and her daughter.    Moreover, both the agreement and the

judge's findings reflect the parties' understanding that the

agreement placed an affirmative duty on the husband to return

the listed personal property to the wife:       the husband

acknowledged this obligation by stipulating that he had already

placed the listed items in the storage unit for the wife to

retrieve, and he further acknowledged his affirmative duty to

produce these items when testifying that he had looked for them

in good faith (but conceded that he did not "flip the house

upside down" in his search).

     b.   Undoubted disobedience.       Once the judge finds that the

defendant received a clear and unequivocal command, the judge

must then find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

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defendant "disobediently refrained" from following that command.

Warren Gardens Hous. Coop. v. Clark, 420 Mass. 699, 701 (1995).

See Birchall, petitioner, 454 Mass. at 853.

     In her complaint, the wife provided the husband with a list

detailing the items of which she most urgently wished to regain

possession.   The divorce judgment, which incorporated the

parties' agreement, required the husband to move all listed

items from the house to the storage unit.    As of the date of the

contempt hearing, the husband had not placed the listed items in

the storage unit.   Because the divorce judgment unequivocally

commanded the husband to move the listed items to the storage

unit, and the judge found that the husband did not make a good

faith effort to comply, the judge was "warranted in inferring a

wil[l]ful disobedience of the court's order."    Furtado v.

Furtado, 380 Mass. 137, 150 (1980).     We therefore conclude that

the judge's ultimate contempt finding was not an abuse of

discretion.   Martinez, 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 705.

     c.   Amount of contempt penalty.   We also review the trial

judge's imposition of a contempt penalty to ensure that the

judge did not abuse her discretion when determining the penalty

amount.   "[T]he amount of a coercive fine requires consideration

of the defendant's financial resources in order to arrive at a

fine that will be effective but not unreasonably oppressive."

L.F. v. L.J., 71 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 823 (2008), quoting Labor

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Relations Comm'n v. Fall River Educators' Ass'n, 382 Mass. 465,

481 (1981).    "In determining the amount of a fine imposed as a

means of securing future compliance, a judge should consider the

character and magnitude of the threatened harm, the probable

effectiveness of any suggested sanction, the defendant's

financial resources, and the seriousness of the burden on that

defendant."    L.F., supra, quoting Labor Relations Comm'n, supra

at 482.

     Explaining her reasoning behind the contempt penalty, the

judge found that the wife would suffer harm if the husband did

not return the requested items and that there was "legitimate

concern that [the] [h]usband did not act in good faith to locate

[the] [w]ife's personal property and secure it in a storage

unit."    The judge also found that the husband had "sufficient

financial resources" to pay the $2,500 contempt penalty for each

of the important items he failed to return to the wife.    Because

the judge's reasoning demonstrates adequate consideration of the

relevant factors, we conclude the judge was within her

discretion to impose the contempt penalty.

     2.   Due process.   "A contempt proceeding must satisfy the

requirements of due process."    Milano v. Hingham Sportswear Co.,

366 Mass. 376, 378 (1974).    "[D]ue process of law . . . requires

that one charged with contempt of court be advised of the

charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them

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by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be

represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call

other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or

explanation."     Sodones v. Sodones, 366 Mass. 121, 127 (1974),

quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275 (1948).

       a.   Evidentiary hearing.   The husband argues that the judge

was required to hold an evidentiary hearing and erred by failing

to do so.      First, we consider whether the judge was required to

hold an evidentiary hearing in this case.      "A defendant in a

contempt proceeding may . . . waive his right to an evidentiary

trial."      Mahoney v. Mahoney, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 537, 540 (2006),

quoting Milano, 366 Mass. at 379.       "Such a waiver may result, in

effect, from a failure to assert rights in the trial court in a

manner which permits effective appellate review."      Mahoney,

supra.      While "under certain circumstances a judge may properly

rule on a complaint for contempt without an evidentiary hearing,

or without receiving live testimony . . . [t]ypically, in such

cases, material facts are not in dispute."      Id.   "In some cases,

an evidentiary hearing is deemed waived and a judgment of

contempt may be founded upon oral representations . . . (at

least in the absence of objection to such a procedure)."      Id. at

541.

       Second, we consider whether the judge actually held an

evidentiary hearing.     While the parties were sworn in at the

                                    8
beginning of the hearing, we cannot say that the husband had "a

chance to testify" by way of formal direct and cross

examination, or to "call other witnesses in his behalf, either

by way of defense or explanation'" as due process requires.

Sodones, 366 Mass. at 127, quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at

275.    Therefore, the hearing conducted before the judge did not

amount to a formal evidentiary hearing.

       While we conclude that a full-blown evidentiary hearing did

not take place, we also conclude that one was not required in

this case.     Because the record does not show that the husband

either requested an evidentiary hearing, or that he objected in

the trial court to the absence of an evidentiary hearing, we

conclude that the husband waived his right to such a hearing.

See Mahoney, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 540-541.

       b.   Prejudicial trial.   The husband next argues that he was

prejudiced by a flawed trial process.     To support his argument,

he points to the length of the hearing (thirteen minutes), the

evidence relied on by the judge, and the wife's testimony which

he argues was unsworn and unchallenged.     While the husband is

correct as to the length of the hearing, the record confirms

that both the husband and the wife were sworn in at the start of

the hearing.     The husband also spoke to the judge at greater

length than the wife did, although for most of the hearing it

was the parties' attorneys who spoke.     The husband was given an

                                    9
opportunity to explain his efforts to locate the wife's items

and, in doing so, admitted that his search had been limited.

Because the hearing was not a formal evidentiary hearing, the

judge was not required to permit the husband to call witnesses

or to admit evidence.    We conclude that the judge adequately

heard both parties' perspectives on the issues before her and

did not conduct the hearing in a prejudicial manner.

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Meade,
                                        Hershfang & D'Angelo, JJ. 2),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    October 10, 2023.

2   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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