Court Opinion

ID: 9672410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:54:23.899024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.894563
License: Public Domain

R. L. Tahvonen, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes that the sentence imposed by the trial court is invalid because the majority does "not believe the Legislature has authorized a sentence of one hundred to three hundred years in prison for the offense of armed robbery.” My understanding of the law constrains me to disagree.
Mr. Moore was sentenced for armed robbery. *394The applicable statute provides that armed robbery is "punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years.” MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. The trial court sentenced Mr. Moore to a term of one hundred to three hundred years in prison. The conclusion follows, with the force and simplicity of Aristotelian syllogism, that the sentence was within the maximum authorized by the Legislature.
The majority opinion avoids the snare of the obvious by reading the statute creatively. The law says that the sentence may be for "any term of years”; the majority reads "a term of years less than life.” The law grants broad discretion to the trial bench to fashion an appropriate sentence; the majority restricts that authority on the basis of considerations extraneous to the statute. The law is clear; the majority’s view obscure.
Of course, the majority purports to merely "construe” or "interpret” the statute to effectuate the. Legislature’s intent. However, the most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that, where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the judiciary’s role is to enforce, not construe. The statute here is plain: a trial court may sentence for "life or any term of years.” Any term of years means a term without limitation as to duration. The assertion that the term of years must be shorter than life expectancy because no one can serve more than life misses the mark. The issue is not whether the defendant can serve the sentence, but whether the court can impose it. Likewise, the existence of the lifer law, MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4), may prompt long indeterminate sentences but certainly does not invalidate them. Finally, although the long and indeterminate sentence may in fact exceed a life sentence as served, that assumption is premised upon speculation alone. Notwithstanding *395the lifer law, the inmate serving a life sentence perhaps will never be paroled. In fact, the lifer law itself may be repealed or amended. In short, the majority analysis is founded upon assumptions similar to those this Court expressly prohibits trial courts from making at sentencing. People v Humble, 146 Mich App 198; 379 NW2d 422 (1985), and People v Fleming, 142 Mich App 119, 126; 369 NW2d 499 (1985).
The majority suggests the Legislature can correct the problem by amending the statute. I suggest this Court can avoid the problem in the first place by simply applying the law as it is.
Because I am convinced judicial construction here is not warranted in the first instance, I will not discuss at length the construction adopted by the majority. It is enough to say that if "any term of years” cannot equal or exceed a particular defendant’s life expectancy, every judge will be an actuary, every attorney will be a physician, and every defendant will be at death’s door on sentencing day.
I would affirm.