Court Opinion

ID: 9377525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 07:00:10.944401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:14.788830
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                        2023 MSPB 10
                             Docket No. AT-1221-20-0134-W-1

                                       Jessie McCray,
                                         Appellant,
                                               v.
                                 Department of the Army,
                                           Agency.
                                        March 7, 2023

           Jennifer Duke Isaacs, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

           Angela Slate Rawls, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, for the agency.

                                          BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                  OPINION AND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the following reasons, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the initial
     decision as to the finding that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that he
     engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i). We MODIFY
     the initial decision as set forth in this Opinion and Order to find that the appellant
     also failed to nonfrivolously allege he made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B) or
     (C). We further MODIFY the initial decision to credit the appellant’s facially
                                                                                      2

     plausible assertions, consistent with the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
     the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) in Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection
     Board, 979 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was employed by the agency as a GS-12 Human Resources
     Specialist at the Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC), Redstone Arsenal,
     Alabama. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 32, 34. His 2018 performance year
     ran from April 1, 2017, to March 31, 2018. McCray v. Department of the Army,
     MSPB Docket No. AT-3443-19-0060-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0060 AF), Tab 4
     at 105-06. According to the appellant, he filed a grievance in May 2018, through
     the agency’s administrative grievance process, alleging that his supervisor
     “engage[d] in discrimination against a coworker with disabilities.” IAF, Tab 1
     at 5, 11, 36, 50, Tab 6 at 10.
¶3         The appellant filed a second administrative grievance on July 26, 2018,
     concerning his supervisor’s alleged denial for the 2018 performance year of
     (1) the appellant’s request to provide input regarding his accomplishments into
     the agency’s automated performance system, and (2) a time-off award (TOA) for
     performance.    IAF, Tab 6 at 10, Tab 7 at 37-42.        With that grievance, he
     submitted a report containing information regarding other employees’ TOAs.
     IAF, Tab 6 at 32, 34, 36-37, Tab 7 at 25-26, 37, 41. He had access to the report
     in order to fulfill his duties as a Human Resources Specialist.       IAF, Tab 6
     at 32-33, Tab 7 at 25-26. During a meeting with the appellant on August 7, 2018,
     his supervisor advised him that it was inappropriate to pull the TOA information
     of others for his personal grievance. IAF, Tab 6 at 34, 36. In response, the
     appellant sent an email to his supervisor the following day, instructing her,
     “Do not engage me on matter[s] that pertain to the on-going Administrative
     Grievance.” 0060 AF, Tab 4 at 5; IAF, Tab 6 at 34.
                                                                                       3

¶4         Later that month, the appellant’s supervisor issued the appellant a notice
     proposing to suspend him for 5 days for using his official position to access the
     TOA information of other employees for his personal gain. IAF, Tab 6 at 32-33.
     The suspension also cited the appellant’s email to his supervisor not to “engage”
     with him on his grievance as disrespectful conduct. Id.
¶5         Also in August 2018, in response to the appellant’s July 2018 grievance, the
     CPAC Director provided the appellant with an opportunity to submit input
     regarding his 2018 performance. 0060 AF, Tab 4 at 104, 107-12, 129. That same
     month, the appellant received his TOA. IAF, Tab 1 at 43, Tab 6 at 26; 0060 AF,
     Tab 4 at 129-30.
¶6         On October 3, 2018, the CPAC Director issued a decision on the appellant’s
     proposed 5-day suspension, agreeing that the appellant engaged in the alleged
     misconduct and determining that the penalty was appropriate. IAF, Tab 6 at 9,
     46-48.      He served this 5-day suspension from October 4 to 8, 2018.
     0060 AF, Tab 4 at 79-80.
¶7         Meanwhile, the agency selected the appellant for the position of GS-12
     Personnel Support Specialist, for which he had previously applied.      0060 AF,
     Tab 4 at 2, 82; IAF, Tab 6 at 6, 30. According to the appellant, this selection
     decision was made in May 2018.          0060 AF, Tab 4 at 2; IAF, Tab 6 at 6.
     He further alleged below that agency procedures required the agency to make a
     tentative job offer within 3 business days. IAF, Tab 6 at 6. In July 2018, he
     asked his supervisor when he could expect this tentative job offer. Id. at 30.
     On September 27, 2018, the appellant received notification that he was to begin
     his   new    position   on   October   14,   2018.   0060   AF,   Tab   4   at   82.
     Effective October 14, 2018, the appellant was reassigned to his new position.
     Id. at 73-75.
¶8         Later in October 2018, the appellant filed a Board appeal challenging his
     5-day suspension. 0060 AF, Tab 1 at 3, 17-21, Tab 4 at 1. An administrative
     judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal in January 2019.
                                                                                             4

      0060 AF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (0060 ID) at 1, 4.          The administrative judge
      found, as relevant here, that to the extent the appellant sought to file an IRA
      appeal, he failed to indicate whether he had filed a complaint with the Office of
      Special Counsel (OSC), a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing an IRA appeal with
      the Board. 1 0060 ID at 3 & n.1.
¶9          In February 2019, the appellant filed a complaint with OSC alleging that the
      agency retaliated against him for his May and July 2018 grievances. IAF, Tab 1
      at 32, 42, 49-50. He asserted that the retaliatory actions began in approximately
      May or June 2018, and ended in October 2018.              Id. at 25-26, 33-35, 43-50.
      These actions included initially denying him an opportunity to add his input into
      the performance appraisal system for his 2018 performance; delaying the issuance
      of his 2018 TOA; issuing him the 5-day suspension in October 2018; and taking
      more than 3 days to make his tentative job offer for the position of Personnel
      Support Specialist. Id. OSC subsequently terminated its inquiry and advised the
      appellant of his right to file an IRA appeal with the Board. Id. at 50-51. The
      appellant then filed the instant IRA appeal, reasserting these claims to the Board.
      IAF, Tab 1 at 1, 5-7, 11, 13-15.
¶10         Based on the written record, the administrative judge issued an initial
      decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.                 IAF, Tab 8,
      Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 4-6.      He found the appellant exhausted his OSC
      remedy. ID at 3. However, he determined that neither of the appellant’s alleged
      grievances constituted protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), over
      which the Board would have jurisdiction in an IRA appeal.                   ID at 4-5.
      Finally, the administrative judge held that, although the appellant informed OSC
      of his prior Board appeal concerning his 5-day suspension, and although such an

      1
       Neither party petitioned for review from that decision, and it is now the final decision
      of the Board. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(a)-(c) (providing that an initial decision generally
      becomes the Board’s final decision if neither party files a timely petition for review).
                                                                                             5

      appeal was a protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), all of the
      personnel actions alleged by the appellant in his OSC complaint occurred before
      he filed that Board appeal on October 26, 2018; thus, it could not have been a
      contributing factor in the actions at issue. ID at 5-6. The appellant has filed a
      petition for review, to which the agency has responded.           Petition for Review
      (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

                                            ANALYSIS
¶11         The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant exhausts his
      administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that
      (1) he made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
      protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),
      and (2) the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s
      decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a). Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 12
      (2016). The parties do not dispute the administrative judge’s finding that the
      appellant exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC regarding his
      allegations that, in reprisal for his administrative grievances, the agency initially
      denied him the opportunity to provide input into the agency’s performance system
      regarding his 2018 performance, delayed his 2018 TOA, suspended him for
      5 days, and took more than 3 days to make his tentative job offer. 2 ID at 3-5;
      IAF, Tab 1 at 25-27, 32-33, 36-50.

      2
        The parties also do not dispute the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s
      October 26, 2018 Board appeal could not have been a contributing factor in the alleged
      personnel actions because it postdated those actions. ID at 5-6. It does not appear the
      appellant alleged retaliation for his prior Board appeal below. IAF, Tab 6 at 11-16.
      Nonetheless, we discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s contributing
      factor determination. See El v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶¶ 9-10
      (2015) (concluding that a disclosure could not have contributed to personnel actions
      taken before the disclosure was made), aff’d per curiam, 663 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir.
      2016). The administrative judge made no finding as to whether the appellant exhausted
                                                                                           6

¶12         The parties also do not dispute the finding that the appellant did not allege
      that he sought to remedy reprisal for whistleblowing in his grievances, and thus
      they did not constitute protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i). ID
      at 4-5. Section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) includes as protected activity “the exercise of
      any appeal, complaint, or grievance right . . . with regard to remedying a violation
      of [5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)].” Exercising other appeal, complaint, or grievance
      rights falls within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii). The Board’s IRA
      jurisdiction includes a claim of retaliation for filing a grievance under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), but not for filing a grievance under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii).
      5 U.S.C. § 1221(a); Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365,
      ¶ 7 (2013). Thus, the Board lacks jurisdiction over a grievance that does not seek
      to remedy a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), i.e., one that does not seek to
      remedy whistleblower reprisal.       See Elder v. Department of the Air Force,
      124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 39 n.8 (2016) (determining that 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i)
      prohibits retaliation for filing a Board appeal in which a claim of whistleblower
      reprisal was raised).
¶13         Although the record does not contain a copy of the appellant’s May 2018
      grievance, he alleged that the subject matter of this grievance was his
      supervisor’s discrimination against a disabled coworker. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 11, 36,
      50.   As described by the appellant, his supervisor directed all team members
      except the appellant’s visually impaired coworker “to move to a cubicle area
      separated by a wall.” Id. at 36. The appellant stated that this action caused the
      coworker to feel “isolated, . . . unwelcomed, not respected, unsupported and

      with OSC regarding the activity of filing his prior Board appeal. ID at 3. Because the
      administrative judge properly determined the appellant failed to prove contributing
      factor, a necessary element of his jurisdictional burden, we discern no error in the
      decision not to address the exhaustion element. See Schmittling v. Department of the
      Army, 219 F.3d 1332, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that, in an IRA appeal, the
      Board may find it lacks jurisdiction based on an appellant’s failure to meet any one of
      the jurisdictional prerequisites).
                                                                                         7

      devalued as a team member.” Id. The appellant did not allege that he sought to
      remedy whistleblower reprisal in his May 2018 grievance. Id.
¶14        In his July 2018 grievance, the appellant alleged that, as of that time, his
      supervisor had denied his request to provide input regarding his 2018
      performance into the agency’s performance appraisal system and denied his TOA
      for the same year. 3 IAF, Tab 7 at 37-42. As to the denial of his request to
      provide input within the system, he acknowledged that he had previously been
      given the opportunity to provide written input outside the automated performance
      appraisal system.   Id. at 37-40.   However, he argued that this was insufficient
      because agency guidance stated, in pertinent part, that the system was “a
      comprehensive automated platform to . . . document” performance-related
      matters, including “employee input.”       Id. at 40.   Concerning his TOA, the
      appellant asserted that he was entitled to an award in light of his fully successful
      performance rating, he had requested the TOA, and he had not received it. Id.
      at 40-41.   He did not allege that the agency’s actions were in reprisal for a
      protected disclosure. Id. at 37-42. Therefore, we discern no basis to disturb the
      administrative judge’s finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the
      appellant’s grievances under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i).
¶15        Further, the appellant has not alleged the agency’s actions were motivated
      by his refusal “to obey an order that would require [him] to violate a law, rule, or
      regulation,” activity which is protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D).
      Thus, the issues before us are whether the appellant made nonfrivolous
      allegations that his disclosures and activity were protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8), (9)(B), or (9)(C). As explained below, we find that he did not.

      3
        As discussed above, the agency later provided the appellant with the opportunity to
      submit input regarding his performance, and also gave him a TOA for his 2018
      performance.
                                                                                                 8

      The appellant’s disclosures are not within the Board’s jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8).
¶16         The appellant argues that the administrative judge “erred by failing to
      consider . . . entirely” his disclosure of disability discrimination against a
      coworker. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11; IAF, Tab 1 at 11, 36. He alleges he made this
      disclosure in his May 2018 administrative grievance.             PFR File, Tab 1 at 11.
      The administrative judge acknowledged that the parties disputed whether the
      appellant raised disability discrimination in a May 2018 grievance as he alleged,
      or later, in his August 30, 2018 response to the agency’s proposal to suspend him
      for 5 days, as claimed by the agency. 4 ID at 5; IAF, Tab 1 at 25, 50, Tab 7 at 7,
      23, 26-27. As discussed above, he found that, regardless of when the appellant
      raised such discrimination issues to the agency, he did not seek to remedy
      whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) in the grievance, and
      therefore    his   grievance     was    not   protected     activity   under     5   U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i). ID at 5. Thus, to the extent the appellant is arguing that the
      administrative judge failed to consider his May 2018 grievance, he is mistaken.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 11.

      4
        After the initial decision was issued in this case, the Federal Circuit held in
      Hessami, 979 F.3d at 1368-69, that when determining IRA jurisdiction, the issue of
      whether an appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that he made protected disclosures that
      contributed to a personnel action must be determined based on whether he “alleged
      sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”
      Here, the administrative judge did not credit the appellant’s facially plausible allegation
      that he made the subject disclosure in a grievance in May 2018. ID at 3, 5.
      Nonetheless, the administrative judge credited the appellant’s claim that, at some point,
      he made disclosures of disability discrimination. ID at 5. As discussed below, we
      agree that the content of this grievance was not protected. Thus, any error by the
      administrative judge in failing to credit the appellant’s assertion as to when he made
      this disclosure was harmless. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R.
      281, 282 (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s
      substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision). For purposes of
      our analysis, we have accepted as true the appellant’s claim that he alleged disability
      discrimination in a May 2018 grievance.
                                                                                       9

¶17         We have considered that the appellant may be asserting that the
      administrative judge failed to address whether the grievance contained
      disclosures protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The administrative judge did
      not conduct such an analysis for either of the appellant’s grievances. ID at 4-5.
      We modify the initial decision to find that the appellant’s alleged disclosures in
      his administrative grievances do not afford the Board jurisdiction over his IRA
      appeal under section 2302(b)(8). As a result, any oversight by the administrative
      judge in failing to address the appellant’s potential section 2302(b)(8) claim does
      not affect the outcome in this case. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force,
      22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984).
¶18         An allegation of reprisal for making a disclosure in the course of exercising
      a grievance right is an allegation of a prohibited personnel practice under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9), not 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).       Serrao v. Merit Systems
      Protection Board, 95 F.3d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), abrogated in part on
      other grounds by Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367,
      1371-72 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 6; Fisher v.
      Department of Defense, 47 M.S.P.R. 585, 587-88 (1991); see Alarid v.
      Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 10 (2015) (explaining that filing a
      grievance and representing another employee in the grievance process are
      activities protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)).     Thus, only disclosures made
      outside the context of a grievance right granted by law, rule, or regulation are
      protected under section 2302(b)(8).     Serrao, 95 F.3d at 1576; see 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(A) (identifying the “exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance
      right granted by any law, rule, or regulation” as a protected activity),
      section 2302(b)(9)(B) (providing that testifying or assisting another individual in
      the exercise of his grievance rights under section 2302(b)(9)(A) is a protected
      activity).   Accordingly, the appellant’s alleged disclosures in his May and
      July 2018 grievances cannot support a finding of Board jurisdiction under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
                                                                                        10

¶19           Even if the appellant had made his claim of disability discrimination outside
      the context of his May 2018 grievance, it could not be considered a protected
      disclosure under section 2302(b)(8). The Board adjudicates claims of disability
      discrimination raised in connection with an otherwise appealable action under the
      substantive standards of section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
      (Rehabilitation Act). Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB
      31, ¶ 35. The standards under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as
      amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, have
      been incorporated by reference into the Rehabilitation Act and the Board applies
      them to determine whether there has been a Rehabilitation Act violation.
      29 U.S.C. § 791(f); Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 35.                 The ADA has an
      anti-retaliation provision, which prohibits discriminating against any individual
      because of protected activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶ 44.       Such   protected   activity   includes   opposing   unlawful   disability
      discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 44 (identifying
      both requesting a reasonable accommodation and complaining of disability
      discrimination as activities protected by the ADA).             Thus, accepting the
      appellant’s allegations regarding his May 2018 grievance as true, his grievance is
      protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act.
¶20           The Board has long held that it lacks IRA jurisdiction over disability
      discrimination claims. Smets v. Department of the Navy, 117 M.S.P.R. 164, ¶ 14
      (2011), aff’d per curiam, 498 F. App’x 1 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Coons v. Department
      of the Treasury, 85 M.S.P.R. 631, ¶ 22 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds
      by Arauz v. Department of Justice, 89 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 7 n.1 (2001); Marren v.
      Department of Justice, 51 M.S.P.R. 632, 636-42 (1991), aff’d per curiam,
      980 F.3d 745 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Table), and modified in part on other grounds by
      Robinson v. U.S. Postal Service, 63 M.S.P.R. 307, 323 n.13 (1994).
      In Marren, the Board considered the scope of the Whistleblower Protection Act of
      1989 (WPA of 1989), Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16, which first expanded the
                                                                                        11

      Board’s jurisdiction to include IRA appeals. 51 M.S.P.R. at 636-41. The Board
      observed that an employee who seeks to remedy disability discrimination has at
      his disposal the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and its
      long-established procedures as an avenue to seek redress. Marren, 51 M.S.P.R.
      at 641.   It further noted that in the legislative history of the WPA of 1989,
      Congress did not indicate any intent to change the balance of distribution of equal
      employment opportunity review or diminish the primary roll afforded the EEOC
      in that arena. Id. at 642.
¶21         Like Federal employees seeking to remedy a violation of the Rehabilitation
      Act, those seeking to remedy a violation of Title VII, i.e., discrimination based on
      race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, may also seek redress before the
      EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)-(b). In Edwards v. Department of Labor, we
      reaffirmed the longstanding principle that activity and disclosures protected under
      Title VII are not protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) because employees
      seeking to remedy reprisal for such activity and disclosures have the right to seek
      redress before the EEOC. Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 10-25. This rationale in
      Edwards applies equally to claims of disability discrimination. For example, in
      Edwards, we cited to Congressional testimony by the Special Counsel expressing
      concern about granting IRA appeal rights to employees who also had the EEOC
      as an avenue to seek redress.     Id., ¶ 10.   That testimony did not distinguish
      between Title VII-based claims and other claims of discrimination that are
      remedied by the EEOC. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1987: Hearings on S.
      508 Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Services, Post Off., & Civil Serv. of the Comm.
      on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 100th Cong. 138-39, 379-80
      (1987) (containing a prior draft of legislation establishing the Board’s jurisdiction
      over IRA appeals and the relevant testimony of the Special Counsel regarding that
      language).
¶22         Therefore, we conclude that the Board’s IRA jurisdiction does not extend to
      claims of reprisal for complaining of practices made unlawful by the
                                                                                                  12

      Rehabilitation Act. Because the appellant’s disclosures of alleged discrimination
      against a disabled coworker fall within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act,
      the   Board     does   not   have     jurisdiction        over   those   disclosures    under
      section 2302(b)(8).

      The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that his grievances are protected
      activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B).
¶23         Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B), protected activity includes “testifying for
      or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise” of any appeal,
      complaint,     or   grievance    right. 5    5 U.S.C.        § 2302(b)(9)(A)-(B);      Alarid,
      122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 10. The administrative judge did not address whether the
      appellant’s grievances were protected activity under section 2302(b)(9)(B).                 In
      addition, the parties do not raise this issue on review. However, the Board is
      obligated to “determine its own jurisdiction over a particular appeal.” Parrish v.
      Merit Systems Protection Board, 485 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
      (citing Cruz v. Department of the Navy, 934 F.2d 1240, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
      (recognizing    the    Board’s    “jurisdiction      to    determine     its   jurisdiction”)).
      Therefore, we address the issue here.
¶24         In Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 2, the appellant alleged the agency retaliated
      against him for making disclosures and filing EEO complaints in which he raised
      allegations that the agency discriminated against employees generally, and one of
      his subordinates in particular, because of their race.              We found no basis to
      conclude that the appellant’s disclosures or complaints were protected activities
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B) because there was no indication in the record that

      5
        Differing from 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), which bars reprisal for an appellant’s
      personal exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by law, rule, or
      regulation concerning an alleged violation of section 2302(b)(8), section 2302(b)(9)(B)
      bars reprisal for assisting another individual in the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or
      grievance right granted by law, rule, or regulation, and such a proceeding need not
      concern remedying a violation of whistleblower reprisal under section 2302(b)(8).
      Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 12 n.5.
                                                                                                          13

      the appellant’s subordinate, who purportedly was denied a promotion based on his
      race, or any of the other employees allegedly discriminated against based on race,
      filed any appeal, complaint, or grievance. Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 28.
¶25          Here, the appellant did not allege that he was lawfully assisting his
      coworker in the exercise of the coworker’s grievance right; rather the appellant
      alleged that he had exercised the grievance right in May 2018, in which he raised
      concerns about disability discrimination against his coworker. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 7,
      11, Tab 6 at 4, 6, 10. Because the appellant has not alleged that his coworker
      filed an appeal, complaint, or grievance in which the appellant assisted, he has
      not    alleged        that   he    engaged     in   a   protected        activity   under   5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(B). See Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 28; Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600,
      ¶ 12    n.5   (explaining          that   5   U.S.C.        §    2302(b)(9)(A)(i)     differs     from
      section 2302(b)(9)(B) in part because the former bars reprisal for an appellant’s
      personal exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right). Similarly, the
      appellant’s July 26, 2018 grievance, in which he challenged his supervisor’s
      alleged initial denial of the appellant’s request to provide input regarding his
      accomplishments into the agency’s automated performance system and a TOA for
      his 2018 performance, is not protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(B).
      IAF, Tab 6 at 10, Tab 7 at 37-42. The appellant has not alleged that he was
      testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual other than himself in
      connection with that grievance. We therefore find that the appellant has failed to
      make a nonfrivolous allegation regarding this statutory provision.

      The appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that his grievances are protected
      activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C).
¶26          Prior to December 12, 2017, the whistleblower protection statutory scheme
      provided that “cooperating with or disclosing information to the Inspector
      General of an agency, or the Special Counsel, in accordance with applicable
      provisions       of     law,”     is   protected.       5       U.S.C.   § 2302(b)(9)(C)        (2016);
      Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 33.                   Section 1097(c)(1) of the National Defense
                                                                                        14

      Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, 1618
      (2017) (NDAA), amended section 2302(b)(9)(C) to provide that, in addition to the
      Inspector General of an agency or the Special Counsel, a disclosure to “any other
      component responsible for internal investigation or review” is also protected.
      Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 29. Although all of the relevant events in this appeal
      occurred after the December 12, 2017 enactment date of the NDAA, neither the
      administrative judge, nor the parties, addressed whether the appellant’s
      administrative grievances fell within the expanded scope of this subsection.
      Therefore, we do so here. 6 See Parrish, 485 F.3d at 1362 (finding that the Board
      is obligated to determine its jurisdiction over an appeal).
¶27         The legislative history of the NDAA does not define the scope of the
      expanded section 2302(b)(9)(C), and the term “component responsible for
      internal investigation or review” is not defined elsewhere in the statute. It is
      unnecessary to define the term here because we can make our finding on narrower
      grounds. We are guided by the principle that the provisions of a statute should be
      read together to avoid rendering any provision inoperative or superfluous.
      Horner v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 815 F.2d 668, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
      As previously discussed, section 2302(b)(9)(A) prohibits retaliation for the
      “exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or
      regulation – (i) with regard to remedying a violation of [section 2302(b)(8)]; or
      (ii) other than with regard to remedying a violation of [section 2302(b)(8)].” We
      do not read section 2302(b)(9)(C) to include disclosures made in the course of an
      administrative grievance, the same activity protected under (b)(9)(A), because
      doing so would effectively subsume all or part of (b)(9)(A).

      6
        In Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 29-33, we determined that the NDAA’s expansion of
      section 2302(b)(9)(C) did not apply to events occurring prior to the enactment of the
      NDAA. Unlike in Edwards, all the relevant events here took place post-enactment and
      the expanded section 2302(b)(9)(C) applies to this appeal.
                                                                                     15

¶28        This determination is consistent with prior interpretations of 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b).   The Board and the Federal Circuit have declined to interpret the
      provisions of section 2302(b)(8) and (b)(9) as overlapping.       For example, the
      Federal Circuit held that an employee’s disclosure made during the course of his
      EEO complaint can only be protected under section 2302(b)(9)(A), and not (b)(8),
      reasoning in part that reading the two subsections as covering the same activity
      “would render § 2302(b)(9)(A) largely irrelevant, if not completely superfluous.”
      See Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 978 F.2d 679, 690-91 (Fed. Cir.
      1992) (citing Horner, 815 F.2d at 674). Similarly, the Board determined that
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) did not protect an appellant from reprisal for disclosures
      made during an internal agency grievance.          Fisher, 47 M.S.P.R. at 587-88.
      The Board explained that there would be no need for section 2302(b)(9)
      protections if it interpreted (b)(8) to override and make redundant the provisions
      of (b)(9). Fisher, 47 M.S.P.R. at 587-88. We likewise find that the appellant’s
      disclosures, made in his administrative grievances, are not protected activity
      under section 2302(b)(9)(C), because to find otherwise would render (b)(9)(A)
      irrelevant and superfluous.
¶29        In addition, the history of 5 U.S.C. § 2302 supports the conclusion that
      Congress did not intend activity protected under section 2302(b)(9)(C) to overlap
      with (b)(9)(A).     Prior to the enactment of the Whistleblower Protection
      Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 101(b)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 1465
      (codified in pertinent part at 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a)), (WPEA), the Board’s IRA
      jurisdiction only extended to protected disclosures under section 2302(b)(8), and
      not to any of the protected activities identified in (b)(9). The Federal Circuit
      cautioned against “read[ing] the scope of § 2302(b)(8) as including [protected]
      activities squarely within § 2302(b)(9)(A),” observing that doing so “would have
      the effect of reversing this carefully considered Congressional decision” to
      exclude protected activities, including activities under section 2302(b)(9), from
      the Board’s jurisdiction at that time. Spruill, 978 F.2d at 690-91.
                                                                                                       16

¶30         The WPEA expanded the Board’s jurisdiction over IRA appeals to include,
      as relevant here, activity protected under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or
      (D), but not (b)(9)(A)(ii). See Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7 (recognizing this
      expansion to the Board’s jurisdiction as to section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), but not
      (b)(9)(A)(ii)). As noted earlier, the Board does not have jurisdiction over claims
      of reprisal for activity protected under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), i.e., a grievance
      an employee files on his own behalf that does not seek to remedy whistleblower
      reprisal like the ones at issue here. 5 U.S.C. 1221(a); Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365,
      ¶ 7; cf. Elder, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 39 n.8 (stating that 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i)
      prohibits retaliation for filing a Board appeal in which a claim of whistleblower
      retaliation was raised under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)). The parties do not dispute
      the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s grievances fell into this
      category         and    therefore     outside       the      Board’s       jurisdiction      under
      section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i). ID at 4-5.            We decline to read the new language in
      section 2302(b)(9)(C) to include claims covered by (b)(9)(A)(ii). Doing so would
      render     the    deliberate    distinction     between      section      2302(b)(9)(A)(i)       and
      (b)(9)(A)(ii)      activity    meaningless.        It    would    also     effectively    subsume
      section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii) into (b)(9)(C).                  See Horner, 815 F.2d at 674.
      Accordingly,       because     the   appellant’s        claims   fall    within   the    scope    of
      section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), they cannot fall within the scope of (b)(9)(C). As a
      result, we find that he has failed to nonfrivolously allege that his grievances are
      protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). Based on the above analysis,
      we deny the appellant’s petition for review and find that the Board lacks
      jurisdiction over this IRA appeal. 7

      7
        As a result of our findings here, we do not reach the appellant’s arguments regarding
      contributing factor or whether the agency would have taken the same actions if he had
      not filed administrative grievances. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12, 16; see Schmittling,
      219 F.3d at 1336-37 (holding that, in an IRA appeal, the Board cannot assume it has
      jurisdiction and proceed to make a determination on the merits).
                                                                                           17

                                             ORDER
¶31         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).

                                NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

            (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
      judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
      Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

      8
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        18

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
                                                                                19

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                              131 M Street, N.E.
                                Suite 5SW12G
                          Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     20

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             21

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.