Court Opinion

ID: 9661823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:52:03.539505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:34.113629
License: Public Domain

John F. Stroud, Justice. This is a suit to determine if the family immunity doctrine should bar recovery by an unemancipated minor from one standing in loco parentis for injuries resulting from an unintentional tort. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment, and we agree that the action cannot be maintained in Arkansas. On August 7, 1974, Bradley Davis Inmon, at that time two and one-half years of age, was injured while playing in a storage room at the residence of the appellees, his maternal grandparents. Bradley was burned while playing with a gasoline can that exploded and caught fire, necessitating skin grafts and other medical treatments. Bradley, by his next friend, Christopher Thomas, brought suit against appellees for negligence, seeking $25,000 in damages. Appellees had permanent custody of the minor by court decree ánd were in the process of adopting him. At some point after the accident, the adoption proceedings were completed. Appellees raised the family immunity doctrine as a bar to the action and moved for summary judgment. The motion was granted by the trial court on April 30, 1979, and from that order appellant brings this appeal. The sole issue presented here is whether an unemancipated minor may maintain a cause of action for negligence against a person or persons standing in loco parentis, in this case the maternal grandparents. The parties offer only two Arkansas cases as authority in this matter, and we find no others, Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W. 2d 468 (1938), and Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W. 2d 245 (1939) . In Brown a young boy was adopted by his stepfather. Several years later, when the boy was 15 years of age, his adoptive father intentionally administered strychnine poison to him, resulting in his death. The court acknowledged the family immunity doctrine established the previous year in Rambo and commented: We are not willing to extend the doctrine announced in the Rambo case, supra, so as to prevent an adopted child from bringing suit against his adoptive father for a voluntary tort committed upon him by the adoptive father. We need not address now the issue of an adoptive parent, as Bradley Davis Inmon was not adopted by appellees until after the tort occurred in the case now on appeal. However, we easily distinguish the Brown case, as the suit there was for an intentional tort. The Rambo case was a suit by a six year old boy, acting by his mother and next friend, against his natural father, alleging negligence and seeking to recover damages for personal injuries. The court , in establishing the family immunity doctrine in Arkansas stated: We, therefore, hold that an unemanicipated minor may not maintain an action for an involuntary tort against his parent in this state. In Rambo, supra, at 834, 114 S.W. at 469, the court also quoted with approval 46 C.J., p. 1324, which states: An unemancipated minor child has no right of action against a parent or a person standing in loco parentis, for the tort of such parent or person, . . . We are not persuaded by appellant’s contentions that the family immunity doctrine has become a legal anachronism. Nor do we believe that the policy considerations of family harmony and prevention of collusion and fraud are no longer valid. Although more than 40 years have elapsed since Rambo, we still believe in the sanctity of the family unit and find the statement of the court then is still valid today: But it is deemed better public policy that occasional injuries of this kind go unrequited rather than encourage or tolerate proceedings so repugnant to natural sentiments concerning family relations. For these reasons, we adhere to the family immunity doctrine and extend the holding in Rambo to apply to persons in loco parentis as well as to natural parents. Affirmed. Mays, J., dissents.