Court Opinion

ID: 2963602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:12:52.10694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:43.879049
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1223

                               CHARLES STELLA, ET AL.,

                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

                             JOHN J. KELLEY, JR., ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                              __________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                 [Hon. A. David Mazzone, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                         __________________________

                              __________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Cyr and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                              __________________________

               Richard E.  Brody, with whom Thomas M.  Elcock and Morrison,
               _________________            _________________     _________
          Mahoney & Miller were on brief, for appellants.
          ________________
               Harvey A. Schwartz, with whom  Schwartz, Shaw & Griffith was
               __________________             _________________________
          on brief, for appellees.

                              __________________________

                                   August 23, 1995

                             __________________________ 

                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.  This appeal,  which requires us
                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.
                           ______________

          to  apply the  teachings of  Johnson v.  Jones, 115  S.  Ct. 2151
                                       _______     _____

          (1995), furnishes  virtually a textbook  model of  the limits  of

          interlocutory review  of qualified immunity matters  in the post-

          Johnson era.  We conclude that we have jurisdiction over only one
          _______

          facet of the appeal and, on that facet, we  affirm the challenged

          order.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    This case comes  before us  for the second  time.   See
                                                                        ___

          Stella  v. Town  of Tewksbury,  4 F.3d  53 (1st  Cir. 1993).   We
          ______     __________________

          retell the tale  only to the extent  necessary to put the  issues

          that we must decide into workable perspective.

                    In   Tewksbury,  Massachusetts  (the  Town),  the  five

          members  of the Zoning Board of Appeals (the Board) are appointed

          for  fixed terms  by  the Town's  governing  body (the  Board  of

          Selectmen)  and may be removed during their terms only for cause.

          Plaintiffs  Charles Stella,  J.  Peter Downing  and Bruce  Gordon

          formerly served  on the Board.   In that capacity,  they voted to

          grant several controversial variances.  When residents complained

          and the selectmen urged stricter enforcement of the Town's zoning

          code,  the Board balked.   Even after the  selectmen instigated a

          citizens'  petition demanding  greater  rigor,  and succeeded  in

          attracting over  1,000  signatures, the  Board did  not mend  its

          ways.

                    In October of 1989,  the selectmen created a two-member

          subcommittee  to  investigate  the  Board's  performance.     The

                                          2

          subcommittee  held public  hearings at  which various  complaints

          were  aired.    When the  Board  refused  to  change course,  the

          selectmen  decided  to clean  house.    After the  Commonwealth's

          attorney general  thwarted an  effort by  two selectmen, John  J.

          Kelley, Jr.  and William  J. Hurton,  to reduce  the size  of the

          Board  from  five  members  to three,  the  selectmen  instituted

          proceedings regarding  the possible removal of  Board members for

          cause.1   This time, a bare  majority of the selectmen    Kelley,

          Hurton, and Thomas Camara    succeeded in ousting members  of the

          Board from office on a series of three-to-two votes.2

                    In May  1991, three  of the  casualties of  this putsch

          filed suit against Kelley, Hurton, Camara, and the  Town pursuant

          to 42  U.S.C.   1983 (1988).   Their flagship claim  was that the

          selectmen  cashiered them  in retaliation  for their  speech (the

          votes they had cast), thus abridging the First Amendment.3

                    We  need  not recount  the  murmur  of skirmishes  that

          ensued.   It  suffices to  say that  after two  notoriously false

                              
          ____________________

               1The selectmen acted in pursuance of a statute providing  in
          relevant  part that  any member  of a  municipal zoning  board of
          appeals "may  be removed  for cause  by the  appointing authority
          upon  written charges and after a public hearing."  Mass. Gen. L.
          ch. 40A,   12 (1975).

               2The  selectmen  held  a  separate hearing  for  each  Board
          member.  The hearings occurred on various dates from September to
          December,  1990.  Separate votes  were taken with  regard to each
          ouster.

               3Although the complaint contained other statements of claim,
          e.g., an  allegation that the selectmen  improperly conducted the
          removal hearings, thus depriving the plaintiffs of procedural due
          process, the instant appeal relates solely to the First Amendment
          claim and, hence, we confine our account to that claim.

                                          3

          starts (one of which sparked the parties' earlier journey to this

          court)  the selectmen  moved  for summary  judgment on  qualified

          immunity grounds.  The district court at first granted the motion

          but,  on reconsideration, reversed its  field.  The selectmen now

          appeal from the order denying summary judgment.

          II.  DISCUSSION
          II.  DISCUSSION

                    We  begin   with  the  architecture  of  the  qualified

          immunity  defense.  We  then consider the  teachings gleaned from

          Johnson v. Jones.  Finally, we apply the lessons we  have learned
          _______    _____

          to the problems that confront us.

                                          A
                                          A

                    Public officials accused of civil rights violations may

          raise  the  defense of  qualified  immunity as  a  shield against

          claims  for damages arising out  of their actions.   If, however,

          the official's conduct violated some right emanating from federal

          law, and  if the law was  clearly established at the  time of the

          infringement, so that an  objectively reasonable actor would have

          realized that  his conduct violated the  plaintiff's rights, then

          the  qualified immunity  defense is unavailable.   See  Harlow v.
                                                             ___  ______

          Fitzgerald, 457  U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982);  Buenrostro v. Collazo,
          __________                                 __________    _______

          973 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1992).  Thus, the doctrine of qualified

          immunity  limits  a  plaintiff's  damages  against  state  actors

          "insofar as  their conduct  does not violate  clearly established

          statutory or  constitutional rights of which  a reasonable person

          would have known."  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
                              ______

                    The  meaning   of   the  adjectival   phrase   "clearly

                                          4

          established," as it operates in the qualified immunity arena, has

          not always  been clearly  established.   The Court  has, however,

          attempted to explicate the phrase:

                    The   contours   of   the   right   must   be
                    sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
                    would  understand  that  what  he   is  doing
                    violates that right.  This is not to say that
                    an official action  is protected by qualified
                    immunity  unless the very  action in question
                    has previously  been held unlawful, but it is
                    to say  that in the light  of preexisting law
                    the unlawfulness must be apparent.

          Anderson  v.  Creighton,  483  U.S.  635,  640  (1987)  (citation
          ________      _________

          omitted); see also  Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 585 (1st Cir.
                    ___ ____  _______    _______

          1993); Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941  F.2d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1991).   We
                 ____    __________

          recently wrote:  "The inquiry into the nature of a constitutional

          right for  the purpose of ascertaining  clear establishment seeks

          to  discover whether the right was reasonably well settled at the

          time  of the challenged conduct  and whether the  manner in which

          the  right related  to the  conduct was  apparent."   Martinez v.
                                                                ________

          Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 988 (1st Cir. 1995).
          _____

                                          B
                                          B

                    The qualified immunity defense is, in part, an immunity

          from  trial  as well  as  an immunity  from  damage awards.   See
                                                                        ___

          Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,  232 (1991).  Thus, the  defense
          _______    ______

          may  be  asserted by  a  pretrial motion  and, if  the  motion is

          rejected, immediate appellate review is sometimes available.  See
                                                                        ___

          Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
          ________    _______

                    In Johnson v. Jones,  the Supreme Court cast  new light
                       _______    _____

          on the  circumstances under  which an immediate  appeal will  lie

                                          5

          from  the denial  of  a  pretrial  motion asserting  a  qualified

          immunity  defense.    The  plaintiff, Houston  Jones,  brought  a

          section 1983  action against five police  officers, claiming that

          they  used excessive force incident  to his arrest and detention.

          Three of the five officers proffered a qualified immunity defense

          and moved for summary judgment, contending that they knew nothing

          about the alleged beating.  The district court denied the motion,

          finding enough circumstantial evidence to raise genuine issues of

          material fact anent the movants'  liability.  The movants pursued

          an  interlocutory appeal,  arguing that  the record  reflected no

          trialworthy questions.  The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal,

          discerning an  absence of appellate  jurisdiction.  26  F.3d 727,

          728 (7th Cir. 1994).

                    The Supreme Court granted  certiorari and, resolving  a

          split  in the  circuits,4  held that  "a  defendant, entitled  to

          invoke a  qualified-immunity defense,  may not appeal  a district

          court's summary  judgment order insofar as  that order determines

          whether or not the  pretrial record sets forth a  `genuine' issue

          of fact for trial."  Johnson, 115  S. Ct. at 2159.  Thus, on  the
                               _______

          one hand,  a district court's  pretrial rejection of  a proffered

          qualified immunity  defense remains  immediately appealable as  a

          collateral  order to the extent that it  turns on a pure issue of
                              
          ____________________

               4Prior to the Court's decision in Johnson, several courts of
                                                 _______
          appeals (including this court) permitted  interlocutory review of
          pretrial   "evidence  insufficiency"  claims   made  by  official
          defendants asserting qualified  immunity defenses, while  several
          other  courts  of appeals  refused to  afford  such review.   See
                                                                        ___
          Johnson,  115 S.  Ct. at  2154 (delineating  the division  in the
          _______
          circuits and citing representative cases).

                                          6

          law, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.  See id. at
                                                                 ___ ___

          2158; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at  530.  On the other hand,  a district
                ________

          court's pretrial rejection of a qualified immunity defense is not

          immediately appealable to the  extent that it turns on  either an

          issue of  fact or an issue perceived by  the trial court to be an

          issue  of fact.   See Johnson,  115 S.  Ct. at  2159.  In  such a
                            ___ _______

          situation,  the  movant must  await the  entry of  final judgment

          before appealing the adverse ruling.  See id.; see also 28 U.S.C.
                                                ___ ___  ___ ____

            1291 (1988).

                    The  bottom  line, then,  is  simply this:    a summary

          judgment  order which  determines that  the pretrial  record sets

          forth a genuine  issue of  fact, as distinguished  from an  order

          that  determines whether  certain given facts  demonstrate, under

          clearly established law, a  violation of some federally protected

          right, is not reviewable  on demand.  In reaching  this branch of

          its holding, the Court abrogated our earlier decision in Unwin v.
                                                                   _____

          Campbell, 863  F.2d 124,  132 (1st Cir.  1988) (determining  that
          ________

          appellate jurisdiction  exists  in qualified  immunity cases  for

          interlocutory appeals brought to test denials of summary judgment

          that turn  on questions  of  alleged evidentiary  insufficiency).

          Consequently, we  acknowledge that Unwin  and its progeny  are no
                                             _____

          longer good law.5
                              
          ____________________

               5The  law sometimes  moves in  strange and  mysterious ways.
          Our decision in Unwin  resolved an apparent conflict between  two
                          _____
          lines of First  Circuit cases:   those that  refused to  consider
          "evidence  insufficiency"  issues  regarding  qualified  immunity
          defenses on  interlocutory appeal, see, e.g.,  Roure v. Hernandez
                                             ___  ____   _____    _________
          Colon, 824 F.2d 139,  141 (1st Cir. 1987), and  those that deemed
          _____
          the  exercise of jurisdiction over such issues to be proper, see,
                                                                       ___

                                          7

                                          C
                                          C

                    The threshold question for our consideration is whether

          Johnson applies  retroactively to cases pending  on direct appeal
          _______

          on the date the Court  handed down its opinion.  We  hold that it

          does.    When  dealing  with   matters  that  govern  a   court's

          jurisdiction,  there  is   no  conceivable  bar   to  retroactive

          application  of  a  "new,"   judicially  declared  rule.    Thus,

          regardless of the fact  that the selectmen filed their  notice of

          appeal prior to the Court's decision, Johnson controls.
                                                _______

                    In  this  case,  Johnson  requires that  we  parse  the
                                     _______

          complaint.  The plaintiffs claim  that the selectmen removed them

          from  the Board because of  their voting patterns,  and that this

          unceremonious  dumping  infringed  a  constitutionally  protected

          right  (free speech).  The legal framework that applies to claims

          of  this genre is settled  beyond hope of  contradiction.  When a

          former government employee brings  a First Amendment suit against

          his  employer for taking an adverse employment action against him

          on the  basis of his speech, the premier precedent is Mt. Healthy
                                                                ___________

          City  Sch. Dist.  Bd. of  Educ. v.  Doyle, 429  U.S. 274  (1977).
          _______________________________     _____

          Under the Mt. Healthy paradigm, the plaintiff must show both that
                    ___________

          his  speech was  constitutionally  protected, and  that it  was a

          "substantial" or "motivating" factor for the adverse action taken

          against  him.    Id.  at  287.    If  the  plaintiff  meets these
                           ___

          requirements, the burden of  persuasion shifts, and the defendant
                              
          ____________________

          e.g., Emery v. Holmes, 824 F.2d 143, 147 (1st Cir. 1987).  Having
          ____  _____    ______
          come  full circle,  we  now reinstate  Roure  as the  law  of the
                                                 _____
          circuit.

                                          8

          must then prove  "by a  preponderance of the  evidence" that  the

          employment action was not  affected by the speech, that  is, that

          the  employer would  have  acted  in  the  same  way  toward  the

          plaintiff "even in the absence of the protected conduct."  Id.
                                                                     ___

                    The  plaintiffs'  First  Amendment  claim  tracks  this

          model.     They  say,  in   substance,  that  their   votes  were

          constitutionally protected,  and that  the selectmen's desire  to

          stifle this  "speech" was  the salient factor  in their  removal.

          The selectmen  offer a  twofold rejoinder.   They  assert, first,

          that  the  plaintiffs' votes  are not  constitutionally protected

          speech (or, at least, that  the constitutional protection was not

          clearly  established in  1990,  when the  selectmen acted),  and,

          second, that the evidence  conclusively shows that the plaintiffs

          were ousted  for due cause, namely,  incompetence, dereliction of

          duty, and an intransigent refusal to follow the law.

                    In denying the selectmen's motion for summary judgment,

          the  lower court resolved both of these points in the plaintiffs'

          favor; the court  ruled that the plaintiffs'  votes were entitled

          to free-speech  protection, and that the plaintiffs  had limned a

          trialworthy  question  as to  the  selectmen's  motivation.   The

          selectmen challenge this ruling in both its particulars.

                                          D
                                          D

                    The interface  between Johnson and the  two-pronged Mt.
                                           _______                      ___

          Healthy test  provides an excellent  example of the  newly stated
          _______

          limits on  appellate  jurisdiction in  respect  to  interlocutory

          appeals   from  pretrial  orders   rejecting  qualified  immunity

                                          9

          defenses.  Under  Johnson, we have  jurisdiction to inquire  into
                            _______

          the  first of the selectmen's challenges, that is, to examine the

          existence vel  non of a  constitutionally protected  right.   See
                    ___  ___                                            ___

          Johnson, 115 S. Ct.  at 2158.  But  we lack the power  to inquire
          _______

          into,  or address, the second  of these challenges,  that is, the

          fact-based  question of what the evidence does (or does not) show

          concerning whether  the selectmen's actions violated the asserted

          right   a question that depends, in this case, on the selectmen's

          motives in ejecting the plaintiffs from their seats on the Board.

          See id. at 2159.
          ___ ___

                    The initial  question under Mt. Healthy  asks whether a
                                                ___________

          constitutionally  protected right  is in  play at  all.   This is

          essentially  a  legal, not  a factual,  inquiry.   See  Wright v.
                                                             ___  ______

          Illinois Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1498-99
          __________________________________________

          (7th  Cir. 1994); Williams v.  Kentucky, 24 F.3d  1526, 1532 (6th
                            ________     ________

          Cir.),  cert. denied,  115 S. Ct.  358 (1994).   As  the query is
                  _____ ______

          framed, the  answer to it  does not depend upon  whose account of

          the  facts is correct.   Thus, Johnson    which permits immediate
                                         _______

          review  of the rejection of  a qualified immunity  claim when the

          issue appealed  concerns not what  facts the litigants  might (or

          might not) be able to prove,  but, rather, whether a given set of

          facts  shows a violation of a federally protected right   permits

          immediate review of the trial court's order in this respect.  See
                                                                        ___

          Johnson, 115  S. Ct. at 2158;  Mitchell, 472 U.S. at  528.  Since
          _______                        ________

          appellate  jurisdiction  exists to  this  extent,  we proceed  to

          examine the selectmen's contention on its merits.

                                          10

                    Basically, the  selectmen maintain  that the  speech at

          issue  here   votes cast  by public officials   is  not a form of

          speech  protected by  the  First Amendment.    We do  not  agree.

          Voting   by  members  of   municipal  boards,   commissions,  and

          authorities  comes  within  the  heartland  of  First   Amendment

          doctrine,  and   the  status   of  public  officials'   votes  as

          constitutionally   protected   speech   was  established   beyond

          peradventure of doubt at the time the selectmen defenestrated the

          plaintiffs.

                    The  dispositive  precedent  on  these  points  is  our

          opinion in Miller v. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523 (1st Cir.), cert.
                     ______    ____________                           _____

          denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).  In Miller, a section 1983 case, the
          ______                           ______

          municipality's board of selectmen allegedly forced the removal of

          certain  elected members  of  the  Hull  Redevelopment  Authority

          because of  the latter's  support for construction  projects that

          the  selectmen opposed.  See id. at  526-28.  There, as here, the
                                   ___ ___

          selectmen attempted to  justify the ouster on grounds  of neglect

          and   inefficiency.    See  id.   at  528.     Following  a  jury
                                 ___  ___

          determination  that  the  plaintiffs  were  dismissed  for  their

          political  opinions,  and  not  for  the  reasons  cited  by  the

          selectmen, the  defendants appealed.   They averred,  inter alia,
                                                                _____ ____

          that   the  votes  cast  by   the  plaintiffs  did  not  comprise

          constitutionally  protected  speech.    See id.  at  532-33.   We
                                                  ___ ___

          rejected this asseveration, concluding  that votes cast by public

          officials  merit  First  Amendment  protection.    Judge  Bownes,

          writing for this court, stated:

                                          11

                    [W]e have no difficulty  finding that the act
                    of voting on public  issues by a member of  a
                    public  agency  or  board  comes  within  the
                    freedom  of speech  guarantee  of  the  first
                    amendment. .  .  .    There can  be  no  more
                    definite expression of opinion than by voting
                    on a controversial public issue.

          Id. at  532 (footnote omitted).  We went on to hold that "elected
          ___

          members of  a public agency  may not be  removed from  office for

          voting contrary to the wishes of the Board of Selectmen."  Id. at
                                                                     ___

          533.

                    Given this stalwart precedent    which, like fine wine,

          has only improved with age    it is beyond serious question  that

          votes  cast by  the members  of municipal  boards are  ordinarily

          entitled to  First Amendment protection, and  that this protected

          status was clearly established  prior to the date of  the present

          denouement.6  Thus, unless some distinctive feature  of this case
                              
          ____________________

               6Indeed, we reached this precise conclusion in Miller:
                                                              ______

                         We  find  that  in  the  light  of  pre-
                    existing  law,  the unlawfulness  of removing
                    plaintiffs from  their positions . . . should
                    have been apparent  to defendants. . .  .  At
                    the  time the  removals were  effected, there
                    was  firmly  embedded  in our  constitutional
                    fabric   the    principle   that   government
                    employees could not be discharged for reasons
                    that  infringed  on the  employee's  right of
                    freedom of speech.

                                   *      *      *

                         A  reasonable  member  of  the  Board of
                    Selectmen would have understood  that removal
                    of the members of the  [Authority] for voting
                    as they  did, was  an egregious violation  of
                    plaintiffs'  first amendment  right.  .  .  .
                    There is  no basis  for defendant's  claim of
                    qualified immunity.

                                          12

          snatches it from Miller's precedential orbit, the plaintiffs have
                           ______

          satisfied Mt.  Healthy's first prong.   See Rankin  v. McPherson,
                    ____________                  ___ ______     _________

          483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987) ("It is clearly established that a State

          may  not discharge  an employee  on a  basis that  infringes that

          employee's  constitutionally  protected  interest  in  freedom of

          speech.");  Perry  v.  Sindermann,   408  U.S.  593,  597  (1972)
                      _____      __________

          (similar).

                                          E
                                          E

                    The  selectmen labor  to  distinguish  Miller in  three
                                                           ______

          ways, but to  no avail.  First,  they posit that  Miller involved
                                                            ______

          the removal of  elected officials whereas this  case involves the
                          _______

          removal  of appointed officials.  This is a distinction without a
                      _________

          difference.   The selectmen  have offered no  plausible rationale

          for  variable treatment, and  no language in  Miller supports the
                                                        ______

          conclusion that the First  Amendment right at issue applies  less

          broadly  to  appointed  officials   as  contrasted  with  elected

          officials.  We, therefore,  decline the defendants' invitation to

          create a wholly artificial dichotomy.

                    Second, the selectmen observe  that the language of the

          relevant removal statutes is not identical.  This is true  as far

          as it goes, but it does not go very  far.  The applicable statute

          in Miller  allowed removal  of agency members  for "inefficiency,
             ______

          neglect of  duty or  misconduct in office."   Mass.  Gen. L.  ch.

          121B,     6 (1969).   Here,  the  applicable statute  permits the

          removal  of Board members "for cause."   Mass. Gen. L. ch. 40A,  
                              
          ____________________

          Miller, 878 F.2d at 534 (citations omitted).
          ______

                                          13

          12 (1975).   Once again,  the selectmen have  advanced no  cogent

          reason  why  these  slight  variances in  terminology  warrant  a

          significant  dilution  of  the  First Amendment  protection  that

          safeguards votes  cast by  officials who  are subject to  removal

          under section 12.

                    The selectmen  reserve their most  impassioned rhetoric

          for  their protest that the  votes at issue  here were "illegal,"

          and that the illegality  somehow stripped away the constitutional

          protection  that otherwise  would  have attached.7    We are  not

          convinced.   This argument is  merely a back-door  approach to an

          examination   of  the  defendants'   reasons  for  banishing  the

          plaintiffs   a topic that, under current circumstances, cannot be

          broached  on  interlocutory  appeal.    See  text  infra.    And,
                                                  ___        _____

          relatedly,  the district  court rejected  this argument  on fact-
                                                                      _____

          based  grounds; since  Johnson precludes  us from  inquiring into
          _____                  _______

          factual controversies  on an  interlocutory appeal,  see Johnson,
                                                               ___ _______

                              
          ____________________

               7This argument uses as a vaulting pole a footnote in Miller,
                                                                    ______
          878 F.2d at 533  n.14, in which Judge Bownes quoted United States
                                                              _____________
          v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d  444, 457 (2d Cir. 1988) (subsequent
             _______________
          history omitted as irrelevant),  to the effect that "just  as the
          First  Amendment would  not  permit [council  members] to  incite
          violation  of federal law, it does not permit them to take action
          in violation  of such  law."  Yonkers  is inapposite here.   That
                                        _______
          case involved members of a city council who refused to cast votes
          necessary to effectuate a federal court decree.   See id. at 452.
                                                            ___ ___
          The  recalcitrant  council  members  tried  to  raise  the  First
          Amendment as a shield against the federal court's order.  See id.
                                                                    ___ ___
          at  457.    On appeal,  the  Second  Circuit  balanced the  First
          Amendment  claims  against  "the  public  interest  in  obtaining
          compliance    with   federal   court    judgments   that   remedy
          constitutional  violations," and  found  that  enforcing  federal
          court  orders   "unquestionably  justifies  whatever   burden  on
          expression has occurred."   Id.  It is readily  apparent that the
                                      ___
          situation in Yonkers has no known parallel in Tewksbury.
                       _______

                                          14

          115  S.  Ct. at  2159,  we  cannot  undertake here  and  now  the

          factbound delving  into illegality that the  selectmen's argument

          necessarily entails.

                    In sum,  we have jurisdiction to  hear an interlocutory

          appeal from  a  pretrial order  denying summary  judgment on  the

          basis  of qualified  immunity  to  the  extent  that  the  appeal

          challenges the trial court's  legal determination that votes cast

          by  members of  a  local zoning  board comprise  constitutionally

          protected speech.  Exercising this jurisdiction, we find that the

          defendants' efforts  to deflect  the Miller rule  are unavailing.
                                               ______

          Consequently, we hold that  the votes cast by the  plaintiffs, in

          their capacity as Board members, are entitled to protection under

          the  First  Amendment.   Since the  law  from which  this holding

          prescinds was  clearly established in 1990,  the district court's

          refusal  to  grant  summary judgment  on  this  ground  cannot be

          faulted.

                                          F
                                          F

                    The second prong of  the Mt. Healthy paradigm addresses
                                             ___________

          whether or not the  constitutionally protected speech amounted to

          a  "substantial"  or  "motivating"  factor  in  the  decision  to

          terminate the plaintiffs qua Board members.  See Mt. Healthy, 429
                                   ___                 ___ ___________

          U.S. at  287.  When this  appeal was taken on  February 27, 1995,

          Unwin reflected the law of this circuit, and, thus, we would have
          _____

          entertained  an  interlocutory  appeal  of the  district  court's

          determination  that  the amassed  evidence  sufficed  to raise  a

          trialworthy  issue.    Johnson,  however,  demands  a   different
                                 _______

                                          15

          outcome.  Although  the selectmen  tell a plausible  tale to  the

          effect that  they ousted the  plaintiffs for dereliction  of duty

          rather than  on speech-related  grounds, that tale  is factbound.

          The district court, in  declining to grant the motion  for brevis
                                                                     ______

          disposition, did so on the basis that the summary judgment record

          contained  enough  evidence  to  raise  triable  issues  of  fact

          concerning the selectmen's motivation.  While the selectmen claim

          that  this  decision  is  deeply flawed,  Johnson  bars  pretrial
                                                    _______

          appellate review of such "evidentiary insufficiency" claims.  See
                                                                        ___

          Johnson,  115 S. Ct. at 2159 (holding that "a defendant, entitled
          _______

          to invoke a qualified-immunity defense, may not appeal a district

          court's summary  judgment order insofar as  that order determines

          whether or not the  pretrial record sets forth a  `genuine' issue

          of  fact for trial").   Indeed,  Justice Breyer  anticipated this

          very type of circumstance, and made it clear that such cases fell

          within the class of  cases in which an interlocutory  appeal does

          not lie.  See id. at 2158 (explaining that the jurisdictional bar
                    ___ ___

          extends  to  "constitutional tort  cases  .  . .  [that]  involve

          factual controversies about, for example, intent").

                    Accordingly,   we  may   go  no   further.     We  lack

          jurisdiction to  review, on an interlocutory  basis, the district

          court's finding that there is a genuine factual dispute regarding

          a substantive  element of  the plaintiffs'  constitutional claim,

          namely,  the  selectmen's  actual  motivation   in  removing  the

                                          16

          plaintiffs from office.8

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                              
          ____________________

               8We  see no anomaly in  our determination that  one facet of
          the  defendants' appeal  passes Johnson  muster though  the other
                                          _______
          facet  does  not.    Indeed,  the  Court  anticipated  that  such
          schismatic  situations would develop.  See Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at
                                                 ___ _______
          2159.

                                          17