Court Opinion

ID: 9833384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:40:11.284336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:02.159410
License: Public Domain

Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants file a motion and supplemental motion for rehearing. In the supplemental motion, appellant contends that the judgment of this court in this case is in conflict with the following cases: McHenry, et al. v. Bankers’ Trust Co. et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 206 S. W. 560; McBride et al. v. United Irrigation Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 211 S. W. 498, and same case on motion for rehearing (Tex. Civ. App.) 213 S. W. 938; Edinburg Irrigation Co. v. Paschen (Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S. W. 329, and by the Commission of Appeals, 235 S. W. 1088. A most casual reading of those cases will not only show there was no conflict, but will show the perfect harmony of those decisions with that of the instant case; and the motion for a rehearing is overruled.
On Appellees’ Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees’ motion calls our attention to the fact that the parties were joined in said cause at their instance in seeking the relief prayed for therein, both as to the equitable relief as well as the one for damages, and urges that we erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court in sustaining the special exceptions presented and urged by the Edinburg Irrigation Company, the Stewart Harm Mortgage, the W. E. Stewart Land Company, and W. E. Stewart to the first amended original petition of plaintiffs, on the ground there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff in said cause and a misjoinder of causes of action in so far as appellants sought to recover damages.
In our opinion we did not, on the issue raised above, undertake in any way to disparage the merits of the claim, but only in so far as the matter involved the discretion of the court to hear all the matters passed upon. We did not overlook the rule that where the issues- all arise and grow out of the same matter, in a suit in equity in contradistinction to a common-law action in administering equity the court in the former class having jurisdiction of all the parties and the res should enter a complete decree. 16 Cyc. 247; 16 Cyc. 110; 10 Ruling Case Law, *344p. 370, § 120; Chambers v. Cannon, 62 Tex. 293; Galveston City R. Co. v. Miller (Tex. Civ. App.) 38 S. W. 1132; Moore v. Minerva, 17 Tex. 20; Teel v. Rio Bran Oil Co., 47 Tex. Civ. App. 153, 104 S. W. 420. The record here presents such a case. If we sustain the judgment of the trial coprt on the question or rather on the matter of judicial discretion, it will no doubt wort an irreparable injury upon the appellees, in that they could not in another suit have all the same parties and issues before the court, as some of them are nonresidents of the state. Ordinarily in exercising such a discretion it must be assumed parties would not be deprived of any right to litígate in some other suit the issues with the same parties.
As to whether or not the question of mis-joinder of parties was properly raised by exceptions instead of by plea in abatement we need not consider (Oliver v. Huckins [Tex. Civ. App.] 244 S. W. 628), for we have no question but what they were properly joined in the suit. In the case of Mayhew & Isbell Lumber Co. v. Valley Wells Association, 216 S. W. 229, cited in our original opinion in this case, this court said:
“However, we- are of the opinion that-the actions were properly joined, especially under our liberal practice. If the contract had provided how many crates each member was to receive, there would be good ground for appellant’s contention; but the contract leaves the matter of the division of the crates to the members. It follows that if separate suits were brought, and the appellant was unable to procure the consolidation thereof, it might be subjected to recoveries for damages caused by failure to deliver more crates than it was bound to deliver. Each plaintiff would view the matter from his particular standpoint and allege his damages in accordance with his views. Each might sustain his contention, and the result would be binding on appellant, but not on the members not parties to the suit. We think it is obvious that appellant was entitled to demand that all parties claiming damages under the contract should join therein, and, this being the case, it follows that it was proper to permit the joinder. Moore’s Adm’r v. Minerva, 17 Tex. 20; Robbins v. Ayres, 10 Mo. 538, 47 Am. Dec. 125.”
If the common point of litigation be decisive of the entire matter, though the interests of the plaintiffs or the liabilities of the defendants are unconnected except by the common question, but all arising out of the same transaction may be joined whep all the plaintiffs and all the defendants are interested in the same claim of right and the relief sought by the plaintiff is of the same general character. Such joinders may be necessary. 16 Cyc. 263; Yellow Pine Lumber Co. v. Carroll, 76 Tex. 135, 13 S. W. 261; Hammer v. Woods, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 179, 24 S. W. 942.
Now the effect of the judgment of the trial court in sustaining the exceptions woilld be, as seen, to require the parties to resort to many different suits, requiring.all proper parties in interest to be before the court, which would be impossible, as no suit could be maintained against a nonresident on a personal demand without bringing such person before the court on personal service. The courts abhor multiplicity of suits when all the matters áre properly subjects of the jurisdiction of the court in the same equitable proceeding. Clegg v. Varnell, 18 Tex. 294; Dobbin v. Bryan, 5 Tex. 276; Craddock v. Goodwin, 54 Tex. 578; Walcott v. Hendrick, 6 Tex. 416; Railway v. Graves, 50 Tex. 181; Mateer v. Cockrill, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 391, 45 S. W. 751.
In view of the fact that the' appellants were permitted to join in the suit, and thus are properly before the court for equitable relief, to which it was found they were entitled, complete relief should have been administered, even to determining and awarding the recovery or such damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of the failure of the Edinburg Irrigation Company to perform its alleged <juty, and not drive the parties out of court — from a case in which they were properly before it for one, question —to many separate and distinct suits to seek the redress they were entitled to have adjudicated in this proceeding.
The application of appellees, Ledbetter et al., will be granted to the extent of setting aside the judgment of this court in affirming the judgment of the trial court as to these ap-pellees, and ' remand the cause for another trial as to them and appellant on the issue of damages discussed herein.
As to the judgment of the trial court on the question of granting the injunction, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and, as there is no issue between these appellees and appellee Hoit, the judgment of affirmance in all things stands as to said appellee Hoit. This cause is therefore only remanded for the trial of the issues between appellant Edinburg Irrigation Co. et al. and appellee A. Ledbetter et al. in accordance with this opinion.