Court Opinion

ID: 9775144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:45:10.10899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:20.271651
License: Public Domain

Ray Thornton, Justice. The Mayor of the City of Gould, appellant A.B. Allen, was charged with two counts of “prohibited actions by a municipal official” under the provisions of Arkansas Code Annotated § 14-42-108(a)(l) and (b)(1) in that he: (1) received municipal services from the City without paying for such services at the same rate and in the same manner that the general public pays for such services, and (2) furnished persons within the City water service without requiring payment at the regular rates and in the usual manner. Upon conviction, appellant was fined $50.00 on each count. Pursuant to § 14-42-108(c)(2), the trial court removed him from the Gould mayoralty. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, and that the provision removing him from office and making him ineligible to hold municipal office denies him equal protection of the law. We affirm the convictions, and also the removal from office and ineligibility to hold office, which resulted from the convictions. Count I: The first count against the appellant was brought under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-42-108, which provides: It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of any municipal corporation of this state to receive or accept any water, gas, electric current, or other article or service from the municipal corporation, or any public utility operating therein, without paying for it at the same rate and in the same manner that the general public in the municipal corporation pays therefor. Id. § 14-42-108(a)(l). Ms. Sherry Taylor testified at trial that during 1994 she was the Water and Sewer Clerk, handling both billing and deposits. She testified that water customers living in the City who were connected to the sewer system were required to pay the minimum water bill, and the minimum sewer bill. If a customer used no water, that customer would receive a minimum bill ($7.00) for water and a minimum bill ($10.50) for sewer, plus a $5.00 charge for sanitation. She stated that the exception to this rule was for people outside the city limits. Arkansas State Police Sergeant Gary Allen conducted an investigation of the allegations, and he testified that there were individuals outside the Gould city limits who were paying only for water, but they were not hooked up to the Gould sewage system. From the evidence, it appears that members of the general public in Gould who were connected to the sewer system were required to pay for sewer and sanitation service in order to obtain water service. Robert Stephens, a 1994 member of the Gould City Council, testified a person living in Gould and connected to the sewer system would have a minimum bill of $10.94 each month for sewer services and $7.00 for water services. Stephens further testified that as a water commissioner, he was aware of only one person who did not pay the sewer minimum, despite being hooked up to the sewage system and the water system, and identified that person as appellant, who was not paying the sewer minimum. Appellant testified that he and his wife owned a store in Gould and that water has always been hooked up to the store, but that he stopped paying for the sewer service to the store when it closed in August or September of 1992. This was confirmed by Ms. Taylor’s testimony that appellant had told her that since the store was closed, to leave the water charge on the bill but to take the sewer charge off. During her direct examination in the trial, Ms. Taylor responded as follows to a question whether this was the right thing to do: “Well, I understood that if you stayed within the city fimits and you were connected to sewer, you were required to pay a sewer bill.” The testimony that appellant gave the order to remove his store from the billing requirement for sewer service without disconnecting the store from the sewer fine is evidence that he used his office to obtain preferential treatment not available to the general public.  In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we will affirm if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict. Wilson v. State, 320 Ark. 707, 709, 898 S.W.2d 469, 470 (1996). The evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, must be of sufficient force that it will, with reasonable and material certainty and precision, compel a conclusion one way or another. Kilpatrick v. State, 322 Ark. 728, 733, 912 S.W.2d 917, 920 (1995). This court does not attempt to weigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses. That duty is left to the trier of fact. Mann v. State, 291 Ark. 4, 7-8, 722 S.W.2d 266, 268 (1987). The jury is free to believe the testimony of the State’s witnesses and to discount that of appellant and his witnesses. Jones v. State, 326 Ark. 61, 64, 931 S.W.2d 83, 85 (1996).  We find sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict on the first charge of receiving services without paying at the same rate and in the same manner as the general public. Count II: The second count was brought under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-42-108 which provides: It shall be unlawful for any city official or employee of any municipal corporation in this state to furnish or give to any person, concerns, or corporations any property belonging to the municipal corporation, unless payment is made therefor to the municipal corporation at the usual and regular rates, and in the usual manner, except as provided in subsection (a) of this section. Id. § 14-42-108(b)(l). Appellant was charged with violations of this statute for his actions in adjusting bills of persons using water and sewer services. The appellant does not admit making all of the adjustments reflected in the testimony of Ms. Taylor, Officer Allen, or Mr. Stephens, and contends that the adjustments were made to offset faulty meters or leaky water fines. In considering the appeal on the issue of insufficient evidence, we look at the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence. A procedure for reviewing consumer complaints about bills for services was established by Gould City Ordinance No. 081793, which provides that any user who believes his user charge is unjust and inequitable may make written application to the Gould City Council requesting review of his user charge. The ordinance further provides authority for the City Council to recompute user charges and make them applicable to the next bill. There is no indication that this procedure was used to adjust bills, although Ms. Taylor does indicate that one system-wide reduction of bills ordered by the appellant in July of 1994 had been approved by the City Council. There was no Council approval of the earlier adjustments made in response to user complaints during the month of February. Ms. Taylor testified that she could not remember how many bills were reduced at that time, but she read her note on the last page of the printout that “Adjustments was [ sic] made on all customers, authority per Mayor Allen, with late charges taken off, minimums on past due and current bills will remain the same.” She then indicated that she had signed her name to this note. Ms. Taylor further testified that she documented other adjustments ordered by appellant by noting on the back of the bill stubs “per Mayor Allen.” She identified the bill stubs in a booklet as reflecting adjustment in bills ordered by appellant, and said that she had documented the number of bills actually adjusted during 1994, but left the documentation behind when she was transferred to the police department. When responding to the question, “[D]id you talk to the mayor about those adjustments [during the period of time these adjustments were made]?”, Ms. Taylor replied: “I have — I remember telling him one time that if the meter was read correctly, and I think I told him that I thought that they should be billed for whatever the amount was.” Ms. Taylor also testified that appellant instructed her not to send out bills on election day. Sergeant Gary Allen testified that the prosecuting attorney directed him to investigate a complaint by a citizen’s group that appellant was not paying for water and sewer at the regular rates and that appellant, without authority to do so, was adjusting or dismissing payments due by others on their water and sewer bills. Officer Allen testified that he pulled several bills for examination and found nine bills from the month of September, October, and November that showed adjustments to lower the bills. On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred: Q: Mr. Allen was elected the last of November of ‘94, was he not? A: I believe that is correct. Q: And these issues came up during election, did they not? A: They was . . . yes, sir, it was during that period of time. That was the-the gist of the complaint, that the water bills were being adjusted in exchange for votes. Mr. Stephens testified that he had reviewed the documents presented in evidence, and had prepared a fist of some of the water bills which had been reduced. This fist was received into evidence as State’s Exhibit 5. The names on the fist were drawn from bill stubs which had been marked by Ms. Taylor as being reduced by the mayor. Exhibit 5 disclosed twelve accounts that were reduced between August 31, 1994, and October 31, 1994. Of the twelve accounts, eight bills ranging from $78.70 down to $45.83 were reduced to bills for minimum usage (approximately $23.75). The remaining four accounts, reflecting bills ranging from $171.33 to $76.60, were adjusted by a total reduction of $260.62, with an aggregate reduction for all twelve accounts of $549.18.  We find that there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on the second charge. Removal From Office: We turn to the issue whether the removal from office and the ineligibility to thereafter hold municipal office, which resulted from the conviction, denied to appellant the equal protection of the laws. Arkansas Code Annotated § 14-42-108 provides as follows: Conviction shall ipso facto remove the official or employee from the municipal office or position held by him and shall render him ineligible to thereafter hold any office or position under, or in connection with, the municipal corporation. Id. § 14-42-108(c)(2). A similar provision applicable to all public offices in the state is found in art. V, § 9 of the Arkansas Constitution, which renders an official found guilty of an “infamous crime” ineligible for holding office in perpetuity.  Appellant contends that the provisions for removal and ineligibility established for municipal officers are unconstitutional because they deny to appellant the equal protection of the laws in that county officials are not subject to the same provisions. To meet his burden, appellant must show that the disparate statutory treatment of county and city officers is arbitrary and capricious and is completely devoid of any legitimate purpose. Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 22, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994).  In determining whether a statute is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection, we are guided by well-established principles. If there is any basis for a classification, it will be upheld in the face of an equal protection challenge. Cook v. State, 321 Ark. 641, 648, 906 S.W.2d 681, 685 (1995). If the court finds that the act is rationally related to any legitimate objective of state government under any reasonably conceivable state of facts, the statute will be upheld. Id. Upon review, this court merely considers “whether any rational basis exists which demonstrates the possibility of a deliberate nexus with state objectives, so that the legislation is not the product of utterly arbitrary and capricious government purpose and void of any hint of deliberate and lawful purpose.” Id. (citing Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729 (1994)).  In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, we presume that the statute is constitutional, and the party challenging the constitutionality has the burden of proving otherwise. We resolve all doubts in favor of constitutionality. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 470, 915 S.W.2d 702, 713 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 246 (U.S. 1996); 117 S.Ct. 246 (1996); Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. at 21, 889 S.W.2d at 731. In considering the effect of provisions limiting access to public office, we first examine the issue of what combination of rights, privileges, duties, and' responsibilities are included in holding office. Long ago this court considered this issue in holding that the Governor was not required to issue a commission to the person receiving the largest number of votes for sheriff, when that person was in violation of provisions relating to the accountability for public funds. Taylor v. The Governor, 1 Ark. (1 Pike) 21 (1837). In Taylor, we stated: The applicant has neither been dispossessed of his freehold nor in any manner deprived of his rights, privileges, or property, nor has he been denied the law of the land or judgment of his PEERS, or the freedom or eqúality of elections. All these privileges he possesses in as ample a manner and in as full a degree as any other citizen. The constitution simply withholds from him public trust which depended upon his own volition or will, provided he complied with the condition annexed to the office. Id. at 27.  Holding public office is a political privilege and not a civil right. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Irby, 190 Ark. 786, 795, 81 S.W.2d 419, 422 (1935). In Irby, we considered whether a convicted felon who had received a foil and complete Presidential pardon should thereafter be eligible to hold an office of trust or profit, and stated: To hold that these safeguards and restrictions as they appear in our Constitution were promulgated as a punishment against the banished class cannot be justified by interpretation. Such was neither the intent nor the purpose of the framers of our Constitution. The clear and unmistakable intent and purpose was to safeguard the welfare of the State against invasions as is now thrust upon it. Evidently it was the paramount thought that one who had been convicted for embezzling public funds should not again be trusted with their use, and we are unwilling to admit lack of wisdom in the framers of our Constitution in this regard. Id., 81 S.W.2d at 423. The court deferred to the intent of the framers in protecting the public against violations of the public trust, and it found that the provisions barring the official from holding public office were safeguards rather than punishments and did not violate any constitutional right. Id. at 794-95, 81 S.W.2d at 422-23. The court stated that ineligibility to hold office did not deny the county official’s rights or personal liberty, but instead withheld an honorable privilege. Id. at 796, 81 S.W.2d at 423.  Based on these principles, we note that the statute excluding appellant from holding office in the municipality is not punitive in nature, but only restricts appellant’s privilege of holding municipal office to protect the public from a recurrence of the abuses which led to the convictions.  With the privilege of holding public office come certain responsibilities and power unique to the specific office. A public office is a public trust, and funds officially received are trust funds. Brewer v. Hawkins, 248 Ark. 1325, 1328, 455 S.W.2d 864, 866 (1970). By statute, city officials are given “unlimited authority” to “manage, operate, improve, extend, and maintain” municipal waterworks. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-234-306(a) (1987). The convictions that led to appellant’s removal involved an abuse of power that the public specifically entrusted to municipal officials. There is a nexus between the grant of power and the protection provided to the public. We find that coupling an extraordinary statutory grant of power to a municipal officer with a provision of ineligibility to hold office if that power is abused is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.  We hold that the provision excluding appellant from holding office again in the same city is not unconstitutional. Affirmed. Newbern, J., dissents.