Court Opinion

ID: 9748905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:17:20.642799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:40.640316
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I vigorously dissent. The majority holds that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) proved by a preponderance of the evidence a specific nexus between the jewelry seized from John Singleton (Singleton) and criminal activity. Inasmuch as the Commonwealth presented no evidence at the forfeiture hearing, I strenuously disagree.
In this case, the Commonwealth seeks forfeiture under the common law. Pennsylvania courts did not recognize common law forfeiture of derivative contraband until the 1980s. Commonwealth v. One 2001 Toyota Camry, 894 A.2d 207 (Pa.Cmwlth.) (en banc), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 766, 903 A.2d 1234 (2006). Derivative contraband is property that is legal but is the fruit of a criminal enterprise or was used to perpetuate an unlawful act. Id. Property may not be considered derivative contraband merely because it is owned or used by someone who has engaged in criminal conduct. Id. To forfeit property as derivative contraband under the common law, the Commonwealth must establish a specific connection or nexus between the property and the criminal activity. Id.
I. Absence of Evidence
This court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings of *1231fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Id.
“It is not open to question that ... facts averred in [pleadings] ... are not evidence unless placed in evidence by the trial judge or counsel.” Atlas Bolt and Screw Company v. Komins, 138 Pa.Super. 474, 10 A.2d 871, 872 (1940); see also Miller v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Community Hospital of Lancaster), 737 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999) (stating that “[i]n order to take advantage of an admission contained in a party’s pleadings, the pleading must be formally offered into evidence”).
Moreover, “it is well-settled that an attorney’s statements ... at trial are not evidence.” Grover v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 734 A.2d 941, 944 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999). Thus, an attorney’s statements “cannot be considered.” Mateskovich v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 755 A.2d 100, 101 n. 4 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000).
The majority states that, at the forfeiture hearing, “the Commonwealth introduced evidence that Singleton pled guilty to four counts of burglary, that the bracelet and watch were seized from him at the time of his arrest, and that a similar gold-colored bracelet had been returned to a burglary victim.” (Majority op. at 1226-27) (emphasis added). The majority later concludes that such evidence “made out a nexus between the jewelry and the criminal activity....” (Majority op. at 1230.)
However, according to the transcript of the forfeiture hearing, the Commonwealth presented no witnesses or exhibits, i.e., no evidence at all.1 (See 6/20/2005 hearing, N.T. at 1-12; Singleton’s brief, ex. G.) In making its case, the attorney for the Commonwealth simply told the court about Singleton and the seized jewelry. Near the close of the hearing, Singleton’s attorney objected to the Commonwealth’s failure to produce any evidence.
[Singleton]: There’s no proof of any burglary.
The Court: The Court disagrees. [Singleton]: No proof of any guilty plea, no proof of anything. Their representation [is] by very able counsel, but literally no evidence whatsoever [has been] submitted to the court.
The Court: Counsel, what do you have in evidence?
[Commonwealth]: I don’t think there’s any contesting the fact that he plead on January 9th, 2004 to four burglaries and ... he has [been] doing a state sentence for the very burglaries which this jewelry is at issue for. So I don’t think there’s really any contesting that....
The Court: It’s enough. The petition is granted.
(N.T. at 9-10.)
Although Singleton’s attorney had just questioned the absence of proof of a burglary conviction, the court did not identify any evidence but, instead, after hearing the Commonwealth’s representations, stated “It’s enough.” However, the attorney statements were not evidence, and the Commonwealth did not introduce Singleton’s Petition for Return of Property or his *1232answer to the Commonwealth’s interrogatories as evidence. Because the Commonwealth presented no evidence, it could not meet any burden, let alone the preponderance burden, by circumstantial evidence. The Commonwealth concedes that it produced no direct evidence of a nexus between the seized jewelry and criminal activity, but the Commonwealth argues that one can reasonably infer the nexus from proven facts. However, there are no proven facts here; thus, there can be no reasonable inferences. If the Commonwealth did not prove a nexus inferentially, the Commonwealth did not prove that the seized jewelry is derivative contraband subject to forfeiture.2
II. Specific Nexus
As indicated, to prevail on its “Petition for Forfeiture Pursuant to Common Law,” the Commonwealth had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a'specific nexus between the seized watch and bracelet and criminal activity. One 2001 Toyota Camry.
The majority states that “there has to be some nexus to known criminal activity.” (Majority op. at 10) (emphasis added). However, the majority concludes that the Commonwealth proved only a specific nexus between the seized jewelry and some unknown burglary or burglaries. In my view, there cannot be a specific nexus between seized property and criminal activity unless the criminal activity can be identified with specificity, i.e., unless there is more than a suspicion of criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 559 Pa. 92, 739 A.2d 152 (1999) (criticizing the seizure of property that only gave rise to suspicions that merited further investigation); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 548 Pa. 495, 698 A.2d 576 (1997) (criticizing the seizure of property where there was only the possibility or suspicion of a nexus to criminal activity).
Here, the Commonwealth asserted, without producing evidence, that Singleton was convicted of four burglaries. Without a doubt, the victims of those four burglaries were known; indeed, the Commonwealth asserted that a third item of seized jewelry was returned to a victim. However, none of the victims of the four burglaries claimed the seized watch or bracelet. Thus, the Commonwealth could only suspect that Singleton committed some other unknown burglary or burglaries and that the watch and bracelet were stolen in the commission of those crimes. The Commonwealth’s suspicions may warrant further investigation into Singleton’s commission of other burglaries, but, as a matter of law, they do not establish a specific nexus between the seized jewelry and some criminal activity. Fontanez; Marshall.
Accordingly, unlike the majority, I would reverse.
Judge COLINS joins in this dissent.

. I note that the Reproduced Record, which is attached to Singleton’s brief, contains documents that do not appear in the certified record. This court may consider only documents that appear in the certified record, such as the transcript of the forfeiture hearing. McGaffin v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Manatron, Inc.), 903 A.2d 94 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006). The Commonwealth acknowledges as much in its brief. (See Commonwealth brief at 10 n. 5.)

. In Commonwealth v. $6,425.00 Seized from Esquilin, 583 Pa. 544, 562, 880 A.2d 523, 534 (2005), our supreme court questioned the “artificial and absolutist evidentiary requirements" that this court imposed in the case. Here, however, the majority has abolished all evidentiary requirements in forfeiture cases. I see no need for such a drastic reaction to our supreme court's remarks in Esquilin.