Court Opinion

ID: 9825033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:57:37.690242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:41.575622
License: Public Domain

Upon the Merits.
The first question of importance is whether or not the city of Fair-field, when the relator was elected city attorney in 1928, was operating under section 1758 or 1759 of the Code of 1923. That is, what was the population at the time as section 1758 applies to cities having more than 6,00-0 inhabitants and section 1759 to cities having less than 6,000 inhabitants? True, the federal census of 1920 gave Fairfield less than 6,000 inhabitants, but a municipal census was taken under section 1060 and 1061 of the Code of 1907, and the result filed with the Secretary of State, Max-ch 7, 1923, showed that Fair-field had over 6,000 inhabitants and of which we take judicial notice. 23 C. J. 161; King v. Scott, 217 Ala. 511, 116 So. 681; State v. Joseph, 175 Ala. 579, 57 So. 942, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 248.
Section 175S of the Code of 1923 provides that in cities of a population of more than 6,000 “there shall be elected by the council, ■ at its first regular meeting, or as sooii thex-eafter as practicable, a city treasux-er, a city clerk, who shall be x-esidents of such cities, and a city attorney, who shall hold office until the next general electioix and until their successors are elected and qualified.”
The relator was elected succeeding the election of 1928, and his term was -therefore fixed from then until the election and qualification of his successor at an election to be held in September, 1932. The relator was therefore an officer with a term fixed by law and not by the council or governing board of the city.
We do not think -that the latter part of the section authorizing the council to elect an auditor, a recox-dex-, or any officer required by ordinance “and except as otherwise provided, the council shall have authority to fix the terms of offiefe” applies to the city clerk, treasurer, and attorney whose terms *345are “otherwise provided.” It is conceded in argument of appellant’s counsel that said section fixes the term of treasurer and clerk, but not the attorney because the two former are required to be residents of the city, but there is no such requirement as to the city attorney. We do not think this difference removes the city attorney from the term fixed for the three previously enumerated officers to wit: “a city treasurer,” “a city clerk,” and a “city attorney.”
We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that the relator was an officer with a fixed term of an incorporated city in this state, removable by impeachment under section 175 of the Constitution of 1801. This being the case, he could only be removed by impeachment. Nolen v. State, 118 Ala. 154, 24 So. 251; Touart v. State ex rel. Callaghan, 173 Ala. 453, 56 So. 211; Williams v. State, 197 Ala. 40, 72 So. 330, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 869; Franklin County v. Richardson, 202 Ala. 46, 79 So. 384; Petree v. McMurray, 210 Ala. 639, 98 So. 782.
Whether or not the Legislature has prescribed a method for the impeachment of officers of incorporated cities other than mayor and intendant, as provided by section 175 of the Constitution, matters not, for this relator was an officer of an incorporated city and was removable under said section 175 of the Constitution and under authorities, supra, could not be removed in any other way.
We are cited by the appellant’s counsel to the case of State ex rel. v. Thompson, 211 Ala. 429, 100 So. 756. There the question of whether or not the officer removed came within the Constitution, § 175, seems not 'to have been presented or considered. Moreover, it seems that the officer in this case had no term fixed by law, but the fixation of same was delegated to the governing board of the town under section 1171 of the Code of 1907. Here, we are dealing with an officer of an incorporated city created by law and with a term fixed by law.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
All the Justices concur.