Court Opinion

ID: 9522808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:29.101018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:59.204150
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶29. dissenting. The question that the majority answers is moot, and we should dismiss the appeal rather than answer it. The majority decision is an improper advisory opinion. Moreover, the majority has largely ignored the main ground for the Environmental Court decision, and rendered its opinion based on its construction of the alternative rationale of the court. In fact, the primary ground of the Environmental Court was correct, as determined in the recent decision of this Court in In re *305Eustance Act 250 Jurisdictional Opinion, 2009 VT 16, 185 Vt. 447, 970 A.2d 1285. If we do not dismiss the appeal, we should affirm the Environmental Court judgment. For these reasons, I dissent.
¶ 30. I start with why the majority decision is an improper advisory opinion. CVPS applied for and obtained an Act 250 permit to run an electric line through property because the line was long enough to create Act 250 jurisdiction under Rule 70. Because the line went through land already subject to an Act 250 permit, the district environmental coordinator and the district commission ruled that there were two grounds for Act 250 jurisdiction — the length of the line under Rule 70, and the requirement to amend the preexisting permit covering part of the land over which the line would run. CVPS objects and wants us to decide that the second ground for Act 250 jurisdiction is wrong, even as it acknowledges that the first ground is right. Thus, this is a dispute over reasoning, not result. CVPS has an Act 250 permit, and its land use regulatory requirements will not be affected one iota by the result of this appeal. What CVPS, joined by all the electric utilities in the state, wants is an advisory opinion that it can use in future disputes. We do not have the power to give such an opinion.
¶ 31. CVPS has acknowledged in this Court that it has an Act 250 permit, that it does not contest the requirement for such a permit or its terms, and that no regulatory responsibility imposed upon it is at stake in this appeal. Thus, from its inception this appeal sought nothing more than an advisory opinion on the validity of the second and alternative basis of jurisdiction found by the district commission — “advisory” because a decision that is not absolutely necessary to resolve a legal issue is nothing more than that, simply “solicited legal advice in anticipation of issues.” Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 120, 370 A.2d 191, 192 (1977) (reaffirming the limits on this Court’s jurisdiction, “[t]he most basic [of which] is the prohibition against advisory opinions”). The majority candidly admits that Rule 70 provides jurisdiction over the line extension project. See ante, ¶ 10. Because of that acknowledgement, this is now an appeal with no consequences at stake. CVPS’s land use regulatory requirements will not be affected by the decision of this Court. This appeal is truly moot.
¶ 32. It is one of the fundamental principles of our judicial system that we do not issue advisory opinions. See In re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 115 Vt. 524, 529, 64 A.2d 169, *306172 (1949). Because CVPS was required under Rule 70(b) to obtain an Act 250 permit to develop the utility line extension here at issue, the entire majority opinion in this case rejecting an additional ground for jurisdiction is advisory and unnecessary. As Chief Justice John Roberts, then sitting on the United States Court of Appeals, once observed, the “cardinal principle of judicial restraint” is that “if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring); see also Wood, 135 Vt. at 121, 370 A.2d at 192 (question to be reviewed “must be a necessary part of the final disposition of the case”).
¶ 33. We have faced the situation in this case in the past and recognized that it would be beyond our power to render the advisory opinion sought. For example, in Chittenden South Education Ass’n v. Hinesburg School District, 147 Vt. 286, 514 A.2d 1065 (1986), the cross-appellant teachers’ union sought review of a part of the rationale of the Vermont Labor Relations Board decision under which it had prevailed. Noting that “[o]ur determination would not entitle the Association to any further relief, nor would it change the relief afforded,” we held that we would not “pass on the merits of this issue because it requires this Court to render an advisory opinion prohibited by this State’s Constitution.” Id. at 294, 514 A.2d at 1071. We did so even though we recognized “the importance of the question posed,” apparently the reason for the majority’s advisory opinion in this case. Id. Our power is not created because the challenged alternative rationale for Act 250 jurisdiction may have future consequences. See Baker v. Town of Goshen, 169 Vt. 145, 152, 730 A.2d 592, 597 (1999). In any event, if the Court wants to be sure that there are no consequences from the Environmental Court’s alternative grounds for Act 250 jurisdiction, it could vacate the decision as unnecessary dicta as discussed below. See In re Pilgrim P’ship, 153 Vt. 594, 598, 572 A.2d 909, 911 (1990) (striking permit condition where it was “not necessary” to the decision and mere “dicta”).
¶ 34. In short, under established precedents of this Court, we do not have the power to issue a 100% dicta, advisory opinion in this case. The majority’s response to this barrier to its jurisdiction is inexplicable to me. It says that “this Court can offer . . . meaningful relief,” but fails to specify how. Ante, ¶ 12. All of its discussion after that generalization is about who is named as a *307permittee and not about land use responsibilities. In fact, no regulatory responsibilities are added to CVPS by the Barry permit, which is exactly why this case is moot.
¶ 35. The majority is caught up in the fact that CVPS was required to have two permits. The record demonstrates, however, that the second permit adds nothing to CVPS’s regulatory responsibilities. The second permit is actually an amendment to the Barry permit “issued for record-keeping to document that the tract is also subject to . . . [the CVPS permit], for a utility line project.” CVPS had a valid objection to the amendment because it suggested that CVPS was a co-applicant with respect to the whole Barry permit development project. The Environmental Court solved the objection by making CVPS a co-applicant only with respect to the utility line easement, exactly its status under the Rule 70 permit. Thus, since CVPS is an applicant with respect to the utility line, there is no consequence to it being designated a co-applicant with respect to the same utility line. The majority has blown an amendment done for record-keeping purposes out of proportion.
¶ 36. If the majority believes that the Barry permit will “impose potentially unrelated permit conditions upon CVPS,” ante, ¶ 25, the remedy should be to strike the Barry permit amendment, leaving CVPS subject to the same responsibilities under its Rule 70 permit. The majority states that such an action would be “meaningful relief.” Ante, ¶ 13. Since the amendment was done for record-keeping purposes and not to impose additional risks or obligations on CVPS, its deletion is of little consequence to any party. The remedy is not to render an advisory opinion on an issue that is of no consequence to CVPS, except as an advance determination for some future dispute.
¶ 37. Unfortunately, the advisory nature of the majority opinion continues into its discussion of the merits. The Environmental Court gave two grounds for its decision; the first does provide Act 250 jurisdiction, the latter might provide such jurisdiction. The primary ground for the decision is that the Barry permit by its explicit terms requires an amendment to enable CVPS ,to run a fine through the Barry property. The alternative ground was tentative: Act 250 amendment jurisdiction under Rule 34 might also require an amendment of the Barry permit if CVPS’s project constituted a material or substantial change, a determination the court could not make on the sparse record. Thus, the court *308granted summary judgment against CVPS on the first ground and ruled that it could not grant summary judgment on the latter ground. Clearly, the decision to decline to grant summary judgment is not a final judgment and is dicta in relation to the actual ground for the decision. Nevertheless, the majority spends 95% of its opinion on the dicta, producing dicta about dicta, and barely addresses the real basis for the court decision.
¶ 38. This is a second reason why the appeal of the amendment jurisdiction issue is moot. Having found jurisdiction because of the permit condition, the Environmental Court’s decision on amendment jurisdiction was wholly unnecessary and of no effect. In the recent case of Eustance, 2009 VT 16, the Environmental Court was also confronted with the choice of basing Act 250 jurisdiction on a preexisting permit condition or on amendment jurisdiction under Rule 34. In that case, unlike this one, the Environmental Court understood that the first ground rendered it unnecessary to reach the second, a position we clearly understood and endorsed in observing that it “would be inappropriate for us to reach” the issue of amendment jurisdiction since it was rendered “moot.” Id. ¶24. The majority is ignoring that determination of Eustance here. If the issue of Rule 34 jurisdiction was moot in Eustance, as we held, it is moot here for the same reason.
¶ 39. Although I believe that we should not address the merits of the issue raised by CVPS and resolved in the majority opinion, I also believe that the majority’s decision is wrong on the merits. It barely mentions the primary rationale for the Environmental Court decision, which is based on 10 V.S.A. § 6086(c), a statute that finds no recognition anywhere in the majority opinion. Under this section, a district commission may issue an Act 250 permit containing such “requirements and conditions” as are allowable under a proper exercise of the police power and consistent with the environmental impact criteria set forth in subdivisions (1) through (10) of § 6086(a). Under this section, we have long acknowledged the Board’s power “to police its permits,” to “revoke a permit if the conditions attached . . . are violated,” and generally to exercise “continuing authority over . . . the uses and conditions imposed by the permit.” In re Juster Assocs., 136 Vt. 577, 580-81, 396 A.2d 1382, 1385-85 (1978). Subsequent applicants are bound by the terms and conditions of the original permit unless it is modified. In re Stowe Club Highlands, 166 Vt. 33, 37, 687 A.2d 102, 104-05 (1996). The permit runs with the land and binds the “permittee, and their assigns and successors in interest.”
*309¶40. Thus, the Environmental Court was clearly correct in concluding that the running of the utility line required an amendment under the Barry permit condition because the express language of that permit required the amendment. CVPS is an assignee of the land controlled by the permit holder, by virtue of the easement the landowner gave it to run the line extension.12 The Environmental Court found that the running of the line was development for purposes of the permit condition, and the majority has not suggested otherwise. CVPS argues that we should construe development to mean development that would otherwise trigger Act 250 jurisdiction, in this case jurisdiction under Rule 70. This is clearly an unreasonable construction of the term that would render the permit condition superfluous because it would apply only when there is another source of jurisdiction — that is, when it is unnecessary. Here, the district commission already had jurisdiction over the property and was concerned that no activities occur that would affect the deer habitat. Running a utility line through the deer yard could destroy it, irrespective of whether the line was long enough to create jurisdiction under Rule 70. As we noted in In re Audet, 2004 VT 30, ¶ 11, 176 Vt. 617, 850 A.2d 1000 (mem.), Act 250 regulates “any construction activity, no matter how minute.” The commission’s prohibition on unapproved development must be viewed in this context.
¶ 41. We are left then with the wholly unsupported proposition that the commission cannot adopt a condition that will affect utility activity or enforce a neutral condition, like that involved here, against a utility line extension project. Nothing in Act 250 or Rule 70(b) implementing Act 250 gives utilities a blanket exemption from valid permit conditions. The majority cites nothing to support such a result. It is no answer that the preexisting permit did not bind CVPS because CVPS assumed the obligation of the permit by purchasing its easement over the Barrys’ property.13 Whatever may be the rule when the utility activity does not violate an explicit permit condition, the subject of virtually all of *310the majority’s analysis, there is no support for the utility to have immunity when it does. If we reach the merits — and we should not — we should affirm the Environmental Court decision that CVPS and the landowner must comply with the permit condition that requires permit approval for the line extension on the property.
¶ 42. Indeed, we reached precisely this conclusion, in analogous circumstances, in our very recent decision in Eustance. The question there was whether subsequent agricultural development within a previously permitted subdivision was exempt from Act 250 jurisdiction under the farming exemption of 10 V.S.A. § 6001(3)(D)(i). We held that the development was not exempt for two reasons. First, we held that the exemption from “development” jurisdiction did not apply when Act 250 jurisdiction was based on the construction of a subdivision under 10 V.S.A. § 6081(a). 2009 VT 16, ¶¶ 16-18. Second, we held that a permit amendment was required by the express terms of the earlier permit in that case, which provided that “[a]ny sale [or] further construction ... is specifically not approved without an amendment to this permit.” Id. ¶ 19. Although we noted, in this regard, that the applicants had not challenged the Environmental Court’s conclusion “that the express language of the permit condition required them to obtain a permit amendment irrespective of whether their construction activity would have been exempt as related to farming,” we explained that we would have affirmed the trial court ruling “even if there were no concession.” Id. ¶ 22.
¶ 43. I do not see how it is possible to harmonize our holding in Eustance with the majority holding here.14 If a prior permit condition controlled there, irrespective of whether the farming exemption applied, it must control here irrespective of the preemptive scope of Rule 70. There is no evidence of legislative intent to override existing permit conditions in either case. Indeed, if we were to judge this question entirely on legislative intent, the *311legislative support for the farming exemption is the stronger, as the dissent in Eustance argued. Moreover, the application of the conflicting permit condition is more apparent here than in Eustance. The permit there generally prohibited “further construction” absent a permit amendment, which we construed to include agriculturally related construction, whereas here the condition was aimed specifically at protecting a mapped deer yard from any further disruption, a condition that was obviously triggered by placement of the utility line across the area in question.
¶ 44. While our holding in Eustance obviously speaks for itself, I cannot ignore the majority’s statement that we “did not expressly hold . . . that ‘a prior permit condition controlled . . . irrespective of whether the farming exemption applied.’ ” Ante, ¶ 27 n.11. We expressly held exactly that. We observed that the Eustances had conceded the trial court’s “conclusion that the express language of the permit condition required them to obtain a permit amendment irrespective of whether their construction activity would have been exempt as related to farming,” and we stated plainly that this was a reasonable conclusion “which we would affirm even if there were no concession.” 2009 VT 16, ¶ 22 (emphasis added). If this was not a clear holding that the permit condition controlled irrespective of the farming exemption, I do not know what is. The majority also asserts that Eustance is somehow distinguishable because there the original permit holder sought approval whereas here it is CVPS, not the Barrys. This argument overlooks the fact that CVPS is the grantee of an easement across the property, and the Barry permit expressly provides that it “shall run with the land and the land uses herein permitted, and will be binding upon and enforceable against the Permittees and all assigns and successors in interest.”
¶ 45. Finally, I emphasize that there are very real and substantial consequences from the majority decision, even though there are no consequences for the line extension in this case. The facts of this case do, however, provide a good background to understand those consequences. The Barry permit covers 289 acres, of which the majority is a mapped deer yard. Because of this significant attribute of the land, the first version of the permit prohibited any development or subdivision until the effect on the deer yard was resolved. Condition 3 of the permit stated:
*312Permittees agree that no further development of the tract shall be allowed unless it can be demonstrated that such development will not further impact on the potential of the tract to continue to serve as a protected deer yard or unless it is demonstrated that the tract itself is no longer appropriate, necessary or functional as a deer yard. In any event, no further development of the parcel shall be allowed without the concurrence of the Department of Fish and Wildlife, Agency of Natural Resources and the District Environmental Commission.
The site also contains a Class 2 wetland area, prime agricultural soils and a brook. With respect to the brook, the amended permit that covers the CVPS line also imposes special requirements. The Act 250 application shows that the line is placed underground to minimize the effect on wildlife habitat and that special precautions were taken to minimize impacts on the stream or wetlands and protect the agricultural lands.
¶ 46. This background is important because what CVPS seeks from the appeal, and has received from the majority decision, is the right for line extensions less than 2200 feet long15 to go anywhere CVPS wants, and to be constructed in any way CVPS wants, irrespective of the impact on wildlife habitat, wetlands, streams or agricultural soils. That is, CVPS seeks the right not to protect the deer yard, and to not protect the stream and the wetland, even in a circumstance where the district commission has found that the need for protection is so great that it imposed a special protection condition even before a development proposal was submitted.16 Of course, we do not know how CVPS will use its new authority now that it is free from regulation and does not have to comply with Act 250 conditions applicable to any other land developer, but its seeking of this advisory opinion, with amicus briefs from the other utilities in Vermont, does not suggest that we are dealing only with a matter of principle.
*313¶ 47. It is equally important to understand what is not at stake. The majority talks about the legal obligation on CVPS to run the electric line to extend service to a new user as if Act 250 is being used to block discharge of that obligation. It also talks about “unquantifiable” mischief. Ante, ¶ 22. In fact, CVPS has an Act 250 permit, and there is no suggestion in the record that denial of the permit was ever threatened or that utilities cannot meet their service obligation to the public consistent with Act 250 regulation. The only issue is whether CVPS will be required to extend the electric line in a way that is consistent with the maintenance of wildlife habitat and protects other environmental interests.
¶ 48. In closing, I reiterate the numerous reasons for which I cannot join the majority decision. First and foremost, this case is moot; we should dismiss the appeal. When it unnecessarily reaches the merits, the majority decision fails to address the actual rationale of the trial court, reversing the trial court’s decision without responding to its analysis. The trial court’s analysis was correct, as shown by a very recent decision of this Court, Eustance, that supports the trial court’s analysis and is dead against the majority’s decision. The majority’s attempt to distinguish Eustance is clearly wrong; there is no distinction. I dissent.

 CVPS says in its brief that it is not “an assign or successor in interest to the permittees.” That statement is obviously wrong. CVPS must acquire an interest in the land through which it is running its electric line. Its Act 250 application says it has “secured easements for the proposed line location from the property owners affected by the project.”

 Undeniably, the actions of CVPS put the Barrys in violation of their permit, a consequence the majority ignores.

 While I oppose getting into the dicta about Rule 34 and Rule 70, as I stated in the text, I cannot let pass an additional way in which the majority analysis is contrary to Eustance. In a number of places, the majority unnecessarily says that Rule 70 provides the exclusive source of jurisdiction over utility lines. As the majority states, however, the jurisdictional definition is based on the length of a line that meets the requirement for a development of ten acres. Thus, as Eustance holds, exemptions from development jurisdiction do not apply to permits based on the presence of a subdivision. Just as they do not apply for farming, they cannot apply for utility lines.

 This is the length of line, in a twenty foot wide corridor, that is necessary for the easement area to equal an acre and thus trigger jurisdiction under Rule 70.

 It is reflective of the sparring between this dissent and the majority opinion that the majority characterizes my position as limited to the environmental consequences of the action of utilities. See ante, ¶ 26 n.10. My main concern, in addition to the fact that we are rendering a broad and important holding in a wholly moot case, is that the majority has given utilities uniquely the right to violate special Act 250 permit conditions expressly applicable to them.