Court Opinion

ID: 9653695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:52:06.690965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:00.819208
License: Public Domain

PRETTYMAN, Associate Justice
(dissenting) .
I disagree with my brethren and, because of the nature of the case, think I should *282State the critical points upon which I would reverse the judgment below:
I
I think that the affidavit of bias and prejudice filed by the appellant in the trial court was sufficient under the statute to require the disqualification of the judge to whom it was addressed, and that the affidavit was filed in time.
The affidavit says:
“b) * * * At a hearing of the UnAmerican Activities Committee on February 6, 1947, out of which this very cause arose there was placed into the record a statement of J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation which was allegedly a report of an investigation of my activities by the Federal Bureau of Investigation over many years. Moreover, this report is set forth in full at pages 11-12 of the Committee hearings of February 6, 1947. This report indicates strong personal bias and prejudice against me. During the period of the- investigation and until his elevation to the bench in September, 1945, Justice Holtzoff acted as special assistant to the Attorney General assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. His duties were concerned especially with the investigation by the F.B.I. into the activities of aliens and communists, into both of which categories I fall. * * *
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“d) In connection with his duties as United States attorney assigned to the F.B.I., Justice Holtzoff advised J. Edgar Hoover as to steps and actions to be taken against alien communists, such as myself. V
“e) * * * Justice Holtzoff was legal advisor to the F.B.I. at the time the investigation of me was commenced and continued as such until September, 1945. Upon information and belief, he figured in an important capacity in advising and aiding and determining the policy, nature, scope and objectives of the investigation directed against aliens and communists, which necessarily included myself.”
In sum, the affidavit says that prior to his elevation to the bench the trial judge had been the active legal advisor to the investigator in the very investigation out of which this case arose, - which investigation involved this appellant, among others.
The statute is quite succinct and clear:
“Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, * * *.”1 It is established that upon the filing of an affidavit under this statute the court may determine the legal sufficiency of the affidavit upon the facts as stated but may not give any consideration to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts; the alleged facts must be assumed to be true.2
So the simple question here is whether the fact that the trial judge had been the active legal advisor to the investigator in the very investigation which gave rise to the indictment of the defendant, is legally sufficient as a basis for a belief of personal bias. I think it clearly is.
In Barsky v. Holtzoff3 we held almost identical allegations to require the disqualification of the judge. This case is not like Lawson v. Curran,4 in which there was merely a general allegation that the judge had prosecuted cases involving similar offenses.
Many able and conscientious lawyers and judges — and the trial judge here involved is certainly both — have a deep and abiding conviction of their own abilities to prosecute impersonally and to judge impersonally, and to do both in the same case. But such psychological detachment is not so well established that a belief to the contrary is unreasonable. That a judge has been the *283prosecutor in the early stages of a particular case against a particular individual is a fact “from which a sane and reasonable mind might fairly infer personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.” Hurd v. Letts, 1945, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 234, 152 F.2d 121, 122. In the case just cited, this court established that test for disqualification.5 The statute says “bias or prejudice”, evidently meaning to include bent of mind as well as aggressive antipathy.
The statute6 speaks of filing ten days before the term of court, but that provision was designed for district courts which have periodical terms and in which the identity of the trial judge is known well in advance. In this jurisdiction, the District Court consists of twelve judges who serve in rotation, or upon assignment, in the several branches of the court. The court is in continuous session, except for the summer. Thus, the name of the trial judge may not be known until shortly before the trial; as a matter of fact, several different methods of assigning criminal cases for trial have been experimented with in recent years. It is settled that in this jurisdiction the ten-day provision of the statute is impractical in application and, instead, the rule of “due diligence” must be applied.7 This is permissible under the clause of the statute which excepts from the ten-day requirement cases in which “good cause shall be shown for the failure to file it within such time.”
Appellant and his counsel first knew on May 20, 1947, of the assignment of this case to Judge Holtzoff for trial.8 Appellant was in New York. His principal attorneys were in Washington. On that same day he inquired of them whether he was obliged to go to trial before Judge Holtzoff, in view of the judge’s previous connections with the F.B.I. Counsel arranged to discuss the matter in Washington on May 23rd. They did so, but the principal counsel received a wire during that morning announcing the sudden death of his brother. This disrupted the conference, and, as a matter of fact, on that basis the court continued the trial to June 4th. The affidavit was finally executed in New York on May 28th and was filed here on May 29th. The trial was actually begun on June 4th.
It seems to me that under the foregoing circumstances the filing of the affidavit nine days after the identity of the trial judge was ascertained came within “due diligence”. There was an unforeseeable and unavoidable interruption during those nine days. The affidavit was filed six days before the trial, and other judges were available so that the trial would not have been delayed. Affiant could well have known that with twelve active judges on this District Court, no delay in trial would result from the disqualification of one of them. Moreover, these affidavits should be prepared with the utmost care and certainty as to the facts. The courts should encourage careful consideration and deliberation on the part of counsel. It seems to me to be a grave mistake to hold that such affidavits must be filed almost instantaneously after the identity of the trial judge is ascertained. Such a rule will almost make mandatory the filing of the affidavit without deliberate and careful consideration of counsel. The rule ought to be that they be filed with the utmost deliberation consistent with the undelayed dispatch of the business of the court.
II
I think the court erred in refusing to permit appellant to prove what he intended to say to the Committee when he asked for three minutes before being sworn.9
*284Appellant was convicted of violation of Section 192, Title 2, of the United States Code Annotated.10 That statute is in two' parts.11 The first relates to a person who having been summoned as a witness “upon any matter under inquiry” before a committee of Congress, “willfully makes default”. The second part refers to a person who, having appeared as a witness, “refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry”. The indictment against appellant charged that, having been summoned as a witness to give testimony before the Committee “upon matters of inquiry committed to said Committee * * *, [he] did appear before the said Committee * * * and was directed to be sworn * * * and * * * thereupon failed and refused so to be sworn to testify, and thereby * * * willfully did make default.” Thus, the indictment was for willfully making default. “Willfully” in tfris statute means deliberately or intentionally.12
The Chairman of the Committee evaded answering the questions of defense counsel as to the procedure which the Committee had established in respect to the notation of legal objections, but the plain inference of his testimony is that the established procedure was to allow a' witness to make his legal objections before being sworn. The purport of appellant’s offer of proof was that he had intended to interpose legal objections to being compelled to testify. That proffer must be viewed in the setting of the Committee hearing. The testimony of the Committee Chairman was that the Committee room was “jammed packed with people”, and the chief investigator of the Committee testified that there were quite a few photographers present taking photographs. The entire colloquy, which takes a little less than two pages of print, could hardly have taken more than a few minutes. It is true that appellant did state that he was not going to take the stand and refused to be sworn, but he said twice, “I am ready to answer all questions,” and twice he said, “I do not refuse to be'sworn.” Twice he said that he wanted to speak before he was sworn, and twice he quite definitely said that he wanted only three minutes.
If it was the established practice that legal objections be stated by the witness before he was sworn, and if appellant could prove that all he wanted to do was to state his legal objections and thereafter be sworn and “answer all questions”, I do not see how he could be held guilty of “willful” default. While bad faith is not an element of willfulness, intent is. Appellant was entitled to prove that he had no intent to refuse to testify but merely wanted to follow the established practice.
The trial court made some reference to appellant’s position being that he wished to impose conditions upon his testifying, but I see no merit in that suggestion, if, as a matter of fact, appellant was merely attempting to comply with the established procedure.
III
I also think that judgment of-acquittal should have been directed on the ground that the Government failed to prove that appellant was summoned to testify in a matter of inquiry submitted to the Committee by the Congressional Resolution. This record does not show, and we do not yet know, what it was that the Committee wanted appellant to testify about. The subpoena merely directed the marshal to summon him “to testify touching matters of inquiry committed to said Committee”; it did not describe or name any such matter. He was not told by anybody, so far as the record shows, what the matters were concerning which he was to testify. There is no shred of evidence that he was summoned as a witness upon a matter under inquiry before the Committee, but the statute requires that he must have been summoned upon such a matter. The necessity of proof on the *285point seems to me to be an unavoidable conclusion from the constitutional principles laid down in Kilbourn v. Thompson,13 McGrain v. Daugherty,14 and Sinclair v. United States.15
The Government says that United States v. Josephson16 disposes of this point. But it does not. The Second Circuit was exceedingly meticulous about it. Josephson was not indicted for default; he was indicted, under the second part of the statute, for refusing to answer pertinent questions. Therefore, the court held, expressly and carefully, that no question of willfulness was involved and that the refusal to answer any question was a refusal to answer any pertinent question. We do not have that situation here.
IV
I do not share the view of my brethren in respect to the general conduct of the trial. It is not possible in the short space of an opinion to relate all the incidents which occurred during the course of the trial, and severally and alone they might not constitute ground for reversal, but, when coupled with the considerations already discussed, they make certain the necessity of reversal, in my opinion.

 36 Stat. 1090 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 25.

 Berger v. United States, 1921, 255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481; Scott v. Beams, 10 Cir., 1941, 122 F.2d 777, 788, and cases cited; Mitchell v. United States, 10 Cir., 1942, 126 F.2d 550.

 Misc. No. 126, U.S.App.D.C., June 11, 1947 [no opinion for publication] (petition for mandamus granted).

 Misc. No. 142, U.S.App.D.C., April 13, 1948 [no opinion for publication] (petitions for mandamus and for leave to file petition for writ of prohibition denied).

 Upon the general subject, see Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 605, 626 et seq. (1947).

 Supra note 1.

 While not expressly recited as “due diligence”, this has been the doctrine underlying cases such as Hurd v. Letts, supra, and Laughlin v. United States, 1945, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 151 F.2d 281.

 Appellee Government says that the date is not shown in the record but says that appellant “concedes” and “admits” that it was “about” May 20th.

 The Government says that appellant was permitted to answer, but the record, at pages 133 to 135 of the printed appendix before us, shows plainly that” he was not, and his proffer of proof was denied. The denial was repeated (pages 138, 139 and 149 of the appendix). The Government also attempts to show that in the requested three minutes appellant intended to attempt to read a 20-page mimeographed statement, but the evidence is perfectly clear that that statement was prepared to be read after the *284■witness had testified, and contemplated that he would have been sworn. The proffer of proof indicated that he also had a few written notes, relating to legal objections, which he intended to use in the three minutes.

 R.S. § 102 (1857), as amended, 52 Stat. 942 (1938).

 United States v. Murdock, 1931, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63, 76 L.Ed. 210, 82 A.L.R. 1376.

 Fields v. United States, 1947, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 164 F.2d 97, 100.

 1881, 103 U.S. 168. 26 L.Ed. 377.

 1927, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1.

 1929, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct 268, 73 L.Ed. 692.

 2 Cir., 1947, 165 F.2d 82.