Court Opinion

ID: 9965330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 13:02:46.189508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:54.014973
License: Public Domain

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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 22-CV-0220

                            CRAIG ROYAL, APPELLANT,

                                         v.

           DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

                                        and

        DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICE OF EMPLOYEE APPEALS, APPELLEES.

                          Appeal from the Superior Court
                            of the District of Columbia
                           (2019-CA-004173-P(MPA))
                    (Hon. Fern Flanagan Saddler, Trial Judge)

(Argued January 4, 2024                                      Decided May 2, 2024)

      Daniel S. Crowley, with whom Katelyn A. Clarke was on the brief, for
appellant.

      Alex Fumelli, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Brian L. Schwalb,
Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor
General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Thais-Lyn
Trayer, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department.

     Lasheka Brown, General Counsel of the District of Columbia Office of
Employee Appeals, filed a Statement in Lieu of Brief on behalf of appellee Office
of Employee Appeals.
                                          2

      Before BECKWITH and SHANKER, Associate Judges, and GLICKMAN, Senior
Judge.

      GLICKMAN, Senior Judge: Appellant Craig Royal is a lieutenant with the

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). Before the Office of Employee Appeals

(OEA), he challenged two decisions of the MPD to suspend him without pay. The

first suspension, for a period of fifteen days, was for Lt. Royal’s allegedly deficient

response to an incident of possible domestic violence on February 7, 2015. The

second suspension, for twenty days, was for using unnecessary force in an off-duty

altercation on April 16, 2015, and for “inefficiency” in the performance of his duties

apart from that matter. The inefficiency charge was based on three sustained adverse

actions within a 16-month period, namely, his suspension for the February 2015

incident and two earlier suspensions.

      After an evidentiary hearing, an OEA Administrative Judge (AJ) concluded

that the MPD failed to prove either the February 2015 misconduct charges or the

April 2015 unnecessary force charge on which it had relied. But while the AJ

therefore reversed Lt. Royal’s 15-day suspension, he did not overturn the 20-day

suspension. The AJ upheld that suspension based on other charges concerning

Lt. Royal’s conduct in the April 2015 incident that the MPD itself had considered

and rejected, and on the inefficiency charge. The AJ did not explain why he upheld

the inefficiency charge even though he had rejected the February 2015 complaints
                                         3

on which that charge was partly grounded. The Superior Court affirmed the AJ’s

decision on Lt. Royal’s petition for review.

      In this court, Lt. Royal contends he is entitled to reversal of his 20-day

suspension as well as his 15-day suspension because the OEA exceeded its authority

by basing its decision on charges that the MPD itself had not sustained and for which

the MPD had not sanctioned him, and because the OEA’s determination regarding

the inefficiency charge was not supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons

that follow, we agree with Lt. Royal’s contentions. Accordingly, we reverse the

OEA’s determination upholding the 20-day suspension. We leave in effect that

portion of the OEA’s order relating to the 15-day suspension.

                                         I.

                         A. The February 2015 Incident

      On February 7, 2015, Lt. Royal was off duty and at his residence—an

apartment building he owned in Northwest D.C.—when he heard a woman’s

screams coming from inside one of the other apartments. Lt. Royal went to that

apartment, concluded there had been a quarrel but the woman had not been harmed

or assaulted, and escorted her out of the building. In its notice of proposed adverse

action, the MPD faulted Lt. Royal’s response as a “[f]ailure to obey orders or
                                          4

directives issued by the Chief of Police” and proposed imposition of a 15-day

suspension as the penalty. The notice alleged three specific violations by Lt. Royal:

             Specification No. 1: In that, on February 7, 2015, while
             off-duty, you responded to . . . Apartment #23, because
             you heard what you believed was an assault in progress.
             Once inside the apartment you made only a minimal
             attempt to determine what had transpired and thus failed
             to properly handle the domestic violence assault that had
             taken place [in violation of his duty as the first officer on
             the scene to “[d]etermine whether a crime has been
             committed and, if so, the exact nature of the event.”]

             Specification No. 2: . . . Once inside the apartment you
             failed to obtain translation services to ensure you could
             properly understand the subjects inside the apartment [in
             violation of his duty to provide language access services
             “[i]n every circumstance where limited or no-English
             proficient (LEP/NEP) persons and MPD members need to
             communicate.”]

             Specification No. 3: . . . Once on the scene you took
             police action without notifying on-duty members of the
             department either prior to or after your actions.

      Lt. Royal appealed the proposed adverse action, and the Director of the

MPD’s Human Resource Management Division issued a final notice on August 27,

2015, affirming the 15-day suspension. Lt. Royal appealed that decision to the Chief

of Police, who denied the appeal on October 2, 2015. Lt. Royal then appealed the

matter to the Office of Employee Appeals.
                                         5

                           B. The April 2015 Incident

      On April 16, 2015, Lt. Royal was off duty and out of uniform when he

observed a construction van pull into his apartment building’s private parking lot

and park there in violation of no-parking signs. Lt. Royal approached the driver of

the van and told him he could not park there, but the driver did not immediately

move the vehicle; according to the driver’s later testimony, he did not have the keys

and called a fellow construction worker to bring them. Seeking to have the van

ticketed, Lt. Royal retrieved his “less than lethal” police weapons, moved his

parents’ minivan to block the vehicle from leaving the parking lot, and then called

the police. While he waited, the van’s driver returned with a second person. They

proceeded to maneuver a car that was parked in the lot around the minivan.

Believing he saw the car strike the minivan and then drive off, Lt. Royal called 911

to report the “accident” and followed the construction van on foot.

      During the 911 call, the two construction workers got out of the van and

confronted Lt. Royal. Lt. Royal was not in uniform and he did not identify himself

to the men as a police officer. A heated confrontation ensued. According to

Lt. Royal, the men threatened him, moved aggressively toward him, and ignored his

repeated orders to back off even after he pulled out his police baton and a canister

of Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) spray (a deterrent similar to pepper spray). As the
                                           6

men continued to close in on him and threatened to beat him up, Lt. Royal attempted

to discharge his OC spray at them. The spray malfunctioned, however, and did not

affect anyone. Lt. Royal then retreated to his apartment and awaited the arrival of

the police he had summoned, to whom he reported what had occurred.

         In November 2015, the MPD’s Disciplinary Review Branch proposed that

Lt. Royal be terminated from the police force. The notice of proposed adverse action

listed seven charges of misconduct. Six of the charges related to the April 16

encounter at the parking lot. They included charges of making a false report of

damage to his parents’ minivan, unnecessary or unreasonable employment of force

in resorting to the use of the OC spray, failure to notify on-duty officers before taking

police action, and failing to care for a suspect in his custody after employing the OC

spray.

         The seventh charge was for “inefficiency as evidenced by repeated and

well-founded complaints from superior officers, or others, concerning the

performance of police duty, or the neglect of duty.” This charge was not based

on complaints pertaining to the April 16 encounter at all, but rather rested on the

previously sustained charges of misconduct in the February 7, 2015, incident

and two earlier disciplinary actions against Lt. Royal—a three-day suspension

imposed in July 2014 for failure to complete and submit an investigation on time,
                                         7

and a two-day suspension imposed in January 2015 for improper conduct with a

subject while in an off-duty status.

      Lt. Royal requested a hearing before an adverse action panel to contest the

proposed termination. The panel heard witness testimony and reviewed evidence on

April 19 and May 2, 2016. The panel sustained only two of the seven proposed

charges—Charge 4 and Charge 7—and found Lt. Royal “not guilty” of the other five

charges. The panel made findings with respect to each charge. It found Lt. Royal

guilty of Charge 4 because he “intentionally created and then escalated the situation

to the point that he had no choice but to use force” (i.e., his deployment of the OC

spray). With respect to Charge 7, “[t]he Panel after reviewing the findings and

merits of each case concluded that, although the conduct occurred over a sixteen-

month period, there was a sustained pattern of misconduct that rose to the level of

inefficiency.” 1 In lieu of the initially proposed sanction of termination, the panel

      1
         As we explain below, the General Order defining the charge of inefficiency
provides, inter alia, that “[t]hree sustained Adverse Actions within a 12-month
period upon charges involving misconduct . . . shall be prima facie evidence of
inefficiency” (emphasis added). MPD General Order 120.21. In Lt. Royal’s case,
the amended specification of Charge 7 explained that the three sustained adverse
actions against him within a sixteen-month period, “while not prima facie evidence
of inefficiency, point to a pattern of sustained misconduct which in and of itself is
evidence of inefficiency.”
                                            8

recommended a 10-day suspension on Charge 4 and a consecutive 15-day

suspension on Charge 7.

      Lt. Royal appealed the panel’s decision to the director of the MPD’s Human

Resource Management Division, who reduced the suspension on Charge 7 to ten

days, and then to the Chief of Police, who affirmed the aggregate 20-day suspension

on April 12, 2017. Lt. Royal then appealed to the OEA.

                              C. OEA Proceedings

      Lt. Royal’s two appeals were assigned to Administrative Judge Lim and were

consolidated at the parties’ request. The parties’ submissions included stipulations

of fact. After receiving them, and in light of the parties’ remaining disagreements,

AJ Lim held an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed factual issues. Afterwards,

both Lt. Royal and the MPD submitted post-hearing briefs. Their arguments focused

on whether the evidence supported the three charges underlying the 15-day

suspension and the two charges—Charges 4 and 7—on which the 20-day suspension

was based. Neither party even addressed the charges on which the adverse action

panel had found Lt. Royal not guilty; the MPD never argued for upholding his

suspension on the basis of those charges.
                                            9

      AJ Lim issued the OEA’s Initial Decision on April 29, 2019.2 With respect

to the February 2015 incident, AJ Lim found that Lt. Royal disproved each of the

three charges and established by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not

violate the MPD’s regulations. More specifically, the AJ found that no domestic

violence assault had occurred, that Lt. Royal had reasonably determined that

translation services were not needed, and that “as there was no assault, [Lt. Royal]

had no duty to notify the police.”        Accordingly, the AJ reversed the 15-day

suspension.

      With respect to the April 2015 incident, AJ Lim also found in Lt. Royal’s

favor on Charge 4. He explained this determination as follows:

              The sole specification for Charge 4 alleges that, on April
              16, 2015, while off-duty and at the scene . . . [Lt. Royal]
              unjustifiabl[y] used OC Spray in a manner that escalated
              conflict. Based on the facts in this matter, I find that while
              [Lt. Royal] should have first used verbal persuasion and a
              declaration that he is a police officer before using an OC
              Spray, he then found himself in reasonable fear of
              imminent attack when [the men he confronted]
              approached him in a threatening manner. I therefore find
              that [MPD] did not prove by a preponderance of the

      2
        An Initial Decision becomes a final decision of the OEA thirty-five calendar
days after issuance unless a party to the proceeding files a timely petition for review
with the OEA or in Superior Court. See 6B D.C.M.R. § 635.
                                        10

            evidence that [Lt. Royal’s] use of the OC Spray at that
            point was unjustified.

The AJ upheld Charge 7, however. He explained this decision as follows:

            The sole specification for this charge alleges that, during
            the past twelve (12) [sic 3] months, [Lt. Royal] had three
            complaints lodged against him for which he was
            suspended from duty. [MPD] listed [one of the complaints
            arising from the February 2015 incident and the two
            complaints relating to the two earlier incidents.]
            [Lt. Royal] does not deny having these priors in his work
            record.    Thus, I find that [MPD] proved by a
            preponderance of the evidence that [Lt. Royal] is guilty of
            Inefficiency.

The AJ did not explain why he relied on Lt. Royal’s suspension based on the

February 2015 incident to support his inefficiency finding after having determined

that Lt. Royal had disproved the charges connected with that incident.

      By themselves, the AJ’s findings as to Charges 4 and 7 would have supported

a reduction of Lt. Royal’s suspension from twenty days to ten days (given that the

MPD had assessed a ten-day penalty for each sustained charge). However, despite

neither party having requested it, AJ Lim on his own initiative also considered

whether Lt. Royal’s conduct in the April 2015 altercation supported any of the five

other proposed charges arising out of the April 2015 altercation. The AJ did not

      3
        AJ Lim noted elsewhere that the MPD had amended the specification for
Charge 7 to provide that it covered a period of sixteen months rather than twelve
months.
                                         11

explain why he addressed charges that were not the basis for the suspension at issue.

It appears he did so without fully appreciating that the MPD’s adverse action panel

had acquitted Lt. Royal of those five charges and had not based its proposed sanction

on them or sought to establish them on appeal.4 The AJ concluded that two of those

charges—Charges 2 and 3—were supported by a preponderance of the evidence

(while Charges 1, 5, and 6, in addition to Charge 4, were not).

      Charges 2 and 3, like Charge 4, related to Lt. Royal’s use of OC Spray and

asserted violations of MPD prohibitions on the use of unnecessary force. The AJ

found that Lt. Royal violated Charge 2 because he failed to give verbal warnings

before he used his OC Spray, and Charge 3 because he lacked “legal cause to detain”

the complainants or to “block their exit just to ascertain that they [would] receive

parking tickets.”

      Based on his findings that a preponderance of the evidence supported Charges

2 and 3 in addition to Charge 7, the AJ upheld the 20-day suspension as reasonable

and appropriate.

      4
         We say this because the AJ’s opinion lists all the charges and discusses
whether the MPD met its burden of proving each one of them by a preponderance of
the evidence, without acknowledging that the MPD itself found Lt. Royal not guilty
of five of the charges and did not rely on those charges or purport to have proven
them.
                                         12

               D. The Appeals to Superior Court and This Court

      Lt. Royal filed a petition for review of the OEA’s decision in Superior Court,

contending inter alia that the OEA did not have jurisdiction to uphold his suspension

based on Charges 2 and 3, and that the AJ’s decision to sustain Charge 7 was not

supported by substantial evidence. The court disagreed with those contentions and

denied the petition on March 7, 2022, thereby affirming the OEA decision. Lt. Royal

then took the instant appeal to this court, where he renews those two challenges.

      The MPD did not seek relief in Superior Court, and it has not cross-appealed.

It thus has not challenged the AJ’s decision overturning Lt. Royal’s suspension for

his conduct in the February 2015 incident, nor the AJ’s determination that the MPD

did not prove Charge 4 in connection with the April 2015 incident.

                                         II.

      Although this case is before us on appeal from the Superior Court, “we review

the OEA’s decision as though ‘the appeal had been taken directly to this court.’”5

To survive that review, the decision “must state findings of fact on each material

contested factual issue; those findings must be supported by substantial evidence in

      5
       Brown v. Watts, 993 A.2d 529, 532 (D.C. 2010) (quoting District of
Columbia Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Colbert, 874 A.2d 353, 358 (D.C. 2005)).
                                           13

the [OEA] record; and the [OEA’s] conclusions of law must follow rationally from

its findings.”6 We will not affirm a decision if it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse

of discretion, 7 or if it exceeds the OEA’s statutory authority. 8

            A. The OEA’s “Jurisdiction” to Consider Charges 2 and 3

      The first issue we address is whether the OEA had what has been termed

“jurisdiction” to consider Charge 2 and Charge 3 after the MPD Adverse action panel

found Lt. Royal not guilty of those two charges. Lt. Royal argues that the OEA

exceeded its jurisdiction because Charges 2 and 3 were not part of the final agency

decision. With a caveat regarding the appropriate terminology, we agree with

Lt. Royal that the OEA’s adjudicative authority does not extend to charges on which

the agency did not rely.

      The OEA is authorized by law to “review the record and uphold, reverse, or

modify” an agency decision removing a District employee from service or

      6
       D.C. Fire and Med. Servs. Dep’t v. D.C. Off. of Emp. App., 986 A.2d 419,
424 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
      7
          Brown, 993 A.2d at 532.
      8
        District of Columbia v. 17M Associates, LLC, 98 A.3d 954, 959 (D.C. 2014)
(“An administrative agency is a creature of statute and may not act in excess of its
statutory authority.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                                           14

suspending the employee for ten days or more. 9 A reviewable “final agency

decision” is defined as “a written document from a District agency which contains

the cause of action taken by the District agency against an employee.” 10

      The scope of this adjudicative authority has been characterized, somewhat

imprecisely, as a question of agency “jurisdiction”; thus, the Rules and Regulations

of the Office of Employee Appeals in the Code of Municipal Regulations state that

the OEA’s “jurisdiction” to conduct such review is confined to “final agency

decision[s] affecting” the removal or suspension.11 As we have explained, this

terminology can be misleading. Although we may sometimes speak of the OEA’s

jurisdiction, “jurisdictional doctrines applicable to courts cannot be directly

transposed onto administrative agencies.”12 Therefore, we “ask not whether an

agency has jurisdiction over a party or a dispute in the traditional sense of the term,

      9
          D.C. Code § 1-606.03(b).
      10
           6B D.C.M.R. § 699.1.
      11
           Id. § 604.1 (“Jurisdiction”).
      12
           AFGE Nat’l Off. v. D.C. Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd., 237 A.3d 81, 86 (D.C. 2020).
                                           15

but ‘whether the statutory text [or implementing rule] forecloses the agency’s

assertion of authority, or not.’” 13

       The OEA’s oversight function in appeals of agency disciplinary actions is a

limited one. “[T]he OEA is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency[;]

its role . . . is simply to ensure that ‘managerial discretion has been legitimately

invoked and properly exercised.’” 14 We understand this to mean that the OEA must

focus on the soundness of the charges that the agency actually sustained and relied

upon in imposing it. It exceeds the OEA’s role to consider other possible reasons

for disciplining the employee that the agency did not pursue or rejected. The OEA’s

role is not to second-guess an agency’s deliberate decision to acquit an employee of

charges.

       Thus, in the present case, the OEA had the authority to review the soundness

of the MPD’s “final agency decision” to impose a 20-day suspension on Lt. Royal.

But that decision was based on and “contained” only the charges of which the MPD

had found Lt. Royal guilty, Charges 4 and 7. Those two charges constituted the

       13
            Id. (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 301 (2013)).
       14
         Raphael v. Okyiri, 740 A.2d 935, 945 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Douglas v.
Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 313, 328, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 301 (1981)); accord Office
of D.C. Controller v. Frost, 638 A.2d 657, 660 (D.C. 1994) (quoting Stokes v.
District of Columbia, 502 A.2d 1006, 1009-10 (D.C. 1985) (quoting Douglas,
supra)).
                                          16

entire “cause” contained in the final MPD decision of the “action taken” against

Lt. Royal that he appealed to the OEA. Charges 2 and 3 were not part of the “cause”

contained in that final agency decision because the MPD had concluded that

Lt. Royal was not guilty of those charges. Nor were Charges 2 and 3 the cause, in

whole or part, of any other “final agency decision affecting” Lt. Royal’s removal,

suspension, or any other appealable adverse action taken against him. And no one

purported to appeal Lt. Royal’s acquittals to the OEA. In fact, in its brief before the

OEA, the MPD took the position that the adverse action panel’s conclusions

regarding a charge on which it found Lt. Royal not guilty were “irrelevant to this

appeal.”

      It follows that the OEA’s authorized power to review the MPD’s final decision

to suspend Lt. Royal was limited to determining whether Charges 4 and 7 constituted

good cause for that decision. Because Charges 2 and 3 were not the cause of the

MPD’s reviewable action, the OEA lacked authority to consider whether those

charges could sustain the suspension. The MPD’s discretionary decision to acquit

Lt. Royal of Charges 2 and 3 was not reviewable.15

      15
         On appeal, the MPD argues that the words “cause of action” in the definition
of a “final agency decision” refer to “the relevant nucleus of facts supporting a legal
claim or charge, rather than the claim or charge itself,” and that the OEA therefore
had independent jurisdiction to reconsider charges on which the MPD had acquitted
                                         17

      This conclusion is compelled, as well, by considerations of fairness to the

employee, who is entitled to notice of the charges against which he must defend. In

Frost, this court held that the OEA erred in upholding discipline based on its finding

of a violation with which the employee had not been charged by the agency; in such

circumstances, we explained, the employee had no notice and “could not have been

expected to prepare to defend against” the charge before the OEA. 16

      The situation in this case is analogous to that in Frost. The MPD did not rely

on Charges 2 and 3 before the OEA, Lt. Royal did not have notice that the OEA

Lt. Royal. We consider this an unduly expansive reading of the definition of a “final
agency decision.” That definition focuses on what the agency decision identifies as
the “cause” of the disciplinary “action taken by the District agency against an
employee.” 6B D.C.M.R. § 699.1. Only charges that the agency sustained against
the employee can be said to constitute that “cause”; not charges the agency rejected
or never considered.
       The MPD also asserts that there was “significant overlap between Charges 2,
3, and 4” and that “[i]t can hardly be reversible error for OEA, on de novo review,
to choose to evaluate these identical or near-identical charges slightly differently
from the Adverse Action Panel.” However, we need not consider this argument
because we conclude that the OEA did not have authority to consider the unsustained
charges at all. See Goto v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 423 A.2d 917, 928 (D.C.
1980) (Kelly, J., concurring) (“[A]n agency’s faulty interpretation of its governing
jurisdictional regulations can never be harmless error.”).
      16
           Frost, 638 A.2d at 663.
                                        18

would consider those two charges, and he therefore had no reason to address them

on appeal and did not do so.17

      We appreciate that Frost held that the OEA could not uphold discipline based

on a charge against the employee that the agency had not levied in the first place,

rather than (as here) a charge on which the agency actually had acquitted the

employee. 18 However, we consider that difference immaterial. In either situation,

the employee was not on notice that the OEA might uphold the agency’s disciplinary

action based on charges other than those the agency relied upon.

      17
         The MPD argues that the OEA itself put Lt. Royal on notice that it would
reconsider his guilt of all the charges he had faced, including those on which the
MPD had acquitted him, because AJ Lim’s order consolidating Lt. Royal’s two
appeals described the relevant “issue” for briefing as “[w]hether [the MPD] has
cause for adverse action against [Lt. Royal].” We disagree for two reasons. First,
the general language used by AJ Lim does not at all make clear that he would
consider whether charges that the MPD itself had dismissed might constitute cause
for the MPD’s adverse action. The MPD itself did not understand that. Second, the
MPD’s argument that AJ Lim gave Lt. Royal the necessary notice that acquitted
charges would be considered rests on the assumption that the OEA actually has the
authority to determine the charges and discipline an employee in the first instance,
or to second-guess an agency’s decision to acquit an employee of charges. But as
explained above, that assumption is incorrect; the OEA’s review authority does not
extend that far. An AJ cannot expand the scope of the issues on appeal by mere fiat.
If one proceeds with a proper understanding of the OEA’s limited appellate
authority, framing the issue before the OEA as whether the employer agency has
cause for adverse action against the employee cannot serve to put the employee on
notice that the OEA can consider charges that the agency did not rely on and
acquitted the employee of.
      18
           See id.
                                          19

      For the foregoing reasons, we hold that AJ Lim erred in considering Charges

2 and 3 sua sponte, and in relying on their validity in his decision to uphold

Lt. Royal’s 20-day suspension.

                      B. The Evidence Supporting Charge 7

      The second issue is whether there is substantial evidence to support the OEA’s

affirmance of Charge 7, for inefficiency, against Lt. Royal. An MPD General Order,

relied upon in this case, defines inefficiency as follows:

             Inefficiency as evidenced by repeated and well-founded
             complaints from superior officers, or others, concerning
             the performance of police duty, or the neglect of duty.
             Three sustained Adverse Actions within a 12-month
             period upon charges involving misconduct, as provided in
             this section, shall be prima facie evidence of inefficiency.
             The Adverse Action charges need not be related.19

      Lt. Royal argues that there are two independently sufficient reasons Charge 7

was not supported by substantial evidence: (1) The MPD needed to prove a “prima

facie” case of inefficiency as described in the General Order, and it failed to do so

because the three sustained adverse actions on which the MPD relied were not within

      19
          MPD General Order 120.21; see also 6A D.C.M.R. § 1001.7 (“Three
convictions before trial boards or any summary hearings as authorized by the Mayor,
or both, within a period of twelve (12) months upon charges involving violations of
the rules and regulations of the department shall be prima facie evidence of
inefficiency.”).
                                          20

a twelve-month period; and (2) the charge of inefficiency rested in part on the

February 2015 charges, and AJ Lim found that the evidence did not support those

charges. We address each of these arguments in turn.

                    1. The “Prima Facie Evidence” Criterion

      The definition of inefficiency in General Order 120.21 provides two

descriptions of “inefficiency” for which an officer may be disciplined. The first

description refers to inefficiency “as evidenced by repeated and well-founded

complaints from superior officers, or others, concerning the performance of police

duty, or the neglect of duty.” 20 The phrasing “as evidenced by” implies that

“repeated and well-founded complaints” regarding performance or neglect of duty

are necessary for a finding of inefficiency (other kinds of complaints appear to be

excluded), if not always sufficient for such a finding. (They might be found

insufficient if, for example, the complaints are rebutted or mitigated, or there exist

other requirements for a finding of inefficiency that are not satisfied).

      The second description states that “[t]hree sustained Adverse Actions within

a 12-month period upon charges involving misconduct” shall be “prima facie

      20
           MPD General Order 120.21.
                                          21

evidence” of inefficiency. 21    The term “prima facie evidence” is commonly

understood to mean “[e]vidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless

contradictory evidence is produced.”22 When unrefuted, prima facie evidence is

sufficient to support a particular finding. But while certain evidence may be deemed

sufficient, that particular evidence may not be necessary. Other evidence may also

constitute sufficient proof of the fact to be established. 23 The second description of

inefficiency therefore can be viewed as a subset of the first, i.e., three sustained

adverse actions in a twelve-month period will suffice to constitute the requisite

“repeated and well-founded complaints” for a finding of inefficiency, but other

evidence of a pattern of well-founded complaints may be judged sufficient as well.

      Lt. Royal posits a stronger connection between the two descriptions of

inefficiency; he argues that the second description must be understood as providing

      21
           Id.
      22
        Prima facie evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see, e.g.,
Am. Studies Ass’n v. Bronner, 259 A.3d 728, 744 n.57 (D.C. 2021).
      23
           See, e.g., D.C. Code § 23-1327 (b)-(c) (providing that “[a]ny failure to
appear after notice of the appearance date shall be prima facie evidence that such
failure to appear is willful,” but that factfinders may consider other evidence in
finding that a failure to appear is willful). To give another example, we have said
that “a rebuttable presumption that any person driving a car does so with the consent
of the registered owner” is “prima facie evidence” of the owner’s vicarious liability
for a traffic accident or infraction involving that car. Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181,
192 (D.C. 2007). Obviously, however, the owner’s consent may be proved or
disproved by evidence apart from the presumption (and such proof may be necessary
to establish the owner’s vicarious liability when there is rebuttal evidence).
                                          22

a limiting definition of “repeated and well-founded complaints,” and that it sets forth

the one and only way that a charge of inefficiency can be proved. Otherwise, he

argues, the second description serves no purpose and is meaningless. However, this

is clearly not the MPD’s own interpretation of its definition of inefficiency, as

demonstrated by the Amended Notice of Proposed Adverse Action, the Adverse

action panel’s finding that three sustained adverse actions against Lt. Royal sufficed

to prove the charge of inefficiency even though they occurred during a sixteen-

month period rather than within a period of only twelve months, and the MPD’s

testimony before the OEA. Additionally, specifying that three sustained adverse

actions in twelve months will establish a prima facie case is certainly helpful and

meaningful even if other evidence of a series of well-founded complaints may also

prove inefficiency. It removes uncertainty in many circumstances and furnishes a

useful benchmark in evaluating whether alternative comparable evidence is serious

enough to justify a finding of inefficiency. On the other hand, viewing the specified

prima facie case as the only way to prove inefficiency is implausible because, if that

were so, the General Order’s first description of inefficiency would be superfluous.

      We conclude that there is nothing implausible about the MPD’s understanding

that, while three sustained adverse actions within a twelve-month period will suffice

to prove a charge of inefficiency if not rebutted, such a charge may be proved by

other evidence of repeated and well-founded complaints of misconduct. And where,
                                         23

as here, the Adverse action panel has sustained three adverse actions against an

officer, and those actions did not establish a prima facie case of inefficiency only

because they fell within a period a little longer than twelve months, we cannot say it

is unreasonable to construe the MPD’s definition of inefficiency as applicable. If

anything, strictly limiting that definition, as Lt. Royal proposes, would appear to

narrow it unreasonably.

            2. The OEA’s Basis for Upholding the Charge of Inefficiency

      That said, we agree with Lt. Royal that the AJ’s findings in this case are

insufficient to uphold the conclusion that the MPD proved the inefficiency charge

against Lt. Royal by a preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, the AJ’s factual

findings mandate rejection of that charge.

      The specification of the charge of inefficiency predicated it on three

complaints “for which [Lt. Royal] was suspended from duty.” The three complaints

identified in the specification arose from the February 2015 incident and two prior

incidents. AJ Lim upheld the inefficiency charge based solely on the fact that

Lt. Royal “does not deny having these priors in his work record.” By itself, this

finding was inadequate to justify the inefficiency charge, because that charge

depended on whether the complaints had been sustained or (even if not sustained)

were well-founded. And that precondition was not met here. While the two earlier
                                        24

complaints were sustained—they resulted in Lt. Royal’s suspensions for three days

in July 2014 and two days in January 2015—the complaints arising from the

February 2015 incident were not sustained. As discussed above, AJ Lim himself

found not only that the evidence did not support the February 2015 complaints, but

also that Lt. Royal had “proven by a preponderance of the evidence” that he did not

commit any of the violations with which he was charged as a result of the February

2015 matter. Nor did the AJ find that any of the February 2015 complaints were

well-founded, and we do not see how he could have reached such a conclusion given

his express findings that the evidence did not support those complaints and that

Lt. Royal disproved them. 24 Furthermore, we also do not see how the inefficiency

charge against Lt. Royal could be upheld based solely on the two prior complaints

that led to suspensions of three days in July 2014 and two days in January 2015.

These two suspensions did not amount to prima facie evidence of inefficiency as

defined in the General Order, and before the OEA, the MPD reiterated that the

Adverse action panel found Lt. Royal guilty on Charge 7 “because [he] had three

sustained adverse actions,” and that “[t]he preponderance of the evidence”

      24
        The MPD argues that the fact that the adverse action panel sustained the
charges related to the February 2015 incident provides some indication that they
were well-founded. But the issue is whether the OEA made the necessary finding,
not whether another adjudicator did.
                                          25

demonstrated his guilt of Charge 7 “because he had three prior sustained adverse

actions.” (Emphasis added.) Nor has the MPD argued on appeal that the two

underlying complaints were enough by themselves to prove inefficiency. 25

      Accordingly, we must hold that the OEA’s conclusion upholding the

inefficiency charge against Lt. Royal does not “follow rationally from its

findings,” 26 and is not supported by the credited evidence. And given the AJ’s

explicit findings that the February 2015 bases of the inefficiency charge were

disproven, we do not perceive it necessary to remand for further findings on any

material, contested issues of fact.27 No material factual issues remain to be resolved.

                                         III.

      For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the OEA’s order on

appeal that upholds the MPD’s 20-day suspension of Lt. Royal based on charges

      25
         Instead, on the premise that the AJ sustained two of the April 2015 charges
(Charges 2 and 3) and hypothetically could have relied on them to support the charge
of inefficiency, the MPD argues that the AJ’s erroneous reliance on the February
2015 allegations to find inefficiency was harmless. But as we have explained, the
MPD did not rely on Charges 2 and 3 and they were not properly before the AJ for
consideration.
      26
           D.C. Fire and Medical Servs. Dep’t, 986 A.2d at 424.
      27
        See King v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 742 A.2d 460, 465 (D.C. 1999) (“If
the agency fails to make a finding on a material, contested issue of fact, this court
cannot fill the gap by making its own determination from the record, but must
remand the case for findings on that issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                                        26

arising from the events of April 16, 2015, and a charge of inefficiency. In lieu

thereof, we direct entry of an order reversing the suspension and, if necessary,

directing the MPD to issue Lt. Royal any back pay to which he is entitled and to

restore any benefits he lost as a result of the suspension. We leave unaltered that

portion of the OEA’s order reversing the MPD’s 15-day suspension of Lt. Royal

based on charges arising from the events of February 7, 2015.

                                             So ordered.