Court Opinion

ID: 9766395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:45:35.724293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:29.864537
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, J.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 As jurists, we have all heard the phrase “negligence in the air,” and seen it used in various decisions. In this case, such negligence took the form of a three to four foot pipe that, literally, flew through the air until being stopped by Appellant’s rather innocently situated face (actually the side of his face or head). Since the pipe’s flight originated some forty feet, or more, from Appellant, basic physics suggests that the pipe had been propelled with a fair amount of force. Moreover, since Appellant was essentially “minding his own business,” that is, inspecting steel material ordered by another customer, when he was struck by the pipe, and since it is rather safe to assume that being struck by a pipe that had traveled at least forty feet in the air would cause some compensable injury, one would have thought that Appellant was in possession of a “can’t lose” case, a plaintiffs lawyer’s dream. The image of Michael Jordan in possession of the basketball three feet from the basket, or Mario Lemieiux converging upon an empty net, with nary a defender between them and their respective goals, springs to mind as a functional equivalent. Yet somehow Jordan missed the hoop, Lemieux the empty net. The jury returned a defense verdict and I cannot help but ask, “how can that be?” More important to our task, the trial court refused to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
*1167¶ 2 Without impermissibly invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, common sense suggests that pipes do not fly through the air, a distance of forty feet or more, from naturally occurring causes. Rather, some force is necessary to render the pipe airborne. Since the danger presented by a hard object flying through the air is relatively self-evident, it is only one logical step removed to suggest that the failure to prevent such an occurrence, or the occasioning of such an occurrence in itself, represents a failure to exercise due regard for the safety of others. Of course, a failure to exercise due regard for the safety of others is simply a layman’s definition for negligence.
¶ 3 That Appellee’s negligence, in some form, must be responsible for the accident that occurred here seems beyond rational dispute. Either Mr. Pisano, Appellee’s employee, who employed the pipe in an attempt to securely fasten his load, failed to exercise due care in preventing the pipe from flying through the air, exercised poor judgment in using the pipe in the first place, or Appellee failed to provide proper training and/or instruction to Mr. Pisano with respect to his duties in loading the truck. This should not have been a mystery to the jury, as Appellant provided essentially uncontradicted expert testimony of the dangers of Mr. Pisano’s actions and how its use deviated from a reasonable standard of care. Alternatively, Appellee was not without measures to ensure that nothing would fly off the truck and endanger bystanders. Barriers could have been erected on the side of the Flatbeds or Appellee could have insisted upon loading the truck in isolated bays so that no bystanders would be exposed to such risks.
¶ 4 In contrast, Appellee’s evidence, provided by David Eaborn, essentially amounted to evidence that Appellee’s employees had been using pipes to provide additional leverage for some time. Mr. Eaborn gave no testimony regarding the safety of using such a pipe to gain additional leverage, the standards within the industry for loading steel or other alternatives that might be safer. Of course, evidence that a party has been doing something in a particular way for a period of time does not equate to evidence that the practice is safe.
¶ 5 Moreover, that Appellant must have suffered some compensable injury as a result of being struck with a pipe in the face seems similarly self-evident. While Appellant pled a variety of injuries, some quite serious, others less so, and while there may have been some dispute as to the legitimacy of the injuries pled or the causation of them, it is beyond comprehension that Appellant would not have suffered some “injury” justifying at least a minor award from the jury, if not more.
¶ 6 Indeed, our Supreme Court has instructed that while a jury is not obliged to believe that every injury causes pain or the pain alleged, there are injuries to which human experience teaches there is accompanying pain, including, “the broken bone, the stretched muscle, twist of the skeletal system, injury to a nerve, organ or their function” which a jury may not disregard. Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 518 Pa. 162, 542 A.2d 516 (1988). I believe it is safe to add to the list being struck in the head by a pipe that has flown forty feet from its point of origin.
¶ 7 Perhaps more importantly, both Appellant’s and Appellee’s medical experts were in agreement that some injury was suffered as a result of the accident. While, as might be expected, Appellant’s experts were of the opinion that Appellant’s injuries and symptoms were quite extensive, notably, Appellee’s expert seemingly conceded that Appellant had been injured, to some extent, as a result of *1168being struck by the pipe. Dr. Richard Weisman testified on Appellee’s behalf. Dr. Weisman’s diagnosis was that Appellant was suffering post-concussion disorder related to the accident. Of course, a diagnosis of post-concussion disorder indicates that Appellant had suffered a concussion as a result of being struck by the pipe. Lest the point escape, suffering a concussion is not a particularly pleasant experience. The Merriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary defines a concussion thusly: “a: a stunning, damaging, or shattering effect from a hard blow; especially: a jarring injury of the. brain resulting in disturbance of cerebral function b: a hard blow or collision.” Dr. Weisman further conceded that a lot of Appellant’s symptoms were related to the accident. Weisman Deposition 1/27/98, at 76-78. These included cervical strain, head, neck and shoulder pain and auditory problems.
¶ 8 This Court, sitting en banc, agreed with a proposition presented to them in Mano v. Madden, 738 A.2d 493 (Pa.Super.1999), which they characterized as follows: “Thus, as there was an expert concession that appellee suffered some injury (albeit a mild one), there perforce must be some monetary award, however modest.” We followed up the above premise with the assertion “[I]t is impermissible for a jury, in a personal injury case, to disregard the uncontroverted testimony from the experts of both parties that the plaintiff suffered some injury as a result of the accident in question.” Id., 738 A.2d at 497. Citing Rozanc v. Urbany, 444 Pa.Super. 645, 664 A.2d 619 (1995).
¶ 9 It is often stated that a jury is free to believe some, all or none of the evidence presented. Yet, Neison v. Hines, 539 Pa. 516, 653 A.2d 634 (1995), exposes this general assertion as a less than completely accurate statement of law. There our Supreme Court responded to the assertion that the obligation to assess and weigh the evidence rests with the factfinder by responding:
We agree that the jury is free to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by a witness.... However, this rule is tempered by the requirement that the verdict must not be a product of passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption, or must bear some reasonable relation to the loss suffered by the plaintiff as demonstrated by uncontroverted evidence presented at trial.... The synthesis of these conflicting rules is that a jury is entitled to reject any and all evidence up until the point at which the verdict is so disproportionate to the uncontested evidence as to defy common sense and logic.
Id., 653 A.2d at 637. (Citations omitted).
¶ 10 The concept that the jury’s verdict is sacrosanct is a myth worth dispelling. The fact of the matter is that juries return erroneous verdicts; perhaps, not frequently, but often enough to make it worth noting. Indeed, while it does not happen regularly, juries in criminal cases have been found to return guilty verdicts upon evidence later adjudged by an appellate court to be insufficient, as a mater of law, to support the verdict. While, as a practical matter, a great deal of deference must be afforded the jury’s verdict, when the jury in a civil case ignores the evidence and renders a verdict so disproportionate to the uncontested evidence as to defy common sense and logic, the court is obligated to step in and put' aside the verdict. In the present case it seems clear enough that, as Appellant protests, the jury either disregarded the competent evidence of record, disregarded their instructions from the court or suffered a substantial misapprehension of either law or fact. Alternatively, I believe, the verdict qualifies as one that is so contrary to the weight of the *1169evidence, that it shocks one’s conscience. Either way, a new trial should have been granted. That it was not is an injustice that is magnified by this Court’s failure to reverse the trial court’s failure to do what justice compels.