Court Opinion

ID: 9689812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:47:42.764618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:41.638942
License: Public Domain

ON THE MERITS
I.
It appears in the record that the appellant submitted to the trial court for its consideration a series of seventy or more questions to be asked the venire concerning their qualifications, interests, or bias in the trial of the defendant.
Defendant complains in her argument that the court erred in striking from the list questions 29 and 57, which appear in the defendant’s brief. We quote:
“29. Do you feel that you know too much about this case, from the pretrial publicity that has surrounded it, that you feel you should be disqualified from the case? 29. Do you think it might confuse your judgment if you sit on a jury in this case and not all of what you have heard, read, or learned about the case actually comes out in court in a manner different from what you may have heard ?
“57. Have any of you sat on a grand jury in this circuit within the past two years ? If so: who ?”
With respect to question twenty-nine, we have examined the transcript and find that the trial court in qualifying the jury fully covered the import of this question (See Tr. 144-145). We will not burden this opinion by quoting the court’s inquiry of the jury.
Question fifty-seven was properly stricken from the list. The trial court asked the jurors if any one of them was on the grand jury that returned the indictment. This inquiry met the demands of law.
The above contention of error is without merit.
II.
Deputy Sheriff Ronnie Watkins testified that on February 25, 1972, he in the presence of another, talked with the defendant at which time she signed and gave him a written statement with respect to the homicide and incidents relating thereto.
It appears that .before signing the statement he orally advised the defendant of her Miranda warnings. We quote the testimony of the witness (Tr. 334 — 335):
“Q. Now, what rights did you advise her of, at that time?
“A. I advised the defendant that she had a right to remain silent; that anything that she might say could be used in a Court of law against her; that she had a right to a lawyer or counsel; and the right to have a lawyer or counsel present if and when she did make a statement ; that any time during the questioning that she wished to stop answering questions, she had a right to do so; if she did not have the money to employ an attorney, the State of Alabama or the Court would appoint one to represent her. I asked her did she understand her constitutional rights and she told me that she did.
“Q. Did you—
“THE COURT: State whether or not you told her that she could have a lawyer at any time during the questioning ?
“THE WITNESS : Yes, sir, I did.
“THE COURT: All right.
“Q. State whether or not' you said a lawyer would be furnished her free of charge?
“A. Yes, sir, I did.
“Q. Did you ascertain at that time, as you were talking to her and advis*61ing her of these rights, what education she had had ?
“A. I did, yes, sir.
“Q’. What education?
“A. She advised that she completed the tenth grade of formal education.
“Q. And did you determine at that time her age?
“A. I did, yes, sir.
“Q. What was her age at that time?
“A. At that time she was 19 years of age.
“Q. Did you ascertain at that time whether she could read and write the English language ?
“A. I did, yes, sir.
“Q. And what did she say ?
“A. She advised that she could.
“Q. After advising her — -did you advise her of these rights orally ?
“A. I advised them orally, and she read along with me on the Waiver of Counsel by Defendant in Custody, that I had filled out.”
Defendant signed a waiver of rights which, along with the statement, appears in the record at page 354 et seq. Both were admitted in evidence.
The witness also testified that prior to the defendant’s statement, “he nor anyone in his presence in the sight, presence or hearing of the defendant offered her any reward or hope of reward or other inducement to get her to make a statement or made any threat or used any force against her to get her to make a statement” (Tr. 337).
It is true that the waiver which the defendant signed referred only to murder and not to robbery or assault with intent to murder for which she was also indicted. The instant trial was for murder. Information imparted to the defendant that she was charged only with murder was sufficient. We pretermit discussing the legal availability of the waiver and statement for use in the trial of the other charges.
There was no error in admitting this waiver and statement in evidence.
III.
Ten agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, acting under a valid federal warrant of arrest of the defendant and her three companions, entered the Delmar Motel in California, where all four of the fugitives were housed, and forthwith placed all of them under arrest. The officers did not have a search warrant.
It appears that the four fugitives were all in the motel room that accommodated two single beds, one double bed and a dresser. Inside the dresser drawers, within reach of the defendants or some of them, were some knives. They were in plain view of the officers. The drawers containing the weapons were partially open and by looking in the openings the weapons were in plain view and subject to seizure without a search warrant as an incident of arrest. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed. 2d 777; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685. The officers were also authorized to seize a pair of white boots in the constructive possession of the defendant, lying in a closet of which the door was open, and hold them for evidence. Such seizure was authorized under Preston and Chimel, supra. These weapons and items, after proper sequence of possession was established, were properly admitted in evidence. They shed light on the res gestae of the crime. The boots were the property of Mrs. Froney, who identified them when she testified. They were in the motel room and only one female was in there who could have worn them. The defendant admitted in her voluntary statement that she took the boots from the camper.
*62Defendant was not prejudiced by her suggestion to the arresting officer that she get her clothing in the closet. The officer gave her the boots and then retrieved them after another officer suggested the evidentiary value of the boots.
The trial court did not commit error in admitting the boots in evidence over defendant’s objection because the defendant was not given the Miranda warning when she importuned that her clothing be given her.
IV.
It appears from the evidence that appellant aided and abetted one or more of the three male indictees in killing their victim, Burt Michael Froney. Appellant by such aid became a principal. Title 14, § 14, Code of Alabama 1940.
Mrs. Froney, wife of the victim, testified that as she came out of the bathroom she was confronted by the defendant with a knife poised about waist high and directed toward the witness. The three men were hovered over her husband, and her husband said:
“ ‘Just take the motor home, take our money, but just don’t hurt us.’ ”
Her husband was killed then and there. Mrs. Froney further testified that the defendant at the time told her, “ . . .to take it easy and nothing would happen to me” (Tr. 186).
This evidence was sufficient, when considered with all the other evidence relative to the crime, to support an inference that defendant was an accomplice under Title 14, § 14, supra. Lee v. State, 51 Ala.App. 332, 285 So.2d 495, cert. den., 291 Ala. 787, 285 So.2d 500; Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 So. 274, 280; Jones v. State, 174 Ala. 53, 57 So. 31.
V.
It appears from the record as follows:
“MR. LANE: If it please the Court, in light of some of the requested additional instructions to the panel, I would respectfully request Number 29 be explained to the panel again.
“THE COURT: Number 29?
“MR. LANE: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: No, he asked me about 22.
“MR. LANE: Well, I renew my request.
“THE COURT: No, sir. You can have an exception. We can’t just keep going over everything. I tried to make it as clear as I possibly could do it. You heard all of the testimony. You heard Mrs. Froney and you heard her testimony and she was the only person there and you heard her testimony about everything that happened during that incident.”
After the jury retired the following colloquy took place:
“THE COURT: What says the State ?
“MR. WRIGHT: Satisfied, Your Hon- or.
“THE COURT: What says the defendant?
“MR. LANE: If it please the Court, I have an objection to make out of the presence of the jury and they are not here now.
“First of all, Judge, I believe you stated in your last few statements to the jury panel, ‘you heard Mrs. Froney testify — ’ words to the effect, and her testimony is that she was the only person that was there, or something to this effect and we believe there is other evidence adduced in this trial, namely, the statement of Karen Jordan, who also was there. And I feel this was misleading and that — ”
The last exception after the jury retired for deliberation referred to observations of the court to the jury that were a part of *63the court’s oral charge. The exception, after the jury retired for deliberation, came too late. Such exception to the oral charge must be made in the presence of the jury and before they leave the box. Bentley v. Lawson, 280 Ala. 220, 191 So.2d 372; Webb v. City of Birmingham, 279 Ala. 272, 184 So.2d 352; Vol. 18A Alabama Digest, Trial ®=5273.
The conduct of the trial and the court’s rulings are free from error. The judgment is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
ALMON, TYSON, HARRIS and DeCARLO, JJ., concur.
CATES, P. J., not sitting.