Court Opinion

ID: 9518583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:56:32.424263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:24.481024
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE REINHARD, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion, which, I believe, exalts form over substance. (See Kucharski v. Floro (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1033.) The order at issue states the following: “Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a), there is no just reason for delaying appeal of the order of October 5, 1990.” Thus, the order specifically mentions Rule 304(a) and tracks the language of the rule except it does not refer to enforceability. The majority holds that this failure requires us to find that we have no jurisdiction. However, the failure to include any language of the enforceability of the order does not make the order legally deficient, nor is the failure surprising because the order of October 5, 1990, dismissed the third-party complaint. The logical result of this order is that there is no judgment to enforce. Appeal from, not enforcement of, the judgment is the only possible consequence of the order. Therefore, under these facts, it would have served no purpose for the circuit court to have included language that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement. Although the majority relies on this court’s decision in Arachnid, Inc. v. Beall (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 1096, I believe that case should be reexamined and overruled. Certainly, the purpose of Rule 304(a), to discourage piecemeal appeals, is not furthered by the overly strict interpretation announced in Arachnid. Under the facts of this case, the order fulfilled the purpose of the rule. The holding of Arachnid and of the majority here also frustrates the intent of the parties and the circuit court. In this case, although the order did not include language of enforceability, the clear intent was to permit an appeal under Rule 304(a), and there is no need to track precisely the wording of Rule 304(a). (Hopkins v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 652, 655-56 (Jiganti, J., dissenting).) Thus, the order was sufficient to give this court jurisdiction. Cwiertnia v. Zaborowski (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 841, 845. There is a split of authority on this subject within the divisions of the Appellate Court for the First District (compare Cwiertnia v. Zaborowski (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 841, and Kucharski v. Floro (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 1032 (third division cases requiring only substantial compliance with Rule 304(a)), with Hopkins v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 652 (fourth division), and Hamer v. Lentz (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 692 (fifth division) (requiring strict compliance with Rule 304(a))), as well as between the Second and Third Districts of the Appellate Court (compare Arachnid, Inc. v. Beall (2d Dist. 1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 1096), with Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Kneller (3d Dist. 1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 210). I dissent and would address the appeal on its merits.