Court Opinion

ID: 9698366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:48:41.986057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:40.429980
License: Public Domain

T. E. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). This action challenges the constitutionality of the method of financing public school education in Michigan.
Similar actions have been filed in other states and in Federal courts.1 One of these is now pending on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, *44which has noted probable jurisdiction.2 In Askew v Hargrave, the United States Supreme Court vacated a District Court’s summary declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality of a portion of the Florida school financing system, and remanded for further proceedings, saying:
"Since the manner in which the program operates may be critical in the decision of the equal protection claim, that claim should not be decided without fully developing the factual record at a hearing.” Askew v Hargrave, 401 US 476, 479; 91 S Ct 856, 858; 28 L Ed 2d 196, 199 (1971).
In the case at bar, a factual record has been made. Pursuant to our remand to Ingham County Circuit Court, over 20 session days of trial were held, resulting in the introduction of over 100 exhibits and over 50 pages of detailed findings of fact by the trial judge.
In the light of the United States Supreme Court’s comment in Askew, a full description of the Michigan public school financing system is in order.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The commitment to education by the people of these peninsulas began even before we were the State of Michigan. Indeed, it preceded the United States of America.
The Northwest Ordinance adopted in 1787 by the Congress under the old Confederation provided:

'Article III

"Religion, morality and knowledge, being necessary *45to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”
Michigan was admitted to the Union on January 26, 1837. It became a state pursuant inter alia to an act of the United States Congress, adopted June 23,1836, which provided in part as follows:
"First. That section numbered sixteen in every township of the public lands, and where such section has been sold or otherwise disposed of, other lands equivalent thereto, and as contiguous as may be, shall be granted to the State for the use of schools.” Laws of 1836, p 57; June 23, 1836; 1 MCLA pp 253-254; 1 MSA p 179.
This Act of Congress, and its acceptance by the new State of Michigan, has been described as an irrevocable compact, vesting title to the described lands in the state, and creating a trust for the use of schools. The Minnesota Mining Co v The National Mining Co, 11 Mich 186 (1863).
This trust concept was carried forward in Michigan’s constitutional law and history.
Our Constitution of 1835 provided in article 10:
"2. The legislature shall encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientifical and agricultural improvement. The proceeds of all lands that have been or hereafter may be granted by the United States to this state, for the support of schools, which shall hereafter be sold or disposed of, shall be and remain a perpetual fund; the interest of which, together, with the rents of all such unsold lands, shall be inviolably appropriated to the support of schools throughout the state.
"3. The legislature shall provide for a system of common schools, by which a school shall be kept up and supported in each school district at least three months in every year; and any school district neglecting to keep *46up and support such a school, may be deprived of its equal proportion of the interest of the public fund.”
Michigan’s original scheme of public school financing, adopted in furtherance of constitutional mandate, consisted of four parts. First, every operating school district received its share of the interest of the primary school fund, computed on the number of school age children in the district. Second, the township was required to contribute matching funds. Third, the school district was authorized to levy ad valorum taxes, with specified dollar limitations. Finally, deficiencies were assessed against parents of school children.
The trust fund concept survived in the 1850 and 1908 Michigan Constitutions. The 1850 Constitution added escheats to the fund.3
The principal of the trust fund was paid into the state treasury. The Auditor General computed interest upon the fund annually, and notified the Superintendent of Public Instruction. He in turn, advised the Auditor General annually of the amount of the interest apportioned to each county on account of the number of scholars residing therein. The Auditor General thereupon drew a warrant upon the State Treasurer in favor of the several counties. No specific annual appropriation was necessary. The entire process was administrative, and consistent with the theory that the primary school fund was a trust fund, a permanent endowment to support the public schools of the state.
In 1875, however, the Legislature by Act 22, entitled, "AN ACT to provide for the use of the proceeds of the sale of educational lands in defraying the expenses of the State government,” expro*47priated to the use of the general fund the principal and interest of the primary school fund.
Thereafter, a gradual change in the role of the state in financing public school education began to occur. The primary school fund, having long been commingled with the state’s general fund, and finally expropriated by the Act of 1875, existed only on paper. The interest continued to be computed, as though the fund were in existence. Certain specific taxes were enacted supplementing this interest fund, and the whole came to be known as the primary school interest fund.
Unlike the original primary school fund, the primary school interest fund was not a perpetual, self-sustaining, self-operating endowment. It was rather a revolving fund, constantly being depleted and replenished.
Accordingly, the Constitution of 1908, provided, art 10, § 1:
"Section 1. All subjects of taxation now contributing to the primary school interest fund under present laws shall continue to contribute to that fund, and all taxes from such subjects shall be first applied in paying the interest upon the primary school, university and other educational funds in the order herein named, after which the surplus of such moneys shall be added to and become a part of the primary school interest fund.”
Section 23 of art 10, Const of 1908, the so-called sales tax diversion amendment, provided, in part, as follows:
"Sec. 23. * * * There shall be set aside for the school districts 2 cents of a state sales tax levy on each dollar of sales of tangible personal property on the 1946 statutory base (not rate), to be allocated among said school districts by law. Such taxes so collected shall be deposited in a special school aid fund and be expendable only by legislative appropriations for aid to the school *48districts and school employees’ retirement purposes as shall be provided by law. Said school aid fund shall be separate and distinct from the state general fund.”
These later developments in the financing of public schools in Michigan must be considered in the light of the original compact between the State and the United States with respect to the support of education.
The obligation of that compact was once declared to be judicially enforceable.
In Cooper v Roberts, 59 US (18 How) 173, 15 L Ed 338 (1855), the Supreme Court described the object of the compact as follows:
"There is, obviously, a definite purpose declared to consecrate the same central section of every township of every State which might be added to the federal system, to the promotion 'of good government and the happiness of mankind,’ by the spread of 'religion, morality, and knowledge,’ and thus, by a uniformity of local association, to plant in the heart of every community/the same sentiments of grateful reverence for the wisdom, forecast, and magnanimous statesmanship of those who framed the institutions for these new States, before the constitution for the old had yet been modelled.” p 178.
Further describing the legal effect of the compact, the Court said:
"We agree, that until the survey of the township and the designation of the specific section, the right of the State rests in compact — binding, it is true, the public faith, and dependent for execution upon the political authorities. Courts of justice have no authority to mark out and define the land which shall be subject to the grant. But when the political authorities have performed this duty, the compact has an object, upon which it can attach, and if there is no legal impediment the title of the State becomes a legal title. The jus ad *49rem by the performance of that executive act becomes a jus in re, judicial in its nature, and under the cognizance and protection of the judicial authorities, as well as the others.” Cooper v Roberts, supra, p 179.
In the later case of Alabama v Schmidt, 232 US 168, 173-174; 34 S Ct 301, 302; 58 L Ed 555, 558 (1914), the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, described the obligation of the compact as being "honorary”.
"The gift to the State is absolute, although, no doubt, as said in Cooper v Roberts, 18 How 173, 182, 'there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public faith.’ But that obligation is honorary like the one discussed in Conley v Ballinger, 216 U. S. 84 [30 S Ct 224; 54 L Ed 393 (1910)], and even in honor would not be broken by a sale and substitution of a fund, as in that case; a course, we believe, that has not been uncommon among the States.”
MODERN DEVELOPMENT
The foregoing brief history of Michigan’s role in school financing is useful in the interpretation of more recent provisions of constitution and statutory law.
The Constitution of 1963 worked a radical change in the theory of school financing. For the first time, all constitutional acknowledgement of the Federal endowment for schools was eliminated.
No reference was made either to the "perpetual fund” or to the later primary school interest fund.
Substituted were two brief and comprehensive provisions:
"Sec. 2. The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to *50religion, creed, race, color or national origin.” Const 1963, art 8, § 2.
"Sec. 11. There shall be established a state school aid fund which shall be used exclusively for aid to school districts, higher education and school employees’ retirement systems, as provided by law. One-half of all taxes imposed on retailers on taxable sales at retail of tangible personal property, and other tax revenues provided by law, shall be dedicated to this fund. Payments from this fund shall be made in full on a scheduled basis, as provided by law.” Const 1963, art 9, § 11.
Pursuant to these constitutional mandates, the Legislature has enacted, and frequently amended, the state school aid law, being MCLA 388.611 et seq.; MSA 15.1919(51) et seq. That act begins with these words:
"Section 1. There is hereby appropriated from the school aid fund established by section 11 of article 9 of the constitution of the state for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, and for each fiscal year thereafter, the sum necessary to fulfill the requirements of this act, with any deficiency to be appropriated from the general fund by the legislature. * * * ”
In actual operation, the school aid fund, as established by the constitutional dedication of one-half of all sales tax revenues is insufficient to support the present level of appropriations for state school aid purposes. Supplementation of that fund from the state’s general fund accounts for more than one-half of the state school aid.
The executive budget for 1971-1972 estimates a total state appropriation for school aid in the amount of 1,027 millions of dollars. Of that amount, 472.3 million would be from dedicated revenues, including sales tax, cigarette and liquor taxes.
*51State aid to local school districts is no longer distributed on the simplistic formulae of years gone by. Mathematical equality of distribution on the basis of pupil enrollment, once the hallmark of state aid, has given way to more complex and sophisticated computations, designed to accomplish a variety of state goals in the field of education.
Of particular significance are the provisions of § 3 of the Act, providing for the distribution of 23 million dollars to school districts for the purpose of improving basic cognitive skills of pupils enrolled therein.
As found by the trial court, Michigan Educational Assessment Program measures the basic achievement of students in the 4th and 7th grades throughout the state. Section 3 funds are distributed to the educationally needy, as demonstrated by the test scores. It channels the expenditure of the funds through the State Board of Education to assure that they are expended for effective purposes.
The allocation of § 3 funds is notable because, as found by the trial judge, there is no statistical relationship between the value of taxable property in a given school district and the achievement scores of the students. Therefore, §3 allocations may, and in many instances do, go to districts which have higher than average property tax bases. But the state purpose in the allotment of § 3 funds is clear, and can hardly be considered a deprivation of equal protection of the laws.
Other so-called categorical funds are included in the state school aid laws to assist in payment for transportation, vocational programs and the like. As in the case of § 3 funds, these appropriations are directed toward specific legislative objectives. They operate equally with respect to all districts *52falling within the measure of their standards, and do not deny equal protection of the laws.
SECTION 8a APPROPRIATIONS
The heart of the state school aid program, in terms of dollars distributed to local school districts, is § 8a of the Act, being MCLA 388.618a; MSA 15.1919 (58a). It provides as follows:4
"Sec. 8a. (1) To every district in the state, except as otherwise provided in this act, there shall be appropriated where required to meet the provisions of this act, a sum determined as provided in subsection (2) plus the amount allocated for tuition and transportation. No school district shall receive a smaller net allowance per membership pupil for 1971-72 than was received by the district in 1970-71 after reductions made by executive order except that no more than $10,000,000.00 shall be distributed under this provision. The apportionment of the school aid fund to the several school districts shall be governed and limited by the provisions of section 35. Whenever 2 or more districts are reorganized into a single district, either through a procedure of annexation or consolidation, the amount of state aid to be received by such new district during the 2 years immediately subsequent to the annexation or consolidation shall not be less than the total sum of state aid which was earned by all of the districts forming the new *53district during the last fiscal year in which the districts received aid as separate districts.
"(2) The sum allocated to each school district shall be computed from the following table:
"State equalized valuation behind each child Gross Allowance Deductible Millage
(a) $17,000.00 or more $559.50 14
(b) Less than $17,000.00 $661.50 20”
The effect of this provision is to distribute state aid in an inverse ratio to the ability of the local school district to produce revenue through ad valorem property taxes in the district. Thus a district with more than $40,000 in state equalized valuation of taxable property behind each student would receive nothing from the state by virtue of subsection (2). A district with $39,000 of such property would receive $13.50 for each student. The state aid per pupil increases at the rate of $14 for each decrease of $1,000 in taxable property per student, until the level of $17,000 of state equalized valuation is reached. Thereafter, the increment becomes $20 per thousand. The school district with the lowest ratio of taxable property to student enrollment would receive in excess of $600 per pupil in state aid.
It can be seen that the § 8a funds are not equally distributed in terms of dollars per student. Neither are they equally distributed in terms of a single flat rate based upon the state equalized valuation of taxable property behind each student. The net effect is rather a two-stage graduated rate which favors districts having the least local taxing capacity.
In addition to the formula described in subsection (2) of § 8a, there is provision in subsection (1) for the distribution of 10 million dollars under the so-called membership guarantee or grandfather *54clause.5 This provision has been retained in the Act through the various amendments ever since the revision of Act 221 of PA 1962 increased deductible millage from 3-1/4 mills to 3-7/8 mills, and increased the gross allowance from $205 per student to $224 per student.
Every increase in the gross allowance benefits all school districts equally. Every increase in the deductible millage works to the disadvantage of the districts with higher state equalized valuation per pupil.
Since 1959, the gross allowance has been increased about 350% and the deductible millage has been increased about 600%.
The net effect of the several amendments has been to increase the proportion of state school aid funds distributed to districts with lower valued taxable property.
Several other sections of the state school aid law deserve mention. Section 31 deprives a school district of all aid if school is not taught therein for 9 months of the year. Section 17 provides an appropriation of $20,000,000 to compensate for so-called municipal overburden, according to a formula which takes into account the demands of other governmental services upon the taxable property in the district. Section 35 deprives a district of a proportional share of state aid if local taxation is not levied at a rate of 10 mills or more. 
LOCAL TAX COMPONENT
Almost half of the cost of public school education in Michigan is derived from local ad valorem *55taxes. It is customary to express such taxes in terms of mills. A mill is one-tenth of one percent of the state equalized assessed valuation of real and personal property. Millage emanates from two sources. "Non-voted” millage is annually allocated by the county allocation board or permanently allocated by vote of the people within constitutional limits of 15 and 18 mills respectively.
"Voted” millage is millage over and above the constitutional limitation and is levied from time to time by vote of the electors — taxpaying and non-taxpaying — in the school district.
The number of dollars per student resulting from the levy of local ad valorem taxes depends on the rate of tax (millage) and the state equalized value of taxable property in the district. (S.E.V.)
No finding was made by the trial court as to the median income of families living in the several school districts. Michigan is an economically mixed state, having both industrial and rural areas.
Some school districts, having high ratios of S.E.V. to school enrollment, have high concentrations of industrial and commercial properties. Other districts have little or no industry, and are often called bedroom communities. The defendant City of Dearborn is an example of the former, and the defendants Bloomfield Hills and Grosse Pointe are examples of the latter.
S.E.V. is usually a measure of the wealth «of the district, but not truly a measure of the wealth of the people who live in the district. Thus the City of River Rouge enjoys one of the highest S.E.V. per pupil ratios, but ranks in the lower range of socioeconomic status as measured by the State Board of Education.
Typically, minority students live in industrial *56areas, where S.E.V. ratios are high. The lower S.E.V. districts in Michigan are typically in rural areas where concentrations of minority students are lowest.
The state-wide average millage levy is approximately 25 mills. Because of the difference between the average millage levy in the several school districts and the deductible millage contained in the state school aid formula, there is a disparity among the districts in the amount of revenue per pupil available to the various school districts.
In recent years, Michigan communities have experienced a hardening of opposition to school millage proposals. New millage has often been rejected by the electors, and in some districts, voters have refused even to renew existing millage levels.
Should millage levels fall below the deductible millage provision, state aid would have the effect of substantially equalizing revenues available to higher and lower S.E.V. districts, up to the amount of the gross allowance provided in the state school aid act.
Even so, there would remain a disparity between high and low S.E.V. districts in terms of local capacity to provide educational programs exceeding the cost level of the statutory gross allowance.
. In addition, the disposition of local voters, the vicissitudes of the local market for teachers and school personnel, and the environmental cost factors in various parts of the state all contribute to effect differences in the cost of education from one area of Michigan to another.
LOCAL EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE
The trial court made no finding of fact as to the *57purpose of education. Nor could he have done so. Experts in education are not agreed. Courts are not agreed. People are not in agreement.
In Michigan, we have a constitutionally stated purpose in educating our children. "Religion, morality and knowledge * * * .” Const 1963, art 8, §1.
But the First Amendment has been interpreted as prohibiting the teaching of religion in schools. Likewise, morality is questioned in many quarters as being a species of religious doctrine, and where it is assented to in principle, it is debated in specifics.
Only knowledge remains. Yet even here, there is no agreement as to content. What knowledge is important? Which is necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind?
Some answer, the three "R’s”, Reading, ’riting and ’rithmetic. Some answer, the three "S’s”, Science, Sociology and Sensitivity.
Education stems from the Latin root meaning to "lead out”. Every leading out of a child from the limitations of his infancy necessarily involves value judgments of subject matter, of presentation, of attitude.
There is no such thing as valueless, antiseptic, sterlized education. Even the vaguest pluralist goal of exposing a child to the broadest possible learning experience is itself a very specific educational objective and one far from devoid of shortcomings or beyond criticism.
No statement of the purpose of public education could be less consonant with the free history and liberal tradition of Michigan than that of the Court in Serrano v Priest, 5 Cal 3d 584, 610; 487 P2d 1241, 1259; 96 Cal Rptr 601, 619 (1971):
*58"[P]ublic education actively attempts to shape a child’s personal development in a manner chosen not by the child or his parents but by the state.”
A child is not the creature of the state. A child’s first allegiance is to his family and parental rights and responsibilities in the education of children come before the state’s. Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510; 45 S Ct 571; 69 L Ed 1070 (1925); Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 92 S Ct 1526, 32 L Ed 2d 15 (1972).
Public education is not government education. The two are as distinct as public opinion and government policy.
Public schools are surely subject to reasonable regulation by the state just as they are entitled to support and encouragement from the state. But they do not spring from state laws nor exist to serve state policies and purposes.
Public schools are established by the people in their local communities. They exist primarily to fulfill the parental responsibility of educating children.
It is for the people of each district to write their own definition of quality education through the implementation of such programs, the encouragement of such skills, and the exposure to such values as they deem appropriate and needful.
Through locally elected school officials, locally adopted taxation and locally determined school policies, the public educate their children in public schools. We are not a single homogeneous public. We are a plural society. The aims and aspirations of the people in one community differ from those in another.
One school may offer classical guitar lessons and college level mathematics. Another may emphasize vocational training or animal husbandry. The *59needs of the public in the local community are to be met by their public school. The costs are not the same.
Quality education is not a function of the wealth of a community. It is a function of achieving the goals and fulfilling the educational aspirations of the people who live in the school district, and who in a collective sense, own and operate the public school.
Some school districts with low S.E.V. ratios are very proud of the education they provide. The public is satisfied. The public school provides a quality education.
Other school districts with high S.E.V. ratios are troubled with citizen discontent. The quality of education is unsatisfactory despite considerable resources.
The truth of the primacy of the role of the family in the education of children is only lately being rediscovered. Studies made in our Michigan public schools, placed in evidence in the hearing of this matter, demonstrate that the only factor which bears a significant statistical correlation to cognitive achievement is socio-economic status of the students’ families.
But cognitive achievement itself is only one measure of education. A low dropout rate is another. A low unemployment rate among graduates is another.
Less susceptible of exact measurement, but equally important are the intangible factors. Good sportsmanship, Brotherhood, Courtesy, Loyalty, Integrity, these are all proper objects of the parental educational mission.
And since the public school is primarily a cooperative extension of the familial responsibility to the education of children, the success of the school *60will be measured in the same terms as the success of the parents.
A law abiding semi-literate taxpayer may indeed be a greater credit to his family and his school than a highly articulate rapist.
The distinction between public education and other municipal functions and concerns, relied upon in Serrano, supra, is more rhetorical than logical or legal.
Every local unit of government has a different tax base. Every community in Michigan has a different state equalized valuation of taxable property behind each policeman, fireman, elected official and municipal employee.
Indeed, every county has a different tax base standing behind each lawyer appointed to represent an indigent defendant. The fundamental nature of that expenditure of tax dollars is hardly open to dispute. And yet we have not said that the representation of indigents is a function of the wealth of the community.
And if education is to be distinguished from other municipal concerns, an argument can be made that public education is too fundamental, in terms of its impact on children and its need to be sensitive to local values, to be operated as a single, state-wide amalgam.
Support of local schools by local taxation is a principle qualitatively different from the bare concept of local control.
It is the difference between delegated, agency decision-making and proprietary interest and authority.
The right of the people in a school district to operate local public schools for the purpose of fulfilling locally defined goals is the moral consequence of their own millage elections. It is not a *61privilege extended by sufferance of the state or delegated by reason of administrative expediency perceived by state officials.
PRECEDENTS AND TRENDS
At the outset of this opinion, reference was made to several actions in state and Federal courts, both decided and pending.
Our duty as judicial officers requires obedience to the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in all matters of interpretation and application of Federal constitutional standards.
Discussion of some of those cases is in order.
The first of these is McInnis v Shapiro, 293 F Supp 327 (ND Ill, 1968). Decided by a three-judge panel in the Federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois in November of 1968, McInnis was the earliest of the school financing cases.
There, the court held that the Illinois school financing system, comprised in part of local real property taxation was not in conflict with the due process or equal protection provisions of the Federal Constitution.
In March of 1969, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the district court in McInnis v Ogilvie, 394 US 322; 89 S Ct 1197; 22 L Ed 2d 308, in a per curiam, memorandum opinion. Mr. Justice Douglas felt that probable jurisdiction should have been noted.
In May of 1969, Burruss v Wilkerson, 310 F Supp 572 (WD Va, 1969), was decided by a three-judge panel in the United States district court for the Western District of Virginia. That court cited Mclnnis and came to the same conclusion.
In February of 1970, Burruss also reached the United States Supreme Court, aff'd mem, 397 US *6244; 90 S Ct 812; 25 L Ed 2d 37 (1970), with same per curiam result as Mclnnis. This time, Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice White favored noting probable jurisdiction.
Thereafter, in September of 1970, the California Court of Appeals in Serrano v Priest, 10 Cal App 3d 1110; 89 Cal Rptr 345, similarly held that no cause for constitutional complaint was stated, citing McInnis.
In August of 1971, the Supreme Court of California decided Serrano v Priest, 5 Cal 3d 584, 617; 487 P2d 1241, 1265; 96 Cal Rptr 601, 625, for the first time holding that the equal protection guarantee of the United States Constitution invalidated the California school financing system, insofar as the same relied upon local property taxation.
The Serrano Court distinguished Mclnnis in this way,
"the Mclnnis plaintiffs repeatedly emphasized 'educational needs’ as the proper standard for measuring school financing against the equal protection clause. * * * 99
and then concluded,
"in fact, the nonjusticiability of the 'educational needs’ standard was the basis for the Mclnnis holding; the district court’s additional treatment of the substantive issues was pure dictum.”
The Serrano view of Mclnnis was inaccurate. It was not the Mclnnis plaintiffs who emphasized "educational needs,” but the Mclnnis court which thus characterized the thrust of the plaintiffs’ argument.
"The underlying rationale of the complaint is that only a financing system which apportions public funds *63according to the educational needs of the students satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment.” McInnis v Shapiro, supra, p 331.
In truth, the Mclnnis plaintiffs made almost the identical argument as the Serrano plaintiffs. That argument was considered and decided by the Mclnnis court, not as dictum, but as the controlling reason for decision.
Thus,
"Moreover, under the equal protection clause, the students contend that the importance of education to the welfare of individuals and the nation requires the courts to invalidate the legislation if potential, alternative statutes incorporating the desirable aspects of the present system can also achieve substantially equal per pupil expenditures.13
* * *
The McInnis plaintiffs, like those in Serrano, relied upon Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483; 74 S Ct 686; 98 L Ed 873 (1954), Douglas v California, 372 US 353; 83 S Ct 814; 9 L Ed 2d 811 (1963), and Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506 (1964), but the court in Mclnnis concluded,
"But the plaintiffs’ conclusion does not follow so readily from the preceding building blocks.” McInnis v Shapiro, supra, p 334.
Moreover, the Serrano Court found it necessary to disregard the apparent mandate of the United States Supreme Court in both the Mclnnis and *64Burruss per curiam affirmances. It concluded that such affirmances were not really affirmances because made without oral argument or citation of case precedent.
The first Federal court to come to a result opposite from Mclnnis was the district court for Minnesota in Van Dusartz v Hatfield, 334 F Supp 870 (D Minn, 1971). No three-judge panel was convened in Van Dusartz. The reported decision of the district judge was a memorandum and order upon motion to dismiss in the nature of demurrer.
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the district judge was presented with the necessity of assuming certain allegations to be true for the purpose of deciding the motion to dismiss. One of those uncontroverted assumptions was:
"The districts having the lowest per-pupil expenditure, which are generally the poorest districts in terms of assessed valuation per-pupil unit, offer an education that is inferior to the districts having the highest per-pupil expenditures.” Van Dusartz v Hatfield, supra, p 874.
In Van Dusartz, the district judge subscribed to the reasoning of Serrano, that education is a fundamental interest; that the Minnesota school financing system made the quality of education a function of wealth; that wealth is a suspect classification; that where a fundamental right is denied on the basis of a suspect classification, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest in the classification, and that no such compelling interest was demonstrated in view of suggested alternatives.
The Van Dusartz court was not faced with the problem of remedy. The case has since been dismissed.
*65The same line of reasoning was followed two months later by a three-judge panel of the district court for the Western District of Texas in Rodriguez v San Antonio Independent School Dist, 337 F Supp 280 (WD Tex, 1971).
Unlike Van Dusartz, Rodriguez was a judgment based upon a full factual hearing. While the Texas school financing laws bear much resemblance to our own, the facts found in that case are in many respects different from the facts found by the trial judge in the case at bar.
The Rodriguez court observed that median family income in the several school districts was proved at the trial. It pointed to expert testimony to the effect that the system tends to subsidize the rich at the expense of the poor. It concluded that the "rich” districts had 8% minority pupils, and the "poor” districts were 79% minority.
In Rodriguez, the court assumes without discussion that the amount of money spent on schools is the measure of the quality of education provided, and then concludes:
"Having determined that the current system of financing public education in Texas discriminates on the basis of wealth by permitting citizens of affluent districts to provide a higher quality education for their children, while paying lower taxes, * * * .” p 285.
In our case, there is no evidence of median family income; no suggestion of racial or minority discrimination; no factual basis to conclude that rich people are subsidized by poor people in the educational system. Quite to the contrary, exhibits introduced at trial show that many of Michigan’s richest school districts are in industrial and commercial areas where resident'income is modest.
Furthermore, unlike the Rodriguez court, this *66Court may not assume a direct relationship between "quality” of education and tax base. Evidence was produced at the hearing of this cause which tended to prove that no such relationship existed, and there was no affirmative finding to the contrary.
Finally, the Rodriguez court avoided the problem of judicially manageable standards and judicial remedy by staying its mandate for two years. Its conclusion then is hardly more forceful than the fond hope expressed by the Burruss court that the Legislature would act to improve the system.
In January of 1972, Spano v Board of Education of Lakeland Central School Dist #1, Town of Yorktown, 68 Misc. 2d 804; 328 NYS2d 229 (1972), was decided. The work of a single state nisi prius judge, Spano is notable mostly for its acid disagreement with the Serrano Court’s distinguishment of Mclnnis and Burruss. Spano concludes that the United States Supreme Court has spoken via its per curiam affirmance in those two cases, and the matter is settled.
Subsequently, of course, that august body has noted probable jurisdiction in Rodriguez. Whether that fact portends reversal or affirmance is not for us to speculate.
One last case deserves mention, for it represents a slightly different aspect of the school financing problem.
In May of 1970, a three-judge panel in the United States district court for the Middle District of Florida in Hargrave v Kirk, 313 F Supp 944 (MD Fla, 1970), held the Florida Millage Rollback Law to be unconstitutional. The Millage Rollback Law denied state aid to any district which levied more than 10 mills of ad valorem property taxes, even on vote of the people. The court in effect held *67the people in the districts had a right to tax themselves.
The court pointed out,
"The Florida Act prevents the local Boards from adequately financing their children’s education. The complaint is not that the state permits the Boards to spend less, but that it requires them to spend less. Plaintiffs are asking to be able to raise more money locally. In McInnis the plaintiffs wanted the state to give them more. Irrespective of the plaintiffs’ successful attack on the Act, we know that there will continue to be disparities in per pupil expenditures in Florida, either because some counties may not desire to spend as much as other counties on the education of their children, or because, in the poorer counties, they cannot. Plaintiffs do not contest the variations in per pupil expenditures from these causes, but only 'the unequal impediment placed on us by the state because we are poor.’ We consider this to be a fundamental distinction between the cases.” Hargrave v Kirk, supra, p 949.
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded Hargrave on two grounds. Askew v Hargrave, 401 US 476; 91 S Ct 856; 28 L Ed 2d 196 (1971). First, that the case was a proper one for Federal judicial abstention, and second, that the pleadings and affidavit were inadequate as a basis for deciding the equal protection claim.
Askew is of little help, except as it may demonstrate a disposition in Washington to proceed with caution in the area of invalidating state school financing systems.
In my opinion, the Michigan public school financing system has not been demonstrated to constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws under the state or Federal Constitution. I would dismiss the action, without costs.
Black, J., concurred with T. E. Brennan, J.

 Those courts having reached a result are: Serrano v Priest, 5 Cal 3d 584; 487 P2d 1241; 96 Cal Rptr 601 (1971); Robinson v Cahill, 118 NJ Super 223; 287 A2d 187 (1972); Spano v Board of Education of Lakeland Central School Dist #1, Town of Yorktown, 68 Misc. 2d 804; 328 NYS2d 229 (1972); Hollins v Shofstall (Arizona Superior Court for Maricopa County, 1972); McInnis v Shapiro, 293 F Supp 327 (ND Ill, 1969), aff'd mem sub nom, McInnis v Ogilvie, 394 US 322; 89 S Ct 1197; 22 L Ed 2d 308 (1969); Burruss v Wilkerson, 310 F Supp 572 (WD Va, 1969), aff'd mem, 397 US 44; 90 S Ct 812; 25 L Ed 2d 37 (1970); Hargrave v Kirk, 313 F Supp 944 (MD Fla, 1970); Askew v Hargrave, 401 US 476; 91 S Ct 856; 28 L Ed 2d 196 (1971), vacating judgment and remanding Hargrave v Kirk; Van Dusartz v HatSeld, 334 F Supp 870 (D Minn, 1971); Rodriguez v San Antonio Independent School Dist, 337 F Supp 280 (WD Tex, 1971). Additionally, there have been approximately 23 cases filed in 15 states as of January 1972. See "Appendix” 7 Harv Civil Rights L Rev 103, 200 (1972).

 San Antonio Independent School Dist v Rodriguez, 406 US 966; 92 S Ct 2413; 32 L Ed 2d 665 (1972).

 Const 1850, art 13, §3.

 1972 PA, No 258, amends this section to read as follows:
"Sec. 21. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, from the amount appropriated in section 11 there is allocated to every district a sum determined as provided in subsection (2) plus the amounts allocated for transportation in chapter 7 and tuition in chapter 11.
"(2) The sum allocated to each school district shall be computed from the following table:
"State equalized valuation behind each child Gross Allowance Deductible Millage
"(a) $17,750.00 or more $644.00 16
"(b) Less than $17,750.00 $715.00 20”

 The grandfather clause has been eliminated in 1972 PA 258.

 "Thus, the students advocate a doctrine similar to the close scrutiny given laws which infringe First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Kevishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963).” McInnis v Shapiro, supra, p 331.