Court Opinion

ID: 9583054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:28.529626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:50.568183
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
Although I generally agree with the majority’s analysis of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986), and Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995), I cannot agree with its application of the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.
The majority affirms the trial court’s ruling that the defendants’ exercise of their peremptory strike against prospective juror no. 18 was racially motivated, because the secondary reason given by defense counsel in support of that strike “provided the trial court with at least some evidence that the strike was racially motivated.” Even if this were so, “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (68 SC 525, 92 LE 746) (1948).
Here, the attorneys for both defendants gave as their reason for removing juror no. 18 that they did not want any accountants on the jury. They explained why. Facts stated in the majority opinion show that this was a compelling race-neutral justification for the strike and that the State’s attempt at rebuttal failed.
As a secondary reason, Bonita Joseph’s counsel offered that this juror might have developed a bias in favor of the judge as a result of his prior service as an alternate juror. The record reflects some animosity between this attorney and the trial judge, and counsel stated that “if we wind up in controversy, I don’t want him to come against my client because the juror has already been before Your Honor on another case.” After this ancillary basis was described by the court as “ridiculous” and by the prosecution as “strong[ly] pretextual,” John Joseph’s attorney stated that he too did not “like any juror that’s already been in the same courtroom.”
The prosecuting attorney later argued that Bonita Joseph’s attorney’s second reason for this peremptory strike (the venireman’s prior jury service) was pretextual. When counsel again attempted to justify his fear as a basis for the strike, the court found that reason *405pretextual and ordered the juror reseated even though counsel reminded the court of the primary reason: that this juror was a CPA. John Joseph’s attorney elaborated that the CPA was a “[p]artner in a firm that represents small clients in closely held corporations” in dealings with the IRS and with the medical agency in supplying information. Counsel’s opinion was that the juror would favor the State, considering the particular issues and the nature of the case, to be tried. Counsel observed, “The anger sparked between [the court] and [Bonita Joseph’s attorney] . . . has caused this juror to be on there. . . . [I]t’s going to hurt us tremendously.” Bonita Joseph’s attorney reiterated, “It would appear that my co-counsel, co-defendant, is going to be blaming an accountant or accountants for some of the problems that have arisen. . . . We are flying in the face of an accountant that will be on the jury. That accountant’s reaction will be, ‘Yeah, see, they blamed somebody else, they blamed us.’ That’s the reasons why [co-counsel] and I discussed this, wrote it down as being a strike. Also, the record will reflect, if this particular individual indicated that there was a Medicaid waste and abuse and that was a particular problem that he had — was aware of and bothered him. Your Honor, when you strike every single person that is involved in the accounting field, across the board, black and white, I suggest it is not pretextual. . . .”
Decided March 20, 1998
Steven H. Sadow, for appellant (case no. A97A1774).
W. Michael Maloof, for appellant (case no. A97A1775).
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Charles M. Richards, *406Senior Assistant Attorney General, Nancy B. Allstrom, Assistant Attorney General, J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, for appellee.
*405In this case, unlike Purkett, supra, the proponent of the peremptory strike articulated a justification that was not only race-neutral but also unquestionably affected the venireman’s ability to discharge his duties as a juror. There exists no basis for finding this explanation pretextual. The record shows that the trial court nonetheless found the strike to have been exercised in a racially discriminatory manner solely because the secondary reason propounded by counsel, though not racially suspect, was implausible. Regardless of legitimacy vel non of defendants’ additional reason for removing this juror, it did not dilute the force of their primary reason or tend to show that the strike was racially motivated. The trial court’s finding that the prosecution carried its burden of proving that the strike in question was racially motivated is clearly erroneous.