Court Opinion

ID: 9840113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 07:09:55.017367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:53.922922
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-22-00289-CR
                              __________________

                    CHARLES BRETT BOREN, Appellant

                                        V.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
                       Jefferson County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. 13-18230
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In 2013, a grand jury indicted Appellant Charles Brett Boren for delivery of a

controlled substance (namely methamphetamine) in an amount of one gram or more

but less than four grams, a second-degree felony. See Tex. Health & Safety Code

Ann. § 481.112(c). The indictment alleged as follows:

      . . . Charles Brett Boren, hereinafter styled the Defendant, on or about
      the 4th day of June, two thousand and thirteen, . . . did then and there
      intentionally and knowingly deliver by actual transfer to Shawn Wilson
      a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1 of the Texas Controlled
      Substances Act, namely methamphetamine, by aggregate weight,

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      including any adulterants and dilutants, in an amount of at least one (1)
      gram or more and less than four (4) grams[.]

      In a plea agreement, Boren pleaded guilty to the offense and waived his right

to a jury trial. The trial court found Boren guilty, deferred adjudication, placed Boren

on community supervision for eight years, and assessed a fine of $1000.

      In April 2016, the State filed a Motion to Revoke Unadjudicated Probation,

and in March 2022, the State filed a First Amended Motion to Revoke Unadjudicated

Probation, both alleging that Boren violated the terms of his community supervision.

On June 9, 2022, the State filed a Second Amended Motion to Revoke

Unadjudicated Probation, alleging Boren committed eight violations of the terms of

his community supervision. At a hearing on August 4, 2022, Boren acknowledged

that he had previously pleaded true to one allegation (the sixth alleged violation) in

the motion to revoke, which alleged the following:

      . . . Boren provided a urine sample on or about the 29th day of March,
      2022, for scientific analysis that showed the presence of the metabolic
      by-products of Methamphetamine and Amphetamines, in violation of
      Condition (10) of Defendant’s Deferred Adjudication order.

At the hearing, the State announced it had abandoned the first three allegations, and

the State presented evidence in support of the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged

violations. 1 After hearing evidence, the trial court found Boren violated the terms of

      1
         Although Boren does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding that Boren violated the terms of his community
supervision, we note that Boren pleaded “true” to one of the alleged violations of the
                                           2
his community supervision, found him guilty of the second-degree offense of

delivery of a controlled substance (namely methamphetamines), and imposed

punishment at ten years’ confinement. Boren timely filed an appeal. We reform the

judgment in two respects: to correct a clerical error referencing the wrong subsection

of Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112, and to eliminate surplusage on page

two of the judgment referencing a fine that was not orally pronounced in Boren’s

sentencing hearing. Otherwise, we overrule Boren’s issues and affirm the judgment

as explained below.

                                 Boren’s Sentence

      In issues one, two, and three, Boren argues that, according to the Order of

Deferred Adjudication, Boren pleaded guilty to the offense of delivery of a

controlled substance (methamphetamine) under section 481.112(b) of the Texas

Health & Safety Code, a state jail felony carrying a maximum two-year sentence.

Based on this premise, Boren contends that his ten-year sentence resulting from the

revocation of his community supervision was reversible error because the ten-year

sentence imposed was in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction, the two-year

sentence had already expired when his community supervision was revoked, and that

conditions of his community supervision and proof of a single violation is sufficient
to support revocation. See Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). Accordingly, we need not discuss herein the evidence submitted by the State
on the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged violations.
                                           3
re-sentencing him after the first sentence expired violated the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

      Boren’s argument is premised on what appears to be clerical errors in the

Order of Deferred Adjudication and in the Judgment Adjudicating Guilt. First, the

Order of Deferred Adjudication erroneously lists the “Statute for Offense” as section

481.112(b) of the Health and Safety Code, 2 instead of section 481.112(c) as alleged

in the indictment. Boren pleaded guilty to the indictment which tracked the language

in section 481.112(c). Second, the Order of Deferred Adjudication erroneously lists

the “Degree of Offense” as “State Jail Felony[,]” when an offense under 481.112(c)

is a felony. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(c). Third, although the

Judgment Adjudicating Guilt correctly notes that the “Degree of Offense[]” is a “2nd

Degree Felony[,]” the judgment then incorrectly lists the “Statute for Offense[]” as

“481.112(b)” instead of “481.112(c)[.]”

      Boren incorrectly assumes that these clerical errors (instead of the language

of the indictment, Boren’s plea of guilty to that language, and the trial court’s oral

pronouncement finding Boren guilty as charged), control. When guilt is adjudicated

upon a violation of a condition of community supervision, the order adjudicating

      2
         Section 481.112(b) provides that “[a]n offense under Subsection (a) is a state
jail felony if the amount of the controlled substance to which the offense applies is,
by aggregate weight, including adulterants or dilutants, less than one gram.” Tex.
Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(b).
                                           4
guilt sets aside the order deferring adjudication. Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497,

501-02 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Further, the trial court’s oral pronouncements at the

revocation hearing control when they vary from the written judgment adjudicating

guilt. Id. at 500, 502. As for the clerical error in the Judgment Adjudicating Guilt

referencing the incorrect subsection of section 481.112 of the Texas Health and

Safety Code for the statue of offense, this Court has the authority to reform the trial

court’s judgment to correct clerical errors. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v.

State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We therefore reform the trial

court’s Judgment Adjudicating Guilt to delete “481.112(b)” as the “Statute for

Offense[]” and substitute “481.112(c).” We overrule issues one, two, and three.

                             One Thousand Dollar Fine

      In issue four, Boren argues that the trial court abused its discretion in assessing

a $1000 fine because there was no oral pronouncement of a fine at the revocation

proceeding, and the judgment should be reformed to delete the fine. In issue five,

Boren argues that it was reversible error to impose the fine when the fine was not

orally pronounced and because Boren was indigent. In issue six, Boren challenges

the legal sufficiency of the evidence at the revocation proceeding supporting the fine

because there was no oral pronouncement of the fine at revocation. In issue seven,

he argues that the judgment adjudicating guilt should be reformed to delete the fine

                                           5
or, in the alternative, that the judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded

for further proceedings.

      No fine is stated on the first page of the Judgment Adjudicating Guilt. We

agree that the trial court did not orally pronounce a fine at the time of revocation.

Boren appears to assert that the following language at the top of page two of the

judgment imposes a $1000 fine:

             After hearing and considering the evidence presented by both
      sides, the Court FINDS THE FOLLOWING: (1) The Court previously
      found Defendant qualified for deferred adjudication community
      supervision; (2) The Court deferred further proceedings, made no
      finding of guilt, and rendered no judgment; (3) The Court issued an
      order placing Defendant on deferred adjudication community
      supervision for a period of EIGHT (8) YEARS; (4) The Court assessed
      a fine of $1000.00; (5) While on deferred adjudication community
      supervision, Defendant violated the conditions of community
      supervision, as set out in the State’s AMENDED Motion to Adjudicate
      Guilt, as follows:
      CONDITION: TEN (10)

            Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the State’s Motion to
      Adjudicate. FINDING that the Defendant committed the offense
      indicated above, the Court ADJUDGES Defendant GUILTY of the
      offense. The Court FINDS that the Presentence Investigation, if so
      ordered, was done according to the applicable provisions of Subchapter
      F, Chapter 42A, Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

             The Court ORDERS Defendant punished as indicated above.
      After having conducted an inquiry into Defendant’s ability to pay, the
      Court ORDERS Defendant to pay the fines, court costs, reimbursement
      fees, and restitution as indicated above.

                                         6
The judgment then reflects “Confinement in State Jail of Institutional Division” as

the “Punishment Option[]” selected, and under the section titled “Fines Imposed

Include[,]” no specific fine is selected.

      The trial court included the words “(4) The Court assessed a fine of

$1000.00[]” as the fine imposed at the time of the deferred adjudication, and as part

of its summary of the procedural history of the case. We conclude these words are

surplusage and we reform the judgment to delete the language “(4) The Court

assessed a fine of $1000.00” on the top of page two of the judgment. We sustain

issue four in part, and we need not address issues five, six, and seven. See Tex. R.

App. P. 43.2(b); Valdez v. State, No. 09-22-00148-CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 8915,

at **5-7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (reforming judgment to delete almost identical surplusage).

                             Assessment of Certain Fees

      In issues eight, nine, and ten, Boren argues the trial court violated the Eighth

Amendment and the Separation of Powers Clause of the U.S. Constitution by

assessing fees and costs that have been repealed, and that the trial court violated the

Eighth Amendment and abused its discretion by imposing “fees and expenses” that

have been repealed. Specifically, Boren argues that the $133 itemized charge for the

“State of Texas – (§133.102 CCP)” on the “District Court Commitment” that

itemizes total fines and costs was an error because the “comprehensive

                                            7
rehabilitation” and “abused children’s counseling[]” charges that he asserts must

have been a part of the $133 charge and were “outlawed by Salinas v. State, 523

S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)], and that the $133 cost should be “reduced to

$119.93, after removing charges for these two accounts outlawed by Salinas[.]” He

also argues that the Crime Stopper’s Fee of $50 assessed should be reimbursed.

      In Salinas v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that two of the

accounts listed in section 133.102(e) of the Texas Local Government Code, violated

the separation-of-powers clause of the Texas Constitution because they were not

related to a legitimate criminal-justice purpose and were instead more accurately

characterized as a tax. See Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 108-10 (striking down subsections

(e)(1) and (e)(6), which allocated portions of the $133 court cost to comprehensive

rehabilitation and abused children’s counseling). The remedy in Salinas was to

modify the judgment to reduce the $133 consolidated court cost to $119.93 to delete

the unconstitutional portions of the fee. Id. at 110-11.

      However, the Salinas Court limited the application of its decision to only

certain defendants: (1) those who had raised the appropriate claim in a petition for

discretionary review filed before, and still pending on, the date of the court’s

opinion, and (2) those whose trials end after the court’s mandate in Salinas issued.

Id. at 111-13. The Court further stated that if the Legislature redirected the funds in

subsections (e)(1) and (e)(6) to a legitimate criminal-justice purpose, then trial courts

                                           8
could continue to collect the entire consolidated court cost. Id. at 113 n.54. The Court

noted that, if the Legislature amended the statute before the mandate in Salinas

issued, “the only cases that will be affected by this opinion will be the few that are

now pending in this Court and are appropriate for relief.” Id.

      The Legislature amended the statute before the mandate issued in Salinas and

deleted former subsections (e)(1) and (e)(6) and redirected those funds to the fair

defense account in former subsection (e)(14) (now subsection (e)(12)). See Act of

May 18, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, § 1, 2017 Tex. Gen Laws 463 (codified at

Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 133.102(e)). That amendment went into effect on June

15, 2017, before the mandate issued in Salinas on June 30, 2017. Id.; see Garrett v.

State, No. 03-17-00031-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 8289, at **3-4 (Tex. App.—

Austin Aug. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (observing

that effective date of amendment preceded the date of the Salinas mandate and

noting impact on imposition of consolidated court cost fee pursuant to amended

consolidated fee statute); Hurtado v. State, No. 02-16-00436-CR, 2017 Tex. App.

LEXIS 7034, at **2-4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (same).

      In the present case, the bill of costs shows that the $133 consolidated court

costs fee was assessed upon appellant’s adjudication of guilt on August 4, 2022—

after the effective date of the amended statute, which preceded the issuance of the

                                           9
Salinas mandate. Because the Legislature timely amended the consolidated fee

statute, the trial court was authorized to impose the entire consolidated court cost fee

as provided under section 133.102(a). See Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 113 n.54.

Accordingly, the court’s holding in Salinas does not apply here. See id. The trial

court properly imposed the $133 consolidated court costs fee.

      As for the $50 Crime Stopper’s Fee that Boren complains of, the bill of costs

upon revocation does not reflect such a fee was assessed. To the extent Boren is

challenging the court costs imposed when the trial court deferred his adjudication of

guilt and placed him on community supervision, Boren waived that right when he

failed to file a timely appeal from the order the trial court used when it placed him

on deferred adjudication. See Perez v. State, 424 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (failing to file a timely appeal of the assessment of costs in deferred-

adjudication order forfeits “any appellate complaint” regarding those costs). We

overrule issues eight, nine, and ten.

                               Credit for Time Served

      In issue eleven, Boren argues the trial court erred in not awarding Boren “full

time credit for his time spent undergoing rehabilitation with Cenikor” as part of

Boren’s sentence. Boren acknowledges that the Judgment Adjudicating Guilt

credited him with 921 days for the dates set out in the judgment, but he argues that

he was not credited for time spent participating in Cenikor for “at least the period

                                          10
running from December 15, 2015 through December 16, 2016” and for time that

may not have been credited him for successfully completing a substance abuse

felony punishment facility (SAFPF) program. 3

      Boren was entitled to receive credit for time spent in a substance abuse

treatment facility operated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice under

section 493.009 of the Texas Government Code or any other court ordered

residential program or facility as a condition of his deferred adjudication community

supervision granted if Boren successfully completed the treatment program at that

facility. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 42.03, § 2(a)(2), 42A.755(d). We have

authority to modify the trial court’s judgment to make the record speak the truth

when we have the necessary data and information to do so. See Tex. R. App. P.

43.2(b); see also Warren v. State, No. 12-17-00363-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS

3674, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (because the appellate court had the necessary information, it modified

the judgment to credit appellant for dates the record showed appellant spent in

SAFPF that had not been credited in the judgment). In this case, however, the record

does not establish that Boren successfully completed treatment at Cenikor. Also,

Boren has not established, nor does the record reflect, the specific dates that he spent

      3
       On appeal, Boren does not state what dates he participated in a SAFPF
program, but he states he “may have been partially credited[]” for time spent in that
program.
                                       11
in SAFPF that were not included in the time credited in the Judgment Adjudicating

Guilt. Accordingly, we overrule issue eleven.

                                   Drug Treatment

      In issues twelve, thirteen, and fourteen, Boren argues that, instead of

sentencing Boren to prison, the trial court should have evaluated drug treatment or

rehabilitation alternatives for Boren because he was a non-violent offender with

chronic diabetes, “high security” drug treatment was appropriate because he was

“consistently an informant[,]” and that Boren has a “right to treatment in the least

restrictive alternative environment[.]”

      Once sufficient evidence is presented of a violation of a community service

condition, the trial court has broad discretion in choosing whether to continue,

modify, or revoke the community supervision. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts.

42A.751(d), 42A.752(a), 42A.755(a); Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex.

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). Boren pleaded “true” to the sixth alleged violation of

the conditions of his community supervision. Because a plea of “true” to any one

violation will support revocation of community supervision, revocation was within

the trial court’s discretion. 4 See Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 31 n.2 (Tex. Crim.

      4
        As noted herein, the trial court, after hearing evidence, found “true” three of
the other alleged violations (the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged violations) that
were not abandoned by the State. On appeal, Boren does not challenge those
findings.
                                           12
App. 2015); Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26. And the sentence imposed was within the

range provided in the Penal Code for this offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 12.33(a) (“An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the second degree shall be

punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for any term

of not more than 20 years or less than 2 years.”). We overrule issues twelve, thirteen,

and fourteen.

      To summarize, we reform the Judgment to reference Health and Safety Code

section 481.112(c), rather than section 481.112(b). We further reform the judgment

to delete the language “(4) The Court assessed a fine of $1000.00” on the top of page

two of the judgment. Otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as reformed.

      AFFIRMED AS REFORMED.

                                                          LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                               Justice

Submitted on June 30, 2023
Opinion Delivered September 13, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

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