Court Opinion

ID: 9716871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:52:57.888002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:49.582602
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Justice SCOTT,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur with the majority on all other issues, I respectfully dissent from the issue of whether Byron Pruitt was murdered during the commission of a First-Degree Burglary.
The majority relies on Baker v. Commonwealth, 860 S.W.2d 760 (Ky.1993), in support of its holding on the definition of “immediate flight,” but distinguishes the facts of the Baker case from the facts of this case to overturn the jury’s verdict.
“It seems clear that the aggravating factors in the first-degree-burglary statute *435were enacted to punish those who harm or threaten harm to those at the scene of a burglary. The statute does not limit itself to consideration of acts which take place within the curtilage of the dwelling being burglarized, but is written to protect occupants, neighbors, and passers-by.” Baker at 761-762. I don’t read any language in Baker to suggest that “immediate flight” has to be the cookie cutter burglary suggested by the majority, i.e., “in and out” of a building, without deviation.
Not only does Baker recognize the statute’s intention to protect people like Byron Pruitt, it also recognizes that the question of whether a death occurs during an immediate flight is one for the trier of fact. Furthermore, Baker relies on several like cases from outside this jurisdiction, including People v. Ruiz, 136 A.D.2d 493, 523 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1988), for the presumption that a burglar can arm himself at anytime during the immediate flight from the dwelling and that a defendant may be properly convicted of First-Degree Burglary in that instance. Id. at 762. Interestingly, the Ruiz case goes on to hold, in no uncertain terms, that “[t]he question of whether an act takes place in ‘immediate flight’ from a felony is generally left to the sound discretion of the jury pursuant to an appropriate charge.” Id. at 495, 523 N.Y.S.2d 814; citing People v. Gladman, 41 N.Y.2d 123, 390 N.Y.S.2d 912, 359 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y.1976) (felon held to have been in “immediate flight” some 15 minutes after and one-half mile away from the scene of a robbery); see also People v. Sturgis, 112 A.D.2d 757, 492 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1985) (suspect apprehended in New Jersey after burglary in New York; questions regarding causation and whether the deaths occurred in the course of “immediate flight” from the commission of the burglary were questions of fact for the jury).
The Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to overcome a directed verdict on the First-Degree Burglary charge and therefore its use as an aggravating sentencing factor in the murder of Pruitt was error. In evaluating the evidence presented at trial, in conjunction with the standard for a directed verdict in Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991) (under the evidence as a whole and assuming the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, then directed verdict warranted), the trial court acted properly in overruling the Appellant’s motion for directed verdict and the jury was entitled to decide the issue.
The jury knew of the burglary at Zeig-ler’s house, believed it was the Appellant and knew Pruitt was killed soon thereafter, close to the scene of the burglary. Thus in any event, facts were available from which the jury could reasonably believe Pruitt was killed by the Appellant while in “immediate flight” — even under the standard adopted by the majority opinion. What the majority opinion does however, is require the jury to believe the Appellant’s witnesses “that immediate flight” had ceased. However, this itself is error since the jury is not required to believe the testimony of any particular witness, see Davis v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 53, 109 S.W.2d 2, 3 (1937); a point which the majority now mandates. During their deliberation, the jury sought guidance from the trial court on the issue of “immediate flight” and was properly instructed by the trial court to evaluate the evidence presented and according to the tendered instructions, make a determination as to whether Byron Pruitt was killed during the commission of a First-Degree Burglary. The jury did just that and, absent some error not asserted in this appeal, we should not disturb the jury’s verdict.
*436Further, I do not find anything m a plain reading of KRS 511.020 to suggest a burglary is complete, or finished, if a perpetrator, intends to and does, return to the scene of the burglary to finish the job, fifteen to twenty minutes later; so as to retrieve his burglary tools — in order to complete the escape.
Just as the Appellant’s return to 9000 Grand Point Court to retrieve the generator he stole was the completion of his initial burglary, his return to 7613 Par-kridge Trace to get his tool box would have been the completion of his second burglary, and the attempted return to complete this second burglary resulted in the death of an innocent man.
Not having completed the burglary, and intent on hanging around to re-acquire his burglary tools from the scene, he was still in “immediate flight.” The fact that he had to get another driver did not end the “immediate flight.” Under facts such as these, “immediate flight” should never be held to end until the perpetrator completes or gives up on the burglary and finally attempts to flee the scene to apparent safety. That did not happen here, as the death of Mr. Pruitt proves.
I would hold that the Appellant was still in the course of his “immediate flight” from the Zeigler’s home when he killed Pruitt. The Appellant failed to present any rational argument sufficient to warrant disturbing the jury’s verdict on the facts of this case. Thus, I would affirm the Appellant’s convictions and sentences on all counts.
LAMBERT, C.J., and WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins this opinion.