Court Opinion

ID: 9945461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 21:00:45.982306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:29.843180
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1339     Doc: 49        Filed: 02/26/2024   Pg: 1 of 20

                                            PUBLISHED

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                             No. 23-1339

        PETER D. PROTOPAPAS, as the Receiver for Payne & Keller Company on behalf
        of Payne and Keller Company,

                           Plaintiff - Appellee,

                    v.

        TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY, f/k/a Aetna Casualty &
        Surety Company,

                           Defendant - Appellant,

                    and

        ZURICH     AMERICAN     INSURANCE    COMPANY,  CONTINENTAL
        INSURANCE COMPANY, NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
        OF PITTSBURGH, PA; MEDMARC CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY;
        BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, f/k/a
        Stonewall Insurance Company; LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY;
        CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S OF LONDON AND VARIOUS
        LONDON MARKET COMPANIES; SOUTH CAROLINA PROPERTY AND
        CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION; FIRST STATE
        INSURANCE COMPANY; BIRMINGHAM FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,

                           Defendants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Columbia. Donald C. Coggins, Jr., District Judge. (3:21-cv-04086-DCC)

        Argued: January 25, 2024                                 Decided: February 26, 2024
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        Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

        Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
        Diaz joined. Judge Wynn wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.

        ARGUED: Harry Lee, STEPTOE LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. David B.
        Salmons, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON
        BRIEF: Kevin A. Hall, M. Todd Carroll, Columbia, South Carolina, M. Elizabeth O’Neill,
        WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. John
        B. White, Jr., Marghretta Hagood Shisko, JOHN B. WHITE, JR., P.A. LAW FIRM,
        Spartanburg, South Carolina; Jonathan McLean Robinson, Shanon N. Peake, SMITH
        ROBINSON HOLLER DUBOSE & MORGAN, LLC, Sumter, South Carolina; Bryan M.
        Killian, Amanda L. Salz, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C.; Brian
        Montgomery Barnwell, RIKARD & PROTOPAPAS, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for
        Appellee.

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        NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

               Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, which had removed this case from state

        court to federal court, challenges the district court’s order remanding it back to state court

        pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

               A South Carolina court-appointed receiver brought this action against Travelers and

        other insurers on behalf of a defunct company within a state receivership, alleging breaches

        of insurance policies issued to the company, and Travelers removed the action to federal

        court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

        The district court, however, granted the receiver’s motion to remand, holding (1) that even

        though Travelers invoked diversity jurisdiction under §1332, the court nonetheless lacked

        subject-matter jurisdiction under the doctrine articulated in Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S.

        126 (1881), because the case involved the property of a state receivership that was in the

        exclusive jurisdiction of the state court, and (2) that the removal lacked unanimous consent

        of the defendants because a forum selection clause in insurance policies issued to the

        defunct company by some of the defendants rendered their consent invalid and thus they

        could not join in or consent to removal, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).

               Because the district court’s conclusions in support of remand were at least colorably

        supported, we dismiss this appeal under § 1447(d), which provides that “[a]n order

        remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on

        appeal.” See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 234 (2007)

        (holding that a removal order is not reviewable if the district court “relied upon a ground

        that is colorably characterized” as a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); see also Harvey v.

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        UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Rsrv., 797 F.3d 800, 805 (10th Cir. 2015)

        (holding that the court “will not review the district court’s remand order if it can be

        colorably characterized as grounded” in a procedural defect).

                                                     I

               The Court of Common Pleas in Richland County, South Carolina, invoking its

        equity powers granted by South Carolina Code § 15-65-10(4), created a receivership over

        the South Carolina assets of Payne & Keller Company, a Texas corporation, as well as

        related entities, after Payne & Keller had become defunct. Before the receivership, Payne

        & Keller had been engaged in manufacturing and construction and was facing personal

        injury claims by or on behalf of individuals exposed to asbestos in its products. The state

        court appointed Peter D. Protopapas as the receiver of Payne & Keller and directed him to

        collect all of Payne & Keller’s assets and protect them, subject to order of the court.

        Among other things, the court directed Protopapas “to administer any insurance assets of

        Payne & Keller as well as any claims related to the actions or failure to act of Payne &

        Keller’s insurance carriers” and “to investigate the existence of all insurance coverages

        potentially available to the company in receivership.”        Under South Carolina law,

        Protopapas as a receiver was “an executive officer of the court, to administer the assets of

        the estate under the direction of the court.” In re Fifty-Four First Mortg. Bonds, 15 S.C.

        304, 314 (1881) (quoting Gadsden v. Whaley, 14 S.C. 210, 215 (1880)). He thus held

        possession of Payne & Keller’s assets as an “arm of the court.” In re Am. Slicing Mach.

        Co., 118 S.E. 303, 304 (S.C. 1923).

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               Acting under the authority and control of the South Carolina court, Protopapas, as

        receiver, commenced an action on behalf of Payne & Keller in state court against several

        insurance companies, including Travelers, for coverage of the personal injury claims

        pending against Payne & Keller. Travelers removed the receiver’s action to federal court

        under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In

        doing so, it obtained consents to removal from all other defendant insurance companies,

        except one, which the district court later found to be fraudulently joined to defeat removal

        jurisdiction. Therefore, it appeared that the defendants had unanimously consented to

        removal, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).

               Protopapas filed a motion in the district court to remand the case to state court

        arguing (1) that a forum selection clause in some of the defendants’ insurance policies

        issued to Payne & Keller prevented those companies from consenting to removal, thus

        defeating the unanimous consent required, and (2) that the federal court did not have

        subject-matter jurisdiction over the state receivership under the Barton doctrine.

               The magistrate judge, to whom the case was initially referred, recommended

        granting Protopapas’s motion and remanding on the basis that not all of the defendants had

        consented to the removal. As to the argument under the Barton doctrine, she expressed

        skepticism over whether the doctrine was indeed a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction,

        suggesting that it was instead a prudential limit based on abstention principles.

               The district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s recommendation to remand, but it

        did not affirm all of the magistrate judge’s reasoning. First, the district court concluded

        that the Barton doctrine did indeed preclude removal to federal court because the doctrine

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        “act[ed] as a limitation on federal jurisdiction when a state court ha[d] previously exercised

        its authority by appointing a receiver to handle the administration of property.” (Emphasis

        added). The court explained that “to allow this matter to continue in federal court would

        directly interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of the receivership court over this dispute.”

        In addition to relying on the Barton decision itself, the court also relied on Porter v. Sabin,

        explaining that “it is in the appointing court’s discretion ‘to decide whether it will

        determine for itself all claims of or against the receiver, or will allow them to be litigated

        elsewhere’ and that the appointing court ‘may direct claims in favor of the corporation to

        be sued on by the receiver in other tribunals, or may leave him to adjust and settle them

        without suit.’” (Quoting 149 U.S. 473, 479 (1893)).

               Second, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge that the forum selection

        clause in some of the insurance companies’ policies issued to Payne & Keller precluded

        them from validly consenting to removal such that the removal was not procedurally

        compliant with § 1446(b)(2)(A). The court noted that language very similar to that in the

        clauses before it “ha[d] been widely litigated across this Circuit, with courts consistently

        finding the clause acts as a waiver of an insurer’s right to remove a case from the forum

        selected by the plaintiff,” citing four decisions from courts in the Fourth Circuit, as well as

        three from outside the Circuit.

               From the district court’s remand order dated February 24, 2023, Travelers filed this

        appeal, challenging the correctness of both of the district court’s rulings. Protopapas filed

        a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d),

        which provides that remand orders are “not reviewable on appeal.”

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                                                      II

               Because Protopapas’s motion to dismiss this appeal is based on his claim that we

        lack appellate jurisdiction, we address that motion first.

               Protopapas contends, for the first of his two arguments, that his claims against the

        insurers are assets within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state-receivership court held by

        the receiver as an arm of that court, citing Barton v. Barbour and Porter v. Sabin. He notes

        that the basis for the Barton doctrine is that “federal courts have no jurisdiction over

        property managed by a court-appointed receiver because the property is subject to the

        exclusive jurisdiction of the receivership court for whom the receiver acts,” citing Davis v.

        Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 217–19 (1872); Wiswall v. Sampson, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 52,

        65–66 (1852). And he adds that we have previously recognized that the doctrine is

        jurisdictional. See Conway v. Smith Dev., Inc., 64 F.4th 540, 545 (4th Cir. 2023) (noting

        that “Barton concerns subject-matter jurisdiction” (emphasis added)); McDaniel v. Blust,

        668 F.3d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that the “Supreme Court established in Barton

        that before another court may obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit filed against a

        receiver for acts committed in his official capacity, the plaintiff must obtain leave of the

        court that appointed the receiver” (emphasis added)).

               Travelers contends that Protopapas’s understanding of Barton is too expansive,

        arguing that the doctrine applies only to actions filed against a state-appointed receiver. It

        notes that Barton itself set forth that limitation, recognizing the “general rule that before

        suit is brought against a receiver[,] leave of the court by which he was appointed must be

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        obtained.” Barton, 104 U.S. at 128 (emphasis added). In the case before us, of course, the

        receiver commenced the action.

               Section 1447(d) places “broad restrictions,” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,

        516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995), on the jurisdiction of courts of appeals to review remand orders.

        In enacting this limitation, Congress prioritized finality and efficiency at the expense of

        absolute accuracy, implying a certain level of fungibility of federal and state courts.

        Specifically, the statute provides broadly that, with some exceptions not applicable here,

        “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable

        on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). But the Supreme Court has held that the

        provision is not to be read without limitation. Rather, it explained, the provision “must be

        read in pari materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in

        § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d).” Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at

        127 (citing Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345–46 (1976)). Thus,

        § 1447(d) bars appellate court review of remand orders when they are based on “(1) a

        district court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in removal ‘other than lack

        of subject matter jurisdiction’ that was raised by the motion of a party within 30 days after

        the notice of removal was filed.” Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192,

        196 (4th Cir. 2008).

               When a statute bars appellate review of remand orders — thus defining appellate

        jurisdiction — it arguably prohibits the appellate court from reviewing even whether the

        district court was correct in the substance of the order. Thus, we have noted that the

        § 1447(d) bar stands even when the appellate court believes that the district court’s order

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        may have been “erroneous.” Ellenburg, 519 F.3d at 196 (cleaned up). And Justice

        Kennedy has observed similarly, noting that courts adhere to this limited review even if it

        might be “troubling” to allow an erroneous decision to remain untouched; § 1447(d)

        “leave[s] us no other choice.” Powerex, 551 U.S. at 239 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Indeed,

        as the Supreme Court has noted, it might be enough for the appellate court to deny review

        simply when the district court “purport[s] to remand” for a lack of subject-matter

        jurisdiction by labeling that such is the ground. Id. at 232–33 (emphasis added). But

        because the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction still has to be a basis for a district court’s

        remand order and the appellate court has to be able to so verify when declining to review

        it, the appellate court should take a peek at the district court’s ruling to confirm that fact.

        In doing so, however, it “should be limited to confirming that [the district court’s]

        characterization was colorable,” id. at 234 (emphasis added), i.e., that a lack of subject-

        matter jurisdiction was a “plausible explanation of what legal ground the District Court

        actually relied upon for its remand,” id. at 233. The Powerex Court explained, “Lengthy

        appellate disputes about whether an arguable jurisdictional ground invoked by the district

        court was properly such would frustrate the purpose of § 1447(d) . . . .” Id. at 234. Thus,

        it held that “when . . . the District Court relied upon a ground that is colorably characterized

        as subject-matter jurisdiction, appellate review is barred by § 1447(d).” Id. (emphasis

        added).

               With that standard in hand, we take a brief peek at the district court’s reasoning to

        satisfy ourselves that a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was a colorable or plausible

        explanation of the legal ground on which the court actually relied for remand.

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               To start, the district court purported to rely on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

        in remanding this case, announcing that that was the ground on which it was relying. That

        alone might satisfy § 1447(d) because without jurisdiction, we have no power to review

        more. Indeed, some of the Justices in Powerex would bar review simply on the district

        court’s announcement — i.e., that it “purported to remand for lack of subject-matter

        jurisdiction.” Powerex, 551 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added). But the actual holding of

        Powerex demands a greater level of review, presumably on the basis that a court can

        address what is necessary for it to determine its own jurisdiction. The Powerex Court thus

        held that we must determine whether the district court’s explanation was “colorable” or

        “plausible,” but we should not review the substance of the explanation to determine

        whether it was, in fact or in law, correct.

               In taking that peek in this case, we note that the district court’s explanation for

        relying on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to justify remand was as follows:

               Here, the receivership court has appointed a receiver who is attempting to
               preserve and collect assets of the defunct corporation as part of his fiduciary
               duty. This Court finds that Barton, and its subsequent application in Porter,
               act as a limitation on federal jurisdiction when a state court has previously
               exercised its authority by appointing a receiver to handle the administration
               of property; to allow this matter to continue in federal court would directly
               interfere with the exclusive jurisdiction of the receivership court over this
               dispute.

        (Emphasis added).

               On its face, this seems like a plausible characterization of subject-matter

        jurisdiction. Mindful that a lengthy discussion over the merits of the district court’s finding

        is neither appropriate nor necessary, see Powerex, 551 U.S. at 234, we do, however, take a

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        quick look at Barton to confirm that the district court’s characterization of and reliance on

        it as involving subject-matter jurisdiction was indeed colorable.

               In Barton, Frances Barton was injured while riding as a passenger on a train owned

        by a railroad that had been placed in a state receivership. Barton sued the state-appointed

        receiver in federal court, seeking $5,000 in damages for the railroad’s negligence. The

        receiver challenged the federal court’s jurisdiction, arguing that he was subject exclusively

        to the state-receivership court and that he could not be sued without leave of the

        receivership court. Barton, 104 U.S. at 127–31. The lower federal court agreed, and the

        Supreme Court affirmed. It stated that the suit “brought without leave to recover judgment

        against a receiver for a money demand, [was] virtually a suit the purpose of which [was],

        and effect of which [would] be, to take the property of the trust from his hands and apply

        it to the payment of the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 129. This was because, as the Court

        explained, the suit was against the defendant “in his capacity as receiver, and the execution

        [of a judgment] would run against the property in his hands as such.” Id. at 128. The Court

        noted that it was “immaterial whether the suit [was] brought against [the receiver] to

        recover specific property or to obtain judgment for money demand. In either case leave

        should be first obtained [from the receivership court].” Id. at 129. The Court accordingly

        held, “Upon these facts[,] we are of opinion that [the federal court] had no jurisdiction to

        entertain a suit.” Id. at 131 (citing Peale v. Phipps, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 368, 374 (1852)

        (holding in similar circumstances to those before us, “[w]e see no ground upon which the

        jurisdiction of the court can be sustained” (emphasis added))).

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               The similarities between Barton and the instant case convince us that its holding is

        at least arguably applicable here, despite Travelers’ protestations to the contrary. For

        instance, Travelers argues that notwithstanding Barton, this is simply a common law

        breach of contract case for which neither Travelers nor Barton would need permission from

        the receivership court. But the Supreme Court in Barton rejected such an argument; the

        Court specifically dismissed Barton’s argument that she was injured in tort and therefore

        could bring suit for injuries “without leave of the court by which [the receiver] was

        appointed.” 104 U.S. at 130–31.

               Travelers also argues that Barton is applicable only to suits brought against the

        receiver, but Barton also rejects that notion. Barton found a lack of jurisdiction because

        the claims and property were the subject of the state receivership and could not be adjusted

        in federal court without the receivership court’s approval. As the Barton Court explained,

        the plaintiff’s judgment “would be against the defendant in his capacity as receiver, and

        the execution would run against the property in his hands as such.” 104 U.S. at 128. And

        Porter v. Sabin, a later case applying Barton, confirmed that the doctrine applies to both

        suits by and against the receiver because, when a state court appoints a receiver, “the court

        assumes the administration of the estate” and “[t]he possession of the receiver is the

        possession of the court.” 149 U.S. at 479; cf. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311–12

        (2006) (recognizing the “general principle that, when one court is exercising in rem

        jurisdiction of a res, a second court will not assume in rem jurisdiction over the same res”

        and articulating that the “probate exception” to federal jurisdiction “precludes federal

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        courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the custody of a state probate

        court”).

               Thus, when applying the Barton doctrine, the district court plausibly concluded that

        a federal court lacks jurisdiction over a state receivership or a state-court appointed receiver

        with respect to assets of the receivership because the state court has exclusive jurisdiction

        over the assets of the receivership. Exercising federal jurisdiction over a suit by or against

        a state-appointed receiver, who functions as an “arm” or “executive” of the state-

        receivership court, would infringe on the state court’s control over the receivership assets

        — its exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, as a matter of comity, as well as custom, the Barton

        doctrine rests on this exclusivity of the state receivership over the assets before it as a

        matter of jurisdiction, and indeed we have confirmed as much. See, e.g., Conway, 64 F.4th

        at 545 (noting that “Barton concerns subject-matter jurisdiction”); McDaniel, 668 F.3d at

        156 (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court established in Barton that before another court may

        obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit filed against a receiver for acts committed in

        his official capacity, the plaintiff must obtain leave of the court that appointed the

        receiver”).

               In these circumstances, our quick look confirms that the district court’s

        characterization of its remand as relying on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was

        colorably supported, thus barring our review by reason of § 1447(d).

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                                                    III

               For the avoidance of doubt, we also address Protopapas’s second argument that the

        district court’s conclusion in its remand order that a procedural defect precluded removal

        was also colorably supported and thus also bars our review. Specifically, Protopapas

        contends that, while all defendants signed documents consenting to removal, the forum

        selection clause in the insurance policy issued to Payne & Keller by at least one defendant

        prevented that defendant from validly consenting to removal, thus denying Travelers the

        ability to satisfy the requirement that removal be unanimous.              See 28 U.S.C.

        § 1446(b)(2)(A). The forum selection clause at issue provides:

               It is agreed that in the event of the failure of the company hereon to pay any
               amount claimed to be due hereunder, the company hereon, at the request of
               the insured, will submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent
               jurisdiction within the United States of America and will comply with all
               requirements necessary to give such court jurisdiction and all matters arising
               hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the law and practice of
               such court.

        (Emphasis added).

               The district court concluded that this clause barred at least one insurer from

        consenting to removal to federal court. As it explained, it was remanding the case to state

        court because, “[g]iven the waiver [contained in the forum selection clause], and thus the

        inability to obtain valid consent from all defendants, Defendants have not adequately

        demonstrated they meet the requirement under § 1446(b)(2)(A) that all properly joined and

        served Defendants must join in or consent to the removal of the action.” (Emphasis added).

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               Because the district court purported to rely on a procedural defect, our review, again,

        is limited to whether that characterization is colorable. See Powerex, 551 U.S. at 234; see

        also Harvey, 797 F.3d at 805.

               Travelers contends that it is not because we routinely review on appeal forum

        selection clauses. See, e.g., Bartels v. Saber Healthcare Grp., LLC, 880 F.3d 668, 673 (4th

        Cir. 2018); FindWhere Holdings, Inc. v. Sys. Env’t Optimization, LLC, 626 F.3d 752, 755

        (4th Cir. 2010). But in both Bartels and FindWhere Holdings, the district court’s decision

        was based on a contractual application of where the forum selection clause at issue required

        the suit to be brought and not whether those clauses had any bearing on a defendant’s

        ability to comply with the requirements for removal to federal court. See Bartels, 880 F.3d

        at 672–73 (noting that the district court concluded that the contract required bringing the

        suit in state court because “the forum-selection clause required the action to proceed in

        Franklin County” and there was no “federal courthouse in Franklin County”); FindWhere

        Holdings, 626 F.3d at 754 (noting the district court remanded because it interpreted the

        language of the forum selection clause that suits must be brought “exclusively in, or be

        transferred to, the courts of the State of Virginia” to mean state courts in Virginia).

               Instead, the issue before us is more like that addressed in Overlook Gardens

        Properties, LLC v. ORIX USA, L.P., 927 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2019). There, the plaintiff’s

        loan agreement included a forum selection clause, which, the district court held, precluded

        removal because the lender “could not validly consent to the removal of this action, so the

        unanimity requirement [was] not met.” Id. at 1197 (cleaned up). On appeal from the

        district court’s remand order, the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction under

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        § 1447(d) to review the order. It distinguished its review of an order enforcing a forum

        selection clause from an order remanding for a lack of unanimous consent because of the

        effect of the forum selection clause and concluded that only the latter reflected a defect in

        removal. “While a remand based on interpretation and enforcement of a valid forum

        selection clause is neither a defect in removal process nor a jurisdictional flaw, a lack of

        unanimous consent to removal is a defect in the removal process.” Id. at 1198 (cleaned

        up). Because the district court’s remand order here was similarly based on the effect that

        a forum selection clause had on the defendants’ ability to comply with a procedural

        requirement for removal, we find Overlook Gardens more relevant to the issue here than

        the cases cited by Travelers.

               In short, the district court concluded that because at least one insurer agreed to

        litigate coverage wherever the claimant chose and the claimant chose a state court in South

        Carolina, the insurer was barred thereafter from consenting to a federal forum. Under the

        applicable standard for review of that issue, we conclude that the district court’s

        characterization of a procedural defect in these circumstances was at least colorable,

        inasmuch as unanimous consent to removal was required by § 1446(b)(2)(A). Thus, any

        further analysis and review would not be appropriate.

                                              *      *       *

               For the reasons given, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the district

        court’s remand order under § 1447(d) and accordingly dismiss this appeal.

                                                                                       DISMISSED

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        WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:

               I concur in holding that, because the district court based its remand order on the

        Barton doctrine and colorably described the Barton doctrine as a mandatory limit on its

        subject matter jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed. But today, my good colleagues

        in the majority choose to go well beyond what is needed to resolve this appeal. By

        addressing unnecessary issues, they contravene a clear directive from our Supreme Court

        not to do so.

               We lack jurisdiction to review a remand order if the district court’s basis for remand

        “is colorably characterized” as a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a procedural defect

        in removal, and the bar for whether the district court’s description of its basis for remand

        is “colorable” is exceedingly low. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S.

        224, 234 (2007). Thus, quite clearly, the Supreme Court has directed that our analysis of

        whether a district court’s basis for remand is colorable should be extremely brief. In other

        words, we may not delve into whether the district court’s application of the basis for

        remand was “erroneous.” Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196

        (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351

        (1976), abrogated on other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706

        (1996)). And we should not endeavor to resolve any open questions beyond what is

        necessary to determine whether a remand order is colorably based on a lack of subject

        matter jurisdiction or a procedural defect in removal.

               Our precedent offers a simple resolution to this case. In McDaniel v. Blust, we stated

        that “[t]he Supreme Court established in Barton that before another court may obtain

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        subject-matter jurisdiction over a suit filed against a receiver for acts committed in his

        official capacity, the plaintiff must obtain leave of the court that appointed the receiver.”

        McDaniel v. Blust, 668 F.3d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). We were not asked

        to decide in McDaniel whether the Barton doctrine is based on abstention or imposes a

        mandatory limit on subject-matter jurisdiction. But our reference to the steps a party “must”

        take before we can exercise subject matter jurisdiction provides, at a minimum, a colorable

        basis on which the district court could conclude that the Barton doctrine imposed a

        mandatory limitation on its subject matter jurisdiction. Because State Farm cites no case

        explicitly contradicting that description, and we are not permitted to examine whether the

        district court’s conclusion was erroneous, our analysis can start and end with McDaniel.

               Unfortunately, the majority opinion chooses to say more than is needed to resolve

        this appeal in the manner which the Supreme Court has directed.

               First, the majority opinion issues an unnecessary, and I would say advisory,

        proclamation that the Barton doctrine applies to cases brought both against and by a

        receiver. Majority Op. at 12. Classically, the Barton doctrine applies in “a suit filed against

        a receiver[.]” McDaniel, 668 F.3d at 156 (emphasis added). While the main justification

        for the Barton doctrine—protecting the estate’s property—could support extending the

        doctrine to suits brought by a receiver, no case has held that the doctrine extends that far.

        True, in Porter v. Sabin, the Supreme Court stated that the Barton doctrine applies to

        “claims of or against” a receiver. Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. 473, 479 (1893). But that

        statement was dicta, and, throughout the rest of the opinion, the Supreme Court referred

        only to claims against a receiver. More importantly, as the magistrate judge recognized,

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        the complete dearth of decisions applying the Barton doctrine to cases brought by a

        receiver weighs against extending the doctrine. * See Protopapas v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,

        No. CV 3:21-4086-DCC, 2022 WL 17668402, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2022) (“[N]o

        precedential authority has actually applied the Barton doctrine to foreclose claims brought

        by a receiver in pursuit of his official duties to affirmatively collect potential assets for an

        insolvent corporation.”). And the majority opinion’s conclusion that the Barton doctrine

        applies to cases brought by a receiver goes to whether the district court erred in its

        application of the Barton doctrine, not to whether it colorably described the Barton doctrine

        as imposing a mandatory limitation on subject matter jurisdiction. Because the issue is

        unresolved and unnecessary to our conclusion, it should not be reached.

               Second, in Part III of its opinion, the majority unnecessarily, and again in my

        opinion, advisorily, addresses an alternative basis for the district court’s remand order.

        Either a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a procedural defect in removal can justify

        remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Here, the district court ordered remand based on both a lack

        of subject matter jurisdiction and a procedural defect in removal. See Protopapas v. Zurich

        Am. Ins. Co., No. 3:21-CV-04086-DCC, 2023 WL 2206640, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2023).

        The majority addresses both bases for the district court’s decision. To be sure, we may

        sometimes issue alternative holdings. See Gestamp S.C., LLC v. NLRB, 769 F.3d 254, 262

        n.4 (4th Cir. 2014). But it makes no sense to do so when the first holding in a decision is

               *
                In opposing the majority opinion’s decision to address this issue, I express no
        opinion about the ultimate question of whether the Barton doctrine applies only to suits
        brought against a receiver or if it also extends to suits brought by a receiver.
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        that we lack jurisdiction. Because we have already decided that we lack jurisdiction based

        on the district court’s application of the Barton doctrine, the portion of the majority opinion

        addressing the alleged procedural defect has no importance for its resolution of the case.

        To comply with the well-established principle against issuing “advisory opinions,” Flast

        v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968), we should decline to express a viewpoint where none is

        needed.

               In appeals like this one, Congress has sought to keep our review to a minimum. I

        suggest that future panels carefully heed that directive. Because the majority opinion in

        this case does not, I concur only in the judgment.

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