Court Opinion

ID: 6485378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-26 23:08:37.436087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:54:19.038550
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION OP
QUARLES, J.
I concur in the conclusion and reasoning of the opinion written by Mr. Justice Coke. The theory of the plaintiff as set forth in her complaint is that the notes sued on and the mortgages securing them were released by the agreement of November 27, 1905, such release subject to de-feasance upon the happening of either of two conditions subsequent, viz., the alienation of any of her real estate or the incurring of indebtedness to the extent of one thousand dollars at any one time by Mrs. Roy without the written consent of the plaintiff. The plaintiff relies upon the happening of the last condition subsequent as defeating the release and reviving her cause of action upon the notes sued on here. The agreement is pleaded by plaintiff in effect and copies attached to and made a part of plaintiff’s complaint, and the questions upon which the decision here rests are raised in and appear upon the face of the complaint. If the agreement as to the conditions subsequent is not valid and binding, but, on the other hand, is void for the reason *789that such conditions subsequent are contrary to public policy the complaint shows no cause of action and it is not necessary to plead their illegality or to give notice thereof. The rule of the circuit court requiring notice that the defense of illegality will be relied on was not intended to apply to such defense when it appears upon the face of the complaint. The plaintiff must plead a valid and legal contract. The conditions of defeasance being contrary to public policy and void, and so shown upon the face of the complaint, no question of evidence is involved, the only question being, is the plaintiff entitled to judgment upon her own showing? The trial court held that she was not on the ground that the notes sued on were released by said agreement. The conclusion of the trial court was correct. To hold otherwise would be equivalent to holding that plaintiff is entitled to judgment by reason of a contract against public policy, thereby giving the consent of the court to the enforcement of such contract. In my opinion the court cannot do so and the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.