Court Opinion

ID: 9772613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:23:54.894321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:46.300310
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
In his third point of error appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury at the punishment phase of trial that, if sentenced to life imprisonment, he would have to serve a minimum of 35 years in the penitentiary before becoming eligible for parole. He seems to argue that this information in and of itself constitutes mitigating evidence in contemplation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The majority rejects this argument on the basis of its naked conclusion that “parole eligibility bears no relationship to the defendant’s character or record, or the circumstances of the offense.” At 859. I agree, at least, that appellant fails to establish in his brief how minimum parole eligibility constitutes constitutionally mitigating evidence in this case.
In my view, minimum parole eligibility is constitutionally mitigating only to the extent that, in combination with other evidence, it tends to show that the capital defendant will not “commit criminal acts of violence that would pose a continuing threat to society.” Article 37.071, § 2(b)(1), V.A.C.C.P. See Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995) (Clinton, J., dissenting, 898 S.W.2d at 864 & 867-68; Maloney, J., dissenting, 898 S.W.2d at 882-84). It has no intrinsically mitigating significance otherwise. Id., (Ma-loney, dissenting, 898 S.W.2d at 874-75). Appellant does not argue that he put on evidence to show, e.g., that for the duration of his lengthy incarceration he will pose no threat to the prison population or that by the time he is eligible for parole he will not pose a threat to any facet of society. Compare Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.Cr. App.1991). In combination with such evidence, information about minimum parole eligibility is “indisputably relevant” to the issue of future dangerousness. Had appellant adduced such evidence, to prevent him from also informing the jury of his minimum parole eligibility date would likely have violated the Eighth Amendment in much the same way it would violate due process. Smith v. State, supra (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Because he did not, however, I join the judgment of the Court. I do not join its opinion.
MALONEY, J., joins this opinion.
BAIRD, J.,
joins this opinion for the reasons stated in Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d *360839 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), but for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (Baird, J., concurring), specifically does not join that portion of the opinion referring to the dissenting opinions in Smith, 898 S.W.2d 838 at 857 and 872 (Clinton, J., dissenting and Maloney, J., dissenting.).