Court Opinion

ID: 9892406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 18:11:02.88078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:11.284161
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Kline v. Newton Falls, 2023-Ohio-3841.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO ex rel.                              CASE NO. 2023-T-0052
KENNETH A. KLINE,

                 Relator,                          Original Action for
                                                   Writ of Prohibition
        - vs -

NEWTON FALLS VILLAGE
COUNCIL,

                 Respondent.

                                          PER CURIAM
                                           OPINION

                                     Decided: October 23, 2023
                                    Judgment: Petition dismissed

Sarah Thomas Koovor, Kovoor Law, LLC, P.O. Box 310, Warren, OH 44482 (For
Relator).

David J. Betras, Betras, Kopp & Markota, LLC, 6630 Seville Drive, Canfield, OH 44406
(For Respondent).

PER CURIAM.

        {¶1}     Respondent, Newton Falls Village Council (“Respondent”), moves to

dismiss the petition for a writ of prohibition filed by relator, Kenneth A. Kline (“Kline”). For

the following reasons, we dismiss.

        {¶2}     This original action arises from a resolution passed by the Newton Falls

Village Council to bring charges against and seek removal of Kline, who was, at the time,

the elected mayor of the Village of Newton Falls.
       {¶3}   Kline filed his petition for a writ of prohibition alleging that the council did not

have the authority to remove the elected mayor. Kline also sought an order to prohibit the

council from removing him from office.

       {¶4}   This court held a status conference on August 2, 2023, and subsequently

issued an alternative writ.

       {¶5}   On August 8, 2023, respondent filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, despite failing to file an answer to the petition. Kline opposed the motion and

filed his motion for summary judgment on August 14, 2023. Respondent did not file an

opposition to Kline’s motion for summary judgment. Instead, on September 14, 2023, the

respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Kline had formally resigned as

the village mayor rendering the pending case moot. Kline opposed the motion but did not

deny that he resigned from his position. Kline asserts that until “[c]ouncil determines in its

own proceedings in its removal action is moot, rescinds its resolution, and informs this

Court of such recission, the controversy before this Court continues.” We disagree.

       {¶6}   “[A] writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court

of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior tribunal commanding it to cease abusing

or usurping judicial functions.” State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73,

701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). “[T]he purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts

and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction.” Id. This extraordinary remedy is

customarily granted with caution and restraint and is issued only in cases of necessity

arising from the inadequacy of other remedies. Id.

       {¶7}   To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish that: (1) the

respondent is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that

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Case No. 2023-T-0052
power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no

other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer,

131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18.

       {¶8}   When the issues presented are either “no longer ‘live’” or when the parties

lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, a case is rendered moot. State ex rel.

Ames v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 159 Ohio St.3d 47, 2020-Ohio-354, 146

N.E.3d 573, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Gaylor, Inc. v. Goodenow, 125 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-

Ohio-1844, 928 N.E.2d 728, ¶ 10-11. In other words, “[m]oot cases are dismissed

because they no longer present a justiciable controversy. The requested relief has been

obtained, it serves no further purpose, it is no longer within the court’s power, or it is not

disputed.” Williams-Lindsey v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 11th Dist. No. 2019-T-0054, 2020-

Ohio-1337, 153 N.E.3d 533, ¶ 20-21, citing Cent. Motors Corp. v. Pepper Pike, 9 Ohio

App.3d 18, 457 N.E.2d 1178 (8th Dist.1983).

       {¶9}   However, a prohibition action is not necessarily rendered moot when the

act sought to be prevented occurs before a court can rule on the prohibition claim. State

ex rel. Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 301, 2004-Ohio-2894,

809 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 11-12 citing State ex rel. Rogers v. McGee Brown (1997), 80 Ohio

St.3d 408, 410, 686 N.E.2d 1126. “[U]nder certain circumstances a writ of prohibition may

be granted to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to ‘correct the

results of previously jurisdictionally unauthorized actions[.]’” State ex rel. Ames v. Summit

Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 159 Ohio St.3d 47, 2020-Ohio-354, 146 N.E.3d 573, ¶ 8,

citing State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Reed, 99 Ohio St.3d 106, 2003-Ohio-2506, 789 N.E.2d

203, ¶ 14.

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Case No. 2023-T-0052
       {¶10} In Ames, the relator sought a writ of prohibition against Judge Rowlands

arguing that the judge lacked jurisdiction to reinstate a case and extend the time for

service set forth in Civ.R. 3(A). The Ninth Appellate district dismissed the petition pursuant

to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The Supreme Court of Ohio determined the writ was moot and noted

“this appeal may not continue solely to determine whether Judge Rowlands had

jurisdiction to issue the November 2018 order reinstating the underlying case. Here, a

decision on whether a trial court had authority to reinstate a case that has since been

dismissed would result in a purely advisory opinion.” Ames, 159 Ohio St.3d 47, at ¶ 8.

       {¶11} Generally, courts will not issue advisory opinions. Ohio courts will render an

advisory opinion as to a moot issue only when the issue will always evade judicial review

even though it is capable of repetition. State ex rel. Westfield Ins. Co. v. Mitrovich, 11th

Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-085, 2003-Ohio-5979, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. White v. Kilbane

Koch, 96 Ohio St.3d 395, 2002-Ohio-4848.

       {¶12} Respondents claim that this case is moot because the mayor has resigned

his position. We agree. Because Kline sought to prohibit council from holding a hearing

to remove him from office, the same office he recently resigned from on his own accord,

Kline’s request is moot. In other words, Kline’s writ action is no longer live nor justiciable.

       {¶13} Moreover, the issue of whether the respondents could legally seek to

remove an elected village mayor is not an issue that will always evade judicial review.

Therefore, we decline to address the merits of Kline's prohibition claim as such an opinion

would be advisory.

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Case No. 2023-T-0052
        {¶14} Accordingly, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted, and Relator’s

Petition for Writ of Prohibition is dismissed. Any pending motions are hereby overruled as

moot.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J., EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., ROBERT J. PATTON, J., concur.

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Case No. 2023-T-0052