Court Opinion

ID: 9956196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 14:07:29.034182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:41.479731
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
  internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                     DOCKET NO. A-3590-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN
THE INTEREST OF M.E.M.
_________________________

                Submitted on March 20, 2024 – Decided April 1, 2024

                Before Judges Currier and Vanek.

                On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County,
                Docket No. FJ-18-0260-21.

                Maynard Law Office, LLC, attorneys for appellant
                (Kaitlin M. Kent, on the briefs).

                John P. McDonald, Somerset County Prosecutor,
                attorney for respondent (Catlin A. Davis, Assistant
                Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

       As a juvenile, M.E.M. pleaded guilty to sexual assault and endangering

the welfare of a child. The Family Part's March 2, 2022 order of disposition

imposed a surcharge and monetary penalties totaling $3,450, in addition to

sentencing M.E.M. to three years of probation, prohibiting contact with the
victim and requiring certain conditions complying with Megan's Law, N.J.S.A.

2C:7-1 to -23. After M.E.M. moved to vacate the surcharge and penalties,

asserting they were impermissible against a juvenile, the Family Part denied the

motion, finding they were appropriately imposed. After a careful review of the

record and the applicable law, we affirm the March 2, 2022 order as to the

imposition of the remaining aggregate $3,350 penalty. We remand this matter

to the Family Part to modify the order of disposition to remove the $100

surcharge the State has conceded was improperly applied.

                                              I.

        We set forth the salient facts material to our disposition of the statutorily

imposed penalties. When M.E.M. was between fifteen and seventeen years old,

she1 committed multiple sexual assaults against a child victim who was between

three and five years old. On March 22, 2021, a juvenile delinquency complaint

charged M.E.M. with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-

2(a)(1); second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); and third-degree

endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1).

        On January 25, 2022, M.E.M. pleaded guilty to second-degree sexual

assault and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. As part of the plea

1
    We use the personal pronouns set forth in M.E.M.'s merits brief.
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agreement, the State recommended three years of probation in addition to

continued participation in psychosexual treatment and Megan's Law registration

requirements. The State agreed to dismiss the first-degree aggravated sexual

assault charge and close any remaining open investigations as to M.E.M.

      On March 2, 2022, the Family Part entered an order of disposition

imposing three years of probation, prohibiting contact with the victim; requiring

compliance with Megan's Law, including registration; and compelling M.E.M.

to submit to continued psychosexual treatment, DNA collection and

fingerprinting. The order also imposed the following surcharge and monetary

penalties against M.E.M. totaling $3,450: a $100 sexual assault surcharge (the

surcharge), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.7; a $1,600 Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner

(SANE) penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.6; a $1,000 Sex Crime Victim Treatment

Fund (SCVTF) penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-10(a)(2) (second-degree sexual assault

penalty); and a $750 SCVTF penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-10(a)(3) (third-degree

endangering the welfare of a child penalty).

      On March 9, 2022, M.E.M. sent a letter to the Family Part asking that the

order of disposition be modified to remove the surcharge and all penalties. On

March 16, 2022, M.E.M. received an email from a Somerset County probation

officer, stating "those fines are accurate and do apply to juvenile adjudications

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where Megan's Law attaches. . . . The March 2, 2022 disposition order will

stand."

      On April 14, 2022, M.E.M. filed a motion with the Family Part renewing

the request, which was denied. In a statement of reasons accompanying the June

8, 2022 order, the Family Part set forth that its denial was consistent with the

Legislative intent "for the fines and penalties associated with Megan's Law

offenses to remain against juveniles."

      M.E.M. appealed. On January 9, 2023, we heard oral argument on a

sentencing calendar.    After argument, we entered an order transferring the

appeal to a plenary calendar to allow full briefing on the merits.

      On appeal, M.E.M. contends it was improper for the Family Part to impose

the surcharge, SANE penalty and SCVTF penalty because the respective statutes

do not explicitly apply those monetary sanctions to juveniles. M.E.M. further

asserts that it is contrary to public policy for juveniles to face monetary

punishment because of the potentially disproportionate economic impact on the

offenders and their families.

      As the State has already conceded that the $100 surcharge was improperly

levied against M.E.M., we need not consider that issue further. On remand, the

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Family Part shall enter an amended order of disposition removing the $100

surcharge. We address the remainder of the issues raised on appeal in turn.

                                            II.

      We review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo despite the deference

usually afforded to the Family Part since this appeal turns on statutory

interpretation, which is a question of law. State in the Int. of K.O., 217 N.J. 83,

91 (2014). We are instructed to apply the plain language of the statute where it

is clear, with further interpretation warranted only where it is ambiguous. In re

Expungement Application of D.J.B., 216 N.J. 433, 440 (2014).

      "'To determine the Legislature's intent, [courts] look to the statute's

language and give those terms their plain and ordinary meaning,' because 'the

best indicator of that intent is the plain language chosen by the Legislature.'"

State v. J.V., 242 N.J. 432, 442 (2020) (first quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183

N.J. 477, 492 (2005); and then quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226

N.J. 370, 386 (2016)). "An appellate court will refer to extrinsic sources to

determine legislative intent '[o]nly if the words of the enactment are shrouded

in ambiguity.'" In re Civ. Commitment of W.W., 245 N.J. 438, 449 (2021)

(alteration in original) (quoting Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 513 (2009)).

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      "Statutes must also '"be read in their entirety; each part or section should

be construed in connection with every other part or section to provide a

harmonious whole."'" D.J.B., 216 N.J. at 440 (quoting Burnett v. Cnty. of

Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009) (quoting Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 224

(2008))). "'[A] change of language in a statute ordinarily implies a purposeful

alteration in [the] substance of the law.'" DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 494 (second

alteration in original) (quoting Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 6 N.J. 341, 348 (1951)).

                                            III.

      M.E.M.'s arguments on appeal are predicated on the principle that

"[j]uvenile offenses are not crimes." State in the Int. of K.P., 167 N.J. Super.

290, 294 (App. Div. 1979) (citing State v. De Paola, 5 N.J. 1, 18 (1950)). A

juvenile who pleads or is found guilty under a juvenile delinquency complaint

is not convicted but, rather, is adjudicated delinquent.      Ibid.; see State v.

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999) (stating "a juvenile

adjudication does not constitute conviction of a crime"); see also N.J.S.A.

2A:4A-23. Given the distinction between a conviction and an adjudication of

delinquency, M.E.M. argues that any statutes imposing penalties for convictions

do not apply to juveniles unless the statute also explicitly references

adjudications of delinquency.

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      The SANE penalty is authorized under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.6(a), which

reads, in part: "a person convicted of a sex offense, as defined in [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-

2], shall be assessed a penalty of $800 for each such offense." The SCVTF

penalty is authorized under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-10(a), which sets forth:

            [A] person convicted of a sex offense, as defined in
            [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2], shall be assessed a penalty for each
            such offense not to exceed:

                 ....

                 (2) $1,000, when the conviction is a crime of the
                 second degree;

                 (3) $750, when the conviction is a crime of the
                 third degree . . . .

      Both the SANE and the SCVTF penalties were imposed based on the

definition of sex offense set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2), which, as relevant

to M.E.M., includes "[a] conviction, adjudication of delinquency, or acquittal

by reason of insanity for aggravated sexual assault; sexual assault . . . [or]

endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would

impair or debauch the morals of the child." Accordingly, under the statute, since

M.E.M. is a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent for sexual assault

under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) as a result of her guilty plea, she is deemed to have

committed a sex offense.

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      However, the full phrase designating applicability in both penalty statutes

is "convicted of a sex offense."      M.E.M. argues that the use of the word

"convicted" precludes application of the penalties to juveniles who have been

adjudicated delinquent based on a plea. We start by recognizing that it is well-

settled in our decisional law that "the registration requirements of Megan's Law

. . . apply to all juveniles adjudicated delinquent for commission of a sex

offense."   In re Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 319 (2001).          It would be

incongruous to conclude that the SANE and SCVTF penalties imposed alongside

the other sanctions under Megan's Law do not also apply to juveniles adjudicated

delinquent for commission of a sex offense.

      Furthermore, guilty pleas have the same legal import as a conviction under

New Jersey law. See State in the Int. of T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 330 (2001) (noting

"that a plea of guilty 'is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment

and determine punishment'" (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242

(1969))). Accordingly, we conclude that since M.E.M. pleaded guilty to sex

offenses, the SANE and SCVTF penalties were properly imposed.

      M.E.M. also argues the Legislature's recent elimination of some statutory

penalties demonstrates the penalties at issue in this matter are not intended to

apply to juveniles. We view the continued viability of the SANE and SCVTF

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penalties against juveniles under the recent statutory amendments relating to

monetary assessments stemming from juvenile delinquency complaints. See L.

2021, c. 342 (Senate Bill 3319). The stated purpose of Senate Bill 3319 is to

"eliminate[] certain statutory costs, fees, and penalties imposed on juveniles

involved in the juvenile justice system."     Assemb. Appropriations Comm.

Statement to S. 3319, at 1 (Dec. 13, 2021).

      The Committee Statement to Senate Bill 3319 lists certain "fees, fines,

costs, and other monetary penalties" that are no longer applicable to juveniles.

Megan's Law, SANE and SCVTF are not contained in the list of eliminated

monetary fines, surcharges and penalties. See ibid. Pursuant to our canons of

statutory interpretation, we are instructed not to "engraft language that the

Legislature has not chosen to include in a statute." Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc.,

222 N.J. 362, 381 (2015). We conclude the absence of references to other

penalties in Senate Bill 3319, such as the ones levied on M.E.M., is not a mere

oversight or statement of non-applicability but, instead, is evidence of

legislative intent to continue the imposition of the remainder of the surcharges

and penalties to juveniles.

      This conclusion is bolstered by the statutory framework which provides a

mechanism for assessing and collecting the SANE, SCVTF, and other penalties,

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N.J.S.A. 2C:46-4, from juveniles, which was not repealed. N.J.S.A. 2C:46-

4(a)(1) sets forth that the penalties levied against juveniles adjudicated

delinquent "shall be collected by the Department of Corrections or the Juvenile

Justice Commission." Courts are instructed to "strive for an interpretation that

gives effect to all of the statutory provisions and does not render any language

inoperative, superfluous, void[,] or insignificant." Sanchez v. Fitness Factory

Edgewater, LLC, 242 N.J. 252, 261 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting G.S.

v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 172 (1999)). Since the Legislature did

not repeal the statutory method for collection of penalties from juveniles, we

conclude that it was the intention of the Legislature to continue to impose the

penalties against juveniles that were not otherwise abrogated by the statutory

amendment.

                                           IV.

      We briefly consider M.E.M.'s argument that the Legislature must not

intend for monetary penalties to apply to juveniles because it is against public

policy.   We are instructed not to "adopt an interpretation of the statutory

language that . . . is distinctly at odds with the public-policy objectives of a

statutory scheme." State v. Morrison, 227 N.J. 295, 308 (2016).

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         M.E.M. posits that the penalties levied against her do not align with the

Legislature's stated public policy priorities in that "[f]ines are essentially

punitive in nature, whereas the statutory policy with respect to juveniles is to

correct and rehabilitate rather than punish." State in the Int. of D.G.W., 70 N.J.

488, 495 (1976) (citation omitted).          However, "[a]lthough rehabilitation,

historically, has been the primary focus of the juvenile justice system, a second

purpose—increasingly so in recent times—is protection of the public." State in

the Int. of C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 67 (2018). These twin aims are precisely why the

Family Part is afforded wide latitude in imposing appropriate dispositions and

penalties to promote accountability from juvenile offenders. See State in the

Int. of D.A., 385 N.J. Super. 411, 414-416 (App. Div. 2006). We see no reason

why the monetary penalties imposed on M.E.M. are not consistent with these

goals.

         To the extent we have not addressed M.E.M.'s remaining arguments, we

are satisfied they lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in this

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

         Affirmed and remanded to the Family Part for the limited purpose of

entering a modified order of final disposition removing the $100 surcharge. We

do not retain jurisdiction.

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