Court Opinion

ID: 9398729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 00:00:31.526188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:35.933609
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40224         Document: 00516769913             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/31/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                      May 31, 2023
                                       No. 22-40224                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   Christy Williams,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   American Honda Motor Company, Incorporated,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Eastern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 6:20-CV-22
                      ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Dennis and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Following a car accident, Plaintiff Christy Williams brought suit
   against Defendant American Honda Motor Company, Inc.                           After an
   acrimonious discovery process, the district court granted Defendant’s
   motion to strike Plaintiff’s expert witnesses. Because expert testimony was
   necessary for the suit to proceed, the district court also granted summary
   judgment in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff appeals, asserting that the district

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40224       Document: 00516769913         Page: 2     Date Filed: 05/31/2023

                                    No. 22-40224

   court failed to apply the appropriate tests. We disagree, and affirm the
   district court.
                                          I.
          Plaintiff was driving her car—a Honda Civic designed, manufactured,
   and marketed by Defendant—when it collided with another vehicle. The
   force of the collision caused the airbags to deploy in Plaintiff’s vehicle.
   Plaintiff was subsequently treated for an eye injury.
          Plaintiff filed suit in the 241st Judicial District Court of Smith County,
   Texas against Defendant as well as Honda Motor Company Ltd.—
   Defendant’s Japanese parent company—and the driver of the other vehicle
   involved in the collision. Plaintiff alleged that the airbag deployed improperly
   as a result of the collision and caused her eye injury, for which she sought
   damages. Defendant removed the case to federal court in the Eastern District
   of Texas based on diversity after Plaintiff dismissed the claims against the
   other driver and the Japanese firm. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), 1441(b); Tex.
   R. Civ. P. 162.
          Plaintiff designated two engineers as expert witnesses: Wayne Bradley
   to address airbag system design and performance and Dr. Chandra Thorbole
   to address occupant kinematics and biomechanics. After repeated delays and
   negotiation—in which Plaintiff repeatedly suggested that Plaintiff’s
   willingness to produce her experts was predicated on the availability of
   Defendant’s corporate representative—the parties scheduled depositions of
   Bradley and Thorbole.       Additionally, Plaintiff noticed a deposition of
   Defendant’s corporate representative, but cancelled the afternoon before
   due to a medical emergency in Plaintiff’s counsel’s family and stated:
   “Given the circumstances, and the deadlines in the case, we will not seek to
   depose him again.”

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                                        No. 22-40224

           Less than 24 hours before Bradley’s scheduled deposition, Plaintiff
   began to demand dates for depositions of Defendant’s expert witnesses.
   Plaintiff threatened to withhold Bradley from the scheduled deposition
   unless Defendant committed in writing to allow its experts to be deposed.
   Defendant refused, and Plaintiff informed Defendant that Bradley would not
   appear.
           The day after Bradley’s scheduled deposition, Defendant filed
   supplemental disclosures, including a report of a test conducted to recreate
   the collision as well as two new witnesses: Siyang Yang, the Honda corporate
   representative, and Charles Crosby, the supervisor of the crash test. In
   response, Plaintiff cancelled the Thorbole deposition four days before it was
   scheduled, refusing to allow it until after Plaintiff inspected Defendant’s
   collision recreation test. On the same day, Plaintiff unilaterally noticed
   depositions for five of Defendant’s witnesses set to begin one week later,
   despite the impending Thanksgiving holiday and Defendant’s offer of
   specific dates after the holiday season to schedule the depositions. 1
           Defendant immediately moved for a protective order. Additionally,
   Defendant moved to strike Bradley and Thorbole as expert witnesses—
   alleging that Plaintiff’s handling of the matter amounted to sanctionable
   misconduct—and for summary judgment.

           _____________________
           1
             Plaintiff alleges that Yang and Crosby were expert witnesses—and thus that
   Defendant’s filing violated the operative scheduling order. The purpose of their testimony
   as described in the disclosure—“testimony . . . of a factual nature as it relates to the
   development, design, and testing of the seatbelt, airbag, and sensing systems in the 2017
   Honda Civic sedan” and “the circumstances of the crash test demonstration and provide
   foundational evidence supporting the admissibility of the demonstration”—does not
   support such a conclusion, though the disclosure does state: “To the extent [Yang’s]
   background and experience qualifies him to provide testimony of an expert nature or to the
   extent his testimony is considered as expert opinion, [Defendant] designates him
   accordingly.”

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          Subsequently, Plaintiff and Defendant filed their Joint Final Pretrial
   Report, which listed Defendant’s motion to strike as a pending motion and
   “request[ed] a setting for a Pre-Trial Conference . . . to obtain a ruling from
   the Court regarding any unresolved issues prior to trial.” The district court
   then held the conference, hearing argument on these issues. Four days later,
   the district court granted both Defendant’s motion to strike and motion for
   summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed.
                                         II.
          A district court “has broad discretion in fashioning its sanction.” L.
   Funder, L.L.C. v. Munoz, 924 F.3d 753, 758 (5th Cir. 2019). While that
   “discretion . . . is quite broad,” it is “not unlimited.” Chilcutt v. United
   States, 4 F.3d 1313, 1320 (5th Cir. 1993). The court of appeals “must decide
   . . . not whether this Court would have imposed the same sanctions as did the
   district court,” but rather “whether the district court abused its discretion.”
   Id. And the court of appeals “review[s] the district court’s factual findings
   underpinning its sanction order for clear error.” L. Funder, 924 F.3d at 758.
                                        III.
                                         A.
          “On motion or on its own, the court may issue any just orders,
   including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(vii), if a party or its
   attorney . . . fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.” Fed. R.
   Civ. P. 16(f)(1). “If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit
   discovery . . . the court where the action is pending may issue further just
   orders”—specifically, “sanctions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). In
   general, “Rule 37(b)(2) contains two standards—one general and one
   specific—that limit a district court’s discretion. First, any sanction must be
   ‘just’; second, the sanction must be specifically related to the particular

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                                    No. 22-40224

   ‘claim’ which was at issue in the order to provide discovery.” Ins. Corp. of
   Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 707 (1982).
          A “district court must make four additional findings to impose a
   litigation-ending sanction: (1) the discovery violation was committed willfully
   or in bad faith; (2) the client, rather than counsel, is responsible for the
   violation; (3) the violation ‘substantially prejudice[d] the opposing party’;
   and (4) a lesser sanction would not ‘substantially achieve the desired
   deterrent effect.’” L. Funder, 924 F.3d at 758–59 (quoting Fed. Deposit Ins.
   Corp. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380–81 (5th Cir. 1994)).
                                         B.
          As the district court made clear, “Texas . . . requires expert testimony
   to support products-liability causes of action, including cases where airbag
   deployment is at issue.” See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d
   797, 807 (Tex. 2006). By striking Bradley and Thorbole, the district court’s
   sanction removed a necessary component for Plaintiff’s claim to survive
   Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that striking her
   experts constitutes a litigation-ending sanction, requiring the Conner factors
   to be satisfied—some of which, such as client responsibility, lack support in
   the record.
          The problem with this argument is that it conflicts with a clear
   distinction in black-letter law. “Preclusion orders”—which include the
   exclusion of expert witnesses—“are . . . not as drastic as dismissals or
   defaults.”    Gregory P. Joseph, The Federal Law of
   Litigation Abuse § 49 (2021). “Sometimes a preclusion order may be
   tantamount to a dismissal or default order—that is, the party whose evidence
   is stricken may be unable without it to mount a prima facie case or defense.
   However, the difference between the two types of order is not insignificant.”
   Id. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]hat a particular legal consequence

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   . . . follows from [a sanction] does not in any way affect the appropriateness
   of the sanction.” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 709.
          “[M]any Circuits”—including this Court in Conner—“have
   adumbrated detailed tests that must be satisfied before the sanction of
   dismissal (but not preclusion) may be ordered. If a preclusion order is an
   appropriate sanction in light of the violation, however, it is unlikely to be
   reversed even though it results in a dismissal or default.” Joseph, supra,
   § 49. We apply Conner only when a sanction order has the formal effect of
   ending the litigation. See In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prod. Liab. Litig., 966 F.3d
   351, 357 (5th Cir. 2020) (dismissal); Cruz v. Maverick Cnty., 957 F.3d 563,
   569 (5th Cir. 2020) (dismissal); L. Funder, 924 F.3d at 757 (striking
   pleadings); Moore v. CITGO Refin. & Chems. Co., 735 F.3d 309, 316 (5th Cir.
   2013) (dismissal); Conner, 20 F.3d at 1380 (dismissal). See also Vikas WSP,
   Ltd. v. Econ. Mud Prod. Co., 23 F.4th 442, 447 (5th Cir. 2022) (applying
   Conner when construing a sanction striking pleadings as striking all the
   sanctioned party’s post-settlement motions when the district court had
   relinquished jurisdiction except to enforce the parties’ settlement). We see
   no convincing reason to depart from this approach.
          “When a district court excludes expert testimony as a sanction for a
   violation of a discovery order, we determine whether the court’s action is an
   abuse of discretion by examining four factors: (1) the explanation, if any, for
   the party’s failure to comply with the discovery order; (2) the prejudice to
   the opposing party of allowing the witnesses to testify; (3) the possibility of
   curing such prejudice by granting a continuance; and (4) the importance of

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   the witnesses’ testimony.” Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 380
   (5th Cir. 1996). 2
           The district court carefully considered each of these factors in
   fashioning its sanction. Its order carefully examines Plaintiff’s rationale for
   cancelling the depositions and refusing to make its experts available, finding
   Plaintiff’s resort to self-help inexcusable. It grapples with the importance of
   the testimony to Plaintiff’s case, and weighs it against the importance of the
   deposition to Defendant’s and the importance of enforcing the rules and
   scheduling orders. And it explains why “yet another continuance” as a
   reward for Plaintiff’s behavior would be unjustified. Accordingly, we affirm.

           _____________________
           2
              Plaintiff argues that the district court’s analysis must consider four specific
   factors: “(1) the explanation for the failure to identify the witness; (2) the importance of
   the testimony; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the testimony; and (4) the availability of
   a continuance to cure such prejudice.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Axon
   Pressure Prod. Inc., 951 F.3d 248, 270 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing In re Complaint of C.F. Bean
   L.L.C., 841 F.3d 365, 372 (5th Cir. 2016); Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 791 (5th
   Cir. 1990)). But this test is used for failure to designate or disclose witness testimony. See
   Complaint of C.F. Bean, 841 F.3d at 372; Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 791. And its first factor—
   the explanation for the failure to identify the witness—plainly does not make sense in the
   present context. Nevertheless, we have found it “appropriate” to apply a version of that
   test that reformulates that factor as “the explanation of the party for its failure to comply
   with the court’s order” when “the expert witness was excluded as a result of a violation of
   a discovery order.” E.E.O.C. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 999 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1993).

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