Court Opinion

ID: 9585431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:00:23.124789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:17.803111
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I agree with the majority in its opinion, I do not agree with that portion of Division 2 that states: “[t]he issue of damages, i.e., monetary compensation for harm, is therefore moot.” Plaintiff contended that even though she had produced no evidence, from the occurrence of the malpractice alone nominal damages were to be inferred as a matter of law; thus, on summary judgment, she had no duty to produce actual evidence of such damages. See Spence v. Hilliard, 181 Ga. App. 767, 768 (353 SE2d 634) (1987). Under the majority’s analysis, the issue can never be reached by this Court, because the issue can only arise when there is not evidence, only an inference of nominal damages. It was to clarify this issue of inference of nominal damages that the case was circulated whole court. I contend that for this reason the issue was not moot, and the Court should answer this issue.
Spence dealt with a legal malpractice case that sought special damages arising from the failure to file a compulsory counterclaim. The trial court in granting summary judgment in that case ruled that the evidence showed that the plaintiff was unable to prove the amount of actual or special damages or that such damages were collectible. This Court reversed, stating: “there was a fatal failure of proof with regard to actual damages. . . . Nominal damages are recoverable in a legal malpractice action provided plaintiff carries the burden of proving that he was wronged.” Id. at 768. Such holding should be limited to the facts of Spence, i.e., that nominal damages are authorized “where the violation of a right is shown, substantial damages claimed, and some actual loss proved, and yet the damages are not susceptible of reasonable certainty of proof as to their extent.” (Punctuation omitted.) Jones v. Padgett, 186 Ga. App. 362, 364 (4) (367 SE2d 88) (1988); see also Ponce de Leon Condos. v. DiGirolamo, 238 Ga. 188, 190 (232 SE2d 62) (1977); MTW Investment Co. v. Alcovy Properties, 228 Ga. App. 206 (491 SE2d 460) (1997).
“It stands to reason that if there is no harm resulting from the breach of duty [in a legal malpractice case], then no cause of action exists to be the subject of a lawsuit.” Whitehead v. Cuffie, 185 Ga. App. 351, 352-353 (364 SE2d 87) (1987).
Plaintiff must tender some evidence on summary judgment raising the issue of nominal damages other than evidence of the wrongful conduct alone or suffer a judgment against her.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Judge Blackburn, and Senior Appellate Judge Harold R. Banke join in this special concurrence.
*284Decided July 6, 1998.
John A. Roberts, for appellant.
Dominic Mockler, pro se.