Court Opinion

ID: 9840486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 19:01:07.190644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:35.956590
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10630    Document: 88-1     Date Filed: 09/18/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10630
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       CHALMER DETLING, II,
       a.k.a. Chuck Detling,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.
                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00309-LMM-LTW-1
                          ____________________
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                     22-10630

                         ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
       Before JORDAN and LAGOA, Circuit Judges, and CANNON, * District
       Judge.
       PER CURIAM:
              Chalmer Detling, II has filed a motion for panel rehearing,
       arguing that the panel overlooked one of his arguments. We grant
       the petition for panel rehearing, vacate the opinion previously is-
       sued, and issue this opinion in its place.
             Mr. Detling appeals his jury convictions for wire fraud and
       aggravated identity theft. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1028A(a)(1). Fol-
       lowing oral argument and a review of the record, we affirm. 1
             The government’s theory of the case at trial was that Mr.
       Detling, who was an attorney at the time of the offenses, applied
       for and obtained litigation advances from two financing compa-
       nies—Mighty Financing LLC and Litigation Ventures LLC—in the
       names of his clients without their knowledge. He then used the
       fraudulently-obtained funding to pay his law firm’s general ex-
       penses.
             Mr. Detling first asserts a violation of the Speedy Trial Act,
       18 U.S.C. § 3161. As we explain, this assertion fails.

       * The Honorable Aileen M. Cannon, United States District Judge for the South-

       ern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
       1 As we write for the parties, we set out only what is necessary to explain our

       decision.
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       22-10630                Opinion of the Court                          3

               The Speedy Trial Act generally requires a defendant’s trial
       to commence within 70 days from the filing date of the indictment
       or the defendant’s first appearance, whichever occurs last. See 18
       U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Act, however, excludes certain periods of
       delay from the computation of time. For example, the “delay re-
       sulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion
       through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposi-
       tion of, such motion” is not counted. See § 3161(h)(1)(D). We have
       held that this provision “excludes all time between the filing of the
       motion and the conclusion of the hearing at which it is addressed.”
       United States v. Harris, 376 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (empha-
       sis in original) (quoting United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1292
       (11th Cir. 2003)). The “entire time from the filing of the motion to
       the conclusion of the hearing is excludable, even when the hearing
       is deferred until trial.” United States v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1254
       (11th Cir. 1991).
               The district court deferred ruling on Mr. Detling’s motion
       to strike surplusage in the indictment until the pretrial conference.
       At that time, it heard Mr. Detling’s motion to strike surplusage and
       his motion in limine—both of which concerned his disbarment
       proceedings in Georgia—and ruled on both. See D.E. 168 at 46, 61–
       62 (excluding evidence of disbarment at trial and ordering the gov-
       ernment to “change” the indictment to get rid of language that
       “Mr. Detling is currently not licensed to practice law in the state of
       Georgia”). See also D.E. 139 at 2 (“The Court ordered the Govern-
       ment to revise the Indictment to remove language that the defend-
       ant is not licensed . . . .”). Because the time from the filing of the
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                        22-10630

       motion to strike surplusage on October 30, 2018, until the pretrial
       conference on October 13, 2021, was excluded for the purposes of
       the speedy trial calculation, see Harris, 376 F.3d at 1289, there was
       no Speedy Trial violation. 2
              Mr. Detling next argues that there was insufficient evidence
       to support his convictions. We review a challenge to the suffi-
       ciency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light
       most favorable to the verdict. See United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d
       1306, 1319 (11th Cir. 2014). The question is whether “any rational
       trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
       beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
       (1979) (emphasis in original). The evidence supporting Mr.

       2 Mr. Detling asserts that the district court was not permitted to hold a hearing

       on his motions because N.D. Ga. Local Rule 12.1(E)(1) only authorized the
       magistrate judge to do so. We disagree.
       Rule 12.1(E)(1), which applies to cases in the Atlanta Division, states that mo-
       tions in criminal cases are “initially assigned” to a magistrate judge, who “shall
       conduct any required or necessary hearings.” By providing that motions are
       “initially assigned” to a magistrate judge, Rule 12.1(E)(1) contemplates that
       the district court can and will handle such matters as well. Indeed, N.D. Ga.
       Local Rule 59 expressly provides that reports and recommendations issued by
       a magistrate judge on dispositive motions, and orders issued by a magistrate
       judge on non-dispositive motions, are subject to review by the district court
       upon objections from the parties. Mr. Detling cites to no authority for the
       proposition that a district court lacks the authority to hold a hearing on a non-
       dispositive motion just because such a motion is initially assigned to a magis-
       trate judge.
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       22-10630                   Opinion of the Court                                  5

       Detling’s convictions was close to overwhelming, and we therefore
                 3
       affirm.
              At trial, the government more than met its burden. It pre-
       sented the testimony of four former Detling Law Group employ-
       ees, including Aimee Ingram (the receptionist who later became a
       paralegal and office manager) and three attorneys who worked at
       the firm—Mackenzie Cole, Brooks Neely, and Ben Copeland.
       They testified that Mr. Detling was in charge of the firm, and that
       no major decision was made without his permission. Ms. Ingram
       and Ms. Cole also testified that they did not have access to or con-
       trol over the firm’s accounts. The jury also heard testimony from
       four representatives of Litigation Ventures and Mighty Financing
       who stated that they dealt with Mr. Detling exclusively on the liti-
       gation advances, and their testimony was corroborated by numer-
       ous emails and other business records. They also testified that, had
       they known that Mr. Detling’s clients had not authorized the ad-
       vances or received the funds, they never would have approved the

       3
         To convict Mr. Detling of wire fraud, the government needed to prove be-
       yond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally participated in a scheme to de-
       fraud and that he used the interstate wires in furtherance of the scheme. See
       United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003). To convict him
       of aggravated identity theft, the government needed to prove that he (1)
       knowingly transferred, possessed, or used, (2) without lawful authority, (3) a
       means of identification of another person or a false identification document
       (4) during and in relation to the wire fraud offense. See United States v. Bonilla,
       579 F.3d 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10630

       funding. The evidence further showed that Mr. Detling personally
       signed the applications for the advances. He also picked up and
       endorsed each of the fraudulently-obtained checks.
              The government also presented testimony from several of
       Mr. Detling’s clients, who were victims of the scheme. They ex-
       plained that they never signed or authorized the fraudulent financ-
       ing. FBI Special Agent Antoinette Ferrari testified that she had
       traced the fraudulently obtained funds, and she determined that
       the funds did not go to Mr. Detling’s clients and instead were used
       for the firm’s expenses.
              Mr. Detling finally argues that the district court erred in
       truncating and omitting part of the instruction on deliberate igno-
       rance. The district court instructed the jury that “knowledge”
       could be found if Mr. Detling was “aware of a high probability that
       the fact existed” without also instructing the jury that it must first
       find that he “took deliberate steps to avoid the knowledge.” We
       agree with Mr. Detling that the failure to include this latter portion
       was error. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754,
       769 (2011).
              We nevertheless affirm because the error was harmless.
       Given the nearly overwhelming evidence of intent, the truncated
       deliberate ignorance instruction did not affect Mr. Detling’s sub-
       stantial rights. See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1572 (11th
       Cir. 1991) (error in giving deliberate indifference instruction was
       harmless because the “jury was also instructed that it could convict
       based on a theory of actual knowledge” and “there was sufficient
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       22-10630               Opinion of the Court                        7

       evidence to support the convictions under that theory[.]”); United
       States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 977 (11th Cir. 2008) (“instructing the
       jury on deliberate ignorance is harmless error where the jury was
       also instructed and could have convicted on an alternative, suffi-
       ciently supported theory of actual knowledge”). Here, the jury
       was instructed that it could convict based on his actual knowledge,
       see D.E. 153 at 8–9, and, as explained above, there was plenty of
       evidence that Mr. Detling had actual knowledge of the fraud. For
       instance, the representatives of the financing companies testified
       that they only dealt with Mr. Detling on the fraudulent litigation
       advances, and Mr. Detling’s signature appeared on the applications
       for the fraudulent financing. See D.E. 214 at 143; D.E. 215 at 194–
       95, 213; D.E. 217 at 101–103, 120–21. Moreover, the government
       did not argue in closing that Mr. Detling was deliberately ignorant
       but rather told the jury that he intentionally engaged in fraud. See
       D.E. 219 at 92 (“He’s not randomly relying on Ms. Cole and Ms.
       Ingram and sticking his head in the sand and not finding out what’s
       going on. He is making representation, after representation to the
       financing companies . . . .”). Given the significant amount of evi-
       dence that Mr. Detling knowingly and intentionally committed
       wire fraud and aggravated identity theft, the district court’s error
       in omitting part of the deliberate ignorance instruction was harm-
       less.
             AFFIRMED.