Court Opinion

ID: 9756286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:20:35.369269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:17.495874
License: Public Domain

Rubinow, J.
(dissenting). On the issue of the value of the land taken, the majority opinion holds that the referee should not have considered the evidence concerning the sale price of the BeckermanG-ampel parcel. The opinion does not, however, find error in the referee’s admitting that evidence, and holds that that evidence “could be found to be clearly relevant.”
The consequence of the majority opinion is that this admitted evidence, which the referee could properly find “clearly relevant,” has no more probative force than if it had been excluded. This anomalous result is reached on the ground that, if the price paid in a comparable sale has been influenced by a proposed public improvement, the landowner’s evidence about the comparable sale “must be accompanied” by evidence proving the amount of the “increment of value” resulting from that improvement; and that if that evidence of the comparable sale is not so “accompanied,” the referee must disregard that evidence of the comparable sale.
This holding of the majority opinion is not supported by the case cited as authority for the holding; *183and this holding departs from the sound general rule that the condemnor, not the landowner, has the burden of proving facts that would reduce the landowner’s damages. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I
The sole case cited in the majority opinion as authority for its holding is United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S. Ct. 276, 87 L. Ed. 336. The pertinent facts there were that, in the course of a jury trial to determine the value of land taken for a public improvement, the court, on objection by the condemnor (p. 372), ruled that questions calling for an opinion as to the market value of the land taken had to be framed so as to exclude any increased value attributable to the public improvement. The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the rule that a landowner cannot recover for enhanced value attributable to a public improvement, and said, in discussing the trial court’s ruling (p. 380): “They [the landowners] allege that, in California courts, an opinion witness must state his valuation as at the date of taking and the opposing party is at liberty, upon cross-examination, to elicit the facts on which the witness relied in arriving at that value. Counsel insist that if the Government was entitled to have the witnesses disregard any increment of value due to the Government’s intention to construct the project, it could have developed, on cross-examination, how far the inclusion of any such element had affected the value stated. We think that probably under California procedure this would have been the better and more appropriate way to develop the basis of the witnesses’ opinions. We do not feel, however, that if there was a disregard of the local *184practice in this aspect the error is substantial or worked injury to the . . . [landowners].”
Even if this quotation is interpreted as approving the trial court’s ruling in the Miller case, the decision in that case is inapplicable as a precedent in the case at bar for three reasons: (1) The trial court’s ruling concerned opinion evidence on the valuation of the taken parcel, not factual evidence of the sale price of a comparable parcel. (2) The trial court’s ruling was made in response to an objection by the condemnor to the form of a question; no such objection was made in this case. (3) The trial court’s ruling specified the conditions under which valuation-opinion would be admitted into evidence ; the ruling did not purport to limit the use of evidence after it had been admitted.
II
As the above quotation from the Miller case demonstrates, the issue of enhancement may be raised by means other than by objecting to the form of a question. Thus, the decision in the Miller case makes reference to the “California procedure,” under which cross-examination by the condemnor may be used to determine the extent to which value attributable to enhancement has been included in a valuation. Another method of raising the issue is suggested by Manning v. Redevelopment Agency of Newport, 103 R.I. 371, 238 A.2d 378, where the court held that if evidence of a claimed comparable sale is objected to on the ground that, by reason of enhancement, there is no comparability, the issue of comparability may be treated as a preliminary question of fact, and the party offering the evidence should have an opportunity to establish comparability.
*185Regardless, however, of the method by which the issue of public-improvement value-enhancement is raised, the purpose of raising the issue is to attempt to cause the trier to find a “net market value,” i.e., market value less enhancement, for either the parcel taken or the comparable parcel, and to have the damages awarded on the basis of the “net market value” instead of the market value. Hence, to the extent that the trier finds that the market value of the taken parcel or the sale price of the comparable parcel has been enhanced by the public improvement, the trier will reduce that market value or that sale price when he determines the landowner’s damages. In short, with respect to the purpose of the proof, there is no difference between proof of enhancement and proof of any other fact that will tend to reduce the amount of a condemnation award.
The majority opinion does not state on what theory the landowner should reasonably be expected to introduce evidence for the purpose of reducing the amount that will be awarded to him. “While the issues in . . . [condemnation] cases are limited, such cases are nonetheless adversary in character, and manifestly, the . . . [landowner] was under no duty to produce evidence for the sole benefit of the . . . [condemnor].” Long v. Director of Highways, 44 Ohio Op. 2d 426, 427, 240 N.E.2d 569. “Although no . . . cases [in this jurisdiction] have been called to our attention on the point, the general rule requires the owner to maintain the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his right to damage and the amount thereof, while the burden is on the condemnor to show matters which tend to reduce or mitigate the damage.” Arnold v. Maine State Highway Commission, 283 A.2d 655, 658 (Me.). “Even in those jurisdictions where the general rule *186[i.e., that the burden of proof of damages is on the landowner] prevails, the burden is on the condemnor to produce evidence which minimizes the value or damages.” 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) § 18.5, pp. 18-259 — 18-262. For cases in other jurisdictions applying the general rule, see Green County v. Hicks, 249 Ark. 69, 458 S.W.2d 152; Twenty Club v. State, 167 Neb. 37, 91 N.W.2d 64; State Highway Commission v. Thomas, 2 N.C. App. 679, 163 S.E.2d 649; State Highway Commission v. Hollins, 471 P.2d 324 (Wyo.). Clark v. Cox, 134 Conn. 226, 235, 56 A.2d 512, held that the condemnor has the burden of proving conditions that take a condemnation case out of the general rule that the condemnor is liable for interest from the date of taking to the date of judgment. Although that holding is limited to allocating the burden of proving mitigation of that portion of damages represented by the interest, the court there recognized that condemnation proceedings are “adversary proceedings” (p. 234) and that the condemnor may have the burden of proving facts that would cause the award to be made on a basis other than the general rule of market value plus interest.
Ill
In cases involving the issue of the market value of real property, comparable sales have hitherto been considered preferred evidence. “In other words, the best test is ordinarily that of market sales.” Sibley v. Middlefield, 143 Conn. 100, 107, 120 A.2d 77.
Neither in the authorities nor in the practice of valuation litigation is there any precedent for the limitation placed in this case on the probative value of this “best-test” evidence. The burden of proving the extent of enhancement in the price of a com*187parable sale should be on the party who benefits from that proof, i.e., the condemnor. If the condemnor has that burden, any error of the referee in this ease in finding the extent of enhancement without evidence is harmless error, since the effect of the error is to benefit the condemnor by deducting the amount of the enhancement from the sale price of the comparable parcel. That deducting process makes the “net market value” of the comparable parcel less than the price paid for it, and it is that “net market value,” rather than the sale price, that the referee used in arriving at his decision as to the market value of the taken parcel.
In this opinion Them, J., concurred.