Court Opinion

ID: 9951142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 17:03:20.516843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:17.828695
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 Llusha v. County of Marin CA1/5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 STELA LLUSHA,
          Petitioner and Appellant,                               A166492
 v.
 COUNTY OF MARIN,                                                 (Marin County Super. Ct. No.
          Respondent;                                             CIV2102268)
 CHRISTOPHER MADDOX,
          Real Party in Interest.

      Confronted with a deteriorating septic system on his
family’s hillside Marin County (County) property, Christopher
Maddox applied for and obtained a permit to replace it. That
permit included approval to construct a four-foot high retaining
wall in place of an existing solid wood fence on the property’s
northern boundary. When Maddox was later advised the wall’s
highest section would have to reach five feet, three inches from
ground level, he applied for an amended permit and initiated the
County’s design review process. The County planning division
granted the application over opposition from downslope neighbor
Stela Llusha. After unsuccessfully appealing that decision to the
County’s planning commission and then to its board of
supervisors (Board), Llusha petitioned in the superior court for
writ of mandamus—again without success.

                                                1
      We affirm. Contrary to Llusha’s assertions, the trial
court correctly (1) found the County properly limited the
scope of Llusha’s successive appeals to the retaining wall;
(2) declined to augment the record with information that
was not before the planning division when it considered
Maddox’s application for the amended permit; and (3) found
substantial evidence and adequate findings for the Board’s
decision.

                        BACKGROUND

      In 2018, the planning commission approved Maddox’s plans
to demolish and replace his family’s existing home on a small,
steeply sloped property on Ridge Avenue. To support a necessary
new septic system, the permit authorized a four-foot high
retaining wall along Maddox’s rear property line with Llusha,
which would replace an existing solid four-foot high wood fence
between the parcels. The septic permit expired before Maddox
began the work, but in the spring of 2020, with the system
starting to show unpleasant signs of failing, Maddox successfully
applied to the County’s environmental health services
department to reinstate it. The validity of the reinstated septic
permit is not at issue.

      As work on the new system got underway, Maddox’s septic
engineer determined it would be necessary to increase the
retaining wall’s height by 15 inches along its southernmost 10
feet. Accordingly, Maddox applied for design review approval of
the change. So amended, the permit would authorize an
approximately 35-foot long retaining wall, backfilled to
incorporate the septic system into the hillside and topped with a
four-foot high, see-through hog wire fence. Its tallest section
would reach five feet, three inches, exceeding the height of the
existing property line fence by an amount decreasing from 15
inches to zero over the course of 10 horizontal feet.

                                2
       In September 2020, the County’s planning division staff
conducted a site visit, posted a notice of Maddox’s application
visible from Ridge Avenue, and posted information about the
application on the County website. The following month the
County posted two more notices about the project on its website
and directed interested parties to submit comments by November
11, 2020.

       Llusha owns the property immediately north and
downslope of the project site. On November 18, 2020, through
counsel, she objected that the redesigned retaining wall violated
the County’s design review provisions by “creat[ing]
unarticulated massing that is incompatible with the
neighborhood, and, specifically, [my property].” She asserted the
retaining wall failed to provide appropriate separation between
the properties, retain healthy native vegetation, and assure
adequate landscaping. Furthermore, its appearance from her
property was “not as required in the ‘mass and bulk’ findings set
forth in the design review ordinance. In fact, the mass and bulk
of a proposed structure in close proximity to the shared boundary,
and encroaching into [her] property, creates such a looming
impact as to completely change the quality of life at [her home].”
Llusha also asked the County to delay its decision because she
had not been given timely notice.

       Llusha’s letter enclosed comments from consulting engineer
Michael Watkins, also dated November 18, 2020. Watkins opined
the proposed design did not comply with County code provisions
applicable to “retaining wall and fence location at the property
line” and that it would diminish Llusha’s privacy.

      On December 8, 2020, the planning division approved the
amended plan. After confirming its receipt of Llusha’s November
18, 2020, letter and reviewing her concerns, it explained:
“Pursuant to the Design Review findings that have been made
consistent with Section 22.42.060 of the Marin County

                                3
Development Code below, the project, consisting of a retaining
wall and fencing, provides architectural design, massing,
materials and scale compatible with the neighborhood and has
been designed to avoid adversely affecting the privacy of
downslope properties. [Llusha’s residence] is oriented to the
northeast with primary views located away from the subject
property. Existing mature vegetation is located along the
downslope area of the subject property and between the two
properties as observed by staff during a site visit on September
22, 2020.” The planning division found the amended project was
consistent with the Marin Countywide Plan, the Tamalpais Area
Community Plan, and mandatory findings for Design Review
approval.

      Llusha appealed to the County’s planning
commission. As relevant here, her appeal petition asserted
the “depicted wall/height of 9 feet 3 inches” was
inconsistent with the County code; its height, bulk, and
mass were out of character with the neighborhood and
negatively affected her property, walkway, and
landscaping; the design review findings were unsupported
by substantial evidence; she was not given adequate notice;
and an engineering survey was outdated.

       On February 5, 2021, several days before the
planning commission hearing, Llusha’s attorney wrote the
commission reiterating her earlier complaints about the
retaining wall and, for the first time, asserting there were
significant shortcomings in the engineering of the septic
system. Counsel’s letter attached a second report from
Watkins, also dated February 5, 2021, criticizing the septic
system’s design. In Watkins’s view, the retaining wall and
its backfill would “in effect rotate” the property line’s
contours, which would “draw the leech [sic] field closer to
the property line.” Watkins also expressed concern about

                                4
the septic system’s interaction with drains at the base of the wall
and that “the retaining wall project under consideration and the
septic system replacement project have not been well
coordinated, and as a result the retaining wall project creates
some issues which are not code compliant and not recommended
by the design engineer of the septic system project.”

       At the February 8, 2021, planning commission hearing,
Llusha’s attorney and Watkins testified about Watkins’s reports.
Countering his concerns, Maddox’s septic designer and land use
planning consultant testified that (1) the placement of the
retaining wall and backfill above the native grade made it
impossible for effluent from the septic system to drain onto
Llusha’s property; (2) the wall and backfill would not affect the
septic system’s functioning or design; and (3) there was no code
violation from any change to the property’s contour.

      The planning commission found the planning division’s
design review findings were substantiated and that the project
complied with relevant local policies and findings required for
design review approval. It denied Llusha’s appeal by unanimous
vote and approved the project.

      Llusha next appealed to the Board. On April 25, 2021, two
days before the Board hearing, Watkins submitted a third report
asserting there were errors and omissions in the plans,
specifications, and design for the retaining wall and septic system
and warning the septic system could leach effluent onto Llusha’s
property if it failed.

      At the Board hearing, County environmental health
department staff (which had approved the septic system in a
separate process) testified that they had reviewed the revised
plans for the retaining wall and found that the proposed design
posed no problem for the septic system and complied with the
code. County staff clarified, moreover, that only the retaining
wall, not the septic system, was subject to design review—i.e., the
                                 5
matter on appeal to the Board. The Board president
confirmed that point, noting that only the height of the
retaining wall was subject to review: “We don’t have in our
authority today any decision related to the septic system,
that’s Environmental Health jurisdiction.” Llusha’s
counsel repeated his client’s objections to the “design
component of the retaining wall that interacts or possibly
doesn’t interact with the septic system in the event of a
failure” and the “unaddressed potential” for effluent to flow
downhill. The Board unanimously approved the amended
permit.

      These proceedings ensued. Llusha’s petition for writ
of administrative mandamus asserted the retaining wall
project failed to satisfy various County and state design
review findings and standards and, further, that the
Board’s action was an abuse of discretion and unsupported
by substantial evidence.

       The court rejected each point. Finding the scope of
Llusha’s administrative appeal was limited to the planning
division’s design review findings concerning the retaining
wall and its effect on her property and landscaping, it ruled
the design of the septic system and its potential impact on
Llusha’s property “are not part of Petitioner’s appeal of the
December 8, 2020 decision and cannot be made part of
subsequent appeals.” On the merits, the court found the
Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and
adequate findings. Accordingly, it denied the petition.

      The court also denied Llusha’s motions to augment
the administrative record with (and alternative request for
judicial notice of) the February 5 and April 25, 2021, letters
and reports from Watkins and counsel because they were
not before the planning division when it issued its
December 8, 2020, decision. Moreover, “[a]s neither the

                                 6
[planning commission] nor [the Board] have cited to any of these
late-presented documents, no error appears to have been made
and the evaluation of the [design review board’s] decision first by
the [planning commission] and subsequently by the [Board] was
appropriately limited to evidence before the [design review board]
prior to its rendering of a decision.”

                          DISCUSSION

      Llusha asserts the court erred when it (1) found the scope
of her appeal to the Board did not extend to the septic system and
(2) denied her motion to augment the administrative record with
the documents that were never before the planning division. She
also contends the Board’s decision was unsupported by adequate
findings and substantial evidence. As shall be seen, none of these
contentions has merit.

       Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.51 provides the
procedure for judicial review of adjudicatory decisions rendered
by administrative agencies. (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic
Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514.)
The inquiry in such cases extends to whether the agency
proceeded without or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was
a fair trial; and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of
discretion, which is established if the agency did not proceed in
the legally required manner, the decision is not supported by the
findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (§
1094.5, subd. (b).) Where, as here, the underlying administrative
mandamus case does not implicate a fundamental vested right,
we review the administrative decision, not the trial court's ruling.
(Young v. City of Coronado (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 408, 418-419
(Young).)

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.
                                 7
                                    A.

        We turn first to Llusha’s contention the trial court erred in
determining the design of the septic system and its potential
impact on her parcel were beyond the scope of her administrative
appeal and writ petition. She maintains she was not
required to preserve those issues by raising them in the
planning division or planning commission. Rather, in her
view, the County code allowed her to raise them for the
first time in her administrative appeals and, consequently,
in her mandamus petition. We are unpersuaded.

      First, there were no issues concerning the septic
system for Llusha to appeal to the planning commission
and Board. When Maddox discovered the retaining wall
had to be higher than the approved four feet, County code
required him to apply to the planning division for design
review. (Marin Mun. Code, § 22.20.060, subd. (F.)(2.).)
Neither his application, Llusha’s opposition, nor the
planning division’s decision extended beyond the design
considerations implicated by the redesigned retaining wall
to address the previously approved septic system.

      Nor was there any reason to include the septic
system in the design review proceedings; the County’s
environmental health department, not its planning division
or planning commission, had jurisdiction over the septic
system and had, in fact, considered and reapproved its
design with the higher retaining wall and related drain.
After considering testimony to that effect, the Board
explicitly, and reasonably, determined the interaction of
the septic system and redesigned retaining wall had been
addressed by the environmental health department, and
affirmed that its own authority in the design review appeal
was limited to the retaining wall itself. (See Protect Our
Neighborhoods v. City of Palm Springs (2022) 73

                                     8
Cal.App.5th 667, 678 [courts accord great weight to local agency’s
interpretation of its own ordinance].)

       Llusha relies on BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1221 (BreakZone) for the proposition
that parties are free to raise new issues in administrative appeals
from local agency decisions. BreakZone held an administrative
appeal of a planning commission decision was a de novo
proceeding at which all issues were before the city council. (Ibid.;
see also Lagrutta v. City Council (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 890, 894-
895.) But BreakZone itself acknowledges that this is not the case
where local ordinances provide otherwise. (BreakZone, supra, at
p. 1221, fn. 10.) Here, the County code provides that
administrative appeals must be filed in writing and must
specifically state the pertinent facts and bases for the appeal.
(Marin Mun. Code, § 22.114.030, subd. (B.).) Llusha’s appeal
petition identified only the design of the wall and fence, not the
septic system, as the basis for her appeal. BreakZone,
accordingly, is inapposite.

       Llusha disagrees. She interprets a County code provision
that allows the reviewing body to consider “any issue involving
the matter that is the subject of the appeal, in addition to the
specific grounds for the appeal” (Marin Mun. Code, § 22.114.040,
subd. (B.)(1.), italics added) to require the Board to address and
decide her complaints about the septic system. Not so. Assuming
for purposes of argument that the septic system or its interaction
with the retaining wall was “an issue involving” the retaining
wall’s design in a general sense, it was not the “subject of the
appeal” because that issue had been decided by a separate
agency, in a separate decision, and was therefore, as the Board
president observed, beyond its authority in Llusha’s design
review appeal. Llusha provides no reason why, in this situation,
she was entitled to collaterally attack that decision in her appeals
to the planning commission or the Board.

                                 9
       Llusha’s remaining arguments on this point are also
unpersuasive. As the scope of her administrative appeal
was determined by the County’s procedures (Tahoe Vista
Concerned Citizens v. County of Placer (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 577, 592, fn. 6), it is irrelevant that state law
did not also require her to raise all issues in her written
appeal petition to preserve them for review. (See Gov.
Code, § 65009, subd. (b).)2 Nor does it matter that review
by the planning commission and Board is de novo. As in
Tahoe Vista, supra, at page 592, although those agencies
“would consider the matter ‘over again,’ or in legal
parlance, de novo,” the grounds for appeal were limited to
those within the scope of the appeal under the applicable
rules.
                                  B.

      These conclusions also defeat Llusha’s contention
that the trial court erred when it declined to augment the
administrative record with the letters her attorney and
engineer provided after the planning division approved the
redesigned wall.3 The court explained: “As these
documents were not before the [design review board], they
are post-decision documents, making them extrinsic to [its]
determination and therefore improper to include” in the

      2 Government Code section 65009 was adopted with the

aim of “reduc[ing] delays and restraints upon expeditiously
completing housing projects.” (Gov. Code, § 65009, subd. (a).)
Pursuant to Government Code section 65009, subdivision (b)(1),
“In an action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or
annul a finding, determination, or decision of a public agency . . .
the issues raised shall be limited to those raised in the public
hearing or in written correspondence delivered to the public
agency prior to, or at, the public hearing” except in specified
circumstances not present here.
      3 Llusha has not challenged the court’s denial of her

companion request for judicial notice of these same documents.
                                 10
administrative record. The court further observed it would not
have ruled differently on the petition had it considered the
excluded letters, “since the Court’s finding that the [design
review board’s] decision was supported by substantial evidence is
not affected by the fact that other evidence in the AR may dispute
the evidence relied on.”

       Reviewing this ruling for abuse of discretion, we
reverse only if the excluded evidence was relevant and was
either improperly excluded during the administrative
proceeding or could not, with reasonable diligence, have
been presented before the administrative agency made its
decision. (Evans v. City of San Jose (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th
1123, 1143.) Llusha has not met that burden. The post-design
review documents largely addressed issues with the septic
system, but, as explained, those issues had been resolved in
separate proceedings in a separate County department and were
thus irrelevant to the design review proceedings. To the extent
the documents also touched on the redesigned retaining wall,
they were largely duplicative of the information before the
planning division during the design review proceedings. To the
minor extent they were not (for example, Watkins’s April 25,
2021 letter complained generally of unidentified “flaw[s],”
“technical issues,” “inconsistencies,” and “inaccuracies” in
Maddox’s plans and that that two “sheets” of the plans submitted
for design review were not properly stamped and signed), Llusha
has not identified any relevance they might have to the County’s
decision. Accordingly, even assuming County procedures allowed
the planning commission and Board to consider evidence that
was not considered in the underlying design review proceeding —
a question we need not decide here—Llusha has failed to make
the showing of relevance required to establish the court abused
its discretion in declining to augment the record. (See Sieg v. Fogt
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 77, 88 [appellant in administrative

                                11
mandamus proceeding bears the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating error].)

                                 C.

      Finally, Llusha contends a number of the Board’s
findings are unsupported by substantial evidence and/or
adequate findings. This contention is also meritless.

                                 1.

       An agency’s findings are presumed to be supported
by the record, and an appellant challenging them has the
burden to show they are not. (Young, supra, 10
Cal.App.5th at p. 427.) We may reverse the agency’s
decision only if, based on the evidence, no reasonable
person could have reached its conclusion. (Ibid.)

       For the most part, Llusha’s substantial evidence
argument rests on her view that the administrative record
contained evidence that supports a decision to deny
Maddox’s application, which, she asserts, the trial court
and Board “disregarded,” “ignored,” and “failed to analyze”
or “consider.” To the extent she aims this critique at the
trial court, it is misguided. “On appeal from the denial of a
petition for writ of mandate, our role is identical to that of
the trial court with respect to the administrative record.
That is, both the trial and appellate courts must determine
whether the record is free from legal error. Thus, the trial
court’s conclusions and disposition of the issues are not
conclusive on the court of appeal.” (Alberstone v. California
Coastal Com. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 859, 863.)

      To the extent Llusha’s argument is, rather, that the
Board failed to consider or give adequate weight to the
evidence in her favor, it is misconceived. Our charge on
review from an administrative decision under section
                                 12
1094.5 is to examine all relevant evidence in the record,
considering both the evidence that supports the agency’s
decision and the evidence against it, to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence. But we do not reweigh the
evidence. (Young, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 427.) Rather,
drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in
favor of the administrative decision, we determine whether there
is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that
supports it when viewed in the light most favorable to the
agency’s decision. (Ibid.; Furtado v. State Personnel Bd. (2013)
212 Cal.App.4th 729, 742.)

       Llusha’s claims, scattered throughout and comprising the
lion’s share of her attacks on the findings, that the Board failed
to properly credit (or even consider) her own evidence over
Maddox’s are thus unavailing.4 The administrative record
contains a wealth of evidence, including information gathered
during site visits by staff, planning commissioners and the
Board’s president; photographs of the concerned properties;
project plans and designs; engineering and geotechnical reports;
testimony from neighbors and technical professionals; and
information about the neighborhood, the topography, and the
nature and appearance of the materials to be used. Reviewed
under the correct standard, we are satisfied it provided a
sufficient basis, i.e., evidence that is “ ‘ “reasonable in nature,
credible, and of solid value” ’ ” (Ofsevit v. Trustees of Cal. State
University & Colleges (1978) 21 Cal.3d 763, 773, fn. 9), for the
Board's findings.

      4 Her complaint that the Board failed to consider her

evidence about the septic system, assuming it to be true, is also
irrelevant given our determination in section A, infra, that the
septic system was not at issue in the design review proceedings.
                                 13
                                 2.

       Llusha further asserts that certain findings are
inadequately linked to the supporting evidence. “[I]mplicit
in section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency which
renders the challenged decision must set forth findings to
bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and
ultimate decision or order . . . . By focusing . . . upon the
relationships between evidence and findings and between
findings and ultimate action, the Legislature sought to
direct the reviewing court’s attention to the analytic route
the administrative agency traveled from evidence to
action.” (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County
of Los Angeles, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p.515.)

       Findings must thus be sufficient to enable the parties
to decide whether and upon what basis to seek review and
to allow a reviewing court to determine the basis for the
agency’s action. (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v.
County of Los Angeles (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1348, 1356
(Topanga II).) “However, great specificity is not required.
It is enough if the findings form an analytic bridge between
the evidence and the agency’s decision [Citation.] In
addition, findings are to be liberally construed to support
rather than defeat the decision under review. [Citation.]
‘[W]here reference to the administrative record informs the
parties and reviewing courts of the theory upon which an
agency has arrived at its ultimate finding and decision it
has long been recognized that the decision should be upheld
if the agency “in truth found those facts which as a matter
of law are essential to sustain its . . . [decision].”
[Citations.]’ ” (Ibid.) With these principles in mind, we
turn to those findings Llusha maintains are legally
inadequate.

                                14
       Finding 9(E) states the retaining wall project is consistent
with County water quality policies and would not result in
substantial erosion or discharge sediments or pollutants because
the planned grading and drainage improvements complied with
County standards and best management practices. In support, it
cites County staff’s testimony that Maddox’s system would not
discharge effluent onto Llusha’s property. This satisfies the
Topanga II requirements.

       Llusha’s challenge to the finding that the project was
consistent with seismic hazard policies (Finding 9(F)) fares no
better. Here, the Board found the retaining wall “would be
constructed in conformance with County earthquake standards,
as verified during review of the Building Permit application and
the subject property is not constrained by unusual geotechnical
problems, such as existing fault traces.” Llusha objects that the
Board “fail[ed] to set forth what evidence was used to make this
finding,” but there is no legal requirement that design review
findings must include specific citation to the administrative
record. Indeed, such a requirement would be at odds with the
established rule that findings “ ‘are generally permitted
considerable latitude with regard to their precision, formality,
and matters reasonably implied therein’ ” and “ ‘do not need to be
extensive or detailed.’ ” (Young, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 421,
italics omitted.) In any event, she herself notes the
administrative record includes a geotechnical report that found
“the risk of ground rupture along a fault trace is low at this site.”

       Finding 9(H) states the project is consistent with County
aesthetic requirements “because it would protect scenic quality
and views of ridgelines and the natural environment from
adverse impacts related to development.” Llusha’s claim that
this finding “fails to articulate what evidence forms the basis for
the finding” suffers the same flaw as her challenge to the seismic
finding: its basis is clear from evidence the wall will be screened

                                 15
by dense foliage; the preexisting four-foot high fence in the
same location had similar visual impacts; and Llusha’s
views are primarily oriented away from the project. (See
Topanga II, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1356.)

       Llusha’s remaining challenges to the findings also
concern the project’s potential aesthetic impacts on its
surroundings. Thus, finding 9(I) states the project is
consistent with the County’s residential design policies
because it would fit within the context of the neighborhood,
minimize the perception of mass and bulk, and comply with
design guidelines for single family homes. Finding 10(A)
states the project is consistent with community character
because it would preserve and enhance the characteristics
of its surroundings and be compatible with the
neighborhood with respect to bulk, mass, height, colors,
materials, and design. Finding 11(A) states the project is
consistent with design guidelines and discretionary
development standards “because it is designed to avoid
adversely affecting natural resources and the character of
the local community,” specifically because retaining walls
and fences are typical features in the neighborhood and
their materials would complement the design and “earth-
toned and subdued colors” typical of the area. The rest of
the challenged findings do not differ in any meaningful
way: 11(B) [design, massing and scale are compatible with
surroundings and community], 11(C) [site layout and
design avoid eliminating sunlight, blocking primary views,
or affecting privacy], and 11(E) [project provides
appropriate separation and screening between buildings].

      Each of these findings is amply supported by project
plans and designs, maps, photographs, and County
personnel’s physical inspections of the site. It is

                                 16
abundantly clear from the administrative record how the Board
arrived at them. There was no error.

                              DISPOSITION

      The orders denying Llusha’s motion to augment the
administrative record and petition for writ of mandamus are
affirmed. Maddox is entitled to costs on appeal.

                                                     BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.

Llusha v. County of Marin (A166492)

                                      17