Court Opinion

ID: 9540897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:20:34.423364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:28.580677
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
Once again we confront the question of whether an informant’s tip furnished the police with probable cause to make a war-rantless arrest. We would do well to begin this inquiry by noting that although there is an established analytical framework for principled decision-making in this area of the law, “[t]he unique circumstances under which each case arises ... makes the term ‘binding precedent’ a misnomer.” United States v. Mason, 450 A.2d 464, 466 (D.C.1982); see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 n. 11, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (“There are so many variables in the probable-cause equation that one determination will , seldom be a useful ‘precedent’ for another.”). The majority opinion, however, belies the complexity of the inquiry before us, and in doing so, reaches a result contrary to the fundamental protections afforded by the fourth amendment’s probable cause requirement. I dissent.
I.
First, we must revisit the facts. Officer Shields testified that on the evening of October 28, 1986, a paid police informant with whom he had worked in the past, telephoned him with information concerning a slender, six-foot black man named “Jamie.” He stated that the informant told him that Jamie “usually” sold drugs, “frequently” from the comer of Mozart and Fuller Streets, N.W., and that he “does sell drugs on a daily basis.”1 The informant further stated that he had purchased cocaine from Jamie’s vehicle at that location within the past seventy-two hours. The informant gave Officer Shields the license tag number of the silver BMW Jamie had been driving when he purchased the cocaine, and told him that Jamie lived in the 400 block of Columbia Road.
The next morning, Officer Shields ran a tag check and found that the BMW was registered to someone residing at 423 Columbia Road, N.W.2 Shortly thereafter, Officer Shields and three other officers began a stakeout of that address. At no time during the day-long surveillance, which lasted from 9 a.m. until approximately 7 *103p.m., did the stakeout team see a silver BMW in the neighborhood. At about 1 p.m., Officer Shields left the team and went to pick up the informant, who he then brought back to the stakeout location. No one matching the informant’s description was seen entering or leaving the residence until approximately 7 p.m., when the informant identified an individual leaving the house as Jamie [Goldston]. Goldston entered a white Audi, drove several blocks to the comer of Mozart and Fuller Streets, N.W., parked and then exited his car. Meanwhile, the stakeout team, which consisted of Officer Shields and the informant in one car and the other members of the team in a second car, had been following Goldston. Upon arriving at the intersection, the informant told Officer Shields that the persons standing around the area were waiting for Jamie, a statement to which the members of the stakeout team in the second car apparently were not privy.3 Although the informant stated that he had purchased the drugs from Jamie as Jamie sat in his car, there is no evidence that the people allegedly waiting for Jamie approached the car; rather the testimony shows that the officers from the second car arrested Goldston as he left his car. In the search incident to arrest, the police recovered five packets of cocaine.4
The trial judge denied Goldston’s motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the police had probable cause to arrest him based on the informant’s tip. The judge found that there was sufficient indi-cia of reliability to conclude that probable cause existed based on the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge, and the independent corroboration of certain facts presented in the tip. Nevertheless, she could not “refrain from expressing [her] belief that the officer cut it a little close.”
II.
The trial court’s starting point, like ours, is the “totality of circumstances” test set out in Gates, supra, and applied by this court in see, e.g., Jefferson v. United States, 476 A.2d 685, 686 (D.C.1984).5 To determine whether an informant’s tip constitutes probable cause we may consider his veracity and basis of knowledge, and other indicia of reliability at our disposal, including the corroborative efforts of the police. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 230, 233, 241-42, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2329, 2333-34. If one of the relevant indicia is deficient, it is not necessarily fatal to a finding of probable cause, for a strong showing of reliability in another area may cure the defect. Id. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. This approach “permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indi-cia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant’s tip.... ” Id. at 234, 103 S.Ct. at 2330 (emphasis added). Contrary to the majority’s assertions, supra notes 9 & 11, I harbor no illusions that an informant should be infallible or that we judges deal with anything more than probabilities in a case such as this. I believe that under Gates we are bound to make a substantive and searching inquiry into each and every circumstance pertaining to the reliability or unreliability of a tip, and only then can we make a proper determination as to whether probable cause existed.
A. The Veracity Criterion
The trial court concluded, and the majority agrees, that the informant’s “long and *104significant history of productive tips and the absence of unproductive tips, at least in the evidence,” satisfies the veracity prong of the inquiry notwithstanding the fact that he is an unidentified, paid police informant who obtained his information through an uncontrolled, unverifiable drug purchase up to three days before making his call to the police.6
The credibility or truthfulness of paid informants has always been subject to rigorous scrutiny because they are typically drawn from the criminal milieu and have unascertainable, suspect motives for divulging their information. See Rutledge v. United States, 392 A.2d 1062, 1066 (D.C.1978); Nance v. United States, 377 A.2d 384, 389 (D.C.1977), overruled in part, Jefferson, supra, 476 A.2d 686 (overruling Nance “to the extent” it held that corroboration of innocent details is not of significant value in determining veracity of tip). See generally Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L.Rev. 741, 765-73 (1974). At the suppression hearing, defense counsel’s attempt to probe the credibility issue was frustrated, however, when the trial judge improperly sustained the government’s objections to questions concerning the informant’s standing in the community, his criminal record and whether he came from the criminal milieu. This court has consistently approved of this line of questioning to examine an informant’s credibility:
Without violating the confidences of his source, the agent surely could describe for the magistrate such things as the informer’s general background, employment, personal attributes that enable him to observe and relate accurately, position in the community, reputation with others, personal connection with the suspect, any circumstances which suggest the probable absence of any motivation to falsify, the apparent motivation for supplying the information, the presence or absence of a criminal record or association with known criminals, and the like.
Nance, supra, 377 A.2d at 389 n. 5 (quoting United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 600, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2090, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added); see Rutledge, supra, 392 A.2d at 1066 n. 7.
Defense counsel’s questions were proper, and indeed necessary to determine whether the informant could be trusted to tell the truth, notwithstanding his track record. The trial judge erred by curtailing this line of inquiry.7 This error was particularly damaging to Goldston in light of other indicia of unreliability present in the informant’s tip. Unlike the majority, I cannot say that this error did not deprive Goldston “in a fundamental sense”; given the nature of the error it seems that we are forever foreclosed from making such a determination.
Neither am I persuaded that the informant’s trustworthiness is bolstered by virtue of his alleged declaration against his penal interest, to wit, he admitted participating in an illegal drug transaction. To begin with, although facially against his penal interest, the admission clearly was not contrary to his penal interest because he has never been identified and has previously gathered information through uncontrolled purchases of drugs without being prosecuted. In addition, the informant neither showed nor gave the police the drugs he allegedly purchased, and therefore no evidence exists with which to prosecute him. Under these circumstances, there is no basis whatsoever to conclude that the informant believed his inculpatory statement could subject him to criminal liability.8 Consequently, common sense and rea*105son defy any characterization of his admission as a declaration against his penal interest whereby his credibility is enhanced. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 594-96, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2087-88, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the timeliness of an admission also reflects on the trustworthiness of a statement because of the lessened opportunity for fabrication. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1048-49, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (trust worthiness of declaration against penal interest should be examined by inquiring into, inter alia, the extent to which the declaration is really against the declarant’s interest and the time the declaration is made); Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 200-02 (D.C.1979) (en banc) (setting standard for determining admissibility of declaration against penal interest). Here, the informant waited up to seventy-two hours before relaying his tip, thus casting doubt on the reliability of the information. In light of these considerations, it begs reason to suggest that the informant’s trustworthiness and the tip’s reliability is enhanced by virtue of his admission.
B. The Basis of Knowledge Criterion
Personal observation or knowledge of an illegal transaction establishes the informant’s basis of knowledge when the tip contains detailed, current information which supports an inference that the information was obtained in a reliable fashion. See Rutledge, supra, 392 A.2d at 1065 & n. 5. The basis of the informant’s knowledge becomes unreliable when, as here, the tip is bereft of detail, alleges facts which are easily obtained and predicted, and relates events which are up to seventy-two hours stale.
In this case, the informant’s tip alleges an illegal drug transaction, but contains no specific details of the transaction itself; for example, the day and time of the sale, the logistics of purchasing the drugs from Jamie’s BMW, the type and amount of drugs involved, and their cost. Rather, the informant provided an entirely vague “description” of Jamie, Jamie’s block address, a detailed description of a BMW that was never directly linked to Jamie, and information that Jamie sold drugs on a daily basis and frequently from a particular location.9 These “details” bear little resemblance to the detailed and complete tip relied upon by the Supreme Court in Gates, supra, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, and Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), to support the tip’s reliability. Rather, the generality of the informant’s tip casts considerable doubt on whether he had actual knowledge of the facts alleged in the tip; it is equally if not more likely that he picked the information up on the street. Under these circumstances, I cannot say that the informant’s basis of knowledge supports an inference that the tip is reliable.
C. Corroboration Criterion
Equally troubling is the informant’s failure to come forward with his information *106within a reasonable time soon after the transaction, particularly since this was not a controlled buy. Waiting up to three days to relay his information adversely impacted upon the reliability of the tip because it not only increased the possibility of fabrication, but also decreased the ability of the police to verify or corroborate the information. Based on our experience as judges in this matter, we can be sure that the testimony that the events occurred within the last seventy-two hours indicates that the events were more than forty-eight hours old but less then seventy-two hours old. The tip’s reliability is further undermined by the police’s inability to corroborate the link between the BMW and Jamie, one of the rare, “true” details provided by the informant. The police were only able to make a connection between the BMW and the Columbia Road address from which Goldston exited. Thus, contrary to the informant’s tip, Goldston did not drive a BMW. While the majority styles this inconsistency as a “seeming inaccuracy,” the inability to verify this aspect of Jamie’s modus operandi, as reported by the informant, presents a situation significantly different from what took place in Draper, supra, where all the details of the tip were verified.
The majority “perceive[s] no significant distinction between Draper,” the benchmark case on the value of corroboration, and this case. I believe this comparison is far wide of the mark. In Draper, as in Gates, the police were able to corroborate “a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.” Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 245, 103 S.Ct. at 2335 (emphasis added). Thus in Draper, the tip revealed that the defendant would travel from Chicago to Denver by train “either the morning of the 8th of September or the morning of the 9th of September,” 358 U.S. at 309, 79 S.Ct. at 331. The informant, a paid “special employee of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver” also gave a “detailed physical description of Draper and of the clothing he was wearing, and said that he would be carrying ‘a tan zipper bag,’ and that he habitually ‘walked real fast.’ ” Id. (footnote omitted). As discussed supra, the tip in the present case was general and described mundane, easily predicted facts involving the travel routine of a citizen that spanned all of several city blocks.
Nevertheless, the majority contends that it was sufficient for corroboration purposes that the informant identified Goldston coming out of the Columbia Road residence, and that he drove directly to the location the informant had previously identified. But see supra, note 9. The majority believes that such corroboration cures whatever unreliability problems may exist and supports the inference that the informant is trustworthy, and that he obtained his information in a reliable fashion. I cannot agree.
While the corroboration of wholly “innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause,” Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 243-44 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. at 2335 n. 13; Jefferson, supra, 476 A.2d at 686 (such corroboration is of “significant value”), the corroboration must raise a reasonable suspicion of illegality. See Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 243-46, 103 S.Ct. at 2334-36. When viewed in conjunction with the other facts presented in the tip, no reasonable suspicion of illegality arose from Goldston’s exiting the house, entering a car and driving to a location in the general neighborhood. Compare with Draper, supra, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329 and Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 243, 103 S.Ct. at 2334 (corroboration of innocent facts such as the couple’s rather complex set of travel arrangements to Florida, which is “well known as a source of narcotics and other illegal drugs.”).
We must also distinguish the present case from the situation where information is obtained through a controlled purchase. In the controlled purchase context, the independent, contemporaneous police observation of the informant’s activities is generally deemed sufficient corroboration to establish probable cause. See Berry v. United States, 528 A.2d 1209, 1210 (D.C.1987); Stewart v. United States, 395 A.2d 3, 5-6 (D.C.1978); Jones v. United States, 336 *107A.2d 535, 537-38 (D.C.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 997, 96 S.Ct. 427, 46 L.Ed.2d 372 (1975); cf. Tyler v. United States, 298 A.2d 224, 227-28 (D.C.1972). In a controlled purchase situation, the police take careful measures to ensure that the information is reliable. Thus, the police accompany the informant to the designated location, search him for money and drugs, give him the police funds to make the purchase, observe him enter and exit the premises, and upon his return, search him again to retrieve the drugs. See Stewart, supra, 395 A.2d at 4-5 & n. 1; Jones, supra, 336 A.2d at 537. The contemporaneous observation of the illegal activity in this manner corroborates the informant’s tip and lends steadfast support for further police action. Berry, supra, 528 A.2d at 1210 (issuance of search warrant based on informant’s tip and police officer’s observation of controlled purchase upheld); Stewart, supra, 395 A.2d at 5-6 (issuance of search warrant upheld where informant’s tip was corroborated by police observation of controlled purchase); Jones, supra, 336 A.2d at 537 (issuance of search warrant upheld where informant’s tip was corroborated by police observation of controlled purchase). This case, however, involves an allegation of illegal activity arising from an uncontrolled purchase that was unverified, uncorroborated and carries with it too few indicia of reliability.
Furthermore, with few exceptions, the cases presented to this court on the issue of whether probable cause existed based on an informant’s tip involved hot tips, where it was clear that the tip was given almost contemporaneously with the events the informant was describing, and the police were able to immediately respond to and check out the information. See United States v. Johnson, 540 A.2d 1090, 1090 (D.C.1988) (police arrived on scene “within fifteen seconds” of receiving broadcast of phone tip); Offutt v. United States, 534 A.2d 936, 937 (D.C.1987) (police arrived on scene within twenty minutes of receiving phone call); Berry, supra, 528 A.2d at 1210 (police sought search warrant seventy-two hours after observing a controlled buy); Groves v. United States, 504 A.2d 602, 602-03 (D.C.1986) (police responded immediately to broadcast of phone tip); Allen v. United States, 496 A.2d 1046, 1047, 1049 (D.C.1985) (immediate police response to phone tip).10 Under these circumstances, the corroboration of innocent details takes on heightened significance and greater reliability because of the short time frame between the observation of the illegal event and all of its attendant innocent details, and the verification of those details by the police. Where, as in this case, the tip is dead cold, there must be other indicia reliability to support a finding of probable cause to arrest someone.11
Allen, supra, and Jefferson, supra, are useful examples of cases where the circumstances warranted a finding of probable cause. Allen involved a tip by a concerned *108citizen who the police officer knew “was active in her community’s campaign against drugs” and whose previous calls had resulted in the seizure of illicit drugs on several occasions. Allen, supra, 496 A.2d at 1047-48. Her tip was sufficiently detailed: “a man wearing a pink shirt, blue jeans, and Nike tennis shoes was selling [drugs] at the comer of Fifth and 0 Streets. The caller had seen this man receive drugs from the passenger side of an orange Pontiac that was parked on the street, then distribute them to other persons on the sidewalk.” Id. at 1047. The police arrived at the designated location within five minutes of receiving the call, where they saw a man fitting the tipster’s description walking away from an orange Pontiac. Id. Under these facts, the scales tip heavily in favor of reliability: the informant was unquestionably trustworthy and her detailed tip, which the police corroborated in all of its innocent aspects within minutes of receiving the call, suggested that her information was reliable.
In Jefferson, the police received a tip from an informant who stated that he had observed a woman wearing a blue coat, blue pants and weighing between 140 and 150 pounds, selling drugs inside a liquor store at 12th and U Streets. Supra, 476 A.2d at 685, 687. The police immediately responded to the location, whereupon they identified the woman as she exited the store. Although a police informant, the tipster
had given information on at least nine occasions, and on each of these occasions the information led to arrests and the recovery of narcotics; the detective who received the tip in this case was personally involved in four of the nine cases with this informant; [and] the detective knew that other officers in his unit considered the informant to be reliable.
Id. at 687. While the case for reliability is not as strong in Jefferson as it was in Allen, given the totality of circumstances, the indicia of reliability — the detailed description of an ongoing crime immediately corroborated by the police and an informant with a record for trustworthiness— outweigh the indicia of unreliability — an informant with inherently suspect and unverifiable motives, and no verification of illegal activity. In the present case, the scales tip in favor of unreliability.
III.
“Informants’ tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability [and] [o]ne simple rule will not cover every situation.” Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. at 2329 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). Under Gates we must examine the totality of circumstances surrounding the informant’s tip, and in this case there is no question that the indicia of unreliability outweighs the indicia of reliability. The tip was skeletal and limited in scope; it provided easily obtained and predictable facts; it gave information of a crime up to three days old; the police were unable to corroborate the information with respect to the BMW, a material fact; Goldston’s exit from the car upon arriving at the designated location conflicted with the modus oper-andi predicted by the informant, who allegedly purchased his drugs from the car; and, in light of the tip’s staleness, the corroboration of innocent details failed to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. On these facts, I find no basis whatsoever for concluding that probable cause existed to arrest Goldston and therefore, I must dissent.12

. But see infra, note 9.

. Officer Shields testified that he could not re- , call to whom the BMW was registered.

. In summing up the facts leading to a denial of the motion to suppress, the trial court incorrectly stated that the "officer testified, he saw all the people waving at [Jamie].” (Emphasis added.)

. Officer Shields testified that five packets were found; however, the arresting officer’s statement on a police department form indicates that six packets of cocaine were taken from Goldston.

. We have recently stated that in reviewing a trial court’s decision whether to suppress evidence seized as the result of an informant’s tip, the “appellate court’s role is to ensure that the trial court had a substantial basis for concluding” probable cause existed. United States v. Johnson, 540 A.2d 1090, 1091 n. 2 (D.C.1988) (citing Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332-33). Our review "must afford appellee all legitimate inferences from the testimony and uncontroverted facts of the record. We must also accept the inferences drawn by the trial court from the facts presented if they are supported under any reasonable view of the evidence." United States v. Rorie, 518 A.2d 409, 410 (D.C.1986) (citing United States v. Ward, 438 A.2d 201 (D.C.1981)).

.Officer Shields testified that he had used the informer "approximately eleven times” within the preceding year and one half, and that the information had resulted in the recovery of weapons and narcotics, and an unspecified number of arrests and convictions.

. Counsel was permitted to ascertain that the informant was employed and was not a drug addict, but it was unknown whether he was a drug user or whether he had any motive to lie with respect to Goldston.

. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I do not believe the record supports the conclusion that *105"the government had made no insulating promises of leniency or immunity to the Informant regarding the cocaine purchase forming the basis for the tip at issue here.”

. The Record contains the following statement made by the arresting officer:
On 10-28-86 information was obtained from a reliable source who has proved reliable numerous times in the past. It said that a B/M, 6'O', slim, called "Jamie", driving a silver colored BMW from the area of Irving and Warder NW to area of Columbia Rd. and Mozart to distribute cocaine. It also stated it has purchased cocaine from defendant out of the vehicle in past 72 hours.
On 10-29-86 it pointed out vehicle to Officers who began surveillance in 400 blk. Columbia Rd. NW. The defendant was observed leaving 423 Columbia Rd. in a white Audi with D.C. 959-578 and drive [sic] directly to Fuller & Mozart where he was stopped. Recovered from Defendant was (6) packets of white powder which was field tested positive for cocaine by Officer Michelle Jones.
(Emphasis added).
The arresting officer was a stakeout team member who received information about the tip from Officer Shields. The arresting officer did not testify at the Suppression Hearing. The inconsistencies and contradictions between the arresting officer's statement and Officer Shield's testimony at the Suppression Hearing, particularly with respect to the geographic references and the spotting of the BMW at the 400 block address, are troubling indeed.

. See also Jefferson, supra, 476 A.2d at 685 (police arrived on scene "about five minutes after receiving phone call”); Adams v. United States, 466 A.2d 439, 443 (D.C.1983) (upon receiving phone tip, police checked outstanding arrest warrant status and then proceeded to the location where they saw the car and individual described); United States v. Mason, 450 A.2d 464, 465 (D.C.1982) (police responded within two minutes after receiving radio run); Rutledge, supra, 392 A.2d at 1064, 1065 n. 5 (detective responded promptly to tip); Rushing v. United States, 381 A.2d 252, 254 (D.C.1977) (officer went to site upon hearing radio dispatch of phone tip); Nance, supra, 377 A.2d at 385 (police received tip and went to the described location); Lawson v. United States, 360 A.2d 38, 38-39 (D.C.1976) ("after receiving the radio run, the investigating officers drove promptly” to the location described in the tip).

. Probable cause is a "practical, nontechnical conception,” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949), that “turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. "Probable cause exists where the ‘facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ [the response of the officer was reasonable].” Brinegar, supra, 338 U.S. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. at 1310-11 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)).

. At the very least, the majority, as did the trial judge, must admit that these facts present the "doubtful” or "marginal” case where the absence of a warrant should be determinative. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106, 85 S.Ct. 741, 744, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (discussing judicial preference for warrant in marginal cases); Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 323-24, 435 F.2d 385, 395-96 (1970) (“In doubtful cases where a warrantless arrest *109may be undermined by a finding of lack of probable cause the intervening judgment of the magistrate provides an additional weight that may uphold the arrest.”).