Court Opinion

ID: 9930358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 18:03:50.330972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:13:35.011239
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/6/24 In re K.J. CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 In re K.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court                                          C097594
 Law.

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                       (Super. Ct. No. JV141905)

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 K.J.,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Minor K.J. was a passenger in a late-night traffic stop. He was arrested after an
officer saw a gun magazine protruding from under the front passenger seat. Two other
firearms were later seized, one from the car and another from minor’s underwear. After
the juvenile court denied minor’s motion to suppress evidence of the firearms, minor
admitted to carrying a loaded firearm in public. He appeals from the juvenile court’s
disposition order following that admission, contending the juvenile court erred in denying

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the motion to suppress because the traffic stop was unduly prolonged. We disagree and
affirm.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          On the evening of July 5, 2022, Officers Schraer and Cumberland were on patrol
as part of Sacramento Police Department’s northern gang enforcement unit. Their duties
included responding to gunshots and conducting traffic stops in known gang areas.
While working with the unit, Officer Cumberland was trained in recognizing firearms.
          Around 11:30 p.m., the officers saw a car on El Camino turn northbound on
Truxel at a high rate of speed. Officer Schraer testified that “the area [where] the driver
was driving” and “the manner in which she was driving” raised his suspicions that “she
could have been involved in something else.” While catching up to the car, Officer
Cumberland determined the car was speeding and saw at least one passenger look back at
the patrol car nervously. The officers turned on their lights and pulled over the car for
unsafe speed.
          After the car stopped, the officers walked up to it from both sides: Officer Schraer
from the driver side; Officer Cumberland, the passenger side. While Officer Schraer
talked with the driver, Officer Cumberland learned the rear passengers were minors and
observed they were not wearing seatbelts. He testified that he and Officer Schraer had
“to figure out if [the driver] was a guardian, or a parent, or what their relation to the
juveniles was. And since it was late at night, we [had] to figure out the disposition of the
juveniles.” Officer Schraer testified that they needed to do a records check for the minors
because of their age and the late hour because “usually with juveniles out late, they may
be missing persons.”
          Officer Cumberland stayed at the passenger side of the car, while Officer Schraer
returned to the patrol car for a records check of the driver and one of the passengers. As
Officer Cumberland talked with the passengers, he saw one “reach down to the
floorboard with his right hand.” When Officer Cumberland “tried to see what [the

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passenger] was reaching down toward,” the passenger “pulled his hand back up and
blocked [Officer Cumberland’s] view of his hand.” Officer Cumberland testified, “It
appeared that [the passenger] could have been reaching for something that was in the car;
I didn’t know what. But that does make us uncomfortable when we see someone
reaching toward something[,]” because it “could be a weapon.” Officer Cumberland then
asked the passengers if they had “anything illegal in the car,” and they responded, “No.”
       Officer Cumberland returned to the patrol car, gave two of the passengers’ names
to Officer Schraer, and said he was going to have the occupants get out of the car because
the rear passengers were “shifting.” Officer Cumberland pat searched the occupants as
they got out and found no weapons. One of the passenger doors remained open after all
the occupants were out.
       Officer Schraer talked with the occupants while they sat on the curb. He testified
that he had not completed the records check at this point because “[s]tanding by with
each of them took precedence over sitting on a computer, conducting a records check.”
       Officer Cumberland asked for consent to search the car, but the driver refused.
Officer Cumberland then took a few steps to the driver side of the car and shined his
flashlight into the open passenger door to make “sure that there was nothing in plain view
. . . contraband, weapons, before returning to [the patrol car]” to issue the citations. He
“saw a magazine protruding from under the front passenger seat, in front of where [the
passenger who had made the earlier reaching movement] was sitting.” The occupants
were arrested, and a second weapon was located under the driver’s seat. The officers
later seized a third weapon from minor’s underwear. The time between the start of the
traffic stop and the arrest was less than eight minutes.
       The People filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition, alleging
possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610 [all further statutory references
are to the Penal Code]; count one), carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle (§ 25400,
subd. (a)(3); count two), carrying a loaded firearm in public (§ 25850, subd. (a); count

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three), and unlawful possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a); count four).
Minor joined a co-minor’s motion to suppress the seized firearms.
       The juvenile court (Judge Michael P. Kenny) denied the motion, finding the traffic
stop legitimate and not unduly prolonged. Specifically, the court found there was
“reasonable suspicion to proceed,” given that the stop occurred late at night, involved
children, and one passenger “had engaged in some furtive movements.” The video
footage also showed, “the last individual made no effort to close [the passenger door],
and the officer then basically observed the magazine in plain view.”
       Following the denial, minor admitted carrying a loaded firearm in public (count
three), and the remaining counts were dismissed. The court (Judge Alyson L. Lewis)
declared minor a juvenile court ward and committed him to the care and custody of his
mother under the supervision of probation. Minor timely appealed.
                                      DISCUSSION
       “The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well
established and is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings.” (In re Lennies H.
(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.) We “ ‘defer to [the juvenile court’s] factual
findings if supported by substantial evidence’ but must ‘independently assess the legal
question of whether the challenged search or seizure satisfies the Fourth Amendment.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Suggs (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1360, 1364.)
       Minor contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress because
the traffic stop for speeding was unduly prolonged. Specifically, minor contends the
officers unlawfully deviated from the traffic stop’s initial mission without the
independent reasonable suspicion necessary to justify additional detention time. We
disagree.
       “If the police develop reasonable suspicion of some other criminal activity during
a traffic stop of lawful duration, they may expand the scope of the detention to investigate
that activity. [Citations.]” (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756.)

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“Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause and can arise from less
reliable information than that required for probable cause. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 757.)
The detaining officer must “ ‘point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of
the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person
detained may be involved in criminal activity.’ [Citation.]” (In re Raymond C. (2008)
45 Cal.4th 303, 307.)
       Here, before the stop began, Officer Schraer suspected “something else” could be
amiss based on the location and the driver’s manner of driving. Officer Cumberland also
saw at least one passenger look back at the patrol car nervously. The entire traffic stop
lasted less than eight minutes. (See People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1087
[noting time between approach and arrest as only seven minutes].) Within the first
minute, circumstances developed that added to the initial suspicion. While Officer
Schraer was gathering information from the driver, Officer Cumberland saw that the
passengers were not wearing seatbelts and learned they were minors. The lack of
seatbelts alone triggered an additional traffic violation. (Veh. Code, §§ 27315, 27360.5.)
And the presence of children without seatbelts combined with the late hour added
concern for the passengers’ safety and compounded the suspicion of other criminal
activity. (See Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 [nighttime is relevant factor
in establishing reasonable suspicion]; § 273a [child endangerment].)
       The basis for suspicion increased when the passenger nearest Officer Cumberland
bent over toward the floorboard and blocked Officer Cumberland’s view of his hand.
Such a pronounced movement was at least nervous, evasive behavior. (See In re H.M.,
supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 144 [“[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion”].) Minor’s contention that Officer Cumberland failed
to articulate why the movement equated to a suspicion of criminal activity lacks merit.
Officer Cumberland testified that the reaching movement toward something made him
nervous, given that it “could [have been] a weapon.” And in that regard, “due weight”

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must be given to the “reasonable inferences [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts
in light of his experience.” (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1043.) The totality
of these factors provided reasonable suspicion for the officers to expand the scope of their
investigation.
       Minor’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. His attempt to isolate the
factor of nervous behavior as not unusual or necessarily incriminating falls short. A
“court’s evaluation . . . of . . . factors in isolation from each other does not take into
account the ‘totality of the circumstances’ ” and courts have “preclude[d] this sort of
divide-and-conquer analysis.” (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274.)
       There is also no merit in minor’s contention that Officer Cumberland lacked the
requisite level of suspicion to order the occupants out of the car. It is well established
that officers can order the driver and passengers out of the car, without cause, during a
lawful traffic stop. (Maryland v. Wilson (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 410 (Wilson).) Courts
have reasoned that, “ ‘[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is
minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.’ ”
(Id. at p. 414.)
       We further reject minor’s contention that Officer Cumberland’s brief departure
from the speeding car to speak with Officer Schraer undermined his safety concerns.
There were four occupants in the car versus two police officers, a ratio that presented a
heightened risk of harm to the officers. (See Wilson, supra, 519 U.S. at pp. 413-415
[deeming the additional intrusion on car’s occupants as minimal when the car has
multiple occupants, given the increased risk of harm to an officer].) Thus, Officer
Cumberland’s return to the patrol car to tell Officer Schraer of his plan to have the
occupants get out of the car demonstrated Officer Cumberland’s concern for his safety,
rather than lack thereof.
       Finally, minor’s claim that Officer Cumberland failed to give the passengers the
opportunity to close the door when they got out of the car lacks merit for three reasons.

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First, minor provides no authority that Officer Cumberland was required to give such an
opportunity, nor does minor provide analysis as to the relevance of this asserted fact.
(Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [point not supported with
reasoned argument and citations to authority is treated as waived].) Second, minor’s
claim is undermined by the juvenile court’s finding that the last child to get out made no
effort to shut the door. This finding is supported by independent review of the footage
from Officer Cumberland’s body-worn camera. (People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
926, 943 [conducting independent review of video evidence in appeal from denial of
motion to suppress].) And third, an officer’s plain view observation of contraband from a
car’s exterior with the assistance of a flashlight is lawful. (People v. Superior Court
(1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 636, 639.) Here, Officer Cumberland made “his observation of an
item in plain view from a position where he had the right to be.” (People v. Loma (2010)
49 Cal.4th 530, 564.)
       We therefore conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion to expand the
scope of the traffic stop.

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                                     DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s disposition order is affirmed.

                                                 /s/
                                                MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

 /s/
EARL, P. J.

 /s/
KEITHLEY, J.*

*       Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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