Court Opinion

ID: 9912600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 20:02:28.763767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:25.082290
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Hale CA1/4

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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A167871
                           v.                                          (Solano County Super. Ct.
 LAANDRE ANTHONY HALE,                                                 No. FCR352561)
         Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Laandre Anthony Hale was convicted of armed robbery
causing great bodily injury. He appeals from a court order, made pursuant to
Penal Code1 section 1202.4, awarding $30,730.67 in restitution to the
California Victim Compensation Board (Board) to cover the Board’s payments
of hourly wages and piece rate commissions to the victim for lost income
resulting from Hale’s criminal conduct. Hale argues the trial court abused its
discretion by relying on speculation rather than on evidence of the victim’s
actual losses. We conclude his arguments rest on a misreading of the
statutory scheme outlined in section 1202.4 and overlook an evidentiary
presumption that requires the court to include in its restitution award Board
payments to a victim if the presumption is not rebutted. We affirm.

         1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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                             I. BACKGROUND
      On March 15, 2020, a man was shot in the right thigh in the course of
being robbed by two hooded individuals outside of a store in Dixon,
California. Police, with the help of surveillance video, arrested Hale for the
crime. In June 2022, the Solano County District Attorney filed a felony
complaint charging Hale with, among other things, armed robbery causing
great bodily injury.
      In June 2022, Hale and the People agreed to a negotiated disposition of
his case. Hale pleaded no contest to the robbery charge and admitted the
accompanying sentence enhancement allegations with the understanding
that he would be sentenced to 11 years in state prison. The court accepted
Hale’s plea and admission, and found him guilty of the robbery and the
enhancement allegations to be true. It sentenced him to 11 years in state
prison, awarded him certain credits, and imposed certain fines and fees. The
court reserved jurisdiction regarding victim restitution.
      Subsequently, the People moved under the California Constitution and
section 1202.4 for an order that Hale pay restitution to the Board totaling
$30,730.67, the amount the Board paid to the robbery victim for economic
losses suffered by the victim as a result of Hale’s criminal conduct. This
restitution amount consisted of $30,117.85 for lost income and $612.82 for
medical expenses.
      In support of their restitution motion, the People submitted 13 pages of
partially redacted documents provided by the Board and certified by a Board
custodian of records (Board documents). The Board documents indicate the
victim’s employment ended on July 28, 2020, and that the Board paid the
victim for income loss, net of income taxes, on three separate occasions as
follows: (1) $6,806.94 in lost hourly wages for the period from March 16, 2020

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to July 12, 2020, the “end date on Employment Verification,” based on the
victim’s 2019 tax and employment pay records; (2) $11,333.81 in lost piece
rate commission income for this same time period based on the average of his
commissions listed in his February 2020 pay stubs; and (3) $11,977.10, net
also of unemployment benefits the victim received for the period from
July 13, 2020 to November 15, 2020, the latter date identified as the “Doctor’s
Disability end date,” which payment was based on the same records as the
other payments.
      Hale filed a written objection to the People’s restitution motion. He
contended most of the restitution sought appeared to be for projected income
loss rather than actual income loss and would give the victim a windfall. He
opposed the requested restitution amount in its entirety and asked that, in
the alternative, the court find the victim’s net loss to be either $6,806.94 or
$11,977.10, the two amounts the Board paid the victim for the time period
when the victim was employed.
      At the restitution hearing, the prosecutor contended the Board
documents indicated the victim had lost the income paid to him because he
was unable to work as a result of defendant’s criminal conduct. The
prosecutor argued the amount was reasonable and not speculative because it
was based on pay checks indicating what the victim had been paid before the
incident.
      Hale’s counsel submitted on Hale’s written general objection. He also
contended there was a lack of foundation for much of the lost income paid by
the Board, including because, “even if the doctor assessed that he couldn’t do
certain work,” it was not shown “that he couldn’t do any alternative work” for
the period after his employment. Payments for this time period were
“rewarding for time of work at . . . a hypothetical” without such a showing.

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Counsel argued that the court, if it ordered any restitution, should order Hale
to pay $6,806.94 to the Board, the amount counsel contended the Board
actually paid to the victim from March to July 2020, when the victim was
employed but not working.
      The prosecutor responded that the victim was owed lost income for July
2020 to November 2020, when he was not employed, because he was under
doctor’s orders not to work during this time. The prosecutor also contended
that, from March 2020 to July 2020, the Board paid the victim, in addition to
$6,806.94, another $11,977.10 because it mistakenly did not initially
compensate him for his loss of piece rate commission income for this time
period.
      At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered Hale to pay the
Board the restitution requested, $30,730.67, a directive the court
memorialized in a written order. The court said it appeared the victim was
not allowed to work after July 2020 “because of his medical condition, being
shot in the leg.” The court did not think “a six[-]month period of him not
being able to work and recovering lost income is unreasonable. And it
appears to be related to what happened in this offense for which Mr. Hale
was convicted.”
      Hale filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s restitution order.
                               II. DISCUSSION
      Article I, section 28, subdivision (b), of the California Constitution sets
forth a “ ‘broad constitutional mandate . . . that restitution must be imposed
“in every case . . . in which a crime victim suffers a loss.” ’ ” (People v. Kelly
(2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1178.) In keeping with this mandate, “ ‘statutory
provisions implementing th[is] constitutional directive have been broadly and
liberally construed.’ ” (People v. Stanley (2012) 54 Cal.4th 734, 737; see also

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People v. Baudoin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1191 [“ ‘A victim’s restitution
right is to be broadly and liberally construed.’ ”].)
      Section 1202.4 implements this constitutional mandate. (People v.
Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652–656 (Giordano).) Section 1202.4
provides that, subject to exceptions that do not apply in this case, “in every
case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the
defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make
restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order,
based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other
showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).)
      Additionally, “[i]f, as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the
Restitution Fund has provided assistance to or on behalf of the victim . . .
pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 13950) of Part 4 of Division
3 of Title 2 of the Government Code, the amount of assistance provided shall
be presumed to be a direct result of the defendant’s criminal conduct and
shall be included in the amount of the restitution ordered.”2 (§ 1202.4,
subd. (f)(4)(A), italics added.) This presumption is rebuttable by the
defendant, but to overcome it, “a defendant must prove that his criminal
conduct played, at most, ‘ “ ‘only an “infinitesimal” or “theoretical” part in
bringing about’ ” ’ the injury.” (People v. Lockwood (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
91, 100–101, 102–103.)
      “The amount of assistance provided by the Restitution Fund shall be
established by copies of bills submitted to the California Victim
Compensation Board reflecting the amount paid by the board and whether

      2 The Restitution Fund is the fund from which the Board compensates

crime victims for their economic losses. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(2),
Gov. Code, § 13950 et seq.)

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the services for which payment was made” for such things as medical
expenses or wage loss. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(4)(B).) “Certified copies of these
bills provided by the board and redacted to protect the privacy and safety of
the victim or any legal privilege, together with a statement made under
penalty of perjury by the custodian of records that those bills were submitted
to and were paid by the board, shall be sufficient to meet this requirement.”
(Ibid.)
        A defendant “has a right to a hearing before a judge to dispute the
determination of the amount of restitution.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1); see People
v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172.) “ ‘ “ ‘[T]he standard of
proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (In re S.E. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 795, 803–
804.)
        We review a court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Montiel (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 312, 318.) “ ‘No abuse of discretion will be
found where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution
ordered.’ ” (People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 795, 801.)
        Hale concedes that the Board documents satisfy the requirements of
section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(B) to establish the amount of assistance the
Board provided to the victim here, and he acknowledges the rebuttable
presumption contained in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A). He also does
not dispute that, according to section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A), the
amount of assistance provided “shall” be included in the amount of
restitution ordered. He further concedes that the court properly ordered Hale
to pay restitution to the Board for the compensation it paid to the victim for
the hourly wages he lost from March 2020 to July 2020, when the Board

                                         6
documents indicate he was employed, and for his medical expenses, a total of
$7,419.76.
      But Hale argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
him to pay the Board the remainder of what it paid to the victim, $23,310.91,
for piece rate commission income from March 2022 to November 2022 and for
hourly wages between July 2022 and November 2022. Hale contends the
People did not prove any of these payments were for the victim’s actual
losses, rendering this part of the court’s order speculative. We disagree.
      Hale’s arguments show a lack of understanding of the provisions
contained in section 1202.4 governing restitution owed to the Board when the
Board has paid compensation for economic losses to a crime victim, including
the evidentiary presumption created by these payments. Instead, he relies
on a variety of cases that do not involve Board payments and, therefore, do
not implicate any of the statutory provisions in section 1202.4 that we have
discussed.3 Most importantly, none of these cases involve an evidentiary
presumption created by the payments discussed in those cases. Nor do they
include a statutory directive that presumed payments “shall” be included in
the amount of restitution ordered, which, by the ordinary language and
structure of section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A), appears to be a mandatory
provision of that provision. (See People v. Guitierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354,
1370 [word “shall” used in a Penal Code sentencing provision appeared to be
mandatory based on the “ordinary language and structure” of the relevant

      3 Hale relies on cases such as In re Travis J. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th

187 (Travis J.); People v. Chappelone, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th 1159;
Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th 644; People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7;
People v. Rivera (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1153; In re Anthony M. (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 1010; People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988; People
v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418; and People v. Vournazos (1988)
198 Cal.App.3d 948.

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provision]; Tarrant Bell Property LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th
538, 542 [“we ‘ordinarily’ construe . . . the word ‘shall’ as mandatory”]; see
People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 95 [the word “shall” as used in the
Penal Code is construed “ ‘according to the context and approved usage of the
language’ ” as stated in section 7, subdivision 16].)
      Hale relies most heavily on Travis J., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 187,
including to twice assert that, as stated in Travis J., “[a] defendant bears the
burden of proving that the amount of restitution claimed by the victim
exceeds [the actual loss], but the defendant is not required to meet that
burden until the [actual loss] is established.” (Id. at p. 204.) But Travis J.
did not involve any Board payments to a crime victim and, therefore, did not
implicate any of the provisions contained in section 1202.4 that we discuss
here, such as the evidentiary presumption created by the Board’s payments
to a crime victim. Rather, in Travis J., the juvenile court was presented with
the victim’s claim of economic loss to a probation officer, doubted its
credibility, and instead ordered Travis to pay the victim a lesser amount,
$850, based on its own estimates of the cost to repair the car tire that Travis
had damaged and the wages that would be lost for the time taken to repair
the tire. (Id. at pp. 203–204.) The appellate court, analyzing this order
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, and without application of
the evidentiary presumption or other provisions contained in section 1202.4,
concluded the juvenile court abused its discretion by basing its order “on
nothing more than speculation.” (Travis J., at p. 204.)
      Unlike in Travis J., the trial court here was required to, and did, base
its restitution order on appropriate documentation from the Board, which
created a presumption that, left unrebutted by Hale, required the court to
include in its restitution order that Hale pay the Board for the lost income it

                                        8
paid to the victim in this case. The court’s order was consistent with the
statutory directives contained in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4). Travis J.
and the other cases cited by Hale, none of which involve the Board or the
relevant directives contained in section 1202.4, are inapposite. The People
were not required to prove anything other than that the Board paid the
victim for certain income loss to establish the rebuttable presumption that
these losses were a direct result of Hale’s criminal conduct.
      Repeatedly, Hale either argues that the People failed to present
evidence establishing the amount of the victim’s income losses, thereby
ignoring the evidentiary presumption afforded to the People by section
1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(A), or that he, Hale, somehow rebutted this
evidentiary presumption by raising what he considers to be inadequacies and
internal inconsistencies contained in the Board documents. His arguments
are unpersuasive in light of the evidence presented and the directives
contained in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4).
      For example, Hale argues that the Board documents are not consistent
with one another because they indicate the victim was paid for lost wages
when he was unemployed and collecting unemployment benefits. He
contends these Board payments were duplicative of these unemployment
benefits and, therefore, gave the victim an improper windfall. But nowhere
does Hale establish that the victim’s lost wages and his unemployment
benefits were necessarily the same amount. The Board’s documents indicate
otherwise. They show the Board paid the victim for lost income during his
disability period and after his employment ended only after deducting his
unemployment benefits from the amount the Board determined the victim
lost in wages during this time period. Based on this documentation, the court

                                        9
could reasonably conclude the victim was made whole by the Board’s
payments without receiving any windfall.
      Hale also argues that the Board’s payments to the victim for his lost
piece rate commission income were not rationally calculated because the
Board documents do not describe how it determined these amounts
constituted lost piece rate commission income. According to Hale, there was
no reasonable basis for these payments because the Board documents do not
state “what that ‘piece rate’ payment was for or what the victim did to earn
that extra payment. Though there was a person from [the Board] present in
court, the prosecutor elected not to provide any explanatory testimony from
that person.” Thus, it was “unclear whether [the victim] worked as a
salesperson, an installer, a janitor, a customer service representative, a file
clerk, or in some other position. Nothing in the [Board documents] explains
what ‘piece rate’ is, how it was earned, and how each week’s ‘piece rate’ was
calculated.” Also, there was “no evidentiary basis” for the prosecutor’s
assertion that the Board mistakenly left out this lost commission income
from its first payment to the victim.
      These arguments overlook three critical things. First, the Board
documents make clear what the evidentiary basis for these payments was:
the victim received compensation for lost piece rate commission based on the
average of the commissions he received in February 2020, according to his
February 2020 pay stubs. Second, Hale fails to establish that the Board was
required to provide any further information, given the evidentiary
presumption created by its payments to the victim. Third, Hale ignores that
he elected not to follow the procedure outlined in section 1202.4, subdivision
(f)(4) for defendants to seek additional information from the Board. It
provides that, “[i]f the defendant offers evidence to rebut the presumption

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established by this paragraph, the court may release additional information
contained in the records of the board to the defendant only after reviewing
that information in camera and finding that the information is necessary for
the defendant to dispute the amount of the restitution order.” (§ 1202.4,
subd. (f)(4)(C).) Hale did not call the Board representative who was present
at the hearing as a witness in order to question that individual in an effort to
rebut the presumption. His failure to make any effort to rebut the
presumption also dooms his arguments here.
      Hale further argues that the court’s order that he pay the Board for the
victim’s lost commission income was not rational because the Board did not
follow the statutorily required method for establishing the amount of
commission income the victim was due. The Board documents indicate that
it compensated the victim for lost commission income based on an average of
the commissions he received in February 2020, the period just prior to the
robbery’s occurrence. Hale argues this evidence was insufficient because, as
stated in section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(D), “[c]ommission income shall be
established by evidence of commission income during the 12-month period
prior to the date of the crime for which restitution is ordered, unless good
cause for a shorter time period is shown.”
      The People disagree. They contend that Hale has forfeited this
argument by his failure to first raise it below and, further, that the provision
he cites applies only to restitution to be paid directly to crime victims, not
restitution to be paid to the Board for compensation it has already paid to the
victim.
      We agree with the People. Hale’s argument lacks merit because it
relies on a provision, section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(D), that applies when
direct restitution is sought for a victim’s claimed lost commission income, not

                                        11
on section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4), which applies when restitution is sought
for Board payments already made to a victim for lost commission income as
determined by the Board.
      Hale’s argument in effect presents a question of statutory
interpretation. “ ‘ “ ‘ “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our
fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to
effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s
words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.” ’ ” [Citation.] “[W]e
consider the language of the entire scheme and related statutes, harmonizing
the terms when possible.” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 972, 982.)
“ ‘ “ ‘If the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go
no further.’ ” ’ ” (First Student Cases (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1026, 1035.)
      The text of section 1202.4 regarding commission income clearly
differentiates between the proof necessary to directly compensate the victim
and the proof necessary to compensate the Board. As Hale points out, section
1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(D) states, “[c]ommission income shall be established
by evidence of commission income during the 12-month period prior to the
date of the crime for which restitution is ordered, unless good cause for a
shorter time period is shown.” But Hale fails to mention that section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(3) begins, “To the extent possible, the restitution order shall be
prepared by the sentencing court, [and] shall . . . be of a dollar amount that is
sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined
economic loss incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct,”
including commission income as stated in subdivision (f)(3)(D). (Italics
added.) This italicized language makes clear that subdivision (f)(3)(D) does
not control here—the recipient of the restitution, the Board, is not the victim,
and the order appealed from does not direct that reimbursement be paid to

                                       12
the victim, who has already been made whole by the Board. That
circumstance is governed by section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4), which, as we
have discussed, begins: “(A) If, as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the
Restitution Fund has provided assistance to or on behalf of a victim . . . , the
amount of assistance provided shall be presumed to be a direct result of the
defendant’s criminal conduct and shall be included in the amount of the
restitution ordered.” (Italics added.)
      Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4), makes no mention of any evidentiary
requirements other than the required Board documentation we have
discussed and which was submitted to the court here. The subdivision’s
obvious purpose is to eliminate the need for any such requirements unless
and until the defendant rebuts the presumption created by the Board’s
payments. (See In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 805 [indicating the
presumption contained in section 1202.4, subd. (f)(4) imposes “a burden of
refutation” on defendant].) Further, the Board documents make clear there
was an evidentiary basis for the commission income it paid—the average of
the amount of commission income the victim received in February 2020. We
therefore reject Hale’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to
support the court’s order that he pay restitution to the Board for its payments
to the victim for lost commission income.4
      Finally, Hale argues the court’s order that he pay restitution to the
Board for the victim’s lost income during his disability period and after his
employment ended was not rational because “there was no explanation as to
what determination was made by any doctor about the victim’s ability to
perform any type of work.” Thus, he argues, the court’s order was based on

      4 In light of our conclusion, we do not address the People’s forfeiture

argument.

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speculation, as was the case in Travis J. Here again, Hale fails to account for
the evidentiary presumption created by the Board’s payments to the victim,
and the procedure contained in section 1202.4 by which he could seek
additional information. He fails to establish that the People were required to
prove anything further than what it presented to the court. The court
concluded that “a six[-]month period of [the victim] not being able to work
and recovering lost income” was not unreasonable in light of his being shot in
the leg by Hale. Hale offers us no reason to conclude the court acted beyond
its discretion in reaching this conclusion.
                            III. DISPOSITION
      The order appealed from is affirmed.

                                                   STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

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