Court Opinion

ID: 9955550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 18:08:04.204531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:05.403661
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion         iq
                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                  DEVA ONE SMITH,                                         No. 86156
                  Appellant,
                  vs.
                  THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                                                                               FILED
                  Respondent.                                                  MAR 2 8 2024
                                                                            ELIZAB         BRO
                                                                          CLEM(    S             u
                                                                                       •
                                                                          BY
                                                                                IEF DEPUTY CLERK

                              Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
                  verdict, of two counts of possession of a visual presentation depicting sexual
                  conduct of a person under sixteen years of age. Second Judicial District
                  Court, Washoe County; Barry L. Breslow, Judge.
                              Reversed and remanded.

                  Evelyn Grosenick, Public Defender, and Kathryn Reynolds, Chief Deputy
                  Public Defender, Washoe County,
                  for Appellant.

                  Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
                  District Attorney, and Jennifer P. Noble, Chief Appellate Deputy District
                  Attorney, Washoe County,
                  for Respondent.

                  BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HERNDON, LEE, and BELL, JJ.

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                                                   OPINION

                  By the Court, BELL, J.:
                              This appeal raises issues regarding the scope of a valid search
                  warrant.    Under Nevada law, an affidavit may be incorporated into a
                  warrant to establish probable cause, but that affidavit cannot expand the
                  scope of the search and seizure permitted under the warrant's specific
                  language.    Absent an exception, officers must search only the places
                  authorized on the face of the warrant. Further, if exigent circumstances
                  allow the warrantless seizure of a cell phone, police may not search the data
                  on that cell phone unless a new warrant is obtained or exigent
                  circumstances independently justify the search of the data.
                              Here, officers had a valid warrant for Appellant Deva One
                  Smith's residence only; however, officers seized Smith's cell phone from his
                  person while outside the residence. Under the circumstances, the imminent
                  destruction of evidence exigency justified the seizure. Yet no other exigent
                  circumstance allowed for the subsequent forensic search of the cell phone.
                  Because officers failed to obtain a warrant to search the cell phone, the
                  search of that device violated Smith's Fourth Amendment rights.
                  Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred in denying Smith's
                  motion to suppress the evidence found on the phone. As a result, we reverse
                  the judgment of conviction.
                                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                              Law enforcement first became aware that Deva Smith might
                  possess child pornography during an investigation of another individual,
                  Brandon Navarette. Law enforcement discovered Navarette was sharing
                  images of child sex abuse with others through text messages. One number

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                      Navarette messaged belonged to Smith. Based on subsequent investigation
                      of Smith, officers sought a search warrant for Smith's electronic devices.
                                   The detective seeking the warrant authored a declaration
                      supporting probable cause. The declaration explained the investigation of
                      Smith, including how officers had matched the number from the Navarrete
                      investigation to Smith and what images the officers believed Smith
                      possessed.    The declaration submitted by the detective asserted law
                      enforcement had probable cause to believe Smith possessed child
                      pornography on a phone or computer in his possession, vehicle, or
                      apartment.
                                   The warrant signed by the justice of the peace incorporated the
                      declaration of probable cause by reference. The warrant permitted officers
                      to search Smith's apartment and seize any evidence of child pornography
                      and electronic devices that could contain child pornography. The warrant
                      also authorized the forensic search of any "of the above-mentioned devices"
                      to determine if the devices contained child pornography.       The warrant
                      provided a detailed description of Smith's apartment. The warrant did not
                      authorize a search of Smith's person or his vehicle.
                                   When officers arrived at Smith's apartment building to execute
                      the warrant, they encountered Smith outside the building.           Officers
                      informed Smith of the warrant, asked Smith to open the door to avoid
                      damage from breaking it down, and told Smith he was not under arrest.
                      Officers also seized Smith's cell phone from his person while Smith
                      remained outside the apartment. The next day, a detective conducted a
                      forensic search of the phone. The detective found text exchanges between
                      Navarette and Smith, including child pornography. Officers did not seek a

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                   warrant authorizing the forensic search prior to conducting the search of
                   Smith's phone.
                               Before trial, Smith challenged the admissibility of the texts and
                   pictures from his phone, arguing officers had obtained them in violation of
                   his constitutional rights. The district court found the photos admissible,
                   ruling that the incorporated statement of probable cause in the declaration
                   expanded the scope of the search authorized by the warrant and,
                   alternatively, that the officers reasonably believed in good faith that their
                   actions were consistent with the warrant.
                               At trial, the texts and photos comprised the bulk of the State's
                   case against Smith. The jury convicted Smith of two counts of possession of
                   a visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a person under sixteen
                   years of age. Smith now appeals his conviction.
                                                   DISCUSSION
                               Smith challenges the admissibility of the texts and photos
                   recovered from his cell phone, arguing that the evidence was obtained in
                   violation of his constitutional rights and must therefore be suppressed.
                   Because we agree with Smith and reverse on the search and seizure issue,
                   we need not reach the other issues Smith raises.
                               A motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and fact.
                   State u. Beckman, 129 Nev. 481, 485, 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013). We review
                   the district court's findings of fact for clear error, but we review application
                   of the law de novo. Sornee u. State, 124 Nev. 434, 441, 187 P.3d 152, 157-58
                   (2008).
                               Both the United States and the Nevada Constitutions protect
                   citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV;
                   Nev. Const. art. 1, § 18. A search is per se unreasonable unless performed
                   pursuant to a valid warrant or subject to an exception to the warrant
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                requirement. State v. Lloyd, 129 Nev. 739, 743, 312 P.3d 467, 469 (2013).
                The government may not use evidence procured by an illegal search against
                a defendant, and courts accordingly may suppress illegally obtained
                evidence. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984).
                            In determining whether suppression is appropriate, we
                consider the State's three arguments as to why the evidence was properly
                obtained.   First, the State asserts that the probable cause affidavit
                addressed a search of Smith's person, and the affidavit was incorporated
                into the warrant, so the incorporated affidavit expanded the warrant to
                cover the search and seizure of Smith's cell phone.'      Second, the State
                contends that the officers were relying in good faith on the warrant when
                they seized the cell phone from Smith's person and then searched it. Third,
                the State argues that exigent circumstances justified the seizure and
                subsequent search of Smith's cell phone.     We disagree with the State's
                arguments, except to conclude that exigent circumstances warranted the
                initial seizure of the phone, though not the subsequent forensic search.
                A probable cause affidavit cannot expand the scope of the warrant to
                authorize the seizure of Smith's cell phone found on his person outside his
                apartment
                            To be valid, a warrant must contain a statement "particularly
                describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
                U.S. Const. amend. IV; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 18 (substantially similar
                language). A valid search warrant may only be issued on a showing of
                probable cause. State v. Allen, 119 Nev. 166, 170, 69 P.3d 232, 234 (2003).

                      lWe note that the detective in this case filed a declaration under
                penalty of perjury rather than an affidavit witnessed by a judge or notary.
                Such a declaration satisfies NRS 53.045 calling for an affidavit. We use the
                terms interchangeably here.
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                     When a magistrate issues a warrant, Nevada law permits the statements
                     in support of probable cause to be incorporated by reference.            NRS
                     179.045(6)(b). The issue presented in this case is whether the incorporation
                     of a probable cause affidavit may broaden what can be searched or seized
                     beyond the four corners of the search warrant. We conclude it cannot.
                                 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
                     concluded that incorporation of a declaration or affidavit cannot broaden
                     the scope of a search warrant. In United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885,
                     895 (9th Cir. 2013), federal agents obtained a warrant to search for and
                     seize documents related to a single incident of tax fraud. Officers searched
                     Sedaghaty's home and seized materials related to alleged terrorist activity
                     in addition to tax documents.         Id.   The Ninth Circuit rejected the
                     government's argument that an incorporated probable cause affidavit
                     discussing Sedaghaty's alleged terrorist involvement expanded the scope of
                     the warrant. Id. at 914-15. The court held that the warrant clearly
                     contemplated only tax documents and officers should have sought another
                     warrant for material related to terrorist activity. Id. Because seizure of the
                     materials related to terrorism was beyond the scope of the warrant, officers
                     violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 915. The court warned that
                     allowing an affidavit to expand the scope of a warrant "would permit a
                     kitchen sink probable cause affidavit to overrule the express scope
                     limitations of the warrant itself." Id. at 913. In reaching such a conclusion,
                     the Ninth Circuit aligned with other federal circuit courts that also
                     disapproved of allowing probable cause affidavits to expand the scope of
                     warrants. See United States v. Kaye, 432 F.2d 647, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
                     Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Angelos,
                     433 F.3d 738, 746 (10th Cir. 2006).
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                              The Ninth Circuit's reasoning is persuasive. The United States
                  and Nevada Constitutions require that warrants state with particularity
                  the place, person, and thing to be searched or seized. To allow a probable
                  cause affidavit to effectively control the scope of a warrant would render the
                  particularity requirements meaningless.       We also cannot endorse an
                  interpretation of the law that "would elevate the author of the incorporated
                  probable cause affidavit over the judge issuing the warrant." Sedaghaty,
                  728 F.3d at 914. Thus, we conclude that an incorporated probable cause
                  affidavit cannot broaden a warrant's narrower description of those places or
                  persons to be searched or of the items to be seized, as doing so would violate
                  the particularity requirements of both the United States and Nevada
                  Constitutions.
                              In order to search Smith's person, officers needed to get a
                  warrant authorizing a search of Smith's person, absent an applicable
                  exception to the warrant requirement. The existing warrant, by its clear
                  terms, only authorized the search and seizure of items inside Smith's
                  apartment. The warrant cannot be broadened to include Smith's cell phone
                  on his person because Smith was not inside the apartment—the
                  particularly described place to be searched authorized by the magistrate.
                  Thus, Smith's phone could not be seized pursuant to the existing warrant.
                  Good faith reliance does not apply when officers improperly exceed the scope
                  of the warrant
                              Although Smith's phone was seized outside the scope of the
                  warrant, suppression is not automatic. Evidence obtained from a deficient
                  warrant is generally not subject to suppression "where the officer executing
                  the warrant has an objective good-faith belief that the warrant is valid."
                  State v. Kincade, 129 Nev. 953, 957, 317 P.3d 206, 209 (2013). This means
                  courts will generally not suppress evidence when officers reasonably and in
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                    good faith believed that their warrant was valid, even if a reviewing court
                    later determines that it was invalid.
                                 Even if relying on a warrant, an officer must still "have a
                    reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits" when acting in their
                    official capacity. Allen, 119 Nev. at 172, 69 P.3d at 236 (quoting United
                    States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (1984)). This includes knowing that
                    the warrants must particularly describe "the place or places to be searched,
                    and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized." Nev. Const.
                    art. 1, § 18; see also U.S. Const. amend. IV. An officer cannot, therefore,
                    rely in good faith upon a valid warrant to save its invalid execution. See
                    United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1208 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The
                    Leon good-faith exception will not save an improperly executed warrant.").
                                 In this case, the warrant was valid; Smith does not contest its
                    validity.   Nevertheless, a reasonable officer would have looked at the
                    warrant and understood that the scope of the search was limited to Smith's
                    apartment.    The officers improperly executed the warrant by seizing
                    Smith's phone from his person outside his apartment, when Smith's person
                    was not authorized by the warrant as a place the officers could search. The
                    good faith exception does not apply to this improper execution of a valid
                    warrant. See id. The officers cannot claim a good faith belief that the
                    warrant covered Smith's person because they are required "to have a
                    reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits" when acting in their
                    official capacity. Allen, 119 Nev. at 172, 69 P.3d at 236 (quoting Leon, 468
                    U.S. at 919 n.20). Thus, they should have known that they could not take
                    Smith's phone from his person under the warrant as written because
                    Smith's person was not a place to be searched. The good faith exception
                    cannot apply to this case, where officers improperly executed a valid

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                warrant by seizing an item from a person not particularly described in a
                valid warrant.
                The imminent destruction of evidence exigency justifies the seizure of the cell
                phone from Smith, but the forensic search is unjustified
                            Finally, since neither the warrant nor a good faith reliance on
                the warrant covers the seizure of Smith's phone, we next address whether
                officers operated under another valid exception to the warrant requirement.
                See Lloyd, 129 Nev. at 743, 312 P.3d at 469 (a search is reasonable if
                performed subject to a valid exception to the warrant requirement).
                Warrants are not required under exigent circumstances; "Nile exigent
                circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where the
                exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling
                that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
                Amendment." Byars v. State, 130 Nev. 848, 854, 336 P.3d 939, 943 (2014)
                (internal quotation marks omitted). One exigent circumstance courts have
                long recognized occurs in situations where a suspect may imminently
                tamper with or destroy evidence if that evidence is not immediately seized.
                Howe v. State, 112 Nev, 458, 466-67, 916 P.2d 153, 159-60 (1996); see also
                Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973).
                            The United States Supreme Court has recognized that an
                officer may secure a cell phone without a warrant to prevent the destruction
                of evidence contained on that device. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 388
                                          "
                (2014) (recognizing the sensible concession" that officers could seize
                defendants' cell phones to prevent the destruction of evidence while seeking
                a warrant). The Court emphasized that the exception applied only to the
                physical seizure of the cell phone; the digital search of the phone's contents
                must be authorized by a warrant or justified under a new warrant
                exception. See id. at 390 (stating that generalized concerns about a "remote-
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                wipe" did not justify the search of a cell phone's contents). If officers seize
                a cell phone subject to an exigency, officers must obtain a warrant to search
                its contents absent some separate exigency. Id. at 403 (stating that "what
                police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is
                accordingly simple—get a warrant").
                            Here, officers were justified in seizing Smith's phone, even
                without a warrant, under the imminent destruction of evidence exigency.
                When Smith encountered officers executing the search warrant on his
                apartment, he was alerted to their investigation. At that point, Smith could
                have deleted or destroyed crucial evidence had he retained physical
                possession of the phone. Thus, we conclude that the seizure of Smith's
                phone was proper due to exigent circumstances.
                            The forensic search of Smith's phone the next day, however, was
                not justified by exigent circumstances. The warrant that officers possessed
                did not cover the forensic search because that warrant authorized the
                forensic search only of the devices seized from Smith's apartment, and this
                device was not seized from Smith's apartment. The officers did not seek a
                separate warrant authorizing their forensic search of Smith's cell phone,
                and no exigency existed justifying the search a day after the phone was
                seized. See id. at 402 (contemplating particular exigencies that would
                justify the warrantless search of a cell phone's contents, including "to
                pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who are seriously injured or
                are threatened with imminent injury"). The two-step justification required
                in Riley, one exigency for the seizure and another warrant or exigency for
                the search, was not met here because officers had no warrant or justification
                for the forensic search. Thus, exigent circumstances cannot justify the
                admission of the evidence obtained from Smith's cell phone.

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                    Suppression is appropriate in this case because the search of Smith's cell
                    phone violated his constitutional rights
                                 Without a valid warrant or some exception to the warrant
                    requirement, a search is per se unreasonable. Lloyd, 129 Nev. at 743, 312
                    P.3d at 469.    The government may not benefit from evidence obtained
                    through violation of an individual's right to be safe from unreasonable
                    searches and seizures. Beckman, 129 Nev. at 491, 305 P.3d at 919 (citing
                    Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2013)). Suppression is justified when
                    "the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal
                    governmental activity." Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 (quoting United States v.
                    Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)).
                                 Officers had to obtain the evidence legally to use it against
                    Smith. The incorporated affidavit of probable cause cannot expand the
                    scope of the warrant itself. See Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d at 913-14. Further,
                    officers could not have relied in good faith on the valid warrant they held
                    when improperly executing that warrant. See Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1208
                    n.10.   Finally, no exigent circumstances justified the forensic search of
                    Smith's cell phone after officers seized it. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 402. The
                    government's activity was a per se unreasonable search and illegal. The
                    government then used that illegally obtained evidence against Smith to
                    secure his conviction. Suppression of the evidence from the cell phone is
                    required to ensure that the government does not benefit from the evidence
                    it obtained illegally.
                                                  CONCLUSION
                                 The district court erred when it denied Smith's motion to
                    suppress the evidence obtained from his cell phone. The warrant itself did
                    not cover the search of Smith's person, officers could not have searched
                    Smith's person in good faith reliance on the warrant, and exigent
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                circumstances did not justify the forensic search of the cell phone, though
                exigency likely did support the seizure of the phone from Smith. With no
                warrant or justification for the search of Smith's cell phone, the officers
                violated Smith's constitutional rights when they obtained material from his
                cell phone and that evidence was used to secure his conviction. Thus, we
                conclude that suppression of the evidence obtained from Smith's phone is
                necessary, and the district court erred in failing to suppress the photos and
                messages from the cell phone.       We therefore reverse the judgment of
                conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                                                   J.
                                                    Bell

                We concur:

                                               J.
                Herndon

                Lee       ODYAs                J.

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