Court Opinion

ID: 9942577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 16:05:27.484622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:15.373750
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed February 21, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                            No. 3D22-1697
                        Lower Tribunal No. 22-718
                          ________________

                            R.V., a Juvenile,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

     An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Dawn
Denaro, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kayla Heather McNab, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and SCALES, and MILLER, JJ.

     MILLER, J.
      Appellant, R.V., a juvenile, appeals from a final order adjudicating him

delinquent for the offense of battery and placing him under the supervision

of the Department of Juvenile Justice for a one-year period. The primary

issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in admitting contents of

footage derived from a residential surveillance system into evidence at the

adjudicatory hearing. 1 Because the challenged evidence was sufficiently

authenticated under the “silent witness” theory, we affirm. See Abdallah v.

State, 335 So. 3d 696, 696 *9 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021), review denied, SC22-671,

2022 WL 3330435 (Fla. Aug. 12, 2022) (holding video was properly

authenticated due to sufficient “proof that the process that produced the

video . . . was reliable”).

                              BACKGROUND

      While seventeen-year-old R.V. was residing at His House Children’s

Home (“His House”), a group home for abused, abandoned, and neglected

children, he was observed punching another resident. Two law enforcement

officers responded to the scene.      A His House employee retrieved a

surveillance video depicting the incident, and Miami-Dade Police Officer

1
 We summarily reject the contention that the evidence was insufficient to
establish a lack of consent. See State v. Clyatt, 976 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2008).

                                      2
John Peguero arrested R.V. The State subsequently filed a delinquency

petition charging R.V. with one count of simple battery.

      The victim failed to appear at the final adjudicatory hearing, so the

State sought to prove the crime by alternative means.          Two witnesses

vouched for the authenticity of the footage. The first witness, His House

employee Giovanni Rivera, attested he used his credentials to retrieve the

video shortly after the incident. He then directed the His House Information

Technology Department to memorialize the date and time of the incident,

archive the video, and provide a copy of the footage to law enforcement on

site. Rivera confirmed the location and identified both R.V. and the alleged

victim in the video.

      The second witness, Officer Peguero, testified that, after he responded

to the scene, he interviewed the alleged victim and retrieved the video clip

from His House IT personnel. He then viewed the video and noted it depicted

the interaction. He identified his initials on the compact disc and verified the

video that was presented in court was the same he viewed on the day of the

incident.

      The trial court overruled a foundational objection and admitted the

video into evidence. After R.V. was found delinquent for committing the

offense of battery, the instant appeal ensued.

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                          STANDARD OF REVIEW

      The trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining the admissibility

of evidence. See Penalver v. State, 926 So. 2d 1118, 1132 (Fla. 2006).

Such discretion, of course, is not boundless. It is limited by applicable

evidentiary principles and other legal authority. See Michael v. State, 884

So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

                                 ANALYSIS

      The Florida Evidence Code states that “[a]uthentication or identification

of evidence is required as a condition precedent to its admissibility.”

§ 90.901, Fla. Stat. (2022). “Authentication” is a relatively low bar in this

context. It only requires “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Id.

      Consistent with these principles, the Florida Supreme Court has found

that the factfinder is authorized to render the ultimate determination as to the

authenticity of the evidence. See Gosciminski v. State, 132 So. 3d 678, 700

(Fla. 2013); Mullens v. State, 197 So. 3d 16, 25 (Fla. 2016); see also 55 Fla.

Jur. 2d Trial § 133 (2023).

      Photographic evidence carries unique authenticity considerations. To

overcome concerns regarding manipulation, typically, the proponent of the

evidence invokes a traditional foundation, commonly referred to as the

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“pictorial testimony” theory. Under this model, a sponsoring witness with

personal knowledge of the image depicted testifies the photograph is a fair

and accurate representation. See Richardson v. State, 338 So. 3d 1106,

1115–16 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). “This authenticity requirement has evolved

into a one-sentence predicate: ‘Does this photograph fairly and accurately

depict [the subject]?’” 2 See also Smiley v. State, 295 So. 3d 156, 167 (Fla.

2020) (“Any witness with knowledge that [the photograph] is a fair and

accurate representation may [satisfy] the foundational facts.”) (quoting

Charles W. Ehrhardt, Ehrhardt’s Florida Evidence § 401.2, at 176 (2019

ed.)).

         But this is not the exclusive avenue for fulfilling the foundational

requirements. Under the “silent witness” method, a photograph may be

admitted upon a showing of the reliability of the production process.

Wigmore explained this model in the following manner:

         [I]t has become clear that an additional theory of admissibility of
         photographs is entitled to recognition. Thus, even though no
         human is capable of swearing that he personally perceived what
         a photograph purports to portray (so that it is not possible to
         satisfy the requirements of the “pictorial testimony” rationale)
         there may nevertheless be good warrant for receiving the
         photograph in evidence. Given an adequate foundation assuring
         the accuracy of the process producing it, the photograph should

2
  Brian Barakat & Bronwyn Miller, Authentication of Digital Photographs
Under the “Pictorial Testimony” Theory: A Response to Critics, Fla. B.J.,
Jul./Aug. 2004, at 38, 38.

                                         5
      then be received as a so-called silent witness or as a witness
      which “speaks for itself.”

John Henry Wigmore, 3 Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 790, at 219–

20 (Chadbourn rev., Little, Brown & Co. 1970). Although Wigmore confined

his rationale to photographs, the silent witness theory is equally applicable

to video evidence. See Dolan v. State, 743 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA

1999) (“The videotape . . . was properly admitted under the silent witness

theory.”).

      Florida courts have developed a non-exhaustive list of guiding factors

for use in determining the reliability of the production process. Relevant

factors include: (1) whether the evidence establishes the date and time the

image was captured; (2) evidence of image manipulation; (3) the condition

and capability of the equipment that produced the image; (4) procedural

consideration relating to the preparation, testing, operation, and security of

the equipment involved; and (5) testimony identifying any participants

depicted in the image. See Wagner v. State, 707 So. 2d 827, 830 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1998); Bryant v. State, 810 So. 2d 532, 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

      Against this landscape, we examine the case at hand. Rivera identified

his signature on the compact disc containing the video and carefully

explained the procedure he followed for accessing and retrieving the

footage. The His Help IT Department recorded the date and time the image

                                      6
was captured at his request, and there was no evidence of any editing or

tampering. Rivera confirmed the footage viewed in court was consistent with

that produced on the day of the incident, and he identified R.V. and the

alleged victim on the video.

      Under these circumstances, the “distinctive characteristics and

content, in conjunction with circumstantial evidence, [were] sufficient to

authenticate the video.” See Lamb v. State, 246 So. 3d 400, 409 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2018) (finding evidence can be authenticated even if State does not

“call the creator” of evidence).     Accordingly, we discern no abuse of

discretion by the trial court in admitting the video into evidence.

      Affirmed.

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