Court Opinion

ID: 9715549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:08:28.395573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:35.747340
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). For different reasons, I agree with my colleagues that
—the handwriting specimens seized during the second search of Chism’s home were properly obtained and admissible in evidence;
—the evidence tending to show an earlier attempt by Chism on the life of the victim was admissible.
I
First I wish to add some additional observations regarding the speedy trial issue.
As stated in the opinion of the Court, the delay in Chism’s trial was caused by the circuit judge’s ruling that Chism was not entitled to be represented by a lawyer appointed at state expense and the time consumed in appealing and obtaining a reversal of that ruling.
Legitimate differences of opinion and judgment concerning questions of fact and law are bound to arise in the course of lawsuits. Appellate courts are established to resolve such differences.
Whenever a trial judge errs in ruling on a question that arises before (as here), during or after the trial of a case and the defendant seeks and obtains reversal on appeal and trial or a new trial follows, the delay in the commencement of the trial or the new trial is attributable, in a sense, to the ruling found on appeal to have been erroneous.
*144Sometimes, albeit infrequently, the trial which ultimately results in a defendant’s affirmed conviction occurs many years after the defendant’s arrest because of delay attributable to mistrials or new trials granted by the trial judge or, as here, a successful appeal.
Lawyers, judges, trial and appellate, often differ. Such differences and the time required to resolve them through the time consuming appellate process does not deny a defendant a speedy trial.
What then is a reasonable time for an appeal? Interlocutory appeals are heard on leave granted. Leave was granted on March 29, 1968, 28 days after the Court of Appeals received the prosecutor’s response to the application for leave to appeal. Chism’s brief was filed on May 9 and the prosecutor’s on June 6. On July 1, after the Court of Appeals had concluded hearing cases until October, Chism moved for advancement on the calendar. The motion was denied on July 1& In my opinion the motion should have been granted. If it had been granted the case would have been submitted in the early part of October instead of on November 13, and the unnecessary delay of one month would have been avoided.
I am not persuaded by the contention of Chism and of the amicus that the Court of Appeals was constitutionally obliged to hear during the summer recess the appeal which it granted Chism in the exercise of discretion.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed five months and ten days after the cause was submitted. At the time the average disposition time after submission was two-three months.
In summary, the unjustified delay during the interlocutory appeal was perhaps four months. A delay of that length, while unfortunate, is not, in *145my opinion, so unreasonable as would justify dismissal of the prosecution, which the United States Supreme Court has recently declared is the only possible remedy. See Strunk v United States, 412 US 434; 93 S Ct 2260; 37 L Ed 2d 56 (1973).
II
The opinion of the Court relies on the "totality of facts and circumstances” in upholding the admissibility of the handwriting specimens seized during the second search of Chism’s home. The facts that stand out are that Chism authorized "a complete search”, this authorization was given on October 11, and the papers seized on the following day during the second search had been identified during the first search conducted on the 11th.
I see no reason to read the authorization as justifying but one visit to the Chism home, particularly where what was taken on the second visit was espied on the first visit and was seized within 30 hours after the authorization to search and seize was signed.
I would limit the authority of a co-owner to authorize a search of jointly-owned property to a case where the person giving the consent is himself under suspicion and so consents in an effort to exculpate himself. This apparently was the case in Frazier v Cupp, 394 US 731; 89 S Ct 1420; 22 L Ed 2d 684 (1969), as there the consenting co-user of the duffel bag consented to the search at the time of his arrest.
I am guided by the following well-reasoned statement of the United States Supreme Court:
"Our decisions make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by unreal*146istic doctrines of 'apparent authority.’ As this Court has said, 'it is unnecessary and. ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical * * * [W]e ought not to bow to them in the fair administration of the criminal law. To do so would not comport with our justly proud claim of the procedural protections accorded to those charged with crime.’ Jones v United States, 362 US 257, 266-267 [80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697, 705, 706; 78 ALR2d 233 (1960)].” Stoner v California, 376 US 483; 84 S Ct 889; 11 L Ed 2d 856 (1964), rehearing den 377 US 940; 84 S Ct 1330; 12 L Ed 2d 303 [1964].
Ill
In a case where it is sought to establish the identity of the murderer with circumstantial evidence,1 evidence that the person charged as the murderer has threatened the life of the victim clearly would be admissible.2 On the same principle, evidence is admissible that tends to show a prior attempt to murder the victim by the person charged.3
I agree that a failure to instruct on the limited purpose for which other crimes evidence is received is generally not error in the absence of a request to charge.
T. G. Kavanagh and M. S. Coleman, JJ., did not sit in this case.

 Compare People v Hall, 19 Mich App 95, 109; 172 NW2d 473 (1969).

 See People v Scott, 284 Ill 465; 120 NE 553 (1918); Commonwealth v Moore, 398 Pa 198; 157 A2d 65; 93 ALR2d 616 (1959); 40 Am Jur 2d, § 316, pp 586-687.

 See Washington v State, 8 Tex App 377 (1880); 40 Am Jur 2d, § 312, pp 582-583.