Court Opinion

ID: 9790655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:56:55.12879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.734204
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I dissent from the reversal of the rather paltry awards of $25 alimony per month *193for one year and the $250 attorney’s fee. This for two reasons: 1) Nobody appealed therefrom, and 2) they are not unsupported by the record.
As to 1): Appellant did not attack the awards mentioned on appeal, but only the findings incident to the divorce and child custody awards. I invite anyone to point put in this record where appellant specifically attacked the awards which the main opinion now reverses.
Consistency is no jewel here. This court,, in Sandall v. Sandall,1 has said it would not consider errors not specifically pointed out on appeal. Mr. Justice Crockett, author of the present decision, cited the Sandall case approvingly in In re Lavelle’s Estate,2 and, as though to emphasize the rule, added to the requirement of specificity in pointing out the error, the necessity of pinpointing the evidence in the record that allegedly supports the specifically asserted error. He had this to say:
“An appellant cannot be asked to go through the transcript, showing how the testimony reported on each page does not support the finding. Yet, insofar as practicable, he must detail, with citation to the record where appropriate, the particulars wherein the evidence touching the finding is inconsistent therewith or is not of enough moment to sustain it. See Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093, 15 A.L.R. 620; First National Bank v. Brown, 20 Utah 85, 57 P. 877; Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 491, 210 P. 106, 27 A.L.R. 874; Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296, 1 L.R.A.,N.S., 976.”3
The appellate procedural treatment accorded the instant case by Mr. Justice CROCKETT, in my opinion requires a categorical reversal of the Lavelle case and the others herein cited, failing which, they must of necessity be considered to have been reversed by implication and inconsistency. Highly significant it is that in' the main opinion’s first paragraph in which claimed errors are enumerated, the author does not include a single one directed at the two awards which, later in the opinion, are knocked out. Why not, except that they were not attacked on appeal? Who are we to extend a gratuitous assist to any one litigant against another where no plea for assistance is made, and where the opponent is not even extended the opportunity of answering an unclaimed error?
The fact that the appellant did not specify the awards as having been born in error, should end the matter, but the main opin*194ion having presumed to raise an issue not raised by anyone else, prompts this writer vigorously to challenge the apparent conclusion that the alimony and attorney’s fee awards were either inequitable, unjust, capricious, arbitrary, unreasonable or something else that the main opinion neglects to point out except by way of generalized ipse dixit.
So, as to 2) : I think someone clearly and specifically should demonstrate where the trial court acted inequitably, unjustly, capriciously, arbitrarily, unreasonably or something else in making the awards mentioned, particularly when it appears from the record that plaintiff was not employed gainfully, being strapped with the necessity of caring for an infant, and particularly when a casual perusal of the record, bulky as it is, makes it clear that the services and time expended were well worth far more than $500, much less $250. The instant decision, I venture, will not endear itself to the practitioner whose lot is difficult enough without having attorney’s fees eliminated on appeal, without error assigned and on grounds which I believe to be unwarranted. The attorney’s fee in this case would not represent one monthly payment on the foreign Porsche sport car purchased by defendant.
Our own cases holding that we will not disturb the lower court’s findings if based on any substantial believable evidence, or, put another way, that we will not disturb such findings unless the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court’s conclusions, shows that the trial court clearly, arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably erred, are so numerous as to make their citation monotonous. In the present case I believe the litigants and the trial court are entitled to be apprised in the main opinion as to where in the record, and why, the action of the trial court was so arbitrary as to require reversal of the alimony and attorney’s fee awards. I believe that Mr. Justice Crockett himself has emphasized the principles enunciated above, relating to appellate review, so frequently and repeatedly that his conclusions in the instant case cannot meet the test of his own previous pronouncements.
Since the writing of this partial dissent, the main opinion has been changed somewhat by the addition, among other things, of the following statement:
“ * * * under the broad powers of review in equity with which this court is endowed, when a divorce decree is under attack, it has always been regarded as an attack upon the whole decree (See Porter v. Porter * * * Griffiths v. Griffiths * * * Alldredge v. Alldredge), and when it appears that there is an abuse of discretion so that an inequity or injustice is wrought, the court has proceeded to make such adjustments as it deemed necessary to do justice between the *195parties and to give effect to the purpose just mentioned above (see e.g. Hendricks v. Hendricks * * * Dahlberg v. Dahlberg * * * Wilson v. Wilson * * * Pinion v. Pinion * * * Porter v. Porter).”
An examination of all of these cases discloses no language whatever to the effect that when a divorce decree is under attack, it has always been regarded as an attack upon the whole decree. And, with the possible exception of one case, Griffiths v. Griffiths, every one of the cases cited involved a modification of the decree, but only after the appellant specifically had assigned the subject matter as error or ashed the appellate court for a reversal of that specific subject matter, thus calling to the attention of the court those matters deemed reversable, giving the other side an opportunity to meet and challenge the claimed errors, — not, as here, simply creating an issue for one of the parties and granting such party relief for which he never asked.
It is most difficult to understand how the main opinion could cite the cases mentioned for the proposition enunciated. In Porter v. Porter the appellant claimed error as to the subject matter modified. In Alldredge v. Alldredge the appellant ashed the court to reverse the decree and award alimony. In Hendricks v. Hendricks the appellant assigned as eiror the alimony award. Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, rather than standing for the proposition for which the main opinion gives it credit, in discussing the difference in appellate review in law cases and cases in equity, cited Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034, approving the following language:
“In the latter (equity cases), our duty and responsibility in approving or disapproving findings when challenged are more comprehensive. In such case, on an appeal and a review on questions of both law and fact, and on a challenge of findings, the review in effect is a trial de novo.” [77 Utah 157, 292 P. 217.]
In Wilson v. Wilson, an opinion written by Mr. Justice Crockett, there is absolutely no language that stands for the proposition that when a divorce decree is under attack, it has always been regarded as an attack upon the whole decree and that the court will proceed to make whatever adjustments it thinks proper. As a matter of fact, iii Wilson v. Wilson, unlike the instant case where no error was assigned as to alimony and attorney’s fees, the appellant specifically attacked the whole decree as being inequitable. At least, the respondent knew what was being claimed and had an opportunity to meet it, as was not the case here. Furthermore, it is difficult to square the language in the present case with Mr. Justice Crockett’s assertions in the Wilson case [296 P.2d 981] when he said:
*196“The more recent pronouncements of this court, and the policy to which we adhere, are to the effect that the trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in such matters and that his judgment should not be changed 'lightly, and in fact, not at all, unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.”
In our present case, where $25 per month for only one year was awarded as alimony, and an almost insultingly low attorney’s fee of $250 was granted, it is difficult to’ see where there is “such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion” on the part of the trial court.
The last case, Pinion v. Pinion, cited by Mr. Justice CROCKETT in support of the generalization that when a divorce decree is under attack it has always been regarded as an attack on the whole decree, contains no language that would substantiate such a rule or assertion. On the contrary it adopted the following language which seems to be somewhat different than that of the main opinion, when it said:
“The awarding of alimony and fixing the amount thereof are questions, the determination of which rests within the sound discretion of the trial court; and, unless it is made to' appear that there has been an abuse of discretion on the part of the court in dealing with one or both of these questions, its judgments and orders granting and fixing the alimony will not be disturbed.” [67 P.2d 268.]
I consider the authorities cited by the main opinion as not supporting the proposition that an attack on part of the decree has always been considered an attack on the whole decree, except, possibly as might be implied in the action, but not the language, of Griffiths v. Griffiths, where this court did order a modification of the alimony decree where the parties did not attack it. I am of the opinion that in the Griffiths case, this court unwittingly committed error in changing a part of the decree which was not under attack, and the error has gone unnoticed.
In addition to the foregoing observations, I would like to point out a liberty taken by the majority opinion that is even more startling than to create an issue not raised by either of the parties. I refer to the majority opinion’s incorporation of facts in support of the decision that cannot be found in the record before us. Mr. Justice CROCKETT says that:
“Under searching examination he could show only $30; he owes and must pay at least a $500 note the parties signed jointly, and he has now been inducted into the army, so that for some time, at least during his term in the army, * * * his income will *197be very limited and it is without dis-piite that he is presently without other economic resources.”
I challenge anyone to point to any place in the record before us to prove that the defendant was in the army at the time of the adjudication of this case. If he is now in the army, as Mr. Justice CROCKETT says, such information must have been received dehors and subsequent to the trial court’s adjudication, and it is not my understanding that it is either the function or the privilege of this court to indulge in the luxury of extending itself beyond the printed record. Furthermore, I take issue with the-gratuity “that for some time, at least during his term in the army, his income will he very limited.” If this be the case, it is outside of this record, is based on conjecture, and is far from being the experience of some persons who have been and now are in the army.
The same kind of philosophy used throughout the main opinion is indulged again when it is stated that “fortunately she has a home with her parents which she and her child may rely on until she is able to readjust her life and care for herself.” There is nothing in the record establishing any such fact, and for aught this court knows, absence clairvoyance, she and her child presently may he wanderers in the storm.
Since writing an addendum to my opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice CROCKETT has added a phrase to his opinion, which, to point mp more clearly, I am noting in capital letters, so that the portion of his opinion with which I took issue is repeated here with the added phrase in caps, — with which I also take issue: ' '
“Under searching examination he could show only $30; jhe owes and must pay at least a $500 note the pari ties signed jointly, and he has now been inducted into the army (A FACT ACKNOWLEDGED BY BOTH COUNSEL IN ARGUMENT AND AS PRINTED IN PLAINTIFFS OWN BRIEF); so that for some time, at least during his term in the army, his income will be very limited. It is without dispute that he is presently without other economic resources.”
I am reluctant, hut duty-bound, to take issue further with the capitalized phrase. In my opinion the assertion made is a more radical departure from appellate procedure than those with which already I have taken issue. The added portion assumes that if, after final judgment rendered in the lower court, and after that court has lost jurisdiction by an appeal, and while the matter is pending on appeal, certain facts develop which, had they developed and been presented before final judgment in the court below, such facts might be considered by the appellate tribunal as a basis for reversal, if the parties, upon confrontation, have to admit, at the expense of falsifica- *198; tion, that such facts are true, and such facts happen to be true. The implication of Mr. Justice CROCKETT’S present reason announced in his addendum, for considering .matters ex post facto in reversing an erstwhile solemn judgment of the lower court, becomes startling upon analysis. It simply would mean that if counsel for plaintiff today contacted- counsel for defendant and confronted him with the fact that defendant had been discharged from the army and was now making a very substantial income, and such be the fact, and this information were passed along ter Mr. Justice CROCKETT, he would have to consider the changed circumstance at this late date and reverse himself, sustaining the award of alimony and attorney’s fees, and, instead of saying defendant “has now been inducted into the army so that for some time '* * * his income will be very limited,” would have to say that defendant “has now 'been discharged from the army so that for 'some time * * * his income will be 'very substantial.”
In my opinion, the novelty of such appellate practice should not be placed in the reporter system as a precedent to be followed.
As to footnote 7 of the main opinion, Stuber v. Stuber did not* consider facts .dehors the record to affect the decision as is the case here, hence it seems to be quite inapropos as a supporting authority or for any rule that would permit an appellate court to use evidence not asserted in the court below in arriving at a result not consonant with the trial court’s judgment.
The whole judgment should be affirmed.

. 57 Utah 150, 193 P. 1093, 15 A.L.R. 620.

. 122 Utah 253, 248 P.2d 372, 375.

. See also Lepasiotes v. Linsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297, and Aiken v. Less Taylor Motor Co., 110 Utah 265, 171 P.2d 676.

 Emphasis supplied throughout.