Court Opinion

ID: 9737342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:22:26.663892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:58.228828
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, also dissenting: Chief Justice Clark’s thoughtful analysis clearly demonstrates the error in remanding these cases to the circuit court for determination of whether a prima facie showing of racial discrimination has been made. If Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712, is to have any real impact on the administration of justice, prosecutors and the public must understand that State courts will no longer tolerate the exclusion of black jurors because of their race. What is called for here is a clear signal of the vigor and determination with which the Supreme Court’s mandate will be executed. The concurring opinion endorses these goals, but I believe that, despite my colleagues’ good intentions, the procedure adopted by the court falls short of conveying the needed message. This is particularly true in light of the court’s previous characterization of claims of systematic racially discriminatory jury selection as “emotional arguments.” (People v. Mack (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 103, 122, vacated (1987), 479 U.S. 1074, 94 L. Ed. 2d 127, 107 S. Ct. 1266.) The ruminations in the concurring opinion on various hypothetical situations in which a prima facie case might not exist do not, in my view, clarify the court’s stance. The concurring opinion also suggests that the only way to treat these defendants fairly is to pass the buck to trial judges on the question of whether prima facie cases have been established. Chief Justice Clark convincingly shows that no such procedure is necessary or appropriate: the evidence relevant to this question is already before us. That the standards for judging such evidence have changed does not render the evidence itself suspect. Of course, if we feel that the evidence in a particular proceeding is insufficient to establish a prima facie case or that the defendant was unfairly precluded from making a record, we might deem it appropriate to give that defendant an opportunity to present additional facts. But I do not think that we “become involved in a numbers game” (Ryan, J., specially concurring at 247) by speaking out decisively in cases in which a prima fade showing has clearly been made. People v. McDonald, Nos. 63204, 63240 cons., most plainly illustrates that the court’s refusal to make any pronouncement guiding the circuit or appellate courts on the question of what constitutes a prima facie case is unduly timid. In that case three black defendants were charged with the aggravated kidnapping and rape of a white woman. At the defendants’ first trial, which ended in a mistrial, the prosecutor peremptorily challenged all eight black prospective jurors, and at the second trial the same prosecutor excluded all 16 eligible black jurors called (one other black venireman was excused for cause). Such a“ ‘pattern’ of strikes” (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 88, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723) in those circumstances, at an absolute minimum, makes out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Nothing in law or reason supports the majority’s silence on this question here. In both People v. Cannon (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 245, and People v. Seals (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 417, our appellate court adopted a better procedure-finding prima facie cases and remanding for a hearing on the prosecutor’s explanations. The concurring opinion questions whether in some circumstances even the exclusion of 16 black jurors would necessarily constitute a prima facie case in light of other relevant facts. I can conceive of few, if any, circumstances in which exclusion of 16 black jurors would not call for an explanation by the prosecutors. A contrary suggestion exaggerates the difficulty of establishing a prima facie case. In discussing the proper evidentiary burdens, Batson borrowed extensively from the title VII discrimination context where the Court has made clear that “[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous” (Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 253, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 215, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094). See Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 94-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 86-89,106 S. Ct. 1712,1721-24. But even if it is true that no prima facie case would be established if five black jurors were actually accepted by the prosecution, we need not engage in such guessing games here. In the McDonald case, not five, three, or even one black juror was seated — over two trials all 24 eligible black persons were peremptorily challenged. Fairness to the defendants does not require that we unnecessarily refuse to rule in their favor. While the concurring opinion is correct that the trial judge in People v. McDonald will not have to struggle very hard over the question whether a prima facie case exists, our act of remanding this issue does nothing to show our determination to stamp out the grotesque misuse of peremptory challenges. The Chief Justice also correctly criticizes the court’s unexplained action in remanding by supervisory order for a Batson hearing but leaving in limbo other issues raised by the defendants’ appeals. We should instead follow the lead of our appellate court, which has filed opinions in several cases remanding for a Batson hearing but at the same time passing on the other claims raised. See People v. Seals (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 417; People v. Cannon (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 1009; People v. Johnson (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 163; see also Saadiq v. State (Iowa 1986), 387 N.W.2d 315. Several of the defendants affected by today’s supervisory orders are under sentences of death. If these sentences are eventually to be vacated, there can be no justification for not telling the defendants at the earliest possible time. If not, they again have a right to know. Members of this court have frequently criticized counsel in death penalty cases for taking too long to brief those cases, and we should not compound the problem by dilatory actions of our own. Notwithstanding the instruction to trial judges that the result of their efforts be reported back to us within 63 days, we cannot ignore the delays attendant upon proceedings in busy courts such as we have in many circuits in Illinois. Legal matters have a way of dragging on, and I am not at all confident that these hearings will be completed in the time indicated. As a matter of fact, it has already taken this court better than 90 days since the Supreme Court’s ruling that Batson was to be applied retroactively (see Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 107 S. Ct. 708) to settle on this course of action. People v. Hope, No. 58037, presents the most compelling circumstances for deciding the merits of the other issues on appeal now. Hope’s appeal was first argued in this court in May 1985, almost two years ago. On February 21, 1986, the court filed an opinion upholding Hope’s conviction and death sentence, with three justices dissenting on the death sentence only. Thereafter, one of the justices in the original majority joined the three dissenters in voting for rehearing of the death sentence issue, and reargument was heard on May 14, 1986. If a majority of this court now favors vacating Hope’s sentence and remanding for a new capital hearing, we should rule swiftly and not prolong uncertainty over the death sentence. Quite apart from these considerations, the procedure prescribed here has little to commend it because it is likely to result in a waste of judicial resources. Several cases affected by these orders have already been extensively briefed, and the most recent of these was argued in September 1986. Any additional effort now involved in rendering a decision should not be sufficient to deter us from ruling on issues ripe for resolution. If the trial court on remand of any of these cases holds that no new trial is warranted under Batson, we will then have to tackle the very issues avoided today. The passage of time may require the members of this court to reacquaint themselves with the record, and interim legal developments could mean that new briefing and argument would be needed, thus clearly wasting judicial resources. CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK joins in this dissent.