Court Opinion

ID: 9963032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 15:02:18.725842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:16.160562
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                   Before
                      HOLIFIELD, GROSS, and BLOSSER
                          Appellate Military Judges

                          _________________________

                            UNITED STATES
                               Appellant

                                     v.

                            Kyle A. SHELBY
                      Sergeant (E-5), U.S. Marine Corps
                                  Appellee

                              No. 202200213

                          _________________________

                            Decided: 24 April 2024

       Appeal by the United States Pursuant to Article 62, UCMJ1

                               Military Judge:
                               Adam M. King

 Arraignment 24 February 2022 before a general court-martial convened
 at Camp Foster, Okinawa, Japan.

                             For Appellant:
               Lieutenant Colonel James A. Burkart, USMC
                       Major Tyler W. Blair, USMC

                          For Appellee:
         Lieutenant Commander Leah M. Fontenot, JAGC, USN

 1 10 U.S.C. § 862.
               United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                             Opinion of the Court

   Judge BLOSSER delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
   Judge HOLIFIELD joined. Judge GROSS filed a separate opinion con-
   curring in the result.

                             _________________________

                  PUBLISHED OPINION OF THE COURT

                             _________________________

BLOSSER, Judge:
    This case is before us on an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Article
62(a)(1)(A), Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]. 2 The Government as-
serts one assignment of error [AOE]: the military judge erred when, before
trial, he dismissed Charge II and its sole specification on grounds of cumulative
error. We find error, vacate the military judge’s ruling, and remand for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

    On 9 February 2022, the Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary
Force [CG, III MEF] referred five charges, including an allegation that Appel-
lee committed an abusive sexual contact upon a Marine sergeant in violation
of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 3 to a general court-
martial. 4 On 3 February 2023, the military judge dismissed, without prejudice,
Charge II and its specification (alleging abusive sexual contact) from the first
court-martial based on unlawful command influence [UCI]. 5
    On 7 February 2023, CG, III MEF directed the withdrawal and dismissal
of the remaining charges, and, on 6 March 2023, forwarded the case to Com-
mander, Marine Corps Forces Pacific [COMMARFORPAC] for disposition. 6

   2 10 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(A).

   3 10 U.S.C. § 820.

   4 Previous Charge Sheet, dated 4 January 2022.

   5 App. Ex. XVII at 2-3.

   6 App. Ex. XVII at 3.

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                United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                              Opinion of the Court

   On 4 April 2023, COMMARFORPAC authorized preferral of the same
charges. 7 The Government preferred the present charges on 7 April 2023. 8
    Between dismissal of all charges on 7 February 2023 and preferral of the
same charges on 7 April 2023, Captain [Capt] Adcock, USMC—Appellee’s in-
dividual military counsel [IMC] for the first court-martial—took at least three
actions on Appellee’s behalf. On 15 February, he emailed trial counsel, asking
if he had an update on the way forward with the case. 9 Also on 15 February,
he emailed several judge advocates in the current convening authority’s Office
of the Staff Judge Advocate [OSJA], seeking a time to discuss the case and
stating, “[w]e are interested in resolving this case efficiently considering my
client’s life circumstances and the case’s procedural posture.” 10 One of the
judge advocates from the OSJA responded the same day, indicating they had
not “heard anything about the case yet.” 11 On 6 March, Capt Adcock emailed a
different judge advocate from the OSJA to determine whether trial counsel had
presented the case to him. 12 The military judge’s ruling does not reflect
whether the OSJA responded to this query.
    On 19 April 2023, the convening authority scheduled the Article 32,
UCMJ, preliminary hearing for 26 April 2023. 13 The appointing order for the
preliminary hearing identified Capt Wilson, USMC, and Capt Adcock as Ap-
pellee’s detailed defense counsel. 14
    Despite the actions he took on Appellee’s behalf during the preceding
months, on 24 April 2023, Capt Adcock provided Appellee a “Termination of
Representation” letter. 15 The letter stated, “Since you no longer have charges
pending at [the first] court-martial, this completes my representation of you. I
will close your file and take no further action on your behalf. . . . Because your

   7 App. Ex. XVII at 4; App Ex. XV at 3.

   8 Current Charge Sheet, dated 7 April 2023; App. Ex. XVII at 4.

   9 App. Ex. XV at 3.

   10 App. Ex. XVII at 3; App. Ex. IX at 4.

   11 App. Ex. XVII at 3; App. Ex. IX at 3.

   12 App. Ex. XVII at 3; App. Ex. IX at 2.

   13 App. Ex. XVII at 4.

   14 Id. This appointing order is the only document in the Record indicating Capt

Adcock was detailed to the current court-martial. The convening authority, of course,
has no authority to detail defense counsel. Accordingly, we believe this to be a scrive-
ner’s error.
   15 Id.

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                United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                              Opinion of the Court

case is now closed, I will consider you a former client.” 16 Appellee did not con-
sent to Capt Adcock’s purported termination of representation. 17
    The next day, Appellee, via Capt Wilson—Appellee’s only detailed defense
counsel—requested that Capt Adcock be assigned as his IMC. 18 The request
stated, “An attorney-client relationship does not currently exist with the re-
quested Individual Military Counsel.” 19 Despite an express statement that no
attorney-client relationship existed, the request went on to argue that Capt
Adcock’s:
       extensive involvement in the previous [court-martial] weigh [sic]
       in favor of this request being granted. [Capt Adcock] previously
       served as [IMC] prior to the dismissal and re-preferral of the
       charges. . . . While the current charges have been newly pre-
       ferred and will be referred by a new convening authority, it is
       factually equivalent to the prior litigation. As a result of his in-
       volvement in the previous proceedings, [Capt Adcock] became
       intimately familiar with the case, factually and procedurally.
       This would make his participation in the pending court-martial
       invaluable to [Appellee’s] defense. 20
   The same day he submitted the IMC request, Capt Wilson also requested a
continuance of the preliminary hearing until no earlier than 29 May 2023, not-
ing that Capt Adcock was “no longer [Appellee’s] attorney” but would be re-
quested as IMC. 21
   As of 27 April 2023, Capt Adcock had detached from the Defense Services
Organization and was administratively reassigned to Combat Logistics Com-
pany 33 in preparation for execution of permanent change of station [PCS] or-
ders directing him to the United States Naval Academy [USNA] no later than
10 June 2023 for assignment as a military instructor. 22

   16 Id.

   17 Id.

   18 App. Ex. XVII at 4; App. Ex. III at 3.

   19 Id.

   20 App. Ex. XVII at 5; App. Ex. III at 3–4.

   21 App. Ex. XVII at 5.

   22 App. Ex. XVII at 5–6.

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               United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                             Opinion of the Court

    On 3 May 2023, the convening authority denied Appellee’s IMC request,
finding Capt Adcock not reasonably available because he would soon detach
from his current command for follow-on duty as an instructor at the USNA. 23
    Following the denial of Capt Adcock as IMC, Appellee requested Lieuten-
ant [LT] Harris, JAGC, USN, be assigned as his IMC. Appellee also requested
the convening authority continue the preliminary hearing “to ensure [Appel-
lee] is adequately represented by counsel of his own selection if that request is
granted. . .” 24
    Capt Wilson initially objected to the preliminary hearing occurring before
a decision was made on the IMC request for LT Harris. Capt Wilson ultimately
withdrew his objection to proceeding without LT Harris, but maintained an
objection to proceeding without Capt Adcock. 25 At the preliminary hearing,
Capt Wilson voiced his continued objection to proceeding without Capt Adcock.
Nonetheless, the preliminary hearing proceeded without Capt Adcock or LT
Harris on 31 May 2023. 26
    On 8 June 2023, the preliminary hearing officer recommended referral of
all charges to a general court-martial, which the convening authority did on 27
June 2023. 27
    Appellee was arraigned on 11 July 2023. At the arraignment, the parties
noted that Appellee’s IMC request for LT Harris was still pending. 28 Appellee
stated that he wished to be represented by Capt Adcock even though that par-
ticular request had been denied. 29
   Appellee’s IMC request for LT Harris was approved on 17 July 2023. 30
    In a memorandum to Capt Wilson dated 30 August 2023, Capt Adcock
stated that his attorney-client relationship with Appellee ended “on or about

   23 App. Ex. XVII at 5–6.

   24 App. Ex. XVII at 6.

   25 Id.

   26 Id.

   27 App. Ex. XVII at 6–7.

   28 App. Ex. XVII at 7.

   29 Id.

   30 App. Ex. XVII at 6-7.

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                   United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                                 Opinion of the Court

10 February 2023, when the trial counsel withdrew and dismissed all pending
charges and specifications against [him].” 31
    On 2 September 2023, Appellee filed a motion to compel Capt Adcock as
IMC32 and a motion to dismiss all charges and specifications with prejudice
due to an alleged speedy trial violation. 33 In the motion to compel IMC, Appel-
lee reversed course and contended Capt Adcock’s termination of representation
was improper. 34 In its response, the Government argued an attorney-client re-
lationship did not exist for the charges in the current court-martial. 35 During
the ensuing Article 39(a), UCMJ, hearing on 11 October 2023, Capt Wilson
admitted that he was incorrect when he wrote in the IMC request that an at-
torney client relationship did not exist. 36
    The military judge ruled orally, granting the motion to compel Capt Adcock
as IMC. 37 The military judge concluded that good cause did not exist to sever
the attorney-client relationship, and that Capt Adcock’s purported termination
of representation was without authority. 38 The military judge, therefore, con-
cluded an attorney-client relationship still existed between Capt Adcock and
Appellee. 39 The military judge found the convening authority improperly de-
nied the IMC request, reasoning the convening authority had “several mo-
ments in time . . . to look into this scenario a bit further and determine whether

    31 App. Ex. XVII at 7.

    32 App. Ex. VIII; App. Ex. XVII at 7.

    33 App. Ex. XII; App. Ex. XVII at 1.

    34 App. Ex. XVII at 7.

    35 App. Ex. XVII at 7; App. Ex. X at 1–2. In support of this position, the Government

relied on Capt Adcock’s impermissible attempt to unilaterally terminate his represen-
tation of Appellee, Capt Wilson’s faulty assessment that no attorney-client relationship
existed, and Appellee’s reliance on his two counsel’s legal analysis. We reject this view
as we find no support for it in law or regulation. See also R. at 42 (trial counsel re-
sponding in the negative when the military judge asked if there was “any authority
that supports a counsel unilaterally terminating their representation . . . from an ac-
cused who has not released the counsel”).
    36 App. Ex. XVII at 7; R. at 29.

    37 R. at 60.

    38 App. Ex. XVII at 13.

    39 App. Ex. XVII at 13; R. at 67–70.

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                  United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                                Opinion of the Court

or not there was an attorney-client relationship, even in spite of the Defense’s
original misstatement that there wasn’t.” 40
   Ultimately, after ordering Capt Adcock be assigned as IMC, the military
judge stated:
       The Court will allow the defense to file additional motions, and
       the Court intends to issue a ruling on the defense’s motion to
       dismiss for speedy trial violations. That’s still pending. That’s
       still before the Court. The Court will permit the defense, with
       [Capt Adcock’s] assistance, to—will permit the defense the op-
       portunity to supplement its motion once [Capt Adcock] is af-
       forded the opportunity to prepare pleadings, to meet with coun-
       sel, to meet with the accused, and to engage in preliminary ne-
       gotiations if there are any. 41
The military judge went on:
       And the Court is going to permit [Capt Adcock] to consult with
       the defense and determine whether or not modified trial dates
       are required, whether or not additional filing dates are re-
       quested, and the Court will be open to considering modifications
       to the trial deadlines, once [Capt Adcock] is able to rejoin the
       defense team that he should not have been severed from in the
       first place. 42
   The Article 39(a), UCMJ, hearing ended with trial counsel requesting, and
the military judge scheduling, a pre-trial conference43on 19 October 2023 “in
case the defense [was] not able to get in contact with [Capt Adcock] and deal
with schedules, and things of that nature.” 44
   The next action reflected in the Record is the military judge’s 8 November
2023 written ruling captioned: “Ruling – Defense Motion to Dismiss (Violation
of Right to Speedy Trial).” 45 Initially, the ruling appears ambiguous about
whether its scope includes a speedy trial analysis. The military judge first
wrote:

   40 R. at 71.

   41 R. at 73.

   42 R. at 75.

   43 Pursuant to R.C.M. 802.

   44 R. at 76–77.

   45 App. Ex. XVII.

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                United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                              Opinion of the Court

       [I]n terms of scope and the issues considered, this ruling involves
       both the consideration of the Defense’s motion to dismiss for
       speedy trial violations and the matters considered within the
       Court’s 3 February 2023 ruling [in the previous court-martial].
       Within this conduct, the Court also considers the impact of the
       cumulative error doctrine. Additionally, this ruling memorial-
       izes the Court’s ruling granting the Defense’s motion to compel
       [Capt Adcock] as an IMC made orally at the 11 Oct 23 Article
       39(a) session. 46
But then, in a footnote just following that passage, he wrote, “As noted above,
in terms of scope and the issue considered, this ruling is an extension of the
Court’s 3 February 2023 ruling, as opposed to a ruling on the Defense’s motion
to dismiss for speedy trial violations.” 47 Similarly, in his cumulative error anal-
ysis, the military judge “defer[red] ruling on whether speedy trial violations
occurred until Capt [Adcock] has the sufficient opportunity to supplement the
Defense’s pleadings on that matter.” 48 Any ambiguity about the scope of the
ruling is sufficiently clarified, however, in the document’s final section where
the military judge wrote, “Charge II is dismissed with prejudice due to the cu-
mulative error detailed above, not for alleged violations of the Accused’s right
to a speedy trial.” 49
   Additional facts necessary to resolve Appellant’s AOE are discussed below.

                                 II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction
   The Government may only appeal interlocutory matters in a court-martial
with express congressional authorization. 50 Congress provided the Govern-
ment limited authority to appeal in Article 62, UCMJ, which states in relevant
part:
       (a)(1) In a trial by general or special court-martial . . . the
       United States may appeal the following:

   46 App. Ex. XVII at 2–3 (emphasis added).

   47 App. Ex. XVII at 3, n. 8 (emphasis added).

   48 App. Ex. XVII 15–16.

   49 App. Ex. XVII at 19 (emphasis added).

   50 United States v. Badders, 82 M.J. 299, 302 (C.A.AF. 2022) (citing United States

v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977)).

                                         8
                 United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                               Opinion of the Court

               (A) An order or ruling of the military judge which termi-
        nates the proceedings with respect to a charge or specification.
        ...
        (e) The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to
        effect its purposes. 51
Our superior court has held that “an appeal must actually fall within the stric-
tures of Article 62(a)(1)(A) . . . ,UCMJ, to create appellate jurisdiction.” 52
    Here, we have jurisdiction to review the military judge’s dismissal as it ter-
minated the proceedings with respect to Charge II and its specification. Simi-
larly, we have jurisdiction to review the military judge’s ruling on Appellee’s
IMC request as it formed the basis, in part, for the ultimate dismissal. We do
not have jurisdiction to review the military judge’s UCI ruling in the first
trial. 53

B. Standard of Review
    We review a military judge’s ruling to dismiss a charge and its specification
for an abuse of discretion. 54 It is an abuse of discretion if the military judge: (1)
“predicates his ruling on findings of fact that are not supported by the evi-
dence”; (2) “uses incorrect legal principles”; (3) “applies correct legal principles
to the facts in a way that is clearly unreasonable”; or (4) “fails to consider im-
portant facts.” 55 In an appeal under Article 62, UCMJ, we review “the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party which prevailed below,” which in this
case is Appellee. 56 However, we are limited to acting only with respect to mat-
ters of law. 57 On matters of fact, we are “bound by the military judge’s factual

    51 Article 62(a)(1)(A), (e), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(A), (e).

    52 United States v. Jacobsen, 77 M.J. 81, 85 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

    53 The Government could have appealed the military judge’s dismissal of charge II

and its sole specification in the first trial but chose not to within the prescribed time-
line. See Article 62(a)(2)(A), UCMJ (trial counsel must provide military judge notice of
appeal within 72 hours of the order or ruling).
    54 United States v. Gore, 60 M.J. 178, 187 (C.A.A.F. 2004); United States v. Floyd,

82 M.J. 821, 828 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2022).
    55 United States v. Commisso, 76 M.J. 315, 321 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (citing United States

v. Ellis, 68 M.J. 341, 344 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
    56 United States v. Buford, 74 M.J. 98, 100 (C.A.A.F. 2015).

    57 R.C.M. 908(c)(2).

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                  United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                                Opinion of the Court

determinations unless they are unsupported by the record or clearly errone-
ous.” 58 We may not “find [our] own facts or substitute [our] own interpretation
of the facts.” 59
    The denial of an IMC request “is a matter within the sole discretion of that
authority [prescribed by the Secretary concerned].” 60 We review such a denial
for an abuse of discretion. 61

C. Individual Military Counsel Ruling

   1. Right to Individual Military Counsel and Process for Determining Avail-
ability
    An accused has a statutory right to be represented in his defense at a gen-
eral court-martial, special court-martial, or Article 32 preliminary hearing “by
[individual] military counsel [IMC] of his own selection if that counsel is rea-
sonably available.” 62 Congress mandated that the Secretaries of the Military
Departments, “by regulation, define ‘reasonably available’ for the purpose of
[IMC requests] and establish procedures for determining whether the [re-
quested IMC] is reasonably available.” 63 The IMC regulations issued by each
Military Department are subject to the criteria established by the President in
Rule for Courts-Martial 506(b).
    Rule for Courts-Martial 506(b)(1) established eight categories of judge ad-
vocates who are “not reasonably available” “[w]hile so assigned” to certain du-
ties or positions, including “instructor . . . at a Service school or academy.” 64
However the President granted each Secretary the discretion to “prescribe cir-
cumstances under which exceptions may be made to the prohibitions of [Rule
for Courts-Martial 506(b)] when merited by the existence of an attorney-client
relationship regarding matters relating to a charge in question.” 65

   58 United States v. Becker, 81 M.J. 483, 489 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
   59 United States v. Cossio, 64 M.J. 254, 256 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

   60 R.C.M. 506(b)(2).

   61 United States v. Allred, 50 M.J. 795, 799 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).

   62 Article 38(b)(3)(B), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 838(b)(3)(B).

   63 Article 38(b)(7), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 838(b)(7).

   64 R.C.M. 506(b)(1)(F) (emphasis added).

   65 R.C.M. 506(b)(1).

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                United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                              Opinion of the Court

     The Secretary of the Navy, via the Judge Advocate General [JAG], issued
the Department’s IMC regulations in section 0131 of the Manual of the Judge
Advocate General [JAGMAN]. 66 Section 0131 also provides a non-exhaustive
list of factors to be considered when determining if a requested counsel is rea-
sonably available. 67 The JAGMAN places the “burden . . . on the accused or
counsel for the accused to state in the request . . . clearly whether the accused
claims to have an attorney-client relationship with the requested counsel re-
garding one or more charges pending before the proceeding, and the factual
basis underlying that assertion.”68
    If a “request does not claim an attorney-client relationship regarding any
charge pending before the proceeding, and the requested counsel is not reason-
ably available” by reason of being assigned to one of the enumerated duties or
positions, “the convening authority will promptly deny the request.” 69 Con-
versely, if the request clearly states that an attorney-client relationship exists
or the requested counsel is not assigned to one of the enumerated duties or
positions, “the convening authority will forward the request to the determining
authority” and provide specified information for the determining authority’s
consideration. 70 Neither the Rules for Courts-Martial nor the JAGMAN re-
quire or permit the convening authority to forecast the requested counsel’s fu-
ture availability.
    On the other hand, the determining authority must independently deter-
mine if the requested IMC “has an attorney-client relationship with the ac-
cused regarding any charge pending before the proceeding.” 71 “If the determin-
ing authority finds that there is an attorney-client relationship regarding any

    66 JAGINST 5800.7G.

    67 JAGINST 5800.7G, 0131b(4). Section 0131b(4) also supplements Rule for Courts-

Martial 506(b)(1)’s list of persons not reasonably available by virtue of their current
assignment.
    68 JAGINST 5800.7G, 0131c(1).

    69 JAGINST 5800.7G, 0131c(2)(b); see also R.C.M. 506(b)(2) (“convening authority

shall deny the request”).
    70 JAGINST 5800.7G, 0131c(2)(c); see also R.C.M. 506(b)(2) (“If the accused’s re-

quests makes [a claim of an existing attorney-client relationship regarding a charge in
question], or if the person is not among those so listed as not reasonably available, the
convening authority shall forward the request to the commander or head of the organ-
ization, activity, or agency to which the requested person is assigned.”)
    71 JAGINST 5800.7G, 0131d(1). In making such a determination, counsel, staff

judge advocates, and decision makers would be wise to remember that “withdrawal

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                 United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                               Opinion of the Court

charge pending before the proceeding, then the requested counsel should ordi-
narily be made available to act as [IMC] without regard to whether he or she
would otherwise be deemed reasonably available [by reason of being assigned
to one of the enumerated duties or positions], unless there is ‘good cause’ to
sever that relationship.” 72 The JAGMAN lists the requested counsel’s release
from active duty and terminal leave as two examples of when good cause may
exist. 73
    In accordance with section 0131, the Marine Corps’ Legal Support and Ad-
ministration Manual [LSAM], defines the determining authority for counsel
assigned to Marine Corps commands. 74 “The determining authority for IMC
requests for counsel not assigned to the [Defense Services Organization], in-
cluding auxiliary defense counsel with active defense cases, is that attorney’s
[officer in charge] or commanding officer.” 75
   If a military judge finds an IMC was improperly denied, he “may not dis-
miss charges or otherwise effectively prevent further proceedings based on [de-
nial of IMC]. However, the military judge may grant reasonable continuances
until the requested military counsel can be made available[.]” 76 Similarly, if a
military judge finds a defect in the Article 32, UCMJ, preliminary hearing, “the

and dismissal of charges may terminate a court-martial proceeding, but they do not,
without more, sever the ‘relationship’ that exists between an accused and counsel with
respect to those charges.” Allred, 50 M.J. at 800. “Once established, an existing attor-
ney-client relationship can only be severed by an express release from the accused, a
judicial order, or other good cause.” Id. at 799-800 (citing R.C.M. 505(d)(2)(B). “A mili-
tary defense counsel may not unilaterally withdraw from representing an accused once
the attorney-client relationship is established.” Id. (citing United States v. Acton, 33
M.J. 536, 537 (A.F.C.M.R. 1991); United States v. Hutchins, 69 M.J. 282, 289–291
(CA.A.F. 2011). “An administrative action . . . made solely to accommodate the change
of duty station of [an accused’s defense counsel] cannot be a proper basis for severance.”
Allred, 50 M.J. at 800 (citing United States v. Murray, 42 C.M.R. 253, 254 (1970)); see
also United States v. Eason, 45 C.M.R. 109, 111 (1972) (observing an attorney-client
relationship “may not be severed or materially altered for administrative conven-
ience”).
    72 JAGINST 5800.7G, 0131d(2).

    73 Id.

    74 JAGINST 5800.7G, 0131b(2)(b); Marine Corps Order [MCO] 5800.16 CH-7, Vol-

ume 3, 011201.
    75 MCO 5800.16 CH-7, Volume 3, 011201.E.

    76 R.C.M. 906(b)(2).

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               United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                             Opinion of the Court

military judge should ordinarily grant a continuance so the defect may be cor-
rected.” 77

   2. Military Judge’s Ruling
   We find that the military judge relied on incorrect legal principles to reach
the conclusion that the convening authority improperly denied Appellee’s re-
quest for Capt Adcock to serve as his IMC.
    The military judge found fault in the convening authority’s reliance on Capt
Wilson’s representation that an attorney-client relationship did not exist. 78
But, by placing the burden on the accused to clearly state whether an attorney-
client relationship exists, that is precisely what the JAGMAN requires a con-
vening authority to do. The military judge’s analysis imposed a responsibility
on the convening authority that applies only to the determining authority (i.e.,
the requested counsel’s officer in charge or commanding officer). Unlike a de-
termining authority’s responsibility to independently assess if an attorney-cli-
ent relationship exists based on a list of prescribed criteria, a convening au-
thority has only two, simple questions to answer in reviewing an IMC request:
1) does the accused clearly claim that an attorney-client relationship exists
with the requested counsel; and 2) if not, is the requested counsel currently
assigned to one of the duties and positions enumerated in Rule for Courts-Mar-
tial 506(b)(1) and JAGMAN section 0131. The convening authority has no dis-
cretion and shall deny the request only if it does not clearly claim an attorney-
client relationship and the requested counsel is currently assigned to one of the
enumerated duties or positions. In all other instances, the convening authority
must forward the request to the determining authority.
    The convening authority correctly regarded the request as not clearly
claiming an attorney-client relationship. 79 By imposing on the convening au-
thority a duty to look beyond Appellee’s express representation of no attorney-
client relationship, the military judge applied an incorrect legal principle and
absolved Appellee from his burden to clearly claim the existence of such a re-
lationship. As such, the military judge abused his discretion by applying an
incorrect view of the law.
    Nonetheless, we reach the same conclusion as the military judge that the
convening authority improperly denied the IMC request, but we do so for a
different reason. The convening authority simply had no authority to deny the

   77 R.C.M. 906(b)(3) Discussion.

   78 App. Ex. XVII at 14.

   79 App. Ex. XVII at 4.

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                United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
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request. Captain Adcock’s future assignment to the USNA was not a relevant
part of the convening authority’s analysis. Based on Capt Adcock’s detachment
from the Defense Services Organization at the time of the denial, the convening
authority’s only permissible action was to forward the request to Capt Adcock’s
commanding officer, as the appropriate determining authority.
    The determining authority’s requirements are much more expansive than
the convening authority’s, requiring an in-depth analysis using the criteria
listed in JAGMAN section 0131b(3), to determine if an attorney-client relation-
ship existed. And we agree with the military judge that an attorney-client re-
lationship still exists between Capt Adcock and Appellee (despite Capt Wil-
son’s initial representations and Capt Adcock’s continued contention to the
contrary).
    We, therefore, reach the same conclusion—albeit through a different ana-
lytical framework—as the military judge that the convening authority improp-
erly denied Appellee’s request for Capt Adcock to serve as his IMC. 80
    While we do not know whether the determining authority would have found
Capt Adcock reasonably available if the convening authority had properly for-
warded the IMC request, we do not require an answer that question under the
facts of this case. In its appeal, the Government concedes that “[a]ny error by
the Convening Authority was remedied by the Judge’s Ruling compelling [Capt
Adcock] as counsel for Appellee.” 81 This is consistent with the JAGMAN’s man-
date that a requested counsel ordinarily be made available if an attorney-client
relationship exists.

D. Military Judge’s Cumulative Error Analysis

   1. Cumulative Error Doctrine is not Applicable in the Pretrial Context
    The cumulative error doctrine was not born in military courts, but has been
used by military appellate courts for more than seven decades 82 as an expan-
sion of the mandate in Article 59(a), UCMJ, that authorizes military appellate

   80 We note that the convening authority was not the only person to err regarding

Appellee’s IMC request. Capt Adcock erred by attempting to unilaterally terminate his
representation of Appellee. Capt Wilson erred by representing, in Appellee’s IMC re-
quest, that “[a]n attorney-client relationship does not currently exist with the re-
quested Individual Military Counsel.” Nonetheless, we decline to speculate about what
the convening authority would have done if the IMC request had accurately repre-
sented the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
   81 Appellant’s Reply Br. at 12.

   82 See, e.g., United States v. Yerger, 16 C.M.R. 191, 209 (C.M.A. 1954).

                                          14
                United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                              Opinion of the Court

courts to set aside a finding only if an error “materially prejudices the substan-
tial rights of an accused.” 83 The cumulative error doctrine is a test for prejudice
that looks retrospectively at a trial’s execution and results to assess the “cu-
mulative effect of all plain errors and preserved errors.” 84 Under the doctrine,
criminal courts of appeal determine if “‘a number of errors, no one perhaps
sufficient to merit reversal, in combination necessitate the disapproval of a
finding.’” 85 We then reverse only if we find that the cumulative effect of the
errors denied an appellant a fair trial. 86
    We are aware of no statute, rule, or case that permits the use of the cumu-
lative error doctrine in the pretrial context. To the contrary, one can hardly
assess the cumulative effect of errors on the fairness of a trial if the trial has
not yet commenced and a verdict has not yet been announced.

   2. The Military Judge Erred by Dismissing for “Cumulative Error”
   The military judge illustrated his cumulative error analysis with the fol-
lowing series of Government actions, which he described as “includ[ing] UCI
and prosecutorial misconduct”:
            (1) the initial misleading representation of the disqualified
        [t]rial [c]ounsel to the original SJA, which created misinformed
        preferral and referral decisions regarding Charge II;
           (2) the delayed and ultimately compelled disclosure of re-
        quired discovery surrounding [the alleged victim’s] 3 January
        2022 interview with the disqualified [t]rial [c]ounsel;
           (3) the nonresponsive, confrontational, and accusatory an-
        swers submitted by the disqualified [t]rial [c]ounsel to the De-
        fense pursuant to Court-ordered discovery;
            (4) the initial improper denial of [Appellee’s] IMC request for
        Capt [Adcock] (including a neutral forwarding endorsement
        memo from the [s]enior [t]rial [c]ounsel that omitted both anal-
        ysis and a recommendation);
            (5) the decision to proceed with the Article 32[,UCMJ,]
        [p]reliminary [h]earing over Defense objection regarding Capt

   83 10 U.S.C. § 859(a).

   84 United States v. Pope, 69 M.J. 328, 335 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

   85 Pope, 69 M.J. at 335 (quoting United States v. Banks, 36 M.J. 150, 170–71
(C.M.A. 1992)).
   86 Banks, 37 M.J. at 171.

                                         15
                 United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                               Opinion of the Court

        [Adcock]’s absence based on the convening authority’s improper
        denial;
           (6) the continued denial of Capt [Adcock] to serve IMC [sic]
        from the Article 32 hearing through the filing of pleadings and
        the 11 October 2023 Article 39(a) session; and
            (7) the resulting delay in Capt [Adcock] being produced to
        assist [Appellee] in defending against Charge II from the denial
        of the IMC request to the present date. 87
    As an initial matter, to the extent the military judge may have reconsidered
his 3 February 2023 ruling on UCI in this ruling, 88 doing so would be improper.
A military judge cannot reconsider a ruling from a court-martial that no longer
exists. A military judge may, however, conduct a new analysis of all facts af-
fecting the current court-martial, including any relevant facts related to a pre-
vious court-martial—provided those facts are raised in the current court-mar-
tial.
    In concluding that “the cumulative error doctrine . . . may . . . be considered
at the trial level,” the military judge relied on the First Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Padilla-Galarza 89 and the Army Court of Criminal Appeals’
decision in United States v. Badders. 90 The military judge’s reliance on these
cases was misplaced.
    While the court in Padilla-Galarza wrote that cumulative error “claims are
typically raised . . . for the first time on appeal,” the decision was the culmina-
tion of the court’s post-trial review of the appellant’s convictions. 91 And nothing
in that decision supports a conclusion that cumulative error analysis is appro-
priate in the pretrial context.
  Our sister court’s review in Badders came via an unusual Article 62,
UCMJ, procedural path. Appellee moved, post-trial, for entry of a finding of not

    87 App. Ex. XVII at 17–18.

    88 “[T]his ruling involves . . . the consideration of . . . the matters considered within

the Court’s 3 February 2023 ruling.” App. Ex. XVII at 2–3; see also App. Ex. XVII at
17–18 (UCI and prosecutorial misconduct, and examples 1–3 occurred during previous
trial).
    89 United States v. Padilla-Galarza, 990 F.3d 60, 85 (1st Cir. 2021) (finding appel-

lant’s post-trial cumulative error claim “fanciful”).
    90 United States v. Badders, No. ARMY 20200735, 2021 CCA LEXIS 510 (Army Ct.

Crim. App. Sep. 30, 2021) (unpublished).
    91 Padilla-Galarza, 990 F.3d at 85 (emphasis added).

                                            16
                     United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                                   Opinion of the Court

guilty, dismissal with prejudice, or a mistrial. 92 Following a post-trial Article
39(a), UCMJ, session to address the motion, the military judge relied on the
cumulative error doctrine to declare a mistrial, citing the “cumulative effect of
two evidentiary rulings she determined were erroneous yet non-prejudicial and
her post-trial finding of implied bias linked to one panel member[.]” 93 The Gov-
ernment appealed the military judge’s decision under Article 62, UCMJ.
   The Army court first concluded that assessing a member’s implied bias un-
der cumulative error is improper, reasoning that such an error is not tested for
prejudice and has only one remedy: declaration of a mistrial. 94 However, the
court went on to determine the military judge erred in her “cumulative error
math,” and abused her discretion by finding implied bias and declaring a mis-
trial. 95 Nothing in Badders supports a military judge conducting a pretrial cu-
mulative error analysis.
    We hold that the cumulative error doctrine does not apply in a pretrial con-
text. 96 Pretrial, a military judge is able to ensure a fair trial by addressing each
error—as he did here—with a tailored remedy.

                                  III. CONCLUSION

    The Government’s appeal is GRANTED. The military judge’s dismissal of
Charge II and its specification is VACATED. The record of trial is returned to
the Judge Advocate General for remand to the convening authority and deliv-
ery to the military judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

    92 Badders, 2021 CCA LEXIS at *1–2.

    93 Id. at *2.

    94 Id. at *30–31.

    95 Id. at *43.

    96 We need not decide if a military judge may conduct a cumulative error analysis

post-trial.

                                         17
               United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                            J. Gross, Concurring

GROSS, Judge (concurring in the result):
    I concur with the Court’s decision that the military judge erred by applying
the cumulative error doctrine at the trial level, prior to the court reaching find-
ings. I write separately because I do not believe that the military judge’s ruling
directing the appointment of Capt Adcock as Individual Military Counsel
[IMC] is properly before this Court. I would therefore limit our decision solely
to the question of whether the military judge’s dismissal for cumulative error
was correct in law. While the majority opinion does an excellent job of detailing
the regulatory and statutory framework for consideration and decision on a
request by an accused for appointment of an IMC, the military judge’s order
granting Capt Adcock—by itself—did not terminate the proceedings with re-
spect to a charge or specification or otherwise amount to a ruling that would
permit the Government to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 62,
UCMJ.
    The military judge issued his order directing the appointment of Capt Ad-
cock on 11 October 2023. The Government did not seek reconsideration of his
ruling, nor did the Government seek relief from this Court in the nature of an
extraordinary writ. “When a party does not appeal a ruling, the ruling of the
lower court normally becomes the law of the case.” 1 Although the military
judge considered the Government’s actions in denying Capt Adcock as one of
the many Government missteps (some apparently intentional) leading to his
decision to dismiss Charge II with prejudice, his ruling is based on the compi-
lation of errors with the IMC denial and subsequent intransigence apparently
being the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back.” While the majority
may be right that the military judge reached the right answer on the IMC
question but for the wrong reasoning, I would find that the Government’s de-
cision not to appeal that ruling leaves nothing for us to review.
    Despite the fact that we vacate the military judge’s ruling, nothing in this
opinion should be read as condoning the Government’s behavior in how it has
sought to prosecute Appellee up to this point. The military judge’s ruling sets
forth a series of concerning actions and decisions by the Government both in
the current court-martial and the prior proceedings that could be construed to
demonstrate a “win at all costs” mentality. Trial counsel would be wise going
forward to remind themselves of the Supreme Court’s famous exhortation to
be:

   1 United States v. Parker, 62 M.J. 459, 464 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

                                         1
            United States v. Shelby, NMCCA No. 202200213
                         J. Gross, Concurring

    the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
    of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as com-
    pelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
    therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
    but that justice shall be done. 2

                                FOR THE COURT:

                                MARK K. JAMISON
                                Clerk of Court

2 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

                                       2