Court Opinion

ID: 9641493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:33:08.49302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:37.826707
License: Public Domain

JAMES ALGER FEE, District Judge
(dissenting).
The District Judge dismissed this count as to apartment 407 upon the ground th-at he had no jurisdiction because of the repeal of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. This was done without the concurrence of appellees and upon the motion of the judge himself. Here there was reversible error. First, the District Judge violated the pretrial order, which reserved a single question of fact for trial as to each two apartments 407 and 412. Second, the District Court had jurisdiction of the action and all the charges.
Even if the statute had expired without applicable saving clause and the limitation had run, a civil action with appropriate allegations had been filed by the Expediter, who had authority- to sue, and appellees had been brought into court by the appropriate process. Therefore, the triad! court had) jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties. The District Judge did not pass- upon the question of whether sufficient facts- were-stated to constitute a claim against the defendants and did not consider or p-ass- upon-the survival of the claim under the statute. The cause must then be remanded solely on-the technical ground that the court did have-jurisdiction.
It may be well to say that there are-good grounds for holding no cause- of action for restitution in damages was intended to survive after the lapse of the *617statute of 1942. Woods v. Gochnour, D.C., 81 F.Supp. 457. It is unnecessary to take that ground here, since on the facts in the record this court should direct the dismissal of the cause whether Congress intended a claim for relief in damages by way of restitution should survive the passing of the Act of 1942 or not.
This action has now been reduced to a claim for damages for an alleged violation, ending in 1944, of the Act of 1942, which has expired according to its terms. The right of restitution exists at law or in equity and results in the award of damages, except in special circumstances not present here. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, “Restitution.” The Supreme Court had held that the words of the statute of 1942, “he may make application to the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such provision,” justified a court on equitable principles of restitution in awarding such damages even though a like remedy existed at law.
It has been held the policy of the Act of 1947 was the same as that of the Act of 1942. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 139, 143-144, 68 S.Ct. 421, 92 L. Ed. 596. It will probably likewise be held that this same policy governs the Act of 1949, which was passed long after this case was tried and after its appeal was urged. Even if there were virtue in reviving charges of violation of the dead statutes ■because of the continuity of underlying policy when applied to actual violations of the present,, statute, no complaint is made today of any act of appellees since the statute of 1947 has been in force. No injunction would or could be granted against a violation of the Act of 1947, the Act of 1949 or any future enactment because of such alleged trespasses in the past, if there were no related violations of the current statute. This assumption is pointed up by the fact that there is an express waiver of an injunction here. If an injunction cannot be granted, the synthetic remedy of damages to “enforce compliance” with the provisions of the same dead Act of 1942 has also passed. There is no designated property here involved, of which specific restitution may be ordered, so a naked o right of damages is involved. The specific statute of limitations included by Congress in the same statute of 1942 § 205(e), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(e), has already run against the recovery of damages for the alleged violations at law by either Expediter or tenant. For the Expediter to seek to “enforce compliance” with the expired Act of 1942 by award of the same damages of $233.35 in equity would be inequitable and unjust. Equity should follow the same limitation applied at law. This antinomy is highlighted in contradiction. Since the procedural distinction between equity and law has been abolished, the identical plaintiff comes into the selfsame court and recovers the same amount for the benefit of the same person as restitution in equity, where neither the Expediter nor the proposed beneficiary could obtain the same sum at law. All equitable considerations have been eliminated. The anomaly transcends the ridiculous.
Besides, the Expediter dismissed seventeen charges joined in the amended complaint because he could not prove them. As to the two sole remaining charges, the appellees conclusively proved there was no violation as to apartment 412, and the Expediter conceded the fact and took no appeal therefrom. Exactly the identical issue of fact was reserved as to apartment 407, here in controversy, but the District Judge shortcircuited the issue and, without fault of appellees, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We do not therefore know to a certainty that the Expediter would be as decisively defeated on the same fact as to apartment 412. But the Expediter has made no showing and has given no assurance that he has an idea he could establish the remaining charges or that he intends to pass them to trial on the farts. There was nothing to give the simulacra substance. This appeal should not have been taken without that showing. It should not be assumed appellants were guilty. They have been put to the expense of am appeal where a trial on the facts would, according to every reasonable probability, have vindicated them. In any event, the cause should be remanded with directions to dismiss unless a present violation of law is charged in the premises.