Court Opinion

ID: 9908286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:23.689754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:05.159893
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1307-MR

JORDAN RINGHAM                                                       APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 19-CI-005508

AIMEE GAMES                                                            APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of the

Jefferson Circuit Court. The underlying action arose out of a car accident for

which the jury awarded no damages to Appellant Jordan Ringham (“Ringham”) for

claimed injuries. On appeal, Ringham asserts that several evidentiary rulings

resulted in an unfair trial. We affirm.
                               FACTUAL BACKGROUND

                Ringham was driving through a parking lot in Louisville when

Appellee Aimee Games (“Games”) backed up her vehicle, striking Ringham’s

vehicle. Ringham filed suit, claiming an eardrum perforation and injuries to her

spine from the accident. Games denied negligence and further argued, through

expert testimony, that the perforation and spinal injuries were not caused by the car

accident.

                Several motions in limine were filed, and several objections and

motions were made throughout the trial held in October 2022. At the conclusion of

the evidence, the jury rendered a threshold verdict, pursuant to Kentucky Revised

Statute (“KRS”) 304.39-060, finding that Ringham did not sustain $1,000.00 in

reasonably needed medical services and/or sustain a permanent injury as a direct

result of the automobile accident.1 The trial court entered judgment consistent with

the jury verdict, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Ringham asserts that the trial

court made several incorrect evidentiary rulings that cumulatively resulted in an

unfair trial.

1
  “[T]here are two distinct no-fault threshold questions which under the appropriate fact
situations should be addressed by the jury. Only if a jury answers that at least one of the criteria
has been met should it be instructed to determine the appropriate compensatory damages.
However, should the jury find that neither threshold has been met, then it should be instructed to
cease further deliberations.” Combs v. Stortz, 276 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Ky. App. 2009). Here, the
jury did not find either threshold had been met.

                                                -2-
                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             “[T]he standard of review of a trial court’s evidentiary rulings is an

abuse of discretion.” Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 725

(Ky. 2009) (citation omitted). In analyzing the abuse of discretion standard, we

note that the trial court is empowered to make its own decision “within a range of

permissible decisions,” and such decisions are generally entitled to deference on

appeal. Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Ky. 2004) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

                                     ANALYSIS

      A.     Video Clips During Opening Statement

             Ringham first asserts error regarding the defense use of segments of

expert witness testimony during the opening statement. The defense counsel

prefaced the video clip with “and Dr. Potts gave testimony in this case, and I will

show you just a small piece of what the evidence will be.” Ringham complains

that only approximately seven minutes of clips from an hour and a half of

testimony were shown to the jury during opening statements. Ringham’s attorney

objected during the trial, but the trial court overruled the objection.

             In Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622, 635 (Ky. 2009), counsel played

portions of a physician’s testimony in closing argument. The court did not conduct

                                          -3-
a hearing regarding the video snippets and did not admonish the jury that there

should be no special emphasis on portions of the testimony played during closing.

Id. at 635-36 (citation omitted). On appeal, the Supreme Court found that not

holding a “snippet hearing” was error, although it was deemed harmless. Id. at

637. Both parties reference Morgan in their briefs.

             Ringham asserts that Morgan required the trial court to conduct a

hearing and thus, failure to do so was prejudicial and required reversal. Games

responds that Ringham at no time requested a hearing nor an admonition to the

jury such as was recommended by the Morgan Court. Moreover, here, the trial

court had conducted hearings prior to trial and found the testimony of Dr. Potts to

be admissible. Games asserts there was no reason for the trial court to conduct

another hearing to insure that the snippets were admissible, and further, Ringham

could have played any portion of the testimony in her opening.

             In Morgan, our Supreme Court held that a trial court has the

discretion to determine whether counsel may play portions of videotape

depositions during closing argument. Id. at 636 (citation omitted). Before it

permits a party to play testimony during closing, the trial court must review the

testimony to ensure “that the segments presented to the jury are not overly lengthy,

do not overly emphasize one party’s case, and are not a misrepresentation of the

witness’ testimony.” Id. (citation omitted).

                                         -4-
             Nevertheless, the Court in Morgan ruled that failure to conduct a

hearing was harmless error. Id. at 637. Similarly, here, we find any error in that

regard was harmless. Ringham also maintains that use of snippets during opening

statements creates even more risk of prejudice because the snippets of anticipated

testimony may not make it into evidence. This concern has merit in the typical

case and supports the trial court conducting a hearing to preclude any such

prejudicial or improper admission. However, here, the trial court had conducted a

lengthy pretrial hearing concerning the testimony of Dr. Potts.

             As such, our reading of Morgan reveals no abuse of discretion in this

instance for failure to conduct a second hearing to review the snippets during the

early stages of the trial. Depositions and anticipated testimony are frequently

referred to during opening statements as counsel inform the jury of their view of

the case and the forthcoming evidence. If the defense had played some snippet of

testimony that had been ruled inadmissible, there could be error. However, that

did not happen here. Permitting snippets of testimony that had already been

reviewed and found admissible by the trial court does not constitute an abuse of

discretion by the trial court. Further, while an admonition, as Morgan suggested,

might have been appropriate, Ringham did not request one.

                                         -5-
       B.     The Testimony of Dr. Potts

              Second, Ringham argues that the trial court erred by permitting

certain portions of Dr. Potts’s testimony to be admitted to the jury. Ringham

conducted a discovery deposition of Dr. Potts the day before his scheduled

testimonial deposition to determine the extent of his anticipated trial testimony. At

the testimonial deposition, Dr. Potts agreed that secondary gain could be a relevant

consideration in a physician’s evaluation.

              Q.    In your opinion, is secondary gain a relevant
              consideration for you or any other physician when giving
              a causation opinion, certainly in [] Ringham’s case with
              regard to the 11/19/18 accident where she’s claiming –
              with her claims and seeking monetary gain in this
              lawsuit? Is that a relevant consideration in your opinion?

              A.     Yeah.

              However, Dr. Potts did not disclose that opinion the day before during

the discovery deposition. Therefore, before trial, Ringham moved to preclude that

testimony. This was part of an extensive motion in limine argued and heard by the

trial court, but denied prior to trial.

              We recognize that “[t]he discovery of the substance of an expert

witness’s expected testimony is essential to trial preparation.” Clephas v. Garlock,

Inc., 168 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Ky. App. 2004). However, the complained of

testimony is not at all like the expert opinions that were precluded in Clephas. In

Clephas, the expert witness was not made available for deposition prior to trial,

                                          -6-
was not given any materials to review until very close to the commencement of

trial, and “acknowledged that he did not formulate a medical opinion relating to

[the plaintiff’s] physical condition and/or its causation until a few hours before his

trial testimony.” Id. at 393. He then expressed causation and medical opinions,

not previously disclosed, based upon his review of those materials. Id. The trial

court permitted the testimony, and this Court reversed, finding that the undisclosed

medical and causation opinions at trial violated the civil rules of discovery and

constituted an abuse of discretion. Id.

              Here, as the above testimony reflects, Dr. Potts did not express an

expert opinion not previously revealed, i.e., that Ringham was motivated by

secondary gain. Rather, the expert simply agreed with a question asking whether

secondary gain can be a relevant factor. Further, we have reviewed the testimony

of Dr. Beck, Ringham’s expert. He also agreed that secondary gain can be a

relevant factor to consider, although he did not find it to be present in his

evaluation. The trial court heard all the evidence and did not find this testimony

should be precluded. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling on

this issue.

              Similarly, Ringham argues that the trial court erred in permitting Dr.

Potts to refer to Ringham’s anxiety and depression before the jury. In his

discovery deposition, Dr. Potts admitted that beyond the medical history of these

                                          -7-
conditions appearing in her records, Ringham’s anxiety and depression did not

factor into his expert opinion. In response to questions by Ringham’s counsel, the

following discussion occurred:

            Q.    And same with her history of anxiety and
            depression, that’s not mentioned anywhere else in either
            her physical exam – and please take your time.

            A.    It is not mentioned in my history. It’s only
            mentioned in her records.

            Q.    Right, the one sentence in the very first paragraph.
            It’s mentioned nowhere else in her ear records or
            anything like that?

            A.    You’re speaking specifically of anxiety and
            depression?

            Q.     Correct.

            A.    She has a history of anxiety/depression with
            multiple doctors’ visits for maintenance of these
            psychiatric diagnoses. That’s what it says.

            Q.      Yeah. And I’m asking, that’s the only place that
            it’s referenced in your report, correct?

            A.     Uh-huh. Correct.

            Q.    So you’re not planning on saying that that anxiety
            and depression affects any of your opinions?

            Mr. Breit: Objection to form.

            The witness: No, but I am a physician, so it is part of her
            medical history.

            Later, in his trial deposition, Dr. Potts was asked:

                                        -8-
             Q.    Same question about her anxiety. Is her anxiety
             more likely than not to contribute to her eardrum
             perforation?

             A.     Not directly, only perception of response to
             reaction to things like that.

             Ringham now argues that the response for trial was different from the

response in the discovery deposition. She further argues that reference to anxiety

and depression of a party was prejudicial and should have been entirely excluded.

             First, we do not agree that the testimony or the two responses of Dr.

Potts were vastly different. Moreover, Ringham’s counsel was able to cross-

examine Dr. Potts regarding his prior testimony and any perceived inconsistency.

Second, we do not find that this limited reference to her prior medical history

caused prejudice to Ringham. Comment upon medical history or the medical

record by an expert is generally permitted, unless clearly prejudicial. Kentucky

Rule of Evidence (“KRE”) 803(4).

             Pursuant to KRE 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is outweighed by undue prejudice. However, our case law

emphasizes that the task of weighing probative value and undue prejudice of

proffered evidence is “inherently factual, and therefore, within the discretion of the

trial court.” Ross v Commonwealth, 455 S.W.3d 899, 910 (Ky. 2015). Even if

evidence is improperly admitted, it is considered harmless error if the “reviewing

                                         -9-
court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed

by the error.” Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Ky. 2009).

             The trial court clearly considered any claimed prejudicial effect of all

of the testimony of Dr. Potts pursuant to KRE 403. For instance, the trial court

sustained a separate motion precluding any reference to Ringham’s prior use of

illegal drugs, as the trial court found it to be too prejudicial. Ringham has not

demonstrated prejudice in this regard sufficient to overcome the substantial

discretion of the trial court under our rules of evidence.

             Next, Ringham asserts that the trial court improperly allowed the

admission of hearsay in the trial testimony of Dr. Potts. Apparently, counsel for

Ringham had a conversation with a treating physician for his client that the treating

physician then summarized in a note within the medical records. The medical

records were provided to the defense and then the defense asked its expert about

the note during his trial testimony. Counsel for Ringham objected to this in his

pretrial motions and asserts the same objections here. Ringham argued that the

note was hearsay; that it was not a statement by a party for purposes of medical

treatment; and that the hearsay exception only allowed for admissibility of

statements by a person seeking medical treatment. KRE 803(4). This is an

interesting trial practice issue and raises questions that we would be inclined to

address if properly before us.

                                         -10-
             However, at the pretrial conference, Ringham’s counsel voluntarily

and specifically advised the trial court that he agreed to allow the questioning of

Dr. Potts regarding this note, so long as the note itself was not introduced before

the jury. This was actually Ringham’s proposal, and the trial court agreed to that

solution on the record and in writing. Thus any argument on appeal was waived

and is not properly before us.

             Ringham’s final argument regarding Dr. Potts is that the trial court

erred by not admitting an exhibit referenced in his testimony. The testimony of Dr.

Potts was played to the jury by video, with the exception of the portions excluded

by the trial court. Near the end of the testimony, Dr. Potts referenced a document

he had obtained from the internet. When the defense moved to admit exhibits for

the jury, the defense did not include that document. Ringham sought to introduce

it, and the trial court declined to do so.

             The only authority asserted for this argument is Kentucky Rule of

Civil Procedure (“CR”) 32.01, which governs the admission of depositions, not the

admission of documents into evidence. Ringham argues that any party may

introduce any part of a deposition if the opposing party offers only part of the

deposition. While that is true, here, the issue is not that the defense played only a

portion of the video testimony. Instead, Ringham requested admission of a

document. As such, CR 32.01 is simply not applicable.

                                             -11-
             The jury heard all of the expert’s testimony, other than that excluded

by the trial court as inadmissible. However, exhibits utilized during the deposition

can still be excluded if they contain inadmissible hearsay. For example, the parties

agreed that the expert’s report would not be admitted before the jury, although it

was also an exhibit to the deposition. Again, the decision whether to admit

evidence is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed

absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. See Young v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc.,

781 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Ky. 1989). It appears that counsel was able to cross-

examine the expert regarding the document, but that the trial court did not find the

document itself to be admissible. We have been provided with no basis to find that

constitutes an abuse of discretion.

      C.     Character Evidence of Prior Speeding

             Ringham’s complaint in this regard is rather vague. There was a

pretrial motion to preclude all references to Ringham’s speeding tickets. The trial

court sustained that motion prior to trial. However, during trial, defense counsel

did question Ringham about a comment she had made in her prior sworn testimony

regarding her heavy foot.

             First, this does not appear to be a violation of the trial court’s prior

ruling. Second, this alleged error does not rise to the level of an abuse of

discretion because the jury did not even address fault for the accident, determining

                                          -12-
instead that the injuries claimed were not related to the accident and/or did not

exceed the threshold.

      D.     Financial information of Dr. Beck

             Ringham’s next claim of error concerns her expert witness, Dr. Beck.

Ringham asserts that Dr. Beck was “badgered” regarding his supposed refusal to

provide expert-related income. Ringham retained Dr. Beck, a Florida physician, to

conduct a records review and provide an opinion as to causation. The defense

requested him to provide financial information consistent with Metropolitan

Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Overstreet, 103 S.W.3d 31 (Ky.

2003). In Metropolitan, the Supreme Court upheld

             admission into evidence of:          (1) the number of
             examinations and evaluations performed by the expert
             doctor on behalf of employers, insurance companies, and
             other defendants in the previous twelve months as
             compared to the number of patients seen for treatment
             purposes during the same period; (2) the expert’s charge
             for each examination; and (3) the expert’s charge for each
             deposition given as a result of an examination.

Primm v. Isaac, 127 S.W.3d 630, 632 (Ky. 2004).

             Here, Ringham asserts that the defense did not use proper means to

obtain the information from Dr. Beck and argues that the defense implied Dr. Beck

had been uncooperative or had ignored court orders. The defense filed a motion to

compel that information, which the trial court granted prior to trial. However, it

was only after the trial testimony was preserved that the defense moved the trial

                                         -13-
court to issue such an order. Thus, in response to questions regarding Dr. Beck’s

income from examination and charges, he testified that he did not have the exact

financial information requested, but that if he were so ordered, he would produce

it. From our review of the record, there was no subpoena issued nor any written

discovery addressed to the expert prior to his testimony.

             At the pretrial conference, Ringham objected to the procedure and

essentially argued that it was too late to request such information from Dr. Beck,

and it had not been properly sought by subpoena. However, the trial court advised

that, in keeping with the aforementioned authorities, it had signed an order

requiring the production of the financial information by the expert.

             In response to that ruling, counsel for Ringham stated that he would

advise the doctor and have the information by the first day of trial. What became

of that dispute is not clear from the record. From our review, there was no ruling

during the trial, nor any further discussion of deleting the financial questions from

the testimonial deposition. The trial court did not err in following the well-

established law of this Commonwealth that permits such questioning and

production of financial information. However, the ruling was not made until after

the testimony was preserved for trial, due to the apparent failure of the defense to

move for that relief prior to the trial deposition. Thus, the testimony that the jury

                                         -14-
heard did suggest that there had been a denial of information by Dr. Beck, even

though that had not yet been ordered or subpoenaed.

             The trial court’s order to produce financial information, although

entered after the trial testimony had been preserved, was not in error. The

implication of the questioning might have been limited in light of the trial court’s

ruling, but that was not relief that was requested. Indeed, it is not clear what relief

Ringham requested prior to trial, and there was no objection nor motion made

throughout the course of the trial. Thus, we find no prejudicial error that requires

reversal.

      E.     Testimony of Chiropractor

             Next, Ringham complains of the trial court’s ruling precluding certain

expert testimony from the purview of the jury. The chiropractor’s testimony

consisted of statements pertaining to chiropractic treatment and use of x-rays.

Again, this was addressed at the pretrial conference. After reviewing the

deposition, the trial court elected to redact this rather lengthy discussion because it

found the testimony was irrelevant to the issues before the jury. Counsel for

Ringham wanted to play the chiropractor’s cross-examination to show the jury that

defense counsel was badgering the expert. The trial court exercised its function as

gatekeeper to determine relevancy. The testimony was provided by avowal. The

excluded evidence was confusing, does not appear relevant to this Court, and the

                                         -15-
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded the testimony. As noted,

“the decision whether to admit evidence is vested in the sound discretion of the

trial court and will not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.”

Welsh v. Galen of Va., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 41, 51 (Ky. App. 2001).

      F.     Cumulative Errors

             Finally, Ringham asserts that all the aforementioned rulings,

cumulatively, resulted in a denial of her right to a fair trial. In support of this

argument, Ringham refers us to the Supreme Court case of Roberts v.

Commonwealth, 599 S.W.3d 841 (Ky. 2020). In Roberts, the Court held that

repeated references to inadmissible testimony during a criminal trial were so

unduly prejudicial as to have required a mistrial. Id. at 853. There, the defendant

moved to preclude admission of a prior assault that she had been charged with 14

years earlier. Id. at 846. The trial court ruled that it would allow the admission of

that prior assault if the Commonwealth laid the proper foundation. Id. As the

Court held in Roberts, generally, prior physical violence remote in time has “little

relevance other than establishment of a general disposition to commit such acts;

and the prejudice far outweighs any probative value in such evidence.” Id. at 848

(citation omitted). However, the Court also noted in Roberts that the

Commonwealth had, “against the trial court’s order, improperly introduced the

                                          -16-
evidence (which should have been ruled inadmissible from the start)[.]” Id. This

occurred repeatedly and despite repeated motions for a mistrial.

             We do not find the concerns expressed in Roberts to be at all

comparable to the alleged errors here. We have found no indication of any

motions for mistrial in this case, and in several relevant instances, Ringham did not

object during trial. As we have already outlined, the trial court conducted a

lengthy pretrial conference and ruled on numerous in limine motions, clearly

fulfilling the gatekeeping function required of all trial courts. Having reviewed

each of the assertions individually and cumulatively, we cannot conclude that the

trial court abused its discretion. The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court based

upon the jury verdict is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Rob Astorino, Jr.                          Marc L. Breit
Louisville, Kentucky                       Scott E. Miller
                                           Louisville, Kentucky

                                        -17-