Court Opinion

ID: 9852278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:27:34.381286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.940269
License: Public Domain

Mikell, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I cannot distinguish the case at bar from our Supreme Court’s decision in Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272 (528 SE2d 250) (2000). In Hodo, the witness whom the defendant was not allowed fully to cross-examine, an admitted drug dealer, was not an accomplice but had admitted to criminal conduct on the stand. Id. at 274 (3). In the present case, the witness was an accomplice in the crimes being tried. Nonetheless, both witnesses had large incentives to testify favorably to the state. Hodo held that a defendant’s right of confrontation was not violated by the trial court’s refusal to allow questions about the potential sentence the witness could face because of his criminal conduct. To be sure, the witness in Hodo *568would be speculating about what sentences he might receive for crimes with which he might be charged. And the witness in this case may not know the mandatory minimum sentences or the maximum possible sentences. But the constitutional issue concerns what questions counsel may ask, not the accuracy of the answers he might receive.
Decided July 13, 2001
Sara M. Yeager, for appellant.
J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Jennifer M. Daniels, Robert M. Coker, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
The majority in the case at bar may be correct that questions about mandatory minimum sentences for crimes with which the witness is charged, or could be charged, should be permitted. But we must follow Hodo until and unless the Supreme Court reconsiders its holding. Thus I would vote to affirm.
I am authorized to state that Judge Ellington joins in this dissent.