Court Opinion

ID: 9644098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:48:01.183459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:08.490911
License: Public Domain

DUGGAN, Justice,
dissenting on refusal to consider en banc.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s refusal to consider en banc the panel’s decision to reverse the judgment of conviction based solely on appellant’s point of error three. Tex.R.App.P. 79(d), (e). I believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the jurors implicitly disagreed among themselves as to Deputy Eng’s testimony, and were therefore entitled to have the testimony read. It appears from the record, including appellant’s brief, that appellant did not dispute the existence of this implicit disagreement. The majority has ignored the narrow procedural complaint appellant actually urged, and has granted reversal on its restatement of a complaint that was not asserted.
Appellant’s point of error three literally states:
“The trial court erred in having testimony re-read for the jury during its deliberation without certification from the jury that there was a dispute amongst them as to some point within said testimony.”
(Emphasis added.)
A plain reading of appellant’s point of error shows that he complains that the trial court refused to require the jury to certify their disagreement among themselves as to some point in the testimony, but instead allowed testimony to be read solely on his finding that they disagreed as to some point.
From the time the court received the deliberating jury’s first note, appellant’s counsel repeatedly requested the trial judge to require the jury to certify their disagreement about the witness’ testimony, a procedure to be done in some court-directed manner not spelled out in Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 36.28 (Vernon 1981). Appellant timely objected to the court’s refusals. His appellate complaint understandably sought from us a case law decision directly addressing what was previously stated only in dicta by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Iness v. State, 606 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). In Iness, the court stated:
The court properly instructed [the jury] that they must certify their disagreement and request only that part of a witness’ testimony which was in dispute.
606 S.W.2d at 314. The Iness trial court’s instruction to the jury to “certify their disagreement” was certainly not error, since nothing in article 36.28 prohibits such a procedure in determining jury disagreement; however, as the majority opinion correctly notes, the statute makes no such requirement. Ironically, the court rejects appellant’s contention, but rewrites his point of error to grant relief on a basis he did not urge.
In argument in his brief under point of error three, appellant emphasizes that his complaint is about the court’s refusal to require certification of a dispute. He first writes that “[o]n several occasions prior to the testimony being re-read for the jury, the appellant objected and requested that the trial court notify the jury that they were required to certify that a dispute existed as to a particular point_ (Emphasis added.) Appellant then cites the quoted Iness language noting that “the court properly instructed them that they must certify their disagreement....” (Emphasis in appellant’s brief.) He next argues, “There is no question that it is mandatory that there be a certification as to a dispute_” (Emphasis added.) Later, his brief reiterates, “In the instant case, the appellant repeatedly asked the trial court to instruct the jury that they *506must certify a dispute before testimony can be reread. (Emphasis added.)
In summary, the majority rejects — I believe correctly — appellant’s stated claim of error, i.e., the court’s refusal to require the jury to certify their disagreement. However, the majority proceeds to sustain his point of error and reverse — I believe erroneously — by interpreting his complaint as one they consider appellant should have urged, i.e., the court’s abuse of discretion in finding implicit disagreement.
I would hold that, in fact, implied disagreement among the jurors is shown. The jury’s second and third notes to the court make plain that they are “at a standstill” in their deliberations until Deputy Eng’s testimony can be read to them. When a jury waits hours to hear a witness’s testimony read back, I do not believe a trial judge is unreasonable in concluding the jury disagrees about that testimony. The progression of events during jury deliberations underscored the reasonableness of the judge’s conclusion that the jury was in disagreement about Eng's testimony. Having earlier asked for three witnesses’ testimony, and having been told that the reporter was not available, the jury finally asked only for Detective Eng’s testimony on the matter. The reasonable deduction was that the jurors had resolved any concerns they had about the other two witnesses, the complainant and the defendant, and were now focused on Eng, the “independent” witness. The possible logical conclusions from the jury’s second and third requests were that: (1) the jurors all thought they remembered Eng’s testimony, but they disagreed about it; (2) some jurors had forgotten Eng’s testimony, and were unwilling to accept other juror’s recollections about it; and (3) all 12 jurors had forgotten it. The last alternative was highly improbable. I would categorize possibilities (1) and (2) as varieties of disagreement. Disagreement about Eng’s testimony entitled them to have it re-read.
I find no authority holding that the jury disagreement required under article 38.26 cannot be implicit disagreement. Nothing in article 38.26, and no reported case on the subject, prescribes a ritual to be practiced by either the trial court or jury in order that the court may determine jury disagreement. Indeed, appellant’s point of error sought to have this Court determine that the trial court’s knowledge of jury disagreement must be based on jury certification of that fact, as the Iness dicta approved.
No Texas appellate decision has yet reversed a conviction based on a trial judge’s unreasonable finding of jury disagreement about a witness’s testimony. A close, but distinguishable situation, is found in Pugh v. State, 376 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.Crim.App.1964), where the jury did not ask for the testimony of any witness, but simply requested the date and time of an incident. There, after the information sought was stipulated and furnished, the jury retired and continued deliberations. The Pugh trial judge, on his own motion and over objection, then ordered that all of the arresting officer’s testimony be read back, none of which related to time and place of the incident inquired about. The Court of Criminal Appeals held this “was not authorized and tended to bolster the state’s case,” 376 S.W.2d at 762, and reversed and remanded.
In Flores v. State, 827 S.W.2d 529, 530-531 (Tex.App.-Austin 1992, no pet.), appellant requested and was denied, as a predicate for reading back testimony, even less than a “certification” of disagreement among the jury. There, appellant sought simply to have the trial court answer the jury’s request for testimony “by instructing the jury that the testimony would be read if they reported a disagreement about this testimony.” 827 S.W.2d at 530 (emphasis added). The trial judge refused, stating, “You know they disagree or they wouldn’t ask.” He further added, “[t]he point of [article 36.28] was so that they couldn’t read back the whole testimony but just that portion.” 827 S.W.2d at 530. In rejecting Flores’ complaint that the trial court erred in not requiring the jury to report a disagreement about the requested testimony, the Austin Court of Appeals held:
*507Granted, it is not error to require a jury to state that it has such a disagreement, and it may even be the better practice to do so. [citing authorities]. We agree with the district court, however, that the existence of a disagreement was implicit in the jury’s request.
827 S.W.2d at 531 (emphasis added).
Finally, appellant does not urge as a point of error, as others have successfully done, either that the testimony read to the jury went beyond the testimony requested, or that any material testimony was omitted. I would reject appellant’s precisely stated complaint, as the majority did. However, I would then hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, but reasonably found that the jurors implicitly disagreed among themselves about Deputy Eng’s testimony, and did not err in allowing it to be read back to the jury. I would overrule appellant’s point of error three and consider the remainder of appellant’s complaints on appeal.