Court Opinion

ID: 9554347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 18:11:25.464304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:38.867872
License: Public Domain

J-S20043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ZAHMIR WHITE                               :
                                               :
                        Appellant              :   No. 3003 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 10, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0004999-2018

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                               FILED AUGUST 8, 2023

       Appellant, Zahmir White, appeals from the order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) that dismissed his first

petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)1 without a hearing.

After careful review, we affirm.

       On April 1, 2018, Appellant shot and killed a teenager (Victim 1) and

shot at one of his friends (Victim 2) on South Street in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania.        Trial Court Opinion, 1/8/20, at 2-3.    On April 18, 2019,

Appellant was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter for killing Victim

1, attempted murder and aggravated assault for shooting at Victim 2, reckless

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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endangerment, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on

public streets in Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime, and

was acquitted of first-degree murder and third-degree murder.           N.T. Trial,

4/18/19, at 79-84; Verdict Report.

      On June 21, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

term of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration. N.T. Sentencing at 70-71; Sentencing

Order. Appellant’s trial counsel filed a timely post-sentence motion seeking

only reconsideration of his sentence, which the trial court denied on October

8, 2019. Appellant filed a timely appeal from his judgment of sentence, in

which his appellate counsel challenged only the length of his sentence.

Commonwealth v. White, No. 3186 EDA 2019, slip op. at 3-4 (Pa. Super.

November 6, 2020). On November 6, 2020, this Court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence. Id. at 2, 13. Appellant filed a petition for allowance

of appeal, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on March 9, 2021.

Commonwealth v. White, 250 A.3d 470 (Pa. 2021).

      On March 8, 2022, Appellant filed a timely counseled PCRA petition

asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a new trial on

the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence in his post-

sentence motion and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

appeal his convictions on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. On October 21,

2022, the trial court issued a notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent

to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing on the grounds that the claims

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that counsel failed to assert lacked merit and would have been unsuccessful.

Rule 907 Notice. Appellant did not file a response to the trial court’s Rule 907

notice. On November 10, 2022, the trial court entered an order dismissing

Appellant’s PCRA petition on those grounds. Trial Court Order, 11/10/22; Trial

Court Opinion, 2/7/23, at 5-11. This timely appeal followed.

       Appellant raises two issues in this appeal: 1) whether the trial court

erred in dismissing his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing

argue in his direct appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove voluntary

manslaughter,      attempted      murder,      aggravated   assault,   and   reckless

endangerment; and 2) whether the trial court erred in dismissing his claim

that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert in his post-sentence

motion that Appellant’s convictions of those offenses were against the weight

of the evidence.2 Our review of these issues is limited to determining whether

the record supports the trial court’s determinations and whether its decision

is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 266 A.3d 56, 62 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant argues these two issues in the opposite order.  We have reordered
them for ease of disposition. Appellant does not clearly state in his statement
of questions presented which convictions he claims should have been
challenged by his counsel, but discusses only the offenses of voluntary
manslaughter, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless
endangerment in his argument. Appellant therefore has not asserted any
claims of ineffectiveness of trial or appellate counsel with respect to his
firearms convictions or his possession of an instrument of crime conviction
and we need not consider the sufficiency or weight of the evidence with
respect to those convictions.

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2021); Commonwealth v. Ligon, 206 A.3d 515, 518 (Pa. Super. 2019);

Commonwealth v. Presley, 193 A.3d 436, 442 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      Both of Appellant’s PCRA claims asserted ineffective assistance of

counsel.   To be entitled to relief under the PCRA on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove: 1) that the underlying claim

is of arguable merit; 2) that counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or

inaction; and 3) that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or

inaction. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 618 (Pa. 2015); Bishop,

266 A.3d at 62; Presley, 193 A.3d at 442. The defendant must satisfy all

three elements of this test to obtain relief under the PCRA. Mason, 130 A.3d

at 618; Bishop, 266 A.3d at 62; Ligon, 206 A.3d at 519.

      Appellant’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise sufficiency of the evidence in his direct appeal fails because the

underlying claim that the evidence was insufficient was without arguable

merit. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, if, viewed in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, it is sufficient to

enable the jury to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 469 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v.

Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. Super. 2016); Commonwealth v.

Lawrence, 960 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. Super. 2008). Where the record shows

that evidence was introduced at trial that was sufficient to prove all of the

elements of the offenses in question, a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence

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is without arguable merit and counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing

to raise that claim. Lawrence, 960 A.2d at 478.

      Here, the evidence at trial showed that Appellant and a friend of his

encountered Victim 1, Victim 2, another friend of Victim 1, and Victim 1’s

cousin on South Street in the late afternoon of April 1, 2018, that Victim 2 and

Victim 1’s other friend got into a verbal altercation with Appellant, and that

Appellant pulled out a gun. N.T. Trial, 4/16/19, at 97-103, 107-28, 136-37,

159-60, 184-97, 225-27, 230-31, 239; N.T. Trial, 4/17/19, at 84-85, 127-31,

134. After Appellant pulled out the gun, Victim 1’s cousin and other friend ran

into a store, Victim 1 and Victim 2 ran down the street away from Appellant,

and Appellant fired multiple shots at Victim 1 and Victim 2 at torso level. N.T.

Trial, 4/16/19, at 23, 26, 32, 35-38, 68, 128-31, 160, 188, 190, 197-99, 227,

230-33, 236-38, 240-43; N.T. Trial, 4/17/19, at 71, 119-20, 135, 137-38;

Commonwealth Ex. 66. One the shots fired by Appellant hit Victim 1 in the

lower back and caused his death. N.T. Trial, 4/16/19, at 23, 25-29, 32, 35-

40, 130-31, 199, 233, 237-38; N.T. Trial, 4/17/19, at 136, 138. This evidence

was sufficient to prove all of the elements of voluntary manslaughter,

attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment.

      The elements of the offense of voluntary manslaughter are that the

defendant either killed a person without justification while acting under a

sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation or intentionally

or knowingly killed a person under an unreasonable belief that deadly force

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was   necessary    to   protect   himself.     18   Pa.C.S.   §   2503(a),   (b);

Commonwealth v. Weston, 749 A.2d 458, 462 (Pa. 2000).                 The above

evidence amply proves that Appellant intentionally or knowingly killed Victim

1. Firing a gun directly at a vital part of a person’s body is sufficient to prove

specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 529-30, 551-

52 (Pa. 2022); Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 123 A.3d 731, 746 (Pa. 2015).

Although Appellant testified that he drew his gun and fired it because he saw

Victim 2 attempt to pull a gun out of his backpack and was in fear for his life,

N.T. Trial, 4/17/19, at 120, 133-36, there had been no physical fighting and

there was other evidence that no one else involved in the argument had a

gun, made any physically threatening motion, or prevented Appellant from

leaving. N.T. Trial, 4/16/19, at 117-18, 121-22, 127-28, 132-33, 159-60,

195-97, 203-04, 240, 243; N.T. Trial, 4/17/19, at 71, 95-96. In addition, the

evidence showed that Victim 1 and Victim 2 were running away when

Appellant shot at them.        N.T. Trial, 4/16/19, at 26, 35-36, 240-43;

Commonwealth Ex. 66. The evidence was therefore also sufficient to prove

that Appellant’s belief that deadly force was necessary was unreasonable.

      A conviction for attempted murder requires the Commonwealth to prove

two elements: 1) that the defendant had the specific intent to kill and 2) that

he took a substantial step towards that goal. Commonwealth v. Blakeney,

946 A.2d 645, 652 (Pa. 2008); Ligon, 206 A.3d at 519. The evidence that

Appellant fired his gun at Victim 2’s torso is sufficient to prove both of these

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elements. Commonwealth v. Cannavo, 199 A.3d 1282, 1292 (Pa. Super.

2018) (firing a gun at people at abdominal height showed both specific intent

to kill and that the defendant took a substantial step toward committing

murder); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 443-45 (Pa. Super.

2008) (evidence that defendant fired gun at one person without hitting them

and pointed the gun at second person was sufficient to support attempted

murder conviction).

      This evidence was a fortiori sufficient to support Appellant’s aggravated

assault and reckless endangerment convictions. An attempt to cause serious

bodily injury to another person constitutes aggravated assault, regardless of

whether any injury occurred, and the elements of that offense are that the

defendant intended to cause such injury and took a substantial step to do so.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1); Commonwealth v. Steele, 234 A.3d 840, 845-46

(Pa. Super. 2020); Commonwealth v. Galindes, 786 A.2d 1004, 1012 (Pa.

Super. 2001).    To prove reckless endangerment, the Commonwealth is

required to prove only that the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct that

placed or may have placed another person in danger of death or serious bodily

injury. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705; Steele, 234 A.3d at 847. Proof that the defendant

fired a loaded gun at another person is sufficient to prove both attempt to

cause serious bodily injury and reckless conduct that placed another person

in danger of death or serious bodily injury, even though the defendant did not

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injure the victim. Steele, 234 A.3d at 846-47; Commonwealth v. Hartzell,

988 A.2d 141, 143-44 (Pa. Super. 2009); Galindes, 786 A.2d at 1012.

     Appellant argues that the evidence was nonetheless insufficient to prove

these crimes because he acted in self-defense and because the conviction of

voluntary manslaughter for the killing of Victim 1, rather than first-degree

murder or third-degree murder, is allegedly inconsistent with his attempted

murder and aggravated assault convictions for shooting at Victim 2 and his

reckless endangerment conviction. Neither of these arguments has merit.

     Self-defense is a complete defense to a crime involving use of deadly

force only if the following three elements are all present: 1) the defendant

reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious injury

and that it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent such harm; 2) the

defendant did not provoke the threat; and 3) the defendant did not violate a

duty to retreat. 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(b)(2); Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55

A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 452, 458

(Pa. Super. 2021); Steele, 234 A.3d at 846.       Where the defendant has

introduced evidence of self-defense, the burden is on the Commonwealth to

disprove the self-defense claim by proving that at least one of those three

elements is absent.    Sepulveda, 55 A.3d at 1124; Commonwealth v.

Green, 273 A.3d 1080, 1085 (Pa. Super. 2022); Jones, 271 A.3d at 458. If

the Commonwealth proves only that the defendant’s belief that he was in

imminent danger was unreasonable, self-defense is not a defense to crimes

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other than murder, but the defendant can only be convicted of voluntary

manslaughter, rather than first-degree or third-degree murder, for a killing

committed under that unreasonable belief. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(b); Green, 273

A.3d at 1085-89; Cannavo, 199 A.3d at 1290-92.

      The jury is not required to believe the defendant’s testimony that he

thought that he was in imminent danger and acted in self-defense.

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. 2011); Jones, 271

A.3d at 458; Commonwealth v. Chine, 40 A.3d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super.

2012). Disbelief of the defendant’s testimony, however, is not sufficient by

itself to satisfy the Commonwealth’s burden to disprove self-defense absent

some evidence negating self-defense. Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d

342, 345 (Pa. 2001); Jones, 271 A.3d at 459; Commonwealth v. Ward,

188 A.3d 1301, 1304 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      Here, as noted above, the evidence that no one other than Appellant

had a gun and that Appellant shot at his victims as they were running away is

sufficient to prove that Appellant’s belief that he needed to use deadly force

was unreasonable.     Indeed, that evidence would be sufficient to disprove

Appellant’s claim that he actually believed that Victim 2 had a gun and was in

fear for his life when he shot Victim 1 and shot at Victim 2. A sufficiency of

the evidence argument based on self-defense would therefore be without

arguable merit and counsel cannot be ineffective for failure to raise it.

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      Appellant’s second argument fails for two reasons. First, contrary to

Appellant’s contention, inconsistent verdicts do not render sufficient evidence

insufficient or otherwise invalidate a conviction, unless commission of an

offense of which the defendant was acquitted is an essential statutory element

of the offense of which the defendant was convicted. Commonwealth v.

Baker-Myers, 255 A.3d 223, 229-35 (Pa. 2021); Commonwealth v.

Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1246-50 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Knox, 219

A.3d 186, 197 (Pa. Super. 2019).       Nothing in the charges concerning the

killing of Victim 1, for which Appellant was acquitted of first-degree and third-

degree murder and convicted of voluntary manslaughter, is an essential

element of any of the other offenses of which Appellant was convicted. The

voluntary manslaughter verdict is therefore irrelevant to the validity of

Appellant’s   attempted     murder,     aggravated    assault,   and    reckless

endangerment convictions and cannot make the evidence insufficient to

support those convictions. Moore, 103 A.3d at 1250; Knox, 219 A.3d at 197.

      Second, the verdicts are not even inconsistent.            The voluntary

manslaughter offense of which Appellant was convicted requires proof that the

defendant “intentionally or knowingly kill[ed].” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503(b); see

also Weston, 749 A.2d at 462. That mens rea is completely consistent with

the mens rea for attempted murder of specific intent to kill and the mens rea

for Appellant’s aggravated assault and reckless endangerment convictions of

intent to cause serious bodily injury and recklessness.

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      Appellant’s remaining claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, that trial

counsel was ineffective for failure to seek a new trial on weight of the evidence

grounds in his post-sentence motion, is without merit because he cannot show

prejudice.   To satisfy the prejudice element of an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d

1119, 1127 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. Postie, 200 A.3d 1015, 1023

(Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). Because trial counsel’s alleged error here was

a failure to raise an issue by post-sentence motion, the prejudice element

requires that the defendant show a reasonable probability that relief would

have been granted if the motion had been filed. Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1131-

32; Presley, 193 A.3d at 444-45.

      The trial court properly concluded that Appellant could not show a

reasonable probability that a weight of the evidence motion would have been

granted. A new trial may be granted on the ground that the verdict is against

the weight of the evidence only where the verdict was so contrary to the

evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice. Houser, 18 A.3d at 1136;

Bishop, 266 A.3d at 67-68; Knox, 219 A.3d at 198.

      Appellant argues that the jury’s voluntary manslaughter, attempted

murder, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment verdicts were against

the weight of the evidence because the evidence showed that his actions were

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reasonable self-defense and because it was undisputed that Appellant had a

reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding. Those arguments are without

merit. The trial court concluded that a motion for a new trial on weight of the

evidence grounds would have been unsuccessful because there was

overwhelming evidence refuting Appellant’s self-defense claim and showing

that any belief that he needed to use deadly force was unreasonable. Trial

Court Opinion, 2/7/23, at 8-11.     That conclusion, by the same judge who

presided over Appellant’s trial, is supported by the record.       As discussed

above, Appellant’s claim that Victim 2 had a gun was contradicted by other

witnesses. N.T. Trial, 4/16/19, at 132-33, 203-04, 240, 243. Moreover, the

video evidence showed that the individuals at whom Appellant fired his gun

were already running away from him before he shot at them. Commonwealth

Ex. 66.

      The fact that it was stipulated at trial that Appellant has a reputation for

being peaceable and law-abiding, N.T. Trial, 4/17/19, at 187, does not make

the verdict contrary to the evidence. While a jury may find evidence of good

character sufficient by itself to create a reasonable doubt, Commonwealth

v. Weiss, 606 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Neely, 561

A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. 1989), such evidence does not require that the jury find a

defendant not guilty, and where, as here, there is ample evidence of guilt, a

guilty verdict is not against the weight of the evidence, despite the defendant’s

good character. Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099, 1107-08 (Pa.

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Super. 2022); Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 432 (Pa. Super.

2012); Commonwealth v. Price, 616 A.2d 681, 685 (Pa. Super. 1992).

      For the foregoing reasons, the trial court correctly concluded Appellant

was not entitled to relief on either of his PCRA claims. Accordingly, we affirm

the trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/8/2023

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