Court Opinion

ID: 9487687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:23:46.609449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:25.762562
License: Public Domain

MAGILL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from part I of the majority’s opinion. I would reverse the district court because I believe its decision announced a new rule in violation of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 108 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989).
I.
Teague prevents a federal court from granting habeas relief to a prisoner based on a rule announced after his conviction has become final. Id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. at 1075. Since Groose argued that the district court fashioned a new rule, we “must apply Teague before considering the merits of the claim.” Caspari v. Bohlen, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 948, 953, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994).
We apply a three-step analysis to determine whether Teague precludes the district court’s decision. First we must determine when Abdullah’s conviction became final. Then we “must ‘[s]urve[y] the legal landscape’ ” at that time to “determine whether a state court considering [Abdullah’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). Finally, if we conclude the district court announced a new rule, we must determine whether one of two narrow exceptions to Teague applies. Id.
The core issue is whether the district court’s decision announced a new rule. If so, Teague bars it from applying here, as neither of the two narrow exceptions to Teague are applicable. For Teague purposes, “a decision announces a new rule ‘if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.’” Gilmore v. Taylor, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 2116, 124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). A good faith extension of existing precedent constitutes a new rule as does a decision that is related to existing precedent. Wickham v. Dowd, 914 F.2d 1111, 1114-15 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254, 111 S.Ct. 2897, 115 L.Ed.2d 1061 (1991). A rule is considered a new rule if reasonable jurists could differ as to whether the rule is compelled by existing precedent. Caspari, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 956; Gilmore, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2120 (O’Con-nor, J., concurring). The combination of two long-standing lines of precedent to form a third precedent which is related to both is also a new rule that violates Teague. Wickham, 914 F.2d at 1113-14. I believe that the majority overlooks the definition of a new rule when it determines that Teague is not applicable.
The majority determines that the district court’s rule is not new based upon two longstanding lines of precedent: one deriving from Faretta and its progeny that a defendant’s waiver of his right to an attorney must be knowing and intelligent, maj. op. at 694-95; and one from Holbrook recognizing the inherently prejudicial nature of requiring a defendant to be shackled during trial, maj. op. at 695. The majority then combines these two long-standing lines of precedent to determine that the district court should have inquired as to “whether Abdullah understood the effect shackling would have on his ability to represent himself.” Maj. op. at 695. This combination of two separate well-established and long-standing precedents to form a new third requirement that is logically related to both lines of precedents is a new rule that is barred by Teague. Wickham, 914 F.2d at 1113-14. I believe that the only way this case could survive Teague is if one of these lines of precedents standing alone dictates the district court’s decision.
A. Faretta and its Progeny
The majority asserts that Faretta and its progeny compel the district court’s decision. To determine whether this is so requires a *698formulation of the district court’s rule. The majority has phrased the district court’s ruling as stating that a “defendant seeking to represent himself should be informed by the trial judge of the particular complexities and difficulties that the shackling causes.” Maj. op. at 695. The opinion also states the essence of the district court rule as requiring “the general rule of Faretta [to] be applied to the particular facts in this ease, including the difficulties that shackling would pose to self-representation.” Maj. op. at 695.
It is well-settled that a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to represent himself and that in order to waive his right to counsel he must make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Berry v. Lockhart, 873 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir.1989). This requires the defendant be “made aware of ‘the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). The Supreme Court takes a pragmatic approach to determine whether a waiver is knowingly and intelligently made based upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case. Factors to consider in this process include:
the defendant’s age and education, ... other background, experience, and conduct. The court must ensure that the waiver is not the result of coercion or mistreatment of the defendant, ... and must be satisfied that the accused understands the nature of the charges, the consequences of the proceedings, and the practical meaning of the right he is waiving.
McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir.1985). In United States v. Yagow, this court cited 1 Bench Book for United States District Judges § 1.02 (3d ed. 1986) as a model of a Faretta inquiry. 953 F.2d 427, 431 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 103, 121 L.Ed.2d 62 (1992). The Bench Book colloquy only addresses disadvantages to proceeding pro se in general, not disadvantages specific to an individual defendant’s case.6
Prior to the district court’s decision, I am aware of no case that requires a trial court to include in its Faretta colloquy a warning of the dangers or disadvantages of proceeding pro se that are specific to his case.7 The district court in this case is requiring the Faretta inquiry to include warnings about the particular disadvantages in this case (shackling), not the disadvantages of proceeding pro se in general. I believe this is a new rule, because it is not dictated by existing precedent. The rule is related to the *699Faretta requirement of being informed of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se in general, but this is not sufficient to save it from the bar of Teague. At the very least, reasonable jurists could disagree as to whether or not Faretta and its progeny compel the district court’s decision. Accordingly, I believe the district court announced a new rule in violation of Teague.
Furthermore, in this case the motion for the defendant to remain in shackles did not occur until immediately after defendant’s motion to proceed pro se was granted. Consequently, at the time of the initial Faretta colloquy, it is unlikely that the trial court was aware that it would shortly be ordering the defendant to remain in shackles during the trial. In essence, the district court is requiring the trial court to supplement its initial Faretta colloquy once it became aware that the defendant would be shackled. So stated, this is clearly a new rule in violation of Teague.
B. Shackles
I agree with the majority’s analysis of our long-standing recognition that “forcing a defendant to undergo trial in chains is ‘inherently prejudicial,’ ... and should only be tolerated in cases of dire necessity.” Maj. op. at 695 (citations omitted). However, these precedents do not require any warning of the disadvantages of such shackling be given to the defendant. Accordingly, the long-standing precedent concerning shackling does not dictate the district court’s rule.
II.
I believe that the district court announced a new rule, which violates Teague. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Teague is not applicable because there was compelling long-standing precedent existing at the time of Abdullah’s conviction. I believe that the district court ruling takes two long-standing lines of precedents and combines them into a third, albeit related, rule. This is a new rule in violation of Teague. Consequently, Abdullah may not rely on this rule as a basis for habeas relief. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the district court’s grant of the writ of habeas corpus.

. With respect to the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, the Bench Book advises trial judges to inquire whether the defendant is familiar with the rules of evidence and criminal procedure and to warn the defendant that he will be required to abide by these rules; to inquire whether the defendant is aware of the potential sentence in the case; to warn the defendant that the court "cannot tell you how you should try your case or even advise you as to how to try your case.” 1 Bench Book for United States District Judges § 1.02(2)(g) (1991). The Bench Book also recommends that the trial court warn the defendant to the effect that in its opinion, the defendant “would be far better defended by a trained lawyer than you can be by yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with the rules of evidence. I would strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself.” Id. § 1.02(2)(1). Nowhere in its suggested Faretta warnings does it state that the district court should also warn the defendant of any dangers or disadvantages specific to his particular case that the court is aware of.

. In Culverhouse v. Texas, the Texas appellate court noted that the trial court warned the defendant of the disadvantages of proceeding pro se while shackled. 755 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863, 109 S.Ct. 164, 102 L.Ed.2d 134 (1988). However, the court neither approved nor required trial courts to undertake such a specific Faretta inquiry.
Additionally, it appears that the Florida Supreme Court does not require a trial court to include in its Faretta colloquy a specific warning about the disadvantages of proceeding pro se in shackles. See Diaz v. State, 513 So.2d 1045, 1047 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S.Ct. 1061, 98 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1988). The court noted that the trial court warned Diaz about the difficulties of proceeding pro se, emphasizing the problems arising from his need of an interpreter. Id. The court rejected Diaz’s claim of ignorance that self-representation “might prejudicially increase the shackles impact on the jury” as untenable. Id.