Court Opinion

ID: 9487528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:19:31.115915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:20.307422
License: Public Domain

*830RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In doing so, I hasten to add that this is a difficult case, and principled arguments can be marshalled on either side of this issue. The court starts out by stating that “while Congress could, if it wished, tax the investment income of state agencies such as the education trust, it has not chosen to do so.” My view is to the contrary. I believe that although Congress could exempt such income from taxation, it has not done so. I find some support for this position in the introduction of legislation in Congress in 1988 by U.S. Senator Donald Riegle of Michigan, at the request of state officials, to exempt MET from federal income taxation.1 Although I recognize that legislation can be introduced to resolve uncertainty as well as to create a new exemption, it is significant that this effort to provide a legislative exemption came on the heels of MET finding itself very quickly in financial difficulty after it initially began voluntarily paying the tax.
I also would place more of a political overlay on the analysis of these issues than does the court. However well intentioned it may sound to put into place a program guaranteeing parents affordable college tuition in the future for their children, the engine driving this program was in no small degree plain old partisan politics. Fifty-five thousand persons signed up for this program, and I assume that most of them were registered voters.2
At this point one might ask, so what? What does all of this have to do with whether or not the money earned on MET investments is taxable? The answer to this question is somewhat complex.
Parents who signed a contract with MET essentially were buying an annuity. They would put “X” dollars up front, and over time the interest earned on their investment would allow the fund to grow and keep pace with projected increases in college tuition. If it was this simple, why didn’t parents just buy an annuity on the open market to accomplish the same result? The answer is that no private company could offer an annuity at the attractive price at which it was being offered by MET. MET was able to undercut the market for two reasons. First, in my view, MET proceeded imprudently on the assumption that its earnings would continue at the abnormally high rate that State investments had been earning. Second, unlike a private *831company, MET had the luxury of underestimating the rate of future tuition increases.3
Now I realize that for a government official to overstate revenues and understate expenses is not a capital offense. If it were, death row would be even more crowded than it is. But for MET there were more immediate consequences than the possibility of an eventual deficit. MET was forced to deal almost immediately with a shortfall, and in 1990, only two years after its launch, MET stopped accepting applications and has never resumed.
Although the shortfall was primarily the result of less return on investment than anticipated and greater increases in tuition than contemplated, nothing could be done about these two factors. The only adjustment that hopefully could be made was to secure tax-exempt status, notwithstanding that MET had been told from the start by the IRS that it would not qualify for tax-exempt status,4 a ruling MET accepted.5 MET was forced by financial pressure to revisit this issue, however, and instituted this lawsuit.6 The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the United States. For the reasons that follow, I am convinced that Judge Hillman was correct.
I.
With one limited exception,7 Congress has never imposed a federal income tax upon sovereign states, their political subdivisions, or other entities that are an integral part of the state. This exemption is nowhere written in the tax code. Instead, this de facto exemption has applied since 1913 because the IRS has acknowledged that states are not “corporations, associations, trusts or individuals” subject to income taxation under the Code. In considering the de facto tax-exempt status of state-created entities, the courts have used both the “sovereign power” test and the “integral part” test. Under either test, MET’s petition for tax-exempt status under the de facto exemption fails.
The Internal Revenue Code does not define the term “political subdivision,” but the term has been defined by Treasury regulations pertaining to the exemption of interest on state obligations as “any division of any State or local governmental unit which is a municipal corporation or which has been delegated the right to exercise part of the sovereign power of the unit.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.103-1(b) (1992). Construing the regulation, courts have required entities seeking “political subdivision” status to be authorized to exercise at least one of three sovereign powers: the power of eminent domain, the power to tax, or the police power.
This “sovereign power” test was first recognized by the Second Circuit in two companion cases, Commissioner v. Shamberg’s Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir.1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792, 65 S.Ct. 433, 89 L.Ed. 631 (1945), and Commissioner v. White’s Estate, 144 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792, 65 S.Ct. 433, 89 L.Ed. 632 (1945). In Shamberg’s Estate, the court addressed whether interest on the New York Port Authority’s bonds was excludable from gross *832income. The court found that the Authority was a political subdivision of New York and New Jersey because it was created by a contract between the two states and had maintained many sovereign powers, including the power of eminent domain and the police power. The Authority’s police power included the power to subpoena, the power to issue orders and enforce orders against persons within its jurisdiction, and the power to maintain a uniformed police force. Although the Authority did not have the power to tax, the court found this did not jeopardize the Authority’s tax-exempt status:
Here the activities ... are exercised for a public purpose by an agency set up by the states and given many public powers, though not of taxation or control through the suffrages of citizens. It minimizes its public and political character to treat such an agency as a private corporation merely because of the lack of taxing power which is only one of the attributes of sovereignty.
Shamberg’s Estate, 144 F.2d at 1005.
In White’s Estate, the court considered whether the Triborough Bridge Authority was a political subdivision for the interest on its bonds to be tax exempt. The court found that the Authority was a political subdivision of the State of New York because the Authority was “plainly a subdivision of state government empowered to exercise governmental functions on behalf of the City of New York_” 144 F.2d at 1020. The Authority’s powers included the power of eminent domain and the power “to make use of city agents, employees, and facilities, and to issue bonds for constructing the bridges.” Id.
Other courts have followed this reasoning. In Seagrave Corp. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 247, 1962 WL 1078 (1962), the Tax Court recognized that an entity must be authorized to exercise a sovereign power to constitute a political subdivision. In rejecting several volunteer fire departments’ claims that they were political subdivisions under the Code, the court held:
[T]he volunteer fire companies perform a public function in the sense that they perform the same function that is generally carried on by municipal fire departments. But the volunteer fire companies here involved ... [are] not created by any special statutes and they received no delegation of any part of the State’s power. It is not enough that they perform a public service. They cannot be called a subdivision of the State unless there has been a delegation to them of some functions of local government.
Seagrave, 38 T.C. at 250. Likewise, later courts have held that the delegation of traditional sovereign authority is a crucial factor in determining whether an entity is a political subdivision. See Texas Learning Technology Group v. Commissioner, 958 F.2d 122, 126 (5th Cir.1992); Philadelphia Nat’l Bank v. United States, 666 F.2d 834, 839 (3d Cir.1981) (Temple University not a political subdivision because sovereign power has not been delegated), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105, 102 S.Ct. 2904, 73 L.Ed.2d 1314 (1982); Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States, 438 F.2d 684 (1st Cir.1971) (hospital not a political subdivision in part because did not exercise any sovereign powers).
I find this test helpful, but note that it should not be applied mechanically to grant or deny tax-exempt status to those entities that do or do not possess one of the three historic attributes of state sovereignty. For example, many public utilities have eminent domain powers, and many private colleges have private police forces. However, neither organization has been viewed as a candidate for tax-exempt status.
MET argues that it qualifies as a political subdivision of Michigan because: (1) it possesses the power of eminent domain; (2) it is created by statute for the specific purpose of carrying on a specified governmental program; (3) it has been delegated a part of the duty to foster education within the State, and among the police powers of Michigan is the constitutionally mandated and legislatively required power and duty to promote education within the State; and (4) it possesses the governmental powers of rule-making and conducting quasi-judicial hearings.
MET’s assumption that it possesses the power of eminent domain is based on Mich. Comp.Laws Ann. § 213.23, which provides:
*833Any public corporation or state agency is authorized to take private property necessary for a public improvement or for the purposes of its incorporation or for public purposes within the scope of its powers....
The United States argues that any “theoretical power” of eminent domain that MET possesses is inadequate to confer tax-exempt status upon it, for the Trust’s purpose is to invest money and it therefore is “inconceivable” that the Trust would ever need to invoke its alleged power of eminent domain. I find it unnecessary to decide whether MET possesses eminent domain power under Michigan law, for, even if it did, possession of such power in this ease would be insufficient to grant MET tax-exempt status.
MET does not have the power of taxation, nor does it benefit from legislative appropriation of funds. Any money that it has received from the State was in the form of a loan that MET paid back immediately. Moreover, the State does not guarantee the continued liquidity of the fund. If MET became aetuarially unsound, purchasers of MET contracts could not rely on the State to meet MET’s promise that children’s tuition to state universities will be paid. In addition, despite MET’s arguments to the contrary, it has not established that it possesses the police power. Although the promotion of higher education is a governmental, public function that has been assumed by the states, the maintenance of a prepaid tuition fund is not the type of responsibility historically borne by the states.
My conclusion that MET is not entitled to the de facto exemption is buttressed by MET’s failure to meet the “integral part” test for considering entities who seek tax-exempt status. In deciding whether an entity is an integral part of a state, courts have relied on six factors:
(1) whether it is used for a governmental purpose and performs a governmental function; (2) whether performance of its function is on behalf of one or more states or political subdivisions; (3) whether there are any private interests involved, or whether the states or political subdivisions involved have the powers and interests of an owner; (4) whether control and supervision of the organization is vested in public authority or authorities; (5) if express or implied statutory or other authority is necessary for the creation and/or use of such an instrumentality, and whether such authority exists; and (6) the degree of financial autonomy and the source of its operating expenses.
See Rose v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 918 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936, 108 S.Ct. 1112, 99 L.Ed.2d 273 (1988).
It is unnecessary to define the extent to which MET must meet all of the elements of this list. Even if it were necessary only to fulfill a substantial part of the requirements, MET would fail to meet at least elements (3), (4), and (6). Substantial private interests are involved in MET, for (put in its best light) it was conceived primarily to alleviate parents’ fears about the affordability of higher education. Private individuals, and not public actors, have the right to receive distributions from the Trust, either in tuition payments or in cash. In addition, MET is an independent entity that is not controlled or supervised by the State. See Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 390.1425(1) (“The trust shall be within the department of treasury, but shall exercise its prescribed statutory powers, duties, and functions independently of the head of that department.”). MET’s funds are not commingled with the State’s general revenue fund, ensuring that the State cannot “raid” the Trust. MET, then, has significant financial autonomy from the State, since the State does not guarantee MET’s promise to provide the tuition payments of those beneficiaries who enroll in Michigan’s state colleges and universities. MET also does not receive financial assistance from the State, but instead relies on the income it receives from its investments to pay for operating expenses. Although MET, a state-created entity controlled by board members selected by the governor, has an undeniable connection to the State, its activities and funding arrangements indicate that it is not integral to the functioning of the State.
*834II.
Section 115 provides in relevant part as follows:
Gross income does not include—
(1) income derived from any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to a State or any political subdivision thereof....
26 U.S.C. § 115.
Plaintiffs contend that MET serves an essential governmental function, and the income earned eventually accrues to the State because much of it is used to make direct payments to Michigan public colleges and universities. The district court found that § 115 did not alter MET’s tax status because the statute’s accrual requirement was lacking in this case. Although I have no quarrel with that conclusion, I find that MET does not perform an essential governmental function and therefore does not meet § 115’s standard for tax-exempt status. See United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 7 n. 2, 91 S.Ct. 16, 18 n. 2, 27 L.Ed.2d 4 (1970) (upholding district court conclusion that section 115 exemption not applicable to non-profit corporation created by Maryland legislature with the object of insuring the accounts of shareholders of member savings and loan associations).
The phrase “essential governmental function” was defined long ago by the Supreme Court:
The true distinction is between the attempted taxation of those operations of the States essential to the execution of its governmental functions, and which the State can only do itself, and those activities which are of a private character. The former, the United States may not interfere with by taxing the agencies of the State in carrying out its purposes; the latter, although regulated by the State, and exercising delegated authority, such as the right of eminent domain, are not removed from the field of legitimate Federal taxation.
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172, 31 S.Ct. 342, 357, 55 L.Ed. 389 (1911). See also South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 461, 26 S.Ct. 110, 116, 50 L.Ed. 261 (1905) (limiting tax exemption to instrumen-talities “of a strictly governmental character”).
Plaintiffs contend that higher education in Michigan is an essential governmental function, and I agree. However, it does not necessarily follow that providing a tuition prepayment program for those state citizens who can afford it is an essential governmental function. See Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439, 452, 58 S.Ct. 980, 986, 82 L.Ed. 1448 (1938) (“If it be conceded that the education of its prospective citizens is an essential governmental function of [a state], as necessary to the preservation of the State as is the maintenance of its executive, legislative, and judicial branches, it does not follow that if the State elects to provide the funds for any of these purposes by conducting a business, the application of the avails in aid of necessary governmental functions withdraws the business from the field of federal taxation.”). Offering a program such as MET is not something that only the State itself can do. As noted earlier, investment of money is a quintessentially private function, and investment services similar to those of the Trust are available currently through private companies. See Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, 88 Mich.L.Rev. at 1042 n. 13.
In addition, if the MET program were discontinued, the State of Michigan would be harmed, if at all, only indirectly. The money involved in this program is entirely independent of the State, and thus dissolution of the Trust would not result in any monies flowing out of Michigan’s general fund — unless the state legislature chose to bail out the Trust. Importantly, however, a bail out is not required by statute. To the extent that the MET program makes Michigan public colleges and universities more attractive to prospective students,8 any shortfall in revenue *835from a decline in enrollments if MET were dissolved could be recouped through higher tuition and would not necessarily require additional appropriations from the Michigan legislature. MET does not serve an essential governmental function with such indirect and hypothetical injury to the State.
Plaintiffs respond by noting that MET is not an investment program, but instead guarantees prepaid tuition to state universities and colleges. I might take this argument more seriously if the State pledged its full faith and credit to the MET program, because then the State would suffer direct and measurable harm if the program failed. The State provides no such guarantee, however. Instead, the legislature at its discretion can decide to bail out the Trust if it becomes actuarially unsound. Thus, MET’s pledge to purchasers is chimerical. It is not bottomed on any state guarantee, but rather on wise investment strategies and the correctness of its financial assumptions to ensure the continued soundness of its guarantee. I have already voiced my doubts on this subject.
III.
The Code provides for exemption from taxation for certain charitable organizations. Under § 501(c)(3), an exemption exists for organizations
organized and operated exclusively for ... charitable ... or educational purposes, ... no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual....
In addition, the Code exempts
organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare....
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4).
The presence of any substantial non-exempt purpose will destroy an organization’s exemption under § 501, regardless of the number and importance of truly exempt purposes. See Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283, 66 S.Ct. 112, 114, 90 L.Ed. 67 (1945). While the plaintiffs are correct that the MET program provides public benefits to society at large in the form of a well-educated populace, I agree with the district court that the tuition guaranteeing service constitutes a substantial private purpose that destroys the Trust’s exemption. Those who contract with MET are the principal beneficiaries of the plan. See American Ass’n of Christian Schools Voluntary Employees Beneficiary Ass’n Welfare Plan Trust v. United States, 850 F.2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir.1988) (a trust providing insurance benefits to employees of tax-exempt associations failed to qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3) or (c)(4) because trust had substantial private, non-exempt purpose of providing insurance in exchange for premiums). See also Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210, 1217 (3d Cir.1993) (health plan benefits no one but its subscribers, and even though area in which the plan operates is underserved medically, the plan does not “primarily benefit the community”). In addition, MET restricts its reach to those able to pay, providing evidence that MET is a non-charitable organization under the Code. See Federation Pharmacy Servs. v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 804, 807 (8th Cir.1980) (“An organization which does not extend some of its benefits to individuals financially unable to make the required payments reflects a commercial activity rather than a charitable one.”).
IV.
Having concluded that none of plaintiffs’ statutory arguments have merit, I now turn to plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. Plaintiffs invoke the Tenth Amendment, the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, and the Guarantee Clause in support of their contention that MET’s income from investments is exempt from federal income tax.
A. Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United *836States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment has undergone considerable change in the last several years. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), the Court relied on the Tenth Amendment to hold that Congress acted unconstitutionally when it attempted to apply federal minimum-wage laws to the States. To do so, according to the Court, “would impair the States’ ... [ability] to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental funetions[.]” Id. at 852, 96 S.Ct. at 2474.
Several years later, the Court overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). Rejecting as unworkable the “traditional governmental function” test, the Court concluded that “[a]ny rule of state immunity that looks to the ‘traditional,’ ‘integral,’ or ‘necessary’ nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.” Id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1015. It then found that “the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action — the built-in restraints that our system provides” through state participation in the national political process. Id. at 556, 105 S.Ct. at 1020. It is that process, the Court concluded, that “ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.” Id.
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the internal safeguards of the political process have failed in this case. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513, 108 S.Ct. 1355, 1361, 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to federal tax of certain bonds issued by state and local governments unless those bonds were issued in registered form because “here, the national political process did not operate in a defective manner”). The United States did not violate the Tenth Amendment in taxing MET’s investment income.
B. Intergovernmental Tax Immunity
The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity protects the federal government from state taxation. See California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 109 S.Ct. 2228, 104 L.Ed.2d 910 (1989). More significantly, it also protects state governments from federal taxation. The doctrine addresses both the imposition of a tax on states themselves and on parties with whom the States deal.
Under current intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, the United States can tax any private parties with whom a state does business, even though the financial burden falls on the state, so long as the tax does not discriminate against the state, or those with whom it deals, in favor of the federal government. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 523, 108 S.Ct. at 1366-67. In addition, at least some non-discriminatory federal taxes can be collected directly from the States even though a parallel state tax could not be collected directly from the federal government. Id A tax is considered to be directly “on” the state when the levy falls on the state itself, “or on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities.” Id. at 523, 108 S.Ct. at 1367. My conclusion that MET is not an integral part of the State of Michigan forecloses plaintiffs’ argument that the taxing of MET’s investment income falls directly on the State. The only remaining concern is whether the tax on MET is discriminatory. But see Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, 88 Mich.L.Rev. at 1084 n. 116 (noting that the discriminatory element of the doctrine has “contracted dramatically” so that “most problems involving the doctrine concern disputes over whether a particular entity is part of the state”).
Plaintiffs allege that the United States’ taxing policy discriminates in that several federal programs — i.e., the federal student loan program, the federal insurance program, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the United States Post Office — operate with tax exemptions although they are similar to MET because they invest funds that they receive to support their goals. Al*837though some similarities exist between these programs and MET, I agree with the district court that, unlike MET, these federal programs do not function primarily as an investment service for individual beneficiaries. The more proper comparison is to private investment services whose income is taxed by the federal government. Thus, I find nothing discriminatory in the federal government’s taxation of MET.
C. Guarantee Clause
Finally, plaintiffs contend that federal taxation of MET conflicts with the Guarantee Clause, which provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.” Plaintiffs argue that the power to tax MET amounts to a “substantial federal incursion,” that will “destroy the legitimate interests of the states[.]”
I hesitate to reach the substantive question of the Guarantee Clause’s effect on federal taxation. My hesitancy is not driven by plaintiffs’ arguments, but follows from my conclusion that a federal tax on MET does not amount to a substantial federal incursion on Michigan’s affairs. Having concluded that MET is not an integral part of the State of Michigan, I am hard-pressed to understand the significant incursion of which plaintiffs speak. The district court did not reach plaintiffs’ main arguments, for it concluded that this was a nonjusticiable issue. In doing so, the court relied on frequent holdings by the Supreme Court that claims presented under the Guarantee Clause are “political questions” unable to be resolved by federal courts. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-29, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710-16, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Nevertheless, plaintiffs urge us to follow Justice O’Connor, who argued in dissent in South Carolina v. Baker that Guarantee Clause questions are justiciable. 485 U.S. at 531-34, 108 S.Ct. at 1371-72 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Just as the Supreme Court has declined to answer this difficult question, see New York v. United States, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), I would decline here. I would leave it to the Supreme Court in the first instance to enter this constitutional thicket.
I would affirm.

. The proposed amendment read in part:
(b) Qualified State Prepaid Tuition Plans.—
(1) For purposes of subsection (a)(1), program income derived by a state or agency or instrumentality or political subdivision thereof or an entity created and administered by a state for the benefit of its residents, in connection with a program the function of which is to provide access to higher education by issuing contracts for the provision of education services or the payment of higher education expenses with respect to which an individual is entitled to an exclusion from gross income pursuant to section 135(d), shall be treated as income derived from the exercise of an essential governmental function.
134 Cong.Rec. S 15492 (1988).

. The New York Times has characterized programs such as this as the "key” to middle-class voters:
Now with programs to help two-earner families find day care, to expand student loans and to help young families buy houses, the Democrats hope to restore their own standing, and in the process re-establish government in the good graces of the middle class.
This approach, in fact, has become quite popular at the state level. One of the bolder experiments is Gov. James J. Blanchard's Michigan Education Trust. Under the plan, the state's parents can deposit relatively modest sums today in a state-run interest-bearing trust in exchange for guaranteed tuition for their child in Michigan's college and university system. For an infant, the cost of a four-year guarantee is $6,756. It's more for older children, because the money would be on deposit for a shorter period.
Critics of the plan say it is a politician’s dream. An article in The New Republic recently called it a scheme through which politicians "can buy today’s votes with money from tomorrow’s (as well as today's) taxpayers,” since the promise of a college education will presumably be redeemed long after Mr. Blanchard, who would like to play a larger role in national party strategy, leaves office. But Mr. Blanchard insists that the plan is financially sound. In any case, it has proved immensely popular, and the state is now moving to establish a similar program to help first-time home buyers.
E.J. Dionne Jr., Democrats Seek the Key to the Middle Class, N.Y.Times, Apr. 30, 1989, § 4 at 5.

. Moreover, if the fund has a shortfall, there will be tremendous political pressure on the legislature to pony up the difference.

. In Letter Ruling 8825027, the IRS stated that MET’s income would be taxed.

. “Mr. Roberts [State Treasurer] said that if the state loses the case, the trust would not be harmed financially because it has been paying federal taxes. According to Ms. Keeley [executive director of the trust], the trust has paid a total of about $29 million in 'federal taxes. The trust currently has 55,000 contracts outstanding and $450 million of assets, she added.” Karen Pierog, Michigan Will Appeal Decision Finding that Prepaid Tuition is Not Tax-Exempt, The Bond Buyer, Aug. 20, 1992, Vol. 300, No. 28969 at 2.

. Other states have structured their pre-paid tuition programs differently than Michigan. See, e.g., Pierog, supra note 5 ("William Montjoy, executive director of Florida’s Prepaid Postsec-ondaiy Education Expense program, said ... Michigan's case would have no impact on Florida.... The Florida program is an integral part of the state government, he said, because it is a state agency with a budget funded by state appropriations.”).

. Section 511(a) of the Code includes state colleges and universities in the group of organizations subject to the unrelated business income tax.

. The correctness of this proposition is debatable. Neither party has offered statistical proof that MET has induced or will induce students to attend Michigan public colleges who would otherwise elect to matriculate elsewhere. It would be surprising if this were the case to any large degree. MET is limited to beneficiaries who are residents of Michigan. Even without the MET program, then, those beneficiaries would be entitled to receive in-state tuition, a figure much less *835than that paid by non-resident students. For residents, education from a Michigan public college or university would remain more attractive in terms of its cost than the education offered by private schools or out-of-state public schools.