Court Opinion

ID: 9376167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 21:03:39.900983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:04.744065
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 210355-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                       NOTICE
 Decision filed 03/01/23. The
                                                                            This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-21-0355
                                                                            Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                            not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                  IN THE                       limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                            under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Madison County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 13-CF-986
                                                )
JAMES A. STEELE,                                )     Honorable
                                                )     Neil T. Schroeder,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and Moore concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: Where no meritorious argument can be made that the circuit court erred in finding
               the defendant’s postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
               to be frivolous and patently without merit, appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw
               as counsel on appeal is granted, and the circuit court’s order dismissing the
               defendant’s postconviction petition is affirmed.

¶2       The defendant, James A. Steele, appeals the circuit court’s denial of his postconviction

petition. The Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent him.

OSAD filed a motion seeking to withdraw as counsel, alleging that there is no merit to the appeal.

See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); People v. McKenney, 255 Ill. App. 3d 644

(1994). The defendant was given proper notice and granted an extension of time to file briefs,

objections, or any other document supporting his appeal. The defendant filed a response. We

considered OSAD’s motion to withdraw as counsel on appeal as well as the defendant’s response.

                                                  1
We examined the entire record on appeal and found no error or potential grounds for appeal. For

the following reasons, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw as counsel on appeal and affirm the

judgment of the circuit court of Madison County.

¶3                                       BACKGROUND

¶4     A jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a

child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012)), and the circuit court sentenced him to two

consecutive 20-year terms of imprisonment. There were only two African Americans among the

venire. The first was dismissed because he lied during voir dire. The second was Ms. Nicholson.

When the State used a peremptory challenge to strike Nicholson, defense counsel raised a Batson

challenge (see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). After finding that the defense had made a

prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination and hearing the State’s race-neutral reason for

striking Nicholson, the circuit court found that no Batson violation had occurred.

¶5     On direct appeal, OSAD, which had been appointed to represent the defendant, filed a

motion pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), seeking leave to withdraw as

counsel because it had concluded that there were no meritorious issues to raise on the defendant’s

behalf. In its motion, OSAD explained that no meritorious argument could be made that a Batson

violation had occurred during jury selection. This court agreed, stating:

                “After the trial court found that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of
       discrimination, the State explained that it challenged Nicholson because she was young,
       she had little life experience, and no experience with children. The trial court considered
       the State’s stated reasons and the defendant’s arguments and decided that the State’s
       challenge was not made for discriminatory reasons. We cannot say that the trial court’s
       decision was clearly erroneous. Experience with children would be important where
       Deanna, who was eight when she testified and five when she was abused, was going to
       testify, and her testimony was going to be pivotal in the case. We also accept that a more
       mature juror might be more receptive to the State’s case.” People v. Steele, 2020 IL App
       (5th) 160390-U, ¶ 32.

                                                 2
¶6     The defendant subsequently filed a postconviction petition alleging that OSAD had failed

to provide effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because it did not argue that a Batson

violation occurred. The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as clearly frivolous and

patently without merit because the Batson claim had already been rejected by the appellate court.

¶7     We allowed the defendant to file a late notice of appeal. As noted above, OSAD, which

once again represents the defendant, has filed a motion seeking leave to withdraw because it has

determined that there are no meritorious arguments to raise on appeal.

¶8                                        ANALYSIS

¶9     The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) allows a

person convicted of a crime to “assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial

of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both.” People v.

Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 379 (1998). The Act provides a three-stage process for dealing with

postconviction petitions. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. At the first stage, the court

determines whether the petition is frivolous or patently without merit. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill.

2d 239, 244 (2001). The circuit court dismisses the petition sua sponte if it determines that “the

petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (2009). The circuit court has 90 days from the filing of the petition to

review the petition and dismiss it sua sponte if it makes no claims that are not frivolous or patently

without merit. Id. In making this initial review, the circuit court is to have no input from the State.

Id. at 10-11. Res judicata and waiver apply to claims in a postconviction petition, and they are a

valid basis for a circuit court to dismiss a postconviction petition sua sponte. People v. Blair, 215

Ill. 2d 427, 442 (2005). The doctrine of res judicata bars consideration of issues that were

previously raised and decided on direct appeal. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999); accord

                                                  3
Black’s Law Dictionary 1336-37 (8th ed. 2004) (“res judicata is an issue that has been definitively

settled by judicial decision”).

¶ 10   An allegation of a violation of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is

evaluated under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted in Illinois by People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504,

526-27 (1984). The standard has two prongs, both of which must be satisfied for a defendant to

prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Id. at 525. First, defendant must show that

his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s

shortcomings were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. Second, a defendant must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 11   At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, a petition alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel must only meet a reduced threshold—the petition may not be summarily dismissed if

“(i) it is arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

and (ii) it is arguable that the defendant was prejudiced.” (Emphases in original and internal

quotation marks omitted.) Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 19. The reviewing court can address these

requirements in either order. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 527. A failure to satisfy either prong of the

Strickland standard causes the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel to fail; the court need

not address both prongs. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 670.

¶ 12   Here, the defendant’s postconviction petition argued that appellate counsel provided

ineffective assistance of counsel for not arguing that a Batson violation occurred in the jury

selection process of his trial. Because we determined on direct appeal that no meritorious argument

                                                  4
could be made that the circuit court clearly erred in determining that no Batson violation occurred

(Steele, 2020 IL App (5th) 160390-U, ¶ 32), it cannot be argued that appellate counsel’s refusal to

raise the Batson issue was objectively unreasonable or that the defendant was prejudiced thereby

because res judicata precluded relitigation of the issue in a postconviction petition. We agree with

OSAD that no meritorious argument can be made that the circuit court erred in summarily

dismissing the defendant’s postconviction petition.

¶ 13   We also agree with OSAD that the circuit court’s summary dismissal of the postconviction

petition was procedurally proper. The circuit court determined that the defendant’s postconviction

petition was frivolous and patently without merit and dismissed it approximately two months after

it was filed, well within the 90-day period required by section 122-2.1(a) of the Act (725 ILCS

5/122-2.1(a) (West 2020)), and the record does not reveal any input by the State.

¶ 14                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 15   For the foregoing reasons, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw as counsel and we affirm

the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 16   Motion granted; judgment affirmed.

                                                 5