Court Opinion

ID: 9767576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:21:43.599692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.804031
License: Public Domain

SAM D. JOHNSON, Justice
(dissenting).
This dissent is respectfully submitted.
This writer concurs with the majority’s holdings on assumption of the risk or the defenses available to strict liability. The holding to which this writer is diametrically opposed is the majority’s determination that there is no evidence of design defect.
Irene S. Henderson brought this suit for personal injuries sustained when she intentionally drove into a utility pole in order to stop the runaway vehicle she was driving. At the time of the accident her 1968 Lincoln Continental automobile was virtually new, having been driven less than 10,000 miles and being less than seven months old. Mrs. Henderson was driving in heavy Houston city traffic and had accelerated to enter and attain speed on a freeway. As she merged into the freeway traffic, and wholly without warning, she found that the speed of her car was not responsive to her control. Though she removed her foot from the accelerator, the speed of the car did not diminish. She applied her brakes but it resulted in no reduction of her speed. Being unable to reduce the speed of her vehicle, she exited the freeway at the first opportunity to a less busy thoroughfare. At this point her automobile could be best described as a runaway vehicle. She applied the brakes, pumped the brakes, and then pushed with both feet against the brake pedal in an effort to reduce the speed or to stop the car. All of her efforts were without avail and her car, which continued to accelerate even as she applied the brakes, reached a speed of approximately fifty miles per hour. Perceiving that she was approaching a busy intersection she' thereupon intentionally steered her car directly into a utility pole to avoid injuring others and to stop her car. She sustained serious injuries.
This action was brought as a products liability case and the plaintiffs proceeded to trial solely upon the theory of strict liability as announced and embraced by this court in Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex.1967) and McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.1967). One of Mrs. Henderson’s allegations was that the accelerator of her automobile stuck as a result of a design defect in the air filter housing assembly that is attached to and sits on top of the carburetor. This design defect, she asserted, was the producing cause of her damages.
The trial was to a jury. The jury was asked if they found that the design of the air filter housing was defective. A defective product was defined as one which was unreasonably dangerous.1 The jury answered affirmatively. The jury was asked if such defective design was a producing cause of the accident. Again the jury an*95swered affirmatively. It was on these issues and this theory alone that the trial court entered its judgment for the plaintiffs.
The court of civil appeals encountered no difficulty with this phase of the trial court’s judgment; it has not in any way disturbed or even alluded to the jury’s finding on design defect. As to this and all other subjects before it (other than assumption of the risk and the defenses available to strict liability) the court stated : “We have considered the other points of error and, finding no merit in them, they are overruled.”
In this court the writ was granted, not for the purpose of questioning whether there was any evidence to support the jury’s finding on design defect, but rather to clarify the court’s position on the defenses to strict liability. The majority introduces its consideration of the jury’s determination of design defect by asserting: “There is no evidence in this record to support that finding.” This declaration is made in the face of the contrary determination by the jury, the contrary judgment of the trial court, and the contrary and unanimous determination by the court of civil appeals. This dissent challenges that declaration.
The majority opinion ignores the fundamental basis on which no evidence points are to be considered. That is, this court must view the evidence in its most favorable light in support of the jury finding of design defect, considering only the evidence and inferences which support that finding and rejecting the evidence and inferences which are contrary to that finding. Martinez v. Delta Brands, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.1974); Langlotz v. Citizens Fidelity Insurance Company, 505 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1974); Butler v. Hanson, 455 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.1970); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609 (1950); Cartwright v. Canode, 106 Tex. 502, 171 S.W. 696 (1914). The testimony in the record before this court, both that which will be quoted verbatim in this opinion and that which will be referred to but not quoted, removes any question but that the majority has wholly violated this fundamental rule. It has not considered only the evidence and inferences which support the finding of design defect. It has not rejected the evidence and inferences to the contrary. It has not considered the evidence supporting the finding in its most favorable light.
At the outset we are concerned with whether or not the “scintilla” rule is applicable. See Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, 38 Tex.L.Rev. 361 (1960). We will first assume its applicability. The rule , simply stated, is that when the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is, in legal effect, no evidence, and will not support a verdict or judgment. Seideneck v. Cal Bayreuther Associates, 451 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.1970); Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574, 44 S.W. 1059 (1898); Curtis v. Curtis, 373 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1963, writ ref’d n. r. e.). The test for the application of the scintilla rule is that if reasonable minds cannot differ from the conclusion that the evidence offered to support the existence of a vital fact lacks probative force, it will be held to be the legal equivalent of no evidence. Conversely, if the evidence furnishes some reasonable basis for differing conclusions as to the existence of the vital fact by reasonable minds, the jury finding as to the existence of the disputed fact must be upheld.2 Martinez v. Delta *96Brands, Inc., supra; Langlotz v. Citizens Fidelity Insurance Company, supra; Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, supra; Woods v. Townsend, 144 Tex. 594, 192 S.W.2d 884 (1946); Cartwright v. Canode, supra; Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Groves, 308 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1957, writ ref’d n. r. e.). See Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, supra.
Mrs. 'Henderson’s case, lasting nine days in trial to a jury and consuming 1,219 pages in its statement of facts, was grounded on a showing that a piece of the gasket was eventually cut or separated from the air filter housing and fell into the carburetor, holding a “butterfly valve” in the barrel of the carburetor in an open position causing the engine to run at excessive and uncontrolled speed. A mechanic, Levertt LaRue, examined the wreckage of Mrs. Henderson’s car and testified :
“O Did you look specifically into the rear barrel ?
“A Yes, I did.
“Q Did you find anything abnormal in the left chamber of the rear barrel?
“A Yes. There was a piece of, at that time I didn’t know what it was, it looked like a piece of rubber hung in the left rear barrel and was holding the rear barrel partially open.”
It was this piece of the rubber gasket which caused the speed of Mrs. Henderson’s car to be uncontrollable. Plaintiffs contended, and the jury believed, that the design of the flanges of the groove on the air filter housing and the gasket inserted in the groove was such that the soft rubber gasket had a propensity to become pinched between the flanges on the air filter housing and the sharp edges of the carburetor so that it could be cut and fall into the butterfly valve of the carburetor. This condition was aggravated by the fact that at least some degree of skill was necessary to place, and when removed replace, an air filter housing of this design on a carburetor so that the gasket fits and stays attached correctly . and does not become pinched between the sharp edges of the flanges on the air filter housing and the carburetor. Plaintiffs offered persuasive evidence to support their theory, none of which is even remotely alluded to by the majority.
Gilford E. Gorker, an employee of Ford Motor Company, testified on direct examination by the plaintiffs as to the propensity of the flanges on the air filter housing and carburetor to cut the gasket:
“Q It is kind of rough. I will try not to sit it [speaking of the air filter housing involved] on the furniture and get myself in contempt. But at any rate, looking at the groove from which this gasket has been partially removed one can get a view, can he not, of the sharpness of the edges that go to comprise that groove?
“A Yes. This is the edge of sheetmetal surface. It is relatively sharp.
“Q This gasket that sits inside is made of rubber and synthetic substances relating to it?
“A Yes.
“Q And is subject to being cut or severed by sharp edges ?
“A. It is possible to cut it with the sharp edge, yes.”
Dr. Muster, plaintiffs’ expert witness, on cross-examination by defendants also testi*97fied as to the propensity of the sharp flanges on the air filter housing to cut the gasket:
“Q What I was working up to was when it was you arrived at your conclusion concerning the design of this part. In that connection are you telling and stating to the jury this is a defective design?
“A I think it could have been done better. I say it could have been done better. To use the sharp edged part with rubber is not a good thing, you have a tendency to cut the rubber.
“Q I am not sure you answered the question. The question is not whether it could have been done better. It is your position this is a defective design ?
“A Yes, it could have been improved.
“Q That is not defective. Anything can be improved.
“A I am not a lawyer. Anything that can be improved I am interpreting to be defective in that sense, yes.”
The above testimony, standing alone, would constitute more than a mere surmise or suspicion of the existence of a design defect. The clear import of Dr. Muster’s testimony was that using sharp edges on the air filter housing in conjunction with a rubber gasket was dangerous because there is an inherent tendency for the sharp edge to cut the rubber. A design which uses sharp metal edges with rubber in a location where pieces of rubber pould be cut and fall into an automobile carburetor, threatening human life, is unreasonably dangerous and thus defective. Dean Keeton’s definition of what constitutes an unreasonably dangerous product fits the instant case precisely: “It is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time of trial outweighed the benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed.” Keeton, Product Liability and Meaning of Defect, 5 St. Mary’s L.J. 30, 38 (1973). See Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1968); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.L.J. 5 (1965); Keeton, Products Liability—Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex.L.Rev. 398 (1970).
The above testimony is, however, not the only evidence supporting plaintiffs’ theory and the jury’s verdict. The air filter housing of course is a unit created to be removed and replaced frequently for routine maintenance operations. There was evidence that an individual placing or replacing an air filter housing of this particular design on a carburetor would have difficulty in ascertaining whether he had done so correctly.
Dr. Muster, cross-examination by defendants :
“Q In addition to the fact we agree it is a simple skill to insert that, even I' can do it. The placing of this air filter housing properly on top of the carburetor is a little more difficult for me than putting the gasket in, but it is also essentially a simple mechanical skill?
“A The way it is designed you can’t see if you have it on. If I were doing this I would do it more by feel.
“Q You don’t think placing this on is a simple mechanical skill ?
“A I think it is a simple mechanical skill for feeling you have done it properly. You can’t ascertain very well.
“Q With a simple mechanical skill you can tell if you have it on there, you can feel it?
“A You can’t tell if you have it on there correctly. You can tell if it is solid.”
*98Perhaps an even more graphic illustration of the difficulty in reattaching an air filter of the type involved onto a carburetor was a demonstration performed by Alexander Kozeb, service manager for Plaza Lincoln-Mercury, while under direct examination by defendants. Kozeb was asked to place a demonstration air filter housing onto a demonstration carburetor. He did so, and when asked if he had it correctly placed on the carburetor he replied unequivocally that he did. A closer examination, however, revealed that he did not in fact have the air filter housing correctly attached to the carburetor.
Still another factor tending to support the jury’s finding of design defect is that the process by which the glue, used to hold the gasket onto the underside of the air filter housing, is applied to the groove in the housing is such that the glue is often not applied around the entire circumference of the groove. Moreover, the testimony of Mike Tobrovich, quality control manager for Ford, clearly establishes that Ford was aware of this deficiency. Further, Gilford Gorker, Ford’s employee, under questioning by defendant Ford, pointed out that part of the gasket which had been on the Henderson automobile apparently had no glue at all on it. When asked his opinion as to why it did not have glue on it, he replied:
“A I believe that is easily explained. The operator just didn’t get glue in that portion of the trough. It is a manual operation and they missed a portion of it.”
It is the law of gravity which dictates that when a gasket which is glued to the bottom of an air filter housing is not securely attached it will have a natural propensity to fall down, in this instance, into the barrel of the carburetor. This fact is, however, likewise ignored by the majority.
Still further, several experts testified that the air filter housing and the gasket could have been designed so that the parts of the gasket did not have a propensity to fall into the barrel of the carburetor. They indicated that using a gasket which would fit on top of the carburetor would be a safer design. For example, Dr. Tonn, plaintiffs’ expert witness, testified as follows :
“Q Now, can you see how the top of this carburetor could be designed in such a way that if a piece of the rubber gasket did come off, that it would not fall into the barrel ?
“A Well, anything can be designed differently, yes. You could design it so it couldn’t fall in. It could be done.
“Q Just what steps could be taken, as we look at the top of this carburetor, to insure that type of a safety precaution ?
“A Well, you could use a different type of gasket or different — where the gasket is fitting on the carburetor rather than on the air cleaner. This would be the easiest way that I could think of just offhand of making a change.”
The record, furthermore, explicitly shows that Ford, in fact, later changed the design which the jury found to be defective; the new design conformed to that which Dr. Tonn and others testified would be a safer design. It placed the gasket on top of the carburetor rather than gluing it onto the underside of the air filter housing. In addition, the improved design incorporated “rolled” edges on the air filter housing rather than sharp edges and used a gasket of a different and more durable material than the gasket in the instant case, which became brittle after extended use. Dr. Muster was asked to compare the safety of the improved design with that of the abandoned design:
“Q In your opinion would that [the new design] be a safer design than what we have before us in the 462 series [the old design] ?
*99“A I would say better in the sense it would have no tendency to cut the gasket. You are not after a tremendous sealing quality. It would be better.”
No objective consideration of the foregoing testimony which is either directly quoted or summarized, can fairly result in a determination that it constitutes no more than a mere scintilla, surmise or suspicion of the existence of a design defect.
As indisputable as this is, the instant case is even far more compelling than has been demonstrated. What has been said to this juncture has been predicated on the assumed application of the scintilla rule. But “[t]he.scintilla rule cannot apply when there is direct evidence of a vital fact; it applies only when the vital fact must be inferred from other relevant facts and circumstances which are proved.” Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, supra at 363; Martinez v. Delta Brands, Inc., supra (“But if negligence may be reasonably inferred from direct evidence, then there is more than a scintilla of evidence.”). It is readily recognized that a case based on direct evidence is stronger than one based on circumstantial evidence and, significantly, the cited article’s footnote at this precise point asserts “[a] host of cases has been examined and no case has been found in which it was held that direct testimony of the existence of the vital fact did no more than raise a surmise or suspicion of its existence.” Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, supra at 363, n. 13.
It is not necessary to rewrite the quoted testimony in its entirety to illustrate that direct testimony is not only present but abundant in this record:
Levertt LaRue: “Yes. There was a piece of, at that time I didn’t know what it was, it looked like a piece of 'rubber hung in the left rear barrel and was holding the rear barrel partially open.”
Dr. Tonn: “If it held it open, it would prevent it from closing, so the car would not slow down when you removed your foot from the accelerator. Yes. You should not have anything that falls down in the barrels. If it could get lodged in there, it could cause a problem.”
Gilford E. Gorker: “Yes. This is the edge of sheetmetal surface. It is relatively sharp. . . . It is possible to cut it [the gasket] with the sharp edge, yes.”
Dr. Tonn: “Well, anything can be designed differently, yes. You could design it so it couldn’t fall in. It could be done.”
Dr. Muster: “I think it could have been done better. I say it could have been done better. To use the sharp edged part with rubber is not a good thing, you have a tendency to cut the rubber. . I am not a lawyer. Anything that can be improved I am interpreting to be defective in that sense, yes.”
A graphic illustration of the minimal direct evidence needed to uphold a jury finding is Martinez v. Delta Brands, Inc., supra. In Martinez this court, reversing the court of civil appeals, found sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding of employer Delta Brands’ negligence in failing to furnish its employee Martinez with adequate equipment. Martinez contended that the forklift and clamps with which he was furnished to aid in welding two large pieces of metal together were inadequate. The only evidence as to the adequacy of the equipment was the testimony of Martinez that the clamps, which Martinez knew were smaller than necessary for the job, “broke from halfway” when he was welding the pieces of metal together and that the chain on the forklift jumped out of place and the tines of the forklift suddenly tilted forward. This court unanimously held in that case that this evidence, without more, constituted *100“some evidence, more than a scintilla, to raise the issue of Delta Brands’ negligence.”
The evidence in the instant case is infinitely stronger than that considered sufficient to support the jury finding in Martinez, supra. It is, in the considered judgment of this writer, simply beyond dispute that the testimony which has been quoted, which is only a small fraction of the record, will support differing conclusions by reasonable minds as to the existence of a design defect. The majority, however, does not search the record for evidence to support the jury’s finding, but rather attempts to determine independently of that finding whether “this filter housing, and all housings of the same design, were unreasonably dangerous from the time of installation.” The function of this court, however, is not to determine whether the design in question was defective; the jury has already determined that issue based upon a proper definition of a defective product as one which is unreasonably dangerous. The proper, and indeed the sole, function of this court is to determine whether there is any evidence to support the jury’s finding. If there is any such evidence, it is a clear usurpation of the jury’s function for this court to substitute for the finding of the jury its theory of what constitutes a design defect.
Judgment should be entered for plaintiffs on the jury verdict.
POPE, McGEE and DANIEL, JJ., join in this dissent.

. The definition of a defective product given by the trial court in its charge was as follows:
“A product may be considered defective or defectively designed if, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, it is in a condition not expected by the buyer and which would be unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary- buyer. To be ‘unreasonably dangerous’ the product must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be expected by the ordinary buyer with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the characteristics of such product.”

. In applying the scintilla rule to the instant situation the majority has reached the “strange results” predicted as “theoretically possible” by Chief Justice Calvert. Consider the prophetic example, the situation in this very case, which Chief Justice Calvert posed as an unlikely hypothetical situation:
“It is theoretically possible, and sometimes not far from actual fact, that five members of the Supreme Court will conclude that the evidence supporting a finding of a vital fact has no probative force, and in reaching the conclusion through application of the rule will thus hold, in effect, that the trial judge *96who overruled a motion for instructed verdict, the twelve jurors who found the existence of the vital fact, the three justices of the Court of Civil Appeals who overruled a ‘no evidence’ points of error and four dissenting justices of the Supreme Court are not men of ‘reasonable minds.’ ” Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, supra at 364.