Court Opinion

ID: 9959481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 19:02:52.924886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:20.109349
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SHAMINA YOUNG-ROGERS,      :
                           :
                           :             C.A. No. K23A-05-008 JJC
             Appellant,    :
                           :
    v.                     :
                           :
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF :
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICES :
AUDIT AND RECOVERY,        :
                           :
             Appellee.     :
                           :

                        Submitted: January 23, 2024
                        Decided: April 11, 2024

                           OPINION & ORDER

Shamina Young-Rogers, Pro Se.

Renee L. Hrivnak, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for
Delaware Department of Health and Social Services Audit and Recovery
Management Services.

Clark, R.J.
       Appellant Shamina-Young-Rogers (“Ms. Young-Rogers”) appeals a decision
of the Department of Health and Social Services (“DHSS” or “the Agency”). In her
appeal, she challenges the Agency’s decision to disqualify her from the receipt of
federally funded Supplemental Nutrition Assistance and Food Distribution Program
(“SNAP”) benefits.        The Division of Audit and Recovery Management Services
(“ARMS”) investigated the matter and concluded that Ms. Young-Rogers committed
an intentional program violation (an “IPV”).1 ARMS then presented the contention
to a DHSS Hearing Officer who found that Ms. Young-Rogers committed an IPV
because she failed to disclose that another individual resided in her household and
earned income.2
       Ms. Young-Rogers now appeals DHSS’s decision. She contends that the
Agency denied her the opportunity to participate in a meaningful hearing to contest
her disqualification. She further contends that the other individual never lived in her
home. In support, she offers documents on appeal to prove that he resided elsewhere.
       Here, the Court’s decision turns on whether the DHSS-provided hearing met
requirements set by the federal regulations that controlled the Agency’s actions. For
the reasons below, it did not. Namely, DHSS offered her a telephonic hearing with
no opportunity to submit documentary evidence on her behalf.                    As a result, the
Agency’s decision must be reversed with direction that the Agency provide her with
a fair hearing where she is permitted to offer relevant evidence in her defense.

1
  7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c) (providing that an intentional program violation occurs when an individual
intentionally misrepresents, conceals, or withholds facts to facilitate the unlawful acquisition or
use of SNAP benefits).
2
   Del. Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv. Audit & Recovery Management Services Proposed
Administrative Disqualification, Del. Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Young-Rogers, No. 9003371395 (Del.
Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv. Apr. 21, 2023) [hereafter “Disqualification Decision”].
                                                2
        I.     PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF RECORD
       SNAP is a federal program designed to alleviate hunger and malnutrition by
providing food benefits to low-income individuals and families.3 The federal
government delegates the obligation to administer the program to state agencies. In
Delaware, DHSS is the designated State-level agency.4                 ARMS, which identifies
itself as a Division of DHSS, investigates potential SNAP program violations. It
also initiates administrative proceedings against alleged violators.
       The following facts are those contained in the administrative record below.5
Ms. Young-Rogers has received benefits from SNAP since 2006.6 Since then, she
has submitted multiple renewal requests for food benefits and medical assistance.7
In her 2019 and 2020 renewal forms, Ms. Young-Rogers represented that she resided
at a house she owns in Magnolia with her three children.8               In 2022, she applied to
renew her benefits. At that point, she represented that she shared her household
with only her niece and her three children.9 She did not list Auburn Broadie, the
father of the youngest of her three children, as a member of her household at any
point between 2019 and 2023.

3
  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD AND NUTRITION SERV., FACTS ABOUT SNAP (Jan. 24, 2024).
4
  See 31 Del. C. § 512 (recognizing that DHSS must cooperate with the federal government
regarding any federal acts concerning public welfare and adopt methods to administer those
programs in the State); see also 7 C.F.R. section 271.4 (itemizing a state agency’s responsibilities
when administering SNAP within the state).
5
  The record submitted by the agency is somewhat disorganized. The facts cited herein are from
the testimony and exhibits introduced during the Administrative Disqualification Hearing which
took place on March 3, 2023. See Tr. of Admin. Disqualification Hr’g, Del. Dept. of Soc. Serv. v.
Young-Rogers, No. 9003371395 (Del. Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv. Mar. 3, 2023) [hereafter
“Hr’g Tr.”]. The exhibits ARMS introduced at the hearing are cited as “Hr’g Tr.,” followed by their
exhibit number.
6
  Hr’g Tr. Ex. 4.
7
  Id.; see also Hr’g Tr. Ex. 13.
8
  Hr’g Tr. Ex. 13.
9
  Id.
                                                 3
       In 2019, Mr. Broadie separately submitted an application for public assistance
with DHSS.10 There, he represented that he lived at Ms. Young-Rogers’ house in
Magnolia by listing her address as his.11 He claimed to be the sole member of that
household.12          Later, he completed and signed a six-month periodic report that
confirmed that he remained at that address.13 In that filing, he represented himself
to be the only member of that household.14
       Mr. Broadie did not apply for benefits again until 2021. At that point, he
submitted a new application.15 He again represented that he lived at Ms. Young-
Rogers’ house in Magnolia by, once again, identifying the home by address only.16
       ARMS compared Mr. Broadie’s 2022 application to Ms. Young-Rogers’s
application and identified the discrepancy. As a result, a case worker interviewed
Mr. Broadie.17          During the interview, Mr. Broadie contradicted his written
representation that he was the sole member of his household.18 Nevertheless, he
confirmed that he lived with Ms. Young-Rogers and their mutual daughter in Ms.
Young-Rogers’ home.19 ARMS then broadened the investigation by examining Ms.
Young-Rogers’ conduct because she had not disclosed that Mr. Broadie lived with
her.
       On January 10, 2023, ARMS sent Ms. Young-Rogers a written notice
informing her that it had formally opened an investigation regarding a potential

10
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 6.
11
   Id.
12
   Id.
13
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 7.
14
   Id.
15
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 8.
16
   Id. at 2.
17
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 10.
18
   Id.
19
   Id.
                                             4
IPV.20 In the letter, ARMS invited her to participate in a phone interview to discuss
the disqualification process, the availability of a hearing, and her options.21 The
letter also informed Ms. Young-Rogers that she need not participate in the interview,
and that if she chose not to, she would retain the right to dispute her disqualification
at a later hearing.22      Finally, ARMS’ letter explained that ARMS would present
evidence to a Hearing Officer and request that she be disqualified from receiving
SNAP benefits at the hearing.23
       On January 17, 2023, ARMS Investigator Jean Cenicola spoke with Ms.
Young-Rogers by phone.24           According to the investigator, Ms. Young-Rogers
acknowledged that she and Mr. Broadie had an amicable relationship and that he
visited their daughter every other weekend.25 Ms. Young-Rogers denied, however,
that Mr. Broadie lived with her.26 Ms. Young-Rogers contends that the investigator
told her that the hearing could only be conducted by telephone,27 which the
administrative record confirms.28 Finally, the investigator informed her that she
could nevertheless review ARMS’ evidence before the hearing.29
       DHSS then issued its formal hearing notice that set her case for a telephonic
hearing.30 Neither the hearing notice nor the investigator explained how Ms. Young-
Rogers could present documentary evidence on her own behalf during such a

20
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 2.
21
   Id.
22
   Id.
23
   Id.
24
   Hr’g Tr. at 18:2–5.
25
   Id. at 18:6–10.
26
   Id. at 18: 5–6.
27
   Reply Br. (D.I. 19).
28
   See Hr’g Tr. Ex. 1 at 4 (letter from DHSS to a USDA Senior Program Specialist) (discussing
the fact that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, all hearings have been changed to telephonic).
29
   Hr’g Tr. at 10:2–12.
30
   Notice of Administrative Disqualification Hearing Date and Time, Del. Dept. of Health and Soc.
Serv., to Shamina Young-Rogers (Jan. 30, 2023) [hereafter “Hearing Notice”].
                                               5
hearing. Nor did they explain how she could review ARMS’ documentary evidence
during the hearing.
       The DHSS hearing occurred on March 3, 2023,31 but Ms. Young-Rogers did
not participate. The transcript reflects that the Hearing Officer attempted to call Ms.
Young-Rogers twice and received no answer.32 He then conducted the hearing
without her.     As a result, ARMS Investigator Cenicola, who administratively
prosecuted the matter, submitted the only evidence of record.33
       The record included testimony and documents demonstrating that Mr. Broadie
submitted three benefit applications between 2019 and 2022 and an interim report
that identified Ms. Young-Rogers’ home as his.34 The record also demonstrates that
Ms. Young- Rogers submitted a benefit renewal request in 2022 and did not list Mr.
Broadie as a household member.35 Furthermore, ARMS submitted evidence at the
hearing from Accurint36 searches that, at best, supported an inference that both Mr.
Broadie and Ms. Young-Rogers may have lived at the same Magnolia home in
2022.37 Finally, the Hearing Officer relied upon ARMS’ documentary evidence that
Mr. Broadie earned income that Ms. Young-Rogers’ did not disclose.38
       The Hearing Officer’s written decision followed.39 He found that Ms. Young-
Rogers committed an IPV.40 As a result, DHSS disqualified Ms. Young-Rogers from
receiving SNAP benefits for twelve months.41                He explained that 7 CFR §

31
   Id. at 6: 20–24.
32
   Hr’g Tr. at 6:14–19.
33
   Id.
34
   Hr’g Tr. Exs. 6-9.
35
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 13.
36
   Accurint is a service offered by LexisNexis which provides organizations with background and
residence data extracted from a wide range of public and private sources.
37
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 14, 15.
38
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 12.
39
   Disqualification Decision.
40
   Id. at 5.
41
   Id. at 6.
                                              6
273.12(a)(1)(ii) required Ms. Young-Rogers to update DHSS if her household
composition changed.42 The Hearing Officer found that she had misrepresented her
household composition multiple times over a three-year span.43                   As a result, he
found that she committed a single IPV pursuant to 7 CFR § 273.16(c) for her multiple
misrepresentations and omissions.44            Ms. Young-Rogers now appeals DHSS’s
decision to this Court.45

                          II.     THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
       In Ms. Young-Rogers’ appeal, she contends that DHSS erred by finding that
Mr. Broadie resided in her household.46 She further contends that Mr. Broadie used
her address to procure food stamps in Delaware while he resided in Maryland
without her knowledge or consent.47 In her briefing, she includes several documents
that she did not submit in the hearing below. 48 She contends that those documents
prove that Mr. Broadie did not live with her during any of the years in question.49
       Ms. Young-Rogers concedes that she had sufficient notice of the hearing date
and time.50 She nevertheless contends that she could not attend the telephonic
hearing because she had no phone service.51              In other words, she contends that it

42
   Disqualification Decision at 4.
43
   Id. at 5.
44
   Id.
45
   Appellant’s Notice of Appeal (D.I. 1).
46
   Opening Br. (D.I. 13).
47
   D.I. 19.
48
   Id., Ex. 1–5. These exhibits include, inter alia, several background check authorizations listing
addresses for herself and Mr. Broadie; mail sent to her by DHSS at her address in Dover in 2019
and 2020; mail addressed to Mr. Broadie at his alleged address in Maryland; mail sent by the
Wicomico County, Maryland Board of Elections to Mr. Broadie in 2022; and Mr. Broadie’s Form
1099-R and W-2 tax statements for 2022, both of which were sent to Mr. Broadie’s alleged address
in Maryland.
49
   D.I. 13.
50
   D.I. 19.
51
   Id.
                                                 7
was not her fault that she could not participate.             She asks the Court to reverse
DHSS’s decision, or to alternatively remand the case to the Agency to hold another
hearing to provide her with the opportunity to prove that Mr. Broadie did not live
with her.52 More specifically, she requests what is referred to as a “fair hearing” in
the SNAP regulations.53 She further requests that the Court assign her legal counsel
to assist with her case because of her disability.54
       ARMS contends that Ms. Young-Rogers received a fair hearing. It also
contends that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Hearing
Officer’s finding that she committed an IPV on two bases.55 Namely, ARMS
contends that when she applied for SNAP, she (1) deliberately failed to identify Mr.
Broadie as a member of her household in 2022, and (2) deliberately failed to report
his income that year.56 In support, ARMS relies upon the exhibits and testimony that
its investigator submitted at the hearing. That evidence included: comprehensive
Acccurint reports for Ms. Young-Rogers and Mr. Broadie showing that both parties
may have resided at the Magnolia address between May 2018 and November 2022;57
a case summary and food benefit issuance report for Mr. Broadie;58 applications for
benefits filed by Mr. Broadie using the Magnolia address in 2019, 2021, and 2022;59
wage statements for Mr. Broadie showing income he received from 2018 through

52
   D.I. 1.
53
   Id.; see 7 C.F.R. § 271.7(a) (“Except as provided in § 271.7(f), each State agency shall provide
a fair hearing to any household aggrieved by any action of the State agency which affects the
participation of the household in the Program.”).
54
   D.I. 1. The Court will not further address Ms. Young-Rogers’ request that it appoint her legal
counsel because the Court is unable to appoint counsel on her behalf. The Hearing Notice notified
her of her ability to contact Community Legal Aid for potential representation, however, and she
remains able to do so pending the remand.
55
   D.I. 15 at 16.
56
   Id. at 13, 16.
57
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 14, 15.
58
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 4.
59
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 6–9.
                                                8
2022;60 and two address information requests sent to USPS by ARMS, offered to
show that Mr. Broadie had moved from the Maryland address during the relevant
times that Ms. Young-Rogers contends he lived in Maryland.61
       ARMS also stresses that Ms. Young-Rogers did not participate in the hearing
and therefore offered no evidence to contradict ARMS’s evidence.62                     ARMS
maintains that the administrative hearing was the only venue where she could offer
facts to contest her disqualification.63 To that end, ARMS relies on a basic principle
of administrative law: an aggrieved party cannot expand the record on appeal.64
       Finally, ARMS concedes in its Answering Brief that there is conflicting
evidence as to where Ms. Young-Rogers lived during the first two of the three years
of her disputed benefit payments.65 Accordingly, ARMS acknowledges that there is
not substantial evidence in the record to support DHSS’s findings that she committed
an IPV during those two years.66           Nevertheless, ARMS maintains that there is
substantial evidence to support that she and Mr. Broadie lived together in the same
household in August 2022, and that she falsely represented that he did not.67

                  III.   SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
       The Court’s scope of review in this matter is controlled by 31 Del. C. § 520
(“Section 520”). Section 520 provides that recipients of public assistance may

60
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 12.
61
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 11.
62
   D.I. 15 at 14.
63
   Id.
64
   Id.
65
   Id. at 15.
66
   Id. at 15. Ms. Young-Rogers’ two benefit renewal applications from 2019 and 2020 list her
address as one in Dover, rather in Magnolia. Additionally, the Accurint Report for Mr. Broadie
shows Mr. Broadie as having lived at two addresses in Maryland and one address in Florida during
the relevant time periods, which overlap with the time-period he is alleged to have lived at Ms.
Young-Rogers’ address in Magnolia, Delaware.
67
   Id.
                                               9
appeal DHSS’s decision to the Superior Court if they (1) are subject to an adverse
DHSS decision regarding their entitlement to benefits and (2) suffer financial harm
as a result.68 The appeal must be filed within 30 days of the final administrative
decision and “shall be on the record without a trial de novo.”69
       Section 520 further provides that the Court’s role on appeal is to “decide all
relevant questions and all other matters involved, and [to] sustain any factual
findings of the administrative hearing decision that are supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.”70                  When determining whether there was
substantial evidence to support the Agency’s decision, the Court must review the
record while recognizing the heightened burden of proof placed upon ARMS below:
clear and convincing evidence.71
       Delaware DHSS-appeal-specific case law provides the same benchmarks.
Namely, the Delaware Supreme Court has explained that “the reviewing court must
determine whether [DHSS’s] ruling is supported by substantial evidence and free
from legal error.”72 Evidence is substantial if a reasonable mind might accept such
evidence as adequate to support the conclusion reached.73 Questions of law, on the
other hand, are reviewed de novo.74

68
   31 Del. C. § 520.
69
   Id.
70
   Id.
71
   See 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6) (requiring DHSS to base its determination regarding IPVs “on clear
and convincing evidence which demonstrates that the household member(s) committed, and
intended to commit, intentional Program violations.”).
72
   Prunckun v. Delaware Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv., 201 A.3d 525, 540 (2019).
73
   Id.; see also Ringgold v. Del. Dept. of Health and Soc. Serv., 2018 WL 7021956, at *1 (Del.
Super. July 27, 2018) (“The Court is not to replace the trier of fact in an appeal of an administrative
board decision.”).
74
   Prunckun, 201 A.3d at 540.
                                                  10
                                       IV.    ANALYSIS
       SNAP is a federal nutritional assistance program supported with primarily
federal dollars. As a result, federal regulations controlled the central aspects of Ms.
Young-Rogers’ hearing below and control the disposition of this appeal.75                  They
define what conduct disqualifies her from receiving benefits, the notice she was due,
the nature of the administrative hearing that DHSS needed to provide to her, and the
appropriate penalty if she committed an IPV.76
       As an overview, DHSS committed legal error because her hearing violated
federal regulations by not providing her a means to present documentary evidence
in her defense.      As a result, the Court declines to address whether the record
contained substantial evidence to support DHSS’s findings because the structure of
the hearing offered to Ms. Young-Rogers was fundamentally unfair.
       Ms. Young-Rogers challenges the Agency’s disqualification decision based
upon her IPV. Federal regulation defines an IPV as follows:
       [i]ntentional [p]rogram violations shall consist of having intentionally:
       1.    Made a false or misleading statement, or misrepresented,
             concealed or withheld facts; or
       2.    Committed any act that constitutes a violation of SNAP, SNAP
             regulations, or any State statute for the purpose of using,
             presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing, or
             trafficking of SNAP benefits or EBT cards.77
       Here, ARMS sought to prove to the Hearing Officer that Ms. Young-Rogers
made false and misleading representations repeatedly over three years. On appeal,
ARMS concedes that the evidence below did not support the Hearing Officer’s

75
   See Gonzalez v. State, 207 A.3d 147, 149 (Del. 2019) (recognizing that federal law governs the
Agency’s administration of the SNAP program in Delaware). In fact, federal law’s preemption of
the issue is so pervasive, it preempts any State law civil fraud claim by DHSS against a benefits
recipient. Id. at 154.
76
   7 C.F.R. §§ 271.1–285.5.
77
   7 C.F.R. § 273.16(c)
                                               11
finding that her conduct during the first two of the three years constituted an IPV.
Notwithstanding this concession, ARMS emphasizes that the penalty would be the
same regardless of whether the misrepresentations spanned three years or one year.
Namely, a first IPV requires a one-year disqualification of benefits regardless of the
bases for the IPV.78
       The Agency proceeded to administratively consider Ms. Young-Rogers’
disqualification. It had the option to either refer the matter for criminal charges in
a court of appropriate jurisdiction or to proceed administratively.79            When the
Agency elected to proceed with an administrative hearing, it assumed the obligation
to “conduct [a] hearing, arrive at a decision, and notify the household member . . .
of the decision.”80
       The central question is how much process was due Ms. Young-Rogers. The
United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) answered that question when
adopting the controlling regulations. At the outset, an agency that lawfully adopts
a regulation must follow its own regulations.81 Stated differently, “[w]here the rights
of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own
procedures.”82 This rule applies equally in this case because the USDA regulations
at issue bind DHSS.83       If an agency action violates a regulation promulgated to

78
   7 C.F.R. § 273.16(b)(1)(i).
79
   Gonzalez, 207 A.3d at 150; see also 7 C.F.R. §273.16(a)(recognizing that the Agency has an
either/or choice). Notably, DHSS’s hearing notice fails to comply with the regulation or the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez. DHSS incorrectly states that its decision to
proceed administratively against Ms. Young-Rogers does not bar State criminal prosecution. As
recognized in Gonzalez, it does. Gonzalez, 207 A.3d at 150.
80
   7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(2).
81
   Dugan v. Del. Harness Racing Com’n, 752 A.2d 529, 531 (Del. 2000) (citing United States v.
Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749 (1979)).
82
   Norwood v. Roxana Volunteer Fire Company, 2019 4267416 (Del. Super. Sept. 9, 2019) (citing
Dugan, 753 A.2d at 531).
83
   Gonzalez v. State, 207 A.3d at 149.
                                             12
ensure due process through procedural safeguards, the agency’s action is invalid.84
Notably, agencies are free to promulgate regulations requiring procedural safeguards
that extend beyond constitutional due process requirements.85 Once they do, they,
or an agency with the delegated responsibility to apply those regulations, cannot
disregard them.86        In this case, the federal regulations that bind DHSS’s actions
guaranteed Ms. Young-Rogers a “fair hearing” to contest her disqualification.87
Those regulations further define what constitutes a “fair hearing” by including the
procedural protections necessary to provide her with meaningful hearing.88
       At the outset, the SNAP regulatory scheme provides for a two-tiered
administrative hearing process – a “disqualification hearing,” and a subsequent “fair
hearing.”89 The controlling regulations permit an agency, such as DHSS, to combine
a disqualification hearing and a fair hearing into a single hearing provided the agency
provides the higher level of protections in the combined hearing.90 In this case,
DHSS permissibly offered Ms. Young-Rogers only one hearing and treated it as a
fair hearing.91      When doing so, DHSS met the notice requirements set                          by
regulation.92 Accordingly, the Court’s focus turns to whether DHSS complied with
the regulations meant to ensure that Ms. Young-Rogers had a meaningful hearing.
       In this case, the investigator informed Ms. Young-Rogers that her hearing
would proceed telephonically and that she could arrange to view the evidence against

84
   Dugan, 752 A.2d at 531.
85
   Id.
86
   Id.
87
   7 C.F.R. § 273.15(a).
88
   See 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(i), (l), (m), (p), and (q) (providing DHSS’s responsibilities in the hearing,
specifying notice requirements, placing requirements on the Hearing Officer, specifying Ms.
Young-Rogers’ rights during the hearing, and itemizing the requirements for a final agency
decision).
89
   7 C.F.R. § 273.15(a), § 273.16(a).
90
   7 C.F.R § 273.16(e)(1).
91
   See Disqualification Decision (stamped with “Fair Hearings April 21, 2023”).
92
   7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(3)(iii).
                                                 13
her before the hearing.93 Separately, DHSS’s hearing notice informed Ms. Young-
Rogers of the following:
       [a]n Administrative Disqualification Hearing telephone hearing has
       been scheduled for you. The Hearing Officer (HO) will call you at the
       telephone number we have on record for you as the date and time
       specified below. . . . If you fail to answer the phone, the hearing will
       continue and a decision will be made based on the information provided
       by ARMS.94
       Ms. Young-Rogers contends that she requested a live hearing during the
ARMS interview, but the investigator told her that DHSS would not accommodate
the request.95 DHSS does not contest that assertion. The record further confirms
that DHSS provided her no option for an in-person hearing.96 The record also
confirms that DHSS put no procedures in place that would have enabled Ms. Young-
Rogers to present documentary evidence in her defense.97                          Namely, ARMS
submitted an emailed opinion from an attorney into the hearing record.98                          The
attorney opined that DHSS’s decision to provide only telephonic hearings during the
pandemic complied with federal regulations because DHSS provided respondents
the right to testify orally, cross-examine witnesses, and view the evidence prior to
the hearing.99

93
   Hr’g Tr. at 10:2–12.
94
   Hearing Notice. Of note, the notice identified the upcoming hearing as a “disqualification
hearing.” The Disqualification Decision, however, had “Fair Hearing” stamped on it.
95
   D.I. 19.
96
   See Hr’g Tr. Ex. 1 at 4 (letter from DHSS to a USDA Senior Program Specialist (discussing the
fact that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, all hearings have been changed to telephonic).
97
   See Hearing Notice. While the hearing notice provided that Ms. Young-Rogers would be “given
a chance to provide evidence of all important facts and circumstances of [her] case,” the notice did
not identify any mechanism by which Ms. Young-Rogers could submit documentary evidence for
the Hearing Officer to review.
98
   Hr’g Tr. Ex. 1.
99
   See id. (“The regulation does not state that the client has to be sent the exhibits in order for the
hearing to go forward, merely that they be given ‘adequate opportunity’ to do so. The State Agency
… is required to notify the client of their rights and responsibilities and to offer them the chance
                                                  14
       The hearing structure offered to Ms. Young-Rogers violated four regulatory
requirements promulgated to ensure respondents like her received due process.100
First, 7 C.F.R § 273.15 required that the hearing be structured so as to permit the
Hearing Officer to “[r]equest, receive, and make part of the record all evidence
determined necessary to decide the issues being raised.”101                  Here, the Agency
offered a hearing with no means for Ms. Young-Rogers to introduce documentary
evidence in her defense. It follows directly that there were no means available for
the Hearing officer to receive such evidence.
       Second, the record required the Hearing Officer to “[i]nsure that all relevant
issues are considered [and to] [r]egulate the conduct and course of the hearing
consistent with due process.”102 DHSS did not provide, and the Hearing Officer did
not oversee, a hearing that enabled the Hearing Officer to consider all relevant issues.
The one-sided hearing included ARMS’ submission of many documents and a near
total reliance on hearsay.103 In contrast, DHSS’s procedures offered Ms. Young-
Rogers, as a lay person, no mechanism to submit her own documentary evidence.
       Third, and separately, the regulations guaranteed Ms. Young-Rogers the right
to “[s]ubmit evidence to establish all pertinent facts and circumstances in the

to examine the information prior to the hearing and to have the information available to them
during the hearing.”).
100
    Frankly, in this case, the record demonstrates another possible procedural infirmity that the
Court declines to address both upon grounds of restraint and waiver because Ms. Young-Rogers
she did not participate in the hearing. See Ortiz v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889, 895–96 (3d Cir. 1986)
(explaining that while hearsay evidence is generally admissible in administrative hearings, 7 C.F.R
§ 273.15(p)(5) precludes consideration of adverse statements from declarants who were not
available for cross-examination at hearings).
101
    7 C.F.R.§ 273.15(m)(2)(iii) (emphasis added).
102
    7 C.F.R.§ 273.15(m)(2)(iv).
103
    See Husbands v. Del. Dept. of Educ., 227 A.3d 558, 2020 WL 1814045, at *3 (Del. Apr. 7,
2020) (TABLE) (“It is well settled in Delaware that hearsay evidence is permissible in
administrative hearings, so long as that evidence is not the sole basis for the hearing officer’s
decision.”).
                                                15
case.”104 Again, while the telephonic hearing provided her the ability to testify and
DHSS’s procedures provided her a notional opportunity to review ARMS’ evidence
prior to the hearing, DHSS’s hearing procedure deprived her of a critical right
guaranteed by the regulation – the opportunity to offer evidence to support her
defense.105
       Fourth and finally, the regulations guaranteed Ms. Young-Rogers the ability
to examine all documents and records considered at the hearing at a reasonable time,
both before the date of the hearing, “as well as during the hearing.”106 DHSS’s
hearing procedure provided no mechanism to permit her to view the evidence offered
during the hearing.
       The unfair prejudice to Ms. Young-Rogers is further aggravated in this case
because Ms. Young-Rogers had documentary evidence available to support her
defense.107 Although she did not participate in the phone hearing, the result in this
case is no different. Namely, the Agency presented her with one hearing option – a
hearing procedure that did not meet the abovementioned requirements. From the
beginning, DHSS informed her that she would, in essence, have no right to a fair
hearing as defined in the regulations. Accordingly, her inability to participate in
what was a procedurally deficient telephonic hearing does not estop her from
challenging the basic fairness of the only hearing offered her.

104
    7 C.F.R. § 273.15(p)(6) (emphasis added).
105
    See 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(p)(6) (providing that during a fair hearing, a household has the right to
“submit evidence to establish all pertinent facts and circumstances in the case.”)
106
    7 C.F.R. § 273.15(p)(1) (emphasis added).
107
    The Court recognizes its limited jurisdiction on appeal, and that it cannot consider the evidence
Ms. Young-Rogers submits for the first time on appeal to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence.
Nevertheless, given the hearing structure provided to her, the Court cannot ignore that much of the
documentary evidence she asks the Court to consider would support her defense that Mr. Broadie
did not live with her during the relevant periods. DHSS should have provided her a hearing with
a mechanism to consider sicj evidence, particularly given ARMS burden to prove its case by clear
and convincing evidence.
                                                 16
       As a final observation, ARMS concedes that DHSS based its decision to
disqualify Ms. Young-Rogers on insufficient evidence as to two of the three years
that formed the basis for the decision. This concession does little to alleviate the
Court’s concern regarding the fairness of her hearing.              In the one-sided hearing
below, the Hearing Officer found an IPV based in large part upon those two years
of alleged conduct. Where ARMS now concedes there was not substantial evidence
to support a significant part of the Agency’s findings, the concession reinforces the
need for another hearing.
       In summary, the regulations cited above defined the process due Ms. Young-
Rogers.     When DHSS failed to provide her a hearing that complied with those
regulations, it failed to provide her a meaningful hearing.108 She must have a full
and fair hearing with the chance to present documentary evidence to support her
defense.

                                    V. CONCLUSION
       As explained above, DHSS’s disqualification decision must be REVERSED
as to Hearing Officer’s findings that Ms. Young-Rogers committed an IPV during
the first two years. ARMS concedes a lack of substantial evidence in the record to
support such a finding. The balance of DHSS’s decision as to the third-year alleged
misrepresentations must be REVERSED and REMANDED. DHSS shall provide
Ms. Young-Rogers a full and fair hearing that provides her the opportunity to (1)

108
    As a final note, nothing in this decision should be read to prohibit an agency from conducting
a telephonic or virtual hearing, provided the agency provides adequate measures to permit a
respondent to submit documentary evidence on his or her own behalf and otherwise complies with
controlling regulations and due process requirements. In the telephonic context, however, it is
markedly more difficult to do so, particularly if the respondent is a self-represented litigant.
Nevertheless, whether DHSS ultimately provides Ms. Young-Rogers a telephonic hearing, a virtual
hearing, or an in-person hearing, it must provide her with a reasonable procedure that permits her
to submit documentary evidence on her behalf.
                                               17
present documentary evidence in her defense, and (2) review ARMS’ evidence
during the hearing. While her rehearing is pending, SNAP regulations mandate that
DHSS cannot interrupt an individual’s or household’s benefits.109 Accordingly,
DHSS shall reinstate Ms. Young-Rogers’ SNAP benefits forthwith pending her fair
hearing. Jurisdiction is not retained.
       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                               /s/Jeffrey J Clark
                                                                 Resident Judge

Via File & ServeXpress
U.S. Mail to Appellant Shamina Young-Rogers

109
    See 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)((5) (“A pending disqualification hearing shall not affect the
individual’s or the household’s right to be certified and participate in the Program . . .. [T]he State
agency cannot disqualify a household member for intentional Program violation until the hearing
official finds that the individual has committed [an] intentional Program violation . . .”)
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