Court Opinion

ID: 9781014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 15:10:28.576364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:55.482011
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                            FOURTH DISTRICT

                         ERIC ZONK WARD,
                       Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                    v.

                         STATE OF FLORIDA,
                       Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

                             No. 4D21-3229

                           [August 30, 2023]

   Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth
Judicial Circuit, Indian River County; Dan L. Vaughn, Judge; L.T. Case
No. 31-2018CF001563A.

  Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Virginia Murphy, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pablo Tapia,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J.

   Appellant Erik Zonk Ward appeals a final judgment adjudicating him
guilty of sexual battery, and the State cross-appeals the sentence imposed
by the trial court. We affirm appellant’s conviction without comment as to
the issues raised. However, on the State’s cross-appeal, we consider
whether a defendant may take advantage of a trial court’s verbal misstep
during sentencing, which was quickly rectified, to receive a significantly
lower sentence than that which the trial court intended. Under the
circumstances of this case, we hold that double jeopardy does not prevent
the trial court from correcting such an error and we reverse the sentence
imposed.

   Appellant’s original Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet indicated
that the lowest permissible sentence on the sexual battery charge was
7.875 years. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged
appellant had moved for a downward departure from the sentencing
guidelines but the court never granted that motion and said nothing to
appellant to make him believe that the court was contemplating a sentence
lower than 7.875 years. At the end of the hearing, the court pronounced:
“I’ll adjudicate you guilty of sexual battery, sentence you to serve 7.875
months in the Department of Corrections.” (emphasis added).
Approximately seven seconds after appellant left the courtroom, the judge
acknowledged that he had misspoken when he said “months” instead of
“years,” and corrected himself on the record.

  The scoresheet and written sentencing order both reflected a sentence
imposition of 7.875 years in state prison, signed by the trial court.
Appellant was taken into custody the same day as the sentencing hearing,
and later filed a notice of appeal challenging his conviction.

   Pending his appeal, appellant moved to correct his sentence pursuant
to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). In the motion, he argued
that the trial court should: (1) reinstate his “7.875 months” sentence in
the written order; (2) resentence him based on a scoresheet error where 80
points scored for sexual penetration should have been 40 points for sexual
contact instead; and (3) if neither of the first two arguments succeeded,
sentence him to 7 years and 0.875 months. As to the second argument,
the State conceded that appellant should be resentenced using a
scoresheet with 40 sexual contact points instead of 80 sexual penetration
points.

   The trial court granted appellant’s motion to correct the sentence and
scheduled an evidentiary hearing on his argument that his 7.875-month
sentence should be reinstated to avoid violating double jeopardy
principles. The court also granted resentencing based on the scoresheet
error.

    At the resentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged that it was at
fault when it said “months” instead of “years” at the original sentencing.
It further explained that it did not intend to depart from the minimum
guideline sentence of 7.875 years; otherwise, it would have announced the
departure along with the reason for departing.

    The trial court stated that it needed to resentence appellant considering
the corrected scoresheet. That amended scoresheet indicated a lowest
permissible sentence of 64.5 months, or 5 years and 4.5 months.
Although appellant moved for downward departure in advance of his
original sentencing hearing, he did not file such a motion prior to
resentencing. Thereafter, the court proceeded to resentence appellant as
follows:

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      In my view, because of the double jeopardy issue … I’m
      prohibited from … entering any other sentence than what was
      originally imposed. And as I referenced earlier, everybody in
      here knows what I meant to do. I don’t think there’s any doubt
      about that, but it’s my fault. I said, “Months,” not “Years,”
      and 7 seconds later corrected it, but it seems to be double
      jeopardy prohibits me from increasing this, now this may be
      error perhaps. I’ll let the appellate courts sort it out. So I’ll
      adjudicate you guilty, sir, will sentence you to serve [7.875]
      months in the county jail, not the Department of Corrections.

   The State objected to the sentence imposed, arguing “that the 7.875
years could have been applied.” The State’s cross-appeal of this downward
departure sentence followed.

   The State argues on cross-appeal that the trial court reversibly erred
by resentencing appellant to jail time instead of prison time. Further, the
State contends such a downward departure was improper because no valid
legal ground supported the departure, and the trial court did not articulate
the reasons for the departure. The State claims at resentencing, the court
mistakenly believed it was constrained by double jeopardy and was
compelled to resentence appellant to the jail term as originally (but
mistakenly) imposed.

    Appellant responds that the trial court did not err in sentencing him to
7.875 months in jail because he had a legitimate expectation in the finality
of the initial sentence of 7.875 months. Appellant contends “inadvertent
error” is not an exception to the double jeopardy rule if the initial sentence
was lawful. Therefore, he claims double jeopardy principles bar a
subsequent “correction” that increases the original sentence even if the
oral pronouncement contained an inadvertent misstatement.

  “A double jeopardy claim based upon undisputed facts presents a pure
question of law and is reviewed de novo.” Dunbar v. State, 89 So. 3d 901,
904 n.3 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla.
2006)).

    “Whether a sentence that has been imposed may later be increased
without running afoul of double jeopardy principles turns on whether the
defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence.” Phillips
v. State, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D2646b, D2646b (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 15, 2022),
certifying question of great public importance, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D33d (Fla.
2d DCA Jan. 6, 2023); see Dunbar, 89 So. 3d at 905 (“[T]he later imposition
of [a] more onerous [sentence] ‘violates the double jeopardy clause only

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when it disrupts the defendant’s legitimate expectations of finality.’”
(quoting United States v. Young, 953 F.2d 1288, 1291 n.3 (11th Cir.
1992))).

   “As a general rule, this legitimate expectation of finality attaches when
the sentence is orally pronounced.” Phillips, 47 Fla. L. Weekly at D2646b;
see Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So. 2d 857, 860 (Fla. 1973) (concluding that
jeopardy had attached to the trial court’s pronouncement of a thirty-day
sentence such that after a recess the court could not increase the
defendant’s sentence); Obara v. State, 958 So. 2d 1019, 1021–22 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2007) (reversing a sentence imposed after the defendant had been
called back into the courtroom less than one hour after the imposition of
his original sentence and rejecting the State’s argument that jeopardy had
not attached because the defendant had not yet begun to serve his
sentence). But see Curtis v. State, 789 So. 2d 394, 395–96 (Fla. 4th DCA
2001) (holding that jeopardy had not attached because the record did not
show that the defendant had reached his place of incarceration when trial
court recalled his case and increased his initial sentence).

   Appellant argues his case is like Hobgood v. State, 166 So. 3d 840 (Fla.
4th DCA 2015), and Obara, in which the respective defendants were
removed from the courtroom after the sentencing hearing and taken to a
holding cell. The respective trial courts then recalled the cases and
resentenced the defendants to more onerous terms of incarceration. See
Hobgood, 166 So. 3d at 843; Obara, 958 So. 2d at 1021. In both cases,
the appellate courts held that the trial court violated the appellant’s right
against double jeopardy by later increasing its sentence where the initial
sentence was not illegal. See Hobgood, 166 So. 3d at 847; Obara, 958 So.
2d at 1021.

   We disagree with appellant’s reliance on Hobgood and Obara. As we
stated in Hobgood, “[w]hen a defendant has not been transferred from the
court’s custody to a place of detention at the time his sentences are altered,
service of the sentences has not officially commenced, and defendant’s
rights are not impinged by the trial court’s timely alteration of his
sentences.” 166 So. 3d at 845 (citation omitted). The question then
becomes whether the appellant had begun serving his sentence when the
correction occurred. Id.

   In this case, appellant was only out of the courtroom for “about seven
seconds” before the court realized its verbal error. Unlike the cases on
which appellant relies, the circumstances here suggest nothing that would
have given appellant the impression he had begun to serve his sentence.
In Hobgood, the defendant’s case was recalled later the same day, well

                                      4
after the conclusion of the sentencing hearing and after the defendant was
taken to a holding cell. See Hobgood, 166 So. 3d at 847. In Obara, the
case was recalled ten minutes after the sentencing hearing concluded, and
like Hobgood, the defendant had been taken into custody and placed in a
courthouse holding cell. See Obara, 958 So. 2d at 1021.

    Here, appellant barely made it out of the courtroom when the verbal
error was corrected, and the record does not show any evidence he had
even reached a holding cell within the courthouse when it was. And,
unlike what occurred in Hobgood and Obara, the trial court’s recognition
of its misstatement was immediate, and its correction of the verbal error
was timely. Nothing indicates that the trial court’s amendment to its oral
pronouncement was or could have been a product of further reflection or
receipt of additional information after the conclusion of the hearing. In
fact, the court’s original oral pronouncement was for appellant to serve his
sentence in the Department of Corrections, reflecting the court’s original
intent to sentence appellant to a prison term rather than a stint in the
county jail.

    We also note that appellant appealed his case and challenged his
sentence. “A defendant has no legitimate expectation in the finality of a
sentence that has been appealed or otherwise challenged.” Phillips, 47 Fla.
L. Weekly at D2646b; see also Trotter v. State, 825 So. 2d 362, 365 (Fla.
2002) (“[D]ouble jeopardy is not implicated in the context of a resentencing
following an appeal of a sentencing issue.”); James v. State, 845 So. 2d
238, 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (“[T]here is no legitimate expectation of
finality in a sentence a defendant seeks to overturn.”).

    Further, the State appealed appellant’s 7.875-month sentence because
it fell below the lowest permissible sentence without valid, written reasons
for downward departure and an objection on those grounds was made to
the trial court. See § 921.002(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“A sentence may be
appealed on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code
only if the sentence is below the lowest permissible sentence . . . .”). Here,
appellant did not move for downward departure on resentencing, and the
trial court did not give any written or oral reasons for imposing a 7.875-
month sentence, instead of the 64.5-month lowest permissible sentence
according to the amended scoresheet, besides its fear of technically
violating double jeopardy. Under Florida law, a trial judge may depart
from a defendant’s lowest permissible sentence if justified based on a non-
exhaustive list of factors. See § 921.0026(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). However,
“[d]epartures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the
code must be articulated in writing by the trial court judge . . . .” §
921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2018). Where the trial court fails to give written

                                      5
reasons or make oral findings for granting a downward departure
sentence, the sentence is improper and must be reversed and remanded
for resentencing within the guidelines. See State v. Murray, 161 So. 3d
1287, 1290 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (reversing a downward departure sentence
because the defendant did not move for downward departure and the trial
court did not state it was departing, orally articulate reasons for doing so,
nor enter a written order memorializing the reasons for departure); §
921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2018); cf. Hobgood, 166 So. 3d at 845 n.2 (noting
the State failed to object to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of a
sentence below the lowest permissible sentence, thereby failing to preserve
the error and precluding it from a successful appeal).

   We are not inclined to allow appellant to play “gotcha” by taking
advantage of a verbal mistake made during sentencing that was obvious,
immediately recognized, and corrected by the trial court within seconds,
before service of the sentence had commenced. We therefore reverse
appellant’s sentence of 7.875 months and remand for the trial court to
impose a sentence of 64.5 months consistent with the lowest permissible
sentence under the amended scoresheet.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

CONNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

                            *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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