Court Opinion

ID: 9719442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:52:59.842853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:07.367383
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Acting P. J.
I respectfully dissent. The cause of action appellant attempts to allege falls squarely within the prohibition of Civil Code section 43.5 which provides that “No cause of action arises for . . . [1] (c) Seduction of a person over the age of legal consent.”
*386The Legislature in abolishing the seduction cause of action in 1939 labeled the antiheart balm statute as “Wrongs not actionable. ” Clearly the majority’s assertion that “for every wrong there is a remedy” doesn’t apply in the instant case.
The majority attempts to characterize appellant’s cause of action as a battery or an action for deceit. But in fact, appellant was allegedly seduced by respondent’s false representation of infertility. The gravamen of appellant’s cause of action is the seduction, that is the act of sexual intercourse induced by appellant’s false representations. The injury sustained as a result of the alleged seduction was the ectopic pregnancy and damages that flowed therefrom. Clearly if there can be no cause of action for seduction, there can be no damages for the consequences thereof.
In rejecting respondent’s contention that appellant’s action is barred by Civil Code section 43.5, subdivision (c), the majority argues that this is not a seduction action because “appellant complains not because her virtue was violated . . . but because the sexual act . . . led to an ectopic pregnancy as a result of respondent’s misrepresentation.” I find no support for the contention that the only damage from a seduction is loss of virtue. Surely a woman can suffer mentally and physically from an unwanted pregnancy whether it results in a live birth or is sooner terminated. All we are talking about is the damage that flows from the seduction.
I agree with the court in Stephen K. v. Roni L. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 640 at pages 644 and 645 [164 Cal.Rptr. 618] where it states: “Despite [the] legalism [of plaintiff’s claim], it is nothing more than asking the court to supervise the promises made between two consenting adults as to the circumstances of their private sexual conduct. To do so would encourage unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters affecting the individual’s right of privacy.” Should we grant appellant here a cause of action, we cannot logically foreclose a cause of action to a woman who carries the child to a live birth, or one who has a miscarriage. The possibilitiés are limitless. The courts should stay out of the bedroom. I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 29, 1983. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.