Court Opinion

ID: 9830308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:05:28.433524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:18.630335
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
It is insisted in appellee’s motion for rehearing that the sole and only evidence relied upon to show abandonment was the purchase by appellee of the Johnson claim of title and the act of appellee in filing and prosecuting to final judgment the trespass to try title suit based thereon, and that, because the judgment in that suit was not res ju-dicata, the trial court was justified in peremptorily instructing the jury against the contention of appellant that the contract had been abandoned by appellee. We did not discuss the facts bearing upon the issues to any extent in the original opinion, because it is improper' for us to do so where a case is remanded. It is necessary, however, for us to briefly discuss the effect of the evidence in passing upon this motion.
[4] The record shows that appellee acquired the outstanding title from the Johnson heirs. The acquisition of this title was the only thing which prevented appellant from performing the contract. As we understand the law, appellee had the right, upon obtaining this title, to demand of appellant that he convey to appellee whatever interest he may have previously held, and to tender to appellant performance by paying the contract price, less ■ what it had cost appellee to acquire the Johnson title. Instead of doing this, appellee filed suit upon a hostile claim.
[5, 6] A jury might have decided that this constituted, on the part of appellee, an abandonment of his right of action for specific performance. It is true that, notwithstanding the institution of the trespass to try title suit, appellee did not dismiss this suit, which had been previously filed for specific performance, nor did he demand the return of his earnest money, and it is also true that he testified without contradiction that he was always ready and willing to perform the contract. But it has been frequently held that the testimony of a party to a suit is not conclusive and binding upon the jury where there are facts and circumstances which tend to contradict his statements. Franklin v. Villeneuve, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 128, 68 S. W. 203; Burleson v. Tinnin, 100 S. W. 350; Heierman v. Robinson, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 491, 63 S. W. 657. The record further shows that, prior to the institution of this suit, according to the uncontradieted testimony of appellee, GrQves had declared his intention not to com*892ply with the contract, which may in a measure furnish an excuse for the failure of ap-pellee to demand specific performance of the contract after he had acquired the Johnson title; but we cannot so declare as a matter of law. The question arises: Why was hostile title asserted, 'rather than an effort made to obtain specific performance? This is a question of fact, and not of law. The facts may be sufficient to convince a jury that appellee also decided to abandon his rights in that direction, and rest his chances upon the trespass to try title suit alone. In the discussion of the issue by appellee in his motion, he loses sight of the question of intent. As said in a valuable new work which had just come to our hands: “Therefore in any case where a question of abandonment is involved, the important fact to be determined is: What was the intention of the person whose rights are claimed to have been abandoned?” Volume 1, Ruling Case Law, “Abandonment,” p. 5. Further quoting from said authority: “As in other cases showing the ascertainment of a particular intent, direct evidence of an intent to abandon property or rights of property is not required, but may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the case which are competent to go to the jury as evidence by which that fact may be established.” Id. p. 5. “Although doubtless the occasion may sometimes arise when the facts which constitute the evidence of abandonment are so clear and uncontradicted as to justify the court in instructing the jury as a matter of law that there has been an abandonment, yet in most cases the question of intent to abandon is to be ascertained by the jury from a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the casé.” Id. p. 8.
We have fully considered appellee’s second proposition, which is that, when one party to a contract is in default, he cannot have a rescission or defend against his suit on the contract on the ground of default of the other party. If this proposition is applicable to this case, it does not bear upon the question of abandonment. We do not agree with appellant that res judicata is the point upon which this case turns. A judgment in an action may or may not be res judicata. Still the intention of the plaintiff in filing and prosecuting the suit to judgment is altogether a different question. If we should admit that Groves defaulted, and that he refused to comply with the contract, still this may be one reason why appellee abandoned the contract, if he did. We do not believe we would be justified ih holding, with appellee’s contention, that, as a matter of law, his prosecution of the trespass to try title suit was not an abandonment, and, because the judgment in that suit was not res judicata, there were no facts to go to the jury under appellant’s plea of repudiation, and the motion is therefore overruled.