Court Opinion

ID: 9747829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:37:33.782738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:27.674360
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. Contrary to the majority’s holding, this case is not controlled by the LevilLindsey rule. Rather, it is a case of first impression. For the reasons discussed below, I conclude the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the second new trial motion. On the merits of granting defendants a new trial, I would defer to the trial court because I do not find a “manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion” from reviewing the record in this case. (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 694 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].)
Discussion
I. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction to Entertain the Second Motion for New Trial.
In order to resolve the jurisdictional issue in this case, it is necessary to focus on its unique procedural history.
*850Following a jury trial, defendants were convicted of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The jury also found each defendant personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim.
Defendants filed timely motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence and the trial court’s alleged error in disallowing evidence the prosecution’s chief witness was on probation. The trial court granted the new trial motions as to both defendants and the People appealed. In a unanimous opinion, we reversed and ordered the trial court to deny the new trial motions and “thereafter to proceed according to law.”
After the remittitur issued defendants filed a second motion for new trial. This time the motion was based on the ground the verdict was contrary to the evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 6.) The trial court once again granted defendants’ new trial motion and the People once again appeal.
In holding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this second new trial motion, the majority, in my view, overlooks the significance of this procedural history. Once our remittitur issued in the first appeal, the trial court was reinvested with jurisdiction over the case and the parties were restored to the position they were in prior to the trial court’s order which we reversed. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 600, p. 587; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Appeal, § 3261, p. 4025.) No judgment having been entered, there was no jurisdictional bar to defendants’ second motion for new trial. (Pen. Code, § 1182; People v. Stewart (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 759, 763 [248 Cal.Rptr. 907].)
The cases relied on by the majority are not on point. In People v. Martin (1926) 199 Cal. 240, 242 [248 P. 908], the defendants made a motion for new trial which was denied. While the appeal from the denial of that motion was pending1 defendants made a second motion for new trial which was granted. The Supreme Court reversed the order granting the second new trial motion on two alternative grounds. First, the court noted, when the trial court has already entertained and denied a new trial motion there is no statutory or other authority for a second motion for new trial. As an additional reason for reversing the order, the court pointed out an appeal had been taken from the denial of the first motion. “[I]t would follow that [further] new trial proceedings were removed from the jurisdiction of the trial court by the taking of the appeal.” (Ibid.) The Levi/Lindsey rule provides once the trial court grants or denies a motion for new trial, it generally has no power to change or vacate its former order. (See, e.g., People v. Snyder (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 480, 489-490 [266 Cal.Rptr. 915] and cases cited therein.)
*851None of these cases involved the situation in the present case where the first new trial order was reversed on appeal and a second motion for new trial on different grounds was filed after remand from the appellate court. Here, unlike Martin and Snyder, the defendants are not seeking to have the trial court change or vacate its former order. As a result of our prior decision in this case, the former order no longer existed. No judgment having been entered, there is no jurisdictional bar to a second motion for new trial.
Ordinarily a second new trial motion would fail, not because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear it, but because the ground for the second new trial motion could have been raised in the initial motion and, therefore, is deemed waived. Considerations of fairness and judicial economy weigh heavily against allowing a defendant to raise “interminable” new trial motions. (Coombs v. Hibberd (1872) 43 Cal. 452, 453; People v. Wisely (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 939, 948 [274 Cal.Rptr. 291].)2
But waiver can be a two-edged sword and in this case the second edge cuts against the People. In responding to defendants’ second new trial motion the People never contended the ground the verdict was contrary to the evidence had been waived by failure to raise it in the initial motion. This waiver argument is raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, we are cited by defendants to another rule of fairness and judicial economy which holds, “An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method.” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 311, p. 321.) This rule is usually applied where the contention on appeal raises disputed factual issues (Menefee v. County of Fresno (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1175, 1182 [210 Cal.Rptr. 99]) or where, as here, the alleged error could have been corrected if it had been pointed out the trial court (Sommer v. Martin (1921) 55 Cal.App. 603, 610 [204 P. 33].)
In the present case, the People should have raised the waiver argument in the trial court. They failed to do so and as a result the defendants’ contention the verdict is contrary to the evidence has been fully briefed and argued in the trial court and on appeal. Under these circumstances, in fairness to the *852parties and the trial court, we should address the merits of defendants’ contention.3
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting a New Trial on the Ground the Verdict Was Contrary to the Evidence
An order granting a motion for new trial will not be disturbed on appeal “ ‘ “unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears.” ’ ” (People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 694.) It is beyond doubt the trial court has a duty to grant a new trial in every case in which it is of the opinion a fair and just verdict has not been reached. (People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 633 [262 P.2d 14].) This does not mean the trial court should disregard the verdict or decide what result it would have reached if the case had been tried without a jury. It does mean the trial court should consider the proper weight to be accorded the evidence and then decide whether, in its opinion, there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict. (People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 761 [109 Cal.Rptr. 65, 512 P.2d 289]; People v. Robarge, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 633.)
In the present case, the prosecution’s case depended on the testimony of Laura Galvez, the victim’s girlfriend. Her testimony was the focus of the second new trial motion. And, although the court did not single her out by name, it is obvious from the court’s reference to “factors enumerated in CALJIC instruction 2.92 pertaining to identification testimony,” “discrepancies between the description given by the eyewitness and the defendants” and “facts which corroborate the identification of these two defendants . . . ,” the court had a serious doubt about Ms. Galvez’s credibility in identifying defendants as the men who shot her boyfriend. “[I]f the court entertains a serious doubt as to the credibility of witnesses for the prosecution whose testimony is essential to establish the guilt of the defendant, . . . a new trial [should be] granted.” (People v. Robarge, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 636 (conc. opn. of Carter, J.).)
The question before us is not whether there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict were it to be challenged on appeal (People v. Serrato, *853supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 761) but whether in ordering a new trial on the ground the verdict was contrary to the evidence “ ‘ “a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears.” ’ ” (People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 694.) Here, the record adequately supports the trial judge’s exercise of discretion.
The record does reflect significant discrepancies in Ms. Galvez’s testimony. Ms. Galvez testified defendant Taylor was wearing dark clothing and a baseball cap whereas at the time of his arrest shortly after the shooting Taylor was wearing lime-green pants. More importantly, Ms. Galvez insisted during her direct and cross-examination she had never taken her eyes off the faces of the assailants who were only a few inches from her. However, when asked whether the assailants had beards or mustaches she stated she did not know because she did not pay attention “to this area.” There were other discrepancies between her testimony and that of the victim as to where they were standing when the victim was shot; whether they had been drinking earlier in the day; and whether they had been drinking just prior to the shooting.
It is rare for a judge to grant a new trial in a criminal case. It is rarer still for a judge to grant two motions for new trial in the same case. The jurist in this case is obviously trying to tell us something and I believe we should be more receptive to his message. The trial judge who listened to the testimony, observed the witnesses and independently weighed the evidence clearly had a serious doubt as to Ms. Galvez’s credibility. In addition, the defendants testified they were at a barbecue when the shooting occurred and presented a witness who testified she was with them the entire time. Under these circumstances I cannot say granting a new trial in this action was a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion. Therefore, I would affirm the new trial order.
Respondents’ petitions for review by the Supreme Court were denied February 2, 1994. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.

Penal Code section 1237 formerly allowed an appeal from the denial of a new trial motion.

Waiver has been found not to apply to a second new trial motion where, prior to judgment, a high court decision makes reversal of the judgment inevitable (People v. Risenhoover (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 233, 235 [49 Cal.Rptr. 526]) and where the ground asserted is incompetence of counsel who made the first new trial motion (People v. Stewart, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 763). Neither of these situations is presented here.

We commented on defendants’ failure to raise this contention in our previous decision but in a different context. There, we observed, “[Respondents do not argue on this appeal that the order granting the motions for new trial can be affirmed on the ground that the verdicts were contrary to the evidence .... This ground was waived for failure to raise it in any manner below.” In that statement we were referring to the well-settled rule a new trial order can be affirmed on grounds different from those relied upon by the trial court but cannot be affirmed on grounds that were not raised by the moving party. (People v. Montgomery (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 718, 729 [132 Cal.Rptr. 558]; People v. Skoff (1933) 131 Cal.App. 235, 240 [21 P.2d 118].) Our previous decision did not address the question whether, by failing to raise as a ground for new trial the verdict was contrary to the evidence, defendants had waived that ground for purposes of a second new trial motion.