Court Opinion

ID: 4059536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 19:34:50.493507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:31:54.043329
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                                                                      03-14-00650-CV
                                                                                                                              4396595
                                                                                                             THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
March 18, 2015                                                                                                         AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                                                                                 3/6/2015 10:46:40 AM
                                                                                                                     JEFFREY D. KYLE
                                                                                                                                CLERK

                      WESLEY	
  SPEARS	
  AND	
  RENEE	
  JACOBS,	
  APPELLANTS	
  
                                                                                              RECEIVED IN
                                                                                         3rd COURT OF APPEALS
                                                           V.	
                              AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                                                         3/6/2015 10:46:40 AM
                   FALCON	
  POINTE	
  COMMUNITY	
  HOMEOWNERS'                         ASSOCIATION,	
  
                                                                                           JEFFREY D. KYLE APPELLEE	
  
                                                                                                 Clerk

                                            NO.	
  03-­‐14-­‐00650	
  

                                             MARCH	
  5,	
  2015	
  

               APPELLANTS’	
  OPENING	
  BRIEF	
  WITH	
  SEPARATE	
  APPENDIX	
  

        Wesley	
  S.	
  Spears,	
  State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  18898400,	
  Spears	
  Law,	
  401	
  Congress	
  
        Avenue.,	
  Suite	
  1540,	
  Austin,	
  Texas	
  78701,	
  Tel.	
  512-­‐696-­‐2222,	
  Fax.	
  512-­‐
        687-­‐3499	
  Attorney	
  for	
  Appellants,	
  email,	
  wesleys637@yahoo.com.	
  

                                   ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  IS	
  REQUESTED	
  

                     Appeal	
  from	
  County	
  Court	
  One	
  of	
  Travis	
  County,	
  Texas	
  

                                               C-­‐1-­‐CV-­‐13-­‐010214	
  

                               IDENTITY	
  OF	
  PARTIES	
  AND	
  COUNSEL	
  

        Appellants,	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  and	
  Renee	
  Jacobs	
  

        Appellants’	
  counsel	
  

        Wesley	
  S.	
  Spears,	
  State	
  Bar	
  No.	
  18898400,	
  Spears	
  Law,	
  401	
  Congress	
  
        Avenue.,	
  Suite	
  1540,	
  Austin,	
  Texas	
  78701,	
  Tel	
  (512)696-­‐2222,	
  Fax.	
  512-­‐
        687-­‐3401.	
  

        Appellee,	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  Community	
  Homeowners’	
  Association	
  

        Appellee’s	
  Counsel	
  

        David	
  Chamberlain,	
  Chamberlain	
  and	
  McHaney,	
  301	
  Congress	
  Avenue,	
  
        22nd	
  Floor,	
  Austin,	
  Texas	
  78701	
  Tel.	
  512-­‐474-­‐9124,	
  Fax.	
  512-­‐474-­‐8582	
  
                                             TABLE	
  OF	
  CONTENTS	
  
                                                                     	
  
Identity	
  of	
  the	
  parties	
  and	
  
Counsel……………………………………………………………	
  …………………………i	
  
                                                                     	
  
Table	
  of	
  
Contents………………………………………………………………………………………ii-­‐iii	
  
	
  
Index	
  of	
  
Authorities………………………………………………………………………………….iv-­‐ix	
  
	
  
Issues	
  Presented	
  For	
  
Review………………………………………………………………………………………...	
  x	
  
	
  
Statement	
  of	
  the	
  
Case……………………………………………………………………………………………..	
  1	
  
	
  
Statement	
  Regarding	
  Oral	
  
Argument……………………………………………………………………………………...4	
  
	
  
Statement	
  of	
  
Facts……………………………………………………………………………………………5-­‐28	
  
	
  
Summary	
  of	
  
Argument…………………………………………………………………………………29-­‐32	
  	
  
	
  
Argument………………………………………………………………………………….33	
  
	
  
          Did	
  the	
  trial	
  court,	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  err	
  in	
  granting	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  
Traditional	
  and	
  No	
  Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  denying	
  
appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  Motion	
  for	
  New	
  
Trial?............................................................................................................................33-­‐41	
  
          	
  
     (A)	
  The	
  subject	
  Notice	
  of	
  Violation	
  is	
  defective……………..……..41-­‐48	
  
	
  
     	
  
                                                                          ii	
  

                                                                      	
  
        (B)	
  Appellee	
  violated	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  §	
  209.005	
  and	
  refused	
  
to	
  produce	
  relevant	
  documents	
  that	
  appellants	
  are	
  entitled	
  to	
  obtain	
  by	
  
statute……………………………………………………………………………………….48-­‐57	
  
	
  
         Did	
  the	
  trial	
  court,	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  err	
  in	
  refusing	
  to	
  hear	
  appellants’	
  
Three	
  Motions	
  to	
  Compel	
  Discovery	
  and	
  their	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  
Complete	
  Discovery,	
  before	
  granting	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  
and	
  No-­‐Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  denying	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  
for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment?.......................................................................58-­‐65	
  
	
  
	
       Did	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  err	
  in	
  dismissing	
  appellants’	
  two	
  Texas	
  
Deceptive	
  Trade	
  Practices	
  claims	
  without	
  allowing	
  any	
  oral	
  argument	
  
on	
  the	
  matter	
  and	
  without	
  any	
  basis	
  in	
  law	
  to	
  dismiss	
  the	
  
claims?.........................................................................................................................65-­‐72	
  
	
  
         Did	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  and	
  Wisser,	
  J.,	
  err	
  in	
  denying	
  
appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips?.………………………………72-­‐76	
  
	
  
Prayer……….………………………………………………………………………………..76-­‐77	
  
	
  
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………..…77	
  
	
  
Certificate	
  of	
  Compliance….…...……………………………………………………..78	
  
	
  
Certificate	
  of	
  Service…………………………………………………………………….79	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                                 iii	
  
                                                                   	
  
                                                                   	
  

                                                                     	
  
                                           INDEX	
  OF	
  AUTHORITIES	
  
                                                             	
  
Abdygappariva	
  v.	
  State,	
  243	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  191,	
  198	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐San	
  Antonio	
  
2007),	
  p.	
  74.	
  
                                                             	
  
Ashcreek	
  Homeowner’s	
  Association	
  v.	
  Smith,	
  902	
  S.W.2d	
  586	
  (App.	
  1	
  Dist.	
  
1995),	
  p.	
  43,	
  46,	
  47.	
  
	
  
Axelson,	
  Inc.,	
  et	
  al.,	
  v.	
  The	
  Honorable	
  Grainger	
  W.	
  McIIhany,	
  798	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  

550,	
  555	
  (Tex.	
  1990),	
  p.	
  59.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

Benitz	
  v.	
  Gould	
  Group,	
  27	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  109,	
  112	
  9Tex.	
  	
  App.—San	
  Antonio	
  
2000),	
  no	
  writ),	
  p.	
  33.	
  
	
  
Brewer	
  &	
  Pritchard,	
  PC	
  v.	
  Johnson,	
  167	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  460,	
  469	
  (Tex.	
  App	
  

Houston	
  (14th	
  Dist.)	
  2005,	
  rehearing	
  overruled),	
  p.	
  60	
  and	
  64.	
  

Brown	
  v.	
  Galleria	
  Area	
  Ford,	
  Inc.,	
  752	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  114,	
  116	
  (Tex.	
  1988),	
  p.	
  70.	
  	
  

Burton	
  v.	
  Cravey,	
  759	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  160	
  (Houston	
  1st	
  District	
  1988),	
  p.	
  57.	
  
	
  
Celotex	
  Corp.,	
  v.	
  Catrett,	
  477	
  U.S.	
  317,	
  323-­‐324,	
  106	
  S.	
  Ct.	
  2548,	
  2553	
  
(1986),	
  p.	
  33.	
  
	
  
Chastain	
  v.	
  Koonce,	
  700	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  579,	
  584	
  (Tex.	
  1985),	
  p.	
  70-­‐71.	
  
	
  
Cire	
  v.	
  Cummings,	
  134	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  835,	
  838-­‐39	
  (Tex.	
  2004),	
  p.	
  73.	
  	
  	
  

City	
  of	
  Houston	
  v.	
  Clear	
  Creek	
  Basin	
  Authority,	
  589	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  671,	
  678	
  (Tex.	
  
1979),	
  p.	
  33.	
  
	
  
City	
  of	
  Pasadena	
  v.	
  Gennedy,	
  125	
  S.W.	
  687	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Houston	
  [14th	
  
District]),	
  p	
  45.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
Cf.	
  Creel	
  v.	
  Dist.	
  Attorney	
  for	
  Medina	
  County,	
  818	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  45,	
  46	
  (Tex.	
  	
  

                                                                  iv	
  

                                                                    	
  
1991)	
  p.	
  63.	
  	
  

Clary	
  Corp.,	
  v.	
  Smith,	
  949	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  452,	
  464	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Fort	
  Worth	
  1997,	
  
no	
  writ),	
  p.	
  70.	
  
	
  
Cooper	
  Tire	
  &	
  Rubber	
  Co.	
  v.	
  Mendez,	
  204	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  797,	
  800	
  (Tex.	
  2006),	
  p.	
  
73.	
  
	
  
Crispin	
  v.	
  Paragan	
  Home,	
  Inc.,	
  888	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  78	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐Houston	
  [1st	
  
Dist.]	
  1994,	
  writ	
  denied.),	
  p.	
  46.	
  
	
  
Davis	
  v.	
  Huey,	
  620	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  at	
  566,	
  p.	
  45.	
  

Downer	
  v.	
  Aquamarine	
  Operations,	
  Inc.,	
  701	
  S.W.	
  2d.	
  238,	
  241-­‐242	
  (Tex.	
  

1985),	
  cert	
  denied,	
  476	
  U.S.	
  1159,	
  106	
  S.Ct.	
  2279,	
  90	
  L.Ed.	
  2d	
  721	
  (1986),	
  

p.	
  73.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

Peter	
  Enters,	
  Inc.,	
  v.,	
  51	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  616,	
  623	
  (Tex.	
  App-­‐-­‐Tyler	
  2000,	
  pet.	
  

denied),	
  p.	
  71.	
  	
  

Estate	
  of	
  William	
  H.	
  Arlitt	
  v.	
  Paterson,	
  995	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  713,	
  717	
  (Tex.	
  App.—

San	
  Antonio	
  1999),	
  p.	
  35.	
  

Flamont	
  Design	
  v.	
  Pennzoil	
  Casplan,	
  994	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  830,	
  834	
  (Tex.	
  App.—

Houston	
  [1st	
  Dist.]	
  1999),	
  p.	
  36.	
  

Friesenhahn,	
  960	
  S.	
  W.	
  2d	
  656,	
  654	
  (Tex.	
  1998),	
  p.	
  35.	
  

See	
  Galbraith	
  Eng’g	
  Consultants,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Pochucha,	
  290	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  863,	
  867	
  	
  

	
  

                                                              v	
  

                                                               	
  
(Tex.	
  2009),	
  p.	
  74.	
  

Gaines	
  v.	
  Hamman,	
  163	
  Tex.	
  618,	
  626,	
  358	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  557,	
  563	
  (Tex.	
  1962),	
  p.	
  

34.	
  	
  

Helfand	
  v.	
  Coane,	
  12	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  152,	
  155	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  Houston	
  [1st	
  Dist.]	
  2000,	
  

pet	
  denied),	
  p.	
  58.	
  

Hodas	
  v.	
  Scenic	
  Oaks	
  Property	
  Ass’n,	
  47	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  747	
  (App.	
  4	
  Dist.	
  2000),	
  

p.	
  43	
  	
  	
  

Horizon/CMS	
  Healthcare	
  Corp.,	
  v.	
  Auld,	
  34	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  887,	
  897	
  (Tex.	
  2000),	
  p.	
  

35.	
  	
  

In	
  re	
  Cerebus	
  Capital	
  Mgmt.,	
  L.P.,	
  164	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  379,	
  382	
  (Tex.	
  2005),	
  p.	
  73.	
  	
  

In	
  re	
  Olshan	
  Found	
  Repair	
  Co.,	
  328	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  883,	
  888	
  (Tex.	
  2010),	
  p.	
  73.	
  	
  

In	
  re	
  Ramirez,	
  994	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  682,	
  683	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  San	
  Antonio	
  1998,	
  orig.	
  

proceeding),	
  p.	
  63.	
  	
  	
  

Jackson	
  v.	
  Fiesta	
  Mart,	
  979	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  68,	
  70-­‐71	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Austin1998),	
  p.	
  

36.	
  

Jampole	
  v.	
  Touchy,	
  673	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  569,	
  573	
  (Tex.	
  1984)	
  p.	
  64.	
  

J.	
  P.	
  Bdg.	
  Enterprises,	
  Inc.,	
  v.	
  Timberwood	
  Development	
  Co.,	
  718	
  S.	
  W.	
  2d	
  
841	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  Corpus	
  Christi	
  1986	
  ,	
  writ	
  refused	
  n.r.),	
  p.	
  45.	
  	
  
	
  
Kindred	
  v.	
  Con/Chemical,	
  Inc.	
  650	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  61,	
  63	
  (Tex.	
  1983),	
  p.	
  36.	
  	
  

Lear	
  Siegler,	
  Inc.,	
  v.	
  Perez,	
  819	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  470,471	
  (Tex.	
  1991),	
  p.	
  33.	
  
                                                             vi	
  

                                                               	
  
Limestone	
  Products	
  Distributor	
  v.	
  McNamara,	
  71	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  308,	
  310	
  (Tex.	
  

2002),	
  p.	
  34.	
  	
  

State	
  Farm	
  Lloyds	
  v.	
  Nicolau,	
  951	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  444,	
  451	
  (Tex.	
  1997).	
  P.	
  70.	
  

Low	
  v.	
  Henry,	
  221	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  609,	
  614	
  (Tex.	
  2007),	
  p.	
  73.	
  

Macdonald	
  v.	
  Painter,	
  441	
  S.	
  W.	
  2d	
  179	
  (Tex.	
  1969),	
  p.	
  45.	
  
	
  
Marroquin	
  v.	
  D	
  &	
  N	
  Funding,	
  Inc.,	
  943	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  112,	
  114	
  (Tex.	
  App.—
Corpus	
  Christi	
  1997,	
  no	
  pet.),	
  p.	
  73.	
  
	
  
Matinez	
  v.	
  City	
  of	
  San	
  Antonio,	
  40	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  587,	
  591	
  (Tex.	
  App.—San	
  

Antonio	
  2001,	
  pet	
  denied),	
  p.	
  60.	
  

Merrill	
  Dow	
  Pharmaceuticals,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Havner,	
  953	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  706,	
  711	
  (Tex.	
  

1997),	
  p.	
  36.	
  

M.D.	
  Anderson	
  Hospital,	
  Willrich,	
  28	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  22,	
  23	
  (Tex.	
  2000),	
  p.	
  34.	
  

Moorehouse	
  v.	
  Chase	
  Manhattan	
  Bank,	
  76	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  587,	
  591	
  (Tex.	
  App—

San	
  Antonio	
  2002,	
  no	
  writ),	
  p.	
  60.	
  	
  

Moore	
  v.	
  K-­‐Mart	
  Corp.,	
  981	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  266,	
  269	
  (Tex.	
  App.—San	
  Antonio	
  

1998,	
  pet.	
  denied),	
  p.	
  34.	
  	
  	
  

Munson	
  v.	
  Milton,	
  948	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  813	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐	
  San	
  Antonio	
  1997),	
  p.	
  45.	
  
	
  
Nast	
  v.	
  State	
  Farm	
  Fire	
  &	
  Cas.	
  Co.,	
  82	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  42,	
  47	
  (	
  Tex.	
  App.—Corpus	
  

Christie	
  1990	
  (no	
  pet.),	
  p.	
  70.	
  

                                                               vii	
  

                                                                 	
  
Nelson	
  v.	
  PNC	
  Mortgage	
  Corp.,	
  139	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  442	
  (2004),	
  p.	
  62,	
  63,	
  64.	
  

Nixon	
  v.	
  Mr.	
  Property	
  Management,	
  Co.,	
  690	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  546,	
  548-­‐549	
  (Te	
  

1985),	
  34-­‐35.	
  	
  

Perry	
  v.	
  S.N.,	
  973	
  S.	
  W.	
  2d.	
  301,303	
  (Tex.	
  1998),	
  p.	
  35.	
  

Perry	
  Homes	
  v.	
  Cull,	
  258	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  580,	
  598	
  (Tex.	
  2008),	
  p.	
  74.	
  

Pheasant	
  Run	
  Homeowners	
  Ass’n,	
  Inc.,	
  v.	
  Kastor,	
  47	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  74	
  	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  _	
  
Houston	
  [14th	
  District])	
  2001),	
  p.	
  45.	
  	
  
	
  
Stephan	
  v.	
  Baylor	
  Med.	
  Ctr.	
  At	
  Garland,	
  20	
  S..	
  3d	
  880,891	
  (Tex.	
  App.—
Dallas	
  2000,	
  no	
  pet.),	
  p.	
  34.	
  	
  
	
  
Simon	
  Property	
  Group	
  (Texas)	
  L.P.	
  v.	
  May	
  Dept.	
  Stores	
  Co.,	
  943	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  64	
  
(Tex.	
  App.	
  Corpus	
  Christi	
  1997),	
  p.	
  45.	
  	
  
	
  
Tempay,	
  Inc.,	
  v.	
  TNT	
  Concrete	
  &	
  Construction,	
  Inc.,	
  37	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  517,	
  521-­‐
522	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Austin	
  2001,	
  no	
  writ)	
  citing	
  Robert	
  W.	
  Clore,	
  Texas	
  Rule	
  
of	
  Civil	
  Procedure	
  166a(1);	
  A	
  New	
  Weapon	
  for	
  Texas	
  Defendants,	
  29	
  St.	
  
Mary’s	
  L.	
  J.	
  813,	
  843	
  (1998),	
  p.	
  61,	
  64.	
  
	
  
Walker	
  v.	
  Guiterrez,	
  111	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  56,	
  62	
  (Tex.	
  2003),	
  p.	
  73.	
  
	
  
Walker	
  v.	
  Harris,	
  924	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  375,	
  378	
  Tex.	
  1996),	
  p.	
  35.	
  
	
  
West	
  v.	
  Solite,	
  563	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  240,	
  243	
  (Tex.	
  1978),	
  p.	
  58.	
  	
  
	
  
Wilmoth	
  v.	
  Wilcox,	
  743	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  at	
  658,	
  p.	
  46-­‐47.	
  	
  	
  

Tex.	
  R.	
  Civ.	
  Proc.	
  192.3	
  (a),	
  p.	
  58-­‐59.	
   	
  

U.S.	
  Const.	
  Fourteenth	
  Amendment,	
  p.	
  58.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
Texas	
  Constitution	
  Article	
  1	
  § 19,	
  p.	
  58.	
  
	
  
                                                      viii	
  

                                                                      	
  
	
  

Tex.	
  R.	
  Civ.	
  Proc.	
  166a(i),	
  p.	
  28,	
  46,	
  47,	
  49.	
  

Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  § 209.002	
  et.	
  seg.	
  
	
  
Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  § 209.009,	
  p.	
  11.	
  

Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  § 209.005,	
  p.	
  11,	
  29,	
  48,	
  49,	
  50,	
  51,	
  52,	
  55,	
  56.	
  
	
  
Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  § 209.006	
  P.	
  41,	
  44,	
  45.	
  

Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  § 209.007,	
  p.	
  7,	
  14,	
  19.	
  

Texas	
  Deceptive	
  Trade	
  Practices	
  Act	
  	
  (DTPA)	
  section(s):	
  
	
  
V.T.C.A.,	
  Bus.	
  &	
  C.,	
  	
  §17.50,	
  p.	
  65,	
  68	
  and	
  71.	
  
	
  
V.T.C.A.,	
  Bus.	
  &	
  C.	
  	
  §17.46,	
  p.	
  69.	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
                                                                  ix	
  
	
  
                                                                           	
  
                                                                           	
  
                                                                           	
  
                                                                           	
  

                                                                    	
  
                                                                  	
  
                                  ISSUES	
  PRESENTED	
  FOR	
  REVIEW	
  
                                                                  	
  
         1.	
     Did	
  the	
  trial	
  court,	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  err	
  in	
  granting	
  appellee’s	
  
Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  and	
  No	
  Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  
denying	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  Motion	
  
for	
  New	
  Trial?	
  
         	
  
         2.	
     Did	
  the	
  trial	
  court,	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  err	
  in	
  refusing	
  to	
  hear	
  
appellants’	
  Three	
  Motions	
  to	
  Compel	
  Discovery	
  and	
  their	
  Motion	
  for	
  
Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery,	
  before	
  granting	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  
for	
  Traditional	
  and	
  No-­‐Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  denying	
  
appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment?	
  
	
  
	
       3.	
     Did	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  err	
  in	
  dismissing	
  appellants’	
  two	
  Texas	
  
Deceptive	
  Trade	
  Practices	
  claims	
  without	
  allowing	
  any	
  oral	
  argument	
  
on	
  the	
  matter	
  and	
  without	
  any	
  basis	
  in	
  law	
  to	
  dismiss	
  the	
  claims?	
  
	
  
         4.	
     Did	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  and	
  Wisser,	
  J.,	
  err	
  in	
  denying	
  
appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips.	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
         	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                           x.	
  

                                                            	
  
                                                          	
  
	
  
TO	
  THE	
  HONORABLE	
  THIRD	
  DISTRICT	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS:	
  
	
  
        Appellants,	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  and	
  Renee	
  Jacobs	
  submit	
  this	
  Brief	
  in	
  

Support	
  of	
  their	
  Appeal	
  and	
  request	
  that	
  this	
  court	
  reverse	
  the	
  ruling	
  of	
  

the	
  Honorable	
  David	
  Phillips,	
  from	
  County	
  Court	
  One,	
  Travis	
  County,	
  

Texas	
  granting	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  and	
  No-­‐Evidence	
  

Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  	
  Appellants	
  also	
  request	
  that	
  the	
  this	
  court	
  order	
  

the	
  trial	
  court	
  to	
  enter	
  an	
  order	
  granting	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  

Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  order	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  to	
  hold	
  a	
  Hearing	
  

regarding	
  appellants’	
  right	
  to	
  attorneys’	
  fees	
  and	
  to	
  restore	
  the	
  

remainder	
  of	
  appellants’	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  docket	
  to	
  complete	
  

discovery	
  and	
  for	
  trial.	
  

                               STATEMENT	
  OF	
  THE	
  CASE	
  
                                                   	
  
	
       This	
  matter	
  involves	
  a	
  declaratory	
  judgment	
  action	
  brought	
  by	
  the	
  

appellants,	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  and	
  Renee	
  Jacobs	
  (hereinafter	
  “appellants”)	
  

against	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  Community	
  Homeowners	
  Association	
  (hereinafter	
  

“appellee”).	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  action	
  was	
  brought	
  by	
  the	
  appellants	
  asking	
  the	
  court	
  

to	
  determine	
  whether	
  the	
  actions	
  taken	
  by	
  the	
  appellee,	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  	
  

	
  

                                                        1.	
  

                                                          	
  
Community	
  Homeowners’	
  Association	
  which	
  found	
  the	
  appellants	
  in	
  

violations	
  of	
  unspecified	
  deed	
  restrictions	
  of	
  the	
  appellee	
  was	
  done	
  in	
  

violation	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code.	
  	
  

          Appellants’	
  pled	
  in	
  their	
  Petition	
  that	
  the	
  appellee’s	
  Violation	
  

Notice	
  was	
  defective	
  and	
  therefore,	
  unenforceable	
  because	
  it	
  failed	
  to	
  

cite	
  a	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction	
  that	
  appellants	
  allegedly	
  violated.	
  	
  In	
  

addition,	
  the	
  appellants	
  pled,	
  the	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  gave	
  an	
  invalid	
  cure	
  

date	
  of	
  “before	
  the	
  August	
  inspection”	
  even	
  though	
  the	
  Notice	
  was	
  dated	
  

October	
  22,	
  2013.	
  	
  The	
  Hearing,	
  which	
  appellee	
  relies	
  on	
  to	
  support	
  it’s	
  

actions	
  finding	
  the	
  appellants	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  deed	
  restrictions	
  

occurred	
  on	
  November	
  13,	
  2013.	
  	
  Therefore,	
  the	
  cure	
  date	
  provided	
  in	
  

the	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  was	
  defective	
  because	
  it	
  did	
  not	
  give	
  appellants	
  a	
  

reasonable	
  opportunity	
  to	
  cure	
  the	
  alleged	
  defect	
  and	
  contained	
  an	
  

invalid	
  date.	
  	
  

          The	
  Trial	
  Court,	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  erred	
  in	
  granting	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  

Traditional	
  and	
  No-­‐Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  denying	
  

appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  prior	
  to	
  hearing	
  

appellants’	
  three	
  outstanding	
  Motions	
  to	
  Compel	
  Discovery	
  and	
  	
  

                                                         2.	
  

          	
  

                                                           	
  
       appellants’,	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery.	
  

             The	
  court	
  also,	
  erred	
  in	
  dismissing	
  appellants	
  Texas	
  Deceptive	
  

Practices	
  Act,	
  claims	
  without	
  allowing	
  oral	
  argument	
  and	
  without	
  

indicating	
  any	
  reason	
  for	
  the	
  dismissal.	
  	
  	
  	
  Appellants	
  alleged	
  that	
  

appellee	
  had	
  violated	
  the	
  Texas	
  Deceptive	
  Practices	
  Act	
  by	
  refusing	
  to	
  

provide	
  the	
  appellants	
  with	
  a	
  Hearing	
  in	
  regards	
  to	
  first	
  Violation	
  

Notice.	
  	
  	
  Appellants	
  also	
  alleged	
  that	
  appellee	
  fraudulently	
  omitted	
  

appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears’	
  name	
  from	
  being	
  placed	
  on	
  the	
  Ballot	
  for	
  the	
  

election	
  of	
  Neighborhood	
  Representatives	
  on	
  June	
  7,	
  2014,	
  in	
  violation	
  

of	
  his	
  rights	
  to	
  due	
  process	
  and	
  equal	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  law.	
  

	
           The	
  court	
  in	
  it’s	
  rulings,	
  demeanor	
  and	
  behavior	
  in	
  this	
  case	
  

exhibited	
  extreme	
  bias	
  against	
  the	
  appellants,	
  who	
  are	
  African	
  American	
  

and	
  in	
  favor	
  of	
  appellee,	
  which	
  is	
  controlled	
  by	
  Newland	
  Communities	
  

the	
  largest	
  private	
  developer	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  .	
  	
  The	
  appellants	
  

moved	
  for	
  the	
  Court	
  to	
  recuse	
  itself	
  on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  bias.	
  	
  The	
  court,	
  

Phillips,	
  J.,	
  and	
  Wisser	
  J.,	
  erred	
  when	
  it	
  denied	
  appellants’	
  Motions	
  to	
  

Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips.	
  

	
  

	
  

                                                             3.	
  

                                                               	
  
                                        	
  
                     STATEMENT	
  REGARDING	
  ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  
	
  
	
        Appellants’,	
  request	
  that	
  court	
  allow	
  oral	
  argument	
  in	
  this	
  matter.	
  	
  	
  	
  

There	
  is	
  no	
  record	
  of	
  the	
  Hearing	
  of	
  	
  the	
  parties	
  cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  

Summary	
  Judgment	
  Motion,	
  therefore,	
  appellants	
  believe	
  oral	
  argument	
  

would	
  be	
  very	
  helpful	
  to	
  the	
  court.	
  	
  	
  This	
  court	
  should	
  hear	
  from	
  counsel	
  

and	
  the	
  justices	
  should	
  have	
  an	
  opportunity	
  to	
  inquire	
  of	
  counsel,	
  in	
  

order	
  to	
  get	
  a	
  clear	
  picture	
  of	
  what	
  took	
  place	
  at	
  the	
  September	
  15,	
  

2014,	
  Hearing	
  of	
  the	
  parties’	
  Cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  

the	
  question	
  of	
  whether	
  the	
  appellee	
  refused	
  to	
  cooperate	
  with	
  

discovery	
  and	
  the	
  other	
  issues	
  raised	
  in	
  this	
  Appeal.	
  

          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
          	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                                   4.	
  

                                                            	
  
	
  
                                STATEMENT	
  OF	
  FACTS	
  	
  
                                                         	
  
          Appellants	
  purchased	
  a	
  home	
  in	
  Falcon	
  Pointe,	
  a	
  planned	
  

community,	
  developed	
  by	
  Newland	
  Communities,	
  the	
  largest	
  private	
  

developer	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  on	
  January	
  15,	
  2013.	
  	
  Thereafter,	
  with	
  the	
  

permission	
  of	
  the	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  Community	
  Homeowners’	
  Association	
  

(hereinafter	
  the	
  “appellee”	
  or	
  the	
  “Association),	
  appellants	
  installed	
  a	
  

swimming	
  pool	
  on	
  the	
  subject	
  property	
  in	
  April,	
  2013.	
  	
  After	
  the	
  pool	
  

was	
  installed,	
  appellants	
  became	
  aware	
  that	
  the	
  fence	
  on	
  their	
  property	
  

sat	
  in	
  a	
  depression	
  and	
  was	
  only	
  four	
  feet	
  high	
  along	
  the	
  side	
  of	
  the	
  pool.	
  	
  	
  

          Appellants	
  sought	
  to	
  extend	
  the	
  height	
  of	
  the	
  fence	
  to	
  the	
  full	
  six-­‐

foot	
  height	
  allowed	
  by	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  bylaws	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  and	
  did	
  

so	
  using	
  lattice.	
  	
  By	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  dated	
  July	
  26,	
  2013,	
  Diane	
  Bottema,	
  

appellee’s	
  property	
  manager	
  notified	
  appellants	
  that	
  the	
  lattice	
  

extension	
  that	
  appellants	
  installed	
  to	
  their	
  fence	
  violated	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  

Association.	
  	
  

          Ms.	
  Bottema	
  deposition	
  testimony	
  was	
  the	
  property	
  inspector	
  

assigned	
  to	
  inspect	
  the	
  properties	
  in	
  the	
  Association,	
  Mr.	
  Morales,	
  

prepared	
  the	
  letter	
  and	
  stamped	
  it	
  with	
  Diane	
  Bottema’s	
  signature	
  using	
  	
  

                                                               5.	
  

                                                                 	
  
a	
  rubber	
  stamp.	
  	
  Appellants	
  advised	
  appellee	
  that	
  they	
  wanted	
  a	
  

Hearing	
  and	
  would	
  request	
  a	
  Hearing	
  in	
  writing	
  within	
  the	
  thirty	
  (30)	
  

days	
  provided	
  in	
  the	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  and	
  applicable	
  law.	
  1	
  

          Thereafter,	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  sent	
  appellants	
  an	
  email	
  that	
  stated	
  

despite	
  the	
  clear	
  language	
  of	
  the	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  and	
  the	
  Texas	
  

Property	
  Code	
  appellants	
  were	
  not	
  entitled	
  to	
  a	
  Hearing.	
  	
  	
  The	
  email	
  

stated	
  that	
  in	
  matters	
  of	
  clear	
  violations	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  Association,	
  

the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Association,	
  Ranier	
  Ficken,	
  could	
  act	
  for	
  	
  

the	
  Board	
  without	
  a	
  Hearing.2	
  

          At	
  his	
  deposition,	
  Ranier	
  Ficken,	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  appellee,	
  

testified	
  that	
  contrary	
  to	
  Ms.	
  Bottema’s	
  email	
  he	
  had	
  no	
  authority	
  to	
  act	
  

for	
  the	
  board	
  of	
  the	
  appellee,	
  in	
  matters	
  of	
  clear	
  violations	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  

the	
  Association.3	
  	
  The	
  Association	
  was	
  established	
  in	
  2002,	
  more	
  than	
  

ten	
  years	
  before	
  the	
  appellants’	
  purchased	
  their	
  home.4	
  	
  The	
  Board	
  of	
  

the	
  appellee	
  is	
  still	
  under	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  Developer,	
  Newland	
  

Communities.	
  	
  	
  

          The	
  Board	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  is	
  comprised	
  of	
  two	
  employees	
  of	
  the	
  

developer	
  and	
  a	
  member	
  selected	
  by	
  the	
  Neighborhood	
  Representatives	
  

of	
  the	
  Association.	
  	
  Appellants	
  requested	
  a	
  meeting	
  with	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  	
  

                                                           6.	
  

                                                             	
  
and	
  the	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Association,	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  after	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  

refused	
  to	
  grant	
  appellants	
  a	
  Hearing	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  

§	
  209.007	
  and	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  regulations	
  of	
  the	
  appellee.5	
  

          A	
  meeting	
  was	
  scheduled	
  and	
  held	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  emails	
  that	
  

were	
  exchanged	
  between	
  Ms.	
  Bottema,	
  the	
  property	
  manager	
  and	
  

appellants.6	
  	
  Prior	
  to	
  that	
  meeting	
  appellants	
  removed	
  the	
  lattice	
  

addition	
  to	
  the	
  fence	
  as	
  requested	
  in	
  the	
  first	
  Violation	
  Notice.	
  	
  At	
  the	
  

meeting,	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  and	
  Mr.	
  Ficken	
  gave	
  appellants	
  oral	
  instructions	
  

regarding	
  what	
  kind	
  of	
  privacy	
  screen,	
  appellants,	
  could	
  build.	
  	
  	
  

          Pursuant	
  to	
  that	
  meeting	
  and	
  further	
  emails	
  that	
  were	
  exchanged	
  

between	
  the	
  parties,	
  appellants	
  built	
  a	
  completely	
  free	
  standing	
  privacy	
  

screen,	
  which	
  was	
  not	
  attached	
  to	
  the	
  existing	
  fence	
  in	
  any	
  way	
  in	
  

September	
  of	
  2013.	
  	
  

          Appellants	
  did	
  not	
  receive	
  any	
  Notices	
  of	
  Violation	
  in	
  either	
  

August	
  or	
  September	
  of	
  2013.	
  	
  By	
  letter	
  dated	
  October	
  22,	
  2013,	
  

appellee	
  sent	
  appellants	
  a	
  purported	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  in	
  

violation	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  the	
  privacy	
  screen	
  

that	
  appellants	
  built	
  on	
  their	
  property,	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  instructions	
  given	
  

to	
  appellants,	
  by	
  the	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  Association,	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  and	
  	
  

                                                            7.	
  

                                                            	
  
Diane	
  Bottema,	
  the	
  property	
  manager.7	
  

         The	
  Notice	
  did	
  not	
  cite	
  any	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction(s)	
  that	
  

appellants	
  were	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated.	
  	
  The	
  Notice	
  provided	
  a	
  cure	
  

date	
  of	
  before	
  the	
  “August	
  inspection”,	
  even	
  though	
  the	
  Notice	
  is	
  dated	
  

October	
  22,	
  2013,	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  claimed	
  to	
  have	
  no	
  knowledge	
  as	
  to	
  how	
  

the	
  cure	
  date	
  was	
  determined.	
  	
  Ms.	
  Bottema,	
  the	
  property	
  manager	
  

whose	
  name	
  appears	
  on	
  the	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  answered	
  as	
  follows	
  

concerning	
  the	
  cure	
  date	
  in	
  subject	
  the	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  during	
  her	
  

deposition:	
  

         Q.	
     What	
  cure	
  dates	
  were	
  you	
  trained	
  to	
  put	
  on	
  notices	
  of	
  

violation?	
  

         A.	
     I	
  don’t	
  know.	
  

         Q.	
     Well	
  the	
  date	
  of	
  the	
  letter	
  is	
  what?	
  

         A.	
     The	
  date	
  on	
  the	
  letter	
  is	
  October	
  22nd.	
  

         Q.	
     What	
  year?	
  

         A.	
     2013.	
  

         Q.	
     And	
  it	
  states	
  a	
  cure	
  date	
  of	
  August?	
  

         A.	
     With	
  no	
  date.	
  

         Q.	
     And	
  what	
  do	
  you	
  believe	
  the	
  August	
  they	
  were	
  referring	
  to?	
  

                                                                   8.	
  

                                                            	
  
        A.	
     I	
  don’t	
  know.	
  

        Q.	
     So	
  you	
  don’t	
  even	
  know	
  if	
  I	
  still	
  have	
  time	
  to	
  cure	
  the	
  

defect?	
  

        A.	
     I	
  don’t	
  know.	
  

        Q.	
     So	
  you	
  don’t	
  know	
  if	
  the	
  date	
  refers	
  to	
  2014,	
  correct?	
  

        A.	
     Right.	
  

        Q.	
     You	
  don’t	
  know	
  if	
  the	
  August	
  date	
  refers	
  to	
  2015?	
  

        A.	
     No.	
  

        Q.	
     You	
  don’t	
  know	
  if	
  the	
  August	
  date	
  refers	
  to	
  2016?	
  

        A.	
     No.	
  

        Q.	
     So	
  what	
  date	
  did	
  I	
  have	
  to	
  cure?	
  

        A.	
     I	
  don’t	
  know.	
  

        Q.	
     Well,	
  you	
  said	
  that	
  the	
  cure	
  date	
  could	
  have	
  been	
  the	
  August	
  

                 2014	
  August,	
  2015,	
  August,	
  2016	
  August.	
  	
  I	
  am	
  asking	
  which	
  

                 date	
  it	
  was	
  intended	
  to	
  be	
  .	
  

        A.	
     I	
  don’t	
  know.8	
  

        When	
  asked	
  about	
  the	
  notice	
  Ranier	
  Ficken,	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  

appellee	
  testified	
  regarding	
  the	
  subject	
  October	
  22,	
  2013,	
  Violation	
  	
  

        	
  

                                                           9.	
  

                                                             	
  
          	
  

Notice:	
  

          Q.	
      Let’s	
  assume	
  that	
  letter	
  is	
  dated	
  correctly	
  for	
  the	
  purposes	
  

of	
  this	
  question.	
  

          A.	
      Okay.	
  

          Q.	
      Then	
  the	
  cure	
  date	
  would	
  have	
  been	
  wrong,	
  correct,	
  if	
  that	
  

date	
  was	
  right.	
  

          A.	
      Well,	
  certainly	
  August	
  comes	
  before	
  October,	
  yes.9….	
  

          Q.	
      And	
  so	
  from	
  this	
  Letter	
  could	
  you	
  tell	
  me	
  which	
  particular	
  

regulation	
  it	
  is	
  that	
  I	
  was	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  –	
  the	
  plaintiffs’	
  were	
  alleged	
  to	
  

have	
  violated.	
  

          A.	
      The	
  letter	
  just	
  list	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  CCR’s.	
  

          Q.	
      How	
  would	
  someone	
  know	
  what	
  regulation	
  they	
  were	
  in	
  

violation	
  of	
  with	
  that	
  notice	
  letter?	
  

          A.	
      Relative	
  to	
  this	
  particular	
  letter	
  I	
  don’t	
  see	
  the	
  specific	
  

regulation.10	
               	
  

          The	
  Appellee	
  held	
  a	
  Hearing	
  regarding	
  the	
  October	
  22,	
  2013,	
  

Violation	
  Notice	
  on	
  November	
  13,	
  2014.	
  	
  The	
  By-­‐Laws	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  	
  

                                                           10.	
  

                                                              	
  
provide	
  that	
  if,	
  appellants	
  appear	
  at	
  the	
  Hearing	
  they	
  waive	
  their	
  right	
  

to	
  contest	
  lack	
  of	
  legal	
  notice.11	
  	
  	
  Because	
  appellants	
  wished	
  to	
  contest	
  

the	
  validity	
  of	
  the	
  Notice,	
  they	
  did	
  not	
  appear	
  at	
  the	
  Hearing.	
  	
  

             Thereafter,	
  appellants	
  began	
  to	
  make	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  requests	
  directed	
  

to	
  the	
  appellee	
  to	
  produce	
  documents.	
  	
  Appellants	
  made	
  five	
  requests	
  

for	
  documents	
  as	
  homeowners’	
  in	
  the	
  Association.	
  	
  The	
  Requests	
  were	
  

sent	
  certified	
  mail	
  return	
  receipt	
  requested	
  pursuant	
  to	
  Texas	
  Property	
  

Code	
  §	
  209.005.12	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

             Appellee	
  refused	
  to	
  produce	
  any	
  documents	
  pursuant	
  to	
  

appellants’	
  six	
  requests	
  for	
  Production	
  of	
  Documents	
  to	
  appellee	
  as	
  

homeowners’,	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  §	
  209.005.	
  

Thereafter,	
  appellants	
  made	
  six	
  formal	
  requests	
  for	
  the	
  Production	
  of	
  

Documents	
  in	
  the	
  subject	
  case.	
  	
  Appellants	
  also	
  filed	
  six	
  	
  

Motions	
  to	
  Compel,	
  the	
  production	
  of	
  documents	
  and	
  witnesses.	
  	
  

Appellee	
  refused	
  to	
  produce	
  any	
  documents	
  that	
  appellants	
  requested	
  

except	
  for	
  its	
  liability	
  insurance	
  policy	
  and	
  less	
  than	
  twenty	
  pages	
  of	
  

minutes	
  of	
  Board	
  meetings,	
  which	
  had	
  nothing	
  to	
  do	
  with	
  this	
  case	
  and	
  

two	
  budgets.13	
  	
  	
  

             Appellee	
  refused	
  to	
  produce	
  any	
  correspondence	
  between	
  the	
  	
  

                                                          11.	
  

                                                             	
  
parties.	
  	
  The	
  appellee,	
  refused	
  to	
  produce	
  the	
  Violation	
  Notice,	
  which	
  it	
  

relied	
  on	
  to	
  find	
  the	
  appellants	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  

Association.	
  	
  Throughout	
  the	
  short	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  case	
  the	
  appellee	
  has	
  

refused	
  to	
  cooperate	
  with	
  any	
  discovery.	
  	
  Appellee	
  admittedly,	
  refused	
  

to	
  cooperate	
  with	
  discovery	
  simply	
  asserting	
  it	
  believed	
  that	
  discovery	
  

was	
  unnecessary.14	
  	
  

          Mr.	
  Campbell	
  stated	
  as	
  follows	
  at	
  plaintiffs’	
  first	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  

responding	
  to	
  a	
  question	
  by	
  the	
  court	
  Sheppard,	
  J.:	
  

          The	
  court:	
  	
  Here	
  is	
  me	
  (sic)	
  question,	
  I	
  understand	
  your	
  position	
  

and	
  I	
  grant	
  that	
  can	
  have	
  that	
  position.	
  	
  But	
  it’s	
  an	
  unusual	
  

circumstances	
  to	
  decide	
  that	
  because	
  that	
  is	
  your	
  position,	
  you	
  can’t	
  

give	
  discovery.	
  	
  In	
  any	
  other	
  situation—I	
  mean	
  I’m	
  trying	
  to	
  figure	
  out	
  

how	
  it’s	
  and	
  unreasonable	
  request	
  for	
  him	
  to	
  ask	
  for	
  the	
  deposition	
  of	
  

the	
  key	
  person	
  who’s	
  been	
  telling	
  him	
  and	
  communicating	
  with	
  him.	
  

          MR.	
  CAMPBELL:	
  	
  In	
  terms	
  of	
  the	
  deposition	
  which	
  is	
  the	
  only	
  issue	
  

he	
  brought	
  before	
  the	
  court;	
  trying	
  to	
  compel	
  this	
  deposition.	
  	
  If	
  we	
  

need	
  to	
  that	
  we	
  can.	
  	
  That	
  was	
  one	
  issue	
  I	
  raised	
  with	
  him.	
  	
  We	
  got	
  the	
  

summary	
  judgment	
  arguments.	
  	
  I	
  do	
  no	
  think	
  we	
  need	
  to	
  go	
  through	
  the	
  

process	
  doing	
  the	
  deposition.15	
  

                                                                       12.	
  

                                                                	
  
          	
  

          The	
  counsel	
  for	
  the	
  appellants’	
  asked	
  the	
  following	
  questions	
  to	
  

the	
  court:	
  

          MR.	
  SPEARS:	
                 If	
  he	
  says	
  he	
  is	
  not	
  going	
  to	
  produce	
  the	
  

documents,	
  how	
  do	
  we	
  get	
  	
  that	
  resolved	
  before	
  the	
  deposition.	
  

          THE	
  COURT:	
                  I	
  recessed	
  this	
  hearing.	
  	
  This	
  hearing	
  is	
  in	
  recess	
  

and	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  over.	
  	
  Call	
  my	
  Court	
  set	
  the	
  date	
  and	
  we	
  will	
  talk	
  about	
  what	
  

in	
  subpoena	
  duces	
  tecum	
  he	
  doesn’t	
  want	
  to	
  turnover.	
  	
  We	
  will	
  have	
  

that	
  discussion.	
  	
  When	
  we	
  are	
  through	
  with	
  that	
  discussion	
  we	
  will	
  

figure	
  out	
  what	
  discussion	
  needs	
  to	
  be	
  had	
  next.	
  	
  I	
  am	
  likely	
  to	
  set	
  a	
  

scheduling	
  order	
  and	
  then	
  we	
  will	
  figure	
  out	
  where	
  we	
  are.16	
  During	
  the	
  

first	
  Hearing	
  the	
  court	
  Sheppard,	
  J.,	
  granted	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  

Compel	
  the	
  Deposition,	
  Duces	
  Tecum,	
  of	
  	
  Diane	
  Bottema.17	
  	
  

          In	
  the	
  second	
  Hearing,	
  the	
  court,	
  Sheppard,	
  J.,	
  denied	
  appellants’	
  

Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  finding	
  that	
  the	
  Appellee	
  did	
  not	
  have	
  to	
  produce	
  a	
  

document	
  that	
  was	
  not	
  in	
  existence,	
  since	
  appellee	
  did	
  not	
  maintain	
  

records	
  of	
  the	
  dedicatory	
  violation	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  Association.	
  	
  As	
  a	
  

result	
  the	
  court	
  ruled	
  appellants	
  must	
  request	
  the	
  minutes	
  of	
  the	
  Board	
  

meetings	
  and	
  compile	
  the	
  records	
  themselves.	
  	
  	
  Appellants	
  maintained	
  	
  

                                                              13.	
  

                                                                 	
  
that,	
  the	
  Association	
  was	
  required	
  by,	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code,	
  	
  	
  § 207.009,	
  

to	
  maintain	
  and	
  compile	
  the	
  requested	
  information.	
  	
  	
  Judge	
  Sheppard	
  

further	
  ruled	
  that	
  if	
  the	
  appellee	
  had	
  any	
  objections	
  to	
  appellants’	
  

document	
  requests	
  they	
  must	
  submit	
  the	
  objections	
  to	
  the	
  court	
  before	
  

the	
  deposition	
  of	
  Diane	
  Bottema,	
  the	
  property	
  manager.18	
  	
  	
  

         Appellants	
  did	
  not	
  learn	
  that	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  was	
  replaced	
  by,	
  Natalie	
  

Boykin	
  until	
  appellants’	
  took	
  Ms.	
  Bottema’s	
  deposition.	
  	
  Accordingly,	
  

appellants	
  were	
  then	
  forced	
  to	
  attempt	
  to	
  depose	
  Natalie	
  Boykin,	
  the	
  

new	
  property	
  manager.19	
  	
  	
  After	
  appellants	
  noticed	
  Ms.	
  Boykin’s	
  

deposition	
  appellee	
  moved	
  to	
  quash	
  appellants’	
  Notice	
  to	
  Take	
  

Deposition	
  and	
  appellants	
  filed	
  a	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  Ms.	
  Boykin’s	
  

Deposition.20	
  

         Based	
  on	
  the	
  court’s	
  ruling	
  appellants	
  amended	
  their	
  production	
  

requests	
  to	
  specifically	
  request	
  the	
  minutes	
  of	
  all	
  board	
  meetings,	
  

financial	
  records	
  and	
  all	
  other	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association.	
  	
  	
  The	
  

Association	
  has	
  never	
  filed	
  a	
  copy	
  policy	
  as	
  required	
  by	
  Texas	
  Property	
  

Code,	
  	
  § 209.007,	
  and	
  therefore,	
  it	
  was	
  obligated	
  by	
  statute	
  to	
  produce	
  

copies	
  of	
  all	
  the	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  without	
  cost	
  to	
  any	
  

homeowner	
  who	
  properly	
  requests	
  the	
  records,	
  with	
  private	
  	
  

                                                        14.	
  

                                                           	
  
         	
  

information	
  redacted.21	
  

         Appellants’	
  pursuant	
  to	
  Judge	
  Sheppard’s	
  Order	
  filed	
  a	
  new	
  Notice	
  

to	
  take	
  the	
  Deposition,	
  Duces	
  Tecum	
  of	
  Diane	
  Bottema.	
  	
  Appellants	
  filed	
  

another	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  after	
  the	
  appellants	
  and	
  appellee	
  exchanged	
  

emails	
  regarding	
  whether	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  would	
  produce	
  the	
  documents	
  

requested	
  in	
  appellants’	
  Notice	
  to	
  take	
  Deposition	
  Duces	
  Tecum.	
  	
  

Appellee’s	
  counsel	
  indicated,	
  that	
  although	
  he	
  was	
  going	
  to	
  object	
  to	
  

producing	
  documents,	
  he	
  refused	
  to	
  submit	
  appellee’s	
  objections	
  to	
  the	
  

court	
  prior	
  to	
  Ms.	
  Bottema’s,	
  Deposition	
  as	
  ordered	
  by	
  Judge	
  

Shepperd.22	
  

         The	
  court,	
  Phillips	
  J.,	
  denied	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  ruling	
  

since	
  the	
  deposition	
  has	
  not	
  taken	
  place,	
  the	
  Motion	
  was	
  premature	
  

despite	
  Judge	
  Sheppard’s	
  order	
  requiring	
  the	
  appellee	
  to	
  submit	
  it’s	
  

objections	
  before	
  Ms.	
  Bottema’s,	
  Deposition.23	
  Judge	
  Phillips’	
  Order	
  

ruling	
  the	
  Motion	
  was	
  premature	
  and	
  Judge	
  Shepperd’s	
  Order	
  are	
  

inconsistent	
  since	
  the	
  Hearing	
  of	
  the	
  parties	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  was	
  

simply	
  adjourned	
  to	
  deal	
  with	
  any	
  objections	
  by	
  appellee	
  to	
  the	
  	
  

         	
  

                                                      15.	
  

                                                         	
  
production	
  of	
  records.	
  	
  	
  	
  

          Appellants	
  subsequently	
  took	
  the	
  deposition	
  of	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  and	
  

she	
  produced	
  absolutely	
  no	
  documents	
  pursuant	
  to	
  appellants’	
  Notice	
  to	
  

take	
  her	
  Deposition	
  Duces	
  Tecum,	
  not	
  even	
  her	
  correspondence	
  with	
  

appellants	
  claiming	
  she	
  no	
  longer	
  had	
  access	
  to	
  her	
  own	
  emails	
  even	
  

though	
  she	
  now	
  worked	
  for	
  the	
  property	
  manger,	
  Goodwin	
  

Management	
  in	
  the	
  office	
  where	
  the	
  records	
  were	
  maintained	
  because	
  

the	
  Goodwin	
  Management	
  locked	
  her	
  of	
  her	
  email	
  account	
  and	
  the	
  

records	
  of	
  the	
  Appellee.24	
  	
  	
  The	
  transcripts	
  of	
  both	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  and	
  Mr.	
  

Ficken’s	
  deposition	
  were	
  not	
  available	
  prior	
  to	
  the	
  Hearing	
  of	
  the	
  

parties	
  cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment,	
  because	
  of	
  the	
  delays	
  

caused	
  by	
  appellee.	
  	
  	
  

          Appellants	
  were	
  deprived	
  of	
  their	
  right	
  to	
  produce	
  evidence	
  

obtained	
  from	
  those	
  depositions	
  to	
  refute	
  appellee’s	
  claims	
  in	
  support	
  of	
  

it’s	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  Motion.25	
  	
  Appellants	
  also	
  filed	
  a	
  Notice	
  to	
  take	
  

the	
  Deposition	
  Duces	
  Tecum	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken,	
  the	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  

Association	
  and	
  the	
  developer,	
  Newland	
  Communities’	
  Project	
  Manager.	
  	
  

The	
  appellee	
  oversees	
  yearly	
  dues	
  of	
  the	
  Association,	
  in	
  an	
  amount	
  over	
  

one	
  million	
  dollars	
  per	
  year,	
  while	
  allowing	
  no	
  oversight	
  by	
  the	
  

homeowners.26	
  	
  	
  	
  

                                                          	
  
         	
  The	
  Association	
  is	
  under	
  the	
  control	
  of	
  the	
  developer,	
  Newland	
  

Communities	
  that	
  has	
  through	
  its	
  actions	
  demonstrated	
  that	
  it	
  will	
  	
  

not	
  comply	
  with	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  and	
  make	
  the	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  

Association	
  available	
  to	
  the	
  homeowners’	
  especially	
  the	
  appellants.	
  	
  Mr.	
  

Ficken	
  testified	
  that	
  he	
  had	
  access	
  to	
  all	
  the	
  documents	
  of	
  the	
  

Association	
  but	
  relied	
  on	
  his	
  attorney	
  to	
  determine	
  what	
  documents	
  he	
  

would	
  produce.	
  Mr.	
  Ficken	
  testified	
  that	
  he	
  made	
  no	
  effort	
  to	
  comply	
  

with	
  appellants’	
  Notice	
  to	
  Take	
  his	
  Deposition	
  Duces	
  Tecum27	
  

         Appellants	
  also	
  served	
  appellee	
  with	
  notice	
  of	
  their	
  intent	
  to	
  take	
  

the	
  Deposition	
  Duces	
  Tecum,	
  of	
  Natalie	
  Boykin,	
  the	
  property	
  manager	
  of	
  

the	
  Association,	
  who	
  assumed	
  Ms.	
  Bottema’s	
  position	
  on	
  or	
  about	
  May	
  1,	
  

2013.28	
  	
  Ms.	
  Boykin	
  replaced	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  who	
  was	
  reassigned	
  because	
  

of	
  poor	
  performance,	
  including	
  complaints	
  by	
  other	
  residents,	
  according	
  

to	
  the	
  deposition	
  testimony	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken.29	
  	
  	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  denied	
  that	
  

she	
  was	
  replaced	
  for	
  poor	
  performance.30	
  	
  	
  

         As	
  property	
  manager,	
  Ms.	
  Boykin	
  oversaw	
  the	
  June	
  7,	
  2014,	
  

election.	
  	
  Appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears,	
  properly	
  applied	
  to	
  be	
  included	
  on	
  

the	
  ballot,	
  for	
  neighborhood	
  representative,	
  nevertheless	
  his	
  name	
  was	
  

fraudulently	
  left	
  off	
  the	
  ballot	
  by	
  Natalie	
  Boykin,	
  the	
  new	
  property	
  

manager.31	
   	
            	
        	
       	
        17.	
  

                                                          	
  
          Appellant	
  also	
  Noticed	
  the	
  Deposition	
  of	
  William	
  Meyer,	
  vice	
  	
  

president	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  and	
  vice	
  president	
  of	
  Newland	
  

Communities,	
  the	
  developer,	
  who	
  was	
  one	
  of	
  only	
  two	
  people	
  who	
  voted	
  

at	
  the	
  Hearing	
  finding	
  the	
  appellants	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  

Association,	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  Board’s	
  “business	
  judgment”,	
  not	
  because	
  of	
  a	
  

violation	
  of	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction.32	
  	
  	
  

          Ms.	
  Bottema	
  and	
  Ms.	
  Boykin	
  were	
  the	
  property	
  managers	
  

responsible	
  for	
  the	
  issuance	
  of	
  Violation	
  Notices,	
  conducting	
  elections,	
  

collecting	
  dues,	
  and	
  the	
  overall	
  management	
  of	
  the	
  property	
  of	
  the	
  

Association.	
  	
  Ms.	
  Boykin	
  became	
  custodian	
  of	
  records	
  when	
  she	
  

replaced	
  Ms.	
  Bottema,	
  as	
  property	
  manager	
  and	
  she	
  conducted	
  the	
  

election,	
  which	
  is	
  the	
  subject	
  of	
  one	
  of	
  appellants’	
  two	
  DTPA	
  claims.	
  	
  

After	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  was	
  replaced	
  she	
  testified	
  at	
  her	
  deposition	
  that	
  she	
  

did	
  not	
  have	
  access	
  to	
  the	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association.	
  	
  	
  

          Obviously,	
  this	
  was	
  another	
  attempt	
  to	
  hide	
  the	
  ball	
  by	
  appellee,	
  

allowing	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  to	
  claim	
  she	
  did	
  not	
  have	
  access	
  to	
  her	
  records	
  not	
  

even	
  her	
  own	
  emails	
  or	
  letters	
  related	
  to	
  this	
  matter	
  even	
  though	
  she	
  	
  

          	
  

                                                                     18.	
  

                                                              	
  
was	
  still	
  employed	
  by	
  Goodwin	
  Management	
  the	
  property	
  management	
  

company.	
  	
  Clearly,	
  the	
  four	
  witnesses	
  noticed	
  for	
  deposition	
  by	
  the	
  

appellants,	
  were	
  not	
  only	
  material	
  witnesses,	
  they	
  were	
  critical	
  

witnesses.	
  

         Appellants’	
  Fourth	
  and	
  Fifth	
  Amended	
  Complaint	
  alleged	
  that	
  the	
  

appellee	
  fraudulent	
  left	
  the	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears’	
  name	
  off	
  of	
  the	
  

election	
  Ballot,	
  which	
  was	
  held	
  on	
  or	
  about	
  June	
  7,	
  2014,	
  for	
  

Neighborhood	
  Representative	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  DTPA.	
  	
  The	
  election	
  

took	
  place	
  approximately	
  seven	
  months	
  after	
  suit	
  was	
  filed	
  in	
  this	
  

matter	
  and	
  approximately	
  three	
  months	
  before	
  the	
  court	
  granted	
  

appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  Nevertheless,	
  the	
  court	
  

dismissed	
  this	
  claim	
  without	
  allowing	
  argument	
  on	
  the	
  matter	
  or	
  stating	
  

any	
  reason	
  for	
  the	
  court’s	
  ruling.	
  

         Appellants	
  also	
  alleged	
  a	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  Deceptive	
  Trade	
  

Practices	
  Act	
  (hereinafter	
  “DTPA”)	
  against	
  the	
  appellee	
  based	
  on	
  

appellee’s	
  property	
  manager,	
  Diane	
  Bottema’s,	
  misrepresentation	
  of	
  the	
  

law	
  and	
  the	
  rights	
  and	
  obligations	
  between	
  the	
  parties	
  when	
  she	
  

advised	
  the	
  appellants	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  not	
  entitled	
  to	
  a	
  Hearing	
  as	
  

provided	
  in	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  § 209.007,	
  and	
  the	
  by-­‐laws	
  of	
  the	
  	
  

                                                        19.	
  

                                                           	
  
Association	
  regarding	
  the	
  first	
  Violation	
  Notice.33	
  	
  	
  	
  

         Appellants’	
  counsel	
  sent	
  two	
  emails	
  to	
  court	
  operations	
  officer,	
  

Darryl	
  Sanders	
  requesting	
  that	
  appellants’	
  three	
  outstanding	
  Motions	
  to	
  

Compel	
  Discovery	
  be	
  heard	
  before	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  No-­‐

Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  

Summary	
  Judgment	
  was	
  heard.34	
  	
  	
  Mr.	
  Sanders	
  was	
  also	
  copied	
  on	
  a	
  

series	
  of	
  emails	
  between	
  the	
  parties	
  in	
  which	
  appellants’	
  were	
  

attempting	
  to	
  get	
  the	
  appellee	
  to	
  agree	
  on	
  a	
  hearing	
  date	
  for	
  appellants’	
  

three	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  Discover	
  prior	
  to	
  a	
  Hearing	
  of	
  the	
  parties’	
  Cross	
  

Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment.35	
  	
  	
  

         All	
  disputed	
  court	
  dates	
  were	
  scheduled	
  in	
  the	
  exact	
  same	
  manner	
  

through	
  the	
  Court	
  Operations	
  Officer,	
  Darryl	
  Sanders	
  pursuant	
  to	
  emails	
  

throughout	
  this	
  case.36	
  	
  Mr.	
  Sanders	
  would	
  only	
  communicate	
  with	
  the	
  

parties	
  by	
  email,	
  which	
  copied	
  opposing	
  counsel,	
  because	
  of	
  his	
  belief	
  

that	
  an	
  oral	
  conversation	
  might	
  constitute	
  an	
  improper	
  ex	
  parte	
  

communication.37	
  

         Despite	
  appellants’	
  requests	
  Mr.	
  Sanders	
  testified	
  at	
  the	
  Hearing	
  

of	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips,	
  that	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  advise	
  

Judge	
  Phillips	
  of	
  appellants’	
  request	
  that	
  their	
  three	
  Motions	
  to	
  Compel	
  	
  

                                                       20.	
  

                                                          	
  
be	
  heard	
  prior	
  to	
  the	
  hearing	
  of	
  the	
  parties’	
  Cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  

Judgment.38	
  	
  	
  Further,	
  Mr.	
  Sanders	
  testified,	
  without	
  explanation,	
  that	
  he	
  

did	
  not	
  even	
  respond	
  to	
  either	
  appellants’	
  emails	
  requesting	
  a	
  Hearing	
  

of	
  their	
  three	
  Discovery	
  Motions,	
  before	
  the	
  hearing	
  of	
  the	
  parties’	
  Cross	
  

Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  judgment.	
  	
  After	
  instructing	
  counsel	
  to	
  

communicate	
  with	
  him	
  only	
  by	
  email	
  Mr.	
  Sanders’	
  testified	
  that	
  he	
  did	
  

respond	
  to	
  appellants’	
  crucial	
  emails.	
  	
  The	
  following	
  colloquy	
  is	
  

contained	
  in	
  one	
  email	
  to	
  Mr.	
  Sanders	
  testified	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  respond	
  to	
  or	
  

advise	
  the	
  court	
  of:	
  

	
        A.	
      I	
  mean,	
  I	
  have	
  one	
  that’s	
  to	
  you—I	
  mean,	
  I’m	
  sorry	
  .	
  	
  I	
  have	
  

one	
  September	
  9th	
  at	
  3:27	
  p.m.	
  where	
  it	
  is	
  copied	
  to	
  Mr.	
  Chamberlain.	
  	
  

And	
  you’re	
  indicating	
  in	
  the	
  e-­‐mail	
  that	
  –well,	
  can	
  I	
  just	
  read	
  the	
  e-­‐mail?	
  	
  

	
        Q.	
      Yes.	
  

	
        	
        	
         Mr.	
  Spears	
  I	
  think	
  it	
  is	
  short	
  enough,	
  Judge,	
  that	
  it	
  

wouldn’t	
  be	
  objectionable.	
  

	
        A.	
      It	
  says,	
  “Dear	
  Mr.	
  Sanders.	
  	
  Attorney	
  Campbell	
  would	
  give	
  

me	
  October	
  14	
  and	
  15	
  as	
  dates	
  he	
  is	
  available	
  for	
  hearing	
  on	
  the	
  above	
  

reference	
  motions.	
  	
  The	
  discovery	
  cutoff	
  is	
  September	
  30th,	
  is	
  the	
  

discovery	
  cutoff”,	
  period.	
  	
  “Therefore,	
  since	
  we	
  reserved	
  two	
  hours	
  on	
  	
  

                                                            21.	
  

                                                               	
  
September	
  15,	
  2014	
  for	
  the	
  parties’	
  motions	
  for	
  summary	
  judgment,	
  I	
  

thought	
  September	
  15,	
  2014.	
  	
  I	
  will	
  leave	
  to	
  the	
  court’s	
  discretion	
  as	
  the	
  

as	
  to	
  the	
  appropriate	
  date	
  for	
  the	
  hearing	
  on	
  the	
  above	
  motions.	
  	
  Please	
  

advise.	
  	
  Thank	
  you,	
  Wesley	
  Spears.”39	
  	
  The	
  testimony	
  of	
  Mr.	
  Sanders	
  

went	
  on:	
  

Q	
      You	
  ever	
  have	
  an	
  occasion,	
  (sic)	
  that	
  you	
  can	
  recall	
  where	
  

someone	
  asked	
  you	
  to	
  set	
  a	
  discovery	
  motion	
  before	
  a	
  summary	
  

judgment	
  motion	
  and	
  you	
  did	
  not	
  do	
  so?	
  

A.	
     In	
  this	
  cause	
  or	
  any	
  other	
  cause?	
  

Q.	
     Any	
  other	
  cause?	
  

A.	
     No.	
  

Q.	
     So	
  it	
  is	
  the	
  court’s	
  policy	
  to	
  hear	
  discovery	
  motions	
  before	
  

summary	
  judgment	
  motions?	
  

A.	
     It	
  can	
  be,	
  yes.	
  

Q.	
     It	
  can	
  be	
  or	
  it	
  is?	
  

A.	
     It	
  can	
  be,	
  yes.	
  

Q.	
     Well,	
  is	
  it	
  or	
  isn’t	
  it?	
  

A.	
     Well	
  it	
  depends	
  on	
  the	
  setting	
  party.	
  

	
  

                                                        22.	
  

                                                           	
  
Q.	
     Well,	
  no.	
  	
  I	
  am	
  asking,	
  isn’t	
  it	
  the	
  court’s	
  policy	
  to	
  hear	
  discovery	
  

motions	
  before	
  hearing	
  summary	
  judgment	
  motions?	
  

A.	
     Yes.	
  

Q.	
     And	
  in	
  this	
  case	
  there	
  were	
  three	
  outstanding	
  discover	
  motions	
  

that	
  were	
  pending	
  before	
  the	
  summary	
  judgment	
  motions.	
  	
  That’s	
  what	
  

those	
  emails	
  were	
  about	
  Correct?	
  

A.	
     I	
  believe	
  so.	
  

Q.	
     So	
  the	
  court	
  did	
  not	
  follow	
  its	
  own	
  policy	
  in	
  failing	
  to	
  hear	
  those	
  

motions	
  before	
  ruling	
  on	
  summary	
  judgment.	
  

A.	
     I	
  can’t—…	
  

There	
  was	
  a	
  serious	
  of	
  objections	
  and	
  the	
  questioning	
  continued:	
  

Q.	
     So	
  as	
  court	
  operations	
  officer,	
  you	
  don’t	
  know	
  if	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  practice	
  

that	
  discovery	
  motions	
  are	
  heard	
  before	
  summary	
  judgment	
  motions?	
  

A.	
     Well	
  there	
  can	
  be	
  moyiond—discovery	
  motions	
  before	
  summary	
  

judgment,	
  yes.	
  

Q.	
     And	
  have	
  you	
  ever	
  experienced	
  an	
  occasion	
  where	
  someone	
  asks	
  

for	
  a	
  discovery	
  motion	
  to	
  be	
  heard	
  before	
  summary	
  judgment	
  it	
  was	
  

denied	
  before	
  it	
  could	
  be	
  hear?	
  

A.	
     I	
  don’t	
  know	
  of	
  any.	
  

                                                          23.	
  

                                                             	
  
Q.	
      You	
  don’t	
  know	
  of	
  any	
  other	
  situation	
  where	
  that	
  has	
  occurred?	
  	
  

A.	
      No	
  sir….	
  

Q	
       So	
  you	
  would	
  not	
  dispute	
  if	
  I	
  testified	
  that	
  I	
  had	
  not	
  received	
  the	
  

instruction	
  because	
  you	
  don’t	
  recall	
  giving	
  them.	
  Correct?	
  

A.	
      That	
  would	
  be	
  true,	
  sir.	
  	
  I	
  can’t	
  I	
  don’t	
  have	
  anything.	
  

Q.	
      And	
  in	
  hindsight,	
  you	
  would	
  have	
  given	
  me	
  those	
  instructions	
  had	
  

you	
  realized	
  that	
  I	
  did	
  not	
  have	
  such	
  instructions?	
  

A.	
      If	
  I	
  had	
  been	
  the	
  one,	
  yes	
  sir.	
  

Q.	
      And	
  then	
  the	
  only	
  other	
  question	
  is,	
  again,	
  why	
  would	
  you	
  not	
  

respond	
  to	
  that	
  e-­‐mail?	
  

A.	
      I	
  don’t	
  have	
  answer	
  for	
  you,	
  sir.40	
  

          Mr.	
  Sanders	
  took	
  the	
  civil	
  equivalent	
  of	
  asserting	
  his	
  Fifth	
  

Amendment	
  privilege	
  against	
  self-­‐incrimination.	
  	
  He	
  scheduled	
  every	
  

Hearing	
  in	
  this	
  matter	
  that	
  was	
  not	
  set	
  by	
  the	
  Judge	
  in	
  court,	
  or	
  agreed	
  

to	
  by	
  the	
  parties,	
  pursuant	
  to	
  emails	
  from	
  the	
  parties.	
  	
  He	
  even	
  sent	
  an	
  

email	
  to	
  the	
  parties	
  requesting	
  that	
  the	
  parties	
  communicate	
  with	
  him	
  

by	
  email	
  with	
  copy	
  to	
  the	
  opposing	
  counsel.41	
  	
  The	
  parties	
  could	
  not	
  

agree	
  on	
  a	
  date	
  for	
  the	
  appellants’	
  First	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel.	
  	
  Counsel	
  for	
  

appellee	
  stated	
  to	
  Judge	
  Shepperd	
  that	
  Hearing	
  was	
  set	
  up	
  by	
  email	
  to	
  	
  

                                                                            24.	
  

                                                                     	
  
Mr.	
  Sanders.42	
  	
  Mr.	
  Sanders	
  also	
  testified	
  that	
  he	
  never	
  advised	
  counsel	
  

for	
  the	
  appellants	
  that	
  his	
  requests	
  were	
  not	
  proper	
  nor	
  did	
  he	
  have	
  an	
  

explanation	
  as	
  to	
  why	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  respond	
  to	
  appellants’	
  emails.43	
  	
  	
  	
  

               Mr.	
  Sanders	
  testified	
  that	
  he	
  was	
  not	
  aware	
  of	
  a	
  single	
  case,	
  other	
  

than	
  this	
  case,	
  in	
  which	
  the	
  court	
  did	
  not	
  hear	
  all	
  outstanding	
  discovery	
  

motions	
  before	
  ruling	
  on	
  motions	
  for	
  summary	
  judgment.	
  	
  Mr.	
  Sanders	
  

testified	
  he	
  had	
  no	
  answer	
  why	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  respond	
  to	
  counsel	
  for	
  the	
  

appellants’	
  emails.	
  	
  There	
  were	
  emails	
  addressed	
  directly	
  to	
  Mr.	
  Sanders	
  

and	
  several	
  others	
  he	
  was	
  copied	
  on	
  between	
  the	
  parties	
  because	
  the	
  

parties	
  could	
  not	
  agree	
  on	
  a	
  date	
  for	
  the	
  hearing	
  appellants’	
  three	
  

Discovery	
  Motions.	
  	
  	
  

               Mr.	
  Sanders	
  clearly	
  establishes	
  that	
  the	
  court	
  showed	
  bias	
  against	
  

appellants,	
  who	
  are	
  African	
  American,	
  in	
  favor	
  of	
  the	
  largest	
  private	
  

developer	
  in	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  Newland	
  Communities	
  who	
  is	
  in	
  control	
  

of	
  appellee	
  by	
  violating	
  the	
  court’s	
  policy	
  to	
  hear	
  discovery	
  motions	
  

before	
  deciding	
  motions	
  for	
  summary	
  judgment.	
  

               On	
  September	
  15,	
  2015,	
  the	
  court	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  convened	
  a	
  Hearing	
  

of	
  the	
  	
  

               	
  

                                                             25.	
  

                                                                	
  
parties	
  Cross-­‐Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  Counsel	
  for	
  the	
  

appellants	
  advised	
  the	
  court	
  of	
  appellants’	
  three	
  outstanding	
  Discovery	
  

Motions	
  and	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery.	
  	
  Appellants	
  

have	
  only	
  filed	
  one	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery	
  in	
  

this	
  matter.	
  	
  The	
  court	
  refused	
  to	
  hear	
  the	
  appellants’	
  Motions	
  to	
  

Compel,	
  because	
  despite	
  appellants’,	
  timely	
  requests	
  for	
  a	
  hearing	
  to	
  Mr.	
  

Sanders,	
  the	
  Court	
  Operations	
  Officer	
  did	
  not	
  schedule	
  the	
  Motions,	
  

which	
  the	
  court	
  used	
  as	
  an	
  excuse	
  for	
  not	
  hearing	
  them.	
  	
  

         Despite	
  the	
  anticipated	
  two	
  hours	
  to	
  hear	
  the	
  parties’	
  Cross	
  

Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  the	
  courtroom	
  was	
  full	
  of	
  lawyers’	
  with	
  

much	
  shorter	
  matters	
  waiting	
  to	
  be	
  heard.	
  	
  Other	
  than	
  a	
  one	
  minute	
  

hearing	
  at	
  the	
  beginning	
  of	
  the	
  call	
  of	
  cases,	
  appellants’	
  case	
  was	
  called	
  

before	
  all	
  other	
  matters.44	
  	
  

         Judge	
  Phillips	
  refused	
  to	
  recuse	
  himself,	
  after	
  appellants’	
  filed	
  a	
  

Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  and	
  the	
  matter	
  was	
  referred	
  to	
  the	
  

Administrative	
  Judge,	
  Billy	
  Ray	
  Stubblefield,	
  who	
  denied	
  the	
  appellants’	
  

first	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  because	
  it	
  did	
  not	
  request	
  an	
  immediate	
  Hearing.	
  	
  

Appellants’	
  filed	
  a	
  second	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse,	
  amending	
  the	
  original	
  	
  

                                                        26.	
  

                                                           	
  
motion	
  to	
  request	
  an	
  immediate	
  Hearing.	
  	
  	
  Again	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  refused	
  

to	
  recuse	
  himself	
  and	
  the	
  matter	
  was	
  again	
  assigned	
  to	
  the	
  

Administrative	
  Judge	
  Stubblefield.	
  	
  Judge	
  Stubblefield	
  assigned	
  the	
  

matter	
  for	
  a	
  Hearing	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  Judge	
  Wisser.	
  

	
       On	
  November	
  7,	
  2014,	
  Judge	
  Wisser	
  held	
  a	
  Hearing	
  of	
  appellants’	
  

Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips.	
  	
  	
  	
  During	
  the	
  Hearing,	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  

Court	
  reporter,	
  Cathy	
  Mata,	
  Court	
  Operations	
  Officer,	
  Darryl	
  Sanders,	
  

David	
  Campbell,	
  attorney	
  for	
  appellee	
  and	
  Wesley	
  Spears,	
  counsel	
  for	
  

appellant	
  testified	
  at	
  the	
  Hearing	
  of	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse.	
  	
  

         The	
  court	
  reporter,	
  Ms.	
  Cathy	
  Mata	
  testified	
  that	
  although	
  she	
  was	
  

on	
  the	
  record	
  for	
  the	
  first	
  matter	
  on	
  September	
  15,	
  2014,	
  which	
  lasted	
  

one	
  minute,	
  she	
  went	
  off	
  the	
  record	
  although	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  

announcement	
  that	
  the	
  court	
  was	
  going	
  off	
  the	
  record	
  or	
  that	
  the	
  

Summary	
  Judgment	
  Hearing	
  was	
  not	
  on	
  the	
  record.45	
  	
  The	
  court	
  

reporter,	
  Ms.	
  Mata	
  was	
  still	
  seated	
  in	
  her	
  court	
  reporter’s	
  station	
  

throughout	
  the	
  Hearing	
  of	
  the	
  parties’	
  Cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  

Judgment.46	
  	
  

         Counsel	
  for	
  Appellants	
  was	
  not	
  familiar	
  with	
  the	
  operations	
  of	
  this	
  

         	
  	
  

                                                        27.	
  

                                                           	
  
trial	
  court	
  since	
  this	
  was	
  the	
  first	
  time	
  he	
  had	
  ever	
  argued	
  a	
  Summary	
  

Judgment	
  Motion	
  in	
  this	
  Court,	
  therefore,	
  counsel	
  believed	
  the	
  Hearing	
  

of	
  the	
  parties’	
  Cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  was	
  on	
  the	
  record.	
  	
  	
  

Judge	
  Wisser	
  denied	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips.47	
  	
  

Appellants’	
  filed	
  a	
  Motion	
  for	
  New	
  Trial	
  and	
  a	
  Motion	
  for	
  

Reconsideration.	
  	
  The	
  court	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  denied	
  Appellants	
  Motion	
  for	
  

New	
  Trial	
  and/or	
  for	
  Reconsideration	
  on	
  December	
  1,	
  2014.	
  	
  

         	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

                                                          	
  

                                                          	
  

	
  

                                                       28.	
  

                                                          	
  
                                                 	
  
                               SUMMARY	
  OF	
  THE	
  ARGUMENT	
  
	
  
	
       The	
  trial	
  court	
  erred	
  by	
  denying	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  

Judgment	
  which	
  was	
  based	
  on	
  their	
  claim	
  that	
  the	
  subject	
  Violation	
  

Notice	
  was	
  defective	
  because	
  it	
  failed	
  to	
  provide	
  a	
  citation	
  to	
  the	
  specific	
  

deed	
  restriction(s)	
  the	
  appellants	
  were	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated.	
  	
  The	
  

Violation	
  Notice	
  was	
  also	
  defective	
  because	
  it	
  gave	
  a	
  cure	
  date	
  of	
  “before	
  

the	
  August	
  inspection”	
  even	
  though	
  the	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  was	
  dated	
  

October	
  22,	
  2013.	
  	
  The	
  appellee	
  held	
  a	
  Hearing	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  subject	
  

Violation	
  Notice	
  on	
  November	
  13,	
  2013.48	
  	
  	
  The	
  subject	
  Hearing	
  which	
  

was	
  based	
  on	
  a	
  defective	
  Notice	
  is	
  also	
  defective.	
  

	
       The	
  trial	
  court	
  also	
  erred	
  in	
  failing	
  to	
  grant	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  

Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  regarding	
  appellants’	
  claim	
  that	
  the	
  appellee	
  

was	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  §	
  209.005,	
  because	
  of	
  

appellee’s	
  failure	
  to	
  produce	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association.	
  

	
       The	
  court	
  also	
  erred	
  in	
  failing	
  to	
  hear	
  appellants’	
  three	
  Motions	
  to	
  

Compel	
  Discovery	
  and	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery	
  

before	
  granting	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  and	
  No-­‐Evidence	
  

Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  The	
  court	
  refused	
  to	
  hear	
  appellants’	
  Motions	
  	
  

                                                       29.	
  

                                                          	
  
finding	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  not	
  scheduled	
  for	
  the	
  day	
  of	
  the	
  hearing	
  of	
  the	
  	
  

parties’	
  Cross	
  Motion	
  s	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  	
  The	
  court	
  abused	
  it’s	
  

discretion	
  and/or	
  denied	
  appellants	
  due	
  process	
  and	
  violated	
  court’s	
  

policy,	
  as	
  the	
  Court	
  Operations	
  Officer	
  testified,	
  by	
  failing	
  to	
  hear	
  

appellants’	
  three	
  Discovery	
  Motions	
  and	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  

Complete	
  Discovery	
  before	
  granting	
  appellees’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  

and	
  No-­‐Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  

          The	
  appellants	
  also	
  alleged	
  a	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  DTPA	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  

the	
  false	
  and	
  misleading	
  written	
  statements	
  of	
  the	
  property	
  manager,	
  

Diane	
  Bottema,	
  representing	
  that	
  the	
  appellants’	
  were	
  not	
  entitled	
  to	
  a	
  

hearing	
  in	
  matters	
  of	
  clear	
  violations	
  because	
  the	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  

Association,	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  could	
  speak	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  the	
  Board.49	
  	
  Ranier	
  

Ficken	
  the	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  testified	
  at	
  his	
  deposition	
  that	
  

Ms.	
  Bottema’s	
  claim	
  that	
  he	
  could	
  speak	
  for	
  the	
  Board	
  of	
  the	
  appellee	
  on	
  

matters	
  of	
  clear	
  violations	
  was	
  false.50	
  	
  	
  

          Appellants	
  also	
  alleged	
  that	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  was	
  

subjected	
  voting	
  fraud	
  when	
  his	
  name	
  was	
  left	
  off	
  the	
  ballot	
  for	
  the	
  

election	
  of	
  neighborhood	
  representatives	
  on	
  or	
  about	
  June	
  7,	
  2014.	
  	
  This	
  

claim	
  only	
  existed	
  for	
  three	
  months	
  before	
  the	
  court	
  ruled	
  on	
  the	
  	
  

                                                                    30.	
  

                                                             	
  
parties’	
  Cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  

         The	
  court	
  erred	
  in	
  refusing	
  to	
  recuse	
  itself	
  based	
  on	
  it’s	
  refusal	
  to	
  

hear	
  appellants’	
  three	
  Motions	
  to	
  Compel	
  Discovery	
  and	
  Motion	
  for	
  

Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery	
  that	
  violated	
  court’s	
  policy	
  and	
  by	
  

showing	
  bias	
  against	
  the	
  appellants	
  by	
  refusing	
  to	
  allow	
  counsel	
  time	
  to	
  

argue,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  making	
  demeaning	
  remarks	
  to	
  counsel	
  for	
  appellants.	
  	
  

         The	
  trial	
  court’s	
  bias	
  was	
  also	
  demonstrated,	
  by	
  the	
  Court	
  verbally	
  

abusing	
  counsel	
  for	
  the	
  appellants,	
  giving	
  no	
  consideration	
  to	
  appellants	
  

arguments,	
  as	
  outlined	
  in	
  the	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse.51	
  	
  	
  	
  Even	
  the	
  

court	
  reporter,	
  Cathy	
  Mata,	
  testified	
  when	
  she	
  was	
  called	
  as	
  a	
  witness	
  by	
  

appellee’s	
  counsel,	
  that	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  does	
  raise	
  his	
  voice	
  and	
  is	
  

sarcastic.	
  	
  	
  Counsel	
  was	
  attempting	
  to	
  impeach,	
  appellants’,	
  Wesley	
  

Spears	
  testimony	
  that	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  was	
  shouting	
  at	
  him	
  and	
  acting	
  

sarcastically	
  toward	
  appellants’	
  counsel	
  at	
  the	
  Hearing.52	
  	
  As	
  an	
  example	
  

of	
  the	
  bias	
  shown	
  by	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  on	
  July	
  hearing	
  plaintiffs’	
  third	
  

Motion	
  to	
  Compel:	
  

         “Counsel	
  when	
  they	
  first	
  came	
  here	
  and	
  filed	
  their	
  Motion	
  for	
  

Summary	
  Judgment,	
  they	
  felt	
  there	
  wasn’t	
  any	
  discovery	
  that	
  was	
  	
  

         	
  

                                                        31.	
  

                                                           	
  
necessary	
  before	
  the	
  summary	
  judgments	
  motions	
  where	
  heard.	
  	
  	
  	
  I	
  now	
  	
  

agree	
  with	
  them…”	
  the	
  court	
  went	
  on	
  …	
  	
  The	
  court:	
  	
  And	
  if	
  you	
  asked	
  for	
  

that	
  before	
  file	
  a	
  lawsuit	
  you’d	
  have	
  them	
  in	
  your	
  hands	
  right	
  now.	
  	
  But	
  

once	
  you	
  file	
  a	
  lawsuit,	
  things	
  change….”53	
  The	
  Judge	
  also	
  made	
  a	
  

number	
  of	
  other	
  comments	
  which	
  counsel	
  for	
  the	
  appellant	
  felt	
  were	
  

derogatory.54	
  

          Finally,	
  the	
  court	
  Wisser,	
  J.,	
  erred	
  by	
  failing	
  to	
  grant	
  appellants’	
  

Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips.	
  	
  A	
  reasonable	
  person	
  presented	
  with	
  

the	
  facts	
  appellants	
  presented	
  to	
  the	
  court	
  would	
  lead	
  a	
  reasonable	
  

person	
  to	
  question	
  the	
  impartiality	
  of	
  Judge	
  Phillips.	
  	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  

rulings	
  were	
  so	
  clearly	
  against	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  laws	
  of	
  the	
  State	
  of	
  Texas	
  

and	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  to	
  constitute	
  bias.	
  	
  	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                           32.	
  

                                                              	
  
                                           ARGUMENT	
  
                                                      	
  
I.	
   Did	
  the	
  trial	
  court,	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  err	
  in	
  granting	
  appellee’s	
  
Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  and	
  No	
  Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  
denying	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  
Motion	
  for	
  New	
  Trial	
  
	
  
	
     Summary	
  Judgment	
  is	
  available	
  to	
  the	
  movant	
  only	
  when	
  the	
  

movant	
  establishes	
  that	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  genuine	
  issue	
  of	
  material	
  fact;	
  and	
  

that	
  the	
  movant	
  is	
  entitled	
  to	
  summary	
  judgment	
  as	
  a	
  mater	
  of	
  law.	
  	
  City	
  

of	
  Houston	
  v.	
  Clear	
  Creek	
  Basin	
  Authority,	
  589	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  671,	
  678	
  (Tex.	
  

1979).	
  	
  A	
  defendant/movant	
  is	
  entitled	
  to	
  summary	
  judgment	
  only	
  if	
  no	
  

evidence	
  exists	
  to	
  support	
  the	
  plaintiff’s	
  causes	
  of	
  action.	
  	
  Celotex	
  Corp.,	
  

v.	
  Catrett,	
  477	
  U.S.	
  317,	
  323-­‐324,	
  106	
  S.	
  Ct.	
  2548,	
  2553	
  (1986);	
  	
  See	
  Benitz	
  

v.	
  Gould	
  Group,	
  27	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  109,	
  112	
  9Tex.	
  	
  App.—San	
  Antonio	
  2000),	
  no	
  

writ).	
  	
  	
  

	
             Further	
  a	
  defendant	
  is	
  entitled	
  to	
  summary	
  judgment	
  only	
  if	
  he	
  

disproves,	
  as	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  law,	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  essential	
  elements	
  of	
  each	
  of	
  the	
  

plaintiffs’	
  causes	
  of	
  action.	
  	
  Lear	
  Siegler,	
  Inc.,	
  v.	
  Perez,	
  819	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  

470,471	
  (Tex.	
  1991).	
  	
  A	
  no-­‐evidence	
  summary	
  judgment	
  is	
  essentially	
  a	
  

pretrial	
  directed	
  verdict,	
  and	
  courts	
  apply	
  the	
  same	
  legal	
  sufficiency	
  

standard	
  in	
  reviewing	
  a	
  no-­‐evidence	
  summary	
  judgment	
  as	
  they	
  apply	
  	
  

                                                           33.	
  

                                                              	
  
in	
  reviewing	
  a	
  directed	
  verdict.	
  	
  Stephan	
  v.	
  Baylor	
  Med.	
  Ctr.	
  At	
  Garland,	
  

20	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  880,891	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Dallas	
  2000,	
  no	
  pet.);	
  Moore	
  v.	
  K-­‐Mart	
  

Corp.,	
  981	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  266,	
  269	
  (Tex.	
  App.—San	
  Antonio	
  1998,	
  pet.	
  denied).	
  	
  	
  

	
           Courts	
  are	
  to	
  consider	
  all	
  the	
  evidence	
  in	
  the	
  light	
  most	
  favorable	
  

to	
  the	
  party	
  against	
  whom	
  the	
  no-­‐evidence	
  summary	
  judgment	
  is	
  to	
  be	
  

rendered	
  disregarding	
  all	
  contrary	
  evidence	
  and	
  inferences.	
  	
  Stephan,	
  20	
  

S.W3d	
  at	
  887,	
  see	
  also,	
  Havner,	
  953	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  at	
  711.	
  	
  	
  	
  

	
           It	
  is	
  not	
  the	
  purpose	
  of	
  the	
  summary	
  judgment	
  rule	
  to	
  provide	
  

either	
  a	
  trial	
  by	
  deposition	
  or	
  a	
  trial	
  by	
  affidavit,	
  but	
  rather	
  to	
  provide	
  a	
  

method	
  of	
  summarily	
  terminating	
  a	
  case	
  when	
  it	
  clearly	
  appears	
  that	
  

only	
  a	
  question	
  of	
  law	
  is	
  involved	
  and	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  genuine	
  issue	
  of	
  fact.	
  	
  

See	
  Gaines	
  v.	
  Hamman,	
  163	
  Tex.	
  618,	
  626,	
  358	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  557,	
  563	
  (Tex.	
  

1962).	
  	
  	
  

	
           At	
  summary	
  judgment,	
  the	
  court	
  must	
  consider	
  all	
  the	
  non-­‐

movant’s	
  proof	
  is	
  true.	
  	
  Limestone	
  Products	
  Distributor	
  v.	
  McNamara,	
  71	
  

S.W.	
  3d	
  308,	
  310	
  (Tex.	
  2002);	
  M.D.	
  Anderson	
  Hospital,	
  Willrich,	
  28	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  

22,	
  23	
  (Tex.	
  2000);	
  Nixon	
  v.	
  Mr.	
  Property	
  Management,	
  Co.,	
  690	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  

546,	
  548-­‐549	
  (Tex.	
  1985).	
  	
  	
  

	
           Judge	
  Phillips	
  should	
  have	
  also	
  given	
  appellants	
  an	
  opportunity	
  to	
  	
  

                                                                 34.	
  

                                                                    	
  
amend	
  their	
  pleadings	
  to	
  cure	
  any	
  alleged	
  defects	
  in	
  the	
  pleadings.	
  	
  

Perry	
  v.	
  S.N.,	
  973	
  S.	
  W.	
  2d.	
  301,303	
  (Tex.	
  1998);	
  Horizon/CMS	
  Healthcare	
  

Corp.,	
  v.	
  Auld,	
  34	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  887,	
  897	
  (Tex.	
  2000);	
  Friesenhahn,	
  960	
  S.	
  W.	
  2d	
  

656,	
  654	
  (Tex.	
  1998).	
  	
  	
  

	
         At	
  summary	
  judgment,	
  the	
  court	
  must	
  consider	
  the	
  record	
  as	
  

whole,	
  viewing	
  the	
  summary	
  judgment	
  evidence	
  and	
  inferences	
  from	
  

such	
  evidence	
  and	
  giving	
  the	
  non-­‐movant	
  the	
  benefit	
  of	
  all	
  reasonable	
  

inferences	
  that	
  may	
  be	
  drawn	
  from	
  such	
  evidence.	
  	
  Nixon	
  v.	
  Property	
  

Management	
  Co.,	
  690	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  546,	
  548-­‐549	
  (Tex.	
  1985).	
  	
  

	
         At	
  summary	
  Judgment,	
  the	
  court	
  must	
  indulge	
  every	
  inference	
  in	
  

favor	
  of	
  the	
  non-­‐movant.	
  	
  M.D.	
  Anderson	
  Hospital	
  v.	
  Willirich,	
  28	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  

22,	
  23	
  (Tex.	
  2000);	
  Walker	
  v.	
  Harris,	
  924	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  375,	
  378	
  Tex.	
  1996);	
  	
  

Nixon	
  v.	
  Property	
  Management	
  Co.,	
  690	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  546,	
  548-­‐549	
  (Tex.	
  

1985).	
  

	
         A	
  motion	
  for	
  summary	
  judgment	
  should	
  be	
  denied	
  if	
  the	
  non-­‐

movant	
  produces	
  more	
  than	
  a	
  scintilla	
  of	
  evidence	
  thereby	
  raising	
  a	
  

genuine	
  issue	
  of	
  fact	
  as	
  to	
  an	
  essential	
  element	
  of	
  a	
  cause	
  of	
  action	
  of	
  

which	
  the	
  non-­‐movant	
  would	
  have	
  the	
  burden	
  of	
  proof	
  at	
  trial.	
  	
  See	
  

Estate	
  of	
  William	
  H.	
  Arlitt	
  v.	
  Paterson,	
  995	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  713,	
  717	
  (Tex.	
  App.—	
  

                                                           35.	
  

                                                             	
  
San	
  Antonio	
  1999),	
  rehearing	
  overruled).	
  	
  Evidence	
  is	
  more	
  than	
  a	
  	
  

scintilla	
  when	
  it	
  “rises	
  to	
  the	
  level	
  that	
  would	
  enable	
  reasonable	
  and	
  

fair-­‐minded	
  people	
  to	
  differ	
  in	
  their	
  conclusions”.	
  	
  Merrill	
  Dow	
  

Pharmaceuticals,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Havner,	
  953	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  706,	
  711	
  (Tex.	
  1997).	
  	
  	
  

	
             Evidence	
  is	
  less	
  than	
  a	
  scintilla	
  when	
  it	
  is	
  so	
  weak	
  as	
  to	
  do	
  no	
  

more	
  than	
  create	
  a	
  mere	
  surmise	
  or	
  suspicion	
  of	
  the	
  existence	
  of	
  fact.	
  	
  

Tex.	
  R.	
  Civ.	
  Proc.	
  166a;	
  Kindred	
  v.	
  Con/Chemical,	
  Inc.	
  650	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  61,	
  63	
  

(Tex.	
  1983);	
  Flamont	
  Design	
  v.	
  Pennzoil	
  Casplan,	
  994	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  830,	
  834	
  

(Tex.	
  App.—Houston	
  [1st	
  Dist.]	
  1999);	
  Jackson	
  v.	
  Fiesta	
  Mart,	
  979	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  

68,	
  70-­‐71	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Austin1998).	
  

        As	
  will	
  be	
  demonstrated,	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  No-­‐Evidence	
  and	
  

Traditional	
  Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  should	
  have	
  been	
  denied	
  and	
  

appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  

defective	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  and	
  the	
  other	
  reasons	
  stated	
  herein	
  should	
  

have	
  been	
  granted.	
  	
  	
  

        Appellants	
  received	
  a	
  first	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  bearing	
  the	
  signature	
  of	
  

Diane	
  Bottema,	
  the	
  property	
  manager,	
  which	
  indicated	
  that	
  the	
  lattice	
  	
  

        	
  

                                                                            36.	
  

                                                                     	
  
extension	
  that	
  appellants	
  installed	
  to	
  their	
  fence,	
  was	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  

rules	
  and/or	
  deed	
  restrictions	
  of	
  the	
  Association.	
  	
  By	
  e-­‐mail	
  appellants	
  

notified	
  the	
  property	
  manager	
  that	
  they	
  intended	
  to	
  ask	
  for	
  a	
  Hearing	
  

after	
  they	
  conducted	
  their	
  own	
  investigation.55	
  	
  

       By	
  e-­‐mail	
  the	
  property	
  manager	
  told	
  the	
  appellants	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  

not	
  entitled	
  to	
  a	
  Hearing	
  in	
  this	
  matter	
  because	
  in	
  matters	
  of	
  clear	
  

violations	
  the	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  could	
  act	
  for	
  the	
  Board	
  of	
  

Directors;	
  see	
  text	
  of	
  e-­‐mail	
  below:	
  

        “Yes	
  the	
  fence	
  in	
  the	
  attached	
  photo	
  needs	
  to	
  be	
  moved	
  forward	
  to	
  
       screen	
  the	
  pool	
  pump	
  and	
  the	
  lattice	
  removed	
  from	
  the	
  fence.	
  	
  In	
  a	
  
       situation	
  such	
  as	
  this,	
  the	
  Board	
  President	
  may	
  speak	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  
       the	
  Board	
  of	
  Directors	
  when	
  the	
  home	
  is	
  in	
  direct	
  violations	
  of	
  the	
  
       Deed	
  Restrictions.”56	
  	
  	
  

       Mr.	
  Ficken	
  testified	
  that	
  as	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  

have	
  authority	
  to	
  speak	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  the	
  Board.57	
  	
  Based	
  on	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  

false	
  and	
  deceptive	
  statements	
  the	
  appellants	
  removed	
  the	
  lattice	
  from	
  

the	
  fence	
  all	
  to	
  their	
  loss	
  and	
  damage	
  and	
  requested	
  a	
  meeting	
  with	
  the	
  

association	
  president,	
  Mr.	
  Ficken	
  and	
  Ms.	
  Bottema,	
  the	
  property	
  at	
  

appellants’	
  home	
  to	
  discuss	
  what	
  type	
  of	
  privacy	
  screen	
  could	
  be	
  built	
  	
  

       	
  

                                                        37.	
  

                                                            	
  
on	
  appellants’	
  property.	
  	
  No	
  Violation	
  Letters	
  were	
  issued	
  in	
  August,	
  

September	
  or	
  November	
  of	
  2013.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

On	
  October	
  22,	
  2013,	
  appellants	
  received	
  a	
  second	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  

stating	
  the	
  Privacy	
  Screen	
  as	
  rebuilt	
  violated	
  the	
  rules	
  and	
  deed	
  

restrictions	
  of	
  the	
  Association.58	
  	
  In	
  response	
  to	
  the	
  October	
  22,	
  2013,	
  

Second	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  the	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  sent	
  a	
  letter	
  to	
  the	
  

property	
  manager,	
  Diane	
  Bottema,	
  dated	
  October	
  23,	
  2013,	
  which	
  states	
  

in	
  pertinent	
  part:	
  

        “In	
  that	
  letter	
  you	
  cite	
  an	
  alleged	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  

Homeowners’	
  Association”:	
  

        “Improvement-­‐improvement	
  not	
  in	
  conformance	
  with	
  the	
  

        CCRs/Rules	
  of	
  the	
  association.	
  	
  	
  Comments:	
  	
  	
  	
  Lattice	
  work	
  on	
  top	
  of	
  

        the	
  fence	
  not	
  in	
  conformance	
  with	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  Community	
  HOA	
  

        guidelines…”59	
  	
  

        The	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  did	
  not	
  cite	
  the	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction	
  

appellant(s)	
  allegedly	
  violated.	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  subject	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  also	
  	
  

                                                            38.	
  

                                                                 	
  
provides	
  an	
  invalid	
  cure	
  date	
  of	
  “before	
  the	
  August	
  inspection”	
  even	
  

though	
  the	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  was	
  dated	
  October	
  22,	
  2013,	
  and	
  the	
  

Hearing	
  on	
  the	
  subject	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  was	
  held	
  on	
  November	
  11,	
  2013.	
  	
  	
  	
  

        In	
  regards	
  to	
  defective	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  as	
  outlined	
  in	
  Appellants’	
  

Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment,	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  and	
  the	
  

Bylaws	
  of	
  the	
  Association,	
  provide	
  that	
  in	
  order	
  for	
  a	
  Homeowner’s	
  

Association	
  to	
  take	
  enforcement	
  action	
  it	
  must	
  provide	
  the	
  homeowner	
  

with	
  Notice	
  that	
  provides	
  the	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction	
  that	
  the	
  

Homeowner	
  is	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated	
  and	
  to	
  provide	
  a	
  reasonable	
  cure	
  

date.	
  	
  	
  Appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  provided	
  in	
  pertinent	
  

part	
  as	
  follows	
  regarding	
  the	
  issue	
  of	
  defective	
  Violation	
  Notices:	
  

        	
  The	
  Second	
  Violation	
  Notice,	
  just	
  like	
  the	
  First	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  

does	
  not	
  cite	
  any	
  specific	
  rule(s)	
  and/or	
  deed	
  restriction(s)	
  that	
  the	
  

Association	
  claims	
  that	
  the	
  appellants	
  violated,	
  on	
  that	
  basis	
  alone	
  

appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  should	
  have	
  been	
  

granted.	
  	
  

        A	
  Hearing	
  of	
  the	
  subject	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  was	
  held	
  by	
  the	
  Board	
  of	
  

the	
  appellee,	
  on	
  November	
  11,	
  2013.	
  	
  The	
  matter	
  was	
  heard	
  by	
  two	
  	
  

                                                       39.	
  

                                                          	
  
directors,	
  Ranier	
  Ficken,	
  president	
  and	
  William	
  Meyers,	
  vice	
  president	
  

of	
  the	
  appellee,	
  who	
  are	
  also	
  both	
  high	
  ranking	
  employees	
  of	
  the	
  

Developer,	
  Newland	
  Communities.	
  	
  The	
  neighborhood	
  representative	
  on	
  

the	
  board	
  did	
  not	
  appear	
  or	
  vote	
  at	
  the	
  subject	
  hearing.	
  	
  	
  	
  

        The	
  Hearing	
  was	
  conducted	
  at	
  the	
  direction	
  of	
  Alex	
  Valdes,	
  an	
  

attorney	
  for	
  the	
  appellee.	
  	
  Mr.	
  Valdes	
  announced	
  the	
  decision	
  of	
  the	
  

Board,	
  on	
  November	
  26,	
  2013,	
  in	
  a	
  letter	
  to	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears,	
  

which	
  states	
  as	
  follows:	
  

	
  	
    “Upon	
  careful	
  consideration	
  of	
  all	
  the	
  facts	
  and	
  circumstances	
  
exercise	
  their	
  business	
  judgment	
  as	
  to	
  the	
  best	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  
Association,	
  the	
  Board	
  has	
  made	
  a	
  final	
  determination	
  regarding	
  your	
  
installation	
  of	
  improvements	
  and	
  modifications	
  that	
  were	
  not	
  approved	
  
by	
  the	
  Association.	
  	
  The	
  Board	
  hereby	
  reaffirms	
  and	
  upholds	
  it’s	
  
previous	
  decision	
  regarding	
  the	
  violation	
  set	
  forth	
  in	
  its	
  prior	
  
correspondence	
  to	
  you.”60	
  	
  
	
  
         Just	
  like	
  the	
  subject	
  Violation	
  Notice,	
  Attorney	
  Valdes’	
  letter	
  cites	
  

no	
  deed	
  restriction	
  that	
  appellants	
  were	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated	
  or	
  

upon	
  which	
  the	
  Board’s	
  decision	
  was	
  based.	
  	
  	
  The	
  decision	
  of	
  the	
  board	
  

of	
  the	
  Association	
  was	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  “business	
  judgment”	
  of	
  the	
  Board	
  of	
  	
  

Directors	
  of	
  the	
  Association.61	
  	
  

        Accordingly,	
  the	
  Hearing,	
  which	
  was	
  based	
  on	
  a	
  defective	
  Notice	
  	
  

                                                             40.	
  

                                                                	
  
and	
  which	
  cites	
  no	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction	
  upon	
  which	
  the	
  board’s	
  

ruling	
  was	
  based	
  was	
  invalid	
  as	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  law.	
  	
  The	
  only	
  valid	
  basis	
  for	
  

the	
  taking	
  the	
  enforcement	
  action	
  by	
  a	
  homeowners’	
  association	
  against	
  

a	
  homeowner	
  is	
  the	
  violation	
  of	
  a	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction.	
  	
  	
  

        A	
  “business	
  decision”	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  valid	
  basis	
  for	
  finding	
  the	
  appellants	
  

where	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  unspecified	
  deed	
  restrictions.	
  	
  In	
  fact,	
  the	
  Texas	
  

Property	
  Owners’	
  Protection	
  Act	
  was	
  intended	
  to	
  protect	
  homeowners’	
  

from	
  Homeowners’	
  Associations	
  from	
  exercising	
  of	
  business	
  judgments	
  

that	
  restricts	
  the	
  homeowners’	
  use	
  of	
  their	
  property,	
  based	
  on	
  any	
  

reason	
  other	
  than	
  the	
  violation	
  of	
  a	
  deed	
  restriction.	
  

          	
  (A)	
  THE	
  SUBJECT	
  NOTICE	
  OF	
  VIOLATION	
  IS	
  DEFECTIVE.	
  
          	
  
          The	
  subject	
  Notice	
  of	
  Violation,	
  which	
  was	
  sent	
  to	
  the	
  appellants,	
  

at	
  the	
  direction	
  of	
  appellee’s,	
  property	
  manager,	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  was	
  

defective	
  and	
  did	
  not	
  comply	
  with	
  the	
  requirements	
  of	
  Texas	
  Property	
  

Code	
  	
  § 209.006,	
  and	
  the	
  Bylaws	
  and	
  Rules	
  of	
  the	
  Association.62	
  

	
       The	
  Bylaws	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  provide	
  in	
  pertinent	
  part	
  as	
  
follows:	
  
	
  
         (a)	
   Notice.	
  	
  	
  Prior	
  to	
  the	
  imposition	
  of	
  any	
  sanction	
  hereunder,	
  
the	
  Board	
  or	
  its	
  delegate	
  shall	
  serve	
  the	
  alleged	
  violator	
  with	
  written	
  
notice	
  describing	
  (i)	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  alleged	
  violation,	
  (ii)	
  the	
  proposed	
  
sanction	
  to	
  be	
  imposed,	
  (iii)	
  a	
  period	
  of	
  not	
  less	
  than	
  the	
  (10)	
  days	
  	
  
                                                            41.	
  

                                                             	
  
within	
  which	
  the	
  alleged	
  violator	
  may	
  present	
  written	
  request	
  to	
  the	
  
Board	
  of	
  Directors	
  for	
  a	
  hearing;	
  and	
  (iv)	
  a	
  statement	
  that	
  the	
  proposed	
  
sanction	
  shall	
  be	
  imposed	
  as	
  contained	
  in	
  the	
  notice	
  unless	
  a	
  challenge	
  
is	
  begun	
  within	
  ten	
  days	
  (10)	
  days	
  of	
  the	
  notice.	
  	
  If	
  a	
  timely	
  challenge	
  is	
  
not	
  made,	
  the	
  sanction	
  stated	
  in	
  the	
  notice	
  shall	
  be	
  imposed.	
  
	
  
	
           (b)	
   Hearing.	
  	
  If	
  a	
  hearing	
  is	
  requested	
  within	
  the	
  allotted	
  ten	
  
(10)	
  day	
  period,	
  the	
  hearing	
  shall	
  be	
  held	
  in	
  executive	
  session	
  affording	
  
the	
  alleged	
  violator	
  a	
  reasonable	
  opportunity	
  to	
  be	
  heard.	
  	
  Prior	
  to	
  the	
  
effectiveness	
  of	
  any	
  sanction	
  hereunder,	
  proof	
  of	
  proper	
  notice	
  shall	
  be	
  
placed	
  in	
  the	
  minutes	
  of	
  the	
  meeting.	
  	
  Such	
  proof	
  shall	
  be	
  deemed	
  
adequate	
  if	
  a	
  copy	
  of	
  the	
  notice,	
  together	
  with	
  a	
  statement	
  of	
  the	
  date	
  
and	
  manner	
  of	
  delivery	
  is	
  entered	
  by	
  the	
  officer,	
  Director,	
  or	
  agent	
  who	
  
delivered	
  the	
  notice.	
  	
  The	
  notice	
  requirement	
  shall	
  be	
  deemed	
  satisfied	
  
if	
  the	
  alleged	
  violator	
  appears	
  at	
  the	
  meeting.	
  	
  The	
  minutes	
  of	
  the	
  
meeting	
  shall	
  contain	
  a	
  written	
  statement	
  of	
  the	
  results	
  of	
  the	
  hearing	
  
and	
  the	
  sanction,	
  if	
  any,	
  imposed.	
  	
  The	
  Board	
  of	
  Directors	
  may,	
  but	
  shall	
  
not	
  be	
  obligated	
  to,	
  suspend	
  any	
  proposed	
  sanction	
  if	
  the	
  violation	
  is	
  
cured	
  within	
  the	
  ten	
  (10)	
  day	
  period.	
  	
  	
  Such	
  suspension	
  shall	
  not	
  
constitute	
  a	
  waiver	
  of	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  sanction	
  future	
  violations	
  of	
  the	
  same	
  
or	
  other	
  provisions	
  and	
  rules	
  by	
  any	
  Person.63	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
             Appellants	
  did	
  not	
  appear	
  at	
  the	
  Hearing	
  because	
  the	
  Violation	
  

Notice	
  were	
  defective	
  and	
  failed	
  to	
  give	
  the	
  appellants’	
  adequate	
  notice	
  

of	
  the	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction	
  that	
  appellants’	
  were	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  

violated.	
  	
  Further,	
  the	
  bylaws	
  provided	
  that	
  a	
  homeowner	
  waives	
  notice,	
  

if	
  they	
  appear	
  at	
  the	
  Hearing,	
  so	
  appellants	
  did	
  not	
  appear	
  and,	
  	
  

therefore,	
  appellants	
  did	
  not	
  waive	
  proper	
  notice.	
  	
  

          The	
  Bylaws	
  require	
  the	
  Association	
  to	
  send	
  a	
  Notice,	
  which	
  	
  

                                                           42.	
  

                                                              	
  
provides	
  the	
  “nature”,	
  (emphasis	
  added)	
  of	
  the	
  alleged	
  violations.	
  	
  

Restrictive	
  covenants	
  are	
  subject	
  to	
  general	
  rules	
  of	
  construction.	
  	
  

Hodas	
  v.	
  Scenic	
  Oaks	
  Property	
  Ass’n,	
  47	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  747	
  (App.	
  4	
  Dist.	
  2000).	
  	
  	
  	
  

        Accordingly,	
  the	
  court	
  must	
  give	
  a	
  restrictive	
  covenant’s	
  words	
  and	
  

phrases	
  their	
  commonly	
  accepted	
  meaning.	
  	
  In	
  this	
  case,	
  the	
  by-­‐laws	
  of	
  

the	
  Association	
  requires	
  it	
  to	
  state	
  the	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction	
  and	
  rule	
  

that	
  the	
  appellants’	
  are	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated.	
  	
  The	
  explicit	
  language	
  of	
  

the	
  by-­‐laws	
  requires	
  the	
  Association	
  to	
  identify	
  the	
  “nature”	
  of	
  the	
  

violations,	
  which	
  requires	
  the	
  Association	
  to	
  identify	
  the	
  specific	
  deed	
  

restriction	
  the	
  appellants	
  were	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated.	
  	
  	
  

        The	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals,	
  in	
  Ashcreek	
  Homeowner’s	
  Association	
  	
  v.	
  

Smith,	
  902	
  S.W.2d	
  586	
  (App.	
  1	
  Dist.	
  1995),	
  the	
  leading	
  case	
  on	
  defective	
  

Notice(s)	
  under	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  as	
  it	
  relates	
  to	
  Homeowners’	
  

Associations	
  held	
  that	
  a	
  Notice	
  was	
  defective	
  and	
  a	
  Hearing	
  invalid	
  

because	
  of	
  the	
  Association’s	
  failure	
  to	
  identify	
  the	
  specific	
  deed	
  

restriction	
  the	
  homeowner’	
  was	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated.	
  	
  The	
  Ashcreek	
  

by-­‐laws,	
  which	
  the	
  court	
  interpreted,	
  were	
  almost	
  identical	
  to	
  the	
  By-­‐	
  

laws	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  in	
  this	
  case.64	
  	
  The	
  Court	
  in	
  the	
  Ashcreek	
  case	
  	
  

                                                            43.	
  

                                                               	
  
held,	
  that	
  the	
  Notice	
  of	
  Violation	
  must	
  cite	
  the	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction	
  

that	
  the	
  homeowner	
  is	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated	
  and	
  the	
  Association	
  must	
  

hold	
  a	
  Hearing	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  specific	
  provision	
  of	
  the	
  deed	
  restriction(s)	
  

the	
  homeowner	
  is	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated.	
  	
  	
  

           Therefore,	
  as	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  law	
  the	
  subject	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  was	
  

defective	
  because	
  the	
  failed	
  to	
  cite	
  the	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction(s)	
  

and/or	
  rule(s)	
  the	
  appellants	
  are	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated.	
  	
  Further,	
  the	
  

subject	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  also	
  failed	
  to	
  identify	
  a	
  specific	
  cure	
  date	
  simply	
  

saying	
  comply	
  before	
  the	
  “August	
  inspection”,	
  which	
  was	
  particularly	
  

invalid	
  in	
  regards	
  to	
  the	
  subject	
  Notice	
  of	
  Violation	
  which	
  is	
  dated	
  

October	
  22,	
  2013.65	
  	
  

           Even	
  if	
  the	
  Appellee	
  argues	
  that	
  no	
  cure	
  date	
  was	
  necessary	
  

because	
  this	
  was	
  a	
  second	
  violation,	
  once	
  the	
  subject	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  

provides	
  a	
  cure	
  date,	
  it	
  must	
  provide	
  a	
  valid	
  cure	
  date,	
  which	
  complies	
  

which	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code,	
  § 209.006,	
  and	
  the	
  bylaws	
  of	
  the	
  

Association.	
  	
  A	
  cure	
  date	
  of	
  before	
  the	
  August	
  inspection	
  for	
  a	
  violation	
  

that	
  allegedly	
  occurred	
  in	
  October	
  is	
  clearly	
  defective.	
  	
  

           	
  

    	
  

                                                           44.	
  

                                                           	
  
       Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  §	
  209.006	
  provides	
  that	
  Notice	
  is	
  Required	
  

Before	
  Enforcement	
  Action:	
  

       (a) Before	
  a	
  property	
  owners’	
  association	
  may	
  suspend	
  an	
  owner’s	
  
           right	
  to	
  use	
  a	
  common	
  area,	
  file	
  a	
  suit	
  against	
  an	
  owner	
  other	
  than	
  
           a	
  suit	
  to	
  collect	
  a	
  regular	
  or	
  special	
  assessment	
  or	
  foreclose	
  under	
  
           an	
  association’s	
  lien,	
  charge,	
  an	
  owner	
  for	
  property	
  damage	
  or	
  
           levy	
  a	
  fine	
  for	
  a	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  restrictions	
  or	
  bylaws	
  or	
  rules	
  of	
  
           the	
  association,	
  the	
  association	
  or	
  it’s	
  agent	
  must	
  give	
  written	
  
           notice	
  to	
  the	
  owner	
  by	
  certified	
  mail,	
  return	
  receipt	
  requested.	
  
	
  
       (b) 	
  The	
  notice	
  must:	
  
           	
  
           (1) describe	
  the	
  violation	
  or	
  property	
  damage	
  that	
  is	
  the	
  basis	
  for	
  
                 the	
  suspension,	
  action,	
  charge,	
  or	
  fine	
  and	
  state	
  the	
  amount	
  
                 due	
  the	
  association	
  from	
  the	
  owner,	
  and…	
  	
  
	
  
                           “While	
  a	
  restrictive	
  covenant	
  should	
  be	
  liberally	
  
            construed	
  to	
  give	
  effect	
  to	
  the	
  purpose	
  and	
  intent,	
  equitable	
  
            principles	
  require	
  that	
  covenants	
  restricting	
  free	
  use	
  of	
  land	
  
            which	
  give	
  rise	
  to	
  ambiguity	
  or	
  substantial	
  doubt	
  as	
  to	
  
            interpretation	
  be	
  construed	
  strictly	
  in	
  favor	
  of	
  the	
  homeowner	
  
            and	
  the	
  ambiguity	
  is	
  resolved	
  in	
  favor	
  of	
  the	
  free	
  and	
  unrestricted	
  
            use	
  of	
  the	
  premises.”	
  	
  Simon	
  Property	
  Group	
  (Texas)	
  L.P.	
  v.	
  May	
  
            Dept.	
  Stores	
  Co.,	
  943	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  64	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  Corpus	
  Christi	
  1997);	
  
            Macdonald	
  v.	
  Painter,	
  441	
  S.	
  W.	
  2d	
  179	
  (Tex.	
  1969);	
  J.	
  P.	
  Bdg.	
  
            Enterprises,	
  Inc.,	
  v.	
  Timberwood	
  Development	
  Co.,	
  718	
  S.	
  W.	
  2d	
  841	
  
            (Tex.	
  App.	
  Corpus	
  Christi	
  1986	
  ,	
  writ	
  refused	
  n.r.);	
  City	
  of	
  Pasadena	
  
            v.	
  Gennedy,	
  125	
  S.W.	
  687	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Houston	
  [14th	
  District]).	
  	
  
            Pheasant	
  Run	
  Homeowners	
  Ass’n,	
  Inc.,	
  v.	
  Kastor,	
  47	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  74	
  	
  (Tex.	
  
            App.	
  _	
  Houston	
  [14th	
  District])	
  2001;	
  Munson	
  v.	
  Milton,	
  948	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  
            813	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐	
  San	
  Antonio	
  1997).	
  	
  	
  	
  
                           	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
                           In	
  Davis	
  v.	
  Huey,	
  620	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  at	
  566,	
  the	
  Texas	
  Supreme	
  	
  

                                                                     45.	
  

                                                              	
  
Court	
  addressed	
  the	
  validity	
  of	
  covenant	
  requiring	
  submission	
  of	
  

construction	
  plans	
  to	
  an	
  “architectural	
  control	
  committee”,	
  while	
  

applying	
  Texas	
  common-­‐law	
  rules	
  of	
  construction.	
  	
  In	
  this	
  case,	
  the	
  

subdivision	
  developers	
  attempted	
  to	
  enjoin	
  Davies	
  from	
  building	
  a	
  

home	
  on	
  their	
  lot,	
  citing	
  a	
  refusal	
  of	
  the	
  architectural	
  control	
  

committee	
  to	
  approve	
  their	
  plan	
  for	
  construction.	
  	
  The	
  court	
  found	
  

that	
  the	
  developers	
  had	
  exceeded	
  their	
  authority,	
  and	
  determined	
  

that	
  the	
  restrict	
  covenant	
  was	
  void.	
  	
  Id.	
  at	
  566.	
  	
  	
  	
  

                  The	
  Texas	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  extended	
  the	
  rules	
  in	
  the	
  Davis	
  

  Case	
  in	
  Wilmoth	
  v.	
  Wilcox,	
  743	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  at	
  658.	
  	
  	
  

                      “The	
  court	
  again	
  employed	
  the	
  strict	
  construction	
  
  standard	
  requirements	
  established	
  in	
  the	
  Davis	
  case	
  to	
  construe	
  
  restrictive	
  covenants	
  strictly	
  against	
  the	
  party	
  seeking	
  to	
  enforce	
  
  it.	
  	
  Davis	
  and	
  its	
  progeny	
  provide	
  a	
  common-­‐law	
  strict	
  
  construction	
  of	
  restrictive	
  covenant	
  to	
  protect	
  property	
  owners	
  
  by	
  construing	
  covenants	
  with	
  ambiguous	
  language	
  in	
  favor	
  of	
  the	
  
  free	
  and	
  unrestricted	
  use	
  of	
  real	
  property.	
  	
  In	
  1987,	
  the	
  Texas	
  
  legislature	
  enacted	
  chapter	
  202	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code.	
  This	
  
  chapter	
  was	
  intended	
  to	
  create	
  a	
  mechanism	
  for	
  developers	
  and	
  
  property	
  owner	
  associations	
  to	
  enforce	
  restrictive	
  covenants.”	
  
              	
  
    In	
  the	
  Ashcreek	
  case	
  the	
  court	
  stated:	
  
    	
  
    	
   “This	
  Court	
  recently	
  addressed	
  this	
  issue	
  in	
  Crispin	
  v.	
  Paragan	
  
                   Home,	
  Inc.,	
  888	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  78	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐Houston	
  [1st	
  Dist.]	
  
                   1994,	
  writ	
  denied.)	
  	
  There	
  we	
  concluded	
  that:	
  
    	
  
                                                                 46.	
  
                                                                  	
  

                                                            	
  
                         We	
  are	
  unable	
  to	
  discern	
  a	
  conflict	
  between	
  liberally	
  
                         construing	
  a	
  restrictive	
  covenant	
  to	
  give	
  effect	
  to	
  its	
  
                         purpose,	
  and	
  construing	
  a	
  restrictive	
  covenant	
  either	
  in	
  
                         favor	
  of	
  the	
  free	
  and	
  unrestricted	
  use	
  of	
  land	
  or	
  to	
  strictly	
  
                         construe	
  it	
  against	
  a	
  party	
  seeking	
  enforce	
  it	
  	
  
                         Furthermore,	
  section	
  201.003(a)	
  was	
  effective…	
  	
  The	
  
                         supreme	
  court	
  in	
  Wilmoth	
  on	
  July	
  1,	
  1987,	
  and	
  denied	
  a	
  
                         motion	
  for	
  rehearing	
  on	
  September	
  16,	
  1987.	
  	
  In	
  its	
  
                         decision,	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  also	
  failed	
  to	
  recognize	
  that	
  
                         the	
  property	
  code	
  had	
  overruled	
  the	
  principles	
  upon	
  
                         which	
  relied.	
  
                                          	
  
	
        Id.	
  At	
  81,	
  n.1.	
  
	
  
        In	
  this	
  case,	
  appellants	
  were	
  not	
  given	
  any	
  indication	
  of	
  what	
  

specific	
  deed	
  restriction	
  they	
  are	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated	
  and,	
  thus	
  

appellants	
  were	
  denied	
  legal	
  Notice	
  and	
  a	
  fair	
  Hearing.	
  	
  The	
  court’s	
  

ruling	
  in	
  Ashcreek	
  reiterates	
  a	
  simply	
  principle	
  that	
  before	
  a	
  

homeowner’	
  can	
  be	
  found	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  deed	
  restriction(s)	
  of	
  the	
  

Association	
  they	
  must	
  receive	
  Notice	
  of	
  the	
  specific	
  provision	
  of	
  	
  

the	
  deed	
  restriction(s)	
  they	
  are	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated	
  and	
  they	
  must	
  

be	
  given	
  a	
  fair	
  Hearing	
  based	
  on	
  the	
  specific	
  deed	
  restriction	
  the	
  

homeowner’	
  is	
  alleged	
  to	
  have	
  violated.	
  	
  	
  	
  

        In	
  this	
  case,	
  the	
  appellee	
  clearly	
  based	
  its	
  decision	
  on	
  a	
  business	
  

decision	
  and	
  said	
  so	
  in	
  a	
  letter	
  from	
  their	
  counsel	
  announcing	
  the	
  

decision	
  of	
  the	
  Board.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Board’s	
  decision	
  was	
  based	
  on	
  a	
  “business	
  	
  

                                                          47.	
  

                                                             	
  
decision”	
  as	
  to	
  the	
  best	
  interests	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  (in	
  other	
  words	
  the	
  

best	
  interest	
  of	
  the	
  developer,	
  Newland	
  Properties,	
  who	
  the	
  only	
  voting	
  

members	
  of	
  the	
  Board	
  worked	
  for),	
  not	
  because	
  a	
  violation	
  of	
  a	
  deed	
  

restriction.	
  	
  	
  

         The	
  appellants	
  were	
  denied	
  their	
  most	
  basic	
  rights,	
  that	
  of	
  

reasonable	
  Notice	
  and	
  a	
  fair	
  Hearing	
  with	
  a	
  reasonable	
  opportunity	
  to	
  

be	
  heard	
  and	
  present	
  evidence,	
  “due	
  process”.	
  	
  Allowing	
  a	
  homeowners’	
  

association	
  to	
  take	
  enforcement	
  action	
  without	
  giving	
  a	
  homeowners	
  

specific	
  notice	
  of	
  the	
  deed	
  restriction	
  that	
  it	
  claimed	
  the	
  homeowner	
  

violated	
  is	
  a	
  denial	
  of	
  due	
  process.	
  	
  	
  	
  It	
  would	
  be	
  akin	
  to	
  charging	
  a	
  

person	
  with	
  a	
  crime	
  and	
  not	
  telling	
  them	
  what	
  offense	
  they	
  were	
  

charged	
  with.	
  

   	
  (B)	
  APPELLEE	
  VIOLATED	
  TEXAS	
  PROPERTY	
  CODE	
  209.005	
  
AND	
  REFUSED	
  TO	
  PRODUCE	
  RELEVANT	
  DOCUMENTS	
  TO	
  WHICH	
  
APPELLANTS	
  WERE	
  ENTITLED	
  TO	
  OBTAIN	
  BY	
  STATUTE	
  
   	
  
   Appellee	
  has	
  violated	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  	
  § 209.005,	
  by	
  failing	
  

to	
  provide	
  appellants	
  with	
  the	
  properly	
  requested	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  

appellee.	
  	
  Appellants’	
  have	
  made	
  numerous	
  requests	
  pursuant	
  to	
  Texas	
  

Property	
  Code	
  	
  § 209.005,	
  for	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association.66	
  	
  As	
  part	
  of	
  	
  

                                                               48.	
  

                                                                  	
  
appellee’s	
  dilatory	
  strategy,	
  counsel	
  for	
  appellee	
  objected	
  to	
  producing	
  

the	
  records	
  primarily	
  arguing	
  that	
  since	
  suit	
  has	
  been	
  filed	
  all	
  requests	
  

for	
  documents	
  must	
  be	
  made	
  by	
  a	
  formal	
  document	
  requests.67	
  	
  

         Appellants	
  are	
  unaware	
  of	
  any	
  legal	
  authority,	
  which	
  suspends	
  

appellee’s	
  obligations	
  under	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  	
  § 209.005,	
  to	
  make	
  

the	
  books	
  and	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  reasonably	
  available	
  to	
  

homeowners’	
  after	
  they	
  have	
  filed	
  suit.	
  	
  	
  

         Texas	
  Property	
  	
  § 209.005	
  in	
  pertinent	
  part	
  provides:	
  

    (c) Notwithstanding	
  a	
  provision	
  in	
  a	
  dedicatory	
  instrument,	
  a	
  
        property	
  owners’	
  association	
  shall	
  make	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  records	
  of	
  
        the	
  association,	
  including	
  financial	
  records,	
  open	
  to	
  and	
  
        reasonably	
  available	
  to	
  for	
  examination	
  by	
  an	
  owner,	
  or	
  a	
  person	
  
        designated	
  in	
  a	
  writing	
  signed	
  by	
  the	
  owner	
  as	
  the	
  owners’	
  agent,	
  
        attorney,	
  or	
  certified	
  public	
  accountant,	
  in	
  accordance	
  with	
  this	
  
        section.	
  	
  An	
  owner	
  is	
  entitled	
  to	
  obtain	
  from	
  the	
  association	
  
        copies	
  of	
  information	
  contained	
  in	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  records…	
  
        	
  
   (i)       ….An	
  Association	
  may	
  not	
  charge	
  an	
  owner	
  for	
  the	
  compilation,	
  
             production,	
  or	
  reproduction	
  of	
  information	
  requested	
  under	
  
             this	
  section	
  unless	
  the	
  policy	
  prescribing	
  those	
  costs	
  has	
  been	
  
             recorded	
  as	
  required	
  by	
  this	
  subsection.	
  
             	
  
      The	
  appellee	
  is	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  § 209.005,	
  	
  

because	
  of	
  its	
  failure	
  to	
  produce	
  any	
  records	
  pursuant	
  to	
  appellants’	
  	
  

many	
  requests	
  for	
  the	
  production	
  records.	
  	
  	
  Appellants’	
  first	
  request	
  	
  

                                                        49.	
  

                                                           	
  
sent,	
  pursuant	
  to	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code,	
  was	
  dated	
  December	
  9,	
  2013,	
  

and	
  was	
  sent	
  to	
  the	
  Appellee	
  by	
  certified	
  mail.	
  	
  	
  

        The	
  letter	
  requested	
  a	
  summary	
  of	
  the	
  dedicatory	
  violation	
  history	
  

of	
  the	
  Association,	
  with	
  confidential	
  information	
  redacted	
  as	
  specifically	
  

provided	
  in	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  	
  § 209.005.68	
  	
  	
  The	
  Appellee	
  has	
  refused	
  

to	
  provide	
  any	
  records	
  pursuant	
  to	
  appellants’	
  five	
  requests	
  for	
  

documents	
  pursuant	
  to	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  §	
  209.005.69	
  	
  The	
  appellee	
  

has	
  never	
  communicated	
  to	
  the	
  appellants	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  unable	
  to	
  

produce	
  the	
  records	
  as	
  required	
  by,	
  	
  § 209.005	
  (f)(1)(2)	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  

Property	
  Code.	
  	
  

        The	
  appellee	
  and	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  took	
  the	
  position	
  that	
  the	
  Texas	
  

Property	
  Code	
  is	
  not	
  applicable	
  after	
  appellants	
  filed	
  suit	
  with	
  regards	
  

to	
  the	
  Association’s	
  obligation	
  to	
  make	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  

Association	
  reasonably	
  available	
  to	
  appellants.70	
  	
  The	
  court	
  Phillips	
  J.,	
  

went	
  so	
  far	
  as	
  to	
  say	
  that	
  appellants	
  should	
  have	
  obtained	
  the	
  records	
  

before	
  filing	
  suit.71	
  

        In	
  fact,	
  the	
  limited	
  authority	
  discovered	
  by	
  appellants’	
  counsel,	
  

suggests	
  that	
  the	
  statutory	
  rights	
  of	
  the	
  appellants	
  to	
  records	
  of	
  appellee	
  	
  

                                                            50.	
  

                                                               	
  
do	
  not	
  change	
  after	
  suit	
  is	
  filed.	
  	
  Appellee	
  has	
  refused	
  to	
  produce	
  

documents	
  requested	
  pursuant	
  to	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  requests	
  that	
  Appellants’	
  

have	
  made	
  pursuant	
  to	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code,	
  § 209.005,	
  saying	
  while	
  

this	
  matter	
  is	
  in	
  litigation	
  any	
  requests	
  for	
  documents	
  must	
  be	
  made	
  as	
  

a	
  formal	
  document	
  request.72	
  	
  

       From	
  December	
  9,	
  2013,	
  until	
  the	
  parties’	
  Cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  

Summary	
  Judgment	
  the	
  appellants’	
  have	
  made	
  several	
  other	
  Formal	
  

Discovery	
  Requests	
  for	
  records	
  which	
  complies	
  with	
  Texas	
  Property	
  

Code	
  	
  § 209.005	
  and	
  the	
  Association	
  has	
  failed	
  to	
  follow	
  the	
  procedure	
  

laid	
  out	
  in	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  § 209.005,	
  and	
  simply	
  refused	
  to	
  provide	
  

the	
  requested	
  information.73	
  	
  

       Appellants’	
  first	
  formal	
  request	
  dated	
  December	
  9,	
  2013,	
  was	
  

contained	
  in	
  a	
  certified	
  letter	
  to	
  Diane	
  Bottema,	
  property	
  manager,	
  

requested:	
  

        “I	
  am	
  again	
  requesting	
  a	
  copy	
  of	
  the	
  dedicatory	
  violation	
  history	
  of	
  
the	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  Community	
  Association.	
  	
  I	
  am	
  also	
  requesting	
  a	
  
summary	
  of	
  the	
  fines	
  imposed	
  for	
  each	
  violation	
  identified.	
  	
  To	
  be	
  
perfectly	
  clear,	
  I	
  am	
  not	
  seeking	
  the	
  identity	
  or	
  names	
  and	
  addresses	
  of	
  
the	
  Homeowners’	
  involved.	
  	
  I	
  agree	
  any	
  information	
  regarding	
  the	
  
identity	
  of	
  homeowners	
  may	
  be	
  redacted	
  or	
  otherwise	
  deleted.”74	
  	
  	
  
                                                            	
  
                                                            	
  
                                                        51.	
  

                                                           	
  
        In	
  response	
  to	
  that	
  request	
  appellants	
  were	
  advised	
  pursuant	
  to	
  a	
  

letter	
  dated	
  January	
  13,	
  2013,	
  letter	
  from	
  an	
  attorney	
  who	
  represented	
  

the	
  Association:	
  

       “The	
  Association	
  will	
  comply	
  with	
  all	
  lawful	
  requests	
  for	
  
  documents	
  submitted	
  under	
  the	
  Property	
  Code.	
  	
  Under	
  Texas	
  
  Property	
  Code	
  	
  § 209.005,	
  certain	
  records	
  must	
  be	
  made	
  available;	
  
  however,	
  a	
  property	
  owners’	
  association	
  “is	
  not	
  required	
  to	
  release	
  or	
  
  allow	
  inspection	
  of	
  any	
  books	
  or	
  records	
  that	
  identify	
  the	
  dedicatory	
  
  instrument	
  violation	
  history	
  of	
  an	
  individual	
  owner	
  of	
  an	
  association.”	
  
  	
  
       “To	
  the	
  extent	
  that	
  you	
  wish	
  for	
  a	
  summary	
  of	
  information.	
  	
  I	
  
believe	
  that	
  should	
  be	
  requested	
  through	
  an	
  interrogatory	
  now	
  that	
  this	
  
matter	
  is	
  in	
  litigation	
  and	
  the	
  parties	
  are	
  conducting	
  discovery.	
  	
  To	
  the	
  
extent	
  that	
  your	
  letter	
  constitutes	
  a	
  discovery	
  request,	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  
Community	
  Association	
  objects	
  to	
  the	
  discovery	
  request,	
  as	
  vague,	
  
overbroad,	
  unduly	
  burdensome,	
  and	
  seeking	
  information	
  that	
  is	
  neither	
  
relevant	
  nor	
  likely	
  to	
  lead	
  to	
  the	
  discovery	
  of	
  any	
  relevant	
  or	
  admissible	
  
evidence.	
  	
  In	
  addition,	
  objection	
  is	
  made	
  insofar	
  as	
  the	
  requests	
  (sic)	
  
seek	
  information	
  that	
  is	
  confidential	
  under	
  Texas	
  law”.75	
  	
  
       	
  
       Appellants’	
  request	
  for	
  production	
  of	
  a	
  summary	
  dedicatory	
  

violation	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  Association,	
  with	
  all	
  confidential	
  information	
  

redacted	
  was	
  entirely	
  consistent	
  with	
  Tex.	
  Prop.	
  Code	
  §	
  209.005.	
  	
  On	
  May	
  

23,	
  2014,	
  appellants’	
  sent	
  a	
  letter	
  certified	
  mail	
  to	
  counsel	
  for	
  appellee	
  

asking	
  for	
  copies	
  of	
  all	
  financial	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association.76	
  	
  	
  	
  

Appellants’	
  received	
  the	
  following	
  response	
  to	
  that	
  request	
  pursuant	
  to	
  

a	
  letter	
  from	
  David	
  Campbell	
  dated	
  June	
  10,	
  2014:	
  

                                                           52.	
  

                                                              	
  
        “I	
  write	
  this	
  correspondence	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  your	
  letter	
  dated	
  May	
  
23,	
  2014,	
  in	
  which	
  you	
  state	
  that	
  you	
  “wish	
  to	
  get	
  copies	
  of	
  the	
  financial	
  
records”	
  of	
  appellee,	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  Community	
  Association.	
  	
  	
  Any	
  
requests	
  for	
  documents	
  should	
  be	
  submitted	
  as	
  a	
  formal	
  discovery	
  
requests	
  as	
  this	
  matter	
  is	
  in	
  litigation.	
  	
  After	
  receiving	
  your	
  letter,	
  we	
  
have	
  received	
  a	
  request	
  for	
  production	
  “any	
  and	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  
records	
  of	
  the	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  Community	
  Association,	
  including	
  but	
  not	
  
limited	
  to	
  all	
  financial	
  records….”	
  	
  Defendant	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  Community	
  
Association	
  will	
  respond	
  to	
  this	
  discovery	
  request	
  pursuant	
  the	
  Texas	
  
Rules	
  of	
  Civil	
  Procedure.77	
  	
  	
  
	
  
        On	
  June	
  12,	
  2014,	
  appellants’	
  sent	
  a	
  certified	
  letter	
  to	
  Diane	
  

Bottema,	
  Property	
  Manager	
  for	
  the	
  Association	
  requesting	
  the	
  following	
  

documents:	
  

       “I	
  hereby	
  requests	
  copies	
  of	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  

Falcon	
  Pointe	
  Community	
  Association	
  pursuant	
  to	
  the	
  Texas	
  Property	
  

Code”.78	
  

         Appellants’	
  received	
  the	
  following	
  reply	
  to	
  that	
  request	
  in	
  

pertinent	
  part:	
  

         “As	
  this	
  matter	
  is	
  in	
  litigation,	
  all	
  requests	
  for	
  documents	
  should	
  

be	
  submitted	
  as	
  a	
  formal	
  discovery	
  request	
  to	
  the	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  	
  

Community	
  association	
  (“Falcon	
  Pointe”)	
  through	
  it’s	
  counsel.”79	
  	
  	
  

	
        	
  By	
  letter	
  dated	
  June	
  20,	
  2014,	
  appellee	
  reiterated	
  its	
  position	
  that	
  

any	
  request	
  for	
  documents	
  had	
  to	
  be	
  made	
  by	
  formal	
  document	
  	
  

                                                         53.	
  

                                                            	
  
request.80	
  	
  Appellee’s	
  attorneys’	
  have	
  also	
  requested	
  that	
  appellants	
  

make	
  discovery	
  requests	
  formally	
  in	
  court.81	
  	
  The	
  only	
  documents	
  

appellee’s	
  have	
  released	
  to	
  appellants	
  were	
  a	
  copy	
  of	
  it’s	
  policy	
  of	
  

insurance,	
  and	
  less	
  than	
  twenty	
  pages	
  of	
  minutes	
  of	
  irrelevant	
  board	
  

meetings	
  and	
  two	
  Budgets.	
  	
  	
  Those	
  documents	
  were	
  produced	
  by	
  Ranier	
  

Ficken,	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  pursuant	
  to	
  the	
  Notice	
  to	
  take	
  his	
  

Deposition	
  Duces	
  Tecum	
  that	
  requested	
  virtually	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  records	
  of	
  

the	
  Association.82	
  	
  

       Those	
  documents	
  were	
  produced	
  pursuant	
  to	
  the	
  Notice	
  to	
  Take	
  

the	
  Deposition	
  Duces	
  Tecum,	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken,	
  the	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  

Association.	
  	
  Appellee	
  has	
  refused	
  to	
  produce	
  any	
  correspondence	
  

between	
  the	
  parties	
  or	
  any	
  other	
  document	
  relevant	
  to	
  this	
  case.	
  	
  The	
  

appellee	
  even	
  refused	
  to	
  produce	
  copies	
  of	
  the	
  subject	
  Violation	
  Notice.	
  

       Appellants	
  have	
  requested	
  formal	
  discovery	
  in	
  the	
  form	
  of	
  

Requests	
  for	
  Production	
  of	
  Documents	
  and	
  Notice	
  to	
  take	
  Depositions	
  	
  

Duces	
  Tecum.	
  	
  Appellants	
  have	
  requested	
  copies	
  of	
  all	
  books	
  and	
  	
  

records	
  of	
  the	
  Association.	
  The	
  attorney	
  for	
  the	
  appellee	
  indicated	
  that	
  

appellee	
  would	
  not	
  comply	
  with	
  future	
  requests	
  for	
  documents	
  unless	
  	
  

	
  

                                                       54.	
  

                                                          	
  
they	
  were	
  submitted	
  and	
  ordered	
  through	
  the	
  court	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  Texas	
  

Property	
  Code	
  §	
  	
  209.005.83	
  	
  	
  

        Appellants’	
  requests	
  were	
  made	
  to	
  the	
  appellee	
  pursuant	
  to	
  Texas	
  

Property	
  Code,	
  §	
  209.005	
  which	
  grants	
  to	
  the	
  appellants	
  a	
  statutory	
  right	
  

to	
  the	
  requested	
  documents.	
  	
  Appellee	
  cannot	
  escape	
  its	
  responsibilities	
  

under	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  § 209.005,	
  by	
  relying	
  on	
  the	
  claim	
  that	
  once	
  

appellants’	
  filed	
  suit	
  they	
  must	
  make	
  a	
  formal	
  discovery	
  requests	
  to	
  

obtain	
  the	
  requested	
  documents	
  and	
  then	
  appellee	
  is	
  free	
  to	
  assert	
  

standard	
  discovery	
  objection	
  to	
  the	
  production.	
  	
  	
  

        The	
  appellee	
  has	
  circumvented	
  the	
  rights	
  granted	
  homeowners’	
  

under	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  §	
  209.005.	
  	
  The	
  books	
  and	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  

Association	
  belong	
  to	
  the	
  homeowners’	
  of	
  the	
  Association,	
  and	
  

therefore,	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  evidence	
  do	
  not	
  effect	
  the	
  obligation	
  of	
  the	
  

appellee	
  to	
  release	
  records	
  requested	
  pursuant	
  to	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code§

209.005.	
  	
  	
  The	
  appellants	
  have	
  made	
  numerous	
  formal	
  requests	
  under	
  

Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  § 209.005,	
  after	
  filing	
  suit	
  in	
  this	
  matter,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  	
  

numerous	
  discovery	
  requests.	
  	
  	
  

        The	
  appellee	
  has	
  refused	
  to	
  produce	
  the	
  requested	
  documents	
  	
  

                                                          55.	
  

                                                           	
  
responding	
  by	
  saying	
  since	
  suit	
  has	
  been	
  filed,	
  appellants	
  must	
  make	
  an	
  

official	
  document	
  request	
  in	
  the	
  lawsuit	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  obtain	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  

records	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  and	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  must	
  order	
  the	
  same.	
  	
  

Appellee	
  is	
  basically	
  saying	
  any	
  homeowner’	
  except	
  the	
  appellants	
  are	
  

entitled	
  to	
  copies	
  of	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association,	
  because	
  

they	
  filed	
  suit.	
  	
  	
  

          Homeowners’	
  who	
  have	
  filed	
  suit	
  are	
  the	
  homeowners’	
  who	
  need	
  

the	
  books	
  and	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  the	
  most.	
  	
  Appellee	
  should	
  

have	
  been	
  found	
  by	
  the	
  trial	
  court,	
  as	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  law	
  to	
  have	
  violated	
  

Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  	
  §	
  209.005,	
  for	
  failing	
  to	
  produce	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  

records	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  pursuant	
  to	
  appellants’	
  many	
  requests	
  

enumerated	
  above.	
  	
  	
  

             The	
  trial	
  court	
  should	
  have	
  also	
  granted	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  

Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  denied	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  

and	
  No-­‐Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  Further	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  refused	
  to	
  

hear	
  appellants’	
  three	
  Motions	
  to	
  Compel	
  the	
  production	
  of	
  documents	
  

and	
  witnesses	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  its’	
  	
  

own	
  policy.	
  	
  

                                                                   56.	
  

                                                            	
  
         In	
  Burton	
  v.	
  Cravey,	
  759	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  160	
  (Houston	
  1st	
  District	
  1988):	
  

The	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals,	
  Duggan,	
  J.,	
  held	
  absent	
  proof	
  by	
  association	
  of	
  

improper	
  purpose	
  for	
  inspecting	
  records,	
  owners	
  were	
  entitled	
  to	
  

inspect	
  all	
  pertinent	
  records	
  including	
  those	
  of	
  association’s	
  attorney.	
  	
  

In	
  this	
  case,	
  appellants’	
  numerous	
  requests	
  for	
  documents	
  were	
  

necessary	
  in	
  order	
  for	
  the	
  appellants	
  to	
  prosecute	
  their	
  Declaratory	
  

Judgment	
  Action,	
  which	
  included	
  claims	
  of	
  deceptive	
  trade	
  practices.84	
  	
  

         In	
  the	
  Burton	
  case	
  the	
  court,	
  rejected	
  appellee’s	
  argument	
  that	
  the	
  

request	
  for	
  inspection	
  of	
  records	
  were	
  subject	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  discovery,	
  

specifically	
  rejecting	
  the	
  appellee’s	
  argument	
  that	
  the	
  request	
  was	
  

unduly	
  burdensome.	
  	
  Ruling	
  that	
  unduly	
  burdensome	
  was	
  not	
  

applicable	
  to	
  appellants’	
  statutory	
  requests	
  for	
  records.	
  	
  	
  Accordingly,	
  

this	
  court	
  should	
  also	
  reject	
  the	
  appellee’s	
  argument	
  that	
  appellants’	
  

requests	
  were	
  unduly	
  burdensome	
  and	
  not	
  relevant	
  which	
  are	
  the	
  only	
  

reasons	
  appellee	
  has	
  put	
  forth	
  for	
  not	
  producing	
  the	
  requested	
  copies	
  of	
  

the	
  books	
  and	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  appellee.	
  

         	
  

         	
  

                                                                57.	
  

                                                         	
  
       2.	
    DID	
  THE	
  TRIAL	
  COURT,	
  PHILLIPS,	
  J.,	
  ERR	
  IN	
  REFUSING	
  TO	
  
       RULE	
  ON	
  APPELLANTS’	
  THREE	
  MOTIONS	
  TO	
  COMPEL	
  AND	
  MOTION	
  
       FOR	
  CONTINUANCE	
  TO	
  COMPLETE	
  DISCOVERY	
  PRIOR	
  TO	
  RULING	
  
       ON	
  THE	
  PARTIES’	
  CROSS	
  MOTIONS	
  FOR	
  SUMMARY	
  JUDGMENT.	
  
	
  
                Fundamental	
  requirements	
  of	
  due	
  process	
  demand	
  that	
  a	
  party	
  be	
  

       given	
  a	
  reasonable	
  opportunity	
  to	
  be	
  heard	
  U.S.	
  Const.	
  Amendment	
  14.85	
  	
  

       Similarly,	
  the	
  Constitution	
  of	
  the	
  State	
  of	
  Texas	
  provides	
  that	
  “no	
  citizen	
  

       of	
  this	
  State	
  shall	
  be	
  deprived	
  of	
  life,	
  liberty,	
  property,	
  privileges	
  or	
  

       immunities,	
  or	
  in	
  any	
  manner	
  disenfranchised,	
  except	
  by	
  the	
  due	
  course	
  

       of	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  land.	
  	
  Texas	
  Const.	
  Art.	
  1	
  §19.86	
  	
  	
  

                The	
  purpose	
  of	
  discovery	
  is	
  to	
  allow	
  the	
  parties	
  to	
  obtain	
  the	
  fullest	
  

       knowledge	
  of	
  facts	
  and	
  issues	
  prior	
  to	
  trial.	
  West	
  v.	
  Solite,	
  563	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  

       240,	
  243	
  (Tex.	
  1978).	
  	
  Thus,	
  orders	
  prohibiting	
  discovery	
  may	
  constitute	
  

       an	
  abuse	
  of	
  discretion.	
  	
  See	
  Helfand	
  v.	
  Coane,	
  12	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  152,	
  155	
  (Tex.	
  

       App.	
  Houston	
  [1st	
  Dist.]	
  2000,	
  pet	
  denied),	
  also	
  Tex.	
  R.	
  Civ.	
  P.	
  192.3,	
  (“A	
  

       court	
  abuses	
  its	
  discretion	
  in	
  unreasonably	
  restricting	
  a	
  party’s	
  access	
  

       to	
  information	
  through	
  discovery.”).	
  	
  	
  

                The	
  rule	
  regarding	
  the	
  scope	
  of	
  discovery	
  is	
  broad.	
  	
  “In	
  general	
  a	
  

       party	
  may	
  obtain	
  discovery	
  regarding	
  any	
  matter	
  that	
  is	
  not	
  privileged	
  

       and	
  is	
  relevant	
  to	
  the	
  subject	
  matter	
  of	
  the	
  pending	
  action,	
  whether	
  it	
  	
  

                                                                           58.	
  

                                                                              	
  
relates	
  to	
  the	
  claim	
  or	
  defense	
  of	
  the	
  party	
  seeking	
  discovery	
  or	
  the	
  

claim	
  or	
  defense	
  of	
  any	
  other	
  party.”	
  	
  TEX	
  CIV.	
  192.3	
  (a).	
  	
  This	
  rule	
  

reflects	
  the	
  ultimate	
  purpose	
  of	
  discovery,	
  which	
  is	
  to	
  “seek	
  truth,	
  so	
  

that	
  disputes	
  may	
  be	
  decided	
  by	
  those	
  facts	
  that	
  are	
  revealed,	
  rather	
  

than	
  concealed.”	
  	
  Axelson,	
  Inc.,	
  et	
  al.,	
  v.	
  The	
  Honorable	
  Grainger	
  W.	
  

McIIhany,	
  798	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  550,	
  555	
  (Tex.	
  1990).	
  	
  Due	
  process	
  in	
  all	
  cases	
  is	
  

necessary	
  to	
  insure	
  that	
  all	
  people	
  have	
  equal	
  rights	
  to	
  petition	
  the	
  

court	
  and	
  to	
  be	
  heard	
  and	
  have	
  equal	
  protection	
  of	
  the	
  law.	
  	
  A	
  trial	
  court	
  

abuses	
  its	
  discretion	
  when	
  it	
  acts	
  without	
  reference	
  to	
  any	
  guiding	
  rules	
  

and	
  principles,	
  or	
  in	
  other	
  words	
  acts	
  in	
  an	
  arbitrary	
  or	
  unreasonable	
  

manner.	
  	
  Downer	
  v.	
  Aquamarine	
  Operations,	
  Inc.,	
  701	
  S.W.	
  2d.	
  238,	
  241-­‐

242	
  (Tex.	
  1985),	
  cert	
  denied,	
  476	
  U.S.	
  1159,	
  106	
  S.Ct.	
  2279,	
  90	
  L.Ed.	
  2d	
  721	
  

(1986).	
  	
  

        Before	
  granting	
  a	
  no-­‐evidence	
  motion	
  for	
  summary	
  judgment	
  the	
  

trial	
  court	
  must	
  allow	
  the	
  non-­‐movants	
  an	
  adequate	
  time	
  for	
  discovery.	
  	
  

Tex.	
  R.	
  Civ.	
  Proc.	
  166a(1).	
  	
  In	
  determining	
  whether	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  has	
  

allowed	
  adequate	
  time	
  for	
  discovery,	
  the	
  reviewing	
  court	
  should	
  

determine	
  (a)	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  case;	
  (b)	
  the	
  nature	
  of	
  evidence	
  	
  

        	
  

                                                            59.	
  

                                                               	
  
necessary	
  to	
  controvert	
  the	
  no	
  evidence	
  motion;	
  (3)	
  the	
  length	
  of	
  time	
  	
  

the	
  case	
  was	
  active;	
  (4)	
  the	
  amount	
  of	
  time	
  the	
  no	
  evidence	
  motion	
  was	
  

on	
  file;	
  (5)	
  whether	
  the	
  movant	
  for	
  summary	
  judgment	
  had	
  requested	
  

stricter	
  deadlines	
  for	
  discovery;	
  (6)	
  The	
  amount	
  of	
  discovery	
  that	
  had	
  

already	
  taken	
  place;	
  and	
  whether	
  the	
  discovery	
  deadlines	
  in	
  place	
  were	
  

specific	
  or	
  vague.	
  	
  Moorehouse	
  v.	
  Chase	
  Manhattan	
  Bank,	
  76	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  587,	
  

591	
  (Tex.	
  App—San	
  Antonio	
  2002,	
  no	
  writ);	
  Martinez	
  v.	
  City	
  of	
  San	
  

Antonio,	
  40	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  587,	
  591	
  (Tex.	
  App.—San	
  Antonio	
  2001,	
  pet	
  denied).	
  

       	
  Appellants’	
  have	
  been	
  denied	
  due	
  process	
  by	
  the	
  refusal	
  of	
  Judge	
  

Phillips	
  to	
  allow	
  them	
  to	
  be	
  heard	
  on	
  their	
  three	
  Discovery	
  Motions	
  and	
  

Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery,	
  before	
  ruling	
  on	
  the	
  

parties’	
  Cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  	
  There	
  is	
  no	
  justifiable	
  

reason	
  why	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  refused	
  to	
  hear	
  Appellants’	
  properly	
  filed	
  

three	
  Motions	
  to	
  Compel	
  Discovery	
  and	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  

Complete	
  Discovery.	
  	
  The	
  discovery	
  sought	
  by	
  appellant	
  was	
  intended	
  to	
  

respond	
  to	
  the	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  Brewer	
  &	
  

Pritchard,	
  PC	
  v.	
  Johnson,	
  167	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  460,	
  469	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Houston	
  (14th	
  

Dist.)	
  2005,	
  rehearing	
  overruled).	
  

	
  

                                                      60.	
  

                                                         	
  
	
        A	
  litigant	
  who	
  blocks	
  discovery	
  and	
  withholds	
  evidence	
  cannot	
  

use	
  the	
  non-­‐movant’s	
  lack	
  of	
  evidence	
  to	
  win	
  a	
  summary	
  judgment.	
  	
  

Tempay,	
  Inc.,	
  v.	
  TNT	
  Concrete	
  &	
  Construction,	
  Inc.,	
  37	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  517,	
  521-­‐

522	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Austion	
  2001,	
  no	
  writ)	
  citing	
  Robert	
  W.	
  Clore,	
  Texas	
  Rule	
  

of	
  Civil	
  Procedure	
  166a(1);	
  A	
  New	
  Weapon	
  for	
  Texas	
  Defendants,	
  29	
  St.	
  

Mary’s	
  L.	
  J.	
  813,	
  843	
  (1998).	
  	
  “The	
  ultimate	
  purpose	
  of	
  Discovery	
  is	
  to	
  

seek	
  the	
  truth	
  so	
  that	
  disputes	
  are	
  decided	
  by	
  what	
  the	
  facts	
  reveal,	
  not	
  

by	
  what	
  facts	
  are	
  concealed.”	
  	
  Jampole	
  v.	
  Touchy,	
  673	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  569,	
  573	
  

(Tex.	
  1984).	
  

          In	
  this	
  case,	
  the	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery	
  

was	
  not	
  only	
  timely	
  filed	
  but	
  it	
  states	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  irrefutable	
  reasons	
  

why	
  the	
  Motion	
  should	
  have	
  been	
  heard	
  and	
  granted.	
  	
  The	
  Motion	
  was	
  

also	
  verified	
  and	
  had	
  a	
  detailed	
  affidavit	
  explaining	
  the	
  specific	
  need	
  for	
  

the	
  requested	
  discovery.87	
  	
  

          The	
  subject	
  case	
  has	
  been	
  on	
  file	
  for	
  ten	
  months	
  prior	
  to	
  the	
  court	
  

granting	
  Appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  No-­‐Evidence	
  Summary	
  

Judgment.	
  	
  The	
  discovery	
  cutoff	
  set	
  by	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  was	
  September	
  30,	
  	
  

	
  

	
  

                                                         61.	
  

                                                            	
  
2014.	
  	
  The	
  court	
  granted	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  and	
  No-­‐	
  

Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  on	
  September	
  15,	
  2014.88	
  	
  Appellants	
  

have	
  filed	
  Six	
  Motions	
  to	
  Compel	
  Discovery	
  and,	
  only	
  three	
  have	
  been	
  

heard.	
  	
  	
  

             The	
  Motions	
  were	
  made	
  necessary	
  by	
  the	
  planned	
  dilatory	
  actions	
  

of	
  defense	
  counsel	
  in	
  refusing	
  to	
  cooperate	
  with	
  discovery.	
  	
  	
  Appellants	
  

did	
  not	
  even	
  have	
  the	
  transcripts	
  of	
  the	
  two	
  depositions	
  they	
  were	
  

allowed	
  to	
  take	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken,	
  president	
  of	
  the	
  appellee	
  and	
  Diane	
  

Bottema,	
  the	
  property	
  manager,	
  at	
  the	
  time	
  the	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  

Briefs	
  in	
  this	
  matter	
  were	
  due	
  in	
  the	
  trial	
  court.89	
  

             The	
  appellate	
  court,	
  in	
  Nelson	
  v.	
  PNC	
  Mortgage	
  Corp.,	
  139	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  

442	
  (2004),	
  held:	
  “But	
  Nelson,	
  even	
  as	
  an	
  incarcerated	
  prisoner	
  was	
  

entitled	
  to	
  a	
  ruling	
  on	
  the	
  numerous	
  discovery	
  motions	
  he	
  filed	
  and	
  

requests	
  to	
  be	
  heard.	
  	
  The	
  trial	
  court’s	
  failure	
  to	
  rule	
  on	
  Nelson’s	
  

discovery	
  motions	
  foreclosed	
  any	
  possibility	
  of	
  Nelson	
  exercising	
  his	
  

right	
  to	
  obtain	
  reasonable	
  discovery	
  before	
  summary	
  judgment	
  was	
  

rendered	
  against	
  him.”	
  	
  Id.	
  at	
  444,	
  445.	
  	
  	
  The	
  court	
  also	
  ruled	
  that	
  the	
  

court	
  should	
  have	
  held	
  a	
  hearing	
  on	
  Nelson’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance.	
  	
  	
  

             	
  

                                                                      62.	
  

                                                               	
  
           The	
  court	
  went	
  on	
  to	
  state:	
  

           “In	
  reviewing	
  this	
  case	
  on	
  appeal	
  our	
  concern	
  is	
  not	
  so	
  much	
  with	
  

the	
  alleged	
  errors	
  in	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  rulings.	
  	
  Instead,	
  our	
  concern	
  lies	
  

with	
  the	
  trial	
  court’s	
  repeated	
  failure	
  to	
  hear	
  or	
  rule	
  on	
  the	
  numerous	
  

Motions	
  filed	
  by	
  Nelson	
  despite	
  Nelson’s	
  persistent	
  requests	
  for	
  action.	
  	
  	
  

           A	
  trial	
  court	
  is	
  required	
  to	
  consider	
  and	
  rule	
  upon	
  a	
  motion	
  within	
  

a	
  reasonable	
  time.	
  	
  See	
  In	
  re	
  Ramirez,	
  994	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  682,	
  683	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  

San	
  Antonio	
  1998,	
  orig.	
  proceeding).	
  	
  In	
  this	
  case	
  the	
  vast	
  majority	
  of	
  

Nelson’s	
  Motions	
  were	
  never	
  ruled	
  on.	
  	
  Yet	
  Washington	
  Mutual	
  and	
  

Barrett	
  Burke’s	
  were	
  set	
  promptly	
  and	
  ruled	
  on	
  in	
  Nelson’s	
  absence.	
  ”	
  Id.	
  	
  

at	
  444.	
  

           “The	
  trial	
  court	
  granted	
  summary	
  judgment	
  against	
  Nelson	
  

without	
  giving	
  any	
  apparent	
  consideration	
  to	
  his	
  discovery	
  motions	
  

before	
  ordering	
  that	
  he	
  take	
  nothing	
  by	
  his	
  claims,	
  Nelson	
  was	
  not	
  given	
  

a	
  reasonable	
  opportunity	
  to	
  be	
  heard	
  on	
  the	
  significant	
  issue	
  of	
  his	
  

access	
  to	
  evidence	
  that	
  may	
  have	
  supported	
  his	
  claims.	
  	
  Fundamental	
  

requirements	
  of	
  due	
  process	
  demand	
  that	
  a	
  party	
  to	
  cause	
  be	
  given	
  and	
  	
  

opportunity	
  to	
  be	
  heard.	
  	
  Cf.	
  Creel	
  v.	
  Dist.	
  Attorney	
  for	
  Medina	
  County,	
  	
  

	
  

                                                            63.	
  

                                                               	
  
818	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  45,	
  46	
  (Tex.	
  1991).	
  	
  	
  

           	
  “In	
  his	
  motions	
  to	
  continue	
  the	
  hearing	
  on	
  Washington	
  Mutual	
  

and	
  Barrett	
  Burke’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment,	
  Nelson	
  made	
  the	
  

trial	
  court	
  aware	
  of	
  the	
  fact	
  it	
  had	
  not	
  ruled	
  on	
  his	
  pending	
  discovery	
  

motions	
  including	
  motions	
  to	
  compel	
  discovery.”	
  	
  Id.	
  at	
  444.	
  	
  The	
  Nelson	
  

case	
  is	
  factually	
  analogous	
  to	
  this	
  case.	
  	
  Appellants	
  filed	
  six	
  Motions	
  to	
  

Compel	
  Discovery,	
  three	
  of	
  their	
  Motions	
  remain	
  unheard.	
  	
  	
  Appellants’	
  

Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery	
  also	
  remains	
  unheard.	
  

        Repeatedly	
  in	
  this	
  case	
  the	
  trial	
  court,	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  refused	
  to	
  grant	
  

the	
  discovery	
  requested	
  by	
  appellants.	
  	
  The	
  trial	
  court	
  repeatedly	
  

granted	
  appellee’s	
  requests	
  that	
  the	
  appellants’	
  requested	
  discovery	
  be	
  

blocked	
  and	
  stopped.	
  	
  However,	
  appellee	
  cannot	
  block	
  discovery	
  and	
  

then	
  be	
  granted	
  dismissal	
  of	
  appellants’	
  causes	
  of	
  action.	
  	
  Fair	
  play,	
  Rule	
  

166a	
  and	
  due	
  process	
  do	
  not	
  allow	
  this	
  maneuver.	
  	
  Tex.	
  R.	
  Civ.	
  Proc.	
  

166a;	
  Tempay,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  TNT	
  Concrete	
  Construction,	
  Inc.,	
  37	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  517,	
  

521-­‐522	
  (Tex.	
  App—Austin	
  2001,	
  no	
  writ)	
  citing	
  Thomas	
  R.	
  Phillips,	
  Texas	
  

Supreme	
  Court	
  Update,	
  60	
  Tex.	
  B.J.	
  858,	
  861	
  (1997);	
  Brewer	
  &	
  Pritchard,	
  

PC	
  v.	
  Johnson,	
  167	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  460,	
  469	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Houston	
  [14th	
  Dist.]	
  2005,	
  	
  

rehearing	
  overruled);	
  Jampole	
  v.	
  Touchy,	
  673	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  569,	
  573	
  (Tex.	
  	
  

                                                                64.	
  

                                                                   	
  
1984).	
  	
  	
  	
  

            The	
  trial	
  court	
  erred	
  and	
  abused	
  its	
  discretion,	
  when	
  it	
  granted	
  

appellees’	
  demands	
  to	
  block	
  and	
  stop	
  appellants’	
  requested	
  Discovery,	
  

and	
  then	
  dismissed	
  appellants’	
  causes	
  of	
  action	
  by	
  granting	
  appellee’s	
  

No-­‐Evidence	
  and	
  Traditional	
  Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  

awarding	
  attorneys’	
  fees.	
  	
  The	
  trial	
  court’s	
  granting	
  of	
  the	
  No	
  Evidence	
  

and	
  Traditional	
  Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  should	
  be	
  reversed	
  and	
  

the	
  court	
  ordered	
  to	
  direct	
  a	
  verdict	
  for	
  the	
  appellants’	
  on	
  their	
  Motion	
  

for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  to	
  remand	
  appellants’	
  other	
  claims	
  

for	
  full	
  discovery	
  and	
  a	
  trial	
  on	
  the	
  merits.	
  	
  	
  

3.	
    DID	
  THE	
  TRIAL	
  COURT,	
  PHILLIPS,	
  J.,	
  ERR	
  IN	
  DISMISSING	
  
APPELLANTS’	
  TEXAS	
  DECEPTIVE	
  TRADE	
  PRACTICES	
  ACT	
  CLAIMS	
  
CONTAINED	
  IN	
  THEIR	
  FOURTH	
  AND	
  FIFTH	
  AMENDED	
  COMPLAINTS	
  	
  
	
  
       Appellee	
  has	
  violated	
  the	
  Texas	
  Deceptive	
  Trade	
  Practices	
  Act,	
  

(hereinafter	
  “DTPA”).90	
  	
  V.T.C.A.,	
  Bus.	
  &	
  C.,	
  Section	
  17.50:	
  (a),	
  in	
  two	
  	
  

regards.	
  	
  First,	
  as	
  outlined	
  above	
  the	
  property	
  manager,	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  

made	
  false	
  and	
  misleading	
  statements	
  orally	
  and	
  in	
  writing	
  that	
  

appellants’	
  were	
  not	
  entitled	
  to	
  a	
  Hearing	
  of	
  their	
  alleged	
  violations	
  of	
  

the	
  deed	
  restrictions,	
  in	
  matters	
  of	
  clear	
  violations	
  of	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  	
  

	
  

                                                                65.	
  

                                                                   	
  
Association.	
  	
  	
  

          	
  Based	
  on	
  the	
  property	
  managers	
  misrepresentation	
  of	
  the	
  

appellants	
  did	
  not	
  request	
  a	
  Hearing	
  regarding	
  the	
  first	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  

and	
  tore	
  down	
  the	
  lattice	
  from	
  their	
  fence,	
  as	
  demanded	
  by	
  appellee.	
  	
  

Appellants	
  consequently	
  suffered	
  damage	
  for	
  the	
  fair	
  value	
  of	
  the	
  

materials	
  and	
  labor	
  expend	
  to	
  add	
  the	
  lattice	
  to	
  the	
  fence	
  and	
  to	
  remove	
  

it.	
  

          While	
  this	
  matter	
  was	
  pending,	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  applied	
  to	
  

be	
  on	
  the	
  ballot	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  voting	
  Neighborhood	
  Representative	
  of	
  the	
  

Association,	
  the	
  election	
  was	
  held	
  on	
  June	
  7,	
  2014.	
  	
  Appellant,	
  Wesley	
  

Spears’	
  name	
  was	
  intentionally	
  omitted	
  from	
  the	
  Ballot	
  for	
  

Neighborhood	
  Representative	
  by	
  Appellee,	
  effectively	
  disenfranchising,	
  

appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears,	
  an	
  African	
  American	
  attorney.	
  	
  	
  

          What	
  is	
  very	
  ironic	
  is	
  this	
  occurred	
  in	
  a	
  courthouse	
  named	
  for	
  the	
  

first	
  african-­‐american	
  student	
  at	
  the	
  University	
  of	
  Texas,	
  School	
  of	
  Law.	
  

Heman	
  Marion	
  Sweatt	
  was	
  denied	
  of	
  his	
  dream	
  of	
  becoming	
  a	
  lawyer,	
  

because	
  of	
  discrimination.	
  	
  After	
  climbing	
  the	
  ladder	
  on	
  the	
  backs	
  of	
  

great	
  men	
  like	
  Marion	
  Sweat,	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears,	
  who	
  was	
  born	
  in	
  

the	
  same	
  year	
  	
  

                                                          66.	
  

                                                             	
  
Marion	
  Sweat	
  became	
  the	
  first	
  african-­‐american	
  law	
  student	
  at	
  the	
  	
  

University	
  of	
  Texas,	
  and	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears,	
  became	
  a	
  lawyer	
  in	
  

1979,	
  twenty	
  five	
  years	
  later.	
  Nevertheless,	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  

was	
  denied	
  his	
  most	
  basic	
  human	
  rights	
  that	
  is	
  to	
  serve	
  in	
  an	
  elected	
  

position.	
  

          Ranier	
  Ficken,	
  President	
  of	
  Appellee,	
  testified	
  at	
  his	
  deposition,	
  that	
  

there	
  was	
  no	
  reason	
  why	
  Appellant’,	
  Wesley	
  Spears’	
  name	
  was	
  not	
  

placed	
  on	
  the	
  Ballot	
  for	
  Neighborhood	
  Representative.91	
  It	
  was	
  a	
  

violation	
  of	
  DTPA	
  for	
  the	
  appellee	
  to	
  deny	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  of	
  

his	
  basic	
  civil	
  and	
  human	
  rights	
  to	
  apply	
  and	
  serve	
  in	
  an	
  elective	
  

position	
  because	
  he	
  has	
  brought	
  a	
  lawsuit	
  or	
  because	
  he	
  is	
  African-­‐	
  

American.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

          Appellants,	
  in	
  addition,	
  to	
  the	
  affidavit	
  of	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears,	
  

provided	
  two	
  affidavits	
  from	
  residents	
  of	
  Falcon	
  Pointe	
  who	
  live	
  on	
  

Appellants’	
  street,	
  who	
  also	
  affirmed	
  that	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  

name	
  was	
  not	
  on	
  the	
  Ballot	
  for	
  neighborhood	
  representative	
  when	
  they	
  

attempted	
  to	
  vote	
  for	
  him	
  on	
  June	
  7,	
  2014.92	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

          Plaintiff	
  also	
  provided	
  copies	
  of	
  the	
  election	
  Ballot	
  that	
  omitted	
  	
  

          	
  

                                                                  67.	
  

                                                                    	
  
Appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears’	
  name	
  downloaded	
  from	
  Appellee’s	
  website.93	
  	
  

Election	
  Ballots	
  dated	
  June	
  7,	
  2014,	
  the	
  same	
  Ballot	
  was	
  again	
  

downloaded	
  by	
  appellants	
  from	
  appellee’s	
  website	
  on	
  August	
  17,	
  2014,	
  

neither	
  ballot	
  contained,	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears’	
  name.	
  

       	
  Appellants	
  were	
  denied	
  the	
  right	
  to	
  fully	
  develop	
  their	
  DTPA	
  claim	
  

regarding	
  election	
  fraud	
  since	
  the	
  facts	
  giving	
  rise	
  to	
  the	
  claim	
  occurred	
  	
  

approximately	
  ninety	
  days	
  before	
  the	
  court	
  granted	
  appellee’s	
  No-­‐

Evidence	
  and	
  Traditional	
  Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  The	
  court	
  did	
  

not	
  allow	
  any	
  oral	
  argument	
  regarding	
  plaintiffs’	
  DTPA.	
  	
  Appellants	
  

moved	
  to	
  Compel	
  the	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Natalie	
  Boykin,	
  the	
  Property	
  

Manager,	
  of	
  the	
  appellee	
  who	
  replaced	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  and	
  conducted	
  

the	
  election	
  that	
  is	
  the	
  subject	
  one	
  of	
  Appellant’s	
  Deceptive	
  Trade	
  

Practices	
  Act	
  claims.	
  	
  

       Appellee	
  filed	
  a	
  Motion	
  to	
  Quash	
  Appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  the	
  

Deposition	
  of	
  Natalie	
  Boykin.94	
  	
  	
  The	
  court	
  refused	
  to	
  hear	
  appellants’	
  

Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  Natalie	
  Boykin’	
  Deposition	
  even	
  though	
  it	
  was	
  timely	
  

filed	
  and	
  appellants	
  made	
  two	
  requests,	
  to	
  the	
  Court	
  Operations	
  for	
  

appellants’	
  three	
  Motions	
  to	
  Compel	
  to	
  before	
  the	
  hearing	
  of	
  the	
  parties’	
  

Cross	
  Motion’s	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  The	
  emails	
  informed	
  Mr.	
  	
  

                                                      68.	
  

                                                         	
  
                                                                      	
  

Sanders	
  that	
  counsel	
  for	
  the	
  appellee	
  refused	
  to	
  agree	
  to	
  a	
  date	
  on	
  or	
  

before	
  the	
  Hearing	
  of	
  the	
  parties’	
  Cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  	
  

       Ms.	
  Boykin	
  was	
  the	
  property	
  manager	
  who	
  conducted	
  the	
  election,	
  

which	
  appellants	
  second	
  DTPA	
  claim	
  is	
  based.	
  	
  Clearly,	
  her	
  testimony	
  

was	
  relevant	
  to	
  whether	
  there	
  was	
  election	
  fraud	
  since	
  she	
  was	
  in	
  

charge	
  of	
  conducting	
  the	
  election	
  and	
  was	
  the	
  current	
  property	
  

manager.	
  

       Texas’	
  DTPA,	
  V.T.C.A.,	
  Bus.	
  &	
  C.,	
  Section	
  17.50:	
  (a)	
  A	
  consumer	
  may	
  	
  

maintain	
  an	
  action	
  where	
  any	
  of	
  the	
  following	
  constitute	
  a	
  producing	
  

cause	
  of	
  economic	
  damages	
  or	
  damages	
  for	
  mental	
  anguish:	
  

       (1)	
  the	
  use	
  or	
  employment	
  by	
  any	
  person	
  of	
  a	
  false,	
  misleading,	
  or	
  	
  

deceptive	
  act	
  or	
  practice	
  that	
  is:	
  

       (A)	
  specifically	
  enumerated	
  in	
  a	
  subdivision	
  of	
  Subsection	
  (b)	
  of	
  

Section	
  17.46	
  of	
  this	
  subchapter;	
  and…..	
  

       V.T.C.A.,	
  Bus.	
  &	
  C.	
  Section	
  17.46:	
  

       	
  (a)	
  False,	
  misleading,	
  or	
  deceptive	
  acts	
  or	
  practices	
  in	
  the	
  conduct	
  

of	
  any	
  trade	
  or	
  commerce	
  are	
  hereby	
  declared	
  unlawful	
  and	
  are	
  subject	
  

to	
  action	
  by	
  the	
  consumer	
  protection	
  division…	
  

                                                         69.	
  

                                                               	
  
                                                                  	
  

          (3)	
  any	
  unconscionable	
  action	
  or	
  course	
  of	
  action	
  by	
  any	
  person;	
  

or…	
  

          (12)	
  representing	
  that	
  an	
  agreement	
  confers	
  or	
  involves	
  rights,	
  or	
  

remedies	
  or	
  obligations	
  which	
  it	
  does	
  not	
  have	
  or	
  involve,	
  or	
  which	
  are	
  

prohibited	
  by	
  law…	
  

          Appellants	
  as	
  homeowners	
  are	
  clearly	
  consumers	
  of	
  the	
  services	
  of	
  

the	
  Association	
  they	
  pay	
  dues	
  and	
  receive	
  services.	
  	
  Courts	
  liberally	
  

construe	
  the	
  DTPA	
  and	
  give	
  it	
  the	
  most	
  comprehensive	
  application	
  	
  

possible	
  without	
  doing	
  damage	
  to	
  its	
  terms.	
  	
  Clary	
  Corp.,	
  v.	
  Smith,	
  949	
  

S.W.	
  2d	
  452,	
  464	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Fort	
  Worth	
  1997,	
  no	
  writ);	
  In	
  addition,	
  a	
  

appellants	
  do	
  not	
  have	
  to	
  prove	
  he	
  actually	
  acquired	
  goods	
  or	
  services.	
  	
  	
  

See	
  e.g.	
  Nast	
  v.	
  State	
  Farm	
  Fire	
  &	
  Cas.	
  Co.,	
  82	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  42,	
  47	
  (	
  Tex.	
  App.—	
  

Corpus	
  Christie	
  1990	
  (no	
  pet.)	
  	
  The	
  appellee	
  owed	
  appellants	
  a	
  fiduciary	
  

duty	
  of	
  good	
  faith	
  and	
  fair	
  dealing.	
  	
  Appellee	
  failed	
  to	
  fulfill	
  its	
  fiduciary	
  

obligation	
  to	
  the	
  appellants	
  by	
  refusing	
  to	
  produce	
  documents	
  properly	
  

requested	
  from	
  appellee.	
  

          The	
  DTPA	
  defines	
  “unconscionable	
  action	
  or	
  course	
  of	
  action”	
  as	
  

follows:	
  (5)	
  	
  “Unconscionable	
  action	
  or	
  course	
  of	
  action”	
  means	
  an	
  act	
  or	
  	
  

                                                               70.	
  

                                                                  	
  
practice	
  which	
  to	
  a	
  person’s	
  detriment:	
  

        (A)	
  takes	
  advantage	
  of	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  knowledge,	
  ability	
  experience	
  or	
  

capacity	
  of	
  a	
  person’s	
  to	
  a	
  grossly	
  unfair	
  degree;	
  or	
  

        (B)	
  results	
  in	
  a	
  gross	
  disparity	
  between	
  the	
  value	
  received	
  and	
  

consideration	
  paid,	
  in	
  a	
  transaction	
  involving	
  transfer	
  of	
  consideration.	
  	
  	
  

        The	
  relevant	
  inquiry	
  examines	
  the	
  entire	
  transaction,	
  not	
  the	
  

defendant’s	
  intent.	
  	
  Chastain	
  v.	
  Koonce,	
  700	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  579,	
  584	
  (Tex.	
  1985);	
  

see	
  also	
  Brown	
  v.	
  Galleria	
  Area	
  Ford,	
  Inc.,	
  752	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  114,	
  116	
  (Tex.	
  	
  

1988);	
  State	
  Farm	
  Lloyds	
  v.	
  Nicolau,	
  951	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  444,	
  451	
  (Tex.	
  1997).	
  	
  	
  

The	
  relevant	
  inquiry	
  examines	
  the	
  entire	
  transaction,	
  not	
  the	
  

defendant’s	
  intent.	
  	
  Chastain,	
  700	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  at	
  583.	
  	
  In	
  addition,	
  there	
  must	
  	
  

be	
  a	
  showing	
  of	
  what	
  the	
  consumer	
  could	
  have	
  or	
  would	
  have	
  done	
  if	
  he	
  

had	
  known	
  about	
  the	
  information.	
  	
  Peter	
  Enters,	
  Inc.,	
  v.	
  Hilton,	
  51	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  

616,	
  623	
  (Tex.	
  App-­‐-­‐Tyler	
  2000,	
  pet.	
  denied).	
  	
  

        Clearly,	
  it	
  would	
  be	
  an	
  unconscionable	
  course	
  of	
  action	
  for	
  appellee	
  

to	
  prevent	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears,	
  to	
  serve	
  in	
  an	
  elected	
  position,	
  for	
  

which	
  he	
  is	
  legally	
  eligible,	
  as	
  a	
  neighborhood	
  representative	
  of	
  the	
  

appellee	
  because	
  of	
  his	
  race	
  or	
  the	
  fact	
  he	
  filed	
  suit	
  to	
  address	
  	
  

        	
  

                                                            71.	
  

                                                               	
  
grievances	
  against	
  the	
  appellee	
  or	
  for	
  any	
  other	
  purported	
  reason.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

        Likewise,	
  it	
  is	
  a	
  violation	
  of	
  the	
  V.T.C.A.,	
  Bus.,	
  &	
  C	
  Section	
  17.50:	
  to	
  

represent	
  that	
  an	
  agreement	
  confers	
  or	
  involves	
  rights	
  or	
  remedies	
  or	
  

obligations	
  which	
  it	
  does	
  not	
  have	
  or	
  involve	
  or	
  which	
  is	
  also	
  a	
  violation	
  

of	
  the	
  law.	
  	
  In	
  this	
  case	
  this	
  appellants	
  were	
  denied	
  there	
  right	
  to	
  a	
  	
  

Hearing	
  of	
  the	
  first	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  due	
  to	
  the	
  misrepresentation	
  of	
  

their	
  rights	
  perpetrated	
  by	
  the	
  property	
  manager,	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  as	
  

outlined	
  above.	
  	
  	
  Appellants	
  produced	
  much	
  more	
  than	
  a	
  scintilla	
  of	
  	
  

evidence	
  to	
  support	
  their	
  claims.	
  	
  

        Appellants	
  produced	
  an	
  email	
  from	
  the	
  property	
  manager,	
  

misrepresenting	
  the	
  law,	
  and	
  saying	
  in	
  matters	
  of	
  clear	
  violations	
  the	
  	
  

president	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  can	
  act	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  the	
  Board	
  to	
  support	
  	
  

their	
  first	
  DTPA	
  claim.	
  	
  The	
  laws	
  governing	
  the	
  conduct	
  of	
  Associations,	
  

was	
  designed	
  to	
  protect	
  homeowner’s	
  from	
  the	
  arbitrary	
  actions	
  of	
  

Homeowners’	
  Associations.	
  	
  The	
  court	
  abused	
  its	
  discretion	
  by	
  

dismissing	
  appellants’	
  DTPA	
  claims	
  and	
  without	
  hearing	
  any	
  argument	
  

regarding	
  appellants’	
  claims.	
  

	
  

	
  

                                                             72.	
  

                                                                	
  
       4.	
   DID	
  THE	
  TRIAL	
  COURT	
  PHILLIPS,	
  J.,	
  AND	
  WIZER	
  J.,	
  ERR	
  
BY	
  DENYING	
  APPELLANTS’	
  MOTION	
  TO	
  RECUSE	
  JUDGE	
  PHILLIPS	
  
FROM	
  PRESIDING	
  OVER	
  THIS	
  MATTER.	
  
	
  
        Recusal	
  of	
  judge	
  is	
  concerned	
  not	
  only	
  with	
  actual	
  personal	
  or	
  

pecuniary	
  interests,	
  but	
  also	
  the	
  appearance	
  of	
  impartiality.	
  	
  Beyond	
  the	
  

demand	
  that	
  judge	
  be	
  impartial	
  is	
  the	
  requirement	
  that	
  a	
  Judge	
  appear	
  

to	
  be	
  impartial	
  so	
  that	
  no	
  doubts	
  or	
  suspicions	
  exist	
  as	
  the	
  fairness	
  or	
  	
  

integrity	
  of	
  the	
  court.	
  	
  Vernon’s	
  Ann.	
  Texas	
  Rules	
  of	
  Civ.	
  Proc.,	
  Rule	
  

18b(b)(1).95	
  	
  	
  	
  There	
  is	
  no	
  standard	
  of	
  appellate	
  review	
  specifically	
  	
  

enumerated	
  in	
  Rule	
  18a	
  for	
  the	
  denial	
  of	
  a	
  Motion	
  to	
  Disqualify.	
  	
  	
  

Pursuant	
  to	
  Texas	
  Rules	
  of	
  Civ.	
  Proc.,	
  Rule	
  18a	
  (j)	
  (2)	
  application	
  of	
  an	
  

abuse	
  of	
  discretion	
  standard	
  is	
  the	
  appropriate	
  standard	
  to	
  review	
  the	
  

denial	
  of	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips.96	
  	
  	
  	
  

          An	
  abuse	
  of	
  discretion	
  occurs	
  when	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  acts	
  arbitrarily	
  	
  

and	
  unreasonably,	
  without	
  reference	
  to	
  guiding	
  rules	
  or	
  principles	
  or	
  

misapplies	
  the	
  law	
  to	
  the	
  facts	
  of	
  the	
  case.	
  	
  The	
  reviewing	
  court	
  must	
  

determine	
  whether	
  the	
  trial	
  court’s	
  action	
  was	
  so	
  arbitrary	
  as	
  to	
  exceed	
  

the	
  bounds	
  of	
  reasonable	
  discretion.	
  	
  Marroquin	
  v.	
  D	
  &	
  N	
  Funding,	
  Inc.,	
  

943	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  112,	
  114	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Corpus	
  Christi	
  1997,	
  no	
  pet.);	
  	
  Low	
  v.	
  	
  

	
  

                                                          73.	
  

                                                             	
  
Henry,	
  221	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  609,	
  614	
  (Tex.	
  2007);	
  Cooper	
  Tire	
  &	
  Rubber	
  Co.	
  v.	
  

Mendez,	
  204	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  797,	
  800	
  (Tex.	
  2006);	
  	
  In	
  re	
  Cerebus	
  Capital	
  Mgmt.,	
  

L.P.,	
  164	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  379,	
  382	
  (Tex.	
  2005);	
  Cire	
  v.	
  Cummings,	
  134	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  835,	
  

838-­‐39	
  (Tex.	
  2004);	
  Downer	
  v.	
  Aquamarine	
  Operations,	
  Inc.,	
  701	
  S.W.	
  2d	
  

238,	
  241-­‐242	
  (Tex.	
  1985).	
  	
  	
  

             A	
  trial	
  court	
  abuses	
  it’s	
  discretion	
  when	
  it	
  reaches	
  a	
  decision	
  so	
  

arbitrary	
  and	
  unreasonable	
  that	
  it	
  amounts	
  to	
  a	
  clear	
  and	
  prejudicial	
  	
  

error	
  of	
  law.	
  	
  In	
  re	
  Olshan	
  Found	
  Repair	
  Co.,	
  328	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  883,	
  888	
  (Tex.	
  

2010);	
  In	
  re	
  Cerebus	
  Capital	
  Mgmt.,	
  L.P.,	
  164	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  379,	
  382	
  (Tex.	
  2005).	
  	
  	
  

Essentially,	
  when	
  reviewing	
  issues	
  committed	
  to	
  the	
  discretion	
  of	
  the	
  

trial	
  court,	
  the	
  reviewing	
  court	
  is	
  not	
  to	
  substitute	
  its	
  own	
  judgment	
  for	
  

the	
  trial	
  court’s	
  judgment.	
  	
  Walker	
  v.	
  Guiterrez,	
  111	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  56,	
  62	
  (Tex.	
  

2003).	
  	
  	
  

             The	
  decision	
  whether	
  recusal	
  is	
  necessary	
  is	
  to	
  be	
  assessed	
  on	
  a	
  	
  

case-­‐by-­‐case,	
  fact	
  intensive	
  basis.	
  	
  Abdygappariva	
  v.	
  State,	
  243	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  

191,	
  198	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐San	
  Antonio	
  2007).	
  	
  Even	
  under	
  the	
  abuse	
  of	
  

discretion	
  standard	
  the	
  reviewing	
  court	
  does	
  not	
  defer	
  to	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  	
  

	
  

	
  

                                                            74.	
  

                                                               	
  
on	
  questions	
  of	
  law.	
  	
  Perry	
  Homes	
  v.	
  Cull,	
  258	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  580,	
  598	
  (Tex.	
  

2008).	
  	
  	
  

             In	
  this	
  regard,	
  the	
  construction	
  of	
  statutes	
  and	
  procedural	
  rules	
  

are	
  questions	
  of	
  law,	
  which	
  are	
  reviewed	
  de	
  novo.	
  	
  See	
  Galbraith	
  Eng’g	
  

Consultants,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Pochucha,	
  290	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  863,	
  867	
  (Tex.	
  2009);	
  HCBeck,	
  

LTD.	
  V.	
  Rice,	
  284	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  349,	
  352	
  (Tex.	
  2009);	
  In	
  re	
  Christus	
  Spohn	
  Hosp.	
  	
  

Kieberg,	
  222	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  434,	
  437	
  (Tex.	
  2007);	
  	
  State	
  v.	
  Gonzales,	
  82	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  

322,	
  327	
  (Tex.	
  2002);	
  	
  Brown	
  v.	
  Villegas,	
  202	
  S.W.	
  	
  3d	
  803,	
  805	
  (Tex.	
  	
  

App.—San	
  Antonio	
  2006,	
  no	
  pet.).	
  	
  Similarly,	
  a	
  de	
  novo	
  standard	
  of	
  	
  

review	
  is	
  applied	
  to	
  the	
  interpretation	
  of	
  the	
  state	
  constitution.	
  	
  See	
  	
  

Tesco	
  Am.,	
  Inc.,	
  v.	
  Strong	
  Indus.,	
  Inc.,	
  221	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  550,	
  554	
  n.	
  15	
  (Tex.	
  

2006);	
  Ross	
  v.	
  Union	
  Carbide	
  Corp.,	
  296	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  206,	
  211	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐App.—

Houston	
  [14th	
  Dist.]	
  209,	
  pet.	
  denied).	
  	
  

             Under	
  Texas	
  law,	
  courts	
  have	
  delineated	
  that	
  the	
  test	
  for	
  recusal	
  

on	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  bias	
  or	
  lack	
  of	
  impartiality,	
  is	
  whether	
  a	
  reasonable	
  	
  

member	
  of	
  the	
  public	
  at	
  large,	
  knowing	
  all	
  the	
  facts	
  in	
  the	
  public	
  domain	
  

concerning	
  the	
  judge’s	
  conduct	
  in	
  the	
  case,	
  would	
  have	
  a	
  reasonable	
  

doubt	
  that	
  the	
  judge	
  is	
  actually	
  impartial.	
  	
  Hansen	
  v	
  J.P.	
  Morgan	
  Chase	
  	
  

                                                            p.	
  75	
  

                                                                 	
  
Bank,	
  N.A.,	
  346	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  769,	
  776	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐Dallas	
  2011);	
  Ex	
  Parte	
  Ellis,	
  

275	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  109,	
  116	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐Austin	
  2008);	
  Burkett	
  v.	
  State,	
  196	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  

892,	
  896	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐Texarkana	
  2006).	
  	
  	
  

             Stated	
  another	
  way,	
  if	
  a	
  reasonable	
  person,	
  knowing	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  

circumstances	
  involved,	
  harbors	
  doubt	
  as	
  to	
  the	
  judge’s	
  bias	
  or	
  

impartiality	
  then	
  the	
  burden	
  is	
  met	
  and	
  the	
  judge	
  should	
  be	
  recused.	
  	
  

Mendez	
  v.	
  Quarterman,	
  625	
  F.	
  Supp.	
  2d	
  415,	
  424	
  (S.D.	
  Tex.	
  2009);	
  	
  

Abdygappariva	
  v.	
  State,	
  243	
  S.W.	
  3d	
  191,	
  198	
  (Tex.	
  App.-­‐San	
  Antonio	
  

2007).	
  	
  	
  

             The	
  comments	
  that	
  Judge	
  Phillips’	
  directed	
  at	
  appellants	
  counsel	
  

and/or	
  appellants	
  identified	
  earlier	
  in	
  this	
  case	
  taken	
  together	
  with	
  	
  

unfair	
  and	
  legally	
  unsupportable	
  rulings	
  of	
  the	
  court,	
  leave	
  the	
  

appellants,	
  with	
  the	
  good	
  faith	
  belief	
  that	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  was	
  biased	
  

against	
  them.97	
  

                                                          PRAYER	
  

             The	
  appellants	
  pray	
  that	
  the	
  court	
  reverse	
  the	
  ruling	
  of	
  Judge	
  

Phillips	
  granting	
  appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  and	
  No	
  Evidence	
  

Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  direct	
  the	
  court	
  to	
  grant	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  	
  

             	
  

                                                        p.	
  76	
  

                                                             	
  
Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  to	
  restore	
  appellants’	
  other	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  

trial	
  court	
  docket	
  and	
  to	
  order	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  to	
  hold	
  a	
  hearing	
  regarding	
  

whether	
  appellants’	
  are	
  entitled	
  to	
  Attorneys’	
  fees.	
  	
  	
  Appellants	
  requests	
  

that	
  this	
  court	
  rule	
  that	
  the	
  court	
  erred	
  in	
  not	
  hearing	
  appellants	
  

discovery	
  motions	
  before	
  ruling	
  on	
  the	
  parties’	
  Cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  

Summary	
  Judgment.	
  	
  Further,	
  appellants	
  also	
  requests	
  that	
  this	
  court	
  

rule	
  that	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  and	
  Judge	
  Wisser	
  erred	
  in	
  not	
  recusing	
  Judge	
  

Phillips.	
  

                                               CONCLUSION	
  

         Based	
  on	
  the	
  arguments	
  and	
  law	
  stated	
  herein	
  	
  appellants	
  

respectfully	
  request	
  that	
  the	
  Third	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  grant	
  appellants’	
  

prayer	
  for	
  relief	
  and	
  reverse	
  the	
  decision	
  of	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  and	
  direct	
  the	
  

trial	
  court	
  to	
  enter	
  judgment	
  on	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  

Judgment	
  and	
  restore	
  appellants	
  remaining	
  claims	
  to	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  

docket	
  for	
  discovery	
  and	
  trial.	
  

                                                                               Respectfully	
  Submitted	
  
                                                                               By	
  Appellants	
  

                                                                               /S/Wesley Spears____________________	
  
                                                                               	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  
                                                                               	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Their	
  Attorney	
  

                                                             77.
                                    CERTIFICATION	
  OF	
  COMPLIANCE	
  

          This	
  is	
  to	
  certify	
  that	
  the	
  word	
  count	
  on	
  this	
  document	
  is	
  in	
  excess	
  

of	
  15,000	
  words.	
  	
  The	
  total	
  word	
  count	
  is	
  18,124,	
  and	
  is	
  therefore,	
  not	
  in	
  

compliance	
  with	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  Third	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals.	
  	
  Therefore,	
  

plaintiff	
  is	
  filing	
  a	
  Motion	
  contemporaneously	
  herewith,	
  requesting	
  

permission	
  to	
  submit	
  this	
  Brief,	
  which	
  exceeds	
  the	
  word	
  count	
  provided	
  

in	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  the	
  Third	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals.	
  

                                                                                /s/s Wesley Spears
                                                                                	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  
                                                                                Attorney	
  for	
  Appellant	
  

                                                          78.
                                       CERTIFICATION	
  OF	
  SERVICE	
  

        This	
  is	
  to	
  certify	
  that	
  a	
  copy	
  of	
  the	
  foregoing	
  Brief	
  in	
  Support	
  of	
  

Appellants	
  Appeal	
  to	
  the	
  Third	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  was	
  served	
  on	
  counsel	
  

for	
  appellee,	
  David	
  Chamberlain,	
  Chamberlain	
  and	
  McHaney,	
  301	
  

Congress	
  Avenue,	
  22nd	
  Floor,	
  Austin,	
  Texas	
  78701	
  Tel.	
  512-­‐474-­‐9124,	
  

Fax.	
  512C 474C 8582	
  by hand delivery	
  on	
  this	
  6th	
  day	
  of	
  March,	
  2015.	
  

                                                                                 /s/s Wesley S. Spears
                                                                                 Wesley	
  S.	
  Spears	
  
                                                                                 Bar	
  No.18898400	
  401	
  
                                                                                 Congress	
  Avenue,	
  	
  
                                                                                 Suite	
  1540	
  
                                                                                 Austin,	
  Texas	
  78701	
  
                                                                                 Tel.:	
  512C 696C 2222	
  
                                                                                 Fax.:	
  512C 687C
                                                                                 3499	
  Attorney	
  for	
  
                                                                                 Appellants	
  

                                                          79.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  1	
  Email	
  from	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  to	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  	
  	
  
2	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  3	
  Email	
  from	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  to	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  regarding	
  the	
  rights	
  of	
  

homeowners	
  to	
  seek	
  a	
  Hearing	
  before	
  the	
  Board	
  regarding	
  alleged	
  violations.	
  
3	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  68-­‐69,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  pages	
  79-­‐80.	
  
4	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  4-­‐6,	
  Articles	
  of	
  Incorporation	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  dated	
  August	
  6,	
  2001.	
  
5	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  90-­‐94,	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  §	
  209.005.	
  
6	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  4-­‐5	
  Emails	
  between	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  and	
  Diane	
  Botttema,	
  dated	
  	
  
7	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  1	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  dated	
  October	
  22,	
  2013.	
  	
  	
  	
  
8	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  49-­‐51,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Diane	
  Bottema’s	
  Deposition	
  pages	
  81-­‐83.	
  
9	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  117	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  Deposition	
  p.	
  56	
  L.	
  13	
  -­‐	
  L	
  18.	
  
10	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  118	
  	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  Deposition	
  p.	
  57	
  L.	
  11	
  -­‐	
  L	
  18.	
  
11	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.7-­‐23,	
  Bylaws	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  paragraph	
  22	
  (b)	
  Hearing	
  Appendix	
  

p.	
  18.	
  	
  
12	
  See	
  Certified	
  letters	
  requesting	
  documents	
  from	
  the	
  Association	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  788,	
  

789	
  790	
  and	
  791.	
  
13	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  72-­‐84,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  the	
  Depositon	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken,	
  Exhibit	
  2,	
  

documents	
  produced	
  by	
  Mr.	
  Ficken.	
  
14	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Hearing	
  of	
  Plaintiffs’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  dated	
  May	
  28,	
  2013,	
  p.	
  8.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
15	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Hearing	
  of	
  Appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  Deposition	
  Duces	
  Tecum	
  

of	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  dated	
  May	
  15,	
  2013	
  p.	
  13-­‐17	
  
16	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Hearing	
  of	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  Deposition	
  Duces	
  Tecum	
  

of	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  dated	
  May	
  15,	
  2013	
  p.	
  18.	
  
17	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Hearing	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  deposition	
  of	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  

Duces	
  Tecum	
  dated	
  May	
  15,	
  2014	
  p.	
  14-­‐20.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
18	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Hearing	
  of	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  dated	
  May	
  15,	
  2013	
  p.	
  15-­‐

18.	
  
19	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  48,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  p.	
  9.	
  
20	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  820-­‐822,	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Natalie	
  Boykin.	
  
21	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  103,	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  	
  § 209.007.	
  
22	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Hearing	
  of	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Diane	
  

Bottema	
  dated	
  May	
  15,	
  2014	
  p.	
  13-­‐18.	
  
23	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Hearing	
  of	
  Appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  dated	
  May	
  15,	
  2013	
  p.	
  13-­‐

18.	
  	
  	
  
24	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  45,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Diane	
  Bottema’s	
  deposition	
  p.	
  5.	
  
25	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  961-­‐966,	
  Affidavit	
  of	
  Appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  attached	
  to	
  

appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery.	
  
26	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  72-­‐84,	
  Budgets	
  and	
  minutes	
  of	
  board	
  meetings	
  produced	
  by	
  Ranier	
  

Ficken	
  which	
  other	
  than	
  an	
  insurance	
  policy	
  were	
  the	
  only	
  documents	
  that	
  appellee	
  
produced	
  to	
  appellants	
  throughout	
  the	
  pendency	
  of	
  this	
  case.	
  	
  	
  
27	
  See	
  Appendix	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken’s	
  deposition	
  p.	
  15-­‐18.	
  
28	
  See	
  Notice	
  to	
  take	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Natalie	
  Boykin,	
  Duces	
  Tecum,	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  

396-­‐402.	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 80.	
  

                                                                                                                   	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
	
  
29	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  57-­‐58,	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  p.	
  11	
  -­‐12.	
  
30	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  47,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Diane	
  Bottema’s	
  deposition	
  p.	
  7.	
  

631	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  24-­‐25,	
  Election	
  Ballots	
  showing	
  appellants’	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  was	
  left	
  
off	
  the	
  ballot	
  for	
  Neighborhood	
  Representative	
  also	
  see	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  	
  Motion	
  for	
  
Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery	
  affidavits	
  of	
  two	
  of	
  appellants’	
  neighbors	
  
attesting	
  to	
  the	
  fact	
  the	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  name	
  was	
  left	
  off	
  the	
  ballot	
  for	
  neighborhood	
  
representative.	
  	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  42-­‐46,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  
verifying	
  that	
  the	
  pages	
  downloaded	
  from	
  appellee’s	
  website	
  appeared	
  authentic	
  and	
  
there	
  was	
  no	
  reason	
  that	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears’,	
  name	
  was	
  left	
  off	
  the	
  ballot	
  for	
  
neighborhood	
  representatives	
  pages.	
  
32	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  843-­‐849	
  and	
  863-­‐873.	
  	
  Appellee	
  moved	
  to	
  in	
  bad	
  faith	
  to	
  quash	
  

both	
  depositions	
  of	
  Natalie	
  Boykin,	
  who	
  conducted	
  the	
  election,	
  which	
  took	
  place	
  on	
  
June	
  7,	
  2014,	
  and	
  William	
  Meyer,	
  Board	
  Member	
  who	
  voted	
  to	
  find	
  appellants	
  in	
  
violation	
  of	
  unspecified	
  deed	
  restriction(s).	
  	
  The	
  trial	
  court,	
  Phillips,	
  J.,	
  refused	
  to	
  hear	
  
appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  the	
  Depositions	
  of	
  Natalie	
  Boykin,	
  the	
  property	
  manager,	
  
who	
  conducted	
  the	
  election	
  that	
  the	
  appellants,	
  allege	
  Ms.	
  Boykin	
  intentionally	
  and	
  
fraudulently	
  left	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears’	
  name	
  off	
  the	
  ballot	
  for	
  neighborhood	
  
representative.	
  Mr.	
  Meyer	
  is	
  also	
  Vice	
  President	
  of	
  the	
  developer	
  Newland	
  Communities	
  
and	
  was	
  the	
  deciding	
  vote	
  to	
  find	
  the	
  appellants’	
  in	
  violation	
  of	
  unspecified	
  deed	
  
restrictions	
  developer	
  two	
  votes,	
  homeowners’	
  no	
  votes,	
  big	
  surprise!	
  	
  	
  See	
  Court	
  
Record	
  p.	
  961-­‐966,	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery.	
  
33	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  46-­‐47,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Diane	
  Bottema’s	
  deposition	
  regarding	
  her	
  lack	
  

of	
  access	
  to	
  her	
  own	
  emails	
  and	
  the	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  p.	
  6	
  and	
  7	
  when	
  Ms.	
  
Bottema	
  claims	
  she	
  has	
  no	
  access	
  to	
  her	
  emails	
  or	
  other	
  records	
  because,	
  although	
  she	
  
worked	
  in	
  the	
  office	
  where	
  the	
  records	
  were	
  located	
  her	
  employer	
  Goodwin	
  
Management,	
  the	
  property	
  manager	
  locked	
  out	
  her	
  access	
  to	
  her	
  emails	
  and	
  the	
  
records	
  of	
  the	
  Association.	
  	
  Again	
  appellee’s	
  were	
  playing	
  hide	
  the	
  ball,	
  a	
  million	
  
dollar	
  budget	
  with	
  no	
  oversight	
  by	
  the	
  homeowners’.	
  	
  Ms.	
  Bottema	
  contradicted	
  
the	
  sworn	
  testimony	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  when	
  she	
  denied	
  being	
  replaced	
  by	
  Natalie	
  
Boykin	
  because	
  of	
  her	
  poor	
  performance	
  and	
  locked	
  out	
  of	
  her	
  email.	
  	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  
47.	
  
34	
  See	
  Court	
  record	
  p.	
  1059	
  and	
  Transcript	
  of	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  

Phillips	
  Exhibit	
  34,	
  Vol.	
  3.	
  Emails	
  to	
  Darryl	
  Sanders,	
  Court	
  Operations	
  Officer	
  
requesting	
  that	
  appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  be	
  heard	
  before	
  the	
  parties	
  Cross	
  
Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  
35	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  November	
  7,	
  2014,	
  

Emails	
  requesting	
  appellants’	
  three	
  Motions	
  to	
  Compel	
  Discovery	
  be	
  heard	
  prior	
  to	
  the	
  
parties	
  cross	
  Motions	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  p.	
  36-­‐39.	
  	
  
36	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  the	
  appellant’s	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  November	
  7,	
  

2014,	
  testimony	
  of	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  p.	
  41-­‐54.	
  
37	
  See	
  Transcript	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  November	
  7,	
  2014,	
  testimony	
  of	
  

Wesley	
  Spears	
  p.	
  41-­‐54	
  and	
  Darryl	
  Sanders	
  p.	
  13-­‐22.	
  	
  Mr.	
  Sanders’	
  admits	
  that	
  he	
  was	
  	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           81.	
  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
the	
  only	
  Court	
  Operations	
  Officer	
  involved	
  in	
  this	
  matter	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  hearing	
  of	
  the	
  
parties	
  Cross	
  Motion	
  for	
  Summary	
  Judgment	
  and	
  that	
  he	
  never	
  gave	
  counsel	
  for	
  the	
  
appellants’	
  any	
  instructions	
  informing	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  in	
  appropriate	
  to	
  ask	
  for	
  a	
  setting	
  by	
  	
  
email.	
  	
  He	
  admits	
  in	
  hindsight	
  he	
  should	
  have	
  given	
  those	
  instructions	
  and	
  it	
  was	
  his	
  
job	
  to	
  give	
  those	
  instructions	
  and	
  it	
  was	
  his	
  job	
  to	
  respond	
  to	
  counsel	
  for	
  the	
  
appellants’	
  email.	
  	
  Appellants’	
  should	
  not	
  lose	
  their	
  case	
  because	
  of	
  an	
  inadvertent	
  
mistake	
  by	
  the	
  Court	
  Operations	
  Officer	
  or	
  appellants’	
  counsel,	
  especially	
  after	
  it	
  was	
  
brought	
  to	
  the	
  court’s	
  attention.	
  	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  abused	
  his	
  discretion	
  when	
  he	
  refused	
  
to	
  correct	
  this	
  wrong	
  at	
  the	
  Hearing	
  of	
  Appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  New	
  Trial.	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  
again	
  denied	
  appellants’	
  request	
  that	
  that	
  the	
  court	
  hear	
  their	
  three	
  Discovery	
  Motions	
  
and	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  to	
  Complete	
  Discovery,	
  in	
  their	
  Motion	
  for	
  New	
  Trial,	
  
Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  1105-­‐1119.	
  	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  116,	
  email	
  from	
  Darryl	
  Sanders,	
  Court	
  
Operations	
  Officer,	
  to	
  counsel	
  for	
  the	
  appellants	
  specifically	
  asking	
  that	
  counsel	
  for	
  the	
  
appellants	
  should	
  contact	
  his	
  office	
  only	
  by	
  email	
  to	
  avoid	
  any	
  ex	
  parte	
  
communications,	
  with	
  copy	
  to	
  opposing	
  counsel.	
  	
  Counsel	
  for	
  the	
  appellants’	
  was	
  
following	
  the	
  directions	
  of	
  the	
  Court	
  Operations	
  Officer.	
  
38	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  November	
  7,	
  2014,	
  p.	
  20.	
  	
  	
  	
  
39	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips,	
  November	
  7,	
  2014,	
  p.	
  19-­‐20.	
  
40	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  November	
  7,	
  2014,	
  p.	
  22	
  L1-­‐L12.	
  
41	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  116	
  Email	
  from	
  Darryl	
  Sanders	
  to	
  counsel	
  for	
  appellants	
  asking	
  

them	
  to	
  communicate	
  with	
  him	
  by	
  email	
  to	
  avoid	
  ex	
  parte	
  communications.	
  
42	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  November	
  7,	
  2014	
  p.	
  21-­‐22.	
  
43	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  November	
  7,	
  2014,	
  p.	
  21,	
  L1-­‐25.	
  
44	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  Hearing	
  November	
  7,	
  2014,	
  

testimony	
  of	
  Cathy	
  Mata	
  P	
  11	
  L	
  1	
  through	
  p	
  12	
  L	
  7.	
  
45	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  p.	
  12	
  L.	
  8	
  to	
  L22.	
  	
  	
  
46	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  p.	
  11	
  L20	
  to	
  page	
  12	
  L4.	
  
47	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  40,	
  Judge	
  Wisser	
  Order	
  denying	
  Appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  

Judge	
  Phillips.	
  
48	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  30-­‐31,	
  Attorney	
  Alex	
  Valdes’	
  November	
  26,	
  2013,	
  Letter	
  announcing	
  

the	
  decision	
  of	
  the	
  Board	
  finding	
  the	
  appellants’	
  in	
  violation	
  based	
  on	
  it’s	
  “business	
  
judgment”.	
  
49	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.3	
  Bottema’s	
  email	
  representing	
  that	
  appellants’	
  were	
  not	
  entitled	
  to	
  

a	
  Hearing.	
  
50	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  79-­‐80,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Deposition	
  for	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  Appendix.	
   	
  
51	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  July	
  1,	
  2014,	
  Hearing	
  of	
  Appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  Deposition	
  of	
  

Diane	
  Bottema	
  p.	
  23-­‐26.	
  
52	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  the	
  Hearing	
  Appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Recuse	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  November	
  

7,	
  testimony	
  of	
  Cathy	
  Mata	
  p.	
  66	
  L	
  16	
  to	
  L21	
  and	
  P.	
  67	
  L	
  17	
  to	
  L22.	
  
53	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Hearing	
  Appellants	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel,	
  July	
  1,	
  2014,	
  p.	
  24	
  L	
  4	
  

through	
  p.	
  26	
  L.	
  10.	
  	
  
54	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  1176-­‐1186	
  bias	
  and/or	
  sarcastic	
  comments	
  made	
  by	
  Judge	
  

Phillips	
  to	
  counsel	
  for	
  appellant.	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           82.	
  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
55	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  1	
  Email	
  to	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  from	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  responding	
  to	
  the	
  

first	
  violation	
  letter.	
  	
  
56	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  2,	
  Email	
  from	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  to	
  requesting	
  the	
  fence	
  to	
  be	
  moved	
  in	
  

front	
  of	
  the	
  pool	
  pump.	
  	
  
57	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  68-­‐69,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  79-­‐80.	
  
58	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  1,	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  dated	
  October	
  22,	
  2013.	
  
59	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  1,	
  Violation	
  Notice	
  dated	
  October	
  22,	
  2013.	
  
60	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  30-­‐31,	
  Valdes	
  letter	
  dated	
  November	
  26,	
  2013	
  
61	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  30-­‐31,	
  Valdes	
  letter	
  dated	
  November	
  26,	
  2013.	
  	
  
62	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  100,	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  Section	
  209.006	
  and	
  the	
  Bylaws	
  of	
  the	
  

Association.	
  
63	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  7-­‐23,	
  Bylaws	
  of	
  the	
  Association.	
  	
  	
  The	
  only	
  notes	
  of	
  the	
  11-­‐13-­‐13,	
  

Hearing	
  were	
  contained	
  in	
  handwritten	
  minutes	
  of	
  the	
  11-­‐13-­‐2013,	
  by	
  Diane	
  
Bottema.	
  	
  Ms.	
  Bottema’s	
  notes	
  do	
  not	
  comply	
  with	
  Tex.	
  Prop.	
  Code	
  §	
  209.006	
  
because	
  they	
  do	
  not	
  indicate	
  the	
  sanction	
  imposed.	
  
64	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  7-­‐23,	
  Bylaws	
  of	
  the	
  Association	
  	
  
65	
  See	
  Violation	
  Notice,	
  dated	
  October	
  22,	
  2013,	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  1.	
  
66	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  788,	
  789,	
  790,	
  791	
  Appellants’	
  requests	
  for	
  documents.	
  
67	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  32-­‐33,	
  letter	
  from	
  Alex	
  Valdes,	
  Esq.,	
  January	
  13,	
  2014	
  
68	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  90-­‐93	
  Texas	
  Property	
  Code	
  §	
  209.005.	
  
69	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  32-­‐33	
  letter	
  from	
  Alex	
  Valdes,	
  Esq.,	
  January	
  13,	
  2014.	
  
70	
  See	
  statement	
  by	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  indicating	
  the	
  rules	
  change	
  once	
  suit	
  if	
  filed	
  

transcript	
  July	
  1,	
  2014,	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  1176	
  to	
  1186.	
  
71	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  dated	
  May	
  28,	
  2014	
  p.	
  Court	
  Record	
  1176-­‐

1186.	
  
72	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  792-­‐793,	
  letter	
  from	
  Alex	
  Valdes,	
  Esq.,	
  dated	
  January	
  13,	
  2014.	
  	
  	
  
73	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  788,	
  789,	
  790,	
  791	
  Appellants’	
  requests	
  for	
  documents	
  

	
  and	
  Appellee’s	
  responses	
  to	
  Appellants’	
  requests	
  for	
  records	
  792-­‐793,	
  794,	
  793-­‐
796,	
  797.	
  	
  
74	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  appellants’,	
  December	
  9,	
  2013,	
  letter	
  to	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  p.	
  788.	
  
75	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  letter	
  from	
  Alex	
  Valdes	
  Esq.,	
  to	
  Wesley	
  Spears,	
  dated	
  January	
  13,	
  

2014	
  p.	
  792-­‐793.	
  	
  	
  
76	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  34	
  appellants’	
  letter	
  to	
  David	
  Campbell	
  dated	
  May	
  23,	
  2014	
  
77	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  788-­‐791,	
  letter	
  from	
  David	
  Campbell	
  to	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  dated	
  

June	
  10,	
  2014.	
  
78	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  788-­‐791,	
  Appellants’	
  letter	
  to	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  dated	
  June	
  12,	
  

2014.	
  
79	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  788-­‐791,	
  letter	
  from	
  David	
  Campbell	
  to	
  the	
  appellants	
  dated	
  

June	
  18,	
  2014.	
  	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  788-­‐791	
  and	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  407,	
  Plaintiff’s	
  Motion	
  
for	
  Partial	
  Summary	
  Judgment,	
  Exhibit	
  15,	
  letter	
  to	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  requesting	
  copies	
  
of	
  all	
  the	
  books	
  and	
  records	
  of	
  the	
  Association,	
  dated	
  June	
  18,	
  2014.	
  
	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           83.	
  
	
  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
80	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  788-­‐791,	
  Letter	
  from	
  David	
  Campbell	
  to	
  appellants	
  dated	
  June	
  

20,	
  2014.	
  	
  	
  	
  
81	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  788,	
  789,	
  790,	
  791	
  Appellants’	
  requests	
  for	
  documents.	
  	
  
82	
  See	
  Appendix	
  	
  p.	
  72-­‐84,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  the	
  Depositon	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken,	
  Exhibit	
  2,	
  

documents	
  produced	
  by	
  Mr.	
  Ficken	
  at	
  his	
  deposition.	
  	
  
83	
  See	
  Court	
  record	
  appellee’s	
  responses	
  to	
  appellants’	
  requests	
  for	
  records	
  792-­‐793,	
  

794,	
  793-­‐796,	
  797.	
  
84	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  804-­‐816	
  appellants’	
  Fourth	
  Amended	
  Complaint	
  804-­‐816.	
  	
  See	
  

also	
  Court	
  Record	
  appellants’	
  Fifth	
  Amended	
  Complaint	
  p	
  922-­‐939.	
  	
  	
  
85	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  119,	
  U.S.	
  Const.	
  Amendment	
  14.	
  	
  
86	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  120,	
  Texas	
  Const.	
  Art.	
  1	
  § 19.	
  
87	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p	
  965-­‐966,	
  Affidavit	
  of	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  attached	
  to	
  appellants’	
  

Motion	
  for	
  Continuance.	
  	
  
88	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  37,	
  Court’s	
  Order	
  Granting	
  Appellee’s	
  Motion	
  for	
  Traditional	
  and	
  

No-­‐Evidence	
  Summary	
  Judgment.	
  
89	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  Affidavit	
  of	
  Wesley	
  Spears	
  attached	
  as	
  an	
  exhibit	
  to	
  Appellant’s	
  

Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  961-­‐968.	
  
90	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  113-­‐114,Texas	
  Deceptive	
  Trade	
  Practices	
  Act	
  §§	
  17.50	
  and	
  1746.	
  
91	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  63-­‐67,	
  Transcript	
  of	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Ranier	
  Ficken	
  pages	
  42-­‐46.	
  
92	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  966-­‐968,	
  Affidavits	
  of	
  Jonathan	
  Concepcion	
  and	
  Vahness	
  

Swilley	
  Concepcion	
  attached	
  to	
  Appellants’	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  attesting	
  to	
  the	
  
fact	
  that	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears’	
  name	
  was	
  left	
  off	
  the	
  ballot	
  for	
  neighborhood	
  
representative	
  in	
  support	
  of	
  appellants	
  DTPA	
  claims.	
  	
  
93	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  Motion	
  for	
  Continuance	
  election	
  ballots	
  with	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  

Spears	
  name	
  omitted	
  Court	
  Record	
  961-­‐968	
  not	
  legible.	
  	
  See	
  also,	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  
legible	
  copies	
  of	
  election	
  ballots	
  with	
  appellant,	
  Wesley	
  Spears’	
  name	
  omitted	
  
Exhibit	
  to	
  Ranier	
  Ficken’s	
  deposition.	
  
94	
  See	
  Court	
  Record	
  p.	
  863-­‐873,	
  Appellee’s	
  Motion	
  to	
  Quash	
  the	
  deposition	
  of	
  Diane	
  

Boykin.	
  
95	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  121,Texas	
  Rules	
  of	
  Civ.	
  Proc.,	
  Rule	
  18b(b)(1).	
  
96	
  See	
  Appendix	
  p.	
  122,	
  Texas	
  Rules	
  of	
  Civ.	
  Proc.,	
  Rule	
  18a	
  (j)	
  (2)	
  
97	
  See	
  Statements	
  by	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  demonstrating	
  his	
  bias:	
  	
  See	
  Transcript	
  of	
  July	
  1,	
  

appellants’	
  Motion	
  to	
  Compel	
  Deposition	
  of	
  Diane	
  Bottema	
  p.	
  23-­‐26,	
  Judge	
  Phillips	
  
made	
  the	
  following	
  comments:	
  “The	
  Court:	
  You	
  got	
  good	
  common	
  sense	
  I	
  hope.	
  	
  Mr.	
  
Spears:	
  I	
  think	
  so.	
  	
  The	
  court:	
  That’s	
  what	
  were	
  counting	
  on…	
  Counsel,	
  when	
  they	
  first	
  
came	
  here	
  and	
  filed	
  their	
  motion	
  for	
  summary	
  judgment,	
  they	
  felt	
  there	
  wasn’t	
  any	
  
discovery	
  that	
  was	
  necessary	
  before	
  the	
  summary	
  judgment	
  motions	
  were	
  heard.	
  	
  I	
  
know	
  agree	
  with	
  them….	
  The	
  court:	
  I	
  was	
  going	
  to	
  ask	
  if	
  you	
  filed	
  a	
  request	
  for	
  
production.	
  	
  Mr.	
  Spears:	
  Yes.	
  And	
  I	
  requested	
  all	
  the	
  Books	
  and	
  Records	
  of	
  the	
  
Association,	
  which	
  is	
  everything.	
  	
  The	
  Court:	
  You’re	
  not	
  going	
  to	
  get	
  that.	
  	
  Mr.	
  Spears:	
  	
  
Well,	
  I	
  will	
  get	
  whatever	
  I’m	
  going	
  to	
  get.	
  	
  The	
  Court:	
  	
  Well,	
  no.	
  	
  They’re	
  going	
  to	
  object	
  
that	
  it’s	
  overly	
  broad	
  and	
  burdensome	
  and	
  I’m	
  going	
  to	
  sustain	
  it…	
  The	
  Court:	
  	
  
Shakespeare	
  wrote	
  a	
  play	
  about	
  this	
  case	
  didn’t	
  he?	
  I	
  can’t	
  remember	
  whether	
  it	
  was	
  a	
  	
  
	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           84.	
  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
“Comedy	
  of	
  Errors”	
  or	
  “Much	
  Ado	
  about	
  Nothing.	
  	
  Mr.	
  Spears:	
  Well,	
  it	
  is	
  much	
  ado	
  
about	
  nothing.	
  	
  I	
  agree	
  with	
  you	
  there.”	
  	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           85.