Court Opinion

ID: 9537188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:13:59.963996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:11.304670
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins.
On August 1, 1985, seven-year-old Kumi Mostert drowned when the vehicle in which she was a passenger stalled and was swept into the main flood channel of Dry Creek in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The trial court *1102granted appellee American Multi Cinema, Inc.’s (AMC) motion to dismiss with prejudice and granted appellee Frontier Mall complex owners’, CBL & Associates (CBL), motion for summary judgment. Appellant Gerrit Mostert appeals.
The district court, in its decision letter dismissing this case, stated:
“Plaintiffs have been unable * * * to cite any authority for the proposition that an owner or occupier of land has a legal duty to business invitees to warn them, prior to their leaving the premises, of dangers that may exist at some point remote from the premises between it and the patrons’ destination even if such dangers are known to the owner/occupier and unknown to the business invitee.”
I concur in the decision of the court affirming summary judgment as to CBL but dissent with respect to reversal of the dismissal of AMC.
FACTS
On the evening of August 1, 1985, the Mosterts and their seven-year-old daughter, Kumi, were patrons of American Frontier Six Theatres in the Frontier Mall complex in Cheyenne. While the Mosterts were viewing the 7:45 p.m. showing of “European Vacation,” radio announcements made by the national weather service warned of a severe thunderstorm and flash flooding. Civil defense and law enforcement officials requested that all citizens remain indoors. Cheryl Farris, a CBL employee, did not know of the flooding of Dry Creek. However, she had heard of adverse weather conditions and communicated that information to AMC and other mall tenants. The theatre owners did not advise their patrons of the weather warnings. When the movie ended at approximately 9:45 p.m., the Mosterts exited into the parking lot and began to drive home. If it was a dark night, the mall area was well lighted; and if this was to be a 100 year flood, no one knew it at that time. Perhaps only those driving around in the deep water could have predicted the storm might cause a 100 year flood. Mrs. Mostert, in her deposition, stated:
“Q. When you moved onto Del Range, you weren’t concerned that the six inches of water on the surface was dangerous. Is that your testimony?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Okay.
“A. Besides, there was one hundred other cars there.
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“Q. Now, you kept driving and the water got deeper?
“A. Right.”
Their Ford Ranger pickup continued on about two miles from the mall when it stalled as Mr. Mostert drove into the Dry Creek floodwaters. As the truck was carried downstream, Mr. Mostert attempted to carry Kumi to safety, but was unable to do so and she drowned. Appellant alleges that appellee AMC knew of the severity of the storm, but negligently failed to warn its patrons and failed to prevent the patrons from leaving the theatre.
The majority, in its opinion, candidly admits that:
“Historically, landowners owed no duty to warn or take action to prevent harm to invitees where the risks involved were outside their premises.”
This court, apparently adopting a philosophy that holds that for every misfortune that befalls man there must be a third party who should pay, undertakes to overrule all of the common law and to legislate what it thinks best for society. That neat bit of legislating is accomplished by simply stating that where no duty has ever existed before, “we find it appropriate to depart from the traditional rule that a landowner has no duty to warn an invitee of risks off the landowner’s premises.”
The court suggests support from cases cited as precedent that are not precedent at all, ignoring established law to find a duty where none exists. We have clearly stated the law of landowner liability for condition of premises to be that a business owner
“owes a duty to those whom he has expressly or impliedly invited to come on his premises to be reasonably sure that he is not inviting them into danger, and *1103he must exercise ordinary care and prudence to render his premises reasonably safe to visit. * * * The store owner must use ordinary care to keep the premises in a safe condition, and he is charged with an affirmative duty to protect visitors against dangers known to him and against dangers which he might discover by use of reasonable care.” Buttrey Food Stores Division v. Coulson, Wyo., 620 P.2d 549, 552, 20 A.L.R.4th 419 (1980).
The store owner’s duty to an invitee does not extend to dangerous conditions outside his premises. Johnson v. Hawkins, Wyo., 622 P.2d 941 (1981).
The unanimous rule is typified by Stedman v. Spiros, 23 Ill.App.2d 69,161 N.E.2d 590 (1959), a case in which a guest at a lodge left the lodge property and walked onto a state park where there was a cliff offering a spectacular view of the surrounding countryside. The guest fell off the precipice, dropping more than fifty feet, and sued the lodge for failing to warn of the danger. Id. 161 N.E.2d at 593. After pointing out that an innkeeper has the same duty to his guests as any other businessman to his invitees, and also noting that the lodge owner had no control over the state park, the Illinois court granted judgment to the lodge owner as a matter of law, stating:
“The issue presented here is how far beyond the premises over which the defendant had possession and control does defendant’s duty of due care extend to provide a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress for plaintiff. Clearly, if the brink of the precipice were a step or two from the defendant’s door, or from the stone patio to which defendant’s door opened, we would have a different case than is now presented to us. * * *
“Defendant could not, of course, be expected to warn against the innumerable hidden dangers in a seven hundred acre park, nor could he be expected to light those same potentially dangerous places during the darkness or when visibility is restricted.” Id. at 597-598. See also Brunsfeld v. Mineola Hotel and Restaurant, Inc., 119 Ill.App.3d 337, 74 Ill.Dec. 859, 456 N.E.2d 361 (1983) and cases cited therein.
A few courts have held that the duty of a possessor of business premises may extend to an area off the premises which is used by the possessor’s invitees for immediate ingress and egress to the premises. E.g., Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214, reh. denied 731 F.2d 888 (5th Cir.1984) (entrance way to hotel four feet from door); Ollar v. Spakes, 269 Ark. 488, 601 S.W.2d 868 (1980) (dangerous property must be adjacent); Piedalue v. Clinton Elementary School Dist. No. 32, Mont., 692 P.2d 20 (1984) (ditch next to driveway); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 579 (1971). But not a single jurisdiction has required a business possessor to warn his invitees of known dangers beyond the area of immediate ingress or egress. Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 151 F.2d 909 (7th Cir.1985); Stedman v. Spiros, supra, 161 N.E.2d at 596; Brunsfeld v. Mineola Hotel and Restaurant, Inc., supra, 456 N.E.2d at 366. See also Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 61 at 424 (1985), and Restatement (Second) Torts § 314A comment c and § 332 comment 1 (1965).
The court has not cited a single case in which a possessor of land has been held liable for failing to warn his invitees of dangerous conditions on land not under the possessor’s control. Instead, the cases cited in the majority opinion involve the conduct of dangerous persons, who, after leaving the premises, cause harm to others. These persons represent the instrument of danger and the cause of the harm. Division of Corrections, Dept. of Health & Social Services v. Neakok, Alaska, 721 P.2d 1121 (1986) (parolee); Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166, (1976); Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (mental patient); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408 (1983) (minor liquor purchaser). Here, the instrument of danger was a condition of premises two miles from the theatre. The cases have nothing to do with premises liability.
*1104The court, thus, relying upon cases having nothing to do with premises liability, seeks to buttress the opinion by incorrectly considering as support, again from a case having nothing to do with premises liability, key policy factors listed as:
“(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” Gates v. Richardson, Wyo., 719 P.2d 193, 196 (1986).
Although I seriously question the propriety of considering these policy factors in finding a duty in this case, a review of those factors proves interesting and suggests a result different from that reached by the majority.
1. Foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. The theatre was not warned of flooding. Would it have foreseen that a patron would drive onto Del Range Boulevard, running six inches of water and crowded with hundreds of cars, and drive two miles down the road into deepening water and finally into a flooded creek bed and this accident result? I think not.
2. The closeness of the connection between the defendants’ conduct and the injury suffered. I would conclude that the place of this accident being more than two miles from the theatre, the defendants’ conduct was remote from the injury suffered.
3. The degree of certainty that plaintiffs suffered injury is not questioned.
4. The moral blame attached to defendants’ conduct. It cannot be claimed that the theatre owners deliberately withheld information to cause harm to plaintiffs. Severe weather warnings, thunderstorms, hail, tornadoes, blizzards and ice are commonplace in Wyoming. It is doubtful that a warning would have made any difference, especially in light of the fact that hundreds of cars were travelling on Del Range Boulevard and all over Cheyenne.
5. The fifth consideration is a policy of preventing future harm. In light of what has been said in paragraph four, it is doubtful that this policy would be affected.
6. The extent of the burden upon the defendants. The extension of liability by the decision of this court is mind boggling. In the future, it will apply to every business in the mall, every business in Cheyenne, every person having any business relationship with another. It will subject persons to potential liability for injuries from accidents that occur two miles, ten miles, perhaps hundreds of miles from the business because of blizzard conditions, road closures, icing, heavy rains, tornadoes, even perhaps construction work of which the business may be aware. The business proprietor will have no control over the premises where the accident occurs, no ability or right to remedy any defect, and no control over the actions or risks undertaken by his customer.
7. The consequences to the community and the court system. It has long been a practice to join as a party defendant every person with any potential liability for injuries suffered in an accident. Thus, in an auto accident, it has been common for suit to be filed against not only the drivers of the cars involved but the city for posting of warning or traffic signs, the state of Wyoming for construction of its highways, the manufacturer of the car for defective design, and manufacturers of component parts of the cars. Now I expect we will see mall owners and businesses also joined as parties for failure to warn in all accidents in which weather is in any way involved.
8. The availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. It is doubtful whether insurance exists for this kind of liability, but if it does exist, it will be exceedingly expensive. When the the-atre must pay expensive insurance premiums to cover these claims, the money must come from somewhere. The only place it can come from is theatre tickets. We have *1105seen the cost of ski lift tickets ascend from $12.00 to $35.00 in just a few seasons. It is not unreasonable to believe that the cost of theatre tickets might double or triple if theatre owners might be held liable for accidents that result from rain storms or blizzard conditions ten, twenty, or thirty miles away from the theatre after the patrons have left to return home.
Balancing all of the above factors, it seems that the journey upon which this court now embarks in expanding liability is not justified by the review of factors to determine effect and not in the best interest of society.
The real issue in this case is whether the Wyoming Supreme Court should overrule its own precedent and the common law and create a duty unknown in any other American jurisdiction. The trial court thought we should not. I agree.
I would affirm.