Court Opinion

ID: 9613504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:17:36.607848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:29.648622
License: Public Domain

*1101MOSK, J.
I dissent.
The majority acknowledge that “[a] change in circumstances is required before a court has jurisdiction to extend or otherwise modify probation.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1095.) I agree. They go on to assert, quoting the Court of Appeal, that such a change in circumstances “could be found in a fact ‘not available at the time of the original order,’ namely, ‘that setting the pay schedule consistent with defendant’s ability to pay had resulted in defendant’s inability to pay full restitution as contemplated within the original period of probation.’ ” (Ibid.) Here I disagree.
Information on defendant’s economic status was available at sentencing and cannot be considered a new fact merely because the court overlooked it. The failure of full restitution cannot be attributed to any default on defendant’s part; he made each and every payment required by the pay schedule. The court should have considered whether setting the pay schedule consistent with defendant’s income would allow full restitution to be paid in the probation period.
The extension of a probation period must be based on a change in circumstances relevant to the defendant’s ability to fulfill the terms of probation. For example, in People v. Miller (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 348, 354 [64 Cal.Rptr. 20], tibe court extended the probation period to allow the defendant to make further restitution payments after it learned that he had defrauded additional creditors.1 In In re Peeler (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 483, 491 [72 Cal.Rptr. 254], the court imposed additional conditions on the defendant’s probation after it became aware that she was married to, and planned to live with, a man charged with narcotics violations. Finally, in In re Medina (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 562, 564 [191 Cal.Rptr. 783], the court imposed additional conditions of probation after it learned that the defendant committed another crime while free on bail, pending an appeal of the original judgment granting him probation.
In the present case, there is no change in circumstances affecting defendant’s ability to make restitution. As noted, the trial court did not consider the available facts. It cannot use its own default to burden a defendant who has faithfully fulfilled the precise terms of his probation. Accordingly, its exten*1102sion of defendant’s term of probation is improper. Although a change in circumstances can be found in many situations, I cannot find it here.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Kennard, J., concurred.

In People v. Richards (1976) 17 Cal.3d 614, 622-623, footnote 6 [131 Cal.Rptr. 537, 552 P.2d 97], we questioned the Miller court’s order of modification because it was made without proof that the defendant breached his contracts with the other creditors with the same fraudulent intent that formed the basis of his original theft conviction. The issue in Richards was whether a restitution order served a rehabilitative purpose. The opinion did not call into question the requirement that a modification order must be based on new facts.