Court Opinion

ID: 9809369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:10:22.772518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:36.047860
License: Public Domain

BeowN, J.,
dissenting: My convictions compel me to dissent from tbe judgment of a majority of my brethren, .and, as I regard it a matter of vital importance to tbe profession of tbe law, I will give my reasons as briefly as I can.
These two applicants have each filed a certificate that he is a person of good moral character, sigued by two attorneys of repute. Notwithstanding this, other reputable and high-standing members of. our profession protest against licensing these applicants upon the ground that they are men of bad character and unworthy to fill the responsible position of attorney at law, and they offer us evidence which, they claim, tends to prove that one of the applicants has been conducting the general business of a usurer and extortioner, and who has *20preyed upon and swindled tbe poor and ignorant negroes of bis community. Against tbe other it is charged that be was implicated in burning bis own store for tbe insurance money; and it is claimed as to both applicants that they do not possess good moral characters. As to whether tbe charges have been sustained I am unable, and it is unnecessary, to say. They have offered absolute denial and strong proof to contradict the charges. The judgment of the Court precludes an examination of the evidence, upon the ground that the General Assembly of 1905 in- adopting the Bevisal has taken from this Court the right to determine whether an applicant is a person of good moral character and committed the conclusive and final determination of that highly important matter to any two attorneys authorized to practise in this Court who may be selected by the applicant and who may be complaisant enough to give the necessary certificate. I am of opinion, first, that the construction placed upon the act is erroneous; second, that when the power to grant licenses is possessed by this Court, from whatever source derived, the exercise of it by the Court is a judicial act, and cannot be controlled in any material feature by the Legislature.
Prior to the Act of 1905 it is admitted that this Court not only passed upon the applicant’s legal qualifications, but also upon his upright character. Eor its own information and guidance, the Court formulated rules which the applicant must comply with preliminary to his examination. Among others was the one requiring a certificate of good moral character. Eor some reason or other, the wisdom of which is not apparent to me, the commissioners in compiling the Bevisal of 1905 saw fit to embody these rules of Court in the Bevisal, and, consequently, when that compilation was adopted en bloc by the General Assembly, these rules of Court became a part of the statute law of the State.
It seems to me to be incontrovertible that the possession of a good moral character ought to be and is a necessary legal *21requirement to admission to tbe bar, and I cannot for a moment suppose that the eminent and reputable lawyers who compiled the Kevisal, or the Legislature which adopted their work, intended to take from this Court the right, which it has always exercised, to pass on that question. I say, with entire deference, that such a construction is too narrow and is sticking too much in the bark. "Qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice Broom Max., 685.
The public policy of our State has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he possessed- an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Buffin. ■
Is it possible that the insertion of this precautionary rule of Court into our statute law has brought about the very thing the rule was intended to guard against, viz., the possible, nay, probable admission of immoral persons to the bar? Is it possible that it compels this Court to grant licenses to persons of bad character, notwithstanding the apparent purpose of the statute is to. prevent that very thing? I do not think there can be a reasonable doubt that the purpose of the statute, and the motive that inspired its passage, is to keep the legal profession free of bad men. The profession of the law is one of the most important of all professions. The relation between attorney and client is very confidential, and often involves' matters of the greatest delicacy, and it is of the highest possible importance to the welfare of the people of the State that *22those who are entrusted with their most important and private matters should be men of upright character.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to- be incapable of being used in more than one*sense; and a literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity and fail to carry out the real purpose of the Legislature. 'When this is the case, courts should have recourse to Lord Wensleydale’s Golden Rule, 2 App. Cas., 164, and let the spirit and purpose of the law control its letter, and so construe it as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief aimed at by the framers. “The intention of the Legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, are to control the literal interpretation of particular language in a statute, and language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in that sense which will harmonize with such intention and object and effect the purpose of the enactment.” 26 Am. and Eng. Encyc. Law, 602, and cases cited. As illustrative of this idea, common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the Statute of 1 Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of a felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire, “for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.” So I hold in this case that an act of the Legislature, the undoubted purpose of which is to keép bad men out of an important profession, should not be. so interpreted as to easily let bad men in. The words should be interpreted with reference to the object to be accomplished, for the legislative intention is easily deducible from the subject-matter of the statute, and its unmistakable purpose should be given full effect by this Court. Rex v. Hall, 8 E. C. L., 59; U. S. v. Caldwell, 19 Wall., 264; Opinion of Justices, 7 Mass., 523. The purpose of the act being to exclude men of bad character from the profession, it follows logically that the certificates of good character are merely a preliminary requisite before the applicant can be examined as to his legal *23acquirements. They make out a prima facie case, and, if uncohtr.adieted, entitle the applicant to his license if he passes the legal examination. The statute only prescribes what legal effect shall be given to a particular species of evidence if it stands alone and uncontradicted. State v. Barrett, 138 N. C., 634. To hold that, when contradicted and evidence contra is offered, the certificates are conclusive and this Court cannot examine into the truth of the facts stated in them, is to frustrate and destroy the very noble purpose the Legislature plainly had in view. It is holding substantially that the law does not require good moral character, but only certificates thereof. There is a somewhat similar requirement in New Jersey, yet-the Justices of the Supreme Court of that State hold that they are not limited in their inquiry as to the moral character of an applicant for an attorney’s license to the certificate, but will, and are bound, in cases attended with suspicious circumstances, to look behind it. I commend the exalted tone of their opinion, from ’which I extract the following: “The power of the Court to reject the applicant on the ground of moral delinquency is clear and unquestionable. The power, it is admitted, is one of great delicacy, and should be exercised with extreme caution and with a scrupulous regard for the character and rights of the applicant. But on the other hand, the standing of the profession must not be disregarded, nor must the Court shrink from the performance of a clear duty, however embarrassing.” Attorney’s License Case, 21 N. J. Law, 345. This continues to be the view of that Court, for I find a case as late as 1901 wherein the reasons are given at length for refusing license on the ground of disreputable conduct by the applicant. In re Harris, 49 At., 728.
In discussing the second proposition laid down by me, it is not necessary that I should deny to the General Assembly the power to regulate admissions to the bar. I can admit, for argument’s sake, that the General Assembly may commit the *24right to grant licenses to tbe Bar Association of the State or to some other agency, if it sees fit to do so. That is all that is decided in the case of In re Cooper, 22 N. Y., 67, so much relied on in the opinion of the Oonrt. But the proposition contended for by me is expressly held to be law in that very case, viz., that where power is conferred npon a court of justice, to be exercised by it as a court, the -action of the Court is regarded as judicial, irrespective of the source from whence the power is derived. Nor have the usages and customs of our mother country any bearing upon this question, as seems to be indicated in the opinion. The Inns of Court educated the lawyers in the legal profession and called them to the bar. In case of supposed injustice the candidate for admission could appeal to the twelve Judges in their visitorial capacity. They practically represented the judicial authority, although in theory .they constituted only a domestic forum of final authority to do what they regarded as proper under the circumstances. The English system is founded upon immemorial usage, and the fundamental idea underlying it is that the Court could best ascertain the qualifications of one desiring to practise before it from the judgment of those under whom he had prepared himself for work. We have no such system anywhere in this country, nor anything analogous to it.
In this country where the power is conferred upon the courts, or exercised by them upon the principles of the common law, without special statutory' authority, it is universally held that the Court acts' in its judicial capacity in granting admission to the bar. This is the opinion held by Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Secombe, 60 U. S., 13. Many courts hold that the power to admit is, like the power to remove, an inherent power in the Court, the exercise of which may be, as it often is, regulated by statute, but the statute' does not create it; that its exercise is necessary and incidental to the -Court for its own protection. State v. Winton, 11 Oregon, 456; Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind., 47.
*25In re Day, 181 Ill., 90, holds that the admission of attorneys is not the exercise of a ministerial power, but is the exercise of judicial power, and the following language of Selden, J., in In re Cooper, supra, is quoted with approval: “Attorneys and counsellors are not only officers of the Court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature, and hence their appointment may with propriety be entrusted to the courts, and the latter in performing this duty may very justly be considered as engaged in the exercise of their proper judicial functions.” In the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. Ill, page 281 (2 Ed.), it is said: “But the admission of an applicant to practise is a judicial act, and the attorney when admitted is an officer and member of the Court. The Legislature has no power, therefore, to provide that any person possessing certain qualifications must be admitted. It cannot assume' judicial powers; and in every case courts are vested with discretion as to whether any applicant is entitled to admission.” In support of this the writer cites many cases. The Wisconsin Supreme Court says: “The Legislature has indeed from time to time assumed power to prescribe rules for the admission of persons to practise.. When these have seemed reasonable and just it has generally, we think, been the pleasure of the courts to act upon such statutes, in deference to the wishes of a coordinate branch of the government, without considering the question of power.” In re Goodell, 39 Wis., 240. In this case the Court intimates plainly that if the regulation is unreasonable it will be disregarded.
The Supreme Court of Indiana holds that admission to the bar is a purely judicial function and that the power is inherent in the courts. In re Leach, 134 Ind., 671. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds the same, and speaking of an act of the Legislature upon the subject of admission to the bar says: “Moreover, it is as unwise as it is illegal. It is an imperative command to admit any person to practise law upon complying *26with, certain specified conditions. Yet between the time when the applicant has obtained bis certificate of good character from the Judge of the district, etc., and the presentation of the same to the Court which he seeks to enter, he may have committed some act which would render him an unfit person to practise law or even to associate with gentlemen. No such iron-clad rule would ever be adopted by the judiciary, to which the subject properly belongs. No Judge is bound to admit, -or can be compelled to admit, a person to practise law who is -not qualified or whose moral character is bad. The profession of the law is one of the highest and noblest ini the world. The relation between attorney and client is very close and involves matters of great delicacy. The attorney is an officer of the Court,, and is brought into close and intimate relations with the Court. Whether he shall be admitted, or 'whether he shall be disbarred, is a judicial and not a legislative question.” In re Splane, 123 Pa. St., 540.
I will not discuss the exclusive power of the General Assembly over the matter. Our statute plainly undertakes to vest in the Supreme Court as a court the power to grant licenses, in these words: “No person shall practise law without first obtaining license so to do from the Supreme Court.” The power is not given to the Justices as individuals, but to the Supreme Court, which represents the judicial power of the State in its highest form. It is plain to my mind that the qualifications necessary to admission to the bar, as fixed by the act, are that the applicant must be twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and of sufficient legal learning. The general grant of power to issue the license necessarily and by plain implication confers upon the Court in its judicial capacity the power to determine each of these necessary statutory qualifications. It is admitted that age and legal learning are necessary qualifications. Why is not good moral character likewise a necessary qualification? If it is not a necessary qualification, why require certificates to that effect? *27Why require them to be filed with the Clerk of this Court if they are not for the information of the Court? ,Why should the Court be informed of the applicant’s moral character if the Court is not to pass on it ? If the Court is to pass on it, can the Legislature control the.exercise of a judicial function by limiting the evidence to the certificates filed ? The Legislature can no more do so than it can limit the Court in its investigation of the candidate’s legal learning. Note the disastrous effect upon the profession of the law if the Court is bound by the certificate: Lawyers, on the average, are morally no better and no worse than other people. There are some black sheep in their ranks as in every calling. One black sheep who wishes to enter can apply to two black sheep who are already in to certify to his good moral character. Besult: more black sheep to degrade our noble profession. “Why should a citizen, even if he has committed some offense in the past, be deprived of the privilege of turning his face the other way and making an honorable effort to gain his living by the practice of law ?” asks the Court. I am one of the last of men to place an obstacle in the way of the penitent who has reformed. But I wish to know that he has in truth reformed, and, to be sure of it, I claim the right to investigate. A desire to enter the ranks of the law is no evidence of repentance of one’s sins. I do not know a more profitable field for gifted rascals to exercise their talents in than in the practice of it. This makes it all the more important that the courts should be vigilant to keep them out. “It is not enough,” says the Supreme Court of Connecticut, “for an attorney that he be honest. He must be that and more. He must be believed to be honest. It is absolutely essential to the usefulness of an attorney that he be entitled to the confidence of the community wherein he practises.” County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn., 11.
To prevent the admission to this honorable and important profession of any one not thus entitled to public confidence, *28tbis Court, and afterwards tbe Legislature, adopted these regulations. „ It is our duty to give them that broad and liberal construction which will effectuate the wise and beneficent purpose intended. It must not be understood from this opinion that I hold the applicants guilty of the charges pre-feiued against them.. We-are precluded from passing on their guilt by the judgment of the Court.