Court Opinion

ID: 9715979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:22:01.967514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:40.353654
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LaPORTA, dissenting: I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s improper comments to defense counsel were harmless error. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court’s treatment of defense counsel contaminated the entire proceeding to such a degree that defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63 (107 Ill. 2d R. 63), incorporating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides, inter alia, that a judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before him, should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, and lawyers, and should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law (107 Ill. 2d Rules 63(A)(2), (A)(3)). Thus, the primary objective of the trial judge is to conduct a fair and unbiased trial. My reading of the record in this case indicates that throughout the trial, the court engaged in abusive and insulting behavior toward defense counsel, but did not display the same behavior toward the prosecutor. For example, the trial judge referred to defense counsel’s conduct as “supercilious” and “unfair” and twice called him “unprofessional.” The court chastised defense counsel for inappropriately arguing objections, but did not comment at all when the prosecutor argued an objection in a similar manner. The trial judge suggested during a side bar that defense counsel “[e]at some skin-toughening food over lunch.” The judge criticized him for admonishing witnesses when defendant’s attorney had done no such thing, and directed counsel not to make editorial comments when none had been made. Other remarks made by the court to defense counsel were sarcastic and clearly designed to denigrate and humiliate him. Although some of the court’s comments were made outside the presence of the jury, many of them were heard by the jury. Those remarks, which conveyed to the jury the judge’s belief that defense counsel was attempting to present his case in an improper manner, could only have had the inevitable effect of prejudicing defendant in the eyes of the jury. (People v. Finn (1959), 17 Ill. 2d 614, 162 N.E.2d 354.) Jurors are very aware of the attitudes and opinions of the judge, and any disclosure of disbelief or hostility by the court is very likely to influence them in arriving at their verdict. (People v. Santueci (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 93, 180 N.E.2d 491.) Such conduct by a trial judge is prejudicial error. (People v. Zaccagnini (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 408, 194 N.E.2d 286.) The record indicates that defense counsel did nothing more than attempt to fulfill his duties as an advocate. Yet, the trial court criticized and ridiculed him, suggesting to the jury that defense counsel was attempting to present his case in an improper manner. Moreover, the court’s treatment of defense counsel must have adversely affected his performance during the trial. Defendant was convicted on circumstantial evidence which I do not find to be overwhelming, and the court’s accusations of “unprofessional” or “unfair” conduct occurred while defense counsel was cross-examining the two most important witnesses. It is entirely possible that defendant is guilty of the crimes for which he was charged, but on this record, the jury did not have an opportunity to fairly evaluate the case against him and to determine his guilt or innocence based upon the evidence presented. The trial court’s comments interjected throughout the trial subjected defense counsel to repeated attacks on his ability to adequately and properly represent the defendant. It does not appear that the court’s treatment of defense counsel was justified, and its continuation throughout the trial must have conveyed to the jury a hostile attitude toward the defense. (Santucci, 24 Ill. 2d 93, 180 N.E.2d 491.) The trial court’s behavior would almost inevitably have prejudiced the defendant in the eyes of the jury. Finn, 17 Ill. 2d 614, 162 N.E.2d 354. Certainly the defendant was entitled to a fair and unbiased trial to test his guilt or innocence, and I am convinced that he did not get one. In my view he is entitled to a new trial. I would, therefore, reverse defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.