Court Opinion

ID: 9579756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:58:17.079988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:44.901539
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
(concurring). I agree that the defendant is immune from liability. In Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 596; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), this Court sought "to create a cohesive, uniform, and workable set of rules which . . . readily define the injured party’s rights and the governmental agency’s liability.” It was against this backdrop and our goal of remaining "faithful to the statutory language and legislative intent” of the government tort liability act1 that this Court recognized broad governmental immunity with narrowly drawn exceptions.2 Because Justice Riley’s offering remains faithful to these premises, I reluctantly join her opinion.
Admittedly, Justice Riley’s plain interpretation of the highway exception results in harsh consequences. Her interpretation, however, is defensible because it is in accord with the plain language of the statute3 and Ross’ command of broad governmental immunity with narrowly drawn exceptions. Furthermore, Justice Riley’s interpretation provides an exact standard, defining not only an injured party’s rights but the government’s poten*178tial liability. None of the other separate opinions satisfies each of these components.
Although I find Justices Brickley’s and Boyle’s interpretations preferable from a policy standpoint, I cannot in good conscience join either opinion. Justice Brickley’s interpretation does not provide a standard with which to guide both the bench and bar. The test is vulnerable to endless interpretation, encouraging recurrent appellate litigation. Justice Boyle’s interpretation, while more limited in scope, is not supported by the statutory language or post-Ross case law.
Finally, Justice Levin’s interpretation, while sympathetic to the plight of injured plaintiffs, effectively abrogates governmental immunity within the realm of highway transportation. While the Legislature obviously intended to except certain situations from the shield of governmental immunity, it certainly did not intend to provide limitless application of the highway exception.
I find it inconceivable that liability under the highway exception should be so severely limited, nevertheless for the reasons stated above, I am compelled to strictly construe the statute. The badly fractured opinions seen in this case and Mason v Wayne Co Bd of Comm’rs, 447 Mich 130; 523 NW2d 791 (1994), scream for legislative action. I urge the Legislature to provide a more exhaustive list of exclusions4 or revise the statute, illustrating the extent of the highway exception.

 MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq.

 See also Johnson v Ontonagon Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs, 253 Mich 465, 468; 235 NW 221 (1931) (statutes imposing liability in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed).

 The statute explicitly states the duty and liability of the responsible government agencies:
The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. [MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102X1).]

 The legal profession, government agencies, and potential plaintiffs would benefit greatly if the Legislature defined the term "other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102X1).