Court Opinion

ID: 9896599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 20:01:18.844439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.642323
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10191    Document: 29-1     Date Filed: 11/13/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10191
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       ANITA C. COOKE,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       SGT. RANDY DUANE BRASHEARS,
       OFFICER KENDARIOUS MAYFIELD,

                                                  Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-04680-ELR
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                       23-10191

                               ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Anita C. Cooke appeals the district court’s grant of the mo-
       tion to dismiss based on qualiﬁed immunity ﬁled by Sergeant
       Randy Duane Brashears and Oﬃcer Kendarious Mayﬁeld, in her
       lawsuit alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution under 42
       U.S.C. § 1983. Cooke asserts the district court erred in concluding
       arguable probable cause existed to (1) make a warrantless arrest of
       her; and (2) support an arrest application for her. After review, 1 we
       aﬃrm the district court.
             Cooke asserts Brashears and Mayﬁeld arrested and prose-
       cuted her based on the changing story of a minor, A.W., even
       though A.W. “was lying through his teeth when speaking to”
       Brashears and Mayﬁeld, such that “[a]ny reasonable police oﬃcer
       would or should have spotted these lies instantly,” and not relied on
       A.W.’s statements.
             As to false arrest, Cooke alleges Brashears and Mayﬁeld vio-
       lated her Fourth Amendment rights when they arrested her.
       Brashears and Mayﬁeld contend qualiﬁed immunity shields them

       1 We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss based on qualified

       immunity de novo. Chandler v. Sec. of Fla. Dept. of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198
       (11th Cir. 2012).
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       23-10191                 Opinion of the Court                            3

       from this claim because they had probable cause, or at least argua-
       ble probable cause, to arrest Cooke for the crimes charged.
               To survive a motion to dismiss,2 Cooke must have alleged
       suﬃcient facts to support a ﬁnding of a constitutional violation of
       a clearly established law. Chandler v. Sec. of Fla. Dept. of Transp., 695
       F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2012). In the context of an arrest, proba-
       ble cause exists “when the facts, considering the totality of the cir-
       cumstances and viewed from the perspective of a reasonable of-
       ﬁcer, establish ‘a probability or substantial chance of criminal activ-
       ity.’” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th Cir. 2022) (quot-
       ing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)). In assessing
       whether there was probable cause for an arrest, we “ask whether a
       reasonable oﬃcer could conclude that there was a substantial
       chance of criminal activity.” Id. at 902 (quotation marks and alter-
       ation omitted). “Probable cause does not require conclusive evi-
       dence and is not a high bar.” Id. at 899 (quotation marks omitted).
       “[A]rresting oﬃcers, in deciding whether probable cause exists, are
       not required to sift through conﬂicting evidence or resolve issues
       of credibility, so long as the totality of the circumstances present a
       suﬃcient basis for believing that an oﬀense has been committed.
       Nor does probable cause require certainty on the part of the po-
       lice.” Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002), abrogated
       on other grounds by Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945,
       1955 (2018).

       2 Cooke does not dispute that Brashears and Mayfield were engaged in a dis-

       cretionary function.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10191

              To determine whether there was probable cause for Cooke’s
       arrest, we ask whether a reasonable oﬃcer could have concluded
       there was a substantial chance she had committed the crimes of
       hijacking a motor vehicle, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1, kid-
       napping in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40, aggravated assault in
       violation of O.C.G.A § 16-5-21, and cruelty to children in the third
       degree in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(d).
              “A person commits the oﬀense of hijacking a motor vehicle
       in the ﬁrst degree when such person, while in possession of a ﬁre-
       arm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from an individual . . . by
       force or intimidation.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-44.1(b)(1). “A person com-
       mits the oﬀense of kidnapping when such person abducts or steals
       away another person without lawful authority or warrant and
       holds such other person against his or her will.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-
       40(a). “A person commits the oﬀense of aggravated assault when
       he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon . . . which, when used
       oﬀensively against a person, is likely to . . . result in serious bodily
       injury.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2). A person commits the oﬀense of
       cruelty to children when, “[s]uch person, who is the primary ag-
       gressor, intentionally allows a child under the age of 18 to witness
       the commission of a forcible felony, battery, or family violence bat-
       tery.” O.C.G.A.§ 16-5-70(d).
              According to Cooke’s own allegations, she was driving a sto-
       len truck with her pistol on the dashboard and A.W., a minor, in
       the backseat when she ﬁrst made contact with Mayﬁeld. When
       Mayﬁeld questioned A.W. regarding who owned the vehicle, A.W.
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       23-10191                Opinion of the Court                           5

       “gave conﬂicting answers” but eventually reported the truck be-
       longed to his father. At no point did A.W. suggest the truck be-
       longed to Cooke. While Cooke was talking to Mayﬁeld, another
       oﬃcer reported to Mayﬁeld that the truck had been reported sto-
       len. Cooke’s allegations state while A.W. originally stated his
       brother had willingly given Cooke keys to the truck, A.W. later
       stated “Cooke had taken the truck at gunpoint,” and accused
       Cooke of “pressing the barrel of her gun against his neck as she
       was driving him around the complex,” as well as “cocking the ham-
       mer back on her pistol, threatening to shoot him.” Although
       Cooke’s version of the facts is diﬀerent, the oﬃcers were not re-
       quired to sift through conﬂicting evidence or resolve issues of cred-
       ibility at the time of the arrest, so long as the totality of the circum-
       stances presented a suﬃcient basis for believing that an oﬀense had
       been committed. See Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1234. These allegations are
       enough to establish probable cause for hijacking a motor vehicle,
       kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children. Accord-
       ingly, the district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss
       on the false arrest claim.
              As to malicious prosecution, to allege a claim for malicious
       prosecution, Cooke must ﬁrst allege she suﬀered a seizure pursuant
       to legal process that violated the Fourth Amendment. Laskar v.
       Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020). Because the existence
       of “[p]robable cause renders a seizure pursuant to legal process rea-
       sonable under the Fourth Amendment[,] ... the presence of proba-
       ble cause defeats a claim that an individual was seized pursuant to
       legal process in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Washington,
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       6                         Opinion of the Court                      23-10191

       25 F.4th at 898 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). The ex-
       istence of probable cause to arrest Cooke for hijacking a motor ve-
       hicle, kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to children de-
       feats Cooke’s malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, the district
       court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss on this claim.
              The district court did not err in dismissing Cooke’s com-
       plaint based on Brashears’ and Mayﬁeld’s entitlement to qualiﬁed
       immunity. We aﬃrm.3
              AFFIRMED.

       3 The district court also dismissed Cooke’s state law claims, but Cooke does

       not appeal the dismissal of those claims in her brief. Thus, those claims are
       abandoned. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir.
       2014).