Court Opinion

ID: 9756076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:06:24.615791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:14.547380
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
I join in the opinion for the court, and offer this concurring opinion only to direct attention to two aspects of this *509case that, in addition to those commented upon in the opinion for the court, are important both to our decision here and to the law of sentencing in general.
In Commonwealth v. Wicks, 265 Pa.Super. 305, 401 A.2d 1223 (1979), this court summarized the responsibilities of a judge when imposing sentence. The first responsibility of the sentencing judge is a fact-finding responsibility; the judge must be sure that he has before him “sufficient information to enable him to make a determination of the circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Doyle, 275 Pa.Super. 373, 381, 418 A.2d 1336, 1340 (1979), citing Commonwealth v. Wicks, supra. The second responsibility of the sentencing judge is an application-and-explanation responsibility; the judge must apply to the information he has gathered the statutory guidelines specified in the Sentencing Code, Act of Dec. 30, 1974, P.L. 1052, No. 345, § 1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1321 et seq. (Supp.1977), and then explain on the record how that application has resulted in the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Doyle, supra, 275 Pa. Super. at 383, 418 A.2d at 1341. See Commonwealth v. Farrar, 271 Pa.Super. 435, 447-453, 413 A.2d 1094, 1101-1104 (1979) (discussing two major responsibilities of the sentencing judge). The first aspect of the present case to which I wish to direct attention concerns the sentencing judge’s fact-finding responsibility, the second aspect, the judge’s application-and-explanation responsibility.
-1-
It is apparent from the testimony at trial, the presentence report, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing, that here the sentencing judge had sufficient information concerning the circumstances of the offense and the character of appellant. Thus it would seem that the judge fulfilled one part of his fact-finding responsibility, gathering sufficient information. However, as part of his fact-finding responsibility, the sentencing judge also has a duty to abide by the facts he has gathered, and with respect to that part of his responsibility the sentencing judge here erred.
*510During the sentencing proceeding, the judge stated: “You have done nothing to change your position as I view it. You remain substantially gainfully unemployed and an unproductive member of society. The record does not disclose a single act wherein you have been truly supportive of the society in which you live.” N.T. Sentencing, Jan. 30, 1978, at 17. This statement was inconsistent with the facts gathered by the judge, which were as follows. Appellant was employed as a waitress at the Nexus Vegetarian Cafe-Art Studio. She was an art student at the time of her trial. While she was paid very little for her work as a waitress, she apparently used her employment at the cafe as a means of exhibiting her art works. Indeed, the record indicates that she had sold several art works.
The opinion for the court properly cites the sentencing judge’s inaccurate statement that appellant had not shown remorse. I believe that the judge’s statements regarding appellant’s employment represent an equally (if not more) serious failure to abide by the facts that had been gathered. A struggling artist is not an “unproductive member of society,” to be condemned as not “truly supportive of the society in which you live.” Furthermore, a person like appellant, awaiting sentence and therefore subject to the possibility of being sent to prison, may well be unable to find gainful or productive employment. The facts gathered by the sentencing judge cannot “enable him to make a determination of the . . . character of the defendant” unless the judge considers them in the context of the defendant’s situation.
-2-
In discharging his application-and-explanation responsibility, the sentencing judge committed three errors. One of these errors is identified in the opinion for the court: instead of applying the statutory guidelines specified in the Sentencing Code, the judge applied a concept of “retribution.” One may grant, and even urge, that a sentence may in one of its aspects constitute punishment for having committed a crime. The guidelines specified in the Sentencing *511Code do not forbid the judge, in determining what sentence to impose, from considering that the sentence will impose punishment. What the Code requires is that the judge must consider the facts he has found from a variety of perspectives. Thus, the judge is not to consider only what sentence, given the defendant’s criminal conduct, would represent appropriate punishment, but also such matters as whether the defendant “is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1322(10) (Supp. 1977), and whether “confinement of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to . his [dependents],” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1322(11) (Supp.1977). “Retribution” may be understood as implying vengeance, or as exacting an eye for an eye, and as the opinion for the court emphasizes, the Sentencing Code forbids the judge from basing his sentence on any such considerations. Cf. Commonwealth v. Doyle, supra, 275 Pa.Super. at 385, 418 A.2d at 1344 (judge’s use of word “punishment” did not mean “vengeance”). The other two errors, to which I wish to direct particular attention, were as follows:
First: When a sentence is vacated and the case remanded for resentencing, the sentencing judge should start afresh. Here, on remand the sentencing judge merely attempted to justify his original sentence.
It is settled that the sentencing judge should impose “the minimum sentence consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Wicks, supra (emphasis added). Had the judge taken a fresh view of the facts that had been gathered, it would have been apparent from consideration of appellant’s age, record, and the circumstances of the offense that probation, as the minimum sentence, was indicated.
Second: A statement of reasons for a sentence cannot be sufficient when it is no more than a legal conclusion. Here, the statement of reasons was a mere conclusion, unsupported, if not contradicted, by the facts on record.
In rejecting probation, as the minimum sentence, and in choosing total confinement, the maximum sentence, the *512judge stated that he feared that a sentence of less than total confinement would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. Why he had concluded that the seriousness of the offense would be depreciated he did not say. Moreover, he admitted that he did not know-and he cited no reason to believe-that appellant was likely to commit another crime. While section 1325 of the Sentencing Code recognizes that there will be cases in which a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the offense, the sentencing judge must still explain why in a particular case that would be so. As this court stated in Commonwealth v. Farr1ar, supra, 271 Pa.Super. at 452, 413 A.2d at 1103:
Upon imposing a sentence of total confinement, the sentencing judge must do more than merely echo one of these requirements. “The word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 [91 S.Ct. 2022, 2035, 29 L.Ed.2d 564] (1971). So with the Sentencing Code. The responsibilities it imposes on the sentencing judge do not fade away and disappear upon utterance of the formula that “a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime.” The judge must state, with reference to the record, why he believes that would be so. Only thus will the “appellate courts [be enabled] to ascertain whether the sentence imposed was based upon accurate, sufficient and proper information.” Commonwealth v. Riggins, supra [474 Pa.] at 131, 377 A.2d at 148.
Here the judge’s conclusion that a sentence of less than total confinement would depreciate the seriousness of the offense is not supported by the record. The facts as found by the jury are that appellant’s intent was not to cause serious injury. Without question, her conduct was unwarranted, and constituted a crime. Still, she went to the aid of her friend. Furthermore, she did show remorse for what she had done, and nothing in the record suggested that she was likely to commit another crime.
For the additional reasons expressed in this opinion, I join the opinion for the court, and concur with it that upon *513remand, the sentencing judge should impose no greater sentence than probation.