Court Opinion

ID: 9767352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:17:15.734328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:30.703158
License: Public Domain

*1086HYDE, J.
(dissenting). — I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion herein. I cannot agree that plaintiff’s proof concerted this case to a specific negligence ease. It may be conceded that the petition alleged negligence only in the operation of the bus but it did so in general terms and charged no specific act of negligent operation. (“* * * operated by one of its agents, servants and employees in a negligent manner, in that after she had boarded said bus and paid her fare and while she was walking in the center aisle thereof toward the back thereof with her face toward the back of said bus and with her back toward the front of said bus and where the operator or chauffeur thereof was sitting, said bus suddenly jolted and jerked in a violent and unusual manner.”) I do not think this petition can be construed to allege specific negligence. (See Boulos v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 359 Mo. 763, 223 S. W. (2d) 446; Belding v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 358 Mo. 491, 215 S. W. (2d) 506; Semler v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 355 Mo. 388, 196 S. W. (2d) 197; Price v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 220. Mo. 435, 119 S. W. 932.) In Bergfeld v. Kansas City Rys. Co., supra, 285 Mo. 654, 1. c. 665, 227 S. W. 106, 1. c. 109, it was said, “In order to allege specific negligence, as said in the Price case, there must not only be an averment as to the particular servants whose negligence is complained of, but it must also be pointed out wherein they, or either of them have been negligent. ’ ’ The petition herein did not do that.
I understand the theory of the principal opinion herein to be that plaintiff’s proof showed the specific negligence to be in the sudden application of the brakes. However, the opinion also holds that defendant’s Instruction No. 3 was not prejudicial because plaintiff did not show this sudden application of the brakes to be negligence in the emergency situation that arose while plaintiff was walking to the rear of the bus. It is said there was no proof of negligence because plaintiff failed to prove that the bus was not being driven in a proper manner as near the right side of the street as practicable.' In other words, plaintiff’s proof did not show that defendant had been guilty of any negligence that contributed to the emergency which required the sudden application of the brakes. If the sudden'application of the brakes by defendant’s operator was required by the emergency, then the only negligence of which the operator could have been guilty was some conduct which Contributed to bring about the emergency.
In this situation it seems to me it cannot be held that the case was converted from res ipsa to specific negligence because plaintiff’s proof did not make a jury case on specific negligence. I think plaintiff’s proof must be sufficient to make a jury case on specific negligence before the case can be changed from res ipsa to specific negligence. The rule is that "even though .a plaintiff’s evidence may tend to show the specific cause of the accident he will hevertheless *1087not lose the benefit of the doctrine, nor be deprived of the right to rely upon it in the submission of his ease, if, after his evidence is in, ‘the true cause is still left in doubt or is not clearly shown’ and that he only loses it when he “goes so far in.his own evidence as to point out, and- reveal his knowledge of, the specific act of negligence which was responsible for his injury. ” (Belding v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra, 215 S. W. (2d), 1. c. 510, and cases there cited.) The reason for the rule is that “a plaintiff can neither definitely state nor show that his injury was caused in a certain way and then allow the jury to speculate on whether it was caused in some other way.” (Sanders v. City of Carthage, 330 Mo. 844, 51 S. W. (2d) 529.) Surely a plaintiff has not clearly and definitely shown the specific act of negligence that caused his injury if his evidence is not sufficient to make a jury case on the issue. (On substantially the same kind of evidence as here, we said in the Belding case (215 S. W. (2d), 1. c. 510): “The reference in plaintiff’s evidence to the sudden application of the brakes may not be said to have so clearly pointed out and identified any specific act of negligence on the part of defendant or its driver as to have constituted a waiver of plaintiff’s right to-rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.”
Considering the case one in which plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the res ipsa rule, I think the trial court’s order granting a new trial on the ground that Instruction No. 3 was “misleading” should be affirmed. The principal opinion concedes that this is not ‘ ‘ the perfect instruction to be followed or used in other cases. ’ ’ That indicates some basis for the trial court’s action. However, if the trial court had overruled the motion for new trial, I might agree that Instruction No. 3 was not prejudicially erroneous when considered with the entire charge to the jury; but the situation is vastly different when the trial court exercises its judicial discretion to grant a new trial on the ground stated. “ ‘When a motion for new trial is sustained an appellate court will be more liberal in upholding such action than it might be in reversing a judgment on the same ground on appeal. Thompson v. St. Joseph Ry. L. H. & P. Co., 345 Mo. 31, 131 S. W. (2d) 574; see also Castorina v. Herrmann, 340 Mo. 1026, 104 S. W. (2d) 297; Taylor v. Farmers Bank of Chariton County, 349 Mo. 407, 161 S. W. (2d) 243. This is because the trial judge, having participated in the trial, had the best opportunity to determine the effect of any error; and granting a new trial is the exercise of judicial discretion which will be upheld unless abused or clearly erroneous.’ Teague v. Plaza Express Co., 356 Mo. 1186, 205 S. W. (2d) 563, 566.” (Tennison v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., Mo. Sup., 228 S. W. (2d) 718, 1. c. 721.) I think there are good reasons for the trial court’s conclusion that Instruction No. 3 was misleading and for that reason its action should be sustained.
*1088This instruction does not make it clear that an emergency does not excuse a party if such emergency resulted .from that party’s own negligence. (See Iman v. Walter Freund Bread Co., 332 Mo. 461, 58 S. W. (2d) 477, quoting Hall v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., Mo. Sup., 240 S. W. 175, 177; Lewis v. Zagata, 350 Mo. 446, 166 S. W. (2d) 541; 65 C. J. S. 412, Sec. 17c.) I do not agree that any of the requirements of the instruction upheld in Durmeier v. St. Louis County Bus Co., Mo. Sup., 203 S. W. (2d) 445, 1. c. 447, should be omitted. Certainly Instruction No. 3 herein did not make it clear, as did the instruction in the Durmeier case that, to require a verdict for defendant, it was necessary to find there was no negligence of its bus driver that directly contributed to create the emergency. Furthermore, the requirement in Instruction No. 3 “that the operator of said motorbus could not anticipate that plaintiff might have been injured by the stopping of said motorbus”, injected an issue foreign to tlie essentials of an emergency situation. (See A. L. I. Restatement of Torts, See. 296, comment b.) If there was a true emergency situation, there could not have been any time to anticipate anything after the emergency arose. A better requirement would have been “that the operator of said motorbus could not have anticipated that the automobile would suddenly swerve in front of the motorbiis.” That would present a material issqe on the creation of the emergency.
In Filkins v. Snavely, 359 Mo. 356, 221 S. W. (2d) 736, we approved an instruction on the law of emergency which very clearly hypothesized that the defendant was driving his vehicle on the proper side of the road, “without negligence on his part,” and then hypothesized the cause of the emergency and defendant’s action in a way which his evidence tended to show he acted. We held the trial court properly granted a new trial for failure to give such an instruction on the law of emergency. That is the kind of an instruction which I think should be given when an instruction is required on the law of emergency. While Instruction No. 3 did hypothesize that the bus operator was exercising the highest degree of care in the operation of the bus “under the circumstances,” the jury could have reasonably understood that the instruction in the use of the phrase “under the circumstances” referred to the hypothesized circumstances of the emergency only. Because of the' indefiniteness and lack of clarity of this instruction, the trial judge would have been warranted in believing that the jury returned a verdict for defendant because the jury found the bus driver exercised the highest degree of care upon being confronted by the emergency, although the jury might have believed the operator did negligently contribute to bring about the emergency by failure to be attentive and to hear or observe other vehicles on the street. Therefore, I do not think we can say that there was a clear abuse of judicial discretion by the trial court in *1089granting a new trial on the ground that Instruction No. 3 was misleading.
I would affirm the order granting a new trial.
Leedy, J., concurs.'