Court Opinion

ID: 9797321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:18:22.096697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:26.734337
License: Public Domain

*591ESPINOSA, Chief Judge,
specially concurring.
¶ 22 I concur in the result, but write separately because I question whether wholesale invalidation of the statute is required under the facts of this case. It seems to me sufficient to say that, as applied here, the statute conflicts with the rules of evidence promulgated by our supreme court. There could be many situations, however, in which the admission of a victim’s prior statement under § 13-4252 would be consistent with existing rules of evidence and criminal procedure. Indeed, as the decision notes, the state argued here that the minor’s testimony was admissible under Rule 803(24), Ariz. R. Evid., which essentially allows the admission of “reliable” hearsay otherwise excluded by the rules. See Robinson (minor victim’s prior consistent statement admissible under Rule 803(24) when made in response to nonleading questions, showed knowledge of sexual acts unusual for victim’s age, corroborated by physical evidence and victim’s behavioral changes, and unaccompanied by motive to lie); State v. Crane, 166 Ariz. 3, 799 P.2d 1380 (App.1990) (minor victim’s prior statement describing semen admissible under Rule 803(24) when defendant’s alleged acts were only explanation of victim’s knowledge, victim testified and was cross-examined, her statement was consistent with trial testimony, and witness had no motive to lie). Section 13-4252 imposes foundational requirements that, at least on a case-by-case basis, might be found to fulfill the requirements of Rule 803(24) or other hearsay exceptions.
¶ 23 In this case, I am not as certain as the majority that the minor victim’s videotaped statement and demeanor forty-eight hours after the alleged offense are not more probative for purposes of Rule 803(24) than her in-court testimony almost six months later. See Robinson, 153 Ariz. at 202, 735 P.2d at 812 (“it is difficult to imagine more probative evidence” than when a child first reveals sexual abuse); State v. Alatorre, 191 Ariz. 208, 953 P.2d 1261 (App.1998) (transcript of eight-year-old, sexual-offense victim’s police interview admissible under recorded-recollection exception to hearsay rule; victim testified she remembered event more clearly at time of interview and spoke truthfully during interview). Nevertheless, the prosecution did not proffer any alternative theories of admissibility below, nor did it meet another requirement of Rule 803(24), that notice be provided “sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it.” Indeed, his counsel at oral argument stated defendant had been “sandbagged” with this evidence. Furthermore, as to this issue, the state at no time invoked the rules of evidence in the proceedings below or on appeal until oral argument before this court. Under all the circumstances, I agree the statement was erroneously admitted and could not have been harmless given the dearth of other evidence in the case.
¶ 24 In interpreting a statute, courts should, if possible, give it a constitutional construction. Mardian Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 489, 557 P.2d 526 (1976); State v. Book-Cellar, Inc., 139 Ariz. 525, 679 P.2d 548 (App.1984). Because admissibility of the minor victim’s testimony under the rules of evidence is, in my view, a close question, and because the introduction of evidence under § 13-4252 could, in other eases, be consistent with the rules adopted by our supreme court, I would not find § 13-4252 necessarily unconstitutional, except as applied in this case. See Wohlstrom v. Buchanan, 180 Ariz. 389, 884 P.2d 687 (1994) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that forfeiture statute unconstitutional on its face, but finding its disclosure requirements unconstitutional as applied to him); State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 768 P.2d 150 (1989) (upholding facial constitutionality of A.R.S. § 13-4253, which authorized videotaped testimony of minor witnesses, but remanding for new trial because statute applied in violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right).