Court Opinion

ID: 9712604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:57:01.754344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:13.212541
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE KARNS delivered the opinion of the court: The State has timely filed a petition for rehearing, urging that we decide the other issues raised by defendant which are certain to arise again upon a new trial. (See footnote 1 of our original opinion, 47 Ill. App. 3d 362, 364, 362 N.E.2d 701, 702.) Our holding that defendant’s conviction must be reversed and remanded for a new trial because of the court’s exclusion of the material testimony of a prospective witness is not questioned. Specifically, the State requests that we decide whether the trial court erred in not permitting the attorneys to participate in voir dire; in permitting the victim, a nonexpert, to testify as to medical treatment of his injuries; in admitting into evidence two spent .25-caliber shells; and in refusing defendant’s preferred instruction as to the lesser included offense of simple battery. In the interest of judicial economy, we have decided to address these issues. The record reflects that, throughout voir dire, the court asked all the questions, periodically holding off-the-record conferences at the side bar with the attorneys. The court’s questioning was thorough, and there is no indication of record that the court refused to ask any questions tendered by defense counsel, nor, in fact, that defense counsel ever sought leave to question prospective jurors directly. Before jury selection began, the following exchange took place between the court and defense counsel: “THE COURT: * * * You are acquainted with the method that this Court uses in its Voir Dire examination of the selection of the jury. Are there any questions about that procedure? MR. HARRIS: None, Your Honor. * * * THE COURT: Is there anything else you would like to have placed of record?. * * * MR. HARRIS: No.”  In view of the defendant’s failure to object to the method used by the court below in conducting the voir dire, and the absence of any indication of prejudice, we do not think that defendant can now be heard to complain on appeal that the procedure used contravened section 115—4(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 115—4(f)). Nor do we think that it is appropriate on this record for us to determine whether, as the State contends, the statute relied on by defendant is invalid as an undue legislative infringement on the inherent rule-making power of the judicial branch because it conflicts with Supreme Court Rule 234, made applicable to criminal trials by Rule 431. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, pars. 234, 431.  We have considered the other assignments of error and find them to be without merit. First, the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting witness Cook to testify that “I was shot in the left forearm, and the bullet went in this area and came out over here, which shattered the bone. I have a 3-inch steel plate in my arm from here to here.” That the bone was shattered and there was a steel plate in his arm were, we think, facts within the personal knowledge of Cook requiring no medical training to understand (see, e.g., McCormick, Evidence §13, at 29 (2d ed. 1972)). Next, the spent shells found at the scene of the shooting were properly admitted as tending to prove that the offenses charged, attempt murder and aggravated battery, were committed in the tavern. It is no prerequisite to their admissibility that they be tied in some way to defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 12 Ill. App. 3d 326, 297 N.E.2d 601 (5th Dist. 1973); People v. Galloway, 28 Ill. 2d 355, 129 N.E.2d 370 (1963).) Finally, we think that the evidence in the case did not justify the giving of an instruction on simple battery, and the court properly refused defendant’s tendered instruction. See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, 18 Ill. App. 3d 828, 310 N.E.2d 760 (1st Dist. 1974). The petition for rehearing is denied.