Court Opinion

ID: 9737123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:16:38.481512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.690696
License: Public Domain

T. M. Kavanagh, J.
(dissenting). Plaintiff, the administratrix of the estate of Baby Boy Powers, commenced this action against defendants in the Oakland county circuit court on August 28, 1964, seeking damages under the Michigan wrongful death act.1 Prior to answer, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the plaintiff’s pleadings failed to state a cause of action. After answer and pretrial conference the trial court *186granted defendants’ motion for the reason that “a viable baby boy in its sixth month of gestation which is negligently injured * * * and subsequently stillborn is not a 'person’ within the meaning of Michigan’s wrongful death act.”
Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. (4 Mich App 572.) Plaintiff is here on leave granted by this Court on December 30, 1966.
On October 29, 1962, Hazel L. Powers was involved in an automobile accident with a car driven by defendant Ventittelli and owned by defendant City of Troy. At the time she was 6 months pregnant with child.- As a result of the accident she and her unborn child each received serious injuries, causing the child to be stillborn.
• The first sentence of the Michigan wrongful death act reads as follows:
“Whenever the death of a person or injuries resulting in death, shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages, in respect thereof, then and in every such case, the person who, or the corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The sole question for decision in this case is whether a 6-month old fetus is a person within the meaning of the Michigan wrongful death act.
Defendants rely, as did the trial court and the Court of Appeals, on the case of Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich 60,
*187In the Newman Case the injuries suffered by the unborn child occurred 22 days prior to his birth and caused his death 3 months after he was born. The Court there denied decedent’s cause of action under the survival act, simply stating that the overwhelming weight of authority denied liability, and concluded that (p 64):
“Plaintiff has no cause of action under the common law or under any statute.”
Plaintiff relies on the great weight of authority which presently exists throughout the nation and contends that although LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich 558 (decided in January, 1960), did not expressly overrule Newman v. City of Detroit, supra, it did so by implication.
LaBlue v. Speaker, supra, without dissent determined the status of an unborn child as a person entitled to bring an action under the Michigan dram-shop act.  There the Court pointed out that it and other courts have repeatedly held that for all purposes of construction a child en ventre sa mere is considered as a child in esse if it would be for the’ child’s benefit to be so considered. It cited the case of Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St 114 (87 NE2d 334, 10 ALR2d 1051),3 with approval. In that case an unborn child was considered a person within the constitutional provision giving every person a remedy for personal injury. The Court also cited McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich 274, where it was said (p 279):
“It may be that these statutes do not in terms cover this ease, but they are in harmony with the settled rule when they declare that ‘posthumous *188children are considered as living at the death of their parents.’ * * * And it is held that such children may sue for an injury or loss sustained while en ventre sa mere. 27 Am & Eng Enc Law, 420, and note. We feel justified, by these authorities, in saying that Edward McLain, being in esse, though en ventre sa mere, at the time of the death of the life tenant, was entitled to take under the will with his older brothers and sisters.”
In LaBlue the Court then analogized between the fact situation there and the holdings of this Court and courts of other States under the workmen’s compensation statutes. They hold that posthumous children are entitled to compensation due as the result of the death of a parent.
Turning to the holding of courts in the field of criminal law, the Court stated that a child’s legal existence en ventre sa mere had long been recognized in abortion and other criminal statutes.
The Court then examined how the Michigan Court and other courts construed civil damage or dram-shop act provisions.
In LaBlue it was pointed out that there had been a change in the weight of authority which affected the Newman decision. The Court said (p 570):
“While the statement made by Justice Butzebl, in September of 1937 when this case was decided, was true that the overwhelming weight of authority denied liability, the situation with respect to the law has changed considerably since that time.”
In pointing out that the law had changed, the Court cited 10 ALR2d 1059, which is an annotation dealing with grounds of action for prenatal injuries. That annotation was published in 1950 and stated that cases dealing with prenatal injuries were few in number and that the numerical weight of authority *189denied relief under the various wrongful death statutes. The Court then cited a later annotation found in 27 ALR2d 1256 (published in 1953) which supplemented that in 10 ALR2d, and quoted a portion of that annotation which pointed out the fact that 10 jurisdictions to that date had denied a right of action for prenatal injuries and 7 had allowed such actions. The annotation stated (p 1259):
“However, the fact that 6 jurisdictions out of 7 in the past several years have recognized such an action indicates a definite trend away from the more orthodox view.”
The Court then cited many cases from other jurisdictions which point out the drastic change in the law. The LaBlue opinion concluded by saying (p 578):
“Assuming that the guardian would he able to prove the facts alleged in his declaration, that John LaBlue had acknowledged that he was the father of Deborah Johnson, and assuming that proof of damage and dependency can he shown, it is clear that a cause of action exists.”
With the passage of time and resulting sophistication of judicial precedent and medical knowledge, it is most apparent that the Court in LaBlue was absolutely correct in its appraisal of the Newman Case in stating that the law had changed considerably since Newman had been decided. See Smith v. Brennan, 31 NJ 353 (157 A2d 497); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill App 2d 218 (178 NE2d 691); Sana v. Brown, 35 Ill App 2d 425 (183 NE2d 187); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa 267 (164 A2d 93).
In the case of Sinkler v. Kneale, supra (decided in September, 1960), the Court was considering a case where a Mongoloid infant brought suit for damages caused when defendant, while negligently oper*190ating bis motor vehicle, collided with the car which her mother was driving. The plaintiff at that time was a fetus of one month. As a result of these injuries the child claimed she was born Mongoloid. The Court there reversed an earlier Pennsylvania case showing that the authorities relied upon were cases from other jurisdictions which by that time had reversed themselves, and then upheld the right of action when the child was born alive. The Court then cited a Massachusetts case in which Judge Holmes denied the right of action but felt it necessary to find some opposition to a statement made by Lord Coke on criminal law. Of this the Court in Sinhler stated (p 270):
“Even if the criminal law is faint authority for a tort, the foregoing must show at least that the common law offers no bar to the suit. Judge Holmes’ real point d’appui for decision was that the unborn child was part of its mother. This was undoubtedly the medical vieiv accepted by the law at the time, and it is precisely the view that has altered since.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court then gave a detailed consideration of the various jurisdictions and factors pointing out the change in the law (pp 270, 271):
“Since 1949 seven States have overruled former decisions denying recovery, including the four above cited in Berlin,4 and nine States, dealing with the question for the first time, have upheld recovery. The eighteen States that now allow recovery are: (citing States and cases).
“At present eight States deny recovery. In two the courts note the recent trend and strongly indicate that reversal is likely. These are Michigan, in LaBlue v. Specker (1960), 358 Mich 558, and Wiscon-*191son, in Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co. (1960), 8 Wis 2d 343 (99 NW2d 163). * * *
“Leading text writers have condemned the rnle and advocated recovery: (Citing authority). Prosser says that the trend toward allowing recovery ‘is so definite and marked as to leave no doubt that this will he the law of the future in the United States.’
“The real catalyst of the problem is the current state of medical knowledge on the point of the separate existence of a fetus. In the Smith Case Justice Proctor, speaking for the New Jersey supreme court in a unanimous decision said this [31 NJ 353, 362, 157 A2d 497, 502]:
“ ‘The third reason for the rule denying recovery was the theory that an unborn child was a part of the mother, and therefore not a person in being to whom a duty of care could be owed. All the courts that have permitted recovery for prenatal injuries have disagreed with that theory. They have found that the existence of an infant separate from its mother begins before birth. * * * Medical authorities have long recognised that a child is in existence from the moment of conception, and not merely a part of its mother’s body.’ (Citing authority.)” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court concluded by reversing the lower court and remanding the case with a procedendo.
The very recent Texas case of Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, 419 SW2d 820 (decided October 4, 1967), points out emphatically the definite trend in the law today. The court of appeals’ decision in that case (413 SW2d 825) stated that it agreed with the plaintiff’s theory and rationale as presented, but thought it was for the legislature or the supreme court to change the rule of law in that State. The supreme court reversed a prior decision of that court and allowed the recovery for the injury to the viable baby who was subsequently born live and then *192died. Of the change in the law, the court said (p 822):
“Our research indicates that since this counter trend became evident, no court has denied a right of action for prenatal injuries to a viable infant born alive where the problem has been given re-examination.”
In Prosser on Torts (3d ed), ch 10, § 56, p 354, Professor Prosser gives consideration to the field of prenatal injuries. He points out that nearly all the decisions prior to 1946 denied recovery to the child for prenatal injuries — first, because there was no person in existence; and second, because of the diffi.culty with the proofs. He continues, saying (p 355):
“So far as duty is concerned, if existence at the time is necessary, medical authority has recognized long since that the child is in existence from the moment of conception, and for many purposes its existence is recognized by the law. The criminal law regards it as a separate entity, and the law of property considers it in being for all purposes which are to its benefit, such as taking by will or descent. After its birth, it has been held that it may maintain a statutory action for the wrongful death of the parent. So far as causation is concerned, there will certainly be cases in which there are difficulties of proof, but they are no more frequent, and the difficulties are no greater, than as to many other medical problems. All writers who have discussed the problem have joined in condemning the old rule, in maintaining that the unborn child in the path of an automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother, and in urging that recovery should be allowed upon proper proof.”
He goes on to point out that the years of criticism of the rule have finally had their effect and brought about the most “spectacular abrupt reversal” of legal rule in the history of tort law.
*193Treating the problem of at what stage in embryonic development there should he redress for injuries, Professor Prosser states (pp 356, 357):
“Certainly the infant may be no less injured; and all logic is in favor of ignoring the stage at which it occurs. But with our knowledge of embryology what it is, as we approach the beginning of pregnancy, medical knowledge, and therefore medical testimony and medical proof of causes, becomes increasingly unreliable and unsatisfactory, so that there is good reason for caution. This, however, goes to proof rather than principle; and if, as is undoubtedly the case, there are injuries as to which reliable medical proof is possible, it makes no sense to deny recovery on any such arbitrary basis.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Professor Prosser then turns directly to the issue in question in this case — that is, whether it makes a difference if the child is born live or is stillborn. He states that the majority of jurisdictions at the time of the printing of his book (1964) are more concerned with compensation for a distressing wrong and allow the action even if the child is stillborn.
We must agree with Professor Prosser that the difficulty of proof while the child is in the mother’s womb is no reason to deny recovery. Today the field of medicine is making great strides in this area of prenatal testing.5
*194We are told by Justice 0’Haha in Ms opinion that:
“Considering the plain import of the word ‘person’ at the time of enactment of onr statute and its uniform interpretation through the years, we feel obligated to accord to the term its ‘ordinary signification’ when legislatively employed.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The uniform interpretation through the years consists of one decision—that of Newman v. City of Detroit, supra. We, too, feel obligated to accord the term “its ordinary signification” when legislatively employed, giving the term “person” the same construction the Michigan Supreme Court has given it in workmen’s compensation cases, in criminal law, and abortion cases, in descent and distribution of property cases, and in civil damage cases, including the dramshop statute. In all instances save the Newman Case, supra, “person” has been interpreted to include a child from the time of conception. In all of the above mentioned instances this Court has found that the legislature used the word “person” to include a fetus from time of conception. Clearly, the legislature used the word “person” with the *195same meaning in drafting the Michigan wrongful death act.
The word “person” is subsequently used in section 2 of the death act in providing that the damages shall go to those “persons” who may be entitled to such damages when recovered. Since the law of descent and distribution includes unborn children, it should be presumed that the legislature used the term “person” in both sections of the wrongful death act with the same meaning. See People, ex rel. Simmons, v. Township of Munising, 213 Mich 629, where syllabus 3 says:
“Identical language should receive identical construction when found in the same act.”
We do not lightly overrule settled decisions construing any section of a standing statute. The Newman Case, supra, is that one decision construing an act which does not approach the dignity of a well-settled interpretation. See Smith v. Lawrence Baking Company, 370 Mich 169, 177, citing and following White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 US 32, 40 (62 S Ct 425, 86 L ed 619); and United States v. Raynor, 302 US 540, 552 (58 S Ct 353, 82 L ed 413). Also, see Autio v. Proksch Construction Company, 377 Mich 517, where a majority of this Court, including Justice O’Hara — over the dissents of Justices Black, Kelly, and Dethmers — went beyond the one-case rule.
It is, therefore, clear that the Newman Case should be and hereby is overruled as its conclusions, regardless of their validity in 1937, are clearly erroneous at this date, there having been an historic change not in theology, but in philosophy, science, medicine, and the law without distinction as to abortion cases, workmen’s compensation cases, tort claims including the dramshop act cases, descent and distribution of property or death act cases.
*196It would be enough that we go no further in the determination of this ease, as it is clear (1) that Baby Boy Powers was a person from the time of conception, (2) that he suffered injuries which caused his death, and (3) that if he had survived he would have had a cause of action for the injuries. Our death act states that “in every such case, the person who * * * would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.” (Emphasis supplied.) The act makes no distinction as to time of death.
Without stopping here, however, we turn our attention to the cases heretofore decided in other jurisdictions that are directly in point with this case. Almost all of the cases are collected in 15 ALR3d 992 in an annotation entitled, “Action for death of unborn child.” In section 2 of the annotation, at p 995, are listed 14 jurisdictions which have held that an action may be maintained to recover damages for the wrongful death of an unborn child.6
*197At page 999 of the annotation, under section 3, are listed 10 jurisdictions which denied liability under the same or similar facts.
For this Court to decide this case as do the shrinking minority of courts today, and as Justice O’Hara would have us do, would be to sanction the turning back of the clock and reverting to judicial and scientific fallacies long since obsolete.
Justice Voelker, writing the majority opinion in Steger v. Blanchard, 353 Mich 140, 144, said:
“Rules of law are necessary; properly applied they can succinctly gather in the loose ends of a case and help rationalize the decision. Our courts could scarcely operate without them. But when a rule of law or its application becomes so divorced from the context of reality, from the living human situations to which it is sought to be applied, it becomes meaningless incantation and downright harmful.”
The prime purpose of the death act was to put an end to the common-law rule that tort-feasors whose acts killed rather than injured their victims would escape liability. The death act was designed to permit recovery even after death. This Court should not by a strained construction of the act defeat its purpose.
Since it is not before the Court at this time, we do not take up the question of damages.
The order of the Court of Appeals affirming the entry of the trial court’s summary judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order denying motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff shall have costs.

 CL 1948, § 691.581 et seq. (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.711 et seq.). See, currently, CLS 1961, § 600.2922, as amended by PA 1965, No 146 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 27 A.2922).

 Also eited with approval by Justice Talbot Smith in Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich 33, 47. ' "

 Berlin v. J. C. Tenney Co. (1940), 339 Pa 547 (16 A2d 28).

 “Genetic Damage Detected
“Prenatal Testing Gains
“By Rudy Abramson
“The Los Angeles Times
“St. Louis — Medical scien.ee is approaching the ability to clinically identify in the womb many babies which will be born malformed because of genetic damage, a George Washington University researcher has disclosed.
“The technique which has been used clinically in 20 cases with 100 per cent accuracy, involves withdrawing a small specimen of the amniotie fluid surrounding the developing fetus, growing it in tissue culture, then studying the chromosomes which earry the genetic material responsible for heredity.
*194“Over the last few years, the technique has been used in 200 or more patients in research conducted by Dr. Cecil B. Jacobson, director of George Washington University's reproductive genetics unit, who described the work in a talk on new developments in human geneties before a science writers symposium here Friday.
“Jacobson said he believes the number of genetic mutations producing malformed children is increasing.
“The technique of withdrawing amniotic fluid from the womb has been available since the 19th century, but the potential for using it is only now being realized with the ability to inspect chromosomes and associate their abnormalities with specific malformations.
“At least eight genetically induced malformations — including such well-known ones as Mongolism and Phenylketonuria (PKU) — can now be identified. •
“If the chromosomal analysis of fetal cells from the amniotic fluid should beeome a widely used procedure in cases where genetic damage is suspected, present abortion laws would presumably permit therapeutic abortion on grounds that to give birth to a child known to be defective would endanger the health of the mother.”
(Carried in The State Journal, Lansing, Michigan, on November 20, 1967.)

 Connecticut—Gorke v. Le Clero (1962), 23 Conn Supp 256 (181 A2d 448); Katala v. Markiewicz (1966), 26 Conn Supp 358 (224 A2d 406).
Delaware—Worgan v. Greggo Ferrara, Ino. (1956), 50 Del 258 (128 A2d 557).
Georgia—Porter v. Lassiter (1955), 91 Ga App 712 (87 SE2d 100).
Iowa—Wendt v. Lillo (1960, DC Iowa), 182 D Supp 56 (applying Iowa law).
Kansas—Kale v. Manion (1962), 189 Kan 143 (368 P2d 1).
Kentucky—Mitchell v. Couch (1955, Ky), 285 SW2d 901.
Louisiana—Cooper v. Blanck (1923, La App), 39 So 2d 352 (dictum); Valence v. Louisiana Power Light Co. (1951, La App) 50 So 2d 847.
Maryland—State, use of Odham, v. Sherman (1964), 234 Md 179 (198 A2d 71).
Minnesota—Verkennes v. Cornied (1949), 229 Minn 365 (38 NW2d 838, 10 ALK2d 634).
Mississippi—Sainey v. Korn (1954), 221 Miss 269 (72 So 2d 434).
New Hampshire—Poliguin v. MacDonald (1957), 101 NH 104 (135 A2d 249).
Ohio—Stidam v. Ashmore (1959), 109 Ohio App 431 (11 Ohio Ops 2d 383, 167 NE2d 106).
*197South Carolina—Fowler v. Woodward (1964), 244 SC 608 (138 SE 2d 42) ; Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co. (1964, CA 4), 341 E2d 75 (applying South Carolina law).
Wisconsin—Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1967), 34 Wis 2d 14 (148 NW2d 107).