Court Opinion

ID: 9931641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 16:09:24.820103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:00.303253
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NOS. A-1513-21
                                                                    A-3877-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL A. GILLIARD,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TYON E. EVANS, a/k/a
TYWON EVANS, and
PAC-MAN,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Argued September 18, 2023 (A-1513-21) and November
                   13, 2023 (A-3877-21) – Decided February 9, 2024

                   Before Judges Gilson and Bishop-Thompson.
            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
            Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No.
            20-02-0237.

            Scott Michael Welfel, Assistant Deputy Public
            Defender, argued the cause for appellant in A-1513-21
            (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Ashley
            T. Brooks, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, and Scott
            Michael Welfel, of counsel and on the briefs).

            Colin Sheehan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
            argued the cause for appellant in A-3877-21 (Joseph E.
            Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Colin Sheehan, of
            counsel and on the brief).

            William P. Cooper-Daub argued the cause for
            respondent in A-1513-21 (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
            General, attorney; Amanda Frankel, Deputy Attorney
            General, of counsel and on the brief).

            David M. Galemba, Deputy Attorney General, argued
            the cause for respondent in A-3877-21 (Matthew J.
            Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; David M.
            Galemba, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      These appeals, which we have consolidated for the purpose of issuing a

single opinion, arise out of the search of a vehicle and the occupants and seizure

of two handguns. Following the denial of a motion to suppress the handguns

seized without a warrant, co-defendants Michael Gillard and Tyon Evans both

pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a

permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4, and were sentenced to five years in prison with forty-

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                                        2
two months of parole ineligibility as prescribed by the Graves Act, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-6(c). They now appeal from the orders denying their motion to suppress.

Because the searches and seizures were unlawful, we reverse, vacate their

convictions, and remand for further proceedings.

                                       I.

      A grand jury indicted Gilliard on two counts of second-degree unlawful

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), and one

count of third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a). Gilliard

was also charged with disorderly persons possession of a controlled dangerous

substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4). The same grand jury indicted Evans on

second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), and third-

degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a).

      Gilliard and Evans moved to suppress the two handguns seized without a

warrant after a BMW they had been riding in was stopped. The BMW had been

driven by Kafir Anderson.      We recite the relevant facts from the record

developed at a multi-day evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. The

State presented testimony from Asbury Park Police Officers Christopher Leahy

and Samuel Griffeth, and Sergeant Frank Sangi. On December 1, 2019, Leahy

was assigned to monitor the surveillance cameras in the city's "high-crime areas"

for suspicious behavior. Around 1:00 a.m. on December 2, he "believed" there

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was a radio call concerning gunshots heard around Washington Avenue. He

viewed the video footage of two unidentified men approaching another man as

he walked out of 1292 Washington Avenue.1 As the man attempted to flee east

on Washington Avenue, the two men fired multiple gunshots at the victim, one

of which hit his arm.

       The following night, Leahy monitored the 1200 block of Washington

Avenue. While watching the surveillance camera, at around 10:00 p.m., he saw

Gilliard engaged in what he thought was "suspicious behavior." Leahy knew

Gilliard based on prior "field contacts."       Gilliard briefly entered 1292

Washington Avenue, then came back out and walked west on Washington

Avenue while "cupping" his left arm "very tightly to his body, almost as if he

was gripping something." Leahy later testified he thought Gilliard was "holding

something within his jacket or waistband area." Leahy then watched as Gilliard

walked west on Washington Avenue out of the camera's view.

       Thereafter, at 10:05 p.m., Leahy observed a silver BMW drive up and park

in front of 1292 Washington Avenue. A male exited the BMW, briefly entered

1292 Washington Avenue, exited the building, and then entered the BMW

through the rear driver's-side door. The BMW, which appeared to have a driver

1
    The surveillance camera video was played at the suppression hearing.
                                                                           A-1513-21
                                        4
and two passengers, then pulled away from the parking space without signaling.

Leahy testified the BMW then stopped in the middle of the street and Gilliard

entered the rear passenger side.

      Leahy radioed Griffeth, who was on patrol in a police vehicle, and told

him the BMW "[left the] 1200 block of Washington Avenue without signaling

properly out of the parking space." On cross-examination, Leahy identified

Washington Avenue as a one-way street. He admitted that he ordered Griffeth

stop the BMW and expected Griffeth to comply. Leahy's report confirmed that

he had "transmitted over the radio to Officer Griffeth to conduct a traffic stop

with this vehicle."

      Griffeth testified he received information from Leahy that he was

"conducting surveillance on the city cameras and he observed a couple of

individuals involved in suspicious behavior." By radio, Leahy advised him the

BMW was traveling south on Ridge Avenue towards Springwood Avenue. On

cross-examination, Griffeth testified that Leahy did not order him to stop the

BMW. However, Griffeth admitted that his report stated Leahy "advised [him]

via police radio that he would like me to stop a vehicle, which he observed

partaking in suspicious activity in front of 1292 Washington Avenue." Griffeth

acknowledged that he intended to stop the BMW based on Leahy's direction.

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                                       5
        Griffeth pulled his vehicle to the side of the road on Ridge Avenue and

waited for the BMW. Shortly thereafter, Griffeth saw the BMW slow down as

it approached a red light at the intersection of Ridge Avenue and Springwood

Avenue. He then saw the BMW's turn signal activate as the car made a right-

hand turn at the red light without coming to a full stop. Griffeth testified that

he observed two motor vehicle infractions: (1) the failure to initiate the turn

signal 100 feet prior to turning, and (2) the failure to come to a complete stop at

the red light. Griffeth pulled his vehicle out onto the street, pursued the BMW,

and conducted a motor vehicle stop. Griffeth did not check the BMW's license

plate before exiting his vehicle.

        Griffeth testified that as he approached the BMW, he did not see any of

the occupants make furtive moments or "duck" under the seat. He also testified

that he did not see any of the rear passengers leaning up. When Griffeth got to

the driver's side of the BMW, he saw four occupants in the car. He knew all the

occupants based on their gang affiliations but was unable to identify the specific

gang.

        Although Griffeth spoke to each occupant, his initial interaction was

primarily with Anderson, the driver, through the open driver's window.

Anderson produced his license, but explained to Griffeth that the BMW was his

father's car, and he did not have the insurance card or the vehicle registration.

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                                        6
Anderson asked Griffeth to "look up" the license plate to check the registration.

Griffeth did not check Anderson's driver's license or the registration.

        Griffeth testified that he detected the odor of raw and burnt marijuana

while standing by the driver's window. He saw the two rear passengers, Gilliard

and a juvenile, smoking cigars. Griffeth asked the rear passengers if they were

smoking a cigar to cover up the "weed."          Gilliard stated, "no, no at all."

Anderson admitted to smoking marijuana about fifteen minutes before the stop.

        Sangi, as the road supervisor, arrived at the traffic stop to assist and

walked to the passenger's side of the vehicle. He did not speak with Griffeth, so

he did not know Anderson failed to produce the vehicle registration or insurance

card.

        After Sangi's arrival, Griffeth told the occupants the car would be searched

for "weed." Griffeth removed Anderson from the BMW and searched him near

the trunk but did not recover marijuana. Next, Griffeth removed the juvenile,

the rear driver's side passenger, from the BMW. No marijuana was found during

the search of the juvenile. He was then placed the juvenile near Anderson and

later arrested him.

        Griffeth conducted a search of Evans, the front seat passenger in the

BMW, which revealed marijuana and a "large roll" of cash. Evans was placed

in handcuffs. Five or six additional officers then arrived at the stop.

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                                          7
      Gilliard was removed from the car, and Sangi conducted a pat-down based

on the "strong odor of raw marijuana" coming from him. Sangi discovered

marijuana and a loaded gun during the search. Gilliard was placed under arrest.

      After the occupants were placed under arrest, the officers searched the car.

Sangi testified that he was "concerned" because the BMW "came from a location

that just had a shooting prior to" the traffic stop. Like Griffeth, he did not see

the occupants make any furtive movements or Evans move toward the glove

compartment. Sangi further stated the officers had probable cause to search the

remainder of the BMW based on the marijuana found on Evans. Additionally,

Sangi explained he obtained the car keys from another officer and searched the

glove compartment because Anderson "never provided the registration or

insurance information." A loaded gun was discovered. Later, Sangi received

"the owner's consent" to search the BMW.

      In a July 30, 2021 oral decision, the trial court denied defendant's motion

to suppress the handguns, finding each of the State's witnesses "credible" and

their testimony "consistent" with the video of the stop and search. The court

found Griffeth had an "objectively reasonable and articulable" basis to the stop

the BMW—the failure to stop at the turn and the failure to properly use a turn

signal—and there was no requirement that Griffeth issue citations. In addition,

the court reasoned the motor vehicle infractions were "independent intervening

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                                        8
events, sufficiently attenuated from any questionable order or direction made by

Officer Leahy earlier that night." Therefore, the trial court reasoned that "the

motor vehicle stop was proper and based on that improper turn."

      Relying on State v. Myers, 442 N.J. Super. 287 (App. Div. 2015), the trial

court determined the occupants were properly ordered out of the BMW based

on the "burnt" smell of marijuana. The trial court also noted State v. Witt, 223

N.J. 409 (2015), "afford[ed] police officers at the scene the discretion to choose

between searching the vehicle immediately, if they spontaneously have probable

cause to do so, or hav[ing] the vehicle removed and impounded and seek[ing] a

search warrant later."    It then found there was probable cause to believe

marijuana would be found in the car.

      Lastly, the court found that Anderson’s inability to produce proof of

registration or insurance and the fact that he "never attempted to open the glove

compartment" justified the warrantless search of the locked glove compartment

pursuant to the credentials search exception. The trial court concluded that the

State presented sufficient facts to justify a protective search of the BMW,

resulting in the permissible seizure of the handguns.

      After the denial of the motion to suppress, Gilliard and Evans each

pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun

without a permit.

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                                        9
                                        II.

        Gilliard makes the following arguments on appeal:

              POINT I

              THE STOP AND THE SEARCH WERE
              UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE STOP WAS
              PRETEXTUAL AND UNREASONABLE.

              A. Officer Griffeth did not have reasonable suspicion.

              B. Alternatively, if reasonable suspicion existed [on]
              the record, it did so only [for a] de minimis traffic
              violation, which could not support [the] stop because
              [the] stop was clearly pretextual and such stops are
              unconstitutional under our state constitution.

                 1. First Approach: Finding pretextual traffic stops
                 unconstitutional under our state constitution.

                 2. Second Approach: Using an equal protection
                 framework.

              POINT II

              [GILLIARD'S] CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF
              A HANDGUN WITHOUT A PERMIT MUST BE
              VACATED BECAUSE NEW JERSEY LICENSING
              LAWS ARE FACIALLY UNCONSTITUIONAL (Not
              Raised Below).

              A. Under Bruen2, New Jersey's licensing scheme and
              criminal statute, as written and enforced at the time of
              the purported offense, is unconstitutional. Therefore,
              his conviction must be vacated.

2
    N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
                                                                         A-1513-21
                                        10
            B.    New Jersey law precludes all persons under the
            age of 21 from obtaining a permit to carry a handgun,
            in violation of the second and fourteenth amendments.
            Thus, Gilliard's Conviction for Possession without a
            Permit Must Be Vacated.

            C.     These constitutional challenges are not waived.

      Evans articulates similar arguments on appeal as follows:

            POINT I

            THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE CAR IN
            WHICH EVANS WAS A PASSENGER MUST BE
            SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
            REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE CAR,
            NO   EXCEPTIONS   TO   THE   WARRANT
            REQUIREMENT APPLY, AND THE SEARCH IS
            INVALIDATED BY THE LAW LEGALIZING
            MARIJUANA.

            A. The officers had no reasonable suspicion to stop the
            car.

            B. The warrantless search of the car cannot be excused
            by the automobile exception.

            C. The warrantless search of the glove compartment
            cannot be excused by the credential-search exception.

            D. The odor of marijuana cannot provide probable
            cause for the warrantless search because the law
            legalizing marijuana demands retroactive application.

      It is well established that our review of a trial court's decision on a motion

to suppress following an evidentiary hearing is limited. State v. Ahmad, 246

N.J. 592, 609 (2021). In using a deferential standard of review, we "uphold the

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                                       11
factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings

are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Cohen, 254

N.J. 308, 318 (2023) (citing Ahmad, 246 N.J. at 609). We are bound to defer

"to those findings in recognition of the trial court's 'opportunity to hear and see

the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot

enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting Ahmad, 246 N.J. at 609). We "ordinarily will not disturb

the trial court's factual findings unless they are 'so clearly mistaken that the

interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v. Goldsmith,

251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022).      However, we are not bound by a trial court's

determination of a strictly legal question. See State v. O.D.A.-C., 250 N.J. 408,

425 (2022). Therefore, "[a] trial court's legal conclusions and its view of 'the

consequences that flow from established facts,' are reviewed de novo." State v.

Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526-27 (2022) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249,

263 (2015)).

      When the motion court hears testimony in addition to reviewing an audio

and video recording of the stop,3 an appellate court's own review of the video

recording must not be elevated over the factual findings of the trial court. See

State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374-76 (2017).

3
  The video recording of the traffic stop and the investigative detention was
made from Griffeth's vehicle and body-worn camera.
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                                       12
      A.    The Alleged Reasonable Articulable Suspicion to Stop the BMW.

      We first examine the relevant circumstances to determine whether Leahy

had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the BMW and the

occupants were engaged in criminal activity. Under the United States and New

Jersey Constitutions, a warrantless search by police officers is presumptively

invalid unless the State proves the search is justified by an established exception

to the warrant requirement. Cohen, 254 N.J. at 319. If the State fails to prove

such an exception applies, the evidence seized must be suppressed. Ibid.

      Reasonable suspicion is defined as "a particularized and objective basis

for suspecting a person stopped of criminal activity." State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J.

13, 22 (2004) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002)). There must

be "some objective manifestation that the person [detained] is, or is about to be

engaged in criminal activity." Ibid. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.

411, 417-18 (1981)). When determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, a

reviewing court must consider "the totality of the circumstances — the whole

picture." State v. Nelson, 237 N.J. at 554 (quoting Stovall, 170 N.J. at 361).

      Applying these general principles, we conclude Leahy did not have

reasonable articulable suspicion to order Griffith to stop the BMW. The record

and video surveillance footage shows the traffic stop was more than an

investigatory stop.   Leahy's order was based on an alleged motor vehicle

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                                       13
infraction and defendant's "suspicious behavior" which do not support

reasonable suspicion. See State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 276-77 (2017). We

acknowledge Leahy's testimony concerning his observations in a high-crime

location is relevant to the totality of circumstances; however, more was required

"than simply invok[ing] the buzz words 'high-crime area' in a conclusory manner

to justify [the order] for [an] investigative stop[]." Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 404.

We also note the motion judge did not find reasonable suspicion based on

Leahy's observations.

      We next address defendant's argument that the traffic stop was based upon

pretext, and therefore, unlawful. An investigatory stop must be "based on

'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences

from those facts,' give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity."

Nyema, 249 N.J. at 527 (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002)).

Reasonable suspicion requires "a particularized and objective basis for

suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity." State v. Stovall, 170 N.J.

346, 356 (2002).

      Generally, an officer observing a traffic violation has probable cause to

stop a vehicle. State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017). Moreover, the State

must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the particular facts

objectively supported the officer's reasonable suspicion. State v. Alessi, 240

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                                       14
N.J. 501, 518 (2020); State v. De Lorenzo, 166 N.J. Super. 483, 488 (App. Div.

1979).

      The State contends the stop was lawful based on the failure to give the

appropriate signal when turning under N.J.S.A. 39:4-126, and the failure of the

BMW to come to a complete stop under N.J.S.A. 39:4-144. However, Griffeth

acknowledged that he stopped the BMW at Leahy's direction. Therefore, the

trial court's finding was not supported by the record. Moreover, no testimony

was elicited that the BMW's turn affected the traffic. See State v. Williamson,

270 N.J. Super. 318, 320-22 (App. Div. 1994).

      The trial court rejected defendant's argument that the stop was pretextual

and concluded the traffic stop was based on Griffeth's observation of the motor

vehicle's infractions. The court cited State v. Barrow, 408 N.J. Super. 509 (App.

Div. 2009), stating: "The fact that the justification for the stop was p retextual

[was] irrelevant. Even the slightest motor vehicle violation provides a basis for

the stop." The court determined the "intervening acts of those motor vehicle

infractions [did] not invalidate the stop." We disagree and conclude the trial

court erred in its application of Barrow.

      Here, there was a direct nexus between the traffic stop and Leahy's radio

call to stop the BMW. Griffeth waited for the BMW, which supported his

testimony that he intended to comply with Leahy's order and stop the BMW.

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                                       15
Although Griffeth observed the BMW commit the motor vehicle violations, we

hold the motor vehicle violations were not attenuated from Leahy's order. Thus,

the traffic violations were not independent intervening events. Having engaged

in a fact-sensitive inquiry, we conclude the State failed to show by a

preponderance of the evidence that the stop of the BMW was objectively

supported by the officer's reasonable suspicion.

      We also consider the foreseeability and spontaneity of the traffic stop.

The automobile exception authorizes a warrantless search of a vehicle when

police officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband

or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to probable cause

are "unforeseeable and spontaneous." Witt, 223 N.J. at 448-50. Following Witt,

we have explained warrantless on-the-scene searches of motor vehicles are

permitted in circumstances where: "(1) the police have probable cause to believe

the vehicle contains evidence of a criminal offense; and (2) the circumstances

giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous." State v.

Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. 13, 22 (App. Div. 2019).

      Recently, in State v. Smart, 253 N.J. 156 (2023), our Supreme Court

closely examined the unforeseeable and spontaneous requirement in affirming

the suppression of evidence seized from the search of the car where the police

failed to obtain a warrant. The Court ruled a warrant was required in an

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                                      16
investigative stop where the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were

not unforeseeable and spontaneous as required by Witt. Id. at 173.

      In Smart, the Court held the stop was not "unforeseeable and

spontaneous," stating:

            Here, the police actions that led to the warrantless
            search of the GMC were not prompted by the
            "unforeseeability and spontaneity of the circumstances
            giving rise to probable cause." Witt, 223 N.J. at 414
            (quoting State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 233 (1981)). The
            opposite occurred. Indeed, the investigative stop was
            deliberate, orchestrated, and wholly connected with the
            reason for the subsequent seizure of the evidence.

            [Id. at 172 (citations reformatted).]

      Under Smart and Witt, probable cause pursuant to the automobile

exception must "aris[e] from unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances."

Smart, 253 N.J. at 174; Witt, 233 N.J. at 450. The facts from the suppression

hearing show Griffeth's stop of the BMW was not "unforeseen and

spontaneous."    Instead, the facts establish that Griffeth's presence at the

intersection of Ridge Avenue and Springwood Avenue was orchestrated by

Leahy's direct and deliberate order to stop the BMW.

      B.    The Search of the BMW and the Occupants.

      Probable cause, moreover, did not ripen to search the car or occupants

after the stop. In New Jersey, a lawful traffic stop does not necessarily give rise

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                                       17
to a personal or full automobile search. State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 205, 208-

10 (1994); State v. Roman-Rosado, 462 N.J. Super. 183, 196 (App. Div. 2020).

A full vehicle search requires a showing of probable cause of the presence of

contraband or reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain

access to weapons. State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 426 (2014); Roman-Rosado,

462 N.J. Super. at 196.

      There was insufficient evidence in the record to show reasonable

articulable suspicion for the search of the occupants or probable cause for the

search of the BMW. Prior to the passage of Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement

Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), N.J.S.A. 24:6I-

31 to -56, in 2021, the smell of marijuana provided sufficient probable cause for

an officer to search a car and its passengers. State v. Mandel, 455 N.J. Super.

109, 114-15 (App. Div. 2018).       This matter predates CREAMMA, so had

Griffeth made the stop based solely on the traffic violations, the smell of

marijuana would have provided sufficient probable cause. However, based on

the events as noted above, we hold the smell of marijuana was mere pretext for

the officers' warrantless search.

      Evans concedes CREAMMA was passed after the stop challenged in the

suppression motion but argues for retroactive application of the statute. That

argument lacks merit. First, we have previously held CREAMMA requires

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                                      18
prospective application. State v. Cambrelen, 473 N.J. Super. 70, 76 n.6 (App.

Div. 2022).     Additionally, the imperative language, "shall take effect

immediately," applicable to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(c) signified a prospective

application. L. 2021, c. 16, § 87(a)(1); State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 96 (2022).

Moreover, our Supreme Court has held the Act "has no bearing" on a search that

"predated the passage of CREAMMA." Cohen, 254 N.J. at 328.

      We are similarly not persuaded that Sangi had probable cause to search

the BMW because the vehicle registration was not produced. Sangi was unaware

that Anderson had not produced the registration or the insurance card prior to

the search of the occupants and the car. Griffeth did not conduct a search of a

limited area of the BMW based on Anderson's inability to produce the

registration. See State v. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 2023).

Rather, he told the occupants the car would be searched for "weed." Griffeth

could have searched the Department of Motor Vehicles database to determine

the BMW's ownership prior to the stop and subsequent search but did not do so.

      We are also not convinced the search was for the officers' safety. Neither

Griffeth nor Sangi saw furtive gestures from any occupant to justify a sweeping

search or any actions that "gave rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting

criminal activity." Nyema, 249 N.J. at 530; Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 405-06. In

fact, the record shows the occupants were compliant.

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                                      19
      Lastly, Gilliard's movement was restricted from the moment Sangi arrived

because Sangi stood by the side of the BMW where Gilliard was seated. See

Rosario, 229 N.J. at 272. Also, from the moment of the stop to the arrest, Evans's

movement was restricted.      While Sangi testified that he was "concerned"

because the BMW "came from a location that just had a shooting prior to" the

traffic stop, the shooting occurred approximately twenty-two hours before the

stop, and there was no evidence adduced in the suppression hearing that

identified any of the occupants as being involved in the shooting or armed and

dangerous.

      We, therefore, conclude the traffic stop was not unforeseeable and

spontaneous but was a pretextual, "deliberate," and "orchestrated" stop based on

the "sequence of interconnected events" that began with the radio transmission.

Smart, 253 N.J. at 172. The totality of the circumstances establish that the

officers stopped the BMW to investigate a shooting. Everything thereafter was

a pretext to look for guns. Thus, the subsequent search of Gilliard, Evans, and

the BMW and seizure of the handguns were illegal; and the handguns should

have been suppressed.

      C.     Alleged Unconstitutionality Under Bruen.

      Gilliard also argues his conviction for possession of a handgun without a

permit should be vacated because the New Jersey law is "facially

                                                                            A-1513-21
                                       20
unconstitutional" under Bruen. Gilliard has misread the holding in Bruen. We

conclude Gilliard does not have standing to raise this argument.

      We considered and rejected the same argument in State v. Wade, 476 N.J.

Super 490, 511 (App. Div. 2023). In Wade, we held "that the justifiable need

requirement in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018) was severable and the remaining

provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 (2018), as well as N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), were

constitutional and enforceable." Id. at 511. Gilliard has incorrectly presumed

he "would have been granted a permit but for one potentially invalid provision

of a permit statute." Id. at 507. Based on that legal principle, we reject Gilliard's

argument that New Jersey's gun permit scheme was unconstitutional.

      Reversed, vacated, and remanded.

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