Court Opinion

ID: 9693525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:48:00.918685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:48.047151
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
Although Officer Curry testified that the complaining witness, Mr. Straughan, had identified appellant on the night of the incident, Straughan himself “was unable to identify the appellant in court.” Ante at 196. As to the theft, moreover, Straughan could testify only that money he had in his pocket at 7:00 p. m. “was missing from his pocket at 10:15 p. m., after his street encounter”; he admitted that “he never saw appellant’s hand in his pocket.” Ante at 196. Thus, as the government’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument, Officer Haggerty’s testimony about the two prior incidents involving appellant was crucial to the government’s case.
Over defense objection, the trial court admitted Officer Haggerty’s testimony under two of the familiar exceptions for past illegal activity specified in Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 16, 331 F.2d 85, 90 (1964); see ante at 196 n.1 — in particular, the exceptions for unlawful activity showing “intent” and for unlawful activity showing “a common scheme or plan” (defined by the trial court to include “mo-*199dus operandi”).1 Even if we conclude that these exceptions are applicable — although I have doubts about the common scheme exception 2 — I cannot agree that the April incident, which Officer Haggerty mentioned first, is sufficiently probative of intent to commit robbery to warrant its admission under an instruction permitting that inference.
In the present case, the government attempted to show that appellant (or her companion) placed a hand in Mr. Straughan’s pocket and removed money. Similarly, in the October incident, according to Officer Haggerty, appellant placed her hand in a passing pedestrian’s pocket, although he did not see her remove anything. In the April incident, however, Officer Haggerty did not see the women place their hands in the driver’s pocket, let alone remove anything; the evidentiary basis for inferring attempted theft was marginal. See Appendix.
The government had to rely on the testimony of Officer Haggerty to establish, circumstantially, that appellant assaulted the complaining witness with the intent to rob (a specific intent crime). I agree that the October incident was probative of that intent. But “other crimes” evidence, which is inherently prejudicial, has its limits. In my judgment the April incident was too far afield. The trial court tolerated impermissible bootstrapping by admitting such thin circumstantial evidence of another possible *200robbery. This evidence was of little probative value, since Officer Haggerty himself found there was “no real basis to arrest” appellant and her associates. In contrast, the prejudice to appellant was substantial since the government used this evidence as a central part of its case. The court’s error was not harmless.
Respectfully, I dissent.
APPENDIX
Officer Haggerty testified as follows:
[PROSECUTOR]: And, during your observation of Ms. Page in the area of 14th and L Streets during the month of April, 1979, did you have occasion to see Ms. Page do anything unusual?
A. Yes, sir.
* * * * * *
On the northwest corner there was a car that had stopped for the traffic light there going southbound on 14th. It was one person in the car driving.
I observed Ms. Page and two other females get into the car and virtually surround the driver.
Q. Would you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what you saw the three women do during .this incident. When you say “virtually surround,” what exactly were they doing?”
A. Two of the women got in the front seat and one of the "Women got in the back seat. The two women in the front seat were leaned over towards the driver and were basically around him. The woman in the back seat was over the back — over the seat — right over the seat, right over his shoulder, would have been his right shoulder.
* * * * * *
We went over to the car and we told the three women to get out of the car, and we also told the driver to get out of the car.
******
Q. Now, did you have occasion to observe the driver look for his money after he had gotten out of the car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, where did he look for his money?
A. He checked his pants pockets.
Q. And, did he find an .money in them when he checked them?
A. No, sir.
Q. And, was money subsequently recovered in the car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, who found that and where? A. I did.
Q. Where was that money found?
A. The money was laying on the front seat, right where the driver was sitting. It was folded money and it was kind of like — partially, very partially, stuck in between the seat.
******
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Q. Would you say they touched him where his so-called vital organs may be?
A. Did I see them?
Q. Would you say that would be an area they might have touched him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. And, you went to the car and asked the man to get out, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, you asked him, I believe, if he knew where his money was, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he went like this? (Indicating) Would that be a correct characterization? He sort of looked around his body where his money might be?
A. He went into his pockets.
Q. And, he didn’t find his money, did he?
A. No sir, he didn’t.
Q. All right. And, then, you looked in the car and you saw the money on the seat, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, prior to this, of course, you had seen these three women draped all over him, didn’t you?
A. Yes, sir.
******
*201Q. There was nothing to prevent you from arresting Ms. Page for assault with intent to commit robbery at that time, was there?
A. Only in respect whether we had a complainant or not, sir.
* * * * * *
[PROSECUTOR]: Q. Now, Mr. Slattery asked you about this case where the three women got into the car and asked you about the complainant. Why didn’t you make an arrest in that case?
A. The complainant — the man driving the car was somewhat intoxicated. He was — he had been drinking. I couldn’t say that he was drunk. He had been drinking. He didn’t want to prosecute. He wasn’t — -he couldn’t say positively that he had been robbed. There was really no real basis to arrest them.

. The court twice gave limiting instructions to the jury generally following the language of the Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.49 (3d ed. 1978). At the time Officer Haggerty testified, the court instructed:
THE COURT: And I want to give you a special instruction. This evidence, these pri- or two alleged prior acts, was admitted only for your consideration of whether or not it tends to show the following: A, that this Defendant had the intent to commit the offense for which she is now on trial and that the Defendant had a scheme or plan or mo-dus operandi which included the offense for which she is now on trial.
Now, you are not required to accept this evidence and whether you accept it or not is a matter for you to decide as jurors. But if you decide to accept that evidence, you may do so only for the limited purposes that I have just explained to you and you may not consider it as tending to show in any way the Defendant’s guilt of the offense with which she is now on trial in this case.
Immediately before the jury retired for deliberation, the court gave the instruction again, minus the earlier reference to “modus operandi.”

. I do not believe the two incidents described by Officer Haggerty, which took place one and six months, respectively, before the incident at issue here, come within the commonly understood meaning of the “common scheme or plan” exception, which Drew defines narrowly: “A common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of the one tends to establish the other.” Id. at 16, 331 F.2d at 90. See United States v. Foskey, 204 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 250, 636 F.2d 517, 523 n.5 (1980) (interpreting Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)) (acts separated by a substantial time period do not constitute a “common scheme”); United States v. Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1979) (interpreting Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) ) (acts occurring four to seven months after offense charged are not part of “common scheme”). However, as originally given, the instruction covered not only a common scheme or plan embracing several events but also a standard mode of operation for separate crimes over a longer period of time — a “modus operandi” or “signature.” Evidence of a “modus operandi” is admissible under a different Drew exception: it is probative of “identity.” See Calaway v. United States, D.C.App., 408 A.2d 1220, 1226 (1979) (evidence of prior assault admissible to show modus operandi where government alleges that, in both prior assault and offense charged, defendant approached a young woman on pretense of looking for room to rent, forced her to remove her clothes, subdued her with a blow to the jaw, climbed atop her and strangled her); Crisafi v. United States, D.C.App., 383 A.2d 1, 4-5 (1978) (evidence of prior rape admissible to show mo-dus operandi where government alleged that, in both prior rape and offense charged, defendant approached a woman in a public place and introduced himself as “Simone,” later telephoned the woman, saying he was “George”, Simone’s roommate, and urging her to date Simone, and then attempted to rape her on the resulting “date”). In this case, I conclude the court’s instruction was broad enough that the jury would understand it was directed, basically, at the question of identity — despite the fact that when the court restated its instruction just before the jury retired to deliberate, it defined the scope of the exception as “a scheme or plan which included the offense for which they are now on trial,” without reference to “modus operandi.” If we do not interpret the instruction this broadly, the trial court committed error, see Calaway, supra, at 1227 n.12, which under the circumstances of this case could not be harmless.