Court Opinion

ID: 9492586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:44:41.119606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:22.819896
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Because I believe Ervin was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial, and because I believe Ervin’s Fifth Amendment right to due process may have been violated by the trial court’s failure to ensure a panel of twelve qualified jurors, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Hunter’s testimony was the key to the state’s case against Ervin. On cross-examination, Ervin’s counsel attempted to seize upon Hunter’s prior inconsistent statements exonerating Ervin, including Hunter’s statements in support of his guilty plea. However, according to Er-vin’s trial attorney, Hunter’s testimony had been “devastating” and “somewhat ... a surprise.” (Postconviction Hr’g Tr. at 19, 25.) The defense was called upon to begin its case at 5:06 p.m. on the second day of trial, after the jury sat through a full day of prosecution testimony concerning, among other things, the autopsies performed on the Hodgeses. Voicing no objection to proceeding at that hour, counsel gave an opening statement outlining the evidence he would present, including evidence that Hunter had previously denied Ervin’s involvement in the crime. Chief among this evidence was a videotape of Hunter’s guilty plea in which Hunter repeatedly insists that Ervin was not involved in the murders. Counsel told the jury:
And most importantly and finally, I hope to be able to play the tape and I hope we can shorten it up as much as possible of Bert Leroy Hunter’s plea of guilty in front of Judge Kinder to show *917what he actually said then on the 21st of July.
(Tr. Vol. II at 659 (emphasis added).)
The videotape was crucial to Ervin’s defense, crucial to undermining the credibility of the prosecution’s key witness, Hunter. The defense’s entire presentation lasted just a few hours. When the court was adjourned at 9:55 p.m., some thirteen and one-half'hours after it wa$ called to order that morning, the defense had rested and the state had begun its rebuttal. The jury, however, had not seen the -videotape. After emphasizing the importance of the videotape to the jury, counsel (trying his first capital case) had changed his mind. At the state postconviction hearing, counsel explained he had decided — apparently in the middle of presenting Ervin’s case — that he did not want the jury to hear “the gruesome tale” of the murders yet again. (Id. at 29.)
At the outset, I view counsel’s performance in the context of the breakneck pace of this trial: the first day of trial lasted until 8:36 p.m., the second day from 8:30 a.m. until 9:55 p.m., the jury began its deliberations in the guilt phase of the -trial shortly after noon on the.third day, and was sent home at 9:45 p.m. that night after imposing the death penalty. I believe it is impossible to conclude that the failure to present the videotape to the jury was the product of a sound strategic choice. Rather, it was an error either of judgment or neglect by counsel who never viewed the videotape himself (Postconviction Hr’g Tr. at 34), and who acquiesced in the court’s instruction to proceed with Ervin’s defense at a time when I believe most jurors would rightfully have been somnolent. And although it is only hinted at in the record, I am deeply disturbed by the suggestion that the galloping pace of this trial, at which Ervin’s life was at stake, reflected concern that the trial be concluded before the start of a “big basketball game.”1 (Postconviction Hr’g Tr. at 58-59.)
I believe the videotape would have inflicted' serious damage to Hunter’s credibility. In it, a relaxed and personable Hunter recounts how he and another man caused the deaths of the Hodgeses, and declares repeatedly that Ervin is “the wrong guy.” All the while, Hunter displays the same disarming and disturbing apparent candor reflected in his trial testimony implicating Ervin. I' believe the jury was entitled not only to learn of the fact of Hunter’s prior inconsistent statement exonerating Ervin, but also to observe in a videotaped close-up Hunter’s demeanor and presence in so doing.
Second, counsel’s failure to offer Hunter’s videotaped guilty plea left the jury to speculate as to why it was not allowed to view the videotape. Regardless of the substance of the videotape, I believe counsel could not reasonably have expected the jury to ignore the glaring absence of what Ervin’s attorney announced a few hours earlier to be the keystone of his defense.
II.
With respect to the trial court’s denial of Ervin’s motion to strike venireperson Crane for cause, I believe the majority incorrectly applies Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992), to conclude that Ervin is barred from further developing the factual record in federal court. Because the trial court summarily rejected Ervin’s challenge to Crane and denied him an opportunity to fully and fairly develop the record in state court, I believe Ervin may not be blamed for the inadequacy of the record, and is therefore entitled to an evi-dentiary hearing in federal court to determine whether Crane should have been stricken from the venire. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). If Crane had in fact been a crime victim and Ervin was thus forced to use. a peremptory challenge to *918exclude Crane, Ervin’s due process rights were violated. See Sloan v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1371, 1387 (8th Cir.1995) (stating that due process requires that state follow its own rules with respect to peremptory challenges); State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Mo.1990) (en banc) (holding that under Missouri law, defendants are entitled to “full panel of qualified jurors before being required to make peremptory challenges”).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, I believe Er-vin is entitled to habeas relief.

. See Mizzou Ready to Topple KU, Seattle Times, January 20, 1990 ("The game may prove to be the best of 219 matchups between the longtime arch-rivals.-”).