Court Opinion

ID: 9695977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:32:53.898947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:17.730357
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). From its interpretation of Stanley 1 to its holding in Lewis 2 the majority here travels further to hold that “... a putative father of an illegitimate child, does have the constitutional right to establish, if he can, his natural parent*320age, to assert parental rights, and a legal forum with due process procedures to establish these rights.” Under this unconditional holding, it is difficult to see why a rapist would not be entitled to a declaratory judgment enforcing his rights as the natural father of a child born to the victim of the rape as a result of the rape.- In any event, from Stanley to Lewis to Slawek has been quite a trip.
In Stanley, where a mother had died and the state sought to take the three children from the custody of their father on the “single fact that he and the dead mother had not been married,” the United States Supreme Court set aside the state's action, holding that fathers of children born out of wedlock are entitled to “. . . a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. ...” 3 (Emphasis supplied.) In Stanley, the high court began its opinion by noting that “Joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley intermittently for 18 years, during which time they had three children. When Joan Stanley died, Peter Stanley lost not only her but also his children. ...” 4
In Lewis,5 where the father of a child born out of wedlock sought to set aside both termination of parental rights proceedings and a completed adoption, this court, in a four-to-three decision, went beyond the facts and holding of Stanley 6 to hold that in this state a natural *321father’s parental rights could not be terminated “. . . without actual notice to him, if he was known, or constructive notice, if unknown, and without giving him the right to be heard . ...” 7 While Lewis did not involve the removal of a child from a natural father having actual custody, both Lewis and Stanley dealt with protections given natural fathers of illegitimate children against state action changing custody or terminating rights. Neither Stanley nor Lewis go beyond the area of assuring notice and hearing before, as in Stanley, the child can be taken from the father or, as in the majority holding of Lewis, termination of parental rights of such father can be lawfully terminated. Neither Stanley nor Lewis deal with the right of a father, whose paternity of an illegitimate child is in fact not contested, to seek custody and visitation rights of the child he sired out of wedlock.
In Slawek, the case before us, the putative father of a child born out of wedlock seeks, via declaratory relief, what the majority opinion describes as “. . . a judgment which declares he is the father of the minor child in question and for a determination of his rights and duties as to the care, custody, maintenance and visitation of the minor child.” The majority holds that the natural father of an illegitimate child has a constitutional right thus (1) “to establish, if he can, his natural parentage,” and (2) “to assert parental rights,” identified in the opinion as including “care, custody, maintenance and visitation of the minor child.” Nowhere in the opinion is it even suggested that his right either to establish parentage or to assert parental privileges is subordinate to the rights of the child involved. Yet, in Stanley, even as to the limited right of a natural father to notice and hearing before children can be taken from his actual custody, the United States Supreme Court so limited the right in*322volved, holding: “The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. ...”8 (Emphasis supplied.) The best interest of the child is such powerful countervailing interest. The rights of a natural father do not exist in a vacuum. They coexist, and are subordinate to the rights of the child involved. In this state, by statute, as to a natural father’s claim to custody, a court “shall never give the custody of the child” to the natural father “unless the welfare of such child will be promoted thereby.” 9
The writer concludes that Stanley, by conditioning protection of the rights of a natural father upon the absence of “a powerful countervailing interest,” strengthened the Wisconsin public policy of placing first and foremost concern for the welfare of the child involved in cases involving custody and parental rights. As to custody placement and related matters, our cases have so held.10 As to paternity proceedings involving fathers of illegitimate children, our statutes so provide.11 It is where the *323protection and welfare of the child involved are served thereby that there is the need for a forum and a procedure to establish the fact of parentage and provisions for determination of parental rights and duties. It is primarily on behalf of the child that there is need to establish paternity, provide for maintenance and support by the father and determine custody and visitation disputes.
The writer finds the paternity proceedings statutes (secs. 52.21 to 52.45, Stats.) to be appropriate and available for the judicial determination of parentage and parental rights as to children born out of wedlock. The majority views these statutory provisions as available only (1) where the mother of the illegitimate child initiates the action; 12 and (2) where the child born out of wedlock is likely to be a public charge.13 However, it is also provided that “. . . all such proceedings shall be commenced in the name of the state on the relation of the complainant, or on relation of the child if the complainant is dead, or insane, or does not prosecute. ...” 14 A first, quick reading of this provision for commencing proceedings on behalf of the child might suggest the literalistic construction that “complainant,” as here used, means one who signs a complaint. But three absurd results flow from such interpretation: (1) Only if the mother died after signing the complaint could an action be started on behalf of the child for maintenance; (2) only if the mother became insane after signing the complaint could paternity of the natural child of an insane mother be established; and (3) the “does not prosecute” reference would be no more than a restatement of another specific statutory provision, to wit, sec. 52.23, Stats. The writer would read “complainant” as referring to the *324mother of the child born out of wedlock, rather than only a mother who signs a complaint. The construction of the statute directing initiating proceedings on behalf of the mother who is dead, insane or who fails to prosecute is supported by the preceding sentence in the same section, providing: “Sections 52.21 to 52.45 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate the protection and welfare of the child involved in any proceedings hereunder.”
In the case before us, the putative father of the child born out of wedlock initially requested the district attorney to commence paternity proceedings with the putative father named as defendant. The district attorney declined to do so. Unless he had reason to believe that instituting such interests would not be in the best interests of the minor child, the writer would hold that the district attorney had a clear duty to commence such proceedings where the mother failed to prosecute, exactly as he would have if the mother had died in childbirth or had been adjudged insane. Generally speaking, prosecu-torial discretion “approaches the quasi-judicial.” 15 However, here the district attorney is statutorily directed to commence paternity proceedings on behalf of the child where its mother elects not to prosecute. The authority conferred is subject to the legislative direction that accompanies it. The statutory mandate is to “effectuate the protection and welfare of the child involved.” 16 The prescribed prosecutorial duty, deriving from both mandate and authority, is for the district attorney to institute paternity proceedings on behalf of the child, in the *325name of the state, where the mother does not prosecute. Mandamus does lie to compel public officers to perform their prescribed statutory duties.17 Where the district attorney refused to institute paternity proceedings at the putative father’s request, the indicated recourse of such father was, by writ of mandamus, to insist upon the performance of the duty prescribed by statute.
While a comparison between alternative ways of proceeding to establish parentage and assert parental rights ought not be required, with proceeding under sec. 52.45, Stats., found adequate and available, the writer would add that he considers declaratory relief neither appropriate nor available here. Declaratory relief in this state is granted only where granting such relief will terminate the controversy.18 As to the matters of care, custody, *326maintenance and visitation, it is impossible to hold that a declaratory judgment will finally determine the controversy. Court orders for care, custody, maintenance and visitation privileges are inherently interim in nature, subject to modification and revision in view of changed circumstances of the parents or changed needs of the child. This court rejects declaratory relief where granting a declaratory judgment predictably could only result in requests for supplementary remedies.19 The majority opinion rejects habeas corpus, often utilized to resolve questions of right to custody of a minor child,20 because “. . . habeas corpus proceedings, too, are not well-designed for continued jurisdiction to meet the changing circumstances in questions of custody, visitation and care of a minor child.” Declaratory judgments are neither well-designed, nor up to now, have they been made available as to controversies they cannot with finality terminate.21
The writer would affirm the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer of the minor-defendant, entered *327by the child’s guardian ad litem, and would affirm the trial court judgment dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Han-ley joins in this dissent.

 Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U. S. 645, 92 Sup. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551.

 State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services (1973), 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N. W. 2d 826.

 Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at pages 646, 647, 658.

 Id. at page 646.

 State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services (1973), 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N. W. 2d 826.

 Id. at pages 13-21, dissenting opinion, stating: “. . . In Stanley, the three children lived with their father and mother for eighteen years in what some states would recognize as an entirely legal common-law marriage. Their home was the only home the three children ever knew, and their father never denied the fact of his paternity and never refused to accept the responsibilities of his fatherhood.
“That cannot be said of the petitioner here. . . .”

 Id. at pages 4, 5.

 Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at page 661.

 Sec. 52.21, Stats., Paternity proceedings, jurisdiction, orders, providing: “(2) ... provided that the court shall never give the custody of the child to the defendant [the natural father] unless the welfare of such child will he promoted thereby . . . .”

 See: Welker v. Welker (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 570, 578, 129 N. W. 2d 134, stating: “. . . the polestar remains the welfare of the child. . . .” See also: Wendland v. Wendland (1965), 29 Wis. 2d 145, 157, 138 N. W. 2d 185, holding that children, in disputes as to their custody, “. . . are not to be buffeted around as mere chattels . . . but rather are to be treated as interested and affected parties whose welfare should be the prime concern of the court in its custody determination.”

 Sec. 52.45, Stats.: “Construction of sections 52.21 to 52.45. Sections 52.21 to 52.45 [Note: the paternity proceedings statutes] shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate the protection and welfare of the child involved in any proceedings hereunder. . . .”

 Sec. 62.22, Stats.

 Sec. 62.24, Stats.

 Sec. 62.46, Stats.

 State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 368, 378, 166 N. W. 2d 255. Citing and quoting at pages 379, 380, State v. Coubal (1946), 248 Wis. 247, 21 N. W. 2d 381, at page 257, holding: “. . . There is, however, no basis for holding that his duties in representing the state are not subordinate to legislative direction as to the cases in which he shall proceed.”

 Sec. 52.46, Stats.

 State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, supra, at pages 379, 380, holding: “The district attorney’s function, in general, is of a discretionary type, the performance of which is not compellable in mandamus. . . .
“Yet, where the legislature has spoken and directed the performance of duties under particular facts, the district attorney is obligated to comply with the legislative mandate. . . .
“While it is thus apparent that the district attorney is invested with great discretion and in the usual case can manage his office free from the overseership of the courts or the legislature, it is equally clear that the legislature may, if it desires, spell out the limits of the district attorney’s discretion and can define the situations that will compel him to act in the performance of his legislatively prescribed duties.”

 Pension Management, Inc. v. DuRose (1973), 68 Wis. 2d 122, 132, 205 N. W. 2d 553, stating: “The final question on this appeal is whether or not a declaratory judgment in this action would terminate the controversy. Sec. 269.56 (6), Stats., grants a trial court discretion to deny an application for declaratory relief ‘where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy. . . .’” Citing and quoting Outagamie County v. Smith (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 24, 37, 155 N. W. 2d 639, stating: “22 Am. Jur. 2d, Declaratory Judgments, p. 852, sec. 13, points out that a declaration of rights ‘should not be rendered if it will not finally settle an actual controversy . . . .’ *326The same paragraph (p. 863) also points out that there is authority to a stronger effect and that is ‘that a court may not grant declaratory relief unless it is convinced that its judgment will end the litigation and fix the rights of the parties.’ ”

 Outagamie County v. Smith, supra, at page 38: “We conclude that any declaration of rights that might result from the defendants’ complaint for declaratory judgment could only result in a request for supplementary remedies which this court would refuse to grant. Accordingly, a declaration of rights against either the state administrative bodies concerned or the individuals could not have the effect of terminating the controversy. . . .”

 See: 39 C. J. S., Habeas Corpus, p. 668, sec. 41.

 American Medical Services, Inc. v. Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Asso. (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 198, 204, 188 N. W. 2d 529, holding: “. . . We think the declaratory judgment action cannot be used on the facts presented.
“In this case a declaration of plaintiff’s rights would not terminate the controversy. . . .”