Court Opinion

ID: 9857971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:10:54.339297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:18.488235
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
McCORMICK, Judge.
The panel decision reversing this case on the grounds of an illegal search is withdrawn. Appellant was convicted of possession of an explosive device in Dallas County. The jury assessed punishment at fifteen years in the Texas Department of Corrections.
According to the police officer’s testimony, appellant was initially stopped for driving too slowly and for weaving while driving on a Dallas freeway. Appellant was thereafter unable to produce a valid driver’s license and was placed under arrest. See Article 6687b, Section 13, V.A.C.S.; Article 14.01(b), V.A.C.C.P.
Pursuant to the arrest, a search of the passenger compartment of the car was conducted. During that search, a bomb was found.
Appellant complains because the issue of whether the search was illegal was not presented to the jury as a question of fact pursuant to Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P. Article 38.23, supra, provides:
“No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.
“In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.”
The appellant made a timely request for a special charge which was overruled by the trial court. Appellant took the stand before the jury and denied the officer’s testimony that he was driving below the 45 miles per hour minimum speed. He testified that he was going 50 miles per hour when stopped. The passenger in the car at the time of the arrest testified before the jury that the car had not been weaving when the police stopped it.
The State contends there was no dispute of the facts, but only of the law. Were this the case, appellant would not have been entitled to submit the issue to the jury. Jones v. State, 493 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Gaffney v. State, 575 S.W.2d 537 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
However, in this case, if the jury believed the facts as testified to by the defense witness, the officers would not have been justified in stopping the car. Any fruits resulting from such an illegal stop would have been inadmissible. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant’s requested special charge. Jordan v. State, 562 S.W.2d 472 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
The State’s motion for rehearing is denied, and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.