Court Opinion

ID: 9698936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:04:30.185873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:12.171108
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/25/23 P. v. Raygoza CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                          F083282
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                            (Super. Ct. No. PCF380666C)
                    v.

 KAYLA GENEIRENE RAYGOZA,                                                               OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Juliet L.
Boccone, Judge.
         Victor Blumenkrantz; Jacquelyn E. Larson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A.
Martinez and Amanda D. Cary, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

                                           SEE DISSENTING OPINION
                                       INTRODUCTION
           On July 26, 2021, a jury acquitted defendant Kayla Geneirene Raygoza1 of first
and second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, count 1),2 but found her
guilty of the lesser included offense of aiding and abetting Fabian Nilo in the voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a), count 1)3 of Roman Gomez. Prior to deliberations, the
jury was instructed with the aiding and abetting instruction (CALCRIM No. 401), which
four of our sister courts have found to be a flawed instruction, as applied to implied
malice murder, because it permits a jury to convict a defendant of second degree murder
without a finding that he or she acted with implied malice.4 Although defendant was not
convicted of second degree murder, but rather of the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter, the jury was still required to find she acted with either an intent to kill or a
conscious disregard for human life, “i.e., the mental state ordinarily sufficient to
constitute malice aforethought.” (People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 970 (Bryant)
[“voluntary manslaughter requires either an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for
life”].)
           On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred when it instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 401 because it permitted the jury to find her guilty of voluntary
manslaughter: (1) under an invalid implied malice aiding and abetting theory; and
(2) without a finding she possessed either an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for
human life.

1          Defendant is also identified as Kayla Easter throughout the record.
2          All further references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.
3      As we discuss further below, defendant was also convicted and sentenced to an
additional offense.
4     People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1265‒1269; People v. Glukhoy
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 592 (Glukhoy); People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972,
981‒984 (Langi); People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 714 (Powell).

                                                2.
       Although our Supreme Court recently concluded a theory of aiding and abetting
implied malice murder is still a legally valid theory (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981 (Reyes)), we do find the aiding and abetting instruction (CALCRIM No. 401), as
applied to imp lied malice murder, is flawed and that defendant was prejudiced as a result
of the jury being provided this instruction.5 Accordingly, we reverse the voluntary
manslaughter conviction (count 1), vacate the sentence as to both counts, and remand for
further proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
                                STATEMENT OF CASE
       On November 1, 2019, the Tulare County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, count 1) and assault
with a deadly weapon, to wit, a motor vehicle (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2).
       On July 26, 2021, the jury acquitted defendant of first and second degree murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, count 1), but found her guilty of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (a), count 1) and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2). As to
count 1, the trial court sentenced defendant to the aggravated term of 11 years. As to
count 2, the trial court sentenced defendant to the aggravated term of four years, but
stayed the sentence pursuant to section 654.

5       Defendant further contends the trial court erred “when it imposed the upper term
sentence on count 1 based solely on [section] 654-stayed count 2” (unnecessary
capitalization omitted), and that she is entitled to be resentenced consistent with the
changes made by newly enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) and
Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). As we discuss in detail below, defendant
was prejudiced as a result of the jury being provided with the flawed instruction for
aiding and abetting implied malice murder (CALCRIM No. 401), and we therefore
reverse the voluntary manslaughter conviction (count 1). Because defendant is entitled to
be resentenced and the trial court can readdress its sentencing decisions in light of these
recent changes, we do not address the merits of defendant’s additional claims. (People v.
Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424‒425 [“the full resentencing rule allows a court to
revisit all prior resentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant”]; accord, People
v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“the full resentencing rule”].)

                                               3.
                                SUMMARY OF FACTS
I.     Background
       In 2019, Angela M.6 and Roman Gomez were in a dating relationship and lived
together in a house in Tulare.7 Roman would often be jealous and “sometimes he’d just
try to swing on [her], like put his hands on [her] and stuff like that.” During one specific
incident, Roman was intoxicated and became aggressive and abusive towards her.
       Angela also lived in the house with her cousin, Fabian N. Fabian and Kayla B.8
were in a dating relationship. Angela, defendant, and defendant’s wife, Aaliyah R., were
all friends. Defendant and Fabian did not like Roman.
II.    May 20, 2019 Incident
       On the night of May 20, 2019, Angela and Roman were at the house when
defendant and Aaliyah came over. The four of them were together at the house until
defendant and Aaliyah left after 10:00 p.m. Subsequently, Angela and Roman were in
their car when they got into a physical confrontation. Roman “started just grabbing
[Angela’s] arms and he wouldn’t let [her] go until [she] pushed him away.” Angela then
went into her room and laid on her bed when Roman “started choking [her] again and
pulling [her] hair.” She told Roman to leave and he then proceeded to leave the house
with some of his personal belongings.
       Later on defendant and Aaliyah came back to the house. Both defendant and
Aaliyah observed Roman arguing with Angela, and they told Roman to leave. Defendant
then “started getting aggressive, like trying to be physical with Roman” and “[s]he was

6       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to some persons by their
first names or initials. No disrespect is intended.
7      Angela testified under a grant of immunity.
8      Kayla Bernal and Kayla Raygoza share the same first name. Kayla Bernal will be
referred to as “Kayla” throughout the opinion, whereas Kayla Raygoza will be referred to
as “Defendant.”

                                             4.
trying to put her hands on him, telling him to hurry up and leave, like pushing him away.”
Defendant told Roman he was lucky Angela was there “because she wanted to hurt him.”
Eventually, Roman left the house “[w]ith his stuff, like his clothes.” Angela ended up
with marks on her arms as a result of this confrontation with Roman.
       At or around 1:00 a.m., Angela called Fabian and he told her “he was going to
come over and [she] told him not to.” Later on, Fabian texted Angela and told her he was
“OMW, on my way.” Fabian, Kayla, and Caesar L. then drove over to the house in a
SUV. Fabian then hugged Angela and told her he was sorry, but “he had to do what he
had to do.”9 Fabian then left with Kayla and Caesar in the SUV. Angela went to the
bathroom and when she came back out defendant and Aaliyah were also gone.
       Fabian, Kayla, and Caesar searched for Roman. The group located Roman near a
school, and Fabian and Caesar exited the vehicle and confronted Roman.10 In
surveillance footage,11 Fabian is observed holding a “shiny object in one of [his] hands”
while positioned “in a bladed sort of fighting stance.” In the footage, Fabian and Caesar
are observed “making punching, stabbing motions towards Roman.”12 Subsequently,
defendant drove up in her gray Nissan Altima and hit Roman, Fabian, and Caesar with
her car.13 Defendant got out of the vehicle and involved herself in the altercation, and
ended up pushing and choking Roman, along with hitting him two times. Kayla told law

9       Before this incident, Fabian had told Angela that if Roman “kept putting hands on
[her] that he was going to do what he had to do.”
10    It is unclear in the record whether Kayla also stepped out of the vehicle to
confront Roman. However, what is clear is the two individuals who initially attack
Roman were Fabian and Caesar.
11     The surveillance footage was introduced and admitted as People’s exhibit 10.
12     It was later determined Roman suffered three stab wounds as a result of Fabian
stabbing him with a knife.
13     Defendant testified she “tr[ied] to break up the fight by tapping the two people in
front” with her car and only “tr[ied] to scare them.” It is unclear how fast defendant was
driving when she hit Roman, Fabian, and Caesar with her car.

                                            5.
enforcement defendant was “egging on the fight” and had asked Fabian, “ ‘If that’s all
you have? That’s all? He doesn’t deserve to be here.’ ” After the fight, Roman was on
the ground and told the group, “ ‘That’s enough. Stop’ … ‘I’m sorry.’ ”
       On their way home, Fabian told Kayla he wished he had done more to Roman.
Fabian then came back to the house and Angela noticed he had something “tucked in his
pants,” which she believed was a knife.
III.   Subsequent Law Enforcement Investigation
       Subsequently, Roman called 911 and law enforcement arrived on scene and
observed him “wincing in pain, and he told [them] that he had been stabbed.”
Emergency personnel then transported Roman to the hospital where he died as a result of
three stab wounds.
       On May 22, 2019, law enforcement located defendant in the City of Cutler in her
gray Nissan Altima and placed her under arrest. Later on, officers interviewed defendant
and she admitted to hitting the group with her car and also admitted to getting out of her
car and hitting Roman twice.14 However, defendant testified she did not intend for
Roman to be killed and never encouraged anyone to kill him.
                                      DISCUSSION
I.     Error Related to Jury Instruction CALCRIM No. 401
       Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by instructing the
jury on an invalid implied malice theory of aiding and abetting a homicide, a theory in
which the prosecutor relied on during his closing argument. Specifically, as it relates to
homicide, defendant argues “implied malice is not a valid legal theory of aiding and
abetting a homicide, because it contravenes the requirement that direct aiders and abettors

14     The prosecutor also admitted evidence of text messages where defendant told a
friend she had “choked” or “throttled” Roman and a conversation with Angela where she
laughed about Roman’s condition after the stabbing and said, “ ‘That he would be lucky
if he got up because she hit him with a car.’ ”

                                             6.
harbor a specific intent to commit the charged homicide crime.” (Unnecessary
capitalization and emphasis omitted.) Further, defendant argues the trial court
“committed [prejudicial] instructional error by giving the standard version of CALCRIM
No. 401” because “it fail[ed] to inform the jury of all of the requisite aiding and abetting
elements.” Based on our Supreme Court’s holding in Reyes, we reject defendant’s
contention an aider and abettor to a homicide must act with express malice, but do agree
the standard version of CALCRIM No. 401 given to the jury in this case was erroneous
because it allowed the jury to impute malice to defendant based solely on her
participation in the crime, and this error was prejudicial under the federal standard of
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).15

       A.     Aiding and Abetting Implied Malice Murder is Still a Valid Theory of
              Murder
       Defendant argues the trial court erred because its aiding and abetting instructions
permitted the jury to convict her even if she aided and abetted the perpetrator (Fabian)
with an intent to kill (express malice), and did so with implied malice. She argues a
defendant cannot aid and abet murder based on implied malice. Because our Supreme
Court recently concluded a direct aiding and abetting theory of implied malice murder is
still a valid theory of murder (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 990‒991), we disagree.
              i.     Applicable Law
       “A person who aids and abets the commission of a crime is culpable as a principal
in that crime. (§ 31.) Aiding and abetting is not a separate offense but a form of
derivative liability for the underlying crime.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830,
843 (Gentile).) “[U]nder direct aiding and abetting principles, an accomplice is guilty of

15     The People do not argue forfeiture in response to defendant’s instructional error
claims. Under these circumstances, we will assume arguendo defendant’s claims were
preserved for our review, decide the merits of the claims, and forego addressing
defendant’s alternative ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

                                             7.
an offense perpetrated by another if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense
with ‘knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist
in achieving those unlawful ends.’ ” (Ibid.) Aider and abettor liability is “ ‘based on a
combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own
mental state.’ ” (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 710.) In other words, “ ‘[a]n aider
and abettor must do something and have a certain mental state.’ ” (Id. at p. 712, quoting
People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.)
       “In the context of implied malice, the [act] required of the perpetrator is the
commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the [act] includes
whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life endangering act. Thus, to be
liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or
conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act.”
(Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713, fn. omitted.) As it relates to intent, “the aider
and abettor of implied malice murder need not intend the commission of the crime of
murder. Rather … he or she need only intend the commission of the perpetrator’s act, the
natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, intentionally
aid in the commission of that act and do so with conscious disregard for human life.” (Id.
at p. 714.) The requisite intent is a subjective one – the defendant must have “actually
appreciated the risk involved” (People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 954),
and implied malice may be proven by circumstantial evidence. (People v. Klvana (1992)
11 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1704.)
              ii.    Discussion
       Defendant argues an implied malice theory of aiding and abetting a homicide is no
longer legally valid. Prior to Reyes, this court and four of our sister courts held that a
defendant may still directly aid and abet an implied malice murder. (People v. Werntz
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1111‒1113; People v. Silva (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 632,
640; Glukhoy, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 591; Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 978;

                                              8.
Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 713‒714.) Although it was unclear, prior to Reyes,
whether our Supreme Court still sanctioned the theory of aiding and abetting implied
malice murder (see Glukhoy, at p. 589, citing to Gentile, at p. 850), the high court in
Reyes resolved this uncertainty when it stated that “[c]ase law has recognized and applied
this theory, and we see no basis to abrogate it.” (Reyes, supra,14 Cal.5th at p. 990, citing
to Gentile, at p. 850.) Therefore, consistent with Reyes, we hold “an aider and abettor
who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree
murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts
with conscious disregard for life.” (Reyes, at p. 990, italics added.) Accordingly, we
reject defendant’s contention an aider and abettor to a homicide must act with express
malice.
       B.     CALCRIM No. 401 and Imputed Implied Malice
       Defendant further contends that “even if Powell was correct in concluding that a
defendant can be found guilty of a homicide as an aider and abettor under an implied
malice theory – the particular aiding and abetting instruction given by the trial court in
this case was erroneous for the reasons identified by Powell when it found an identical
instruction erroneous.” We agree with Powell the aiding and abetting instruction
(CALCRIM No. 401) provided in this case was erroneous, and further conclude this error
was prejudicial.
              i.     Additional Factual Background
       As to aiding and abetting liability, the trial court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 400 as follows:

              “A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she
       may have directly committed the crime. I will call that person the
       perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who
       directly committed the crime.

             “A person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it
       personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator.”

                                              9.
The trial court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 401 as follows:

             “To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and
      abetting that crime, the People must prove that:

                    “1.    The perpetrator committed the crime;

                  “2.     The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to
             commit the crime;

                    “3.    Before or during the commission of the crime, the
             defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the
             crime;

                    “AND

                    “4.    The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and
             abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.

              “Someone aids and abets a crime if she knows of the perpetrator’s
      unlawful purpose and she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid,
      facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of
      that crime.

             “If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need
      to actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as
      an aider and abettor.

              “If you conclude that defendant was present at the scene of the crime
      or failed to prevent the crime, you may consider that fact in determining
      whether the defendant was an aider and abettor. However, the fact that a
      person is present at the scene of a crime or fails to prevent the crime does
      not, by itself, make her an aider and abettor.

             “A person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty of that crime if
      she withdraws before the crime is committed. To withdraw, a person must
      do two things:

                     “1.   She must notify everyone else she knows is involved
             in the commission of the crime that she is no longer participating.
             The notification must be made early enough to prevent the
             commission of the crime.

                    “AND

                                           10.
                    “2.    She must do everything reasonably within her power
             to prevent the crime from being committed. She does not have to
             actually prevent the crime.

              “The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
      that the defendant did not withdraw. If the People have not met this
      burden, you may not find the defendant guilty under an aiding and abetting
      theory.” (Italics omitted.)
      The trial court then instructed the jury regarding the principles of homicide and
informed the jury defendant was charged with both murder and the lesser included
offense of voluntary manslaughter. As to murder, the jury was instructed with
CALCRIM No. 520 as follows:

             “The defendant is charged in Count 1 with murder in violation of
      Penal Code section 187. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime,
      the People must prove that:

                    “1.    The defendant committed an act that caused the death
             of another person

                    “AND

                    “2.    When the defendant acted, she had a state of mind
             called malice aforethought.

             “There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and
      implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind
      required for murder.

             “The defendant had express malice if she unlawfully intended to kill.

             “The defendant had implied malice if:

                    “1.    She intentionally committed the act;

                   “2.    The natural and probable consequence of the act were
             dangerous to human life;

                   “3.     At the time she acted, she knew her act was dangerous
             to human life;

                    “AND

                                           11.
                  “4.    She deliberately acted with conscious disregard for
             human life.

             “Malice aforethought does not require hatred or ill will toward the
      victim. It is a mental state that must be formed before the act that causes
      death is committed. It does not require deliberation or the passage of any
      particular period of time.

             “An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable
      consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the
      act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person
      would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding
      whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the
      circumstances established by the evidence.

              “If you decide that the defendant committed murder, it is murder of
      the second degree, unless the People have proved beyond a reasonable
      doubt that it is murder of the first degree as defined in CALCRIM 521.”
      (Italics omitted.)
      The jury was then instructed on the elements regarding first and second degree
murder. Lastly, the jury was instructed “[p]rovocation may reduce a murder from first
degree to second degree and may reduce a murder to manslaughter.” Specifically, the
jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 570 regarding voluntary manslaughter as
follows:

              “A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary
      manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel
      or in the heat of passion.

             “The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the
      heat of passion if:

                    “1.    The defendant was provoked;

                    “2.    As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted
             rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured her
             reasoning or judgment;

                    “AND

                                           12.
                      “3.   The provocation would have caused a person of
              average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that
              is, from passion rather than from judgment.

              “Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific
       emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to
       act without due deliberation and reflection.

              “In order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary
       manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct and
       immediate influence of provocation as [the trial court] define[s] it. While
       no specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is
       not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long period
       of time.

              “It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The
       defendant is not allowed to set up her own standard of conduct. You must
       decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation
       was sufficient. In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
       consider whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation and
       knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from
       judgment.

              “If enough time passed between the provocation and the killing for a
       person of average disposition to ‘cool off’ and regain his or her clear
       reasoning and judgment, then the killing is not reduced to voluntary
       manslaughter on this basis.

               “The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
       that the defendant did not kill as the result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat
       of passion. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
       defendant not guilty of murder.”

              ii.    Standard of Review
       “A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] An appellate court
reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction
accurately states the law. [Citation.] In reviewing a claim of instructional error, the court
must consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions
caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution. [Citations.] The
challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial

                                             13.
record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied the
instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561,
579.)
        As it relates to whether a flawed jury instruction is prejudicial, “[t]he Watson[16]
standard of prejudice (i.e., the error is reversible when there is a reasonable probability
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error)
applies to an instruction that misdirects the jury, including incorrect, ambiguous,
conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions. In contrast, the Chapman standard of
review (i.e., error is harmless only when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error did not contribute to the verdict obtained) applies when an instruction improperly
describes or omits an element of the offense.” (People v. Campbell (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 463, 493, fn. omitted.)
               iii.   Applicable Law
        In Powell, codefendant Langlois argued the language of CALCRIM No. 401
“couches direct aiding and abetting liability in terms of the aider and abettor knowing the
perpetrator intended to commit the crime, the aider and abettor intending to aid and abet
the perpetrator in committing the crime, and that, by words or conduct, the aider and
abettor in fact aided the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” (Powell, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) Recognizing the term “ ‘the crime’ ” referred to murder, the
court then held “the aider and abettor of implied malice murder need not intend the
commission of the crime of murder,” but rather, “relative to the aider and abettor’s intent,
he or she need only intend the commission of the perpetrator’s act, the natural and
probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, intentionally aid in the
commission of that act and do so with conscious disregard for human life.” (Ibid.) The
court concluded that because “the aiding and abetting instructions here [CALCRIM

16      People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).

                                              14.
No. 401] were not tailored for implied malice murder, the instructions were erroneous”
(ibid), but concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “the
prosecutor advanced two theories of liability as to Langlois: (1) direct aiding and
abetting express malice murder, and (2) indirect or extended liability for the natural and
probable consequences of the assault Langlois aided and abetted. The prosecutor did not
advance an implied malice theory as to Langolis.” (Id. at pp. 708, 715, italics added.)
       Further, in Langi, the court relied on Powell to conclude that “[i]f, as here, a trial
court uses such an instruction without tailoring it to the specifics of that crime, the
instruction [CALCRIM No. 401] creates an ambiguity under which the jury may find the
defendant guilty of aiding and abetting second degree murder without finding that he
personally acted with malice.”17 (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.)
       Langi focused on two instructions given to the jury: CALJIC Nos. 3.01 (aiding
and abetting) and 8.31 (second degree murder). (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.)
“CALJIC No. 8.31, as given to the jury, stated that a killing is a second degree murder if
‘1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶] 2. The natural consequences of the act
are dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. [¶] When the
killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant
intended that the act would result in the death of a human being.’ ” (Ibid.) Further,
“CALJIC No. 3.01, as given to the jury, stated that ‘A person aids and abets the
commission … of a crime when he or she: [¶] (1) With knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶] (2) With the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, … [¶] (3) By act or advice aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.’ ” (Ibid.)

17     Langi was an appeal from a denial of a petition for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 975.)

                                              15.
       The court reasoned these combined instructions permitted the jury to “find the
defendant guilty of aiding and abetting second degree murder without finding that he [or
she] personally acted with malice.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) The court
explained that “[t]he aiding-and-abetting instruction stated that a person aids and abets a
crime if he or she acts ‘with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and …
with the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of
the crime.’ (CALJIC No. 3.01, italics added.) However, as noted above, the second
degree-murder instruction specified that the direct perpetrator of that crime need not act
with the unlawful intent of causing death. Thus, while the perpetrator must have
deliberately performed the fatal act ‘with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life’ (CALJIC No. 8.31), his purpose may have been only to strike
or to injure, or conceivably only to embarrass, the victim. Since the perpetrator’s purpose
need not have been to kill the victim, the aider and abettor’s knowledge of that purpose
similarly need not have been knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill. If the
perpetrator need not have had ‘murderous intent,’ certainly the aider and abettor need not
have had such an intent.” (Id. at pp. 982‒983.)
       Langi concluded the aiding and abetting instructions should have explained an
accomplice must have acted with the mental state of implied malice. (Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983.) “The standard aiding-and-abetting instruction given in Powell,
a CALCRIM instruction [CALCRIM No. 401] in relevant substance to the CALJIC
instruction used here [citation], was inadequate as applied to the crime of second degree
murder because it did not clarify that an accomplice must personally harbor that mental
state of implied malice. [Citation.] Similarly, nothing in the standard aiding-and-
abetting instruction given here states that the accomplice himself must have acted with
such knowledge and conscious disregard.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court remanded the
case “[b]ecause the record of conviction d[id] not conclusively negate the possibility that
the jury found [the defendant] guilty of second degree murder by imputing to him the

                                            16.
implied malice of the actual killer, without finding that he personally acted ‘with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life.’ ” (Id. at
p. 984.)
              iv.    Discussion
       Here, as both parties acknowledge, defendant’s homicide culpability was
predicated on a direct aiding and abetting theory based on implied malice18 and the
aiding and abetting instruction (CALCRIM No. 401) given in this case “contained the
language that Powell identified as problematic.” Defendant argues “the trial court in the
present case, just like the trial court in Powell, committed [prejudicial] instructional error
by giving the standard version of CALCRIM No. 401,” whereas the People respond that
“given the implied malice instruction explicitly required the jury to find that [defendant]
personally acted with conscious disregard for life, it is not reasonably probable that the
jury would have found [defendant] guilty merely by finding that she aided a life-
endangering act without any additional mental state, which was the concern of the courts
in Powell and [Langi].” Similar to the instructions provided in Powell and Langi, the
standard aiding and abetting instruction given here (CALCRIM No. 401) was not tailored
to address direct aiding and abetting liability for voluntary manslaughter.19 (Powell,

18     It is undisputed that Fabian stabbed Roman and Roman’s death was the result of
three stab wounds.
19      In response to Powell and Langi, the Judicial Council of California issued an
invitation to comment regarding a new proposed instruction (CALCRIM No. 526) that
would address the concerns outlined in these two opinions. (Jud. Council of Cal.,
Criminal Jury Instructions: Revisions and Additions, Invitation to Comment, Comments
submitted by June 30, 2023, pp. 50-54.) Proposed instruction CALCRIM No. 526 states,
in relevant part, the following:
              “526. Implied Malice Murder: Aiding and Abetting

       “To prove that the defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting murder by
       acting with implied malice, the People must prove that:

                                             17.
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 715; Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982 [“As explained in
[Powell], the standard aiding-and-abetting instructions are ill suited to the crime of

              “1.    The perpetrator committed [an] act[s] that (was/were)
                     dangerous to human life;

              “2.    The perpetrator’s act[s] caused the death of (another person/
                     [or] a fetus);

              “3.    The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit
                     the act[s] that (was/were) dangerous to human life;

              “4.    Before or during the commission of the act[s], the defendant
                     intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the
                     act[s];

              “5.    Before or during the commission of the act[s], the defendant
                     knew the perpetrator’s act[s] (was/were) dangerous to human
                     life, and the defendant deliberately acted with conscious
                     disregard for human life;

              “AND

              “6.    By words or conduct, the defendant did in fact aid and abet
                     the perpetrator’s commission of the act[s].

       “If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need to
       actually have been present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an
       aider and abettor.

       “Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s
       unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid,
       facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of
       that crime. [¶] … [¶]

       “[An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable
       consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the
       act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person
       would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding
       whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the
       circumstances established by the evidence.]” (Criminal Jury Instructions:
       Revisions and Additions, at pp. 50-51, italics in original.)

                                             18.
second degree murder,” and if “a trial court uses such an instruction without tailoring it to
the specifics of that crime, the instruction creates an ambiguity under which the jury may
find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting second degree murder without finding
that he personally acted with malice”].) The instruction should have explained to the jury
that to be guilty as a direct aider and abettor of voluntary manslaughter, defendant as an
aider and abettor must have acted with the mental state of either an intent to kill or a
conscious disregard for human life, “i.e., the mental state ordinarily sufficient to
constitute malice aforethought.” (Bryant, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 970.) Therefore,
because we conclude the jury was not properly instructed regarding the necessary mental
state for defendant’s voluntary manslaughter conviction, we evaluate the prejudice of this
error under Chapman review. (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 7‒8 (Aledamat)
[holding that legal errors require a more stringent standard for prejudice, whereas factual
errors are less likely to be prejudicial].)
               v.     Prejudice20
       Under Chapman review, “[t]he reviewing court must reverse the conviction
unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all
relevant circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 3.) The People must show “beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman,
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) “ ‘To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict
is … to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on
the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’ ” (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63,

20      As it relates to prejudice, we discuss defendant’s further contention “the trial
court’s answer [to the jury question], telling the jurors it was up to them to decide what
the defendant intended to aid and abet, effectively instructed the jury that the prosecution
could satisfy the requirement of sentence number 2 in CALCRIM No. 401 by proving
that [the defendant] knew that the perpetrator, [Fabian], intended to commit the crime of
assault on [Roman,]” which we conclude was improper.

                                              19.
86.) In other words, the Chapman harmless error inquiry asks: “ ‘Is it clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the
error?’ ” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 608 (Geier), quoting Neder v. United
States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18.) Since Chapman, our high court has “ ‘repeatedly
reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the
reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Geier, at p. 608.)
       Here, we are unable to “ ‘confidently say, on the whole record, that the
constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Geier, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 608.) As noted above, “[t]he mens rea, which must be personally
harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to
commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that
the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.”
(Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713; accord, Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983.)
In this case, the act of stabbing is the voluntary manslaughter. Further, as we discuss in
detail below regarding intent, there is a reasonable possibility the jury found defendant
guilty without making a finding of intent because evidence of an intent to kill or a
conscious disregard for human life in aiding and abetting the stabbing (i.e., voluntary
manslaughter) is lacking. (See In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 589 [“The proper
analysis under Aledamat[, supra, 8 Cal.5th 1] does not rest on ‘ “the likelihood that the
jurors would have applied the erroneous instruction,” ’ but whether the jury could have
found what it did find without also making the findings necessary for a valid theory.”],
italics added.)
       In this case, the aiding and abetting instruction did not negate the possibility the
jury found her guilty of voluntary manslaughter without finding she personally possessed
either an intent to kill or conscious disregard for human life. (Bryant, supra, 56 Cal.4th
at p. 970.) The evidence establishes defendant did not like Roman and “wanted to hurt

                                             20.
[Roman]” after observing him abuse Angela. Thereafter, defendant drove up in her car,
hit Roman, Fabian, and Caesar with the car, and proceeded to involve herself in the
altercation by pushing and choking Roman, along with hitting him two times. During the
altercation, defendant “egg[ed] on the fight” and told Fabian, “ ‘If that’s all you have?
That’s all? He doesn’t deserve to be here.’ ” Although the jury found defendant guilty of
assault with a deadly weapon by using her car, and this could have been some evidence
she herself harbored either an intent to kill or conscious disregard for human life against
Roman (see generally People v. Cook (1940) 15 Cal.2d 507, 518 [“ ‘[t]he wil[l]ful use of
a deadly weapon without excuse or provocation, in such a manner as to imperil life,
generally indicates a felonious intent’ ”]), the prosecutor did not focus defendant’s
homicide culpability on this specific act, but rather focused on the act of her aiding and
abetting Fabian in the stabbing of Roman.21 (People v. Napoles (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th
108, 114 [“ ‘either the prosecution must elect the specific act relied upon to prove the
charge to the jury, or the court must instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree that
the defendant committed the same specific criminal act’ ”], italics omitted.) Specifically,
the prosecutor argued during his closing argument:

              “[Defendant] was upset. What she claims to have seen at Angela’s
       house, which given her testimony now is even more muddled about what
       she actually saw and perceived, but she wanted Roman attacked. And she
       made that clear when she was out at the scene while he’s being attacked.

               “So you have this group attack, this group assault going on and
       that’s dangerous to him, right? You know that that’s dangerous when
       you’re out there doing that, someone is getting stabbed, someone is getting
       beat on. And she didn’t care. ‘That’s all you’re going to do to him? He
       doesn’t deserve to be here.’ She wanted more happening to him than what
       she was even seeing. That’s what—that’s what’s important about that.”

21     In his closing argument, the prosecutor only referred to defendant hitting Roman
with her car as evidence to negate her “necessity” defense and as the basis for the assault
with a deadly weapon charge (count 2).

                                            21.
As it specifically related to aiding and abetting, the prosecutor argued:

              “Now, you may be saying, we just went over these, there’s an act,
       expressed intent to kill. How is [defendant] going to be responsible if we
       know that Fabian was the killer…. [¶] Now, aiding and abetting. So to
       prove that a defendant, I know you can all read it, but I’ll read along with
       you, there’s no red at this time. So to prove that a defendant is guilty of a
       crime based on aiding and abetting, I have to prove that the direct
       perpetrator, right? Committed that crime. We watched Fabian, you could
       see the shiny pointy object in his hand and we know that Roman died from
       stab wounds. The defendant, meaning Ms. Raygoza in this case, knew the
       perpetrator intended to commit the crime. Before or during the commission
       of the crime, she intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the
       crime. And the defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the
       perpetrator’s commission of the crime. [¶] … [¶]

               “And your instructions tell you, someone aids and abets a crime if
       they know of the unlawful purpose and specifically intend to and do aid,
       facilitate, promote, encourage or instigate that act. Right? So you’re
       helping in some way. Maybe you’ve knocked them down after you hit
       them, maybe you’re out there and you throw some punches, maybe try to
       strangle someone while this is going on, maybe you’re out there saying,
       ‘Get him, get him, he doesn’t deserve to be here. Is that all you’re going to
       do to him?’ Wanting more done. Pushing it, egging it on. We see those,
       right? You see those elements, they’re clear. Promoting. Encouraging.
       Instigating.

               “Now aiding and abetting right? I’ve said, it’s really about intent.
       And express mali[ce], first degree murder, you have to have a specific
       intent to kill and the aider and abettor has to share that intent.

               “Implied mali[ce]. It’s the intent to aid the acts, right? Because
       that’s what we’re talking about. That manifestation, that express mali[ce],
       is there for first degree murder. So implied mali[ce] is second degree
       murder. So the reckless and [in]difference to someone’s life. That’s doing
       the acts that are dangerous and knowing that you’re doing that, knowing
       you’re participating that and you just don’t care, you just don’t give a damn
       about that person or what happens to them. Like maybe leaving Roman out
       there to die in the street with minutes to plead for his own life.”
The prosecutor continued:

             “So, [defendant] is charged with murder. She’s an aider and abettor
       in Roman Gomez’s murder. She’s charged with assault with a deadly

                                             22.
       weapon. And each time we’ve seen that video I’ve been talking about that
       in terms of murder and what’s happened. Well, let’s watch it one more
       time, because it’s not only evidence of intent, it’s not only evidence of the
       actions that happened—it’s going to start up in a second—but it’s also itself
       a separate crime and a separate action, right? Because she put hands on
       Roman at the house beforehand, she got out of the car, continued her
       assault.”
Finally, during the prosecutor’s rebuttal, he stated the following:

               “They’re also wanting you to blame everybody else and say she’s
       completely innocent. The problem with that is, yes, Fabian did the
       stabbing, right? I’m not saying any different. I’m saying she’s
       encouraging, promoting and instigating that action. That’s the aiding and
       abetting aspect of this and that she admitted[] to the officers once she’s
       caught and once she’s stuck at the end of her interview says, ‘Yeah, I put
       hands on him.’ Right? That’s at the end and she admits, ‘Yeah, I was
       texting my friend and I said I strangled him,’ and she seemed—you know,
       that seemed like a great text to send. Is everything okay? I strangled him.
       Just like she’s talking to Angela afterwards laughing. ‘We’ll see if he can
       even get up because I hit him with the car.’ Those things tend to fit and
       that’s what we’re talking about.”
       Because defendant’s culpability rested on her aiding and abetting Fabian in the
stabbing (People v. Napoles, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 114), we must determine what
evidence exists to support a conclusion she possessed either an intent to kill or conscious
disregard for human life. We again find Reyes instructive. Our Supreme Court
concluded the “[trial] court committed reversible error by misunderstanding the legal
requirements of direct aiding and abetting implied malice murder.” (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 992.) The trial court found that “ ‘the defendant, along with several other
gang members, one of which [was] armed, traveled to rival gang territory’ and then
considered whether that act was done with the mental state required for implied malice.”
(Id. at p. 991.) The court concluded that because “implied malice murder requires
attention to the aider and abettor’s mental state concerning the life endangering act
committed by the direct perpetrator, such as shooting at the victim[,] … the trial court
should have asked whether [the defendant] knew that [the perpetrator] intended to shoot

                                             23.
at the victim, intended to aid him in the shooting, knew that the shooting was dangerous
to life, and acted in conscious disregard for life.” (Id. at p. 992.)
       Similarly, here, any evidence of an intent to kill or conscious disregard for human
life in aiding and abetting in the act of stabbing Roman is lacking. (Powell, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713, fn. 27 [“The relevant act is the act that proximately causes
death.”].) The prosecutor repeatedly argued defendant was aware Fabian had a knife and
had used the knife to stab Roman, but other than defendant physically being present at the
altercation, there is no evidence she was aware Fabian possessed a knife or knew Fabian
planned to stab Roman. Rather, the evidence establishes the only people aware of the
knife were Aaliyah and Angela, and although the prosecutor argued defendant could see
Fabian based on the vehicle’s headlights being turned on, the crime still occurred late at
night after 1:00 a.m. The surveillance footage corroborates this inability to see because
all that is observed is a “shiny object” in Fabian’s hand, making it unlikely defendant
personally observed the knife and was aware Fabian was going to stab Roman.
       Second, and most importantly, the jury’s question during its deliberations
regarding the aiding and abetting instruction (CALCRIM No. 401) suggested it was
contemplating guilt without making a finding defendant possessed the requisite intent for
voluntary manslaughter. (See People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 617 [when
evaluating prejudice, “[t]he jury’s questions during deliberations are also instructive”].)
Specifically, the jury asked the trial court:

       “Can you clarify if the question on page 40 (401 Aiding and [Ab]etting:
       Unintended Crimes) question 2 ‘the defendant knew that the perp[etrator]
       intended to commit the crime?’ Is it knowing perp[etrator] was going to
       murder or assault the victim?” (Italics added.)
The trial court responded, “It is up to you to decide what the defendant intended to aid
and abet based on all evidence in the trial on that issue.”

                                                24.
       We find In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216 (Martinez) instructive. In Martinez,
our Supreme Court found the jury’s question highly relevant in evaluating prejudice.22
(Id. at p. 1227.) “The jury sent the court a note that said: ‘Clarification request on
description of #401 Aiding and Abetting: [¶] Point #2 says: “The defendant knew that
the perpetrator intended to commit the crime,” [¶] What is meant by “the crime”? Did
aider and abett[or] have to know or even expect the possibility that it will be murder (for
count #1)? Or does it mean any crime?’ The court replied, ‘This is what the jury has to
decide. Refer to instructions 400, 401 and 403, read together.’ The court added, ‘ “[A]ny
crime” means any crime the defendants are on trial for.’ ” (Ibid.) The Martinez court
concluded, “the Attorney General ha[d] not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury relied on a legally valid theory in convicting [the defendant] of first degree murder”
because:

       “The jury’s query and the trial court’s response, with its reference to the
       natural and probable consequences instruction (CALCRIM No. 403),
       suggest that some of the jurors’ ambivalence about convicting [the
       defendant] on a direct aiding and abetting theory may have been resolved
       by relying on the theory that the murder was a natural and probable
       consequence of the assaults committed by [the defendant] and his
       codefendant.” (Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1227.)
       Similarly, here, the question suggests the jury believed it could convict defendant
of voluntary manslaughter, even if it concluded the perpetrator (Fabian) only intended to
assault Roman. This conclusion is supported by the fact the trial court responded that
“[i]t is up to you to decide what the defendant intended to aid and abet based on all
evidence in the trial on that issue” (italics added), which could have been reasonably
interpreted by the jury as an instruction that defendant’s aiding and abetting culpability

22     The Martinez court dealt with an alleged error pursuant to People v. Chiu (2014)
59 Cal.4th 155, wherein it concluded the defendant was prejudiced because the jury may
have improperly relied “on the theory that the murder was a natural and probable
consequence of the assaults committed by [the defendant] and his codefendant.”
(Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1227.)

                                             25.
for voluntary manslaughter could have been based either on an intent to kill and/or a
conscious disregard for human life or an intent to commit an assault. Although the jury
could have concluded defendant was aware Fabian had the intent to kill and, thus, aided
and abetted in Roman’s murder, the jury’s question makes it just as likely the jury
concluded that defendant was only aware Fabian intended to assault Roman and, thus,
aimed only to aid in an assault. Therefore, a reasonable possibility exists the jury found
defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter without finding she possessed the requisite
intent of either an intent to kill or conscious disregard for human life. (People v. Lewis
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 874, 887 [“The [Chapman] test is not whether a hypothetical
jury, no matter how reasonable or rational, would render the same verdict in the absence
of the error, but whether there is any reasonable possibility that the error might have
contributed to the conviction in this case. If such a possibility exists, reversal is
required.”].)
       Nonetheless, the People contend that “given the implied malice instruction
explicitly required the jury to find that [defendant] personally acted with conscious
disregard for life, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have found [defendant]
guilty merely by finding that she aided a life-endangering act without any additional
mental state, which was the concern of the courts in Powell and [ ] Langi.” The People
argue that even assuming the instructions “suffer from the same ambiguity as the
instructions in Powell and Langi, it is not reasonably likely that the jury interpreted the
instructions to allow it to convict [defendant] under a prohibited theory of imputed
malice” because the “only charged ‘crime’ was murder” and, thus, “there could have
been no possible confusion that the perpetrator’s ‘unlawful purpose’ meant something
less than the mens rea required for murder,” and CALCRIM No. 520 required the jury to
find “that each defendant must harbor the required intent or mental state set forth in the
instruction for the crime of murder.” We disagree.

                                              26.
       Although we presume the jury understood the instructions and properly followed
the law, this presumption can be rebutted. (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 48‒
49 [“Absent some showing to the contrary, we presume the jury followed the court’s
instructions.”].) The People argue defendant was not prejudiced by this instructional
error because she was only charged with murder and the CALCRIM No. 520 instruction
required the jury to find defendant harbored malice. However, to survive Chapman
review, we must “ ‘find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’ ” (People v. Neal, supra,
31 Cal.4th at p. 86.) Although clarifying instructions were provided to the jury and
murder was the only charged offense as to this specific act, the record is clear the jury
struggled with intent and believed it could convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter,
even if it concluded she only intended to aid and abet Fabian in an assault. Accordingly,
because the jury was provided a flawed instruction (CALCRIM No. 401), as it related to
implied malice, and its inquiry established a possibility it convicted defendant of
voluntary manslaughter without ever finding she possessed either an intent to kill or
conscious disregard for human life, the People are unable to show “beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman,
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)
       On remand, the People may elect to retry defendant on that charge, although with
a properly instructed jury. (People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 607 [“[i]f
reversal is predicated on instructional error, … double jeopardy principles do not come
into play”]; see Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 14‒15 [reversal for trial error,
as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not trigger double jeopardy
concerns]; accord, Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 39‒41.)
                                      DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter in count 1 is reversed, and the
sentence on that count is vacated. The People may elect to retry defendant on that

                                             27.
charge. The sentence is also vacated as to count 2, and the matter remanded for a full
resentencing consistent with this opinion. Following resentencing, the trial court is
directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                           DE SANTOS, J.
I CONCUR:

SNAUFFER, J.

                                            28.
POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J., Dissenting.
       I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s
instructions did not require the jury to find defendant acted with, at least, conscious
disregard for human life.
       The instructions required that, in order to have committed an unlawful killing with
implied malice, the actual perpetrator must have acted with conscious disregard for
human life. Then, to determine whether defendant was liable for that killing as an aider
and abettor, the jury instructions required that she have “specifically intend[ed]” to aid
the perpetrator’s crime.
       By requiring that defendant have specifically intended to aid the crime of killing
with conscious disregard for human life, the instructions thereby required a finding
defendant herself acted with conscious disregard for human life. One cannot specifically
intend to aid and abet a person’s crime of killing with conscious disregard for human life
without themselves also acting with conscious disregard for human life. (See People v.
McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123 [“Absent some circumstance negating malice one
cannot knowingly and intentionally help another commit an unlawful killing without
acting with malice”].)
       In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the majority cites People v. Powell (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell) and People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi).
However, neither is persuasive.
       Powell reasoned:

               “[Defendant] points out the language of the standard aiding and
       abetting instruction given here, CALCRIM No. 401. He emphasizes that
       this instruction couches direct aiding and abetting liability in terms of the
       aider and abettor knowing the perpetrator intended to commit the crime, the
       aider and abettor intending to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the
       crime, and that, by words or conduct, the aider and abettor in fact aided the
       perpetrator’s commission of the crime. As relevant here, ‘the crime’ would
       be murder. But as we have discussed, the aider and abettor of implied
       malice murder need not intend the commission of the crime of murder.
       Rather, relative to the aider and abettor’s intent, he or she need only intend
       the commission of the perpetrator’s act, the natural and probable
       consequences of which are dangerous to human life, intentionally aid in the
       commission of that act and do so with conscious disregard for human life.”
       (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.)
       This is not persuasive, as it relies on an illusory distinction. Specifically, that
there is a substantive difference between what the instructions said – i.e., aiding and
intending the commission of the crime of implied malice murder – versus what the law
actually requires – i.e., intending “the commission of the perpetrator’s act, the natural and
probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life [and] intentionally aid[ing]
in the commission of that act and do so with conscious disregard for human life.”
(Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) However, there is no meaningful distinction
between those two concepts. Aiding and intending the commission of implied malice
murder means intending for the perpetrator to commit the dangerous act, aiding in the
commission of the act, and doing so with conscious disregard for human life.
       Langi is even less persuasive. There, the court faulted the instruction for requiring
the aider and abettor to have acted “ ‘with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator,’ ” whereas the law does not require “knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to
kill.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) But “unlawful purpose” in the context of
implied malice is not “aim[ing] to kill” but rather acting with “conscious disregard for
human life.” Thus, requiring the aider and abettor to act with knowledge of the
perpetrator’s “unlawful purpose” in no way conflicts with the law.
       Langi goes on to reason that while the second degree murder instruction required
the perpetrator to have acted with conscious disregard for human life, the aider and
abettor instruction does not include the same requirement. Not so, as it is conveyed by
the instruction’s requirement that the defendant have the intent or purpose of aiding the

                                              2.
commission of the perpetrator’s crime1 – which in this context would be a conscious-
disregard-for-human-life killing. One cannot specifically intend to aid a conscious-
disregard-for-human-life killing without also consciously disregarding human life
themself. The instructions simply do not permit the jury to convict a defendant as an
aider and abettor without the minimally required mental state.2
       A helpful exercise to illustrate this point would be to imagine that a hypothetical
jury concluded the defendant did not harbor a conscious disregard for human life and see
if the instructions would nonetheless permit them to convict that defendant as an aider
and abettor. Under the instructions given in this case, the answer is no. The impassable
roadblock would come when the jury got to the instructions’ requirement that the
defendant have “specifically intend[ed] to … aid … the perpetrator’s” crime of killing
someone with a conscious disregard for human life. (CALCRIM No. 401.) They would
have to conclude this requirement was unsatisfied and acquit. This demonstrates the
instructions adequately ensured defendant could not be convicted without the jury finding
he harbored the requisite mental state.
       For these reasons, I would affirm and respectfully dissent.

                                                                POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.

       1 Similar to the instruction in Langi, the instructions in the present case required
that defendant knew the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and “specifically intend[ed] to …
aid … the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.”
        2 This is not to say the instructions are as clear as theoretically possible. Proposed
instruction CALCRIM No. 526 (Jud. Council of Cal., Criminal Jury Instructions:
Revisions and Additions, Invitation to Comment, Comments submitted by June 30, 2023,
pp. 50–54) is likely to be an improvement over the existing instructions. But the question
before us is not whether an instruction could be improved in terms of clarity, but instead
whether it accurately conveyed the law. (See People v. Wardwell (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d
560, 565–566 [just because instruction is not a “model of clarity” does not mean jury was
misled by it.]; accord Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 663, 676.)
Even assuming there was room for improvement in terms of clarity, the instructions given
in this case were sufficient to convey the required mental state.

                                              3.