Court Opinion

ID: 9621205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:53:22.762423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:09.697176
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
Justice SCOTT.
I join in Justice Roach’s well reasoned dissent, but add my own dissent to point out that the majority opinion offers no explanation for the purposeful amendment in 1974 to KRS 279.020, changing the words “electric energy” to “energy”; other than to say “[i]f the legislators intend to change the existing statutory language or interpretation, they must use.. .plain and unmistakable language which will leave no doubt that the departure from the prior interpretation is intended.”
Have we forgotten the'energy crisis that began in 1973 and ran through 1974 and 1975, resulting in our first service station gas lines since War World II; along with the concomitant surge in fossil fuel costs— coal went from $7-$10 a ton to upwards of $100 per ton by 1975 with oil and natural gas prices leading the way. The point I make is that this amendment (changing the statute to refer to “energy” rather than “electric energy”) was made during the middle of this crisis. And when the legislature undertook to delete the word “electric”- — they surely meant the statute to refer to something different than “electric energy”;’ otherwise, why would they have made the change? We should not presume the legislature would perform a needless act.
“All bills introduced... shall be written in non-technical language using words with common and everyday meaning. KRS 446.015. All words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of language...” KRS 446.080(4).
Accordingly, a court may not insert language to arrive at a meaning different from that created by the stated language in a statute. Beckham v. Board of Education, 873 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Ky.1994). Kentucky statutes must be given a literal construction, and the language used must be given its ordinary meaning except when the language used has a special meaning in the law. Withers v. University of Kentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Ky.1997).
Electric is defined as “relating to or operated by electricity.” Energy is defined as “usable power” or “the resources for producing such power.” Merrianir-Webster Online Dictionary. Thus, clearly “electric energy” has a different meaning than “energy.”
Thus, since “electric” and “energy” have ordinary and common meanings, we should recognize those meanings, and so apply them. Something the majority refuses to do. It seems to me their failure to do so was triggered by the nature of the Appel-lee — Jackson ' Energy — an electric utility; notwithstanding that by the 1974 amendment the legislature plainly changed the statute so they could “distribute or furnish energy.” Propane is energy (a usable *99power) and is often used as a primary means of heating homes.
I also join with Justice Roach in acknowledging that in any event, the distribution of propane to its customers was a service “requested, or deemed advisable or desirable to operate a utility.” There was simply no evidence put forth to contradict this.
Of course, the legislature will meet early next year and consider this issue again— but there is “a cold winter eomin.’ ” And by the logic of the majority, we have inhibited competition in a “free enterprise system” to the detriment of all the Appellee’s customers.
For the foregoing reasons, I sincerely believe the trial court and Court of Appeals were correct in their analysis — thus I strongly dissent from the majority opinion.