Court Opinion

ID: 9950272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 18:02:38.051054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:19.177985
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/24 P. v. Power CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084793
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF176741A)
                    v.

    JOSHUA CODY POWER,                                                                    OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John W. Lua,
Judge.
         Janice M. Lagerlof, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A.
Martinez and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Poochigian, J. and Meehan, J.

                                          SEE CONCURRING OPINION
       Defendant Joshua Cody Power contends on appeal that his sentences on counts 1
and 3 must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing because the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing the upper terms pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1170,
subdivision (b).2 We agree that the trial court erred in its application of section 1170,
subdivision (b), but conclude any error was harmless. We affirm.
                                PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       On June 22, 2022, the Kern County District Attorney filed an amended
information charging defendant with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1);
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury while confined in prison
(§ 4501, subd. (b); count 2); and attempt by threats or violence to deter a correctional
officer from performing his duty (§ 69; count 3). As to count 2, it was further alleged
that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)). It was also alleged that defendant has five prior strike convictions under the
“Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (c)–(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(e)), two of which were
prior serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subd. (a)).
       The district attorney alleged the following circumstances in aggravation: the
crime involved great violence (California of Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1));3 the victim
was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)); defendant engaged in violent conduct
indicating a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); and defendant has prior
convictions that are numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)).

1      All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2      Section 1170, subdivision (b) was recently amended effective January 1, 2022, by Senate
No. Bill 567. (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.; Senate Bill 567) (See Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, adding
§ 1170, subd. (b)(1), (2).) The amended statute was in effect at the time of defendant’s
sentencing.
3      All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

                                                2.
       On July 15, 2022, a jury found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter (§ 192) on count 1, and guilty as charged on count 2 (§ 4501,
subd. (b)) and count 3 (§ 69). The jury found true the allegation that defendant
personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
       On July 15, 2022, a bench trial was held on the prior convictions and aggravating
circumstances allegations. The court found not true the alleged aggravating circumstance
that the victim was particularly vulnerable. The court found true the five prior strike
convictions, two of which were prior serious felony convictions, and the three remaining
aggravating circumstances allegations: (1) that the crime involved great violence
(rule 4.421(a)(1)); (2) that defendant engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious
danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); and (3) that defendant has prior convictions that are
numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)).
       On August 12, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to prison for the
indeterminate term of 33 years to life (the upper term, tripled pursuant to § 667,
subd. (e)(2)(A)(i)) on count 1 (voluntary manslaughter; § 193, subd. (a)) plus 10 years for
the two prior serious felony conviction enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)), and six years
(the upper term) on count 3 (attempt by threats or violence to deter a correctional officer
from performing his duty; §§ 18, 69). The term imposed on count 2 was stayed under
section 654.
       On August 12, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
                                          FACTS
               Prosecution
       Defendant and Kevin Mansfield were inmates at a corrections facility. They had
been housed in the same cell since approximately December 2017. Their cell was in a
locked and secure unit.
       On February 16, 2018, correctional officer Kevin Almond came on duty at
10:00 p.m. Almond testified that in defendant’s unit all cell doors are locked at

                                             3.
11:00 p.m. Almond’s supervising officer on the night of the incident, correctional officer
Khwann Oliver, testified that routine inmate counts are conducted daily at 5:00 a.m.,
12:00 p.m., 5:00 p.m., 9:30 p.m., and 11:00 p.m.4 During inmate counts, a correctional
officer is supposed to go to each cell in the unit to verify all inmates are physically
present, coherent, and responsive.
       Almond testified he was briefed by the officers who were on the prior shift when
he began his shift on the evening of the incident that the 9:00 p.m. routine inmate count
had been conducted and there had been no incidents in the unit. The control booth officer
on duty in the unit that evening, correctional officer Yolanda Pantoja, whose shift also
began at 10:00 p.m., stated that according to protocol, she would have been informed by
the officer with the prior shift that the routine 9:30 p.m. inmate count had been
performed. She also testified that she believed the 9:30 p.m. count had been conducted
according to standard procedure because no one had informed her otherwise. Pantoja
stated that she had not heard any unusual sounds in the unit from the time she began her
shift at 10:00 p.m. until Almond began the 11:00 p.m. inmate count.
       At approximately 11:00 p.m., Almond began the 11:00 p.m. inmate count. He
stated that at approximately 11:03 p.m. he approached the cell occupied by defendant and
Mansfield. He noticed the light of their cell was still on and their window was partially
covered by cardboard. From outside the cell, Almond ordered the inmates to take the
cardboard off the window but received no response. Almond testified that when he
looked inside the cell through the uncovered part of the window, he saw the two inmates
about two feet from the back of the cell. Mansfield’s body was laying on the floor, and

4      Almond also stated that a minimum of five inmate counts are conducted daily. He
stated he was not sure of all of the times they were regularly scheduled throughout a
24-hour period. However, he and Oliver both testified that counts occurred daily at both
9:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.

                                              4.
defendant was laying on top of him, punching the right side of Mansfield’s face. Almond
said that he ordered the inmates to stop fighting and get in a prone position, but defendant
continued to punch Mansfield, so he radioed other officers for assistance. Almond
testified that at the time he was not sure what Mansfield’s condition was, but he did not
see Mansfield make any voluntary movement or response. He only saw Mansfield’s
body move as it was being struck by defendant.
       When the inmates did not comply with Almond’s orders, he pepper sprayed inside
the cell through the food port. He stated that the first burst of pepper spray had no effect
on either inmate, and defendant continued to punch Mansfield’s face. Almond testified
that he realized Mansfield was incoherent, so he radioed that there was a medical
emergency. Almond again ordered defendant to stop fighting and to get in a prone
position, but defendant replied, “F[***] you” and continued. Almond sprayed a
second burst of pepper spray into the cell, which caused defendant to slide off Mansfield
and lay on the side of the cell. Defendant attempted to stand but fell. Almond testified
that Mansfield made no movements after defendant stopped punching him. Almond
ordered defendant to back up to the food port so he could place handcuffs on him but he
did not comply.
       Assisting officers performed an extraction on defendant but he resisted the
officers’ efforts to restrain him, punching and kicking the officers. Oliver hit defendant’s
legs and buttocks with his baton but defendant continued to resist until the officers were
eventually able to place handcuffs and leg restraints on him and put him in a wheelchair
because he refused to walk.
       Almond testified that after defendant was extracted, Mansfield was lying on the
floor of the cell. Almond did not observe Mansfield breathe or make voluntary
movements. Oliver also testified that he did not see Mansfield make any voluntary
movements and appeared “fully unresponsive.” Oliver stated that Mansfield “was laying
facedown … [a]s [correctional officers] turned him over and placed him on the

                                             5.
backboard … it appeared that he had skin that—the skin appeared to be burned somehow.
It was peeling off of his face, shoulder, hands. His—he was covered in blood. It even
appeared as if his face was somewhat deformed, like disfigured.” Another correctional
officer involved in the extraction, Hector Ortega, stated that efforts to resuscitate
Mansfield with an automated electric device (AED) were unsuccessful. Medical
personnel determined Mansfield did not have a pulse and was not breathing. Medical
personnel were having trouble getting the AED properly applied to Mansfield’s chest
because there was so much blood that it would slide off his skin. They instead began
chest compressions as they transported him to the medical clinic but were unsuccessful.
Attending paramedics pronounced him deceased. Almond stated he was shocked and
surprised at the condition of the cell and extent of the violence, and the cell “had so much
blood inside … that it would be difficult to go in there without it actually being on your
person.”
       Almond testified that defendant looked unrecognizable because of the amount of
blood he had on his body. He accompanied defendant to the medical clinic and stated
that defendant continued to act belligerent there, cursing at the medical team.
       Mansfield was also brought to the medical clinic. Almond observed that he did
not seem responsive. Oliver also observed Mansfield at the medical clinic and believed
he appeared to be deceased.
       Forensic pathologist Dr. Robert Whitmore testified that he performed an autopsy
of Mansfield. He determined his cause of death was strangulation with blunt force head
trauma contributing. He stated that he observed second degree burns on his face, the
right side of his body and upper extremity, and left hand, “consistent with hot liquid
being applied.” He stated that he also observed “blunt force trauma to the head and some
to the body.” He noticed a large contusion on his forehead, bruise on his nose, fractured
nasal bone, bruises and cuts to his lips, abrasions, lacerations and bruising to his left eye,
ruptured left eyeball, and leaking eye fluid. He testified that the ruptured eyeball would

                                              6.
have been caused by “significant” force and it would be unusual for such an injury to be
caused by a fist or elbow.
       He also noted petechiae, or “pinpoint hemorrhages,” in Mansfield’s right eye,
which is frequently caused by strangulation, and saw hemorrhaging in his neck muscles,
tongue muscle, pharynx and thyroid gland and that the thyroid cartilage had
two fractures. He explained that for force applied to the neck to cause death, it must
typically be sustained for three to five minutes and that a person being strangled by
continuous pressure being applied to the neck would lose consciousness “fairly rapidly …
[m]aybe ten seconds,” and that, “if the pressure’s released, [the person will] wake back
up.”
              Defense
       Several correctional officers and former cellmates of Mansfield testified about
their past interactions with Mansfield. They described him as dangerous and violent and
testified that he committed prior assaults on other inmates and had been found in
possession of inmate manufactured weapons.
       Defendant testified that he and Mansfield had been cellmates for approximately a
month or month and a half and his requests to be moved out of Mansfield’s cell had been
ignored multiple times. Defendant stated that although he and Mansfield had no prior
altercations, he was scared of Mansfield because Mansfield presented himself to other
inmates as a violent person.
       Defendant testified that on the evening of the incident, he was brewing whiskey in
their cell and he and Mansfield had been drinking a considerable amount of it since
6:00 p.m. or 6:30 p.m. He testified Mansfield was “talking down” to him and about 30 to
45 minutes after they started drinking, Mansfield suddenly attacked him, punching and
choking him. Defendant stated he tried to get to the door, and fought back, fearing
Mansfield would kill him. He stated Mansfield latched onto his neck and started choking
him, causing him to fear he would die. He stated he threw Mansfield off his back,

                                             7.
causing Mansfield to fall into the batch of whiskey that was brewing. He testified that
the fight lasted “nonstop” for hours, and that no one checked on their cell at 9:30 p.m.
He stated that at some point, “[b]eing so tired and beat up,” he held Mansfield down to
get him to stop fighting. He stated he strangled Mansfield but did not intend to kill
Mansfield. He stated he resisted the officers and restraints because he was “a little
inebriated,” “falling everywhere,” and “trying to protect himself” because the officers
“were pushing a shield down on top of [him].” He testified that he sustained broken
cartilage in his nose, scrapes on his elbows and knees, and lacerations in the incident, but
suffered no burns or puncture wounds. He stated that both he and Mansfield suffered
swollen hands caused by fighting each other.
                                      DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper
terms on counts 1 and 3 because it did not properly apply section 1170, subdivision (b).
He argues the court erred in its application of section 1170, subdivision (b) by (1) finding
no mitigating circumstances, thus failing to properly balance aggravating against
mitigating circumstances; (2) relying on an aggravating circumstance not alleged or
specifically found true in the court trial on the aggravating circumstances; and (3) failing
to state separate reasons relating to the selection of the upper terms for counts 1 and 3.
The People disagree. We conclude the court erred by relying on an aggravating
circumstance not found true beyond a reasonable doubt in the separate bench trial on the
aggravating circumstances, but any error was harmless.
       A.     Background
       The information alleged four circumstances in aggravation: (1) the crime involved
great violence (rule 4.421(a)(1)); (2) the victim was particularly vulnerable
(rule 4.421(a)(3)); (3) defendant engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to
society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); and (4) defendant has prior convictions that are numerous or of
increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)).

                                             8.
       On July 15, 2022, after the jury trial on the charges concluded, a bench trial was
held on the prior convictions and aggravating circumstances allegations. The trial court
admitted as exhibits a certified copy of a defendant’s CLETS printout, or rap sheet
(Exh. 12), and defendant’s 969b packet (Exh. 13). After considering the exhibits, the
evidence presented at the jury trial, the probation report and the parties’ arguments, the
court stated it found not true the alleged aggravating circumstance that the victim was
particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)) but found true the remaining aggravating
circumstances alleged: (1) that the crime involved great violence (rule 4.421(a)(1));
(2) that defendant engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to society
(rule 4.421(b)(1)); and (3) that defendant’s prior convictions are numerous or of
increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)).
       On August 12, 2022, at sentencing, the court discussed whether the upper, middle,
or low terms were appropriate for counts 1 and 3. It found no mitigating circumstances
but found four aggravating circumstances justifying the imposition of the upper terms on
counts 1 and 3. It stated,

                “In considering the probation officer’s report and presiding over the
       trial, the Court does have a grasp of the information presented to the jury as
       well as the information now presented to the Court. In considering the
       appropriate triad to select an indeterminate-term sentencing, the court is
       mindful of … Rule 4.421 and recognizes the limitations the Court can
       utilize to justify an upper-term sentence. The Court says that because
       Count 3, as all counsel are aware, is a count that would result in a
       determinate-term sentence.

               “The circumstances in aggravation, likewise, can be utilized for the
       Court to consider an indeterminate-term sentencing as it relates to factors to
       determine whether to exercise discretion to strike or to impose sentencing
       for particular reasons. It does appear to the Court, based on an evaluation
       of the circumstances in mitigation and aggravation, that the Court will be
       guided by exercising its discretion when considering those factors.

             “For purposes of circumstances in mitigation, there simply aren’t
       any. For circumstances in aggravation, the Court does agree with the

                                             9.
       recommendations by the Probation Department, recognizing that the Court
       did find in a separate trial that three circumstances in aggravation were
       proven by the People beyond a reasonable doubt.

               “One, the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
       great bodily harm or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
       viciousness or callousness. That is pursuant to [rule 4.421(a)(1)]. Two,
       pursuant to [rule 4.421(b)(1)], the defendant has engaged in violent conduct
       that indicates a serious danger to society as evidenced by his present
       conviction as well as prior convictions. Three, pursuant to
       [rule 4.421(b)(2)], the defendant’s prior convictions as an adult are
       numerous or of increasing seriousness. And four, the defendant’s prior
       performance on juvenile misdemeanor and felony probation as well as
       parole have been unsatisfactory and that he has failed to comply with terms
       and he has re-offended.”
       The fourth aggravating circumstance cited by the trial court, that defendant’s prior
performance on juvenile misdemeanor and felony probation and parole was
unsatisfactory, was not alleged in the information, nor found true at the earlier bench trial
on the alleged circumstances in aggravation.
       The trial court then imposed the upper terms on count 1 (§ 192; voluntary
manslaughter) and count 3 (§ 69; attempt by threats or violence to deter a correctional
officer from performing his duty).
       B.     Law
       As amended by Senate Bill 567, effective January 1, 2022, section 1170,
subdivision (b) states that “when a sentencing court chooses a term from a statutory triad,
the chosen term shall not exceed the middle term, unless the facts supporting the
aggravating circumstances are (1) established by the defendant’s stipulation to them,
(2) proven to a jury (or to a court, if jury is waived) beyond a reasonable doubt, or
(3) based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction.” (People v.
Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 44; § 1170, subd. (b).)
       Under amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(5), the trial court must “set forth on
the record the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence imposed. The court may not

                                             10.
impose an upper term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which sentence is
imposed under any provision of law.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(5).)
       We review the trial court’s imposition of the upper term for an abuse of discretion.
(See People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) A court abuses its discretion when
its ruling “falls outside the bounds of reason.” (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th
1198, 1226 (DeSantis).) In doing so, we are “guided by two fundamental precepts”:

                “First, ‘ “[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
       clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
       [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to
       have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
       determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on
       review.” ’ [Citations.] Second, ‘ “a decision will not be reversed merely
       because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate tribunal is neither
       authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of
       the trial judge.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that
       a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational
       or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v.
       Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377 (Carmony).)

       C.     Analysis

              1.     Mitigating Circumstances
       Defendant first contends that the trial court erred because it did not find true any
mitigating circumstances. He argues the court ignored evidence of the following
applicable mitigating factors under rule 4.423: (1) the victim was an initiator of, willing
participant in, or aggressor or provoker of the incident (rule 4.423(a)(2)); (2) the crime
was committed because of an unusual circumstance, such as great provocation, that is
unlikely to recur (rule 4.423(a)(3)); (3) defendant participated in the crime under
circumstances of coercion or duress, or the criminal conduct was partially excusable for
some other reason not amounting to a defense (rule 4.423(a)(4)); and (4) defendant was
intoxicated at the time of the offense (rule 4.423(b)(2)). Defendant further contends that
the mitigating factors that the court should have found true should have outweighed the

                                             11.
court’s finding that the offense involved great cruelty under rule 4.421(a)(1). Here, the
record shows the court clearly considered the totality of circumstances when finding there
were no mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, its finding that the aggravating
circumstances outweighed the lack of mitigating circumstances was not so arbitrary or
irrational that no reasonable person could disagree with it such that it fell outside the
bounds of reason. (See Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377; see also DeSantis,
supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1226.) During the jury trial, defense counsel argued that the victim,
Mansfield, was the aggressor, and that defendant had acted to defend himself. The jury
and court also heard evidence about Mansfield’s violent history in prison before the
incident at issue, and several inmates who knew Mansfield before the incident testified
about his violent behavior and history of attacking other inmates. The jury found that
defendant committed voluntary manslaughter.
       During the hearing on the circumstances in aggravation, the trial court considered
Mansfield’s role in the fight and Mansfield’s history of violence in declining to find that
Mansfield was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421, subd. (a)(3)).
       At sentencing, defense counsel again argued that Mansfield was the aggressor and
that the court should find that defendant defended himself as a circumstance in
mitigation. However, the trial court noted that Mansfield’s role in the incident was
already taken into account by the jury’s finding of voluntary manslaughter on count 1, as
the finding of voluntary manslaughter must have been based on either heat of passion or
imperfect self-defense, and that the jury thus rejected the defense of perfect self-defense.
Discussing defendant’s Romero5 motion and the sentencing triads, the court stated:

               “There is one thing that the jury certainly found, that the defendant
       was not guilty of murder, but he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter for
       either imperfect self-defense or in the heat of passion. It does appear to the
       Court, as an objective observer, that at some point this jury was provided

5      People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

                                             12.
with guidance in determining whether the defendant completely or perfectly
defended himself during the course of this action or whether he imperfectly
defended himself. By virtue of the verdict, it is reasonable to infer that the
defendant very well might have been defending himself but did so
imperfectly by using excessive force under the circumstances.

        “It is that excessive force that this Court considers strongly as it
relates to the manner in which the defendant comported himself in
exercising excessive force to kill another human being. As testified to by
the pathologist, he testified that it would take approximately ten seconds of
continuous pressure around the neck to render an individual unconscious.
It would take another two minutes and 50 seconds, up to four minutes and
50 seconds, for continued pressure along that neck area to kill someone or
to strangle someone. Those are the circumstances that the Court is
confronted with when determining … whether—given the circumstances of
the offense specifically, the defendant should be afforded an opportunity to
be found outside the spirit of the Three Strikes Law. It does not appear to
the Court, given the circumstances of the offense as presented before this
jury, that the defendant should be afforded that right based on the excessive
force utilized by the defendant to kill another human being. For those
reasons alone, the Court would deny the Romero motion.

         “But I stated previously the Court must likewise consider the totality
of the circumstances, which would also include the defendant’s criminal
history. The Court has been presented with documentation during the court
trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the prior convictions alleged.
Court has also been provided with a probation officer’s report which
outlines, albeit briefly, the defendant’s criminal history. When considering
this information, the Court does recognize that the defendant has suffered
one past juvenile adjudication, at least two misdemeanor convictions,
nine felony convictions, five violations of probation. Of the nine felony
convictions, five qualified as strike priors.

       “Given the information provided to the Court during the course of
this motion, the Court now has a better understanding of the four strike
priors accumulated in one case out of Tuolumne County in which they did
derive from separate acts or involved separate victims to justify consecutive
sentencing. That is significant for the Court because the Court views that
particular case and those suffered convictions not as a single course of
abhorrent behavior but rather a continuous course of conduct, certainly
one that is disturbing, and that sets aside the prior convictions that
ultimately arose in 2011. For those reasons it does not appear to the Court

                                      13.
        that the defendant is outside the spirit of the Three Strikes Law, and on that
        basis the Romero motion is denied.”
        It then stated, “For purposes of circumstances in mitigation, there simply aren’t
any.”
        The record reflects that the trial court considered whether the evidence supported
the finding of any mitigating circumstances enumerated in rule 4.423. It was within the
court’s discretion to find that, while defendant may have been defending himself, the
excessive force defendant used did not justify finding Mansfield’s role of aggressor as a
mitigating circumstance.
        Defendant further contends that “the court’s finding in aggravation: that the crime
involved a high degree of cruelty, based on [Mansfield’s] injuries and the condition of the
cell, did not adequately consider all the surrounding circumstances, especially in light of
its belief that Mansfield was not a particularly vulnerable victim and had been the initial
aggressor.” However, the record shows the trial court considered the evidence presented
at trial in finding the aggravating circumstance of a “high degree of cruelty” was not
outweighed by mitigating factors, as it stated it “consider[ed] strongly” the “excessive
force [defendant used] to kill another human being,” based on the pathologist’s testimony
that it would only have taken approximately 10 seconds of continuous pressure around
Mansfield’s neck for defendant to render him unconscious, but would have taken another
two minutes 50 seconds, up to four minutes 50 seconds, of pressure on Mansfield’s neck
for defendant to kill Mansfield. Based on the record, the court’s finding that the offense
involved a high degree of cruelty was within the court’s discretion and was neither so
irrational nor arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.
        Defendant also argues the evidence shows the fight was still ongoing when
Almond came to the cell door. However, the record shows that when Almond arrived at
the cell, he only saw defendant punching Mansfield and never saw Mansfield make any
voluntary movement. Based on this testimony, the trial court could reasonably infer that

                                             14.
Mansfield was already incapacitated while defendant continued to punch him, supporting
the court’s finding of “excessive force” or “great violence” and that any self-defense by
defendant was imperfect self-defense.
       Accordingly, the record shows the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
there were no mitigating circumstances, or in finding that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the lack of mitigating circumstances, as these findings were neither so
irrational nor arbitrary that no reasonable person could disagree. (See Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377; see also DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1226.)

              2.     Prior Performance on Probation (Rule 4.421(b)(5))
       Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by using
defendant’s prior performance on probation and parole (rule 4.421(b)(5)) as an
aggravating circumstance supporting imposition of the upper terms for counts 1 and 3 at
sentencing because that circumstance was not alleged or specifically found true in the
separate bench trial on the aggravating circumstances, as required by section 1170,
subdivision (b). Defendant contends “the parole performance factor [(rule 4.421(b)(5))]
does not fit within the exception for prior convictions contained in section 1170[,
subdivision] (b)(3) which permits the court to consider ‘a certified record of conviction’ ”
for defendant’s criminal history.
       We agree the trial court erred in using the aggravating circumstance of defendant’s
prior performance on probation and parole at sentencing to impose the upper terms on
counts 1 and 3. However, we conclude any error was harmless because the court’s
statement shows it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant
would have been reached in the absence of the error.
       At the bench trial on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court
found true three aggravating circumstances: (1) the crime involved great violence
(rule 4.421(a)(1)); (2) defendant engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to

                                            15.
society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); and (3) defendant has prior convictions that are numerous or of
increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)). A certified copy of defendant’s criminal
history (a section 969b packet; exh. 13) and a CLETS printout (rap sheet; exh. 12) were
admitted into evidence and considered by the court at the bifurcated trial.
       At sentencing, after citing the three aggravating circumstances it found true at the
earlier bench trial on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court also cited a
fourth aggravating circumstance, stating defendant’s “prior performance on juvenile
misdemeanor and felony probation as well as parole have been unsatisfactory [in] that he
has failed to comply with terms and he has re-offended.”
       Rule 4.421(b)(5) lists “prior performance on probation … or parole” as an
aggravating circumstance. (Rule 4.421(b)(5).)
       Amended section 1170, subdivision (b) permits imposition of an upper term based
on a circumstance in aggravation where the facts underlying the circumstance have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(3), the trial court, “may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in
determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the
prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
       Our court recently articulated a standard of review if a trial court fails to follow
section 1170, subdivision (b) in People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, review
granted October 12, 2022, S275655 (Dunn). Dunn establishes a three-question
framework. First, we determine: “(1)(a) beyond a reasonable doubt whether the jury
would have found one aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt and
(1)(b) whether there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have found any
remaining aggravating circumstance(s) true beyond a reasonable doubt. If all aggravating
circumstances relied upon by the trial court would have been proved to the respective
standards, any error was harmless.” (Id. at pp. 409–410, fn. omitted.) If the answer to

                                             16.
question (1)(b) is no, then we determine “(2) whether there is a reasonable probability
that the trial court would have imposed a sentence other than the upper term in light of
the aggravating circumstances provable from the record as determined in the prior steps.
If the answer [to question (2)] is no, the error was harmless. If the answer is yes, the
reviewing court vacates the sentence and remands for resentencing ….” (Id. at p. 410.)
Under the Dunn framework, the “reasonable probability” standard of People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson) is incorporated into questions (1)(b) and (2).6 (Dunn, at
pp. 407, 409–410.) The test under Watson is whether, “ ‘after an examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence,’ [the reviewing court] is of the ‘opinion’ that it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, at p. 836.)
       Here, the facts underlying three of the circumstances in aggravation cited by the
trial court were found true by the court or contained in the certified records of conviction.
However, the fourth circumstance in aggravation relied on by the court, that defendant’s
prior performance on probation and parole was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)), was
neither alleged in the information nor found true by the trial court at the hearing on
aggravating circumstances. Nevertheless, the upper terms were imposed on counts 1 and
3. The court’s imposition of the upper terms on counts 1 and 3 is thus not consistent with
the requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b). Unless imposition of the upper term

6      Our court has also articulated a second possible standard of review in People v. Falcon
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, review granted September 13, 2023, S281242. However, Falcon
expressly states its two-question standard applies to retroactive applications of Senate Bill 567.
(Falcon, at pp. 921 [“We … hold that upon retroactive application of Senate Bill 567 to upper
term sentences imposed under [§ 1170], resentencing is unwarranted only if two requirements are
met .…”], 951 [“In sum, whether resentencing of an upper term sentence is the appropriate
remedy on retroactive application of amended section 1170[, subdivision] (b) involves
two relevant questions.”].) Here, amended section 1170 was already in effect when defendant
was sentenced. Accordingly, this case does not involve the retroactive application of Senate
Bill 567, so Falcon is inapplicable.

                                               17.
on counts 1 and 3 was harmless, the sentence on those counts must be vacated and the
matter remanded to the trial court for resentencing in compliance with section 1170,
subdivision (b).
         Accordingly, we must answer Dunn’s questions.
         We revisit the aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial court. Here, as
discussed above, there was no error as to the court’s findings on the first
three aggravating circumstances found true at the bench trial on the circumstances in
aggravation and mitigation because those circumstances meet the requirements of
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), that the trial court found the facts underlying those
circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt, or subdivision (b)(3), that the facts were
proven by a certified record of defendant’s prior convictions. Accordingly, we need not
determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the jury would have found any one
aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by Dunn question
1(a).7
         We must next address Dunn question 1(b) to determine whether there is a
reasonable probability that the trial court would not have found the remaining
aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the court did not make a
specific finding as to the facts underlying the fourth aggravating circumstance,
defendant’s prior performance on probation and parole, that it cited at sentencing.
Defendant contends that the court would not have found true the aggravating
circumstance regarding defendant’s prior performance on probation or parole because it
does not fit within the exception for prior convictions in section 1170, subdivision (b)(3),
which permits a court to consider “a certified record of conviction,” and because the

7       Because there was no error by the trial court in relying upon the first three aggravating
circumstances, we need not apply the Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 harmless error
standard to the remaining aggravating circumstance. We instead apply Watson, as the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment have already been met. (See Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at p. 410, fn. 14.)

                                              18.
criminal history recited in the probation report does not satisfy section 1170,
subdivision (b)(3). The People argue that the circumstance fits within the exception for
prior convictions contained in section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) for certified records of
conviction.
       Section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) permits a trial court to “consider the defendant’s
prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction
without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) A probation
report is not a certified record of conviction. (Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.)
       Here, the trial court noted at sentencing that defendant had “five violations of
probation” and the record on appeal includes certified records of defendant’s prior
convictions, which document defendant’s convictions for numerous offenses over the
past 20 years, as well as prior prison sentences he served. The certified records also show
more than five probation and parole violation allegations against defendant. However,
the records do not reflect the basis or outcome of all the probation and parole violation
allegations. Accordingly, we find that the fourth aggravating circumstance does not fall
within section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), and we cannot conclude that the court would
have reached the same conclusion on that circumstance without finding true beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the facts underlying the aggravating circumstance of defendant’s
prior performance on probation and parole.
       As we answer Dunn question 1(b) in the negative, we must last determine the
answer to Dunn question 2, whether there is a reasonable probability that the trial court
would have imposed a sentence other than the upper term in light of the aggravating
circumstances provable from the record as determined in the prior steps. If the answer is
no, the error was harmless. As discussed above, the harmless error analysis to be applied
in this case is the Watson standard, whether “it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”
(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

                                             19.
       We conclude the error was harmless. At sentencing, as discussed above, the trial
court explained its choice of the upper terms for counts 1 and 3, giving great weight to
the excessive force used by defendant and his long history of convictions for violence
showing he is a danger to society. It also noted there were no mitigating circumstances.
A single aggravating circumstance is sufficient to impose an upper term sentence.
(People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 813.) The court was therefore permitted to
impose the upper terms on counts 1 and 3 based on the first three aggravating
circumstances it cited at sentencing.
       Given the trial court’s observations and findings on the record, we conclude that it
is not reasonably probable that the court would have imposed a sentence lower than the
upper terms for counts 1 and 3 had it only identified the first three aggravating
circumstances. Therefore, any section 1170 error caused by its reliance at sentencing on
defendant’s prior performance on probation and parole was harmless. (Dunn, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 409–410.)
              3.     Aggravating Circumstances Relating to Count 3
       Defendant last contends that the trial court erred in applying section 1170,
subdivision (b) by not making findings in aggravation that were related to the criminal
conduct in count 3 (§§ 18, 69) under rule 4.421(a) because the offense in count 3 was
based on a separate act involving separate victims from count 1 (§§ 192, 193). Defendant
contends the “violent nature of the crime” aggravating circumstance (rule 4.421(a)(1))
found true relates only to count 1.
       The “great violence” aggravating circumstance (rule 4.421(a)(1)) relates to only
count 1 (voluntary manslaughter; §§ 192, 193), as the trial court explained it found that
circumstance true “given the overall circumstances involving how … Mansfield was
found in the cell.” However, the other two aggravating circumstances found true by the
court, “danger to society” (rule 4.421(b)(1)), and “prior convictions” (rule 4.421(b)(2)),
both relate to defendant, rather than a specific count.

                                             20.
       At sentencing, the trial court stated it gave great weight to the “excessive force”
used by defendant in count 1, referring to the “great violence” aggravating circumstance.
However, the court’s statement at sentencing makes clear that even though the “great
violence,” relates only to count 1, it still found the remaining aggravating circumstances
that relate to defendant, rather than a specific count, sufficient to justify the upper term on
count 3. (See People v. Black, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 813 [A single aggravating
circumstance is sufficient to impose an upper term sentence.].) When discussing the
“danger to society” aggravating circumstance, the court noted, “the defendant has
engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society as evidenced by his
present conviction as well as prior convictions.” It also extensively discussed the “prior
convictions” aggravating circumstance, noting, “the Court must likewise consider the
totality of the circumstances, which would also include the defendant’s criminal
history.… Court has also been provided with a probation officer’s report which outlines
… the defendant’s criminal history. When considering this information, the Court does
recognize that the defendant has suffered one past juvenile adjudication, at least
two misdemeanor convictions, nine felony convictions, five violations of probation. Of
the nine felony convictions, five qualified as strike priors.”
       “[I]t [is] not improper for the court to rely on the same facts to impose both upper
terms.” (People v. Williams (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 145, 156; see People v. Price (1984)
151 Cal.App.3d 803, 812.) “Although preferred practice would have sentencing courts
state reasons separately for each term imposed, for purposes of appellate review,” here,
the court’s “incorporation by reference of its prefatory remarks sufficiently reveals its
reasons for imposing two upper terms” on both counts 1 and 3. (Williams, at p. 156.)
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err by not stating separate reasons for its
imposition of the upper terms on counts 1 and 3.
       We conclude the trial court did not err in applying section 1170, subdivision (b) by
finding no mitigating circumstances or by not stating separate reasons for imposing the

                                             21.
upper terms on counts 1 and 3. Further, while the court did err in applying section 1170,
subdivision (b) by relying on the aggravating circumstance of defendant’s prior
performance on probation and parole (rule 4.421(b)(5)) because the facts underlying that
circumstance were not found true by the court beyond a reasonable doubt or proven by a
certified record of defendant’s convictions, we conclude the error was harmless.
                                    DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                     HILL, P. J.

POOCHIGIAN, J.

                                           22.
MEEHAN, J., Concurring.
       I agree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s sentencing decision
under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b),1 and, therefore, I concur in the
disposition. In reaching that disposition, I also agree with the majority that the trial court
relied on three valid aggravating factors, but erred in finding defendant’s prior
performance on probation and parole was unsatisfactory.2 (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(5).) However, I respectfully write separately because I would find the error
harmless under a traditional application of Watson, as follows. (People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)
       The amendment to section 1170 by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
had been in effect for more than seven months when defendant was sentenced.
Therefore, this case does not involve retroactive application of the statute and there is no
suggestion the trial court was otherwise unaware of the scope of its sentencing
discretion.3 (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391; accord, People v. Salazar,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 425; People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 431–432.) This case

1      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2        So far as it appears from the appellate record in this case, the trial court did not base its
finding on this factor on a certified record pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(3). I am not
persuaded that this factor necessarily falls outside the scope of the statute’s prior conviction
exception, and this case does not present the opportunity to consider that issue. (See People v.
Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 82–83; People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 954–955 &
fn. 13, review granted Sept. 13, 2023, S281242 (Falcon).) Therefore, I do not join the majority’s
opinion to the extent it takes that position. (Maj. opn., pp. 16–18.)
3      The majority characterizes this court’s decision in Falcon as limited to the retroactive
application of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). (Maj. opn., p. 18, fn. 6.) In Falcon,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pages 950–951, review granted, a panel of this court declined to follow
the harmless error analysis articulated by a different panel of this court in People v. Dunn (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 394, review granted October 12, 2022, S275655, which was also a retroactive
application case, and concluded that remand was required under Gutierrez, which provided the
applicable standard for assessing error in the context of retroactive application of Senate Bill
No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391; accord,
People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424–425.) Neither the analysis nor the concerns raised
in Falcon are as limited as the majority suggests, however, and I do not join in that position.
also does not involve an unauthorized sentence claim (Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 942–943, review granted; see In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130 [“an
unauthorized sentence or one in excess of jurisdiction is a sentence that ‘could not
lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case’ ”]), or a claim of
structural error (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 178–179 (Sivongxxay)).
       “States are free to apply their own harmless error rules to errors of state law”
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 178), and, absent an error of the foregoing type or a
federal constitutional error,4 we generally evaluate a claim of state statutory error under
the Watson harmless error test (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973, citing
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; accord, Sivongxxay, supra, at pp. 178–179). Under
Watson, “a defendant must demonstrate that it is ‘reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to [the defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ”
(Sivongxxay, supra, at p. 178, quoting Watson, supra, at p. 836; accord, People v. Lewis,
supra, at p. 974).
       In this instance, the trial court found four aggravating factors and no mitigating
factors. Although the court erred in finding that defendant’s performance on probation
and parole was unsatisfactory, three valid aggravating factors support the sentencing
choice. Under the circumstances in this case, defendant fails to show a reasonable

4       This case does not present the situation where there were no properly proven factors, but
as observed in Falcon, “As the requirements under state law frame how the Sixth Amendment
applies, and because amended section 1170[, subdivision ](b) now effectively incorporates
Sixth Amendment principles, it is likely better to consider state law viability before moving to
the constitutional analysis—this is particularly true if, as we have questioned, the lack of any
properly proven or established aggravating circumstances signals an unauthorized sentence under
state law. If a circumstance is properly established under the amended law, it almost certainly
satisfies Sixth Amendment principles. And, if there are no properly proven circumstances, and
this constitutes an unauthorized sentence under state law, then there is no need to consider the
constitutional question because resentencing would be required.” (Falcon, supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at p. 952, fn. 12, review granted.)

                                               2.
probability of a more favorable result had the trial court not erred in finding the
fourth aggravating factor. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)5
       Therefore, on these grounds, I concur with the majority’s disposition in this case.

                                                                                  MEEHAN, J.

5       This result will not always follow from evaluating an erroneous finding on an
aggravating factor under Watson, as some cases may not involve any valid aggravating factors,
may involve a mix of aggravating and mitigating factors, or may otherwise evade a
determination by a reviewing court that there is no reasonable probability of a more favorable
result had the error not occurred. As stated in Falcon, “The harmless error test under Watson has
indeed been applied in cases where a sentencing court considered improper sentencing factors.”
(Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 950, review granted, citing People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th
324, 492 & People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233.) However, “[e]ven this application of
Watson in Avalos came with a caveat: because the pre-2007 [determinate sentencing law]
contained a presumptive middle term sentence coupled with the requirement that aggravating
circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances before imposition of the upper term was
proper, reviewing courts were also required to reverse when it could not be determined whether
the improper factor was determinative for the sentencing court in weighing the circumstances
and imposing an upper term.” (Falcon, supra, at p. 950, fn. 11, italics added, citing Avalos,
supra, at p. 233.)

                                               3.