Court Opinion

ID: 9522757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:05.909264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:53.203443
License: Public Domain

Hennessey, C.J.
(concurring). I concur in the opinion of the court, but add some views of my own as to the court’s statement about a defendant’s voluntary use of alcohol or illegal drugs. In several recent cases, this court has moderately broadened the significance of evidence concerning voluntary intoxication. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 385 Mass. 639, 648-649 (1982); Commonwealth v. Mazza, 366 Mass. 30, 34 (1974); Commonwealth v. Costa, 360 Mass. 177, 186 (1971). In the instant case, I read the opinion of the court as making the voluntary ingestion of intoxicants relevant to the “specific intent” required for the crime of assault with intent to murder, just as we have made it relevant to the “deliberate premeditation” required for certain cases of murder in the first degree. Id. But “specific intent” may not have clear meaning to all judges and all lawyers. I trust that it is clear that the language of the court here has no bearing on the great majority of crimes of violence, such as assault by means of a dangerous weapon and armed robbery. See Commonwealth v. McGrath, 358 Mass. 314, 320 (1970). It is not in the public interest to conclude that a defendant’s voluntary intoxication is relevant to most crimes of violence. We turn our backs on the realities of today’s society if we move in that direction. I add that my concerns here do not implicate our decisions relating to insanity, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 539-540 (1976) (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting in part), which are based on the sound premise that we should not treat as criminals those persons who are incompetent because of mental disease.