Court Opinion

ID: 9753040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:53:02.373895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:28.120514
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as I would remand to the PCRA court for clarification and supplementation of its opinion before relying on its fact finding, since I believe that the opinion is ambiguous and insufficient in material respects.
For example, Appellant presents a colorable argument that the PCRA court’s finding of a reasonable strategy on trial *527counsel’s part in foregoing objections to the improper references to post-arrest silence makes sense only in light of the court’s interrelated understanding that counsel had otherwise preserved an objection relative to such references, see Commonwealth v. Duffey, No. 84 CR 176, at 5-6 (C.P. Lackawanna Dec. 15, 2004) (indicating that the issues regarding Dr. Hume’s testimony were preserved). Appellant notes that the court elaborated on this view at the supplemental hearing on remand, as follows:
[M]y theory behind my reasoning and rationale in support of my decision here today is that [trial counsel] in my view, first of all, did properly preserve the appeal. He preserved it in both his pretrial filings and his trial objections particularly in light of the relaxed waiver rule that was in place in 1984 with regard to death penalty cases in constitutional issues.
I further found that there was reasonable basis and rationale for not objecting once again during the course of the testimony because, one, it was already preserved. But more importantly [counsel] didn’t want to call attention ...
N.T., November 18, 2004, at 166-67.1 On the other hand, however, the PCRA court otherwise expressly credited, at least in theory, the Commonwealth’s argument that appellate counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to preserve this issue, because the underlying claim of trial-counsel inef*528fectiveness was unmeritorious. See Duffey, No. 84 CR 176, slip op. at 7.2
To the degree that the PCRA court misapprehended that a general objection to expert testimony will preserve a challenge to an inappropriate reference to post-arrest silence occurring in the witness’s examination, I believe that such potential misunderstanding colors the court’s findings and conclusions, and therefore, they should not be relied upon in our review as if detached from their ambiguous context.
■ If the PCRA court’s opinion is, as the majority holds, that counsel’s conduct in failing to preserve an objection to the prejudicial references to post-arrest silence was reasonable, I have substantial reservations about accepting it, because the opinion lacks a meaningful, supporting evaluation.
For example, while crediting trial counsel’s testimony that he forewent objections to the prejudicial testimony and argument because he had made other objections and did not wish to appear obstreperous to the jurors, the PCRA court has offered no review of any portion of the trial record concerning such other objections in terms of their quality and likelihood of success relative to the objections that could have been made to alleviate the prejudice ensuing from the references to post-arrest silence. It seems to me that, before accepting counsel’s logic that his making of unmeritorious objections foreclosed ones necessary to prevent prejudice that is reasonably likely to have affected the imposition of a sentence of death, see Duffey, 579 Pa. at 204, 855 A.2d at 775 (finding that Appellant was prejudiced by the commentary concerning his post-arrest silence), a reviewing court would be duty bound to make some evaluation along these lines to distinguish between truly reasonable strategic choice and serious miscalculation. Indeed, the mere fact that the other objections asserted afford no cause for relief, as did the omitted one, seems to me to suggest a degree of circumspection in evaluating such ques*529tionable stewardship that is not reflected in the PCRA court’s opinion.
Concerning the alternate explanation that counsel held some notion (that he later abandoned) that he might be able to turn the references to Appellant’s post-arrest silence to Appellant’s advantage by using them to demonstrate his limited mental capacity, see Majority Opinion, 585 Pa. at 503-04, 889 A.2d at 62, it seems apparent to me that there were ample, alternate means available to counsel to make his point (including the direct testimony of his own experts) that were substantially more direct and consistent with the objective of advancing his client’s interests in avoiding the imposition of a death sentence than permitting prejudicial testimony impinging on Appellant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination onto the record concerning Appellant’s refusal to answer questions posed by the Commonwealth’s expert witness.3 In this regard, counsel’s reasoning on its face appears to fall squarely within the category of serious miscalculation, as opposed to reasonable strategy.

. The majority indicates that this statement on the part of the PCRA court relates to preservation of an objection to Dr. Hume's testimony generally, not to the specific constitutional error that this Court discussed in Duffey II. See Majority Opinion, 585 Pa. at 506 n. 4, 889 A.2d at 63 n. 4. This position, however, fails to take into account that this specific constitutional error was all that was before the PCRA court at the remand hearing. See Duffey, 579 Pa. 186, 205, 855 A.2d 764, 776 (2004)(remanding for an evidentiary hearing solely with respect to the issue of the stewardship of counsel relative to the prejudicial testimony concerning post-arrest silence). It therefore appears reasonably clear to me that the PCRA court was expressing the position that the general objections obviated the specific, relevant ones. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the PCRA court would couch its “reasoning and rationale in support of [its] decision here today” in terms of counsel’s preservation of issues and errors that were not before the court.

. The PCRA court reasoned that it nevertheless was required to address appellate counsel’s conduct in a more abstract fashion in light of this Court's remand order. See Duffey, No. 84 CR 176, slip op. at 8.

. It merits emphasis here that the expert had advised Appellant that such refusal would be without penalty to him. See Duffey, 579 Pa. at 199-200, 855 A.2d at 772.