Court Opinion

ID: 9741203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:51:33.319885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.879141
License: Public Domain

Connolly, J.,
dissenting.
In my opinion, the advisory form which the law enforcement officer read to Christner, prior to his blood test, was adequate under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197(10) (Reissue 1993) to advise Christner of the penal consequences of refusing to submit to the test and of failing the test.
It is undisputed that the advisory form read to Christner is the same as the advisory form that was at issue in Smith v. State, 248 Neb. 360, 535 N.W.2d 694 (1995). Thus, the only discernible difference between Smith and the instant case is that Smith arose in the context of an administrative license revoca*559tion proceeding, whereas the instant appeal arises from a criminal prosecution for driving under the influence.
As in Smith, the majority of this court once again ignores the legislative intent behind § 60-6,197(10). See Smith v. State, supra (Connolly, J., dissenting). This is so, as the majority notes, despite the Nebraska Legislature’s having amended § 60-6,197(10), which now provides: “Any person who is required to submit to a chemical blood, breath, or urine test or tests pursuant to this section shall be advised that refusal to submit to such test or tests is a separate crime for which the person may be charged.” § 60-6,197(10) (Cum. Supp. 1996).
While this amended version of § 60-6,197(10) is not applicable in the instant case, it is clear that the amendment was “in direct response to the July 1995 ruling of the Nebraska Supreme Court in a case called Smith v. State.” Public Hearing, L.B. 939, Committee on Transportation, 94th Leg., 2d Sess. 17 (Jan. 16, 1996). At the public hearing for L.B. 939, Senator Douglas A. Kristensen, principal introducer, stated:
The logical conclusion of the Supreme Court’s ruling could be an unending and an unlimited advisement form.. . . That could affect all drunk driving cases in this state. That’s not the logical conclusion. That’s not what the Legislature intended, and it certainly isn’t what good public policy should be.
Id. at 18-19.
Clearly, the only relevant consequences contemplated by § 60-6,197(10) are the penalties for refusing to submit to a chemical test and for failing a chemical test. In the instant case, the advisory form which the law enforcement officer read to Christner advised him of the criminal penalties for first, second, third, and fourth or subsequent convictions for both offenses. As a result, Christner was sufficiently informed of the requisite consequences. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in receiving Christner’s blood test result, and therefore, I would affirm.
Wright and Gerrard, JJ., join in this dissent.