Court Opinion

ID: 9484405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:52:45.912438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:13.896314
License: Public Domain

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge
(concurring).
While joining in the court’s opinion, I am troubled by our resolution of the “successive appeals” issue. Article 3(b) provides that a finding concerning an Article 3(a) defense, involving race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, “shall be immediately appealable by either party to the United States district court, or court of appeals, as appropriate.” We hold that this unclear language does not indicate that an appellant receives only one appeal — i.e., an appeal to the district court, if the initial extradition decision was by a magistrate, or an- appeal to the court of appeals if the initial extradition decision was by a district judge — but rather was meant to provide, however clumsily, for the full federal appellate process. Thus, where as here the initial extradition decision was by the magistrate, appellant can appeal, (1) to the United States district court; (2) from the district *1334court to this court; and, I assume, (3) from this court to the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.
It is sad but true that this interpretation of the ambiguous language — while seemingly what was intended — creates significant new opportunities for persons to delay their extradition. Historically, extradition decisions by a.judge or magistrate were not appeal-able, thus avoiding the potential delays which often attend appellate review. Obviously, the more extradition is susceptible to being bogged down in endless procedural maneuvering, the greater the danger that essential witnesses to the charged crime may die or disappear and their memories fade prior to trial. It used to be thought that the interest of another civilized nation in enforcing its criminal law entitled it to the reasonably prompt extradition of accused persons. The present appeal to this court has enabled appellant to delay trial in Great Britain by another year or more.
It would have been useful had the United States of America gone more deeply, in its briefs before us, into the pros and cons of the proper interpretation of Article 3(b). In a Treaty case of first impression, the interpretation espoused by the Attorney General can be enlightening. As best I can tell, the Attorney General agrees with the court’s reading of the Treaty, i.e., that the full federal appellate process, and not a truncated version, was intended. However, the alternative interpretation — what my colleagues call the “one bite of the apple” approach— has some appeal given Article 3(b)’s literal language and the long tradition divorcing extradition from the normal appellate process. We could have benefited from a more considered explication of all this by the United States.
In any event, I write separately in order to emphasize the implications of Article 3(b), as we now interpret it, so that the drafters of future provisions will have no illusions concerning the inevitable potential for delay, and may decide whether other approaches would be desirable.