Court Opinion

ID: 9545905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:21:58.304213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:44.484376
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Justice,
dissenting:
This was a consent decree and its provisions became final when no appeal was prosecuted. Even if the majority were correct in holding that this was not a consent decree, its provisions still became final when no appeal was prosecuted. Having failed to appeal the stock option provisions, husband was limited to timely pursuit of statutory proceedings for vacation or modification of a judgment. 12 O.S.1971, §§ 1031 et seq. See, e. g., Fisher v. Fisher, Okl., 558 P.2d 391 (1976); Dickason v. Dickason, Okl., 607 P.2d 674 (1980).
If there was a flaw in the option provision, it was — and is — mere error. It does not rise to the level of a “jurisdictional defect.” The error, if any, was agreed to and in any case, was unappealed from.
The decree is a final judgment of a court having jurisdiction to render it. It is unaffected by Hubbard v. Hubbard, supra, or any other event, and this Court errs in holding otherwise. I dissent.
I am authorized to state that IRWIN, C. J., and OP ALA, J., join me in this dissent.