Court Opinion

ID: 9912480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 17:00:45.877052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:32.021887
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 22-3518
                         ___________________________

                                    Benjamin Folta,

                         lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,

                                            v.

                   Norfork Brewing Company; Jason B. Aamodt,

                      lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants.
                                        ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                  for the Western District of Arkansas - Harrison
                                  ____________

                           Submitted: September 20, 2023
                             Filed: December 22, 2023
                                  ____________

Before COLLOTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

       Benjamin Folta sued Norfork Brewing Company and its owner, Jason B.
Aamodt, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. The
parties settled the case, but Norfork and Aamodt then brought this appeal to argue
that the district court lacked jurisdiction. Because the private settlement between the
parties disposed of Folta’s claims, and there is no final decision of the district court
from which to appeal in any event, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

      Norfork operates a small brewery in Arkansas. Folta was employed there from
approximately May 2018 through February 2021. In this action, he claimed that
Norfork and Aamodt failed to provide overtime compensation, as required by the
FLSA, when he worked more than forty hours per week. We will refer to the
company and owner, collectively, as Norfork.

       Following discovery, Norfork moved for summary judgment on the ground that
Folta was not a covered employee under the FLSA. The FLSA requires minimum
wage and overtime compensation only for employees who are “engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce” or who work for an enterprise that is so
engaged. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1). The court concluded that there were
genuine issues of material fact on this question, and denied Norfolk’s motion for
summary judgment.

       At the same time, Folta moved for partial summary judgment. He argued that
if he were covered by the FLSA, then the undisputed facts showed that he would be
entitled to overtime pay. The district court agreed with Folta and granted partial
summary judgment for him on entitlement to pay. But neither the denial of summary
judgment nor the grant of partial summary judgment was a final decision that could
be appealed. See Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 188 (2011); Liberty Mut. Ins. v.
Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976). Therefore, the case remained pending in the
district court to resolve whether Folta was a covered employee under the FLSA.

       The parties then reached a settlement agreement. The district court concluded
that the agreement was fair and reasonable, and described it as “resolving Plaintiff’s
FLSA claims.” The court later awarded attorney’s fees to Folta under the statute. See
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

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       On appeal, Norfork seeks to challenge the denial of its motion for summary
judgment and the grant of partial summary judgment for Folta. Among other things,
Norfork maintains that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
case; the company asserts that whether an employee is covered under the FLSA is a
“jurisdictional” question. Folta responds that the appeal is moot in light of the
settlement, and that this court lacks appellate jurisdiction in any event because the
district court never entered a final decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

      “Article III restricts federal courts to the resolution of cases and controversies.”
Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 732 (2008). “A case becomes moot—and therefore no
longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—‘when the issues
presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.’” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quoting Murphy v.
Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam)).

       When parties settle all of their claims, a case generally becomes moot. See
Hammond Clock Co. v. Schiff, 293 U.S. 529, 529 (1934) (per curiam); Chaganti &
Assocs. P.C. v. Nowotny, 470 F.3d 1215, 1225 (8th Cir. 2006); 13B Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3533.2 (3d ed. 2023). Courts are not licensed “to retain jurisdiction over cases in
which one or both of the parties plainly lack a continuing interest, as when the parties
have settled.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 192 (2000). The settlement agreement in this case is not in the record, but
the district court characterized it as “resolving Plaintiff’s FLSA claims.” Because the
settlement resolved all of Folta’s claims, there is no live case or controversy.

       Norfork asserts that the settlement agreement reserved its ability to pursue its
“jurisdictional” argument on appeal. According to the company, the agreement states
that Norfork “does not waive any defense asserted in the litigation.” But where the
parties have settled their claims, they cannot avoid mootness by agreement. Lake

                                           -3-
Coal Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 474 U.S. 120, 120 (1985) (per curiam); Allflex
USA, Inc. v. Avid Identification Sys., Inc., 704 F.3d 1362, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2013);
Yunker v. Allianceone Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 701 F.3d 369, 374 (11th Cir. 2012).
Even if we assume that parties could in some circumstance maintain a live
controversy by providing in a settlement agreement for a right to appeal, see Avid
Identification Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 971-72 (Fed. Cir.
2010), the language cited here is insufficient. Norfork asserts that the agreement did
not “waive any defense,” but the company cites no provision unequivocally reserving
a right to appeal. The language would be insufficient to allow an appeal from a
consent judgment, see Scanlon v. M.V. SUPER SERVANT 3, 429 F.3d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir.
2005); the same conclusion applies with respect to a settlement agreement. And the
district court’s orders denying summary judgment and granting partial summary
judgment establish no final decision of the district court from which to appeal in any
event.

      For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
                      ______________________________

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