Court Opinion

ID: 2963751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:14:42.760329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:45.588217
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

        December 4, 1995        [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                           

                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1610 

                                    JEAN A. GUAY,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                 PIERRE R. KAPPELLE,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                 [Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                         __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Stahl and Lynch,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Jean A. Guay on brief pro se.
            ____________
            Mark H.  Grimm and  Wistow &  Barylick Incorporated  on brief  for
            ______________      _______________________________
        appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                      Per Curiam.  Appellant, Dr. Jean Guay, appeals from
                      __________

            the  dismissal of his complaint  pursuant to Fed.  R. Civ. P.

            12(b)(6).  The district court determined that Dr. Guay failed

            to state  a claim for malicious prosecution  because he could

            not show that the  prior medical malpractice action initiated

            by  appellee, Pierre Kappelle, had ended  in his (Dr. Guay's)

            favor.  We agree.

                      Under  Rhode  Island  law,  a  claim  of  malicious

            prosecution  requires  a plaintiff  to  show  that the  prior

            proceeding  was  initiated maliciously  and  without probable

            cause, finally terminated  in his or her favor,  and resulted

            in some  special injury to  him or her.   Salvadore  v. Major
                                                      _________     _____

            Elec.  & Supply,  Inc., 469 A.2d  353, 357 (R.I.  1983).  The
            ______________________

            magistrate  judge  determined  that   the  jury  verdict  had

            "terminated"  the  malpractice  action in  Kappelle's  favor.

            However,  we  note that  Kappelle  did  not  prevail  on  the

            negligence claim.  Nonetheless  Kappelle prevailed on a claim

            of  lack of informed consent, and we conclude, on this basis,

            that, for  purposes of malicious prosecution, the malpractice

            action did not terminate in Dr. Guay's favor.

                      Only if  these two claims represented  two distinct

            causes of  action could Dr. Guay have  maintained a malicious

            prosecution   suit   based   on   the   negligence   verdict.

            Specifically,  if  Kappelle  had  filed an  action  based  on

            negligence,   res  judicata   would  have  barred   him  from

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            maintaining a later action for lack of informed consent; that

            is,  it would  be considered the  same cause of  action.  See
                                                                      ___

            Town  of Johnston v. Bendick,  658 A.2d 914,  914 (1995) (res
            _________________    _______

            judicata bars the relitigation of the same cause of  action).

            Thus, Kappelle prevailed in the action as a whole when he was

            awarded  damages for his injury.   See Freidberg  v. Cox, 197
                                               ___ _________     ___

            Cal. App. 3d 381, 388, 242 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855 (1987)  (where

            there  were several  theories of  recovery in  the underlying

            suit  --  contract,  joint  venture  and   interference  with

            contract  -- but only one injury -- nonpayment of fees -- the

            fact that the  malicious prosecution plaintiff  had prevailed

            on two of the theories did not mean that the prior action had

            terminated in his favor;  the malicious prosecution defendant

            won a  judgment for damages in the cause of action as a whole

            and res  judicata would have  barred him  from splitting  the

            various claims).

                      We reach the same result considering the settlement

            agreement as the final termination of the state action.  "[A]

            termination based on a compromise or settlement is not deemed

            favorable."   Nagy v. McBurney,  120 R.I. 925,  931, 392 A.2d
                          ____    ________

            365,  368 (1978).  The malpractice case here was settled with

            the  release of  Dr. Guay  from liability  in exchange  for a

            payment to Mr. Kappelle of a little over $70,000.  Whether  a

            settlement agreement is a termination in favor of  a litigant

            depends, in  part, on whether it  represents "an inconclusive

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            result  that cannot be characterized as either a victory or a

            defeat."  C.N.C.  Chem. Corp. v. Pennwalt Corp.,  690 F.Supp.
                      ___________________    ______________

            139, 141 (D.R.I. 1988).  To be favorable, then, a termination

            "must be reflective  of the merits  of the action and  of the

            plaintiff's innocence  of  the misconduct  alleged  therein."

            Villa v.  Cole, 4 Cal. App.  4th 1327, 1335, 6  Cal. Rptr. 2d
            _____     ____

            644,  648-49 (1992).   The  language of  the "Release  of All

            Claims" indicates nothing about the merits of the malpractice

            action  and,  in  particular,  nothing  (much  less  anything

            favorable) about Dr.  Guay's liability.   Thus, it  is not  a

            termination on the merits in Dr. Guay's favor.

                      We also reject Dr. Guay's argument that because Mr.

            Kappelle  allegedly  engaged  in  fraud  in  the  malpractice

            action, he (Mr.  Kappelle) is prohibited from  relying on the

            unfavorable  termination of  that action.   Although  the two

            cases  cited by  Dr.  Guay hold  that  an exception  to  this

            requirement exists  where a prior  judgment was  fraudulently

            obtained,   these  cases   involved   situations  where   the

            plaintiffs  in the  original actions  had  misrepresented the

            very facts they needed to show in order  to secure the relief

            they  were seeking.  See Tyler v. Central Charge Serv., Inc.,
                                 ___ _____    __________________________

            444  A.2d 965 (App. D.C.  1982) (to obtain  attachment of the

            malpractice  plaintiff's  wages,  the  malpractice  defendant

            falsely told the court in the prior action that plaintiff had

            not  paid a  debt  and that  a  stay of  execution  existed);

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            Lockett & Williams v. Gress Mfg. Co., 8 Ga. App. 772, 70 S.E.
            __________________    ______________

            255 (Ga. App. 1911) (to obtain an injunction, the malpractice

            defendant made statements of fact it knew were false).  Here,

            Dr.  Guay's  allegations  go,  at  most,  to  Mr.  Kappelle's

            credibility  as  a  witness   and  the  qualifications  of  a

            physician  who testified for Mr. Kappelle.   These actions do

            not stand  on the  same footing as  those engaged  in by  the

            plaintiffs in the above cases.

                      Because we find that the malpractice action did not

            terminate  in  Dr.  Guay's favor,  we  need  not address  the

            question of special injury.

                      The judgment of the district court is affirmed. The
                                                            ________

            motion for sanctions is denied.
                                    ______

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