Court Opinion

ID: 9689123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:20:47.039106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:45.154223
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I write separately to express my view that the time has come for this state to abandon the interest-analysis-based approach detailed by the majority. Rather, I would adopt a lex fori approach to choice of law questions.
I am troubled by the choice of law analysis defined by the majority. It describes this state’s choice of law rules as:
*291[W]e will apply Michigan law unless a “rational reason” to do otherwise exists. In determining whether a rational reason to displace Michigan law exists, we undertake a two-step analysis. First, we must determine if any foreign state has an interest in having its law applied. If no state has such an interest, the presumption that Michigan law will apply cannot be overcome. If a foreign state does have an interest in having its law applied, we must then determine if Michigan’s interests mandate that Michigan law be applied, despite the foreign interests. [Ante at 286, citing Olmstead v Anderson, 428 Mich 1, 24, 29-30; 400 NW2d 292 (1987).]
This two-part test requires lower courts to engage in the speculative endeavor of ascertaining another jurisdiction’s interests. The majority does this by examining two factors:1 1) the constitutionality of applying a foreign jurisdiction’s law, ante at 287, and 2) the foreign jurisdiction’s choice of law rules, id. at 288. However, each of these factors are likely to cause confusion and inconsistent outcomes.
Under the first factor, the majority, despite recognizing that choice of law and jurisdiction are doctrinally distinct, fails to clarify the distinction between the minimum-contacts test for personal jurisdiction with the constitutional limits on choice of law. Id. at 287, n 22. As cited by the majority, the United States Supreme Court required that a forum state have sufficient contacts to a case so that the application of its law is “neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.” Allstate Ins v Hague, 449 US 302, 313; 101 S Ct 633; 66 L Ed 2d 521 (1981). Though Allstate did discuss *292choice of law in terms of contacts and fundamental fairness, it did not state that this test was identical to the analysis for determining personal jurisdiction. Further, it has been recognized that choice of law and jurisdiction are fundamentally distinct concepts.2 Indeed, the analysis for determining jurisdiction is concerned with the court’s contacts with a party, while the test for choice of law examines contacts with a party and the occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litigation. Id. at 308, 313. The majority’s constitutional analysis oversimplifies this area of the law.
The majority’s second factor demonstrates how its concern with the interests of other jurisdictions will result in confusion. To ascertain the interest of Ontario, the majority examines the choice of law rules of Ontario, and determines that an Ontario court would apply Michigan law if this case were before it. Ante at 288-290. Therefore, the majority concludes that Ontario has no interest in this litigation. Id. Thus, the majority requires the courts of this state to decipher and apply the choice of law rules of potentially every jurisdiction in the country, and possibly the world, before it can determine which law to apply. This is simply too great a burden. The potential for confusion and error is clear. The bench and bar of this state are experts in Michigan law. To require expertise in the choice of law rules of any number of foreign jurisdictions is certain to lead to widespread confusion. These cases, and the appeals that they will *293most surely generate, will tax the resources of this state’s judiciary on all levels.
Nonetheless, the majority’s analysis is consistent with this state’s current choice of law rules. This leads me to conclude that the problems in the majority’s opinion stem from this underlying methodology. The most fundamental flaw in this approach to choice of law is that it requires the courts of this state to choose between the laws of Michigan and those of foreign jurisdictions. As a matter of policy, the courts of this state should apply Michigan law. The application of foreign law requires a Michigan court to interpret and apply that law as if the court was sitting in that foreign jurisdiction. State courts should not presume to speak for other jurisdictions in this manner. Further, the majority’s analysis requires Michigan courts to apply the law of another jurisdiction in certain cases. However, before a court can do this, it must first expressly refuse to apply the laws of this state.3 This refusal ignores and defeats the express will of the Legislature. Clearly, the courts of this state should avoid this outcome.4
Moreover, there is an increased likelihood of error when Michigan courts attempt to rule on foreign laws.5 The courts of this state must examine foreign laws in both phases of the majority’s analysis. In the *294first phase, Michigan courts are apparently required to interpret and apply foreign choice of law rales and to examine the interests of a foreign jurisdiction by determining the purpose or intent of its law. In this case, the majority determines that Ontario would apply Michigan law.6 In the second phase of the majority’s analysis, a Michigan court would have to apply foreign law if a jurisdiction is found to have sufficient interests to displace Michigan law. As previously discussed, I feel that Michigan courts should avoid deciding cases through the application of foreign laws.
A second flaw with this state’s choice of law methodology is that it is unpredictable. Olmstead sought to create a system that would allow parties to accurately forecast the law that governs any given litigation. However, this case shows that this has not been the result. Rather, these parties have been delayed for over five years as the courts of this state have straggled to determine the governing law.7 Further, the majority does not make this system any more predictable. Instead, it fails to define a systematic approach for determining the interests of other jurisdictions. It examines two factors in determining that neither Ontario nor Ohio can be interested in this case. Yet, it is far from clear that these are the only factors to be considered.8 Indeed, the crucial factor in Olmstead *295was the citizenship of the parties.9 By undertaking its approach, the majority removes any certainty regarding what factors will be applied to determine if a state has an interest.
Moreover, the second part of the majority’s test requires a court to weigh any foreign interests against those of Michigan. However, by finding that no other state has an interest, the majority avoids explaining how competing interests are to be weighed. Future litigants have no way to predict the methodology, let alone the outcome, when a court is required to weigh interests. Thus, under the majority’s interpretation of the current choice of law system, parties have little certainty concerning the law that will be applied to their dispute.
The third flaw in this choice of law approach is that it allows hidden, pro-forum manipulation. The majority recognizes that courts manipulate apparently neutral choice of law rules in order to justify the application of forum law. Ante at 281-282. This defeats the parties’ expectation that choice of law rules will be neutrally applied. I agree with the majority’s comment that this preference is not surprising. Id. However, the majority fails to take steps to eliminate this problem. Indeed, the analysis that the majority uses to determine that Ohio and Ontario have no interest in this litigation is an example of that approach.
*296These serious flaws in what is now the choice of law rules of this state lead me to believe that Michigan should select a new choice of law approach. I feel that lex fori should be adopted. This approach will avoid the three evils of the majority’s methodology. First, under lex fori, Michigan courts will only apply Michigan law in most cases. This eliminates the problems that result when a Michigan court applies the laws of another jurisdiction. Second, a lex fori approach will bring clarity and predictability to this area of the law. All parties entering a Michigan court would know that they are to be governed by Michigan law.
Finally, courts would not be tempted to manipulate the choice of law rules. The lex fori approach would eliminate the need for a court to employ one of the two primary techniques that courts have used to avoid the application of a foreign jurisdiction’s law. The court would not have to invoke a public policy exception to a rule requiring the application of another jurisdiction’s law and would not have to resort to recharacterizing an issue as procedural, rather than substantive, to allow the application of the forum’s law.10 The lex fori rule would generally *297eliminate the need for a court to distinguish between substantive and procedural law. Rather, the laws of Michigan, substantive and procedural, would clearly govern without any possibility for manipulation. This would ensure that courts fulfill the legitimate expectation of the litigants that laws be applied evenly and fairly.
I am aware that the lex fori approach has been criticized for encouraging forum shopping. This supposed evil is greatly exaggerated and should not deter this state’s adoption of the lex fori approach. Forum shopping is thought to be an evil because it allows a plaintiff to expose a defendant to the laws of a forum that has little involvement in the litigation, assuming that the forum has jurisdiction over the defendant. Olmstead, 428 Mich 26. Under the approach I propose, an entity may be subjected to Michigan law concerning a cause of action that may have arisen elsewhere, if all constitutional requirements are satisfied. However, this should not prevent the adoption of the lex fori approach in this state.
Initially, it is important to recognize that a forum shopping party who chooses Michigan is asking the courts of this state to effectuate the laws and policies of Michigan. There is no reason why Michigan courts should summarily refuse this request. Rather, it is the duty of Michigan courts to effectuate these laws and policies. Assume that a plaintiff chooses to file suit in Michigan because Michigan law recognizes his claim. The application of Michigan law to this plaintiff’s claim will fulfill the policy expressed by the Michigan Legislature, which recognizes the claim. Thus, forum shopping is not necessarily problematic to the extent *298that it leads to the fulfillment of the laws and policies of this state.
Forum shopping is also commonly assumed to be unfair to defendants. This view is based on the premise that the plaintiff has selected an unfair forum.11 However, the law that the defendant would have the court apply is likely to be just as unfair.12 Indeed, the defendant will likely urge the court to apply the law of the jurisdiction that is most certain to lead to a dismissal.13 Thus, while the plaintiff may “shop” for a forum whose law is beneficial to its case, the defendant is just as likely to “shop” for law favorable to it. Thus, there is really no innocent party in these situations. The fairest way to resolve this is to rely on the traditional notion that the plaintiff is the master of his lawsuit, and, as such, is entitled to choose the forum.14 Also, in the vast majority of cases, an entity that has sufficiently connected itself to Michigan so that a Michigan court has jurisdiction over it will not be unfairly burdened by the application of Michigan’s laws.
Finally, it should be pointed out that choice of law rules that focus on interests do not automatically discourage forum shopping. Indeed, choice of law methodologies that focus on abstract interests are also vulnerable to manipulation.15 Thus, no choice of law system is entirely free from forum shopping. However, I *299feel that any negative effects that would result from forum shopping as a result of the adoption of a lex fori approach would be outweighed by the benefits of maintaining a clear, predictable choice of law system that would require Michigan courts to give effect to Michigan law.
The only limits placed on a lex fori system should be those required by the United States Constitution. In Allstate, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court found that a state could apply its law to a case if it had “significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.” Allstate, 449 US 308. While this seems to be a fairly stringent test, the Court found that only a few tangential contacts were needed to satisfy it.16 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Allstate significant-contacts test in Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797, 814-823; 105 S Ct 2965; 86 L Ed 2d 628 (1985). It found that a Kansas court could not apply Kansas contract and equity law to every claim made by over 28,000 class action plaintiffs when less than three percent of the plaintiffs and less than one percent of the disputed leases had any connection to Kansas. Thus, there is clearly some threshold level of contacts below which *300a forum state may not constitutionally apply its law.17 However, it appears that this threshold is very low.18 Thus, the United States Constitution does not substantially limit Michigan’s ability to adopt a lex fori approach.
Thus, I would adopt the lex fori approach in all tort cases involving choice of law issues. As discussed above, the United States Constitution prohibits the application of lex fori in some cases. Indeed, Shutts shows that a court may have jurisdiction over a case, but not be able to apply its substantive law. In those cases where a Michigan court has jurisdiction, but Michigan has insufficient contacts to the litigation or the parties so that the application of Michigan law would be arbitrary or unfair, a court should select the law of the most interested jurisdiction, guided by the principles set forth in Olmstead.
In this case, lex fori should be applied because no constitutional limitations on lex fori are applicable. The United States Supreme Court has found that forum states have complete authority to apply their own procedural rules, including statutes of limitation. Sun Oil Co v Wortman, 486 US 717, 725-730; 108 S Ct 2117; 100 L Ed 2d 743 (1988). Michigan classifies statutes of limitation as procedural. Stephens v Dixon, 449 Mich 531, 534; 536 NW2d 755 (1995); People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 595; 487 NW2d 698 (1992). Further, Michigan has significant contacts with this case *301to constitutionally apply its law because the accident occurred in Michigan and a Michigan court is the forum. Thus, I concur with the majority that Michigan’s statute of limitations should apply in this case. However, I cannot agree with the choice of law methodology employed by the majority. I would adopt a lex fori approach.
Riley, J., concurred with Brickley, J.
Kelly, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 The majority fails to specify whether there are other appropriate methods of analyzing a state’s interest. Indeed, Olmstead identified the interests of the parties with their citizenship and did not explore any of the methods used by the majority. Id. at 28 (finding that Wisconsin had no interest because none of the parties was a resident of that state). Thus, the proper method for analyzing interests remains unclear.

 See Brown, The ideologies of forum shopping — Why doesn’t a conservative court protect defendants, 71 NC L R 649, 700-701 (1993).

 See Weinberg, Against comity, 80 Geo L J 53, 70 (1991).

 It should be noted that choosing another jurisdiction’s law is fundamentally different from adopting another state’s approach to a given issue. In the choice of law context, a Michigan court acts as if it is a court in a foreign jurisdiction and puiports to speak on that jurisdiction’s laws. However, when a Michigan court finds another state’s approach on an issue persuasive and adopts it, the court merely refines Michigan law. Thus, its holding only addresses the laws of this state.

 This is especially true when the law is from a foreign country, such as the Ontario choice of law rules examined by the majority.

 See Cox, Razing conflict facades to build better jurisdiction theory: The foundation — There is no law but forum law, 28 Val U L R 1, 42 (1993) (arguing that courts have no authority to interpret the intentions of foreign legislatures).

 The original complaint was filed on September 5, 1991.

 The majority does not even apply these factors to both jurisdictions. Rather, it applies the constitutional factor to eliminate the possible application of Ohio law, and the choice of law rule inquiry to determine that *295Ontario has no interest in this litigation. It also fails to explain why it employs this approach.

 Id. at 28. (“Since neither party in this case is a citizen of Wisconsin [where the accident occurred], that state has no interest in seeing its limitation of damage provision applied.”)

 In Olmstead, supra at 9-10, this Court stated:
As noted in [Sexton v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc, 413 Mich 406, 426-431; 320 NW2d 843 (1982)], courts employed escape devices to avoid potentially harsh results [from the common-law rule of lex loci delicti]. The two main manipulative techniques were “procedural characterization” and the “public policy” exception. Id. at 426. Procedural characterization involves characterization of an issue as procedural rather than substantive, and then applying forum law to the procedural issues. Courts, thus, were able to evade applying the law of the state in which the wrong occurred.
The public policy exception was invoked when the application of a foreign law would be violative of Michigan public policy.

 See Weinberg, n 3 supra at 64.

 See id.

 See id. at 71.

 See Brown, n 2 supra at 668-672 (discussing the ways in which the American legal system is benefited when the plaintiff is allowed to choose the forum, and the forum applies the lex fori).

 See Brown, n 2 supra at 674, quoting Gottesman, Draining the dismal swamp: The case for federal choice of law statutes, 80 Geo L J 1, 9 *299(1991) (explaining that parties will choose a forum whose choice of law rules lead to the adoption of favorable foreign law).

 The suit involved an automobile accident that had occurred in Wisconsin involving only Wisconsin residents. Allstate, 449 US 305. However, the decedent had worked in Minnesota. Id. Further, the decedent’s widow moved to Minnesota after the accident. Id. The widow then sued in Minnesota under an insurance policy issued by a company that did business in Minnesota. Id. at 305, 317. The Court found these contacts sufficient to uphold the application of Minnesota law by a Minnesota court. Id. at 313-319. See also Brown, n 2 supra at 696 (describing the Allstate test as easily met).

 See Rickman & Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws (2d ed), § 94[b][2], p 279.

 See id. at § 94[d], pp 281-282 (explaining why there is only a “remote” chance that the United States Supreme Court would upset a state’s choice of law). See also Weinberg, n 3 supra at 68-69 (arguing that the Supreme Court has weakened Allstate and is very tolerant of the states’ choice of law results).