Court Opinion

ID: 9372981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:57.421444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.239961
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JENNIFER D. EOFF,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                         DE-0752-17-0015-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                       DATE: January 30, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Jennifer D. Eoff, Lakewood, Colorado, pro se.

           Amy Duin, Esquire, Lakewood, Colorado, for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                               Member Limon recused himself and
                       did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                         FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained her removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:        the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner ’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the init ial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision.            5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).       We
     FORWARD the appellant’s hostile work environment claim to the Denver Field
     Office for adjudication as an individual right of action (IRA) appeal.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The agency removed the appellant from her Research Geolog ist position for
     failing to follow an instruction to limit her interaction with her former supervisor.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 9, 15-21; Tab 8 at 22. Specifically, the agency
     charged the appellant with violating the Associate Director ’s instruction to limit
     her interaction with the former supervisor to issues required for her work on the
     Reserve Growth Task in the National and Global Assessment (NAGA) project and
     reassigning the appellant to another supervisor .      IAF, Tab 11 at 9, 29.      The
     agency specified that the appellant intentionally violated the instruction on
     April 28, 2016, when she sent an email to her former supervisor about a letter of
     reprimand that she issued to the appellant in September 2014, concerning matters
     unrelated to the NAGA project. IAF, Tab 1 at 9-10.
¶3         The agency advised the appellant in the proposal notice that, in
     recommending her removal, it considered as an aggravating factor the fact that
                                                                                         3

     she had been counseled for inappropriately contacting her former supervisor on at
     least six other occasions. Id. at 10. The agency also advised the appellant that it
     considered the following prior disciplinary actions as aggravating factors: (1) her
     September 2014 letter of reprimand for unprofessional behavior; and (2) her
     7-day suspension in 2015 for unprofessional behavior and failure to follow
     instructions. Id. The agency further advised the appellant that it considered the
     following mitigating factors: (1) her 5 years of Federal service; (2) her superior
     performance rating; (3) her medical issues; and (4) any harassment, provocation,
     personality conflicts, or other circumstances that could have contributed to her
     offense. Id. at 10-12. The deciding official concluded that the removal penalty
     was reasonable because the mitigating factors were outweighed by the appellant’s
     serious misconduct and she had no rehabilitative potential. Id. at 18-20.
¶4         The appellant filed a timely Board appeal of her removal and raised an
     affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation. 2 IAF, Tab 1 at 3, 5. She alleged
     that the agency removed her in retaliation for disclosing to management her
     former supervisor’s “misconduct, mismanagement, and abuses of authority.” Id.
     at 5. She also referred to “continuing hostile conditions” and a complaint that she
     filed with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). Id. The appellant included with
     her appeal a copy of a whistleblowing complaint that she filed with OSC before
     her removal and OSC’s letter informing her that OSC had terminated its
     investigation of her complaint. Id. at 23-62, 132-33.
¶5         The administrative judge issued an order setting forth the                   proof
     requirements to establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 3.
     After holding a teleconference with the parties, however, the administrative
     judge issued an order stating that he found it appropriate to treat the appellant ’s

     2
      The appellant indicated on her appeal form that she was also appealing the denial of a
     within-grade increase. IAF, Tab 1 at 3. The administrative judge found that the
     appellant withdrew this claim, and the appellant does not dispute this finding on review.
     IAF, Tab 5 at 1.
                                                                                       4

     case as a chapter 75 removal appeal, instead of an IRA appeal, because she did
     not make an informed election to challenge her removal at OSC. 3 IAF, Tab 5
     at 1-2. The administrative judge summarized the appellant’s claims on appeal as
     alleging that the agency’s removal action was retaliation for the following
     protected disclosures and activity: (1) her April 15, 2015 email to her former
     supervisor and other agency officials, purportedly disclosing her former
     supervisor’s misconduct, gross mismanagement, and abuse of authority 4; (2) her
     October 2014 grievance about a letter of reprimand; and (3) her June 2015
     grievance about a suspension. Id. at 3. He also informed the appellant of the
     burden of proof for establishing an affirmative defense of retaliation in a
     chapter 75 action. Id. at 2-4.
¶6           Additionally, the administrative judge agreed to consider whether the
     alleged retaliatory actions mentioned in OSC’s closure letter showed a pattern of
     retaliation that culminated in the appellant’s removal. IAF, Tab 5 at 2 n.3. The
     administrative judge identified those matters as (a) a letter of reprimand, (b) the
     denial of an award, (c) a suspension, and (d) a reassignment. Id. He considered
     those matters relevant because, with the possible exception of the award de nial,
     the agency mentioned them in the proposal to remove the appellant.           Id. The
     administrative judge explained that he could not order corrective action for those
     matters in the context of this chapter 75 appeal. Id. He also advised the parties
     to ensure that any additions, corrections, or objections to his order and summary
     be received by October 12, 2016, or they would be deemed waived. IAF, Tab 5
     at 1 n.2. Neither party objected or proposed any additions or corrections to the
     order and summary before the filing deadline.

     3
       The administrative judge made this finding — although OSC’s closure letter mentioned
     the appellant’s removal — because the appellant stated that she did not inform OSC of
     the agency’s removal decision or ask OSC to add it to her claim. IAF, Tab 5 at 2, Tab 7
     at 3, 9.
     4
         IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 7 at 6.
                                                                                       5

¶7         Both parties submitted voluminous documentation on appeal.                  IAF,
     Tabs 7-15, 17-30.       After holding a prehearing conference, the administrative
     judge issued an order and summary modifying the list of issues that he would
     consider. IAF, Tab 31. He summarized the appellant’s affirmative defense as
     alleging that she was removed in reprisal for her April 15, 2015 email and her
     October 2014 grievance about a letter of reprimand. Id. at 1. He indicated that
     the appellant had withdrawn her prior allegation that her removal was in reprisal
     for her June 2015 grievance of a suspension. Id. at 1-2. The administrative judge
     also reaffirmed that he would consider the appellant’s additional evidence and
     argument that her alleged retaliatory removal was the final event in a chai n of
     retaliation consisting of her being suspended, reassigned, and denied an award . 5
     Id. at 2.   The administrative judge advised the parties that any additions,
     corrections, or objections to his prehearing conference order and summary must
     be received by November 26, 2016, or be deemed waived. Id. at 1 n.1. Neither
     party objected or made corrections to the prehearing conference order
     and summary.
¶8         After holding a hearing, the administrative judge sustained the charge based
     on the stipulated facts and affirmed the agency’s removal action. IAF, Tab 47,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 5, 16.     In reaching his decision, the administrative
     judge found that the Associate Director’s April 27, 2015 instruction to the
     appellant was proper and she did not dispute receiving the instruction or her
     failure to follow it.     ID at 5.   The administrative judge also found that the
     appellant failed to prove her affirmative defenses of whistleblower reprisal and
     retaliation for filing a grievance. ID at 6-13. He found no evidence of retaliation
     in the actions that preceded the appellant’s removal, including her reprimand,

     5
      The administrative judge indicated that the appellant had withdrawn her claim that the
     chain of retaliation began with a September 2014 letter of reprimand because it
     preceded her protected activity. IAF, Tab 31 at 2.
                                                                                      6

      reassignment, and instruction to limit her contact with her former supervisor. 6 ID
      at 10. He also found that the agency proved a nexus between the charge and the
      efficiency of the service, and the penalty of removal was reasonable. ID at 6, 16.
¶9          The appellant has filed a petition for review arguing that the adm inistrative
      judge erred in denying her affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal and
      sustaining the removal penalty.      Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.      The
      agency has responded in opposition to her petition. PFR File, Tab 3.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW 7
¶10         The appellant does not dispute the administrative judge’s finding that the
      agency proved the charge as specified.          ID at 5.   We discern no basis for
      disturbing that finding, which is supported by the stipulated facts. IAF, Tab 22
      at 8-10, Tab 30 at 13-16; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.63 (indicating that a stipulation will
      satisfy a party’s burden of proving the fact alleged); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
      (indicating that the Board generally will consider only issues raised in a timely
      filed petition or cross petition for review).
¶11         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in
      finding that she failed to prove her affirmative defense of reprisal. PFR File,
      Tab 1. She disputes his finding that she made no protected disclosures in her
      April 14-15, 2015 emails.       Id. at 25-26, 31, 94-97.     The appellant submits
      additional evidence on review and asks the Board to reconvene the hearing
      because the agency did not subpoena one of her approved witnesses to testify at
      the hearing.   Id. at 15-18.   She argues that the administrative judge failed to
      address all of her alleged disclosures and retaliatory actions included in the
      approximately 1,500 pages of evidence that she submitted on appeal. Id. at 18,

      6
        The administrative judge further noted that the appellant submitted no evidence or
      argument about her claim that the retaliatory nature of her removal was evidenced by
      the agency’s denying her an award. ID at 7 n.3.
      7
       We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                           7

      24-27. She contends that the administrative judge failed to address this evidenc e
      documenting the agency’s “long-term harassment” and her “two-year history of
      conflict with her former management team.” Id. at 18. She also challenges the
      administrative judge’s penalty analysis, arguing that he failed to consider her
      health condition as a mitigating factor. Id. at 19-20. For the reasons discussed
      below, we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to
      prove     her   affirmative    defense    of   retaliation   and   the   removal   penalty
      was reasonable.

      The appellant failed to prove her affirmative defense of reprisal for
      whistleblowing pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
¶12           On review, the appellant disputes the administrative judge ’s finding that the
      disclosures she made in her April 14-15, 2015 emails 8 to her former supervisor
      and others agency officials, about her former supervisor’s request for a meeting to
      discuss the appellant’s alleged performance and conduct issues, were not
      protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). PFR File, Tab 1 at 31, 68-97; ID at 11,
      13.     The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove by
      preponderant evidence that she made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8) because she failed to explain in detail what wrongdoing she
      purportedly disclosed.        ID at 11.   The administrative judge also reviewed the
      content of the appellant’s April 2015 emails and explained his reasons for finding
      that nothing therein demonstrated that she disclosed information protected by
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). ID at 11-13. For the reasons discussed below, we agree
      with the administrative judge’s well-reasoned finding that the appellant failed to
      meet her burden of proof on her reprisal claim.
¶13           To prove an affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal in a chapter 75
      appeal, an appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that she made a
      protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), and that her protected

      8
       In the initial decision, the administrative judge refers to t he appellant’s April 13-15,
      2015 emails, collectively, as the April 15, 2015 email. ID at 11; IAF, Tab 11 at 34-73.
                                                                                     8

      disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action at issue.          See
      Shannon v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 21 (2014). A
      protected disclosure is a disclosure of information that the appellant reasonably
      believes evidences a      violation of   any law, rule, or regulation, gross
      mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
      and specific danger to public health or safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); Shannon,
      121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 22.    The test for whether the appellant had a reasonable
      belief that her disclosure evidenced wrongdoing as set forth in 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8)(A) is an objective one.      Shannon, 121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 22.         A
      reasonable belief exists if a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential
      facts known to and readily ascertainable by the appellant could reasonably
      conclude that the actions evidenced one of the categories of wrongdoing listed in
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). Id.
¶14         On review, the appellant provides a chart describing her alleged disc losures
      in her April 14-15, 2015 emails. PFR File, Tab 1 at 94-97. She explains that she
      disclosed the following information:        (1) her confusion about her former
      supervisor’s request for a meeting to discuss her performance and conduct, which
      she describes as unfair and an unexpected assault; (2) her decision to contest the
      performance and conduct issues identified by her former supervisor; and (3) her
      reasons for disregarding her former supervisor’s instruction to limit the recipients
      of their email exchange about her performance issues.          Id.   The appellant
      contends that this information constituted protected disclosures of harassment and
      a hostile work environment because her former supervisor’s request for a meeting
      to discuss the appellant’s performance issues violated an ethical dut y to treat
      employees with respect and provide a supportive work environment. Id. at 94,
      97.   She argues that she made protected disclosures of mismanagement,
      supervisory misconduct, and abuses of authority, when she contested her former
      supervisor’s purportedly false description of her performance and conduct issues.
      Id. at 25-26, 94-96. She also asserts that she made a protected disclosure that her
                                                                                      9

      former supervisor was confused about her dual “supervisory and project
      management responsibilities,” in emails explaining why she disregarded the
      instruction to limit the recipients of her performance related emails. Id. at 96.
¶15         To meet her burden of proof, the appellant’s disclosures of wrongdoing
      must be specific and detailed. See Linder v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R.
      14, ¶ 14 (2014). Having considered the appellant’s argument and reviewed the
      contents of her emails, we discern no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s
      well-reasoned finding that the appellant’s vague allegations of wrongdoing in her
      April 2015 emails do not meet this standard.      ID at 11-13; see Crosby v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
      drew appropriate references, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v.
      Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
      The appellant’s emails contesting the description of her performance and conduct
      issues and expressing disagreement with her former supervisor’s management
      decisions did not convey specific and detailed information that a disinterested
      observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable
      by the appellant could reasonably conclude evidenced a protected disclosure of
      any wrongdoing listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). See Francis v. Department of
      the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 138, ¶ 12 (2013) (finding that the appellant’s
      nonspecific and poorly explained disclosure, expressing mere disagreement over
      job-related issues, was insufficient to constitute a protected disclosure of any
      wrongdoing in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)); see also Czarkowski v. Department of
      the Navy, 87 M.S.P.R. 107, ¶ 12 (2000) (finding that a disclosure questioning
      management decisions that are merely debatable or just simple negligence or
      wrongdoing, with no element of blatancy, is not protected as a disclosure of
      gross mismanagement).
                                                                                          10

      The appellant failed to prove her affirmative defense of reprisal for exercising her
      grievance right under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii).
¶16         On review, the appellant argues that her removal was “definitely”
      retaliation for her October 2014 grievance about her September 2014 letter of
      reprimand but identifies nothing in the record to suggest that the agency had a
      strong motive to retaliate for this protected activity. 9 PFR File, Tab 1 at 28. She
      further argues that the administrative judge placed too much emphasis on her
      2014 grievance, to the detriment of her other alleged activities and disclosures, in
      finding that she failed to prove retaliation. Id. For the reasons discussed below,
      we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to meet
      her burden of proving reprisal for this protected activity.
¶17         Because the appellant did not seek to remedy whistleblowing reprisal in her
      October 2014 grievance, the administrative judge properly found that her claim of
      retaliation for exercising her grievance rights is covered under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii). ID at 8; IAF, Tab 32 at 59-62; IAF, Tab 14 at 78-140; see
      Mattison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 8 (2016). To
      establish an affirmative defense of retaliation for activity protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii), the appellant is required to show that: (1) she engaged i n
      protected activity; (2) the accused officials knew of the activity; (3) the adverse
      action under review could have been retaliation under the circumstances; and
      (4) there was a genuine nexus between the alleged retaliation and the adverse
      action. See Pridgen v. Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 32;
      Warren v. Department of the Army, 804 F.2d 654, 656-58 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 10; IAF,

      9
        The appellant also contends, for the first time on review, that the offi cial who decided
      her October 2014 grievance violated departmental directives requiring him to consider
      all relevant factors to ensure “equitable and effective resolution of [the] conflict.” PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 25. We have not considered this argument because the appellant has not
      shown that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite her
      due diligence. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d).
      10
        Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to
                                                                                         11

      Tab 5 at 4. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to meet her
      burden of proving this reprisal claim because she failed to prove a nexus between
      her protected grievance activity and her removal, and we agree. ID at 8-10.
¶18         As explained in the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the
      appellant’s removal could have been retaliatory because the accused officials
      knew about the protected grievance activity. 11 ID at 9 & n.4. Upon weighing the
      evidence, however, the administrative judge concluded that the agency’s nominal
      motive to retaliate for the appellant’s grievance activity in October 2014 did not
      outweigh the agency’s legitimate reason to remove her in August 2016 for her
      demonstrated unwillingness to follow instructions.        ID at 10.    In reaching his
      decision, the administrative judge found highly credible the proposing and
      deciding officials’ testimony explicitly denying retaliation and providing
      compelling nonretaliatory reasons for removing the appellant.                Id.    The
      administrative judge found that the officials involved in the removal action had
      little motive to retaliate against the appellant for her having grieved a letter of
      reprimand that did not involve them and occurred 1½ years before her removal.
      Id. The administrative judge also found no evidence of retaliation in the actions
      that preceded the removal action, including the appellant ’s reprimand,
      reassignment, and instruction limiting her interaction her former supervisor. Id.
      We have considered the appellant’s arguments on review challenging the
      administrative judge’s weighing of evidence, and we conclude that the

      the All Circuit Review Act, Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file
      petitions for judicial review of Board decisions on whistleblower reprisal claims with
      any circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek
      review of such claims before any appropriate court of appeal.
      11
         The administrative judge found that the following accused officials knew about the
      appellant’s October 2014 grievance: (1) the proposing and deciding officials in her
      removal action; (2) her former supervisor; and (3) the Associate Director who took
      three actions against the appellant on April 27, 2015, when he (i) proposed her
      suspension, (ii) reassigned her to a new supervisor, and (iii) issued the instruction to
      limit her interaction with her former supervisor. ID at 9.
                                                                                       12

      administrative judge’s demeanor-based credibility findings deserve deference
      from the Board. See Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367,
      1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

      The appellant’s remaining arguments present no basis for disturbing the
      initial decision.
¶19         Next, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to consider
      all of her disclosures and protected activity that contributed to her removal. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 5, 18, 24. For example, she contends that the administrative judge
      also should have considered the following evidence:            (1) her disclosures in
      2014-2015 expressing her concerns about her former supervisor; (2) her 2015
      grievance activity; (3) her requests for reconsideration of her 2014 performance
      ratings and 2015 suspension; and (4) her disclosures to OSC, the Board, the
      Office of Inspector General, and equal employment opportunity personnel. Id.
      at 24-26. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the appellant’s argument
      provides no basis for disturbing the initial decision.
¶20         After holding a prehearing conference, the administrative judge issued an
      order summarizing the appellant’s affirmative defense as alleging that she was
      removed in retaliation for her April 15, 2015 email disclosures and her
      October 2014 grievance about her September 2014 letter of reprimand.             IAF,
      Tab 31 at 1-2. He indicated that the appellant had withdrawn her prior allegation
      that her removal was in reprisal for a June 2015 grievance that she filed about a
      suspension. Id. The administrative judge also agreed to consider the appellant’s
      evidence and argument that her removal was the final event in a chain of
      retaliation, which included an award denial, a suspension, and a reassignment. Id.
      at 2; IAF, Tab 5 at 2 n.3. The administrative judge warned the appellant that any
      additions, corrections, or objections to his order and summary must be received
      by November 26, 2016, or be deemed waived.               IAF, Tab 31 at 1 n.1.    The
      appellant’s failure to object and make timely additions or corrections to the
                                                                                          13

      administrative judge’s order on appeal precludes her from doing so on review. 12
      See Miller v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 557, ¶ 7 (2012).
¶21         The appellant also appears to argue that she was denied the opportunity to
      prepare her case on appeal. She argues that the agency’s failure to provide the
      administrative judge with “mandatory” documents adversely affected the outcome
      of her appeal. 13 PFR File, Tab 1 at 15. She alleges that the agency’s delayed
      response to her discovery request effectively prevented her from submitting “all
      critical evidence” before the record closed on appeal, and she submits additional
      documents on review. Id. at 16, 30-99. She also asks the Board to reconvene the
      hearing so that the agency can subpoena a crucial witness approved to testify on
      her behalf. Id. at 17-18. She contends that she was unable to reach the witness,
      who was not an agency employee when the hearing occurred, and that the agency
      was obligated to subpoena her. Id. For the reasons discussed below, we find that
      the appellant was not denied the opportunity to prepare her case on appeal.
¶22         Although the appellant asserts that she was not instructed on how to deal
      with these matters, we note that the administrative judge issued orders informing
      her of the Board’s discovery and subpoena procedures under 5 C.F.R.
      §§ 1201.71-1201.85. Id. at 16; IAF, Tab 2 at 3-4, Tab 6 at 2-3. In the event one

      12
         The appellant also argues on review that the deciding official in her October 2014
      grievance about her September 2014 letter of reprimand, violated an agency directive
      requiring him to consider all relevant factors in disciplinary actions because he failed to
      investigate her concerns about her supervisor. She contends that the administrative
      judge should have considered this issue in her removal appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 25.
      We disagree because the appellant does not explain how the alleged procedural defect
      in the agency’s grievance investigation proves that there is a nexus between her
      protected grievance activity and her removal. See Warren, 804 F.2d at 656-58.
      13
         The appellant asserts that the agency should have made the “mandatory files”
      available to the administrative judge because they “be came part of the official record”
      when she submitted them to the deciding officials in her removal action, the grievance
      of her suspension, and her request for reconsideration. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15. On
      review, the agency contends that it provided the appellant with all responsive discovery
      by November 23, 2016, before the record closed on December 6, 2016. PFR File, Tab 3
      at 9-10.
                                                                                          14

      party refuses to voluntarily make available pertinent documents or witnesses in a
      Board proceeding, the Board’s rules provide, after the other party files a motion
      to compel, for issuing orders to compel that documents or other discovery be
      produced, and for issuing subpoenas. Kinsey v. U.S. Postal Service, 12 M.S.P.R.
      503, 505-06 (1982); see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73-75, .81-85. The appellant does not
      contend that she filed a motion to compel the documents that she sought from the
      agency, and she has not shown that the evidence and argument that she submits
      on review is new and material evidence, which was not available despite her due
      diligence before the record closed on appeal. 14 See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d).
¶23         Moreover, contrary to the appellant’s argument on review, the agency
      was not obligated to provide for her witness’s appearance because the witness
      was not an agency employee when the hearing occurred. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17.
      The agency was obligated only to provide for the appearance of agency
      employees who were approved witnesses.            IAF, Tab 6 at 2-3; see 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.33(a).    The administrative judge offered to assist the appellant in
      arranging for the appearance of any approved witnesses not employed by the
      agency by ordering the agency to make such witnesses available or by issuing a
      subpoena, but the appellant did not request his assistance.          IAF, Tab 6 at 2-3.
      Because the appellant failed to take advantage of the procedures available to her
      prior to the close of the record, she cannot now claim injury. Perry v. U.S. Postal
      Service,   46 M.S.P.R.   425,   431    (1990),   aff’d,   937 F.2d    623   (Fed.    Cir.
      1991) (Table).

      14
         On review, the appellant submits emails from 2013-2016, all of which predate the
      close of the record on appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 32-93. The appellant provides a chart
      with commentary about some of those emails and her alleged protected disclosures
      therein. Id. at 94-98. The appellant also asserts that she was unable to upload certain
      evidence before the filing deadline because the file was too large but contends that
      evidence was “already part of the official record,” which the administrative judge
      should have considered. Id. at 15. But the appellant has not shown that the evidence
      and argument she submits on review is new and material evidence that was not
      available, despite her due diligence, before the record closed on appeal. See 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.115(d).
                                                                                         15

¶24         The appellant also argues that the administrative judge should have granted
      her an extension of time to file her closing brief because she did not receive
      notice between December 4 and 13, 2016, to “indicate that the audio recordings
      from the Hearing (December 5-6, 2016) were available”; she further asserts that
      she learned of the availability of the recordings on December 19, 2016, six days
      after she filed her brief.      PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17.        The appellant further
      contends that the Board’s failure to make the record of the hearing available
      sooner, and her lack of funds to purchase the written transcript, barred her from
      access to important evidence before she filed her closing brief. Id. at 17. The
      appellant also argues that she had no opportunity, before the record closed on
      appeal, to rebut false information that the agency included in its closing brief.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 6.
¶25         We are not persuaded by the appellant’s arguments.             First, the Board’s
      regulations provide notice to the parties that “[c]opies of recordings or existing
      transcripts will be provided upon request to parties free of charge.”           5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.53. The appellant does not assert that she requested from the regional
      office a copy of the hearing recording prior to submitting her closing brief.
      Second, the record does not show that the appellant requested an extension of
      time to file her closing argument or for the record to remain open to rebut
      argument submitted by the agency just before the record closed, as permitted by
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.59(c). 15    The administrative judge considered the appellant’s

      15
         As noted above, the appellant asserts that she received no emails from the Board
      regarding the availability of the audio recordings in the e -Appeal Repository between
      December 4 and December 13, 2016, and she states that the format of the audio
      recordings is not “universally accessible across different computer operating systems.”
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17. While the Board currently makes hearing audio files
      available to the parties through the e-Appeal Repository in many instances (following
      receipt of the audio files from the court reporter), 5 C.F.R. § 1201.53(c) requires that
      parties make a written request for such recordings, and in turn a copy of the recording is
      provided to the party free of charge. Similarly, to the extent the appellant argues in her
      petition that she could not afford to purchase a printed copy of the hearing transcript,
      the Board’s regulation provides parties with free copies of hearing recordings or
                                                                                            16

      closing brief in reaching his decision. ID at 7 n.3. We therefore find that the
      administrative judge afforded the appellant an opportunity to rebut the agency’s
      closing argument. 16
¶26         Regardless, we have considered the appellant’s lengthy rebuttal to the
      agency’s closing argument, in which she rejects the agency’s characterization of
      her attitude toward management, defends her character and value to the agency,
      reasserts her belief that her performance was underrated, and explain s that her
      emails on April 14-15, 2015, were intended “to emphasize, among other things,
      the unfairness and hostility” that she experienced from her former supervisor and
      the project chief. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-14. We find that the appellant’s response
      to   the   agency’s    closing    argument     does not     demonstrate     error   in     the
      initial decision.

      The administrative judge properly found that the agency proved a nexus between
      the misconduct and the efficiency of the service, and that the removal penalty
      was reasonable.
¶27         The administrative judge found that the agency established a nexus b etween
      its decision to discipline the appellant for the sustained charge of failure to follow
      instructions and the efficiency of the service. ID at 6. Neither party challenges
      this finding on review, and we discern no reason to disturb it.

      existing transcripts upon written request. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.53(c) (emphasis added). In
      this case, the audio recording is the official record of the hearing as no transcript exists.
      See IAF.
      16
         Moreover, while the appellant alleges that the agency made false statements about her
      performance and conduct in its closing argument, she does not contend that the agency
      introduced any new evidence in its final submission. Cf. Schucker v. Federal Deposit
      Insurance Corporation, 401 F.3d 1347, 1355-58 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that it is error
      to refuse to permit an appellant to rebut evidence submitted by an agency on the record
      closing date in cases decided without a hearing); Miller v. U.S. Postal Service,
      110 M.S.P.R. 550, ¶¶ 8-9 (2009) (finding it appropriate to consider new evidence
      submitted on review by the appellant to rebut the agency’s evidentiary submission,
      concerning an unforeseen dispositive issue, filed at the close of the record in a case
      decided without a hearing).
                                                                                    17

¶28        The administrative judge also found that the penalty of removal was
      reasonable. ID at 13-16. In reaching his decision, the administrative judge found
      that the deciding official properly considered the relevant factors in Douglas v.
      Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).        ID at 15-16.        On
      review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to consider her
      health condition as a mitigating factor.   PFR File, Tab 1 at 20. However, the
      administrative judge’s failure to mention all of the evidence of record does not
      mean that he did not consider it in reaching his decision. Marques v. Department
      of Health & Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062
      (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table). Moreover, the record reflects that the deciding official
      considered the appellant’s health condition in his Douglas penalty analysis, IAF,
      Tab 1 at 12, and the administrative judge found the deciding official’s
      consideration of the Douglas factors “thorough.” ID at 15; see Higgins v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 955 F.3d 1347, 1354-56 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
      (acknowledging that although the Board’s analysis of the appellant’s medical
      condition was “cursory,” it was still properly considered against the other
      relevant Douglas factors when determining the reasonableness of the penalty).
      Thus, we discern no error in the administrative judge’s decision finding that the
      removal penalty was reasonable for the appellant’s proven and repeated failure to
      follow the agency’s instruction.     ID at 16; see Lentine v. Department of the
      Treasury, 94 M.S.P.R. 676, ¶¶ 2, 12, 15 (2003) (finding that removal was a
      reasonable penalty for an employee who intentionally and re peated emailed
      another employee despite explicit instructions to stop). Based on the foregoing,
      we affirm the initial decision sustaining her removal.

      We forward the appellant’s claim alleging a hostile work environment to the
      regional office for adjudication as an IRA appeal.
¶29        The appellant also argues on review that the administrative judge should
      have considered her claim that she was subjected to a hostile work environment in
      reprisal for whistleblowing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16, 18, 31; see IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
                                                                                        18

      In support of her argument, she refers to about 1,500 p ages of evidence that she
      submitted on appeal, purportedly documenting her “long-term harassment” and
      the agency’s “discriminatory treatment of employees.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 18,
      24.   She also argues that her misconduct “was provoked” by the “long -term
      hostile [work environment].”       Id. at 31.    Although the administrative judge
      did not adjudicate her hostile work environment claim in this chapter 75 removal
      appeal, we find no reversible error.
¶30         As explained above, the appellant’s failure to object to omitting her hostile
      work environment claim from the administrative judge’s orders summarizing the
      issues under consideration in this removal appeal precludes her from doing so
      now. IAF, Tabs 5, 31; see Miller, 117 M.S.P.R. 557, ¶ 7. Moreover, to the extent
      that the appellant seeks corrective action for the alleged retaliatory hostile work
      environment that preceded her removal, the Board cannot order corrective action
      for this matter in her chapter 75 appeal. IAF, Tab 5 at 1 n.3. Regardless, the pro
      se appellant may not have understood her right to file a separate IRA appeal with
      the Board based on her hostile work environment claim.            Because the record
      reflects that she has exhausted her hostile work environment claim before OSC,
      we forward this claim to the Board’s Denver Field Office for adjudication as an
      IRA appeal. 17 IAF, Tab 1 at 23, 31, 132; see Skarada v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16 (recognizing that allegations of a hostile work

      17
         The appellant also asserts, for the first time on review, that the agency engaged in
      “numerous instances of character defamation (slander and libel),” which should have
      been considered as part of the ongoing retaliation and harassment. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 21-23. She contends that she found evidence of the alleged defamat ion in the
      discovery that she received from the agency, and she had no time to address it on
      appeal. Id. at 21-22. We decline to consider her additional argument on review
      because she has failed to demonstrate that it is based on new and material evidence that
      previously was unavailable despite her due diligence. Banks v. Department of the
      Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). To the extent that the appellant argues that the
      alleged defamation and libel is evidence of a hostile work environment, she may
      reassert this argument in her IRA appeal.
                                                                                  19

environment may constitute a personnel action under the whistleblower
protection statutes).

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 18
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall withi n their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

18
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have u pdated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   20

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at    the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
                                                                             21

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or oth er security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                  22

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b)    other   than   practices   described   in   section 2302(b)(8),     or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 19 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our w ebsite at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

19
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                        23

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.