Court Opinion

ID: 9553883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:36:41.433332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:30.919552
License: Public Domain

JACOBSON, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I concur that the amount of damages awarded to the widow, Nancy Sedillo, was inadequate and obviously the result of the jury attempting to apply the principles of comparative negligence to a case which was tried under contributory negligence principles.1 I likewise agree that the supreme court’s ruling in Begay v. City of Tucson, 148 Ariz. 505, 715 P.2d 758 (1986), requires that a new trial on the issue of Nancy Sedillo’s damages be limited to those damages only.
I disagree that the award of the jury as to the other statutory beneficiaries requires reversal, as these awards are, contrary to the majority opinion, completely supported by the evidence and are not tainted by the comparative/contributory negligence misunderstanding which influenced the inadequate verdict to Nancy Sedillo.
In reaching this conclusion, some additional facts are relevant. Timothy Sedillo died two weeks before trial and was 21 years old at the time of his death. At the time of his father’s death, Timothy was completely emancipated and financially independent of his father. Timothy and his brothers Michael and Matthew had not lived with their father since 1970.
Michael Sedillo, like Timothy, at the time of his father’s death was completely emancipated and financially independent of his father.
Matthew Sedillo was 14 at the time of his father’s death and his father’s sole financial contribution to Matthew was in the form of child support in an undisclosed amount.
Eleanor Sedillo, Tony Sedillo’s mother, was 80 years old at the time of trial, was not financially dependent upon her son, Tony, and did not even appear or testify at trial.
The deceased, Tony Sedillo, was employed as an inspector/supervisor with the Arizona Department of Transportation earning the sum of $21,500 per year. Although Dr. Wilt, an economic analyst, estimated Tony’s future earnings to approximate $1.2 million, with a present value of $237,300, this estimate required Tony’s earnings with the Department of Transportation to be approximately $91,000 by the year 2006.
While the majority opines that the sum of $237,300 was “lost by the statutory beneficiaries,” there is no evidence that any beneficiary, other than Nancy Sedillo, would share in this community asset. In fact, the inferences to be drawn are that at least the emancipated statutory beneficiaries would not share in this asset as no financial contributions were being made to them at the time of Tony’s death.
With this financial information, the jury awarded Toni Sedillo, the five-year-old daughter, $50,000; Matthew Sedillo, $5,000; and made no award to the deceased *485son Timothy, the emancipated son Michael, or the financially independent mother Eleanor.
A.R.S. § 12-613 provides:
In an action for wrongful death, the jury shall give such damages as it deems fair and just with reference to the injury resulting from the death to the surviving parties who may be entitled to recover
(emphasis added).
The law, I thought, was clear that the amount of damages which a jury can award for such non-monetary items as loss of affection, love, companionship, consortium, personal anguish and suffering, is entirely within the providence of the jury. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Lueck, 111 Ariz. 560, 535 P.2d 599 (1975) cert. denied, 425 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 1510, 47 L.Ed.2d 763 (1976).
Moreover, the granting or denial of a motion for new trial for lack of damages, or an additur for inadequate damages, is left to the greatest possible discretion of the trial judge and that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except in cases where clearly abused. Bond v. Cartwright Little League, Inc., 112 Ariz. 9, 536 P.2d 697 (1975).
Applying these principles to this case and turning first to the statutory beneficiaries, who received no award (Timothy, Michael and Eleanor), it is clear that the jury could and did consider their lack of financial dependency upon the deceased in arriving at their verdict. Although there was testimony that these beneficiaries loved and were loved in return by the deceased, the amount of this loss was particularly within the discretion of the jury.
The majority sidesteps this issue by holding that “those appellants who did not receive any damages were also entitled to some damages ... by virtue of their status as statutory beneficiaries.” No citation of authority is given for this holding, probably because it is contrary to Arizona law.
As was stated by the supreme court in Begay v. City of Tucson:
[T]he proportion of damages which each statutory beneficiary is entitled to recover is not based on an equal division among the statutory beneficiaries. It is based on their individual pecuniary loss suffered by reason of the wrongful death, (emphasis added).
Id. 148 Ariz. at 508, 715 P.2d at 761.
It necessarily follows that if no pecuniary loss is suffered, no recovery is warranted, as this court noted in Quinonez for and on Behalf of Quinonez v. Andersen, 144 Ariz. 193, 696 P.2d 1342 (App.1985), by affirming an award of no damages to a statutory beneficiary (husband of the deceased) in a wrongful death action.
Thus, contrary to the majority opinion that the evidence does not justify a zero award to these beneficiaries, the jury could properly consider that Timothy was dead at the time of trial, that Mrs. Eleanor Sedillo did not even testify at trial, and that Michael was emancipated at the time of his father’s death. At least the trial judge, under these circumstances, did not clearly abuse his discretion in denying a new trial as to these beneficiaries.
Turning to Matthew Sedillo, again the evidence is uncontradicted that the only financial contribution made by his father was a monthly child-support payment in an unknown amount. He had not lived with his father since he had been approximately one year old. He was 14 years old at the time of his father’s death and had a legal right to support for only an additional four years. While I might consider an award of $5,000 under these circumstances to be low, a jury and a judge who had an opportunity to see the witnesses thought the award was justified. Again, I see no clear abuse of discretion.
Finally, the award of $50,000 to Toni Sedillo, the deceased’s five-year-old daughter, must be considered. Again, I, had I been on the jury, might have granted more. The majority, however, is unable to articulate any specific evidence which would justify an increase in this award other than the conclusionary statement that “the damages awarded to these appellants who received some damages are legally insuffi*486cient in light of the evidence established at trial.” The judge and jury which originally heard this evidence came to a contrary conclusion. In absence of a more concrete statement of reasons to find otherwise, I would allow the jury determination to stand.
In summary, because I believe the jury from a legal misunderstanding reduced Nancy Sedillo’s award, I agree that a new trial as to her damages is warranted. As to the balance of the statutory beneficiaries, the jury was justified in its awards.

. This observation is based upon the arguments of appellee’s counsel before this court, contending the jury's award as to Nancy Sedillo could be justified on the basis that the jury could apply comparative negligence principles.