Court Opinion

ID: 9856982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:09:24.223851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:41.718843
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with part I (Legality of the Stop) and part III (Prosecutorial Misconduct) of the Court’s opinion. I respectfully dissent from part II (Legality of the Search) of the Court’s opinion.
Following appeal from the trial court, this case was initially assigned to our Court of Appeals. On June 6, 1991, the Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress. The essence of the Court of Appeals’ decision is contained in its conclusion:
We hold that a frisk for identification falls outside of the purview of police conduct constitutionally permitted during an investigatory stop. The conclusion is inescapable that the officer’s command that Rawlings submit to such a search precipitated Rawlings’ attempt to divest himself of the contraband and the ultimate seizure of the evidence by police. Under these circumstances, the state’s theory of abandonment must be rejected. Because the state’s evidence was obtained as a consequence of police conduct violative of the fourth amendment, it *938should have been excluded from evidence.
State v. Rawlings, 1991 Opinion No. CA-93 at 12 (June 6, 1991) (citations omitted).
I agree with this analysis.