Court Opinion

ID: 9951138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 17:03:19.132272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:17.534337
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 P. v. Knowles CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A167792
 v.
 RODERICK JAMES KNOWLES,                                                (Solano County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. FC36622)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Appellant Roderick James Knowles (appellant) appeals from the
superior court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 We affirm.
                                     PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In March 1994, the Solano County District Attorney filed an
information charging appellant with murder (§ 187) with allegations that he
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5) and that he committed the murder
during the commission of a robbery or attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)). A jury found appellant guilty of murder and found true the robbery-
murder special circumstance, but the trial court declared a mistrial as to the
firearm allegation because the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The trial
court sentenced appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

         1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                               1
      In December 2019, appellant filed a section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing.2 In a brief filed in support of the petition, appellant argued he
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the petition because the jury’s
failure to reach a verdict on the firearm enhancement meant that he was
convicted on a felony-murder theory. In April 2021, the superior court
concluded appellant made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief,
received further briefing, and conducted an evidentiary hearing at which
appellant presented expert testimony. In April 2023, the court found that the
prosecution had “proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] was a
major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless disregard for human
life.” The court denied the petition, and the present appeal followed.
                         FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
      On the evening of October 25, 1993, Matthew J. (the “victim”) was
fatally shot in Fairfield in the course of a robbery. The evidence showed that
appellant planned the robbery and was present, but there was no eyewitness
testimony whether it was appellant or an accomplice who shot the victim.
Prosecution Case
      In October 1993, the victim and his wife S.J. lived in an apartment in
Fairfield with their five-year-old son. The evening of October 25, S.J. saw
appellant and another man outside her apartment complex, and she asked
them if they knew where she could buy marijuana. Appellant said he would
sell S.J. four ounces of marijuana for $225 and bring the marijuana to her

      2 The petition was actually filed under former section 1170.95, now

section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58 (Assem. Bill No. 200 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.)), § 10, eff. June 30, 2022.) For convenience and clarity, we refer to
section 1172.6 in this decision, even if section 1170.95 was in effect at the
time of the referenced portion of the record or authority.
      3 Appellant’s October 11, 2023 request for judicial notice of the record

from the appeal from his conviction (case number A068551) is granted.

                                        2
apartment. About 20 minutes later, appellant returned accompanied by a
different man, but the marijuana was an ounce short. Appellant said he
would return in 20 minutes with the proper amount.
      S.J. left to speak to a friend, leaving the victim in the apartment with
the purchase money. Around 9:00 p.m., an eyewitness was working on a car
in the parking lot for the victim’s apartment complex when he saw two men
in black clothing and a man in a white tank top “fighting.” The man in the
tank top ran away, and the two other men ran after him. A few seconds after
the three men left the eyewitness’ view, he “heard three shots.” Later, after
an ambulance arrived, the eyewitness saw the victim on the ground, wearing
a tank top.
      About 10-15 minutes after S.J. left her apartment, she and her friend
walked back towards her and the victim’s apartment. On the way, S.J. saw
the victim lying on his back “in a bush.” The victim was vomiting, so S.J.
flipped him over onto his stomach, at which point she noticed that his “head
was bleeding.”
      The first Fairfield police officer to arrive found the victim about 100
feet from his apartment “face down in some ivy” with a head wound and two
wounds on his legs. The victim was “moaning a little bit.”
      The victim died eight days later. The cause of death was a gunshot
wound to the head. The victim also suffered a gunshot wound to a thigh and
to a leg.
      A bullet hole was discovered in the victim’s kitchen wall that was not
there prior to the night of the robbery.
      In November 1993, appellant was arrested in Texas and brought back
to Fairfield and interrogated. Appellant’s initial story was that he agreed to
sell a woman four ounces of marijuana and ended up fighting with her

                                           3
husband over a $10 bag. He denied knowledge of any murder. The police
informed appellant that his accomplice, Cedrick B., had told them that they
had gone to the apartment to commit a robbery, that it was appellant’s idea,
and that appellant had the gun and shot the victim.
      After further back and forth, appellant changed his story and stated
that somebody had a gun and he “took off running” and heard shots.
Eventually he admitted planning the robbery with Cedrick B. and another
man, and he admitted obtaining the gun, but he claimed they had “no
intention of them shooting the dude at all.” Appellant and Cedrick B. entered
the victim’s apartment; Cedrick B. had the gun. Cedrick B. pointed the gun
at the victim, who pleaded, “Put the gun away.” Appellant kicked the victim
in the stomach, and Cedrick B. tried to fire the gun but nothing happened.
Appellant tried to run out of the house, but the victim “grabbed” him.
Cedrick B. pointed the gun to the victim’s head and appellant said, “Don’t
shoot him in the head.” Cedrick B. “shot the gun at the ground,” allowing
appellant to get out of the apartment. But appellant slipped and fell and the
victim jumped on him. Cedrick B. came to appellant’s aid, and they ran away
in opposite directions. Appellant then “heard some shots,” met up with
Cedrick B., and disposed of the gun. After a pause in the recording—during
which a detective said “If this guy was kicking your butt, you should have
told us that”—appellant changed his story to say he took the gun from
Cedrick B. and shot the victim after the victim tried to grab the gun.
Defense Case
      Appellant testified that, on the night of the robbery, he agreed to sell 4
ounces of marijuana to a woman (S.J.) who lived in an adjoining apartment
complex. He went home to obtain the marijuana, and he called his friend

                                       4
“Man” and asked Man to bring him a gun for “protection” during the
transaction.
      Appellant asked Cedrick B. to accompany him during the drug sale.
When they arrived at S.J.’s apartment, they discovered they had brought less
than four ounces, so they left to retrieve the proper amount. They met up
with Man, and Cedrick B. said “he was willing to rob” S.J. Appellant said he
did not want to be part of the robbery, but he said the others could use his
marijuana during the robbery. Man decided against it because there was not
enough money to be made. By the time appellant, Cedrick B., and Man
walked back to S.J.’s apartment, “it was understood that there wasn’t going
to be any robbery.”
      Man left, and appellant and Cedrick B. entered S.J.’s apartment.
Appellant believed Man still had the gun, but, while appellant spoke to the
victim, Cedrick B. pointed the gun at the victim’s head. Appellant tried to
run away, but the victim “grabbed” appellant. Cedrick B. fired the gun into
the floor, and appellant ran out the front door. Appellant slipped and fell,
and the victim resumed fighting with him. Cedrick B. helped appellant fight
the victim, and appellant fled. Appellant did not see the victim again, but he
heard two gunshots. When appellant and Cedrick B. met up shortly
thereafter, Cedrick B. told appellant that he thought he had shot the victim
in the leg. Appellant threw the gun on a roof, and two days later he flew to
San Antonio (where he grew up) because he was “scared” after the shooting.
He denied shooting the victim; he told the police he shot the victim after the
police mentioned he “had a good chance of beating this case on self-defense.”
Evidence in Support of Resentencing
      At the evidentiary hearing on appellant’s resentencing petition,
appellant presented testimony from Dr. Rahn Minagawa, “an expert in

                                       5
forensic psychology specifically relating to adolescent and juvenile brain
development.” Dr. Minagawa conducted “a comprehensive psychological
evaluation and social developmental assessment on” appellant, who was 20
years old when he robbed the victim. The expert testified that “the male
brain reach[es] maturity” around age 25. The “last part of the brain to fully
develop,” the “prefrontal cortex,” “is associated with executive functioning,
decision making, planning, understanding consequences.” Prior to age 25,
the male brain “can’t exert as much control, especially during . . . emotionally
charged situations or when other peers are present.” Dr. Minagawa opined
that appellant’s brain was still developing at the time of the robbery,
hampering his judgment, especially in the presence of peers. Dr. Minagawa
also testified that appellant had described traumatic life experiences: he grew
up in an abusive home, he had been the target of several attacks, and he had
been shot at the age of 18 and ended up paralyzed for about a year.
Dr. Minagawa opined that such experiences would impact a person’s ability
to “deliberate and to fully understand or comprehend their decisions.” He
explained, “[I]f you’ve been traumatized early on, parts of your brain become
much more reactive to perceive[d] threats, much more reactive in emotionally
charged situations.”
      Appellant also presented testimony from Dr. Richard Angelo Leo, a
professor of law and psychology who testified as an expert in “social
psychology and criminology, specifically in the practice of police
interrogations, psychology coercion and making of false confessions.” Dr. Leo
testified about interrogation techniques police use to obtain incriminating
statements from suspects and about the possibility of false confessions. Dr.
Leo opined that appellant’s assertion that the officers suggested a claim of

                                       6
self-defense matched “a classic minimization technique in homicide
interrogations.”
                                 DISCUSSION
      Appellant contends the superior court erred in denying him
resentencing relief under section 1172.6 based on the court’s finding that he
acted with reckless indifference to human life. We conclude the court’s
finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Legal Framework
      “Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
amended the felony-murder rule to provide: ‘A participant in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a
death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1)
The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer,
but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder
in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2 [the statute defining felony-
murder special circumstances].’ (§ 189, subd. (e).) The new law was designed
‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant
in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
466, 477 (Oliver).)
      “The Legislature also added former section 1170.95 (now section
1172.6), which creates a procedure for offenders previously convicted under a
felony-murder theory to obtain the benefits of these changes retroactively.

                                        7
Under the statute, individuals convicted of murder can petition for relief in
the court where they were sentenced if (1) the complaint or information filed
against them ‘allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder . . .,’ (2) they were convicted of murder following a trial, and (3) they
could not now be convicted of murder ‘because of changes to [s]ection 188 or
189.’ (Former § 1170.95, subd. (a); see now § 1172.6, subd. (a).) In most cases
where the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to
relief, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution
bears the burden of proving, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
guilty of murder or attempted murder’ under state law as amended by Senate
Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)” (Oliver, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 477–478.)
      A superior court’s determination whether the prosecution met its
burden in a proceeding under section 1172.6 is reviewed for substantial
evidence. (Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 480.) “We ‘ “examine the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains . . . evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that
would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond
a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298;
accord Oliver, at p. 480.) In the present case, the court found that appellant
was a major participant in the robbery-murder of the victim and that he
acted with reckless indifference to human life. On appeal, appellant does not
dispute that substantial evidence supports the major participant finding but
he argues insufficient evidence supports the reckless indifference finding.
      In People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), the Supreme Court
explained that reckless indifference to human life is “ ‘implicit in knowingly
engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Id. at

                                        8
p. 616.) It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing)
to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire
that death as the outcome of his actions.” (Id. at p. 617.) “Reckless
indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective element.
[Citation.] As to the subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of
and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense
is committed,’ and he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk
of death his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective element,
‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and degree that, considering
the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known
to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.” ’ ”
(In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 (Scoggins).)
      “[T]he mere fact that a robbery involves a gun is insufficient on its own
to establish reckless indifference to human life.” (Oliver, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 478; see also Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 617–618.)
Instead, “Clark listed factors to consider when determining whether reckless
indifference existed: ‘Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used
during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the
defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she have the
opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of
the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for
violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant
make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony?’ [Citation.] As
with a major participant finding, ‘ “[n]o one of these considerations is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.” ’ ” (Oliver, at

                                        9
pp. 478–479; see also Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 683 [“[d]etermining a
defendant’s culpability under [section 190.2, subdivision (d)] requires a fact-
intensive individualized inquiry”].)
Analysis4
      In finding that appellant showed reckless indifference to human life,
the superior court first reiterated its finding that appellant arranged for the
gun to be brought and knew that Cedrick B. was armed. The court also
observed that appellant was present during the robbery and had “multiple
opportunities to stop” it. “Even after the shots [appellant] had an
opportunity to check on and assist [the victim] and especially after being told
[Cedrick B.] might have shot [the victim] in the leg, but [appellant] did not do
so.” The court found that appellant was aware of the risk of violence before
the fatal shooting because Cedrick B. fired a shot in the apartment. Finally,
the superior court found that appellant’s conduct was “not attributed to
immaturity[,] impetuosity[,] or failure to appreciate the risk and
consequences” of his actions. When appellant planned the robbery, there was
“no evidence that [he was] being pressured.” He was the one who planned
the robbery and sought a gun, and he “fully unders[tood] the violent risk”
involved.
      At the outset, we note that the fact that appellant “was a major
participant in the underlying felony is—itself—supportive of the . . . factual
finding that [he] acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (People v.
Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 113; see also Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 615 [“The greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the

      4 Because the superior court did not find beyond a reasonable doubt

that appellant was the shooter, this court’s analysis assumes Cedrick B. was
the shooter.

                                       10
more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life”].) In the
present case, in concluding that appellant was a major participant, the
superior court observed that appellant was the “instigator” and planner of the
robbery, arranged for the firearm to be present because he knew the inherent
danger of the drug deal, was present at the robbery, and disposed of the gun
after the shooting. The court reasonably inferred from appellant’s
statements in the police interrogation that Cedrick B. was his backup. Those
facts that demonstrate appellant’s leading role in planning and executing the
robbery offer “ ‘significant support’ ” for the court’s reckless indifference
finding. (Clark, at p. 615.)
      Further, several of the factors identified in Clark as supporting a
reckless indifference finding are present here. Appellant knew Cedrick B.
was armed and appellant was responsible for arranging for the gun to be
brought to the robbery. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–619; cf.
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [the defendant “did not use a gun, nor did
he know that a gun would be used during the felony”]; People v. Keel (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 546, 559 (Keel) [“there was no evidence that [the defendant]
provided [the shooter] with his firearm”]; People v. Ramirez (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 970, 988 (Ramirez) [“it was [the shooter] who instigated and
planned the carjacking, provided the gun, and fired it”].) Appellant was
present during the robbery, the subsequent struggle, and (according to the
eyewitness) the pursuit of the victim that resulted in the shooting. (Clark, at
p. 619; see also People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 592 (Mitchell)
[the defendant “was physically present at every stage of the crime: planning,
execution, dividing the spoils, and flight”].) The evidence supported an
inference appellant was the leader, but he failed to “act as a restraining
influence.” (Clark, at p. 619.) Most significantly, he pursued the victim

                                        11
rather than directing Cedrick B. to allow the victim to escape. (Cf. Scoggins,
at p. 678 [the defendant “was not physically present at the crime scene and
was not in a position to restrain [the shooter] once the meeting with [the
victim] began”]; Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 989 [the defendant
“ ‘was not “close enough to exercise a restraining effect on the crime” or [the
shooter]’ ”]; In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 559 (Taylor) [the
defendant “never got out of the car and had no opportunity to prevent the
shooting” and “could not even see” the interaction between the shooter and
the victim].)5 Finally, appellant “fail[ed] to provide aid” to the victim, even
though he admitted Cedrick B. told him the victim had been shot. (Clark, at
p. 619; see also People v. Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652, 664 [the
defendant “did not call for assistance or attempt to render aid to the victim
who did not die at the scene of the shooting”]; cf. Ramirez, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 989 [“There is no evidence [the defendant] had an
opportunity to help [the victim] . . . or that [the defendant] knew [the victim]
had been wounded by the gunfire.”].) Appellant made no effort to ensure that
the victim would receive medical attention. (Cf. Scoggins, at p. 680 [the
defendant walked over to see if the victim was still breathing and other
bystanders had already called the police].)6

      5 Appellant suggests he acted as a restraining influence because he

claimed in his police interrogation that he told Cedrick B. not to shoot the
victim in the head. But he did not so testify at trial and the superior court
was free to disbelieve that self-serving assertion, especially given his
numerous lies during the interrogation. In any event, appellant does not
claim he told Cedrick B. not to shoot at all, and he did not prevent the pursuit
of the victim.
      6 These specific considerations distinguish the present case from those

in which there is nothing “that one can point to that elevated risk to human
life beyond those risks inherent in any armed robbery.” (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 623; accord Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 987.) In

                                       12
      Appellant emphasizes there is no evidence he had any prior knowledge
of Cedrick B.’s propensity for violence. (See Taylor, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
p. 558 [no “evidence that [the shooter] had killed before or that [the
defendant] was aware of previous violent behavior on [the shooter’s] part”].)
We agree there is no evidence appellant knew of Cedrick B.’s propensity for
violence before the robbery, but, as the superior court pointed out, appellant
did become aware of Cedrick B.’s propensity when Cedrick B. fired the gun
inside the victim’s apartment. As we have observed previously, appellant
could have tried to stop any subsequent pursuit of the victim, so, when he
failed to do so, it was with knowledge that Cedrick B. very well might shoot
again. Therefore, this factor does offer some support for the superior court’s
reckless indifference finding.7
      Finally, appellant argues the evidence of his “age, brain development,
background of dysfunction and trauma and evidence about how such factors
may impact[] an adolescent’s ability to appreciate the risks or consequences
in criminal conduct” undermined the reckless indifference finding. But
appellant concedes “the evidence of the plan to commit a robbery with a
firearm did not appear to be impulsive or due to any peer pressure.” (See
Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489; cf. Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 562 [15-year-old defendant “would have felt pressure to ‘hit the block’ and
go along with the robbery instigated by” the shooter, where the robbery was
not planned in advance]; Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 991 [15-year-

other words, this was not “[a] robbery in which the only factor supporting
reckless indifference to human life [was] the fact of the use of a gun . . . .”
(Clark, at p. 617, fn. 74.)
      7 Other factors mentioned by the Supreme Court in Clark, such as the

duration of the offense, are not significant in the present case, as either
supporting or undermining the reckless indifference finding. (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at pp. 620–622.)

                                        13
old defendant “ ‘was afraid that if he did not help [the shooter], the
neighborhood would find out and someone might kill him later’ ”].) And,
although appellant’s actions during the robbery might have been impacted by
his impulsivity, that does not negate the relevance of his failure to act as a
restraining influence and failure to render aid to the victim. (See Oliver, at
p. 490 [the defendant’s actions “did not show ‘a transient rashness’ or
‘inability to assess consequences’ ”]; see also Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at p. 595 [“Youth can distort risk calculations. Yet every 18 year old
understands bullet wounds require attention. The fact of youth cannot
overwhelm all other factors.”]; accord Oliver, at p. 489.)
      Given appellant’s leading role in planning the armed robbery, his
physical presence throughout, his pursuit of the victim, and his failure to
render any kind of aid after the shooting, we conclude substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that appellant acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The superior court’s order is affirmed.

                                                     SIMONS, J.
We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.

(A167792)

                                       14