Court Opinion

ID: 9663401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:37:49.450553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:49.244081
License: Public Domain

*440Levin, J.
(dissenting). This is an action for malicious prosecution. I write separately because (1) this Court should not decide — even if the question of probable cause is, in the instant case, solely for a court to decide as a question of law — whether there was probable cause until after the trial court and the Court of Appeals have reviewed the record for that purpose, (2) Daniel, a layman, was not sufficiently informed concerning the law to justify him in initiating the prosecution against Koski unless he was advised to do so by an attorney after full disclosure of the facts within his knowledge and information, and (3) whether Daniel made full disclosure of all the facts is a jury question especially since there were credibility issues.
i
An element of an action for malicious prosecution is that the defendant initiated the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff without probable cause.1 In the absence of a conflict in the testimony *441concerning the circumstances, presenting an issue of fact for jury determination, the court determines — we all agree — whether the defendant had probable cause for initiating the prosecution.2
The Court of Appeals concluded that there was, in the instant case, a conflict in the testimony and reversed a directed verdict against plaintiff Aldred E. Koski entered by the trial judge at the conclusion of Koski’s proofs.
A majority of this Court concludes that there was no dispute of fact and the question of probable cause should therefore have been decided by the court and not by a jury. The majority proceeds to review the record, and further concludes that defendant Danny R. Daniel had probable cause to initiate the prosecution.
In so ruling, the majority states that the facts should be viewed as a "prudent, cautious person would see the situation,”3 and, applying that standard, Daniel had probable cause to initiate the prosecution. The majority further states that although Koski would not have been guilty of the charged criminal offense if he did not have a larcenous intent,4 that would not necessarily negate probable cause because both the contract document and officers of the Madison Heights Police Officers Association disputed Koski’s claim that he had been authorized to accept delivery of and to endorse checks to the order of the mhpoa and to use the proceeds for the publication of the *442magazine without running them through the mhpoa account.5 The majority adds that a reasonable mistake of law as to whether conduct amounts to a criminal offense, as well as a reasonable mistake of fact as to the conduct of the accused, does not preclude a finding of probable cause.6 The majority further adds that Daniel made full and fair disclosure to the prosecuting attorney and therefore is not subject to liability in an action for malicious prosecution.7
ii
Neither the trial judge nor the Court of Appeals reviewed the record to determine whether, viewing the question of probable cause as one of law, there was probable cause.
The trial judge apparently thought that the . probable cause question was for the jury, and directed a verdict against Koski because the judge did not see how the jury could fail to conclude that there was probable cause: "I do not see how the jury, based upon what has been presented here, could say that there was not probable cause.”8
*443Because the Court of Appeals concluded that there were disputed questions of fact, it did not review the record to determine whether, viewing the question as one of law, there was probable cause.
This Court should not bypass the trial court and the Court of Appeals on this issue. Even if, as the majority indicates, the trial court found "that as a matter of law defendants had probable cause to initiate criminal prosecution against plaintiff,” the Court of Appeals has not, in all events, reviewed the record to determine whether, viewing the question as one of law, there was probable cause.
The appropriate course — following upon the majority’s decision that there was no dispute of fact and the question of probable cause should have been decided by the court and not by a jury — is to remand either to the trial court or the Court of Appeals to determine whether, on the record so far made, there was probable cause. Only after their assessment should this Court consider whether further review by this Court is warranted.
m
The Restatement of Torts, 2d, states that a person has probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings if he "correctly or reasonably believes” that the accused acted in a particular manner, that the acts committed constitute the offense he charges the accused with committing, and "that he is sufficiently informed as to the law *444and the facts to justify him in initiating” the prosecution.9 (Emphasis added.)
The majority quotes the foregoing language of the Restatement with apparent approval.10 The majority nevertheless quotes, also with apparent approval, the following excerpt from an alr annotation:
If there are sufficient facts to warrant an ordinarily prudent person in believing that another has committed a crime, failure to make further investigation before instituting a prosecution does not constitute a want of probable cause”[11] [emphasis added],
and states, on the basis of the alr excerpts quoted in its opinion:
These cases stand for the proposition that where there are sufficient facts to warrant a prudent person in defendant’s position to believe that a crime was committed and the defendant committed it, the failure to make a further investigation does not negate probable cause.[12] [Emphasis added.]
*445A
Manifestly, it is of considerable importance for purposes of a civil action for malicious prosecution, whether a person has probable cause to initiate a criminal prosecution if a prudent person would believe that the person to be prosecuted has committed or probably committed a crime, or whether, as the Restatement states, he must additionally correctly or reasonably believe "that he is sufficiently informed as to the law and the facts to justify him in initiating” the prosecution.
Consistent with its conclusion that probable cause is established when a prudent person would believe that the person to be prosecuted has committed or probably committed a crime, the majority states that where the facts are so sufficient, it is not necessary to investigate a "possible” defense that might "negate probable cause as a matter of law,” that a person initiating a prosecution need not undertake a "full-scale effort to resolve conflicting allegations”13 or "make a further investigation” that might "negate probable cause.”14
It is, however, well-established, as set forth in the commentary to the black letter of the section of the Restatement quoted with apparent approval by the majority, that although the circumstances may be incriminating, they "may not so clearly indicate guilt that a reasonable man would initiate criminal proceedings without investigation.”15 (Emphasis supplied.)
A rule that further investigation is not required where there is sufficient evidence that a crime was committed and the accused probably committed it would also ignore, as again set forth in the com*446mentary to the Restatement, that "[i]n determining whether a person has probable cause for initiating criminal proceedings upon the facts known or reasonably believed by him to exist, the character of the accused as it is known or should be known to the accuser by reputation or experience is a highly important factor.”16 (Emphasis supplied.)
B
It appears that Koski was a man of good reputation. He had worked for many years as a news reporter for various newspapers and radio stations. For three years, he had worked with the Michigan State Police Troopers Association where his duties included editing a monthly tabloid for the state police.
Because Daniel thought that there was no need to investigate further after one of the officers of the mhpoa had contradicted Koski’s assertion that he had been authorized to accept, endorse, and use the proceeds of checks made out to the order of the mhpoa, Daniel saw no need to examine the books and records of the mhpoa or of Koski. Koski had asked Daniel to do so and had suggested to Daniel that the money shortage might have been due to misuse of mhpoa money by an officer of the association.
Whether or not such a further investigation was warranted or would have been productive is, of course, a matter of judgment, a judgment which the majority of the Court has concluded, contrary to Thompson v Price, 100 Mich 558, 561; 59 NW 253 (1894),17 is for the court rather than a jury to make._
*447In all events, it is not correct to say or suggest that when there is evidence sufficient to show that the requisite acts constituting the criminal offense have probably been committed by the accused further investigation is not required where there is contradictory evidence concerning the accused’s defense.
The danger of such a rule is illustrated by the facts of this case where Daniel was told that Koski was not authorized to endorse the checks or use the proceeds by an officer of the mhpoa who, it was ultimately determined, had been embezzling funds of the mhpoa, but for whose misconduct the chain of events that led to Koski’s prosecution probably would not have occurred.
c
The majority, on the basis of its assessment of the record, concludes that Daniel reasonably believed that Koski had acted in the manner charged and that those acts constituted the offense he charged Koski with committing. It is unclear whether the majority also concludes that Daniel was sufficiently informed as to the facts to justify him in initiating the prosecution, the majority apparently or possibly being of the view that no more is required to establish that there was probable cause. Be that as it may, it is clear that Daniel was not sufficiently informed as to the law to justify him in initiating the prosecution.
Daniel was a layman. As also set forth in the commentary to the black letter of the Restate*448ment, "[i]n the ordinary case a layman, aware of his own ignorance of the law, will not be justified in initiating the proceedings unless he has been advised to do so by an attorney, in which case he will be protected”18 if advice is "sought in good faith” and "given after a full disclosure of the facts within the accuser’s knowledge and information.”19 If, however, "the layman elects to proceed without this advice, he. is ordinarily not acting as a reasonable man and does not have probable cause, since he knows or reasonably ought to know that he does not” "have sufficient information to justify him in taking the step.”20
Thus, even if Daniel correctly or reasonably *449believed that he was sufficiently informed concerning the facts to justify him in initiating the prosecution,21 he did not act as a reasonable person and did not have probable cause to initiate the criminal prosecution against Koski unless he made full disclosure of the facts within his knowledge and information to an attorney — in this case, because he dealt with no other attorney, the prosecuting attorney.
IV
Daniel acknowledged at the trial that he mainly considered the way the checks were made payable, the way they were endorsed, and how the funds were used. When Daniel requested the prosecutor to issue a warrant for Koski’s arrest, he presented three checks endorsed by Koski, an incident report, and his own written report which did not disclose Koski’s claim that he was authorized to endorse the checks and use the proceeds without running them through the mhpoa account.
The majority states:
Although Mr. Daniel stated that he would have had no reason to specifically tell the prosecutor of Mr. Koski’s claim of right to the money, he did state that the transcribed interview of Mr. Koski by Mr. Daniel would have been given to the prosecuting attorney. Further, Richard Thompson, the prosecutor who authorized the charge, testified that the interview was in the prosecutor’s ñle and that an assistant prosecutor routinely goes over the documentation in the file. It is well-settled that one who makes a full and fair disclosure to the prosecutor is not subject to an action for malicious prosecution. Modla v Miller, [344 Mich 21; 73 NW2d 220 (1955)]. In this case, the trial court could have correctly concluded that Mr. Daniel did *450so and directed a verdict on that basis.[22] [Emphasis supplied.]
Although it is indeed ordinarily the function of the court to determine whether the defendant had probable cause for initiating the proceedings, it is "for the jury to find whether the accused laid before the attorney all the facts he knew or of which he had reliable information . . . .”23
A jury is not required to accept even the uncontradicted testimony of a disinterested witness.24 Neither Daniel nor the assistant prosecutor can, in all events, properly be regarded as disinterested witnesses. Daniel was a defendant, and the assistant prosecutor’s superior, the Oakland County Prosecutor, was also a defendant.25
It was for the jury to decide whether Daniel did in fact deliver a copy of the transcribed interview with Koski to the assistant prosecutor, whether if this was done at all it was done before the warrant was issued, and whether the manner and time of delivery was such as to constitute presenting "all the facts” for advice before the warrant was issued.
In sum, it was for the jury to decide whether "all the facts” that Daniel knew or "of which he had reliable information” were presented to the assistant prosecutor before the warrant was issued. Daniel, absent such a full disclosure, would not have acted reasonably in initiating the criminal *451prosecution against Koski because, as a layman, Daniel was not sufficiently informed concerning the law to initiate the prosecution absent advice to do so by an attorney. The majority therefore errs in concluding that Daniel had probable cause simply because, in its assessment of the record, he was sufficiently informed of the facts to justify him in concluding that Koski had acted in the manner charged and that those acts constituted the offense charged.
I would remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cavanagh and Archer, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.

 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 653, p 406.
Two of the four elements of an action for malicious prosecution were clearly satisfied, see Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 119, p 871; Turbessi v Oliver Iron Mining Co, 250 Mich 110, 112; 229 NW 454 (1930). A prosecution was caused to be commenced by Daniel against Koski, and those proceedings terminated in Koski’s favor.
In directing a verdict, the trial judge did not advert to the element of malice. The Court of Appeals said that for that reason it had not discussed the question of malice, but that on retrial malice would be a jury question. The statement by the Court of Appeals that "if the jury finds a lack of probable cause, it may thereupon infer malice,” Koski v Vohs, 137 Mich App 491, 520; 358 NW2d 620 (1984), finds support in Davis v McMillan, 142 Mich 391, 402; 105 NW 862 (1905). No issue in regard to malice has been presented on this appeal.
I agree with Daniel that the Court of Appeals erred in stating that "the dismissal on the merits of the larceny by conversion charge against plaintiff by the district judge at the conclusion of the preliminary examination is evidence of a lack of probable cause to prosecute on the part of defendant Daniel.” Koski v Vohs, supra, p 517. While that is, indeed, the rule in many jurisdictions (Prosser & Keeton, Torts [5th ed], § 119, p 881; Restatement Torts, 2d, § 663), the rule in *441this state is that the discharge of the defendant at the conclusion of the preliminary examination "has not in itself any tendency to show a want of probable cause . . . .” Davis v McMillan, supra, p 402. See also Prine v Singer Sewing Machine Co, 176 Mich 300, 320; 142 NW 377 (1913); Stefanic v Montgomery Ward & Co, 358 Mich 460, 462; 100 NW2d 250 (1960).

 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 673, p 448 and accompanying comment on clause (c).

 Ante, p 432.

 Ante, p 433.

 Ante, p 433.

 Ante, p 435.

 Ante, p 439.

 The judge explained that, in his view, Koski was asking the jury to draw unreasonable inferences, to indulge in assumptions and to speculate: "And some of the language I hear used here, you’re forced to a conclusion, and you have to assume this, you draw some other inference from this inference. And all those things, and I don’t think I can let a jury go on all the speculation.”
While the judge said that Koski had "not sustained the burden” of establishing probable cause, in the next sentence he said: "I do not think that reasonable minds could differ in this and I’m going to take it away from the jury and grant the motion in this matter.” The judge apparently thought that if reasonable minds could differ, the question would have been for the jury; as he said at the beginning of his ruling: "I do not see how the jury, based upon what’s been presented here, could say that there was not probable cause.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*443The judge gave no indication that he understood or was proceeding on the basis that probable cause, in the absence of a conflict in the testimony presenting an issue of fact for jury determination, is a question of law for the court.

 One who initiates or continues criminal proceedings against another has probable cause for doing so if he correctly or reasonably believes
(a) that the person whom he accuses has acted or failed to act in a particular manner, and
(b) that those acts or omissions constitute the offense that he charges against the accused, and
(c) that he is sufficiently informed as to the law and the facts to justify him in initiating or continuing the prosecution. [3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 662, p 423.]
The commentary to the Restatement of Torts, 2d, explains that a "private prosecutor’s mistaken belief that the accused is guilty of the offense charged against him may be due to a mistake of fact, that is, a mistake as to what the accused has done or left undone. On the other hand, it may be due to a mistake of law, that is, a mistake in believing that the actual or supposed acts or omissions of the accused constitute the offense charged against him.” 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 662, comment d, p 424.

 Ante, p 434, n 7.

 Ante, p 436.

 Id.

 Ante, p 435.

 Ante, p 436.

 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 662, comment on clause (c), p 428.

 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 662, comment h on clause (a), p 426.

 The supervisor of a township had been arrested on a charge of having wilfully neglected to require from a resident taxpayer a statement of his taxable property. After the conclusion of the prosecu*447tion, the supervisor commenced an action against the complaining witness for malicious prosecution. This Court held that "it was at least a question for the jury” whether the defendant was justified in initiating the prosecution "without making inquiry, direct, of the only person who was cognizant of the facts,” the taxpayer.

 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 662, comment i on clause (b), p 427.

 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 666, p 433.

 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 662, comment i on clause (b), p 427. Judicial decisions so holding include Bain v Phillips, 217 Va 387; 228 SE2d 576 (1976); Higgins v Pratt, 316 Mass 700; 56 NE2d 595 (1944); Vasser v Berry, 85 Ga App 435; 69 SE2d 701 (1952); see also Rose v Whitbeck, 277 Or 791; 562 P2d 188 (1977); Brown v Kisner, 192 Miss 746; 6 So 2d 611 (1942).
There may, however, be situations in which a layman, even without the advice of counsel, may reasonably believe that he has enough information about the law of the matter to justify him in going ahead. This may be true, for example, if he knows that there is a statute on the books which by its terms clearly makes the conduct in question a crime, and the accused escapes conviction only because the statute is for the first time held to be unconstitutional. In the absence of information to the contrary, the layman is justified in assuming that any statute is valid, and if its terms are clearly applicable to the facts he has probable cause for his action. The same is true when the accused escapes conviction only because the statute is construed by the court in a manner not readily apparent upon its face to be inapplicable to the facts. There may be similar situations in which the conviction fails because of refinements of law that the reasonable layman could not be expected to know or to anticipate and on which he could not reasonably be expected to seek advice. Examples are the lack of jurisdiction of an inferior court over offenses of a particular kind or borderline distinctions in the degrees of larceny provided by particular statutes. [3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 662, comment i on clause (b), p 427.]

 See n 9.

 Ante, p 439.

 3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 666, comment g on clause (b), p 437; Webster v Fowler, 89 Mich 303, 304; 50 NW 1047 (1891).

 See People v Jackson, 390 Mich 621, 625; 212 NW2d 918 (1973); Woodin v Durfee, 46 Mich 424, 427; 9 NW 457 (1881).

 At the conclusion of the plaintiffs proofs, the judge directed a verdict in favor of all the defendants, including the Oakland County Prosecutor. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to all the defendants except Daniel. The issues on this appeal concern only Daniel.