Court Opinion

ID: 9538279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:34:16.073349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:43.032824
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting).
I am constrained to dissent from the position adopted by the majority for I am of the opinion that it constitutes an unwarranted departure from both the statutory and the case law.
The majority of the Court concedes that the check in question, standing alone, is not a sufficient memorandum as will satisfy the Statute of Frauds1 for it does not contain all of the essential terms and provisions of the contract.
The Statute of Frauds provides, in part, that “[ejvery contract ... for the sale, of any lands, . . . shall be void unless the contract, or some note of memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the ... sale is to be made [generally referred to as “the party to be charged”] ...” 2
This Court has construed the foregoing statute on numerous occasions. In Adams v. Manning3 the Court held that the following language contained in a receipt was insufficient to satisfy the statute:
October 19, 1907. Received of H. W. Manning thirty dollars ($30) as part payment of thirty acres of land. Price to be $100 for said land.
In Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co.4 the Court stated the matter as follows:
It is fundamental that the memorandum which is relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all of the essential terms and provisions of the contract.
In Zion’s Properties, Inc. v. Holt5 the Court construed the words “as per agreement of 12-8-73” written on a check as not being a sufficient memorandum in writing to modify a written contract for the sale of land as would satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
In light of the foregoing pronouncements of the law, the majority of the Court seeks to cure the contract deficiency evident in the instant case by construing an unexecut-ed and undelivered deed as a part thereof.6 In support of its position, it cites the case of Miller v. Hancock.7
I take no exception to the general proposition espoused in Miller v. Hancock that several writings may be construed together as containing all the terms of a contract. However, that case does not stand for the proposition that writings of any quality may be utilized to ascertain the terms of the contract. In fact, that case is clearly distinguishable on its facts from the ease at hand. Miller v. Hancock dealt with deeds that not only were executed but also delivered by placement in escrow by both parties pursuant to agreement. No such authenticity of related writings exists in the instant case.
Irrespective of the foregoing, the following all-important point, not noted by the majority of the Court, is further dispositive of this appeal.
While the law remains relatively flexible as to the type of “signature” which will satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, and as to its placement on the writing, it nevertheless recognizes the necessity for the signature to be affixed with the intent or purpose of authenticating the terms of the writing. “[Tjhere must be inscribed on the memorandum, with the intention thereby to authenticate the document, the name of the party to be charged. ... It is not sufficient that the party’s name appears on the memorandum or document merely to identify him as one of the contracting parties or for some wholly ex*375traneous purpose. It must have been inscribed as an authentication of the contents of the memorandum.”8
In the instant case, Jensen’s endorsement in blank of the check did not authenticate the terms of Gregerson’s “memorandum” set forth on the front thereof.
Under Utah law, the transfer or negotiation of a negotiable instrument is ineffective absent the endorsement of the trans-ferror.9 Obviously, the endorsement of a negotiable instrument has, as its primary purpose, the negotiation for value of the instrument. One desiring to demonstrate an ulterior purpose for such endorsement need produce evidence to that effect. In the absence of such evidence, no presumption arises that the transferor of the instrument, simply by endorsement becomes contractually bound by the terms of a reference memorandum placed on the face of the instrument by the maker.10
I deem the majority’s reliance on Jensen’s endorsement of the check as a “signature” for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of the Statute of Frauds as being precluded by law. There is nothing in the record before us to support the conclusion that Jensen, by endorsing the check, intended to demonstrate the authenticity of the “memorandum” on the front thereof as a portion of an underlying agreement. In fact, Jensen disclaims any awareness on his part that the memorandum appeared on the face of the check at the time he endorsed it. Hence his endorsement of the check is not to be viewed as a “signature” as would authenticate the memorandum.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
WILKINS, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of .HALL, J.

. U.C.A., 1953, 25-5-1 et seq.

. U.C.A., 1953, 25-5-3.

. 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915).

. 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952).

. Utah, 538 P.2d 1319 (1975).

. An unexecuted and undelivered deed is a nullity and therefore could not be part of any agreement. See 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds, Sec. 136.

. 67 Utah 202, 246 P. 949 (1926).

. 2 Corbin on Contracts. Sec. 520. See also, 4 Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Sec. 585 and Restatement 1, Contracts, Sec. 210.

. See U.C.A., 1953, 70A-3 -201(3).

. See 11 Am.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes, Sec. 193.