Court Opinion

ID: 9390575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 20:01:27.870375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.284276
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 KANG KYU SEO, et al.,

                  Plaintiffs,

          v.                                                 Civil Action No. 18-785 (RDM)

 CHARLES MOON SUK OH, et al.,

                  Defendants.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

         On October 6, 2022, a jury returned a verdict in favor of all four Plaintiffs in this case,

finding that Charles Moon Suk Oh and Wade Road, Inc. failed to pay Plaintiffs overtime as

required by both the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and D.C. law. Plaintiffs filed a

proposed final order with the Court, in which they sought compensatory damages, liquidated

damages, and interest. Dkt. 61. In a prior opinion, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs were

entitled to compensatory and liquidated damages in amounts set forth in the opinion. See Dkt. 70

at 17.

         The Court deferred ruling, however, on the availability of pre-judgment interest pending

further briefing. As explained in the last opinion,

         According to Plaintiffs, they are each entitled to an additional award of interest
         “at the rate of 5%” starting on October 6, 2022. Dkt. 61-1 at 1–2. Plaintiffs fail
         to explain why they are entitled to the payment of interest running from the date
         of the jury’s verdict but, rather, merely cite to D.C. Code § 28–3302(c). That
         provision, however, sets the prevailing interest rate “on judgments and decrees,”
         id., and is thus seemingly inapposite, since the Court has yet to enter judgment,
         see Zuniga v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 270 A.3d 897, 902 (D.C. 2022)
         (holding that “judgment” under that statute is a final, appealable order). But
         because neither party has briefed this issue, and because Plaintiffs have
         requested the opportunity to [be] heard on the question, Dkt. 61 at 2, the Court
         will defer ruling on the question of interest at this time.
Id. at 16.

        Plaintiffs have since come back with two new theories of pre-judgment interest under

D.C. law.1 First, they assert that the amount owed in this case constitutes a “liquidated debt,”

and, therefore, the Court is required to award pre-judgment interest under D.C. Code § 15–108.

See Dkt. 71 at 3. Alternatively, if the Court concludes that this is an unliquidated debt, Plaintiffs

argue that the Court should, in its discretion, award pre-judgment interest under D.C. Code § 15–

109. Id. at 3–6. Plaintiffs have also altered their ask; while they previously sought pre-judgment

interest running from the date the jury returned its verdict, Dkt. 61-1 at 1–2, they now request

pre-judgment interest going back to 2017, Dkt. 71 at 6. Defendants’ response—which spans less

than two pages and contains almost no analysis—merely asserts that the award is already

punitive, since it includes quadruple damages and attorneys’ fees, and that pre-judgment interest

is therefore inappropriate. See Dkt. 72. Finally, Plaintiffs also request post-judgment interest,

Dkt. 71 at 1, which Defendants do not oppose, Dkt. 72 at 2.

                                                  I.

        D.C. Code § 15–108 provides that,

        In an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or
        the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to recover a liquidated debt on
        which interest is payable by contract or by law or usage the judgment for the
        plaintiff shall include interest on the principal debt from the time when it was
        due and payable, at the rate fixed by the contract, if any, until paid.

There are therefore two distinct requirements under § 15–108: (1) the debt must be liquidated;

and (2) interest must be payable by contract or by law or usage. See Klayman v. Jud. Watch,

1
 As Plaintiffs acknowledge, Dkt. 71 at 2, pre-judgment interest is unavailable under the FLSA.
See Serrano v. Chicken-Out Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 179, 199 (D.D.C. 2016); Ventura v. L.A.
Howard Constr. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 99, 102 n.2 (D.D.C. 2015); Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc.,
738 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2010).

                                                  2
Inc., No. 06-cv-670, 2019 WL 1244079, at *27 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2019). Plaintiffs have failed to

satisfy either requirement.

        First, this case does not involve a “liquidated debt” under § 15–108. “For the purposes of

this provision, ‘[a] liquidated debt is one which[,] at the time it arose[,] . . . was an easily

ascertainable sum certain.’” Irazabal v. 201 Kennedy St. Holdings, LLC, No. 21-cv-1378, 2022

WL 4365736, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2022) (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting

Steuart Inv. Co. v. The Meyer Group, Ltd., 61 A.3d 1227, 1240 (D.C. 2013)). “Notably, to

trigger D.C.’s mandatory prejudgment interest statute, the debt must have been for a ‘sum

certain’ at the time that it arose, which for purposes of the statute happens only if its size was

known to both parties at the time.” CapitalKeys, LLC v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 278 F. Supp. 3d 265,

275 (D.D.C. 2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting Wash. Inv. Partners of Del., LLC v. Secs.

House, K.S.C.C., 28 A.3d 566, 582 (D.C. 2011)). “Moreover, for a damages award to trigger

D.C. Code § 15–108, the plaintiff must have ‘had an immediate right, judicially enforceable[,]’

to recover that sum certain at the time that the debt arose.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1254 (D.C. 1990)).

        The Court concludes that the debt owed here was not a “sum certain” because, at the time

Defendants violated the wage statutes at issue, the quantum of damages was unknown. To

calculate the damages owed in this case, the jury had to find the weeks and hours worked for

each of the Plaintiffs. See Dkt. 59. That was no simple task. To be sure, because Defendants

admitted certain allegations in their answer, the jury was told the dates Mr. Seo, Ms. Chase, and

Ms. Johnson worked. Dkt. 33 at 10. But an admission does not render a debt “liquidated” within

the meaning of the statute. As for Ms. Agnew, moreover, the jury was still required to make

findings regarding the weeks she worked. Dkt. 59 at 6. Even more to the point, for each of the

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four Plaintiffs, the jury had to find the average number of hours over forty hours each worked per

week during that period.

       Even after the jury returned its verdict, moreover, the quantum of damages owed

remained unsettled. For each Plaintiff, the Court had to walk through a complicated analysis in

an eighteen-page opinion to ascertain the damages owed. See Dkt. 70. For example, the Court

had to determine (1) whether Ms. Chase started work in the beginning or the middle of May

2016; (2) when Ms. Johnson started work; and (3) whether Plaintiffs were entitled to liquidated

damages, and if so, the amount of those liquidated damages. See id. at 6. In addition, for three

of the four Plaintiffs, the Court had to ascertain the appropriate minimum wage, which changed

for those three Plaintiffs over the period of their employment.

       Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that, at the time the statutes were violated, any of

the parties knew (or could readily have determined) how much Defendants owed each Plaintiff,

much less that there was a “sum certain.” Indeed, that sum was not fixed until the Court issued

its opinion in January 2023. This case therefore lays in stark contrast to the typical § 15–108

case in which the sum certain is clear from the face of a written agreement. See, e.g., Irazabal,

2022 WL 4365736, at *4 (breached promissory note provided for principal sum and interest);

Johnson-Lancaster & Assocs., Inc. v. TB Ballston, LLC, No. 20-cv-1565, 2020 WL 7481040, at

*3 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2020) (“Here, TB Ballston failed to pay the fixed, ascertainable sums

recorded in Johnson-Lancaster’s invoices.”).

       The cases on which Plaintiffs rely are inapposite. In Bragdon v. Twenty-Five Twelve

Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 856 A.2d 1165 (D.C. 2004), the parties did not dispute that the

overcharges at issue were a liquidated debt. Id. at 1169. Giant Food, Inc. v. Jack I. Bender &

Sons, 399 A.2d 1293 (D.C. 1979), addressed, in a breach of contract case, whether pre-judgment

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interest was available where an unliquidated counterclaim was asserted against a liquidated

claim. Id. at 1299. And District Cablevision Ltd. Partnership v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714 (D.C.

2003), addressed the availability of pre-judgment interest where the liquidated damages were

reduced by an unliquidated amount. Id. at 731. None support Plaintiffs’ contention that

“[w]ages are, by nature, a ‘liquidated debt.’” Dkt. 71 at 3 (quoting Bragdon, 856 A.2d at 1169

n.6).2

         Second, even if the principal amount at issue here was due on a liquidated debt, Plaintiffs

have failed to demonstrate that “interest is payable by contract or by law or usage.” D.C. Code

§ 15–108; see also Klayman, 2019 WL 1244079, at *27; Bazarian Int’l Fin. Assocs., LLC v.

Desarrollos Hotelco, C.A., 342 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2018). Strikingly, Plaintiffs make

no argument with respect to this requirement; indeed, when quoting the statute, they inexplicably

omit this dispositive language through the use of ellipses. Dkt. 71 at 3. Because Plaintiffs do not

even argue that this requirement of § 15–108 is met, they have failed to carry their burden.

         In any event, even without briefing, it appears that this second requirement is not

satisfied. First, Plaintiffs have failed to identify any contract that entitles them to pre-judgment

interest. See, e.g., Klayman, 2019 WL 1244079, at *27 (“The parties’ Confidential Severance

Agreement does not provide for interest on Klayman’s personal expenses . . . .”). Second, they

2
  Plaintiffs will be awarded additional damages under D.C. Code § 32–1012(b)(1), which
provides that “any employer who pays any employee less than the wage to which that employee
is entitled under this subchapter shall be liable to that employee in the amount of the unpaid
wages, statutory penalties, and an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to treble the
amount of unpaid wages.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court is not convinced—and the Plaintiffs
did not argue—that the phrase “liquidated damages” in § 32–1012(b)(1) is equivalent to
“liquidated debt” in § 15–108. “Liquidated damages” refer to the extra damages a court awards
under D.C. law; as explained, by contrast, “liquidated debt” refers to a debt that was an easily
ascertainable sum certain at the time it arose. Irazbal, 2022 WL 4365736, at *4. Indeed, the
Court was unable to find any case citing § 32–1012 and awarding pre-judgment interest.

                                                  5
concede that the statutes at issue do not themselves provide for pre-judgement interest. See Dkt.

71 at 2 (“There does not appear to be any binding precedent on the availability or unavailability

of pre-judgment interest under D.C. wage laws specifically.”); see also Klayman, 2019 WL

1244079, at *28 (“[O]n the basis of its independent research, the Court shall assume, arguendo,

that ‘law’ does not expressly require an award of interest under these circumstances.”). That

leaves “usage,” which “refers to what is customary or usual under similar of comparable

circumstances.” Bazarian, 342 F. Supp. 3d at 23 (quoting Aspire Channel, LLC v. Penngood,

LLC, 139 F. Supp. 3d 382, 389 (D.D.C. 2015)). Plaintiffs offer no basis for this Court to

conclude that awarding pre-judgment interest in wage and hour cases is customary or usual; to

the contrary, Plaintiffs fail to identify a single wage and hour case applying § 15–108.

       Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that § 15–108 requires an entry of pre-

judgment interest in this case.

                                                II.

       Alternatively, Plaintiffs request pre-judgment interest under D.C. Code § 15–109.

Section 15–109 provides:

       In an action to recover damages for breach of contract the judgment shall allow
       interest on the amount for which it is rendered from the date of the judgment
       only. This section does not preclude the jury, or the court, if the trial be by the
       court, from including interest as an element in the damages awarded, if necessary
       to fully compensate the plaintiff. In an action to recover damages for a wrong
       the judgment for the plaintiff shall bear interest.

Once again, Plaintiffs’ brief omits from its quotation of the statute the most relevant language,

asserting only that: “Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest under D.C. Code § 15–109,

‘as an element in the damages awarded, if necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff.’” Dkt. 71

at 3 (quoting D.C. Code § 15–109).

                                                 6
       When one reads the entire statute, it is clear that it does not apply here. First, the statute

applies only to claims of breach of contract; this case, in contrast, is for violations of various

wage and hour laws. See, e.g., Cobell v. Zinke, 741 F. App’x 811, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“It also

was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to award prejudgment interest [under § 15-

109] because the award originated from a claim based on contract, that is, his engagement

letter.”); Romero v. ITW Food Equip. Grp. LLC, 118 F. Supp. 3d 349, 352 (D.D.C. 2015) (“The

District of Col[u]mbia Court of Appeals has interpreted this statute as ‘authorizing post-

judgment interest in both tort and contract cases, but pre-judgment interest only in contract

cases . . . .’”) (quoting Duggan v. Keto, 554 A.2d 1126, 1140 (D.C. 1989)).

       Second, the statute allows the court (as opposed to the jury) to “includ[e] interest as an

element in the damages awarded” only when “the trial [was] by the court.” D.C. Code § 15–109;

see, e.g., Paige Int’l, Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 267 F. Supp. 3d 205, 210–11 (D.D.C. 2017)

(awarding pre-judgment interest under § 15–109 after bench trial); see also Klayman, 2019 WL

1244079, at *26 (inquiring whether the counts “concerned unliquidated damages, such that the

jury would be required under D.C. Code § 15–109 to decide any entitlement to prejudgment

interest” (emphasis added)). Because this is not a case in which “the trial [was] by the court,”

even if § 15-109 otherwise applied, Plaintiffs’ recourse was to ask the jury to return an answer of

pre-judgment interest, which they failed to do.

       In any event, Plaintiffs have failed to address at least two of the essential requirements

under § 15-109 and have thus forfeited any contention that they are entitled to pre-judgment

interest under that provision.

                                                   7
                                                  III.

        It is possible that, aside from these two statutes, the Court might in its discretion order the

award of pre-judgment interest. See, e.g., Dist. Title v. Warren, No. 14-cv-1808, 2015 WL

7180200, at *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2015) (“Though D.C. law explicitly authorizes prejudgment

interest in contract actions under D.C. Code § 15–108 and § 15–109, D.C. law neither authorizes

nor forbids the award of prejudgment interest for claims of unjust enrichment.”); Romero, 118 F.

Supp. 3d at 352; Lanny J. Davis & Assocs. LLC v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 962 F. Supp.

2d 152, 164 (D.D.C. 2013) (Section 15–109 “does not preclude the court from including interest

as an element of the damages awarded [i.e. pre-judgment interest], if necessary to compensate

the plaintiff.” (cleaned up) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To the extent the Court has the

authority to do so, it declines to exercise that authority.3

        “A trial court has wide discretion in awarding prejudgment interest.” Lanny J. Davis &

Assocs. LLC, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 164. Pre-judgment interest may be awarded “if necessary to

fully compensate the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting D.C. Code § 15–109); see also L. Off. G.A. Lambert

& Assocs. v. Davidoff, 72 F. Supp. 3d 110, 118–19 (D.D.C. 2014). “Courts . . . balance the

‘equities in [each] case’ to determine whether pre-judgment interest is appropriate.” Paige Int’l,

Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d at 211 (alteration in original) (quoting Davidoff, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 119).

“Relevant considerations include whether the plaintiff has been deprived of the use of the money

withheld, whether he timely commenced suit, and the certainty of the amount due.” Lanny J.

3
  It may be that pre-judgment interest it not available at all. In Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc., 738
F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2010), Judge Lamberth concluded that, as under the FLSA, pre-judgment
interest is not available under the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law because, like the
FLSA, that statute uses “restrictive language when disclosing its remedies” such that “the
remedies provided [within the DCWPCL] are exclusive.” Id. at 23. Because Defendants do not
make this argument—and because the Court would not award pre-judgment interest in any
event—the Court need not resolve that question.

                                                   8
Davis & Assocs. LLC, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 164 (quoting Winder v. District of Columbia, 555 F.

Supp. 2d 103, 111 (D.D.C. 2008)); see also Paige Int’l, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d at 211).

       Plaintiffs argue that pre-judgment interest is appropriate in this case because the D.C.

wage and hour statutes at issue are punitive in nature. See Dkt. 71 at 2. That argument misses

the mark. The purpose of pre-judgment interest is to ensure “that the wronged party can be made

whole.” Bassin, 828 A.2d at 732 (quoting Riggs Nat’l Bank, 581 A.2d at 1255). Here, Plaintiffs

have been made whole four times over. As explained in the Court’s prior opinion, D.C. Code

§ 32–1012(b) provides the “severe remedy” of “what amounts to quadruple damages:

compensatory damages equal to the unpaid overtime wages plus liquidated damages equal to

three times that amount.” Dkt. 70 at 5–6 (emphasis in original). In this case, Defendants owe a

total of $89,800.17 in compensatory damages. See id. at 17. When accounting for the liquidated

damages, however, that number skyrockets to $359,200.67. See id. There is simply no argument

that Plaintiffs need pre-judgment interest to be made whole.4

                                               IV.

       Finally, Plaintiffs also request post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, Dkt. 71 at

1, and Defendants do not disagree, see Dkt. 72 at 2; see also Serrano v. Chicken-Out Inc., 209 F.

Supp. 3d 179, 199 (D.D.C. 2016). The Court will accordingly award post-judgment interest as

4
 The two cases on which Plaintiffs most heavily rely—Galeana v. Lemongrass on Broadway
Corp., 120 F. Supp. 3d 306, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), and Gonzalez v. Bustleton Services, Inc., No.
08-cv-4703, 2010 WL 1813481, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2010)—interpret state laws from New
York and Pennsylvania, respectively, and therefore shed no light on D.C. law.

                                                9
provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (“Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil

case recovered in a district court.”).

                                         CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiffs’ request for pre-judgment

interest and will GRANT their request for post-judgment interest.

        A separate order will issue.

                                                    /s/ Randolph D. Moss
                                                    RANDOLPH D. MOSS
                                                    United States District Judge

Date: April 27, 2023

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