Court Opinion

ID: 9544989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:04:19.652218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:50.899111
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Had I been writing for the majority, I would have found that this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal and therefore would have affirmed.
Following the perfection of the appeal in this case, we discovered a possible jurisdictional defect, and, at oral argument, we asked the parties to submit additional briefs addressing our concerns. Given the provisions of Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P.,1 we questioned whether the appellant’s notice of appeal was timely. The following describes the sequence of events that gives rise to the problem:
Judgment Entered 4-27-81
Rule 59 Motion Piled 5-05-81
Notice of Setting For 5-22-81
Hearing on Motion 2 (set for 6-29-81)
Rule 60 Motion Filed 6-22-81
Hearing on Motions 6-29-81
Order Denying Motions Entered 7-10-81
Notice of Appeal Filed 7-23-81
According to Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P., motions for new trial are deemed denied if not decided within 60 days of the entry of the judgment, unless a continuance is granted “by order of the court” (emphasis added) allowing as much as an additional 30 days within which to determine the issue raised by the motion. Under this rule, appellant’s motion for a new trial must be deemed denied by operation of law on June 26,1981, unless the clerk of court’s “Notice of Setting”, which set the date for hearing argument upon the Rule 59 new trial and Rule 60(b) motions three days past the June 26 date, amounted to an “order of the court” granting the permitted extension for ruling on the motion for a new trial. If this is the effect of the clerk’s “Notice of Setting”, *1123then appellant’s appeal from the judgment was timely filed. If this is not the effect of the clerk’s entry, then the notice of appeal was late and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal on its merits.3
We are faced with this dilemma: In order to hold for the appellant’s position that the “Notice of Setting” is sufficient to comply with the 59(f) time-extension provision, we must be able to say:
1. The “Notice of Setting” for hearing argument on appellant’s motion for a new trial is actually an order extending the time limitation within which the court can decide the motion for a new trial under Rule 59(f), and
2. If that is what the “Notice of Setting” really is — an order extending the time within which the court will be permitted to decide the motion for a new trial — then we must be able to decide that the clerk of the court has the power and authority to make and enter such an order, i.e., — assuming, arguendo, the “Notice of Setting” was made on the court’s motion and was intended to serve as an order extending the time within which the court could decide the motion for a new trial under 59(f), we must then ask whether the clerk of court’s “Notice of Setting” can be said to be an “order of the court” as required by Rule 59(f).
My review of the question forces me to conclude that the clerk of court’s “Notice of Setting” did not and could not have the effect of granting the extension contemplated by the provisions of Rule 59(f). This means that, under our rules and opinions interpreting them, we cannot reach any issues on appeal except that which concerns the trial courts denial of appellant’s Rule 60(b) motion.4
As noted earlier, Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P. authorizes the granting of a continuance of up to 30 days past the original 60 days from the entry of judgment during which additional time the trial court is permitted to rule on the motion. The language of the rule makes clear that the extension can only be granted by “order of the court.” In other words, the extension-granting decision is a discretionary matter with the court. The purpose of subdivision (f) of Rule 59 is to expedite court business, and to insure the finality of judgments. See a discussion of this subject in Board of Commissioners v. Casper National Bank, 55 Wyo. 144, 96 P.2d 564 (1939), rev. on other grounds, 105 P.2d 578 (1940). We have held that the provisions of subdivision (f) are jurisdictional and the extension requirements must be complied with or the judgment becomes final at the end of 60 days. Furthermore, a written order by the court cannot extend the time limitation after the motion has been deemed denied by operation of law. Johnson v. Hauffe, Wyo., 567 P.2d 735 (1977); McMullen v. McMullen, Wyo., 559 P.2d 37 (1977); Sun Land & *1124Cattle Co. v. Brown, Wyo., 387 P.2d 1004 (1964).5
Is a “Notice of Setting” an order — and if it is an order, is it an order extending time within which to decide the motion for a new trial — or is it an order setting the time for argument on the motion — or is it both?
I have heretofore noted the entry made by the clerk of the court at n.2, supra. On its face, the clerk’s entry purports to set the motion hearing beyond the 60-day deadline conceived by Rule 59(f). Other than this, the record reflects no action by the trial judge with respect to the granting or denying of an extension of time within which to rule on appellant’s new-trial motion. Nothing in the record verifies the notion that the “Notice of Setting” extending the time past the 60-day limit was entered by authority of the trial judge. Even if it could be shown that the “Notice of Setting” has been entered by the clerk upon the motion of the trial judge, there is still no record indication that the entry was intended to be an order extending the time within which the motion for a new trial could be decided as contemplated by Rule 59(f). It certainly does not say that this is what the person who authorized the writing intended. All the “Notice of Setting” says is that the argument on the motion for a new trial will be heard by the court on the 29th of June, 1981, at 5:30 p. m. It appears to be a ministerial entry by the clerk of the court— perhaps at the behest of the judge — telling attorneys when the judge will be available to hear arguments on the motions. It does not purport to say — at least on its face— that the judge has exercised his discretion with respect to whether or not he will extend the time within which he will make a decision on the granting or denial of a new-trial motion.
For the judge to say to the clerk of court, “Tell the lawyers to be here next Tuesday to argue their motions,”
seems to indeed impose upon the clerk a ministerial task. But should the judge say to the clerk,
“You decide whether or not we should grant the appellant additional time within which the motion for a new trial will be heard, failing which it will be deemed denied,”—
this sounds like the clerk is being delegated the court’s discretion.
In view of the authorities that I will refer to hereafter, it must be assumed that the entry by the clerk was a ministerial task and did not — because it could not — involve judicial discretion. This assumption leads to the conclusion that the entry was what it appears to be — a ministerial act which told lawyers when to appear to argue the motions and was not an exercise of such judicial discretion as would be necessary in deciding whether or not the court would grant a motion to extend the time for deciding the new-trial issue under Rule 59(f).
If the clerk’s entry is an order extending the time for purposes of Rule 59(f), is it an “order of the court” — or is it just a clerk’s order? And if it is the former is the clerk authorized to make such an order?
Various Wyoming statutes describe the duties of clerks of court, none of which suggest that a clerk has the power to issue orders of the court. Section 5-3-202, W.S. 1977 describes the duties of a district court clerk as follows:
“Each clerk of the district court shall keep and make up the records and books of the court of his particular county, receive all cases filed therein, properly record and attend to the same, and shall have the care and custody of all the records, seal, books, papers and property pertaining to his said office or the court of the county for which he is elected and which may be filed or deposited therein, and shall receive, account for and pay over all money that may come into pos*1125session of the court according to law, and under the orders or decrees of the court, * * * »
Section 5-7-101, W.S.1977 states in general terms:
“The clerk of each of the courts shall exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties enjoined upon him by statute and by the common law; and in the performance of his duties he shall be under the direction of his court.”
These statutes clearly contemplate that the function served by a clerk of court is that of an administrative officer of the court whose duty it is to perform ministerial tasks.
The general rule is said to be:
“In as much as a clerk of court is essentially a ministerial officer, as is stated in § 1 of this Title, he cannot, without express constitutional or statutory authority to that effect, exercise any judicial functions, and the court, it has been held, has no power, in the absence of statutory authority, to delegate such matters to the clerk, although the clerk may properly perform acts which are classified as ministerial.” (Emphasis added.) 14 C.J.S. Clerks of Court, § 35.
The rule was reiterated in Corbin v. State ex rel. Slaughter, Fla.App., 324 S.2d 203 (1975), where the court held a clerk of court is a ministerial officer who does not exercise discretion in performing most of his services. This general rule regarding the powers and the functions of the clerk of court has been reiterated in numerous cases. For example, in Sabbe v. Wayne County, 322 Mich. 501, 33 N.W.2d 921 (1948) the court said:
“We have held that the duties and functions of county clerks are purely ministerial and that judicial functions cannot be performed by court clerks, nor may the power to do so be conferred upon them. People v. Colleton, 59 Mich. 573, 26 N.W. 771; Wilson v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 87 Mich. 493, 49 N.W. 869, 24 Am.St.Rep. 173; Toms v. Recorder’s Court Judge, 237 Mich. 413, 212 N.W. 69.” 33 N.W.2d at 922.
See also, Bertagnolli Bros. v. Bertagnolli, 23 Wyo. 228, 148 P. 374 (1915) and Kimbel v. Osborn, 61 Wyo. 89, 156 P.2d 279 (1945).

What is an “order of the court”?

It has been said:
“An ‘order of court’ has been defined as one made in open court by a judge of the court who is present at the place designated for the transaction of judicial business and there assumes to transact such business. A ‘judge’s order’ has been defined as one made by a judge at chambers or out of court. Under some statutes the distinction between court orders and judge’s orders has been abolished, at least with respect to certain courts.” (Footnotes omitted.) 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders, § 2(b).
Another definition says:
“An ‘order’ of a court has been defined as the judgment or conlusion [sic] of a court by which affirmative relief is granted or denied on a motion or a special proceeding. The word has been defined at greater length as a decision made during the progress of a cause, either before or after final judgment, settling some point of practice or some question collateral to the main issue presented by the pleadings that must be disposed of before the main issue can be passed on by the court or that must be determined for the purpose of carrying into execution the final judgment. Although ‘order’ has been statutorily defined as being every direction of a court or judge made in writing and not included in a judgment, the word ordinarily connotes not only an order reduced to writing but also any verbal command, direction, order of the court made during the course of a trial.” 56 Am.Jur.2d, Motions, Rules, and Orders § 3 (1971) and the cases cited therein.
Accordingly, courts construing the term “order - of the court” have said that the phrase implies affirmative action by the judge which is specific and limited in its application. Loomans v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 38 Wis.2d 656, 158 N.W.2d *1126318, 321 (1968); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sampley, 108 Ga.App. 617,134 S.E.2d 71, 74 (1963); Puckett v. Swift & Company, Mo.App., 229 S.W.2d 713, 717 (1950). The above authorities make clear that the phrase “order of the court”, as utilized in Rule 59(f), contemplates some affirmative record action by the trial court, in order that a continuance will be said to have been granted.
In State v. Dickson, 53 Wis.2d 532, 193 N.W.2d 17 (1972) the court said:
“In the instant case, there was no order of the court which could have been disobeyed. The record shows that Judge Traeger relied upon the document bearing the caption, ‘Circuit Court Chambers,’ and rubber stamped with the name of the clerk of court. A direction issued by the clerk is not an order of the court in the sense used in legal procedures. Section 269.27, Stats., makes it clear that orders issued ‘out of court’ may be made only by judges or, in the appropriate cases, by court commissioners. Nowhere in the statutory recitation of the powers and duties of a clerk of court is there any grant of power to issue orders over his own signature.
“It is well recognized in Wisconsin that a clerk of court may not exercise any judicial powers. Wisconsin Lumber & Supply Co. v. Dahl (1934), 214 Wis. 137, 252 N.W. 714, held that, in the absence of a specific grant of power, a clerk of court could not authorize the calendaring of cases for trial. The limitations on the powers of a clerk of court were further defined in Pacific Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Irmiger (1949), 254 Wis. 207, 212, 36 N.W.2d 89, 92, wherein we said:
“ ‘... the acts of the clerk of the court are ministerial and clerical, and he may not exercise judicial power except in accordance with the strict language of a statute conferring such power upon him.’ “It is thus apparent that the clerk could not issue a directive having the authority and dignity of a court order and, in fact, in the instant case the clerk attempted no such usurpation of power. It did not purport to be an order ‘by the court.’ It was a mere notice signed by the clerk and carried with it none of the qualities of a properly issued order of a court.” 193 N.W.2d at 22.
In Toulon v. Nagle, 67 Wis.2d 233, 226 N.W.2d 480, 485 the court said:
“On February 11, 1972, the parties were sent a notice by the clerk rescheduling the motions to April 21,1972. The notice did not recite that the extension was by order of the court and it failed to state any cause for the extension. The transcript was completed on March 24, 1972, and Toulon’s motion for judgment on the verdict was made on April 7, 1972, the date originally scheduled. Nagle’s motions were not filed until April 11, 1972. Subsequent extensions were made by the court for cause after April 21, 1972, and are not contested by Toulon.
“Under this sequence of events relating to the extension of time on the filing and determination of motions, the trial court ultimately granted Nagle’s motion for a new trial on the issue of damages with an option to Toulon, pursuant to Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1960), 10 Wis.2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393, but denied the rest of Na-gle’s motions.
“We find the decision of the trial court on the postverdict motions to be persuasive. Unfortunately the record does not show that the extension granted from April 7, 1972, to April 21, 1972, was by order of the court for cause, as required by sec. 270.49, Stats. Loomans v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. (1968), 38 Wis.2d 656, 158 N.W.2d 318; Anderson v. Eggert (1940), 234 Wis. 348, 291 N.W. 365; Beck v. Wallmow (1938), 226 Wis. 652, 277 N.W. 705. We determine, therefore, that the instant order granting a new trial on the issue of damages, with option to accept a lesser amount and denying Nagle’s other motions is ineffective and void. Graf v. Gerber (1965), 26 Wis.2d 72, 76, 131 N.W.2d 863.”
These authorities are representative of the law on the question and stand for the proposition that a clerk of court, absent statute-*1127ry authority, has no power to issue orders over his or her own signature, and a clerk’s directive which requires the exercise of judicial discretion is not an “order of the court” within the contemplation of law.
In certain specific instances the clerk of court in Wyoming has been vested with powers of a judicial nature. For instance, Rule 55, W.R.C.P. authorizes the entry of default judgments by the clerk. However, in the case of Kimbel v. Osborn, supra, we held that the power of the clerk of the court to enter default judgments as provided by statute6 only allows the clerk to enter judgments for fixed sums. We said that the statute does not grant to the clerk any discretionary power and we emphasized that the clerk’s authority is purely ministerial in character. Kimbel v. Osborn, 156 P.2d at 288. We said at p. 287 of that same opinion:
“It is reasonably apparent from the views expressed by the authorities reviewed above that statutes authorizing Clerks to enter judgments in certain cases should be strictly construed and unless the letter of the law is complied with, as regards the power granted, the action of such officials must be treated as void.”
In Bertagnolli Bros. v. Bertagnolli, supra, the clerk entered a default judgment as he was authorized to do by statute. But the judgment was entered at a time when there was a demurrer to the complaint on file and which demurrer had been filed after the statutory time for filing the answer and other papers had expired. Thus the entry of the judgment by the clerk had the effect of overruling the demurrer. This was— said this court — the exercise of a judicial function which was beyond the power of the clerk of the court.
We said:
“The question presented in this case goes to the jurisdiction, for it involves the authority or power of the clerk to act at all, in view of the fact that a demurrer had been filed before judgment was applied for or entered, and remained on file and undisposed of. The question to be determined is this: Did the filing of the demurrer after the time for answer had expired, without leave of court or consent, but before the application for judgment, divest the clerk of the authority conferred by statute to enter the judgment? We think it clear that unless the demurrer was a nullity, the clerk was not authorized to enter a default judgment. Acting ministerially only, he has no power to determine the sufficiency of an answer or other pleading, either as to form or substance, or whether, if filed out of time, it shall be allowed to remain on file. Only the court or judge may determine those questions.
“An objection to a pleading on the ground that it was filed out of time may be waived, and the court in the exercise of a sound discretion may refuse to strike it from the files and consider it as though filed in time. Under section 4456, above quoted, the time for answer may be extended, and section 4418 (Comp.Stat.1910) provides that the court, or a judge thereof in vacation, may, for good cause shown, extend the time for filing any pleading upon such terms as are just. If the plaintiff had moved to strike the demurrer from the files, the court might have overruled the motion and allowed the pleading to stand, which would be conclusive unless excepted to and subsequently set aside. Parker v. Haight, 14 Ohio Cir.Ct. 548; Newsom’s Adm’r v. Ran, 18 Ohio 240; Seymour v. Railway Co., 44 Ohio St. 12, 4 N.E. 236; Lyons v. Fidelity Lodge, 2 Wkly. Law Bui. (Ohio) 97; Hengehold v. Gardner, 4 Wkly. Law Bui. (Ohio) 958; Carver v. Williams, 6 Wkly.Law Bui. (Ohio) 672. The showing necessary or sufficient to prevent the striking from the files of a pleading filed out of time is not involved in the question now being presented and considered; the material point is that the court possesses the power to determine the matter.” 148 P. at 375-376.
*1128I see an analogy between Bertagnolli and the case at bar. In the instant matter — if the rule of Bertagnolli is to be followed — it must be said that the entry of the “Notice of Setting” was not and could not substitute for a court order granting an extension of time within which to decide a motion for a new trial. If that be the case, then, there being no extension, this court has no jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was filed late. To say it another way, if it be argued that the clerk’s “Notice of Setting” constituted an order extending the time within which the motion for new trial could be considered and decided, then — under Bertagnolli — the clerk was without authority to exercise judicial discretion and the entry was a nullity for this purposé.
In Kimbel v. Osborn, supra, we considered this same statute which authorizes the clerk to enter a default judgment. We made the following observation as we harked back to Bertagnolli, supra, 156 P.2d at 283-284:
“So in Bertagnolli Brothers v. Bertagnol-li, 23 Wyo. 228,148 P. 374, 375, decided in 1915 with the law of 1905, supra, before it this Court said with reference to the Clerk’s authority thereunder that:
“ ‘It is generally held, under such a statute, that it directs the judgment to be entered, and that the clerk acts merely in a ministerial capacity; and upon that ground the validity of statutes conferring such authority upon the clerk is upheld. See Utah Ass’n, etc. v. Bowman, 38 Utah 326, 113 P. 63, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 334. The court in the case cited, speaking of this power of the clerk, say: “This duty is imposed by law, and the clerk has no discretionary powers with respect thereto. His act in entering such a judgment is no more judicial or discretionary than his act in entering a judgment upon the verdict of a jury or the finding of the court would be. In either case the law imposes the duty, and in entering the judgment the clerk merely executes what the law requires of him.” Hence it must appear that any judgment so entered by the clerk was within the authority conferred by the statute, or otherwise the judgment will be void.’
“This Court’s especially significant comment in the language quoted last above appears in the last sentence thereof.”
See also: Cheshire v. First Presbyterian Church, 221 N.C. 205, 19 S.E.2d 855 (1942); Kelone v. Kelone, La.App., 209 So.2d 803 (1968). The lesson to be taken from Ber-tagnolli, Kimbel and other cited cases is that even where a clerk of court is vested by statute (or rule) with the power to enter judgments, in doing so the clerk is only acting in a ministerial capacity and cannot extend that power to areas traditionally reserved to the judge of the court by whom the clerk is employed. As we have noted, the judge himself cannot delegate his powers and duties to the clerk of court. 14 C.J.S. Clerks of Court § 35, supra.
Considering these authorities, I am of the opinion that action by a clerk of court in setting a hearing for a motion for new trial cannot amount to an “order of the court” granting an extension under Rule 59(f), if, by chance, the setting places the time for argument past the 60-day limitation. I would hold that in order for the Rule 59(f) extension to be granted, the trial judge is required to take some affirmative action, clear on the record, and to issue an order specifically stating that an extension is granted and that the order must be filed pursuant to § 1-16-301, W.S.1977.7 Under the conditions expressed by Rule 59(f), this order can be issued either by the judge on his own initiative or at the request of the parties. Clearly such a decision is within his discretion, but the decision is of such a nature that the judge cannot delegate the authority to his clerk of court. Rule 59(f) simply does not contemplate any action by any person or authority except the trial judge himself since it is the judge who is charged with ruling on the motion.
*1129I note in passing that we left similar questions open in Murry v. State, Wyo., 631 P.2d 26 (1981). There we noted:
“The record does contain a setting of the motion for a new trial for hearing on December 4, 1980, made by the clerk of court on November 26, 1980. Assuming either or both of these occurrences to be valid (oral granting of continuance by the district judge without a contemporaneous record thereof or granting of a continuance by the clerk of court), * * 631 P.2d at 28,
and expressed doubt as to whether or not an oral pronouncement or setting by the clerk would satisfy the extension provision of Rule 34, W.R.Cr.P.
The appeal on the merits should be dismissed because there is no “order of the court” in the record which grants an extension within which to determine the new-trial motion. The motion was deemed denied within 60 days of the judgment which date was June 26, 1981. Since the notice of appeal was not filed until July 23, 1981, it was not, therefore, filed in accord with Rule 2.01, W.R.A.P., and the untimely filing of a notice of appeal has heretofore been held to be jurisdictional. Murry v. State, supra; State v. Berger, Wyo., 600 P.2d 708 (1979); Snell v. Ruppert, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1042 (1975); Rutledge v. VonFeldt, supra at n.3.
In my judgment, the only issue available for our review concerns the denial of appellant’s Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. motion. I would hold that a review of the briefs precludes discussion of the trial court’s denial of the Rule 60 motion since appellants have failed to cite any cogent authority for their position. For that reason I would not address the issue. Elder v. Jones, Wyo., 608 P.2d 654 (1980); Merritt v. McIntyre and McIntyre Garden Center, Wyo., 613 P.2d 206 (1980).
I would add this caveat: The majority of the court have resolved to decide this case on its merits in spite of what I consider to be a clear jurisdictional defect. This says to me that the majority will dismiss some appeals where the appeal requirements are jurisdictionally defective but, if it suits their fancy, will refuse to dismiss other appeals even though the record reflects a jurisdictional imperfection. This is patently unfair to all of those who have felt the sting of this court’s prior orders of dismissal. For me, the majority’s decision to decide this case on its merits has the effect of discarding our longstanding rule that a late notice of appeal automatically deprives the Wyoming Supreme Court of jurisdiction.
Thus, I regret all of the votes I have cast in the past for the dismissal of appeals upon the grounds that the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure have not been complied with, and I cannot again vote, as I have for nearly eight years, to automatically deny an appellant his right to the appellate processes in this court due to the failure to timely comply with a rule of appellate procedure. I will, hereafter, consider each excuse for a late appellate filing upon its merits — just as the majority has done in this case.

. The operative language of Rule 59(f), W.R. C.P. is:
“Motions for new trial or to alter or amend a judgment; time limit. — Motions for new trial and motions to alter or amend a judgment shall be determined within sixty (60) days after the entry of the judgment, and if not so determined shall be deemed denied, unless within such sixty (60) days the determination is continued by order of the court but a continuance shall not extend the time to a day more than 90 days from the date of entry of judgment.” (Emphasis added.)

. The record reflects the following Notice of Setting entry by the clerk of court:
“PURSUANT TO ORDER made upon The Court’s own Motion in the above case, notice is hereby given that Monday the 29 day of June 1981 at 5:30 P.M. has been set for Hearing of all of Defendants’ Motions, * * *.”

. We said in Rutledge v. VonFeldt, Wyo., 564 P.2d 350 at 351-352:
“Without a timely notice of appeal from the judgment, we are without jurisdiction. Jackson v. State, Wyo., 547 P.2d 1203; Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Vannelli, Wyo., 370 P.2d 738; Spencer v. Pringle, 51 Wyo. 352, 67 P.2d 204; Fertile Valley Canal Co. v. Kearney, 37 Wyo. 475, 263 P. 620; Culbertson v. Ainsworth, 26 Wyo. 214, 181 P. 418; Hahn v. Citizens’ State Bank, 25 Wyo. 467, 171 P. 889, reh. den. 25 Wyo. 467, 172 P.2d 705; Financial Management Corp. v. Wyoming Electric Sign Co., supra; Bosler v. Morad, Wyo., 555 P.2d 567; Bard Ranch Inc. v. Weber, Wyo., 538 P.2d 24, reh. den., Matter of Final Proofs of Appropriation of Following Water Rights, Wyo., 541 P.2d 791; and Bowman v. Worland School Dist., Wyo., 531 P.2d 889.
“Even though these jurisdictional deficiencies were not called to our attention by the parties, it was, nevertheless, our unhappy obligation to call them up ourselves. Jackson v. State, supra, and authorities therein contained.”

. The Rule 60(b) issue is before us since an order on this motion is final and appealable. However, Rule 60(b) motions do not extend the time limit for appeal, and appellants are thereby precluded from attacking the underlying judgment. Thus, any issues involving the merits of this case were not preserved for our review by reason of the 60(b) motion. See: McBride v. McBride, Wyo., 598 P.2d 814 (1979); Kennedy v. Kennedy, Wyo., 483 P.2d 516 (1971).

. It is important to note that the cases above dealt with Rule 59 or its progeny, when the rule provided not only that an extension could be granted by order of the court, but also by stipulation of the parties. Under the present Rule 59 structure, an extension can only be granted by order of the court. (Amendment, April 12, 1978.)

. Kimbel v. Osborn, supra, dealt with construction of W.R.S. § 89-1207 (1931) which was later superseded by the adoption of Rule 55, W.R.C.P. See: Rule 87, W.R.C.P.

. § 1-16-301 provides in pertinent part:
“All judgments and orders must be entered in the journal of the court and specify clearly the relief granted or order made in the action.