Court Opinion

ID: 9560996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:00:52.831767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:28.156563
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       AUG 21 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CALVERT A. WILLIAMSON,                          No.    22-16618

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:21-cv-00098-JMS-RT

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF HAWAII; DAVID Y. IGE,
Governor; PUBLIC SAFETY
DEPARTMENT; MICHAEL HOFFMAN;
FRANCIS SEQUEIRA; LANCE
RABACAL; CESAR ALTARES; DANIEL
BRYANT,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Hawaii
                  J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted August 15, 2023**

Before:      TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

      Calvert A. Williamson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his action alleging racial discrimination. We have jurisdiction under

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090

(9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

      The district court properly granted summary judgment on Williamson’s

hostile work environment claim because Williamson failed to raise a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether the work environment was sufficiently severe

or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of Williamson’s employment. See

Christian v. Umpqua Bank, 984 F.3d 801, 809 (9th Cir. 2020) (in analyzing a

hostile work environment claim, courts consider “all the circumstances, including

the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance” (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Not

every insult or harassing comment will constitute a hostile work environment.”).

      The district court properly granted summary judgment on Williamson’s due

process and equal protection claims because Williamson failed to raise a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether he was deprived of a constitutionally

protected liberty or property interest, or whether defendants acted with an intent or

purpose to discriminate based upon race. See Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021,

1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show

                                          2                                    22-16618
that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the

plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir.

2000) (explaining that where the Equal Protection Clause covers the actions

challenged in the complaint, a plaintiff may not proceed on a substantive due

process theory); Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir.

1993) (reciting elements of procedural due process claim).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Williamson’s state law claims. See Ove v. Gwinn,

264 F.3d 817, 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review; “[a] court

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims

once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williamson leave to

amend his complaint where he requested such relief after summary judgment had

been entered. See Nguyen v. United States, 792 F.2d 1500, 1503 (9th Cir. 1986)

(stating that a court “ordinarily will be reluctant to allow leave to amend to a party

against whom summary judgment has been entered” (citation omitted)).

      We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

                                          3                                       22-16618
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      Appellees’ motion to supplement record on appeal (Docket Entry No. 11) is

granted.

      AFFIRMED.

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