Court Opinion

ID: 9458067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:41:59.66529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:37.584110
License: Public Domain

ELY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. Not only do I find the majority’s conclusion unacceptable, I am also disturbed over the reasoning by which that conclusion is reached.
The Supreme Court has long struggled to define the power of the police to search vehicles. See, e. g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).1 In its attempt, the Court has always undertaken to balance the interests of the police with those of the drivers whose automobiles are searched. As I read the majority opinion, it does not meet our Fourth Amendment problem with engagement into the balancing process required of us. Consequently, I submit that it sanctions a practice that circumvents the Supreme Court’s decisions and unnecessarily upsets the desired balance. In carefully articulating those rules which limit the scope of vehicle searches, the Supreme Court has, I think, endeavored to reconcile the legitimate interests of society as a whole with the justified interest of a driver in the security and privacy of his automobile. In Preston, supra, for example, the post-impoundment exploratory search of a vehicle, in which four vagrancy suspects had been arrested, was held unconstitutional. The court wrote:
“We think that the search was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest and conclude, therefore, that the search of the car without a warrant failed to meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, rendering the evidence obtained as a result of the search inadmissible.”2
376 U.S. at 368, 84 S.Ct. 881, 884, 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 781. There are marked similarities between Preston and the case at hand. I can discern only one significant difference. That is that, here, there is the effort to justify the search on grounds that apparently were not urged in Preston.3 I do not underestimate the *965importance of this distinction. In a close case, resolving the question of whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment does indeed require that we “focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of private citizens.” Ca-mara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1734, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 939 (1968). In applying the appropriate test, I have concluded that in our case my Brothers have not correctly “balance [d] the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.” Id. at 536-537, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 940.
While I can see the validity of some of those interests claimed to support careful so-called “inventory searches,” I can also see that those interests are put forth with overbreadth.4 If our attention is directed only to those interests, however valid, then we are led to the point where the interests may be held to justify too much. They could be viewed so as to support intrusions into a vehicle whenever it is taken into custody and regardless of the means by which the police acquired its control, the extent of the time period for which it is to be retained, and also, of course, the desires of the owner. Since any part of a vehicle, as well as any item within it, may, at any time, be stolen, lost, or damaged, the police have an interest in conducting an extensive inventory of a vehicle’s contents. If this interest is deemed paramount, then it follows that any inventory search is constitutionally permissible.5 Surely it cannot be that such a simplistic conclusion is valid. See Preston, supra; cf. United States v. Thweatt, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 433 F.2d 1226, 1231 (1970). To the extent that such inventories are allowed, the privacy of drivers is sacrificed. Rights are accorded to the police while, at the same time, more fundamental rights are withdrawn from others. Governmental interests, vis-a-vis those of our citizens, are not necessarily supreme. See Camara, supra. A delicate balance between conflicting public and private interests must be achieved, 387 U.S. at 536-537, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 940 (1968).
My Brothers attempt reconciliation by drawing a distinction based upon the extent of the search. As I see it, this effort is a waste, since decisions based upon that kind of compromise do not reflect the considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment problems. Necessarily, they can be based upon “little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040-2041, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694-695 (1969). I cannot accept a principle which, for example, might permit a search beneath a vehicle’s front seat or within its glove compartment but might vitiate the search of a closed handbag or suitcase found in the automobile. Yet, that is the uncertain principle which derives from the “subjective view.” Compare United States v. Fuller, 277 F.Supp. 97 (D.D.C.1967), conviction affirmed, sentence vacated, case remanded for resentencing, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 433 F.2d 533 (1970) and United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1971) with Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.2d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal.Rptr. 412 *966(1971). “Under such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection[s] . . . approach the evaporation point.”6 Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at 765, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2041, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 695 (1969). A principle which depends for its application upon the “subjective view” can afford, even at its best, only partial protection for both the police and those whose privacy is violated. There should be, and I think there is, a solution that is more satisfactorily accommodating to both the police and the owners of seized vehicles. This is to permit extensive inventory searches of seized vehicles, so as fully to protect the police, but to forbid, over the objection of one having standing, the use of any item seized in the search as evidence against the objector, assuming, of course, that the evidence would not otherwise be admissible under Fourth Amendment principles. The adoption of such a rule, which has already gained some support,7 would, I believe, work an effective compromise between significantly conflicting interests and most nearly effectuate the delicate and even balance for which we are supposed to strive. Moreover, such a rule would appear to comport with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that “evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 901 (1968). While inventory searches of vehicles may be necessary for the full protection of the police who have seized such vehicles, they entail invasions no less intrusive than those which might be made pursuant to an illegal warrant. To permit them undermines sound Fourth Amendment principles. Hence, I cannot believe that all evidence uncovered in such searches should be admissible.8 The California Supreme Court, recently described in United States Law Week, as “Long a leader” (40 U.S.L.W. 1129), appears to believe that the concept of inventory searches is abhorrent. See Mozzetti v. Superior Court, supra. See also People v. Miller, Cal., 496 P.2d 1228, 101 Cal.Rptr. 860 (1972). I can uphold them, but I believe that they can comport with Fourth Amendment guarantees only insofar as they cannot be employed to aid in the prosecution of one whose right to privacy has, by the search, been infringed.
I also reject (1) the majority’s resolution of the issue of reasonableness and (2) the majority’s suggestion that the impounding officer might not have been engaged in a search.
I do not dispute the validity of the procedures which led to the discovery of the watches. In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968), extensively quoted by the majority, the Supreme Court conclusively held that property found in plain view by a police officer securing an impounded vehicle may constitutionally be seized. Here, the majority at*967tempts to rely upon the valid seizure of the watches as the basis for the subsequent search of the sample case by characterizing that search as “reasonable steps taken to secure valuable property in plain view.”9 I do not think the “plain view” doctrine can be, or should be, so applied as to bootstrap the police from “one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 (1971) (Stewart, J.).10
I turn to the majority’s suggestion that “reasonable measures taken to protect . . . personal property in plain sight within [an impounded vehicle] are not a search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.”11 I do not dispute the accuracy of this proposition in the abstract, for in some cases, it is probably correct [E. g., where mere removal of property from the vehicle reveals the incriminating evidence.]. I do, however, strongly disagree with the majority’s implication that such a principle is applicable here. The majority incorrectly interprets Harris. That case did not involve protective measures which unnecessarily intruded upon Harris’ privacy and might have been characterized as a search. Furthermore, the Court reserved judgment on the “admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the police regulation” at issue. 390 U.S. at 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L. Ed.2d 1067, 1069-1070 (1968). Hence, that case indicates nothing about whether unnecessary intrusions, however reasonable they might be if judged on the basis of their convenience to the police, entail a search under relevant Fourth Amendment criteria. Moreover, since the search in our case extended beyond the “plain view” of anyone, that there was a search should be the inevitable conclusion. In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme Court rejected a circumscribed, semantic approach to the definition of “search” and “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. “In our view, the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis of reasonableness. [Citations].” 392 U.S. at 18 n. 15, 88 S.Ct. 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 904 (1968).12 Undertaking to draw fine distinctions between “searches” and “inventories” and “reasonable measures taken to protect property in plain sight” serves, in this case, only to divert attention from the critical inquiry which, under Fourth Amendment principles, should be conducted. See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1971).13
I would affirm.

. Our court has not ignored these decisions in the past. See Barrentine v. United States, 434 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1970).

. Cases such as Cooper, supra, and Gar-roll, supra, in which some police conduct was held constitutionally permissible are not inconsistent with this result. They merely reflect the delicate balancing that is required. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-537, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1734-1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 940 (1967).

. The same limited distinction differentiates this case from our prior decision in Barrentine, supra.
The state does not contend that the search of Mitchell’s car is justifiable as a search incident to arrest — such an argument would be readily dismissed upon the authority of Preston. Nor does the state argue that there was either probable cause to believe that Mitchell’s car contained contraband or evidence of crime or that consent to the search had been given. Neither contention could be supported by the record. See Barrentine, supra.
In this connection I note the majority’s reference to Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), and to Heffley v. Hocker, 420 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1969), vacated, sub nom. Hocker v. Heffley, 399 U.S. 521, 90 S.Ct. 2236, 26 L.Ed.2d 780, reversed on remand 429 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1970). Those cases are wholly inapposite here. They sanction searches of impounded vehicles only where, at the time a vehicle is seized, there is probable cause to search it for contraband or evidence of crime. There is no indication here that prior to their search the police had any suspicions regarding the contents of Mitchell’s automobile.

. The Supreme Court has never fully considered the constitutional significance of these purposes for, police searches. However, in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 60, 87 S.Ct. 788, 790, 17 L.Ed.2d 730, 732 (967), the Court commented on the meaning of its decision in Preston. It wrote, “[t]he search was therefore to be treated as though the car was in his own or his agent’s possession, safe from intrusions by the police. . . .”

. The possible relevance of the views expressed in this opinion to all property seized through inventory searches is obvious. I do not, however, express any view about the validity of inventory searches of things other than vehicles. Other purposes may justify searches in those situations. See, e. g., Westover v. United States, 394 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1968).

. The situation here is different than that analyzed by the Supreme Court in Chimel or Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Those cases involved circumstances fully amenable to a decision determining reasonableness upon the basis of the search because the legitimate objectives of the police could be fully protected by the allowance of a limited search. Here, in contrast, a search limited in its scope would not wholly fulfill the purposes of the intrusion. The police interests can be met only by an intensive search, revealing all of the property which might be stolen, lost, or damaged. Obviously, such an extensive intrusion completely deprives the property owner of his right to the privacy of his property.

. See Mayfield v. United States, 276 A.2d 123 (D.C.C.A.1971); Stroud, The Inventory Search and the Fourth Amendment, 4 Ind.Leg.Forum 471, 479-486 (1971).

. In Terry, the Supreme Court discussed, at length, the limitations of the exclusionary rule as a tool of judicial control over police conduct. 392 U.S. at 13-15, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Nothing therein convinces me that the rule should not be applied in this unique context.

. In adopting this reasoning, the majority may reach the correct result, but its reasoning is faulty. If the result is correct, that is because, if one permits inventories at all, looking into the opened sample case was reasonable. The intrusion was slight, there was a high degree of probability that it contained property of some value, and its location in the automobile made it a ready target for theft. The need to search would therefore permit further examination of the case. The reasoning is faulty because the majority’s approach to the search of the case is not based upon consideration of principles relevant to the Fourth Amendment, such as the need to search and the extent of the intrusion. Rather, it is based upon a determination that it was convenient for the police to place the watches in the case, a factor I deem irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment.

. The district judge expressly found that the pistol was not in plain view.

. The majority also writes, “[h]ere, there was arguably no search.”

. The Court’s recent decision in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971), does not disturb this analysis as it is applied here. See generally People v. Mozzetti, 4 Cal.2d 699, 711-712, 484 P.2d 84, 92, 91 Cal.Rptr. 412, 420 (1971).

. The Mozzetti decision is favorably reviewed in 40 Fordham L.Rev. 679 (1971).