Court Opinion

ID: 9676768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:32:36.395503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:51.072755
License: Public Domain

WEDEMEYER, P.J.
¶ 108. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). I, respectfully dissent in part for reasons procedural, substantive and fundamental from the lead opinion reversing the jury. I concur with the lead opinion's conclusion that Mackenzie failed to provide any evidence of improper conduct that would constitute tortious interference with his prospective contract with Miller and, even if he had, Smith's conduct was privileged as a matter of law. I also concur with paragraph 8 of the lead opinion, wherein we affirm the partial summary judgment dismissal of *75Mackenzie's claim based on wrongful termination. Now, I set forth my reasons for dissenting.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Intentional Misrepresentation Claim.

¶ 109. I first address the procedural aspect of my dissent. When reviewing a sufficiency of evidence issue post-verdict, we shall not reverse a trial court's decision on the issue unless the court is clearly wrong in assessing the evidence. A trial court is "clearly wrong" when there is no credible evidence supporting the jury's finding or in overturning a jury verdict which is supported by any credible evidence. See Weiss v. United Fire & Cas., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 389-90, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995). Deference to the jury's verdict is even greater when it has been approved by the trial court, which is the procedural posture in which we find this appeal. See Staehler v. Beuthin, 206 Wis. 2d 610, 617, 557 N.W.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1996). When applying this standard, we focus on the record evidence and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, not on arguments of counsel or their briefs, as helpful as these items may be. We now apply this standard of review to the record.
¶ 110. Among the many issues raised on this appeal and cross-appeal, Miller and Smith contend that the evidence is insufficient to prove any of the essential elements of intentional misrepresentation.1 The lead opinion agrees with this contention. Therefore, a review of the basis for the lead opinion, as compared to the content of the total record, is in order. *76Whether there is support in the record for the jury's verdict, finding that intentional misrepresentation occurred, will depend, in large part, on the existence of any credible evidence to support reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict.
¶ 111. The lead opinion proffers four reasons to support its conclusion that there was no false representation of fact: (1) the record provides absolutely no evidence that Mackenzie's position was downgraded in 1987; (2) an admission by Smith to Mackenzie in 1992 that Glickert's hiring by Miller, the subsequent transfer of personnel from his supervision to Glickert, and the assumption of some of Mackenzie's former responsibilities caused his downgrading, was an ambiguous statement; (3) Mackenzie's grade-level status was unaffected by the reorganization; and (4) Mackenzie's belief that his position may have been downgraded due to altered responsibilities by the reorganization in 1987, does not constitute "any" evidence that Smith lied to him in 1987 or concealed anything from him in 1989. Each posited basis will be addressed in turn.
¶ 112. The first basis for the lead opinion is the absence of any evidence that Mackenzie's employment position was downgraded in 1987. Among the instructions given to the jury was the definition of the evidence that they could consider. It consisted of the testimony of the witnesses given in court, both on direct and cross-examination, deposition testimony presented during trial, and exhibits received in the trial record. The court also instructed the jury that it was not necessary that every fact in this trial be proved directly by a witness or an exhibit. A fact may be proved indirectly by other facts or circumstances from which it usually and reasonably follows according to human experience. We can presume the jury followed *77these instructions. In question one of the verdict, the jury was asked to answer, "Did Robert L. Smith make a representation of fact at any time, that Jerold J. Mackenzie's grade level was not affected by the 1987 reorganization?" The inquiry was open-ended timewise; i.e., did Smith at any time represent a fact that Mackenzie's grade level was not affected by the 1987 reorganization.
¶ 113. The lead opinion claims that the only evidence which suggests that Smith's response was false was Smith's answer to a written interrogatory cited during trial wherein Smith stated that he informed Mackenzie that his position had been grandfathered, implying that the downgrading had actually occurred in 1987. At trial, however, Smith claimed that he was mistaken in his dates and the date should have been 1989, which is when the grandfathering issue came into play. In the lead opinion's view, this corrected the discrepancy. Maybe. Maybe not.
¶ 114. The jury heard from Mackenzie that, in 1987, Smith stopped by Mackenzie's office to inform him that Glickert had been hired and what his responsibilities would be. This reorganizational development concerned Mackenzie and he asked Smith: "Does that affect my grade level? It's half my area. Is this going to get me downgraded?" Mackenzie testified that Smith responded:
[I]t's not going to affect you at all. Don't worry about it. . .. you're very important to the company. You're making a good contribution. I really want you to help Mr. Glickert learn the Miller ways, to get comfortable at Miller. You know the ropes. They're a little different over at Budweiser probably, so I want you to spend some time with him and help him.... quite frankly . .. there's a lot of things that *78[need to] be done in distributor services and you haven't had the attention or the time to focus on that. So you'll have time to focus on that now.
¶ 115. Smith had no specific recollection of the 1987 meeting, but presumed he would have met with Mackenzie and explained to him the impact of the reorganization. There is more in the record than a mere implication as suggested by the lead opinion. Under cross-examination, Smith responded to the following questions:
Q Did you have more than one meeting or discussion with Mr. Mackenzie regarding the fact that he had been grandfathered?
I know we talked about the period of time around '87.
But now we're up to 92. Do you recall more than one meeting with Mr. Mackenzie regarding grandfather status?
And your answer was, I don't recall a specific meeting or meeting dates.
Question: Do you recall more than one meeting?
Answer: Again, if I spoke to him, at this point in time, I'm presuming it was likely I spoke to him back in 1987, at the time of that organization change. In both instances my practice would be to tell him the impact on his Grade Level.
Contrary to the lead opinion's contention, there is additional testimony in the record to place at issue precisely what occurred in 1987 or in 1992. It was then for the jury to decide who should be believed and whose testimony should be accorded more probative value. The *79jury's verdict supplies the answer. There is a reasonable basis in the record for the answer.
¶ 116. The second basis for the lead opinion's conclusion that there was a lack of proof is its belief that an admission by Smith to Mackenzie in 1992 that Glickert's hiring by Miller, and the sequential transfer of personnel from his supervision to Glickert's, and the assumption of some of Mackenzie's former responsibilities caused his downgrading, was an ambiguous statement. The relevant testimony which Mackenzie argues supports his claim, but which the majority debunks, reads:
A Mr. Smith told me that this [downgrading] was due to when Mr. Glickert came in to his area, and they transferred a large number of my people to his responsibility. That that caused my rating to downgraded.
Q And that would have been what year?
A 1987.
¶ 117. The lead opinion totally discounts this testimony maintaining that the word "that" is ambiguous because it could either refer to 1987 and to when the downgrading occurred or, to when Glickert came into Smith's area bringing about the reorganization that led to the downgrading in 1989. Assuming ambiguity, the lead opinion then concludes that the latter reading is the most logical and supported by the evidence. If one assumes the testimony was ambiguous, the majority committed procedural error by arrogating to itself the role of the finder of fact, here the jury. Once "ambiguity" is present, if at all, it is the task of the jury to determine which inference it deems appropriate to draw from the testimony presented. See RTE Corp. v. *80Maryland Cas. Co., 74 Wis. 2d 614, 621, 247 N.W.2d 171 (1976).
¶ 118. The third basis for the lead opinion's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient is the fact that, although the position that Mackenzie occupied was downgraded to level 13, he retained all the benefits of level 14. This conclusion is not entirely correct, and is misleading as borne out by the record. The testimony clearly reflects that Mackenzie made no secret about his career goal at Miller. Pure and simple, he aspired to be a management director. He had slowly but consistently progressed to a grade level 14 employee. He was one level below his goal.2 Directors were level 15 and above. A level 14 employee was entitled to the pay range of the status, executive dining privileges, first-class air travel, and eligibility for stock options in the parent company, Philip Morris. Even though the grandfathering practice permitted Mackenzie to retain his salary and most perks when Smith approved the level 13 downgrade, Mackenzie was removed from the grade level which, in the natural progression of events, would have allowed him to achieve a directorship. No individual who had ever been downgraded from a level 14 or higher had ever returned to his or her original grade. On August 17, 1992, Mackenzie was informed by an inter-office correspondence that "you were reclassified and 'grandfathered' at the grade level 14 in a job evaluated at grade level 13 due to an organizational realignment and/or restructuring." The same day, Mackenzie spoke to his supervisor, Zielinski, about the *81content of the letter. The questions and answers during Zielinski's testimony at trial reveal the following:
Q Did not Jerry Mackenzie then come and talk to you and was very upset about learning the information that was contained in the letter ...?
A Yes, he was.
Q Sure. Because one of the things Mr. Mackenzie told you, when he said he was really upset, was that — ... Mackenzie said to you was he was upset about being grandfathered, that the goal he had established for himself as director was now farther apart than he realized ... and that he felt he was not aware that he had been grandfathered, and that an opportunity to perhaps make a choice in his career earlier had not been allowed to him. That's what he told you.
A Those are the sentiments he expressed, yes.
Q He told you that he lost an opportunity to make a choice in his career because it had not been allowed to him since he didn't know about it, right?
A Yes.
Q He told you that he was now farther away from his goal of being a director because now his position was a 13.
A Correct.
Q And that nobody had told him he had been grandfathered.
A Yes.
*82¶ 119. On August 19, 1992, Smith summoned Mackenzie to his office to explain the notice Mackenzie had received on August 17,1992. Smith informed Mackenzie that effective January 1, 1993, he would no longer be grandfathered. It is for this reason that the jury heard the following testimony from Mackenzie:
Q Now, in 1987 you testified that you approached Mr. Smith about how the Glickert coming was going to affect you.
A Yes, I did.
Q Had you been told that your position was going to be reevaluated, just reevaluated for a determination of an appropriate Grade Level, what would you have done if you had been told that?
A I would have looked at my options for employment someplace else.
Q Why?
A Because if they were going to downgrade me in my position, that's a demotion. And I wouldn't be in the front running, or in the running really at all for a promotion, so I would be — I would be stuck where I was. I would be sealed off. So I would look somewhere else to be able to get my career back on track.
¶ 120. Thus, the jury had before it evidence of the total effect of his job reclassification, not just the narrow view as portrayed by the lead opinion of the same pay and perks. From this evidence, it is not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that the job classification position Mackenzie occupied had, in fact, been downgraded, even though he retained some of the advantages of the previous level position.
*83¶ 121. Lastly, the lead opinion concludes that Mackenzie's belief that his position may have been downgraded due to altered responsibilities by the reorganization in 1987, does not constitute "any" evidence that Smith lied to him in 1987 or concealed anything from him in 1989.1 disagree.
¶ 122. Mackenzie presented his evidence of intentional misrepresentation to the jury. Whether he expressed what happened to him and the sequence of events in terms of a "belief' or otherwise is not relevant. The judgment of the jury on the misrepresentation claim, to a large extent, depended upon how the jury assessed Mackenzie's or Smith's credibility, and their respective versions of what happened between 1987 and 1992. The essence of Mackenzie's misrepresentation claim can be encapsulated in his testimony about his meeting with Smith in August 1992, after he had been informed about his status:
A I learned that what I had believed back in 1987, that I was not going to be affected, and for all of that time up until 1992 that I'd been betrayed, I'd been lied to.
A Because he told me it would not affect me. It would not affect your Grade Level. It's not going to affect you, Jerry, you're making a contribution, don't worry. He's my boss. He's a vice-president.
¶ 123. Smith, on the other hand, on cross-examination, displayed a very elusive memory. Although Mackenzie was one of only five managers who reported directly to Smith, and whose work product reflected upon Smith's own performance evaluation, Smith *84could not remember the number or content of meetings that related, by his own admission, to matters of vital personal concern to one of his managers. In addition, he found himself caught in a contradiction as to what he earlier admitted telling Mackenzie but, at trial, he backtracked and claimed he was in error. Mackenzie claimed that in 1989 he was never told about his reclassification, and did not learn about it until August 17, 1992.
¶ 124. Smith, although he could not remember the specifics of any meeting with Mackenzie, nevertheless insisted that Mackenzie was in error in claiming he had never been informed in 1989. The first question on the verdict that the jury had to answer was not time-specific as to when a misrepresentation of fact may have occurred. Because the jury was instructed that it need not ignore matters of its common knowledge and its observations and experiences in the affairs of life under the evidence, the affirmative answer to the first question is readily understandable. The second question whether the "representation was untrue" was a credibility call. From the above recitation, it was not unreasonable if the jury did not believe Smith and chose rather to draw inferences from the record that reasonably could be drawn; i.e., that Mackenzie's account of what happened was more acceptable than that of Smith. Smith's statement to Mackenzie in 1987 "it's [the reorganization] not going to affect you at all" has a broad sweep to it and is all encompassing. Even the lead opinion admits that Mackenzie's responsibilities were affected when Glickert was hired. It is not too attenuated to reasonably infer that reduced responsibilities shall call for reevaluation, reclassification and downgrading. Further, the jury heard testimony from both the chief executive officer of Miller, John MacDon-*85ough, and Mackenzie's last immediate supervisor, Zielinski, that Mackenzie should have been told about the downgrading.3 There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury determination.
¶ 125. The lead opinion concludes that, even if Smith misinformed Mackenzie in 1987 or failed to inform him in 1989, no evidence was offered that Smith did so in an effort to induce him to continue his employment with Miller. According to the lead opinion, Mackenzie maintains that the jury could draw the common sense conclusion that a demotion would prompt a reasonable person in his position to look for work elsewhere, and that Smith was concerned about losing well-qualified individuals, thereby supplying the reasonably inferred motivation for intent to deceive for work continuation.
*86¶ 126. Mackenzie was extremely skilled in applying computer technology to the sales marketing and distribution of Miller products. He conceived of and created a computerized mapping project for distributors. He co-developed a project called "AIMS" that involved the use of hand-held computers to conduct market surveys of Miller distributors. His work on this project was the basis for being nominated to receive the prestigious Chairman of the Board of Philip Morris award. The long hours he devoted to his assignments were well-noted.
¶ 127. In annual evaluations from 1982 to 1990, he was rated "exceeds performance." His job performance enhanced Smith's performance evaluation. Even after his employment had been terminated, he was retained as a consultant, and Miller refused to allow him to work for a Canadian competitor. As mentioned earlier, Smith considered Mackenzie a very important contributor to the brewery. With all of this evidence before it, plus Smith's questionable performance as a credible witness, it is not unreasonable for the jury to infer the existence of the intent to deceive.
¶ 128. The lead opinion also sets forth three circumstances to demonstrate contradictions in Mackenzie's claim that the misrepresentation was made with intent to deceive. I quibble not with this analysis. But again, the error of the lead opinion's way is stepping into the shoes of the finder of fact. It was for the jury to resolve any apparent contradictions. It did so. An appeals court ought not retry the evidence, as I believe the lead opinion has done. See Holz v. Busy Bees Contracting, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 598, 600, 589 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1998). The author of the lead opinion writes that Mackenzie offered no evidence that he relied to his detriment on any misrepresentation. Ear*87lier in this dissent, there is set forth excerpts of the evidence demonstrating what Smith told Mackenzie after he specifically asked what impact Glickert's arrival and the reorganization would have on his status. "It's not going to affect you at all. Don't worry about it," responded Smith. Smith tells him he is important to the company. He is making a contribution. Smith was his boss, and a vice-president. What more does a person need, in order to reasonably rely, other than the affirmative assurances of his vice-president. With these words of comfort, Mackenzie did not act unreasonably when other people under him were being reclassified because he had been given the assurances of his boss: "Don't worry!" As observed by the trial court, Mackenzie was "lulled" into believing he was on an upward mobility tract. Mackenzie's executive search expert supplied evidence regarding the effect the passage of five years had on his marketability. Even his last immediate supervisor, Zielinski, was not aware that the position Mackenzie occupied had been downgraded until 1992.
¶ 129. The lead opinion concludes that Mackenzie offered "nothing" to prove misrepresentation damages. Mackenzie, on the other hand, argues that, based upon the evidence, the jury reasonably could have decided: (1) being downgraded was the "kiss of death" at Miller for promotion purposes; (2) had he truly known he was downgraded, he would have had the opportunity to pursue his upward career with another company, and would have earned upward to $6,000,000 until retirement age; and (3) he lost that opportunity because of his age at the time he was finally told the truth.
¶ 130. Mackenzie presented evidence that he was not told the truth about his employment status *88from 1987 through August 1992. There is evidence in the record that had he been told the truth about information he specifically requested from Smith, he would have known his future advancement was foreclosed and he would have sought other opportunities. There is evidence in the record that no one who had been downgraded at Miller ever returned to, or was promoted beyond, his or her original grade. There is evidence that Mackenzie was unable to secure employment, even though he hired an executive recruiter and was searching for a job. There is evidence as to what his salary and benefits would be at levels 13, 14 and 17. There is expert testimony that, based upon his age range between the years 1987-1992 and his executive level, his job marketability was imperiled by not being able to pursue other career opportunities, and that he suffered a complete earning capacity loss which would not have occurred had he been told the truth. Contrary to the lead opinion's efforts to recast the evidence, there is more than enough evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that had Mackenzie been given a truthful answer to his inquiry in light of his superior's knowledge of his career goals, he would have sought employment elsewhere and would have earned the equivalent compensation, testified to by experts, that he would reasonably have earned at Miller had he stayed until retirement.

B. Substantive Claim: Whether an Intentional Misrepresentation Claim Exists.

¶ 131. I now address the substantive reasons for my dissent. The lead opinion concludes that the Tatge case "precludes an employee's tort claim against an employer for alleged intentional misrepresentation that allegedly induced continuation of employment." *89Relying on public policy, the lead opinion also concludes that no duty to disclose was required here. I disagree with both conclusions.
¶ 132. In essence, the author of the lead opinion writes that Miller had no independent duty to refrain from engaging in intentional misrepresentation. I cannot agree. Tatge addressed a negligent misrepresentation claim that was inextricably tied to termination. Tatge did not go so far as to abolish the tort of intentional misrepresentation for an employee. Tatge was not an intentional misrepresentation case. Rather, it is a very narrow decision declaring that a breach of contract case was not actionable in tort. It should not be interpreted to preclude a continuation of employment claim based on intentional misrepresentation, such as was presented here. Contrary to the lead opinion's rationale as to how Mackenzie tried and argued the case, it did not relate to a misrepresentation made with respect to his termination. There is no inextricable tie between the intentional misrepresentation and the performance of the contract. Mackenzie did not have to establish a duty independent of the performance of the contract because his claim did not relate to misrepresentations made with respect to his termination. See Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 10 Wis. 2d 716, 723, 329 N.W.2d 411 (1983). The misrepresentations he complains about related to inducing him to continue his employment. Tatge does not specifically address this issue, nor can I conclude we should read Tatge to preclude this type of claim. In fact, the lead opinion admits and cites cases across the country that support Mackenzie's claim. See Majority at ¶¶ 30-31 & n.6. For example, New York "has long held that an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, independently pleaded, can constitute a cause of action which *90may be pleaded in addition to, or as an alternative to, an action for breach of contract." Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 21, 22 (S.D. N.Y. 1980).
¶ 133. These cases have recognized that an employer who lies to an employee to induce the employee to continue with the company cannot escape the liability that may be associated with intentional deceit. Cases dealing with the unilateral volunteering of corporate strategy and insider information are distinct from affirmatively being untruthful about the answer to a specific request. This case is not about a duty to disclose. It is about the absolute duty not to lie!4 It may, however, entail a duty to disclose facts upon which the requester may rely, after a specific request is made. See Wis JI-Civil 2401 ("A duty to speak may arise when information is asked for."). Having concluded that Tatge does not bar the claim presented here, I also am persuaded by the reasoning espoused in several of the cases the majority dismisses. For example, in Marketing West, Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher, Corp., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (Ct. App. 1992), the court reiterated that when a employer decides to speak," 'either voluntarily or in response to inquiries, he is bound not only to state truly what he tells but also not to suppress or conceal any facts within his knowledge which materially qualify those stated. If he speaks at all he must *91make a full and fair disclosure.'" Id. at 865 (citation omitted).
¶ 134. It is undisputed that under Wisconsin case law Smith and Miller can be found liable for intentional misrepresentation to indm~ one to work. How then can we conclude that the sanction disappears when the employee steps over the doorstep of the workplace? There is no legal basis to support this position. The cases supporting Mackenzie's claim recognize that fraudulent inducement to continue employment "is separate from a claim based on termination of employment which is not available to at-will employees." Franz v. Iolab, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1537, 1542 (E.D. La. 1992). Although the at-will employment doctrine adhered to in this state permits employers to dismiss employees for any reason, this doctrine does not, and cannot, permit an employer to lie and deceive an employee to continue employment. The at-will employment doctrine does not bar a claim for intentional misrepresentation against an employer. See Offshore Petroleum Divers, Inc. v. Cromp, 952 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). Here, Smith knew Mackenzie's career goals and, when specifically questioned as to whether the reorganization would affect him (Mackenzie), Smith affirmatively represented that it would not.
¶ 135. The appellants and the lead opinion fail to address the question that goes to the heart of the employer-employee relationship and its stability: does the employer have a right to do a wrong? They cite no cases that allow an employer to engage in intentional misrepresentation with impunity. This case involved a fact-specific request, not a request to divulge every detail of the boardroom. An employer can withhold any information it wants as long as it is not done fraudulently. When Mackenzie questioned Smith, Smith *92could have refused to answer. Once Smith spoke, he assumed the duty to speak truthfully. As the WELA brief succinctly points out, there is no basis in law, equity or public policy for this court to endorse the granting of employers the license to lie. Without exception, employees are expected to be honest in their work performance and there is no reason that a different standard should only apply to employers. Truthfulness and integrity in an employee-employer relationship form a foundation that allow all to thrive.
¶ 136. Here, the jury found that Mackenzie proved the elements of intentional misrepresentation: that Smith made a representation of fact that was untrue, Smith knew it was untrue, and made it with the intent to deceive and to induce Mackenzie to stay employed at Miller to Mackenzie's detriment.
¶ 137. The lead opinion further concludes that public policy precludes allowing Mackenzie to maintain the intentional misrepresentation claim. The lead opinion provides five reasons to reject Mackenzie's claim: (1) market forces are a good enough deterrent; (2) at-will relationship will retain its desired flexibility; (3) duty to disclose is not simple; (4) the action should be in contract and not in tort; and (5) there is no sensible just stopping point. I disagree with the lead opinion's analysis in each respect.
¶ 138. Market Forces. The lead opinion suggests that market forces will be sufficient to deter fraudulent practices. I cannot agree. As evidenced by Mackenzie's case, market forces did not preclude the deceit that the jury found was committed here.
¶ 139. Flexibility of At-Will Employment. The lead opinion suggests that preclusion of tort claims in the employment context will result in the at-will employment relationship retaining the flexibility that *93is so advantageous to both employers and employees. Recognizing that an employee may present an intentional misrepresentation claim to a jury in an attempt to prove that the employer lied to him to prevent him from seeking employment elsewhere, will not interfere with the flexibility of employment at-will. These types of claims are few and far between, as evidenced by the limited number of cases reported across the country. Intentional misrepresentation actions are fact-specific and difficult to prove.
¶ 140. Complexity of Duty to Disclose. The lead opinion concludes that recognizing this cause of action would create difficulties in defining what an employer may be required to disclose. This is an insufficient policy reason to foreclose Mackenzie's claim. This type of complex question involves issues that lawyers, who accept cases, and courts, who preside over cases, have been deciding day after day. The fact scenarios cited in the lead opinion as hypothesized by HRMA and WMC do not constitute sufficient reason to foreclose the claim altogether. The fact scenarios presented are distinct from the very specific facts the jury was presented with here.
¶ 141. Contract not Tort. The lead opinion suggests that foreclosing this claim will not permit an employer to commit fraudulent acts because employees still have a contract remedy. Unless an employee has a contract with a term that requires the employer to be truthful in response to an inquiry about the employee's job status, if asked, and prohibits an employer from lying in order to prevent the employee from seeking employment elsewhere, it is hard to imagine contract law providing an adequate remedy for the fact scenario presented to the jury in Mackenzie's case.
*94¶ 142. No Sensible Stopping Point. Finally, the lead opinion suggests that recognizing this claim would result in "employers,and employees forever guessing at the limits of their responsibility and potential liability." I cannot agree that "no sensible stopping point" public policy precludes Mackenzie's claim. Again, as evidenced by the relatively limited reported case law across the country addressing this issue, specifically in the states where this claim has been recognized, there has not been a stampede to the courthouse steps. The bottom line is that, in this case, the jury found that Smith, when directly asked by Mackenzie whether his status was affected by the reorganization, lied. He told Mackenzie that he would not be affected at all, that Miller needed him, he was a valued employee, etc. When an employee directly asks the question of an employer, and the employer chooses to answer the question, fairness and adherence to fundamental principles of society demand that the employer provide the employee with a truthful answer to the question.

C. Fundamental Reasons.

¶ 143. Lastly, I conclude that there are very fundamental reasons to reject the majority's reversal of the jury's intentional misrepresentation finding. That Miller and Smith may have had the greater right under the "at-will" doctrine to discharge Mackenzie, for any reason or no reason, does not entail the lesser right to lie to him because one has a fundamental duty not to lie.5
¶ 144. We, as humans, are social beings by nature and destined to communicate with our fellow *95human beings. One of the means that we possess for communicating is the faculty of speech. Speech is an instrument by which a mind is brought into contact with another mind, by which the thoughts of one are conveyed to another. To use speech to convey a thought of the mind, which is not truly a thought of the mind, is to use the faculty of speech contrary to its primary purpose. Therefore, the right use of speech, as determined by its very nature, is to make known the thoughts of the mind to signify what one thinks is true. When one intentionally uses words or actions which belie one's inner convictions, one misuses the faculty of speech. To do so, is then to signify what is not true. It is the absence of conformity between the mind and speech which constitutes a lie.
¶ 145. More germane to the issue before us, an intentional misrepresentation which the jury found to have occurred, is a lie because Smith's speech and subsequent actions did not conform to the true thoughts of his mind, and were performed without justification. He had a fundamental duty not to lie or intentionally misrepresent because it was contrary to his nature. From a societal standpoint, Smith's actions have a pernicious effect because they tend to destroy mutual confidence and weaken the bonds fundamental to an orderly and peaceful society.6 Whether the Kantian "Categorical Imperative" or a general Thomistic orientation (both of which served as partial foundation stones in the development of our common law and constitutional tradition) are a basis for analysis, it is fundamentally wrong to lie without a justification.7
*96¶ 146. On the surface, this appeal may seemingly concern itself with whether a cause of action was appropriately pleaded but, in reality, it focuses upon a more fundamental value necessarily contemplated by our Wisconsin Constitution. Article I, section 22 acknowledges: "The blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." WlS. Const, art. I, sec. 22 (emphasis added). To even dare suggest, much less conclude, that the wrong of intentional misrepresentation should be excused, qualified, or suspended from sanction because of the circumstances in which it is found to have been executed; i.e., it occurred in an employment setting, is the apogee of moral relativism or utilitarianism. Such a resolution ought not be condoned.
¶ 147. There is a time or times for every fundamental principle forming a basis for our society to be acknowledged or reinforced. This appeal presents that occasion. Our state has a well-respected tradition for preserving fundamental individual and societal rights, euphemistic rationalizations notwithstanding. Time and again, our judicial system has risen to the occasion. To resolve this appeal on the basis of situational morality, as perhaps unconsciously proposed by the majority, would be a disservice to our citizens, our state and our society.
*97¶ 148. In sum, I would affirm the jury's verdict on the intentional misrepresentation claim, but reverse on the interference with contract claim.8

 Because the lead opinion adequately sets forth the elements of intentional misrepresentation and the burden of proof, I eschew unnecessary repetition.

 This factor is further supported by the fact that had Mackenzie been given the position recommended by the Boston Consulting Group task force, he would have been elevated to level 15 and a directorship.

MacDonough testified via deposition, which was read to the jury:
Q As the chief executive officer of Miller Brewing Company, do you believe that an employee is entitled to know when his position is downgraded by the company?
A Yes, I would want them to know.
Zielinski testified:
Q And if... he [Mackenzie] was your direct report... you would have called him in and told him [that he had been downgraded], correct?
A Possibility, yes.
Q Well, in your deposition you didn't say possibility, you would have said it was your obligation to do so, and you would have done it.
A I believe I would have, yes.
Q Yes. Because it was your obligation.
A Personally the way I manage, yes.

 I also note that the trial court ruled that Miller had waived its right to contest "duty to disclose." The trial court pointed out that Miller stipulated that it had a duty to disclose. The lead opinion disagrees with the trial court's conclusion in this regard. But having reviewed the trial court's ruling on this issue, where it points out the pertinent discussion between the parties on the subject, I would defer to the trial court's decision as to this matter.

 John H. Garvey, What are Freedoms For? 195-206 (Harv. Univ. Press 1996).

 Jos. Sullivan, Special Ethics 17-28 (Holy Cross College Press 1949).

 Hadley Arkes, First Things, An Inquiry into the First Principles of Morals and Justice 85-115 (Princeton Univ. *96Press 1986); LEIBEL, READINGS IN ETHICS 529-565 (Loyola Univ. Press 1926); Peter Kreeft, A Refutation of Moral Relativism 101-123 (Ignatius Press 1999).

 In so concluding, it would be necessary for me to address the issues raised regarding punitive damages. Having reviewed the trial court's decision in this regard, I agree with the analysis set forth and would affirm the judgment in that regard. The trial court concluded that there was credible evidence to support the punitive damage award against Miller. The trial court made this determination after having the opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and other evidence. It concluded that there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that Miller's conduct was outrageous. I adopt the reasoning of the trial court.