Court Opinion

ID: 9386217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 17:08:50.757963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.326281
License: Public Domain

J-S01044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRIAN THOMAS ANTONOVICH                    :
                                               :
                        Appellant              :   No. 179 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 5, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-02-CR-0000508-2021

BEFORE:       BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                               FILED: APRIL 11, 2023

         Appellant, Brian Thomas Antonovich, appeals the judgments of sentence

imposed after he was convicted of stalking, terroristic threats, and

harassment.1         He challenges the discretionary aspects of his aggregate

sentence: two to four years’ imprisonment, to be followed by six years’

probation. Upon review, we affirm.

         On October 7, 2021, Appellant waived a jury and proceeded to trial.

N.T. 10/7/21, 5-7.       The trial court offers us the following summary of the

facts:

         At trial[,] the Commonwealth presented the testimony of the
         victim who testified that between April and May of 2020 she first
         encountered [Appellant] when she was walking near a grocery
         store in the Greenfield area of Pittsburgh. As she walked past
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2709.1(a)(2), 2706(a)(1), and 2709(a)(4), respectively.
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      [Appellant], who sitting at a bus stop, he said to her, “I like your
      ass in your pants[,]” and as she ignored him and continued
      walking[,] he screamed at her, “I will F--- you up your ass.” The
      victim then ran across the street and [Appellant] screamed at
      her[,] “I am going to beat you the F--- up.” The victim testified
      that she had eight to ten similar encounters with [Appellant] in
      the Greenfield area over the ensuing months. The victim also
      testified that on the night of January 7, 2021[,] she was in her
      fenced[-]in front yard with her dog when [Appellant] approached
      the fence, leaned over and began throwing punches at her dog.
      When the victim pleaded for him to stop, [Appellant] stated: “I
      am going to kill your dog[,]” and told the victim[,] “I am going to
      get you[,]” and “I am going to beat you the F--- up.” The victim
      did not know [Appellant’s] name at that point but subsequently
      videoed him on other encounters and[,] after showing the video
      to others in the neighborhood[,] was able to identify [Appellant].
      After identifying [Appellant,] she was able to video him again
      approaching her and yelling[,] “I will slam your door shut for real.”
      The victim testified that[,] during the repeated encounters with
      [Appellant,] he threatened to sexually assault her, beat her up[,]
      and kill her and her dog. The victim testified that she not only
      feared for herself but others in the neighborhood and posted
      information regarding the threats by [Appellant] online. On cross
      examination[,] defense counsel elicited testimony that the victim
      only identified [Appellant] by name after showing the video she
      made to others in the neighborhood and it was those other
      individuals who provided [Appellant’s] name to the victim.
      Further, [the cross-examination testimony included] that the
      victim subsequently researched [Appellant’s] name on the
      internet and found that [Appellant] had similar criminal offenses
      and she then contacted the police. The Commonwealth also
      presented evidence from the investigating officers that the victim
      clearly identified [Appellant] from a photo array as the person
      repeatedly threatening her.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/22, 2-3 (trial record citations omitted).

      On October 14, 2021, the court found Appellant guilty of stalking by

repeatedly committing acts to cause fear, terroristic threats, and harassment

through the communication of lewd, lascivious, threatening, or obscene

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language.     N.T. 10/7/21, 5; N.T. 10/14/21, 3; Bill of Information, 3/8/21.

Sentencing was deferred for the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation

report and a mental health evaluation.           N.T. 10/14/21, 3; Mental Health

Evaluation Order, 7/12/21, 1.           On January 5, 2022, the court imposed

consecutive terms of one to two years’ imprisonment and three years’

probation for stalking and terroristic threats, and no further penalty for

harassment.2       N.T. 1/5/22, 14; Sentencing Order, 1/5/22, 1.        Prior to

announcing the terms of the sentence, the court told Appellant, “I find you to

be a clear and present danger to society and the victim here. You don’t seem

to take any remorse and responsibility. I feel that you’re definitely a threat

to her as well as the general public.” N.T. 1/5/22, 14.

       Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion seeking modification of his

sentence in which he claimed, among other things, that his sentence was

____________________________________________

2 Both imprisonment terms were within the standard range recommended by
the Sentencing Guidelines. The guidelines assigned offense gravity scores of
four for stalking and three for terroristic threats. 204 Pa.Code § 303.15
(offense listing; 7th ed., amend. 5). Appellant had a prior record score of five.
N.T. 1/5/22, 6-7.        Accordingly, the guidelines recommended minimum
imprisonment terms of nine to sixteen months, plus or minus three months
for aggravating or mitigating circumstances, for stalking, and six to sixteen
months, plus or minus three months for aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, for terroristic threats. 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a) (basic
sentencing matrix; 7th ed., amend 5).

Appellant was charged for acts committed on or about April 1, 2020, through
January 14, 2021, a period of time that spanned the effective date of the sixth
amendment of the seventh edition of the Sentencing Guidelines. For our
purposes that amendment is not material because the fifth and sixth
amendments both recommended same minimum imprisonment terms.

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unreasonable, manifestly excessive, and contrary to the factors set forth

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), and that the sentencing court failed to consider

his rehabilitative needs contrary to Section 9721.       Post-Sentence Motion,

1/12/22, ¶¶ 6-7. After the court denied the motion, Appellant timely filed a

notice of appeal and a court-ordered concise statement of matters complained

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Order Denying Post-Sentence

Motion, 1/12/22, 1; Notice of Appeal, 2/7/22, 1; Rule 1925 Order, 2/24/22,

1; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 3/17/22, 1-3.

      Appellant presents the following question for our review: “Did the Trial

Court abuse its sentencing discretion by focusing entirely on the gravity of the

offenses and the impact on the victim in imposing [his] sentence?” Appellant’s

Brief at 5.

      Appellant asserts that the sentencing court abused its discretion by

focusing entirely on the gravity of his offenses and their impact on the victim

and not giving any consideration to his mitigation evidence, including his

rehabilitative needs, his alcoholism and mental health diagnoses, and the fact

that he had a comprehensive treatment plan in place for rehabilitation.

Appellant’s Brief at 11. He alleges that this claim raises a substantial question

for our review because he states in his separate statement in his brief pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) that the claim highlights the fact that the court abused

its discretion “by disregarding the mandates of Section 9721(b).” Appellant’s

Brief at 13. He also points out that combined claims of excessive sentences

and the failure to consider mitigating sentencing factors raises a substantial

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question for our review. Appellant’s Brief at 14, citing Commonwealth v.

Miller, 275 A.3d 530 (Pa. Super. 2022).

         Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, such as the claim

presented here, “do not entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right.”

Commonwealth v. Perzel, --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 2252159, *5 (Pa. Super.,

filed Feb. 28, 2023). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing

issue:

         [W]e conduct a four[-]part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal[;] (2) whether the
         issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
         reconsider and modify sentence[;] (3) whether appellant’s brief
         has a fatal defect[, see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f);] and (4) whether there
         is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
         appropriate under the Sentencing Code[.]

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006).                    An

appellant must satisfy this four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction

when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Commonwealth

v. Salter, --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 2053193, *4 (Pa. Super., filed Feb. 17,

2023), citing Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super.

2014). As to the last part of the test,

         A substantial question will be found where an appeal advances a
         colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either
         inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or is
         contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
         process. At a minimum, the Rule 2119(f) statement must
         articulate what particular provision of the code is violated, what
         fundamental norms the sentence violates, and the manner in
         which it violates that norm.

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Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 132 (citation omitted).

      The Commonwealth raises no argument as to the timeliness of

Appellant’s notice of appeal and concedes that Appellant preserved his claim

before the sentencing court and included a required statement in his brief

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).        Appellee’s Brief at 9-10 & n.9.          The

Commonwealth, while describing the nature of the Rule 2119(f) statement as

“anemic,” ultimately states that “it is likely appellant will be deemed to have

raised the requisite substantial question.”        Appellee’s Brief at 10, citing

Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 242 A.3d 667, 680 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(acknowledging that claims that a sentencing court sentenced based solely on

the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors or

failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria, including the protection of the

public, the gravity of the underlying offense, and the rehabilitative needs of

an appellant, as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), present a substantial

question).

      We do not find any impediment to us reaching the merits of Appellant’s

claim. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, preserved his instant claim by

raising   a   combined   excessive-sentence       and   failure-to-consider-Section

9721(b)-sentencing-factors    claim    in   his    post-sentence     motion,   and

demonstrated that his instant claim raised a substantial question for purposes

of Rule 2119.    See Commonwealth v. Snyder, --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL

1793573, *3 (Pa. Super., filed Feb. 7, 2023) (noting that a claim that a

sentencing court disregarded a defendant’s rehabilitative potential and

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sentenced her to a manifestly excessive sentence presented a substantial

question); Miller, 275 A.3d at 534 (concluding that a defendant raised a

substantial question where he contended that a sentencing court “focused

solely on the nature of the crimes,” “paid no more tha[n] lip service to [his]

strides toward rehabilitation and reform,” and imposed a “manifestly

excessive sentence”).

      We apply the following standard of review when reviewing discretionary

sentencing claims:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Bankes, 286 A.3d 1302, 1307 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted).   “[W]hen imposing sentence, the trial court is granted broad

discretion, as it is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances

before it.” Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020).

This deferential standard is based on the recognition that “the nuances of

sentencing decisions are difficult to gauge from the cold transcript used upon

appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 32 A.3d 232, 236 (Pa. 2011),

quoting Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961-62 (Pa. 2007).

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     42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) offers the following guidance to the trial court’s

sentencing determination:

     [T]he sentence imposed should call for total confinement that is
     consistent with section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and
     the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates
     to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and
     the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

     Moreover,

     [42 Pa.C.S. §] 9781(c) specifically defines three instances in which
     appellate courts should vacate a sentence and remand: (1) the
     sentencing court applied the guidelines erroneously; (2) the
     sentence falls within the guidelines, but is “clearly unreasonable”
     based on the circumstances of the case; and (3) the sentence falls
     outside the guidelines and is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. §
     9781(c). Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d), the appellate courts must
     review the record and consider the nature and circumstances of
     the offense, the sentencing court’s observations of the defendant,
     the findings that formed the basis of the sentence, and the
     sentencing guidelines. The … weighing of factors under 42 Pa.C.S.
     § 9721(b) [is] exclusively for the sentencing court, and an
     appellate court could not substitute its own weighing of those
     factors. The primary consideration, therefore, is whether the
     court imposed an individualized sentence, and whether the
     sentence was nonetheless unreasonable for sentencing falling
     outside the guidelines, or clearly unreasonable for sentences
     falling within the guidelines, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 875-76 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

     When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the
     particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
     defendant. In considering these factors the court should refer to
     the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics

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       and potential for rehabilitation. Where pre-sentence reports exist,
       we shall…presume that the sentencing judge was aware of the
       relevant information regarding defendant’s character and
       weighted those considerations along with mitigating statutory
       factors.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 277 A.3d 577, 593 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted).

       Additionally, we note the “imposition of consecutive rather than

concurrent sentences lies within the sound discretion of the sentencing court.”

Commonwealth v. Redmond, 273 A.3d 1247, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2022),

citing Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 133 (citation omitted). It is well-accepted that

“[i]n imposing a sentence, the trial [court] may determine whether, given the

facts of a particular case, a sentence should run consecutive to or concurrent

with another sentence being imposed.”          Commonwealth v. Wright, 832

A.2d   1104,   1107    (Pa.   Super.   2003)    (citation   omitted);   see   also

Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 612 (Pa. Super. 2005) (42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9721 “affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence

concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same

time or to sentences already imposed.”) (citations omitted).

       Here, Appellant asserts in the heading of his argument that the

sentencing court abused its discretion “by focusing entirely on the gravity of

the offense and the impact of the victim in imposing [his] sentence.”

Appellant’s Brief at 16. Based on his tailored citation to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c),

he intimates that this Court should vacate his sentence and remand because

the sentencing court imposed a sentence within the recommendations of the

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Sentencing Guidelines but the application of the guidelines would be “clearly

unreasonable” given the circumstances involved in this matter. Appellant’s

Brief at 16-17.   As for those circumstances, he refers us to his counsel’s

arguments from the sentencing hearing about the role of his alcohol use and

mental health issues throughout his criminal history, his prior lack of any in-

patient or rehabilitation treatment, and his support for a Justice Related

Services (“JRS”) treatment plan to address these underlying causes of his

crimes.   Appellant’s Brief at 19, citing N.T. 1/5/22, 3-5.        After these

arguments which appeared to be in the same vein as the claim preserved in

his post-sentence motion, Appellant proceeds to segue into a separate claim

that the sentencing court erred by not offering an adequate explanation of the

reasons for its sentence at the sentencing hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 20.

He then restates the court’s remarks that prefaced the imposition of his

sentence, calling them “exceptionally minimal,” and argues that the limited

remarks demonstrated that the trial court “gave no consideration to [his]

mitigating evidence as required by Section 9721(b).” Appellant’s Brief at 20.

We do not discern an abuse of discretion upon reviewing these arguments.

      To the extent that Appellant presents for the first time on appeal an

argument that the trial court abused its discretion by not offering an adequate

statement of reasons for the sentence pursuant to Section 9721(b), that part

of his argument is waived as it was never preserved below either in an

objection at the sentencing hearing following the imposition of his sentence or

in his post-sentence motion. See Commonwealth v. Hartman, 908 A.2d

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316, 319 (Pa. Super. 2006) (appellant waived a discretion sentencing claim

by not preserving it at sentencing or in a timely post-sentence motion);

Commonwealth v. Mann,            820   A.2d   788,   794   (Pa.   Super.   2003)

(discretionary sentencing claim waived where, although appellant filed a post-

sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence, the motion did not include

the specific claim raised on appeal); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in

the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

The claims preserved below were that the sentencing court failed to consider

Appellant’s rehabilitative needs and imposed an excessive sentence – not that

the court failed to offer an adequate statement of reasons pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).      See Post-Sentence Motion, 1/12/22, ¶¶ 6-7 (“At

sentencing, this Honorable Court failed to consider [Appellant’s] rehabilitative

needs, in violation of 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9721(a) and (b). … Based on the foregoing,

[Appellant] submits that his sentence is unreasonable, manifestly excessive,

and contrary to factors set forth under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), 42 Pa.C.S. §

9725, and the Sentencing Code generally.”).

      In any event, the court offered a statement of reasons for the sentence

but Appellant suggests that it was inadequate because it failed to address the

court’s consideration of his mitigation evidence. In support of that argument,

he relies solely upon this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Coulverson,

34 A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011). Appellant’s Brief at 17-20. He argues that

because the sentencing court’s statement was “exceptionally minimal,” “as in

Coulverson,” the record fails to “evince that the [sentencing] court …

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considered anything other the severity of [the] offenses and their impact on

the victim.” Appellant’s Brief at 20.

       Coulverson, a well-reasoned opinion by an esteemed member of this

panel, does not support a finding of an abuse of discretion here. In that case,

the defendant pleaded guilty to rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,

sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, robbery, unlawful restraint,

terroristic threats, and two counts of indecent assault that he committed when

he was 19 years old. Coulverson, 34 A.3d at 138-39. The sentencing court

imposed an 18-to-90-year aggregate term of imprisonment, which included

the imposition of multiple consecutive statutory maximum sentences to

accomplish the upper end of the sentence. Id. at 139. On appeal, we found

that the imposition of a 90-year maximum sentence on a 19-year-old

defendant was “clearly unreasonable” as the trial court imposed a virtual life

sentence, failing to give any consideration to the defendant’s characteristics

and improperly basing its sentencing on its determination that defendant

should “spend as much of his life in prison as the court could order[.]” Id. at

148.

       In the instant case, Appellant does not develop an argument that his

sentence was “clearly unreasonable” for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

Instead, he is only arguing that the sentencing court’s statement of reasons

showed a disregard for mitigating evidence and that was an abuse of

discretion based on Coulverson. But the result in Coulverson did not hinge

on an improper or inadequate statement of reasons.           See id. at 146

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(“Although we do not dispose of this appeal on that basis, we are troubled by

the court’s cursory treatment of so weighty a matter, as the 90-year

aggregate maximum potentially consigns a 19-year old defendant with mental

health problems to life in prison without even a nod to relevant sentencing

factors.”) (emphasis added). This Court vacated the sentence and remanded

because the maximum aggregate sentence was “clearly unreasonable” and

the court’s stated reasons appeared to “ignore the continuum of circumstances

underlying a defendant’s criminal conduct, society’s need for rehabilitation, or

the statutory factors enunciated in our Sentencing Code on the way to

imposing a maximum sentence.” Id. at 150.

      In the present case, as opposed to Coulverson, the trial court imposed

two imprisonment terms within the standard range recommended by the

Sentencing Guidelines that did not extend to the statutory maximum. Also,

the court’s statement of reasons for the sentence did not demonstrate a

fixation to keep Appellant “in jail for life,” id. at 149 n.3, to the total disregard

of the relevant sentencing factors under Section 9721(b).           Here, the trial

court’s statement – while short and certainly not to Appellant’s liking –

reflected consideration of the mandatory sentencing factors under Section

9721(b).    The court’s findings as to Appellant being “a clear and present

danger to society and the victim” and a “threat to [the victim] as well as the

general public” reflected consideration of the factors concerning the need to

protect the public and the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on

the life of the victim and on the community. N.T. 1/5/22, 14. At the same

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time, the court’s statement to Appellant, “You don’t seem to take any remorse

and responsibility,” N.T. 1/5/22, 14, appeared to reflect consideration of his

need for rehabilitation, the remaining mandatory factor for imposing an

imprisonment term under Section 9721(b).

       The trial court could have elaborated on its remarks prior to the

imposition of the sentence but we cannot characterize the offered statement

of reasons as evincing a disregard for the mandatory statutory sentencing

factors as in Coulverson. To the extent that Appellant suggests that the trial

court had to address the points and statements made by his counsel to reflect

its consideration of the mitigation evidence, Appellant does not cite any

caselaw to that effect.      Indeed, “a lengthy discourse on the trial court’s

sentencing philosophy is not required. Rather, the record as a whole must

reflect the court’s reasons and its meaningful consideration of the facts of the

crime and the character of the offender.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903

A.2d   1247,   1253   (Pa.    Super.   2005)    (citations   omitted);   see   also

Coulverson, 34 A.3d at 145 (“The court is not required to parrot the words

of the Sentencing Code, stating every factor that must be considered under

Section 9721(b).”) (citation omitted).

       In this instance, we can presume that the sentencing court was

aware of the statutory sentencing factors and considerations about Appellant’s

character and properly weighed them because the record reflects the court’s

possession of a pre-sentence investigation report. N.T. 1/5/22, 2 (the court

asked Appellant’s counsel about whether he had a chance to review the report

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and   whether   there   were   any   additions   or   corrections   to   it);   see

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (“Where pre-

sentence reports exist, we shall continue to presume that the sentencing judge

was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.);

accord Commonwealth v. Rosario, 248 A.3d 599, 614 (Pa. Super. 2021);

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      Furthermore, Appellant’s reliance on Coulverson is misplaced because

he fails to demonstrate that his sentence is “clearly unreasonable” such that

the trial court committed a manifest abuse of discretion when it sentenced

him. The trial court only imposed two consecutive standard-guideline-range

sentences resulting in a four-year maximum possible imprisonment term and

six years of probation.    This is a reasonable sentence where Appellant

reoffended after serving a prior lengthy imprisonment term for prior sex

offenses and the instant charges involved him threatening additional sex acts

and violence against the victim in this case. N.T. 10/7/21, 18-19; N.T. 1/5/22,

4, 7. Moreover, the court acted within its discretion by opting for consecutive

sentences where the underlying charges involved eight to ten encounters that

Appellant had with the victim. N.T. 10/7/21, 19. Appellant was not entitled

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to a volume discount for his crimes.3 Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d

333, 341 (Pa. Super. 2015).

       We find that the aggregate sentence is not grossly disparate to

Appellant’s conduct and does not appear “clearly unreasonable” for purposes

of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant is entitled

to no relief on the grounds raised before us.

       Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/11/2023

____________________________________________

3 We also note that the fact that victim’s testimony addressed that Appellant
“started throwing physical punches” at her dog and made threats to kill the
animal during one of the encounters is particularly troubling and additionally
speaks to the rehabilitative needs of Appellant that might be addressed by the
sentence imposed. N.T. 10/7/21, 20.

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