Court Opinion

ID: 9662203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:02:46.773485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:37.736373
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in part with the majority opinion and dissent in part on the award of rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees in this case, as rehabilitative alimony should not be awarded where there is no need of rehabilitation. Furthermore, plaintiff has ample funds and property to defray her own attorney’s fees, trial and appellate.
*801PREAMBLE
In this era of the women’s liberation movement,1 is there any remaining viability to a theoretical basis for according alimony to an ex-wife not only upon the basis for what the wife should have, but what the husband can and ought to pay? It is good to see where we were in infancy, in Statehood, so we know where we went or where we are going.2 The rule that this Court should consider not only what the wife should have, but what the husband can and ought to pay, was handed down in Grant v. Grant, 5 S.D. 17, 57 N.W. 1130 (1894). To this day, this case has not been overruled and for common sense, in pithy terms, it can serve as a polestar for the myriad of situations which can confront this Court now and in the future concerning alimony and rehabilitative alimony. This Court, I hasten to point out, has refined as set forth below, those factors to be taken into consideration in awarding alimony.
PHILOSOPHIC VIEW
Dissents are more often frowned upon, than blessed, by the appellate textbook writers. Many academicians believe that the image of justice or the controlling precedent are sorely eroded by a dissent. There is, by and large, a traditional antipathy toward dissents in the appellate world. Historically, however, the healthy growth of law would stagnate and die without the pioneer in law — who is often the dissenter. It goes without saying that in the fields of scientific and social endeavor, without the spirit and gusto for achievement bosomed within the pioneer, America as a Nation would not have risen as the leader of the Free World. As the arrival of birds which foretell spring, dissents serve to predict or foretell a changing view in law. Often, a dissent is based upon existing precedent but refuses to recognize that the majority view has correctly applied the law to the facts of the case. In the latter, less creativity is noted, yet the influence and force of the dissent may impact the law in the future. Perhaps a minority viewpoint will serve the Bar and the Bench as a signal of caution and will linger on amber until it is given a green light in the future.
Rehabilitative alimony is a new concept to South Dakota and I fear its expansion where no rehabilitation is necessary. Although not blessed with mystic legal powers, I reasonably foresee onrushing domestic litigation seeking rehabilitative alimony as it is “new law in South Dakota.” When a new tree suddenly appears in the orchard bearing fruit, it is likely that there are those who would stand under the tree to taste the sweetness of its bounty. The reader should note that it is the majority opinion which has reversed a decision of the lower court holding, in effect, that the lower court did not do equity to a litigant. It is noted that the lower court precisely articulated twenty separate findings of fact and entered thirteen well-reasoned conclusions of law. The trial court presided in a most sensitive case, as it involved another state trial judge, most certainly, and did, exercise the greatest of deliberation, aforethought, and equitable conscience. I am simply not offended by the values of quality here adjudged below and would accordingly affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety. Thus, in reviewing, I question not the wisdom of the lower court as has the majority but, rather, persist in reviewing the legality of its acts. Is not this my duty and the function of this Court?
DISSENT
“To me, rehabilitative alimony is an award of a monthly sum of money to reha*802bilitate a deserving spouse so that he or she may obtain the skills necessary to fend for himself or herself in life, by education or job training.” Saint Pierre v. Saint Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 263 (S.D.1984) (Henderson, J., specially concurring). Plaintiff herein has received training as a registered nurse. Further, her recent employment with a Sioux City nursing home shows with certainty that she is employable as a registered nurse — without the necessity of additional vocational training. This employment also indicates that plaintiffs physical condition does not restrict her employability in her specialized field as a registered nurse. Plaintiff testified that she does not foresee any future medical needs. As a former trial lawyer and circuit judge, I remember well the adage in the trial courtroom: A party is bound by his (her) testimony. 30 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1087 (1967); Miller v. Stevens, 63 S.D. 10, 256 N.W. 152 (1934).
Based upon these factors, the trial court did not deem it necessary to award alimony.
The trial court has broad discretion in making a division of property and awarding alimony and this court will not set aside or modify its decision unless it clearly appears that the court abused its discretion. In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the property division and alimony award will be considered together.
Wallahan v. Wallahan, 284 N.W.2d 21, 26 (S.D.1979) (citations omitted). There was no abuse of discretion herein. SDCL 25-4-46 provides that “all orders and decrees touching the alimony and maintenance of a spouse ... are subject to revision on appeal in all particulars, including those which are stated to be in the discretion of the court.” This Court has repeatedly taken the position that it will not disturb a decision of the circuit court upon a question of alimony unless there is an abuse of discretion. What, pray tell, is an abuse of discretion? How can we descend from our equitable throne to breathe practicality into that phrase? An “abuse of discretion” refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence. Herndon v. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917, 918 (S.D.1981). This trial court’s decision in denying alimony was not clearly against reason and evidence. Unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused the discretion conferred upon it by state statute, this Court will not disturb an award of alimony or child support. Hrdlicka v. Hrdlicka, 310 N.W.2d 160 (S.D.1981). This Court reflects an overly sympathetic and compassionate decision establishing rehabilitative alimony, and thereby reversing the trial court below who had the parties and evidence all before it, and which is totally unjustified by the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the evidence which was submitted and heard by the trial court. It is a nice tuning by this Court which, in my opinion, errs in so holding. The majority opinion has dramatized the health factor of plaintiff, minimized her property award, and maximized defendant’s assets to justify its holding. In effect, this Court has had an equitable, functional overlay. Plaintiff has good employment and a healthy cash award. The ex-husband ought not to pay when the ex-wife has a profession which will meet her needs, is practicing her profession, and obtaining financial security therefrom. Rehabilitative alimony should not be a gift. Alimony should not be a gift. There must be a sound and substantial reason, in the evidence, not only that the defendant can pay but that he ought to pay. This must be tempered with what the plaintiff should have.
Property division and alimony are to be considered together and it is evident by my reading of the trial court’s decision and the rationale thereof that the trial court considered both (though not awarding alimony) in its decision.
An inherent fault lies in the reasoning of the majority opinion by isolating the subject of alimony. For, as we expressed in Goehry v. Goehry, 354 N.W.2d 192, 194 (S.D.1984), “[t]he trial court’s award of alimony and the division of property are considered together on appeal to determine *803whether the trial court abused its discretion. Krage v. Krage, 329 N.W.2d 878, 879 (S.D.1983) (emphasis supplied)_”
Lastly, I dissent on an award of $3,000 in trial and appellate attorney’s fees plus costs of appeal. Plaintiff ex-wife has a cash award of $18,450. She has, therefore, liquid assets to defray legal expenses. She is far from penniless ánd has not been turned out into the world without adequate means to fend for herself. Indeed, prior to trial, she received $11,000 in personal property and she is the recipient of two major vested inheritances in land of which she will enjoy the proceeds thereof sometime in the future. The ex-husband, incidentally, contributed greatly to the ex-wife’s interests in her grandfather’s and father’s estates through handling probate at no charge, estate planning at no charge, and defending an adverse possession lawsuit on a portion of the land to be inherited by her at no charge. In Finding of Fact number 16, the trial court specifically found that through these acts of gratuity, the ex-husband had contributed to the acquisition of the inherited property. This property was set aside to the ex-wife and under Clement v. Clement, 292 N.W.2d 799 (S.D.1980), the trial court had a legitimate right to consider the fact that the ex-wife inherited the property but was not bound to set it aside for her and could have considered it as part of the property to be divided. See SDCL 25-4-44. Moreover, each month she is assured of a $500 child support stipend in addition to her salary. As the children will not, in this Midwestern culture, consume this total amount for groceries, clothing, and incidentals, surely some of the $500 per month payment will be used to defray partial housing and utilities. Thus, the ex-husband is affording her a degree of protection from the elements encompassed within the $500 per month child support. It strikes me that under all of the circumstances, a denial of an award of attorney’s fees below was not an abuse of discretion for the decision thereon was not clearly against reason and evidence. Again, this Court indulges in a sympathetic overlay towards the plaintiff when she should stand at the bar of justice imbued with no more or no less rights than any other litigant under similar facts and circumstances.
This case pointedly concerns alimony at the trial level (which was denied) and now rehabilitative alimony which has sprung, sua sponte, from this Court. A discourse on reimbursement alimony in the majority opinion is obiter dicta. The obiter dicta appears to be another attempt to engrain and engraft within the domestic relations law of the State of South Dakota an alimony of further dimension, by another name. In the days of repeated pronouncement and demands for equality and independence of the sexes,3 it would appear that the State of South Dakota has veered sharply into a column of the liberalization of alimony. Historically, this would appear to be a paradox.
In conclusion, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in toto.

. From days of the Dakota Territory through early Statehood and until 1974, the husband and father was the head of the family and could choose a reasonable place or mode of living and the wife and mother was required to conform thereto. SDC § 14.0208 (1939). At the behest of this movement, this historic statute and concept was repealed in 1974 by our State Legislature (1974 S.D.Sess.Laws 173).

. Alimony in South Dakota, from the days of the Dakota Territory through early Statehood and to 1977, was restricted by state statute to the receipt of alimony by wife from an offending husband. In 1977, this statute was amended to provide that either party, husband or wife, could be required to pay alimony to the other party. SDCL 25-4-41.

. Under ch. 1, 1973 Sess.Laws of the State of South Dakota, the State Legislature adopted a resolution approving the Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution. Note that our historic statute on husband and father being the head of the family was repealed in 1974. By ch. 2, 1979 Sess.Laws, the resolution favoring the adoption of the ERA was rescinded.