Court Opinion

ID: 9909224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 19:01:07.693124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:21.022218
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40038         Document: 00516998105               Page: 1      Date Filed: 12/12/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                          FILED
                                                                                     December 12, 2023
                                       No. 23-40038                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                          Clerk

   Charles E. Epley,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                              versus

   Hien Luong, D.D.S.; Dorace L. Bedard, P.M.H.N.P.;
   Wanda T. Hilliard, A.P.R.N.; Charles Daniel Adams,
   M.D.; Adjetey Kwaku Lomo, M.D.; Kwabena Owusu, M.D.;
   Julia Renee Ward, M.D.; Walid Hamoudi, M.D.; Tawana
   Lakesha Smith, M.D.; Marcus Eric Hinkle, M.D.;
   Natascha Tove Dumas-Dow, M.D.; Erin Alison Jones,
   D.O.; Owen Joseph Murray, D.O.; John/Jane Does
   Medical Officials; Albert Ikechukwu Oguejiofor, M.D.,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 3:20-CV-43
                     ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam: *

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-40038      Document: 00516998105          Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/12/2023

                                    No. 23-40038

          The district court sua sponte dismissed Charles Epley’s pro se lawsuit
   for failure to serve the defendants. On appeal, Epley argues the district court
   abused its discretion because his indigency, his mental disability, and the
   COVID-19 pandemic furnished good cause for his two-year-long delay in
   serving process. Finding no abuse of discretion, we AFFIRM.
                                         I.
          In February 2020, former prisoner Epley filed a pro se complaint
   against several healthcare providers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they
   deliberately withheld care during his incarceration. The clerk of the court
   issued a notice of deficient pleading, warning that Epley must file an amended
   complaint and either pay the $400 filing fee or apply to proceed in forma
   pauperis (“IFP”). Epley paid the filing fee.
          Epley sought an extension to file his amended complaint and serve the
   defendants, claiming the pandemic prevented him from contacting process
   servers. The court granted him 30 more days to serve process and set May
   29, 2020, as the deadline for his amended complaint. Before this date, Epley
   sought leave to proceed IFP because “debilitating serious medical
   conditions” allegedly prevented him from working. Although he was able to
   pay the original filing fee through a loan, he now claimed to be unable to pay
   for service.
          The court denied Epley’s motion as moot because Epley had already
   paid the filing fee. And “[t]o the extent Epley request[ed] service of process
   by the United States Marshal, the court in its discretion denie[d] the request
   at th[at] time because Epley ha[d] not yet filed his amended complaint. See
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).” Epley filed his amended complaint within the
   court’s deadline.
          On October 30, 2020, after five months of inactivity, the court ordered
   Epley to show cause why his complaint should not be dismissed for

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                                    No. 23-40038

   insufficient service. After noting the 90-day deadline under Federal Rule of
   Civil Procedure 4(m), the court noted that “[i]n the five-month period since
   filing his amended complaint, Epley ha[d] not filed proof of service or any
   other documents with the court,” even after it granted Epley one extension
   of time under Rule 4(m). The court warned Epley that it would dismiss under
   Rule 4(m) if he failed to show good cause for failing to serve. Additionally,
   the court stated that “Epley’s response must include proper proof of service
   of the summons and complaint on the defendants listed in the complaint.”
   Epley moved for an extension to respond to the show cause order, citing as
   justifications psychiatric disorders, the pandemic, and his pro se status. The
   district court denied the motion, stating that after five months of inactivity,
   ten more days would not alleviate these barriers.
          Epley timely responded to the show cause order on November 20,
   2020. He argued his physical and mental conditions left him disabled for days
   at a time. He also noted that he previously informed the court of his
   indigency, which prevented him from effectuating service. According to
   Epley, the court’s phrase “at this time” in its order denying IFP led him to
   believe the court would revisit the issue after he filed his amended complaint.
   Since then, Epley had simply waited to hear from the court and was
   unconcerned by the delay because he assumed it was due to either the
   pandemic or the court’s investigating his claims. Epley also claimed he was
   afraid of being sanctioned for filing too many documents.
          In December 2022, after two years with no further communication
   from Epley, the district court dismissed Epley’s complaint under Rules 4(m)
   and 41(b) because he failed to show good cause for failing to serve. Epley
   timely appealed. The district court granted his motion for leave to proceed
   IFP on appeal.

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                                         II.
          We review a dismissal for failure to effect service for abuse of
   discretion. Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 2013). The
   serving party bears the burden of proving good cause for failure to effect
   service. Ibid.
                                        III.
          On appeal, Epley argues the district court abused its discretion
   because he showed good cause for failing to timely effect service. We
   disagree.
          A district court must dismiss a complaint without prejudice under
   Rule 4(m) “if a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is
   filed, unless the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure.” Lewis v. Sec’y of
   Pub. Safety and Corr., 870 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2017); Fed. R. Civ. P.
   4(m). A district court enjoys “broad discretion in determining whether to
   dismiss an action for ineffective service of process.” George v. U.S. Dep’t of
   Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 788 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1986)
   (per curiam). Good cause requires proof of at least “excusable neglect”—
   simple inadvertence, mistake of counsel, “or ignorance of the rules usually
   does not suffice.” Thrasher, 709 F.3d at 511. The plaintiff must provide some
   “showing of good faith” and “some reasonable basis for noncompliance”
   with the court’s deadline. Ibid. (citation omitted). The plaintiff should also
   show due diligence in attempting to perfect service. Id. at 512.
          When, as here, the statute of limitations bars future litigation on a
   plaintiff’s claims, a Rule 4(m) dismissal operates as a dismissal with
   prejudice. We therefore apply “more exacting” review. Coleman v. Sweetin,
   745 F.3d 756, 766 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted). We will
   affirm “only where a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the
   plaintiff exists and a lesser sanction would not better serve the interests of

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                                      No. 23-40038

   justice.” Thrasher, 709 F.3d at 513. This usually involves “at least one of
   three aggravating factors”: (1) delay caused by the plaintiff himself;
   (2) prejudice to the defendant; or (3) “delay caused by intentional conduct.”
   Id. at 514 (citation omitted). A delay warranting dismissal with prejudice
   must be “longer than just a few months” and must “be characterized by
   significant periods of total inactivity.” Id. at 513 (citation omitted).
          Epley suggests several reasons justifying his delay in perfecting
   service, including confusion about the court’s orders, his medical condition,
   his pro se status, his indigency, and the pandemic. We agree with the district
   court, however, that none of these excuses constituted good cause.
          Our decision in Thrasher is instructive. In that case, the district court
   ordered the pro se plaintiff to show cause why his complaint should not be
   dismissed for failure to serve under Rule 4(m). Thrasher, 709 F.3d at 510. The
   plaintiff sought an extension to respond and then unsuccessfully attempted
   to perfect service himself. Ibid. In the meantime, the plaintiff missed the
   court’s deadline, did not respond to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and
   did not file his proof of service for over five months. Ibid. Finding the plaintiff
   lacked good cause for the delay, the district court dismissed. Ibid. On appeal,
   the plaintiff claimed his mental illness provided good cause for failing to serve
   because he was admitted to an out-of-state facility for over two months
   during the service window. Id. at 512. We disagreed. Even applying more
   exacting review to the with-prejudice dismissal, we held that “the record
   indicates clear delay.” Id. at 513. And even deducting the two-month
   treatment period, we found that the plaintiff still inexcusably delayed service
   for over eight months. Id. at 512.
          Just as in Thrasher, we cannot say that Epley’s mental or physical
   conditions justified the delay in service. Epley fails to show why his claimed
   infirmities somehow excused the fact that the defendants remained unserved

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                                      No. 23-40038

   for well over two years. Epley, after all, filed pleadings both before and after
   issuance of the show cause order.
             Nor did Epley’s purported confusion about the wording of the court’s
   orders justify the delay. The court delineated Epley’s deadlines and referred
   him to Rule 4(m). Moreover, after denying Epley’s motion to proceed IFP,
   the court informed him it had not authorized service by the Marshal. Finally,
   in its show cause order, the court again referred Epley to the pertinent
   procedural rules and warned him that failure to comply would risk dismissal
   of his complaint.
             Nor did COVID-19 excuse Epley’s failure to serve. Throughout the
   pandemic, the court did not hold proceedings in abeyance but, instead,
   continued to set litigation deadlines. And, just as a two-month hospital stay
   in Thrasher did not excuse ten months of inactivity, see 709 F.3d at 512, the
   pandemic’s initial disruptions did not excuse Epley’s two-year delay in
   service.
             Nor did Epley’s indigency justify his failure to serve. Epley was never
   authorized to proceed IFP and was thus not entitled to the benefits of IFP
   status. See, e.g., McGrew v. McQueen, 415 F. App’x 592, 593–94 (5th Cir.
   2011) (affirming with-prejudice dismissal for pro se plaintiff who
   unsuccessfully claimed IFP status). Nor did Epley’s pro se status justify the
   delay. “[A] litigant’s pro se status neither excuses his failure to effect service
   nor excuses him for lack of knowledge of the Rules of Civil Procedure.”
   Thrasher, 709 F.3d at 512 (footnote omitted).
             Finally, we note that the district court considered lesser sanctions
   such as fines, conditional dismissal, and explicit warnings, but found these
   alternatives would not serve the interest of justice because it already issued
   multiple extensions and explicit warnings to no avail. See Thrasher, 709 F.3d
   at 513.

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                                     No. 23-40038

          In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a lack
   of good cause for Epley’s failure to serve process.
          Additionally, the court did not err in ruling that Epley showed no
   diligence in pursuing his claims. Our decision in Rochon v. Dawson is
   instructive. 828 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1987). There, the district court dismissed
   the pro se plaintiff’s IFP complaint, citing his “dilatoriness” and “fault” in
   not serving the defendant for nearly two years. Id. at 1110. When the plaintiff
   learned the Marshals could not find the defendant based on the address the
   plaintiff had provided, the plaintiff failed to correct the error. Id. at 1108–09.
   We held that, while IFP plaintiffs may rely on service by the Marshals, a
   plaintiff, “[a]t a minimum,” must “remedy any apparent service defects”
   made known to him. Id. at 1110; cf. Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444,
   445, 448 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding IFP plaintiff showed good cause for failure
   to serve because he moved to appoint a special server and tried to effect
   service himself and through the clerk of court).
          Rochon supports the district court’s finding that Epley lacked
   diligence. Like the plaintiff there, Epley did nothing when alerted to the need
   for service. Epley neither followed up with the court nor took action himself.
   Cf. Lindsey, 101 F.3d at 445, 448. He instead waited passively for over two
   years. While we are sympathetic to the obstacles that Epley claims to have
   encountered, those difficulties do not justify his lack of diligence.
          The bottom line is that Epley’s response to the show cause order did
   not require any further action from the district court before it could rule that
   Epley failed to show good cause. Epley could not have reasonably thought he
   was entitled to court action, absent a motion, before the district court decided
   whether he demonstrated good cause. After discussing at length the correct

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   standard and our court’s precedent, the district court held Epley had not
   shown good cause. This decision was not an abuse of discretion. 1
                                                                            AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
           1
             The district court also dismissed under Rule 41(b), which permits dismissal sua
   sponte when the plaintiff fails to prosecute. See Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d
   835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018). Because the same heightened standard applies to with-prejudice
   dismissals under Rules 4(m) and 41(b), we affirm the Rule 41(b) dismissal for the same
   reasons stated above. See ibid.; Millan v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 546 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir.
   2008).

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                                    No. 23-40038

   Haynes, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of Epley’s dismissal. As the
   majority opinion discusses, we must apply “more exacting” review of the
   district court’s dismissal because the statute of limitations would bar future
   litigation of Epley’s claims. Coleman v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 766 (5th Cir.
   2014) (per curiam). Thus, even if there is no showing of good cause for
   insufficient service of process, we may affirm “only where a clear record of
   delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff exists and a lesser sanction
   would not better serve the interests of justice.” Thrasher v. City of Amarillo,
   709 F.3d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted); see also Milan v. USAA
   Gen. Indem. Co., 546 F.3d 321, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2008). “To warrant
   dismissal, we must find a delay longer than just a few months; instead, the
   delay must be characterized by significant periods of total inactivity.”
   Thrasher, 709 F.3d at 513 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

          Here, I conclude that the district court abused its discretion because
   it improperly attributed to Epley the two-year delay in service of process.
   Only five months passed between Epley’s amended complaint and the
   district court’s show cause order. Epley timely responded to the show cause
   order and again raised to the court that he did not have the funds to conduct
   service of process. The district court then waited over two years to address
   Epley’s response. Yet the district court’s order focused on the fact that two
   years passed since Epley’s last filing. By improperly assessing the delay
   caused by the court rather than Epley, I conclude that the district court
   committed reversable error. Epley’s delay of only a few months is not enough

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   to warrant dismissal of his claims. See Milan, 546 F.3d at 326–27. Most
   importantly, this case is distinct because Epley was waiting for a ruling from
   the court. Indeed, Epley timely responded to the district court’s show cause
   order and identified his need for assistance with service of process because
   he was indigent and disabled. After that, the court did nothing for two years.
   The subsequent period of inactivity thus came from the court’s failure to rule
   on Epley’s filing. We have previously held that dismissal was improper
   because the significant delay was caused by the court rather than the plaintiff.
   See John v. State of La., 828 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting district
   court’s finding of a clear record of delay, in part, because “[t]he major
   interruption in th[e] litigation, a two-year period from 1984 to 1986, resulted
   from the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its subsequent
   reversal on appeal”). I don’t think that Epley should face the extreme
   sanction of dismissal when the district court’s lack of ruling caused the major
   delay in this case.

          Finally, Epley’s lack of in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status distinguishes
   this case from Rochon v. Dawson. 828 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1987). In Rochon,
   the IFP plaintiff provided an incorrect address to the Marshals Service and
   the district court subsequently issued an order noting that one of the
   defendants had not been served with the complaint. Id. at 1110. Despite the
   plaintiff having an avenue to remedy the service defects through the Marshals
   Service, he “remain[ed] silent and d[id] nothing.” Id. In contrast, Epley did
   not have the benefit of the Marshals Service to contact. Nor did Epley simply

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   do nothing when the district court identified his service issue; he instead
   responded and emphasized his request to proceed IFP.

          As discussed above, where a district court dismisses a case and the
   statute of limitations likely bars future litigation, our precedent requires both
   a clear record of delay and a proper finding that lesser sanctions would not
   better serve the interests of justice. Coleman, 745 F.3d at 766. Because Epley
   caused only a five-month delay, there is no clear record of delay warranting
   dismissal. See Milan, 546 F.3d at 326–27. Further, the district court has not
   shown that lesser sanctions would be ineffective. Epley received only one
   warning—which he timely responded to—and has met all other deadlines.
   His inability to serve the defendants clearly stems from his lack of IFP status
   as opposed to a lack of diligence. At a minimum, the district court created
   confusion for the pro se litigant, Epley; in my view, the district court abused
   its discretion in dismissing the case under these facts.
          Given the decision of the majority of this court not to reverse, I
   respectfully dissent.

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