Court Opinion

ID: 9585917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:05:07.63117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:16.824447
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment and I agree with Division 1 of the majority opinion which deals with the main action. With regard to appellant’s counterclaim which is discussed in Division 2 of the majority opinion, I agree that there are factual issues which preclude summary judgment. However, Division 2 of the majority opinion deals entirely with the existence of genuine issues of material fact with regard to a quasi-new agreement vis-a-vis the promissory note. It is my opinion that there is another issue in the case, which if resolved in favor of appellee, would demand judgment against appellant as to the counterclaim even if a quasi-new agreement existed with regard to the note.
I refer to the Deposit Agreement executed by appellant in connection with the creation of the bank account, the setoff from which is alleged to have been wrongful. Paragraph 4 of the Deposit Agreement reads as follows: “To secure any and all indebtedness and liability of Depositor to Bank, however and whenever incurred or evidenced, whether direct or indirect, absolute or contingent, due or to become due, Depositor hereby transfers and conveys all balances, *149credits, deposits, monies and items now or hereafter in this account and Bank is authorized at any time to charge such indebtedness or liability against this account, whether or not the same is then due, and the Bank shall not be liable for dishonoring items where the making of such a charge or charges results in there being insufficient funds in Depositor’s account to honor such items.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear that this Deposit Agreement gave appellee the right to set off funds in the account to pay any indebtedness owed to it by appellant whether the same was due or not. This type of clause has been held to be enforceable. Greene v. C. & S. Bank of Cobb County, 134 Ga. App. 73 (213 SE2d 175) (1975). Therefore, if, in fact, appellee set off funds from the account to apply to the indebtedness before the allegedly wrongfully dishonored checks were presented, the appellee is entitled to judgment. This would be true even if there existed a quasi-new agreement with regard to payments due under the promissory note.
However, I am constrained to agree that the case must be reversed and remanded for trial because there appears to be some conflict in the evidence as to the date on which the account was debited by appellee. Appellee contends that the setoff occurred on August 18,1981, and the first allegedly wrongfully dishonored check was presented on that same date. However, the appellant relies upon the fact that the bank’s ledger sheet shows that the “setoff’ didn’t occur until August 20,1981. Therefore, a question of fact exists as to the date of setoff. If the appellee set off the funds before the presentation of the checks, there was no wrongful dishonor because at the time of presentment, there was a zero balance in the account. If, however, the setoff had not occurred prior to the presentment of the checks, there would be evidence supporting appellant’s position that the dishonor was without authority.