Court Opinion

ID: 9710088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:01:44.3008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.141159
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
Substantially for the reasons stated by the trial judge in his written order of February 17, 1995, I believe that summary judgment was properly granted. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Ms. Anderson asserted in her affidavit in opposition to Ford’s motion that “the air bag of my scout car did not deploy properly as it did not inflate on impact.” According to the majority, this statement, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Anderson, was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact within the meaning of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). I disagree.
Ford’s expert witness, Anthony Valasin, explained in his affidavit that
[t]he sensors are designed to detect impact and energize the circuit in just 20 milliseconds. The air bag is fully inflated 40 milliseconds after the sensors detect impact. From initial contact to full deployment takes only 60 milliseconds; as a point of comparison, it takes 100 milliseconds to blink an eye. This is so short a time interval that people often do not recall seeing the air bag inflate. In fact, given how fast the process occurs, inflation from the gas burning generant and deflation of the expended gas through the air bag’s vent holes essentially take place simultaneously.
In other words, according to Valasin, the air bag inflates so rapidly that Ms. Anderson’s failure to observe its inflation was not at all inconsistent with Ford’s compelling evidence that the device operated normally.3
Ms. Anderson presented no expert evidence to counter that of Mr. Valasin. The speed at which an air bag inflates and the capacity of a human eye to observe are matters “beyond the ken” of the average lay juror. Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195, 200 (D.C.1991). To expect a lay trier of fact to pass on these subjects is akin to “leav[ing] it to a jury of tailors and haberdashers to pass judgment, unaided by expert testimony, on how to make a wet and rolling deck in a seaway a safe place to work.” Id. (quoting Zinnel v. United States Shipping Bd. E.F. Corp., 10 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1925) (dissenting opinion)). Ms. Anderson therefore could not, without expert testimony of her own, raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the portion of Valasin’s affidavit which I have quoted above.4
*655It is, of course, well settled that genuine and material issues of fact are not to be tried or resolved by resort to a motion for summary judgment. Vale v. Bonnett, 89 U.S.App. D.C. 116, 118, 191 F.2d 334, 336 (1951); Messall v. Efron, 72 A.2d 694, 696 (D.C.1950). “Evidence ... that is too incredible to be accepted by reasonable minds, [however], does not raise an issue of credibility.” 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.15[4], at 56-295 (1995) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, summary judgment is properly granted where “the evidence on one or the other hand is too incredible to be accepted by reasonable minds or is without legal probative force even if true.” Vale, supra, 191 F.2d 334, 89 U.S.App. D.C. at 118; see also Messall, supra, 72 A.2d at 696. The question, therefore, is not whether Ms. Anderson presented any evidence in opposition to the motion, but rather, whether she presented evidence sufficient to permit an impartial trier of fact to find rationally in her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “[Ujnsupported evidence which is contrary to the physical facts and scientific principle has no probative value.” Zollman v. Symington Wayne Corp., 438 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827, 92 S.Ct. 59, 30 L.Ed.2d 55 (1971). A party’s testimony is not sufficiently credible to be accepted by a reasonable mind when it has been effectively refuted by reliable physical experiments or demonstrations. Id. at 31-32.
In the present case, Ms. Anderson asserted no fact which effectively contradicted Ford’s expert and other evidence. The air bag could have inflated — indeed, in light of the expert evidence, it must have inflated— whether or not Ms. Anderson was able to observe the event. An impartial juror therefore could not rationally infer from Ms. Anderson’s affidavit that the air bag did not function properly. Assuming Ms. Anderson’s assertion as to what she saw and did not see to be true, the inference that she asks us to draw from it is nevertheless incredible in light of the entire summary judgment record.
The trial judge thus correctly concluded that
the affidavits stand uncontroverted except for the bald assertion in plaintiffs own affidavit that “the air bag of my scout car did not deploy properly as it did not inflate on impact.” Plaintiffs Aff., ¶ 1. That assertion is not sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute on this record. Stated differently, on this evidence a reasonable juror could not find for the plaintiff on the issue of proper deployment of the air bag. Since that is the central issue in the case, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I agree entirely with the judge’s analysis. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment.

. As the trial judge explained,
[tjhe condition in which [Officer Fish] saw and photographed the air bag was exactly the condition it should have been in if it had deployed correctly. Valasin Aff. No. 1., ¶¶ 5, 9, and 12, Aff. No. 2, ¶ 4. Stated otherwise, the fact that Fish observed the air bag hanging deflated from the steering wheel "establishes that the tear seams molded into the trim cover of the air bag module had fully and uniformly separated, and that unit had generated sufficient force to have fully inflated the air bag.” Id.

.Although it is true, as my colleagues suggest, that the issue here is whether the air bag fully inflated on impact, see maj. op. at 653 n. 1, expert testimony is required on the question whether, in light of the evidence of record, there is any reasonable possibility that it did not so inflate.