Court Opinion

ID: 9782196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:05:58.997112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:51.781694
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J., Dissenting.
As a court, we have a “limited role” in interpreting statutes enacted by the Legislature. (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671, 927 P.2d 1175] (California Teachers).) Our role is “not to establish policy” (Carrisales v. Department of Corrections (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1132, 1140 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083]) or to “inquir[e] into the ‘wisdom’ of’ the Legislature’s “policy choices.” (People v. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1, 17 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 192, 37 P.3d 380].) It is to “follow the Legislature’s intent, *307as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law, ‘ “ ‘whatever may be thought of the wisdom, expediency, or policy of the act.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (California Teachers, supra, at p. 632.) In short, we have neither prerogative nor power “to substitute our public policy judgment for that of the Legislature. [Citation.]” (Thomas v. City of Richmond (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1154, 1165 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 442, 892 P.2d 1185].)
In my view, the Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the relevant statutory language, was to include the information requested here from the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (Commission)—peace officers’ names, employing departments, and dates of employment—as “personnel records” within the meaning of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8.1 I therefore dissent from the majority’s conclusion, which, contrary to the principles set forth above, improperly disregards the Legislature’s policy decision regarding the public’s interest in “ ‘the qualifications and conduct of law enforcement officers’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 297), and substitutes the majority’s different view on that subject.
I. The Requested Information is Confidential Under Sections 832.7 and 832.8.
As the majority explains, the issue here is whether the Commission’s records of officers’ names, employing departments, and dates of employment are “ ‘[pjeace officer . . . personnel records . . . , or information obtained from these records’ ” under section 832.7, subdivision (a). (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 289.) If they are, then they are “confidential” and they may “not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to” specified provisions of the Evidence Code. (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a).) If they are not, then because they are public records, they may be obtained through a request under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.), unless some other disclosure exception applies.
Section 832.8 specifies the “mean[ing]” of the term “personnel records” for purposes of applying section 832.7. It provides: “As used in Section 832.7, ‘personnel records’ means any file maintained under that individual’s name by his or her employing agency and containing records relating to any of the following: [][] (a) Personal data, including marital status, family members, educational and employment history, home addresses, or similar information. Q] (b) Medical history. [][] (c) Election of employee benefits. [][] (d) Employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline. [][] (e) Complaints, or investigations of complaints, concerning an event or transaction in which he or she participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the *308manner in which he or she performed his or her duties. [][] (f) Any other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The question here is whether the requested information at issue falls within any of these categories.
Under well-settled principles, to answer this question of statutory construction, we must “first look at the actual words of the statute, ‘giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’ [Citation.] ‘If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, “then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” [Citation.] “Where the statute is clear, courts will not ‘interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Tindall (2000) 24 Cal.4th 767, 772 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 14 P.3d 207].) “ ‘One who contends that a provision of an act must not be applied according to the natural or customary purport of its language must show either that some other section of the act expands or restricts its meaning, that the provision itself is repugnant to the general purview of the act, or that the act considered in pari materia with other acts, or with the legislative history of the subject matter, imports a different meaning.’ [Citation.]” (Leroy T. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 434, 438 [115 Cal.Rptr. 761, 525 P.2d 665] (Leroy T.).)
Under the plain and commonsense meaning of the relevant statutory language, the records at issue here qualify as “personnel records” within the meaning of section 832.8, subdivision (a). As noted above, in relevant part, that subdivision defines “personnel records” as records relating to “[p]ersonal data, including marital status, family members, educational and employment history, home addresses, or similar information.” (Ibid.) In my view, the term “[p]ersonal data” (ibid.), as commonly understood, includes a person’s name. Notably, the majority agrees that under the “general[]” dictionary definition of the term “personal,” “[a] name might be viewed as ‘personal data’ . . . because it relates to a person.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 296.) Indeed, this construction is consistent with prior decisions in which we have characterized a person’s name as “personal data” (Estate of MacDonald (1990) 51 Cal.3d 262, 265, fn. 2 [272 Cal.Rptr. 153, 794 P.2d 911]; see Boyer v. United States F. & G. Co. (1929) 206 Cal. 273, 275 [274 P. 57]), and “personal information” (People ex rel. Orloff v. Pacific Bell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1132, 1139 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 80 P.3d 201]). As for the officers’ employing departments and dates of employment, this information qualifies under the common and ordinary understanding of the term “employment history,” which is one of the listed examples of confidential “[p]ersonal data” in section 832.8, subdivision (a). (See American Heritage Dict. (4th ed. 2000) p. 833 [defining “history” as “a chronological record of events”].)
In my view, the majority has not met its burden, as set forth above, to justify its refusal to apply section 832.8, subdivision (a), “ ‘according to the *309natural or customary purport of its language.’ ” (Leroy T, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 438.) Regarding officers’ names, the majority “assume[s] that in defining personnel records the Legislature drew the line carefully” and would have expressly “list[ed] ‘name’ as an item of ‘[p]ersonal data’ ” had it “intended to prevent the disclosure of officers’ identities as such.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 298.) The majority’s assumptions are inconsistent with the language of section 832.8, subdivision (a), which defines “personnel records” as records relating to “[p]ersonal data, including marital status, family members, educational and employment history, home addresses, or similar information.” (Italics added.) As we have often explained, the word “including” is ordinarily a term of enlargement, not of limitation; it expands, rather than contracts, the meaning of a word. (Flanagan v. Flanagan (2002) 27 Cal.4th 766, 774 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 574, 41 P.3d 575]; Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 582 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139].) Moreover, the phrase “or similar information” also obviously expands the scope of the term “[p]ersonal data” as used in section 832.8, subdivision (a). (See Garden Grove Police Department v. Superior Court (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 430, 434 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 642] [“the term ‘similar information’ signifies [the Legislature’s] intent to include other things relating to the listed items . . . which are not expressly listed”].) Given the statutory language, the majority errs in reasoning that the Legislature “carefully” drew a “line” between protected and unprotected information and meant to exclude information other than that expressly listed. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 298.) Indeed, given the broadly inclusive language the Legislature chose, the more reasonable conclusion is that the Legislature would have expressly exempted an officer’s name from the protections of section 832.7 had it intended to exclude this quintessential piece of “[p]ersonal data.” (§ 832.8, subd. (a).)
The majority also argues that the word “personal” may “carr[y] a connotation of ‘private,’ ” i.e., “ ‘proper to private concerns,’ ” concerning someone’s “ ‘private business, interests, or activities; intimate.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 296.) Of course, had the Legislature intended to limit the scope of section 832.8, subdivision (a), to private and intimate information, the Legislature could easily and clearly have done so simply by rewriting the provision as the majority does when it refers to information that is “personal or private.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 296, fn. 5, italics added.) Moreover, the listed examples of “[p]ersonal data” in section 832.8, subdivision (a), affirmatively demonstrate that the Legislature was not using the term in this sense. Among the listed items are “educational and employment history.” (Ibid.) There is nothing particularly private or intimate about a police officer’s educational or employment history.2 (Department of State v. Washington Post *310Co. (1982) 456 U.S. 595, 600 [72 L.Ed.2d 358, 102 S.Ct. 1957] [“employment history ... is not normally regarded as highly personal”].) Nor does that history relate only to a police officer’s private business or activities. On the contrary, an officer’s educational and employment history are highly relevant to something the majority insists is of substantial “public” interest: the officer’s “qualifications” for a law enforcement position. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 299.) Given the Legislature’s express inclusion of “educational and employment history” as protected “[personal data” (§ 832.8, subd. (a)), the majority errs in restricting the scope of “[p]ersonal data” section 832.8, subdivision (a) encompasses based on the fact the word “personal” may carry a connotation of private or intimate. (Cf. Ornelas v. Randolph (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095, 1101 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 847 P.2d 560] [examples expressly listed in statute do not “share any unifying trait which would serve to restrict the meaning of the [statutory] phrase”].)
For a number of reasons, I also disagree with the majority that, given the Attorney General’s “long held” view that “ ‘the name of every public officer and employee ... is a matter of public record,’ ” we should disregard the statutory language’s ordinary meaning and require “a more specific indication” that officers’ names are protected “ ‘personal data’ ” under section 832.8, subdivision (a). (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 296.) First, neither of the two Attorney General opinions the majority cites in support of its view (ibid.) specifically concerned peace officers. (County Payroll Records as Public Records, 60 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 110 (1977); State Employees’ Retirement Act, 25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 90, 91 (1955).) Second, the earlier opinion, which served as the sole authority for the later one, cited no authority and offered no analysis for its assertion that “it is a fact that the name of every public officer and employee ... is a matter of public record.” (State Employees’ Retirement Act, supra, 25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p. 91.) Third, that a public employee’s name is a public record is not in dispute here; on the contrary, as the majority explains, “[i]t is undisputed that the information sought [here] . . . constitutes a public record,” and the only issue is whether one of the CPRA’s exceptions exempt that public record from disclosure. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 288.)3 Which leads me to the fourth and final reason I disagree with the majority’s reliance on these opinions: the later one expressly recognized that certain of the CPRA’s provisions “specifically exempt[]” otherwise public records from disclosure, and it applied the very exemption at issue here, i.e., Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k), which exempts “ ‘[rjecords the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, including but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege.’ ” *311(County Payroll Records as Public Records, supra, 60 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. at p. 113, quoting Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k).) For all of these reasons, nothing in the cited Attorney General opinions justifies the majority’s demand for greater specificity.4
I also disagree with the majority’s view that in passing sections 832.7 and 832.8, the Legislature was only concerned about “linking a named officer to the private or sensitive information listed in” the latter section. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 295.) By its express terms, section 832.7, subdivision (a), makes “confidential” all qualifying “personnel records” and all “information obtained from these records,” and it precludes “disclosure]” of all such records and information except as authorized by statute. Thus, information that qualifies under section 832.8 as a “personnel recordQ” is confidential and may not be disclosed even if the proposed disclosure would not be “link[ed]” to a particular officer’s name. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 295.) The Attorney General confirmed this view of the statutes in a 1988 opinion concluding that sections 832.7 and 832.8, as they then read, precluded release to the public of summary and statistical information regarding citizen complaints against peace officers, even if the officers were not identified. (71 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 247 (1988).) The Legislature responded to the Attorney General’s opinion by enacting what is now section 832.7, subdivision (c), which provides that a department “may disseminate data regarding the number, type, or disposition of complaints . . . made against its officers if that information is in a form which does not identify the individuals involved.” (See Stats. 1989, ch. 615, § 1, pp. 2060, 2061.) This express authorization to release certain information “in a form which does not identify” the officer (§ 832.7, subd. (c)) would be unnecessary if, as the majority erroneously reasons, the statute only precludes disclosure of confidential information that is “link[ed]” to a particular officer’s name. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 295.) Moreover, this exception to confidentiality is limited in two important respects: (1) it applies only to a very small subset of the information specified as confidential in section 832.8, i.e., “data regarding the number, type, or disposition of complaints” made against officers (§ 832.7, subd. (c)); and (2) even as to this small subset, it merely permits, and does not require, disclosure. (Ibid, [department “may” disclose specified information].) In other words, the subdivision authorizes a department to refuse to disclose the specified information even in a form that does *312not identify the officers, and it confers no discretion to disclose any of the other information section 832.8 makes confidential. Thus, contrary to the majority’s analysis (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 295-296), subdivision (c) of section 832.7 does not in any way support the majority’s view that the Legislature, in passing sections 832.7 and 832.8, was only concerned about “linking a named officer to the private or sensitive information listed in” the latter section. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 295.) On the contrary, in view of its limitations, as described above, the subdivision actually supports the opposite conclusion.
Regarding officers’ employing departments and dates of employment, I find equally unconvincing the majority’s justifications for ignoring the ordinary meaning of the term “employment history” (§ 832.8, subd. (a)) and holding that the term includes only “ ‘basic status or identifying information about the employee as he or she came to the job’ ” and “ ‘does not include any information that would be specific to the current job.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 295.)5 The majority first asserts that “[t]he items enumerated in subdivision (a) [of section 832.8] do not constitute information that arises out of an officer’s employment.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 294.) Of course, this assertion ignores the common understanding of the term “employment history,” and is true only if one interprets that term as the majority ultimately does, i.e., to exclude any information regarding an officer’s current job. In other words, the majority’s assertion, which the majority offers as the first step towards its conclusion, already assumes its conclusion. Moreover, the majority’s assertion is erroneous as to officers who pursue education that is necessary to obtain, keep, or advance to a particular position; as to these officers, aspects of their “educational . . . history,” which is one of the items subdivision (a) enumerates, would in fact arise out of their employment. The majority next asserts that interpreting the term “ ‘employment history’ ” in subdivision (a) to include information about an officer’s current position would “renderQ subdivision (d) [of section 832.8] unnecessary and redundant,” because “all of the information listed in subdivision (d)” would be “encompass[ed]” by the term “ ‘employment history’ ” in subdivision (a). (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 294-295.) I disagree; in my view, although the name of a person’s employer and the dates of the person’s hiring and termination clearly and necessarily fall within the ordinary meaning of the term “employment history,” the same cannot be said of any and all records relating to “[ejmployee advancement, appraisal, or discipline,” which are the records specified in subdivision (d). Thus, although following the ordinary meaning of the statutory language would produce some overlap between subdivisions (a) and (d), it would not, as the majority asserts, render the latter completely redundant and unnecessary. Any minor redundancy would not at all impair subdivision (d)‘s distinct purpose: to clarify that the records specified in that *313subdivision, which may or may not constitute “employment history” under section 832.8, subdivision (a), nevertheless are confidential “personnel records” within the meaning of section 832.7. Thus, the majority’s analysis of the statutory language is unconvincing.
Moreover, the majority’s construction of the phrase “employment history” is problematic when that phrase is viewed, as it should be, “in the context of the statute as a whole.” (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 90 P.3d 1168].) In construing a statute, unless a contrary intent appears, we “presume[]” the Legislature “intended that similar phrases be accorded the same meaning.” (People v. Wells (1996) 12 Cal.4th 979, 986 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 911 P.2d 1374].) Section 832.8 contains two phrases similar to “employment history”: “[m]edical history” (§ 832.8, subd. (b)) and “educational . . . history” (§ 832.8, subd. (a)). Giving these two similar phrases the same construction the majority gives the phrase “employment history” means that only an officer’s prehiring medical and educational information is included in the officer’s confidential “personnel records” under section 832.7. I see no basis in logic, statutory language, or legislative history for making confidentiality depend on whether medical and educational information about an officer relates to a prehiring, as opposed to posthiring, period. And, because I believe the terms “medical history” and “educational . . . history” include an officer’s posthiring medical and educational information, I see no basis for interpreting the term “employment history” in subdivision (a) differently. As the Commission argues, “ ‘history’ cannot have one meaning in one subdivision of [the] statute, but an entirely opposite meaning in the very next subdivision.”
The majority’s construction is also problematic in its application. The majority states that section 832.8, subdivision (a), only includes information about the officer “ ‘as he or she came to the job.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 295.) Does this mean that records reflecting posthiring changes regarding an officer’s “marital status, family members, educational . . . history, [and] home addresses” (§ 832.8, subd. (a)) are not confidential “personnel records” under section 832.7? The majority also states that the term “ ‘employment history’ ” only encompasses information “relating to the officer’s current position.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 294.) An officer who has been terminated does not have a current position with his or her former department, so records of the former department (or information derived from those records) regarding such an officer’s hiring and termination would seem to qualify as “personnel records” under the majority’s construction. Yet, the majority seemingly holds that even as to terminated officers, the information requested here is not “[p]ersonal data” under section 832.8, subdivision (a). (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 299.)
*314Ultimately, there is little to support the majority’s construction other than the majority’s own view of public policy.6 The majority asserts that the public has a “substantial” interest “in the qualifications and conduct of peace officers” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 299), and that the public’s interest “ ‘in the qualifications and conduct of law enforcement officers’ ” is “ ‘far greater’ ” than its interest in the qualifications and conduct of “the average public servant.” (Id. at p. 297.) It is in light of this policy concern that the majority declares itself “hesita[ntj” to follow the ordinary meaning of the statutory language. (Id. at p. 296.)
Even were I to agree with the majority’s view of public policy—a matter on which I express no opinion—I do not believe that view would justify the majority’s construction. The Legislature has clearly and expressly articulated a different view of public policy in the very statutes at issue here. As noted above, among the records the Legislature has expressly made confidential are those relating to an officer’s “advancement, appraisal, or discipline” (§ 832.8, subd. (d)), and to “[cjomplaints, or investigations of complaints, concerning an event or transaction in which [the officer] participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which he or she performed his or her duties.” (Id., subd. (e).) This information goes more to the heart of an officer’s qualifications and conduct than any other, and the Legislature’s decision to make it confidential thus reflects a view of policy at odds with the policy view that drives the majority’s construction.7 As I noted at the outset, we have neither power nor prerogative to substitute our view of public policy for the Legislature’s.
Indeed, the public itself, through an amendment to the state Constitution, has also expressed a policy view different from the majority’s. As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at p. 288), when the voters added a constitutional provision declaring a “right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business” and making “the writings of public officials and agencies . . . open to public scrutiny” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(1)), they also expressly preserved “statutory procedures governing discovery or disclosure of information concerning the official performance or professional qualifications of a peace officer.'''’ (Id., subd. (b)(3), italics added.) Through this provision, the voters ratified and endorsed the policy view the Legislature implemented by enacting sections 832.7 and 832.8, subdivisions (d) and (e). Of course, we do not pass upon the wisdom, expediency, or policy “of enactments by the voters any more than we would enactments by the Legislature.” (Professional Engineers in California *315Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1016, 1043 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 155 P.3d 226].) Given that the Legislature, through sections 832.7 and 832.8, and the voters, through a constitutional amendment, have expressly protected the confidentiality of records relating to the qualifications and conduct of police officers, the majority errs in basing its construction on a view of policy contrary to that expressed by both the Legislature and the electorate. I therefore disagree with the majority’s conclusion that subdivision (a) of section 832.8 does not encompass records reflecting an officer’s name, employing agency, and dates of employment.8
II. Government Code Section 6254, Subdivision (c).
As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at p. 299), in resisting disclosure, the Commission also relies on Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c), which provides that the CPRA does not require disclosure of “[personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (c).) The majority rejects this argument, finding that “the privacy and safety interests of peace officers in general do not outweigh the public’s interest in the disclosure of the information sought . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 303.) In light of my conclusion that the requested information is encompassed within Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, subdivision (a), I need not decide whether Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c), also applies. I do, however, have several comments about the majority’s analysis.
In my view, the majority’s analysis of the public interest in disclosure is inconsistent with the view of that interest the Legislature and the voters have expressed. Like its analysis of Penal Code section 832.8, the majority’s analysis of Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c), depends heavily on the majority’s view that “[t]he public’s interest in the qualifications and conduct of peace officers is substantial . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 299.) According to the majority, the public has a “legitimate interest” in discovering “why” peace officers leave a department and whether a department is hiring officers who have been dismissed from other departments, because this information will facilitate identification of “specific instances of potentially inappropriate employment practices.” (Id. at p. 300.) In my view, the Legislature has already spoken on this subject, by expressly providing in sections 832.7 and 832.8, subdivisions (d) and (e), that an officer’s personnel file is not an appropriate source of information on these subjects. And, the voters have *316ratified the Legislature’s policy decision by passing a constitutional provision that expressly preserves “statutory procedures governing discovery or disclosure of information concerning the official performance or professional qualifications of a peace officer.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(3).) The majority’s analysis improperly ignores these expressions of policy by the Legislature and the voters.
I also question several other aspects of the majority’s analysis. In light of its holding that sections 832.7 and 832.8 “do not protect an officer’s name, employing department, and dates of employment,” the majority concludes that these statutes “do not support the argument that peace officers have a recognized privacy interest in” that information. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 301.) Because, as earlier explained, I disagree with the majority’s construction of sections 832.7 and 832.8,1 disagree with the majority’s conclusion.
I also question the majority’s view that disclosure of all officers’ names is necessary to serve the public’s interest in tracing officers’ movements and identifying general trends and specific instances of potentially inappropriate employment practices. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 300, fn. 10.) To serve this asserted interest, it is unnecessary to disclose the identity of all officers in the Commission’s records, most of whom no doubt have rarely or never transferred from one department to another. Instead, this asserted interest can be fully satisfied by using a two-step process in which the requested information is first disclosed with nonidentifying tracking designations substituted for the officers’ names, followed by disclosure of the names of the relatively few officers whose movements may merit further inquiry. This approach would be entirely consistent with the CPRA, which requires “deletion” of any exempt material that is “reasonably segregable” from nonexempt material. (Gov. Code, § 6253, subd. (a).)
I next question the majority’s reliance on the fact that officers’ names may be otherwise accessible to the public in various ways. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 301.) In construing exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)), which is similar to Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c), in that it applies to personnel files “the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” the high court stated: “The privacy interest protected by Exemption 6 ‘encompass[es] the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.’ [Citation.] An individual’s interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be available to the public in some form.” (Department of Defense v. FLRA (1994) 510 U.S. 487, 500 [127 L.Ed.2d 325, 114 S.Ct. 1006].) The majority’s analysis gives no consideration to this aspect of an officer’s privacy interest.
*317Finally, I am also not convinced of the majority’s view that release of the requested information poses no threat to the safety of officers and their families. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 302-303.) Notably, in 1990, the Legislature amended subdivision (a) of section 832.8 by adding “home addresses” to the list of examples of confidential “[personal data.” (Stats. 1990, ch. 264, § 1, p. 1535.) According to the amendment’s legislative history, one of the Legislature’s purposes in adding “home addresses” to the list was to protect officers and their families. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1985 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended May, 16, 1990, p. 2.) Given that publicly available databases on the Internet make it easy to link a name to an address, the release of an officer’s name would not seem to pose much, if any, less of a safety risk than would disclosing an officer’s home address. (See Frank v. City of Akron (6th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 813, 819 [“Most individuals’ addresses ... are readily available on the Internet”].) Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, in light of the accessibility of information through the Internet, it would be entirely “feasible” for someone hostile toward the police to use the list of names to locate peace officers’ addresses in order to “harass them” or their families. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 302.) Moreover, in light of the Legislature’s acknowledgment of the dangers faced by officers and their families, I do not agree with the majority (id. at p. 302) that we can simply dismiss this threat as being “purely speculative.”9 (See King County v. Sheehan, supra, 57 P.3d at p. 315 [it is “naive ... to believe that police officers who are identified on anti-police web sites ... by name and home address . . . could not thereby be placed in danger or subjected to harassment”].)
Ultimately, the majority concedes that in light of “the privacy and safety interests of’ some officers, the requested records “may contain some information that should be exempted from disclosure.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 303.) The majority assigns to the Commission the responsibility for making the showing necessary to establish that information concerning “particular officers” should not be disclosed. (Id. at p. 303.) In my view, the Commission, which is not the officers’ employing department but is merely an agency that collects information from numerous employing departments, is poorly suited to identify and assert the privacy and safety interests of the individual officers identified in its records.
*318III. Conclusion.
“[A]side from constitutional policy, the Legislature, and not the courts, is vested with the responsibility to declare the public policy of the state. [Citations.]” (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046].) Thus, “[w]hen the Legislature has spoken, the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the better policy.” (City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 121 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 42, 906 P.2d 1196].) Our constitutional role is simply to “follow the Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law,” whatever we may think of its wisdom, expediency, or policy. (California Teachers, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 632.) Because I believe the majority’s holding substitutes the majority’s view of policy for that of the Legislature, as expressed by the plain meaning of the words in section 832.8, subdivision (a), I dissent.
Baxter, J., concurred.

 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.

 Nor, contrary to the majority’s assertion, is an officer’s educational and employment history “the type of information that, for reasons of officer safety, should not be revealed to perpetrators or witnesses of crimes.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 296.)

 Because the CPRA only requires disclosure of “[plublic records” (Gov. Code, § 6253, subd. (a)), the question of an exemption’s applicability presupposes that the information in question is a public record. Thus, that a public employee’s name is a public record is of no analytical significance.

 The majority’s reliance on decisions from “other jurisdictions” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 297, fn. 6) is equally unconvincing. None of the cited cases involved provisions similar to sections 832.7 and 832.8, two did not even involve peace officers, and three were decided decades after the Legislature passed sections 832.7 and 832.8. (See Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Tollefson (Colo.Ct.App. 1998) 961 P.2d 1150; Magic Valley Newspapers v. Medical Center (2002) 138 Idaho 143 [59 P.3d 314]; Moak, et al., Aplnt. v. Phila. News., et al. (1975) 18 Pa.Commw. 599 [336 A.2d 920]; King County v. Sheehan (2002) 114 Wn.App. 325 [57 P.3d 307].) For these reasons, these non-California decisions are irrelevant to determining the intent of the Legislature in enacting sections 832.7 and 832.8.

 I note that an officer’s name meets these criteria. It is not clear, then, why the majority concludes that section 832.8, subdivision (a), does not include this information.

 Notably, the majority cites nothing in the legislative history that supports its construction.

 For this reason, the majority’s assertion that there is only “some tension” between its view of public policy and the Legislature’s (maj. opn., ante, at p. 298) is a significant understatement.

 Because the majority declines to decide whether the Commission adequately established that the information in its possession came from files maintained under the officers’ names by their employing agencies (maj. opn., ante, at p. 299, fn. 8), I also decline to address that issue. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.516(b)(3) [“court need not decide every issue the parties raise”].)

 The statutes the majority cites (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 302-303, fn. 13) do little to support its view that the possibility of harassment from disclosure of an officer’s identity is “speculative” and that such harassment may not even be “feasible.” (Id. at p. 302.) Three of the cited statutes only limit address disclosures done with malicious intent (absent an officer’s “written demand” for nondisclosure). (Gov. Code, §§ 6254.21 and 6254.24; Pen. Code, § 146e, subd. (a).) The remaining statutes place limitations on only two potential sources of address information: records of the Department of Motor Vehicles if confidentiality is expressly requested (Veh. Code, § 1808.4, subd. (a)), and voter registration cards (Elec. Code, § 18110).