Court Opinion

ID: 9572664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:43:31.91272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:46.525463
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDSON, Justice
(concurring specially)
I concur specially, motivated by an apprehension the overall impact of the majority’s language may be misinterpreted as it relates to our rules concerning summary judgment.
I. Rule 237(e), Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:
“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”
This rule has been enforced in our decisions. A.T. & T. Co. v. Dubuque Communications, 231 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Iowa 1975) (“We have held that language [in R.C.P. 237(e)] requires movant to establish by evidentiary matter the absence of a genuine issue and this is so even though no adequate resistance is made”); Gruener v. City of Cedar Falls, 189 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Iowa 1971) (“We doubt that plaintiff’s resistance contains sufficient specific facts constituting admissible evidence to be an adequate response”).
Although the majority’s opinion is replete with language relating to defendant’s knowledge or suspicions or serious doubts, it is of course understood the corporate defendant, being an impersonal entity, could be guilty of proceeding with knowledge a story was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false only through the imputed acts of its employee or employees directly responsible. See Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Iowa 625, 633, 146 N.W. 830, 834 (1914); White v. Textbook Co., 150 Iowa 27, 31, 129 N.W. 338, 340 (1911); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1280 pp. 957-960. If the publishing corporation were to be held responsible for its knowledge generally, then it could be charged with the information in its files, a concept rejected by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 287, 84 S.Ct. 710, 730, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 710-711 (1964).
In this instance defendant urges one employee was directly responsible for the alleged mistake and publication of the libelous news story. That employee’s version of the incident, his knowledge and mental processes, were before trial court on submission of the motion only through the affidavit of a supervisor who made an “investigation”. It is plain this evidence would be hearsay and inadmissible if proper objection had been urged below. Defendant does not assert here its evidence met the requirements of R.C.P. 237(e), rather it urges we may consider it even though it was hearsay because defendant made no objection be*159low, citing Sallee v. Routson, 247 Iowa 1220, 1222-1223, 78 N.W.2d 516, 517-518 (1956). In my view, this position is sound. Of course, had objection been made, defendant may well have submitted an affidavit which would have met the rule requirement.
II. To me yet another danger of misinterpretation lurks in our disposition of this appeal. The gist of actual malice is almost identical whether defined by the United States Supreme Court, Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 279-280, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706 (“ * * * statement * * * made * * * with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”) or by this court, Vojak v. Jensen, 161 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Iowa 1968) (“Actual malice is defined as ill-will, hatred or desire to do another harm. It may also result from a reckless or wanton disregard of the rights of others”). Obviously a vital element in the ordinary case is the “state of mind” of the person or persons directly responsible. Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 287, 84 S.Ct. at 730, 11 L.Ed.2d at 710.
For the same reasons negligence cases ordinarily are not susceptible of summary adjudication, Daboll v. Hoden, 222 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1974), claimants damaged by libelous publications should be summarily deprived of their day in court only after the most rigid application of our rule that all material properly before the court must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Steinbach v. Continental Western Insurance Company, 237 N.W.2d 780 (Iowa 1976); Sherwood v. Nissen, 179 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 1970). A summary adjudication turning on the subjective state of mind of a person responsible for an otherwise libelous statement, proved by the post-publication affidavit of that individual, would come into inevitable tension with our long-standing rule a court and jury are not bound to accept testimony as true because it is not contradicted. Daboll v. Hoden, supra, 222 N.W.2d at 736; Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d 632, 643 (Iowa 1969). Of course, even where facts are not in dispute or contradicted, if reasonable minds might draw different inferences from them, a jury question is engendered. Rule 344(f)(17), R.C.P.; Ruby v. Easton, 207 N.W.2d 10, 15 (Iowa 1973).
In this instance the other circumstances, including the retraction, coupled with the objective explanation placed in the record without objection may merit administrating a coup de grace to plaintiff’s cause of action at a pre-trial stage.