Court Opinion

ID: 9898133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:41.181863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:11.089646
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                    No. 84205-6-I
                      Respondent,
                                                    DIVISION ONE
      v.
                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 KEVIN ALEXANDER RODRIGUEZ,

                      Appellant.

      COBURN, J. — A jury convicted Kevin Rodriguez of manslaughter in the first

degree after the trial judge declined to instruct the jury on manslaughter in the second

degree based on the fact Rodriguez testified that he was acting in self-defense.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction,

despite Rodriguez’s own testimony, other admitted evidence created an inference

where a jury could have found that Rodriguez was in such a psychotic delusional state

that he did not know of and disregarded a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur,

but that he did act criminally negligent. Because there was a factual basis to instruct

the jury on manslaughter in the second degree, the trial court abused its discretion by

failing to do so when requested. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

     Citations and pincites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
84205-6-I/2

                                           FACTS

       In February 2019, Antonio Robles Mendez shared an apartment in Monroe,

Washington, with six other men. He shared the master bedroom with Daniel Aquino

Indalecio. Leonel Martinez Martinez shared a room with Josue Galvan Tereso.

Damaso Martinez Crus shared a third bedroom with someone also named Antonio who

went by the name Moises. The seventh roommate was Evodio Garcia Martinez, known

to others by the name “Bodio,” who always slept on the couch in the living room with the

same particular set of blankets completely over him.

       Around 10 p.m. on February 9, Robles Mendez, along with Galvan Tereso,

Martinez Martinez, and Aquino Indalecio, left to go to a casino. When they were

leaving, Garcia Martinez was on the couch, awake but preparing to go to sleep, and the

two other remaining roommates stayed behind to sleep in their shared room.

       Robles Mendez and the others returned some time between 1 and 2 a.m. They

entered the apartment 1 and saw a blanketed form on the living room couch where

Garcia Martinez usually slept. Suddenly, Rodriguez walked out of the bedroom that

Galvan Tereso and Martinez Martinez shared.

       Rodriguez and Robles Mendez knew each other. Rodriguez testified at trial that

Robles Mendez had invited Rodriguez to stay at the apartment earlier that day or the

previous night. Robles Mendez denied having invited Rodriguez to stay at the

apartment. Robles Mendez did not initially recognize Rodriguez because he wore a

black bandana and a hooded sweatshirt. Without explanation, Rodriguez began

attacking the returning roommates with two knives. Robles Mendez first recognized

       1
         The jury heard conflicting testimony as to whether the door was locked when the men
returned to the apartment.
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Rodriguez when the bandana covering his face began falling off. During the ensuing

physical confrontation where the roommates tried to subdue Rodriguez, Rodriguez

slashed Martinez Martinez in the arms and Robles Mendez’s shoulder and next to his

eye. Rodriguez locked Galvan Tereso and Aquino Indalecio outside the apartment after

they had fled at the initial shock of the attack. Robles Mendez either threw a vacuum or

a fan at Rodriguez, knocking him over. The roommates were able to wrestle one of the

knives away from Rodriguez and unlock the front door to let the two other roommates

back inside to assist in the struggle. The men wrestled Rodriguez to the ground, took

the last knife away from Rodriguez and tied his wrists.

      During the struggle, the men landed on Garcia Martinez who was under the

blanket on the couch and did not move. After shifting the blanket on the couch, they

discovered that Garcia Martinez had been brutally stabbed to death.

      Robles Mendez recalled that during the confrontation Rodriguez said he was

sorry, he didn’t do it and that there were “more people outside in the Tahoe.” Robles

Mendez ran out to the doorway and saw a gray car that was leaving the apartment

complex but did not recognize anyone in it. Martinez Martinez remembers Rodriguez

was silent during the initial attack, but after they subdued him Rodriguez began to say

that it wasn’t him and started to repeat the name “Chuy.”

      After the roommates discovered that Garcia Martinez was dead, Rodriguez

continued attempts to rise up and Martinez Martinez began to hit Rodriguez in the head

with a frying pan while Galvan Tereso struck Rodriguez with a wooden board. Robles

Mendez stepped out of the apartment and called 911.

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       Monroe Police arrived and found Robles Mendez holding a rag to his head to

staunch blood flow from the laceration he had received. Robles Mendez directed police

inside the apartment by calling out: “Hurry, hurry. He’s in here. He killed him.” Officers

could hear banging and scuffling from within the apartment along with a shout of “Chuy,

no, stop.” Officer Trevor Larson rushed up the stairs and looked inside the foyer where

he saw six males 2 pinning Rodriguez against a half-wall inside the entrance to the

apartment. Rodriguez had injuries to his face and hands and was slick with blood.

Robles Mendez indicated to police that Rodriguez had killed Robles Mendez’s

roommate.

       As police officers escorted Rodriguez down the landing and handcuffed him,

Rodriguez struggled and shouted a constant string of unprompted phrases: “Chuy, no.

Chuy, stop. Chuy, don’t hurt me.” As the officers placed Rodriguez in the backseat of

officer Larson’s patrol car, Rodriguez continued to protest and shout repetitive and

rambling phrases, among them: “Alberto, tell him the truth.” “Not the car, not in the car,

Chuy, no.” “No dragging, no dragging.”

       As Larson drove Rodriguez to the EvergreenHealth hospital in Monroe,

Rodriguez continued to shout: “Chuy, don’t hurt me, Chuy, stop.” Larson asked

Rodriguez if he could tell the officer his name, to which Rodriguez responded “it’s K-

Rod.” Upon arrival at the emergency room drop off area, and in response to the

shouting of “stop hurting me, don’t hurt me” from Rodriguez, Larson told Rodriguez they

were not hurting him, that he was the police and they had arrived at a hospital, then

       2
          Robles Mendez said Martinez Crus and the other Antonio were not initially part of the
fight but came out when they heard the police. Martinez Crus testified that he did not hear
anything the night of the murder as he had gone to sleep early and was woken up after police
arrived.
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identified himself as Larson, at which point Rodriguez responded by saying “the big

one,” “the little one,” and “the little Larson.” When hospital staff arrived with a gurney,

Rodriguez was escorted out of the squad car and onto it, all the while saying “stop, don’t

hurt me,” and “no, no, Chuy’s out there.” Rodriguez erratically mumbled or screamed

about “Chuy” in between cries of pain as his clothing was cut off of him and hospital

staff examined his injuries. Rodriguez had numerous injuries, bruising, cuts, and a

brain bleed. A toxicology report confirmed the presence of methamphetamine and

alcohol in Rodriguez’s blood draw. He would later be transferred to a Seattle hospital to

treat the brain bleed, which was almost certainly incurred during the struggle at the

apartment.

       A Snohomish County Medical Examiner testified that Garcia Martinez was killed

by “a large slashing wound of his throat that went through his carotid arteries and the

jugular veins all the way through on both sides.” The injuries were inflicted while he was

laying faceup on the couch and Garcia Martinez likely died “basically in the position

where [medical examiners] first saw him.” The medical examiner estimated 70 discrete

injuries on the victim’s body, including 20 or 21 injuries just to his face. These were

sharp incisions all the way to the facial bones. The nature of injuries to the abdomen

and liver along with blood pooling analysis suggested that many of these stab wounds

were made after the victim had already died. The defects and blood on the blanket that

had reportedly covered Garcia Martinez were consistent with the multiple stab wounds.

Overwhelming forensic evidence linked Rodriguez to the knives found at the scene and

the victim.

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       Rodriguez testified at trial that on February 9, having previously been given

permission to stay in the apartment by Robles Mendez, he moved in some of his

belongings, bought and used methamphetamine, went to a gym, then drank alcohol in

the apartment. Then he heard the sound of a car, which he believed (based on the

unique exhaust note) to be that owned by his friend, Chuy. 3 According to Rodriguez, he

then heard Chuy and a group of individuals go up the stairs where he met them at the

door, then they pushed their way into the apartment, punched Rodriguez, and

demanded money. Rodriguez testified that as he fought back to defend himself, the

man who had up to this point been laying on the couch under a blanket rose up to join

with Chuy and the other assailants, brandished a gun, and threatened to shoot

Rodriguez. Rodriguez then retrieved his pair of kitchen knives and slashed at the gun-

wielding man’s face twice, whereupon the man “fell backwards to where he got up from

the couch.” Rodriguez testified he was in fear for his life and “wasn’t going to sit there

and find out if he was going to shoot me.”

       Rodriguez testified that he knew Garcia Martinez because they were “in the

same apartment” and in passing from him working in a Mexican grocery store.

Rodriguez identified Garcia Martinez as the man he slashed in the face twice, but there

was “no way” he was responsible for the many grievous injuries shown in autopsy

photographs. Rodriguez testified that he had no prior disagreement with or reason to

want to harm or kill Garcia Martinez.

       3
         Chuy was identified as the nickname of a real person, Jesus Padilla, who lived in the
neighborhood according to other witness testimony, but only Rodriguez identified Chuy as being
present in the apartment at any time that night. Police sought contact with Padilla without
success.
                                              6
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         Rodriguez said that after slashing at Garcia Martinez he fled to a bedroom where

he locked the door behind himself and smoked methamphetamine. Rodriguez testified

that he was again attacked at some point but that Chuy was no longer there and he did

not recognize the faces of any of his assailants, and the fight “probably ended because I

lost.” Rodriguez has vague memories of the arrival of the police, but did not recognize

his own actions as shown by body cam footage. Rodriguez also testified that he does

not remember being able to focus much that night.

         The defense called an expert witness, Dr. Mark Koenen, a general and forensic

psychiatrist with experience in drug-induced psychosis. Dr. Koenen evaluated

Rodriguez by interviewing him twice as well as reviewing, among other information, a

psychological evaluation conducted by another psychologist, police reports, body

camera footage, and a toxicology report from the night of Rodriguez’ arrest. Dr. Koenen

testified that he had diagnosed Rodriguez with alcohol use disorder, methamphetamine

use disorder, and a transient psychotic disorder secondary to the methamphetamine

use. Symptoms of that diagnosis included agitation, violence, paranoia, and poor reality

testing (in short, paranoid delusions). Dr. Koenen testified that long-term

methamphetamine use can result in delusions that persist months and possibly even

years.

         Dr. Koenen explained that these paranoid delusions could manifest as beliefs in

unreal aggressors tormenting the individual, and that Rodriguez’ behaviors the night of

the arrest were consistent with such symptoms. Koenen further testified:

         Psychosis can affect intent if you don’t know what you’re doing . . . say
         you were in a psychotic state and you’re seeing things and hearing things
         and you’re delusional. Your intent could be to shoot a werewolf because
         you see it right in front of me . . . [but, the bullet] hits me. You didn’t intend

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       to shoot me, you intended to shoot this thing that was in your house that,
       frankly, wasn’t there.

Although Dr. Koenen used fantasy antagonists like werewolves, extraterrestrials, and

demons to illustrate extreme cases of these psychotic delusions, he also made clear

that more mundane and facially believable but no less false delusions were possible

(“like my neighbor was trying to kill me . . . I remember they were here, I remember they

threatened me. It may never have happened”) and that Rodriguez’ symptoms appeared

to fit this pattern. From the interviews he had done with Rodriguez, Dr. Koenen

described Rodriguez’s impressions of that night as “vague memories and . . . very

fragmentary. It was like talking to somebody about a dream they had.” Dr. Koenen

further testified that in his medical opinion Rodriguez was suffering from delusions the

night Garcia Martinez was killed.

       Dr. Koenen also explained that potential motives and efforts to cover up a crime

are some things a forensic evaluation considers. “It’s always a question of is this thing

that happened a result of mental illness or just somebody basically lying about it.” In

Rodriguez’s case, Dr. Koenen observed that there was neither evidence of a coherent

motive nor an attempt to cover up the crime and that Rodriguez’ behavior afterward as

observed by eyewitnesses was completely disorganized. Dr. Koenen testified that

Rodriguez’s behavior closer in proximity to the drug use was probably even more

disorganized. Dr. Koenen testified that “[i]t really has the feel of something that is the

product of psychosis.”

       Though Rodriguez did suffer a head injury and brain bleed during the

confrontation with the roommates, Dr. Koenen testified that this fact did not alter his

evaluation because Rodriguez was released the very next day from the hospital and “it

                                             8
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probably resolved pretty quickly.” During cross examination, the prosecutor asked Dr.

Koenen to address Rodriguez’s admissions made at trial.

       [Prosecutor:] Dr. Koenen, would it impact your opinion of your evaluation if
       you were aware that Mr. Rodriguez testified that he did intend to stab
       Evodio?

       [Answer:] Wouldn’t change it if it was a – if he was still operating from
       some delusion about defending himself.

       At the end of trial, Rodriguez proposed multiple jury instructions, including

manslaughter in the second degree. 4 The court instructed the jury on self-defense,

voluntary intoxication, diminished capacity, evidence of mental illness, murder in the first

degree, murder in the second degree, and manslaughter in the first degree. The court

declined to instruct the jury on manslaughter in the second degree. The court

explained, “I don’t find that there is sufficient factual basis for a negligence standard

based upon the evidence that’s been presented, so that’s why I’m not giving that

manslaughter.”

       At closing, the defense argued that Rodriguez’ and Koenen’s testimony

mandated a conviction for manslaughter in the first degree:

       If you believe Kevin was in that apartment and stabbed Evodio Garcia
       Martinez, ask yourself why. . . . If you take the uncontroverted testimony
       of Dr. Koenen, then he couldn’t form intent or premeditation. That leaves
       you with manslaughter in the first degree. That’s the uncontroverted
       testimony in this case.

The jury found Rodriguez not guilty of murder in the first degree, but guilty of

manslaughter in the first degree and the two counts of assault in the second degree.

The jury also found that Rodriguez was armed with a deadly weapon for all counts.

       4
        These proposed instructions were consistent with the relevant Washington Practice
Series Criminal Instructions. 11 W ASHINGTON PRACTICE: W ASHINGTON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 10.04 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC), 28.05, 28.06.
                                              9
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                                       DISCUSSION

       The trial court denied Rodriguez’s request to instruct the jury on manslaughter in

the second degree because the court did not find a sufficient factual basis to support

giving the instruction. Rodriguez assigns error to this ruling.

       A defendant “may be found guilty of [a lesser included offense,] the commission

of which is necessarily included within that with which he or she is charged in the

indictment or information.” RCW 10.61.006. “The statutory right to lesser included

offense instructions ‘protect[s] procedural fairness and substantial justice for the

accused.’” State v. Avington, No. 101398-1, slip op. at 14 (Wash. Sept. 28, 2023),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1013981.pdf (quoting State v. Coryell, 197

Wn.2d 397, 412, 483 P.3d 98 (2021)). Giving juries the option to convict on a lesser

included offense

       is crucial to the integrity of our criminal justice system because when
       defendants are charged with only one crime, juries must either convict
       them of that crime or let them go free. In some cases, that will create a
       risk that the jury will convict the defendant despite having reasonable
       doubts.

Coryell, 197 Wn.2d at 418 (quoting State v. Henderson, 182 Wn.2d 734, 736, 344 P.3d

1207 (2015)). The test to determine whether a criminal defendant is entitled to

instruction on a lesser included offense has two prongs, one legal and one factual.

State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443, 447-48, 584 P.2d 382 (1978). The trial court and the

parties agreed that the legal prong of Workman was satisfied. “[F]irst and second

degree manslaughter are lesser included offenses of second degree intentional murder

and instructions should be given to a jury when the facts support such an instruction.”

State v. Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 541, 551, 947 P.2d 700 (1997).

                                             10
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       The standard of review applied to jury instructions depends on the trial court’s

decision under review. Coryell, 197 Wn.2d at 405. We review a trial court’s decision

not to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion if the decision is based on a

factual determination, while if it is based on a legal conclusion it is reviewed de novo.

Id. Because the issue before the panel is the factual prong of the Workman test, we

review under the abuse of discretion standard.

       In determining whether evidence supports an inference that the lesser crime was

committed, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting

the instruction. State v. Fluker, 5 Wn. App. 2d 374, 397, 425 P.3d 903 (2018). “If a jury

could rationally find a defendant guilty of the lesser offense and not the greater offense,

the jury must be instructed on the lesser offense.” Henderson, 182 Wn.2d at 736.

       The distinction between manslaughter in the first and second degree is the level

of culpability. The jury was instructed that “[a] person commits the crime of

manslaughter in the first degree when he or she recklessly causes the death of another

person unless the killing is justified.” Another instruction explained that

               A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of
       and disregards a substantial risk that death may occur and this disregard
       is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise
       in the same situation.
               When recklessness as to a particular result is required to establish
       an element of a crime, the element is also established if a person acts
       intentionally as to that result.

Rodriguez had proposed a to-convict instruction for manslaughter in the second degree,

which would have required the jury to find that Rodriguez “engaged in conduct of

criminal negligence” and that Garcia Martinez died as a result of Rodriguez’s negligent

                                             11
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acts. See RCW 9A.32.070 (“A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree

when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person.”).

              A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence
       when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act
       may occur and this failure constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
       of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation.
              When criminal negligence as to a particular fact is required to
       establish an element of a crime, the element is also established if a
       person acts intentionally or knowingly or recklessly as to that fact.

WPIC 10.04; RCW 9A.08.010(1)(d).

       The State argues that “the difference between the two degrees of manslaughter

is the determinative issue and there was no evidence the defendant acted only

negligently.” The State makes this argument despite the fact it correctly quotes the

Supreme Court’s clarification of the analytical test in Coryell:

       The test was never intended to require evidence that the greater, charged
       crime was not committed—only that a jury, faced with conflicting evidence,
       could conclude the prosecution had proved only the lesser or inferior
       crime.

       ...

       In sum, we reaffirm that the factual requirement for giving a lesser or
       inferior degree instruction is that some evidence must be presented—
       from whatever source, including cross-examination—which affirmatively
       establishes the defendant’s theory before an instruction will be given.

(quoting Coryell, 197 Wn.2d at 414-15) (emphasis added).

       The State argues that Rodriguez’s testimony established that he intended to stab

the victim in the face repeatedly and that, even in light of Dr. Koenen’s testimony, the

jury would have to disregard the defendant’s testimony to find that he was merely

negligent. The State adds, “no person would fail to be aware of a substantial risk of

homicide where he stabs a person in the head with chef’s knives.” But the question is

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not whether the evidence establishes that Rodriguez acted only negligently. The

question is whether the jury, faced with conflicting evidence, could conclude that

Rodriguez acted negligently by knowing of and disregarding a substantial risk:

       The reason lesser included instructions are given is to assist the jury in
       weighing the evidence, determining witness credibility, and deciding
       disputed questions of fact. The jury, not the trial judge, is “the sole and
       exclusive judges of the evidence.” Although there may be conflicting
       evidence, this evidence presents a question of fact for the jury. The
       conflicts in the evidence merely present a question of fact for the jury.

Coryell, 197 Wn.2d at 414 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State

v. McDaniels, 30 Wn.2d 76, 88, 190 P.2d 705 (1948), overruled in part on other grounds

by State v. Partridge, 47 Wn.2d 640, 289 P.2d 702 (1955)).

       The State’s argument is grounded in its position that the jury had to believe

Rodriguez’s trial testimony that he intended to stab the victim in the face. What the

State ignores is that the jury can choose to accept or reject Rodriguez’s testimony in

whole or in part. The jurors were correctly instructed that they were “the sole judges of

the credibility of each witness” and were “the sole judges of the value or weight to be

given to the testimony of each witness.” See Moen v. Chestnut, 9 Wn.2d 93, 102, 113

P.2d 1030 (1941) (observing that a jury is not limited, in its findings, to the direct

testimony of any one witness and is “free to accept, or reject, any part of the testimony

of any witness”).

       The jury heard evidence that questioned Rodriguez’s mental state. Rodriguez

admitted to using methamphetamine that night and a toxicology report confirmed it to be

true. He exhibited delusional thinking while with his roommates, police, and at the

hospital. Dr. Koenen, a forensic psychologist, examined Rodriguez and diagnosed him

with alcohol use disorder, methamphetamine use disorder, and a transient psychotic

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disorder secondary to the methamphetamine use. Dr. Koenen testified that psychosis

can affect intent if someone does not know what they are doing. Though Rodriguez

testified at trial that he stabbed Garcia Martinez as a reaction to Garcia Martinez

pointing a gun at Rodriguez, Dr. Koenen’s testimony suggested that this testimony itself

could be a product of delusion. Dr. Koenen explained that long-term methamphetamine

use can result in delusions that persist months and even years. Rodriguez testified that

he does not remember being able to focus much on the night in question. Dr. Koenen,

who interviewed Rodriguez twice, said Rodriguez’s impressions of that night were

“vague memories . . . very fragmentary. It was like talking to somebody about a dream

they had.”

       At trial during questioning, Rodriguez repeatedly was asked about the police

officer body cam footage that captured his behavior at the time of arrest and was played

during trial. Rodriguez testified that he did not remember much of it. His own testimony

of stabbing Garcia Martinez twice while he was standing in front of the door and

watching him fall back onto the couch was contradicted by the medical examiner and

forensic evidence that showed Garcia Martinez to have suffered about 70 discrete

injuries, including 20 or 21 sharp incisions to the face. Garcia Martinez was laying on

his back on the couch at the time he was killed. The stabbing continued even after he

was dead. A reasonable juror could have found that Rodriguez’s testimony was a

delusional attempt to make sense of the evidence presented at trial and not necessarily

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of what Rodriguez was thinking the night Garcia

Martinez was killed.

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       The evidence is such that a jury could find that Rodriguez was in such a

psychotic delusional state that he did not know of and disregarded a substantial risk that

a wrongful act may occur, but did act criminally negligent by failing to be aware of a

substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur. But the jury was not given this option.

       It does not matter that Rodriguez argued that he acted in self-defense. “[I]t is

generally permissible for defendants to argue inconsistent defenses so long as they are

supported by the evidence.” State v. Frost, 160 Wn.2d 765, 772, 161 P.3d 361 (2007).

While a trial court should “‘in all cases . . . restrict the argument of counsel to the facts in

evidence,’” they still “‘cannot compel counsel to reason logically or draw only those

inferences from the given facts which the court believes to be logical.’” Id. (second

alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Perez-

Cervantes, 141 Wn.2d 468, 475, 6 P.3d 1160 (2000); City of Seattle v. Arensmeyer, 6

Wn. App. 116, 121, 491 P.2d 1305 (1971)).

        The courts should “err on the side of instructing juries on lesser included

offenses.” Henderson, 182 Wn.2d at 736.

       State v. Fernandez-Medina is instructive. There, the defendant argued that by

withholding an instruction on assault in the second degree the trial court prevented a

presentation to the jury of an alternative theory of the case, while the prosecution

countered that the instruction was unwarranted due to the presentation of an alibi

defense. 141 Wn.2d 448, 457, 6 P.3d 1150 (2000). The Washington Supreme Court

reversed the Fernandez-Medina trial court’s denial of the requested instruction, noting

that “[i]f the trial court were to examine only the testimony of the defendant, it would

have been justified in refusing to give the requested inferior degree instruction . . . [but

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that the] trial court is not to take such a limited view of the evidence . . . when it is

deciding whether or not an instruction should be given.” 141 Wn.2d at 455-56

(emphasis added). Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court appeared to follow the

State’s argument of focusing on the defendant’s testimony rather than take an

appropriately-expansive view of the evidence and permit the defense to present their

theories, as supported by that evidence, to the jury.

       The trial judge’s denial of an instruction on manslaughter in the second degree

necessarily limited how the defense presented its theory of the case to the jury. The

defense argument as presented to the jury at closing largely took Rodriguez’ testimony

at face value, contending that from the standpoint of Rodriguez’ memories of that night

he committed a subjectively reasonable act of self-defense by stabbing Martinez twice

in the face after Martinez pointed a gun at Rodriguez. Without the instruction on

manslaughter in the second degree, Rodriguez could not suggest an alternative verdict

to the jury.

       The State cites Avington to support its argument that this court “must apply

deferential review” under the abuse of discretion standard and that, because the trial did

not apply an incorrect legal standard and the court’s application of the factual prong was

reasonable, we should affirm. Specifically, the State argues,

       One reasonable interpretation of the evidence may be that a juror could
       reasonably infer that diminished capacity in one scenario, forming intent,
       also means an ability to appreciate risk is affected. However, the question
       before this Court is whether another reasonable interpretation, the one the
       trial court adopted, is that general testimony about a defendant’s behavior
       and the possible effects of methamphetamine use, in light of “all of the
       evidence,” failed to support an inference that this defendant could not
       appreciate the risks of his actions. Where a trial court applies the factual
       prong of Workman, this Court must apply deferential review. The trial
       court’s factual determination was reasonable.

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The State misreads Avington. The Washington Supreme Court did not affirm the

Avington trial court’s decision to not instruct on manslaughter out of deference to the

trial court’s reasonable interpretation of the evidence. In fact, the Supreme Court

expressly noted that “Avington correctly notes that in its oral ruling, the trial court stated

that ‘the physical evidence undermines greatly the credibility of Mr. Avington’s assertion

that he did not aim at anybody in particular.’” Avington, slip op. at 21. It was because of

that statement by the trial court that our Supreme Court, quoting Coryell, 197 Wn.2d at

414-15, wrote

       We take this opportunity to reaffirm that the members of the jury, not the
       trial judge, are “the sole and exclusive judges of the evidence.” Thus,
       genuine questions of credibility must be left to “the jury’s decision.” We
       reaffirm that it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to “weigh[ ] the
       evidence and deny[ ] a lesser included instruction when the evidence
       presented should have been weighed by the jury.”

Avington, slip op. at 21-22 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court,

nonetheless, affirmed the conviction because Avington’s testimony did not create any

relevant factual dispute for the jury’s determination. 5 Id. at 22.

       Unlike the defendant’s testimony in Avington, in the instant case Rodriguez’s

testimony did create a relevant factual dispute. The physical evidence as to how Garcia

Martinez died contradicted Rodriguez’s version of events. Dr. Koenen’s testimony,

       5
           Avington was charged under accomplice liability for inciting and participating in a
gunfight. His co-defendant testified to intentionally firing the shots that killed the victim.
Avington, slip op. at 9. The Supreme Court observed that
         [t]he undisputed evidence at trial showed that the bullet that killed [the victim] did
         not come from Avington’s gun. As a result, Avington’s testimony about the
         direction of his aim did not create a question of fact for the jury as to whether he
         participated in [the victim]’s death under circumstances manifesting an extreme
         indifference to human life. In other words, contrary to Avington’s argument, it
         simply did not matter whether Avington was aiming directly at anyone or not.
Id. at 2.
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toxicology reports, and witness testimony supported a reasonable inference that

Rodriguez was in a psychotic delusional state at the time Garcia Martinez was killed.

Thus, some evidence existed to support instructing the jury on manslaughter in the

second degree. It was for the jury, not the judge, to weigh the evidence.

       For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying Rodriguez’s request to instruct the jury on manslaughter in the second degree.

We reverse the manslaughter conviction and remand for further proceedings. 6

WE CONCUR:

       6
          Rodriguez also appeals the imposition of the DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) collection
and community custody supervision fees. The parties agree and the record supports that these
fees were reflected on the judgment and sentence in error. Though we reverse the
manslaughter conviction, we nonetheless point out these errors for the trial court to strike these
legal financial obligations because the sentence included Rodriguez’s two other convictions of
assault in the second degree.
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