Court Opinion

ID: 6545508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-19 22:19:14.264458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:55:57.344133
License: Public Domain

Hire, C. J., (after stating the facts.) 1. The negligence of the company in failing to give the signals, required by law was abundantly established, and the conflict in the evidence on this point has been settled by the jury. The next question, and the one most earnestly presented here, is that‘the evidence showed that Hitt was guilty of contributory negligence in driving on the track under the circumstances set out in the statement. Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, said: “It is well settled that, where there is uncertainty as to the existence of either negligence or contributory negligence, the question is not one of law, but of fact, and to be settled by a jury; and this whether the uncertainty arises from a conflict in the testimony, or because, the facts being undisputed, fair-minded men will honestly draw different conclusions from them. (Citing authorities.)” Richmond & D. Rd. Co. v. Powers, 149 U. S. 43. The authorities sustaining this doctrine are collected in St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 61 Ark. 549, 33 S. W. 1070. Testing the evidence upon this principle, it cannot be said that the facts disclose a situation rendering it negligence for Hitt to drive onto the track. At a distance of 82 feet from the track he took the precautions required by law and common sense, and, neither seeing nor hearing anything to indicate a train was coming on the main track, and, the way being made clear, and employees standing near, with better opportunity of seeing or hearing than he had, who would doubtless warn him for humanity’s sake alone, if no duty rested on them, not to cross in front of a rapidly approaching train, and, after consulting with his son, the fatal drive began. While it is true the sheet of the wagon obstructed the vision on either side, and in a measure the hearing, yet they believed from their investigation that the way was clear, and they continued to look ahead and listen. The electric arc light and the headlight of the freight engine, casting their rays on the crossing, might well tend to prevent the discovery of the light from the headlight of the approaching train. The situation confronting Mr. Hitt was not such as requires the court to say, as a matter of law, that it was per se negligence, under the circumstances, to attempt to cross the track. The ringing bell or sounding whistle would doubtless have given the warning of the approaching train, which was not otherwise apparent to Mr. Hitt or his son. These are facts from which fair-minded men may draw different conclusions as to whether the care exercised was proportional to the danger to be avoided, and such as the situation called for from men of prudence and caution. When such are the facts of a case, then the question must be settled by a jury, under proper instructions. 2. The next matter assigned as error is the giving of the third and fourth instructions, which are set out in the statement of facts. The point urged against these instructions is that they displayed to the jury an expression of opinion upon the part of the court upon the weight of the evidence. It is further urged against the third that it has singled out certain parts of the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, and disregarded every item of contributory negligence, and, without referring to the same, in a counter statement, has said the weight of this specific evidence is sufficient to set aside all the evidence establishing contributory negligence. If there is evidence to sustain a particular theory of a case, the court should properly instruct the jury as to such theory. Smith v. State, 50 Ark. 545, 8 S. W. 941. Instructions should declare the law as applicable to any view of the facts which upon the evidence may be taken by either of the parties to the cause on trial. Luckinbill v. State, 52 Ark. 45, 11 S. W. 963. Every instruction should be hypothetical, i. e., predicated upon the supposition that, if certain evidence be true, then the legal consequence resulting therefrom is one way or the other. State Bank v. McGuire, 14 Ark. 530; Collins v. Mack, 31 Ark. 684. It is error to refuse to give a specific instruction correctly and clearly applying the law to the facts in the case, even though the law, in a general way, is covered by the charge given. St. Louis & S. F. Rd. Co. v. Crabtree, 69 Ark. 134, 62 S. W. 64. Applying these settled principles to the instruction in question, it cannot be said that they are open to the objections urged. Each side prayed and was granted many specific instructions, covering phases of the case which they desired drawn sharply to the attention of»the jury. The court fails to find error in them, and, taken, together, they consistently present the whole case, generally and specifically. 3. Error is assigned in the refusal of the court to give the sixth instruction. The distance from the center of the side track upon which the freight train stood to the center of the main track, upon which the train was approaching, was 14 feet. It was therefore an impossibility to have avoided the accident at that late moment. The mules drawing the wagon were on the main track before the wagon could have cleared the freight train, and the freight train behind them was whistling at that moment. The care is to be measured by the act of going into this danger, not when it is too imminent for avoidance, and when excitement and danger dethrone judgment. The case was properly submitted under instructions fully explaining the care required, and it was not error to refuse to give this one. 4. Objection is made to admission of testimony of a life insurance agent as to the expectancy of life, as shown by the mortality tables, of a man of Hitt’s age, and an estimate of the amount required to purchase an annuity equal to Hitt’s income. These tables were held admissible, and their uses explained, in Arkansas Midland Ry. Co. v. Griffith, 63 Ark. 491, 39 S. W. 550. The record fails to show the calculation complained of, but it •could not be error, as it was but relieving the jury of the labor involved in it. The court gave the following instruction on the subject: “If your verdict should be for the plaintiffs, you will assess the damage at such sum as will compensate them for their pecuniary loss resulting from the death of the husband and father. In estimating this loss, it is proper for you to take into consideration the age, health, habits, occupation, expectation of life, mental and physical capacity for and disposition to labor, and the probable increase or decrease of that ability with the lapse of time; his earning capacity; the care and attention, the instruction and training, one of his disposition and character may be expected to give to his family — and thus determine the value of the life. From this amount deduct the personal expenses of deceased, and the balance, reduced to its present value, would be the present amount of your verdict, provided such of the deceased’s children as were minors at his death or at this time would not be entitled to any compensation on account of death of deceased for a period beyond the time of their attaining their majority.” It is seen, therefore, that the court properly gave the elements to consider in arriving at the compensatory amount. If the calculation was made, it was useful only to reach the probable amount required to purchase the annuity to represent his income, and from such amount personal expenses were directed to be deducted. Opinion delivered July 29, 1905. 5. The verdict is assailed as excessive. It is less, by the sum of $1,054, than the sum representing the present value of his income. Of course, his personal expenses should be deducted —likely much more than said $1,054; but, on the other hand, there was another element proper to enter into the verdict, and that was the loss of his care and attention to his minor children. St. Louis & N. A. Rd. Co. v. Mathis, ante, p. 184, and cases there cited. The verdict is not excessive. The judgment is affirmed. Battle and Riddick, JJ., dissent.