Court Opinion

ID: 9523129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:36:20.171818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:35.242746
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE BARRY, specially concurring: I specially concur in the result of the majority opinion but do so for reasons other than those expressed by my colleagues. I believe the trial court correctly found that the questioned ordinance of the village of Romeoville was beyond the authority delegated to it by the General Assembly. I acknowledge the established principle of statutory construction, that a municipal ordinance should, as far as possible, be given a construction which renders it valid rather than void. Here the normal presumption of the validity of the ordinance has been overcome. After reviewing the evidence and the arguments, I agree with the trial court that the General Assembly has not delegated the power to the village to regulate the political activities of its employees as the questioned ordinance attempted to do. The powers of a village are divided into two categories, those that are expressly granted and those that are implied. The village possesses and may only exercise those powers expressly granted by the General Assembly and those additional powers necessarily implied in or incident to those expressly granted powers. City of Bloomington v. Wirrick (1942), 381 Ill. 347, 45 N.E.2d 852; Village of Cherry Valley v. Schuelke (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 91, 360 N.E.2d 158; Ill. Const. 1970, art. 7, §7. The village argues, and the majority opinion wrongly concludes, that section 10 — 4—1 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev” Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 10 — 4—1) is a delegation by the General Assembly of the power to regulate all the political activities of its employees. Section 10 — 4—1 states: “The corporate authorities of any municipality may provide by ordinance in regard to the relation between all municipal officers and employees in respect to each other, the municipality, and the people.” The language of the above-quoted statute is a very broad delegation of power to the village to regulate and direct its day-to-day operations with regard to employees and officers as they affect the village. Although the power therein is expressly delegated, it does not specifically authorize for the village to thereby regulate the political activities of its employees. The power to so act, if it exists at all, must then necessarily be implied from the general powers set forth in section 10 — 4—1 of the Illinois Municipal Code. The legislature has not seen fit to specifically delegate the power to so regulate employee conduct, as has been attempted here, to the village. The language of section 10 — 4—1 itself does not authorize any additional implied powers to the village as the necessary and proper clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. I, §8) does to Congress. I do not believe the Illinois General Assembly intended that their general delegation of power in this section of the Municipal Code should be broadened to include a multitude of unnecessarily far reaching additional implied powers. I particularly do not believe the General Assembly intended by section 10 — 4—1 to authorize villages to enact law limiting the political activities of their employees after working hours. In support of this contention is the analogous situation of the cities civil service act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 10 — 1—1), and section 2 of “An Act to define and regulate political activity by merit employees of the State * * (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24 1/2, par. 38t). The General Assembly provided for the village of Romeoville to establish civil service only through a referendum procedure with the approval by a vote of the electors being necessary to adopt it. Within the cities civil service act the General Assembly has specified the types of political control over village employees that the village may exert. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, pars. 10 — 1—26 through 10 — 1—34 inclusive.) The ordinance adopted by the village of Romeoville is even more stringent than the cities civil service act and “An Act to define and regulate political activity by merit employees of the State * ” in that it purports to regulate after-work activities of village employees. I do not believe that the General Assembly by a grant of implied power in section 10 — 4—1 intended for the village to be able to circumvent the referendum procedure required to adopt a civil service system and allow the village to more stringently regulate the political activities of its employees than the State itself has authorized by separate, more specialized legislation. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24 1/2, par. 38t. The majority suggests that restricting the powers of a village to deal with its employees pursuant' to section 10 — 4—1, as I propose, would be too narrow an interpretation and would leave the municipality without the power to regulate abusive and improper political conduct by its employees. I do not believe such a narrow interpretation renders section 10 — 4—1 “meaningless or impotent.” To the contrary, I do not interpret that section so narrowly as to deprive the village of all the implied power to deal with its employees on a day-to-day basis in the labor market of today. However, the General Assembly has provided an alternative mode for such regulation of political and activities otherwise of municipal employees in the cities civil service act. That act should be utilized, for it is a specific grant of power to the village to enact such regulations. I cannot acquiesce in the strained construction of section 10 — 4—1 of the Illinois Municipal Code utilized by the majority opinion to affirm the judgment of the trial court. For the reasons stated I believe the judgment appealed from was proper and should be affirmed.