Court Opinion

ID: 9926110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 19:02:28.098921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:03.097407
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/23/24 P. v. King CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                            THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    (Sacramento)
                                         ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C097031

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 03F07198)

           v.

    RALPH KING,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In 2005, a jury convicted defendant Ralph King of second degree murder and
attempted murder arising from a shooting carried out by his son. Defendant contends that
the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 former section
1170.95 (now § 1172.6)2 is not supported by substantial evidence. He further argues the

1        Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2      Defendant filed his original petition under former section 1170.95. During the
pendency of that petition, and before the trial court’s most recent ruling, the Legislature
amended former section 1170.95 effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551.) The
Legislature later renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 effective June 30,

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trial court’s conclusion that defendant acted with implied malice impermissibly
contradicts the jury’s acquittal of him for first degree murder. Finally, he argues we
should reverse his conviction for attempted murder or remand the case for further
proceedings on that count. We will affirm.
                                              I
                                     BACKGROUND
       A.     Defendant’s Underlying Crimes and Convictions
       In the drive-through lane of a fast-food restaurant, Demarkas King3 fired a gun
into a car. He killed one person, Allen Qualls, and injured another, M.W. Defendant
accompanied Demarkas and codefendant Kenneth McClish to the scene of the shooting
but remained on the opposite side of a wall while the shooting occurred. (People v. King
(Oct. 19, 2006 (C050300) [nonpub. opn.] (King I).)4
       As relevant here, the second amended consolidated information charged
defendant, Demarkas, and McClish with the murder of Qualls and the attempted murder
of M.W. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664/187, subd. (a).)
       Under the substantial evidence standard of review that applies here, we recount the
evidence from the record “ ‘ “in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant

2022, with no substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will cite to current
section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.
3    Because defendant and Demarkas King have the same last name, we will refer to
Demarkas by his first name. No disrespect is intended.
4      We cite to the opinions in defendant’s direct appeal and prior section 1172.6
appeal to summarize the procedural history of the case, as permitted by section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). We do not use these facts in our analysis but present them to give
context to our discussion.

                                              2
guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276,
298.)
        Defendant is Demarkas’s father. At the time of the crime, McClish was the on-site
property manager of defendant’s apartment complex and also defendant’s friend.
Defendant lived in McClish’s apartment complex but in a different unit. Demarkas lived
with his wife and child at a different apartment complex.
        The shooting here took place at approximately 11:30 p.m. on August 20, 2003, in
the drive-through lane of a fast-food restaurant near defendant’s apartment complex. The
restaurant was across a large field from the complex. A cinderblock wall separated the
fast-food restaurant drive-through lane from the field.
        Demarkas testified he had a confrontation with M.W. (also known as Nova Mike)
while he was at a gas station, during which M.W. threatened him. M.W. and another man
later went to Demarkas’s apartment on August 17, 2003, and assaulted him in front of his
daughter.5
        Later that same day, Demarkas’s wife told a responding sheriff’s deputy that her
husband was involved in a fight, but neither Demarkas nor the other man were at the
apartment anymore.
        M.W. and another man came back a few days later and banged on Demarkas’s
apartment door, and Demarkas called the police, but the police told him they could not do
anything about it.
        The day before the shooting, McClish’s roommate B.P. overheard Demarkas tell
defendant that people had come into Demarkas’s home and assaulted him, and the police

5      Demarkas and defendant shared this same basic information with the investigating
detective. The video of those interviews was played for the jury as was defendant’s
interview.

                                             3
were not doing anything about it. Defendant was upset about this and said he did not
want his family treated like that.
       B.P. overheard another conversation between defendant, Demarkas, and a
neighbor, on this subject. In that conversation, defendant told Demarkas they had one
gun and needed to procure another. Demarkas said he knew where to get a gun, as he had
borrowed one before. There were also other conversations in that same time frame
involving defendant and Demarkas in which they talked about needing another gun. B.P.
heard defendant say the men who hurt Demarkas did not know who they were dealing
with and he was not going to allow his family to be disrespected.
       The evidence disclosed Demarkas’s stepbrother-in-law, T.O., saw defendant with
a black semiautomatic handgun in August 2003. T.O. told Demarkas’s wife and the
investigating detective that, about a week before the shooting, defendant purchased the
black nine-millimeter handgun from some people standing at a local market. Before the
shooting, T.O. saw defendant show the gun to Demarkas and say, “This is a nice gun,” or
something to that effect. Demarkas’s wife reported that defendant said he bought the gun
on the street for $20. She also told an investigator that defendant told her that he gave the
gun to Demarkas.
       Defendant and Demarkas’s wife testified that M.W. came to the door of
Demarkas’s apartment the evening of the shooting and tried to kick it in while Demarkas
was at work. As soon as his wife called him, Demarkas started to walk home. Defendant
picked Demarkas up on the way and brought Demarkas to Demarkas’s apartment.
       At 10:21 p.m., Demarkas called 911. In that call, he reported his wife told him
someone was trying to kick in his back door. Demarkas told the operator the person was
driving a primer gray Nova or a white Chevy.
       Sacramento County Sheriffs responded to the apartment. The lead responding
deputy did not remember seeing any damage to the door when he arrived and did not

                                             4
prepare a report. He cleared the call at 11:00 p.m. Demarkas was upset because the
deputies would not do anything.
       Demarkas testified he got his gun from under the pillow on his bed. Next,
defendant, Demarkas, and his wife left Demarkas’s apartment and drove to defendant’s
apartment complex. On the way, Demarkas saw M.W.’s car in the parking lot of the fast-
food restaurant. After they parked at defendant’s apartment, Demarkas testified he took
his gun from the car.
       B.P. was present at McClish’s apartment complex the night of the shooting.
Around 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. that night, McClish told B.P. that Demarkas was coming over.
Around 11:00 p.m., Demarkas arrived and asked B.P. where McClish was. B.P.
responded he was asleep in their apartment and Demarkas went upstairs.
       A little later, B.P. saw defendant, Demarkas, and McClish together. Demarkas
told defendant, “There they go,” “There go the car,” “The ones that jumped me,” and
“[W]e need to go.” B.P. saw the three men leave through the front of the apartment
complex.
       After he was arrested, Demarkas told the investigating detective his nine-
millimeter handgun was at his dad’s house. He said he walked over to the fast-food
restaurant and shot into the gray Nova. He described himself as angry and fed up.
Demarkas told the detective, “Man, when I seen him, I just clicked. You know what I’m
saying? I was fed up with this mother fucker, and I seen him at the drive-thru
[restaurant]. I walked up there, and I saw him, and I just shot. I didn’t even look. I just
shot in the fucking car.” Demarkas said he saw M.W. in the passenger seat of the car but
did not know who was driving. He said he was trying to shoot Nova Mike. He also told
the detective that defendant was watching the shooting from the other side of the nearby
cinderblock wall. After the shooting, Demarkas told the officer his father asked for the
gun and Demarkas gave it to him.

                                             5
       The independent witnesses’ testimony and evidence were consistent with the
version of events Demarkas relayed to the detective. Witnesses at the fast-food restaurant
saw Demarkas walk up to the passenger side of a primer gray car, pull out a gun, and fire
into the car several times. In a subsequent inspection of the crime scene, police found six
nine‑millimeter shell casings on the ground. All of the casings were fired from the same
gun.
       The witnesses also saw another man standing near Demarkas in the drive-through
area at the time of the shooting (presumably McClish). After the first shot, the witness
said Demarkas looked back at the second man and then fired additional shots. After the
shooting, witnesses saw Demarkas and the second man jump over the cinderblock wall
and leave. Both men had guns in their hands.
       B.P. heard the shots coming from the fast-food restaurant and then heard footsteps
coming through the field. Next, she saw defendant, Demarkas, and McClish jump over
the fence into the apartment complex. B.P. saw defendant take a handgun out of his
waistband and unload it. He told B.P., “we do this gangsta style.” Defendant put the gun
in his waistband and left in the direction of his apartment.
       A second witness also saw defendant, Demarkas, and McClish return through the
field after the gunshots and jump over the fence about five minutes after the shooting.
That witness testified defendant was yelling, “[T]hey should not mess with my family.”
This witness saw defendant reload the gun he was holding when he returned.
       Demarkas’s wife testified Demarkas said defendant had told Demarkas the night
of the murder words to the effect of, “[Y]ou need to do what you got to do.”
       When he was arrested, defendant first told the detective that he saw Demarkas run
by himself over to the fast-food restaurant, heard some gunshots, and then saw Demarkas
run back to the apartment complex. Defendant claimed he only walked across the field to
see, but turned back to the apartment when he heard the gunshots. Later, defendant
admitted he got up to the wall but could not climb over it. So, he pulled himself up to

                                              6
look, and that is when he heard (but did not see) Demarkas fire the shots and saw
Demarkas’s arm extended towards the car. Defendant and the detective went to the
scene, and defendant pointed out where he had stood on a water pipe next to the wall
when the shooting occurred.
        During a later statement, defendant told the detective Demarkas had a gun and
tried to hand it to him, but defendant did not want it, so he let it drop to the ground and
left it there.
        The car containing the two men Demarkas shot drove into a gas station across the
street. Qualls got out of the car and fell down, while M.W. walked around. Qualls died
from the gunshot wounds after being taken to the hospital.
        In the days following the shooting, defendant talked about people “[m]essing with
his ‘M’ F’ing children,” and disrespecting his family and how he was not going to allow
that. Defendant also told Demarkas’s wife defendant had gotten rid of the gun.
        After the shooting, Demarkas spoke with his wife about the shooting. In that
conversation, Demarkas told her McClish and defendant accompanied him to the fast-
food restaurant the night of the shooting. Demarkas said defendant could not hop the
wall but got up into a position where he could see what happened. Demarkas said the
plan was not to “go over there and pop these [N-words].” Demarkas also said that, on the
night of the shooting, defendant told him, “You got to do what you got to do.” Demarkas
told his wife that he and McClish were armed with guns at the shooting, and that
Demarkas was the one who pulled the trigger.
        The jury found defendant, Demarkas, and McClish not guilty of first degree
murder, but found them guilty of second degree murder of Qualls and the attempted
murder of M.W. In his direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant’s convictions. (King
I, supra, C050300.)

                                              7
       B.     Defendant’s Section 1172.6 Petition
       In January 2019, defendant filed a petition under section 1172.6 to be resentenced
on his murder conviction. The petition only raised the issue of his murder conviction.6
In its preliminary order, the trial court noted it appeared the original petition challenged
the murder conviction, but acknowledged it was possible defendant sought relief from his
attempted murder conviction based on an equal protection theory. In his brief, defendant
indeed argued Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437)
covered attempted murder convictions.
       The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage as to both the murder
count and the attempted murder count. In June 2021, we reversed and remanded the
matter for an order to show cause/evidentiary hearing. (King II, supra, C091351.)
       On remand, in October 2021, the trial court set the matter for an evidentiary
hearing in January 2022 recognizing Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 775) would be in effect at that time. In January and June 2022, the People
submitted briefing that argued defendant was still guilty of murder and attempted murder
despite the change in the law. In response, defendant argues he was no longer guilty of
murder, but should be resentenced on the attempted murder conviction. Notably, he did
not argue the application of Senate Bill No. 775 to his attempted murder conviction.
       The parties submitted the matter on the original trial reporter’s transcript, the
clerk’s transcript, and briefing. The trial court also admitted a copy of our original
opinion in King I and used it solely to relate the procedural history of the case. The trial
court found there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the
murder of Qualls. The trial court concluded the evidence demonstrated defendant
planned with Demarkas to kill M.W. and another person in retaliation for M.W. beating

6      On our own motion, we augmented the record in this case to incorporate by
reference the record in defendant’s prior appeal. (People v. King (June 28, 2021,
C091351) [nonpub. opn.] (King II); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155.)

                                              8
up Demarkas in his apartment. Defendant made statements that indicated an intent to kill
and aid in the shooting of others, including the statements “they” did not know who
“they” were messing with and that his family was not to be disrespected. Further, the
trial court found the evidence demonstrated defendant gave Demarkas the gun when
Demarkas reported that M.W. was in the drive-through of the neighboring fast-food
restaurant, and defendant went to watch the shooting. The court further stated that if
these facts did not establish express malice, they established implied malice in that
defendant demonstrated a reckless disregard for human life.
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                              II
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that he could be convicted of murder under the current law because the record lacked
substantial evidence he engaged in the requisite actus reus or had the mens rea to
establish he aided and abetted a murder with implied malice. He further argues the trial
court could not conclude defendant acted with express malice because the jury acquitted
him of first degree murder. He asks us to reverse his conviction for attempted murder or
remand the case for further proceedings on that count.
       A.     Senate Bills No. 1437 and No. 775
       Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted “to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent
to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill No. 1437
achieved this by amending sections 188 and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1172.6 to expand its
coverage to include those convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable

                                              9
consequences doctrine . . . .” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; § 1172.6, subd. (a).) Section
1172.6 permits persons who were previously convicted of murder under the natural and
probable consequence doctrine to petition for resentencing if they “could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
       In relevant part, Senate Bill No. 1437 “amended the natural and probable
consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that
‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(3), added by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)” (People v. Harden
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708.)
This language eliminated the use of the natural and probable consequences doctrine in
murder prosecutions but left “personally possessing malice aforethought a necessary
element of murder.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846.)
       Implied malice murder also remains as a valid legal theory for a second degree
murder conviction after the changes to sections 188 and 189. (People v. Powell (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 689, 714.) “Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing
is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to
life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) Under this theory, “ ‘an aider and abettor
who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree
murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts
with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (Id. at p. 990.)
       In addition, “ ‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus of
the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea. [Citation.] In the context of
implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-
endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts

                                              10
constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an
implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the
commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which
must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the
perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of
the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious
disregard for human life.’ ” (People v. Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 990-991, italics
omitted.) As explained in Reyes, it is not enough to simply travel with the armed
murderer into gang territory. (Id. at pp. 991-992.) Instead, where the life-endangering
act is a shooting, the trial court must ask whether the aider and abettor knew that the
direct perpetrator intended to shoot at the victim, intended to aid him in the shooting,
knew that the shooting was dangerous to life, and acted in conscious disregard for life.
(Id. at p. 992.)
       B.      Procedure and Standard of Review
       After the trial court issues an order to show cause, “the court shall hold a hearing
to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction
and to recall the sentence.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the hearing, “the burden of proof
shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
       We review a trial court’s findings following an evidentiary hearing on a section
1172.6 petition for substantial evidence. (People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 298.) “Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition.
While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve
contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.”

                                             11
(Ibid.) This standard of review does not change because the trial reviewed a section
1172.6 petition on a paper record. (Clements, at p. 301.) “ ‘Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.’ ”
(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 943.)
       C.     Application to Defendant’s Murder Conviction
       As guided by Reyes, the key question here is whether substantial evidence exists
that defendant (1) knew that Demarkas intended to shoot at the victims, (2) intended to
aid him in the shooting, (3) knew that shooting was dangerous to life, and (4) acted in
conscious disregard for life. We conclude that substantial evidence supports these
elements.
       When he learned that his son Demarkas had been beaten by the victims in his
apartment, defendant expressed his outrage and stated he would not allow his family to
be treated in this manner. Defendant encouraged Demarkas and McClish to get a second
gun. In fact, defendant showed Demarkas the small, black nine-millimeter gun he had
just purchased at the local market. Defendant admitted he supplied Demarkas with the
weapon Demarkas used during the shooting.
       After the victims came to Demarkas’s apartment door the night of the murder,
defendant went with Demarkas to defendant’s apartment complex. On the way,
Demarkas saw M.W.’s car in the parking lot of the nearby fast-food restaurant. When
they arrived at defendant’s and McClish’s apartment complex, Demarkas told defendant,
“There they go,” “There go the car,” “The ones that jumped me,” and “[W]e need to go.”
Defendant accompanied Demarkas and McClish as they left the apartment complex to
commit their crimes.
       At the time the men went to the confrontation, defendant told Demarkas he “got to
do what [he] got to do.” Defendant had to know Demarkas was in an agitated state and
had the gun that defendant had given him. Defendant accompanied Demarkas and

                                            12
McClish to the fast-food restaurant and stood close by while Demarkas fired repeatedly
into the car, killing one of the victims and injuring the other.
       The three men returned from the murder together, and defendant had the murder
weapon in his possession. Defendant proudly proclaimed his participation in the crime
when he told B.P., “we do this gangsta style,” and “[t]hey should not mess with my
family.”
       Defendant’s knowledge that Demarkas would go to the car and shoot the people
inside it is supported by the evidence of: (1) defendant’s outrage at M.W.’s treatment of
his family, displayed both before and after the crime, (2) his direction that Demarkas and
McClish should get another gun, (3) obtaining the gun used in the crime and supplying it
to Demarkas, (4) accompanying Demarkas to the scene of the shooting after telling him
to do what he had to do, knowing it was the men who had intimidated his family, and
(5) his presence at the scene of the shooting.
       The trial court reasonably inferred from these actions that defendant knew
Demarkas would go to the car and shoot into it, and defendant intended to aid Demarkas
in that shooting. Defendant had to know shooting into an occupied vehicle with a
semiautomatic pistol is dangerous to human life, and defendant acted in conscious
disregard of life when he gave this life-threatening instrumentality to Demarkas,
encouraged him to use it, and encouraged the murder and attempted murder by being
physically present as it unfolded before his eyes, doing nothing to stop it. Contrary to his
argument, defendant was not merely a person who expressed some support for the
shooting. Defendant was involved in every step of the crime.
       D.     First Degree Murder Acquittal
       Defendant argues reversal is required because the jury acquitted him of
premeditated murder and thus the trial court could not find he had express malice to
uphold his second degree murder conviction. Because we conclude substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding defendant acted with implied malice and defendant does

                                              13
not argue the first degree murder acquittal bars this theory, we need not reach this
argument.
       E.      Attempted Murder Conviction
       Defendant argues we should reverse his attempted murder conviction or remand it
for further proceedings under section 1172.6. Defendant forfeited this contention by not
raising it in the trial court.
       As it relates to the crime of attempted murder, in 2021 the Legislature amended
section 1172.6 with Senate Bill No. 775. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551.) That statute became
effective January 1, 2022. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c); Gov. Code, § 9600, subd.
(a); People v. Camba (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 857, 865.) As amended, section 1172.6,
subdivision (a) states: “A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with the
court that sentenced the petitioner to have petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts.” This
change to section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539, 548.)
       Defendant’s original petition did not raise the issue of resentencing for his
attempted murder conviction. After this court remanded the matter, not only did
defendant fail to argue the trial court should vacate the attempted murder conviction, he
also affirmatively argued the trial court should strike his murder conviction under section
1172.6 and just resentence him on the attempted murder conviction. Defendant therefore
forfeited his argument that we should remand this case for further consideration of his
attempted murder conviction. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351-354 [to
preserve the issue for appellate review, the defendant must raise it in the trial court].)

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                                     DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                      \s\                    ,
                                                 Krause, J.

We concur:

     \s\                    ,
Robie, Acting P. J.

     \s\                    ,
Wiseman, J.*

*      Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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