Court Opinion

ID: 9876556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 14:07:04.876182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:13.332871
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1236

                             ADOPTION OF MATEO. 1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       After a trial, a Juvenile Court judge found that the mother

 was unfit to parent Mateo, now thirteen years old, and that

 Mateo's best interests would be served by the termination of the

 mother's parental rights. 2       The mother appeals from the decree

 terminating her parental rights.          She argues that the

 determination of her unfitness was premature because at the time

 of trial she was on a trajectory that showed she soon would

 become fit to care for Mateo; the Department of Children and

 Families (DCF) did not make reasonable efforts to restore Mateo

 to her care; and the judge did not sufficiently consider Mateo's

 best interests in declining to mandate posttermination visits.

 We affirm.

 1 A pseudonym.
 2 The judge also entered a decree terminating the father's
 parental rights. The father did not appeal.
     Background.   Mateo was born in May 2010.    In March 2013, a

report pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A report), was filed

alleging neglect of Mateo by the mother.   The subsequent

investigation by DCF pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51B (51B

investigation), substantiated concerns regarding the behavior of

the mother, who was struggling with substance use disorder. 3

From March 2013 until June 2014, the mother left Mateo in the

care of her aunt (first aunt).   During this time, the mother

completed treatment related to alcohol and domestic violence and

attained ten months' sobriety.

     In the spring of 2014, Mateo, then four years old, returned

to live with the mother, who was in a relationship with a male

partner.   In September and October 2014, three 51A reports were

filed that included allegations that the mother had neglected

Mateo by exposing him to domestic violence.      After 51B

investigations, the allegations of neglect by the mother were

supported.   At trial, the mother testified that she did not

recall that that partner was a registered sex offender; she

described him as a "severe alcoholic" who was physically abusive

to her but never hurt Mateo.   The judge found that in 2014 Mateo

witnessed domestic violence in the home.

3 The mother has two older children, born in 1993 and 1997, who
were raised by other relatives because of the mother's addiction
struggles, mental health issues, and pattern of violent
relationships.

                                 2
     On October 24, 2014, two more 51A reports were filed

alleging sexual abuse of Mateo.   The mother told a DCF social

worker that Mateo had told her that while in the care of the

first aunt he was sexually abused by a cousin.   After a 51B

investigation, the allegations of sexual abuse by the cousin

were unsupported. 4

     In 2016, the mother married another man, and remained

married to him at the time of trial.    In July 2016, the mother

brought Mateo to a Fourth of July party at the home of a

different aunt (second aunt), who Mateo had never met.    The

second aunt agreed to care for Mateo for the weekend.    The

mother later called the second aunt and asked her to watch Mateo

while the mother found a treatment program.   Between then and

the end of August, the mother visited Mateo only once.    On

August 26, 2016, a 51A report was filed alleging neglect of

Mateo by the mother and sexual abuse of Mateo by the mother's

husband.   After a 51B investigation, those allegations were

supported.   At trial, the mother testified at first that she had

no memory of those allegations against her husband, then said

that the second aunt had made them up because her husband had

stopped giving the second aunt money.

4 During a forensic interview, then four year old Mateo made
vague disclosures about the cousin.

                                  3
     In September 2016, the Probate and Family Court granted

guardianship of Mateo to the second aunt.       In April 2017, the

second aunt filed a petition in the Juvenile Court alleging that

Mateo was a child requiring assistance, G. L. c. 119, § 21,

because of concerning behaviors.       Also in April 2017, a 51A

report was filed alleging sexual abuse of Mateo by three adult

men while in the mother's care.    After a 51B investigation,

allegations of sexual exploitation by the mother were

unsupported.    That spring, Mateo was placed in a residential

treatment program for six weeks, after which he returned to the

second aunt's care.

     In August and November 2017, 51A reports were filed

alleging sexual abuse of Mateo by the mother.       After a 51B

investigation, the allegations in the November 2017 51A report

were supported.    Due to her difficulty in managing Mateo's

problematic behaviors, the second aunt relinquished her

guardianship.    To prevent custody reverting to the mother, DCF

filed this care and protection petition seeking temporary

custody of Mateo.

     The mother did try to address her challenges.       She was

diagnosed with bipolar II disorder, posttraumatic stress

disorder, anxiety disorder, and alcohol use disorder, and began

seeing a psychiatrist biweekly.    She also attended Alcoholics

Anonymous (AA) meetings, an intensive outpatient program for

                                   4
substance abuse, a sober parenting program, and weekly

counseling on domestic violence.       Throughout 2018, police

received dozens of calls to respond to the mother's home, many

of which involved domestic violence between her and her current

partner.

     From November 2017 until January 2020, Mateo lived in a

group home where he received intensive therapy for issues

including sexual trauma.   At first, his clinician did not

recommend visits between Mateo and the mother.       In early 2018,

the DCF ongoing social worker made multiple unsuccessful

attempts to contact the mother, but her telephone would not

accept voicemails, an action plan mailed to her was returned to

sender, and when the social worker made an unannounced visit the

mother was not home.   The mother and Mateo had supervised

telephone calls beginning in May 2018, supervised visits

beginning in July, and two unsupervised visits in late 2018.       In

November 2018, the mother relapsed and was arrested and charged

in the District Court with offenses including assault and

battery on a police officer, assault and battery by means of a

dangerous weapon, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest.       As

a result of the relapse, the mother's visits with Mateo were

again supervised.

                                   5
     In April 2019, when Mateo was almost nine years old and

still living in the group home, DCF's goal for him was changed

to adoption.    DCF began looking for a foster family for him.

     The last in-person visit between the mother and Mateo was

in the fall of 2019.    In November 2019, the mother again

relapsed.    She stopped attending the substance abuse program.

On November 25, 2019, the mother was charged in the District

Court with trespassing and assault and battery on a pregnant

person. 5   Warrants issued in both District Courts with open

cases.

     For the next two years the mother was "on the run," moving

from place to place and avoiding communication with DCF because

she did not want to be arrested on her open warrants.    During

that time she was abusing alcohol and not taking her prescribed

medication.    For those two years, the mother refused to give DCF

any information about her location, or about any services or

treatment providers she was accessing.    As a result, she was not

in compliance with her DCF action plan.    At trial she testified

that during those years she was staying at a Salvation Army

program in New Hampshire.

5 The mother had previously been convicted of crimes including
2006 charges of possession of a hoax explosive device, armed
robbery, and unarmed robbery.

                                  6
     In January 2020, Mateo was placed with a foster family,

where he at first received individual and group therapy, as well

as psychiatric treatment.    After a few weeks it was determined

that he did not need such a high level of services, and in

August 2020 he began weekly individual therapy.    Although the

mother refused to tell DCF where she was living, the mother and

Mateo continued telephone calls; at first they were supervised

by the foster mother, until during one call the mother discussed

something that upset Mateo, and so the foster mother no longer

wanted to supervise the calls.    Beginning in July 2020, the

ongoing DCF social worker supervised the calls; he tried to

schedule in-person visits between the mother and Mateo but was

unable to do so.

     In July 2020, a preadoptive licensing study was approved

for a couple interested in adopting Mateo.    On December 30,

2020, Mateo moved to the preadoptive parents' home, where they

live with their son who is about two years younger than Mateo

and is also adopted.    Because of his transition to the

preadoptive home, Mateo's treatment with his previous therapist

was discontinued, and he was placed on two wait lists for

therapy.

     On January 1, 2021, the mother and Mateo had a supervised

telephone call.    After this, the mother reached out several

times for additional contact with Mateo, but he did not wish to

                                  7
speak to her.    In March 2021, the mother, angry and intoxicated,

told the DCF ongoing worker that she knew where Mateo lived and

went to school, and she was going to kidnap him.      The mother did

not participate in a foster care review in March 2021 or a court

investigation that was completed in September 2021.      Throughout

2021, the mother regularly requested contact with Mateo, but he

refused contact with her.    The mother believed that someone was

influencing Mateo to reject her, and that he would be "happier"

with her because she was his biological mother.

     Meanwhile, Mateo settled into life with his preadoptive

family.    He began calling his preadoptive parents "mom" and

"dad."    He formed a bond with his foster brother, with whom he

shares a room.    He is eager to be adopted into that family. 6      He

started signing his name with their surname.       In school, Mateo

has an individualized education plan that addresses both his

academic and emotional needs, and his grades improved

substantially.    He meets with the school adjustment counselor;

receives support from the school psychologist; and meets weekly

with his school therapist, whom he can also contact for support

as needed during the school day.       At the time of trial, Mateo

was still on the wait list for a private therapist.

6 Because Mateo is over twelve years old, his consent is required
to adoption. See G. L. c. 210, § 2 (written consent of child
required "if above the age of twelve").

                                   8
     Trial began on August 17, 2021, and was conducted via the

Internet-based video conferencing platform Zoom.    As of that

point, the mother was not engaged with DCF and was unavailable

for visits.    She told the judge that she was then at the

Salvation Army program in New Hampshire, but refused to disclose

its name or address because it was a domestic violence shelter.

On at least four occasions between May 2021 and the fifth day of

trial, October 18, 2021, the judge warned the mother that she

had outstanding warrants and repeatedly ordered her to clear

them up.   In October 2021, the mother canceled a scheduled visit

with Mateo.    On October 26, 2021, the mother was arrested on her

outstanding warrants.    In November 2021, the mother was the

victim of domestic violence in Manchester, New Hampshire, but at

trial refused to give any details about what happened.

     The mother's trial testimony began on December 1, 2021.

She testified that in November 2021 she had begun attending four

AA meetings a week, seeing a psychiatrist, and attending

substance abuse treatment three days a week.    However, she

refused to provide any documentation of those services or sign

releases permitting DCF to confirm her participation.    The judge

credited the mother's testimony that in November 2021 she began

reengaging in psychiatric services and substance abuse

treatment.    Asked where she was then living, the mother became

extremely upset on multiple occasions, eventually testifying

                                  9
that she was living temporarily with her grandmother in Lynn.

Asked where she was working, the mother refused to answer.       The

judge found that the mother "presented at trial as unstable,

angry, and impulsive with limited insight."     The judge found

that, despite engaging in a wide array of services since at

least 1998, the mother "has been unable to make any meaningful

changes, and continues to display poor insight."

     After fourteen nonconsecutive days of trial between August

17, 2021, and April 12, 2022, the judge found that DCF had made

reasonable efforts to restore Mateo to the mother's care.     The

judge concluded that the mother was unfit to care for Mateo and

that termination of the mother's parental rights was in Mateo's

best interests, and issued a decree terminating the mother's

parental rights.   The judge declined to order posttermination

visitation but ordered that the mother may send one letter and

one picture per year to the preadoptive parents.     The judge

subsequently issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of

law, "demonstrating, as we require, that close attention was

given to the evidence."   Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. 158, 165

(2001).   The mother appealed.

     Discussion.   Unfitness.    The mother argues that the judge

acted prematurely in determining that she was unfit to parent

Mateo, and that the mother "made a powerful case that there was

a real likelihood that she was on a trajectory that soon would

                                  10
enable her to be able to care for the child."   As evidence of

that trajectory, the mother points to her testimony that she had

cleared up her warrants and was attending AA meetings,

psychiatric appointments, and therapy appointments.

     "To terminate parental rights to a child and to dispense

with parental consent to adoption, a judge must find by clear

and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings proved by

at least a fair preponderance of evidence, that the parent is

unfit to care for the child and that termination is in the

child's best interests" (citation omitted).   Adoption of Yalena,

100 Mass. App. Ct. 542, 549 (2021).   Because termination of

parental rights is an "extreme step, . . . it is appropriate for

a judge to consider whether, on the basis of credible evidence,

there is a reasonable likelihood that the parent's unfitness at

the time of trial may be only temporary" (citation omitted).

Care & Protection of Zeb, 489 Mass. 783, 788 (2022).   "Because

childhood is fleeting, a parent's unfitness is not temporary if

it is reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged or

indeterminate period."   Id., quoting Adoption of Ilona, 459

Mass. 53, 60 (2011).

     As set forth above, the judge had before her ample evidence

on which to base her finding that the mother was unfit to parent

Mateo, and that her unfitness as a parent was likely to

continue.   The mother conceded at trial that she was not ready

                                11
to have custody of Mateo.   The judge noted that the mother had

not had custody of Mateo since he was six years old, had not

seen him in person since the fall of 2019, and had not spoken to

him since January 2021.   The mother was "on the run" from DCF

for two years of Mateo's life, while he was nine to eleven years

old and living in a group home, then in a foster home, and

finally with his preadoptive family.

     At the same time, the judge recognized that the mother had

made some progress, and encouraged her to continue with

treatment.   The judge specifically found that the mother loves

Mateo.   A finding of unfitness is not a determination that the

mother does not love Mateo.   See Adoption of Darlene, 99 Mass.

App. Ct. 696, 702 (2021).

     The judge's analysis shows that she based her custody

determination on an "'even handed' assessment of the evidence."

Adoption of Helga, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 521, 528 (2020), quoting

Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 225-226 & n.8 (1998), cert.

denied sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S. 1034 (1999).

"[O]ur lodestar is necessarily the best interests of the child."

Adoption of Bea, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 416, 417 (2020).   "[W]e defer

to the judge's determinations regarding the best interests of

the child, and reverse only where there is a clear error of law

or abuse of discretion" (citation and quotation omitted).

Adoption of Helga, supra.   "At some point the court must say,

                                12
'Enough,' . . . and act in the child[]'s best interests"

(citation omitted).    Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 60.   See

Adoption of Lisette, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 297 (2018).

     Reasonable efforts.    The mother argues that the judge

abused her discretion in finding that DCF made reasonable

efforts to restore Mateo to the mother's care as required by

G. L. c. 119, § 29C.

     During trial, the mother filed a written objection to any

finding that DCF had made reasonable efforts, arguing, as she

argues here, that Mateo had not been receiving sufficient

therapeutic services in his preadoptive home.    The judge found

that DCF had made reasonable efforts, though she acknowledged

that Mateo "should have been in therapy" while in the

preadoptive home.   We agree that the delay in finding a

therapist for Mateo did not negate the mother's inability to

meet his needs.

     In arguing that DCF did not make reasonable efforts to

restore Mateo to her care, the mother also raises claims that

DCF failed to provide her with services or to ensure that she

took advantage of them.    Both DCF and Mateo argue that the

mother did not raise those claims below, and so she waived them.

See Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 242 (2020).     We

tend to agree, but even if we were to consider the claims, they

would not undermine the judge's finding that DCF's efforts were

                                 13
reasonable.   As to the mother's claims that DCF should have

followed through on recommendations made in 2018 that she obtain

services, and should have granted her more visitation with

Mateo, the mother's own conduct in going "on the run" and hiding

from DCF for two years severely undermines her attempt to cast

blame on DCF.   DCF's "obligation to make reasonable efforts to

reunify the child with the mother is contingent upon her

obligation to substantially fulfill her parental

responsibilities (including seeking and using appropriate

services)."   Adoption of Yalena, 100 Mass. App. Ct. at 554.   See

Adoption of Daisy, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 768, 782 (2010).   Contrast

Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. 212, 217 (2017) (no

reasonable efforts, where DCF investigator testified she did not

know what services were available and it was "not her job" to

prevent removal from home).

     We are mindful that the mother's past unfitness to parent

Mateo and the likelihood that her unfitness will continue

indefinitely are in part the result of the disease of addiction.

However, the mother's arguments that DCF's efforts fell short of

reasonable because of a lack of evidence that DCF ensured that

Mateo understood the disease of addiction or cleared up his

"confusion" about his mother's lack of communication while she

was on the run, even if raised below, would not be grounds to

set aside the judge's finding that DCF made reasonable efforts.

                                14
      Posttermination visits.   The mother argues that in

declining to mandate posttermination visitation between her and

Mateo, the judge did not sufficiently consider the best

interests of the child and gave too much weight to her finding

that there was not a "particularly strong bond" between the

mother and Mateo.   We are not persuaded.

      Based on the evidence before her, the judge had ample

grounds to decline to require posttermination visitation.     In

particular, the judge credited the testimony of the preadoptive

mother that if in the future Mateo expressed a desire for

contact with the mother, the preadoptive parents would cultivate

it.   "There is no reason to question the presumption that

[Mateo]'s preadoptive parents will act in [his] best interest in

evaluating -- now and in the future -- whether continued contact

with [his] mother is in [his] best interest . . . ; nor is there

any compelling reason requiring that a visitation order be

                                 15
entered in order to protect the best interests of the child"

(citations omitted).     Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 66.

       Conclusion.   Accordingly, the decree terminating the

mother's parental rights to Mateo is affirmed.

                                       So ordered.

                                       By the Court (Massing,
                                         Henry & Grant, JJ. 7),

                                       Clerk

Entered:    September 27, 2023.

7   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  16