Court Opinion

ID: 9760003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:38:04.894963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:09.146733
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
The Fifth Amendment is a protection against compulsion. When one is not compelled by force, fear or favor to speak, but does so voluntarily for his own reasons, at a time of his own choosing, there is no earthly reason why he should not be subject to the same searching inquiry as any other witness. The Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Wier, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), enunciated that principle saying:
In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239, 65 L.Ed.2d 86, 100 S.Ct. 2124 (1980), a case dealing with pre-arrest silence, we said:
“Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact and circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 1042, p. 1046 (Chadbourne Rev.1970). Each jurisdiction may formulate its own rules of evidence to determine when prior silence is so inconsistent with present statements that impeachment by reference to such silence is probative.”
455 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. at 1311, 71 L.Ed.2d at 493-94.
The common law, based on common experience, recognized, as does the Supreme Court, that silence has its risks. That facts and circumstances may indeed have natural, human inconsistency with silence. Moreover, and more important, “silence” is not the subject of the constitutional provision. The Fifth Amendment is not an exhortation to silence or a celebration of its golden qualities. It protects it *587when exercised, but it does not enforce or encourage silence. Hence, despite its enigmatic twist that Miranda “warnings” are an inducement to silence, the Supreme Court is at pains to say that the federal Constitution does not prohibit mention of the natural inconsistency that may exist between silence and the facts and circumstances of a case. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239, 100 S.Ct. at 2129; Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. at 1311, 71 L.Ed.2d at 493-94.
The Supreme Court therefore left the matter to the states in instances where no warnings or inducements to silence exist. Id. Given this opportunity, the majority in this case, continues its adventures in uncharted puddles. The majority explicitly acknowledges that the rule in Pennsylvania is more restrictive than the position taken by the Supreme Court. In doing so, I believe the Court has turned a cloak into a dagger.
That one may remain silent in the face of accusation is a personal option, and a constitutional privilege. There is a difference, however, between silence and compulsion. Compulsion is never permissible. Silence is a choice, a choice, depending upon the facts and circumstances, that may contain risks.
The majority confuses compulsion with “silence”. There is a constitutional protection against compulsion, silence is a choice and a waivable privilege. So long as one maintains silence, we must, as far as possible, protect it from unfavorable inference. When one chooses to speak, however, we owe no duty to protect against any natural inconsistency that may exist between former elected, self-imposed silence and trial testimony.
In this case, appellant, charged with murder, voluntarily took the witness stand to offer his version. No one forced or dragged him. He freely chose to speak. He offered that he fired in self-defense because someone was shooting at him. On cross-examination he was asked:
*588Did you ever tell the police that somebody was shooting at you?
The majority finds this an impermissible reference to appellant’s acknowledged “silence” at arrest. It is clear, that at no time, at arrest or trial, was appellant induced, forced, promised or favored to speak. He did so because he wanted to, when he wanted to. To protect him from whatever inconsistency that elected silence may have created is to give selected sanctuaries immune from inquiry, from the truth testing process, and from the common experience of men. See Commonwealth v. Alicea, 498 Pa. 575, 582-583, 449 A.2d 1381, 1385 (1982) (McDermott, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court, not known for a heavy hand in these matters, has adopted the rule. In each one of these avant garde minority positions we espouse, we retire more of the small tools available to the truth testing process. Here, a shield has become a weapon. As Mr. Justice Stevens said in a similar situation:
This is a case in which the defendants’ silence at the time of their arrest was graphically inconsistent with their trial testimony that they were the unwitting victims of a “frame-up” in which the police did not participate. If defendants had been framed, their failure to mention that fact at the time of their arrest is almost inexplicable; for that reason, under accepted rules of evidence, their silence is tantamount to a prior inconsistent statement and admissible for purposes of impeachment.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 621-22, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2246, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
Silence to save oneself or one’s friends is not always invoked to thwart oppressors; it can be a greedy, self-centered thing of terrible consequence. The Constitution, should not be distorted into a manual for escape artists to ward off every possible threat.
HUTCHINSON, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.