Court Opinion

ID: 9849868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:48:06.734191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:27.571925
License: Public Domain

DE MUNIZ, P. J.,
dissenting.
Defendant concedes that Stites consented to the search of the house and bedroom that she and defendant jointly occupied. However, in spite of that conclusion, and the trial court’s finding that the state presented “sufficient proof to show that there was joint control of the bedroom,” the majority accepts defendant’s argument that Stites “did not have authority to consent to a search of [defendant’s] nightstand.” In doing so, the majority holds that
“[Stites’s] ability to open and occasionally access the unlocked drawer, in the absence of any evidence of permission or acquiescence by defendant, does not, as a matter of law, support an inference that Stites was actually authorized to open or exercise control over the nightstand.” 158 Or App at 507 (emphasis in original).
I disagree with the majority’s holding for the reasons that follow.
Whether a third party has actual authority to consent to a search of a given area “ ‘necessarily involves resolution of factual issues.’ ” State v. Wrenn, 150 Or App 96, 103, 945 P2d 608 (1997) (quoting State v. Ready, 148 Or App 149, 153, 939 P2d 117, rev den 326 Or 68 (1997)). We are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact where the evidence supports those findings. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 443 P2d 621 (1968). When the trial court does not make specific factual findings, and there is evidence from which such facts could be decided more than one way, we must presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion. Id. at 487.
*509Here, Stites shared the house and the bedroom with defendant. Durbin testified that Stites told him that she had obtained methamphetamine from the nightstand when it was unlocked and that defendant had given her methamphetamine out of the drawer before.
The majority wants to infer, from a lack of explicit testimony regarding defendant’s state of mind, that Stites did not have joint control of defendant’s nightstand. Whether or not that inference can be made, it is not one that this court is now permitted to make. Under Ball v. Gladden, we must presume that the trial court found the facts in a manner consistent with its ultimate conclusion, and we are bound by those facts.
Durbin’s testimony permitted the trial court to infer factually that Stites had authority to get into the nightstand when it was unlocked. The nightstand was unlocked and the drawer was partially open when Durbin searched it. That is sufficient for the court legally to conclude that, when Stites consented to the search of the bedroom, she had joint control of the nightstand.
The majority’s refusal to accept the trial corut’s reasonable factual inferences amounts to nothing more than factfinding. It is a fundamental part of our jurisprudence that we are not permitted to do that at this stage of the proceeding. Accordingly, I dissent.