Court Opinion

ID: 9772409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:16:55.767817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:43.878943
License: Public Domain

SCALES, Justice,
concurring.
For the reasons expressed in Justice Whitham and Justice McCraw’s opinions, I would hold that article 37.07(4) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers provision of the Texas constitution and the due process clause of both the Texas and the Federal constitutions. Consequently, the trial court erred in charging the jury pursuant to article 37.07(4). However, appellant has not demonstrated that the court’s charge has caused him to suffer actual egregious harm. Therefore, I agree with the majority that appellant’s conviction should be affirmed.
In Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
We hold that finding error in the court’s charge to the jury begins — not ends — the inquiry; the next step is to make an evidentiary review along the lines of that described above in Davis, supra, as well as a review of any other part of the record as a whole which may illuminate the actual, not just theoretical, harm to the accused.
* * * * * *
To the extent that it holds any charge error requires “automatic” reversal, Cumbie v. State, 578 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) is overruled, as are all other opinions inconsistent herewith.
Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174 (emphasis added). The court held that where there is no objection to the charge submitted to the jury, the appellant must show that he suffered egregious harm to obtain a reversal. Id. at 171. Consequently, because appellant did not object to the jury charge given in the present case, the trial court’s charge does not constitute reversible error unless appellant can show that the charge caused him to suffer actual and egregious harm.
There is no evidence before us that the jury applied the parole information contained in the court’s charge in assessing appellant’s punishment. In light of Almanza, I will not speculate as to the actual effect, if any, that the parole information contained in the court’s charge had on the jury’s assessment of punishment against appellant. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174 (harm resulting from jury charge error must be actual and not just theoretical) (emphasis added). Rather, I would hold that appellant must affirmatively demonstrate, in the record, that the parole information actually affected the jury’s assessment of punishment against him. See Lawrence v. State, 700 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (“[b]y failing to object *849in the instant case, the appellant is charged with showing actual egregious harm” under Almanza) (emphasis added); see also TEX.CRIM.PROC.CODE ANN. art. 36.19 (Vernon 1981) (error not reversible unless it is apparent from the record that defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial). The appellant could have met the burden by showing that one or more jurors voted for a harsher punishment as a result of the parole information made available to the jury by the trial court’s charge. Cf. TEX.CRIM.PROC.CODE ANN. art. 40.-03(8) (Vernon 1979) (jury misconduct may be proved by voluntary affidavits of jurors); Munroe v. State, 637 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (jury misconduct can be proved by showing that a single juror voted for harsher punishment because of the misconduct). Because there is no evidence of the jury’s actual use, if any, of the parole information conveyed by the trial court’s charge, I would hold that appellant has. not met his burden of showing that he has suffered actual egregious harm. Accordingly, I would affirm appellant’s conviction because no reversible error is shown by the record.