Court Opinion

ID: 9954399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 12:03:11.365597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:09.062567
License: Public Domain

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   STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DWAYNE SAYLES
                 (SC 20575)
     Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js.

                                  Syllabus

Convicted of felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first
   degree, among other crimes, in connection with his role in the robbery
   of a convenience store and the shooting death of the store clerk, the
   defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the
   trial court had improperly denied his motions to suppress evidence of
   his cell phone and the data contained therein. The defendant and two
   other men, V and S, had driven to the convenience store in V’s car.
   While V waited in the car, the defendant and S entered the store, robbed
   it of cash and cigars, and fatally shot the store clerk. V then drove S
   and the defendant to the defendant’s apartment. V later contacted the
   police and identified the defendant and S in photographs taken from
   the store’s surveillance footage, which showed that they were wearing
   masks and gloves. Subsequently, the police obtained and executed a
   search warrant for the defendant’s residence, where they found a ski
   mask and a pair of gloves. The defendant was not present during the
   search but thereafter met with the police for an interview. Before the
   interview, the defendant gave his cell phone to his mother, who was
   sitting outside of the interview room. After the defendant invoked his
   right to counsel, a detective approached the defendant’s mother and
   asked her for the defendant’s cell phone, which she gave to the detective.
   The police subsequently obtained a warrant to search the contents of
   the cell phone. The evidence retrieved from the cell phone included a
   draft, unsent text message to an unknown recipient, in which the defen-
   dant stated, ‘‘[i]f I get locked up tell sheema put them shits in the river
   some where . . . .’’ At trial, there was testimony that ‘‘sheema’’ referred
   to the defendant’s girlfriend, and the prosecutor argued during closing
   argument that ‘‘shits’’ referred to the gun used during the robbery. The
   state also elicited testimony from H, who had been incarcerated with
   the defendant during the defendant’s pretrial custody. H testified that
   the defendant admitted that he and S both had shot the clerk during
   the robbery. The state further introduced into evidence a statement
   made to the police by J, a friend of the defendant who had been arrested
   for an unrelated crime. In that statement, J indicated that he had spoken
   to the defendant and S on the day of the robbery and that they had
   admitted to having shot the clerk. The Appellate Court upheld the judg-
   ment of conviction. In doing so, the Appellate Court rejected the defen-
   dant’s claims that the police had violated his rights under Miranda v.
   Arizona (384 U.S. 436) and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitu-
   tion when they continued to interrogate him after he had invoked his
   right to counsel, that the seizure of his cell phone violated the fourth
   amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of
   the Connecticut constitution, and that the affidavit the police submitted
   in support of their application for a warrant to search the contents of
   his cell phone contained materially false information. On the granting
   of certification, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter
   alia, that the Appellate Court had improperly upheld the defendant’s
   conviction and that article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution
   mandates protection of a suspect’s rights under Miranda via the adop-
   tion of a rule that evidence obtained through the questioning of a suspect
   after the suspect has invoked the right to counsel must be suppressed
   and cannot be used in the state’s case-in-chief at a subsequent trial.

Held that any error in the admission of the contents of the defendant’s cell
   phone was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and, accordingly, this
   court declined to address the defendant’s constitutional challenges and
   affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment:

   A review of the trial record demonstrated that the state offered an
   overwhelming wealth of evidence beyond the contents of the cell phone
   to prove that the defendant had committed the crimes with which he
  was charged, including surveillance footage from inside of the conve-
  nience store, which depicted two perpetrators wearing hoodies, ski
  masks, and gloves, and the detailed testimony from V about his and the
  defendant’s involvement in the events that occurred on the night of
  the robbery, and the consistency and independent corroboration of the
  various witnesses’ testimony and statements rendered any error with
  respect to the admission of the contents of the cell phone harmless
  beyond a reasonable doubt.

  Specifically, V’s detailed testimony was corroborated by H’s testimony
  that the defendant had admitted to the robbery and had provided him
  with numerous details about it, including that the defendant and another
  man both had guns and both had shot the clerk, that he wanted to get
  his cell phone excluded from evidence because it contained a photograph
  of the gun used in the robbery, that he was worried that the ski mask
  and gloves discovered by the police might have his DNA on them, and
  that he hid the gun at his girlfriend’s house after the shooting but moved
  it once the police searched his residence, and V’s testimony was also
  corroborated by J’s statement to the police, which included details about
  the robbery that were not publicly available, such as the type of gun S
  used and the brand of cigars they stole.

  Moreover, the state presented significant evidence of the defendant’s
  consciousness of guilt, insofar as there was testimony from H that, after
  J gave his statement to the police, the defendant directed his cousin to
  assault J to force J to recant his testimony, and testimony from J himself
  that, after speaking to the police, he had a physical altercation with
  someone who had the same name as the defendant’s cousin.

  Furthermore, there was physical evidence corroborating the testimony
  and statements of V, H, and J, including the ski mask and gloves found
  during the search of the defendant’s residence, testimony that an analysis
  of the DNA discovered on that ski mask indicated that the defendant
  was a potential contributor to that DNA, and testimony about the histori-
  cal cell site location data associated with the defendant’s cell phone,
  which established that that phone was in the areas of the convenience
  store and the defendant’s residence at around the same times that,
  according to V’s testimony, V, the defendant, and S were at those locations.

  Although this court acknowledged that the testimony of V and H was
  properly viewed with some skepticism in light of their self-interest in
  testifying for the state as an accomplice and a jailhouse informant, respec-
  tively, the quality of their testimony grew in strength with the degree of
  independent corroboration.

  In addition, even though the prosecutor mentioned the unsent text mes-
  sage several times during closing and rebuttal arguments, when viewed in
  context, the prosecutor’s focus on the unsent text message was minimal
  relative to the other evidence admitted at trial, insofar as the prosecutor
  addressed the testimony of the various witnesses and the cell site location
  data before mentioning the contents of the cell phone and emphasized
  that other evidence far more strongly, and the contents of the cell phone
  played no role in establishing an element of an offense or in bolstering
  or destroying the credibility of any particular witness, which lessened
  the impact of any improper admission of the cell phone’s contents.
                         (One justice dissenting)
     Argued October 11, 2022—officially released March 26, 2024

                           Procedural History

  Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of felony murder, conspiracy to commit rob-
bery in the first degree, criminal possession of a pistol
or revolver and carrying a pistol without a permit,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
New Haven and tried to the jury before B. Fischer, J.;
verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defen-
dant appealed to the Appellate Court, Elgo, Alexander
and Suarez, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judg-
ment, and the defendant, on the granting of certifica-
tion, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Dina S. Fisher, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
   Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom were Lisa M. D’Angelo, executive assistant
state’s attorney, and, on the brief, John P. Doyle, Jr.,
state’s attorney, Patrick J. Griffin, former state’s attor-
ney, Seth R. Garbarsky, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, and Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
                         Opinion

   ROBINSON, C. J. A jury found the defendant, Dwayne
Sayles, guilty of felony murder in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-54c, among other offenses, in connection
with his role in the robbery of a New Haven convenience
store that resulted in the fatal shooting of the store
clerk. The defendant now appeals, upon our grant of
his petition for certification,1 from the judgment of the
Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction.
State v. Sayles, 202 Conn. App. 736, 769, 246 A.3d 1010
(2021). On appeal, the defendant raises numerous con-
stitutional challenges to the decision of the Appellate
Court upholding the trial court’s denial of his motions
to suppress evidence of his cell phone and its stored
data. We, however, need not address the merits of the
defendant’s various constitutional claims because we
conclude that any error in the admission of the contents
of the defendant’s cell phone was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the Appellate Court.
   The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history, much of which is aptly set forth in
the opinion of the Appellate Court. ‘‘On April 6, 2015,
Leighton Vanderberg drove around in his wife’s Ford
Focus with the defendant and Jamal Sumler. The three
men proceeded to the Fair Haven section of New Haven
and then toward Forbes Avenue. Sumler requested that
they stop at a store. Vanderberg complied, drove to [the
Pay Rite Food Store (Pay Rite)] convenience store and
parked on the street. Vanderberg asked Sumler to pur-
chase a couple of cigars and provided him with cash to
complete the transaction. The defendant and Sumler went
into the convenience store while Vanderberg remained in
the vehicle.
  ‘‘Sumler, wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt, entered
the convenience store first. As he approached the counter,
he pointed a pistol at the victim, Sanjay Patel, an
employee at the convenience store. As Sumler moved
behind a counter, the defendant entered the convenience
store. The defendant pulled out a pistol from his pocket
and, after a few moments, shot the victim. The defen-
dant was handed a box of cigars and some cash. He
then moved toward the entrance of the convenience
store. As Sumler and the victim, who brandished a stool,
engaged in a physical altercation, the defendant fled.
After the defendant departed, Sumler shot the victim.’’
(Footnote omitted.) State v. Sayles, supra, 202 Conn.
App. 739–40. The victim later died from his injuries,
namely, gunshot wounds to the torso and extremities.
Id., 740 and n.4.
   The three men fled in the Ford Focus to the Church
Street South housing complex, where the defendant
lived in an apartment. Id., 740. The defendant threw an
entire box of cigars and the sweatshirt he was wearing
into a nearby dumpster. Id. ‘‘After receiving approxi-
mately $20 for gas from the defendant and thirty to forty
cigars from Sumler, Vanderberg left the apartment.’’ Id.,
741.
   ‘‘The next night, Vanderberg learned from a friend
that the victim had been shot and killed at the [Pay
Rite]. Thereafter, he informed his probation officer
about what had transpired . . . . Following his arrest,
Vanderberg met with police detectives on April 14, 2015,
and identified the defendant and Sumler in photographs
that were taken from surveillance video at the [Pay
Rite].’’ Id., 741. On April 15, 2015, the police executed
a search warrant for the defendant’s residence. Id., 744.
During their search, the police discovered a black ski
mask and a dark colored pair of gloves. Id., 744 and n.10.
   The defendant was not present at the time of the
search, but, when he learned about the search later that
day, he contacted the police and agreed to meet for
an interview with Detectives Chistopher Perrone and
David Zaweski at a New Haven police station. Id., 744.
At the start of the video-recorded interview, Perrone
read the defendant his Miranda2 rights. Id., 744–45 and
n.11. Perrone subsequently took the defendant’s cell
phone from the defendant’s mother, who was holding
it for him during the interview.3 Id., 742, 744–45. The
defendant and his mother then left the police station.
The next day, the court granted Perrone’s application
for a search and seizure warrant to obtain data con-
tained in the defendant’s cell phone. Id., 742.
  Ultimately, the police retrieved from the defendant’s
cell phone (1) an incoming text message telling the
defendant not to come home at approximately the same
time that the police were searching his residence, (2)
a news report about the Pay Rite robbery, which had
been downloaded after the search of the defendant’s
home, (3) communications between the defendant, Sumler,
and Vanderberg on the night of the Pay Rite robbery,
and (4) a draft, unsent text message, stating, ‘‘[i]f I get
locked up tell sheema put them shits in the river some
where worda loc.’’4
  ‘‘After further investigation, the police arrested the
defendant. In May, 2015, while in pretrial custody, he
admitted to a fellow inmate [Derrick Hoover] that he
and Sumler had shot the victim during the robbery of
the [Pay Rite].’’ State v. Sayles, supra, 202 Conn. App.
741.
   The state charged the defendant with felony murder
in violation of § 53a-54c, conspiracy to commit robbery
in the first degree in violation of General Statutes
§§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a) (2), criminal possession of a
pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
217c, and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation
of General Statutes § 29-35 (a). Prior to trial, the defen-
dant moved to suppress evidence of his cell phone and
its stored data. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied the defendant’s motions to suppress,
first orally and later in a supplemental memorandum
of decision. The case was then tried before a jury, which
found the defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court
rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict
and imposed a total effective sentence of eighty years
of incarceration.
   The defendant appealed from the judgment of convic-
tion to the Appellate Court, claiming that ‘‘(1) [the]
police detectives [had] violated his Miranda rights and
his rights pursuant to article first, § 8, of the Connecticut
constitution when they continued to interrogate him
after he invoked his right to counsel, (2) the police
detectives [had] seized his cell phone in violation of
the fourth amendment to the United States constitution
and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution,
and (3) the affidavit that the police [had] submitted in
support of their application for a warrant to search the
contents of his cell phone contained materially false
information.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Sayles, supra,
202 Conn. App. 738–39. The Appellate Court rejected
these claims, following this court’s decision in State
v. Mangual, 311 Conn. 182, 85 A.3d 627 (2014), and
concluded that, under federal case law following the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 159 L. Ed. 2d 667
(2004), a violation of Miranda constitutes a violation
of only a prophylactic rule, and, thus, the fruits of the
poisonous tree doctrine5 did not require suppression of
the contents of the defendant’s cell phone. See State v.
Sayles, supra, 739, 751–52; see also id., 748–50. As to
the defendant’s state constitutional claim seeking the
adoption of a new prophylactic rule ‘‘to protect against
police tactics aimed at undermining the constitutional
rights of a suspect,’’ the court held that the defendant
had abandoned the claim because his appellate brief
contained only a single sentence of analysis. Id., 753;
see id., 753–55. The Appellate Court rejected the defen-
dant’s fourth amendment claim, reasoning that the sei-
zure of the cell phone was supported by probable cause
and was justified under the exigent circumstances doc-
trine. See id., 761–65. Finally, the Appellate Court con-
cluded that the record and the defendant’s brief were
inadequate for review of the defendant’s claim under
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L.
Ed. 2d 667 (1978), that the affidavit that the police
submitted in support of their application for a warrant
to search the contents of his cell phone contained mate-
rially false information by omitting the fact that he had
requested an attorney. See State v. Sayles, supra, 767–
79. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judg-
ment of conviction. Id., 769. This certified appeal followed.
See footnote 1 of this opinion.
  On appeal, the defendant claims that the Appellate
Court improperly upheld the trial court’s denial of his
motions to suppress evidence of his cell phone and
the data stored therein for several reasons. Principally,
however, the defendant provides a comprehensive anal-
ysis under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684–86, 610
A.2d 1225 (1992), and claims that article first, § 8, of
the Connecticut constitution mandates protection of a
suspect’s Miranda rights via the adoption of a rule ‘‘that
evidence obtained through questioning a suspect after
the suspect has invoked the right to counsel [pursuant
to Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S. Ct.
1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981)] must be suppressed and
cannot be used in the state’s case-in-chief [at] a subse-
quent trial.’’6
   In response, the state contends that it is unnecessary
to reach the constitutional issues raised by the defen-
dant because any error in the admission of the cell
phone and its stored data was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, insofar as the ‘‘evidence of the contents
of the [cell] phone was relatively minor and had no
tendency to influence the judgment of the jury in view
of the totality of the evidence . . . .’’7 The state’s argu-
ments are consistent with ‘‘the doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance,’’ which this court often applies ‘‘not
to decide difficult questions of constitutional law when
the state has established that any constitutional error
will not affect the result of the appeal because it is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ State v. Dickson,
322 Conn. 410, 497, 141 A.3d 810 (2016) (Robinson, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 582 U.S. 922, 137 S. Ct. 2263,
198 L. Ed. 2d 713 (2017); see, e.g., State v. Bowden,
344 Conn. 266, 276, 278 A.3d 472 (2022) (declining to
consider ‘‘[the] important issue’’ of whether seizure of
defendant’s cell phone was supported by sufficiently
particular warrant because any error was harmless
beyond reasonable doubt); State v. Tony M., 332 Conn.
810, 821–22, 213 A.3d 1128 (2019) (declining to consider
whether trial court properly found that defendant volun-
tarily waived his Miranda rights because any Miranda
violation from admission of his statement would be
harmless beyond reasonable doubt); State v. Jordan,
314 Conn. 89, 96–97, 100–101, 101 A.3d 179 (2014)
(declining to decide whether closet was within defen-
dant’s control for purposes of search incident to arrest
doctrine because any fourth amendment violation in
admitting drugs found in closet was harmless beyond
reasonable doubt).
   Accordingly, before addressing the defendant’s vari-
ous constitutional claims, we turn to the state’s harm-
less error arguments. The state contends that the
importance of the cell phone data paled in comparison
to Vanderberg’s testimony, which was corroborated by
independently obtained cell site location data—the
legality of which is unchallenged8—establishing that
the defendant’s phone was in the vicinity of Howard
Avenue, Pay Rite, and Church Street South, where the
defendant’s mother lived, before, during, and after the
robbery. The state emphasizes that additional corrobo-
ration of Vanderberg’s account is provided by Hoover’s
testimony that the defendant had told him that his
phone had ‘‘ ‘[taken] a hit where the crime was,’ ’’ which
he intended to address ‘‘by having his cousin take responsi-
bility for the phone while it was in the vicinity of Pay
Rite.’’ The state argues further that Hoover’s jailhouse
informant testimony was ‘‘independently corroborated’’
with respect to ‘‘almost every important detail’’ and that
Vanderberg’s testimony was similarly corroborated by
the video surveillance footage establishing ‘‘the approx-
imate sizes of the robbers, the different lettering on
their sweatshirts, the fact that they were both masked
and gloved, and that they stole cigars in bluish wrap-
pers.’’ Finally, the state observes that ‘‘DNA consistent
with that of the defendant and Sumler was found on
the masks seized from their residences.’’
   Focusing in particular on the unsent text message
telling Baker to ‘‘put them shits in the river,’’ which
the state suggested referred to murder weapons, the
defendant contends in response that the state cannot
establish that any error was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. The defendant argues that this evidence
covered up numerous gaps in the state’s case, which
‘‘rested on inferences from imprecise cell site location
data and the testimony of dubious value from shady
felons,’’ and which suffered from ‘‘no eyewitnesses to
the shooting, no evidence (aside from Vanderberg’s self-
serving testimony) placing the defendant definitively at
the scene, no fingerprints or DNA linking the defendant
to the shooting, no murder weapon, and no evidence
after a search of his house or clothes that linked him
to the shooting.’’ In particular, the defendant observes
that the prosecutor referred to the unsent text message
four times during closing argument, which ‘‘demon-
strates its importance’’ to the state’s case. The defen-
dant also argues that the ‘‘fact that a mask found in
[his] home had his DNA on it . . . is meaningless. He
owned it. There was no connection made between the
mask and the shooting of the clerk.’’ (Citation omitted.)
Finally, the defendant argues that he had been ‘‘elimi-
nated as a contributor to the DNA found on and in
Vanderberg’s car and the mask found in it,’’ and that
the police failed (1) ‘‘[to test] the gloves taken from the
defendant’s home for gunshot residue,’’ (2) to ‘‘pull any
footage from video cameras near the defendant’s apart-
ment to check Vanderberg’s testimony about the dumps-
ter,’’ and (3) to locate ‘‘Vanderberg’s sweatshirt’’ or ana-
lyze his DNA. We agree with the state, however, and
conclude that the consistency and independent corrob-
oration of the testimony of Vanderberg, Hoover, and
a statement from Jeremiah Samuels, a friend of the
defendant, render any error with respect to the admis-
sion of the unsent text message harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
  It is well established that ‘‘the test for determining
whether a constitutional [error] is harmless . . . is
whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
[error] complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained. . . . If the evidence may have had a tendency
to influence the judgment of the jury, it cannot be con-
sidered harmless. . . . That determination must be
made in light of the entire record [including the strength
of the state’s case without the evidence admitted in
error]. . . . Additional factors that we have considered
in determining whether an error is harmless in a particu-
lar case include the importance of the challenged evi-
dence to the prosecution’s case, whether it is cumulative,
the extent of cross-examination permitted, and the pres-
ence or absence of corroborating or contradicting evi-
dence or testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
 State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 196, 283 A.3d 477
(2022). ‘‘In other words, we [must be] satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt that the result would be the same
without the admission of the assumedly improper evi-
dence.’’ State v. Jordan, supra, 314 Conn. 104; see, e.g.,
State v. Russaw, 213 Conn. App. 311, 358, 278 A.3d 1,
cert. denied, 345 Conn. 902, 282 A.3d 466 (2022). This
inquiry is an objective one and requires us to consider
the quality and quantity of both the inadmissible evi-
dence and the admissible evidence that remains to sup-
port the verdict of the jury. See, e.g., State v. Van Kirk,
306 Mont. 215, 227–28, 32 P.3d 735 (2001); State v. Bou-
dreau, 175 N.H. 806, 817, 305 A.3d 905 (2023); see also
State v. Bowden, supra, 344 Conn. 276–77 (‘‘we begin
our analysis of harmlessness by placing the pieces of
inadmissible evidence obtained from the defendant’s
cell phone in the context of the other evidence properly
admitted at trial’’).
   Our review of the trial record demonstrates that the
state offered an overwhelming wealth of evidence beyond
the unsent text message to prove that the defendant had
committed felony murder and conspiracy to commit
robbery in the first degree. To begin, surveillance cam-
era footage from inside the Pay Rite on Forbes Avenue
shows that a person entered the store holding a handgun
in his right hand and wearing a gray hoodie with writing
down the sleeves, a dark ski mask, and dark gloves.
This person approached the counter and pointed a gun
at the clerk. A second person then entered the store
wearing a dark colored hoodie with light colored writing
across the front, a dark ski mask, and dark gloves. The
first person went behind the counter as the second
person stood in front of it. The second person removed
a handgun from his hoodie and fired it at the clerk,
who is seen clutching his midsection. The first person
handed what appears to be a handful of currency to
the second person as the wounded clerk handed the
second person what appears to be a cigar box. As the
second person began to exit the store, the clerk swung
a stool at the first person, who also shot the clerk before
exiting the store.
   Testifying for the state, Vanderberg, who drove the
car used in the commission of the Pay Rite robbery,
identified the two shooters in the surveillance video as
the defendant and Sumler, and he described them both
as being approximately five feet, seven inches tall. As
to the events leading up to the robbery and shooting,
Vanderberg testified that, on the day of the crime, he
had been driving around New Haven in his wife’s green
Ford Focus when he received a call or FaceTime from
either the defendant or Sumler, and they planned to
meet and hang out. About fifteen minutes after the call,
Vanderberg picked up the defendant and Sumler in his
wife’s vehicle on Dixwell Avenue in New Haven, and
they drove around smoking marijuana. Vanderberg tes-
tified that he, the defendant, and Sumler never dis-
cussed committing a robbery. According to Vanderberg,
at Sumler’s request, he parked at ‘‘Eddy’s’’ convenience
store on Howard Avenue, where Sumler placed a gun in
a cupholder and then exited the vehicle. The defendant
took the gun from the cupholder. After a few minutes,
Sumler returned to the vehicle with two pairs of black
gloves, put on one pair, and gave the defendant the
other. The defendant returned the gun to Sumler and
asked Vanderberg for a sweatshirt. Vanderberg gave
him a blue Nautica hoodie.
   The three men then continued to drive around New
Haven before stopping at the Pay Rite on Forbes Ave-
nue. Vanderberg parked around the corner and asked
the defendant and Sumler to get him some cigars. The
defendant and Sumler exited the vehicle; both were
wearing hoodies, and Sumler was holding his gun. A few
minutes later, the defendant came back to the vehicle,
walking fast while holding something in his hoodie and
dropping cigars from his hands. Sumler then walked
calmly back to the vehicle. Vanderberg drove the defen-
dant and Sumler to the defendant’s apartment complex,
where the defendant threw a cigar box and Vanderb-
erg’s hoodie in a dumpster. Once inside the defendant’s
apartment, Sumler handed the defendant his gun, which
the defendant placed in a storage area outside of his
apartment. While talking at the apartment, the defen-
dant told Vanderberg that his and Sumler’s actions at
Pay Rite were ‘‘some spur of the moment shit,’’ from
which Vanderberg inferred that they had robbed the
convenience store. At that point, however, he did not
know about the shooting. Vanderberg testified that, the
day after the shooting, he learned that the clerk had
been killed, and what happened ‘‘just wasn’t sitting right
with’’ him. Accordingly, he decided to inform his proba-
tion officer of what had happened and to arrange a
meeting with law enforcement officers. He testified at
trial pursuant to a plea agreement with the state.9
  Vanderberg’s detailed testimony was far from the
only evidence linking the defendant to the crime.10 Hoo-
ver, a jailhouse informant, testified that, for four or five
months, he was held in the same correctional facility
as the defendant after the defendant’s arrest for the
Pay Rite robbery. According to Hoover, he and the
defendant spoke almost every day during that time, and
the defendant talked to him about the Pay Rite robbery
three or four times per week. Specifically, the defendant
told Hoover that he and another man had shot the clerk
at the Pay Rite on Forbes Avenue. The defendant also
told Hoover that he wanted to get his cell phone ‘‘thrown
out’’ of evidence because it contained a photograph of
the gun used in the robbery, that the police had discov-
ered his ski mask and gloves at his residence, that he
was worried that the ski mask and gloves might have
his DNA on them, that he planned to testify that he
had used the mask for dirt biking, that Vanderberg had
remained in the vehicle during the robbery, that they
shot the clerk because he ‘‘took too long,’’ that both he
and Sumler shot the clerk, that they both had guns, that
they stole money and cigars, that, after the shooting,
he hid the gun at his girlfriend’s house but moved it
after the police searched his residence, that his cell
phone ‘‘took a hit’’ where the crime occurred, that he
planned to testify that his cousin had his cell phone in
that area, that, if he could get a low enough bond, he
would run ‘‘down south,’’ and that he wanted someone
to call Vanderberg’s wife to tell her that Vanderberg
needed to recant. Hoover testified that he documented
these conversations on a notepad in his cell so he could
‘‘help [his] situation.’’
  Additional corroboration was provided by a state-
ment by Samuels, which was admitted into evidence
for substantive purposes under State v. Whelan, 200
Conn. 743, 753, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994,
107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986).11 Samuels had
been arrested for another crime when, during an inter-
view with the police, he provided information about
the Pay Rite robbery, some of which was not publicly
available. Specifically, Samuels told the police that he
had spoken to Sumler and the defendant on the day of
the Pay Rite robbery, and they told him that Sumler
had a .357 caliber firearm, that Sumler and the defen-
dant had both worn masks and had both shot the clerk,
and that the proceeds of the robbery amounted to Dutch
Masters brand cigars and some money. Samuels also
told the police that he previously had known Sumler
and the defendant to possess or have access to a semiau-
tomatic handgun that he referred to as either a ‘‘deuce
deuce’’ (.22 caliber) or a ‘‘deuce five’’ (.25 caliber). Sam-
uels also informed the police that, after Vanderberg’s
arrest, the defendant told Samuels that Vanderberg
could not inculpate him because Vanderberg had not
been inside the store with him and Sumler during the
robbery.
  The state also offered evidence that, after Samuels
spoke with the police, but before his incarceration on
other charges, the defendant had his cousin, James
‘‘Sucky’’ Douglas, assault Samuels to force him to recant
his testimony. Specifically, Hoover testified that the
defendant told him that he had Sucky beat up an individ-
ual identified as either ‘‘JS or JC’’ to get him to recant
his statement to the police. Consistent with Hoover’s
testimony, Samuels testified that he had a physical alter-
cation with someone named Sucky after he spoke to
the police. The state offered into evidence a statement
Samuels wrote after this physical altercation, in which
he stated that he had provided the police with false
information and that he wanted to recant. Samuels also
wrote a letter to Sumler, stating that he could ‘‘make
it right’’ by giving a statement that he had been ‘‘high’’
at the time of the interview and that he had provided the
police with ‘‘bullshit.’’ Indeed, at trial, Samuels testified
that he had been under the influence of Xanax during
the police interview, had lied to the police about the
Pay Rite case, and wished to recant. This testimony set
the foundation for the admission of a redacted version
of his interview with the police under Whelan.
  The record also contained physical evidence corrobo-
rating the testimony and statements of Vanderberg,
Hoover and Samuels.12 The state entered into evidence
a black ski mask and a pair of black gloves, which the
police had seized when they searched the defendant’s
home in the Church Street South housing complex.
Additionally, Daniel Renstrom, a forensic science exam-
iner with the state forensic science laboratory, testified
that an analysis of the DNA discovered on the ski mask
found inside the defendant’s apartment indicated that
the defendant was a potential contributor to that DNA,
with the expected frequency of Black and white people
as contributors to that sample being one in five. The
defendant is a Black male.13
   James J. Wines, a special agent for the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, testified regarding the historical cell
site location data associated with the defendant’s cell
phone. This data established that the cell phone was in
the areas of Howard Avenue, the Pay Rite convenience
store on Forbes Avenue where the victim was killed,
and Church Street South at about the same times that
Vanderberg testified that he, the defendant, and Sumler
were at those locations. In particular, prior to the shoot-
ing, at both 7:11 and 7:15 p.m., the defendant’s cell
phone pinged the same cell tower, which covered the
area of Howard Avenue. At 7:16 p.m., the defendant’s
phone pinged a different cell tower that covered an area
that included the Pay Rite on Forbes Avenue. Wines
testified that both cell towers pinged during this time-
frame were in clear signal areas, meaning that the likeli-
hood of the cell signal being redirected to another tower
was minimal. Following the shooting, between 8:29 and
11:30 p.m., the defendant’s cell phone pinged a third cell
tower near his apartment eleven times. Wines conceded
that he could not provide the exact location of the
defendant’s cell phone at any specific time. He also
acknowledged that a cell phone signal could move from
one tower to another without the cell phone and user
moving.
   In addition to physical evidence, the state also offered
the testimony of Jonathan Gavilanes. He testified that,
at the time of the shooting, he was across the street
from the Pay Rite at an auto repair shop. He heard the
sound of a gunshot, looked out the shop window, and
saw a man wearing a ski mask run out of the conve-
nience store. He then heard a second gunshot and saw
another man wearing a ski mask run out of the conve-
nience store. Gavilanes testified that both men were
wearing sweatshirts, and both were ‘‘[a]bout five feet,
seven inches [tall], almost [Gavilanes’] height,’’ which
was six feet tall.
   Having reviewed the record in this case, we are con-
vinced that any impropriety in the admission of the
cell phone and its stored data was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. The defendant correctly observes
that the testimony of Vanderberg and Hoover is properly
viewed with some skepticism, given their obvious self-
interest in testifying for the state as an accomplice and
a jailhouse informant, respectively. See, e.g., State v.
Jones, 337 Conn. 486, 501–503, 254 A.3d 239 (2020);
Birch v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 37,
65–66, 219 A.3d 353 (2019); State v. Patterson, 276 Conn.
452, 468–70, 886 A.2d 777 (2005). Nevertheless, what
may be qualitatively weak evidence—especially stand-
ing alone—may grow in strength considerably when
viewed in context. See, e.g., State v. Maner, 147 Conn.
App. 761, 778, 780–81, 83 A.3d 1182 (in determining that
claimed confrontation clause violation was harmless
beyond reasonable doubt, court considered defendant’s
confession to jailhouse informant in combination with
eyewitness testimony), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 935, 88
A.3d 550 (2014). The record demonstrates that the qual-
ity of the testimony of Hoover and Vanderberg grows
by leaps and bounds with the degree of independent
corroboration present in this case.
   First, Vanderberg’s testimony was corroborated by
the video of the police interview, admitted under
Whelan, in which Samuels stated that the defendant
had also admitted to him his involvement in the robbery
and shooting of the store clerk at the Pay Rite. Evidence
that the defendant had his cousin use physical force to
intimidate Samuels into recanting provides significant
evidence of consciousness of guilt and also bolstered
Samuels’ previous statement to the police that the
defendant had admitted his role in the robbery and the
shooting to him. See State v. Bowden, supra, 344 Conn.
279–80 (impact of improper cell phone and text message
evidence was heavily undercut by consciousness of
guilt evidence, namely, witness tampering and destruc-
tion of evidence).
  Second, Vanderberg’s testimony was independently
corroborated by Hoover’s testimony that the defendant
admitted that (1) he had robbed the Pay Rite and shot
the clerk, (2) his cell phone ‘‘took a hit’’ in the area of
the crime, (3) he planned to testify that his cousin had
his cell phone at the time of the crime, and (4) he was
worried about his DNA being on the ski mask and gloves
that the police had discovered at his residence. In addi-
tion to this level of detail, what makes the quality of
Hoover’s jailhouse informant testimony particularly
compelling is that it contains information—not avail-
able to the public—that would not have been known
to anyone except the perpetrators. See State v. Jones,
supra, 337 Conn. 510 (in assessing credibility of infor-
mant, fact finder may consider, inter alia, ‘‘[t]he extent
to which his testimony is confirmed by other evidence
. . . [t]he specificity of the testimony . . . [and] [t]he
extent to which the testimony contains details known
only by the perpetrator’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). That Hoover, who had no prior connection to the
defendant or the crimes at issue, knew details about the
crime that were not available to the public significantly
bolstered his credibility and the qualitative strength of
his testimony.
  Finally, the most powerful evidence corroborating
the testimony of Hoover and Vanderberg is cell site
location data, the legality of which is unchallenged;
see footnote 8 of this opinion; establishing that the
defendant’s phone was (1) in the area of Howard Ave-
nue when he was picked up by Vanderberg, (2) in the
area of the Pay Rite on Forbes Avenue at the approxi-
mate time of the robbery and shooting, and (3) in the
area of Church Street South, where the defendant lived
with his mother, just after the crime. Nevertheless, the
defendant contends that the cell site location data are
of minimal weight because ‘‘[t]he fact that [his] cell
phone was in the vicinity of his . . . apartment, as well
as Howard Avenue and the general area where the
shooting occurred at around the same time as the shoot-
ing . . . is not dispositive; he lived there.’’ (Citation
omitted.) This argument oversimplifies the meaning of
the evidence. As Wines explained, the cell site location
data did not merely show that the defendant was in the
vicinity of these three areas at the same time; it did not
show that, at 7:16 p.m., the defendant’s phone pinged
a cell tower that covered all of Howard Avenue, the
area of the shooting and his apartment. Rather, this
evidence showed that the defendant was closest to the
tower in the area of the shooting, and not the tower in
the area of the apartment where he lived, at 7:16 p.m.
Indeed, Wines testified that the cell towers in the area
of the defendant’s apartment and in the area of the
shooting each had clear visibility, limiting the potential
for the cell phone to have pinged cell towers further
away from the cell phone’s actual location. Although
Wines conceded that the cell site location data could
not precisely pinpoint the defendant’s location, this
imprecision nevertheless was limited by the fact that
the clear visibility at each cell tower meant that it was
far more likely that the defendant’s location was within
the area of the pinged cell tower.
   Beyond the cell site location data, still more evidence
independently corroborated nearly every important
detail of Vanderberg and Hoover’s testimony, including
the in-store surveillance footage, consistent with Gavi-
lanes’ eyewitness testimony, showing the suspects’
height, and the presence of black gloves and a ski mask
in the defendant’s residence. See, e.g., State v. Smith,
344 Conn. 229, 262–63, 278 A.3d 481 (2022) (in determin-
ing harm, testimony of witness was bolstered by video
footage). Nevertheless, the defendant argues that Gavi-
lanes’ eyewitness testimony did not bolster the testi-
mony of Hoover or Vandenberg because Gavilanes testified
that the two shooters were ‘‘almost [his] height,’’ which
was six feet tall, whereas the defendant was five feet,
seven inches tall. This argument mischaracterizes Gavi-
lanes’ testimony. He testified that both suspects were
‘‘[a]bout five feet, seven inches [tall], almost [Gavi-
lanes’] height,’’ which was six feet tall, so Gavilanes
testified that the suspects were ‘‘shorter’’ than him.
(Emphasis added.) Similarly, the defendant argues that
the in-store surveillance footage and Vanderberg’s testi-
mony conflicted because the footage did not show
Vanderberg giving the defendant a sweatshirt from his
truck right before the robbery, and, thus, neither corrob-
orated the testimony of Hoover and Samuels. This argu-
ment again misunderstands the testimony. Vanderberg
testified that he had given the defendant a sweatshirt
from his trunk before the robbery but that he was not
sure precisely when and where he did so. Specifically,
he thought this occurred while the three men were ‘‘at
Eddy’s or somewhere in the Hill [section of New Haven].’’
  We also disagree with the defendant’s argument that
the lack of linchpin DNA evidence significantly under-
mines the state’s harmless error claim in this case. The
evidence showed that the defendant was one of the 20
percent of Black or white Americans who could have
contributed DNA to the ski mask, the ski mask was
discovered where the defendant lived, and the mask
was similar in appearance to the ski mask worn by the
suspects shown in the surveillance footage. Although
the DNA evidence standing alone is far from definitive,
considered in the context of the other properly admitted
evidence, it nevertheless supports a nexus between the
defendant and the shooting.
   Finally, in assessing the potential impact of improp-
erly admitted evidence on the jury’s verdict, we con-
sider the parties’ closing arguments in order to assess
its centrality to the factual issues in the case, with the
degree of the parties’ emphasis and reliance on the
improperly admitted evidence indicative of its impor-
tance to the jury’s verdict. See, e.g., State v. Culbreath,
340 Conn. 167, 195, 263 A.3d 350 (2021). We acknowl-
edge that the prosecutor mentioned the draft text mes-
sage retrieved from the defendant’s cell phone—
evidence that the defendant principally claims to have
harmed him14—several times during closing and rebut-
tal arguments. Viewed in context, however, the prosecu-
tor’s focus on the unsent text message was minimal
relative to the other evidence admitted at trial. Not only
did the prosecutor address the testimony of Vanderberg
and Hoover, the statement of Samuels, and Wines’ testi-
mony about the cell site location data before mentioning
the contents of the cell phone, but the prosecutor
emphasized that other evidence far more strongly.15
After defense counsel’s closing argument, in which
counsel asserted the theory that Vanderberg had framed
the defendant to mitigate his own culpability as the
getaway driver for both the Pay Rite robbery and
another fatal convenience store shooting in Bridge-
port,16 the prosecutor gave a rebuttal argument. In the
rebuttal argument, the prosecutor addressed the vari-
ous attacks on Vanderberg’s credibility. The prosecutor
again emphasized the importance of the cell site loca-
tion data and urged the jury to credit the testimony of
Hoover and the video of Samuels’ police interview, both
of which independently referred to statements by the
defendant admitting his participation in the Pay Rite
robbery and shooting. Only after discussing in detail
the other physical evidence of the crime—the bullet
fragments and the gloves and ski mask found in the
defendant’s residence—did the prosecutor again raise
the topic of the unsent draft text message, arguing that
it referred to throwing the gun used in the robbery into
the river.17 Thus, the contents of the defendant’s cell
phone played only a minor role in the prosecutor’s
closing and rebuttal arguments relative to the other
evidence that more directly linked the defendant to
the charged crimes. Additionally, the contents of the
defendant’s cell phone played no role in establishing
an element of the offense, or bolstering or destroying
the credibility of any particular witness, which lessens
the impact of any improper admission into evidence.
   Indeed, our case law establishes that a prosecutor’s
reliance on illegally obtained evidence in closing argu-
ments —even evidence more directly incriminating than
the text message at issue in this case—is not dispositive.
See State v. Tony M., supra, 332 Conn. 819, 823–25 and
n.8 (any Miranda violation resulting from defendant’s
statement that tossing his infant son off bridge was
akin to basketball ‘‘ ‘free throw’ ’’ was harmless beyond
reasonable doubt as to element of intent, even though
it was used to impeach his testimony at trial that drop
was accidental, given ‘‘[the] overwhelming, indepen-
dent evidence of the defendant’s intent to kill his baby
that the jury could have credited,’’ including text mes-
sages sent to baby’s mother on night of murder, state-
ments to psychiatry resident at hospital, statements to
his mother and baby’s mother on night of murder, and
fact that statement was mentioned only briefly during
summation); State v. Jordan, supra, 314 Conn. 103–105
(admission of ecstasy pills illegally seized from defen-
dant’s closet was harmless beyond reasonable doubt
with respect to his intent to sell, despite prosecutor’s
heavy reliance on them in closing argument, given ‘‘[the]
ample additional circumstantial evidence . . . that
[he] intended to sell the thirty pills he possessed on his
person at the time of his arrest,’’ including testimony
from multiple witnesses that they had seen defendant
sell similarly marked ecstasy pills in several locations).
   In sum, we conclude that the evidence against the
defendant, viewed cumulatively and in context, was
overwhelmingly strong and that the admission into evi-
dence of the contents of the cell phone did not contrib-
ute to the jury’s verdict. Vanderberg’s narrative of the
defendant’s actions on the evening of the Pay Rite rob-
bery was independently corroborated by the defen-
dant’s separate admissions of guilt to Hoover and
Samuels, along with the cell site location data and the
discovery of a ski mask and gloves at the defendant’s
residence. There was also consciousness of guilt evi-
dence in the form of witness intimidation, insofar as
Sucky assaulted Samuels in an attempt to keep him
from testifying against the defendant, which Hoover
testified occurred at the defendant’s direction. These
evidentiary underpinnings together convince us that
any error in the admission of the contents of the defen-
dant’s cell phone was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
   The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
  In this opinion McDONALD, D’AURIA and MULLINS,
Js., concurred.
   1
     We granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal, limited
to the following issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly uphold the
trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the contents of
his iPhone in reliance on United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S. Ct.
2620, 159 L. Ed. 2d 667 (2004), and State v. Mangual, 311 Conn. 182, 85
A.3d 627 (2014), when the seizure of those contents was the result of ques-
tioning after he had invoked his Miranda rights, on the basis that a cell
phone and its stored data constitute ‘physical’ (i.e., nontestimonial) evidence
that need not be suppressed if seized as the result of a Miranda violation?’’
And (2) ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court properly reject the defendant’s claim that
the holding in Patane does not comport with the broader protections against
compelled self-incrimination afforded under article first, § 8, of the Connecti-
cut constitution?’’ State v. Sayles, 336 Conn. 929, 247 A.3d 578 (2021).
   The defendant initially did not seek certification to appeal from the portion
of the Appellate Court’s opinion rejecting his claims that (1) the seizure of
his cell phone was not supported by the existence of probable cause and
exigent circumstances, and (2) the affidavit supporting the application for
a search warrant for his cell phone contained false information in violation
of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978).
See State v. Sayles, supra, 202 Conn. App. 755, 765. After we granted the
defendant’s petition for certification to appeal, we granted his subsequent
motion for permission to file a supplemental brief raising those issues under
the fourth amendment to the United States constitution.
   2
     Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).
   3
     Specifically, when the defendant first arrived at the police station, Per-
rone saw him holding his cell phone. State v. Sayles, supra, 202 Conn. App.
745. Although the detectives were not aware of this, before entering the
interview room with them, the defendant had handed his cell phone to his
mother, who was sitting on a nearby bench outside of that room. Id., 744.
The defendant then asked to speak with an attorney. Id. Perrone briefly left
the interview room, and, when he came back, he said to the defendant:
‘‘you have a cell phone . . . you had it out there. Who has your phone?’’
The defendant replied that his mother had the phone. Id., 742. Perrone again
left the interview room, approached the defendant’s mother, and asked if
she had the defendant’s cell phone. Id., 745. She responded affirmatively
and handed it to Perrone. Id. Perrone then showed the cell phone to the
defendant and asked if it was his, and the defendant confirmed that it was.
Concerned about the potential loss of evidence through the erasure of data
or loss of the device, Perrone took custody of the cell phone immediately,
pending application for a search warrant. Id.
   4
     Testimony at trial established that ‘‘sheema’’ referred to the defendant’s
girlfriend, Tysheema Barker.
   5
     Upon the determination that a constitutional violation has occurred, the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires the exclusion ‘‘not only [of]
the illegally obtained evidence itself, but also . . . other incriminating evi-
dence derived from the primary evidence.’’ Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
441, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984).
   6
     In addition to his state constitutional claim, which presents an issue
of first impression, the defendant also contends that the Appellate Court
improperly relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Patane, supra, 542 U.S. 630, in concluding that the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine did not require suppression of the contents of the
defendant’s cell phone under the fifth amendment to the United States
constitution. Specifically, he argues that this case did not involve a simple
failure to give the Miranda warnings because, by continuing the interroga-
tion, the detectives ‘‘deliberate[ly] flout[ed]’’ the defendant’s invocation of
his right to counsel under Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. 477. He also
argues that evidence of the contents of a cell phone is not physical evidence
but, instead, is testimonial evidence. As a corollary, the defendant contends
that (1) the trial court made clearly erroneous factual findings concerning
whether the defendant was free to leave the police station and whether the
interview had ended when the police asked the defendant for his cell phone,
and (2) the police interview was custodial in nature and triggered his protec-
tions under Miranda. Finally, the defendant argues that, under Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014), and State
v. Smith, 344 Conn. 229, 278 A.3d 481 (2022), the ‘‘all data’’ search warrant
used to obtain the cell phone violated the fourth amendment to the United
States constitution because it was not supported by probable cause and
because it lacked sufficient particularity.
   7
     As an additional, alternative ground to uphold the denial of the motion
to suppress, the state also relies on the inevitable discovery and independent
source doctrines to bar the application of the exclusionary rule in this case.
Given our conclusion as to the state’s harmless error claim, we need not
address this alternative ground.
   8
     The defendant does not challenge the legality of the cell site location
data associated with his cell phone that was obtained via a search warrant
issued to his cellular service provider. Nevertheless, the dissent argues that
the cell site location data evidence is itself fruit of the poisonous tree that
should have been excluded from evidence and, therefore, not considered
in the harmless error analysis. See footnote 4 of the dissenting opinion. This
analysis marks a departure from the adversarial process, pursuant to which
claims are framed and raised by parties and then reviewed by the courts;
see, e.g., State v. Stephenson, 337 Conn. 643, 653, 255 A.3d 865 (2020); insofar
as the dissent raises a claim that the defendant himself has abandoned by
not briefing. See, e.g., Traylor v. State, 332 Conn. 789, 805, 213 A.3d 467
(2019) (‘‘[a]n unmentioned claim is, by definition, inadequately briefed, and
one that is generally . . . considered abandoned’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)); State v. O’Brien-Veader, 318 Conn. 514, 562, 122 A.3d 555 (2015)
(inadequately briefed claims are abandoned). Absent resort to the supple-
mental briefing procedure provided by Blumberg Associates Worldwide,
Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 161–62, 84 A.3d
840 (2014), for courts raising such claims sua sponte, we deem the legality
of the cell site location data undisputed and afford it full consideration in
conducting our harmless error analysis.
   9
     Vanderberg acknowledged further that he had a history of criminal activ-
ity, including charges of felony murder in connection with the robbery of
a Bridgeport convenience store a few days after the events at issue in the
present case. He also admitted that he had unspecified pending charges and
had entered into a plea agreement with the state, pursuant to which he
agreed to testify, although the state did not promise to recommend a specific
sentence unless required to do so by the court.
   10
      The dissent disagrees with our view that, for purposes of assessing
harmless error, the value of the testimony of Vanderberg and Hoover, and
the prior inconsistent statement of Samuels, is enhanced by the fact that
this evidence independently corroborates each other. The dissent contends
that it is ‘‘most likely’’ that the evidence from the defendant’s cell phone
persuaded the jury to believe their otherwise ‘‘inherently dubious’’ testimony.
Part III of the dissenting opinion. The dissent then illustrates the suspect
nature of testimony from accomplices or jailhouse informants by citing
certain sister state cases for the proposition that some states will not even
permit the testimony of accomplices or jailhouse informants to come into
evidence without corroboration by a source other than another accomplice
or jailhouse informant. See part III and footnote 7 of the dissenting opinion;
see also, e.g., State v. Harris, 405 N.W.2d 224, 227 (Minn. 1987); People v.
Ohlstein, 54 App. Div. 2d 109, 112, 387 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1976), aff’d, 44 N.Y.2d
896, 379 N.E.2d 222, 407 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1978); Chapman v. State, 470 S.W.2d
656, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); cf. Schnidt v. State, 357 S.W.3d 845, 851
(Tex. App. 2012) (standard for corroboration of accomplice and jailhouse
informant testimony is same, and one cannot corroborate the testimony of
the other), review denied, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Docket No.
PD-0311-12 (April 18, 2012). The dissent ‘‘fail[s] to understand’’ how such
witnesses’ ‘‘powerful incentive . . . to implicate the defendant falsely in
the crimes charged . . . is eliminated or even reduced by the fact that
multiple witnesses all share the same motivation.’’ Part III of the dis-
senting opinion.
   We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s reliance on this body of case
law. First, as the dissent acknowledges, the accomplice corroboration rule
is one of evidentiary sufficiency that is not required at common law and
that has largely been implemented by statute in approximately one-half of
the states, ‘‘requiring, in varying degrees, that the testimony of an alleged
accomplice be corroborated by independent evidence, that is, evidence not
dependent on an accomplice.’’ State v. Jones, 466 Md. 142, 158, 216 A.3d
907 (2019). In overruling its common-law accomplice corroboration rule as
arbitrary and an intrusion on the jury’s constitutional role as fact finder;
see id., 160–62; Maryland’s highest court recently observed that ‘‘most juris-
dictions (thirty-two states, the District of Columbia, the federal courts,
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) either have not adopted the
accomplice corroboration rule or have since repealed it,’’ leaving Tennessee
as ‘‘the only [jurisdiction] with a [judicially created] accomplice corrobora-
tion rule.’’ Id., 160–61. Most significant, Connecticut does not have a com-
mon-law or statutory rule requiring the corroboration of accomplice or
jailhouse informant testimony as a matter of law, with recent legislation
addressing jailhouse informant testimony concerning disclosure; see Gen-
eral Statutes § 54-86o; and, in certain serious felony cases, more wholistic
assessments of reliability beyond corroboration under General Statutes § 54-
86p. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 337 Conn. 486, 505–506, 254 A.3d 239 (2020).
Instead, in our view, the informant and accomplice testimony in this case
is consistent with those indicators of reliability, including ‘‘(1) [t]he extent
to which the jailhouse witness’s testimony is confirmed by other evidence;
(2) [t]he specificity of the testimony; (3) [t]he extent to which the testimony
contains details known only by the perpetrator of the alleged offense; (4)
[t]he extent to which the details of the testimony could be obtained from
a source other than the defendant; and (5) [t]he circumstances under which
the jailhouse witness initially provided information supporting such testi-
mony to [the police] . . . or a prosecutorial official, including whether the
jailhouse witness was responding to a leading question.’’ General Statutes
54-86p (a); see, e.g., State v. Jones, supra, 506.
   Second, even in states that have accomplice corroboration rules, it is by
no means settled law that the testimony of a jailhouse informant cannot be
used to corroborate that of an accomplice. Compare People v. Huggins, 235
Cal. App. 4th 715, 718–19, 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 672 (2015) (concluding that
statutes requiring corroboration of accomplice and jailhouse informant testi-
mony do not preclude use of jailhouse informant testimony to corroborate
accomplice testimony, and rejecting request ‘‘to impose a judicially created
rule that accomplices and in-custody informants cannot corroborate each
other’s testimony because both are self-interested’’), review denied, Califor-
nia Supreme Court, Docket No. S226350 (July 8, 2015), and State v. Pippitt,
645 N.W.2d 87, 94 (Minn. 2002) (rejecting argument that jailhouse informant
was not credible as matter of law for purposes of corroborating accomplice
testimony), with Johnson v. State, Docket No. 11-14-00311-CR, 2017 WL
3923665, *6–7 (Tex. App. August 31, 2017) (discussing split of authority on
this point among intermediate appellate courts in Texas).
    11
       ‘‘In Whelan, [this court] adopted a hearsay exception allowing the sub-
stantive use of prior written inconsistent statements, signed by the declarant,
who has personal knowledge of the facts stated, when the declarant testifies
at trial and is subject to cross-examination. This rule has also been codified
[at] § 8-5 (1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, which incorporates all
of the developments and clarifications of the Whelan rule that have occurred
since Whelan was decided.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Gray, 342 Conn. 657, 686, 271 A.3d 101 (2022).
    12
       Thus, we respectfully disagree with the dissent’s blanket statement that
‘‘[t]here was no physical evidence connecting the defendant to the crimes.’’
(Emphasis added.) Part III of the dissenting opinion. The dissent, however,
concedes that the police recovered a ski mask and gloves—plainly items
of physical evidence—from the defendant’s home but seeks to diminish the
importance of this evidence because, in the dissent’s view, ski masks and
gloves are commonly found items in many homes located in the northeastern
United States. See id. The presence of the mask and gloves is nevertheless
of greater significance in light of the other evidence showing that the robbers
wore ski masks and that the defendant’s cell phone was in the vicinity of
the Pay Rite at the time of the shooting. Moreover, the defendant’s statement
to Hoover about his concern that the police might find his DNA on the mask
and gloves would be an odd thing say if he was not concerned that the
police would be able to link the mask and gloves to those worn by the
perpetrators. Finally, the jury was free to compare the mask and gloves
recovered from the defendant’s closet to the mask and gloves worn by the
perpetrators in the surveillance video for similarities that would render them
more probative evidence.
    13
       Additionally, upon a search of Sumler’s residence pursuant to a warrant,
the police discovered grey sweatpants, black gloves, a black mask, nine
millimeter bullets, and .38 caliber bullets. Jill Therriault, a firearms examiner,
testified that three .38 caliber bullets and one .25 caliber bullet were recov-
ered from the crime scene. All three .38 caliber bullets were fired from the
same gun.
    14
       As we noted previously; see text accompanying footnote 4 of this opin-
ion; and as the dissent emphasizes in great detail; see part II of the dissenting
opinion; the police retrieved other potentially incriminating evidence from
the defendant’s cell phone, as well, including a text message purportedly
from his mother not to come home during the execution of the search
warrant and Internet searches for news stories about the Pay Rite robbery.
Nevertheless, the defendant’s harmless error arguments are focused exclu-
sively on the impact of the unsent text message. Although we focus on the
case as argued by the defendant, which relies nearly entirely on the unsent
text message element, we emphasize that the inclusion of the other items
found in the data on the defendant’s cell phone does not change our conclu-
sion that the strength of the state’s case renders the assumed constitutional
violation harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Stephenson,
337 Conn. 643, 653, 255 A.3d 865 (2020) (describing how parties customarily
raise and argue claims in adversarial system).
    15
       Specifically, during her initial closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed
the evidence that the state had presented. The prosecutor spent the first
quarter of her closing argument focused on Vanderberg’s testimony. Then,
the prosecutor reviewed the testimony of Gavilanes, the police officers who
responded to the crime scene, and the associate medical examiner who
examined the victim’s body. The prosecutor emphasized the contents of the
video recording of Samuels’ original statement to the police and then reviewed
Hoover’s testimony. Only then did the prosecutor mention the cell phone’s
contents and, even then, referred specifically to the unsent, draft text mes-
sage only briefly. Instead, the prosecutor proceeded to emphasize Wines’
testimony and the cell site location data.
    Specifically, with respect to the contents of the defendant’s cell phone,
the prosecutor argued: ‘‘In the series of text messages that [was] presented,
there’s a text message that was received by the defendant’s [cell] phone at
3:55 a.m. on April 15, 2015, that says, ‘[d]o not come here.’ There was also
testimony that, later that day, the same day, April 15, 2015, the defendant
and his mother went to the New Haven Police Department to talk to detec-
tives about why they were at . . . his house. In the same string of text
messages, there’s a text message that . . . was not sent, although [there
was testimony establishing that] there were numerous reasons why a text
message may not be sent. Maybe [the cell phone] lost contact with the
server, but there’s a text message that was typed on the defendant’s phone,
‘[i]f I get locked up tell sheema put them shits in the river some where
[worda loc].’ ’’
    16
       During his closing argument, defense counsel asserted that it was Vand-
erberg and not the defendant who had robbed the Pay Rite and shot the
clerk. Defense counsel’s closing argument contained an exhaustive attack
on Vanderberg’s credibility, focusing on the fact that he was involved in
another robbery and shooting in Bridgeport soon after the Pay Rite robbery
and that both crimes shared many similarities, like two suspects wearing
ski masks, robbing a convenience store, and shooting the clerk. Thus, coun-
sel argued that the defendant was not involved in the Pay Rite robbery at
all and that Vanderberg falsely accused the defendant in an attempt to create
a credible defense that Vanderberg did not know that he had used his wife’s
car to act as a getaway driver for deadly convenience store robberies in
Bridgeport and New Haven.
    17
       The prosecutor specifically argued in rebuttal: ‘‘And what were those
texts? When he got the first one right around the time the police are actually
tossing his house, from someone to [the defendant], ‘[d]o not come here.’
Later that day, a text that we know was never sent, but it was drafted on
that phone, ‘[i]f I get locked up tell sheema put them shits in the river some
where [worda loc].’ Shits can mean anything, right? People are constantly
throwing stuff in the river. Does that make sense, or does it make more
sense that he keeps his gun at his girlfriend’s house? He knows he’s going
to get locked up for this offense, and he’s desperately trying to get the word
out to get rid of those guns. . . . How about the conversation with Sheema?
They’re talking about the text message. She had met with [the inspector
from the state’s attorney’s office] a couple [of] days earlier. Of course, she
hasn’t seen [the defendant] in over [one] year, but she decides to go and
pay him a visit days before she gets on the stand. And he says, ‘[t]hat don’t
mean nothing. You never got it. That don’t mean nothing.’ He’s not worried
at all. What’s he referring to? Is he referring to the guns? Is he referring to
the text message? I don’t know. It certainly shows knowledge of something
though, doesn’t it?’’