Court Opinion

ID: 9898211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:11.084527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:57.395962
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 KEITH WILLIAMS,
                                             No. 84567-5-I
                         Appellant,
                                             DIVISION ONE
               v.
                                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 CUSTODIAN OF PUBLIC RECORDS
 NC DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

                         Defendant,

 MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

                         Respondent.

       MANN, J. — Keith Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals a trial court order

granting in part and denying in part his motion to compel Microsoft Corporation to

produce documents and comply with third party subpoenas. Williams argues that the

trial court erred by considering Microsoft’s untimely filed opposition to his motion to

compel and accepting as a complete response Microsoft’s declaration attesting that a

reasonable search revealed no records as requested in the subpoena. We affirm.

                                              I

       This matter arises from an ongoing public records dispute between North

Carolina resident Williams and the custodian of public records for the North Carolina

Department of Justice (NCDOJ). On June 9, 2022, Williams filed a foreign subpoena in
No. 84567-5-I/2

King County Superior Court directing Microsoft to produce “non-content” e-mail logs for

four NCDOJ e-mail accounts on specific dates in July 2017. The request stated that the

“logs should specify; sender, recipient, date, and time.” Microsoft objected to the

subpoena arguing that the e-mail accounts, if they exist, are “owned and controlled by

the customer” and that Williams’s request should be directed to the account holders

rather than to Microsoft. Counsel for Microsoft later conferred with Williams and

explained that the e-mail accounts referenced in his subpoena are called “enterprise

accounts,” meaning that the customer can configure their services so that it was

possible that Microsoft would have no responsive records. At that time, Microsoft had

not yet searched for records responsive to Williams’s subpoena.

       Dissatisfied with this response, Williams moved ex parte to compel Microsoft to

produce the information he sought. Counsel for Microsoft told Williams that Microsoft

had completed its search for responsive records and found none. After Williams

declined Microsoft’s request to strike his motion to compel, Microsoft responded with a

declaration from records custodian Carolina Bonilla González attesting that a

reasonable search carried out under her direction revealed no records as requested in

the subpoena. On July 21, 2022, a superior court commissioner denied Williams’s

motion without prejudice and directed that it be presented before the chief civil judge.

       Williams then refiled his motion to compel and noted the motion for August 26

without oral argument. Microsoft refiled its opposition to the motion after the court

closed on August 25, so it was accepted for filing at 9:00 a.m. on August 26—the day

the motion was set to be heard. On the same day, Williams moved to strike Microsoft’s

                                             2
No. 84567-5-I/3

opposing brief as untimely under the local rules. Williams did not respond substantively

to Microsoft’s arguments opposing his motion to compel.

       On August 30, 2022, the trial court substantially denied Williams’s requests for

relief. In so ruling, the court considered and reviewed Microsoft’s untimely filed

opposition to Williams’s motion. The court ruled that the declaration of Microsoft’s

records custodian failed to comply with GR 13 because it did not include the city and

state where it was executed, but that Microsoft had otherwise complied with the

requirements of the subpoena. In compliance with the court’s order, Microsoft provided

Williams with an updated declaration that fully complied with GR 13(a). The trial court

denied Williams’s motion for reconsideration.

       Williams appeals.

                                               II

       Williams argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his right to

due process by accepting Microsoft’s opposition to his motion to compel even though it

was untimely filed under the local rules. We disagree.

       The trial court “has discretionary authority to manage its own affairs so as to

achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Woodhead v. Discount

Waterbeds, Inc., 78 Wn. App. 125, 129, 896 P.2d 66 (1995). Whether to accept or

reject an untimely filing lies within the trial court’s discretion. O’Neill v. Farmers Ins. Co.

of Wash., 124 Wn. App. 516, 521, 125 P.3d 134 (2004). A court abuses its discretion if

its decision is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. Coggle v. Snow, 56

Wn. App. 499, 507, 784 P.2d 554 (1990). We will not reverse the trial court’s ruling

                                               3
No. 84567-5-I/4

based on an untimely filing absent a showing of prejudice. Hanson Indus. Inc. v.

Kutschkau, 158 Wn. App. 278, 291, 239 P.3d 367 (2010).

       Under King County Superior Court Local Civil Rule (KCLR) 7(b)(4)(D), “[a]ny

party opposing a motion shall file and serve the original responsive papers in opposition

to a motion, serve copies on parties, and deliver working copies to the hearing judge no

later than 4:30 p.m. four judicial days before the date the motion is to be considered.”

KCLR 7(b)(4)(G) adds that “[a]ny material offered at a time later than required by this

rule, and any reply material which is not in strict reply, will not be considered by the

court over objection of counsel except upon the imposition of appropriate terms, unless

the court orders otherwise.”

       Microsoft filed its opposition to Williams’s motion to compel on the morning of the

hearing, so it was untimely under KCLR 7(b)(4)(G). But Williams has not shown any

resulting prejudice. Williams had notice of the substantive issues raised in Microsoft’s

opposition brief because it filed the same arguments in its opposition to Williams’s first

motion to compel, which had been erroneously filed in the ex parte department a few

weeks earlier. Williams replied to Microsoft’s response during the first round of briefing

before the ex parte department. And Williams’s opening brief on his refiled motion to

compel addressed and disputed the substance of Microsoft’s opposition. Given these

circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Microsoft’s

untimely opposition brief.

       Williams argues that KCLR 7(b)(4)(G) requires “strict” compliance for replying to

a response, so he could not reply “unless the court orders otherwise.” Because the

court did not issue such an order before accepting Microsoft’s untimely response and

                                              4
No. 84567-5-I/5

denying his motion to compel, Williams contends that the trial court’s decision to accept

Microsoft’s untimely response denied him an opportunity to reply. But in this context,

the term “strict” simply means that the reply’s scope is limited to matters placed in issue

by the opposition brief. See 15A DOUGLAS J. ENDE, W ASHINGTON PRACTICE: W ASHINGTON

HANDBOOK ON CIVIL PROCEDURE § 62.12 (2023 ed.). Here, the trial court held the motion

open for four days after Microsoft filed its opposition brief before issuing its ruling.

Nothing prevented Williams from replying during that period of time.

       Williams also argues that the court erred in considering Microsoft’s opposition

brief because Microsoft failed to seek the court’s permission to consider it. But nothing

in the rules requires a party to move for leave to file a late brief. Nor do the rules restrict

the trial court’s discretion to consider an untimely brief without a motion.

                                              III

       Williams next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to

compel Microsoft to produce the records he requested in the subpoena. The trial

court’s ruling on a motion to compel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Lake

Chelan Shores Homeowners Ass’n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 176 Wn. App.

168, 183, 313 P.3d 408 (2013).

       If a party flouts discovery, CR 37(a)(2) permits the party seeking discovery to

move to compel. CR 37(a)(3) provides that “an evasive or incomplete answer is to be

treated as a failure to answer.” Here, however, Microsoft’s response was satisfied

through the declarations it provided attesting that a reasonable search revealed no

records as requested in the subpoena. Microsoft lacked responsive records, so there

was nothing to compel.

                                               5
No. 84567-5-I/6

       Williams argues that the court erred in accepting the records custodians’

declarations as its final response to his subpoena. He asserts that he did not agree to

accept a declaration rather than the data he sought in his subpoena. But there is no

authority for the proposition that a court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to

compel unless the party seeking discovery agrees that the response is complete.

       Williams insists that a proper search would have produced the noncontent data

he seeks. He points to articles available on Microsoft’s website which suggest that

Microsoft sometimes possesses data for its enterprise customers and that an enterprise

account holder could run an audit log to collect the data Williams sought. But as

counsel for Microsoft previously explained to Williams, enterprise customers can

configure their services so that it was possible that Microsoft would have no responsive

records. The statements on Microsoft’s website do not contradict the records

custodians’ declarations attesting that a search of the enterprise accounts targeted in

Williams’s subpoena yielded no records.

       Williams also argues that the updated declaration Microsoft provided in

compliance with the trial court’s order was inadmissible hearsay. This is so, he

contends, because the second declaration was provided by a different individual who

did not conduct the search. But the second declarant specified that she had taken over

responsibility for overseeing the collection of responsive documents because the first

declarant had gone on leave, and she attested to the results of the original search.

There is no reason to believe that this process undermined the reliability or accuracy of

the search. See ER 803(a)(7) (absence of regularly kept business records is an

exception to the rule against hearsay); 5 KARL B. TEGLAND, W ASHINGTON PRACTICE:

                                             6
No. 84567-5-I/7

EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 803.41 (6th ed. 2016) (discussing procedure for

establishing foundation requirements of business records).

       Williams, relying on CR 52(a)(1), further argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in failing to provide sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusions of law

in regard to Microsoft’s “evasive and incomplete [r]esponse and secondhand hearsay

declaration.” CR 52(a)(1) provides that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury

. . . the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law.”

But CR 52(a)(5) specifies that findings of fact and conclusions of law are generally not

required for rulings on motions. Here, the court ruled on a motion to compel, not a

matter tried to judgment. The court was not required to issue findings of fact or

conclusions of law.

                                              IV

       Lastly, Williams argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for

reconsideration. “Motions for reconsideration are addressed to the sound discretion of

the trial court and a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s ruling absent a

showing of manifest abuse of discretion.” Wilcox v. Lexington Eye Inst., 130 Wn. App.

234, 241, 122 P.3d 729 (2005).

       In seeking reconsideration, Williams largely repeated the arguments he raised in

support of his motion to compel. The trial court explained that it denied reconsideration

given the absence of prejudice to Williams, the moving party. As discussed above,

Williams fails to demonstrate any error in the trial court’s order. Likewise, for reasons

already detailed, Williams has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying reconsideration.

                                               7
No. 84567-5-I/8

      Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

                  8