Court Opinion

ID: 9609368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:26:37.687633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:10.044672
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s holding that Officer Miller’s detention of defendant was an investigatory stop, and not an arrest. However, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the majority’s opinion. I would hold that Officer Miller had reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was involved in criminal conduct based on the totality of the circumstances.
As the majority states, an “investigative stop and detention leading to a pat down search must be based on an officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Briggs, 140 N.C. App. —, -, 536 S.E.2d 858, 860 (2000) (citing State v. Sanders, 112 N.C. App. 477, 481, 435 S.E.2d 842, 845 (1993)). “[T]he detaining officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the partic*431ular person stopped of criminal activity” based upon the “totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 628 (1981).
In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000), defendant fled upon seeing police vehicles patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Two officers caught up with defendant, stopped him and conducted a protective pat down search. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court held that flight upon approach of a police vehicle in a high crime area is insufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. People v. Wardlow, 183 111.2d 306, 701 N.E.2d 484 (1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 119, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000). On appeal by the State of Illinois, the United States Supreme Court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support an investigative stop based on the “totality of the circumstances”. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000). In overturning the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
[I]t was not merely [defendant’s] presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officer’s suspicion but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Our cases have recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 124, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 576 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
In the present case, the majority indicates that the facts do not support the conclusion that defendant fled from Miller and Waters. I disagree. In Wardlow, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: “we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers . . . Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Id. at 125, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 577. In United States v. Cortez, the Supreme Court held that:
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same — and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms *432of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 629 (emphasis supplied).
Officers Miller and Waters testified to the following facts: they were following defendant, they called the dispatcher to report they were going to stop the truck, defendant saw that he was being followed, the truck abruptly stopped in the middle of the street, defendant and the driver split up, defendant walked towards a closed store, Officer Miller knew that defendant was aware the store was closed because he had seen defendant there earlier that evening, when Officer Miller asked defendant to stop, defendant refused, Officer Miller renewed his request for defendant to stop, and had to physically restrain defendant. Based on the totality of the circumstances and “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior”, this was sufficient evidence that defendant was fleeing or exhibiting nervous, evasive behavior, and not merely going on about his business.
In State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 233, 415 S.E.2d 719, 722, our Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant to investigate drug activity and to frisk him for weapons. Justice Whichard wrote:
1) defendant was seen in the midst of a group of people congregated on a corner known as a “drug hole”; 2) [Officer] Hedges had had the corner under daily surveillance for several months; 3) [Officer] Hedges knew this corner to be a center of drug activity because he had made four to six drug-related arrests there in the past six months; 4) [Officer] Hedges was aware of other arrests there as well; 5) defendant was a stranger to the officers; 6) upon making eye contact with the uniformed officers, defendant immediately moved away, behavior that is evidence of flight; and 7) it was [Officer] Hedges’ experience that people involved in drug traffic are often armed.
While no one of these circumstances alone necessarily satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements, we hold that, when considered in their totality, Officer Hedges had sufficient suspicion to make a lawful stop.
The Court particularly noted that Officer Hedges saw the defendant “not simply in a general high crime area, but on a specific comer known for drug activity.” Id. The Court recognized that the “mere *433presence in a neighborhood frequented by drug users is not, standing alone, a basis for concluding that the defendant was himself engaged in criminal activity.” Id. at 234, 415 S.E.2d at 722 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362-63 (1979)). The Court held that “defendant’s immediately leaving the corner and walking away from the officers” after seeing them was an “additional circumstance” supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 234, 415 S.E.2d at 722-23. (emphasis supplied) (citing United States v. Jones, 619 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1980) (individual’s flight from uniformed law enforcement officer may be fact used to support reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity is afoot”); United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 758-59 (defendant’s companion immediately moved away with a “rapid motion” after looking in direction of observing officer); State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1983) (flight, nervousness, or a startled look at the sight of an officer may be a factor leading to reasonable suspicion), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 80 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1984)); See Also, Briggs, supra (upholding protective search where defendant was stopped in high crime area, the hour was late, and officer knew drug dealers frequently carry weapons).
In Butler, supra, defendant walked away after realizing a police officer had seen him. The Court in Butler held this was evidence of flight. In the present case, after noticing he was being followed by a marked police vehicle, the truck, in which defendant was a passenger, abruptly stopped in the middle of the street and defendant walked away. I would hold defendant displayed evidence of flight or “nervous, evasive behavior”.
Wardlow and Butler mandate that Officer Miller’s actions be considered in light of the “totality of the circumstances”. Officer Miller testified to the following circumstances: 1) defendant was in a high crime area; 2) the apartment complex was known as an “open air drug market”; 3) Officer Miller had conducted surveillance and made arrests around this apartment complex for three to four years; 4) it was nighttime, around 9:50 p.m.; 5) defendant’s truck slowed to turn into the apartment complex, and apparently seeing the police vehicle, the driver hesitated and did not turn into the complex; 6) when the police vehicle was not in view, defendant’s truck returned and entered the complex; 7) upon seeing the police vehicle following him, the truck defendant was in abruptly stopped; 8) defendant stepped out of the truck while still in the middle of the street; 9) defendant walked towards a dark, closed store, also in a high drug crime area; 10) defendant smelled of alcohol; 11) when asked to stop for ques*434tioning, defendant walked away, behavior that is evidence of flight; 12) defendant refused to stop and place his hands in plain view despite requests from Officer Miller; and 13) criminals involved in drug traffic are often armed.
Defendant was present in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking. Defendant displayed nervous and evasive behavior. Defendant attempted to flee into the darkness. The majority holds that these circumstances lead “to nothing more than an ‘inchoate and unparticu-larized suspicion or hunch’ of criminal activity.” I find such a holding contrary to the precedent discussed above. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the majority’s opinion.
I would also hold that the protective search and subsequent seizure of contraband was lawful. The Supreme Court has held that seizure of nonthreatening contraband detected during a pat down search is permissible as long as the officer’s search was within the bounds authorized by Terry. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed.2d 334 (1993).
If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain view context.
Id. at 375-76, 124 L. Ed.2d at 346 (emphasis supplied). The “immediately apparent” requirement is satisfied if the police have probable cause to believe that they have come upon evidence of criminal conduct during the pat down search. State v. White, 322 N.C. 770, 370 S.E.2d 390, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958, 102 L. Ed.2d 387 (1988). “Probable cause is a ‘common sense, practical question’ based on ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ ” State v. Wallace, 111 N.C. App. 581, 584, 433 S.E.2d 238, 240 (1993) (citation omitted). “The standard to be met when considering whether probable cause exists is the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
Officer Miller testified that drug dealers often carry weapons. Defendant was in an area known for its drug trafficking, it was nighttime, and defendant was acting suspicious and evasive. Officer Miller testified that he was familiar with the mass and contour of crack *435cocaine. Using his expertise and tactile senses, Miller possessed probable cause under the circumstances to believe that the contraband in defendant’s pocket was crack cocaine. Officer Miller was justified in seizing the contraband without a warrant. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the learned trial court.