Court Opinion

ID: 9512636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:18:45.080184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:28.721840
License: Public Domain

Chief Judge GUTIERREZ
specially concurring.
*269I specially concur to elaborate on the “care or custody” issue decided herein and also to shed some light on how the issue was considered by the jurors, the lawyers and the trial court. Also, I believe it is important to understand Idaho’s position in defining “care or custody” in contrast with other jurisdictions that have interpreted the term under similar criminal statutes.
In reviewing the 1020 page transcript, it is apparent that the bulk of the evidence presented focused upon the other elements of the injury to a child statute and not upon the “care or custody” element. Suffice it to say that the individual testimony of the witnesses on this element reflects mostly an incidental or generalized reference to establishing this element.
In closing argument to the jury, the state outlined the evidence establishing that Morales had “care” of E.H. It pointed to the fact that Morales helped E.H. come to America and the fact that Morales lived with E.H. Additionally, the state brought out the fact that sometimes Morales cared for E.H. while E.H.’s mother was at work, that Morales drove E.H. around, that Morales checked on E.H. during the work day, and that Morales drove the child to the hospital and to see a specialist. Lastly, the state pointed out that Morales posed as E.H.’s father.
Remarkably, Morales’s counsel did not address the “care or custody” element in his closing argument to the jury.
Erendira’s defense counsel asked the jury to find that Erendira did not have E.H. in her “care or custody.”1 The state, in rebuttal closing argument, requested the jury find that E.H. was in Erendira’s “care” by applying the definition of “care” to be, “provision of what’s necessary for the welfare and protection of someone or something, look after and provide the needs for.” Morales’s counsel objected on the grounds that the state was implying the state’s enumeration of “care” was the legal definition. The district court overruled the objection.
The jury was handed the case for deliberation on Friday, August 18, 2005, around 5:50 p.m. Approximately one and one-half hours later, the jury submitted a question to the district court. The jury inquired whether the term “care or custody” was defined in the Idaho Code, and if not, how did the relevant law define the term. The district court, with the stipulation of the parties, responded by instructing that the term “care or custody” is not specifically defined in the Idaho Code or in relevant cases from the Idaho Appellate Courts and thus, the jury should give that term its common understanding when applying the instructions given by the court.
At 11:30 p.m., the district court sent a note to the jury. It asked whether the jury wished to continue deliberating or return for further deliberation the next morning. The court offered to have staff remain present to assist or the jurors could recess until Saturday morning if the jury felt it could make progress the next day. The jury responded with a note stating the jury felt it could decide the case that same night. It stated the jury was making progress and it also stated that Saturday morning was an impossibility for several of the jurors. Approximately forty-five minutes later, the guilty verdicts were returned by the jury. It appears the jurors had questions regarding the “care or custody” element and struggled to resolve that issue.
This Court has spoken and, to some extent, clarifies the definition of “care or custody” for future cases. We have held, in essence, that when a child resides in an adult person’s home, and that person sometimes or occasionally watches2 that child, and that *270person further renders repeated aid for the child’s injuries, that person is deemed to have “care” of the child and is subject to prosecution under the injury to a child statute.
Morales’s brief cited to three eases from other jurisdictions that have similar statutes prohibiting injuries to children. These other jurisdictions — with the exception of Maryland, where the facts of the ease are distinguishable — have determined that the term “care or custody” should be given its ordinary meaning or have relied on dictionary definitions to define the term.
In People v. Culuko, 78 Cal.App.4th 307, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 (2000), the Court concluded that the victim was in the “care or custody” of Garcia, stating that:
“[There is] no special meaning to the terms ‘care and custody’ beyond the plain meaning of the terms themselves. The terms ‘care or custody’ do not imply a familial relationship but only a willingness to assume duties correspondent to the role of a caregiver.” (Quoting People v. Cochran, 62 Cal.App.4th 826, 832, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 257, 261 (1998)). Here, Garcia and Culuko were living together as husband and mfe, in one room, with a baby. Strawn testified that Garcia took care of the baby; at times, Garcia was left alone with the baby. When interviewed by police, Garcia admitted he bathed the baby, changed the baby, and gave the baby a bottle at 2:30 a.m. Finally, and most significantly, Roberts testified that, five days before Joey died, Garcia said he was taking full responsibility for caring for the baby so the baby would bond with him
Id. at 808 (emphasis added).
In State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 937 P.2d 310 (1997), the Arizona Supreme Court employed the same dictionary definition of “care” we have relied upon when it determined that “both ‘custody’ and ‘care,’ as they relate to A.R.S. § 13-3623, imply accepting responsibility for a child in some manner.” Id. at 314. The Arizona Court then found that the “defendant provided food and shelter for the family. He acted as a caregiver to all of Gray’s children and was, in essence, their stepfather, although not married to their mother. [The victim] testified that she had to ask permission of her mother or defendant before she could go outside and play.” Id. at 316. (Emphasis added). The Arizona Court concluded that there was substantial evidence to find that the defendant had the “care or custody” of the victim.
In Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979), the statute involved provided, in pertinent part, that “any parent, adoptive parent or other person who has the permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor child ...” may be found guilty of a felony for mistreating a child. Md. Ann.Code art. 27, § 35A(a) (1966). Pope had met a young mother and her daughter (the victim) at a church service on Friday night and invited them to stay with her. The daughter and her mother spent two nights at Pope’s house, as the child died as a result of injuries committed by the young mother on Sunday. The Pope Court, relying on prior case law, concluded that “temporary care or custody” is synonymous with “in loco parentis.” The Court went on to define “in loco parentis ” as referring “to a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption. It embodies the two ideas of assuming the parental status and discharging the parental duties.” Pope, 396 A.2d at 1063.
The cases from these other jurisdictions explicitly or implicitly require more than an occasional babysitting or watching of a child. This is in stark contrast to our holding today. The practical effect in Idaho is that, while the state may not be able to identify in situations like the one before us who the abuser is, the broad definition of “care or custody” will hold any adult living in the household accountable, even if the adult’s oversight of the child is considered minimal.

. Morales and his wife, Erendira, were tried jointly. Morales's wife had separate counsel and participated in the proceedings with the assistance of an interpreter. It is unclear why Morales did not have an interpreter, despite his testimony that his English was limited. Morales's difficulty with the English language is reflected in the transcript of Morales’s testimony.

. The evidence in the record did not elaborate on what constitutes watching or babysitting a twenty-one-month-old child. Detective White testified that Morales stated in his interrogation that he fed the kids lunch once in a while and checked on them during the day. Officer Rebollozo testified that Morales’s wife stated in her interrogation that Morales changed E.H.'s diaper once and, after the second injury incident, he started *270going home from his work in the farm fields at 10:00 a.m. to check on the babies.