Court Opinion

ID: 9939339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 20:02:59.248488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:59.430923
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/24 In re Jacob H. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re JACOB H., a Person Coming                                  B327825
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

                                                                  Los Angeles County
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                               Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP03920C
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 DANY H.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Stephen C. Marpet, Commissioner. Conditionally
affirmed.
      Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        ____________________
       Dany H., the biological father of Jacob H., appeals the
juvenile court’s determinations that (a) Dany is not entitled to
presumed father status; and (b) there was no reason to know
Jacob is an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We review each
question for substantial evidence. The record does not compel the
conclusion that Dany is Jacob’s presumed father. And we find no
error in the juvenile court’s preliminary determination—made
prior to its jurisdictional and dispositional orders—that there was
no reason to know Jacob is an Indian child. However, since the
court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department) each recognize their
continuing inquiry duties under ICWA, we conditionally affirm
with instructions to continue to fulfill ICWA obligations.
                           BACKGROUND
       This case began in October 2022, when Jacob was five. It
was precipitated by Dany murdering Jacob’s mother’s boyfriend
and then absconding with Jacob after picking him up from school
under a fictitious name. Dany was later found walking the
streets with Jacob at 1:00 a.m. Jacob was detained. Dany was
arrested. Dany has been in state custody ever since.
1.     Background Relevant to Parentage
       Before Dany murdered mother’s boyfriend, it is unclear
how much time Jacob spent with Dany. Only a small amount of
time is established in the record. Jacob lived with Dany at
Dany’s siblings’ house or houses for a month or two before the
murder. This was because he had just been released from jail in
August 2022, and mother’s substance abuse had rendered her
unable to care for Jacob and her two other children by a different

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father. For some time before Dany was released from jail, Jacob
stayed with maternal grandmother or in a motel with mother.
       The parties do not tell us how long Dany was in jail prior to
his August 2022 release. At some point—again, we do not know
when—he spent about a year on the lam in Mexico while wanted
in California for receiving stolen property. Dany offers that he at
least lived with mother while she was pregnant with Jacob.
       At the juvenile court arraignment hearing in November
2022, Dany’s counsel represented that Jacob lived with Dany
since October 2021 and that Dany had always provided for Jacob
and held him out as his own child to family and friends. Dany
filed a signed Form JV-505 regarding parentage the same day to
the same effect. He also asserted that he participated in “home &
school activities” with Jacob, and Jacob spent holidays and
birthdays with Dany’s family. In that filing, Dany acknowledged
he had not previously established parentage—neither by a
voluntary declaration nor court judgment—and requested a
finding of presumed fatherhood. On the basis of these
representations, the court stated, “[s]ounds like he’s a presumed
father for this child. [¶] We’ll make [Dany] a presumed father.”
       But some of the representations that formed the basis for
that ruling were false. Jacob could not have lived with Dany
from October 2021 through October 2022 because Dany was
released from jail in August 2022. Dany and mother both stated
Jacob had lived with Dany for just a month or two before the
murder. Mother did confirm Dany provided some material
support for Jacob. And it is true that Dany was known to Jacob’s
school. Both he and mother had instructed the school not to
release Jacob to the other, but neither ever provided the school

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any legal documents or custody orders showing a restriction
against the other parent.
       On its own initiative, after discovering that Jacob’s birth
certificate did not identify Dany as his father, the juvenile court
notified the parties it would reconsider whether Dany was a
presumed father. At Dany’s counsel’s request, the court
continued the matter so counsel could prepare for the hearing.
       About a month later, Dany’s counsel offered the following
argument as to why Dany should be a presumed father:
“although [Dany] was not married to the mother, not on the birth
certificate, he has lived with the child. He’s lived with him for a
few months in October of 2021. I believe prior to this incident, he
was living with the child and enrolled the child in school. He was
involved in the child’s schooling. In the report the principal knew
of [Dany]. He has been around and has a relationship with
Jacob.” She continued, “[h]e indicated in the report he was
paying mother’s rent for some time so he has a relationship. I
don’t understand why he would not be presumed.”
       The juvenile court rejected these arguments because Dany
“had never taken the child into his home . . . .” It explained, “[h]e
may have lived with the child with mother but that’s different
than taking the child into his home. He’s not on the birth
certificate. They weren’t living together at conception or birth.
And he has never taken the child into his home. For a couple of
months he might have lived with mother but that’s it.”
       Dany’s counsel did not dispute this characterization of the
facts. Rather, she responded “[t]hat was his home at the time,
Your Honor.” After the juvenile court found Dany was merely a
“bio-alleged father” and not a “presumed father,” Dany’s counsel
asked the court to reconsider: “I would just like to restate my

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request for presumed status, under Family [Code]
section 7611(d), [Dany] has held himself openly as the father and
held him in his home, even if he shared that home with the
mother. We’re again asking for presumed status.” Notably,
Dany’s trial counsel abandoned any contention that Dany had
lived with Jacob in a home that was not mother’s or that, as
Dany’s appellate counsel repeatedly and incorrectly claims, Dany
“took exclusive custody of Jacob since October 2021 until the
child’s detention from [Dany] in October 2022 . . . .”
2.     Facts Relevant to ICWA
       Mother and Dany each filed a Form ICWA-020 denying
Indian heritage. The Department separately inquired with
mother, Dany, and maternal grandmother about possible Indian
heritage. Each denied any such heritage, and Dany described his
family as being of Mexican, rather than American Indian,
descent. The Department did not inquire with any paternal
relatives, despite at least one paternal aunt living locally and
having been identified as a potential monitor for telephonic visits
between Dany and Jacob. Dany lived with this or another
paternal aunt or uncle before being arrested for murder, and the
Department had Dany’s last known address. Thus, the
Department had contact information for at least one paternal
aunt or uncle with whom it had not, as of the commencement of
this appeal, inquired about Indian heritage.
       The juvenile court found it had no reason to know Jacob
was an Indian child, as defined under ICWA, both after father
filed his ICWA-020 form and after mother filed her ICWA-020
form. Each of these findings was made before the court entered
its jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

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                            DISCUSSION
1.     Parentage Finding
       Dany challenges the juvenile court’s decision to deem him a
biological and alleged father rather than a presumed father. The
Department contends he forfeited his constitutional challenges to
that action by failing to raise them below, and we agree. (People
v. Navarro (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1347, fn. 9 [“[a]ll issues,
even those involving an alleged constitutional violation, are
subject to the rule of forfeiture, and a defendant’s failure to raise
the issue before the trial court will generally result in the
appellate court’s refusal to consider it”].) We find his other
arguments to be without merit.
       First, we reject Dany’s contention that the juvenile court
committed reversible error by failing to comply with its duty of
inquiry imposed under California Rules of Court, rule 5.635(d)
and (e). Dany argues the juvenile court erred in failing to order
the clerk to prepare and submit a parentage inquiry to the local
child support agency to determine whether parentage of Jacob
had been established. Cognizant that such an error is subject to
harmless error analysis (see In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th
1113, 1123 [applying harmless error analysis to purported
violation of rule 1413 (now rule 5.635)]), Dany contends error was
prejudicial because he “declared on his JV-505 parentage form
that there was a previous parentage finding through genetic
testing ‘DNA’ and he paid mother for the child’s care, likely
showing that parentage and child support may have already been
established.” Not so. Dany’s JV-505 form did say he “want[ed]
the court to know” “[p]ositive DNA test,” but it also provided
parentage had not been established—neither by a voluntary
declaration nor court judgment—and requested a finding of

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presumed fatherhood. Because there was no parentage order or
declaration to be discovered, there was no prejudice.
       Second, we are unpersuaded that the juvenile court erred
in concluding the record failed to establish Dany was Jacob’s
presumed father under subdivision (d) of Family Code
section 7611. It is undisputed that Dany does not qualify as a
presumed father under any of the other section 7611 grounds
because he and mother never married, Dany was not named on
Jacob’s birth certificate, and Dany had no formalized support
obligation to Jacob. (See id., subds. (a)-(c).)
       To qualify as a presumed father under Family Code
section 7611, subdivision (d), a father must “receive[] the child
into [his] home and openly hold[] out the child as [his] natural
child.” (Ibid.) Receipt of the child and holding the child out as
kin are two separate requirements. (Adoption of Michael H.
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043, 1051 [“a man who has neither legally
married nor attempted to legally marry the mother of his child
cannot become a presumed father unless he both ‘receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural
child.’ ”].) “A person requesting presumed parent status under
section 7611, subdivision (d) must have a ‘fully developed
parental relationship’ with the child.” (In re M.Z. (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 53, 63.)
       “There are no specific factors that a trial court must
consider before it determines that a parent has ‘received’ a child
into the home and has established a parental relationship.” (W.S.
v. S.T. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 132, 145.) “ ‘[C]ourts have looked to
such factors as whether the [alleged father] actively helped the
mother in prenatal care; whether he paid pregnancy and birth
expenses commensurate with his ability to do so; whether he

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promptly took legal action to obtain custody of the child; whether
he sought to have his name placed on the birth certificate;
whether and how long he cared for the child; whether there is
unequivocal evidence that he had acknowledged the child; the
number of people to whom he had acknowledged the child;
whether he provided for the child after it no longer resided with
him; whether, if the child needed public benefits, he had pursued
completion of the requisite paperwork; and whether his care was
merely incidental.’ ” (In re J.H. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 635, 646.)
      “While the juvenile court may consider a wide range of
factors in making a presumed parent determination, as
appropriate to the circumstances [citation], the core issues are
the person’s established relationship with and demonstrated
commitment to the child.” (In re Alexander P. (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 475, 485.) The burden is on the person seeking
presumed parent status to demonstrate the foundational facts
giving rise to the presumption. (R.M. v. T.A (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 760, 774.)
      We review the juvenile court’s rejection of Dany’s claim to
presumed father status under Family Code section 7611,
subdivision (d) for substantial evidence. (In re Spencer W. (1996)
48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1653.) Because Dany had the burden of
proof in the juvenile court, this standard of review requires Dany
to demonstrate the evidence below compelled a finding in his
favor as a matter of law. (See, e.g., In re Aurora P. (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1163.) In assessing his position, we
consider “whether [his] evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and
unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave
no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517,

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1528, overruled in part by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1010.)
      The record does not compel the conclusion that Dany is
Jacob’s presumed father. Dany first claims the record
“abundantly showed [he] lived with mother when she was
pregnant with Jacob, and after they separated, [Dany] tried to
marry mother by giving her an engagement ring and paid
mother’s rent and gave her money for Jacob’s care.” Most of
these facts are based exclusively on statements Dany made to the
Department and the Department recited in a report. In the same
report, the Department noted Dany’s lack of credibility and
denial of facts that were well established by other witnesses (e.g.,
that Dany once shot at a car that had cut him off while driving
with Jacob and mother). Accordingly, the juvenile court was free
to disbelieve Dany’s reported statements to the Department. As
to Dany’s financial support, the court might reasonably have
attributed it to serving Dany’s own interests rather than his
interest in being a parent to Jacob. (Cf. In re Spencer W., supra,
48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1653 [the father’s cohabitation with the
mother and the child at the mother’s home not demonstrative of
commitment to the child given other interests the father had in
the arrangement].) Dany acknowledged financially supporting
mother was something he did to help mother “get better.”
Similarly, his decision to care for Jacob between Dany’s stints in
state custody related, in Dany’s telling, to mother’s substance
abuse issues.
      Dany goes on to claim he “took exclusive custody of Jacob
since October 2021 until the child’s detention from [him] in
October 2022, a period of time when mother succumbed to her
drug use and voluntarily relinquished Jacob’s physical custody to

                                 9
[Dany].” As already noted, Dany claimed this in his JV-505 form
but contradicted it in other statements to the Department. He
admitted he was in custody for at least some of this time as he
was incarcerated at least during August 2022 and the record does
not disclose how long he was held in custody before his release in
August 2022.
       Ultimately, the breadth of factors the juvenile court was
entitled to consider, the limited time Dany cared for Jacob, and
the lack of clarity as to whether that took place at Dany’s home,
mother’s home, or the home of a sibling of Dany’s, we cannot say
that the record compels the conclusion that Dany received Jacob
into his home. As such, we need not consider whether Dany also
held Jacob out as his child.
2.     ICWA Inquiry
       In involuntary state court proceedings concerning child
custody, such as these dependency proceedings, ICWA requires
notice to the relevant Indian tribe “where the court knows or has
reason to know that an Indian child is involved.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(a).) It is incumbent upon the court administering such a
proceeding to inquire whether the subject child is an Indian child.
The scope of the duty on the court, as well as certain participants
in the proceeding (including county welfare departments, like the
Department), is defined by federal regulations and related state
law. (See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 23.107 (2023); Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224.2; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481.)
       “The duty to inquire begins with the initial contact,
including, but not limited to, asking the party reporting child
abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the
child may be an Indian child.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2,
subd. (a).) The court and county welfare department “have an

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affirmative and continuing duty” to inquire whether a child for
whom a petition under section 300 may be or has been filed may
be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
       Dany claims error under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 224.2, subdivision (b), which obligates the Department to
ask certain persons related to the proceedings about the child’s
possible Indian ancestry. (See § 224.2, subds. (a), (b), (c); In re
S.S. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 575, 581; In re D.F. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) As relevant to Dany’s appeal, these
persons include the child’s statutorily defined “extended family
members.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subds. (b), (d); see also
25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (c).) While
the duty to inquire of extended family members lies with the
county welfare department, a juvenile court’s finding that the
ICWA does not apply implies that (a) neither the department nor
the court had a reason to know or believe the child was an Indian
child; and (b) the department fulfilled its duty of inquiry. (In re
Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.) We review such
findings for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
       This appeal was taken when the case was in its early
stages. The order appealed was the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
and dispositional order. “[A]n ICWA appeal at the jurisdiction
and disposition stage” is premature “where there will necessarily
be further dependency proceedings in the juvenile court (at which
continuing ICWA duties apply)” and a basis for later appeal if for
some reason the Department fails to fulfill its continuing duty of
inquiry. (See In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 638.)
       Although the juvenile court twice found no reason to know
Jacob was an Indian child after receiving the parents’ respective
ICWA-020 forms, it also recognized the inquiry was ongoing. The

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minute orders summarizing its findings included an admonition
to the parents to keep the court and Department apprised of any
new information relating to possible ICWA status. The court
remains obligated to change its finding of no reason to know
Jacob is an Indian child if new information comes to light. (In re
S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 176.) Likewise, the Department
acknowledges that it has “an ongoing duty to comply with the
ICWA and the opportunity to conduct further inquiry of extended
paternal family members.” We expect the Department will fulfill
its duty of inquiring with all available extended family members
as the case progresses, if it has not done so already.
      We therefore conditionally affirm the court’s orders.
Should it become known, or should there be reason to know, that
Jacob is an Indian child, the notice requirement will be activated,
and the relevant tribes will need to be notified. The jurisdictional
and dispositional findings do not need to be reversed to direct the
court and the Department “to do something they recognize they
must do anyway.” (In re S.H., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 177.)
                          DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s finding with respect to Dany’s
paternity and preliminary findings with respect to Jacob’s Indian
heritage are conditionally affirmed subject to the Department
and the court continuing to fulfill their ICWA obligations.

                              GRIMES, Acting P. J.

      WE CONCUR:

                        WILEY, J.               VIRAMONTES, J.

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