Court Opinion

ID: 9594073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:26:56.638851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:04.637559
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
This is an appeal by the Michigan State AFL-CIO, challenging the validity of Civil Service Rule 1-5.7, modified effective July 14, 1988, prohibiting the use of union leaves of absence for partisan political activity. We hold that the revised rule violates the political freedom act1 enacted by the Michigan Legislature.
i
This case presents a rather long, factual and procedural history. In December 1987, the United Auto Workers-Conununity Action Program (UAW-CAP) and the Michigan Democratic Party sponsored a training seminar on election campaign strategies. The Office of the State Employer was given notice of the three-day seminar; however, it was unaware that the seminar would involve partisan political issues.
Fifty-six state employees who were members of the UAW Local 6000 attended the seminar. Thirty-seven employees used the union sponsored administrative leave buy-back program, under which the union reimbursed the state the net salary of the employees for the period of absence. Seventeen employees invoked the union officer leave, pursuant to a collective bargain, under which the union reimbursed the state for the gross total cost of the employee’s wages and the employer’s share of insurance premiums and retirement. One employee invoked the administrative leave *724bank 1, under which the employee suffered no loss of pay or benefits and one employee used his own time, which was not provided for under any leave arrangement.
In response to a letter from two Republican legislators, State Representative Frank Fitzgerald and Senator William Sederburg, the Civil Service Commission investigated the December 1987 meeting. As a result of the investigation, the commission issued a strong statement that partisan political activities are not to be engaged in by employees who are on administrative leave or who have been released from work under conditions specified for “union business” in bargaining agreements. The Department of Civil Service stated, “An employee using his or her authorized annual leave is not restricted, but annual leave used for partisan political purposes may not be ‘bought back’ under union business provisions . . . .”
As a result of the controversy over the December 1987 meeting, the commission revised its rule relating to the activity prohibited during work hours. The old rule provided:
1-5.7 Prohibited During Work Hours.- — -Activities permitted under Sections 1-5.1 and 1-5.5 shall not be engaged in by a classified employee during the hours the employee is on actual duty.[2]
*725The new rule provides:
1-5.7 Prohibited During Work Hours. — Activities permitted under sections 1-5.1 and 1-5.5 shall not be engaged in by a classified employee during the hours the employee is on actual duty. Actual duty includes the employee’s scheduled work hours and overtime. Off duty includes all time outside scheduled work hours and overtime, annual leave, unpaid leave of absence, lost time and leave granted to the employee to become a full time employee of an employee organization holding exclusive representation rights, pursuant to an approved collective bargaining agreement. For purposes of this rule, employees released from their regular state workplace for union activities, union business or any other employee organization purpose under any leave agreement, including “annual leave buy-back” provisions, shall be considered to be on actual duty, assigned by the employer to take part in union activities deemed to be in the best interests of the state and not including partisan political activity.
In response to the rule change, an objection was filed by every employee organization exclusively representing state classified employees, representing in the aggregate approximately seventy-two percent of *726the state classified work force, or roughly 44,600 individuals.
The employees’ objections stemmed from the commission’s exclusion of partisan political activities while on union leave, while allowing partisan political activities while on other types of leave. To fully understand the employees’ objections, it is necessary to review the different types of leave of absences that are available to an employee:
1. Leave for Union Business. There are seven types of leave for union business. The employee is compensated by the state in whole or in part.3
*7272. Jury Duty Leave. The employee is granted administrative leave for jury duty, with full pay.
3. Time off for Court Appearances. The employee is entitled to administrative leave with full pay. However, if an employee appears in court in any capacity other than as a witness for the People, he or she will not be considered as being on duty, nor will administrative leave be granted.
4. Sick Leave. The employee may use accrued sick time, annual leave, or lost time to cover periods of approved medical absence. All sick leave must be approved by the employer.
5. Annual Leave. Initial annual leave is available upon approval of the employer, for such purposes of voting, religious observances, and necessary personal business.
6. Paid Leave. The employee is authorized to use paid leave for education and systematic improvement of knowledge or skills required in the performance of their work.
The State Personnel Director reviewed the objections filed by the employees; however, it found no *728basis for delaying the effective date of the enactment of the revised rule. Therefore, on July 14, 1988, the revised rule became effective.
The employee unions commenced the instant action in Wayne Circuit Court for a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining enforcement of revised Rule 1-5.7, and for declaratory relief. The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. On October 28, 1988, the circuit court granted summary disposition for plaintiffs. It ruled that the plaintiff employee organizations had standing to assert the claims and that the commission had exceeded its authority and violated the Michigan political freedom act. The trial court did not reach the constitutional issues raised in counts I and in of the complaint.
The commission appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 191 Mich App 535; 478 NW2d 722 (1991) (hereinafter AFL-CIO I). The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that plaintiffs had standing to seek a declaratory judgment. Id. at 544-549. However, it reversed the ruling that the revised rule violated the political freedom act. Plaintiffs argued that union leave is “off-duty” time that is beyond the scope of regulation by the Civil Service Commission. However, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ characterization of union leave as “off-duty” time because Rule 1-5.7 defines union leave time as “actual-duty.” AFL-CIO I at 550-551. The Court stated that actual duty means on-the-job behavior related to job performance, including activities of classified employees during work hours for which they are being compensated.
*729The Court relied on Council No 11, AFSCME v Civil Service Comm, 408 Mich 385, 408; 292 NW2d 442 (1980), in which this Court stated that “the commission’s ‘sphere of authority’ delimits its rule-making power and confines its jurisdiction over the political activity of classified personnel to on-the-job behavior related to job performance.” The Court of Appeals held that a prohibition against political activity by classified employees is permissible under the political freedom act if three conditions are satisfied:
(1) The classified employee receives some form of compensation for the time spent on leave,
(2) The employee would be performing duties at the usual job site if the employee were not on leave, and
(3) The employee is permitted to leave for a specific purpose approved by the employer. [AFL-CIO I, supra at 550.]
The Court concluded that the release of employees under union leave was part of the employees’ duties for which they were compensated, therefore the union leave programs at issue did not implicate classified employees’ off-duty activities. The Court remanded the case for consideration of plaintiffs’ pending constitutional claims. Id. at 552.
The parties again filed cross-motions for summary disposition with respect to the constitutional claims. Judge Hausner granted summary disposition for the commission, finding that the rule did not violate equal protection or due process, and further that there was no violation of free speech and association.
After remand, plaintiffs appealed, and in a decision issued February 6, 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. 208 Mich App 479; 528 NW2d 811 (1995) *730(hereinafter AFL-CIO II). It held that the revised rule affects the Civil Service Commission’s “legitimate ban on partisan political activity during actual-duty hours. Nothing in this rule offends a recognized Michigan or federal constitutional right to free speech or assembly. The state government, as an employer, most assuredly may restrict the partisan political activity of its employees while they are on duty.” Id. at 491. The Court also disagreed with the plaintiffs that the revised rule is unconstitutionally vague and over-broad, and that it violates equal protection and due process. It affirmed the decision of the trial court on remand.
Plaintiffs filed a delayed application for leave to appeal to this Court. In an order dated December 19, 1995, this Court remanded to the Court of Appeals “to address plaintiffs’ argument that Rule 1-5.7 unconstitutionally bans speech and association on the basis of the content of the speech.”
The Court of Appeals issued a supplemental opinion on remand on March 8, 1996, unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 191523), which stated in part, “[t]he rule arose out of a specific incident of partisan political activities while employees were on union leave and the Commission amended the rule to address that problem. Unless and until evidence is adduced that the Commission fails to prevent other partisan political activity that comes to its attention in a similar fashion, we cannot identify a content-based abrogation of speech or association rights, much less a violation of equal protection.”
The plaintiffs again appealed to this Court, and this Court granted leave on May 22, 1996. 451 Mich 898.
*731n
Initially, defendant asserts that plaintiffs failed to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals in AFL-CIO I to this Court pursuant to MCR 7.301(C)(3) and (4), and instead pursued remand. As a consequence, defendant asserts, this Court is divested of its jurisdiction to review the determinations made in AFL-CIO I, and those determinations are now the law of the case. We reject defendant’s argument.
MCR 7.302(C)(4) provides:
If the decision of the Court of Appeals remands the case to a lower court for further proceedings, an application for leave may be filed within 21 days after
(a) the Court of Appeals decision ordering the remand, or
(b) the Court of Appeals decision disposing of the case following the remand procedure, in which case an application may be made on all issues raised in the Court of Appeals, including those related to the remand question.
We agree with plaintiffs that MCR 7.302(C)(4) gives the parties the option, after a Court of Appeals judgment ordering remand, of seeking immediate appeal or of waiting until proceedings following remand are completed, before seeking plenary appeal. The commentary to the rule provides guidance:
New MCR 7.302(C)(4)-(6) clarifies the parties’ options when a decision of the Court of Appeals remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Basically, a party may immediately appeal to the Supreme Court or may await the conclusion of the proceedings in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals following the remand.
Therefore, we retain jurisdiction over both AFL-CIO I and AFL-CIO II.
*732m
THE POLITICAL FREEDOM ACT
The political freedom act4 is an uncommon exercise of the Legislature’s power to protect and insure the personal freedoms of all citizens, “including the rights of free speech and political association . . . Council No 11, supra at 394. As a unanimous Court stated, the act “undertakes to authorize and extend to a specific class of citizens — employees in the state classified civil service — the right to engage in partisan political activity . . . while on mandatary leave of absence.” Id. at 395.
In Council No 11, this Court stated:
We do not question the commission’s authority to regulate employment-related activity involving internal matters such as job specifications, compensation, grievance procedures, discipline, collective bargaining and job performance, including the power to prohibit activity during working hours which is found to interfere with satisfactory job performance. . . . The Court has also recognized the commission’s power to regulate and even prohibit off-duty activity which is found to interfere with job performance. . . .
Sec. 2. An employee of the state classified civil service may:
* ** *
(d) Engage in other political activities on behalf of a candidate or issue in connection with partisan or nonpartisan elections.
Sec. 4. The activities permitted by sections 2 and 3 shall not be actively engaged in by a public employee during those hours when that person is being compensated for the performance of that person’s duties as a public employee.
*733That power does not extend, however, to the blanket prohibition of off-duty activities, political or otherwise, as a matter of policy simply because such activities may conceivably interfere with satisfactory job performance. What an employee does during his off-duty hours is not of proper concern to the Civil Service Commission unless and until it is shown to adversely affect job performance. Even then the commission’s authority is not to curtail the off-hours activity, it is to deal with the adequacy of job performance ... on a case-by-case basis. [Id. at 406-407 (citations omitted).]
Our decision in Council No 11 held that the state may not regulate the off-duty political activities of state classified civil service employees, unless those activities were found to interfere with job performance.5 The parties in this case dispute whether union leave is off-duty or actual-duty activity. If the activity is actual duty, the commission has the power under the Michigan Constitution to regulate it. If, however, the activity is off-duty, the commission may only regulate it if it affects job performance. We hold that union leave is not “actual-duty” merely because the commission has so defined it. If that were the case, *734the commission could define evenings and weekends as “actual-duty,” and thus impermissibly regulate what employees do on their own time. Instead, we think that whether an activity is off duty or actual duty depends on the particular circumstances of the activity in question. In order to determine the status of union leave, we must look to the applicable provision of the political freedom act, which gives guidance regarding whether an activity is “actual duty.”
The political freedom act allows a state employee to engage in partisan political activity except “during those hours when that person is being compensated for the performance of that person’s duties as a public employee.” 1976 PA 169, MCL 15.404; MSA 4.1702(4) (emphasis added). We hold that the language of the political freedom act is unambiguous. It prohibits partisan political activity during work hours when two conditions are met: (1) the employee is being compensated by the employer, and (2) such compensation is for the performance of the employee’s duties as a public employee.
Whether the revised Rule 1-5.7 violates the political freedom act necessarily depends on whether the employee, when taking union leave to engage in partisan political activities, is compensated by the state for the performance of duties as a public employee. While the revised rule was enacted after the political meeting took place, the rule was created because of what the commission perceived to be a misuse of union leave. Therefore, by way of example only, we find it is illustrative to examine the particular facts relating to the employees who took union leave to participate in the seminar. As stated previously, there were fifty-six employees who took union leave to par*735ticipate in the three-day seminar. However, because not all union leaves of absence are paid for by the state, we must examine each type of union leave invoked.
1. UNION OFFICER LEAVE
Seventeen union members invoked their union officer leave to participate in the seminar. Union officer leave applies to union representatives who devote over twenty-five percent of work a year to union business. Because these union members are not “full time employee [s] of an employee organization holding exclusive representation rights” as required under the revised rule, they would be prohibited from engaging in partisan political activities while on leave. However, pursuant to article 7(D)(2) of the collective bargaining agreement, the union reimburses the employer for the gross total cost of the employee’s wages and the employer’s share of the insurance premiums and retirement. Therefore, the employer does not pay any compensation to these employees for the use of union officer leave. Because the revised rule is violative of the first prong of the test for the political freedom act, the rule is invalid as it applies to union officer leave.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE BUY-BACK
Thirty-seven employees invoked their administrative leave buy-back in order to participate in the seminar. Under this type of leave arrangement, the union designates those employees who will attend, and the employer submits a bill to the union for the net salary for the period of absence. Under the first prong of the test, the employer is reimbursed only the net salary of the employee for the period of absence. However, the *736insurance premiums and fringe benefits are paid by the employer. Because this partial payment constitutes compensation by the employer, the state may have a legitimate interest in regulating the conduct of its employees. Therefore, the first prong of the test is satisfied.
As to the second prong, the state must demonstrate that the compensation is for the “performance of [the employee’s] duties as a public employee.” The plaintiffs contend that the payment of fringe benefits is not compensation directly for the performance of duties. They cite federal cases that distinguish between “wages, i.e., sums paid to an employee specifically for the work he performs, and . . . compensation occasioned by the fact that the employee has performed or will perform work for the employer, but which is not payment directly for that work.” BASF Wyandotte Corp v Local 227, Int’l Chemical Workers Union, 791 F2d 1046, 1049 (CA 2, 1986). Plaintiffs contend that continuation of fringe benefits during an employee’s union leave is not direct payment for services rendered, but rather an incident of the employer-employee relationship generally. We agree.
Whether an employee on union leave is compensated for the performance of the employee’s duties as a public employee under the political freedom act is an issue of first impression. However, we have previously considered whether an employee’s injury that occurred while the employee was conducting union business arose out of, and in the course of, his employment for purposes of worker’s compensation. In Tegels v Kaiser-Frazer Corp, 329 Mich 84; 44 NW2d 880 (1950), we held that an employee is not considered to be in the employer’s service when he is *737engaged in union activity. Citing California precedent, we stated
“[Respondent [] was attending a union meeting from which her employer and his representatives were expressly excluded. At the time respondent [] was injured she was not acting for her employer nor engaged in his service. She was exercising a personal privilege for her own personal benefit in attending a meeting of an organization of which she was a member and the purposes of which were clearly for her own interests and not necessarily in any way for the benefit of her employer.” [Id. at 88, quoting Associated Oil Co v Industrial Accident Comm, 191 Cal 557, 562; 217 P 744 (1923).]
We agree with Associated Oil that an employee is acting in the scope of employment when “the employee is doing the duty he is employed to perform . . . .” Id.
Similarly, in interpreting the Civil Service Reform Act,6
7the United States Supreme Court has held that there is a
basic assumption underlying collective bargaining in both the public and the private sector that the parties “proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest.” NLRB v Ins Agents’ Int’l, 361 US 477; 80 S Ct 419; 4 L Ed 2d 454 (1960), quoted in General Building Contractors Ass’n v Pennsylvania, 458 US 375, 394; 102 S Ct 3141; 73 L Ed 2d 835 (1982). [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 US 89, 107-108; 104 S Ct 439; 78 L Ed 2d 195 (1983). ][7]
*738Finally, the collective bargaining agreement with the union and the state clearly indicates that employees on union leave are conducting business for the union and not for the state. The agreement provides that union “representatives are to be considered as employees of the Union during the periods of absence covered by Administrative Leave from the bank.”
These arguments, while not binding on the issue presented, are persuasive authority for our holding today. We hold that under the political freedom act, an employee who receives fringe benefits for attending a union meeting is not being compensated by the employer for the “performance of [the employee’s] duties as a public employee.” While attending a union meeting, the employee is not doing the duty he was employed to perform. Furthermore, the interests of the union and the employer are often “antagonistic.” It would be paralogistic to hold that an employee who receives compensation from the employer to engage in activity that is antagonistic to the employer’s interest is somehow receiving compensation for the performance of the employee’s duties as a public servant.
Therefore, because the compensation is not for the performance of the employee’s duties as a public employee, the prohibition is invalid under the political freedom act as it applies to administrative leave buy-back.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE BANK 1
One employee invoked administrative leave bank 1 in order to participate in the seminar. With this type *739of leave, the employee suffers no loss of pay or benefits. Therefore, the first prong of the test is satisfied because the employee receives compensation and fringe benefits from the employer. However, like administrative leave buy-back, the second prong is not satisfied because the employee is not being compensated for the performance of his duties as a public employee.
4. OWN TIME (NOT UNDER ANY LEAVE ARRANGEMENT)
Because the parties have not submitted any documentation regarding whether the employee using his own time was being paid by either the union or the employer, we cannot make a determination that prohibiting him from engaging in political activities was violative of the political freedom act.
Therefore, we hold that where the union reimburses the state not only for the wages of the employee, but also the fringe benefits, the state may not prohibit those employees from participating in partisan political activities pursuant to the political freedom act. Furthermore, because union leave is antagonistic to an employer’s interest and because an employee on union leave is not doing the duty he was employed to perform, the state may not prohibit employees from participating in partisan political activities while on union leave pursuant to the political freedom act unless such activities are shown to adversely affect job performance.8 We caution that our holding today is limited to the application of the political freedom act to union leave. We do not *740express an opinion with regard to any other leave arrangement that is regulated by the state.
In view of the invalidity of Rule 1-5.7 under the political freedom act, we decline to reach the constitutional issues framed by the plamtiffs-appellants. As we have repeatedly stated, “there exists a general presumption by this Court that we will not reach constitutional issues that are not necessary to resolve a case.” Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993); Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich 146, 154; 103 NW2d 769 (1960). Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Mallett, C.J., and Boyle and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 1976 PA 169, § 4, MCL 15.401 et seq.; MSA 4.1702(1) et seq.

 The activities referred to in both the old and new rule 1-5.7 are described in sections 1-5.1 and 1-5.5 of the Commission Rules, as follows:
1-5.1 Candidates for Public Office. — An employee in the classified service may become a candidate for nomination and election to any local elective office, partisan or non-partisan, without first obtaining a leave of absence.
1-5. la An employee in the classified service may become a candidate for nomination and election to state office but shall request *725and shall receive a leave of absence without pay at the time of compliance with the candidacy filing requirements or sixty (60) days prior to the election in question, whichever date is closer to the election.
* ** *
1-5.5 Political Party Activities. — An employee in the classified service may:
l-5.5a Become a member or an officer of a political party committee formed or permitted under the election laws of Michigan or of the United States.
l-5.5b Be a delegate to any convention held by a political party.
l-5.5c Engage in political activities on behalf of a candidate or issue in connection with a partisan or non-partisan election.

 The seven types of union leave are as follows:
a. Incidental Paid Time Off — to handle grievances, meet with management during working hours. . . .
b. Paid Annual Leave — available to all employees for personal business including but not limited to union activity, up to an annual hourly limit. CBA art. 39, pp. 112-116. An Employee organization may “buy-back” annual leave credits exhausted by an employee absent for union business. . . . The union can only exercise this option for any employee once per calendar quarter. The union reimburses the employer for the employee’s net salary ....
c. Administrative Leave Bank 1 — a bank of paid leave established for employees attending authorized union functions. . . . The employee suffers no loss of pay or benefits. . . .
d. Administrative Leave Bank 2 — a bank of paid leave restricted to nine designated union officials for attendance to union business. . . . The union reimburses the employer for all applicable insurance premiums during the period the employee’s absence is covered by this administrative leave bank. . . .
e. Union Officer Leave — leave of absence, compensation fully reimbursed by the union, for union representatives devoting over 25% of work year to union business. . . . [T]he union reimburses the employer for the gross total cost of the employee’s wages and the employer’s share of the insurance premiums and retirement. . . .
f. General Unpaid Leave — available for purposes of secondary education, medical treatment, military service, union office, matemity/patemity. . . .
*727g. Administrative Leave Buy Back — not part of [the collective bargaining agreement] based on bargaining and past practice. This is often used for large, one time meetings or trainings, for bargaining and other similar events. Under this arrangement, no leave time is deducted from an employee’s annual leave balance .... The union designates those employees who will attend and the employer submits a bill to the union for the net salary for the period of absence.

 1976 PA 169, MCL 15.401 et seq.; MSA 4.1702(1) et seq., states in pertinent part:

 We note that in Council No 11 the commission argued that the political freedom act was a violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5, and specifically the provision that declares that the Civil Service Commission shall “regulate all conditions of employment in the classified service.” Id. at 397. We held:
[T]here is no provision in our Constitution which plainly, or by fair implication, empowers the Civil Service Commission to regulate the off-duty political activity of classified civil servants as attempted by Rule 7, or in any manner preemptively conflicts with the power of the Legislature to enact 1976 PA 169. The statute does not conflict with the Civil Service Commission’s authority to regulate, indeed proscribe, on-duty political activity or deal with unsatisfactory job performance attributable to off-duty political activity or any other cause on a case-by-case basis. [Id. at 408-409.]

 5 USC 7131(a).

 Other federal courts, in interpreting the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 USC 186(a), have held that compensation to employees on leaves of absence for union business is not compensation for work performed for the employer. See BASF Wyandotte Corp v Local 227, Int’l Chemical Workers *738Union, supra at 1048-1049; NLRB v BASF Wyandotte Corp, 798 F2d 849 (CA 5, 1986); Communications Workers of America v Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc, 670 F Supp 416; 126 LRRM 3015 (D DC, 1987).

 We note that the defendant has made no showing that union leave adversely affected the employees’ job performance.