Court Opinion

ID: 9392840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 14:00:52.027205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:49.298743
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 NA’EEM BETZ,

         Plaintiff,
                 v.                                       Civil Action No. 22-2235 (JEB)
 SYNCHRONY BANK,

         Defendant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       This Telephone Consumer Protection Act lawsuit is far from Plaintiff Na’eem Betz’s first

rodeo. A frequent pro se filer, he brings this TCPA action against Synchrony Bank for allegedly

calling him over 80 times using an autodialer and pre-recorded message. Plaintiff filed this

Complaint in July 2022, and he has since amended it twice and withdrawn a third proposed

amendment. Synchrony now moves to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. The Court will

grant that Motion in part and deny it in part.

I.     Background

       Random robocalls are undeniably annoying and, in some cases, against the law.

According to his Second Amended Complaint and his attached exhibits, which the Court treats as

true for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, Synchrony repeatedly called Betz using pre-recorded

voice messages without his consent.

       Betz provides a log of phone calls from Synchrony starting on February 20, 2021. See

ECF No. 22-1 (2d Am. Compl.), Exh. A (Phone Log). According to this log, Synchrony called

him approximately once a day to collect on his “alleged debt.” 2d Am. Compl., ¶ 2; see also

Phone Log. These daily calls lasted through May 24 of that year. See Phone Log.

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        When he did not answer these calls, Betz received a voicemail that identified the caller as

Synchrony, requested that he return its call, provided contact information, and ended with a

statement saying, “This is a recording.” 2d Am. Compl., Exh. B (Message Transcript). Betz

alleges that he expressly revoked “any and all prior express consent” by telephone on February

26 and 27 and on May 6. See 2d Am. Compl., ¶ 11. On these occasions, he answered the phone

saying, “[P]lease stop calling I revoke any and all prior consent,” and “[y]ou do not have my

consent any longer to harass me with prerecorded messages on my cellular telephone” before

immediately hanging up. Id.

        Betz explains that he further revoked his consent when he filed two complaints with the

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on April 19 and May 21, 2021. On May 25, Synchrony

responded to Betz’s CFPB complaints and stated that the company had a policy to “cease and

desist collection telephone calls once the accountholder has provided [it] with the cease and

desist notification.” Id., Exh. D (Response Letter). The response further stated, “On April 22,

2021, in response to your request submitted through [the CFPB complaint,] we coded this

account to prevent future telephone calls.” Id. Synchrony, however, “[did] not have [a] record of

receiving a cease and desist request from you either in writing or over the telephone prior to our

receipt” of the CFPB complaints. Id.

        In total, Betz received 83 calls from Synchrony — 52 prior to April 22 and 31 after

Synchrony “cod[ed]” his account. See 2d Am. Compl., ¶¶ 11, 15. “Upon information and

belief,” Betz alleges that Synchrony made these calls using a dialing system that had “the

capacity to store or call phone numbers using a random or sequential number generator.” Id.,

¶ 18.

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       The case has had quite a drawn-out procedural history. Betz filed his Complaint on July

27, 2022. Synchrony then moved to dismiss the Complaint on September 15. See ECF No. 8

(MTD). Rather than respond to Synchrony’s Motion to Dismiss, Betz sought to amend his

Complaint in November. See ECF No. 15 (Mot. to Am. Compl.). The Court granted this Motion

on December 2. See Minute Order of Dec. 2, 2022. Synchrony then moved to dismiss Betz’s

Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 18 (MTD Am. Compl.). Again, Betz chose not to respond to

this Motion and, instead, sought to file another Amended Complaint in February 2023. See ECF

No. 22 (Consent Filing of 2d Am. Compl.). The Court granted this Motion soon after. See

Minute Order on Feb. 6, 2023.

       The cycle continued. Synchrony moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. See

ECF No. 23 (MTD 2d Am. Compl.). After requesting multiple extensions of time to respond to

that latest Motion to Dismiss, see ECF Nos. 25, 28 (Mots. Ex. Time), Betz filed a Motion for

Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 29 (Mot. to Amend); ECF No. 29-1 (3d

Am. Compl.). Only within the last month did he finally respond to Synchrony’s Motion to

Dismiss. See ECF No. 33 (MTD Opp.). Betz later withdrew his Motion for Leave to File a

Third Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 35 (Notice of Withdrawal). The remaining Motion —

the Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint — is now ripe.

II.    Legal Standard

       Defendant moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This

Rule permits a court to dismiss any count of a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” In evaluating the motion, the court must “treat the complaint’s factual

allegations as true and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from

the facts alleged.’” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

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(quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (citation omitted). The

Court need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” or an

inference unsupported by facts set forth in the complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193

(D.C. Cir. 2006).

       This pleading standard is “not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff,” Dura

Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005), as a count will survive so long as there is a

“‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support

the claim.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., 544

U.S. at 347). While “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a dismissal

motion, id. at 555, the complaint still “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

       In other words, a plaintiff must put forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint

may survive even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely” or the veracity of the claims are

“doubtful in fact” if the factual matter alleged in the complaint is “enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56.

       In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may

consider “the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in

the complaint[,] and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” Equal Emp’t

Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

With pro se litigants, the court must consider a complaint “in light of” all filings, including those

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responsive to a motion to dismiss. Brown v. Whole Foods Market, 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir.

2015).

III.     Analysis

         The Second Amended Complaint contains two counts: violation of the TCPA and

invasion of privacy. The Court analyzes each separately.

                1. TCPA

         To make out a TCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant called a cellular

telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) or a pre-recorded or

artificial voice (PRAV); (3) without the recipient’s prior express consent. See 47 U.S.C.

§ 227(b)(1)(B). An ATDS is defined by the TCPA as equipment that “has the capacity (A) to

store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator;

and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. § 227(a)(1).

         In his Second Amended Complaint, Betz alleges that Synchrony repeatedly called his cell

phone using an ATDS or PRAV without his consent. See 2d Am. Compl., ¶¶ 43–48. He further

explains that he made his lack of consent known numerous times, both verbally when he

answered calls and in writing when he filed a complaint with the CFPB. Id., ¶¶ 11, 13.

Although Betz apparently has withdrawn his contention that Synchrony used an ATDS, see

MTD Opp. at 6, the Court will discuss both ATDS and PRAV in turn.

         Where the called party is the intended recipient of a message, an ATDS theory normally

will not apply. An automatic telephone dialing system uses a random or sequential number

generator, and a caller would not use such technology to contact a specific person without a

showing to the contrary. See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Betz does

not disagree that Synchrony intentionally called him — albeit with the use of an automated

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system — to collect on a debt. See Response Letter. Other than mentioning that this debt is

“alleged,” Betz does nothing to refute the targeted nature of the calls. See 2d Am. Compl., ¶¶ 2–

3, 13, 15, 31; Response Letter (stating the exact debt Betz owes); see also Facebook, Inc. v.

Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1168, 1170 (2021) (ruling for Defendant in TCPA case and

highlighting targeted nature of communications). Betz, consequently, has not sufficiently pled

that Synchrony used an ATDS in calling him.

       As a result, Plaintiff’s claim may proceed only if Synchrony used a PRAV without his

prior express consent. There is little dispute that Defendant used a pre-recorded or artificial

voice during these calls. Each voicemail he received contained the exact same message, which

ended by saying, “This is a recording.” The sole question is thus whether Synchrony had Betz’s

prior express consent to receive PRAV calls.

       It is true that Plaintiff offers nothing within the Second Amended Complaint to show the

absence of express consent. Yet, “the burden is on the caller to prove that it obtained the

necessary prior express consent.” In the Matter of Rules & Reguls. Implementing the Tel.

Consumer Prot. Act of 1991 (“2015 Decision”), 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7990, ¶ 47 (2015) (emphasis

added), set aside on other grounds by ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 692; see also In the Matter of Rules

& Reguls. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 23 FCC Rcd. 559, 565, ¶ 10

(2008). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, such consent would have to appear in the Complaint or

be contained in one of the documents attached thereto. That is not the case.

       In seeking dismissal, Synchrony instead relies on one purported admission to show that

Betz previously consented to the calls. See ECF No. 34 (Reply to MTD Opp.) at 2–3; 2d Am.

Compl., ¶ 49 (“Plaintiff revoked any prior express consent before the additional (‘31’) telephone

calls with artificial prerecorded messages placed by the Defendant.”). Yet, this assumes too

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much. First, it overlooks the times Betz states he never consented. Id., ¶ 15 (stating Synchrony

called him “without prior express written consent”); id., ¶ 47 (similar). Further, in this

“concession,” Betz does not necessarily admit prior consent but rather underscores his continued

desire to stop receiving calls. The Court, therefore, cannot infer that he previously agreed to

receive these calls. See 2015 Decision, 30 FCC Rcd. at 7990, ¶ 47; see also 47 C.F.R.

§ 64.1200(f)(9) (defining prior express consent to require written agreement meeting certain

requirements).

       The Court, accordingly, will grant Synchrony’s Motion to Dismiss this count only in part,

allowing Betz to proceed with his TCPA claim as it relates to Synchrony’s use of a PRAV.

                 2. Invasion of Privacy

       Betz’s second count alleges common-law invasion of privacy. See 2d Am. Compl.,

¶¶ 54–62. Invasion of privacy is not seen as one tort, “but a complex of four, each with distinct

elements and each describing a separate interest capable of being invaded. The four constituent

torts are (1) intrusion upon one’s solitude or seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3)

publicity that places one in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriating one’s name or

likeness for another’s benefit.” Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213, 1216–17 (D.C. 1989). Betz’s

claim relates to the first, intrusion upon one’s solitude or seclusion. That tort has three elements:

“(1) an invasion or interference by physical intrusion, by use of a defendant’s sense of sight or

hearing, or by use of some other form of investigation or examination; (2) into a place where the

plaintiff has secluded himself, or into his private or secret concerns; (3) that would be highly

offensive to an ordinary, reasonable person.” Id. at 1217 (internal citations omitted). Defendant

does not challenge the first two elements but instead maintains that its calls were not highly

offensive.

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       District of Columbia courts have found calls to constitute an invasion of privacy only

“when the telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a

course of hounding the plaintiff that becomes a substantial burden to his existence.” Redshift v.

Shaw, No. 2017 CA 2722, 2018 WL 11397927, at *5 (D.C. Super. Jan. 31, 2018) (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652(B) cmt. d). The Second Amended Complaint offers

nothing to support the claim that an ordinary, reasonable person would find Synchrony’s calls

highly offensive to the extent that they became a substantial burden to his existence.

       Synchrony normally called Betz once a day to collect on an alleged debt; what is more,

Betz declined to answer most of the calls. See Phone Log. Even when he did answer, he would

promptly hang up. See 2d Am. Compl., ¶ 12. These calls included no threats or personal

attacks, and at no point does Betz allege that Synchrony called him to the point of “hounding.”

Cf. Redshift, 2018 WL 11397927, at *5 (noting that harassing and bullying calls and texts would

come in at all hours of day and night). Defendant called during normal working hours and

simply asked Betz to return the call. See Phone Log; see also Message Transcript.

       Although Betz may allege in conclusory fashion that these calls caused “emotional harm

and distress, embarrassment, humiliation, and other losses,” 2d Am. Compl., ¶ 59, he provides

little detail as to these allegations. The most Betz explains in this regard is that he experienced

“annoyance, waste of time, the use of the telephone power and network bandwidth, and the

intrusion on his telephone that occupied it from receiving legitimate communications.” Id., ¶ 35.

These are not enough.

       Again, Betz may not like these phone calls, but they do not amount to an invasion of

privacy. The Court will dismiss this count.

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IV.    Conclusion

       For these reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Second

Amended Complaint in part and deny it in part. A separate Order so stating will issue this day.

                                                            /s/ James E. Boasberg
                                                            JAMES E. BOASBERG
                                                            Chief Judge
Date: May 8, 2023

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