Court Opinion

ID: 9706804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:52:02.407213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:25.206970
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice O’Brien :
The majority ignores the clear meaning of the language in holding that appellee fits within the resale exclusion1 in §2(h) (2) of the Sales and Use Tax Act. The instant situation constitutes a resale, says the majority, because it involves “the physical incorporation of personal property as an ingredient or constituent into other personal property . . . which the person incorporating such property has undertaken at the time of purchase to cause to be transported in interstate commerce to a destination outside this Commonwealth.” It is clear to me that appellee cub the time of purchase did not undertake to cause the steel it bought to be transported in interstate commerce to a destination outside this Commonwealth. The quoted language obviously refers to a situation where the purchaser orders the shipment to be shipped directly from the vendor to an out-of-state location. Surely, the situation where a purchaser buys steel, fabricates it in Pennsylvania, *552and then some months later ships it out of state, could not have been within the contemplation of the legislature when it enacted the instant language.
I would thus hold that appellee does not fit within the resale exclusion, and remand to the court below for consideration of whether either the manufacturing or the “interim basis” exclusion applies.

 Whether it is called an exclusion or an exemption is irrelevant in this case.