Court Opinion

ID: 9770953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:26:20.334269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:23.102087
License: Public Domain

HECHT, Justice,
joined by GONZALEZ, Justice, dissenting.
Here as in In re Ethyl Corporation,1 also decided today, the Court holds, not that the claims consolidated for trial by the district court can be tried together without prejudice, but only that defendants’ record is as yet insufficient to show prejudice. I disagree with the Court that defendants should be required to offer more evidence of prejudice when the parties agree and the record demonstrates that the district court acted arbitrarily, when there has been no showing that the claims can be tried together without prejudice, when there is no evidence of economy to be achieved from a consolidated trial, and when no authority can be cited from any jurisdiction approving the trial of so many dissimilar claims together. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Defendants’ counsel stated at oral argument:
to our knowledge, there has never been a multi-plaintiff breast implant trial outside the State of Texas. Within the State of Texas, there has never been a trial of as many as nine plaintiffs as is proposed here. In fact, the largest number that we are aware of is four, and we’re not aware of any multiple manufacturer trials, certainly outside the context of a woman who has multiple implants with different manufactures.
Counsel added: “There have only been a handful of breast implant trials altogether.” Plaintiffs have not challenged these assertions, and the Court cites no case from any court that would support the consolidation ordered by the district court in this case.
This is certainly not surprising, given the agreement of plaintiffs and defendants in this case that the district court acted completely arbitrarily in consolidating for trial the nine plaintiffs’ claims against three groups of defendants. Plaintiffs’ counsel told the Court in oral argument that the district court’s decision was “arbitrary and capricious”, that the “consolidation did not favor the plaintiffs”, and that he was therefore opposed to it, although he had not sought relief. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that based on his experience, trying four claims at once was workable, but trying more than six claims at once was not, either from plaintiffs’ standpoint or defendants’. Defendants, of course, agreed that the consolidation was prejudicial.
Defendants based their argument of prejudice on extensive discovery showing the age of each plaintiff (between 34 and 59), the date or dates she received the implants (from 1974 to 1991), the reason for the implants (reconstruction or augmentation), the type of implants (silicone gel, saline, both silicone and saline, and coated or uncoated), who manufactured them (different plaintiffs had implants from different manufacturers), the physician who performed the implant sur*606gery (all different), whether the implants ever raptured (some did and some did not), whether there were multiple implant surgeries (some had as many as three), whether the implants had been removed (for seven plaintiffs, yes), and the injuries claimed (chest pain, rash, flu symptoms, fever, memory loss, hair loss, joint pain, headaches, infection of the reproductive organs, itehiness and vaginal discharge, bacterial infection of the feet, ringing in the ears, tender skin, cramps in feet and hands, easy bruisability, neck and shoulder pain, a tingling sensation, pain in the arms, pain in the ears, dry mouth and eyes, weariness, dizziness, etc.). The Court concludes:
if the defendants had demonstrated that the disparities among the claims would actually affect the trial of the case and the evidence that the jury would consider, we would be inclined to agree with the manufacturers that a jury would be confused and that the parties would be prejudiced by a single trial of these nine claims. But evidence has not been provided to support the claims of prejudice and confusion.2
It is hard to imagine how the near certainty of prejudice and confusion could be any more apparent, especially given plaintiffs’ counsel’s own concessions at oral argument. To put defendants to further proof is makework.
More importantly, defendants should have no additional burden to show prejudice when there has been absolutely no showing of an absence of prejudice or of an efficiency to be achieved by a consolidated trial. The additional time that will be required to keep separate the various claims, and the risk of reversal on appeal, have not been factored into any determination whether consolidation is necessary “to avoid unnecessary costs or delay”, the basis for consolidation under Rule 174(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, the record reflects, and the parties concede, that the district court undertook no determination of any kind before ordering consolidation.
The Court concedes this: “We recognize that the trial court made no attempt to assess whether confusion or prejudice would result if these claims were tried together.”3 To determine whether mandamus relief is appropriate, the Court need not “plumb the subjective reasoning of the trial court.”4 As the author of today’s opinion wrote for the Court only a little over a year ago, joined by all the Members of today’s majority who were then on the Court, “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision ‘is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to guiding principles.’ ”5 Judged by this standard, the record before us shows a clear abuse of discretion.
Despite the denial of relief, in this case, just as in Ethyl, the Court makes perfectly clear that the cases consolidated by the district court cannot be tried together without prejudice. Here, as in that case, the district court would do well to reconsider its consolidation order in light of today’s opinions.

. 975 S.W.2d 606 (Tex.1998).

. Ante at 604.

. Ante at 604.

.Ante at 605.

. Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997) (citation omitted).