Court Opinion

ID: 9399675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 06:00:16.876315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.289957
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BRENDA D. HICKS,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        AT-0752-16-0105-B-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: June 5, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Ronnie Hubbard, Jackson, Mississippi, for the appellant.

           Hyacinth M. Clarke and Joshua N. Rose, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
     which sustained her removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only
     in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings
     of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of
     statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or
     the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an
     abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or
     new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the
     petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of
     the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After
     fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to make findings on the appellant’s allegations of race
     discrimination, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
     The initial appeal
¶2         Effective October 29, 2015, the agency removed the appellant from her
     Food Inspector position based on a single charge of conduct prejudicial to the
     best interests of the service supported by two specifications.       MSPB Docket
     No. AT-0752-16-0105-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 14-19.               In
     specification one, the agency alleged that, on April 30, 2014, after the appellant’s
     supervisor informed her that he had denied her leave request, the appellant called
     her supervisor over to her vehicle at the end of her shift, pulled what appeared to
     be a gun from under the seat of her car, and showed it to him. Id. at 15, 25. In
     specification two, the agency alleged that, on May 6, 2014, the appellant came to
     the door of an agency office, asked for her supervisor, and then pointed her finger
     at him and made a noise as if she were firing a gun. Id.
¶3         The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging her removal and raised
     affirmative defenses of a denial of due process in connection with an agency
     investigation of the charge, harmful procedural error, and discrimination based on
     race. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 13 at 4, Tab 15 at 7-8, Tab 20 at 2-7. After holding
                                                                                        3

     the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision reversing
     the appellant’s removal on due process grounds not raised by the appellant,
     without addressing whether the agency proved the charge. IAF, Tab 22, Initial
     Decision (ID). The administrative judge based this conclusion on the deciding
     official’s testimony that he considered the appellant’s misconduct as “threats,” an
     offense different from and more serious than the charged offense of conduct
     prejudicial to the best interests of the service. ID at 4. The administrative judge
     further found that the deciding official’s consideration of the appellant’s conduct
     as threats constituted an ex parte communication that introduced new and material
     information to which the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to respond.
     ID at 5-7.     The administrative judge declined to address the appellant ’s
     affirmative defense of harmful procedural error, having reversed her removal on
     due process grounds, but found that she failed to prove her affirmative defense of
     racial discrimination. ID at 8.
¶4        The agency filed a petition for review of the initial decision in which it
     argued that the administrative judge erred in finding that it violated the
     appellant’s due process rights. Hicks v. Department of Agriculture, MSPB
     Docket No. AT-0752-16-0105-I-1, Petition for Review File, Tab 1. The Board
     agreed with the agency.     Hicks v. Department of Agriculture, MSPB Docket
     No. AT-0752-16-0105-I-1, Remand Order, ¶¶ 10-16 (Sept. 22, 2016) (Remand
     Order). The Board found that, although the agency did not charge the appellant
     with making a threat, the penalty section of the proposal notice quoted agency
     policies regarding firearms and workplace violence, which prohibit threats, and
     addressed the same type of alleged misconduct that formed the basis for t he
     appellant’s removal. Id., ¶ 14. It found further that the proposal notice did, or
     should have, put the appellant on notice that the agency viewed her alleged
     misconduct as analogous to a threat. Id., ¶¶ 14-15. The Board vacated the initial
     decision and remanded for the administrative judge to issue a new initial decision
     that made further findings regarding the charge, the appe llant’s affirmative
                                                                                         4

     defenses, nexus, and the penalty.        Id., ¶ 17.    The Board noted that the
     administrative judge may adopt his original finding regarding the appellant ’s
     affirmative defense of race discrimination. Id.

     The remand appeal
¶5         On remand, the administrative judge found that the Board reinterpreted the
     charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as making a threat,
     and he found that the agency met its burden to prove that the appellant’s
     misconduct in specifications one and two were threats. Hicks v. Department of
     Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-16-0105-B-1, Remand File, Tab 6,
     Remand Initial Decision (RID) at 7-10. As to specification one, he found that the
     appellant’s supervisor testified credibly that the appellant showed him a gun and
     the appellant’s testimony that she showed him a bottle of liquor was not
     believable. RID at 6. As to specification two, the administrative judge credited
     the version of events based on the testimony of several witnesses to the incident
     over the appellant’s version of events. RID at 8-9. He also found that the agency
     established nexus and that the removal penalty was reasonable. RID at 10-11.
     Additionally, he readopted his finding that the appellant failed to prove he r
     affirmative defense of race discrimination, and found that she failed to prove her
     affirmative defense of harmful error. RID at 12.
¶6         In her petition for review, 2 the appellant argues that the agency did not
     provide her adequate notice that it viewed the charge as involving a threat, that
     the administrative judge erred in finding her supervisor credible, and that the
     more than 1-year delay between the charged misconduct and the initiation of the
     agency action harmed her ability to defend against the action.              Hicks v.

     2
       Attached to the appellant’s petition are a number of documents. Hicks v. Department
     of Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-16-0105-B-1, Remand Petition for Review
     File, Tab 1 at 9-18, 23-26. The parties submitted all of these documents below. IAF,
     Tab 8 at 25-26; Tab 11 at 12-16, 19-21; Tab 17 at 7; Tab 18 at 7. Because these
     documents are already part of the record, they do not constitute new evidence. See
     Meier v. Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980).
                                                                                            5

     Department of Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-16-0105-B-1, Remand
     Petition for Review (RPFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-8, 21. The appellant also argues that
     the administrative judge erred in applying the legal criteria for determining
     whether there had been a threat, that the real reason for the agency action was her
     tardiness, that it was legal under Mississippi law to have a weapon in her vehicle,
     and that the administrative judge erred by not considering a charge set forth in the
     proposal notice that the deciding official did not sustain. 3 Id. at 4, 7-8, 19-21.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The law of the case doctrine precludes Board review of the appellant’s argument
     that she was not on notice that the agency charge was analogous to a charge of
     making a threat.
¶7         As noted, in its remand decision, the Board found that the proposal notice
     did, or should have, put the appellant on notice that the agency viewed the alleged
     misconduct as analogous to a threat. Remand Order, ¶ 15. Under the law of the
     case doctrine, a tribunal generally will not reconsider issues that already have
     been decided in an appeal unless there is new and material evidence adduced at a
     subsequent trial, controlling authority has made a contrary deci sion of law, or the
     prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. Jonson
     v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 122 M.S.P.R. 454, ¶ 11 n.8 (2015)

     3
       The appellant timely filed her petition for review on October 28, 2016. RPFR File,
     Tab 1. The Clerk of the Board informed the agency that it could file a response on or
     before November 22, 2016. RPFR File, Tab 2. The agency filed its response on
     November 28, 2016. RPFR File, Tab 5. With its response, the agency filed a request to
     waive the filing deadline. Id. at 18. The agency declared that, on November 17, 2016,
     it placed the correctly addressed package containing the response in a Federal Express
     pick up box, and, on November 28, 2016, learned from Federal Express that it failed to
     deliver the package containing the response. Id. at 20. Attached to the request is a
     copy of a Federal Express label addressed to the Board and dated November 17, 2016.
     Id. at 21. Additional support for the agency’s assertion that it sent the response to the
     Board on November 17, 2016, is provided by the appellant, who filed a reply to the
     agency’s response on November 22, 2016, prior to the Board’s receipt of the response.
     RPFR File, Tab 3. Under these circumstances, we accept the agency’s response to the
     petition for review.
                                                                                          6

     (quoting Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912)).                The doctrine
     “merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has
     been decided, [and is] not a limit to their power.” Jonson, 122 M.S.P.R. 454,
     ¶ 11 n.8; see Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir.
     1994) (observing that a court’s decision to apply the law of the case doctrine is
     within its discretion).    The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure consistency,
     thereby avoiding the expense and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserving the
     Board’s resources, and fostering reliance on the Board by avoiding inconsistent
     decisions. See Hoover v. Department of the Navy, 57 M.S.P.R. 545, 552 (1993)
     (setting forth this rationale in the context of litigation in general).
¶8         On review, the appellant argues that she had no knowledge that the agency
     viewed the charge as analogous to a threat charge.          RPFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6.
     However, she has not shown that new and material evidence was present at the
     remand hearing.      Nor has she shown that controlling authority has made a
     contrary decision of law or that the Board’s decision that the penalty section of
     the proposal notice quoted agency policies regarding f irearms and workplace
     violence, which prohibit threats, see Remand Order, ¶¶ 14-15, was clearly
     erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. We find that the appellant has
     not shown error in our prior decision, and therefore we apply the law of the case
     doctrine to our finding that the appellant knew or should have known that the
     agency viewed the alleged misconduct as a threat. Under the circumstances of
     this case, the law of the case doctrine precludes relitigating whether the proposal
     letter gave the appellant adequate notice that the agency considered the agency
     charge as analogous to a charge of making a threat.

     The appellant failed to show error in the administrative judge ’s credibility
     determination.
¶9         In her petition for review, the appellant reiterates the argument she made to
     the administrative judge that her supervisor stated in his workplace violence
     statement that he was not sure he had seen a gun. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 7. In
                                                                                        7

      making his credibility determination, the administrative judge noted that the
      supervisor and the appellant were the only witnesses to the acts alleged in
      specification 1.    RID at 4.    Thus, the administrative judge found that his
      determination as to whether the agency proved that specification turned on which
      version of events, that of the supervisor or that of the appellant, he found more
      credible.   Id.    Applying the criteria of Hillen v. Department of the Army,
      35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), to his assessment of the credibility of the two
      witnesses, he found that the supervisor’s statement that the appellant slid out into
      view what appeared to be a pistol in a holster was more credible than the
      appellant’s statement that she pulled a small bottle of whiskey or vodka in a paper
      bag from under her car seat. RID at 4-6. In finding the supervisor more credible
      than the appellant, the administrative judge did not distinguish between the
      demeanor of the supervisor and the appellant, finding that demeanor did not favor
      one or the other. RID at 6.
¶10         The Board must afford special deference to an administrative judge’s
      credibility findings when he or she relies expressly or by necessary implication
      on witness demeanor. Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367,
      1372 (Fed. Cir. 2016).        Likewise, the Board is not free to overturn an
      administrative judge’s credibility findings merely because it disagrees with those
      findings. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
      In the remand initial decision, the administrative judge considered the
      supervisor’s workplace violence statement that he was not sure he had seen a gun,
      and found that it was a prior inconsistent statement that weig hed in the
      appellant’s favor. RID at 5. He found that the appellant’s testimony that she
      harbored no ill feelings toward her supervisor is contradicted by evidence
      reflecting that she was “written up” by him for absence without leave (AWOL)
      mere hours before their encounter near her car.        Id.   He also found that a
      coworker testified that the appellant was upset for having been “written up” by
      her supervisor earlier in the day on which she allegedly showed him the gun . Id.
                                                                                          8

      Further, the administrative judge found that the supervisor testified that when he
      saw the gun, he told the appellant, “If you’re going to shoot me, shoot me
      between the eyes.” Id. In addition, the administrative judge found that, a week
      before the incident with her supervisor, the appellant told a coworker that she
      carried a gun in her car. RID at 6. Finally, the administrative judge found it
      inherently improbable, as the appellant asserted, that she would offer her
      supervisor a gift of a bottle of liquor within hours after he “wrote her up” up for
      being AWOL. Id. Under the circumstances, we find no reason to reweigh the
      evidence, and we defer to the administrative judge’s findings here on credibility
      issues.   See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997)
      (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she
      considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made
      reasoned conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services,
      33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same); see also Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1302.

      The appellant did not show that she was harmed by the agency’s delay in bringing
      the removal action.
¶11         The equitable defense of laches bars an action when an unreasonabl e or
      unexcused delay in bringing the action has prejudiced the party against whom the
      action is taken. Pueschel v. Department of Transportation, 113 M.S.P.R. 422, ¶ 6
      (2010); Social Security Administration v. Carr, 78 M.S.P.R. 313, 330 (1998),
      aff’d, 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Talakowski v. Department of the Army,
      50 M.S.P.R. 18, 22 (1991).        The party asserting laches must prove both
      unreasonable delay and prejudice.       Pueschel, 113 M.S.P.R. 422, ¶ 6; Carr,
      78 M.S.P.R. at 330. The mere fact that time has elapsed from the date a cause of
      action first accrued is not sufficient to bar an agency disciplinary action as such a
      delay does not eliminate the prejudice prong of the laches test.         Cornetta v.
      United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc). As to prejudice,
      there are two types that may stem from the delay in initiating an action. Id. First,
      “defense” prejudice may arise by reason of a defendant’s inability to present a
                                                                                       9

      full and fair defense on the merits due to the loss of records, the death of a
      witness, or the unreliability of memories of long past events, thereby undermining
      the Board’s ability to judge the facts. Id. The second type, economic prejudice,
      may arise where a party and possibly others will suffer the loss of monetary
      investments or incur damages, which likely would have been prevented had the
      action been initiated earlier. Id.
¶12         Here, the acts of misconduct that formed the basis for the agency action
      occurred in April and May 2014, and the agency proposed th e appellant’s removal
      on August 10, 2015, and effected the removal on October 29, 2015. IAF, Tab 7
      at 15-19, 24-30.    Thus, approximately 18 months passed from the time of the
      conduct to the disciplinary action.    The appellant asserts that because of the
      delay, some of her coworkers who may have been able to testify in her defense
      had transferred or received promotions to other work areas. RPFR File, Tab 1
      at 21. She also asserts that those coworkers who remained had probably forgotten
      the specifics of what might have transpired. Id.
¶13         The Board has held that a 3-year period between the misconduct that formed
      the basis for a disciplinary action and the initiation of the action was not
      unreasonable. Carr, 78 M.S.P.R. at 330-31 (finding that it was not unreasonable
      for the agency to include in its disciplinary action misconduct that occurred more
      than 3 years earlier); Special Counsel v. Santella, 65 M.S.P.R. 452, 465-66 (1994)
      (finding that the Office of Special Counsel’s 3-year delay in bringing a
      disciplinary action after it learned of possible prohibited personnel practices was
      not unreasonable).     Thus, the appellant has not shown that the delay was
      unreasonable.      Furthermore, the appellant did not identify any particular
      individual whom she was unable to locate or contact to testify in her defense
      because of the delay, and she did not show that anyone who testified was unable
      to recall the specifics of the events that formed the basis of the agency’s charge
      against her. Thus, we find that the appellant has not shown that her ability to
      defend against the charge was prejudiced in any manner by the agency’s delay.
                                                                                     10

      Therefore, we find that the appellant has not shown that this action is barred by
      the doctrine of laches.

      The appellant’s other arguments on review do not establish error in the initial
      decision.
¶14         On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erred in
      applying the test to determine whether an employee has made a threat stated in
      Metz v. Department of the Treasury, 780 F.2d 1001, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 1986). RPFR
      File, Tab 1 at 19. She contends that the administrative judge failed to consider
      that her supervisor said that the appellant never made any threatening statements.
      Id. Under Metz, in deciding whether a statement constitutes a threat, the Board is
      to apply the reasonable person criterion, considering the listeners’ reaction and
      apprehension, the wording of the statement, the speaker’s intent, and the
      attendant circumstances. Metz, 780 F.2d at 1002.
¶15         Here, the administrative judge considered whether the appellant made an
      actionable threat by showing a gun to her supervisor, and subsequently making a
      gun shape with her hand, pointing her hand at her supervisor, and making a
      shooting noise, not by uttering threatening words. Under the circumstances, th e
      supervisor’s statement that the appellant did not utter threatening words is
      immaterial to the administrative judge’s finding that, under all the attendant
      circumstances, the appellant’s actions constituted a threat.
¶16         The appellant also asserts that the agency was really removing her because
      of her tardiness. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 21. The appellant does not point to anything
      to support this assertion and the notice of proposed removal and the decision
      notice make no mention of her tardiness. In any event, the Board is required to
      review the agency’s decision on an adverse action solely on the grounds invoked
      by the agency; the Board may not substitute what it considers to be a more
      adequate or proper basis.         See Fargnoli v. Department of Commerce,
      123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 7 (2016).      Thus, we find the appellant’s claim that the
                                                                                        11

      agency removed her based on her leave record unavailing. IAF, Tab 7 at 15-19,
      24-30.
¶17         The appellant also argues on review that Mississippi state law permits the
      open carrying of a handgun in a motor vehicle without a permit or license. RPFR
      File, Tab 1 at 7-8, 19-20. The appellant has not explained how the fact that she
      could have a gun in her vehicle under state law would prevent the agency from
      charging her with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service by, among
      other things, displaying the gun to her supervisor only a few hours after he wrote
      her up for being AWOL.
¶18         Next, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erred by not
      considering a charge set forth in the proposal notice that the deciding official did
      not sustain. Id. at 4-5. The appellant does not cite any legal authority to support
      her argument that the administrative judge must consider a charge mentioned in
      the proposal notice when it is not sustained by the deciding official, and we are
      unaware of any such requirement.

      The appellant failed to prove her affirmative defense of racial discrimination.
¶19         Finally, although the administrative judge adopted his original finding that
      the appellant failed to prove race discrimination, he did not restate those findings
      in the remand decision. Despite the fact that the appellant did not disagree with
      those findings in her petition for review, because the Board vacated the initial
      decision in which the administrative judge made the finding that the appellant
      failed to meet her burden to prove race discrimination, we make findings on tha t
      affirmative defense.
¶20         Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, requires that
      personnel actions “shall be made free from any discrimination based on race,
      color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). An appellant
      may prove an affirmative defense under this subsection by showing that
      prohibited discrimination or reprisal was a motivating factor in the contested
      action, i.e. that discrimination or reprisal played “any part” in the agency’s action
                                                                                           12

      or decision. Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 21,
      30. Nevertheless, while an appellant who proves motivating factor and nothing
      more may be entitled to injunctive or other forward-looking relief, in order to
      obtain the full measure of relief available under the statute, including status
      quo ante relief, compensatory damages, or other forms of relief related to the end
      result of an employment decision, he must show that discrimination or reprisal
      was a but-for cause of the employment outcome. Id., ¶ 22.
¶21         At the hearing, the appellant proffered no evidence of discrimination based
      on race. She did not demonstrate in any way that she was treated more harshly
      than an individual who was not a member of her protected group, nor did she
      provide any other kind of evidence indicating that the agency’s action was based
      on discriminatory intent.     See Godesky v. Department of Health and Human
      Services, 101 M.S.P.R. 280, 285 (2006). Therefore, we find that the appellant has
      not met her burden of proving that the prohibited consideration of race
      discrimination was a motivating factor in the contested personnel action and thus
      failed to establish her affirmative defense of race discrimination . Pridgen,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

      4
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      13

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
                                                                                   14

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so , you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.           See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
                                                                                     15

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                16

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.