Court Opinion

ID: 9893781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:03:55.7898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:11.257773
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/30/23 P. v. Ewell CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B311450

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BA400028)
         v.

JOHN WESLEY EWELL,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.

     Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David E. Madeo, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                               _________________________
       Appellant John Wesley Ewell moved to suppress evidence
obtained in connection with his October 23, 2010 arrest; to quash
and traverse the search warrant issued that same day for his
residence and vehicle; and to suppress evidence found in the
ensuing searches. After the trial court denied his motions,
appellant pled no contest to four counts of first degree robbery in
violation of Penal Code1 section 211 and four counts of murder
(§ 187) with robbery and special circumstance allegations
pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).2 He was sentenced
to four terms of life without the possibility of parole for the
murders, and four mid-terms of four years for the robbery
convictions, stayed pursuant to section 654.
        He now appeals the denial of those motions. Appellant
was arrested after officers investigating the home invasion
robbery-murders of Leamon and Robyn Turnage reviewed video
footage from four locations where a Turnage ATM card was being
used. Investigating officers concluded that appellant was the
person using it. Appellant contends there was no probable cause
for his warrantless arrest because there were no reasonable
grounds to believe he was the person using Robyn Turnage’s
ATM card.
       Investigators obtained a search warrant for appellant’s
home and car, based on essentially the same facts which
prompted his arrest. Appellant contends the search warrant was
facially invalid for essentially the same reasons as the arrest.
Appellant brought a contemporaneous motion to traverse the
warrant, contending the affidavit supporting the warrant

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2     The People had sought the death penalty against appellant.

                                 2
includes statements made with reckless disregard for the truth.
He further contends the warrant was invalid because it failed to
describe the items to be seized with reasonable particularity.
       Finally, appellant contends the officers exceeded the scope
of the warrant when they seized a day planner which contained
the address of another robbery-murder victim, Hanna Morcos,
and that all items related to the Morcos murder seized after that
search were the fruit of the poisonous tree. Appellant seeks
suppression of all seized evidence as a remedy for what he
characterizes as the officers’ flagrant disregard for the scope of
the warrant. We see no error in the trial court's denial of all the
motions and so affirm the judgment.
                         BACKGROUND
      On September 24, 2010, appellant murdered Hanna Morcos
and stole items, notably foreign coins, from the home on West
137th Street in Hawthorne. On October 13, 2010, appellant
murdered Denise Roberts and stole items from her home on
South Hoover Street, two houses down from appellant’s
residence. On October 21, 2010, appellant murdered Leamon and
Robyn Turnage and stole items from their home on West 142nd
Street in Hawthorne. Appellant bound the wrists or ankles of all
four victims.
      The Morcos and Roberts murders were unsolved when Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) officers went to the
Turnage home in the later afternoon of October 22, 2010, to
investigate a possible double homicide and discovered the
Turnages had been murdered.
      Robyn Turnage was bound with black electrical tape
around her wrists; there was also black electrical tape around her
head. Leamon had black electrical tape around his head, and his

                                 3
hands were tied behind his back with a white cord or string. A
yellow nylon rope was under and around his body.
       Empty boxes suggested jewelry had been taken. Robyn’s
purse had been emptied out in the living room and Leamon’s
wallet was open on the kitchen table. Credit/debit cards
appeared to be missing from both.3 Investigators noticed a Bank
of the West checkbook, contacted a police detective specializing in
credit card crimes and asked if he had a source in the banking
industry, specifically Bank of the West.
       At some point in the investigation, on either October 22 or
23, Detective Hecht spoke with Mohammad Khan, a tenant in a
back guest house on the Turnage property. Khan told Detective
Hecht that at about 11:30 a.m. on October 21 Leamon Turnage
came to Khan’s unit with a man in a blue baseball hat, blue work
shirt and dark pants. Turnage said the man needed to check the
property for a gas leak. Khan described the “gas man” as a black
male in his early 50’s with a thin build and a thin mustache.
Detective Hecht got the impression from Khan that the man was
just “smelling” for gas.” Khan said they did not smell any gas
and left very quickly.
       In the very early morning hours of October 23, 2010, Bank
of the West representative Hayley McCormick contacted
Detective Hecht. She drove to a bank branch, opened it up and
logged onto the bank’s computer equipment to search for activity.
She told investigators that Robyn Turnage’s Bank of the West
ATM card was being used at ATMs in the area.

3     Later in the investigation, after the crime scene was
released back to the family, family members found several credit
cards under a bed in the house.

                                 4
      Investigators learned from a Bank of the West employee
that bank records showed the Turnage ATM card had been used
at 4:24 p.m. on October 21, 2010 at R&F Liquor, at 10:25 a.m. on
October 22, 2010 at a Shell gas station at 854 West El Segundo
Boulevard in Gardena, and at 10:36 a.m. on October 22, 2010 at a
7-11 store at 861 West Rosecrans Avenue in Gardena. Detective
Hecht went to the three locations and viewed surveillance video.
      Video from R&F Liquor showed appellant entering and
leaving the store twice. 4 One of the exit times was 4:24 p.m.
That location did not have a camera focused on the ATM itself.
      Video from the Shell station showed appellant conducting
an ATM transaction from 10:28 to 10:30 a.m.
      Video from the 7-11 showed appellant arriving at the store
at 10:40 a.m. That location did not have a camera filming the
actual ATM or an outdoor camera.
      At the Shell station, appellant is seen on video entering and
exiting a red car with a black primer hood and black right front
fender; the car is also seen in the R&F Liquor video, and it is
reasonable to infer appellant is driving it in the video.
      Sometime later, on October 23, 2010, Detective Hecht
learned from Bank of the West that the Turnage ATM card had
been used again at the same Shell station and the same 7-11, and
at an ARCO station at 11259 South Vermont, at 6:54 a.m.,
7:00 a.m. and 7:35 a.m. respectively. Detective Hecht viewed
videos from the locations, and saw the same black male, believed

4     To be clear, the person in the videos is a black male with a
thin build and a thin mustache. It was Detective Hecht’s opinion
that this same man was in all the videos, and that the man was
appellant.

                                 5
by Detective Hecht to be appellant, at all three locations, and the
distinctive red car at the Shell and ARCO stations.
       The Shell video showed appellant conducting an ATM
transaction from 6:58-7:00 a.m. It also showed the distinctive red
car.
       The recorded videos from the 7-11 and ARCO station were
missing (or perhaps never copied by LASD), but Detective Hecht
recalled viewing the videos and seeing appellant. He specifically
recalled seeing appellant exiting and entering the red car at the
ARCO station.
       The LASD Surveillance and Apprehension team began
surveillance of the 7-11 and the Shell station as well as a liquor
store which was across the street from the Shell station. The
Turnage ATM card had been declined there due to daily
withdrawal limits. At about 7:00 p.m., LASD Detective Arturo
Barrera observed a black male get into the distinctive red car at
the liquor store. The team followed the car to 12653 South
Hoover Street, where the man got out of the red car and entered
the residence. When the man came out about 20 minutes later,
officers arrested the man, identified as appellant.
       Detective Duval prepared a search warrant for the Hoover
Street residence and the red car. The warrant was authorized by
a magistrate on October 23, 2010 at 11:26 p.m. Detective Duval
and his partner Sergeant Garcia supervised the search, which
was conducted by Hawthorne Police Department (HPD)
personnel. As relevant to this appeal, an HPD officer discovered
an address in a day planner, and other HPD officers recognized it
as the address of the Morcos murder.
       The next day, Detective Hecht supervised a search of the
red car, which had been impounded. LASD Sergeant Alexander

                                6
MacArthur was present; he was an investigator in the Morcos
murder. During the search of the car Detective Hecht seized a
blue coin purse containing foreign coins and a black briefcase
containing papers. Later that day Detective Hecht gave these
items to Sergeant MacArthur.
      Detective Duval searched the red car on October 27, 2010,
and Detective Hecht searched the car again on October 29, 2010.
Additional items were recovered during both searches.
                         DISCUSSION
I.    Probable Cause Supported Appellant’s Arrest.
       Officers arrested appellant without a warrant, and
appellant moved to suppress all evidence recovered after that
arrest, on the ground that officers lacked probable cause to arrest
him.
       The trial court found there was probable cause to believe
appellant was using an ATM card that belonged to Robyn
Turnage shortly after the card was likely taken, based on:
(1) surveillance video showing a “very distinctive” car at some/all
of the ATM locations, which appellant was observed driving very
shortly before his arrest; and (2) surveillance videos of the ATM
locations showing a person at the locations in close proximity to
the times the cards were being used. That person matched the
general description of a person observed with Mr. Turnage at the
residence the morning of the murders. Thus, the trial court
concluded that there was probable cause to arrest appellant for a
felony.
       The prosecution bears the burden of proving the
reasonableness of a warrantless arrest. (People v. Williams
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130.) A warrantless arrest is reasonable

                                 7
under the Fourth Amendment where an officer has probable
cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being
committed. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1037 (Kraft).)
Probable cause exists if facts known to the arresting officer would
lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an
honest and strong suspicion that an individual is guilty of a
crime. (Ibid.) Probable cause “does not demand any showing
that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.”
(Texas v. Brown (1983) 460 U.S. 730, 742 (Brown).) “Probable
cause may exist even though there may be some room for doubt.”
(People v. Fischer (1957) 49 Cal.2d 442, 446 (Fischer).) “The test .
. . is not whether the evidence upon which the officer made the
arrest is sufficient to convict.” (Ibid.)
        Where an officer makes a warrantless arrest based on a
belief there is probable cause to do so, “the officer must testify to
the facts or information known to him on which his belief is
based” because “the court and not the officer must make the
determination whether the officer's belief is based upon
reasonable cause.” (People v. Boyles (1955) 45 Cal.2d 652, 656.)
In ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court is “vested with
the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any
conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual
inferences.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.)
        “ ‘The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial
court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by
substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so
found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.
[Citations.]’ ” (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719.)

                                 8
       Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding probable
cause because the surveillance videos either do not show him
actually conducting an ATM transaction or do not show any
transactions at the times provided by Bank of the West for the
Turnage card transactions, and thus do not sufficiently connect
him to the use of the Turnage ATM card.
       The facts related by Detective Hecht for probable cause
largely involve the videos from locations where the Turnage ATM
card was used. Detective Hecht’s testimony, detailed above,
shows that appellant appeared at all the locations where the
Turnage ATM card was used on October 21, 22, and 23, within
minutes of the time Bank of the West records verify the card
being used.5 We find these facts alone to be compelling, but even
if they were not sufficient to lead a person of ordinary care and
prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that
appellant was using the stolen Turnage ATM card, these facts do
not stand alone.
       Recorded video from the Shell station, the only location
with a video camera pointed at the ATM, shows appellant using
the ATM within minutes of the time Bank of the West records
verify the Turnage ATM card was used on both October 22 and
23, 2010. Appellant focuses on the slight time difference between
the time on the videos and the Bank of the West times, and
argues that the time discrepancies in the Shell videos, “without

5      The Turnage ATM card was used at four locations: R&F
Liquor, the Shell station, the 7-11, and an ARCO station.
Detective Hecht testified that he viewed video from all the
locations. There was an attempted use of the card at J&S Liquor
on October 23, 2010, but the card was declined. Detective Hecht
did not remember any video from J&S Liquor.

                                 9
further verification, cast doubt” on whether he was using the
Turnage ATM card. Of course, “Probable cause may exist even
though there may be some room for doubt.” (Fischer, supra,
49 Cal.2d at p. 446.)
       The video surveillance recordings, ATM internal time
clocks (if they played any role in the time differences) and the
Bank of the West records are all forms of computer records.6
Generally, inaccuracies in computer records go to the weight of
the evidence, not its admissibility. (People v. Martinez (2000)
22 Cal.4th 106, 132.) Put differently, the trial court was not
required to disregard completely a computer record because it
had an inaccuracy. The trial court could properly determine
what weight to give the computer records. The trial court
recognized the time discrepancies but found the “close proximity”
of the times showed that appellant had used the Turnage ATM
card. We find substantial evidence to support this finding.
       Detective Hecht began viewing the Shell videos “at least
almost five, ten minutes on either side” of the Bank of the West
times and he did not see anyone else use the ATM in that time
period. Specifically, the recorded videos played by defense
counsel during the hearing shows that no one used the ATM in
the brief interval between the Bank of the West time for the
Turnage transaction (10:25 a.m.) and appellant’s use of the ATM
(10:28–10:30 a.m.) on October 22, 2010 or between the Bank of

6     Although not determinative of our analysis on this issue,
when Detective Duval was shown the videos during the hearing,
he testified that “in my experience, when I go to capture
surveillance video, I usually start it 20 minutes before and
20 minutes after the time . . . because there’s always a
discrepancy in the times.”

                               10
the West transaction time (6:54 a.m.) and appellant’s use of the
ATM (6:58–7:00 a.m.) on October 23, 2010. It should be
emphasized that this same set of circumstances occurred on two
different days. This evidence strongly suggests appellant was the
person who used the Turnage ATM card at the Shell station.
       Although more was not required, we note the Shell station
transactions increase the probative value of the videos from R&F
Liquor and the 7-11, which do not directly show the ATM itself.
For the R&F Liquor store visit and the two Shell station
transactions, appellant’s distinctive red car is captured on video,
but no single other car appears in all three videos. Put
differently, the videos strongly suggest that no one other than
appellant was at both the R&F Liquor store and the Shell station
at or near the time the Turnage ATM card was used.7
       The 7-11 store and the Shell station are about a two-minute
drive from each other, and Bank of the West records show
Turnage ATM card transactions occurring about 11 minutes
apart at the two locations on October 22. 2010. Appellant
appears at the 7-11 at about 10:40 a.m., about 10 minutes after
he completed the Shell station ATM transaction on October 22.
Although video from the 7-11 store for October 23 could not be
located at the time of the suppression hearing, Detective Hecht
testified he observed appellant on that video within minutes of
the Bank of the West time for the transaction; Bank of the West

7      We note that although the video from the ARCO station
could not be found at the time of the hearing, Detective Hecht
testified that the distinctive red car appeared in that video, which
showed the ARCO station around the Bank of the West time for
the transaction. The 7-11 store apparently did not have outdoor
cameras.

                                11
records place the Shell station and 7-11 transactions six minutes
apart on that date.
       Finally, on October 23, 2010, as Detective Hecht was
aware, appellant was observed getting into and driving the
distinctive red car and he was followed to a residence on Hoover.
It was at this location appellant was arrested. Appellant’s use of
the distinctive red car strongly suggests that he is in fact the
black male in the videos.
       Viewing these facts as a whole, we find a “common-sense
probability” that appellant was the person using the Turnage
ATM card. Since the evidence also showed that the card was
used on October 21, 2010, only hours after the likely time of the
Turnage robbery-murder, the evidence as a whole would lead a
person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and
strong suspicion that appellant stole the card from the Turnages,
that is, he committed robbery. (See People v. Grimes (2016)
1 Cal.5th 698, 731 (Grimes) [For robbery charge, “ ‘[p]ossession of
recently stolen property is so incriminating that to warrant
conviction there need only be, in addition to possession, slight
corroboration in the form of statements or conduct of the
defendant tending to show his guilt’ ”]; People v. Gamble (1994)
22 Cal.App.4th 446, 453.)
II.   Challenges to the Search Warrant Fail.
       As the trial court correctly summarized, appellant raised
five issues in connection with his motion to quash and traverse
the October 23, 2010 search warrant: 1) the sufficiency of the
probable cause set out in the search warrant affidavit;
2) misstatements in the affidavit that involved reckless disregard
for the truth and which, if excised, negated probable cause; 3) the
sufficiency of the particularity of the items to be seized;

                                12
4) seizures during the search exceeding the scope of the warrant;
and 5) the inapplicability of the good faith reliance doctrine.
       A motion to traverse is different from a motion to quash.
A defendant moving to quash a warrant asserts the warrant on
its face lacks probable cause. A defendant moving to traverse a
warrant “ ‘mount[s] a subfacial challenge, i.e., attack[s] the
underlying veracity of statements made on the face of the search
warrant application.’ ” (People v. Heslington (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 947, 957, fn. 7 (Heslington).) If the defendant
shows deliberate misstatements or misstatements made with a
reckless disregard for the truth, those statements must be
excised from the warrant and probable cause must be reassessed.
(Ibid.)
       “The question facing a reviewing court asked to determine
whether probable cause supported the issuance of the warrant is
whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a
fair probability existed that a search would uncover wrongdoing.
[Citations.] ‘The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make
a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the
“veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ [Citation.]
In a pre-Proposition 8 case, we stated: ‘In determining the
sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance of a search warrant the
test of probable cause is approximately the same as that
applicable to an arrest without a warrant, . . . [citations], namely,
whether the facts contained in the affidavit are such as would
lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and
conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion of the guilt of the

                                 13
accused.’ [Citation.]” (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1040–
1041.) More specifically, “ ‘Probable cause sufficient for issuance
of a warrant requires a showing that makes it “ ‘substantially
probable that there is specific property lawfully subject to seizure
presently located in the particular place for which the warrant is
sought.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Clark (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 490, 496–
497 (Clark).) “ ‘The affidavit must set forth more than the “ ‘mere
conclusion’ ” of the affiant that the items sought are located on
the premises to be searched. [Citations.] The affidavit must
present the magistrate with facts indicating the circumstances
underlying the affiant's belief in order that the magistrate may
judge their persuasiveness for himself.’ ” (Id. at p. 497.) The
magistrate's determination of probable cause is entitled to
deferential review. (Kraft, at p. 1041.)
      A.    The Search Warrant Was Supported by Probable
            Cause
       A defendant moving to quash a warrant asserts the
warrant on its face lacks probable cause. (Heslington, supra,
195 Cal.App.4th at p. 957, fn. 7.) Thus, in reviewing the
sufficiency of the facts upon which the magistrate or judge based
his or her probable cause determination, “we consider only the
facts that appear within the ‘ “four corners of the warrant
affidavit.” ’ ” (Clark, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.)
       The trial court found that “the bottom line is there was
usage of these cards by a person who matched the description
and whose car matched the description of the defendant. And he
was surveilled [for] a time. And that all was discussed earlier in
terms of probable cause to arrest. [¶] But while there were
discrepancies, I think a fair reading of the affidavit established
probable cause.”

                                14
       Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding
probable cause for the warrant for essentially the same reason it
erred in finding probable cause to arrest: There was insufficient
evidence connecting him to the use of the Turnage ATM card.
Appellant also contends that there were insufficient facts stated
in the affidavit to identify him as the gas man who came to the
Turnage property on October 21, 2010.
       Although we agree with trial court that essentially the
same standard applies for probable cause for a warrant as it does
for an arrest, we consider probable cause for the warrant anew,
as the affidavit was prepared by Detective Duval and does not
include precisely the same information as Detective Hecht’s
testimony about probable cause to arrest. In brief, after listing
the dates and times for the relevant ATM transactions, the
affidavit states that “Investigators reviewed the video footage
recovered from the Shell gas station and the 7-11 store. They
noted that the person [us]ing the card was a male black with a
thin build and a thin moustache.” These are sufficient facts to
show that the male black suspect was using the Turnage ATM
card. The affidavit also notes that investigators “were also able
to see [the suspect] enter/exit a red car, which had a black primer
hood and right front fender.” The area around the Shell station
was placed under surveillance and later in the day, the suspect
was spotted entering a red car with a black hood and right front
fender. The surveillance team followed the car to 12653 South
Hoover Street; the suspect entered the residence through the
front door. When he exited the residence about 20 minutes later,
he was arrested and identified as appellant. This is sufficient
evidence to show that the person in the videos was appellant.

                                15
      These facts, together with information in the affidavit that
other credit/debit cards and jewelry were missing from the
Turnage residence, were sufficient to make it “ ‘substantially
probable that there is specific property lawfully subject to seizure
presently located in’ ” appellant’s residence. (Clark, supra,
230 Cal.App.4th at p. 496.) Specifically, appellant’s use of the
Turnage ATM card shows his conscious possession of it, and the
use of the card the morning after the robbery supports an
inference that he stole the card from the Turnages. (Grimes,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 731.)8 This inference is slightly
strengthened by appellant’s generally similar appearance to the
gas man seen at the Turnage residence on the day of the robbery-
murder. This is weak evidence, as the description of the gas man
was very general, but it does have some slight corroborative
value.9 Since other property was apparently taken during the
robbery, it was substantially probable that other property would
be found at appellant’s residence.

8      This evidence alone would, if believed by a jury, be
sufficient evidence to support a conviction for theft. If considered
with the evidence that cards were taken from the Turnage home
while the Turnages were present and restrained, it would
support a conviction for robbery.
9     It might have been possible, as appellant suggests, for
investigators to do more to connect appellant to the gas man,
such as showing a photograph of appellant to the Turnage tenant
who described the gas man. But, given the evidence that
appellant used the Turnage ATM card, it was not necessary,
particularly given the time constraints of the investigation and
the low quality of the still photos produced from the video.
Probable cause does not require evidence sufficient to convict the
suspect. (Fischer, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 446.)

                                 16
       We cannot agree with appellant that probable cause was
lacking because the information about the times and places of the
uses of the Turnage ATM card was “conclusory.” Appellant bases
this characterization on the fact that Detective Duval did not
speak directly to McCormick, did not know her title or position at
Bank of the West, and did not know the “mechanism” by which
McCormick was able to determine the time and location of the
Turnage ATM card usage.
       In general, hearsay may be relied upon in seeking a search
warrant. (People v. French (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1317.)
Further, officers can make arrests based on information and
probable cause furnished by other officers. (People v. Ramirez
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1553.) The record shows that
Detective Hecht spoke with McCormick.
       We do not find conclusory the statement referring to the
times and places of the Turnage ATM card usage. A conclusory
statement, in this context, would be a bare statement that the
card was used or that the card was used at the particular places
and times given, but without any indication of the source of the
information at all. The affidavit begins by stating the source of
the information was Hayley McCormick “from” Bank of the West;
this statement is reasonably understood to indicate she is an
employee of the bank. In context, the affidavit is reasonably
understood as indicating that McCormick lawfully accessed the
Turnage ATM card usage information through her employer.
Read as a whole, the statement on the next page of the affidavit
that investigators “were advised that [the] card was used at the
following ATM’s” is reasonably understood as meaning that the
investigators were advised by McCormick.

                               17
       We do not see the significance of stating McCormick’s exact
title or position at Bank of the West, or the exact “mechanism”
used by McCormick to determine the Turnage ATM card usage.
McCormick’s phone number was provided in the affidavit if the
magistrate wanted to verify her existence or had questions about
Bank of the West’s records. But generally, more details about
McCormick or the computer software or hardware she used would
have no meaning to a person who was not a Bank of the West
employee or a specialist in banking software or hardware.10
      B.    The Statements in the Affidavit Were Not Made with
            Knowledge of Falsity or Reckless Disregard for the
            Truth
        A motion to traverse requires the defendant to show that:
“(1) the affidavit contained ‘a false statement made “knowingly
and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth;” and
(2) “the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
probable cause.” ’ ” (Heslington, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 957,
fn. 7.)
        In deciding such a motion, a trial court must first decide if
the affidavit contains deliberately false statements or statements
made in reckless disregard for the truth. If so, the statements
must be excised and the affidavit retested for probable cause.
This rule applies to omissions as well as affirmative statements.
Mere negligence is not enough. Put differently, we do not excise
inaccurate statements which are the result of negligence.

10    Given the short time period involved, it is virtually certain
McCormick accessed Bank of the West’s electronic/computer
records for the Turnage account and saw the transactions.

                                 18
       Appellant contends that the statements about his card
usage are inaccurate, and the trial court erred in denying his
motion to traverse the warrant. The trial court ruled: “I . . . don’t
find that there was a reckless disregard for the truth. There was
a lot of information being transferred among officers on a very
immediate basis. And while that doesn’t excuse [lack of]
attention to detail, I just don’t find that there was recklessness
here.” We defer to this finding if supported by substantial
evidence.
       “ ‘[When] the Fourth Amendment demands a factual
showing sufficient to comprise “probable cause,” the obvious
assumption is that there will be a truthful showing’ (emphasis in
original). This does not mean ‘truthful’ in the sense that every
fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, for
probable cause may be founded upon hearsay and upon
information received from informants, as well as upon
information within the affiant’s own knowledge that sometimes
must be garnered hastily. But surely it is to be ‘truthful’ in the
sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately
accepted by the affiant as true.” (Franks v. Delaware (1978)
438 U.S. 154, 164–165 (Franks).) Thus, it is not enough for a
defendant to simply show a discrepancy between the actual facts
and the facts given in the affidavit. (People v. Costello (1988)
204 Cal.App.3d 431, 442.)
       Appellant contends the phrase “investigators responded to
these locations . . . and obtained video footage from the ATM’s”
indicates that the actual transactions involving the Turnage card
could be observed in each of the videos for the October 21 and 22,

                                 19
2010 transactions.11 We agree in part. This phrase could be
understood as suggesting that the Shell station and 7-11 videos
showed appellant actually using the Turnage card, when
considered with the later statement that “[i]nvestigators
reviewed the video footage recovered from the Shell gas station
and the 7-11 store. They noted that the person [us]ing the card
was a male black with a thin build and a thin moustache.”12
       Appellant also claims there is a misleading omission in the
affidavit because it does not specify that the Shell station video
times do not precisely match the Bank of the West times for the
Shell station ATM transactions. We agree that this information
is not included in the affidavit.
       Essentially, appellant’s argument was that Detective Duval
displayed reckless disregard for the truth because he made
statements about the contents of the surveillance videos when he
had not actually viewed those videos. Detective Duval recalled
that he relied on other officers’ accounts of the videos’ contents,

11    The affidavit states: “the [victim’s] debit card had been
used at ‘R&F Liquor Store,’ . . . on October 21, 2010 at 1617
hours. It had also been used at the ‘Shell Gas Station,’ located at
854 West El Segundo Boulevard . . . on October 22, 2010, at 1025
hours, and at the ‘7-11’ store located at 861 West Rosecrans
Avenue . . . on October 22, 2010, at 1036 hours. Investigators
responded to those locations [and] obtained the video footage
from the ATM’s.”
12    We do not find that the affidavit can reasonably be
understood as indicating that appellant was directly shown using
the ATM in the videos from R&F Liquor, the ARCO station or
J&S Liquor. The affidavit does not state that investigators
viewed the video from the R&F Liquor ATM, or that they viewed
any video from the ARCO or J&S Liquor.

                                20
but he did not recall which officers. Detective Duval believed
that the officers were the ones who were tasked with obtaining
and viewing the video. Detective Hecht confirmed that the
information in the affidavit “pretty much all” came from him as
the lead investigator, and that he had viewed the videos.
       It was permissible for Detective Duval to rely on another
officer’s investigation, including viewing the videos, and on
hearsay. Thus, Detective Duval’s failure to view the video does
not show reckless disregard for the truth.
       As to Detective Hecht’s statements, appellant relied on the
fact of the inaccuracies to show reckless disregard for the truth.
Appellant did not point to any specific evidence of Detective
Hecht’s behavior that showed the inaccuracies and the omission
were the product of reckless disregard. He simply argued that
Detective Hecht had a responsibility to be accurate, or as
accurate as possible. More is required.
       We note that the investigation into the Turnage robbery-
murder was large and fast moving. Different teams handled
different aspects of the investigation. Detective Hecht had the
task of viewing the videos. His first viewing took place the
morning of October 23, 2010 and by the evening of October 23
appellant had been arrested. It was at this point that the search
warrant needed to be prepared. Detective Hecht assigned the
task of writing the affidavit to Detective Duval, an experienced
officer who was part of the investigation. Detective Hecht and
his partner met with Detective Duval and his partner to convey
the information about the video content. Nothing about this
process suggests a reckless disregard for the truth.
       Further, Detective Hecht had not slept the night before,
and fatigue, coupled with the stress of a fast-paced investigation,

                                21
provide the most likely explanation for the inaccuracies about the
videos. At most, this would be negligence.
       We recognize that the record in this case is itself full of
discrepancies which make it hard to assess what happened
concerning the transmission of information for the affidavit. As
the trial court discussed at length: “I think everybody can agree
that the testimony that was taken during the hearings had some
discrepancies internally in terms of what officers testified to,
what they later recalled after being refreshed, what was in the
affidavit . . . . [¶] How much of it was based on lack of
recollection, how much of it was based on surmising, how much of
it was based on what one hoped would have been there, I mean it
runs the gamut in terms of bases for the discrepancies. [¶] But I
don’t think anybody can say there weren’t discrepancies in what
each officer testified to himself, what officers testified to in
relation to each other, and what ultimately the pieces of evidence
that were displayed showed. That I think is clear. [¶] . . . [¶] And
it was exacerbated, I think, by the fact that there were multiple
days, multiple images, and it all happened a while ago, that is
like seven or eight years ago. So I mean, I think all of that
contributed to—to some of the discrepancies in the testimony
itself. I know at times I had a hard time keeping track of which
event was being discussed.”
       Given the state of the record, we note that even if we
assumed for the sake of argument that Detective Hecht had acted
with reckless disregard for the truth, we would not find that
appellant would prevail on his motion. When a defendant has
shown reckless disregard, we correct the affidavit and then retest
it to determine whether it supports probable cause. (Franks,
supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 171–172; People v. Eubanks (2011) 53

                                22
Cal.4th 110, 136.) Under that analysis, we would strike the
phrase “from the ATM’s” from the affidavit so that it simply
reads “Investigators responded to those locations [and] obtained
the video footage.” We would change the next challenged
sentence to read: “They noted that the 7-11 and Shell station
videos showed a male black with a thin build and a thin
mustache, but only the Shell station videos directly showed the
male using the card.”13 We would also correct the statement
about investigators seeing the distinctive red car to clarify where
it was seen by investigators: at the Shell station, R&F Liquor,
and the ARCO station, but not at the 7-11. Finally, we would add
the specific times provided by Bank of the West for the
transactions and the times shown on the Shell station videos.
      We find this corrected version sufficient to show probable
cause that appellant was the person using the Turnage ATM
card. The time differences are minor. Further, appellant used
the same Shell station ATM within minutes of the Bank of the
West time two days in a row. While the corrected affidavit no
longer states that the 7-11 video directly shows appellant using
the ATM or exiting/entering the distinctive red car, the corrected
affidavit still places appellant at R&F Liquor and the ARCO
station (through the presence of his distinctive red car) and at the
7-11 store, all near the time that the Turnage ATM card was
used at those locations. Coupled with the strong evidence
provided by the Shell station videos, this is sufficient to show

13    Arguably, to make the statement entirely accurate, it
would be changed to read: “All the videos show the presence of a
think black male with a thin build and a thin mustache, but only
the Shell station videos directly show him using the card.”

                                23
probable cause to believe that appellant was the person using the
Turnage ATM card. Thus, the warrant remains valid.
      C.    The Warrant Satisfied the Particularity Requirement
       Both the United States and California Constitutions
require a search warrant to provide a “particular” description of
the property to be seized. (People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th
1104, 1132 (Robinson).) “The purpose of the ‘particularity’
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is to avoid general and
exploratory searches by requiring a particular description of the
items to be seized.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229,
1296 (Bradford).) Put differently, “a search warrant must
describe items to be seized with particularity sufficient to prevent
a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.”
(Robinson, at p. 1133.)
       “In the context of the Fourth Amendment, ‘ “[p]articularity
is the requirement that the warrant must clearly state what is
sought.” ’ ” (Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) A warrant
“ ‘need only be reasonably specific’ [citation], and ‘the specificity
required “varies depending on the circumstances of the case and
the type of items involved.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “The requirement of
reasonable particularity ‘is a flexible concept, reflecting the
degree of detail available from the facts known to the affiant and
presented to the issuing magistrate.’ ” (Ibid.)
       “ ‘Whether the description in the warrant of the property to
be seized is sufficiently definite is a question of law on which an
appellate court makes an independent judgment.’ ” (People v.
Tockgo (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 635, 640.)
       Appellant contends the description of the property in the
warrant was so deficient that it essentially authorized a general
search. We cannot agree.

                                 24
      The property to be seized is listed in Attachment B to the
warrant: “Any credit/debit cards in the name of Victim Leamon
C. Turnage, or Victim Robyn Turnage, or identification in the
victim’s names, or the previous that is not in the name of anyone
else not residing at the location. Any jewelry that can be shown
to the victim’s family for identification at a later date. Any items
that can be used for binding purposes such as electrical tape, duct
tape, packaging or shipping tape, rope, cord or string. Two oral
saliva samples from the interior of John Ewell’s mouth.”
      There was no need to specify the precise credit/debit cards
by the issuing financial institution believed to have been stolen
from the Turnages. Any such card in their name found at
appellant’s residence would be the proceeds of the robbery and
subject to seizure. The same is true for identification in the
Turnages’ names.
      Under the circumstances, the officers had no ability to be
more specific in describing the jewelry stolen from the Turnages.
Assuming the Turnage children could have looked at the house
and determined which exact jewelry items were missing, as
appellant contends, the children lived in Florida; the daughter (or
daughter-in-law) had just had a baby and so could not easily
travel. Thus, it was reasonable to seize any jewelry until it could
be determined what precisely had been taken from the Turnage
residence.
      Similarly, under the circumstances of the investigation and
the facts known to the officer, the inclusion of items not visible on
the Turnage bodies in the list of items that could be used for
binding, such as “duct tape, packaging or shipping tape” was not
overly broad. At the time of the search, it was known through
observation of the bodies that electrical tape was used to bind the

                                 25
Turnages, as were certain cords. The search took place about
24 hours after the bodies were found, however, and it is unlikely
that all the binding materials on the bodies had been fully
analyzed. Thus, other forms of tape might have been used and it
was reasonable to include those forms the items to be seized. We
do agree that any credit/debit cards or identification cards in the
names of anyone not residing at the residence was broad, and
that there was no specific evidence that appellant had robbed
anyone other than the Turnages. At the same time, such items
would have an apparently incriminating character, and would be
seizable under the plain view doctrine. Thus, the inclusion of
this category of items was generally unnecessary. We note that
even if the category should have been included, it would not
render the warrant facially deficient, or invalidate the warrant as
a whole. (See Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1292–1293;
People v. Joubert (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 946, 952.)
      D.    The Scope of the Search Warrant Was Not Knowingly
            Violated
       It is undisputed that at least three items seized from
appellant’s residence and multiple items seized from appellant’s
car fell outside the scope of the search warrant as written.
Appellant focuses primarily on the day planner seized during the
residential search which contained the address of the Morcos
murder. For reasons that are not clear from the record, the trial
court and counsel treated this item as if it were evidence of
appellant’s dominion and control of the residence. This created a
problem because Attachment B makes no reference to items
showing appellant’s dominion and control over the residence.

                                26
       A dominion and control provision is very common in search
warrants. (See, e.g., People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200,
206 [provision is “a standard feature in search warrant
practice”].) There is no reason to believe the magistrate would
have rejected the warrant in this case if it had included such a
provision, or asked that the provision be stricken. Detective
Duval testified he normally included such a provision in the list
of property to be seized, and in hindsight believed he had
inadvertently omitted it from this warrant because he was
working from a different station and did not have access to the
templates he normally used. The trial court found this testimony
credible and we agree.
       The fact remains that the provision is not in the warrant.
None of the officers who participated in the search, with one
possible exception, received or read a copy of the search warrant
or affidavit. Sergeant Chris Cognac testified he had “read the
fact that it had been signed by a judge and that we were
searching for documents pertaining to the crime.” He later added
he was told to look for items that would link appellant to the
residence being searched. All the other officers also believed they
had been told verbally to search for documents showing
appellant’s control over the residence, but none could remember
the specific individual who made that statement.
       Trial counsel and the trial court then analyzed this
omission as one involving good faith reliance on an oral
representation of the warrant’s contents and analyzed this issue
under the framework of United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897
(Leon). We agree with appellant that the specific application of
the “good faith” rule found in Leon is not directly applicable to
this case. (Ibid).

                                27
       Under Leon, the good faith exception applies when a law
enforcement officer relies on a warrant issued by a neutral
magistrate which is facially valid but is later determined by a
court to lack probable cause. (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 901.)
The officer’s reliance on the warrant must be objectively
reasonable. For example, the affidavit must not be so devoid of
indicia of probable cause that an officer’s belief in the existence
probable cause would be unreasonable. The mistake considered
in Leon was one by a magistrate, and so the Leon analysis does
not apply directly to reliance on mistaken statements of probable
cause made by law enforcement officers.
       We also agree with respondent’s contention on appeal that
the “good faith” rule first articulated in Leon “was never intended
to be restricted to [the] specific circumstances” of Leon. Rather,
Leon was only one fact-specific application of the cost-benefit
analysis that is the core of the exclusionary rule. (See Davis v.
United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 238 [“The basic insight of the
Leon [good faith] line of cases is that the deterrence benefits of
exclusion ‘var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement
conduct’ at issue”].)
       We further agree with respondent that the “good faith” rule
has been expanded since Leon, to cases other than those
involving facially valid search warrants which are subsequently
invalidated. But, under this line of cases, the source of the
mistake still matters. It was not until its decision in Herring v.
U.S. (2009) 555 U.S. 135 (Herring) that the Supreme Court
applied the rule to an officer’s reliance on a mistake by other law
enforcement personnel. In that case, two different law
enforcement agencies were involved, one for Coffee County and
one for Dale County. (Ibid.) This case similarly involves two

                                28
different law enforcement agencies: LASD and HPD.14 The
record is clear that LASD prepared the search warrant
application, based on evidence LASD had developed, and
submitted the application to a magistrate; the record strongly
indicates that HPD officers performed the actual search of the
residence. Herring requires that we look at the conduct of all the
officers involved.
       The HPD officers’ reliance on LASD’s statement that the
search warrant prepared by LASD included a dominion and
control category, was objectively reasonable and in good faith. As
we have discussed, this is an extremely common, virtually
routine, category for residential search warrants. There was no
reason for HPD officers to doubt its presence, or even to seek to
confirm that presence by requesting a copy of the warrant.
       The second part of this analysis, the conduct of LASD
personnel, is less straightforward because the record is less clear
on LASD conduct. First, it is not clear which LASD officer told
the HPD personnel about the content of the warrant. Detective
Duval appears to have been at a nearby LASD station when the
magistrate faxed back the approved warrant, and then began
driving to the South Hoover residence. Detective Duval said he
called officers at the residence and told them he had a signed
search warrant and was en route. According to Detective Duval,
that would normally be when search assignments were given. It

14    The two agencies were, to a degree, working together.
Thus, the attenuation present in Herring is not present here. As
the California Supreme Court has pointed out, “the Supreme
Court's general holding [in Herring] regarding what conduct
triggers the exclusionary rule does not focus on the issue of
attenuation.” (Robinson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp.1125–1126.)

                                29
is reasonable to infer that this is when the mistake occurred, that
is, Detective Duval did not attempt to read the warrant aloud
while en route, but relied on his (mistaken) memory of preparing
the warrant application.15 When Detective Duval arrived at the
Hoover residence, he may have simply repeated the mistake he
made in the car, now engrained in his memory. We do not
condone Detective Duval’s failure to read the warrant as
approved (or perhaps to read it carefully), but under the
circumstances of this case, it is at most negligence. Not only was
the omitted category a common one which was a part of Detective
Duval’s normal search warrant template, but inclusion of the
category only resulted in the seizure of two documents showing
appellant’s dominion and control of the residence: two letters
addressed to appellant at the South Hoover address. Thus, there
is no basis to conclude that Detective Duval deliberately inserted
this category into the search warrant for some nefarious reason.
       The record also indicates that the omission was the product
of an unusual circumstance which was not likely to recur.
Detective Duval prepared the warrant application at a station
where he did not normally work, and where he had difficulty
accessing templates. Thus, there would be no significant
deterrent effect from excluding any evidence found that fell into
the omitted category.
       We note that the dominion and control category only
appears to apply to two pieces of mail addressed to appellant at

15    We note we cannot rule out an incomplete reading of the
warrant, that is, that Detective Duval glanced at Attachment B,
recognized the first line of the text he had written, which was
specific to the Turnage robbery-murders and did not read further.
This would not change our conclusion.

                                30
the South Hoover address. The item most discussed in the trial
court in connection with the good faith rule does not, on the
record before us, show appellant’s dominion and control over the
South Hoover residence. There is nothing to indicate that the
day planner displayed the Hoover address, or even information
about the Hoover address which might support an inference of
dominion and control.16 Rather, good faith reliance on the
dominion and control category was used primarily to justify the
decision to open the day planner. As we explain below, officers
were permitted to look inside the day planner under the search
warrant as written, that is, without the dominion and control
category.
         1.     The Residence Search Through Discovery of the
                Day Planner
      A number of items outside the scope of the search warrant
were recovered in the residence search. Of most concern to
appellant is the Morcos address found in the day planner. The
CVS receipt and the paper with addresses of coin collectors, found
by Sergeant Cognac, were also the subject of testimony at the
hearing, although primarily to support the argument that the
search turned into a general search for evidence related to the
Morcos murder.
      We agree with the trial court that it is appropriate to
analyze the house search under the plain view doctrine. “The
plain-view doctrine permits, in the course of a search authorized
by a search warrant, the seizure of an item not listed in the

16     The same is true for the CVS receipt and the foreign coin
collectors’ addresses, the other items recovered in the residential
search which were also discussed at length in the trial court.

                                31
warrant, if the police lawfully are in a position from which they
view the item, if its incriminating character is immediately
apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the
object. (Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 135–137 [110
S.Ct. 2301, 2307–2308, 110 L.Ed.2d 112]; Texas v. Brown (1983)
460 U.S. 730, 739 [103 S.Ct. 1535, 1541–1542, 75 L.Ed.2d 502]
(plur. opn.); see Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 374–
375 [113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136–2137, 124 L.Ed.2d 334].) In such
circumstances, the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in
plain view is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, even if
the discovery of the evidence is not inadvertent. (Horton v.
California, supra, 496 U.S. 128, 130 [110 S.Ct. 2301, 2304].)”
(Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1293–1294.)
       We begin with the second part of the doctrine first. As the
U.S. Supreme Court has explained, the doctrine does not require
inadvertence because “evenhanded law enforcement is best
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct,
rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of
mind of the officer. The fact that an officer is interested in an
item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a
search should not invalidate its seizure if the search is confined
in area and duration by the terms of a warrant.” (Horton, v.
California, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 138 (Horton).) Thus, if an officer
“has a valid warrant to search for one item and merely a
suspicion concerning the second, whether or not it amounts to
probable cause, we fail to see why that suspicion should
immunize the second item from seizure if it is found during a
lawful search for the first.’’ (Id. at p. 139.) Put differently, the
officers’ interest in evidence relating to the Morcos murder, if
any, would not alone bar application of the plain view doctrine.

                                32
       Here, the warrant authorized the officers to search for
credit/debit cards, identification cards, and jewelry, and so they
could look anywhere such items might be found. All the items
seized in this case were found in locations where cards and
jewelry might be found, or in plain view on a piece of furniture.17
Specifically, a card could be concealed inside a day planner of the
sort recovered here. Thus, officers were permitted to look inside
the day planner to see if any cards were present. We note that
the photograph of the page with the Morcos address on it, as
shown in the record on appeal shows several smaller scraps of
paper resting on or attached to the page opposite the page with
the address; the added thickness of the paper would make this
natural place to open the day planner if one was searching for a
concealed credit card. Testimony of some of the officers at the
scene indicates it was also the first page of the day planner,
which would also be a natural place to look for hidden items.
       The second part of the plain view doctrine requires that the
“incriminating character” of the seized item be “immediately
apparent.” (Horton, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 136.) The trial court
found that the officers “came across items that they had probable
cause to believe were related to another crime.” Appellant
contends there is nothing obviously incriminating about the
address in the day planner, but does not specifically discuss the
writing on its first page.18

17    In three instances, a bag or box containing the items was
also seized.
18     Appellant does not argue that the CVS receipt and coin
collector addresses were not incriminating, only that they were
not incriminating as to the Turnage murders. He appears to
focus on these two items as the beginning of what he

                                33
       In this context, “probable cause is a flexible, common-sense
standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer
would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,’
[citation], that certain items may be contraband or stolen
property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than
false. A ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating
evidence is involved is all that is required.” (Brown, supra,
460 U.S. at p. 742.) The items need not be “associated with a
particular crime as a prerequisite to their seizure; . . . it is
sufficient that the investigators have probable cause to believe
the item is evidence of some crime.” (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at
p. 1043.)
       Sergeant Cognac did not describe his initial reaction to the
day planner in detail, but did say that he thought it was “odd”
that there was someone else’s address in the day planner. His
testimony that he then “ran” the address supports an inference
that upon first seeing the page, he believed that it might be
useful evidence of some crime. Although not articulated by
Sergeant Cognac, the relevant page of the day planner does not
merely include an address without an identifying name attached,
which is somewhat odd. More significantly, the page also
displays the words “Stealing” and “Prison.” A person of
reasonable caution would be warranted in the belief that the day
planner would be useful evidence of some crime, and so its
seizure was proper.

characterizes as an expanded and tainted search for evidence
connecting him to the Morcos murder. Accordingly, we do not
discuss the incriminating character of these items. We consider
appellant’s other claims below.

                                 34
       Assuming for the sake of argument that Sergeant Cognac
did actually “run” the address and that running the address
would constitute an investigation, that does not retroactively
negate the facially apparent incriminating value of the page, or
the inference that Sergeant Cognac initially recognized it as
useful evidence of some crime.
       Although not necessary to our conclusion on this claim, we
note that substantial evidence supports finding that Sergeant
Cognac in fact learned of the significance of the address from his
fellow HPD officers. According to HPD Detective Bradley
Jackson, Sergeant Cognac found the day planner inside a bag and
showed the address to Detective Jackson and HPD Detective
Vincent Arias. They recognized it as the Morcos address. HPD
Lieutenant Gary Tomatani testified that his best recollection was
that he was shown the day planner by Sergeant Cognac, and he
immediately recognized the address as the Morcos address. This
would be odd behavior for someone who already knew the
significance of the address. More generally, Detective Duval
testified that HPD officers who were present for the search
recognized the address as the Morcos address and advised him of
that.
       If this were the case, simply showing an item to fellow
officers would not constitute an investigation that would bar
application of the plain view doctrine, regardless of the
motivation for doing so. That is especially true here, where the
procedure for the search involved the searching officers
contacting one of the supervising officers and showing them an
item potentially subject to seizure. The procedure then called for
one of the supervising officers to recover the item, if appropriate,
simplifying the chain of custody. Specifically, the testimony

                                35
indicated that although Cognac may have first located the day
planner, it was ultimately “recovered” by Sergeant Garcia.
         2.    Searches after Discovery of the Day Planner
       As mentioned above, after Sergeant Cognac found the day
planner, he also recovered two items which appellant
characterizes as related to the Morcos murder: the CVS receipt
and the list of coin collectors’ addresses. Law enforcement
officers searched appellant’s impounded red car on October 24,
October 27 and October 29, 2010 and ultimately seized a
significant number of items. Appellant moved to suppress all
seized items, but only discussed in depth the CVS receipt and the
coin collectors’ addresses recovered by Cognac during the house
search and the blue coin purse with foreign coins and the black
briefcase with documents, seized by Detective Hecht from the car
on October 24. He characterizes these four items as related to
the Morcos murder.
       On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress all items related to the Morcos
murder seized after the Morcos address was found in the day
planner, because those items are fruits of the poisonous tree and
should have been excluded for that reason. (Wong Sun v. United
States (1963) 371 U.S. 471.) Put differently, appellant contends
that the discovery of the Morcos address was the “catalyst
following which the search of the home expanded into a far
broader search for items relating to the Morcos homicide”
including the subsequent searches of the car and seizures of
items within on October 24 and 27, 2010. Appellant contends
that the search was further broadened on October 29 into a
seizure of every item in the car that might possibly be related to
any other crime.

                                36
       The short answer to appellant’s argument is that we have
found the day planner was properly seized, as set forth above.
Thus, there is no poisonous tree.
       We recognize appellant also believes both that the search
was expanded or broadened after the discovery of the day
planner, and that this was improper.
       We do not agree that the search was “expanded” into a
“broader” search. During the search of the residence, Cognac did
recover two items which appellant contends are linked to the
Morcos murder, but there is no evidence that he made a special
effort to look for such items. When asked if he believed that he
could search for other evidence relating to the Morcos murder
after finding the address in the day planner, Sergeant Cognac
replied: “Search for things in the search warrant. If they led to
another homicide, then they led to another homicide.” Detective
Duval acknowledged that after the Morcos address was
discovered, a number of HPD officers mentioned that the murder
involved the theft of foreign coins, and so the officers searching
the residence were “also” going to be looking for foreign coins. We
see nothing improper about this, particularly since coins would be
found in the same size spaces where jewelry would be found, and
the warrant specifically authorized a search for jewelry. No coins
were in fact recovered from the residence on October 23, 2010.
       Turning to the car searches, we see no significance in LASD
Sergeant MacArthur, an investigator on the Morcos murder,
accompanying Detective Hecht to the vehicle search on October
24, 2010. (See People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 167
[officers from another jurisdiction may accompany officers
conducting a search pursuant to a warrant without tainting the
evidence uncovered in the process, even when the accompanying

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officers lack probable cause for their own search warrant].)
Detective Hecht stated his belief that the coin purse and briefcase
recovered on that date were incriminating as to the Turnage
murders, but even if it turned out that they were in fact
incriminating as to the Morcos murders, Detective Hecht’s
seizure was permissible under the plain view doctrine.
       Detective Hecht recovered very few items from the car on
October 24, 2010, and he described the car as having “a lot of
items” in it.19 We see nothing improper about a continued search
of the car on October 29.20 The October 23, 2010 warrant was
still valid on that date. (§ 1534 [“A warrant executed within the
10-day period shall be deemed to have been timely executed and
no further showing of timeliness need be made”].)21 Detective
Hecht acknowledged that he was also looking for items that could
connect appellant to any other known homicides. As we have
discussed above, an officer is permitted to search for items for

19    Ultimately, detectives filled four boxes with items from the
car, which constituted only a majority of the items in the car, not
all.
20    The car was impounded, and multiple searches in such
situations are not uncommon. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court
(Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85 (Nasmeh).)
21     “As a general proposition, ‘ “[t]he Fourth Amendment does
not specify that search warrants contain expiration dates.” ’
[Citation.] ‘[C]ompleting a search shortly after the expiration of a
search warrant’—a time period governed in this state by section
1534—'does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and
cannot be the basis for suppressing evidence seized so long as
probable cause continues to exist, and the government does not
act in bad faith.’ ” (Nasmeh, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 99.)

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which he does not have probable cause as long as he is in a place
where he is entitled to be; he may seize the items if they have an
apparently incriminating character.
       Although Detective Duval’s reasons for searching the car on
October 27, 2010 are not clear, he was not present for the October
24 search and it would certainly be acceptable for him, as an
investigating officer in the Turnage murder case, to search the
car personally. Although Detective Duval did recover documents
related to the Morcos murder, it was permissible for him to
search for such items because he was in a place where he is
entitled to be and appellant does not dispute the incriminating
character of the items.
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                    STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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