Court Opinion

ID: 9848440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:19:44.902606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:18.035481
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
In Division 1 the majority rules that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to measure damages, in that purchase price when comple*865mented by age of the personal property and its condition when lost to plaintiff would provide an adequate basis for a determination of its fair market value. With that I agree. Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga. App. 328, 334 (147 SE2d 782) (1966); Cunningham v. Hodges, 150 Ga. App. 827 (1) (258 SE2d 631) (1979), and cases cited. “Ordinarily the measure of damages where property has been converted is its market value at the time of the conversion.” Park v. Swann, 20 Ga. App. 39 (3) (92 SE 398) (1917); Cooper v. Citizens Bank of Gainesville, 129 Ga. App. 261, 262 (3) (199 SE2d 369) (1973).
Appellants complain not only of the type of evidence, however, but also of the jury charge on this point, as they did repeatedly at trial. That is not ruled on here, although it is enumerated as error, and a ruling is called for as the case is reversed for retrial. OCGA § 5-6-34 (c).
The court gave the charge on measure of damages requested by plaintiff: “in dealing with common personal property, and that is things like clothing, household goods, et cetera, a jury shall be able to assess the actual cash value of the property when the witness or homeowner testifies to the purchase price or replacement cost of the property and its purchase date or date of acquisition.”
This was the only charge given on the subject of measurement of these damages. The charge recites the rule of evidence established in Braner v. Southern Trust Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 117, 121 (3) (335 SE2d 547) (1985) relating to proof of loss under an insurance police covering actual cash value, where the insurer complained that the insured proved only replacement cost. The Supreme Court fashioned a rule for homeowner fire loss cases involving destruction of personal property, departing from the general rule as to what is required as proof of damages to such personal property. It explained the variation as necessitated by practicalities. The rule, however, does not establish the measure of damages, only the type of proof acceptable. The contract established the measure.
This is not an insurance case, where the insurer defendant can (as done in Braner) use a depreciation formula to reduce the evidence of replacement cost to actual cash value, the ultimate measurement question in such cases. It is not even a contract case, but one where the plaintiff alleged the tort of conversion. Nor is it a case involving total destruction of the property and proof of its value. Finally, it is not one involving a long parade of small personal items the individual condition of which at time of loss would take an inordinate amount of testimony peripheral to the main issue, that of establishing loss. These are the practicalities which prompted the Supreme Court’s relaxation of the proof rule in a circumscribed class of cases.
The charge instructed the jury to set the damage at “actual cash value,” whereas the true measure is the fair market value. See Jones *866v. Spindel, 128 Ga. App. 88, 93 (2) (a) (196 SE2d 22) (1973); 122 Ga. App. 390, 393 (6) (177 SE2d 187) (1970). See generally Cobb & Eldridge, Ga. Law of Damages (2d ed.), §§ 36-30; 31A-1; 31A-2.
Decided February 2, 1988
Rehearing denied February 18, 1988
C. James Jessee, Jr., for appellants.
Michael E. McLaughlin, for appellee.
Secondly, it does not instruct when the measurement is to be applied, i.e., at the time of conversion because plaintiff did not seek, nor was there any evidence of, a higher value between conversion and trial, which would have allowed the latter. OCGA § 44-12-152.
Nor is there any basis for assessing depreciation in this case via testimony in lieu of condition of the property, as in the insurance case, or any instruction concerning the necessity of considering the condition of the property at purchase and at conversion.
The proper charge would be the general rule as referred to in Braner. It, rather than the special Braner evidentiary rule, should be given on retrial so that the jury may determine the recoverable damages as provided by law.