Court Opinion

ID: 9398275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 18:09:12.474654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.893060
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Bentley, 2023-Ohio-1792.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                      CASE NOS. 2022-L-076
CITY OF PAINESVILLE,                                          2022-L-080

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                    Criminal Appeals from the
        - vs -                                      Painesville Municipal Court

BRIAN E. BENTLEY,
                                                    Trial Court Nos. 2020 CRB 1832 A
                 Defendant-Appellant.                                2020 CRB 1832 B

                                              OPINION

                                         Decided: May 30, 2023
                                          Judgment: Affirmed

Joseph Hada, Madison Township Prosecutor, 1392 SOM Center Road, Mayfield
Heights, OH 44124 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Vanessa R. Clapp, Lake County Public Defender, and Melissa A. Blake, Assistant Public
Defender, 125 East Erie Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Defendant-Appellant).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant, Brian E. Bentley, appeals from his conviction for

Assault in the Painesville Municipal Court. For the following reasons, we affirm the

judgment of the lower court.

        {¶2}     On September 10, 2020, a Complaint was filed in the Painesville Municipal

Court, alleging that Bentley had committed Aggravated Trespass, a misdemeanor of the

first degree, in violation of R.C. 2911.211(A), and Assault, a misdemeanor of the first

degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A).
       {¶3}   On December 14, 2020, Bentley filed a Demand for Trial by Jury, the matter

was set and continued, and a bench trial was ultimately held.        At the conclusion of the

trial, the court stated “I don’t think [Bentley’s] at fault for the aggravated trespass because

I don’t think he went there initially to be an aggravated trespasser, but he’s certainly guilty

of the assault.” In a form Judgment Entry, the following, with certain language circled,

crossed out, or underlined, was included: “The defendant * * * entered a plea of guilty/no

contest: (was found guilty after (jury) trial) to the charges of: AGGR. TRESPASS M1

ASSAULT M1. The defendant is hereby found guilty of those charges. The remaining

charges are dismissed at the request of the State.”

       {¶4}   Bentley appealed and we held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to

conduct a bench trial since Bentley had filed a request for a jury trial and had not waived

that right. State v. Bentley, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2021-L-089 and 2021-L-090, 2022-Ohio-

1099, ¶ 13. We reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, observing that

Bentley has a right to a jury trial unless properly waived. Id. at ¶ 14.

       {¶5}   On remand, Bentley filed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial and the

matter proceeded to a bench trial. Prior to the trial, defense counsel argued that double

jeopardy barred retrial on the Aggravated Trespass charge since Bentley had already

been acquitted. The court determined it should retry this charge since its prior judgment

was void due to its lack of jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial. The following pertinent

testimony and evidence were presented at trial.

       {¶6}   On September 7, 2020, Officer Ryan Shannon of the Madison Township

Police Department responded to a call at the home of Shauna Adkins. Adkins was

“extremely upset” and described that there had been a disagreement between her

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children and a neighbor child, and a subsequent confrontation occurred in which the

child’s father, Bentley, assaulted her.    Shannon observed facial injuries to Adkins,

including redness and swelling to her left eye.

       {¶7}   Shannon spoke with Bentley, who indicated that Adkins had come to his

home to discuss the issue between their children and Bentley subsequently went to

Adkins’ house to talk with her further. He described that “she came charging out of the

back door with her hand raised leading him to believe that she was going to strike him.”

According to Shannon, Bentley first indicated that she tried to hit him and “he changed

that to she did hit him.” Shannon observed that Bentley had redness on his face and

injuries to his left hand. Sergeant Douglas Covert also made contact with Bentley who

was cooperative and indicated that he had acted in self-defense.

       {¶8}   Shauna Adkins testified that on the date of the incident, her son indicated

that he had been bullied by a neighbor child, Bentley’s son. She went to Bentley’s house

and told him and the child’s mother about the incident. They did not want to do anything

and “pretty much shut the door in [her] face.” On her walk home, she became aware of

a conflict between the same neighbor child and her older son.

       {¶9}   After Adkins returned home, Bentley came to her residence and knocked

on the door. She stepped outside, he began cursing at her, and stated that she sent her

son to beat up his child. He then punched her in the left eye with his right hand. Adkins

described the impact of the hit, stating: “At that point, the impact to my eye was so strong

it spun my body around, my head bounced off a rock, and I hit the ground.” Adkins

indicated that before Bentley hit her, she did not gesture at him, make aggressive

movements, or touch him. After she was hit, her brother, Shane, came out of the house,

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tackled Bentley, and the two began fighting. Bentley then left, she called the police, and

she was taken to the emergency room. She was treated for a concussion and lost central

vision in her left eye.

       {¶10} Patrolman Justin Dahl took photographs of Adkins’ injuries the day after the

incident. He described that her left eye was swollen with a bruise about the size of a golf

ball. Her forehead and back of her head were swollen and she had a contusion on her

eyelid. There were also bruises on her leg and elbow and a scratch on her wrist.

       {¶11} Brooke Spencer, Bentley’s girlfriend, lives with Bentley and their children.

She testified that on September 7, Adkins came to their door complaining about their

children “playing chicken on their bikes” and was being loud and aggressive. As Adkins

was walking away, she made a comment which Spencer believed meant Adkins was

going to have her child beat up Spencer and Bentley’s child. Spencer subsequently

discovered that her son had been “beat * * * up” by Adkins’ child. After she informed

Bentley of this incident, he went to Adkins’ home. According to Spencer, Adkins and

Bentley argued and Adkins began “backing him up to the car” in the driveway, she

punched him, and Bentley hit her back. The brother than rushed from the house, tackled

Bentley, and threatened him.

       {¶12} Bentley described the incident originating when Adkins came to their home

and was discussing with his girlfriend an incident between their sons. Adkins made a

comment about having her son take care of it. He later learned that his son had been

beaten up by Adkins’ son. He instructed his girlfriend and children to go to Adkins’ home

to call the police on her. He also went to her home and knocked on the door with no

response. He then approached the side of the house and she came out “angry and

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aggressive * * * with her hand up telling me that I wasn’t going to threaten with the police.”

She was pointing and cursing and then punched him in his left eye. He then hit her “one

time in self-defense.” He explained that she had been walking toward him so he had his

back up against a van and “had nowhere to go.” Pictures of redness on his face were

presented that he testified was caused by Adkins. After he returned the punch, her

brother tackled him and they got into a tussle.

       {¶13} The court found a lack of evidence that Bentley went on the property to

commit an offense for the purposes of an Aggravated Trespass conviction. It found him

guilty of Assault. It sentenced him to a term of 90 days in jail and 90 days of electronically

monitored house arrest. Bentley’s requests to stay the sentence were denied in the trial

court and this court.

       {¶14} Bentley timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error:

       {¶15} “[1.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant-appellant when it

denied his motion for acquittal made pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A).

       {¶16} “[2.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant-appellant when it

returned a verdict of guilty against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶17} “[3.] The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant-appellant when it

retried him on the offense of aggravated trespass after he had been previously found not

guilty of that offense in violation of the defendant’s protection against double jeopardy

and in violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the

Ohio Constitution.”

       {¶18} In his first and second assignments of error, Bentley argues that the lower

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court erred in denying his motion for acquittal and that his conviction for Assault was

against the weight of the evidence, raising questions as to the credibility of the victim and

whether he struck her in self-defense. We will address these assignments jointly as they

are interrelated.

       {¶19} “Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of

acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as

to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.” State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261, 381 N.E.2d 184 (1978), syllabus. “Thus,

when an appellant makes a Crim.R. 29 motion, he or she is challenging the sufficiency of

the evidence introduced by the state.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Hastings, 11th Dist.

Portage No. 2020-P-0014, 2021-Ohio-662, ¶ 23. In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d

259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

       {¶20} Whereas “sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy as to whether

the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, * * * weight of the

evidence addresses the evidence’s effect of inducing belief.” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio

St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380, 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). “[A] reviewing court asks whose evidence

is more persuasive—the state’s or the defendant’s?” Id. An appellate court must

consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences, the credibility of the

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witnesses, and whether, “in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must

be reversed and a new trial ordered.” (Citation omitted.) Thompkins at 387. “[A] finding

that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence necessarily must include a

finding of sufficiency.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Arcaro, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2012-

A-0028, 2013-Ohio-1842, ¶ 32.

       {¶21} To convict Bentley of Assault, the State was required to prove, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that he did “knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to

another * * *.” R.C. 2903.13(A).

       {¶22} In relation to the manifest weight, Bentley argues that there was a lack of

evidence to corroborate Adkins’ version of events and emphasizes that both he and his

girlfriend testified that Adkins hit him first and he responded in self-defense.

       {¶23} “In cases involving the use of non-deadly force, the elements of a valid self-

defense claim are ‘the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation, and the

defendant had a genuine belief that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm.’” (Citation

omitted.) State v. Heald, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2021-L-111 and 2021-L-112, 2022-Ohio-

2282, ¶ 21. “If, at the trial of a person who is accused of an offense that involved the

person’s use of force against another, there is evidence presented that tends to support

that the accused person used the force in self-defense * * *, the prosecution must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense.”

R.C. 2901.05(B)(1).

       {¶24} Here, two opposing versions of events were established by the State and

the defense. Under the State’s version, Bentley was not threatened or assaulted and,

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thus, had no belief that he faced a danger of bodily harm while Bentley presented

testimony that he was punched first and struck Adkins in response. A determination of

whether Adkins was the aggressor and Bentley was merely acting to defend himself turns

upon an evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. Disputes in credibility for the

purposes of evaluating self-defense are best resolved by the trier of fact. It has been held

that “a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the trier of

fact believed the state’s version of events over the defendant’s version” and rejected the

defendant’s claim of self-defense. State v. Messenger, 2021-Ohio-2044, 174 N.E.3d 425,

¶ 49 (10th Dist.); State v. Wilk, 9th Dist. Medina No. 22CA0008-M, 2023-Ohio-112, ¶ 21

(when presented with conflicting testimony regarding whether the defendant was acting

in self-defense, “the jury was in the best position to assess the credibility of the testifying

witnesses”) (citation omitted); see State v. Thomas, 2019-Ohio-2795, 139 N.E.3d 1253,

¶ 43 (11th Dist.) (conflicting testimony about who pulled their weapon first raised a factual

dispute about self-defense hinging on credibility). In weighing the witness testimony

supporting a claim of self-defense, the trier of fact is “free to believe or disbelieve the

testimony of the witnesses” and “is in the best position to take into account

inconsistencies, along with the witnesses’ manner and demeanor, and determine whether

the witnesses’ testimony is credible.” State v. Haney, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-098,

2013-Ohio-2823, ¶ 43.

       {¶25} Here, a finding by the trier of fact that Adkins was truthful about the details

of the assault was not against the weight of the evidence. There is nothing inherently

lacking in credibility in Adkins’ testimony. Adkins suffered injuries serious enough that

she sought medical treatment, which were corroborated by police testimony. Officer

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Shannon observed that, when Bentley spoke with police, he first indicated Adkins “had

tried to hit him” but “he changed that to she did hit him.” This conveyed that Bentley was

inconsistent in his story of the events that took place. Further, although Bentley argued

that Adkins had ordered her son to beat up their child and was then assaulted by her,

Adkins was the one who sought police assistance. Such facts support a determination of

Adkins’ credibility. The fact that Bentley and his girlfriend both testified to his version of

events is not determinative: “[t]he mere number of witnesses, who may support a claim

of one or the other of the parties to an action, is not to be taken as a basis for resolving

disputed facts.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954).

       {¶26} Bentley argues that Adkins’ testimony about her injuries was discredited

because, although claimed to be serious, the prosecutor charged him only with

misdemeanor Assault. We decline to consider the prosecutor’s rationale for bringing

charges. This does not impact whether the State proved the Assault offense with which

he was charged. The testimony and evidence presented support a finding that his

conviction for Assault was supported by the weight of the evidence.

       {¶27} Bentley also argues that there was not sufficient evidence to demonstrate

that he was the aggressor. As we have found, the weight of the evidence supported a

finding that he was the aggressor and did not commit the acts in self-defense, this court

“need not engage in a separate analysis of sufficiency.” State v. Taylor, 2022-Ohio-3611,

198 N.E.3d 956, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.). We further note that, as Bentley’s arguments relate to

the credibility of the victim’s testimony, “an evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility * * * is

not proper on review for evidentiary sufficiency.” State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227,

2002-Ohio-2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 79.

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       {¶28} Finally, Bentley observes that “the trial court never actually found Mr.

Bentley guilty or that the state proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather,

stated, ‘I do find that there is enough evidence to find that he did assault [the

complainant].’” We do not find error relating to this issue. The court’s indication that there

was evidence to find Bentley committed the offense, coupled with its statement in the

Judgment Entry that he was found guilty of Assault, constituted a conviction. Bentley

points to no authority requiring the court to state that it found him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. We have no reason to question that the court made this finding under

the burden of proof required to convict Bentley as we “must presume that the trial court

applied the law correctly.” State v. Coombs, 18 Ohio St.3d 123, 125, 480 N.E.2d 414

(1985); see State v. Williams, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190380, 2020-Ohio-5245, ¶ 10

(“[i]n a bench trial, where the record contains no substantiation that the trial court applied

the wrong standard, we may presume regularity of the proceedings”).

       {¶29} The first and second assignments of error are without merit.

       {¶30} In his third assignment of error, Bentley argues that the court improperly

tried him for Aggravated Trespass in violation of principles of double jeopardy since he

had previously been acquitted of this offense.

       {¶31} “The double-jeopardy protections of the United States Constitution’s Fifth

Amendment, which is applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment

and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, prohibit multiple prosecutions for the

same offense.” State v. Mutter, 150 Ohio St.3d 429, 2017-Ohio-2928, 82 N.E.3d 1141, ¶

2. This includes “a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.” (Citation

omitted.) Id. at ¶ 15. “[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause affords the defendant who obtains

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a judgment of acquittal at the trial level absolute immunity from further prosecution for the

same offense.” (Citation omitted.) Girard v. Giordano, 155 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-

5024, 122 N.E.3d 151, ¶ 10. “A de novo standard of review is applied to the trial court’s

determination regarding the application of the double jeopardy clause.” State v. Miller,

2020-Ohio-3854, 156 N.E.3d 297, ¶ 56 (11th Dist.).

       {¶32} There is no question that Bentley was tried a second time for Aggravated

Trespass. Although the lower court had previously found that Bentley was not “at fault

for the aggravated trespass because I don’t think he went there initially to be an

aggravated trespasser,” i.e., there was not sufficient evidence of a required element of

the offense, it tried him for this offense a second time. The State contends, however, that

the doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply because the remand “negat[ed] the trial

court’s decision on both charges from the first trial.”

       {¶33} This court has found double jeopardy concerns are not implicated in certain

circumstances where a defendant was tried but the trial court lacked jurisdiction. State v.

Keim, 11th Dist. Trumbull Nos. 2020-T-0050, et al., 2021-Ohio-793, ¶ 13. In Keim, this

court found no error in denying a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy where the

trial of a defendant was commenced but the case was dismissed part-way through the

trial because the court realized it lacked jurisdiction. This analysis was based on the fact

that the judgments would be void and jeopardy could not attach where the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

       {¶34} In the present matter, however, this court reversed and remanded for a new

trial based on a lack of jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial due to the failure to obtain the

waiver of the right to a trial by jury. Bentley, 2022-Ohio-1099, at ¶ 13. Keim’s rationale

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is premised on the fact that a “plea of former jeopardy cannot be based on a void

judgment.” Keim at ¶ 10, citing Foran v. Maxwell, 173 Ohio St. 561, 184 N.E.2d 398

(1962). However, “[i]t is only when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction that its

judgment is void; lack of jurisdiction over the particular case merely renders the judgment

voidable.” (Citations omitted.) Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806

N.E.2d 992, ¶ 12; State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248,

¶ 26 (“when a specific action is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the

exercise of that jurisdiction renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void”). Jurisdiction

over the particular case “involves consideration of the rights of the parties” and connotes

“the court’s authority to proceed or rule on a case that is within the court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d

1040, ¶ 19.

       {¶35} It has been held that “any defect in failing to obtain a properly executed

written jury trial waiver is a defect in the trial court’s exercise of its jurisdiction and not a

lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance.” State v. Van Dyne, 5th Dist.

Guernsey No. 15CA26, 2016-Ohio-1476, ¶ 17. See also State v. Downs, 11th Dist.

Ashtabula No. 2004-A-0084, 2005-Ohio-4646, ¶ 14 (where there was no waiver of the

right to a jury trial, “the county court’s exercise of jurisdiction was in error”). Here, the

issue was not whether the court had authority to hear the type of case, as it was the

correct court in which to proceed with the charges, but whether it had jurisdiction to hear

the matter in relation to the rights of the individual party, i.e., where Bentley did not waive

the right to a jury trial. Since the error made by the trial court in holding a bench trial

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without a proper waiver rendered its judgment voidable rather than void, the rationale in

Keim is not applicable here to preclude application of the principles of double jeopardy.

       {¶36} Presuming that the court erred in finding that it could retry the Aggravated

Trespass charge, we find no reversible error. Bentley concedes that, although improperly

tried, he was acquitted of Aggravated Trespass at the second trial.            He contends,

however, that by allowing the State of Ohio to introduce “inadmissible/irrelevant evidence”

on the charge of Aggravated Trespass at the retrial, “the entire proceeding was tainted

by evidence that the trial court should not have heard.” He requests that the conviction

for Assault be reversed due to presentation of such evidence.

       {¶37} To be convicted of Aggravated Trespass, it must be proven that the

defendant did “enter or remain on the land or premises of another with purpose to commit

on that land or those premises a misdemeanor, the elements of which involve causing

physical harm to another person or causing another person to believe that the offender

will cause physical harm to that person.” R.C. 2911.211(A)(1).

       {¶38} Here, the evidence of whether an assault occurred, relating to causing

physical harm to Adkins, was equally relevant to the charges of Assault and Aggravated

Trespass. Evidence relating to the acts of the assault would be admissible regardless of

whether Aggravated Trespass was tried. Bentley observes that evidence relating to his

“arrival at the complainant’s home, the duration of the visit, and how/when he exited were

irrelevant to the charge of Assault.” However, evidence relating to his activities in arriving

at the home and the activities he committed while there were intertwined with testimony

relating to his actions in the assault.      Describing the assault necessarily required

explaining his presence at the residence where the assault took place. Even if some

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testimony relating to his actions on the premises was not expressly relevant, its admission

is harmless as there is nothing in the record to indicate that it resulted in a conviction for

Assault, which stemmed from his actions in hitting Adkins. State v. Powell, 132 Ohio

St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 111 (finding harmless error since there

was “little chance” irrelevant testimony affected defendant’s convictions).

       {¶39} Bentley also argues that retrying him for Aggravated Trespass “forced both

him and defense counsel to strategize in a way to defend against both charges as

opposed to just the Assault.” It is unclear how being tried for both offenses impacted his

trial strategy. His defense was premised upon the fact that he acted in self-defense. Any

defense presented to the Assault charge necessarily constituted a defense for the

Aggravated Trespass since it addressed the element of “causing physical harm.” Bentley

presents no argument demonstrating how being tried solely for Assault would have

changed this strategy.

       {¶40} The third assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶41} For the foregoing reasons, Bentley’s conviction for Assault in the Painesville

Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

concur.

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