Court Opinion

ID: 9831742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:19:40.514797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.513087
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
By inadvertence, the opinion heretofore rendered in this case was numbered 5395, whereas it should have been numbered 5396.
[7] Counsel for appellants have presented an able and ingenious motion for rehearing, reviewing all the questions discussed in our original opinion, and in addition thereto assert that the court committed fundamental error in not reversing the judgment and dismissing the case, because they insist that it is apparent of record, from the judgments entered in said case in both the justice and county courts, that both the amount sued for at the time said action was begun, as well as the amount .recovered.therein, was in excess of $200, hence not within the original jurisdiction of the justice’s court, nor the appellate jurisdiction of the county court. The justice court judgment, in so far as it is deemed material to the point here involved, omitting formal parts, reads:
“That the court, after hearing the pleadings, evidence, and argument of counsel, took the case under advisement, * * * and, after fully considering the matters at issue, the court is of opinion that plaintiffs should have judgment as prayed for. It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that the plaintiffs W. B. Walker & Sons, a partnership composed of W. B. Walker, J. O. Walker, W. D. Walker, and T. B. Walker, do have and recover of and from T. J. Freeman, receiver of the International & Great Northern Railroad Company, the sum of $185.24, with interest from March 26, 1908, at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum, $10 attorney’s fees, and all costs of this suit, for which let execution issue.”
The county court judgment, omitting formal parts, after reciting that the case was tried before the court without a jury, proceeded, “Who, after having heard the pleadings, evidence, and argument of counsel thereon, and after considering the same, is of the opinion that the law is with the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the full amount sued for,” then rendered judgment against both Freeman, as receiver of the International & Great Northern Railroad Company, and the defendant the International & Great Northern Railroad Company, “for the sum of $185.24, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum from March 26, 1908, together with $10 additional for attorney’s fees, and for all costs of suit in this court and in the justice court, from -which the case was appealed.”
Counsel for appellants have also moved the court to grant a writ of certiorari to bring up the original citation issued in the justice court, a certified copy of which is attached to this motion, which we presume, of course, to be correct. If said judgments are to be regarded as controlling, then appellants’ contention would be correct, because where a suit is brought for damages, and interest is sought to be recovered from the time of the injury, then the authorities are to the effect that the interest becomes a part of the damages and may be so considered in determining the jurisdiction. See Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Rayzor, 172 S. W. 1103; Schulz v. Tessman, 92 Tex. 488, 49 S. W. 1031; Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Crenshaw, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 198, 112 S. W. 117; Ft. Worth & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 169 S. W. 1052. But we are of opinion that this matter should be determined, not alone by the judgment, but by an inspection of the whole record, and in so doing we should consider the plaintiffs’ claim lodged with the justice when the suit was filed, as well as the citations issued and the notation made by the justice on ids docket. The claim lodged with the justice shows that plaintiffs sued for $185.24, together with $10 as attorney’s fees, amounting to the sum of $195.24 in all; no interest being mentioned in said account. The citation issued by the justice, omitting formal parts, reads:
“You are hereby commanded to summon T. J. Freeman, receiver of the International & Great Northern Railroad Company, to be and appear before me at my office in Austin, Travis county, Tex., at the next regular term of said court on the last Monday in March, A. D. 1911, at 10 o’clock a. m., to answer to the complaint of-W. B., W. D., T. B., and J. C. Walker, under the firm name of W. B. Walker & Sons, in an action to recover of defendant the sum of $185.-24, as damages on shipment of molasses from Austin to San Marcos, 4/6/08, as per demand on file herein. Plaintiffs pray judgment for said amount, with legal interest, $10 attorney’s fees, and costs of suit,” etc.
Article 2322 of Vernon's Sayles’ Civil Statutes provides that, when a claim or demand is lodged with the justice of the peace for suit, it shall be his duty to issue forthwith a writ or citation for the defendant. *1137Tlie succeeding article provides, among other things, that such citation shall state the names of all the parties to the suit and the nature of the plaintiff’s demand (which, as we understand, embraces, among other things, the amount of the claim). It appears that the justice of the peace complied with the law in this respect, and issued his citation corresponding with the claim of plaintiff for $185.24, stating that the plaintiff prayed judgment for said amount, with legal interest and $10 attorney’s fees. Article'2326, Id., provides that the pleadings in justice court shall be oral, except where otherwise specially provided, but a brief statement thereof may be noted on the docket. The notation made by the justice merely shows that the suit was for $185.24, without stating interest or giving date of the claim.
It further appears from the record that, after pleas were filed showing that Thos. J. Freeman had been discharged as receiver by the federal court, plaintiff was granted leave in the county court to make the International & Great Northern Railway Company (the purchaser of the property from the receiver) a party defendant pending appeal. Thereupon citation was issued from' the county court against the International & Great Northern Railway Company, in which plaintiffs’ claim is recited to be a claim for damages for $185.24. Thereafter said company, through its counsel, filed a plea in abatement, which, after giving style and number of the case, reads as follows:
“And now comes the International & Great Northern Railway Company and says that it appears from the plaintiffs’ petition or demand herein that the cause of action, if any, upon which said company is cited to answer, and which is sought to be established against it, is less in amount than $200, and is therefore not within the jurisdiction of this court as to said company, either by virtue of the amount involved or by virtue of its not having been made a party defendant in the justice court and before appeal to this court, or both. Wherefore the said International & Great Northern Railway Company says that no judgment can be rendered against it in this proceeding, and prays judgment of the court that this suit abate as to said company, and that it go hence with its costs.”
Plaintiffs’ claim, as filed with the justice, was, we think, for an amount less than $200; the citation issued in the justice’s court was for $185.24 as damages to a shipment of syrup. The prayer was for judgment for said amount, with legal interest, $10 attorney’s fees, and costs. We think this citation, as well as that issued from the county court, affirmatively showed that the suit was for an amount within the jurisdiction of the justice’s court, and that the notation on the docket of said court is corroborative thereof. In Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Rayzor, supra, where an effort was made to defeat the jurisdiction of the county court on the ground that the plaintiff sought recovery for more than $1,000, where the allegations were that the suit was brought for $975, concluding with a prayer as follows:
“Wherefore plaintiff prays that the defendants be cited to answer this petition, and that on the trial hereof he have judgment for his said damages in the sum of $975, with legal interest thereon, for costs of suit, and for general relief”
■ — and where it appeared that the interest from the time of the injury, which was stated in the pleading, if added to. said amount* would exceed the jurisdiction of the county court, Mr. Justice Phillips, in discussing a similar question, in effect holds that where it affirmatively appears that plaintiff seeks interest as a part of the judgment, and not as; interest on the judgment, and the aggregate-amount of both exceeds the jurisdiction of the court, then such court would have no jurisdiction; hut where the allegation left it in doubt, as in the ease then under consideration, whether interest was sought as a part of the damages or as interest upon the-judgment, that such doubt should be resolved in favor of the jurisdiction of the court, cit■ing in support thereof Dwyer v. Bassett, 63 Tex. 274.
So it seemsi that if, from the whole record, we should conclude that the question of jurisdiction was doubtful, it would be our duty, under the case last cited, to hold in favor of such jurisdiction. But is this question doubtful ? It was not raised in the-justice’s court or county court, nor was it presented here in the briefs of appellants, but is now urged for the first time in the motion for rehearing. Counsel appearing here for-appellants likewise appeared in both of the lower courts for the receiver, as well as for the appellant company; and since they participated in such trials in the court below,, where they ..urged a plea in abatement, contending that the justice’s court did have jurisdiction of the amount in controversy, we are not prepared to disagree with them in this conclusion, and therefore overrule-the motion for rehearing.
Believing, however, that the court below erred in rendering judgment for interest from March 26, 1908, the same is now here so reformed as to render judgment for appellees for $185.24 and $10 attorney’s fees, together-with 6 per cent, interest on the whole amount,, from the 23d day of January, 1914, the date such judgment was rendered, and, as thus-reformed, said judgment will be affirmed; cost of appeal taxed against appellees.
Motion overruled.
On Second Motion for Rehearing by the-International & Great Northern Railway Company.
[8] A second motion for rehearing by the International & Great Northern Railway Company, appellant, has been filed, predicated chiefly on the contention that, since the judgments of both the justice and county courts were for amounts in excess of $200,. *1138said courts did not have jurisdiction, and therefore their judgments are void, and hence this court erred in reforming and affirming said judgment. This view, if maintained, leaves out of consideration what, in fact, may have been the amount in controversy, and gives controlling effect to the amounts as stated in the judgments themselves. We think the mere fact that such judgments were rendered for a greater amount than was in fact in issue will not have such effect, but that, in order to determine whether the court had jurisdiction, we must look to the entire record to ascertain what was the amount in controversy, irrespective of what amounts were 'recovered, as shown by the judgments themselves.
In 24 Cyc. 464, subd. 2, we find this language:
“As a general proposition, the amount claimed or in controversy in an action before a justice of the peace is the test by which his jurisdiction is to be determined.”
Again, on page 645 in the same work, it is said:
“In most of the states the amount actually claimed or in controversy, or the value of the property in dispute, is the criterion by which the jurisdiction of the appellate court is to be determined, irrespective of the verdict or judgment in the justice’s court” (italics ours)
—citing various cases in support of the text, among others Grooms v. Atascosa County, 29 S. W. 73; Horton v. McKeehan, 1 White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 465.
Our own Constitution and statute on this subject is that:
“The courts of justice of the peace shall, in addition to the powers and duties elsewhere provided for, have and exercise original jurisdiction in civil matters of all cases where the amount in controversy is $200 or less, exclusive of interest.” Vernon’s Sayles’ Civ. Stats, art. 2291; Constitution, art. 5, § 19.
Article 2391, Vernon’s Sayles’ Civ. Stats., provides that:
“Any party to a final judgment in a justice’s court may appeal therefrom to the county court where such judgment, or the amount in controversy, shall exceed $20 exclusive of costs, and in such other cases as may be expressly provided by law.”
The rule is elementary that the judgment must conform to and be controlled by the pleadings.' In the instant case, since it appears from the entire record that the amount claimed was within the jurisdiction of the justice’s court, the county: court had appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that tire judgment was for an amount greater than $200. If correct in our original holding that the claim filed with the justice, together with the citation and notation on the docket, showed that the suit, as originally filed in the justice’s court, was for $195, with a prayer for interest on the judgment from the time of its rendition, and not for interest as a part of the damages, then we think it is immaterial that the judgment, as entered in said court, was for more than $200, because the amount in controversy must have controlling effect. In Grooms v. Atascosa County, supra, it is held that, on appeal from the judgment in the justice’s court, the amount in controversy, and not the amount of the judgment rendered, determines the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
Believing that the amount in controversy in this case was less than $200, we hold that the justice’s court, as well as the county court, had jurisdiction of this case, notwithstanding the fact that the court rendered judgment for a greater amount; and therefore overrule the motion for rehearing.
Motion overruled.