Court Opinion

ID: 9405638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 21:00:44.783733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:23.120156
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4358

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        KEVIN LA-MAR CALDWELL,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:19-cr-00258-LCB-1)

        Submitted: January 19, 2023                                       Decided: June 27, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge, and FLOYD,
        Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Ira Knight, Assistant Federal Public
        Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro,
        North Carolina for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Frank J. Chut,
        Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               After Kevin La-Mar Caldwell pled guilty to possession of firearms by a convicted

        felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), the district court sentenced him to

        time served and a three-year term of supervised release. Before expiration of that term,

        Caldwell’s probation officer petitioned the district court to revoke his supervised release,

        alleging he had violated the conditions of supervision by being convicted in North Carolina

        state court of felony breaking and entering, felony larceny after breaking and entering, and

        felony possession of cocaine, and being sentenced to suspended terms of 12 to 24 months’

        imprisonment and 30 months’ supervised probation; and fleeing the apartment in which he

        was approved to reside. At the revocation hearing, Caldwell admitted these violations.

        The district court calculated an advisory policy statement range under the U.S. Sentencing

        Guidelines Manual (2021) of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment, revoked Caldwell’s

        supervised release, and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment and 12 months of

        supervised release. On appeal, Caldwell argues that this sentence is procedurally and

        substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

               “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

        supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 (4th Cir. 2020). We will

        affirm a revocation sentence “if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly

        unreasonable.” Id. In determining whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable,

        we must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively

        unreasonable. United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017). In making this

        determination, we are guided by “the same procedural and substantive considerations that

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        guide our review of original sentences,” but we take “a more deferential appellate posture

        than we do when reviewing original sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370,

        373 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

               “A [supervised release] revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district

        court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’

        nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

        factors.” United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

        marks omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing applicable factors). “[A]lthough the court

        need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when

        imposing a post-conviction sentence, it still must provide a statement of reasons for the

        sentence imposed.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208 (cleaned up). The court’s explanation also

        must provide us assurance that it considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised

        by the parties as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed. United States v. Gibbs,

        897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if,

        in light of the totality of the circumstances, the [district] court states an appropriate basis

        for concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d

        at 297 (internal quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence falling within the

        recommended policy statement range under the Guidelines is presumed reasonable. Gibbs,

        897 F.3d at 204.

               Only if we find a revocation sentence unreasonable do we consider whether the

        sentence “is plainly so, relying on the definition of plain used in our plain error analysis-that

        is, clear or obvious.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208 (cleaned up). “If a revocation sentence-even

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        an unreasonable one-is not plainly unreasonable, we will affirm it.” Id. (internal quotation

        marks omitted).

               The 24-month prison term and the 12-month supervised release term do not exceed

        the applicable statutory maximums, and the district court properly calculated Caldwell’s

        advisory policy statement range at 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment. The court also

        considered this range, the argument of counsel, and Caldwell’s allocution. Caldwell argues

        that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to fully

        articulate the reasons for it and failed to consider his nonfrivolous arguments for a shorter

        prison term. He also argues that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because the

        court did not provide a compelling justification for it.

               We reject Caldwell’s arguments. Although not couched in the precise language of

        applicable § 3553(a) factors and factors applicable for consideration under the Guidelines,

        the district court’s reasons for imposing sentence are easily matched to factors appropriate

        for consideration in the revocation sentencing context and tied to Caldwell’s particular

        situation, namely, the nature and circumstances of his violative conduct, his history and

        characteristics, the need for the sentence imposed to deter Caldwell, and the sanctioning of

        his acts in breaching trust while on release, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(B), 3583(e);

        USSG ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (“[A]t revocation the [district] court should

        sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust.”). The record also reflects that the

        district court considered but ultimately rejected Caldwell’s arguments for a shorter prison

        term. See Gibbs, 897 F.3d at 204, 206. The court stated appropriate bases for the

        conclusion that Caldwell should receive the sentence it imposed, and Caldwell has not

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        pointed    to    factors   tending      to   overcome     the    presumption      that   his

        within-policy-statement-range prison term is reasonable. The sentence is not unreasonable

        and therefore is not plainly unreasonable.

               Moreover, even “assuming arguendo [Caldwell is] able to demonstrate the district

        court committed plain error,” we nevertheless conclude he is “unable to show that the

        court’s error affected his substantial rights by influencing the outcome of the revocation

        hearing.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 2013). Caldwell has not

        argued he would have received a lower sentence had the district court not committed the

        errors he alleges, and he therefore has “failed to justify a remand for resentencing.” Id. at

        643.

               We thus affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument because

        the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court

        and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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