Court Opinion

ID: 9567115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:48:59.441147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:35.118238
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent as to Division 3 and the judgment of affirmance in Case No. 62437.
Ga. L. 1919, p. 386, former Code § 26-3001, made it a misdemeanor to be “an eavesdropper or Peeping Tom.” Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, et seq. organized a new chapter making “eavesdropping” and “Peeping Tom” different offenses, but both were misdemeanors classified as invasions of privacy. One can be a Peeping Tom by “peeping through windows or doors or other like places” or one who goes on the premises of another to spy or invade their privacy. This crime was by the Act of 1968 changed from a misdemeanor to a felony.
Criminal Trespass (Code § 26-1503), originated in the Act of 1968, p. 1249 (1933 Code § 26-3002), making it a misdemeanor to wilfully enter on the lands of another after being forbidden to do so. Ga. L. 1968, p. 1285, makes it a misdemeanor to enter on the land of another for an unlawful purpose.
Thus, the Criminal Code of 1968 did the following: (1) kept criminal trespass as a misdemeanor but added the words of entry “for an unlawful purpose,” and (2) kept the criminal offense of Peeping Tom but Code § 26-3010 changed it from a misdemeanor to a felony. The former section Code 26-3002 redefined the offense as going on the premises of another “to spy or invade their privacy,” but appears to set forth a type of greater crime to be a “Peeping Tom” (one who has completed peeping) and a lesser crime of becoming a “Peeping Tom” (one who goes upon property of another for the same purpose but not completing the act of peeping) both in the same section with the same punishment. Commission of either of these acts or crimes carries punishment as a felony. Yet completion of the acts comprising the latter lesser crime contains exactly the identical essential elements necessary to convict defendant under Code § 26-1503. The *695evidence in this case indicates appellant was on the property of another without the latter’s consent but for what unlawful purpose is a matter of intent. Punishment under Code § 26-1503 is for a misdemeanor. Where, as here, a timely request has been made to charge the offense of criminal trespass under Code § 26-1503 it was error to fail to also give this charge, otherwise, it had the effect of requiring felony punishment rather than giving the jury a choice of convicting appellant of only a misdemeanor.
This case appears to be controlled by Loury v. State, 147 Ga. App. 152 (248 SE2d 291) (1978), holding it reversible error not to give a request for charge on criminal trespass in a burglary case. In the cited case the trial judge, upon request, provided the jury a choice between burglary (felony) and criminal trespass (misdemeanor) as the matter of intent was a question for the jury. It is unquestioned that a TV set and other valuable effects were in the houses in the case sub judice. Evidence of one independent crime introduced to show intent revealed the appellant actually entered the home of the owner without consent: “There in my living room stood Arthur Lemon.” This could have a bearing on intent as to the act of criminal trespass for the unlawful purpose of committing burglary punishable as a misdemeanor. If the greater crime of burglary demands, when requested, a charge on the lesser misdemeanor crime, surely, the same principle as to the greater Peeping Tom violation (felony) should receive the same application. It is reversible error to fail to give this lesser charge when requested so that the jurors may properly decide intent as between the greater and lesser crimes.