Court Opinion

ID: 9612014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:02:36.605665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:43.777573
License: Public Domain

PHILLIP R. GARRISON, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion except with reference to a statement made in the discussion of the third point on appeal, and with reference to the analysis under the sixth point affirming the $2,000 judgment against Appellant for attorney fees. I respectfully dissent from those portions of the opinion.
In its discussion of the third point on appeal, the majority opinion cites Baumgart v. Baumgart, 944 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Mo.App. W.D.1997), for the proposition that in a modification action pursuant to § 452.410.1, “the court is not required to state specifically what circumstances have changed as long as the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that such a change has occurred.” I disagree with that statement. First, Appellant does not raise an issue in her point relied on about the sufficiency of the trial court’s findings with reference to identifying the changes of circumstances it found to support the modification. This is perhaps for the reason that while the trial court made a general statement that there had been a change of circumstances of the child and its custodian so continuing and substantial as to warrant modification as to child custody, visitation and support to serve the best interests of the child, the court did make specific findings, in response to requested findings of fact, that were responsive to the changes of circumstances alleged in the motion. In my view, therefore, this statement in the majority opinion is dicta.
Beyond that, I disagree with the principle for which the Baumgart case was cited here. Section 452.410.1 prohibits a trial court from modifying a prior custody decree unless, among other things, it “finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.” In my view, when a trial court finds a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of custody, it should specify not only that there were changes in circumstances, but also what those changes were and to whom they apply. Otherwise, appellate courts are left in the position of perusing the entire record to determine if there is a basis for the finding without any indication of what the trial court believed or disbelieved. If the statute requires that a trial court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it “finds” the necessary, prerequisites, requiring such a specific finding is neither unreasonable nor does it offend the plainly expressed legislative intent of the statute.7 Consistent with this is the statement in Sumnickt v. Sackman, *82906 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Mo.App. W.D.1995), a modification of custody case, which held that “unless we see something in the record that is clearly an item of substantial concern, we will confine ourselves to those concerns which have been pleaded, and which the trial court believed to be sufficiently significant to warrant mention in the court’s order.” See also Parker v. Parker, 66 S.W.3d 778, 787 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002).
I also dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the award of attorney fees to Respondent. As pointed out by the majority, § 452.355.1 requires consideration of all relevant factors including the financial resources of both parties, the merits of the case, and the actions of the parties during the pendency of the action. Here, Appellant’s point is directed to the lack of substantial evidence of an ability to pay the judgment as well as the comparative financial condition of the parties. She argues that “the trial court specifically found in its judgment that Mother, who is only employed part-time, and her present husband have a negative net worth and therefore are in a far worse position to pay the cost of this litigation than is Father, who currently earns a gross monthly income of $4,441.00 per month as a captain in the United States Army.”
Appellant was not employed at the time of trial, having given birth to a child two months earlier. She anticipated going back to work as an emergency registration clerk at a local medical center, but on a part-time basis because of the cost of child care. Her income at that employment had been $19,993 when she had worked full-time. Accordingly, her Form 14 reflected a gross monthly income for her of $833. Respondent’s Form 14 imputing income of $2,037 per month to Appellant was adopted by the trial court.8
The record before us does not reflect any evidence about Appellant’s available disposable income. The evidence did indicate that she and her current husband have a home that has no equity, they owe $71,000 in other mortgages and debts, they have no savings, and they have no assets with values as much as their liabilities. In fact, the trial court found that Appellant “is not employed, the home she and her new husband have purchased is heavily mortgaged and they have a negative net worth.”
In the absence of evidence as to the parties’ financial resources, an award of attorney fees cannot be supported. In re Marriage of Trimble, 978 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Mo.App. S.D.1998). A court must know what debts each party owes and what non-employment income each has before it can determine either need or ability to pay attorney fees pursuant to § 452.355.1. Id.; see also Barancik v. Meade, 106 S.W.3d 582, 594 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). Thus, “financial resources” of the respective parties contemplates consideration of which party is best financially able to bear attorney’s fees. In re Marriage of McCoy, 818 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Mo.App. S.D.1991).
In McDaniel v. McDaniel, 982 S.W.2d 729, 732-33 (Mo.App. E.D.1998), the mother, to whom $886 monthly income was imputed, was ordered to pay $2,000 of the father’s attorney fees even though the evidence indicated that he had a monthly income of $2,393. There was no evidence that the mother had available resources from which to pay the attorney fee award, and there was no evidence that the father could not afford to pay his own attorney fees. Id. at 732. The appellate court reversed the award, finding it was an abuse of discretion, based, among other things, *83on the mother’s lack of ability to pay. Id. at 733.
In the instant case, I would reverse the award against Appellant for attorney fees. Even considering the income imputed to Appellant, Respondent has over twice as much monthly income as does Appellant. In Kreitz v. Kreitz, 750 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Mo.App. E.D.1988), the court reversed an attorney fee award where the party in whose favor the judgment was entered had an income more than twice that of the party ordered to pay. Additionally, here, there is no showing that Appellant has the ability to pay the attorney fees or that Respondent has a need. In this regard, I also note that Appellant was ordered to pay child support of $165 per month as well as $2,475 in retroactive child support, payable at the rate of $100 per month.
In affirming the judgment against Appellant for part of Respondent’s attorney fees, the majority opinion relies, in part, on the income of Appellant’s present husband. I disagree with this approach for two reasons. First, there was no evidence concerning the expendable income of Appellant and her current husband after paying their existing debts, which totaled more than their assets.
Secondly, § 452.355 obligates the court to consider the “financial resources of both parties,” but I do not believe that necessarily includes the income or assets of a current spouse. In this case, neither party cites authority concerning the propriety of including the income of Appellant’s current husband in assessing an ability to pay attorney fees. The majority opinion also includes that factor without citing authority in support.
The decision in K.J.B. v. C.M.B., 779 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Mo.App. E.D.1989), indicates, albeit without the citation of authority, that a new spouse’s income is not an appropriate consideration in determining an award of attorney fees under § 452.355. There the court noted the new spouse’s income, but said, “[h]owever, there is no evidence that mother has assets of her own or works outside the home.” Id. However, the western district’s decision in Callis v. Bryce, 872 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Mo.App. W.D.1994), indicates, again without the citation of authority, that consideration of assets jointly owned with a new spouse was appropriate in determining an award of attorney fees.
Section 452.370.1 provides, in part, that in actions for modification of child support or maintenance, the trial court shall consider all financial resources of both parties, “including the extent to which the reasonable expenses of either party are, or should be, shared by a spouse or other persons with whom he or she cohabits,” and the earning capacity of a party who is not employed. As indicated above, § 452.355.1 permits the trial court to order one party to pay part of the other party’s attorney fees and costs after considering all relevant factors including the financial resources of both parties. Unlike § 452.370.1, § 452.355.1 includes no provision concerning consideration of a third party. Instead, § 452.355.1 specifically refers to the financial resources of “both parties.”
Appellant’s current husband is not a party to these proceedings and there is no showing that his income is a “resource” available to her to satisfy a judgment for part of Respondent’s attorney fees. Accordingly, I do not agree with any suggestion that it is appropriate to consider the income of Appellant’s husband in determining the propriety of an award against her for a part of those attorney fees.

. The judgment in this case was entered prior to the effective date of Rule 78.07(c) which provides that allegations of error relating to the failure to make statutorily required findings must be raised in a motion to amend the judgment in order to be preserved for appellate review.

. The imputation of that income to Appellant is not an issue on this appeal.