Court Opinion

ID: 9597930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:04:00.559658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:39.903656
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The only contention ever raised in and addressed by the habeas court is whether, in entering his guilty plea, Clowers waived his right to counsel. Thus, that is the sole issue which this Court should now consider. See King v. Hawkins, 265 Ga. 93 (454 SE2d 135) (1995). As with all constitutional rights, a defendant can forfeit the right to counsel by a knowing and intelligent waiver. Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82, 83 (316 SE2d 749) (1984). The burden was on the Warden to prove a valid waiver by Clowers. Blaylock v. Hopper, 233 Ga. 504, 506 (1) (212 SE2d 339) (1975). After conducting a hearing, the habeas court found that the respondent met that burden. If there is any evidence to support that finding, we should not disturb it. Williams v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 453 (1) (192 SE2d 378) (1972). There is clearly sufficient evidence and, in my opinion, the majority erroneously substitutes its finding for that which the habeas court was authorized to make. Therefore, I dissent to the reversal of the denial of Clowers’ petition for habeas corpus.
The assistant district attorney who prosecuted Clowers testified to the “standing policy” in effect in his circuit when the guilty plea was entered. “Evidence of a routine or standard procedure can be used to establish a waiver of the right to counsel. [Cit.]” Parks v. McClung, 271 Ga. 795, 796, in. 4 (524 SE2d 718) (1999). According to the assistant district attorney’s testimony, there was “a waiver form that was used in our circuit that the judges required for us to review with each defendant [who] wanted to enter a plea of guilty.” The Warden was unable to produce the actual form which Clowers signed, because it could not be found after a thorough search. However, the *467lack of that specific waiver form presented, at most, a “best evidence” problem. The Warden resolved the issue by producing identical documents identified “as examples of the waiver form that was used” in Clowers’ case, as well as eyewitness testimony of the assistant district attorney that Clowers executed the waiver form that was presented to him. See McGee v. State, 260 Ga. 178 (3) (391 SE2d 400) (1990); Harp v. State, 169 Ga. App. 670, 671 (2) (314 SE2d 686) (1984); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Latimore, 151 Ga. App. 786, 788 (1) (261 SE2d 735) (1979); Trice v. Adams, 33 Ga. App. 257, 258 (3) (125 SE 878) (1924). Thus, the evidence established that Clowers signed a waiver of rights form, the terms of which incorporated a full and complete waiver of his right to counsel. See Parks v. McClung, supra.
Moreover, the assistant district attorney testified that, before execution of the waiver form, he followed his “standard practice” of reviewing the terms with Clowers, informing him of his right to counsel and establishing that he did, in fact, want to waive that right. There is no procedural requirement that the trial court make the guilty plea inquiries, so long as they are made in its presence. State v. Germany, 245 Ga. 326, 328 (265 SE2d 13) (1980). Here, the assistant district attorney testified that, at the time he was making the inquiries of Clowers, they were seated at the defense table in the courtroom and that the trial judge was in the courtroom at that time. Thus, the discussion between Clowers and the assistant district attorney obviously took place in the trial court’s presence.
The guilty plea hearing was conducted immediately after Clowers’ execution of the waiver form. The transcript of that hearing shows that Clowers responded in the affirmative when the trial court asked if he understood what the assistant district attorney had just discussed with him. The trial court also stated that it wanted “to be sure” that Clowers understood “all [of his] constitutional rights.” To that end, the trial court referred to the signed waiver form, and asked whether Clowers did understand all of his rights. Clowers agreed that he did. The trial court then specifically informed him of his right to counsel and gave him an opportunity to withdraw his proffered plea and proceed to trial with appointed counsel. However, Clowers responded that he wanted to adhere to his guilty plea. It is immaterial that this colloquy may have occurred after the trial court’s oral “acceptance” of Clowers’ guilty plea. Parks v. McClung, supra at 798.
It is clear that the evidence in this case authorizes a finding that, before entering his guilty plea, the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible, but, at least until today’s opinion, the State could use extrinsic evidence to show that a guilty plea was *468knowing and voluntary. Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 475 (1) (211 SE2d 764) (1975). In my opinion, Parks v. McClung, supra, is, in all material respects, indistinguishable. Here, as there, the extrinsic evidence offered at the habeas hearing proved that the defendant was fully advised of his right to counsel and that the trial court satisfied itself that he was aware of that right and voluntarily waived it. “This evidence authorized the habeas court’s finding that [Clowers] knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived [his] right to counsel. [Cits.]” Parks v. McClung, supra at 798. As Parks is controlling authority which mandates an affirmance herein, I dissent to the reversal of the habeas corpus court’s correct order.
Decided June 12, 2000.
Craig L. Cascio, for appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne K. Strickland, Wesley S. Wood, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this dissent.