Court Opinion

ID: 9565876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:29:25.233651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:35.953461
License: Public Domain

Judge GREENE
concurring in the result.
“When a spouse uses separate property in the acquisition of property titled by the entireties, a gift to the marital estate is presumed.” McLean v. McLean, 323 N.C. 543, 555, 374 S.E.2d 376, 383 (1988); McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 154, 327 S.E.2d 910, 917, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985) (a marital gift is presumed when one spouse, “from separate property causes property to be conveyed to the other spouse in the form of tenancy by the entireties”). “This presumption is rebuttable only by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that a gift was not intended.” McLean. Donor spouse has the burden of rebutting the presumption. Id. Whether donor spouse succeeds in rebutting the presump*18tion of gift to the marital estate by clear, cogent and convincing evidence remains “a matter left to the trial court’s discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).
The marital property presumption may be rebutted by the conveyance’s inclusion of an “express statement of separate property intention.” Id. Otherwise, evidence that a gift was not intended can be gathered from “circumstances which led to the execution” of the deed and the parties’ action after execution of the deed. See Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Balentines, Inc., 285 N.C. 452, 462, 206 S.E.2d 242, 249 (1974). For example, evidence that the donor spouse continued to treat the property as his separate property after the conveyance is some evidence that he did not intend a gift. See Waddell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 678, 97 S.E.2d 222, 229 (1957) (evidence that donor spouse paid taxes out of his salary was “competent for the jury to consider in arriving at plaintiff’s intention at the time of the conveyance . . . tending to rebut the presumption of a gift of the property to his wife”). Competent evidence also includes evidence of the parties’ intent, including the donor’s intent, not to make a gift of the properties to the marital estate. Here, wife argues that the only competent evidence relating to intent is the parties’ expression of intent at the time of conveyance. Wife’s position is not supported in the law:
For the truthfulness of the parties when upon the witness stand we must depend, as in the case of other witnesses, upon the obligation of their oath and their reputation for truth and veracity. If these can be relied upon for the truth of statements made in reference to acts and words of which the eye and ear may take notice, they may for the same reason be accepted as guarantees for the truth of statements made in respect to motives and intents of which the mind or inner man alone can take cognizance. Nor is there, in our judgment, any well-grounded reason for apprehending that this rule will obstruct rather than advance the ends of justice. There is no more danger of imposing upon the jury falsehood or pretense in respect of motives and intents than there is of doing the like in respect to visible or external circumstances. The jury can as readily distinguish between the false and true in respect to the former as to the latter. If the motive or intent assigned is inconsistent with the external circumstances, it must be discarded as false. If on the contrary they are consistent, there is no reason why they may not be true.
*192 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 581 (3d ed. 1940); see also Phifer v. Erwin, 100 N.C. 59, 6 S.E. 672 (1888) (the court allowed a mortgagor to testify at trial that he had no intent to defraud); State v. King, 86 N.C. 603, 606 (1882), citing Seymour v. Wilson, 14 N.Y. 568 (“the assignor was allowed to say upon his examination [at trial] that it was not his purpose in making the conveyance to delay or defraud his creditors . . .”).
I now apply these principles to the facts in this case.

8.6 Acre Tract

I agree with the majority that plaintiff-wife did not receive any title to defendant-husband’s one-half interest in the 8.6 acre tract because he received it as a consequence of a partitioning proceeding among his fellow joint tenants. See Smith v. Smith, 248 N.C. 194, 102 S.E.2d 868 (1958). However, our inquiry does not end here. A separate question is whether husband’s one-half interest represents separate or marital property. Because husband obtained the one-half interest by virtue of his grandmother’s will, it qualifies as his separate property according to N.C.G.S. § 50-20(b)(2) (1982) (separate property includes property acquired by devise). Nonetheless, any active increase in this separate property must be classified as marital property. Beightol v. Beightol, 90 N.C. App. 58, 61, 367 S.E.2d 347, 349, review denied, 323 N.C. 171, 373 S.E.2d 104 (1988) (passive appreciation of separate property is not considered marital property).
The other one-half interest in the 8.6 acre tract which husband purchased with what appears to be his separate property is presumed to be marital property, since it was titled in the entireties. The question here is whether husband has offered clear, cogent and convincing evidence of his contrary intention sufficient to rebut the marital gift presumption. On this issue, the trial court determined that husband “maintained the 8.6 acres as his own separate property and that he sold the tobacco poundage off this tract of land to an individual by the name of Guy Coy for the amount of $1,194.00.” These findings reflect some competent evidence that could support the trial judge’s conclusion that husband did not intend to make a gift to the marital estate. It is some evidence that he continued to treat the property as his separate property after it was titled by the entireties. Factors significant to the court’s determination would be whether proceeds from the tobacco allotment sale was maintained as husband’s separate property or *20if it was commingled with marital funds and the degree to which husband maintained the 8.6 acres as his separate property supported by his separate funds.
Accordingly, I join the majority in vacating the trial court’s conclusion that the entire 8.6 acre tract is husband’s separate property and would remand for a new determination of that issue based on the above analysis.

Mitchell Property

I agree with the majority that the presumption of a marital gift cannot be rebutted by any of the following findings:
This property is ancestral property and has been in the Defendant’s maternal ancestry for over 100 years.
[W]hen the Plaintiff took an appraiser to these tracts of land for an appraisal to be made in Mitchell County to testify in this cause, the Plaintiff did not know where the 24 acres or the 2.14 acres were located on Conley Ridge Road.
That the Plaintiff did not testify that she understood that the Defendant intended to make her a gift of the Mitchell County property.
Furthermore, the fact that the properties were purchased with husband’s separate property is immaterial.
However, the following finding is relevant and represents some evidence to support a conclusion that husband did not intend a marital gift:
That the Defendant testified that at no time did he ever intend to make a gift of any of these deeds to the Mitchell County property to his wife.
Record evidence supports this finding. Husband testified in pertinent part:
Q. All right now, did you at the time that her name was placed on the deed, did you intend to make her a gift of any portion of that land . . .
A. No, sir.
*21Defendant’s credibility as a witness was a matter for the trial judge to resolve, who obviously found this evidence credible. See Draughon v. Draughon, 82 N.C. App. 738, 347 S.E.2d 871, review denied, 319 N.C. 103, 353 S.E.2d 107 (1987). I note that the evidence here is substantially different from the evidence offered by donor spouse in the Thompson decision:
Q. Mr. Thompson, was it your intent to have your former wife’s name placed on the deed?
A. No, and this is the reason I asked twice first.
Thompson v. Thompson, 93 N.C. App. 229, 232, 377 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1989). In the Thompson decision, this court noted that evidence that donor spouse did not intend to have his wife’s name placed on the deed did “not rise to the level of clear, cogent and convincing evidence of defendant’s intention not to make a gift to the marital estate.” Id. Here, defendant gave direct testimony that he did not intend to make a gift to his wife, sufficient evidence in my opinion to support, but not require, the trial judge’s conclusion that donor spouse did not intend to make a gift to the marital estate.
Nonetheless, I agree with the majority that because the trial judge obviously has relied on evidence that has no bearing on the issue of whether wife rebutted the marital gift presumption, this issue must be remanded to the trial judge for a new determination.

Eads Property

I agree with the majority and its reasoning that the parties titled the property in such a manner so as to create a tenancy by the entireties, not a tenancy in common. Furthermore, I agree with the majority that husband had the burden of rebutting the marital gift presumption and, therefore, wife had no obligation to introduce, nor could she be penalized for failing to introduce, any evidence on this issue. However, some record evidence exists to support but not require a conclusion that husband rebutted the marital gift presumption, as reflected by the trial judge’s finding:
That all of the funds ... received from the sales of the property were never common-mingled [sic] with the Plaintiff and Defendant’s own marital assets.
*22That the Defendant never intended to make a gift of this property to the marital estate.
That the Defendant testified that all the transactions involving the Eads property was [sic] the result of the acts of the partnership alone and that neither partner ever intended to make a gift of any of the property, be it real or personal or cash, to either of their wives.
Along with this evidence, the trial court relied on findings which clearly were not appropriate, and this issue must be remanded to the trial court for a new determination.

Plaintiffs Conversion of Marital Property

I disagree with any majority suggestion that the trial judge treated the allegedly converted funds, here $53,000.00, as part of the marital estate. The trial judge concluded as a matter of law:
that the Plaintiff converted to her own use the sum of $53,000.00[,] which is marital property which should be accounted for in the equitable distribution of the property between the parties.
However, in the distributional order it appears that the trial court considered the $53,000.00 conversion as a distributional factor:
The Court does not order the Plaintiff to account for any portion of the $53,000.00 that she withdrew from the joint savings account. The Court will take this into consideration in arriving at a just and equitable distribution of marital property acquired by the parties and the difference in the income of the parties as of the date of the separation. The Court in its discretion finds that this would be just and proper under the facts in this case.
In an equitable distribution proceeding, the trial judge properly considers evidence of actual dissipation of marital assets for non-marital purposes by either spouse in anticipation of separation as a distributional factor, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-20(c)(12). See Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 88, 331 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985) (“the only fault or misconduct that is ‘just and proper’ under N.C.G.S. § 50-20(c)(12) is that which dissipates or reduces marital property for non-marital purposes”).
*23However, the evidence here does not support a finding that wife converted marital funds for non-marital purposes. Therefore, the trial court erred in considering this as a factor in the marital estate distribution. Record evidence supports the trial judge’s.finding that there existed a joint savings and checking account into which husband deposited money each month and that wife “had control and managed the family budget without any interference or supervision” by husband. This evidence creates a presumption that husband consented to wife’s use of the funds “for purposes of sustaining the family or enhancing its standard of living.” McClure v. McClure, 64 N.C. App. 318, 323, 307 S.E.2d 212, 215, review denied, 310 N.C. 308, 312 S.E.2d 651 (1984). Thus, husband had the burden of offering clear and convincing evidence that he did not consent to wife’s use of the funds and that the funds wife withdrew exceeded normal family expenses. See Spence v. Jones, 83 N.C. App. 8, 348 S.E.2d 819 (1986), disapp. on other grounds, Armstrong v. Armstrong, 322 N.C. 396, 368 S.E.2d 595 (1988). At best, husband’s evidence shows that wife made withdrawals from the joint spousal account for which she did not account. This evidence is very similar to the evidence presented to this court in the Spence decision by which defendant “merely showed that the funds withdrawn exceeded the expenses of the family.” Here, as in Spence, husband offered no evidence to show that wife made non-marital use of the funds and so did not offer clear and convincing evidence that wife withdrew the funds without husband’s consent and used the funds for purposes other than sustaining the family.

Distribution

On remand, if the trial judge determines that the property titled in the entireties is marital property, the trial judge also must consider as a factor in determining an equitable distribution of the marital property the fact that husband contributed this property to the marital estate from his separate properties pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-20(c)(12); Armstrong, at 404, 368 S.E.2d at 600; see Lawrence J. Golden, Equitable Distribution of Property § 5.27 (1983) (the presumption of marital property provides flexibility to the trial court in fashioning an equitable award); § 8.20 (the means for acquiring marital property is an important factor in determining equitable distribution).