Court Opinion

ID: 9363299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 19:06:10.031283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:30.278242
License: Public Domain

[Cite as JoMar Group, Ltd. v. Brown, 2023-Ohio-98.]

                                      COURT OF APPEALS
                                    HOLMES COUNTY, OHIO
                                  FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JOMAR GROUP, LTD.                                        JUDGES:
                                                         Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                               Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
                                                         Hon. John W. Wise, J.
-vs-
                                                         Case No. 22 CA 005
GARY M. BROWN

        Defendant-Appellant                              OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                              Civil Appeal from the Court of Common
                                                      Pleas, Case No. 20 CV 039

JUDGMENT:                                             Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                               January 12, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                                For Defendant-Appellant

GRANT A. MASON                                        THOMAS D. WHITE
MILLER, MAST & MASON, LTD                             EQUES, INC.
88 South Monroe Street                                5589 Country Road 77
Millersburg, Ohio 44654                               Millersburg, Ohio 44654
Holmes County, Case No. 22 CA 005                                                      2

Wise, J.

      {¶1}    Defendant-Appellant, Gary M. Brown, appeals from the March 17, 2022,

Judgment Entry by the Holmes County Court of Common Pleas. Defendant-Appellee is

JoMar Group, Ltd. The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.

                          STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

      {¶2}    On June 19, 2020, Appellee, an Ohio limited liability company, filed a

complaint alleging breach of contract and seeking specific performance.

      {¶3}    On July 13, 2020, Appellant filed his Answer.

      {¶4}    On August 18, 2020, Appellee filed an Amended Complaint. The amended

complaint contained one count of breach of contract seeking specific performance, one

count seeking damages for breach of contract, and one count of intentional interference

with a contract also seeking damages.

      {¶5}    On September 8, 2020, Appellant filed his Answer to the Amended

Complaint.

      {¶6}    On October 9, 2020, Appellee filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

      {¶7}    On November 13, 2020, Appellant filed a Response in Opposition.

      {¶8}    On November 25, 2020, Appellee filed a Reply to Appellant’s Response in

Opposition.

      {¶9}    On December 23, 2020, Appellant filed a Sur Reply.

      {¶10} On January 27, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Appellee’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment.

      {¶11} On February 25, 2021, the trial court overruled Appellee’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment.
Holmes County, Case No. 22 CA 005                                                           3

       {¶12} On October 6, 2021, Appellee filed a Second Amended Complaint. The final

amended complaint alleged Appellant sold a 260-acre tract of land. The contract called

for Appellee to purchase around 158 acres from Appellant. The contract included a

provision that provided Appellee the ability to purchase the remaining 102 acres

(“Option”).

       {¶13} Within the time period of the Option, Appellee notified Appellant of his

intention to exercise his option to purchase the remaining acreage. After receiving no

response from Appellant, Appellee sent a certified letter notifying Appellant of his intention

to exercise the Option.

       {¶14} After sending the certified letter, Appellee began negotiations with a third

party for the sale of the real estate subject to the Option. An agreement was reached on

June 25, 2020. Appellee then informed Appellant of the contract between Appellee and

the third party for the sale of the real estate.

       {¶15} On November 2, 2021, Appellant filed an Answer.

       {¶16} On December 16, 2021, the trial court held a bench trial.

       {¶17} On March 17, 2022, the trial court issued a judgment entry finding in favor

of Appellee on the First and Third Counts. Count two was found to be moot.

       {¶18} On April 13, 2022, Appellee filed a notice of waiver of damages and a motion

for the court to enter a final appealable order.

       {¶19} On May 24, 2022, the trial court entered its final judgment entry.

                                    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶20} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and herein raises the following two

Assignments of Error:
Holmes County, Case No. 22 CA 005                                                          4

       {¶21} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING APPELLEE’S COUNT I

FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND ORDERING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

       {¶22} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND

INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT AND AWARDED DAMAGES FOR

ALLEGED INTERFERENCE THAT TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE

CONTRACT.”

                                                 I.

       {¶23} In Appellant’s first Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the trial court erred

by finding the existence of a valid option contract, and if a breach occurred, ordering

specific performance. We disagree.

                                       a. Standard of Review

       {¶24} The interpretation and construction of written contracts is reviewed de novo.

Long Beach Assn., Inc. v. Jones, 82 Ohio St.3d 574, 576, 697 N.E.2d 208 (1998).

However, an appellate court is not the finder of fact, we neither weigh evidence nor judge

credibility of witnesses. Our role is to determine whether relevant, competent, and

credible evidence exists upon which the fact finder could base his or her judgment.

Peterson v. Peterson, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2003-0049, 2004-Ohio-4714, ¶10,

citing Cross Truck v. Jeffries, 5th Dist. Stark No. CA 5758, 1982 WL 2911 (Feb. 10, 1982).

                             b. Consideration for Option Contract

       {¶25} “In the ordinary real estate option contract, the seller offers to sell his real

property upon fixed terms, and he and his prospective buyer agree that, in exchange for

a consideration paid by the buyer, the seller will leave his offer open for a specified time.

Within this context, the option contract is not a contract to buy and sell the property, but
Holmes County, Case No. 22 CA 005                                                           5

only a contract whereby the seller agrees to leave his offer open for a time certain.

Confusion often arises since the option is combined with the main offer to sell and its

attendant detailed terms.” Ritchie v. Cordray, 10 Ohio App.3d 213, 215, 461 N.E.2d 325

(1983).

       {¶26} “However, the two are separate and independent, even though found in one

document; the option is collateral to the main offer to sell. The main offer does not become

a contract to buy and sell unless and until its terms are accepted. The option, on the other

hand, is already a binding complete contract to leave the offer open-there has been both

offer and acceptance, supported by consideration.” Id.

       {¶27} This particular case has another layer of complexity as the document which

allegedly contains the Option is also part of a contract for the sale of a different parcel of

real estate.

       {¶28} Appellant argues that since the Option was part of a larger contract, and no

distinct consideration was called out, then the option contract is unenforceable. For

support they cite Bhavnani v. Voldness, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 95APE03-284, 1995 WL

578124. Bhavnani clearly states, “appellant has failed to affirmatively demonstrate that

he gave separate consideration for the option.” Id. However, the Tenth District Court of

Appeals uses the term “separate consideration” as “something other and independent of

the consideration that will pass between the parties in the event that the option is

exercised.” Mirich v. Safarek, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 81 C.A. 48, 1982 WL 6105, citing,

17 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d 453-454, Contracts, Section 22.

       {¶29} In the case sub judice, Appellant received consideration of $1,425,000, a

van, a promise not to divide the real estate for two and half years, and the right to walk or
Holmes County, Case No. 22 CA 005                                                        6

ride over the property during his lifetime. Appellant gave consideration of real estate and

the option to purchase 102 acres of land located south of SR 241 for $1,800,000.

       {¶30} Accordingly, separate consideration of “something other and independent

of the consideration that will pass between the parties in the event that the option is

exercised” was provided.

                                    c. Specific Performance

       {¶31} The remedy of specific performance rests in the sound discretion of the trial

court, “not arbitrary, but controlled by principles of equity, on full consideration of the

circumstances of each particular case.” Hog Heaven of New Philadelphia, Inc. v. M & M

W. High Ave, L.L.C., 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2014AP020006, 2014-Ohio-5125, ¶16.

              The remedy of specific performance is governed by the same

       general rules which control the administration of all other equitable

       remedies. The right to it depends upon elements, conditions, and incidents

       which equity regards as essential to the administration of all its peculiar

       modes of relief. When all these elements, conditions, and incidents exist,

       the remedial right is perfected in equity. These elements, conditions, and

       incidents, as collected from the cases, are the following: The contract must

       be concluded, certain, unambiguous, mutual, and based upon a valuable

       consideration; it must be perfectly fair in all its parts; it must be free from

       any misrepresentation or misapprehension, fraud or mistake, imposition or

       surprise; it cannot be an unconscionable or hard bargain; its performance

       must not be oppressive upon the defendant; and, finally, it must be capable

       of specific execution through a decree of the court.”
Holmes County, Case No. 22 CA 005                                                           7

              Manning v. Hamamey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 72072, 1998 WL

       57093.

       {¶32} Appellant argues that because the parties exchanged various versions of a

real estate purchase agreement, this makes the final contract ambiguous. We disagree.

       {¶33} Appellant hired an attorney to represent him in the negotiations. The prior

versions of the proposed real estate purchase agreement show ongoing negotiations to

arrive at the final signed contract of May 28, 2015. Nothing in the record shows the final

contract was unclear or ambiguous, that fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation took place,

or that it was unconscionable. As such the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

ordering specific performance of the contract.

       {¶34} Appellant’s first Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                                 II.

       {¶35} In Appellant’s second Assignment of Error, Appellant argues the trial court

erred when it found intentional interference of a contract. We disagree.

       {¶36} The elements of tortious interference with a contract are “(1) the existence

of a contract, (2) the wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract, (3) the wrongdoer’s

intentional procurement of the contract’s breach, (4) lack of justification, and (5) resulting

damages.” Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 176, 707 N.E.2d

853 (1999).

       {¶37} Appellant argues he was unaware of the third-party contract and that

because his initial refusal to honor the Option took place before the third-party contract

was signed, the trial court erred finding Appellant committed intentional interference of a

contract.
Holmes County, Case No. 22 CA 005                                                        8

       {¶38} Appellant testified that on July 29, 2020, he was aware that the third-party

contract existed. Therefore, we must determine if the trial court abused its discretion in

finding the Appellant’s refusal to honor the Option after being made aware of the third-

party contract was justified. An abuse of discretion implies the court’s attitude is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d

217, 450 N.E.2d 1140.

       {¶39} A court determining whether an actor’s interference with a contract was

justified should consider the following factors:

              (a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the

       interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the

       interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in

       protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of

       the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the

       interference, and (g) the relations between the parties.

              Siegel, 85 Ohio St.3d at 176, 707 N.E.2d 853.

       {¶40} It has been established that Appellee properly exercised the Option within

the timeframe noted. A series of preparatory draft contracts were exchanged leading to

the final contract. Each draft contract and the final contract contained some form of the

Option. Appellant knew the Option existed and never objected to the Option until Appellee

attempted to exercise it. Appellant knew Appellee entered into a third-party contract

selling the real estate subject to the Option and still refused to honor the Option.

       {¶41} Based on the forgoing, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

finding Appellant intentionally interfered with Appellee’s third-party contract.
Holmes County, Case No. 22 CA 005                                                9

      {¶42} Appellant’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.

      {¶43} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of

Holmes County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.

By: Wise, J.

Gwin, P. J., and

Hoffman, J., concur.

JWW/br 0106