Court Opinion

ID: 9951746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 21:06:19.591298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:18.306872
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                       Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                              STATE OF MINNESOTA
                              IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                    A23-0920

                                   In re the Matter of:

                            Jimmy Rosas, OBO Minor Child,
                                    Respondent,

                                           vs.

                                    Soledad Sanchez,
                                       Appellant.

                                 Filed March 18, 2024
                                       Affirmed
                                    Bratvold, Judge

                            Sherburne County District Court
                                File No. 71-FA-22-123

Jimmy Rosas, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

C. Alexander Anderson-Cazales, Square 1 Legal, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

      Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;

and Bratvold, Judge.

                          NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

      This is an appeal from a district court order denying appellant’s motion to vacate an

order for protection (OFP). Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion

because newly discovered evidence would have a probable effect on the outcome if the
district court had granted a new evidentiary hearing. We conclude that the district court’s

factual findings support its legal conclusion that the newly discovered evidence would not

have a probable effect on the result of a new hearing. While the district court also rejected

appellant’s motion as untimely, we need not address the propriety of that determination.

Thus, we affirm.

                                          FACTS

       In March 2022, respondent Jimmy Rosas petitioned for an OFP against appellant

Soledad Sanchez on behalf of their minor son, who was seven years old at the time of the

petition. Rosas and Sanchez share parenting time. Rosas lives in St. Paul, while Sanchez

lives in Elk River with her nonjoint minor daughter, I.E.S., who was 16 years old at the

time of the petition. In the petition, Rosas averred that, on March 21, 2022, the son arrived

at Rosas’s house “with bruises all over his legs that he stated he got from” Sanchez. Rosas

also attested that the son “is afraid to go back to” to Sanchez’s house.

       The district court issued an ex parte OFP after determining that Rosas’s petition

“allege[d] an immediate danger of domestic abuse.” Sanchez requested a hearing. The

district court held an evidentiary hearing on September 1, 2022, at which six witnesses

testified, including Rosas, Sanchez, and I.E.S. That same day, following the hearing, the

district court issued an OFP against Sanchez, finding that, “on March 15, 2022,” Sanchez

“hit [the son] . . . repeatedly in the upper thighs with a belt, causing pain and extensive

bruising, injuries not consistent with reasonable parental discipline and thus constituting

domestic child abuse.” The district court’s order provided for telephone and in-person

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supervised parenting time and prohibited Sanchez from any other contact with the son for

two years.

       On    February 3,    2023,   Sanchez       moved   to   “[v]acat[e]   the   Order   for

Protection . . . pursuant to Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60.02” based on

“newly discovered evidence.” In an accompanying affidavit, Sanchez averred that, “[o]n

or about the last week of October 2022,” she learned that I.E.S. told her caseworker “that

on the morning of March 18, 2022, [I.E.S.] had hit [the son] with a stick several times

causing bruising and injuries.” Sanchez averred that I.E.S.’s caseworker reported I.E.S.’s

statement to child protection, and as a result, police interviewed I.E.S., who “confessed to

hitting [the son] repeatedly with a stick.” I.E.S. stated that “she had been feeling guilty

about the whole situation because [Sanchez] had taken the fault through the legal

proceedings.”

       On March 1, the parties appeared for a hearing on Sanchez’s motion to vacate.

Rosas was self-represented, and Sanchez was represented by counsel. Sanchez requested

that the district court vacate the OFP or, in the alternative, “schedule a new hearing on the

issue.” Rosas opposed the motion. Rosas stated that the son “said that it was his mother”

who hit him and that the son’s statement was received at the evidentiary hearing. Sanchez

responded that I.E.S.’s confession “puts into question whether the information presented

at the trial by [the son] was accurate.”

       On April 24, the district court issued an order denying Sanchez’s motion to vacate.

The district court judge, who did not preside over the evidentiary hearing on the OFP,

stated that “[t]here is no indication that” the judge who granted the OFP “relied solely on

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the testimony of [I.E.S.] in finding that domestic abuse had occurred.” The district court

noted that the son’s statement that Sanchez hit him was offered at the evidentiary hearing. 1

The district court determined that Sanchez’s motion to vacate was not supported by

“evidence to allow the Court to conclude that the change in [I.E.S.’s] testimony would have

an effect on the result of a new trial.” The district court described Sanchez’s new evidence

as “impeaching testimony.” Although the parties did not discuss the timeliness of

Sanchez’s motion, the district court determined that Sanchez’s “request for a new trial

[was] outside the timeframe” allowed by Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.03 and was therefore

untimely.

       Sanchez appeals. 2

                                        DECISION

       Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 allows the district court, under the

circumstances described in the rule, to “order a new trial or grant such other relief as may

be just.” Sanchez and the district court repeatedly refer to the relief Sanchez sought as a

“new trial.” A domestic-abuse proceeding, however, is brought under Minn. Stat.

§ 518B.01 (2022) and is a “special proceeding.” Steeves v. Campbell, 508 N.W.2d 817,

818 (Minn. App. 1993). Additionally, “a new trial motion in domestic abuse proceedings

under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 is not authorized.” Id. The parties do not address the fact that

1
 The district court also noted that the OFP included the finding that Sanchez hit the son
“on March 15, 2022.” In contrast, Sanchez’s affidavit referred to an “incident between the
minor child” and I.E.S. that “occurred on March 18, 2022.”
2
 Rosas did not file a brief with this court. Under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03, “the case
shall be determined on the merits.”

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new-trial motions are unauthorized in domestic-abuse proceedings. For purposes of this

appeal, however, we will treat the appeal as one seeking review of the district court’s denial

of a motion for a new evidentiary hearing under the “other relief as may be just” portion of

rule 60.02.

       Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(b) provides that “the court may relieve a

party . . . from a final judgment . . . , order, or proceeding and may order a new trial or

grant such other relief as may be just” based on “[n]ewly discovered evidence which by

due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new [hearing] pursuant

to Rule 59.03.” We review a district court’s decision whether to grant relief under rule

60.02 for an abuse of discretion. Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016).

“A district court abuses its discretion when it acts under a misapprehension of the law or

when its factual findings are clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotations omitted).

       To obtain relief under rule 60.02(b), the moving party must satisfy three steps. First,

“the moving party must show that the new evidence was not discovered until after [the

hearing], and could not have been discovered before [the hearing] by the exercise of

reasonable diligence.” Frazier v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 811 N.W.2d 618, 631

(Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Second, the moving party must show that the newly

discovered evidence is “relevant and admissible.” Id. Third, “the newly discovered

evidence must not be merely collateral, impeaching, or cumulative, but rather, must be

such as to have a probable effect upon the result of a new [hearing].” Id. (quotation

omitted).

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       Sanchez argues that the district court abused its discretion for two reasons. First,

Sanchez argues that the district court “committed a clear abuse of discretion in denying

[her] motion under Rule 60.02(b)” because the district court erred in its analysis of the

newly discovered evidence.

       The district court did not discuss whether Sanchez’s evidence was “newly

discovered” under step one and “assume[d] the evidence would be relevant and admissible

at trial if [I.E.S.] was present and testified” under step two. Thus, only the third step,

whether the newly discovered evidence would have a probable effect on the result of a new

hearing, is at issue on appeal.

       Under step three, the district court determined that the newly discovered evidence

was “impeaching testimony” that would “be used to impeach [I.E.S.] with a prior

inconsistent statement.” The district court also determined that the newly discovered

evidence would not have a probable effect on the result of a new hearing because “other

witnesses at the hearing testified that [Sanchez] . . . caused the harm to [the son].”

       Sanchez argues that I.E.S.’s statement is not only impeachment evidence because it

“goes to the substantive issue in the case.” Sanchez contends that I.E.S. “directly admit[ted]

to the act that was the basis of the Order for Protection,” and therefore, the newly

discovered evidence “would have a probable effect upon the result of a new [hearing].”

       We are not persuaded. “Appellate courts cannot presume error by the district court,

and the complaining party has the obligation to provide the appellate court with a record

sufficient to show any alleged error.” Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. App.

2022). An appellant bears the burden of providing any transcripts “deemed necessary for

                                              6
inclusion in the record.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.02, subd. 1(a). Sanchez did not provide

this court with a transcript of the evidentiary hearing. Thus, we cannot determine whether

the newly discovered evidence was admissible for impeachment purposes only or was also

admissible as substantive evidence.

       Because Sanchez did not provide the evidentiary-hearing transcript, “[w]e are

limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of

law.” Am. Fam. Life Ins. Co. v. Noruk, 528 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. App. 1995), rev.

denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1995). We therefore examine the district court’s factual findings in

its order denying the motion to vacate and assess whether those findings support the district

court’s legal conclusion that Sanchez’s motion to vacate failed step three.

       In denying the motion to vacate, the district court found that the parties agreed that

I.E.S. testified at the evidentiary hearing that Sanchez “had harmed” the son. The district

court found, based on the evidence at the evidentiary hearing, that the son “reported that it

was [Sanchez] that had caused the injuries.” The district court also found that the parties

agreed that “other witnesses at the hearing testified that [Sanchez] . . . caused the harm” to

the son.

       We conclude that these findings of fact support the district court’s legal conclusion

that Sanchez’s motion did not satisfy the third step—that the newly discovered evidence

would have a probable effect on the outcome of a new hearing. Because evidence other

than I.E.S.’s testimony supported the OFP, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

determining that the admission of I.E.S.’s confession would not have a probable effect on

the outcome of a new hearing.

                                              7
       Second, Sanchez argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her

motion to vacate, because “the motion was timely.” Sanchez contends that the district court

appears to have applied, in error, the 30-day deadline for a rule 59 motion for a new trial

to her rule 60.02(b) motion to vacate. The district court’s order stated that “[a] notice of

motion for a new trial shall be served within 30 days . . . of the filing of the decision or

order,” quoting Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.03. The district court determined that Sanchez’s

“request for a new trial is outside the timeframe allowed by the Rules.” 3

       Because we conclude that the district court’s factual findings support its legal

conclusion that the newly discovered evidence would not have a probable effect on the

result of a new hearing, we need not decide whether Sanchez’s motion was timely. 4

       Affirmed.

3
 As discussed above, “a new trial motion in domestic abuse proceedings . . . is not
authorized.” Steeves, 508 N.W.2d at 818. We observe that a rule 60.02(b) motion to vacate
must be made within a reasonable time “not more than 1 year after” the order that is the
subject of the motion. Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.
4
  Sanchez’s brief to this court also asserts that the OFP “will likely expire by the time [this]
court hears this appeal” and argues that “[b]ecause collateral consequences attach to an
expired order for protection, an appeal of an expired order for protection is not moot.” The
OFP against Sanchez was granted for two years on September 1, 2022. Minnesota law
generally requires this court to render a decision “in every case within 90 days after oral
argument or after the final submission of briefs or memoranda by the parties, whichever is
later.” Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2022). Because we will issue a decision in this
appeal before the OFP expires on September 1, 2024, we need not consider Sanchez’s
mootness argument.

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