Court Opinion

ID: 9611650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:58:54.57649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:15.798120
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING OR TRANSFER

Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rules 84.17 and 83.02 (2001), Defendant requests that we rehear this case or, in the alternative, transfer it to the Supreme Court of Missouri. In support, Defendant complains this court disregarded relevant authority, i.e., State v.. McClain, 968 S.W.2d 225 (Mo.App.1998), and ignored her argument based on McClain. Defendant asserts McClain is factually similar to her case and supports her position that she did not have “knowledge of the presence or nature of the drug [methamphetamine] in the car and along the roadway.” We disagree. McClain was not addressed in the principal opinion because the facts and issues presented in McClain are so factually dissimilar from the facts and issues here as to render it irrelevant as authority for Defendant’s arguments.
In McClain, the defendant was convicted of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of § 195.211, RSMo (1994).1 As part of the “attempted manufacturing” charge, the State claimed McClain had “possession” of the necessary precursors to manufacture the drug. When McClain was searched, methamphetamine was found on his person. The State argued that methamphetamine found on McClain linked him to a blue bag containing the manufacturing precursors. However, the bag was found in a closet located within an office adjacent to a public place of business where McClain was arrested. No evidence showed McClain had regular access to or use or control of the place of business. The State pointed to evidence that when the bag containing the precursors was found, it was unzipped. From that the State suggested it was reasonable to infer McClain had knowledge of the bag’s contents and the nature or use to which the contents could be put. Id. at 227. This court found such argument unpersuasive because nothing in the evidence indicated the bag was unzipped when McClain and his companions arrived at the garage. Continuing, we noted:
*429“[E]ven if [McClain] saw the contents [of the blue bag], and even if he recognized them as items used to manufacture methamphetamine, such knowledge alone does not support a finding that [McClain] had possession of the items.”
“As to [McClain’s] statement to [police] that J brought the blue bag into the garage, the State fails to explain how such statement indicates [McClain] possessed the bag or its contents. The statement reveals only that the bag was behind the garage and J brought it inside. The statement does not indicate [McClain] ever had joint possession with J of the bag or its contents.”
Id. at 227.
Thus, the reasons for reversal in McClain had two prongs, i.e., insufficient proof of McClain’s knowledge of the contents of the bag and insufficient evidence that McClain ever had possession of the bag and its contents.
As stated earlier, these are not the facts and issues presented here. Defendant admits there was sufficient evidence to prove she possessed methamphetamine. She claims, however, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that she was aware of the illegal nature of the substance. The factual distinctions between McClain and this case render McClain inapposite as authority for Defendant’s argument. On the other hand, the authorities cited in the principal opinion, when read in the factual context of this case, firmly support a finding that Defendant knew the items she possessed contained illicit drugs.
Defendant’s motion for rehearing and, in the alternative, transfer is denied.

. The charge against McClain arose from the same incident as the charges against the accused in State v. Janson, 964 S.W.2d 552 (Mo.App. 1998), and the accused in State v. Condict, 952 S.W.2d 784 (Mo.App. 1997).