Court Opinion

ID: 9672414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:54:35.192885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.930600
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Because Article 22.16(c)(2), V.A.A.C.P., “requires that the Judiciary refrain from exercising a part of its core power for a period of a year and a half,” and thus “unduly interferes with the Judiciary’s effective exercise of its constitutionally assigned power,” the Court held it invalid under Article II, § 1, Constitution of The State of Texas, in Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237, at 241 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).1
Because Article 22.16(c)(1), V.A.C.C.P., “prohibits the court from entering a final judgment in such a case for a nine month period,” the Court extended the reasoning and holding in Armadillo Bail Bonds, supra, to misdemeanor cases, and held subsection (c)(1) unconstitutional as well, in State v. Matyastik, 811 S.W.2d 102, at 104 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).2 Turning to determine “whether the same is true of Art. 22.16(a),” for the Court, Judge Miller underscored the pertinent statutory language under consideration, viz: “(a) After forfeiture of bond and before the expiration of the time limits set by Subsection (c) of this article, the court shall....” First, he recalled the settled rule that “if one part of a statute is held unconstitutional, the remainder of the statute continues to be valid;” he then noted that “subsection (a) is contingent upon the time limitations established in subsection (c), and thus has no effect without the invalid provisions.” Drawing from a recent opinion of this Court that “the remainder of the statute must be sustained if it is complete within itself and capable of being executed in accordance with the intent wholly independent of that which has been rejected,” Judge Miller concluded for the Court:
“... Because subsection (a) cannot be executed or have any effect without utilizing the provisions of subsection (c), we hold that the portion of Art. 22.16(a), V.A.C.C.P., utilizing subsection (c) is invalid under article 2, § 1 of the Texas Constitution, [note omitted]. Thus, re-mittitur now may be done anytime between forfeiture and entry of a final judgment.”
Id. at 104.3 While it is not free from doubt, since the Court announced at the outset *504that it was finding “Article 22.16(a) and (c)(1) unconstitutional,” id., at 102, we may take the underscored sentence to mean “discretionary” remittitur, taking into account whether one or more enumerated conditions in the remainder of subsection (a) is satisfied. See also Article 22.13, V.A.C.C.P.
Because we reviewed the “decision” of the court of appeals in Makeig v. State, 802 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990), found its “reasoning is sound” and “adopt[ed] the opinion as our own without further comment” in Makeig v. State, 830 S.W.2d 956 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), perhaps without noticing that the Amarillo Court of appeals did not have whatever guidance might have been provided by our opinion in State v. Matyastik, supra, as the majority here seems to suggest in its opinion at 499, n. 1, we may well have “rushed to judgment.” For reasons developed in the margin, however, my view is that the Makeig court of appeals did not implicate validity or application of Article 22.16(d) in any manner inconsistent with our prior cases, including Matyastik.4
Therefore, as I understand the legal consequences of those three decisions of this Court, the following parts of Article 22.16 have been declared unconstitutional: all but the enumerated conditions in subsection (a);5 all of subsection (c); the portion of subsection (d) reading “After the expiration of the time limits set by Subsection (c) of this article and....”
Accordingly, before entry of final judgment the trial court in its discretion may remit “all or part of the amount of the bond,” after making appropriate deductions prescribed by statute. Article 22.16(d) and (e).
*505In the instant cause, however, appellant did not move for remittitur until after the judgment nisi was made final. In this situation alternative remedies noticed by the court of appeals in Makeig v. State become available, and the majority opinion properly addresses them and ultimately concludes the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing remittitur.
For those reasons I join the judgment of the Court.

. Conforming to procedure prescribed in germane provisions of Chapter Twenty two, the trial court entered judgment nisi, surety answered to show cause, the court found no good cause and made the judgment final — all prior to expiration of eighteen months; surety filed a motion for new trial relying on the bar in Article 22.16(c)(2), and the trial court denied relief. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on the ground that the prohibition is invalid under Article II, § 1. Armadillo Bail Bonds, supra at 238. As reported in the text above, this Court agreed and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

. As in Armadillo Bail Bonds so also in State v. Matyastik, all proceedings from forfeiture of bail to grant of remittitur occurred within the time limits set by subsection (c). Unlike the outcome of proceedings in Armadillo Bail Bonds, however, in State v. Matyastik, supra, after the trial court rendered judgment nisi, later made the judgment final and surety moved for remittitur relying in part on Article 22.-16(a)(1), the trial court ordered remittitur in full; the State filed a motion to vacate the order which the trial court denied. The Waco Court of Appeals found Article 22.16 "constitutional in its entirety," and affirmed the judgment below. Matyastik, supra at 102-103.
All emphasis here and throughout this opinion is mine unless otherwise indicated.

.In his separate opinion Judge Campbell characterizes our holding as stated “cryptically,” following "somewhat oblique discussion.” Opinion at 505 and 506, respectively. My own view is that whatever ambiguity may be seen in the *504formulation is removed by the judgment of this Court, viz-.
"The judgment of the court of appeals [affirming that of the trial court] is reversed and the remittitur order of the trial court is vacated. "
That is to say, the court of appeals erred in upholding constitutionality of the mandatory re-mittitur provision in subsection (a), and the trial judge erred in the belief that the court was statutorily mandated to order remittitur in full before expiration of the nine month limitation.

. In Makeig v. State, supra, the surety on a 550,000 bond was certain enough that the principal would not appear for a scheduled hearing that he spent some $3,000 to find and surrender him under a warrant pursuant to Articles 17.16-17.19, V.A.C.C.P., but was not successful; the trial court forfeited bail, entered judgment nisi in June and made the judgment final on September 8; principal was later arrested in another state and surety paid the costs to transport back to the county of prosecution September 21; principal plead guilty and was sentenced to ten years confinement; on October 5, surety moved for mandatory remittitur after forfeiture in full, less costs and interest pursuant to Article 22.-16(a)(1) and (2); on November 2, the trial court granted partial remittitur in the sum of $25,000, less costs of suit. Id. at 60-61.
On appeal, as well as point of error two claiming the bond was invalid, surety contended the trial court erred in three other particulars:
First, in entering final judgment earlier than eighteen months after forfeiture, on impliedly finding Article 22.16(c)(2) unconstitutional on the strength of Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 772 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989). The court of appeals overruled that point on the basis of our decision in Armadillo Bail Bonds, supra. Id. at 61-62.
Third, in refusing to remit a portion of forfeited bail in accordance with Article 22.16(d) and (e), i.e., “[ajfter the expiration of the time limits set by Subsection (c) and before entry of final judgment against the bond.” The court of appeals overruled that point, reasoning that since eighteen months had not expired and final judgment had already been entered before the remit-titur hearing, therefore, "by their terms, subsections (d) and (e) were not applicable to the present circumstance, and the court’s actions cannot be judged by their provisions." Id. at 62.
Fourth, and alternatively, in abusing its discretion by refusing to order sufficient remittitur. The court of appeal found that neither subsections (a) or (d) applied, and overruled that point for reasons dehors the statute, viz', the trial court retained “plenary power to reform its judgment" under Tex.R.Civ.Pro. 329b(a), (e) and (g), and the motion or remittitur being filed timely may be treated as a special bill of review under Article 22.17, V.A.A.C.P.; on either basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Id. at 62-63.
Therefore, in affirming the judgment below the court of appeals did not treat the constitutional viability of Article 22.16(d) and (e), although the State took the position both are invalid (Appellee's Brief on PDR, at 2).

. That part of the qualifying condition reading "After forfeiture of a bond” is not included in the language declared unconstitutional in Ma-tyastik is of no practical moment. The issue of remittitur cannot arise until after bail is forfeited. See, e.g., Articles 22.01, 22.02, 22.10, 22.11, 22.125 and 22.14.