Court Opinion

ID: 9950756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 19:01:50.905743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:43.960893
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12258    Document: 48-1     Date Filed: 03/14/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-12258
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       JESSE REGALADO,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       TOWN OF TRION,
       CITY OF SUMMERVILLE,
       CHATOOGA COUNTY,

                                                 Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                     23-12258

                       D.C. Docket No. 4:22-cv-00277-WMR
                            ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Jesse Regalado, proceeding pro se, appeals following the dis-
       trict court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint, which he
       brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Trion; the City
       of Summerville; and Chattooga County (collectively, “the defend-
       ants”). His complaint claims that he gave local government offi-
       cials certain ideas about potential town projects, and the officials
       took those ideas and used them without paying him for the ideas,
       purportedly in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights.
       The district court dismissed his suit for, inter alia, failure to state a
       claim upon which relief could be granted and improper service as
       to two of the defendants.
              On appeal, Regalado argues that: (1) the district court erred
       in finding that the defendants did not violate his rights under the
       Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments because they seized his
       intellectual property without compensation or due process; (2) the
       defendants’ actions violated his contractual rights; and (3) he
       properly served all defendants. 1 After careful review, we affirm.

       1 Regalado has also filed three motions on appeal: to stay the judgment due to

       an emergency surgery and two related motions to seal his medical records.
       Regalado offers no law to support his argument that we should stay the judg-
       ment and it is unclear how the surgery would necessitate that we do so.
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       23-12258                 Opinion of the Court                            3

                                           I.
              When appropriate, we review de novo a district court’s ruling
       on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d
       870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008). A court must view the complaint in the
       light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all the plaintiff’s well
       pleaded facts as true. Id. We also review de novo a district court’s
       interpretation of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
       Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll Cty. Comm’rs, 476 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th
       Cir. 2007). We review for abuse of discretion a court’s dismissal
       without prejudice of a complaint for failure to timely serve a de-
       fendant under Rule 4(m), as well as a court’s decision to grant an
       extension of time under Rule 4(m). Id. We will affirm unless we
       conclude that the district court has made a clear error of judgment
       or has applied the wrong legal standard. Richardson v. Johnson, 598
       F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010).
               To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege
       sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft
       v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility
       when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
       draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
       misconduct alleged.” Id. “[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted
       deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will

       However, Regalado’s medical records are of little public value and are per-
       sonal in nature. Accordingly, we DENY his motion to stay the judgment and
       GRANT both motions to seal.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-12258

       not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d
       1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). However, “[w]here a more carefully
       drafted complaint might state a claim,” a pro se plaintiff “must be
       given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district
       court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252
       F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted).
               Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
       counseled pleadings and, therefore, are liberally construed. Tan-
       nenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Nev-
       ertheless, pro se litigants are still required to conform to procedural
       rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). Fur-
       ther, liberal treatment of pro se pleadings “does not give a court li-
       cense to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an other-
       wise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v.
       Air Jamaica, 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).
               An appellant abandons an issue by failing to challenge it on
       appeal. See Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994) (ap-
       plying this abandonment rule to a pro se litigant). An appellant also
       abandons a claim where he presents it only in “passing references”
       or “in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and
       authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681
       (11th Cir. 2014). “[S]imply stating that an issue exists,” without
       providing reasoning and citation to authority that the appellant re-
       lies on, “constitutes abandonment of that issue.” Id. (quoting Singh
       v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009)). Further, to
       obtain reversal of a district court judgment based on multiple,
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       23-12258                Opinion of the Court                          5

       independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that every
       stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect. Id. at 680.
                                         II.
               First, we are unpersuaded by Regalado’s argument that the
       district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 claims alleging viola-
       tions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Section
       1983 prohibits officials acting under color of state law from depriv-
       ing another of their constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A mu-
       nicipal or county government may be subject to suit under § 1983
       “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether
       made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly
       be said to represent official policy, inflicts . . . injury.” Monell v.
       Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978).
              The Fifth Amendment provides that: “No person shall be . .
       . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
       nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
       pensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment thus
       prohibits governmental takings of personal property, including in-
       tellectual property. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 359–60
       (2015). The “just compensation” clause in the Fifth Amendment
       applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. First
       Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cnty., Cal.,
       482 U.S. 304, 310 n.4 (1987). The Fourteenth Amendment similarly
       protects against the deprivation of property without due process of
       law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12258

              The Fourth Amendment, which also applies to the states
       through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects individuals from un-
       reasonable seizures of their property. Gennusa v. Canova, 748 F.3d
       1103, 1109–10 (11th Cir. 2014). A seizure of property occurs when
       there has been a meaningful interference with a person’s posses-
       sory interest in the property. Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1136
       (11th Cir. 2018). The “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
       reasonableness.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quota-
       tions and citation omitted). Reasonableness is measured by exam-
       ining the totality of the circumstances. Id.
              For starters, it appears that Regalado has failed to adequately
       preserve on appeal his challenge to the district court’s dismissal of
       his constitutional claims. As the record reflects, the district court
       held that his constitutional claims failed for multiple reasons; one
       of these reasons was that Regalado had not alleged any facts to es-
       tablish that Chattooga County was subject to suit. Indeed, to make
       out his constitutional claim under § 1983, Regalado needed to plead
       that the County had policies or customs related to his allegations,
       see Monell, 436 U.S. at 695, and he alleged nothing of the sort.
               However, Regalado’s brief on appeal does not address the
       district court’s dismissal of his constitutional claims based on his
       failure to allege facts establishing that the County was subject to
       suit. As a result, he has not expressly challenged one of the inde-
       pendent grounds on which the district court based its dismissal,
       which means that he abandoned on appeal any challenge to his
       constitutional claims against the County. Nor does his brief make
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       23-12258               Opinion of the Court                        7

       any substantive argument about the court’s dismissal of his intel-
       lectual property claims, so he has abandoned this issue as well.
              Regardless, even if we were somehow able to find that Re-
       galado had implicitly preserved sufficient challenges to this issues,
       they would still fail. As for the Fourth Amendment claim, Rega-
       lado did not allege facts showing that an illegal seizure of property
       occurred because his complaint states that he gave his plans to Chat-
       tooga County. And by voluntarily relinquishing control over the
       plans, he cannot be said to have a reasonable possessory interest in
       it. Crocker, 886 F.3d at 1136; Ohio, 519 U.S. at 39.
               Regalado’s Fifth Amendment claim also fails because his
       complaint did not allege facts showing that the County used his
       plans for a medical center. Rather, he said he learned that a medical
       facility was going to be built in the Town of Trion and he assumed
       the defendants had used his plans. This conclusory allegation is
       insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Oxford Asset Mgmt., 297
       F.3d at 1188. Even though the Fifth Amendment prohibits govern-
       mental takings of intellectual property, Regalado’s idea cannot be
       “taken” unless the County actually implemented it. Horne, 576 U.S.
       at 359–60. And for similar reasons, Regalado’s Fourteenth Amend-
       ment claim fails too, since he did not allege that the defendants ac-
       tually used any of the ideas he freely gave to them.
               Accordingly, because Regalado failed to adequately allege
       his constitutional claims, and then failed to properly challenge the
       district court’s dismissal of them, we affirm as to these issues.
                                       III.
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12258

               We are also unconvinced by Regalado’s argument that the
       district court erred in dismissing his breach of contract claims. In
       Georgia, “[a]ll contracts entered into by the county governing au-
       thority with other persons [o]n behalf of the county shall be in writ-
       ing and entered on its minutes.” O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1. But Regalado
       did not allege that he had entered into a written contract with Chat-
       tooga County, as required by Georgia law. Thus, his contract
       claims were properly dismissed, and we also affirm in this respect.
                                        IV.
               Finally, we find no merit in Regalado’s argument that the
       district court abused its discretion in dismissing without prejudice
       his claims against the Town of Trion and the City of Summerville.
       Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provides that state-created gov-
       ernments must be served by: “(A) delivering a copy of the sum-
       mons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer; or (B) serv-
       ing a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state’s law for
       serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.” Fed. R.
       Civ. P. 4(j)(2). Under Georgia law, cities and towns must be served
       by “delivering a copy of the summons attached to a copy of the
       complaint . . . to the chairman of the board of commissioners, pres-
       ident of the council of trustees, mayor or city manager of the city,
       or to an agent authorized by appointment to receive service of pro-
       cess.” O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(5).
              When a defendant is not served within 90 days of filing of
       the complaint, the district court, on motion or on its own after no-
       tice to the plaintiff, “must dismiss the action without prejudice
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       23-12258                  Opinion of the Court                                9

       against that defendant or order that service be made within a spec-
       ified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). However, if the plaintiff shows
       good cause for failure to timely effect service, the court “must ex-
       tend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Id. The pro-
       cedural requirement of service of process must be satisfied before
       a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
       De Gazelle Grp., Inc. v. Tamaz Trading Establishment, 817 F.3d 747,
       748 (11th Cir. 2016).
              Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dis-
       missing without prejudice Regalado’s claims against the Town of
       Trion and the City of Summerville under Rule 4(m). Regalado has
       stated, below and on appeal, that he served two private attorneys
       rather than any Trion or Summerville officials, as required by
       O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). Further, both
       Trion and Summerville deny that these private attorneys were au-
       thorized to receive service. Thus, the district court did not make a
       clear error of judgment or applied the wrong legal standard, and
       we affirm.2
              AFFIRMED.

       2        Regalado also argues that the defendants and the court violated several
       statutes and regulations that are irrelevant to his claims. For example, he says
       that the defendants violated the “general character of truthfulness” in
       O.C.G.A. § 24-6-608 and the Georgia Code of Ethics for Government Service,
       O.C.G.A. § 45-10-1. He also claims that the district court violated Federal Rule
       of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)(3), and American Bar Association Rule 2.2 “Impar-
       tiality and Fairness.” However, because these statements have no applicability
       to his claims or in the manner he describes, we need not address them further.