Court Opinion

ID: 9956881
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Date Created: 2024-04-03 13:00:43.39522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.237835
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USCA11 Case: 22-13699    Document: 32-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13699
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        QUINTON PAUL HANDLON,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cr-00145-JES-MRM-1
                            ____________________
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        22-13699               Opinion of the Court                         2

        Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Quinton Handlon appeals the denial of his motion for
        compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues
        that the district court erred because his father’s poor health and
        need for a caregiver constituted an extraordinary and compelling
        reason to justify a sentence reduction. Because Handlon has failed
        to show that he is eligible for compassionate release, we affirm.
                                          I.
               Handlon sexually abused his minor niece for years when she
        was between the ages of eleven and fifteen years old. See
        Presentence Report ¶¶ 13–19. He demanded that she send him
        explicit pictures, pressured her into engaging in sexual activity with
        him, and discussed over email a “business plan” to feature her
        pictures and videos on an “Adult web site.” Id. ¶19. Upon
        Handlon’s arrest, law enforcement seized more than 140
        pornographic photos and three pornographic videos of his niece
        from multiple devices at his residences and on his person, including
        a thumb drive in his pocket containing naked pictures of his niece
        when she was eleven years old. Id. ¶¶ 21–28.
               After a four-day jury trial, Handlon was convicted of
        producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a)
        and 2251(e); coercing and enticing a minor to engage in sexual
        activity for the production of child pornography in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 2422(b); and possessing child pornography in violation of
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        22-13699               Opinion of the Court                        3

        18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2252(b)(2). Id. ¶¶ 2–5. Handlon was
        sentenced to life on the coercion and enticement count, and to
        concurrent sentences of 360 months and 120 months on the
        production and possession counts.
               Now incarcerated, Handlon filed a motion for
        compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), contending
        that his eighty-five-year-old father had been diagnosed with lung
        cancer and “need[ed] help.” Handlon requested that he be released
        “to have what time [he had] left with [his] father.” The district
        court denied that motion because Handlon “provided no
        supporting documentation regarding his father’s condition or care,
        or whether defendant is the only available caretaker.”
                Handlon tried again, ﬁling what he called a “motion to
        amend” his earlier motion for compassionate release. Handlon
        clariﬁed that his father did not have lung cancer. Instead Handlon’s
        father had the following medical conditions, which Handlon
        documented with a letter from his father’s attending medical
        provider: chronic stage 3 kidney disease, cerebral infarction to
        embolism of middle cerebral artery, memory impairment, hearing
        loss, and aneurysm of thoracic aorta. Handlon also purported to
        “state under oath” that two of his sisters lived in the same town as
        his father but that “both have children of th[eir] own and I’ve been
        told they visit as much as they can but there is no one that can stay
        with him around the clock.”
              The district court construed Handlon’s “motion to amend”
        as a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion for
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        22-13699               Opinion of the Court                         4

        compassionate release. The court denied the motion for
        reconsideration, concluding that “the additional information
        fail[ed] to support an extraordinary and compelling circumstance
        for a reduction in sentence and release [of Handlon] to care for his
        father.”
               This appeal followed.
                                         II.
                A “court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it
        has been imposed except” in certain circumstances established by
        statute or rule. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see United States v. Giron, 15
        F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). One of those circumstances is
        known as “compassionate release,” Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345, which
        allows a court to reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment “upon
        motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
        administrative rights,” where the court has “consider[ed] the
        factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are
        applicable,” and found that “extraordinary and compelling reasons
        warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United
        States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 909–10 (11th Cir. 2021).
               To award compassionate release, the court must also find
        that the sentence “reduction is consistent with applicable policy
        statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. §
        3582(c)(1)(A). The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s policy statement
        on compassionate release requires that the defendant “not [be] a
        danger to the safety of any other person or to the community.”
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        22-13699                  Opinion of the Court                                5

        United States Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.13(a)(2) (Nov. 2023); see
        also United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2021). 1
                 “Because all three conditions — i.e., support in the § 3553(a)
        factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adherence to
        § 1B1.13’s policy statement — are necessary, the absence of even
        one would foreclose a sentence reduction.” United States v. Tinker,
        14 F.4th 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021). The district court did not
        consider the § 3553(a) factors. It did not decide whether Handlon
        was a danger to the safety of other people or to the community, so
        it did not have the opportunity to consider that “pedophiles who
        have sexually abused children are a threat to continue doing so
        . . . .” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1214 (11th Cir. 2010); see
        also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (expressing “grave
        concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex
        offenders and their dangerousness as a class” and stating that “[t]he
        risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is frightening and high”)
        (quotation marks omitted); United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179,
        1201 (11th Cir. 2008) (“As Congress has found and as we have
        discussed, child sex offenders have appalling rates of recidivism . . .
        .”); Irey, 612 F.3d at 1215–16 (listing “cases in which serious crimes
        were committed by those on supervised release” including child
        pornography and child molestation). Instead the court found that
        Handlon had failed to satisfy the “extraordinary and compelling

                1 The policy statement in effect when Handlon’s motion was before
        the district court used the same language. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2) (Nov. 2018).
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        22-13699               Opinion of the Court                         6

        reason” condition, which was a suﬃcient basis to deny Handlon’s
        motion. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–39.
               “We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a
        sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Giron, 15
        F.4th at 1345. “After eligibility is established, we review a district
        court’s denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of
        discretion.” Id.
               When Handlon ﬁled his motion and when the district court
        reviewed it, the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement had
        identiﬁed only four categories of “extraordinary and compelling”
        reasons that could make a movant eligible for a sentence reduction:
        (1) the defendant’s medical condition, (2) the defendant’s age,
        (3) the defendant’s status as the only potential caregiver for a minor
        child or spouse, and (4) “other reasons” as determined by the
        Director of the Bureau of Prisons. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1249–50;
        U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)–(D). That last “catch-all” category
        did not “grant discretion to courts to develop ‘other reasons’ that
        might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence.” Bryant, 996
        F.3d at 1247–48; see also id. at 1262–65.
               Handlon contends that his father’s medical condition and
        the limited availability of other caregivers make Handlon eligible
        for compassionate release. He asserts that his father is now
        receiving treatment for kidney cancer. He reasserts that his sisters
        “have been helping our father as much as they can, but n[e]ither
        can remain with him.” In Handlon’s view, the district court should
        have recognized that his father’s “hea[l]th issue’s [sic] and living
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        22-13699                Opinion of the Court                          7

        alone should be considered an [e]xtraordinary or compelling
        reason to grant Handlon home conﬁnement so he can remain to
        watch over our father when others are unable to do so.”
               The government responds that Handlon is not eligible for
        compassionate release because, at the time his motion was before
        the district court, the need to care for an incapacitated parent did
        not ﬁt into any of the four recognized categories of extraordinary
        and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction. Handlon does
        not deny that fact. Instead he suggests that, if the incapacitation of
        a spouse or of a caregiver of a dependent child can justify
        compassionate release, then the incapacitation of a parent should,
        too. Handlon argues that “the best int[e]rest of the rule of law”
        calls for allowing him to be released from his sentence of life
        imprisonment to assist his siblings with his father’s care.
               The district court did not err when it determined that
        Handlon is ineligible for compassionate release because he failed to
        present an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief
        recognized by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement.
        Congress delegated the power to “define ‘what should be
        considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence
        reduction’” to the Sentencing Commission, not the courts. Bryant,
        996 F.3d at 1249 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)). A district court is right
        to reject a rationale for a sentence reduction that “does not fall
        within any of the reasons that 1B1.13 identifies as ‘extraordinary
        and compelling.’” Id. at 1265. Handlon’s asserted need to care for
        an incapacitated parent was not included in the list of reasons the
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        22-13699               Opinion of the Court                          8

        Sentencing Commission considered to be “extraordinary and
        compelling,” so his motion was properly denied. See id.
                Since the parties submitted their briefs to this Court, an
        amendment to the policy statement contained in the relevant
        guidelines has gone into eﬀect. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 814
        (effective Nov. 1, 2023). The newest version of the policy
        statement includes in its definitions of “[e]xtraordinary and
        compelling reasons” a circumstance that is closer to the ground
        Handlon has asserted: “The incapacitation of the defendant’s
        parent when the defendant would be the only available caregiver
        for the parent.” Id. at 200–01 (emphasis added); see U.S.S.G.
        § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) (Nov. 2023). Handlon urges us to give eﬀect to
        that amendment and to accept his father’s need for him to act as a
        caregiver (in addition to his sisters, depending on their availability)
        as an extraordinary and compelling reason potentially justifying
        relief.
                But we can retroactively apply that amendment in this
        appeal only if it is a “clarifying” amendment, not if it is a
        “substantive” amendment. See United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d
        1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 2011). The 2023 amendment to § 1B1.13
        altered the text of the guideline itself to allow for compassionate
        release in a new circumstance. That is a substantive amendment.
        See id. at 1185 (“An amendment that alters the text of the Guideline
        itself suggests a substantive change, while an amendment that
        alters only the commentary suggests a clarification.”) (citations
        omitted); United States v. Summers, 176 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.
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        22-13699                   Opinion of the Court                                  9

        1999) (“[T]he alteration of actual Guideline language strongly
        suggests that a substantive change was being made.”). We cannot
        give it retroactive effect in this appeal.
               The government suggests that Handlon could ﬁle a new
        motion for compassionate release now that the amendment to the
        policy statement is in eﬀect. It appears that nothing in 18 U.S.C. §
        3582 prevents Handlon from doing that. But there was no error in
        the district court’s denial of the motion before the new amendment
        went into effect.
               The district court correctly ruled that Handlon failed to
        establish that he was eligible for relief under 18 U.S.C.
        § 3582(c)(1)(A). We affirm the denial of Handlon’s motion for
        compassionate release. 2

                2 Handlon also argues in his reply brief to this Court that he is
        “factually innocent,” and he requests a subpoena to help challenge email
        evidence used against him at trial “if it is within [this Court’s] power to grant”
        that request. It is not. Handlon’s argument that he was improperly convicted
        is not a recognized extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence
        reduction, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b); Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1265, nor a proper basis
        for seeking relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See, e.g., Antonelli v. Warden,
        U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1351 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A] [28 U.S.C.] § 2255
        motion is the exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner to collaterally attack his
        conviction and sentence . . . .”); see also United States v. Amato, 48 F.4th 61, 63
        (2d Cir. 2022) (affirming the denial of a motion for compassionate release
        where the district court refused to “consider new evidence proffered for the
        purpose of attacking the validity of the underlying conviction”); United States
        v. Fine, 982 F.3d 1117, 1118–19 (8th Cir. 2020) (affirming the denial of a motion
        brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) in part because the movant’s argument
        “that he was actually innocent of his sentence” was properly construed as “an
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        22-13699                  Opinion of the Court                               10

               AFFIRMED.

        unauthorized successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence”).
        If Handlon — having already filed an unsuccessful motion to vacate, set aside,
        or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 — wants to attempt to file a
        second or successive § 2255 motion, then he “must first obtain authorization
        from the Court of Appeals.” Telcy v. United States, 20 F.4th 735, 737 (11th Cir.
        2021); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). So far his attempts to do so have been
        unsuccessful. See In re Handlon, No. 23-14069 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2024) (denying
        Handlon’s application to authorize the district court to consider his second or
        successive § 2255 motion).