Court Opinion

ID: 9723185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:05:33.87005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:45.406466
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent on the basis (1) that submission of an accommodation offense under the statute requires proof of the affirmative element of “accommodation” and (2) there is a total lack of such evidence.
The issue here presented arises as a result of a recent change in our controlled substance statute, section 204.410, relating to proof of the accommodation offense.
Prior to July 1, 1976, section 204.410 established a two-step procedure wherein a defendant convicted of delivery of a controlled substance or of possession with intent to deliver could request an accommodation hearing if he desired the question of his status as an accommodator to be adjudicated. Section 204.410, Code 1975. If defendant properly requested the accommodation hearing prior to sentencing, see State v. Miller, Iowa, 241 N.W.2d 909, 911, the jury then passed on the sole issue of whether defendant by his act intended to accommodate another or intended to profit thereby. After the landmark case of State v. Monroe, Iowa, 236 N.W.2d 24, not only was a jury required at the second trial but the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not an accommodator. In State v. McNabb, Iowa, 241 N.W.2d 32, 34, 35, we defined “accommodation” in terms of favor to another and contrasted it with “profit” which generally means excess of returns over expenditures in a given transaction.
I. By the recent amendment, this two-step system has been replaced by a unified procedure wherein the jury may decide an accommodation offense in the main trial. The new section, 66 G.A. (1976 Session) ch. 1245, ch. 4, section 231 (now codified as section 204.410, Code 1977), which became effective July 1, 1976, provides:
“Accommodation offense. In a prosecution for unlawful delivery or possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, if the prosecution proves that the defendant violated the provisions of section 204.401, subsection 1 but fails to prove that the defendant delivered or possessed with intent to deliver the controlled substance for the purpose of making a profit, the defendant shall be guilty of an accommodation offense and shall be sentenced as if he had been convicted of a violation of section 204.401, subsection 3. An accommodation offense may be *863proved as an included offense under a charge of delivering or possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of section 204.401, subsection 1.” (Emphasis supplied).
It is readily apparent on examination of this section the legislature intends that an accommodation offense may be proved and submitted to the jury when the record includes proof of accommodation. Accommodation is not an element of the offense of which defendant was charged and convicted.
II. Assuming, as the majority does, that accommodation is an included lesser offense herein we must consider the established law in this area.
The State in its brief stresses that we have consistently stated a lesser included offense is appropriate for submission only when the elements of the lesser offense are an elementary part of the greater offense and there is a factual basis in the record for submitting the case to the jury. I agree. State v. Billings, Iowa, 242 N.W.2d 726. Thus defendant was only entitled to the simple possession instruction in addition to intent with delivery for profit under the facts of this case.
The record before us is completely lacking of any evidence on which the jury could base a finding defendant intended to deliver the heroin not for profit — an accommodation. The evidence only referred to intent to deliver for profit. Defendant’s statements to the arresting officers included undisputed admission he intended to deliver the drugs for profit. Therefore the facts in this case plainly excluded submission of intent to deliver as an accommodation. See State v. York, Iowa, 256 N.W.2d 922; State v. McNabb, supra, pages 34, 35 of 241 N.W.2d.
Of course, a lesser included offense is not submitted unless the evidence justifies it in the particular case. State v. Billings, supra, page 731 of 242 N.W.2d; State v. Smith, Iowa, 223 N.W.2d 223, 225; State v. Lamar, Iowa, 210 N.W.2d 600, 606.
I would hold defendant’s contention he is entitled to reversal on the ground the trial court erred in refusing to submit possession with intent to deliver not for profit is untenable.
LeGRAND, REES and HARRIS, JJ., join in this dissent.