Court Opinion

ID: 9957107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 17:12:01.978612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.387469
License: Public Domain

J-S27019-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 ANDREW TERRY INGRAM                        :
                                            :
                    Appellant               :   No. 505 MDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 14, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-01-CR-0001106-2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                FILED APRIL 03, 2024

      Andrew Terry Ingram appeals from the judgment of sentence of

seventy-two hours to six months of incarceration imposed following his

convictions of three counts of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and one

count of failing to drive on the right side of the roadway. Upon review, we

affirm.

      We previously summarized the procedural and factual history as follows:

      This case stems from a traffic stop conducted by Pennsylvania
      State Police (“PSP”) Trooper Alexander Loder [around midnight]
      on June 13, 2022. Trooper Loder was driving behind Appellant
      when Trooper Loder observed Appellant’s front and rear driver’s
      side tires cross the double yellow centerline. Appellant continued
      to travel with a portion of his vehicle over the centerline for sixteen
      seconds. Trooper Loder initiated a traffic stop and Appellant
      complied by pulling over. The trooper approached Appellant and,
      upon speaking with him, smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana
      and noticed that Appellant had bloodshot eyes. Appellant stated
      that he had smoked marijuana twenty to thirty minutes before the
      stop. Trooper Loder conducted field sobriety tests and ultimately
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      concluded that Appellant was under the influence of marijuana
      and could not safely drive.     Appellant was arrested and
      subsequently consented to a blood draw, which revealed the
      presence of marijuana.

      On January 6, 2023, Appellant proceeded to a combined
      suppression hearing and bench trial.      [At the hearing, the
      Commonwealth presented a dashcam video that recorded the stop
      and the events immediately preceding it.] The trial court denied
      Appellant’s suppression motion, found him guilty as indicated
      above, and sentenced him. This timely appeal followed. The trial
      court entered an order directing Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.
      1925(b) statement, but none was filed. The court issued a
      statement suggesting the appeal be dismissed as a result. Over
      one month later, counsel filed an untimely concise statement on
      Appellant’s behalf, raising a single issue challenging the
      sufficiency of the evidence. Counsel then filed in this Court [an
      application to withdraw and brief pursuant to Anders v.
      California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v.
      Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009)], presenting the same
      sufficiency challenge as the only issue arguably supporting an
      appeal.

            Given this procedural posture, and the fact that the certified
      record was missing material items, we denied counsel’s petition,
      remanded for counsel to ensure inclusion within the certified
      record of all necessary materials, and directed the trial court to
      file a Rule 1925(a) opinion in response to the untimely Rule
      1925(b) statement.

Commonwealth v. Ingram, 307 A.3d 685, 2023 WL 6999363, at *1

(Pa.Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision) (cleaned up).

      Ultimately, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.           Counsel

supplemented the record with all pertinent evidence, including the dashcam

video, and filed an advocate’s brief. Accordingly, the matter is now ripe for

our review, and we proceed to the merits of Appellant’s sole issue on appeal:

“Did the trial court err in finding sufficient evidence to establish a violation of

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[§] 3301 of the Motor Vehicle Code, based on Appellant’s momentary and

slight crossing of the double yellow line without impeding any other vehicle

traveling on that section of roadway at this time?” Appellant’s brief at 3.

       While at first appearing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence,

Appellant in actuality assails the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion

based upon the court’s finding that the trooper had probable cause to stop his

vehicle for violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3301.1 We consider such a claim mindful of

the following legal principles:

       An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
       to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
       whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
       the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
       facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
       the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
       Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
       remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
       a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
       supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
       findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
       erroneous.     Where the appeal of the determination of the
       suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
       suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
       appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
       court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
       of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth argues that we should find the suppression issue waived

for failure to clearly articulate it in the Rule 1925(b) statement. See
Commonwealth’s brief at 8. However, since the trial court readily identified
the precise issue Appellant sought to raise on appeal and addressed it in its
Rule 1925(a) opinion upon remand, we decline to find waiver.

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Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263, 266 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned

up).

       It is undisputed that the trooper stopped Appellant’s vehicle because he

crossed the double yellow centerline, which is prohibited by § 3301.2 Since

the stop was based upon a perceived traffic violation that required no further

investigation, Trooper Loder needed to have probable cause for it to pass

constitutional muster. Id. at 267. In that regard, we reiterate “that a police

officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a

traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Id. (cleaned up).

       The trial court found that Appellant had driven his vehicle “with its front

and rear driver’s side tires over the double yellow centerline for over [sixteen]

seconds” for “no valid reason[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 8/29/23, at 7. Based

upon Appellant’s violation of § 3301, the court held that Trooper Loder had

probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. Id. Appellant contends that these

factual findings are not supported by the record. See Appellant’s brief at 16.

In particular, he argues that the dashcam video contravenes Trooper Loder’s

testimony, showing his tires on the centerline, but not across it, except for

perhaps two seconds. Id. at 17. Consequently, he maintains that this fleeting

infraction cannot support a finding of probable cause.        Id. at 18-19.    In

____________________________________________

2 Section 3301 of the Vehicle Code provides, except for delineated exceptions:

“Upon all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right
half of the roadway[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a).

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support, Appellant relies on this Court’s prior declaration that we were “not

foreclos[ing] the possibility that a momentary and minor violation of § 3301

might, in a different case, be insufficient to establish probable cause for a

vehicle stop.” Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 847 (Pa.Super. 2013).

        Upon review, we do not find this to be that case. At the suppression

hearing, Trooper Loder testified that as he traveled behind Appellant’s vehicle,

he “observed the vehicle cross over the center double-yellow line for

approximately [sixteen] seconds.” N.T. Suppression, 1/6/23, at 7. From that

vantage point, Appellant “was clearly over the double-yellow line.” Id. at 9.

Our review of the dashcam video does not undermine this testimony.

Preliminarily, it bears mentioning that the video is visually grainy and the

extreme contrast between the low-light nighttime conditions and bursts of

overexposure from vehicle and streetlights makes it difficult to ascertain the

precise location of the vehicle’s tires in relation to the centerline during the

thirty-second range from 0:17, when the dashcam begins to continuously

capture the vehicle, to 0:47, when the vehicle comes into clearer focus. Once

in focus, though, the front and rear tires of the driver’s side of the vehicle are

plainly past the near-line of the double-yellow division, and wavering on and

past the far-line, until the vehicle drifts back into the appropriate lane around

0:50.

        Based on the foregoing, we determine that the trial court’s factual

findings are supported by the record and, consequently, that Appellant’s

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violation of § 3301 was neither minor nor momentary. Discerning no error in

the court’s conclusion that Trooper Loder had probable cause to stop the

vehicle for a violation of § 3301, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/03/2024

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