Court Opinion

ID: 9425870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:16:03.512419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:58.102369
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White,
joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun,
dissenting.
The Court, in reaching an interpretation of the immigration statutes which permits a finding that daily and seasonal commuters from Mexico and Canada are “special immigrants” not subject to documentation and numerical restrictions upon entry to this country, contravenes one of the cardinal principles of statutory construction: “administrative practice does not avail to overcome a statute so plain in its commands as to leave nothing for construction.” Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933) (Cardozo, J.). Administrative construction over a long period of time is an available tool for judicial interpretation of a statute only when the statutory terms are doubtful or ambiguous. . United States v. Southern Ute Indians, 402 U. S. 159, 173 n. 8 (1971); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 52 (1939); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, supra. In light of the characteristics of the aliens whose status is in question and the ordinary meaning of *81the very specific terms Congress used in these immigration statutes, this principle applies with force here.
I
Daily and seasonal commuters both reside in fact in either Mexico or Canada and cross the border into this country either daily or seasonally to work.1 The daily commuter’s defining characteristic is his limited presence in this country; he comes across the border to work each day and returns to his actual dwelling place in Mexico or Canada when his work is done. The seasonal commuter, in contrast, remains in this country continuously during the seasons in which he works here, but then absents himself completely for the remaining portions of the year. For the Court to reach its result, it must undertake the unlikely project of demonstrating that these aliens are in legal effect permanent residents of the United States under the immigration laws.
To qualify as a “special immigrant” given dispensations from normal documentation requirements and numerical limitations, a commuter must be “an immigrant, lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (27) (B). The included phrase “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” means in turn “the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.” §1101 (a) (20). The immigration laws define “perma*82nent residence” as “the place of general abode,” a person’s “principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent,” § 1101 (a) (33), with the relationship of the person to the place of residence being “of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary . . . §1101 (a) (31). Under the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s own regulations, in order to be exempt from the normal documentation requirements upon entry, an alien must be returning to his “unrelin-quished lawful permanent residence” from a “temporary absence abroad.” 8 CFR §211.1 (b)(1). On its face, the present practice of the Service is flatly contrary to its own regulation.
Confronted with the obvious difficulty that this statutory language defining permanent resident status and the regulations will not accommodate the daily and seasonal commuters,2 the majority, without the aid of legislative history, contends that these plain words should be given special, technical meanings:
“Section 1101 (a) (20) defines ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’ as ‘the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed’ (italics added). The definition makes the phrase descriptive of a status or privilege which need not be reduced to a permanent residence *83to be satisfied, so long as that status has not changed.” Ante, at 71 (italics supplied by the Court).
The use of italics will not alter the ordinary meaning of the statutory terminology, however, and the Court gives no basis for believing that Congress intended something other than the ordinary meaning of the words it used. No one could reasonably suggest that Congress was seeking to accommodate the commuters when it enacted these definitions and to provide special status to those who do not reside and do not intend to reside in this country. Clearly it was dealing with those aliens who seek permanent-resident status in this country and who fulfill that intention.
Since the language of the statute simply will not bend to allow the proposition which the Government and the Court adopt — that in defining “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” Congress meant to include persons who have never intended to reside permanently in this country, who do not currently reside in this country, and who never will become actual permanent residents3 — the ultimate rationale for the decision must be .that the plain *84meaning of the statute has been changed by a longstanding administrative practice accepted by Congress as the appropriate construction.4
II
Administrative construction of a statute which conflicts with the express meaning of the statutory terms can be viewed as authoritative only if it appears that Congress has in fact accepted that construction, and the burden of proof necessarily is on the proponent of the administrative view. Since “ [c] ongressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis,” Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 185-186, n. 21 (1969), congressional silence standing alone cannot constitute congressional acceptance of a continuing administrative practice. The Court, however, elevates such silence to acquiescence by stressing proof of the practice and the absence of any indication that Congress has “repealed” it. Ante, at 75.
The administrative practice of treating daily commuters as immigrant aliens began in 1927 with the Depart*85ment of Labor’s General Order No. 86.5 Since Mexicans and Canadians were not subject to numerical limitations on entry into this country, this classification of the commuters had no practical effect upon them; informal documentation requirements were followed.6 It was not until 1952 that Congress enacted a provision which could have limited the entry of commuters. Under § 212 (a) (14) of the 1952 Act, 66 Stat. 183, Congress provided that an immigrant could not enter if the Secretary of Labor certified that there were sufficient domestic workers available in his field of work or that his entry would have an adverse impact on the wages or working conditions of domestic workers. In 1965, Congress tightened this restriction by providing that aliens were inadmissible unless the Secretary of Labor certified that there were insufficient domestic workers available in the field and that the employment of aliens would not adversely affect wages and conditions of American workers. 8 TJ. S. C. § 1182 (a) (14).7 In another 1965 amendment, Congress *86imposed the first quota on immigration from the Western Hemisphere, effective in 1968.8
There can be no reasonable presumption, therefore, that prior to 1952 Congress concerned itself with the propriety of the administrative classification of daily commuters under the immigration statutes.9 Only with the passage of the 1952 legislation and subsequent amendments was there evidence of some possible concern on the part of Congress with the number of Mexican and Canadian aliens entering this country to work. Thus if Congress both expressed concern at the influx of alien workers but approved the commuter practice, then the Court’s conclusion of congressional acquiescence in the administrative construction would have some persuasive force. Since that construction conflicts with the meaning of the statute on its face, however, something more than silence is required to establish acquiescence. Cf. Leary v. United States, 395 U. S. 6, 24-25 (1969). The only evidence of congressional acceptance cited by the Court is a brief description of the prior practice with respect to commuters contained in an extremely extensive report of an investigation of this Nation’s immigration system published by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1950.10 *87The fact that “[n]o doubt as to the desirability of the practice was expressed,” ante, at 78, will not overcome the fact that the terms of the statute passed two years later are incompatible with that practice, and neither the Court nor the Government can point to any express congressional acceptance of that practice in spite of the incompatibility.11 The Court does say that since 1965 there have been numerous committee reports indicating congressional knowledge of the commuter problem and that Congress “has not reached a consensus that the administrative policy ... is wrong.” Ibid. But the Court has clearly, and erroneously, placed the burden upon Congress to show that it has not accepted the practice rather than on the administrative agency to establish that Congress has acquiesced.
Very recently, in noting an exception to the principle of giving great weight to an administrative construction of a statute, we said that “an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly violating its statutory mandate.” FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 745 (1973). But the Court has allowed an agency to do so in this case.12
*88Ill
The majority acknowledges the many political, economic, and social implications of the issues in this case and the need for the Court to legislate only when interstitial ambiguities in a statute require resolution, but it then rests its rejection of these unambiguous provisions of the immigration laws'upon legislative considerations: the economic consequences to the alien commuters and to their communities of finding that the administrative practice is not consistent with the statute, the possible impact upon American border communities if those commuters who are legally capable of doing so choose to *89take up actual residence in this country, and the need to avoid negative effects upon this country’s relations with Mexico and Canada. Ante, at 78-79. But these interests, as well as the opposing interests of domestic labor, form part of the congressional calculus, and this Court is hardly equipped or authorized to predict by its decision the direction in which that balance of interests will ultimately tip. Because I believe that the Court has strayed from the neutral judicial function of applying traditional principles of statutory construction, I must respectfully dissent.

 Counsel for the federal parties (hereinafter the Government) indicated at oral argument that commuters actually form a spectrum rather than two hard-and-fast categories. Some commuters stay in this country for whole seasons and then switch later to daily commuting. Some daily commuters come across the border less regularly than every workday, and sometimes seek only temporary employment and switch employers. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18, 52, 54.

 Strain between the statute and the administrative practice is also evident in the need for the Government to fit the daily commuter’s trip each day from his home in Mexico or Canada to his workplace in this country as a return to this country “from a temporary visit abroad.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (27) (B) (emphasis added). As indicated in the text, the regulations refer to a return to “an unrelinquished lawful permanent residence” in this country from “a temporary absence abroad . . . .” 8 CFR §211.1 (b).

 In an effort to make the facts fit the statute, the Court of Appeals found that the commuter’s place of work could be considered his permanent residence. 156 U. S. App. D. C. 304, 311, 481 F. 2d 479, 486 (1973). Others have noted the “logical inconsistency” and the lack of a precise fit between the practice and the law but have justified the discordance by citing “practical needs and considerations of foreign policy.” 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure §2.19, p. 2-105 (1973 Cum. Supp.). The practice has been viewed as an “amiable fiction” and the product of “administrative ingenuity.” Id., §2.8b, p. 2-43 (1974). The Board of Immigration Appeals has similarly acknowledged that the commuter practice “manifestly does not fit into any precise category found in the immigration statutes” and that “[t]he status is an artificial one, predicated upon good international relations maintained and cherished between friendly neighbors.” Matter of M - D - S -, 8 I. & N. Dec. 209, 213 (1958).

 The effect of the Court’s decision is not only to stretch the meaning of the statute so as to include commuters within the permanent resident status, but also to throw into question the meaning of “permanent resident” throughout the immigration laws with obvious anomalous consequences. See Gooch v. Clark, 433 F. 2d 74, 83-85 (CA9 1970) (Wright, J., dissenting). For example, the “spouses, unmarried sons or unmarried daughters of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” are included in the second preference group for immigration visas. 8 U. S. C. §1153 (a)(2). Thus a commuter’s immediate kin are perhaps eligible for a preference although the commuter may himself have been entitled to no preference. The Government suggests that the commuter’s status for other purposes is not before the Court and need not be decided. Brief for Federal Parties 28. But the Court should be reluctant to accept an invitation to make an ad hoc decision with respect to one aspect of a statutory definition where it is clear that the definition is a central one which Congress has provided with the intent of having it applied generally.

 See the relevant text of General Order No. 86, ante, at 73-74, n. 25.

 The Court’s opinion suggests that General Order No. 86 removed commuters from quota restrictions applicable to nonimmigrants. Ante, at 77. But Mexican and Canadian commuters had not been subject to any quotas. The Immigration Act of 1924 imposed no quotas on nonimmigrants, and Mexicans and Canadians were not subject to immigrant quotas. 43 Stat. 153. The General Order was designed primarily to prevent quota aliens from entering this' country through Canada and Mexico as nonimmigrants. Letter from Secretary of Labor, dated Nov. 26, 1928, in App. A of H. R. Rep. No. 2401, 70th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-10 (1929). Informal documentation was maintained despite the classification of the commuters as immigrants because the immigration authorities did not view Congress as intending to interfere with the practice of border crossings by commuters. Report of Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration 101-102 (1968).

 The Secretary of Labor has not issued a certification allowing the entry of aliens seeking employment as farm laborers. 29 CFR §§ 60.2 (a) (2), 60.7 (Schedule B).

 § 21 (e), 79 Stat. 921.

 The Government refers to the inclusion in an early draft of a House bill, H. R. 5138, which ultimately became the Alien Registration Act of 1940, of a provision which would have prohibited any alien from entering this country from Mexico or Canada for the purposes of working or seeking employment. Hearing on H. R. 5138 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, p. 3 (1939). The deletion of that provision prior to the reporting of the bill does not signal congressional approval of the administrative classification of commuters, but rather, as with the absence of quotas restricting the entry of Mexicans and Canadians, an unwillingness to restrict such entry .which persisted at least until 1952.

 S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 535-536, 616 (1950).

 The Government concedes that the seasonal commuter practice grew after the bracero program had lapsed. Tr. of Oral Arg. 53; Brief for Federal Parties 75. See also Gordon, The Amiable Fiction — Alien Commuters Under Our Immigration Laws, in Employment of “Green Card” Aliens During Labor Disputes, Hearings on H. It. 12667 before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 181, 183 (1969). Therefore, there is even less reason for believing that Congress acquiesced in the administrative classification of seasonal commuters.

 The majority cites Massachusetts Trustees v. United States, 377 U. S. 235 (1964), and United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459 (1915), in support of its rationale of statutory construction. Ante, at 74. A comparison of the statutes and facts of those cases *88with the situation here, however, graphically reveals the extent of the majority’s departure from accepted canons of construction.
In Massachusetts Trustees the Court was faced with the problem of harmonizing apparently inconsistent sections of the same statute governing an agency’s authority. The literal language of the statute was found insufficiently precise to dispose of the question. Under these circumstances, the Court looked to the agency’s practice, which could be given “some weight”; but the successive extensions by Congress of the agency’s authority in the face of the agency’s prior practice was not, even then, to be controlling. 377 U. S., at 241-245.
In Midwest Oil Co. the Presidential power to withdraw public lands from private acquisition which Congress by legislation had made free and open to occupation and purchase was found in the hundreds of such withdrawal orders, beginning in the early years of the Government, which had not been repudiated by Congress. In addition, the Executive Order in question was issued seven years after the Secretary of the Interior, in response to a resolution of the Senate calling for information as to the authority for such withdrawals, sent to the Senate a report which cited the longstanding practice and the Executive’s claim of authority. Congress took no action to repudiate that claim. Legislation soon after the order in question authorized such withdrawals by the President prospectively, expressed no intention on the part of Congress to repudiate past withdrawals, and left the question of the validity of past withdrawals to the courts. 236 U. S., at 469-471, 480-483. Nothing in this case remotely resembles the historical record upon which congressional acquiescence was premised in Midwest Oil Co.