Court Opinion

ID: 9696340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:45:18.602025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:21.480840
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, J.
(dissenting in yurt). I would agree that the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury. However, I would not return this case to the trial court for a new trial. I would hold that the evidence did not warrant recovery against the defendant, Homestake Enterprises, Inc., on the theory of attractive nuisance. I would also hold that public policy prohibits recovery by the plaintiff, because his damages were caused by his negligent use of stolen property, and it would be unreasonable to allow recovery against the defendant even if its negligence in some way contributed to the theft of the prop*60erty, and, therefore, to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff as the result of the negligent use of the blasting caps.
The attractive nuisance doctrine relies on the presence of an artificial condition which the possessor of land has maintained or allowed to exist thereon. The majority now expands this doctrine to include personal property not associated with the land or any activity conducted thereon. A possessor who “has reason to know” of the existence of the property apparently has a duty to secure it so that it cannot be removed without permission by a child trespasser even when committing a theft. The majority disclaims imposing a duty of inspection on the possessor, at the same time holding:
“If the possessor knows of facts from which a reasonable person would infer that the condition in question exists, or would govern his conduct upon the assumption that it does exist, the possessor is charged with knowledge of the condition.” (Supra, at 53).
The majority says that the defendant could be held “to have reason to know” of the caps’ existence on the property because of the large accumulation of junk on the land. According to the majority, this might give the defendant cause to know that items were present which posed a serious risk to trespassing children. I do not dispute this conclusion, but I do dispute that knowledge of unidentified junk will permit an inference that blasting caps were present. Although the majority disclaims imposing a duty to inspect on the defendant, the “reason to know” analysis imposes not only a duty to inspect, but also a duty to find the dynamite caps.
The majority uses several pages of its opinion to distinguish between “should know” and “reason to know.” As applied to the facts of this case, the effort is wasted. Both terms, as used in the Restatement (2d) of Torts (1965), have alternative definitions charging the possessor with knowledge if a reasonable person would “gov*61ern his conduct upon the assumption that (the fact in question) exists.” Supra, at 48. The inferences which the majority uses to satisfy this dual definition are so tenuous that the majority is placing a heavier burden on the landowner than a mere duty of inspection. If the presence of junk supports a reasonable inference that blasting caps are on the premisfes, the defendant was required to assume that fact even if an inspection had been made and no caps were discovered. Having disclaimed the duty to inspect, the majority is saying that the “assumption” governs every case. This amounts to imposing strict liability on the landowner if a reasonable person would have “assumed” there was a serious risk to children, for whatever reason. With the benefit of hindsight, this is an easy assumption to make.
The majority rejects the holding of the trial judge that the plaintiff was a trespasser. This is necessary so that the majority can order a new trial, because otherwise the plaintiff’s age and knowledge of the danger would bar recovery under the attractive nuisance theory. The plaintiff was fifteen years old at the time of the incident. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that he possessed less than ordinary intelligence. He had been warned on numerous occasions of the dangers associated with blasting caps, as had his companions. This is why all three ran after the caps had been thrown in. In Shulte v. Willow River Power Co., 234 Wis. 188, 290 N.W. 629 (1940), a complaint grounded on a theory of attractive nuisance for the death of a sixteen-year-old boy was held subject to a demurrer because the attractive nuisance theory did not apply to young people of ordinary intelligence who are sixteen years of age, and there was no allegation that the boy was not of ordinary intelligence. In James v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 266 Wis. 290, 63 N.W.2d 116 (1954), the plaintiff was a fifteen-year-old boy with a mental age two or three years *62younger. He had been warned of the danger. A jury verdict returned in his favor on the attractive nuisance theory was reversed by this court.
The majority seeks to avoid the foregoing cases by holding that the plaintiff’s eleven and fourteen-year-old companions, the actual trespassers, were protected under the attractive nuisance theory and, therefore, the plaintiff was covered as well because the defendant might have breached its duty to the eleven and fourteen-year-old boys. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the younger boys were well aware of the danger posed in throwing blasting caps into a fire. Therefore, the attractive nuisance doctrine was not applicable to them, and the majority’s curious reasoning that under the attractive nuisance doctrine their negligence can somehow be attributed to the defendant, cannot be applied to the facts in this case. Further, the majority brushes aside the fact that the caps were stolen from the defendant’s land. The plaintiff was well aware that the caps were stolen property. In fact, he participated in the effort to destroy the evidence by burning the caps. The fifteen-year-old plaintiff, as well as the eleven and fourteen-year-old boys, each could have been found delinquent (guilty of the theft of the caps) under the reasoning employed in State v. Genova, 77 Wis.2d 141, 252 N.W.2d 380 (1977). As a party to the crime, the plaintiff could also have been considered as a party to the trespass.
Even if the defendant knew of the existence of the blasting caps, public policy prevents a holding that the defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. In Lichter v. Fritsch, 77 Wis.2d 178, 252 N.W.2d 360 (1977), this court held that it was against public policy to impose liability on the owner of a motor vehicle, who had negligently left the key in the ignition, for damages sustained by a third party when the vehicle was stolen by another who negligently caused the injuries of the third party. *63Applying the same reasoning, it is against public policy to allow recovery in this case. The blasting caps were stolen from the defendant’s property and were negligently thrown into the fire by one of the boys who perpetrated the theft. They exploded causing the plaintiff’s injury. I would hold that it is an unreasonable burden on the owner of land to allow recovery for injuries caused by the negligent use by a trespasser of personal property stolen from the premises of another.
The only possible distinction between Lichter v. Fritsch, supra, and the case at bar is that there was no insurance coverage in the Lichter case because the vehicle was operated without the owner’s consent and there is coverage here. If a car is left unlocked in the owner’s driveway, and is taken by another, there might not be coverage under the owner’s auto insurance policy, but there may be coverage under the owner’s homeowner’s policy. It behooves a landowner to be sure that his premises liability policy provides coverage at least as high as his automobile liability policy. Perhaps the majority would even extend coverage if the car were “hot-wired” by a juvenile. So long as attractive nuisance is being expanded beyond its intended limits to include movable, personal property which has no connection with the premises other than being present thereon, it can also be applied to a riding lawn mower or snowmobile taken by a juvenile causing injury to another off the owner’s premises. The possibilities are endless.
For the foregoing reasons, I agree that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. However, I would remand with directions to dismiss the complaint rather than order a new trial. Since the majority has ruled that there is need of a new trial and since the focus of the defendant’s liability is to be on the attractive nuisance duty to the plaintiff’s uninjured eleven and fourteen-year-old companions, I believe the defendant is also en*64titled to a comparative negligence instruction relating not only to the plaintiff’s duty of ordinary care to protect himself, but also to his duty as the oldest in the group to warn his companions of the danger of throwing blasting caps into a fire and his duty to dissuade them therefrom. The negligence of all parties is to be compared, including the former tenant and the plaintiff’s two companions as well as the plaintiff and the defendant, Homestake. If the record after retrial is the same as the one before us now, the trial court must hold that the plaintiff is more negligent than the defendant, Homestake, as a matter of law.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice William G. Callow joins in this dissent.