Court Opinion

ID: 9660845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:22:17.968677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:09.711995
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GRIFFIN,
joined by CHIEF JUSTICE CALVERT and JUSTICE SMITH and WALKER, dissenting on motion for rehearing.
The majority opinion on motion for rehearing decides no new questions of law. It seeks only to bolster further its previous upholding of the Oklahoma decree on the ground of comity. None of the cases cited in the opinion are in point on the question before us. These same cases were discussed in my original dissent and I see no point in discussing them further.
As I understand the majority opinion on motion for rehearing, it now seeks to evade the plain provisions of Arts. 2328b-l 2 and 3, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Civil Statutes, on two grounds. The first is that the prohibition against allowance of alimony for a former wife as provided in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Arts. 2328b-l, 2 and 3, applies only to alimony “of a continuing and re-occurring nature,” and to alimony “in its usual form”i.e., a continuing obligation to pay to the wife a stated sum of money at periodic intervals in lieu of the common law obligation to support the wife; and, secondly, the act really does nothing to the law existing prior to its passage and has no effect on the remedies then existing. Based on these premises, the majority then states that the original decision does not violate the public policy of Texas, and if it did so violate it, Texas should not have such public policy, and that in this case the majority is not going to be bound by such public policy.
The majority states that had this decree been for periodic payments, it would be invalid, but being for “an award of alimony in gross or an award of property in lieu of continuing *233periodic payments,” it is valid. As to allowance of a lump sum for support of the wife see Boyd v. Boyd, 22 Tex. Civ. App., 200, 1899, 54 S.W. 380, no writ history. The court in the Boyd case granted the divorce and adjudged the sum of $800 against the husband for future support of the wife, and made the $800 a charge against the husband’s interest in 80 acres of land. This action of the trial court was reversed and rendered in favor of the husband, the court saying:
“Under the laws of this state, courts are not authorized in divorce suits to provide permanent alimony for the support of the divorced wife. An allowance may be made for her support during the pendency of the suit for divorce, until the final decree is made in the case. Rev. St. art. 2986. The final decree may also order a division of the common estate, if there be such. Id. art. 2980. But the court cannot devest title out of one of the spouses, and invest it in the other. Neither can the court compel the husband, by final decree, to support the divorced wife. Pape v. Pape, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 99, 35 S.W. 479 * *
While the case has no writ history it was cited with approval in Cunningham v. Cunningham, 1931, 120 Tex. 491, 40 S.W. 2d 46.
The case of McBride v. McBride, Tex. Civ. App., 1953, 256 S.W. 2d 250, no writ history, quotes authorities frojn this court and the Courts of Civil Appeals which effectively demonstrate the error of the majority position. In discussing the allowance of permanent alimony, i.e., alimony or support of a wife after a judgment of divorce, that court said:
“First and foremost is that the Court has no jurisdiction and is without authority to grant permanent alimony. Art. 4637, V.A.C.S., Pape v. Pape, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 99, 35 S.W. 479 (San Antonio, writ dism.), Ex Parte Ellis, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 539, 40 S.W. 275; Boyd v. Boyd, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 200, 54 S. W. 380; Bond v. Bond, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 129, 90 S.W. 1128; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 40 S.W. 2d 46, 75 A.L.R. 1305; Ex parte Guinn, 121 Tex. 66, 41 S.W. 2d 219; Jinks v. Jinks, Tex. Civ. App., 205 S.W. 2d 816 (Texarkana); 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 202, p. 884, 15 Tex. Jur. p. 649.
*234“Secondly, the award of permanent alimony is against the public policy of this state.” We quote from Cunningham v. Cunningham, supra [120 Tex. 491, 40 S.W. 2d 46] :
“ ‘It thus appears that it was originally the public policy of the Republic to confer authority on the district court to compel either spouse to provide the other with proper maintenance.
“After a brief time, the Congress enacted a change in the public policy of the Republic, disclosed by sections 8, 6, 14 and 4 of the Act of January 6, 1841, which have been continuously re-enacted in substance, and are now embodied in articles 4637, 4636, 4639, and 4638 [V.A.C.S.]’.”
In Cunningham v. Cunningham, 1931, 120 Tex. 491, 40 S.W. 2d 46, 75 A.L.R. 1305, a portion of which was quoted in McBride v. McBride, this court, speaking through Justice Greenwood, discusses the cases having to do with both wife and child support as permanent alimony. All the cases held that permanent alimony could not be allowed by the courts of Texas. He applies the same rule to all orders providing support for either the wife and/or child, or children, extending beyond the final judgment in the divorce action. Summarizing as to the order before the court — a child support order — he says that first, no action can be maintained in Texas to enforce the father’s continuing duty to support his children, except as provided by the divorce statutes, and, second, that the power of the court is so limited by the divorce statutes that no order can be entered directing payments beyond the date of entry of final judgment. The same reasoning applies to permanent alimony for the support of the wife. As a result of this court’s decision in the Cunningham case, the Legislature in 1935, by enactment of Art. 4639a, changed the public policy of the state so as to provide for support of children after final divorce judgment. It is significant that the Legislature has not made any change with regard to the support of the wife by the husband after divorce judgment has become final. On the contrary, the Legislature in 1951 reiterated the public policy of the state when, by Senate amendment to the original bill, it added to Art. 2328b-l & 2 (6) and Art. 2328-3 (7) the words “but shall not include alimony for a former wife.” This language indicates its intention to preserve the public policy of this state against such awards of permanent alimony.
*235In the case of Martin v. Martin, Comm. App., 1929, 17 S.W. 2d 789, disposing of a suit by a wife for support of herself and a child, with no divorce suit pending, this court said:
“* * * our statute (article 4637, Rev. Civ. St., 1925) provides for the allowance of alimony pending suit for divorce, and until final decree is entered. This statute is exclusive in its very nature, and no alimony can be decreed by any court in this state except under its express terms.”
See also 20 Tex. Jur. 2d 611, § 289. In this state the legal duty of the husband to support his wife ceases upon the severance of the marital bonds, nor has a court the power to decree that a husband may be subjected to such support after divorce. Permanent alimony is not provided for by Texas statutes. Phillips v. Phillips, 1918, Tex. Civ. App., 203 S.W. 77, 79, no writ history, citing Pape v. Pape, 1918, 13 Tex. Civ. App., 99, 35 S.W. 479; Bond v. Bond, Tex. Civ. App., 90 S.W. 1128. The Phillips case was cited with approval in Cunningham v. Cunningham, supra.
How is the public policy of a state determined? In answering this question, Mr. Justice Storey for the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 2 Howard 127, 11 L. Ed. 205 at p. 197, says: “Nor are we at liberty to look at general considerations of the supposed public interest and policy of Pennsylvania upon this subject, beyond what its constitution and law and judicial decisions made known to us. The question, what is the public policy of a State, and what is contrary to it, if inquired into beyond these limits, will be found to be one of great vagueness and uncertainty, and to involve discussions which scarcely come within the range of judicial duty and functions, and upon which men may and will complexionally differ * * *. We disclaim any right to enter upon such examinations, beyond what the State constitutions, and laws, and decisions necessarily bring before us.” (Emphasis added). This is quoted as authority under Note 93, p. 854, 15 C.J.S., along with numerous other authorities from various states of the union to the same effect.
“In its most liberal application comity cannot be applied in opposition to the positive law of the forum. Although generally state courts accept the laws of a sister state as construed by the courts of that state, even though the construction may appear incorrect in principle, a court is not required to enforce a right *236that, although valid and enforceable in another state, contravenes the public policy of its state.” 12 Tex. Jur. 2d 304, § 3. The doctrine of comity does not require that a Texas court enforce a foreign law or give effect to rights arising thereunder if to do so will contravene the public policy of the state or work injury or injustice to a citizen or citizens of the state. It is said that the most liberal state comity cannot require Texas to enforce the laws of another when in conflict with its own laws. Portwood v. Portwood, Tex. Civ. App., 1937, 109 S.W. 2d 515, 523, dism., w.o.j. To the same effect is the opinion in Nueces Valley Townsite Co. v. San Antonio, U. & G. R. Co., 123 Tex. 167, 67 S.W. 2d 215, 220 (1933): “* * * No judgment * * * can be affirmed, which is contrary to the public policy of the State as declared by a valid statute,” citing City of Tyler v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 99 Tex. 491, 500, 91 S.W. 1, 13 Ann. Cas. 911. See also Strawn Merchantile Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Strawn, Tex. Civ. App., 1926, 279 S.W. 473, no writ history, cited with approval in State of California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W. 2d 227, 232, (1958).
The case of Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry Co., 1883, 31 Minn. 11, 16 N. W. 413, quoted from by the majority, dealt only with the right to enforce in Minnesota a transitory cause of action for personal injuries suffered in Iowa. The right of action was given by the Iowa statute. Minnesota had no such statute, nor does the court mention a statute of Minnesota prohibiting recovery on such cause of action.
The case recognizes that “liability, if the action be transitory, may be enforced, and the right of action pursued, in the courts of any state which can obtain jurisdiction of the defendant, provided it is not against the public policy of the laws of the state where it is sought to be enforced.” (Emphasis added.) A reading of the case shows this principle of law to be well recognized by the Minnesota court and recovery was allowed because it was not against the public policy of Minnesota.
The majority contends that since Texas courts can set aside all or a part of the community and separate property for the support of either the husband or wife and children, we should permit the Oklahoma courts to do so. A sufficient answer to that contention is that the plaintiff is not suing for any such relief, but is suing to recover “title” to a part of defendant’s separate property. Up to this point the majority has contended that the Oklahoma judgment does not purport to award the property but *237is only a judgment in personam; however, it now reverses itself and seeks to justify its position by stating that the Oklahoma court had the right to charge the Texas property by a judgment for support of the wife after divorce. Up to this point also the majority had paid at least lip service to the proposition that the Oklahoma court could render no judgment directly affecting the title to the Texas property.
The majority cite Fain v. Fain, Tex. Civ. App., 1928, 6 S.W. 2d 403, dism., w.o.j., as sustaining the proposition that the Texas courts have asserted their authority to issue equitable decrees in personam relating to property outside the state. That case is not in point for the reason that the suit was pending in Texas and the parties were in Texas and the judgment was to cancel deeds, certificates of stock, etc. I have never contended that had defendant executed a deed in pursuance of the Oklahoma court decree that deed would be invalid. The Fain case would be in point only in an appeal of this cause, or a contempt proceeding in Oklahoma between plaintiff and defendant. In the Fain case the Texas court could enforce its decree by contempt. In our case the Oklahoma courts cannot so enforce their decree.
. In view of the intention of the Legislature when it passed the Uniform Support act, which was called to our attention for the first time on motion for rehearing, I maintain my position as the correct one, and in accordance with the settled laws and decisions of this state for many, many years. A contrary decision, in my opinion, is contrary to those laws and decisions.
I would grant the motion for rehearing and affirm the judgments of both courts below.