Court Opinion

ID: 9956233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 16:00:51.477049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.446303
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 21-30251

              Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No.
                                         3:18-cr-00130-
 v.                                      TMB-MMS-1

MARKANTHONY DELEON
SAPALASAN,                                 OPINION

              Defendant-Appellant.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Alaska
      Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding

       Argued and Submitted September 12, 2023
                 Seattle, Washington

                   Filed April 1, 2024

  Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Ryan D. Nelson, and
           Daniel P. Collins, Circuit Judges.

              Opinion by Judge R. Nelson;
            Concurrence by Judge R. Nelson;
               Dissent by Judge Hawkins
2                       USA V. SAPALASAN

                          SUMMARY *

                         Criminal Law

    In a case in which Markanthony Sapalasan was
convicted of drug felonies, the panel affirmed the district
court’s denial of Sapalasan’s motion to suppress
methamphetamine found during an officer’s inventory
search of Sapalasan’s backpack.
    The panel held that the police may constitutionally
conduct an inventory search of belongings when the property
is lawfully retained and the search is done in compliance
with police regulations, even after the individual has been
released. Distinguishing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640
(1983), the panel wrote that because Sapalasan conceded
that he was validly separated from his property, government
custody of the backpack lawfully emerged. That separate
custody allowed the government to conduct an inventory
search of the backpack, and because that search was done in
substantial compliance with police department policy,
suppression of the evidence is unwarranted.
    Concurring, Judge R. Nelson wrote separately to
emphasize (1) he would reach the same conclusion on the
lawfulness of the search by applying the principles laid out
in Lafayette; and (2) he would not reach the merits of
differentiating Alaskan state law because Sapalasan waived
any reliance on Zehrung v. Alaska, 569 P.2d 189, 193, 195
(Alaska 1977), by failing to address it below.

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                     USA V. SAPALASAN                     3

    Judge Hawkins dissented. Citing Lafayette and Ninth
Circuit case law emphasizing the significance of impending
incarceration on the propriety of a jailhouse inventory
search, Judge Hawkins disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion regarding the inventory search of Sapalasan’s
backpack at the police station after Sapalasan—who was
never booked, let alone incarcerated—had been released
from questioning. Judge Hawkins wrote that the majority
also refused to follow Ninth Circuit case law that requires
consideration of whether the inventory search complied with
existing state law requirements as part of the Fourth
Amendment analysis.

                       COUNSEL

Thomas E. Weaver (argued), The Law Office of Thomas E.
Weaver, Bremerton, Washington, for Defendant-Appellant.
A. James Klugman (argued), Stephen Corso, and Karen
Vandergaw, Assistant United States Attorneys; S. Lane
Tucker, United States Attorney; United States Department
of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office, Anchorage,
Alaska; Allison M. O’Leary, Assistant United States
Attorney, United States Department of Justice, United States
Attorney’s Office, Civil Division/Environmental Torts
Section, Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
4                    USA V. SAPALASAN

                        OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

    Markanthony Sapalasan was arrested and his backpack
was taken and searched. Sapalasan was then taken to the
police station for questioning for potential involvement in a
murder. After questioning, Sapalasan was released from
detention. Around six hours later, at the end of his shift,
Officer Tae Yoon conducted a routine inventory search of
Sapalasan’s backpack, which he had retained in his squad
car. Officer Yoon found methamphetamine in the backpack.
Sapalasan, convicted of two drug felonies, appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the
methamphetamine found during the search. We hold that the
police may constitutionally conduct an inventory search of
belongings when the property is lawfully retained and done
in substantial compliance with police regulations, even after
the individual has been released. Thus, we affirm.
                              I
    At about 2:30 am, Anchorage police officers Tae Yoon
and Jonathan Behning responded to a call about gunshots at
a nearby apartment. As they approached the vicinity of the
apartment house, they met Markanthony Sapalasan, carrying
a red backpack, and another individual walking away from
the apartment house. Officer Behning noticed a pistol
sticking out from Sapalasan’s front pocket. In response,
Behning drew his weapon, ordered Sapalasan not to move,
and searched him for the weapon. He found the pistol
loaded, with one round in the chamber and one round
missing from the magazine.
                       USA V. SAPALASAN                        5

    Officer Yoon arrested Sapalasan, handcuffed him, and
put him in his vehicle. Yoon retrieved Sapalasan’s backpack
and requested permission to search it. Sapalasan agreed.
Yoon found no contraband during his search. Yet he learned
that an individual had been found dead in the nearby
apartment house with a single gunshot wound. So Yoon
transported Sapalasan to the police station for further
questioning regarding his potential involvement. Before
departing for the police station, he placed Sapalasan’s
backpack in the front passenger seat of his squad car.
    Sapalasan was interviewed at the police station. Yoon
stayed only briefly during the interview before returning to
the field to finish his shift, with Sapalasan’s backpack still in
his vehicle. After Yoon left, the interview was concluded
and Sapalasan was released. Before the end of his shift at 9
am, Yoon returned to the station and conducted a detailed
inventory search of the backpack to log potential evidence.
During his inventory search, he found methamphetamine.
He stopped the search and obtained a search warrant at
around 8:22 am.
    Sapalasan was charged with Possession with Intent to
Distribute Methamphetamine and Possession of a Firearm in
Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime. He moved to
suppress the methamphetamine on the ground that his
backpack was searched without a proper warrant in violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights. The magistrate judge
recommended that his motion be denied, and the district
court agreed. Sapalasan was found guilty of both charges.
He now appeals based on what he claims was an unlawful
search of his backpack.
6                      USA V. SAPALASAN

                               II
    “We review de novo motions to suppress, and any factual
findings made at the suppression hearing for clear error.”
United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2011)
(cleaned up).
                              III
    On appeal, the government first argues that the search of
the backpack in the field was a valid search incident to arrest,
or a legal inventory search. We need not resolve these
issues. Even if we assume that these prior searches were
unlawful, suppression is unwarranted because we conclude
that Yoon executed a lawful inventory search at the police
station.
    When an individual is lawfully brought to a police
station for booking into jail, the police may conduct an
inventory search of that individual’s belongings as part of
the booking process. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640,
643 (1983). But the police did not search Sapalasan’s
backpack while he was detained for questioning, nor did they
book him into jail. Instead, Officer Yoon separated
Sapalasan from his backpack when he was arrested, and
Yoon then retained lawful custody of it in his squad car
during the rest of his shift. On appeal, Sapalasan concedes
that “separating him from the backpack during transport and
interrogation by detectives was lawful.” And he concedes
he was arrested on probable cause at the scene. After
retaining custody of the backpack while Sapalasan was
interviewed, Yoon conducted an inventory search of the
backpack—at the end of his shift, around six hours later.
Since Sapalasan was already released from detention, we
must resolve whether the police may conduct an inventory
                       USA V. SAPALASAN                       7

search under these circumstances. We conclude that they
can.
    In Lafayette, the Supreme Court held that under the
Fourth Amendment, “it is reasonable for police to search the
personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the
routine administrative procedure at a police stationhouse
incident to booking and jailing the suspect.” 462 U.S. at 643.
The Court explained that a standardized inventory search
process “not only deters false claims but also inhibits theft
or careless handling of articles taken from the arrested
person.” Id. at 646. The dissent believes Lafayette only
permits an inventory search “in the specific context of an
arrestee who is about to be jailed.”
    But several critical concessions help distinguish
Lafayette from the facts here. Sapalasan was lawfully
separated from his backpack before Officer Yoon conducted
the inventory search. Thus, Sapalasan was lawfully arrested,
and Officer Yoon lawfully retained custody of Sapalasan’s
backpack. In Lafayette, the initial separation of the arrestee
and his property occurred only as part of the booking
process. 462 U.S. at 641–42. And the separation of this
property created government custody that triggered the
policy rationale in justifying an inventory search.
Accordingly, the validity of the separation and the inventory
search authority depended on whether Lafayette was going
to jail. If someone at the stationhouse needs to be placed in
the jail facilities, then that individual must be separated from
whatever property is on his person.
    Here, the lawfulness of the initial separation of
Sapalasan from his backpack is unchallenged, so the
justification of an inventory search does not depend on
whether he was headed to jail. In an analogous case before
8                        USA V. SAPALASAN

the First Circuit, a court upheld the inventory search of a
towed vehicle that yielded a backpack containing drug
paraphernalia. See United States v. Rivera, 988 F.3d 579,
580–82 (1st Cir. 2021). Like Rivera, it was immaterial
whether the defendant faced jail time. Id. at 580–81. In fact,
the defendant in Rivera was not even facing arrest. Id. at
580. Instead, what mattered was that the lawful separation
of the defendant from the property created the government’s
lawful custody. In those cases, the policy rationales behind
an inventory search are fully implicated and such a search
may be undertaken in accordance with that doctrine’s
limitations.1
    Under Lafayette and its progeny, an inventory search’s
primary limitation is that it must satisfy reasonable police
regulations and be administered in good faith. Lafayette,
462 U.S. at 643. Sapalasan does not contest that Officer
Yoon administered the search in good faith. Thus, we only
need to address whether Yoon conducted the inventory
search in compliance with Anchorage Police Department
policy. Ensuring that the police follow standardized
procedures helps prevent searches that rest on a concealed
investigatory police motive. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 375–76 (1987); Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 642.

1
   For the same reasons, Zehrung v. Alaska, 569 P.2d 189, 193, 195
(Alaska 1977), cited by the dissent, can be distinguished. Like in
Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 641–42, it was the decision to proceed with the
booking—in violation of state law—that led to the separation of Zehrung
from his property and the need for an inventory search, Zehrung, 569
P.2d at 195. The separation of Sapalasan from his property occurred
before the booking process, creating the government’s concededly
lawful custody of the backpack. That custody justifies an inventory
search at the stationhouse regardless of whether Sapalasan had left the
station or not.
                      USA V. SAPALASAN                      9

    Officer Yoon conducted the inventory search of the
backpack at the end of his shift rather than right after
obtaining custody of the backpack. Yoon arguably did not
conduct an “immediate” inventory search as required by the
Anchorage Police Department policy. Still, like the district
court, we conclude that Yoon’s search sufficiently followed
Department policy to constitute a lawful inventory search.
The Anchorage Police Department’s “Evidence-Handling
and Submission” Policy states that an inventory search be
done “under the color of authority.” The policy adds that
“all property collected under the color of authority shall be
submitted on the date collected, received, seized, or no later
than the end of the employee’s assigned shift, or detail,
directly to the Evidence Section[.]”
    Although Officer Yoon did not “immediately make an
inventory list” of Sapalasan’s backpack, he still “submitted”
the collected property at the end of his shift. Yoon,
therefore, substantially complied with department policy
even if there were a minor deviation. United States v.
Magdirila, 962 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that
an officer “complied substantially” with Police Department
Policy and that “[h]is failure to precisely comply with [it]
did not render the [inventory] search invalid”). Moreover,
because Yoon made “a list or inventory as soon as
reasonable,” the later inventory search is constitutional.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 646. Here, the delay in Yoon’s
inventory search was reasonable because he needed to
handle other more urgent calls on dispatch during his shift.
Accordingly, even though there was a delay in the inventory
search, it was not unreasonable for Yoon to maintain custody
of the backpack and conduct the inventory search at the end
of his shift. This substantially complied with department
policy. And because of this compliance, Yoon exercised a
10                    USA V. SAPALASAN

lawful inventory search of Sapalasan’s backpack at the
stationhouse.
    Last, Sapalasan argues that Yoon lacked probable cause
to conduct the inventory search because, at that time,
Sapalasan had been released from custody. But the
“justification for [inventory] searches does not rest on
probable cause.” Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 643. In fact,
“probable cause to search is irrelevant in inventory
searches.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Therefore,
even if Yoon lacked probable cause to conduct an inventory
search, it is immaterial in determining the search’s
constitutionality.
                              IV
    The search of Sapalasan’s backpack at the police
stationhouse was a lawful inventory search. Because
Sapalasan conceded that he was validly separated from his
property, government custody of the backpack lawfully
emerged. That separate custody allowed the government to
conduct an inventory search of the backpack. And because
that search was done in substantial compliance with police
department policy, suppression of the evidence is
unwarranted.
     AFFIRMED.

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

     I write separately to emphasize two points. First, I would
reach the same conclusion on the lawfulness of Officer Tae
Yoon’s inventory search by applying the principles laid out
in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983). Second, I
would not reach the merits of differentiating Alaskan state
                     USA V. SAPALASAN                     11

law. Sapalasan waived any reliance on Zehrung v. Alaska,
569 P.2d 189, 193, 195 (Alaska 1977), by failing to address
it below.
                             I
    I begin by discussing Lafayette’s full reasoning. There,
the police arrested the defendant, brought him to the police
station, and then searched his “purse-type shoulder bag,”
finding drug paraphernalia. 462 U.S. at 641–42. The
Court’s key consideration was whether it was “reasonable
for police to search the personal effects of a person under
lawful arrest as part of the routine administrative procedure
at a police stationhouse incident to booking and jailing the
suspect.” Id. at 643. Because the officer testified that the
search was standard procedure “to inventory ‘everything’ in
the possession of an arrested person,” the search was
constitutional. Id. at 642.
    Sapalasan’s inventory search did not occur while he was
detained. But the Supreme Court explained that courts must
balance the search’s “intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.” Id. at 644 (quoting Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).            A “range of
governmental interests support an inventory process.” Id.
For example, a standardized inventory search process “not
only deters false claims but also inhibits theft or careless
handling of articles taken from the arrested person.” Id. It
can also help “guard the police from danger.” Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987). The Court has affirmed
these principles time and again when the inventory search
follows reasonable police regulations in good faith. See
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976);
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). And the location of
12                     USA V. SAPALASAN

that inventory search does not diminish the government’s
interest. Whether it’s Opperman’s inventory search of an
automobile’s glove compartment, Lafayette’s search of
personal possessions, or Bertine’s search of a closed
backpack inventoried from an impounded van, the
governmental interest is the same. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at
13 372–73 (“[T]he governmental interests justifying the []
inventory searches in Opperman and Lafayette are nearly the
same as those which obtain here.”).
    So this court must decide whether Sapalasan’s release
from custody diminishes the inventory search’s
reasonableness. The dissent relies on Lafayette’s defining
an inventory search as “an incidental administrative step
following arrest and preceding incarceration.” 462 U.S. at
644 (emphasis added). The argument goes that, since
Sapalasan was released when Officer Yoon searched his
backpack, the administrative necessity—and any other
necessity—was extinguished. That conclusion, however,
narrows Lafayette beyond recognition.
    True, Lafayette and its progeny never clarified whether
an inventory search at a police station required the arrestee
to either face incarceration or momentary custody. But the
underlying policy justifications for an inventory search do
not turn on the arrestee’s status. In Lafayette, the Court
explained that inventory searches are reasonable because
they “deter[] false claims” about the searched item’s
contents, “inhibit[] theft or careless handling of articles,” and
protect officers from any concealed “[d]angerous
instrumentalities—such as razor blades, bombs, or
weapons.” Id. at 646. When Sapalasan’s backpack was
searched, it could have contained dangerous materials that
needed to be identified. The police also had an incentive to
fully inventory the backpack’s contents, in case they needed
                       USA V. SAPALASAN                      13

to either rebut false claims or deter theft. The delayed
inventory search served these governmental interests,
notwithstanding Sapalasan’s release. Therefore, Lafayette
itself shows that Officer Yoon’s inventory search was
lawful.
    Our sister circuits’ cases also bolster this conclusion. For
example, the First Circuit upheld the inventory search of an
impounded vehicle that yielded a backpack containing drug
paraphernalia. United States v. Rivera, 988 F.3d 579, 580–
82 (1st Cir. 2021). Even though the defendant faced neither
incarceration nor arrest, id. at 580, the court found that
checking for “dangerous items” and deterring “false claims
of theft” justified the search. Id. at 582 (citing Bertine, 479
U.S. at 373) (internal quotations omitted). I agree.
Sapalasan’s status when his lawfully obtained bag was
searched does not affect the policy rationale behind an
inventory search. On this point, the dissent attempts to
distinguish Rivera because it involved an impounded
vehicle’s inventory search. The dissent, of course, rightly
argues that vehicles are subject to lower expectations of
privacy. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112‒13 (1986).
Regardless, the governmental interest in inventorying
property lawfully in its possession remains strong. See
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367, 372.              Whether searching
automobiles or personal possessions, that interest outweighs
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests. See id. at 372.
So as Rivera noted, the government interest in Lafayette
permeates Rivera, ensuring that police must inventory any
items found in an impounded vehicle to identify dangerous
items and prevent false theft claims. 988 F.3d at 582.
Because of that, I see no reason to distinguish Rivera.
14                    USA V. SAPALASAN

                             II
    A final argument raised by the court, over a dissent,
warrants brief discussion. See Order (Sept. 7, 2023); id.
(Collins, J., dissenting). We asked the parties to address at
oral argument how Alaska state law might influence our
conclusion on the legality of the inventory search. Ninth
Circuit law states that courts should evaluate state law when
considering an inventory search’s lawfulness. See United
States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). For
example, in United States v. Peterson, the court looked to
Washington law when it held that Washington police could
not conduct an inventory search if the arrestee could avoid
incarceration by posting bail. 902 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.
2018) (citing Washington v. Smith, 783 P.2d 95, 98 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1989)). At our request, Sapalasan argued at oral
argument that similar Alaskan state law prohibits inventory
searches before the arrestee can post bail. See Zehrung, 569
P.2d at 195. The government argued that this issue was
waived. See United States v. Guerrero, 921 F.3d 895, 897
(9th Cir. 2019).
    Our majority makes clear why Zehrung does not apply
to the case here. Yet, I write separately to explain why we
need not reach this new argument’s merits. At the
suppression hearing, Sapalasan never challenged the
inventory search under this theory interpreting the Alaska
Constitution. We once held that “[a] theory for suppression
not advanced in district court cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.” United States v. Keesee, 358 F.3d 1217,
1220 (9th Cir. 2004). The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure have since softened that categorical rule. Now,
“[i]f a party does not meet the deadline for making a Rule
12(b)(3) motion, the motion is untimely. But a court may
consider the defense, objection, or request if the party shows
                      USA V. SAPALASAN                     15

good cause.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3). We now hold that
defendants waive new suppression arguments absent “good
cause for failing to present in [a] pre-trial motion the new
theory for suppression he raises in this appeal.” Guerrero,
921 F.3d at 897.
    I find no reason to deviate from Guerrero. Nowhere in
the suppression motion did Sapalasan challenge the second
backpack search under Zehrung or the Alaska Constitution.
Nor did Sapalasan raise this issue here—until invited to do
so. Sapalasan has not shown good cause as to why this
theory was not presented below. To consider it now would
violate the party presentation principle. See United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020). For these
reasons, I would decline to consider the merits of Zehrung in
addressing the inventory search’s legality.

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

    I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion
regarding the inventory search of Sapalasan’s backpack at
the police station after he had already been released from
questioning. In the Supreme Court’s landmark holding on
stationhouse inventory searches in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462
U.S. 640 (1983), the Court concluded: “We hold it is not
unreasonable for police, as part of the routine procedure
incident to incarcerating an arrested person, to search any
container or article in his possession, in accordance with
established inventory procedures.” 462 U.S. at 648
(emphasis added).
   Although the majority relies principally on the initial
separation of Sapalasan from his backpack, the Court
16                    USA V. SAPALASAN

emphasized the specific context of the inventory search on
at least four separate occasions in the opinion, concluding
that such a search was reasonable in balancing the policy
considerations underlying the search and the specific context
of an arrestee who is about to be jailed (and thus about to be
separated from his belongings for some extended period of
time):
     • “The question here is whether, consistent with the
        Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for police to
        search the personal effects of a person under lawful
        arrest as part of the routine administrative procedure
        at a police stationhouse incident to booking and
        jailing the suspect.” Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
     • “[T]he factors justifying a search of the person and
        personal effects of an arrestee upon reaching a police
        station but prior to being placed in confinement are
        somewhat different from the factors justifying an
        immediate search at the time and place of arrest,” and
        also noting that “an arrested person is not invariably
        taken to a police station or confined. Id. at 645
        (emphasis added).
     • “At the stationhouse, it is entirely proper for police
        to remove and list or inventory property found on the
        person or in the possession of an arrested person
        who is to be jailed.” Id. at 646 (emphasis added).
    Another telling indication that the Supreme Court found
the impending incarceration to be of critical importance is
that it remanded the case so that the lower court could
determine if the defendant was actually going to be
imprisoned, as Lafayette’s arrest was only for a
misdemeanor of disturbing the peace: “The record is unclear
                      USA V. SAPALASAN                     17

as to whether respondent was to have been incarcerated after
being booked for disturbing the peace. That is an
appropriate inquiry on remand.” Id. at 648 n.3 (emphasis
added). If the incarceration status was unimportant to the
analysis, the Court could have simply affirmed without
remanding.
    Our Ninth Circuit case law has also emphasized the
significance of impending incarceration on the propriety of
a jailhouse inventory search. In United States v. Peterson,
the defendant moved to suppress evidence found during a
jailhouse inventory search because he was arrested only for
misdemeanor warrants, and under Washington law could
have posted bail to avoid incarceration (and the search). 902
F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir. 2018). Significantly, we agreed
with the defendant that the inventory search would have been
unlawful if the officers had conducted the search prior to
providing the defendant the opportunity to post bail. Id. at
1020. However, the arresting officer had also testified at the
suppression motion that if Peterson had posted bail on the
misdemeanor charge, the officer would have instead booked
and incarcerated Peterson on a charge of resisting arrest for
which no bail had been set; we therefore affirmed the denial
of the motion to suppress under the doctrine of inevitable
discovery. Id.
    Neither the government nor the majority have cited a
published case upholding a stationhouse inventory search of
someone’s belongings who was not also in the process of
being booked and incarcerated. The government principally
relies on Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), which
permitted an inventory search of an impounded vehicle, and
the majority relies on United States v. Rivera, 988 F.3d 579,
580‒82 (1st Cir. 2021), which also involved an impounded
vehicle where the defendant was not under arrest. But
18                    USA V. SAPALASAN

vehicles have long been recognized as subject to lower
expectations of privacy, New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,
112‒13 (1986), and there are various reasons apart from
arrest and incarceration, including the community caretaking
function, in which the police may need to impound a vehicle
encountered in the field and conduct an inventory search in
conjunction with such impound. But even then, we have
recognized that the initial impound and inventory
justification can dissipate depending on the factual
circumstances; if, for example, a licensed driver arrives on
scene who could take possession of the vehicle instead. See
Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 516‒17 (9th
Cir. 2018).
     In this case, Sapalasan was never booked, let alone
incarcerated. He was questioned by police, determined to be
a witness to—but not a suspect in—the shooting, and
released. Like an arrestee who makes bail to avoid
incarceration, or the arrested driver of a vehicle who
provides an alternate person to retrieve his car, Sapalasan’s
release after questioning obviated any continuing
justification for the police to hold or search his property. I
am thus unconvinced by the majority’s emphasis on the
initial separation of Sapalasan from his backpack, as it
ignores the reality of the circumstances at the time of the
actual inventory search.
   The majority also refuses to follow Ninth Circuit case
law that requires us to consider whether the inventory search
complied with existing state law requirements as part of the
Fourth Amendment analysis. Ordinarily, when applying
                      USA V. SAPALASAN                      19

federal constitutional law, we need not make such an
inquiry. But as we explained in United States v. Cormier:

            There are two exceptions to the general
       rule that state law violations do not require
       suppression of evidence in federal court. The
       first exception arises when a court is
       determining the legality of an inventory
       search, because “federal law on inventory
       searches by state or local police officers
       [requires] that they must be conducted in
       accordance with the official procedures of
       the relevant state or local police department.

220 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
    In United States v. Wanless, we thus analyzed the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim pertaining to the
legality of a vehicle inventory search by looking first to
Washington law. We noted that the Washington State
Trooper’s manual appeared to require an inventory search of
any impounded vehicle, but we also recognized that
“Washington courts have placed a limitation on the search
requirement.”       882 F.2d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir.
1989). Washington case law requires troopers to first ask the
owner, if present, if he would consent to the vehicle search;
the person then has the option to decline, take the chance that
loss will occur, and avoid the search. Id. We concluded that
the trooper’s failure to follow this state-court-imposed
limitation on their inventory search procedure rendered the
resulting search illegal under the federal constitution, even
though it was otherwise conducted in accordance with the
police manual. Id.
20                        USA V. SAPALASAN

     So, too, here, there is a procedure manual that appears to
authorize an inventory search of virtually any item that
comes into the police’s possession. But there is also Alaska
case law holding that a warrantless stationhouse inventory
search is without justification when an arrestee is not going
to be incarcerated, and imposing additional obligations on
officers, such as permitting the arrestee a reasonable
opportunity to make bail and to avoid incarceration and the
corresponding search. Zehrung v. State of Alaska, 569 P.2d
189, 193, 195 (Alaska 1977) (“We recognize that our
decision necessitates invalidating a standard procedure at the
jail.”); Gray v. State of Alaska, 798 P.2d 346 (Alaska 1990)
(reiterating that, absent specific exigencies, even if an
arrestee is to be placed in a holding cell while being given a
reasonable time to make bail, only a limited patdown for
weapons is permissible, and a full inventory search can only
be conducted if the person is to be incarcerated). 1 In other
words, conducting an inventory search pursuant to a broad
department policy does not constitutionally authorize every
inventory search, particularly if the law of that state has
judicially limited that authority to certain situations (such as
when an impounded car’s owner gives consent or when an
arrestee is actually going to be incarcerated). 2

1
  The Anchorage police department has apparently paid little attention to
these decisions. In 2000, an Alaska court of appeals judge noted in a
concurrence that it appeared the Anchorage jail was still conducting
inventory searches of all arrestees, including those who could make bail,
and that “these procedures are essentially the same ones declared illegal
twenty years ago in Zehrung.” Castleberry v. State, 2000 WL 530686
*4-5 (Ala. Ct. App. 2000).
2
 Certainly, these Alaska cases do not cover the specific situation in this
case, in which the person was never booked or incarcerated. Predicting
                          USA V. SAPALASAN                            21

    It is true that Sapalasan did not cite Zehrung in district
court or in his opening brief. However, he clearly raised the
claim that the stationhouse inventory search was invalid
under the Fourth Amendment and cited analogous Ninth
Circuit cases such as Peterson, which in turn looked to
underlying state law to determine the propriety of the
search. See Peterson, 902 F.3d at 1020. As we explained in
Thompson v. Runnels:

         Once “an issue or claim is properly before the
         court, the court is not limited to the particular
         legal theories advanced by the parties.”
         [Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S.
         90, 99, (1991).] Instead, the court “retains the
         independent power to identify and apply the
         proper construction of governing law,” id.,
         and is free to “consider an issue antecedent
         to . . . and ultimately dispositive of the
         dispute before it, even an issue the parties fail
         to identify and brief,” U.S. Nat'l Bank of
         Oregon v. Ind. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508
         U.S. 439, 447 (1993) (quoting Arcadia v.
         Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990))
         (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
         In re Greene, 223 F.3d 1064, 1068, n. 7 (9th
         Cir.2000) (holding that the court could
         consider a statutory interpretation argument

state law based on existing precedents, it seems reasonable to think that
Alaska courts would expect Sapalasan to be given a reasonable amount
of time to retrieve his backpack from the station prior to a caretaking
inventory, much as an arrestee must be given a reasonable amount of
time to make bail. We could also certify the question to the Alaska
Supreme Court for clarity.
22                    USA V. SAPALASAN

       not specifically raised by the defendant
       because, “[w]hen an issue or claim is
       properly before the court, the court is not
       limited to the particular legal theories
       advanced by the parties.” (quoting Ind. Ins.
       Agents, 508 U.S. at 446)).

705 F.3d 1089, 1098 (9th Cir. 2013).
    We are required to consider whether the inventory search
Sapalasan challenged was authorized and conducted in
accordance with state law in order to determine his clearly
raised federal claim. Comier, 220 F.3d at 1111. Having
raised the appropriate legal claim, it is our duty to determine
its merits, which in turn necessitates investigating Alaskan
law, whether Sapalasan cited the case or not.
   I would grant Sapalasan’s motion to suppress the
contents of the backpack.