Court Opinion

ID: 9811163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:11:42.499413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:31.031902
License: Public Domain

Barnhill, L,
dissenting. The defendant owns property on both sides of the boulevard. That portion of her property which lies on the south side thereof is triangular in shape, contains .71 of an acre and is composed partly of land formerly subjected to the easement of the right of way of the Old Dowd Road, and partly of land outside of the bounds of the right of way of either road. The land claimed by the plaintiffs is to the south of this tract and extends to the center of the right of way of the old road and also extends to and is bounded by the new boulevard to the east.
The plaintiffs do not allege, and there is no evidence tending to show, the ownership by adverse possession of the property claimed by the plaintiffs. Nor could the plaintiffs assert ownership by adverse possession where their use of the property admittedly was as a member of the public in exercising their right to travel upon a public road. Furthermore, the old boulevard as located in front of plaintiffs’ property was in existence less than twenty years.
*101While it is established in this jurisdiction that where a public road is discontinued the owners of property abutting on the public road prior to its abandonment are entitled to a private way of ingress and egress over the old road, this rule exists in behalf of those whose property is, by the abandonment or relocation of the road, completely cut off from and deprived of any other access to the new road. The plaintiffs have failed to establish any right under this principle of law. They not only have access to the new boulevard over one-half of the land formerly subjected to the easement of the old road but their land borders upon the new road. In any event, they would be entitled only to a reasonable means of ingress and egress. This Court has not held, and I am of the opinion that we should not now hold, that such abutting property owner is “entitled to use the full width (60 ft.) right of way” of the old road “for ingress and egress.”
Here the plaintiffs have 30 feet of the old right of way located on their property, of this 30 feet two-thirds is paved. Therefore, they, are not deprived of the right of ingress and egress and they should not be permitted to take the land of the defendant, which reverted free of the easement when the old road was abandoned, so that they may have a 60-foot right of way. The statement in the opinion of the majority that “there was evidence to support plaintiffs’ claim to use the full width (60 ft.) right of way of the Old Dowd Eoad for ingress and egress to the New Wilkinson Boulevard” is not supported- by any reference to the supposed evidence in support of this claim and a careful perusal of the record fails to disclose it. Moreover, the stipulations of the parties as to “the true dividing line between the lands of the plaintiffs and defendant” is entirely ignored by the majority. Admissions made in open court have heretofore been regarded as binding on the parties. Turner v. Livestock Co., 119 N. C., 457, 102 S. E., 849. The trial court acted on this admission and it should be considered here.
The old maxim, “Once a highway always a highway,” does not mean that road officials, under proper legislative authority, may not abandon a public road. This maxim, as quoted in Davis v. Alexander, 202 N. C., 130, 164 S. E., 617, and in the majority opinion, was taken from 2 Elliott, Eoads & Streets, (4d). Standing alone and unqualified it does not constitute a correct statement of the law, as the complete text clearly shows. The right of the State, in the exercise of its plenary power, to abandon or discontinue a public road is recognized in the Davis case, supra. County officials were vested with this right many years ago. C. S., 3750 and 3751. And the Legislature, by ch. II, sec. 7, Public Laws 1921, conferred this authority upon the State Highway Commission. Road Com. v. State Highway Com., 185 N. C., 56, 115 S. E., 886. See also Cameron v. State Highway Com., 188 N. C., 84, 123 S. E., 465. *102This power was again conferred upon the State Highway Commission by cb. 46, sec. 1, Public Laws 1927, which authorized this Commission "to change, alter, add to, or abandon, and substitute new sections for, any portion of the State highway system, as now or hereafter, taken over, maintained and established.”
The maxim as quoted exists only in support of the position that when it is shown that a highway was once laid out pursuant to law or created by dedication the burden of showing discontinuance, abandonment or vacation is upon the party who asserts it. It merely means that when it is shown that a public way has been established the law presumes that it continues as such until the contrary is shown. See Parker v. Highway Com., 195 N. C., 783, 143 S. E., 871. If “Once a highway always a highway” is a doctrine of the common law, except as I have indicated, it has been expressly repealed by statute and no longer prevails in this State.
(See map on opposite page.)
It is expressly alleged in the complaint that the State Highway authorities moved or relocated the Wilkinson Boulevard (the section of the road in controversy being part of the old boulevard). The State Highway Commission had a right so to do and to abandon that section of the road plaintiffs now seek to keep open as a public highway.
As a general rule, after a highway is vacated or abandoned it is the same as if it had never existed and can again be brought into existence only in the same manner as an entirely new highway; the public easement is extinguished and the road authorities relieved of the duty to keep it in repair. 2 Elliott, Roads & Streets (4d), p. 1690, and cases cited in notes. The general public loses all rights in the road abandoned. Nevertheless, the abutting owners whose property is deprived of road frontage by the relocation are entitled to the right of ingress and egress over the old road. This right to ingress and egress over and along the abandoned road applies when and only when, by the discontinuance of the road, such abutting owners are deprived of an outlet. But, so far as I have been able to find, there is no case which has interpreted this rule to mean that they may demand the use of the full width of the old road. Their rights are dependent upon the rule of reason.
The Davis case, supra, cited and relied upon in the majority opinion does not hold that the plaintiff therein was entitled to the full width of the old road. Furthermore, the facts are distinctly different and the case is not in point except upon the alleged right of the plaintiff to ingress and egress. There the defendant owned a tract of land lying on both sides of the old road and between the property owned by the plaintiff and the new road. The shift in the location of the road had deprived the plaintiff of any outlet except over the old road. The defendant *104sought to close that part of the old road which intersected his land. The Court held that he could not do so to the extent of depriving the plaintiff of his right of ingress and egress. This is the full force and effect of that decision.

*103

*104But the record discloses the following stipulation and admission: “It is admitted by the plaintiffs and the defendant that the true dividing line between the lands owned by the plaintiffs, Ada Long et al., and the lands owned by the defendant, runs down the center of what is known in the pleadings as the old "Wilkinson Boulevard, formerly the public highway extending from Charlotte to Gastonia.” This stipulation entered into by the plaintiffs constitutes a twofold admission: (1) That the area now in controversy known as the Old "Wilkinson Boulevard is a part of an abandoned public highway; and, (2) That the defendant is the owner of such land to the admitted true dividing line which runs down the center of the old road. Having admitted that the defendant owns the property which they now claim and over which they are attempting to assert the right of possession the plaintiffs may not now contend to the contrary. The admission is binding on them.
In view of the admission of discontinuance and considering that the bridge over the river near plaintiffs’ property, which constituted a part of the old boulevard, has been torn away and a barricade erected and that the State Highway Commission no longer maintains the old boulevard and the plaintiffs in their brief treat the old road as a part of an abandoned highway, it would seem to be beside the question to contend now that this is not an abandoned highway. Furthermore, it affirmatively appears from the evidence of the plaintiffs that when this tract of land was sold at public auction and purchased by defendant the plaintiffs, through their representative, appeared at the sale and bid $990.00, thus recognizing its private ownership.
But in maintaining its position that the record does not disclose the abandonment of the Old "Wilkinson Road reliance is placed on the statement of the district engineer who said that when the Highway Commission abandoned a road it reverts to the jurisdiction of the county commissioners. This witness had theretofore testified that “the State of North Carolina has abandoned that old road at the point to which I referred near the "Wilkinson Boulevard. The State nor the county do any work on it.” The engineer’s statement that jurisdiction over the road reverted to the county commissioners was an erroneous statement of law. The Legislature, by ch. 145, sec. 7, Public Laws 1931, vested “the exclusive control and management and responsibility for all public roads in the several counties” in the State Highway Commission and abolished “all county, district and township, highway or road commissioners by whatever name designated.” No jurisdiction of the county existed to which control of the road could revert.
*105Appeal is from the judgment of nonsuit. So the case comes to this: “In an action for trespass judgment of nonsuit is granted at the close of the plaintiffs’ evidence on solemn admission in open court that the defendant owns the property in which the plaintiffs seek to assert an easement and has not encroached on their land. Yet the judgment of nonsuit is reversed. This is done notwithstanding the admission that the old road was abandoned and the plaintiffs sought to purchase the very land in controversy.”
It is apparent from the record that the plaintiffs are seeking to compel the defendant to leave unobstructed all of the original roadbed of the Dowd Eoad — not for the purpose of enabling them to traverse the road in the ordinary course of traffic but so that they may use the easement as a direct outlet to the new road. This is to be accomplished by going across the easement rather than along it as traffic would ordinarily pass. That this is the purpose of the suit seems to be conceded in the majority opinion. If this is done it will enable the plaintiffs to subject to an easement, without compensation, a part of defendant’s land which is not now and has never been subjected to the easement of either the old or the new road, for the triangular strip of land owned by the defendant is composed partly of land within and partly of land outside the easement.
If the majority opinion prevails the plaintiffs, whose land borders upon the new road and who already have a 20-foot paved road to the public highway, will be allowed to impose upon the defendant’s land a 30-foot easement for their further convenience and enrichment when defendant’s land is now already subjected to the 100-foot right of way of the new road. In my opinion this position cannot be sustained in the name of justice and is not supported either by law or by reason.
Stact, C. J., and 'W’iNBOkne, J., concur in dissent.