Court Opinion

ID: 9910820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 17:08:34.660392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:33.922978
License: Public Domain

J-S39036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CELESTIN JULES                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 656 MDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 21, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0004101-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                   FILED: DECEMBER 18, 2023

       Celestin Jules (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, following his non-jury

conviction of one count of endangering the welfare of children (EWOC).1

Contemporaneous with this appeal, Appellant’s counsel, William C. Bispels,

Esquire, has filed a petition to withdraw from representation and an Anders

brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). The Anders brief presents challenges

to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting Appellant’s

conviction.      In addition, Appellant submitted a pro se answer and

supplemental response to the Anders brief raising additional claims. Based

on the following, we affirm.
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1).
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     On October 6, 2021, Appellant was charged with one count of EWOC in

connection with the care of his 10-year-old son. The case proceeded to a

bench trial on March 7, 2023, during which Appellant was represented by

Corey S. Chwiecko, Esquire.

     The trial court summarized the relevant testimony as follows:

     Deneida Perez testified that she is a case manager for Signature
     Family Services, which is a contract provider for Berks County
     Children and Youth Services. Ms. Perez testified that she worked
     with . . . Appellant and his son, [S.J.], for two to three months.
     Ms. Perez testified that [S.J.] required services because he is
     nonverbal and was diagnosed with autism and ADHD. On July 28,
     2021, when [S.J.] was ten years old, Ms. Perez had a visit
     scheduled with [S.J.] and was supposed to also meet with . . .
     Appellant. However, . . . Appellant called her and said that he
     would not be coming.

            Ms. Perez testified that she went to an apartment located in
     the 600 block of North Fifth Street in the City of Reading to see
     [S.J.] and meet with [S.J.]’s caregiver, who was named Patrick.
     When Ms. Perez arrived, she observed that Patrick was sitting
     outside on a step. Ms. Perez identified herself and asked to see
     [S.J.]. Patrick led Ms. Perez to a room that had what she
     described as a barricade blocking the door.

            After Patrick moved a chair, a table, two doors, and a stove
     out of the way, Ms. Perez was able to enter [S.J.]’s room. Ms.
     Perez observed what she described as a disheveled bed on the
     floor and a door that was blocking most of the window to the room.
     [S.J.] was wearing a t-shirt and nothing from the waist down. Ms.
     Perez testified that she observed staining in the room and that
     there was the smell of urine. Ms. Perez did not see any toys,
     books, or food in the bedroom. Photographs of the apartment
     were admitted into evidence as Commonwealth’s Exhibits 1-18.

            Ms. Perez told Patrick that it was not appropriate to have
     the items blocking the door to the room and testified that Patrick
     agreed. Because [S.J.] was not toilet trained, Ms. Perez made
     sure that he had a dry diaper as well as a snack and a drink before
     she left. After leaving the apartment and speaking to her

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     supervisor Ms. Perez returned and asked to see [S.J.] again. After
     Patrick led Ms. Perez back in, she observed that the barricade was
     up again.

             Ms. Perez testified that she then spoke to . . . Appellant and
     informed him of the situation with the barricade. Ms. Perez
     testified that . . . Appellant, whom she described as irate, said that
     he told Patrick to do that. Ms. Perez testified that . . . Appellant
     did not give her any more information about Patrick and said that
     . . . Appellant made no attempt to see his son after she spoke to
     him. Ms. Perez subsequently removed [S.J.] from the residence
     and took him to LIFE House in Reading, which is an after-hours
     facility for Berks County Children and Youth Services.

            On cross-examination, Ms. Perez testified that the entire
     time she was working as [S.J.]’s caseworker, she was aware that
     . . . Appellant lived in Lititz with his wife and other children, while
     [S.J.] lived in the apartment in Reading with a caretaker.
     However, Ms. Perez further testified that she met with . . .
     Appellant at the apartment in Reading and that . . . Appellant was
     aware of the physical condition of the apartment and the bedroom
     of the child.

            In addition, Ashley Frey, an emergency duty caseworker for
     Berks County Children and Youth Services, testified that she spoke
     to . . . Appellant on the phone the day [S.J.] was removed from
     the apartment and that . . . Appellant was unwilling to come to
     Reading or send a different caregiver. . . . Appellant indicated
     that he was content with the care that [S.J.] was receiving from
     Patrick and stated that Patrick was caring for the child pursuant
     to his instructions. . . . Appellant stated that if [S.J.] were a
     different child, barricading him in the room would not be
     appropriate. However, because he has special needs, barricading
     him in the room is necessary. When Ms. Frey tried to discuss why
     barricading the child in the room was inappropriate, . . . Appellant
     replied, “Says you.”

     Finally, Criminal Investigator (hereinafter “C.I.”) Christopher
     Santoro of the Reading Police Department testified that as part of
     his investigation, he executed a search warrant at 631 North Fifth
     Street, Apartment 1F, in the City of Reading. C.I. Santoro took
     photographs of the apartment and testified that the child’s
     bedroom smelled of urine and feces and that there appeared to
     be dried feces on the walls. C.I. Santoro spoke to . . . Appellant
     about the conditions in which the child had been living and

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       testified that . . . Appellant was aware that the child had been
       barricaded in the room. . . . Appellant said that he instructed
       Patrick to do that and said that it was for the child’s own good.
       When C.I. Santoro commented that he would not have treated his
       dog in that fashion, . . . Appellant responded, “That is you.”

Trial Ct. Op., 6/22/23, at 3-6 (record citations omitted).

       C.I. Santoro also testified that, as part of his investigation, he reviewed

the notes of testimony from S.J.’s dependency hearing, which was conducted

on August 4, 2021. See N.T. Trial, 3/7/23, at 72-73. The transcript from the

dependency hearing was marked as evidence and admitted at trial. Appellant

did not testify on his own behalf or present any evidence.

       At the conclusion of trial, the court found Appellant guilty of EWOC. On

April 21, 2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of 11 1/2 to 23

months’ incarceration, followed by five years of probation. Appellant did not

file a post-sentence motion. Instead, on April 28, 2023, Appellant filed a pro

se notice of appeal.        Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted Attorney

Chwiecko’s request to withdraw because Attorney Bispels had entered his

appearance.2

       When, as here, counsel filed a petition to withdraw and accompanying

Anders brief, we must first examine the request to withdraw before

addressing any of the substantive issues raised on appeal. Commonwealth

____________________________________________

2 Attorney Bispels complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

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v. Bennett, 124 A.3d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 2015). An attorney seeking to

withdraw from representation on appeal must:

      1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
      making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
      determined that the appeal would be frivolous; ) furnish a copy of
      the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that he or
      she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional
      arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court’s
      attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc). Pursuant to Santiago, counsel must also:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
      counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
      counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, and (4) state
      counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
      Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
      case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
      that the appeal is frivolous.

Id., quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

      In the present case, the brief and motion to withdraw filed by Attorney

Bispels substantially comply with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.

See Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1032. However, we point out that counsel’s motion

to withdraw and letter to Appellant state the appeal is meritless, rather than

frivolous. See Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 8/22/23; see also Attorney

Bispels’ Letter to Appellant, 8/22/23.   We remind counsel that the correct

standard required to withdraw from representing a client on direct appeal is a

determination that the appeal is frivolous. See Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1032;

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.       The two terms are not synonymous.          See

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Commonwealth v. Hipps, 274 A.3d 1263, 1271 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(“Frivolousness and meritless are distinct concepts. [F]rivolous is a slightly

higher standard than lack of merit; an argument may be meritless, but not

frivolous.”) (citations & quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 288 A.3d

1292 (Pa. 2022); Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1305 n.10 (Pa.

Super. 1997) (“[A]n appeal is frivolous where it lacks any basis in law or fact.”)

(citation & quotation marks omitted).

      Nevertheless, while Attorney Bispels used the term meritless in his

motion and letter to Appellant, he concludes in the Anders brief that there

are “no non-frivolous argument[s]” to support Appellant’s appeal.            See

Anders Brief at 19. Thus, we conclude Attorney Bispels’ motion to withdraw

and Anders brief substantially meet the requirements of Anders and

Santiago. Further, Attorney Bispels has provided this Court with a copy of

the letter he sent to Appellant, advising him of his right to proceed with newly

retained counsel or pro se, and to raise any additional points for this Court’s

attention. See Attorney Bispels’ Letter to Appellant, 8/22/23. Thereafter,

Appellant filed both a response and supplemental response raising additional

claims which we will discuss infra.

      Thus, we proceed to address the substantive claims presented in the

Anders brief, as well as Appellant’s pro se responses, and then conduct a “full

examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly

frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1196 (Pa. Super.

2018) (en banc) (citation & emphases omitted). If we agree with Attorney

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Bispels’ assessment, “[we] may grant his request to withdraw and dismiss the

appeal[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

      As mentioned above, the Anders brief presents two substantive issues

for our review:

      1. Whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a verdict
      of guilty of [EWOC?]

      2. Whether the verdict of guilty of [EWOC] was contrary to the
      weight of the evidence[?]

Anders Brief at 7 (some capitalization omitted).

      The first issue on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting Appellant’s EWOC conviction. See Anders Brief at 16. We begin

with our well-settled standard of review:

      As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims
      requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to
      the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
      reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence
      will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes
      each material element of the crime charged and the commission
      thereof by the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless,
      the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
      certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved
      by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
      that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from
      the combined circumstances.

      The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly
      circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence
      establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial
      does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with
      the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the
      presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute
      out judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the
      evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a

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      defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the . . .
      convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 708-09 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citation omitted).

      The crime of EWOC is defined, in relevant part, as follows: “A parent,

guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of

age, or a person that employs or supervises such a person, commits an

offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty

of care, protection or support.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1).

      Therefore, to establish a violation of Section 4304, the Commonwealth

must demonstrate the following:

      1) the accused is aware of his/her duty to protect the child;

      2) the accused is aware that the child is in circumstances that
      could threaten the child’s physical or psychological welfare; and

      3) the accused has either failed to act or has taken action so lame
      or meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to
      protect the child's welfare.

      If the Commonwealth fails to prove any one of these elements,
      there is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for child
      endangerment.

Commonwealth v. Pahel, 689 A.2d 963, 964 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation

omitted).

      Moreover:

      The “knowing” element of the crime applies to the general issue
      of whether the defendant knew that he was endangering the
      child’s welfare, not whether the defendant knew that he would
      cause any particular result.

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Commonwealth v. Smith, 956 A.2d 1029, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en

banc).

      We also emphasize our commentary in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 471

A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. 1984), regarding the legislature’s intent in enacting

Section 4304:

      The Supreme Court has said that Section 4304 was drawn
      broadly to cover a wide range of conduct in order to
      safeguard the welfare and security of children. It is to be
      given meaning by reference to the common sense of the
      community and the broad protective purposes for which it
      was enacted. Thus, the common sense of the community, as well
      as the sense of decency, propriety and the morality which most
      people entertain is sufficient to apply the statute to each particular
      case, and to individuate what particular conduct is rendered
      criminal by it.

Id. at 1231 (emphasis added; citations & quotation marks omitted).

      Appellant contends that the conditions in which his child, S.J., was found

were necessary and acceptable for S.J.’s protection. See Anders Brief at 16.

Moreover, in his pro se response to the Anders brief, Appellant insists that

the Commonwealth failed to establish the knowing element of EWOC because

“the caretaker [watching S.J.] went way over what [A]ppellant instructed him

to do, [which was only] to place a gate in front of SJ’s door . . . when [the

caretaker had] to take a shower or bath” so that S.J. was not left unattended.

See Appellant’s pro se Answer to Anders, 9/19/23, at 7. He further asserts

that the “Commonwealth did not establish [he] was aware [that] the nature

of his conduct certainly will cause such result[.]” See id. at 8.

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       Appellant also argues the Commonwealth failed to establish the

supervising element of the crime because Patrick “was the one supervising

[S.J.] while [A]ppellant [was] at work.” See Appellant’s pro se Answer to

Anders at 8.        Lastly, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth never

presented expert testimony to support its claims. See id.

       We agree with the trial court’s determination that the “facts, taken

together, were sufficient for [the] court as fact-finder to find Appellant guilty

of” EWOC. Trial Ct. Op. at 6.

       First, Appellant was aware of his duty to protect his son. See Pahel,

689 A.2d at 964. During the dependency hearing,3 Appellant confirmed that

he had been S.J.’s primary caretaker for the seven months prior to the incident

at issue, while S.J.’s biological mother, with whom the child generally resided,

was hospitalized.4 See N.T. Dependency H’rg, 8/4/21, at 27-28.

       Second, Appellant was aware that S.J. was in circumstances that could

threaten his physical or psychological welfare. See Pahel, 689 A.2d at 964.

By his own admission, Appellant was not only aware that the caretaker,

Patrick, barricaded S.J. in his bedroom, Appellant had instructed him to do so.

See N.T., Trial, at 44, 56, 70-71. Further, the conditions of the room in which

____________________________________________

3 The transcript from the dependency hearing was marked and admitted as

Commonwealth Exhibit 19 at Appellant’s trial. See N.T., Trial, at 5, 80.

4 Appellant and S.J.’s mother were not together, and he explained that his
“actual wife doesn’t want to deal with” S.J. See N.T., Dependency H’rg, at
26.

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S.J. resided were unsanitary, if not deplorable. The child slept on a “heavily”

stained and soiled mattress and box spring, with no sheets, and only a

blanket. See id. at 46. The room was dirty and smelled “strongly of human

feces and urine.” Id. at 45. The only window was “completed boarded over”

so there was no “airflow” and, in July, the room was “extremely warm.” Id.

at 46. Moreover, when Case Manager Perez first entered S.J.’s room, S.J. was

wearing “just a T-shirt and nothing from the waist down.” Id. at 15.

      C.I. Santoro testified that when he “confronted [Appellant] with the

conditions of the home and the barricading[,]” Appellant admitted he knew of

“those conditions” and was “the one who actually directed the caretaker [how]

to care” for S.J. N.T., Trial, at 75-76. Further, Case Manager Perez testified

that Appellant was aware of the “physical conditions of the home and the

bedroom of the child[,]” because he was present during prior visits when they

discussed those conditions. Id. at 37, 39. She explained that although her

team considered consulting with “other agencies[, Appellant] did not want to

put any services in place for assistance that he had to be in the home for.”

Id. at 40.

      Third, Appellant failed to act to protect S.J.’s welfare. See Pahel, 689

A.2d at 964.   As explained above, Appellant was aware of the deplorable

conditions in the home where his child was residing, and, in fact, directed

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S.J.’s caretaker to barricade him in the room.5 See N.T., Trial, at 44, 56, 70-

71.   Emergency Duty Caseworker Frey testified that when she spoke with

Appellant after taking custody of S.J., she “addressed with him the concerns

and the conditions of the home.” Id. at 56. She noted “[h]e did not seem

surprised by any of it at all[, except] he denie[d] that [S.J.] would be left

without food or water.” Id. Further, as noted above, Case Manager Perez

testified that during previous visits, she and Appellant “discussed” the

conditions of the home as “being problematic[,]” and Appellant “talked about

cleaning it up.” Id. at 40. During the dependency hearing, Case Manager

Perez explained that while she never observed a barricade in front of S.J.’s

room during her prior visits, those visits were all announced ─ the visit on

July 28, 2021, was unannounced. See N.T., Trial, at 10; N.T., Dependency

H’rg, at 15.

       As for Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to provide expert

testimony, such testimony is not required.         The crime of EWOC does not

require proof that the child suffered a definitive injury.        Rather, the

Commonwealth must prove the defendant “knowingly endanger[ed] the

welfare of the child[,]”6 or, in other words, placed the child in circumstances
____________________________________________

5 With regard to Appellant’s claim that he was unaware his conduct would
“cause such result[,]” we reiterate that the Commonwealth is only required to
prove Appellant “knew he was endangering the child’s welfare, not whether
[he] knew that he would cause any particular result.” See Smith, 956 A.2d
at 1038. See also Appellant’s pro se Answer to Anders, 9/19/23, at 8.

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1).

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“that could threaten the child’s physical or psychological welfare.” Pahel, 689

A.2d at 964.    Accordingly, the Commonwealth’s failure to provide expert

testimony is of no moment, and we conclude the Commonwealth presented

sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s verdict.

      The second issue in the Anders brief challenges the weight of the

evidence supporting Appellant’s conviction. See Anders Brief at 18.

      This Court’s standard of review of a weight of the evidence claim is well-

settled:

      A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is
      sufficient to sustain the verdict, but seeks a new trial on the
      ground that the evidence was so one-sided or so weighted in favor
      of acquittal that a guilty verdict shocks one’s sense of justice. On
      review, an appellate court does not substitute its judgment for the
      finder of fact and consider the underlying question of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence, but, rather,
      determines only whether the trial court abused its discretion in
      making its determination.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013) (citations

omitted).

      Here, the trial court found Appellant waived his weight claim. See Trial

Ct. Op. at 7. We agree. Pennsylvania Rule of Procedure 607 dictates that a

challenge to the weight of the evidence must be raised with the trial judge

either:

      (1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing;

      (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or

      (3) in a post-sentence motion.

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3). “An appellant’s failure to avail himself of any of

the prescribed methods for presenting a weight of the evidence issue to the

trial court constitutes waiver of that claim.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 231 A.3d

1011, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2020).             See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, Cmt. (“The

purpose of this rule is to make it clear that a challenge to the weight of the

evidence must be raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.”). Because

Appellant did not advance a weight claim at sentencing or in a post-sentence

motion, his challenge on appeal is waived for our review.

       Next, we address three additional claims Appellant presented in his pro

se answer and supplemental response to the Anders brief: (1) Appellant’s

trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance; (2) the parental

justification defense7 excused his actions; and (3) the Commonwealth failed

to demonstrate that he engaged in “a course of conduct” to support the

grading of his offense as a third-degree felony. See Appellant’s pro se Answer

to Anders at 2-5, 9-10; Appellant’s pro se Supplemental Response Regarding

Anders Brief, 11/1/23, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

       First, Appellant alleges that both trial counsel (Attorney Chwiecko) and

appellate    counsel    (Attorney     Bispels)     rendered   ineffective   assistance.

Specifically, he contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to or

challenge the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence supporting his

conviction and for failing to file a post-sentence motion, and faults appellate
____________________________________________

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 509(1).

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counsel for failing to request permission to file a post-sentence motion nunc

pro tunc after entering his appearance.            See Appellant’s pro se Answer to

Anders at 2-5, 10; Appellant’s pro se Supplemental Response Regarding

Anders Brief at 1-2 (unpaginated).

       “[A]s a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel until collateral review.” Commonwealth v. Grant,

813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002).            Our Supreme Court has recognized three

limited exceptions to the general rule: (1) in extraordinary circumstances

where claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are “apparent from the record

and meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best serves the

interests of justice;”8 (2) where there is good cause shown and unitary review

of the claim is preceded by a waiver of the right to seek review under the

Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA);9 and (3) “where the defendant is statutorily

precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA review[,]” such as, when a

defendant receives a short sentence or a fine for their crimes.10

       None of these exceptions apply to the facts before us. Appellant’s claims

are not apparent from the record and meritorious, Appellant has not waived

his right to PCRA review, and the sentence imposed by the trial court does not

statutorily prohibit him from seeking PCRA review. See Holmes, 79 A.3d at
____________________________________________

8 See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 563 (Pa. 2013).

9 See Holmes, 79 A.3d at 564; see also 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545.

10 See Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352, 361 (Pa. 2018).

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563-64; Delgros, 193 A.3d at 361. See also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (to

be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must "plead and prove by a

preponderance of the evidence [they have] been convicted of a crime under

the laws of this Commonwealth and is at the time relief is granted . . . currently

serving   a   sentence    of   imprisonment,    probation    or   parole    for   the

crime"). Accordingly, we decline to entertain the ineffectiveness claims on

direct appeal and dismiss them without prejudice for Appellant to raise the

claims on collateral review.

      Next, we address Appellant’s contention that his actions are excused by

the parental justification affirmative defense “because [S.J.] used to escape

several times over the years and [Appellant] acted to safeguard [him].” See

Appellant’s pro se Answer to Anders at 9–10.

      The parental justification defense may be raised to excuse “conduct that

is otherwise criminal, but which under the circumstances is socially acceptable

and   which    deserves    neither   criminal   liability   nor   even     censure.’”

Commonwealth v. Yachimowski, 232 A.3d 861, 866 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(emphasis & citations omitted). As set forth in the Crimes Code, the parental

justification defense requires proof of the following elements:

      1) the actor use[d] “force upon or toward the person of another;”
      2) the actor “is the parent or guardian or other person similarly
      responsible for the general care and supervision of a minor or a
      person acting at the request of such parent, guardian or other
      responsible person;” 3) “the force is used for the purpose of
      safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, including the
      preventing or punishment of his misconduct;” and, 4) “the force
      used is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk

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      of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme
      pain or mental distress or gross degradation.”

Id., citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 509(1).

      Here, Appellant’s claim that his decision to barricade S.J. in his room

was necessary “to safeguard” the child because he had escaped from the home

“several times over the years” does not support the parental justification

affirmative defense. See Appellant’s pro se Answer to Anders at 9-10. S.J.

was not simply locked in his room to prevent him from escaping. Rather, the

testimony established that he was barricaded in the room ─ his doorway was

blocked by a stove, a table, a chair, two additional doors, and a plank. See

N.T., Trial, at 13. Moreover, the condition of the room was filthy, and the only

window was “completely boarded over” so that no light or airflow could come

through.   See id. at 45-46.    When confronted with the unsafe conditions,

Appellant exhibited no concern for his child.     Instead, he was “irate” and

“blam[ed the caseworkers] for the situation.” Id. at 22. Appellant “was not

willing to come to [the home] or send a different caregiver.” Id. at 44. It is

evident that S.J.’s living conditions, particularly the fact he was barricaded in

his bedroom, created a “substantial risk” of “mental distress or gross

degradation.” See Yachimowski, 232 A.3d at 866. Compare id. at 863-64

(father was entitled to parental justification jury instruction when evidence

established parents confined five-year old to her room using baby gates

screwed into wall so that child did not roam house unattended in middle of

the night, but that home was “not in disarray[,]” there was a “potty chair” and

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wipes in child’s room, and parents removed gates when confronted with fire

safety concern).

      Lastly, Appellant challenges the grading of his conviction as a third-

degree felony. See Appellant’s pro se Answer to Anders at 9. The offense

of EWOC is generally graded as a first-degree misdemeanor. See 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 4304(b)(i).   However, if “the actor engaged in a course of conduct of

endangering the welfare of a child[,]” the offense may be graded as a third-

degree felony. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(b)(ii) (emphasis added). “Although

the EWOC statute does not define ‘course of conduct,’ the phrase is clearly

used in that context to differentiate the penalties for single and multiple

endangering acts.”    Commonwealth v. Kelly, 102 A.3d 1025, 1031 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (en banc).

      In support of his claim, Appellant argues that “[e]ven [Case Manager

Perez] stated that [the date of the incident] was the first time she saw such

thing[s]” since she started working with them four months prior.            See

Appellant’s pro se Answer to Anders at 9 (emphasis added).

      We find this argument without merit. Here, it was evident that Appellant

“engaged in a course of conduct” consisting of “multiple endangering acts”

over an extended period. See Kelly, 102 A.3d at 1031. While Case Manager

Perez acknowledged that the first time she observed S.J.’s door barricaded

was during her visit on July 28, 2021, she also explained that was her first

unannounced visit. See N.T., Dependency H’rg, at 15. However, as noted

above, she also testified that during prior visits, she and Appellant “discussed”

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the conditions of the home as “being problematic[,]” and Appellant “talked

about cleaning it up.” N.T., Trial, at 40. See also N.T., Dependency H’rg, at

15 (Case Manager Perez stating “I was always concerned of the quality of the

home and [S.J.’s] quality of life”). However, Appellant was unwilling “to put

any services in place for assistance that he had to be in the home for.” See

N.T., Trial, at 40. Thus, we conclude the Commonwealth presented sufficient

evidence for the trial court to determine Appellant engaged in a “course of

conduct” of endangering the welfare of his child to support the grading of the

offense as a third-degree felony.11 See Commonwealth v. Barkman, 295

A.3d    721,    735-36     (Pa.   Super.       2023)   (determining   “confluence   of

circumstances strongly suggested an ongoing pattern of neglect, not merely

a momentary state of affairs[,]” to support grading of EWOC as third-degree

felony when if it could be “reasonably inferred” that “unsanitary and

deplorable conditions” in home “developed over a period of days, weeks or

months”).

       Consequently, we agree with Attorney Bispels’ determination that the

appeal is frivolous, and the pro se claims raised by Appellant warrant no relief.

Moreover, our independent review of the record reveals no non-frivolous

issues to be raised on appeal. See Yorgey, 188 A.3d at 1196. Therefore, we

____________________________________________

11 We note, too, that Appellant was charged with the crime as a third-degree

felony, and the Commonwealth explicitly argued that Appellant engaged in a
“course of conduct” in its closing before the court entered its verdict. See
Criminal Information, 12/16/21; N.T., Trial, at 83-84.

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affirm the judgment of sentence and grant Attorney Bispels’ petition to

withdraw.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.      Petition to withdraw as counsel

granted.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/18/2023

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