Court Opinion

ID: 9960321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 21:17:53.38058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:22.291623
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STEPHEN LUDWIG, a single man;                    No. 85537-9-I
 ROSS KLINGELE and ARRIETTE
 BURN, a marital community,
                                                  DIVISION ONE
                       Appellants,

          v.                                      UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 CITY OF MOUNTLAKE TERRACE, a
 municipal corporation,

                       Respondent.

          CHUNG, J. — Stephen Ludwig, Ross Klingele, and Arriette Burn

(collectively, the Homeowners) appeal the dismissal of their complaint against

the City of Mountlake Terrace (City). They also challenge the trial court’s award

of attorney fees and CR 11 sanctions. We conclude that the trial court properly

dismissed the Homeowners’ complaint on claim preclusion grounds and did not

abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees and imposing sanctions. Thus, we

affirm.

                                      FACTS

          In February 2014, the Homeowners purchased a property on 226th Place

Southwest in Mountlake Terrace (the Property). The Property is adjacent to Hall

Creek, which the City uses as a stormwater conveyance.
No. 85537-9-I/2

       In 2017, the Homeowners sued the City. According to the Homeowners, 1

their complaint “alleged negligence on the part of the City for damage to the bank

armor that defended the west foundation wall of their house” from Hall Creek

(2017 Lawsuit). The matter was tried to the bench in September 2022. The court

found that “[a] bulkhead and rockery exist on the Property to protect the home

from migration of [Hall Creek] and from flooding.” It also found,

       In 1969, the City contracted with [the Reid-Middleton firm (RMA)] to
       construct a concrete box culvert replacing an existing corrugated
       metal pipe culvert carrying Hall Creek beneath 226th Pl[ace]. The
       plan for this culvert called for existing rockery and the bulkhead to
       remain in place, the existing creek channel to be lowered by about
       one foot, and 150-pound rocks to be installed in a contiguous row
       along the creek banks. . . . The purpose of these 150-pound rocks
       was to confine the water at lower levels within the channel and to
       protect the existing bank.

The court found that the City did not install the row of 150-pound rocks as

specified by RMA.

       The court also found that in April 2014, while conducting repairs on the

Property, one of the Homeowners “discovered the bulkhead had been

undermined and soil behind the bulkhead had been removed, creating a cavity

approximately sixteen feet long, three to four feet wide, and one to two feet deep

behind the bulkhead,” and “[i]t was later learned that this cavity had been created

by scouring of water from Hall Creek, which over time, allowed water to enter the

Property side of the bulkhead and create the cavity.” 2 Further, the court found

that the Homeowners then hired a professional engineer to design a repair;

“[h]owever, [the Homeowners] could not afford [the] repair as designed, and

       1 The 2017 complaint is not in the record.
       2 Bold face omitted.

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No. 85537-9-I/3

decided to file suit against the City.”

       The court concluded that “the City assumed a duty when it undertook the

[1970] project to install the box culvert pursuant to the [RMA] plans” and that the

City breached that duty. But it found that the Homeowners did not “prove th[e]

failure to properly install the 150-pound rocks proximately caused the damage to

the Property.” In particular, the court found that “the design of the bulkhead (no

footing, no reinforcement), along with the angle of the stormwater striking it,

could [have] themselves caused the damage.” And because the Homeowners

failed to prove proximate cause, their negligence claim failed. The court entered

its findings and conclusions in the 2017 Lawsuit on February 3, 2023.

       On April 26, 2023, the Homeowners filed the instant lawsuit, seeking

injunctive relief. They alleged substantially the same background facts described

above, i.e., that (1) they purchased the Property in February 2014, (2) the

Property includes a portion of Hall Creek, which the City uses as a stormwater

conveyance, (3) the City undertook a culvert replacement project in 1970, (4) the

Homeowners discovered a sinkhole behind the bulkhead in 2014, which was

caused by scouring from Hall Creek, and (5) they sued the City in 2017 after the

remedy designed by their engineer was beyond what they could afford. They also

alleged,

       The City . . . excavated a deeper channel . . . to accommodate the
       deeper culvert . . . . Plans for this work, provided by [RMA],
       specified that the banks of the deeper channel should be protected
       by rows of 150-pound rocks. As any reasonable person could
       surmise, a deeper channel would require deeper bank-protection.
       Yet the City, in breach of its duty to properly construct the channel
       changes . . . , neglected to install this protection. After failing to
       place the specified protection, the City then failed to provide any

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No. 85537-9-I/4

       protection at all for the deeper channel. Nor did the City perform
       any inspection, monitoring or maintenance to identify and prevent
       damaging scour along the vulnerable deeper banks at [the]
       [P]roperty.

The Homeowners alleged that “[l]acking any protection, the deeper channel bank

[on the Property side of the creek] has been entirely scoured away” and that the

scour “eventually undercut[ the] existing concrete bulkhead that had previously

protected the west foundation wall of [the Property],” causing damages to the

Homeowners. The Homeowners requested an injunction directing the City to

“cease and desist directing concentrated and damaging stormwater against Hall

Creek’s vulnerable east channel bank near [the Property], without also providing

proper protection for said bank” and to “immediately maintain, repair, or replace

Hall Creek’s already damaged bank armor along [the Property] to current

standards in accordance with its established duty.”

       In May 2023, the City moved under CR 12(b)(6) to dismiss the

Homeowners’ complaint, arguing that it was time-barred, the 2017 Lawsuit

precluded the Homeowners’ claims herein, and those claims were also

foreclosed by laches. The trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss as well

as its subsequent motion for an award of attorney fees and an additional $1,000

in CR 11 sanctions, for which the Homeowners and their attorney were jointly

and severally liable.

       The Homeowners appeal.

                                    ANALYSIS

       I.     Motion to Dismiss

       The Homeowners argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their

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No. 85537-9-I/5

complaint. Because claim preclusion barred the complaint, we disagree. 3

        Claim preclusion, historically referred to as res judicata, is an equitable

doctrine that precludes relitigation of already determined causes. Weaver v. City

of Everett, 194 Wn.2d 464, 472-73, 450 P.3d 177 (2019). It prevents relitigation

of an entire claim when a prior proceeding involving the same parties and issues

culminated in a judgment on the merits. Id. at 480. In addition to the threshold

requirement of a final judgment on the merits in the prior suit, the party asserting

claim preclusion has the burden to establish that the prior action and the

challenged action have “concurrence of identity” in four areas: (1) subject matter,

(2) cause of action, (3) persons and parties, and (4) quality of persons for or

against whom the claim is made. Id. All four elements must be satisfied to

establish claim preclusion. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853,

866, 93 P.3d 108 (2004). “Because it is a question of law, we review a

determination that claim preclusion applies de novo.” Hassan v. GCA Prod.

Servs., Inc., 17 Wn. App. 2d 625, 633, 487 P.3d 203 (2021).

        Here, it is undisputed that the 2017 Lawsuit ended in a final judgment on

the merits. It is also undisputed that the 2017 Lawsuit and the instant proceeding

involve the same parties and quality of persons. Additionally, although

“Washington law does not specify how precise[ly] the subject matter in the first

and second suit must coincide,” Eugster v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 198 Wn. App.

758, 787, 397 P.3d 131 (2017), the two proceedings plainly involve the same

subject matter, i.e., the City’s alleged responsibility to repair the damage that Hall

        3 Because we affirm the dismissal on this ground, we need not decide whether dismissal
was also proper based on the statute of limitations or laches.

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No. 85537-9-I/6

Creek has caused to the Property. Cf. id. (disciplinary proceeding against

attorney involved the same subject matter as attorney’s later lawsuit claiming the

disciplinary process violates due process in that both proceedings “include[ ] the

[bar association’s] disciplinary process”).

       The remaining question, then, is whether the 2017 Lawsuit and the instant

proceeding have concurrence of identity in cause of action. “[I]dentity of causes

of action ‘cannot be determined precisely by mechanistic application of a simple

test.’ ” Rains v. State, 100 Wn.2d 660, 663-64, 674 P.2d 165 (1983) (quoting

Abrahmson v. Univ. of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 206 (9th Cir. 1979))). To aid in the

analysis, courts have considered the following four factors:

       “(1) [W]hether rights or interests established in the prior judgment
       would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second
       action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in
       the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of
       the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same
       transactional nucleus of facts.”

Rains, 100 Wn.2d at 664 (alteration in original) (quoting Costantini v. Trans

World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982)). “These four factors are

analytical tools; it is not necessary that all four factors be present to bar the

claim.” Ensley v. Pitcher, 152 Wn. App. 891, 903, 222 P.3d 99 (2009). Ultimately,

the question is whether the later claim is one that “might or should have been

litigated [or that] was litigated” in the earlier proceeding. Hadley v. Cowan, 60

Wn. App. 433, 441, 804 P.2d 1271 (1991); see also Norris v. Norris, 95 Wn.2d

124, 130, 622 P.2d 816 (1980) (claim preclusion “acts to prevent relitigation of

claims that were or should have been decided among the parties in an earlier

proceeding” (emphasis added)).

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No. 85537-9-I/7

       The Homeowners assert that there is no identity in cause of action

because the 2017 Lawsuit involved “very specific allegations about construction

negligence,” whereas in the instant lawsuit, the Homeowners “claim that the City

has failed to maintain and repair their waterway and is in continuing breach of its

duty to properly maintain and repair the waterway today.” But these are both

claims that the City has breached a duty to maintain and/or repair the waterway.

Indeed, the Homeowners themselves specifically rely on the findings from the

2017 Lawsuit as having established the existence of that duty, stating that they

filed the second lawsuit “based on the Trial Court’s finding that the City did,

indeed, have a duty of care to repair and maintain the waterway.” While the

Homeowners now allege that the scope of the City’s duty was broader than a

duty of care in following RMA’s construction plans and, thus, the City breached

an ongoing duty by its failure to repair and maintain the waterway since, they

could have and should have brought this theory forward in the 2017 Lawsuit. See

Eugster, 198 Wn. App. at 790 (“Res judicata applies not only to points on which

the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a

judgment, but to every point that properly belonged to the subject of the litigation,

and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought

forward at that time.” (emphasis added)); Sound Built Homes, Inc. v. Windermere

Real Estate/South, Inc., 118 Wn. App. 617, 630, 72 P.3d 788 (2003) (“ ‘The law

of res judicata now reflects the expectation that parties who are given the

capacity to present their entire controversies shall in fact do so.’ ” (internal

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No. 85537-9-I/8

quotation marks omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2)

cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1982))).

       To this end, the Homeowners concede that they sought an injunction in

the 2017 Lawsuit based on the theory they allege herein, and that the court

denied it because there was an adequate remedy at law, i.e., monetary damages

for negligence. Considering the first Rains factor, whether rights or interests

established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution

of the second action, allowing the Homeowners to proceed in this lawsuit would

impair the City’s interest in maintaining the judgment in the 2017 Lawsuit that

concluded it was not liable to the Homeowners. Similarly, the third Rains factor,

whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right, in both suits, the

Homeowners allege an interest in redress for the City’s breach of a duty to

maintain and repair the Hall Creek waterway.

       As to the second Rains factor, whether substantially the same evidence is

presented in the two actions, and the fourth factor, whether the two suits arise

out of the same transactional nucleus of facts, both lawsuits arise from and

depend on evidence of what the City has or has not done since it undertook the

1970 culvert installation project, which was the basis on which the trial court in

the 2017 Lawsuit found that the City “assumed a duty.” Indeed, although the full

record from the prior lawsuit is not before us, the Homeowners represented

below that in the 2017 Lawsuit, they “advanced facts that would have supported

their current claim,” and the court’s findings in the prior lawsuit are consistent

with this statement.

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No. 85537-9-I/9

       Yet the Homeowners now assert that because their negligence claim “was

denied at trial, but no final judgment was entered as to injunctive relief,” they may

maintain a claim for injunctive relief because it is “the only legally cognizable

cause of action left.” This assertion ignores that “an injunction is a remedy, not an

independent cause of action.” Markoff v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 9 Wn. App.

2d 833, 851, 447 P.3d 577 (2019) (emphasis added). Where the Homeowners

not only had an opportunity—but tried and failed—to prove their entitlement to

monetary relief against the City, they may not now pursue injunctive relief

premised on the same facts, which were known to them at the time of the earlier

lawsuit. See Eugster, 198 Wn. App. at 790 (“A matter should have been raised

and decided earlier if it is merely an alternate theory of recovery or an alternate

remedy.”); cf. 15 DOUGLAS J. ENDE, W ASHINGTON PRACTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE

§ 44:2 (3d ed. Supp. 2023) (“If the substantive claim on which a request for

injunctive relief is based is dismissed, there is no longer a right that can be

vindicated or protected by an injunction.”).

       In short, the Homeowner’s complaint seeks to relitigate the 2017 Lawsuit.

And although not addressed by the parties, as discussed above, consideration of

the Rains factors also supports a determination that claim preclusion applies.

The trial court did not err by dismissing the Homeowners’ complaint.

       II.    Attorney Fees and Sanctions

       The Homeowners next argue that the trial court erred by awarding the City

its attorney fees under RCW 4.84.185 and imposing CR 11 sanctions. Again, we

disagree.

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No. 85537-9-I/10

       RCW 4.84.185 provides that a court in a civil action “may, upon written

findings by the judge that the action . . . was frivolous and advanced without

reasonable cause, require the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party the

reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in opposing such

action.” CR 11(a) provides that an attorney or party signing a pleading, motion, or

legal memorandum certifies that they have read it and that it is, to the best of the

attorney or party’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable

inquiry, well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good faith argument

for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of

new law, not interposed for any improper purpose. “If a pleading, motion, or legal

memorandum is signed in violation of this rule, the court . . . may impose upon

the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction.”

CR 11(a).

       We review awards under RCW 4.84.185 and CR 11 for abuse of

discretion. State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verharen, 136 Wn.2d 888, 903, 969 P.2d

64 (1998). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Sw. Suburban Sewer

Dist. v. Fish, 17 Wn. App. 2d 833, 838, 488 P.3d 839 (2021).

       Here, the trial court had a tenable basis to award attorney fees and

impose a sanction. There was evidence in the record that after the Homeowners

filed a pre-suit tort claim with the City, counsel for the City wrote to them,

       It appears from your tort claim form that you are making an identical
       claim for damages (“to repair and maintain bank armor”) that has
       already been adjudicated in the [2017 L]awsuit. As you recall, the
       Superior Court, after a full trial, found that you did not meet your

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No. 85537-9-I/11

       burden to prove the City proximately caused damage to your
       property’s bank armor/bulkhead.

The City attached a copy of the findings and conclusions from the 2017 Lawsuit,

as well as an order denying the Homeowners’ subsequent motion for

reconsideration. The City also explained that the Homeowners’ attempt to

relitigate their claim was prohibited by the doctrine of claim preclusion. And, the

City notified the Homeowners that if they proceeded to file suit, the City would

pursue sanctions under both RCW 4.84.185 and CR 11. Yet the Homeowners

pressed on, pleading a claim for an alternate remedy that even they

acknowledged was premised on the same facts they advanced in the 2017

Lawsuit.

       Furthermore, as the City accurately observes, the Homeowners’ claim in

this lawsuit fundamentally arises from allegations of negligence: The

Homeowners assert that the City breached a duty of care with regard to the

maintenance and repair of the Hall Creek waterway. Cf. Callahan v. Keystone

Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wn.2d 823, 826, 435 P.2d 626 (1967) (negligence

connotes a “failure of duty to exercise due care”). This claim is subject to RCW

4.16.130’s two-year statute of limitations. Wallace v. Lewis County, 134 Wn. App.

1, 13, 137 P.3d 101 (2006) (“An action for negligent injury to real property is

subject to a two-year statute of limitations.” (citing RCW 4.16.130)). And it

accrued at the latest in 2014, when the Homeowners undisputedly discovered

the damage to the Property. See id. at 13 (action for negligent injury to real

property “accrues when the plaintiff suffers some form of injury to his real

property,” and “[w]here there is a delay between the injury and the plaintiff’s

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No. 85537-9-I/12

discovery of it, the court may apply the discovery rule”). Yet the Homeowners did

not file this lawsuit until April 2023, some nine years later.

        The City pointed this out in its motion to dismiss and also asserted that at

best, the Homeowners’ claim was subject to the three-year limitations period in

RCW 4.16.080. 4 It also gave notice, again, that it intended to seek an award of

attorney fees and CR 11 sanctions. The Homeowners responded by asserting

that “[o]ngoing inaction in the face of ongoing damage . . . may constitute a

‘wrong of a continuing nature.’ ” 5 But the Homeowners provided no legal support

for such a rule, much less any analysis as to why it applies here. When pressed

on this in relation to the City’s later motion for fees and sanctions, the

Homeowners cited only a criminal law treatise and a handful of non-Washington

criminal cases, again without any analysis as to why those authorities apply here.

The Homeowners also argued that “the case at bar is a logical continuation of the

[2017 Lawsuit], and therefore a legitimate inheritor of that case’s timely filing.”

But they cited absolutely no authority for this “logical continuation” theory, which

if anything, bolstered the trial court’s conclusion that claim preclusion applies.

See Spokane Rsch. & Def. Fund v. City of Spokane, 155 Wn.2d 89, 99, 117 P.3d

        4 On appeal, the Homeowners contend that “because no proof of the applicability of any
one of the stated statutes is offered,” and because the City did not “properly repl[y] to [their]
assertion concerning tolling of the statute of limitations,” the City did not meet its burden to show
that the Homeowners’ complaint was time barred. This contention is without merit. The City
demonstrated that however characterized, the Homeowners’ claims were subject to, at most, a
three-year limitations period. The Homeowners’ failure to specify the nature of their claims does
not amount to an argument that neither a two- or three-year statute of limitations applies. And it
was the Homeowners, not the City, who bore the burden to show that tolling applied. See Rivas v.
Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 164 Wn.2d 261, 267, 189 P.3d 753 (2008) (“A plaintiff . . . carries the
burden of proof if he or she alleges that the statute [of limitations] was tolled and does not bar the
claim.”).
          5 Emphasis added.

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No. 85537-9-I/13

1117 (2005) (“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is intended to prevent piecemeal

litigation and ensure the finality of judgments.”). Under the circumstances, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the Homeowners’ complaint

was not well grounded in law or fact and was frivolous and advanced without

reasonable cause.

       The Homeowners disagree and point out that in a declaration in support of

dismissal, the City’s counsel stated the nature of the Homeowners’ claims was

“essentially that the City caused flooding of [the Property].” The Homeowners

assert that because they “have never claimed damages for ‘flooding,’ ” the

attorney fee award was unreasonable. But where both of the Homeowners’

lawsuits alleged that stormwater runoff was damaging the Property, the trial court

was within its discretion to reject the Homeowners’ hypertechnical focus on the

use of the term “flooding” to describe the essence of the Homeowners’ claims.

The Homeowners also argue that the CR 11 sanctions were manifestly

unreasonable because “[i]n essence, having been unsuccessful in its earlier

attempt to hold the City liable for negligence in the construction of the culvert

changes at [the P]roperty, the only legally cognizable action left to . . . seek

redress for the ongoing harm was and is a suit in equity for an affirmative

injunction.” But as discussed, this argument mischaracterizes injunctive relief as

an independent cause of action, as distinct from a remedy. The Homeowners fail

to show that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to the City and

imposing CR 11 sanctions.

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No. 85537-9-I/14

      III.   Fees on Appeal

      As a final matter, the City requests an award of fees on appeal.

“Washington State courts follow the ‘American Rule’—even as to a prevailing

party, ‘attorney fees are not available as costs or damages absent a contract,

statute, or recognized ground in equity.’ ” LK Operating, LLC v. The Collection

Grp., 181 Wn.2d 117, 123, 330 P.3d 190 (2014) (quoting City of Seattle v.

McCready, 131 Wn.2d 266, 275, 931 P.2d 156 (1997)). The City requests fees

under RCW 4.84.185, but that statute does not authorize an award of fees on

appeal. Bill of Rights Legal Found. v. Evergreen State Coll., 44 Wn. App. 690,

697, 723 P.2d 483 (1986); see also Hanna v. Margitan, 193 Wn. App. 596, 614,

373 P.3d 300 (2016) (“Because RCW 4.84.185 requires written findings to

support an award of attorney fees . . . , and appellate courts do not make

findings, RCW 4.84.185 does not authorize an award of fees on appeal.”).

Accordingly, we deny the City’s request for an award of fees on appeal.

      We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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