Court Opinion

ID: 9677044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:41:46.289896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:53.328509
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING
DICE, Commissioner.
In their motion for rehearing, appellants urge as reversible error the court’s action in permitting Officer Driskell to testify, over objection, that in the game of policy it is the writer who does the actual exhibiting to the public, it being appellants’ contention that such testimony of the officer was tantamount to a legal conclusion and invaded the province of the jury.
 Officer Driskell, as stated in our original opinion, was shown to be qualified as an expert on policy. Under the holdings of this court, an officer whose qualifications as an expert on policy are shown may testify as such and explain the game to the jury. Grigsby v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 248, 298 S.W.2d 595, and Griffey v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 338, 327 S.W.2d 585. Officer Driskell, as an expert, was qualified to explain the game of policy to the jury. We are unable to agree that his statement to the jury that only the writers exhibited the game to the public constituted a legal conclusion. Such was nothing more than a statement of fact and inference by the officer, based upon his knowledge of the game of policy as an expert. Nor do we agree that his testimony constituted an invasion of the province of the jury. In the relatively recent case of Cordero v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 160, 297 S.W.2d 174, this court, in discussing a similar question, quoted the rule as stated by Judge James R. Norvell in his article “Invasion of the Province of the Jury,” in 31 Texas Law Review, p. 731, as follows:
“ ‘The rule supported by the later American authorities is in substantial accord and may be stated as follows:
“ ‘A witness in testifying as to what he has perceived may employ inferences and state all relevant inferences, including those embracing ultimate fact issues to be decided by the trier of fact, provided he possesses a special knowledge, skill or experience not possessed by the trier of fact, which places him in a better position to draw the inference than is the trier of fact, or if the witness may more adequately and accurately communicate what he has perceived to the trier of fact by testifying in terms of inference or by stating inferences, and his use of such inferences in testifying will not be likely to mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice of the objecting party.’ ”
Clearly, in the instant case, Officer Dris-kell was possessed with more knowledge of the game of policy than the jurors in the case and his testimony could not have misled the jury to the prejudice of appellant.
It is further contended by appellants that the court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial when Officer Driskell, while being questioned on direct examination concerning his knowledge that appellants had picked up some bets for another writer, stated:
“The defendants told me they had been dropped off * *
The record reflects that no objection was made by appellants until after the question was asked and answered by the witness, when their counsel stated:
“We object and at this time we ask for a mistrial.”
Thereupon, the question was withdrawn by state’s counsel and the jury was instructed by the court not to consider the question and answer for any purpose whatsoever. Under the record, we perceive no reversible error in the bill.
Remaining convinced that a proper disposition was made of the case upon original submission, the motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion approved by the court.