Court Opinion

ID: 9659498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:48:06.338895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:08.874707
License: Public Domain

ENOCH, Justice,
concurring.
I write separately because I believe this case brings into sharper focus the concerns I expressed in Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 808 (Tex.1995) (Enoch, J., concurring). As a general rule, an agent cannot be liable for tortiously interfering with his principal’s contract because agent and principal are considered one and the same. Holloway, 898 S.W.2d at 795. In Holloway, however, the Court held that an agent acting within the scope of his authority may be liable to a third party for tortious interference if the agent does not act in good faith. Holloway, 898 S.W.2d at 796.
Although not explicitly articulated in its opinion, the Court in this case employs its standard from Holloway. As I stated in Holloway, I disagree with this standard. In my view, when an agent is acting under the authority of his principal, the results of the agent’s conduct are actionable solely against the principal under breach of contract principles. This is so even if the agent acts in bad faith. Mere breach of contract is not actionable in tort. Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Tex.1992).
The first question must be whether the agent acted within the scope of his authority. The plaintiff has the burden of proof, and if he fails to show the agent acted outside his authority, the inquiry is over, and the agent is not liable for tortious interference. If the plaintiff proves the agent acted outside the scope of his authority, however, he must also demonstrate that the agent did not act with a good faith belief that his actions were in the *183best interest of the principal. In summary, the plaintiff can prevail against the agent for tortious interference only if the plaintiff shows lack of both authority and good faith.
Because this case comes to us on summary judgment in favor of Morgan Stanley, in order to prevail Morgan Stanley must prove, as a matter of law, that it acted within the scope of its authority as Tenneco’s agent. Morgan Stanley avers by affidavit that it performed all services on behalf of Tenneco. This fact is not challenged. Further, it is undisputed in the summary judgment record that Tenneco hired Morgan Stanley to sell Houston Oil & Minerals. This evidence establishes that Morgan Stanley acted within the scope of its authority in negotiating the sale of Houston Oil & Minerals. Texas Oil offers no evidence that creates a question of fact as to this issue. Therefore, as a matter of law, Morgan Stanley cannot be liable for tortious interference with the prospective business relationship between its principal— Tenneco—and Texas Oil. Given that Morgan Stanley acted within the scope of its authority, the Court’s discussion of good faith is unnecessary and misleading.
Because I agree that Morgan Stanley negated as a matter of law a necessary element of tortious interference, I concur in the Court’s judgment.