Court Opinion

ID: 9553957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:38:02.484274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:41.217520
License: Public Domain

Justice SCOTT,
dissenting:
Relying upon legislative history to overcome statutory language, the majority holds that section 10-4-706(l)(c)(II), 4A C.R.S. (1987), was intended to permit insurers to avoid liability for rehabilitation benefits in excess of $50,000. Maj. op. at 1305. Because the plain language of the statute does not limit the total amount of benefit payments for rehabilitation procedures or treatment and training, I disagree with the majority’s construction of section 10-4-706(l)(c)(II). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I
The facts are as set forth in the majority opinion. However, I would rely upon the plain language of the statute to determine the rehabilitation benefits provided by section 10-4-706.
A
When construing statutory provisions, we should give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 902 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Colo.1995); PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, 898 P.2d 542, 545 (Colo.1995). First, we must “look to the statutory language itself, giving words and phrases their commonly accepted and understood meaning.” PDM Molding, Inc., 898 P.2d at 545. Where the statutory language is plain and clear, we need not resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction; rather, we need only apply the statute as written. Allstate Ins. Co., 902 P.2d at 1387; see also PDM Molding, Inc., 898 P.2d at 545; Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237, 246 (Colo.1992). Thus, our construction of the statute is best informed by “resort to the plain language of the Act.” Allstate Ins. Co., 902 P.2d at 1387.
I also note that “[t]he Act should be liberally construed to further its remedial and beneficent purposes.” Id. As set forth in the legislative declaration, the basic purpose of the Act “is to avoid inadequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents” and to “provid[e] benefits to persons ... injured in accidents.” § 10-4-702, 4A C.R.S. (1994). The General Assembly’s objective in adopting the no-fault act was to maximize insurance coverage for those unable to carry on their prior activities. Allstate Ins. Co., 902 P.2d at 1387; see also Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585, 593 (Colo.1984).
Today’s result minimizes benefits to those injured and maximizes protection for the assets of the insurers at the expense of the insured. To the contrary, we have previously held that the legislative intent behind the *1306Act is to provide full compensation to persons injured in automobile accidents. Allstate Ins. Co., 902 P.2d at 1388; Sulzer v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 794 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Colo.1990). The plain language, combined with the fundamental purposes behind the Act, dictates that the provision at issue, section 10-4-706(l)(c)(II), as it existed prior to the 1994 amendment, should not limit rehabilitation benefits to $50,000 as the majority has concluded. Rather, I would conclude that the section establishes a rebuttable presumption that an insurer has complied with the provision for rehabilitation services when payments made by the insurer reach “fifty thousand dollars within five years after an accident involving a motor vehicle.”
B
The majority does not accept as controlling the fact that there is no absolute $50,000 limit on rehabilitation benefits set forth in section 10-4-706(l)(c)(I)(A). That section of the statute clearly stated:
(1) Subject to the limitations and exclusions authorized by this part 7, the minimum coverages required for compliance with this part 7 are as follows:
(e)(1)(A) Compensation without regard to fault for payment of the cost of rehabilitation procedures or treatment and rehabilitative occupational training necessary because of bodily injury arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle.
§ 10-44706(1), 4A C.R.S. (1987). This plain language militates against the majority’s conclusion that an insurer’s obligation to compensate persons injured in accidents for rehabilitation services and treatment is wholly met once the value of rehabilitation services has reached $50,000. What makes the majority’s failure to acknowledge the absence of such an absolute limit in its holding, in my view, inappropriate and, at best, questionable, is that elsewhere in the Act, the General Assembly had no difficulty setting such an absolute limit in clear, unmistakable language.
Section 10-4-706, 4A C.R.S. (1987), set forth the minimum coverages for insurers required for compliance with the statute. Directly preceding the section on rehabilitation benefits, the statute provides for medical expenses compensation. In pertinent part, section 10-4-706(l)(b) stated:
Compensation without regard to fault, up to a limit of fifty thousand dollars per person for any one accident, for payment of all reasonable and necessary expenses for medical, chiropractic, optometric, po-diatric, hospital, nursing, X-ray, dental, surgical, ambulance, and prosthetic services ... performed within five years after the accident for bodily injury arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle.
§ 10-44706(l)(b), 4A C.R.S. (1987) (emphasis added). Thus, the General Assembly clearly established a monetary cap on insurers’ liability for medical expenses under the Act. Yet, the General Assembly did not enact a similar limit on rehabilitation benefits. If the General Assembly sought the same absolute limitation for rehabilitation expenses as medical expenses, it would have used the same language. See People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 976 (Colo.1987) (“It must be presumed that the legislature has knowledge of the legal import of the words it uses_”). The plain language of section 10-4-706(l)(e)(I)(A) does not conclusively establish a $50,000 limit as the minimum required coverage that insurers must provide for rehabilitation benefits.
Rather than creating an express limitation like that placed on medical benefits, the General Assembly created a presumption of compliance whereby an insurer “shall be presumed to have complied with the provision for rehabilitation” when payments reach $50,000 within five years after a motor vehicle accident. § 10-4-706(l)(c)(II), 4A C.R.S. (1987) (emphasis added). Because we must interpret statutes according to the plain language provided by the General Assembly, we cannot enforce a monetary limit on rehabilitation expenses similar to that limiting medical expenses where there is no such limit present in the statute.
Another portion of the statute also persuades me that there is no limit on rehabilita*1307tion benefits based on a plain reading of the statute. Section 10 — 4—710(2)(b) stated that “[a] complying policy may provide that all benefits set forth in section 10-4-706(l)(b) to (l)(e) and in this section are subject to an aggregate limit of two hundred thousand dol-lars_” (Emphasis added.) For this phrase to have meaning, rehabilitation benefits must, in certain circumstances, permissibly exceed $50,000. If rehabilitation benefits are limited to $50,000, section 10-4-706(l)(b) to (l)(e), 4A C.R.S. (1987 & 1992 Supp.), provides the following coverage: $50,000 for medical expenses; $50,000 for rehabilitation expenses; $20,800 for lost wages; and $9,125 for essential services for a total aggregate minimum basic coverage of $129,925. However, section 10-4-710(2)(b) permits an insurer to limit “all benefits set forth in section 10-4-706(l)(b) to (l)(e) ... to an aggregate limit” of $200,000. If the General Assembly had intended unequivocally to limit rehabilitation benefits to $50,000, then it would not have been necessary to include a potential $200,000 “aggregate limit” of section 10-4-706 basic coverage in section 10-4 — 710(2)(b) if already limited to $129,925.
Also, section 10-4-710 does not otherwise refer to rehabilitation benefits. Although under section 10-4-710 an insurer is required to offer unlimited medical and income coverage, it has no duty to offer optional, extra rehabilitation benefits. Under section 10-4-710, an insurer need not offer additional rehabilitation coverage because section 10-4-706(l)(c)(II) already provides for the possibility of rehabilitation benefits exceeding $50,-000.
II
A
The majority construes section 10-4-706(l)(c)(II) as a required minimum coverage for rehabilitation benefits. In pertinent part, section 10-4-706(l)(e)(II) stated, “[a]n insurer ... shall be presumed to have complied with the provision for rehabilitation when the value of rehabilitation services or treatment provided ... shall have reached fifty thousand dollars within five years after an accident involving a motor vehicle.” § 10-4-706(l)(c)(II), 4A C.R.S. (1987). The majority confuses the meaning of this presumption of compliance by reading section 10-4-710, 4A C.R.S. (1992 Supp.), a succeeding provision of the statute which provides for optional additional coverage, as providing grounds for rebutting the presumption. Maj. op. at 1303. Specifically, the majority asserts that construing the word “presume” as establishing a monetary cap “comports with the provisions of section 10-44710 that contemplate a scenario in which more extensive coverage may be offered and purchased.” Id. There is, however, no statutory or historical authority for such a construction of the statute.
Furthermore, by its commonly accepted legal meaning, the word “presume” implies that the decision is not final and a person in disagreement may make a valid argument against recognition of the presumed fact. In my view, if the General Assembly intended to set a monetary cap, it would have used the proper language to establish such a maximum. Instead, the General Assembly decided to use the word “presume” which implies that a person challenging the insurer’s compliance may rebut the presumption that the insurer has complied with the statutory requirements by providing fifty thousand dollars in rehabilitation benefits. To presume means, inter alia, “to suppose to be true without proof.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 932 (1985). Thus, there may be proof which will establish that the presumption is false and not to be followed. The majority assumes that the only type of proof permitted to rebut the presumption of compliance is proof that the insured purchased extended coverage from the insurer. Neither the statute nor the legislative history of the statute limits the scope of rebutting the presumption of compliance. In fact, there may be other justifiable rebuttals such as the argument that the insurer did not comply because rehabilitation benefits reasonably exceeded fifty thousand dollars and the contract between the insurer and the *1308insured did not limit such benefits to that amount.1
B
The majority resorts to Webster’s Dictionary rather than our extensive precedent concerning rebuttable presumptions. I believe our judgment to be sound when our inquiry is informed by Colorado law. I conclude that resort to our rules and law requires a result different than that found in Webster’s Dictionary and what the majority proposes. For example, Colorado rule of evidence 301 provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally east.
CRE 301. In Ward v. Teller Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 60 Colo. 47, 55, 153 P. 219, 222 (1915), we stated:
We are not to be understood as saying that such prima facie case is conclusive, for it is always subject to be overcome by evidence to the contrary....
It is in law a presumption, and “presumptions” are rules of convenience based upon experience or public policy, and established to facilitate the ascertainment of truth in the trial of causes. Except in the few instances of conclusive presumptions, one is not as a matter of law stronger or weaker than another. The whole case is then thrown open to be decided as a fact upon all the evidence. It is for the sound judgment of the jury to weigh all the circumstances, including the characters of the persons involved and the probability of different lines of conduct, and determine where the truth lies as a matter of common sense unfettered by any arbitrary rule.
See also § 5-1-301(15), 2 C.R.S. (1992) (“‘Presumed’ or ‘presumption’ means that the trier of fact must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until the evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence.”); Murray v. Montgomery Ward Life Ins. Co., 196 Colo. 225, 229, 584 P.2d 78, 81 (1978) (“The effect of a presumption is to create a prima facie case, upon which judgment may be rendered in the absence of contrary evidence.”); American Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 101 Colo. 34, 37, 70 P.2d 349, 351 (1937) (same).
If the General Assembly intended the presumption in section 10-4-706(l)(c)(II) to be irrebuttable, it would have used different language. When creating conclusive presumptions, the General Assembly plainly states its intention. See, e.g., § 8-41-206, 3B C.R.S. (1996 Supp.) (“Any disability beginning more than five years after the date of injury shall be conclusively presumed not to be due to the injury....”); § 7-55-113, 3A C.R.S. (1986) (“Every domestic corporation or association ... and every agricultural or livestock , association ... shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted and adopted the provisions of this article_”); § 7-56-120(3), 3A C.R.S. (1986) (“In any action upon such marketing agreement, it shall be conclusively presumed that a landowner or landlord or lessor is able to control the delivery of products produced on his [or her] land by tenants-”). Therefore, I would conclude that, by using the term “presumed” versus “conclusively presumed,” the General Assembly established a rebuttable presumption in *1309section 10-4~706(l)(c)(I) regarding rehabilitation procedures or treatment and training.
III
The General Assembly enacted a statutory scheme unique to Colorado. In my view, Colorado’s unique provisions militate against authoritative comparison to other jurisdictions where sufficient differences exist; therefore, such comparisons are, in fact, profitless. The majority may feel compelled to make our law, with its language differences, similar in judicial gloss to other no-fault statutes. Maj. op. at 1303-04. However, our duty in construing a statute requires that we first turn to the language of the Colorado statute. This is what our General Assembly has directed by virtue of its codification of our canons of statutory construction. § 2-4-203(1), IB C.R.S. (1980).
Although we may consult the statements of legislators who promulgated section 10-4-706(l)(e)(II), our primary goal is to construe the statute as it is written. The plain language of the statute does not require us to prohibit recovery beyond fifty thousand dollars. Furthermore, the language of the statute is not ambiguous such that we must consult the legislative history to determine its true meaning. Indeed, we should not construe a statute contrary to its clear terms.
The majority rests on the principle that we can divine the legislative intent of the General Assembly based upon the statements of a single member.2 However, I believe it unsound, in the face of plain language, to uphold a result supported only by the contrary comments of a single member of the General Assembly.
IV
Finally, I would not affirm the court of appeals’ decision in Colby, as the majority does, because there exists a significant flaw in the court of appeals’ analysis. In reversing the trial court in Colby, the court of appeals concluded that the presumption applied to the number of years only, rather than the dollar amount or both. Colby, 908 P.2d at 1173. I would reach the same conclusion as the trial court did because the statutory language, on its face, created a presumption of compliance “when the value of rehabilitation services or treatment ... shall have reached fifty thousand dollars within five years after an accident involving another motor vehicle.” § 10-4-706(l)(c)(II). The language of the statute clearly states that if an insurer pays $50,000 and the payments are made within five years after a motor vehicle accident, the insurer is entitled to the presumption of compliance. Otherwise, if the presumption were to apply only to the number of years, an insurer could postpone any payment for five years and still receive the presumption of compliance. If that were true, there would be no reason to include a dollar amount, making the $50,000 amount superfluous. Thus, I would conclude that the presumption of compliance is triggered only when both the dollar and time limitations are met.
Accordingly, because I would rely upon the plain language of the statute without resort to legislative history, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice LOHR and Justice HOBBS join in this dissent.

. In these two cases, the insurance policy did limit liability for rehabilitation expenses to $50,-000. Although the terms and conditions of the insurance contract between the insured and the insurer usually govern the determination of their rights and duties, Lopez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 192, 194 (Colo.App.1994), the policy's provisions are not in all instances the final authority in such a determination. The No-Fault Act is incorporated as part of every auto insurance policy, and the provisions of the act govern in any conflict between the act and the policy. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Allen, 797 P.2d 46, 49 (Colo.1990) (quoting Marquez v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 29, 33 (Colo.1980)).

. In fact, the majority relies on legislative history supporting a proposed $25,000 limit on rehabilitation expenses, yet that is not the language we are construing here today. Indeed, there is no discussion of a $50,000 limit in any of the statute's legislative history prior to the 1994 amendment.