Court Opinion

ID: 9901003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 22:11:30.610297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:24.060201
License: Public Domain

2023 UT App 131

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

                        STATE OF UTAH,
                           Appellee,
                              v.
                    JAMES ANDREW NARANJO,
                           Appellant.

                             Opinion
                         No. 20210865-CA
                     Filed November 2, 2023

         First District Court, Brigham City Department
                The Honorable Spencer D. Walsh
                          No. 201100285

             Benjamin Miller, Attorney for Appellant
                Sean D. Reyes and Marian Decker,
                     Attorneys for Appellee

  JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
     JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1     Perhaps to pass the time while waiting in a state park’s
parking lot at the crack of dawn, James Andrew Naranjo used
various sticky implements to steal fee envelopes his fellow
citizens had placed into a self-pay box. His actions were observed
by an angler, who called the police. An officer arrived to find
Naranjo joined by two others in an apparent drug transaction. A
circus of sorts ensued, involving an extremely low-speed pursuit
attended by evidence of the recent envelope thefts and drugs
being tossed from a vehicle. Charges and a trial followed, and
Naranjo was convicted of several offenses, including failure to
respond to an officer’s signal to stop and possession of a
                          State v. Naranjo

controlled substance. Naranjo appeals on various grounds,
including ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

                         BACKGROUND

¶2      Around 5:00 a.m. on a July 2020 morning, an angler, who
was fishing at Willard Bay State Park, noticed Naranjo sitting
inside a maroon-colored car in the marina parking lot. The angler
reported that he saw a pile of manila-colored envelopes,
apparently those used to pay the day-use fee for the marina,
inside the car. He believed that Naranjo had torn open the
envelopes and was removing the cash from them. The angler
called the police, and the dispatcher asked the angler to get the
car’s license plate number. On his way back to get the number, the
angler saw a black car pull into the lot. A man and a woman got
out and started talking to Naranjo, who was still seated in the
maroon car. The angler reported the maroon car’s plate number
to the dispatcher.

¶3     A uniformed police officer (Officer) arrived around 6:00
a.m., driving a patrol truck with police logos and a lightbar, which
was not turned on at the time. Officer saw three people inside the
maroon car on his arrival: Naranjo in the driver seat, a man in the
passenger seat, and a woman in the back passenger seat. As
Officer pulled near the maroon car, the woman got out and went
to a nearby restroom. Officer parked his truck facing the maroon
car. Officer got out of the patrol truck and began to walk toward
the car, at which point Naranjo started to drive away.

¶4     Officer put up his hands, “palms out in halting fashion,”
and verbally ordered Naranjo to “[s]top.” Officer acknowledged
that Naranjo’s windows were rolled up when he gave the
direction to stop. As Naranjo drove past, Officer returned to his
patrol truck and activated the lightbar. Naranjo did not stop but
drove “erratically” around the parking lot, making a U-turn and

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                          State v. Naranjo

several “quick braking movements” and twice trying to pull into
marked parking spots. Officer said that he “made eye contact”
with Naranjo and “tried to signal [him to] slow down or stop.”
Naranjo stopped in a third marked parking spot, and Officer
opened the driver-side door of his patrol truck, apparently to
approach Naranjo’s car. But when Naranjo saw this, he put his car
“back into drive and continued to drive around the parking lot.”

¶5     Believing that Naranjo “was not going to stop,” Officer
drove toward the exit, using his truck to block the lone point of
egress.

¶6     Meanwhile, the woman got behind the wheel of the black
car. The man had gotten out of Naranjo’s car and into the black
car at some point after Officer had left to block the gate. Officer
then saw the black car driving toward him at the exit. The woman
and the man “gestured” to Officer that they wanted him “to move
out of the way and threw their arms up in the air.” Officer
apparently did not respond as they wanted, so they attempted to
go around the patrol truck. Officer then hit the black car with his
truck, pinning the fleeing car against a fence post. The couple then
got out and began to flee on foot. The pair was apprehended by
another officer.

¶7     Naranjo, who had by this point backed into a berm and
wooden fence surrounding the parking lot, continued his efforts
“to drive away,” according to Officer. Officer got out of his truck,
drew his firearm, and commanded Naranjo to stop. Naranjo
stopped, rolled down his window, and “started throwing items
out,” including “small plastic baggies and pieces” of the fee
envelopes, insisting that “they weren’t his.” Officer told Naranjo
to turn off the car “at least five” times, but Naranjo never
complied.

¶8    Officer ordered Naranjo “not to move.” Naranjo
responded that he was “scared” and “did not want to go to jail.”

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                           State v. Naranjo

During this time, Officer reported that Naranjo “continued
reaching around in the compartments in the vehicle, underneath
the seat, [and] around the seat [to] whatever was within arm’s
reach of him.”

¶9    Officer ordered Naranjo to open the driver-side door, but
he did not, so Officer walked to the car, opened the door, and
ordered Naranjo to get out. Naranjo was then taken into custody.

¶10 A search of Naranjo yielded some one-dollar bills. In the
search of his car, police found “burglary tools,” including gloves
with sticky residue, sticky mouse traps, and wire strippers with
sticky residue on them. Police also found fee envelopes with
sticky residue on them and some small bills (fives and ones) in the
car, along with drug paraphernalia (namely, small plastic baggies,
lighters, a scale, needles, and a spoon) and yellow pills inside a
black carrying case that had been on the driver-side back seat.
Notably, Naranjo’s identification card was also in the black
carrying case. 1 A zippered bag in the black case contained more

1. After oral argument, Naranjo’s appellate counsel submitted a
letter challenging an assertion made by the State during oral
argument that the identification card was found in the black case.
See Utah R. App. P. 24(j) (“When authority of central importance
to an issue comes to the attention of a party after briefing or oral
argument but before decision, that party may file a notice of
supplemental authority setting forth: (1) the citation to the
authority; (2) a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point
argued orally to which the authority applies; and (3) relevance of
the authority.”). The State responded, stating that “it is not clear
that [Naranjo’s] identification was in fact found inside the black
case.”
       But our review of the trial transcript shows that the jury
heard that Naranjo’s identification card was found inside the
black case. One of the police sergeants, in his testimony before the
                                                        (continued…)

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                          State v. Naranjo

small plastic baggies, including one with a heart-stamp design.
Additionally, officers found dirt and other debris lodged in the
exhaust pipes of Naranjo’s car, apparently acquired when he
backed into the berm supporting the fence around the parking lot.
Officers also found gouges in the berm caused by the exhaust
pipes of Naranjo’s car backing into it.

¶11 In the other car—the black one driven by the couple—
police found narcotic-contaminated foil and drug paraphernalia,
including spoons, needles, and baggies featuring heart stamps.

¶12 Officer advised other officers assisting in the search of the
lot that “the suspects were seen throwing some things out the
window of their vehicle” and “that items were being thrown out
of the vehicles as they attempted to run.”

¶13 One investigator found a metal rod with sticky residue,
which police suspected Naranjo had used to retrieve the
envelopes from the drop box. The rod was found near where
Naranjo had backed into the fence and did not appear to have
been there long because the residue was still tacky.

¶14 Police found other items near where Naranjo had stopped
his car in the parking lot, including drug paraphernalia, baggies,

jury, identified the black case in a photo exhibit. He testified that
he found that case on the driver-side back seat of Naranjo’s car.
The prosecutor asked him, “And did you have a chance to see the
contents of that?” The sergeant responded that he did. Then the
sergeant was shown the photo exhibits of the contents—including
the identification card—of the black case. The prosecutor asked
him if the photos displayed “the contents of that box that [he]
found in the [maroon] car.” The sergeant said that they did. See
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 2, 10 P.3d 346 (“On appeal, we
review the record facts in a light most favorable to the jury’s
verdict and recite the facts accordingly.” (cleaned up)).

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                            State v. Naranjo

foil, torn cash, and fee envelopes. One of those baggies had the
heart-stamp design and contained “a crystal-like substance” that
was later identified as methamphetamine.

¶15 Naranjo was charged with failure to respond to an officer’s
signal to stop and possession of a controlled substance. 2

¶16 Naranjo was tried before a jury. At the close of the State’s
case, Naranjo moved for a directed verdict. With regard to the
failure to stop, Naranjo argued that “[t]here was not evidence that
would lead . . . a reasonable trier of fact to determine . . . that event
happened.” The State responded by arguing that Officer had
provided a “detailed account of what happened,” including that
he had “not only given visual signals with his hands to stop” but
also activated “the lights on his truck trying to get him to stop”
and “finally drew his weapon” to get Naranjo “to stop.”

¶17 For the possession count, Naranjo argued that the evidence
did not show he possessed the methamphetamine because the
“substances were found outside the vehicle.” The State contended
that “just as with all the other evidence that was tossed out the
window, there’s no reason to suggest that the methamphetamine
wasn’t also from” Naranjo.

¶18 The court denied the directed verdict motion, concluding
that “some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could
find . . . that the elements of the crime have been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.”

¶19 Regarding the failure to stop, the court stated that “we
have the testimony of Officer[,] . . . who indicate[d] that he saw

2. Naranjo was also charged with and convicted of theft,
interference with an arresting officer, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and possession of burglary tools. He does not
challenge these convictions on appeal.

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                          State v. Naranjo

[Naranjo] operating the vehicle,” “that he indicated to . . . Naranjo
by raising his hands that he was to stop,” and that he “turned on
his overhead” lightbar. And even after these efforts, Officer
testified that Naranjo still “attempted to flee or [elude] him.” The
court noted that there was “some corroboration” of Officer’s
account through the testimony of the angler, “who testified that
he saw the maroon vehicle attempting to leave and he saw the
lights flashing.” And concerning the possession charge, the court
noted that Officer testified that he saw “Naranjo attempting to
throw items out of the vehicle. And in that same vicinity,
according to the testimony of several witnesses, a [baggie] of . . .
methamphetamine was found.”

¶20 As relevant here, on the failure-to-stop count, the jury was
instructed it must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that
Naranjo “did knowingly receive a visual or audible signal from a
law enforcement officer to bring a vehicle to a stop” and “did
intentionally . . . attempt to flee or elude a law enforcement officer
by vehicle or other means.”

¶21    The jury convicted Naranjo of all charges. Naranjo appeals.

            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶22 Naranjo raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that
the evidence was insufficient to support his “convictions for
failure to respond to a police officer’s signal to stop and for
possession of a controlled substance.” 3 “In assessing a claim of

3. The State contends the sufficiency challenge was not preserved
in Naranjo’s motion for a directed verdict. While the motion was
rather spartan, the record makes clear that the court understood
and ruled on the issue it raised. And “an issue is preserved for
appeal when it has been presented to the district court in such a
                                                    (continued…)

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                          State v. Naranjo

insufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict of the jury.” State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT
10, ¶ 30, 326 P.3d 645 (cleaned up). “And we will not reverse a
jury verdict if we conclude that some evidence exists from which a
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Holsomback, 2022 UT
App 72, ¶ 18, 513 P.3d 82 (emphasis added) (cleaned up).

¶23 Second, Naranjo claims that he received ineffective
assistance because his trial counsel did not request a “unanimity
jury instruction for failure to respond to an officer’s command to
stop.” “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised
for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review
and we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Alarid,
2022 UT App 84, ¶ 24, 514 P.3d 610 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 525
P.3d 1261 (Utah 2022).

                            ANALYSIS

                   I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶24 “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an
appellate court gives substantial deference to the jury.” State v.
Holsomback, 2022 UT App 72, ¶ 21, 513 P.3d 82 (cleaned up). “And
a jury is not obligated to believe the evidence most favorable to
the defendant, nor does the existence of contradictory evidence or
of conflicting inferences warrant disturbing the jury’s verdict on
appeal.” State v. Granados, 2019 UT App 158, ¶ 28, 451 P.3d 289
(cleaned up), cert. denied, 462 P.3d 800 (Utah 2020). “Thus, we will

way that the court has an opportunity to rule on it.” State v. Suhail,
2023 UT App 15, ¶ 89, 525 P.3d 550 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 531
P.3d 730 (Utah 2023).

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                          State v. Naranjo

reverse a jury verdict only when the evidence,” when viewed “in
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury,” “is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he or she was convicted.” State v.
Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 302, 299 P.3d 892 (cleaned up).

¶25 Considering this standard, we conclude the State
presented “some evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find beyond a reasonable doubt” that Naranjo failed to respond
to an officer’s signal to stop and possessed a controlled substance.
Holsomback, 2022 UT App 72, ¶ 24 (cleaned up).

A.     Failure to Stop

¶26 Naranjo argues that the “evidence was insufficient to
support [his] conviction for failure to stop at a police command.”
We disagree.

¶27 The State needed to show that Naranjo knowingly received
Officer’s “visual or audible signal” to stop and intentionally
attempted “to flee or elude” Officer. See Utah Code § 41-6a-
210(1)(a); see also State v. Bird, 2015 UT 7, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d 1141
(explaining the requirement of knowing and intentional mental
states for failure to stop). The State presented much more than
“some evidence” of these elements on which the jury could
convict Naranjo, Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 177 (cleaned up),
demonstrating that the jury’s verdict was not based on
speculation or gaps in the evidence as Naranjo contends.

¶28 First, the State presented evidence of Naranjo’s initial
response to Officer’s signal to stop. Officer arrived, uniformed
and in a marked patrol truck, in the marina parking lot and then
parked facing Naranjo’s car. As Officer walked toward Naranjo’s
car, Naranjo began driving away. At this point, Officer put up his
hands and verbally told Naranjo to stop. But Naranjo continued

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                          State v. Naranjo

to drive past Officer. Even if Naranjo’s windows were rolled up,
interfering with his ability to hear, the jury could have reasonably
concluded that it was light enough on a July morning for Naranjo
to have seen Officer’s hand signal to stop. And given the small
number of cars present at that hour and Officer’s proximity to
Naranjo’s car, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Naranjo should have known that Officer was signaling him to
stop.

¶29 Second, the State presented evidence of Naranjo
continuing to disregard Officer’s signals to stop. Even if Naranjo
had failed to notice Officer’s initial verbal command and hand
signal, the jury could have reasonably concluded that when
Officer then turned on the patrol truck’s flashing red-and-blues, it
would have been hard to go unseen or misunderstood. Instead of
stopping, Naranjo continued to drive “erratically” around the
parking lot, making a U-turn and two attempts to park in marked
stalls. Naranjo continued driving, despite Officer making eye
contact with him and signaling him to “slow down or stop.” And
after Naranjo pulled into a third stall and apparently stopped, he
again began driving around the parking lot as soon as Officer got
out of his patrol truck. The jury could have reasonably concluded
from this behavior that Naranjo was engaging in cat-and-mouse
maneuvering as he either weighed his options to find a viable
escape route or bought time to rid himself of contraband in his
possession.

¶30 Third, the State presented evidence that Naranjo attempted
to flee from the parking lot after receiving several signals to stop.
When Officer was occupied with blocking the entrance and
dealing with the other two suspects, Naranjo backed into a fence
surrounding the parking lot. The State presented evidence of the
damaged fence and gouges in the berm, along with dirt and other
debris that accumulated in the tailpipes of Naranjo’s car when he
backed into the berm. From this evidence, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that Naranjo, seeing that Officer was

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                          State v. Naranjo

occupied with the other suspects, made an ill-advised attempt to
break through the fence to access the road.

¶31 Fourth, the State presented evidence that Naranjo
continued to disregard Officer’s signal to stop even after Officer
had pinned the black car against the fence and had turned his
attention back to Naranjo. Officer testified that he observed
Naranjo “still in his vehicle and still driving around in the parking
lot.” He got out of his patrol truck, drawing his firearm and
commanding Naranjo to stop. But even then, Naranjo only
partially complied. While he did stop driving, he did not turn off
his car—despite being told to do so at least five times—and he
engaged in a frantic effort to throw various incriminating items
out his window. From this, the jury could have reasonably
concluded that Naranjo intended to continue his efforts to flee or
elude Officer, at least until Officer opened the driver-side door
and took him into custody.

¶32 Naranjo also argues that an officer’s signal to stop must “be
given before the driver begins to drive away from the officer.”
Thus, he reasons that none of Officer’s commands to stop
establish that Naranjo knowingly received the signal to stop.
Naranjo appears to assert there was not enough evidence to
support that he saw Officer’s signal as he drove away. We are
unpersuaded. Naranjo’s reading of the failure-to-stop statute is at
clear variance with the text, which states that “[a]n operator who
receives a visual or audible signal from a law enforcement officer
to bring the vehicle to a stop may not . . . attempt to flee or elude
a law enforcement officer by vehicle or other means.” Utah Code
§ 41-6a-210(1)(a). The phrase “bring the vehicle to a stop” clearly
anticipates that a vehicle is moving when the command to stop is
given. One cannot logically “bring” a vehicle “to a stop” if that
vehicle is not moving in the first place. Moreover, the evidence
presented to the jury clearly indicates that Naranjo was aware of
Officer. Not only did Officer say he made eye contact with
Naranjo, but there is evidence that Naranjo’s evasive maneuvers

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                          State v. Naranjo

were made in direct response to Officer’s actions, such as when
Naranjo began driving again as soon as he noticed Officer exiting
his patrol truck.

¶33 Naranjo further argues that he never showed an intent to
flee or elude because he drove only slowly around the parking lot,
stopped occasionally, and did not drive toward the exit. 4 The
problem with this argument is that it ignores alternative
inferences that the jury likely drew in support of the intent to flee
or elude Officer, such as that Naranjo drove slowly and stopped
occasionally because he was looking for another exit or to buy
time to rid himself of contraband. And the jury could have
concluded that Naranjo feared that heading for the exit would
have resulted in his immediate apprehension or triggered a more
aggressive pursuit, depriving him of the opportunity to jettison
the contraband. That Naranjo’s efforts in fleeing or eluding
Officer were obtuse and poorly thought out is without import.
The fact remains that the jury received abundant evidence that
Naranjo repeatedly tried to flee or elude Officer, albeit
ineffectively and incompetently.

¶34 Thus, we conclude that any of Officer’s signals to get
Naranjo to stop would have provided “some evidence” from
which the “jury could find that the elements of the crime”—that
Naranjo knowingly received Officer’s signal or command to stop
and intentionally continued in his effort to flee or elude Officer—
“had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Maestas, 2012
UT 46, ¶ 177 (cleaned up).

4. Even a slow-speed chase in a parking lot carries some risk of
harm to pedestrians and property. And, as is evident here, such
behavior is, at the very least, distracting to law enforcement
officers as they deal with other suspects. Thus, far from being
benign, Naranjo’s behavior was potentially harmful to others and
interfered with Officer’s attempts to investigate the scene.

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                          State v. Naranjo

B.     Drug Possession

¶35 Naranjo argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction of possession of the controlled substance
that was found in the parking lot, specifically because he “neither
had special control of the area where the drugs were found nor
was he in possession of similar contraband.”

¶36 Along with what we have already explained about our
review of sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, see supra ¶ 24, we
note that “[d]irect evidence is not required” for a jury to reach a
conviction, see State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 47, 326 P.3d 645. In
fact, “[s]ustainable verdicts are entered every day on the sole basis
of circumstantial evidence.” Id.; see also State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT
5, ¶ 18, 349 P.3d 664 (“Inferences may reasonably be drawn from
circumstantial evidence.”). And “the idea that circumstantial
evidence is necessarily less convincing and of less value than
direct evidence is a misstatement of the law. On the contrary,
circumstantial evidence may even be more convincing than direct
testimony.” State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶ 57, 397 P.3d 626
(cleaned up).

¶37 The State had to show that Naranjo “knowingly and
intentionally” possessed the methamphetamine found in the
parking lot, see Utah Code § 58-37-8(2)(a), which the State
presented as constructive possession. Constructive possession is
a theory under which a jury is “asked to draw an inference based
on circumstantial evidence connecting [a defendant] with the
contraband.” Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 10. “To find that a defendant
had constructive possession of a drug or other contraband, it is
necessary to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the
accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused had
both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control
over the drug.” State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985); accord
Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 19.

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                          State v. Naranjo

¶38 Our caselaw has “identified some relevant considerations”
a jury may take into account to establish possession, including
“ownership and/or occupancy of the residence or vehicle,
presence of the defendant when the contraband is discovered, the
defendant’s proximity to the contraband, . . . incriminating
statements or behavior, and presence of contraband in a specific
area where the defendant had control.” Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 19.
In light of these considerations, there is no question that the State
presented more than “some evidence,” see Maestas, 2012 UT 46,
¶ 177 (cleaned up), to establish that Naranjo constructively
possessed the methamphetamine found in the parking lot.

¶39 First, Naranjo exhibited incriminating behavior in the
parking lot. Most notably, Officer observed Naranjo throwing
“small plastic baggies” from his car and announcing that “they
weren’t his.” And when the parking lot was searched after
Naranjo’s arrest, a small plastic heart-stamped baggie containing
methamphetamine was found a few spaces away from where
Naranjo ultimately stopped his car. A jury could reasonably
conclude that this methamphetamine baggie was discarded by
Naranjo when Officer saw him throwing items from his car.
Alternatively, the jury could have just as reasonably concluded
that Naranjo had thrown the methamphetamine baggie out of his
car earlier when Officer was occupied with blocking the entrance
or during Naranjo’s tour of the lot.

¶40 Second, Naranjo’s identification card being found in the
black carrying case provided evidence from which the jury could
have inferred Naranjo possessed the contraband. Finding his
identification card in the same black case that also contained a
heart-stamped baggie provided a strong link between Naranjo
and the methamphetamine baggie found in the parking lot. That
the black case was found on the back seat is of little significance
in refuting this link for several reasons. For one thing, Naranjo’s
identification card was found in the black case, providing robust
evidence that the case and its contents belonged to him. Moreover,

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                           State v. Naranjo

Officer testified that he saw Naranjo moving items about the
interior of the car during the parking lot pursuit, so Naranjo had
ample opportunity to create a little distance between the
incriminating evidence and his physical reach by tossing it in the
back seat.

¶41 Third, a jury could have reasonably inferred from
Naranjo’s statements that the items he was throwing from the car
“weren’t his” and that he “did not want to go to jail” that Naranjo
knew the tossed items contained evidence that indicated he was
in possession of a controlled substance and that he was trying to
distance himself from them as much as possible.

¶42 Fourth, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Naranjo and the other two suspects were involved in a drug deal
in Naranjo’s car and that they jointly possessed the
methamphetamine because the methamphetamine baggie found
in the parking lot featured the same heart-stamp design as the
baggie found in Naranjo’s car and the baggies found in the black
car. See State v. Nihells, 2019 UT App 210, ¶ 13, 457 P.3d 1121
(“[C]ontraband may be possessed either individually or jointly
with others.”); see also Utah Code § 58-37-2(1)(ii) (“For a person to
be a possessor . . . of a controlled substance, it is not required that
the person be shown to have individually possessed . . . the
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly
participated with one or more persons in the . . . possession . . . of
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring
. . . .”).

¶43 Fifth, from the sticky metal rod found near where Naranjo
backed into the fence and the torn fee envelopes and cash, the jury
could have reasonably concluded that Naranjo was the one most
likely to be throwing items out of his car, including the baggie
with methamphetamine. While it is true that other responding
officers were told that the “suspects” generally “were seen
throwing some things out of the window of their vehicle,” it is

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                          State v. Naranjo

also true that much of what was found in the parking lot was
directly linked to Naranjo, providing the jury reason to conclude
that the methamphetamine baggie, which was found close to
where Naranjo finally stopped, most likely came from Naranjo.
After all, only Naranjo was specifically reported to have been seen
throwing baggies out of his car. And only Naranjo was reported to
have been driving around the parking lot, while the evidence
suggests that the other suspects made a beeline for the exit upon
seeing Officer executing his blocking maneuver.

¶44 These circumstances, when taken together, provided
“some evidence,” see Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 177 (cleaned up), of a
“sufficient nexus between [Naranjo] and the [methamphetamine]
to permit an inference that [Naranjo] had both the power and the
intent to exercise dominion and control over” the drugs found in
the parking lot, see Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶ 19. And while the
evidence might have given rise to other reasonable inferences,
Naranjo does not enjoy the presumption that those inferences
should be given more weight simply because they present an
alternative explanation favorable to him. See id. ¶ 27 (“The
question presented [in a sufficiency of the evidence analysis] is
not whether some other (innocent) inference might have been
reasonable. It is simply whether the inference adopted by the jury
was sustainable.”); accord State v. Darnstaedt, 2021 UT App 19, ¶ 35
n.6, 483 P.3d 71, cert. denied, 496 P.3d 716 (Utah 2021).

¶45 In sum, we conclude that “some evidence” existed for the
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Naranjo failed to
respond to an officer’s signal to stop and possessed a controlled
substance. See Holsomback, 2022 UT App 72, ¶ 24 (cleaned up).

               II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶46 Naranjo argues that the jury instruction for failing to stop
was insufficient because it did not require the jury to be
unanimous in two respects: (1) it left open which specific act of

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                          State v. Naranjo

Officer constituted the signal to stop and (2) it did not ask the jury
to agree on which of Naranjo’s acts constituted failure to respond.
For the signal to stop, Naranjo argues that the jury could have
identified four different actions: (a) Officer approaching the car
with hands out, (b) Officer activating the lightbar, (c) Officer
approaching the car the second time, and (d) Officer approaching
with gun drawn. And for failing to respond, Naranjo again
identifies four different actions that could have divided the jury:
(a) Naranjo driving away when Officer first approached on foot,
(b) Naranjo continuing to drive after Officer activated the lightbar,
(c) Naranjo driving again after temporarily parking, and (d)
Naranjo still driving after Officer returned from dealing with the
other two suspects at the gate. Given these possibilities, Naranjo
argues that his trial counsel (Counsel) rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to “ensure that the jury was properly
instructed that they must unanimously agree on which act
constituted the offense.”

¶47 “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the defendant must show that (1) . . . counsel’s performance was
deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” State v. Wright, 2021 UT App 7, ¶ 52, 481 P.3d 479
(cleaned up), cert. denied, 496 P.3d 718 (Utah 2021). “However,
there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance
claim to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant
makes an insufficient showing on one.” State v. Collier, 2020 UT
App 165, ¶ 12, 479 P.3d 351 (cleaned up). Because we conclude
that Naranjo was not prejudiced by this alleged deficiency, we
limit our analysis to the second prong. “An error by counsel, even
if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the
judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the
judgment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). “The
burden is on the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the outcome of his or her case would have been

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                           State v. Naranjo

different absent counsel’s error. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of
the proceeding.” State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 43, 462 P.3d 350
(cleaned up).

¶48 Here, even if Counsel had requested a specific unanimity
instruction as to which action or actions constituted Officer’s
signal to stop and which act or acts constituted Naranjo’s failure
to respond, we see no reasonable probability that this would have
had an effect on the outcome.

¶49 Regarding the signal to stop, the activation of the lightbar
was the most distinct and obvious signal. We see no reasonable
probability that the members of the jury would have failed to
agree that Naranjo knowingly received the signal to stop when
Officer turned on the lightbar. It was a mostly empty parking lot,
and Officer had already parked his patrol truck right in front of
Naranjo. Even if Naranjo had not heard Officer’s voice command
or seen his initial hand signal, there is no chance that he would
have missed the flashing lightbar. After all, lightbars are designed
to be highly visible from a significant distance. That’s why
emergency vehicles have them. So even if jury members might
have disagreed about whether Naranjo somehow missed all the
other signals, we have no doubt that they would have agreed that
Naranjo received at least this most obvious signal. There is no
unanimity problem here because the lightbar—being the most
conspicuous signal—subsumed all the less obvious signals that
some members of the jury may have found sufficient. In other
words, those jurors who were convinced that the more subtle
signals were enough would, a fortiori, agree that the flashing
lightbar constituted a signal to stop.

¶50 The same reasoning applies to Naranjo’s failure to
respond. The failure-to-stop statute simply requires that a driver
who “receives a visual or audible signal from a law enforcement
officer to bring the vehicle to a stop may not . . . attempt to flee or

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                         State v. Naranjo

elude a law enforcement officer by vehicle or other means.” Utah
Code § 41-6a-210(1)(a)(ii). Here, as we have just explained, there
can be no unanimity problem on the signal to stop because the
jurors would have agreed that the activation of the lightbar was
sufficient. And yet, even after receiving this most obvious—
indeed, almost impossible-to-miss—signal, Naranjo proceeded to
drive away from Officer in an attempt to flee or elude him. We see
no reasonable possibility that the jurors would have disagreed on
this point.

¶51 Accordingly, Naranjo has failed to show prejudice by the
lack of a specific unanimity instruction.

                         CONCLUSION

¶52 Naranjo’s sufficiency of the evidence challenges fail
because there was evidence to support his convictions for failure
to stop and possession of a controlled substance. His claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel fails for lack of prejudice.

¶53   Affirmed.

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