Court Opinion

ID: 9656976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:09:52.388604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:39.350755
License: Public Domain

BILL VANCE, Justice,
concurring.
I reach the same result as the majority — affirming the judgment.
BLOOD SPATTER EVIDENCE
My differences revolve largely around the majority’s extensive discussion about, and implied criticism of, the manner in which Holmes preserved his complaint about the admission of expert testimony.

The Objection

As the majority notes, Rule 702 requires the proponent of scientific evidence to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the evidence is both relevant and reliable. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). To be considered reliable, evidence based on a scientific theory must satisfy three criteria: (1) the underlying scientific theory must be valid; (2) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question. Hartman v. State, 946 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (citing Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573); see also Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). Under Texas Rule of Evidence 104(a) and (c) and Rule 702, all three criteria must be proven to the trial court, outside the presence of the jury, before the evidence may be admitted. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573.
The majority mistakenly asserts that Holmes “ultimately did not contest” whether Detective January properly applied blood spatter technique on the occasion in question and refuses to address the issue. In so saying, the majority ignores an objection made when the testimony was admitted during trial — quoted earlier in its own opinion: “... there has been no showing of [the] technique being properly applied on the occasion in question prior to us coming on the record in front of the jury.” Majority Opinion at 184-85.
“As regards specificity, all a party has to do to avoid the forfeiture of a complaint on appeal is to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it.” Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
A fair evaluation of the requirement for preservation of an objection to expert testimony in a criminal case should acknowledge that a criminal trial is different from a civil trial, particularly in the defendant’s limited right to discovery. Prior to the expert’s taking the stand, the nature of the proposed expert’s testimony is not known in detail. No discovery has been allowed; no depositions have been taken. The defendant is entitled, upon motion and notice, to the name and address of an expert the state may use at trial. TexCode CRiM. PROC. Ann. art 39.14 (Vernon Supp.2004). This puts defense counsel in a criminal case at more of a disadvantage than a lawyer objecting to the admission of expert testimony in the usual civil case. For example: How is counsel to know if the underlying scientific theory is objectionable until the state attempts to prove that it is valid in the hearing required outside the *197presence of the jury? How is counsel to know whether the technique applying the theory is objectionable until the witness describes it for the judge in that hearing? How is counsel to know whether the expert’s application of the technique on the occasion in question is objectionable until the witness relates how it was applied in that hearing? How is counsel to know whether the State has proven these matters by clear and convincing evidence until the state presents the testimony at the hearing? Because the proponent must satisfy the requirements of the rule, an objection that the proponent has not satisfied the predicate requirements of Rule 702 is sufficient to cause the court to hold the hearing out of the presence of the jury. Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). When Holmes again objected under Rule 702 to the admissibility of the testimony before the jury, his objection included all of the requirements of Rule 702. Rule 702 does not, contrary to the majority’s assertion, require “very specific objections.” Majority Opinion at 185.
Based on the extensive explanation advanced to demonstrate non-preservation, I fear that this case demonstrates a willingness to impose hyper-technical requirements on complaint preservation, at least in the area of expert testimony.

Evidence of Reliability

Following Alvarado, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the first two criteria were satisfied, based on Detective January’s testimony. Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 215-16 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). In this, I agree with the majority. Majority Opinion at 184. For that reason, I cannot join the unnecessary discussion about judicial notice.

Application of Technique

Detective January testified that the blood found on walls and a sofa probably got there from a wound gushing blood, or, if blood accumulated on a body, then when the body thrashed around, the blood flew to the walls and sofa. He said other blood on the floor dripped from a wound. Blood on a door frame came from someone bleeding who rubbed against it. He said there was a large amount of blood found throughout the crime scene.
I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the third criterion was satisfied by Detective January’s description of his application of the technique to the facts on the occasion in question.
The issue is properly overruled.
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR DRUG USE
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the objection to the evidence of prior drug use was not preserved. The majority confuses “preservation” with the rule that “the erroneous admission of testimony is not cause for reversal, if the same fact is proven by other testimony not objected to.” Leday v. State, 988 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).
We have written at least twice on this topic since Leday was decided. In Horton v. State, Chief Justice Davis wrote for a unanimous court:
The State argues that any error arising from the admission of the evidence in question is “harmless or waived” because evidence of a similar nature was admitted without objection. The State’s use of the term “waiver” in this instance has been rejected recently by the Court of Criminal Appeals as inaccurate. See Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 & nns. 6-8 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). Under Leday, a trial court’s action in improper*198ly “overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence was received without objection, either before or after the eom-plained-of ruling.” Id. at 716-18. In this situation, the court’s improper action is “rendered harmless” by the admission of similar evidence without objection. Id. at 718-19 & nn. 6-8.
Horton v. State, 986 S.W.2d 297, 302 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, no pet.). In Haynes v. State, citing Leday, we said, “The Court discussed whether the rule is one of waiver or harmless error, but did not definitively state which it is.” Haynes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 855, 859 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, no pet.). It is not a failure to preserve the complaint.
However, because the same evidence came in later without objection, this issue is properly overruled.
CONCLUSION
Because I agree that the issues should be overruled, I concur in affirming the judgment.