Court Opinion

ID: 9792424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:29:12.587616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.773656
License: Public Domain

Dimmick, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent from the analysis of the majority except for that portion which admits this issue is moot. Majority opinion, at 376. I perceive the issue to be whether the Court Commissioner properly exercised his common law or statutory power (see RCW 2.28.150) in modifying appellant's commitment order from a less restrictive treatment order to an inpatient treatment order. I would hold that the decision of the Court Commissioner, which was based on facts and circumstances unique to appellant, was proper.
The propriety of that decision can only be determined in the context of the specific facts of this case, i.e., the degree of deterioration in appellant's mental condition at the time the court modified or revoked its order. This court's opinion today severely limits and narrowly defines procedure in mental illness cases by comparing them to criminal cases. I fear the result may well be that dangerous or ill patients will be put on the streets, however briefly, contrary to the legislative intent of the statute, expressed as follows:
The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed so that persons who are in need of care and treatment for mental illness shall receive humane care and treatment and be restored to normal mental condition as rapidly as possible with an avoidance of loss of civil rights where not necessary, and with as little formality as possible, still preserving all rights and all privileges of the person as guaranteed by the Constitution.
RCW 71.02.900.
In my opinion, this case is similar to our unanimous decision in State v. Keller, 98 Wn.2d 725, 657 P.2d 1384 (1983), wherein we held a court may depart from a literal *386reading of statutory language so as to avoid strained or absurd consequences and to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Although decided on a different statute (RCW 10.77.150), our reasoning regarding legislative intent should be the same.
In the Keller case the appellant also argued that she had not violated any express condition of her release and therefore revocation was improper. We disagreed. Our Keller court reiterated prior case law to interpret legislative intent that the State has a legitimate interest in ensuring the safety and security of its citizens by the commitment of individuals who are dangerous to themselves or society.
Here without a doubt the appellant was a serious danger to herself. All of the witnesses testified she was unable to care for her basic needs including taking her medicine. Ms. Cross' final words at the hearing were, "I want to stay here." I would affirm the trial court's conclusion that the Court Commissioner, observing appellant, took appropriate action pursuant to his inherent powers.