Court Opinion

ID: 9580650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:07:16.174012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:25.739272
License: Public Domain

HEARN, C.J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that Grant’s injury is not compensable under South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Law. I would hold that Grant’s injury is compensable because it arose out of and in the course of his employment.
The majority bases its decision largely upon what it perceives to be our limited standard of review. While I agree that the question of whether an accident arises out of and in the course of employment is largely one of fact, here there are no material facts in dispute.1 Thus, the question of whether the accident is compensable is a question of law. See Gibson v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. No. 3, 838 S.C. 510, 517, 526 S.E.2d 725, 729 (Ct.App.2000).
Despite the fact that Grant owns the Clinton House, the only reason Grant drove to the Clinton House on the day of the accident was to deliver sample bobbins to customers of *194Grant Textiles. Grant’s father, who is the president of Grant Textiles, was already at the Clinton House meeting with those customers.
As described in the majority’s opinion, as Grant approached the Clinton House, he had to swerve out of his lane in order to avoid debris in the road. After successfully maneuvering around the hazard, Grant left his truck idling in the entrance-way of the Clinton House and walked back down the highway to remove the debris from the road. Although removing debris from the highway was certainly not one of his regular duties as vice-president of Grant Textiles, Grant explained that, on this occasion, he felt that he did have an obligation to remove the hazard. Specifically, Grant testified:
[T]o me that right there was a safety issue because I had to come out of the road [in order to avoid the obstacle] and ended up right there at the driveway [of the Clinton House]. And I had some customers going and coming. I had some customers coming in that evening. And me and my father was [sic] leaving. If you travel as much as I do and see some accidents, you know, I thought I was doing the right thing.
By attempting to remove the debris from the road, Grant was trying to ensure that the customers, his father (a co-worker), and he could safely travel to and from the Clinton House.
For an injury to be compensable under the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Law, it must both arise out of and be in the course of the employment. Osteen v. Greenville County Sch. Dist., 333 S.C. 43, 49, 508 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1998). The phrase “arising out of’ refers to the causal origin of the injury, whereas the phrase “in the course of’ refers to the injury’s time, place, and circumstance. Id. at 50, 508 S.E.2d at 24. In Hiers v. Brunson Construction Co., our supreme court explained:
‘[I]f in the course of [a worker’s] employment an emergency arises and, without deserting his employment, [the worker] does what he thinks necessary for the purpose of advancing the work in which he is engaged in the interest of his employer, and in so doing he suffers injury, the accident may properly be regarded as arising out of the employment.’
*195221 S.C. 212, 234-235, 70 S.E.2d 211, 222 (1952) (quoting 58 Am.Jur. 764). Furthermore, in Osteen v. Greenville County School District, 333 S.C. 43, 48, 508 S.E.2d 21, 24 (1998), the supreme court recognized that our state has “adopted Professor Larson’s view that there are circumstances when injuries arising out of acts outside the scope of an employee’s regular duties may be compensable.” The court explained that “[tjhese circumstances have been applied to: (1) acts benefiting co-employees; (2) acts benefiting customers or strangers; (3) acts benefiting claimant; and (4) acts benefiting [the] employer privately.” Id. at 48-49, 508 S.E.2d at 24 (citing Larson, §§ 27.00-27.48) (internal footnote omitted).
In the case before us, the undisputed facts indicate that the time, place, and scope of Grant’s duties as an employee of Grant Textiles brought him immediately in contact with a dangerous situation. The undisputed facts also show that Grant attempted to remove the debris from the road in order to ensure that he, his co-employee, and the customers of Grant Textiles could safely travel to and from the Clinton House. Thus, Grant’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Osteen, 333 S.C. at 48-49, 508 S.E.2d at 24.
The supreme court’s decision in Howell v. Kash & Karry, 264 S.C. 298, 214 S.E.2d 821 (1975), lends further support to awarding Grant benefits. In Howell, an employee of a grocery store was injured when he chased down two boys who had snatched a purse from a woman in the parking lot. The supreme court acknowledged that chasing thieves was not part of the employee’s regular duties, but ultimately concluded the employee’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. In reaching this conclusion the court explained that “awards have been upheld for injuries occurring in the course of miscellaneous Good Samaritan activities by employees, on the theory that the employer ultimately profited as a result of the good will thus created.” Id. at 301-302, 214 S.E.2d at 822. Like the grocery store employee in Howell, the time, place, and scope of Grant’s actual duties brought him immediately in contact with a situation that was dangerous to his employer’s customers. While clearing debris from the highway was not a part of Grant’s regular duties, his attempt to rectify a dangerous situation was a Good Samaritan act similar to the grocery store clerk’s actions in Hoivell. There*196fore, I would affirm the circuit court’s decision to award Grant benefits.

. When asked during oral argument which facts were in dispute, the attorney for Grant Textiles pointed to conflicting testimony concerning the distance between the entrance of the Clinton House and the accident. Grant testified that he believed the obstacle was fifty feet down the road, but "it may have been further.” The trooper from the highway patrol who investigated the accident testified that "seeing as how both parties had left the scene, [he] was not one hundred percent certain exactly where [the accident] took place.” The trooper further testified that, 325 feet from the entrance of the Clinton House, he found a pair of glasses on the side of the road. While the testimony from Grant and the trooper did not coincide exactly, both of their descriptions indicate that the accident took place in close proximity to the entrance of the Clinton House. Thus, any difference in their testimony is immaterial. Furthermore, when this case was presented to the circuit court. Grant’s attorney stated twice that the facts were not in dispute, and the attorney for Grant Textiles never objected to that or pointed out any facts that were disputed.