Court Opinion

ID: 9943227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 21:03:58.947032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:33.721907
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24 P. v. Johnson CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B324960

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. TA037534)
           v.

 ROBERT JOHNSON,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, John J. Lonergan, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
      Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                             ____________________________
      In 1998, a jury convicted petitioner Robert Johnson of the
murder of Corie Williams and the attempted murder of Tyrone
Lewis. Johnson appeals from the order denying his June 2022
Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition for resentencing, formerly
numbered section 1170.95. Johnson argues the record of
conviction does not necessarily show either that he was the
actual killer or that he acted with malice aforethought. We
disagree and affirm.

                         BACKGROUND

1.    Johnson’s Description of the Background Facts2
      “ ‘The 118 East Coast Crips claim the area around Avalon
Boulevard and Imperial Highway as their territory. Bounty
Hunter Bloods who attend Centennial High School ride the MTA
bus through that territory. There is a long-standing rivalry
between Bloods and Crips gangs in general and between the
118 East Coast Crips and Bounty Hunter Bloods in particular.

      1   Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
      2  For purposes of this appeal, we accept the “facts” as
Johnson recites them in his opening brief. He relies on the
statement of facts in People v. Pugh (Mar. 23, 2021, B301904)
[nonpub. opn.] (Pugh), which in turn relied on the statement of
facts in People v. Johnson et al. (June 14, 2001, B129670)
[nonpub. opn.] (Johnson). By relying exclusively on the factual
background in our prior appellate opinion and failing to
summarize the evidence before the resentencing court, Johnson
has forfeited any objection to inadmissibility of the evidence
described in the prior opinion. (See People v. Vance (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 706, 713.)

                                    2
The 118 East Coast Crips use certain insults to intimidate
Bloods. . . .
       “ ‘In 1996 and 1997, there had been persistent problems
between the 118 East Coast Crips and Bloods who rode the
number 53 MTA bus that passed by Avalon Boulevard and
Imperial Highway. Specifically, Bloods would display gang signs
while passing through the Crips’ territory. The 118 East Coast
Crips considered this disrespectful. . . .
       “ ‘[Robert] Johnson [Pugh’s confederate] is a member of the
118 East Coast Crips. He is known as “Baby Kiko.” Defendant
Pugh likewise is a member of this Crips gang. He is known as
“Li’l Evil.” Defendant Pugh was the leader of the “little ones,” or
very young gang members such as defendant Johnson.’ [Johnson,
supra, B129670.]
       “On January 15, 1997[,] Pugh and Johnson ‘said it was
disrespectful for Bloods to be coming through the neighborhood.
They were annoyed at Bloods displaying gang signs and yelling
out the bus windows as they passed through the neighborhood.
Defendants Pugh and Johnson discussed getting on the bus the
next time Bloods were aboard, going to the back, beating up
Bloods, then getting off at the next stop. They picked Thursday,
January 16, as a good day for the attack. . . .’ (Johnson, supra,
B129670.)
       “On January 16, 1997, Pugh said, ‘ “Y’all ready?” ’ and
boarded the bus with Johnson and Randall Amado. (Johnson,
supra, B129670.) Amado had a handgun. (Ibid.) Pugh ‘led the
group across the street’ to the bus. (Ibid.) Pugh boarded the bus
and he and his confederates ‘identified themselves as 118 East
Coast Crips, then demeaned Bloods with epithets. At least one of
them shouted, “Shoot this . . . bus up[.]” ’ (Ibid.)

                                   3
       “Johnson used a pistol to shoot two victims, one of whom
died as a result of a gunshot wound to the neck. (Johnson, supra,
B129670.) After the shooting, the ‘Crips ran’ away and were
heard ‘laughing about the shooting. They said they heard they
had shot a girl.’ (Ibid.)” (Pugh, supra, B301904, italics added.)
       “In a pretrial interview, Johnson told police that he, Pugh,
and others gathered. (Johnson, supra, B129670.) ‘ “Everyone
was talking about getting the Bloods who ride the bus.” The plan
was to drag some Bloods off of the bus, after which they would
“torture them and kill them.” He [Johnson] started to get on the
bus but another gang member pulled him off. Defendant Johnson
walked to the rear of the bus. He pointed a .40 caliber Glock at
the rear window. Everyone was yelling at him to shoot. He put
the gun into the rear window next to the rear door, then fired
four times. . . . He was shooting at two Bloods at the rear of the
bus.’ (Ibid.)
       “In a pretrial written statement, Pugh stated that he ‘was
waiting at the bus stop at Imperial Highway and Avalon
Boulevard with his girlfriend, Natasha Barnes (Barnes). He
intended to take Barnes to his grandmother’s house . . . .
Defendant Pugh identified himself as an East Coast Crip. He
was dressed in blue as he waited at the bus stop. There just
happened to be eight East Coast Crips at the bus stop that day.
When the bus stopped, a woman got on, followed by Barnes and
defendant Pugh. As he was about to pay his fare, defendant
Johnson went to the back of the bus, where approximately
10 Bounty Hunter Bloods were seated. After an exchange of
words, defendant Johnson got off the bus.’ (Johnson, supra,
B129670.) Pugh ‘saw a hand holding a gun come through the
back of the bus as the door closed and the bus began to pull away

                                   4
from the bus stop . . . . He heard approximately 12 shots.’ (Ibid.)”
(Pugh, supra, B301904).)

2.    Procedural Background
       Johnson was tried in a joint trial with Pugh and Amado,
with one jury for Johnson and the other for Pugh and Amado.
Only Johnson’s jury heard Johnson’s pretrial admission that he
was the shooter. The court instructed the juries together.
Johnson’s counsel’s argued that although “Mr. Johnson
acknowledged his guilt for the crimes,” Amado “was the killer in
this case.” Johnson’s counsel further argued, “[W]e know that
Mr. Johnson was not the shooter. And we know that it’s probable
that Mr. Amado is the shooter.”

            a.    Instructions
      The instruction on natural and probable consequences
identified the target crime of assault with a firearm and
potentially permitted an aider and abettor in an assault with a
firearm to be convicted of murder.3 The natural and probable

      3  The natural and probable consequence instruction
provided: “One who aids and abets [another] in the commission
of a crime [or crimes] is not only guilty of [those crimes], but is
also guilty of any other crime committed by a principal which is a
natural and probable consequence of the crime[s] originally aided
and abetted.

      “In order to find a defendant guilty of the crime[s] of
murder, assault with a firearm & shooting into an occupied
vehicle . . . you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that:

      “1. The crime of assault or assault with firearm was
      committed;

                                    5
consequence instruction did not include attempted murder. A
conspiracy instruction incorporated natural and probable
consequence doctrine, but applied that doctrine only to assault
with a firearm and shooting at an occupied vehicle, not murder or
attempted murder.
      The court instructed the juries on deliberate and
premeditated murder and that instruction required “express
malice aforethought.” The final portion of the instruction
provided: “To constitute a deliberate and premediated killing,
the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and
the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the
consequences, [he] decides to and does kill.”
      With respect to murder, the court instructed the juries on
transferred intent: “[O]ne attempts to kill a certain person, but

     “2.   That the defendant aided and abetted that crime;

     “3.   That a co-principal in that crime committed the
     crime[s] of murder and assault with a firearm; and

     “4.   The crime[s] of murder and assault with a firearm
     [were] a natural and probable consequence of the
     commission of the crime[s] of assault or assault with a
     firearm.

      “[You are not required to unanimously agree as to which
originally contemplated crime the defendant aided and abetted,
so long as you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and
unanimously agree that the defendant aided and abetted the
commission of an identified and defined target crime and that the
crimes of murder and assault with a firearm & shooting into an
occupied vehicle was a natural and probable consequence of the
commission of that target crime.]”

                                   6
by mistake or inadvertence kills a different person, the crime, if
any, so committed is the same as though the person originally
intended to be killed, had been killed.”
       The court also instructed the juries on aiding and abetting
as follows: “A person aids and abets the [commission] [or]
[attempted commission] of a crime when he or she, [¶] (1) with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and [¶]
(2) with the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime, and [¶] (3) by act or
advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of
the crime.”
       The court instructed the juries that to convict for attempted
murder, it had to find that the defendant harbored “express
malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully
another human being.” The court further instructed on the
definition of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder: “To constitute willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder, the would-be slayer must weigh and consider
the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a
choice and, having in mind the consequences, decides to kill and
makes a direct but ineffectual act to kill another human being.
[¶] The People have the burden of proving the truth of this
allegation. If you have a reasonable doubt that it is true, you
must find it to be not true.”
       Although the court instructed the juries on second degree
felony murder, neither jury found Johnson or his confederates
guilty of second degree murder.
       As to the firearm allegation, the trial court instructed the
juries that it was alleged Johnson personally used and personally
discharged a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle in the

                                    7
commission of the murder and attempted murder. The court
further instructed the jury that if it found Johnson guilty of one
or more charged crimes it had to determine whether he
personally used and personally discharged a firearm at an
occupied vehicle in the commission of the crimes.

            b.    Verdict
       We focus on those aspects of the verdict relevant to
Johnson’s resentencing petition.
       The Johnson jury convicted him of the first degree murder
of Corie Williams. The jury further found a principal was armed
with a handgun and Johnson personally used a handgun. The
jury found that, in the commission of the murder, Johnson
discharged a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle. The jury also
convicted Johnson of the attempted murder of Tyrone Lewis and
found that the attempted murder was committed willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation. The jury further found
that a principal was armed with a handgun and Johnson
personally used a handgun in the commission of the attempted
murder. In addition, the jury found Johnson discharged a
firearm at an occupied vehicle.4
       For the murder, the trial court sentenced Johnson to an
indeterminate 25-year-to-life term and a determinate six-year
term for one of the firearm enhancements. For the attempted
murder, the court sentenced Johnson to a concurrent sentence of

      4 The jury also convicted Johnson of assault with a firearm
on Tammy Freeman, another passenger on the bus with Williams
and Lewis, and found Johnson personally used a firearm,
personally discharged a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Freeman. Finally, the
jury convicted Johnson of shooting at an occupied vehicle.

                                    8
life with the possibility of parole. The court sentenced Johnson to
an additional four year determinate term for the assault with a
firearm and shooting at an inhabited dwelling. The court stayed
the sentence on the firearm enhancements for each offense other
than the six-year term for the murder.
       On June 20, 2022, Johnson petitioned for resentencing.
The court appointed counsel and counsel argued Johnson “met
his burden of establishing a prima facie showing that he is
entitled to relief.” After a hearing, the court denied the petition,
finding Johnson ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
The court stated that “it was the petitioner Mr. Johnson that took
a handgun and fired it into the rear window of the bus . . . .”

                          DISCUSSION
      Johnson argues the resentencing court erred in finding that
he was ineligible for resentencing because the record neither
shows as a matter of law that he was the actual killer nor that he
acted with malice aforethought.

A.    Legal Resentencing Principles
      Prior to 2019, a jury could convict a defendant of murder
under the felony-murder rule and natural and probable
consequences doctrine without finding malice. Under the felony-
murder rule as it existed before 2019, malice was imputed if the
defendant intended to commit the underlying qualifying felony.
(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184 [“ ‘The felony-
murder rule imputes the requisite malice for a murder conviction
to those who commit a homicide during the perpetration of a
felony inherently dangerous to human life.’ ”].) Under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it existed before
2019, an aider and abettor could be held liable for any offense

                                    9
that was the natural and probable consequence of the crime aided
and abetted. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158
[describing former law].)
       Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–4) modified the law
relating to accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a murder theory
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843) and more
narrowly defining felony murder. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 703 (Strong); §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189,
subd. (e)(3)). Senate Bill No. 1437 also added former
section 1170.95 providing the procedure for a defendant convicted
of felony murder or murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to request resentencing relief. (Gentile, at
p. 843.)
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) amended section 1170.95.
In addition to convictions based on the natural consequences and
felony murder doctrines, persons convicted on a “theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime” are eligible for resentencing relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see also former § 1170.95, subd. (a).) The bill
clarified that persons convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter also may petition for resentencing. (People v.
Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, 30.) It further clarified that
the burden of proof applicable in the evidentiary hearing is
beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Owens (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1020–1021.) The Legislature then
renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without

                                    10
substantive change. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, fn. 2,
citing Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
       Section 1172.6 describes a multipart process for
resentencing petitions. The first step is making a prima facie
case for relief. “When the trial court receives a petition
containing the necessary declaration and other required
information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’
[Citation.] If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) When evaluating a petition, the resentencing court may
consider the record of conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 972.) “ ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s
factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting
an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.] ‘However, if the record,
including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified
in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’
[Citation.]” (Lewis, at p. 971.)
       In People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, our Supreme
Court held that “a petitioner who alleges that he or she could not
currently be convicted of a homicide offense ‘because of changes
to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019’ (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3)) puts at issue all elements of the offense under a valid
theory.” (Curiel, at p. 462.) The allegation “is not refuted by the
record unless the record conclusively establishes every element of
the offense. If only one element of the offense is established by
the record, the petitioner could still be correct that he or she

                                    11
could not currently be convicted of the relevant offense based on
the absence of other elements.” (Id. at p. 463.)5

B.    Johnson Is Ineligible for Resentencing
       On appeal, Johnson’s principal argument is that “nothing
in appellant’s record of conviction shows as a matter of law that
appellant was the actual killer.” Johnson’s argument contradicts
his statement of facts on appeal, which includes his admission
that he “used a pistol to shoot two victims, one of whom died as a
result of a gunshot wound to the neck.” (Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [noting that a statement in a brief
may be deemed an admission of fact or law against the party
making it].)
       Johnson’s argument is also inconsistent with the record of
conviction, which demonstrates Johnson was the only person who
discharged a firearm during the commission of the murder and
attempted murder. Reaffirming this conclusion is the Johnson
jury’s finding that he discharged a firearm at an occupied vehicle,
the only such vehicle being the bus in which the victims were
riding. Put simply, Johnson’s jury necessarily rejected the
argument of Johnson’s trial counsel that Amado, rather than
Johnson, was the shooter. In his reply brief on appeal, Johnson
asserts, “[T]he jury could . . . have decided that an accomplice
may have shot and killed the murder victim . . . .” There are

      5    We asked the parties for supplemental briefs to address
what impact, if any, Curiel has on the issues in this appeal.
Johnson responded that Curiel shows “discerning care must be
taken . . . in assessing whether any of the jury’s verdicts or
findings show as a matter of law that appellant was the actual
killer . . . .”

                                   12
two problems with this argument. First, it is bereft of citation to
the record. Second, Johnson’s contention conflicts with his
admission in his statement of facts and his jury’s findings that he
was the person who discharged a firearm during both the murder
and attempted murder.
       Johnson next argues that standing alone, the firearm
enhancement does not show malice aforethought. We agree with
that statement as a general principle. (People v. Offley (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598.) In this case, however, additional
information in the record of conviction shows the jury “must have
convicted the defendant on the basis of his own malice
aforethought.” (Id. at p. 599.)
       Given the trial court’s instructions on attempted murder
and willful, deliberate, and premediated attempted murder, the
jury could not have found him guilty of attempted murder
without also finding he intended to kill. To reiterate, the trial
court instructed the jury that a necessary element of attempted
murder is that “[t]he person committing the act harbored express
malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully
another human being.” (See p. 7, ante.) Also, in accordance with
the trial court’s instructions, by finding the attempted murder
willful, deliberate, and premediated, the jury reaffirmed that
Johnson weighed the killing and decided to kill another human
being. (See ibid.)
       With respect to the murder, the jury necessarily found
Johnson harbored intent to kill when it convicted him of first
degree murder rather than second degree murder. The first
degree murder instruction included that “[t]o constitute a
deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and
consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against

                                   13
such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, [he] decides
to and does kill.”6 His conviction of first degree murder belies his
counsel’s argument that the record of conviction fails to
demonstrate he harbored malice aforethought.
       Johnson acknowledges on appeal, that if he “was the sole
shooter, acting with express malice, as the prosecution asserted
in closing argument, then he would of course be ineligible for
relief.” (See People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 743–
744 [actual killer ineligible for resentencing].) The finding in a
joint trial that Johnson was the only person who discharged a
firearm in connection with the murder and attempted murder
shows he was the actual killer. Further it shows Johnson’s jury
necessarily rejected Johnson’s alternate theory that Amado was
the shooter. The instructions combined with the verdict
demonstrate as a matter of law, that Johnson acted with express
malice, i.e. intent to kill when he premeditated the murder and
the attempted murder. As a matter of law, Johnson is thus
ineligible for resentencing.

      6   See page 6, ante.

                                    14
                        DISPOSITION
       The order denying Robert Johnson’s resentencing petition
is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                         BENDIX, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             WEINGART, J.

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