Court Opinion

ID: 9773083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:36:18.311144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.955239
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice.
The 152nd District Court of Harris County issued an order temporarily enjoining Appellant A. C. Morgan, operator of the Satellite Club in Humble, Texas, and Lyn-hart J. Krenek, owner of the premises on which the club is located, from allowing the club to be used for the illegal purpose of prostitution. Morgan has appealed. The City of Humble has not favored us with a brief.
At the hearing on the City’s motion for temporary injunction, testimony was permitted that although appellant had previously been employed by others as bartender-manager, he had been lessee-operator of the Club only from January 10, 1979 to the date of the hearing. W. F. Kessler, Sergeant, Harris County Sheriff’s Office, the sole witness for appellee, testified that from September 19, 1978 to March 7, 1979 fourteen prostitution arrests had been made at the Club, but that since January 10 just two alleged prostitutes have been arrested, and neither had been convicted.
Appellant preserves two points of error, one concerning the admissibility of Sgt. Kessler’s testimony, and the other complaining of insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court is clothed with broad discretion in determining whether to issue a temporary injunction, and its order will be reversed only on a showing of a clear abuse of discretion, where the pleadings and evidence present a case of probable right and probable injury. Transport Co. of Texas v. Robertson Transports, 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549 (1953).
However, a grant of a temporary injunction is an abuse of discretion where the evidence fails to establish a reasonable basis for deciding that the applicant has a probable right of recovery. Jobe v. Watkins, 458 S.W.2d 945 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1970, n. r. e.). Nor will such an injunction be granted when the evidence raises material disputed fact issues. Dallas Independent School District v. Daniel, 323 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1959, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
Appellant argues in his first point of error that Sgt. Kessler was erroneously, over objection, allowed to testify to the general reputation of the club in the community. We agree.
When counsel for appellee objected that Sgt. Kessler, having testified that the general reputation of the Satellite Club was that “[ijt’s a house of prostitution”, had no knowledge of the Club’s general reputation in the community, the court replied: “For the purpose of this hearing, he can testify as to the reputation.”
Testimony as to reputation is an exception to the hearsay rule, and may not reflect the personal opinion of the witness. 2 McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 1325 p. 178 (2d ed. 1956); Sherrill v. Phillips, 405 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.). To allow Sgt. Kessler to testify to the reputation of the club in the community was reversible error.
Appellant’s second point of error urges that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings that the club is a public nuisance and that Appellant Morgan has allowed prostitutes to ply their trade publicly at the location. We agree.
Sgt. Kessler was the only prosecution witness. No evidence was introduced that tended to prove that under appellant’s ownership the Satellite Club was being used for the illegal purpose of prostitution. There is nothing in the record to indicate whether the arrestees were apprehended while soliciting or while merely present at the club. *366No connection between them and the club management is shown. The appellant, Morgan, was not present at the time of the arrest; the two women had not been brought to trial and until such time are presumed innocent; and the trial court specifically determined that Morgan was not being enjoined for any occurrence prior to January 10, 1979. The record reveals the following:
THE COURT: At this hearing I will grant the Injunction as to the allowing a public nuisance and prostitution to be carried on at the — whatever that address is as against anyone.
No Bond required. The findings of this Court is that the landlord was not involved or participated in any way in the prostitution, if any, that was carried out at this location.
Also that Mr. Morgan took possession as a tenant of this property on January 10th of 1979 and that he was [sic] not been enjoined for something that happened prior to that time. (Emphasis added).
Arrest of two alleged prostitutes, without more, is far from proof that the premises are dedicated to the solicitation of prostitution.
The litany set out above is sufficient for us to sustain appellant’s second point. Additionally, we are of the opinion that none of Sgt. Kessler’s testimony as to the arrests was admissible. He was not present at the time of the March 7, 1979 arrests, and testified, over objection, from vice division records made by other officers in that department. When counsel for the appellant protested that the City of Humble had not laid the proper predicate for the introduction of those records the following colloquy ensued:
THE COURT: Those records are under your care, custody and control and kept during the normal course of business hours?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: In the regular course of business and the—
THE WITNESS: Only our office has access to those records. The Vice Division Office. No one else has access to those records but us.
MR. SMITH (Appellant’s lawyer): Your Honor, you just proved up what he has left out.
THE COURT: I am sorry. I thought I heard him say that. That’s why I was trying to see if I misunderstood something.
Putting of words in a witness’s mouth by the court is far from eliciting testimony as to the reliability of the records. The court was beyond the bounds of his discretion in his interrogation of the witness. Furthermore, the vice division records were not introduced into evidence and do not constitute a part of the record before this court. Sgt. Kessler’s testimony was hearsay, and hearsay is no evidence at all and will not sustain a fact finding. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Butler, 483 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
The dissent makes much of the activities at the club prior to Morgan’s assumption of ownership on January 10, 1979 and asserts that there were twelve arrests for solicitation or prostitution and no competent evidence of convictions resulting from these arrests. The following excerpt from the record is illustrative of the kind of information provided by the witness, Kessler:
Q Mr. Kessler, you referred to the fact the fourteen cases were made through November, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q These fourteen cases, have any of them been — has there been a disposition made on any of these cases?
A Yes, sir, I think two or three of them finally got to trial during county court and they were convicted.
Q Two or three?
A Yes, sir.
Q Of those two or three, when were they filed?
A In — on Annette went to trial and it was filed 12/11/ of ’78. And I think Schultz on 12/6/ of ’78, the case made on her, I think she pled on that case *367and I am not certain. I think Faith Kay Bonner pled on a case November 16 of ’78, that was made on her.

Q So there have been three convictions . ?
A These convictions are just personal recollections of the officers’ making comments they either pled or went to trial on it and it is not personal knowledge. And I am not certain of it. To be clear about that.
Q But anything you are referring to out of those records is not your records, is not your personal knowledge?
A Some of it is and some isn’t.
Q Merely recollections of officers previously that have written in the statements, right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you saying everything in those records you are not in direct supervision of at all times?
A I am in direct supervision of them always. But comments were made in the office about dispositions of cases and that is what I am basing on there has been convictions. (Emphasis added).
While this court recognizes that the type of facility operated by Morgan may well degenerate into a disorderly house, we are bound by the rules of evidence. Handed down on February 13, 1980 by this court is the opinion in Morgan v. State of Texas, 596 S.W.2d 220, which demonstrates the proof necessary to sustain a court’s action in granting a temporary injunction. The record before us leaves us no alternative under the law but to dissolve the temporary injunction.
That part of the temporary injunction that applies to Morgan is dissolved and the case is remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.
Reversed in part and remanded.