Court Opinion

ID: 9929997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 21:04:18.589408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:58:10.816639
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/5/24 P. v. Ruskauff CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A166516
 v.
 KEVIN MICHAEL RUSKAUFF,                                                (Sonoma County
                                                                        Super. Ct. Nos. SCR-742035-1,
           Defendant and Appellant.
                                                                        SCR-741742-1)

         Defendant Kevin Michael Ruskauff appeals from the sentence imposed
after he entered no contest pleas in separate criminal cases. Defendant
contends the trial court erred, and defense counsel was ineffective, in failing
to address Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) (§ 1170(b)(6)(A)),
which provides a rebuttable presumption in favor of the lower term if the
defendant “has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma”
that “was a contributing in the commission of the offense.” He also requests
a modification of the abstract of judgment.
         We affirm.
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Case No. SCR-741742-1
         In September 2020, Jane Doe reported to a police officer that defendant
had threatened to kill her and her son in voice messages and texts sent from

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12 to 15 different phone numbers. After the officer attempted to call
defendant, he too began receiving threatening calls and texts; defendant
threatened to kill the officer and his family.
      The Sonoma County District Attorney charged defendant with making
criminal threats to Doe (Pen. Code,1 § 422, subd. (a); count 1) and obstructing
an officer by means of threat (§ 69, subd. (a)); count 2). Defendant was also
alleged to have a prior conviction that qualified as a strike (§ 667, subds. (d)
and (e)) and serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) (§ 667(a)).
      In October 2020, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings
pursuant to section 1368.
Case No. SCR-742035-1
      A few days after the court declared a doubt about his competence to
stand trial in Case No. SCR-741742-1, defendant barricaded himself in his
jail cell. When an emergency response team tried to enter his cell, defendant
threw a pitcher of urine and feces at the three deputies, hitting all three in
the face.
      As a result of this incident, defendant was charged with three counts of
battery by gassing (§ 243.9, subd. (a)) with allegations of a prior strike and
serious felony conviction. The trial court again suspended criminal
proceedings pursuant to section 1368.
Commitment and Restoration to Competence
      In both cases, the trial court found defendant not competent to stand
trial and ordered him committed to the state hospital. At Napa State
Hospital, defendant was diagnosed with “schizophrenia, multiple episodes”
and prescribed psychotropic medication.

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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       In March 2022, a hospital psychologist found defendant competent to
stand trial. The psychologist reported that defendant “experienced a
significant change in mental status” while compliant with his medication;
defendant was now able “to have a meaningful bilateral conversation without
the interference of symptoms of mental health.”
       The trial court found defendant competent and reinstated both criminal
proceedings.
Plea
       On the day jury selection was scheduled to begin in both cases,
defendant entered an open plea of no contest to all charges and prior
conviction allegations in Case No. SCR-741742-1 and Case No. SCR-742035-
1. Defendant also stipulated to the following aggravating circumstances in
both cases: “under Rule 4.421, factor (a)(1), the crime involved great violence,
great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm or other acts disclosing a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness or callousness, and factors under (b)(1), the
defendant has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to
society, (2), the defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained
petitions as a juvenile are numerous or of increasing seriousness, (3), the
defendant has served a prior term in prison or county jail under Section
1170(h), (4), the defendant was on probation, mandatory supervision, post
release community supervision or parole when the crime occurred, and, (5),
the prior performance on probation, mandatory supervision, post release
community supervision or parole was unsatisfactory.”

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Sentencing
      In August 2022, defense counsel filed a sentencing memo in which he
(1) invited the court to strike defendant’s prior strike conviction (Romero2
motion) and dismiss the section 667(a) enhancement and (2) identified
mitigating factors. Counsel asked the court to find defendant outside the
spirit of the Three Strikes law, noting his current offenses “were clearly the
result of a mental illness.” He argued dismissal of the section 667(a)
enhancement was warranted because, among other things, “[t]he current
offense is connected to mental illness,” quoting section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(D). And counsel urged the court to impose the lower term because
“defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that
significantly reduced culpability for the crime,” quoting California Rules of
Court, rule 4.423(b)(2).3
      At the sentencing hearing on August 31, 2022, the trial court denied
the request to dismiss the strike, citing defendant’s extensive criminal
history, but it granted the request to dismiss the five-year enhancement
under section 667(a), “based on the clear mental health situation.”
      The trial court found the stipulated aggravating factors did, “in fact,
apply” and found as a mitigating factor “that the defendant was suffering a
mental condition that significantly reduced his culpability.” The court
determined the aggravating and mitigating factors were “in balance” and
imposed a middle term for the principal term.

      2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

      3 The prosecution filed an opposition to the Romero motion and

statement in aggravation. The probation officer filed a report documenting
defendant’s lengthy criminal history and recommending the upper term and
a total sentence of 19 years, eight months.

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       The trial court sentenced defendant to 12 years, eight months in prison
composed of six years (the middle term of three years doubled due to the prior
strike conviction) for one count of gassing (count 1 in Case No. SCR-742035-
1); two consecutive two-year terms (one-third the middle term doubled) for
the other two gassing offenses (counts 2 and 3 in Case No. SCR-742035-1); a
consecutive 16 months (one-third the middle term of two years doubled) for
making criminal threats (count 1 in Case No. SCR-741742-1); and a
consecutive 16 months (one-third the middle term of two years doubled) for
obstructing an officer (count 2 in Case No. SCR-741742-1).
                                 DISCUSSION
A.     Failure to Address Section 1170(b)(6)(A)
       1.    The Law
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(S.B. 567) amended the determinate sentencing law, section 1170, in several
respects. Previously, the law granted trial courts “broad sentencing
discretion to determine whether the imposition of the lower, middle, or upper
term ‘best serve[d] the interests of justice.’ ” (People v. Mitchell (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 1051, 1056.) But S.B. 567 established “a presumption of the
lower term” in certain specified circumstances. (People v. Flores (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039; Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c), adding § 1170, subd.
(b)(6).)
       As relevant to defendant’s claims, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), now
provides, “[U]nless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition
of the lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological,

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physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect,
exploitation, or sexual violence.”
      2.    Defendant’s Claim of Trial Court Error is Forfeited
      Defendant asserts the trial court erred in “fail[ing] to address the
presumption of a lower term as statutorily required in light of the
schizophrenia contributing to [his] offense conduct.” However, the provision
defendant relies on, section 1170(b)(6)(A), refers to different types of
“trauma,” including “psychological” trauma; it does not create a presumption
in favor of the lower term whenever mental illness contributed to the
commission of the offense. (People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 777
(Tilley).) Defendant seems to assume that debilitating mental illness, by
itself, automatically qualifies as psychological trauma, but he offers no
argument for this assumption, which is contrary to the language of the
statute and case law. (See id. at pp. 775, 777 [rejecting claim that the
sentencing court should have considered the defendant’s “mental health
problems” under section 1170(b)(6)(A); the statute “does not require the court
to impose the lower term because of defendant’s mental illness, but for
psychological trauma” and mental illness alone does not create a lower term
presumption].)
      Defendant relies on People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226
(Banner), but he misunderstands that case. In Banner, the Court of Appeal
recognized that “psychological trauma based on mental illness may be a
circumstance qualifying for the lower term,” but emphasized, “we do not hold
mental illness alone qualifies for the lower term presumption.” (Id. at p. 241,
italics added.) Under Banner, a defendant may invoke section 1170(b)(6)(A)
based on mental illness only if the defendant’s mental illness resulted in
psychological trauma and “that trauma . . . contribute[d] to the crime.” (Ibid.)

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      Here, defendant’s sentencing memo was filed over eight months after
S.B. 567 came into effect, and the trial court sentenced him the same month.
Yet, defendant did not request the lower term based on section 1170(b)(6)(A).
Defense counsel never argued that defendant’s mental illness caused him to
experience psychological trauma or that psychological trauma contributed to
the commission of the offenses. In this circumstance, defendant has forfeited
his claim that the trial court failed to consider section 1170(b)(6)(A). (See
Tilley, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 778 [where the defendant “did not seek the
lower term based on section 1170, subdivision (b)(6); object to the imposition
of the middle term; or argue that [he] suffered any psychological trauma as a
result of mental illness” his claim based on section 1170(b)(6)(A) was
forfeited]; People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043–1044 [failure to
raise S.B. 567’s amendments to section 1170 after revocation of probation
months after S.B. 567 went into effect forfeited appellate claim for
resentencing under the amended statute].)
      We reject defendant’s argument that forfeiture should not apply
because the trial court misapprehended its sentencing obligations. Nothing
in the record suggests the trial court misunderstood the law. Also unavailing
is defendant’s claim that defense counsel’s many references to defendant’s
mental illness and its severity sufficiently put the trial court on notice that
section 1170(b)(6)(A) was at issue. This argument again incorrectly assumes
that mental illness alone could qualify as psychological trauma under the
provision.
      3.     Defendant Fails to Show Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
      Next, defendant contends defense counsel was ineffective in failing to
argue section 1170(b)(6)(A) applies. This contention fails on direct appeal.

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      “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance are more
appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009; accord People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264,
266–267 [habeas corpus is the more appropriate procedure to address an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it may include evidence of an
attorney’s reasons for making the complained-of decision, which is outside
the appellate record].)
      Defense counsel was not asked why he did not raise section
1170(b)(6)(A) at sentencing, and a possible explanation for his omission is he
reasonably believed it did not apply in this case. While there is clear
evidence that defendant has schizophrenia and that his offenses were
connected to his mental health issues, we cannot say the record shows he
experienced psychological trauma based on his mental illness or that any
such trauma contributed to his crimes. (See Banner, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at p. 241.) Where “the appellate record does not disclose what mitigating
evidence was available that was not presented, or what reasons defense
counsel may have had for not presenting it,” we do not presume counsel was
ineffective. (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 598.) Any claim of
ineffective assistance based on defense counsel’s failure to raise section
1170(b)(6)(A) must be made in habeas proceedings. (See ibid. [“ ‘ “On a silent
record, as we have here, we will not assume that the defense counsel’s failure
to present mitigating evidence rendered his assistance ineffective. Any

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assertion that counsel was inadequate in this regard must be raised on
habeas corpus.” ’ ”].)
B.    Abstract of Judgment
      The abstract of judgment reflects assessments of $80 for court
operations per section 1465.8 and $60 for conviction assessments under
Government Code section 70373. Defendant argues the abstract of judgment
must be modified because the trial court orally imposed $40 for court
operations and $30 for the conviction assessment. We disagree.
      The trial court first imposed the prison terms for the gassing
convictions in Case No. SCR-742035-1 and next imposed the terms for the
convictions in Case No. SCR-741742-1. The court then ordered fines and fees
as follows: “Restitution fine in each of the cases in the amount of $330 per
1202.4 of the Penal Code. An additional restitution fine of $330 per 1202.45
of the Penal Code is suspended unless parole is revoked. $40 court security
fee per Penal Code Section 1465.8 and a $30 criminal conviction fee pursuant
to Government Code Section 70373 is ordered.”
      The minute order for Case No. SCR-742035-1 reflects that the court
ordered defendant to pay “$40 Court Security Fee” and “$30 Criminal
Conviction Fee,” and the minute order for Case No. SCR-741742-1 reflects the
same assessments.
      When “reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts are in conflict,” the record
“ ‘will be harmonized if possible.’ ” (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596,
599.) Here, the reporter’s transcript, minute orders, and abstract of
judgment can be harmonized by reading the trial court’s imposition of
assessments as applying in each of the two cases. Thus, the trial court
ordered defendant to pay a $40 court security assessment in Case No. SCR-
742035-1 and another $40 court security assessment in Case No. SCR-

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741742-1 for a total assessment of $80 as reflected in the abstract of
judgment. Likewise, defendant is to pay a $30 conviction assessment in Case
No. SCR-742035-1 and another $30 conviction assessment in Case No. SCR-
741742-1 for a total assessment of $60 as reflected in the abstract of
judgment. No correction to any part of the record is necessary.
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

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                                   _________________________
                                   Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

A166516, People v. Ruskauff

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