Court Opinion

ID: 9737611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:30:19.218211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.259035
License: Public Domain

Peterson, Justice
(dissenting).
The essence of the decision, from which I respectfully dissent, is that the court below was justified in vacating a conviction of second-degree murder for the admitted killing of decedent on the sole ground that defendant in pleading guilty had made a statement of fact which would negate the existence of an essential element of the crime. I agree with the principle that a plea of guilty should not be accepted or, if made, should be withdrawn upon the motion of the court or counsel if such were the case, but I do not agree that this is the case.1
1. Defendant admittedly killed the Reverend Berner Nyjordet on May 23, 1963. Decedent was shot in the head with a pistol at pointblank range and stabbed several times in the head and chest. Defendant was originally indicted for first-degree murder, essential elements of which include both premeditation and an intent to effect death; 2 but that indictment was dismissed and replaced by an information charging the lesser crime of second-degree murder, for which only an intent to effect death, not premeditation,3 is the essential element. Defendant acknowledges that his counsel had explained to him “very carefully and in some detail” the essential elements of both crimes, so it cannot be said from this record that defendant did not understand the nature and elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty.
Defendant, the majority concludes, made a statement of fact negating *26the essential element of intent to kill when, contemporaneous with his plea of guilty, he said that he did not have that intent. There is less to that statement, however, than appears when read merely in isolation from his other statements. I submit that such statement, if considered in its full context, reflects nothing more than a disavowal of the nonessential element of premeditation, a disavowal which is of significance in justifying the dismissal of the original indictment and acceptance of a plea of guilty to a lesser crime. The statement which constitutes the basis of the trial court’s decision is, indeed, his response to the interrogation of the court:
“Q. [By the court] You didn’t plan to kill this man, did you?
“A. I didn’t have no intentions to.
“Q. You didn’t know him before that night, did you?
“A. No.
“Q. The first time you decided or thought — the thought came to your mind was when he said something that irritated you, is that right?
“A. When he mentioned about my girl’s name. He told me to call— just think of me as your girl, that is what he said.” (Italics supplied.) The real meaning of defendant’s statement is, I think, equally apparent from the following colloquy with the county attorney:
“County Attorney: When you went into the country with Nyjordet, did you intend to rob him?
“The Defendant: No.
* * * * *
“County Attorney: Did you intend to rob him?
“The Defendant: Not when I got in the car.
“County Attorney: Not when you got in the car, but after you were out in the country by Hayward did you intend to rob hinü
“The Defendant: Yes.
“County Attorney: Did you intend to kill him?
“The Defendant: No.
“County Attorney: You knew you were shooting at his head, didn’t you?
“The Defendant: Yes.” (Italics supplied.)
*27It is utterly unrealistic to read into defendant’s isolated statement a negation of that essential element when considered with his detailed account of the circumstances in which he shot and stabbed decedent. We have in the past held unequivocally that the intent to cause death — even premeditation — may be determined from such circumstances as the fact of being armed and the method in which the killing occurred. State v. Campbell, 281 Minn. 1, 161 N. W. (2d) 47; State v. Hare, 278 Minn. 405, 154 N. W. (2d) 820; State ex rel. Fruhrman v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 242, 146 N. W. (2d) 174; State v. Ware, 267 Minn. 191, 126 N. W. (2d) 429; State v. Gowdy, 262 Minn. 70, 113 N. W. (2d) 578. As it was so succinctly stated in State v. Hare, 278 Minn. 405, 408, 154 N. W. (2d) 820, 822:
“* * * Aiming a loaded revolver at a person and firing three shots, all of which strike the target, surely permits an inference of premeditation with intent to kill.”
I do not mean to suggest, of course, that a plea of guilty is properly accepted, however inescapable the probable inference of guilty might be were the evidence submitted to a trial of the disputed issue, if the defendant chose categorically to assert his innocence. I submit, however, that the whole of defendant’s statements of fact neither constitutes a clear and unequivocal declaration of such innocence nor raises serious doubt as to his guilt of the crime admitted by the plea of guilty.
2. The vacating of the plea of guilty may well have the practical result of defendant’s ultimate acquittal. Crucial evidence against defendant is apparently contained in a “confession” taken without the giving of the warnings and the availability of counsel as required by the Miranda rule.4 Because the conviction occurred prior to the effective date of Miranda, the confession would not have been inadmissible on that ground. But whether or not upon a post-Miranda trial its admissibility would be ultimately sustained, is most uncertain. Although I would agree with the court in holding that the admissibility of the confession is to *28be determined according to pre-Miranda standards, this does not fully safeguard the state from possible prejudice, for the ultimate decision is not for us to make but for the United States Supreme Court.
I would reverse and reinstate the judgment of conviction.

 Nor, apparently, did the District Court of Washington County which had denied defendant’s petition in a prior habeas corpus proceeding. Our reversal and remand in State ex rel. Chapman v. Tahash, 277 Minn. 503, 152 N. W. (2d) 309, was to afford an evidentiary hearing as to such other issues raised by defendant as could not be determined from the original record.

 Minn. St. 609.185(1).

 Minn. St. 609.19.

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. ed. (2d) 694, 10 A. L. R. (3d) 974.