Court Opinion

ID: 9857304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:29:16.773274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:26.742928
License: Public Domain

George Bose Smith, J., dissenting. Contrary to every pertinent decision of this court the majority opinion views the evidence in this case in the light least favorable to the findings of the Commission. The abundance of substantial evidence supporting the denial of this claim is minimized, characterized as weak, or ignored altogether. Before discussing the evidence I should like to review the rules that govern us in the consideration of appeals like this one. It was settled by the early case of J. L. Williams & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, 205 Ark. 604, 170 S. W. 2d 82, that the finding's of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission are entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury. The substantial evidence rule was adopted in that case and has been uniformly followed ever since. When the findings of the Commission are given the same effect as a jury verdict certain other rules applicable to the review of jury trials come into play and have been invariably followed in the past. One is that the evidence must be viewed in the strongest light in favor of the Commission’s findings. Hughes v. Tapley, 206 Ark. 739, 177 S. W. 2d 429; Ozan Lbr. Co. v. Garner, 208 Ark. 645, 187 S. W. 2d 181; Campbell v. Athletic etc. Co., 215 Ark. 773, 223 S. W. 2d 499. The rule is the same whether the Commission allows or denies the claim. As we said in Springdale Monument Co. v. Allen, 216 Ark. 426, 226 S. W. 2d 42, where the Commission had rejected the claim: “When we give to the testimony its strongest probative force in favor of the action of the full Commission denying the award, as we must do, we are unable to say that such action was not based on some substantial testimony. ’ ’ As in the case of a jury, it is for the Commission and not this court to draw inferences and reach conclusions from the facts. Wren v. D. F. Jones Const. Co., 210 Ark. 40, 194 S. W. 2d 896. It is likewise the Commission’s sole province to arrive at a conclusion of fact when medical testimony is in conflict. It was said in Ark. Workmen’s Comp. Com’n v. Sandy, 217 Ark. 821, 233 S. W. 2d 382: “In the instant case, the medical testimony as to the extent of the claimant’s disability was conflicting, and the Commission evidently chose to accept the report of Dr. Cheairs. The courts are without authority to reverse the conclusion of the Commission in this regard.” A more detailed statement of the rule as to conflicting medical evidence was made in Burdine v. Partee Flooring Mill, 218 Ark. 60, 234 S. W. 2d 193: “ We do not have here a case wherein the expert testimony can be held to be uncontradicted: ‘ “Moreover, were it conceded that all the expert witnesses introduced in the case agreed upon conclusions as argued by appellant, the jury would not necessarily have to so find the facts to be, because such testimony may be controverted by any other competent evidence.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Green, 181 Ark. 1096, 29 S. W. 2d 304. Not only this, but, were it conceded that all the expert testimony offered by both parties was in full accord and agreement and not contradicted by any other expert evidence, yet the jury would not be bound by such testimony. 11 B. C. L., 586, states the rule as follows: “Even if several competent experts concur in their opinion, and no opposing expert evidence is offered, the jury are still bound to decide the issues upon their own fair judgment.” ’ Ark. Power & Light Co. v. Bollen, 199 Ark. 566, 134 S. W. 2d 585.” The pertinent evidence, considered in accordance with the binding rules referred to above, may be divided into two categories: first, the proof relating to the silica hazard to which McKown was exposed, and, second, the medical testimony. There is direct and positive evidence that McKown was not injuriously exposed to a silica hazard in the Boyd mine. When he went to work for that company in 1938 or 1939 he stated, according to the uncontradicted proof in the record, that his asthma was so bad that he could not work inside the mine. He was therefore given an outside job, at which he worked until 1942. It was in 1942 that McKown began to work inside the mine. He was, for at least 90% of his time, employed as a pumper, his duty being to tend the pumps that expel water from the mine. There is proof that as a pumper McKown worked in the wettest, most dust-free parts of the mine, and in addition he was in the indraft of fresh air that was continuously circulated through the mine. The Boyd mine was the first one in the state to be fully equipped with water, which was constantly sprayed upon the cutting machines to keep down harmful dust. The mine was subject to surprise inspections by state, federal, and insurance company representatives; all the reports were commendatory. Three men, it is true, were awarded compensation benefits for silicosis after having been last employed in the Boyd mine. These men, however, worked in the dusty areas of the mine and may have acquired silicosis before the mine was equipped with water. They were not pumpers and did not work in the favorable conditions that attended McKown’s job. The principal testimony indicating that McKown worked for any substantial time where rock was being cut is given by McKown himself. His credibility is open to question. When he resigned his job in 1951 he applied for unemployment compensation, stating (a) that he had been discharged, (b) that he had been replaced by a machine, and (c) that he had applied for work at Camp Chaffee. McKown admitted at a hearing below that all three statements were false and had resulted in fraud charges being brought against him. The Commission was certainly free to discredit McKown’s testimony about his exposure to dust and to believe the contrary proof given by unimpeached witnesses. The foregoing was the background of proof that the Commission had before it in weighing the medical testimony. At the outset I would lay aside the majority’s remarks about the qualifications of the doctors, the verification .of their reports, and the lack of cross-examination. None of these matters have been or could be raised by the appellee. The procedure before the Commission is informal. Hardly any of the many physicians who testified were asked about their qualifications. Had there been any desire on the part of the claimant to examine the witnesses about their qualifications, to demand that their reports be verified, or to exercise the right of cross-examination, the issue should have been raised before the Commission. The supposed defect could then have been readily remedied. It is elementary that a litigant, by failing to object, waives irregularities that could be corrected at once if a timely objection were made. Upon the record only a few positive statements can be made about McKown’s condition. He is undoubtedly disabled by reason of shortness of breath and rapid exhaustion upon exertion. He undoubtedly has emphysema of the lungs, which is a condition characterized by a thickening in the walls of the air spaces through which oxygen is absorbed into the blood stream. It is undoubtedly true that repeated N-rays do not show in McKown’s lungs the nodules that ordinarily accompany a disabling grade of silicosis. Emphysema is not itself a disease; it is a secondary result of something else. The pivotal medical issue is whether MeKown’s emphysema is the result of silicosis or of some other condition. On this point the medical testimony is in irreconcilable conflict; the witnesses themselves concede that certainty is impossible. Dr. Riley summed up the matter by saying that the only absolute method of determining the presence of silicosis is a postmortem examination. There are two medical theories concerning the diagnosis of grade II silicosis, which, according to much of the proof, is the lowest disabling grade of the disease. Some authorities believe that this grade can exist even though X-ray films reveal no silicotic nodules. Other authorities, equally respected, believe that such nodules are invariably present when the disease has progressed to the point of disability. Neither school of thought professes absolute certainty in the matter. Here, for example, even the physicians on whose testimony the majority opinion rests are not nearly so positive as the majority members of this court. Dr. Chamberlain is perhaps as sure of his position as any of the doctors diagnosing McKown’s malady as silicosis. He says that grade II can be eliminated, because the nodules are absent. He is unable to attribute tbe emphysema to any particular cause; grade I silicosis can, or cannot be present. Dr. Riley made a diagnosis of silicosis, grade II, in April 1952, after having found no evidence of silicosis upon two examinations of McKown in 1951. Both his diagnoses cannot be correct, as it is shown without dispute that the disease could not have originated or progressed between his examinations without continued exposure to silica. A careful study of the record shows that the testimony favoring McKown’s claim is just as “weak” as the majority have termed the testimony upon which the Commission chose to rely. Mc-Kown, of course, had the burden of proof. The testimony which the majority dismiss as insubstantial includes the opinions of five physicians, some of whom are unquestionably experts in the field. Dr. Sander, according to the evidence, is a recognized authority. In obtaining his expert opinion the Commission submitted for his consideration the X-rays, the reports of the other doctors pro and con, and all other available material. Upon the basis of all the data in the case Dr. Sander says: “In conclusion, it is my opinion that this man has no evidence of silicosis.” Other testimony supporting the findings of the Commission includes the following: Dr. Rose, a Fort Smith physician who has had forty years of experience with coal miners, states that nodules must be present before a determination of silicosis can be made; he rules out silicosis in McKown’s case. Dr. Douglas states that Mc-Kown has marked emphysema with no silicosis. Dr. Dar-nall, who is the only thoracic surgeon in Fort Smith, and who was cross-examined, testified: “I cannot see evidence of silicosis by X-ray and I cannot make a diagnosis of silicosis.” Dr. Hornberger is of a similar opinion. The majority’s implication that McKown’s emphysema can be explained only upon the assumption that he has silicosis is not supported by the record. Both Dr. Sander and Dr. Hornberger say that the emphysema could be caused by asthma. As Dr. Sander puts it: “ The causes of emphysema are numerous. They include not only long-standing asthma and chronic bronchitis. . . . Every internist sees many cases of severe emphysema in persons who have never had dust exposure in a mine or factory and who have never had the diseases which one commonly thinks of as causes of emphysema.” No witness disputes this testimony. For several years prior to 1942 McKown’s asthma was so severe that he could not work inside the mine. He admits that he was treated for asthma immediately after he became disabled in 1951. The Commission was at liberty to conclude, on the basis of uncontradicted substantial evidence, that McKown’s emphysema is of asthmatic origin. In any event the question is one of fact for the Commission alone. The majority pay lip-service to the substantial evidence rule by citing some of the cases in which it has been applied. But in this record there is unquestionably substantial proof to show that McKown does not have silicosis. The evidence of exposure preponderates in favor of the appellants. Five skilled physicians affirmatively state that McKown does not have the disease. There are admittedly other causes for the development of emphysema, one of which is shown to exist in McKown’s case. What, then, can be the explanation for the reversal of the Commission’s decision upon a question of fact? The answer apparently lies in the final words of the majority opinion, where it is said that compensation cases should be liberally construed and that doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the claimant. It is undoubtedly true that the compensation law itself should be liberally construed in favor of the workman. It may also be true that the commissioners, within the limits of their consciences, should construe the evidence liberally in the claimant’s favor. But if the majority mean that it is reversible error for the Commission to fail to take a liberal view of the evidence in favor of the claim, the decision is demonstrably wrong for several reasons. First, the authorities elsewhere (we have not passed directly on the point) sensibly reject the view that the Commission commits reversible error when it does not view the evidence favorably to .the employee. To quote a few cases: “ It is of course the settled rule everywhere that these acts are to be liberally construed in favor of the workman; but this does not mean, as counsel seem to argue, that the rule as to the measure of proof, of the sufficiency of evidence, is different from the rule in ordinary cases. The burden is on the plaintiff to reasonably satisfy the trial court that the accident arose out of and in the course of the workman’s employment, and where there is any substantial legal evidence in support of the findings of the trial court, the judgment, whether affirmative or negative, will not be disturbed on appeal.” Ex parte Goleman, 211 Ala. 248, 100 So. 114. “The act ... is of course to be liberally construed in furtherance of a legislative purpose to provide compensation for accidental injuries sustained within the scope of its provisions, but the rule of liberal construction has nothing to do with the function of the commission in weighing evidence or in resolving conflicts in the testimony.” Staten v. Long-Turner Const. Co., Mo. App., 185 S. W. 2d 375. “The liberality of construction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act extends only to the provisions thereof and not to the proof required upon the trial on the merits.” Hinton v. Louisiana Central Lbr. Co., La. App., 148 So. 478. “In the case at bar, it must be remembered that workmen’s compensation statutes shall be liberally construed, and, also, that that rule does not apply to questions of fact but to matters concerning the construction of the statute, and that the principle does not dispense with the requirement that those who claim benefits under the act must, by competent evidence, prove the facts upon which they rely.” Ehman v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 33 Wash. 2d 584, 206 P. 2d 787. Second, the notion that the Commission’s findings should be set aside for its failure to view the evidence with, indulgence toward the claimant cannot be reconciled with the long-settled rule that the findings must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. This case is a perfect illustration. There is undoubtedly substantial evidence to sustain the Commission’s decision, but that decision is nevertheless being set aside. Obviously the two theories cannot be harmonized. To enforce the majority’s view is to read something into the statute that is not there: a requirement that a double standard of review be applied in the compensation cases. The substantial evidence rule is apparently to be applied when the Commission makes an award; all doubts are then to be resolved in favor of its findings. But when the Commission denies the award — a result that seems to be implied as one reason for having a hearing — the substantial evidence rule no longer applies; all doubts are to be resolved against the Commission’s findings. There is no support in the statute or in the cases for such a rule. Third, and most important, it is clearly wrong to require the Commission to take a biased view of the evidence. If the commissioners are to be responsible for determining the facts they must be free to decide issues of credibility and other controverted points of fact in accordance with their own consciences. If they sincerely believe that witness A is lying and that witness B is telling the truth, they must be free to accept B’s testimony, whether it is favorable or adverse to the claimant. No self-respecting man would continue to sit upon a tribunal which was required by a higher court to take a prejudicéd view of the evidence. Yet that must be the result if this court holds that the commissioners commit reversible error when they fail to show sympathy for the claimant. In the administration of justice it is certainly a new doctrine for a court to declare that the finders of the facts must not be fair and impartial, that they must, under penalty of reversal, tip the scales in favor of one of the litigants. I regret that I cannot put into stronger language my conviction that the decision in this case is wrong. Holt and McFaddik, JJ., join in this dissent.