Court Opinion

ID: 9465347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:43:57.604303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:08.114584
License: Public Domain

INGRAHAM, Circuit Judge,
concurring
specially.
I concur in the result but would reach the issue of lack of prosecution. Although the district court’s December 15, 1976, order of dismissal was entered without explanation, the order may fairly be read as a Rule 41(b) dismissal for lack of prosecution. First, appellee’s June 24, 1976, motion to compel appellant to answer interrogatories was pending at the time of the dismissal. Second, the dismissal followed the failure of appellant’s counsel to appear at a pretrial conference on November 30, 1976, or to respond to the court’s request for a reply memorandum on appellee’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.
A Rule 41(b) dismissal “is a drastic remedy to which a court may resort only in extreme situations.” Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1978). The sanction is appropriate only where there is “a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Durham v. Florida East Coast Railroad Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967). Otherwise, dismissal is an abuse of discretion. Flaksa v. Little River Marine Construction Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1968).
This is not a case of protracted delay or total inactivity by a plaintiff. See Ramsay v. Bailey, 531 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 1976); Murrah v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 480 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1973). Only eight months elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the order of dismissal. See United States v. Inter-American Shipping Corp., 455 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1972). Appellee served interrogatories upon appellant on April 23, 1976, which were answered, albeit tardily, on September 8, 1976. Other than the late filing of interrogatory answers, appellant’s only unauthorized delay was the two week period immediately preceding the dismissal. See id.
A legitimate excuse for the unauthorized absence of appellant’s counsel would belie classification of his conduct as “contumacious.” See, e. g., Silas, at 386; In re Liquid Carbonic Truck Drivers Chemical Poisoning Litigation, 580 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1978). According to appellant’s counsel’s affidavit explanation of his absence, which has not been disputed, he was away from his office from November 12, 1976, until after December 15, 1976, because of a gall bladder operation and related medical complications. He claimed that he was unaware of the November 30, 1976, pretrial conference and the court’s request for a reply memorandum until he learned of the dismissal. Since the non-appearance of appellant’s counsel was not in deliberate disobedience of the court, his conduct was not “contumacious.” See Coon v. Charles W. Bliven & Co., Inc., 534 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1976); Brown v. O’Leary, 512 F.2d 485, 486 (5th Cir. 1975).
Moreover, the appellant was in no way connected with or responsible for his counsel’s absence. “Dismissal is generally inappropriate and lesser sanctions are favored where neglect is plainly attributable to an attorney rather than to his blameless client.” Silas, at 385. Accord, Hassenflu v. Pyke, 491 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. 1974); Flaksa, 389 F.2d at 889.
*249Although I do not condone the failure of appellant’s counsel to notify the court or opposing counsel of his physical inability to proceed with the case, I would hold that the district court’s dismissal for lack of prosecution was an abuse of discretion.