Court Opinion

ID: 9444944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:16:36.638585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:03.956992
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Tribune and Pinellas filed mutually exclusive applications for the television channel assigned to the Tampa-St. Pe-tersburg area under the Commission’s allocation plan.1 These cities are twenty miles apart. Tribune, which proposed construction of a station in Tampa, is controlled by Richmond, Chicago and New York residents who will take no part in managing broadcasting operations. Pinellas, which proposed construction of a station in St. Petersburg, is owned by local residents who will manage all the station’s affairs. In granting the application of Tribune, the Commission disregarded local ownership and ownership-management integration as values in themselves worthy of a preference. It chose to rely instead upon the past broadcast performance records of the applicants as a more reliable guide for determining which one would be more likely to effectuate its program proposals. The Commission found that both Pinellas and Tribune had “past desirable performance” records.
In its decision, the Commission stated that it had awarded “no preference [to Pinellas] * * * on the basis of integration of local ownership and management and participation in community affairs.” Despite this flat statement, the Commission thereafter said, in its opinion on Pinellas’ petition for rehearing, that
*210“ * * * the preference accruing to Pinellas as a result of its superiority in these factors [local ownership and ownership-management integration] is slight and, although not separately stated, was considered. Our intention was not to deprive, nor did we deprive Pinel-las of the slight preference it merits with regard to these factors.” Emphasis supplied.
Although not expressed, we must assume from the Commission’s refusal to disturb the award to Tribune that it found this belatedly acknowledged “slight preference” outweighed by Tribune’s “obvious superiority” in the field of local live programs. The Commission’s decision had found such superiority in two of six program classifications, agriculture and education.2 The record clearly demonstrates that the choice between Pinellas and Tribune was regarded as extremely close and that this superiority provided the “decisive” factor in favoring Tribune3
. „ , , , ,, , ,, „__• Appellant contends that the Commis- • f , „ , . sion s substitution of past performance records^ for local owner-management m comparing applicants constitutes a reversal of policy which does violence to the important substantive values inherent in local ownership. It also contends that the record ^ does not support the preference to Tribune on programming, But I think our consideration of these contentions and a final disposition of this review, should await a remand to the Commission for the purpose of supplying an essential conclusion which is missing from the present record. This conclusion relates to the issue of concentration of control and diversification of the media of mass communication. Since the Commission viewed the qualifications of the applicants as closely balanced with respect to the issues it did consider, its resolution of an issue which it did not consider might reasonably be expected to affect the result,
The existence of this issue plainly appears from the record. Pinellas is the licensee of one of three radio stations in St. Petersburg, and its principal stoekhoIder Publishes one of two daily newsPapers there. On the other hand, Tribune is n°t only the publisher of one of two daily newspapers and licensee of °ne °t two radio stations in Tampa but, in addition, its controlling stockholders own dominant interests in two daily newspapers and two radio stations in Richmond, Virginia, and in a corporation which is an applicant for a TV station there. The Commission concluded that these newspaper and broadcast affiliations of Pinellas and Tribune justified a ■ , .,. , , . . preference to a third and unsuccessful Hcant T B who had no sucb affiliations4 gut the Commission reached nQ conclugion on whetherj as betWeen pilíellas and Tribune) PineIlas was enyyed preference by reason of Tribune>s more extensive newspaper and broadcast affiliations. Hence it would appear - that the Commission did -not consider the comparative merits of pínellas and Tribune upon the issue of concentration of control and diversification of the media of mass communication.5
*211That this issue is directly related to a critically “important component of the public interest” is not open to question. Clarksburg Pub. Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 1955, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 211, 225 F.2d 511, 518. As the Commission has said, “One of the basic underlying considerations in the enactment of the Communications Act was the desire to effectuate the policy against the monopolization of broadcast facilities and the preservation of our broadcasting system on a free competitive basis.” 6
It is true that Pinellas did not challenge, either administratively or before this court, the Commission’s failure to reach a conclusion on this issue. Under familiar principles,7 and a review provision of the Act,8 it may be argued that our consideration of this issue is precluded. But I think this argument cannot prevail when, as here, it would result in abandonment of our duty to require the Commission to discharge its proper function with respect to “[o]ne of the basic underlying considerations” of the Act. It clearly appears from the scheme of the Act that the Commission may not disregard issues of vital importance to the public interest simply because they are not presented by the parties. Thus § 309 provides for the specification of issues by the Commission, quite apart from those the parties raise, in both comparative and protest proceedings.9
10And, under § 403, the Commission has full power to “institute an inquiry, on its own motion” into any matter before it. The purpose of this broad grant of authority is to enable the Commission to explore all basic issues relevant to the Act’s public interest criterion. It expresses congressional recognition of a principle which flows from the inherent nature of administrative tribunals. Unlike courts, regulatory agencies are not confined by the “conventional judicial modes for adjusting conflicting claims — modes whereby interested litigants define the scope of the inquiry and determine the data on which the judicial judgment is ultimately based. Administrative agencies have power themselves to initiate inquiry, or, when their authority is invoked, to control the range of investigation in ascertaining what is to satisfy the requirements of the public interest in relation to the needs of vast regions and sometimes the whole nation in the enjoyment of facilities for transportation, communication and other essential public services.” Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 1940, 309 U.S. 134, 142-143,10 60 S.Ct. 437, 441, 84 L.Ed. 656.
The Commission’s role is not merely that of a referee in an adversary proceeding, who scores points only upon issues selected by the individual contestants and gives the decision to the highest scorer. While this might assure a “right” decision between the contestants, it does not assure a “right” decision in the public interest.11 The latter decision requires exploration and evaluation of *212factors vital to such interest, whether or not they have been raised by the parties.12 Any other view would make the Commission’s role dependent upon applicants who wish to avoid resolution of issues which, though relevant to the public interest, may reflect adversely on both.13 It would relegate the Commission to the role of a “traffic officer,” without power to protect the “interest of the listening public in ‘the larger and more effective use of radio’.”14
There is dictum in Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 1949, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 40, 46-47, 175 F.2d 351, 357-58, which lends support to the restrictive view of the Commission’s role. That case, however, did not involve a failure of the Commission to consider an issue not raised by the contesting applicants. In any event, this dictum cannot be applied where, as here, a basic policy issue under the Act is involved.
In exercising our equity powers to review Commission action, this court, like the Commission, should be mindful of the public interest criterion which the statute prescribes as a condition precedent to a grant. Until we are satisfied that this criterion has been properly applied in this case, by a comparison of Pinellas and Tribune on the diversification issue and a conclusion thereon, we should not affirm. I would, therefore, remand the cause to enable the Commission to make this comparison and reevaluate its decision prior to our review.15

. F.C.C. Sixth Report and Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905, 4020 (1952).

. Dissenting Commissioner' Bartley, however, felt that neither applicant was entitled to a preference based on proposed programming in view of Pinellas’ distinct superiority in its provision .for local live news programs.

. The'’Broadcast Bureau excepted to -the initial decision because the award to Tribune was “grounded upon completely insubstantial and insignificant reasons” with the exception of the preference in programming. And this preference, the Bu- . reáu said, wás unsupported by the find-" ings. - '

.Tampa Bay took no appeal.

. In Ws dissentj ll0weyerj Commissioner 'Bartley interpreted the Commission’s deeision. ag a conelusion that pinelias was entitled -to i0 preferenCe over Tribune, This conclusion, if it is implicit in the decision, is unexplained. In ;view of Tribune’s more extensive interests in communications media, an explanation1 of the Commission’s reasoning is essential to the validity of that conclusion;' : ’’

. Multiple Ownership, F.C.O. Report and Order, 18 Fed.Reg. 7796, 7797 (1953), citing Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 1940, 309 U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L. Ed. 869, 1037.

. See United States v. Tucker Truck Lines, 1952, 344 U.S. 33, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54; Democrat Printing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 1952, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 72, 78, 202 F.2d 298, 303.

. 66 Stat. 720, 47 U.S.C.A. § 405.

. 66 Stat. 715, 47 U.S.C.A. § 309(b) and (c).

. This distinction between the judicial and administrative process has been discussed by the commentators. See Lan-dis, The Administrative Process 34-46 (1938); Davis, Administrative Law 476-83 (1951).

. In the administrative process “it is imperative that controversies be decided as ‘rightly’ as possible, independently of the formal record the parties themselves produce. The ultimate test of the administrative is the policy that it formulates; not the fairness as between the parties or the disposition of a controversy on a record of their own making.” Landis, The Administrative Process 39 (1938).

. “A regulatory agency has an affirmative duty to carry out a program, to protect a public interest which frequently is otherwise unrepresented. When parties fail to produce needed facts, the regulatory agency typically must take the initiative in aggressively making its own factual investigation.” Davis, Administrative Law 476 (1951).

. Suppose, for example, that both of two mutually exclusive applicants had extensive newspaper and radio affiliations, e. g., comparable to those outlined in Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 1955, 96 U.S. App.D.C. 211, 225 F.2d 511, 518. Would the Commission be free to disregard these affiliations simply because neither party saw fit to raise the diversification issue?

. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 1943, 319 U.S. 190, 215-216, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1009, 87 L.Ed. 1344.

. 66 Stat. 720, 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(h); Fleming v. Federal Communications Comm., 1955, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 223, 225 F.2d 523, 526.