Court Opinion

ID: 9882074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 22:16:17.102273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:58.534977
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/4/23
                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                     SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                            DIVISION FOUR

 PARRIS J.,                           B313470; B316247;
                                      B317613
       Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                      Los Angeles County
       v.                             Super. Ct. No.
                                      19STFL13412
 CHRISTOPHER U.,

       Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mark A. Juhas, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Gregory R. Ellis and Gregory R. Ellis, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Goodwin Proctor, Alexis Coll-Very, Sylvia Ewald; Family
Violence Appellate Project, Shuray Ghorishi, Cory Hernandez
and Jennafer Dorfman Wagner, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Thomas M. Peterson and
Pejman Moshfegh for Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment
and Appeals Project, Stopping Domestic Violence, California
Protective Parents Association, Center for Domestic Peace,
Sanctuary for Families, The National Family Violence Law
Center at George Washington University Law School, the Law
Foundation of Silicon Valley, California Women’s Law Center,
Community Overcoming Relationship Abuse, Los Angeles Center
for Law and Justice, and Women Lawyers Association of Los
Angeles, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 ____________________________
                        INTRODUCTION

        Christopher U. appeals from the five-year domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) issued against him at the request of his
former spouse, Parris J.1 He contends the trial court abused its
discretion by granting Parris’s request for a DVRO because the
record does not demonstrate he engaged in conduct rising to the
level of abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act
(DVPA), Family Code2 section 6200 et seq. Christopher also
asserts the trial court erred by ordering him to change the
beneficiary of the $4 million insurance policy he owns on Parris’s
life from himself to a charity of her choice, and by failing to grant
his requests for a statement of decision. Lastly, Christopher
argues that because the DVRO must be reversed, the trial court’s
order awarding $200,000 in attorneys’ fees to Parris as the
prevailing party under section 6344 must also be reversed.
        As discussed below, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by granting Parris’s request for a DVRO. In
addition, we reject Christopher’s contentions regarding the life
insurance policy. Thus, we have no reason to reverse the order
awarding attorneys’ fees to Parris. We also conclude reversal is
not required based on the denial of Christopher’s requests for a
statement of decision. Accordingly, we affirm.

1     Per this court’s order filed March 22, 2023, this opinion
refers to the parties by first name and last initial.
2    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Family Code.

                                 2
                         BACKGROUND

I.    Factual Background3

       Parris and Christopher began dating in October 2017. At
the time, Parris was 27 years old and Christopher was 48 years
old. Parris was working as a personal assistant and living with a
male roommate in San Francisco. Christopher lived in West
Hollywood.
       At the end of 2017, Parris began a full-time graduate
program to pursue a master’s degree in business administration.
She moved in with Christopher in April 2018.
       The parties became engaged in February 2019. In late
March 2019, Christopher purchased a $4 million insurance policy
on Parris’s life for his benefit (the “Life Insurance Policy”).
According to Parris, Christopher told her the policy’s death
benefit was $1 million, and she only became aware of the actual
amount of the death benefit through discovery in the underlying
proceedings.
       Parris and Christopher were married in late May 2019.
Christopher paid for the wedding, which cost approximately
$250,000 to $300,000. Two weeks later, Parris started an
internship with the Bank of America in Charlotte, North
Carolina. Christopher found an apartment in Charlotte for Parris
to live in, rented it solely in his name, and paid for her rent
throughout her 10-week internship.

3      In this section of the opinion, we limit our discussion of the
facts to the main events giving rise to the underlying action. In
the Discussion section, post, we discuss in detail several events
and interactions that took place during the parties’ relationship
and after the date of separation.

                                  3
      In July 2019, the parties got into multiple disagreements,
which led them to engage in heated arguments via text messages
for several weeks. In his messages to Parris, Christopher
repeatedly insulted, berated, and demeaned her. He also accused
Parris of cheating on him numerous times. On several occasions,
he told Parris he was kicking her out of their home. Among other
things, he stated he was going to change the locks, that he would
not let Parris back into their home, that he had packed up her
belongings, and that he intended to ship them to Parris or her
parents. Christopher also threatened Parris via text messages
and e-mail, and told her that he would burn and donate all the
things he had bought for her.
      Parris testified Christopher’s threats to dispose of her
belongings made her “extremely concerned.” Thus, on July 27,
2019, Parris flew from Charlotte to Los Angeles. Upon arrival,
she called the police to escort her into Christopher’s home
because she “was extremely terrified of him.” Parris then
retrieved her belongings, moved them to a storage unit, and
returned to Charlotte to finish her internship. Christopher was
not present when Parris moved out. The parties treated Parris’s
move-out date as the date of their separation.
      Less than a week later, on August 2, 2019, Christopher
flew to Charlotte and went to Parris’s apartment without her
prior knowledge or consent. He arrived at about 2:30 or 3:00 p.m.
and used spare keys provided to him by the landlord to enter the
apartment through the back door. Parris later returned to the
apartment after running an errand and saw Christopher inside.
      Parris testified Christopher’s unannounced arrival to her
apartment scared her. She believed he was only there because he
was furious she moved her things out of his home. Because she

                                4
did not want to be alone in the apartment with him, they went to
a brewery at approximately 3:30 or 4:00 p.m. Subsequently, they
went to a cigar shop, a restaurant, and a bar.
       The parties did not return to the apartment until late in
the evening. At trial, they offered conflicting testimony regarding
the events that took place thereafter. The evidence is undisputed,
however, that between 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., Parris tried to
leave the apartment, but Christopher prevented her from doing
so. Ultimately, Parris slept in her bedroom, and Christopher slept
on the couch. Parris left the apartment at 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. the
next day, when a few of her friends with a spare key let
themselves in and escorted her out.
       Between August and November 2019, the parties continued
to communicate by e-mail. Shortly after the incident in Charlotte,
Christopher expressed remorse for his actions and tried to
reconcile with Parris. In response, Parris indicated she did not
wish to continue their relationship, and suggested they amicably
settle their affairs and part ways. Subsequently, Christopher
repeatedly accused Parris of cheating on him, insulted her,
cursed at her, and called her countless lewd and demeaning
names. He also threatened her and her family many times.
Consequently, in October and November 2019, Parris told
Christopher to stop contacting her.

II.   Procedural Background

      On November 15, 2019, Parris filed a request for a DVRO
against Christopher. The trial court entered a temporary
restraining order (TRO) in her favor the same day. Several
months later, on April 1, 2020, Christopher filed a request for a
DVRO against Parris and was issued a TRO in his favor later
that day.

                                 5
      On March 29, 2021, Parris filed a request for an order
compelling Christopher to either cancel the Life Insurance Policy
or change the beneficiary from himself to a charity of her
choosing. She also asked the trial court to consider his refusal to
cancel the Life Insurance Policy to be “a separate and further act
of domestic violence against [her] . . . .” The trial court ultimately
decided the matter as part of the trial on the parties’ DVRO
requests.
      Trial began on May 19, 2021, and ended on June 4, 2021.
After the parties presented their closing arguments, the trial
court issued an oral decision granting a five-year DVRO in
Parris’s favor. As a part thereof, the court ordered Christopher to
change the beneficiary on the Life Insurance Policy to a charity of
Parris’s choice, and prohibited Christopher from changing the
beneficiary while the DVRO was in place. It then denied
Christopher’s request for a DVRO. We set forth the court’s
rulings relating to Parris’s requests in the Discussion section,
post.
      Christopher timely appealed from the DVRO.
      On July 6, 2021, Parris filed a request for attorneys’ fees
and costs pursuant to section 6344. She ultimately sought a fee
award of $227,380.29. On September 9, 2021, the trial court
awarded Parris $200,000 in attorneys’ fees, finding the amount to
be reasonable, and that Christopher had the ability to pay both
his and Parris’s fees. Christopher timely appealed from the
attorneys’ fees order.
      On November 4, 2021, the trial court entered a first
amended DVRO, which reflected the parties’ stipulation to stay
enforcement of the DVRO’s directive requiring Christopher to
change the beneficiary of the Life Insurance Policy while his

                                  6
appeals from the trial court’s orders were pending. Christopher
timely appealed from the first amended DVRO.
      Christopher later moved to consolidate the three appeals
arising out of the trial court’s orders. We granted his motion on
February 28, 2022, and consolidated cases B313470, B316247,
and B317613 for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and
decision.
      On April 22, 2022, the trial court entered a second
amended DVRO, which corrected a clerical error in the
stipulation attached to the first amended DVRO. Subsequently,
on June 10, 2022, we granted Christopher’s unopposed request to
construe his notice of appeal filed on December 23, 2021 to
encompass the second amended DVRO.

                          DISCUSSION

I.    Governing Principles and Standard of Review

       “Under the DVPA, a court is authorized to issue a
protective order ‘“to restrain any person for the purpose of
preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a
period of separation of the persons involved”’ upon ‘reasonable
proof of a past act or acts of abuse.’” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Curcio).) The DVPA defines “abuse” as “any of
the following: [¶] (1) To intentionally or recklessly cause or
attempt to cause bodily injury. [¶] (2) Sexual assault. [¶] (3) To
place a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious
bodily injury to that person or to another. [¶] (4) To engage in any
behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section
6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a).) “Abuse is not limited to the actual
infliction of physical injury or assault.” (Id., subd. (b).)

                                 7
       Behavior that may be enjoined under section 6320 includes
“disturbing the peace of the other party[.]” (§ 6320, subd. (a).) As
used in the DVPA, “‘disturbing the peace of the other party’ refers
to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party. This
conduct may be committed directly or indirectly, including
through the use of a third party, and by any method or through
any means including, but not limited to, telephone, online
accounts, text messages, internet-connected devices, or other
electronic technologies. This conduct includes, but is not limited
to, coercive control, which is a pattern of behavior that in purpose
or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and
personal liberty. Examples of coercive control include, but are not
limited to, unreasonably engaging in any of the following: [¶] (1)
Isolating the other party from friends, relatives, or other sources
of support. [¶] (2) Depriving the other party of basic necessities.
[¶] (3) Controlling, regulating, or monitoring the other party’s
movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, economic
resources, or access to services. [¶] (4) Compelling the other party
by force, threat of force, or intimidation . . . to engage in conduct
from which the other party has a right to abstain or to abstain
from conduct in which the other party has a right to engage. [¶]
(5) Engaging in reproductive coercion, which consists of control
over the reproductive autonomy of another through force, threat
of force, or intimidation . . . .” (§ 6320, subd. (c).)
       “The DVPA vests the court with discretion to issue a
restraining order ‘simply on the basis of an affidavit showing past
abuse.’ [Citation.] The burden of proof is by a preponderance of
the evidence. [Citations.] The DVPA ‘confer[s] a discretion
designed to be exercised liberally, at least more liberally than a

                                 8
trial court’s discretion to restrain civil harassment generally.’”
(Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 11.)
       “We review the grant of a DVPA restraining order for abuse
of discretion, and, to the extent we are called upon to review the
court’s factual findings, we apply the substantial evidence
standard of review. [Citation.] In reviewing the evidence, we
examine the entire record to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—to support
the trial court’s findings. [Citation.] We must accept as true all
evidence supporting the trial court’s findings, resolving every
conflict in favor of the judgment. [Citation.] We do not determine
credibility or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] If substantial
evidence supports the judgment, reversal is not warranted even if
facts exist that would support a contrary finding.” (Curcio, supra,
47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.)

II.   Analysis

      A.    Christopher did not forfeit his challenges to the
            DVRO by failing to present evidence supportive
            of the trial court’s rulings.

       Preliminarily, we address Parris’s contention that we need
not consider the merits of Christopher’s arguments on appeal.
Relying on Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491 (Ashby),
Parris contends Christopher forfeited his arguments because he
“fail[ed] to present material evidence fairly, and sometimes not at
all.” She then identifies a number of facts which, in her view,
support the trial court’s orders, but were improperly omitted from
and/or misleadingly presented in Christopher’s opening brief on
appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we are not persuaded by
Parris’s argument.

                                9
       In Ashby, the appellate court determined the appellant
forfeited his argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying the renewal of a DVRO entered in favor of his ex-wife.
(Ashby, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 511.) In so doing, the court
noted the appellant’s “account of the case’s procedural history
ignore[d] significant events in the case.” (Id. at p. 512.) It also
observed the appellant’s factual summary and legal analysis
“set[ ] forth a one-sided narrative of events[,]” and did not
describe the evidence supporting the DVRO’s issuance. (Id. at
p. 513.) Ultimately, the appellate court concluded the appellant
“set forth only favorable evidence, which if viewed in isolation
may have compelled a different result but did not prove the [trial]
court abused its discretion in renewing the DVRO.” (Ibid.)
       Here, Parris aptly observes Christopher presents the facts
in a manner favorable to him by highlighting the evidence and
omissions supportive of the arguments raised later in his opening
brief. His opening brief does not, however, entirely omit all the
facts supporting the trial court’s rulings. (Cf. Ashby, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at p. 513.) While Christopher tends to omit details
that would, if included, arguably cast him in a negative light, he
does discuss the key events about which Parris testified at trial.
Christopher also acknowledges he sent text messages and e-mails
to Parris containing “obscene comments[,]” and that he
“sometimes yelled at [Parris] when he was angry.” In addition, he
sets forth the trial court’s oral decision in detail and thereby
discusses the evidence underlying its conclusions.
       Under these circumstances, we are not persuaded by
Parris’s contention that Christopher forfeited his arguments on
appeal because he “fail[ed] to cite and accurately present

                                10
significant, material evidence supporting [the court’s] orders[.]”
We, therefore, address his arguments on the merits.

      B.    Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
            conclusion that Christopher disturbed Parris’s
            peace.

            1.    Relevant Background

       In granting a DVRO in Parris’s favor, the trial court found
Christopher disturbed her peace and harassed her. It also found
he used money, power, and emotional abuse to control her. In
support of these findings, the court observed: (1) Christopher
“was very disrespectful” in the ways he addressed and talked to
Parris in his text messages to her; (2) his text messages showed
“[h]e called her all sorts of names” in order “to keep her off
balance and maintain control”; (3) in his testimony at trial and
text messages to Parris, he repeatedly discussed how he paid a
lot of money for the wedding; and (4) he offered to pay some of
Parris’s bills if she gave him the text messages between her and
her friends to prove she did not cheat on him.
       With respect to the August 2019 incident in Charlotte, the
trial court found the parties’ different narratives “equally as
credible in some respect[s] [but] equally non-credible in others.”
Without resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the court
concluded the undisputed evidence showed Christopher “was in
control of the apartment in North Carolina.” On this point, it
noted Christopher referred to the apartment as “his apartment”
several times, and that the landlord called him to report Parris
was making noise or having guests, including men, over at the
apartment.

                                 11
      Lastly, the trial court determined Christopher violated
Parris’s TRO against him by sending disparaging letters to her
employer. It found this act, on its own, was sufficient to justify
entering a DVRO in Parris’s favor.

            2.    Analysis

       In arguing the DVRO must be reversed, Christopher
asserts: “Parris did not sustain her burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that [he] abused her under the
DVPA. That is, the body of evidence viewed objectively under the
totality of the circumstances fell far short of establishing
harassment, disturbing the peace, or coercive control rising to the
level of abuse.” In support of this position, he appears to raise two
arguments, which we address in turn below.

            a.    Arguments Regarding Christopher’s
                  Interpretation of Section 6320

       First, Christopher contends the legislative history
underlying the amendments to the DVPA enacted in 2020
“reflect[ ] the Legislature’s intent that a finding of non-physical
abuse under the [DVPA] be subject to a reasonable person
standard . . . .” Therefore, he argues, when deciding whether a
person’s actions “disturb[ed] the peace of the other party” under
section 6320, courts must determine whether the conduct at issue
would have objectively destroyed the mental or emotional calm of
a reasonable person. As discussed below, we do not agree with his
argument.
       Christopher’s contention presents a question of statutory
interpretation, which requires us to “ascertain the Legislature’s
intent so as to give effect to the law’s purpose.” (In re Corrine W.
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 522, 529.) “We begin with the statute’s plain

                                 12
language, as the words the Legislature chose to enact are the
most reliable indicator of its intent.” (Ibid.)
       As noted above, section 6320, subdivision (c), provides, in
relevant part: “‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ refers to
conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys
the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” This provision
contains no language suggesting that a reasonableness standard
governs whether someone “disturb[ed] the peace of the other
party.” (See § 6320, subd. (c).) When defining other behaviors
that constitute “abuse” under the DVPA, however, the
Legislature has expressly and unambiguously stated when a
reasonableness standard applies. (See, e.g., § 6203, subd. (a)(3)
[conduct “plac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension of
imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another” is
“abuse” under the DVPA] (italics added); § 6320, subd. (c)
[“coercive control” is “a pattern of behavior that in purpose or
effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and
personal liberty” (italics added)].) Consequently, by omitting
similar language from its definition of “disturbing the peace of
others[,]” the Legislature deliberately chose not to limit the
DVPA’s reach to conduct that would destroy the mental or
emotional calm of a reasonable person. (See Brown v. Kelly
Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 725 [“‘It is a well
recognized principle of statutory construction that when the
Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and has
excluded it in another, it should not be implied where
excluded’”].)
       Having concluded Christopher’s interpretation of section
6320 is unsupported by the statute’s unambiguous language, we
need not consider the legislative history. (See In re Marriage of

                                 13
Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497 (Nadkarni) [“‘“If the
terms of the statute are unambiguous, we presume the
lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the
language governs”’”].) In any event, we reviewed the relevant
legislative history and conclude it also does not support his
argument.
       In 2020, the Legislature amended section 6320 to: (1) define
the term “disturbing the peace of the other party” as used in
section 6320 based on relevant case law; (2) specify “disturbing
the peace of another party” includes, but is not limited to,
“coercive control”; (3) define the term “coercive control”; and (4)
provide a non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct amounting
to “coercive control.” (See Stats. 2020, ch. 248, § 2; Sen. Bill No.
1141 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1141); see also Sen. Rules Com.,
Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill. No. 1141 (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 6, 2020, p. 3.)
       Christopher relies heavily on the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s analysis, conducted in May 2020, of an early version
of SB 1141. At the time, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted
SB 1141 “establishe[d] narrow parameters to limit the
application of its provisions to clearly abusive behaviors.” (Sen.
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill. No. 1141 (2019-2020
Reg. Sess.) May 6, 2020, at p. 7.) It then stated: “The bill provides
that a person’s conduct constitutes coercive control only if all of
the following are satisfied:
         • the person intentionally, or with reckless
           disregard of the consequences, engages in a
           pattern of behavior that interferes with the will
           of the victim;

                                 14
         • the person intends to cause the victim severe
           emotional distress, or a reasonable person
           would know that the conduct would be likely to
           cause the victim severe emotional distress;
         • the victim does suffer severe emotional
           distress; and
         • the person’s conduct is not reasonable under
           the circumstances.
        “These parameters – a mental state, objective
unreasonableness, causation, foreseeable harm, actual harm –
are all the types of elements commonly used in and [sic] torts,
such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, and criminal
provisions. These elements provide strong guardrails to help
ensure that the bill will function as intended and not reach
benign conduct that is ordinarily tolerated in relationships or
that does not actually distress the person. Additionally, the
requirement that the conduct be unreasonable under the
circumstances helps ensure that the bill will not be used against
a victim who takes reasonable coercive actions to defend
themselves against an abuser.” (Ibid.)
        According to Christopher, the comments above show the
Legislature intended an objective, reasonable person standard to
govern the question whether conduct “disturb[s] the peace of the
other party” for purposes of the DVPA. This argument is
meritless because those comments do not relate to the
Legislature’s definition of the term at issue. They pertain to the
May 2020 version of SB 1141, which only sought to “[a]mend[ ]
the definition of ‘abuse’ under section 6203 to include ‘coercive
control,’” define what conduct constitutes coercive control, and
“[l]ist[ ] types of conduct that may constitute coercive control[.]”

                                 15
(Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill. No. 1141 (2019-
2020 Reg. Sess.) May 6, 2020, at p. 3.) The bill did not endeavor
to define the term “disturbing the peace of the other party” until
it was amended in August 2020. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen.
Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill. No. 1141 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)
as amended Aug. 6, 2020, p. 3.) In addition, while SB 1141
initially proposed a multi-element test to provide “strong
guardrails” limiting the category of conduct constituting “coercive
control,” that test ultimately was not adopted. (See § 6320, subd.
(c) [“coercive control is a pattern of behavior that in purpose or
effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and
personal liberty”].) Thus, we are not convinced the legislative
history cited by Christopher shows the Legislature intended to
incorporate a reasonable person standard into section 6320’s
definition of the term “disturbing the peace of the other party.”
       Christopher’s reliance on Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th 1,
is likewise unavailing. There, our colleagues in Division Three
held that courts are not authorized to issue a DVRO “based on
any act that upsets the petitioning party[,]” as “[t]he DVPA was
not enacted to address all disputes between former couples, or to
create an alternative forum for resolution of every dispute
between such individuals.” (Id. at p. 13.) Thus, the appellate
court concluded the respondent’s “single, private Facebook post
accusing [the petitioner] of abusing her” did not “rise to the level
of destruction of [the petitioner’s] mental and emotional calm,
sufficient to support the issuance of a domestic violence
restraining order.” (Ibid, italics and fn. omitted.) In
acknowledging the DVPA’s limits, however, the court did not hold
or otherwise suggest that the analysis of whether conduct

                                16
“disturb[ed] the peace of the other party” under section 6320 is
governed by an objective, reasonable person standard. (See ibid.)
      In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude
Christopher has not shown that courts must apply an objective,
reasonable person standard when deciding whether a person has
“disturb[ed] the peace of the other party” within the meaning of
section 6320. Instead, the relevant inquiry is simply whether the
person against whom the DVRO is sought engaged in “conduct
that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroy[ed] the
mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).)

                  b.     Arguments Based on the Evidence

       Next, Christopher contends the evidence does not establish
he engaged in conduct rising to the level of abuse under the
DVPA. In support of his position, he argues: (1) rather than
demonstrating abuse, Christopher’s text messages “contain[ing]
rude and sometimes obscene language” reflect the heated and
emotional unwinding of the parties’ “high conflict relationship”;
(2) while the evidence showed he “had more available money and
used it for [Parris’s] benefit[,]” it did not establish he used money
to isolate or control her; and (3) the letters Christopher sent to
Parris’s employer did not rise to the level of harassment because
they were “not [part of] a pattern of harassment or disturbing
[Parris’s] peace of mind.” For the reasons discussed below, we are
not persuaded by Christopher’s contentions.
       As an initial matter, we note Christopher’s first and second
arguments are unaccompanied by citations to the record. It is
well-settled that “[t]he appellate court is not required to search
the record on its own seeking error[,]” and therefore where, as
here, “a party fails to support an argument with necessary

                                 17
citations to the record, the argument will be deemed [forfeited].”
(LA Investments, LLC v. Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061.)
       In any event, having reviewed the record, we conclude it
contains substantial evidence to support a finding that
Christopher disturbed Parris’s peace and engaged in conduct
amounting to coercive control. As discussed in detail below, the
record reflects Christopher manipulated Parris into becoming
financially dependent on him to keep her in the relationship and
control her behavior. The evidence also demonstrates he
controlled her behavior through emotional abuse. Specifically, it
shows that whenever Parris did something Christopher disliked,
he aggressively berated, insulted, and demeaned her, often using
profanity and crude language to do so. Through this pattern of
behavior, Christopher effectively, and unreasonably, coerced
Parris into doing what he wanted without question to avoid
further emotional abuse. And, his emotional abuse did not end
upon the parties’ separation. In addition to denigrating Parris
incessantly, Christopher repeatedly threatened her and her
family, and followed through on several of his threats.
       Early on in their relationship, while Parris was living in
San Francisco, Christopher accused her of cheating on him with
her male roommate and told her he did not want her to live with
another man. He demanded she give him the text messages she
exchanged with her roommate, and threatened to get an attorney
to obtain them from her. Eventually, Parris provided Christopher
with the messages. In addition, although she could not afford the
rent on her own, Parris moved into a studio because Christopher
pressured her to do so and offered to cover the $600 to $700
increase in her rent. Parris testified Christopher did not help her
with her rent, however.

                                18
       In May 2018, Parris received $182,000 in a tort settlement.
She had $30,000 in credit card debt at the time. Although she
intended to pay off her entire debt, Christopher advised her to
leave one-third of the balance to improve her credit. Parris
followed his advice.
       Parris testified that when the parties moved in together,
Christopher stated he was going to cover her expenses while she
was in graduate school. He also told her that he had a
background in finance, that he worked in investments, and that
he would help her invest her money. However, once Parris moved
in with him, Christopher started asking her to cover his
expenses. For example, he asked her to pay his daughter’s nanny,
his gardener, and his pool keeper; to buy groceries; and to wire
him $15,000 to help him in a “business situation.” Parris agreed
to his requests because he stated he would repay her, and she
trusted him. For a time, she kept a ledger to keep track of what
she paid for. Christopher, however, never paid her back. Instead,
Parris testified, whenever she brought the matter of repayment
to Christopher’s attention, he would call her an “ungrateful
b[*]tch” and refer her to luxury items he had bought for her.
       Soon after moving in together, Christopher told Parris she
needed to get a car. Parris expressed interest in an older, used
car. Christopher, however, encouraged her to get a newer, more
expensive, model. When Parris told him she could not afford that
car, he told her not to worry because he would pay for it. Parris
then leased the car in her name. Christopher gave her $8,000 in
cash to put toward the car, and she used $28,000 from her
settlement funds for the down payment. The monthly payments
for the car’s lease and insurance totaled $1,800.

                               19
       Parris also testified Christopher advised her to take out all
the student loans offered to her, as they would pay it back later.
As part of her loans, she received $13,000 twice per year for
living expenses. Those funds were deposited directly into the
bank account she used to pay Christopher’s expenses, send him
money, and give him cash to use for poker.
       In addition, Parris testified that during their relationship,
Christopher advised Parris to open two credit cards in her name,
and to make him an authorized user on those cards. One was an
American Express card, and the other a Barclays card. According
to Parris, Christopher made a majority of the charges on these
cards. Christopher used the American Express card to pay for a
variety of his personal expenses and used the Barclays card
almost exclusively to play online poker.
       Parris testified that her personal bank account was
depleted within six months. The amount in her “personal
account was so low that [she] would have to ask [Christopher]
to wire [her] funds just so [she] could go get gas.” Parris
testified Christopher “held [her] in that [financial] position up
until . . . [they] got married.” After the wedding, she started
earning money at her internship. When their relationship ended,
Parris had $160,000 in student loans and $50,000 in credit card
debt.
       Parris testified she did not have any designer clothes when
the parties started dating. Christopher told her she “looked like
sh[*]t in [her] outfits from JCPenny’s, and so he . . . b[ought] [her]
new things and directed what [she] w[ore] when [they] w[ent]
out.” When asked why she bought him expensive gifts for
holidays and his birthday, she testified: “At first, I got him gifts
that I thought were appropriate, and he responded poorly and

                                 20
was quite rude. So I started buying him nicer things that he was
more accepting of.” In addition, Parris testified that when
Christopher got angry, he usually screamed at her, but there
were a couple of occasions where he threw her clothes around the
room.
       In July 2018, a few weeks after Parris got her car,
Christopher became angry with her when she met a friend for
lunch in Orange County without telling him beforehand. Upon
learning of her plans, Christopher sent Parris numerous text
messages scolding and berating her for going to lunch. Among
other statements containing profanity, he accused her of wanting
to “show[ ] off [her] car” instead of helping him address a legal
matter he was attending to, told Parris that she was “so f[*]cking
immature[,]” and stated he would “never be able to [trust] [her]
judgment[.]” Parris told him she was driving home in tears and
was available to help. She also apologized to him profusely,
stated she felt terrible for making him upset, and tried to explain
why she thought her lunch plans would not interfere with her
ability to assist him. Christopher then told her to “[s]tay out of
[his] f[*]cking phone” because she did not “make any f[*]cking
sense.”
       As noted above, in late March 2019, Christopher purchased
the Life Insurance Policy. Parris testified that she was minimally
involved in the application process for the Life Insurance Policy.
She got her blood drawn and met with the insurance agent on one
occasion to give him some documents. Christopher provided the
agent with all the other information used to fill out the
application. Parris testified that when she received the completed
application for signature via DocuSign, she signed it quickly
without reviewing it, as “Christopher was rushing [her] to sign

                                21
it,” and “it was easier [for her] to do what Christopher asked of
[her] than to deal with his anger and abuse.” Based on
Christopher’s representations, Parris believed the policy’s death
benefit was $1 million, rather than $4 million. She testified she
would not have signed the policy application had she known the
death benefit was $4 million.
       Parris testified that before the parties got married,
Christopher promised he would not have a bachelor party, as he
did not want Parris to have a bachelorette party. Shortly before
the wedding, however, Christopher’s friends threw him a
bachelor party. In response, Parris “got really upset[ ] and . . .
overdrank.”
       When Christopher came home from the party, Parris was
sick. He screamed at her and told her to sleep on the floor
because she did not deserve to sleep on a bed. He also took
photographs of her. When Parris tried to sleep in the guest room,
Christopher followed her to ensure she slept on the floor, rather
than the bed. She eventually slept on the couch.
       The next morning, Christopher sent Parris a photograph
depicting her standing over a toilet. Subsequently, in multiple
messages containing profanity, he criticized and shamed her for
getting “sloppy drunk[.]” In doing so, he demeaned her, stating
“THAT[’]S NOT WHAT LADIES DO, g[i]rls from the gutter yes
[sic]” and that “women who can’t control their drinking belong to
a certain class and should stay there.” Further, he questioned her
judgment and told her she “should be extremely remorseful about
[her] stupid[,] childish actions.” Christopher also questioned
whether he wanted to marry her, stating: “[You] think I want to
make a wife out of any girl who did what [you] did last night?”
After Parris stated she was embarrassed about what happened

                               22
and apologized several times, Christopher stated: “[I] hope this
never happens again.”
       Parris testified that during their wedding, Christopher
“blamed [her] for multiple issues.” He told Parris that she was
not allowed to have any drinks and blamed her for the poor
appearance of his daughter’s hair. Soon thereafter, Parris asked
her friend to accompany her to the restroom, as she “felt like
[she] was starting to have a panic attack.” After taking a few
minutes to breathe, Parris returned to Christopher, who
immediately berated her for spending too much time in the
restroom. Parris testified that as a result of his behavior, she “felt
controlled.”
       As noted above, soon after the wedding, Parris began an
internship at the Bank of America in Charlotte. Christopher
testified he made the decision for Parris to pursue that internship
over another one she was offered in Malibu. Originally, however,
Parris wanted to take the internship in Malibu.
       In late June 2019, Parris did not answer a FaceTime call
from Christopher because she was on the phone with a friend.
The friend was visiting Parris in Charlotte, and Parris was trying
to arrange transportation for her. Christopher got mad at Parris
for not answering his call. He stated she was “rude[ ]” and
“f[*]cking disrespectful” because she “could h[a]v[e] [t]aken a
milli[second] to pick up or call [him] right back soon after he
FaceTimed [her] but [she] didn’t.” Although they had planned to
go to Las Vegas together on July 4th, Christopher repeatedly told
Parris to cancel her flight to Las Vegas because he did not want
to see her. He dismissed her attempts to explain her actions as
lame, stupid, and incoherent. Christopher insisted Parris’s

                                 23
behavior was inexcusable, and stated he would never tolerate
such conduct from a girlfriend, let alone a spouse.
       On July 12, 2019, Christopher told Parris to send a text
message to the wife of a business associate. In this message, he
wanted her to shame and threaten them for failing to repay
money owed to Christopher. When Parris questioned whether she
should get involved and refused to send a message to his liking,
Christopher accused her of being selfish and unsupportive. He
told her he was ashamed to call her his wife, that she was an
insult to his name, and that she was a disgrace. He also called
her “one hell of an idiot[ ] with “[z]ero intelligence” and a “dumb
f[*]ck piece of sh[*]t.” Further, he told her, “We are done[,]” and
that he never wanted to see her again. In addition, he repeatedly
stated he would be packing up her things to send them away.
       A week later, Parris sent Christopher a message asking
whether he was with a woman whom she had asked him not to
speak to again, as she saw him let the woman into the house on
their home’s security camera at 3:00 a.m. Christopher denied the
allegations, and the parties argued by text message over the next
few days. Throughout the argument, Christopher—again, using
substantial profanity—demeaned Parris with classist insults,
told her she was not worthy of his time or the money he had
spent on her, and accused her of cheating on him.
       The argument escalated to the point that, on July 18, 2018,
for the first time in their relationship, Parris called Christopher a
name, stating he was a “lying, cheating, egotistical, narcissistic,
[*]sshole[.]” Christopher responded: “[You] f[*]cking white trash
piece of sh[*]t.” He then repeatedly cursed at her, called her
several other names, and threatened her multiple times. He
stated he “will burn [and] donate all that [he] gave [her,]” that

                                 24
she “will know what an [*]sshole is capable of[,]” and that he “will
make [her] hate[ ] [him]” because he will “show her what
[*]ssholes do[.]” Parris begged him to stop, and stated she felt
scared and sick. That same day, he sent her an e-mail stating: “I
will show no remorse and cut through [you] like . . . hot butter
through [a] knife[,] [you] have no f[*]cking idea, who the f[*]ck do
you think you [are] talking to????”
       As noted above, the parties separated on July 27, 2019. At
trial, when asked why she did not leave the relationship
immediately upon realizing it had become abusive, Parris
testified: “I was scared. I was scared to leave. I knew I would lose
absolutely everything. [Christopher] kept me in a perpetual state
of debt. And I was a grad student, and I didn’t know what he was
capable of. And it was easier, sometimes, to s[t]ay than it was to
leave . . . .”
       As discussed above, in August 2019, Christopher flew to
Charlotte and entered Parris’s apartment without her prior
knowledge or consent.
       Between August and November 2019, Christopher
continued to e-mail Parris. He incessantly and aggressively
cursed at her, called her many disrespectful and lewd names,
berated her, insulted her, accused her of cheating on him, and
referenced how much he had paid for the wedding and her
apartment in Charlotte. On several occasions, he offered to pay
some of Parris’s bills if she complied with certain requests he had
made. For example, Christopher told Parris that he would pay off
her credit cards if she gave him her login information for her
accounts. He also represented that he would pay off her credit
cards if she gave him all the text messages between her and her
friends in Charlotte.

                                25
        In the midst of his insults, Christopher also threatened
Parris many times. Specifically, the evidence shows he: (1)
threatened that he “will sue [her] for money [he] lost as a result
of [their] fraudulent union as well as sue for the cost of the
wedding[ ]”; (2) stated he would show her “no f[*]cking remorse[ ]”
(capitalization omitted) and that he “[h]ope[d] [her] family can
come up with some money” because he “will get a judgment
against [her] from the civil court that [he] will use against [her]
in the future” to recover the money he spent for her rent in
Charlotte, the money given to her by his friends as wedding gifts,
and the cost of the wedding; (3) told her to “[b]e ready for a
tsunami of lawsuits[ ]” because he “will ask for [his] money back
[for] . . . the photographer, flowers, wedding dress, [and] ring[ ]”;
(4) stated that until she “s[ought] God’s forgiveness for the brutal
betrayal [she] dished out to [him], [he] will continue to seek a
campaign against [her]”; (5) stated that her father “will bear the
brunt of [Christopher’s] wrath in his lifetime”; (6) told her she
“will know the meaning of suffering[ ]” (capitalization omitted);
(7) told Parris that she “need[ed] to be hit hard with a defamation
[suit]” and that she “w[ould] find out soon enough if [she was] not
careful how [he] dispatch[es] [his] enemies in court[,]” as he
“live[s] for a good court fight”; (8) stated that unless she cleared
up her alleged lies to him, Parris “will put [her]self in
unimaginable financial strain” because he “will cut off [her] car
payment[s] [and] car insurance[ ]”; and (9) advised Parris not to
“let [him] ruin her” because he “w[ill] put [her] in a financial
crisis like [she has] never seen [before], one that will take [her]
[d]ecades to clean up[.]”
        As noted above, in November 2019, Parris applied for a
DVRO and received a TRO in her favor. The next month,

                                 26
Christopher sued Parris’s father for attempted civil extortion,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
       In June 2020, Christopher sent identical letters to Bank of
America’s Human Resources Department and three of its Human
Resources executives. The letters identified Parris by her full
name and her birthdate. Christopher told the recipients to
conduct a proper background check on Parris before hiring her,
as “she has her moral compass upside down, [and is] not the kind
of employee you want anywhere near your organization.”
(Capitalization omitted.) Christopher attached his April 2020
TRO against Parris to the letter, claiming he got the TRO
because Parris was harassing him online and stalking him and
his current girlfriend on social media. He also related he was in
the process of having their two-month marriage annulled.
Christopher further stated Parris “has a criminal record from a
2016 felony DUI arrest in San Clemente, California.”
(Capitalization omitted.) He concluded by asking the recipients to
“vet [Parris] properly as she would add zero value to [their]
organization.” (Capitalization omitted.)
       Parris did not find out about the letters until they were
obtained in discovery during the underlying proceedings. She
grew concerned about what else “he [was] doing behind [her] back
that [she was] unaware of . . . .” On appeal, Christopher does not
dispute that he violated the November 2019 TRO by sending the
letters.
       In sum, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that,
during their relationship, Christopher used a combination of
financial and emotional abuse to overcome Parris’s will and
subdue her into doing what he wanted without question. Further,

                               27
substantial evidence supports the conclusion that after the
parties separated, Christopher continued his campaign of
emotional abuse, and repeatedly threatened to ruin Parris and
her family. He acted on his threats by suing her father and
sending unsolicited letters designed to sabotage her career. By
way of his actions, Christopher intimidated Parris and caused
her significant distress. The record therefore contains substantial
evidence to support a finding Christopher engaged in “conduct
that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroy[ed]
[Parris’s] . . . mental [and] emotional calm.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) It
also contains substantial evidence to support a finding that
Parris was the victim of “coercive control[,]” as Christopher
engaged in “a pattern of behavior that in purpose [and/or] effect
unreasonably interfere[d] with [her] free will and personal
liberty.” (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by finding Christopher
“disturb[ed] the peace of the other party” (ibid.) and issuing a
DVRO in Parris’s favor.

      C.    The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
            ordering Christopher to change the beneficiary
            on the Life Insurance Policy.

            1.     Relevant Background

      Immediately after finding sufficient grounds to issue a
DVRO in Parris’s favor, the trial court addressed her request for
an order requiring Christopher to cancel the Life Insurance
Policy or change the beneficiary to a charity of her choosing. The
court began its analysis by noting the statutes governing its
authority to issue certain types of orders under the DVPA.
Specifically, the trial court identified: (1) section 6322, which

                                 28
permits it to “issue an ex parte order enjoining a party from
specified behavior that the court determines is necessary to
effectuate orders under Section 6320 or 6321[ ]” (§ 6322); (2)
section 6320, which authorizes the issuance of a DVRO enjoining
conduct that “disturb[s] the peace of the other party[ ]” (§ 6320,
subd. (a)); (3) section 6340, which allows the court to “issue any of
the orders [it is authorized to enter ex parte] after notice and a
hearing[ ]” (§ 6340, subd. (a)(1)); (4) section 6324, which allows
the court to “issue any ex parte order determining the temporary
use, possession, and control of real or personal property of the
parties . . . during the period the [DVRO] is in effect[ ]” (§ 6324);
and (5) section 6360, which permits “[a] judgment entered in a
proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . [to] include a protective
order as defined in Section 6218[ ]” (§ 6360).
       The trial court then noted that although the Life Insurance
Policy was “an investment vehicle[,]” the asset was also “very
personal” in nature. Considering the Life Insurance Policy’s $4
million death benefit, as well as the nature and duration of the
parties’ relationship, the court found Christopher’s maintenance
of the Life Insurance Policy was an “ongoing disturbance of
[Parris’s] peace.”
       Subsequently, the court acknowledged it did not believe it
could order Christopher to cancel the Life Insurance Policy
because the asset was his separate property. Instead, the trial
court: (1) prohibited Christopher from cashing, borrowing
against, canceling, transferring, or disposing of the Life
Insurance Policy while the DVRO was in place; (2) ordered him to
change the beneficiary of the Life Insurance Policy from himself
to a charity selected by Parris; and (3) prohibited Christopher

                                 29
from making future changes to the beneficiary of the Life
Insurance Policy for the duration of the DVRO.

            2.    Analysis

       Christopher argues the trial court erred by finding his
maintenance of the Life Insurance Policy was a form of abuse
under the DVPA, and by ordering him to change the beneficiary
of the Life Insurance Policy to a charity of Parris’s choosing. We
address his contentions of error in turn below.
       With respect to his first point, Christopher asserts he is
“aware of no authority holding that the ongoing passive existence
of separate property—legal itself, with no showing of imminent
risk arising from that existence—is a form of domestic
violence . . . .” This argument is unpersuasive because it does
nothing more than point out the novelty of the issue presented in
this case (i.e., whether, on the facts in this case, the trial court
erred by finding Christopher’s maintenance of the Life Insurance
Policy disturbed Parris’s peace). Christopher’s observation
regarding the existing case law does not affirmatively
demonstrate the trial court erred in making the challenged
finding. (See Rayii v. Gatcia (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408
[“An appealed judgment is presumed correct, and the appellant
must affirmatively demonstrate error”].)
       Christopher also contends the trial court’s finding is not
supported by sufficient evidence because “there is no substantial
evidence in the record that Christopher would intentionally harm
Parris.” Again, we are not convinced by his argument.
       As discussed above, the trial court found Christopher’s
maintenance of the Life Insurance Policy disturbed Parris’s
peace. The question, then, is whether this finding is supported by
substantial evidence. Bearing in mind that “[w]hat disturbs the

                                30
peace of a person depends on each case” (K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 965, 981), we conclude the court’s finding is
adequately supported by the record. As discussed above, the
evidence shows that, throughout their relationship, Christopher
emotionally abused Parris, using verbal aggression and
intimidation to exert power and control over her. She asked the
police to accompany her when she moved out of his home. Then,
soon after she moved out, he flew to Charlotte and let himself
into her apartment without her knowledge or consent. Following
their separation, Christopher flooded Parris with threats, in
which he expressed a desire to recoup the substantial sums of
money he had spent on her, and promised to bring her and her
family to financial ruin. He then went to great lengths to follow
through with his threats, going so far as to sue Parris’s father
and violate her TRO against him by sending her employer
unsolicited letters to sabotage her career.
       On this record, the trial court could reasonably find Parris
was afraid of Christopher. It could also find Parris’s discovery of
the Life Insurance Policy’s $4 million death benefit increased her
fear because she learned Christopher had a significant financial
incentive to kill her, and that she feared for her safety as a result.
Indeed, at trial, Parris testified she had a “true concern that
[Christopher] would kill [her]”, which led her to “fle[e] to an
exclusive area in Hawaii [ ] to get away from him” and prevented
her from sleeping at night. She also testified: “[I]f he can send
letters to the H.R. executives for no reason at all, except to
destroy my career and ruin my life, then what would he do for $4
million?” Given the particular facts in this case, we discern no
error in the trial court’s finding that Christopher’s continued
status as beneficiary of the Life Insurance Policy disturbed

                                 31
Parris’s peace (§ 6320, subds. (a) & (c)) and therefore was a form
of abuse. (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).)4
      With respect to his second point of error, Christopher
contends the trial court lacked the authority to order him to
change the beneficiary of the Life Insurance Policy. In support of
this position, he relies principally on three cases: In re Marriage
of Bratton (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 791 (Bratton), In re Marriage of
Braud (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 797 (Braud), and In re Marriage of
Rossin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 725 (Rossin). As discussed below,
none of these cases assist Christopher in demonstrating
reversible error.
      In Bratton, the appellant challenged an order entered in
the parties’ marital dissolution proceeding directing her to
terminate the whole life insurance policy she owned on her ex-
husband’s life. (Bratton, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 792-793.)
The appellate court reversed, holding the ex-husband lacked
standing to challenge the legality or enforceability of the
appellant’s insurance policy on his life. (Id. at pp. 794-795.) In
Braud, the appellate court addressed whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to enter the deferred sale of the family home,5 among

4      Having arrived at this conclusion, we need not address
Christopher’s apparent contention that if the trial court
improperly found his maintenance of the Life Insurance Policy
was an act of abuse under the DVPA, it also erred by concluding
section 6322 authorized it to order him to change the beneficiary
of the Life Insurance Policy.
5     “Under a statutory scheme adopted in 1988, family law
courts are authorized to issue an order deferring sale of the
family home if the court determines that it is ‘economically
feasible’ to maintain the physical condition of the home and
required house payments during the deferral period, and that

                                32
many other issues arising out of the parties’ marital dissolution
action. (Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 804-805.) In so
doing, it acknowledged the family court’s limited authority over
separate property in martial dissolution actions, stating: “‘The
court may characterize disputed assets and liabilities as being
separate or community, may confirm separate property to the
owner spouse and, to the extent permitted by statute, may order
reimbursement from the community to a party’s separate estate
or to the community from a party’s separate estate. . . . But
unless the parties otherwise agree, the court’s jurisdiction over
separate property extends no further . . . .’” (Id. at p. 810, italics
omitted.) Lastly, in Rossin, another marital dissolution case, the
appellate court considered whether the appellant’s disability
benefits should be characterized as community or separate
property. (Rossin, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 730.) It held the
disability benefits were separate property because the appellant
acquired the right to the benefits before marriage and paid for
the disability policy using separate property funds. (Id. at
pp. 730, 736, 738.)
       None of the cases arose under the DVPA. Nor did any of
them consider whether a trial court may order a party to change

‘the order is necessary in order to minimize the adverse impact of
dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties on the
child.’ [Citations.] Such an order ‘temporarily delays the sale and
awards the temporary exclusive use and possession of the family
home to a custodial parent of a minor child or child for whom
supported is authorized . . . , whether or not the custodial parent
has sole or joint custody, in order to minimize the adverse impact
of dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties on the
welfare of the child.’” (Braud, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 808-
809.)

                                  33
the beneficiary of an insurance policy he or she owns on his or her
ex-spouse’s life after finding the former’s maintenance of the
policy constitutes abuse under the DVPA. We, therefore, reject as
unsupported Christopher’s contention that the trial court erred
by ordering him to change the beneficiary on the Life Insurance
Policy from himself to a charity of Parris’s choosing.6
       In addition, we conclude the trial court’s order fell within
the bounds of its broad authority under the DVPA to issue “a
panoply of remedial orders” (Rivera v. Hilliard (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 964, 980 (Rivera)) to “prevent acts of domestic
violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation
of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period
sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the
causes of the violence.” (§ 6220; see also § 6320 et seq.
[authorizing issuance of a variety of ex parte orders]; § 6340 et
seq. [authorizing issuance of additional orders after noticed
hearing].) “The Legislature has . . . expressed an intent to entrust
the courts with some latitude in applying these remedies.”
(Rivera, supra, at p. 981.) Specifically, in enacting the DVPA’s
predecessor statute, the 1979 Domestic Violence Restraining Act,
the Legislature “recogni[zed] that ‘[i]t is virtually impossible for a
statute to anticipate every circumstance or need of the persons
whom it may be intended to protect. Therefore, courts must be
entrusted with authority to issue necessary orders suited to

6     We likewise reject as unsupported Christopher’s argument
that the portions of the DVRO relating to the Life Insurance
Policy must be reversed because they “substantially altered his
ownership of the policy[ ]” and therefore were “effectively close” to
requiring him to cancel the Life Insurance Policy. We express no
opinion on the trial court’s authority to order the policy’s
cancellation because that issue is not before us.

                                 34
individual circumstances, with adequate assurances that both
sides of the dispute will have an opportunity to be heard before
the court.’” (Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.)
       Here, the trial court properly exercised its authority under
sections 6320, 6322,7 and 6340 to issue an order protecting Parris
from further abuse by Christopher. Taken together, these
statutes authorized the trial court to issue the following orders
after notice and a hearing (§ 6340, subd. (a)(1)): (1) an order
“enjoining a party from . . . disturbing the peace of the other
party[ ]” (§ 6320, subd. (a)); and (2) an order “enjoining a party
from specified behavior that the court determines is necessary to
effectuate orders under Section 6320 or 6321[ ]” (§ 6322). By
directing Christopher to change the beneficiary on the Life
Insurance Policy from himself to a charity of Parris’s choosing,
the trial court restricted him from maintaining an insurance
policy on Parris’s life on terms giving him a significant financial
incentive to kill Parris. In so doing, the court appropriately
fashioned a remedial order tailored to Parris’s needs based on the
facts of this case, and enjoined Christopher from engaging in the
specific conduct that it had found to constitute an ongoing
disturbance of Parris’s peace. (See §§ 6320, subd. (a), 6322, &
6340, subd (a)(1); see also Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1498 [noting that, as originally enacted, the DVPA reflected
the Legislature’s recognition that “‘courts must be entrusted with
authority to issue necessary orders suited to individual
circumstances[ ]’”].)

7    In his reply brief, Christopher acknowledges “section 6322
might enable the court to order a change of beneficiary if the
maintenance of the policy is found to constitute abuse under the
[DVPA] . . . .”

                                35
      In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude
Christopher has not demonstrated the trial court erred by finding
his maintenance of the Life Insurance Policy disturbed Parris’s
peace, and therefore was a form of abuse under the DVPA. Nor
has he shown the trial court erred by ordering him to change the
beneficiary on the Life Insurance Policy.

      D.    Reversal is not required based on the trial
            court’s denial of Christopher’s requests for a
            statement of decision.

            1.    Relevant Background

       On May 24, 2021, in the middle of trial, Christopher filed a
request for statement of decision on all issues relating to the Life
Insurance Policy. He filed another request for statement of
decision on June 14, 2021, which pertained to other aspects of the
DVRO entered against him.
       In June 2021, the trial court issued written orders denying
Christopher’s requests. The court ruled: (1) the request filed on
June 14, 2021 was untimely because the decision announced on
June 4, 2021 was a final, rather than tentative, decision; and (2)
the request filed on May 24, 2021, was improper because, rather
than seeking the factual and legal basis for the DVRO, it
improperly asked the trial court to respond to 15 interrogatory-
style questions.

            2.    Analysis

      Christopher argues the trial court erred by denying his
requests for a statement of decision because both were timely.
For the reasons discussed below, even assuming, arguendo, his

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requests were timely, we conclude he has not shown reversal is
required based on the asserted error.
       First, Christopher’s requests were improper. “Code of Civil
Procedure section 632 authorizes [a] party to request a statement
of decision and thereby obtain the legal and factual basis for the
trial court’s decision.” (People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent
Homes, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 509, 525 (Casa Blanca).) The
requests filed by Christopher, however, did not merely ask the
trial court to explain the factual and legal basis for the DVRO.
Instead, his first request asked the trial court to respond to 15
different statements relating to the Life Insurance Policy. His
second request asked the court to respond to 66 separate
questions, many of which contain additional follow-up questions,
relating to a sprawling number of issues and topics. Accordingly,
Christopher’s requests inappropriately “s[ought] an inquisition, a
rehearing of the evidence.” (Casa Blanca, supra, at p. 525.) We
therefore discern no error in the trial court’s decision to deny
these requests. (See id. [holding as improper a request for a
statement of decision that made 16 demands, each with several
sub-parts, which would have required the trial court to answer
over 75 questions]; see also In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 981-982 [request for statement of
decision comprising a “laundry list of 52 demands” was
improper].)
       Second, Christopher has not demonstrated he was
prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to issue a written statement
of decision. “[A] trial court’s error in failing to issue a requested
statement of decision is not reversible per se, but is subject to
harmless error review.” (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099,
1108.) “‘[T]he burden is on the appellant in every case to show

                                 37
that the claimed error is prejudicial; i.e., that it has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.] Injury is not presumed from
error, but injury must appear affirmatively upon the court’s
examination of the entire record. ‘But our duty to examine the
entire cause arises when and only when the appellant has
fulfilled his duty to tender a proper prejudice argument. . . . [T]he
appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how
the error caused a miscarriage of justice.’” (In re Marriage of
McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) Nowhere in his
briefs does Christopher clearly explain how he was prejudiced by
the denial of his requests for a statement of decision. We
therefore conclude the asserted error is harmless. (See Santina v.
General Petroleum Corp. (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 74, 77 [“Where any
error is relied on for a reversal it is not sufficient for appellant to
point to the error and rest there”].)

      E.    We need not address Christopher’s arguments
            regarding the attorneys’ fees award.

      Christopher’s contentions for full or partial reversal of the
order awarding attorneys’ fees to Parris are conditioned on full or
partial reversal of the DVRO against him. Having rejected his
challenges to the DVRO, and thereby concluding it should be
affirmed in its entirety, we need not address his arguments
relating to Parris’s attorneys’ fees award.

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                         DISPOSITION

       The DVRO is affirmed. In addition, the order directing
Christopher to pay Parris’s attorneys’ fees is affirmed. Parris
shall recover her costs on appeal.

                   CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                                    CURREY, P. J.
      We concur:

      MORI, J.

      ZUKIN, J.

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