Court Opinion

ID: 9626179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:04:37.849558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:22.646709
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice.
On November 18, 1982, appellant Darrell White pled guilty to one count of first degree burglary and was sentenced to a five-year prison term. The trial court retained jurisdiction for 120 days pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2601(4)1 and directed the Department of Probation and Parole to submit a substance abuse analysis and report on White at the end of the 120 day period. On February 3, 1983, the trial court extended its retained jurisdiction over White for an additional 60 days. Following that order, the Department of Classification of the Board of Corrections submitted a report recommending that the trial court relinquish jurisdiction. White requested a hearing before the sentencing judge prior to the relinquishment of jurisdiction for the purpose of presenting a rebuttal to the Department of Classifications’ recommendation to the trial court. The trial judge, relying on earlier pronouncements of this court, observed that White had received a hearing before the Board of Corrections and was not entitled to a hearing before the court at this stage of the proceedings.2 The trial court then relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing and the defendant was committed to the custody of the Idaho Board of Corrections for execution of judgment.
Defendant appeals from the sentence on the grounds that the trial court’s failure to grant him a hearing at the time it relinquished jurisdiction constituted a denial of due process of law in violation of Idaho Constitution art. 1, § 13 and U.S. Constitution amend. XIY. By this appeal White asks this court to overrule State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472, 567 P.2d 17 (1977) wherein we held that no hearing, under the rule requiring defendant’s presence at imposition of sentence,3 was necessary when at the expiration of the 120 day evaluation period, the trial court relinquished jurisdiction over the defendant and effectuated execution of sentence. White further requests that we extend the rationale of State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582 P.2d 728 (1978) wherein we determined that a prisoner has a sufficient interest in the fairness of the evaluations by the North Idaho Correctional Institution (NICI) to invoke procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and Idaho Constitution art. 1, § 13. In Wolfe, supra, we stated:
*943Before a report is sent back to the sentencing judge (pursuant to the retained jurisdiction of I.C. § 19-2601), certain procedures must be followed. The prisoner must be given adequate notice before the hearing, including notice of the substance of all matters that will be considered. The prisoner must be given an opportunity to explain or rebut any testimony or recommendations. In addition, the prisoner must be free to call witnesses in his behalf from among the employees and other prisoners at NICI. This information should be included in the report sent back to the sentencing judge. Id. at 389, 582 P.2d 728.
Since we believe the procedural safeguards established in Wolfe adequately furnish a criminal defendant with due process, we decline the invitation to overrule Ditmars, supra. We therefore affirm the decision of the trial court.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD and BAKES, JJ., concur.

. 19-2601. Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in any district court of the State of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the state, except those of treason or murder, the court in its discretion, may:
(4) Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first one hundred and twenty (120) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction, during which time the court shall retain jurisdiction over the defendant which jurisdiction shall be entered on the order of commitment, and place the defendant on probation under such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient, notwithstanding that the term of the court during which such defendant was convicted or sentenced may have expired; upon application of the state board of correction and for good cause shown, the court may extend the period under which it retains jurisdiction of the defendant an additional sixty (60) days.

. Judge Rowett stated, “Clearly, the Court here is not required to have a hearing before relinquishing its retained jurisdiction. State versus Lopez [102 Id. 692, 638 P.2d 889, (1981) ] ... was very clear on that point, as were the other cases that considered this matter____”

. I.C.R. 32(a) and 43 entitle a defendant to be present at the time the court makes its final decision concerning the sentence.