Court Opinion

ID: 9905971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 17:10:14.679362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:02.162915
License: Public Domain

J-S31007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JAMES FAIRCHILD                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 777 EDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 18, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-45-CR-0001632-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2023

       Appellant, James Fairchild, appeals pro se from the judgment of

sentence entered on October 18, 2022, following his jury trial convictions for

burglary – overnight accommodations with no person present, criminal

trespass, criminal mischief, and theft by unlawful taking – moveable

property.1 We affirm.

       We briefly summarize the facts of this case as follows. On September

11, 2020, police responded to a burglary investigation at a residence on

Harvest Lane in Pocono Summit, Pennsylvania.         The homeowner (hereinafter

“the victim”) reported that he arrived at the home to find an unfamiliar gray

Volkswagen in the driveway. The victim told police that a male walked toward

him from the rear of the home, asked if the home was for sale, and got into
____________________________________________

1  18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(2), 3503(a)(1)(ii), 3304(a)(5), and 3921(a),
respectively.
J-S31007-23

the Volkswagen and drove away. The victim described the white male as over

six feet tall, thin, and “scruffy looking.” The victim also gave police the license

plate number of the Volkswagen at issue, which was registered to Appellant.

Subsequently, the police showed the victim a photograph of Appellant and the

victim confirmed it was the man he saw earlier.       Upon further inspection of

the subject property, the police found a broken basement window and the

back door of the residence left open. The basement floor was wet and there

were cut copper pipes overhead and sections of cut pipe stacked on the floor.

Police also discovered hedge trimmers and an unfamiliar boot print on the

basement floor. A garage door left ajar revealed several pieces of broken

copper tubing on the floor. Police interviewed Appellant and his wife, and both

claimed that Appellant was at their home that day working on their septic

tank. The police took a sample of Appellant’s DNA and applied for a search

warrant for Appellant’s home.      After the search warrant was served upon

Appellant, the police received a telephone call from him.      Appellant realized

the police recovered hedge trimmers from the victim’s property and he

explained that he had been missing his hedge trimmers for some time.

Appellant sounded nervous because the police took his DNA sample.

Appellant further stated that the recovered hedge trimmers were probably his.

      On June 28, 2022, a jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned

crimes.   On October 18, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate sentence of 66 to 180 months of incarceration.           Appellant was

represented by privately retained counsel from the inception of the case

                                       -2-
J-S31007-23

through sentencing. After imposition of sentence, Appellant requested he be

permitted to represent himself pro se.           Following a colloquy pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998), the trial court entered

an order on October 20, 2022, which allowed counsel to withdraw, found

Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel,

and permitted Appellant to represent himself pro se. This timely pro se appeal

resulted.2

____________________________________________

2  The record reveals that Appellant handed his pro se post-sentence motion
to prison officials on October 24, 2022, which was within 10 days of the
imposition of sentence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (“[A] written post-sentence
motion shall be filed no later than 10 days after imposition of sentence.”); see
also Pa.R.A.P. 121(f) (“A pro se filing submitted by a person incarcerated in
a correctional facility is deemed filed as [of] the date the filing was delivered
to the prison authorities for purposes of mailing as documented by a properly
executed prisoner cash slip or other reasonably verifiable evidence.”). The
trial court held a hearing on February 23, 2023 and denied Appellant’s
post-sentence motion by order entered on the same day. Appellant filed a
timely pro se notice of appeal on March 23, 2023. While Appellant purports
to appeal from the order denying his post-sentence motion, the appeal
properly lies from the judgment of sentence, and we have corrected the
caption accordingly. See Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408,
410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc). Appellant filed a pro se concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
on April 10, 2023. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) on May 1, 2023. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se brief with this
Court and he has not indicated that he wishes to have counsel appointed to
represent him on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 141 A.3d 512,
521 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“[O]nce a defendant has made a competent waiver of
counsel, that waiver remains in effect through all subsequent proceedings in
that case absent a substantial change in circumstances….”).

                                           -3-
J-S31007-23

      Of the fifteen issues Appellant presents on direct appeal to this Court,

thirteen of them assert ineffective assistance of counsel. See Appellant’s Pro

Se Brief, at 2-3. This Court has recently stated:

      Generally, a criminal defendant may not assert claims of
      ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Instead, such
      claims are to be deferred to [Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)]
      review.     However, our Supreme Court has recognized three
      exceptions to the general rule [and] held that a trial court has
      discretion to address ineffectiveness claims on direct review in
      cases where (1) there are extraordinary circumstances in which
      trial counsel's ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and
      meritorious to the extent that immediate consideration best
      serves the interests of justice; or (2) there is good cause shown,
      and the defendant knowingly and expressly waives his entitlement
      to seek subsequent PCRA review of his conviction and sentence.
      More recently, our Supreme Court adopted a third exception[,
      applicable in the context of collateral review], which requires []
      courts to address claims challenging [PCRA] counsel's
      performance where the defendant is statutorily precluded from
      obtaining subsequent PCRA review [such as where a defendant
      alleges PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness in connection with a first
      PCRA petition].

Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755, 760–761 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(internal citations and quotations omitted; footnote incorporated).

      In this case, the trial court denied Appellant’s claims of trial counsel

ineffectiveness as premature, concluding:

      [T]here is no instance of ineffectiveness or ineffectiveness per se
      that [] is apparent from the record.     In addition, this case does
      not involve or present extraordinary circumstances. Further,
      [Appellant] did not allege or prove, and the record does not reveal,
      that the interests of justice require that [Appellant’s]
      ineffectiveness claims be addressed before his direct appeal is
      decided. Likewise, [Appellant] did not allege or establish, and [the
      trial court] did not discern, good cause for considering the claims
      before his judgment of sentence becomes final. Additionally, and

                                     -4-
J-S31007-23

       in any event, [Appellant] did not expressly waive the right to
       pursue a first PCRA petition. Thus, [no] exception applies.
       Accordingly, [the trial court found it] properly denied [Appellant’s]
       ineffective assistance of counsel claims as premature.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/2023, at 4. Based upon our review of the record and

applicable law, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that Appellant’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be deferred until collateral

review, after his judgment of sentence becomes final.3

       Appellant’s two remaining, inter-related appellate issues are as follows:

       Did the Commonwealth violate the Rules of Professional Conduct
       by using overreaching and reckless statements at closing
       arguments?

       Did the Commonwealth intentionally mislead or misinform the jury
       [in its] closing arguments?

Appellant’s Pro Se Brief at 2 (numbers, misspellings, and suggested answers

omitted).

       Initially, we note that upon review of the trial transcripts, defense

counsel did not object to any of the Commonwealth’s closing remarks. See

N.T., 6/28/2022, at 13-20. As such, Appellant waived his challenge to the

Commonwealth’s closing statements. See Commonwealth v. Yandamuri,

____________________________________________

3   Moreover, we note that although Appellant sets forth his 13 ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in the statement of questions presented section
of his appellate brief, he does not develop these claims with legal citations or
references to the certified record and we could find them waived for this
reason. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super.
2007), citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (“[I]t is an appellant's duty to present arguments
that are sufficiently developed for our review” and an appellate “brief must
support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and
with citations to legal authorities.”).

                                           -5-
J-S31007-23

159 A.3d 503, 528 n.23 (Pa. 2017) (finding challenge to prosecutor's

statement during closing argument waived where the appellant failed to

demonstrate where in the record he had preserved this claim and the Supreme

Court's independent review did not disclose a contemporaneous objection);

see also Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406, 423 (Pa. 2008) (absence

of a contemporaneous objection below constituted a waiver of appellant's

claim respecting the prosecutor's closing argument); see also Pa.R.A.P.

302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.”). Additionally, we note that the Commonwealth

contends that “Appellant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct should be

deemed waived for failure to properly develop the arguments before this

Court.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4; see also id. at 6 (“Appellant cites no

relevant law, makes no reference to the record, does not cite specific

statements and has simply made a bald assertion of error.”).       For these

reasons, we deem Appellant’s appellate issues waived.

     Regardless, even if Appellant had properly preserved his claims

pertaining to prosecutorial misconduct, we deem them meritless. Appellant

apparently challenges the Commonwealth’s closing statements pertaining to:

the victim twice identifying Appellant as the perpetrator prior to trial,

Appellant’s height, Appellant’s need for money as the motive for his crimes,

and that the hedge trimmers recovered at the crime scene belonged to

Appellant. See N.T., 2/23/2023, at 8-14; see also Appellant’s Pro Se Reply

Brief at *1-2 (unpaginated).

                                    -6-
J-S31007-23

      We have previously determined:

      [W]ith specific reference to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in
      a closing statement, it is well settled that any challenged
      prosecutorial comment must not be viewed in isolation, but rather
      must be considered in the context in which it was offered. Our
      review of a prosecutor's comment and an allegation of
      prosecutorial misconduct requires us to evaluate whether a
      defendant received a fair trial, not a perfect trial. Thus, it is well
      settled that statements made by the prosecutor to the jury during
      closing argument will not form the basis for granting a new trial
      unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to
      prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility
      toward the defendant so they could not weigh the evidence
      objectively and render a true verdict. The appellate courts have
      recognized that not every unwise remark by an attorney amounts
      to misconduct or warrants the grant of a new trial. Additionally,
      like the defense, the prosecution is accorded reasonable latitude,
      may employ oratorical flair in arguing its version of the case to
      the jury, and may advance arguments supported by the evidence
      or use inferences that can reasonably be derived therefrom.
      Moreover, the prosecutor is permitted to fairly respond to points
      made in the defense's closing, and therefore, a proper
      examination of a prosecutor's comments in closing requires review
      of the arguments advanced by the defense in summation.

Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d 606, 615 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also

Commonwealth v. Bedford, 50 A.3d 707, 715 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc)

(“Our standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is limited to

whether the trial court abused its discretion.”).

      Here, the trial court determined that “the statements and arguments

[made by the Commonwealth during closing argument] about which

[Appellant] complains did not go beyond the admitted evidence and its

reasonable inferences, were not deliberate attempts to destroy the objectivity

of or inflame the jury, and constituted fair comment on and rebuttal to the

                                      -7-
J-S31007-23

arguments advanced by the defense.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/2023, at 6.

We agree.     At trial, defense counsel argued that another person borrowed

Appellant’s vehicle and was the perpetrator of the crimes at issue.         Thus,

identification was central to trial and the Commonwealth’s closing argument

pertained to admitted evidence or reasonable references pertaining to

identification.   Moreover, the Commonwealth’s closing statement regarding

Appellant’s financial affairs was fair response to defense’s closing argument

that Appellant’s wife lent their vehicle (the vehicle identified by the victim) to

a third party for $30.00 during the relevant time period which “is a lot of

money when you’re a poor farmer.” N.T., 6/28/2022, at 9.          In closing, the

Commonwealth merely responded to Appellant’s contentions. Put differently,

the Commonwealth simply conveyed its competing theory of the case to the

jury, employing permissible inferences and rhetorical flair.     Finally, we note

that the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

      The speeches and arguments of counsel are not part of the
      evidence and you should not consider them as such. Nonetheless,
      in deciding this case you should carefully consider the evidence in
      light of the various reasons and arguments each lawyer presented.
      It is the right and the duty of each lawyer to discuss the evidence
      in a manner that is most favorable to the side that he represents.
      You may be guided by each lawyers’ arguments to the extent they
      are supported by the evidence, and insofar as they aid you in
      applying your own reason and common sense. However, you are
      not required to accept the arguments of either lawyer. It is for
      you and you alone to decide the case based on the evidence as it
      was presented from the witness stand and in accordance with the
      instructions [] give[n]. In this regard counsel will call your
      attention to evidence they consider material and may ask you to
      draw certain inferences from that evidence. Please keep in mind
      however that you are not bound by the attorneys’ recollection of

                                      -8-
J-S31007-23

      the evidence, it is yours and yours alone that must guide your
      deliberations.    If there is a discrepancy between counsels’
      recollection and your recollection of the evidence you are bound
      by your own recollection, nor are you limited to that which is
      mentioned by either or both of the attorneys. You must consider
      all the evidence that you believe is material to the issue involved.
      As to the inferences that counsel asks or may ask you to draw, to
      the extent such inferences are supported by the evidence and
      appeal to your reason and judgment, you may consider them in
      your deliberations.     Finally, in their closing arguments the
      attorneys may call your attention to certain principles of law,
      please remember however, that you are not bound by any
      principle of law mentioned by either of the attorneys. You must
      apply the law on which you were instructed [] and only that law
      to the facts as you find them.

N.T., 6/28/2022, at 4-5.      “The law presumes the jury will follow the

instructions of the court.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 846

(Pa. 2014). For all of the foregoing reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion

or error of law in denying Appellant relief on his claims of Commonwealth

prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 11/30/2023

                                     -9-