Court Opinion

ID: 9431029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:31:11.597738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:20.692245
License: Public Domain

Justice Marshall,
with whom Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
In these two cases, prevailing defendants sought reimbursement for expert witness fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). The Rule provides that “[e]x-*446cept when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” In No. 86-322, the District Court found that some of the expert testimony was “indispensable to the determination of [the] issues in the case” and taxed against the plaintiff the portion of witness fees attributable to that testimony. 102 F. R. D. 73, 86 (ED La. 1984). In No. 86-328, even though the District Court found the defendant’s expert was “helpful and perhaps necessary to its case,” the court declined to award fees in excess of the amounts specified in 28 U. S. C. § 1821. Civ. Action No. WC 78-33-WK-P (ND Miss., Aug. 24, 1983), p. 9.
The Court now informs us that the District Courts had no power to award costs not expressly authorized by statute.1 In its haste to extinguish all discretion to award these non-statutory costs, however, the Court has rendered Rule 54(d) a nullity.
Before today, it was generally recognized that the “unless the court otherwise directs” language in Rule 54(d) was in*447tended as a grant of discretion to the district courts. See, e. g., 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2665, p. 171 (2d ed. 1983). Except where expressly prohibited by statute from doing so, the Rule “vests in the district court a sound discretion over the allowance, disallowance, or apportionment of costs in all civil actions.” 6 J. Moore, W. Toeggart, & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶54.70[5], p. 54-331 (2d ed. 1987). This is because Rule 54(d) adopts the practice formerly followed in equity, see 6 Moore ¶54.70[3], p. 54-321; 10 Wright §2668, pp. 197-200, where courts possessed the power to award costs not expressly provided by statute, as “part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation.” Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 166 (1939) (footnote omitted). See generally Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 265 U. S. 78, 83 (1924); Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 317-318 (1920).
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules, this Court has addressed the scope of the district courts’ power to tax costs on only one occasion. In Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U. S. 227 (1964), the Court held that a District Court acted within its discretion in refusing to tax a witness’ expenses for travel in excess of 100 miles as costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff.2 It expressly rejected the argument that a district court lacks the power to award these expenses as costs. The Court noted:
“While this Rule could be far more definite as to what ‘costs shall be allowed,’ the words ‘unless the court otherwise directs’ quite plainly vest some power in the court to allow some ‘costs.’” Id., at 232.
*448In a sentence labeled dictum by the majority, the Court sought to provide guidance to the lower courts by explaining that this discretion “should be sparingly exercised with reference to expenses not specifically allowed by statute.” Id., at 235. As Judge Rubin observed below, “[t]he Court’s conclusion reveals its premise: Rule 54(d) gives the district court discretion to award costs not enumerated in § 1920.” 790 F. 2d 1174, 1190 (CA5 1986) (en banc) (concurring and dissenting). This is certainly how Justice Harlan, author of the dissent in Farmer, viewed the case. See 379 U. S., at 240 (“the foundation of today’s decision” is the “scope of the discretion of a district judge acting within his powers”).
Rather than following Farmer, as it should, the majority relies on Henkel v. Chicago, S. P., M. & O. R. Co., 284 U. S. 444 (1932). But Henkel provides no support for a restrictive interpretation of a district court’s power to award fees under Rule 54(d). The opinion in Henkel addressed the narrow question whether district courts had authority to tax expert witness fees as costs in an action at law. At the time, courts of law lacked the power to award costs not expressly granted by statute, see Ex parte Peterson, supra, at 317-318, although those sitting in equity could award such costs, as justice required, without regard to the fee statutes. Approaching the issue purely as a matter of statutory construction, the Court concluded that expert witness fees were included in and limited to the amounts prescribed by the predecessors to 28 U. S. C. §§1920 and 1821. 284 U. S., at 446-447. The majority acknowledges, as it must, that Henkel was decided before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure effected a merger of law and equity. What the majority ignores, however, is the vital significance of that fact. As noted above, Rule 54(d) adopts the practice in equity, thereby giving federal courts in all actions the broad discretion previously afforded only to courts exercising equitable powers.
*449The majority’s assertion that discretion can be exercised only “to refuse to tax costs in favor of the prevailing party,” ante, at 442, is plainly inconsistent with the equitable principles on which Rule 54(d) is based. Moreover, it reinforces the fact that the Rule is now entirely superfluous. Because the language of §1920 is permissive — “[a] judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following” — courts already have discretion to disallow the costs listed therein.3
As the Court noted in Farmer, Rule 54(d) does not define “costs.” 379 U. S., at 232. Seizing on this “omission,” the Court now declares that §1920 sets forth the universe of “costs” taxable under the Rule. Ante, at 441-442. Any contrary interpretation, it claims, “renders § 1920 superfluous.” Ante, at 441. This misreads § 1920. That section does not purport to be exclusive. It does not direct that “the following costs and no others may be taxed.”4 By contrast, the predecessor to § 1920, the 1853 Fee Act, provided that “the following and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed,” Act of Feb. 26,1853,10 Stat. 161 (emphasis added); this language was omitted from the 1948 revision. Despite this seemingly significant deletion, the majority contends that “[t]he sweeping reforms of the 1853 Act have been carried forward to today, ‘without any apparent intent to change the controlling rules.’” Ante, at 440, quoting Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 255 (1975). In Alyeska, this Court held that the same fee statutes did not *450authorize recovery of attorney’s fees by a prevailing party. Even in Alyeska, however, the Court recognized that the fee statutes had never been entirely exclusive: “To be sure, the fee statutes have been construed to allow, in limited circumstances, a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in excess of the small sums [for docket fees] permitted by §1923.” Id., at257.5
Not only is the Court’s holding inconsistent with the language and history of Rule 54(d) and § 1920, but it is also ill advised as a policy matter. As Judge Rubin stated in his opinion below:
“The costs of litigation, as we all know, have become staggering. A plaintiff may put a defendant or a defendant may put a plaintiff to a tremendous amount of expense, apart from the cost of obtaining an attorney’s services, in defending or prosecuting a case. One cause of this expense is the unavoidable necessity of expert witness testimony to establish or rebut many legal claims.
“Although the victor in litigation is not entitled to spoils, he ought at least to be able to invoke the court’s discretion to make him whole.” 790 F. 2d, at 1192-1193.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

 1 do not understand today’s decision to decide the question whether a district court may award expert witness fees under 42 U. S. C. § 1988.
No. 86-322 is an antitrust case; obviously, § 1988 is not at issue in that ease. And, as an examination of the record reveals, the issue is not properly before the Court in No. 86-328, either. In that case, petitioner, a prevailing civil rights defendant, made a motion for attorney’s fees “and expenses” under § 1988 and filed a bill of costs under Rule 54(d). The bill of costs included $31,333.87 for “expert witness fees and expenses.” Record 38. On December 30, 1982, the District Court summarily denied the motion for attorney’s fees and expenses, based on its conclusion that, under Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), “the lawsuit was brought in good faith and was neither frivolous, unreasonable, nor without foundation.” Record 1. The court referred all other questions concerning the taxing of costs to a Magistrate. Id., at 2. Petitioner did not appeal the District Court’s order denying attorney’s fees under § 1988. It appealed only the District Court’s order of August 24,1983, denying its application for expert witness fees under Rule 54(d). See Record 33.

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e), a district court’s power to compel attendance of witnesses extends only 100 miles. Relying on this Rule, District Courts had traditionally declined to tax as costs expenses of witnesses traveling more than 100 miles. See Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U. S., at 231-232.

 The legislative history of §1920 supports this view of Rule 54(d). Congress replaced the mandatory language found in the earlier version— “shall tax costs” — to conform to the discretion afforded by Rule 54(d). See H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., App. A162 (1947) (Reviser’s Note).

 Despite the majority’s protestations, refusing to construe § 1920 as the exclusive definition of costs would not render the statute superfluous. Its principal purpose is to set forth those routine, readily determinable costs which, in ordinary eases, will automatically be taxed by the clerk of the court.

 With respect to fees, Alyeska identified three circumstances appropriate for such “assertions of inherent power in the courts,” Alyeska Pipeline Co., v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S., at 259: when the trustee of a fund preserved or recovered the fund for the benefit of others in addition to him or herself; when a party acted in willful disobedience to a court order; or when the losing party acted in bad faith or vexatiously. Id., at 257-259.