Court Opinion

ID: 9910348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:07:37.067362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:20.137559
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1544-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRENDON N. MATOS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted October 24, 2023 – Decided December 15, 2023

                   Before Judges Natali and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Morris County, Indictment No. 11-10-1115.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on
                   the briefs).

                   Robert J. Carroll, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney
                   for respondent (Tiffany M. Russo, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Brendan N. Matos appeals from the Law Division's June 29,

2020 order denying his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition without an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

                                         I.

      Consistent with the terms of his negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled

guilty in 2014 to the first-degree felony murder of his father, along with first-

degree robbery and second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon. After

merger and consideration of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors,

the court sentenced defendant to a forty-year aggregate custodial term with an

eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period subject to the No Early Release

Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.       Defendant appealed only his sentence and we

affirmed. State v. Matos, No. A-1994-14 (App. Div. April 15, 2015).

      Following his appeal, defendant filed a timely petition for PCR in which

he asserted his plea counsel's representation "during pre-trial . . . and during plea

discussions and negotiations" was constitutionally ineffective under the two-part

test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).1

1
   To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must
satisfy the two-part test enunciated in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, by
demonstrating that: 1) counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) the deficient
performance actually prejudiced the accused's defense. The Strickland test has

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                                         2
Defendant's appointed PCR counsel filed a supplemental petition and brief

detailing defendant's claims.2

       Defendant argued his plea counsel failed to "raise issues which

would . . . assist in his defense," such as "fully" pursuing a Miranda3 hearing to

suppress an inculpatory statement elicited during his interrogation. Defendant

argued his statement was illegally obtained, and that he did not knowingly,

voluntarily or intelligently waive his rights.

       Specifically, defendant claimed his statement should have been

suppressed based on defendant's "clear[]" invocation of counsel at several

points, as well as defendant's diminished mental state during the interrogation.

Among other evidence, defendant relied on the report of Dr. Robert Lattimer,

been adopted for application under our State constitution. See State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
2
  Before us, defendant has not asserted all the arguments he raised before the
PCR court. For purposes of conciseness, we address only those arguments
which defendant presently appeals to us. As he has failed to reprise the
remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented to the PCR court,
we accordingly deem those unbriefed arguments waived. See Telebright Corp.
v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Taxation, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div. 2012)
(deeming a contention waived when the party failed to include any arguments
supporting the contention in its brief); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2023) ("[A]n issue not briefed is deemed waived.").
3
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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                                         3
M.D., P.A., one of the experts he retained who opined he was "clearly

delusional" during his interrogation based on his incoherent speech and

references to his deceased father. On this point, defendant pointed to several

instances during his interview as indicative of his confusion and uncertainty,

such as when he stated, "So I guess I'm talking now?," repeated references to

communicating with his deceased father, as well as his statement to one of the

interrogating officers "Why didn't you wait for a lawyer?"

      According to defendant, the police ignored his invocation of his right to

an attorney in an effort to coerce a confession, as evidenced by the length of his

interview, and the officers' refusal to provide him with dry clothing and

necessary medical care. Further, he contended the interrogating officers failed

to clarify his unambiguous requests for representation. Defendant argued his

plea counsel's failure to pursue an application suppressing his statement

prejudiced him as it was "essentially the best and only evidence against

[defendant]."

      As to his representation during the plea negotiations, defendant claimed

his counsel was constitutionally deficient by coercing him to plead guilty.

Defendant argued he was improperly "led to believe he would lose at trial, would

receive a harsher sentence, and had no other recourse but to plead guilty."

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Further, defendant maintained his plea counsel refused to communicate with him

regarding the plea offer, and only informed him of its existence moments before

the plea hearing.

      Defendant also submitted certifications in support of his petition from

both him and his mother. Defendant's certification described that when he was

a teenager he "began [to] hear[] voices telling [him] to rob, steal and do drugs."

Defendant further stated on the day of the incident he saw "people on the lawn

and heard voices" which told him his "father was going to kill [him]," and

leading up to the murder he had not slept in eight days.

      In discussing the interrogation, defendant stated he "had no idea what was

going on and thought [his] father was alive and trying to hire [him] an attorney

after [his] multiple requests for an attorney." He further certified he was not

given any of his prescription medications while he was incarcerated despite

"desperately" requiring them.

      Defendant also certified his plea counsel was aware he was not provided

his necessary medication and "used this to his advantage to trick [him] into

taking a plea of forty . . . years." As related to his plea, defendant maintained

plea counsel advised him he "had to accept the plea deal because [he] would be

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found guilty" at trial, and also stated plea counsel manipulated him to accept the

offer by informing him his mother would go bankrupt if they proceeded to trial.

      He also stated plea counsel met with him on only two occasions, "for

under ten minutes each time" despite requesting more visits. Defendant also

certified he was under the impression he was attending a Miranda hearing on the

day of his plea proceeding, and because he had not received his medication, he

"was very confused and disoriented" when plea counsel "forced [him] to take

the . . . deal" minutes before the hearing. Defendant also maintained his plea

counsel emailed his mother and instructed her "not to tell [defendant] he was

working on a plea deal prior to . . . [the] hearing."

      Defendant further detailed he explicitly told plea counsel he was "not

willing to plead to any deal that would expose [him] to a sentence greater than

twenty . . . years." He reiterated he would not have accepted the plea deal had

plea counsel properly advised defendant on the viability of a Miranda motion.

      Defendant's mother's certification similarly described that plea counsel

visited defendant only twice throughout his representation for approximately ten

minutes each visit. She also certified that while imprisoned, defendant failed to

receive his necessary medication. His mother attested plea counsel emailed her

in October 2013, and stated she "should not tell [defendant] yet that [plea

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                                         6
counsel] was attempting to resolve the case by way of a plea deal." In addition,

she stated defendant was not informed about his plea deal until five minutes

prior to the hearing, but did not specify if she personally witnessed this

interaction or if she was informed about it by defendant.

      After considering the parties' submissions, record, and oral arguments,

Judge Stephen J. Taylor applied the well-recognized standard in Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687, and found defendant failed to establish a prima face claim his plea

counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, he denied defendant's petition without an

evidentiary hearing and detailed his reasoning in a thoughtful and

comprehensive forty-seven-page written opinion.

      Judge Taylor determined defendant's claims were not procedurally barred

under Rules 3:22-3 and 3:22-4(a), contrary to the State's arguments.          He

explained defendant's substantive Strickland claims were ripe for review,

explaining that although defendant "waived his right to challenge the

admissibility of his confession and assert affirmative defenses by virtue of his

guilty plea," he was within his right to "argue that counsel's failure to pursue

those claims and defenses in the prior proceedings amounted to ineffective

assistance of counsel."

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                                       7
      As to the merits, Judge Taylor rejected defendant's argument that plea

counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a Miranda hearing. On this point,

the court relied on the fact plea counsel initially filed a motion to suppress

defendant's statements. Judge Taylor determined this action was reflective of

counsel's knowledge "of the import of the statement as well as the possibility

that he might have to litigate the admissibility of the confession." The court

also determined plea counsel's choice not to pursue a hearing was sound defense

strategy, based on the time limit the State offered for acceptance of its plea offer,

and further reasoned if plea counsel chose to litigate the admissibility of

defendant's statement and reject the State's offer, he would have been exposed

to "a potential life without parole sentence."

      The court also concluded counsel's decision did not prejudice defendant,

as it rejected defendant's claim that his confession "was the 'only evidence'

against him," noting the significant circumstantial and direct evidence which

established defendant shot his father and attempted to conceal the murder and

robbery.   The court noted this evidence included defendant "sending text

messages from his father's phone, [and] [his] specific behavior before, during,

and after the crime that are indicative of guilt and the appropriate mens rea . . .

[as] detail[ed] in the State's expert reports."

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                                          8
      The court also evaluated the merit of defendant's arguments regarding the

admissibility of his confession and rejected defendant's claims that his rights

were not honored by investigators, or that he was coerced to confess.

Specifically, the court noted that when defendant first invoked his right to an

attorney, the interrogating officer ceased the interrogation as required. The

court also determined defendant's invocation of his rights did not necessitate his

immediate removal from custody, nor did it render his confession inadmissible,

as police remained in the process of conducting an active criminal investigation.

      Further, Judge Taylor noted defendant was given food, water, and clothing

and his questioning only continued after he re-initiated contact with the officers.

Overall, the court concluded plea counsel's actions were a "sound trial strategy,"

and did not prejudice defendant, as counsel negotiated a more favorable plea

offer which was less than defendant's exposure to a sentence of life without the

possibility of parole.

      Finally, the court rejected defendant's arguments regarding the

ineffectiveness of his plea counsel in communicating with him based on

defendant's plea colloquy. Specifically, the court relied on defendant's sworn

testimony at the proceeding, including portions in which defendant described

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                                        9
his satisfaction with counsel, as well as his affirmance he was afforded sufficient

time to examine and discuss the offer with plea counsel.

      Further, the court noted it was unable to find any evidence in the plea

record to support defendant's claims he was confused and disorientated at the

proceeding, based on the court's detailed, comprehensive and explicit findings

regarding defendant's alertness, responses and overall demeanor when accepting

the factual basis for the plea. Although the court acknowledged its requirement

to view the facts "in the light most favorable to the defendant," the court

concluded it was not compelled "to ignore the record and sworn testimony of

defendant."

      This appeal followed in which defendant's counsel reprises many of the

arguments defendant unsuccessfully raised before the trial court. Defendant

specifically asserts:

              POINT ONE

              THE PCR COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED
              DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE RECEIVED
              INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF HIS PLEA
              COUNSEL WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN
              EVIDENTIARY HEARING

              A.   THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
                   REGARDING CLAIMS FOR INEFFECTIVE
                   ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY

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                                       10
                   HEARINGS AND PETITIONS FOR POST-
                   CONVICTION RELIEF

            B.     DEFENDANT RAISED A PRIMA FACIE
                   CLAIM FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
                   BASED ON PLEA COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
                   LITIGATE THE PREVIOUSLY      FILED
                   MIRANDA MOTION

            C.     PLEA    COUNSEL'S   FAILURES    TO
                   ADEQUATELY    COMMUNICATE     WITH
                   DEFENDANT, REVIEW ALL RELEVANT
                   DISCOVERY, AND TO TRANSMIT THE
                   STATE'S PLEA OFFER TO DEFENDANT
                   CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
                   OF COUNSEL

                                        II.

      Before us, defendant argues his plea counsel was ineffective for failing to

litigate a previously filed Miranda motion, as he claims the motion would have

been successful, based on the "recorded interrogation of [d]efendant [which]

contained abundant material" illustrative that defendant's "confession was not

the result of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver."          Specifically,

defendant relies on his ignored requests for an attorney, the interrogating

officer's minimization of the Miranda warnings, law enforcement's withholding

of medical treatment, and his "unmistakable signs of delusion" as evidence of

his counsel's deficiency in failing to attempt to suppress his statement.

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                                       11
      Defendant also relies on State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 210 (2022), and State

v. Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. 495, 522 (App. Div. 2022), and argues because the

police refused to inform defendant of his charges, and repeatedly referred to his

father's murder in vague terms, he was misled regarding his true status in the

investigation.

      In addition, defendant argues Judge Taylor erred in denying his petition

without an evidentiary hearing as he raised a prima facie claim of ineffective

assistance based on prior counsel's inactions during plea negotiations.

Specifically, defendant claims his plea counsel failed "to meet adequately with

[him] to discuss the case and explain legal issues," or provide and review all

relevant discovery materials with defendant, such as his interrogation video.

      In addition, defendant contends his plea counsel misrepresented to him

plea counsel's intention of litigating a motion to suppress his recorded

confession. According to defendant, counsel "hid" the amended plea offer until

moments before the hearing. Further, defendant alleges counsel misadvised

defendant that if he proceeded to trial he would leave his mother "destitute."

Defendant therefore argues the statements asserted in defendant's and his

mother's certifications, "raise the question whether the decision to plead guilty

was his or his attorney's." He further claims that "[a] proper evaluation of [his]

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                                       12
claim[s] could be accomplished only by having counsel provide testimony at an

evidentiary hearing regarding his performance during the plea negotiation. "

      Having considered these contentions in light of the record and the

aforementioned well-established legal principles, we reject all of defendant's

arguments and affirm substantially for the reasons detailed in Judge Taylor 's

written opinion. The judge correctly denied defendant's petition without a

hearing after determining he failed to satisfy either the performance or prejudice

prong of the Strickland test. That decision is supported by substantial evidence

in the record and in accordance with applicable legal principles. We provide the

following to amplify our decision.

                                       III.

      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed

questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. Where, as here, a PCR court fails to

conduct an evidentiary hearing, it is within our authority "to conduct a de novo

review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court." Id.

at 421. A defendant's right to an evidentiary hearing is not automatic, see State

v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992), but courts should conduct a hearing "to

resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims if a defendant has presented a

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                                       13
prima facie claim in support of post-conviction relief and the facts supporting

the claim are outside the trial record." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154,

170 (1999).

       When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish, by a

preponderance of the credible evidence, that he is entitled to the requested relief.

State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013); Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459. To sustain

that burden, the defendant must allege and articulate specific facts that "provide

the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell,

126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

       As noted, to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, the defendant is obligated to show not only the particular manner in

which counsel's performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency

prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at

58. Under the first prong of this test, the defendant must demonstrate that

"counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687.

       Under the second prong, the defendant must show "that counsel's errors

were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

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                                        14
reliable." Ibid. That is, "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. "

Id. at 694. There is a strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment." Id. at 690.

      Moreover, the acts or omissions of counsel of which a defendant

complains must amount to more than mere tactical strategy. Id. at 689. As the

Supreme Court observed in Strickland:

            [a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires
            that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
            effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
            counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
            conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.
            Because of the difficulties inherent in making the
            evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption
            that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
            reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
            defendant must overcome the presumption that, under
            the circumstances, the challenged action "might be
            considered sound trial strategy."

            [Ibid. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101
            (1955)).]

      When a defendant asserts his attorney was ineffective by failing to file a

motion, he must establish that the motion would have been successful. State v.

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                                        15
O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007). "It is not ineffective assistance of counsel for

defense counsel not to file a meritless motion." Ibid.

      We agree with Judge Taylor and reject defendant's argument his plea

counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate a motion to suppress defendant's

statement to police as such a motion would have been meritless. See O'Neal,

190 N.J. at 619. As Judge Taylor found, officers did not question defendant

after he asserted his right to counsel. Indeed, upon defendant stating, "I mean I

need a lawyer," the interrogation immediately ceased. It was only following

defendant's re-initiating his conversation with the police and his Mirandizing,

did the officers begin interviewing him again while also clarifying potentially

ambiguous statements he made. We are satisfied the interrogating officers'

consistent clarification and explanations of defendant's Miranda rights both

prior to defendant's request for a lawyer and following defendant's re-initiation

with the officers does not evidence impermissible interrogation of defendant

following an invocation of his right to counsel. See State v. Fuller, 118 N.J. 75,

81-82 (1990); see also State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 65 (1997).

      We are also unpersuaded, based on a totality of the circumstances, the

interrogating officer impermissibly contradicted defendant's Miranda warnings

when he suggested defendant's honesty in the interrogation would benefit him .

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                                       16
State v. Puryear, 441 N.J. Super. 280, 297 (App. Div. 2015). We reach this

conclusion upon a full review of the record and considering the interrogating

officer's language that appealed to defendant's sense of decency, as well as his

age and prior experiences with law enforcement. State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449,

463 (2005).

      We also find defendant's reliance on Sims, 250 N.J. at 215, and Diaz, 470

N.J. Super. at 495, misplaced, as both cases are distinguishable from the matter

before us. The Court in Sims instructed "[t]he rule announced in A.G.D. is clear

and circumscribed. If a complaint-warrant has been filed or an arrest warrant

has been issued against a suspect whom law enforcement officers seek to

interrogate, the officers must disclose that fact to the interrogee" before

beginning their questioning. Id. at 213 (citing State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56, 68-

69 (2003)). The court directed "[i]n a case in which there is evidence of such

bad-faith conduct on the part of law enforcement officers, the trial court should

consider such conduct as part of the totality-of-the-circumstances test." Sims,

250 N.J. at 216.

      Applying the Court's ruling in Sims to the record before us, defendant's

statement was freely volunteered, and the detectives did not overbear

defendant's will in the course of their interrogation. State v. Hreha, 217 N.J.

                                                                           A-1544-20
                                      17
368, 383 (2014). While the detectives did not advise defendant he was a suspect

in the murder of his father, there was no obligation on them to do so as defendant

had not been charged with that or any crime related to those events when

questioned by the detectives. See Sims, 250 N.J. at 214. Additionally, applying

the totality-of-the-circumstances test defendant's waiver was clearly voluntary.

      We also note, nothing in the record before us remotely approached the

chicanery we condemned in Diaz, 470 N.J. Super. at 495. Indeed, there is no

support for the claim the detectives initiated the interrogation to deliberately

mislead defendant in "a planned investigative strategy to elicit incriminating

statements," id. at 503, as officers did not elicit any information connecting

defendant to the murder until after they stated, in response to defendant's re-

initiating the conversation and being Mirandized, the charges on the search

warrant "stemm[ed] from the incident at your house . . . and what happened with

your dad."

      As such, defendant failed to establish his plea counsel was ineffective

based on his failure to prosecute fully a motion to suppress statements to police

because such a motion would have clearly been unsuccessful. Indeed, a review

of the record indicates police conducted a lawful interrogation in which

defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

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                                       18
      Additionally, defendant failed to illustrate how plea counsel's

recommendation to resolve the case by accepting the State's plea offer evidenced

actions which "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687-88. Although defendant claims his confession qualified as "the

most powerful evidence in the case," as Judge Taylor correctly found, defendant

ignores the powerful circumstantial evidence against him.          Such evidence

included being found in the same area as his father's stolen vehicle, his use of

his father's credit cards following his death, and the text messages sent from his

father's phone. Affording counsel the requisite "extreme deference," Fritz, 105

N.J. at 52, in his decision to negotiate a plea in an effort to avoid an incredibly

harsh sentence, in conjunction with the circumstantial evidence against

defendant, plea counsel's failure to litigate the Miranda issue simply cannot be

categorized as an error "so serious" to describe counsel as "not functioning as

. . . guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

      Even assuming defendant satisfied the performance prong under

Strickland, defendant's claim this inaction prejudiced him is simply not

supported by the record. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. As Judge Taylor

noted, the State's amended plea offer indicated if counsel were to litigate the

validity of defendant's Miranda waiver, the State would have withdrawn its plea

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                                       19
offer. In such an event, defendant would be exposed to the possibility of a

custodial sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.4

      Similarly, we agree with Judge Taylor defendant's claim his plea counsel

was ineffective for failing to communicate, review relevant discovery, and

properly discuss the plea simply is belied by the record. Indeed, defendant stated

at his plea hearing he clearly understood the terms of the plea, and he was in no

way coerced to accept it. Further, defendant testified he was provided enough

time to review the plea offer and that he was satisfied with his representation.

The reliability of these statements is not solely based in the inherent nature that

they were entered under oath, but also in the court's explicit findings regarding

defendant's overall demeanor during the proceeding. See State v. Simon, 161

N.J. 416, 444 (1999) (stating a defendant's representations during plea hearings

carry a presumption of truth).

4
   Defendant was originally charged with purposeful murder in violation of
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), and the grand jury returned an aggravating factor for
committing murder while engaged in a robbery. As such, if found guilty,
defendant faced life in prison without the possibility of parole. See N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3b(4). The record indicates the State dismissed this charge as part of
defendant's guilty plea to felony murder in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11 -3a(3),
which carries a custodial term ranging from thirty years to life. See N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3b(1).
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                                       20
      Nor are defendant's mother's certifications persuasive in establishing an

issue of material fact warranting an evidentiary hearing, as her statements attest

only to the existence of an email from plea counsel which requested she not

discuss with defendant the resolution of the case by way of a plea, months before

the State's final offer. Further, while she did certify plea counsel failed to inform

defendant of the plea until just moments before the hearing, she failed to include

if she was present when this occurred, or if this was simply a statement heard

secondhand from defendant. In any event, defendant's statements during the

sworn plea hearing belie these statements. Again, even if we were to accept

defendant's certifications as true, despite their direct contradiction in the record,

defendant has failed to illustrate accepting this plea deal prejudiced him.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

      In sum, we are satisfied that defendant failed to satisfy either the

performance or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and defendant's

arguments to the contrary in his counselled appellate brief are unavailing. To

the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's arguments it is

because we have concluded they are of insufficient merit to warrant further

discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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                                        21