Court Opinion

ID: 9568641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:06:01.598126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:39.812069
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. Although I agree that the double jeopardy clause may apply to some enhancement proceeding issues, it does not apply here. Initially, I must observe that it is settled law that a person may be tried a second time for an offense that has been set aside on appeal. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 *886(1896). See generally State v. Percy, 81 S.D. 519, 137 N.W.2d 888 (S.D.1965). This principle alone could justify an affirmance here.
Further, the majority opinion, in misapplying double jeopardy issues to the facts, allows defendant to make a mockery of the judicial system and it fosters and encourages hoodwinking of our trial courts in their serious sentencing tasks. Remember, here, while represented by counsel, defendant at the enhancement phase admitted identity and his prior convictions, NEVER raising, challenging, or even mentioning the issue of lack of counsel. Then, subsequent to sentencing, defendant commenced a habeas corpus proceeding challenging the validity of his sentence. There he complained, for the first time, that the sentencing court did not verify that during one of the prior convictions he was represented by counsel — this all at a time when defendant knew (or should have recalled) that he had previously signed a waiver of such counsel in that prior proceeding. Nowhere in the record has defendant claimed he was without counsel at his prior convictions — in fact, he admits that his sole complaint is that the State never proved it. I suggest that this is frivolous and preposterous.
After remand by the habeas corpus court for re-sentencing, defendant now complains that his prior waiver of counsel should be ignored and suppressed and that he be totally exonerated from that prior conviction. It seems as though his “second bite of the apple” is equally frivolous and preposterous.
What are the respective obligations of the participants at the enhancement proceedings? Initially the trial court, after appropriate advice and admonition, must establish identity by inquiring of defendant whether he is one and the same person alleged to have committed the alleged prior crimes specified by the State in Part II of the Information. If he denies the identity, a trial must follow; but if he admits his identity regarding the prior convictions, the court may proceed to the sentencing phase unless defendant in some manner challenges or makes suspect the validity of the prior convictions. State v. Jameson, 80 S.D. 333, 123 N.W.2d 300 (1963). It is not the burden of the trial court to inquire nor is it the obligation of the State to prove — at that stage — that the prior convictions are valid. Id.) Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967);1 Bevins v. Klinger, 365 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1966); Baymon v. State, 94 Nev. 370, 580 P.2d 943 (1978). On the other hand, if defendant questions or challenges the validity of the prior convictions, the State then has the obligation of proving to the court that enhancement is appropriate due to a valid prior criminal record. Bevins, supra: Duke v. State, 266 Ark. 697, 587 S.W.2d 570 (1979); Addington v. State, 2 Ark.App. 7, 616 S.W.2d 742 (1981); but see State v. Afong, 61 Haw. 281, 602 P.2d 927 (1979). To hold otherwise (following the rationale of the majority) would put the State in the untenable position of having to negate every possible defect in a prior conviction without knowing what the claimed defects were. As occurred here, it would allow a defendant to lay in the weeds— knowing full well that the prior conviction was valid and the claimed defect a sham— and then attack the sentence in a habeas corpus proceeding, knowing that the State’s hands are tied from subsequently showing the remedial facts to the court.
Here, the State surely erred by not making the appropriate showing at the habeas corpus proceeding. Probably, the habeas corpus court erred by remanding the case for re-sentencing. State v. Jameson, supra; State v. Jameson, 69 S.D. 565, 13 N.W.2d 46 (1944). However, no appeal was taken from the habeas corpus decision and it must now stand.2
*887To now prohibit the State, at a court-ordered re-sentencing, from showing to the court the court’s own file, which establishes that the entire proceedings have been a sham, all under the guise of double jeopardy, is inappropriate and imprudent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice WUEST joins in this dissent.

. Note in Burgett that defense counsel objected to a prior conviction, claiming it was invalid, at the initial proceeding.

. Certainly it is appropriate to challenge the validity of the prior convictions by habeas corpus, especially where defendant has not been represented by counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. In that event, however, the issues must be totally presented to and addressed by the habeas corpus court, followed by appeal, if *887necessary. Remand by the habeas corpus court is generally inappropriate.