Court Opinion

ID: 9724213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:48:36.459626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:57.557105
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting in part and concurring in part: In my opinion, my colleagues’ technical reading of the immunity granted by section 3 — 106 cannot withstand analysis. While it is true that most of the cases tested under section 3 — 106 involve unsafe or defective physical aspects of the public entity’s property itself (see e.g., Davis v. Chicago Housing Authority (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 296, 555 N.E.2d 343 (charging negligent maintenance and operation of playground); Jarvis v. Herrin City Park District (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 516, 285 N.E.2d 564 (charging failure to maintain, inspect and repair slide in park)), governmental immunity has prevailed as well under section 3 — 106 where the injured plaintiff charged only negligent conduct by defendant’s employee in the use of public property. Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 501, 512, 565 N.E.2d 654, 660. Contrary to my colleagues’ assessment, I do not believe that our supreme court was confused, inconsistent or in error when it determined that the injured plaintiff in Burdinie was precluded from recovery against the municipal defendant by virtue of the immunity granted by section 3 — 106 of the Immunity Act. In Burdinie, plaintiff claimed damages for injuries allegedly resulting because the municipal defendant’s employee, a swimming instructor at the public pool, negligently instructed plaintiff, a nonswimmer, to jump into the pool’s shallow end, whereupon plaintiff jumped, struck his head and was injured. The court stated that section 3— 106 “applies to situations where an unsafe condition exists on municipally controlled property intended for recreational use” and “contemplates liability only if the municipality or municipal employee acts in a ‘willful and wanton’ manner.” (139 111. 2d at 512, 565 N.E.2d at 660.) Because plaintiff’s complaint was framed in terms of negligence only, our supreme court ruled that it did not state a cause of action under section 3 — 106. It is apparent to me that the Burdinie court correctly interpreted the term “condition” as alluded to in the statute to mean not only a defective, unsafe or negligently maintained aspect of public property, but an employee’s negligent conduct or acts in connection with the use of such property as well. This interpretation is consistent with the Burdinie court’s prefatory statement that “[tjhere is no municipal liability *** for negligence resulting in injuries occurring on public property intended for recreational purposes, unless the local public entity is guilty of willful and wanton conduct (111. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 3 — 106).” (139 Ill. 2d at 506-07, 565 N.E.2d at 658.) As in the case on appeal today, there was no allegation in Burdinie of a faulty pool or recreational facility, only allegations of negligent conduct on the part of the public entity’s employee. It is my opinion that in rejecting plaintiff’s negligence counts pursuant to section 3 — 106, the Burdinie court left no doubt but that the term “condition” embraced the employee’s negligent conduct, which created the situation making the injury possible on public recreational property, as well as the physical attributes of such property. Further, my colleagues’ narrow interpretation of “condition” violates the cardinal rule of statutory construction that force, effect and meaning should be given to the entire statute so as to render the statute a harmonious, consistent and symmetrical whole (82 C.J.S. Statutes §346 (1953)). By my view, the majority pits unsafe physical attributes of a public recreation area or facility caused by negligence (the first clause of section 3 — 106) against willful or wanton conduct of a public entity or employee (second clause) and illogically determines that a public employee’s negligent conduct (presumably only to the extent that it does not physically affect the entity’s property) is not subject to the immunity granted by the statute. I cannot believe that this result was contemplated by the legislature. By contrast, applying a broader interpretation to the term (as was done in Burdinie) makes sense of the entire section. I would hold that the immunity afforded in the first clause includes negligent conduct in the creation of a “condition,” and this conduct was intended by the legislature to be parallel to and contrasted with willful and wanton conduct in the creation of an unsafe condition in the second clause. Otherwise stated, a “condition” created by the negligence of a public recreational proprietor or its employee is not actionable by virtue of governmental immunity (first clause of section 3 — 106), but such immunity is not available if the “condition” is caused by “such local entity or public employee[’s] *** willful or wanton conduct” (second clause). 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 3-106. Finally, as I see it, my colleagues’ holding defeats legislative goals of encouraging the development of parks and other recreational areas (Beckus v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 558, 397 N.E.2d 178) and protecting local public entities and employees from negligence liability arising from the operation of such public facilities (111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 1 — 101.1). On June 30, 1986, during the House debates on article I of Senate Bill 1200, amending the Tort Immunity Act, Representative Greiman poignantly observed, “This Amendment puts kids back in the parks. It puts Saturday’s heroes back in the high school football playing field. And yet, it makes sure that communities will still be liable for wanton and willful conduct that disregards, with conscious indifference, the safety of its citizens.” (84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1986 (House Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill 1200).) Senate President Rock similarly addressed practical concerns in explaining the purpose of the legislation: “[W]e set up a joint Senate committee between the Committees on Local Government and Insurance and asked them to go out and hold some hearings and find out, if they could, the extent of the problem with respect to the affordability and availability of liability insurance particularly as it related to local governments, because all of us were aware and somewhat appalled that counties and park districts and municipalities were confronted with the fact that-they were uninsurable or that the insurance that was offered to them was unaffordable. *** Article I is the Tort Immunity Act and the local governments and their representatives insofar as I know are pleased and well they should be, because their problem is addressed and responded to.” (84th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, at 78-80, June 30, 1986 (Senate First Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill 1200).) (Article 1 of Senate Bill 1200 was enacted into law as Public Act 84 — 1431, effective November 25, 1986.) Obviously, the “loophole” that the majority creates in the statute today will effectively destroy the protections that the local governments and the State legislators thought they had achieved for the benefit of local governments. I would hold that the answer to the first certified question is yes — that is, a local governmental entity is immune from liability for negligent acts arising from a hayrack ride pulled by two mules which it operates on its own property under section 3 — 106. 111. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 85, par. 3 — 106. I agree with the majority’s resolution of the second certified question.