Court Opinion

ID: 9896439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-11 18:10:52.523766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:00.365045
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00115-CV

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

CHARLES DEROUEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND
DEROUEN EXPRESS SERVICES LLC
D/B/A JC EXPRESS SERVICES,                                            Appellants,

                                            v.

EDDIE PRIDGEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND
EDDIE PRIDGEN WELDING LLC,                                             Appellees.

                On appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
                       of Victoria County, Texas.

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
            Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina
              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

      Appellants Charles DeRouen, Individually and DeRouen Express Services LLC

d/b/a JC Express Services (DeRouen Services) appeal from a no-answer default

judgment rendered in favor of appellees Eddie Pridgen, Individually and Eddie Pridgen
Welding LLC (Pridgen Welding). By five issues that we have reorganized, DeRouen and

DeRouen Services argue: (1) the trial court’s amended default judgment is void;

(2) service was defective; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion

for new trial; (4) Pridgen Welding lacked capacity to bring its claims; and (5) the evidence

was insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment.

       We vacate in part, affirm in part, reverse and remand in part, and reverse and

render in part.

                                   I.      BACKGROUND

       On July 14, 2021, Pridgen and Pridgen Welding filed their original petition, alleging

claims for relief against DeRouen and DeRouen Services under the theories of breach of

contract, sworn account, and quantum meruit. Pridgen and Pridgen Welding attached to

the petition: (1) a balance sheet, indicating the total amount of debt owed by DeRouen

and DeRouen Services as of July 13, 2021 ($18,830); (2) letters dated December 21,

2020, and June 16, 2021, demanding that DeRouen and/or DeRouen Services pay this

outstanding balance; (3) an affidavit signed by Pridgen; (4) a “Land Lease” executed

between Pridgen and DeRouen, in their capacities as lessor and lessee, respectively;

and (5) judgments and liens entered against DeRouen in other matters. The petition

requested personal service on DeRouen at “23434 Pearson Bend Lane, Richmond,

Texas 77469, or wherever he can be found.” It also requested personal service on

DeRouen Services through DeRouen Services’ registered agent, Brian W. Rogers, who

could be located at “5803 N. John Stockbauer, Suite E, Victoria, Texas, 77904.”

                                              2
A.      Substitute Service

        1.      On DeRouen, Individually

        On August 10, 2021, Pridgen filed a motion for substitute service, which stated that

“[r]easonably effective notice of the suit” could be given to DeRouen by serving a copy of

the petition and order granting substitute service on “anyone 16 years of age or older at

the location specified in the attached affidavit.” The affidavit attached to the motion was

sworn to by Avery Marcus Garrett, who averred that he attempted service on DeRouen

at “1402 N. Henry, Cuero, Texas” on “7-22-21” at “9:20 A.M.,” “7-26-21” at “11:10 A.M.,”

and “7-28-21” at “5:05 P.M.” However, Garrett checked a box indicating that “[a]fter a duly

diligent attempt to serve process on the person or entity at the address listed above, I

have been unable to affect process.” The following day, the trial court granted Pridgen’s

motion for substitute service, permitting service on DeRouen by leaving copies of the

petition, citation, and order granting substitute service with any person sixteen years old

or older, or by affixing copies of the same to the front door at “1402 N. Henry, Cuero,

DeWitt County, Texas 77954, a place Charles DeRouen is likely to be found.” The court

concluded that such a manner of service “will be reasonably effective in

giving . . . DeRouen notice of the suit.”

        A return of the citation was filed on August 18, 2021, and indicated that Garrett

delivered a copy of the petition and citation to James Patrick Martin on July 21, 2021, at

9:12 a.m.1 Additionally, on August 30, 2021, a document entitled “DECLARATION OF

NOT FOUND” was filed. In this declaration, Christopher G. Sampa averred that on July

        1 The return did not indicate that a copy of the order granting substitute service had been delivered

to Martin.
                                                     3
19, 2021, he visited 23434 Pearson Bend Lane, Richmond, Texas 77469, and learned

from the occupant—DeRouen’s sister-in-law—that DeRouen was not presently living

there, nor had he ever “really” lived there. That same day, DeRouen’s sister-in-law

provided Sampa with DeRouen’s phone number, and Sampa left a voicemail for

DeRouen.

       2.     On DeRouen Services

       On September 27, 2021, Pridgen filed another motion for substitute service,

claiming that “[r]easonably effective notice of the suit may be given to . . . [DeRouen

Services] by having the Texas Secretary of State served as the agent for the entity

pursuant to Texas Business Organizations Code [§] 5.251(1)(B).” Attached was an

affidavit attested to by Garrett. In the affidavit, Garrett explained that he had attempted to

locate Rogers, the registered agent of DeRouen Services, at his place of business, his

last known address, and at his parents’ residence. Garrett explained that he had “no

knowledge of [Rogers’s] whereabouts.”

       The following day, the trial court signed an order granting substitute service. The

order permitted service on DeRouen Services by “serving the Texas Secretary of State,

as agent, with the citation, with a copy of the petition and a copy of this order attached, at

P.O. Box 13697, Austin, Texas 78711-3697.” On November 29, 2021, a letter from the

Texas Secretary of State was filed, in which the Secretary certified that the citation,

petition, and order granting substitute service were received by his office on October 7,

2021. A copy of these documents was then forwarded on October 18, 2021, to 5803 N.

John Stockbauer, Suite E, Victoria, TX 77904. The Secretary explained that process “was

                                              4
returned to this office on November 12, 2021, Bearing the Notation, Return to Sender,

Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward.”

B.     Final Default Judgment

       On January 12, 2022, the trial court signed a final default judgment. This judgment

recited, “The Court has considered the pleadings and records on file in this cause and the

evidence and is of the opinion that judgment should be rendered for Plaintiffs.” The

judgment granted: (1) $26,430.00 “as the principal amount due”; (2) $7,754.71 “as

attorney’s fees”; (3) $816.46 “for costs of court”; and (4) post-judgment interest on all of

the above at a rate of 5% per annuum until the judgment is paid in full. The judgment also

awarded to Pridgen and Pridgen Welding several vehicles and portable buildings, as well

as “[a]ll contents in the [p]ortable buildings and on the property left by [d]efendants.”

C.     Motions for New Trial

       On January 27, 2022, DeRouen and DeRouen Services filed a motion for new trial.

The motion asked that a new trial be granted because: (1) neither DeRouen nor DeRouen

Services received actual notice of the suit; (2) DeRouen and DeRouen Services had a

meritorious defense, specifically, they contested the amount due under the contract and

whether they were proper parties to the lawsuit; and (3) granting a new trial would neither

cause delay nor injure Pridgen and Pridgen Welding.

       Attached to the motion for new trial was an affidavit signed by DeRouen. According

to this affidavit, DeRouen never lived at the 1402 N. Henry address, and Martin did not

pass on a copy of the citation or petition to DeRouen. Additionally, DeRouen averred that

though “Rogers was the Registered Agent for the LLC, [he] never . . . provided a copy of

                                              5
the citation or suit to [DeRouen].” DeRouen also explained that he had engaged two

separate attorneys to assist him with negotiations with Pridgen; neither of whom informed

DeRouen of the pending litigation. Lastly, DeRouen stated,

       Once I discovered there was a lawsuit, I called the [c]ourt clerk’s
       office[,] . . . and the clerk let me know someone was trying to serve [me]
       with a lawsuit. The clerk told me to wait until I was served with citation, and
       then to keep calling to see if there’s a court date to attend.

DeRouen filed an amended motion for new trial on January 28, 2022, claiming that a new

trial should be granted because: (1) “The default was rendered without proper service on

Defendants”; (2) “Defendants’ failure to appear should be excused”; (3) “It has not been

more than 30 days since judgment . . . was rendered”; and (4) “Defendants have a

meritorious defense to Plaintiffs’ claims.” No further detail was included. DeRouen neither

mentioned nor attached his prior affidavit or any other sworn document to the motion.

       On February 8, 2022, Pridgen and Pridgen Welding filed a response to the

amended motion for new trial, claiming that they strictly complied with the rules governing

service. The response also provided more detail into why they believed 1402 N. Henry

was a proper address for substitute service. For instance, attached to the response was

a copy of DeRouen’s final decree of divorce that was signed on May 27, 2021, and

awarded DeRouen “[a]ny interest the parties have in real property located at 1402 N.

Henry, Cuero, Texas.”2

       The court held a hearing on February 15, 2022. No testimony or evidence was

presented in support of or opposition to the motion for new trial. However, the court heard

       2 This document was not attached to either motion for substitute service.

                                                   6
argument from the parties’ attorneys. DeRouen’s attorney primarily argued that substitute

service was not reasonably calculated to reach DeRouen individually. The trial court

denied the amended motion for new trial at the conclusion of the hearing and signed an

order to that effect the same day.

D.     Amended Default Judgment

       DeRouen and Derouen Services filed a timely notice of appeal on March 14, 2022.

However, on March 16, 2022, Pridgen and Pridgen Welding filed a motion to amend the

default judgment, explaining that they had a “desire to have the original Default Judgment

amended to include anticipated reasonable and necessary attorney[’s] fees should

Plaintiffs prevail in an appeal of this judgment.” The motion contended that it was “timely

file[d]” and worked to “extend the trial court’s plenary power.” On April 18, 2022, DeRouen

and DeRouen Services filed a response and objection to Pridgen’s motion, arguing that

the trial court’s plenary power had expired and that they objected to any amending of the

default final judgment.

       The trial court signed an amended default judgment on April 27, 2022. This

amended judgment mirrored the language of the original default judgment in all respects

save one: it awarded appellate attorney’s fees to Pridgen and Pridgen Welding. This

appeal followed.

                            II.      AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT

       By their first issue, DeRouen and DeRouen Services contend that the trial court

lost plenary power to amend its judgment and that the April 27, 2022 amended default

judgment should be vacated. Pridgen and Pridgen Welding concede error.

                                            7
A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       A judgment is void if it was signed after the trial court’s plenary power expired.

State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tex. 1995). “[A]ppellate courts do not

have jurisdiction to address the merits of appeals from void orders or judgments; rather,

they have jurisdiction only to determine that the order or judgment underlying the appeal

is void and make appropriate orders based on that determination.” Freedom Commc’ns,

Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. 2012). A trial court’s jurisdiction to enter an

order is a question of law we review de novo. In re C.G., 495 S.W.3d 40, 43 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, pet. denied).

       “A motion for new trial, if filed, shall be filed prior to or within thirty days after the

judgment or other order complained of is signed.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(a).

       If a motion for new trial is timely filed by any party, the trial court, regardless
       of whether an appeal has been perfected, has plenary power to grant a new
       trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment until thirty days
       after all such timely-filed motions are overruled, either by a written and
       signed order or by operation of law, whichever occurs first.

Id. R. 329b(e). “[A] motion for new trial filed after a preceding motion has been overruled

is not ‘timely’ for purposes of extending the trial court’s plenary power.” In re Brookshire

Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

B.     Analysis

       Here, the trial court denied DeRouen and DeRouen Services’ amended motion for

new trial on February 15, 2022. Therefore, the trial court’s plenary power over its January

12, 2022 judgment expired on March 17, 2022. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e). Pridgen’s

motion for amended default judgment, filed on March 16, 2022, did nothing to extend the

                                               8
trial court’s plenary power. See In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 70.

Therefore, because the trial court’s plenary power had already expired when it signed its

April 27, 2022 judgment, we sustain DeRouen’s and DeRouen Services’ first issue and

declare the April 27, 2022 judgment void. See State ex rel. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 486.

Nonetheless, this leaves intact the trial court’s January 12, 2022 judgment. See id. We

will review DeRouen’s and DeRouen Services’ remaining issues with respect to that

judgment.

                                      III.   SERVICE

       By their second issue, DeRouen and DeRouen Services argue that the trial court

erred by granting a default judgment when substitute service was ineffective.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       A court obtains jurisdiction over a defendant through valid service of process or

through the defendant’s appearance. Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex.

1991); see also Dansk Express, LLC v. IPFS Corp., No. 01-22-00621-CV, 2023 WL

4937497, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 3, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). “In a

default judgment case in which jurisdiction is based on substituted service, jurisdiction

must affirmatively appear from the face of the record.” Onnela v. Medina, 785 S.W.2d

423, 425 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1990, no writ). “We indulge no

presumptions in favor of valid issuance, service, or return of citation.” Spanton v. Bellah,

612 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2020). “Accordingly, even if a defendant has received actual

notice of a pending lawsuit, a default judgment rendered upon defective service will not

stand.” Id. “[F]ailure to affirmatively show strict compliance with the Rules of Civil

                                             9
Procedure renders the attempted service of process invalid and of no effect.” Uvalde

Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam).

“Virtually any deviation from the statutory requisites for service of process will destroy a

default judgment.” Creaven v. Creaven, 551 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

       “Substituted service exists to allow plaintiffs to effect service where proof of actual

notice under Rule 106(a) is impractical.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Costley, 868

S.W.2d 298, 298 (Tex. 1993). A movant seeking substitute service must support their

motion with a statement “listing any location where the defendant can probably be found

and stating specifically the facts showing that service has been attempted under [Rule

106(a)] at the location named in the statement but has not been successful.” TEX. R. CIV.

P. 106(b). If this is satisfied, Rule 106(b)(1) “allows service by leaving a copy of the citation

and petition with someone over the age of sixteen at the defendant’s place of abode as

stated in the affidavit.” Costley, 868 S.W.2d at 299; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(b)(1).

“[S]ubstitute service may not properly issue on a motion supported by an affidavit that is

conclusory or otherwise insufficient.” Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990);

see Lewis v. Ramirez, 49 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001,

no pet.). We review a trial court’s order authorizing substitute service de novo. Furst v.

Smith, 176 S.W.3d 864, 869–70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

B.     Analysis

       1.     DeRouen, Individually

       We first address Pridgen’s argument that DeRouen’s briefing on this issue is

                                               10
inadequate and was therefore waived. We construe appellate briefs “reasonably, yet

liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not lost by waiver.” Perry v. Cohen, 272

S.W.3d 585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). In his brief, DeRouen explained that “[n]o

statement was given as to whether DeRouen lived [at 1402 N. Henry], that Garrett had

talked to someone who said he lived there, or any other statement upon which Pridgen

could rely that service at said address would be reasonably effective to give DeRouen

notice of the suit.” DeRouen cites to the clerk’s record, Rule 106, and several relevant

cases, and—albeit in a separate issue—asks this “[C]ourt to find Pridgen’s evidence

insufficient to warrant the trial court’s authorizing Rule 106b substituted service on anyone

over the age of 16 residing at 1402 N. Henry.” We construe this argument as a challenge

to the evidence supporting the finding that DeRouen could likely be found at this address;

therefore, we conclude that this issue is adequately briefed for review. See id.

       Pridgen argues that he was only required to include “a sworn statement . . . listing

a place that is one where the defendant ‘can probably be found,’ and describing the

unsuccessful efforts to serve him personally there” in the affidavit attached to his motion

for substitute service. But while the affidavit did contain the dates and times of the service

attempts, “it did not contain evidence of probative value that the address was [a] . . . place

where the defendant could [probably] be found.” See Coronado v. Norman, 111 S.W.3d

838, 842 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet. denied) (citing Garrels v. Wales Transp., Inc.,

706 S.W.2d 757, 758–59 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ)); see also Davis v. Martin,

No. 01-07-00831-CV, 2009 WL 350642, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 12,

2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that substitute service was improper where the

                                             11
affidavit in support of substitute service did “not state the location of the Davises’ usual

place of business, usual place of abode, or other place where the Davises can probably

be found”). Neither the affidavit nor the motion for substitute service included any facts to

support an inference that DeRouen could probably be found at the 1402 N. Henry

address.

       Although the response to the motion for new trial contained additional information

supporting the notion that 1402 N. Henry may be a location where DeRouen could

probably be found, that information was not before the trial court at the time it made its

decision. Therefore, we cannot consider it when determining whether the motion for

substitute service was properly granted. See, e.g., Hornell Brewing Co. v. Lara, 252

S.W.3d 426, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“[W]e hold that the

better practice is to assess whether the trial court abused its discretion based on the

information available to the trial court at the time of the ruling.”); In re A.W.P., 200 S.W.3d

242, 245 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“In determining whether the trial court

properly granted judgment on the deemed admissions, we consider only the evidence

before the trial court at the time it made that decision.”); In re Harvest Cmtys. of Hous.,

Inc., 88 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding) (“A judgment

must take its validity from the action of the court at the time it is rendered and not from

what persons may or may not do after the court has rendered the judgment.”); see also

Martinez v. Hauling 365, LLC, No. 13-20-00195-CV, 2022 WL 480251, at *2 n.4 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 17, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We do not consider

these filings as they were not before the trial court when it ruled on Martinez’s motion for

                                              12
new trial, the issue on appeal.”).

       Pridgen also argues that a 2020 revision to Rule 106(b)(1) dispensed with the

requirement that a motion for substitute service indicate that the location in question be a

place where the defendant may be found. See Order Amending Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure 106 and 108a, Misc. Docket No. 20-9103 (Tex. Aug. 21, 2020),

https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1449613/209103.pdf. The prior version of Rule 106

allowed the location in the statement to be “the defendant’s usual place of business or

usual place of abode or other place where the defendant can probably be found.” Id. The

amendment to the rule deleted the first two example locations and instead solely required

that the location be “any location where the defendant can probably be found.” Id.

       We are unpersuaded by Pridgen’s argument. The comment to the amendment

indicates that the rule was changed to incorporate rules regarding electronic service,

rather than in response to any concern about what facts must be alleged in an

accompanying affidavit, and that other changes to the rule were made primarily for the

purpose of clarification. TEX. R. CIV. P. 106 cmt. (“Rule 106 is revised in response to

section 17.033 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which calls for rules to provide

for substituted service of citation by social media. . . . Other clarifying and stylistic

changes have been made.”). Generally, a defendant’s “usual place of business or usual

place of abode” will likely also be “place[s] where the defendant can probably be found.”

Deleting this superfluous language is consistent with the notion that this modification to

the rule was intended primarily for clarification, rather than to make a substantive change.

If anything, this alteration cemented the requirement that a movant show that the location

                                            13
in their statement is one where the defendant “can probably be found,” rather than any

other location.

        Because Pridgen’s motion for substitute service did not contain any evidence that

DeRouen could probably be found at the 1402 N. Henry address, we conclude that the

trial court erred by granting substitute service as it pertained to DeRouen individually. We

sustain this issue as it pertains to DeRouen individually.3

        2.      DeRouen Services

        DeRouen Services focuses its argument on this issue on the fact that the record

does not reflect that Rogers, the registered agent, ever actually received service. The

facts in this case are nearly identical to those of Campus Investments, Inc. v. Cullever,

144 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam), and we are therefore constrained by its holding.

In Cullever, after several unsuccessful attempts to personally serve the defendant’s

registered agent, the plaintiffs requested substitute service on the registered agent via

the Secretary of State. Id. at 465. The trial court granted this request, and the Secretary

“subsequently issued a certificate that he had received and forward[ed] a copy of the

citation and Second Amended Original Petition . . . by certified mail, which was returned

marked ‘Attempted—Not Known.’” Id. The supreme court “recognize[d] that service of a

defective citation through substituted service on the Secretary of State could mislead a

defendant and lead to an improper default judgment.” Id. at 466. However, the supreme

court acknowledged that the defendant in this case “was not misled here because—as it

        3 Because this issue is dispositive, we need not address DeRouen’s remaining issues. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but
that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).
                                                    14
had failed to update addresses for its registered agent and registered office—it never

received anything the Secretary sent. Accordingly, [the defendant] was negligent in failing

to comply with its statutory duties.” Id. The supreme court held that “[a] certificate like the

one here from the Secretary of State conclusively establishes that process was served.”

Id.

         The same is true here. After multiple attempts to personally serve Rogers,

DeRouen Services’ registered agent, Pridgen sought to serve the entity through the

Secretary of State.4 Based on the supreme court’s holding in Cullever, that Rogers never

actually received a copy of the citation and original petition is not important. See id.

Indeed, the supreme court has since held that “to require proof of actual notice upon

substituted service would frustrate Rule 106(b)’s purpose . . . .” Costley, 868 S.W.2d at

299. What matters is that service was effectuated pursuant to the trial court’s order

granting substitute service, and DeRouen Services does not dispute that specific issue.5

         We overrule this issue as it pertains to DeRouen Services.

                                     IV.      MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

         By its second issue, DeRouen Services argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying its motion for new trial.

         4 DeRouen Services argues that it was in the process of changing its registered agent at the time

the Secretary of State attempted to forward service, and it has attached to its brief a document that it
contends supports this proposition. However, this document is not part of the appellate record. Therefore,
we disregard it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.1 (“The appellate record consists of the clerk’s record and, if
necessary to the appeal, the reporter’s record.”); Democratic Schs. Rsch., Inc. v. Rock, 608 S.W.3d 290,
305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (“Documents attached as exhibits or appendices to briefs
do not constitute formal inclusion of such documents in the record on appeal, and we cannot consider
matters outside the record in our review.”).
         5 Moreover, the record reflects substitute service was effectuated in compliance with the trial court’s

order.
                                                      15
A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       “A default judgment should be set aside and a new trial granted if (1) the failure to

answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was due to a mistake

or accident, (2) if the defendant sets up a meritorious defense, and (3) the motion is filed

at such time that granting a new trial would not result in delay or otherwise injure the

plaintiff.” In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 114–15 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); see Craddock v.

Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939). “The defaulting party has

the burden of setting forth facts establishing all three elements of the Craddock test.”

Action Powersports, Inc. v. 1STEL, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 632, 639 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2016, no pet.). “[C]onclusory allegations are insufficient.” Holt Atherton Indus. v. Heine,

835 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. 1992).

       “A motion for new trial is addressed to the trial court’s discretion and the court’s

ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of an abuse of

discretion.” Dir., State Emps. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.

1994). “However, a trial court abuses its discretion by not granting a new trial when all

three elements of the Craddock test are met.” Id.

B.     Analysis

       Here, DeRouen Services initially filed a motion for new trial with an attached

affidavit that contained some factual allegations corresponding to elements of the

Craddock test. However, it then filed an amended motion for new trial that solely

contained conclusory language. “The filing of an amended motion for new trial within the

time provided by Rule 329b is a matter of right and it would be an abuse of discretion for

                                            16
the court to deny leave for its filing.” Consol. Furniture Co. v. Kelly, 366 S.W.2d 922, 923

(Tex. 1963). “An amended motion supersedes and supplants the preceding motion.” Ajao

v. Hall, 654 S.W.3d 22, 28 (Tex. 2022) (first citing W.C. Turnbow Petrol. Corp. v. Fulton,

194 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. 1946); and then citing Williams v. Bayview-Realty Assocs.,

420 S.W.3d 358, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)); see also State v.

Seventeen Thousand & No/100 Dollars U.S. Currency, 809 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1991, no pet.) (“A substituted or amended motion for summary

judgment super[s]edes and supplants the previous motion, which may no longer be

considered.”). Therefore, we may only consider the propriety of the trial court’s actions

with respect to the amended motion for new trial.6

        Conspicuously absent from DeRouen Services’ amended motion for new trial are

any facts to support its conclusory claim that it had “a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs’

claims.” Because the trial court had no evidence before it that DeRouen Services had a

meritorious defense to Pridgen’s claims, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion

in denying the amended motion for new trial. 7 See Reverse Mortg. Funding, LLC v.

Robertson, 599 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (concluding that

because no verified allegations of fact accompanied the conclusory statements in its

motion for new trial, appellant “failed to establish a prima facie meritorious defense”);

Boyes v. Morris Polich & Purdy, LLP, 169 S.W.3d 448, 453–54 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005,

          6 The trial court’s order signed on February 15, 2022, denies only the amended motion for new

trial, and does not mention the original motion for new trial.
        7 Because we hold that the third Craddock element was not satisfied, we need not discuss the

other two. See Holt Atherton Indus. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1992).
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no pet.) (“Conclusory allegations do not satisfy the meritorious defense requirement of

Craddock.”). We overrule this issue.

                              V.      PRIDGEN WELDING’S STANDING

       In the section of its brief addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, DeRouen

Services also contends that Pridgen Welding “was not a party to the Land Lease and had

no capacity to assert a claim against DeRouen.” Pridgen Welding concedes that it “does

not have a valid claim for open account, breach of contract, or quantum meruit against”

DeRouen or DeRouen Services. It asks us to affirm the default judgment rendered on

January 12, 2022, in all respects, “except as to . . . Pridgen Welding.”8 We appreciate

what is plainly Pridgen Welding’s attempt to deal fairly and honestly. However, “parties to

a suit cannot concede a question of law necessary to the proper disposition of a point on

appeal.” Jackson Hotel Corp. v. Wichita Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 980 S.W.2d 879, 881 n.3

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). Although framed as a question of whether Pridgen

Welding had the capacity to bring its claims, we conclude that the issue we must address

is one of standing.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       “Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction that courts review de novo.”

Sneed v. Webre, 465 S.W.3d 169, 180 (Tex. 2015). When reviewing standing for the first

time on appeal, we “must construe the petition in favor of the party, and if necessary,

review the entire record to determine if any evidence supports standing.” Tex. Ass’n of

Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).

       8 Neither party has briefed the issue of standing.

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       “A plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is

acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act,

regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy.” Coastal Liquids

Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2001) (cleaned

up). “A plaintiff does not lack standing simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of

his claim; he lacks standing because his claim of injury is too slight for a court to afford

redress.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2008). “A party

must have both standing and capacity to bring a lawsuit. And while standing as an issue

cannot be waived, capacity can be.” Id. “To show constitutional standing, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that: (1) it suffered a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact; (2) the injury

is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and (3) a favorable decision is likely to

redress the injury.” McLane Champions, LLC v. Hous. Baseball Partners LLC, 671

S.W.3d 907, 912–13 (Tex. 2023).

B.     Analysis

       Here, Pridgen Welding did not and does not assert that it suffered any

particularized injury-in-fact because of DeRouen and DeRouen Services’ actions. See id.

Indeed, the redress sought by the petition is damages for alleged injuries suffered by

Pridgen, not Pridgen Welding. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515–16 (1975)

(discussing an association’s standing to bring a claim on behalf of its members generally);

Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. v. Beasley, 598 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2020) (“Thus, Forth

did not claim that Allstate’s settlement caused her any injury and therefore she lacked

standing to sue.”). Therefore, we conclude that Pridgen Welding lacks standing in this

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matter, and we dismiss its claims for want of jurisdiction.

                            VI.    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       By its final issue, DeRouen Services argues that the evidence was insufficient to

hold it liable for any breach of contract. Specifically, it argues that “Pridgen failed to

present any evidence of DeRouen [Services’] consent to be bound by the Land Lease, or

that DeRouen’s signature on the Land Lease was made in any capacity other than his

individual capacity.” It also argues that “[t]he only viable cause of action asserted by

Pridgen is one for breach of contract.”

       First, the trial court’s judgment does not state which cause of action it found

meritorious; it simply states that “judgment should be rendered for Plaintiffs.” DeRouen

Services does not explain why Pridgen only having one viable cause of action “probably

caused the rendition of an improper judgment,” and because such a conclusion is not

supported by the record, we must overrule it. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1).

       Second, “the non-answering party in a no-answer default judgment is said to have

admitted both the truth of facts set out in the petition and the defendant’s liability on any

cause of action properly alleged by those facts.” Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating,

Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177, 183 (Tex. 2012); see Dodd v. Savino, 426 S.W.3d 275, 292–93

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“If the facts set forth in the petition allege

a cause of action, the default judgment conclusively establishes the defendant’s

liability. . . . Consequently, appellants are precluded from asserting a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence.”). “The defendant’s default thus establishes liability, but a trial

may still be necessary if the plaintiff’s damages are unliquidated.” Paradigm Oil, 372

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S.W.3d at 183.

       DeRouen Services does not challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings or

unliquidated damages, but instead challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to reverse-

pierce the corporate veil. “Alter ego, or piercing the corporate veil, is not an independent

cause of action, but is instead a means of imposing liability for the underlying cause of

action.” Dodd, 426 S.W.3d at 291. DeRouen Services, having failed to file an answer prior

to a valid default judgment, cannot now challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to

establish liability. See id. at 292; Paradigm Oil, 372 S.W.3d at 183; see also Morgan v.

Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. 1984) (“[I]f the facts set out in the

petition allege a cause of action, a default judgment conclusively establishes the

defendant’s liability.”).

       We overrule DeRouen Services’ final issue.

                                    VII.   CONCLUSION

       We vacate the trial court’s amended default judgment signed on April 27, 2022.

We reverse and remand the January 12, 2022 judgment as it pertains to DeRouen

individually. We reverse and render judgment dismissing Pridgen Welding’s claims for

want of jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court’s January 12, 2022 judgment only as it

pertains to the judgment rendered in favor of Pridgen and against DeRouen Services.

                                                               GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                                               Justice

Delivered and filed on the
9th day of November, 2023.

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