Court Opinion

ID: 9964826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 22:01:23.476939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:44.061418
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2607
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                 v.

JOHN FEENEY,
                                               Defendant-Appellant.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
           No. 1:20-cr-00794-1 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.
                     ____________________

    ARGUED DECEMBER 13, 2023 — DECIDED APRIL 30, 2024
                ____________________

   Before WOOD, KIRSCH, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    LEE, Circuit Judge. John Feeney pleaded guilty to being a
felon in possession of a ﬁrearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) and carrying an explosive during that unlawful
possession in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2). At sentencing,
the parties disagreed on the applicable base oﬀense level un-
der the Sentencing Guidelines for Feeney’s § 922(g)(1) convic-
tion. The government argued that Feeney’s possession of an
explosive warranted an increased base oﬀense level under
2                                                 No. 22-2607

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(5). Meanwhile, Feeney argued that this
outcome would punish him twice for the same conduct in vi-
olation of Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4. The court
agreed with the government and applied the higher base of-
fense level to Feeney’s sentence. Because Feeney has the better
interpretation of the relevant guideline and application note,
we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
    I. Background
    On July 24, 2020, oﬃcers with the Grundy County Sheriﬀ’s
Department received information that Feeney may have been
involved in a roadside shootout. The next day, a sergeant be-
gan conducting surveillance of Feeney’s residence. After ob-
serving Feeney drive away from his house and commit mul-
tiple traﬃc violations, the sergeant pulled him over. During
the stop, Feeney was asked to step out of his car and stand at
the rear, but instead he ignored the request, locked his car,
and walked away. The sergeant and another deputy who ar-
rived on the scene eventually caught up to Feeney, searched
his vehicle, and found two pistols, ammunition, drugs, and
drug paraphernalia. They also found three artillery-shell ﬁre-
works, one of which Feeney had modiﬁed to contain metal
shrapnel.
   In a four-count superseding indictment, the government
charged Feeney, a convicted felon, with unlawfully pos-
sessing the two pistols pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and
with carrying explosives—the ﬁreworks shells—while com-
mitting that felony pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2). Feeney
pleaded guilty to both oﬀenses.
   In anticipation of sentencing, the probation oﬃce pre-
pared a presentence investigation report (PSR). As to the
No. 22-2607                                                  3

§ 922(g)(1) conviction, the PSR set a base oﬀense level of 14
under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6). The PSR then applied two spe-
ciﬁc oﬀense characteristics. First, it applied a two-point in-
crease pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4) because one of the
ﬁrearms was stolen. Second, it applied a four-point increase
pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because Feeney possessed the
ﬁrearms in connection with another felony (here, drug traf-
ﬁcking). After a three-level reduction for acceptance of re-
sponsibility, Feeney’s total oﬀense level was 17. With a crimi-
nal history category of IV, the PSR recommended a guideline
range of 37 to 46 months of imprisonment. As to the convic-
tion for carrying explosives while committing a felony, the
PSR calculated the guideline sentence to be the statutory 10-
year minimum under § 844(h)(2). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(a).
   Both parties objected to the oﬀense-level calculation for
the § 922(g)(1) conviction. They reasoned that Application
Note 4 to § 2K2.4 and our holding in United States v. Foster,
902 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2018), prohibited the court from apply-
ing speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics under § 2K2.1(b)(4) and
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
    The government also objected to the PSR’s base oﬀense
level of 14 for Feeney’s § 922(g)(1) conviction. In the govern-
ment’s view, Feeney’s base oﬀense level should have been 18
under § 2K2.1(a)(5) because the oﬀense also involved a “ﬁre-
arm”—the modiﬁed ﬁrework shell—as described in 26 U.S.C.
§ 5845(a). Consistent with the PSR, Feeney maintained that
Note 4 to § 2K2.4 precluded the court from applying an en-
hanced base oﬀense level based on an explosive or weapon
when formulating his § 922(g)(1) sentence.
  At the sentencing hearing, the district court agreed that
Note 4 in § 2K2.4 prohibited applying the speciﬁc oﬀense
4                                                     No. 22-2607

characteristics under § 2K2.1(b). But it sided with the govern-
ment regarding the base oﬀense level, reasoning that Note 4
only prohibits the court from applying weapon-related spe-
ciﬁc oﬀense characteristics to the underlying sentence. As a
result, the court calculated the total oﬀense level for the
§ 922(g)(1) conviction to be 15 (a base oﬀense level of 18 re-
duced by 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility). Combined
with a criminal history category of IV, this yielded a guideline
range of 30 to 37 months of imprisonment. The court imposed
a within-guidelines sentence of 30 months for the § 922(g)(1)
oﬀense and a mandatory consecutive sentence of 120 months
for the § 844(h)(2) oﬀense.
    II. Discussion
       A. Standard of Review
    We review challenges to the procedural soundness of a
sentence de novo, including challenges to a district court’s in-
terpretation of the Guidelines. United States v. De La Cruz,
897 F.3d 841, 844 (7th Cir. 2018). Incorrectly calculating the
guideline range is procedural error. See Rosales-Mireles v.
United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134 (2018). In parsing the Guide-
lines, we employ general rules of statutory construction, be-
ginning with the plain language in the Guidelines and their
application notes, which are generally considered authorita-
tive. Foster, 902 F.3d at 657 (citing Stinson v. United States, 508
U.S. 36, 38 (1993)).
       B. Analysis
    On appeal, Feeney renews his challenge to the district
court’s sentence for his conviction under § 922(g)(1). Speciﬁ-
cally, he argues that the district court erred when it applied a
base oﬀense level of 18 under § 2K2.1(a)(5) instead of a base
No. 22-2607                                                     5

oﬀense level of 14 under § 2K2.1(a)(6). In doing so, he relies
on the plain text of Note 4 to § 2K2.4. According to Feeney,
Note 4 prohibits a court from double counting his possession
of explosives in determining the base oﬀense level for his
§ 922(g)(1) conviction because that conduct is already being
punished through his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h).
    The “cardinal principle” of textual interpretation is to
“give eﬀect, if possible, to every clause and word” of the text.
Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) (quoting Wil-
liams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000)). With this principle in
mind, we begin with Note 4, which provides, in relevant part:
       If a sentence under this guideline is imposed in
       conjunction with a sentence for an underlying
       oﬀense, do not apply any speciﬁc oﬀense char-
       acteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or
       discharge of an explosive or ﬁrearm when de-
       termining the sentence for the underlying of-
       fense. A sentence under this guideline accounts
       for any explosive or weapon enhancement for
       the underlying oﬀense of conviction, including
       any such enhancement that would apply based
       on conduct for which the defendant is account-
       able under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. n.4.
    The ﬁrst sentence of Note 4 makes clear that a court may
not apply a speciﬁc oﬀense characteristic for the possession of
an explosive or ﬁrearm to determine the sentence for an un-
derlying conviction if that conduct is separately punished un-
der § 2K2.4, as it is here. See Foster, 902 F.3d at 657–58. What
is less clear from the text of Note 4, however, is whether a
6                                                  No. 22-2607

court may apply other enhancements for the possession of ex-
plosives or weapons—for example, by increasing the base of-
fense level—when determining the sentence for the underly-
ing conviction. This question bears directly on Feeney’s sen-
tence. If the answer to this question is no, the district court
erred when it applied a base oﬀense level of 18 under
§ 2K2.1(a)(5), because that augmented base oﬀense level re-
lied on Feeney’s possession of a ﬁrearm as described in 26
U.S.C. § 5845(a). We address this now as a matter of ﬁrst im-
pression.
    To determine whether the district court erred in applying
§ 2K2.1(a)(5)’s base oﬀense level to Feeney’s § 922(g)(1) sen-
tence, we proceed in two steps. First, we ask whether Note 4’s
prohibition is limited only to speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics or
whether it prohibits the application of any explosive or
weapon enhancement to the underlying sentence. Second, if
Note 4 prohibits any enhancement, we must determine
whether augmenting a base oﬀense level for conduct involv-
ing explosives or weapons is such an “enhancement” prohib-
ited by Note 4.
   We begin with the plain text of Note 4. The note’s ﬁrst sen-
tence speciﬁcally instructs courts not to apply speciﬁc oﬀense
characteristics for ﬁrearms and explosives in calculating the
underlying sentence. That much is clear. But the note does not
stop there.
    In the next sentence, the note uses language that sweeps
more broadly. It continues: “A sentence under [§ 2K2.4] ac-
counts for any explosive or weapon enhancement for the underly-
ing oﬀense of conviction, including any such enhancement that
would apply based on conduct for which the defendant is ac-
countable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” U.S.S.G.
No. 22-2607                                                   7

§ 2K2.4 cmt. n.4 (emphasis added). If, as Note 4 states, a sen-
tence under § 2K2.4 accounts for “any” explosive or weapon
enhancement for the underlying oﬀense, that leads us to con-
clude that courts are prohibited from applying “any” explo-
sive or weapon enhancement to the underlying sentence—not
just those attributable to speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics.
    Our conclusion regarding Note 4’s scope accords with tra-
ditional rules of statutory interpretation. According to the
rule against surplusage, we aim to give independent meaning
to the entire text so that no part is rendered meaningless. See
Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 358. Here, if we read Note 4’s prohibition
as limited to speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics as the government
suggests, the word “any” would have no meaning. Indeed,
such an interpretation would read the main clause of the sec-
ond sentence out of the text entirely.
    In response, the government oﬀers a textual argument of
its own—that Note 4’s prohibition covers only speciﬁc oﬀense
characteristics because the “do not apply” command in the
ﬁrst sentence appears only in conjunction with speciﬁc of-
fense characteristics and not “any … enhancement.” We do
not see this conclusion as inevitable based on the plain text of
Note 4. Instead, we read the ﬁrst sentence as prohibiting dou-
ble counting of special oﬀense characteristics. Then, the sec-
ond sentence broadens the scope of that prohibition to include
any explosive or weapons enhancements to determine the un-
derlying sentence. Besides, as discussed, narrowly focusing
on the ﬁrst sentence reads out what the second sentence
makes clear—that a sentence under § 2K2.4 “accounts for any
explosive or weapon enhancement for the underlying oﬀense
of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. n.4 (emphasis added).
8                                                               No. 22-2607

    Although we base our conclusion primarily on Note 4’s
plain text, our reading also comports with Note 4’s overarch-
ing purpose to prevent duplicative punishment. 1 For exam-
ple, the Sentencing Commission’s comments in Amendment
599 (which put in place the language of Note 4) provide that
Note 4 was enacted to “avoid unwarranted disparity and du-
plicative punishment.” U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 599
(2000). The Commission further explained that the amend-
ment was “intended to avoid the duplicative punishment that
results when sentences are increased under both the statutes
and the guidelines for substantially the same harm.” Id.; see
also United States v. Mays, 967 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir. 2020)
(“The stated purpose of Application Note 4 is to avoid dupli-
cative punishment, known as double counting in the Guide-
lines universe.”).
    Taking the government’s approach in this case would pun-
ish Feeney twice for carrying the explosive—once in his aug-
mented base oﬀense level under § 2K2.1(a)(5) for the under-
lying § 922(g)(1) conviction, and again through his § 844(h)(2)
conviction for carrying an explosive during the commission
of a felony. We think such a reading is inconsistent with the
stated purpose of Note 4.
   Our view also gains support from Application Note 2 to
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2, which describes how a district court should
determine the guidelines applicable to an oﬀense under
Chapter Two. It states in part that “[w]here there is more than
one base level within a particular guideline, the

    1 Of course, “double counting is generally permissible” unless, as

here, “the text of the guidelines expressly prohibits it.” United States v. Viz-
carra, 668 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 2012).
No. 22-2607                                                                 9

determination of the applicable base oﬀense level is treated in
the same manner as determination of a speciﬁc oﬀense charac-
teristic.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 cmt. n.2 (emphasis added). If we are
to determine the base oﬀense level “in the same manner” as
speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics in calculating the applicable
guidelines, it also stands to reason that we should treat them
similarly for the purposes of Note 4’s prohibition against dou-
ble counting.
    Finally, we oﬀer one practical point. If we place ourselves
in the shoes of the Sentencing Commission, we see little rea-
son to prohibit the double counting of conduct contained in
speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics but not in augmented base of-
fense levels when both punish similar conduct. True, base of-
fense levels and speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics are contained
in separate subsections of the Guidelines. But despite this dif-
ference in categorization, they function in the same way—
both operate to increase a defendant’s overall oﬀense level if
the underlying oﬀense involved an explosive or weapon. See
United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 2010)
(noting that double counting occurs when “precisely the same
aspect of a defendant’s conduct factors into his sentence in
two separate ways”). Given this, we think it unlikely that the
Sentencing Commission would have intended to allow dou-
ble counting of one category of enhancement but not the
other. 2

    2 In fact, this is exactly what the district court did. Acknowledging that

it could not increase the total offense level for Feeney’s § 922(g)(1) convic-
tion by applying a specific offense characteristic for the explosive, it in-
stead increased the base offense level for the § 922(g)(1) conviction based
on the same conduct. Indeed, it did so because it found Feeney’s posses-
sion of the explosive to constitute relevant conduct under § 1B1.3, despite
10                                                        No. 22-2607

    The government’s other arguments are equally unpersua-
sive. First, the government contends that because the exam-
ples that follow the relevant language in Note 4 all pertain to
speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics, we cannot read “any … en-
hancement” to encompass anything other than speciﬁc of-
fense characteristics. But the point of an example is merely to
illustrate a rule’s application based on a speciﬁc set of facts—
not to demonstrate the full range of circumstances to which a
rule might apply. Because these examples were not meant to
be all-encompassing, we think the plain language of Note 4’s
ﬁrst two sentences provides more reliable insight into what
the Sentencing Commission intended.
    Second, the government also asks us to compare Note 4 of
§ 2K2.4 with Application Note 7 of § 2K2.1, which provides
that a “defendant whose oﬀense involves a destructive device
receives both the base oﬀense level from the subsection appli-
cable to a ﬁrearm listed in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) … and the ap-
plicable enhancement under subsection (b)(3).” U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1 cmt. n.7. According to the government, because the
Sentencing Commission in Note 7 explicitly mentioned both
the base oﬀense level and the special oﬀense characteristics,
the Commission’s language in Note 4 referring to only spe-
ciﬁc oﬀense characteristics must limit the entire paragraph to
speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics. We ﬁnd this attenuated com-
parison unconvincing. The fact that another note from

Note 4’s admonition that Feeney’s mandatory consecutive ten-year sen-
tence for violating § 844(h)(2) “accounts for any explosive or weapon en-
hancement for the underlying offense of conviction, including any such
enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the defendant
is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt.
n.4.
No. 22-2607                                                      11

another guideline provision refers to the two terms separately
bears little on whether Note 4’s use of “any … enhancement”
includes enhancements besides special oﬀense characteristics.
    Having established that Note 4’s prohibition extends to
“any … enhancement” and not just those based on speciﬁc of-
fense characteristics, the next question is whether an aug-
mented base oﬀense level that relies on conduct involving ex-
plosives or weapons counts as an “enhancement” under the
text of Note 4. We conclude that it does.
    Because the Guidelines do not deﬁne “enhancement,” we
look to its plain meaning. See United States v. Taliaferro, 211
F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2000). In simple terms, its root “en-
hance” means to “heighten” or to “increase.” Enhance, Mer-
riam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/enhance (last visited Apr. 25, 2024). Black’s Law Diction-
ary further deﬁnes “enhancement” as “[a]n upward adjust-
ment to a defendant’s oﬀense level under applicable sentenc-
ing guidelines.” Enhancement, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019). Looking to these deﬁnitions, it is clear to us that
when a district court applies a higher base oﬀense level prem-
ised on use of an explosive or ﬁrearm, it is employing an “en-
hancement” because a higher base oﬀense level acts as a net
increase to the defendant’s total oﬀense level. In this case, for
example, the district court’s application of § 2K2.1(a)(5) in-
stead of § 2K2.1(a)(6) added four points to Feeney’s total of-
fense level—up from 11 to 15.
    Consistent with this construction, we have used the term
“enhancement” to refer to both increases based on graduated
base oﬀense levels and speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics.
See, e.g., United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 652 (7th Cir. 2020);
United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2010).
12                                                     No. 22-2607

The government argues that the distinction between base of-
fense levels and speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics did not matter
in any of these cases, and that, as a result, we were not using
“enhancement” as a term of art. But if true, this only supports
our conclusion that the plain meaning of “enhancement” is
broad and not conﬁned to increases based on speciﬁc oﬀense
characteristics. See Smith v. First Hosp. Lab’ys, Inc., 77 F.4th 603,
607 (7th Cir. 2023); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 101 (2012)
(“[G]eneral words … are to be accorded their full and fair
scope” and should not be “arbitrarily limited.”).
    Finally, we note that the district court’s miscalculation of
the guideline range in this case was not harmless.
See United States v. Bravo, 26 F.4th 387, 396 (7th Cir. 2022). The
court imposed a sentence within the range it calculated, and
it did not suggest that Feeney would have received the same
sentence if the guideline range were lower. Id. at 396–98.
     III. Conclusion
    For these reasons, we VACATE Feeney’s sentence and
REMAND the case to the district court for resentencing con-
sistent with this opinion.
No. 22-2607                                                     13

    KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This appeal asks us to re-
solve a single, narrow question: Does Application Note 4 of
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 only limit enhancements based on “speciﬁc
oﬀense characteristics,” or does it also aﬀect the preliminary
step of determining a defendant’s base oﬀense level? The ma-
jority interprets Application Note 4 to include the latter. I dis-
agree.
    The plain text of § 2K2.4, its accompanying commentary,
and the structure of the Sentencing Guidelines as a whole all
indicate that “enhancement” only applies to “speciﬁc oﬀense
characteristics” and does not refer to the initial base oﬀense
level determination. The command of Application Note 4 is
clear: “[D]o not apply any speciﬁc oﬀense characteristics….”
The note says nothing about the base oﬀense level, which is a
threshold determination that acts as a starting point for the
Guidelines calculation. Only after deﬁning that starting point
does the district court have anything to enhance based on spe-
ciﬁc oﬀense characteristics. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
                                 I
    We interpret the Sentencing Guidelines in the same way
that we interpret statutes—beginning with the text of the rel-
evant provision and discerning its plain meaning. United
States v. Foster, 902 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2018). In addition to
that text, we consider the application notes, which are treated
as part of the Guidelines themselves. United States v. Von Loh,
417 F.3d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 2005). When possible, we construe
statutes so that no clause, sentence, or word is superfluous or
insignificant. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). Fur-
ther, when deciding between competing understandings of a
statute, we consider the objectives of the larger statutory
scheme and select the meaning that is compatible with the rest
14                                                 No. 22-2607

of the law. River Road Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,
651 F.3d 642, 651 (7th Cir. 2011).
                               A
     Application Note 4 of § 2K2.4 provides:
        If a sentence under this guideline is imposed in
        conjunction with a sentence for an underlying
        offense, do not apply any specific offense char-
        acteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or
        discharge of an explosive or firearm when de-
        termining the sentence for the underlying of-
        fense. A sentence under this guideline accounts
        for any explosive or weapon enhancement for the
        underlying offense of conviction, including any
        such enhancement that would apply based on
        conduct for which the defendant is accountable
        under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 n.4 (emphasis added). The dispute on appeal
revolves around the italicized language in the second sen-
tence. The majority concludes that the second sentence ex-
pands the first sentence to apply not only to specific offense
characteristics but also to base offense levels, rendering the
first sentence entirely superfluous of the second. Ante, at 11.
This conclusion does not comport with the plain language of
Application Note 4.
    The first sentence of Application Note 4 acts as an une-
quivocal command to district courts: “[D]o not apply” spe-
cific offense characteristics for possession of an explosive to
the underlying offense (here, felon in possession of a firearm).
The second sentence then states the reason for that command:
“A sentence under this guideline accounts for any explosive
No. 22-2607                                                    15

or weapon enhancement for the underlying offense of convic-
tion ….” Nowhere does the note expand the scope of the com-
mand to apply to base offense level determinations, as the ma-
jority now posits.
    This aligns with Application Note 4’s amendment history.
Before 2000, the note consisted only of the first sentence (di-
recting courts not to apply specific offense characteristics).
Through Amendment 599, the Sentencing Commission added
the second sentence and included pertinent examples apply-
ing the Guideline. The Sentencing Commission’s reason for
adding this language could not have been clearer: to “clarif[y]
application of the commentary.” U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C,
Amend. 599 (2000). At no point did the Sentencing Commis-
sion suggest that the amendment was meant to expand the
scope of the note beyond its original language to limit base
offense level determinations. This is buttressed by the Com-
mission’s subsequent citations to several example cases
where courts misinterpreted the original language of the note.
Notably, in all of those cases, the courts had wrongly applied
enhancements based on specific offense characteristics rather
than on base offense level determinations. See, e.g., United
States v. Willett, 90 F.3d 404, 407–08 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying a
specific offense weapons enhancement because the defendant
used different weapons in the underlying offense). Accord-
ingly, the Sentencing Commission amended Application
Note 4 to account for those errors and resolve disparate inter-
pretations of the note’s original text.
    The Background further reinforces this limited scope of
Application Note 4. See United States v. Womack, 610 F.3d 427,
432 (7th Cir. 2010) (relying on the Guidelines background sec-
tion to ascertain “Congress’s preference”). Namely, the
16                                                  No. 22-2607

Background of § 2K2.4 provides: “To avoid double counting,
when a sentence under this section is imposed in conjunction
with a sentence for an underlying offense, any specific offense
characteristic for explosive or firearm discharge, use, brandish-
ing, or possession is not applied in respect to such underlying
offense.” (emphasis added). Again, the text makes clear that
the purpose of the Guideline is to limit offense level increases
based on specific offense characteristics rather than on initial
base offense level determinations (which are not increases at
all, as explained below). This alone resolves our question on
appeal.
                               B
    Notwithstanding the fact that the Sentencing Commission
did not expand the scope of the note by adding the second
sentence, I also disagree with the majority’s broad interpreta-
tion of “enhancement.” To analyze the term, I first describe
the boundary in the Guidelines between the two central con-
cepts at the heart of this case—base offense level determina-
tions on the one hand and specific offense characteristics on
the other. Second, I provide an overview of how the Guide-
lines have generally used enhancement as a term of art with
those concepts. And third, with this context in mind, I parse
the text of Application Note 4 itself.
    The Guidelines meticulously explain how a district court
is to calculate a Guidelines range when imposing a sentence:
“The court shall determine the kinds of sentence and the
guideline range as set forth in the guidelines … by applying
the provisions of this manual in the following order ….”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a). Continuing, the Guidelines distinguish
between a base offense level determination and an applica-
tion of specific offense characteristics: namely, the court shall
No. 22-2607                                                     17

“[d]etermine the base offense level and apply any appropriate
specific offense characteristics, cross references, and special
instructions contained in the particular guideline in Chapter
Two in the order listed.” Id. § 1B1.1(a)(2). In other words, once
the district court identifies the relevant Chapter Two section
applicable to a conviction, it naturally must determine the
base offense level first. In many cases, there is only one possi-
ble base offense level. See, e.g., id. § 2B3.2 (single base offense
level of 18 for extortion by force). But in other instances, like
this case, multiple base offense level options are available that
depend on the defendant’s conduct. Only after determining
the base offense level does the court then apply enhancements
to that base offense level—based on specific offense charac-
teristics—to calculate the total offense level. See, e.g., United
States v. Prado, 41 F.4th 951, 954 (7th Cir. 2022) (“The proper
calculation would begin with the 20 base offense level, add a
four-level enhancement for the number of firearms and a
four-level enhancement for the obliterated serial number fire-
arm, thus totaling 28, and then adding the additional four-
level enhancement for the use in connection with a felony of-
fense followed by the three-level deduction for acceptance of
responsibility, yielding a total offense level of 29.”).
    Unsurprisingly, the Guidelines only use “enhancement”
when referring to increases beyond a static, already-deter-
mined base offense level. I acknowledge that our precedent
on occasion has described choosing the higher of two base of-
fense level options as an enhancement. See, e.g., United States
v. Cherry, 855 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 2017) (referring to the
higher base offense level applicable in § 2K2.1(a)(3) as an en-
hancement). But those cases did not involve interpretation of
the term as used in the Guidelines, and perhaps in the future,
our language should be more precise. Rather than being used
18                                                   No. 22-2607

as a term of art, enhancement was, at most, used to denote the
increase in value from one base offense level to the next, in
line with its broad English definition. But the term is not used
so broadly in the Guidelines. I have not found one example
where the Guidelines use enhancement to refer to picking one
base offense level over another. Rather, the Guidelines con-
sistently distinguish base offense level determinations from
enhancement applications based on specific offense charac-
teristics, emphasizing that the two concepts cover different
aspects of a sentence, even if they apply based on the same
conduct. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 Background (distinguish-
ing the base offense level of aggravated assault from the spe-
cific offense characteristic weapon enhancement even if both
apply based on the same conduct).
    In fact, this exact distinction is made in one of the Guide-
lines at issue. Section 2K2.1(a) offers eight different base of-
fense level options for convictions related to the unlawful re-
ceipt, possession, or transport of firearms. One of those op-
tions, § 2K2.1(a)(5), instructs courts to apply a base offense
level of 18 if the offense involved a firearm described in 26
U.S.C. § 5845(a), which includes destructive devices. Then,
separately, as a specific offense characteristic under
§ 2K2.1(b)(3)(B), the court is instructed to increase the base of-
fense level by two if the offense involved a destructive device
other than a portable rocket, missile, or device used to launch
a rocket or missile. Thus, if a defendant unlawfully possesses
a destructive device, he automatically begins at a higher base
offense level of 18 under § 2K2.1(a)(5) and receives an addi-
tional two-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) for the
same conduct. Application Note 7 of § 2K2.1 plainly ad-
dresses this scenario: “A defendant whose offense involves a
destructive device receives both the base offense level from the
No. 22-2607                                                    19

subsection applicable to a firearm listed in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)
… and the applicable enhancement under subsection (b)(3).”
(emphasis added). The note emphasizes that this result is ac-
ceptable because “[s]uch devices pose a considerably greater
risk to the public welfare than other National Firearms Act
weapons.” The majority dismisses Application Note 7 as ir-
relevant. Ante, at 10–11. But the note exemplifies how the
Guidelines have consistently used enhancement as a term of
art and have eschewed the broad meaning the majority
adopts. Ante, at 11. And the note relates directly to the crimi-
nal conduct in this case. Further, it illustrates the point that,
while base offense levels and specific offense characteristics
“function in the same way” by ultimately yielding a higher
total offense level, ante, at 9, they have wholly separate pur-
poses in punishing a defendant’s criminal conduct. All told,
§ 2K2.1, like the Guidelines as a whole, defines a clear bound-
ary between base offense level determinations and enhance-
ments based on specific offense characteristics.
    This boundary mirrors the language of Application Note
4 at issue. As in every other case where the Guidelines refer
to an enhancement, the use of the term in the note’s second
sentence must refer to enhancements based on specific of-
fense characteristics. See River Road, 651 F.3d at 651 (interpret-
ing a statutory term while considering the overall statutory
scheme and context). The Sentencing Commission’s own use
of enhancement confirms this interpretation. Recall that the
original language of Application Note 4, before Amendment
599, was nearly identical to the first sentence of the note as it
stands today—the text did not reference enhancement, only
specific offense characteristics. See United States v. Foster, 902
F.3d 654, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2018) (comparing the language of
§ 2K2.4 before and after the amendment). Nonetheless, the
20                                                  No. 22-2607

Commission described the note’s original language as having
“previously stated that if a sentence was imposed under
§ 2K2.4 in conjunction with a sentence for ‘an underlying of-
fense,’ no weapon enhancement should be applied.” U.S.S.G.
Supp. to App. C, Amend. 599 (emphasis added). In its own
words, then, the Commission used enhancement and specific
offense characteristics interchangeably when referring to the
note’s pre-amendment text.
    Moreover, Application Note 4 is replete with other clues
confirming that “enhancement” refers only to increases to an
established base offense level based on specific offense char-
acteristics. For instance, the note gives several examples of en-
hancements that would not apply under the Guideline; un-
surprisingly, each example relates to enhancements based on
specific offense characteristics. Not one example precludes, as
an “enhancement,” the selection of a higher base offense level.
Though these examples are not “all-encompassing,” ante, at
10, the wholesale omission of any examples of base offense
level determinations cannot be disregarded.
    Two final textual points. First, the majority relies on dic-
tionaries to ascertain the plain meaning of “enhancement.”
Ante, at 11 (noting the term means to “increase” or
“heighten”). I have no quarrel with that definition. But one
cannot increase the value of something that does not yet exist.
Without first determining a base offense level, there is noth-
ing to increase or heighten. And choosing a higher base of-
fense level out of two (or more) options does not imply that
the lower option is the default from which an increase takes
place.
   Second, the majority places far too much weight on “any
enhancement” in the second sentence (and on the word “any”
No. 22-2607                                                   21

in particular) to support an expansive interpretation of the
term that wholly ignores the first sentence. Ante, at 7 (empha-
sizing “any” as broadening the scope of the first sentence). In
the majority’s view, my interpretation would render this lan-
guage meaningless and create statutory surplusage. Id. Stated
differently, why would the Sentencing Commission have
added the second sentence, and “any enhancement” in partic-
ular, if not to include base offense level determinations?
    But the use of “any” in the second sentence is not surplus-
age because the first sentence itself used the term—prohibit-
ing “any specific offense characteristics.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 n.4
(emphasis added). The Sentencing Commission’s decision to
use “any” again in subsequent sentences does not broaden the
meaning of enhancement. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S.
561, 570 (1995) (noting “the ‘normal rule of statutory construc-
tion’ that ‘identical words used in different parts of the same
act are intended to have the same meaning’”) (quotation omit-
ted). Simply, the first sentence refers to “any specific offense
characteristic,” while the second sentence refers to “any en-
hancement.” Based on the plain language of the note and its
statutory background, this is a distinction without a differ-
ence.
   Rather, it is the majority’s interpretation that now renders
portions of Application Note 4 meaningless: the introductory
sentence to be specific. If the majority is correct that “any en-
hancement” refers to both specific offense characteristics and
higher base offense levels, then the note’s initial, narrow ref-
erence to “specific offense characteristics” would be redun-
dant and pointless. The Sentencing Commission might as well
have struck “specific offense characteristics” from the text be-
cause the “any enhancement” language fully encompasses
22                                                   No. 22-2607

the concept. We do not interpret statutes this way. See Dun-
can, 533 U.S. at 174.
                                C
    The majority also contends that applying § 2K2.4 only to
specific offense characteristics would lead to impermissible
double-counting. But there is no rule against double counting
in the Guidelines; instead, “double counting is presumed per-
missible ….” United States v. Cook, 850 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir.
2017) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Vizcarra,
668 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he default rule is that the
same conduct may determine the base offense level and also
trigger the cumulative application of enhancements and ad-
justments unless a specific guideline instructs otherwise.”).
And in this case, as I noted above, Application Note 7 in
§ 2K2.1 distinguishes a defendant’s base offense level due to
his use of a destructive device under § 2K2.1(a)(5) from the
two-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) based on the
same conduct. Correspondingly, the limitation in Application
Note 4 of § 2K2.4 only serves to limit the application of the
two-level § 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) enhancement, not the initial base
offense level determination.
    That is precisely what happened in this case. Feeney was
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which bars felons
from possessing a firearm, and 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2), which
prohibits the carrying of an explosive during the commission
of a felony. Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, the district court calcu-
lated the § 844(h)(2) Guidelines range to be the mandatory
term of imprisonment required by statute. The § 922(g)(1)
Guidelines range was determined separately under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1. There, the district court first addressed the threshold
step of determining the base offense level. Because Feeney
No. 22-2607                                                   23

used a destructive device, his base offense level was 18 under
§ 2K2.1(a)(5). The majority views this as an enhancement be-
cause Feeney was assigned a base offense level of 18 rather
than a base offense level of 14 under § 2K2.1(a)(6) (the base
offense level for possession by a prohibited person). But the
district court merely determined which of the eight possible
base offense levels applied to Feeney based on his criminal
conduct. Only then could the court enhance that offense level
based on specific offense characteristics. Because of Applica-
tion Note 4’s command, however, the court correctly re-
frained from enhancing Feeney’s offense level by two under
§ 2K2.1(b)(3)(B) (a specific offense characteristic). That is all
that the note required.
    The majority interprets Application Note 4 in a manner in-
consistent with the plain text of the applicable Guidelines and
its amendment history. “It is not our place to rewrite the
guidelines,” United States v. Joseph, 50 F.3d 401, 403 (7th Cir.
1995), and I would not do so here. For the reasons outlined
above, I respectfully dissent.