Court Opinion

ID: 9963044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 15:04:11.896389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:16.383045
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                      KWUAN MONTRELL BAKER,
                             Appellant,

                                     v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                             No. 4D2023-2642

                              [April 24, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; Michael C. Heisey, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2020CF002332 A.

  Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sorraya M. Solages-
Jones, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

   Kwuan Montrell Baker appeals his convictions and sentences for one
count of high speed or wanton fleeing or eluding and one count of felony
driving with a suspended license following a non-jury trial. Finding merit
in Defendant’s argument that the trial court fundamentally erred by failing
to obtain a valid waiver of jury trial from Defendant, we reverse.

    On the day of trial, defense counsel advised the court that Defendant
wanted to proceed with a non-jury trial. Defense counsel then asked
Defendant if it was his decision and desire to proceed with a non-jury trial,
and Defendant orally affirmed. Neither defense counsel nor the trial court
conducted any further inquiry of Defendant, and no written waiver of jury
trial was filed.

    “The United States and Florida Constitutions provide defendants with
a fundamental right to a jury trial.” Walker v. State, 149 So. 3d 170, 171
(Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Nonetheless, “[a] defendant charged with a criminal
offense may in writing waive a jury trial with the consent of the state
(Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.260), or orally on the record after colloquy from which
the court finds the waiver is voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sinkfield v. State, 681 So. 2d 838, 838
(Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). The failure to obtain a valid waiver of a defendant’s
right to jury trial is not only per se reversible error, but also constitutes
fundamental error. See id. (“Florida courts have treated [the failure to
obtain a valid waiver of a defendant’s right to jury trial] as per se reversible
error.”); Dumas v. State, 439 So. 2d 246, 252 n.8 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
(“Because the right of an accused to trial by jury is fundamental, Floyd v.
State, 90 So. 2d 105, 106 (Fla. 1956), an infringement of that right
constitutes fundamental error.”).

    To obtain a valid oral waiver of a defendant’s right to jury trial, the trial
court “must conduct a colloquy that ‘will focus a defendant’s attention on
the value of a jury trial and . . . make a defendant aware of the likely
consequences of the waiver.’” Morris v. State, 680 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla.
1st DCA 1996) (quoting Tucker v. State, 559 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 1990)).
Importantly, defense counsel’s statement to the court that the defendant
has agreed to a non-jury trial is not a valid oral waiver in the absence of
the court’s requisite inquiry of the defendant and on the record findings
that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Walker, 149
So. 3d at 171 (defense counsel’s statement to the court that “both the
prosecutor and defense counsel agreed the case should be set for non-jury
trial” did not constitute a valid oral waiver); Sinkfield, 681 So. 2d at 839
(defense counsel’s statement to the court that the defendant “agreed to go
non-jury” was not a valid oral waiver). This is true even if the statement
is made in the defendant’s presence and with the defendant’s oral
confirmation. See Morris, 680 So. 2d at 545.

   Morris is particularly instructive. In that case, defense counsel orally
moved for a non-jury trial during a pretrial conference. 680 So. 2d at 545.
“Defense counsel then asked appellant if this was his request, and
appellant orally affirmed.” Id. The trial court thereafter granted the
request for a non-jury trial without any further inquiry of the defendant.
Id. In reversing the case for a new trial, the appellate court held that
although “the waiver of jury trial was made orally by appellant’s counsel
in appellant’s presence, and appellant orally affirmed,” the trial court “did
not make the requisite inquiry into the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
nature of the waiver.” Id.

    Here, similar to Morris, defense counsel merely asked Defendant to
orally confirm on the record that it was his decision and desire to proceed
with a non-jury trial. The trial court, however, failed to make any inquiry,
let alone the requisite inquiry into the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
nature of the waiver. The trial court’s failure to obtain a valid waiver—

                                       2
written or oral—constitutes fundamental error. See Dumas, 439 So. 2d at
252 n.8. Accordingly, the cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

   Reversed and remanded for new trial.

GROSS and GERBER, JJ., concur.

                          *         *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                                   3