Court Opinion

ID: 9881142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 19:04:14.177269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:10.614826
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 P. v. Ceja CA2/8
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                       B314760

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. TA146632
         v.

EDWARD CEJA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Allen J. Webster, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded.
      Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Mathews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        ____________________
      A jury convicted Edward Ceja and an accomplice of
attempted murder and found gang enhancements true. Ceja
alone brings this appeal and argues three evidentiary errors
compel reversal. He also maintains reversal is necessary due to
recent legislation requiring bifurcation of trials involving gang
enhancement allegations and adopting heightened proof
requirements for these enhancements. We vacate Ceja’s gang
enhancement finding, remand for further proceedings, and
otherwise affirm the judgment. Undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
                                  I
      A little after 6 p.m. on June 9th, 2018, Ceja entered a
supermarket with two others, Anthony Contreras and Pablo
Andy Amador. Surveillance video from inside the store and still
shots from the video show Ceja up close. We see his face and his
clothing: He is wearing a white shirt with a black one
underneath, light blue jeans with black pleats near the knees, a
backwards black baseball cap, a black backpack, and black and
white shoes. His companions both have white shirts and dark
bottoms. From the way Ceja is walking, grabbing his waistband,
and readjusting his pants, it appears he has a gun.
      The video does not have sound. It shows Ceja chancing
upon and then exchanging words with a man named Francisco
Rivera, who was accompanied by two others. Ceja squared up
with Rivera. Amador pushed Ceja back, and the confrontation
ended. Ceja’s group left the store without making a purchase and
went to Contreras’s white Lexus.
      The video picks up the passenger side of the car and shows
Amador getting inside. The action is further away in the parking
lot but is still visible.

                               2
      The video shows the white car pull out of its parking spot
and move to a place with a better view of the store’s exit. The
driver, Contreras, then readjusted the white car’s position and
waited.
      Rivera left the store about five minutes after Ceja,
Contreras, and Amador.
      As Rivera emerged, the white car sped toward Rivera, who
darted out of the way. Ceja jumped out of the back seat with a
gun. Ceja shot at Rivera several times, hitting him in the head
and arm. Ceja also hit two cars before getting back in the white
car, which sped away.
      Police arrested Ceja and Contreras. The video captured the
Lexus’s license plate number, which led police to Contreras. This
car was in the driveway of Contreras’s home when they served a
search warrant there.
      In jail, Contreras made incriminating statements to an
informant. The two discussed gangs. Contreras said he was in
“OES.” Mid-conversation, a deputy led Contreras out of the cell
and showed him video from the supermarket incident. When
Contreras returned, he told the informant, “It’s some serious shit,
man. . . . I’ma be here for a minute, dog.” He described what the
video showed. He admitted the video showed his license plate,
him, and his “little cousin.” Contreras confirmed he didn’t “do it”
but “they got my little primo . . . on that shit” and “that fool’s
already on camera . . . .”
      Detective Jason Marx had a recording device placed in
Contreras’s jail cell. A redacted version of the recording was
admitted into evidence, but not the transcript. The recording had
been sanitized to remove details about a separate homicide
involving Ceja, which also was caught on video.

                                3
       Both Ceja and Contreras declined to testify in their joint
trial. Rivera was an uncooperative witness who claimed not to
remember the day he was shot. Rivera previously told Marx that
Ceja’s group appeared to be looking for trouble, approached him
in the store, and “banged” on him: asked about his gang. Rivera
told them he didn’t “ ‘gang bang. But if there’s a problem, we can
handle it.’ ”
       The prosecution played video clips of the supermarket
incident for the jury and published still shots from the videos.
Marx, who had been investigating the homicide case involving
Ceja and had studied the videos of both shootings, “immediately
identified” Ceja as the supermarket shooter. At trial, he briefly
described the circumstances of this other shooting, which
occurred in July 2018. Multiple witnesses had identified Ceja as
the shooter there. Marx’s investigation of this other shooting led
him to the suspects in this case.
       The trial court permitted this testimony under Evidence
Code section 1101, subdivision (b), as evidence relating to motive
and intent. The court did not, however, allow the prosecution to
play the surveillance video of the other shooting. The prosecution
had charged Ceja for the June 2018 supermarket incident and
the July 2018 homicide in one information. But on defense
motions, the court severed the counts for the two incidents for
trial.
       Other evidence tied Ceja to the supermarket shooting.
       The prosecution introduced text messages from Ceja to his
girlfriend in which he appears to discuss the shooting. The
messages appear to say: Some shit, babe they got me “smh”
(shaking my head); I told him take it outside cuz security was on
us already so we waited outside in a parking lot; so we pulled up

                                4
and I just did my thing; my mom called me to see if it was me and
she said the whole parking lot was taped off and they took his
bitch ass to the hospital; I’m sorry baby but I ain’t gonna look like
no bitch.
       Several hours before the shooting, Ceja recorded a selfie
video of him wearing the same clothing and backpack shown in
the supermarket surveillance videos. In the video, Ceja makes a
gang hand sign and pulls out a Beretta 92F handgun—a nine-
millimeter gun—from his waistband. Other photographs and
video from Ceja’s cell phone show him with what looks like this
gun and clothing matching the supermarket shooter’s. Marx
established the gun shown in Ceja’s phone was consistent with
the gun seen in the surveillance videos for both shootings. Police
never found the gun.
       The jury learned that Ceja and Contreras had texted about
Contreras providing Ceja a nine-millimeter handgun, and that
police found nine-millimeter expended bullet casings at the
supermarket crime scene.
       Marx established the light jeans worn by the supermarket
shooter matched those worn by Ceja in the July shooting and
those shown in photographs and videos on Ceja’s phone. Police
found these jeans at Ceja’s address with an empty Beretta
magazine in the pocket. Police also found a black baseball cap
there.
       An expert tied Ceja to DNA found on the recovered jeans.
Another expert determined the cartridge casings found at the
supermarket crime scene would fit into the recovered magazine,
and the magazine would fit into a nine-millimeter Beretta.
       Cell phone and social media evidence established Ceja,
Contreras, and Amador were cohorts. The jury saw these three

                                 5
and others posing with guns or making the hand sign for the OTF
gang (Only the Family). Videos from Contreras’s phone show
him tagging OTF and OES.
       Detective Carolina Roman was the prosecution’s gang
expert. She explained committing crimes benefits gangs by
instilling fear in the community, enhancing the gang’s reputation
for violence, making the gang more powerful, and increasing
respect from other gangs. She provided background on OTF—
including its primary activities and rivalries, and its association
with OES—and she opined Ceja was a member of OTF. Roman
opined the shooting was committed for a gang’s benefit.
       The lead security officer for Lynwood schools reluctantly
testified about OTF and other cliques or “tagging crews” at the
high school and the problems they caused on campus. He
identified Amador and others as part of OTF and testified Ceja
would get into altercations at school.
       The prosecution’s trial theory was that Ceja and family
members belonged to a small and ambitious gang, eager to
establish itself and to move up the ranks among gangs. Their
gang sought to win recognition from the Mexican Mafia, which
would give OTF status in the neighborhood. Recognition from
the Mexican Mafia is significant, because “the Mafia is like the
ultimate for gangs. So it’s very important for them to get it.” A
way for a lesser gang to earn Mexican Mafia recognition is to
establish a reputation for violence. “So they’re going to commit
crimes, shootings, murders, they’re going to show how violent
they are in order to be recognized by them.”
       One prosecutorial theme was that Ceja was acting to
establish a reputation as a shooter—a true killer. “A reputation
is everything.” Some of the prosecution’s case concerned Ceja’s

                                6
boastful social media postings about what a fearful threat he was.
One message was that “he would shoot somebody in the head.”
“They better be afraid of him.”
       For the defense, Ceja’s counsel recalled Marx and called a
video witness who compared photographs from Ceja’s phone to
still shots from the supermarket videos and discussed clips from
these videos. This presentation aimed to establish the shooter
was not wearing a hat and backpack, the video did not show
anyone get into the white Lexus, and all three suspects wore
white shirts.
       Contreras’s counsel did not call witnesses. He and the
prosecution stipulated Contreras was not related to Ceja and
others by blood. Contreras’s case was built on conceding he was
the driver and Ceja was the shooter but portraying himself as an
unknowing companion.
       The jury convicted Ceja and Contreras of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated attempted murder. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a).) It
found firearm and gang allegations true. (§§12022.53, subds. (a)-
(d) & (e)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) The jury also convicted both
defendants of felony and misdemeanor vandalism for the damage
to the two cars. (§ 594, subd. (a).) Ceja separately pleaded no
contest to murder for the July 2018 incident.
                                   II
       On appeal, Ceja maintains the trial court should have
excluded evidence of the July shooting, Contreras’s jailhouse
statements, and all cell phone evidence. Ceja also contends he
should benefit from recently enacted ameliorative laws for gang
enhancements, laws he says require reversal here. We agree only
with part of his latter contention. A limited remand is necessary.

                                 7
                                  A
      Ceja first argues it was improper to admit evidence of the
July shooting because this incident was dissimilar to the June
supermarket shooting and the evidence was unduly prejudicial.
For purposes of analysis, we assume there was error. This
assumed error was harmless. We apply the harmless error
standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). (See
People v. Jefferson (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 494, 508.)
      The jury watched a video of Ceja shooting Rivera. It could
compare Ceja’s face, clothing, and demeanor from the video clips
and the still shots to the pictures and video from Ceja’s phone
showing him with a Beretta 92F handgun. One selfie video from
a few hours before the shooting shows Ceja holding this gun and
wearing the same clothes the supermarket videos show. The jury
could see that of the three men who approached Rivera’s group in
the store, only Ceja could have been the shooter, as only he was
wearing light pants.
      Marx tied the distinctive jeans Ceja wore in the
supermarket video to those shown in Ceja’s phone and found at
Ceja’s address with an empty Beretta magazine in the pocket.
He linked the recovered magazine to the crime weapon. And he
connected the gun featured in Ceja’s phone to the gun seen in the
store shooting.
      The jury saw the jeans, the black baseball cap, and the
magazine found at Ceja’s address. DNA on the jeans pointed to
Ceja.
      The jury knew Ceja and Contreras had texted about
Contreras giving Ceja a nine-millimeter gun. And it knew police
found nine-millimeter expended bullet casings at the scene.

                                8
       The jury saw text messages in which Ceja appeared to
confess to the crime and to identify his motive.
       In short, this assumed evidentiary error in admitting
evidence of another crime was harmless.
                                   B
       Ceja argues the trial court improperly admitted Contreras’s
recorded jailhouse statements under the hearsay exceptions for
declarations against interest and party admissions. Ceja does
not challenge their admission on confrontation grounds.
       Ceja and Contreras had a joint trial. The trial court
admitted the jailhouse recording with some redactions, but not
the transcript.
       Any assumed error was harmless. Even if the trial court
incorrectly admitted this evidence, reversal of Ceja’s convictions
would be unwarranted. We again apply the Watson harmless
error standard. (See People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 618–
619 (Duarte).)
       The jury did not ask to listen to the recording while
deliberating, and it had no transcript to study during its
deliberations. The recording was almost an hour long. Much of
the time, the informant was providing information, advice, and
assurances to Contreras. Contreras expressed concern about his
situation, at times saying he was “trippin’ out” and didn’t “know
what the fuck to say” to police.
       Contreras spoke about his gang involvement and conceded
his “little cousin” was “active” and was putting them on the map.
He noted his male family members—including his brother, five
“primos” (cousins), and an uncle—are all “busted” for serious
crimes. He acknowledged: “I guess when it’s time to put in work,

                                9
fool, it’s just time to put in work” and “this is the life we chose
. . . . It is what it is, dog.”
         At times, Contreras spoke about the supermarket shooting:
he explained how the situation went from “zero to a hundred real
quick” despite his efforts to de-escalate it; how he drove away
afterwards and covered his tracks by wiping down the car and
breaking his phone; and how “they’re gonna get me for that shit,
dog.” Only after Contreras left the jail cell to watch the
surveillance video and returned did he concede that his “primo”
did it: he “just hopped out the car and started letting that fool
have it, dog.” When asked if you can see it “good” on the video,
Contreras responded: “Very good, fool. I’m there too, fool. Fuck,
man. It is what it is, dog.”
         We also incorporate our earlier analysis of harmless error.
         The prosecution’s case against Ceja was strong without
Contreras’s statements. It is not reasonably probable Ceja would
have obtained a more favorable result had the court excluded the
disputed statements. (See Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 613,
619–620 [applying the Watson standard where exculpatory
statements were erroneously admitted].)
         Ceja argues a more stringent standard of harmlessness
applies because the challenged evidence was unreliable. Ceja’s
cases rebuff this argument. (E.g., Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
pp. 618–619 [“Because the prosecution’s case depended so heavily
on the unreliable and impeached testimony of Eran Knox . . . we
also conclude that the court’s error in applying section 1230
cannot be dismissed as harmless under People v. Watson [ ], the
standard applicable to state law error in the admission of
hearsay”]; People v. Gallardo, 18 Cal.App.5th 51, 74, 76–77
[applying the Watson standard after finding the disputed

                                10
statements were too self-serving and unreliable to qualify as
declarations against interest].)
       The circumstances of Contreras’s jailhouse statements also
bear hallmarks of reliability. From the long exchange between
Contreras and the informant, it was apparent Contreras made
his statements in confidence to someone he trusted: apparently
an older, experienced fellow gang member and cellmate. There is
no sign Contreras suspected he was speaking to a police
informant. Much of what Contreras relayed disserved his penal
interest: his statements made him at least an accessory to the
supermarket shooting and implicated him in gang activity. Most
of Contreras’s statements did not concern his younger “primo.”
While Contreras hoped his “cousin” would take the blame, he told
the informant “I ain’t gonna say shit though” because “that’s my
primo.” According to Contreras, when police identified Ceja, he
told them he didn’t know what they were talking about.
Contreras was not looking to improve his situation with the
police by shifting responsibility to Ceja.
       Contreras’s statements were not so unreliable that their
admission violated Ceja’s constitutional rights.
                                   C
       Ceja’s third contention is the trial court erroneously
admitted cell phone evidence without sufficient authentication.
He appears to claim evidence purportedly from his and
Contreras’s phones could be authenticated only by the person
who extracted data from the phones.
       We assume Ceja did not forfeit this third contention.
Nevertheless, this contention is incorrect.
       Authentication means introducing evidence sufficient for a
fact finder to find the evidence is what it purports to be. (Evid.

                               11
Code, § 1400; People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 267
(Goldsmith).) The proponent may rely on expert testimony, the
writing’s content, or circumstantial evidence. (Evid. Code,
§§ 1418, 1421; Goldsmith, at p. 268.) “[T]here are no limits on
the means by which a writing may be authenticated.” (People v.
Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 715, 729; see Evid. Code, § 1410.)
       We review a trial court’s decision that evidence has been
sufficiently authenticated for abuse of discretion. (See
Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266.)
       The disputed items are photographs and videos stored on
the phones Marx obtained from Ceja and Contreras’s home
pursuant to search warrants, and “Cellebrite” reports reflecting
text messages on these phones. Cellebrite is the extraction
software.
       Marx’s testimony, plus the content and timing of the items,
was sufficient to show the disputed items were what the
prosecution claimed they were: photographs and videos from the
defendants’ phones and messages created by them. (See
Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 271 [content of photographs
may support a finding of genuineness]; see also People v. Valdez
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1437 (Valdez) [“the proponent’s
threshold authentication burden for admissibility is not to
establish validity” categorically].)
       Marx was present for Ceja’s arrest. Ceja had a cell phone
on him at the time, which was booked. Marx obtained
Contreras’s phone after serving a search warrant on Contreras’s
residence. He wrote the search warrants to obtain the data from
both phones.
       Once he gets these warrants, Marx transfers the phones to
the Sheriff Department’s High-Tech Task Force. The task force

                                12
then uses Cellebrite software to download the data in a way that
leaves no footprint and does not alter the data.
       Marx provided “the complete download” to the parties.
Looking at one of the Cellebrite reports, he explained this was
the format of the text messages extracted from the phone.
Cellebrite trained and certified Marx and the task force to do this
work. Marx formerly had been in charge of the downloading. He
explained how the software allowed investigators to generate
separate reports to “parse out different parts of information such
as contacts, text messages, photographs.” That is what he did in
this case.
       Marx testified he went through Ceja’s phone to look for
pictures, photographs, and videos from the date of the shooting,
and he accessed messages and photographs from both defendants’
phones pursuant to search warrants. He then testified about
various photographs, videos, messages, and extraction reports
from the phones.
       The photographs and videos have identifying features: one
still shot of a video created the day of the July homicide shows
the distinctive light blue jeans and a Beretta 92F handgun; the
selfie video made the day of the supermarket shooting shows Ceja
wearing the same clothing he wears in the surveillance video,
holding a Beretta, and making the OTF gang hand sign; several
photographs show Ceja, Amador, and sometimes others either
making this hand sign or holding a gun; another photograph
shows Ceja’s gang moniker (“Baco”) with “O.T.F.” tagged on a
wall; other videos show Contreras doing the tagging himself.
       The reports also have identifying features: they include
known contacts or monikers, including “Nutty” (Contreras), “50”
(Amador), and Ceja’s girlfriend Genesis. Some show Ceja’s

                                13
distinctive writing style and labeling, as explained by Marx and
Roman.
       The key text messages between Ceja and his girlfriend are
close in time to the supermarket shooting. They appear to refer
to the shooting. They name Ceja as one of the people texting:
Ceja’s girlfriend calls him “Edward.”
       No witness or evidence created doubt that the phone
evidence was anything but authentic photographs, videos, and
messages from the defendants’ phones. No defendant denied a
phone was his or claimed Cellebrite provides false data or
inaccurate reports.
       To authenticate the data, the prosecution did not need to
call the person who performed the downloads. (See People v.
Calhoun (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 275, 290–293, 314 & 319 [phone
data properly authenticated where the officer who seized a
Vortex cell phone and was familiar with Cellebrite—but who had
others do the download—testified, and where the contacts and
messages reflected in the report established the victim used the
phone to communicate with the defendant]; see also Goldsmith,
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 272 [“We disagree that the testimony of a
Redflex technician or other witness with special expertise in the
operation and maintenance of the ATES [automated traffic
enforcement system] computers was required as a prerequisite
for authentication of the ATES evidence”].)
       In re K.B. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 989 is consistent with our
analysis. The prosecution in In re K.B. relied on the testimony of
a police officer who used Cellebrite to extract images on the
defendant’s phone, but the court did not say this foundation was
required. (See id. at pp. 997–998.)

                                14
       This trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
disputed phone evidence. (See Valdez, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1436 [“the trial court could conclude that particular items on
the [MySpace] page, including a photograph of [defendant]
forming a gang signal with his right hand, met the threshold
required for the jury to determine their authenticity”].)
                                  D
       Ceja’s fourth and fifth contentions spring from Assembly
Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 333), which became
effective on January 1, 2022, after the jury convicted Ceja. (See
People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206 (Tran).)
       AB 333 did two key things. First, it added section 1109,
which, on defense request, requires gang enhancement
allegations be tried separately from the substantive offense.
(Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1206.) Second, it altered the
elements of the section 186.22 gang enhancement. (See ibid.)
       Ceja argues the first change requires reversal of the entire
judgment and the second requires reversal of his gang
enhancement. We reject the first argument and accept the
second.
                                  1
       California appellate courts are split on whether the new
bifurcation provision applies retroactively. (Tran, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 1208.) Our Supreme Court acknowledged the split
but declined to resolve it in Tran. (Ibid.)
       We need not take sides because we conclude the lack of
bifurcation did not prejudice Ceja.
       “The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of
a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the
charged offense.” (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31

                                 15
(Chhoun); see also Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1208 [even if not
admitted to prove a gang enhancement, gang evidence may be
relevant and admissible to prove other facts related to a crime].)
       While not all the gang evidence introduced in this case
would have been admissible in a bifurcated trial, most of it was
relevant and would have been admissible to establish Ceja’s
motive and intent for the attempted murder charge. “Evidence of
the defendant’s gang affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s
territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices,
criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove
identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of
applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the
charged crime.” (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040,
1049.)
       Ceja’s appellate briefing concedes the gang evidence could
support an inference he had a motive to commit the attempted
murder and “some gang evidence would certainly have been
admissible to prove appellant’s association with his codefendant
Contreras and his motive to commit the charged attempted
murder.”
       Gang evidence would have remained central to this case
because it explained why Ceja responded violently and
disproportionately to a small provocation. Evidence of Ceja’s and
other participants’ gang affiliation provided context for Ceja’s
actions and helped establish his motive and intent. (See Chhoun,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 30–33 [finding gang evidence relevant and
admissible and recognizing “motive can illuminate intent”].) The
probative value of the evidence also outweighed its potential for
unfair prejudice.

                               16
       Evidence that two OTF members committed other
offenses—underage possession of a firearm, vandalism, and
aggravated assault—would have been unnecessary in a trial
limited to the charged offenses. This evidence, however,
comprised only a few pages of trial testimony and a handful of
exhibits. The charged attempted murder was more inflammatory
and more serious. This other evidence did not prejudice Ceja.
Nor did it render this trial fundamentally unfair.
       Given the strength of the evidence against Ceja, as we have
recounted above, and the relevance of gang evidence to Ceja’s
attempted murder charge, there was no reasonable probability
Ceja would have obtained a more favorable result if his trial had
been bifurcated. (See Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1209–1210
[applying Watson]; see also People v. Ramos (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 1116, 1131 [same].) New section 1109 does not
require reversal of Ceja’s guilty verdicts.
                                  2
       Apart from adding section 1109, AB 333 amended section
186.22 in many respects and made the standards for applying
gang enhancements more rigorous. (People v. Cooper (2023) 14
Cal.5th 735, 744–745 (Cooper); see also Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 1206 [outlining the changes].) Among other things, this bill
narrowed the definition of “pattern of criminal gang activity” by
specifying the predicate offenses must commonly benefit a
criminal street gang and by requiring the benefit to be more than
reputational. (Tran, at p. 1206; § 186.22, subds. (e)(1) & (g).)
       The parties agree these statutory changes apply
retroactively to Ceja but dispute whether a remand to retry the
enhancement is warranted. Ceja prevails on this issue.

                               17
       Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 governs our
review. (Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 746.)
       This trial did not establish the new statutory requirements
of section 186.22. Ceja argues many requirements were not met,
but noting one example suffices here: the evidence did not
establish the predicate offenses introduced at trial benefited a
gang in a way that was more than reputational. (See § 186.22,
subds. (e)(1) & (g).)
       The record is rather thin on the predicate offenses. The
prosecution established Philip Smith was an OTF member who
admitted to firearm possession by a minor and was photographed
holding the firearm. The prosecution also established Ricky
Gomez was an OTF member who pleaded no contest to a violation
of section 245, subdivision (a)(4), and also had a vandalism case
for spray painting “OTF” on a bank. No evidence addressed the
circumstances of the assault apart from the following: Roman
testified she learned that Gomez approached a victim, demanded
money, stabbed the victim, and remarked, “ ‘This is my turf.’ ”
       Roman repeatedly stressed the importance of reputation
and testified gang members commit crimes for their gangs to
enhance their reputation.
       A jury reasonably could have concluded from the evidence
that the predicate offenses were committed for personal gain or to
enhance OTF’s reputation. This is insufficient under the
amended statute. (See Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 744.)
       To compound this problem of proof, the trial court
instructed the jury, consistent with the old law, that the
predicate offenses did not have to be gang related. (See Cooper,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 740.)

                               18
      Ceja’s gang enhancement finding cannot stand. (See
Cooper, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 746–747; People v. Ramirez
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 64, review granted October 12, 2022,
S275341.)
                          DISPOSITION
      We vacate Ceja’s gang enhancement finding and remand
the matter to the trial court to provide the prosecution an
opportunity to retry the gang allegations against Ceja under the
amended section 186.22. In all other respects, we affirm the
judgment.

                                         WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             GRIMES, J.

                               19