Court Opinion

ID: 9953326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 20:10:12.731414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:56.511006
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Bradley, 2024-Ohio-1057.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                      :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                              No. 112913
                 v.                                 :

JOHN BRADLEY, JR.,                                  :

                 Defendant-Appellant.               :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 21, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                    Case Nos. CR-21-655788-A, CR-21-657513-A,
                       CR-21-657961-A, and CR-21-658136-A

                                              Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J.:

                   Defendant-appellant, John Bradley, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s

decisions denying his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in four different cases.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s decisions and remand for

further proceedings.

I.   Procedural Background

                  In August 2021, Bradley entered guilty pleas in Cuyahoga C.P. Nos.

CR-21-655788-A, CR-21-657513-A, CR-21-657961-A, and CR-21-658136-A. During

the plea hearing on these four separate cases, Bradley stated that he understood the

maximum penalties involved, including that (1) he faced a mandatory prison

sentence on the felonious assault offense in CR-657961 because of the one-year

firearm specification, (2) felonious assault carried a potential range of two to eight

years, and (3) the Reagan Tokes Law would apply to this sentence.1 (Tr. 17-18.) He

denied that anyone made any threats or promises to induce him into accepting the

plea. (Tr. 12.)

                  In September 2021, the trial court sentenced Bradley on all four cases.

The court ordered Bradley’s sentences in CR-655788, CR-657513, and CR-658136

to run concurrently with the sentence in CR-657961. In that case, after applying the

Reagan Tokes Law, the court imposed a prison sentence on Count 1 (felonious

assault) of seven to ten and one-half years, plus a mandatory, consecutive one-year

sentence on the firearm specification, for a total prison sentence of eight to ten and

one-half years.

       1 The record before this court is an App.R. 9(A) record.    The only transcript in the
record is the August 2021 plea hearing that the state attached to its brief in opposition to
Bradley’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Bradley has not requested to transfer any
transcripts filed in the prior appeals to this appeal for this court to consider.
              Bradley appealed his convictions in these cases and raised two

assignments of error — the first challenging the constitutionality of the Reagan

Tokes Law, and the second contending that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to the Reagan Tokes sentence. State v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

110882, 2022-Ohio-1075, ¶ 5 (“Bradley I”). This court overruled his assignments of

error and affirmed his convictions. Id. Bradley timely appealed Bradley I to the

Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the appeal and held the matter for the

resolution of State v. Hacker, Ohio Supreme Court Case Nos. 2020-1496 and 2021-

0532.   See State v. Bradley, Ohio Supreme Court Case No. 2022-0522, and

07/19/2022 Case Announcements, 2022-Ohio-2446.

              In June 2022, Bradley successfully reopened his direct appeal

pursuant to App.R. 26(B) because the trial court failed to provide him with the

required notifications under R.C. 2929.17(B)(2)(c) when imposing a Reagan Tokes

sentence. State v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110882, 2022-Ohio-2954, ¶ 13-

14 (“Bradley II”). Accordingly, this court “vacated, in part” Bradley’s sentence for

Count 1 in CR-657961 and “remanded [the matter] to the trial court for the limited

purpose of resentencing to provide the notifications required by R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c).” Id. at ¶ 16.

              On December 8, 2022, prior to the limited-purpose resentencing,

Bradley filed identical motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in all four cases,

contending that (1) he would not have pleaded guilty if he knew he would receive an

indefinite sentence under Reagan Tokes and (2) his attorney promised him that he
would only receive two years in prison. Bradley did not support his motion with any

documentary evidence supporting either argument. The state opposed the motion,

contending that res judicata barred his claims, his convictions were previously

affirmed in his direct appeal, and no manifest injustice occurred.

              On December 13, 2022, the trial court conducted the limited-purpose

resentencing as mandated by this court in Bradley II. The trial court provided the

requisite Reagan Tokes notifications pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). On January

12, 2023, Bradley appealed his sentence, once again challenging the

constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. This court, noting the release of State v.

Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535, the day before Bradley filed his notice

of appeal, overruled his assignment of error on the authority of Hacker, which found

the Reagan Tokes Law constitutional. State v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

112320, 2023-Ohio-3630, ¶ 4 (“Bradley III”).2 Bradley appealed Bradley III to the

Ohio Supreme Court; the court declined jurisdiction in January 2024.

              On May 26, 2023, while Bradley III was pending in this court and

Bradley I was still pending in the Ohio Supreme Court, the trial court summarily

denied Bradley’s motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in all four cases.

              Bradley now appeals, raising two assignments of error that challenge

the trial court’s summary denial of his motions to withdraw without conducting an

evidentiary hearing.

      2 On   October 26, 2023, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Bradley I on the
authority of Hacker. See 10/26/2023 Case Announcements, 2023-Ohio-3863.
II. Trial Court’s Jurisdiction

               At the outset, this court must address whether the trial court had

jurisdiction to consider Bradley’s motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. The state

raised in the trial court, and here on appeal, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction

to consider Bradley’s motions because this court affirmed his convictions in Bradley

I. The state relies on State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common

Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97-98, 378 N.E.2d 162 (1978), which held that “Crim.R. 32.1

does not vest jurisdiction in the trial court to maintain and determine a motion to

withdraw the guilty plea subsequent to an appeal and an affirmance by the appellate

court.”   This court has recognized, however, that the Ohio Supreme Court

subsequently clarified that Special Prosecutors does not apply to motions filed

under the criminal rules or permitted by statute and that it specifically identified

that a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea is a vehicle for

seeking postconviction relief from a final judgment. State v. Walton, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 112235, 2023-Ohio-2879, ¶ 19-20, citing State v. Davis, 131 Ohio

St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d 516, paragraph two of the syllabus; State ex

rel. Davis v. Janas, 160 Ohio St.3d 187, 2020-Ohio-1462, 155 N.E.3d 822, ¶ 11, fn.

3. Accordingly, this court’s affirmance in Bradley I did not divest the trial court of

authority to consider Bradley’s motions.

               Bradley also challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction but raises this

issue for the first time in his reply brief in the instant appeal. We recognize that he

raised this issue in rebuttal to the state’s contention that the trial court lacked
authority to consider his motion because this court affirmed his convictions and thus

appears to be proper. See Loc.App.R. 16(A)(2)(c) (reply brief “must be restricted to

matters in rebuttal to the answer portion of the second brief”). He contends that

because Bradley III was pending in this court, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to

consider his motion to withdraw his guilty plea in CR-657961. Bradley states that

the motions filed in the other cases were unaffected by the Bradley III appeal, and

thus the trial court had authority to rule on those motions. In support, he relies on

this court’s decision in State v. Drake, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105908, 2017-Ohio-

7328, in which we explained that where a court lacks jurisdiction to rule on a motion

due to a pending appeal, the trial court lacks authority to deny the motion and must

hold the motion in abeyance until the appeal is decided. Id. at ¶ 4.

               The general rule of law is that the trial court loses jurisdiction to take

action in a cause after an appeal has been taken and decided except “to take action

in aid of the appeal, until the case is remanded to it by the appellate court.” Special

Prosecutors at 97. The trial court retains jurisdiction, however, over issues “not

inconsistent with the appellate court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm the

judgment from which an appeal is taken.” Yee v. Erie Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 51 Ohio

St.3d 43, 44, 553 N.E.2d 1354 (1990).

               Accordingly, we agree with Bradley that the trial court was without

jurisdiction to consider his motion to withdraw his guilty plea in CR-659761 because

Bradley III was pending in this court. The issue in Bradley III involved a facial

constitutional challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law.           If the trial court granted
Bradley’s motion to withdraw and, thus, vacated his conviction that included a

Reagan Tokes sentence, Bradley would no longer have standing to challenge the

Reagan Tokes Law as unconstitutional. Accordingly, the trial court’s consideration

of the motion to withdraw would be inconsistent with this court’s jurisdiction to

reverse, modify, or affirm the trial court’s judgment.3

               We disagree, however, with Bradley that the trial court had

jurisdiction to consider the other three cases. Although Bradley is correct that

Bradley III did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction, Bradley I, which also

challenged the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law, was pending in the Ohio

Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court did not decide Bradley I until October

2023 — well after the trial court ruled on Bradley’s motions to vacate his guilty pleas.

Because Bradley I encompassed all four of his cases, the trial court lacked authority

to consider his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. We note that the state

recognized the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to consider Bradley’s motions because

in its brief in opposition, the state requested that the trial court hold his motions in

abeyance until the resolution of Bradley I.

               Accordingly, because Bradley I was pending in the Ohio Supreme

Court and Bradley III was pending in this court, the trial court lacked jurisdiction

       3 Granted, the Bradley III Court could have dismissed the appeal because the issue

raised went beyond the scope of the limited-purpose remand. The issue did not challenge
the trial court’s Reagan Tokes notifications but raised a facial constitutional challenge to
the Reagan Tokes Law — an issue this court previously decided and rejected in Bradley I
and, thus, this court could have also applied the doctrine of res judicata and overruled the
assignment of error.
to rule on his motions to vacate his guilty pleas. The trial court should have held the

motions in abeyance until the resolution of all appeals.

               Our decision to reverse the trial court’s decisions and remand for

reconsideration of Bradley’s motions seems superfluous, especially when it is

entirely possible that res judicata will bar Bradley’s motions to withdraw his guilty

pleas, but a trial court’s ability to consider matters that would affect a reviewing

court’s jurisdiction and ability to consider the merits of a pending appeal cannot be

disregarded.

               The assignments of error are sustained, not because the trial court

erred in failing to hold a hearing before denying Bradley’s motions, but because the

court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motions altogether. Now that Bradley’s

appeals in both Bradley I and Bradley III have been fully decided, the trial court

now has jurisdiction to consider his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.

               Judgments reversed and remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

      It is ordered that the parties share equally the costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the

trial court for further proceedings.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR