Court Opinion

ID: 9917428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 15:02:47.691937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:44.343545
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                    PRO-KARTING EXPERIENCE, INC.,
                      a Florida for-profit corporation,

                                 Petitioner,

                                     v.

                            34TH STREET, LLC,
                    a Florida limited liability company,

                                Respondent.

                              No. 2D22-2577

                             January 12, 2024

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Pinellas County;
Thomas M. Ramsberger, Judge.

Brandon T. Holmes of Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Tampa; Jason S. Lambert
and Tyler C. Troyer of Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A., Tampa (withdrew
after briefing); and Jay L. Farrow of Farrow Law P.A., Coral Gables
(substituted as counsel of record), for Petitioner.

Walter Sowa, III of The Law Office of Walter Sowa, III, PL, Bradenton, for
Respondent.

SILBERMAN, Judge.
     In this dispute involving a commercial lease, 34th Street, LLC (the
Landlord), filed an eight-count complaint against Pro-Karting Experience,
Inc. (the Tenant). The Tenant seeks certiorari review of a writ of
possession entered in favor of the Landlord. The Tenant also seeks
review of a prior "Order Granting Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment for failure to Pay Property Taxes" (the Order), which
directs the Tenant to pay $104,409.75; however, the parties dispute
whether this court has jurisdiction to review that order. We conclude
that we lack jurisdiction to review the Order because the petition was
untimely filed and that the challenge to the writ of possession has
become moot by a subsequent order. Therefore, we dismiss the Tenant's
petition for writ of certiorari.
      On May 10, 2022, the trial court issued the Order, and the Tenant
filed a motion for rehearing. Subsequently, the Landlord filed a "Motion
for Contempt, Eviction, and Entry of Judgment for Failure to Pay
Property Taxes Pursuant to Court Order" (Motion for Contempt). The
Landlord also sought a writ of possession. On August 8, 2022, the
Tenant filed its Emergency Motion to Stay Issuance of Writ of Possession
(Motion to Stay) and sought to have it heard on an emergency basis. The
trial court did not address the Motion to Stay before it issued a writ of
possession on August 9, 2022. The Tenant then filed its certiorari
petition on August 10, 2022.
      This court granted a provisional stay of the writ of possession until
the trial court formally ruled on the pending Motion to Stay. After a
hearing, the trial court granted the Motion to Stay in an order rendered
on August 22, 2022. In doing so, the trial court acknowledged that the
Tenant had deposited $117,026.53 into the court registry. On
reconsideration, the trial court denied the Motion for Contempt and the
Landlord's requests for a writ of possession without prejudice to the
Landlord's ability to seek such a writ "on different grounds at a later
date." Based on its ruling, the trial court declared that "the Writ of

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Possession dated August 9, 2022 is void ab initio and shall have no legal
effect."
      As the Landlord argued in its response to the certiorari petition, the
August 22, 2022, order reconsidering the request for a writ of possession
and declaring the writ of possession void ab initio rendered the challenge
to the writ of possession moot. The Tenant has not disputed the
Landlord's argument on this point. Therefore, as to the writ of
possession, we dismiss the Tenant's certiorari petition as moot.
      Turning to the Order granting partial summary judgment, the
Landlord filed its motion for partial summary judgment on count four
which alleged breach of the parties' lease for failure to pay property taxes
and count seven for eviction. The Tenant raised numerous affirmative
defenses, including setoff of damages. The Order directed the Tenant to
pay the property taxes to the Landlord by a date certain but specifically
acknowledged remaining judicial labor on the case.
      The Tenant contends that the Order must be treated as a final
order subject to rehearing and appeal. Because the Order directs the
Tenant to pay $104,409.75 to the Landlord on or before June 10, 2022,
the Tenant argues that the Order has the attributes of a final order and
should be treated as a money judgment. The Tenant asserts that it has
no ability to challenge the monetary judgment if it is not treated as a
final order.
      The Landlord argues that the Order is nonfinal and that the
Tenant's motion for rehearing did not suspend rendition of the Order
filed on May 10, 2022; thus, the petition for certiorari filed on August 10,
2022, is untimely, and this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Order.
The Tenant did not file a reply to the Landlord's response. We agree with

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the Landlord that the petition was not timely filed and that we lack
jurisdiction to review the Order.
     East Avenue, LLC v. Insignia Bank, 136 So. 3d 659 (Fla. 2d DCA
2014), which the Tenant relies upon, does not control the outcome here.
In East Avenue, this court treated a direct appeal from an amended
summary judgment for damages on some counts of a multi-count
complaint as a certiorari proceeding. Id. at 660-61. Because there were
pending counts that were factually and legally interrelated, the judgment
was not final or appealable "under traditional rules of finality." Id. at 661
(citing S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974)). The
"wrinkle" in East Avenue was that the judgment had "language
authorizing execution." Id. Therefore, a "strict application of the S.L.T.
Warehouse finality criteria would leave East Avenue exposed to
enforcement of the judgment at a time when it cannot obtain review of it
and, importantly, it cannot shield its assets from execution by posting an
appellate supersedeas bond." Id.
     This court reasoned "that certiorari is available to review the form
of an order, if not its underlying merits, insofar as it permits execution
prior to rendition of an appealable final judgment." Id. at 664; see also
Mohler v. Elliott, 332 So. 3d 1120, 1121-22 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (same).
Because the summary judgment order in East Avenue "permitted
execution prior to rendition of a truly appealable final judgment in the
case," this court determined that certiorari relief was appropriate. 136
So. 3d at 665; see also Team Richco, LLC v. Rapid Sec. Sols., LLC, 290 So.
3d 629, 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (quashing a partial summary judgment
that allowed execution but not reaching the merits because, " 'under
traditional rules of finality,' the partial summary judgment was not final
or appealable" (quoting E. Ave., 136 So. 3d at 661)); Innovision Prac. Grp.,

                                     4
P.A. v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 135 So. 3d 501, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)
(relying upon East Avenue and noting that certiorari review was available
because"[t]he partial final judgment included the language 'for all of
which sums let execution issue' ").
      Here, the Order does not contain the language "for all of which
sums let execution issue" or similar wording that allowed for certiorari
review in the cases cited above. Although the Order directs the Tenant to
pay the Landlord by a date certain, the Order states that it is granting a
motion for partial summary judgment and does not contain language
authorizing execution on a judgment. Thus, the present case is
distinguishable from East Avenue and its progeny.
      In addition, the trial court here specifically contemplated further
judicial labor. For example, the Order states the following: "This ruling is
without prejudice to the [Tenant]'s right to seek any setoffs that may be
adjudicated later. This Order does not make any decision as to whether
to allow or deny any setoffs." Thus, judicial labor remains, and the Order
is clearly a nonfinal order. See Dep't of Bus. & Pro. Regul. v. Fla. Ass'n of
Wholesale Distribs., Inc., 198 So. 3d 981, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("Here,
the circuit court's order clearly articulates further judicial labor to be
performed in the future and, therefore, remains a nonappealable,
nonfinal order.").
      Further, East Avenue, Mohler, Team Richco, and Innovision did not
involve any issue relating to the effect of a motion for rehearing on the
timeliness of a party's attempt to obtain review of an order. "The
characterization of an order on review as final or non-final has
jurisdictional consequences." Guglielmi v. Guglielmi, 324 So. 3d 554,
556, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) ("Because that [temporary] modification
order is not a final order, even our recharacterizing the subsequent

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motion to vacate as a motion for rehearing would be of no help to the
former wife."). Only "authorized and timely filed" motions for rehearing
can toll rendition of an order. Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1)(B). When a
motion for rehearing is directed to a nonfinal order, it "is not an
authorized motion." Guglielmi, 324 So. 3d at 557 (citing Wagner v.
Bieley, Wagner & Assocs., 263 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1972)).
      A petition for writ of certiorari "shall be filed within 30 days of
rendition of the order to be reviewed." Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(c)(1). "[A]n
untimely petition for writ of certiorari is ineffective to confer jurisdiction
on the appellate court." Caldwell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 980 So. 2d
1226, 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The Tenant has pointed us to no rule
that tolls rendition based on a motion for rehearing of a nonfinal order
for which certiorari relief is sought.
      Therefore, the petition filed approximately three months after the
Order was rendered is untimely, and this court lacks jurisdiction to
review the Order in this certiorari proceeding. We note that if for any
reason this challenge to the Order were considered the appeal of a
nonfinal order under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, the
motion for rehearing likewise does not toll rendition of the Order. See
Guglielmi, 324 So. 3d at 557 (reiterating that "a motion for rehearing
directed to a non-final order is not an authorized motion and 'cannot
operate to toll the time for filing an interlocutory appeal' " (quoting
Wagner, 263 So. 2d at 4)). Thus, as to the Order, we dismiss the petition
for lack of jurisdiction as untimely filed.
      Dismissed in part as moot; dismissed in part as untimely filed.

LaROSE and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.

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Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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