Court Opinion

ID: 9711723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:37:44.906509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.048372
License: Public Domain

*381FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
Mr. Justice Cappy has written for the majority that Robert Bricker is entitled to a third trial for murder. I strongly dissent.
The majority’s primary reason for granting a new trial is that the trial court erroneously failed to give an instruction that Kellington was an accomplice. I do not believe that the accomplice instruction was required.1
*382Normally, the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, would be entitled to the inference in its favor that Kellington was not an accomplice. However, in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 479 Pa. 34, 387 A.2d 820 (1978), this Court stated:
The rationale behind instructing a jury that it should view the testimony of an accomplice with suspicion when the accomplice testifies for the prosecution, lies in the recognition that such a witness, out of a reasonable expectation of leniency, has an interest in inculpating others. For an accomplice charge to be required, the facts need not require the inference that the witness was in fact an accomplice, they need only permit such an inference. If the evidence is sufficient to present a jury question with respect to whether the prosecution’s witness was an accomplice, the defendant is entitled to an instruction as to the weight to be given to that witness’s testimony.
479 Pa. at 37, 387 A.2d at 822 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The first question we must resolve, then, is whether the facts permit an inference that Kellington was an accomplice.
*383The majority would permit the inference of Kellington’s involvement in the conspiracy to murder Sacco because he knew of the plot to murder Sacco; he was present at a the meeting at which Bricker, Prosdocimo and Gabler discussed alternate locations and methods; the gun stored at Kellington’s house was, according to Kellington, the murder weapon; Kellington housed Gabler before and after the shooting; and Kellington attended a post-murder meeting and drove Gabler home.
It is elementary, however, that knowing of a plot does not necessarily implicate one in the plot; that walking in on a meeting, by accident, as was testified, does not make one a participant in the meeting; that storing a gun in one’s home for someone else does not, per se, implicate one in a crime which a third person subsequently commits with that gun; that housing a person, even one who subsequently commits murder, does not, without more, implicate the host in murder; and that attending the post-murder meeting and driving the murderer home does not fall within the definition of “accomplice.”2
While the evidence indicates that Kellington walked in on a meeting at which Sacco’s murder was being discussed, it does not indicate that Kellington was a part of that discussion. Nor is there evidence that he participated in any other phase of the planning of Sacco’s death. At the meeting in his apartment, Kellington told Bricker where Bricker’s gun was stored, but he did not give the gun to Bricker or to anyone else. Furthermore, there is nothing of record to indicate that this particular gun was the murder weapon. As to providing housing for Gabler, that, in itself, is not a criminal act. Finally, any acts which Kellington performed after the shooting would not be relevant to the *384question of whether he was an accomplice. I conclude, therefore, that Kellington was not an accomplice.3
But even if I were to determine that the evidence permitted an inference that Kellington was an accomplice, I would still conclude that the accomplice instruction was not required. As this Court stated in Thomas, the reason for the accomplice instruction is to caution the jury that the accomplice may testify to inculpate others in order to advance his own interests. In other words, because of the accomplice’s own criminal liability, he may be lying. In this case, defense counsel began his cross-examination as follows:
DEFENSE COUNSEL. Okay, Mr. Kellington, you would agree with me that during the period of 1978 through 1979, you were a professional liar?
KELLINGTON. Yeah, I lied a lot; yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. Isn’t it true that you were making your living by lying in 1978 and 1979 as far as ripping people off with drugs?
KELLINGTON. Well, I lied about paying them; yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. Isn’t it true that you lied to a priest and sold him phoney bonds?
KELLINGTON. I didn’t do it. I was involved in it.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. Now, as far as — as far as your history, it is true, is it not, that you started off running numbers, as far as your criminal history? You ran numbers?
KELLINGTON. Yes sir.
*385DEFENSE COUNSEL. And you worked for Mr. Joe DeMarco?
KELLINGTON. Yes sir.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. And isn’t it true Mr. DeMarco is a good friend of yours?
KELLINGTON. Yes sir.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. And while you were working for Mr. DeMarco, you were also dealing in heroin?
KELLINGTON. Yes sir.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. And you were also working as a — sort of like a strong armed body guard?
KELLINGTON. Collector. Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. A collector; and in fact, you were collecting debts for Mr. DeMarco?
KELLINGTON. Yes sir.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. And that was with regard to his loan sharking operation?
KELLINGTON. Yeah, that and numbers.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. Okay, and you had, in fact, — you also had some dealing in beating up pimps for prostitutes.
KELLINGTON. For George Lee, yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. And isn’t it true that doing these collections and doing this protection work that you beat a lot of people up; is that correct?
KELLINGTON. Yes sir.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. And in fact, you have broken arms and ribs and things like that?
KELLINGTON. Sometimes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. Sometimes? You’ve broken people’s jaws and noses?
KELLINGTON. In fights. Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. These are in — sometimes to collect from — on the loan sharking operation; is that right?
KELLINGTON. Sometimes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. And while you were doing this, you would use a black jack or other weapons?
*386KELLINGTON. Sometimes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. Okay. Now, you — you were involved in certain armed robberies, is that correct?
KELLINGTON. One.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. And you were involved in some burglaries also?
KELLINGTON. Yeah, one or two.
DEFENSE COUNSEL. And during these — this time— and we’ll talk about the time of — say from ’75 — 1975 towards ’79, you were heavy into the use of drugs, is that correct?
KELLINGTON. Yes sir.
N.T. 5/31/88, 69-73. In addition, defense counsel established that Kellington’s life of crime, violence and lies culminated in at least one other homicide in which Kellington had been identified as the shooter, and that Kellington was at that time free because of the cooperation he provided in this case.
Although defense counsel requested the accomplice instruction, the trial court determined that the appropriate instruction, instead, was as follows:
Also, in this case, if you decide that a witness deliberately testified falsely about a material point — that is about a matter which could effect [sic] the outcome of this trial, you may, for that reason alone, choose to disbelieve the rest of his testimony, but you are not required to do so. You should consider not only deliberate falsehood, but also all other factors bearing on the witness’ credibility in deciding whether or not to believe other parts of his testimony.
In closing, defense counsel, capitalizing on Kellington’s testimony and knowing the instruction to be given, stated:
The selective memory of Mr. Kellington. He remembers things from 15, 20 years ago about beating up prostitutes and collecting money and threatening people and beating them up, but then he forgets that he had a *387fight with Mr. Sacco. Forgets Mr. Sacco called him names. We learn that in cross-examination. He forgets that Sacco was saying things about the DeStefano homicide. He forgot that Sacco was — put the word out on the street about it. It didn’t come out on direct examination. It came out through cross-examination. These are the things that Mr. Kellington — were pulled from Mr. Kellington. He forgot that he was I.D.’d as the trigger man in Florida; and then, Lean remember one point that I think is very important, not only for what is said, but for how it was said. I can remember being here and asking him if he ever shot a deer in the Highland Park Zoo, and he — what did he say? Right. I submit to you he immediately said, “It wasn’t me. That was a police officer that shot him, or some county detective or somebody. It wasn’t me that shot him,” so, although laboriously or maybe ineffectively, I was trying to go through transcripts, when he realized that I would finally get to the point where he had admitted that, he said, “I’ll save you the time. I shot that deer. I shot the deer in Highland Park.”
This is the type of person that we’re dealing with. He’s lied. He’s cheated his whole life. He’s made his living — and a very good living out of lying and cheating. He made his life out of lying and cheating. He stood to gain freedom. He accomplished his goal. When the police were informed he had information on these unsolved homicides and he gave this information, I’m sure that they just finally and rightfully said, “Well, we have to go with it.” They believed him. Obviously, somebody believed him, but the fact that he was believed at one point, does that, in any way imply that, in fact, what he’s saying is truthful? It does not.
Somehow, in some way, you must make a determination of this case based only on the testimony of Mr. Kellington and Mr. Rossi because they’re the only people *388that linked Mr. Bricker. Somehow, it must be implied that through this act of confession through getting up here and unabashedly saying, “I’m a liar,” he therefore can now tell the truth that he’s been born again to tell the truth now. “Because I admit to being a liar, therefore you have to believe me.” I submit to you that anything that Mr. Kellington would say to you should raise a reasonable doubt in your mind.
Remember that a reasonable doubt is what would make a reasonably prudent person pause or hesitate before doing something of import in their life. I submit to you that anything that Mr. Kellington has said should make a reasonably prudent person pause or hesitate. You would not buy a used car from that man. Mr. Kellington is an admitted liar, and because he admits to being a liar, that doesn’t grant him redemption where now he — now, because — I admit to all those bad things, so now I’m telling you the truth. It doesn’t work that way. You still have to consider what he’s saying. You still have to believe what he’s saying. I submit to you, you cannot believe the word of Mr. Kellington.
The best con men, the best writers of fiction, the best people that are able to get over on other people, they mix truth and they mix fiction. They mix truth and reality. The truth of the matter was Tommy Sacco was killed. The fiction is that Mr. Bricker, in. any way, had any involvement in it. The reality is that Mr. Kellington’s arm was used. Mr. Kellington’s gun was used. Mr. Kellington had the motive. Mr. Kellington was facing electrocution.
I submit to you, Mr. Kellington creates a mythical background to [the] fact that Mr. Sacco was killed. The judge will instruct you, and he will tell you that there’s another principle of law that you must consider, and that principle — it comes from the Latin, and what it is [falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus]. That means if you are false — if a witness takes a witness chair and testifies falsely on *389one thing, he could be false on everything. The judge will instruct you that that is a rule of law and a rule that you can obviously take to heart. If you believe that Mr. Kellington has lied on one thing, you could disregard his whole testimony. You also have the right to say, “Oh, I don’t believe Mr. Kellington on this, but I believe him on that.” You can do that, but I submit to you it would be inconsistent with your oath.
Please use your common sense. Judge testimony not only by what you hear but by how you hear it. Judge testimony by not only how somebody says something — or not only by what they say, but how they say it. Did Mr. Kellington ever make eye contact? Did he look believable? Did you get a visceral reaction of belief? That’s how the judge will tell you have to determine credibility. Use the collective common sense that you have that has enabled each and every one of you to attain this age in life. Use that, abide by your oath, and we’ll be completely satisfied____
N.T. 6/1/88, 56-66.
It is apparent from reading portions of defense counsel’s cross examination and summation together with the instruction from the court that the jury was well apprised of the danger inherent in Kellington’s testimony. Further, the jury was well aware that it had the power to disbelieve some portion or all of what Kellington said and that it could totally disbelieve all of his testimony if it determined that he lied in a single instance. Finally, the jury was aware that Kellington had received favorable treatment with respect to other crimes in which he was involved because of his testimony in this case. In short, the jury was aware that Kellington was a criminal who had lied in the past, who might be lying in the present, and whose testimony was, therefore, suspect, and that they had the authority to disbelieve any or all of the testimony if they disbelieved any part of it.
*390This Court’s requirement of an accomplice instruction in Thomas was never intended as a per se rule. Where, as here, the purposes of the Thomas rule have been achieved through vigorous cross examination and summation, the trial court’s refusal to give the accomplice instruction was not error. Pennsylvania does not utilize jury charges which must be read verbatim. We do not rigidly enforce rote language, but rather examine the charge with relation to the record to see whether the jury is fairly apprised of the applicable law. In this case, even if Kellington were viewed as an accomplice, the jury was fairly warned of the pitfalls in believing the testimony of a witness such as Kellington, and the purpose enunciated in Thomas was accomplished. To hold otherwise would elevate form over substance, something this Court has repeatedly refused to do.
As a secondary reason to reverse the conviction and order a new trial, the majority has determined that it was error to permit the plea agreements of Kellington and Rossi to go out with the jury during deliberations. The majority reasons that because the plea agreements of Kellington and Rossi require them to tell the truth on pain of prosecution for perjury, and because the agreements are executed by the United States Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the District Attorney of Allegheny County, the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as well as Rossi and Kellington and their attorneys, the government, “by executing the documents,’’ placed the guarantee of government on the truthfulness of the testimony of Kellington and Rossi. The majority concludes “beyond question” that the plea agreements in the hands of the jury bolstered the credibility of the state’s witnesses to the extent that Bricker was denied a fair trial.
The short answer to this view is that it is absurd. The agreement merely implies that the Commonwealth believes its witnesses. That, presumably, is true in every case. If the Commonwealth did not believe its witnesses, it would not put them on to testify. And if it did put them on to testify and found that they made false statements or told *391less than the whole truth, it would, presumably, prosecute them for penury. This is true in every case, not just this one, and if it requires a reversal here, it should require a reversal in every case in which the Commonwealth puts on a witness and acts as if it believes him.
The majority’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Tann, 500 Pa. 593, 459 A.2d 322 (1983), for the proposition that the plea agreements constitute improper buttressing of the veracity of Rossi and Kellington is misplaced. In Tann attorneys for two government witnesses took the stand and testified that their clients had voluntarily waived their right to remain silent and had entered into a plea bargain which required them to testify truthfully against the defendant in that case. This Court held that the testimony of these attorneys was irrelevant and objectionable in that “[n]one of the evidence presented through [the attorneys] has any rational probative value to the issue of appellant Tann’s guilt.” Id., 500 Pa. at 603, 459 A.2d at 327. In this case there was no such testimony. The Commonwealth was required to reveal the existence of the plea agreements precisely because these agreements, far from bolstering the witnesses’ credibility, raised doubts as to the likelihood of truthfulness emanating from the mouths of two such blatantly self-interested career criminals. The plea agreements did not, therefore, improperly bolster the testimony of government witnesses and they were not improperly admitted into evidence.
Rather than the agreements constituting a sub silentio testimony on the part of the government that “just this once” these untrustworthy criminal witnesses are to be believed, the effect of these agreements was to warn the jury, to remind them that they were dealing with criminals, and that the danger of their lies and deceitfulness was so extreme, even in this case, that the government stood ready to prosecute them for perjury, should it come to light that they lied. Far from endorsing these witnesses, the government’s own document reveals the extent of its distrust. There was no error in the admission of these plea agree*392ments and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to take the plea agreements with them. To hold that the court erred is to treat the jury as a group of medieval serfs who can be told about the plea agreement but who may not be shown the actual document for fear that they will be dazzled by gold seals and signatures on a paper submitted by the state..
The only abuse of discretion in this case is the majority’s willingness to conjure up reasons to give a twice convicted murderer yet a third trial.
I dissent.
NIX, C.J., and McDERMOTT, J., join in this opinion.

. An accomplice is defined by 18 Pa.C.S. § 306 as follows:
(c) Accomplice defined. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he:
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it.

. As to the majority’s reliance on comments made by the district attorney and on paragraph 5 of the plea agreement to bolster its contention that Kellington was an accomplice, little need be said. The prosecutor merely stated that Kellington was an unsavory character and that he associated with criminals. That does not make him an accomplice in any particular crime. As to the plea agreement, what the prosecuting authorities believed when they entered the plea agreement with Kellington is not evidence in the case. The agreement speaks for itself, and it indicates nothing more than the possibility that Kellington would be required to enter a plea in the Sacco case "if, in the opinion of the said officiab, said charges are warranted, based on the facts and the law.”