Court Opinion

ID: 9518267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:48:33.514133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:02.036784
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION

Jackson, J.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case for several reasons as hereinafter set forth.
It appears from the record and the oral argument in this court, that the appellant, Elbert Koonce, and appellee, Patricia Koonce, are both residents of Pulaski County, Arkansas. It further appears from the record that on July 24, 1956, the Chancery Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, entered an order directing the appellant, Elbert Koonce, to pay Forty Dollars ($40.00) per week for the support of his minor children; that thereafter the appellant permitted said payments to become delinquent and appellee recovered a judgment in cause No. 104165 in said court for said arrearage in the sum of nine hundred sixty dollars ($960.00), together with costs.
Thereafter, so far as we are able to ascertain from the record here, appellee filed suit on the Arkansas judgment in the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County, Vanderburgh County, Indiana, against the appellant, Elbert Koonce, service of process on the appellant being had by publication. Judgment was had by default in the sum of $960.00 together with court costs. The finding and judgment of the Superior Court of Vander-burgh County is set out in full in the majority opinion, and in the interest of brevity is omitted here.
*447The majority opinion, holds that the aforementioned judgment is in rem, that so much thereof as is in per-sonam is surplusage and that the motion to strike ap-pellee’s petition in the Probate Court of Vanderburgh County was a collateral attack upon the judgment in the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County.
The petition to strike filed in the Probate Court, omitting the formal parts, signature and jurat, reads as follows, to-wit:
“1. The petition is a sham.
“2. .Said judgment upon which said petition is based is a nullity, the same purporting to be a personal judgment against Elbert Koonce for $960.00, but upon which no personal service was ever obtained upon the said Elbert Koonce and said personal judgment having been obtained on constructive service only by publication is [sic] a newspaper.
“3. Said judgment is claimed in said petition to be an ‘attachment,’ but no writ of attachment has ever been issued thereunder or in said cause of action on which said alleged judgment, was obtained, and any such alleged attachment is therefore a nullity.
“4. Said judgment is of no force or effect.”
The real questions in issue here, it seems to me, are, (1) Is the judgment obtained in the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County a personal judgment against the appellant? (2) Is the judgment of the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County, having been obtained on constructive service without any appearance in the action by the appellant, a valid judgment?
I think the first question must be answered in the affirmative by reason of the wording of the last paragraph of the judgment, which reads as follows:
“IT IS, THEREFORE, CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED AND ORDERED by the Court that the *448plaintiff recover of and from the defendant the sum of Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars ($960.00), together with her costs laid out and expended. . .
The second question it seems must be answered in the negative.
An Indiana Statute provides as follows:
“2-1062 — No Personal Judgment Upon Constructive Service. — No personal judgment shall be rendered against a defendant constructively summoned who has not appeared in the action.” Acts ,1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, §71, p. 240, being §2-1062, Burns’ 1946 Replacement.
Since the judgment of the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County was a default judgment based upon constructive service only, and was a personal judgment for $960 and costs, it would follow that the judgment would be in conflict with the above statute and hence would be a nullity and void. Sowders v. Edmunds, et al. (1881), 76 Ind. 123; Moyer, Guardian v. Bucks (1891), 2 Ind. App. 571, 28 N. E. 992 ; Pattison v. Grant Trust etc., Co., Adm. (1924), 195 Ind. 313, 144 N. E. 26; 2 Gavit, Ind. Pl. & Pr., §213 (e) (6) ; 17 I. L. E., Judgment, §15, p. 150.
And, as is said in 17 I. L. E., Judgment, §271, p. 345,
“. . . a judgment which is absolutely void is entitled to no authority or respect, and therefore may be impeached at any time in any proceeding in which it is sought to be enforced or in which its validity is questioned, by any one with whose rights or interests it conflicts.” See also: Coryell v. Crawley (1956), 235 Ind. 139, 131 N. E. 2d 467, and cases there cited.
The record discloses that the basis for the action in the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County was the personal judgment for money in the sum of $960 and *449costs by the Arkansas Court; that being the foundation of the action in the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County, its jurisdiction was limited to the rendition of a money judgment, (i.e. the subject matter of the action), the enforcement of the personal judgment (i.e. jurisdiction of the person of the appellant) was barred by the statute, §2-1062, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, swpra.
This was not an action in attachment, as the requirements of the statute Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, §202, p. 240, being §3-509, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, were totally ignored. Attachment being a statutory proceeding in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed or no rights will be acquired thereunder. 3 I. L. E., Attachment, §1, p. 193.
Appellant raises further questions relative to the proceedings below which are of probative value, but need not be discussed in this dissent in view of the decision reached on the determinative questions.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
Note. — Reported in 172 N. E. 2d 859.