Court Opinion

ID: 9468752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:22:46.566586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:02.289201
License: Public Domain

BARRETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In order to understand the basis of my dissent, it is necessary to review the issues framed by the pleadings, the objections posed to the instructions given, and the separate jury verdicts returned. This review leads me to conclude that the case should be reversed for failure of the trial court to pay any heed to Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1979) which, most significantly, was announced and filed in excess of five months prior to the Corriz trial. It is my view that the Clappier opinion set forth principles directly applicable to the case at bar and which, if followed by the trial court, would have avoided the errors which I deem prejudicial.
Corriz’s First Amended Complaint set forth claims under four (4) causes of action, or counts, succinctly as follows:
(1) First Cause of Action or Count I: Corriz alleged that the defendants, acting separately and in concert, deprived him of his right to:
a) Freedom from illegal detention and imprisonment;
b) Freedom from physical abuse, coercion and intimidation; and
c) Freedom from unlawful arrest without evidence in support thereof.
Corriz specially alleged that: the above rights were secured to him by provisions of the due process clause of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 and 1985; the defendants acted under color of state law and outside the scope of their jurisdiction, with willful intent to deprive him of these rights; the Sheriff’s Department condoned and permitted such abuses, i.e., use of unlawful force and false arrests; and Sheriff Naranjo failed to properly train, supervise and control the officers of his Department.
Corriz thus alleged that, as a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid acts, he suffered great bodily pain and injury and mental anguish and that he had been damaged: (a) $300.00 representing medical care and treatment, (b) property damage of $300.00, (c) loss of earnings of $2,000.00, (d) general damages of $100,000.00, and (e) punitive damages because of the defendants’ willful, malicious and/or reckless actions of $100,000.00.
(2) Second Cause of Action or Count II: Based upon all of the allegations contained in Count I and the Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant filed against him on or about September 15, 1976, which, he alleged, arose by reason of alleged malicious actions of Defendants Steve Martinez, Canuto Martinez, Joe V. Salazar and Emilio Naranjo, he was falsely arrested, and, as a direct and proximate cause, he suffered these alleged damages: (a) $150.00 as attorney’s fees, (b) $100,000.00 for nervous shock, loss of sleep and mental anguish, and (c) $100,000.00 for punitive damages as a result of the alleged willful, malicious and/or reckless actions aforesaid, all without just cause or provocation.
(3) Third Cause of Action or Count III: Corriz realleged all facts set forth in the First and Second Causes of Action and, in addition, alleged that Defendant Steve Martinez did intend to shoot and seriously injure him and did so in a rude, insolent and angry manner without just cause, provocation or justification, resulting in these alleged damages: (a) $100,000.00 for medical *903expenses, lost earnings, property damages and pain and discomfort, and (b) $100,000.00 for punitive damages for Martinez’s willful and malicious actions.
(4) Fourth Cause of Action or Count IV: Corriz realleged all facts set forth in the first three causes of action and, in addition, alleged that Defendant Emilio Naranjo, as Sheriff of Rio Arriba County, was obligated to insure that the actions of the officers under his command did not endanger the persons or interests of persons subject to their custody but that, contrary to his duty and notwithstanding numerous complaints concerning improper conduct of his deputies, he failed to properly investigate, discipline or train his officers; and, that his negligent acts, errors and omissions resulted in damages in the sum of $50,000.00.
Following answer and other pre-trial proceedings, partial summary judgment was granted, as follows: (a) in favor of Sheriff Naranjo on Counts III and IV; (b) in favor of Canuto Martinez on Counts III and IV, (c) in favor of Joe Salazar on Counts I, III and IV, and (d) in favor of Steve Martinez on Count IV. Counts III and IV were dismissed as to the Sheriff’s Department. Thus, the case went to trial before a jury on this basis:
First Cause of Action or Count I (Civil Rights):
Against all defendants except Joe V. Salazar.

Second Cause of Action or Count II (Malicious Prosecution):

Against all defendants.

Third Cause of Action or Count III (Assault and Battery):

Against defendant Steve Martinez only.
The case was tried to the jury for five days. Separate and distinct verdicts were returned in favor of Corriz, as follows:
On the First Cause of Action or Count I (Civil Rights), against all four defendants in amount of $30,000.00.
On the Second Cause of Action or Count II (Malicious Prosecution), against Sheriff Naranjo and the Sheriff’s Department in amount of $30,000.00.
On the Third Cause of Action or Count III (Assault and Battery), against Deputy Steve Martinez in amount of $2,273.00. Punitive damages: $30,000.00 against Sheriff Naranjo, $20,000.00 against Deputy Steve Martinez, and $10,000.00 against Deputy Canuto Martinez.
The Court entered judgment in accordance with those verdicts, as accumulated, for a total award of $122,273.00. The defendants filed timely motions for new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for remittitur, all of which were denied. The Court also awarded Corriz attorney fees of $44,309.75.
The appellants contend that the case should be reversed based on the following claimed errors: (1) the jury’s verdict was excessive as a matter of law and represents multiple recovery for the same injuries, (2) the jury should not have been instructed on damages for violation of constitutional rights per se or on the liberty issue, (3) the issue of malicious prosecution should not have been submitted to the jury because it overlapped with the Civil Rights issues and because there was no evidence to support this claim against Emilio Naranjo and the Sheriff’s Department, and (4) the award of punitive damages must be reversed because the underlying liability for compensatory damages was not properly determined and because it is excessive in light of plaintiff’s actual damages.
I reject Corriz’s contention, with which the majority agrees, that the defendants did not properly object to material, significant instructions targeted to defendants’ contention that the instructions, coupled with the multiple verdicts, lead to duplicity, confusion and double recovery. With full cognizance of the requirements of Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. rule 51, 28 U.S.C.A., I believe, contrary to the majority, that the record reflects that counsel for the defendants did adequately object to various pertinent instructions given by the Court out of the hearing of the jury and before the jury commenced its deliberations, particularly in light of the fact that our Clappier v. Flynn, *904supra, had been the law of this Circuit for five months prior thereto. The trial court overruled the objections and stated “A note will go to the jury that they will start their deliberation.” [Joint Appendix, p. 359].
The purpose of Rule 51 is to prevent a litigant from taking advantage of an error which could be rectified by the court if called to its attention by proper objection. If the objection properly calls alleged error to the court’s attention, then exception is taken and the requirement of Rule 51 is met. Fiedler v. McKea Corp., 605 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1979); Rogers v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Co-op., Inc., 580 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1978); Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976); Taylor v. Denver & R.G.W. R. Co., 438 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1971). And a party claiming plain error under Rule 51 has a heavy burden of demonstrating fundamental injustice. Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007, 95 S.Ct. 2628, 45 L.Ed.2d 669 (1975). See also: Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
It is my opinion that, viewed in conjunction with the dictates of Clappier v. Flynn, supra, the defendants-appellants properly and timely preserved their exceptions to the instructions given the jury under Rule 51, supra. The charge is not final and the jury is not to be regarded as having retired to consider the verdict, until all exceptions have been made and ruled on by the court and all necessary corrections made. Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Johnson, 140 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1944). As pointed out, supra, counsel for defendants did in fact posit objections to the Court’s instructions before the jury commenced its deliberations.
'In Rogers v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Co-op., Inc., supra, we said that “The purpose of Rule 51 is at least two-fold, namely, to make it abundantly clear to the trial court the objecting party’s position, and secondly, to afford the trial judge the opportunity to make changes or corrections, if he be so inclined.” 580 F.2d at p. 1042.
Objection was lodged to Instructions 4 and 20 as duplicitous and improper by injecting into the case a “false issue” upon which there was no evidence, and thus an “abstract statement concerning an alleged violation . .. [constituting] ... an issue [not truly] framed by the evidence.” [Joint Appendix, pp. 352, 353, 354]. The objection was directed to the Court’s instructions relating to deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The above statements, coupled with defense counsel’s remarks to the Court that these instructions [on the deprivation of liberty issue] “repeats those claims [of assault and battery, unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution] and reemphasizes the claims of alleged misconduct and deprivation of rights” [Joint Appendix, p. 354], adequately conveyed the clear, obvious thrust of these objections: that the federal constitutional rights deprivation claims, set forth in Instructions 4 and 20, based on “liberty interests”, were improperly submitted to the jury as a separate, independent basis for liability. This is so, inasmuch as these instructions, when coupled with the instructions relating to the common law tort claims, impermissibly lead the jury to consider and return verdicts constituting double recovery under alternate theories arising from the same operative facts.
Counsel for defendants also objected to Instruction 35 which states that “an officer is not allowed to act in violation of settled law or to violate the clearly established rights of the plaintiff” as contradictory to other instructions given by the Court relating to the defenses of good faith.
Defense counsel objected to Instruction 42 as a “general statement of the elements of damage to be considered by the jury ... [including] ... elements of the damage [due to] the violation of civil rights ... would create liability but are not measures of damages.” [Joint Appendix, p. 357]. (Emphasis supplied). Counsel then made specific reference to Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) when contending that the instructions given create “... the opportunity for furor and rampant speculation by the jury *905.. . [the jury] ... could not make an assessment of a verdict upon factual proof ... no guide either in the law or in the proof of how you set a dollar amount of any sort on that kind, of a — for damage calculation under that standard.” [Joint Appendix, pp. 357-358]. (Emphasis supplied).
Further, counsel for defendants objected to Instruction 43 on the basis it “... is telling the jury that this element [violation of constitutional rights] must be assessed ... of great size.” [Joint Appendix, p. 358]. The instruction does, to be sure, state precisely that to which the objection was posed. The last sentence of the first paragraph of Instruction 43, referring to compensation or damage award for the deprivation of constitutional rights states that it must be measured on this basis: “The value of such rights, while difficult to assess, must be considered great.” [Joint Appendix, p. 97]. (Emphasis supplied). This was certainly most misleading and clearly erroneous.
I would hold that the objections lodged were adequate to appraise the trial court of the alleged errors as presented on appeal. This is particularly so in that the District Court is charged with knowledge of the applicable law laid down in Clappier v. Flynn, supra.
To be sure, these contentions of error were more artfully presented by the defendants in their motion for new trial. However, it is my view that the trial court understood the crux of the objections posed, i.e., the likelihood of double recovery under alternative theories seeking the same relief when tried together. This should have been abundantly clear to the Court when the jury was permitted to return four distinct, separate verdicts.
The Court’s admonition contained in Instruction 43 that the [damage] award “value” of constitutional rights which Corriz may have been deprived “... while difficult to assess, must be considered great” [Joint Appendix, p. 97] (Emphasis supplied), is clearly in conflict with language contained in other instructions relating to compensatory and punitive damage awards. This admonition was tantamount to an invitation for verdicts representing double recovery, and was clear error. When the judge stated to the jury that the value (for damage award purposes) “must be considered great” he unquestionably told the jury that the violation of any constitutional right must be assessed of great size. There is no justification for that type of instruction. It infringed on the sole prerogative of the jury to weigh the evidence and arrive at award of damages based on the facts and governing law.
In Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 812, 80 S.Ct. 1248, 4 L.Ed.2d 1153 (1960), this court said that the presiding judge is the governor of the trial, with the inescapable duty to fully and correctly instruct the jury on the applicable law of the case, and to guide, direct and assist them toward an intelligent understanding of the legal and factual issues involved in their search for the truth. In this regard, I again observe that the jury was instructed and retired for deliberations in the instant case on February 25, 1980, some five months after this court’s opinion was issued in the case of Clappier v. Flynn, supra. It is my view that had the District Court followed the dictates of Clappier, the problem of separate damage awards returned based upon alternate legal theories of liability under circumstances whereby but only one award was permissible, would have been avoided.
Here, as in Clappier, the alternative claims were simply alternate legal theories seeking the same relief. Corriz was not entitled to a separate compensatory damage award under each legal theory. Rather, he was entitled to only one compensatory damage award if liability were found on any or all of the theories.
The jury verdicts, four in number, were returned with damages awards totaling $122,273.00, as follows:
(1) Verdict in sum of $30,000.00 for compensatory damages “on the issue of violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights” against defendants Emilio Naranjo, Steve Martinez, Canuto Martinez and Rio Arriba County Sheriff’s Department.
*906(2) Verdict in sum of $30,000.00 for compensatory damages “on the issue of malicious prosecution” in violation of state law against defendants Emilio Naranjo and Rio Arriba County Sheriff’s Department.
(3) Verdict in the amount of $2,273.00 “on the issue of assault and battery” against the defendant Steve Martinez.
(4) Verdict in the following amounts and against the following defendants representing punitive damages:
$30,000.00 — Emilio Naranjo
$20,000.00 — Steve Martinez
$10,000.00 — Canuto Martinez
I believe that the compensable transactions from which damages could arise in this case are essentially two: First, the initial police confrontation resulting in the shooting injury sustained by Corriz with his. attendant medical care and mental anguish, and, second, the malicious prosecution claim which followed the shooting incident. Within the factual boundaries of these two transactions, each allegation of federal constitutional rights deprivations must necessarily find its lodging place. Those deprivations, as identified and submitted by the trial court, were: the right to be free from illegal detention; the right to be free from physical abuse, coercion and intimidation; the right to be free from unlawful arrest without evidence in support thereof; the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law and to be free from unlawful and excessive force against person and property; and, the right not to be subjected to the filing of false criminal charges.
Corriz sought relief under each cause of action stated in his First Amended Complaint predicated on the operative facts supporting two basic occurrences — first, assault and battery, and, second, malicious prosecution. The complaint anchored these causes of action to alternate legal theories to support the same relief sought. Under these circumstances, Corriz was entitled to only one compensatory award if liability should be found on any or all of the theories involved. Clappier v. Flynn, supra; Greenwood Ranches, Inc. v. Skie Const. Co., Inc., 629 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1980); Cunningham v. M.G. Transport Services, Inc., 527 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1975).
Carey v. Piphus, supra, involved a suit for damages brought by public school students under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 against school officials, wherein the students were found to have been suspended from school without procedural due process. The Court specifically stated that cases involving awards of damages for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights other than the right of procedural due process were not there controlling. Nevertheless, the Court observed:
To the extent that Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. [409], at 442 [96 S.Ct. 984, at 1000, 47 L.Ed.2d 128] (White, J., concurring in judgment).
B.
It is less difficult to conclude that damages awards under § 1983 should be governed by the principle of compensation than it is to apply this principle to concrete cases. But over the centuries the common law of torts has developed a set of rules to implement the principle that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights. These rules, defining the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide the appropriate starting point for the injury under § 1983 as well.
It is not clear, however, that common-law tort rules of damages will provide a complete solution to the damages issue in every § 1983 case. In some cases, the interests protected by a particular branch of the common law of torts may parallel closely the interests protected by a particular constitutional right. In such cases, it may be appropriate to apply the tort rules of damages, directly to the § 1983. *907See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. [144], at 231-232 [90 S.Ct. 1598, 1641-1642, 26 L.Ed.2d 142] (Brennan, J. concurring and dissenting). In other cases, the interests protected by a particular constitutional right may not also be protected by an analogous branch of the common law of torts. See Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. [167], at 196, and n. 5 [81 S.Ct. 473, at 488, 5 L.Ed.2d 492]. (Harlan, J., concurring) ... In those cases, the task will be the more difficult one of adapting common-law rules of damages to provide fair compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right.
4c * 4c H< 4: 4c
... In order to further the purpose of § 1983, the rules governing compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in question — just as the common law rules of damages themselves were defined by the interests protected in the various branches of tort law.
435 U.S. at pp. 256-259, 98 S.Ct. at pp. 1048-1050.
In the case at bar, I conclude that the alleged deprivations of Corriz’s federal constitutional rights fit the “mold” and are protected by an analogous branch of common-law tort rules of damages recognized under the laws and by the courts of the State of New Mexico.
Carey v. Piphus, supra, was addressed in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). The Supreme Court there held that petitioner Davis’ cause of action against former Congressman Passman for damages in the form of back pay for discriminatory discharge of her as an employee [deputy administrative assistant] based on her sex should be recognized as an implied right of action with attendant implied right to damages anchored directly to alleged violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court analyzed the distinction between invoking the power of the courts to recognize a litigant’s “cause of action” as distinct from the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled to receive. The Court observed that the damages issue must be judicially manageable:
... a damages remedy is surely appropriate in this case.... Relief in damages would be judicially manageable, for the case presents a focused remedial issue without difficult questions of valuation or causation .. . Litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has given federal courts great experience evaluating claims for back pay due to illegal sex discrimination.
442 U.S. at p. 245, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2277. [Emphasis supplied].
Unlike Davis v. Passman, supra, the case at bar, in light of the Court’s instructions relating to the alleged deprivations of Corriz’s federal constitutional rights, when coupled with the verdicts tendered, presented a focused remedial issue with difficult, confusing and/or duplicitous questions of valuation or causation.
In light of the recurring practice of pleading and joining a state tort claim-remedy with a § 1983 federal constitutional rights deprivation claim-remedy involving identical operative facts, the courts must be ever alert to avoid double recovery based upon alternative legal theories seeking the same relief. The risks of jury confusion and undue complication engendered in trying a common-law state tort claim with a § 1983 federal civil rights claim were pointed out in Clappier v. Flynn, supra. We there recommended that trial courts thus presented with the difficult problems of duplicity, confusion and double recovery may overcome them by:
.. . wise use of special interrogatories to be submitted to the jury pursuant to Fed. Rules Civ.Proc. rule 49, 28 U.S.C.A. Such interrogatories could require findings on both claims with accompanying special verdict forms which should provide the district court a clear, adequate basis for entry of the appropriate judgment.
605 F.2d at p. 530.
The purpose of the wise use of special interrogatories is to- obtain consistent answers, representing a logical and probable verdict on the relevant issues as submitted. *908Willard v. The John Hayward, 577 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1978). When the verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Fed.Rules Civ. Proc. rule 58, 28 U.S.C.A. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is also inconsistent with the verdict, judgment shall not be entered and the district court must return the jury for further consideration of its answers and the verdict or grant a new trial pursuant to Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 49, 28 U.S.C.A.
We are treading on dangerous ground to ignore the fact that Clappier v. Flynn, supra, was the law of this Circuit for five months prior to the Corriz trial. We have not hesitated to reverse and remand where circumstances have changed between the ruling of the trial court and the decision on appeal. Amador D. Mestas v. Elephant Butte Irrigation District, No. 79-1689 (10th Cir., Unpublished, 4/2/81). Thus, Rule 51 cannot have exclusive application in this case. However, even should I so agree, it is my view that the objections posited, when considered in light of Clappier v. Flynn, require reversal and remand.