Court Opinion

ID: 9598234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:06:59.84626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:19.480730
License: Public Domain

*401Ness, Justice
(dissenting):
Disagreeing with the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent.
Respondent made timely motions for directed verdict, at the end of the State’s case-in-chief and prior to submitting the case to the jury. Respondent further moved after the jury returnedits verdict for judgment N. O. V.or in the alternative a new trial. The trial judge vacated the jury’s verdict and granted the motion for judgment N. O. V.1
The State appeals alleging the trial court abused its discretion in granting respondent a judgment N. O. V. This appeal raises the issues of this Court’s jurisdiction and scope of review. I would hold the State cannot appeal a fact based post verdict judgment.
The respondent moves to dismiss the appeal arguing that the State has no right to appeal from a judgment of acquittal, and second, that the appeal would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the U. S. Constitution (Fifth Amendment) and the Constitution of South Carolina, Article I, § 12.
First, I address respondent’s contention that the State has no right of appeal from the judgment reversing his conviction.
“That the State has no right of appeal from judgment upon verdict of acquittal in a criminal case seems to have been recognized and accepted as the law of this jurisdiction from the beginning of our judicial history.” State v. Lynn, et al., 120 S. C. 258, 260, 113 S. E. 74 (1922) as cited in State v. Holiday, 255 S. C. 142, 177 S. E. (2d) 541 (1970). Also see Rex Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2550 (K. B. 1770).
While a limited right of appeal in criminal cases has been conferred in federal criminal cases by 18 U. S. C. A. 3731 and by statute in some states, we have no such statutes and the extent of the right of the prosecution to appeal in South Carolina has been defined by our judicial decisions. State v. Holli-day, supra, 255 S. C. 142 at 144, 177 S. E. (2d) 541.
In the federal courts “[t]he exceptional right of appeal given to the Government by the Criminal Appeals Act is strictly *402limited to the instances specified.” U. S. v. Borden Company, et al., 308 U. S. 192, 60 S. Ct. 182, 185, 84 L. Ed. 181 (1939). These limited rights, none of which apply to a judgment of acquittal, are all specified in 18 U. S. C. A. § 3731 as amended on January 2,1971. In United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 90 S. Ct. 2117, 2129, 26 L. Ed. (2d) 608 (1970) it was stated:
“Quite apart from the statute, it is of course, well settled that an acquittal cannot be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [the defendant] twice in jeopardy----.”
In United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 318, 12 S. Ct. 609, 612, 36 L. Ed. 445 (1892) it was held the government could not “appeal in a criminal case without express statutory authority in order to overcome the common-law rule that the state could not sue out a writ of error in a criminal case unless the legislature had expressly granted it that right. — The prior version of the Criminal Appeals Act was construed in accordance with the common-law.” See Vol. 8A Moore’s Federal Practice, Rules of Criminal Procedure, See 29-52.4, R. 29, Note 55.
The State argues vigorously the federal court’s decisions decided pursuant to 18 U. S. C. A. § 3731 allow the prosecution to appeal from post verdict dismissal of an indictment2 or from post verdict rulings in favor of the defendant.3 I agree that in the federal courts this may be proper but not in the state courts absent an enabling statute.
The same prohibition against successive trials for the same offense barred the government’s appeal from a preverdict dismissal in Sanabria v. U. S., 437 U. S. 54, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 57 L. Ed. (2d) 43 (1978), and from appeal for a new trial after a post verdict dismissal in Burks v. U. S., 437 U. S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. (2d) 1 (1978).
Thus as our general assembly has enacted no express statutory authority, the State’s right to appeal under any circumstances in a criminal prosecution is determined by judicial decisions.
*403In State v. Lynn, swpra, this Court refused the State’s appeal from an order granting the defendant a new trial. Subsequently, in State v. DesChamps, 126 S. C. 416, 120 S. E. 491 (1923) the Court permitted the State’s appeal where the granting of a new trial in a criminal case was predicted wholly upon a error of law. Again in State v. Holliday, supra, the State was allowed an appeal from a judgment reversing a defendant’s conviction in magistrate’s court on purely legal grounds.
“The order under appeal was not concerned with the weight or sufficiency of the evidence, but was based upon the wholly legal ground that unlawful arrest, within itself, vitiated the conviction. Since the conviction was reversed on a purely legal ground, the State had the right to appeal from such judgment.” (Emphasis added). State v. Holliday, supra, 255 S. C. 142 at 145, 177 S. E. (2d) 541.
No allegations of legal error are present in this case. The handwritten January 9,1981, order states in its entirety:
“The verdict of the jury, of guilty, as to Leon Dasher is hereby vacated and a verdict of not guilty is directed and ordered by the court.”
Although no reasons were stated for the reversal of the jury’s guilty verdict, respondent’s motion for judgment N. O. V. was made on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, thus it is apparent the trial judge granted the motion because he believed there was no substantial evidence to warrant a conviction. It is plain the trial judge evaluated the State’s evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. It was held in U. S. v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, at 297, 90 S. Ct. 2117, at 2133, 26 L. Ed. (2d) 608, “no appeal (could) be taken by the Government from an acquittal no matter how erroneous the legal theory underlying the decision.” Also see U. S. v. Steed, 646 F. (2d) 136 (4th Cir.1981).
In U. S. v. Steed, supra, rehearing en banc, 674 F. (2d) 284 (1982), the Fourth Circuit addressed the same issues raised here. The court based their jurisdiction to hear the appeal on the Criminal Appeals Act of 1970, stating “Congress granted the government an appeal of right no less expansive than that accorded to defendants.” 674 F. (2d) 284 at 286. The key words *404here are “Congress granted.” “The United States has no right of appeal in a criminal case, absent explicit statutory authority.” U. S. v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 101 S. Ct. 426, 434, 66 L. Ed. (2d) 328 (1980), South Carolina has no criminal appeals act, thus the Fourth Circuit’s determination in U. S. Steed, supra, is not applicable in this State’s criminal appeal.
There is no standard of review or right to appeal in criminal cases contained in South Carolina’s Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Article I, § 12 of the South Carolina Constitution prohibits the State from seeking any review of a verdict or judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. We have long recognized as have the Federal and United States Supreme Courts, that the State cannot appeal in a criminal case without express statutory authorization. State v. Rogers, 198 S. C. 273, 17 S. E. (2d) 563 (1941); State v. Holliday, supra, United States v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 95 S. Ct. 1013, 1018, 43 L. Ed. (2d) 232 (1975); U. S. v. Sanges, supra. Our prior judicial decisions limit the State’s right to appeal to cases where purely legal errors exist. The United States Supreme Court in U. S. v. Martin Linen Supply Company, et al., 430 U. S. 564, 97 S. Ct. 1349 at 1353, 51 L. Ed. (2d) 642 (1977) held:
“Consideration of the reach of the constitutional limitations inhibiting governmental appeals was largely unnecessary during the prior regime of statutory restrictions. ---However, now that Congress has removed the statutory limitations to appeal and the relevant inquiry turns on the reach of the Double Jeopardy Clause...”
Moreover, “the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial after a conviction has been reversed because of insufficiency of the evidence.” U. S. v. DiFrancesco, supra, 101 S. Ct. 434. In Burks v. U. S. supra, the defendant Burks was convicted of armed robbery, and the court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case for determination of whether to direct a verdict of acquittal or order a new trial. Certiorari was granted and the U. S. Supreme Court per Mr. Chief Justice Burger held, that the court of appeals, by vacating the jury’s guilty verdict, in essence held that the trial court had erred by not granting defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. The court explicitly stated, “if the (trial) Court had so held in the first instance, as the reviewing court said it should have *405done, a judgment of acquittal would have been entered and, of course, petitioner could not be retried for the same offense. — ’’(Emphasis added). Burks v. U. S., supra, 437 U. S. 1 at 12, 98 S. Ct. 2141 at 2147, 57 L. Ed. (2d) 1. Former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered. If the jury acquitted, there plainly would be double jeopardy to give the State another go at this citizen. We see no difference when the court orders a judgment of acquittal for lack of evidence. Sapir v. U. S., 348 U. S. 373 at 374, 75 S. Ct. 422 at 423, 99 L. Ed. 426 (1955).
In United States v. Jenkins, 490 F. (2d) 868 (2nd Cir. 1973) the Second Circuit in tracing the right of the prosecution to appeal stated at page 873, footnote 10:
“The case law in the thirteen original states at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted gives some further insight into the dimensions of the common law protection the drafters thought they were building into the Fifth Amendment. The few reported cases touching on the problem of appeals in criminal cases generally stated or appeared to assume that the prosecution could not appeal from an acquittal, — ”. (Emphasis added).
Also see State of Wisconsin v. Detco, Inc., 66 Wis. (2d) 95, 223 N. W. (2d) 859 (1974); State of Kansas v. Gustin, 212 Kan. 475, 510 P. (2d) 1290 (1973); State v. Meen, 171 Wis. 36, 176 N. W. 70 (1920).
In the Meen case, supra, the court held, “a discharge of an accused by the court, either before or after verdict, for want of sufficiency of evidence, in legal effect the same as an acquittal, is not reviewable by writ of error on the application of the state.” (Emphasis added). 176 N. W. at page 70.
The circumstances in the Meen case are similar to those in the instant case. There the defendant was found guilty by a jury after which the trial judge entered an order arresting judgments for want of evidence to sustain the verdict. The court in Meen, supra, at page 71 stated:
“The defendant’s motion after verdict among other things demanded the discharge of the defendant on the ground that the evidence of the case is insufficient to warrant the conviction of defendant of the offenses *406charged in the information. The record is also clear that the defendant insisted on his discharge by asking the court to direct a verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of all the testimony in the case. It is manifest that the defendant insisted that no case had been made against him and that the court direct that he be discharged from further prosecution in the case. This is the effect of the proceedings in the trial court. In the light of this state of the case, is the state entitled to prosecute a writ of error to review the case in this court? Writs of error do not lie at the suit of the state except pursuant to constitutional statutory provisions.”
Also see State v. Powell, 86 N. C. 640 (1882); State v. Solomons, 6 Yerger’s R. 360 (Tenn. 1834); Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. IV, page 386 (1847), by Thomas M. Cooley in Vol. II, Bood IV, Ch. 26, page 148 (1889) and by Christian Chitty, Lee, Hovenden and Ryland in Vol. II, Book IV, page 271 (1872) all contain the statement that under the common law the pleas of acquittal are a bar to appeal.
Moreover, other textbooks are in accord that no appeal lies at the instance of the State in a criminal case. U. S. v. Sanges, supra; Bishop’s Criminal Law, page 658.
Exercising the traditional power of appellate courts to determine the proper standards of review where they are not legislatively imposed, I would apply here a standard of absolute deference to purely fact-based post verdict judgments of acquittal in order to protect the traditional, historical right of criminal defendants to have the trial court’s factual determination accorded absolute finality. The granting of the motion for judgment N. O. V. by the trial judge on the lack of evidence was final, and cannot be reviewed without express statutory authority. On this basis I would dismiss this appeal and affirm the fact-based judgment of acquittal entered by the trial judge.
I would affirm.
William L. Rhodes, Jr., Acting Associate Justice, concurs.

 This motion under Circuit Court Rule 79 related back to the motion for a directed verdict. Grooms v. Zander, 246 S. C. 512, 144 S. E. (2d) 909 (1965); Gallmon v. American Employers Insurance Company, 272 S. C. 369, 252 S. E. (2d) 124 (1979).

 U. S. v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 95 S. Ct. 1013, 43 L. Ed. (2d) 232 (1975).

 U. S. v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117, 101 S. Ct. 426, 66 L. Ed. (2d) 328 (1980).