Court Opinion

ID: 9696370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:46:04.58708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:21.797973
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge
(dissenting in part and concurring in part) :
I disagree with the conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion with regard to its treatment of a purported “proffered” plea. However my grave concern is with the way in which the majority gratuitously attempts to circumscribe the role of a trial judge in the plea bargaining process. Citing a case with facts totally inapposite to those of the instant case,1 the majority concludes that “the [trial] court does not have primary responsibility, but rather the role of guarding against abuse of prosecutorial discretion.” This pronouncement, stated as a general proposition, is a misstatement of the law, posing the potential for a dangerous intrusion on the judicial function. I do not see how the facts of this case warrant a consideration of prosecutorial discretion — not to mention a remand for the exercise of a prerogative which the prosecutor does not now desire.2
It is hardly necessary to repeat here that a criminal defendant has no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted and that a trial court may reject a plea in the exercise of sound discretion. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L. Ed.2d 211 (1962) ; United States v. Gaskins, 158 U.S.App.D.C. 267, 485 F.2d 1046 (1973); Super.Ct.Cr.R. 11. Such discretion “is to be exercised in relation to the problem as it is presented, which is usually . . . a composite of factors.” Griffin v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 108, 110, 405 F.2d 1378, 1380 (1968). The composite of factors here supports the trial court’s exercise of discretion.
*152On the second day of trial, the court without objection from either the defense or the prosecution, refused to pursue a tentative suggestion on the part of defense counsel that disposition by plea was desired. The trial court’s action must be considered in light of what actually transpired at trial and not solely with respect to the court’s oblique reference to “trouble.” The record shows that the court from the outset of trial had been gravely concerned with the administration of a fair trial because of several factors — not the least of which had been differences between the defendant and his counsel. These differences manifested themselves when the defendant requested the presence of a witness whom counsel had not subpoenaed, when he requested that counsel be relieved, and when counsel was unable at one point to locate his client. Counsel, even at the time of proffering the suggestion of a plea, was not sure that he or his client desired the disposition.
On this record and in the absence of objection from the defense or the government, it seems clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to pursue the matter further. The court was acting in an area where it had primary responsibility, and in furtherance of the basic intent of Rule 11 — the protection of the defendant. See United States v. Gaskin, supra, 158 U.S.App.D.C. at 270, 485 F.2d at 1049. There was not the slightest suggestion at trial, and there is no suggestion in this court, that the government had an interest in disposition of the case by plea that would have required the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to have considered the component of fairness to the prosecution.
For this reason, the case of United States v. Ammidown, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 497 F.2d 615 (1973), relied upon by the majority for its pronouncement, is inappo-site. That case arose under circumstances where the trial court and the United States Attorney differed as to how the interests of the prosecution would best be served. At issue there was whether a bargaining agreement laboriously worked out by the prosecutor because of the need to bring another felon to justice, could be rejected by the court solely because of its conclusion that the defendant should receive the greater punishment. This required consideration, inter alia, of the respective roles of the court and the prosecutor in dismissals pursuant to Federal Rule 48(a).3 In setting standards for the harmonization of such roles, Judge Leventhal, speaking for the appellate court, specifically noted that he was “passing any discussion of fairness to the defense, since it is not directly involved in the case at bar . . ..” Id. at 35, 497 F.2d at 622.
In the instant case, the trial court told the appellant that because of the circumstances involving the commencement and direction of trial, the plea had been rejected for appellant’s protection. While expressed belatedly, it is confirmation of what appears apparent from the record— that there was a sound and reasoned exercise of discretion made in fairness to the defense. I see no reason to remand this case, over the opposition of the government, for reconsideration of a proffered guilty plea by a reluctant appellant.4
*153As to the remaining issue, because I am persuaded that we should be loath to carve out exceptions to the right of representation by counsel, I concur in the holding that this case must be remanded for sentencing in the presence of counsel.5

. See United States v. Ammidown, 162 U.S. App.D.C. 28, 497 F.2d 615 (1973), discussed at p. 152, infra.

. The government argues in this court that the “record adequately demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept appellant’s plea in the midst of the trial.”

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 48(a) provides that:
The Attorney General or the United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial without the consent of the defendant.

. This court has been informed by counsel that appellant, who is now serving a sentence for murder, has indicated that he would not accept a plea bargain in this case upon remand.
Conviction on one of the two counts to which appellant would have entered the plea — -the unlawful entry count — was vacated by the trial judge. I question that it would be “permissible” now to accept a guilty plea to this charge.

. I note that the availability of programs for the treatment and rehabilitation of narcotic addicts has necessitated bifurcated sentencing proceedings to permit the determination of a defendant’s eligibility for such programs. Thus there is authority that the initial hearing constitutes the “imposition of sentence” and that the defendant may waive even his own presence at the second stage where he has been heard initially, requests treatment, and does not challenge the bargain made with the court nor the findings of the agency with regard to such treatment. United States v. Curtis, 523 F.2d 1134 (D.G.Cir.1975). That case is distinguishable, however, as arising under 18 U.S.C. § 4251 et seg. (1970).