Court Opinion

ID: 9752680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:28:30.392398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:13.227795
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice,
dissenting in part
I concur with the majority on issues (IB), (2), and (3). At 891. I dissent on issue (1A). In this case, the defendant specifically raises a question of fatal variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof adduced at trial. He claims that the variance constitutes reversible error because the variance deprives him of the protection of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Me. Const. art. I, § 8; U.S. Const., amend. V. The variance noted exists between the allegations of the indictment that the property involved in the alleged offense was “the property of Taylor Rental Co.” (emphasis added) and the proof at trial that the property was owned by David Adams and that he did business as Taylor Rental Center.
*897The protection against double jeopardy, as secured by the Federal Constitution, is applicable in state cases based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); Gwinn v. Deane, 613 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1980). In State v. Wing, Me., 426 A.2d 1375, 1381-82 (1981) (Carter, J., dissenting), I wrote at length concerning the double jeopardy issue to establish two principal points: first, the federal double jeopardy doctrine requires that “the indictment must be sufficiently precise in identifying the crime charged that the indictment itself will be a guard against a subsequent trial on the same charge,” Id. at 1381 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); second, a fatal variance occurs in proceedings under review on appeal when the proof at trial resulted in conviction of an offense but subsequent reprosecution would not be prevented by a facial reading of the indictment employed in that prosecution. Id. at 1382. Applying these points to this case, I think it apparent that the variance here is fatal. The proposition need only be stated to demonstrate the fatal quality of the variance: the defendant was charged with illegally obtaining possession of property of “Taylor Rental Co.”; the defendant was proved at trial to have illegally obtained possession of property of “David Adams.” The allegations of the indictment alone would not identify the offense actually proved against the defendant as one for which he could not again be prosecuted on an indictment charging that defendant illegally obtained “the property of David Adams.”
After Wing, this Court took the path suggested by Roberts, J. in Wing, Id. at 1378 (Roberts, J., concurring) in deciding State v. Hebert, Me., 448 A.2d 322 (1982). In Hebert, we held that under the liberal rules of modern criminal pleading, “[t]he scope of jeopardy created by an indictment is therefore as broad as that indictment may be fairly read.” Hebert, 448 A.2d at 326. On that principle, we held that an indictment for Gross Sexual Misconduct, see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 (1980), which alleged compelling another to engage in “a sexual act,” afforded sufficient double jeopardy protection as to a proved offense involving an oral-genital act because the indictment, ■when pleaded in. bar of a subsequent prosecution, must be read broadly enough to include any sexual act falling within the components of time, place, and identity of the victim in that indictment. The indictment would, therefore, protect against any subsequent prosecution for any sexual act occurring at the same time and place and involving the same victim. We noted in Hebert: “[t]hus, if the allegations in one prosecution describe an offense which is shown to be within the scope of the charging allegations of a prior prosecution, then the defendant may successfully raise a defense of former jeopardy to the subsequent proceedings.” Hebert, 448 A.2d at 326.
The majority relies on Hebert in deciding this case. Majority opinion at [at 893], In my view, the rationale of that case will not save this prosecution because there is no legitimate basis on which the indictment in this case can be read to encompass the offense of illegally obtaining possession of property of David Adams. If the defendant were again charged by a properly drawn indictment with that offense, the indictment in this case would provide him with no protection against double jeopardy. The variance in this case is, therefore, fatal. Consequently, the remaining portion of the majority’s rationale on the point can not properly result in an affirmance of the conviction.1

. I have struggled, unsuccessfully, to concur with the majority concerning this point on the basis of stare decisis, specifically the rule articulated in State v. Damon, Me., 395 A.2d 121, 122 (1978), State v. Nappi, 369 A.2d 230, 232 (1977), and State v. Kimball, Me., 359 A.2d 305, 307 (1976), that the record at trial and the appellate opinion, in addition to the indictment, provide substance to the double jeopardy bar. In my dissent in Wing, joined by no other member of the Court, I stated my critique of that rule. Wing, 426 A.2d at 1381-83.