Court Opinion

ID: 9393715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 21:01:19.129291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:55.038812
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 22-1129

                         UNITED STATES,

                            Appellee,

                               v.

                        GAMAL ABDELAZIZ,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

No. 22-1138

                         UNITED STATES,

                            Appellee,

                               v.

                          JOHN WILSON,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

         [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                      Barron, Chief Judge,
                Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

     Joshua C. Sharp, with whom Brian T. Kelly, Lauren A. Maynard,
and Nixon Peabody LLP were on brief, for appellant Abdelaziz.
     Noel J. Francisco, with whom Yaakov M. Roth, Marco P. Basile,
Harry S. Graver, Jones Day, Michael Kendall, Lauren M. Papenhausen,
White & Case LLP, Andrew E. Tomback, and McLaughlin & Stern, LLP,
were on brief, for appellant Wilson.
     Elliott M. Davis, Kateland R. Jackson, Scott A. Chesin, and
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. on brief for Former United States
Attorneys, amici curiae.
     Michael J. Iacopino, Brennan Lenehan Iacopino & Hickey,
Steven F. Molo, Leonid Grinberg, Justin V. Shur, Kenneth E. Notter
III, and MoloLamken LLP on brief for the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Board of Criminal
Lawyers, amici curiae.
     Robert T. Smith, Mary Fleming, Timothy H. Gray, and Katten
Muchin Rosenman LLP on brief for Law Professors, amici curiae.
     Alexia R. De Vincentis, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Rachael S. Rollins, United States Attorney, and Donald
C. Lockhart, Ian J. Stearns, Stephen E. Frank, Leslie A. Wright,
and Kristen A. Kearney, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on
brief, for appellee.

                           May 10, 2023
            LYNCH, Circuit Judge.      The convictions underlying this

appeal arise from a government criminal prosecution of alleged

misconduct related to college admissions.          The government alleged

that Rick Singer -- a college admissions consultant -- and his

clients engaged in various forms of bribery and fraud to help

secure     those   clients'     children's     admission    to     competitive

universities.      Singer, who pleaded guilty in a separate case to

multiple     charges1    and     cooperated      with     the    government's

investigation, is not a defendant here, and his culpability is

well established.

            The defendants-appellants in this case are two parents,

Gamal Abdelaziz and John Wilson, who hired Singer. Both men agreed

with Singer to make payments purportedly to university accounts in

exchange    for    university   employees'     securing    their    children's

admission as athletic recruits -- a path to admission Singer

referred to as the "side door."2            Their defense at trial and on

appeal is that they believed Singer's services and the side door

to be legitimate and that they acted in good faith.

     1    Singer   pleaded   guilty  to   conspiracy   to   commit
racketeering, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); conspiracy to commit money
laundering, see id. § 1956(h); obstruction of justice, see id.
§ 1512(c)(2); and conspiracy to defraud the United States, see id.
§ 371.
     2    Singer contrasted this side door with the "front door"
(admission on merit) and the "back door" (admission through large
"institutional advancement" donations).

                                    - 3 -
             The    government      charged       Abdelaziz    and     Wilson     with

multiple offenses based on their work with Singer.                      It alleged

that both defendants had participated in an overarching conspiracy

not   only   with    Singer   but    also   with     other    Singer    clients    to

corruptly    influence      university      employees     through      payments     to

university accounts, in violation of the federal programs bribery

statute.     See 18 U.S.C. § 666.        It further alleged that Abdelaziz

and Wilson conspired with other parents to commit two types of

mail and wire fraud: honest services fraud, by using their payments

to deprive the universities of the honest services of their

employees, and property fraud, by depriving the universities of

property in the form of "admissions slots."              See id. §§ 1341, 1343,

1346, 1349. It also charged Wilson with several substantive counts

of federal programs bribery and wire fraud, and with filing a false

tax return in connection with his payments through Singer.                      See 26

U.S.C. § 7206(1).

             A   jury   convicted    both     Abdelaziz       and   Wilson   of   all

charges.     The defendants challenge those convictions on a number

of grounds.        They contend that payments to university accounts

cannot violate § 666 or constitute honest services fraud because

the   payments       were     intended      for     accounts        owned    by   the

universities -- the alleged victims of the scheme.                      They argue

that the property fraud theory is invalid because admissions slots

are not property, or, in the alternative, that their convictions

                                      - 4 -
must be vacated because the district court erred by instructing

the jury that admissions slots are property as a matter of law.

And   they     argue   that    the    government     proved     only   a   narrower

conspiracy than the one alleged by the indictment and that this

variance prejudiced them on all counts.              Wilson also asserts that

various forms of trial error require us to vacate his conviction

for filing a false tax return.                Our task in this appeal is to

assess these arguments and determine whether the charged conduct

falls within the specific crimes of which these defendants were

convicted and whether the manner in which this case was charged

and tried unacceptably deprived these two defendants of a fair

trial on their own conduct, rather than the conduct of others.

Nothing   in    this   opinion       should   be   taken   as   approval     of   the

defendants'      conduct      in   seeking    college      admission   for    their

children.

             We reject the defendants' argument that payments to

accounts controlled by the alleged victim of a bribery scheme

cannot violate § 666, which lacks any basis in the provision's

text, and so deny their request for judgment of acquittal on that

basis.    And we affirm Wilson's conviction for filing a false tax

return.

             We do hold that the government's honest services theory

is invalid as a matter of law under the Supreme Court's decision

in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), and that, on

                                        - 5 -
the arguments offered by the government, the district court erred

in instructing the jury that admissions slots constitute property.

Accordingly,   we   vacate   the   defendants'   mail   and   wire   fraud

convictions.   We also hold that the government failed to prove

that Abdelaziz or Wilson agreed to join the overarching conspiracy

among Singer and his clients charged in the indictment, and that

this variance prejudiced the defendants by allowing the government

to introduce a significant amount of powerful evidence related to

other parents' wrongdoing in which these defendants played no part,

creating an unacceptable risk that the jury convicted Abdelaziz

and Wilson based on others' conduct rather than their own.             On

that basis, we vacate the conspiracy convictions and Wilson's

substantive convictions under § 666.3

                             I.    Background

           We begin by laying out the basic facts and procedural

history.   We elaborate on this background information as necessary

in our analysis of the legal issues.

     3    We acknowledge and thank the amici curiae for their
submissions in this case.    Eleven former U.S. Attorneys, five
criminal law professors, and the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers and the American Board of Criminal Lawyers filed
briefs in support of Wilson.

                                   - 6 -
                                            A.

                                            1.

             The charges against Abdelaziz stem from his work with

Singer in 2017 and 2018 to secure his daughter's admission to the

University       of    Southern     California      ("USC").        Abdelaziz      had

previously paid Singer to work with his two older children in 2012

and 2013; the government does not argue or cite any evidence that

these     2012   and    2013     services    for   Abdelaziz's      children      were

improper.

             It is undisputed that Abdelaziz agreed with Singer in

approximately June 2017 to pursue side-door admission to USC for

his daughter.         Abdelaziz maintains that he believed this option to

be   at    least      tacitly    approved    by    the   school     and    to   entail

"preferential admissions treatment to students like [Abdelaziz's

daughter] who could assist athletic teams as practice players or

team      managers     and      whose   parents    donated     to    the    athletic

department."          At the time, Abdelaziz's daughter had not played

competitive basketball in over a year; she had played for her

school's junior varsity team until January or February 2016 but

had stopped playing after failing to make the varsity team.                      A USC

admissions officer testified that Abdelaziz's daughter was also

not an academically competitive applicant outside the athletic

recruitment process.

                                         - 7 -
            On July 16, 2017, Singer sent Abdelaziz an email with

the subject line "For Me to complete USC athletic profile" that

requested information about Abdelaziz's daughter's scholastic and

athletic    accomplishments,       including   "If   they   play   the   sport-

Basketball," "Accolades if they have them," and "Action Picture."

Abdelaziz forwarded the email to his wife, but the record does not

otherwise show any response.            Eleven days later, Singer emailed

Abdelaziz again to request "an action photo or two of [Abdelaziz's

daughter] playing basketball."          Abdelaziz responded: "Got it."      He

then sent Singer five photos of high school girls' basketball

games, four of which -- as Abdelaziz represents in his brief and

the government does not dispute -- contained his daughter, and one

of which did not.         The file names for the photos used generic

letters and numbers (for example, "DSC_0007.JPG") and differed

only in the numbers.        Singer responded: "We will use this one."

His email identified the chosen photo -- the one that did not

contain Abdelaziz's daughter -- only by the file name.

            Singer instructed one of his associates to prepare the

profile.     The associate did so; the result included the photo

Singer     had   selected    and    various    basketball    statistics    and

accolades    that   the     associate    invented    and    that   Abdelaziz's

daughter had not earned.       Singer sent this profile to Abdelaziz in

early August, together with a message from his associate: "Let me

                                     - 8 -
know if you want me to add any other awards to her profile or if

you think that is enough."

               As he did at trial, Abdelaziz disputes whether he saw

this    message.             Singer    originally       sent        the     profile     to

gamalaziz@cox.net.           This address generated an automatic reply that

stated: "Please be advised that I have changed my e-mail address

to gamalaziz797@gmail.com."                An FBI agent testified that he was

not aware of any evidence that Abdelaziz opened or responded to

the message, although Abdelaziz later responded to messages Singer

sent to the same cox.net address, having apparently forwarded them

to    the    gmail.com       account   mentioned      in     his    automatic     reply.

The     next          day,    Singer        also      sent     the         profile      to

amalaziz797@gmail.com -- the address mentioned in the automatic

reply, but without the opening "g."                The same FBI agent testified

that,       because    of    the   typo,    this   message         would    be   "off   in

cyberspace."

               Singer then sent the profile to an administrator in the

USC Athletics Department who had agreed with Singer to facilitate

Abdelaziz's daughter's side-door admission.                        That administrator

added additional falsehoods to the profile -- including a photo of

a different girl.            This version of the profile became the basis

for the profile presented to "Subco," a subcommittee of USC

admissions       officers      responsible      for    overseeing          admission    of

                                           - 9 -
athletic recruits.           Based on this profile, Subco considered and

approved Abdelaziz's daughter's admission on October 5, 2017.

               On October 10, the same athletics administrator who

revised Abdelaziz's daughter's profile sent Singer a letter from

the     Dean    of    Admissions   conditionally       admitting    Abdelaziz's

daughter as a recruited athlete, pending her submission of a full

application packet and other administrative tasks.               Singer emailed

this letter to Abdelaziz the same day.

               In early November, Abdelaziz forwarded the letter to a

Singer employee, together with an email that stated: "[Singer]

asked that we work with you to complete USC's application . . . ."

Abdelaziz later exchanged emails with this employee, Singer, and

another Singer associate about his daughter's application.                     In

these    emails,      Singer    noted    that    it   was   important   for   the

application to discuss "basketball as apassion [sic]."                  Abdelaziz

later "reminde[d]" the others of this "direction" when it came

time to edit his daughter's application essays.

               In    early   January    2018,    Abdelaziz's    daughter      sent

Abdelaziz and the Singer employee an application essay in which

she described "[t]he basketball court [as her] art studio" and

wrote: "Whether I am playing alone or in a pickup game with friends

or in front of a crowd of two hundred people at school, I feel an

enormous release from my everyday life when I am on the court."

Abdelaziz responded in the same email thread that he had "read

                                        - 10 -
[his       daughter's]      essays,"   and   opined   that   "overall    [they

were] . . . good."           His daughter had not played on the school

basketball team for nearly two years at the time.                 The Singer

employee submitted Abdelaziz's daughter's USC application the

following day.

              Abdelaziz and the        government agree that Abdelaziz's

daughter was formally admitted in March 2018, although they do not

cite any exact date in the record.

              On March 16, 2018, a foundation run by Singer sent

Abdelaziz an invoice for $300,000,4 purportedly for a "[p]rivate

[c]ontribution."           Abdelaziz wired that sum to the foundation ten

days later.         Where that money ultimately went is unclear from the

record, but an FBI agent testified that Singer's "general pitch

[to parents] was that [a side-door payment] was a donation to a

program," and government counsel acknowledged at trial that Singer

told Abdelaziz the payment would go to a university account.                The

government does not argue on appeal that the jury could have found

that Abdelaziz intended the payment to go to any USC employee

personally.

              Abdelaziz's daughter enrolled at USC in fall 2018.            She

never      played    for    or   otherwise   associated   with   the    women's

basketball team.

       4  Singer ran both a for-profit business, The Key, and a
nonprofit foundation, The Key Worldwide Foundation.

                                       - 11 -
            In September 2018, the FBI approached Singer, and he

agreed to cooperate with the government's investigation of his

clients and university insiders.        As part of this cooperation

agreement, Singer made various recorded calls at the government's

direction.

            The government cites two such calls involving Abdelaziz.

The first occurred on October 25, 2018.      During the call, Singer

told Abdelaziz that his foundation was being audited and that the

IRS had "asked . . . about" Abdelaziz's payment.      Singer further

stated that he was "not going to tell the IRS anything about the

fact that your $300,000 . . . was paid to . . . [an athletics

administrator] at USC to get [Abdelaziz's daughter] into school

even though she wasn't a legitimate basketball player at that

level."   Abdelaziz responded: "OK."    Singer asked: "You're OK with

that, right?"    Abdelaziz answered: "Of course."    A moment later,

he added:

            No, I -- I mean, I -- you know, I mean . . .
            my intention was to, uh, donate the money to
            the foundation and, uh, what -- you know, and
            then from there obviously, uh -- I don't
            think -- Uh, do they have the intention of
            reaching out to the people that sent those
            payments?

Singer said he did not know and that he "wanted to make sure our

stories are correct."     He told Abdelaziz that he was "going to

essentially say that [the] $300,000 payment . . . was made to our

                               - 12 -
foundation to help underserved kids," and "wanted to make sure

[Abdelaziz was] OK with that."    Abdelaziz replied: "I am."

          In the same exchange, Singer told Abdelaziz that the USC

athletics administrator with whom Singer had arranged the side

door had called Singer to say that she "loved" the profile created

for Abdelaziz's daughter and that "going forward, anybody who isn't

a real basketball player that's a female, [she] want[ed] [Singer]

to use that profile."    Abdelaziz responded: "I love it."

          The second call took place on January 3, 2019.       Singer

told Abdelaziz that the same athletics administrator had called

him to "give [him] a heads up" that the Admissions Department had

"asked . . . why [Abdelaziz's daughter] did not show up for Women's

Basketball in the fall," and that the administrator had "told them

that [Abdelaziz's daughter] had an injury."        Abdelaziz asked

whether the Admissions Department would ask his daughter about the

situation and whether he needed to "prepare her."    Singer stated

that they would not contact Abdelaziz's daughter and that he had

"wanted [Abdelaziz] to know what" the administrator had told the

Admissions Department.    Abdelaziz responded: "I will answer the

same, uh, should they call me."

                                  2.

          Wilson engaged Singer's services to facilitate side-door

admission for his children on multiple occasions between 2013 and

                               - 13 -
2019: first for his son, and then, years later, for his twin

daughters.

          Beginning in spring 2013, Wilson worked with Singer to

secure his son's admission to USC through the side door as a

purported water polo recruit.    Singer explained to Wilson by email

that the USC men's water polo coach was "giving [him] 1 boys slot,"

available on a "first come first [sic]" basis.          In response to

Wilson's asking when payment was due, Singer responded: "No payment

of money till [sic] [the USC men's water polo coach] gets a verbal

and written [sic] from admissions . . . ."

          Wilson's son did play high school water polo, but his

high school coach testified that he was not a player of the level

ordinarily recruited by USC, a noted water polo powerhouse.           In

emails sent at the time, Wilson expressed doubts about whether his

son would fit in on the team, asking Singer whether "it w[ould] be

known that [his son was] a bench warming candidate" and whether

his son would "be so weak as to be a clear misfit at practice,"

and stating that "[o]bviously his [son's] skill level m[ight] be

below the other freshmen" and that he "want[ed] to be sure [his

son would] not [be] a lepper [sic]."        Singer responded that "the

commitment   is   to   be   on    the     roster[,]   not   attend   all

practices[;] . . . he will have to attend drug tests and other

mandatory functions for 1 year [but then can] walk away/ frankly

after the 1st semester he can move on."

                                 - 14 -
           In August 2013, Singer noted in an email to Wilson that

the water polo coach needed "a player profile so he [could] add

[Wilson's son] to his recruit list and present him to admissions

in October," and that Singer had the necessary materials to create

the profile.    Wilson responded: "Great - let me know when [you]

have verified [you] have it all completed and into [sic] [the water

polo coach]."   In October, Singer updated Wilson: "[The water polo

coach] has [Wilson's son's] stuff and asked me to embellish his

profile more, which I am doing."    A few days later, Singer emailed

the profile to Wilson.        It misrepresented several aspects of

Wilson's   son's   athletic   qualifications   --   for   instance,   by

erroneously describing him as a captain of his high school team

and listing implausibly fast swim times.       Wilson's counsel argued

both at trial and on appeal that the government did not prove

Wilson was aware of the falsehoods in the profile.            Wilson's

counsel emphasized that an FBI agent whose testimony the government

used to introduce the email containing the profile acknowledged

that he was not aware of emails or other evidence showing Wilson

read or responded to Singer's message, and that the profile listed

the wrong home address and used Wilson's son's SAT scores rather

than his more impressive ACT scores, which Wilson purportedly would

have wanted included.

                                - 15 -
           An assistant water polo coach at USC relied on this

profile to prepare the athletic profile used by Subco to consider

whether to admit Wilson's son.

           Subco considered and approved Wilson's son's admission

on February 28, 2014, relying in part on the falsified athletic

profile.

           The day after Subco approved his son's admission, Wilson

emailed Singer to "[t]hank[] [him] again for making this happen."

He asked about "the options for the payment" and requested an

invoice "for consulting or whatever from [Singer's business] so

that [Wilson could] pay it from [his private equity firm's]

corporate account."    After some further discussion of payment

mechanics, Wilson's firm wired $220,000 to a combination of Singer,

his business, and his foundation on April 7, 2014.   The government

does not contend that any USC employee personally received a

portion of this payment.   Singer passed $100,000 along to the USC

men's water polo team and, so far as the record shows, retained

the other $120,000.

           Wilson's son quit the water polo team after his first

semester at USC.

           Several years later, in September 2018, Wilson called

Singer about the possibility of helping Wilson's twin daughters,

then juniors in high school, with their college applications.   The

government recorded this call, which took place before Singer began

                              - 16 -
cooperating     with   the     government,   without   the    participants'

knowledge.     Singer explained that for Wilson's daughters to gain

admission to the highly competitive schools they were interested

in "on their own" would require "essentially perfect grades" and

excellent standardized test scores, but added that "if you said

you wanted to . . . go through a different door you c[ould] do

that."    Wilson inquired about "the other door," asking if it was

"like . . . water polo and [a] donation," and Singer explained the

price and availability of admission through the side door at

various   universities.        Singer   informed   Wilson    that   side-door

admission to Stanford or Harvard would cost "a minimum of [$]1.2

million," since a coach would have to "giv[e] up his spot" to a

purported recruit who is "not a good enough athlete[] to compete,"

but would provide a "done deal.         Just like with [Wilson's son]."

Singer explained that the sport "d[id]n't matter," saying he "would

make them a sailor or something."            Wilson laughed in response.

Wilson observed that they were discussing "big numbers," since

"there's so many people that want to do th[is]," and asked if

"there [was] any way to make [the payments] tax deductible as like

donations to the school."         Singer stated that payments would be

deductible as contributions to his foundation.

             Wilson and Singer continued to discuss the use of the

side door for Wilson's daughters after Singer began cooperating

with the government.         From this point on, Singer's references to

                                    - 17 -
university insiders willing to facilitate side-door admission were

part of a ruse created by investigators.

          In a September 29 call, Wilson confirmed that, while his

daughters remained undecided on what schools they wanted to attend,

he was "interested about the side door and that stuff" and asked

what schools and sports were available.        Singer assured him that

the side door "is gonna . . . happen where you want it to happen,"

and that crew or sailing might be potential sports options. Wilson

asked: "[W]hat if they're not really that good?" Singer responded:

"[A]t the end of the day . . . I may be able to go to the sailing

coach   and   say,   'Hey,   this   family's   willing   to   make   the

contributions. . . . [The child] may not be up to the level you

are, but . . . you're gonna get a benefit, and the family's gonna

get [a] benefit.'"    Wilson also asked how the payment would work.

Singer stated that "the money [went] into [his] foundation," and

that he would then "split the money potentially to the coach or

other . . . parties that are at that school that need the

money[.] . . . Or it may go right to the coach, . . . depend[ing]

on the school."

          In October, Wilson called Singer to discuss "making some

donations now, whatever -- how that can work."      Singer stated that

he worked with "a bunch of schools," including Harvard and Stanford,

on a "first come, first served" basis, and that, "if [he] were to

get a deposit . . . [of] like half a million dollars in the bank,"

                                - 18 -
they could "figure out where [Wilson's daughters] wanna go" later.

"[H]aving the money already, in advance, [would] make[] it much

easier" because coaches "don't want to give up a spot" unless "the

family guarantee[s] . . . that they're gonna ante up and they're

gonna   make   a   payment."   Wilson     asked   whether   his   daughters

"actually ha[d] to do th[e] sport" or whether "[t]hey could just

go in and      . . . be like . . . the scorekeeper[,] . . . water

girl[,] . . . [or] manager."      Singer confirmed that they could be

"[m]anager[s] or whatever you want to call 'em," and that Wilson's

daughters were "athletic and . . . big" enough that he could "sell

to anybody that they're athletic enough to be able to take 'em and

there'll be no question."      Singer further assured Wilson that, if

he used the side door, admission would be "a done deal."            Wilson

requested that Singer send him wiring information, and confirmed

with Singer that if he sent "[h]alf a million" he would be "locked

in for 2." Wilson's private equity firm wired $500,000 to Singer's

foundation two days later at Wilson's direction.

            Later that month, Singer told Wilson that he had spoken

with Stanford's sailing coach, that the coach was willing to

"guarantee[] a spot for next year," and that Wilson could "have

first dibs" if Singer sent the coach the "[$]500,000 that [Wilson]

wired into [Singer's] account to secure the spot for one of

[Wilson's] girls."     Singer also mentioned that he had "asked [the

coach] for a second spot in sailing and [the coach] said he

                                 - 19 -
c[ould]n't do that because he ha[d] to actually recruit some real

sailors so that Stanford d[id]n't . . . catch on."           Wilson laughed

and said "[r]ight."       Wilson asked for more time for his daughters

to decide where they wanted to go, and inquired whether there was

"any news on the Harvard side."           Singer promised to get back to

him.5

             On November 29, Singer informed Wilson that they had

"got a spot if . . . [Wilson's daughter] want[ed] to go to Harvard."

He claimed that "the senior women's administrator at Harvard [was]

going to give [Wilson's daughter] a spot," in exchange for which

Wilson would "have to give . . . her . . . $500,000" through

Singer's foundation to "fund the senior women's administrator."

He added: "I've already paid [the Stanford sailing coach] the

[$]500      [thousand]    and   now    we'll   give   the   senior   women's

administrator [$]500 [thousand] . . . . [Y]our total's going to be

[$]1.5 [million].        [$]250 [thousand] will come in the spring for

Stanford and [$]250 [thousand] for Harvard in the spring and

we'll . . . be done."       Wilson responded: "OK, great."      When Wilson

        5 Singer and Wilson covered similar ground in a call a few
days later, in early November. Singer told Wilson: "[W]e got the
Stanford spot. They wanna know if you want it because I have to
pay the coach, um, right away."      He reiterated that the coach
"d[id]n't care if it's a sailor or not." He added that he was
"working" on Harvard, but it would "not happen for several months."
Wilson again asked for more time to figure out which schools his
daughters wanted to attend. He also agreed with Singer that his
daughters "weren't going to get into either" Harvard or Stanford
without the side door.

                                      - 20 -
asked what sport his daughter would need to play, Singer answered:

"[The Harvard administrator will] figure it out. . . . [I]t doesn't

matter the sport at this point.        She will . . . just get her in

through . . . athletics in one of the sports but it won't matter."

Singer also noted that Wilson's other daughter "w[ould]n't have to

sail but we're going to put her through sailing" at Stanford.

Wilson responded that "sailing is actually a logical thing.         She

could be even the mascot, whatever, but she knows sailing."           He

confirmed that the plan "sound[ed] fantastic" and was "great news."

Wilson's private equity firm wired a further $500,000 to Singer's

foundation on December 11, again at Wilson's direction.

            As with Abdelaziz, the government acknowledged at trial

that Singer "told the parents," including Wilson, "that the money

would go to the athletic program at the schools."        On appeal, it

does not argue that the jury could have found that Wilson intended

any of his payments to go to insiders' personal accounts, rather

than   to   university-owned   accounts   related   to   the   insiders'

positions.

                                  B.

            On March 5, 2019, a federal grand jury in the District

of Massachusetts returned a single-count indictment charging David

Sidoo -- a parent who had worked with Singer -- with conspiracy to

commit mail and wire fraud in connection with Sidoo's allegedly

having paid Singer to have one of his associates take various

                                - 21 -
standardized tests for Sidoo's children.   The indictment further

alleged that Singer had also paid his associate "to secretly take

the SAT and ACT for the children of other co-conspirators known

and unknown to the Grand Jury."

          Six days later, the government filed a separate criminal

complaint alleging that roughly thirty other parents, including

Abdelaziz and Wilson, had conspired with Singer and others to

commit mail fraud and honest services mail fraud.   The complaint

alleged varying forms of misconduct by the named parents; some

were alleged to have schemed to help their children cheat on

standardized tests, while others -- like Abdelaziz and Wilson --

were alleged to have conspired to bribe university employees to

secure their children's admission.

          Many of the parents named in the complaint elected to

enter plea agreements with the government.    For example, Gordon

Caplan, Agustin Huneeus, and Bruce Isackson -- three parents whose

interactions with Singer would later figure in the evidence at

Abdelaziz's and Wilson's trial -- agreed to waive the requirement

of indictment by a grand jury and plead guilty to various offenses

pursuant to criminal informations.

          On April 9, 2019, a grand jury returned a superseding

indictment in the government's case against Sidoo that named as

codefendants eighteen parents from the complaint who had not

entered plea agreements, including Abdelaziz and Wilson.      The

                             - 22 -
government superseded this indictment twice more in the following

months.      During this period, four more parents pleaded guilty

without written plea agreements.

             The operative          fourth superseding        indictment        in this

case, returned on January 14, 2020, charged fifteen parents with

an overlapping set of offenses.                     All fifteen defendants were

charged with conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and honest

services mail and wire fraud.               See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346,

1349.       This count alleged an overarching conspiracy among the

defendants        and     others,     including       Singer,   to        defraud    two

standardized       test    firms     and    five    universities     --    Georgetown;

Harvard;     Stanford;      the     University      of   California,      Los   Angeles

("UCLA"); and USC -- in two alternative ways: first, by depriving

them of property in the form of "standardized tests and test

scores" (for the standardized test companies) and "admission to

the   [u]niversities"         (for    the     universities),       and     second,    by

depriving them of the honest services of their employees through

the   use    of    "bribes    and     kickbacks."         Notably,       although    the

indictment contained detailed allegations of fraud related to

standardized testing with respect to several other defendants, it

did not allege that either Abdelaziz or Wilson had engaged in or

even been aware of that form of misconduct.

             Eleven parents, including both Abdelaziz and Wilson,

were also charged with conspiracy to commit federal programs

                                           - 23 -
bribery.    See id. §§ 371, 666(a)(2).     The indictment alleged that

the parents had "conspired . . . to bribe agents of USC to secure

their children's admission to that university."

            Wilson -- but not Abdelaziz -- was charged with three

substantive counts of wire fraud and honest services wire fraud,

see id. §§ 1343, 1346, and two substantive counts of federal

programs bribery, see id. § 666(a)(2), all in connection with his

efforts to secure admission to Harvard and Stanford for his

daughters.    In addition, Wilson alone was charged with filing a

false tax return, see 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), in connection with his

treatment of his payments to secure his son's admission to USC on

his 2014 tax return.6

            The defendants moved to dismiss on a number of grounds.

Three of those grounds previewed arguments Abdelaziz and Wilson

now make on appeal: First, the defendants moved to dismiss the

federal    programs   bribery   and   honest   services   fraud   charges,

arguing that payments made to the alleged victim of a bribery

scheme -- here, the universities -- cannot constitute bribes.

Second, they moved to dismiss the mail and wire fraud charges

insofar as these charges alleged that the defendants had defrauded

the universities of property, arguing that admissions slots do not

     6    All fifteen defendants were also charged with conspiracy
to commit money laundering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The district
court dismissed this charge as to Abdelaziz and Wilson before trial
on the government's motion.

                                 - 24 -
constitute property.          Third, they moved to dismiss the conspiracy

counts, arguing that the indictment alleged a "rimless wheel"

conspiracy barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), and to dismiss the entire

indictment because it did not allege that the defendants had

participated        in    a   single     act,    transaction,     or   series    of

transactions, such that joinder was improper.

                The district court denied these motions in a memorandum

opinion and order issued June 23, 2020.                United States v. Sidoo,

468 F. Supp. 3d 428, 435 (D. Mass. 2020).                       It reasoned that

"[p]ayments made to accounts controlled by university insiders,

even       if   such     payments      were     ultimately     received    by   the

universities," could support the § 666 and honest services fraud

charges.        Id. at 445; see id. at 444-45.               It further concluded

that       admissions    slots   "are    property    interests     owned   by   the

university cognizable under the mail and wire fraud statutes."7

Id. at 441; see id. at 440-42.                    And it determined that the

indictment adequately alleged a single overarching conspiracy and

that, as a result, joinder was appropriate.                  See id. at 437-39.

       7  The district court later incorporated this conclusion
into its instructions to the jury on the mail and wire fraud
counts, which stated: "For purposes of the mail and wire fraud
statutes,   admission[s]  slots   are  the   property  of   the
[u]niversities."

                                        - 25 -
            Before trial, twelve of the defendants reached plea

agreements with the government, and one received a presidential

pardon. After unsuccessfully moving to sever, Abdelaziz and Wilson

were tried jointly before a jury in fall 2021.

            Singer himself did not testify at trial, despite having

cooperated with the investigation.           The government did, however,

introduce    a   substantial   amount   of    evidence    related   to   other

parents' work with Singer without showing that Abdelaziz or Wilson

were personally aware of those activities.               For example, Bruce

Isackson -- one of the parents who worked with Singer who entered

a plea agreement with the government -- was the government's first

witness, and described his knowing misconduct in his dealings with

Singer.     He testified, for instance, that he had paid to have his

daughter's standardized test scores altered and that he "knew a

good portion of th[e] money [he paid Singer to facilitate his

children's college admission] was going into [Singer's] pockets

and [to] the people who helped him" rather than to the university

accounts for which it was purportedly intended.              The government

also introduced recorded calls between Singer and other parents,

but not between Singer and Abdelaziz or Wilson, in which Singer

and those other parents discussed obviously wrongful activities,

such   as   schemes   to   cheat   on   standardized     tests.     And   the

prosecution drew the jury's attention to this evidence during its

opening statement and closing argument.             For instance, during

                                   - 26 -
closing argument, government counsel stated: "[One] thing that you

need to find . . . [is] that the defendants . . . knew that what

they were doing [was] wrong.   One way you know that [they did] is

because Bruce Isackson told you that he knew it, from the witness

stand."

          The defendants argued through counsel that they had

believed Singer's services to be legitimate and had acted in good

faith.

          The jury found both Abdelaziz and Wilson guilty on all

counts.   Abdelaziz and Wilson moved for judgment of acquittal or

a new trial, raising, as most relevant here, arguments similar to

those made in the pretrial motions to dismiss.    The district court

denied the motions, relying on the reasoning from its decision

denying the motions to dismiss.    See United States v. Abdelaziz,

578 F. Supp. 3d 110, 113-14, 116 (D. Mass. 2021).         The court

sentenced Abdelaziz and Wilson to twelve and fifteen months'

imprisonment, respectively.

          These timely appeals followed.

          II. Rejection of the Defendants' Theory that Their
 Convictions Under 18 U.S.C. § 666 ("Theft or bribery concerning
   programs receiving Federal funds") Fail as a Matter of Law

          We begin with the defendants' argument that the charges

under 18 U.S.C. § 666 (as well as the related § 666 conspiracy

counts) "fail as a matter of law."      We review these questions of

law about the scope of § 666 de novo, see United States v.

                               - 27 -
Fernandez,      722    F.3d       1,    8    (1st    Cir.   2013),   and   reject   the

defendants' argument.

              The text of § 666 criminalizes "corruptly giv[ing],

offer[ing], or agree[ing] to give anything of value to any person,

with       intent     to        influence      or     reward    an    agent    of    an

organization . . . in connection with any business, transaction,

or series of transactions of such organization . . . involving

anything of value of $5,000 or more."8                  18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).       The

parties agree that the "agent[s]" in this case are the university

employees who worked with Singer and that the "organization[s]"

are the universities.              The defendants do not make any developed

argument that their dealings with Singer and, through him, the

university insiders were not "in connection with . . . business,

transaction[s],            or     [a]       series    of    transactions      of    [the

universities] involving anything of value of $5,000 or more."                        Nor

do the defendants argue that the payments were not "inten[ded] to

influence" the insiders in conducting that business or those

transactions.

       8   Section 666 applies only if the "organization" in
question "receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of
$10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract,
subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal
assistance." 18 U.S.C. § 666(b); see id. § 666(a). On appeal,
the defendants do not dispute that the universities satisfy this
condition.

                                             - 28 -
            The focus of the defendants' arguments is instead on

whether payments intended for university accounts -- which the

government does not dispute the defendants' payments were -- can

violate § 666.      That is, the defendants dispute that the phrase

"any person" in § 666 can refer to the "organization" which is the

agent's principal.      Here, the organization which is the agent's

principal is a university.       The defendants contend that a payment

to a university principal is not covered by § 666's text and does

not align with common or historical understandings of the terms

"bribe" and "bribery" or the purposes of "bribery" statutes.                In

particular, the defendants emphasize that the government cannot

produce a single case in the history of Anglo-American law in which

a payment to an agent's principal was prosecuted as a bribe.             Thus,

the defendants contend that construing the provision to proscribe

such   payments     would   violate   several     canons   of    construction

requiring    that    "ambiguous"      criminal    statutes      be   construed

narrowly.

                                      A.

            We turn to the plain language of § 666.          See, e.g., Baker

v. Smith & Wesson, Inc., 40 F.4th 43, 48 (1st Cir. 2022) ("We start

with the [statutory] text . . . ."); see also Salinas v. United

States, 522 U.S. 52, 55-57 (1997) (interpreting § 666 based on its

"plain language").     That text refers to a thing of value given "to

any person."      18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).         At oral argument, defense

                                   - 29 -
counsel conceded that the "person" to whom a "[]thing of value" is

given could be an organization.9           See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (defining

"person" to include "corporations, companies, associations, firms,

partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies" "unless the

context indicates otherwise").

          Given this concession, we see no textual reason to

exclude the organizational principal from the set of entities that

qualify as "any person" for purposes of § 666.         The Supreme Court

has explained that courts should give effect to § 666's "expansive,

unqualified language," including in its use of the word "any."

Salinas, 522 U.S. at 56-57; see also Sabri v. United States, 541

U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (declining to read § 666 to require proof

that crime itself had nexus with federal money); Fischer v. United

States, 529 U.S. 667, 677 (2000) (reading "benefit" in § 666 to

include Medicare funds).         Salinas, for example, reasoned that

Congress's   use   of   "any"   before   "the   business    or   transaction

clause . . . undercut[] [a defendant's] attempt to impose [a]

narrowing construction" that would limit § 666's application to

bribes affecting federal funds.      522 U.S. at 57.       Here, the use of

"any" before "person" militates against excluding principals from

the set of eligible "person[s]."

     9    Similarly, in their briefing, the defendants stated that
bribes could be directed to the agent's "political campaign,
or . . . his favorite charity."

                                  - 30 -
             Section   666's    context    and   history   buttress   the

conclusion that "any person" includes the agent's principal.          See

Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 20-27 (considering "statutory context,"

including history of § 666 and related statutes, in interpreting

§ 666).    Congress amended § 666 into essentially its current form

in 1986.     See id. at 21-22.    In so doing, Congress used the same

operative language as used in 18 U.S.C. § 215, the bank bribery

statute, which it had also revised earlier that year.        Indeed, the

committee report on the § 666 amendment explained that "[t]he

provision     parallels   the   bank   bribery   provision   (18   U.S.C.

[§] 215)."     H.R. Rep. No. 99-797, at 30 n.9 (1986).        Compare 18

U.S.C. § 215(a)(1), with id. § 666(a)(2).

             Before 1986, § 215 prohibited "directly or indirectly,

giv[ing], offer[ing], or promis[ing] anything of value to any

[agent] of any financial institution . . . or offer[ing] or

promis[ing] any such [agent] to give anything of value to any

person or entity, other than such financial institution, for or in

connection with any transaction or business of such financial

institution."    Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1107(a),

98 Stat. 1837, 2146 (emphasis added).       The 1986 amendment to § 215

revised the statute to bar "corruptly giv[ing], offer[ing], or

promis[ing] anything of value to any person, with intent to

influence or reward an officer, director, employee, agent, or

attorney of a financial institution in connection with any business

                                  - 31 -
or transaction of such institution."      Act of Aug. 4, 1986, Pub. L.

No. 99-370, § 2, 100 Stat. 779, 779.

          This history of § 215 and thus of § 666 shows that

Congress knew how to exclude the agent's principal from the set of

"person[s]" who could receive the thing of value, and it chose not

to do so in revising § 215 or importing its language into § 666.

Cf. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 357 (2013)

(comparing the text of antidiscrimination statutes and concluding

that "when Congress elected to address [a concept] as part of a

detailed statutory scheme, it did so in clear textual terms").

Section 666 itself includes no express carveout -- the statute

refers only to "any person."      That context further undercuts the

defendants' effort to introduce a carveout for payments to the

agent's principal.10

          The     defendants'     textual      counterarguments      are

unpersuasive.    They first respond that the "person" and the

"organization" must be distinct in order "to give each term

independent   meaning."   Even    when    "person"   and   "organization"

happen to refer to the same entity, however, each term does

independent work in defining the offense: the former describes the

recipient of the thing of value, while the latter identifies the

     10   The language of § 666 tracks the language of the revised
version of § 215.       The defendants make no argument that,
notwithstanding the revisions to the text of § 215, "any person"
in that provision excludes the financial institution.

                                 - 32 -
agent's principal.         See 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2); cf. Littlefield v.

Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, 951 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2020)

(finding     no    surplusage        where     a    statute    contained       multiple

definitions       of     potential     benefit       recipients    even    though    a

particular     person      might     qualify       under   multiple     definitions).

Further, the defendants do not explain -- and we can think of no

explanation -- why their reasoning would not require concluding

that the "agent" must also be distinct from the "person" who

receives the thing of value.             Yet even the defendants acknowledge

that a payment to the agent himself "in exchange for an exercise

of his powers" is a paradigmatic form of bribery covered by § 666.

           The defendants turn for support to the Supreme Court's

decision in Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158

(2001), but that case does not help their cause.                      Cedric Kushner

involved   a      suit    under    the   Racketeer         Influenced    and   Corrupt

Organizations ("RICO") Act, which "makes it 'unlawful for any

person employed by or associated with any enterprise'" to engage

in certain conduct.          Id. at 160 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).

The Court concluded that the RICO Act's text contemplates "two

distinct entities: (1) a 'person'; and (2) an 'enterprise' that is

not simply the same 'person' referred to by a different name,"

because, by the statute's terms, the "person" must be "employed by

or associated with" the "enterprise," and "[i]n ordinary English

                                         - 33 -
one speaks of employing, being employed by, or associating with

others, not oneself."      Id. at 161.

            The premise of the defendants' argument is that § 666

"follows a similar structure" to that of the RICO statute and so,

under Cedric Kushner, the "person" and the "organization" must be

distinct.    The defendants' premise is wrong: § 666's language does

not parallel the RICO statute in the relevant respect.             The RICO

statute sets out a particular relationship between the "person"

and   the   "enterprise"   --   the   former   must   be   "employed    by   or

associated with" the latter -- that is incompatible with the

"person" and the "enterprise" being synonymous.               In contrast,

§ 666's text does not require such a relationship between the

"person" and the "organization."         Instead, it refers broadly to

"any person" and, separately, to an "organization."

            At oral argument, Wilson's counsel also asserted that

"the thing of value" required by § 666 cannot "be the type of

professional benefit that the government has been relying on."

See 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (requiring, inter alia, "giv[ing],

offer[ing], or agree[ing] to give anything of value").                 We need

not decide whether professional benefits can qualify as "anything

of value" for purposes of § 666 because that phrase, as used in

the statute, refers not to what the agent personally receives from

the arrangement but to what the defendants "g[a]ve[], offer[ed],

or agree[d] to give . . . to any person" -- here, the money the

                                  - 34 -
defendants paid or agreed to pay to the universities.               Money is

indisputably a thing of value.           See, e.g., Salinas, 522 U.S. at

57.   That is all § 666 requires.

                                        B.

           The   defendants      also    offer    nontextual   arguments    to

support their view that § 666 cannot criminalize payments to the

university principals.      They contend first that a payment to a

university principal does not fall within ordinary or historical

understandings of the terms "bribe" or "bribery" or implicate the

purpose of antibribery provisions, and second that a series of

statutory construction canons favor their reading: They assert

that § 666 is "ambiguous," such that the rule of lenity applies.

The government's reading, they argue, alters the balance of state

and federal criminal jurisdiction, which should not be done without

a clear statement by Congress.          They conclude by arguing there are

vagueness concerns which require a narrow reading of § 666.

           Given   the   clear    meaning    of   the   language   chosen   by

Congress, arguments about the meaning of "bribe" and "bribery" or

the generalized purposes of "bribery" laws are beside the point.11

As the Supreme Court said in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct.

      11  The section's caption does use the term "bribery," 18
U.S.C. § 666, but "[t]he caption of a statute . . . 'cannot undo
or limit that which the [statute's] text makes plain,'" Intel Corp.
v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256 (2004) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. &
Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529 (1947)).

                                   - 35 -
1731 (2020), "[w]hen the express terms of a statute give us one

answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it's no

contest."       Id. at 1737.   Nor does the fact that the government has

not identified any historical bribery prosecution involving a

payment to the agent's principal override § 666's clear text.                 Cf.

id. at 1750-53 (rejecting narrow reading of Civil Rights Act of

1964 based on historical applications).

            The     defendants'       arguments     based   on   various   canons

calling for narrow constructions of ambiguous criminal statutes

fail because the text of § 666 is not ambiguous with respect to

whether it covers payments to the university principals.                      See

Salinas, 522 U.S. at 66 ("The rule [of lenity] does not apply when

a statute is unambiguous or when invoked to engraft an illogical

requirement to its text."); id. at 59-60 (holding that the canon

of construction requiring a clear statement to alter the federal-

state    balance    of     criminal    jurisdiction     "does    not   warrant   a

departure from [§ 666's] terms" where the statute's "text . . . is

unambiguous on the point under consideration"); cf. Skilling v.

United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (finding no vagueness

problem where it was "as plain as a pikestaff that" the conduct at

issue would violate a statute (quoting Williams v. United States,

341 U.S. 97, 101 (1951))).            The rule of lenity, for example, does

not     apply    because    "there     is    [no]   '"grievous    ambiguity      or

uncertainty" in the statute.'"              Muscarello v. United States, 524

                                       - 36 -
U.S. 125, 139 (1998) (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.

600,   619   n.17   (1994)).       The    Supreme       Court     has    consistently

commanded that § 666 be interpreted in keeping with its "expansive,

unqualified    language,"      which     "undercuts      .    .   .     attempt[s]   to

impose . . . narrowing construction[s]."                Salinas, 522 U.S. at 56-

57; see also Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605; Fischer, 529 U.S. at 677.

             Further,   the    defendants'           policy   argument      that     our

interpretation of § 666 would upset the state-federal balance and

"criminalize a large swath of ordinary transactions" suffers from

several flaws.      That policy argument would arrogate to the federal

judiciary choices which have been made by Congress.                            And the

argument disregards that there are meaningful restrictions on

§ 666's scope.

             The statutory text of § 666 imposes several restrictions

on the type of conduct proscribed by the provision.                        First, the

reach of § 666 is limited by two dollar thresholds.                       Section 666

applies only if the organization at issue "receives, in any one

year   period,   benefits     in   excess       of    $10,000     under    a   Federal

program."     18 U.S.C. § 666(b); see id. § 666(a).                      And "to fall

within the purview of § 666, [a bribe] must be made 'in connection

with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of [the

covered] organization, government, or agency involving anything of

value of $5,000 or more.'"             Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 12 (second

                                       - 37 -
alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)); see id.

at 12-13 (discussing this "transactional element").

            Most importantly, § 666 requires that a defendant have

acted "corruptly."      18 U.S.C. § 666.          This "corruptly" element

provides a meaningful limit on the provision's sweep.               See, e.g.,

Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167

(2004)   (describing    "the   settled    rule"    that   courts    "must,   if

possible, construe a statute to give every word some operative

effect").

            The government stresses that the requirement that the

defendant    act   "corruptly"   restricts   the     scope   of    permissible

prosecutions.      Its brief does not argue that any payment which

violates any university policy could violate § 666.               Instead, the

government    focuses   on   payments    intended    to   induce    university

insiders to act contrary to the schools' underlying interests.

But the definitions of "corruptly" that appear in the legislative

histories of other federal bribery statutes point against the

conclusion that the term somehow operates to exclude agents'

principals from the set of "person[s]" who can receive the thing

of value under § 666.    See H.R. Rep. No. 87-748, at 18 (1961) ("The

word 'corruptly' [in 18 U.S.C. § 201, the federal officials bribery

statute,] . . . means with wrongful or dishonest intent."); H.R.

Rep. No. 99-335, at 6 n.24 (1985) ("The term 'corruptly' [in § 215,

the bank bribery statute,] means that the act is done 'voluntantly

                                  - 38 -
[sic] and intentionally, and with the bad purpose of accomplishing

either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by

some unlawful methods or means.       The motive to act corruptly is

ordinarily a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other

benefit to one's self, or some aid or profit or benefit to

another.'" (quoting 2 E. Devitt & C. Blackmar,           Federal Jury

Practice and Instructions § 34.08 (3d ed. 1977))).         Nothing in

those definitions appears uniquely incompatible with payments made

to agents' principals.

          Moreover,   because   the   defendants'   argument   for   the

reversal of the § 666 counts does not squarely raise the meaning

of "corruptly" in this context, we see no basis for reversing their

convictions on any contention about the meaning of "corruptly."12

          We reject the defendants' argument that the charges

under § 666 fail as a matter of law because the payments at issue

were intended for university accounts.13

     12   Because, as we will explain, we vacate the § 666
convictions on other grounds, we leave it to the district court to
address the import of the meaning of "corruptly," if necessary, on
remand after full briefing.
     13   The defendants also argue that they are entitled to a
new trial due to alleged error in the jury instructions. Because
we vacate the convictions under § 666 on other grounds, as
discussed below, we do not address this argument.

                                - 39 -
           We address the defendants' more successful argument that

the § 666 convictions must be vacated for trial error in Section

IV, set forth below.

 III. Acceptance of the Defendants' Defenses as to Convictions
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346 ("Honest Services Fraud"
                      and "Property Fraud")

           The defendants argue that the charges under the mail and

wire fraud statutes, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346, fail as a

matter of law.    These mail and wire fraud charges were based on

two distinct legal theories: honest services fraud and property

fraud.14   The defendants argue that the conduct charged in the

indictment does not involve the core honest services doctrine

identified in    Skilling.   They also argue that the statutory

requirement that "property" be the subject of the alleged scheme

or artifice to defraud cannot be met here.

           While the question is close, in the end we agree with

the defendants. Considering each theory de novo, see United States

v. Correia, 55 F.4th 12, 41 (1st Cir. 2022); Fernandez, 722 F.3d

     14   The defendants do not dispute that if either theory is
legally viable and the jury instructions were proper, the evidence
was sufficient. See United States v. Celestin, 612 F.3d 14, 24
(1st Cir. 2010) ("[W]hen the government has advanced several
alternate theories of guilt and the trial court has submitted the
case to the jury on that basis, an ensuing conviction may stand as
long as the evidence suffices to support any one of the submitted
theories." (quoting United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 309 (1st
Cir. 2006))). They argue separately that, even if the government's
theory and the jury instructions were legally sound, they are
nonetheless entitled to a new trial because of trial error; we
address those contentions in Section IV below.

                              - 40 -
at 8, we conclude that the honest services fraud theory fails as

a matter of law and that the government's arguments with respect

to the property theory are not adequate to support the jury

instructions given at trial.      We vacate the defendants' mail and

wire   fraud    convictions,     including   the    related    conspiracy

convictions (Counts One, Six, Eight, and Nine of the operative

indictment).

                                    A.

          The     government's     honest     services    fraud   theory

essentially    charges   the   defendants    with   a   non-traditionally

recognized form of bribery.        Understanding this theory and the

defendants' objections to it requires some background on the

history of the mail and wire fraud statutes.        In particular, it is

important to understand (1) the law in this area before the Supreme

Court's decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987);

(2) the congressional reaction to McNally; and (3) the Court's

2010 decision in Skilling interpreting the current scope of the

mail and wire fraud statutes after those developments and in light

of constitutional concerns.      See generally Skilling, 561 U.S. at

399-402 (recounting this history).

                                    1.

          Sections 1341 and 1343 both prohibit "any scheme or

artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means

                                  - 41 -
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."15

18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (emphasis added).      As the Supreme Court

said in Skilling: "Emphasizing Congress' disjunctive phrasing, the

Courts of Appeals, [beginning in the 1940s], interpreted the term

'scheme or artifice to defraud' to include deprivations not only

of money or property, but also of intangible rights."    561 U.S. at

400.    This "honest services doctrine" proscribed forms of fraud in

which,

            [w]hile the offender profited, the betrayed
            party suffered no deprivation of money or
            property; instead, a third party, who had not
            been deceived, provided the enrichment. For
            example, if a city mayor (the offender)
            accepted a bribe from a third party in
            exchange for awarding that party a city
            contract, yet the contract terms were the same
            as any that could have been negotiated at
            arm's length, the city (the betrayed party)
            would suffer no tangible loss. Even if the
            scheme occasioned a money or property gain for
            the   betrayed    party,   courts    reasoned,
            actionable harm lay in the denial of that
            party's right to the offender's "honest
            services."

Id. (citation omitted).      While honest services cases "[m]ost

often . . . involved bribery of public officials," courts also

applied the theory to the private sector.      Id. at 401 (quoting

       15 The mail fraud statute applies to schemes involving use
of the mails, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, while the wire fraud statute
applies to those involving use of the wires, id. § 1343. Apart
from these elements, the Supreme Court has construed the statutes
coextensively, see, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S.
349, 355 n.2 (2005), and so we discuss them interchangeably.

                                - 42 -
United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1980)).

The defendants do not assert that the statutes cannot reach purely

private actors.         "[B]y 1982, all Courts of Appeals had embraced

the honest-services theory of fraud."                      Id. (citation omitted).

            But    the        Supreme       Court's    1987       decision   in    McNally

"stopped [the theory] in its tracks."                       Id.    "McNally involved a

state   officer        who,    in     selecting       Kentucky's      insurance    agent,

arranged    to    procure       a    share    of     the    agent's    commissions      via

kickbacks paid to companies the official partially controlled."

Id. at 401-02 (citing McNally, 483 U.S. at 360).                        The prosecution

did not allege that the scheme had cost the state money or resulted

in worse insurance; rather, it argued that the scheme had deprived

Kentucky of its right to honest services.                          Id. at 402 (citing

McNally, 483 U.S. at 353, 360).                The Court rejected this argument

and the honest services doctrine, which, it reasoned, "le[ft] [the

mail and wire fraud statutes'] outer boundaries ambiguous and

involve[d]       the    Federal        Government       in    setting     standards     of

disclosure and good government for local and state officials."

Id. (quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at 360).                           The Court "read the

statute    'as    limited       in    scope    to     the    protection      of   property

rights,'"    and       stated        that    "[i]f     Congress       desire[d]    to    go

further, . . . it must speak more clearly."                       Id. (quoting McNally,

483 U.S. at 360).

                                            - 43 -
           Congress responded the following year by enacting 18

U.S.C. § 1346, which provides: "For the purposes of [the mail and

wire fraud statutes], the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud'

includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible

right of honest services."      See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 402.

           In   2010,   the   Supreme    Court    considered      a    vagueness

challenge to § 1346 in Skilling.        See id.   The defendant, a private

sector actor, was "charged . . . with conspiring to defraud [a

company's] shareholders by misrepresenting the company's fiscal

health,   thereby   artificially    inflating      its    stock       price"   and

allowing the defendant to profit through his salary, bonuses, and

stock sales.    Id. at 413.   He contended that § 1346 did not provide

fair notice of the conduct it prohibits and that its "standardless

sweep" would enable arbitrary prosecutions.              Id. at 403 (quoting

defendant's brief); see also, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.

352, 357 (1983) ("As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness

doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense

with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand

what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.").

           Recognizing the constitutional due process concerns,

including fair notice and vagueness, raised by the statute, the

Court chose to narrow the statute, rather than invalidate it, to

"preserve what Congress certainly intended the statute to cover,"

                                 - 44 -
that is, what the Court called the "core" of the pre-McNally honest

services doctrine. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 404. This core "involved

fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through

bribes or kickbacks supplied by a third party who had not been

deceived."      Id.; see also id. at 407 ("Although some applications

of      the     pre-McNally    honest-services      doctrine    occasioned

disagreement among the Courts of Appeals, these cases do not cloud

the doctrine's solid core: The 'vast majority' of the honest-

services cases involved offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary

duty,    participated    in   bribery   or   kickback   schemes."   (quoting

United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1987))).

"To preserve the statute without transgressing constitutional

limitations, [the Court] . . . h[e]ld that § 1346 criminalizes

only the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law."

Id. at 408-09.      The defendants here argue that the conduct charged

in the indictment does not involve the core honest services

doctrine identified in Skilling.

              The Court explained that when the narrowed § 1346 is

"[c]onfined to these paramount applications," it "presents no

vagueness problem."       Id. at 404.    Turning to the issue of notice,

the Court said that, "'whatever the school of thought concerning

the scope and meaning of' § 1346, it has always been 'as plain as

a pikestaff that' bribes and kickbacks constitute honest-services

fraud."       Id. at 412 (quoting Williams, 341 U.S. at 101).        And the

                                   - 45 -
narrowing construction limited the risk of arbitrary prosecutions

by the fact that § 1346's "prohibition on bribes and kickbacks

draws content not only from the pre-McNally case law, but also

from federal statutes proscribing -- and defining -- similar

crimes," id. (citing, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)), such

that a "criminal defendant who participated in a bribery or

kickback scheme . . . cannot tenably complain about prosecution

under § 1346 on vagueness grounds," id. at 413.

            Because there was no allegation -- or plausible way of

reading    the    facts   to   suggest   --     that    Skilling       himself   had

participated in a bribery or kickback scheme, the Court concluded

that he had not committed honest services fraud.                 Id.

                                        2.

            The    defendants    contend       that    their   payments     to   the

universities,      the    parties     whose     interests      were    purportedly

betrayed    by    their    agents,     cannot     constitute       bribes    under

Skilling's interpretation of § 1346.                   There is no charge of

kickbacks in the indictment.

            In    response,     the   government        relies   on     Skilling's

statement that its narrow construction of § 1346's "prohibition on

bribes . . . draws content not only from the pre-McNally case law,

but also from federal statutes proscribing -- and defining --

similar crimes.       See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 666(a)(2); 41

U.S.C. § 52(2) . . . ."         561 U.S. at 412.         The government relies

                                      - 46 -
on this language to argue that § 1346 effectively incorporates a

version of § 666, such that -- borrowing the language of § 666 --

§ 1346 covers "[w]hoever . . . corruptly gives, offers, or agrees

to give anything of value to any person, with intent to influence

or reward an agent of [a principal]."         18 U.S.C. § 666.

            Although the question is a close one, we conclude that

the government's reliance on this single statement in Skilling is

misplaced.    The government's reading is, for several reasons,

impossible to reconcile with Skilling's language and its core

holding that § 1346 covers only "the bribe-and-kickback core of

the pre-McNally case law."       561 U.S. at 409.    The government has

not identified any pre-McNally case involving a purported bribe

paid to the victim of an alleged bribery scheme.                Further, the

statutes in force while courts developed the pre-McNally case law

defining "bribery" do not support the conclusion that payments to

the purportedly betrayed party constitute "bribes" as that term is

traditionally understood or used in Skilling.             Nor is there any

support for that view in other legal sources defining "bribery."

Rather than interpreting the language the government cites to

override    these    considerations,    we   understand    it    instead     to

constrain    the    honest   services   doctrine's   sweep.        And     this

understanding that Skilling's reference to other statutes does not

mean that § 1346 is coextensive with these other statutes draws

additional support from the facts that those statutes define

                                  - 47 -
offenses broader than traditional bribery and that those statutes

may vary from each other in their coverage.

          The      government's          reading    ignores     Skilling's     core

"hold[ing] that § 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback

core of the pre-McNally case law."                   Id.; accord id. at 408

(confining   the    scope    of      §     1346    "to   the   core   pre-McNally

applications");     see   id.   at       404-09    (looking    to   "the   doctrine

developed in pre-McNally cases in an endeavor to ascertain the

meaning of the phrase 'the intangible right of honest services'"

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1346)).               The government has not cited any

pre-McNally honest services case involving a purported bribe paid

to an agent's purportedly betrayed principal, and does not dispute

that no pre-McNally       case involved            such a payment.         Skilling

embodies a narrower understanding of the meaning of "bribery" for

purposes of honest services fraud that cuts against concluding

that the conduct involved here, which does not fall "[i]n the

main . . . [of] the pre-McNally cases," is a "bribe" in the sense

meant by Skilling.16      Id. at 404.

          The government emphasizes Skilling's characterization of

pre-McNally case law as recognizing the potential for honest

     16   The defendants argue that the lack of pre-McNally
precedent "is dispositive" and requires acquittal. We need not
reach so far; even assuming that the lack of pre-McNally precedent
is only a relevant but not a dispositive factor in our analysis,
we reach the same result.

                                         - 48 -
services fraud "[e]ven if [a] scheme occasioned a money or property

gain for the betrayed party."       Id. at 400 (citing United States v.

Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1400 (2d Cir. 1976)).            But the government

does not contend that the Court had in mind a case like this one,

where the alleged bribe was paid directly to the purportedly

betrayed party.    In fact, the cases to which the Court referred

appear to have involved traditional bribery fact patterns that

happened   incidentally     to      benefit   the      agent's    principal

financially.     See id. (citing, inter alia, Shushan v. United

States, 117 F.2d 110, 115, 119 (5th Cir. 1941)).          Dixon, the case

the Court cited for the proposition that schemes that financially

benefitted the principal could still be actionable under pre-

McNally doctrine, did not involve bribery at all; it simply stated

in passing that honest services fraud could cover schemes that

"enriched" the principal.        536 F.2d at 1400 (citing United States

v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)).           In support

of that proposition, Dixon, in turn, cited a Seventh Circuit

decision   in   which   racing    interests   bribed    certain    Illinois

officials to allow additional racing events, which incidentally

increased tax revenues.    See Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1135, 1139, 1149-

51.   That is a classic bribery fact pattern, distinct from the

direct payments to the university principals involved here.

           Nor do statutes in effect during the pre-McNally period

show that a payment to the purportedly betrayed party would have

                                   - 49 -
been considered a "bribe." As discussed above, until its amendment

in 1986, shortly before the Court decided McNally, the bank bribery

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 215, expressly excluded payments to an agent's

principal from its coverage.        See Act of Oct. 12, 1984, § 1107(a),

98 Stat. at 2146 (prohibiting "directly or indirectly, giv[ing],

offer[ing], or promis[ing] anything of value to any [agent] of any

financial institution . . . or offer[ing] or promis[ing] any such

[agent] to give anything of value to any person or entity, other

than such financial institution, for or in connection with any

transaction or business of such financial institution" (emphasis

added)).     This limitation in scope undercuts any argument that it

was clear before McNally that "bribery" would encompass a payment

to the purportedly betrayed party.

            Other legal sources defining "bribery" either weigh

against    the   government's     position   or   are   at   most   ambiguous.

Black's Law Dictionary, for example, defines "bribery" as "[t]he

corrupt payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for

official action."      Bribery, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)

(emphasis    added).      While    the   government     contends    that    the

university    insiders   stood    to   benefit    professionally     from   the

defendants' payments, describing this type of indirect benefit

from a payment to a university principal -- the alleged victim of

the scheme -- as a "private favor" is at best a stretch.                    Cf.

United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007)

                                    - 50 -
(observing, in a pre-Skilling prosecution for honest services

fraud under § 1346, that "[t]he United States has not cited, and

we have not found, any appellate decision holding that an increase

in official salary, or a psychic benefit such as basking in a

superior's approbation (and thinking one's job more secure), is

the sort of 'private gain' that makes an act criminal" under

§ 1346, and rejecting the prosecution's theory (quoting United

States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998))); see also,

e.g., H. James, When Is a Bribe a Bribe?                     Teaching a Workable

Definition of Bribery, 6 Teaching Bus. Ethics 199, 209–16 (2002)

("Any payment made to a principal, for any purpose, is not by

definition a bribe.").

            The government's attempt to circumvent this lack of

authority     by    relying       on    Skilling's          citation     to   other

anticorruption statutes fails.           The government's reading of § 1346

to   incorporate    a   version    of    §   666    eliminates     the   important

limitations    on   liability      included        in   §   666,   including    the

requirement that affected programs receive federal funds and the

threshold dollar value involved, which we described above.17                    See

18 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(b).         More importantly, the Supreme Court in

      17  The jury instructions that the government requested, and
those that were ultimately given at trial, for example, did not
require the jury to find that the alleged bribes satisfied either
of those requirements in order to convict under an honest services
theory.

                                       - 51 -
Skilling emphasized these specific limitations in describing the

statutes.    See 561 U.S. at 413 n.45.

            Critically, the statement on which the government relies

appears in the Court's discussion of why its construction of § 1346

will prevent arbitrary prosecutions.           See id. at 412-13.       In that

context, the citation is best read as constraining honest services

prosecutions    by      referring     prosecutors         to    statutes   that

collectively   offer    general     guidance    as   to   whether    particular

conduct may be actionable, rather than as expanding the concept of

"bribery" to incorporate even the outermost limits of the cited

statutes' scopes.    Indeed, the government's argument would stretch

criminal    liability     beyond     those     statutes'       context-specific

limitations.    Skilling does not hold, as the government argues,

that any conduct that might violate those other statutes also

violates § 1346.

            Our reading properly accounts for the fact that Congress

crafted § 666 and other federal anticorruption statutes to target

particular classes of misconduct, and thus did not necessarily

confine those statutes to criminalizing the classic crime of

"bribery" in the sense described in Skilling and at the core of

the pre-McNally case law.            The Supreme Court has repeatedly

observed that § 666 uses "expansive, unqualified language" in

service of Congress's unique interest in protecting federal funds

from misuse.    Salinas, 522 U.S. at 56; see id. at 56-59; see also

                                    - 52 -
Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606-07.          That language sweeps beyond the type

of "bribery" reflected in pre-McNally law and the other legal

sources discussed above.            We do not think that while narrowly

construing § 1346 to cover "the bribe-and-kickback core of the

pre-McNally case law," Skilling, 561 U.S. at 409, the Court meant

simultaneously to extend § 666's broad language to apply outside

the particular context for which Congress designed it.

              Indeed,     the   government's   reading   would    threaten   to

render    §   666   (and    other   specialized   anticorruption     statutes)

superfluous, since § 1346 would cover the same ground while also

extending to other contexts.             Cf. id. at 413 n.45 (addressing

potential "superfluous[ness]" between § 1346 and more specialized

anticorruption statutes).18          Our reading recognizes the statutes'

distinct roles, with § 666 covering a broader set of types of

conduct but applying only in a narrower context.                 Section 666's

breadth is inseparable from its narrow focus.

              The government ignores the fact that Skilling itself

recognized that other federal anticorruption statutes may vary in

scope.        See   id.    at   412-13   (describing     these    statutes   as

"defining . . . similar [but not necessarily identical] crimes").

     18   Skilling explained that construing § 1346 to overlap to
some degree with specialized anticorruption statutes does not
render § 1346 superfluous because it applies to a broader range of
contexts. See 561 U.S. at 413 n.45. It is a different question
whether reading § 1346 to cover everything that § 666 covers, as
well as other conduct, would render § 666 superfluous.

                                     - 53 -
Given the number of potentially relevant statutes, the variation

resulting from the government's reading would be problematic.                 For

example, this variation would have existed in this case under the

pre-1986   version    of   the   bank   bribery       statute,   §   215,    which

explicitly excluded payments to an agent's principal.                Compare Act

of Oct. 12, 1984, § 1107(a), 98 Stat. at 2146 (pre-1986 § 215),

with, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), and Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub.

L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119, 1119 (enacting 18 U.S.C. § 201, the

federal officials bribery statute, which potentially applies to

payments to "any public official" or "any other person").

           Construing § 1346 to cover conduct not covered by the

core   pre-McNally    understanding     of    "bribes"    would      not   provide

sufficient   notice    for   "ordinary       people    [to]   understand     what

conduct is prohibited."          Skilling, 561 U.S. at 402 (quoting

Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357).        An ordinary person would not be on

notice that a payment to a purportedly betrayed party was bribery

within the core of pre-McNally law, raising the same concern which

motivated the Supreme Court in Skilling to construe honest services

fraud as it did.     Our holding that § 666 may cover the defendants'

conduct does not cure this concern: § 1346 does not have § 666's

clear text, and, as we have explained, Skilling did not hold that

liability under any other federal anticorruption statute suffices

to render an act criminal under § 1346.

                                   - 54 -
            Various          canons   and    other     interpretive     methodologies

employed by the Supreme Court reinforce our conclusion that, after

Skilling, § 1346 does not cover the defendants' conduct as honest

services fraud.          Unlike in our interpretation of § 666, these

interpretive tools do apply here because the applicability of

§ 1346 to the charged conduct has little historical antecedent and

would introduce ambiguity. And the Supreme Court "ha[s] instructed

that   'ambiguity        concerning      the      ambit    of   criminal     statutes[,

including the mail and wire fraud statutes,] should be resolved in

favor of lenity.'"            Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25

(2000) (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971))

(applying    rule       of    lenity    in    non-honest        services    mail     fraud

prosecution). Similarly, in the honest services context, the Court

has    repeatedly       "decline[d]          to   'construe      [federal        criminal]

statute[s]   in     a    manner       that    leaves      [their]   outer    boundaries

ambiguous    and        involves       the    Federal      Government       in    setting

standards' of 'good government for local and state officials.'"

McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016) (quoting

McNally, 483 U.S. at 360); see, e.g., Skilling, 561 U.S. at 408-

12; McNally, 483 U.S. at 360.                Indeed, embracing the government's

reading of § 1346 would go beyond "'setting standards' of 'good

[state and local] government,'" McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373

(quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at 360), and stretch honest services

bribery to potentially criminalize such parental actions as, for

                                         - 55 -
example, donations to preschools by parents who hope to gain

admission for their children.        Further, the contrast between the

Court's repeated instruction to apply the honest services doctrine

narrowly and its broad, textualist application of § 666 supplies

another reason not to read Skilling as incorporating § 666 into

§ 1346.

          We should not be misunderstood.              We do not say the

defendants' conduct is at all desirable.         That is far different

from the issue we face of whether that conduct is in violation of

§ 1346's honest services language as interpreted by the Supreme

Court in Skilling.   As Skilling explained, "[i]f Congress desires

to go further, . . . it must speak more clearly than it has."            561

U.S. at 411 (quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at 360).          The government's

honest services theory cannot support the defendants' mail and

wire fraud convictions.

                                     B.

          Independently of honest services fraud, the government

argues that we should affirm the defendants' mail and wire fraud

convictions on the distinct property fraud theory.              The mail and

wire   fraud   statutes   prohibit    use   of   the    mails     or   wires,

respectively, to effect "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for

obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent

pretenses, representations, or promises." 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.

A prosecution for property fraud under these statutes requires the

                                - 56 -
government to prove "that the 'object of the fraud . . . [was]

[money or] property in the victim's hands.'" Pasquantino v. United

States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 (2005) (second alteration and omission

in   original)      (internal      quotation         marks     omitted)     (quoting

Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 26).

            The asserted "property" that the government argues was

obtained here is "admissions slots."              Indeed, the district court

instructed the jury that, "[f]or purposes of the mail and wire

fraud   statutes,    admission[s]        slots    are    the    property     of   the

[u]niversities."

            The defendants contend, however, that admissions slots

can never qualify as property for purposes of the mail and wire

fraud   statutes,    and    thus      that   their    convictions      under    these

statutes must be reversed for that reason alone.                     As a fallback

argument, they also contend that even if some admissions slots

could be property for purposes of those statutes, we must vacate

the convictions because, given the limitations of the government's

arguments   and     evidence     in    this     case,    the    district     court's

instruction that "admissions slots" are property was error.

            The government responds to these two different defense

arguments   with    one    categorical        assertion.        It   contends     that

"admissions   slots"       at   the    universities      supply      the   necessary

                                       - 57 -
property    because      admissions    slots    by    their   nature     constitute

property.19

            We reject the government's argument that admissions

slots at any university always qualify as property for purposes of

the mail and wire fraud statutes.               The government's categorical

argument fails, for example, to recognize even the well-known

variations in types of admissions slots offered at the university

level;     for     instance,     early       admission,   rolling        admission,

conditional       admission,     waiting-list        admission,    and     deferred

admission.       Nor does the government's categorical approach account

for the fact that admissions occur at all levels of education,

from nursery school through postgraduate studies, and involve

millions of students and parents.             We reject, too, the defendants'

equally categorical contention to the contrary and so reject their

argument     that    their     property-based        convictions    under     these

statutes must be reversed on the ground that the government did

not prove that property was involved in the commission of those

offenses because "admissions slots" cannot be property.

            But     we   do   agree   with    the    defendants'   more     limited

fallback argument that the jury instruction erred in stating, based

on the arguments and record in this case, that "admission[s] slots

     19   The government does not develop any argument on appeal
that the universities were defrauded of money or property, such as
instructional   resources,   associated   with   the   defendants'
children's enrollment.

                                      - 58 -
are the property of the [u]niversities."         We see no basis for

concluding that such a categorical statement is invariably true of

any admissions slot, and the government has not identified any

basis in the record that would indicate that the instruction could

be upheld on the ground that there was evidence that the admissions

slots in question in the charged offenses in this case qualified

as property as a matter of law.

          We emphasize the narrowness of our holding: We do not

hold that admissions slots cannot ever be property.          Nor do we

hold that the jury instruction given by the district court could

never be appropriate.     The resolution of these questions will

require much more detail, both legal and factual, on the nature of

the purported property interest at issue.         It may well be that

there must be resolution of disputed facts by a jury and resolution

of the ultimate legal question by the court.       A court may well be

able to validly conclude on the evidence in a particular case that

admissions slots constitute property.      Such increased detail would

better position a district court to consider, for example, whether

dictionaries,   case   law,   treatises,    or   other   legal   sources

establish that similar interests are treated as property, see,

e.g., id. at 356 (citing such sources); Carpenter v. United States,

484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (similar), and whether expert educational

and/or economic evidence is warranted.       But here, the government

does not identify from the record of this case adequate details

                                - 59 -
about the admissions slots at issue, or admissions slots generally,

that would support the instruction given.                     Thus, we see no basis

for concluding that the district court validly instructed the jury

that,   "[f]or   purposes      of    the    mail       and    wire    fraud    statutes,

admission[s] slots are the property of the [u]niversities."

                                           1.

             The fundamental problem with the government's argument

as to why the instruction was not in error is that the government

fails to describe the purported property interest in anything other

than highly general, abstract terms, leaving us no firm basis on

which   to   assess   whether       the    admissions         slots    at     issue   here

constitute property.         The government's brief describes such slots

as economically valuable and exclusively within the power of a

university to issue, revoke, or prohibit transfer of, and on that

basis alone it asks us to conclude that they are property.

             Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, we do not

accept the government's argument that admissions slots always

qualify as property for purposes of the mail and wire fraud

statutes     merely    because      they        may    bear     some     hallmarks      of

traditionally recognized forms of property.                     A series of Supreme

Court   decisions     have    counseled         that    courts       should    resort   to

traditional notions of property in construing the mail and wire

fraud statutes. See Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 356 (citing treatises

and case law in conducting property analysis); Cleveland, 531 U.S.

                                      - 60 -
at 24 ("We reject the Government's theories of property rights [in

part] because they stray from traditional concepts of property.");

Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26; cf. Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct.

462, 466-67 (2016) (citing treatises and case law in analyzing

whether   property      requirement   was    satisfied    under   bank   fraud

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344).           Carpenter, for example, held that

"[c]onfidential business information" constitutes property under

§§ 1341 and 1343 because it "has long been recognized as property";

the Court cited in support of its conclusion an array of cases, a

statute, and a treatise. 484 U.S. at 26. Based on these decisions,

the   parties   agree    that   "[i]ntangible    rights    can    qualify   [as

property] . . . if they have historically been treated as property

or bear its traditional hallmarks."

            The Supreme Court's decision in Pasquantino explained

that we must determine whether the alleged property interest

constitutes "'property' as that term ordinarily is employed."               544

U.S. at 356; see id. ("When interpreting a statute, we must give

words their ordinary or natural meaning." (quoting Leocal v.

Ashcroft,     543   U.S.   1,   9   (2004)    (internal    quotation     marks

omitted))).     The Court's mail and wire fraud decisions offer

several     potentially    relevant     guideposts   for     that    inquiry,

including whether the purported property at issue falls within a

dictionary definition of that term, whether it has been recognized

as property in case law or other legal sources, and whether it

                                    - 61 -
exhibits traditional attributes of property.             See, e.g., id. at

355-57.    We consider these factors in turn, none of which support

the   government's     categorical       position,      in   defending     the

instruction, that admissions slots always constitute property.

            Pasquantino itself relied in large part on Black's Law

Dictionary's definition of "property" for guidance on the term's

ordinary meaning.      See id. at 356 (citing Property, Black's Law

Dictionary (4th ed. 1951)).          Here, however, the government does

not make any argument based on the dictionary definition of

"property."

            The   government    does     offer    two    cases    recognizing

interests purportedly analogous to admissions slots as property,

but both are easily distinguishable.             The government cites the

Supreme Court's decision in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity

Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008), which allowed a group of plaintiffs who

regularly sought to purchase tax liens at county auctions to pursue

a RICO claim against a rival bidder based on allegations that the

rival had committed mail fraud by fraudulently attesting that it

had complied with a county rule regulating the number of bids that

an entity could make.     See id. at 642-44, 647-48, 661.             In fact,

Bridge's    analysis   did     not    address    the    money    or   property

requirement -- the Court accepted the case to answer a different

question about the interaction between the RICO and mail fraud

statutes.   Id. at 641-42.     Nonetheless, the government argues that

                                     - 62 -
it held "that [the] false representation[s] to secure . . . extra

bid[s] . . . , thereby depriving other bidders of the opportunity

to obtain the liens, w[ere] . . .         'act[s] . . . indictable as

mail fraud.'"    (Quoting id. at 648.)    To the extent the government

seeks to use this case, it misses the fact that the property the

fraudulent bidder in Bridge sought to obtain, and of which the

plaintiffs claimed to be defrauded, was not the bids, but the

"valuable liens" available in the auctions.             Id. at 648; cf.

Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 356 (recognizing a "right to be paid

money" as property under mail and wire fraud statutes).

          The    government's   other   authority,   United      States    v.

Frost, 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 1997), held that a university "ha[d]

a property right in [unissued] degree[s]."           Id. at 367.          The

government    contends   that   admissions   slots   are    analogous     to

unissued degrees.     We agree with the defendants, however, that

unissued degrees are meaningfully different from admissions slots,

at least insofar as the government has described such slots. Frost

itself observed that a degree represents the culmination of the

transaction between the university and the student, in which the

university,     "in   return    for   tuition   money      and   scholarly

effort, . . . agrees to provide an education and a degree."               Id.

So far as the government's arguments show, an admissions slot, in

contrast, involves an offer to participate in that transaction --

one that a potential student may or may not accept.         Even assuming

                                 - 63 -
Frost's correctness, it does not establish that admissions slots

are a historically recognized form of property interest.

            The government falls back to an argument that admissions

slots are necessarily property because they "bear the primary

traditional hallmarks of property."20      It contends that an interest

qualifies   as   property   if   it   exhibits   (1)   "exclusivity,"   see

Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26-27 (observing that "exclusivity is an

important aspect of confidential business information and most

private property"), and (2) "economic value," see Pasquantino, 544

U.S. at 355-57 (holding that "[v]aluable entitlement[]" to be paid

taxes is property); Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 22 (observing that

unissued licenses had economic value to Louisiana, but concluding

that this value alone did not make the licenses property in the

State's hands).    It then asserts that admissions slots always have

these features. We conclude that this purported test is too broad,

as it would construe "property" to reach abstract interests that

the Court, as well as several circuits, have concluded fall outside

the statutes' scope.

     20   It may be that underlying the government's argument is
an assumption that a contractual interest necessarily creates a
property interest.    But this circuit has never so held, and
Carpenter expressly rejected that argument as to honest services
fraud. See 484 U.S. at 25 (citing McNally, 483 U.S. at 355, 359
n.8, 360) (explaining that a "contractual right to [an employee's]
honest and faithful service" is not a cognizable property interest
in this context).

                                  - 64 -
            Portions of the government's brief could be read to argue

that economic value alone suffices to turn an intangible interest

into a property right under the mail and wire fraud statutes.              In

particular, the brief asserts that Pasquantino defined property as

simply "something of value."        While the Court did use that phrase,

Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 355 (quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at 358),

it did not state that economic value alone brought the purported

property at issue within the scope of §§ 1341 and 1343; instead,

it looked to a legal dictionary, treatises, and case law to

determine whether the particular "[v]aluable entitlement[]" at

issue constituted property,21 id. at 356; see id. at 355-57.

            But   even   to   the   extent   the   government   argues   that

admissions slots are always property because they are, by their

nature, both exclusive and economically valuable, its proposed

test sweeps too broadly.        McNally illustrates the problem.           The

purported   right   to   honest     services   that   McNally   declined   to

recognize as property would satisfy both of the test's prongs: the

right belonged exclusively to the entity to which honest services

were owed, cf. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 401 (characterizing pre-

McNally honest services doctrine as proscribing "breache[s of an

employee's] allegiance to his employer" (quoting United States v.

     21   A test looking only at whether the purported property
interest has economic value would also sweep too broadly for all
the same reasons as a test requiring both economic value and
exclusivity, discussed below.

                                    - 65 -
McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir. 1976))), and plainly held

economic value for that entity.                  The proposed test's failure to

reach       the    right    result   on    McNally's    facts   demonstrates      its

overinclusiveness.22

                  The proposed test is also incompatible with multiple

circuit decisions holding that various intangible interests that

are both exclusive and valuable fall outside the scope of §§ 1341

and 1343.         For example, the government's theory conflicts with the

Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Sadler, 750 F.3d 585

(6th    Cir.       2014).     There,      the   government   charged   one   of   the

defendants, Nancy Sadler, with wire fraud in connection with the

purchase of controlled substances.                   See id. at 588-89.           The

prosecution did not dispute that Sadler paid full price for the

pills at issue; instead, to satisfy the property requirement, it

argued that Sadler had lied to the sellers about the patients to

       22 The defendants argue that the government's test also
conflicts with Cleveland, which held that unissued gaming licenses
possessed by the State of Louisiana did not qualify as property
for mail fraud purposes despite the State's exclusive control over
the licenses, 531 U.S. at 23-24, and the fact that they could
potentially generate revenue (in the form of application
processing fees) even while in the State's possession, id. at 22.
But the Court reached that result because, in administering the
licensing scheme, the State acted as a regulator, rather than as
a property holder. See id. at 20-25. That reasoning would not
apply to entities, like the universities, without regulatory
authority. Were Cleveland the only obstacle, then, the government
could have proposed the same test but restricted its application
to private parties.    There is no such easy fix for the test's
incompatibility with McNally.

                                           - 66 -
whom she would distribute the pills, "depriv[ing] the [sellers]

of . . . a right to accurate information before selling the pills."

Id. at 590-91.      The court rejected this argument, reasoning that

"the ethereal right to accurate information" did not qualify as a

property right, in part because it did not "amount[] to an interest

that 'has long been recognized as property.'"            Id. at 591 (quoting

Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 23); accord United States v. Yates, 16 F.4th

256, 265 (9th Cir. 2021).         The government's proposed test would

call for the opposite result, since a party's purported right to

accurate   information    before    engaging    in   a    transaction   would

presumably both have economic value for and belong exclusively to

that party.      See also United States v. Bruchhausen, 977 F.2d 464,

467-68 (9th Cir. 1992) (declining to recognize as property a

seller's right to control "the destination of [its] products after

sale," even though such a right would, by hypothesis, be exclusive

to the seller and potentially economically valuable).

           The     government's     highly     general      argument    would

criminalize a wide swath of conduct.         Under the government's broad

understanding of property applied to admissions slots as a class,

embellishments in a kindergarten application could constitute

property fraud proscribed by federal law.                Cleveland explained

that it "reject[ed] the Government's theories of property rights

not simply because they stray[ed] from traditional concepts of

property," but also "because [they] invite[d the Court] to approve

                                   - 67 -
a sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction in the

absence of a clear statement by Congress."    531 U.S. at 24; cf.

Yates, 16 F.4th at 265 (rejecting property theory that "would

transform all deception into fraud").

          Further, as the Court stated in Cleveland:

          [T]o the extent that the word "property" is
          ambiguous as placed in [the mail and wire
          fraud statutes], we have instructed that
          "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
          statutes should be resolved in favor of
          lenity."      This   interpretive   guide   is
          especially appropriate in construing [the mail
          and wire fraud statutes] because . . . mail
          [and wire] fraud [are] predicate offense[s]
          under RICO . . . .       In deciding what is
          "property" [in this context], we think "it is
          appropriate, before we choose the harsher
          alternative, to require that Congress should
          have spoken in language that is clear and
          definite."

531 U.S. at 25 (citations omitted) (first quoting Rewis, 401 U.S.

at 812; and then quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit

Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222 (1952)); see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)

(defining mail and wire fraud as predicate offenses for purposes

of RICO statute).

                               2.

          At the same time, we must also reject the defendants'

argument that no admissions slot at any university can qualify as

property for purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes and thus

that their property-based convictions under those statutes must be

reversed on this basis.   The defendants characterize admissions

                             - 68 -
slots as mere "offer[s] to engage in a transaction: The college is

offering to provide educational services to a student in exchange

for tuition payments."    However, the defendants do not address the

complexities that would arise were there to be evidence that a

particular admissions slot is more than a mere offer to transact.

The same complexities which undercut the government's argument

undercut this argument by the defense.            Cf. Tamboura v. Singer,

No. 19-cv-03411, 2020 WL 2793371, at *1-5 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2020)

(dismissing for lack of standing two class action lawsuits to

recover   application    fees    from      universities   at   which    Singer

arranged side doors alleging that the plaintiffs "did not receive

the 'fair' and 'objective' admissions process that they were

promised" in a "bargain-for-exchange," only because the plaintiffs

did not allege that they "applied for, were being considered for,

or were denied . . . athletic spot[s]," which were the "focus[]"

of "Singer's scheme").

           We thus cannot accept the defendants' contention that

admissions slots can never be property, such that we could reverse

their property-based convictions on that ground alone.

                                      3.

           There    remains   the    defendants'     argument    that    their

property-based     convictions   must      be   vacated   because,     even   if

admissions slots could constitute property in some circumstances,

the jury instruction here was incorrect.            The defendants advance

                                    - 69 -
two distinct arguments in this regard, one of which we cannot

accept but the other of which we do.

          The defendants take aim at the instruction in part

because they contend that the question whether admissions slots

constitute property is -- as a matter of law -- a question of fact

to be decided by the jury.          But neither party has provided any

briefing on whether the question whether an interest constitutes

property is, regardless of the facts of the case, a question of

law to be decided by the judge.         Indeed, the parties' arguments

are simply not clear as to what issues would present questions of

fact to be determined by a jury, much less what are questions of

law to be determined by a court.             Neither party has cited any

Supreme Court case law resolving this issue, and, as best we can

tell, the Supreme Court has not resolved the matter.            Perhaps it

will in upcoming cases.       But we do not decide important issues of

law based on vague, broad, and unsupported assertions by the

parties in a case.   We need not resolve the issue here, and nothing

in this opinion should be taken to suggest that the ultimate

determination of whether admissions slots are property is an issue

for the jury.

          That   said,   we    do    find    persuasive   the   defendants'

separate contention that the jury instruction was erroneous here

because it instructed that "admission[s] slots are the property of

the [u]niversities."     There is some ambiguity as to whether, in

                                    - 70 -
making   this       instruction,   the     district    court   accepted     the

government's contention that any admissions slot at any university

necessarily qualifies as property.            If so, then we have already

explained why that conclusion is incorrect.

             If, however, the instruction was based on a more specific

determination regarding the admissions slots at the universities

at issue here, we fail to see the basis in the record for such a

conclusion.      We do not understand admissions processes to be

universally the same across universities, and the meaning of

"admissions     slot"    may   differ      across    institutions,    yet   the

government's argument treats them interchangeably and in sweeping

terms.   Indeed, the government has cited no evidence and offered

no argument specific to the admissions slots at the schools at

which these two defendants sought admission for their children.

Nor   does    the    government    offer     any    guidance   --    or   record

citations -- for understanding the contours of these specific

universities' admissions policies and processes or the rights,

benefits, or obligations, if any, associated with obtaining an

admissions slot at these universities.              It develops no argument,

for example, that either a student's application or a university's

offer of admission creates a contractual relationship between the

applicant and the school.          Nor does it argue that every student

awarded an admissions slot will eventually enroll -- in fact, it

acknowledges, as it clearly must, that some will not.

                                    - 71 -
            With respect to what a proper jury instruction would

say, or even whether one would be proper in this case given a more

developed record on remand, we are not in a position to address

the question, given the nature of the arguments that have been

made to us.         We do emphasize, though, that the argument that

admissions       slots   are   categorically      property   because    they    are

exclusive and have economic value is insufficient.                   And, to the

extent there are more case-specific arguments about the specific

admissions slots involved in the charged offenses in a given case,

we emphasize only that any argument that those admissions slots

constitute property would have to show that, in light of what the

record revealed about the nature of those particular slots, they

would satisfy the standards that we have described above that the

Supreme    Court    requires     us    to   apply   to   determine    whether    an

intangible right is a species of property.

            We     recognize    that    our   analysis    leaves     considerable

uncertainty as to how district courts should apply the mail and

wire    fraud    statutes'     property     requirement    in   cases   involving

admission to educational institutions.              There are sound reasons to

be     prudent    and    cautious     about     criminalizing    conduct,      even

unethical conduct, in this complicated area affecting so many

students and parents.

                                       - 72 -
                                        4.

            We   hold   that,   based    on   the   arguments   made   by   the

government, the district court's jury instruction was error.                 We

therefore vacate the defendants' convictions on the mail and wire

fraud charges, including the related conspiracy charges.

  IV. Acceptance of the Defendants' Argument that There Was a
  Prejudicial Variance with Respect to the Conspiracy Charges

            We turn to the defendants' core contention that under

Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent the conspiracy charges

are of an impermissible "rimless wheel" type forbidden by law,

depriving them of fair trials.23              Count One of the indictment

alleged an overarching nationwide conspiracy among Singer, his

staff, university insiders, and parents to facilitate the parents'

children's admission to Georgetown, Harvard, Stanford, UCLA, and

USC by means of mail and wire fraud, in violation of §§ 1341, 1343,

and 1346.    Count Two alleged an overarching nationwide conspiracy

among a subset of the same individuals to secure children's

admission to USC by means of federal programs bribery, in violation

of § 666.    The defendants contend that the evidence is at most

sufficient to show, however, that they agreed to join only a

narrower conspiracy, which was to gain admission for each's own

respective child or children (rather than to gain admission also

     23   The defendants are supported in this view by an amicus
brief from eleven former U.S. Attorneys.

                                   - 73 -
for other parents' children). As a result, they contend that there

was a variance as to both counts, because that narrower conspiracy

is not the broader one charged.24

            The    defendants'      characterization   of     the   charged

conspiracy as a "rimless wheel" derives from the Supreme Court's

decision in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).

There, the government alleged that a single hub figure had assisted

otherwise unrelated clients or groups of clients in fraudulently

obtaining separate loans.        See id. at 752-55.         The government

indicted the hub figure and his clients as part of one overarching

conspiracy.   Id. at 752-53.     The Court concluded that the evidence

did   not   show   that   several    client-defendants      had   agreed   to

participate in a single conspiracy with the other clients.25               See

id. at 754-55.     Instead, "the pattern was that of separate spokes

      24  For convenience, we will refer to the two charged
conspiracies as "the charged conspiracy" because the defendants
contend that there was a variance because each charged conspiracy
was broader than what they contend the evidence at most suffices
to show -- their respective agreements to each join a conspiracy
to gain admission for their own child or children.
      25  The government conceded in Kotteakos that the evidence
did not support a finding of a single conspiracy. See 328 U.S. at
754-56, 768-69.     The Court endorsed that conclusion in both
Kotteakos and Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947),
and its reasoning in doing so informs our analysis. See Kotteakos,
328 U.S. at 754-56, 768-69; Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 558; cf., e.g.,
Brito v. Garland, 22 F.4th 240, 248 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting that
this court is "bound to follow 'considered dicta' of the Supreme
Court" (quoting United Nurses & Allied Pros. v. NLRB, 975 F.3d 34,
40 (1st Cir. 2020))).

                                    - 74 -
meeting at a common center . . . without the rim of the wheel to

enclose the spokes," which "made out a case, not of a single

conspiracy, but of several."     Id. at 755 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see id. at 754-55.         Further, the Court held that, while

the failure to prove the single conspiracy charged might amount to

harmless error in some cases, the defendants had been prejudiced

by a defect in the jury instructions.             See id. at 767-72.    More

generally,    the   Court   warned    of   the    danger   of   prejudice   to

defendants in cases where the government charges a broad conspiracy

but proves only a collection of narrower ones, as the overbroad

charge increases the risk that a jury will be exposed to and weigh

against a defendant evidence that is actually relevant only to a

separate conspiracy in which the defendant was not a participant.

See id. at 766-67.

             Abdelaziz and Wilson contend that the evidence fits

Kotteakos's "rimless wheel" model, with Singer and his associates

as the hub and parents as the spokes.            They assert that, whatever

agreements might have existed among Singer and other parents, the

evidence would not allow a reasonable jury to find that each of

Abdelaziz and Wilson agreed to conspire with those parents.                 And

they argue that this variance between the charges in the indictment

and the proof at trial prejudiced them because the overarching

conspiracy charges allowed the government to introduce evidence

related to other parents' activities that undermined Abdelaziz's

                                 - 75 -
and Wilson's defenses and led the jury to convict them for those

other   parents'   conduct   and   not   for   their   own   actions.   In

particular, the defendants contend that the overarching conspiracy

charge enabled the prosecution to present to the jury inflammatory

evidence, in the form of both witness testimony and recorded calls,

of other parents' obviously culpable conduct in which Abdelaziz

and Wilson played no part.

           This court determines whether convictions for conspiracy

must be vacated on the ground that the scope of the conspiracy

proved at trial varied from the conspiracy that was charged in the

indictment by answering three questions:

           (1) Is the evidence sufficient to permit a
           jury to find the [conspiracy] that the
           indictment charges?     (2) If not, is it
           sufficient to permit a jury, under a proper
           set of instructions, to convict the defendant
           of a related, similar conspiracy [to violate
           the same statute]?     (3) If so, does the
           variance affect the defendant's substantial
           rights or does the difference between the
           charged conspiracy and the conspiracy proved
           amount to "harmless error?"

United States v. Glenn, 828 F.2d 855, 858 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer,

J.); see also United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 773 (1st Cir.

1996) ("[S]o long as the statutory violation remains the same, the

jury can convict even if the facts are somewhat different than

[those] charged -- so long as the difference does not cause unfair

prejudice." (quoting United States v. Twitty, 72 F.3d 228, 231

(1st Cir. 1995))).

                                   - 76 -
          The answer to the second question is not in dispute: the

government contends -- and the defendants do not make any developed

argument to the contrary -- that the evidence was sufficient to

permit a jury to convict each defendant of conspiring with Singer,

his staff, and university insiders to secure his own child's or

children's admission.     That leaves only the first and third

questions at issue.

          We analyze first whether there was sufficient evidence

to convict the defendants of the broader charged conspiracy, and

second whether, if not, the resulting variance from the indictment

prejudiced the defendants.      We conclude that the evidence was

insufficient to prove that these defendants agreed to join the

broader charged conspiracy and that the defendants were prejudiced

by the variance, and so we vacate the defendants' conspiracy

convictions.26    We   also   vacate    Wilson's   substantive   §   666

convictions.

     26   We have already vacated the defendants' mail and wire
fraud conspiracy convictions in Section III.        This variance
analysis provides an alternative ground for that holding, in
addition to providing the sole ground for vacating the convictions
for conspiracy to commit federal programs bribery under § 666.
Because we have already vacated the mail and wire fraud conspiracy
convictions, we do not address Abdelaziz's argument that his
conviction for conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud must be
vacated because of alleged error in the jury instructions'
description of the scope of the charged conspiracy.

                               - 77 -
                                    A.

            To assess whether the claimed variance occurred, we must

determine whether the evidence sufficed for a rational juror to

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants agreed to join

the broader charged conspiracy.      Glenn, 828 F.2d at 858.       As with

all sufficiency challenges, our review is de novo, and we must

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.

United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 115, 117 (1st Cir.

2011).    The evidence cannot suffice to support the verdict through

the kind of inference-stacking that "would require impermissible

speculation on the jury's part."     Glenn, 828 F.2d at 860.      We begin

this inquiry by providing the relevant legal background, which

reveals the relevance to the inquiry of three specific factors.

We then turn to the record in this case regarding each of those

factors.

                                    1.

            The three factors that we have found to be helpful in

guiding the inquiry into whether the evidence suffices to show

that a defendant agreed to join a conspiracy as broad as the one

charged rather than only a smaller, narrower one are "(1) the

existence of a common goal [among the alleged participants in the

charged    conspiracy],   (2)   interdependence    among   [the   alleged]

participants [in the charged conspiracy], and (3) overlap among

the   [alleged]   participants     [in     the   charged   conspiracy].'"

                                  - 78 -
Dellosantos,     649   F.3d    at    117      (quoting   United   States   v.

Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d 411, 421 (1st Cir. 2009)). The analysis

is "pragmatic," United States v. Fenton, 367 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir.

2004), and no single factor "is necessarily determinative," United

States v. Díaz-Arias, 717 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2013); see, e.g.,

Dellosantos,     649    F.3d        at     120-21   (considering     factors

collectively).

          It is particularly important in this inquiry to look not

only to how these three factors bear on individuals alleged to

have performed a similar role in the charged conspiracy to the

role allegedly played by the specific defendants before us in these

appeals, but also to whether these specific defendants agreed to

join that broader conspiracy rather than at most only a narrower

one.   As then-Judge Breyer described:

          [W]e recognize that conspiracy law, like most
          criminal law, focuses upon the activities of
          an individual defendant.      It is therefore
          dangerous to think of a conspiracy as a kind
          of "club" that one joins or a "business" in
          which one works.     Those metaphors falsely
          suggest that the "member" or "employee"
          automatically becomes legally responsible for
          the entire enterprise. Instead, "the gist of
          the   [conspiracy]    offense    remains  the
          agreement, and it is therefore essential to
          determine   what   kind   of    agreement  or
          understanding existed as to each defendant."

Glenn, 828 F.2d at 857 (second alteration in original) (citation

omitted) (quoting United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384 (2d

Cir. 1964)).   And while an agreement to conspire may be express or

                                     - 79 -
tacit and can be proven using direct or circumstantial evidence,

see id. at 857-58, "[the government] can prove only the agreement

or   understanding    that   the   evidence     .    .   .    implies    beyond    a

reasonable doubt," id. at 858.

           In Glenn, the court held that the evidence did not

suffice to show that a defendant, Glenn, had joined the single

conspiracy charged by the government to import marijuana from

Thailand and hashish from Pakistan.         See id. at 858-60.            Instead,

the court held that the evidence sufficed to show only that Glenn

had joined a narrower conspiracy to import hashish, although that

conspiracy was with some of those alleged to be part of the broader

conspiracy described in the indictment.              See id.

           Glenn     emphasized    that   the       inquiry    into     whether    a

defendant has agreed to join the conspiracy charged focuses on the

scope of the activity in which the defendant agreed to join.                      See

id. at 857.   It explained that the record might have sufficed to

show that several other individuals in what it referred to as "the

core group" had conspired to import both marijuana and hashish.

Id. at 859.   But Glenn further explained that while the evidence

showed that Glenn had dealings with that core group with respect

to the distribution of hashish and was aware that the core group

was involved in a broader conspiracy than one just to distribute

hashish, that did not mean that the evidence sufficed to show that

he had agreed to join that marijuana-hashish conspiracy.                   See id.

                                   - 80 -
The court explained that, while the evidence showed that Glenn was

aware of efforts to import marijuana by those in the core group,

there was no evidence that he understood himself to have a stake

in the success of those efforts or saw them as interdependent with

his efforts to import hashish.         See id.      As a result, the court

determined   that    the     government     had       not    proven      Glenn's

participation in the broader multidrug conspiracy -- just his

participation in a narrower, hashish-only scheme.                Id.

                                      2.

           With   this     legal   framework     in    mind,     we    begin   by

considering what the evidence shows with respect to whether the

defendants shared a common goal with the other alleged participants

in the broader charged conspiracy.             We do so because if the

evidence does show as much, then it would point in favor of finding

that the defendants had agreed to join in the charged conspiracy.

           We acknowledge that, as the government emphasizes, the

common goal factor "is given wide breadth."           Dellosantos, 649 F.3d

at   117     (internal       quotation      marks      omitted)         (quoting

Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d at 421).              In the context of drug

distribution rings, this court has repeatedly recognized that

"selling   cocaine   for    profit"   can   qualify     as   a    common   goal.

Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d at 422; accord, e.g., United States v.

Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695 (1st Cir. 1999).

                                   - 81 -
          But this is not a drug distribution case, and the Supreme

Court has distinguished between fact patterns in which members of

a broader conspiracy seek to "achiev[e] a single unlawful end" and

those in which the alleged coconspirators each pursue "an end in

itself, separate from all others, although all [a]re alike in

having similar illegal objects."   Blumenthal v. United States, 332

U.S. 539, 558 (1947).   In the latter class of cases, there is no

common goal shared by the alleged participants in the single

broader charged conspiracy, even though each alleged participant

may have a "similar illegal object[]" as the other participants.

Id.

          Several decisions from this circuit have also found that

alleged coconspirators lacked a common goal where they pursued

similar but distinct ends or acted based on different motives from

those common to the charged conspiracy.      See United States v.

Monserrate-Valentín, 729 F.3d 31, 44 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding no

common goal between alleged coconspirators who aimed to commit one

robbery and others who sought to commit a series of robberies, and

noting that the former group was motivated by a desire to seek

revenge against the victim while the latter's objective was "purely

pecuniary"); United States v. Franco-Santiago, 681 F.3d 1, 9-10

(1st Cir. 2012) (contrasting goal of committing one robbery with

goal of committing a series of robberies), abrogated on other

grounds by Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237 (2016); cf.

                              - 82 -
Glenn, 828 F.2d at 859-60 (distinguishing between agreement to

import marijuana, agreement to import hashish, and agreement to

import both).       Other circuits have held the same.               See, e.g.,

United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833, 842 (6th Cir. 2008)

(finding no "common goal" where alleged coconspirators engaged in

similar   conduct      but   were   unaware   of    and   indifferent   to   one

another's activities); United States v. Rosnow, 977 F.2d 399, 406

(8th   Cir.    1992)   (finding     no   common    purpose   where   defendants

"engaged in similar acts for similar reasons . . . in order to

benefit themselves individually[ or] to gain revenge on their

individual perceived enemies, and not to benefit the group as a

whole"); United States v. Harrison, 942 F.2d 751, 757 (10th Cir.

1991) (distinguishing between an overarching conspiracy with a

"common" goal and multiple conspiracies with "identical" -- but

not common -- goals).

              We ask then whether the government's evidence as to each

defendant was sufficient to show that that defendant falls into

the former class of cases.           The government offers two kinds of

arguments to show that the cases at hand fall into the former

class -- the first of which concerns what the evidence shows about

the nature of the alleged scheme and the second of which concerns

what the evidence shows as to more specific conduct by each

defendant.

                                     - 83 -
                                  a.

          The   government's   contention   that    the   nature   of   the

alleged scheme here itself provides a basis for concluding that

these defendants shared a goal in common with the other alleged

participants faces an immediate difficulty: the alleged scheme has

the hallmarks of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy.        On the government's

own account, the evidence shows that a hub figure or figures

(Singer and others working directly with him to assist parents in

gaining admission for their children) had dealings with many

separate spokes (the individual parents who obtained services from

Singer and his group).     We consider whether the hub-and-spoke

nature of the scheme charged would, in and of itself, support a

reasonable inference that any "spoke" shared a common goal with

the other "spokes," and reject the government's argument.

          Blumenthal is a case of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy in

which the evidence was deemed sufficient to show that the spokes

shared a common goal due to the nature of the scheme.              There,

several individuals were charged with conspiring to sell whiskey

at rates above a government price ceiling.         See 332 U.S. at 541.

The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to show that the

defendants, each of whom was charged with purchasing whiskey from

a single supplier to distribute and then selling it to others, had

a common goal -- "to sell . . . whiskey unlawfully [at an above-

market rate]" -- with the other defendants, which included not

                                - 84 -
only the supplier but other distributors.           Id. at 559.        That was

so because the other potential explanations for those defendants'

conduct in purchasing the whiskey at an above-market price from

the conspiracy's hub were so economically irrational as to be

"scarcely conceivable."      Id. at 550.     And the Court concluded that

the   fact   that   they   shared   that   goal   with   the   other    alleged

conspirators supported a finding that they had tacitly agreed to

join the single, charged conspiracy.          See id. at 550, 559.

             Blumenthal explicitly contrasted the scenario involved

in that case with the contrary outcome in the scenario at issue in

Kotteakos, where a hub figure had helped otherwise unconnected

clients or groups of clients fraudulently obtain loans.                See id.

at 558; Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 753-55.            The Court explained that

although each client (or group of clients) in Kotteakos pursued a

"similar illegal object[]," none "was interested in whether any

loan except his own went through," and that this lack of common

purpose cut against treating the clients as participants in a

single overarching conspiracy.             Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 558.

Rather, the evidence "made out a case, not of a single conspiracy,

but of several."     Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755; see id. at 754-55.

             The defendants here do not dispute that the evidence

suffices to show that all parents alleged to have conspired with

Singer and his core group had similar unlawful goals in one sense:

getting their own children into particular universities through

                                    - 85 -
illicit means.       And the evidence does suffice to show that Singer

and   others    in   his   core   group    shared   a   goal   of   facilitating

admissions into universities for the children of parents who sought

the group's services, as the business model of the alleged scheme

depended on their ability to secure those side doors.

           The relevant question, though, is whether the nature of

the alleged scheme is such that it would be reasonable to infer

that any parents who sought the assistance of the core group shared

a goal of getting children other than their own into any university

just because they sought such assistance for their own children.

We do not see how the nature of the alleged scheme would support

such an inference.

               The defendants were purchasing a service from the core

group in the way that any consumer of a service would purchase it

from a service provider.          We do not commonly infer, however, that

a buyer shares a common goal with a seller just because the two

transact with one another.          See United States v. Bedini, 861 F.3d

10, 15 (1st Cir. 2017) (looking for "more than a mere buyer-seller

relationship" (quoting United States v. Ortiz-Islas, 829 F.3d 19,

25 (1st Cir. 2016) (Souter, J.))); Ortiz-Islas, 829 F.3d at 25

(finding "more than a mere buyer-seller relationship" due to

evidence that "seller" fronted wholesale quantities of cocaine to

"buyer," showing "act of trust that assumed an ongoing enterprise

with a standing objective");              cf.   Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 753

                                     - 86 -
(explaining   that   hub   figure's   relationship   to   each   alleged

coconspirator was that of a "broker . . . charging a five per cent

commission for his services").

          Moreover, this is not a case like Blumenthal, in which

there is some straightforward reason to draw an inference that the

defendants had a goal beyond benefiting themselves.         Here, unlike

in Blumenthal, the two defendants had a clear self-interest in

dealing with the hub figures: obtaining their own children's

admission in a discrete buyer-seller transaction.         Thus, there is

a quite "conceivable" explanation for their willingness to seek

Singer's assistance that by no means entails their having a broader

goal of ensuring that other parents could obtain similar assistance

from Singer for their children and thus a common goal with other

spokes.   Cf. Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 550 (describing alternative

explanation for defendants' conduct other than participation in a

broader conspiracy as "scarcely conceivable").

          Indeed, the nature of the defendants' status as buyers

in this scheme much more easily leads to the opposite inference:

that the defendants were indifferent or even adverse to whether

other parents' children were admitted to the schools to which they

sought admission, and had no interest in what happened to parents

seeking admission at other universities.       It is commonplace that

universities'   admissions   processes   are   competitive    and   often

highly competitive.    The defendants argue that, far from proving

                                - 87 -
pursuit of a common goal, the evidence showed that "Singer's

clients were at times led to believe they were competitors."                   They

cite as an example an email exchange involving Singer, Wilson, and

Wilson's wife in which Singer stated that USC's water polo coach

was "giving [him] 1 boys [sic] slot" and that he had "5 + wanting

in that are boys [--] 2 polo[,] 3 others."

               Of course, as the government points out, this court and

others         have    explained      that      competition      among      alleged

coconspirators does not itself preclude a finding of an overarching

conspiracy where there is other evidence supporting a finding of

an overarching conspiracy notwithstanding that competition.                    See,

e.g., United States v. Rivera Calderón, 578 F.3d 78, 92 & n.2 (1st

Cir. 2009) (concluding that "even if there was some competition

[among coconspirators in a drug ring], that alone d[id] not detract

from     the     various   ways    the   appellants       conspired      together,"

particularly          because   the   evidence      did    not   show      "serious

competition," such as undercutting one another's sales).                   However,

that does not make competition irrelevant; indeed, competition

cuts against the reasonableness of inferring that the defendants

shared a common goal with all the alleged coconspirators here.

See United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1397 (7th Cir. 1991)

("The evidence does not suggest that [a defendant conspired with

other individuals]; rather, it shows that he was competing with

them.").

                                       - 88 -
           We do not say that, on different evidence, it would be

impossible for any parent who sought out services from Singer and

the core group to have adopted the common goal of advancing the

success of children seeking admission though side doors.      Some

parents may have had an interest in the broader success of the

venture.    Here, the government cites to testimony from Bruce

Isackson, an alleged unindicted coconspirator parent who pleaded

guilty and cooperated with the government as its lead evidence,27

that he thought it was "good" that lots of parents worked with

Singer because "[m]ost of these people have very complicated [tax]

returns," which "would [make it] pretty hard [for the IRS] to

figure things out."

           As Glenn instructs, however, we must keep our attention

focused on whether each individual defendant agreed to join the

broader conspiracy that was charged.    There is no evidence that

either defendant before us on appeal ever spoke with or even was

aware of Isackson's dealing with the core group, let alone that

they shared his view that the participation of other parents was

"good" for the success of the core group's venture.28   Isackson's

     27   Isackson was named alongside Abdelaziz and Wilson in the
government's original criminal complaint.      He entered a plea
agreement with the government pursuant to a criminal information,
waiving the right to indictment, and so was not indicted with the
defendants.
     28   Isackson testified that he had never met or spoken with
Abdelaziz and that he had met Wilson at school or charitable events

                              - 89 -
testimony about his own understanding of how the breadth of

participation   by   other     parents   mattered   does    not   support   a

reasonable inference that any parent who worked with Singer was

similarly    interested   in     ensuring   that    other    parents     were

participating, too.

            The government also points to evidence that "a stock

part of Singer's pitch" included describing the benefits of broad

participation, and urges us to conclude that it would be reasonable

to infer that each defendant heard that pitch.              While the pitch

may help clarify the nature of the scheme, the evidence that the

government cites at most shows that Singer told at least some

parents, including Wilson, that his operation worked with a large

number of parents and schools.        That is the usual assertion of any

successful venture.     The idea that a larger venture is more likely

to succeed than a smaller one is not necessarily true.

            Moreover,   while   the   evidence   suffices    to   show   that

Singer and his core group had a financial interest in whether

children of parents other than the defendants obtained admission,

no parent had any similar financial stake in how successful other

children were in getting admitted through the services of the core

group.   Glenn and Kotteakos do not permit us to conclude that the

defendants' mere awareness that Singer and the core group had other

but had never had any "substantive conversation[s]" with him.

                                  - 90 -
parents enrolled suffices to permit a rational juror to infer that

the defendants shared the goal of advancing the success of that

broader conspiracy.       Glenn, 828 F.2d at 859; Kotteakos, 328 U.S.

at 755.

                                          b.

             The government also points to evidence that is more

defendant specific to show that the common goal factor favors its

position.    For example, the government points to evidence that the

Wilson family referred other parents to Singer, and that Abdelaziz

responded "I love it" when told that Singer would be using his

daughter's profile as a model when creating profiles for children

of other parents seeking admission to USC.              The government thus

contends that even if the nature of the scheme -- even as fleshed

out through the Isackson testimony and the evidence of Singer's

pitch   --   does   not   in   and   of    itself   suffice   to   support   the

reasonable inference that the defendants had the common goal of

advancing the success of the broader venture, this defendant-

specific evidence does when considered in the context of the

evidence as a whole.

             In pressing this point, the government asks us to accept

that the common goal of the charged conspiracy was merely to

advance the conspiracy's success.              By defining a common goal at

that high level of generality, the government's argument threatens

to drain the common goal factor of any independent significance in

                                     - 91 -
the inquiry into whether the evidence suffices to show that the

scope of the conspiracy that the defendants joined is the same as

the one charged.       Nor does the government identify any prior

precedent of ours that treats as the common goal of the conspiracy

charged    merely   advancing   the   conspiracy's   success.   Even   in

Blumenthal, the "common end" was described not merely as ensuring

the conspiracy's success, but more specifically as "to sell the

whiskey unlawfully" and "to aid in disposing of the whiskey."          332

U.S. at 559.

            The defendant-specific evidence that the government puts

forward to show that these defendants shared a common goal is more

relevant to the factor that we discuss in the next section --

interdependence.      Interdependence, after all, "concerns whether

'the activities of one aspect of the scheme are necessary or

advantageous to the success of another aspect of the scheme.'"

Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 117 (quoting Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d

at 422).

            Indeed, in connection with the interdependence factor,

the government does point to the same evidence about the specific

conduct of the defendants in allegedly aiding other parents in

obtaining admission for their children through Singer's venture.

We discuss this body of evidence -- and the weakness of it -- in

the next section.     The same weaknesses which lead us to conclude,

as we next explain, that this evidence does not supportably show

                                  - 92 -
based on the interdependence factor that the defendants tacitly

agreed to join the broader charged conspiracy also leads us to

conclude that it fails to do so based on the common goal factor.

                                      3.

           We turn to the other factor in dispute: interdependence.

Glenn is instructive once again.           As then-Judge Breyer explained

in the context of an alleged drug-distribution conspiracy:

           [K]nown interdependence . . . makes it
           reasonable to speak of a tacit understanding
           between the distributor and others upon whose
           unlawful acts the distributor knows his own
           success    likely  depends.       When   such
           interdependence   is   missing,    when   the
           distributor is indifferent to the purposes of
           others in the enterprise -- say, other
           distributors -- the tacit understanding does
           not exist.

Glenn, 828 F.2d at 857-58 (citation omitted).              Thus, as we have

explained, "[e]ach individual must think the aspects of the venture

interdependent, and each defendant's state of mind, and not his

mere   participation    in   some   branch    of   the   venture,    is   key."

Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 117 (quoting Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d

at 422).

           The indictment here alleged that the defendants agreed

to conspire not only with Singer and the core group but also with

the purported coconspirator parents.          See Glenn, 828 F.2d at 857

(observing     that      conspiracy        requires      agreement        among

coconspirators).      It is therefore insufficient for the government

                                    - 93 -
to show only that each of the defendants conspired individually

with Singer and the core group to secure admission for their own

children to prove the broad overarching conspiracy charged.                    The

government must show that each of these two defendants agreed to

conspire with the other parents charged as coconspirators in the

larger conspiracy.          See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755 (recognizing

that no single conspiracy existed where the evidence showed only

"separate spokes meeting at a common center . . . without the rim

of the wheel to enclose the[m]").                 For, as other circuits have

explained,       where     the   government    has    charged   a   hub-and-spoke

conspiracy like that alleged here, interdependence must exist

between the spokes, and not simply between the hub and each spoke,

for the interdependence factor to support a finding of a single

conspiracy.        See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796,

811      (11th      Cir.     2004)       (evaluating     whether     there      was

"interdependence of the spokes"); United States v. Mathis, 216

F.3d 18, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting an argument that the

government must "show interdependence only among the hub . . . ,

not among the spoke[s]" because the "spoke[s] . . . in a hub

conspiracy must not only have a connection to the hub . . . but

must also have interdependence among each other in order to form

a     rim    and    constitute       a    single     conspiracy").        Without

interdependence between the defendants and other parents, the

"tacit      understanding"       necessary    for    these   defendants   to   have

                                         - 94 -
agreed to conspire with the other parents does not exist.                     Glenn,

828 F.2d at 858; see id. at 857-58.

             We look at whether the evidence of the conduct of each

of these two defendants shows interdependence with the other

parents in the broader charged conspiracy. See, e.g., Dellosantos,

649 F.3d at 119-20 (assessing interdependence of two branches of

alleged drug conspiracy, one of which distributed cocaine and one

of which distributed both cocaine and marijuana).

                                           a.

             Here,       too,   the    government    argues,   relying      on   drug

distribution cases, that the jury could infer from "the nature of

the scheme" that the defendants must have understood themselves to

be interdependent with other parents.                We cannot agree.

             This court has found that form of inference appropriate

in the context of defendants selling "wholesale quantit[ies]" of

drugs   to   drug        distribution     rings     for   resale    to    individual

buyers/users, e.g., Portela, 167 F.3d at 697; see id. at 697-98,

but that fact pattern is not at all analogous to this case.                      It is

clearly reasonable to infer that a drug supplier must understand

that "[t]he success of [his] transaction [i]s dependent on [the

existence    of]     a    conspiratorial        network   capable    of    disposing

profitably of the [drugs], and the very existence of such a network

[i]s necessarily dependent on the existence of other wholesale

suppliers."     Id. at 697.           The wholesale supplier knows there must

                                         - 95 -
be a further distribution chain for the distribution of his

wholesale quantities of drugs.     See id.

           Singer, though, is not a wholesaler of any good, and

neither defendant is a distributor.        The evidence here is that

Singer brokered such arrangements as he made for the admission of

these two defendants' children on an individual basis, with each

"an end in itself" rather than an integrated part of a larger

conspiracy.   Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 558.    Indeed, as with "common

goal," the competitive nature of college admissions would, if

anything, cut against a finding of interdependence.         See United

States v. Carnagie, 533 F.3d 1231, 1240 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting

that   "direct   competition"   between   alleged   coconspirators   cut

against finding interdependence).     Nor is there any evidence here

of anything akin to coconspirators' "fronting" each other money or

drugs, which we have looked to even in drug conspiracy cases to

substantiate the notion that coconspirators were interdependent.

See, e.g., Bedini, 861 F.3d at 16.

           The government also argues that a rational jury could

infer interdependence between the defendants and other parents

from just the nature of the scheme because "[b]road participation

allowed . . . parents to rely on . . . the scheme's success," as

"Singer [could] recruit more coaches and . . . offer parents . . .

more options at more schools."       To support this "nature of the

scheme"-based method of proving interdependence, the government

                                 - 96 -
cites a phone call between Singer and parent Agustin Huneeus, an

alleged unindicted coconspirator.29     In that call, according to the

government, Huneeus "motivat[ed] himself to participate in the

scheme based on the experience of" another parent who worked with

Singer and "the scheme's track record."

           Even if a parent chose to work with Singer based on his

past success with other parents, the government must prove as to

interdependence that "the activities of one aspect of the scheme

are necessary or advantageous to the success of another aspect of

the    scheme."      Dellosantos,   649     F.3d   at   117   (quoting

Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d at 422).     A track record of success may

have made parents more confident that Singer could help their

children, but it does not mean that those parents necessarily

viewed their children's admission as in some way dependent on

Singer's work     with other parents.      Thus, even accepting the

government's interpretation of the inferences to be drawn from the

call about Huneeus's understanding of the scheme, they do not

supportably show that Abdelaziz and Wilson had the same view.     See

id. (noting focus on each defendant's own state of mind).      To draw

such a conclusion would require stacking inference upon inference

      29  Like Isackson, Huneeus was named in the government's
original criminal complaint alongside Abdelaziz and Wilson, but
pleaded guilty pursuant to a criminal information before Abdelaziz
and Wilson were indicted.

                               - 97 -
through "impermissible speculation on the jury's part."                 Glenn,

828 F.2d at 860.

              The government separately argues that a rational jury

could find the required interdependence from the nature of the

scheme because the inclusion of additional parents in the scheme

benefited the defendants by making "the interconnected web of

relationships and finances . . . more difficult to unravel."                In

support of this "nature of the scheme"-based theory for finding

that the interdependence factor points in favor of the convictions,

the government again cites Isackson's testimony that he thought it

was "good" that lots of parents worked with Singer because "[m]ost

of these people have very complicated [tax] returns," which "would

[make it] pretty hard [for the IRS] to figure things out."                 The

government also asserts that "Wilson and Abdelaziz . . . join[ed]

the   other    parents   in   channeling    millions    of   dollars   through

[Singer's operation]," that they discussed "the mechanics of money

flow" with Singer, and that "both were sophisticated and successful

businessmen" who would understand "the advantages of this feature

of the scheme."

              We disagree with the government: this evidence does not

support   a    finding   of   interdependence.         Isackson's   testimony

reflected his own personal view that it was "good" that other

parents of means had also engaged Singer because in his view that

made a coverup easier.         Neither Abdelaziz nor Wilson discussed

                                   - 98 -
Singer's services with Isackson, and there was no evidence they

shared his views or even would have thought those views plausible.

See Portela, 167 F.3d at 695 (emphasizing that interdependence

depends on defendant's own state of mind); Glenn, 828 F.2d at 859

(evaluating       evidence    of   defendant's    state     of   mind).     While

sometimes a defendant's efforts to cover up a conspiracy may be

probative of his agreement to join the conspiracy, in which case

a cover-up effort interdependent with other coconspirators might

suffice to show interdependence, the proof the government offered

here was of a different actor's guilt.

            Further, the discussions about "the mechanics of money

flow"     that    the    government      cites   involved    basic   logistical

questions about payment due dates and wiring instructions; at no

point during those exchanges did the defendants allude to any

perceived benefit from intermingling their payments with other

parents'.        That parents made their payments to the universities

through    Singer       is   naturally    explained   by    Singer's      role   in

coordinating the transactions.            The government stretches too far

in arguing that the payments through Singer necessarily show that

any parent who hired Singer intended to allow Singer to commingle

funds for the purpose of making it more difficult for prosecutors

to show Singer was engaged in a criminal conspiracy with other

parents by means of transmission of funds to the universities.

                                      - 99 -
             We conclude that the nature of the alleged scheme is not

such    that,    because    the   evidence     suffices   to   show   that   the

defendants sought Singer's services in connection with their own

children, the evidence also suffices to show that the defendants

were interdependent with other parents for whom Singer coordinated

side-door deals.

                                         b.

             As with the "common goal" factor, the government also

contends     that   there   is    more   defendant-specific     evidence     that

suffices to show that the interdependence factor supports the

conclusion that each of the defendants before us agreed to join

the broader charged conspiracy,               even if the evidence of the

scheme's nature in and of itself does not.            We conclude, however,

that this evidence, when considered in the context of the record

as a whole, does not so suffice without the sort of inference-

stacking that "would require impermissible speculation on the

jury's part."       Glenn, 828 F.2d at 860.

             The parties do not dispute that both Abdelaziz and Wilson

were at least aware that Singer conducted side doors for other

parents.30      However, as the defendants point out, mere awareness

       30 Abdelaziz argues that he "did not know that the 'side
door' was broader than USC," but the government presented evidence
that "a stock part of Singer's pitch" was the "wide[] variety of
school options" that he was able to offer parents, which could
allow a jury to conclude that Abdelaziz learned the same from
Singer.

                                     - 100 -
of a common figure's involvement in similar dealings with similarly

situated    people     is     far    from   enough    to   show   interdependence.

Indeed, in Glenn we concluded that even though Glenn had "attended

one meeting where the core conspirators discussed the smuggling of

both marijuana and hashish," this showed "at most that Glenn knew

about   the       marijuana    venture,"      not    "that   [he]      thought   [it]

interdependent" with the hashish venture in which he was involved.

Id. at 859.

              As evidence that Abdelaziz thought his work with Singer

interdependent with other parents', the government relies on a

phone call between Abdelaziz and Singer in October 2018 -- after

Abdelaziz's daughter had been admitted to and enrolled at USC.

During the call, which Singer initiated at the government's request

after   agreeing       to    cooperate      with    investigators,      Singer    told

Abdelaziz that a USC athletics administrator had "loved" the

basketball profile they had used to facilitate his daughter's

admission and wanted Singer to use it for other applicants who

"[are]n't     .    .   .    real     basketball     player[s]"    in    the   future.

Abdelaziz responded: "I love it."

              That response by a father about his daughter, ambiguous

as it is, does not bear the weight the government posits.                     Further,

Abdelaziz's daughter had already been admitted to USC well before

Singer made that call.              It is not an admission by Abdelaziz that

he joined an interdependent conspiracy with other parents in

                                        - 101 -
advancement of his own interests.               Construing this conversation as

evidence that Abdelaziz considered himself interdependent with

other parents would again require impermissible inference-stacking

on the jury's part.

              As evidence of interdependence related to Wilson, the

government relies on evidence that Wilson as well as other parents

"referred and recruited other parents."                  And the government adds

that Wilson had a motive to make such referrals because he had

other teenage children for whom he might seek Singer's services in

the future, and thus he was likely to be a repeat player.

              The government points to four such referrals in its

brief, only one of which involved Wilson as the speaker: First, a

2013    email       from    Wilson's     wife    to    Singer    asking   about    the

possibility of two of Wilson's son's friends' taking part in a

"UCLA       workshop/internship"         and    "college       counseling"   run     by

Singer.31      Second, a 2017 email, also from Wilson's wife, to Marci

Palatella      --    a     codefendant    in    this   case,    including    in    both

conspiracy counts -- which states: "I had a few thoughts about

[Singer] & USC -- easier to talk on the phone."                    The third is not

from Wilson or his wife, but from Palatella -- a 2018 phone call

       31 One of the friends was later admitted to USC with
Singer's assistance; his family made a $100,000 contribution for
"USC baseball" through Singer's foundation. The friend's parents
do not appear to have been charged in this case, and the
government's brief does not describe them as codefendants.

                                         - 102 -
between Palatella and Singer in which Palatella mentioned telling

a neighbor about Singer's services and assured Singer that she

"d[id]n't say much to anybody unless [she] th[ought] they'd be a

good candidate" and that she would "hand [him] the right people."

And fourth, a 2018 text exchange and phone call between Singer and

Wilson    in    which   Wilson   stated    that    he   had   a    "good    --   very

wealthy -- friend [with] a daughter applying to Brown."                       Wilson

described the friend as "willin[g] to pay a million, 2 million" to

secure his daughter's admission, and said he would "connect" Singer

and the friend by email.32

               Because Wilson's own "state of mind . . . is key" to the

interdependence inquiry, the actions of his alleged coconspirators

are of limited relevance. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 117; see, e.g.,

Glenn, 828 F.2d at 859 (distinguishing between views of defendant

and alleged coconspirators).              Further, the referral by Wilson

involving Brown University does not fall squarely within the

conspiracy alleged by the indictment, which did not include Brown

among the set of universities allegedly targeted by the parents.

               Regardless, this one referral involving Wilson does not

support    an     inference   that   Wilson       viewed   his     activities     as

interdependent with Singer's work with other clients.                       Wilson's

(or another parent's) referring a friend to Singer does not

     32   Wilson's friend was not indicted                    in   the     operative
indictment for his interactions with Singer.

                                     - 103 -
necessarily provide an "indication that [Wilson] thought that [his

work with Singer to obtain admission for his own children] was

'necessary or advantageous to the success'" of Singer's work with

other parents, or vice versa.         Monserrate-Valentín, 729 F.3d at 44

(quoting Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 117).

           A jury could plainly infer that Wilson wanted Singer to

work with the friend and that he hoped that that work would be

successful.     But to conclude based on this evidence that Wilson

thought that Singer's work with other parents would be beneficial

to his own success, even if he was likely to be a repeat player,

would again require stacking inference upon inference.33             For, as

the defendants point out, Kotteakos itself contained evidence that

both the defendant and other alleged coconspirators, many of whom

were repeat players, had referred others to the "hub" figure, but

held that such evidence did not suffice to show that either the

defendant or the other alleged coconspirators who made referrals

had   thereby   joined   with   the    "hub"   figure   in   an   overarching

conspiracy.     See 328 U.S. at 754 ("Kotteakos . . . sent Brown [(the

hub figure)] applications on behalf of other persons.").

      33  At oral argument, the government contended that the
record shows more than "bare referrals" and that parents
effectively vetted potential new participants in the scheme to
ensure they would benefit Singer's network. The only evidence to
this effect is Palatella's statement to Singer, not made by Wilson
or even his wife.

                                 - 104 -
           We conclude that there was insufficient evidence from

which a rational jury could find interdependence with respect to

these two defendants.            This factor, too,          points against the

conclusion     that    the   defendants     agreed     to    join    the     broader

conspiracy that was charged rather than merely the narrower ones

to ensure admission for their own children.

                                       4.

           The defendants do not contest that the final factor,

overlap among the participants, is satisfied by Singer's and his

associates' interactions with the parents.              See Dellosantos, 649

F.3d at 118. Rather, they assert, and we agree, that the "evidence

of   overlap   .   .   .   was   insufficient     to   outweigh      the    lack   of

interdependence" and common goal.           Id. at 120.

           In an abundance of caution before we turn to the issue

of prejudice, we discuss the totality of the evidence.                 See United

States v. Canty, 37 F.4th 775, 796 (1st Cir. 2022) (considering

totality     of    circumstances      in    addition        to      common     goal,

interdependence, and overlap).          The government does not cite any

additional     considerations      beyond   the    three     factors       discussed

above; the defendants offer one.

           As the defendants point out, the dissimilarity in the

conduct of the parents alleged to have conspired with Singer

undercuts the reasonableness of finding a single conspiracy.                       See

Franco-Santiago, 681 F.3d at 10.            Franco-Santiago held that the

                                    - 105 -
evidence   was   insufficient    to     show   that   a   defendant   who   had

conspired to commit one robbery had agreed to join a broader

conspiracy to commit a series of robberies in part because "the

robbery in which [the defendant] did participate [was] notably

different from the other robberies encompassed by the . . .

overarching conspiracy."       Id.; see id. at 11-12.         In particular,

the robbery in which the defendant had participated "was one of

cash from a person, whereas the other four robberies were all

robberies of places of business."          Id. at 10.      In this case, the

evidence showed significant differences between the conduct of the

defendants   and   that   of    their    alleged      coconspirators.       The

government introduced evidence that other parents who purportedly

participated in the alleged overarching conspiracy knowingly made

payments to university insiders' personal accounts and paid to

alter standardized test scores or have third parties take online

classes for their children.       The evidence does not show, and the

government does not argue, that Abdelaziz or Wilson engaged in

those practices.

           Evaluating the record as a whole, we conclude that there

was insufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants joined the broader

conspiracy charged in the indictment.

                                  - 106 -
                                    B.

          Our conclusion that the proof varied from the indictment

does not, on its own, "upset [the defendants'] conviction[s]."

Glenn, 828 F.2d at 858.       After all, "[a]s long as administrative

convenience leads the government to prosecute many, or all, members

of a large criminal enterprise at a single trial, variances between

the scope of the conspiracy charged and that proved may, at least

as to some defendants, be fairly common," id., and "a defendant

'can hardly . . . complain when the government's proof at trial

establishes a scheme similar to but somewhat narrower in breadth

and   malignity     than   that     charged     in   the     indictment,'"

Monserrate-Valentín, 729 F.3d at 49 (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting United States v. Mubayyid, 658 F.3d 35, 48-49

(1st Cir. 2011)).

          To succeed on appeal, then, the defendants must also

show that the variance "prejudiced [them -- that] it 'affect[ed]

[their] substantial rights.'"        Glenn, 828 F.2d at 858 (second

alteration   in   original)    (internal      quotation    marks   omitted)

(quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935)); accord,

e.g., Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 124.         This circuit has "recognized

at least three" possible forms of prejudice in this context,

Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 124:

          First, a defendant may receive inadequate
          notice of the charge against him and thus be
          taken by surprise at trial.       Second, a

                                  - 107 -
            defendant may be twice subject to prosecution
            for the same offense. Third, a defendant may
            be prejudiced by "evidentiary spillover": the
            "transference of guilt" to a defendant
            involved in one conspiracy from evidence
            incriminating     defendants    in    another
            conspiracy in which the particular defendant
            was not involved.

Id. at 125 (quoting Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 774 (citations omitted)).

            Abdelaziz and Wilson focus exclusively on the third form

of prejudice -- evidentiary spillover.                   They argue that because

the   government    charged,      but    failed     to    prove,   an   overarching

conspiracy,    it   "was    able    to     admit    mountains      of   inflammatory

evidence    about   markedly      different        conduct   by    other   parents,"

including    evidence      that    other    parents      were   aware    that   their

payments would go to university officials personally, that other

parents paid to alter standardized test answers and scores, and

that other parents paid Singer's staff to take courses for their

children.     This evidence involved parental knowledge and conduct

markedly different in kind from Abdelaziz's and Wilson's alleged

activities and focused on parents with whom the defendants did not

interact.     Meanwhile, the government chose not to put Singer on

the stand, where he would have been subject to cross-examination,

despite the facts that Singer was the person with whom these two

defendants did interact and that he had cooperated with the

prosecution.     The defendants argue that all of this "created an

                                     - 108 -
impermissibly high risk that the jury . . . could not fairly

evaluate [the defendants'] own knowledge or intent."

          In   response,   the   government   emphasizes    that   "[t]o

prevail on a claim of prejudicial spillover, a defendant must prove

prejudice so pervasive that a miscarriage of justice looms."

Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 776 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002, 1008 (1st Cir. 1995)).

The government contends that the defendants cannot meet that

standard because, it asserts, (1) some evidence related to the

other parents may have been admissible even to prove the narrower

conspiracies   involving   the    defendants,   (2)   the   government

compartmentalized its presentation of the evidence in a way that

would prevent evidentiary spillover, (3) the trial court issued

appropriate limiting instructions to the jury, and (4) the proof

of the defendants' participation in those narrower conspiracies

was overwhelming.

          The record does not support the government's assertions.

Rather, applying de novo review, Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 124, we

agree with the defendants: "The dangers for transference of guilt

[in this case were] . . . so great that no one really can say

prejudice to substantial right has not taken place," Kotteakos,

328 U.S. at 774.

                                 - 109 -
                                     1.

           The   government   does    not        dispute   that   to   convict

Abdelaziz and Wilson of conspiring to violate either § 666 or the

mail and wire fraud statutes, it had to show that the defendants

possessed the requisite mental state to commit the underlying

offense.   Violation of § 666 requires acting "corruptly . . . with

intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization."                 18

U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).   Violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes

requires acting "with the specific intent to defraud."                  United

States v. Martínez, 994 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United

States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 1998)).                     Both

conspiracy convictions thus required the government to prove that

Abdelaziz and Wilson acted with some culpable state of mind.               And

at trial both defendants argued that they lacked this mental state

and had instead acted in good faith, believing Singer's side door

to be a path to admission of which the universities at least

tacitly approved.

           Notably,   the   government      at    trial    acknowledged   that

Singer provided some "totally legitimate" services, including

"assistance with college applications," and did not contend that,

even when he was committing fraud with some parents, he was

committing fraud with all parents who engaged him.                Indeed, the

evidence at trial showed that Abdelaziz paid Singer for work with

his two older children in 2012 and 2013 -- years before Abdelaziz

                                - 110 -
allegedly began conspiring with Singer to facilitate his youngest

daughter's admission, sometime in 2017.      The government has not

argued or cited any evidence that those earlier transactions were

in any way improper.

          Given this context, "there was a pervasive risk" that

"the jury might have unfairly transferred to [Abdelaziz and Wilson]

the guilt relating to" other parents who worked with Singer.

Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 125.    Based on the overarching conspiracy

charge, the government introduced powerful evidence of culpable

intent on the part of other parents that presented a pervasive

risk of prejudicing the jury's assessment of each defendant's own

intent.

          For   example,   in    contrast   with   the   government's

acknowledgment that Singer told Abdelaziz and Wilson that their

payments would go to the universities, the government's first

witness, Isackson, testified that he "knew a good portion of [the

money he paid Singer] was going into [Singer's] pockets and [to]

the people who helped him."      He further described his concerns

about shielding the transactions from IRS scrutiny, again evincing

a consciousness of guilt.       In addition, a government auditor

testified about payments from other parents through Singer to the

personal accounts of university insiders at Georgetown, Yale, and

UCLA, while a USC soccer coach testified to accepting bribes from

Singer for facilitating the admission of other parents' children.

                                - 111 -
            Further, through recordings of calls between Singer and

other parents, as well as the testimony of Isackson and a Singer

associate, the government introduced evidence of other parents'

paying Singer to facilitate clearly fraudulent conduct that was

both plainly wrongful and dissimilar in kind from Abdelaziz's and

Wilson's actions.        Isackson testified that he "paid to have one of

[his] daughter's test scores altered."                 In a recorded call, parent

Gordon Caplan, an alleged unindicted coconspirator,34 discussed

with    Singer    a    scheme    to     have   his    daughter   fake   a   learning

disability in order to secure extra time on a standardized test

and to bribe a proctor to correct her answers.                   A Singer employee

testified    to       having    taken    online      courses   with   the   parents'

knowledge for the children of Singer clients other than Abdelaziz

and Wilson.       The government thus "subjected the [d]efendants to

voluminous testimony relating to unconnected crimes in which they

took no part."         Id.

            The government, citing case law holding that the risk of

"prejudice [is] minimized [where] . . . transactions not directly

involving [a defendant are] of the same character as the ones that

did involve him," United States v. Levine, 569 F.2d 1175, 1177

(1st Cir. 1978), argues that at least some other parents engaged

       34 Like Huneeus and Isackson, Caplan was named in the
government's original criminal complaint alongside Abdelaziz and
Wilson, but pleaded guilty pursuant to a criminal information
before Abdelaziz and Wilson were indicted.

                                         - 112 -
in the same kind of conduct as Abdelaziz and Wilson by "pay[ing]

Singer to present [their] child[ren] as . . . Division I athletic

recruit[s] based on falsified credentials."

              The defendants dispute the degree to which they were

aware of any falsified credentials.               But, even accepting that some

other    parents'    conduct     was        similar   in   some    respects   to   the

defendants', much of the evidence introduced by means of charging

the broader conspiracy nonetheless involved forms of conduct that

were    different    in   kind     from      Abdelaziz's     and   Wilson's.       Cf.

Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 125 (noting risk of evidentiary spillover

where    government,       based       on     overarching     conspiracy      charge,

presented evidence of marijuana transactions against defendants

who had participated only in cocaine distribution). All this other

evidence threatened to influence the jury on the core issue of the

defendants' state of mind.

              Our   precedent     in    Martínez      supports     our    conclusion.

There, a defendant and former public official, López, was charged

with    and   convicted    of    receiving        bribes    from    a    codefendant,

Hernández, in violation of § 666 and the mail and wire fraud

statutes, and argued that her being tried jointly with Hernández

created an unacceptable risk of evidentiary spillover.                        See 994

F.3d at 4-5, 11.          López's "primary defense . . . was that she

merely accepted gifts from [Hernández] without any sort of quid

pro quo."      Id. at 15.        Yet, because she was tried jointly with

                                        - 113 -
Hernández, who was also charged with a series of unrelated bribes

involving other public officials, "[t]he jury before which López

was tried was exposed to days of detailed evidence regarding

Hernández's    role    in"     those    other    bribery       schemes,     including

"direct evidence of the corrupt intentions of those alleged to

have been involved."           Id. at 14.            This court vacated López's

conviction because "the evidence about how Hernández corruptly

schemed with others . . . to which her jury . . . was exposed . . .

create[d] a grave risk of spillover prejudice."                    Id. at 15; see

id. at 15-16.        In particular, "that evidence risked leading the

jury in considering her charges to impute the states of mind of

[the individuals who had conspired with Hernández in the separate

bribery schemes] . . . to López."             Id. at 15.

           The   same      reasoning     applies       here.     The   overarching

conspiracy charge enabled the government to introduce evidence of

other parents' corrupt intent and actions in working with Singer,

which we have described.            Just as Martínez recognized a "grave

risk"   that   the    jury    imputed    to   López      the   state   of    mind   of

Hernández's other collaborators, id., we see an unacceptable risk

that the jury in this case may have imputed other parents' culpable

mental states to the defendants.

           Finally, in addition to the specific evidence of other

parents' intent and dissimilar conduct, the sheer number of alleged

coconspirators       and     the   breadth      of    the   alleged    overarching

                                       - 114 -
conspiracy      further    substantiates        that    there       was   prejudicial

evidentiary spillover in this case.              Kotteakos explained that the

risk of prejudice increases with the number of defendants, the

number    of    conspiracies      proven,       and    the    number      of   alleged

coconspirators.        See 328 U.S. at 766-67; see also United States v.

Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 292 (3d Cir. 2007).                 Although only Abdelaziz

and Wilson went to trial, the operative indictment charged fifteen

parents   from    twelve       families    in    addition      to    alleged     named

coconspirators like Caplan, Huneeus, and Isackson who were not

charged    in    the    same    indictment       but    who     were      treated   as

coconspirators for evidentiary purposes at trial.                     Cf. Kotteakos,

328 U.S. at 766 (noting that "only one conspiracy was charged, but

eight separate ones were proved, involving at the outset thirty-

two defendants"); Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 110, 111 n.2, 125

(finding spillover prejudice where government charged eighteen

individuals, of whom three went to trial, and evidence proved two

distinct conspiracies).

           For those reasons, we agree with the defendants that

there was a significant risk that the evidentiary spillover in

this case prejudiced them and affected their substantial rights.

See Monserrate-Valentín, 729 F.3d at 49-50.

                                          2.

           The    government's       responses        are    unpersuasive.          The

government first contends that at least some of the evidence

                                     - 115 -
related to other parents may have been admissible against Abdelaziz

or Wilson as proof of their participation in narrower conspiracies.

But "[w]e . . . cannot see how evidence of such depth and quality

about the nature of the allegedly corrupt scheme[s]" in which

Singer engaged with other parents "could have been admitted at a

trial against" Abdelaziz or Wilson on narrower conspiracy charges,

and "the admission of that evidence in a trial of [Abdelaziz or

Wilson]    still       would      have    been    limited   by    Federal    Rule    of

Evidence . . . 403."35            Martínez, 994 F.3d at 14.

               Next,   the     government        argues   that   the   record   shows

distinct treatment of evidence related to other parents sufficient

to mitigate the risk of prejudice resulting from evidentiary

spillover.       We disagree.        The prosecution did, at various times

during its opening statement and closing argument, remind the jury

that "[t]his trial is about [Abdelaziz and Wilson], what they knew,

what they intended and what they agreed to do," and encourage

jurors    to    "[l]ook      at    what   the     defendants     did   and   what   the

defendants said."         But at other times it invited the jury to use

evidence related to other parents to prove the guilt of Abdelaziz

and Wilson; for example, it chose to call as its first witness

     35   Rule 403 provides that "[t]he court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."

                                          - 116 -
Isackson -- a parent who confirmed that he had never met Abdelaziz

and that, while he had met Wilson at school or charitable events,

he had never had any "substantive conversation[s]" with him, and

whose    own    scheme    was    obviously         wrongful.       It   then   built   on

Isackson's testimony and used it during its closing argument.                          Its

description during closing argument of "the evidence of how the

scheme worked" drew almost exclusively on Isackson's testimony and

recordings of calls between Singer and other parents.                       Also in its

closing, the government told jurors: "You know . . . that these

defendants      joined     in    .     .    .   that     conspiracy      knowingly     and

intentionally[,] . . . that the defendants knew what they were

doing and . . . intended to do it, and that they knew that what

they were doing [was] wrong . . . because Bruce Isackson told you

that he knew it . . . ."               (Emphasis added.)          These statements by

the     government     itself        seriously        undermine    the     government's

contention      that     the    jury       would   not   have   considered     evidence

regarding other parents in determining what the defendants had

done.

               The government also argues that the district court's

instructions to the jury were sufficient to prevent the risk of

spillover.       The district court instructed the jury that it must

base its verdict as to each defendant "upon evidence of his own

words and actions" and "assess the evidence against each defendant

individually."         However, these limiting instructions "did not

                                            - 117 -
suffice to mitigate th[e] risk of spillover prejudice here."             Id.

at 15.   Martínez explained that a similar limiting instruction was

inadequate to address the risk of evidentiary spillover where

trying a defendant jointly with her codefendants had "enabled the

government to put forth direct evidence of the corrupt intent of

[an alleged coconspirator's] collaborators in a distinct scheme,

even though the government had only circumstantial evidence as to

[the defendant's] state of mind and the trial . . . implicated a

number of players and . . . complicated charges."            Id.   The same

concerns apply here.        "[W]e do not readily assume that a jury

disregards clear directions," Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 775, but, given

the pervasive risk of evidentiary spillover in this case, the

limiting instructions cannot save the convictions.

           The government lastly asserts that the convictions can

stand because there was "overwhelming evidence that [Abdelaziz and

Wilson] participated in smaller conspiracies that advanced their

own side-door deals."      See, e.g., United States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d

1228,    1235-36   (1st    Cir.   1994)   (finding     no   prejudice   from

evidentiary spillover where "[t]he admissible evidence against

each appellant amply proved his complicity in [a] narrow[er]

conspiracy").      We     think   the   government's    evidence   of   each

defendant's smaller conspiracy with Singer (which the defendants

admit was sufficient) was not so strong as to be overwhelming in

relation to the significant risk of prejudice posed by the evidence

                                   - 118 -
regarding other parents.          Cf. Martínez, 994 F.3d at 11, 15-17

(vacating conviction due to spillover prejudice where there was

sufficient evidence to support conviction but government's case

depended      on   circumstantial       evidence    from    which      competing

inferences were possible).

              We reject the government's leading argument relying on

the transcripts of calls between Singer and Wilson in which Wilson

verified that his daughters did not actually need to play the

sports for which they would purportedly be recruited; agreed with

Singer's statement that the girls were "athletic enough" for Singer

to   "sell"    them     without   raising   any    "question"        and   without

"Stanford['s] . . . catch[ing] on"; and suggested that they could

be   nonplayers       such   as    "scorekeeper[s],"       "water      girl[s],"

"manager[s],"      or    "mascot[s]."       The    reference    to    Stanford's

"catch[ing] on" was made by Singer, not Wilson, and record evidence

supports the notion that Singer had for years prior to this

conversation represented to Wilson that               the side door was a

longstanding path to admission, the proceeds of which went to the

university itself.       This statement, coming as late as it did, must

be weighed against the impression Wilson had gained from years of

conversations with Singer and from Wilson's experience arranging

a side door for his son years earlier.            The government's view also

requires a further inference by the jury that Wilson did not

believe that the university and upper-level administrators tacitly

                                    - 119 -
approved of side-door admission even if that policy was not known

to everyone in the university, and that he did not think Singer

was    referring    to   such    a   dynamic   when    he   spoke       about

"Stanford['s] . . . catch[ing] on."

           The references to other nonplayer roles for Wilson's

daughters (for instance, as managers) at least equally support the

defendants' argument that they understood side-door admission

through athletics was a practice the universities had approved, at

least tacitly.     Indeed, testimonials on Singer's website described

his assisting other clients in obtaining both college admission

and positions as "managers" for college sports teams.             Thus, to

construe this evidence as showing Wilson's guilty intent, the jury

would have to make at least one inference, even if a reasonable

one:   that   Wilson     made   these   statements    knowing    that     the

universities in question did not condone the practice, such that,

even if he believed his payments to be part of a quid pro quo, he

did not in good faith believe that such a quid pro quo was welcomed

by the universities and so did not amount to bribery.           And such an

inference regarding Wilson's good or bad faith intent based on his

understanding of Singer's scheme is precisely the sort that stands

to be prejudiced by the evidence of the bad faith intent of other

parents when committing similar conduct, as well as evidence of

dissimilar conduct that could not plausibly be accompanied by good

faith intent.

                                  - 120 -
               As to Abdelaziz, the government points chiefly to a phone

call that took place between him and Singer after his daughter had

already matriculated at USC, in which Singer told him that USC's

Admissions Department was investigating why his daughter "did not

show up for Women's Basketball in the fall," and that the USC

administrator with whom Singer had negotiated the side door had

told the Admissions Department that it was because Abdelaziz's

daughter had suffered an injury.           Singer then told Abdelaziz: "And

I doubt that Admissions will call you regarding [your daughter],

you know, getting in through the side door and . . . not showing

up for practice. . . . But they may ask you . . . So I just wanted

you to know in case they call . . . ."               Abdelaziz responded by

asking Singer whether the Admissions Department would ask his

daughter and whether he should "prepare her."              Singer said they

would    not    ask   her,   but   might   call   Abdelaziz,   and   Abdelaziz

responded: "That's fine.           I will answer the same [regarding the

purported injury], uh, should they call me."

               The government argues that this phone call is strong

evidence that Abdelaziz understood that the side door was "at odds

with the Admissions Department's expectations."                But, while it

certainly is relevant evidence on that score, the jury -- as with

Wilson's phone call -- would have to make multiple inferences to

arrive at such a conclusion, such as that this later conversation

(which     occurred      after     Abdelaziz's     daughter    had     already

                                     - 121 -
matriculated at USC) was also reflective of his earlier intent,

and that he did not believe that other actors and administrators

at USC, including potentially higher-up administrators, tacitly

approved of and welcomed these side doors even if other USC

administrators were not aware of that.

            We again point out that the more sweeping the charged

conspiracy, the higher the bar for showing that the evidence was

"overwhelming," and consequently for showing that an error was

harmless.    As Kotteakos itself explained, "it is one thing to hold

harmless the admission of evidence [in a case] where only two

conspiracies involving four persons all told were proved, and an

entirely different thing to apply the same rule where, as here,

only one conspiracy was charged, but eight separate ones were

proved."    328 U.S. at 766; see also Kemp, 500 F.3d at 292.   Indeed,

the Court in Kotteakos itself commented that each defendant "was

clearly shown to have shared in the fraudulent phase of the

conspiracy in which he participated," but nonetheless reversed the

lower court's finding that the error was harmless because it "d[id]

not understand how it can be concluded, in the face of the

instruction, that the jury considered and was influenced by nothing

else."   328 U.S. at 771.   And since that was the case in Kotteakos,

where the Court found that the indictment alleged at least eight

separate conspiracies, we do not see how that would not be the

case here, where the indictment alleges at least fifteen.

                                - 122 -
           For these reasons, we agree with the defendants that the

risk of evidentiary spillover in this case rendered prejudicial

the   variance    between    the   broader    conspiracy    charged     in   the

indictment and the narrower ones shown at trial.                 We therefore

vacate the conspiracy convictions (Counts One and Two of the

operative indictment).36

                                       C.

           Because we have already vacated Wilson's conspiracy and

substantive wire fraud convictions and address his tax conviction

in the next section, we focus here on whether our holding vacating

the conspiracy convictions due to a prejudicial variance requires

us also to vacate his substantive convictions for federal programs

bribery under § 666.        Wilson's brief repeatedly asserts that the

prejudicial      variance   requires    a    new   trial   on   "all   counts."

Although the government's brief explicitly acknowledges Wilson's

contention that the prejudicial variance requires us to vacate his

      36  We do not reach Abdelaziz's argument that the variance
was prejudicial because there was not venue in the District of
Massachusetts for the smaller conspiracy. Abdelaziz has not argued
that we must conduct a venue analysis even where we conclude that
a variance is prejudicial on alternative grounds. Nor did he seek
distinct relief based on his venue argument in his opening brief,
which sought only vacatur of his conviction.       To the extent
Abdelaziz claims an entitlement to different relief in his reply
brief, that argument has been waived.     See, e.g., Green Earth
Energy Photovoltaic Corp. v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n, 51 F.4th 383,
391 n.15 (1st Cir. 2022).
          We do not address any Double Jeopardy Clause issues as
they are not before us, and we express no opinion on the matter.

                                   - 123 -
substantive     convictions,      it     does    not    develop    any    distinct

counterargument against this claim, instead relying on its general

argument    that   there   was    insufficient         spillover   prejudice     to

warrant vacating any of the defendants' convictions.37

            Wilson's argument for vacating the § 666 convictions

effectively amounts to a retroactive-misjoinder claim.                   See, e.g.,

Mubayyid, 658 F.3d at 72-73, 72 n.39; United States v. Hamilton,

334 F.3d 170, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2003).                   "Retroactive misjoinder

occurs where joinder was proper initially because of a conspiracy

allegation, but where later developments, such as [a] . . . court's

decision . . . to set aside a defendant's conspiracy conviction,

appear to render the initial joinder improper."                    Mubayyid, 658

F.3d at 72 n.39 (quoting United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 693

(6th    Cir.   2009)   (alterations        and    internal      quotation    marks

omitted)); accord Hamilton, 334 F.3d at 181.               To win "a new trial

on the ground of retroactive misjoinder, a defendant 'must show

compelling     prejudice,'"      which    "may   be     found   where    there   is

'[p]rejudicial spillover from evidence used to obtain a conviction

       37 In particular, the government has not argued that Wilson
failed to preserve his claim that the prejudicial variance requires
vacating his substantive convictions, and so we need not decide
whether plain error review would apply, had the government argued
for it. See United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581, 586
(1st Cir. 2015) ("When the government fails to request plain error
review, we, and many of our sister circuits, review the claim under
the standard of review that is applied when the issue is properly
preserved below.").

                                    - 124 -
subsequently reversed on appeal.'"        Hamilton, 334 F.3d at 181-82

(alteration   in    original)   (first      quoting   United    States   v.

Vebeliunas, 76 F.3d 1283, 1293 (2d Cir. 1996); and then quoting

United States v. Jones, 16 F.3d 487, 493 (2d Cir. 1994)).              As in

the variance context, succeeding on a claim of spillover prejudice

requires Wilson "to show prejudice so pervasive that a miscarriage

of justice looms."    United States v. Correia, 55 F.4th 12, 36-37

(1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United

States v. Simon, 12 F.4th 1, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2021)).

          For all the reasons just discussed in the variance

analysis, we conclude that this case meets that standard.          As with

the conspiracy charges, Wilson's intent in his dealings with Singer

was a key issue with respect to the substantive § 666 counts.            See

18   U.S.C.   §    666(a)(2)    (covering     only    parties   that     act

"corruptly . . . with intent to influence or reward an agent of an

organization").    And the government offers no reason -- and we can

think of none -- why the risk of spillover from evidence of other

parents' dealings with Singer would be less acute with respect to

Wilson's substantive § 666 counts than with respect to the related

conspiracy charges.

          Nor is this "a case in which the results of the trial

might be thought to undermine any claim of prejudice."           Martínez,

994 F.3d at 16.    We have observed that "a discriminating verdict,"

in which the jury convicts on some charges but not others, "is an

                                - 125 -
indication that spillover prejudice did not infect the jury's

decisional calculus."     Correia, 55 F.4th at 38; see id. at 38-39.

The jury in this case returned guilty verdicts on all counts,

offering    no     reassurance       that   jurors    were    "[]able    to

compartmentalize the evidence of each offense." Id. at 39 (quoting

Mubayyid, 658 F.3d at 74).

           Case law from other circuits supports our conclusion.

See, e.g., United States v. Tellier, 83 F.3d 578, 581-82 (2d Cir.

1996) (finding retroactive misjoinder where a RICO count on which

the court found there had been insufficient evidence to convict

had allowed the government to introduce "enormous amount[s] of

prejudicial spillover evidence" related to "criminal activities in

which [the] defendant did not participate"); Jones, 16 F.3d at

492-93 (applying retroactive misjoinder where count on which court

had   vacated    conviction    had    allowed   government   to   introduce

inflammatory evidence of defendant's criminal history); United

States v. Aldrich, 169 F.3d 526, 528-29 (8th Cir. 1999) (similar).

           The Second Circuit, for example, has developed a "three-

part test" for assessing retroactive-misjoinder claims based on

prejudicial spillover.        Hamilton, 334 F.3d at 182.     It examines:

           (1) whether the evidence introduced in support
           of the vacated count "was of such an
           inflammatory nature that it would have tended
           to incite or arouse the jury into convicting
           the defendant on the remaining counts,"
           (2) whether the dismissed count and the
           remaining counts were similar, and (3) whether

                                  - 126 -
             the government's evidence on the remaining
             counts was weak or strong.

Id. (quoting Vebeliunas, 76 F.3d at 1294 (internal quotation marks

omitted)).     This test is satisfied here.     As to the first prong,

the powerful evidence of other parents' obviously culpable conduct

was potentially inflammatory -- far more so than the evidence of

Wilson's own acts.      As to the second prong, the Second Circuit has

explained that "prejudicial spillover is unlikely if the dismissed

count and the remaining counts were either quite similar," such

that the evidence relevant to the invalidated count would be

independently admissible in connection with the other charges, "or

quite dissimilar," such that a jury could readily compartmentalize

the evidence.     Id. at 182; see id. at 182-83.           For the reasons

described in the variance analysis, this case falls in the middle

ground between these extremes,        where a retroactive-misjoinder

finding is appropriate. At least the vast majority of the evidence

of   other   parents'    activities   would   not   have    been   properly

admissible in a prosecution of Wilson alone.        But the evidence was

not so disconnected from Wilson's activities -- bearing, as it

did, on other parents' understanding of their work with Singer --

as to limit the risk that the jury would impute those parents'

mental states to Wilson.      Cf. Martínez, 994 F.3d at 14.        And, as

to the third prong, we have already explained that the government's

                                 - 127 -
evidence related to Wilson himself was insufficiently strong to

counteract the pervasive risk of prejudice.

             We vacate Wilson's convictions on the substantive § 666

charges (Counts Eleven and Twelve of the operative indictment).

This result makes it unnecessary to address -- outside the context

of Wilson's tax conviction -- various evidentiary arguments raised

by the defendants as grounds for vacating their convictions.           Many

of these rulings may well become moot on remand, and we express no

view on the merits of the defendants' evidentiary arguments with

respect to the conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, and § 666 charges.

We note, however, that the government does not attempt to defend

on appeal many of the bases on which the district court relied in

excluding various exhibits.

        V.    Affirmance of Wilson's Conviction for Filing a
              False Tax Return Under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)

             Finally, we turn to Wilson's conviction for filing a

false tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), which makes it a felony

to "[w]illfully make[] and subscribe[] any return, statement, or

other   document,   which   contains   or   is   verified   by   a   written

declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and

which [the individual] does not believe to be true and correct as

to every material matter."      We first lay out the relevant facts,

then analyze and reject Wilson's challenges to his conviction.

                                - 128 -
                                       A.

            The   tax    count    arises    from   Wilson's    designation   of

payments he made in 2014 to secure his son's admission to USC as

business expenses and charitable contributions on his 2014 income

taxes.

            At the time he worked with Singer to obtain his son's

admission, Wilson was the sole shareholder of Hyannis Port Capital,

an S corporation.         An S corporation is a "pass-through entity"

which    does   not     separately   pay    federal   taxes;    instead,     the

corporation's     "income,       losses,    deductions,   and    credits     are

attributed to individual shareholders," Bufferd v. Comm'r, 506

U.S. 523, 524-25 (1993); accord Benenson v. Comm'r, 887 F.3d 511,

513 n.1 (1st Cir. 2018), such that Hyannis Port Capital's profits,

losses, and deductions directly affected Wilson's personal tax

liability.

            On March 1, 2014, the day after Subco considered and

approved his son's admission, Wilson sent Singer an email with the

subject line "USC fees" that read: "Thanks again for making this

happen!    Pls give me the invoice.            What are the options for the

payment?   Can we make it for consulting or whatever from the [K]ey

[(Singer's business)] so that I can pay it from the corporate

account ? [sic]"        Singer replied: "Yes we can send you an invoice

for business consulting fees and you may write off as an expense."

He also requested "the name address etc you want the invoice to be

                                     - 129 -
made out to."      Wilson responded: "Awesome!"           He provided billing

information for Hyannis Port Capital.

             On March 29, 2014, Wilson emailed Hyannis Port Capital's

office manager, Debbie Rogers, that "Monday we will get an invoice

and wiring instructions for $250k.           To be paid by hpc inc."          When

Rogers asked what account the invoice should be charged to, Wilson

replied:     "Business   Consulting      -    the     invoice   will     be       for

consulting - pls work with [Singer] to get invoice correct."                      The

following day, Wilson emailed Rogers again, stating that "the

amount is $200,000 not [$]250,000."

             Two days later, Rogers told Wilson by email that she had

consulted Singer and one of his business associates, and that they

had   said   the   payment   structure   would       be   "[$]100k   .   .    .    to

[Singer's] foundation, [$]100k an invoice from the Key [(Singer's

business),] and [$]20k to Rick Singer."               Rogers noted that this

totaled $220,000, rather than the $200,000 Wilson had previously

mentioned, and Wilson explained that he had "added $20 k for

[Singer's] expenses." He also confirmed that the entire sum should

be invoiced to Hyannis Port Capital.

             Consistent with this plan, Hyannis Port Capital wired

$100,000 to Singer's business, $100,000 to Singer's foundation,

and $20,000 to Singer on April 7, 2014.             Nine days later, Singer's

business issued a $100,000 check made out to "USC Men's Water Polo"

on behalf of the "Wilson family."

                                  - 130 -
            Singer's foundation sent Wilson a letter dated April 7,

2014, acknowledging his "contribution of $100,000" and stating

that "no goods or services were exchanged" for the payment. Singer

and his business also provided invoices, both dated April 1, to

Hyannis Port Capital.        The business's invoice purported to be for

"Business    Consulting,"        and     Singer's      referred   to     "Special

Consulting     .    .   .   Concept,      design,      and   implementation    of

Professional       Development    program        for   Hyannis    Port    Capital

associates."       Wilson offered no evidence and does not argue on

appeal that Singer or his business actually provided any consulting

services to Hyannis Port Capital.            In July, USC also sent Wilson

and his wife a thank-you letter acknowledging a $100,000 gift,

apparently in connection with the $100,000 check from Singer's

business.

            On his 2014 tax return, Wilson deducted the $120,000

Hyannis Port Capital paid to Singer and Singer's business as

business expenses and the $100,000 payment to Singer's foundation

as a charitable contribution.38           Wilson does not dispute that the

payment could not properly be deducted as a charitable contribution

if he received goods or services in exchange for the payment.

     38   Wilson originally filed a 2014 return in December 2015.
He later filed two amended returns, neither of which made any
changes   to   his  claimed  business   expenses  or   charitable
contributions.

                                       - 131 -
             An   IRS   agent   testified    that   these   deductions    saved

Wilson $88,546 in taxes. On cross-examination by Wilson's counsel,

the same agent testified that treating the $120,000 in payments to

Singer and his business as business expenses, rather than deducting

the   full   $220,000     as    charitable    contributions,   saved     Wilson

roughly $1,425.         Wilson's tax preparer testified that the exact

effect of deducting the payments as business expenses, rather than

charitable contributions, would have been uncertain until all of

Wilson's tax information was available at the end of the year.

             The indictment charged Wilson with filing a false tax

return based on allegations that both the $100,000 charitable

contribution deduction and the $120,000 business expense deduction

were improper.     During closing argument, Wilson's counsel asserted

with respect to the charitable deduction that Wilson was "not real

attentive to his taxes" and may have made some unintentional

errors, but "thought he made a donation" and "could get a deduction

for it."     He further argued that, given that belief, Wilson would

have had little motive to willfully fraudulently deduct the payment

as a business expense, since the deduction made only a small

difference in his tax liability compared to deducting the entire

sum as a charitable contribution.

             The jury returned a general verdict of guilty on the tax

count without specifying the theory on which it relied.             Wilson's

                                    - 132 -
proposed verdict form had not requested a special verdict giving

the basis for the jury's decision.

                                B.

          Wilson challenges his tax conviction on three grounds.

First, he contends that the conviction must be vacated pursuant to

the Supreme Court's decision in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.

298 (1957), and its progeny because the verdict may rest on an

invalid legal theory.   Second, he argues that spillover prejudice

from the variance in the conspiracy counts also tainted this

conviction.   Third, he asserts that the district court prejudiced

his defense through erroneous evidentiary rulings.     We consider

these arguments in turn.

                                1.

          We first reject Wilson's argument that we must vacate

his conviction under the Supreme Court's decision in Yates.

          The defendants in Yates were charged with a single count

of conspiring (1) "to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of

overthrowing the Government of the United States by force and

violence" and (2) "to organize, as the Communist Party of the

United States, a society of persons who so advocate and teach."

Id. at 300.   The Court concluded that the conduct underlying the

latter "organiz[ing]" object had occurred outside the relevant

statute of limitations, such that the defendants could not lawfully

have been convicted of conspiracy on that basis.       See id. at

                              - 133 -
303-11.      The Court then rejected the government's argument that

the convictions could nonetheless stand based on the alternative

"advoca[cy]" object, holding that "a verdict [must] be set aside

in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not

on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury

selected."     Id. at 312; see id. at 311-12.           In later cases, the

Court has reaffirmed this rule while clarifying that it applies

where "a particular theory of conviction submitted to [the jury]

is contrary to law," and not where one of several alternative bases

for conviction is legally sound but supported by insufficient

evidence.     Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991).

             Here, the indictment did offer two types of allegedly

false statements on which the jury could have convicted: Wilson's

deductions for purported charitable contributions and business

expenses.      Wilson does not, however, develop an argument that

either of those theories of conviction set forth in the indictment

is legally unsound.       He does not disagree with the government's

assertion that the jury could convict based on a "find[ing] that

Wilson willfully made a false statement as to a material matter on

his tax return by falsely claiming the payments were business

expenses and/or that he received no goods or services in exchange

for   them    [as   necessary   to   claim     a   payment   as   a   charitable

contribution]."      On the contrary, he acknowledges that "perhaps a

jury could [were it not for the alleged Yates and other trial

                                     - 134 -
errors] convict on the [business expense deduction] theory," and

appears to concede that "a quid pro quo . . . vitiates any

charitable deduction even if the exchange was otherwise lawful."

He also does not argue that the jury instructions on the tax count

were improper.39

            Instead,      Wilson   posits        that    the     jury   might   have

convicted   him    of    tax   fraud    based    on     its    conclusion   that   he

committed bribery or property fraud, on a theory that unlawful or

fraudulent payments are not deductible.                 And because, he argues,

his bribery and property fraud convictions were based on legally

flawed premises, the "[d]erivative" tax conviction cannot stand

under Yates.

            We reject this argument because the record does not

support Wilson's claim that the jury could have convicted him on

the tax count based on its verdicts on the bribery or property

fraud charges.40        He has not cited anything in the indictment or

the jury instructions that would lead a juror to conclude that a

     39    The district court instructed the jury that this count
required the government to prove that (1) "Wilson made or caused
to be made a [2014] federal income tax return . . . that he verified
to be true," (2) the "return was false as to a material matter,"
(3) "Wilson signed the return willfully and knowingly -- knowing
that it was false," and (4) the "return contained a written
declaration that it was made under the penalty of perjury."
     40   We have also partially rejected Wilson's premise that
all of the bribery and property fraud charges are legally
unsupportable. See supra Sections II-III.

                                       - 135 -
guilty verdict on other charges would necessarily affect the

outcome   of    the   tax   count.41   See   Skilling,    561   U.S.   at   414

(characterizing Yates as holding that "constitutional error occurs

when a jury is instructed on alternative theories of guilt and

returns a general verdict that may rest on a legally invalid

theory" (emphasis added)); Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59 (explaining

that the Yates rule reflects the fact that "[j]urors are not

generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of

conviction submitted to them is contrary to law" (emphasis added)).

The jury instructions for the tax count, for example, did not

cross-reference the other counts or otherwise suggest that the

jury's findings on the bribery or property fraud charges were

relevant to the tax count.         Cf. United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d

484, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1996) (vacating tax fraud conviction where

jury had convicted defendant of bribery under legally invalid

theory    and   was   instructed   that   bribes   were   not   deductible),

abrogated in part on other grounds by Salinas, 522 U.S. 52.

Certainly, a juror likely would -- and should -- have viewed some

     41   As we discuss below, to the extent Wilson argues that,
even if the jury did not treat its verdict on the other counts as
dictating the outcome of the tax count, the presence of such
inflammatory charges might have influenced its verdict on the tax
count, we note that Wilson has not challenged on appeal the
district court's denial of his motion to sever the tax count from
the other charges before trial, and the argument that we must
vacate his tax conviction due to retroactive misjoinder lacks
merit.

                                   - 136 -
factual findings as relevant to multiple counts; for instance,

whether Wilson understood himself to be entering a quid pro quo

guaranteeing his son's admission in exchange for payment would

bear both on the § 666 charge and on the legitimacy of his

charitable deductions.       But Wilson offers no support for the

assertion that a juror would have viewed the legal status of his

payments as bribes as controlling the legitimacy of his deducting

those payments.

            Wilson's strongest argument is that the instruction to

the jury that, "[f]or purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes,

admission[s] slots are . . . property" -- which we have already

held was erroneous based on the theory presented by the government

at trial and on appeal, see supra Section III.B -- may have

influenced the verdict on the tax count.     He contends that, having

been told that an admissions slot is property as a matter of law,

the jury might have concluded that Wilson's payment could not

constitute a valid charitable contribution, since it would have

been made in exchange for goods or services.           Taken in context,

however, this erroneous instruction on different counts does not

undermine   the   jury's   verdict.   The   property    instruction   was

specifically limited to "the mail and wire fraud statutes," and

Wilson cites nothing else in the instructions that would indicate

to a juror that the verdict on the fraud count should influence

                                - 137 -
the tax count.42   "[We] presum[e] that jurors, conscious of the

gravity of their task, attend closely the particular language of

the trial court's instructions in a criminal case and strive to

understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them."

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 (1993) (alterations in

original) (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9

(1985)).   And, although Wilson did move below to sever the tax

count from the other counts due in part to the confusion that might

be caused by the theory that admissions slots are property, he

does not now style his argument as an objection to the district

court's denial of any motion to sever, nor to a failure by the

district court to issue a clarifying instruction on the tax count

to dispel that potential confusion.    In the absence of any such

argument, the alleged confusion caused by the district court's

     42   The specific limiting language in the property
instruction and the distinctness of the instructions relevant to
the different counts undermines Wilson's reliance on United States
v. Lindberg, 39 F.4th 151 (4th Cir. 2022).     Lindberg vacated a
defendant's conviction under § 666 because it concluded that a
jury instruction incorrectly defining the term "official act" for
purposes of a separate bribery charge had "infected" the jury's
consideration of the § 666 count. Id. at 164; see id. at 164-65.
Although § 666 does not contain an "official act" requirement (it
refers instead to payments intended to influence an agent in
connection with "any business, transaction, or series of
transactions" of an organization), the court recognized that the
district court had nonetheless "provided instructions on both
counts at the same time using the term 'official act.'" Id. at
164. Wilson does not cite any such overlapping instructions in
this case.

                             - 138 -
instructions on a separate count cannot by itself provide a basis

for vacating his conviction on this count.

          Wilson also argues that post-trial statements by the

government and district court show that the jury may have convicted

him on the tax count based on its conclusions about the other

charges, but neither statement provides a basis for vacating the

conviction.    First, he highlights that the government, in a

memorandum opposing Wilson's post-trial motion for a new trial on

Yates grounds, stated that "the jury could convict [either on the

theory that] Wilson deducted an illegal bribe as business and

charitable deductions, or because he deducted payments . . . that

were not in fact charitable contributions or business expenses."

Although this statement appears to accept Wilson's premise that

the jury could have convicted on this basis, neither Wilson's

motion nor the government's response cited any material presented

to the jury that would have led jurors to believe that the verdict

on the bribery and fraud counts should control the verdict on the

tax count.    We decline to vacate the jury's verdict based on a

single sentence in a post-trial filing.      Cf. United States v.

McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 824 n.4 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that

concession by government in district court does not bind this

court).

          Second, Wilson relies on a ruling by the district court

during sentencing that, for purposes of the tax loss amount

                             - 139 -
applicable during sentencing, Wilson could not claim any of the

$220,000 payment as a legitimate charitable contribution "because

the entire payment was fraudulent."          Wilson cites no authority for

the proposition that a statement by the court during sentencing is

relevant to determining the basis for a jury's verdict.                  This

statement also does not require vacating Wilson's conviction.

           Without some clearer grounding in the record, Wilson's

broad argument that the jury might, on its own initiative, have

based its resolution of the tax count on the bribery or property

fraud charges does not create a Yates problem.

                                     2.

           We turn to Wilson's argument that the same spillover

prejudice that led us to vacate his conspiracy and substantive

§ 666 convictions also requires us to vacate his tax conviction,

which we understand to be a retroactive-misjoinder argument, even

though Wilson has not characterized it as such.            See United States

v. Cadden, 965 F.3d 1, 21 n.7 (1st Cir. 2020) ("'[R]etroactive

misjoinder' arises where joinder of multiple counts was proper

initially, but later developments . . . render the initial joinder

improper." (quoting Jones, 16 F.3d at 493)).              In discussing this

alleged evidentiary spillover, Wilson does not draw a distinction

between   the   charitable   and   business     expense    deductions.     We

conclude that Wilson has not met his burden to "prove prejudice so

pervasive that a miscarriage of justice looms."             Wihbey, 75 F.3d

                                   - 140 -
at 776 (quoting Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d at 1008).                    Our analysis

applies to both the business expense and charitable contribution

theories.

             The government's case on the tax count relied largely on

Wilson's own emails discussing how to structure the payments

related to his son's admission, limiting the risk that Wilson was

convicted based on other parents' conduct.                    See id. at 775-76

(noting      that    distinctness      of   evidence     related    to    charged

coconspirators' conduct reduced danger of evidentiary spillover or

jury confusion); United States v. Moran, 984 F.2d 1299, 1304 (1st

Cir. 1993) (similar).           The distinctness of this evidence from

evidence related to other parents also increases the probability

that   the    jury   was   able   to    comply   with   the    district   court's

instruction to determine Wilson's "guilt or innocence . . . on an

individual basis."         See Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 775 (observing that

similar instruction limited risk of spillover prejudice).

             Further, the evidence against Wilson on the tax count,

based on his own words and conduct, was very strong.                See Morrow,

39 F.3d at 1235-36 (concluding variance did not warrant vacating

convictions where evidence properly admissible against defendants

"amply proved" their guilt).           Importantly, Wilson does not develop

on appeal any argument that, as a matter of substantive tax law,

the statements on his return were true -- that is, that the

payments     were    properly     deductible     as     business   expenses    or

                                       - 141 -
charitable contributions.     He does not meaningfully dispute the

government's theory that the payments did not qualify as business

expenses (because of their personal nature) or as charitable

contributions (because they were his side of a quid pro quo to

secure his son's admission).43        His argument as to spillover

prejudice, and as to the alleged evidentiary errors discussed

below, focuses instead on the required mental state: that the false

return be "ma[de] and subscribe[d]" "[w]illfully."        26 U.S.C.

§ 7206(1) (emphasis added).      We thus have no cause to reexamine

the conviction on the basis of substantive tax law, and instead

focus on the evidence of Wilson's intent.

          That evidence, with respect to both the business and

charitable   deductions,   was   powerful.   After   having   already

discussed the cost of the side door with Singer, Wilson, apparently

     43   In particular, with respect to the business deduction,
Wilson does not argue on appeal that the fact that his business
was a pass-through S corporation is relevant to the payments'
deductibility, thereby waiving any such argument.      See United
States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). With respect
to the charitable deduction, as discussed below, Wilson argues
that the district court improperly excluded evidence related to
USC's practices in acknowledging donations for tax purposes. He
asserts that this evidence would have shown that "back-door and
non-Singer side-door donations were . . . fully deductible." But
Wilson styles this argument as involving an "evidentiary error[]"
bearing on his mental state, and, in his opening brief, does not
cite any legal authority explaining why this USC practice would
bear on the deductibility of his payments.       We thus deem any
challenge to the legal deductibility of the payments waived. See
id.; United States v. Diggins, 36 F.4th 302, 320 (1st Cir.)
(explaining that arguments not developed in an appellant's opening
brief are waived), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 383 (2022).

                                 - 142 -
on his own initiative, asked Singer if the payment could be

designated "for consulting or whatever from [Singer's business] so

that [Wilson] c[ould] pay it from the corporate account."                    When

Singer responded that he could send an invoice for consulting that

Wilson    could    "write    off   as   an   expense,"   Wilson      responded,

"Awesome!"       Wilson then directed his office manager to charge the

invoice to "Business Consulting" and to expect invoices from

Singer.     Wilson offered no evidence and does not argue on appeal

that any such consulting actually took place.             Indeed, any notion

that Wilson deducted these expenses because he believed that

Singer's    college    counseling       services    qualified   as     "Business

Consulting" is severely undermined by the fact that Wilson deducted

the $20,000 that went to Singer personally on the basis that it

was   for   the    "[c]oncept,     design,    and   implementation      of    [a]

[p]rofessional [d]evelopment program for Hyannis Port Capital

associates," a service completely unrelated to college counseling,

and one that Singer clearly never performed.

            Wilson does not argue that he could plausibly have relied

in good faith on Singer's representation that the payment could

legitimately be "writ[ten] off as an expense" so long as it was

falsely described as for business consulting services, nor would

such an argument be tenable.              Instead, Wilson's enthusiastic

response    to    Singer's   statement    linking    payment    from    Wilson's

corporate account with a "write off" provides evidence that Wilson

                                    - 143 -
was aware of the tax benefits of falsely characterizing the

payments as business expenses and acted willfully to obtain those

benefits.

            As    for   Wilson's        deducting       the    $100,000       payment    to

Singer's nonprofit foundation as a charitable contribution, it is

first worth noting that, although Wilson paid $100,000 to Singer's

foundation, it was Singer's for-profit business that then paid

$100,000 to USC.        Without some link between the two payments, the

payment to Singer's nonprofit would clearly be in exchange for

goods     and    services   --     the        same     services       that    Wilson    was

simultaneously attempting to deduct as a business expense.

            However, even assuming that Wilson deducted the $100,000

payment    to    Singer's   foundation           intending       that    it    reflect    a

charitable contribution that would in turn be made to USC, the

government offered strong evidence that Wilson understood this

payment to be part of an explicit quid pro quo to secure his son's

admission, rather than a gift that might also curry some intangible

amount of favor with the university.                   Singer told Wilson that the

USC men's water polo coach was "giving [him] 1 boys slot" on a

"first come first [sic]" basis.                Later, Wilson asked Singer: "When

is [the USC men's water polo coach] going to be able to give us

decision [sic] on USC?             And when do I pay u [sic]?"                        Singer

responded:       "No   payment     of       money     till    [sic]    [the    USC     men's

water     polo    coach]    gets        a     verbal    and     written       [sic]    from

                                            - 144 -
admissions . . . ."        The day after Subco considered and approved

his son's admission, Wilson thanked Singer "for making this happen"

and asked for an "invoice" with no differentiation between payment

for   Singer's     services   and     any   contribution     to   USC,   further

suggesting that he viewed the payment as his side of an exchange

to secure his family a concrete benefit, rather than as a gift.

             That the deductions ultimately saved Wilson tens of

thousands of dollars on his taxes would give the jury further

reason to conclude that Wilson acted willfully.

             Wilson's    brief   on    appeal    downplays    this   evidence,

arguing that Wilson was living overseas at the time of filing;

could not have foreseen "whether or how" classifying the payments

as business expenses, rather than charitable donations, would

affect     his   tax   liability;    and    ultimately   saved    only   $1,425,

relative to his liability had he deducted the entire $220,000 as

a charitable contribution.44          This argument rests on an assumption

that Wilson believed he could legitimately deduct the entire sum

as a charitable contribution, but the government produced strong

evidence to the contrary.           Further, even if this assumption were

correct, the argument offers no plausible good faith explanation

of why Wilson himself sought to classify the payments as consulting

      44  Notably, this argument echoes the position Wilson's
counsel unsuccessfully presented to the jury during closing
argument.

                                      - 145 -
fees, and the unpredictability of the resulting tax benefits cuts

both ways -- Wilson may have hoped to gain more through the

maneuver.

            We   conclude   that    Wilson    has   not   shown   a    risk   of

evidentiary spillover that warrants vacating his tax conviction.

                                      3.

            Finally,   Wilson      contends    that   allegedly       erroneous

evidentiary rulings by the district court require us to vacate the

tax conviction.     The excluded material he cites falls into three

categories: (1) statements by Singer, (2) statements by Wilson,

and (3) evidence related to USC's practices in acknowledging

donations.45     We conclude that, even assuming the district court

erred in excluding this evidence -- a question we need not and do

not decide -- those errors were harmless with respect to the tax

conviction.46

     45   Wilson also argues that the district court's exclusion
of various evidence related to USC's admissions practices
prejudiced his tax count defense by "hobbl[ing] the defense to the
bribery and fraud counts." This claim repackages Wilson's Yates
argument, and we reject it for the same reasons.      In addition,
Wilson asserts elsewhere in his brief that the district court erred
in declining to suppress certain call recordings the government
captured beginning in September 2018. He does not reference this
issue in discussing the tax count, and so we do not consider it
here.
     46   We emphasize that our holding that any error in the
exclusion of this evidence was harmless is limited to Wilson's tax
conviction. We express no view as to whether the exclusion may
have been harmful with respect to any other count.

                                   - 146 -
            "An error will be treated as harmless only if it is

highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict."

United States v. Kilmartin, 944 F.3d 315, 338 (1st Cir. 2019)

(internal   quotation   marks   omitted)   (quoting   United   States   v.

Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1498 (1st Cir. 1997)).          "To sustain the

verdict, the reviewing court must be able to say with a fair degree

of assurance that the erroneous ruling did not substantially sway

the jury." Id. (quoting Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling

Co., 161 F.3d 77, 87 (1st Cir. 1998)); see also id. (requiring "a

panoramic, case-specific inquiry" (quoting United States v. Piper,

298 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2002))).

            The first category of excluded evidence cited by Wilson

encompasses a variety of statements by Singer to listeners other

than Wilson, including public presentations and communications

with other parents. In these statements, Singer generally depicted

himself as well connected in the realm of college admissions and

experienced in using the side door to help clients' children gain

admission. For example, in a corporate presentation, Singer stated

that he "read applications at two schools every year," including

some of "the . . . most prominent universities in America," and

had "d[one] 761 side doors into the best schools in America."           He

asserted to one parent that the "side door is not improper" but is

part of "how all schools fund their special programs or needs,"

                                - 147 -
and    told      another    that    he    would     soon    be   meeting     with    "the

President[s] of Harvard and Tufts for lunch."47

                 Wilson does not contend that he was aware of these

statements during his dealings with Singer.                      Instead, he argues

that "[a] jury could have reasonably inferred that Singer pitched

the side-door to Wilson in the same way he pitched his advice to

other parents," and that such a pitch would tend to show that

Wilson plausibly could have believed that Singer's business was

legitimate.         For several reasons, we conclude that any error in

excluding this evidence was harmless with respect to the tax count.

                 First,    there    was    other     evidence      before    the     jury

regarding Singer's pitch.            See, e.g., United States v. Veloz, 948

F.3d 418, 434 (1st Cir. 2020) (finding erroneous exclusion of

evidence harmless where record contained other evidence "to the

same effect"); United States v. Wilkerson, 251 F.3d 273, 280 (1st

Cir.    2001)      (similar).       An    IRS   agent      who   assisted    the    FBI's

investigation of Singer and his clients testified at trial that

"Singer's        general    pitch    was    that     [side-door      payments       were]

donation[s] to . . . program[s]"; that "Singer did not use the

word 'bribe' when he was discussing the side door"; and that even

after       he   began    cooperating      with     the    government,      Singer    "at

times . . . would go back to his whole pitch and go back to the

       47 The district court excluded these statements                               on   a
combination of relevance, hearsay, and Rule 403 grounds.

                                          - 148 -
old cover story as part of his just being used to saying 'donation'

when we asked him to say payment."                   The agent even acknowledged

that Singer's framing of the side door as a donation "does not

sound bad."         The jury evidently           found this similar evidence

unpersuasive.

              The   probative    value     of    the    excluded    material   with

respect to the tax count was also quite low.                    See, e.g., United

States   v.    Brown,   805     F.3d    13,     17    (1st   Cir.   2015)   (finding

evidentiary error harmless where jury likely gave little weight to

improperly admitted material).                Singer's statements have little

apparent relevance to the business deduction theory of tax fraud,

as a belief on Wilson's part in Singer's legitimacy would not

provide a basis for classifying the payments as business expenses,

and Wilson does not offer any explanation for how that could be

otherwise.      With respect to the charitable deduction, Wilson's

understanding of Singer's legitimacy would at most be tangentially

relevant to his understanding of whether the payment was pursuant

to a quid pro quo, which Wilson does not dispute would "vitiate[]

any charitable deduction."             And in order to rely on the evidence

at all, the jury would need to infer that Singer made similar

statements to Wilson himself and that Wilson relied on those

statements -- a possible, but hardly inevitable, conclusion.

              Most importantly, as discussed above, the government's

evidence on the tax count was powerful with respect to both the

                                       - 149 -
charitable and business expense deductions.    See, e.g., Kilmartin,

944 F.3d at 338-39 (noting that "the strength or weakness of the

government's evidence of guilt is normally the most important

integer in the harmlessness equation").     Considering the totality

of the circumstances, we conclude that any error in the exclusion

of Singer's statements was harmless.

          The second category of excluded evidence consists of

statements by Wilson himself.       Wilson's brief identifies six

excluded exhibits of this type.   The first three are email threads

referring other parents to Singer.       In one thread, for example,

Wilson told another parent: "There is a company and [a] CEO I know

well who was a great help to us [with Wilson's son] that might be

very helpful for you too.    I would be happy to connect you and pay

for it . . . if you and your daughter would find it useful."

Wilson asserts that a jury might infer "that Wilson would refer

Singer's services to [other parents] only if he believed those

services were legitimate."

          The other three excluded statements appear in emails

from Wilson to Singer about his son's admission and enrollment at

USC.   In one, sent at the beginning of his son's senior year of

high school, Wilson asked whether it was important for his son to

retake the ACT and SAT, saying that it "[s]eem[ed] like a lot [to

do] in the fall."   The other two, sent during the summer before

his son's enrollment at USC, inquired about the start date for his

                               - 150 -
son's water polo practices.48       Wilson argues that these emails

might lead a jury to conclude that Wilson believed that "Singer

was legitimate, that his son needed to do well on his tests, and

that his son was going to play water-polo."

          We   conclude,   for   similar   reasons   as   with   Singer's

statements, that, even assuming the exclusion of this evidence was

erroneous, it was harmless with respect to the tax count.

          Again, evidence similar to the excluded material was

before the jury.   See Veloz, 948 F.3d at 434; Wilkerson, 251 F.3d

at 280.   In a recorded call introduced into evidence by the

government, Wilson told Singer that he planned to refer a friend

to him -- apparently the same friend who received one of the three

excluded referrals.49   Another government exhibit included emails

from Wilson to Singer in which Wilson asked whether "it w[ould] be

known that [his son was] a bench warming candidate," noted that

"[o]bviously his skill level m[ight] be below the other freshmen,"

inquired whether his son would "be so weak as to be a clear misfit

at practice," and stated that he "want[ed] to be sure [his son

     48   As with the Singer statements, the district court
excluded these exhibits on a combination of relevance, hearsay,
and Rule 403 grounds.
     49   During the call, Wilson identified the friend by name,
identified his employer, and said the friend had a daughter who
"want[ed] to go to Brown."     One of the excluded referrals was
addressed to a parent with the same name whose email address
corresponded to the friend's employer, and noted that the parent's
daughter "ha[d] a strong interest in Brown."

                                 - 151 -
would] not [be] a lepper [sic]."         And, although neither party

mentions as much in its briefing, one of Wilson's water polo

inquiries appears to have been admitted as part of a government

exhibit; indeed, when introducing the exhibit, the government had

a witness read Wilson's email aloud to the jury.

          The   probative   value   of   the   excluded   material   with

respect to the tax count was also low.     See, e.g., Brown, 805 F.3d

at 17.   For the same reasons as with Singer's statements, whether

Wilson believed that Singer's services were legitimate has limited

relevance to his state of mind for purposes of the tax count.        And,

in any event, the excluded statements provide only weak evidence

about Wilson's understanding of Singer's legitimacy.        Wilson does

not dispute that Singer provided at least some legitimate services

in addition to admission through the side door, and the referral

emails -- which do not mention the side door by name -- could be

for those services, shedding little light on Wilson's perception

of the legitimacy of the services Singer provided to him. Further,

the email regarding exam scores is, as the government argues,

"consistent with questioning whether [Wilson's son] had to worry

more about test scores at all given the side-door arrangement in

place," and the emails about water polo would be consistent with

Wilson's believing that, even if his son was not a legitimate

athlete, he needed to at least pretend to be a team member for the

side-door scheme to work.    Cf. United States v. Sabean, 885 F.3d

                               - 152 -
27, 42 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding any error harmless where excluded

"statements had as much of a tendency to inculpate the defendant

as to exonerate him," because "the net impact of the evidence was

likely a wash").

            Given the government's strong evidence on the tax count,

we conclude it is highly probable the exclusion of these exhibits

did not taint Wilson's conviction.             See Kilmartin, 944 F.3d at

338-39.

            Finally,   Wilson       argues     that    the    district   court

erroneously   excluded     evidence    related    to     USC's   practices     in

acknowledging   donations     for    tax     purposes.       Federal   tax   law

generally   requires   a   charitable      organization      that   receives    a

payment made "partly as a contribution and partly in consideration

for goods or services" to (1) inform the donor that only the excess

value of the payment beyond the value of those goods or services

is deductible for federal tax purposes, and (2) provide an estimate

of the value of the goods or services for the donor to use in

preparing her taxes.       26 U.S.C. § 6115(b); see id. § 6115(a).

Wilson sought to introduce evidence that USC did not advise other

donors that they were required to offset the value of their

charitable deductions by the value of any admissions benefits

received in exchange for their donations.                 In particular, in

response to a subpoena, USC offered "to provide a declaration

explaining that . . . it ha[d] no responsive documents reflecting

                                    - 153 -
that USC instructed a donor to reduce his or her tax deductability

[sic] in connection with an admission decision because USC does

not offer admission to any applicant in exchange for quid pro quo

payments."   Wilson argues that this evidence, which the district

court excluded on relevance grounds, "would have supported the

good-faith legitimacy of Wilson's deductions" by showing that he

"reasonably believed that no offset was required."   The government

does not develop any argument that this evidence was properly

excluded; it instead contends that the exclusion was harmless.    We

agree.

          The evidence's probative value was limited.     See, e.g.,

Brown, 805 F.3d at 17.    It had no bearing on the legitimacy of

Wilson's deductions for business expenses.    And it would provide

only indirect support for Wilson's claim that he believed the

charitable deductions to be legitimate.    Wilson did not contend

below that he was aware of USC's donation acknowledgement practices

at the time he filed his tax return; indeed, the district court

excluded the evidence because Wilson did not show such awareness.

Instead, we understand Wilson's brief to argue that evidence that

USC did not instruct other donors to offset charitable deductions

by the value of any admissions boost received would have made

Wilson's belief that such an offset was not required appear more

reasonable and, as a result, more likely to be sincere.   See United

States v. Lachman, 521 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2008).       But to the

                             - 154 -
extent     Wilson     asserts    that     this     evidence    confirms       the

reasonableness of his belief in the deduction's legitimacy because

it shows that USC shared that belief, the language of USC's

proposed    declaration    undercuts      his    argument.    The    university

claims not to have instructed donors to offset the value of their

contributions only because it "does not offer admission to any

applicant in exchange for quid pro quo payments."                   But we have

already shown why the evidence is very strong that Wilson could

not have believed in good faith that he was not engaging in a quid

pro quo.    And to the extent Wilson argues that he was not aware

that the benefit he received in that quid pro quo was the kind of

valuable    benefit    that    would   preclude    his   payment    from    being

deductible,    nothing    in    the    disputed    document   bears    on   that

question, since the document at most establishes the ordinary point

that a donation not given pursuant to a quid pro quo is fully

deductible.    In truth, then, the proposed declaration does not

support Wilson's position, meaning that the exclusion of that

declaration was not prejudicial.

            Given this context, the government's strong evidence on

both theories of the tax count again enables us to "say with a

fair degree of assurance that the [exclusion of this evidence] did

not substantially sway the jury," rendering any error harmless.

Kilmartin, 944 F.3d at 338 (quoting Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at 87).

            We affirm Wilson's tax conviction.

                                      - 155 -
                           VI.   Conclusion

          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Wilson's conviction

for filing a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)

(Count   Thirteen   of   the   operative   indictment).     We   vacate

Abdelaziz's   and   Wilson's   other   convictions,   and   remand   for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                 - 156 -