Court Opinion

ID: 9534548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:40:50.009385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:24.416360
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I respectfully dissent with respect to both the wrongful discharge and the sex discrimination claims in this case.
I. wrongful discharge
Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim was premised on a just-cause termination policy contained in an employee handbook and verbal assurances made by her supervisor, John Ozar. I concur with the majority that the verbal statements were not sufficient to create a reasonable expectation of just-cause employment. However, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the opinion that relates to plaintiff’s legitimate expectations of just-cause employment contained in the employee handbook. Because I find that reasonable minds could conclude that the employee hand*187book created a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment, I would hold that a question of fact existed precluding summary disposition in favor of defendants.
a. the employment handbook PLAINTIFF RECEIVED IN 1973
As the majority recognizes, the handbook plaintiff received when she was hired in 1973 stated in relevant part, “No employee will be terminated without proper cause or reason and not until management has made a careful review of the facts.” It also stated, “The contents of this booklet are not intended to establish, and should not be interpreted to constitute any contract between . . . any employee . . . .” The majority relies on Heurtebise v Reliable Business Computers, Inc, 452 Mich 405; 550 NW2d 243 (1996), to state that “provisions in a handbook will not create enforceable rights when the handbook expressly states that such provisions are not intended to create an employment contract.” Ante at 169. I disagree that Heurtebise compels summary disposition against the plaintiff.
First, the majority states that “the handbook specifically disclaims any intent to create contractual or binding obligations to employees.” Ante at 157 (emphasis added). However, the disclaimer only relates to “contractual obligations.” Recall, the provision states, “The contents of this booklet are not intended to establish . . . any contract . . . .” The distinction is significant as it relates to this case.
As this Court stated in Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107, 118; 507 NW2d 591 (1993), a legitimate-expectations analysis is not a contract analysis:
*188In other words, there are two alternative theories of enforceabliity that may support a claim of wrongful discharge in Michigan. While the first theory is grounded solely on contract principles “relative to the employment setting,” Rowe [v Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc, 437 Mich 627, 632; 473 NW2d 268 (1991)], the second theory is grounded solely on public policy considerations. As Justice Boyle noted in her concurring opinion in In re Certified Question (Bankey v Storer Broadcasting Co), 432 Mich 438, 458; 443 NW2d 112 (1989), “the pure legitimate expectations leg of Toussaint [v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980)] was founded on the Court’s common-law authority to recognize” enforceable obligations that arise “ ‘outside the operation of normal contract principles.’ ”
Indeed, Justice Boyle stated that where the enforceable obligation arises out of a personnel policy handbook, a “contract theory is not appropriate . . . In re Certified Question, supra at 458 (Boyle, J., concurring).
Therefore, a disclaimer of contractual intent should have no effect on a policy contained in a handbook that gives rise to legitimate expectations of just-cause employment that are “outside the operation of normal contract principles.” Heurtebise is inapplicable because it was not grounded on a “legitimate expectations theory”; rather, it was grounded on a theory that the plaintiff was contractually obligated to arbitrate her civil rights claims.1 We stated in Heurtebise that *189“[i]t is undisputed that an arbitration provision is unenforceable if it is not a binding contract.” Id. at 413 (emphasis added). 2
In Rood, supra at 139, we stated, “Once it is determined that a promise has been made, the second step is to determine whether the promise is reasonably capable of instilling a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment . . . .” I would hold that the employer’s policy stating that “[n]o employee will be terminated without proper cause or reason” is reasonably capable of instilling a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment. Because I believe the contractual disclaimer did not contradict the just-cause provision, I would hold that a question of fact exists whether plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment.
The majority does not reach the remaining issues in plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim because it holds that no reasonable person could find that plaintiff had *190a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment (despite an express statement indicating such employment in her employment manual). Therefore, for the reasons already set forth by the majority in Lytle v Malady, 456 Mich 1; 566 NW2d 582 (1997), I dissent from the majority’s disposition and result of plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim.
n. THE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her age and sex. The issue presented is whether she has demonstrated sufficient evidence of age or sex discrimination to survive defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
A. SUMMARY DISPOSITION STANDARD
A court reviewing a motion for summary disposition must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion, and grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party. Stevens v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 433 Mich 365, 370; 446 NW2d 95 (1989). As this Court stated in Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374, n 3; 501 NW2d 155 (1993):
The alternative would require our abandonment of what has been called the “truth-testing process of cross-examination” and would encourage unwarranted invasion by judges of the jury’s exclusive province. [Citations omitted.]
hi this case, I fail to understand how the majority can state that no reasonable juror could find in favor of plaintiff, as a matter of law, when three respected and unanimous Court of Appeals judges and four *191members of this Court have already held that on the very facts of this case, plaintiff presented an issue of fact for the jury. At the summary disposition stage, the only question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, any reasonable person could find in favor of plaintiff. Seven current and former judges of this state have held that the answer is “yes.” Therefore, I respectfully dissent.3
B. PROOF REQUIRED UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
At oral argument, the defendant argued that the McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green4 burden-shifting test does not apply because, in a reduction-in-force situation, there is no “replacement.” However, the defendant is incorrect that the burden-shifting test “just doesn’t work” under the facts of this case. As this Court stated in Town v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688; 568 NW2d 64 (1997), a plaintiff does not have to prove she was “discharged” and “replaced” to prove a prima facie case. Indeed, we stated:
The . . . prima facie approach requires an employee to show that the employee was (1) a member of a protected class, (2) subject to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified for the position, and that (4) others, similarly situ*192ated and outside the protected class, were unaffected by the employer’s adverse conduct. [Id. at 695.]
However, as a tangential issue, the difficulty is determining what amount of proof is necessary to survive summary disposition. The problem is that each case comes with its particular facts and circumstances, making it difficult to set a “formula” for determining what evidence is “necessary” in each case.
I believe that, as a practical matter, applying McDonnell Douglas to any case should not make it any easier or any more difficult for a plaintiff to show an issue of fact for the jury, than it would be if the test never existed. I believe proper application of McDonnell Douglas supports this, as does this Court’s opinion in Town.
Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, and the defendant has articulated its legitimate business reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists whether the plaintiff was fired because of discrimination. All plaintiff’s evidence should be considered at this final stage, including her prima facie evidence.
The proofs offered in support of the prima facie case may be sufficient to create a triable issue of fact that the employer’s stated reason is a pretext, as long as the evidence would enable a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer’s decision had a discriminatory basis. [Id. at 697.]
As is required of any case, “the evidence must create a material issue of fact on which reasonable minds could conclude that the employer’s stated rea*193son is a pretext for discrimination for summary judgment to be precluded.” Id. at 698.
C. PLAINTIFF PRESENTED A QUESTION OF FACT REGARDING SEX DISCRIMINATION
The facts that support plaintiffs claim of sex discrimination have now been laid out in sufficient detail in one decision of the Court of Appeals and two decisions of this Court. Therefore, I will only list those relevant factors that plaintiff asserts support her claim:
1. In 1987, plaintiff was ordered by Malady that all the “girls” must wear dresses to the company open house.
2. Plaintiff told Malady that she did not want to wear a dress.
3. Plaintiff had never been required to wear a dress to the open house in the preceding fourteen years she worked at defendant company.
4. Plaintiff did not wear a dress to the company open house.
5. Within one week of the June open house, Malady gave Lytle her first negative performance evaluation.5
6. The company policy was to give performance evaluations in December of each calendar year.
*1947. No female employee who wore a dress to the company picnic was treated adversely by Malady.
8. In September 1987, plaintiff was not consulted regarding an affirmative action hiring by Malady.
9. Plaintiff was responsible for administration of the company’s affirmative action program.
10. Malady hired a friend for the position.
11. Plaintiff complained to Malady, who did not respond.
12. Plaintiff complained to Malady’s supervisor.
13. Malady’s supervisor issued a memorandum to Malady remonstrating him for interfering with Lytle’s responsibilities and failure of communication.
14. Within one to two weeks of the memorandum issued by Malady’s supervisor, Malady made his second, negative performance evaluation of plaintiff, in September 1987.
15. Malady failed to do a December 1987 or any 1988 performance evaluation of plaintiff.
16. In January 1989, without warning, plaintiff was demoted to human resources specialist.
17. Plaintiff was replaced by Walter Boczkaja, a male.
18. Boczkaja had been Lytle’s subordinate for the previous ten years.
19. When Boczkaja was originally hired, plaintiff trained him.
20. After 1989, plaintiff began reporting to Boczkaja.
*19521. After the negative performance evaluations by Malady, subsequent performance evaluations of plaintiff were done by Boczkaja, and all were satisfactory.
The majority contends that “plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that she was similarly situated [to Boczkaja].” Ante at 183. In fact, plaintiff presented evidence that she was more qualified: She not only trained Boczkaja, she supervised him for the ten years preceding his promotion to her position, and her demotion. The majority contends that Boczkaja received a series of promotions on the basis of his work performance for his first two years on the job. However, the majority ignores the fact that plaintiff received outstanding performance evaluations and promotions over the preceding fourteen years of her employment. In fact, she was promoted from clerk typist, when she was first hired, to employment manager under the human resources director John Ozar.
The majority contends that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that her performance or quality of her work product did not decline over time. However, even as the majority opinion recognizes, “Plaintiff contended that these evaluations were uncharacteristic of her job performance . . . .” Id. at 182 (emphasis added). To be true to summary disposition, the majority must take plaintiffs testimony in the light most favorable to her. Therefore, even assuming defendant’s position that the quality of plaintiff’s performance declined in 1987, plaintiff contended that her performance did not decline, and the issuance of the negative performance evaluations was a pretext *196for discrimination. This is a factual dispute for the jury to decide.
In support of plaintiffs contention that her performance did not decline, is the timing of the negative performance evaluations. A reasonable inference could be drawn that the performance evaluations were not issued because of poor performance, rather they were issued because of Malady’s discriminatory intent. First, the evaluations had never been issued before December. Second, the evaluations each were issued within seven to fourteen days of the incidents relating to “all the girls” must wear dresses and the “affirmative action” policy of the company. Third, how could plaintiff show her performance was either good or bad from September 1987 through December 1988 when Malady failed to give her a performance evaluation in December 1987 or at any time during 1988? After fifteen months without any review by Malady, in January 1989, she was demoted by Malady. Finally, once Boczkaja began evaluating her instead of Malady, her reviews were increased to a satisfactory level.
I would hold that there was more than ample evidence from which a reasonable person could find that plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of her sex in the events leading up to, and ultimately resting on, her demotion. Certainly, all should agree that a demotion is an adverse employment action.
As a final point, the majority takes issue with plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim because, with respect to plaintiff’s ultimate discharge, Roof was the person who fired her, not Malady. However, a reasonable inference is that Roof’s decision to terminate plaintiff was because of her two negative performance evalúa*197tions and her subsequent demotion, all of which were made by Malady. In fact, plaintiff noted that Boczkaja testified at his deposition that Malady participated with Roof in the decision with respect to the plaintiff. While defendants obviously contend that the decision was made because of economic reasons, this factual dispute is improperly resolved by the majority instead of by a jury.
Additionally, the mere fact that plaintiffs duties were redistributed to seven employees, five of whom were women, proves nothing. There is no evidence to show whether these women objected to wearing dresses to the open house, whether they wore dresses to the open house, or whether they asserted their right to have the affirmative action policy implemented properly.
Therefore, while defendant asserted that it was conducting a reduction in force, and while I would hold that the reduction in force was genuine, factual questions remain whether plaintiff was terminated as a result of the RIF or as a result of unlawful discrimination.
D. AGE DISCRIMINATION
I concur with the result of the majority in regard to plaintiffs age discrimination claim. However, if, on remand, plaintiff were able to produce the evidence that the company was hiring more employees during the alleged rif, and plaintiff were able to show that they were younger than the employees allegedly terminated as a result of the RIF, she may have presented sufficient evidence to survive summary disposition on her age discrimination claim.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 At oral argument, the attorney for the defendants stated that the only difference between this case and Heurtebise is that in this case the employee is trying to enforce a just-cause provision of a handbook rather than an arbitration provision. However, as noted above, this statement is incorrect. Heurtebise dealt with whether there was a contractual obligation to arbitrate, despite a contractual disclaimer. This case deals with the legitimate expectations of just-cause employment that arise outside the normal operation of contract principles. Therefore, a contractual dis*189claimer should have no effect on a policy arising outside the operation of those principles.

 Even if we proceed under the majority’s theory of a “contractual” disclaimer, plaintiff should prevail under well-established rules governing contract law. A basic rule of contract law is that contradictory terms or meanings are construed against the drafter. In Raska v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Michigan, 412 Mich 355, 362; 314 NW2d 440 (1982), this Court held that a contract is ambiguous when its words reasonably may be understood in different ways. If, fairly read, the contract leads to two reasonable but conflicting interpretations, it is ambiguous and should be construed against the drafter. In this case, the drafter of the handbook was the defendant. Hence, the issue whether plaintiff was reasonable in expecting just-cause employment should at least be a question for the jury. The defendant created security in its work force by expressing in its policy manual that its employees will be discharged only for cause, yet at the same time it stated that it did not want to be contractually bound to any of its statements. Because these two statements may be perceived as contradictory under contract principles, plaintiffs claim should also proceed to the jury under a contract theory.

 The majority states that “[t]his reasoning . . . would effectively deny this Court’s appellate review . . . and would render rehearing motions entirely obsolete.” Ante at 184-185, n 33. Apparently the majority misses the point. I do not dispute that rehearings are appropriate, and indeed sometimes necessary to clarify or change an opinion previously issued. However, where the issue is whether any reasonable person could find in favor of plaintiff on these facts, the fact that seven judges have answered this question “yes” only demonstrates that it is not impossible for reasonable jurors to agree with plaintiff as well.

 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973).

 The majority states that it was within three months after the open house that plaintiff received the negative performance evaluation. While she also received one in September 1989, plaintiff received her first negative performance evaluation within one week of the open house.