Court Opinion

ID: 9459447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:20:39.683352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:09.871470
License: Public Domain

COFFIN, Chief Judge
(concurring).
As stated in note 3, supra, I would go further than the majority. Even if it were to be concluded, with sufficient support, that the post-1970 amendments to the contract did not amount to “major federal action”, that HUD possessed no significant retained powers under the contract,1 and that future significant federal participation in the project was not reasonably anticipated, I would hold that the' Symphony Area of the Fenway Project should be subjected to a restricted environmental review.
In City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 1972), we said that a project had not yet become sufficiently federalized so as to make the action of the local agency become federal action for purposes of NEPA because there existed no firm federal commitment of funds. It would therefore be anomalous to say that action on a project which has become federalized by such commitment ceases to be major federal action for purposes of NEPA upon that very com*894mitment. And in Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1973), we recognized that those in partnership with the federal government may be properly subjected to legislation or court action which might be inappropriate in matters of purely private concern.2 This principle is not new, for “beyond challenge is the power of the Federal Government to impose reasonable conditions on the use of federal funds, federal property, and federal privileges .... [T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project and to the overall objectives thereof.” Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295, 78 S.Ct. 1174, 1185, 2 L.Ed.2d 1313 (1958). Without the need for a precise definition of when partnership begins, there can be no doubt that here, as early as December 1967 when the original HUD-BRA contract was signed, those parties had commenced to operate as partners.
To assign such a label to this relationship does not settle the nature or extent of the parties’ obligations. More precise analysis must be undertaken. Since, were it not for the participation of a non-federal partner, the obligation of HUD would be clear,2
3 the real question is whether the BRA and those working on the Fenway Project can now be subjected to a duty of restraint during a review process which they did not foresee in 1967.
In urging a narrow construction of NEPA and the concept of partnership here, appellees contend that the Housing Act of 1949, under which HUD has financed this project, is similar to the reeently adopted aid scheme of revenue sharing in the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq. (1973 Supp.), and that federal interference in the project after the grant is made is therefore unwarranted and detrimental to federal-state relations.4 As a general proposition this argument misses its mark, for, most unlike revenue sharing, the Housing Act of 1949 establishes a categorical grant program which is the essence of partnership. In fact, the Secretary of HUD is empowered to “include in any contract or instrument made pursuant to [the act] such other covenants, conditions, or provisions . . . as he may deem necessary to assure that the purposes of [the act] will be achieved.” 42 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(7). Such pervasive powers are inconsistent with appellees’ reading of the act and description of the relationship between the parties. Moreover, in this case HUD was content only to include in amendments to the original contract a new anti-discrimination clause, but did not insert an environmental review clause. Were the obligation to conform to supervening national legislation to turn, as HUD urges, on the perspicacity of the contracting officer important national policies as to civil rights, labor, and environment could be easily thwarted, by design or inadvertence. Such fortuitous results are neither desirable nor consistent with a concept of partnership, which implies a reasonable reservation of powers in any federal-nonfederal contract to achieve vital national goals. See infra.
Appellees also allege, however, that whatever relevance the concept of part*895nership might have for projects commenced under post-NEPA contracts, the federal partner is precluded from imposing new duties upon its nonfederal partner for programs begun pre-NEPA. The sanctity of contract is claimed to be impaired if the project is enjoined until HUD can issue an environmental study. But whether NEPA is applicable here because there may be, as we have stated, additional major federal acts to be performed or because the Fenway Urban Renewal Project is the type of partnership to which the statute applies as a result of the existence of a federalized project denominated a “proposal” for a “major Federal action”,5 there can be no complaint rising to constitutional proportions. Thus, for example, where purely private contracts have been altered or abrogated by subsequent federal legislation, no constitutional cause of action has been found to lie.6 Similarly, it is difficult to see how BRA can complain about being subjected to the significant requirement in NEPA that federally assisted programs reflect environmental planning in accordance with § 4332(2)(C). It cannot, I think, be gainsaid that where important and overriding public concerns are manifested in statutes like NEPA which are meant to have sweeping application and which cannot be said to confer any primary benefits on the United States as a contract party, cf. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 55 S.Ct. 432, 79 L.Ed. 912 (1935), compliance with these new laws is a necessary appurtenance to the partnership status of the nonfederal contracting party, whenever the partnership may have commenced.
One of the major legislative ends sought to be achieved by NEPA — the improvement of the “regulatory system” administered by each agency by requiring consideration of environmental factors at all stages of decision-making in federally assisted programs so as to preserve and improve the environment — is so important that “[tjhose who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.” F.H.A. v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91, 79 S.Ct. 141, 146 (1958). In that case the Court considered the application of a 1954 amendment to a 1946 housing act under which the federal government had contracted, in 1949, to provide mortgage insurance for an apartment house.7 In finding that the new law, as applied to the old contract, was merely operating prospee*896tively, the Court stated that “[fjederal regulation of future' action based upon rights previously acquired by the person regulatéd is not prohibited by the Constitution. . . . Immunity from federal regulation is not gained through forehanded contracts.” Id. at 91, 79 S.Ct. at 146. BRA, like the owners of the apartment house in The Darlington, has received and continues to receive the benefits of federal funding, and it is hard to find any valid reason for its failure to recognize its obligations to aid its federal partner in carrying out the mandate of NEPA. In fact, the continuing federal role here would seem to be much greater than that in The Darlington. See also Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 817 (3d Cir. 1970), where in view of the important concerns reflected in the 1968 Civil Rights Act, the court read that law as imposing certain conditions on HUD and its partner which had, prior to 1968, entered into a contract for a federal mortgage insurance guarantee.
I also find unpersuasive HUD’s confession of an absence of power to effectuate any suggestions for change resulting from its NEPA study or other remedial avenues open to it. In the event that it interprets its specific contractual authority too narrowly to enable it to cope with the situation, it is possible that HUD or others who seek to vindicate the goals of NEPA will have available sufficient remedies, if and when the need arises, which may be found in the nature of the legislative scheme, Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S; 448, 457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957), here perhaps in the area of environmental law, see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972), or in the area of federal housing legislation, see, e. g., Shannon v. HUD, supra, 436 F.2d at 822, or even as related to the obviously pervasive contracting power of the United States, see, e. g., United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1967), and United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1970).
In the NEPA context, for example, a problem might arise where a federalnonfederal partnership was engaged in a ten year construction project requiring an initial NEPA statement and periodic updates. If, in the eighth year, a study showed that an uncompleted portion would be environmentally unwise and that it should not be built, it is inconceivable that just because federal money had changed hands years ago, the United States would be without any remedy should its nonfederal partner resist alterations.
I would therefore have preferred to direct that an injunction issue, subject to “escape hatch” clause 4a of the section entitled “Relief”, without the findings required by the majority.

. Two such powers, which may or may not be purely ministerial, would seem in particular to require not merely assertions by the contracting parties but such evidence of prior interpretation and invocation as might exist. One is the right to “monitor” the project, requiring, for example, HUD approval of BRA “proclamations” as to street, lighting, and sidewalk construction contracts, or FHA issuance of an allocation to a developer. The other is the opaque provision giving HUD the power to prevent BRA from “tak[ing] any steps which might in the opinion of the Secretary, violate Federal laws or regulations”. Could HUD invoke this power if post-1970 fair labor or air quality standards were being violated, rather than leave enforcement to the Secretary of Labor, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., or the Environmental Protection Agency, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq.? If so, does NEPA fall in the same category of “laws or regulations” ?

. In referring to federal aid schemes as evidencing some sort of partnership, the writer has used a term virtually synonymous with “joint venture” used by the Supreme Court in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 279, 78 S.Ct. 1174, 2 L.Ed.2d 1313 (1958), and identical with that used in Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Dept., 446 F.2d 1013, 1027 (5th Cir. 1971).

. It should be observed that if the project were a purely federal one, there would be no question but that it would be subject to some environmental review even though it had been commenced pre-NEPA and were well along toward completion. See, e. g., Environmental Defense Fund v. T.V.A., supra.

. It is not, however, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts but rather the local planning agency with whom HUD has contracted.

. See Environmental Defense Fund v. T.V.A., in which the court held that the continuing significant construction of the project causes that project to remain, for purposes of NEPA, a “proposal for action” until consummation. While that project was admittedly undertaken solely by a federal agency, the court’s interpretation of “proposal” obviously lias relevance for federal aid programs as well, where the concept and existence of “major Federal action” may be different.

. See, e. g., Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603, 613, 32 S.Ct. 589, 56 L.Ed. 911 (1912) (Employers’ Liability Act of 1908); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 342, 17 S.Ct. 540, 41 L.Ed. 1007 (1897) and United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214, 234-235, 42 S.Ct. 496, 66 L.Ed. 907 (1922) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Ball v. Halsell, 161 U.S. 72, 16 S.Ct. 554, 40 L.Ed. 622 (1896) and Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U.S. 170, 40 S.Ct. 474, 64 L.Ed. 843 (1920) (federal regulation of champerty).

. The Darlington dealt with a statute which expressly provided for its application to pre-existing contracts. See also, e. g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 787-789, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694 (1948). But as it was not necessary for Congress to have explicitly stated its intent that NEPA affect pre-NEPA contracts — since in imposing new obligations on tiie federal government and its contractual partners NEPA makes no “exceptions of existing contracts", Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 479, 31 S.Ct. 265, 55 L.Ed. 297 (1911) (emphasis in original), reference to The Darlington here is meant to address appellees’ constitutional arguments that application of NEPA to the entire Fenway Project somehow unlawfully interferes with BRA’s pre-existing contract rights.