Court Opinion

ID: 9677099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:43:24.72063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:50.700300
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
In remarking that asserted violations of Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), raised in context of a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus, will be subject to a contemporaneous objection requirement, the majority alludes to cases discussing asserted errors “appellate courts will not consider” due to procedural default, viz: Gibson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), and cases cited therein at 131.1 Manifestly these cases do not inform the question whether a requirement of preservation of an asserted violation of federal constitutional dimension ought to inhere in a post-conviction collateral attack under Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. However, in my view it is indeed appropriate to require that an objection be lodged in the trial court in order to preserve an asserted claim of violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of confrontation acknowledged in Long2 in an Article 11.07 application for writ of habeas corpus, for reasons which follow.
Elsewhere I have described the “advent of the Substantial Federal Question” in state post-conviction collateral attack via what is presently Article 11.07, supra. See Ex parte Banks, 769 S.W.2d 539, 545-47 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Clinton, J., dissenting); Ex parte Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Prior to that advent, questions of cognizability of a claim on collateral attack of a judgment of conviction turned on whether it “went to the integrity of the judgment, viz: Whether the claim is that the judgment is void for illegality or voidable for irregularity.” Ex parte Banks, supra, at 544. As the United States Supreme Court began to recognize, for purposes of implementing federal habeas corpus provisions, that “[a] court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost” on account of some federal constitutional defect committed in the proceedings, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1468 (1938), so, too, this Court began to consider violations of certain federal constitutional rights to impact the integrity, if not jurisdiction, of the trial court to such an extent as to render a conviction “void” for purposes of our own post-conviction collateral review. See cases discussed in Ex parte Banks, supra, at 545-47. The Fifth Circuit, under pressure from the Supreme Court to effectuate federal constitutional rights via 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254, looked to our own Article 11.07 as *107a possible state avenue for providing a full and fair fact-finding hearing consonant with the dictates of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), and hence began to dismiss federal writs under the rubric of exhaustion of state remedies. E.g., Carroll v. Beto, 379 F.2d 329 (CA5 1967).
Having already begun to entertain certain federal claims in post-conviction collateral attacks, this Court readily acceded to the Fifth Circuit’s gloss, particularly in light of amendments to Article 11.07 in 1967. Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). There the Court observed:
“A judgment of conviction obtained in violation of due process of law is void for want of jurisdiction of the court to enter such judgment. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837.[3]
“Habeas corpus is an appropriate means by which relief from confinement under a void conviction may be obtained in the State as well as in the Federal Courts. [Citing, inter alia, those cases discussed in Ex parte Banks, supra, at 545-47].”
Id., at 826. It seems all but certain that states are not compelled by any provision of the federal constitution to provide post-conviction collateral avenues for vindication of federal constitutional rights. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987); Murray v. Giarratano, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Cf. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422 (1965). Nevertheless, by incorporating the notion of the federal courts that a constitutional defect can render a conviction “void” into its own post-conviction ha-beas corpus jurisprudence, this Court did in fact provide such an avenue.
The era of the Warren Court saw a proliferation of federal constitutional rights recognized and made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, claims cognizable in a federal writ were expanded beyond those “classic” examples that had been identified before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Fay and Townsend as implicating “fundamental fairness,” viz: “that the proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly made use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based on a confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, at 544, 102 S.Ct. 1198, at 1217, 71 L.Ed.2d 379, at 404 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Concomitantly this Court has seen a burgeoning of claims raised in post-conviction writs of habeas corpus under Article 11.07 based upon asserted constitutional defects at trial. In strict adherence to Ex parte Young, supra, we have continued to entertain such claims. This is true even though as early as Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942), and as late as Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), the United States Supreme Court has itself abandoned “the fiction that habeas reached only jurisdictional defects in favor of the statement that ‘[i]t extends also to those exceptional *108cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the only-effective means of preserving his rights.’ ” Wechsler, Habeas Corpus and the Supreme Court: Reconsidering the Reach of the Great Writ, 59 U.Colo.L.Rev. 167, at 174 (1988), quoting Waley, 316 U.S. at 105, 62 S.Ct. at 966, 86 L.Ed. at 1304. Though the federal courts have largely ceased to predicate entertainment of constitutional claims under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 upon the premise that a constitutional defect divests the trial court of jurisdiction, thus rendering the conviction “void,” in continuing to recognize such claims this Court adheres to that “fiction.”4
It may be that as a matter of policy we would want to recognize federal constitutional claims in state post-conviction collateral attack under Article 11.07, if only to provide a forum in state court for airing claims that may otherwise necessitate a hearing in the federal habeas court under Townsend v. Sain, supra. But to say we reach a constitutional defect in post-conviction collateral attack because it serves to “void” the conviction raises anomalies.
In the first place, if the claim is that a defect is sufficient to render a conviction void, in the sense of removing jurisdiction from the convicting court, it makes little sense to speak in terms of a procedural default of that claim. We do not ordinarily think it necessary to object in order to preserve a claim of voidness. Yet we also know that “even a constitutional error may be waived by failure to object.” E.g., Parker v. State, 649 S.W.2d 46, 55 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
Second, and similarly, where a constitutional defect is such as to render conviction “void,” it would not seem necessary to inquire into retroactivity of a new judicial decision announcing the rule; one would think that any conviction suffering that “voidness” would be subject to collateral attack, irrespective of when the conviction occurred. In Teague v. Lane, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), however, the United States Supreme Court decided that new constitutional rules, though cognizable to all cases on direct appeal, and presumably in federal collateral attack of convictions which become final after announcement of the new rule, would not be cognizable in collateral attack of proceedings that have become final before the new rule is announced. Teague ultimately vindicates Justice Harlan’s approach to retroactivity as articulated in, e.g., his separate opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971). But if, consistent with this approach, considerations of “finality” may be allowed to take precedent over recertification of a constitutional defect, it can only be because the defect did not truly nullify the conviction.5 Even before Teag-ue v. Lane, supra, whether a new constitutional requirement or rule would apply retroactively to convictions final before the rule was announced was a troublesome question, turning upon whether the new rule implicated “the very integrity of the fact-finding process.” E.g., Ex parte Hemby, 765 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), and cases discussed there. Query: if a rule fails to affect “the very integrity of the fact-finding process,” should it provide, even prospectively, a basis for post-conviction collateral attack?
*109A third anomaly lies in the fact that certain constitutional violations, though because they render a conviction “void” we would reach them on collateral attack, may nevertheless be subject to a harm analysis. Indeed, we have already recognized that Long error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Mallory v. State, 752 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 5.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).
In my view these anomalies counsel that we limit cognizability of federal constitutional claims under Article 11.07, supra, to “exceptional” constitutional defects so “fundamental” as not to be susceptible to a determination of harm, such as those identified in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106, 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470 (1986).6 It is only “[ejrrors of this kind [that] justify collateral relief no matter how long a judgment may have been final and even though they may not have been preserved properly in the original trial.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 544, 102 S.Ct. at 1217, 71 L.Ed.2d at 404. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). In my judgment, nothing in the federal constitution requires this Court to extend the scope of its post-conviction collateral review even as far as this, much less farther. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, Murray v. Giarratano, and Case v. Nebraska, all supra.
Assuming, however, that the Court will continue indiscriminately to entertain federal constitutional claims under Article 11.-07, supra, we should at least acknowledge that we do so at the behest of the federal courts; not because every such claim, if borne out, would necessarily render the conviction “void.” In short, we have agreed to review some merely “voidable” claims in post-conviction collateral attack. Cf. Ex parte Truong, supra.
Accepting this premise, there is certainly nothing anomalous in applying our own contemporaneous objection rules to require preservation of some types of constitutional error. In doing so, we but require an accused to signal to appellate or habeas court that he did not in fact acquiesce to receipt of objectionable evidence, argument, procedure, or what have you. See Polk v. State, 729 S.W.2d 749, at 753-55 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). To the extent our rules may tend to work an inadvertent “forfeiture” rather than a conscious “waiver” of some, less fundamental constitutional rights, see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976) *110(Brennan, J., dissenting), I fail to see any reason this Court should be more accommodating than the Federales themselves. E.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (delineating “cause” prong of “cause and prejudice” standard); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (delineating “prejudice”).
To my mind Long error is not so fundamental as to call for suspension of the contemporaneous objection rule. Furthermore, I agree with the majority that applicant’s claim does not fall within our own recognized exception to that rule, as recently explicated in Mathews v. State, 768 S.W.2d 731, at 733 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Thus I concu” in the judgment of the Court that applicant may not raise his Long error by way of Article 11.07, supra.

. All emphasis added unless otherwise indicated.

. The State constitutional component of applicant's claim is not cognizable in an Article 11.07 application for writ of habeas corpus, Ex parte Hemby, 765 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), notwithstanding, in view of Ex parte Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Therefore the majority needlessly addresses whether applicant has preserved this facet of his claim.

. Citation to Fay v. Noia, supra, for this proposition is somewhat puzzling. In Fay the Supreme Court observed:
“The breadth of the federal courts’ power of independent habeas corpus stems from .e.. the historical essence of habeas corpus that it lies to test proceedings so fundamentally lawless that imprisonment pursuant to them is not merely erroneous but void. Hence, the familiar principle that res judicata is inapplicable in habeas proceedings ... is really but an instance of the larger principle that void judgments may be collaterally impeached.... This is not to say that a criminal judgment resting on a constitutional error is void for all purposes. But conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review.”
372 U.S. at 422-23, 83 S.Ct. at 840-41, 9 L.Ed.2d at 859-60. It is for purposes of enhancing its point that federal courts have power to review federal constitutional claims under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254, notwithstanding state dismissal of such claims on the basis of procedural default, that the Court here spoke in terms of "voidness.” Nothing in this or any other passage from Fay would seem to mandate that state courts likewise consider a federal constitutional defect necessarily to render a conviction “void" for purposes of invoking state post-conviction collateral remedies.

. Later cases, though ultimately deriving from the holding of Ex parte Young, supra, have not expressly retained the language of “voidness," observing simply "that habeas corpus will lie only to review jurisdictional defects or denials of fundamental or constitutional rights.” Watson v. State, 601 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); See also Ex parte Banks, supra, at 540; Ex parte Shields, 550 S.W.2d 670, at 675 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). At work in these decisions, nevertheless, is the notion that, like a defect of jurisdiction, denial of a "fundamental or constitutional” right will void a judgment of conviction.

⅛ In a similar vein, it is curious that, absent a showing of “cause and prejudice," considerations of, inter alia, "finality" should be found to counsel against federal habeas review of a claimed constitutional defect that a state court has declined to review for reasons of procedural default, if the defect genuinely operated to “void” the conviction. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982).

. Failing this, the Court might at least consider refusing to docket any potentially harmless federal constitutional claim under Article 11.07, supra, unless the applicant, as part of his burden to allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief, pleads facts to show how he was harmed by the purported constitutional error. There has already been some stirring in this direction. Compare Ex parte Maldonado, 688 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), and Ex parte Coleman, 599 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
In Ex parte Maldonado, supra, the Court declined to entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.07, supra, which alleged fundamental defect in the court's charge to the jury. Recognizing that following Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), a fundamentally defective jury charge would provide a basis for post-conviction habe-as relief, notwithstanding Ex parte Coleman, supra, the Court nevertheless dismissed Maldonado's application without prejudice for failure to allege reasons the purported jury charge error operated, in context of his trial, to deny him a fair and impartial trial. See also Ex parte White, 726 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).
It is true that in Ex parte Maldonado, supra, a showing of egregious harm was an actual corn-ponent of the constitutional error; therefore, failure to allege the requisite harm amounted to a failure to state facts establishing error of constitutional proportion. Here applicant’s constitutional right to confront his accuser would be denied the moment the jury was allowed to view the videotape, and no further showing is necessary to establish constitutional error. Such error is susceptible, however, to a harmless error analysis. Mallory v. State, supra. Harmless constitutional error provides no basis for relief in habeas corpus. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972). In a direct appeal from a criminal conviction, error mandates reversal "unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” Tex.R.App.Pro., Rule 81(b)(2). Most constitutional errors are subject to the same test. Rose v. Clark, supra. In a collateral attack, however, where the burden is upon the applicant to establish the illegality of his constraint, we might justifiably require an applicant to plead and prove that asserted constitutional error in fact more likely than not contributed to his conviction.