Court Opinion

ID: 9442767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:58:35.813546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:13.219073
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
*670I agree as to the liability of libellant. I dissent because I think the railroad (i. e., the railroad trustees) should be held liable over, by way of indemnity, to libellant. The wreck statute imposed a non-delegable duty on libellant to mark the wreck. But I think the tug Allentown, owned by the railroad, by not discharging its duty to libellant, caused libellant to be liable to the vessels injured by the unmarked wreck.
The tug undertook to tow the barge and therefore assumed obligations to the barge. That it did so gratuitously is not material ;1 especially is this so, because the railroad had a selfish reason for wanting the barge moved in order to have its dock clear. I think that, in two ways, the tug violated its duty to the barge:
(1) When the barge was wrecked, the tug could not properly, in discharge of its duty to libellant, leave the wreck without marking it. The tug did attempt to mark it, by attaching a lantern to the flag pole; but as the tug soon discovered, this attempt failed, when the false roof floated away. (2) The tug then gave incorrect information about the wreck’s location to representatives of the railroad, and told libel-lant’s foreman that the railroad would report the wreck to the Coast Guard. The misinformation caused the Coast Guard to delay in finding and marking the wreck. During this delay, the other vessels were damaged by the wreck. Had correct information been given to the Coast Guard, doubtless it would have marked the wreck before that damage occurred. Because of either or both (1) and (2), the railroad, I think, is liable over to libellant.
Of course, libellant’s liability to the other vessels is not lessened on that account. But if A is held liable for breach of a non-delegable duty — statutory or otherwise — A is entitled to indemnity from C, if C’s conduct caused that breach, and if C’s conduct was a violation of a duty (by the route of contract or tort) which C owed to A. Burris v. American Chicle Co., 2 Cir., 120 F.2d 218, 222; Restatement of Restitution, §§ 94, 95.
Libellant pleaded that the railroad was liable for the conduct of the Allentown (a) in failing to mark the wreck, or to stand by, until the Coast Guard took charge, and (b) in failing promptly to notify the Coast Guard of the exact location of the wreck. The pleading contained a prayer for “further and other relief.” Thus the pleading sufficed to include the railroad’s liability over to libellant.

. The Deer, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 7 Fed.Cas. at page 352, No. 3,737; King v. Red Star Towing & Transportation Co., D.C.E.D.N.Y., 48 F.2d 633, 634; cf. Harper, Law of Torts, 220 et seq.; Corbin, Contracts, I, 683-686.