Court Opinion

ID: 9758497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:33:37.61802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:52.427058
License: Public Domain

Conford, P. J. A. D.,
Temporarily assigned, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the Court’s reversal of the conviction for the reasons stated in its opinion. However, I dissent from the announcement in the opinion that hereafter, and presumably at the retrial herein, defendants in criminal cases asserting duress as a defense will be required to prove the defense to the satisfaction of the fact-finder by a preponderance of the evidence. I regard this change in New Jersey law with respect to the ultimate burden of persuasion as to affirmative defenses (except for the defense of insanity) to be an unwarranted modification of the civilized concept of Anglo-American criminal law that it is the burden of the State to prove the guilt of the criminally accused beyond a reasonable doubt in every case.
The cases cited by the Court (442, second paragraph) amply document the New Jersey and general rule that, as to affirmative defenses (duress clearly being one), defendant has the initial burden of coming forward with some evidence thereof, unless such evidence appears in the State’s ease, whereupon the ultimate burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt is required to be borne by the State. This rule is adhered to by both the A. L. I. Model Penal Code and the proposed New Jersey Penal *445Code. See M. P. C. (proposed official draft 1962) Sec. 1.12 (1), (2); Commentary, Tent. Dr. No. 4 (1955) pp. 108-113; N. J. P. C. (1971) Sec. 20:1-12 a. b. (1); Commentary, pp. 35-36. In commenting upon the operation of the rule the Model Penal Code reporter expressly cites with approval Professor McCormick’s listing of duress as a typical affirmative defense as to which the jury should not be permitted to convict if they entertain a reasonable doubt. Commentary, Tent. Dr. No. 4, supra, at 112-113; and see McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 321 at 684 (1954); id., second edition, Sec. 341 at 800-802 (1972).
The Court now reverses the burden of proof as to duress because of the “open-ended” nature of the defense as newly reformulated by the Court (whether “a person of reasonable firmness in [defendant’s] situation would have been unable to resist” the coercion, p. 442) as well as “the possibility for abuse and uneven treatment” (supra, p. 443). The substantive reformulation of the defense of duress by the Court’s opinion is a progressive step in our jurisprudence. The Court adopts the highly rational viewpoint of the Model Penal Code and the proposed New Jersey Penal Code (supra, p. 442). However, I do not regard the defense as thus reformulated as any more subject to “abuse” and “uneven treatment” than any of the other criminal affirmative defenses such as self-defense, entrapment or the like. If the defense of duress is true in a particular ease the defendant is innocent as having been free from culpable intent. See State v. Savoie, 67 N. J. 439, 455 (1975). Ordinarily a defendant cannot 'be convicted unless the jury finds his criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet the rule today adopted by the Court would permit the jury to convict even if they entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant (as a person of reasonable firmness) had been free from the coercive effect of duress when he committed the indicted act.
The fact that evidence of duress is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant is no justification for the Court’s *446position. That situation is more or less true of all affirmative defenses — a circumstance which explains why the standard rule imposes on the defendant the initial burden of coming forward with some evidence of the defense (unless the State’s case supplies it). There is no reason to believe a jury less capable, in duress cases as compared with other affirmative defenses, of appraising credibility of witnesses and weighing proofs and accordingly concluding they have no reasonable doubt that the defense is untrue in a particular case.
Eor these reasons I would not alter the existing rule of burden of proof as to the affirmative defense of duress.
Conford, P. J. A. D., concurring in the result
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman, Cliffobd and Scheeibeb and Judge Confobd — 7.
For affirmance — Hone.