Court Opinion

ID: 9594965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:34:23.186792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:25.497475
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Acting Judge,
dissenting:
Originally the writing of the opinion in this case fell to me. I proposed to “Affirm in Part; Reverse in Part; and Remand.” A majority of the panel having now taken a contrary view, I file my proposed opinion (with minor modifications) as my dissent.
Defendant, Charles Rhinehart, pled guilty to receiving stolen goods. He was sentenced to four years in prison, suspended on time served and was ordered to serve two years probation and complete two hundred hours of public service.
At the plea hearing, the solicitor stated that no restitution *40was sought inasmuch as the property had been recovered. The statement was in error. When it was learned that the stolen property had not in fact been recovered, a hearing was held. The hearing judge, as an additional condition of probation, ordered an unspecified amount of restitution as a condition of the original probationary sentence. The judge did not determine the amount or the details of restitution but left these matters to the determination of the solicitor’s office. Defendant appeals asserting error by the court in (1) amending the sentence, (2) in ruling that the Defendant had misrepresented the facts, and (3) in allowing the solicitor to determine the amount of restitution.
I.
Defendant asserts the addition of restitution was improper in that the court lacked jurisdiction to amend his probationary sentence. However, the lower court specifically stated that it was not going to change Defendant’s sentence, but was adding restitution as a condition of probation.
A trial court has specific statutory authority to modify the conditions of probation. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-430 (Supp. 1992). The authority is quite broad, allowing the court to modify the conditions at any time and to include any condition not prohibited by the statute. Id. Restitution is not prohibited by the statute but has been recognized as an appropriate condition of probation. State v. Bynes, 304 S.C. 62, 403 S.E. (2d) 126 (Ct. App. 1991); see also, S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-125 (1976) (sentence for crimes involving the unlawful receiving of property may not be suspended unless restitution is made if the sentence is less than the maximum prescribed by law). Therefore, it follows that restitution may also be imposed as a condition upon modification of probation by the court. See e.g., State v. Petrie, 60 Or. App. 351, 653 P. (2d) 1015 (1983) (modification of probation to require restitution to victim was appropriate). I find no error by the trial court as its actions were within its statutory power.
In days of yore, courts looked with disfavor upon using the court of general sessions to aid victims of crime in collecting monies due from the perpetrator of the crime. In more recent times the public policy of the courts and of the law is to encourage criminal courts to bring about restitution. Such is *41often the only instrumentality available to right a wrong which a victim has experienced. That policy is spelled out by the General Assembly of South Carolina when it enacted § 17-25-125 swpra. That section reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in every case in which a person is sentenced for a crime involving the unlawful taking or receiving of or malicious injury to another’s property, and the judge sentences such person less than the maximum sentence prescribed by law, a portion of such sentence may be suspended and the defendant placed on probation if he makes restitution to the victim in an amount equal to the monetary loss sustained by the victim as determined by the judge.
If the defendant fails to make restitution in accordance with the terms prescribed by the judge, the suspension shall be revoked and the defendant shall serve the original sentence.
Nothing contained herein shall preclude a judge from prescribing other conditions of probation.
To hold that restitution is not permitted in this case simply means that the victim must suffer his own loss.
II.
Defendant also argues that the lower court erred when it ruled that the defendant had represented at the sentencing hearing that the stolen goods had been recovered and restitution was not an issue. From my review of the transcript, it appears that the solicitor was the person who made the representation to the court. The sentence of the judge gave the defendant the advantage of the solicitor’s error. Whether the defendant knew of the error is of no consequence. As indicated hereinabove, the judge definitely had statutory authority to change the terms of the probationary sentence. I find no error.
III.
Defendant also argues, and the State concedes, that it was improper for the lower court to order payment of an unspecified amount of restitution and to delegate *42the determination of the amount to the solicitor’s office when the amount was in dispute. I agree.
When restitution is in dispute, a court must determine the specified amount. Moreover, before a court may order restitution to a victim, it must hold a hearing and determine the actual amount of damages or loss. State v. Fussell, 299 S.C. 162, 383 S.E. (2d) 1 (1989). This is necessary to ensure an evidentiary basis for the reparation exists and to guarantee the proper exercise of the trial judge’s discretion as to conditions of probation. State v. Wilson, 274 S.C. 352, 264 S.E. (2d) 414 (1980).
A hearing should have been held by the lower court to determine this matter. As a result, I remand this issue back to the lower court for a determination of the amount and circumstances of the restitution to be made.
I would affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.