Court Opinion

ID: 9917445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 15:03:13.290475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:03.739238
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                        Case No. 5D22-943
                 LT Case No. 2021-MM-004009-A
                  _____________________________

CHARLES EVERETT ANDERSON,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the County Court for Seminole County.
Debra Krause, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Ryan M. Belanger,
Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Roberts J.
Bradford, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Appellee.

                        January 12, 2024

EDWARDS, C.J.

     While Appellant, Charles Everett Anderson, was in a
department store, surveillance video captured him taking empty
gift bags from his backpack and filling them with merchandise. As
he was doing this, a store manager moved nearby and made eye
contact with him. Appellant stopped what he was doing, left the
gift bags loaded with $450 of polo shirts in the store, and walked
out. He was arrested, charged, tried by a jury, and convicted of
petit theft and trespass. 1 His request for a jury instruction on the
defense of abandonment was properly denied by the trial court.
We affirm.

    Appellant was charged with violating section 812.014, Florida
Statutes (2021), which states:

      (1)   A person commits theft if he or she knowingly
      obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use,
      the property of another with intent to, either
      temporarily or permanently:

            (a)  Deprive the other person of a right to the
            property or a benefit from the property.

            (b)   Appropriate the property to his or her own
            use or to the use of any person not entitled
            to the use of the property.

§ 812.014, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Because “endeavor[ing] to”
is included in the definition of theft, “[t]he substantive, completed
crime is fully proved when an attempt, along with the requisite
intent, is established.” State v. Sykes, 434 So. 2d 325, 327 (Fla.
1983). Thus, the fact that Appellant did not take the shirts past a
register or out the door is of no moment unless he established the
defense of abandonment.

     Florida recognizes the affirmative defense of abandonment
which originated in the common law and was later supplemented
by section 777.04(5), Florida Statutes (2021). See Carroll v. State,
680 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). As the Third District
observed:

    1 The jury heard testimony and received a redacted document

proving that Appellant had been trespassed or barred from this
store in the past, but the jury was not told why he had been
trespassed before. Appellant does not challenge his conviction for
trespass.

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      The law distinguishes between          a “voluntary
      abandonment” and an “involuntary abandonment.”
      According to Professor LaFave, “The cases are in
      agreement that what is usually referred to as an
      involuntary abandonment is no defense.” 2 Wayne R.
      LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal
      Law § 6.3(b), at 53-54 (1986).

Id.

    “In order to constitute a defense, the abandonment must be
complete and voluntary.” Id. It is the defendant who bears the
burden of proving the defense by the preponderance of the
evidence. Harriman v. State, 174 So. 3d 1044, 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA
2015).

     Involuntary abandonments involve situations where a
defendant encounters unexpected difficulty and decides not to
complete the crime because of that, or “when the defendant
withdraws because of a belief that the intended victim has become
aware of his plans, or because he thinks that his scheme has been
discovered or would be thwarted by police observed in the area of
the intended crime.” Carroll, 680 So. 2d at 1066 (internal citation
omitted).

      Here, the store’s surveillance video shows Appellant looking
around nervously as he starts to pull out two large gift bags that
are not available in that store. When he sees other shoppers
nearby, he returns the gift bags to their place of hiding in his
backpack. After they leave his area, he once again pulls out the
bags labeled “Congrats,” looks around some more, and then starts
filling them with expensive shirts. The store manager testified
that when she moved into position behind a counter, she and
Appellant made direct eye contact. Right after that, Appellant
deserted his gift bags filled with shirts, turned, and can be seen on
video walking out of the store. The evidence presented to the jury
shows a classic example of involuntary abandonment of the crime.
There was absolutely no evidence that Appellant’s abandonment
was voluntary and we decline Appellant’s invitation to substitute
rank speculation for evidence in the record. Because there was no

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evidentiary basis for the requested jury instruction, the trial
court’s denial was proper. 2

    AFFIRMED.

LAMBERT, J., concurs.
EISNAUGLE, J., concurring in result, with opinion.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

    2 Appellant did not submit a written version of the requested

jury instruction and there was clearly some confusion over
whether defense counsel was asking for an abbreviated
abandonment instruction found in a case they discussed, a
standard instruction based on section 777.04(5), or some hybrid
combination. This was compounded by defense counsel vacillating
about what version was being requested at different times during
the lengthy discussion of this one instruction. See Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.390(c) which states that parties should submit requested jury
instructions in writing.

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                                             Case No. 5D22-943
                                 LT Case No. 2021-MM-004009-A

EISNAUGLE, J., concurring in result with opinion.

     I agree that we must affirm Appellant’s judgment and
sentence because the issue Appellant raises on appeal is not
reviewable on our record.        Specifically, the trial court’s
conclusions regarding Appellant’s vague request for a special
instruction cannot be reviewed because Appellant failed to
identify any specific language for the special instruction below—
either verbally or in writing.

     Instead, Appellant requested only a broadly defined concept
for the requested special instruction. Without more detail, this
court cannot evaluate whether the trial court erred when it denied
the request. See Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d 747, 756 (Fla. 2001)
(“In order to be entitled to a special jury instruction, [the
defendant] must prove: (1) the special instruction was supported
by the evidence; (2) the standard instruction did not adequately
cover the theory of defense; and (3) the special instruction was a
correct statement of the law and not misleading or confusing.”
(footnotes omitted)). For instance, in the absence of a clear request
for specific language, an appellate court cannot discern whether
the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law and
not misleading or confusing. See, e.g., Holley v. State, 423 So. 2d
562, 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (“The reason for requiring filed,
written requests for instructions is clear in the case of special,
nonstandard jury instructions. Without the text of the request
itself in the record there would be nothing to review.”). It is not
this court’s responsibility to fill in the blanks for Appellant, nor is
the trial court required to craft language for a party’s special
instruction.

     Given the lack of proposed language, Appellant cannot
demonstrate error on appeal. See Cox v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 203
So. 3d 204, 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“[O]n appeal[,] the duty rests
upon the appealing party to make error clearly appear.” (quoting
Lynn v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 81 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955))).

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