Court Opinion

ID: 9549962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:27:00.295336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:06.111067
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, Justice,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
This Court’s duty in disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and to preserve its confidence in the legal profession and in the judiciary which licenses it. We should tolerate nothing less than the highest degree of integrity and fidelity in the lawyer-client relationship.1 Disciplinary proceedings are instituted to safeguard the interest of the public, to protect it, and to preserve the public confidence in the legal profession and the entire judicial system, not to punish a legal practitioner.2 We must zealously promote regulation of the bar without forgetting that lawyers are also entitled to due process during the course of disciplinary proceedings.3
*896Overreaching for pecuniary gain by an attorney should be vigorously investigated and discipline imposed if warranted. I would ensure this result by returning to the rules existing before January 1, 1970, which pass constitutional muster.4 However, the majority opinion imposes a public censure on the respondent, Donald E. Smo-len (Smolen/attorney), for providing humanitarian, non-interest bearing loans to destitute clients.5 Because the only difference between courting clients with receptions and dinner parties and helping a destitute client through a non-interest bearing loan is one of compassion, and because it appears that Rule 1.8(e) of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct6 violates both the Oklahoma and the United States *897Constitutions and the proposed draft of § 48 to the Restatement (Third) Governing Lawyers,7 I dissent.
Apparently, rule 1.8(e) is grounded in the doctrines of champerty and maintenance. A brief discussion of these concepts is necessary to an understanding of the rule. The common law roots of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty are deeply embedded. The basic notions were present in the legal development of ancient Greeks and Romans, and they became deeply ingrained in the medieval law of England. Movements against the use of champerty and maintenance were a revolt against feudal institutions which required support to the retainers of a feudal magnate despite the justification of a particular action.8 A champertous agreement, is one in which a person lacking an interest in another’s litigation finances the suit for personal gain. Champerty is officious intermeddling in litigation in which one has no interest by assisting its prosecution with the intent to derive compensation from the proceeds of the suit.9
As early as 1275, the prohibition against maintenance and champerty was applied to royal officers.10 These restrictions were imposed to check despotism.11 Lords and other large land holders purchased contested claims against one another, or against commoners. As a defense, the commoners conveyed a portion of their interest in land to some powerful lord to maintain their suit. The nobles’ powers grew,12 they paid far below the bona-fide sale price reducing the tenant’s profits. As tenants by cham-pert, the nobles were entitled to share in the rents and profits with the grantor.13 The laws of maintenance and champterty were introduced to protect the commoner against the growing power of the nobles.14 However, it was not considered maintenance for a rich man to assist a poor man with money or advice in order to enable him to bring or defend an action, provided the assistance was given out of charity.15 It was not maintenance for an attorney to take money for his advice or to expend money for his client, if it was to be repaid.16 The prohibitions against maintenance and champterty were instituted to prevent the churning up of litigation, the clogging of the courts, and to protect the people. In a strange convolution, the prohibition of Rule 1.8(e) against a lawyer providing financial assistance to a client now places the client at the mercy of more wealthy opponents and of the system. Instead of being forced into rendering up a portion of land to a lord, a modern-day litigant may be forced into an unfair settlement by economic pressures.
Title 21 O.S.1991 § 55417 prohibits attorneys from engaging in champertous acts by purchasing any evidence of debt with the intent to sue on the instrument., However, loans to destitute clients for living expenses pending the outcome of litigation have been found not to constitute champerty 18 especially if the loan occurs after the *898attorney-client relationship has been established.19 Making a loan to a client to cover necessary living expenses is not against public policy20 or necessarily unethical conduct, per se.21
In Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437, 445 (La.1976), the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether a disciplinary rule22 identical to Rule 1.8(e) prevented a retained attorney from advancing money to a client. In Edwins, the attorney had advanced approximately $3,000.00 to a client who used the money for living expenses, to prevent a foreclosure, and to pay for medical treatment. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that neither the spirit nor the intent of the disciplinary rule was violated by the advance or guarantee by a retained lawyer to a client of minimal living expenses, of minor sums necessary to prevent foreclosures, or of necessary medical treatment. The Court went on to find that a construction of the statute which led to a holding that the advances were prohibited would put the rule in constitutional jeopardy. It held that a court-adopted bar disciplinary rule which placed an unreasonable burden upon an individual’s right to enforce claims allowed by law might violate the constitutional guarantee of access to courts.23
The California Supreme Court has adopted a rule which expressly adopts the position taken by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Edwins. Rule 5-10424 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct provides that an attorney is not prohibited from loaning money to a client upon the promise of the client to repay the loan once the attorney has been employed.25 Minnesota has adopted a rule most suited to the protection of the client. Rule 1.8 of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct provides in pertinent part:
“... (c) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation except that ...
(3) a lawyer may guarantee a loan reasonably needed to enable the client to withstand delay in litigation that would *899otherwise put substantial pressure on the client to settle a case because of financial hardship rather than on the merits, provided the client remains ultimately liable for repayment of the loan without regard to the outcome of the litigation and, further provided, that no promise of such financial assistance was made to the client by the lawyer, or by another in the lawyer’s behalf prior to the employment of that lawyer by the client ...”
This rule allows an advocate to guarantee a loan for a client who might otherwise be forced into an unwanted or unfair settlement. It ensures that the client is able to maintain his/her cause to its conclusion.
We are required under 12 O.S.1991 § 2201(A) to take judicial notice of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma. Title 12 O.S.1991 § 2201 provides in pertinent part:
“A. Judicial notice shall be taken by the court of the common law, constitutions and public statutes in force in every state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States.... ”
Because Rule 1.8(e) is unconstitutional, discipline may not imposed under the Rule. Rule 1.8(e) potentially violates several sections of both the United States Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution — the equal protection clause, United States Const, amend. XIV, § 1;26 access to courts, Okla. Const, art. 2, § 6;27 the special law clause, Okla. Const, art. 5, § 46;28 the privileges and immunities clause, Okla. Const, art. 5, § 51;29 the First Amendment of the United States Constitution;30 the Okla. Const, art. 1, § 2;31 and the Okla. Const, art. 2, § 15.32
It is interesting to note that the concurring opinion agrees with the position expressed here while admitting that Rule 1.8(e) won’t pass constitutional muster. However, these constitutional protections must be applied to this lawyer. We are charged with the duty to take judicial notice of the common law, constitutions and public statutes.33 The requirement to take *900judicial notice of the constitution is mandatory.34 The notice the Court is required to take of constitutional provisions may be taken at any stage of a proceeding.35 We have previously recognized the duty to take judicial notice of constitutional, fundamental rights in disciplinary proceedings in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Lobaugh, 781 P.2d 806, 810 (Okla.1988). In Lobaugh, we addressed the issue of a lawyer’s right to be heard during a hearing before a trial panel. In doing so, the Court stated that even if the issue of the right to be heard had not been preserved properly before the trial panel, it would have fallen to this Court to remedy a manifest miscarriage of fundamental due process.
It is well established in our jurisprudence that public law issues may be resolved by the application of legal theories not tendered below.36 It is this Court’s duty to the public to protect it from the wrongful acts of unscrupulous and dishonest attorneys.37 The exclusive power to prescribe rules for conduct, to discipline attorneys, and to revoke licenses to practice law rests with this tribunal.38 We cannot impose rules upon the practicing bar which we recognize as unconstitutional when we are the final arbiters of those rules and the only entity cloaked with the power to alter them. We are the institution responsible for the continued public confidence in the practicing bar. The disciplining of attorneys is a public issue of great interest.39
We may not ignore the untenable position of an attorney faced with disciplinary proceedings. Because of economic duress, the attorney, even if believing there is a valid defense to the charge, may opt in the form of a plea bargain to take a humiliating, and embarrassing sanction in the form of a public censure rather than face total jeopardy and the unknown. Faced with de novo review,40 the attorney may opt for an unpalatable compromise in an effort simply to get the Bar Association removed from the process.
Nevertheless, attorneys should not be allowed to establish a ‘pecuniary gain by overreaching. This result can be avoided by reinstitútion of Rule 10 and Rule 4241 or by the adoption of the proposed § 48 to the Restatement (Third) Governing Lawyers which restricts advances to clients to circumstances in which a “... loan is needed to enable the client to withstand delay in litigation that otherwise might unjustly induce the client to settle or dismiss a case because of financial hardship rather than on the merits.”42
*901Neither the United States Constitution nor the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma delineate the effective date of judicial opinions. Subject to limited exceptions, decisions were given retrospective effect at common law.43 The United States Supreme Court has broadly endorsed variations in juristic philosophy involving retrospective and prospective decisions.44 The decision to apply a new rule retrospectively is one of judicial policy.45 Retroactive application of a newly announced rule is the traditional common-law approach, ráther than the exception.46 In determining whether to give a rule retrospective application, three factors are considered: 1) whether the rule announced is a new principle of law; 2) whether retrospective application would retard operation of the rule; and 3) whether retroactive application would produce an inequitable result.47 The language of the new rule would clearly change the prior language of rule 1.8(e), allowing client loans in restricted circumstances. Retrospective application of the new rule would not retard its operation or produce an inequitable result.
I would urge our revisitation of rule 1.8(e). We should adopt a version similar to the Restatement’s proposed § 48 in place of its presently unconstitutional counterpart. The Okla. Const, art. 2, § 648 guarantees that the courts of justice shall be open to every person. Adoption of a rule consistent with the draft of § 48 would allow attorneys’ to ensure that the courthouse doors stay open for their economically disadvantaged litigants. The rule would not require any attorney to loan money to any client. However, it would allow an attorney to make a loan to a client to ensure that the client is not forced into an early and disadvantageous settlement by the strong arm of a powerful defendant, thereby reinforcing public confidence in the adversarial system.

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262, 267 (Okla.1982).

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Stubblefield, 766 P.2d 979, 984 (Okla.1988); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Evans, 747 P.2d 277, 2885 A.L.R.4th 557, 564 (Okla.1987); Annot., “Attorney & Client: Disciplinary Proceeding Based Upon Attorney’s Direct or Indirect Purchase of Client’s Property,” 35 A.L.R.3d 674, 676 (1971).

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Lobaugh, 781 P.2d 806, 811 (Okla.1988).

. Rule 10, 5 O.S.1961, Ch. 1, App. 3, see note 6, infra; Rule 42, 5 O.S.1961, Ch. 1, App. 3, see note 6, infra. These rules would not prohibit the kinds of advances made here. See, In re Ruffalo, 249 F.Supp. 432, 440-443 (N.D.Ohio 1965).

. An affidavit and a letter attached to pleadings submitted to this Court show the humanitarian nature of the loans. An affidavit signed by Johnny Ray Jones provides:
“I, JOHNNY RAY JONES, am 31 years old and married to Arlise Jones; we have two children, Clark, age 6 years, and Johnny Jr., age nine weeks. Mr. Smolen has represented my family for at least 15 years on all my legal problems. I look at Don Smolen as a friend before a lawyer. On November 6, 1989, I asked Mr. Smolen for f 100.00 to keep my utilities on. He gave it to me. Then, in February, 1990, I borrowed $60.00 more to help me on my rent. Mr. Smolen never charged me any interest and he helped me when I had no job and was down on my luck. He will always be my friend and lawyer.”
A letter written on December 28, 1991, and signed by Marsha Stage provides in pertinent part:
"... Don, please help me out, I bought a car payed 1,000 on my Son’s funeral bill — my kid Xmas. I have to get my License, in order to do that, I have to pay a fine. Don I have no money except to rent an apt. I leave here in 3 wk. with no home, I have to have a place to stay. I will come back to prison if I drive and get stopped. I’m getting a job here at C.S.U. I’ll only get pd. once a mo.
I have to get my license renewed and pay the fine, I did not know I owed this, my case manager checked So I can have and I.D. before I leave. Don, you are my only hope, I have no one I can get the money from. Please loan me $500.00 — please, I will go back to prison the first time I get stopped. This is an emergency, I promise I’ll pay you $100.00 a mo. until it is payed back, You also have my Indemnity fund, I’ve already lose 2½ yr. of my life, everything I had.
All I have is what in my locker here, & a car to go out to. I need a chance. I'm trying real hard to do things right, I have a job waiting I can’t get to it, on suspended license's I go to jail, I promise I will pay it back, you can check here if you like.
Don, I get released Jan 24, I owe a fine. My case manager will take me down pay the fine and get my license back.- I’m sorry, but after my Son’s death, I really didn't know it was owned. Please I’ll sign a paper, anything I’ll lose my job, if I can't get there, and, don I won’t even have a way to get there to talk to Richard with Suspended license, this is my only chance to get back on my feet, I have a job-car-apt-all I need is $500.00 to pay this fine.
Your my only hope Don please help me, so I can try and start my life again.
You can send the money here my case manager will make arrangements with a C.O. to take me, to pay it and get them renewed.
Please Don, this is my only chance and your my only hope. I promise you will get it, I’ll make payments anything. My job is here in the City....”

.Rule 1.8(e), Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S.1991, Ch. 1, App. 3-A provides:
“While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to a client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.”
When this rule was adopted by the Court in 1988, I dissented from this portion of the proposed rules. The prohibition against advancing or guaranteeing financial assistance to a client first appeared as a part of the Oklahoma Code of Professional Responsibility on January 1, 1970, subject to an order entered by this Court on December 16, 1969. Prior to that time, constitutional prohibitions against conflicts of interest were in place. Rule 10, 5 O.S.1961, Ch. 1, App. 3 provides:
“Acquiring Interest in litigation. The lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting.”
Rule 42, 5 O.S.1961, Ch. 1, App. 3 provides:
“Expenses of litigation. A lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or bear the expenses of litigation; he may in good faith advance expenses as a matter of convenience, but subject to reimbursement.”

. The Restatement (Third) Governing Lawyers, tentative draft no. 4, § 48, see note 42, infra.

. B. Radin, "Maintenance by Champerty,” 24 Calif.L.Rev. 48-49, 64 (1935-36). See also, Martin v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 665 F.2d 598, 603 (5th Cir.1982).

. Martin v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., see note 8, supra; Savage v. Seed, 81 Ill.App.3d 744, 36 Ill.Dec. 846, 401 N.E.2d 984, 989 (1980).

. Statute of Westminster I of 1275; M. Radin, "Maintenance by Champterty," see note 7 at 62.

. Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 608 (1957).

. Hovey v. Hobson, 51 Me. 62, 64 (1863).

. B. Radin, “Maintenance by Champterty," see note 8 at 60-61, supra.

. Hovey v. Hobson, see note 12 at 65.

. W. Odgers, The Common Law of England, v. 1, p. 200 (Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd. 1911).

. Lytle v. State, see note 11, supra.

. Title 21 O.S.1991 § 554 provides in pertinent part:
“Any attorney who either directly or indirectly buys or is interested in buying any evidence of debt or thing in action with intent to bring suit thereon is guilty of a misdemeanor_”

. Dombey, Tyler, Richards & Grieser v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 351 F.2d 121, 129 (6th Cir.1965).

. Hildebrand v. State Bar, 18 Cal.2d 816, 117 P.2d 860, 863-64 (1941); Johnson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 128 Minn. 365, 151 N.W. 125, 127 (1915); Mytton v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 211 S.W. 111, 113 (1919).

. People v. McCollum, 341 Ill. 578, 173 N.E. 827, 831 (1930).

. In re Ruffalo, see note 4 at 443-44, supra. See also, State v. Dawson, 111 So.2d 427, 430 (Fla.1959); Annot., “Validity & Propriety of Arrangement by Which Attorney Pays or Advances Expenses of Client," 8 A.L.R.3d 1155, 1176-82 (1966); Comment, “Loans to Clients for Living Expenses,” 55 Calif.L.Rev. 1419, 1449 (1967). But see, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kandel, 317 Md. 274, 563 A.2d 387, 391 (1989); Shea v. Virginia State Bar, 236 Va. 442, 374 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1988); Matter of Carroll, 124 Ariz. 80, 86, 602 P.2d 461, 467 (1979); In re Berlant, 458 Pa. 439, 328 A.2d 471, 476 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964, 95 S.Ct. 1953, 44 L.Ed.2d 451 (1975).

. The rule under consideration provided:
“While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except that the lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.”

. Economic duress may come into play when parties have disproportionate bargaining power and the person with no reasonable alternative succumbs to settlement pressure. See, Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 731 P.2d 411, 414-16 (Okla.1986). Here, there is no assertion that the attorney ever instituted collection procedures to collect the loans or forced their repayment.

. Professional Rules, Rule 5-104 provides in pertinent part:
“(A) A member of the State Bar shall not directly or indirectly pay or agree to pay, guarantee, or represent or sanction the representation that he will pay personal or business expenses incurred by or for a client, prospective or existing and shall not prior to his employment enter into any discussion or other communication with a prospective client regarding any such payments or agreements to pay; provided this rule shall not prohibit a member:
... (2) after he has been employed, from lending money to his client upon the client’s promise in writing to repay such loan ...”

. The Texas Rules of Professional Responsibility contain no prohibition against the lending of money to a client.

. The United States Const, amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
"SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws_”

. The Okla. Const, art. 2, § 6 provides:
“The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.”

. The Okla. Const, art. 5, § 46 provides in pertinent part:
"The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing:
... Regulating the practice ... before the courts ..."

. The Okla. Const, art. 5, § 51 provides:
"The Legislature shall pass no law granting to any association, corporation, or individual any exclusive rights, privileges, or immunities within this State.”

. The United States Const., amend. 1 provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

. The Okla. Const, art. 1, § 2 provides:
“Perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant of the State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; and no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.”

. The Okla. Const, art. 2, § 15 provides:
"No bill of attainder, ex pose facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed. No conviction shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate: Provided, that this provision shall not prohibit the imposition of pecuniary penalties.”

. Title 12 O.S.1991 § 2201 provides in pertinent part:
“A. Judicial notice shall be taken by the court of the common law, constitutions and *900public statutes in force in every state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States....”

. Use of "shall” by the Legislature is normally considered as a legislative mandate equivalent to the term "must,” requiring interpretation as a command. Fuller v. Odom, 741 P.2d 449, 453 (Okla.1987).

. Title 12 O.S.1991 § 2203 provides in pertinent part:
"... C. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of a proceeding."

. Matter of McNeely, 734 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Okla.1987) [Authored by Opala, C.J.]; Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Okla.1985) (Overruled on other grounds.) [Authored by Opala, CJ.].

. In re Rice, 167 Okla. 330, 29 P.2d 599 (1934).

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. O’Bryan, 385 P.2d 876, 888 (Okla.1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 649, 84 S.Ct. 983, 11 L.Ed.2d 980 (1963).

. See, R.J. Edwards v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 409 (Okla.1972) [Concerning questions relating to the unlicensed practice of law, this Court re-fered to "the importance of the issues raised to the due administration of justice and to the protection of the public welfare.”].

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Lacoste, 813 P.2d 501, 503 (Okla.1991).

. Rule 10, 5 O.S.1961, Ch. 1, App. 3, see note 6, supra and Rule 42, 5 O.S.1961, Ch. 1, App. 3, see note 6, supra and accompanying discussion.

. The Restatement (Third) Governing Lawyers, tentative draft no. 4, § 48 (April 10, 1991) provides in pertinent part:
"§ 48. Forbidden Client-Lawyer Financial Arrangements
(1) A lawyer may not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation that the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(a) Acquire a lien as provided by § 55 to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; and
(b) Contract with a client for a contingent fee in a civil case except when prohibited as stated in § 47.
*901(2) A lawyer may not make or guarantee a loan to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation that the lawyer is conducting for the client, except that the lawyer may:
(a) Advance or guarantee a loan covering court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which to the lawyer may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(b) Make or guarantee a loan on fair terms, the repayment of which to the lawyer may be contingent on the outcome of the matter, if the loan is needed to enable the client to withstand delay in litigation that otherwise might unjustly induce the client to settle or dismiss a case because of financial hardship rather than on the merits_”

. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507, 93 S.Ct. 876, 877, 35 L.Ed.2d 29, 32 (1973).

. Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst, 287 U.S. 358, 364, 53 S.Ct. 145, 148, 77 L.Ed. 360, 366, 85 A.L.R. 254, 260 (1932).

. McGehee v. Florafax Int'l, Inc., 776 P.2d 852, 854 (Okla.1989); Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 652 P.2d 260, 268 (Okla.1982).

. Cox v. Brockway, Inc., 708 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Okla.1985).

. Kay Elec. Coop. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 815 P.2d 175, 177 (Okla.1991); McGehee v. Florafax Int'l, Inc. see note 45 at 854, supra.

. The Okla. Const. art. 2, § 6, see note 27, supra.