Court Opinion

ID: 9522573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:29:02.834548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:17.412745
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE EBERSPACHER, specially concurring: I concur in the affirmance of the judgments entered, but with regard to the claim by Christine McCord of a conflict of interest, emphasis must be placed on the distinctive fact that trial counsel herein was privately retained. The sixth amendment allows co-defendants the freedom to choose to hire the services of a single attorney to mutually represent all of them. (Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978),_U.S._, 55 L. Ed. 2d 466, 98 S. Ct. 1173. Compare People v. Somerville (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 1, 245 N.E.2d 461; People v. Craig (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 242, 361 N.E.2d 736 with People v. Cross (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 199, 331 N.E.2d 643; People v. Grigsby (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 812, 365 N.E.2d 481.) Under most circumstances, where counsel has been privately retained by co-defendants, such reflects a voluntary and intelligently made choice by them. While this choice may foreclose certain avenues of defense, it may also concomitantly open other avenues or may result in other reciprocal benefits, such as in cost and expediency, which the co-defendants prefer. As stated by Justice Frankfurter in Glasser: “There are advantages and disadvantages in having separate counsel for each defendant or a single counsel for more than one. Joint representation is a means of insuring against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives strength against a common attack.” (315 U.S. 60, 92, 86 L. Ed. 680, 710-11, 62 S. Ct. 457, 475.) In most of these instances, there is a natural trade-off by the co-defendants of certain of their individual interests in favor of other such interests. However, in cases in which counsel has been appointed to represent multiple defendants, stricter scrutiny has been employed to guard against possible conflicts of interests. (People v. Frey (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 437, 365 N.E.2d 283; People v. Meng, 54 Ill. App. 3d 357, 369 N.E.2d 549; People v. Spicer (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 748, 378 N.E.2d 169; People v. Ishman and Bogay (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 517, 378 N.E.2d 179; People v. Baxtrom (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 546, 378 N.E.2d 182.) In such instances, a court order requiring a defendant to share his attorney’s services with his co-defendants is rarely, if ever, based upon the benefits to be accrued to that defendant but rather is likely to be based only upon considerations of economy and expediency benefiting the interests of the State. A court appointment of counsel reflects no choice on the part of a defendant. Thus implicit in a court order requiring multiple client representation is the determination that such representation will be appropriate, effective and free of possible conflicts of interest. (See People v. Bopp (1917), 279 Ill. 184, 116 N.E. 679.) Further, the court thereby assumes an affirmative obligation to anticipate possible conflicts of interests. In the case at bar, Christine McCord chose to be represented by the same privately retained attorney who represented her husband. Despite the broad language of our supreme court in People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109, 113, 239 N.E.2d 441, 444, and People v. Coslet (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 127, 133, 364 N.E.2d 67, 70, which cases involved court appointed counsel, I do not think that Illinois courts are willing to go as far as the New Jersey Supreme Court has in State v. Land (1977), 73 N.J. 24, 372 A.2d 297, a case involving privately retained counsel representing a husband and wife. Although Christine may have yielded certain possible avenues of defense, this alone under the circumstances does not justify the conclusion that she was denied her right to assistance of counsel.