Court Opinion

ID: 9653854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:57:04.073597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:02.290338
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. Members of the Bar and trial bench should take particular notice of this case since it changes the measure of damages in deceit actions. In our recent case of O’Neal Ford, Inc. v. Davie, 299 Ark. 45, 770 S.W.2d 656 (1989), we noted our bias favoring the benefit-of-the-bargain rule when considering the amount of damages in misrepresentation cases. Damages are determined under that rule by establishing the difference between the actual value of chattel and its value had it been as represented. Id. In determining what the property is actually worth, the property is to be valued at the time of purchase. Moore Ford Co. v. Smith, 270 Ark. 340, 604 S.W.2d 943 (1980); Greiner Motor Co. v. Sumpter, 244 Ark. 736, 427 S.W.2d 8 (1968); Union Motors, Inc. v. Phillips, 241 Ark. 857, 410 S.W.2d 747 (1967); see also Brill, Ark. Law of Damages, § 31-6 (1984). In the present case, the appellant offered absolutely no evidence regarding the value of the car at the time he purchased it from the appellee. In fact, the only value evidence presented by the appellant was what he sold it for, and that sale took place two months and 2,500 miles after the date he purchased the car. In this respect, the appellant called a witness, a car broker, who said that he understood “it (the car) brought $13,500.00 but I would never had paid that much for it.” That witness was never asked his opinion as to the car’s worth at the time of purchase. The majority opinion makes reference to testimony by the appellant that “his loss in the transaction was $1,500.” The majority implies the $ 1,500 figure was sufficient to meet the legal measure of damages in a deceit action. Not so. To put appellant’s statement in context, the $1,500 loss to which appellant made reference was the amount he lost at the time his car broker sold the car for $13,500 — again two months and 2,500 miles after he purchased the car. Of course, the fact such a statement was given without objection has nothing to do with whether it is sufficient to establish what the value of the car was when purchased. Apparently, the majority court, by its opinion, has decided to adopt what might be called a “benefit-of-the-bargain rule with a de minimis non curat lex twist.” In other words, the court will assume there is little or no difference in a car’s (or chattel’s) value when it is sold two (or perhaps more) months after its purchase. There is no other way one can explain the majority’s decision. In conclusion, I would add that since the record appears sufficient to support the appellant’s allegation of misrepresentation, the result reached by the majority appears an equitable one. However, when this court applies equitable principles to a law case, particularly one involving measure of damages, it can generally expect to pay a price when considering and deciding future cases. Finally, in an apparent attempt to justify its decision regarding the damages issue, the majority raises, on its own, the suggestion that appellee’s challenge to the appellant’s evidence of damages was untimely. The majority also submits the appellee failed to move for a directed verdict on the measure of damage issue. In response, I would point out that the appellant never argued those issues below, and this court has no authority to search the transcript to find justification to reverse a case. See Boren v. Qualls, 284 Ark. 65, 680 S.W.2d 82 (1984); First National Bank of Brinkley v. Frey, 282 Ark. 339, 668 S.W.2d 533 (1984). In addition, aside from jurisdiction issues, we do not reverse cases on theories not presented by the appellant to either the trial court or this court. Arkansas Kraft Corp. v. Johnson, 257 Ark. 629, 519 S.W.2d 74 (1975). I would affirm the trial court’s granting of the appellee’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of damages.