Court Opinion

ID: 9607102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:55:27.95281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:37.081305
License: Public Domain

Nichols, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
Georgia Power Company filed a condemnation proceeding to condemn a right-of-way across land owned by Bray and Moseley. The northern boundary of the property condemned was approximately 30 feet south of the northern boundary of the land owned by the condemnees as tenants in common. Bray alone owned land abutting on the north to the land jointly owned.
On the trial evidence was adduced as to consequential damages to the jointly owned land not condemned, and to the property owned solely by Bray. There was no evidence of consequential benefits. The condemnor contended in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals that it was error to admit evidence of, and to *564permit a recovery for, consequential damages to the land owned solely by Bray. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and certiorari was granted to review such question purportedly one of first impression in Georgia.
In Kennedy v. State Hwy. Dept., 108 Ga. App. 1 (132 SE2d 135), it was held, following decisions of this court, that a single in rem proceeding may be brought to condemn separate tracts of land although the ownership of such tracts is not identical. It was further held that under such circumstances consequential benefits to one of the tracts cannot be used to offset consequential damages to the other tract.
In Tift County v. Smith, 219 Ga. 68 (131 SE2d 527), it was held: "None of their property having been taken or damaged in the dead-ending of the road upon which their property abuts, the plaintiffs’ petition against the county did not allege a cause of action for compensation.” That case was not a case filed to condemn property for public purposes but an action filed by property owners to recover for damages allegedly done to their property by the State Highway Department in the course of constructing a limited-access highway. The decision disapproved prior decisions which had held that the creation of a cul de sac by closing a road could constitute special damages to property between the cul de sac and the first intersection.
The appellant cites decisions decided under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution (Code § 1-805), but these cases are not controlling inasmuch as the United States Constitution provides: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation,” while the Georgia Constitution of 1945 as amended provides in Art. I, Sec. Ill, Par. I (Code Ann. §2-301),"Private property shall not be taken, or damaged, for public purposes, without just and adequate compensation being first paid. . .”
Nor is the proper test as to consequential damages the boundary lines shown on the condemnee’s deed conveying to him the property through which the right-of-way is condemned. Through the years large parcels of land are subdivided and sold in small parcels while other small parcels are purchased from separate owners to *565create a single large parcel and, unless title to the created large parcel is transferred, the owner’s title may well be contained in different deeds.
The real question presented is whether the constitutional mandate that private property cannot be taken or damaged without just and adequate compensation being first paid may be restricted so as to preclude a condemnee from recovering all damages to which he is entitled unless all the property damaged is under identical ownership as that actually taken and title derived from the same source in one conveyance.
No question as to the right of an owner of real property to consequential damages to remaining property when a part of his property has been taken or damages is presented. In Wayne v. Hartridge, 147 Ga. 127, 132 (92 SE. 937), it was said: "The term 'property’ is a very comprehensive one, and is used not only to signify things real and personal owned, but to designate the right of ownership, and that which is subject to be owned and enjoyed.”
Once the property of the owner is invaded by condemnation proceedings he is entitled to recover for all damages done to his remaining contiguous property.
When the condemnor took the right-of-way over the jointly owned property it was required to pay the condemnees just and adequate compensation for the damages done to their remaining property. Each person who owned a part of the property condemned is entitled to recover the consequential damages to his remaining contiguous property not condemned. The fact that his title to the remaining property is not identical (as to percent of ownership) or that it was not all obtained in the same conveyance would not preclude his right to recover all consequential damages to his remaining property.
No error appears in the opinion of the Court of Appeals on this issue and such judgment should be affirmed.