Court Opinion

ID: 9533570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:32:41.749185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:05.391500
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY, dissenting: Some uncontradicted facts should be put in bold relief to understand our position. On oral argument it was admitted that no prior conduct of respondent prompted “wiring” the police officer. It was initiated by the activity of the assistant State’s Attorney who, according to the police officer, had advised him to do everything necessary, including committing perjury, to aid the defendant in the criminal case. Respondent admittedly had nothing to do with the assistant State’s Attorney’s conduct. Moreover, respondent was tried and acquitted of the charge of bribing an officer and subornation of perjury. The police officer’s testimony before the disciplinary commission, as the majority opinion points out (69 Ill. 2d at 359), was contrary to his sworn evidence at the trial of respondent’s client in the criminal case on the crucial question, the location of the gun. In view of this fact, we are, in my opinion, confined to respondent’s testimony of this incident as it is set forth in the majority opinion. Respondent was not impeached in any method, although his conversation with the police officer had been recorded. Those who saw and heard him apparently believed him. I refer to the Honorable Louis Garippo, an experienced and able judge who heard respondent’s criminal trial without a jury, and the hearing panel of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. Their opportunity to judge credibility was far superior to ours, since we are confined to the lifeless record. More than that, the different version of Officer Argyrakis is that of an admitted perjurer. Either his testimony in the criminal court case of respondent’s client or his testimony before the disciplinary commission was false; both could not be true. As this court observed in In re Donaghy (1948), 402 Ill. 120, 134-35: “The punishment to be inflicted by disbarment of an attorney is the destruction of his professional life. Only clear and satisfactory proof can justify a decision from which would flow-consequences of such a grave nature. (People ex rel. Deneen v. Matthews, 217 Ill. 94.) To justify disbarment the case made must be free from doubt, not only as to the act charged but as to the motive with which it was done. (People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Ader, 263 Ill. 319.) *** The evidence of guilt of the accused with reference to the transactions charged must be clear, and it is not sufficient that the evidence shows a state of facts not entirely creditable to the respondent and the other parties to the transaction.” The requisites that there be “clear and satisfactory proof” and that “the evidence of the guilt of the accused *** must be clear” apply equally when the penalty is suspension. Here the evidence fails to meet either test. We must evaluate this bizarre tableau in the light of reality. Respondent asked the first question any lawyer puts to an investigating officer: “What is in your report?” Argyrakis told him a search of the car revealed a gun. He makes the statement that the gun was in open view. Respondent stated what his client told him and queried: “What is going on?” The police officer retorted: “I can find the gun wherever I want.” Respondent said: “I just want the truth.” The wired officer brought up the question of money. The police officer, it must be remembered, was playing a diabolical role. He portrayed himself to respondent as one whose concept of the truth is dependent upon compensation. The officer’s predetermined role was to obtain some incriminating statement from respondent. No doubt he was impressive. Respondent had these alternatives: He could impeach the officer with his report if he testified contrary to it. However, such impeachment would only go to his credibility. (People v. Collins (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 179, 194-98; People v. McKee (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 265, 270; Smith v. Pelz (1943), 384 Ill. 446, 451-52.) The report would not be original evidence. (People v. Gant (1974) , 58 Ill. 2d 178, 183; People v. Collins (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 179, 198.) A motion to suppress could well be denied, although the officer’s testimony was false, since the question before the court would be the believability of the witnesses’ testimony as a whole. (See People v. McCray (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 66, 71; People v. Carbona (1975) , 27 Ill. App. 3d 988, 1001; People v. Hampton (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 427, 435.) Or respondent, after laying a foundation for the admissibility of the corridor conversation, could himself take the stand and impeach the officer. Such a practice, however, has long been frowned upon. Finley v. Felter (1949), 403 Ill. 372, 379; Biskupski v. Jaroszewski (1947), 398 Ill. 287, 295. Respondent had to make a judgment. While it could have been abetter one, it certainly had not that magnitude of wrong the majority would attribute to it. According to the majority, payment for truthful evidence is no different than payment for false or fabricated evidence. Specifically, it stated: “We do not find persuasive respondent’s argument that payment for ‘truthful’ testimony is less harmful to our judicial system than is payment for false testimony or fabrication of evidence.” (69 Ill. 2d at 361.) Payment for false testimony or fabrication of evidence, and payment for the truth are poles apart. The evil is not in the payment as the majority would suggest. It is in whether the testimony itself is truthful or false. Payment for false testimony or fabrication of evidence is a crime under our laws. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 32 — 3.) It is subornation of perjury. More than that, it violates the basic moral code of “Thou shall not bear false witness against thy neighbor,” the eighth commandment of the decalogue. Nothing in the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1 — 1 et seq.) makes it unlawful to pay for truthful testimony, nor is there anything in the moral code precluding such conduct. This young man has already been heavily penalized. Following his arrest, he lost considerable weight, received psychiatric treatment, and voluntarily stopped the practice of law. He did not return to his work until several months following his acquittal on the criminal charges. At the time of the disciplinary hearing, he was still under psychiatric care. More than that, we have dealt proportionately lesser penalties in more grievous incidents. The chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, who gave false testimony before a Federal grand jury and before a Senate subcommittee on appropriations on two occasions, was suspended for an effective period of only one year and four months. (In re Cook (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 26.) In In re Spencer (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 496, the respondent represented an executor in probate proceedings. Without the executor’s knowledge or consent and while still representing him, the respondent accepted a retainer fee and entered into a contingent fee contract to represent a beneficiary in a suit to contest the will. The respondent filed a petition to remove the executor and signed the beneficiary’s name without her consent. For this misconduct, he was censured. Reference to these cases is made solely to point out our heavy-handedness here, not that we are without standards. We must be mindful of Plato’s admonition: “It is better to suffer an injustice than to commit one.” The penalty imposed here offends the reasonable man’s sense of justice which, like great works of art, defies definition. As Mr. Justice Clark aptly points out in his opinion, there is a disparity of sanctions in our disciplinary procedure. Ever present in the administration of justice has been this problem of disparity of penalty. There are two conflicting forces: that of the public for protection, and that of the lawyer for evenhanded treatment. Our duty is to accomodate both. Justice itself is the accomodation of conflicting interests. Many years ago Learned Hand concluded: “I don’t believe there is any royal road to attain such accomodations concretely.” We must be ever aware that we deal in problems with a human, not a mathematical equation. Oür problem is judicial, not legislative. We must avoid standards so rigid that the needs of situations as they evolve cannot be met. Illustrative of what we mean is a series of decisions in which this court made conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude conclusive evidence of an attorney’s guilt and a ground for disbarment. (In re Eaton (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 338; In re Teitelbaum (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 586; In re Needham (1936), 364 Ill. 65.) Violation of the Internal Revenue Code (Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sec. 145(b)) was a crime involving moral turpitude. (In re Teitelbaum (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 586.) Yet in In re Greenberg (1961), 21 Ill. 2d 170, and In re Crane (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 398, while the court recited the rule, it was compelled to retreat from its rigidity. In those cases the nature of the criminal conduct was considered to determine the appropriate discipline to be accorded. In re Walker (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 48, manifests that there has been a complete erosion of this once-prevalent standard. We have an abundance of standards. The problem is in their application. As Cassius said: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves ***.” I would dismiss the charge against respondent here.