Court Opinion

ID: 9624058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:49:48.92972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:38.377299
License: Public Domain

*299TYSON, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s opinion on all issues other than the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees being vacated.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that petitioners are not entitled to recover attorney’s fees under either G.S. § 6-21.2 or G.S. § 6-20. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion.
A. “Other Evidence of Indebtedness”
G.S. § 6-21.2 provides:
Obligations to pay attorneys’ fees upon any note, conditional sale contract or other evidence of indebtedness . . . shall be valid and enforceable, and collectible as part of such debt, if such note, contract or other evidence of indebtedness be collected by or through an attorney at law after maturity. . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.2 (1999) (emphasis supplied). The majority’s opinion concludes that G.S. § 6-21.2 does not provide statutory authority for the court’s award of attorney’s fees because “no debt arises from the Consent Judgment, other than the payment of attorney fees from the non-prevailing party, thus the fees are not allowable as an ‘evidence of indebtedness.’ ”
The phrase “other evidence of indebtedness” has been defined by our Supreme Court to include “any printed or written instrument, signed or otherwise executed by the obligor(s), which evidences on its face a legally enforceable obligation to pay money.” Stillwell Enterprises, Inc. v. Interstate Equipment Co., 300 N.C. 286, 294, 266 S.E.2d 812, 817 (1980). The Supreme Court stated that such a definition “does no violence to any of the statute’s specific provisions and accords well with its general purpose to validate a debt collection remedy exnresslv agreed upon bv contracting parties.” Id. at 294, 266 S.E.2d 817-18 (emphasis supplied).
In Stillwell, the Supreme Court reversed this Court’s holding that G.S. § 6-21.2 was inapplicable, and that an award of attorney’s fees arising out of a lease dispute was improper. Id. at 295, 266 S.E.2d at 818. The Court noted that the lease agreement at issue contained a legally enforceable obligation by the plaintiff-lessee to remit rental payments to the defendant-lessor in exchange for use of property. Id. *300at 294, 266 S.E.2d at 818. Holding that such an agreement “is obviously an ‘evidence of indebtedness,’ ” the Court held: “we see no reason why the obligation by plaintiff to pay attorneys’ fees incurred by defendant unon collection of the debts arising from the contract itself should not be enforced to the extent allowed by G.S. § 6-21.2.” Id. at 294-95, 266 S.E.2d at 818 (emphasis supplied).
The majority opinion correctly notes that “[a] consent judgment is the contract between the parties entered upon the records with the approval and sanction of the court. It is construed as any other contract.” Redevelopment Comm. v. Hannaford, 29 N.C. App. 1, 2-3, 222 S.E.2d 752, 753 (1976). In the Consent Judgment sub judice, the parties agreed that “[i]n the event any action is brought by either party to enforce this Judgment, the prevailing party or parties in said action shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees from the non-prevailing party for its representation in said subsequent proceedings.”
The $600,000 awarded petitioners by the trial court is “evidence of indebtedness.” The court provided respondents with the option of securing this debt by posting a performance bond or by providing petitioners a first lien deed of trust on property owned by respondents.
It is undisputed that petitioners’ action before us is a motion in the cause within the original action that ended with the consent judgment that imposed legally enforceable monetary obligations on respondents. When the consent judgment was entered, the obligation of respondents matured. It is also undisputed the petitioners prevailed in enforcing and collecting upon the matured obligations contained in the consent judgment. Thus, consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Stillwell, G.S. § 6-21.2 provides authority for petitioners to recover the attorney’s fees “unon collection of the debts arising from the contract itself.” Stillwell at 294-95, 266 S.E.2d at 818 (emphasis supplied). I would hold that the trial court had statutory authority under G.S. § 6-21.2 to award attorney’s fees.
B. Fees as Costs in Equitable Relief
The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees is also authorized by G.S. § 6-20. G.S. § 6-20 provides that, “[i]n other actions, costs may be allowed or not, in the discretion of the court, unless otherwise provided by law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-20 (1999). A trial court may, in *301its discretion, award attorney’s fees under G.S. § 6-20 if “just and equitable.” Batcheldor v. Boyd, 119 N.C. App. 204, 208, 458 S.E.2d 1, 3-4, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 418, 461 S.E.2d 753 (1995) (citing Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Dodson, 260 N.C. 22, 131 S.E.2d 875 (1963)); see also, Alsup v. Pitman, 98 N.C. App. 389, 390, 390 S.E.2d 750, 751 (1990) (recoverable costs under G.S. § 6-20 may, in trial court’s discretion, include expenses for depositions even though deposition expenses do not appear expressly in the statutes).
In suits in equity, the allowance of costs rests in the discretion of the court. Worthy v. Brower, 93 N.C. 492, 1885 WL 1714, (N.C.) (1885). Under G.S. § 6-20, the trial court’s allowance of costs, including attorney’s fees, is within the court’s sound discretion and “will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Wachovia Bank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Bob Dunn Jaguar, Inc., 117 N.C. App. 165, 175, 450 S.E.2d 527, 533 (1994) (citation omitted).
In this case, petitioners filed a motion in the cause seeking the following equitable remedies: (1) to set aside the modification of consent judgment as having been obtained by fraud or mistake, and (2) specific performance of the consent judgment by Mountain Lake and Harborgate. The trial court ordered “specific performance compelling [all] respondents to take such actions as will bring about the completion of the obligations imposed by the Consent Judgment as modified.” The court also ordered “[respondents to provide security for the performance of the obligations compelled by this Order in the amount of $600,000.” The remedy sought and the court’s relief is equitable in nature. Thus, under G.S. § 6-20, the trial court had discretion to award petitioners’ costs, including attorney’s fees. Respondents present no evidence of an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award.
I would affirm the learned trial court’s award of attorney’s fees under either G.S. § 6-21.2 or G.S. § 6-20.1, therefore, respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion.