Court Opinion

ID: 2965141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:58.637725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:05.765890
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 97-1725 

                                   RENALDO PLEDGER,

                                Petitioner, Appellant,

                                          v.

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                Respondent, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

        No. 97-2119 

                                     SEAN DIXON,

                                Petitioner, Appellant,

                                          v.

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                Respondent, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

        No. 97-2245 

                                  EDWIN CARMICHAEL,

                                Petitioner, Appellant,

                                          v.

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                Respondent, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

        No. 97-2297 

                                  STEVEN WADLINGTON,

                                Petitioner, Appellant,

                                          v.

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                Respondent, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                [Hon. Walter Jay Skinner, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                          Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            Renaldo  Pledger,  Edwin  Carmichael   and  Steven  Wadlington  on
            ________________   _________________        __________________
        memoranda pro se.
            Sean Dixon on brief pro se.
            __________
            Donald K.  Stern, United States Attorney,  and Kevin J.  Cloherty,
            ________________                               __________________
        Assistant United  States Attorney,  on brief for  appellee in  No. 97-
        2119.

                                 ____________________

                                   February 5, 1988
                                 ____________________

                      Per Curiam.    In   a   joint   trial,  petitioners
                      __________

            Renaldo  Pledger,  Sean Dixon,  Edwin  Carmichael  and Steven

            Wadlington were each convicted of multiple  offenses stemming

            from  their involvement  in  a large-scale  drug distribution

            ring  in Boston, Massachusetts.  On direct appeal, this court

            affirmed after rejecting  a multitude of challenges  to their

            convictions and sentences.  See United States v. Whiting,  28
                                        ___ _____________    _______

            F.3d  1296 (1st  Cir. 1994).    Petitioners thereafter  filed

            separate motions  for habeas relief  under 28 U.S.C.    2255,

            advancing a  plethora of new  claims.  In each  instance, the

            district  court denied relief  and then  declined to  issue a

            certificate   of  appealability  (CAP).    See  28  U.S.C.   
                                                       ___

            2253(c)(1).  Petitioners  have now submitted CAP  requests to

            this court.  

                 In order to qualify for  a CAP, a habeas petitioner must

            make "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

            right," id.   2253(c)(2)--i.e., a showing that the issues are
                    ___

            debatable among reasonable jurists, that a court could decide
                                                             _____

            them in  a different  fashion, or that  they are  adequate to

            deserve encouragement to proceed further, see, e.g., Barefoot
                                                      ___  ____  ________

            v.  Estelle,  463 U.S.  880,  893  n.4  (1983).   Because  we
                _______

            conclude  that none  of the  petitioners  has satisfied  this

            standard, the CAP applications will be denied and the appeals

            terminated.  

                 Petitioners have presented  an assortment of overlapping

            contentions, which we  have divided into two  categories.  We

            will  first  address  a  pair  of  joint  challenges  to  the

            convictions and sentences, and will then consider a number of

            individual claims.  Because most of the claims either consist

            of,  or  are  accompanied   by,  complaints  of   ineffective

            assistance  of  counsel  (IAC), and  because  they  all prove

            unavailing  on the  merits,  we need  not  pause to  consider

            whether they each  are cognizable  in the  habeas context  or

            whether any are subject to procedural default.

                                     Joint Claims
                                     ____________

                 1.   All four  petitioners contend  that the  government

            withheld  notes of  witness interviews  in  violation of  its

            obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83  (1963), and
                              _____    ________

            the  Jencks Act,  18 U.S.C.    3500.   It is  undisputed that

            several government  witnesses engaged in  debriefing sessions

            prior to  trial at  which prosecutor  Kelly  and DEA  special

            agent Murphy took handwritten notes.  During trial, the court

            rejected  defense requests  for disclosure of  such material.

            Some  time later, petitioners gained possession of notes that

            the prosecutor had  taken of one  interview with the  witness

            Anser   Adams.     Insisting  that   those  notes   contained

            exculpatory  and  impeachment  material  and  were  otherwise

            discoverable under the Jencks Act, petitioners argue that the

            government was  remiss in not  turning over all notes  of all

                                         -4-

            witness interviews.  The district court justifiably concluded

            otherwise. 

                 The  Jencks Act  claim is entirely  unavailing.   As the

            notes were never  adopted by the witness and  did not involve

            grand  jury testimony, they  would fall within  the statute's

            purview  only  if  they provided  a  "substantially verbatim"

            account of what had been said.  18 U.S.C.   3500(e)(2).  Such

            an  account must  reflect the  witness' own words  "fully and

            without distortion."  Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343,
                                  _______    _____________

            352  (1959); accord,  e.g., United  States  v. Neal,  36 F.3d
                         ______   ____  ______________     ____

            1190,  1198 (1st  Cir. 1994),  cert. denied,  117 S.  Ct. 519
                                           ____________

            (1996); United States v. Newton,  891 F.2d 944, 954 (1st Cir.
                    _____________    ______

            1989).   The  notes  here  did  not do  so.    Instead,  they

            evidenced "substantial  selection of material"  and contained

            the  prosecutor's  "own interpretations  or  impressions" and

            were thus "not to be produced."  Palermo, 360 U.S. at 352-53;
                                             _______

            accord, e.g., United  States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d  40, 47 (1st
            ______  ____  ______________    _______

            Cir.) (reviewing such a determination for clear error), cert.
                                                                    _____

            denied, 117 S. Ct. 130 (1996).
            ______

                 Nor have petitioners  explained how the notes  were both

            "favorable" and "material"  to the defense, United  States v.
                                                        ______________

            Brimage, 115 F.3d 73, 79 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
            _______                              ____________

            321  (1997),  such   that  the   withholding  thereof   might

            constitute a Brady  violation.  It  suffices here to  observe
                         _____

            that  evidence  is  "material"  if  there  is  "a  reasonable

                                         -5-

            probability  that, had  the evidence  been  disclosed to  the

            defense,  the  result  of  the  proceeding  would  have  been

            different."   United States v.  Blais, 98 F.3d 647,  651 (1st
                          _____________     _____

            Cir. 1996),  cert. denied,  117 S.  Ct. 1000  (1997) (quoting
                         ____________

            United States  v. Bagley, 473  U.S. 667, 682  (1985)); accord
            _____________     ______                               ______

            Kyles v. Whitley,  514 U.S. 419,  432-41 (1995).   Especially
            _____    _______

            given the  amount of Brady  and Jencks Act material  that was
                                 _____

            disclosed and the extent  to which the witnesses in  question

            were  impeached  at   trial,  petitioners  have  "failed   to

            articulate  any   theory  demonstrating  such   a  reasonable

            probability."  Blais, 98 F.3d  at 651; accord, e.g., Brimage,
                           _____                   ______  ____  _______

            115  F.3d at  79 (finding evidence  to be  non-material after

            noting degree to  which witness' character had  been "sullied

            in cross-examination").  Moreover, the weight of the evidence

            against  each of  these  petitioners--which  we described  at

            length in the unpublished portion of our earlier opinion, see
                                                                      ___

            Whiting, supra, slip  op. at 55-57 (Dixon),  61-62 (Pledger),
            _______  _____

            66-68  (Carmichael),  68-70  (Wadlington)--would  render  any

            Brady  violation in this regard harmless, see, e.g., Bennett,
            _____                                     ___  ____  _______

            75 F.3d at 47.

                 We  likewise disagree that the court erred in dismissing

            these claims  without convening  a hearing  or examining  the

            remaining witness  notes in camera.   A habeas  petitioner is
                                     _________

            not  entitled to an evidentiary  hearing where, as here, "his

            allegations are 'vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible.'"

                                         -6-

            David v. United States, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 1998 WL 21848,  at
            _____    _____________

            *6 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting  Machibroda v. United States, 368
                                         __________    _____________

            U.S. 487, 495 (1962)); accord, e.g., United States v. McGill,
                                   ______  ____  _____________    ______

            11  F.3d   223,  225-26  (1st   Cir.  1993).     And  because

            petitioners'  claims were  unsupported by  the  set of  notes

            actually  produced, we  cannot  fault  the  district  court's

            decision to forgo examination of the others.   Compare United
                                                           _______ ______

            States  v.  Strahl,  590  F.2d  10,  14-15  (1st  Cir.  1978)
            ______      ______

            (cautioning against sole reliance  on prosecutor's assurances

            that interview notes were not covered by Jencks Act).1  
                                                                 1

                 2.  All  petitioners but Pledger challenge  the quantity

            of  drugs  for  which  they  were  each  held  accountable at

            sentencing.  They  contend, inter alia, that  the court erred
                                        __________

            by  failing to make  individualized findings in  this regard.

            They  also  complain  of counsel's  failure  to  pursue these

            matters, particularly in  light of a clarifying  amendment to

            the guidelines  that was adopted  during the pendency  of the

            appeal.  We perceive no  error; indeed, we rejected a related

            set of arguments on direct appeal.

                 In order  to calculate the  quantity of drugs  for which

            each  petitioner  was  responsible, so  as  to  determine the

            applicable base  offense level, the sentencing  court engaged

                                
            ____________________

               1   Our rejection  of the Brady/Jencks  Act claims  on the
               1                         _____
            merits disposes of  the subsidiary IAC  claims.  The  further
            suggestion in  this regard  that the  prosecution engaged  in
            intentional misconduct is totally without record support.

                                         -7-

            in   a  two-step  process.    It  first  estimated  that  the

            organization as  a whole  had distributed  an average  of two

            kilograms of cocaine per week during its existence.   Relying

            on the "relevant  conduct" provision in U.S.S.G.    1B1.3, it

            then multiplied this figure by  the number of weeks that each

            petitioner  had been involved.  On direct appeal, petitioners

            challenged  the  two-kilograms-per-week  estimate, contending

            that it lacked evidentiary  support, see Whiting, 28 F.3d  at
                                                 ___ _______

            1303-05;  we disagreed, describing  the court's finding  as a

            "conservative  estimate [that] left a fair margin of safety,"

            id. at 1305.   Petitioners now argue that the court  erred by
            ___

            attributing  that estimate  to  each  of  them  without  more

            particularized   inquiries   into    what   quantities   were

            foreseeable and  were within  the scope  of their  respective

            agreements.

                 Petitioners' precise complaint is difficult to identify.

            To the  extent they are alleging that the court automatically

            saddled each of  them with the full amount  of drugs involved

            in the conspiracy  without further inquiry,  thereby applying

            an  erroneous  legal standard,  they  are  mistaken.   As  we

            explained  in  the  earlier appeal,  petitioners  "were  held

            responsible  at  sentencing   for  'drugs  [they]  personally

            handled  or  anticipated handling,  and,  under  the relevant

            conduct  rubric, for drugs  involved in additional  acts that
                                                                     ____

            were reasonably foreseeable  by [them] and were  committed in
            _____________________________________________________________

                                         -8-

            furtherance  of the conspiracy.'"   Whiting, 28  F.3d at 1304
            ______________________________      _______

            (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d
                                      _____________    _________

            1161,  1197  (1st Cir.  1993)).2    To  the extent  they  are
                                           2

            alleging  that the  court's  findings of  foreseeability were

            unsupported  by the evidence (or that  counsel should have so

            contended), they fare  no better.   Three of the  petitioners

            (Pledger,  Dixon and Wadlington)  did voice such  a challenge

            below,  and  Wadlington  pursued it  on  appeal--all  without

            success.   See  Whiting,  supra,  slip op.  at  72-74.   More
                       ___  _______   _____

            important, there has been no showing how the court's findings

            in this regard might possibly have constituted clear error.

                 Petitioners'  reliance on the  1992 revision of    1B1.3

            (amendment 439) likewise proves unavailing.   It is true that

            this  amendment was clarifying in nature  and thus could have

            been invoked on  direct appeal.  See, e.g.,  United States v.
                                             ___  ____   _____________

            LaCroix, 28 F.3d 223, 227  n.4 (1st Cir. 1994); United States
            _______                                         _____________

            v.  Carrozza, 4 F.3d 70, 74 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993).  Yet we fail
                ________

            to see how  petitioners would have  benefited from doing  so,

            much less  how their  attorneys can be  thought derelict  for

            having failed  to do so.   Both the  1990 version of    1B1.3

            (which  was applied  at  sentencing)  and  the  1992  version

                                
            ____________________

               2   The presentence  reports applied  the same  standard--
               2
            stating  that each petitioner was being "held accountable for
            the drugs sold by the enterprise, that is, for the conduct of
            others  in  furtherance  of  the  execution  of  the  jointly
            undertaken conspiracy that was reasonably foreseeable by this
            defendant, during the time of his involvement in the criminal
            enterprise." 

                                         -9-

            required that  relevant conduct be  "reasonably foreseeable."

            And both required  that it be "in furtherance  of the jointly

            undertaken  criminal activity."   As here relevant,  what the

            1992 amendment did was elaborate  on this latter criterion by

            explaining that "the court must first determine the  scope of

            the  criminal  activity  the particular  defendant  agreed to

            jointly  undertake (i.e., the  scope of the  specific conduct
                                ____

            and  objectives  embraced  by  the  defendant's  agreement)."

            U.S.S.G.   1B1.3, comment. (n.2) (1992).  

                 Yet  this merely fleshed  out the  preexisting standard.

            The  earlier version likewise  had referred to  conduct being

            "within  the  scope of  the  defendant's agreement."    See  
                                                                    ___

            1B1.3, comment. (n.1) (1990).  Prior to the amendment, we had

            explained that  "the measure of a  defendant's accountability

            for drug transactions in which he was not personally involved

            is usually congruent with the scope of his agreement with the

            other  participants  in  the  criminal  enterprise."   United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Garcia, 954  F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1992).   We have
            ______    ______

            since  indicated  that  "application  note  2  [of  the  1992

            amendment], read as a whole,  appears to use 'in furtherance'

            and 'within the scope' interchangeably."  LaCroix, 28 F.3d at
                                                      _______

            227 n.5.  Most important, petitioners have offered no factual

            support for the  assertion that their colleagues'  drug sales

            "were  outside the scope  of [petitioners'] agreement[s], or,

            put another way, that those  transactions were other than  in

                                         -10-

            furtherance  of the  jointly  undertaken criminal  activity."

            Id. at 228.3
                       3
            ___

                                  Individual Claims
                                  _________________

                 1.  Wadlington  was convicted, among other  offenses, of

            possessing  an unregistered shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C.

               5861(d).  The  statutory definition of  "firearm" required

            proof that the shotgun possessed two characteristics: that it

            had a  barrel length of  less than  18 inches, or  an overall

            length of less than 24 inches, and  that it could fire (or be

            restored to fire) shotgun shells.  In its charge to the jury,

            the court inadvertently omitted this definition--an oversight

            that  neither  side  brought to  its  attention.   Wadlington

            raised  the  matter  on direct  appeal  but  without success.

            Subjecting the issue to plain-error scrutiny due to  the lack

            of objection below, we  held that the error had  not caused a

            "miscarriage of justice" or seriously affected "the fairness,

            integrity or  public  reputation  of  judicial  proceedings."

            Whiting, 28 F.3d at 1309 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507
            _______                           _____________    _____

            U.S. 725,  736 (1993)).   In so concluding, we  observed that

                                
            ____________________

               3 A  trio of  subsidiary claims  likewise  miss the  mark.
               3
            Petitioners contend that the court  failed to notify them  of
            its  tentative findings before  imposing sentence,  as called
            for by  U.S.S.G.    6A1.3(b) (1990).    The record  indicates
            otherwise.  They assert that the drug-quantity information on
            which the court relied was inherently unreliable; we rejected
            an identical claim on direct appeal.  See Whiting, 28 F.3d at
                                                  ___ _______
            1305.   And  petitioners  insist  that  counsel  should  have
            requested an evidentiary hearing  prior to sentencing;  under
            the circumstances, we find neither substandard performance by
            counsel nor prejudice resulting therefrom. 

                                         -11-

            the   "undisputed  evidence"   showed   that  the   statutory

            definition had  been met--meaning  that there  was "no  risk"

            that  the  omission had  "resulted  in the  conviction  of an

            innocent man."  Id.
                            ___

                 Wadlington now raises the same  issue by means of an IAC

            claim,  complaining of  counsel's failure  to  object to  the

            omission.  An IAC claim  requires a showing of both deficient

            performance and prejudice.   The Supreme Court  has described

            the  prejudice element as  follows: "The defendant  must show

            that   there  is  a  reasonable  probability  that,  but  for

            counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

            would  have been  different.  A  reasonable probability  is a

            probability  sufficient   to  undermine  confidence   in  the

            outcome."   Strickland  v.  Washington,  466  U.S.  668,  694
                        __________      __________

            (1984).      No   such  reasonable   probability   has   been

            demonstrated; to the contrary, as we earlier concluded, it is

            "clear that  the jury  would readily  have  convicted" had  a

            proper instruction been given.  Whiting, 28 F.3d at 1309.
                                            _______

                 2.   Dixon  complains  of  improper  advice  from  trial

            counsel.  Specifically,  he contends that he  wished to plead

            guilty   to   his  substantive   distribution   charge  while

            proceeding  to  trial  on  his  conspiracy  charge,  but  was

            mistakenly  informed  he  could  not  do  so.     Since  this

            allegation is presented in purely conclusory  form, dismissal

            was appropriate.  See David, ___ F.3d at ___, 1998 WL  at *6.
                              ___ _____

                                         -12-

            Moreover, even if this allegation were true, Dixon has failed

            to  explain,  and we  are  unable  to  perceive, how  he  was

            prejudiced.  The indictment charged (and the evidence showed)

            that his distribution offense was committed in furtherance of

            the conspiracy.   As a  result, a  guilty plea to  the former

            would only have augmented the proof of his involvement in the

            latter.  Nor would there  have been any discernible effect on

            Dixon's  sentence;   the   considerable   evidence   of   his

            participation in the  conspiracy meant that,  even if he  had

            been acquitted on the conspiracy count,  the relevant-conduct

            provision might well have yielded the same outcome.

                 3.   Wadlington criticizes his attorney for advising him

            not to take the witness  stand.  Yet when "[u]naccompanied by

            coercion,  legal advice concerning  exercise of the  right to

            testify  infringes no right ... but simply discharges defense

            counsel's  ethical responsibility to  the accused."   Lema v.
                                                                  ____

            United States, 987 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1993); accord, e.g.,
            _____________                                   ______  ____

            Bucuvalas v. United States, 98 F.3d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1996).
            _________    _____________

            Wadlington  has made  no allegation  of  coercion and,  given

            Wadlington's criminal history, counsel's advice can hardly be

            called into question.

                 4.   Carmichael argues that  his attorney was  remiss in

            effectively  abandoning a  pretrial  motion  for  a  bill  of

            particulars  concerning his money  laundering charge.   As he

            notes, we  declined  on direct  appeal  to address  an  issue

                                         -13-

            involving  that  motion  because of  counsel's  action.   See
                                                                      ___

            Whiting, slip op. at 66.  Yet no prejudice thereby ensued; we
            _______

            went on to observe that "[h]ad counsel properly preserved the

            issue,  the  government's  provision  of  the  Western  Union

            transfers would be sufficient to avoid any actual surprise or

            prejudice."   Id.  Carmichael's more general complaints about
                          ___

            the extent of  preparation performed by counsel  are likewise

            unavailing.

                 5.  Pledger objects to the  performance of his appellate

            counsel.   Specifically,  he argues  that  counsel failed  to

            pursue a  claim that the  process of selecting  counties from

            which the petit  jury pool was chosen operated  in a racially

            discriminatory manner.  Yet the determination of which issues

            have  the best  chance  of  succeeding  on  appeal  obviously

            entails  the exercise  of  professional  judgment.   Judicial

            scrutiny  thereof "must  be highly  deferential," Strickland,
                                                              __________

            466 U.S.  at 689--particularly where, as here, there has been

            no  showing that  the  claim  has any  colorable  merit.   No

            ineffective assistance has been demonstrated.4
                                                         4

                 6.   Pledger challenges the district court's alternative

            holding  that his petition was time-barred under AEDPA's one-

            year statute of  limitations.  He contends  that the "mailbox

                                
            ____________________

               4   Several  of  the other  petitioners  also complain  of
               4
            counsel's failure to pursue certain  claims on appeal.  As we
            have determined each of those underlying claims to be without
            merit,  the attorneys'  conduct  in  this  regard  cannot  be
            faulted.

                                         -14-

            rule" governing the timing of a notice of appeal filed by  an

            inmate confined in  an institution, see Houston  v. Lack, 487
                                                ___ _______     ____

            U.S. 266 (1988); Fed. R.  App. P. 4(c), should likewise apply

            to  a  habeas petition  filed  by  such  an inmate.    Having

            rejected his  various  claims  on  the merits,  we  need  not

            address this  argument.   Pledger's further  contention--that

            AEDPA  is  inapplicable   whenever  the  underlying  criminal

            conviction  preceded its effective date, even when the habeas

            petition  was filed thereafter--is  meritless.  See  Lindh v.
                                                            ___  _____

            Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997).
            ______

                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                 We need go no further.5  For these reasons, we share the
                                       5

            district  court's assessment that none of the petitioners has

            made a substantial showing of the denial of  a constitutional

            right.  Their CAP applications are therefore denied.

                 The   applications   of  petitioners   Pledger,   Dixon,
                 ________________________________________________________

            Carmichael and Wadlington for a certificate  of appealability
            _____________________________________________________________

            are each denied, and their respective appeals are terminated.
            _____________________________________________________________

                                
            ____________________

               5   All claims not  mentioned herein have  been considered
               5
            and rejected.  None requires comment.

                                         -15-