Court Opinion

ID: 9791268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:08:21.935596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:35.157043
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
I concur with the discussion of prosecuto-rial misconduct under rule 4.2 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, but dissent from the balance of the main opinion.
My colleagues base their reversal on a violation of defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel. They go on to conclude that defendant was prejudiced because he might have obtained a better bargain. In *406the course of this analysis, they assert that the trial court made no specific finding whether defendant validly waived his right to counsel. They then conclude as a matter of law that the State did not, and could not, demonstrate that defendant validly waived that right. I cannot agree with this analysis.
“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Although waiver is not to be presumed from a silent record, see State v. Hamilton, -732 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1986), the record in this case is far from silent. On June 8, 1988, an evidentiary hearing was conducted by the court in response to defendant’s motions to dismiss and to re-cuse the office of the county attorney. The basis for those motions essentially was that defendant had been deprived of his right to counsel.
Four witnesses testified for the State. It is clear from that testimony that defendant, on his own initiative, contacted the police after he had been jailed for aggravated robbery. Defendant told the police that he could provide information on a pending criminal case. In exchange, defendant sought to avoid going back to prison and asked if he could be sentenced to time in a county jail or halfway house. At no time did he ever propose to enter a guilty plea. All four of the State’s witnesses testified that defendant had not requested consultation with his attorney. They also denied having discouraged him from doing so. The sole witness to refute this testimony was defendant himself.
The record further indicates that the county attorney agreed to make certain sentencing recommendations based on the information provided by defendant. Prior to the delivery to defendant of the written agreement, however, defendant made a court appearance with his attorney. By his own admission, defendant met privately with his attorney after court and said nothing about the pending agreement. He also freely admitted that his jailers made no restriction on his use of the telephone. Further testimony by defendant established that his background and experience included numerous other arrests. When viewed with the Miranda warnings given in connection with this arrest, it is clear that defendant was well aware of his right to an attorney.
Following the hearing, the court denied defendant’s motions concluding, “Court finds no violation of the 6th amendment.” (Emphasis added.)1 In view of the quantity and nature of the evidence taken, the court implicitly, if not explicitly, determined that the State had carried its burden and that defendant had made a valid waiver of the right to counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (the State has the burden to show a knowing and voluntary waiver). My colleagues, however, now determine that the State did not meet its burden and conclude, despite the evidence and the trial court’s determination, that defendant’s testimony was more credible.
“It is not our function to determine the credibility of conflicting evidence or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (quoting State v. Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984)). Rather, the trial court must record its findings with respect to factual issues, see Utah R.Crim.P. 12(c) (Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(c)), which “should not be upset unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah Ct.App.1990); see also United States v. Carrasco, 887 F.2d 794, 819 (7th Cir.1989) (finding of sixth *407amendment waiver subject to clearly erroneous standard); but see Norman v. Ducharme, 871 F.2d 1483, 1486 (9th Cir.1989) (the validity of a waiver is a mixed question of law and fact). Only when the findings “are against the clear weight of the evidence or ... the appellate court reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made” is clear error indicated. Menke, 787 P.2d at 539; see also Carrasco, 887 F.2d at 819 (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). I am not ready to find clear error in this case. See State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415, 419 (1981) (right clearly waived).
The United States Supreme Court has delineated the recognition of a valid waiver of counsel in cases such as this — by “pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the particular proceeding, and the dangers of proceeding without counsel.” Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2398, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988). Here, the majority remands the case to determine what “bargain defendant would likely have struck had competent defense counsel been a key participant in the negotiations.” The record testimony is clear, however, that defendant received all the consideration the county attorney was willing to give. The deputy county attorney testified that defendant’s case
had as much evidence that directly pointed toward this one defendant [as] any of the cases that I had handled. I couldn’t see any reason why it should be negotiated. I didn’t feel it was my responsibility to the people of this community and to fulfill my job requirements to negotiate something as serious as an aggravated robbery to something less, simply to avoid trying it.
The county attorney testified that defendant initially asked if, in exchange for his cooperation, the charge against him could be reduced or dismissed. The county attorney’s response was “absolutely not.” Other testimony establishes that the State considered both the merits of the case against defendant and the case in which defendant agreed to cooperate and believed the cases to be strong enough that greater concessions to defendant simply were not necessary or contemplated.
A pragmatic assessment by the trial judge obviously resulted in the conclusion that counsel would not have obtained any better deal, and that defendant surely made “his choice [with his] eyes open.” Patterson, 108 S.Ct. at 2395 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). In accordance with my conclusion, I also do not perceive any value in the main opinion’s creative remedy for defendant’s “prejudice.”
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. This determination was contained in a minute entry. The court requested the preparation of findings of fact and conclusions of law, but such findings are not included in the record. "While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.” Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. at 1023.