Court Opinion

ID: 9949644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 14:01:12.318373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:50.947144
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11065     Document: 40-1      Date Filed: 03/12/2024   Page: 1 of 14

                                                                 [PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit
                            ____________________

                                  No. 23-11065
                            ____________________

        DAVID ADAMS,
        MICHAEL SHAW,
        GERALD KASMERE,
        on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
                                                      Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        PALM BEACH COUNTY,
                                                      Defendant-Appellee.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-80127-BER
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11065

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and MARCUS,
        Circuit Judges.
        WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
            This appeal requires us to decide whether golf attendants who
        provided services at Palm Beach County golf clubs in exchange for
        discounted golf were “employees” under the Fair Labor Standards
        Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). David Adams, Gerald Kasmere, and Mi-
        chael Shaw seek to represent a class of bag-drop attendants, driv-
        ing-range attendants, and course rangers at County-owned world-
        class golf clubs. The attendants allege that the County’s use of their
        services violated the minimum-wage and anti-retaliation provi-
        sions of the Act, id. §§ 206, 215(a)(3), and the Florida Minimum
        Wage Act and the Florida Constitution, FLA. STAT. § 448.110; FLA.
        CONST. art. X, § 24. The district court dismissed the attendants’
        complaint because it concluded that the attendants were public-
        agency volunteers and not employees under the Act and Florida
        law. We affirm.
                                I. BACKGROUND
            David Adams, Gerald Kasmere, and Michael Shaw served as
        golf attendants at the Osprey Point Golf Club, a “world-class” golf
        club owned by Palm Beach County. The County owns four such
        clubs, which it operates for profit. The attendants responded to a
        County Parks and Recreation Department advertisement seeking
        “volunteers” to perform services in exchange for discounted golf,
        among other benefits. The advertisement states, “Volunteers
        Needed”; explains that “[v]olunteers serve as course rangers,
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        23-11065               Opinion of the Court                        3

        driving range attendants and bag drop attendants”; and promotes
        that “Osprey Point volunteers enjoy being outdoors, getting to
        know others with similar interests and reduced fees to play and
        practice golf.”

            The attendants performed services including greeting custom-
        ers; carrying and loading customers’ golf clubs; cleaning balls,
        clubs, and carts; retrieving carts from and returning carts to cart
        barns; patrolling the range and policing the pace of play; raking
        sand traps and filling divots; collecting trash; and retrieving balls
        from the driving range. Attendants were not allowed to choose
        their duties and were required to follow specific service rules,
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                23-11065

        including not sitting while on duty. According to the attendants,
        their services “enhance[d] the value of the golfing experience,”
        were “essential to attract customers,” and were “integral to the op-
        eration” of the County’s clubs. Privately owned golf clubs must pay
        wages to attendants providing comparable services.
            The County treated attendants as volunteers. Attendants were
        allowed to accept tips but were neither promised nor paid wages.
        But attendants who worked at least one seven-hour shift a week
        were promised “unlimited” rounds of golf at substantially dis-
        counted rates, limited to certain days, times, and locations. The
        County typically charged $96 for a round of golf at Osprey Point,
        but eligible volunteers could play for only $5. The County offered
        similar discounts to volunteers at its other courses. The attendants
        calculate that someone who worked the required seven hours a
        week, and who played five rounds of golf a week, could receive
        $23,660 in savings a year (or $65 an hour worked).
            The attendants participated in the County program for multi-
        ple years: Adams provided services for almost four years, Kasmere
        for over four years, and Shaw for over seven years. All three availed
        themselves of the benefit of reduced golf fees. The complaint pro-
        vides information on the attendants’ use of their discounts over
        only specific time periods. It explains that from October 2016
        through November 2019, Adams received 31 discounted rounds of
        golf amounting to $2,821 in savings, for an average value of $890 a
        year or $74 a month. From October 2016 through March 2020, Kas-
        mere received 95 discounted rounds of golf amounting to $8,645 in
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        23-11065               Opinion of the Court                        5

        savings, for an average value of $2,470 a year or $206 a month. And
        from February through August 2019, Shaw received 43 discounted
        rounds of golf amounting to $3,913 in savings, for an average value
        of $559 a month.
             Kasmere was furloughed during the Covid–19 pandemic and
        attempted to return to Osprey Point in October 2020. The Osprey
        Point manager told Kasmere that the club “needed” attendants to
        return because “some workers who had previously been in those
        positions were unable or unwilling to return to work because of
        the pandemic.” The manager also explained that, as part of the
        club’s Covid policies, attendants would no longer clean golf clubs
        or load customers’ golf bags, and tip jars would be removed. But
        when Kasmere complained that removing the tip jars “would make
        it even harder” on the attendants, the manager informed Kasmere
        that no positions were available.
             The attendants filed a putative class action. The operative com-
        plaint alleges violations of the minimum-wage provision of the Fair
        Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, (count I); the Florida Mini-
        mum Wage Act and Florida Constitution, FLA. STAT. § 448.110;
        FLA. CONST. art. X, § 24, (count II); and (as to Kasmere only) the
        anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
        § 215(a)(3), (count III). The district court dismissed the complaint
        for failure to state a claim because it concluded that the attendants
        were public-agency volunteers not covered under the federal Act
        or Florida law. We dismissed an earlier appeal for lack of jurisdic-
        tion because the district court failed to address the claims of
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11065

        additional opt-in plaintiffs, Adams v. Palm Beach County, No. 21-
        13825, 2022 WL 17246908, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 28, 2022), and on
        remand, the district court dismissed as to the opt-in plaintiffs for
        the reasons stated in its previous order.
                           II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
            We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, ac-
        cepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing
        them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ounjian v. Glo-
        boforce, Inc., 89 F.4th 852, 857 (11th Cir. 2023). We limit our consid-
        eration to the pleadings and the attached exhibits. GSW, Inc. v. Long
        County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993).
                                 III. DISCUSSION
             An individual must be an “employee” under the Fair Labor
        Standards Act to be protected by its minimum-wage and anti-retal-
        iation provisions. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 215(a)(3). The Act defines
        an “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer,” id.
        § 203(e)(1), and it defines “employer” as “any person acting directly
        or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an em-
        ployee,” including a public agency, id. § 203(d). The touchstone of
        the employee inquiry is one of “economic reality.” Tony & Susan
        Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Lab., 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (citation and
        internal quotation marks omitted).
            The Act exempts a public-agency volunteer from its definition
        of employee:
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        23-11065               Opinion of the Court                        7

              The term “employee” does not include any individual
              who volunteers to perform services for a public
              agency . . . if—

              (i) the individual receives no compensation or is paid
              expenses, reasonable beneﬁts, or a nominal fee . . .;
              and

              (ii) such services are not the same type of services
              which the individual is employed to perform for such
              public agency.

        29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A). Whether an individual is a volunteer or an
        employee “is a matter of law to be determined by the court.” E.g.,
        Purdham v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 637 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2011);
        see also Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1983).
             The Act does not define “volunteer.” But Department of Labor
        regulations provide that a volunteer is an “individual who performs
        hours of service for a public agency for civic, charitable, or human-
        itarian reasons, without promise, expectation or receipt of com-
        pensation for services rendered.” 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a). An indi-
        vidual need “only be motivated in part” by civic or charitable rea-
        sons to qualify as a volunteer. McKay v. Miami-Dade County, 36 F.4th
        1128, 1138 (11th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added). And we agree with
        our sister circuits that the regulatory definition should be applied
        “in a commonsense manner, which takes into account the totality
        of the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the in-
        dividual providing services and the entity for which the services are
        provided.” Purdham, 637 F.3d at 428 (citation and internal
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11065

        quotation marks omitted); see also Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf, 388
        F.3d 522, 528 (5th Cir. 2004) (we review “the objective facts sur-
        rounding the services performed to determine whether the totality
        of the circumstances” establishes volunteer status).
            To determine whether the public-agency volunteer exemption
        applies, we must evaluate whether the attendants fall under the
        statutory definition because they served a public agency and re-
        ceived either “no compensation” or only “expenses, reasonable
        benefits, or a nominal fee” for their services. 29 U.S.C.
        § 203(e)(4)(A)(i). We must also evaluate whether the attendants fall
        under the regulations, by being at least “in part” motivated by
        “civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons, without promise, ex-
        pectation or receipt of compensation.” McKay, 36 F.4th at 1137
        (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a)). We exercise common sense and
        consider the totality of facts and circumstances when applying the
        regulatory definition. See City of Elmendorf, 388 F.3d at 528.
            No party disputes that the attendants served a public agency,
        so we proceed in two parts. First, we explain that the attendants
        received discounted rounds of golf as “reasonable benefits” for
        their services. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A)(i). Second, we explain
        that the attendants cannot prove any “promise, expectation or re-
        ceipt” of employee compensation, see 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a), be-
        cause they applied for “volunteer” positions advertised to provide
        only “being outdoors, getting to know others with similar interests
        and reduced fees to play and practice golf” as benefits. We conclude
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        23-11065               Opinion of the Court                         9

        that the attendants are not employees and cannot state a mini-
        mum-wage or anti-retaliation claim under the Act or Florida law.
            A. The Attendants are Statutory Employees Who Received Only
                       “Reasonable Benefits” for Their Services.
            The attendants are public-agency volunteers because they re-
        ceived discounted golf as “reasonable benefits”—not inadequate
        compensation—for their services. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A)(i).
        The attendants argue that they were employees who worked for
        “compensation,” but less than minimum wage, in the form of thou-
        sands of dollars of golf discounts. We disagree. Reduced fees on
        golf did not trigger the loss of the attendants’ volunteer status.
            Whether benefits cause the loss of volunteer status “can only
        be determined by examining the total amount of payments made
        (expenses, benefits, fees) in the context of the economic realities of
        the particular situation.” 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(f). Likewise, the Su-
        preme Court has required us to anchor to “economic reality” when
        asking if an individual is an employee protected by the Act. See Al-
        amo, 471 U.S. at 301 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
        ted). The Act instructs us to evaluate only the benefits that the at-
        tendants actually received. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A)(i) (volunteer
        exemption turns on what an individual “receives” or “is paid”).
            The attendants cannot prove that reduced-fee access to a
        world-class golf club was, as a matter of economic reality, anything
        more than a perk for volunteer services. See Alamo, 471 U.S. at 301.
        Adams, Kasmere, and Shaw applied for positions plainly advertised
        as “volunteer” positions, with no mention of wages or cash
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11065

        payment. The only pecuniary benefits that the attendants were
        promised or received were reduced fees for golf and the oppor-
        tunity to receive tips from customers during some period that they
        served as attendants. To be sure, the Supreme Court has held that
        in-kind benefits may constitute “wages in another form,” which
        qualify as compensation under the Act. See Alamo, 471 U.S. at 293.
        But the Alamo Court was referring to “food, shelter, clothing, trans-
        portation and medical benefits”—in other words, goods and ser-
        vices that could substitute for wages “under the economic reality
        test of employment.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
        omitted). Reduced fees on rounds of golf—an inherently recrea-
        tional activity—are hardly analogous. And the monthly value of
        the attendants’ savings was minimal: over the periods specified in
        the pleadings, Adams received 31 discounted rounds of golf valued
        at $2,821 in savings, or about $74 a month; Kasmere received 95
        discounted rounds of golf valued at $8,645 in savings, or about $206
        a month; and Shaw received 43 discounted rounds of golf valued at
        $3,913 in savings, or about $559 a month. Cf. Purdham, 637 F.3d at
        434 (yearly stipends of $2,114 and $2,073 did not cause loss of golf
        coach’s volunteer status).
               B. The Attendants are Volunteers under the Regulations.
            The attendants assert that they were not volunteers under the
        regulations for two reasons. First, they argue that they did not en-
        gage in services traditionally associated with volunteerism. The
        County replies that their services did provide civic benefits for the
        County’s residents. Second, the attendants argue that the district
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        23-11065               Opinion of the Court                         11

        court erred by relying on the attendants’ lack of expectation of
        compensation. The County replies that the district court correctly
        applied an “objective reasonableness” test—the attendants were
        not promised and could not reasonably have expected any com-
        pensation. The County is correct on both points.
            The regulations define a volunteer as an individual who serves
        for “civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons, without promise,
        expectation or receipt of compensation for services rendered.” 29
        C.F.R. § 553.101(a). The regulations provide the following exam-
        ples of volunteer activities:
               [I]ndividuals may volunteer as ﬁreﬁghters or auxiliary
               police, or volunteer to perform such tasks as working
               with retarded or handicapped children or disadvan-
               taged youth, helping in youth programs as camp
               counselors, soliciting contributions or participating in
               civic or charitable beneﬁt programs and volunteering
               other services needed to carry out charitable or edu-
               cational programs.

        Id. § 553.104(b). But the regulations also state that there “are no
        limitations or restrictions imposed by the [Act] on the types of ser-
        vice which private individuals may volunteer to perform for public
        agencies.” Id. § 553.104(a).
             The attendants argue that their activities were “qualitatively
        different” from the examples of volunteerism listed in the regula-
        tions, and that they did not work to “improve their community or
        the lives of its residents.” But the regulations do not limit the kinds
        of activities that qualify as volunteer services. Id. Nor do the
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                23-11065

        attendants dispute that public golf courses provide County citizens
        with “civic” benefits. See McKay, 36 F.4th at 1137. For example, mu-
        nicipalities traditionally maintain public parks and outdoor recrea-
        tional facilities to enhance “health and quality of life” in the com-
        munity; public courses are a more affordable “gateway” option for
        golf newcomers; and the County maintained a teaching facility that
        introduced newcomers to golf. The attendants also acknowledge
        that their services were crucial to the County’s ability to maintain
        golfing courses for the public: the attendants were “essential to at-
        tract customers” and were “integral to the operation” of the course.
        So by their own admission, the attendants chose to serve in posi-
        tions that they knew were crucial to providing civic benefits to
        County citizens.
             The regulations also provide that any “promise, expectation or
        receipt of compensation for services rendered” precludes the find-
        ing that an individual is a public-agency volunteer. 29 C.F.R.
        § 553.101(a). But the receipt of “reasonable benefits” does not qual-
        ify as the receipt of compensation. Id. § 553.106(a). And any “expec-
        tation” of compensation must be “objectively reasonable.” Brown
        v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 755 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2014). To find
        otherwise would allow individuals to “wish themselves (however
        unreasonably) into being owed . . . wages, despite the (reasonable)
        belief of public agencies that they were accepting volunteered ser-
        vices.” Id.
           The district court correctly ruled that the attendants were not
        promised, could not have reasonably expected, and did not receive
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        23-11065               Opinion of the Court                        13

        any “compensation” for their services. As we have explained, the
        attendants were not promised and did not receive “compensation”
        because reduced golf fees are not “wages in another form” under
        any economic reality. See Alamo, 471 U.S. at 293. Nor does the com-
        plaint establish that the attendants had an objectively reasonable
        expectation of compensation. The County’s advertisement, featur-
        ing benefits like “being outdoors, getting to know others with sim-
        ilar interests and reduced fees to play and practice golf,” could not
        be objectively construed as a promise of payment for work. The
        County unequivocally advertised the position to volunteers. Not
        even the attendants assert that they were promised wages. And Ad-
        ams, Kasmere, and Shaw remained with the County program, un-
        der its terms, for nearly four, over four, and over seven years, re-
        spectively. We agree with the district court that it is unreasonable
        “to expect wages when you sign up for a position advertised for
        volunteers” and then “do not receive wages for an extended period
        of time.”
             The district court did not err. The attendants were not “em-
        ployees” under the Act. And the attendants’ Florida law claims fail
        because the Florida Act must be interpreted “as consistent with”
        the federal Act. Llorca v. Sheriff, Collier Cnty., 893 F.3d 1319, 1328
        (11th Cir. 2018) (“Only those individuals entitled to receive the fed-
        eral minimum wage under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and
        its implementing regulations shall be eligible to receive the state
        minimum wage pursuant to [the Florida Constitution] and [the
        Florida Minimum Wage Act].” (quoting FLA. STAT. § 448.110(3))).
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        14                   Opinion of the Court             23-11065

                              IV. CONCLUSION
             We AFFIRM the judgment in favor of Palm Beach County.