Court Opinion

ID: 9495996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:15:02.878197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:18.337887
License: Public Domain

GREGORY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the district court did not plainly err in denying Ellis’ motions to suppress or by imposing a thirty-year sentence on Count Three. However, I believe that the district court’s failure to satisfy the pre-sentencing requirements clearly imposed by Congress upon the federal courts in Section 851(b) constitutes plain and prejudicial error. Accordingly, I must dissent from Part III of the majority’s opinion.
The majority concedes that the district court committed plain error in its failure to perform the statutory colloquy required by section 851(b). As the majority observes, the district court failed either to clearly inquire whether Ellis affirmed or denied the prior convictions or to warn Ellis regarding the consequence of failing to object at the appropriate time. Proceeding to analyze this deficiency under the plain error standard of Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 52(b), the majority then concludes that the district court’s “error did not affect Ellis’ substantial rights.” In reaching this result, the majority notes Ellis’ failure to object to the prior convictions during either his partial colloquy or pursuant to section 851(c). According to the majority, it is clear that even if the district court had properly apprised Ellis of his right to object, Ellis would not have challenged his prior convictions. Notwithstanding the evidence marshaled by the majority to bolster its conclusion, I simply cannot agree that Ellis necessarily would have forfeited his objection if the district court had properly discharged its statutory duty.
First, although I find it perverse and ironic that Ellis’ forfeiture should be analyzed under the exacting plain error standard, I concede that we are bound by its strictures. As the Ninth Circuit aptly noted in United States v. Severino, “It’s a bit strange to require that a defendant object to the district court’s failure to give him an admonition. After all, if the defendant knows to object, he doesn’t need the admonition in the first place; it’s the defendant who fails to object that needs the admonition most.” 316 F.3d 939, 948, n. 7 (9th Cir.2003). However, as the Severino court also noted, we appear to be foreclosed from treating Ellis’ forfeiture differently by the Supreme Court’s decision in United *601States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) (analyzing under plain error the defendant’s failure to object to the district court’s failure to comply with Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3) regarding waiver of the right to counsel at trial). If a defendant must establish plain error where the district court has failed to ensure proper waiver of a right as fundamental as the right to counsel at trial, we cannot insist that a defendant have greater protections to challenge an error under section 851(b).
Before applying the prejudice component of the plain error analysis, we should also note this Court’s reasoning in United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245 (4th Cir.1992). In Campbell, we allowed sentencing upon substantial compliance with the terms of section 851(b) where we were satisfied that “the substantive protections underlying [section 851(b) ] were provided ... [and where] [defendant appreciated his right to challenge the state conviction.” Id. at 252 (emphasis added). In Campbell, because the defendant challenged his prior convictions in a presentence motion, his objections were properly raised before the Court. Nonetheless, our emphasis upon the defendant’s appreciation of his statutory right cannot be overlooked. It is not clear to me that Ellis appreciated his right to object and the consequences of silence. Hence, I do not think that the majority’s conclusion properly addresses the fundamental concern underlying our substantial compliance approach in Campbell.
If Ellis had appreciated his rights, which would have been the case if the district court had fulfilled its statutory duty, I believe that he probably would have objected to his prior convictions. Given that Ellis was denied his rights by the district court, we owe him at least the benefit of the doubt with respect to whether he would have objected if he had appreciated his rights. Because I believe that Ellis probably would have acted differently had he been aware of the risks of forfeiture, I conclude that the district court’s error affected Ellis’ substantial rights.
Finally, I do not believe that Ellis’ failure to object pursuant to section 851(c) should vitiate the district court’s underlying error. Admittedly, as the majority notes, some of our sister circuits have grounded findings of harmless error in the section 851(b) context upon the defendant’s failure to object in satisfaction of section 851(c). See, e.g., United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1525 (D.C.Cir.1997) (treating failure to warn of waiver as harmless where defendant failed to offer sufficient factual basis to challenge his priors pursuant to section 851(c)); United States v. Williams, 298 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.2002). I find, however, that this approach unnecessarily penalizes the defendant for the sentencing court’s failure to follow Congress’ directions. Indeed, invoking this answer to resolve the issue of prejudice merely begs the question of whether a defendant who appreciates his rights would have objected appropriately. We cannot confidently say whether Ellis, had he objected at the appropriate time, would have complied with the provisions of section 851(c). We should reserve consideration of compliance with this section until after Ellis is afforded an appropriate colloquy.
Because I believe that Ellis was prejudiced because he did not appreciate his rights, I dissent from the majority’s affir-mance of the sentence and would instead remand to the district court with directions to conduct a proper colloquy pursuant to section 851(b).