Court Opinion

ID: 9849687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:44:24.048546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:23.930836
License: Public Domain

BENTON, Judge, dissenting.
Mark Evans Epps was convicted of violating Code § 18.2-57.2 (“committing] an assault and battery against a family or household member”). The male friend of Epps’ former wife testified that Epps and Epps’ former wife were standing “five feet apart” and “were just screaming and hollering at each other.” The male friend moved between them as Epps and *64his former wife screamed at each other. No evidence proved that Epps touched his former wife. To convict an accused of an assault and battery the evidence necessarily must prove beyond a reasonable doubt an unlawful touching. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 679, 682, 36 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1946); Gnadt v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.App. 148, 151, 497 S.E.2d 887, 888 (1998). However, Epps was convicted of assault and battery based solely on the words he spoke.
Despite the lack of evidence of a touching, the only issue raised on this appeal is whether in proving an assault the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt an act denoting an intention of presently using actual violence. The Commonwealth argues that Epps’ verbal threats proved the assault.
Although the offense of “assault” is regulated by statute, see Code § 18.2-57, it continues to be defined by common law. The common law definition of criminal assault is well established in Virginia.
“An assault is an attempt or offer, with force and violence, to do some bodily hurt to another, whether from wantonness or malice, by means calculated to produce the end if carried into execution; as by striking at him with a stick or other weapon, or -without a weapon, though he be not struck, or even by raising up the arm or a cane in a menacing manner, by throwing a bottle of glass with an intent to strike, by levelling a gun at another within a distance from which, supposing it to be loaded, the contents might injure, or any similar act accompanied with circumstances denoting an intention coupled with a present ability, of using actual violence against the person of another. But no words whatever, be they ever so provoking, can amount to an assault; ... ”. (Italics supplied).
Harper v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 723, 733, 85 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1955) (citation omitted) (second emphasis added). See e.g., Jones, 184 Va. at 681-82, 36 S.E.2d at 572; Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 658, 180 S.E. 395, 397 (1935); Wood v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 401, 404, 140 S.E. 114, 115 (1927); Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 130, 132-33, 415 S.E.2d *65250, 251 (1992); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 515, 517, 412 S.E.2d 731, 732 (1992).
The majority accepts defendant’s argument that, when relying solely on the common law criminal definition of assault, “there is no assault unless an accused committed some act denoting an intention of presently using actual violence.” However, the majority holds that the “defendant’s words and acts satisfy the common law tort definition of assault that has long been a part of the definition of the present definition of criminal assault.” In affirming the conviction, the majority reasons that the common law crime of assault has merged with the civil tort of assault. See Koger D. Groot, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Virginia 27-28 (3d ed.1994).1 But see Charles E. Friend, Personal Injury Law in Virginia § 6.3, at 208-09 (1990) (“[T]he criminal action for assault and the tort action for assault involve different principles, purposes, and sanctions. The two actions should not be confused, and rules applicable to one should not be assumed to be applicable to the other.”).
The principle is well established that the criminal offense of assault requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of some overt physical act which proffers imminent unwanted force. See Burgess v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 697, 708, 118 S.E. 273, 276 (1923) (assault requires an “overt act” which “puts the *66party assailed in well-founded fear of bodily harm”); Harper, 196 Va. at 725, 85 S.E.2d at 255; Jones, 184 Va. at 681-82, 36 S.E.2d at 572; Merritt, 164 Va. at 658, 180 S.E. at 397. Mere words can never amount to an assault in criminal law. See Harper, 196 Va. at 725, 85 S.E.2d at 255.
In this case, the Commonwealth proved no overt act by Epps indicating an actual or apparent present ability to cause bodily harm. There is simply no evidence of any physical act by Epps. The record proved that Epps and his former wife were arguing and that Epps threatened his former wife. The wife’s male friend testified that Epps and his former wife were standing five feet away from each other and that they “were just screaming and hollering at each other.” No evidence proves that Epps committed an overt act indicating an actual or apparent present intent and ability to cause bodily harm. The evidence in the record proved “mere words” of insult and threat, which are never enough, under either theory, to constitute an assault.
In Virginia, a criminal assault is either (1) an attempt to touch another person in an unprivileged way, see Harper, 196 Va. at 725, 85 S.E.2d at 255, or (2) an intentional placing of another in apprehension of receiving an immediate unprivileged touching. See Burgess, 136 Va. at 707-08, 118 S.E. at 276. “[B]oth will involve some physical act which proffers imminent unwanted force.” John L. Costello, Virginia Criminal Law and Procedure § 4.2, at 70-71 (2d ed.1995) (emphasis omitted). Because the Commonwealth failed to prove the existence of any act indicative of the present ability, either actual or apparent, of inflicting immediate bodily harm, I would hold that the evidence is insufficient to prove Epps committed an assault upon his former wife.

. Groot states, in pertinent part, the following:
At common law a criminal assault was an attempted batteiy. It made no difference whether the victim was put in fear or was even aware of the assault____ At the same time a civil assault was committed by putting the victim in apprehension of a battery; civil assault depended upon the apprehension of the victim, but did not require an actual overt attempt to batter.
These two forms of assault long ago merged so that a criminal assault is "any attempt or offer with force or violence to do corporal hurt to another.” An assault in the ancient criminal form, or attempted batteiy, requires proof that the accused intended a battery and performed some direct, ineffectual act towards its commission. An assault in the ancient civil form, an offer to batter, requires proof of a threat, actual or implied, to batter and an apparent present ability to do so. Actual ability to carry out the threat is not required because this form of assault turns on the victim’s apprehension of harm; apparent ability is sufficient to create apprehension.