Court Opinion

ID: 9731976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:03:21.485261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:22.260045
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. The Court today holds that evidence which should have been suppressed prior to trial may be used to convict a defendant at a trial that never should have been held. This topsy-turvy procedure is unfair and counterproductive to an orderly administration of criminal justice. I therefore dissent.
At the outset, I point out that the procedure condoned in this case for fixing a mistake made at the pretrial suppression hearing was not remotely suggested by the State in advocating for affirmance nor mentioned by defendant in an overabundance of candor. It springs from the Court without the usual appellate practice of briefing and argument.
Moreover, we have no basis to know what facts the trial court relied on in denying defendant’s motion to suppress at trial. The only findings of fact on the suppression issue were made by the judge presiding at the pretrial hearing. Ordinarily, we would remand a case in this posture for articulation of the basis and reasons for denial of a suppression motion. State v. Senecal, 145 Vt. 554, 561-62, 497 A.2d 349, 353 (1985); V.R.Cr.P. 47(c).
Be that as it may, I would reverse on this record because the State should not be permitted a second chance to cure an error made at the pretrial suppression motion level.
Our rules require criminal defendants to raise before trial “[m]otions to suppress evidence on the ground that it was file-*14gaily obtained.” V.R.Cr.P. 12(b)(3). The defendant here followed the rule. Our rules further provide that “[i]f the motion [to suppress] is granted, the evidence shall not be admissible at the trial or at any future hearing or trial.” V.R.Cr.P. 41(f). Here, as this Court has concluded, the motion should have been granted; the suppression judge should have ruled that there was an insufficient basis to stop defendant. Ordinarily, we would reverse, but the error is deemed not reversible in this case because the error caused a trial at which the trial court disagreed with the suppression judge’s previously made findings of fact. The trial court thus “cured” the suppression judge’s error. Of course, it was error for the trial to have occurred at all: had the suppression judge done as he was supposed to according to this Court, there would have been no trial. The evidence would have been suppressed, thereby leaving no evidence available to prove that defendant had committed a crime.
The unfairness of the Court’s approach becomes apparent simply by pointing out that, had the defendant appeared at the suppression hearing before a judge who would have reached the right result, he would now be a free man. Instead, the suppression judge reached the wrong result, giving the State a second chance to convict defendant, a chance the law says should not have happened.
Where does this legal hocus pocus come from? Although some courts have allowed trial evidence to cure erroneous suppression rulings, this rule is by no means unanimous.
Courts differ regarding what evidence can be considered by the appellate court on review. Most federal courts state that, in passing on the denial of a suppression order, the appellate court can consider the evidence introduced at trial as well as that introduced in relation to the pretrial suppression motion. Several state courts disagree, limiting appellate review to only that evidence introduced at the suppression hearing or through the motion papers.
W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 20.7(b), at 20-35 (2d ed. 1991). The federal cases follow Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925), which established the rule in the most cursory fashion: “The whole matter [that was the subject of the pretrial motion] was gone into at the trial, so no right of the defendants was infringed.” Once the *15United States Supreme Court spoke, the issue became “settled law,” and other federal courts have not fully explored the issue, choosing instead to simply recite the Carroll incantation. State courts adopting a Carroll-type rule have done so in a similar manner, bereft of analysis, simply concluding without discussion that the rule is “not prejudicial” to defendants. People v. Braden, 34 Ill. 2d 516, 520, 216 N.E.2d 808, 810 (1966); Commonwealth v. Young, 349 Mass. 175, 178, 206 N.E.2d 694, 696 (1965); see also State v. Carrico, 696 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)(“The real damage is not done until the evidence is introduced in the trial.... Thus, a trial court can receive additional evidence and change its ruling prior to admitting the objected-to-items in evidence ....”). These cases miss the obvious point: defendant should never have been subjected to the curative trial.
Numerous state courts have deviated from the federal rule and have reached conclusions supporting this dissent. Trusty v. State, 308 Md. 658, 670-72, 521 A.2d 749, 755-56 (1987); People v. Kaigler, 368 Mich. 281, 288, 118 N.W.2d 406, 409 (1962); State v. Gora, 148 N.J. Super. 582, 592, 372 A.2d 1335, 1340, cert. denied, 74 N.J. 275, 377 A.2d 679 (1977); People v. Wilkins, 65 N.Y.2d 172, 180, 480 N.E.2d 373, 378, 490 N.Y.S.2d 759, 764 (1985); People v. Gonzalez, 55 N.Y.2d 720, 721-22, 431 N.E.2d 630, 630-31, 447 N.Y.S.2d 145, 145-46 (1981). One state has reached the same result by statute. See People v. Wright, 72 Cal. App. 3d 328, 344, 140 Cal. Rptr. 98, 107 (1977) (under Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(i), (j), search or seizure issue can be relitigated at trial, but court can only look at evidence previously presented at a special hearing on validity of the search or seizure).
The New York Court of Appeals grounded its rule on a policy of curbing abuse of the system and injustice to defendants. See Wilkins, 65 N.Y.2d at 180, 480 N.E.2d at 378, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 764 (citing People v. Havelka, 45 N.Y.2d 636, 384 N.E.2d 1269, 412 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1978), which established the rule in the context of remands for additional evidentiary hearings on suppression issues). If a defendant’s motion is erroneously denied at a suppression hearing, a potential for abuse exists whenever the State gets a second opportunity to cure the error: the temptation will always exist consciously or unconsciously for the State *16to fill in the holes that appeared at the suppression hearing and tailor its evidence “to fit the court’s established requirements.” Havelka, 45 N.Y.2d at 643, 384 N.E.2d at 1273, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 349. The potential for such abuse was present in this case. The suppression court clearly found certain parts of the police officer’s testimony less than convincing, and a temptation existed for it to be presented more forcefully at trial.
As a general rule, “a reviewing court determines the correctness of a trial court’s ruling ‘as of the time when it was made and according to what the record shows was before the lower court at that time.’” Henry v. State, 468 So. 2d 896, 899 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)(quoting 24A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1836, at 555-56); accord State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 85, 97 S.E.2d 476, 477 (1957). I see no reason to deviate from this rule in this case.
The practice created by the Court also has serious practical drawbacks. V.R.Cr.P. 12 was promulgated to simplify pretrial practice, give counsel and the court early opportunity “to evaluate and shape the case,” determine preliminary matters that could “delay or interrupt trial,” and avoid unnecessary trials. See Reporter’s Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 12, at 71, 72 (1983). Case law amplifying the rules provides that renewed motions at trial may be the basis for revising pretrial rulings. As stated in State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 514, 438 A.2d 1135, 1142 (1981):
We agree with defendant’s position that pretrial rulings are not necessarily binding throughout the trial; they are tentative only, and subject to revision at trial. If the rule were otherwise a trial judge would be tied to obvious errors even when, as here, the earlier rulings were made by a different judge. The trial judge would moreover be rendered helpless in the face of additional evidence or other considerations developing during trial of the case which might otherwise dictate a modification or a reversal of the preliminary rulings. While caution should be the guiding principle in acting on pretrial motions renewed at, during, or after trial, they are not immutable regardless of the circumstances which may arise later in time. (Citation omitted.)
The so-called Senecal rule, that a defendant waives his claim of error in a pretrial ruling unless objection is renewed at trial, is predicated on the possibility that “‘other or different facts [may] appear’” at trial which should cause “‘a reexamination of *17issues of constitutional concern.’” State v. Connolly, 133 Vt. 565, 569, 350 A.2d 364, 367 (1975) (quoting State v. Blondin, 128 Vt. 613, 270 A.2d 165 (1970)). When, however, new facts are not adduced and the same judge presides over the pretrial matter and the trial, no waiver of review of a pretrial ruling will be found. Senecal, 145 Vt. at 558, 497 A.2d at 351.
The Court does not invoke a Senecal waiver — properly so, because defendant renewed his objection in moving to suppress at trial — but misconstrues, in my opinion, the reach of what the Senecal line of cases envisions may be of consequence in making revised rulings at trial.
For instance, in cases such as this one where the evidence is the same at trial as it was at the suppression hearing, the Senecal doctrine cannot be read properly as permitting the trial judge to overrule the facts found by another judge, who reviewed essentially the same evidence at the suppression hearing. To allow otherwise serves no legitimate purpose and flies in the face of time-honored doctrines of finality. To permit the practice of the trial judge finding facts specifically not found by the suppression judge on essentially the same testimony renders our justice system suspect and offends the spirit of not placing a defendant in double jeopardy. It tells a defendant, you may need to undergo two evidentiary proceedings before different judges and be subject to the most restrictive view of the factual merits on which your motion rests.
I agree with Justice Dooley’s concurrence that Senecal should be overruled, except I believe Senecal does not demand affirmance in this case. The Senecal doctrine is not entirely irrational if we reverse here. At best, the Senecal doctrine should be viewed narrowly, as solely a rule of waiver in circumstances where a defendant does not seek at trial a second, more favorable, opinion. I read Senecal as requiring the second opinion, using the trial court as a quasi-intermediate appellate court. As pointed out by the Court, the second opinion is for “protection of defendant’s rights,” not to cure erroneous suppression of evidence before trial.
The principal practical difficulty with the Court’s approach is the reality that the trial judge — knowing that another judge has denied a motion to suppress on the very evidence presented anew at trial — simply does not feel obligated to second-guess *18the other judge. This is natural given the reluctance to try issues over again and the deference judges ordinarily give to each other’s rulings. The trial record in this case, being devoid of any factual reason given to deny suppression, underscores the concern that the trial judge may simply defer to the result reached by the pretrial judge.
The better practice is to require the State to fully litigate a suppression issue prior to trial and not burden a defendant with the possibility that at trial a concerned prosecutor may endeavor to improve the factual record on the suppression issue. A defendant should not have to run the gauntlet twice.
I would reverse.