Court Opinion

ID: 9641259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:26:40.407366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:36.099134
License: Public Domain

P ashman, J.
(dissenting). This is a case of first impression concerning the construction of a recently-enacted section of N. J. R. A. 26:3-31. Subsection p. of that statute empowers local boards of health to act as agents for landlords to obtain necessary repairs when the heating equipment of an apartment fails to function and the outside temperature falls below 55 “F.1 Plaintiff-tenant sought to invoke this *442provision in order to have the heat and hot water in her apartment restored after the boiler in the building ceased operating. Although the Appellate Division upheld the tenant’s rights under the statute, the majority today reaches a contrary result by means of a mechanical approach to statutory construction which defeats the promise and hope afforded by N. J. S. A. 26:3-31(p).
Plaintiff Arlethia Jones was a tenant of the Roy L. Management Corporation in an apartment building located at 448 Fail-mount Avenue in Newark. On or about October 1, 1974, plaintiff notified the landlord that she was no longer receiving heat or hot water in her apartment. She also contacted the Division of Inspections of the Newark Department of Health and Welfare, which conducted an inspection of the building and determined that in fact the boiler was broken. The landlord was unwilling to make the necessary repairs because plaintiff was the only paying tenant in the apartment, the costs were prohibitive, and comparable repairs in the past had been frustrated by persistent vandalism.
Accordingly, on November 15, 1974, plaintiff commenced an action in lieu of prerogative writ to compel defendant-director of the Department of Health and Welfare to serve as statutory agent for the landlord, to hire repairmen and procure material to repair the boiler, pursuant to N. J. S. A. 26:3-31(p). Plaintiff contended that N. J. S. A. 26:3-31 (p) represents a mandatory authorization for the local *443board of health to assume this responsibility. The trial court, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed in a reported opinion. Jones v. Buford, 132 N. J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 1975). Reading provisions of the Faulkner Act, N. J. S. A. 40:69A—1 et seq. and N. J. S. A. 26 :3-31, in pari materia, the Appellate Division found that the Newark Department of Health and Welfare, as a “local board of health,” was subject to the latter statute. The court then held that the power conferred by the provision was administrative in nature and imposed a mandatory duty on defendant to pursue plaintiff’s interests in obtaining sufficient heat and hot water. In construing the statute, the court stated:
It is apparent from the nature and scope of the legislation that the Legislature intended that the members of the residential renting public, for whose protection the statute was enacted, should have the right to have the power thus conferred, exercised for their benefit.
[132 N. J. Super, at 215]
On January 14, 1975, the day after oral argument in the Appellate Division, the Newark Division of Inspection declared the apartment building to be unfit for human habitation. Pursuant to the Division’s vacation order, and the Relocation Assistance Act, N. J. S. A. 20:4-1 et seq., plaintiff was moved to a different apartment building by the Newark Housing Authority. Because of the importance of the question posed by this case, we declined to dismiss the action as moot and granted defendant’s petition for certification. 68 N. J. 151 (1975).
I
The majority rejects the Appellate Division’s statutory construction of N. J. S. A. 26:3-31(p). The majority reads the introductory clause of the statute to find, in the absence of any definitive legislative history, that this legislation is “of the enabling variety.” Enabling legislation, as opposed *444to that which is unitary and self-executing, requires regulatory implementation before it becomes effective. Because such implementation is a function vested in the sound discretion of municipal authorities and their agents, courts cannot compel local enactment. Eor this reason, the majority holds that, by its 'failure to promulgate regulations for N. J. S. A. 26 :3-31(p), the Newark Department of Health and Welfare has precluded plaintiff from resorting to the statutory remedy afforded by this statute.
My disagreement with the majority originates from its erroneous statutory construction of N. J. S. A. 26:3-31(p), and the unfortunate consequences resulting from that interpretation. Significantly, the use of the word “shall,” in the introductory clause of a statute, such as N. J. S. A. 26:3-31(p), usually indicates a mandatory rather than permissive obligation. As Justice Schettino observed in Harvey v. Essex Cty. Bd. of Freeholders, 30 N. J. 381 (1959) :
The word “may” is ordinarily permissive or directory, and the words “must” and “shall” are generally mandatory. Such terms, however, have been held to be interchangeable whenever necessary to execute the clear intent of the Legislature. The problem is primarily one of ascertaining the intent of the Legislature.
[30 N. J. at 391-392].
Accord, City of Passaic v. Passaic Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 18 N. J. 371, 395-96 (1955); Leeds v. Harrison, 9 N. J. 202, 213 (1952). Thus, contrary to the majoritj', I perceive that this statute creates a mandatory obligation on its face.
This construction becomes more compelling when, as here, we consider a statute which confers a substantial benefit upon members of the public. In such provisions, to avoid negation or denial of an important benefit, courts ordinarily construe legislation to impose a mandatory obligation on the responsible governmental body to effectuate the legislative scheme in the absence of an express contrary intent. As one leading commentary on the subject states:
*445A grant of power to public officers, where individuals or the public have a right that it be exercised for their benefit, is mandatory.
[2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4 ed. 1973), § 57.17 at 441]
Recognizing the important interests served by this rule of construction, courts have applied the rule in a broad and liberal fashion. Thus, to avoid the deprivation of a statutory benefit, courts have found a mandatory obligation to implement legislation even where the language of a statute is arguably permissive. As early as 1860, the former Supreme Court observed:
Words giving power or permission to do am act which concerns the public interest, when applied to a public body or officers, are to be construed as requiring the act to be done, although the phraseology of the statute be permissive merely, not peremptory, whenever there is nothing in the act save the permissive form of the expression, as may appoint, or shall have power to do so, to denote that the legislature designed to lodge a discretion in the body authorized to act. [State v. Newark, 28 N. J. L. 491, 497-98 (Sup. Ct. 1860) ; emphasis supplied].
An extensive line of cases following this precedent has almost uniformly adhered to this basic rule of construction. See Central Land Co. v. Bayonne, 56 N. J. L. 297, 300 (E. & A. 1893); Kennelly v. Jersey City, 57 N. J. L. 293, 297 (Sup. Ct. 1894); Clark v. Elizabeth, 61 N. J. L. 565, 581-82 (E. & A. 1898); Fagen v. Hoboken, 85 N. J. L. 297, 299 (E. & A. 1913); McDonald v. Hudson Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 99 N. J. L. 170, 172 (E. & A. 1923); Leeds v. Harrison, supra, 9 N. J. at 213; Harvey v. Essex Cty. Bd. of Freeholders, supra, 30 N. J. at 392; Como Farms, Inc. v. Foran, 6 N. J. Super. 306, 311 (App. Div. 1950); Bayonne v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 30 N. J. Super. 409, 417-18 (App. Div. 1954). Furthermore, the "substantial” interests upheld in these cases, such as the duty of a municipality to publish solely in an official newspaper, Fagen v. Hoboken, supra, and the power of a municipality to retire court attendants who reach the age of 65, Harvey *446v. Essex Cty. Bd. of Freeholders, supra,, pale in comparison with plaintiffs interest in this case —• the provision of sufficient heat during cold weather.
The majority bases its decision largely on the proposition that the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute should prevail, regardless of precedents and rules of statutory construction to the contrary. Sutherland, supra, § 45.05 at 15; Malawan v. Monmouth Cty. Bd. of Taxation, 51 N. J. 291, 298 (1968); Union Cty. Bd. of Freeholders v. Union Cty. Park Comm’n, 41 N. J. 333, 337 (1964). However, the piecemeal fashion in which this statutory scheme was adopted undermines the inquiry undertaken by the majority to delineate the legislative intent. N. J. S. A. 26 :3—31 itself is the product of at least 12 separate pieces of legislation which were enacted over a 91-year period. Any effort to discern a consistent or readily ascertainable intent on the part of the Legislature in adopting the different subsections of this statute runs into formidable obstacles of interpretation which are blithely ignored. Furthermore, although the majority concludes that the Legislature has chosen to delegate power to local boards of health through enabling acts, ante at 438, it freely admits that in “surveying the field of public health it will be seen that the Legislature has, from time to time, resorted both to the enabling and self-executing tj'pes of statutes.” Ante at 438.
Transcending this inquiry, additional factors undermine the majority’s conclusion that the statute is not self-executing. It is clear that the Legislature enacted this provision to afford the tenant practical relief from the health hazards and discomforts of an unheated apartment. I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that 'the availability of other remedial options to local: boards of health is in any way probative of the discretion vested in municipal authorities. The issue is whether the local board must implement thé statute, thereby entitling the tenant to have the heating system in this building repaired if the landlord has failed to take appropriate action, and not whether it must exercise the option *447provided by the statute under the facts of this particular case. See Part II, infra.
Moreover, on its face, N. J. S. A. 26:3-31 neither requires further implementation, nor indicates that its time of effectiveness is to be postponed until such implementation is accomplished. If anything, this suggests an intent contrary to that found by the majority. See 2 Sutherland, supra, § 33.06 at 9. A close examination of N. J. S. A. 26 :3—31 (p) also shows that it affords sufficiently detailed guidance to obviate the need for any implementing legislation. The statute clearly specifies the object of the legislation (“to restore to operating condition the furnace, boiler or other equipment essential to tire proper heating of any residential unit rented by said landlord”), its subject (“local board of health”), the powers which are conferred by the statute (“To act as the agent for a landlord in the engaging of repairmen and the ordering of any parts necessary to restore . . . equipment essential to the proper heating”), who may invoke those powers (“the tenant”), when the powers may be invoked (“24 hours . . . [after] the tenant has lodged a complaint with the local board of health”) and the conditions which must be met prior to invoking the powers (“a bona fide attempt has been made by the tenant to notify the landlord of the failure of the heating equipment, . . . the landlord has failed to take appropriate action, and the outside air temperature is less than 55° P”). These provisions and the absence of any indication that further implemention was either contemplated or necessary, warrant the conclusion that N. J. S. A. 26:3-31(p) is self-sufficient and requires no further implementation.
I am not persuaded that the introductory clause of the statute requires a different conclusion. That section provides that the “local board of health shall have power to pass, alter or amend ordinances and make rules and regulations in regard to the public health.” Once it is recognized that the statute is self-executing, it is clear that the statement refers to the ability of the local board of health to pass rules *448and regulations concerning powers which it is granted under the statute. This corresponds to the quasi-legislative authority which belongs to administrative agencies to promulgate interpretative rules. See generally, 1 Davis, Administrative Law, § 5.03 (1958); Cunningham v. Dep’t of Civil Service, 69 N. J. 13 (1975). Although the clause leaves the promulgation of such rules to agency discretion, it does not suggest that this power may be used to neutralize the efficacy of the statute as a whole. In fact, to the extent that the statute is sufficiently clear in this case, the necessity for additional legislation is thereby ameliorated. Reference to the quasi-legislative powers of the local boards of health only acts as an invitation to use these powers if necessary at a later time. I therefore find that N. J. S. A. 26 :3-31 is a self-executing statute, and that subsection (p) is both operative and available despite the failure or reluctance of the local board of health to enact supplementary regulations. By virtue of the express terms of the statute, I would further find that Ms. Jones was entitled to invoice the terms of relief provided by the Legislature under N. J. S. A. 26:3-31(p).
II
The majority .finds that the municipality has not availed itself of the statutory scheme by implementing regulations, treating only in dictum the question whether a tenant has a right to have the power inherent in N. J. S. A. 26:3-31 exercised in this case. Because I find the statute to be self-executing, I now address this issue.
Preliminarily, I reiterate that the right which is afforded to the tenant under the statute is merely the right to file a complaint with the local board of health and thereby invoke the powers enumerated in subsection p. However, it is my belief that enforcement of the remedy under N. J. S. A. 26 :3— 31 (p) is, and should be, entrusted to the sound discretion of the local board of health. This is in accordance with the best interests of fairness and administrative practicalities. While the remedy provided in N. J. S. A. 26:3—31 (p) should *449be readily accessible to tenants who are deprived of heating, its administrative enforcement should be based upon a factual determination of need. Situations aTe conceivable where a tenant might unjustifiably file a complaint with the local board of health, invoking N. J. S. A. 26:3-31(p) as a means of harassment or oppression. Once it is determined that factual allegations are unfounded, it would be proper for the local board to decline to exercise its discretion. Such an action should only be undertaken, however, as an exercise of sound discretion consistent with the purposes of the underlying legislation. See Swede v. Clifton, 22 N. J. 303 (1956). Furthermore, to avoid arbitrary administrative determinations and also to provide a record for judicial review, the reasons for the decision of the local board of health should be reduced to writing. See Monks v. N. J. State Parole Bd., 58 N. J. 238, 249 (1971); Donaldson v. N. Wildwood Bd. of Educ., 65 N. J. 236, 245 (1974).
Of course, within the context of the instant case, a determination of this sort is unnecessary because Ms. Jones no longer lives at 448 Fairmount Avenue and the apartment building in which she formerly resided has been condemned. However, even if the apartment house had not been condemned, it is possible that the Department of Health and Welfare, in its sound discretion, might have lawfully declined to grant relief. The building required extensive and expensive repairs beyond the mere replacement of a boiler. Consequently, it is possible that the desired repair work would have been totally ineffective. Under these circumstances, the Department should be able to seek other forms of relief such as the condemnation and relocation actually effected in this case.
The majority fails to fully implement an important statutory provision. Its refusal' to provide procedures for relief in this case stands in stark contrast to the decisions of an increasing number of courts which have recognized the deprivation suffered by the poorer segments of our society with regard to the basic amenities of human existence. *450These amenities, though not of constitutional dimension, have been regarded as essential to the general welfare, and have prompted both federal and state courts to strike down procedural obstacles which unduly restrict access to them. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N. J. 496, 519 (1975). Foremost among these necessities is shelter. In N. J. Mortgage Finance Agency v. McCrane, 56 N. J. 414 (1970), this Court specifically stated:
The question of whether a citizenry has adequate and sufficient housing is certainly one of the prime considerations in assessing the general health and welfare of that body. [56 N. J. at 420].
Subsequent cases have reaffirmed this proposition. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N. J. 473, 483 (1973); Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel Tp., 67 N. J. 151, 178-79 (1975).
Shelter anticipates something more than the mere provision of four walls and a roof. It clearly contemplates, as we stated in McCrcme, housing which is both “adequate” and “sufficient.” In this regard, housing which lacks heating when the temperature drops below 55° F. does not comport with the “adequate” and “sufficient” standards which we previously enunciated.
The majority today permits the local authorities in Newark to effectively shirk their statutory responsibility to effect these standards until such time as those authorities decide to implement what I find to be an already clear legislative mandate. I refuse to stand back while the local authorities fiddle and Ms. Jones freezes. Consequently, I would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division.
For reversal—Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Clifford and Sciireiber and Judge Conford— 6.
For affirmance—Justice Pashman—1.

The introductory clause and subsection p. of N. J. S. A. 26:3-31 provide:
The local board of health shall have power to pass, alter or amend ordinances and make rules and regulations in regard to the public health within its jurisdiction, for the following purposes:
p. To act as the agent for a landlord in the engaging of repairmen and the ordering of any parts necessary to restore to operating condition the furnace, boiler or other equipment essential to the proper heating of any residential unit rented by said landlord, provided, *442however, that at least 24 hours have- elapsed since the tenant has lodged a complaint with the local board of health, prior to which a bona fide attempt has been made by the tenant to notify the landlord of the failure of the heating equipment, and the landlord has failed to take appropriate action, and the outside air temperature is less than 55° F.
Any person who supplies material or services in accordance with this section shall bill the landlord directly and by filing a notice approved by the local board of health, with the county clerk, shall have a lien on the premises where the materials were used or services supplied.