Court Opinion

ID: 9693460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:42:55.333831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:47.225819
License: Public Domain

Larson, J.
— On the 3rd of August, 1952, petitioner, James Bawden McCandless, was arrested in Polk County, Iowa, and charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. He was bound over to the grand jury and released on a bond which was furnished by a relative with whom he resided near Webster City, Iowa. Petitioner’s bond provided for his appearance at the next term of the District Court in and for Polk County “to be begun and held at Des Moines * # * on the 2d day of September, A. D. 1952,” there and then to answer the charge against him. The grand jury returned an indictment against petitioner McCandless on the 10th of October, 1952, charging him with the crime of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense. Warrant was issued for his arrest and said information communicated by radio to the office of the sheriff of Hamilton County, though there is no showing it was- ever received by the sheriff. Nevertheless there was no reply from that officer, no *602further action shown by the Polk County sheriff’s office to obtain custody of the accused, and no attempt by the accused to depart from his usual abode. On April 23, 1953, defendant was called in open court, failed to answer, and his bond declared forfeited. Petitioner contends he had no knowledge of his indictment until a notice was served April 27, 1953, upon his bondsman. Hearing was set for the 11th of May, 1953, to show cause why judgment should not be entered on the bond. Petitioner and his counsel appeared in court on said date, the bond forfeiture was set aside, and the petitioner formally arraigned under the indictment. Thereupon petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, stating as grounds the provisions of sections 795.2 and 795.3, Code of Iowa, 1950. It appeared that the accused had lived in Des Moines and worked there within a few7 blocks of the courthouse most of the time from the latter part of September 1952 until the hearing, but had never inquired of the court or of court officials as to the status of his matter. He did visit at his home near Webster City frequently and said he kept in touch with his attorney there who was representing him in this and other matters. His attorney had written several letters to the Polk County Attorney regarding the charge, most of which pertained to the attorney’s view that there was insufficient evidence for consideration or presentment to the grand jury. The last of these letters was dated September 2, 1952, and stated:
“With reference to the above case, w7e have had no further w7ord from your office with reference to your intended disposition of the matter. In the event that the defendant is to be indicted, we will produce him for arraignment at your request bn two days notice if that is agreeable with you. Inasmuch as the plea will be not guilty, we also request that in such event, the case be set for trial to a day certain in order that we may be on hand for trial.”
The Polk County Attorney replied on September 4, 1952, as follows: “The OMVI charge against the above named defendant [James McCandless] has not yet been heard by the Polk County Grand Jury. Please be assured that I will keep you advised of whatever action the Grand Jury takes on this case.”
*603Petitioner maintains that, as he had heard nothing through his attorney or otherwise, he had a right to assume that the matter had been dropped, though he had not inquired at the Polk County courthouse nor requested that his bond be exonerated.
The terms of the District Court in Polk County commenced on September 2, 1952, November 3,1952, January 5, 1953, March 2, 1953, and May 4, 1953, and each term duly concluded without calling the accused for trial until April 23, 1953. The petit jury for the March term, 1953, was discharged on or about April 10, 1953. Thus there appears no dispute as to the passage of three terms of court between the time of petitioner’s indictment and April 23, 1953, when his case was first called for trial.
In overruling petitioner’s motion to dismiss the iudictment against him, the respondent judge stated that he had very serious doubts if the statutes involved begin to run until after arraignment. He also held that there was shown “ample good excuse here” for not bringing petitioner to an earlier trial. Thereupon petitioner instituted this proceeding in certiorari to review the court’s ruling.
 I. The statutory period is applicable whether the accused is arrested and arraigned or not. We discussed this matter in Hottle v. District Court, 233 Iowa 904, 11 N.W.2d 30, and held that while the court did not have jurisdiction over the person of the accused until he was served under the indictment, the court could on its own motion dismiss the indictment in a proper showing under these sections. We discussed there the contention of the state that, because the accused had never been arrested upon warrant issued under the indictment, he could not move to dismiss the indictment for the reason that the court does not obtain jurisdiction until the arrest, under the decision in State v. Judkins, 200 Iowa 1234, 206 N.W. 119. We further distinguished between that situation and cases involving a “speedy trial”, and concluded while the rule in the Judkins case was correct, it did not apply to a motion to dismiss an indictment for failure to provide a speedy trial. We conclude, therefore, the motion to dismiss the indictment was proper under *604the considered statutes regardless of whether or not there had been an arrest under the indictment.
II. As in a number of like appeals, we are again called upon for an interpretation and application of the constitutional guaranty of a speedy trial, as defined by the provisions of section 795.2 and section 795.3, Code of Iowa, 1950. Section 795.2 provides: “If a defendant indicted for a public offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial at the next regular term of the court in which the indictment is triable after the same is found, the court must order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown.”
Section 795.3 provides: “If the defendant be not indicted or tried as above provided, and sufficient reason therefor is shown, the court may order the prosecution continued from term to term, and discharge the defendant from custody on his own undertaking, or on the undertaking of bail for his appearance to answer the charge at the time to which the same is continued, but no continuance under this section shall be extended beyond the following three terms of the court.”
The nature of the above quoted sections is a statutory definition of the term “speedy trial” as conceived by the particular legislature enacting it, with the purpose in mind of more effectively enforcing the constitutional guaranty. Pines v. District Court, 233 Iowa 1284, 10 N.W.2d 574.
These sections should be read together and are interpreted to mean that if “good cause” is shown the court may continue the case, but not beyond three terms of court (Davison v. Garfield, 219 Iowa 1258, 257 N.W. 432, 260 N.W. 667; Paul v. District Court, 231 Iowa 1027, 2 N.W.2d 751) unless accused waives in some manner his statutory and constitutional privilege of a speedy trial. Pines v. District Court, supra.
The rule in most jurisdictions now is clear. In order for an accused to enjoy the privilege of a “speedy trial”, he must make a demand to the court for an early trial. If he fails to do so he waives not only the privilege provided by the constitution but the requirement of the statutes as well, and it is therefore unnecessary for the state to show “good cause” for the *605delay. Thus we conclude the privilege afforded the accused for an early trial is considered waived when no demand is made to the court, and there can be no dismissal of the charge solely on the ground that “good cause” for the continuance was not shown by the state. It is only after the demand has been made to the court that the statutory provisions become effective and place the burden on the state to show “good cause” for a continuance. To this extent we now alter our holding in Davison v. Garfield, supra.
III. Petitioner complains bitterly that he was injured when he relied upon the promise of the Polk County Attorney that his lawyer would be kept “advised of whatever action the Grand Jury takes on this case.” This may or may not be true. The petitioner and his counsel chose to rely upon the promise in the county attorney’s letter. They were not compelled or authorized in law to do so. This transaction, nevertheless, is little more than petitioner’s misplaced confidence or a failure of the county attorney to carry through on a courtesy he personally assumed. It cannot be held binding on the court or the state nor relieve the defendant from his promise in the bond filed in court guaranteeing his appearance. To hold otherwise would not appeal to reason, for the law does not confer upon the county attorney the right to dismiss any indictment without the court’s approval. In an effort to punish the county attorney for his neglect it is unthinkable to provide such indirect authority in him at the expense of public safety and welfare. Furthermore, we have been cited no authority, nor have we been able to locate any, holding that under such circumstances a county attorney may relieve one accused from the obligations of his bond. The trial court held this an insufficient excuse for defendant’s'failure to appear in court as required by his bond, and we agree. In so deciding we do not offer an excuse for the failure of the Polk County officer for not keeping a promise to petitioner’s counsel or for failing to use greater diligence in taking the petitioner into custody after the indictment. However, in the ease of Pines v. District Court, supra, we held that the defendant was not relieved from his responsibility to appear in court to answer an indictment even though he was available *606for arrest and was not arrested and brought before the court for that purpose nor pursuant to a bond forfeiture action.
It has been well said that the rights given the accused by the constitution and our statutes are shields, not weapons, and being so intended by the legislature, we must give meaning to that intent. If this is true, what must one do in order to use the shield? Must the state carry it for him? We think not.
In the case of People of State of New York v. Davis, 168 Misc. 511, 514, 5 N. Y. S.2d 411, 414, the court said: “* * * there is no obligation on the part of the district attorney to give the defendant notice of the particular day on which he proposes to move the case of the People against the defendant”, and we find no statutory duty in Iowa that requires the county attorney to notify a defendant in default of his bond that he will act against him at any certain time. Such notices are from the court, not the county attorney, and so here the petitioner must rely solely on negotiations with the court in relation to any charge against him to avoid a waiver of the privilege of a “speedy trial.”
 Petitioner argues that the statutes involved herein set up a legislative policy of imposing upon the officers of the state the affirmative duty of speedy action to bring the accused to trial and that his inferred consent to delay is of no force, and that his failure to demand trial cannot be held a waiver of the constitutional right. It is true these statutes have a dual purpose and were also intended to eliminate delays in criminal cases by imposing upon officers, especially the courts, the affirmative duty to speed them, but the accused cannot absolve himself of his responsibility for the delay unless he appeals to the court, especially in cases where the matter is not yet before the court. Where the defendant is on bail and does not appear in court demanding trial, he has little reason to complain of the delay. Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N.E. 991, 35 L. R. A. 176, 54 Am. St. Rep. 447. He is not under the oppression of the goi'ernment which the provisions were designed to prevent.
IV. It is the general rule, now well established, that if acts or omissions of the accused are the cause of or a contributing factor in the delay which passes the trial over the second *607or subsequent term, he should not be entitled to a dismissal. Such acts, or failure to act when one is bound to do so, may give rise to an agreed postponement, or to a waiver of those constitutional and statutory provisions herein considered. Pines v. District Court, supra.
The purpose of section 795.2 and section 795.3 and the provisions in section 10 of Article I of the Iowa Constitution as well as the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, we have repeatedly said, were.-to relieve one accused of the hardship of indefinite incarceration, or the anxiety of suspended prosecution if at liberty on bail, and to require the courts and peace officers to proceed in the trial of criminal charges with such reasonable promptness as proper administration of justice demands. We discussed fully this object of establishing definiteness in the term “speedy trial” by enacting statutes such as those herein involved in the case of Pines v. District Court, supra, and shall not burden this opinion with a restatement of them now.
Most other jurisdictions agree with our Iowa rule. In Hembree v. Howell, 90 Okla. Cr. 371, 214 P.2d 458, the court held that where the defendant is on bail, the presumption is that delay in trial is caused by or with his consent, and the record must affirmatively show that he demanded trial or resisted continuance, but if he is not on bail, the law makes demand for him, and prosecution has the burden of showing lawful cause for delay, citing State ex rel. Davis v. Bayless, 38 Okla. Cr. 129, 259 P. 606. See Hottle v. District Court, 233 Iowa 904, 11 N.W.2d 30.
The Minnesota court, in passing on matters similar, said in State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153, 155, 216 N.W. 787, 788: “The right to a speedy trial is valuable. * * * It is a privilege to the accused. If he does not claim it, he should not complain. It may be waived. The statute is a means of enforcing the constitutional provision. The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this he must be held, in law, to have waived the privilege. Until he has so acted the state is not called upon to establish the existence of the statutory ‘good cause.’” (Italics ours.)
*608We quoted from this decision with favor in Pines v. District Court, supra. We also held in State v. Rowley, 198 Iowa 613, 615, 198 N.W. 37, 38, 199 N.W. 369, that the provisions of our statute herein considered are for the benefit of an accused person who claims its protection. We said therein: “It may be waived by him.”
■  In People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 250, 246 N.W. 60, 61, the court held that the proper method of making demand for speedy trial is by motion filed in the cause or made in open court, and when the defendants are out on bail they waive the constitutional right to a speedy trial by not demanding it. It further held: “The demands, whatever their character, made on the circuit judge at chambers and on the prosecuting officers, were not sufficient. * * * The rights of defendants are for determination and protection of the court. The demand must be made to the court.” (Italics ours.) Here also the duty of the petitioner was to appeal to the court, and it is not sufficient to show a demand on the county attorney or to rely upon such communication in lieu of his duty to appear in court as required by his bond. The requirement under our statute is that one so charged, or his counsel, must appear in court or file a formal demand or request for an early trial, and such a request or demand to any other officer will not suffice. We must here construe the petitioner’s failure to so act amounted to a waiver on his part that indicated no desire, interest in, or willingness to secure an early disposition of the charge against him, the anxious inquiry of his counsel prior to the submission of the matter to the grand jury notwithstanding.
We have already established in the case of Pines v. District Court, supra, that it will take but little more in the nature of surrounding circumstances to constitute a waiver of any right to a dismissal under these sections, for there the court said at page 1301 of 233 Iowa, page 583 of 10 N.W.2d: “It is our conclusion that the petitioner, not having resisted postponement, nor demanded a trial, nor made any effort to bring his ease on for trial, waived any right to a dismissal under the provisions of section 14024” (now 795.2). The facts herein, we believe, justify the finding by the trial court that the accused agreed *609to the postponement, or that the accused waived his right to a dismissal under the statutes. The court’s refusal to dismiss under the requirement of the statutes here involved was within its discretion and was correct.
We can see no sufficient or valid reason for petitioner’s failure, after the close of the September term of court on or about November 3, 1952, to appear in court to answer or be relieved of his bond obligation. In this failure he was at fault. Petitioner’s duty to appear as required by his bond was not relieved by the county attorney’s communication. We are unable, therefore, to accept petitioner’s excuse for not presenting himself to the court, or at least renewing his inquiry after the September term of court had expired. ITis strange silence after receiving the county attorney’s letter early in September is not convincing that he desired or had an interest in a speedy disposition of the pending charge against him. The most plausible indication of his desire was that petitioner was agreeable to the indefinite postponement of any action against him.
Petitioner complained further that he pleaded guilty to a like charge in Harding County, relying on an assumed dismissal of this charge, and would be further prejudiced in now being forced to face the Polk County indictment. The court however ordered no change in the charge in the case at bar, so that the accused will not be required to face a charge of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense. We feel this was fair and was a sufficient concession to defendant for his reliance on the county attorney’s promise.
The Kansas court in Ex parte Van Garner, 134 Kan. 410, 412, 5 P.2d 821, 822, said: “But it does not follow that the petitioners are to go scot free without answering to justice for their alleged crimes because the provision of the crime code intended to secure them a speedy trial was not complied with. Ever since their arrest these petitioners were represented by counsel. * * * They were quite content to let the term go by without calling the court’s attention to their statutory right of trial at that term.” (Italics ours.)
The federal decisions are in accord, for in Pietch v. United States, 10 Cir., Okla., 110 F.2d 817, 819, 129 A. L. R. 563, 567, *610certiorari denied, 310 U. S. 648, 60 S. Ct. 1100, 84 L. Ed. 1414, the court said: “A person charged with a crime cannot assert with success that his right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth 'Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has been invaded unless he asked for a trial. In the absence of an affirmative request or demand for trial made to the court it must be presumed that appellant acquiesced in the delay and therefore cannot complain”, citing cases. (Italics ours.)
That this is the general rule in most jurisdictions there can be no doubt. For a list of cases in various states, see Pines v. District Court, supra, 233 Iowa 1284, at 1299, 10 N.W.2d 574.
In the case of State v. McTague, supra, 173 Minn. 153, 154, 216 N.W. 787, 788, the court said: “The constitutional and statutory provisions for a speedy trial are for the protection of the defendant, but that does not mean that the state is the only one that may initiate action. There is really no reason for the courts to free an accused simply because a dilatory prosecutor has ‘gone to sleep at the switch’ * * * while the defendant and his counsel rest in silence.”
The accused must act in some way to assert his right to an immediate trial, and if he fails to call the court’s attention to his demand, this failure will justify a finding by the* court that he waives the privilege of a speedy trial. This is the meaning of our statutes and the purpose of the constitutional provision. Logic does not demand that we reward one charged with a crime for the mere neglect of an officer, nor that we punish the state and society for that same failure of an officer, unless the accused in some way absolves himself from fault by at least calling the court’s attention to the matter. We are content to say that the spirit of the laws herein referred to is that the accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay, and such record and attitude must be expressed to the court. If this is not done, he is held to have waived the privilege of a speedy trial as defined in the sections herein discussed, and the state is not therefore called upon to prove good cause for a continuance.
Having found no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in holding that there was a sufficient showing to constitute an *611agreed postponement, “good cause” for the delay, and waiver, the writ of certiorari is therefore annulled.- — Writ annulled.
Garfield, Wennerstrum, Mulroney, and Smith, JJ., concur.
Thompson, J., dissents.
Hays, C. J., and Bliss and Oliver, JJ., join in the dissent.