Court Opinion

ID: 9791432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:10:45.979526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:36.294074
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hall
dissenting:
I dissent.
On December 15, 1961, three judges of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, to whom I refer as the judges, in their official capacities, commenced this action in their own court. They named as parties defendant the Board of County Commissioners of El Paso County, to whom I refer as the board.
The burden of the judges’ complaint is that they had exercised their statutory rights and performed their statutory duties in fixing the salaries of their probation officers and clerical help. They allege that their actions “in fixing each such salary [salaries] was reasonable and necessary to maintain and efficiently operate the District Court in and for El Paso County.”
They further allege that the board has arbitrarily,, capriciously and unreasonably refused to approve the' salaries fixed by the court, pursuant to C.R.S. ’53, 39-16-1 (probation officer), which provides that the judges shall fix their salaries subject to the approval of the board, and 56-3-8 (clerical help), which provides that clerical help shall receive such compensation as shall be fixed by the judges and the salary as shall be approved by the board; that the amounts approved by the board-are unreasonable.
*44The judges pray that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the board to approve the salaries as fixed by the court, or show cause why they should not be approved.
For a second claim the judges allege many of the facts set forth in their first claim, and further allege:
“That the relative legal rights, powers, duties and liabilities of the Plaintiffs [the judges] and Defendants [the board] in the matter here in controversy are affected by and dependent upon the construction and validity of two statutes, namely, Colorado Revised Statutes §§ 39-16-1 and 56-3-8 (as amended).”
They pray that their court “ * * * after finding the facts * * * construe and interpret each of said statutes, * * * declare the relative rights, powers, duties and liabilities of these parties under them, and grant the Plaintiffs * * * further * * * relief * * * and order the Defendants * * * to pay the Plaintiffs’ reasonable expenses of litigation, attorneys’ fees * * * .”
To this complaint the board filed several motions asserting that:
1. The judges have no real interest in the action and are not the real parties in interest;
2. The judges have no capacity or authority to bring the suit;
3. The court as a tribunal is without jurisdiction to bring an action in its own tribunal.
Prior to ruling on any of these motions, and on January 11, 1962, the judges filed their motion as follows:
“Come now the Plaintiffs, G. Russell Miller, William M. Calvert, and David W. Enoch, as the District Judges in and for the Fourth Judicial District of Colorado, by their attorneys, Jim R. Carrigan and William H. Erickson, moving this Honorable Court for an order adding Ruth M. Burns, Vera R. Bishop, Pamela Foster, Mary L. Henderson, Lee Phillips, Irene Sunde, Bernadette Mar-old, Mae Burk, Minnie Stafford, F. J. Livingston, Lillian *45Raber, and Glenn Darby as parties plaintiff, and as. grounds therefor would show * * * .
“1. That [the employees] are the individual employees and officers of the District Court * * * who have been adversely affected by the action of the Defendants [the board] in refusing to approve the salaries set [fixed] by the * * * judges * * * .
“2. That no cause of action existed in the parties-named * * * until January 1, 1962, when the salaries set by the * * * Judges * * * became, or should have become, effective.
“3. That the presence of [the employees] * * * is necessary if a full determination of the issues joined [none were then joined] in the within action is to be made.” (Emphasis supplied.)
On January 11, 1962, the same date on which the foregoing motion was filed, there was filed an amended complaint in which we find the judges and also the above named employees named as plaintiffs.
The record does not disclose that an order was ever entered, at the behest of anybody, adding the employees as plaintiffs in the action.
.The record does not disclose that the employees ever sought to become plaintiffs or ever gave their consent to become plaintiffs, or that they ever intended to become parties plaintiff or defendant to this or any other litigation, or that they are happy or unhappy with their “fixed” and “approved” salaries.
Just how individuals become parties plaintiff in a lawsuit without their knowledge, consent or expressed intention surpasses my understanding. Here we have the employees listed as parties plaintiff, aborted into the case by the judges.
We have rules of court governing parties. Provision is made for joining as defendants, upon motion, persons who should be plaintiffs but do not choose to seek redress in the courts. I find nothing in the record, in the rules, statutes or cases which gives or purports to give *46to a party plaintiff power to join his friend, enemy, neighbor, or even employee as a fellow plaintiff without authorization previously obtained from such person to be joined. In this case, however, that result, along with other innovations, appears to have been accomplished.
As I view the proceedings there are no parties to this lawsuit except the judges and the board. The effort of the judges to bring in as parties plaintiff those who have not chosen to become plaintiffs are futile and void. Individuals become parties plaintiff to a lawsuit by their own volition, not by the whim or fancy of another.
My conclusion as to a proper disposition of this matter would not be influenced by the fact that the employees are in or out of the lawsuit. However, I do wish to go on record as not sanctioning the injecting of another into litigation as plaintiff, except upon authority theretofore granted by the party to be joined as plaintiff.
From the majority opinion it would seem that the wording of the statutes involved is such as to demand that we interpret the same and determine the intention of the legislature.
In 82 C.J.S. 526, Statutes, § 311, it is said: “The purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law, and the rules or canons of construction are merely aids for ascertaining legislative intent. * * * . Such rules are useful only in cases of doubt; they are never to be used to create doubt, but only to remove it.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In McCarten v. Sanderson, 111 Mont. 407, 109 P. (2d) 1108, the court had this to say about the word “approval”:
“There is no occasion to construe the word ‘approval’ otherwise than in its usual and accepted sense; neither the context nor the apparent intention of the legislature justifies any such departure; and we must assume that the legislature meant to use the word in the full ordinary meaning, and not subject to the express mandatory *47duty imposed on the state board of acting favorably upon all applications where the statutory requirements are met, nor as a duplication of or an advisory adjunct to, the state board’s authority. The legislature found no difficulty in finding words directing the state board to issue licenses to all those found qualified under the statute; and if it had intended merely to duplicate a finding of those qualifications it could readily have directed the local authority to approve all applications, subject only to the statutory requirements. Approval’ is the opposite of ‘disapproval’; it necessarily involves discretionary power, which ordinarily is complete unless limited in some way. Since the limitation contended for does not appear in the act, either specifically or by necessary or reasonable implication, we may not read it in.”
I find nothing in the pertinent statutes that requires “interpretation.” The language is simple and plain. The words “fixed” and “approved” are words of common usage having a definite and accepted meaning, and in the context used are not new or novel. This statute has been on the books for forty-four years and applies not only to salaries of judicial help, but also to the salaries of help of county treasurers, assessors, clerks and superintendents of schools.
The legislative branch of the government is vested with the power and charged with the duty of providing funds for the proper functioning of government; this includes the levy and collection of taxes and the disbursement of available funds. Here the legislature delegated to the judges and the board certain authority to be by them exercised in furtherance of the over-all duties of the legislature.
Before concluding that the words used (“fixed” and “allowed”) are of doubtful meaning, it would seem proper to consider the legislative history of the present statutes on the subject.
In 1890 the legislature (Laws 1891, p. 310) provided that clerks of district courts should be paid specified *48.salaries, payable “out of the fees of their office.” In the same act the legislature provided that deputies “shall receive such compensation as shall be allowed by such judges(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus it appears that as early as 1891 the general .assembly saw fit to delegate to the judges the exclusive, unfettered power to determine the salaries to be received by their deputies.
In 1899 the legislature (Laws 1899, p. 333) amended the 1891 statute changing the amounts of the salaries to be paid to clerks. No other changes were made.
In 1907 the legislature (Laws 1907, p. 561) amended the 1899 law and again changed the amounts of the salaries to be paid to clerks. No other changes were made.
In 1917 the legislature (Laws 1917, p. 226) amended the 1907 laws and for the first time provided that court ■clerks should be paid out of the general fund rather than out of fees of their office. Clerks’ salaries were increased by the legislature which provided that “compensation •of the deputy clerks * * * shall be fixed by the judge.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In 1919 the legislature (Laws 1919, p. 377) again .amended the law and fixed the salaries of clerks of district courts in counties of the First Class, in Divisions A and B of all counties of the second class. Further amendment was made providing that in all other counties ■clerks should receive such annual salary as “fixed” by the judge — “But at not to exceed [specified amounts].”
In addition, the legislature very materially amended the law and provided that: “The Judges * * * may appoint * * * deputy clerks * * * at such compensation * * * as shall be fixed by such judges with the approval of the Board * * * .” (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislature did not state its reasons or motives for taking from the judges their previously legislative delegated privilege and duty of fixing salaries of deputies without interference, approval or control of anyone. *49Possibly it intended to retain some control over the actions of the individuals to whom it had given authority, and over those charged with the duty of providing money to pay lawful claims. In any event, it sought to curtail and limit the authority previously granted to judges.
In 1949 the legislature (Laws 1949, p. 402) again amended the law concerning the salaries of deputy clerks. Provision was made for the judges to “fix” compensation “as shall be approved by the Board * * * .” This language replaced the former wording, “ * * * with the approval of the Board * * * .” (Emphasis supplied.)
Though the legislature has, in 1955, 1957, and 1959, given further consideration to salary problems of the courts, it has not seen fit to abdicate, nor to relinquish control over salaries and the raising and disbursement of public funds.
By no distortion of the meaning of words can the word “disapproval” be construed to mean “approval.”
The net result of the majority opinion is that salaries are to be paid in amounts fixed by the judges and “disapproved” by the board.
The plain language used, the purpose of the amended and repeated legislation, the evil to be remedied, all point to a legislative intent repugnant to that assumed by the judiciary.
The fact that the board, an arm of the legislative branch of the government, is here claiming they never had any such intention as that ascribed to them should carry some weight.
Here, for the first time in one hundred and more years, for the first time in the history of the Territory and State of Colorado, we have the judiciary dragging the legislative branch of the government into its court for the purpose of having the judiciary determine what the legislature intended in adopting certain legislation.
The majority opinion sets forth “certain well estab*50lished rules of construction” in determining legislative intent. Among other rules stated:
“ (2) it must be assumed that the legislature acted with full knowledge or relevant constitutional provisions, inherent judicial powers existing, and of previous legislation and decisional law on the subject; that it did not intend to create a situation amounting to a departure from the general concept of democratic government; and that it sought to recognize and confirm inherent powers rather than to destroy them.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Not all of the foregoing language meets with my approval.
Particularly, I protest the statement to the effect that: * * * it must be assumed that the legislature acted with full knowledge of * * * inherent judicial powers existing, and * * * that it [the legislature] sought to recognize and confirm inherent powers rather than to destroy them.”
The majority opinion quotes with approval the following from the Findings and Conclusions of the trial judge:
“In Colorado there are repeated confirmations of the proposition that the courts have the inherent power to •carry on their functions * * * , and may incur necessary and reasonable expenses in the performance of their judicial duties and, in cases such as this one, it is the plain ministerial duty of those who control the purse to pay such expenses except only where the amounts are :so unreasonable as to affirmatively indicate arbitrary •and capricious acts. * * * .”
Here the Court is speaking of “inherent powers.” I would call the powers outlined as incidental rather than inherent. Many times we have said that arms of government have such incidental powers as are reasonably necessary to perform its functions. Here the judges have the necessary help, the employees are performing their duties, and none has submitted a voucher that has not been paid, and the court has not been curtailed in the performance of its functions.
*51The majority states that it must be assumed that the legislature “sought to recognize and confirm inherent powers rather than to destroy them.” I assume no such thing. Inherent and legislative powers are mutually exclusive; if they are inherent, they are not legislative; if they are legislative, they are not inherent.
The majority opinion points out that our government is divided into three departments, and quotes with approval from Denver v. Lynch, 92 Colo. 102, 18 P. (2d) 907, as follows:
“The departments [Executive, Legislative and Judicial] are distinct from each other, and, so far as any direct control or interference is concerned, are independent of each other. More, they are superior in their respective spheres.”
I wholeheartedly subscribe to that language. Each department should take care of its own business and not interfere with or take over the business of another. However, in my opinion the majority do not apply this principle here — -rather they say, none shall interfere with the functions of the judiciary, nor shall the judiciary interfere with the legislative branch, so long as it functions in a manner that meets with the approval of the judiciary.
In 51 Am. Jur. 71, Taxation, § 42, it is said: “ * * * it is universally recognized that in the distribution of the powers of government in this country into three departments, namely, legislative, executive, and judicial, the power of taxation is peculiarly and exclusively legislative, and consequently falls to the legislature without special assignment as a part of the more general power of lawmaking. * * * .”
This court has subscribed to the foregoing in City and County of Denver v. Lewin, 106 Colo. 331, 105 P. (2d) 854, wherein we said:
“ ‘The legislature must determine all questions of state necessity, discretion or policy involved in ordering a tax and in apportioning it; must make all the necessary *52rules and regulations which are to be observed in order to produce the desired returns, and must decide upon the agencies by means of which collections shall be made. The courts cannot review the determination of the legislature in regard thereto. * * * .’ ” — 1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th Ed., p. 169, § 67.
“ ‘The taxing power of the state is exclusively a legislative function, and taxes can be imposed only in pursuance of legislative authority, there being no such thing as taxation by implication. Subject to the fundamental or organic limitations on the power of the state, the legislature has plenary power on the matter of taxation, and it alone has the right and discretion to determine all questions of time, method, nature, purpose, and extent in respect of the imposition of taxes, the subjects on which the power may be exercised, and all the incidents pertaining to the proceedings from beginning to end; and the exercise of such discretion, within constitutional limitations, is not subject to judicial control. * * * .’ 61 C.J., pp. 81-83, § 10.”
The final order of the trial court (October 17, 1962) contains the following somewhat persuasive language:
“Now, therefore, this court * * *, do command you * * * as members of the Board of County Commissioners * * * to allow for payment and cause to be paid the said monthly salaries [fixed by the judges and disapproved by the board] * * * and make known * * * to this court * * * on or before * * * November 5, 1962, how you have executed this writ, * * * (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, we have orderly legislative procedures set up for county government. We have the board vested with powers and charged with duties to (1) approve salaries; (2) prepare a budget wherein is included anticipated costs of operation of the county government (including salaries of necessary help); (3) to levy and collect taxes in such amount as will meet the budget requirements; *53(4) to audit and approve vouchers for proper charges incurred in government operations.
In this case the judiciary has invaded the exclusive domain of the legislative branch of the government. The board is under judicial mandate to perform its functions, not according to provisions of the legislative enactments, but according to directions of the court.
The legislature directed the board, as an arm of the legislative branch, to pay to county employees such salaries as it approves; the court says, you pay such salaries as we approve; the legislature told the board to annually prepare and “pass a resolution to be termed the annual appropriation resolution * * * in which said board shall appropriate such sum or sums of money as may be deemed necessary to defray all necessary expenses and liabilities of such county.”
Implicit in the decision in this case and the mandate is the direction to the board that it include in its appropriation resolution amounts fixed by the judges and disapproved by the board. Compliance with the mandate of the court requires the board to approve that which it disapproves; to audit and approve for payment vouchers which it in fact disapproves; to levy taxes in an amount that it does not sanction, and to disburse public funds in an amount in excess of that which it approves or sanctions.
In my opinion the judiciary has here not only interfered with the legislative functions — it has completely occupied the area involved.
Here we have the judiciary seeking and obtaining a judicial mandate directed to the board, presumably under Rule 106(a) and (2), R.C.P. Colo.:
“(a) * * * In the following cases relief may be obtained by appropriate action * * * :
❖ ❖ *
“ (2) Where the relief sought is to compel an inferior tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to perform *54an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, * * * .”
The judges apparently had no difficulty in concluding that the board is inferior and proceeded accordingly. I do not consider either party as inferior; in fact, both are supreme in their respective areas — the judicial and the legislative branches of our government. Clearly the judiciary sought to and did impose its will on the board in an area in which the board is charged with the exercise of its own judgment.
In its second claim the judiciary seeks to have the judiciary construe and interpret statutes and declare the relative rights and duties of the judiciary, as provided by Rule 57, R.C.P. Colo., or C.R.S. ’53, 77-11-1 to 15, which gives legislative effect to the rule. I find nothing in the rule authorizing the judiciary to institute an action seeking to have the judiciary declare the rights and duties of the judiciary. Clearly it was never intended that the judiciary be a party plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action, its part in such proceedings cannot extend beyond availability to act in such proceedings at the behest of “any person interested under a deed, will * * * or whose rights * * * are affected by a statute * * * .”
It would seem that the employees or any of them could have proceeded to have their rights under the statutes declared. As pointed out above, none of them sought the aid of the court; none are in reality parties to this litigation.
The majority opinion contains the following language to which I cannot subscribe:
“While we affirm this judgment in the interest of a speedy determination of the issues involved, we do not determine that the procedure employed is the exclusive remedy by which enforcement of a judicial prerogative may be obtained.”
To state that “ * * * we do not determine that the procedure employed is the exclusive remedy * * * ,” *55is redundant; it is no answer to the long and loud contentions of the board that the procedures are without precedent, wrong and void.
The words “judicial prerogative” are defined by Black as: “An exclusive or peculiar privilege. The special power, privilege, immunity, or advantage vested in an official person, either generally, or in respect to the things of his office, or in an official body, as a court or legislature.”
The privileges sought to be exercised by the judges here are, in my opinion, indeed peculiar, and to that extent the judges have brought themselves well within Black’s definition.
The judiciary is often accused (and I apprehend at times with justification) of judicial legislation. Here we boldly drag the legislature before us, make a frontal attack, and with our undefined, inherent powers, and judicial prerogatives, strike down legislation in an area that this court has said (Denver v. Lewin, supra) is under the exlusive jurisdiction of the legislature.
I dissent and disapprove of this proceeding in its entirety.