Court Opinion

ID: 9721796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:09:40.981788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:28.752871
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority's opinion holding that the trial judge did not properly advise Defendant-Petitioner Johnson before accepting his guilty plea because the trial judge failed to specifically advise Petitioner that his prior convictions could be considered aggravating circumstances for sentencing purposes, As the majority point out, this action pertains to a petition for post-conviction relief and Petitioner *979therefore has the burden of proof and stands in the shoes of one appealing from a negative judgment. The trial judge as trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and of the credibility of the witnesses. Only when the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion which the trial court did not reach will the trial court's post-conviction decision be disturbed as contrary to law. Neal v. State, (1983) Ind., 447 N.E.2d 601; Neville v. State, (1982) Ind., 439 N.E.2d 1358.
I believe the majority's opinion is based on an erroneous interpretation of Ind.Code § 85-4.1-1-3(d) (Burns 1979). It is my opinion that the Court of Appeals properly interpreted this statute in VanDerberg v. State, (1982) Ind.App., 434 N.E.2d 936. Writing for the Third District, Judge Hoffman found that § 85-4.1-1-8(d) did not require the trial court to always inform the defendant that his prior convictions could result in an aggravated sentence. Judge Hoffman specifically wrote:
"A trial court needs to discuss the prior convictions only when there is a possibility that the maximum sentence provided for in the individual sentencing statutes may be increased because of a prior conviction or convictions. Once the trial court informs a defendant of the maximum sentence for the offense charged, it fulfills its statutory obligation. Trial courts need not inform a defendant of the aggravating circumstances which could result in an increase to the presumptive sentence. To the extent that Bullock v. State, [ (1980) Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 1220] holds otherwise, it misconstrues IC 1971, 35-4.1-1-8."
VanDerberg, Ind.App., 4834 N.E.2d at 988. There are many penalty statutes in Indiana which provide a maximum and minimum sentence for a guilty verdict or plea and which further provide that if the defendant previously has been convicted of the same crime, the rank of the then pending conviction is raised to require a more severe penalty. An example of such a penalty statute was considered by this Court in Sweet v. State, (1982) Ind., 439 N.E.2d 1144, reh. denied (1988). Appellant Sweet was charged with having knowingly delivered marijuana in an amount under thirty grams pursuant to Ind.Code § 85-48-4-10 (Burns Supp.1982). Indiana's penal code specifically aggravates a drug dealing offense from class A misdemeanor status to class B felony status when the person charged previously has been convicted of an offense involving marijuana or hashish. Another example of such a statute is Ind.Code § 9-11-2-8 (Burns Supp.1983) whereby a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated is increased to class D felony status if the defendant previously has been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Moreover, our penal statutes generally increase a crime from class C felony status to class B or class A felony status when a weapon is used or injury results in the commission of the crime. I1 believe, therefore, that the legislature intended § 35-4.1-1-3(d) to require a trial court to advise a defendant of the effect of these penal statutes on the sentencing which follows a guilty plea only if a defendant's prior convictions might result in that defendant receiving a sentence in excess of the maximum provided by statute for the charged crime and announced by the trial judge. It appears to me to be a straining of . the meaning and interpretation of this statute to hold that the legislature intended to require that the trial judge must always advise the defendant of all aggravating circumstances which might influence the trial judge in increasing the presumptive sentence.
The trial judge in the instant case informed Petitioner that the presumptive sentence for the crime of murder to which he was pleading guilty was forty years which could be reduced by mitigating factors or increased by aggravating factors. The trial judge further advised Petitioner that the trial judge had before him a document by which the prosecution indicated that it would argue for an increase over the presumptive sentence. The document also indicated that Petitioner would move for a mitigation of the presumptive sentence. The trial judge asked Petitioner if he was *980aware of said document and its contents and Petitioner said that he was. The document considered and referred to by the trial judge was a plea bargain agreement signed by Petitioner's trial counsel, Petitioner and the prosecuting attorney. Said document specifically stated:
"Further, at the time of sentencing, the State of Indiana will argue for incarceration and an aggravated sentence, and the defendant will argue for mitigation of sentence with the ultimate decision relative to the sentence to be imposed in this action to be left to the discretion of the judge."
Petitioner admitted killing the victim although he claimed that the victim attacked him first because of a personal argument 'they had. Petitioner specifically claimed that the vietim took a swing at him with his knife which Petitioner then took from her and used to slash her throat; when the victim fell into some water, Petitioner held her under the water with his foot until she stopped moving. By his statements to the trial court and by his statements reported in the presentence report, Petitioner claimed that his "problems" resulted from his illicit use of drugs. The evidence adduced at trial in fact showed that Petitioner had a lengthy criminal record dating from 1975 which indicated many convictions for the use and sale of various illicit drugs and for various types of larceny and theft. The trial court found that Petitioner's sentence should be enhanced by ten years beyond the presumptive sentence of forty years due to the nature of the offense and due to Petitioner's criminal background.
Petitioner was exhaustively advised and examined by the trial court regarding all of his rights and the alternatives he faced upon entering a plea of guilty to this crime. Petitioner did not carry his burden to show that the advice given to him before entering his guilty plea was in any way deficient. I therefore dissent to the majority's opinion and would affirm the trial court.
GIVAN, C.J., concurs.