Court Opinion

ID: 9465567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:50:03.936979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:14.873154
License: Public Domain

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Because I conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial of these defendants-appellees on the conspiracy count in question, I would dismiss the Government’s appeal which does not lie under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 where the Clause prohibits further prosecution.
The dispositive questions turn on an examination of what occurred during and after the six days of trial of these defendants on the conspiracy count and several substantive counts, these defendants all being charged in the conspiracy count (count 1) and at least one substantive count. To me, the record shows clearly that the trial court denied motions to dismiss the conspiracy charge for duplicity in alleging several conspiracies, that the court ruled that more than one conspiracy was shown on the basis of the evidence, that at the time that ruling was announced the court contemplated a retrial of the conspiracy and other counts with the Government being required to restructure its proof of conspiracy, but that the court later reconsidered and dismissed the conspiracy count as to these defendants 15 days later by the order in question, not then contemplating a retrial.
The trial court’s order of June 23, 1978, which is sought to be appealed herein, states that when the docket was sounded each of these defendants moved to dismiss count 1, asserting that they were being charged with multiple conspiracies, citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557. The order points out that the court denied the motions to dismiss and stated it would be necessary to hear the Government’s proof before the Court could determine whether there was a variance between the one conspiracy charged and the proof. (XI R. 240-41).
The order points out further that after six days of trial the court was forced to declare a mistrial because of failure of the Government to furnish Jencks Act materials. And the order then says that defendants again urged the court to dismiss the conspiracy count because the proof had shown multiple conspiracies and the “court stated from the bench that the proof so far as these seven defendants were concerned, did show multiple conspiracies.” (Id. at 241).
The record of the proceedings in court and the trial court’s remarks reveal the same developments. At the conclusion of the six days of trial the court announced orally both his declaration of the mistrial because of the Jencks Act problem and his belief “that the evidence in this case shows more than one conspiracy.” The remedy for the latter ruling was “that it will be incumbent upon the Government so far as a new trial is concerned to focus effort as far as conspiracies are concerned with respect to at least the two conspiracies that I have indicated, and the participants in those matters.” (IX R. 960). And the court further said (id. at 961):
. I think effort will have to be made in connection with any such retrial by the United States attorney, and counsel for the defendants, and the Court to *950focus the trial in a manner so that what I conceive to be a situation in this case which is forbidden by the Tenth Circuit case and the Supreme Court case to avoid that, to avoid having that circumstance arise in connection with the next trial, if there be one.
The court had just discussed Kotteakos and United States v. Butler, 494 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir.) and their treatment of the multiple conspiracy problem.
The court also stated that “[mjistrial is going to be granted on all counts.” (Id. at 963). And although further request for dismissal was made of the conspiracy count, that request was rejected, the court remarking that dismissal was not the court’s position and that the Butler opinion had remanded for a new trial. (Id. at 965).
Thus, at the time the rulings were announced at the end of the six days of trial, the trial court did clearly contemplate a‘ new trial on the conspiracy count along with the substantive counts.
However, there are other critical facts in our record. Toward the end of the proceedings when counsel pressed again the point that the court should instead dismiss the conspiracy count the court refused to dismiss that count but stated (id. at 966):
Well, the Court has been thinking about that. I have steadfastly told you that I would not rule on those motions until I heard all the evidence in the Government’s case. That would have been my position but for this other matter which arose today. Now, if, in view of what has occurred, you are certainly not precluded from, if you think you can demonstrate to me that the law is that I ought to dismiss, you will be permitted to file such a motion and a brief in support thereof. At the present time my ruling is simply that there is going to be a mistrial.
Fifteen days later, the question was reconsidered. And instead of refusing to dismiss the conspiracy count and scheduling a retrial on that count, the court dismissed the count by its order of June 23, 1978. The order pointed out that the Government’s motion to reconsider an order of severance entered on June 141 had caused the court to reexamine the question of dismissal and its earlier view under Butler “that it would not be necessary to dismiss count 1 of the indictment . . . ” (XI R. 241). After discussing the problem further, the order concluded that “the facts in the case as to these seven defendants are sufficiently parallel to the facts set forth in Kotteakos as to require dismissal of count 1.” This conclusion was said to be “limited to the evidence which was addressed in the trial against the above named seven defendants . . . ” (id. at 241) and was not applicable to defendants tried earlier. The order dismissed count 1. (Id. at 242).
From the whole of the record it seems clear to me that on reconsideration the trial court dismissed the conspiracy count without any provision for a retrial of that charge, and that it did so not on a defect in the indictment, but on failure of the Government to prove the single conspiracy it. set out to prove, the evidence showing more than one conspiracy. And the court stated also that “with respect to each of [the two separate conspiracies shown on planting and growing marihuana, and on picking up and returning marihuana from south Texas] as to some of these defendants on trial there is a clear absence of any showing- of any participation by those defendants in either of those conspiracies except to the extent that they may have been buyers or purchasers of marihuana.” (IX R. 959-60) (Emphasis added).
It is true that the court said there was some proof of more than one conspiracy and in that sense this in not a case where the trial court finds no proof of any guilt. Nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence of six days of trial the court found that the Government did not prove the single overall conspiracy charged. In this situation, where jeopardy had attached and the ruling *951on the defect in the Government’s case was based on the proof, a dismissal was proper. In similar circumstances a judgment of acquittal has been entered and dismissal has been directed of an overall conspiracy-charge. Fernandez v. United States, 329 F.2d 899, 905, 909 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832, 85 S.Ct. 62, 13 L.Ed.2d 40 (as to the petition for certiorari of the defendants whose other convictions were affirmed); see 8 Moore’s Federal Practice 18.06[4], p. 8-44; but see United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040, 92 S.Ct. 1311, 31 L.Ed.2d 581.
Our Butler case did remand for a new trial as to one defendant in similar circumstances. However I do not feel that this disposition can be made in view of Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1.2 And I do not believe a retrial can be justified under United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168, which held appealable a dismissal for preindictment delay, or Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 53 L.Ed.2d 80, which concerned a prior dismissal after the evidence was heard but for a defect in the information. Here the dismissal was based on the evidence and the Government’s failure to prove the single conspiracy charged. Thus this case is closer to the problem of insufficiency of the evidence in Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64-73, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43, and double jeopardy is involved.
We have focused considerable attention here on what the trial judge actually did rule and whether he intended to retry the conspiracy count. That is of significance, particularly so that we know what we are reviewing and affirming or setting aside. However, the vital safeguard of the Double Jeopardy Clause is not measured by the intention or discretion of the trial court or this court. Availability of the constitutional safeguard is a question of law, and it should not be given a narrow, grudging application which would deprive it of much of its significance. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199.
After examining the Government’s evidence presented in six days of trial, the trial judge concluded that the Government failed to establish the single overall conspiracy it set out to prove. To subject these defendants to a retrial on the conspiracy count would compel them to “run the gantlet” twice. Green v. United States, supra at 190, 78 S.Ct. 221. Concluding that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the defendants from retrial on that charge, I would dismiss the appeal.

. This order had severed the substantive counts from trial with the conspiracy count and severed the substantive counts from each other for retrial. (XI R. 237).

. Burks was decided June 14, 1978. The order of dismissal in question was filed June 23, 1978.