Court Opinion

ID: 9720898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:44:16.82538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.078878
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
concurring in result.
I agree that the record is sufficient to enable a trier of fact to find that the defendant knew of his right to trial by jury and that by tendering a plea of no contest he was waiving that right.
Assuming, but not conceding, that the burden should properly be placed on a defendant to assert *752and prove manifest injustice, as indicated in section 2.1, ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, that burden is satisfied by the defendant simply pointing to a record silent as to the waiver of a constitutional right. Otherwise, the decision cannot be reconciled with the language of Mr. Justice Douglas in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274: “Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. * * * Second, is the right to trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 491. * * * We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.” (Emphasis supplied.)
McCown and Hastings, JJ., join in this concurrence.