Court Opinion

ID: 9543495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:45:56.911962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:26.159467
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WELCH,1  dissenting: I agree with the majority’s finding that mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. However, in this case, the facts reveal more than mere propinquity. Defendant was initially suspected of being a felon, Clyde Jines, with an outstanding warrant. At that time Officer Wagner did not have an identification of the suspected felon Jines, except that Jines was traveling with McLean, who was also a felon with an outstanding warrant. Officer Wagner knew and recognized McLean. Furthermore, when arrested defendant neither objected to being called Jines nor offered any identification to indicate that he was not Jines. I also disagree with majority’s finding that the State lacked proof to link defendant to the items found on McLean or in the suspect vehicle. Defendant walked into the pawnshop with McLean and asked the owner how much she was paying for gold and tried to sell her two gold rings. Prior to entering the pawnshop, a neighborhood woman saw McLean and defendant get out of the Ford Torino in which other officers found stolen goods from the Dunn and Neff burglaries. Furthermore, defendant possessed stolen goods prior to the victim’s (Dunn’s) discovery of the burglary. In addition, the Neff and Dunn burglaries happened not only in close proximity to the pawnshop but also within hours of each other and within hours of the defendant’s arrest at the pawnshop. Thus, I find that the State established more than mere propinquity of the defendant to McLean and as such the items found on McLean and defendant are not subject to exclusion. Although I agree with the majority’s finding that defendant’s consent was voluntary, I do not agree with the majority’s finding that the consent was obtained through the exploitation of the unlawful arrest. I find, as majority does, that the record does not indicate whether any Miranda warnings were given and that the consent was given three hours after arrest and while defendant was in jail. However, I disagree with all other points in the majority’s opinion regarding this point. During the three hours in custody, police properly identified defendant and the goods. Since the arrest was initiated by an honest mistaken identity, the actions of the police officers were not purposeful or flagrant official misconduct. Further, the intervening circumstances dissipated the taint involving the initial arrest, transportation to the station, discovery of defendant’s true identity and eventual discovery of the connection of the seized goods with the Dunn and Neff recent burglaries. Since less is required by way of intervening circumstances where there is an absence of any purposeful and flagrant official misconduct, as the majority states, I find these are sufficient intervening circumstances to dissipate the taint of the consent. Thus, the items seized in the search of defendant’s home are not subject to exclusion. In addition, the evidence found on the defendant at the time of the arrest and the search of his home would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means. (Nix v. Williams (1984), 467 U.S. 431, 444-45, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 387-88, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509-10.) Especially, in this case, the arresting officer acted in good faith believing defendant was Clyde Jines. The other officers responded in good faith to the arresting officer’s call for assistance and to a call to look for a Ford Torino with stolen license plates. For the foregoing reasons, I would have reversed the trial court’s findings.   Justice Welch replaces Justice Jones, who retired after the cause was taken under advisement.