Court Opinion

ID: 9722070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:16:12.777784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:14.157251
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). The principle issue that divides the majority and minority opinions is whether the state must show, as a jurisdictional fact, that the defendant intended the drugs he sold in Florida to be distributed in Michigan. Because the harmful consequence that defendant intended and that actually occurred in Michigan was possession of the drugs in Michigan, we would hold that *495the defendant may be tried in a Michigan court for conspiracy to possess and for the possession of cocaine in Michigan on an aiding and abetting theory, where the alleged agreement with, and aid to, the Michigan resident occurred in Florida. We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the complaint, and remand this case for a preliminary examination.
I
Defendant Michael Blume is a Florida resident charged in a two-count information with conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine,1 and the manufacture or possession with intent to manufacture or to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine under an aiding and abetting theory.2 The charges stem from a June, 1988, incident involving Blume’s alleged sale of cocaine in the State of Florida to Randall Hoyt, a resident of the State of Michigan.3
Hoyt was arrested by the Michigan State Police after a search of his apartment and business yielded approximately one kilogram of cocaine. He revealed the identity of his source, and a warrant was issued for Blume’s arrest._
*496Blume was arrested in Florida and was arraigned in Michigan. After the arraignment, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on his motion to quash the warrant and complaint for lack of jurisdiction.4
Regarding the conspiracy charge, the court found that Hoyt and another resident of Michigan agreed that Hoyt would travel to Florida, purchase one kilogram of cocaine, and return to Michigan to divide the cocaine with his friend. The court found that "the Defendant did have [a] discussion with Randy Hoyt, [and] that they did discuss the sale of cocaine by Defendant to Randy Hoyt for the purpose of transporting it to Michigan to be delivered, sold, possessed . . . .”
In addition, the record reflects that in his statement to police investigators, Hoyt indicated that a later conversation with Blume contemplated the purchase of more cocaine for delivery in Michigan or Chicago, Illinois. The record also indicates that Blume acknowledged having had prior contacts with Hoyt, and that Blume admitted to phone contact with Hoyt in July or August, 1988, a conversation apparently instigated by law enforcement officers some time after the search warrant had been executed in Michigan.
Regarding the substantive count brought under an aiding and abetting theory, the district court found
that Mr. Hoyt had possession of cocaine, that he intended to deliver it, sell it, that he obtained that cocaine in Florida from Mr. Blume, that Mr. Blume sold it to him knowing that he was going to transport it to Michigan and sell it. . . ._
*497The Defendant, under the facts as I understand them, did aid and assist Mr. Hoyt in having cocaine in the State of Michigan for the purpose of delivering it. I think that a supplier, one who supplies cocaine to another, does aid and abet that person in having possession of the controlled substance with the intent to manufacture or deliver it.
The court dismissed the charges, however, and concluded that because the conspiracy did not occur in Michigan, and because no aid or encouragement was given in Michigan, Michigan did not have jurisdiction to proceed.
The circuit court reversed and ordered reinstatement. It held that both charges could be brought because they were the result of acts done in one state that were intended to produce and actually did produce detrimental effects in Michigan. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision in an unpublished opinion per curiam, decided January 15, 1992 (Docket No. 129818) at 1. We granted leave to appeal. 441 Mich 880 (1992).
II
The majority’s analysis of the evidence obscures the fact that the defendant’s motion to quash the complaint and warrant challenged only the magistrate’s determination of jurisdiction. As such, it is only necessary to determine here whether the warrant was supported by sufficient probable cause to believe that "(1) an offense has been perpetrated; (2) defendant has committed it; and (3) the magistrate has jurisdiction to act in the case.”5 *498Defendant bears the burden of establishing a ground for quashing the complaint and warrant.6
Thus, while the initial questions presented are the power of the Legislature to proscribe conduct that occurs outside its borders and the intent of the Legislature to give the conspiracy and aiding and abetting statutes extraterritorial effect, the ultimate inquiry is whether the magistrate properly determined jurisdiction to act in the case, which in turn rests on whether the defendant intended to produce a detrimental effect in Michigan.
On review of the grant or denial of a motion to quash, we do not weigh the evidence but only determine whether there is any evidence supporting the charge. Where the challenge is to the magistrate’s jurisdiction to act, we review only to determine whether there is any evidence to support the magistrate’s determination that probable cause existed to believe the defendant intended to produce a detrimental effect in Michigan. Disputed issues of fact are to be resolved by a properly instructed jury.7
*499III
Although discussion of the Legislature’s power to proscribe conduct that occurs outside its borders frequently occurs in the international law arena, the theories of legislative jurisdiction are the same whether applied between the United States and other sovereign nations or between the sovereign states.8
Unless a legislature has the power to enact the statute that seeks to proscribe extraterritorial conduct, the state may not enforce it for acts committed outside its territory. Whether the legislature possesses that power depends on various recognized principles on which the power to proscribe extraterritorial conduct is based.9
While neither courts nor commentators agree on the number or names assigned to the principles governing the exercise of legislative criminal jurisdiction,10 the most often recognized bases for exercise are:
*500(1) territorial, where[] jurisdiction is based on the place where the offense is committed; (2) national, where[ ] jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the offender; (3) protective, where[] jurisdiction is based on whether the national interest is injured; (4) universal, which amounts to physical custody of the offender; and (5) passive personality, where[ ] jurisdiction is based or the nationality or national character of the victim. [United States v Smith, 680 F2d 255, 257 (CA 1, 1982).]
At common law, criminal jurisdiction was based primarily on the territorial principle. Under this view, because "each crime has only one situs (or locus) . . . only the place of the situs has jurisdiction.”11 Thus, if the situs is within the physical borders of a state, the state may subject the perpetrator to prosecution.12
*501As an aid in pinpointing the situs of the crime, courts divided the territorial principle into "objective” and "subjective” bases.13 Under the objective territorial principle, the situs "include[s] the state whose rights have been assailed, including the state’s 'political integrity’ and the 'life, safety, and property of its subjects.’ ”14 Thus, where the "life, safety and property” of a state’s citizens are endangered, the Legislature may proscribe conduct that occurs outside the state’s physical borders.
Conversely, under the subjective territorial principle, the situs of the crime for legislative jurisdictional purposes is "the state in which the offender is located at the time the crime is committed . . . [because] it is that state to which the offender looks in governing his conduct.”15 Thus, where an actor’s conduct produces detrimental effects in *502another state, the state where the actor was physically located at the time of his conduct would be able to proscribe the conduct. The principles are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, more than one principle may be applicable to a given set of facts.16
As the majority acknowledges, we have recognized exceptions to the general rule against extraterritorial application of state statutes "as populations and technology progressed and travel between countries and among the states increased to an everyday occurrence . . . .”17 We have approved the objective territorial principle of criminal jurisdiction,18 and have recognized that Michigan may give extraterritorial effect to its criminal laws , where the acts committed outside the state that sought to punish them were intended to have a detrimental effect in our state. In Deur v Newaygo Sheriff, 420 Mich 440; 362 NW2d 698 (1984), the plaintiff, a Michigan resident who owned a tractor-trailer rig that lost braking control and fatally injured three persons in Maryland, was indicted by a Maryland grand jury for manslaughter by motor vehicle. The plaintiff was arrested in Michigan, but resisted extradition to Maryland. While the indictment alleged that the plaintiff *503"had 'intentionally and knowingly’ adopted and enforced a policy of poor maintenance which contributed to the accident[,]”19 the Maryland statute proscribed grossly negligent operation, driving, or control of a motor vehicle. In short, Maryland sought "to give extraterritorial effect to a penal statute seeking to regulate unintentional conduct.”20 We noted that the United States Supreme Court had addressed the issue in Strassheim v Daily, 221 US 280; 31 S Ct 558; 55 L Ed 735 (1911):
In Strassheim, the accused had been indicted in Michigan for bribery and also for obtaining money from the state by false pretenses. The accused, Daily, did not act in Michigan relating to the charged crimes. In reversing an order on habeas corpus discharging Daily, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, stated, pp 284-285:
"If a jury should believe the evidence and find that Daily did the acts that led Armstrong to betray his trust, deceived the Board of Control, and induced by fraud the payment by the State, the usage of the civilized world would warrant Michigan in punishing him, although he never had set foot in the State until after the fraud was complete. Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power.” (Emphasis added.)[21]
*504Because Michigan’s nonfugitive extradition statute22 requires an act in Michigan that "intentionally result[s] in a crime” in the state requesting extradition, and because the Maryland statute allowed prosecution for grossly negligent conduct, the plaintiff was entitled to habeas corpus relief.
Because we have recognized the objective territorial principle of criminal jurisdiction in a different context, we agree with the majority that the Legislature may proscribe conduct that occurs outside our physical borders that is intended to produce, and actually produces, a detrimental effect in Michigan.
IV
The conclusion that the Legislature has the authority to enact a statute with extraterritorial effect does not end the inquiry. The statute may only be enforced against conduct that occurs out of state if the Legislature’s intent to give the statute extraterritorial effect is clear.23 The statutes in question are silent with regard to their extraterritorial application. We therefore look to their purpose and subject matter to determine the relevant legislative intent.
The United States Supreme Court described the appropriate analysis as follows:
We have in this case a question of statutory *505construction. The necessary locus, when not specially defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law of nations. Crimes against private individuals or their property, like assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement and frauds of all kinds, which affect the peace and good order of the community, must of course be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the government where it may properly exercise it. If punishment of them is to be extended to include those committed outside of the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard. . . .
But the same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers or agents. Some such offenses can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Government because of the local acts required to constitute them. Others are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense. [United States v Bowman, 260 US 94, 97-98; 43 S Ct 39; 67 L Ed 149 (1922).]
Construction of criminal statutes to determine extraterritorial application has not been limited to *506construction of statutes proscribing fraud or obstruction. For example, the federal courts have applied this method in cases involving conspiracy and illegal possession with intent to distribute narcotics,24 and conspiracy to kill a member of Congress and aiding and abetting the killing of a member of Congress.25 However, this Court has held that the Legislature’s power to do so is limited to intentional acts that are intended to have, and that actually do have, a detrimental effect within the state. When detrimental effects are intended and actually occur, the state may punish the actor as if he had been present in the state at the time the acts were performed.26
We conclude that the nature of both conspiracy to commit an offense and aiding and abetting in the commission of an offense is such that inclusion of language making them specifically applicable to conduct that occurred outside the state’s borders is unnecessary. Moreover, neither conspiracy nor aiding and abetting logically require that the conduct that constitutes the agreement or the aid be committed within Michigan’s physical borders.
A
The textbook definition of conspiracy is a mutual agreement or understanding, express or implied, *507between two or more persons to commit a criminal act or to accomplish a legal act by unlawful means.
An overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is unnecessary27 because the crime is complete when the agreement is reached. However, to say that the crime is complete when the agreement is reached does not mean that the agreement must occur within Michigan. The crime of conspiracy continues while the parties are engaged in the unlawful enterprise. In other words, it exists until arrest, abandonment, or success.28
The crime of conspiracy requires a dual intent: an "intent to combine with others, and [an] intent to accomplish the illegal objective.”29 Because intent may be inferred from evidence of the circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties, " '[d]irect proof of an agreement is not required, nor is it necessary that a formal agreement be proven.’ ”30 Furthermore, while "knowledge is the foundation of intent,” and mere knowledge of a conspiracy or its illegal objective, without more, is not enough to prove intent,31 we may examine the defendant’s conduct to determine whether the defendant pro*508vided "informed and interested cooperation, stimulation, [or] instigation.”32
The agreement to commit a criminal act that is the gist of the offense of conspiracy is punished because of the "special danger to society presented by group as opposed to individual activity.”33
"Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal could accomplish.” [People v Carter, 415 Mich 558, 570; 330 NW2d 314 (1982), *509quoting Callanan v United States, 364 US 587, 593-594; 81 S Ct 321; 5 L Ed 2d 312 (1961).]
Thus, the nature of the offense is clearly not situs based. The agreement to pursue an illegal goal need not occur in Michigan. Moreover, the increased danger to society posed by group association, and its continuing quality, compel the conclusion that the Legislature intended the conspiracy statute to be applied to an agreement that was reached in Florida with intended consequences in Michigan. A contrary result ascribes an intent to the Legislature to abandon protection of Michigan citizens and "leave open a large immunity for [conspiracies] as easily committed by citizens” in other states as in Michigan.34
B
The same reasoning applies to the substantive charge brought under the aiding and abetting theory. The aiding and abetting theory is used to connect one person to the illegal action of another.35 It seeks to proscribe "all words or deeds which may support, encourage or incite the commission of a crime.”36 Like the agreement in a conspiracy, the aid or encouragement need not logically occur in Michigan, especially where the crime that is aided or encouraged will be committed in Michigan. Thus, the nature and purpose of the statute proscribing aiding and abetting a crime support our conclusion that the Legislature intended it to apply to aid or encouragement given outside our physical borders.
Moreover, pursuant to the statute, one who aids and abets is to be treated in all respects as if he *510had directly committed the substantive crime.37 To say that the state may prosecute Hoyt for the substantive offense, but may not prosecute Blume for that offense under an aiding and abetting theory, would be, in effect, to treat Blume as if he had not directly committed the crime. Such an anomalous result is not required by the statute.
V
We reiterated in Deur38 that an intentional act intended to cause and causing harmful consequences in the forum state is within the reach of the state’s authority. As Deur indicates, the threshold question for assertion of the state’s jurisdiction is whether there is a showing sufficient to permit the court to conclude that the defendant intended to produce a detrimental effect in the forum state. This question is separate from whether the elements of the crime can be made out at the preliminary examination.
Defendant’s motion to quash the complaint and warrant challenges the magistrate’s conclusion regarding the jurisdiction of the court to issue the warrant and ultimately try him for the offenses charged. As noted, a Michigan court has jurisdiction to try a defendant charged with acts that *511occurred outside the geographical boundaries of the state where the defendant intended to cause, and actually caused, a detrimental effect in Michigan. Thus, on review rather than weigh the evidence, we must determine whether there was any evidence to support the issuing magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause existed to believe that the magistrate possessed jurisdiction to act. In other words, was any evidence presented to show that the defendant intended to cause a detrimental effect in Michigan and was any evidence presented to show that a detrimental effect did, in fact, occur in Michigan.39 We believe there was.
By contrast with the jurisdictional facts in Deur, in the instant case, as in Strassheim, the record supports the circuit court’s conclusion that defendant committed an intentional act, with an intent to produce detrimental effects in Michigan, which did produce such detrimental effects.40 The investigating officer testified that defendant knew that Hoyt lived in and intended to return to Michigan. At the very least, defendant’s knowledge, coupled with his alleged delivery of cocaine, supports an inference that the defendant intended that Hoyt *512possess cocaine in Michigan. Because it is unlawful to possess cocaine in Michigan, and because criminal activity is detrimental to the citizens of Michigan, it can fairly be said that the defendant intended a detrimental result in Michigan.
However, as defendant’s brief acknowledges, the officer further testified that defendant knew that it was possible that Hoyt would split the cocaine with another person upon his return to Michigan. This additional knowledge supports the inference that the intended detrimental effect was distribution of the cocaine in Michigan by Hoyt. Either way, an intended detrimental effect may be inferred from the evidence presented. Defendant’s conduct allows us to conclude, for the purposes of asserting jurisdiction, that he intended to produce detrimental effects in Michigan. Moreover, officers found cocaine at Hoyt’s apartment and at his business. Hoyt told officers that he had purchased the cocaine from Blume. Thus, evidence was presented to show that Blume’s conduct resulted in Hoyt’s possession of cocaine in Michigan, a detrimental effect. Therefore, evidence to support the magistrate’s determination of jurisdiction to act in the case existed, and it was error for the district court to quash the complaint and warrant.
Whether the defendant introduced evidence for the purpose of negating the existence of the required intent is not dispositive of the motion to quash. Thus, the majority’s observation that it does not appear that defendant knew or intended that Hoyt was going to "sell” the cocaine in Michigan is a non sequitur. To determine the magistrate’s jurisdiction to act, it is not required that the defendant specifically intended that the drugs be "sold” in Michigan. All that is required is that the defendant perform an intentional act with knowledge of its harmful consequences, in this *513case possession of drugs in Michigan. Therefore, we would hold that under the facts as found by the district court,41 there was subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
VI
In sum, we would hold that the Legislature possesses the power to proscribe conduct that occurs outside the state where that conduct is intended to produce and actually produces detrimental effects in the State of Michigan. Because statutes proscribing conspiracy and statutes proscribing aiding or encouraging the commission of a crime have as their purpose prevention of dangerous concert of action, and because the nature of each statute is such that the conduct that constitutes a violation of the statute need not logically occur within the physical borders of the State of Michigan, we would hold that the Legislature intended to allow application of the statute to acts that occurred outside the state.42 We would also *514hold that the evidence supports the magistrate’s determination of jurisdiction to act in this case.
We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the charges, and remand the case to the district court.
Riley and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.

 MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1).

 MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i).

 Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, ante, p 482, n 11, defendant has not been charged with conspiracy to deliver narcotics to Hoyt in Florida or in Michigan. Defendant is charged with conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver, and possession with intent to deliver does not logically require two persons for its completion.
A conspiracy between Hoyt and his Michigan partner already existed before Hoyt traveled to Florida to purchase cocaine. It is this preexisting Michigan conspiracy that the prosecutor alleges that Blume became a member of by allegedly selling cocaine to Hoyt in Florida. As the majority recognizes, "[a] defendant may become a member of an already existing conspiracy if he ' "cooperates knowingly to further the object of the conspiracy. . . .” ’ ” Ante, pp 483-484 (citations omitted).

 The content of Hoyt’s statements to law enforcement officers was admitted through the testimony of the officer who had interviewed him.

 People v Franklin, 117 Mich App 393, 396; 323 NW2d 716 (1982). See also MCL 767.3; MSA 28.943.

 See MCL 767.74; MSA 28.1014, which provides that "[n]o motion to quash . . . the indictment, shall be received by any court unless the party offering such plea shall prove the truth thereof by affidavit, or by some other sworn evidence.” See also Gridley v United States, 44 F2d 716 (CA 6, 1930), cert den 283 US 827 (1931).
While it is true that the statute refers to motions to quash an indictment, " '[ijndictment’ means an indictment, information, presentment, complaint, warrant, and any other formal written accusation and, unless a contrary intention appears, means any count thereof.” MCL 761.1(d); MSA 28.843(d).

 People v Webb, 163 Mich App 462; 415 NW2d 9 (1987). See also Commonwealth v Bighum, 452 Pa 554, 559; 307 A2d 255 (1973) ("Jurisdiction is a legal issue and therefore is not normally a concern for the jury. However, in those infrequent cases where jurisdiction depends upon the resolution of disputed facts, it is within the province of the jury to resolve the issue under proper instructions”).
Indeed, even the Court in Strassheim v Daily, 221 US 280; 31 S Ct 558; 55 L Ed 735 (1911), recognized that the resolution of disputed facts was for the jury when it noted that if the jury believed that the *499defendant had committed the acts complained of, Michigan would be justified in punishing the defendant. Similarly, if the jury in this case believes that Blume knew that Hoyt would be returning to Michigan to split the cocaine with another, and armed with that knowledge, supplied the cocaine to be split to Hoyt, then the intent to create a detrimental effect in Michigan, here the further distribution of cocaine, would be shown.
We also note a conflict among the various states regarding quantum of proof necessary to prove jurisdiction. See anno: Comment note— necessity of proving venue or territorial jurisdiction of criminal offense beyond reasonable doubt, 67 ALR3d 988. The parties have neither argued nor briefed this issue, thus its resolution must await another case in which the issue is clearly presented.

 Rotenberg, Extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction and the state criminal law, 38 Tex L R 763, 767-768 (1960).

 United States v Smith, 680 F2d 255, 257 (CA 1, 1982), cert den 459 US 1110 (1983); Rivard v United States, 375 F2d 882, 885 (CA 5, 1967), cert den sub nom Giroleau v United States, 389 US 884 (1967).

 See, e.g., Smith, n 9 supra at 257 (recognizing six bases: territorial, national, protective, universal, passive personality, and objective territorial); Rivard, n 9 supra at 885 and ns 5-9 (recognizing five bases: territorial, national, protective, universality, and passive per*500sonality); George, Extraterritorial application of penal legislation, 64 Mich L R 609, 613-614 (1966) (recognizing six bases: territorial, floating territory, protected interest, nationality of the offender, nationality of the victim, and universality); Perkins, The territorial principle in criminal law, 22 Hastings L J 1155, 1155 and n 1 (1971) (recognizing four bases: territorial, Roman, injured forum, cosmopolitan); Rotenberg, n 8 supra at 767, n 17, citing Jurisdiction with respect to crime, 29 Am J Int’l L Supp 435, 445 (1935) (recognizing five bases: territorial, national, protective, universal, and passive personality); and comment, Jurisdiction over interstate felony murder, 50 U Chi LR 1431, 1433-1439 (1983) (recognizing three bases: common law or territorial, significant activity, and integral relation).

 LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), § 2.9(a), p 129.

 However, restricting jurisdiction to that based exclusively on the territorial principle, leads to fictions intended to fix the location of a crime for jurisdictional purposes. Berge, Criminal jurisdiction and the territorial principle, 30 Mich LR 238, 243-244 (1931). For example, courts have created the doctrine of constructive presence in order to allow a state to punish an offender not located within the state when the offender set in motion the events which culminated in a harm in the prosecuting state. Id. The classic formulation of the doctrine of constructive presence is found in Simpson v State, 92 Ga 41; 17 SE 984 (1893). In affirming the conviction of a defendant who had been standing in the State of South Carolina at the time he shot at a person in Georgia, the Georgia Supreme Court stated:
Of course, the presence of the accused within this State is essential to make his act one which is done in this State; but *501the presence need not be actual. It may be constructive. . . . So, if a man in the State of South Carolina criminally fires a ball into the State of Georgia, the law regards him as accompanying the ball, and as being represented by it, up to the point where it strikes. . . . [T]he act of the accused did take effect in this State. He started across the river with his leaden messenger, and was operating it up to the moment when it ceased to move, and was therefore, in a legal sense, after the ball crossed the State line up to the moment it stopped, in Georgia. [Id. at 43, 46; quoted in Berge, supra at 243-244.]
Justice Holmes, dissenting in Hyde v United States, 225 US 347, 384; 32 S Ct 793; 56 L Ed 1114 (1912), cautioned against the circular reasoning resulting from the constructive presence fiction. He stated:
To speak of constructive presence is to use the language of fiction, and so to hinder precise analysis. When a man is said to be constructively present where the consequences of an act done elsewhere are felt, it is meant that for some special purpose he will be treated as he would have been treated if he had been present, although he was not. [Id. at 386; quoted in Berge, supra at 244.]

 Rotenberg, n 8 supra at 769.

 Id., quoting Wharton, Extra-territorial crime, 4 Southern L R 676, 699-700 (1878).

 Id., citing Stimson, Conflict of Criminal Laws (1936).

 Id. at 768. See also United States v King, 552 F2d 833, 851 (CA 9, 1976), cert den 430 US 966 (1977) ("[C]ourts have recognized that the territorial concept of jurisdiction is neither exclusive nor a full and accurate characterization of the powers of states to exercise jurisdiction beyond the confines of their geographical boundaries”); Wheat v State, 734 P2d 1007, 1008 (Alas App, 1987) ("The issue is now well-settled in the modern view that states may rely, without constitutional impediment, on a number of non-territorial grounds as a basis for asserting criminal jurisdiction over acts occurring outside their borders”), citing Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), pp 38-45; 1 Torcia, Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed), § 14.

 Sexton v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc, 413 Mich 406, 434; 320 NW2d 843 (1982).

 Deur v Newaygo Sheriff, 420 Mich 440, 446-447; 362 NW2d 698 (1984).

 Id. at 443.

 Id. at 446. (Emphasis added.)

 Id. at 446-447. The most recent application of the doctrine in the Court of Appeals resulted in allowing Michigan to bring criminal charges pursuant to MCL 750.350a; MSA 28.582(1), against the noncustodial father of a child for retaining that child in Colorado in violation of the Michigan custody order. People v Harvey, 174 Mich App 58; 435 NW2d 456 (1989). On the basis of Deur and Strassheim, *504the Court of Appeals held that the father’s failure to return his child to her mother
should be considered a crime committed within the State of Michigan. . . . The detrimental effects of defendant’s intentional retention of the girl in violation of the Michigan court’s custody order occurred here, in Michigan, since it was the authority of a Michigan court that was thwarted and it was the custodial right of a Michigan resident that was infringed upon.
[Id. at 61.]

 MCL 780.3a; MSA 28.1285(3-1/2).

 Sexton, n 17 supra at 434, 435.

 21 USC 846; 21 USC 841(a)(1); United States v Baker, 609 F2d 134 (CA 5, 1980).

 18 USC 351(a); United States v Layton, 855 F2d 1388 (CA 9, 1988), cert den 489 US 1046 (1989). In Layton, the defendant, a member of the People’s Temple, was charged in connection with the death of Congressman Leo Ryan at the Port Kaituma airstrip in the Republic of Guyana. The defendant argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged acts occurred outside the United States. The court disagreed and held that the district court had "properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over each count in the indictment.” 855 F2d 1394.

 The majority’s statement that defendant must have a specific intent to act is simply a misreading of Deur, supra.

 The federal government and some other states require that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy be performed within their physical borders in order to confer jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v Winter, 509 F2d 975, 982 (CA 5, 1975). However, if we were to require that an overt act occurred in Michigan before Michigan could punish the conspiracy designed to have a detrimental effect in Michigan, we "would have the anomalous requirement that more be shown for jurisdiction than is necessary for conviction of the crime.” United States v Williams, 589 F2d 210, 213 (CA 5, 1979).

 See LaFave & Scott, n 11 supra, § 6.5(e), p 555.

 People v Carter, 415 Mich 558, 568; 330 NW2d 314 (1982).

 Id., quoting People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 311; 220 NW2d 465 (1974).

 Direct Sales Co v United States, 319 US 703, 711-712; 63 S Ct 1265; 87 L Ed 1674 (1943); United States v Falcone, 109 F2d 579 (CA 2, 1940), aff’d 311 US 205; 61 S Ct 204; 85 L Ed 128 (1940); Atley, n 30 supra at 310.
The majority cites Direct Sales and Falcone for the proposition that *508" ' "the evidence of knowledge must be clear, not equivocal” ’ ” and that "' the inference of such knowledge cannot be drawn merely from knowledge the buyer will use the goods illegally.’ ” Ante, p 485. What the majority, itself, fails to acknowledge is that in Falcone, the government argued that knowledge of the conspiracy to operate illicit stills and informed cooperation in it could be inferred from sales of goods not illegal in themselves — sugar, yeast and cans — to known distillers of alcoholic beverages during prohibition. The court in Falcone disagreed. The suppliers of the unrestricted goods could not be held to be part of the conspiracy without knowledge of the conspiracy to operate the illicit stills and active participation in that goal.
Later, in Direct Sales, the Court noted that the quantity of proof required to show knowledge of the buyer’s unlawful use of a product was different where the product is inherently harmful. Thus, the Court permitted an inference of knowledge of the misuse of a prescription mail-order narcotic to be drawn from the mail-order company’s quantity sales and sales tactics to a physician who was illegally dispensing the narcotics. In this respect the Court noted that "[a]ll articles of commerce may be put to illegal ends. But all do not have inherently the same susceptibility to harmful and illegal use. Nor, by the same token, do all embody the same capacity, from their very nature, for giving the seller notice the buyer will use them unlawfully.” Id. at 710. (Emphasis added.)
Both further possession of a kilogram of cocaine and further distribution of a kilogram of cocaine are unlawful. Thus, unlike sales of a prescription narcotic, the nature of cocaine and the quantity allegedly sold, allow the inference that Blume knew of Hoyt’s intended unlawful use.

 Direct Sales Co, n 31 supra at 713.

 Carter, n 29 supra at 569-570.

 United States v Bowman, 260 US 94, 98; 43 S Ct 39; 67 L Ed 149 (1922).

 Carter, n 29 supra at 575.

 People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370, 378; 220 NW2d 393 (1974).

 Carter, n 29 supra at 576.

 The objective territorial principle embraced in Deur "has been asserted successfully where there was proof that defendant’s actions either produced some effect within the [forum seeking to prosecute], or even if the defendant never performed any act within the [forum], that he was part of a conspiracy in which some coconspirator’s activities took place within [the forum].” Baker, n 24 supra at 138. In other words, if the conspiracy is designed to result in a crime in the forum, and if there is proof of an overt act committed in the forum by at least one coconspirator, the forum will have jurisdiction over the conspiracy. Winter, n 27 supra at 982. "Under conspiracy doctrine, the forum state has jurisdiction over all conspirators involved in a conspiracy and all criminal acts committed in furtherance of it if any overt act is committed within its bounds by any of the conspirators.” George, n 10 supra at 623.

 The majority would have the prosecutor prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that this intent existed and would have the magistrate act as the trier of fact where intent is disputed. As noted, disputed questions of fact regarding the defendant’s intent are for a jury to resolve.

 But see People v Puig, 85 Misc 2d 228, 233; 378 NYS2d 925 (1976), where the court held that the possible sale of narcotics in New York from an alleged transfer of cocaine that occurred in New Jersey did not give the New York court jurisdiction over the transfer. It reasoned that, under Criminal Procedure 20.20(2)(b), jurisdiction was proper if " 'the statute defining the offense is designed to prevent the occurrence of a particular effect in this state and the conduct constituting the offense committed was performed with intent that it would have such effect herein.’ ” " '[Particular effect’ ” means that the consequences of the conduct " 'have a materially harmful impact upon the governmental processes or community welfare of a particular jurisdiction . . . .’ ” Id. Possible sales in New York did not satisfy the requirement of a particular effect.

 This Court has the benefit of a record created on the jurisdictional issue. The United States Supreme Court in Strassheim, supra, looked only to the facts alleged in the indictment for obtaining money by false pretenses. It assumed that if a jury believed the evidence, the defendant could be tried in Michigan, because the facts as alleged in the indictment showed that the defendant intended to produce, and actually produced, a detrimental effect in the state seeking to prosecute.

 Defendant argues that before reversing the decision of the district court, the circuit court must first have found that the district court abused its discretion in its findings of fact. We agree with the Court of Appeals: "[T]he circuit court did not dispute the district court’s findings of fact, but accepted them as valid. The circuit court decision was exclusively based on the finding that the district court erred as a matter of law on the jurisdiction issue.” Slip op, p 2.
Defendant also argues that it was error for the circuit court to find that the elements of a conspiracy were established. Again we agree with the Court of Appeals: "[T]he circuit court hearing was not a preliminary examination but was, as defense counsel conceded, held only to address the issue of whether the district court erred in determining the legal question regarding jurisdiction.” Id.