Court Opinion

ID: 9470942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:21:22.553727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:12.026559
License: Public Domain

LOGAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
With respect, I must dissent.
In a habeas corpus case such as this the Supreme Court requires that the petitioner, to be entitled to relief, show cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the default. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982); Cf. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982) (collateral attack on federal conviction). In the earlier appeal this Court agreed that actual prejudice had been demonstrated. Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1364 (10th Cir.1981). Actual prejudice had been demonstrated because the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal concluded that the statements made by the prosecutor were reversible error. If the defense counsel had timely objected to the prosecutor’s improper comments, the Oklahoma court would have ordered a new trial. Runnels v. State, 562 P.2d 932, 937 (Okla.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893, 98 S.Ct. 270, 54 L.Ed.2d 179 (1977). This surely meets the actual prejudice requirement of Isaac and Frady. The most effective demonstration of prejudice would be a showing that a petitioner was convicted of a crime that he can conclusively show he did not commit. In the instant case, had the defense counsel objected, the petitioner would have received a new trial; instead he is serving a long prison term. Short of a showing of innocence, this presents the most conclusive demonstration of prejudice possible.
Under Isaac and Frady the petitioner must also establish cause for his lawyer’s failure to make a contemporaneous objection. But the instant case demonstrates that in some situations it is impossible to conclusively prove whether there was or was not cause. Here the defense counsel died after the case was tried and before the habeas action was initiated. But that is not all we have. The record indicates that the defense counsel was 74 years old and in poor health at the time of trial; in addition, he was hard of hearing. Thus, circumstantial evidence indicates that he may not have heard the prosecutor’s prejudicial remarks, either because of his hearing problem or his state of health, and he cannot be questioned to determine the reason for his failure to object. While the death of the defense counsel prior to a habeas proceeding does not automatically satisfy the cause requirements, the interceding death should not preclude a finding of cause.
Did Isaac and Frady intend that if cause could not be established by evidence stronger than we have here that relief must be denied no matter how great the actual prejudice to the petitioner is? I do not think the Supreme Court intended such a result. If the victim of this crime confessed that the crime was never committed or there was conclusive proof of petitioner’s innocence, it would not help meet the cause prong of Isaac. Yet at least in this type of situation the Supreme Court contemplated that federal habeas relief would be permitted. The majority opinion in Isaac states, “The terms ‘cause’ and ‘actual prejudice’ *601are not rigid concepts .... In appropriate cases those principles must yield to the imperative of a fundamentally unjust incarceration .... [W]e are confident that victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and-prejudice standard.” 456 U.S. at 135,102 S.Ct. at 1575. I think the Court was saying that if the petitioner can establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, he is entitled to relief regardless of his ability to conclusively establish the cause for his attorney’s failure. In the instant case there was clear error of the type that would entitle the petitioner to a new trial had the defense counsel made proper objection, the counsel is deceased and can never tell us why he failed to make the objection, and the circumstantial evidence supports the inference that counsel may not have heard the prejudicial comments by the prosecutor. I would find that the cause requirement enunciated in Isaac has been met. Additionally, as I stated in my earlier dissent, I would find that if it is presumed or inferred that the defense counsel intentionally failed to object to the prosecutor’s remarks on the petitioner’s failure to take the stand, in the circumstances of this case, that lawyer did not meet the standards of competence we have required in Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945, 100 S.Ct. 1342, 63 L.Ed.2d 779 (1980).