Court Opinion

ID: 9647538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:39:14.272328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:50.465321
License: Public Domain

*383ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant has raised issues in his motion for rehearing which require clarification and correction of the Court’s opinion filed January 3, 1985.
In discussing whether Alcoa owed a duty to warn Aim, the opinion states, “The bottler is the one possessing the adequate means to pass warnings on to consumers.” Aim contends that this statement is factually incorrect because the evidence shows that 7-Up, the parent soft drink corporation, has control over the beverage labels and not the bottler. Aim argues that Alcoa therefore owed a duty to warn 7-Up and that the evidence shows that Alcoa did not warn 7-Up.
Assuming that 7-Up controlled the labeling, we first point out that Aim as the plaintiff had the burden to prove that Alcoa breached its duty to warn 7-Up. The only evidence presented by Aim on this issue is the testimony of George Greene that as far as he knew, Alcoa had never given the warning to 7-Up. This testimony is of no value on this issue because Mr. Greene was not an employee or representative of either Alcoa or 7-Up and there was no evidence he was in a position to know what warnings Alcoa had given or not given 7-Up. Aim failed to carry his burden of proof on this issue.
Second, J.F.W. was licensed by 7-Up to package and sell its product. J.F.W. had the physical means to place a warning on the bottles. After J.F.W. received warning from Alcoa, it was incumbent on it as the licensee of 7-Up to communicate the warning to its parent company and attempt to obtain authorization to include the warning in the labeling. We hold that whatever duty Alcoa owed to warn 7-Up, it fulfilled by its warning to J.F.W.
Aim asserts that the court erred in holding that there is an implied jury finding that the warning to J.F.W. was adequate because this finding is contrary to the judgment of the trial court that Alcoa is liable. Aim cites Lunsford v. Sage, Inc. of Dallas, 438 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.) and Life Insurance Co. of Southwest v. Nims, 512 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1974, no writ) for the proposition that implied findings are only presumed in support of the judgment and not to defeat it.
First, the implied finding is necessary to and in support of the portion of the judgment holding J.F.W. liable. A finding that the warning was adequate is logically essential to the jury’s conclusion that the negligence of J.F.W. proximately caused Aim’s injury.
Second, the cases cited above by Aim apply Rule 279 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure which states that when issues are omitted to the jury, and there is no written finding made by the trial court on the omitted issues, then such omitted issues shall be deemed to be found by the court in support of the judgment. Rule 279 refers to implied findings by the trial court, and not to implied jury findings. Therefore, this court’s implying of a jury finding from an express jury finding is not covered by Rule 279 and the cases applying it.
Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing is overruled.