Court Opinion

ID: 9638192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:37:07.067334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:04.346822
License: Public Domain

MANTON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). Patent No. 1,634,316 was granted to appellant on July 5, 1927, on an application filed March 27, 1926, for a massage heating roller. The present suit is for infringement of this patent and for an injunction restraining the further prosecution of an equity suit in the New York state court between the parties. Appellant, prior to the filing of his application for this patent, made the device for the app.ellee Oppenheimer. Appellant alleges it was unsuccessful, and, although modified, did not succeed, and has been abandoned. After appellant filed his application for this patent, he furnished apparatus for the same to the appellee. Oppenheimer filed a later application for a pat*35ent in June, 1926. In August, 1927, the parties disagreed. Appellee Contoure Laboratories, Inc., incorporated by Oppenheimer, took over the latter’s business. Oppenheimer filed an amendment to his application of June 26, 1927, and claimed appellant’s patent, and asked for an interference between the parties.
But, before that interference was declared, appellee brought suit against the appellant in the Supreme Court of the state of New York. The complaint alleged that Oppenheimer disclosed the idea of the Becher patent to him, and that Becher fraudulently took out a patent in defiance of Oppenheimer’s rights. The interference has never been prosecuted and is still pending. The present suit for infringement brings into question who is the first inventor, the claim being that the federal court only has exclusive jurisdiction of this issue. It is contended that the state court erroneously took jurisdiction and decided this question, which is one arising under the patent laws of the United States. Section 256, Judicial Code (28 USCA § 371).
The complaint in the state court did not claim an expressed contract whereby appellant was to apply his inventive skill to the use of the appellee, nor is it claimed that a contract exists by which the resulting invention of the appellant, made during such employment, must pass to the appellee. But the complaint in the state court stated “that defendant [present plaintiff] appropriated to his own use said ideas and said invention and the modification and improvements thereof, and in violation of his agreement [to keep Oppenheimer’s ideas secret] made application to the Commissioner of Patents of the United States for letters patent.”
It alleged a fraudulent use of Oppenheimer’s ideas. The complaint did not allege that the plaintiff had agreed to assign his invention, but, on the contrary, says that he did not invent anything, and, if the appel-lees’ theory is right, then the patent is void. Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U. S. 667, 9 S. Ct. 202, 32 L. Ed. 576. The issue in the state court was whether the patent obtained by plaintiff was a product of his own genius, while in the employ of the appellee, or whether it was a fraudulent use of Oppenheimer’s idea. The solution of this question necessarily required a challenge to the validity of the patent obtained by the appellant. The issue was not whether a patent, conced-edly valid, is the product of appellant’s genius, and, as such, should be assigned under an implied contract of assignment. The suit sounded in tort and not in assumpsit.
It may not be doubted now that the state courts are permitted to adjudicate suits which may incidentally involve the patent law, as in Luckett v. Delpark, 270 U. S. 496, 46 S. Ct. 397, 70 L. Ed. 703, in which case it was pointed out that the complainant did not, by its bill in the state court, raise any question as to the validity or construction of the patent, nor did it make any claim for damages for infringement. That suit was an ordinary bill for specific performance to complete the assignment to complainant for an improvement of a patent, in compliance with his covenant for further assurance and it was held that the defendant there held the legal title as trustee for the complainant, and that the state court had jurisdiction to pass upon the ownership. That case did not arise under the patent law. The main and declared purpose was to enforce the rights of the plaintiff under contract with the defendants for royalties, and the reconveyance of one patent. The issues there were whether the assignee of a patent was performing his contractual duties, the patent being eoneededly the assignor’s, while in the ease at bar the issue was whether the appellant made his own discovery or fraudulently used Oppenheimer’s.
At bar there is no contract of assignment whatever upon which a state court could permissibly adjudicate the question of who is the first inventor, and a mere reading of the decision and findings in the state court point out clearly that the basis of decision was a determination by the trial judge that Oppenheimer’s was the first conception, and that appellant took his ideas in applying for the patent. It is not intimated that the appellant was to apply for the patent in Oppenheimer’s behalf. Appellant’s claim was that the idea of the patent was his own knowledge. The state trial court in decision merely held that Oppenheimer made certain discoveries, and not the appellant, and therefore they were not of the appellant’s discovery. It is the same issue that is presented in the interference proceeding. Congress long ago determined to leave that to the Patent Office. New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U. S. 473, 32 S. Ct. 238, 56 L. Ed. 513; Excelsior Wooden Pipe. Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U. S. 282, 22 S. Ct. 681, 46 L. Ed. 910; St. Paul Plow Works v. Starling, 127 U. S. 376, 8 S. Ct. 1327, 32 L. Ed. 251.
In. Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., *36168 U. S. 255, 18 S. Ct. 62, 42 L. Ed. 458, the plaintiff sued in the state court to recover a sum of money for the manufacture and installation of a water gas device. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had guaranteed to save him harmless and defend him in any suit brought by third parties for patent infringement; that the patent laws under which the plaintiff made the apparatus were void, and an infringement of the patent of another company which had sued the defendant for infringement; that the plaintiff had not defended the suit, and that the defendant had thus been compelled to cease using the apparatus. At the trial, the defendant introduced evidence tending to show defendant’s patent infringed that of the other company, in support of the allegations of its defense, and the Supreme Court said:
“The action, however, was not brought to test the validity of plaintiff’s patents, to recover damage for their infringement, or to enjoin their use by the defendant. The suit was an ordinary action of assumpsit upon the common counts for the price of a machine — a patented machine it is true, but none the less subject to a common law action to recover its value.”
The question of the validity of the patent was raised collaterally in the state court, but at bar it is in direct litigation between the alleged patentee and the infringer, and the issue of validity of the patent was squarely raised by the appellee in the state court, when he took the position that the appellant was not the discoverer of the device for which he had obtained a patent. Therefore cases like Wade v. Lawder, 165 U. S. 624, 17 S. Ct. 425, 41 L. Ed. 851; Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U. S. 46, 8 S. Ct. 756, 31 L. Ed. 683; By-Products Recovery Co. v. Mabee (D. C.) 288 F. 401; Underhill v. Schenck, 238 N. Y. 7, 143 N. E. 773, 33 A. L R. 303; and Wittemann Bros. v. Wittemann Co., 88 Misc. Rep. 266, 151 N. Y. S. 813, which hold merely that the state court has jurisdiction to determine the question of whether a contract for assignment of a defendant’s interest in a pending or existing patent has been breached, are not in point. In Craig, etc., Corp. v. Static Control Co. (C. C. A.) 295 F. 72, this court had before it a claim of a plaintiff who alleged an assignment of the defendant’s patent to him, whereby he became the sole owner of the invention and any improvements thereon. The bill alleged that the defendants thereafter established defendant corporation and manufactured articles infringing the plaintiff’s patent. The defendant said the articles were manufactured under the separate patent issued to him. The plaintiff at the trial sought to prove that an officer of the plaintiff was the inventor of the second patent, and not the defendant. This court held that the defendant’s device did not infringe, but upon the claim that the plaintiff’s officer was the inventor, and not the defendant, this court, after a review of the provisions of the statute, said:
“It is thus apparent that any priority controversy except one arising under sections 4915 and 4918 [which is not material in the instant ease] of the Revised Statutes is to be considered a finality in any subsequent infringement litigation where the patent in suit is not a patent granted on the invention which was involved in said priority controversy in the Patent Office. Until the applicant has exhausted his rights through the tribunals of the Patent Office, he may not raise the question here sought to be raised in the district court.”
This would have the same application in the state court. Affirming the District Court, we said:
“The exclusive remedy of the appellant for testing the priority of invention is with that tribunal [Patent Office] except in a direct suit by the Smith patentee for infringement, where the validity of his patent, including the questions of originality and date of invention, might be litigated.”
And further, as to the third cause of action, it was alleged that it was based upon a contract of assignment, and we held it did not raise a question as to “patentability, title, scope, or monopoly of any patent,” and that it was a matter for the state court to decide, since there was no diversity of citizenship.
The application of the authoritative holdings to the facts of the present suit support the maintenance of this suit in the District Court, and we should hold that the state court was without jurisdiction, because the suit there was based upon the application of the patent laws of the United States. Cheatham Electric Switching Device Co. v. Ky. Switch & Signal Co., 213 Ky. 23, 280 S. W. 469.
A preliminary injunction should be granted. This court has held that, where there is no prqof of long-continued acquiescence by the public as would raise a prima facie case in the patentee’s favor, it is the practice to refuse a preliminary injunction. Simson Bros., Inc., v. Blancard & Co., Inc. (C. C. A.) 22 F.(2d) 498; Hildreth v. Norton (C. C. A.) 159 F. 426. However, it does appear *37that, by reason of an improper assumption of jurisdiction in the state court, the appellant, who has the presumption of validity of the patent in his favor, is being deprived of the rights thus accorded him by reason of the result in the state court. Infringement by the defendant continues, and moreover assumption of the title, by reason of the state court decision, places appellees in control of the manufacturing of the device. Appellant should have equitable relief under these circumstances, and an injunction should be granted against further infringement until a trial may be had of the issue presented as to who was the first inventor. An injunction restraining proceedings on the state court decree may be granted under the general equity powers of the District Court. Simon v. So. Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255, 59 L. Ed. 492.
For the reasons stated, I dissent.