Court Opinion

ID: 9625051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:26:11.362835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:00.037891
License: Public Domain

Ott, J.
(dissenting) — I cannot agree with the majority’s contention that “The city [of Centraba] did not purport to exercise its police power, regardless of the statute [chapter 44, Laws of 1935, p. 115].”
Zoning is a proper exercise of the police power. See Lil-lions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn. (2d) 629, 289 P. (2d) 203 (1955). Art. XI, § 11, of the state constitution, grants to cities and towns the power to make and enforce pobce regulations within their corporate limits, the only constitutional limitation being that such regulations shall not conflict with the general laws of the state.
Chapter 44, Laws of 1935, p. 115 (RCW 35.63), was enacted as an exercise of the state’s police power. The act does not deny a city the right to exercise its zoning power, as derived from the constitution, within its own territorial limits. It provides a suggested procedure for local planning, and authorizes qualified cities and towns to participate in regional planning. The statute grants power which the city did not otherwise have. The act provides that, “If any council or board desires to avail itself of the powers conferred by this act,” it must meet the requirements of *560the act. It follows that a city would have no right to participate in the authorized regional plans, unless it brought itself within the provisions of chapter 44, Laws of 1935.
By ordinance No. 856, adopted August 24, 1948, the city brought itself within chapter 44, Laws of 1935. By ordinance No. 882, passed August 30, 1949, the city adopted a comprehensive zoning plan which complied with the state zoning act.
Ordinance No. 973, adopted April 20, 1954, amended ordinance No. 882, § 14, to provide that the city might amend the zoning plan “upon its own motion and after public hearing,” thus deleting from the ordinance passed in compliance with the state zoning act the necessity of the “concurrence of the planning commission” in proposed amendments.
Assuming, arguendo, that chapter 44, Laws of 1935, requires “concurrence of the planning commission” in zoning plan amendments, it follows that the city could not dispense with such concurrence and remain under the act. The city, having the discretionary power under § 2 to put itself under the act, likewise had the power to withdraw therefrom. It did so in effecting the deletion above discussed.
In making zoning regulations after the adoption of ordinance No. 973, the city was exercising its police power granted by Art. XI, § 11, of the state constitution, and as authorized by the legislature in its grant of general powers to cities of the second class. See RCW 35.23.440 (19) (56) [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 9034]. The zoning ordinance adopted by the city of Centralia was not in conflict with the general laws of the state. The legislative act did not make it mandatory that a city qualify under chapter 44, Laws of 1935, before a city could establish a zoning procedure and plan. The legislature did not, by this act, pre-empt the field of zoning. Centralia’s zoning procedure and plan are concurrent, and not in conflict, with the state’s zoning program as provided for in chapter 44, Laws of 1935. Not being in conflict with the general laws of the state, Centralia’s zoning *561ordinance was a proper exercise of the city’s police power.
Finally, I do not believe that the legislature intended that a planning commission should have veto power over the legislative body that created it. Such veto power allows an appointive body to thwart the objectives of elected officials who are responsible for the passage of city legislation, and who are answerable to the electorate.
Section 10, chapter 44, Laws of 1935, p. 120, sets out all of the powers the legislature intended to grant to planning commissions as follows:
“Any such commission is authorized and empowered to act as the research and fact finding agency of city or county. To that end it may make such surveys, analyses, researches and reports as are generally authorized or requested by its council or board, or by the state council with the approval of its council or board. Any such commission, upon such request or authority, is further empowered and authorized:
“(1) to make inquiries, investigations and surveys concerning the resources of the county;
“(2) to assemble and analyze the data thus obtained and to formulate plans for the conservation of such resources and the systematic utilization and development thereof;
“(3) to make recommendations from time to time as to the best methods of such conservation, utilization and development;
“ (4) to cooperate with other commissions, with the state council and with other public agencies of the municipality, state and United States in such planning, conservation and development; and
“(5) in particular to cooperate with and aid the state council within its territorial limits in the preparation of the state master plan provided for in section 3, chapter 54 of the Special Session Laws of 1933, and in advance planning of public works programs.”
The specific powers which the legislature granted to the commission are to make inquiries, to assemble and analyze data, to make recommendations, to cooperate with other commissions, and, in particular, to cooperate with and aid the state council. The power to veto the action of the council or board that created the commission is not included among those powers expressly granted. I am firmly of the opinion that, if the legislature had intended to grant veto *562power in this respect, it would have expressly granted such power in § 10, in which section all of the powers the legislature intended to grant are specifically enumerated.
For the reasons stated, the judgment should be reversed.