Court Opinion

ID: 9544612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:57:52.60328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:17.585523
License: Public Domain

*535Neill, J.
(concurring)—I concur in the remanding of this case for a new trial, but do not go as far as the majority seemingly does in the application and construction of the strict liability doctrine enunciated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
Comment g to Restatement of Torts, supra, states at 351:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s [manufacturer’s] hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller [manufacturer] is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed. The burden óf proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.
This comment makes it clear that the plaintiff has the burden of proving (1) that there was a defect, (2) which existed at the time the product left the hands of the manufacturer, (3) which was not contemplated by the user, (4) which renders the product unreasonably dangerous, and (5) that such defect was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. This same concept is succinctly stated by the Illinois court when it adopted this rule of strict liability. In Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), that court said:
Such liability does not, of course, make Bendix [manufacturer] an absolute insurer. The plaintiffs must prove that their injury or damage resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed at the time it left the, manufacturer’s control.
Further, there is no automatic causation which traces from the manufacturer to user—again, this is a matter of proof by the plaintiff. In Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 443, 420 P.2d 855 (1966), wherein that court adopted this rule of strict liability, it is pointed out that
*536He [plaintiff] must still establish that his injury was caused by a defect in the product, and that such defect existed when the product left the hands of the defendant [manufacturer]. The concept of strict liability does not prove causation, nor does it trace cause to the defendant.
Therefore, instructions to be given on a retrial should clearly state these elements which plaintiff must prove.
Defendant has made a cogent argument on the relevance of the age and mileage of the automobile, a point covered by instruction No. 8. It should be understood that the omission of instruction No. 8 on a retrial does not, in any way, limit the right of the defendant to argue the age and mileage matter to the jury. Such argument is entirely proper under instructions as to plaintiff’s burden to prove that a defect in the automobile existed at the time it left the hands of defendant manufacturer.
We should be cautious in adopting a rule of strict liability against a manufacturer who has, presumably, exercised all due and reasonable care to make an acceptable and reasonably safe product. Although I recognize this current development in American tort law, it should be made crystal clear that the adoption of this doctrine by us does not create a rule of absolute liability. The mere fact of a malfunction of a product is not sufficient to raise an inference that the necessary elements for strict liability are present.
Hill and McGovern, JJ., concur with Neill, J.