Court Opinion

ID: 9401841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 14:08:03.121994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:55.537401
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                          In The Supreme Court

             The State, Petitioner,

             v.

             James Caleb Williams, Respondent.

             Appellate Case No. 2021-001493

       ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

                          Appeal from Sumter County
                       Howard P. King, Circuit Court Judge

                              Opinion No. 28157
                    Heard March 8, 2023 – Filed June 14, 2023

                                      REVERSED

             Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
             Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch,
             Jr., both of Columbia, and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus
             Finney, III, of Sumter, all for Petitioner.

             Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
             Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: James Caleb Williams was indicted for the attempted murder of
Ashley R., the attempted murder of Malik Myers, and one count of possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime, related to a shooting at a nightclub
in Sumter County. A jury convicted Williams of the attempted murder of Ashley R.
and the possession charge. The court of appeals reversed Williams' convictions in a
2-1 opinion. State v. Williams, 435 S.C. 288, 867 S.E.2d 430 (Ct. App. 2021). The
majority concluded the trial court erred in not granting Williams' directed verdict
motion as to the attempted murder of Ashley R. because the State relied on the
doctrine of transferred intent to prove Williams had the intent to kill Ashley R. The
majority held the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to specific intent
crimes, such as attempted murder. The dissent disagreed, but found the issue
unpreserved. We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to address
whether transferred intent applies to specific intent crimes. However, after oral
argument and further deliberation, we find this issue was not preserved at trial. We
therefore reverse the court of appeals' majority opinion.

                                           I.

The facts of this case are adequately presented in the court of appeals' opinion.
Pertinent to our resolution is Williams' motion for directed verdict. Williams moved
for a directed verdict on the sole ground that the State had not presented sufficient
evidence as to the identity of the person who shot at Myers and Ashley R. The State
responded that it had presented enough evidence to create a jury question as to
whether Williams was the shooter. As to Ashley R., the State argued, "just
specifically because he was not shooting directly at Ashley, I would point out that
we're proceeding under transferred intent and we do believe that he was firing his
gun with malice and the bullet struck Ashley R." The trial court denied the motion
for a directed verdict, reasoning, in part, that the evidence supported the charges
against Williams because there was testimony Williams was firing at Myers and–
"by transferred intent"–Ashley R. After presenting his defense, Williams renewed
his motion for a directed verdict "for the reasons I stated earlier." The trial court
denied the renewed motion. The trial court later instructed the jury on transferred
intent without objection.
Williams never asserted there was insufficient evidence of intent or claim the
doctrine of transferred intent did not apply to attempted murder as grounds for his
directed verdict motion. Transferred intent was brought up only by the State and the
trial court. We therefore conclude Williams failed to preserve the issue of whether
the doctrine of transferred intent applies to specific intent crimes for our review. See
State v. Jordan, 255 S.C. 86, 93, 177 S.E.2d 464, 468 (1970) (holding issue not
raised as a ground for a directed verdict motion was not preserved); State v.
Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 455, 503 S.E.2d 214, 221 (Ct. App. 1998) (same). The trial
court never had the chance to consider the transferred intent issue against the
arguments Williams now unveils on appeal. We are "a court of review, not of first
view." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005). We therefore agree with
Judge Huff's dissent and hold the issue of transferred intent was not preserved.
Accordingly, we reverse the opinion of the court of appeals and affirm Williams'
convictions and sentences for the attempted murder of Ashley R. and possession of
a weapon during the commission of a violent crime.

REVERSED.
BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW, JAMES and HILL, JJ., concur.