Court Opinion

ID: 9757614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:49:30.774622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:41.434841
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing on McCarroll’s petition for expunction with McCarroll present, but that the error was harmless because McCarroll probably would not have been successful on the merits. Respectfully, I believe the majority has missed the point.
McCarroll formally asked to appear at the expunction hearing in order to present evidence. He had no attorney, and, therefore, had no other means of sustaining his burden. The trial court did not rule on that request. We do not know that any evidence was offered at the hearing because we have no record. I cannot conclude, as does the majority, that McCarroll could not prevail because I have no idea what the evidence was or would have been.
Individuals who are incarcerated do not automatically lose their access to the courts as a result of their incarcerated status.1 An inmate, whether a defendant or a plaintiff in a civil action, does not, however, have an absolute right to personally appear.2 In determining whether a personal appearance is warranted, “appellate courts have held that the trial court must balance, by considering various factors, the government’s interest in protecting the integrity of the correctional system against the prisoner’s right of access to the courts.”3 Among the factors that a trial court may consider are:
• the cost and inconvenience of transporting the inmate to court;
• the security risk and potential danger to the court and the public of allowing the inmate to attend court;
• whether the inmate’s claims are substantial;
• whether a determination of the matter can reasonably be delayed until the inmate is released;
• whether the inmate can and will offer admissible, noncumulative testimony that cannot be offered effectively by deposition, telephone, or otherwise;
• whether the inmate’s presence is important in judging his demeanor and credibility compared with that of other witnesses;
• whether the trial is to the court or to a jury; and
• the inmate’s probability of success on the merits.4
*381A key factor is whether the inmate is represented by counsel or is proceeding pro se.5 We are required to review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an inmate’s bench warrant request, and we conduct that review under an abuse of discretion standard.6
The right of an inmate to have access to the courts entails not so much his physical presence in the courtroom as the opportunity to present evidence or contradict the evidence of the opposing party.7 “The right to be heard includes the opportunity to introduce evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, to be heard on questions of law and to have judgment rendered only after trial.”8 As the Beaumont Court of Appeals has suggested: “Should the court find that the pro se plaintiff inmate in a civil action is not entitled to leave prison to appear personally in court, then the prisoner should be allowed to proceed by affidavit, deposition, telephone, or other effective means.”9
The record in the case before us does not indicate that the trial court addressed McCarroll’s request for a bench warrant to appear at the expunction hearing. There is, therefore, nothing in the record to show that the court attempted to strike a fair balance between the integrity of the correctional system and McCarroll’s right of access to the courts.10 Furthermore, the record does not reflect that the trial court considered alternative means by which McCarroll could present and respond to evidence on his petition.
We should join our sister courts in holding that a trial court abuses its discretion in fading to issue a bench warrant to allow an inmate to appear in court without first considering and ruling upon the inmate’s bench warrant request and evaluating alternative methods of participation in court proceedings.11 Because there is no indication that the trial court in this case ad*382dressed McCarroll’s request for a bench warrant by performing the appropriate balancing tests to ensure that his fundamental constitutional right to court access was adequately protected, we should hold, as I understand the majority to do, that the trial court abused its discretion.
If the trial court abused its discretion by failing to protect McCarroll’s fundamental constitutional right to court access, I cannot understand how such error can be harmless. We should remand this case to the trial court to permit the trial judge to consider and rule on McCarroll’s request for a bench warrant. Whether the trial court grants or denies the request, under the law as I understand it, the trial court must actually hold a hearing on McCar-roll’s petition and permit McCarroll to present his evidence in some fair manner. I respectfully dissent.

. Zuniga v. Zuniga, 13 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3198, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)).

. In re Marriage of Daugherty, 42 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Pruske v. Dempsey, 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ); Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 414 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ denied).

. Nance v. Nance, 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).

. Jones v. Jones, 64 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.); Taylor v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet.); Thomas v. Bilby, 40 S.W.3d 166, 169 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.); Zuniga, 13 S.W.3d at 801.

. Jones, 64 S.W.3d at 210; Dodd v. Dodd, 17 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

. In re B.R.G., 48 S.W.3d 812, 820 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.); Dodd, 17 S.W.3d at 716.

. Dodd, 17 S.W.3d at 717.

. Nichols v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, no writ).

. Byrd v. Attorney General, 877 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).

. See Ex parte Guajardo, 70 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.); Zuniga, 13 S.W.3d at 801-02.

. See Guajardo, 70 S.W.3d at 206 (reversing denial of expunction petition where trial court did not rule on or consider inmate petitioner’s motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testifi-candum); Jones, 64 S.W.3d at 211-12 (holding trial court abused its discretion in denying pro se husband’s motion for continuance in divorce action brought by wife where record did not reflect that court considered husband's request for bench warrant by balancing need for husband to appear with short delay that would be necessitated by continuance); In re I.V., 61 S.W.3d 789, 797 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (holding a trial court abuses its discretion by failing to act on an inmate’s legitimate request to be present at his civil trial); Dodd, 17 S.W.3d at 718 (holding failure of trial court to consider and rule upon request of purported husband, who was incarcerated and acting pro se, to appear as defendant at trial to divide property among purported spouses and failure to make appropriate findings weighing right to attend against other factors constituted abuse of discretion); Zuniga, 13 S.W.3d at 801-02 (holding trial court erred in granting default divorce judgment against incarcerated husband without considering husband’s motion for bench warrant); Byrd, 877 S.W.2d at 569 (holding trial court’s failure to act on plaintiff inmate’s motion requesting a bench warrant to appear at hearing on defendant’s plea to jurisdiction constituted abuse of discretion and required reversal of ruling dismissing inmate’s claim for lack of jurisdiction).