Court Opinion

ID: 9677175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:45:23.854825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:52.555835
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge
(concurring specially)-
The court today correctly interprets the express language of Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2004). Today’s decision represents the present legislative intent of section 15.99, which requires municipalities to provide written notice of a decision to the petitioning party within (a strict) 60 days. Am. Tower v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309,' 313 (Minn.2001), Veit Co. v. Lake County, 707 N.W.2d 725, 728-29 (Minn.App.2006), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2006). Today’s finding is in accordance with the plain language of section 15.99. I write separately to underscore the inherent danger in this rigid legislative, scheme. I suggest this issue must be revisited by the Minnesota Supreme Court or the legislature to make the changes needed to protect municipalities and their citizenry from unnecessary negligence liability, while not *924interfering with the right of aggrieved parties to pursue remedies.
Municipalities, like Minnetrista, find themselves in a difficult situation. When Hans Hagen asked for a variance, Minne-trista deemed such a variance injurious and ultimately sought to deny the request. The decision this court reaches today, based on a rigid application of the statute, cannot take into consideration the type of variance sought by Hans Hagen, and the failure of Hans Hagen to exhibit any actual prejudice.
For instance, had Hans Hagen sought to construct a tire-burning industrial unit, a coal-fired power plant, a monstrous metal-shredder plant, a car battery/freon disposal plant, etc., today’s decision would grant and allow a potential injurious business too operate in residential Minnetrista. Anyone seeking a variance for something they have no chance to get, but are willing to pay the application fee and “take a shot” could file for a variance just to see what happens. With an administrative slip of the pen, as we have here, and with no showing of actual prejudice (with candor, respondent agrees that the short time-lapse caused none) it looks like the law mandates granting that variance.
I suggest there is precedent for examining an extremely short statute of limitations to see whether any actual prejudice has resulted, and, if not so, to work that into a common-sense reading of the law.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that arbitrary deadlines are sometimes “unduly harsh.” Terrell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 346 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn.1984). In Terrell the supreme court conducted a similar analysis as this court does today regarding a strictly worded legislative scheme. Id. The supreme court noted that absent such direct statutory direction, public policy would require an avoidance of injustice through requiring actual prejudice. Id. at 151. In recognizing disfavor on forfeiture of decisions or policies due to the passing of arbitrary deadlines, the legislature amended the statute at issue in Terrell to require a showing of actual prejudice. 1984 Minn. Laws ch. 592, § 55, at 1282. Subsequent decisions from this court then did not apply the same strict scrutiny administered by the supreme court in Terrell partly due to the legislature’s change in heart. See, e.g., LaFriniere v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C5-88-1582, 1989 WL 23535, at *2 (Minn.App. Mar.21,1989). In general, actual prejudice need be shown or there may be a limit to recovery. L & H Transport, Inc. v. Drew Agency, Inc., 369 N.W.2d 608, 611 (Minn.App.1985), aff'd 384 N.W.2d 435 (Minn.1986) ...
Respondents responsibly admit that Minnetrista’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious and that actual oral notice of the rejection was received at the October 9, 2005 meeting.
If the supreme court and legislature maintain the strict interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 15.99, that we see today, the inherent right of a municipality to fulfill its duty to protect the citizenry from unhealthy variances is emasculated. Normal statutes of limitation are commonly two, three, or six years to allow individuals and organizations the ability to adequately protect themselves from liability. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 541.07 (2004) (imposing two-or-three-year limitations on certain claims), Minn.Stat. § 17.9441, subd. 5 (2004) (imposing six-year statute of limitations on agricultural contract violations). The time limit here is 60 days. Hans Hagen admits that they were given constructive knowledge that the variance request was rejected after the vote at the first meeting. Without a showing of any actual prejudice, Hans Hagen’s request for relief should be — ideally—scrutinized and the interests of the public weighed against those of Hans Hagen.
*925The relatively short delay, nine days, to Minnetrista’s actual notice of denial in this case highlights the flaw within the harsh interpretations required by Minn.Stat. § 15.99. I believe that the supreme court or the legislature needs to reexamine the automatic approval of a variance to require a showing of at least some actual prejudice before overriding a municipality’s right to safeguard itself from harm. Hans Hagen was unable to show any prejudice suffered because of the nine day delay. If Minne-trista’s letter had not arrived after six months, or one year, a showing of actual prejudice could be doable. That is a case for another day based on those facts.
The second huge “bear in the kitchen” is the potential unlimited liability of Minne-trista and other similarly situated municipalities for classic ministerial negligence and easily provable damages. With the right noxious plant in place in a neighborhood because of a nine-day delay, or a six-day delay, or a one-day delay, every abutting landowner, residential or commercial, and possibly every homeowner within a strong wind’s smelling distance of a plant would be able to show through independent appraisal that the value of their property was reduced by ministerial negligence of the municipality.
The doctrine of common-law official immunity protects municipalities from liability arising from discretionary decisions. Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988). That is boilerplate law and needs no elaboration. But it is also equally clear that municipalities are subject to claims for ministerial negligence. An act is ministerial “when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Minn.1991) (quoting Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 224, 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937)). Whether a given action is discretionary or ministerial is a question that turns on the facts of each case. Reuter v. City of New Hope, 449 N.W.2d 745, 751 (Minn.App.1990), review denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 1990). Minnetrista has the protection of discretionary immunity to debate an ordinance, to pass or not pass one, and to grant or not grant zoning variances. Municipalities are shielded when they balance the standard laundry list, economic, social, political, etc. Nusbimm v. County of Blue Earth, 422 N.W.2d 713, 720 (Minn.1988). With regard to ministerial duties required of a public official, the Supreme Court has stated that if “he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct. A mistake as to his duty and honest intentions will not excuse the offender.” Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136, 78 U.S. 136,138, 20 L.Ed. 101 (1870).
Once Minnetrista formally denied Hans Hagen’s request, the instructions to the clerk to follow the statutory instructions for mailing were purely ministerial. After receiving a directive from the city council, there is no “discretion” in an employee not to put something in the mail within a clearly delineated statutory time-line. That directive is absolute, is not debatable, involves no economic balancing of interests (other than the expenditure of a $.39 stamp), and without giving an advisory opinion, it is difficult to conjure up a decent argument that the failure here to observe the 60-day deadline (albeit just nine days late) was anything but purely ministerial. A case could be built by a competent lawyer that failure to do so within the unambiguous statutory time constitutes at least enough “slight negligence” to build a cause of action on.
This is the apocalyptic scenario that, like tax day, April 15, is never too far off. In a hypothetical involving a coal-fired power plan or a metal-shredder, etc., etc., it would be difficult for a municipality to *926defend a claim of actual damages by owners of real property anywhere within sight-lines, or the wind-blown areas, or the entire community.
I strongly suggest that with section 15.99, some showing of actual prejudice should be determinative of the issue before us. In determining whether actual prejudice can be shown, the lapse of time would assist in determining liability on a case-by-case basis.
When determining the scrutiny necessary in matters like this, judges need the flexibility to balance the harshness of the penalty in relation to the shortness of the time limit in relation to actual prejudice shown. In the case of the minor delay involved here, Minnetrista should be given some latitude in their ability to make a decision that will severely impact those the municipality is charged to protect.
This is not to infer that Hans Hagen will not be a good neighbor; it is to state unequivocally that a bad neighbor would be in the same shoes as Hans Hagen is today, and it appears the courts are powerless to do any justice.
If municipalities are forced into bonding to exercise their power of eminent domain (to buy out affected homeowners, similar to excessive “airport noise”), or face the possibility of multiple lawsuits for devalued property, the taxpayer will be hollering for justice.
I respectfully concur but point out what I believe to be a serious flaw in what we are compelled to do today.