Court Opinion

ID: 9819212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:20:20.319273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.403185
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SLATER specially concurring in part and dissenting in part. I dissent from the majority’s judgment with regard to the imposition of extended-term sentences for each of the Class X aggravated criminal sexual assaults. The majority recognizes the general rule that where a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses of varying classifications, only the offenses within the most serious class may draw an extended term. People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 469 N.E.2d 569 (1984). However, the majority relies on the supreme court’s decision in People v. Young, 124 Ill. 2d 147, 529 N.E.2d 497 (1988), as an exception to this rule. In Young, the supreme court, following the rationale set forth in People v. Neal, 111 Ill. 2d 180, 489 N.E.2d 845 (1985), concluded that section 5 — 8—2(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5—8— 2(a) (West 1992)) could logically apply only to murder convictions where the defendant was sentenced to a term of years shorter than the extended term. Consequently, as section 5—8—2 could not apply to sentences of death or natural life, a defendant convicted of multiple offenses could receive an extended-term sentence for the most serious conviction other than murder. Young, 124 Ill. 2d 147, 529 N.E.2d 497. In a more recent decision mentioning neither Neal nor Young, the supreme court construed section 5—8—2 to require the reduction of a defendant’s extended-term sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault to a nonextended term because the most serious of defendant’s convictions was murder. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 568 N.E.2d 1234 (1990). As in Neal, the defendant in Henderson was sentenced to death, not a term of years. While the majority recognizes that the supreme court’s more recent decision in Henderson did not apply the rule in Young, the majority nonetheless continues to rely on Young as controlling. The majority lauds the reasoning in Young and simply remarks that the supreme court did not intend to overrule Young when it decided Henderson. 1 disagree. Clearly, the decisions in Young and Henderson cannot be reconciled. Subsequent to its decision in Young, the supreme court again had the opportunity to construe section 5—8—2, and it chose not to follow its earlier rationale. While Henderson did not explicitly overrule Young, its rejection of Young’s reasoning implicitly did so. See People v. Askew, 273 Ill. App. 3d 798, 652 N.E.2d 1041 (1995). The most recent guidance from the supreme court is that an extended-term may be imposed only for the most serious offense of which the defendant has been convicted, even when one of those offenses is murder. I therefore conclude that the imposition of extended-term sentences for each of the aggravated criminal sexual assaults was improper.