Court Opinion

ID: 9693535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:48:19.592525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:48.200070
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). I do not agree that there was no evidence of a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s damage.
In his memorandum of decision, the trial referee found that there was a stone culvert in the Penn Central embankment through which water flowed to the other side (north and away from the property of the plaintiff), that for many years Penn Central possessed, maintained and controlled that railroad culvert and that for at least eighteen months prior thereto, it did not inspect the culvert to determine if it had clogged. It was the plaintiff’s contention that the flooding and damages were caused by water backing up onto the plaintiff’s land because of the clogged culvert.
On those factors, causation between the defendants’ failure to act as to the culvert and the plaintiff’s damage should present no problem. Rather than causation, it appears that the basis of the trial referee’s decision was the application of the common enemy doctrine which permits a landowner to repel surface water without incurring liability to adjoining landowners.
The plaintiff requested this court to reject the common enemy doctrine and to substitute a less harsh and more equitable rule. That there are other rules in other jurisdictions was recognized by this *492court in Rutkoski v. Zalaski, 90 Conn. 108, 96 A. 365 (1916). Some jurisdictions have adopted the civil law rule which holds that “ ‘the right of drainage of surface-waters, as between owners of adjacent lands, of different elevations, is governed by the law of nature. The lower proprietor is bound to receive the waters which naturally flow from the estate above, provided the industry of man has not created or increased the servitude.’ ” Rutkoski v. Zalaski, supra, 111. This has sometimes been described as a servitude of natural drainage. Under this doctrine, each owner must leave the natural system undisturbed. The civil law and the common enemy approaches are property based concepts.
The term “common enemy” came into general usage with the 1875 New Jersey decision of Town of Union v. Durkes, 38 N.J.L. 21 (N.J. 1875), which stated (p. 22), “surface water was the common enemy, which every proprietor may fight and get rid of as best he may.” Those states adopting the common enemy rule believed it would foster land development since the developer need not bear the costs to others of his improvements. This doctrine had the virtue of encouraging the improvement of property, a desirable goal in nineteenth century America. The disadvantage of this doctrine was that it meant might made right: The landowner with the greater resources could build the highest embankment and so repel water onto his neighbor’s property.
In their strict application, these doctrines led to opposite results. Since they also led to unjust results, many courts modified or made exceptions to them. Some states applied one rule to urban areas and another to rural areas, or incorporated *493the tort principles of reasonableness and negligence into their rules. See annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 1193. Commentators have criticized this piecemeal approach as creating a great deal of confusion. Note, 2 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 549 (1980).
Connecticut has also modified the common enemy doctrine by the proposition that a landowner cannot use or improve his land so as to increase the volume of the surface waters which flow from it onto the land of others, nor can he discharge surface waters from his land onto the land of others in a different course from their natural flow, if by so doing he causes substantial damage. Falco v. James Peter Associates, Inc., 165 Conn. 442, 335 A.2d 301 (1973); Taylor v. Conti, 149 Conn. 174, 177 A.2d 670 (1962). This modification does not, however, apply to the present case.
Even though the policies behind the common enemy and civil law views are widely divergent, modification based upon reasonableness may lead to similar results. Modification has meant that “. . . the civil-law owner may never drain his land except by following the natural drainage, but the common-enemy owner may always drain his land except that he may not use artificial channels. The civil-law owner may never obstruct the natural flow of surface waters unless he acts reasonably, while the common-enemy owner may always obstruct the flow if he acts reasonably.” Maloney & Plager, “Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty?” 8 Natural Resources J. 72, 79 (1968).
In order to avoid the problems which resulted from either the common enemy or civil law rules, or the modified forms of these rules, many jurisdictions have adopted the reasonable use rule.
*494The doctrine of reasonable use is not the same as the reasonable use modification of the common enemy rule. The reasonableness modification rests on determinations of “negligence,” “malice,” and “good faith.” Absent negligence, or an intentional injury, the common enemy or the civil law rule would be applied. The rule of reasonable use, however, does not rest on negligence, nor does it focus solely on the character of the property owner’s action. Instead, it focuses on the results of the action, the consequent interference with another’s use and enjoyment of his land—much like the nuisance branch of tort law. Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975).
The New Jersey Supreme Court in adopting the rule of reasonable use expressed it in this manner: “. . . each possessor is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others, but incurs liability when his harmful interference with the flow of surface waters is unreasonable.” Armstrong v. Francis Corporation, 20 N.J. 320, 327, 120 A.2d 4 (1956).
The jurisdictions which have adopted this principle have set forth varying tests for determining liability: (a) Is there a reasonable necessity for such drainage? (b) Has reasonable care been taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land receiving the water? (c) Does the benefit accruing to the land drained reasonably outweigh the resulting harm? (d) When practicable, is the diversion accomplished by reasonably improving the normal and natural system of drainage, or if such a procedure is not practicable, has a reasonable and feasible artificial drainage system been installed? Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286 (1948).
*495This reasonable use approach has been adopted by the Restatement (Second), Torts, as well as many other jurisdictions.1 The underlying policy is that an intrusion of surface water on one’s property is much like any intrusion of smoke, fumes, or noise. Section 833 of the Restatement (Second), Torts provides: “An invasion of one’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land resulting from another’s interference with the flow of surface water may constitute a nuisance under the rules stated in §§ 821A-831.” The invasion can be either intentional, reckless or negligent. By way of illustration, the Restatement gives these examples: “1. The A Railroad Company owns and is in possession of a strip of land adjacent to land owned and occupied by B. There is a natural depression across both tracts of land through which surface waters from rain and melting snow are accustomed to flow from B’s land onto and across A’s land. A builds an embankment across this depression, leaving no opening, and as A realizes, the surface waters accumulating from the next hard rainfall cannot escape, spread out over B’s land and damage his crops. This invasion of B’s interest in the use and enjoyment of his land is intentional and A’s liability for nuisance depends upon whether the invasion is unreasonable under the rules stated in *496§§ 826-831. On A’s liability for trespass, see § 158. 2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that A puts a small culvert through its embankment to accommodate the surface waters that flow in the depression. After a hard, two-day rainfall, however, the flow of water in the depression is so great that the culvert cannot accommodate it, and as a result B’s land is flooded and his crops are damaged. This invasion of B’s interest in the use and enjoyment of his land is not intentional since it was not substantially certain to result from the acts of A, and A’s liability therefore depends upon whether it was negligent in building so small a culvert.” Restatement (Second), Torts § 833, p. 147.
An advantage of this rule is its flexibility. Current social policy dictates that a person no longer have unfettered control of his land. In an urbanized state such as Connecticut it would be unjust for a landowner to ignore the harmful consequences of his actions. The reasonable use rule permits the costs of land development to be allocated to the developer rather than the adjoining landowners.
"While this rule does not offer the certainty which the previous Connecticut law offered, the “desire for certainty of liability should not and must not serve as a judicial pardon for the unreasonable conduct which has been manifested by any landowner in our modern society.” Butler v. Bruno, supra, 275.
Although different courts have adopted various tests to determine what is a reasonable use of one’s property; note, 2 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 549 (1980); annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 1193; the law of nuisance clearly involves the proper weighing analysis. Surface water invasions should not be treated any dif*497ferently from invasions of smoke, vibrations or noise. Courts are familiar with nuisance concepts and can easily apply the law of nuisance to surface water cases.
The plaintiff brought its suit on the basis of negligence. Under Connecticut law of negligent nuisance, the law imposes upon every property owner a duty to make reasonable use of his property so as to occasion no unnecessary damage or annoyance to his neighbor. The determination of reasonableness is essentially a weighing process, involving a comparative evaluation of conflicting interests. Maykut v. Plasko, 170 Conn. 310, 365 A.2d 1114 (1976). Surface water problems should be decided under Connecticut nuisance law, utilizing the Minnesota and New Jersey guidelines.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
In this opinion Parskey, J., concurs.

 See, e.g., Weinberg v. Northern Alaska Development Corporation, 384 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1963); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Klutey v. Kentucky Department of Highways, 428 S.W.2d 766 (Ky. 1968); Tucker v. Badoian, 376 Mass. 907, 384 N.E.2d 1195 (1978); Armstrong v. Francis Corporation, 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956); Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1967); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975); Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1968); Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).