Court Opinion

ID: 9407929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 20:04:30.381378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.703785
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/10/23 In re F.M. CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 In re F.M., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL
 SERVICES AGENCY,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    A166758, A167524
 v.
                                                                        (Alameda County
 F.M.,
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. JD03470201)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         F.M., the alleged father of a now one-year-old boy, appeals the
dispositional order declining to order reunification services for him and the
subsequent order terminating his parental rights. He has filed identical
briefs in these two consolidated appeals, arguing the dependency court erred
in not elevating him to presumed father status.
         We affirm both orders. The dependency court did not err in its
parentage determination.
                                                  BACKGROUND
         These proceedings were commenced in April 2022, when Alameda
County Social Services (the Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging the

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baby, F.M., Jr., was at risk due to his mother’s and F.M.’s homelessness, lack
of suitable housing and untreated substance abuse; mother’s mental health
issues; and the previous termination of mother’s parental rights concerning
two older children due to her 14-year struggle with substance abuse and
mental health issues.1
      The baby was born prematurely, and he and his mother tested positive
for amphetamines at his birth. His mother acknowledged using
methamphetamine during the pregnancy and having a long history of
methamphetamine addiction. The baby was detained while hospitalized in
the neonatal intensive care unit, suffering from withdrawal symptoms.
      A few days after the baby’s birth, the social worker interviewed mother
and F.M. at the hospital. Mother told the social worker F.M. is the baby’s
father, which both she and F.M. continued to maintain throughout these
proceedings. F.M. told the social worker he and mother had been in a
relationship for two years. Mother denied being homeless; but she also told
the social worker she had received no prenatal care because she is homeless.
Both mother and F.M. said they had been living together at the home of
mother’s ex-husband and the home of F.M.’s mother in Oakley, California.
F.M. expressed an intent to live with mother and the baby at the home of
mother’s ex-husband upon the baby’s discharge. Mother subsequently left
the hospital against medical advice and showed up the next day at her ex-
husband’s house high on heroin.
      When contacted, mother’s ex-husband denied F.M. and mother had
been living with him. He said the two are homeless and abuse substances.

      1 The minor shares the same initials as the alleged father. To avoid
confusion, we refer to the minor as “baby” or “baby boy.”

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He was willing to allow mother and the baby to live with him, but not F.M.,
whom he did not know and did not want around his daughter.
      F.M.’s sister-in-law was potentially open to being assessed for
placement; F.M.’s brother declined to be assessed because he was unsure if
F.M. is the baby’s biological father. F.M.’s brother also denied that mother
and F.M. had been living at their family’s home in Oakley and said F.M. had
not lived there for two years.
      At the detention hearing held on April 13, 2022, neither mother nor
F.M. were present. The dependency court appointed them counsel, granted
them visitation and ordered the Agency to conduct a formal search for F.M.
      The Agency located him about 10 days later and he attended the initial
family team meeting (on May 3).
      At a subsequent hearing (held on June 28), the dependency court
advised counsel for the parties it had been unable to locate a voluntary
declaration of paternity for F.M. in the state database search it had
conducted, “[s]o at this point we do not have any proof or direction one way or
the other as to whether or not [his] name is on the birth certificate.”
      By the time of the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing held three
months after the detention hearing, F.M. had attended just one visit (a few
days before the hearing), his referral for substance abuse testing and
treatment had been terminated because he had skipped all appointments and
taken no steps to enroll, and the Agency had lost contact with him.
      The combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing was held on July 25,
2022, and F.M. again did not attend, even though the social worker had
previously reminded him of the hearing date. The petition’s allegations (as
amended) were found true and the baby was declared a dependent. The court
bypassed reunification services for mother based on her prior child welfare

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history. F.M.’s counsel proffered a declaration of paternity on his behalf
signed only by her, not by F.M., and asked the court to elevate him to
presumed father status based on it. At F.M.’s counsel’s request, the court
conducted a paternity inquiry of mother, who testified F.M. is the baby’s
biological father, supported her financially during the pregnancy, visited at
the hospital and signed some paperwork there, which the hospital would not
give her access to once the dependency case was underway. The court also re-
checked the state database and again could not find any voluntary
declaration of paternity on file for F.M., noting that often it takes only two
months for them to get entered in the database whereas here it had been
about three months since the baby’s birth. The court declined to elevate F.M.
to presumed father status in his absence and without proof of a signed
declaration of paternity, and on that basis declined to order reunification
services for him. The court scheduled a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26 hearing. F.M. then appealed the disposition order.
      At a subsequent hearing on September 7, 2022, the court found the
Agency had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate F.M., whose
whereabouts were still unknown. The Agency believed he was living in a
homeless encampment in East Oakland. On the morning of the hearing,
however, his counsel notified the court he was presently in jail, with a
hearing date in eight days.
      By the time of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing
(held on November 21, 2022), F.M. had been released from custody, and his
attorney had lost contact with him. His whereabouts remained unknown
until the morning of the hearing, when it was discovered he had recently
been arrested again (six days before the hearing) and was back in custody

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facing new charges.2 There had been no further visits3 and the hearing
proceeded in his absence. The court again declined to elevate F.M. to
presumed father status and terminated his and mother’s parental rights. He
then appealed those rulings too.4
                                 DISCUSSION
      F.M. argues, first, that the dependency court erred in declining to deem
him a presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d).5 That provision
“creates a rebuttable presumption of presumed fatherhood if ‘[t]he presumed
parent receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child
as his or her natural child.’ ” (W.S. v. S.T. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 132, 143
(W.S.), quoting § 7611, subd. (d).)
      The inquiry is more qualitative than quantitative. “A father does not
need to receive the child into his home for a specific period of time, although
cohabitation for an extended period of time may strengthen a claim for
presumed parent status. [Citation.] However, to receive a child into his or
her home, a parent must ‘demonstrate a parental relationship, however

      2He had been served with notice of the hearing while in jail the prior
month, and so had his counsel.
      3  At the July 25, 2022 jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the court
terminated father’s visits because he had not been elevated to presumed
father status (“He should not be visiting if he’s an alleged father. And really
that is a bit of a problem”).
      4 The record does not contain a written order terminating parental
rights or a minute order of the hearing. No party argues this precludes our
consideration of F.M.’s appeal. We presume the law was followed and that
the ruling was either entered into the minutes or a written order was
prepared and entered. (See Evid. Code, § 664; In re I.V. (2017)
11 Cal.App.5th 249, 258; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c).)
      5All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless
otherwise indicated.

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imperfect.’ [Citation.] ‘Presumed parent status is afforded only to a person
with a fully developed parental relationship with the child.’ ” (W.S., supra,
20 Cal.App.5th at p. 145.) “It is not enough to demonstrate ‘only a caretaking
role and/or romantic involvement with a child’s parent.’ ” [Citation.] Rather,
the presumed parent must demonstrate ‘ “a full commitment to his [or her]
paternal responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise.” ’ ” (In re
Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 485.)
      In assessing this issue, courts have looked to a number of factors, none
dispositive. (W.S., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 145.) As relevant here, they
include factors such as “ ‘whether the man actively helped the mother in
prenatal care; whether he paid pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate
with his ability to do so; whether he promptly took legal action to obtain
custody of the child; whether he sought to have his name placed on the birth
certificate; whether and how long he cared for the child; whether there is
unequivocal evidence that he had acknowledged the child; [and] the number
of people to whom he had acknowledged the child . . . .” (Id. at pp. 145-146.)
“While the juvenile [dependency] court may consider a wide range of factors
in making a presumed parent determination, as appropriate to the
circumstances [citation], the core issues are the person’s established
relationship with and demonstrated commitment to the child.” (In re
Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 485.)
      “A person seeking presumed parent status has the burden of
demonstrating compliance with the statutory requirements by a
preponderance of the evidence.” (In re Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at
p. 492.) Where a trial court has concluded that a party failed to meet its
burden of proof, reversal is required only if the evidence compelled a finding
in the party’s favor on that issue as a matter of law. (Sonic Manufacturing

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Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466.) In
such a case, “ ‘the inquiry on appeal is whether the weight and character of
the evidence . . . was such that the [trial] court could not reasonably reject
it.’ ” (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111,
1121, citing In re R.V. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 181, 201.) “ ‘We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the ruling, giving it the benefit of every reasonable
inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citation.]
We defer to the trial court’s credibility resolutions and do not reweigh the
evidence.’ ” (In re Alexander P., at p. 492.)
      F.M. argues he established presumed father status under section 7611,
subdivision (d), because both he and mother testified they had lived together
and been in a romantic relationship for two years, they both reported that he
was the baby’s biological father, and he attended an initial family team
meeting where he expressed a desire to be involved with the baby and wanted
reunification services. He also points to mother’s testimony that he told
friends and family about the pregnancy, accompanied her to “a lot of” her
medical appointments during her pregnancy, visited the baby at the hospital
for three days, and signed some paperwork at the hospital that she couldn’t
recall and couldn’t locate.
      Such evidence does not establish presumed parentage as a matter of
law, such that we must reverse. The dependency court was not required to
believe mother’s testimony about these subjects. (See Hicks v. Reis (1943)
21 Cal.2d 654, 659-660.) Indeed, it had good reason to doubt her credibility.
For example, she testified F.M. accompanied her to “a lot” of her medical
appointments, but at the hospital she told the social worker she had had no
prenatal care. Further, the court sustained uncontested allegations that she
had no prenatal appointments and was seen only three times during her

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pregnancy in the emergency room. She had also told the social worker that
she had lived with F.M. at the homes of two different relatives, but both of
those relatives disputed those statements.
      Moreover, there was considerable evidence that F.M. lacked a
commitment to establishing a relationship with the baby and assuming the
role of parent, none of which his brief discusses. We do not agree that he
proved a demonstrated commitment to the newborn child as a matter of law,
such that no factfinder could conclude otherwise. Although F.M. attended
the initial family team meeting, he did not attend the second one. Nor did he
avail himself of the substance abuse testing and treatment referral the
Agency gave him. And despite multiple opportunities for visitation during
the first three months of the case, he visited the baby only once. This record
does not compel a determination as a matter of law that F.M. demonstrated
“ ‘ “a full commitment to his [or her] paternal responsibilities.” ’ ” (In re
Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 485.) It suggests the opposite. The
dependency court did not err in declining to elevate him to presumed father
status under section 7611, subdivision (d).
      F.M. also argues he put his name on the child’s birth certificate and
signed a voluntary declaration of paternity at the hospital.6 But, as he

      6  Although F.M. has not framed this point as an independent
argument, we regard it as such. A genetic parent may acquire presumed
parent status by executing a valid, voluntary declaration of paternity that is
filed with the Department of Child Support Services. (See § 7573, subd. (d),
incorporated by § 7611; In re A.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 340, 349, fn. 2; M.M.
v. D.V. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 733, 742.) Doing so is an independent basis for
establishing presumed parentage than pursuant to subdivision (d) of
section 7611, by receiving the child into their home and openly holding them
out as a natural child. (See § 7611 [“A person is presumed to be the natural
parent of a child if the person meets the conditions provided in . . . Chapter 3

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acknowledges, neither document could be found. At best, the evidence about
the birth certificate and declaration of paternity was inconclusive, consisting
only of his and mother’s statements that he did these things. He cites no
authority that mother’s testimony alone and/or their statements to the social
worker compelled the dependency court to find that these documents exist.
On the contrary, “[i]f weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered when it
was within the power of the party to produce stronger and more satisfactory
evidence, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust” (Evid. Code,
§ 412); that is certainly true at least of the voluntary declaration of paternity.
Nothing prevented F.M. from signing another one at any time during these
proceedings, filing it with the appropriate child support agency and supplying
it to the court. His counsel tried to do so on his behalf at the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing three months into the case, but because F.M.
was not present she could only proffer a paternity form he had not signed,
which the dependency court rightly declined to credit. F.M. cites no authority
that an unexecuted declaration of paternity is entitled to any legal force.
      F.M. argues “[t]he fact that the juvenile [dependency] court and the
social workers could not locate these documents does not disprove that [he]
signed them.” But he bore the burden of establishing his presumed
parentage, and so it was his burden to prove that he did sign them, not the
Agency’s burden to prove that he didn’t.7 His statements to the social worker

(commencing with Section 7570) of Part 2 or in any of the following
subdivisions” including (d)].)
      7 At the detention hearing or as soon thereafter as possible, a
dependency court must inquire at the hearing about the identity of all alleged
or presumed fathers, which includes asking whether any man has signed a
voluntary declaration of paternity. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 316.2, subd. (a)(5).)
In the present case the dependency court went farther and itself conducted a

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and mother’s vague testimony did not compel the dependency court to
conclude that he had signed a voluntary declaration of paternity and/or was
listed on the baby’s birth certificate. Far from being conclusive proof of those
facts, their statements suffered from credibility issues that were the trial
court’s exclusive province to assess. The dependency court did not err in
insisting that F.M. himself attend the proceedings, attest to his paternity
and/or sign or produce a copy of a validly executed voluntary declaration of
paternity before the court would consider elevating him to presumed father
status.
      Finally, F.M. argues that because the baby was detained at birth, he
was precluded from receiving the baby into his home and thereby achieving
presumed parent status, and thus qualifies as a parent on non-statutory
grounds under Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816. Extended
discussion is unnecessary. To establish parentage under Kelsey S., an alleged
father must show that he has promptly attempted to assume his parental
responsibilities as fully as the circumstances permit. (See id. at p. 849.) He
must show he has “done all that he could reasonably do under the
circumstances,” to demonstrate a “full commitment to his parental
responsibilities,” from the time he learned he was the biological father up to
and including during the pending legal proceedings. (Id. at pp. 850, 849.)

records check, which yielded no evidence F.M. had signed a voluntary
declaration of paternity. The court also must send a parentage inquiry to the
local child support agency, on the mandatory Judicial Council Form (JV-500),
asking whether parentage has been established through any superior court
order or judgment or through the execution and filing of a voluntary
declaration of paternity. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635(d)(2).) The record
contains no such document. F.M. raises no issue about the adequacy of the
dependency court’s parentage inquiry, however, and we express no opinion on
that subject.

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For the reasons already explained, F.M. has not demonstrated this. Despite
having been represented by appointed counsel, who definitively
communicated with him about getting elevated to presumed father status,
F.M. visited the baby just once, attended no court hearings, declined to
participate in substance abuse testing and treatment, skipped a family team
meeting and eventually could not even be located. (See, e.g., In re D.S. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1245-1246 [error to accord Kelsey S. status to
biological father who initially visited with baby and took prompt legal action
to establish paternity but thereafter got “sidetracked” from establishing a
parental bond by his own behavior including drug use and criminality].) “[A]
father whose own bad decisions preclude him from carrying out his parental
responsibilities does not satisfy the high bar set by Kelsey S.” (In re D.S., at
p. 1246.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The dispositional order and the order terminating parental rights are
affirmed.

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                                     STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MILLER, J.

In re F.M. (A166758, A167524)

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