Court Opinion

ID: 9791272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:08:23.121656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:35.176762
License: Public Domain

CORCORAN, Justice,
concurring in part:
I agree with the majority that A.R.S. § 4-312(A) violates article 18, § 5 of the Arizona Constitution. I disagree with the majority that this is the case in which we should decide that issue. Sound jurisprudence dictates that we dispose of this case on the nonconstitutional grounds discussed below, particularly when our failure to do so leaves potential confusion about the resolution of those issues.
Two threshold procedural issues were presented in both the trial court and the court of appeals that might have allowed us to resolve this case without addressing the constitutional issue. Both of those procedural issues were among the ones on which we granted review. The majority ignores resolution of these issues:
1. Does A.R.S. § 4-312(A), which was effective August 13, 1986, apply to a lawsuit that was filed after that date even though the cause of action arose in 1985?
2. If so, did the filing of a defective referendum petition challenging A.R.S. § 4-312(A) operate to delay the effective date of the statute until after the complaint had been filed in this case, making the statute inapplicable?
This court normally avoids determination of a constitutional issue if we can decide the case on other grounds. See State v. Yslas, 139 Ariz. 60, 63, 676 P.2d 1118, 1121 (1984); School Dish v. Strohm, 106 Ariz. 7, 9, 469 P.2d 826, 828 (1970). This case could have been resolved by addressing the above two issues on their merits.
The trial court applied a statute that was effective in August 1986 to bar a cause of action that arose in September 1985. I believe the trial court made an erroneous retroactive application of A.R.S. § 4-312(A) to this case by granting the motion to dismiss. See A.R.S. § 1-244; see also Carrillo v. El Mirage Roadhouse, 164 Ariz. 364, 367-368, 793 P.2d 121, 124-125 (1990) (A.R.S. § 4-312 did not apply retroactively to a July 1985 occurence). The court of appeals initially agreed that the statute applied because the complaint was filed after the statute’s August 1986 effective date. See Schwab v. Matley, 162 Ariz. 46, 47, 780 P.2d 1387, 1388 (App.1988) (vacated on reconsideration, id.). I believe the court of appeals erroneously concluded that the cause of action was not “vested” prior to filing of the complaint; this was a misapplication of our decision in Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc., 149 Ariz. 130, 717 *426P.2d 434 (1986). On reconsideration, the court of appeals concluded that the effective date of the statute had been delayed, pending the invalidation of a defective referendum petition, until September 12, 1986, and that because the complaint had been filed prior to that date, the statute did not apply. See Schwab v. Matley, 162 Ariz. at 47, 780 P.2d at 1388 (opinion on reconsideration). I believe the court of appeals reached the right result in ultimately concluding that the statute did not apply to this case, but erroneously reasoned that the statute was not in effect on the date the complaint was filed as a result of the pending referendum petition.
Because I conclude that the statute does not retroactively apply to this lawsuit, I agree with the majority’s disposition of this case in reversing the trial court’s dismissal order, vacating the court of appeals’ decision, and remanding the case for further proceedings. However, because I believe the statute does not apply to this case, I disagree with the majority that the constitutional issue was “squarely presented” in this case. Furthermore, I am troubled, that in reaching the constitutional issue, the majority has created the impression that it first considered and rejected these threshold procedural issues. A casual reader of this opinion and that of the court of appeals on rehearing might think that this court has implicitly held as follows: (1) that the applicable law was that in effect on the date the complaint was filed rather than that in effect on the date the alleged injuries occurred; and (2) that a defective referendum petition can somehow automatically delay the operative effective date of a statute. Neither of these principles is approved in the majority opinion, and this case should not be cited as precedent for either.
I realize that this court has no “case or controversy” requirement analogous to the restriction imposed on federal courts by the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. However, we have long recognized the wisdom of exercising judicial restraint from deciding issues not squarely before us, to insure that we do not issue mere advisory opinions. See Big D Constr. Co. v. Court of Appeals, 163 Ariz. 560, 789 P.2d 1061 (1990); In re Strobel, 149 Ariz. 213, 216, 717 P.2d 892, 895 (1986); State v. B Bar Enter., Inc., 133 Ariz. 99, 101 n. 2, 649 P.2d 978, 980 n. 2 (1982). I do not agree that we should address the constitutionality of a statute in a case to which it does not apply simply because it was briefed and argued. I also do not believe the constitutional issue on which the majority decision is based was one that would have otherwise escaped review if not decided here; surely the statute would be challenged by those having causes of action arising after its effective date. I would therefore have preferred to exercise judicial restraint in this case and decide the merits of the procedural issues, rather than the constitutionality of the statute.