Court Opinion

ID: 9477264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:18:43.822666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:47.046645
License: Public Domain

BORK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority’s remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine the “fact” of Dr. Yaz-di’s degree of peril will require a hearing on a question wholly unsuited to the capacities of the judicial process. The facts judges, and juries, find are ordinarily about past events or future harms from past events predicted according to disciplines such as medicine or economics or common sense views of likely outcomes. The “fact” the majority here requires the district court to “find” is not like a determination whether an automobile involved in a collision ran a red light, whether a defendant distributed a controlled substance, or whether business competitors agreed to fix prices. The opportunity for cross-examination, which the majority claims must be afforded appel-lee, is required for sorting out facts of that sort, not for making political predictions about what might happen to Dr. Yazdi under wholly unknowable circumstances in the future, which is rather like using a trial to predict the outcome of the next Presidential election.
If an evidentiary hearing is the best method of deciding questions like these, then the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency ought to use the federal courts and cross-examination to arrive at the “truth” on such questions as what the Ayatollah Khomeini will do next with respect to Iraq or the prospects of dissident factions within Libya. It is improbable that anybody would suppose that the result, whatever it might be, was a finding of “fact.” It would be speculation only. The question here is similar: what actions might be taken in the future with respect to a particular individual by the government of Iran, or by any one of a number of political or religious factions, some of them presently unknown, within that turbulent and volatile nation.1
The majority requires the Department of State and the Washington Post to have a hearing on the latter “issue,” that they cross-examine each other’s affiants, and that both sides “present the testimony of expert witnesses, and nonexperts with first-hand knowledge, on the state of affairs in Iran, particularly with respect to attitudes toward Iranians with American ties.” Maj. op. at 39.2 It is difficult to *41know how the district court will try “the state of affairs in Iran” other than to ask whether there is any danger to an Iranian politician who has denied that he is an American citizen and then is shown to be one by the American government. If more than that is proposed, it is not clear what it is. Given the events of the past several years, moreover, it is hard to believe an evidentiary hearing is required to learn Iranian attitudes toward America.
Following the hearing, the majority presumably would have the district court make findings as to what the evidence adduced established. This court will then review, on a clearly erroneous standard, the “findings” about the “state of affairs in Iran,” “attitudes toward those with American ties,” and what all of this might portend for Dr. Yazdi’s continued well being.
The majority seems to completely miss my point that courts do not deal in predictive political facts. I agree with the majority that courts can, and should, determine facts involving foreign events and actors. The problem with the “facts” in this case is not that they involve foreigners, acts taking place on foreign soil, or even events taking place in Iran. See, e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting v. Sotheby Parke-Bernet, Inc., 839 F.2d 780 (D.C.Cir.1988) (court upholds a jury’s factual determination involving the confiscation of a violin in Iran).
What places this case so totally outside the province of judicial capacity is that the district court is asked to predict political events and violence in Iran. While courts are competent to determine issues of predictive fact, I know of no legal principle which allows a court to speculate about future political events and then call its guess a “fact.”
One can dress up any sort of political speculation to look like a judicial determination of “facts,” but the dress does not alter the reality. Since the world’s best intelligence services cannot infallibly predict the occasions and the targets of terrorism, it would seem unduly optimistic for the D.C. Circuit to suppose that its trial processes can do so. In truth, what will come out of such a process in the present case will be an uninformed guess by unqualified judges about what might happen to Dr. Yazdi in a nation tom by factional violence, in a culture wholly different from our own, in a political context we do not understand, in a city we have never seen, and that is over 6,000 miles from where we sit.
It is appalling that anyone’s life, liberty, or property is to be made to depend on so preposterous a judicial undertaking. The majority fails to acknowledge, even in passing, that the privacy interest asserted here is quite different from the typical Exemption 6 privacy interest. We are not being asked to determine whether disclosure of Yazdi’s citizenship status will unduly embarrass him or perhaps cut short a promising career in Iran by damaging his political reputation. Instead the privacy interest asserted is the possibility that physical danger to life and limb will flow from disclosure. Surely there can be no asserted privacy interest graver than the risk of physical harm or loss of life.
No court could conceivably find that Dr. Yazdi will be subject to no danger whatever or that he will certainly be injured. This means that the best a factfinder can honestly attempt is to estimate the odds on injury to Dr. Yazdi and then decide what degree of risk crosses the threshold of an unwarranted “invasion of privacy.” That is a most peculiar judicial function. I would have thought any increase in danger to a man’s life would cross the threshold. And, as I have suggested, no judge can honestly say that increased danger will not result. It should be enough to support the summary judgment here that neither we nor the trial court can possibly say with any assuredness, with or without a hearing, that releasing the information sought would pose no danger to Dr. Yazdi.
Although FOIA provides that reviewing courts must examine the record de novo, 5 *42U.S.C. § 522(a)(4)(B) (1982), in the particular facts of this case the factors to be considered are so far beyond the competence of the judiciary to assess that according substantial weight to the factual allegations and opinions of the agencies is appropriate. See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 176, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 1891, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985); Weissman v. CIA, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (1977). Congress specifically recognized this principle with respect to Exemption 1 of the FOIA:3
Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of public disclosure of a particular classified record. Accordingly, [Congress] expects] that [federal courts, in making de novo determinations in section 552(b)(1) cases under the Freedom of Information law, will accord substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record.
S.Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, p. 6290, see also 120 Cong.Rec. 17,024 (1974) (Sen. Muskie) (“[By suggesting de novo review in Exemption 1 cases,] I am not asking the courts to disregard the expertise of the Pentagon, the CIA, or the State Department. Rather, I am saying that I would assume and wish that the judges give such expert testimony considerable weight.”).
In Halperin v. CIA, 203 U.S.App.D.C. 110, 629 F.2d 144 (1980), this court applied the “logic” of Congress’ statement with respect to Exemption 1 in its review of a CIA decision not to release the names of attorneys or law firms retained by the CIA to perform legal services connected with classified activities. The CIA claimed that the records were exempt from disclosure under Exemption 3 of the FOIA, which protects matters that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” 5 U.S. C. § 552(b)(3) (1982). The statute the CIA relied upon was 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976), which provides that “the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure[.]” The CIA refused to disclose the names sought because, among other reasons, the disclosure could result in harm to the individuals identified and could lead to further disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. We held that the question of “whether the predicted danger is a reasonable expectation ... is precisely ... [the] point that a court, lacking expertise in the substantive matters at hand, must give substantial weight to agency statements, so long as they are plausible and not called into question by contrary evidence or evidence of agency bad faith.” Halperin, 629 F.2d at 149.
The “logic” of according deference to agency opinions regarding foreign policy and this court’s holding in Halperin should provide persuasive reason to accord “substantial weight” to the State Department’s assessment of the potential harm to Dr. Yazdi from disclosure of the requested information.4 First, the reasons for deference in foreign policy matters are applicable here, for an estimate of the degree of danger in which disclosure would place Dr. Yazdi depends upon expert knowledge about the internal situation and politics of Iran, matters within the competence of the State Department and far outside ours.
Second, it is anomalous to accord deference to an agency’s opinion “that the disclosure of the identity of an attorney doing work for the CIA might expose him to adverse action from hostile powers,” Halperin, 629 F.2d at 148, but to refuse to accord any deference to an agency’s opinion that “[a]n official of the Government of *43Iran who is reputed to be an American citizen would ... be in physical danger from some of the revolutionary groups that are prone to violence.” Affidavit of Harold H. Saunders 112, J.A. at 19. In both cases the expertise to which we defer is the same: the ability to assess the political climate in a foreign nation and to determine the attendant risk of harm to individuals from disclosure of information regarding those individuals. And, in each case judges “lack the expertise necessary to second-guess such agency opinions.” Halpe-rin, 629 F.2d at 148.
Application of this standard in assessing Dr. Yazdi’s privacy interest reveals that the privacy interest at stake is indeed quite substantial. For example, in describing the situation in Iran in 1980, Harold H. Saunders, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated that “[a]ny individual in Iran who is suspected of being an American citizen or of having American connections is looked upon with mistrust. An official of the Government of Iran who is reputed to be an American citizen would, in my opinion, be in physical danger from some of the revolutionary groups that are prone to violence.” Affidavit of Harold H. Saunders II2, J.A. at 19. Yazdi was Iran’s Foreign Minister but resigned soon after the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran. He apparently remained a member of the Kevolutionary Council for some time. Id. H 8, J.A. at 19. He also sat in the Iranian parliament, see Supplemental Affidavit of Harold H. Saunders 112, J.A. at 80, though at oral argument counsel for the State Department stated his understanding that Yazdi was no longer a member of that body.
In a supplemental affidavit, Assistant Secretary Saunders noted that “[t]here continues to be intense anti-American sentiment in Iran and several revolutionary leaders have been strongly criticized in the press for their alleged ties to the United States [and] any person suspected of having such a connection would likely be subject to severe scrutiny, suspicion and possible harm.” Supplemental Affidavit of Harold H. Saunders ¶ 3, J.A. at 80. See also Affidavit of David T. Schneider, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs: “Individuals ... arrested due to their association with Americans remain in jail”; “There has been no moderation in the anti-American rhetoric of the regime. The U.S. is still called the ‘Great Satan’ “Cu-mulated evidence points to Iranian involvement in acts of international terrorism, including the attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon”; Dr. Yazdi is “a member of the faction led by Mehdi Bazargan.... This faction is already in danger due to Mr. Bazargan’s public criticisms of the regime .... A meeting attended by members of the Bazargan faction was broken up by rioters who entered the building, forcing Bazargan and others to flee through a rear entrance. Dr. Yazdi’s association with this faction is well known in Iran as are his relatively moderate politics including a willingness to seek accommodation with the United States.” J.A. at 126-32.
These facts justify the affidavit’s conclusion that “[i]f Department of State files were to confirm that Dr. Yazdi was a U.S. citizen, which he has reportedly denied, it would have results which constitute a serious threat to his personal privacy, safety, and well being, including arrest and imprisonment.” J.A. at 131. It seems clear that Yazdi, who was a prominent Iranian official and who has denied being an American citizen, would be in more than ordinary peril if the American government should declare that, in truth, he is an American citizen. This court is certainly in no position to contradict the State Department’s assertions on that subject.
I do not, as the majority asserts, advocate blind deference to the State Department. There is no anomaly in asserting that we should accord substantial weight to the State Department’s affidavit while also noting that the conclusions stated in it are plausible. Under the standard enunciated in Halperin, the State Department’s affidavits should be accorded substantial weight because “they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely con-*44elusory statements, and ... they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Halperin, 629 F.2d at 148.5 My arguments from plausibility are an appropriate examination for contradictory evidence or bad faith.
The only evidence in the record that could be construed to contradict the Department’s affidavits is the previous publication of allegations of Dr. Yazdi’s U.S. citizenship and lack of any known subsequent harm to Dr. Yazdi. But, as the State Department contends, it is the official confirmation of Dr. Yazdi’s citizenship that would result in a serious threat to his safety and well being. It is common knowledge that foreign governments often react much more strongly when facts they already know or suspect are given official confirmation. An authoritative statement from the United States government about a person’s American citizenship is certain to be regarded as more credible than unofficial assertions published in the media. Whatever suspicions may have been occasioned by the two books previously mentioned, official confirmation would remove all doubt. And even if no doubt exists among those in Iran who might take action, a public statement by our government may still provoke a reprisal that otherwise would not take place, for an official statement of this sort, unlike media accounts, may be seen by members of a foreign government as requiring a public response to something they would have preferred to ignore.
This circuit has previously noted the distinction between speculation and official acknowledgment. Thus, we have remarked that the Soviet Union had long known of flights of U-2 planes over Soviet territory and knew specifically that a U-2 they had brought down was engaged in gathering intelligence. But it was only when President Eisenhower publicly confirmed those facts and that he had approved the mission that the Soviet Union denounced the American action and cancelled a scheduled summit conference. See Afshar v. Department of State, 226 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130-33 & n. 7 (1983) (citing Phillippi v. CIA, 211 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 655 F.2d 1325, 1332 (1981)); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 211 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 656 F.2d 724, 743-45 (1981).
In the context of FOIA, this circuit has noted that “[u]nofficial leaks and public surmise can often be ignored by foreign governments ... but official acknowledgment may force a government to retaliate.” Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130-31. Although that statement was made about a foreign government’s cooperation with U.S. intelligence services, its underlying rationale is applicable here. The distinction between a foreign government’s reaction to rumor or speculation and official confirmation is not dependent on the type of information released or the FOIA exemption involved. Instead, reaction to official confirmation takes place “[i]n the world of international diplomacy, where face-saving may often be as important as substance....” Phillippi, 655 F.2d at 1333. I believe that under this persuasive precedent, the Washington Post’s reliance on the impact of widespread speculation about Yazdi’s citizenship on his privacy interest is misplaced.
This court should instead give substantial weight to the State Department’s allegations that official confirmation of Yazdi’s alleged citizenship would subject him to “physical danger” and “severe scrutiny, suspicion and possible harm.” It is clear that the Department asserts “threats to privacy interests more palpable than mere possibilities.” Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380 n. 19, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1608 n. 19, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976).
In the case before us, we have not merely the State Department’s informed estimate of the dangers, backed by a factual recounting of events in Iran that is not *45disputed, but also an estimate that, as any reader of the Washington Post knows, is very plausible. Very little deference to the State Department’s knowledge is required. This court is not asked, on the basis of undisclosed expertise, to believe anything more than common sense alone would suggest. Given the nature of the threat in this case, and the utter inadequacy of the trial process to find the degree of Yazdi’s danger, let alone to find that the danger is nonexistent, such an expert assessment, backed by recited facts, should be sufficient. I would grant summary judgment to the Department of State.

. As the majority notes, this question is, in some respects, similar to the findings of fact made by an immigration officer when an alien attempts to prove (or does prove) that he has a "well-founded fear of persecution” should he return to his native land and thus is entitled to refugee status in this country. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982). The asylum procedure mandates that INS request an advisory opinion from the State Department. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7(a), 208.10(b) (1987). Judicial review of an INS decision not to grant asylum status is deferential. The decision whether the alien has met the refugee definition is reviewed under the substantial evidence test. The ultimate decision to grant or deny asylum is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. Espinoza-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir.1985). Judicial review of an INS determination not to withhold deportation is also limited to substantial evidence review. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1982). it is significant that in another area of the law, where "country conditions" are at issue, Congress has limited judicial review.
It is also for these reasons that under the applicable standards the alien "must introduce credible, direct, and specific evidence of facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution." Mendez-Efrain v. INS, 813 F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir.1987). Aliens, who unlike Dr. Yazdi are present at the hearing, are required to show an individualized threat; a general level of violence or danger is not sufficient. Id. Thus, the focus of the INS’ evidentiary hearing on refugee status is on individualized facts not on general political speculation.

. I grant the majority's uncontroversial argument that summary judgment is limited to situations where no material facts are in dispute. Maj. op. at 29-31. It is also beyond dispute that the "integrity of a court’s de novo judgment rests upon an adversarial system of testing for truth when critical adjudicative facts are in dispute." Id. at 31. What the majority blithely ignores, however, is that in this case we are confronted with "facts" which are beyond the capabilities of the adversarial system itself. No amount of adversarial cross-examination will help the district court judge to determine the *41credibility of the experts called to testify by each side. The most the district court will be able to determine is that each political expert holds his political opinion sincerely.

. Exemption 1 protects from disclosure matters that are "(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order....” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1982).

. I certainly do not mean to indicate that a court must give deference to every agency opinion in an Exemption 6 case. As I note in the body of the opinion, this case presents a situation quite unlike the typical Exemption 6 privacy interest.

. See Hayden v. National Security Agency, 197 U.S.App.D.C. 224, 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937, 100 S.Ct. 2156, 64 L.Ed.2d 790 (1980); Goland v. CIA, 197 U.S.App.D.C. 25, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980); Ray v. Turner, 190 U.S.App.D.C. 290, 587 F.2d 1187, 1194-95 (1978); Weissman v. CIA, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 565 F.2d 692, 697 n. 10 (1977).