Court Opinion

ID: 9737396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:23:57.106887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:58.621433
License: Public Domain

Connolly, L,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I agree with the majority opinion that Allied was required to provide underinsured motorist protection for persons “using” the vehicle and could not limit coverage to the smaller class of persons “occupying” the vehicle. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Emry was “using” the vehicle at the time he was struck. The majority opinion recognizes that a causal relationship or connection must exist between an accident or injury and the ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle in order for an incident to fall within the meaning of the phrase “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle.” The majority opinion correctly cites Farmers Union Co-op Ins. Co. v. Allied Prop. & Cas., 253 Neb. 177, 569 N.W.2d 436 (1997), for the proposition that “but for” causation is required. However, the majority ignores the test as set out in Farmers Union Co-op Ins. Co.
In Farmers Union Co-op Ins. Co., we noted that we “require that something peculiar to the vehicle itself causally contribute to the accident.” Id. at 183, 569 N.W.2d at 440. The cases cited by the majority in the instant case all support this general proposition. It is a peculiar characteristic of delivery trucks that their drivers will need to ask for directions, of tow trucks that their drivers will need to tow cars, of construction vehicles that a foreman will need to stop and repair construction equipment, of gas station trucks that a gas station attendant will need to pour gasoline into a stranded car, of garbage trucks that a garbage collector will need to pick up garbage, of a firetruck that a firefighter will complete a fire report, and of any vehicle that the driver will need to go for help if the vehicle breaks *705down. However, it is not a peculiar characteristic of an ordinary vehicle that such a vehicle will be used to help the victims of an accident involving another vehicle. Such a use would be peculiar to an ambulance, but that is not the type of vehicle at issue here.
Nonetheless, the majority concludes that the vehicle was “used” in the instant case. The majority accomplishes this feat by deleting the peculiarity requirement, stating that in determining “use,” we need only consider whether the activity can reasonably be expected to occur in relation to the operation of the vehicle and whether the person was “vehicle oriented.” The majority’s failure to include a peculiarity requirement in its new test renders the test meaningless. Indeed, one could contemplate that stopping for ice cream will occur in relation to the operation of a vehicle and that such a stop would be “vehicle oriented.” Likewise, one could conclude that a dogbite will occur in relation to the operation of a vehicle when a dog is in the vehicle and that the dogbite would be “vehicle oriented.” Thus, by adopting the “vehicle oriented” test, the majority has implicitly overruled this court’s holding in Farmers Union Co-op Ins. Co. and started a descent down the proverbial slippery slope.
Stephan, J., joins in this concurrence and dissent.