Court Opinion

ID: 9585655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:02:36.387028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:48.198730
License: Public Domain

Banke, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I do not consider the evidence in this case sufficient to support a conviction under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
The victim of the robbery was unable to identify the appellant as having been one of the perpetrators, although he stated that he knew the appellant “by sight.” Consequently, Ms. Cook’s testimony constituted the only evidence connecting the appellant to the crime. As noted in the majority opinion, Ms. Cook had originally told police that the person who grabbed her father was Michael Tarplan. She later reaffirmed this identification by selecting Tarplan’s photo from a display shown to her by police and by testifying against him under oath at his preliminary hearing. However, in the company of Tar-plan’s brother Steve and another of Tarplan’s brothers, she subsequently visited the detective in charge of the investigation, informed him that Tarplan had not been involved, and, for the first time, implicated the appellant. According to the detective, the appellant’s name was furnished to him on this occasion not by Ms. Cook but by Steve Tarplan, who was described as having “done all the talking.” Despite all of this, Ms. Cook was never asked to identify the appellant from a lineup, nor was she otherwise asked to verify her identification of him prior to trial. Furthermore, neither of Tarplan’s brothers was called as a witness.
*433Under the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, supra, the proper test for assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is no longer whether there is “any evidence” of guilt but whether the evidence, taken as a whole, would permit a rational trier of fact to find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accord Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89 (1) (263 SE2d 131) (1980); Muse v. State, 160 Ga. App. 272 (5) (287 SE2d 224) (1981). Unless we are to consider this distinction totally meaningless, I believe the appellant’s conviction must be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.