Court Opinion

ID: 9730845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:26:12.270865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:09.311034
License: Public Domain

HlPPE, District Judge,
dissenting.
The court is holding that a municipality is not subject to its own zoning regulations, and I dissent. If the court were committed to a line of precedent which would compel this result, that would be one thing. In Nebraska, however, the question is one of first impression.
Although the answer is open in Nebraska, the problem is not new. When governments were not significant land users, and the concept of zoning was new, exemptions from zoning regulations were uniformly granted to governments. See the discussion and cases cited in 2 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 12.03 (1976); 2 Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning, Ch. X-i (1955); 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 135 (1958); 82 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning §§ 149 et seq. (1976); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 970 (1958). The notion of governmental regulation over land use was not popular. The needs of the public were thwarted by zoning complications. One government may have need for land use in an area that another government had zoned and unreasonably refused variances. Sovereign immunity was the rule, eminent domain was perceived a superior principle, and governmental accountability was nonexistent. All of these reasons contributed to the general rule that zoning regulations do not apply to governmental operations.
The absurdity of the rule is very easy to demonstrate under modern conditions. For example, one city may condemn land in the limits of another city and place its sewage facilities there. That happened in City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court of Tempe, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637 (1962), where the dissenting opinion argues for the rule proposed by this dissent. A municipality could put its sewage disposal facility in an area zoned by it for “residential A” uses. Kedroff v. Town of Springfield, 127 Vt. 624, 256 A.2d 457 (1969), is an example of *236such a result. Or, it could do the same thing with the city dump. Rose v. Commissioner of Public Health, 361 Mass. 625, 282 N.E.2d 81 (1972), illustrates such a situation.
Recognizing these kinds of problems have compelled courts of first impression to adopt a more flexible rule. Recent cases so holding include Porter v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 489 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652 (Fla. App. 1974); Oronoco v. Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972); St. Louis County v. City of Manchester, 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1962); and City of Fargo, Cass Cty. v. Harwood Tp., 256 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1977). This seems to be the trend and acknowledges the present-day state of affairs. Governments are now significant land users. If their operations are exempt from zoning, public anticipation for development will be dashed by the very government that encoded the rules. Urban sprawl and the concrete explosion intensifies the need for strict adherence to planning. Exempting governments makes a significant uncertainty as to how much one can count on land to be developed according to the applicable zoning plan.
These courts have articulated a “balancing-of-public-interests” test to handle problems when one public interest, such as providing a fire station, conflicts with another public interest, such as the certainty that land use planning be enforced. Each case is then analyzed to determine where the public interest lies. This makes sense, because all of the public power of municipalities has its source from state statute. The power to condemn; to establish governmental facilities such as fire stations, sewage facilities, city dumps, courthouses, etc.; and to zone are all equally important and have the same sovereign. To simply say that the power to zone must always bend if other powers come in conflict is simply avoiding the question, not resolving it. The problems in such conflict are certainly *237complex and demand much more than the simplistic approach that a government with power of eminent domain may disregard anyone’s zoning rules, their own included.
None of the typical problems illustrated in these types of cases are present here. The power of eminent domain was not used. Two competing governments are not involved. The Village did not exempt itself from its ordinance. The Village is clearly using its governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. Municipalities in Nebraska are no longer totally immune from suit. The Village of Brainard simply wants to locate its fire station next to the plaintiffs’ home. Its zoning regulations prohibit it at that location. Therefore, the question is squarely presented, whether a municipality may disregard its own zoning requirements with no reason at all.
The statutory authority for village zoning mandates a comprehensive plan, including: “A land-use element which designates the proposed general distributions, general location, and extent of the uses of land for agriculture, housing, commerce, industry, recreation, education, public buildings and lands, and other categories of public and private use of land.” (Emphasis supplied.) Neb. Rev. Stat. § 19-903(1) (Reissue 1977).
The zoning for the land in question permits no public uses whatever. The Village has provision in the zoning regulation for securing a special permit for a governmental nonconforming use after a public hearing, but the city did not even get a regular building permit, much less apply for a special permit.
Nowhere in the Nebraska statutes is there an intimation that municipalities are exempt from their own zoning rules, nor does the ordinance of the Village of Brainard provide for that. .It seems to me that the statutes assume that use by the public is one category to be designated in zoning. That being the case, it seems that zoning descriptions on uses of land must include whether it will have a public use. This one does not.
*238It might be argued that the zoning rules should not apply to a body that enacted them because they could change them anyway. Also, usually there is a way they could provide for exceptions. Therefore, it would be a waste of time to say the regulations apply in the first place.
The problem with this thought is that it overlooks the procedure a municipality must apply in changing its regulations. First, the public is aware of what happens because of a public hearing. Second, the pressure of politics is a factor in seeing that the right result is reached. Third, judicial review is available to guard against arbitrariness.
If the majority opinion is the law, then a municipality is not required to take those steps when it deviates from its zoning requirements. All it has to do is begin construction. Under such a scheme of justice, one could wake up to find a city dump construction starting next door in a residential area of the city. There would be no notice that the government was deviating from its own rules. There would be no public forum to air the grievance. There would not be political pressure one could bring. Worst of all, the courts would be closed to a collateral injunction under this ruling because the city is not legally required to comply with its regulations anyway. This is a colossal betrayal of legitimate public expectations. If governments cannot be trusted to follow established written rules, then who can?
The majority attempts to justify the result for two reasons. They first claim that Seward County Board of Commissioners v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266, 242 N.W.2d 849 (1976), adopts the rule that all governments possessing the power of eminent domain are exempt from zoning requirements. I would adopt the “balancing-of-public-interests” rule and hold the Seward case to its facts of city airport establishment power versus county zoning power.
*239They also intimate that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 19-901 (Reissue 1977) limits zoning power of municipalities to private uses by failing to mention public uses. Two sections later, however, the statutes insist that a comprehensive plan delineate and map the public uses of land, as well as private uses. The Seward case assumed that the county had power to zone regarding public uses, and I would suggest that the statutes assume likewise. This is so because the eminent domain statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 19-709 (Reissue 1977), provides for conflicts between certain eminent domain powers of cities of the first or second class or villages and the contrary zoning of other cities of the first or second class or villages. Thus, the Nebraska statutory scheme assumes that one city may zone according to public uses that another government may have within its limits.
Since the reasons for the result are illusory, it should be clear that more consideration must be given to formulating Nebraska law on the subject. A blanket rule proposed by the majority will come back to haunt this court, as it has others. It will permit governments possessing eminent domain powers to complicate sound planning by others. Worse yet, it permits a government to disregard its own written rules that everyone else is expected to follow. The approach urged in this dissent still permits legitimate public endeavors where their need is clearly demonstrated. It does not hamstring municipalities from providing needed services; it just makes them do so within the framework of their own regulations. It does, however, provide a forum for the aggrieved neighbor. The majority rule does not.