Court Opinion

ID: 9900459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:13:15.507972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.413517
License: Public Domain

No. 256                May 17, 2023                  25

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                          A. B. A.,
                   Petitioner-Respondent,
                              v.
                   Kent Howard WOOD,
                   Respondent-Appellant.
              Multnomah County Circuit Court
                   17SK02038; A175899

  Benjamin N. Souede, Judge.
  Submitted February 22, 2023.
  Mark T. McLeod and Mcleod & McLeod filed the brief for
appellant.
  No appearance for respondent.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  AOYAGI, P. J.
  Affirmed.
26                                                             A. B. A. v. Wood

            AOYAGI, P. J.
         The parties were previously in a romantic relation-
ship. In November 2017, the trial court entered a permanent
stalking protective order (SPO) against respondent for the
protection of petitioner. During subsequent family law pro-
ceedings regarding the parties’ joint children, respondent
obtained evidence that he believes shows that petitioner lied
in the SPO proceeding. In March 2019, respondent moved
under ORCP 71 C to set aside the SPO on the ground that it
was obtained by fraud.1 The court denied the motion in April
2021. Respondent appeals. Petitioner has not appeared on
appeal. We affirm.
         ORCP 71 C recognizes the inherent authority of a
trial court “to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court”:
         “This rule does not limit the inherent power of a court to
     modify a judgment within a reasonable time, or the power
     of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a
     party from a judgment, or the power of a court to grant
     relief to a defendant under Rule 7 D(6)(d), or the power of a
     court to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.”

We review a court’s ruling under ORCP 71 C for abuse of
discretion. Hill v. Hill, 323 Or App 458, 459, 523 P3d 163
(2022).
         The gist of respondent’s argument is that the SPO
should have been set aside because petitioner lied in her tes-
timony at the SPO trial, as shown by subsequently obtained
evidence contradicting or undermining that testimony.
Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by not setting aside the SPO given, in his words, the
“extraordinary record of fraud and misrepresentation by
[petitioner].”

    1
      The motion filed in the trial court cites “ORCP 71” generally, but respon-
dent states in his opening brief that it was a motion under ORCP 71 C. We accept
that representation, given that respondent’s appellate counsel was also his trial
counsel and filed the motion. We also note that, had the motion been filed under
ORCP 71 B(1)(c)—the other provision of ORCP 71 regarding set-aside for fraud—
it would have been untimely. See ORCP 71 B(1) (requiring a motion made “for
reasons (a), (b), and (c)” to be filed not more than one year after receipt of notice of
the judgment).
Cite as 326 Or App 25 (2023)                                        27

         The trial court did not abuse its discretion by deny-
ing respondent’s motion to set aside the SPO. In fact, the
trial court lacked authority to grant the motion in these
circumstances. Under longstanding Oregon precedent, “a
court’s inherent authority does not extend to setting aside
a judgment for all types of fraud. Rather, a court has the
inherent authority to set aside a judgment for extrinsic
fraud only.” Dept. of Human Services v. M. M. R., 296 Or App
48, 51, 437 P3d 1233, rev den, 365 Or 194 (2019); see also
Campbell and Campbell, 151 Or App 334, 339, 948 P2d 765
(1997) (“Courts have inherent authority under ORCP 71 C
to modify a judgment. However, that authority is limited
to extraordinary circumstances such as extrinsic fraud,
duress, breach of fiduciary duty or gross inequity.”).
       The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
fraud—and the reason for that distinction—is well described
in Wimber v. Timpe, 109 Or App 139, 146, 818 P2d 954 (1991):
       “Relief will be granted on the basis of extrinsic fraud
   under ORCP 71 C but will be denied if the fraud is intrin-
   sic. Extrinsic fraud consists of acts not involved in the fact
   finder’s consideration of the merits of the case. Relief is
   granted because the unsuccessful party has been pre-
   vented by the fraud from fully trying the case. As a result,
   there never has been a real contest of the subject matter of
   the litigation before the court. In contrast, intrinsic fraud
   consists of acts that pertain to the merits of the case, such
   as perjured testimony. Intrinsic fraud will not provide a
   basis for relief from a judgment, because the litigant had
   an opportunity to refute the representations. When that
   opportunity is not used, the litigant is denied relief because
   of a policy that there must be finality in litigation.”
(Internal citation omitted.)
        Since 2012, ORCP 71 B(1)(c) has given trial courts
express authority to set aside judgments for both intrin-
sic and extrinsic fraud. See ORCP 71 B(1)(c) (authorizing
a trial court to relieve a party from a judgment due to
“fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic)”);
Heritage Properties v. Wells Fargo Bank, 318 Or App 470,
481, 508 P3d 577 (2022) (explaining that, prior to a legisla-
tive amendment to ORCP 71 B(1)(c) that took effect in 2012,
“nearly 100 years of Oregon case law made clear that relief
28                                                           A. B. A. v. Wood

from a judgment or order could only be granted for extrin-
sic fraud and not for intrinsic fraud”). Respondent did not
make his motion under ORCP 71 B(1)(c), however, which is
subject to a time limitation. See 326 Or App at 26 n 1. And,
as we explained in M. M. R., the legislative expansion of the
trial courts’ express authority under ORCP 71 B(1)(c) did not
affect the scope of the trial courts’ inherent authority refer-
enced in ORCP 71 C, which is still limited to extrinsic fraud.
M. M. R., 296 Or App at 51 n 1 (“The amendment to ORCP
71 B does not affect our holding in Wimber as to the scope of
a court’s inherent authority.”).
         Here, respondent sought to prove that petitioner
perjured herself in the SPO proceeding, thereby committing
fraud on the court. Even assuming arguendo that the trial
court agreed with respondent that petitioner committed
fraud,2 it was intrinsic fraud, not extrinsic fraud, and there-
fore did not provide a basis for set-aside under ORCP 71 C.
See Wimber, 109 Or App at 146 (holding that the trial court
lacked inherent authority to set aside a judgment based
on a party having made fraudulent misrepresentations in
court to obtain that judgment—even though we “strongly
condemn[ed]” such conduct—because the “fraud was intrin-
sic and went to the merits of the case”); see also M. M. R.,
296 Or App at 52 (holding that the juvenile court lacked
inherent authority to set aside a judgment, where a parent
alleged that the Department of Human Services had given
false testimony in court and otherwise engaged in intrinsic
fraud, as that is not a basis for set aside under ORCP 71 C).
           Affirmed.

     2
       Respondent has requested de novo review. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (giving us
“sole discretion” to conduct de novo review of the facts in “an equitable action or
proceeding”); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (limiting de novo review to “exceptional cases”).
Because the trial court’s factual findings ultimately do not affect the disposition
of this appeal, we decline that request. See ORAP 5.40(8)(d)(iv) (identifying as
one consideration relevant to our decision whether to exercise de novo review
“[w]hether the factual finding(s) that the appellant requests the court find anew
is important to the trial court’s ruling that is at issue on appeal (i.e., whether an
appellate determination of the facts in appellant’s favor would likely provide a
basis for reversing or modifying the trial court’s ruling)”).