Court Opinion

ID: 9945904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 19:04:46.152001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:14.049225
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24 P. v. Smith CA1/1
Opinion following rehearing
               NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                             DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
            Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                               A166175
 v.
 JOSEPH A. SMITH,                                              (San Francisco City & County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. 12025705)
            Defendant and Appellant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION1
        Defendant appeals from his resentencing on a Penal Code2 section
1172.6 petition. After the parties stipulated to vacate defendant’s voluntary
manslaughter conviction, the trial court redesignated the conviction as one
for shooting at an occupied vehicle and resentenced defendant. On appeal,
defendant contends the trial court committed three errors: (1) it imposed an
upper term sentence based on aggravating factors that had not been
stipulated to by defendant, proven to a factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt,
or established by a certified record of conviction; (2) it violated his rights to

       This appeal is appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion in
        1

accordance with California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
        All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
        2

indicated.
due process and against double jeopardy by selecting his conviction for
assault with a semiautomatic firearm as the principal term; and (3)
insufficient evidence supported redesignation of his vacated voluntary
manslaughter conviction as the target felony of shooting at an occupied
vehicle. Because we agree with defendant’s third contention, we will reverse,
vacate his sentence, and remand for a full resentencing. We therefore need
not, and do not, address defendant’s other contentions.
                               BACKGROUND3
March 2012 Shooting
      On March 30, 2012, police responded to a report of a deceased man,
Diondre Young, at 403 Main Street in San Francisco. Young had sustained
multiple gunshot wounds, and shards of auto glass covered his body.
      An anonymous witness saw the shooting. She had been at a club
known as “330 Ritch” (the club). When she left, she saw Young sitting in the
passenger seat of a white BMW as it passed by. She then saw someone with
a black automatic handgun run up along the passenger side of the car and
fire into the passenger side five to seven times. She described the shooter as
a Black male with dark hair, 30 to 40 years old, approximately five feet eight
inches tall and 150 pounds, wearing a black coat (“a hoodie, . . . rain-type
jacket”), black pants, and shoes with a red stripe.
      A relative of Young’s told police the anonymous witness identified
defendant as the shooter. However, when the police showed the witness
photo spreads that included defendant’s photo, she could not, on two separate
occasions, identify him. In fact, at the second photo spread she identified

      3 This background summary is based on the testimony at the
preliminary hearing.

                                       2
someone else as the shooter. The police could not locate any other
eyewitness.
      Surveillance footage from a camera near the club showed the shooter
was left-handed and wore a jacket similar to the one the anonymous witness
said the shooter was wearing. Another surveillance video from a location on
Townsend Street about a block from the scene showed defendant, along with
several other individuals, getting out of a dark sedan before the shooting.
      When interviewed, defendant admitted to having been at the club on
the night of the shooting, but he denied knowing anything about it.
Defendant also denied owning a jacket like the one described by the
anonymous witness or owning a shirt like the one depicted in the video of the
shooting. An officer who observed the interview noted defendant wrote with
his left hand.
October 2012 Shooting
      On October 1, 2012, police officers responded to a report of shots fired
on the corner of Plymouth Avenue and Broad Street in San Francisco. Officer
Fortuno interviewed S.S., who told him that he had been hanging out on the
corner when a silver van pulled up. S.S. said the driver of the van, later
identified as defendant, was shouting at his friend T.S. and shot him.
Original Sentence
      Defendant was charged with multiple counts in connection with the two
shootings.4 As to the March 2012 incident, defendant was charged with first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count I) and discharging a firearm at an
occupied vehicle (§ 246; count II). As to the October 2012 incident, defendant
was charged with, among other things, assault with a semiautomatic firearm

      4   We discuss only those charges relevant to the issues on appeal.

                                        3
(§ 245, subd. (b); count IV), with a great bodily injury enhancement
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
      In July 2013, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement. He
pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter (count I) and admitted an allegation
that he was a principal armed with a firearm in the commission of a felony.
(§§ 192, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (a)(1).)5 He also pled guilty to assault with a
semiautomatic firearm as alleged in count IV, and admitted the great bodily
injury allegation as to that count. Defendant was sentenced to a total of 17
years in state prison.
Section 1172.6 Petition and Resentencing
      In January 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant
to former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The trial court accepted the
parties’ stipulation that defendant was entitled to relief on his manslaughter
conviction and the related enhancement.
      At the resentencing hearing, the court—over defendant’s objection—
designated section 246 (shooting at an occupied vehicle) as the target offense
in place of the vacated manslaughter conviction and designated the section
245 (assault with a semiautomatic firearm) conviction as the principal term.
The court imposed the upper sentence of nine years for the principal term,
the term of three years for the great bodily injury enhancement, and the term
of one year eight months for the section 246 charge, for a total of 13 years
eight months.

      5  The prosecution amended the information to make count I voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), and added an allegation of a principal armed
with a firearm in the commission of a felony (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).

                                        4
                                 DISCUSSION
      Since it resolves the instant appeal, we address only defendant’s claim
that his conviction of the redesignated target offense, shooting at an occupied
vehicle (§ 246), is unsupported by sufficient evidence, since it is based on the
same facts as the voluntary manslaughter conviction which the prosecution
conceded could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the record before
the court.
      Under section 1172.6, subdivision (e), if murder was charged
generically in the information and the target offense was not charged, the
conviction shall be redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for
resentencing purposes. (See People v. Silva (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 505, 517
(Silva).) A target offense that was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement at
the original sentencing constitutes a target offense that was not charged for
section 1172.6 resentencing purposes. (People v. Arellano (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 418, 432, review granted Mar. 15, 2023, S277962.)
      At resentencing, the burden is on the prosecution to prove any
redesignated crimes because designation of a new crime in lieu of a murder
conviction is analogous to a criminal conviction. (Silva, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 526–527.) In In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, the
court concluded “Full and effective appellate review” requires that
redesignated offenses be “proven beyond a reasonable doubt” and “supported
by substantial evidence on appeal.”6 (Id. at p. 775; see Silva, at pp. 533–534
(conc. opn. of Streeter, J.) [discussing why beyond a reasonable doubt
standard is compelled both as a matter of constitutional due process and
statutory interpretation]; but see id. at p. 527 (maj. opn. of Pollak, P. J.)

      6Both parties have assumed in their briefing that the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard applies.

                                         5
[declining to decide which standard of proof—preponderance of the evidence,
clear and convincing proof, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt—applies to
redesignation of target offense].) The trial court sits as the trier of fact in
section 1172.6 proceedings, and its findings will be upheld on appeal if
supported by substantial evidence. (Silva, at pp. 529–530; People v. Del Rio
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 47, 56 (Del Rio) [redesignated robbery conviction was
not supported by substantial evidence based on hearsay in probation report].)
      The Attorney General first claims defendant is mistaken in stating the
prosecutor conceded the evidence did not support a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. He maintains the
“prosecutor merely stipulated that the evidence could not prove [defendant]
was either the actual shooter or an aider and abettor who acted with the
malice aforethought required to be convicted of the target offense of
manslaughter.” However, the record shows otherwise.
      In its supplemental response to the petition for resentencing, the
prosecution conceded not only that it could not prove that defendant was not
the actual shooter or a major participant acting with reckless indifference,
but also that it could not prove a section 246 violation. Specifically, the
prosecution acknowledged that section 1172.6 would allow for redesignation
of section 246 as the target offense or underlying felony, but stated: “The
People do believe, however, that there must be evidence of that redesignated
crime within the evidence before this Court, as is required of any
enhancements[,] and concede that we cannot prove such beyond a reasonable
doubt upon current known evidence. [Defendant’s] guilty plea stipulation of a

                                         6
factual basis was based upon the preliminary hearing transcript, without any
other specifics provided.”7 (Italics added.)
      The Attorney General next maintains that even if there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding defendant was the shooter, there is
evidence to support a finding he was guilty of aiding and abetting the
perpetrator in shooting at an occupied vehicle.8 “Generally, to be convicted
under an aiding and abetting theory, a defendant must ‘act with knowledge of
the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either
of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.’ ”
(People v. White (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 305, 317, quoting People v. Beeman
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.) Because shooting at an occupied vehicle is a
general intent crime, the Attorney General asserts defendant “need only
knowingly and intentionally facilitate the direct perpetrator’s commission of
the crime, without intending some additional result or consequence not
required for the crime.” (White, at p. 317.)
      “Factors relevant to a determination of whether [a] defendant [is] guilty
of aiding and abetting include: presence at the scene of the crime,

      7 The Attorney General’s suggestion that the trial court may have
rejected the prosecution’s concession as improvident is also unsupported by
the record. At the resentencing hearing, the trial court made no mention of
the prosecution’s concession, let alone offered any reason why it was
improvident.
      8 We note our review in this case is complicated by the fact the trial
court made no factual findings when resentencing defendant based on the
section 246 violation. (See, e.g., Del Rio, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 56 [trial
court failed to make factual findings at § 1172.6 hearing before convicting the
defendant of robbery]; Silva, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 530 [where trial
court redesignates offense based on underlying felony or target offense never
charged, court must make factual findings on the defendant’s guilt].)

                                        7
companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.” (People v.
Singleton (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 492.)
      The Attorney General cites to the following evidence: (1) police officers’
preliminary hearing testimony that they reviewed surveillance camera
footage and identified defendant as one of four occupants of the suspect
vehicle, (2) defendant’s admission to being in the area the night of the
shooting, and (3) his admission to being a principal armed with a firearm
during the commission of a felony in connection with his guilty plea to
voluntary manslaughter.
      As defendant points out, however, the testimony of the officers did not
pertain to the video of the shooting, but to the video showing defendant
emerging from the suspect vehicle at a different location at least a block
away. Defendant’s admission was only that he was at the club that night, not
that he was present during the shooting. Moreover, the only eyewitness to
the shooting was twice unable to identify defendant in photo lineups, and
during the second lineup, she identified someone else.
      The Attorney General also argues defendant’s admission to being a
principal in possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony suffices
to support a conviction of the redesignated target offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, he cites no authority in support of the contention that
admitting an enhancement to a vacated conviction suffices as proof of guilt
for redesignation.
      In sum, we conclude the prosecution’s concession in the trial court was
well taken, the redesignated section 246 target offense was not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, and reversal is required. We therefore vacate
defendant’s sentence and return the matter to the trial court to conduct a full

                                       8
resentencing.9 (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [when part of
sentence is stricken on review, remand for full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate for trial court to exercise its discretion in light of changed
circumstances]; People v. Hill (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 831, 834 [“[A]n
aggregate prison term is not a series of separate independent terms, but one
term made up of interdependent components. The invalidity of one
component infects the entire scheme.”].) We express no opinion as to how the
trial court should exercise its discretion on remand.10
                                DISPOSITION
      Defendant’s conviction for shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246) is
reversed and his sentence is vacated. We remand for a full resentencing.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

      9  The Attorney General asserts remand is unnecessary because “ ‘it is
highly unlikely’ ” the court will impose a shorter sentence, quoting Silva,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at page 532. However, in Silva, the conviction that
was reversed for insufficient evidence did not contribute to the length of the
sentence. (Ibid.) The Attorney General also points out the trial court
selected the upper term on count IV and declined to strike defendant’s prior
strike conviction. However, the court made those decisions in the context of
defendant facing two felony convictions stemming from two different cases.
Because one of those convictions has been reversed, it is not clear how the
trial court may exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed
circumstances.
      10 Defendant suggests in his appellate briefing that the trial court
should impose a low term sentence based on his youth, childhood trauma,
and his progress in custody. Defendant is, of course, free to raise that
argument on remand.

                                        9
                                            _________________________
                                            Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P. J.

_________________________
Castro, J.*

**Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A166175, People v. Smith

                                       10