Court Opinion

ID: 9408039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 15:01:15.239101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.348204
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 22-2148
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                               Kyle Anthony Doolin

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Iowa
                                 ____________

                            Submitted: March 17, 2023
                               Filed: July 11, 2023
                                  [Unpublished]
                                  ____________

Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
                         ____________

PER CURIAM.

       Kyle Doolin pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) near a protected location (Coe College)
after having been previously convicted of a felony drug offense. See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), 851, and 860(a). Relying on two 1998 convictions
related to the possession and distribution of cocaine, the district court 1 determined
Doolin was a career offender under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“Guidelines”) § 4B1.1(b)(1), increased Doolin’s total offense level by nine levels,
and sentenced him to 157 months of imprisonment. Doolin challenges application
of the career offender enhancement and the reasonableness of his sentence.

       The district court determined Doolin’s Guidelines range was 157 to 196
months of imprisonment based on his total offense level and a category VI criminal
history. Doolin argues his total offense level would be lower, resulting in a
significantly lower sentence, absent the § 4B1.1(b)(1) enhancement. Doolin
contends the two 1998 convictions should be considered a single conviction because
the earlier state offense is merely relevant conduct for the federal conviction and the
state conviction is outside the 15-year lookback period. Additionally, Doolin argues
his sentence was greater than necessary when considering his struggles with
substance abuse and poor health.

      The district court sentenced Doolin to the bottom of the sentencing range.
Nevertheless, it noted, “The defendant’s criminal history is extremely troubling . . . .
[H]e has 59 adult convictions. 9 of those were violent.” The district court stated,

      It is one of the worst criminal histories I’ve seen as a judge. The
      defendant has earned the label of career offender in the commonsense
      term—or meaning of that term. In that vein, I would just note that if I
      was in error in my calculation of the defendant being a career offender
      under the guidelines, I would vary upward to the same level, finding
      that he should be at the same level as a career offender based on the
      extreme criminal history he has, even if I was wrong in the
      technicalities of the guideline calculation of whether he meets the
      definition of a career offender.

      1
        The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa.
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      The district court applied the career offender enhancement after determining
the two convictions were separate based on an intervening arrest between the
charges, which were filed separately in state and federal courts, resulting in separate
sentencing dates. The district court also considered Doolin’s argument about the
age of the convictions, determining that although the records were “muddled,” the
government met its burden to show it was more likely true than not “the defendant
had his parole revoked and he was sentenced for a period of time within the 15-year
window applicable to the career offender status.”

       We discern no error in the district court’s determinations. Nevertheless, we
hold that even assuming the career offender enhancement was improper, it was
harmless error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The enhancement increased Doolin’s
offense level under the Guidelines. However, even if the district court miscalculated
Doolin’s Guidelines sentence, we have said this is harmless error “when the district
court indicates it would have alternatively imposed the same sentence even if a lower
guideline range applied.” United States v. Richardson, 40 F.4th 858, 868 (8th Cir.
2022) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 821 F.3d 984, 988–89 (8th Cir. 2016)).
Here the district court said that, based on Doolin’s “extreme criminal history” and
the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it would have imposed the 157-month
sentence because “if I was in error in my calculation of the defendant being a career
offender under the guidelines, I would vary upward to the same level.” Accordingly,
we find it “clear that the judge based the sentence . . . on factors independent of the
Guidelines” and thus any miscalculation of Doolin’s Guidelines sentence was
harmless. See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 200 (2016); see also
United States v. Williams, 968 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 2020). Therefore, Doolin’s
challenge to the district court’s application of a career offender enhancement fails.

       Doolin also contends his sentence was unreasonable because the district court
failed to grant him a downward variance based on his substance abuse issues and
poor health. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Scanlan, 65 F.4th 406, 409 (8th Cir. 2023); but see
United States v. Dailey, 958 F.3d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Typically, we will not
                                         -3-
review a district court’s refusal to grant a downward departure.”). Relevant here, a
sentencing court does abuse its discretion by “failing to consider a relevant factor
that should have received significant weight” or “considering only the appropriate
factors but in weighing them, committing a clear error of judgment.” Scanlan, 65
F.4th at 409 (quoting United States v. Stoner, 795 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2015)).
Yet, a within-Guidelines-range sentence is presumed reasonable. Id. And the
“district court has ‘wide latitude’ in weighing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.”
United States v. Hamilton, 46 F.4th 864, 871 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States
v. Nguyen, 829 F.3d 907, 925–26 (8th Cir. 2016)).

        Doolin has not rebutted the presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence
was reasonable. The district court took into consideration the mitigating factors
presented by Doolin, including his substance abuse issues and poor health. The
district court discussed the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including its
observations that Doolin’s situation was not significantly mitigating to warrant a
downward departure but would warrant adjusting the sentence to the bottom of the
Guidelines range. “But ‘simply because the district court weighed relevant factors
. . . more heavily than [Doolin] would prefer does not mean the district court abused
its discretion.’” United States v. Sisk, 999 F.3d 631, 636 (8th Cir. 2021) (ellipses in
original) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 986 F.3d 782, 808 (8th Cir. 2021)).
Under these circumstances, the sentence was not unreasonable, and we affirm the
district court’s within-Guidelines-range sentence.
                         ______________________________

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