Court Opinion

ID: 9720193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:19:55.742774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:14.016650
License: Public Domain

Holbrook, P. J.
(concurring). This writer is unable to say that the plaintiffs who were found to be skilled artisans and specialists by the trial court come within the meaning of MCLA § 600.2908 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2908). However, the trial judge also determined in his opinion, in part, as follows:
“The claims of Blacklock, Cooper, Steinke, Addi-cott, Bloomquist, Schmidt, and Marceau require more detailed examination. Blacklock originally was hired as a common laborer but was elevated to a junior draftsman by the time the corporation showed evidence of financial difficulty. Marceau, Steinke, Addicott, and Bloomquist were all hired as draftsmen at a monthly salary. Steinke basically was a fixture and jig designer with most of his work being on the drafting board. Cooper was hired as a cabinet maker and pattern maker, a skilled trade. Schmidt was hired as a foreman. All these men worked in their respective fields until sometime in July of 1962 when the shop employees left their jobs because the corporation was unable to meet the payroll. Thereupon these plaintiffs met with Curt Knoppel, the president, and agreed to go into *533the shop and assume the duties of production upon the representation that new financing was being sought and would be more apt to be forthcoming if production was kept up. There is no question that these plaintiffs thereby assumed the duties of ordinary day laborers, i.e. production workers. It is for this work that they now claim to have become laborers within the meaning of the above statute.”
Considering that the plaintiffs-appellants were actually performing “the duties of ordinary day laborers, i.e., production workers”, it seems reasonable to apply the law as determined in the case of Lawton v. Richardson (1898), 118 Mich 669, 670, 671:
“The record shows Mr. Eichardson proposed to engage in business in Detroit, and advertised for a salesman and manager for a dry-goods store. Mr. Lawton met him at the Eussel House, and was told by Mr. Eichardson, that he had $18,000 with which he was going to buy goods. Mr. Lawton hired out to him July 25th, for $75 a month, expecting to be the manager of the store. He went to work July 27th, helping to get the store ready for business. In August, Mr. Lawton and Mr. Eichardson went East, and bought the goods. August 22d, Mr. Law-ton returned to Detroit, helped unpack the goods, and helped about the marking of the goods, putting them upon the shelves, and getting the stock ready for the opening day. After that he did the work of an ordinary clerk, helping about selling the goods, sweeping out the store, and doing the general work of the store. Mr. Eichardson, at the time of the employment, asked Mr. Lawton to furnish $250 as security for the proper performance of his work. It was furnished to Mr. Eichardson, and never returned. It does not form any part of the decree rendered by the circuit judge. * * *
“The store was closed about September 24th by the creditors, either by commencing replevin and attachment suits, or by mortgagees taking posses*534sion. Emma H. Hall is the mother-in-law of Mr. Richardson, and Thomas E. and William B. Hall his brothers-in-law.
“The circuit judge found that, as to the work done by Mr. Lawton when in New York, it was not the work of a laborer, within the meaning of the statute; but as to the other work done by him, and the work done by the other complainants, it was labor, within the meaning of the statute. It is apparent from what has already appeared that nearly all the labor done was not intellectual or professional in its character, nor was it of an especially skillful kind. It was, in the main, manual labor, and of such a character as the statute was intended to protect. Black’s Appeal (1890), 83 Mich 520.”
Mr. Lawton was permitted to recover for the work done as a laborer but was not permitted to recover for his services rendered while in New York in buying the goods for the store. Likewise, in the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants recovered a judgment for services rendered for common labor in the shop. There is no claim for services rendered in their skilled profession. Division of the services rendered, therefore, is not necessary in our case, and plaintiffs are rightfully entitled to recover in this action.