Court Opinion

ID: 9954922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 14:03:40.388403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:06.383798
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed March 27, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D23-0639
                       Lower Tribunal No. 21-22353
                          ________________

                Giselle Gattorno and David Iglesias,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

                              Steven Souto,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Lourdes Simon, Judge.

     Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Lissette Gonzalez and Carly M.
Weiss, for appellants.

     Florida Advocates, and Carlos D. Cabrera (Dania Beach), for appellee.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ.

     EMAS, J.
     INTRODUCTION

     Appellants, Giselle Gattorno and David Iglesias, the defendants below,

appeal a nonfinal order granting plaintiff Steven Souto’s motion for leave to

amend his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages. Appellants

contend the trial court erred in allowing leave to amend because the motion

and proffer failed to make “a reasonable showing by evidence in the record

or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for

recovery of such damages,” as required by section 768.72(1), Florida

Statutes (2021). Specifically, they assert that Souto failed to show that

Gattorno’s actions rose to the level of “intentional misconduct or gross

negligence” under section 768.72(2), Florida Statutes (2021). We have

jurisdiction 1 and, upon our de novo review of the evidence proffered,

1
  In 2022, the Florida Supreme Court amended Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.130, authorizing appeals of nonfinal orders that “grant or deny
a motion for leave to amend to assert a claim for punitive damages.” Fla. R.
App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(G). See In re Amend. to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130, 345 So.
3d 725 (Fla. 2022). Prior to that amendment, such orders were reviewable
only by certiorari, but the scope of review was limited to determining whether
the trial court complied with the procedural requirements of section 768.72,
Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Ross Dress For Less Va., Inc. v. Castro, 134 So.
3d 511, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“[A]ppellate courts do have certiorari
jurisdiction to review whether a trial judge has conformed with the procedural
requirements of section 768.72, but do not have certiorari jurisdiction to
review a decision of a trial judge granting leave to amend a complaint to
include a claim for punitive damages when the trial judge has followed the
procedural requirements of section 768.72. Certiorari is not available to
review a determination that there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the

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considered in a light most favorable to Souto, we affirm the trial court’s order

granting Souto leave to amend to assert a claim for punitive damages.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      The lawsuit arises out of an incident in which Gattorno (who was driving

David Iglesias’ car) reversed out of a parking space, striking and pinning

Souto between her car and another car. As a result, Souto suffered injuries

that necessitated surgery. Among the disputed issues surrounding the

events of that evening is whether Gattorno was intoxicated.

      Souto sued Gattorno and David Iglesias in a two-count complaint,

alleging Gattorno negligently operated the car causing severe and

permanent bodily injury to Souto, and that David Iglesias was vicariously

liable as the owner of the car.

      Following discovery, Souto filed the underlying motion for leave to

amend the complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages on the basis that

Gattorno was intoxicated when she struck Souto with Iglesias’ car. The

evidentiary proffer included deposition testimony from four people: Gattorno,

Danielle Iglesias, Souto, and Christopher Noonan (a friend of Souto who

witnessed the incident).

record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis
for recovery of such damages.”) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658
So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 1995)).

                                       3
       These four witnesses testified that Gattorno and Danielle Iglesias met

Souto, Noonan and their friends at The Wharf, a club in Miami. The two

groups arrived at the club separately and did not meet until after 2:00 a.m.

When the club closed at approximately 3:00 a.m., Noonan and one of his

friends stayed in the parking lot talking to Gattorno and Danielle Iglesias, as

the women sat in their car with the windows lowered. Meanwhile, Souto was

standing behind the vehicle speaking to an acquaintance who had parked

his car behind the women. While the details in the witnesses’ stories vary,

Souto and Noonan testified that, when Gattorno backed out of the parking

space to leave, she struck Souto, pinning him to the vehicle parked behind

her.

       The accounts of these witnesses also differed on whether Gattorno

was intoxicated. Gattorno and Danielle Iglesias testified that Gattorno drank

two mojitos between 11 p.m. and 2 a.m., before they encountered the group

of men at The Wharf. Noonan and Souto testified that Gattorno drank at least

two drinks in their presence and “a couple of shots,” and that Gattorno was

acting intoxicated before the incident in the parking lot.

       The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, discussed the

proffered evidence, and granted Souto’s motion for leave to amend to add

the punitive damages claim. This appeal followed.

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      STANDARD OF REVIEW

      This Court applies de novo review to a nonfinal order granting a motion

for leave to amend a complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages. Grove

Isle Ass'n, Inc. v. Lindzon, 350 So. 3d 826, 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). In doing

so, this court “views the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the

light most favorable to the plaintiffs and accepts said evidence as true for the

purpose of reviewing whether a reasonable basis exists for punitive

damages.” Est. of Blakely by & Through Wilson v. Stetson Univ., Inc., 355

So. 3d 476, 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022). See also Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter,

376 So. 3d 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023); Hosp. Specialists, P.A. v. Deen, 373 So.

3d 1283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).

      ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

      Appellants contend the proffer failed to provide a reasonable

evidentiary basis to allow Souto to seek punitive damages. They generally

cite to the quality of the evidence and argue the trial court applied the

incorrect standard in reaching its decision. We find Appellants’ contention to

be without merit.

      “Under Florida law, the purpose of punitive damages is not to further

compensate the plaintiff, but to punish the defendant for its wrongful conduct

and to deter similar misconduct by it and other actors in the future.”

                                       5
Manheimer v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1495, 2023 WL

4919540, at *2 (Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 2, 2023) (quoting Owens–Corning

Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1999)). Section

768.72(1) provides:

      In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be
      permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in
      the record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a
      reasonable basis for recovery of such damages.

      Stated differently, “[t]he statute requires the trial court to act as a

gatekeeper and precludes a claim for punitive damages where there is no

reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery.” KIS Grp., LLC v. Moquin, 263 So.

3d 63, 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (quotation omitted). Such a function is

significant because punitive damages are a “game changer” in litigation—

specifically, “a punitive damages claim subjects the defendant to financial

discovery that would otherwise be off limits . . . and potentially subjects the

defendant to uninsured losses.” Manheimer, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1495 at *2

(quotation omitted). As to the trial court’s determination, this court has

explained:

      A trial court must weigh both parties’ showings when considering
      whether the evidence or proffer is sufficient to establish a
      reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery of punitive damages.
      A trial court's inquiry under section 768.72 is more intensive than
      at summary judgment because the statute necessarily requires
      the court to weigh the evidence and act as a factfinder.

                                      6
Manheimer, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1495 at *3 (quotation omitted); see also

Napleton's N. Palm Auto Park, Inc. v. Agosto, 364 So. 3d 1103, 1105 (Fla.

4th DCA 2023) (“As a threshold matter, the trial court improperly believed it

had to accept Agosto's proffer as true.”) And while the trial court’s role as

gatekeeper requires it to consider and weigh the competing showings of the

parties and to act as a factfinder, the statute does not require the plaintiff

prove an entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence

at this pleading stage of the case. To impose such a requirement “would

circumvent the statute and impair a claimant's ability to plead punitive

damages, and no court of this state has the discretion ‘to construe an

unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its

express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.’” Deaterly v.

Jacobson, 313 So. 3d 798, 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting Holly v. Auld,

450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)).

     The record below confirms that the trial court considered and weighed

the evidence offered by the parties, acted as a factfinder, and performed its

gatekeeper role in concluding that Souto provided a reasonable evidentiary

basis for the recovery of punitive damages.

      We reject Appellants’ suggestion that evidence of intoxication while

driving does not provide the requisite “reasonable basis” for recovery of

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punitive damages. In Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla.1976), the

Florida Supreme Court explained that

      we see that the courts and the Legislature have evolved the
      notion that drunk drivers menace the public safety and are to be
      discouraged by punishment. . . . In line with that policy, therefore,
      we hold that juries may award punitive damages where voluntary
      intoxication is involved in an automotive accident in Florida. . . .
      We affirmatively hold that the voluntary act of driving “while
      intoxicated” evinces, without more, a sufficiently reckless attitude
      for a jury to be asked to provide an award of punitive damages if
      it determines liability exists for compensatory damages.

See also Case v. Newman, 154 So. 3d 1151, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

      Because intoxication while driving can constitute a basis for a punitive

damages award, the proffered evidence satisfied the statutory requirement

to provide a reasonable basis for recovery of punitive damages:

      Both Gattorno and Danielle Iglesias testified that Gattorno had at least

two mojitos between 11:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. In addition, Steven Souto

testified that, in his presence, Gattorno had at least two mojitos “and a couple

of shots or something” within a forty-five-minute period. Souto further

testified that Gattorno appeared to be drunk: “She was very giggly. My friend

Patricio was letting her sit on his lap. She definitely looked like she was

intoxicated.”

      Noonan testified that Gattorno drank at least two mojitos within a forty-

five minute period, and that she appeared intoxicated: “[I]t seemed as if

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Danielle wasn’t really intoxicated, and [Gattorno] was kind of more, you

know, she was drunk.” Once the club closed, and they were in the parking

lot, Gattorno and Danielle were in Iglesias’ car, with Gattorno behind the

wheel. Noonan stood outside the car, talking to them, and he told Gattorno

that Danielle should drive: “You know, I think your cousin [Danielle] should

drive because, you know, you’ve been—I feel like you’ve been drinking a

little bit too much.” According to Noonan, Danielle agreed with this

assessment and offered to drive, but Gattorno became upset, raised her

window, and “put[] the car in reverse and like hit[] the gas, like off impulse.

And that’s when she slam[med] into Steven.”

      Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was

no error in the trial court finding Souto provided a reasonable basis to permit

leave to amend to add a claim for punitive damages. Appellants raise

additional arguments, none of which merits further discussion.2

2
   For example, Appellants contend that Souto and Noonan’s testimony
included inadmissible hearsay. While the trial court can certainly consider
this aspect in weighing the parties’ proffer in support of their respective
positions, a proffer of evidence supporting a punitive damages claim “is
merely a representation of what evidence the [party] proposes to present and
is not actual evidence.” Est. of Despain v. Avante Grp., Inc., 900 So. 2d 637,
644 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (quotation omitted). “By allowing a punitive
damages claimant to satisfy his initial burden by means of a proffer, section
768.72 contemplates that a claimant might obtain admissible evidence or
cure existing admissibility issues through subsequent discovery.” Cook v.
Fla. Peninsula Ins. Co., 371 So. 3d 958, 961-62 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (quoting

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      CONCLUSION

      The trial court performed its gatekeeping function in acting as a

factfinder and weighing the parties’ showings in determining whether to grant

Souto leave to amend to assert a claim for punitive damages. Upon our de

novo review of the evidence proffered, considered in a light most favorable

to the plaintiff below, we affirm the trial court’s order granting Souto leave to

amend to assert a claim for punitive damages.

      Affirmed.

Royal Marco Point I Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. 3:07 CV 16,
2010 WL 2609367, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2010)).

Additionally, the mere fact that the evidence proffered by the parties was in
some respect conflicting does not require a trial court to deny a motion
seeking leave to add a claim for punitive damages. Indeed, at trial a jury can
conclude that punitive damages have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence even in the face of conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence
presented. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 273
(Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (discussing the level of proof required to meet the “clear
and convincing” standard and observing: “It is possible for the evidence in
such a case to be clear and convincing, even though some evidence may be
inconsistent. Likewise, it is possible for the evidence to be uncontroverted,
and yet not be clear and convincing.”) (additional quotation omitted). See
also Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023); Edwards
v. State, 351 So. 3d 1142, 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (noting that “clear and
convincing evidence does not mean that there are no inconsistencies in the
evidence.”)

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