Court Opinion

ID: 9369995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 16:00:54.367619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.637737
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-9593      Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 1
                                                                              FILED
                                                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                        PUBLISH                           Tenth Circuit

                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                   February 10, 2023

                                                                      Christopher M. Wolpert
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

     THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
     EX REL. HECTOR H. BALDERAS,
     Attorney General; THE NEW
     MEXICO ENVIRONMENT
     DEPARTMENT,

           Petitioners,

     v.                                                   No. 21-9593

     UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
     REGULATORY COMMISSION;
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

           Respondents.
     ______________________________________

     INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS,
     LLC,

           Intervenor - Respondent.

                          _________________________________

          Petition for Review from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                                (NRC-1: 72-1050)
                        _________________________________

 Submitted on the briefs *:

 P. Cholla Khoury, William G. Grantham, and Zachary E. Ogaz, Assistant
 Attorneys General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New
 Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico (Bruce C. Baizel, New Mexico

 *
       We have determined that oral argument would not be helpful, so we
 forgo oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 2

 Environment Department, Office of General Counsel, Santa Fe, New
 Mexico, with them on the briefs), on behalf of the Petitioners.

 Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General, and Justin D. Heminger, Attorney,
 U.S. Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division,
 Washington, D.C. (Marian L. Zobler, General Counsel, and Andrew P.
 Averbach, Solicitor, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of the
 General Counsel, Rockville, Maryland, with them on the briefs), on behalf
 of the Respondents.

 Brad Fagg, Timothy P. Matthews, and Ryan K. Lighty, Morgan, Lewis &
 Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C., on behalf of the Intervenor-Respondent.
                    _______________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                _______________________________________

 BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
                _______________________________________

       This petition involves an agency’s regulation of private storage of

 nuclear fuel. The agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, granted a

 license to Interim Storage Partners to store spent nuclear fuel near the New

 Mexico border. New Mexico challenges the grant of this license, invoking

 the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., and the National

 Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.

       The Commission moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Objecting

 to the motion, New Mexico invokes jurisdiction under the combination of

 the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342(4), 2344, and the Atomic Energy Act, 42

 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2296b-7. But these statutes can combine to trigger

 jurisdiction only when the petitioner was an aggrieved party in the

 licensing proceeding.

                                        2
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 3

       This limitation applies here because New Mexico didn’t participate

 in the licensing proceeding or qualify as an aggrieved party. To the

 contrary, New Mexico just commented to the Commission about its draft

 environmental impact statement. Commenting on the environmental impact

 statement didn’t create status as an aggrieved party, so jurisdiction isn’t

 triggered under the combination of the Hobbs Act and Atomic Energy Act.

       New Mexico not only invokes the Hobbs Act and Atomic Energy Act,

 but also alleges that the Commission violated the Nuclear Waste Policy

 Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270, and acted ultra vires. These allegations

 don’t trigger our jurisdiction. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act governs the

 establishment of a federal repository for permanent storage—not temporary

 storage by private parties like Interim Storage. And even when an agency

 acts ultra vires, we lack jurisdiction when the petitioner had other

 available remedies. New Mexico had other available remedies by seeking

 intervention in the Commission’s proceedings. So we grant the

 Commission’s motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

 1.    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted a temporary license
       to Interim Storage.

       The Nuclear Regulatory Commission bears the authority to license

 the private use of facilities to store spent nuclear fuel. Pac. Gas & Elec.

 Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 206–

 207 (1983); Skull Valley Band Of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d

                                        3
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023    Page: 4

 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004). Based on this authority, the Commission

 conducted proceedings to address Interim Storage’s application for a

 license. See Interim Storage Partner’s Waste Control Specialists

 Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,070 (Aug. 29,

 2018), corrected, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,680 (Aug. 31, 2018) (public notice of

 Interim Storage’s application for a license).

       To facilitate public participation, the Commission issued a notice

 stating that any interested entity could request a hearing. Id. at 44,071

 (“[A]ny persons . . . whose interest may be affected by this action may file

 a request for a hearing and petition for leave to intervene.”). This notice

 stated what the entity would need to include and explained that permission

 to intervene would create status as a party. Id. Despite this notice, New

 Mexico didn’t request a hearing or petition to intervene in the licensing

 proceeding.

       The licensing proceeding closed over a year after the Commission

 had issued the notice. See In the Matter of Interim Storage Partners LLC,

 LBP-19-11, Docket No. 72-1050-ISFSI, Mem. & Order at 14 (Dec. 13,

 2019) (statement by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the

 Interim Storage proceeding had terminated). After the proceeding closed,

 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission prepared a draft environmental impact

 statement, as required by federal regulations and the National

                                        4
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 5

 Environmental Policy Act. See R. vol. 3, at 83; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 10

 C.F.R. § 51.20(a), (b)(9).

       With preparation of this draft, the Commission notified the public

 and invited comments. Interim Storage Partners Consolidated Interim

 Storage Facility Project, 85 Fed. Reg. 27,447-03 (May 8, 2020). New

 Mexico commented, criticizing the draft. R. vol. 4, at 931–41, 947–52

 (comments by Michelle Lujan Grisham, Governor of New Mexico, the New

 Mexico Environment Department, and the New Mexico Energy, Minerals

 and Natural Resources Department). The Commission responded to New

 Mexico in the final version of the environmental impact statement. See,

 e.g., R. vol. 3, at 734, 737, 739–40 (designating Michelle Lujan Grisham as

 commenter 81 and officials from the New Mexico agencies as commenters

 60-22, 152, and 155); R. vol. 3, at 561–62, 564, 565, 583–85, 593, 596,

 599–600, 602–05, 606–07, 635–37, 638–39, 645–47, 648–49, 651–52, 652–

 53, 653–56, 662–63, 667–68, 669–72, 673–77, 703, 705–06, 706–08, 709–

 10, 713–15, 728 (responding to commenters 60-22, 81, 152, and 155).

       The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ultimately granted a temporary

 license to Interim Storage to construct and operate a facility to store spent

 nuclear fuel. Interim Storage Partners, LLC; WCS Consolidated Interim

 Storage Facility; Issuance of Materials License and Record of Decision, 86

 Fed. Reg. 51,926-02 (Sept. 17, 2021); id. at 51,927 (“The license

 authorizes [Interim Storage] to store . . . spent nuclear fuel for a license

                                        5
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201    Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 6

 period of 40 years.”). New Mexico petitions for us to review the grant of

 this license, and the Commission challenges our jurisdiction over New

 Mexico’s petition.

 2.       We lack jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act because New Mexico
          wasn’t a “party aggrieved” by the Commission’s final order.

          The Hobbs Act creates federal appellate jurisdiction over the Nuclear

 Regulatory Commission’s final orders as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2239. 1 28

 U.S.C. § 2342(4). In turn, § 2239 authorizes review of final orders that

 grant, suspend, revoke, or amend a license. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A),

 (b)(1).

          This jurisdiction can be invoked only by “aggrieved” parties. See 28

 U.S.C. § 2344 (stating that “[a]ny party aggrieved by the final order may

 . . . file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue

 lies”). So we consider whether New Mexico qualifies as an aggrieved

 party.

          A.   We must assess New Mexico’s status as a party based on its
               participation in the administrative proceedings.

          Status as an “aggrieved party” would exist only if we regard New

 Mexico as a party to the administrative proceeding. See ACA Int’l v. Fed.

 1
       The Hobbs Act refers to final orders of the Atomic Energy
 Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4). Congress later abolished the Atomic
 Energy Commission and transferred licensing and regulatory functions to
 the newly created Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 5814(a),
 § 5841(f).
                                         6
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 7

 Commc’ns Comm’n, 885 F.3d 687, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he phrase

 ‘party aggrieved’ requires that petitioners have been parties to the

 underlying agency proceedings, not simply parties to the present suit who

 are aggrieved in a constitutional (Article III) sense.”). To assess status as a

 party, we evaluate the level of participation required in the administrative

 proceeding. Water Transp. Ass’n v. I.C.C., 819 F.2d 1189, 1192 (D.C. Cir.

 1987). We evaluate that participation based on the practices of the agency

 and the formality of the proceeding. See id.

       In making this evaluation, we’re not bound by the Commission’s

 description of the entity as a party. See id.; Clark & Reid Co. v. United

 States, 804 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1986). We instead consider whether New

 Mexico had participated appropriately under the available administrative

 procedures. See Gage v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 479 F.2d 1214, 1217

 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review an

 Atomic Energy Commission order because the petitioner had “refrained

 from participating in the appropriate and available administrative

 procedure”). For example, if the Commission had required intervention and

 New Mexico didn’t seek leave to intervene, we would lack jurisdiction

 under the Hobbs Act. Water Transp. Ass’n, 819 F.2d at 1192.

       B.     New Mexico did not participate in the licensing proceeding.

       We consider whether New Mexico needed to seek leave to intervene

 in the Commission’s licensing proceeding. In this inquiry, we are guided

                                        7
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 8

 by the Atomic Energy Act and its regulations. See Ohio Nuclear-free

 Network v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 53 F.4th 236, 239–40 (D.C. Cir.

 2022). Under the Act, anyone interested in a licensing proceeding can

 request a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A). The Commission must

             grant interested entities a hearing upon request and

             admit the entity as a party to the proceeding.

 Id.

       The regulations specify how entities are to request a hearing. For

 example, an interested entity must file a written request and specify the

 contentions for the hearing. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a). The agency will grant

 the request if the entity

             has proposed a contention that’s within the scope of the
              proceedings and material to the findings that the Commission
              must make, see 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f) (stating the requirements
              for a contention to be admissible), and

             has standing, see 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d) (stating the requirements
              for standing).

 And if an interested party unsuccessfully requests a hearing, the party can

 appeal to the Commission. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.311(c) (“An order denying a

 petition to intervene, and/or request for hearing . . . is appealable by the

 requestor/petitioner on the question as to whether the request and/or

 petition should have been granted.”).

       New Mexico didn’t seek leave to intervene, request a hearing, or

 submit contentions. New Mexico instead commented on the Commission’s
                                         8
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 9

 draft of the environmental impact statement. By choosing only to comment,

 New Mexico bypassed the chance to participate as a party in the licensing

 proceeding. See Gage v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 479 F.2d 1214, 1217

 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regul.

 Comm’n, 823 F.3d 641, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“To challenge the

 Commission’s grant of a license renewal, . . . a party must have

 successfully intervened in the proceeding by submitting adequate

 contentions under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309.”). Given the failure to take advantage

 of that chance, New Mexico doesn’t qualify as an aggrieved party under

 the Hobbs Act. See Ohio Nuclear-free Network v. U.S. Nuclear Regul.

 Comm’n, 53 F.4th 236, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (concluding that the

 petitioners weren’t parties aggrieved under the Hobbs Act when they

 emailed a letter rather than request a hearing or submit contentions related

 to the license). 2

 2
       New Mexico points out that it unsuccessfully petitioned to suspend,
 revoke, and stay the license and sought a hearing in connection with that
 petition. Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 3 n. 1; see 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 (“Any
 person may file a request to institute a proceeding pursuant to § 2.202 to
 modify, suspend, or revoke a license.”). We don’t rule out the possibility
 of jurisdiction to address the denial of that petition. See Fla. Power &
 Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 741 (1985) (“Congress intended to vest
 in the courts of appeals initial subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges
 to Commission denials of § 2.206 petitions.”). But New Mexico is
 challenging issuance of the license itself rather than the refusal to suspend,
 revoke, or stay the license.

                                        9
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 10

        Granted, some cases regard submission of comments as enough in

  rulemaking proceedings, where the agency solicits input through comments

  rather than intervention or submission of contentions. See ACA Int’l v.

  Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 885 F.3d 687, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Just as

  submitting comments confers party aggrieved status in the context of a

  rulemaking (assuming an adverse outcome), one who comments on

  another’s petition for a rulemaking or declaratory ruling has presented its

  view to the agency so as to qualify as a party.” (cleaned up)). New Mexico

  invokes these cases, arguing that status as a “party” is the same when an

  agency conducts rulemaking and adjudicative proceedings. For this

  argument, New Mexico questions the distinction between rulemaking and

  adjudication.

        New Mexico’s argument overlooks the Commission’s requirements

  for appropriate participation. Regardless of whether an agency is enacting

  a rule or adjudicating a dispute, we consider an entity a “party” only if it

  “participat[es] in the appropriate and available administrative procedure.”

  Gage v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 479 F.2d 1214, 1217 (D.C. Cir.

  1973). The appropriateness and availability of these procedures differ

  when agencies enact rules and adjudicate disputes.

                                        10
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 11

        Here we must consider the administrative procedures available under

  the rules accompanying the Atomic Energy Act. 3 Under these rules, New

  Mexico needed to raise its claims by submitting contentions and requesting

  a hearing or petitioning to intervene. See pp. 8–9, above. And for the

  claims involving the National Environmental Policy Act, New Mexico

  needed to frame the contentions based on Interim Storage’s environmental

  report. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2) (stating that for “issues arising under

  the National Environmental Policy Act, participants shall file contentions

  based on the applicant’s environmental report”); Ohio Nuclear-free

  Network v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 53 F.4th 236, 240 (D.C. Cir.

  2022) (concluding that a person seeking to intervene in a licensing

  proceeding under the Atomic Energy Act “must request a hearing or

  otherwise intervene in the proceeding as required by the [Act] and its

  regulations,” which includes persons “who object to the agency’s discharge

  of its [National Environmental Policy Act] duties”); see also Nat. Res. Def.

  Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 823 F.3d 641, 652 (D.C. Cir.

  3
         Though New Mexico invoked the National Environmental Policy Act,
  this invocation couldn’t trigger jurisdiction because the statute doesn’t
  create an independent cause of action. See Diné Citizens Against Ruining
  Our Environment v. Haaland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 21-2116, slip op. at 14
  (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2023) (stating that the “[National Environmental Policy
  Act] does not create a cause of action”); Ohio Nuclear-free Network v. U.S.
  Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 53 4th 236, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (stating that
  assertion of objections under the National Energy Policy Act doesn’t create
  jurisdiction over challenges to an amended license).
                                        11
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 12

  2016) (stating that the National Environmental Policy Act “does not, by its

  own terms or its intent, alter the Commission’s hearing procedures”

  (quoting Beyond Nuclear v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 704 F.3d at 12,

  18 (1st Cir. 2013))). 4 Given the failure to submit contentions, request a

  hearing, or petition to intervene, New Mexico did not participate

  appropriately based on the Commission’s practices and the formality of the

  proceeding.

        C.      New Mexico could have raised its environmental objections
                by submitting contentions about Interim Storage’s
                environmental report.

        New Mexico observes that the adjudicatory proceeding had closed

  before the Commission issued the draft environmental impact statement.

  Based on this observation as to the timing, New Mexico insists that public

  comments provided the only chance to address the Commission’s draft. But

  New Mexico overlooks the relationship between Interim Storage’s

  environmental report and the Commission’s environmental impact

  statement.

        In applying for a license, Interim Storage had to submit an

  environmental report, addressing all of the considerations required under

  4
        The Nuclear Regulatory Commission argues not only that we lack
  jurisdiction but also that New Mexico had failed to exhaust available
  administrative remedies. We need not address the exhaustion issue because
  jurisdiction doesn’t exist.

                                        12
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 13

  the National Environmental Policy Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 10 C.F.R.

  § 51.45(b). The Commission then had to prepare an environmental impact

  statement to evaluate and document the environmental impacts. See 10

  C.F.R. § 51.20(b)(9) (requiring the preparation of an environmental impact

  statement before the agency can issue a license to store spent nuclear fuel);

  see also Ohio Nuclear-free Network v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 53

  F.4th 236, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“[The National Environmental Policy Act]

  requires all federal agencies to document the environmental impacts of

  certain proposed federal actions.”). So if New Mexico had environmental

  concerns, it could have asserted contentions and requested a hearing when

  Interim Storage submitted its environmental report. 10 C.F.R.

  § 2.309(f)(2); see p. 11, above.

        In fact, many of New Mexico’s criticisms of the environmental

  impact statement appear equally applicable to the environmental report. 5

  For example, New Mexico makes three criticisms of the environmental

  impact statement based on its

  5
        Interim Storage’s environmental report doesn’t appear in the record.
  But the report is subject to judicial notice because it’s publicly available
  on the Commission’s website. See Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A.,
  Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2012) (taking judicial notice of the
  existence of “documents filed with [an agency] and now available on the
  agency’s public website”). We’re considering the environmental report
  only for its contents—not to prove the truth of those contents. See Tal v.
  Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1265 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the
  court can take judicial notice of public documents to show their contents
  but not to prove the truth of matters stated).
                                        13
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 14

             assumptions about the eventual availability of a federal
              repository and cost of transportation to a permanent repository,

             failure to consider the possibility of terrorism or New Mexico’s
              cost to use the Texas-New Mexico rail line, and

             failure to consult New Mexico.

  All of these criticisms involve matters that had appeared in Interim

  Storage’s environmental report.

        First, New Mexico petitions for judicial review based on the

  Commission’s assumption involving a permanent repository and future

  transportation costs to the repository. For example, New Mexico criticizes

  the environmental impact statement for assuming the existence of a

  permanent repository by 2048. Petitioner’s Opening Br. at 33–35. But this

  assumption also appeared in Interim Storage’s environmental report. WCS

  Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility Environmental Report

  (Rev. 2), 72-1050, at 1-5 (“[T]he earliest estimated time by which a

  permanent geologic repository could be licensed and operational is

  2048.”).

        New Mexico also argues here that the environmental impact

  statement mistakenly assumed the cost of transportation even though a

  permanent repository doesn’t yet exist. Petitioner’s Opening Br. at 36. But

  Interim Storage’s environmental report had made the same assumptions

  despite the absence of a permanent repository. See WCS Consolidated

  Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility Environmental Report (Rev. 2), 72-
                                        14
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 15

  1050, at 4-12, 4-16 (assuming shipments from the facility would be to “the

  proposed repository at Yucca Mountain in Nye County, Nevada”).

        Second, New Mexico criticizes the environmental impact statement

  for factors that were overlooked. For example, New Mexico argues that the

  environmental impact statement failed to account for New Mexico’s cost to

  use the Texas-New Mexico rail line. Petitioner’s Opening Br. at 40–41. But

  the same was true of Interim Storage’s environmental report. WCS

  Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility Environmental Report

  (Rev. 2), 72-1050, at 3-5, 3-7.

        New Mexico also argues that the environmental impact statement

  omitted an assessment of possible terrorism. Petitioner’s Opening Br. at

  44–46. But Interim Storage’s environmental report contained the same

  omission.

        Third, New Mexico argues that it should have been able to provide

  input into the environmental impact statement. Petitioner’s Opening Br. at

  46. But in its environmental report, Interim Storage had omitted the New

  Mexico environmental agencies in the list of entities to be consulted. See

  WCS Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility Environmental

  Report (Rev. 2), 72-1050, at 1-7. 6

  6
        The only New Mexico entity listed was the New Mexico State
  Historic Preservation Office. See WCS Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel
  Storage Facility Environmental Report (Rev. 2), 72-1050, at 1-14.
                                        15
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 16

        As these examples indicate, Interim Storage’s environmental report

  shared many of the features that New Mexico criticizes. And New Mexico

  had access to that environmental report when Interim Storage requested a

  license. New Mexico thus had a chance to object to many of the features

  reappearing in the Commission’s draft of the environmental impact

  statement.

        With contentions and a request for a hearing or a petition for leave to

  intervene, New Mexico could later have filed new or amended contentions

  to challenge the environmental impact statement. See 10 C.F.R.

  § 2.309(f)(2) (stating that participants can “file new or amended

  environmental contentions after the deadline . . . based on a draft or final

  [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] environmental impact statement”). So

  New Mexico could have raised its current arguments even though the

  Commission had closed the administrative record before issuing the draft

  environmental impact statement.

  3.    We lack jurisdiction under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act because
        it does not govern Interim Storage’s license.

        New Mexico also invokes the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.

  §§ 10101–10270. This statute addresses plans to develop a federal

  repository for storing spent nuclear fuel. Skull Valley Band of Goshute

  Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1242 (10th Cir. 2004).

                                        16
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 17

        The Nuclear Waste Policy Act provides federal appellate jurisdiction

  over challenges to an environmental impact statement prepared with

  respect to an action under Part A of the statute. See 42 U.S.C.

  § 10139(a)(1)(D) (granting original jurisdiction to the federal courts of

  appeal to review environmental impact statements prepared with respect to

  an action under “this part,” which is Part A). 7 But the Commission did not

  prepare the environmental impact statement with respect to an action under

  Part A.

        Part A “establishe[s] a schedule for siting, construction, and

  operation of a permanent federal repository.” Bullcreek v. Nuclear Regul.

  Comm’n, 359 F.3d 536, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131–10145,

  10101(18) (defining “repository” under Part A as “any system licensed by

  the Commission that is intended to be used for, or may be used for, the

  permanent deep geologic disposal of . . . spent nuclear fuel” (emphasis

  added)); see also Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376

  F.3d 1223, 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that Part A establishes “a

  7
         Section 10139(a)(1)(D) also creates jurisdiction “for review of any
  environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to [the National
  Environmental Policy Act] . . . as required under section 10155(c)(1) of
  this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1)(D). Section 10155(c)(1) requires an
  environmental impact statement for certain sites owned by the federal
  government. 42 U.S.C. § 10155(c)(1). Because Interim Storage is a private
  entity, § 10155(c)(1) does not apply.

                                        17
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023    Page: 18

  schedule for developing a permanent federal repository”). But Interim

  Storage’s facility and license are neither permanent nor federal.

        The license is temporary, as it will expire in 40 years. During this

  period, Interim Storage can store spent nuclear fuel. R. vol. 4, at 827.

  Because the license is temporary, Part A doesn’t apply.

        New Mexico argues that Interim Storage’s facility could become a de

  facto permanent warehouse for storage, pointing to uncertainty over the

  feasibility of a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel. We reject this

  argument.

        Though we don’t know whether the government will complete a

  permanent repository, Interim Storage’s license would remain temporary

  either way because of the 40-year term. By the end of the 40-year period,

  Interim Storage would need to seek renewal. If the Nuclear Regulatory

  Commission were to decline renewal of the license, Interim Storage

  couldn’t continue to use the facility to store spent nuclear fuel. See 10

  C.F.R. § 72.54. So the possibility of renewal doesn’t make the license

  permanent.

        Even if the license were permanent, however, Part A wouldn’t govern

  because the storage facility is owned and operated by a private entity

  (Interim Storage). Because the entity is private, the Commission relied on

  the Atomic Energy Act, which authorizes licensing and regulation of

  “private use of private away-from-reactor spent fuel storage facilities.”

                                        18
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 19

  Bullcreek v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 359 F.3d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

  (emphasis added); see R. vol. 4, at 827 (the Interim Storage license stating

  that it was issued “[p]ursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954”). So the

  license does not concern a federal facility.

        New Mexico points out that the license refers to the Department of

  Energy, suggesting that the reference implies that the federal government

  will use the facility. This suggestion reflects a misunderstanding of the

  license. The license says that operations can’t start until Interim Storage

  obtains a contract with the U.S. Department of Energy or another title-

  holder that’s “responsible for funding operations.” R. vol. 4, at 829. This

  provision allocates responsibility for funding operations, ensuring that

  whoever owns the nuclear fuel will pay for the storage. (If the Department

  of Energy owned the nuclear fuel, the Department would pay for the

  storage; if a private entity owned the fuel, the private entity would pay.)

  That provision doesn’t

             authorize the federal government to store its spent nuclear fuel
              at the facility or

             make the federal government the licensee or operator of the
              storage facility.

  See Don’t Waste Michigan v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, No. 21-1048,

  2023 WL 395030, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2023) (per curiam; unpublished)

  (interpreting the same language and concluding that it does not make the

                                        19
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 20

  Department of Energy responsible for the spent nuclear fuel being stored at

  Interim Storage’s private facility).

        New Mexico also argues that the environmental impact statement,

  record of decision, and issuance of the license are “inextricably linked to

  actions taken pursuant to [the Nuclear Waste Policy Act] provisions.”

  Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 13. New Mexico points to the Nuclear

  Regulatory Commission’s

             reliance on a previous determination that a permanent
              repository would be available by 2048, R. vol. 3, at 134,

             discussion that the facility is needed for storage capacity
              before a permanent repository is available, id. at 115,

             assumption that spent nuclear fuel will be moved to a
              permanent repository, id. at 172–73, and

             reference to the Department of Energy’s analyses, id. at 286.

  These references don’t show the issuance of an action under the Nuclear

  Waste Policy Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1)(D). After all, the

  Commission didn’t prepare the environmental impact statement for a

  facility that was permanent or operated by the federal government.

                                         * * *

        The Commission didn’t issue the environmental impact statement

  based on an action under Part A of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. So this

  Act doesn’t trigger jurisdiction.

                                          20
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201    Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 21

  4.    We would lack jurisdiction even if the Commission had acted
        ultra vires.

        New Mexico also argues that we have jurisdiction because the

  Nuclear Regulatory Commission acted ultra vires. We disagree.

        District courts can review administrative actions when an agency acts

  ultra vires if no court could otherwise review the action. See Quivira

  Mining Co. v. U.S.E.P.A., 728 F.2d 477, 484 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[Leedom v.

  Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190 (1958)] stands for the proposition that ultra vires

  agency action may be reviewed by the district courts, notwithstanding

  exclusive court of appeals review provisions, when no relief is otherwise

  available.”).

        New Mexico argues that we obtained jurisdiction because the

  Commission acted ultra vires. But even if the Commission had acted ultra

  vires, New Mexico could have obtained judicial review by participating in

  the Commission’s proceedings through submitting contentions and a

  request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene. This opportunity

  prevents New Mexico from invoking this exception even if the Commission

  had acted ultra vires. See id. (rejecting a claim that the district court had

  jurisdiction despite a provision for exclusive appellate review because the

  plaintiffs had bypassed opportunities to challenge the regulation).

        New Mexico urges an exception that would create jurisdiction

  regardless of the possibility of administrative action. In urging this

                                        21
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201    Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 22

  exception, New Mexico relies on a Fifth Circuit opinion—American

  Trucking Associations, Inc. v. I.C.C., 673 F.2d 82, 85 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982)

  (per curiam)—which permitted review “if the agency action is ‘attacked as

  exceeding the power of the Commission.’” Id. at 85 n.4 (quoting Schwartz

  v. Alleghany Corp., 282 F. Supp. 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).

        Most circuits have declined to follow American Trucking. See Matter

  of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 799 F.2d 317, 334–35 (7th

  Cir. 1986) (deciding not to follow American Trucking and concluding that

  “[t]he statute limits review to petitions filed by parties, and that is that”);

  Erie-Niagara Rail Steering Comm. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 167 F.3d 111,

  112 (2d Cir. 1999) (characterizing American Trucking’s exceptions as

  unpersuasive dicta); Nat’l Ass’n Of State Util. Consumer Advocs. v.

  F.C.C., 457 F.3d 1238, 1249 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on denial of

  reh’g, 468 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2006) (declining to follow American

  Trucking and stating that a party is aggrieved when it “participated in the

  agency proceeding” (quoting Alabama Power Co. v. F.C.C., 311 F.3d 1357,

  1366 (11th Cir. 2002))); cf. Baros v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co., 400 F.3d 228,

  238 n.24 (5th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that American Trucking has “been

  squarely rejected by some of our sister circuits”). We agree with these

  courts, concluding that non-parties cannot appeal orders that “exceed the

  power” of the agency because

                                         22
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201    Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 23

             “‘exceeding the power’ of the agency may be a synonym for
              ‘wrong,’ so that the statute then precludes review only when
              there is no reason for review anyway” and

             “[the Hobbs Act] is the source of the court’s jurisdiction, . . .
              [a] court may not decide a case just because that would be a
              good idea; power must be granted, not assumed.”

  Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R. Co., 799 F.2d 317, 335

  (7th Cir. 1986).

        Nor does American Trucking support New Mexico’s reliance on the

  exception for ultra vires action. There the Fifth Circuit concluded that “it

  is incumbent upon an interested person to act affirmatively to protect

  himself in administrative proceedings, and . . . (s)uch a person should not

  be entitled to sit back and wait until all interested persons who do so act

  have been heard, and then complain that he has not been properly treated.”

  Am. Trucking Associations, Inc., 673 F.2d at 84 (quoting Nader v. Nuclear

  Regul. Comm’n, 513 F.2d 1045, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) (emphasis added)

  (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the need for affirmative action to

  protect oneself, reliance on American Trucking is misplaced because New

  Mexico could have participated in the licensing proceeding.

        Because American Trucking is neither persuasive nor applicable,

  jurisdiction wouldn’t exist even if the Commission had acted ultra vires.

  5.    Conclusion

        We dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Hobbs Act and

  Atomic Energy Act don’t trigger jurisdiction because New Mexico didn’t
                                        23
Appellate Case: 21-9593   Document: 010110811201   Date Filed: 02/10/2023   Page: 24

  take advantage of the chance to participate in the Commission’s licensing

  proceeding. Nor does jurisdiction exist under the Nuclear Waste Policy

  Act, for the Commission didn’t issue the environmental impact statement

  with respect to an action under Part A of the Act. And even if the

  Commission had acted ultra vires, we’d lack jurisdiction because New

  Mexico could otherwise have asserted its arguments in the licensing

  proceeding.

                                        24