Court Opinion

ID: 9910158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 21:01:00.703064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:15.102571
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 23a0525n.06

                                       Case No. 22-1841

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                                Dec 14, 2023
                                                      )                  KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      )
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                            )
                                                      )        ON APPEAL FROM THE
v.                                                    )        UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                                                      )        COURT FOR THE WESTERN
JEROME TILL,                                          )        DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
       Defendant-Appellant.                           )
                                                      )                            OPINION

Before: McKEAGUE, STRANCH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

       NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Jerome Till pleaded guilty to distributing at least forty

grams of heroin laced with fentanyl. The Presentence Report identified Till’s extensive criminal

history as a potential reason for an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. The district judge

imposed an upward departure and sentenced Till to seventy months in prison, ten months above

his Guidelines range. Till now appeals, arguing the upward departure is procedurally unreasonable

because the court (1) did not provide reasonable notice of the potential departure, (2) did not

adequately explain the sentence, and (3) based the sentence on erroneous facts. We disagree and

AFFIRM.

                                                I.

                                               A.
       On August 17, 2020, Jerome Till sold what he thought was heroin to a confidential DEA

informant. It turns out, Till’s more than fifty grams of drugs contained a mix of heroin, cocaine,
No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

and fentanyl. Other evidence revealed that Till was part of a larger drug ring, so the government

eventually arrested and indicted Till for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 400 grams

or more of a substance containing fentanyl and distribution of forty grams or more of a substance

containing fentanyl. Till pleaded guilty to distributing forty grams or more of a substance

containing fentanyl.

          The government then prepared a Presentence Report (PSR), which set Till’s base offense

level at twenty-four. The base offense level was reduced by two levels for playing a minor role in

the criminal activity and three levels for accepting responsibility, leading to a total offense level

of nineteen. Several of Till’s past criminal convictions contributed to his criminal history score,

such as possessing a firearm as a felon, failing to comply with sex offender registration

requirements, manufacturing controlled substances, and obstructing justice by fleeing from the

police. This established a criminal history category of IV.

          But other past convictions did not contribute to this criminal history score, including

larceny from a person, possession of a controlled substance, and criminal sexual conduct in the

fourth degree. Till’s past, unconvicted criminal conduct also did not contribute to his criminal

history score. For example, Till was charged with criminal sexual conduct, several counts of

domestic violence, possession of a firearm by a felon, and assault with intent to do great bodily

harm, on top of several other offenses. Till also had multiple pending charges at the time of his

arrest.

          With an offense level of nineteen and a criminal history category of IV, Till’s

recommended Guidelines range was forty-six to fifty-seven months in prison. But because this

range fell below the statutory mandatory minimum for his crime, his Guidelines range defaulted

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No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

to sixty months. The PSR also addressed factors that could warrant an upward departure from the

Guidelines range:

       The probation officer has identified USSG § 4A1.3 Criminal History Adequacy as
       a potential ground[] for departure. It is noted Mr. Till has numerous violent
       offenses which he was not convicted of, but are clearly part of a larger pattern of
       behavior that victimizes women in the community, making him a great[er] risk to
       the public than captured by the current guideline scoring.

R.364, PSR, p.44, PageID 1677. The PSR therefore recommended an upward departure for a

sentence of seventy-eight months.

                                               B.

       At the sentencing hearing, Till’s attorney argued that Till did not “actually know there was

fentanyl” in the heroin he was selling. R.424, Sent. Tr., p.7, PageID 2194. Counsel contended

that “the person who knows he is selling something that’s contaminated with fentanyl” should be

punished “more harsh[ly] than the person who sells something ignorant of that fact.” Id. Till’s

counsel also implored the court to look “sympathetically” on Till because he had a difficult

upbringing, so the court “should not place too much weight on this uncharged violence.” Id. at

p.6, PageID 2193.

       The district court imposed a sentence of seventy months in prison, ten months above Till’s

mandatory minimum. In addressing the PSR’s recommended departure, the court explained that

it did “not bas[e] a departure upward” on dismissed conduct, but instead “depart[ed] upward from

the advisory guideline range” for “two reasons.” Id. at p.10, PageID 2197.

       First, the court had “a policy disagreement with the base offense level for distribution of

fentanyl at the level now prescribed by the guidelines,” because the Guidelines Commission had

“not had the opportunity to review whether fentanyl is appropriately placed at [Base] Offense

Level 24,” and in “the Court’s judgment, Base Offense Level 24 is not adequate.” Id. “Fentanyl

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No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

and its death causing effects in the Western District of Michigan and across the country,” the court

continued, “mandates a higher base offense level.” Id. at p.11, PageID 2198.

       Second, referencing the “two parts to the guideline provision regarding upward departure

based on inadequacy of criminal history,” see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a) for the relevant parts, the court

explained that “based on the totality of the record, Criminal History Category IV does not

adequately measure the likelihood of this defendant re-offending.” R.424, p.11, PageID 2198.

The court emphasized that Till had “a horrible record on a number of fronts, not the least of which

is a prior firearms conviction, a prior conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree,

among other convictions which the Court has reviewed.” Id. Accordingly, the Court announced

it was “going to depart or vary upward two levels” to a range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months

and impose a sentence “towards the higher end of that range.” Id. The court believed that Till

needed to be “specifically deterred” because he was “a threat to the public.” Id. at pp.11–12,

PageID 2198–99.

       The court also accepted Till’s contention that he “did not know that the drugs that he was

delivering contained fentanyl.” Id. at p.12, PageID 2199. But the court found that “drugs laced

with fentanyl [are] becoming so ubiquitous in the drug trafficking community in the Western

District of Michigan that you assume the risk at this point in time when you think you’re delivering

heroin.” Id. In the court’s experience, “the likelihood that fentanyl is also involved is extremely

high.” Id. So the court explained that “when you decide to deal heroin in the Western District of

Michigan, the potential for it to be laced with fentanyl is, in the Court’s judgment, very high.” Id.

       These reasons led the court to sentence Till to prison for seventy months. Counsel for Till

objected to the higher sentence but advanced no other objections. Id. at p.14, PageID 2201. The

attorney for the government then asked if the court was basing the departure on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3

                                                 4
No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

or if it was a variance based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court responded that the “second

part” of 4A1.3(a)(1) “says, ‘or the likelihood the defendant will commit other crimes.’” R.424,

p.15, PageID 2202. So “it’s a departure pursuant to 4A1.3, it’s a variance because I have a policy

disagreement with the Base Offense Level of 24, so it’s really conjunctive, rather than one basis.”

Id. at p.16, PageID 2203.1 Till timely appealed.

                                                 II.

       We review district court sentencing decisions under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard. United States v. Johnson, 79 F.4th 684, 705 (6th Cir. 2023). So we review the sentencing

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo, giving due deference to

the district court’s application of the Guidelines to facts. United States v. Abdalla, 972 F.3d 838,

850 (6th Cir. 2020).

       When we review a sentence, we look for reasonableness in two forms: procedural and

substantive. United States v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 351 (6th Cir. 2015). Till claims the

district court’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable, Appellant Br. at 10, so that is our focus

here. A sentence can be procedurally unreasonable if, for example, the sentencing judge fails to

adequately articulate its reasoning for imposing the sentence, United States v. Jones, 81 F.4th 591,

601 (6th Cir. 2023), or bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, United States v. Small,

988 F.3d 241, 257 (6th Cir. 2021).

1
  A “departure” and a “variance” are distinct concepts: A Guidelines “departure” refers to the
“imposition of a sentence outside the advisory range or an assignment of a criminal history
category different than the otherwise applicable category” resulting “from the district court’s
application of a particular Guidelines provision, such as § 4A1.3.” United States v. Grams, 566
F.3d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 2009). On the other hand, a “variance” refers to the “selection of a sentence
outside of the advisory Guidelines range based upon the district court’s weighing of one or more
of the sentencing factors of § 3553(a).” Id. at 686–87. Because Till mainly challenges the court’s
reasoning under § 4A1.3(a), we will refer to the sentence here as an upward departure.

                                                   5
No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

         Till contends the district court committed three procedural errors: (1) the court violated

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h) by providing insufficient notice before departing

upward; (2) the court did not adequately explain why U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 justified an upward

departure; and (3) the court based its sentence, at least in part, on erroneous facts. Appellant Br.

at 11. We address each in turn.

                                                 A.

         The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that, before “the court may depart from

the applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence

report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court must give the parties reasonable notice that

it is contemplating such a departure,” and the “notice must specify any ground on which the court

is contemplating a departure.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h). Because the adequacy of notice under Rule

32(h) is a legal issue, we review it de novo. United States v. Matheny, 450 F.3d 633, 637 (6th Cir.

2006).

         The PSR below “identified USSG §4A1.3 Criminal History Adequacy as a potential

ground[] for departure.” R.364, p.44, PageID 1677. Under the Guidelines, if “reliable information

indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the

seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit

other crimes, an upward departure may be warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). It thus lays out

two grounds for a potential departure: the criminal history category “substantially under-

represents” either (1) the “seriousness” of the defendant’s criminal past or (2) the “likelihood that

the defendant will commit other crimes.” Id. And when it came time for sentencing, the district

court explained that “based on the totality of the record, Criminal History Category IV does not

adequately measure the likelihood of this defendant re-offending.” R.424, p.11, PageID 2198. So

                                                 6
No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

the court invoked § 4A1.3’s second option. Indeed, when counsel asked for clarification, the court

explained that it was basing the departure on the “second part.” Id. at p.15, PageID 2202.

       The PSR satisfied Rule 32(h)’s notice requirement when it identified U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3’s

criminal history adequacy provision as a factor that may warrant departure. This alone is sufficient

to provide “reasonable notice.” See Matheny, 450 F.3d at 635–37 (holding that a PSR that simply

restated the text of § 4A1.3(a)(1) without any further reasoning was enough to give the parties

notice of a potential departure under Rule 32(h)). The PSR is required “only to give notice, not to

explain its rationale.” Id. at 640. So any further explanation, while helpful, is unnecessary. And

here, the PSR provided notice plus additional reasoning. The PSR elaborated, “Till has numerous

violent offenses which he was not convicted of, but are clearly part of a larger pattern of behavior

that victimizes women in the community, making him a great[er] risk to the public than captured

by the current guideline scoring.” R.364, p.44, PageID 1677.

       Based on the language that “Till has numerous violent offenses which he was not convicted

of,” Till argues that the court could only depart upward based on non-convicted conduct. See

Appellant Br. at 13. But the district court explained that it was departing upward because Till had

“a horrible record on a number of fronts, not the least of which is a prior firearms conviction, a

prior conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree, among other convictions which

the Court has reviewed.” R.424, p.11, PageID 2198. Till therefore believes that by basing the

departure on convicted conduct, the court contradicted the PSR.

       Because of the PSR’s note about Till’s uncharged criminal conduct, the parties focused on

that conduct at and before sentencing rather than prior, convicted conduct that did not contribute

to Till’s criminal history category. R.371, Sent. Memo., pp.1–2, PageID 1719–20; R.424, pp.5–6,

PageID 2192–93. But Till’s argument ultimately confuses specificity with exclusivity. Simply

                                                 7
No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

because the PSR provided more information as to why it believed a departure may be warranted

does not mean that this specificity negated notice. The first sentence of the PSR section entitled

“FACTORS THAT MAY WARRANT DEPARTURE” reads, the “probation officer has identified

USSG §4A1.3 Criminal History Adequacy as a potential ground[] for departure.” R.364, p.44,

PageID 1677. This provided “reasonable notice” to Till that the court was considering a departure

based on the provisions of §4A1.3. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(h); Matheny, 450 F.3d at 637. Till even

admits in his brief that “the PSR recommended, and therefore provided notice to the parties, that

USSG § 4A1.3 could be applied to increase Mr. Till’s Sentence.” Appellant Br. at 12. Till,

therefore, has failed to show that the court violated Rule 32(h) in sentencing him.2

                                                B.

       We next consider whether the court adequately explained its departure based on

§ 4A1.3(a)(1). If a sentencing court departs from the Guidelines range, Congress requires the court

to give “the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described” in the

applicable Guidelines. United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 205 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)). We have accordingly held that “a sentence is procedurally unreasonable”

when the sentencing court fail[s] to “‘provide its specific reasons for an upward departure or

variance.’” Id. at 206 (quoting United States v. Blackie, 548 F.3d 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2008)).

       In explaining its departure, the court below expressed that “based on the totality of the

record, Criminal History Category IV does not adequately measure the likelihood of this defendant

re-offending.” R.424, p.11, PageID 2198. The court emphasized that Till had “a horrible record

2
  The government argues that Till failed to raise his Rule 32(h) argument below and thus we must
review for plain error. Appellee Br. at 12. Till responds that plain error does not apply because
he did not get a chance to object below. Appellant Reply Br. at 5–6 n.1. No matter if we review
for plain error or not, Till’s Rule 32(h) argument fails.

                                                 8
No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

on a number of fronts,” and that “Till needs to be specifically deterred” to “get the message” that

he needs to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Id. at pp.11–12, PageID 2198–

99.

       The court did not abuse its discretion by explaining the departure in this way. The court

offered several “specific reasons” for departing—the totality of the record not reflecting Till’s

likelihood of reoffending, the need to deter him, and his inability to comply with the law. In a

similar case, we found sufficient a district court’s explanation when it noted that “no sentence

imposed has deterred him from further criminal activity” and that the criminal history category

“did not adequately reflect the defendant’s likelihood to reoffend.” United States v. Mabry, No.

22-1576, 2023 WL 4183456, at *3 (6th Cir. June 26, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

That is enough here too.3

       Till argues that the district court did not adequately explain the sentence because it failed

to articulate how the examples listed in § 4A1.3(a)(2)4 factor into Till’s sentence. Appellant Br.

3 Till avers that the district court’s “method of departure” was irregular because it failed to key the

upward departure to a specific increase in his criminal history category. Appellant Br. at 17; see
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(4)(A) (requiring the court to “determine the extent of a departure . . . by using,
as a reference, the criminal history category applicable to defendants whose criminal history or
likelihood to recidivate most closely resembles that of the defendant’s”). True, the court should
have described the departure as moving over (in the Sentencing Table) to a higher criminal history
category rather than moving up two offense levels. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B) (specifying that
the court should move up in offense level only if the criminal history category is at VI, the
maximum). But in this case, a proper upward departure based on a criminal history category of V
would put Till in a higher range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months, the same range the district
court used in its departure. And his sentence of seventy months was within this higher range. So
any error was “harmless” because it plainly “did not affect the district court’s selection of the
sentence imposed.” Grams, 566 F.3d at 688 (quoting United States v. Obi, 542 F.3d 148, 156 (6th
Cir. 2008)). The district court’s explanation is thus not reversible.
4
 That provision states that the “information described in” § 4A1.3(a)(1) “may include information
concerning the following: (A) Prior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal history
category (e.g., sentences for foreign and tribal convictions). (B) Prior sentence(s) of substantially
more than one year imposed as a result of independent crimes committed on different occasions.

                                                  9
No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

at 15–17. But Till produces no applicable case showing that a sentencing court cannot base an

upward departure on § 4A1.3(a)(1) without first going through the examples in § 4A1.3(a)(2).5 To

the contrary, other courts have held that “the court is not limited to considering only these

[§ 4A1.3(a)(2)] factors” in imposing a departure. United States v. Outlaw, 720 F.3d 990, 992 (8th

Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Robinson, 456 F. App’x 283, 290 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining

that “§ 4A1.3(a)(2)’s list of types of information courts can consider in upwardly departing is not

exhaustive” because it uses the term “includes,” which commentary to the Guidelines defines as

“not exhaustive” (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. 2)). Indeed, the district court in Outlaw did not go

through the § 4A1.3(a)(2) factors and partly based its increase on “a need to protect the public,”

similar to the district court below. Outlaw, 720 F.3d at 992. So there is nothing in the statute’s

text nor relevant precedent that says courts must go through (a)(2)’s list before departing upward

under (a)(1). Given all of this, the district court did not abuse its discretion in explaining Till’s

sentence.

                                                  C.

        Last, Till alleges that his sentence was based on erroneous facts. The claim that a sentence

is procedurally unreasonable because it was based on erroneous facts requires a two-part showing:

(C) Prior similar misconduct established by a civil adjudication or by a failure to comply with an
administrative order. (D) Whether the defendant was pending trial or sentencing on another charge
at the time of the instant offense. (E) Prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal
conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(2).
5
  Till cites United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 2020), but that case is not applicable.
First, it deals with a substantive reasonableness challenge, not a procedural reasonableness
challenge like here. Second, it says nothing about § 4A1.3(a)(2). And third, the past criminal
conduct there was juvenile conduct, which required a more specific connection to the relevant
crime. Till also cites United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 2010), but
that too is a substantive unreasonableness case, and it is one in which the Sixth Circuit found no
abuse of discretion for the upward variance.

                                                  10
No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

A defendant must establish, first, “that the challenged evidence is materially false or unreliable,”

and, second, “‘that such false or unreliable information actually served as the basis for the

sentence’ in order to prove a due-process violation.” United States v. Adams, 873 F.3d 512, 517

(6th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 898 F.2d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1990)).

       Till points to the district court’s statements that the “potential” for drugs to be “laced with

fentanyl is, in the Court’s judgment, very high” and “the likelihood that fentanyl” is involved is

“extremely high.” Appellant Br. at 22 (quoting R.424, p.12, PageID 2199). According to Till,

this constitutes an erroneous fact because the odds of dealing fentanyl are not, in fact, very high.

Till proffers a DEA report from 2020 to argue that only eight percent of powdered drugs contain

fentanyl. Id. (quoting DEA, 2020 National Drug Threat Assessment 10). The DEA reports that

“fentanyl mixed with heroin accounted for 94 kilograms of the 1,066 kilograms of powdered drugs

examined.” Id. (cleaned up). But the court relied on its own experience and the admissions of

Till’s own counsel when it discussed the fentanyl, which was not an abuse of discretion.

       First, the court was clear that it was making a claim about its own experience and judgment.

See R.424, p.12, PageID 2199 (confining its statements to what it has dealt with in “the Western

District of Michigan,” basing this “on the Court’s experience in this Court,” and twice repeating

that this was “in the Court’s judgment”). We have upheld sentences when district judges rely on

their own experience. See United States v. Robinson, 892 F.3d 209, 216 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining

that “the district court has discretion to consider the nature of heroin and similar drugs when

deciding that the Guidelines do not provide adequate punishment” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); United States v. Burnette, 414 F. App’x 795, 798 (6th Cir. 2011) (The “district court

may also consider a wide variety of other factors, including its own experience, where relevant”).

“And we have found no error” where a district court departed upward but specifically predicated

                                                 11
No. 22-1841, United States v. Till

any policy disagreements “on local, not national, conditions.” Robinson, 892 F.3d at 216 (internal

quotation marks omitted). What’s more, we have held that merely presenting statistics that don’t

exactly match the district court’s statements does not render a sentence unreasonable. See United

States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723, 730–31 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding defendant’s sentence

where the district court relied on studies suggesting high recidivism rates for child sex offenders,

even though defendant presented data showing only a 6.2% chance of reoffending). Till cannot

show the court committed procedural error with the statistics he proffers. Indeed, he presents no

caselaw from our court or any other showing that such an alleged error is reversible.

       Second, the claim that the district court relied on an erroneous fact is belied by counsel’s

own statements. Till’s counsel admitted that “there is a good chance in today’s day and age you’re

probably going to be selling fentanyl along with whatever it is you thought you were going to be

selling,” and that “in the eyes of the law, it doesn’t matter whether you know or you don’t know

that there is fentanyl in that illicit stuff.” R.424, p.7, PageID 2194. It is unpersuasive to now turn

around and claim that the court’s statement to the same effect is an “erroneous fact.” Thus, we

cannot say the court committed procedural error here.

                                                 III.

       For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM.

                                                 12