Court Opinion

ID: 9685228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:26:41.426278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:03.383691
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(concurring). I agree with the conclusion reached in Judge Danhof’s opinion, that the circuit court erred in granting accelerated judgment based on the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237(131), but for the reason stated below I cannot join in his opinion.
MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237(131) provides in relevant part:
"The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer. As used in this section * * * 'employer’ includes his insurer, a service agent to a self-insured employer, and the accident fund insofar as they furnish, or fail to furnish, safety inspections or safety advisory services incident to providing workmen’s compensation insurance * * * .”
Defendant Auto-Owners is being sued to collect benefits under a policy of insurance issued to provide coverage required by the "no fault” chapter of the insurance code. MCL 500.3101-500.3179; MSA 24.13101-24.13179. It is not being sued for furnishing or failing to furnish "safety inspections or safety advisory services incident to providing workmen’s compensation insurance”. Auto-Owners cannot claim the exclusive remedy protection from suit under § 131 of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act on these facts.
Whether the exclusive remedy provision of worker’s compensation is a bar to recovery of no-fault benefits was the only question briefed and *233argued in this case. The constitutionality of the set off provisions of MCL 500.3109; MSA 24.13109 was not raised and I would not reach it in this case, especially since plaintiff has expressed his willingness to abide by the statute as written. However, since Judge Danhof has gratuitously reached this question, I will express my view.
Section 3109(1) requires that "Benefits provided or required to be provided under the laws of any state or the federal government” be deducted from personal injury protection benefits before payment by the insurer. There is no question that worker’s compensation is a "benefit * * * required to be provided” under the laws of this state.1
Although there has been some disagreement on the method of analysis and the degree of acceptance of the reasonableness of the distinctions made by the Legislature under this provision, no panel has found § 3109(1) constitutional in its application. O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 70 Mich App 487; 245 NW2d 801 (1976), lv granted, 397 Mich 848 (1976) (set off for Social Security benefits), Wysocki v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 77 Mich App 565; 258 NW2d 561 (1977) (set off for Social Security benefits), Pollock v Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co, 79 Mich App 218; 261 NW2d 554 (1977) (deduction of worker’s compensation benefits from no-fault policy purchased by the employee).
I would reach the same result here, where both the worker’s compensation and no-fault policies are provided by the employer. The problem is that the legislative scheme is essentially arbitrary. Why the distinction between private collateral sources which are required to be provided by law, *234and those which are not required to be provided?2 I would suggest that there is no valid reason and find the statute unconstitutional as applied to these facts. O’Donnell v State Farm, supra, at 497-498, Bowser v Jacobs, 36 Mich App 320; 194 NW2d 110 (1971).

 See MCL 418.111; MSA 17.237(111) and MCL 418.301; MSA 17.237(301).

 I disagree with the statement in Pollock, 79 Mich App at 223, that this distinction is reasonable if the legislative purpose was to reduce insurance premiums. When some are allowed duplicative recovery while it is denied to others solely on the basis that their supplemental benefits are required to be provided by law an essentially arbitrary classification has been made.