Court Opinion

ID: 9963378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 14:00:49.197234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:47.864930
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10502    Document: 48-1     Date Filed: 04/25/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10502
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       DANIEL ANGEL RODRIGUEZ,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-22058-CMA
                          ____________________
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                       23-10502

       Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Daniel Rodriguez appeals the denial of his motion to vacate
       his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He asserts his trial counsel
       provided ineffective assistance by advising him that, even after
       pleading guilty in an unconditional guilty plea, he would be able to
       appeal the trial court’s decisions on his pretrial motions. Rodriguez
       contends but for that advice, he would not have pled guilty. Ro-
       driguez was granted a certificate of appealability on the following
       issue:
              Whether the district court erred in denying Rodri-
              guez’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for advis-
              ing him that his guilty plea would not waive his right
              to appeal his pretrial motions.
       After review, 1 we vacate and remand for the district court to hold
       an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
               A federal prisoner “claiming the right to be released upon
       the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Con-
       stitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which
       imposed the sentence to vacate . . . the sentence.” 28 U.S.C.
       § 2255(a). “Unless the motion and the files and records of the case

       1 We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo as a mixed ques-

       tion of law and fact. Jones v. United States, 224 F.3d 1251, 1256–57 (11th Cir.
       2000).
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       23-10502               Opinion of the Court                          3

       conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court
       shall . . . grant a prompt hearing thereon . . . .” Id. § 2255(b). An
       evidentiary hearing must be held “if the petitioner alleges facts that,
       if true, would entitle him to relief” unless his claims are “patently
       frivolous,” “unsupported generalizations,” or “affirmatively con-
       tradicted by the record.” Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 714–15
       (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted); Holmes v. United States, 876
       F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted).
              An ineffective assistance of counsel claim has two elements:
       (1) deficient performance; and (2) prejudice. Strickland v. Washing-
       ton, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Performance is deficient if “counsel
       made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
       ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.
       Generally, prejudice is shown if “there is a reasonable probability
       that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
       ceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
              In the context of a guilty plea, the Supreme Court has held
       “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must
       show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
       errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
       on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Post hoc
       assertions that a defendant would not have pled guilty but for the
       attorney’s deficient advice are generally not sufficient and courts
       should instead “look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate
       a defendant’s expressed preferences.” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S.
       357, 369 (2017). The likelihood of success on the merits following
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                       23-10502

       maintenance of a not guilty plea is not determinative, so long as
       the chance is truly central to the defendant’s decision making. See
       id. at 368–71. “[A] voluntary, unconditional guilty plea waives all
       nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings.” United States v. Patti,
       337 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003). This includes recusal and sup-
       pression issues. Id. at 1322; United States v. McCoy, 477 F.2d 550, 551
       (5th Cir. 1973). 2
              The district court erred in denying Rodriguez’s motion
       without holding an evidentiary hearing. The district court applied
       an incorrect legal analysis on the prejudice prong of the ineffective
       assistance inquiry. The district court analyzed prejudice as whether
       Rodriguez’s claims would have been successful on appeal if not un-
       knowingly waived by his guilty plea. Instead of asking whether,
       without the attorney’s deficient advice, “there is a reasonable prob-
       ability that . . . [Rodriguez] would not have pleaded guilty and
       would have insisted on going to trial,” the district court instead in-
       quired whether Rodriguez would have succeeded on appeal in the
       absence of waiving the recusal issue with his guilty plea. See Hill,
       474 U.S. at 59. The Supreme Court has held the low likelihood of
       success on the merits does not prevent a defendant from showing
       prejudice, so long as the chance of success is genuinely central to
       their decision whether to plead guilty. See Lee, 582 U.S. at 368-71.

       2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

       this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
       cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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       23-10502               Opinion of the Court                          5

       As such, the low chance of Rodriguez’s success on appeal without
       the waiver is not dispositive of the prejudice inquiry. See id.
               The correct inquiry was whether Rodriguez would not have
       pled guilty and instead insisted on going to trial had his counsel
       correctly advised him. Under this analysis, Rodriguez “allege[d]
       facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief” and his claims were
       not “patently frivolous,” “unsupported generalizations,” or “af-
       firmatively contradicted by the record.” See Aron, 291 F.3d at 714-
       15; Holmes, 876 F.2d at 1553. First, Rodriguez alleged and provided
       supporting evidence in an affidavit by his trial counsel, Ana Davide,
       that she gave him incorrect advice that he “would be able to appeal
       all the issues regarding his case, including all pretrial motions.” See
       Patti, 337 F.3d at 1320, 1322; McCoy, 477 F.2d at 551. This was de-
       fective performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
              Second, liberally construing Rodriguez’s pro se initial § 2255
       motion, he alleged he would not have pled guilty but for Davide’s
       erroneous advice regarding the appealability of his pretrial mo-
       tions. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
       Cir. 1998) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard
       than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
       construed.”). This is an allegation of prejudice, and can be consid-
       ered sworn, as can all the supporting documents attached to Rodri-
       guez’s motion. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Hill, 474 U.S. at 59;
       United States v. One Olivetti Elec. 10-Key Adding Mach., 406 F.2d 1167,
       1168 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating unsworn statements by the same per-
       son incorporated by reference into sworn affidavits and complaints
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       6                        Opinion of the Court                    23-10502

       are considered sworn). While it is a post hoc assertion and insuffi-
       cient, by itself, to carry Rodriguez’s burden, it is supported by the
       facts that: (1) he pled guilty without a plea agreement and without
       receiving any beneficial dismissals; (2) the specificity of Davide’s
       advice has at least some tendency to show Rodriguez was con-
       cerned with being able to appeal his pretrial issues; (3) he raised the
       issues in motions in the district court; (4) he raised these issues,
       among others, on his direct appeal; and (5) he stated, admittedly
       post hoc, that the recusal issue was significant in the firing of his trial
       counsel and his request to proceed pro se.
              Nor does other evidence defeat his claim. The trial court did
       not inform him that he had waived these issues. While the record
       contains ample evidence of other considerations which impacted
       his decision to plead guilty, none “affirmatively contradict[s]” his
       claim that the advice about his ability to raise pretrial motions on
       appeal was a but for cause of his guilty plea. Thus, the district court
       erred in denying Rodriguez’s § 2255 motion without holding an ev-
       identiary hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); Aron, 291 F.3d at 714-15;
       Holmes, 876 F.2d at 1553. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for
       the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether Rodri-
       guez’s counsel was ineffective for advising him that his guilty plea
       would not waive his right to appeal his pretrial motions.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.