Court Opinion

ID: 9722010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:14:30.787313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:30.055475
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
The death statute amendment would, in the absence of the savings clause, be applied in all death sentence hearings occurring after its effective date. The death sentence for murder was the maximum sentence for murder before the amendment and remained the maximum sentence for murder after the amendment. All who face a death sentence hearing after the amendment became law fall within the same class. The object of the amendment is to provide a better way for the jury and judge to determine whether a criminal defendant, convicted of murder and for *1247whom an aggravating cireumstance outweighs mitigating cireumstances, should receive the sentence of death. The equal protection clauses require that there be a rational basis for achieving this object and affecting this refinement in some but not all sentencing hearings. State ex rel Indiana Youth Center v. Howard Juvenile Court (1976), 264 Ind. 371, 344 N.E.2d 842; Vicory v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 688, 400 N.E.2d 1380. Since there is no such basis, the benefits of the amendment must be extended wherever possible. In the event appellant Alcorn is convicted of murder, and an aggravating cireumstance is determined to outweigh mitigating cireumstances, an occasion for application of the amendment will have arisen. I respectfully dissent.