Court Opinion

ID: 9929245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 03:00:47.823252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:19.675573
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
WALKER, HAYES, and PARKER
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Private E2 NATHANIEL I. GILKEY
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20210440

Headquarters, 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command
Christopher E. Martin, Military Judge (arraignment)
Jeffrey W. Hart, Military Judge (motions and trial)

Lieutenant Colonel Carol A. Brewer, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Colonel Michael C. Friess, JA; Captain Sean P. Flynn, JA; Jonathan
F. Potter, Esquire; Major Bryan A. Osterhage, JA; Captain Sean Patrick Flynn, JA
(on brief); Colonel Michael C. Friess, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Dale C. McFeatters,
JA; Major Bryan A. Osterhage, JA; Captain Sean P. Flynn, JA (on reply brief);
Colonel Philip M. Staten, JA; Major Robert W. Rodriguez, JA; Captain Kevin T.
Todorow, JA (on brief on specified issue).

For Appellee: Colonel Christopher B. Burgess, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline J.
DeGaine, JA; Major Kalin P. Schlueter, JA; Captain Melissa A. Eisenberg, JA (on
brief); Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline J. DeGaine, JA; Major Kalin P. Schlueter, JA;
Captain Patrick S. Barr, JA; Captain Alex J. Berkun, JA (on brief on specified
issue).

19 January 2024

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

WALKER, Senior Judge:

The military judge erred when he failed to recuse himself due to actual bias
and the appearance of bias. His personal bias! was a product of his experience as a

Rule for Courts-Martial 902(b)(1).
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440

victim of a similar crime and was demonstrated by his conduct during the
proceedings, all of which raise doubt as to the court-martial’s legality, fairness, and
impartiality. We, therefore, set aside appellant’s findings and sentence.

BACKGROUND
A. Appellant’s Offenses

Appellant’s offenses involved his taking advantage of a male friend of his
younger brother. The victim was good friends with appellant’s younger brother, and
it was primarily through his brother that appellant came to know the victim.
Appellant also interacted with the victim during his senior high school football team
scrimmages with the junior high team, of which the victim was a member.

After graduating from high school in 2018, appellant joined the Army and
trained to become a military police officer. In approximately October 2018,
appellant invited the victim to connect with him on the social media platform
Snapchat which the victim accepted. Initially, the two of them communicated about
hunting and video games. At the time of these communications, the victim was only
14 years old.

In January 2019, the victim received a request to connect with someone on
Snapchat with the account name of a girl with whom the victim was familiar, so he
approved the request. When the victim inquired about a photo of the girl, he was
sent a video of a girl masturbating. The victim testified that the girl in the video
appeared young, but her face was not visible in the video. The person then asked for
a photo of the victim. He responded by sending a close-up photo of his genitals.
Immediately after sending the photo, the victim felt uncomfortable and blocked the
other account from communicating with him.

The following morning, the victim noticed several Snapchat messages and
missed phone calls from appellant. In the messages, appellant told the victim that he
was in trouble and that appellant was coming in a few weeks to arrest him.
Appellant further advised the victim that he could get out of trouble if he became a
confidential informant for the military. Frightened, the victim agreed to cooperate.
Appellant informed the victim that he must reconnect with the purported female

* We have fully and fairly considered appellant’s Assignments of Error II and III,
and the matters personally submitted by appellant pursuant to United States v.
Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982) and find they warrant neither discussion nor
relief. Assignment of Error I and Grostefon matters VI, VII, VIII, X, and XII are
rendered moot by our opinion.
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440

account and do whatever the person requested. While the victim was at school, the
female Snapchat account sent a message to the victim requesting that he go to the
bathroom and send more photos of his genitals. The victim testified that he
complied and sent the account four to five photos of his genitals and then again
blocked the account. Later that afternoon, appellant sent a message to the victim to
unblock the female Snapchat account. There were several additional instances in
which the victim sent photos or videos of himself to the female Snapchat account
and then immediately blocked the account. Each time the victim blocked the
account, he received a message from appellant instructing him to unblock the
account.

Later in January 2019, the Yell County, Arkansas sheriff’s office received a
call from a person claiming to be from Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID)
requesting to speak with a sheriff. A deputy sheriff spoke with an individual who
identified himself as Special Agent (SA) Gilkey and stated that CID was conducting
a child pornography investigation in Danville, Arkansas. The deputy sheriff
contacted the local high school resource officer and informed him about that
conversation. The resource officer contacted the phone number provided by the
deputy sheriff and spoke with a male who identified himself as an officer from the
state police. During the conversation, the resource officer recognized the voice and
believed it to be appellant. When confronted, appellant admitted to his identity.
Appellant informed the resource officer that he was working a case in which there
could possibly be a kidnapping from the school and he also mentioned a child
pornography case. Knowing that appellant had joined the military, the resource
officer asked for the contact information for appellant’s commander. When the
resource officer spoke with someone purporting to be appellant’s supervisor, he
could tell the person was disguising his voice and testified the voice sounded like
appellant.

Approximately three months passed in which the victim was not contacted by
the female Snapchat account. In late May 2019, appellant contacted the victim via
Snapchat and informed him that the female Snapchat account was a military account
used to catch pedophiles and the account had been hacked and the victim needed to
reconnect with the account. As soon as the victim complied, the account messaged
the victim and instructed him to send more photos of his genitals. The account
further requested videos of the victim masturbating; the victim complied. The
victim testified that during the periods of time he was communicating with the
female Snapchat account, he did not receive messages from appellant. The only time
the victim received messages from appellant’s account was when he blocked the
female Snapchat account. Soon thereafter, the victim informed his mother of what
had been occurring and she reported it to local law enforcement.

Appellant was charged with one specification of impersonating an agent of the
U.S. Army CID, one specification of sexual abuse of a child, one specification of
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440

obstruction of justice, two specifications of distribution of child pornography, three
specifications of possession of child pornography, and one specification of
production of child pornography, in violation of Articles 106, 120b, and 134,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 906, 920b, and 934.

B. The Military Judge’s Background and Conduct

Appellant was arraigned in October 2020. A pretrial hearing was held in
December 2020 by a different military judge who presided over the remainder of
appellant’s trial. During that pretrial hearing, the military judge informed the
parties that he was not aware of any grounds for challenge against him. In response,
both parties declined the opportunity to voir dire the military judge.

In January 2021, defense counsel requested a hearing for conducting voir dire
of the military judge. During voir dire, defense counsel inquired as to whether the
military judge or a member of his family had been the victim of a similar offense to
those with which appellant was charged. At first, the military judge responded in
the negative but then requested that the defense counsel describe the charged
offenses. The military judge then disclosed that approximately fifty years prior,
when he was about seven years old, he was sexually abused by a 65-year-old Boy
Scout troop leader. The military judge stated that he did not consider that to be a
similar offense based upon the underlying facts of appellant’s case as he understood
them, given there was no physical contact alleged in appellant’s charged offenses.
The military judge further stated that he did not believe the incident that happened
to him impacted his daily life. He explained that the only time he ever thought
about the incident was during training on voir dire as a military judge and had
concluded that it was something he should disclose to the parties. Defense counsel
affirmatively declined any objection to the military judge serving on appellant’s
case. At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the military judge again gave the parties the
opportunity to challenge him and both parties declined. At that same hearing,
appellant elected to be tried by military judge alone.

At trial, the government admitted appellant’s lengthy video recorded
statement to CID totaling approximately 4 hours and 37 minutes. Approximately 40
minutes of the recording consisted of obtaining administrative data from appellant,
appellant sitting alone in the interview room for a short period, and a period at the
conclusion of the interview of just an empty room. The government published
several excerpts from appellant’s CID interview during the trial, totaling
approximately 37 minutes. Defense counsel highlighted during closing argument
that the CID agent used coercive techniques while interviewing appellant, including
continually rejecting appellant’s denials and pressing appellant for admissions to the
alleged offenses. Defense counsel specifically requested that the military judge
review the entire interview during deliberations. The military judge closed court at
0911 for deliberations and concluded deliberations at approximately 1230. Court
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440

recessed until the following day, pending appellant’s evaluation for mental health
concerns.

Court reconvened the following day. Defense counsel requested: (1) a
continuance in order to evaluate appellant’s competence; (2) another sanity
evaluation under Rule for Courts-martial [R.C.M.] 706; and, (3) reconsideration of
the military judges denial of the defense request for an expert consultant in forensic
psychology. The military judge denied all three motions from the bench and
immediately announced his findings. The military judge convicted appellant,
contrary to his pleas, of one specification of impersonating a U.S. Army CID agent,
one specification of sexual abuse of a child, three specifications of possession of
child pornography, one specification of distribution of child pornography, and one
specification of production of child pornography, in violation of Articles 106, 120b,
and 134, UCMJ. The military judge acquitted appellant of one of the specifications
of distribution of child pornography and the specification of obstruction of justice.
Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial asserting that there was substantial doubt
as to the fairness and impartiality of the trial given that the military judge did not
consider all the evidence. Specifically, the defense argued that the military judge
only deliberated for approximately three hours and fifteen minutes and could not
have reviewed the entirety of the four hours of appellant’s CID interview and all
documentary evidence in that amount of time. The military judge denied the defense
motion for a mistrial, from the bench, while confirming that he did not consider all
the evidence. Subsequently, the military judge granted the defense request for a
continuance so the defense could request the convening authority grant an expert
consultant for sentencing.

Trial reconvened over five months later, at which time the military judge addressed
additional defense motions and conducted a pre-sentencing hearing. Prior to moving
to pre-sentencing proceedings, the defense moved for reconsideration of its motion
for a mistrial, citing the appellant’s competency during the proceedings and the
military judge’s failure to review all the evidence during deliberations. As an
alternative, defense counsel requested the military judge recuse himself for purposes
of ruling on the motion for reconsideration if he did not believe he could be
impartial in rendering a ruling. The military judge did not recuse himself and denied
the motion for reconsideration. During its pre-sentencing argument, the government
requested appellant be sentenced to a total of five years of confinement. The
military judge sentenced appellant to a dishonorable discharge, a total of seven years
of confinement, with all periods to run concurrently,’ forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and reduction to the grade of E-1.

3 The Military Judge sentenced appellant to confinement as follows:
As to Charge I and its Specification: 30 days.

(continued .. .)
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440
LAW AND DISCUSSION
A. Actual vs. Appearance of Judicial Bias

“An accused has a constitutional right to an impartial judge.” United States v.
Butcher, 56 M.J. 87, 90 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). “An impartial and disinterested trial judge is the foundation on which the
military justice system rests, and avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as
important as avoiding impropriety itself.” United States v. Berman, 28 M.J. 615,
616 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989). To ensure every military accused receives an impartial
judge, the President promulgated R.C.M. 902, which provides the framework for
when a military judge must be disqualified from participating in a court-martial,
whether for actual bias or the appearance of bias.

Rule for Courts-Martial 902(a) addresses the appearance of bias, placing a
duty upon a military judge to “disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which that military judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
Appearance bias is determined objectively. Hasan v. Gross, 71 M.J. 416, 418
(C.A.A.F. 2012).4

Rule for Court-Martial 902(b) outlines five specific circumstances in which a
military judge is categorically disqualified from a proceeding for actual bias. The
circumstances relevant to appellant’s assignment of error are found in subsection
(1), which mandates recusal when a military judge “has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding.” R.C.M. 902(b)(1); see Butcher, 56 M.J. at 90 (noting R.C.M.
902(a) governs the appearance of bias while R.C.M. 902(b) governs specific
disqualifying circumstances). A military judge may not accept waiver of any ground
for challenge under R.C.M. 902(b). R.C.M. 902(e).

(. . . continued)

As to Charge II and its Specification: 3 years.

As to Specification 1 of Charge IV: 3 years.

As to Specification 3 of Charge IV: 2 years.

As to Specification 4 of Charge IV: 7 years.

As to Specification 5 of Charge IV: 2 years.

As to the Additional Charge and its Specification: 3 years.

* Although appellant’s pleadings focus on the appearance of bias under R.C.M.
902(a), under our plenary review authority, we will also address actual bias under
R.C.M. 902(b). Art. 66, UCMJ.

f
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440

Disqualification for actual bias under R.C.M. 902 (b)(1), “must be based upon
extra-judicial, personal knowledge, not knowledge gained through performance of
judicial duties.” United States v. Black, 80 M.J. 570, 574 (Army. Ct. Crim. App.
2020) (cleaned up). “[P]Jersonal means the bias or prejudice ‘must stem from an
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than
what the judge learned from his participation in the case.’” Jd. (cleaned up); see
Litkey v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 549-551 (1994).

When a military judge’s impartiality is challenged on appeal, “the test is
whether, taken as a whole in the context of this trial, a court-martial’s legality,
fairness, and impartiality were put into doubt” by the military judge’s actions.
United States v. Burton, 52 M.J. 223, 226 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (cleaned up). When
conducting this test, we apply an objective standard of “[a]ny conduct that would
lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned....” United States v. Kincheloe,
14 M.J. 40, 50 (C.M.A. 1982) (cleaned up). Allegations of partiality “must be
supported by facts or ‘some kind of probative evidence’ which would warrant a
reasonable inference of lack of impartiality on the judge’s part.” Id.

B. Waiver of Appearance of Bias

Unlike claims based upon actual bias, disqualification under R.C.M. 902(a) is
subject to waiver if there is a “full disclosure on the record of the basis for
disqualification.” R.C.M. 902(e); see United States v. Quintanilla, 56 M.J. 37, 77
(C.A.A.F. 2001) (noting appearance bias is waivable after full disclosure on the
record of the basis for disqualification).

Whether an appellant has waived an issue is a legal question we review de
novo. United States v. Davis, 79 M.J. 329, 331 (C.A.A.F. 2020) (citing United
States v. Haynes, 79 M.J. 17, 19 (C.A.A.F. 2019)). “[W]aiver is the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Jd. (quoting United States v.
Galdue, 67 M.J. 311, 313 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (internal quotations marks omitted)).
While we review forfeited issues for plain error, “we cannot review waived issues at
all because a valid waiver leaves no error for us to correct on appeal.” Jd. (quoting
United States v. Campos, 67 M.J. 330, 332 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).

Appellant concedes, and we agree, appellant waived any objection for
disqualification of the military judge under R.C.M. 902(a) for apparent bias when
the military judge revealed the disqualifying information on the record and appellant
declined to request recusal. Davis, 79 M.J. at 332. Appellant exercised his right to
voir dire the military judge who disclosed that he was a victim of child sexual abuse
fifty years prior to appellant’s court-martial. The military judge answered several
follow-up questions about the nature and details of the abuse and whether it
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440

currently impacted the military judge. We find that there was disclosure on the

record of a potential basis for disqualification of the military judge under R.C.M.
902(a). After completing voir dire, defense counsel requested a recess to consult
with appellant. Upon reconvening, appellant affirmatively declined to challenge the
military judge. Appellant was also provided another opportunity to challenge the
military judge at a subsequent pretrial hearing and again affirmatively declined to
challenge the military judge. Appellant, knowing the military judge who had been
subject to sexual abuse as a child would preside over his trial, elected to be tried by
that military judge.

As appellant has affirmatively waived any objection to the military judge’s
potential disqualification for an appearance of bias, there is nothing left for us to
correct on appeal pertaining to any appearance of bias by the military judge absent
the exercise of our Article 66(d), UCMJ, authority to pierce through appellant’s
waiver. In contrast to our superior court’s review authority under Article 67, Article
66(d), UCMJ, prescribes a duty to service courts to affirm only such findings of
guilty as we find correct in law and fact and that we determine, on the basis of the
entire record, should be approved. Our superior court has referred to this authority
as a service court’s “awesome, plenary, de novo power of review,” United States v.
Cole, 31 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A. 1990), further describing the service courts as
having a “carte blanche to do justice.” United States v. Claxton, 32 M.J. 159, 162
(C.M.A. 1991). We have previously held that, even when affirmative waiver would
otherwise render panel instructions correct in law, the third “should be approved”
prong of Article 66, UCMJ, “allows us to, in our discretion, treat a waived or
forfeited claim as if it had been preserved at trial.” United States v. Conley, 78 M.J.
747, 750-51 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2019) (citing United States v. Britton, 26 M.J. 24,
27 (C.M.A. 1988)).

When exercising this Article 66(d), UCMJ, power, our superior court has
endorsed the approach of considering whether the issue was waived and then
deciding whether to address the matter under Article 66(d). United States v. Hardy,
77 M.J. 438, 442 (C.A.A.F. 2018).° The Hardy court left undisturbed the holding in
United States v. Quiroz that a service court may use its Article 66, UCMJ, power to
address a waived issue. See Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334, 338 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

° We are cognizant that under the current version of Article 66, effective 1 January
2021, we no longer retain the “should be approved” discretion to reach waived
claims. This case, however, is governed by the prior version of Article 66 in effect
at the time of referral.

° The Hardy case was decided under the 2016 Manual for Courts-Martial [M.C.M.]
in which the court’s review power was delineated in Article 66(c), UCMJ.
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440

Despite the clear affirmative waiver in this case, our Article 66(d), UCMJ,
review compels us to affirm only such findings of guilty as we find correct in law
and fact and that we determine, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved
(emphasis added). For all the reasons cited herein, we find the significance of the
right to an impartial judge worthy of piercing waiver in this case.

C. The Military Judge Was Disqualified for Both Actual and the Appearance of Bias

If an appellant, as in this case, does not raise the issue of disqualification
until appeal, we examine the claim under the plain error standard of review.” United
States v. Martinez, 70 M.J. 154, 157 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citing United States v. Jones,
55 M.J. 317, 320 (C.A.A.F. 2001)). “Plain error occurs when (1) there is error, (2)
the error is plain or obvious, and (3) the error results in material prejudice.” Jd.
(citing United States v. Maynard, 66 M.J. 242, 244 (C.A.A.F. 2008)). If we
determine the military judge should have disqualified himself, we then analyze the
facts to determine if the error was harmless. “In a plain error context we look to see
if the error materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the appellant”
pursuant to Article 59(a), UCMJ. Martinez, 70 M.J. at 159.

In reviewing the entirety of the record, we conclude that there is probative
evidence warranting a reasonable inference of the military judge’s lack of
impartiality. United States v. Pearson, 2019 CCA LEXIS 462, *19 (Army Ct. Crim.
App. 18 Nov. 2019) (mem. op.) (“[d]Jetermining whether a military judge is biased,
or could be perceived as such, however, is not a mathematical equation resolved
based on the percentage of rulings granted for the defense or the government but
instead requires a holistic review of the record.”) Specifically, we find the military
judge’s (1) initial failure to disclose potentially disqualifying information on two
separate occasions, (2) inconsistent and contradictory descriptions of the potentially
disqualifying information, (3) government favorable rulings on admission of
evidence without requiring the government to provide the basis for admission, (4)
failure to require the government to comply with rules of evidence related to
testimony about Snapchat images and videos, (5) admitted failure to review all the
evidence, (6) failure to appreciably consider a motion for a mistrial, and (7)
imposition of a term of confinement well in excess of the government’s request to be
’ indicative of the military judge’s personal bias in this case. The totality of these
errors demonstrates the military judge lacked impartiality and erred in failing to
recuse himself.

First, we note that the military judge failed to voluntarily disclose the
extrajudicial source of his bias, which was his prior sexual abuse by a Boy Scout
leader, a crime with similarities to appellant’s charged offenses. While appellant’s
case did not involve physical sexual abuse, it certainly involved the manipulation of
a position of trust and an adult abusing a minor. Just as one would trust a Boy Scout
leader as someone to mentor and lead young boys, so too would a minor look to the
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440

older brother of a friend who played on a senior sports team and was serving in the
military as a person with some inherent trust. A reasonable person would find that
the military judge’s sexual abuse was similar enough in nature to the charged
offenses to warrant disclosure, despite the considerable gap in time and the military
judge’s view to the contrary. The military judge admitted that his prior abuse came
to mind during his judicial training, yet he failed to voluntarily disclose this
information on the record, instead disclaiming any knowledge of disqualifying
information. When defense counsel requested a subsequent pretrial hearing for the
sole purpose of conducting voir dire, the military judge noted for the record that he
had previously allowed both parties the opportunity to voir dire him and that each
party declined. The military judge then inquired whether anything had changed
since the prior hearing necessitating voir dire and required defense counsel to justify
the lack of inquiry when initially provided the opportunity. Defense counsel
explained that due to a motion discussed at the prior hearing, he was not focused on
voir dire at that time. Ultimately, the military judge granted the defense request for
voir dire and disclosed his abuse but was not particularly forthcoming and, in some
instances, contradictory regarding details of the incident. At this point, the military
judge should have recognized his personal bias and his disqualification from serving
on this case.

Upon a review of the record in its entirety, we find the military’s judge’s
failure to recuse himself from this case due to personal bias or prejudice against
appellant, a suspected child sex offender in a position of trust, is plain and obvious.
The military judge’s rulings pertaining to admission of certain government evidence
reflected his bias. Appellant was charged with production of one video and one
digital image of child pornography. Defense objected to the victim’s testimony of
multiple requests to send images of his genitals to a Snapchat account controlled by
appellant. Specifically, defense counsel asserted that evidence of more than one
video or image was uncharged misconduct under Military Rule of Evidence [Mil. R.
Evid.] 404(b) and prejudicial under Mil. R. Evid. 403. The military judge initially
overruled the objection without requesting any justification of relevance from the
government. He also overruled the renewed objection under Mil. R. Evid. 404(b),
noting “the court’s not in a position to determine which evidence ties into the
charges” and then summarily ruled that the testimony was not unduly prejudicial
with no analysis. Appellant was also charged with both distribution and production
of one video and one digital image of child pornography. Over defense objection,
the military judge admitted multiple images and videos for each of these
specifications, holding that the government was not required to provide specific
notice as to which image or video it was selecting out of the entire cache that served
as a basis for those charged offenses. While the military judge was correct in that
the military is a notice pleading jurisdiction, he never required the government
sufficiently justify the relevancy of admitting multiple videos and images for the
possession and distribution offenses or identify which of the multiple images the
government believed satisfied the definition of child pornography.

10
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440

More concerning is the potential impact of the military judge’s decision to
admit multiple images and videos supporting the possession, distribution, and
production of child pornography. The military judge then failed to specify which
image or video of the multiple videos and images admitted at trial appellant was
convicted of possessing, producing, and distributing when announcing his findings.
United States v. Ross, 68 M.J. 415, 417 (C.A.A.F. 2010). (“If there is no indication
on the record of which of the alleged incidents forms the basis for the conviction,
then the findings of guilty are ambiguous and the Court of Criminal Appeals cannot
perform a factual sufficiency review.” United States v. Wilson, 67 M.J. 423, 428
(C.A.A.F. 2009) (citation omitted). The military judge’s failure to require the
government to identify with specificity which image or video it was asserting
supported each specification was further evidence of a continuing disregard for the
high burden the government bears to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, with a certain
degree of specificity, every element of each offense.

The military judge also ignored potential deficiencies in the charged offenses
which we attribute to his personal bias. The specification for impersonating an
agent of CID does not appear to state an offense. The specification merely alleges
that appellant telephoned a sheriff’s department and stated he was a member of
CID.’ United States v. Yum, 10 M.J. 1, 9 (C.M.A. 1980) (holding that the
specification must contain “not only an allegation and a showing of the pretense of
authority, but also the allegation and showing of an act which ‘must be something
more than merely an act in keeping with the falsely assumed character.’”) (citations
omitted); United States vy. Felton, 31 M.J. 526, 530 (finding that the evidence
established an overt act beyond the mere pretense of authority in that appellant used
that authority to intimidate a female into meeting with him) (holding the charged
specification deficient in that it only alleged a bare false representation and nothing
more); United States v. Hall, 25 M.J. 628 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987); United States v.
Adams, 14 M.J. 647 (A.C.M.R. 1982) (holding specification sufficient because it
alleged false representation and an overt act of attempting to purchase codeine).
The specification, as in this case, must contain more than a bare false representation
that appellant asserted he was an Army CID agent.

The military judge’s admission of the victim’s testimony about the images and
videos he exchanged with appellant without requiring the government to satisfy Mil.

’ The specification states, “In that Private (E2) Nathaniel I. Gilkey, U.S. Army, did,
at or near Camp Humphreys, Republic of Korea, on or about 22 January 2019,
wrongfully and willfully impersonate an agent of the Army Criminal Investigation
Division by telephoning the Yell County Sheriff’s Department and stating that he
was Special Agent Gilkey, a member of the United States Criminal Investigation
Division.”

11
GILKEY — ARMY 20210440

R. Evid. 1002 and 1004 is another example of the military judge failing to hold the
government to its high burden, which we again find indicative of a personal bias or
prejudice. The victim testified that appellant sent him a video via Snapchat of what
appeared to be a minor female masturbating. The video itself was never admitted at
trial. The victim also testified he sent several Snapchat photos of his genitals and a
video of him masturbating to a Snapchat account, allegedly controlled by appellant,
without the government admitting a copy of the images or video. Several months
later, when the victim reported his exchange of sexually explicit images and videos
with appellant, he informed law enforcement this was accomplished via Snapchat.
The government did not present any testimony that either civilian law enforcement
or CID made any attempts to recover the images or videos from Snapchat or from the
victim’s phone. The CID agents working the case seized appellant’s cellphone but
never conducted a full forensic or logical extraction of the phone, and thus none of
the images or videos to which the victim testified were recovered or admitted at
trial.2 Yet, the government elicited testimony from the victim describing the
Snapchat images and videos without any defense objection.

Military Rule of Evidence 1002 states “[a]n original... recording... is
required in order to prove its content” unless an exception applies.’ In this case,
Mil. R. Evid. 1004 could have provided the requisite exception. The two applicable
options required the government to either show the original was “lost or destroyed”
or the original could not be “obtained by any available judicial process.” Mil. R.
Evid. 1004(a)-(b). The first exception requires the government to show “[a]ll the
originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith.” Mil.
R. Evid. 1004(a). The other exception allows evidence of the content of a recording
when an original cannot be obtained by any available judicial process. Mil. R. Evid.
1004(b). The military judge did not require the government to satisfy either of the
exceptions outlined in Mil. R. Evid. 1004 but rather, freely allowed the government
to present testimony of the videos and images the victim exchanged with appellant.
Allowing the victim’s testimony without satisfying the requirements of Mil. R. Evid.
1002 and 1004 lowered the government’s burden in this case pertaining to the
offenses of production of child pornography and sexual abuse of a child.

® We recognize that the images and videos may not have been recovered even if law
enforcement conducted a full forensic extraction. However, the rule required the
government to demonstrate the images and videos were unrecoverable.

? United States v. Grindstaff, 2022 CCA LEXIS 524 (Army Ct. Crim App. 30 Nov.
2022)( (mem. op.) (holding the military judge abused his discretion in admitting
testimony of a Snapchat video over defense objection when the government failed to
satisfy either of the exceptions for admission under R.C.M. 1004).

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Most concerning is the issue of the military judge failing to review all the
evidence in this case, by his own admission. The government admitted the video
recording of appellant’s CID interview which consisted of approximately 4 hours in
which there was substantive questioning. The government only published
approximately 37 minutes of those 4 hours during the trial. In closing argument,
defense counsel requested the military judge review the entirety of the video
asserting that law enforcement used coercive interview techniques to garner
appellant’s admissions. The military judge only deliberated for approximately 3
hours and 20 minutes, the approximate length of the CID interview not published
during trial. While we recognize that there is a presumption that the judge correctly
applied the law in making an independent judgment in the case, the military judge
admitted he did not review the video during deliberations. United States v.
Littlewood, 53 M.J. 349, 354 (C.A.A.F. 2009). When the defense counsel requested
a mistrial on the basis that the military judge had not deliberated long enough to
review the entirety of the CID interview, the military judge denied the motion from
the bench, without any appreciable deliberation, stating,

The video of the accused included according — the assertions that were
made in court was that the video included a lengthy break in the
beginning and the part at the end. So, the defense made a tactical
decision whether to play the entire video in court, when it certainly had
the option of doing that, elected not to do so. So, the defense’s motion
under 915 is denied.

The military judge’s response certainly indicates that he did not review the entire
video as the defense requested. More disturbing is the military judge’s placing the
burden on the defense counsel to publish a video that was admitted by the
government in support of its burden to prove the offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt. Failing to review the entire video, despite defense’s request to do so,
deprived appellant of the fact-finder considering potential exculpatory and
mitigating evidence during the merits portion of the trial. We note that in a ruling
on a motion to reconsider the motion for mistrial, the military judge asserted that he
had reviewed the entire video and “quickly forward[ed] through portions of the
recording that were neither helpful to the Defense, the Government or the Court.”
Given that this assertion was made in a written ruling several months after the
announcement of findings, and upon reflection, we give that statement considerably
less weight than the statement the military judge made on the record soon after the
announcement of findings, which clearly indicated he believed he was not required
to review all the admitted evidence if it was not published in open court.

The military judge’s personal bias or prejudice against appellant, while
demonstrated throughout the proceedings, arose from his own abuse as a child from
a male adult in a position of trust. As stated, appellant was a male adult in a
position of trust. We find no authority for the proposition that personal bias or

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prejudice must concern only that party. We find, when determining whether actual
bias exists, that it is sufficient that appellant is a member of that class of people that
the factfinder holds a personal prejudice against.

For the foregoing reasons, we find a reasonable person, knowing all the
circumstances, would question the military judge’s impartiality in appellant’s case.
More specifically, we find the military judge was disqualified from presiding over
appellant’s case due to his personal bias under R.C.M. 902(b)(1). The military judge
committed plain error in failing to recuse himself because an accused is entitled to
an impartial judge, personal bias or prejudice requires a judge’s disqualification, and
the military judge failed to disqualify himself. In the absence of actual bias under
RCM 902(b)(1), we would also find plain error for an appearance of bias for all of
the same reasons, and we would pierce waiver in this case because of the magnitude
of the right impacted — appellant’s right to an impartial judge.

D. Material Prejudice to Appellant’s Substantial Rights

Having determined that the military judged erred in failing to recuse himself
under both actual and apparent bias, we must turn to whether this error materially
prejudiced a substantial right of appellant.

Appellant was entitled to an impartial judge and was denied that right in this
case resulting in the military judge failing to hold the government to its high burden
of proof and threshold requirements for admission of evidence. The military judge’s
bias impacted his rulings on defense objections when the government sought
admission of multiple images or videos of suspected child pornography despite
having only charged appellant with possession, production, and distribution of child
pornography of one image or video in Specifications 1, 4, and 5 of Charge I. These
rulings prejudiced appellant when the military judge found appellant guilty of those
specifications but failed to identify which specific image or video of which appellant
had been found guilty, potentially adversely impacting appellant’s right to a legal
and factual sufficiency review by this court and protection against double jeopardy.
The judge’s personal bias also resulted in appellant being convicted of a potentially
facially deficient specification of impersonating a CID agent. The military judge
also failed to require the government to satisfy the threshold requirements for
admission of testimony about Snapchat videos and images. Given that the victim’s
testimony was the primary evidence of the description of the sexually explicit
images and videos appellant exchanged with a minor, it significantly lowered the
government’s burden of proof as to the specification of Charge II and specification 4
of Charge IV, yet the military judge still convicted appellant of these specifications.

Further, the military judge’s bias impacted appellant’s substantial right to

have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant was convicted of
offenses that were alleged to have been prejudicial to good order and discipline for

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which the government presented no evidence. Specifications 1, 3, 4, 5 of Charge IV
and the specification of Additional Charge I allege that appellant possessed,
produced, and distributed child pornography. The terminal elements for each of
these specifications allege appellant’s conduct was both service discrediting and to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces. “[E]very element of
a criminal offense—including the terminal element of Article 134, UCMJ—must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt and cannot be conclusively presumed based on the
accused’s conduct....” United States v. Richard, 82 M.J. 473, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
The absence of evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, could not have allowed any rational trier of fact to find appellant’s
conduct was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces. See
United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 451 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (finding convictions
under Article 134, UCMJ legally insufficient where the “mere possibility...
unsupported by the record” of the terminal element being satisfied was “so tenuous
and speculative as to be legally insufficient....”). Where, as here, the government
offered no evidence to prove appellant’s conduct was to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces for any of the aforementioned specifications, it
follows that the military judge failed to hold the government to its burden as to that
element. Even when defense requested the military judge reconsider his finding as
to Specification 5 of Charge IV, including that there was insufficient evidence to
support the element of prejudice to good order and discipline, the military judge
erroneously affirmed his finding as to even that specific element, without providing
any rationale which would afford him increased deference. !°

The most egregious act by the military judge impacting appellant’s substantial
rights was his failure to review one of the central pieces of the government’s
evidence, appellant’s law enforcement interview. While the government published
excerpts of the interview, there was a significant portion of appellant’s interview not
published in open court, requiring the military judge review the remainder of the
interview during his deliberations. Appellant’s own admissions are one of the
strongest forms of proof for the government in satisfying its burden of proof. United
States v. Torres, 60 M.J. 559, 569 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Ariz v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991)). At the same time, the tone of the interview

'0 We acknowledge that the military judge issued a written ruling in response to a
defense request that the military judge reconsider his findings as to Specification
1,3,4,5 of Charge IV as it pertained to the “prejudicial to good order and discipline”
language. However, the military judge’s written ruling on the sufficiency of the
evidence of “prejudicial to good order and discipline” is little more than conclusory
and merely references appellant’s being a military member in a foreign country as
being sufficient evidence to support this element. The military judge’s cursory
analysis does not support a great level of deference by this court.

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and the interview tactics used by law enforcement in obtaining appellant’s
statements were central to the defense theory of the case. Further, exculpatory and
mitigating information provided by appellant in that interview was equally as
important for the military judge both on the issue of guilt and as to an appropriate
sentence. The military judge’s failure to review that piece of evidence prejudiced
appellant’s right to a fair trial.

Finally, the military judge’s bias impacted appellant’s right to a sentence that
is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to promote justice and maintain good
order and discipline.” R.C.M.1001(f). The government recommended that appellant
be sentenced to no less than a total of five years of confinement for all offenses.

The defense recommended that a total of 28 months of confinement was an
appropriate sentence. The military judge sentenced appellant to concurrent terms of:
three years of confinement for sexual abuse of a child; three years of confinement
for distribution of child pornography; two years of confinement for each of the two
specifications of possession of child pornography occurring in 2019; seven years of
confinement for production of child pornography; and three years of confinement for
an additional specification of possession of child pornography that occurred after
appellant was aware he was under investigation for child pornography offenses. The
military judge adjudged a total of seven years of confinement, significantly in excess
of the sentence the government recommended in this case. While it is not unlawful
for a military judge to sentence appellant to a term of confinement in excess of the
government’s recommendation, it is certainly unusual for a military judge to do so.
The victim testified that the offenses made him feel angry and worthless, it
negatively impacted his relationship with his parents and friends, and he canceled
his fifteenth birthday party over it. However, the government did not present any
additional aggravation evidence. Yet, the military judge imposed a sentence greater
that the government’s recommendation. We find that, under the facts of this case,
the military judge’s personal bias impacted his imposition of an appropriate
sentence.

For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the military judge’s failure to
recuse himself materially prejudiced appellant’s substantial rights.

E. Even Absent Prejudice Appellant Is Entitled to Relief Under Liljeberg

Even absent material prejudice to a substantial right pursuant to Article 59(a),
UCMSJ, a judge’s failure to disqualify himself may still require a remedy after
applying the test laid out in Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 862-864 (1988) for an appearance of bias.

In Liljeberg, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining

“whether a judgment should be vacated” based on a judge’s appearance of partiality:
“[1] the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, [2] the risk that the

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denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and [3] the risk of undermining
the public’s confidence in the judicial process.” 486 U.S. at 864. The Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) applies the same three-part test in analyzing
cases involving a military judge’s appearance of partiality pursuant to R.C.M.
902(a). See United States v. Quintanilla, 56 M.J. 37, 45 (C.A.A.F. 2001).

The analysis for the third Liljeberg factor is “similar to the standard applied
in the initial R.C.M. 902(a) analysis” in that we apply an objective standard and
view the issue of disqualification through the eyes of a reasonable member of the
public. Martinez, 70 M.J. at 159-60. However, the analysis of the third Liljeberg
factor is much broader than the initial R.C.M. 902(a) analysis because “we do not
limit our review to facts relevant to recusal, but rather review the entire proceedings,
to include any post-trial proceeding, the convening authority action, [appellate
proceedings], or other facts relevant to the Liljeberg test.” Jd. at 160. Put simply,
courts consider the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the basis for
disqualification to determine if a remedy is warranted. See, e.g., United States v.
Kish, No. 201100404, 2014 CCA LEXIS 358 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 17 Jun. 2014)
(considering both the military judge’s actions during appellant’s court-martial and
the military judge’s public comments made two weeks after appellant’s trial as part
of the analysis of Liljeberg’s third factor); see also Berman, 28 M.J. at 618 (“What
happened on 4 December and after between [the military judge and the prosecuting
attorney] is relevant to our assessment of their relationship prior to that date’).

We conclude that reversal is required under the three Liljeberg factors. For
the first factor, we have identified several injustices appellant suffered at the hands
of the military judge. It is not simply that there were a number of adverse rulings
against appellant, but that those rulings failed to hold the government to its burden
of proof, including failing to review all of the evidence. As previously discussed,
some of the military judge’s rulings exhibited personal bias on his part. While he
did not rule uniformly in the government’s favor, some of his rulings were erroneous
and others not given appreciable deliberation. Appellant challenged the
government’s case at almost every opportunity and often times renewed objections
and requested reconsideration of adverse rulings as a result of a lack of appreciable
consideration by the military judge. Further, much of the government’s evidence
related to the exchange of child pornography with a minor was based primarily upon
the testimony of the minor. The government did not present evidence of the images
or videos exchanged and was unable to conduct a full analysis of appellant’s cell
phone to potentially recover any of those images or videos. The government’s
evidence on the offenses of sexual abuse of a minor, impersonating a law
enforcement agent, and production of child pornography was not overwhelming.

For the second factor, appellant did not address this point in his brief, instead

focusing on the first and third Liljeberg factors. Because appellant did not present
any argument on this point, we are convinced it is “not necessary to reverse the

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results of the present trial in order to ensure that military judges exercise the
appropriate degree of discretion in the future.” United States v. Uribe, 80 M.J. 442,
450 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (quoting Butcher, 56 M.J. at 93). Our conclusion that the
military judge plainly erred in failing to recuse himself in this case will serve as a
sufficient deterrent for military judges in future cases to be appropriately mindful of
their obligations under R.C.M. 902.

Upon examination of the entire proceedings, the third Liljeberg factor favors
reversal of the court-martial findings and sentence. For all the same reasons that we
found both actual bias and the appearance of bias, and material prejudice to
appellant’s substantial rights, we conclude that the military judge’s actions in this
case would undermine the public’s confidence in the judicial process. We would
find that just on this factor alone the case warrants reversal, but together with the
first factor, we are even more convinced that reversal is warranted in this case.

CONCLUSION

The findings of guilty and the sentence are SET ASIDE. A rehearing is
authorized.

Judge HAYES and Judge PARKER concur.

S EN P. HAIGHT
Acting Clerk of Court

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