Court Opinion

ID: 9579182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:52:15.70405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:31.633592
License: Public Domain

Deen, Judge,
dissenting. I think this appeal poses a much narrower question than would be indicated from either the majority opinion or from Judge Pannell’s dissent, that is, whether the order in this case was self-executing. The statute is unambiguous that where there is an order of dismissal of a petition "for failure to comply with . . . any order of court” the judgment must be considered as one on the merits, preventing a refiling of the action, "unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies.” Code Ann. § 81A-141 (b). It is obvious that this order does not so specify, and therefore the only question left for discussion *207is whether an order that the petition is "dismissed” and a purported self-executing order of automatic dismissal on failure to do an act in the future are one and the same thing in their legal consequences. They have always been held to be so. A specific example is the many decisions of Georgia appellate courts that an order to the effect that a general demurrer be sustained with a stated number of days in which to amend, the petition to "stand dismissed” on failure to amend within the time limited, is automatic, self-executing, and a final judgment. Smith v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 181 Ga. 479 (2) (182 SE 603); Gamble v. Gamble, 193 Ga. 591 (19 SE2d 276); Peacock Constr. Co. v. Chambers, 223 Ga. 515 (1) (156 SE2d 348); Hayes v. Simpson, 83 Ga. App. 22 (62 SE2d 441). If this is true, there is no difference between an order dismissing the petition in presentí and one declaring that the petition stands dismissed upon failure, within a stated number of days, to cure the defect pointed out. Therefore, this case is controlled in all particulars by Old South Investment Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 124 Ga. App. 697, supra.
The real difficulty, of course, lies in the fact that whereas in most prior adjudications the question of whether the merits had in fact been passed upon was left to the court to determine, as it should be (Code Ann. § 81A-141 (b)), however, contains the legislative proviso that the court must consider the decision as one operating on the merits (even if it obviously is not) unless the trial judge in the prior case so noted. But since it is within the legislative scope to determine under what circumstances a litigant will be allowed to refile a complaint, this court should take the law as it finds it. While I am most sympathetic to and would like to be associated with the majority view, I am constrained by these considerations to concur in the dissent.