Court Opinion

ID: 9648033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:59:57.35394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:06.025750
License: Public Domain

SPECTOR, Justice,
joined by
HIGHTOWER and GAMMAGE, Justices,
concurring and dissenting.
Texans have long recognized that the right of trial by jury is “the only safe guarantee for the life, liberty, and property of the citizen.” 1 Today’s decision undermines that guarantee by allowing the Legislature to arbitrarily curtail the jury’s role. While I join in most parts of the majority opinion, I cannot join in part VII, which abridges an injured worker’s right to a jury trial.
The Texas Workers’ Compensation Act of 1989 sharply restricts the jury’s discretion on critical issues. In determining the extent of impairment, the jury must adopt one of the exact impairment ratings offered by a physician in the case. Tex.Lab.Code § 410.306(c). *535Thus, the jury cannot choose to accept only part of a physician’s testimony; it must adopt that testimony in full, without regard to the physician’s credibility or the jury’s own assessment of the underlying facts.
I believe this requirement violates our Constitution. See Tex. Const, art. I, § 15; Tex. Const, art. V, § 10. The right of trial by jury dictates that a jury must be allowed to decide all matters of fact, and the essence of the jury’s role as fact-finder is to weigh and evaluate the evidence. A jury cannot be bound, as a matter of law, to accept expert testimony. See Callejo v. Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 755 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex.1988). Rather, “[t]he jury is the exclusive judge of the facts proved, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Benoit v. Wilson, 150 Tex. 273, 239 S.W.2d 792, 796 (1951).
We have expressly recognized that the fact-finder is entitled to accept one portion of an expert’s testimony, while rejecting another. Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345, 346 (1948). This principle is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 142 Tex. 385, 181 S.W.2d 68, 72 (1944) (“[A] jury may accept or reject portions of the testimony of a witness_”); Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Vogel, 179 S.W. 268, 269 (Tex.Civ. App.-Galveston 1915, writ ref'd) (“The jury were not compelled to credit all the testimony of any witness or reject it all_”); Houston & T.C.R. Co. v. Taylor, 20 Tex.Civ.App. 654, 49 S.W. 1055, 1055 (Tex.Civ.App.1899, writ ref'd) (“The jury were not compelled to credit all the testimony of any witness or reject it all.”); Garcia v. Sanders, 90 Tex. 103, 37 S.W. 314, 317 (1896) (“The jury were not bound to accept or reject in toto the testimony of either [witness].... ”); Garcia v. State, 522 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (jury may “accept or reject any or all of the [witnesses’] testimony”); Austin Fire Ins. Co. v. Adams-Childers Co., 246 S.W. 365, 368 (Tex.Comm’n App.1923, judgm’t adopted) (“The jury had a right to believe part of [a witness’] evidence and absolutely discard other portions of it.”); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Upshaw, 560 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1977, no writ) (“[T]he jury had the sole right to accept or reject the testimony of each witness in whole or in part.”); Langdeau v. Piske, 317 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1958, writ refd n.r.e.) (“[I]t is peculiarly within the province of the jury to reconcile inconsistencies or accept or reject portions of witnesses’ testimony.”); Texlan, Inc. v. Freestone County, 282 S.W.2d 283, 288-89 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1955, no writ) (“[T]he jury, being the trier of the facts, had the duty and responsibility of passing upon the credibility of the witnesses and determining the ultimate issues before them and, in so doing, they could reject or accept the testimony of each witness in whole or in part as they found the facts to be.”).
These authorities establish that the jury is entitled to weigh a physician’s testimony and accept it in whole or in part. This role is especially important in determining an injured worker’s impairment rating. Even the American Medical Association, which promulgated the guides that provide the ratings, insists that an impairment rating “was by no means intended as a precise indicator of impairment.”2 The record establishes that a three percentage point difference in the ratings would not be unexpected, even when two physicians agree on the extent of impairment. Under the Act, three percentage points means nine weeks of impairment income benefits. Three percentage points could also determine whether an injured worker receives any supplemental income benefits at all, since those benefits are not available to anyone with an impairment rating below fifteen percent.
The Act provides that unless there has been a substantial change in the worker’s condition, “evidence of extent of impairment shall be limited to that presented to the commission.” Tex.Lab.Code § 410.306(c). Thus, the jury is bound by a physician’s initial conclusion, even if the physician backs off from that conclusion at trial, or admits that the impairment rating was rounded to the nearest five percent, as the guides expressly allow.
*536Requiring the jury to adopt fully the testimony of one of the experts, and reject fully the testimony of the others, eviscerates its central function of weighing and evaluating the testimony. Because this derogation of the jury’s historic role unconstitutionally impinges on the right of trial by jury, I dissent.

. The Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Texas (1836), reprinted in 3 Tex. Const. Ann. 478, 479 (Vernon 1993).

. Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association et al. at 9.