Court Opinion

ID: 9787221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:12:47.502857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:53.561575
License: Public Domain

Judge RUSSEL
dissenting.
The Hygiene Fire Protection District wants to condemn private property and build a firehouse there. Boulder County resists because the firehouse would disrupt a plan that the county adopted under the Planned Unit Development Act of 1972 (PUD Act), sections 24-67-101 to -108, C.R.S.2008. The issue is whether Hygiene Fire must obtain the county’s permission.
The majority concludes that the answer is no. It declares that, as a public entity, Hygiene Fire is exempt from an enforcement provision in the PUD Act, section 24-67-106(3)(b), C.R.S.2008. From that premise, the majority reasons that Hygiene Fire need comply only with the Planning Act, which governs zoning decisions generally. See § 30-28-110, C.R.S.2008. And it concludes that, under the Planning Act, Hygiene Fire may overrule the county’s decision. See § 30-28-110(1)(b), C.R.S.2008.
*493I respectfully disagree with this analysis. I think the legislature intended the PUD Act to apply to public entities such as Hygiene Fire. I therefore conclude that Hygiene Fire may not resort to the Planning Act but must comply with section 24-67-106(3)(b). I write separately to explain my view.
A. Traditional Rule
The majority begins its analysis by recalling a traditional rule that allows public entities to disregard county or municipal zoning regulations. The majority states that this rule has been codified in section 30-28-110(l)(b). And its opinion reflects the assumption that, had the legislature wanted to depart from the rule in the PUD Act, it would have expressed its intent in unmistakable terms.
I disagree with this assumption. I think there are good reasons to question the nature and extent of the traditional rule, and I do not think that it should influence our analysis here.
The majority takes its view of the traditional rule from Reber v. South Lakewood Sanitation District, 147 Colo. 70, 362 P.2d 877 (1961). In that case, the supreme court held that a public entity could overrule a county planning commission under a particular statute. Id. at 75, 362 P.2d at 879. The court also stated, in dicta, that “[i]n the absence of such statute, courts of last resort have recognized that districts, authorities and other state authorized governmental subdivisions have the power to overrule or disregard the restrictions of county or municipal zoning regulations.” Id. at 75, 362 P.2d at 879-80.
After reviewing the decisions cited in Re-ber, as well as subsequent decisions from Colorado and other states, I am inclined to doubt the existence of a single traditional rule. Instead of one consistent principle, courts have employed various rationales. See Macon Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 252 Ga. 484, 314 S.E.2d 218, 222-23 (1984) (noting the superior sovereign test, governmental-proprietary test, eminent domain test, statutory guidance test, and balancing-of-interests test). These rationales may yield inconsistent results, depending on the nature of the entities and activities involved. See generally Elaine Marie Tomko-DeLuca, Annotation, Applicability of Zoning Regulation to Governmental Projects or Activities, 53 A.L.R.5th 1 (1997).
Here, we have a dispute between a county and a special district. Because both public entities are created and defined by statute, the result turns solely on legislative intent. In resolving this case, I would focus on the statutory text and would not distort the inquiry by presuming that a special district is exempt from a county’s zoning regulation. See City of Fargo v. Harwood Twp., 256 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D.1977) (declining to recognize the “inherent superiority” of a political subdivision that, like the zoning entity, derives its powers from the legislature); cf. Clark v. Town of Estes Park, 686 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Colo.1984) (a municipality is subject to its own zoning ordinances unless the “zoning ordinances specifically exempt municipal activity”).
Thus, in the absence of plain language that answers the question directly, I would employ the usual tools of statutory construction to determine whether, under the PUD Act, the county may regulate the location of governmental activity conducted by a special district.
B. Statutory Construction
“In construing a statute, our goal is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature and adopt the statutory construction that best effectuates the purposes of the legislative scheme.” Mishkin v. Young, 107 P.3d 393, 396 (Colo.2005). “Often the best guide to legislative intent is the context in which the statutory provisions appear and any accompanying statement of legislative policy, such as a legislative declaration.” Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d 437, 443 (Colo.2007).
Unlike the majority, I see ample evidence of legislative intent to apply the PUD Act to public entities such as Hygiene Fire.
*4941. Legislative Purpose
The PUD Act is not just another zoning statute. It allows a county or municipality to create a comprehensive plan for land that is located in a single development district. See § 24-67-103(3), C.R.S.2008. It thus creates “an alternative to traditional zoning.” Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Bainbridge, Inc., 929 P.2d 691, 708 (Colo.1996).
In declaring the purposes of the PUD Act, the general assembly identified aims that could be attained only if public entities were required to comply:
In order that the public health, safety, integrity, and general welfare may be furthered in an era of increasing urbanization and of growing demand for housing of all types and design, the powers set forth in this article are granted to all counties and municipalities for the following purposes: (a) To provide for necessary commercial, recreational, and educational facilities conveniently located to such housing;
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(e) To encourage a more efficient use of land and of public services, or private services in lieu thereof, and to reflect changes in the technology of land development so that resulting economies may enure to the benefit of those who need homes;
(f) To lessen the burden of traffic on streets and highways;
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(i) To provide a procedure which can relate the type, design, and layout of residential, commercial, and industrial development to the particular site, thereby encouraging preservation of the site’s natural characteristics; and
(j) To encourage integrated planning in order to achieve the above purposes.
§ 24-67-102(1), C.R.S.2008.
The general assembly has directed us to “liberally construe!]” the PUD Act to further its purposes. § 24-67-107(6), C.R.S. 2008. In my view, this means that we must give broad effect to the enforcement provision at issue:
Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b.5) of this subsection (3), no substantial modification, removal, or release of the provisions of the plan by the county or municipality shall be permitted except upon a finding by the county or municipality, following a public hearing called and held in accordance with the provisions of section 24-67-104(l)(e) that the modification, removal, or release is consistent with the efficient development and preservation of the, entire planned unit development, does not affect in a substantially adverse manner either the enjoyment of land abutting upon or across a street from the planned unit development or the public interest, and is not granted solely to confer a special benefit upon any person.
§ 24-67-106(3)(b).
But the majority has gone in the other direction. By adopting a narrow construction of section 24 — 67—106(3)(b), it allows public entities to disregard a unified plan of development. Under the majority’s view, counties and municipalities cannot ensure that public recreational and educational facilities will be “conveniently located” near housing. See § 24-67-102(l)(a). Nor can they achieve an “efficient use of land and of public services.” See § 24-67-102(l)(e). Instead, they must tolerate the unilateral decision of any public entity that has condemnation powers. This is the “antithesis of sound land use planning.” City of Fargo, 256 N.W.2d at 697.
2. Additional Enforcement Provision
I recognize that the legislature expressly mentioned governmental entities in one part of the PUD Act but did not mention them in the enforcement provision at issue. Unlike the majority, however, I do not think that this feature is significant.
In section 24-67-106(3)(b.5), C.R.S.2008, the legislature addressed a specific question: What should happen if a county or municipality has set aside land for a particular public purpose, but the public entity that owns the land wants to do something else? In answering this question, the legislature allowed the public entity to act in certain ways, with the permission of the county or municipality:
(b.5) (I) Subject to the requirements of subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b.5), *495in the case of any land located within a planned unit development that has been set aside for a governmental use or purpose as specified in the plan, the plan agreement, or related documents, a governmental entity that holds legal title to the land may, with the approval of the county or municipality in which the land is located, as applicable, and following a public hearing called for and held in accordance with the provisions of section 24-67-104(l)(e), do any of the following, singularly or in combination:
(A) Subdivide all or any portion of the land;
(B) Remove or release all or any portion of the land from any limitations on its use or purpose by the governmental entity as specified in the plan, the plan agreement, or related documents; or
(C) Sell or otherwise dispose of all or any portion of the land.
(II) Any action authorized in accordance with the requirements of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b.5) shall only be undertaken upon a finding by the county or municipality, as applicable, following the public hearing required pursuant to sub-paragraph (I) of this paragraph (b.5) that all or any portion of the land is not reasonably expected to be necessary for a governmental use or purpose or that the governmental use or purpose will be furthered by disposal of the land. Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph (b.5), where action has been undertaken in accordance with the requirements of this paragraph (b.5), the future use of all or any portion of the land shall in all other respects be consistent with the efficient development and preservation of the entire planned unit development and with the plan.
§ 24-67-106(3)(b.5).
I see nothing in subsection (b.5) that would exempt a public entity from complying with section 24 — 67—106(3)(b). Instead, I see a distinct set of standards that was enacted to address a distinct problem. And I do not think that the legislature intended to enact the kind of inconsistent scheme that results from the majority’s interpretation. It makes little sense to subject a public entity to the county’s control when the entity owns land within a planned unit development, and yet exempt the entity from control when the entity does not own the land but will take it through condemnation.
C. Conflicting Statutes
Were it not for the PUD Act, I would agree that Hygiene Fire could overrule the county’s decision under section 30-28-110(1)(c), C.R.S.2008. This is a general review provision that applies whenever a county has adopted a master plan to guide development of unincorporated territory. See § 30-28-106, C.R.S.2008. But the enforcement provision of the PUD Act is more specific: it applies only when, as here, a planned unit development has given a master plan binding force that it would not otherwise have. See §§ 24-67-104(1)(f), 30-28-106(3)(a), C.R.S.2008.
Because the two enforcement provisions are irreconcilable, and because the PUD Act is more specific, I think section 24-67-106(3)(b) controls. See § 2-4-205, C.R.S. 2008; B.G.’s, Inc. v. Gross, 23 P.3d 691, 696 (Colo.2001). I therefore conclude that Hygiene Fire may not overrule the county’s decision under section 30-28-110(l)(e). Cf. City & County of Denver v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 782 P.2d 753, 766 (Colo.1989) (public entity may not rely on section 30-28-110(l)(e) to overrule regulations adopted under the Land Use Act, sections 24-65-101 to -65.1-502, C.R.S.2008).
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order.