Court Opinion

ID: 9374478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-23 07:00:40.252548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:51.208263
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                      MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                       2023 MSPB 6
                             Docket No. SF-0353-15-0241-I-1

                                 Randall S. Desjardin,
                                        Appellant,
                                             v.
                             United States Postal Service,
                                         Agency.
                                    February 22, 2023

           Randall S. Desjardin, Grove, Oklahoma, pro se.

           Michael R. Tita, Esquire, Sandy, Utah, for the agency.

                                         BEFORE

                             Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                               Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt Member
                        Vice Chairman Harris recused herself and
                   did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision that
     granted in part his restoration claim on the merits. The agency has filed a cross
     petition for review. For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the petition for
     review and GRANT the cross petition for review.           We AFFIRM the initial
     decision IN PART, AS MODIFIED by this Opinion and Order, REVERSE it IN
     PART, and VACATE it IN PART.                 More specifically, we AFFIRM AS
     MODIFIED the administrative judge’s finding that the agency arbitrarily and
     capriciously denied the appellant restoration. We REVERSE the administrative
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     judge’s finding that the agency discriminated against the appellant on the basis of
     his disability. We VACATE the administrative judge’s order to pay the appellant
     back pay for 2 hours per day for the time during which he was denied partial
     restoration.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant is employed by the agency as a City Carrier. Initial Appeal
     File (IAF), Tab 6, Subtab A at 2. On December 11, 2014, he submitted a written
     request to the agency’s local injury compensation manager to return to work
     following an absence due to a compensable injury. Id., Subtab B. He included a
     Form CA-17 (Duty Status Report) completed by his doctor that listed his medical
     restrictions. Id. at 2. He submitted updated paperwork over the following week.
     Id. at 4, 6-7, 10, 12.
¶3         On January 7, 2015, the appellant filed this Board appeal challenging the
     agency’s failure to restore him to duty.     IAF, Tab 1.     Around the time the
     appellant filed his Board appeal, the agency informed him by letter that it had
     unsuccessfully searched for available work within his medical restrictions within
     his facility and throughout the local commuting area.      IAF, Tab 6, Subtab E.
     Although the letter was dated January 5, 2015, it does not appear to have been
     sent to the appellant until 8 days later.      Id., Subtab F.    Additionally, the
     appellant’s supervisor conceded in her hearing testimony that in fact a full search
     of the local commuting area had not been conducted when the agency sent the
     letter. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of S.N.).
¶4         The agency searched the local commuting area on January 15, 2015, based
     on restrictions that differed somewhat from those set forth by the appellant’s
     doctor.   That search resulted in a finding of no work available within the
     appellant’s restrictions. IAF, Tab 17 at 31-71. Approximately 2 weeks after he
     filed this appeal, the appellant received and accepted a modified limited-duty
     assignment casing mail for up to 2 hours per day.       Id. at 14.   The appellant
                                                                                            3

     accepted the modified limited-duty assignment “under protest,” asserting that
     there was sufficient work available for him to work a full-time schedule.
     Id. at 13-14. He also argued that he could perform his duties as a union steward.
     Id.
¶5         Effective March 24, 2015, the appellant accepted a new modified
     limited-duty assignment for 8 hours per day.             IAF, Tab 42, Subtab BB.
     In accepting the offer, the appellant protested that the offer did not specifically
     include union steward duties. Id. However, the appellant acknowledged in his
     hearing testimony that he was permitted to perform those duties after accepting
     the March 24, 2015 limited-duty assignment. HCD (testimony of the appellant).
¶6         After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     granting the appellant’s request for restoration in part.               IAF, Tab 61,
     Initial Decision (ID). Specifically, she found that the agency’s initial search for
     available work for the appellant was inadequate because it failed to include the
     entire local commuting area and was based on incorrect medical restrictions. 1
     ID at 7.   She further found that the appellant’s partial restoration to duty in
     January 2015 was so unreasonable as to amount to an arbitrary and capricious
     denial of restoration. ID at 7-8. The administrative judge rejected the appellant’s
     argument that the agency was required to assign him to perform union steward
     duties as part of its restoration obligation. ID at 9-11. However, she found that
     there were at least 2 hours of work available daily within the appellant’s medical
     restrictions from the time he submitted his restoration request in December 2014.
     ID at 11-13. Accordingly, the administrative judge ordered the agency to pay the
     appellant back pay and benefits for 2 hours per day for the period during which

     1
       The administrative judge determined that the agency had searched for work based on a
     restriction of no walking at all, when the appellant’s walking restriction was limited to
     walking carrier routes. ID at 7.
                                                                                      4

     his request for restoration was denied in its entirety and to conduct a proper
     search for available work retroactive to December 12, 2014. ID at 28-29.
¶7        Having found that the Board had jurisdiction over the appellant’s
     restoration appeal, the administrative judge then addressed the appellant’s claims
     of discrimination, retaliation, and harmful procedural error. She found that the
     appellant failed to show that the agency denied him a reasonable accommodation
     for his disability because he failed to identify either an accommodation that
     would have enabled him to perform the essential functions of his position or a
     vacant funded position to which he could have been reassigned. ID at 16-17.
     In addressing the appellant’s disparate treatment disability discrimination claim,
     the administrative judge applied a mixed-motive analysis and found that the
     appellant’s disability was a motivating factor in both the agency’s failure to
     immediately restore him for at least 2 hours per day, as well as its failure to
     restore him to full-time work. ID at 17-19. The administrative judge found that
     the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have denied the
     appellant a full-time limited-duty assignment even in the absence of his
     disability, but she also found that the agency failed to meet that burden regarding
     the failure to immediately provide 2 hours of work. ID at 19-20.
¶8        The administrative judge also found that the appellant failed to prove that
     his sex or prior equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity was a motivating
     factor in the agency’s actions. ID at 20-23. She further found that the appellant
     failed to show that the agency’s actions constituted retaliation for his
     whistleblowing or union activities. ID at 23-27. Finally, the administrative judge
     found that the appellant failed to show any harmful error separate from the merits
     of his restoration claim. ID at 27-28.
¶9        The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has filed a cross
     petition for review challenging the initial decision. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tabs 1, 9.   The appellant argues that the agency’s actions violated the
     applicable collective bargaining agreement, the agency’s Employee and Labor
                                                                                      5

Relations Manual, and the National Labor Relations Act by failing to allow him
to perform union duties. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-12. He also argues that there were
sufficient nonunion     duties available to restore him to            full-time work.
Id. at 13-17.   He argues that his union duties are essential functions of his
position and that the agency’s failure to restore him to perform those duties is
therefore a denial of reasonable accommodation. Id. at 17. The appellant further
argues that he proved his claims of harmful error, sex discrimination, and
retaliation for prior EEO, whistleblowing, and union activities.         Id. at 18-21.
Finally, the appellant asserts that he has evidence that was not previously
available. 2 Id. at 21, 25-165. In its cross petition for review, the agency argues
that the administrative judge erred in finding disability discrimination because it
was not required under the Rehabilitation Act to offer the appellant duties that did
not comprise the essential functions of a position. PFR File, Tab 9 at 10-12.
The appellant has responded in opposition to the agency’s cross petition for
review. 3 PFR File, Tab 11.

2
  We have reviewed the documents the appellant submitted for the first time on review,
and we find that he has not shown that those documents were unavailable prior to the
close of the record below, despite his due diligence. Therefore, the Board will not
consider them. See Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980);
5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). Regarding the sworn statements submitted with the petition for
review, although the statements themselves are dated after the close of the record
below, the appellant has not shown that the information contained in the documents, not
just the documents themselves, were unavailable despite his due diligence.
See Grassell v. Department of Transportation, 40 M.S.P.R. 554, 564 (1989); 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115(d).
3
  We deny the appellant’s objection to the Clerk of the Board’s order granting the
agency an extension of time to file its response to the appellant’s petition for review.
PFR File, Tab 11 at 4.
                                                                                              6

                                              ANALYSIS
      To establish jurisdiction over his restoration claim as a partially recovered
      employee, the appellant must show that the agency failed to meet its minimum
      obligation under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d).
¶10           The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act provides, among other things,
      that Federal employees who suffer compensable injuries enjoy certain rights to be
      restored to their previous or comparable positions.            Kingsley v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 9 (2016); see 5 U.S.C. § 8151(b). Congress has
      explicitly granted the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) the authority to
      issue regulations governing the obligations of employing agencies in this regard.
      5 U.S.C. § 8151(b).        Pursuant to this authority, OPM has issued regulations
      requiring agencies to make certain efforts toward restoring employees with
      compensable injuries to duty, depending on the timing and extent of their
      recovery. 5 C.F.R. § 353.301; see Smith v. U.S. Postal Service, 81 M.S.P.R. 92,
      ¶ 6 (1999).
¶11           The regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d) concerns the restoration rights
      granted to “partially recovered” employees, defined in 5 C.F.R. § 353.102 as
      injured employees who, “though not ready to resume the full range” of their
      regular duties, have “recovered sufficiently to return to part-time or light duty or
      to      another    position    with    less    demanding      physical      requirements.”
      Section 353.301(d) requires agencies to “make every effort to restore in the local
      commuting area, according to the circumstances in each case, an individual who
      has partially recovered from a compensable injury and who is able to return to
      limited duty.”      This means, “[a]t a minimum,” treating individuals who have
      partially recovered from a compensable injury substantially the same as other
      disabled 4 individuals under the Rehabilitation Act, as amended.                 5 C.F.R.
      § 353.301(d). The Board has interpreted the regulation to require that an agency

      4
          The regulation anachronistically refers to “handicapped” individuals.
                                                                                            7

      must at least search within the local commuting area for vacant positions to which
      it can restore a partially recovered employee and to consider her for any such
      vacancies. Sanchez v. U.S. Postal Service, 114 M.S.P.R. 345, ¶ 12 (2010). 5
¶12         Although 5 U.S.C. § 8151 does not itself provide for an appeal right to the
      Board, the regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 353.304 provides Board appeal rights to
      individuals affected by restoration decisions under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301.
      As relevant here, the regulation provides that a partially recovered individual
      “may appeal to [the Board] for a determination of whether the agency is acting
      arbitrarily and capriciously in denying restoration.”          5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c).
      Pursuant to the law and regulations in effect at the time this appeal was filed, to
      establish jurisdiction over a restoration appeal as a partially recovered individual,
      the appellant must prove the following by preponderant evidence:            (1) he was
      absent from his position due to a compensable injury; (2) he recovered
      sufficiently to return to duty on a part-time basis or to return to work in a position
      with less demanding physical requirements than those previously required of him;
      (3) the agency denied his request for restoration; and (4) the denial was arbitrary
      and capricious. 6 Bledsoe v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 659 F.3d 1097, 1104
      (Fed. Cir. 2011); Latham v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 400, ¶ 10 (2012),

      5
        Although the Rehabilitation Act may in some cases require an agency to search
      beyond the local commuting area, we have found that, read as a whole,
      section 353.301(d) requires only that an agency search within the local commuting area
      and that the reference to the Rehabilitation Act means that, in doing so, it must
      undertake substantially the same effort that it would exert under that Act when
      reassigning a disabled employee within the local commuting area.             Sanchez,
      114 M.S.P.R. 345, ¶ 18.
      6
        A preponderance of the evidence is “[t]he degree of relevant evidence that a
      reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find
      that a contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q)
      (formerly codified at 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(2) (2015)).
                                                                                            8

      overruled on other grounds by Cronin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13,
      ¶¶ 20-21. 7
¶13         The jurisdictional standard established by 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c) “reflects
      the limited substantive right enjoyed by partially recovered employees.”
      Bledsoe, 659 F.3d at 1103.        Whereas employees who fully recover from a
      compensable injury within a year have an “unconditional right to restoration
      under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(a) and 5 U.S.C. § 8151(b)(1),” a partially recovered
      employee does not have such an unconditional right. Bledsoe, 659 F.3d at 1103.
      Rather, the agency only is obliged to “make every effort to restore” a partially
      recovered employee “in the local commuting area” and “according to the
      circumstances in each case.” Id.; 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d). The Board appeal right
      under 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c) is likewise conditional:             “[b]ecause partially
      recovered employees do not have an unconditional right to restoration, they do
      not have the right to appeal every denial of restoration.”         Bledsoe, 659 F.3d
      at 1103 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the arbitrary and capricious standard
      of 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c) “limits jurisdiction to appeals where the substantive
      rights of partially recovered [appellants] under section 353.301(d) are actually
      alleged to have been violated.”       Id.; cf. Palmer v. Merit Systems Protection
      Board, 550 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that a partially recovered
      employee alleging improper restoration “may appeal only on the limited grounds
      enumerated in [section 353.304(c)]”). In other words, for purposes of the fourth
      jurisdictional element, a denial of restoration is “rendered arbitrary and

      7
        After Bledsoe and Latham were issued, the Board changed its regulations and adopted
      a “nonfrivolous allegation” standard for restoration appeals, rather than the
      “preponderant evidence” standard set forth in those cases. Kingsley, 123 M.S.P.R. 365,
      ¶ 10. The new standard applies only in cases filed on or after March 30, 2015, Practices
      and Procedures, 80 Fed. Reg. 4,489, 4,496 (Jan. 28, 2015) (codified in pertinent part
      at 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57), and is therefore inapplicable to this appeal.
                                                                                        9

      capricious by [an agency’s] failure to perform its obligations under 5 C.F.R.
      § 353.301(d).” Bledsoe, 659 F.3d at 1104.
¶14           Under the law in effect at the time this appeal was filed, an appellant who
      established these jurisdictional elements automatically prevailed on the merits.
      Latham, 117 M.S.P.R. 400, ¶ 10 n.9. In finding that the appellant established
      jurisdiction over, and thus the merits of, his restoration claim, the administrative
      judge applied the standard set forth in Latham, in which the Board held that when
      an agency voluntarily assumes restoration obligations beyond the “minimum”
      requirements of 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d), the agency’s failure to comply with those
      agency-specific requirements is arbitrary and capricious for purposes of
      establishing Board jurisdiction. ID at 5-6; Latham, 117 M.S.P.R. 400, ¶¶ 13-14.
      As the Board in Latham recognized, the U.S. Postal Service’s rules obligate it to
      offer modified assignments when the work is available regardless of whether the
      duties constitute those of an established position. See Latham, 117 M.S.P.R. 400,
      ¶ 41.     Thus, under existing precedent, the administrative judge properly
      considered whether the agency properly searched for and provided available
      duties to the appellant. ID at 7-8.
¶15           However, after the initial decision in this appeal was issued, the Board
      overruled Latham in Cronin. The Board in Cronin held that, although agencies
      may undertake restoration efforts beyond the minimum effort required by OPM
      under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d), an agency’s failure to comply with self-imposed
      obligations cannot itself constitute a violation of 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d) such that
      a resulting denial of restoration would be rendered arbitrary and capricious for
      purposes of establishing Board jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c).
      Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20. Rather, as explained in Cronin, the issue before
      the Board is limited to whether the agency failed to comply with the minimum
      requirement of 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d), i.e., to search within the local commuting
      area for vacant positions to which it can restore a partially recovered employee
                                                                                      10

      and to consider him for any such vacancies. See Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20
      (citing Sanchez, 114 M.S.P.R. 345, ¶ 12).
¶16        The Board in Cronin further held that, contrary to its prior suggestion in
      Latham, claims of prohibited discrimination or reprisal cannot serve as an
      “alternative means” of showing that a denial of restoration was arbitrary and
      capricious.   Id., ¶ 21.   The Board in Cronin held that, although an agency’s
      failure to comply with section 353.301(d) may well be the result of prohibited
      discrimination or reprisal for protected activity, whether that is so is immaterial
      to the question of whether a denial of restoration is arbitrary and capricious for
      purposes of section 353.304(c). Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 21.

      The agency violated its restoration obligation by failing to search throughout the
      local commuting area for vacant positions to which it could reassign the
      appellant, and the proper remedy is for the agency to conduct such a search
      retroactively.
¶17        Under Cronin, the Board’s sole jurisdictional inquiry in an appeal alleging
      an arbitrary and capricious denial of restoration to a partially recovered employee
      is whether the agency complied with its obligation under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d) to
      search within the local commuting area for vacant positions to which it can
      restore the employee and to consider him for any such vacancies. For restoration
      rights purposes, the local commuting area is the geographic area in which an
      individual lives and can reasonably be expected to travel back and forth daily to
      his usual duty station. Hicks v. U.S. Postal Service, 83 M.S.P.R. 599, ¶ 9 (1999).
      It includes any population center, or two or more neighboring ones, and the
      surrounding localities. Sapp v. U.S. Postal Service, 73 M.S.P.R. 189, 193 (1997).
      The question of what constitutes a local commuting area is one of fact.
      Sanchez, 114 M.S.P.R. 345, ¶ 13. The extent of a commuting area is ordinarily
      determined by factors such as common practice, the availability and cost of
      public transportation or the convenience and adequacy of highways, and the travel
      time required to go to and from work. Id.
                                                                                          11

¶18         Here, the administrative judge found that the agency’s initial search for
      available work in December 2014 was limited to the appellant’s facility and
      therefore did not cover the entire local commuting area. ID at 7. Under Cronin,
      the agency’s efforts to find work that did not constitute the essential functions of
      an established position cannot form the basis of a restoration claim before the
      Board. 8 We therefore vacate the administrative judge’s findings that the agency’s
      actions in connection with its search for modified duties constituted an arbitrary
      and capricious denial of restoration within the Board’s jurisdiction. 9 However, in
      light of both the agency’s failure to search beyond a single facility when the
      appellant sought to return to work, as well as its use of incorrect restrictions when
      searching for work, we find that the agency violated its obligation under 5 C.F.R.
      § 353.301(d) to search the local commuting area for vacant positions to which it
      could restore the appellant. See Scott v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 375,
      ¶ 13 (2012) (finding an arbitrary and capricious denial of restoration when the
      agency based its search for work on incorrect restrictions); Urena v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 113 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 13 (2009) (finding a nonfrivolous allegation of an
      arbitrary and capricious denial of restoration when the agency’s search for
      available work was limited to a single facility). We therefore find that the agency
      violated the appellant’s restoration rights under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d) but only to
      the extent it failed to conduct a proper search for vacant positions.

      8
        Consistent with general principles of law, we give Cronin retroactive effect in this
      case, which was pending at the time Cronin was decided. Heartland By-Products, Inc.
      v. United States, 568 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
      9
        Although we find the agency’s search in this case was inadequate, we do not mean to
      suggest that an agency violates an employee’s restoration rights under 5 C.F.R.
      § 353.301(d) by searching for available duties that do not constitute the essential
      functions of an established position. We assume that a properly conducted search for
      available duties within an employee’s restrictions also would encompass available
      positions with duties that fell within those restrictions. The search in this case was
      inadequate because the agency failed to search the entire local commuting area and used
      incorrect restrictions.
                                                                                           12

¶19         When, as in this case, the denial of restoration was arbitrary and capricious
      for lack of a proper job search, the Board has found that the proper remedy is for
      the agency to conduct an appropriate search of the local commuting area
      retroactive to the date of the appellant’s request for restoration, and to consider
      him for any suitable vacancies. Tram v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 388,
      ¶ 10 (2012). The remedy of a retroactive job search will be sufficient to correct
      the wrongful action and substitute it with a correct one based on an appropriate
      search. Id. However, it will not put the appellant in a better position than the one
      he was in before the wrongful action because it leaves open the possibility that
      the agency still might be unable to find a vacant position. Id. The appellant may
      be entitled to back pay only if the agency’s retroactive search uncovers a position
      to which it could have restored him. 10 Id. We therefore vacate the administrative
      judge’s order requiring the agency to pay the appellant back pay for the period
      during which she determined he was entitled to partial restoration.

      The Board will continue to adjudicate discrimination and retaliation claims in
      connection with denials of restoration over which it has jurisdiction.
¶20         The Board in Cronin declined to address how it should address claims of
      discrimination and retaliation in restoration appeals within its jurisdiction.
      Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 21 n.12.            In Latham, the Board stated that, in
      restoration appeals, claims of discrimination and reprisal should be understood as
      “independent    claims”    rather   than   as   “affirmative   defenses.”      Latham,
      117 M.S.P.R. 400, ¶ 58 n.27.        The Board indicated that the concept of an
      “affirmative defense” fits better in matters such as adverse action appeals when
      the agency bears the burden of proof on the merits. 11 Id.

      10
         We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s union duties are not
      themselves a position to which he could have been reassigned. ID at 9-11.
      11
        The Board in Latham also noted the possibility that discrimination and reprisal claims
      could serve as alternative ways for an appellant to show that the denial of restoration
      was arbitrary and capricious. Latham, 117 M.S.P.R. 400, ¶ 58 n.27. However, as we
                                                                                       13

¶21        Despite the Board’s criticism in Latham of the use of the term “affirmative
      defense” to describe the adjudication of discrimination and retaliation claims in
      restoration appeals, the Board has continued to adjudicate those claims in the
      same manner as it did before Latham. See, e.g., Davis v. U.S. Postal Service,
      120 M.S.P.R. 122, ¶¶ 15-18 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Cronin,
      2022 MSPB 13.      We see no reason to alter that approach.        Under 5 U.S.C.
      § 7702(a)(1), if an employee “has been affected by an action which [he] may
      appeal” to the Board and “alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination
      prohibited by” certain enumerated anti-discrimination statutes, the Board is
      required to “decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action in
      accordance with the Board’s appellate procedures.” Thus, once the appellant has
      established that the challenged action is within the Board’s jurisdiction, the Board
      is required by statute to adjudicate both the action itself and any claim that the
      action was based      on one of      the enumerated categories of        prohibited
      discrimination.

      Findings that the agency committed disability discrimination against injured
      employees in the past do not control the outcome of the disability discrimination
      issue in this appeal.
¶22        As we noted in Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 22 n.13, the Equal Employment
      Opportunity Commission (EEOC) held in a class action appeal that the agency
      had discriminated against disabled employees who were injured on duty (IOD)
      and assessed under the agency’s National Reassessment Program (NRP) between
      May 2006 and July 2011. See Velva B. v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
      Nos. 0720160006 & 0720160007, 2017 WL 4466898 (Sept. 25, 2017), request for
      reconsideration    denied,     Request     Nos.    0520180094       & 0520180095,
      2018 WL 1392289 (Mar. 9, 2018). Specifically, the EEOC found that “officials

      explained previously, that aspect of Latham is no longer good law under Cronin.
      Supra ¶ 16.
                                                                                      14

      involved in the development and deployment of the NRP were motivated by
      unlawful considerations of the class members’ disabilities when they subjected
      IOD employees to NRP assessments and took follow-up actions to those
      assessments under the auspices of the NRP.” Id. at *14-*21. Those “follow-up”
      actions included the withdrawal of previously granted modified work assignments
      from IOD employees, id. at *26, the creation of a hostile work environment,
      id. at *29, subjecting employees to unlawful disability-related medical inquiries,
      id. at *33, and disclosing confidential medical information, id. at *38.
¶23        The Board generally defers to the EEOC on issues of substantive
      discrimination law unless the EEOC’s decision rests on civil service law for its
      support or is so unreasonable that it amounts to a violation of civil service law.
      Alvara v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 627, ¶ 8 (2011).
      However, we find that the EEOC’s decision in Velva B. does not control the
      outcome of the disability discrimination issue in this appeal or any other
      restoration appeal within the Board’s jurisdiction.
¶24        First, the EEOC made clear that the matters before it in the class action
      were not mixed cases, i.e., they did not involve matters appealable to the Board.
      Velva B., 2018 WL 1392289, at *3; see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a). Any restoration
      appeal within the Board’s jurisdiction in which disability discrimination is
      claimed is, by definition, a mixed-case appeal, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a)(2), and is
      therefore distinct from the matters addressed by the EEOC in Velva B.
¶25        Additionally, the Board’s jurisdiction over discrimination claims in mixed
      cases is limited to determining whether discrimination was “a basis for the
      action” within its jurisdiction.     See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1).        The Board’s
      jurisdiction to adjudicate a discrimination claim as to one personnel action does
      not include jurisdiction over all other actions the appellant alleges to be
      discriminatory. See Lethridge v. U.S. Postal Service, 99 M.S.P.R. 675, ¶¶ 8-13
      (2005) (rejecting the EEOC’s suggestion that the Board could adjudicate
      discrimination claims relating to otherwise nonappealable actions if they are
                                                                                          15

      “inextricably intertwined” with or “cannot sensibly be bifurcated” from otherwise
      appealable actions). Thus, in the case of an arbitrary and capricious denial of
      restoration to a partially recovered employee, the Board can consider only
      whether that particular denial of restoration was discriminatory. The Board can
      consider agency actions other than the appealable action only to the extent those
      other actions are relevant to whether the appealable action itself was
      discriminatory. See Deas v. Department of Transportation, 108 M.S.P.R. 637,
      ¶ 20 (2008) (finding in a suspension appeal that, while the Board could not
      adjudicate a claim that the proposal to suspend was discriminatory, it could
      consider whether any discrimination in the proposal could be imputed to the
      subsequent suspension), overruled on other grounds by Abbott v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶ 10 (2014). Here, the matter over which the Board
      has jurisdiction is the agency’s failure to restore the appellant due to its failure to
      properly search the local commuting area for vacant positions to which it could
      have reassigned him. In adjudicating the appellant’s discrimination claims, the
      Board therefore is limited to consideration of that action. Discrimination claims
      relating to other agency actions, including any actions relating to limited-duty
      assignments that do not constitute the essential functions of an established
      position, are matters for the EEOC, rather than the Board.
¶26         Finally, the EEOC’s findings of disability discrimination in Velva B.
      involve the development and implementation of the NRP, a program that ended in
      2011. Velva B., 2017 WL 4466898, at *6. The events at issue in this appeal took
      place more than 3 years after the NRP ended, and there is no indication that the
      actions at issue here were affected by the NRP. Thus, the EEOC’s findings as to
      the NRP’s development and implementation do not affect our analysis of the
      disability discrimination claim in this case.

      The appellant did not prove his disability discrimination claims.
¶27         The appellant alleged disability discrimination under both reasonable
      accommodation and disparate treatment theories. The Board adjudicates claims
                                                                                           16

      of disability discrimination raised in connection with an otherwise appealable
      action under the substantive standards of section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act.
      Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 35.
      The Rehabilitation Act has incorporated the standards of the Americans with
      Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act
      Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). Id. Therefore, we apply those standards
      here to determine if there has been a Rehabilitation Act violation.                  Id.
      In particular, the ADAAA provides that it is illegal for an employer to
      “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of a disability.”
      42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).      The Board recently clarified that only an otherwise
      qualified individual with a disability is entitled to relief, whether the individual
      alleges disability discrimination based on a disparate treatment or reasonable
      accommodation theory. Haas v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB
      36, ¶¶ 28-29. 12
¶28         A qualified individual with a disability is one who can “perform the
      essential functions of the . . . position that such individual holds or desires” with
      or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Thus, an appellant
      can establish that he is a qualified individual with a disability by showing that he
      can, with or without accommodation, perform either the essential functions of his
      position of record or those of a vacant funded position to which he could be
      assigned.   See Clemens v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 11
      (2014).

      12
         The administrative judge informed the appellant that he was required to show that he
      was a qualified individual with a disability to be entitled to protection under the
      Rehabilitation Act. IAF, Tab 51 at 5. Thus, although we are applying the Board’s
      decisions in Pridgen and Haas, which were issued after the initial decision in this case
      and clarified the relevant legal standard, the appellant had adequate notice of that
      standard.
                                                                                             17

¶29         The appellant does not allege that he could perform the essential functions
      of his City Carrier position with or without accommodation, and the medical
      restrictions submitted by his doctor precluded “route walking. . . for the delivery
      of mail.” IAF, Tab 6, Subtab B at 7. We therefore find that the appellant did not
      establish that he was qualified based on his ability to perform the essential
      functions of the position he held.       Thus, he would need to identify a vacant
      funded position to which he could have been reassigned in order to establish that
      he is a qualified individual with a disability.         In addressing the appellant’s
      reasonable accommodation claim, the administrative judge found that the
      appellant failed to meet his burden to show that there was any vacant position he
      could perform within his medical restrictions, even with a reasonable
      accommodation. ID at 16-17. We agree with the administrative judge’s finding
      because the record does not show any existing vacant position to which the
      appellant could have been reassigned. 13 We therefore find that the appellant’s
      disability discrimination claims under both disparate treatment and reasonable
      accommodation theories fail because he has not established that he is a qualified
      individual with a disability.

      The appellant failed to prove his affirmative defenses of discrimination based on
      his sex or retaliation for prior EEO activity.
¶30         As to the appellant’s claims of sex discrimination and retaliation for prior
      EEO activity, the administrative judge applied the standard set forth by the Board
      in Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612 (2015). Applying that

      13
        Our finding that the agency failed to conduct a proper search for available positions
      within the local commuting area, supra ¶ 18, does not relieve the appellant of his
      burden to establish the existence of a position to which he could have been reassigned
      in order to establish that he is a qualified individual with a disability. The agency
      argued before the administrative judge that the appellant had not identified a position he
      could perform within his medical restrictions. IAF, Tab 17 at 10. The appellant
      acknowledged that argument and indicated that he had requested information in
      discovery regarding the availability of positions he could perform. IAF, Tab 18 at 5.
                                                                                          18

      standard, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove by
      preponderant evidence that either his sex or prior EEO activity was a motivating
      factor in the agency’s actions. ID at 20-23.
¶31         Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, requires that actions
      “shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
      national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Since the initial decision was issued,
      the Board has clarified that an appellant who proves that discrimination under
      Title VII was a motivating factor in the contested personnel action may be
      entitled to injunctive or other “forward-looking” relief, but to obtain the full
      measure of relief, including status quo ante relief, compensatory damages, or
      other forms of relief related to the end result of an employment decision, the
      appellant must show that discrimination was a “but-for” cause of the action.
      Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22. “But-for” causation is a higher burden than
      “motivating factor” causation.      Id., ¶¶ 21 n.4, 22, 48.     Consistent with the
      administrative judge’s findings, we conclude that the appellant has not shown that
      his sex was a motivating factor in the agency’s failure to properly search the local
      commuting area. 14    Because the appellant did not show that his sex was a
      motivating factor in the agency’s failure to restore him, he necessarily failed to
      meet the more stringent “but-for” standard. Id. Accordingly, he is not entitled to
      any relief based on his allegations of sex discrimination.
¶32         Concerning the appellant’s retaliation claims, the record reflects that his
      prior EEO activity was based on both Title VII and the ADA. IAF, Tab 20 at 20,
      Tab 26 at 4, 28. Claims of retaliation for opposing discrimination in violation of

      14
         Administrative judges are not required to separate “direct” from “indirect” evidence
      and to proceed as if such evidence were subject to different legal standards, or to
      require appellants to demonstrate a “convincing mosaic” of discrimination or
      retaliation. Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 24. Although the administrative judge in this
      case discussed different types of evidence, we find no material error and the initial
      decision reflects that the administrative judge properly considered the record as a
      whole. ID at 20-23.
                                                                                           19

      Title VII are analyzed under the same framework used for Title VII
      discrimination claims, as set forth above. Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 30. We see
      no error in the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant failed to prove
      that Title VII retaliation was a motivating factor in the agency’s actions. 15
¶33           To prevail in a claim of retaliation for engaging in activity protected by the
      ADA, as amended by the ADAAA, including filing EEO complaints based on
      disability discrimination, the appellant must show that retaliation was a “but-for”
      cause     of   the   agency’s   action.    Pridgen,   2022    MSPB      31,   ¶¶ 44-47.
      The administrative judge, applying the now-obsolete mixed-motive analysis,
      found that the appellant failed to show that retaliation was a motivating factor in
      the agency’s denial of his restoration rights.          ID at 21-22; see Pridgen,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 47 (overruling Southerland v. Department of Defense,
      119 M.S.P.R. 566 (2013), to the extent it applied a mixed-motive standard to
      ADA retaliation claims). Because the appellant did not show that his protected
      activity was a motivating factor in the agency’s failure to restore him, he
      necessarily failed to meet the more stringent “but-for” standard that applies to his
      retaliation claims. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 21 n.4, 22, 48. Thus, the
      appellant is not entitled to relief for his Title VII or ADA-based retaliation
      claims.

      The appellant’s claims of harmful procedural error and retaliation for
      whistleblowing and union activities are moot.
¶34           Having determined that the appellant is entitled to corrective action on the
      merits of his restoration claim, we find that we need not address some of the
      appellant’s additional claims.     First, because the sole remedy for a finding of

      15
        Because we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to show
      that any prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the agency’s action, we
      need not resolve the issue of whether the appellant proved that sex discrimination or
      retaliation for engaging in EEO activity protected by Title VII was a “but-for” cause of
      the agency’s decision. Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 30-33.
                                                                                       20

      harmful procedural error is reversal of the agency action, see 5 U.S.C.
      § 7701(c)(2)(A), the appellant already is entitled to all the relief he would obtain
      if he were to prevail on that claim. Similarly, because the appellant would not be
      entitled to damages even if he were to prevail on his claims of retaliation for
      whistleblowing and union activities, those claims are also moot. See Hess v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 183, ¶ 8 (2016) (dismissing as moot a Postal Service
      employee’s claim of whistleblower reprisal because such employees are not
      entitled to attorney fees or damages for whistleblower reprisal); Farquhar v.
      Department of the Air Force, 82 M.S.P.R. 454, 459, ¶ 11 (1999) (holding that
      awards of compensatory damages are not available for claims of reprisal for
      having filed a grievance, or any other kind of reprisal that does not implicate
      Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 16

                                             ORDER
¶35         We ORDER the agency to conduct a proper job search retroactive to
      December 11, 2014, and to consider the appellant for any suitable positions
      available during that time period consistent with its restoration obligations under
      5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d). The agency must complete this action no later than
      30 days after the date of this decision.
¶36         In the event the agency’s restorative job search uncovers an available
      position to which it could have restored the appellant, we ORDER the agency to
      pay the appellant the correct amount of back pay, interest on back pay, and other
      benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or Postal Service regulations, no later than
      60 calendar days after the date of this decision. We ORDER the appellant to
      cooperate in good faith in the agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back
      pay, interest, and benefits due, and to provide all necessary information the

      16
        The appellant’s discrimination and EEO reprisal claims are not moot because the
      Board is authorized to award compensatory damages in connection with those claims.
      Hess v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶¶ 1, 20 (2016).
                                                                                        21

      agency requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about
      the amount of back pay, interest due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the
      agency to pay the appellant the undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days
      after the date of this decision.
¶37         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶38         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision in this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶39         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
      Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
      made within the 60-day period set forth above.
¶40         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).
                                                                                     22

                       NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT
                   REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                       ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at Title 5 of
the United States Code (U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), or 1221(g). The regulations
may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1202.202, and 1201.203. If you believe
you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees and costs
WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.                              You
must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued the
initial decision on your appeal.

                        NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 17
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

17
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        23

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                24

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     25

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 18 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:

18
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              26

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
   describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
            collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
   Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the
   type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave
   to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum
Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
       a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
       b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
       c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.