Court Opinion

ID: 9605503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:38:11.631657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:38.381437
License: Public Domain

*360Judge Hoeton
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority that this indigent and incarcerated defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily chose to represent himself in the defense of four serious charges which resulted in his imprisonment for a minimum term in excess of 13 years.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const, amend. VI. This right to the assistance of counsel is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). Our North Carolina Constitution also provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has the right ... to have counsel for defense . . . .” N.C. Const, art. I, § 23.
Although a defendant may waive his right to counsel and represent himself, that waiver “must be knowing and voluntary, and the' record must show that the defendant was literate and competent, that he understood the consequences of his waiver, and that, in waiving his right, he was voluntarily exercising his own free will.” State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 354, 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980).
The crucial issue in this case is whether this defendant understandingly and voluntarily waived his right to the assistance of counsel at trial based on a waiver of his right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel at his arraignment six weeks prior to his trial. I do not believe the record demonstrates a constitutionally valid waiver by defendant. I therefore believe that he is entitled to a new trial.
The public defender was appointed counsel for defendant on 22 November 1995 based on an affidavit of indigency. The affidavit showed that defendant’s monthly income was a $250 disability payment. At defendant’s arraignment on 11 September 1996, however, defendant moved that his court-appointed counsel be relieved of further duties. The trial court entered an order on 11 September 1996 reciting that defendant wished to represent himself or obtain privately retained counsel. The trial court advised defendant that he was making a “serious mistake” but found as a fact that “the Defendant understands the nature of his cases, that his motion is well taken and the Court concludes as a matter of law that the relief sought by the Defendant ought to be allowed.” The transcript of the arraignment and motions hearing is not before us; therefore, we are not advised of *361statements made by defendant which provided a basis for the trial court’s conclusions concerning the informed nature of defendant’s decision.
On that same date, defendant signed a form entitled “Waiver of Counsel.” This form gave defendant a choice of two alternative waivers, and reads in part:
I freely, voluntarily and knowingly declare that:
(check only one)
1. [X] I waive my right to assigned counsel and that I, hereby, expressly waive that right.
2. [ ] I waive my right to all assistance of counsel which includes my right to assigned counsel and my right to the assistance of counsel. In all respects, I desire to appear in my own behalf, which I understand I have the right to do.
The trial court then signed the following “Certificate of Judge” which appeared on the same “Waiver of Counsel” form:
I certify that the above named person has been fully informed in open court of the charges against him, the nature of and the statutory punishment for each charge, and the nature of the proceeding against him and his right to have counsel assigned by the court and his right to have the assistance of counsel to represent him in this action; that he comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of punishments; that he understands and appreciates the consequences of his decision and that he has voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently elected in open court to be tried in this action:
(check only one)
1. [X] without the assignment of counsel.
2. [ ] without the assistance of counsel, which includes the right to assigned counsel and the right to assistance of counsel.
It is also significant that the “Waiver of Counsel” form includes the following note in bold type at the bottom:
Note: For a waiver of assigned counsel only, both blocks numbered “1” must be checked. For a waiver of all assistance of counsel, both blocks numbered “2” must be checked.
*362It is clear from the “Waiver of Counsel” form that defendant did not waive his right to be represented by counsel, but only waived the right to court-appointed counsel.
After his arraignment, defendant remained continuously in custody until 23 October 1996, when he was brought to the courtroom and advised that his trial was about to begin. The following colloquy then occurred between defendant, the trial court and the district attorney:
The Court: Are you ready to proceed?
Defendant Love: No, sir, I am not.
M: * * *
Defendant Love: I have some witnesses I have to subpoena for this case. I have never been charged with drugs in my life whatsoever, never been convicted of any felony whatsoever in my life. All of this stuff here is just a bunch of lies. So I want to go forward with a jury. I want to subpoena witnesses. I have not been notified that this was going to be a trial date. My trial date was set for the 23rd of last month, and the District Attorney’s office — I do not have a lawyer to represent me. Also Judge, I would like to—
The Court: Wait a minute. Let’s address one thing at a time. Is it on the calendar this week?
Mr. Todd: It is, Your Honor.
The Court: Was he notified it was on the calendar this week?
Defendant Love: No, sir.
[There was no contrary answer from the district attorney or clerk.]
The Court: You tell me who you want to subpoena and we will see what we can do about it.
Defendant Love: Yes I do, Your Honor.
* * * *
Ti-ie Court: Mr. Love, we are going to try your cases, and the motion to consolidate for joinder of the cases is allowed. We are *363going to start the jury selection in a few minutes. And we will just proceed accordingly. (Emphasis added).
There was no inquiry made by the trial court regarding defendant’s right to be represented by counsel, nor did the trial court exercise its discretion to appoint standby counsel for defendant. The State contends that defendant “clearly” wanted to represent himself as shown by his statement to the jurors “[s]o with me, yeah, I am representing myself. Why am I representing myself? Because I am not guilty of anything.” That statement was made, however, in the context of the trial court having denied what amounted to a motion to continue the case even though defendant had asked to subpoena witnesses he thought important to his defense. Defendant also advised the trial court that he was not represented by counsel at the same time that he stated that he was not ready to proceed. Whether defendant intended to revoke his waiver of appointed counsel cannot be determined from the record, because the trial court interrupted defendant’s statement and did not subsequently make any inquiry into whether defendant had decided to represent himself.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 provides that:
A defendant may be permitted at his election to proceed in the trial of his case without the assistance of counsel only after the trial court makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant:
(1) Has been clearly advised of his right to the assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of counsel when he is so entitled;
(2) Understands and appreciates the consequences of this decision; and
(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 (1997) (emphasis added).
In this case defendant’s earlier waiver of assigned counsel does not amount to a waiver by defendant to appear without the assistance of any counsel. “Statements of a desire not to be represented by court-appointed counsel do not amount to expressions of an intention to represent oneself.” State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 339, 279 S.E.2d 788, 800 (1981). Consequently, the trial court was required to make *364some inquiry into defendant’s intention with regards to having counsel at his trial. That is particularly true because defendant told the trial court that he did not have a lawyer to represent him; he had not had the opportunity to subpoena witnesses; he was not advised of the date of his trial; the trial court did not even consider appointing standby counsel for defendant pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1243 (1997); and defendant continued to maintain his innocence.
In State v. Williams, 65 N.C. App. 498, 309 S.E.2d 721 (1983), this Court held that a purported waiver of court-appointed counsel by defendant Williams was not constitutionally valid. When Williams was tried, no inquiry was made as to his pro se appearance because he had initially informed the trial court that he wanted to hire his own lawyer. In granting him a new trial, this Court held the following:
The waiver in the present case is deficient in several respects. First, no determination was made as to whether defendant was represented by counsel. Second, even though defendant clearly was not represented, he was not informed of his right to counsel. Third, defendant was never asked and the court never determined whether he was able to afford the private counsel that he indicated that he “would like to hire.” Lacking in these particulars and in light of defendant’s answers to Judge Morgan that he wanted a lawyer and did not wish to waive the right, defendant’s waiver is not constitutionally valid.
Id. at 506, 309 S.E.2d at 725.
A waiver of such a hallowed fundamental constitutional right should not be lightly inferred from fragments of a long and sometimes ambiguous record. As Justice Sutherland eloquently observed in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932):
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have [sic] a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel *365at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 68-69, 77 L. Ed. at 170 (1932).
Here, an incarcerated lay defendant was required to proceed to trial without any meaningful notice, without counsel and without witnesses. This record does not reveal a constitutionally valid waiver of counsel, and defendant is entitled to a new trial. Furthermore, even if such a valid waiver could be found from this record, I believe there was also plain error in requiring defendant to proceed to trial without notice and an opportunity to prepare his cases, and therefore he is also entitled to a new trial on that alternate basis.