Court Opinion

ID: 9483257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:15:31.543488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:31.185072
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
INTRODUCTION
Eddie Galindo appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Galindo seeks relief from his California state court conviction for second degree murder. Galindo contends that he was deprived of a fair trial because of the state court’s exclusion of exculpatory hearsay evidence which he contends was admissible as a dying declaration of the victim. He also contends his fundamental right to testify in his own behalf was denied when the trial court determined that he could be impeached with a prior manslaughter conviction. After that ruling, he did not testify. We affirm.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Galindo was found guilty of second degree murder in connection with the death of his wife. Galindo and his wife were arguing. Galindo went to a bedroom closet, removed a sawed-off shotgun, loaded it, and then poked it into his wife’s stomach.1 The gun fired; Galindo claims he did not pull the trigger and that the gun went off accidentally. He later admitted to police that he knew the gun malfunctioned. His claim throughout his state appeals and this proceeding is that he did not know the gun could malfunction in the way that it did when his wife was shot.
Galindo claims two errors. The first is that the state court excluded the statements of his wife to a police officer after the shooting. When asked who shot her, Mrs. Galindo replied, “My husband.” The officer then asked, “Was it an accident?” Mrs. Galindo answered, “Yes.” She did not answer any further questions. She died several hours later. The trial court found that Mrs. Galindo’s statements were not made under a sense of immediately impending death, and thus did not fall under the “dying declaration” exception to the hearsay rule. It excluded the statement.
The second claim of error surrounds the trial court’s ruling that if Galindo chose to testify, he could be impeached by a fifteen year old prior felony conviction for manslaughter. The state court of appeals reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to hold a hearing under People v. Collins, 42 Cal.3d 378, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173 (1986).
The trial court held a Collins hearing in camera to determine what Galindo would have testified about. The court ruled that though the manslaughter conviction was admissible, it would have exercised its discretion to exclude the prior felony conviction for impeachment purposes. After reviewing the trial evidence and Galindo’s in camera testimony, the trial court concluded that there was no reasonable probability of a different result if the jury had heard Galindo’s testimony. The state court of appeal affirmed.
After exhausting his state court remedies, Galindo brought a petition for writ of *1429habeas corpus in the district court. The district court denied the petition. Galindo filed a timely appeal.2
DISCUSSION
A. The “dying declaration”
The state may not exclude evidence when to do so would deprive the defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838, 105 S.Ct. 137, 83 L.Ed.2d 77 (1984). Applying the balancing test set out in Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 974, 112 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1991), we conclude that the exclusion of Mrs. Galindo’s statement does not reach constitutional proportions.
The state’s compelling interest in the application of the hearsay rule can be outweighed only by the most urgent considerations. Perry, 713 F.2d at 1453. The trial court found that Mrs. Galindo was not under an immediate sense of impending death. The state court’s resolution of this factual question is presumptively correct under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1307, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982), and the petitioner points to nothing in the record that requires disregard of the state court’s finding. Nor has the petitioner demonstrated that Mrs. Galindo’s statement was otherwise reliable. Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530. Therefore the petitioner has not shown that his interest in the admission of Mrs. Galin-do’s statement outweighs the state’s interest in its exclusion under the hearsay rule.
B. The erroneous impeachment ruling
The government contends that Galindo cannot raise the claim that the trial court erroneously ruled that he could be impeached with his prior felony. The government is correct. In Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43, 105 S.Ct. 460, 464, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), the Supreme Court held that in order to preserve an objection to a trial court’s ruling that a prior felony conviction could be admitted, a defendant must actually testify at trial. Galindo did not do so, and thus waived any federal constitutional claim he might otherwise have had.
We, of course, understand that Luce was laid down as a federal rule of procedure, but it surely follows that its requirements do not violate the United States Constitution. As the Court indicated, “a federal court’s preliminary ruling on a question not reaching constitutional dimensions — such as a decision under Rule 609(a) — is [not] reviewable on appeal.” 469 U.S. at 42-43, 105 S.Ct. at 464. Thus, at the time of Galindo’s conviction, the California courts simply gave additional procedural protections to defendants. Those courts have explained the limits of the added protections, limits which cannot themselves violate the United States Constitution. The Constitution was complied with here.3
AFFIRMED.

. Galindo maintains that he was only trying to scare his wife, and that he never had any intention of killing her.

. Galindo received an extension of time to file his notice of appeal until September 1, 1990, and thus his appeal is not untimely as contended by Ylst.

. Essentially, Judge Reinhardt believes that the California courts erred, but we do not sit to correct state court errors regarding state law. We sit to assure compliance with the United States Constitution. See Estelle v. McGuire, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 475, 481-82, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1992); Guzman v. Morris, 644 F.2d 1295, 1297-98 (9th Cir.1981).