Court Opinion

ID: 9889412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 14:07:08.99121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:11.777554
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-47

              IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MARY M. FINN.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Two formal petitions to probate two different wills

 (executed by the decedent approximately eight years apart) were

 filed in the Probate and Family Court.           The first petition,

 which sought to probate the decedent's will executed in 2010

 (2010 will), was filed by Robert Keough, who was appointed

 personal representative of the estate.           Less than one year

 later, the second petition was filed by Gregory White, who

 sought to (1) probate the decedent's will executed shortly

 before her death in 2018 (2018 will), (2) be appointed personal

 representative, and (3) dismiss and set aside all action on

 Keough's earlier petition.        After the parties submitted this

 case "on the record" by agreement, 1 the judge issued decrees 2

 1 We understand this to be the equivalent of a "case stated."
 Ware v. Hardwick, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 326 (2006).
 2 The judge issued separate documents entitled "Decree" and

 "Decree and Order on Petition for Formal Adjudication," both
 dated June 30, 2022. Although only the latter document appears
that dismissed the formal probate of the 2010 will and all

related orders (including the appointment of Keough as personal

representative), allowed the petition for formal probate of the

2018 will, and appointed White as personal representative.

Keough's appeal from those decrees presents the narrow question

whether the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (MUPC), G. L.

c. 190B, §§ 3-410 and 3-412, permitted the judge to act on

White's petition for formal probate of the 2018 will and White's

request to set aside the prior decree and related appointment,

where all requested relief was set forth in the same petition.

Because we conclude that the MUPC does not require that a

request to set aside a prior formal probate decree and related

appointment of the personal representative be filed as a

separate document, we affirm.

     1.   Background.    The following facts and procedural history

are not disputed.    In October 2018, after the decedent's death

in September 2018, Keough filed a petition in the Probate and

Family Court for a decree and order of formal probate of the

2010 will and appointment as personal representative of the

decedent's estate.      Under the terms of the 2010 will, the

decedent made Keough and his wife beneficiaries of her estate.

on the trial court's docket, we treat this as an appeal from
both decrees.

                                    2
The petition was allowed, the decree entered, and Keough was

appointed to serve as the estate's personal representative.

     In April 2019, Gregory White filed several documents in the

same court and under the same docket number, including the 2018

will and a document titled "Petition for Formal Probate of a

Will [and] Appointment of a Personal Representative."   The

latter document requested two forms of relief:   issuance of (1)

orders setting aside the existing formal findings of testacy and

Keough's appointment as personal representative under the 2010

will, 3 and (2) a decree and orders of formal probate of the 2018

will and White's appointment as personal representative.   The

2018 will named two friends of the decedent -- not Keough or his

wife -- as the estate's beneficiaries.

     As noted, the parties submitted their dispute to a judge

for resolution.   After consideration of the record and the

parties' proposed rationales, the judge dismissed the original

order allowing Keough's petition for formal probate of the 2010

will and Keough's appointment as personal representative of the

estate, and allowed White's petition for formal probate of the

2018 will and White's appointment as personal representative. 4

3 White contended, inter alia, that the 2018 will superseded the
2010 will.
4 In doing so, the judge also concluded that Keough had failed to

show that the 2018 will was the product of undue influence.
Keough does not, in this appeal, challenge that aspect of the
judgment.

                                 3
The judge's written findings include the ruling central to this

appeal, namely, that White's request to vacate the previous

decree and related orders and his petition for formal probate of

the 2018 will were properly included in the same document.

     2.   Discussion. 5   a.   Standard of review.   Keough contends

that the judge misinterpreted the requirements of the MUPC;

specifically, G. L. c. 190B, §§ 3-410 and 3-412.       His argument

presents a question of statutory interpretation, and our review

is thus de novo.   See Cusack v. Clasby, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 756,

758 (2019).   In conducting our review, we are mindful that the

language of the statute "should be given effect consistent with

its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature

unless to do so would achieve an illogical result."       DiMasi v.

Secretary of the Commonwealth, 491 Mass. 186, 191 (2023),

quoting Olmstead v. Department of Telecomm. & Cable, 466 Mass.

582, 588 (2013).   "[I]f the language [of a statute] is clear and

unambiguous, it is conclusive as to the intent of the

Legislature."   DiMasi, supra at 191-192, quoting Deutsche Bank

Nat'l Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC, 471 Mass. 248, 253

(2015).

5 To the extent White contends that Keough's arguments on appeal
were waived, he fails to provide adequate legal support for his
position, and we do not consider it. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a)
(9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

                                    4
      b.    G. L. c. 190B, §§ 3-410 and 3-412.   As relevant here,

§ 3-410 prohibits a judge from probating more than one

instrument offered for probate unless "neither expressly revokes

the other or contains provisions which work a total revocation

by implication."     G. L. c. 190B, § 3-410.   Here, the terms of

the 2010 will were entirely different than those of the 2018

will; neither party suggests that under § 3-410 both wills could

be probated simultaneously, and we assume without deciding that

they could not be.     Accordingly, we agree with Keough to the

extent that he argues that under § 3-410, the judge could not

have allowed the probate of the 2018 will without first (or,

perhaps, simultaneously) allowing White's request (set forth in

his petition) to vacate the previous decree probating the 2010

will. 6    See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-410.   There is nothing in the

record to suggest that the judge in this case failed to act on

White's prayer for relief in the required order, and we presume

that he did so. 7

      We do not, however, agree that § 3-410 prohibits a judge

from acting on a petition to probate a second (or subsequent)

6 We construe White's request to "set aside" the orders of formal
probate of the 2010 will as one to "vacate" those orders. See
Black's Law Dictionary 1648 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "set
aside" as "to . . . vacate [a judgment, order, etc.]"). Keough
does not argue otherwise.
7 Given our conclusion, we need not address Keough's challenge to

White's standing to petition for probate of the 2018 will.

                                   5
instrument and related request to vacate a prior decree and

related orders unless the two petitions are filed as separate

documents. 8   In arguing that it does, Keough relies on the

following language from § 3-410:       "After a final order in a

formal testacy proceeding has been entered, no petition for

probate of any other instrument of the decedent may be

entertained, except incident to a petition to vacate a previous

probate order and subject to the time limits of section 3-412." 9

Contrary to Keough's contention, nothing in this language or in

any of the other language of § 3-410 or § 3-412 "mandate[s]" the

filing of separate documents.    See Doe v. Board of Registration

in Med., 485 Mass. 554, 562 (2020) ("It is not our place to

amend a statute's clear language to add language the Legislature

chose to omit").    The key words and phrases -- "may be

8 Indeed, were it to do so, in the circumstances of this case, it
would directly conflict with § 3-107 of the MUPC, providing that
"petitions for formal orders of the court may combine various
request for relief in a single proceeding if the orders sought
may be finally granted without delay." G. L. c. 190B, § 3-107.
See Cusack, 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 758-759. Keough has not
provided any legal support for his contention that the
application of § 3-107 is confined to petitions "by those
persons who have already been appointed Personal Representative
of an estate." See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing
in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).
9 To the extent that Keough argues that White failed to comply

with the time limits under § 3-412, his argument assumes that
White's request contained in his petition to vacate was not
properly before the court. We disagree with Keough on the
latter point, and Keough does not otherwise contend that White's
petition failed to comply with the timing requirements of § 3-
412.

                                   6
entertained, except incident to a petition to vacate," G. L.

c. 190B, § 3-410 (emphasis added) -- are not defined in the

MUPC, and so we interpret them "according to [their] common

usage."   Matter of the Estate of Slavin, 492 Mass. 551, 554

(2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Palmer, 464 Mass. 773, 778 n.6

(2013).   The usual meaning of "entertain" is "to give judicial

consideration to," Black's Law Dictionary 672 (11th ed. 2019);

not, as Keough suggests, to permit the filing of.     The phrase

"incident to" is commonly understood to mean "arising out of" or

"connected with."    Black's Law Dictionary 911 (11th ed. 2019).

Read in a way that comports with these definitions, the

statutory language supports the judge's interpretation and

conclusion.    Further, reading § 3-410 in this way reduces the

number of filings in a given case and facilitates streamlined

review of a request to give effect to a superseding will.     This

result is consistent with promotion of the express statutory

objective of a "speedy and efficient system for liquidating the

estate of the decedent and making distribution to the decedent's

successors."    G. L. c. 190B, § 1-102 (b) (3).   See Cusack, 94

Mass. App. Ct. at 758-759.    Accordingly, we conclude that the

judge did not err in making the challenged rulings. 10

10To the extent that we do not address other arguments, they
"have not been overlooked. We find nothing in them that
requires discussion." Department of Revenue v. Ryan R., 62

                                  7
     3.    Conclusion. 11   The "Decree" dated June 30, 2022, and the

"Decree and Order on Petition for Formal Adjudication" dated

June 30, 2022, are affirmed.

                                        So ordered.

                                        By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                          Desmond & Hand, JJ. 12),

                                        Clerk

Entered:    October 10, 2023.

Mass. App. Ct. 380, 389 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v.
Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
11 White's motion for appellate fees is denied.
12 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                    8