Court Opinion

ID: 9470880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:18:50.610027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:09.275644
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES,
Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Errors which standing alone may be deemed harmless or insufficiently prejudicial to amount to a denial of due process may cumulatively produce a trial setting which is fundamentally unfair. Walker v. Engle, 70S F.2d 959 (6th Cir.1983); United States v. McClister, 608 F.2d 785, 788-90 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Diharce-Estrada, 526 F.2d 637, 642 (1st Cir.1976). Cf. United States v. Jones, 482 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir.1973); United States v. Maroney, 373 F.2d 908 (3rd Cir.1967). While the majority concedes that such a “cumulative error rule” exists, it declines to find that a proper application of that principle requires a reversal of the district court in this case. Because I am convinced that the majority either misperceives or misapplies the critical notions of cumulative error and fundamental fairness, I respectfully dissent from the decision it reaches.
The majority’s treatment of this critical issue comprises only three short paragraphs. Accordingly, before explaining my bases for disagreement, I will repeat Section VII of the majority opinion in its entirety:
It has been urged that the cumulative effect of the numerous errors which occurred in the trial in the state courts require reversal. The majority of this panel believe that none of the claimed errors are of constitutional proportion and that the cumulative error rule should not apply in this case.
This case is to be differentiated from some in which the rule has been applied. Appellant’s guilt as to Count II has been sufficiently established if the State’s witnesses are believed. In addition, the trial, of which complaint is made, was in the courts of the State of Ohio. Appellant carried his case to the highest court of that State. Although he obtained a well written dissent, the majority of the state judges reviewing this record did not feel the errors were sufficient to grant a retrial. This is an important distinction.
As we have pointed out, the individual errors claimed primarily presented issues of state law and not of federal constitutional proportion. Their cumulative effect did not, in our judgment, impugn fundamental fairness or otherwise deprive Payne of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The cursory nature of this analysis tends to cloud any search for its rationale. However, if taken at face value, the clear implication of the majority opinion is that whenever the bulk of the errors occurring during the course of a trial are errors of state law, there can be no denial of due process. The majority seems to believe, that absent the existence of individual errors of “constitutional proportion,” the cumulative effect of all errors could never “impugn fundamental fairness.” This approach simply begs the question.
It is true that mere errors in the application of state law are generally not cognizable in the federal habeas corpus context. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, *13171568 n. 21, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982); Bell v. Arn, 536 F.2d 123 (6th Cir.1976). Yet, errors of state law which result in a denial of fundamental fairness do justify habeas corpus relief. Handley v. Pitts, 491 F.Supp. 597, 599, aff’d., 623 F.2d 23 (6th Cir.1980); Maglaya v. Buchkoe, 515 F.2d 265 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931, 96 S.Ct. 282, 46 L.Ed.2d 260 (1975); Gemel v. Buchkoe, 358 F.2d 338 (6th Cir.1966). The threshold question, therefore, is not whether errors are errors of state or federal law, but whether there has been an inroad on fundamental fairness. To answer that question is the precise aim of any cumulative error analysis.
Just as isolated errors are generally not to be considered outside the context of the “curative” effects of the remainder of a trial, Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974), so too, we must consider whether the combined effect of any series of errors (no matter what the nature of each error when isolated), “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id. at 643, 94 S.Ct. at 1871.1 It is well settled that due process of law at least guarantees that “convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend a sense of justice.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173, 72 S.Ct. 205, 210, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1951). The majority would apparently view trial errors in isolation to determine whether they are of “constitutional proportion” before admitting that the cumulative impact of those errors could amount to a denial of due process. Such an approach fails to address the underlying question with which we must grapple, whether the petitioner’s trial, as a whole, was fundamentally fair. I believe that it was not.
The discrepancy between the indictment and the proofs at trial is first among the errors which characterized the flawed trial of Major Payne. As the majority notes, not all surplus language is harmless and nonprejudicial. In fact, whenever on the record as a whole it appears that the inclusion of an otherwise unnecessary issue “interfere[s] with the proper consideration of the real issues, reversal [is] required.” Gawne v. United States, 409 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943, 90 S.Ct. 956, 25 L.Ed.2d 123 (1969). See also, Michaud v. United States, 350 F.2d 131 (10th Cir.1965) (where added issue prevents proper consideration of other issues in trial, conviction cannot stand).
In the present case the element of “lawful seizure” was injected at every stage of the proceedings: in the indictment, throughout the course of the government’s case, during the argument of counsel, and in the instructions to the jury. The very cases relied upon by the majority support the conclusion that the injection of that issue was impermissible.
In Gawne the court partially based its conclusion that the verdict had been unaffected by a surplus element in the indictment on the fact that the evidence on the statutory elements of the offense was overwhelming. In a very detailed dissent from the decision of the state court of appeals in the present case, Judge Jackson clearly pointed out the meager nature of the evidence against the appellant'. He concluded that, on the record as it stood, a guilty verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Without repeating Judge Jackson’s well-reasoned dissent, I believe that the review which led him to find that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict leads easily to the conclusion that the evidence was not overwhelming, as *1318would appear to be required for a proper application of Gawne.2
In United States v. Kartman, 417 F.2d 893 (9th Cir.1969), the Court refused to set aside a verdict solely on the basis of sur-plusage which allegedly induced the defendant to misplace the emphasis of his defense. The district court had also improperly rejected a written offer of proof and had failed to allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine one of the prosecution’s witnesses. Considering the presence of the surplus in conjunction with the other errors occurring at trial, however, the Court found that the conviction could not stand. The cumulative impact of the errors in the present case appears at least as prejudicial as that in Kartman, making an application of the principle established and the result reached by the Ninth Circuit particularly appropriate. All other errors must therefore be considered in light of the presence of a surplus issue which, though the defendant was required to defend against, the government wholly failed to prove.
The majority recognizes that the admission of Campbell’s testimony regarding an evidence tag was error; the testimony was clearly hearsay. The majority concludes, however, that the error was harmless because the evidence tag carried its own “in-dicia of reliability.” It notes that the circumstances surrounding the tag’s alleged existence indicate that it was written by someone in the Sheriff’s department in the “usual manner,” that there was “no apparent reason” for anyone to misrepresent the facts and that there was sufficient other evidence indicating that the guns had been seized in the raid, making the testimony noncrucial. I simply cannot agree with this analysis of the issue.
Even if one assumes that lawful seizure need not be shown, establishing a source for these guns greatly adds to the credibility of the claim that they existed at all, and to the claim that they were present in the Sheriff’s office at the time of the alleged theft. This was the only piece of tangible evidence from a seemingly uninterested source which directly corroborated Campbell’s testimony. There was, however, no indication who had written the tag, what that person's motivation was, or when it had been done. Rather than presenting clear indicia of reliability, the fact that no one could testify to having written the tag, or to having knowledge of who did so, indicates a blatant element of unreliability.
An argument that the error was harmless because Campbell could have testified that the guns were present in the evidence bag is contrary to reason. The obvious purpose of the testimony regarding the tag, and the obvious prejudice resulting from its admission, was to corroborate the testimony of a seemingly biased witness whose testimony, if standing alone, could easily have been undercut by the contrary testimony of the other deputies. I address this particular error in detail because I believe that, beyond the incremental impact the presence of this error has on a cumulative error analysis, the admission of this evidence, in and of itself, rises to the kind of “constitutional proportion” that would warrant reversal of the appellant’s conviction, flying in the face of the appellant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.
The remainder of the alleged errors dealing with the theft-in-office charge are “dispensed with quickly” by the majority. The majority concludes that once the lawful seizure language in the indictment is deemed surplusage, the appellant’s claims of insufficient notice of the charges against him, of the non-uniform application of Ohio Rule 30 and of the jury’s failure to follow its oath3 *1319can all be rejected. The majority concludes either that proper action in these contexts was unnecessary or that any error would be irrelevant. I can also dispense with these charges quickly since I believe errors are never irrelevant where their combined effect is to create a trial atmosphere which is constitutionally infirm.
I am not unmindful that, as the majority repeatedly asserts, we are dealing with a conviction in state court. However, “The due process clause places upon this Court the duty of exercising a judgment, within the narrow confines of judicial power in reviewing State convictions, upon interests of society pushing in opposite directions.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 171, 72 S.Ct. at 209. Even with the limitations on state court review which are written into the habeas corpus statute and have been expanded upon by myriad court decisions in the area, the Great Writ continues to play a vital role in our jurisprudence. A trial court must not be permitted to allow the state to attain a conviction if it overrides constitutional protections in the process. Constitutional guarantees must be protected even where it entails, by necessity, disagreement with the highest court of a state. That is precisely why 28 U.S.C. § 2254 exists.
In the words of Justice Frankfurter, “Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and right and just.” Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16, 70 S.Ct. 457, 460, 94 L.Ed. 604 (1949) (dissenting opinion). Simply put, the trial afforded the petitioner was so fundamentally unfair that it amounts to a denial of due process. Hence, I must dissent from the refusal to grant the writ and to order a new trial in this case.4

. Given the vague contours of the due process guarantee, one’s constitutional right to due process can only be adequately protected if the judiciary maintains a “wide-lens” view of the proceedings by which an individual is ultimately deprived of his liberty:
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause “inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings resulting in a conviction in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses. Malinski v. New York, supra, 324 U.S. 401, at 416-417, 65 S.Ct. 781, at 788-789, 89 L.Ed. 1029.
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169, 72 S.Ct. 205, 208, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1951).

. Actually, I have a problem with any application of Gawne. The appellant claims that the government should be required to prove the elements included in an indictment and that it was the total failure to prove the element of “lawful seizure” which resulted in an unfair trial. Gawne holds that where the state fails to prove the added element, we can assume that it was not crucial to their case and, hence, does not present any problems of fundamental fairness. The logic of this approach evades me. Not only does it fail to address the appellant’s argument that the state should be required to prove all elements of an indictment, but the potential confusion which may infect the propriety of the trial as a whole is totally ignored.

. The jurors were specifically instructed that they should not return a guilty verdict unless *1319and until they made the determination that the guns had been lawfully seized. It is not seriously debated that there is virtually no evidence of lawful seizure. The appellant claims that a guilty verdict under those circumstances is clear evidence that the jury violated its oath. The state court and the majority simply find that since the lawful seizure language is deemed unnecessary, the lack of evidence regarding it is irrelevant. Such a response, even if true, fails to answer the contention that the jury was clearly not acting in accordance with the instructions given by the trial judge and, hence, were in apparent violation of their oath.
The cumulative error analysis employed in this dissent relieves me. from discussing the proper course for an appellate court to take in such circumstances.

. The appellant also contends that the constitutional infirmities inherent in the theft-in-office conviction necessitate a reversal of the intimidation conviction as well. He contends that the two are so intertwined that they must fall together. The appellant notes that if the theft-in-office charge were believed, and the jury thought the claims of that theft were in the notes that Campbell claims to have kept, the jury would then have in mind a motive for the alleged threats. Essentially, the appellant claims that the intimidation charge is only logically supportable if the theft charge is true and provable. Hence, if the theft conviction is reversible, so must be the intimidation conviction.
The majority simply determines that the evidence was independently sufficient under a Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) standard to support the intimidation charge. While I agree with the majority that where the issue turns on which witnesses the jury chooses to believe, this Court is not free to overturn a verdict under a pure sufficiency of the evidence review, there is more at issue here. My conclusion that the appellant’s trial as a whole was so fundamentally unfair as to make any resulting conviction constitutionally impermissible cannot be segmented. The danger of prejudice infects the entire trial and, hence, even if the appellant’s own intertwining argument is rejected, a new trial on all charges is mandated by notions of fundamental fairness and due process — notions which can neither be ignored nor only partially satisfied.