Court Opinion

ID: 9853451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:49:03.607012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:49.047035
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case since, I believe, the Court is substituting its judgment of what is an occupational disease for that of the Board and because, in my opinion, the Court is setting aside findings of fact supported by evidence, albeit controverted, Gradwohl v. J. R. Simplot Co., 96 Idaho 655, 534 P.2d 775 (1975). The scope of our review in cases such as this, which is and should be quite •narrow, is established both by the Idaho Constitution, Article 5, section 9, and by statute, I.C. §§ 72-724, 72-732. It is evident that expertise in highly complex compensation cases are not the special province of the judiciary. For that reason, a broad authority was vested in the Board as an agency with expertise. Only when the Board’s decisions are unsupported by “any substantial competent evidence,”«I.C. § 72-732(1), or are not supportable as a matter of law, Idaho Constitution, Article 5, section 9, does this Court have the authority and rightful power to reverse a decision of the Board. I believe neither standard justifies the Court’s action today.
The Board concluded that the claimant’s pulmonary emphysema was not an occupational disease within the meaning of I.C. § 72-102(17)(a), because it was not “due to the nature of his occupation, nor is it characteristic of and peculiar to his occupation as a heavy equipment operator in road construction work.” The above statute defines an occupational disease as one “due to the nature of an employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of, and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment.” The majority does not argue that pulmonary emphysema was brought on by claimant’s job since the evidence rather strongly suggests it was caused by claimant’s long-term heavy smoking. Rather, the majority concludes that pulmonary emphysema becomes an occupational disease when it is aggravated, however slightly, by job related conditions, such as dust which is common in the operation of heavy construction equipment. The requirement that an occupational disease be “characteristic of, and peculiar to” the employment contemplates, I believe, more than the fortuity that a preexisting disease be aggravated in some respect by a job related condition. I find the authorities cited by the majority inapposite because dust is not a hazard peculiar to heavy equipment operators. Bess v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 469 S.W.2d 40 (Mo.App.1971). I, therefore, believe the Court errs in substituting its judgment for that of the Board as to whether the claimant’s pulmonary disease was an occupational disease within the meaning of I.C. § 72-102(17)(a). Deciding whether or not a condition is an occupational disease is not a matter in which judicial experience and training create special expertise. For that reason such decisions are committed to the Board and today’s decision undercuts the authority of the Board.
*326I would affirm the Board’s factual determination that the appellant’s disease was not characteristic of and peculiar to his occupation, which finding is supported by the testimony of Dr. Nowierski. By statute we may only set aside an order of the Board if it is not based on “any substantial competent evidence.” While two other doctors testified in favor of the claimant, our task in reviewing orders of the Board does not allow us to weigh conflicting evidence. We must affirm where “any” substantial competent evidence supports the Board’s action. Dr. Nowierski’s testimony here was substantial and competent and supports the Board’s determination. Applying the statutory standard of review set out in I.C. § 72-732(1) to this case requires, in my estimation, an affirmance.