Court Opinion

ID: 9635268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:44:35.122962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:22.228082
License: Public Domain

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I concur in the result of the majority’s ruling that two of defendant Pacheco-Lopez’s initial statements, made before he received Miranda warnings, should be suppressed. I agree with the majority that defendant’s statements of when he arrived at the house and how he got there were the products of custodial interrogation and not subject to the “booking exception.” 1 However, in evaluating the booking exception, I do not join the majority’s focus and obiter dictum regarding the heightened importance of a stationhouse location and recordation. In this regard, I reiterate that the booking exception applies if, under the totality of the circumstances, the questions and/or police activities are “normally attendant to arrest and custody” and are not “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s de novo fact-finding and suppression of Pacheco-Lopez’s second group of statements. Regarding this “Miranda-in-the-middle” issue, the majority misapplies, both legally and factually, Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). First, regarding the legal standard, because there was not an opinion *431of the Court in Missouri v. Seibert, and five Justices did not agree on a rationale, “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds... Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion by Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
Applying the Marks “narrowest grounds” rule, I would hold that Seibert does not overrule Elstad, but creates an exception to it for cases in which the police intend to evade the safeguards of Miranda by deliberately employing a two-step strategy. Our sister circuits have so held. See United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 535-36 (2d Cir.2007); United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1312-13 (11th Cir.2006); United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir.2006); United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 531-33 (3d Cir.2006); and United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1090 (7th Cir.2004). Indeed, Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment, only, in Missouri v. Seibert, and provided the fifth vote for reversal, would continue to apply the voluntariness test of Oregon v. Elstad absent this showing. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 620, 124 S.Ct. 2601 (“[t]he admissibility of postwarning statements should continue to be governed by the principles of Elstad unless the deliberate two-step strategy was employed.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
As the Seventh Circuit stated in Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1090:
In Justice Kennedy’s view, however, an inquiry into change in time and circumstances between the prewarning and postwarning statements—what he called “curative steps”—is necessary only in cases involving the deliberate use of a two-step interrogation strategy calculated to evade the requirements of Miranda. Justice Kennedy thus provided a fifth vote to depart from Elstad, but only where the police set out deliberately to withhold Miranda warnings until after a confession has been secured. Where the initial violation of Miranda was not part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert.
In the present case, the district court did not make factual findings regarding the voluntariness of defendant’s pre- and post-Miranda statements pursuant to El-stad, and similarly Elto rule whether the police intended to evade Miranda by deliberately employing a two-step strategy, and, if stratewhether defendant’s Miranda warnings were MiBecause the record on appeal is inadequate, I would remand for a hearing and findings on these disputed issues of material fact. See Williams, 435 F.3d at 1161-62; Stewart, 388 F.3d at 1091-92. See also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. 1285; United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir.1998); and United States v. McCurdy, 40 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir.1994).
Regarding the law, the majority clearly errs by applying the Seibert (plurality opinion) “effectiveness” factors in the absence of a factual finding that the police deliberately attempted to evade the safeguards of Miranda. Without this limitation set forth in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, Justice Souter’s plurality opinion is nothing more than the views of four Justices. Thus, by itself, the Seibert plurality opinion is not precedentially binding. All of our sister circuits that have addressed this issue agree. Nonetheless, the majority applies Justice Souter’s opinion as if it were precedent without the restriction of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. More*432over, the majority has impermissively engaged in de novo factfinding, which is normally the province of the trial court.
Finally, the majority refuses to acknowledge that the present case is factually distinguishable from both Oregon v. Elstad and Missouri v. Seibert. Elstad and Seibert were cases in which the defendants revealed inculpatory evidence as a result of a custodial interrogation conducted before the administering of their Miranda rights. In both cases, the defendants subsequently reiterated the earlier information after receiving Miranda warnings. However, in neither case did the defendant invoke his right to remain silent. In such instances, it is obviously difficult to determine whether the accused made an informed choice to confess or whether he believed his second confession was a continuation of the earlier, improper interrogation. Here, unlike Patrice Seibert or Michael Elstad, defendant Pacheco-Lopez exercised his right to silence after receiving Miranda rights. The plurality opinion in Seibert sets forth factors to be evaluated by the trial courts when the factual question of the effectiveness of the “Miranda-in-the-middle” warnings is in doubt. The ultimate objective is to determine whether the Miranda warnings were, in fact, effective. As Justice Souter stated:
The threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function “effectively” as Miranda requires. Could the warnings effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture? Could they reasonably convey that he could choose to stop talking even if he had talked earlier?
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12, 124 S.Ct. 2601.
In the present case, the answer to the above questions appears to be “yes.” The majority contends that the record is unclear regarding whether Pacheco-Lopez invoked his right to silence or merely stated that he did not wish to speak to police further. However, the Supreme Court has directed that invocations of Miranda rights be interpreted broadly, and that upon a defendant’s assertion of the right to remain silent “in any manner” questioning must immediately cease. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Therefore, in the present case, it appears unnecessary to conduct a searching review of the circumstantial evidence to determine whether the warnings were effective to Pacheco-Lopez.2 Indeed, by invoking his right to silence, defendant Pacheco-Lopez conveyed this understanding in the clearest, most unequivocal way possible that he understood his right to do so. See United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 766 (8th Cir.2001) (noting that defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel is “strong evidence” that defendant understood his rights), vacated on other grounds by 536 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002); see also Pickens v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 988, 995 (10th Cir.2000) (citing Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (10th Cir.1998))(noting that invocation of a Miranda right demonstrates a defendant’s understanding of that right).3 In light of *433his invocation of his right to remain silent, suppression of Pacheco-Lopez’s post-Miranda statements can only arise from a perfunctory application of ill-fitting case-law without regard to the factual realities of this case.
The majority argues that “the thrust of the effectiveness inquiry focuses on whether the defendant had a choice ‘at [the] juncture’ of the statement, not whether the defendant’s later behaviors cast retrospective insight into his state of mind at the time of the statement.” This statement underscores the majority’s misunderstanding of how, on its facts, this case differs critically from Seibert and Elstad. The very purpose of analyzing the Seibert factors is to marshal circumstantial evidence, such as: location of the questioning; the time elapsed between warnings; and change in questioners, in order to ascertain whether the defendant, or a hypothetical reasonable proxy, would be able to make an informed choice regarding his right to remain silent. Under this approach, we attempt to approximate what the defendant could understand only because we typically do not know what the defendant did understand. The present case, however, offers that rare window into a defendant’s mind that allows us to answer this latter question. Apparently, the warning was effective because Pacheco-Lopez invoked his right to silence. Thus, there appears to be no reason to substitute circumstantial assumptions for this direct evidence.
My colleagues might have a plausible argument had Pacheco-Lopez never invoked his right to silence. Similarly, if defendant had received a second Miranda warning after his post-Miranda inculpato-ry statements and then invoked his right to silence, a question might arise whether Pacheco-Lopez understood his rights when he made the statements admitting his guilty conduct. But when, as here, there was a single Miranda warning, and the defendant invoked his right to remain silent after this warning, the most reasonable inference is that defendant understood his right to remain silent.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would vacate the district court’s order and remand to the trial court for a new suppression hearing and factual findings essential for our informed resolution of the Elstad and Seibert issues. I would not assume the role of factfinder but defer to the trial court’s superior abilities in this regard.

. In my view, defendant’s responses to the first two questions asking him for his name and address ("where they lived”) are covered by the "booking exception.” See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (opinion by Brennan, J.) (1990). To the extent that the majority rules otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

. At a minimum, the trial court should make findings on these factual issues before our review on -appeal.

. The majority asserts that these cases are inapposite because they decided the question of whether the defendant waived his right to remain silent. However, in order to validly waive one’s right to silence, one must first understand that right. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 165 L.Ed.2d 557 (noting that "a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights must be voluntary, *433knowing, and intelligent, i.e., ‘the product of a free and deliberate choice ... made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’ ") (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). Accordingly, while these cases address the larger issue of waiver, these holdings are applicable regarding the subsumed issue of what constitutes evidence of understanding of one's Miranda rights.