Court Opinion

ID: 9403339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 21:04:41.015352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:06.281992
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 220568-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                         NOTICE
 Decision filed 06/20/23. The
                                                                              This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0568
                                                                              Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                 not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                         limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                    under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF STATE OF ILLINOIS,                )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Macon County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 21-CF-759
                                                )
THOMAS J. JARRETT,                              )     Honorable
                                                )     Jeffrey S. Geisler,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and McHaney concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: Because the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel where
               he cannot show that he was prejudiced by the allegedly deficient performance of
               his trial counsel, we affirm his conviction for home invasion, and his otherwise
               unchallenged 10-year sentence.

¶2       The defendant, Thomas L. Jarrett, appeals his conviction and 10-year sentence, following

a bench trial in the circuit court of Macon County, for the offense of home invasion. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

¶3                                        I. BACKGROUND

¶4       On June 29, 2021, the defendant was charged, by information, with one felony count of

home invasion and two misdemeanor counts of domestic battery. Each charge involved the same

alleged victim, Marshena Banks. The home invasion count alleged that the defendant entered

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Banks’s home without permission and intentionally caused injury to her by striking and kicking

her body and head with his hands and feet. The first domestic battery count alleged that the

defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to Banks, who allegedly was a family or household

member of the defendant, by striking and kicking her body and head with his hands and feet. The

second domestic battery count alleged that the defendant “knowingly made physical contact of an

insulting or provoking nature with [Banks], a family or household member of the defendant” by

striking and kicking her body and head with his hands and feet.

¶5     The defendant subsequently was released on bond, subject to electronic monitoring and

other conditions. The defendant was not permitted, inter alia, to be within 500 feet of the home in

which Banks lived, and was not permitted to have any direct or indirect contact with Banks.

Thereafter, the State filed a number of verified applications to increase the defendant’s bond,

alleging that the defendant violated the conditions of his bond on multiple occasions by being in

the exclusion zone within 500 feet of Banks’s residence, as well as by attempting to tamper with

his electronic monitoring device and by leaving the state of Illinois without court approval. On

December 1, 2021, a hearing was held on the State’s verified applications to increase the

defendant’s bond. Following the introduction of documentary evidence, and argument by the

parties, the trial judge agreed with the State that the conditions of bond had been violated, and

raised the bond, although he raised it less than the State requested.

¶6     At a subsequent proceeding, the defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his

right to a jury trial, following admonishments from the trial judge, and the case proceeded to a

bench trial that began on April 25, 2022. The first witness called by the State was Marshena Banks.

Banks testified that she currently lived at the residence at which the crimes were alleged to have

occurred. She testified that she did not know exactly how long she had lived there, that she could

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not remember if she lived there on May 11, 2021, and that she did not remember police officer

Eric Havens coming to the house and speaking to her on May 11, 2021. She further testified that

she did not remember Officer Havens appearing in uniform, or having a body camera. She testified

that she did not “remember that day at all.” She testified that she did not remember Officer Havens

asking her what happened, and did not remember telling Officer Havens that Banks’s “ex came

and kicked in the door and jumped on” Banks.

¶7     Banks testified that she knew the defendant, and she identified him in the courtroom. She

testified that she and the defendant had a child together. When asked if Officer Havens asked her

if she was cut anywhere after the incident in question, Banks testified that she did not remember.

When asked if Officer Havens asked her if the red stains on her clothing were paint or blood,

Banks testified that she did not remember. When defense counsel thereafter offered a hearsay

objection to the question, counsel for the State responded as follows: “Your Honor, obviously this

is a situation where we’re going to have to treat her as hostile so I’m going to have to confront her

with every statement she made and every response she gave.” The trial judge overruled defense

counsel’s objection.

¶8     Counsel for the State then asked Banks a second time if Officer Havens asked her about

the stains on her clothing. Banks did not answer, instead asking, “Do I have the right to plead the

fifth?” Counsel for the State answered, “No.” There was no objection from defense counsel and

no statement from the trial judge. Banks then answered, “Well, no, I don’t remember.” She

thereafter testified that she did not remember telling Officer Havens that the stains were blood

from her nose and lip, did not remember Officer Havens asking her what the name of her ex was,

did not remember telling Officer Havens her ex was the defendant and spelling his name for Officer

Havens, and did not remember Officer Havens asking if she knew the defendant’s phone number

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and address. She further testified that she did not remember (1) stating that she did not know the

defendant’s phone number and address, (2) stating that no one else was present during the incident,

(3) describing what she thought the defendant was wearing at the time of the incident, (4) stating

that she believed the defendant left on foot, or (5) stating how long she had been in a relationship

with the defendant, and how long ago the relationship ended. She was asked additional questions,

all of which she answered by stating that she did not remember. When defense counsel objected

to one of the questions, and the trial judge overruled the objection, counsel for the State added,

“And for the record, obviously, I have to prove up the—I have to perfect the impeachment so I

have to go through all of this.”

¶9     On cross-examination, Banks continued to deny remembering anything about the incident.

When asked why she did not remember, Banks stated, “Because I don’t. Going through a lot of

emotional stuff. I don’t remember that day. Don’t remember *** that timeframe.” She thereafter

agreed that the doorframe to the house where the crimes were alleged to have occurred had damage

from termites. She agreed that the damage occurred “without anyone busting through the door.”

When asked more questions about May 11, 2021, she repeatedly reiterated that she did not

remember that day.

¶ 10   Eric Havens testified that he was an officer with the Decatur Police Department, and that

on May 11, 2021, he was on duty and was dispatched to Banks’s residence. He testified that he

spoke to Banks, and that while doing so, he was wearing a department-issued body camera, which

recorded their interaction. He testified that he subsequently reviewed the body camera footage

from the interaction, and that it was “a fair and accurate recording” of the interaction. Counsel for

the State requested permission to play the recording for the court. Defense counsel objected to

playing the entire recording, stating that counsel believed the State could only “play snippets” for

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impeachment purposes. Counsel for the State responded that Banks “essentially, testified that she

doesn’t recall anything,” and that “the question and answer that [counsel for the State] did on the

stand is the portion that’s going to be played.” She added, “It’s the substance of what happened

and in order to perfect the impeachment because her inability to recall is, essentially, equivalent

under the case law as a denial, I have to actually show it.” The trial judge overruled the defense

objection, and the recording—which comprised approximately five minutes, and is included in the

record on appeal—was played for the court. The contents of the footage are not disputed on appeal,

with the parties agreeing that the footage shows, inter alia, Banks telling Officer Havens that her

“ex” kicked in the door to the house and jumped on Banks.

¶ 11   Thereafter, counsel for the State asked Officer Havens about photographs he took at the

scene. He testified that one photograph showed “the door that the suspect entered in through,

forced it open, and that’s the missing trim on the side of the doorjamb.” He testified that another

photograph showed the blood on Banks’s clothing, and yet another photograph showed “her split

lower lip, and swollen.” On cross-examination, Officer Havens agreed that he did not witness the

incident, and agreed that he believed he observed termite damage to the door. On redirect

examination, he testified that he had no reason to believe that Banks was under the influence of

any substances at the time of the incident.

¶ 12   Following the testimony of Officer Havens, counsel for the State asked for the body camera

footage recording and Officer Havens’s photographs to be admitted into evidence. The trial judge

admitted them into evidence. The State then rested, and the trial judge asked, “I assume that you’re

asking the Court to proceed under the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements under the

statute 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 and asking me to consider that substantive with the body camera as

shown?” Counsel for the State answered, “That is correct.” The trial judge thereafter stated, “Of

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course, the statute talks about first of all the statement is inconsistent with the testimony at the

trial. Of course, she stated she could not remember. The witness was subject to cross-examination,

that’s clear.” He subsequently added, “It does narrate, describe, or explain the events or conditions

which the witness had personal knowledge of and also the statement was recorded.” The trial judge

then asked the State if it had “any case law where a witness states that they don’t have any

recollection of what happened on that occasion that allows me to consider that as substantive

evidence?” The State responded, inter alia, that “professing that you do not recall is the equivalent

of a denial,” which meant that “the prior inconsistent statement” was admissible “as substantive

evidence.”

¶ 13   Following a recess, the trial reconvened on April 29, 2022. After hearing further arguments

from the parties about whether the body camera footage recording could come in as substantive

evidence, the trial judge ruled that it could. Thereafter, the defendant’s mother testified for the

defense that on May 11, 2021, the defendant was with her in Tennessee. On cross-examination,

she conceded that she had not come forward with this information prior to the trial. Following

closing arguments, the trial judge made the following findings and rulings: (1) it was “clear” to

the trial judge that Banks “was not being truthful” when she testified that “she didn’t remember

very much about what happened on that occasion,” (2) the body camera footage provided evidence

that the defendant broke into the house and hit Banks “in the head,” causing bleeding, (3) the alibi

testimony of the defendant’s mother was not credible, and (4) the evidence showed that the

defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of all three charges against him. The trial judge

entered judgments of conviction on all three offenses and, upon motion of the State, revoked the

defendant’s bond.

                                                 6
¶ 14   On May 13, 2022, the defendant’s trial counsel filed a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. Therein, she contended, inter alia,

that after the conclusion of the defendant’s bench trial, Banks “drafted, signed, and had notarized

a statement” in which Banks claimed “that she lied to the police on May 11, 2021, because she

was upset with the [d]efendant.” The motion further asserted that in addition to this “new

exculpatory evidence,” the trial judge erred when he allowed the body camera footage in as

substantive evidence. Attached to the motion as exhibit 1 was a signed and notarized statement

from Banks in which she contended, inter alia, that the defendant did not commit the crimes of

home invasion and domestic battery of which he was convicted. The “notary acknowledgment”

that accompanied Banks’s statement claimed that her statement was signed in Illinois, but also

stated that the notary was certifying Banks’s signature “under PENALTY OF PERJURY under

the laws of the State of California.”

¶ 15   On July 1, 2022, a hearing was held on the defendant’s motion. At the outset of the hearing,

the trial judge asked defense counsel if she intended “to put Ms. Banks on the stand to state that

she lied to the police?” Defense counsel answered, “possibly,” depending upon what answers

Banks gave when questioned. The trial judge then stated, “Bring Ms. Banks in because before she

takes the stand, I’m going to appoint an attorney for her so that she does not take the stand and

incriminate herself, or at least she knows what she’s doing.” Banks entered the courtroom and was

admonished by the trial judge, who appointed an attorney to represent her. The trial judge then

ordered a recess so that Banks could confer privately with the attorney.

¶ 16   Following the recess, Banks testified that she attempted to “plead the fifth” at the

defendant’s bench trial because she gave the police a false statement about what happened on May

11, 2021. She agreed that after she was not allowed to “plead the fifth,” she answered the questions

                                                   7
asked of her by stating that she did not remember what happened on May 11, 2021. She verified

the statement that accompanied the defendant’s motion as exhibit 1 and testified that no one forced

her to write it. She testified that she wrote it because she did not want the defendant to be jailed as

the result of her false accusation. She testified that her statement was correct, and that she did not

see the defendant at all on May 11, 2021, he did not break into her house on that date, and he did

not hit her on that date. Banks testified that she created the blood on her face by turning on a hot

shower to create steam in the bathroom, then rubbing her nose until it bled. She did not explain

her split, swollen lip. She testified that the doorframe was already damaged, and that the defendant

did not damage it. On cross-examination, when asked if she was confronted by three women in the

vestibule outside the courtroom prior to her present testimony, Banks testified that she did not

know the women. She agreed, however, that she knew the women were members of the

defendant’s family. When asked how she got “the cut on [her] lip” on May 11, 2021, Banks

answered only, “There was this cut on my lip.” She did not testify with regard to the fact that her

lip is obviously swollen in one of the photographs Officer Havens took and authenticated, which,

as described above, was admitted into evidence at the bench trial and is part of the record on appeal.

There was no redirect examination of Banks.

¶ 17   Following Banks’s testimony, and argument by the parties, the trial judge stated that he

remembered the defendant’s bench trial “vividly.” With regard to Banks’s attempt to invoke her

fifth amendment rights, and the State’s answer to her that she could not invoke those rights, the

trial judge stated as follows: “I didn’t get involved because I didn’t know why a victim would be

asserting a Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination at that time.” He added, “I didn’t see

any reason that she would have a Fifth Amendment right, but some interesting [issues] have been

                                                  8
brought up at this stage.” He recessed the hearing to allow the parties to conduct further research,

and provide further arguments, if desired.

¶ 18   The hearing reconvened on July 13, 2022. The trial judge noted that each party had filed a

memorandum of law, and that he had considered the filings, and had conducted his own research

as well. He then allowed each party to present additional oral argument. Thereafter, he stated that

he believed he had “to make a determination as to [Banks’s] credibility in this situation.” He found

that Banks was a “reluctant victim or reluctant witness,” that she did not possess “a Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination,” and “that the testimony she has presented both

before and after her live testimony was not credible.” He further found that after considering all of

the evidence, “the state did prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt based on the officer’s video

in this case.” Accordingly, he denied the defendant’s motion.

¶ 19   The defendant’s sentencing hearing was held on August 18, 2022. The State presented

evidence and argument in aggravation, mostly related to the defendant’s extensive prior criminal

history and other alleged prior criminal acts, and the defense presented evidence and argument in

mitigation. The State argued for a 25-year sentence in this case. The defense argued for the

minimum sentence of 6 years, to be served at 50%. Ultimately, the trial judge sentenced the

defendant to 10 years of imprisonment on the home invasion conviction. He did not enter sentence

on the two domestic battery convictions, which he thereafter found merged with the home invasion

conviction. This timely appeal followed.

¶ 20                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21   The sole issue raised on appeal by the defendant is his contention that his trial “counsel

was ineffective for allowing the State to admit testimonial evidence that should have been excluded

by Marshena Banks’ fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” To prevail on a claim

                                                 9
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s

performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Both prongs of the Strickland test must

be satisfied by the defendant for a finding of ineffectiveness. People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649,

¶ 30. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally reviewed de novo. People v. Gunn,

2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 91.

¶ 22   To establish deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s

performance was “objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 94. “A defendant is entitled to competent, not perfect,

representation, and mistakes in trial strategy or judgment will not, of themselves, render the

representation ineffective.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Bell, 2021 IL App (1st)

190366, ¶ 63. The defendant must overcome a strong presumption that trial counsel’s inaction was

based on sound trial strategy. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 341-42 (2007). Trial strategy

includes decisions on “what matters to object to and when to object.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. at 344. The failure to object to testimony, therefore, may be a matter of sound trial

strategy which does not necessarily establish deficient performance. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d

194, 221 (2004).

¶ 23   When considering the second prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must demonstrate

that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 96. Where the

evidence against the defendant is overwhelming, the reviewing court will not be persuaded that it

is reasonably probable that a jury would have acquitted the defendant in the absence of counsel’s

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alleged errors. Id. A court may dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for insufficient

prejudice before reaching the deficiency of counsel’s performance. People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d

1, 13 (1991).

¶ 24   As noted above, on appeal the defendant in this case claims that his trial “counsel was

ineffective for allowing the State to admit testimonial evidence that should have been excluded by

Marshena Banks’ fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” In support of this

proposition, appellate counsel for the defendant first contends that Banks’s prior statement,

presented to the trial judge as part of the body camera footage, “was the only incriminating

evidence presented at trial.” The defendant thereafter contends that because his trial “counsel did

not object to Banks’ testimony or ask the court to address Banks’ attempt to invoke her fifth

amendment protection,” and instead “allowed Banks to testify that she did not remember anything

from the time of the home invasion,” the body camera footage was admitted as substantive

evidence, and led to the conviction of the defendant. In terms of the prejudice that resulted from

his counsel’s failure to object, the defendant argues on appeal that if Banks had been “allowed to

plead the fifth, and did not testify at trial,” then the footage was not have been admissible, because

“a witness’s assertion of the fifth amendment privilege at trial is not an inconsistent statement

under section 115-10.1.”

¶ 25   We first note that the defendant does not object to the admission into evidence of the

photographs taken by Officer Havens, which, as described above, show what Officer Havens

characterized as (1) “the door that the suspect entered in through, forced it open, and that’s the

missing trim on the side of the doorjamb,” (2) the blood on Banks’s clothing, and (3) “her split

lower lip, and swollen.” We next note that the defendant’s argument about Banks’s testimony and

the body camera footage of her statements to Officer Havens misapprehends the facts relevant to

                                                 11
this issue and the law applicable to those facts. As the State pointed out at trial, a witness’s prior

testimony does not have to directly contradict testimony given at trial to be considered inconsistent

within the meaning of section 115-10.1. See, e.g., People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 87 (1989). A

professed memory loss can render a statement inconsistent with an earlier one, as can evasive

answers, silence, or changes in position. Id. at 87-88. Accordingly, the problem with the

defendant’s argument on appeal is that by the time Banks attempted to invoke her fifth amendment

rights during her testimony at the defendant’s bench trial, she had already testified, as described

above, that, inter alia, (1) she did not remember Officer Havens asking her what happened, and

did not remember telling Officer Havens that Banks’s “ex came and kicked in the door and jumped

on” Banks, (2) she knew the defendant (whom she identified in court), and (3) she and the

defendant had a child together. Moreover, she had already been asked if Officer Havens asked her

(1) if she was cut anywhere after the incident in question, to which she had already testified that

she did not remember, and (2) if the red stains on her clothing were paint or blood, to which she

also had already testified that she did not remember. Thus, by the time she attempted to invoke her

fifth amendment rights, she had already voluntarily produced testimony at trial that evinced a

professed memory loss and was evasive, and that therefore was inconsistent with her statements

in the footage, the latter of which were, along with Officer Havens’s unobjected-to photographs of

the damage to the door and of Banks’s injuries, sufficient to convict the defendant of home

invasion. In other words, by the time she attempted to invoke her fifth amendment rights, portions

of the footage—portions that we reiterate were, along with Officer Havens’s unobjected-to

photographs of the damage to the door and of Banks’s injuries, sufficient to convict the defendant

of home invasion—were already admissible as substantive evidence to impeach her pre-invocation

testimony with regard to, inter alia, the issue of whether she told Officer Havens that the defendant

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kicked in the door and attacked Banks. In light of these facts, it would have been pointless for the

defendant’s trial counsel to object when Banks thereafter attempted to invoke her fifth amendment

rights and the State told her she could not invoke them, because that would not have stopped the

relevant footage and photographs from coming in as substantive evidence to impeach her pre-

invocation testimony. It is axiomatic that failing to make a futile objection does not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., People v. Holmes, 397 Ill. App. 3d 737, 745 (2010).

Accordingly, there is no merit to the issue raised by the defendant on appeal.

¶ 26    As a secondary reason for affirming the defendant’s conviction and sentence, we agree

with the State that it also would have been futile for the defendant’s trial counsel to object because

if counsel had done so, and Banks had successfully invoked her fifth amendment rights, then under

section 115-10.2a(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10.2a(c) (West

2020))—which is a provision that applies specifically to domestic violence prosecutions—Banks

would have been deemed unavailable as a witness, and her prior inconsistent statement would have

been admissible as substantive evidence for that reason. Although the defendant claims in his reply

brief on appeal that section 115-10.2a(c) conflicts with the Illinois Rules of Evidence—specifically

Rule 804 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011)—the defendant cites no precedent supporting the existence of such a

conflict. That deficiency notwithstanding, we do not agree that the provisions are in conflict. Rule

804 is a general rule of evidence; section 115-10.2a(c) is a specific rule that applies only to

domestic violence prosecutions such as this one. Thus, there is no conflict between them in this

case.

¶ 27                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction for home invasion, and his

otherwise unchallenged 10-year sentence.

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¶ 29   Affirmed.

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