Court Opinion

ID: 9855926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:34:29.448522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:17.863406
License: Public Domain

NAHMIAS, Justice,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion with the understanding that our holding in Division 1 — that the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply to the statutory claim presented — rests on the fact that the Natural Gas Act expressly authorizes a private right of action for consumers. Although the remedial purpose of the Act supports that conclusion, it would not be sufficient to reach that result. Otherwise, we would have to overrule the line of Court of Appeals cases the majority cites on page 711, which applied the voluntary payment doctrine notwithstanding the arguably remedial purpose of the statutes at issue. The Court does not question those cases.
It should be clear, therefore, that the Court is not adopting wholesale the approach of the three decisions from other states cited as “[s]ee also” and described parenthetically on page 713, as those courts relied principally on the remedial purpose of their state statutes to negate the voluntary payment defense. See Indoor Billboard Washington v. Integra Telecom of Washington, 170 P3d 10, 24 (Wash. 2007) (rejecting voluntary payment doctrine “because we construe the [Consumer Protection Act] liberally in favor of [con*715sumers]”); Ramirez v. Smart Corp., 863 NE2d 800, 810 & n. 2, 813 (Ill. App. 2007) (in case involving alleged excessive charges for medical records, rejecting voluntary payment doctrine based on the remedial purposes of the Illinois Hospital Records Act and Consumer Fraud Act, despite also holding that the Hospital Records Act does not create an express or implied cause of action, in contrast to Cotton v. Med-Cor Health Information Solutions, 221 Ga. App. 609, 611-612 (472 SE2d 92) (1996), which upheld the voluntary payment defense in the similar context of claims under Georgia’s Health Records Act); Huch v. Charter Communications, 290 SW3d 721, 727 (Mo. 2009) (rejecting voluntary payment doctrine based on the remedial purpose of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, where a cable television provider charged consumers for unsolicited paper television guides, in contrast to Telescripps Cable Co. v. Welsh, 247 Ga. App. 282, 284-285 (542 SE2d 640) (2000), which upheld the voluntary payment doctrine where a cable television company charged Georgia customers excessive late fees).1
Decided March 15, 2010.
Rogers & Hardin, Robert B. Remar, Jill E. Steinberg, Kimberly L. Myers, for appellant.
Strickland, Brockington & Lewis, Frank B. Strickland, Anne W. Lewis, Jason R. Doss, for appellees.

 I note that the Washington Consumer Protection Act contains an express private right of action, see Indoor Billboard/Washington, 170 P3d at 17, as does the Missouri statute at issue in Huch, see 290 SW3d at 725, so that our reasoning in this case would likely lead to the same result reached in those cases. The Washington and Missouri courts, however, did not explicitly rely on that fact in rejecting the voluntary payment doctrine.