Court Opinion

ID: 9760682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:08:27.473153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:15.790643
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
BOWES, J.:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent. Observing that we are an error-correcting court, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to vacate the trial court’s order and remand for a second evidentiary hearing while expressly sustaining the trial court’s legal reasoning.
¶ 2 I would hold that the trial court erred in finding that the Schuylkill County Clerk of the Orphan’s Court (the “Clerk”) was not required to make an accommodation due to Appellant’s inability to personally appear in the Clerk’s office and apply for a marriage license. I believe the Clerk was obliged to provide an alternative method for Appellant to exercise his fundamental, constitutional right to marry, and consequently, the Clerk’s failure to accommodate Appellant was unconstitutional. I would therefore reverse.
¶3 Appellant argues that the Clerk’s strict application of 23 Pa.C.S. § 1306, requiring a marriage applicant’s personal appearance for an oath and examination, effectively denies Appellant the ability to exercise his fundamental right to marry.13 I agree. I believe the Clerk’s interpreta*262tion of the law is incorrect and that office’s refusal to provide an adequate alternative for prisoners incarcerated in Schuylkill County to secure marriage licenses imper-missibly infringes on their constitutional rights.
¶ 4 At the outset, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that no constitutional violations arise under the facts of this case.14 It is settled that marriage is a fundamental right under both the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) (right to marry is part of fundamental right of privacy implicit in Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause); Fabio v. Civil Service Commission of City of Philadelphia, 489 Pa. 309, 414 A.2d 82 (1980) (constitutional right to privacy encompasses activities relating to marriage). It is also clear that the manner in which the Clerk has elected to perform its ministerial duties encroaches upon Appellant’s right to marry. Cf. Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that county officials can be defendants to constitutional challenge although their duties were entirely ministerial). “The inquiry is not on the nature of an official’s duties but into the effect of the official’s performance of his duties on the plaintiff’s rights.” Id. at 54. Unlike the majority, I would not artificially impute the duty to accommodate Appellant upon the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections or the local sheriff. The legislature designated the task of regulating marriage licenses to the Orphans’ Court, see 20 Pa.C.S. § 711(19), and the various clerks of the Orphan’s Court are obliged to perform their duties in a constitutionally fit manner.
¶ 5 Furthermore, I do not believe that the deferential standard employed by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), is applicable to the case sub judice. In Turner, the Supreme Court held that a Missouri prison regulation barring prisoners from marriage absent a compelling reason to do so was constitutionally infirm. The Court fashioned the following test to determine the regulation’s constitutional fitness: “[W]hen *263a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. This test, which places the burden upon the prisoner, has been employed consistently to determine the validity of various prison regulations. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 589 U.S. 126, 132, 128 S.Ct. 2162, 2168, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003). However, this standard only applies to prison regulations. As the Turner Court did not address the effect that a regulation would have upon outside entities, the standard does not extend to state actions beyond the prison walls. Since the rule in question is not a prison regulation and was not implemented to further a penological interest, the deferential “legitimate interest” standard employed in Turner is inapposite.
¶ 6 Instead, this matter demands strict scrutiny. Pursuant to the due process guarantees in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, strict scrutiny applies to the denial of the fundamental right to marry. Nixon v. Commonwealth, 576 Pa. 385, 400, 839 A.2d 277, 287 (2003) (“Where laws infringe upon certain rights considered fundamental, such as the right to privacy, the right to marry, and the right to procreate, courts apply a strict scrutiny test.”). This standard, referred to as a substantive due process analysis, utilizes a means-ends test to scrutinize the relationship between the' fundamental right and the interest sought to be achieved. Id. When applying strict scrutiny, the courts will uphold an interference with the free exercise of a fundamental right only if it is necessary to promote a compelling or overriding state interest, and if a compelling interest exists, the means necessary to effectuate that interest must be narrowly tailored to achieve the objective. Khan v. State Board of Auctioneer Examiners, — Pa. -, - -, 842 A.2d 936, 942-43 (2004). Laws restricting fundamental rights rarely survive strict scrutiny. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992).
¶ 7 Considering section 1306 under the first prong of the standard, it is well established that the state has a compelling interest in regulating marriages and requiring applicants to obtain marriage licenses. See Zablocki, supra at 386, 98 S.Ct. 673 (“reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed.”). The legislature’s mandate for a marriage applicant to appear personally for an oath or affirmation is constitutionally fit on its face. However, I believe the Clerk’s interpretation of the statute is incorrect, and its chosen method of achieving the state’s objective is not sufficiently narrow to allow prisoners to exercise their fundamental right to marry.
¶ 8 Contrary to the Clerk’s reading of the statute, section 1306 does not require a marriage license applicant to appear at the courthouse in person nor does it preclude qualified individuals outside of the Clerk’s office from administering the oath and examination. Consequently, the Clerk’s strict construction of the personal appearance requirement, which demands a personal appearance at the Schuylkill County Courthouse for an oath and examination performed by a representative of the Clerk’s office, is improper, and in this case, it results in an unconstitutional divestiture of Appellant’s fundamental right to marry.
¶ 9 In support of its interpretation of the personal appearance requirement, the Clerk contends that it has inadequate staff to send a representative to each of the four prisons within Schuylkill County to conduct the required interviews upon the demand of the prisoner-applicants, and that *264it has insufficient funds to obtain the technology which would enable it to conduct video-conferences with prisoner-applicants.15 Nevertheless, I believe the Clerk could fashion and employ a reasonable alternative that would both comply with the legislature’s mandate and allow prisoners to exercise their rights without burdening Schuylkill County taxpayers. Further, as we are constrained to apply strict scrutiny, the majority’s concerns relating to the number of prisoners housed in correctional institutions and support facilities within our borders are irrelevant to our analysis, Having found that a compelling interest exists, our only concern is whether there are less restrictive means of accomplishing the state’s objective. In this case, several alternatives exist.
¶ 10 As Appellant and amici curiae suggest, there are several low-cost alternatives that would accommodate Appellant’s rights. First, the Clerk’s office could schedule periodic trips to prisons within Schuylkill County to conduct examinations and issue marriage licenses two or three times a year. Since the examinations would be performed at predetermined intervals rather than at the prisoners’ request, the cost associated with this service would be minimal. Similarly, the Clerk could deputize a corrections employee at each of the four institutions and have them administer the oath and examination. See Toms v. Taft, 338 F.3d 519 (6th Cir.2003) (county probate court deputized corrections employee to administer oath and issue marriage license). Alternatively, as section 1306 does not limit who may conduct the sworn examination, the Clerk could accept affidavits that were sworn, attested, and notarized at the prison and then mailed to the Clerk’s office. All of these viable accommodations would allow prisoners within Schuylkill County to exercise their rights without imposing significant costs upon the Clerk or the county and its taxpayers. The existence of these affordable alternatives militates against a finding that the Clerk’s reading of the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s objective. Accordingly, I would find that the Schuylkill County Clerk of Orphans’ Court policy is unconstitutional.
¶ 11 The majority posits that the enumerated powers and duties of the Clerk of the Orphans’ Court do not include providing the suggested accommodations,16 and consequently, it opines that the Clerk cannot be compelled to accommodate Appellant. I believe this argument fails to grasp the nature of the issue. It is not a matter of who is best suited to provide Appellant with access to a marriage license; rather, the question is what entity is precluding Appellant from obtaining a marriage license and exercising his right to marry. Under the facts of this case, that entity is the Clerk of the Orphans’ Court in Schuylkill County.
¶ 12 Although the Clerk does not have a statutory mandate to provide a specific reasonable accommodation to prisoners seeking a marriage license, the legislature’s omission does not negate the Clerk’s responsibility as a state actor to perform its ministerial duties without treading upon the fundamental rights of others. See Finberg, supra. Since 23 Pa.C.S. § 1306 *265neither requires that an applicant appear at the county courthouse nor precludes other qualified individuals from examining applicants outside of the Clerk’s office, I believe the Clerk’s interpretation of the statute is unduly restrictive and its refusal to provide a reasonable alternative to the personal appearance requirement is unconstitutional.
¶ 13 Accordingly, I dissent.

. The statute provides as follows:
§ 1306. Oral examination *262Each of the applicants for a marriage license shall appear in person and shall be examined under oath or affirmation as to:
(1) The legality of the contemplated marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage or marriages and its or their dissolution.
(3) The restrictions set forth in section 1304 (relating to restrictions on issuance of license).
(4) All the information required to be furnished on the application for license as prepared and approved by the department.
23 Pa.C.S. § 1306. A statute is not unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the constitution. Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 574 Pa. 460, 832 A.2d 418 (2003). The statute at issue herein is unquestionably constitutional on its face. Since the state has the authority to restrict marriages under its police power, it is within its rights to require applicants to comply with registration and licensing requirements. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 S.Ct. 723, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888) (recognizing marriage as a social relationship governed by individual states under police power); Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 359 Pa.Super. 111, 518 A.2d 591 (1986). (right to privacy inherent in marriage is not unrestricted but subject to state’s police power). The constitutional deprivation in this case springs from the Clerk’s strict interpretation of the personal appearance requirement and its refusal to provide a reasonable alternative.

. The majority reasons that since Appellant, an indigent prisoner, is not a member of a suspect class, there is no equal protection violation in this case. While I agree that the facts of this case do not implicate equal protection, as noted in the discussion infra, the denial of a fundamental right alone is sufficient to justify a substantive due process analysis. See Nixon v. Commonwealth, 576 Pa. 385, 399-401, 839 A.2d 277, 287 (2003).

. While some prisoners can comply with the Clerk’s personal appearance requirement because they can afford to pay the Schuylkill County Sheriffs Department to transport them to the Clerk's office, Appellant cannot meet that requirement. No alternative exists to accommodate indigent prisoners.

. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 2777 Powers and duties of the office of the clerk of the orphans’ court division.