Court Opinion

ID: 9858303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:19:56.933452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:53.836969
License: Public Domain

UHLENHOPP, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I think the jury could reasonably infer defendant delivered drugs to Edington to have sexual intercourse with her rather than merely to accommodate her. See State v. Knutson, 220 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa); McDonald v. State, 57 Ala.App. 529, 329 So.2d 583, cert. den. 429 U.S. 834, 97 S.Ct. 99, 50 L.Ed.2d 99.
The State was not required to satisfy the court beyond a reasonable doubt. On this record we as a court might or might not have a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s purpose, if we reviewed the issue de novo. All the State had to do was introduce evidence of facts and circumstances from which a jury could reasonably infer that defendant did not deliver drugs to Edington to accommodate her. In determining whether a jury could so infer, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. We stated in State v. Overstreet, 243 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Iowa):
It is equally well settled that on defendant’s appeal from criminal conviction based on jury verdict challenging sufficiency of evidence to sustain the verdict, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and accepts as established all reasonable inferences tending to support the jury’s action. It is necessary to consider only the supporting evidence whether contradicted or not. It is for the fact finder, not us, to resolve questions of fact and determine the credibility of witnesses.
Furthermore, the State did not have to prove an intent by defendant to make a profit or to induce dependency or habituation, or an intent by Edington to pay defendant any money, physical property, or goods. We said in State v. McNabb, 241 N.W.2d 32, 34-35 (Iowa):
The statute lists neither two nor three elements for accommodation status. Rather it first announces a separate, lesser punishment where the offense was committed as an accommodation to another. Thereafter the legislature contrasts two of the possible examples where accommodation clearly does not exist.
The words “ * * * only as an accommodation to another individual * * ” as used in this section mean to furnish, as a favor to the recipient, something the recipient desires.
The facts in the instant case plainly exclude defendant from this definition. The furnishing of the pills was motivated by defendant’s desire to recoup his money; it was not done as a favor to the recipient. Defendant was not an accommodation deliverer. .
It was not necessary under these facts to show defendant sold the pills for a profit or that he sold them for the purpose of making another person dependent upon them. In either event such a showing would have been in itself sufficient to establish defendant was not an accommodation deliverer. But under the statute it was not necessary to make such a showing where the facts otherwise establish defendant did not fall within the definition.
See also State v. Stidolph, 263 N.W.2d 737 (Iowa).
Some of the testimony at the accommodation trial follows. Regarding the drugs in the bag defendant placed in the shed, Officer Timko testified:
Q. All right. Can you tell us the quantity or approximate quantity of mar*926ijuana? A. Yes, I believe it would have been twenty-three grams. .
Q. And as to the barbiturates, do you have a count of the various barbiturates found? A. I do.
Q. Would you tell us what they were? A. There was approximately 10½ phenobarbital tablets; there were two pento-barbital tablets, also a barbiturate; there was also two amobarbitals; and approximately 56 phendimetrazine, which was at that time a Schedule III controlled substance.
As to the bearing the quantity of drugs has on the accommodation issue, see State v. Metcalf, 260 N.W.2d 857 (Iowa).
Edington testified that she had been married and divorced twice, lived with one Jerry Brown, and had known defendant about 23 years. She testified further in part (I have added the italics):
Q. As of March 8, 1975, or at some point in time prior to that, had you established an intimate relationship with Mr. McDaniel? .
The Witness: Yes.
Q. When did that begin?
The Witness: It was in October, probably, of the first year that I lived there.
Q. What year would that be? A. 1973. . . .
Q. Over the course of the year, we’ll say leading up to March 8th of last year, on how frequent a basis would you see Mr. McDaniel? .
The Witness: Approximately every two weeks. Not always, but usually on the night that they had council meetings.

Q. All right. Did you have any arrangement with the defendant, Mr. McDaniel, to pay him for the materials that came on the morning of March 8th

The Witness: No. .
Q. Did you intend to pay him at any time on or after March 8 for those materials? A. No.
Also:
Q. Do you recall when you would have first discussed the materials which were delivered on March 8th with the defendant, when you would have had the first conversation relating to those materials? A. It was early on the afternoon on Friday. It was early, you know, I suppose maybe one or two in the afternoon.
Q. How did the conversation take place? A. Well, when he called me, that’s what we talked about, and he said he would drop them off on his way home from work, and then, because his wife was waiting for him, he called and told me that he couldn’t bring them then, he would bring them down the next day.
Q. All right. During the month of January of 1975, would you have seen the defendant? A. Yes.
Q. On how many occasions? A. Once or twice, because it was every — every month, I seen him; usually once a month at least, if not twice. .
Q. During those two preceding months, January and February of 1975, did you have any sexual contact with the defendant? .
The Witness: Yes. .
Q. On those occasions, did you give anything to the defendant, any money, any physical property, goods? A. No.

Q. Did you receive anything from him? A. Yes.

Q. What did you receive? A. Marijuana. .

Q. Did you receive it on every occasion that you saw him? A. Yes. . . .

Q. Did you ever discuss with the defendant, receiving marijuana from him? A. Yes. . . .
Q. Well, how many times did you talk about it? A. Well, when he would call on the phone, marijuana and sex was all that was usually even really talked about.

Q. You said that in connection with the marijuana, you also discussed sex with the defendant? A. Yes. .
*927Q. Mrs. Edington, can you tell us the date or the approximate date that you first discussed marijuana with the defendant? A. In October of 1973, I couldn’t tell you the exact date.

Q. And when did you first establish the intimate relationship with the defendant? A. About that time.

On cross-examination Edington testified in part:
Q. I gather from the way the prosecutor was conducting his direct examination that you have had sexual relations with Mr. Brown? A. Yes.
Q. How old are you, Mrs. Edington? A. I’ll be forty in September.
Q. How old is Jerry Brown? A. He’s twenty-two. .
Q. Did Davis Faris live with you? A. Yes.
Q. For how long? A. Approximately two — a year and a half to two years.
Q. And your relationship with Jack [defendant] has always been a friendly, compatible sort of relationship? A. Yes.
Q. You didn’t expect anything from him, and he didn’t really expect anything from you, in terms of friendship, did he? A. Not until the last — since October of 1978. It just kind of got to be a thing.

Q. Okay. The next time you testified was at the preliminary hearing. Now, you testified that when you began meeting with Chief McDaniel, you always met him in the car, is that right? A. Yes.
Q. And that’s when the sexual relations began? A. Yes.
Q. The sexual relations began with getting in the car? A. We always went someplace, we went someplace besides.

Q. But the times are simultaneous, when you talk about getting in the car with Officer McDaniel, you are also talking about that as being the point in time in which sex began too, aren’t you? A. Yes.

Q. And you are also now stating that that’s when the marijuana was begun to be given you, is that correct? A. Yes.

Q. And that all began in October of 1973? A. Yes. . . .
Q. —but your statement now is that having met with him twice a month, you had sex with him two or three times a month, and I would like to know how you did that? A. (No response.)
On redirect examination Edington testified in part:
Q. Well, Mrs. Edington, let me give you an opportunity to answer that question; during the months of January and February of 1975, how often did you see Mr. McDaniel? A. About two — not any more than two times a month.

Q. All right, how often did you have sex with him during that period? A. Every time.

I would hold the jury could reasonably infer defendant did not deliver the drugs merely to accommodate, but for his own purposes — sex. If defendant had given Ed-ington a small quantity of marijuana on one occasion as a favor, we would have a different case. But the jury could find that the sexual intercourse and the delivery of marijuana both began in October 1973 and were still going, on in February 1975. Defendant and Edington went out about twice a month, which would be about 34 times. This prolonged period of sex and drugs renders the conclusion of a nexus between the sex and drugs almost irresistible let alone reasonable — to say nothing of the rest of the testimony. I would affirm the judgment.
MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND and REES, JJ., join in this dissent.