Court Opinion

ID: 9519862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:26:12.457474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:05.584472
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, also concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority’s initial determination that a defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s appeal. I also agree with the majority that, where the circuit court gives proper Rule 604(d) and Rule 605(b) (188 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)) admonitions to an adult defendant and the defendant fails to comply with Rule 604(d), it is not appropriate for the appellate court to remand the cause to the circuit court for strict compliance with Rule 604(d). Instead, the appellate court must dismiss the appeal because the defendant has an adequate remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq. (West 2000)). See People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93 (1988). I part company with the majority, however, because it assumes, without analysis or citation to authority, that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings, and does not provide an adequate remedy for the juvenile in the case at bar. Moreover, the assumption the majority makes affects the very outcome of the present cause and is therefore contrary to principled judicial review. In my opinion, whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings is an issue of great import which this court must decide to reach the proper resolution of this cause. ANALYSIS In Wilk, in the context of criminal proceedings, this court considered what should be the effect of the defendants’ failure to comply with Rule 604(d). Both defendants had filed notices of appeal of their guilty pleas without prior Rule 604(d) motions to withdraw the guilty pleas. This court first acknowledged, the impact upon a defendant’s rights when there is a failure to comply with Rule 604(d): “[A]n attorney who stands with his client in a criminal proceeding, hears the admonishments of the court required by Rule 605(b), and fails to adhere to Rule 604(d) by moving to withdraw the plea prior to filing a notice of appeal has fallen short of providing competent representation. *** The defendant, through no fault of his, is deprived of a right to be heard in the appellate court. Such assistance of counsel, coupled with the denial of appellate review, raises effective assistance of counsel constitutional questions. Furthermore, many of the grounds for withdrawal of guilty pleas, consideration of which is denied because of counsel’s failure, themselves may raise constitutional questions.” Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 105-06. This court also emphasized, however, the importance of Rule 604(d): “[The] purpose [of Rule 604(d)] is to ensure that before a criminal appeal can be taken from a guilty plea, the trial judge who accepted the plea and imposed sentence be given the opportunity to hear the allegations of improprieties that took place outside the official proceedings and dehors the record, but nevertheless were unwittingly given sanction in the courtroom. Rule 604(d) provides for fact finding to take place at a time when witnesses are still available and memories are fresh. [Citation.] A hearing under Rule 604(d) allows a trial court to immediately correct any improper conduct or any errors of the trial court that may have produced a guilty plea.” Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 104. The court then noted that exceptions to Rule 604(d) fashioned by various panels of the appellate court had circumvented and defeated the purpose of the rule: “If the appellate court elects to retain jurisdiction of the appeal and considers the merits of the defendant’s contentions, the rule has been ignored. If the appellate court remands the case for a motion to withdraw, to be filed and to be considered by the trial court, the case has taken a needless trip to the appellate court, wasted that court’s time, extended the time within which the motion to withdraw must be filed under Rule 604(d), and attaches no consequences to the ignoring of the requirements of the rule of this court.” Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 106-07. Balancing the various interests at issue, this court affirmed the dismissal of the defendants’ appeals. The court noted that, pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the defendants had an appropriate vehicle for the vindication of their rights. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 107. In the case at bar, as in Wilk, respondent’s attorney failed to comply with Rule 604(d). Counsel did not file a motion to withdraw respondent’s guilty plea or a motion to reconsider the sentence. Since respondent is a juvenile and not an adult, the question then becomes whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. If the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings, respondent, like the adult defendants in Wilk, has an adequate remedy for counsel’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d). Conversely, if the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings, respondent does not have an adequate remedy for counsel’s failure to comply with the rule. Due process considerations would dictate that, rather than dismiss respondent’s appeal, this court remand to the circuit court for strict compliance with Rule 604(d). See People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469 (1996) (this court remanded the cause for strict compliance with Rule 604(d) where the trial court failed to give the defendant the Rule 605(b) admonitions regarding Rule 604(d)). The appellate court recognized that whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings is a crucial issue in this case. The court observed: “Since the issue is one of waiver rather than jurisdiction, the question is not whether we can consider respondent’s appeal but whether we should. Of course, if this were a criminal case Wilk would dictate dismissal, leaving the respondent to his remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ***.” (Emphases in original.) 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. The court then held that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. Being aware, however, that by its holding the juvenile’s claim of constitutional violations would escape scrutiny, the court advanced an alternate resolution of the case: “Because a juvenile, unlike an adult offender, has no alternative means of presenting his claims, we believe it is appropriate to invoke Supreme Court Rule 615(a): ‘Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977-78. The appellate court remanded the cause to the circuit court for strict compliance with Rule 604(d). 328 Ill. App. 3d at 978. The majority opinion tracks the reasoning of the appellate court in determining that compliance with Rule 604(d) is not jurisdictional. However, unlike the appellate court opinion, the majority opinion does not determine, with proper analysis and citation to authority, whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. Rather than determine this crucial question, the majority merely assumes that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. The majority states: “The Post-Conviction Hearing Act, however, has never been held to apply in juvenile proceedings. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 321-22 (‘this court has not reviewed holdings of the appellate court concluding that relief from such (juvenile court] proceedings is unavailable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act’). Consequently, dismissing a juvenile defendant’s appeal for failing to comply with the written motion requirements of Rule 604(d) may leave a juvenile without a remedy for his claims, including those claims alleging constitutional violations.” 206 Ill. 2d at 604. Further, in rejecting the State’s contention that a juvenile would not be left without a remedy but could resort to a section 2 — 1401 motion (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401 (West 2000)), the majority states: “Section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, does not provide a juvenile defendant with a remedy equivalent to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Although the remedial powers of section 2 — 1401 have been held to extend to criminal cases, such a motion is intended ‘to correct all errors of fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown to the petitioner and court at the time judgment was entered, which, if then known, would have prevented its rendition.’ [Citation.] A juvenile’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d) does not fall within those parameters.” 206 Ill. 2d at 604-05. The majority concludes that: “Because a juvenile does not have an adequate means for presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), we find that dismissal is too harsh a sanction for a juvenile defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d). We emphasize, however, that this court requires strict compliance with Rule 604(d) in both the juvenile and the adult context. We therefore hold that when a juvenile defendant fails to comply with the written motion requirements of Rule 604(d) prior to filing an appeal, the appellate court has no discretion and must remand the cause to the circuit court for strict compliance with Rule 604(d).” 206 Ill. 2d at 605. With due respect, my colleagues of the majority err in that they make an assumption which affects the very outcome of this case. Consider the alternate assumption, that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. In that case, respondent, like the defendants in Wilk, has an adequate remedy for counsel’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d). Applying Wilk, it would also follow that the proper resolution of this case is to dismiss respondent’s appeal. I note that this court is entrusted with the responsibility for a just result and the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent. People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 379 (1993), quoting American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (1991), citing Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967). Where, as here, an issue of import is relevant to the final determination of the cause and is not yet decided by this court, the court is duty bound to consider the issue and arrive at a reasoned decision concerning the issue. The court should not assume, without analysis or authority, that the issue has been decided in a particular manner. Nor should the court divorce itself from its responsibility by observing that no other court has ever decided the issue in a particular manner. In the case at bar, this court is duty bound to consider whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. The court may not merely assume that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a remedy for a defendant who has suffered a substantial violation of his or her constitutional rights in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction. See 725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 (West 2000). In assuming that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings, this court has, without analysis, deprived all juveniles of the comprehensive remedies afforded by the Act. I do not here imply that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act should apply to juvenile proceedings. Rather, I suggest that this court, as the supreme judicial body of this state, must shoulder its responsibilities and come to a reasoned decision about the issue. CONCLUSION I cannot join fully in the majority opinion because the majority refuses to decide an important issue in the case at bar, and because the majority makes an assumption about that issue which controls the very outcome of the case. While I concur in the majority’s holding that a defendant’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d) does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s appeal, I respectfully dissent from the balance of the opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICE RAR-ICK join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.