Court Opinion

ID: 9894362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 16:01:14.830034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:24.494447
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13668     Document: 60-1     Date Filed: 11/01/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13668
                           ____________________

        SEAN P. REILLY,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT
        OF CORRECTIONS,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00118-MW-MJF
                           ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                   21-13668

        Before JORDAN, LAGOA, Circuit Judges, and CANNON,* District
        Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
               In 2021, Sean Reilly—a Florida prisoner—submitted a peti-
        tion for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging
        a 2009 conviction and a subsequent 2015 judgment for revocation
        of probation. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of
        jurisdiction, concluding that it was an unauthorized second or suc-
        cessive habeas corpus application.
               Mr. Reilly appeals the district court’s dismissal of his peti-
        tion. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
                                                I
               We begin with an overview of the sentences and convictions
        relevant to Mr. Reilly’s § 2254 petition from 2021. The procedural
        history is complicated, but necessary to understanding what the
        2021 petition related to.
                                                A
               The September 2009 Judgment. On September 22, 2009, in
        Case No. 2008-CF-4221, Mr. Reilly was convicted of two counts
        (Counts One and Five) of criminal use of personal identiﬁcation
        information in Leon County Circuit Court. As to Count One, Mr.
        Reilly was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days of imprisonment,

        * The Honorable Aileen M. Cannon, United States District Judge for the South-

        ern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        21-13668               Opinion of the Court                         3

        followed by two years of community control and two years of pro-
        bation. As to Count Five, he was sentenced to “two years of com-
        munity control followed by two years of probation, to run consec-
        utive to the incarcerative portion of the sentence on Count [One]
        but concurrent with the supervisory portions of the sentence on
        Count [One] (the community control and probation).” D.E. 19 at
        3.
               The 2010 Violation of Supervision Judgment. In September
        of 2010, while Mr. Reilly was serving the supervisory portion of
        the 2009 sentence in Case No. 2008-CF-4221—and of another sen-
        tence unrelated to this appeal in Case No. 2008-CF-781—he was
        charged with violations of his supervision. On December 6, 2010,
        the state court found that he had violated the conditions of super-
        vision and revoked his term of supervision. As to Count One of
        the 2009 judgment, Mr. Reilly was sentenced to 60 months of im-
        prisonment. As to Count Five, he received a split sentence of two
        years of community control followed by two years of probation,
        to run consecutive to the incarcerative sentence on Count One.
               The 2015 Violation of Probation Judgment. In December of
        2013, while Mr. Reilly was serving the supervisory portion of his
        sentence from the 2010 violation of supervision judgment, he was
        charged with aggravated stalking in Leon County Circuit Court
        and with violation of his probation in Case No. 2008-CF-4221. In
        April of 2015, “following a combined nonjury trial on the [aggra-
        vated stalking] charge . . . and a [violation of probation] hearing in
        Case No. 2008-CF-4221, the state court found [Mr.] Reilly guilty of
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  21-13668

        [a]ggravated [s]talking . . . and guilty of violating his supervision in
        Case No. 2008-CF-4221 (imposed by the 2010 [violation of proba-
        tion] Judgment).” Id. at 4–5. On June 18, 2015, Mr. Reilly was sen-
        tenced to a term of ﬁve years of imprisonment for the aggravated
        stalking conviction, and ﬁve years of imprisonment for the viola-
        tion of probation, with the latter to run consecutively to the for-
        mer.
                                           B
               Over the last ﬁve years, Mr. Reilly has ﬁled various § 2254
        petitions. We discuss certain petitions—those relevant to this ap-
        peal—below.
               The 2018 Petition. In 2018, Mr. Reilly ﬁled a § 2254 petition
        in the Northern District of Florida, challenging the sentence im-
        posed in 2010. He amended that petition in 2019 and identiﬁed the
        date of the judgment and sentence he was challenging as Decem-
        ber 6, 2010. This was the sentence resulting from the 2010 viola-
        tion of supervision judgment discussed above. Mr. Reilly raised
        various ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims, and the district
        court denied the petition on the merits.
               The 2020 Petition. In 2020, Mr. Reilly ﬁled another § 2254
        petition in the Northern District of Florida, this time challenging
        the sentence imposed in 2009. In this petition, he identiﬁed the
        date of the judgment of conviction that he was challenging as July
        24, 2009, and the date of the sentence as September 22, 2009. This
        was the sentence resulting from the original “September 2009 judg-
        ment” discussed above for the two counts of criminal use of
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        21-13668               Opinion of the Court                          5

        personal identiﬁcation information. Mr. Reilly raised several inef-
        fective assistance of counsel claims, as well as a claim that the cu-
        mulative impact of his counsel’s ineﬀectiveness deprived him of a
        fair and impartial trial. The district court dismissed the petition on
        jurisdictional grounds and did not reach the merits of the claims
        asserted. Speciﬁcally, the district court adopted the magistrate
        judge’s report and recommendation, which recommended that the
        petition be dismissed for being an unauthorized second or succes-
        sive petition. Mr. Reilly appealed the dismissal of his § 2254 peti-
        tion and, as of the time of this decision, that appeal is still pending
        before this Court in Case No. 21-11565.
               The 2021 Petition. In 2021, Mr. Reilly ﬁled the § 2254 petition
        at issue in this appeal. This petition raised two claims—one chal-
        lenging the original 2009 conviction and one challenging the 2015
        violation of probation judgment. As to the 2009 conviction, Mr.
        Reilly alleged that his counsel was ineﬀective for failing to convey a
        plea oﬀer of deferred prosecution. See D.E. 1 at 3. And as to the
        2015 violation of probation judgment, he asserted that his counsel
        was ineﬀective for advising him to “waive his right to a jury trial on
        the aggravated stalking oﬀense and proceed to a joint hearing in-
        volving both the new law violation of aggravated stalking and the
        [violation of probation.]” Id. at 5.
               The Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections
        moved to dismiss the petition as second or successive, arguing that
        the petition was Mr. Reilly’s “ﬁfth habeas action in [the Northern
        District of Florida] and his second attempt to ﬁle an unapproved
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                     21-13668

        successive petition challenging his 2009 conviction[.]” D.E. 13 at 1–
        2. The district court granted the motion and dismissed Mr. Reilly’s
        petition for lack of jurisdiction based on its conclusion that the pe-
        tition was an unauthorized second or successive habeas corpus ap-
        plication. This is Mr. Reilly’s appeal from that ruling. 1
                                              II
               “We review de novo whether a petition for a writ of habeas
        corpus is second or successive” under the Antiterrorism and Eﬀec-
        tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla.
        Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
                                             III
               “After a state prisoner has had a trial, a direct appeal, and an
        opportunity for collateral review in the state courts, he typically
        gets one, and only one, chance to collaterally attack his conviction
        in federal court.” Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1324. Subject to certain
        exceptions not relevant here, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) requires district
        courts to dismiss “[a] claim presented in a second or successive ha-
        beas corpus application under [§] 2254 that was presented in a prior
        application[.]”
               Though AEDPA does not deﬁne “second or successive,” we
        are not without guidance in assessing this “term of art.” See Mag-
        wood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332 (2010) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel,
        529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000)). The Supreme Court explained in

        1 For ease of reference, Appendix I demonstrates the habeas petitions filed by

        Mr. Reilly and their corresponding challenged judgments.
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        21-13668                Opinion of the Court                          7

        Magwood that “the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be inter-
        preted with respect to the judgment challenged.” Id. at 333. The
        Supreme Court also made clear “that the phrase . . . applies to ha-
        beas petitions, not to the claims they raise.” Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla.
        Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in orig-
        inal). In other words, under § 2244(b), there are no second or suc-
        cessive claims. Rather, “the phrase ‘second or successive’ applies to
        an application as a whole[.]” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Mag-
        wood, 561 U.S. at 334–35). And “where . . . there is a new judgment
        intervening between the two habeas petitions, an application chal-
        lenging the resulting new judgment is not second or successive.”
        Id. (quoting Magwood, 561 U.S. at 341–42).
                With this backdrop, we have “conclude[d] that when a ha-
        beas petition is the ﬁrst to challenge a new judgment, it is not ‘sec-
        ond or successive,’ regardless of whether its claims challenge the
        sentence or the underlying conviction.” Id. at 1281. To determine
        whether the 2021 habeas petition challenges a new judgment, we
        look to the judgment “that places [Mr. Reilly] in custody.” Ferreira
        v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he
        judgment that forms the basis of the habeas petition is the one that
        places the petitioner in custody.”). Here, that judgment is the 2015
        violation of probation judgment. Though that 2015 judgment
        stems in part from the 2009 judgment, the sentence that author-
        ized Mr. Reilly’s current detention is the sentence imposed in 2015
        for his violation of probation. See Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1325 (“The
        judgment that matters for purposes of [§] 2244 is the judgment au-
        thorizing the prisoner’s conﬁnement.”) (internal quotation marks
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  21-13668

        omitted). Thus, because “the judgment to which AEDPA refers is
        the underlying conviction and most recent sentence that authorizes
        the petitioner’s current detention,” we conclude that the 2015 judg-
        ment is the dispositive judgment. See Ferreira, 494 F.3d at 1292.
               Given that Mr. Reilly has not challenged that judgment be-
        fore, his 2021 petition is not “second or successive.” That is, “[s]ince
        there was a new judgment”—i.e., the sentence imposed in 2015
        when Mr. Reilly violated his probation—there is “no reason to dif-
        ferentiate between [his] claim[s] challenging” the 2009 conviction
        in his 2021 habeas petition and those “challenging the [2015] sen-
        tence.” Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1281. Put simply, “when a habeas
        petition is the ﬁrst to challenge a new judgment, it is not ‘second
        or successive,’ regardless of whether its claims challenge the sen-
        tence or the underlying conviction.” Id.
               Mr. Reilly’s 2021 habeas petition is his ﬁrst to challenge the
        2015 violation of probation judgment. Thus, even though it in-
        cludes claims challenging the underlying 2009 conviction, it is not
        a “second or successive” application. See id. at 1279 (“Since his pe-
        tition was his ‘[ﬁrst] application challenging [an] intervening judg-
        ment,’ it was not ‘second or successive,’ regardless of whether he
        had raised the claims before.”) (quoting Magwood, 561 U.S. at 338).
                                          IV
               For purposes of this appeal, we decide only whether the
        2021 habeas petition was second or successive. We conclude that
        it was not, and therefore the district court had (and has) jurisdiction
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        21-13668                   Opinion of the Court                          9

        to consider the petition. We reverse the district court’s dismissal
        and remand for proceedings consistent with our opinion.2
                REVERSED AND REMANDED.

        2 Of course, “AEDPA’s other limitations still apply” and may otherwise pre-

        clude Mr. Reilly from relief. See Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1281 n.9.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                21-13668

                                    Appendix I

        September 2009 Conviction                     2020 Habeas Petition
                                                      Claims made against the
                                                      September 2009 Judgment

        2010 Violation of                             2018 Habeas Petition
        Supervision Judgment                          Claims made against the
                                                      2010 Violation of Super-
                                                      vision Judgment

        2015 Violation of                             2021 Habeas Petition
        Probation Judgment                            Claims made against the
                                                      September 2009 Convic-
                                                      tion and the 2015 Second
                                                      Violation of Probation
                                                      Judgment