Court Opinion

ID: 9944496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 17:10:14.942252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:16.930741
License: Public Domain

J-S40045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MOHAMMED KAMANA                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 867 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 28, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0006317-2015

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2024

       Appellant, Mohammed Kamana,1 appeals from the order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that dismissed his first petition filed

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)2 without a hearing.        For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm.

       Appellant and his co-defendant, Mustafa Crenshaw, were charged with

attempted murder, aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, possession of a

firearm by a prohibited person, carrying a firearm without a license, and

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant’s name is also referred to in the record in this case as Mohammed

Kamara. This Court for ease of discussion will refer to him as Appellant.
2   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
J-S40045-23

carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia for shooting a man (Victim)

in the back on April 13, 2015. The shooting occurred after Appellant, who had

been in a dispute with Victim several days earlier, and his co-defendant pulled

up to Victim in a white car near the intersection of 67th Street and Elmwood

Avenue in Philadelphia, exited the car, and began fighting with Victim.

Commonwealth v. Kamana, No. 3446 EDA 2017, slip op. at 1-2 (Pa. Super.

June 7, 2019) (unpublished memorandum). During the fight, Appellant’s co-

defendant passed a gun to Appellant, who then shot Victim. Id. at 2.

      A jury trial of the charges against Appellant and his co-defendant, other

than possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, was held from March 20

to March 29, 2017. Eight witnesses testified at the trial of Appellant and his

co-defendant: Victim, a SEPTA bus driver who witnessed the shooting, and six

police officers and detectives. In addition, a video recording from a store on

the southwest corner of 67th and Elmwood was played.

      Victim testified that as he was leaving a store on Elmwood Avenue on

April 13, 2015, Appellant and Appellant’s co-defendant, both of whom he knew

from the neighborhood, drove up in a white car. N.T. Trial, 3/23/17, at 131,

135-38. Victim testified that he had been in a verbal argument with them a

few days earlier and that when Appellant and Appellant’s co-defendant got out

of the car, they walked toward him looking like they wanted to fight. Id. at

131-35, 139.    Victim testified that he began fighting with Appellant and

Appellant’s co-defendant and that Appellant’s co-defendant passed a gun to

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Appellant and Appellant pointed the gun at Victim. Id. at 139-40, 166-67.

Victim testified that he turned to run away, but that the gun went off and he

was shot in the back. Id. at 131, 139-40, 166-67. He testified after he was

shot, his friends helped him into a red car and drove him to the hospital. Id.

at 140-41. Victim admitted that at the hospital he told the police that he

didn’t know who shot him and that he identified Appellant and Appellant’s co-

defendant later only after the police had threatened to lock him up. Id. at

142,146-48, 163-65.

      The bus driver testified that on April 13, 2015, when she was driving

her bus on her route and was stopped at a red light at 67th and Elmwood, she

saw what she thought was a bunch of kids horsing around or fighting at the

corner and heard a pop.     N.T. Trial, 3/24/17, at 142-44.    The bus driver

testified that after she heard the pop, she turned the bus onto 67th Street,

drove a couple of blocks further, flagged down a police officer, and reported

that there had been a shooting and its location. Id. at 143-45. Although the

bus driver testified at trial that she did not see anyone pull out a gun before

she heard the pop, she admitted that she gave a signed statement to police

on April 17, 2015, in which she stated that she saw one of the people in the

fight fire a gun. Id. at 144, 146-49, 154, 162-63. The statement, which the

bus driver admitted accurately reported what she told police on that date and

the officer testified was a verbatim report of his questions and her answers

that she signed, was read into and admitted in evidence. Id. at 146-54; N.T.

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Trial, 3/27/17, at 28-29, 81-82.    In that statement, the bus driver reported

that the shooter was “[m]aybe 5’8”, regular size” and that she heard the

shooter talking with an African or Jamaican accent. N.T. Trial, 3/24/17, at

149-50, 167-68. The bus driver testified that she did not see the shooter’s

face and could not identify Appellant or his co-defendant as having been at

the scene of the shooting. Id. at 163-64, 166-67, 170.

      The video showed that a white car pulled up at the 67th and Elmwood

intersection at approximately 1:19 p.m. on April 13, 2015, that two people

got out of the white car, and that there was commotion involving several

people while a SEPTA bus was at the opposite corner. N.T. Trial, 3/23/17, at

96, 98-100, 104-06, 110; N.T. Trial, 3/24/17, at 7-8.        The video showed

people then getting into the white car and driving off, other people then

entering a red car and driving away in a different direction, and police arriving

at the scene approximately four minutes after both cars had left. N.T. Trial,

3/23/17, at 100-02. Police witnesses testified that a recently fired cartridge

casing was found at the scene.      N.T. Trial, 3/23/17, at 55-56; N.T. Trial,

3/24/17, at 12-13, 31-32; N.T. Trial, 3/27/17, at 21-22.

      At the end of the first week of the trial, before the bus driver testified,

the Commonwealth disclosed that the police officer who arrested Appellant

would testify from personal knowledge that Appellant sometimes speaks with

an African accent and that it also had prison telephone call recordings, which

it did not intend to introduce in its case in chief, showing Appellant speaking

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with an African accent. N.T. Trial, 3/24/17, at 111-13, 135-36. Appellant’s

counsel objected to this evidence on the ground that it had not been disclosed

in discovery, and the trial court delayed the arresting officer’s testimony to

permit counsel to listen to the prison call recordings and prepare for the

testimony. Id. at 113-14, 116-37.

      After Appellant’s trial counsel listened to the prison call recordings, the

trial court permitted the Commonwealth to ask the arresting officer about

Appellant’s accent.   N.T. Trial, 3/27/17, at 47-48.      The arresting officer

testified that he was familiar with Appellant from interactions with the

community that he patrolled and had spoken with Appellant and heard

Appellant speaking with others. Id. at 58-60. The arresting officer testified

that he has heard Appellant speak “with an African dialect” at times and at

other times speak with no accent. Id. at 60. The arresting officer further

testified that on April 24, 2015 at approximately 5:00 a.m., he went with other

officers to 2105 South 65th Street, which was not Appellant’s house, to arrest

Appellant. Id. at 64, 71. The arresting officer testified that after he knocked

on the door, he saw Appellant look out the front ground floor window at him.

Id. at 64-65.   The arresting officer testified that he identified himself and

asked Appellant to open the door and that Appellant then fled up the stairs,

did not respond to officers banging on the door, and came down and unlocked

the door only after officers had opened the front window. Id. at 65-67, 72-

73. The arresting officer testified that the biographical information filled out

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after Appellant’s arrest in this case stated that Appellant was born in Liberia

and that Appellant’s height was 6’1”. Id. at 68-70.

      Neither Appellant nor his co-defendant testified or called any witnesses.

Prior to trial, Appellant’s trial counsel had filed a notice of alibi defense listing

Muna Turay and Laye Donzo as alibi witnesses who would testify that Appellant

was with them at a remembrance service for a deceased relative at the time

of the shooting.    3/16/16 Notice of Alibi. After listening to the prison call

recordings, however, trial counsel withdrew the alibi defense.           N.T. Trial,

3/27/17, at 55. After the Commonwealth rested, the trial court conducted a

colloquy of Appellant on whether he wished to testify and call witnesses. Id.

at 87-89. In this colloquy, Appellant testified that he discussed whether to

testify with trial counsel, that following those discussions, he chose not to

testify, and that he was not threatened and made the decision not to testify

of his own free will. Id. at 88-89. With respect to calling witnesses, Appellant

responded to the trial court’s questions as follows:

      THE COURT: All right, sir. And were there witnesses that you gave
      names of and addresses and information for your lawyer to
      contact that you wish to have called in this case that were not
      called?

      THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am.

      THE COURT: Your lawyer has indicated that he did contact certain
      witnesses that were listed on an alibi notice that he provided the
      Court with, and today he’s indicated those witnesses would not be
      called. Is that your decision to not call those witnesses as well?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

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Id. at 89. In its charge, the trial court included an instruction that the jury

could infer consciousness of guilt from the evidence that Appellant hid or fled

from police. N.T. Trial, 3/28/17, at 39-40.

      On March 29, 2017, the jury convicted Appellant of attempted murder,

aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, possession of an instrument of a

crime, carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on the

streets of Philadelphia. N.T. Trial, 3/29/17, at 3-5, 7-9; Verdict Slip. The jury

convicted Appellant’s co-defendant of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy,

possession of an instrument of a crime, carrying a firearm without a license,

and carrying a firearm on the streets of Philadelphia, but acquitted him of

attempted murder. N.T. Trial, 3/29/17, at 5-10. Both Appellant and his co-

defendant waived their right to a jury trial of the possession of a firearm by a

prohibited person charge, and the trial court found Appellant and his co-

defendant guilty of that offense, following a hearing at which they stipulated

to their prior convictions. Id. at 10-19.

      The trial court, on June 9, 2017, sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

term of imprisonment of 111/2 to 23 years followed by 10 years’ probation,

consisting of consecutive terms of imprisonment of 9 to 18 years and 21/2 to

5 years for the attempted murder and conspiracy convictions, followed by

concurrent terms of probation of 10, 7, 5, and 5 years for the firearms and

possession of an instrument of crime convictions, and no further penalty for

aggravated assault.     N.T. Sentencing at 68; Sentencing Order, 6/9/17.

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Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which were denied by operation of law,

and timely appealed from his judgment of sentence. On June 7, 2019, this

Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions, but vacated his consecutive conspiracy

sentence, and, because this disturbed the trial court’s sentencing scheme,

vacated the entire judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Kamana, No. 3446 EDA 2017, slip op. at 20. Appellant did not file a petition

for allowance of appeal.

      On August 20, 2019, the trial court resentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of imprisonment of 111/2 to 23 years followed by 10 years’

probation, consisting of consecutive terms 9 to 18 years and 21/2 to 5 years

for the attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person

convictions, two consecutive 5-year terms of probation for the other firearms

convictions, a concurrent 5 years’ probation for possession of an instrument

of crime, and no further penalty for the aggravated assault and conspiracy

convictions. Sentencing Order, 8/20/19. Appellant did not file a direct appeal

from this judgment of sentence.

      On August 12, 2020, Appellant filed a timely pro se first PCRA petition.

PCRA counsel was appointed and filed an amended PCRA petition on May 13,

2021, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly

discovered evidence. The amended PCRA petition asserted that Appellant’s

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call Turay, Donzo, and a third alibi

witness, Abdulai Gassama, to testify that at the time of the shooting they were

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with Appellant at Appellant’s relative’s gravesite and prior to going to the

gravesite, that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call those witnesses to

testify that Appellant does not speak with an African accent, and that trial

counsel was ineffective in failing to call Appellant to testify in his own defense.

Amended PCRA Petition at 7-8, 13-15. The amended PCRA petition alleged

two items of newly discovered evidence, statements of Victim’s sister

concerning Victim’s identification of who shot him and a statement of Eugene

Patterson, a friend of Appellant who was at the house where Appellant was

arrested, and also alleged that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call

Patterson as a witness at trial to testify that Appellant stayed at that house

often and that Patterson, not Appellant, was the person who looked out the

window and ran upstairs when police arrived. Id. at 15-16, 22-26.

      On February 3, 2022, the PCRA court issued a notice pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 of its intent to dismiss all of Appellant’s PCRA claims without

a hearing. In this notice, the PCRA court stated that no hearing was necessary

because Appellant at trial represented to the court that he did not wish to call

the alibi witnesses, that there were no witnesses he wanted to call, and that

it was his own voluntary decision to not testify on his own behalf, because

testimony that Appellant does not speak with an accent would not have been

beneficial to Appellant in light of the Commonwealth’s recordings of him

speaking with an accent, because there was no basis to conclude that Victim’s

sister would testify as Appellant sought, and because Patterson’s statement

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did not satisfy the requirements for newly discovered evidence. PCRA Court

Notice of Intent to Dismiss at 2-6. Appellant filed a response to the PCRA

court’s Rule 907 notice, in which he made arguments in support of his PCRA

claims and asserted that a hearing was necessary. On February 28, 2022, the

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Trial Court

Order, 2/28/22

      On March 25, 2022, Appellant timely appealed.            On March 3, 2023,

before briefs were filed in this appeal, Appellant filed an application seeking

to remand the case to the PCRA court to present newly discovered evidence

of another witness, Nile Montgomery, who stated in an affidavit dated

November 9, 2022, that he witnessed the April 13, 2015 shooting, that he saw

Appellant’s co-defendant and another person that he knew, who he identified

as “Ju” get out of the white car and argue with Victim, that “Ju” shot Victim,

and that Appellant was not present. Application to Remand at 2-3 & Ex. A.

On March 27, 2023, this Court denied the application to remand without

prejudice to Appellant's right to raise this issue in his brief before the merits

panel. 3/27/23 Order.

      In his brief, Appellant raises the following six issues: whether the PCRA

court erred in dismissing four claims of ineffective assistance of his trial

counsel without a hearing, (1) failure to call Appellant to testify in his own

defense; (2) failure to call alibi witnesses; (3) failure to call witnesses to testify

that Appellant does not speak with an African accent; and (4) failure to call

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Patterson as a witness to refute the Commonwealth’s claim that Appellant fled

police; (5) whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing his newly discovered

evidence claim concerning Victim’s sister; and (6) whether remand is required

for a hearing on a newly discovered evidence claim based on Montgomery’s

post-appeal affidavit.

      We review the dismissal of a PCRA petition to determine whether the

court’s decision is supported by the record and free of legal error.

Commonwealth v. Staton, 120 A.3d 277, 283 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth

v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1051 (Pa. Super. 2019); Commonwealth v.

Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012). A court may properly dismiss a

PCRA claim without a hearing where the defendant has not set forth a

sufficient claim for PCRA relief or if it is clear from the record that the claim is

patently without merit. Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1); Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45

A.3d 1096, 1107 (Pa. 2012); Wah, 42 A.3d at 338.

      Appellant’s first four issues involve claims of ineffective assistance of

Appellant’s trial counsel.   To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove: (1) that the underlying claim

is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel’s action or inaction had no reasonable

basis; and (3) that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or

inaction.   Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 618 (Pa. 2015);

Commonwealth v. Washington, 269 A.3d 1255, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(en banc); Commonwealth v. Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 15 (Pa. Super. 2020).

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The defendant must satisfy all three prongs of this test to obtain relief under

the PCRA. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Selenski, 228 A.3d at 15.

      The decision whether to testify in one’s own defense is a decision made

by the defendant himself after consultation with counsel. Commonwealth

v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Pa. 2000); Washington, 269 A.3d at 1264;

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Where, as here, the defendant represents to the court in a colloquy that he

voluntarily waives his right to testify, he generally cannot argue that trial counsel

was ineffective in failing to call him to the stand. Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1075;

Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2014). In such a

situation, a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel in advising his client not to

testify may be sustained only if the defendant shows that his counsel gave

him specific advice that was so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and

intelligent decision whether to testify on his own behalf. Nieves, 746 A.2d at

1104; Rigg, 84 A.3d at 1086. Advice not to testify has been held sufficiently

unreasonable to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where the

defendant shows that counsel advised him not to testify based on an

erroneous belief that evidence harmful to his case would come before the jury

if he testified.   Nieves, 746 A.2d at 1104-06; Washington, 269 A.3d at

1265-68.    In contrast, where counsel bases his advice not to testify on a

founded concern that the defendant’s testimony will result in harmful evidence

coming to the jury’s attention, the advice not to testify is reasonable and does

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not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1075-

76.

      Here, Appellant did not allege any basis on which it could be concluded

that his trial counsel’s advice to not testify was based on an erroneous belief

or was unreasonable. Appellant alleged in his PCRA petition that trial counsel

advised him not to testify because his testimony would result in evidence that

he spoke with an African accent, which would be harmful to his defense

because it would be consistent with the identification of the shooter by the

bus driver. Amended PCRA Petition at 14 & attached Certification of Appellant.

That advice was not erroneous. Although Appellant contends that he does not

have an accent and trial counsel should have known that, the record shows

that trial counsel knew that Appellant could speak without an accent and gave

his advice after he became aware that the Commonwealth had recordings of

Appellant speaking with an African accent and had listened to those

recordings. N.T. Trial, 3/24/17, at 112, 122-25, 135; N.T. Trial, 3/27/17, at

48-49, 88-89. Appellant notably did not dispute in his PCRA petition that the

recordings on which counsel based his advice showed Appellant speaking with

an African accent. The record therefore establishes that trial counsel had a

reasonable basis to believe that Appellant’s testimony would result in

additional harmful evidence concerning Appellant’s accent that was far

stronger than the arresting officer’s testimony, as Appellant’s testimony would

result in Appellant breaking into an African accent during his testimony or, if

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Appellant did not, either admission by Appellant on cross-examination that he

does sometimes speak with an African accent or the playing of recordings

showing him speaking with an African accent.

      Commonwealth v. Breisch, 719 A.2d 352 (Pa. Super. 1998), on which

Appellant relies, does not support his contention that his PCRA petition set

forth a potentially meritorious claim that counsel was ineffective in advising

him not to testify. In Breisch, this Court held that ineffective assistance of

counsel was shown where the defendant’s testimony was the sole evidence to

support her defense that she was given authorization to sign the checks on

which forgery charges against her were based, counsel had no basis to believe

that the defendant’s testimony would result in admission of harmful evidence,

and there was no evidence that the defendant agreed to the decision not to

testify. Id. at 355-57. None of those factors is present here. To the contrary,

Appellant’s testimony was not necessary to support a defense, as his alibi

defense could be proved through other witnesses named in his notice of alibi

without Appellant’s testimony. Moreover, as discussed above, trial counsel

had a reasonable basis to conclude that Appellant’s testimony would result in

harmful evidence, and the record shows that Appellant confirmed to the trial

court that he made a voluntary decision not to testify following consultation

with trial counsel. N.T. Trial, 3/27/17, at 88-89. Because the trial record

shows that Appellant made a voluntary decision not to testify after

consultation with trial counsel and the advice that Appellant alleges that

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counsel gave was not based on an erroneous assumption or belief, the PCRA

court did not err in dismissing this claim for PCRA relief without a hearing.

      Appellant’s remaining three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

all involve claims of failure to call certain witnesses to testify on particular

subjects.   Failure to call a witness can constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel only where the defendant shows that the witness existed, was

available, and was willing to testify on the defendant’s behalf; that trial

counsel knew or should have known of the witness’s existence; and that the

absence of the witness’s testimony prejudiced the defendant. Sneed, 45 A.3d

at 1108–09; Selenski, 228 A.3d at 16. In addition, failure to call a witness

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel made a

decision not to call the witness based on a reasonable strategic judgment that

the witness, even if favorable to the defendant on some points, would be

harmful to the defendant’s case. Commonwealth v. Ervin, 766 A.2d 859,

866 (Pa. Super. 2000).

      The PCRA court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s claim that trial

counsel was ineffective for failure to call Patterson as a witness without a

hearing because Appellant did not allege in his PCRA petition that his trial

counsel knew or should have known that Patterson was a relevant witness.

Appellant’s PCRA petition did not assert that Appellant ever gave Patterson’s

name to trial counsel as a witness or told him that Patterson could provide

evidence contradicting the arresting officer’s testimony.      Amended PCRA

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Petition at 22-25. Neither Appellant nor Patterson stated in their attached

certifications that trial counsel was advised that Patterson was the person who

fled from the police when they came to arrest Appellant or that Patterson

would testify that Appellant frequently stayed at the house where he was

arrested before the shooting occurred.         Rather, Patterson’s certification

described only the facts to which he would testify and Appellant’s certification

discussed only the testimony that Appellant would have given, his desire to

testify, and counsel’s advice not to testify.      Id., Certification of Eugene

Patterson and Certification of Appellant. Indeed, the PCRA petition argued

that Patterson’s statement was newly discovered evidence that was not

available to counsel at trial, and Appellant admitted to the trial court, after the

arresting officer’s testimony, that there were no witnesses that he wished to

call whose names and addresses he gave to counsel. Id. at 25; N.T. Trial,

3/27/17, at 89.

      Appellant did allege in his PCRA petition that his trial counsel was aware

of the alibi witnesses and witnesses that he contends would testify that he did

not have an African accent.       Appellant submitted with his PCRA petition

witness certifications of Gassama, Turay, and Donzo stating that trial counsel

spoke to them about testifying.       Amended PCRA Petition, Certification of

Abdulai Gassama, Certification of Memuna Turay at 2, and Certification of Laye

Donzo at 2. All three of these witnesses stated in their certifications that they

would have testified that they were with Appellant at a memorial service in

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another location in Philadelphia on the day of the shooting, and Gassama and

Turay stated that they would also have testified that Appellant does not have

an accent.    Id., Certification of Abdulai Gassama, Certification of Memuna

Turay at 1, and Certification of Laye Donzo at 1-2. In addition, the record

showed that trial counsel listed Turay and Donzo as alibi witnesses. 3/16/16

Notice of Alibi.

      Appellant, however, was questioned by the court at trial on whether he

wanted to call witnesses and represented to the court that he did not wish to

call any witnesses. N.T. Trial, 3/27/17, at 89. Where a defendant represents

to the trial court that the decision not to call witnesses is his own decision and

his decision not to call witnesses is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the

defendant is bound by those representations and cannot successfully assert a

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses.

Commonwealth v. Rios, 920 A.2d 790, 803 (Pa. 2007), overruled on other

issue,    Commonwealth        v.   Tharp,     101    A.3d   736    (Pa.   2014);

Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 316 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth

v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626, 642-43 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). The purpose

of this rule is to prevent a defendant from “build[ing] into his case a ready-

made ineffectiveness claim to be raised in the event of an adverse verdict.”

Paddy, 800 A.2d at 316.

      Appellant’s claims concerning failure to call witnesses to testify that he

does not speak with an accent and failure to call alibi witnesses are barred by

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his representation that he did not want to call witnesses. Appellant’s decision

not to call witnesses concerning his accent was plainly knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary for the same reason as his claim concerning counsel’s advice to

not testify failed. It is clear on the face of the record that Appellant could not

show that trial counsel’s advice not to call witnesses to testify that Appellant

did not have an accent was unreasonable because the trial transcript shows

that counsel made the decision not to call witnesses after he listened to the

Commonwealth’s recordings of Appellant speaking with an African accent.

N.T. Trial, 3/24/17, at 112, 135; N.T. Trial, 3/27/17, at 48-49, 55. Given the

Commonwealth’s ability to show Appellant speaking with an African accent,

calling witnesses on the issue of Appellant’s accent would only emphasize and

result in more conclusive evidence on a point harmful to Appellant’s defense.

Because the record establishes that trial counsel cannot be shown to have

acted without any reasonable basis in advising Appellant to not call witnesses

to testify that Appellant speaks without an accent and Appellant’s waiver of

his right to call witnesses on this subject was therefore knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary, the PCRA court properly dismissed this claim without a hearing.

      Although the trial record by itself would not conclusively preclude

Appellant from showing that his decision not to call alibi witnesses was

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, Appellant, did not plead anywhere in his

PCRA petition or his response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice what advice

counsel gave him on whether one or more of the alibi witnesses should be

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called to testify or the grounds on which counsel based his advice concerning

these witnesses.     To the contrary, Appellant in his PCRA petition only

discussed trial counsel’s knowledge of the alibi witnesses, their availability,

and the alleged value of the alibi testimony to his defense, not the advice that

counsel gave Appellant on calling these witnesses, and the only advice that

Appellant alleged that counsel gave him concerned the issue of whether

Appellant should testify in his own defense. Amended PCRA Petition at 10-12

& Certification of Appellant. In response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice,

which advised Appellant that his claim concerning failure to call these

witnesses was subject to dismissal based on his statements in his colloquy,

PCRA Court Notice of Intent to Dismiss at 2-3, Appellant again only argued

the merits of his PCRA claim concerning the alibi witnesses and made no

allegations concerning any specific advice from counsel that could have

rendered Appellant’s waiver of calling these witnesses unknowing or

unintelligent.   Objections to Rule 907 Notice at 4-7. Indeed, in his brief in

this Court, Appellant admits that “we do not know what advice was given” by

counsel to Appellant concerning the calling of alibi witnesses “and whether it

was appropriate under the circumstances.” Appellant’s Brief at 28. Because

Appellant failed to make any allegation sufficient to permit a finding that

counsel’s advice not to call alibi witnesses was so unreasonable as to make

Appellant’s agreement not call these witnesses unknowing and unintelligent,

see Nieves, 746 A.2d at 1104 (erroneous advice by counsel can vitiate a

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defendant’s otherwise valid waiver of his rights), the PCRA court did not err in

dismissing this claim for relief without a hearing.

      Appellant’s remaining two issues involve claims for relief based on newly

discovered evidence. To prevail on such a claim, the defendant must prove

(1) that the exculpatory evidence was discovered after trial and could not have

been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) that this

new evidence is not merely corroborative or cumulative of evidence that was

admitted at trial; (3) that the new evidence is not being used solely to impeach

credibility; and (4) that the new evidence would likely result in a different

verdict.   Commonwealth v. Tedford, 228 A.3d 891, 911 (Pa. 2020);

Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 972 (Pa. 2018); Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2018).            All four of these

requirements must be proved, and if the defendant fails to establish any one

of these, the after-discovered evidence claim fails. Small, 189 A.3d at 972;

Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 363 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      The first of Appellant’s newly discovered evidence claims in this appeal

is based on allegations that Victim’s sister told PCRA counsel that Victim

admitted to her that Appellant did not shoot him and that the shooter was

another person known as “Majou.” Amended PCRA Petition at 15. This claim

for PCRA relief was insufficient on its face because Appellant admitted in the

PCRA petition that Victim’s sister is unwilling to testify to those facts and

denies that Victim made any such statements to her.          Id. at 15 & text

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messages attached thereto as Exhibit D at 10-17. Although PCRA counsel

alleged that Victim’s sister made those statements to him prior to her later

denials, her statements to counsel were not contemporaneously electronically

recorded, set out in a writing signed by her, or given under oath and therefore

cannot be admissible for the truth of their contents under Pa.R.E. 803.1.

      The only basis on which Appellant asserts that Victim’s sister’s out-of-

court statements could be admissible for their truth is as statements against

interest. That argument is without merit.       A statement is admissible as a

statement against interest only if it is contrary to the declarant’s financial

interest or exposes the declarant to criminal liability.     Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3);

Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1176 (Pa. 2012).               Telling PCRA

counsel that her brother told her that Appellant did not shoot him did not

expose Victim’s sister to financial harm, as there is no claim that she had any

financial interest affected by the shooting or the identity of the shooter. Nor

could her statements expose her to criminal liability, as she never testified

under oath on the subject and the statements that she reported did not

implicate her in any crime. Because the only newly discovered evidence from

Victim’s sister would not be admissible at trial, this evidence could not possibly

have resulted in a different verdict.      The PCRA court therefore properly

dismissed this claim for relief without a hearing.

      Appellant’s remaining newly discovered evidence claim, a claim based

on the statement of alleged eyewitness Montgomery, was never presented to

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or ruled on by the PCRA court. We therefore cannot rule on the merits of this

claim.   Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court … cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal”). The relief that Appellant is seeking from

this Court on this issue, however, is a remand to permit him to present this

claim to the PCRA court.

      The affidavit of Montgomery stating that he witnessed the shooting and

that Appellant was not at the scene is dated November 9, 2022, over seven

months after the dismissal of his PCRA petition and the filing of this appeal

and indicates that Montgomery did not tell Appellant that he witnessed the

shooting until a relatively short time before he signed the affidavit. Application

to Remand at 2 & Ex. A. Appellant therefore could not have raised this claim

before the PCRA court after he alleges that he first learned of this evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. 2000) (“when an

appellant’s PCRA appeal is pending before a court, a subsequent PCRA petition

cannot be filed until the resolution of review of the pending PCRA petition by

the highest state court in which review is sought, or upon the expiration of

the   time   for   seeking   such   review”),   overruled    on   other    issue,

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020); Commonwealth v.

Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      Remand, however, is unnecessary because Appellant can raise this claim

by a second PCRA petition after the conclusion of this appeal. If a defendant,

while an appeal from denial of an earlier PCRA petition is pending, learns of

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new evidence that could not have been discovered earlier in the exercise of

due diligence, a PCRA petition asserting that claim is not time-barred if it is

filed within the time period provided by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2) after final

resolution of the appeal. Lark, 746 A.2d at 588; Beatty, 207 A.3d at 963.

In that situation, final resolution of the appeal “is the first ‘date the claim could

have been presented.’”       Lark, 746 A.2d at 588 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(2)).

      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err

in dismissing Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly

discovered evidence without a hearing and that no remand is necessary with

respect to Appellant’s claim of newly discovered evidence during the pendency

of this appeal. We therefore affirm the order of the PCRA court and deny

Appellant’s motion to remand.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 2/26/2024

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