Court Opinion

ID: 9548906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:10:30.27572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:36.005305
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion holds that the second prong of the test set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), is satisfied by the assertion contained in the affidavit that the affiant received information from “a previously reliable confidential informant whose information has resulted in narcotics arrest and seizures on at least two past occasions.” In my view, to approve this language as competent to demonstrate the reliability of the informer is to permit the Fourth Amendment to be eschewed through simple litany. To accept the above phrase as constitutionally sufficient is to ignore the purpose for which the concept of probable cause was included in the Constitution and for which the dyadic rule of Aguilar-Spinelli was formulated.
The warrant is an integral aspect of our system of criminal justice because it extends protection to each individual from hasty decisions of police officers on patrol. It places the responsibility in a neutral and detached magistrate to determine whether an officer is justified in interfering with our guaranteed right to be free from unreasonable intrusions into privacy.
“The protection which the warrant guarantees consists of requiring that those inferences [regarding probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive *380enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).
Unless the affidavit which the police present to the magistrate includes the constituent elements and concrete facts, the magistrate necessarily will be unable to perform his constitutional function of exercising independent judgment. People v. Treadway, 182 Colo. 239, 512 P.2d 275 (1973) (Erickson, J. dissenting). When the affidavit consists only of conclusions which the police officer has drawn, the affiant prevents the magistrate from completing his duties.
To comply with the constitutional requirements is not an insurmountable task. Facts can and have been tendered to the magistrate which meet the standards demanded by the Constitution. The affidavit should state when the information was received. Moreover, as noted by the Maryland Court of Appeals, the magistrate could be informed.
“whether the cases have been tried or whether they resulted in acquittals or convictions. The magistrate [could be] informed whether materials found at the time of the arrests corresponded with the information supplied by the informant. He' [could be] apprised as to the police assessment of the value of the information furnished by the informant, e.g., whether it amounted to more than underworld rumor .... The magistrate [could be] informed whether the informant’s information had always proved correct.” Kraft v. State, 16 Md. App. 347, 297 A.2d 328 (1972).
The affidavit presented to the magistrate in People v. Cruz, 244 Cal.App.2d 137, 53 Cal.Rptr. 354 (1966), represents the manner in which the affidavit may be prepared to comply with the spirit of the constitutional command. There, the affiant stated:
“Affiant received information from a confidential reliable informant who has furnished information in the past that has resulted in the arrest of 7 persons, 6 for [statutory violations], and one for violation of parole. These cases are still waiting adjudication in Los Angeles courts. Informant has never given information which proved to be incorrect.” Through the facts contained in the affidavit, the affiant has *381provided information to the magistrate which he can consider and from which he can draw conclusions as to the reliability of the informant. See Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L.Rev. 741 (1974).
The majority’s decision in this case serves to dilute the protections which the Constitution offers and to remove the magistrate from his all important role in the framework of the Bill of Rights. In my view, the ruling of the trial court should be reversed.