Court Opinion

ID: 9838222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 18:04:15.586863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:59.179072
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/5/23
               CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                       DIVISION SEVEN

THE LAW FIRM OF FOX AND             B319265
FOX,
     Plaintiff and Appellant,       (Los Angeles County
                                    Super. Ct. No.
        v.                          20STCV14405)

CHASE BANK, N.A.,

        Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
      The Law Firm of Fox and Fox and Frank O. Fox for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Cozen O’Connor and Brett D. Watson for Defendant and
Respondent.
                    _________________________

     The Law Firm of Fox and Fox (Law Firm) appeals from a
judgment entered after the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Chase Bank, N.A. In 2020 the Law Firm
filed this action against Chase alleging negligence in the
disbursement of funds from a blocked account containing estate
funds to the sole signatory on the account (as administrator of
the estate), Jazzmen Brumfield (Brumfield). The Law Firm
represented Brumfield as the administrator in the probate
proceedings following the death of her father. The Law Firm
alleged Chase was negligent in disbursing the entirety of the
estate funds to Brumfield despite a probate court order specifying
that Brumfield would receive at most $16,000 from the account,
with most of the remaining funds to be paid to the Law Firm (and
then to other beneficiaries as funds became available). On
January 13, 2022 the trial court granted Chase’s motion for
summary judgment, concluding Chase owed no duty of care to the
Law Firm and had complied with the probate court order.
       On appeal, the Law Firm contends it raised triable issues
of fact with respect to whether Chase owed a duty to the Law
Firm, whether Chase breached any such duty, and whether
Chase’s conduct in distributing the funds to Brumfield (who
absconded with the funds) was the proximate cause of the Law
Firm’s damages. We conclude Chase owed the Law Firm a duty
of care based on the special relationship it had with the Law
Firm as an intended beneficiary of the probate court’s order
directing that the estate funds be deposited into a blocked
account from which withdrawals could only be made “on court
order” (blocked account order) and Chase’s acceptance of that
order by executing the “receipt and acknowledgment of order for
the deposit of money into blocked account” (acknowledgment)
(capitalization omitted). Chase certified in the acknowledgment

                                2
that “no withdrawal of principal or interest from this account will
be permitted without a signed court order.”
       In finding a duty, we consider the factors first articulated
by the Supreme Court in Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647
(Biakanja). Although banks do not generally have a duty to
police customer accounts for suspicious activity, Chase owed the
Law Firm, as an intended beneficiary of the blocked account
order and acknowledgment, a duty to act with reasonable care in
limiting distributions from the blocked account to those
authorized by court order.
       Chase contends it properly distributed all of the blocked
funds pursuant to the probate court’s order approving final
account and report of administrator in the matter of In re Estate
of Lamont Brumfield (the final probate order), which approved
the final account and set the amounts Brumfield and the Law
Firm were “authorized” to receive before payment of the
beneficiaries. However, the order did not direct Chase to pay
specific amounts to Brumfield or the Law Firm, and therefore,
distribution of all the funds (or any funds) in the blocked account
to Brumfield was unauthorized absent a further court order.
Accordingly, there were triable issues of fact whether Chase
breached its duty and whether that breach caused the Law Firm
harm by allowing Brumfield to withdraw all the funds in the
account. We reverse.

                                 3
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Disbursement of Funds in the Probate Case1
       Brumfield hired the Law Firm2 to represent her as the
administrator of the estate of Lamont Brumfield in the probate
case, In re Estate of Lamont Brumfield (Super. Ct. L.A. County,
2017, No. 17STPB05296). On June 25, 2018 the probate court
entered the blocked account order, which confirmed the sale of
real property belonging to the estate and directed the
establishment of a blocked account with Chase. The order
specified: “Net sale proceeds must be deposited by escrow holder
in a blocked account to be withdrawn only on court order.
Receipts must be filed.”
       The blocked account order was presented to Chase on
October 31, 2018. The same day, Chase opened a blocked account
and deposited into the account the net proceeds from the sale in
the amount of $63,383.47. On November 7, 2018 an attorney-in-
fact for Chase executed the acknowledgment using Judicial
Council Form MC-356. By signing the form, Chase (through its
attorney-in-fact) acknowledged receipt of the blocked account
order and certified that no withdrawal from the blocked account
would be permitted “without a signed court order under this case
name and number, bearing the seal of this court.” Brumfield was
designated as the administrator and only authorized signatory on

1     The factual background is taken from evidence submitted
by the parties in connection with Chase’s motion for summary
judgment. We note where the facts are in dispute.
2     The Law Firm is a general partnership composed of Frank
Fox and Claire Fox. Further unspecified references to Fox refer
to Frank Fox.

                               4
the account. Brumfield signed a personal signature card that
also identified her as the only authorized signatory on the
account.
       On December 20, 2019 the probate court issued the final
probate order closing administration of the estate. The order
provided in paragraph 2 that Brumfield was “authorized and
directed to receive statutory compensation for services rendered,
in the sum of $16,000.00.” Paragraph 3 provided the Law Firm
was “authorized and directed to receive: [¶] a. Statutory
compensation for services rendered, in the sum of $16,000.00; [¶]
b. Extraordinary compensation for legal services rendered, in the
sum of $44,151.25; and [¶] c. Costs, in the sum of $6,173.39.”
The order specified that “[t]he amounts detailed in paragraphs 2
and 3, above, shall be paid from the balance of the funds
remaining ($47,383.47) and the unpaid balance, from any
currently unknown assets of the Decedent later discovered.”
       The final probate order also provided for distribution of the
balance of the funds remaining in the account to pay creditor’s
claims by the California Department of Child Support Services in
specific amounts, and if there were any remaining assets,
distribution in equal shares to Brumfield and minors Nehemiah
Brumfield and Chaz Brumfield. Finally, the order closed the
administration of the estate.
       Fox drafted and lodged with the probate court the final
probate order. Only Fox appeared at the hearing for the final
account and report of administrator.3

3     Neither party designated the reporter’s transcript for
inclusion in the appellate record.

                                 5
       On January 14, 2020 Fox and Brumfield brought the final
probate order to a Chase branch and presented it to Sergio Chun,
a private client banker. According to Fox, he advised Chun that
no funds could be distributed from the blocked account without
both Fox and Brumfield being physically present. Fox further
instructed Chun that the funds were to be paid separately to Fox
and Brumfield directly from the account. Fox stated in his
declaration that Chun agreed to these terms, but Chase disputed
that Chun agreed (or had authority to agree). Chun stated in his
declaration that he informed Fox and Brumfield that no one at
the branch level was authorized to review court documents or
release funds held in blocked accounts. He said he would forward
the final probate order to the appropriate Chase department and
offered to call Fox and Brumfield when a decision was made
regarding the final probate order and the blocked account.
       According to a declaration from John M. Chiavacci, a Chase
transaction specialist, Brumfield made a “series of withdrawals
from the [b]locked [a]ccount” from January 21 to January 23,
2020.4 It is undisputed that Brumfield withdrew the entirety of
the funds in the blocked account.

B.     This Lawsuit, the Demurrers, and the Grant of Summary
       Judgment in Favor of Chase
       On April 14, 2020 the Law Firm filed this action alleging a
single cause of action for negligence against Chase. After Chase
filed a demurrer, the Law Firm filed a verified first amended
complaint on September 15, 2020. The first amended complaint

4      The Chiavacci declaration refers to withdrawals in 2021,
but it is clear from the record that this is a typographical error
and Chiavacci intended to refer to withdrawals in 2020.

                                  6
identified Brumfield as Doe 1. Chase demurred again, and on
January 22, 2021 the trial court overruled the demurrer and
denied Chase’s accompanying request for judicial notice,
reasoning Chase’s arguments “go outside the pleading.”
       Chase filed its motion for summary judgment on
October 12, 2021. Chase primarily argued, as it does on appeal,
that it owed no duty to the Law Firm. Chase asserted seven
arguments: (1) banks have limited general duties toward their
depositors; (2) banks have limited general duties to
noncustomers; (3) the economic loss rule barred recovery;
(4) Chase and the Law Firm did not have a fiduciary relationship;
(5) there was a lack of foreseeability of harm; (6) the narrow duty
placed on banks to guard against specific types of check fraud did
not apply; and (7) Chase had only a limited duty “to keep the
funds frozen in the [b]locked [a]ccount until the court determined
that the funds could be released,” and it satisfied this duty by
waiting to release the funds until the final probate order
unblocked the account.5 Chase also asserted the Law Firm could
not show causation because once the funds were unblocked
pursuant to the court order, Chase had no choice but to disburse
them to Brumfield, and it was Brumfield who caused the injury.
       In its opposition the Law Firm argued Chase owed the Law
Firm a duty based on a special relationship arising from the
probate proceedings that required Chase to exercise due care in
distributing funds from the blocked account. The Law Firm

5     Chase’s arguments at times conflated duty and breach (as
they do on appeal). To the extent Chase argued it fully complied
with its duties under the final probate order, Chase was actually
arguing it did not breach its duty to reasonably comply with
orders of the court.

                                7
further asserted that the factors set forth in Biakanja, supra,
49 Cal.2d 647 supported imposition of a duty. Moreover, the final
probate order did not direct Brumfield to withdraw money to pay
the Law Firm, but rather, directed Chase to pay the specified
funds directly to the named recipients.
       In its reply, Chase reiterated the seven theories it had
advanced in its opening memorandum without addressing the
Biakanja factors. Chase also submitted evidentiary objections to
two statements in the Fox declaration in support of the Law
Firm’s opposition.6
       On January 13, 2022, after hearing argument from counsel,
the trial court granted Chase’s motion for summary judgment,
reasoning, “The demurrer was overruled because the argument
brought in facts outside the pleading. Summary judgment allows
those facts to be considered. It is undisputed that [Brumfield]
was the customer, not Fox, and that [the] Bank did exactly [what]
it was told to do by the underlying order. By law, there is no
liability on the Bank and summary judgment must be granted.”
The court did not rule on Chase’s evidentiary objections to the
Fox Declaration.7

6     The challenged assertions were as follows: (1) “‘The order
mandates that payment of the amounts to Plaintiff shall be made
directly from the blocked account with Chase, not indirectly, via
Ms. Brumfield or any other person’” and (2) “‘Mr. Chun stated
that he understood and agreed to comply with these terms.’”
7     Where the trial court fails to rule on evidentiary objections
in the context of a summary judgment motion, on appeal we
presume the objections have been overruled, with the objector
having the burden to renew its objections on appeal. (Reid v.
Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534.) Chase does not

                                 8
      The Law Firm appealed from the January 13, 2022 order
granting summary judgment. On June 24, 2022 the trial court
entered judgment in favor of Chase.8

                          DISCUSSION

A.     Standard of Review on Summary Judgment
       Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no
triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c);
Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018)
4 Cal.5th 607, 618 (Regents); Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Los Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, 668.) “‘“‘“We review the
trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set
forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which
objections were made and sustained.”’ [Citation.] We liberally
construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of

challenge the trial court’s evidentiary rulings on appeal and has
forfeited any challenge to the rulings. (Villanueva v. City of
Colton (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1197; Roe v. McDonald’s
Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114.)
8      After we notified the Law Firm that the order granting
summary judgment was not appealable, the Law Firm filed a
response attaching the June 24, 2022 judgment. We consider the
Law Firm’s premature notice of appeal a valid “notice of appeal
filed after judgment is rendered but before it is entered” and treat
the notice as filed immediately after entry of judgment. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(1); see Silva v. Langford (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 710, 715, fn. 6; Valdez v. Seidner-Miller, Inc.
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 600, 607.)

                                 9
that party.”’” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th
340, 347; accord, Doe, at p. 669.)
       A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial
burden of presenting evidence that a cause of action lacks merit
because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the cause of
action or there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2); Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 618; Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.) If the
defendant satisfies this initial burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to present evidence demonstrating there is a triable
issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2);
Aguilar, at p. 850.) “The plaintiff . . . shall not rely upon the
allegations or denials of its pleadings to show . . . a triable issue
of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific
facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); accord, Roman v. BRE Properties,
Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1054 [“It is fundamental that to
defeat summary judgment a plaintiff must show ‘specific facts’
and cannot rely on allegations of the complaint.”].)

B.     Chase Owed a Duty of Care to the Law Firm as an Intended
       Beneficiary
       The four elements of a negligence claim are well
established: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) proximate causation; and
(4) injury. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213
(Brown) [“To establish a cause of action for negligence, the
plaintiff must show that the ‘defendant had a duty to use due
care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the
proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’”]; Kesner v.
Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158; Nally v. Grace

                                 10
Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 292.) In moving for
summary judgment, Chase argued the Law Firm could not
establish three of the elements: duty, breach, and causation. We
agree with the Law Firm that Chase owed the Law Firm a duty
of care, and the Law Firm has created a triable issue of fact as to
breach and causation.

       1.     Duty of care owed to third parties
       “Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be resolved
by the court.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213; accord,
Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 398
(Gas Leak Cases).) The general rule governing duty of care is set
forth in Civil Code section 1714. (Brown, at p. 213.) Civil Code
section 1714, subdivision (a), provides, “Everyone is responsible,
not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care
or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .”
Under this provision, “[i]n general, each person has a duty to act
with reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Regents, supra,
4 Cal.5th at p. 619; accord, Gas Leak Cases, at p. 398 [“In
California, the ‘general rule’ is that people owe a duty of care to
avoid causing harm to others and that they are thus usually
liable for injuries their negligence inflicts.”].)
       However, “[d]uty is not universal; not every defendant owes
every plaintiff a duty of care. A duty exists only if ‘“the plaintiff’s
interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s
conduct.”’” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213; accord, Sheen v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 920 (Sheen).) For
example, “[t]he law does not impose the same duty on a

                                  11
defendant who did not contribute to the risk that the plaintiff
would suffer the harm alleged.” (Brown, at p. 214.)
       A significant exception to the general duty of care under
Civil Code section 1714 applies where the defendant causes only
economic loss, commonly called the “economic loss rule.” (Sheen,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 922 [“The [economic loss rule] is
deceptively easy to state: In general, there is no recovery in tort
for negligently inflicted ‘purely economic losses,’ meaning
financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage.”];
Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 406 [liability in negligence
for “purely economic losses” is “the exception, not the rule”].)
       This case presents such a situation—the Law Firm alleges
it suffered solely an economic loss as a result of Chase’s
negligence in releasing all the funds in the blocked account to
Brumfield. Although the economic loss rule is therefore
implicated, there is an exception to the rule’s limitation on
liability where the plaintiff and defendant have a special
relationship and policy considerations support finding a duty.
(Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 400; J’Aire Corp. v.
Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 804 (J’Aire).) As the Supreme
Court explained in Gas Leak Cases, “The primary exception to
the general rule of no recovery for negligently inflicted purely
economic losses is where the plaintiff and the defendant have a
‘special relationship.’ [Citation.] What we mean by special
relationship is that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of a
particular transaction but was harmed by the defendant’s
negligence in carrying it out.” (Gas Leak Cases, at p. 400.)
       This case falls squarely within the rubric of a special
relationship as first articulated by the Supreme Court in
Biakanja, supra, 49 Cal.2d 647. There, the Supreme Court held a

                                12
notary public who negligently drafted a will for the decedent
owed a duty of care to an estate beneficiary who was not in
contractual privity with the notary public but was the intended
beneficiary of the transaction. (Id. at pp. 650-651.) As the
Supreme Court later explained, “A special relationship existed
between the intended beneficiary and the notary in Biakanja . . .
because ‘the “end and aim” of the transaction’ between the
nonparty decedent and the notary was to ensure that the
decedent’s estate passed to the intended beneficiary.” (Gas Leak
Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 400, quoting Biakanja, at p. 650; see
J’Aire, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 802, 804-805 [third-party lessee
who operated a restaurant sufficiently alleged a cause of action
for negligence based on construction delays against a contractor
hired by the owner of the building to renovate the restaurant
based on the special relationship between the contractor and
lessee]; cf. Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 215 [“In a case
involving harm caused by a third party, a person may have an
affirmative duty to protect the victim of another’s harm if that
person is in what the law calls a ‘special relationship’ with either
the victim or the person who created the harm.”].)9 Here too, the

9     The “special relationship” doctrine addressed in Brown,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pages 216 to 222 and Regents, supra,
4 Cal.5th at pages 619 to 627 with respect to a defendant’s
affirmative duty to protect a plaintiff from foreseeable
noneconomic injury caused by a third party is different from the
“special relationship” at issue in Biakanja and J’Aire arising from
a transaction in which the third party is an intended beneficiary
who suffered only economic loss as a result of the transaction.
(See Brown, at p. 222 [defendant taekwondo association had
special relationship with athletes who were sexually abused by

                                 13
intent of the creation of the blocked account was to ensure the
estate funds would be available to the intended beneficiaries,
which included the Law Firm.
       The Supreme Court in Biakanja, supra, 49 Cal.2d at
page 650 explained “[t]he determination whether in a specific
case the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in
privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various
factors . . . .” The court considered six factors typically described
as the Biakanja factors: (1) the extent to which the transaction
was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm
to the plaintiff; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct; and (6) the policy of
preventing future harm. (Ibid.; see Gas Leak Cases, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 401 [“Discerning whether there is a special
relationship justifying liability [for purely economic loss by a
third party] can nonetheless be a subtle enterprise” involving
balancing of the Biakanja factors]; J’Aire, supra, 24 Cal.3d at
p. 804 [applying Biakanja factors to find duty of care owed to
third party lessee]; Beacon Residential Community Assn. v.
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP (2014) 59 Cal.4th 568, 578

their coach, who was a member of the association]; Regents, at
p. 613 [universities have special relationship with their students
“and a duty to protect them from foreseeable violence during
curricular activities”].) However, “[r]elationships that have been
recognized as ‘special’ share a few common features. Generally,
the relationship has an aspect of dependency in which one party
relies to some degree on the other for protection.” (Regents, at
p. 620; see generally id. at pp. 620-621.)

                                 14
[“Biakanja set forth a list of factors that inform whether a duty of
care exists between a plaintiff and defendant in the absence of
privity.”].)10
      The Supreme Court in J’Aire, supra, 24 Cal.3d at page 806
emphasized that a “key component” in this analysis is the
foreseeability of the harm. However, as the Supreme Court

10     The Supreme Court in Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
page 401 explained the Biakanja balancing test applies a subset
of the factors used in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108,
112 to 113 for consideration of whether a defendant owes a duty
of care to a plaintiff not in privity with the defendant. (See
Sheen, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 937 [the multifactor test set forth
in Rowland is “largely similar” to the Biakanja factors].)
Although the Rowland and Biakanja factors largely overlap, they
are applied in different factual scenarios and in a distinct
manner. The Biakanja factors “are used to determine whether
persons must exercise reasonable care to avoid negligently
causing economic loss to others with whom they were not in
privity (sometimes referred to as third parties).” (Sheen, supra,
12 Cal.5th at pp. 937-938.) The “Rowland factors serve to
determine whether an exception to [Civil Code] section 1714’s
general duty of reasonable care is warranted.’” (Sheen, at p. 938,
quoting Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 217-218.) In other
words, the Biakanja factors apply in this type of case, in which
the defendant has a special relationship with an intended
beneficiary of a transaction who suffers only economic loss, to
determine whether based on policy considerations there is a duty
“justifying liability” (Gas Leak Cases, at pp. 400-401, italics
added), whereas the Rowland factors apply where there is a
special relationship between the parties that supports finding the
defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from noneconomic
loss, to determine “whether policy considerations justify limiting
any resulting duty.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 221, italics
added.)

                                15
explained in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 398
(Bily), even where the economic loss is foreseeable, the court has
considered factors in addition to those in Biakanja in declining to
impose a duty of care, for example, where “damage awards
threatened to impose liability out of proportion to fault or to
promote virtually unlimited responsibility for intangible injury.”
Rather, “[d]eciding whether to impose a duty of care turns on a
careful consideration of the ‘“‘“the sum total”’”’ of the policy
considerations at play, not a mere tallying of some finite, one-
size-fits-all set of factors.” (Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 401; see Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 841
[declining to impose on third-party payroll company a duty of
care to employee of hiring business after “[c]onsidering the ‘“sum
total”’ of the relevant considerations of policy”]; Lucas v. Hamm
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 583, 589 [“Since defendant was authorized to
practice the profession of an attorney, we must consider an
additional factor not present in Biakanja, namely, whether the
recognition of liability to beneficiaries of wills negligently drawn
by attorneys would impose an undue burden on the profession.”].)
       In Bily, the Supreme Court held a company’s auditor owed
no general duty of care to investors regarding the preparation of
a public report on the financial well-being of the company where
the investors had suffered financial losses as a result of
statements in the report. (Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 376.) The
Bily court concluded it was “certainly” foreseeable the investors
would suffer losses from the negligently prepared audit reports,
but an auditor “owes no general duty of care regarding the
conduct of an audit to persons other than the client.” (Bily, at
pp. 376; see Gas Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 401.) The Bily
court observed, similar to the context of bystander liability for

                                16
negligent infliction of emotional distress, “‘[T]here are clear
judicial days on which a court can foresee forever and thus
determine liability but none on which that foresight alone
provides a socially and judicially acceptable limit on recovery of
damages for [an] injury.’” (Bily, at p. 399, quoting Thing v. La
Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644, 668; see Gas Leak Cases, at p. 401.)
The court held auditors’ potential multi-billion-dollar liability for
financial losses suffered by third parties who rely on public audit
reports was out of proportion to fault and raised other policy
concerns. (Bily, at pp. 401-402; see Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 838; Gas Leak Cases, at pp. 401-402.)
       Although Chase highlights this language in Bily that
foreseeability cannot alone support a duty owed to third parties,
Chase ignores Bily’s finding the auditor did owe a duty of care on
a negligent misrepresentation theory to the “specifically intended
beneficiaries of the audit report who are known to the auditor
and for whose benefit it renders the audit report.” (Bily, supra,
3 Cal.4th at pp. 406-407.) As the Supreme Court observed in Gas
Leak Cases, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pages 401 to 402, the Bily court
“limited auditor liability to claims for negligent
misrepresentation brought by plaintiffs who—like the plaintiffs
in Biakanja and J’Aire—were ‘specifically intended beneficiaries’
of the defendant’s conduct.”
       Here, as in Biakanja and J’Aire, Chase and the Law Firm
had a special relationship because the Law Firm was an intended
beneficiary of the blocked account order and acknowledgment,
which limited distribution of estate funds.11 The Law Firm was

11    Although the Law Firm is technically a creditor of the
estate (see, e.g., Prob. Code, § 11420(a)(1) [listing expenses of

                                 17
authorized by statute to be paid for its legal fees from the estate
(Prob. Code, § 10810, subd. (a)),12 and further, the Probate Court
order authorized payment of approximately $66,000 to the Law
Firm for this purpose in the final probate order. When Chase
opened the blocked account on October 31, 2018, it did so
pursuant to the probate court’s blocked account order that
specified the funds from the proceeds of the sale of the estate’s
real property must be deposited “in a blocked account to be
withdrawn only on court order.” And in moving for summary
judgment, Chase acknowledged it “owe[d] a duty and obligation
to comply with court orders” (although it disputed whether that
duty was owed to the Law Firm). We therefore apply the
Biakanja factors to determine whether Chase owed a duty of care
to the Law Firm in making distributions from the blocked
account.

      2.     The Biakanja factors support a finding Chase owed a
             duty to the Law Firm in distributing funds from the
             blocked account
      The Law Firm contends the Biakanja factors favor a
finding Chase owed it a duty of care. Chase does not address the
Biakanja factors in its respondent’s brief other than
foreseeability, instead focusing on the limited duty of care owed

administration as the highest priority debt of the estate]), for
simplicity we describe it as a beneficiary because its claim to a
portion of the blocked funds is similar to that of the named
beneficiaries.
12   Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Probate Code.

                                 18
by banks to non-depositors.13 The Law Firm is correct. The
Biakanja factors support a finding Chase had a duty to use
reasonable care in distributing funds from the blocked account.

            a.     The transaction was intended to affect the
                   Law Firm
       As discussed, the first Biakanja factor is “the extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff.”
(Biakanja, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 650.) Chase does not dispute
that it agreed to comply with the probate court’s orders in
distributing funds from the blocked account. Pursuant to the
statutory scheme, the attorney for the personal representative in
a probate matter “shall” receive compensation from the estate for
“ordinary services” provided by the attorney pursuant to
statutory guidelines based on the value of the estate. (§ 10810,
subd. (a); see Estate of Trynin (1989) 49 Cal.3d 868, 873 [“An

13     Chase argues in its respondent’s brief that there are seven
theories under which it is not liable for injury caused to the Law
Firm, two of which we discuss in this section (the economic loss
rule and foreseeability of harm). We address below Chase’s
arguments that it did not owe a duty to the Law Firm because, as
a bank, it did not owe a duty to depositors or non-depositors to
police activity in a depositor’s account for suspicious activity. We
do not reach Chase’s argument that it did not owe a fiduciary
duty to the Law Firm, because the Law Firm only asserts that it
had a special relationship with Chase, not that it had a fiduciary
relationship. Likewise, because we conclude Chase’s duty to the
Law Firm arose from the plain language of the blocked account
order and Acknowledgment, we do not reach whether any
statements by Chun supported a duty owed by Chase to the Law
Firm.

                                19
attorney who has rendered services to an estate’s representative
may obtain compensation by petitioning the superior court sitting
in probate for an order requiring the representative to make
payment to the attorney out of the estate.”].)14 Under this
statutory scheme, “an attorney who has performed probate work
is a person interested in the estate.” (Trynin, at p. 873.)
Consistent with sections 10810 and 10811, the final probate order
specified the Law Firm was “directed to receive” $16,000 in
“[s]tatutory compensation for services rendered,” approximately
$44,000 for “[e]xtraordinary compensation for legal services
rendered,” and approximately $6,000 in costs.
       Moreover, under the Probate Code, expenses of
administration (including attorneys’ fees) have priority over all
other debts of the estate. (§ 11420, subd. (a)(1) [“expenses of
administration incurred that are reasonably related to the
administration of that property by which obligations are secured
shall be given priority” over secured debts].) Accordingly, the
blocked account order and acknowledgment, by preventing
disbursement of the estate funds in the blocked account without a
court order authorizing payment, were intended to affect the Law
Firm, which had a priority right to those funds. This factor
therefore weighs strongly in favor of finding a duty of care.

14    Compensation for ordinary legal services is commonly
known as “‘statutory’” or “‘ordinary’” compensation. (Estate of
Hilton (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 890, 894-895; see Estate of Wong
(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 366, 374-375.) Compensation for services
that are not involved in the typical probate case, commonly
known as “extraordinary services,” “may” be paid out of estate
assets at the discretion of the probate court in an amount the
court determines is “just and reasonable.” (§ 10811, subd. (a); see
Wong, at 375; Hilton, at p. 895.)

                                20
              b.    The foreseeability and certainty factors
      Because the establishment of the blocked account was
intended to benefit the Law Firm, the second Biakanja factor
(foreseeability of harm) also weighs heavily in favor of finding a
duty of care. (Biakanja, supra, 49 Cal.2d at 650; see J’Aire,
supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 804 [because contract between owner and
contractor was for renovation of restaurant operated by plaintiff,
“it was clearly foreseeable that any significant delay in
completing the construction would adversely affect [plaintiff’s]
business”]; Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corporation (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 1054, 1078 [“Typically, as in J’Aire and Stewart [v.
Cox (1961) 55 Cal.2d 857], the first two . . . factors operate in
tandem—because the underlying contract was intended to affect
the plaintiffs, the harm to the plaintiffs as a result of the
defendants’ negligence was a fortiori foreseeable.”].) It was
foreseeable that distributing the entirety of the funds in the
blocked account to one beneficiary, without a court order
directing disbursement of the funds, would harm the other
beneficiaries, including the Law Firm.
      With respect to the third Biakanja factor (the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury), it is undisputed the
Law Firm suffered injury as a result of Chase’s allowing
Brumfield to withdraw all the funds in the blocked account
without a court order directing it to do so, depriving the Law
Firm of any payment. There is likewise a close connection
between Chase’s conduct in distributing all the funds to
Brumfield and the Law Firm’s injury (the fourth factor).
(Biakanja, supra, 49 Cal.2d at 650; see Chang v. Lederman
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 67, 83 [“[F]rom the allegations in [the
plaintiff’s] complaint there appear to be no intervening

                                21
circumstances that might have broken the causal connection
between [the defendant’s] conduct and [the plaintiff’s] damage
(the fourth factor).”].)15

           c.      We do not attach moral blame to Chase’s
                   conduct
       We recognize Chase relied on a mistaken interpretation of
the final probate order in releasing all of the estate funds to
Brumfield; there is no evidence the distribution in any way
benefitted Chase. And but for Brumfield’s conduct in absconding
with the funds, there would have been no injury. Thus, we do not
attach moral blame to the negligent conduct of Chase. This
factor therefore favors Chase.

           d.     The policy of preventing future harm supports
                  finding a duty
      The goal to prevent future harm supports finding a bank
owes a duty of care to an intended beneficiary where a bank
releases funds from a blocked account without court
authorization. Chase agreed to comply with the probate court
order directing that the estate funds be placed in a blocked
account, withdrawable only pursuant to court order, and it
allowed the estate funds to be withdrawn without a proper order.
The probate system reflects a fundamental recognition that the
preservation and distribution of the assets of the deceased for
beneficiaries require special care and court supervision. And
third party beneficiaries are typically powerless to safeguard
their own interests. For example, a beneficiary would not know,

15   We address Chase’s causation arguments further below.

                               22
as here, that funds have been distributed from the estate to a
person lacking a right to the funds until it is too late.
       The procedure in the Probate Code for creating and
limiting disbursements from blocked accounts addresses this
problem. Pursuant to section 9703, subdivision (a), “Upon
application of the personal representative, the court may, with or
without notice, order that money or other personal property be
deposited [in an account] and be subject to withdrawal only upon
authorization of the court.” (See § 8483 [providing that amount
of bond may be reduced where deposited funds may only be
withdrawn upon court order pursuant to section 9703].) This
longstanding requirement was first enacted in 1909 in section 91
of the Bank Act (Stats. 1909, ch. 76, § 91, p. 105), which
provided, “Any court, having appointed and having jurisdiction of
any executor, administrator, guardian, assignee, receiver,
depositary, or trustee, upon the application of such officer or
trustee, or upon the application of any person having an interest
in the estate . . . may authorize such officer or trustee to deposit
any moneys then in his hands, or which may come into his hands
thereafter, and until the further order of said court, with any
such trust company . . . . Such deposits shall be paid out only
upon the orders of said court.” (Stats. 1909, ch. 76, § 91, p. 105,
italics added; see Stats. 1909, ch. 76, § 93, p. 106 [authorizing
reduction in bond after deposit with trust company]; see also
Stats. 1909, ch. 76, § 51, p. 98 [authorizing deposit in bank
instead of trust company].) Holding banks accountable to
intended beneficiaries for the negligent disbursement of funds
from blocked accounts will create an incentive for banks to take
steps to ensure estate funds placed in a blocked account are not
distributed without clear court authorization, furthering the goal

                                 23
of protecting beneficiaries, who could not otherwise safeguard
their interests.

      3.     The cases limiting a bank’s duty to police customer
             accounts do not foreclose a finding of duty
       Chase contends that imposing a duty on a bank to protect a
non-depositor from the potential fraud of an authorized signatory
would be contrary to California law that, with limited exceptions,
neither imposes a duty on banks to police the account activity of
its depositors nor imposes a duty of care owed to non-depositors.
Although Chase is correct that banks generally do not have a
duty to monitor accounts for suspicious activity, the duty Chase
owes to the Law Firm does not arise from a duty to ferret out
suspicious activity, but rather, from its receipt of estate funds
and placement of the funds in a blocked account, and its special
relationship with intended beneficiaries of those funds. The duty
to act with reasonable care in limiting distributions from a
blocked account to those authorized by court order, to protect the
interests of intended beneficiaries of the funds, falls squarely
within the obligations placed on a bank consistent with the policy
considerations set forth in Biakanja. Further, most courts that
have analyzed a bank’s limited duty of care to monitor accounts
have, as we do here, considered the policy factors set forth in
Biakanja (or Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113
(Rowland)) in determining the breadth of that duty.
       Banks owe a long-recognized duty of care to their
depositors. (Bullis v. Security Pac. Nat. Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d
801, 808 (Bullis) [a bank has “a duty to act with reasonable care
in its transactions with its depositors”]; Basch v. Bank of America
(1943) 22 Cal.2d 316, 321 [“a bank pays a forged check at its

                                24
peril”]; Pacific Finance Corp. v. Bank of Yolo (1932) 215 Cal. 357,
361 [banks have a duty to ensure funds are not “improperly
disbursed”]; Chazen v. Centennial Bank (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th
532, 543 (Chazen).)
       In Bullis, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pages 805 to 806, the
Supreme Court considered a bank’s failure to follow its internal
protocols and the Probate Code by allowing one of two co-
executors to withdraw funds from an estate’s account.16 In
affirming the judgment in favor of the estate, the court concluded
the bank “clearly had a duty to act with reasonable care in its
transactions with its depositors, including the . . . estate.” (Id. at
p. 808.) Regarding breach, the court found there was
“substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that [the
bank’s] failure to require the signatures of both co-executors on
withdrawals fell below the standard of care owed to the estate.”
(Id. at p. 811.)
       Although banks have a duty to act with reasonable care
toward their depositors, including to ensure a person making a
withdrawal has authority to do so, Financial Code section 1451
addresses the longstanding principle first codified in the 1925
Bank Act (Stats. 1925, ch. 312, (Assem. Bill No. 725 (46th Sess.)
§ 16a) that banks have no duty to monitor withdrawals made by
authorized parties in an authorized manner. (See Kurtz-Ahlers,
LLC v. Bank of America, N.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 952, 956 [the
contractual relationship between a bank and a depositor “‘does

16     The Bullis court considered former section 570 (now
codified in section 9630), which provided that “one of two co-
executors may act alone [o]nly if the other co-executor is absent
from the state or legally disqualified from acting.” (Bullis, supra,
21 Cal.3d at p. 810.)

                                 25
not involve any implied duty “to supervise account activity”
[citation] or “to inquire into the purpose for which the funds are
being used”’”]; Chazen, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at 537 [“a bank has
no duty to monitor trust accounts for breaches of fiduciary
duty”].)
       Financial Code section 1451 provides, “When the depositor
of a commercial or savings account has authorized any person to
make withdrawals from the account, the bank, in the absence of
written notice otherwise, may assume that any check, receipt, or
order of withdrawal drawn by such person in the authorized form
or manner, including checks drawn to his personal order and
withdrawal orders payable to him personally, was drawn for a
purpose authorized by the depositor and within the scope of the
authority conferred upon such person.” (Italics added.)
Section 1451’s limitation on the bank’s duty to supervise
withdrawals is designed to protect depositor privacy and to
facilitate efficient processing of banking transactions. (Kurtz-
Ahlers, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 957, 960-961; Chazen, supra,
61 Cal.App.4th at p. 539.)
       The Supreme Court in Sun ‘n Sand, Inc. v. United
California Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 671, 695 (Sun ‘n Sand) carved
out a narrow duty of inquiry for banks to make reasonable
inquiries when “checks, not insignificant in amount, are drawn
payable to the order of a bank and are presented to the payee
bank by a third party seeking to negotiate the checks for his own
benefit.” The court concluded that under the alleged facts the
bank breached its duty to a third-party company where the bank
allowed the company’s employee to deposit in her own account
checks made out to the bank (not to the employee), which were
intended to pay the company’s bills. (Id. at pp. 678-679.) In

                                26
concluding the bank owed the company a duty to protect it from
the suspicious conduct of its employee, the court considered the
Rowland factors and found that because the loss was reasonably
foreseeable, the bank owed a limited duty of care to the company.
(Id. at p. 695.)
       Aside from the narrow Sun ‘n Sand exception, courts have
refrained from imposing on banks a duty to third parties to
monitor bank account transactions for suspicious activity. (See
Kurtz-Ahlers, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 958-959, 961 [bank
owed no duty to company where company’s bookkeeper
fraudulently deposited company checks into her own account
because bookkeeper appeared authorized to deposit checks and
policy considerations strongly weighed against finding a new
duty to monitor transfers from one depositor (the company) to
another]; Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
1138, 1151 [banks did not owe duty of care to third-party
bankruptcy estate where officers of debtor corporation allegedly
opened suspicious bank accounts to perpetrate fraud because “the
banks’ alleged knowledge of the [officers’] suspicious account
activities—even money laundering—without more, does not give
rise to tort liability for the banks”]; Karen Kane, Inc. v. Bank of
America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1202 [finding after
considering Rowland factors that bank had no duty to company
whose checks were fraudulently cashed by its employee where
company had “no relationship with the Bank, and the Bank did
nothing more than allow its customer . . . to deposit checks into
its own account”]; Chazen, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 545-546
[bank did not owe duty of care to third parties who were not
known to bank based on broker’s improper disbursements from

                                27
trust accounts where the broker was authorized to make the
disbursements].)
       Unlike these cases, in which the courts have confirmed
there is no (or a very limited) duty to third parties based on a
bank’s duty to monitor depositor accounts where transactions are
on their face authorized, in this case Brumfield made an
unauthorized withdrawal of funds from the blocked account
because the final probate order did not specifically direct Chase
to distribute funds from the blocked account to Brumfield (or
anyone else). Absent a court order with instructions on the
amounts to pay Brumfield and the Law Firm, it was unclear how
much money should have been distributed to each because the
total amount allocated to Brumfield and the Law Firm exceeded
the amount of estate funds in the blocked account.17 It was for
the court to decide how to allocate the available funds between
Brumfield and the Law Firm, and then for the court to issue an
order directing Chase on how to distribute the funds from the
blocked account. The final probate order did not do this.

17     Pursuant to section 11420, subdivision (b), subject to
exceptions not applicable here, “the debts of each class are
without preference or priority one over another. No debt of any
class may be paid until all those of prior classes are paid in full.
If property in the estate is insufficient to pay all debts of any
class in full, each debt in that class shall be paid a proportionate
share.” Because payment of $16,000 to Brumfield plus the
$66,325.14 owed to the Law Firm ($16,000 for ordinary services,
$44,151.25 for extraordinary services, and $6,173.89 in costs)
were in the same debt class (costs of administration), they should
have each received a proportionate share of the $47,383.47 in the
blocked account.

                                 28
C.     The Law Firm Created a Triable Issue of Fact as to Whether
       Chase Used Reasonable Care in Implementing the Blocked
       Account Order
       Chase contends it did not breach any duty it owed to the
Law Firm in distributing estate funds pursuant to the final
probate order because it followed the order in releasing the funds
in the blocked account to Brumfield as the only authorized
signatory on the account. We agree with the Law Firm that the
language of the final probate order (in the absence of extrinsic
evidence) supports a contrary conclusion.
       The interpretation of a court order is a question of law we
review de novo. (Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co. (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 308, 326; American Civil Rights Foundation v.
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 436,
448.) “The same rules apply in ascertaining the meaning of a
court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any
other writing.” (Mendly v. County of Los Angeles (1994)
23 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1205; accord, Dow, at p. 326; In re Ins.
Installment Fee Cases (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1429 [“‘In
construing orders they must always be considered in their
entirety, and the same rules of interpretation will apply in
ascertaining the meaning of a court’s order as in ascertaining the
meaning of any other writing.’”]; see Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures
& Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1125-1126 [“The rules
governing the role of the court in interpreting a written
instrument are well established. . . . Ordinarily, the objective
intent of the contracting parties is a legal question determined
solely by reference to the contract’s terms.”].)
       Contrary to Chase’s contention, the final probate order does
not direct Chase to unblock the account for release of all the

                                29
funds to Brumfield, who would (according to Chase) then be
responsible for distribution of the funds to the other beneficiaries,
including the Law Firm. While possibly Brumfield’s signature
would have been necessary to effectuate the release of funds to
the Law Firm and other beneficiaries, that does not mean she
could withdraw any funds from the blocked account without a
court order directing Chase to release the funds to Brumfield.
Further, section 9704 provides that the bank, upon receipt of an
order for distribution of money or personal property from an
account, “may deliver the property directly to the distributees.”
And to the extent there was a lack of clarity in how the funds
should have been distributed, Chase should have sought
guidance from the court or required the Law Firm to obtain a
more specific order.
      A comparison between the final probate order and Judicial
Counsel Form MC-358 (order authorizing withdrawal of funds
from blocked account)18 highlights the flaws in Chase’s position
that the final probate order authorized distribution of the estate
funds to Brumfield without a further order. Judicial Council
Form MC-358 provides with respect to a blocked account that the
“Petitioner is authorized to withdraw, and the depository is
ordered, on presentation of a file-stamped copy of this order, to
permit the petitioner to withdraw” the listed amount. The order
specifies each payee and the amount to be distributed to the
payee. By contrast, the final probate order approves the amount
Brumfield, the Law Firm, and the beneficiaries are “authorized

18     The Judicial Council website provides that form MC-358
“[s]tates the court’s decision (order) allowing funds to be taken
out (withdrawn) from a blocked account (a bank or other account
requiring a court order to deposit or withdraw funds).”

                                 30
and directed to receive,” but nowhere does the order authorize
Brumfield to withdraw, or Chase to pay, specific amounts to each
payee. Although parties do not need to use the Judicial Council
template, adherence to it (with specific directions to the bank)
ensures the distributions are authorized by court order.
      Accordingly, the Law Firm created a triable issue of fact as
to Chase’s breach of its duty of care owed to the Law Firm.

D.     The Law Firm Raised a Triable Issue of Fact as to
       Causation
       “The element of causation requires there to be a connection
between the defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s injury.” (Coyle
v. Historic Mission Inn Corp. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 627, 645.)
“Causation exists where ‘the defendant’s breach of its duty to
exercise ordinary care was a substantial factor in bringing about
plaintiff’s harm.’” (Janice H. v. 696 North Robertson, LLC (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 586, 598; accord, Beebe v. Wonderful Pistachios &
Almonds LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 351, 370 [“The ‘substantial
factor’ test for causation is appropriate in all tort actions.”]; see
Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639,
661 [“We have previously observed that ‘[i]n cases where
concurrent independent causes contribute to an injury, we apply
the “substantial factor” test’ [citation], which requires the
plaintiff to ‘show some substantial link or nexus between
omission and injury.’”].) Like breach and injury, causation is a
fact-specific issue for the trier of fact. (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 1144 [“Breach, injury, and causation must be demonstrated on
the basis of facts adduced at trial, and a jury’s determination of
each must take into account the particular context in which any
act or injury occurred.”].)

                                  31
       Chase contends the Law Firm cannot establish causation
because Brumfield’s misconduct was effectively a supervening
cause of the Law Firm’s injuries. “Under traditional tort
principles, once a defendant’s conduct is found to have been a
cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries, the conduct of a third party
will not bar liability unless it operated as a superseding or
supervening cause, so as to break the chain of legal causation
between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries.”
(Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 770;
accord, Coyle v. Historic Mission Inn Corp., supra, 24 Cal.App.5th
at p. 645.) “The third party’s misconduct ordinarily will not be
regarded as a supervening cause if the misconduct itself was
foreseeable to the defendant.” (Cleveland v. Taft Union High
School Dist. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 776, 810, fn. 15; see Cole, at
p. 770.)
       Foreseeability is therefore the touchstone of the
supervening cause analysis. “‘If the likelihood that a third person
may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the
hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.’”
(Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49, 58, quoting
Rest.2d Torts, § 449, fn. omitted [“It is of no consequence that the
harm to plaintiff came about through the negligent or reckless
acts of [a third party].”]; accord, Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 47. As the Supreme Court explained in
Bullis, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pages 812 to 813, in affirming a
judgment finding the bank liable for the unauthorized
withdrawal of funds from an estate’s account, “[The bank] asserts
that the imposition of liability would punish [the bank] for its

                                  32
failure ‘to control the conduct of another,’ i.e., [the co-executor of
the estate]. [Citation.] This contention overlooks the fact that
the trial court merely reaffirmed the obvious proposition that [the
bank] owed a duty of due care to its depositors. [The bank] was
held liable for the estate’s loss because its conduct, in opening
and maintaining the estate’s account, did not meet the standard
of reasonable care expected of a bank. Its negligent conduct
resulted in a reasonably foreseeable injury. Thus, liability was
based on [the bank’s] own negligence, not on a breach of any duty
to control [the co-executor].”
       As discussed, while Brumfield’s own misconduct
contributed to the Law Firm’s injuries, and improper
withdrawals of estate assets are precisely the sort of hazard the
blocked account was created to prevent, there is a question of fact
whether her misconduct was foreseeable. Accordingly, because
Chase failed to establish it owed no duty to the Law Firm, and
the Law Firm created a triable issue of fact as to breach of duty
and causation, we reverse the trial court’s order granting
summary judgment.

                                 33
                         DISPOSITION

      The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to
vacate its order granting Chase’s motion for summary judgment
and to enter a new order denying the motion. The Law Firm is to
recover its costs on appeal.

                                        FEUER, J.
We concur:

             SEGAL, Acting P. J.

             ESCALANTE, J.*

*     Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                               34