Court Opinion

ID: 996444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:50:45.487374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:42.441401
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                      No. 97-7068

FRANKLYN EARL BANNERMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
J. Calvitt Clarke, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CR-90-105-N, CA-97-287-2)

Submitted: August 18, 1998

Decided: September 21, 1998

Before ERVIN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Jeffrey Scott Shapiro, VERGARA & ASSOCIATES, Hopewell, Vir-
ginia; Cheryl Johns Sturm, Westtown, Pennsylvania, for Appellant.
Laura Marie Everhart, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Franklyn Bannerman appeals from a district court order that con-
cluded his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 &
Supp. 1998) was barred by the one-year limitations period provided
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214. Bannerman was convicted in 1991,
and he filed his habeas motion on March 14, 1997. Bannerman had
until April 23, 1997, to file his § 2255 motion. See Brown v.
Angelone, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 389030 (4th Cir. July 14, 1998)
(Nos. 96-7173, 96-7208). Therefore, his motion was not time-barred.
Accordingly, we grant a certificate of appealability on this issue,
vacate the district court's order, and remand for further proceedings.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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