Court Opinion

ID: 9703917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:12:46.670841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:52.799003
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I agree with Judge Kelly’s analysis in parts II and III of his opinion, and concur in the result of reversing the case and remanding for retrial on the charge of possession only. However, I disagree with his treatment of the search warrant issue in part 1.1 must dissent to that part of Judge Kelly’s opinion which upholds the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. The evidence seized pursuant to that warrant should not be allowed into evidence upon retrial.
The validity of any search warrant depends entirely on the validity of the affidavit which supports its issuance. A search warrant is issued when the examining magistrate satisfies himself *549that the affidavit offered in support thereof contains sufficient information to establish probable cause to search the place mentioned and seize the items described. The affidavit must be judged solely on the basis of the information it contains. If it is invalid on its face, then any search warrant it supports is defective and any search conducted in reliance on it is unreasonable. Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410, 413, fn 3; 89 S Ct 584; 21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969). Accordingly, we proceed to determine whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant in this case contains sufficient information to justify a conclusion that probable cause existed to subject defendant Peterson to a search of his residence.
Aside from the field test conducted by the affiant, all of the information in the affidavit was supplied by informants. While it is true that an affidavit may be based on the hearsay reports of others, Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160, 172-173; 69 S Ct 1302; 93 L Ed 1879 (1949), such hearsay can be accepted by the magistrate only if there is reason to believe it. This requirement is aptly stated for our purposes in Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964):
"Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, [citation omitted], the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, [citation omitted], was 'credible’ or his information 'reliable.’ Otherwise, 'the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint’ will be drawn not 'by a neutral and detached magistrate,’ as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer *550'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’ [citations omitted], or, as in this case, by an unidentified informant.” Aguilar, supra, at 114-115.
In other words, the magistrate must be apprised both of the "honesty of the informant and the basis for his report”. Spinelli, supra, at 424 (White, J., concurring).
The instant affidavit furnishes the circumstances underlying the affiant’s belief that there was marijuana in Peterson’s residence, since it summarizes the recent, personal observations of the informants. United States v Harris, 403 US 573, 579; 91 S Ct 2075; 29 L Ed 2d 723 (1971). This satisfies the first part of the Aguilar test. However, the affidavit nowhere indicates on what basis the affiant concluded that the informants were reliable or that their information was credible.1
The prosecutor in his brief stresses the quality of the information obtained from the informants as proof of their reliability. In so doing, he confuses the two quite distinct elements of the Aguilar test, the same mistake apparently made by both the affiant and the examining magistrate.
To say that the informants accurately described the residence, listed the substances to be found therein, and produced a sample of those substances which proved to be marijuana is to beg an important question. This information will support at most the conclusion that there is an ample basis for the informants’ allegations if the information is accurate. To be sure, if the informants observed the marijuana inside the described residence and if they then brought a sample of that same mari*551juana to the police, probable cause to search would be established. However, the affidavit does not provide us with any reason to believe that the informants saw the things they claimed to have seen or did the things they claimed to have done.
The affiant does not maintain that he or anyone else has had any prior dealings with these informants in which they have proven reliable. Compare Jones v United States, 362 US 257; 80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697 (1960). Testimony taken at the preliminary examination reveals that none of the officers had any knowledge of previous instances of reliable reporting on the part of the informants.
Evidence of prior trafficking in contraband can be used to substantiate an informant’s report. See Jones v United States, supra; Nathanson v United States, 290 US 41, 46; 54 S Ct 11; 78 L Ed 159 (1933). However, there is no indication that Peterson is known by the police as a user or seller of harmful drugs. In fact, police witnesses at trial admitted that he did not have a reputation in either capacity. In addition, none of the officers had any personal knowledge that Peterson’s background included use or sale of drugs. Compare United States v Harris, supra.
Nor can the informants’ report be characterized as a declaration against penal interests, as was true of the informant in United States v Harris, supra. In Harris the informant admitted committing a crime to the police. Admissions of crime are said to carry with them "indicia of credibility” sufficient at least to support as reliable the reports of the informant who makes the admission. United States v Harris, supra, at 583. In the present case the informants have not admitted a crime. They did not say that the marijuana they carried with them belonged to them. They did not tell the *552police that they used marijuana or that they purchased any marijuana from Peterson or anyone else. On the contrary, the trial testimony indicates that the informants claim to have taken the sample from Peterson’s residence in order to turn it over to the police. These circumstances do not lend credibility to their statements. Compare United States v Harris, supra, at 584.
This affidavit does not even contain the bare conclusory allegation that the informants are reliable, the type of self-serving claim held insufficient in Spinelli, supra. The affiant here was unwilling to go so far — he could only refer to the informants as "apparently reliable”.
I must conclude that the information supplied by the informants’ tip does not satisfy the Aguilar requirement that the informants be shown to be reliable. Next, it must be determined whether the "other allegations which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report” are sufficient to meet the Aguilar test. Spinelli v United States, supra, at 415.
The only corroborative allegation in the affidavit concerns the field test by which the affiant concluded that the sample provided by the informants was marijuana. While this test quite properly assisted the affiant in determining that the informants had a basis for their report, it is insufficient to allow him to conclude that the report is truthful. We have no way of knowing where the marijuana sample came from unless we believe the informants’ story. That the field test proved positive provides no additional reason for believing that the marijuana came from Peterson’s residence, however much it makes the belief that the sample is marijuana legitimate. And that the informants did not lie when they said the sample *553was marijuana cannot alone provide corroboration for all of their other allegations. See Spinelli v United States, supra, at 425-429 (White, J., concurring). We do not have a case involving the kind of self-executing corroboration exhibited in Draper v United States, 358 US 307; 79 S Ct 329; 3 L Ed 2d 327 (1959), where the police independently verified all but one detail of an informant’s extraordinarily thorough description. The independent corroboration here, like that present in Spinelli, is inadequate to support the informants’ report:
"This cannot by itself be said to support * * * the inference that the informer was generally trustworthy * * * .” Spinelli, supra, at 417.
Careful study of the affidavit submitted in support of the application for the search warrant has convinced me that a conclusion that the informants supplying the tip were a reliable source of information is impermissible.2 What was said in Spinelli, supra, deserves repetition here:
"We conclude, then, that in the present case the informant’s tip — even when corroborated to the extent indicated — was not sufficient to provide the basis for a finding of probable cause. This is not to say that the tip was so insubstantial that it could not properly have counted in the magistrate’s determination. Rather, it needed some further support. When we look to the other parts of the application, however, we find nothing alleged which would permit the suspicions engendered by the informant’s report to ripen into a judgment that a crime was probably being committed.” Spinelli, supra, at 418.

 The prosecutor suggests that the demeanor of the informants led the affiant to believe that they were telling the truth. Since this information was not included in the affidavit, it cannot be considered. United States v Spinelli, supra, at 413, fn 3.

 Cf. the affidavit in People v Iaconis, 29 Mich App 443; 185 NW2d 609 (1971), aff’d sub nom People v Bercheny, 387 Mich 431; 196 NW2d 767 (1972).