Court Opinion

ID: 9633012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:31:15.342067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:27.067048
License: Public Domain

Kennedy, J.
(dissenting in part) — I agree with the majority’s disposition of the evidentiary issue raised in this appeal, but I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by denying Mr. Barker’s request to represent himself. First, the request, in context, was equivocal; second, it was untimely; third, by not renew*244ing the request after various continuances in the trial date by which the untimely nature of the request could arguably have been cured, Barker relinquished his right to represent himself.
It is necessary to review Mr. Barker’s request in its total context:
. mr. barker: Your Honor, the bottom line is me and Ostlund [Appellant’s defense attorney], me and John Ostlund, we don’t see eye to eye, Your Honor, at all. We haven’t discussed my case; we haven’t even reviewed my case whatsoever. I had conflict with him the other week in a PR hearing. We went back and forth, and he advised me to get my own counsel. I asked him if he could get off my case and then he told me to hire my own attorney, and I feel like he wouldn’t represent me to the best of his knowledge, even though he has a lot of cases he has to do whatever, whatever to — brought that out to me in court that he doesn’t have the time. So, I would ask the Court with all due respect that he could be removed from my case, and I will switch. I don’t know if he should put another counsel from his office, because he is the head man in his office, or assign another attorney. If not, then I have my rights to go to California.
the court: It will be denied. The only real option you have is to hire your own attorney. When you get an attorney from the Public Defender’s office they assign their officer, and basically that’s the way it goes, but you have got the best counsel in the county and —
mr. barker: Your, Honor, there is a conflict of interest between me and him.
the court: Lots of conflict of interest. You are not the lawyer. He —
mr. barker: Can I —
mr. grant [deputy prosecuting attorney]: Stipulated on the record —
mr. barker: Are you refusing me my rights to exercise my rights as a citizen of California for no reason?
the court: I have told you what you have been told before. If you wish to hire your own attorney, you are free to do so.
mr. barker: Okay, but are you refusing my right to exercise my rights?
the court: Absolutely not. Mr. Ostlund would be your attorney.
mr. barker: What about my rights as a citizen of California?
the court: How many times do I have to tell you, if you wish to hire your own attorney, you may hire your own attorney.
mr. barker: I am not asking that. I am saying, to represent myself.
the court: At this time it’s too late.
*245me. grant: Excuse me. I was hoping to clarify for the record’s sake what this conflict of interest is that he is claiming. All we hear from him today is that he has a problem dealing with Mr. Ostlund. I don’t know of any particular conflict of interest.
the court: I don’t really think it’s anything we should go into. It’s basically none of your business. It’s none of my business. I just need to know that he is going to be represented by counsel, and if he knows he can hire his own attorney he can. If he doesn’t then Mr. Ostlund is one of the best attorneys in the county as far as I am concerned, and that’s
mr. ostlund: I am not aware of any legal conflict of interest in the case at all, Your Honor.
the court: Yeah.
mr. barker: I am being denied my rights?
the court: You can sit down, and we will take the next case.
(Italics mine.) Report of Proceedings (Dec. 30, 1992), at 4-6.
It is not clear from this record that Mr. Barker desired to represent himself at the trial in Washington. He appears to have been operating under the mistaken assumption that he could either switch from one court-appointed attorney to another or avoid, a trial in Washington altogether and go to California. His request to represent himself may well have been for the purpose of asserting some self-perceived right, as a citizen of California, to be returned to that state, in lieu of a trial in Washington, if his request for substitute court-appointed counsel were not to be granted.
Even if Mr. Barker’s request can be viewed as an unequivocal request to represent himself at the trial in Washington, we should affirm the trial court’s determination that the request came too late. The request was made on December 30,1992, a Wednesday. New Year’s Day, a legal holiday, fell on Friday of that week. Trial was scheduled to commence on Monday, January 4, 1993. Thus, there was only one court day remaining prior to trial, that being Thursday, December 31, which was New Year’s Eve.
In State v. DeWeese, 117 Wn.2d 369, 377, 816 P.2d 1 (1991) a defendant’s request to represent himself was granted on March 9, 1989; trial was scheduled to commence on March 20. DeWeese, 117 Wn.2d at 372. Following his conviction, DeWeese appealed, arguing inter alia that his request to *246represent himself had been equivocal and untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that De-Weese had made a timely and valid request to proceed pro se. DeWeese, 117 Wn.2d at 377. Thus, an unequivocal request made 11 days before trial would appear to be timely.
In State v. Fritz, 21 Wn. App. 354, 364, 585 P.2d 173, 98 A.L.R.3d 1 (1978), review denied, 92 Wn.2d 1002 (1979) the defendant’s unequivocal request, on the day set for trial, was denied by the trial court on untenable grounds (i.e., that the defendant was not competent to intelligently waive counsel or to serve as his own counsel). The conviction was nevertheless affirmed by this court, because the request was both untimely and interposed for the purposes of delay. Fritz, 21 Wn. App. at 365 (see also Fritz, at 361). Accordingly, the record reflected a sound basis for rejection of the request, even though the trial court did not rest its decision on that basis.
In State v. Garcia, 92 Wn.2d 647, 655-56, 600 P.2d 1010 (1979) our Supreme Court stated (albeit in dictum):
In order to invoke the unconditional self-representation right, an unequivocal assertion of that right must be made within a reasonable time before trial. If the request is made shortly before or as the trial is to begin, the existence of the right depends on the facts with a measure of discretion in the trial court. In the absence of substantial reasons a late request should generally be denied, especially if the granting of such a request may result in delay of the trial.
(Citations omitted. Italics mine.)
In light of these cases, I find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Mr. Barker’s request was untimely. That being so, it was not error for the trial court to fail to make the Faretta inquiries.6
The record reflects that Mr. Barker’s case did not go to trial on January 4, 1993, as scheduled. Instead, it was continued several times. On January 20, 1993, after jury selection, with Mr. Barker present, his attorney disclosed that he had lost his temper with Barker, and indicated that Mr. *247Barker might wish to address the court regarding his continued representation. Report of Proceedings (Jan. 20, 1993), at 3.
Immediately thereafter, Barker did address the court, but said nothing about self-representation. Instead, he discussed two unrelated issues. Report of Proceedings, at 2-7. Following those discussions, the trial court twice asked whether the parties wished to raise any other issues and Barker remained silent. Report of Proceedings, at 6-7. Moreover, during his statements to the court Barker repeatedly referred to his court-appointed counsel as "my attorney”. Report of Proceedings, at 3.
In State v. Bebb, 108 Wn.2d 515, 740 P.2d 829 (1987) the trial court initially granted the defendant’s request to represent himself, but appointed a public defender to act as standby counsel, over Bebb’s objections. Later, Bebb requested that standby counsel’s status be changed to cocoun-sel. This request was granted. Thereafter, the public defender represented Bebb fully, and Bebb made no attempt, during trial, to reassert his right of self-representation. Bebb, 108 Wn.2d at 518, 520.
Following his conviction, Bebb appealed, contending inter alia that the trial judge had infringed on his constitutional right of self-representation, indeed, had compelled him to relinquish that right, by virtue of a tentative ruling that Bebb’s communications with standby counsel would not be privileged. Bebb, 108 Wn.2d at 524-25.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, although the trial court’s tentative ruling as to the attorney-client privilege was clearly incorrect, because once the trial commenced, Bebb acquiesced entirely when the public defender assumed the function of sole trial counsel. Thus, Bebb’s previous request for self-representation was rendered moot when, by his conduct, he voluntarily waived the previously asserted right to proceed pro se and reclaimed his right to counsel. Bebb, 108 Wn.2d at 525-26.
Similarly, I believe that Mr. Barker, by his conduct at the trial, relinquished any right of self-representation he may *248have previously asserted, unequivocally or otherwise. As our Supreme Court noted in Bebb, 108 Wn.2d at 525-26:
Since the right to proceed pro se exists to promote the defendant’s personal autonomy, rather than to promote the convenience or efficacy of the trial (and often operates to the defendant’s detriment) courts generally find that relinquishment of the right to proceed pro se is a far easier matter than waiver of the right to counsel.
(Citation omitted.)
For all of these reasons, I would affirm Mr. Barker’s conviction.

 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).