Court Opinion

ID: 9400685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 20:01:14.03444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.330072
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 23a0262n.06

                                      Case No. 22-3800

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                             Jun 08, 2023
                                                                         DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                   )
REBECA SANTIAGO,
                                                   )
       Plaintiff-Appellant,                        )        ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                   )        UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v.                                                 )        COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
                                                   )        DISTRICT OF OHIO
MEYER TOOL INCORPORATED, et al.,                   )                         OPINION
       Defendants-Appellees.                       )

Before: COLE, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

       DAVIS, Circuit Judge.     Plaintiff-Appellant Rebeca Santiago worked at Meyer Tool

Incorporated (“Meyer Tool”) for 19 years before the company terminated her employment in 2017.

After her termination, she sued Meyer Tool, Edwin Finn, her direct supervisor, and Deanna

Adams, the company’s Human Resources Director (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting claims

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”), the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), and various Ohio state laws. The parties filed cross

motions for summary judgment, and the district court denied Plaintiff’s motion and granted

Defendants’ motion as to all federal claims and some state law claims. The court declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Santiago’s remaining state law claims, dismissing them

without prejudice. Santiago now appeals the district court’s decision. For the reasons stated

below, we AFFIRM.
Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

                                               I.

       Meyer Tool is an international, Ohio-headquartered manufacturing company that supplies

precision components used in turbine engines for military and commercial jet planes. Santiago’s

employment with Meyer Tool spanned from 1998 until 2017. She initially joined the company as

a parts inspector, and shortly after, became a machinist. Throughout her time as a machinist,

Edwin Finn was Santiago’s direct supervisor. As a machinist, Santiago operated a Conventional

Electrical Discharging Machining Tool (“EDM”), which uses electrodes to burn precise holes in

turbine parts. The result of deviating from the EDM operating process—which is incorporated

into an operations sheet provided to operators—is producing a deviated part. When a part is

deviated, Meyer Tool reports the issue to the intended client, and the client determines whether it

will accept the part.

       In 2014, Santiago was diagnosed with human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). Santiago

spoke with a Human Resources employee about her need to take time off for her medical condition.

Santiago received approval to take intermittent disability leave under the FMLA from June 15,

2016 through December 15, 2016 and from January 5, 2017 through July 5, 2017. In August 2015,

Santiago sent an email to Finn disclosing her HIV diagnosis. Once Santiago returned from FMLA

leave, Finn began to highly scrutinize her work and complain about her taking time off.

       Meyer Tool maintained an employee handbook which contained various company policies,

including those addressing leave and time off, punctuality and attendance, performance and

training, and complaint procedures. In the Performance and Training section, the handbook

stipulated that non-workplace behavior violations of the handbook would lead to “verbal, written,

and/or final warnings before termination of employment results.” It provided that “[i]t is within

Meyer Tool’s sole discretion to determine the appropriate action, corrective or otherwise, in any

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

given situation.” And notably, the handbook flagged for employees that “[p]oor job performance

will lead to discipline, up to and including termination.”

        As for attendance, the handbook set out a system whereby employees would accumulate

points based on unexcused absences, tardies, or early departures for a rolling twelve-month period.

For example, one unexcused absence would result in one cumulative point. The policy also

specified the discipline that corresponded with accrual; five points led to verbal counseling, seven

points—a written warning, eight points—three days’ unpaid suspension, nine points—a letter

explaining the attendance policy and reminding employees that they would be subject to

termination review upon reaching ten points, and ten points—termination pending review. The

handbook further explained that disciplinary action stemming from attendance violations would

be considered separately from other forms of disciplinary action related to job performance, but

that “multiple occurrences regarding both attendance and work performance or behavior” may

result in termination if the employee “has been suspended on both accounts.” Even so, the

handbook warned employees that “[f]ailure to report for work or failure to notify the supervisor

may warrant termination of employment without notice.” Meyer Tool required all employees to

sign an acknowledgement form indicating their understanding that “continued employment is

contingent on following the policies contained in the Employee Handbook.” Santiago signed the

form.

        During her time at Meyer Tool, Santiago violated and was disciplined for a number of

employee handbook violations. She received disciplinary action for attendance policy violations

in July 2014, October 2014, twice in April 2016, twice in June 2016, and in February, March, and

June 2017. For her violations, Santiago received two verbal warnings, four written warnings, two

three-day unpaid suspensions, and a 9-point letter. Her final suspension took place from June 27

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

to 29, 2017, less than one month before Meyer Tool terminated her employment. Meyer Tool’s

attendance tracking system required employees taking FMLA leave to identify absences, tardies,

or early departures that were covered by the FMLA. Santiago did not identify any occurrences

leading to her violations as FMLA-related.

       Santiago also violated the company’s Performance and Training Policy in 1999, 2002, and

twice in 2012. These violations resulted in two verbal warnings, one written warning, and one

three-day unpaid suspension, respectively. Meyer Tool’s files also show that Santiago produced

deviated parts on February 1 and 8, 2017, but that she received no disciplinary action for either

deviation. Santiago’s final violation of the performance policy occurred in May 2017, when she

produced four deviated parts. Meyer Tool terminated Santiago’s employment on July 20, 2017.

The intended client ultimately rejected all four deviated parts after Santiago’s termination.

       Following her termination Santiago filed a questionnaire with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in October 2017. On the questionnaire, Santiago asserted

that (1) she is disabled in that she is positive for HIV; (2) she informed HR and her supervisor,

Edwin Finn, of her disability; (3) she was terminated by Finn for deviated parts; and (4) many

individuals “deviated dozens of parts and still work [at Meyer Tool] after many years.”

       A week later, Santiago filed her first charge with the EEOC. She alleged that (1) she has

a disability; (2) she was approved to take disability leave; (3) upon her return from leave, Finn

highly scrutinized her work; (4) Finn informed her that she was discharged for producing non-

conforming parts; (5) she is aware that co-workers have produced non-conforming parts and were

retained.

       In July 2018, 358 days after her termination, Santiago filed a second charge with the EEOC.

In the second charge, she alleged gender discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

and the EPA. Santiago claimed that Finn sexually harassed her throughout her tenure at Meyer

Tool. She further alleged that Meyer Tool paid her less than male machinists, assigned her less-

desirable shifts and assignments, and blamed her for other workers’ errors. She again asserted that

she was terminated by Finn due to her disability.

       Santiago subsequently received two right-to-sue letters from the EEOC and brought suit in

district court. After filing their Answer to Santiago’s original Complaint, Defendants moved for

Judgment on the Pleadings as to Santiago’s Title VII claims, arguing that she failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies by not timely filing her second charge within Title VII’s requisite 300-

day window. The court adopted a magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, which

recommended granting Defendants’ motion in its entirety, thereby dismissing that claim.

       In an amended complaint, Santiago alleged the following eleven causes of action:

(1) gender   discrimination   in   violation   of   Ohio   Rev.   Code    §   4112.01,   et   seq.;

(2) disability/perceived disability discrimination in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112;

(3) disability discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02; (4) gender-based pay

discrimination in violation of the EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); (5) wrongful termination in

violation of Ohio Public Policy; (6) gender-based pay discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev.

Code § 4111.17; (7) retaliation in violation of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; (8) negligent

retention and supervision; (9) defamation by slander; (10) hostile work environment based on

gender, disability, and perceived disability in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.02(A) and

4112.99; and (11) hostile work environment based on disability and/or perceived disability in

violation of the ADA.

       The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court denied Santiago’s

motion in its entirety, and granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion. Santiago v.

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

Meyer Tool Inc., No. 1:19-CV-032, 2022 WL 3908954, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2022). The

court dismissed, with prejudice, Santiago’s claims of disability discrimination in violation of the

ADA and Ohio law, FMLA retaliation, gender-based pay discrimination in violation of the EPA

and Ohio law, and hostile work environment in violation of the ADA. Id.

       As to Santiago’s claims for both federal and state disability discrimination and FMLA

retaliation, the district court assumed that Santiago established a prima facie case, but concluded

that Defendants had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for her termination.

The court also found that Santiago failed to establish that Defendants’ reasons were pretextual and

failed to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination. Finally, the court determined that

Santiago did not administratively exhaust her hostile work environment claims before the EEOC.

       The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Santiago’s remaining state

law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). This appeal followed.

                                                II.

       We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Romans v. Mich. Dept.

of Hum. Servs., 668 F.3d 826, 835 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d

890, 894 (6th Cir. 2004)). Summary judgment is warranted when there exists no genuine dispute

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a)). There exists a genuine dispute of material fact if there is sufficient evidence for

a trier of fact to find for Santiago. See Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep’t, 844 F.3d 556, 565 (6th

Cir. 2016). In ruling, we draw all reasonable inferences in Santiago’s favor as the non-moving

party. See Romans, 668 F.3d at 835.

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

                                                 III.

       Santiago asserts that the district court erred in granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment.     Specifically, she argues that (1) Defendants failed to show a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory, nonretaliatory reason for terminating her and, regardless, the reasons offered

were pretexts for disability discrimination and FMLA retaliation; (2) she successfully established

a prima facie case of wage discrimination; and (3) she adequately exhausted her administrative

remedies, permitting her to pursue her claims for hostile work environment in violation of the

ADA. We take each claim in turn.

                                    A. ADA and FMLA Claims

       Absent direct evidence of ADA disability discrimination or FMLA retaliation, as here, we

analyze each of these claims using the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc.,

544 F.3d 696, 703, 707 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying the burden-shifting framework to ADA

discrimination and FMLA retaliation claims).

       Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Santiago bears the initial burden of establishing

a prima facie case of discrimination on account of her disability, and of retaliation for her use of

FMLA leave. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. For purposes of this appeal we assume,

as the district court did, that Santiago has established a prima facie case for both ADA

discrimination and FMLA retaliation.

       The burden thus shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory,

nonretaliatory reason for their actions. See id. If successful, the burden then reverts to Santiago,

who must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reasoning is mere pretext

for discrimination or retaliation. Id. at 804.

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

        Because we apply the same analysis after the prima facie showing, and because Santiago

generally discusses the facts without specific application to the individual legal claims, we address

these claims together.

              i.   Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory, Nonretaliatory Reason for Termination

       Santiago first asserts that Defendants have not presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

and nonretaliatory reason for her termination. Defendants’ burden here is quite low; it is only “one

of production, not persuasion,” and we make “no credibility assessment.” Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).

       Meyer Tool says that it terminated Santiago because of her “repeated failure to follow

Meyer Tool policy and her substandard work product.” As evidence supporting the legitimacy of

its reasons, the company presented its employee handbook and records of Santiago’s violations.

The district court correctly determined that Defendants satisfied their burden.

       We have held on many occasions that the violation of a wide variety of an employer’s

articulated policies constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment

actions. See Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc., 988 F.3d 318, 327 (6th Cir. 2021) (termination for

insubordination in violation of policy); Chattman v. Toho Tenax America, Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 349

(6th Cir. 2012) (final written warning for horseplay in violation of safety policy); Cartwright v.

Lockheed Martin Util. Servs., Inc., 40 F. App’x 147, 155 (6th Cir. 2002) (sleeping during break

against policy). Indeed, it is well-established that no formal policy at all is required for an

employer to clear the low burden associated with this particular showing. See, e.g., Woythal v.

Tex-Tenn Corp., 112 F.3d 243, 246 (6th Cir. 1997) (termination for “negative attitude and lack of

interest in the company’s future” constituted legitimate reason). The salient consideration is

whether Defendants’ stated reason is discriminatory, or retaliatory. It is not.

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

         The parties quibble about whether the district court misapplied the holding in

Schwendeman v. Marietta City Schs., 436 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (S.D. Ohio 2020). But Schwendeman

is binding on neither this court nor the court below. And even if it were, it is consistent with the

precedential authorities discussed above so the district court did not err in according it persuasive

value.    The Schwendeman court found that an employee’s violation of company policies

prohibiting the falsification of leave and falsification of benefits, constituted legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for termination, as did dishonesty alone. Schwendeman, 436 F. Supp

3d at 1061. Santiago argues that because the policy violations Meyer Tool has articulated did not

involve allegations of her lying or falsifying leave or benefits, the stated reasons are insufficient.

But the reasons discussed in Schwendeman are not exhaustive. As noted above, we have accepted

violation of company policies addressing a range of workplace behaviors as legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for dismissal. Nothing in this record suggests that Meyer Tool’s

attendance and product quality policies should be denied the same acceptance.

         Santiago’s arguments to the contrary appear to conflate this determination with whether

Defendants’ stated reasons were pretextual. We proceed with that analysis.

                 ii.   Pretext

         Defendants having produced legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons for

her termination, the burden shifts back to Santiago to establish that Defendants’ stated reasons

were merely pretextual. See Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2012). Santiago

can show pretext by demonstrating that the stated reasons (1) have no basis in fact, (2) did not

actually motivate her termination, or (3) were insufficient to motivate her termination. Id.

Ultimately, the overarching question is simply whether Santiago produced evidence sufficient for

a jury to “reasonably reject [Meyer Tool’s] explanation of why it fired her.” Chen v. Dow Chem.

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). Notably, “[a]lthough a plaintiff need not always ‘produce

additional evidence to support a finding of pretext[,]’ if the plaintiff points to evidence that she

already     presented,   it   must   specifically     rebut   the   employer’s   proffered   legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason.” Brown v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 814 F. App’x 72, 85 (6th Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted). Santiago argues that all three paths support a finding of pretext.

          Santiago cannot prevail under the first showing, where we simply inquire whether the

proffered bases for her discharge actually happened. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems.

Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,

Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). Santiago maintains that Defendants’ allegations that she repeatedly

failed to follow company policy and produced substandard work are “completely unfounded and

belied by the evidence in the record.” To support her argument as to performance, Santiago points

us to her own affidavit, where she stated that she “often trained new machinists and got them

familiar with the assigned duties.” But this statement has no bearing on the undisputed fact that

she deviated four parts prior to her termination.

          With respect to attendance violations, Santiago asserts that she was approved to take

intermittent FMLA leave and that she never missed work without calling in first. In support of

this assertion, Santiago points to deposition testimony of HR employee JoAnne Poff, who

explained that Meyer Tool approved Santiago for intermittent FMLA leave from January 5, 2017

to July 5, 2017, a fact that Defendants do not dispute. But this ignores Poff’s testimony and related

documentary evidence indicating that Santiago eventually exceeded the hours allotted for her

FMLA leave. Meyer Tool records further reflect that Santiago did not identify any of her tardies

or absences that resulted in policy violations as FMLA-related. And regarding her assertion that

she always called before missing work, Santiago points only to her own deposition testimony

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

stating as much. But when given an opportunity to provide written comments on the warning

reports that accompanied each disciplinary action, Santiago declined. What’s more, Santiago

admitted during her deposition that, at the time she received discipline for failing to follow call-

off procedures, she likely would have had her call records available to simply show that she had

called in, but did not do so. Construing these facts in the light most favorable to her, Santiago has

not come forward with evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether her policy

violations actually occurred.

       Next, Santiago’s arguments that Defendants’ proffered reasons for her termination “did not

actually motivate” the discharge mount an indirect attack on the employer’s articulated reasons for

termination. See Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084. Using this approach, Santiago can “attempt[] to indict

the credibility of [her] employer’s explanation by showing circumstances which tend to prove that

an illegal motivation was more likely than that offered by the defendant.” Id. “In other words,

[Santiago] argues that the sheer weight of the circumstantial evidence of discrimination makes it

‘more likely than not’ that the employer’s explanation is a pretext, or coverup.” Id.

       Santiago points to the statistical analysis performed by her expert Dr. Rebecca Fang for

support. In her analysis, Dr. Fang concludes that employees taking FMLA leave at Meyer Tool

were more likely to be terminated than those not taking FMLA leave, and that between 2014 and

2017, all six machinists who took FMLA leave were terminated. Based on Dr. Fang’s analysis,

Santiago urges the conclusion that her own termination was more likely than not due to her FMLA

leave. While Santiago’s statistical evidence may have sufficed to make a prima facie showing of

FMLA retaliation at the summary judgment stage, it is not sufficient on its own to show pretext

here. See Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1468-69 (6th Cir. 1990); cf. Hopson v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 427, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2002).

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

       In Barnes, we explained that “[a]ppropriate statistical data showing an employer’s pattern

of conduct toward a protected class as a group can, if unrebutted, create an inference that a

defendant discriminated against individual members of the class.” 896 F.2d at 1466 (emphasis

added). When a plaintiff offers statistics showing “a disproportionate discharge rate for a protected

group there are three possible explanations for the discrepancy: the operation of legitimate

selection criteria, chance, or the defendant’s bias.” Id. at 1468. Where the statistics indicate a

significant statistical disparity, there is strong evidence that chance is not to blame. Id. at 1468-

69.

       But one way for Defendants to attack Santiago’s prima facie case established by statistics

is by demonstrating that “even if [Santiago’s] statistics and the court’s assumption tend to indicate

that bias could have played a role in some of the decisions, that bias did not play a role in the

particular decision to discharge” Santiago. Id. at 1469. In Barnes, the defendants successfully

rebutted statistical evidence by presenting their own evidence that the terminated plaintiffs were

less qualified than others occupying comparable positions, thereby “undercut[ting] the importance

of the plaintiffs’ statistical proof.” Id. So too here, where Defendants have come forward with

evidence that Santiago repeatedly violated company policies for which she received progressive

discipline. That is, because the statistics themselves do not establish that Santiago’s FMLA leave

more likely than not played a factor in her termination decision, they cannot carry her burden at

the pretext stage. See id. (“This method of attacking a statistical prima facie case cannot be

rebutted by reference to the statistics already presented since the statistics here do not tend to

establish that age played a factor in any particular decision.”).

       On the other hand, in Hopson, we relied on Barnes to hold that significant statistical

evidence, when coupled with “independent circumstantial evidence” can suffice to show that a

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

statistical disparity is more likely than not due to the defendant’s bias, and that the defendant is

not entitled to summary judgment. Hopson, 306 F.3d at 437-38. The “independent circumstantial

evidence” in Hopson included, in part, testimony of a manager that the plaintiff’s race was a factor

in the company’s decision not to hire him for certain jobs. Id. at 437. Santiago points to no such

additional circumstantial evidence. Her statistical evidence, standing alone, is not so significant

to indicate that her termination was more likely than not retaliation for her FMLA leave,

particularly in light of her documented disciplinary history.

       This leaves the third path—that Meyer Tool’s reasons were insufficient to motivate the

discharge. This is essentially an argument that the stated reasons for termination could not have

motivated dismissal. See Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084. Here, Santiago “must show by a preponderance

of the evidence that ‘other employees, particularly employees not in the protected class, were not

fired even though they were engaged in substantially identical conduct to that which the employer

contends motivated its discharge.’” Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 286-87 (6th Cir.

2012) (quoting Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084) (emphasis added).

       Santiago cannot meet her burden here because she has failed to identify retained employees

“not in [her] protected class” with whom she is “similar in all of the relevant aspects.” Weigel v.

Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 378-79 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Ercegovich v. Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998)). We have explained that in order for

employees to be considered similarly situated, we look to factors such as whether they “dealt with

the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same

conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their

conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.” Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352 (quoting Mitchell

v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)). However, we clarified in Ercegovich that the

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

inquiry is not to be applied mechanically. Id. at 352-53. Rather, what makes a plaintiff “similarly

situated [to the non-protected employee] in all relevant respects” is fact-sensitive and to be

determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.

       Applying these standards, Santiago’s evidence of retained Meyer Tool employees

precludes meaningful comparison. First, she points to no employee with a disciplinary record that

demonstrates the employee engaged in “substantially identical conduct” to her own. Blizzard, 698

F.3d at 286-87 (quoting Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084). In the district court and on appeal, Santiago

highlights employee Ruth Clark, a machinist also supervised by Finn who produced deviated parts

and whom Finn suspended for three days before permitting her to return to work. But as the district

court explained, Santiago offers no evidence about Clark’s violation of other Meyer Tool

policies—particularly the attendance policy which Santiago was found to have violated—thus

rendering her an inappropriate comparator for the purposes of pretext.

       Santiago accuses the district court of only focusing on Ruth Clark and ignoring “evidence

in the record of numerous male machinists who produced large quantities of defective parts and

were not terminated.” But it is on appeal that Santiago has directed the court’s attention to this

slew of nine new individuals. We generally decline to entertain factual recitations not brought to

the district court’s attention in the first instance. See Chicago Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487

F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he opposing party ‘has an affirmative duty to direct the court’s

attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine

issue of material fact.’” (quoting In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001))); Sumpter v.

Wayne Cnty., 868 F.3d 473, 490 (6th Cir. 2017) (“We have said time and again, district courts

cannot be expected to dig through the record to find the seeds of a party’s cause of action.”). Even

were we to consider Santiago’s newly-augmented argument, it would still fail as none of her

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

examples includes any individual with attendance policy violations as severe as her own in

addition to their performance violations. Further, Santiago provides no information describing

discipline or termination decisions, such as who the decisionmakers were, what types of parts the

employees produced, or what level of skill and difficulty their jobs required. In fact, Santiago

ignores testimony from the very same deposition that she cites to support her comparator evidence,

in which former Vice President of Operations Gordon McGuire explains that several of the

referenced employees were responsible for producing “delicate parts” or parts that were being

developed for the first time where deviations were expected or far more common. The record (and

Santiago) appears otherwise silent as to what types of parts the remainder of the comparators were

responsible for producing. And McGuire’s testimony as well as Meyer Tool’s employee files

indicate that the newly-proffered employees were not supervised or disciplined by Finn. See Kinch

v. Pinnacle Foods Grp., LLC, 758 F. App’x 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2018) (“If different supervisors treat

different employees with different responsibilities differently for the same conduct, it doesn’t

follow that discrimination motived the disparate treatment.”). Moreover, while she repeatedly

highlights that the nine newly-referenced employees are all male, Santiago makes no mention of

whether any of them, or Clark, (1) were outside of her protected class for purposes of the ADA, or

(2) had not engaged in protected activity for purposes of the FMLA. See Keogh v. Concentra

Health Servs., Inc., 752 F. App’x 316, 324-25 (6th Cir. 2018) (declining to find pretext where

“plaintiff cite[d] no evidence that any similarly situated, nondisabled employee with a disciplinary

record as voluminous as his was treated differently”); Norton v. LTCH, 620 F. App’x 408, 412 n.2

(6th Cir. 2015) (considering whether proffered comparator employee had not taken FMLA leave

for purposes of FMLA retaliation pretext analysis); see also Hull v. Stoughton Trailers, LLC, 445

F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding comparators inadequate where “[plaintiff] fail[ed] to present

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

any evidence on the critical independent variable here: FMLA leave (i.e., which comparators did

(or did not) take FMLA leave).”).        Santiago’s evidence of purportedly similarly situated

employees, on the whole, is insufficient to establish that Defendants’ reasons for her termination

were pretextual.

       As to her last argument that Defendants’ stated reasons were insufficient to result in her

termination, Santiago asserts that based on her expert’s analysis, “there was no statistical evidence

showing that Ms. Santiago was terminated by Meyer for producing rejected/non-conforming parts

only,” and that Santiago herself “had never seen a machinist be terminated for ‘bad’ or

‘nonconforming’ parts.” Santiago’s firsthand knowledge is of little use since there is no reason to

assume that she would have knowledge of every employee’s departure from the company or reason

for the same during the relevant period. Meyer Tool’s disciplinary records, in contrast, establish

that the company had indeed terminated employees for producing nonconforming parts and for

poor work quality. Moreover, both of these arguments continue to downplay Santiago’s extensive

attendance policy violations, including a suspension for such violations within a month of her

eventual termination. The court sees no reason to overlook these violations.

       Because Santiago has not presented evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find that

Defendants’ reasons for her termination were pretextual, we affirm the district court’s

determination.

                                     B. Wage Discrimination

       Santiago next asserts that, contrary to the district court’s finding, she made out a prima

facie case for wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and Ohio’s

analogous law, Ohio Rev. Code § 4111.17. Both laws prohibit covered employers from paying an

employee of one sex at a lesser rate than an employee of the opposite sex for equal work. 29 U.S.C.

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

§ 206(d)(1); Ohio Rev. Code § 4111.17(A). We analyze claims brought pursuant to the federal

and state law under the same standards. Birch v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Prob. Ct., 392 F.3d 151, 161 n.6

(6th Cir. 2004).

       To establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination, Santiago is required to show that

Meyer Tool paid male employees different wages for equal work, for jobs that required equal skill,

effort, and responsibility, and that were performed under similar working conditions. Briggs v.

Univ. of Cincinnati, 11 F.4th 498, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2021). We note that “equal work” does not

require the jobs themselves to have been identical. Beck-Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353, 359

(6th Cir. 2006). But “[i]n determining whether a comparator is appropriate for the purposes of an

EPA claim, our focus is on actual job requirements and duties, rather than job classifications or

titles.” Id. at 362 (citing Brennan v. Owensboro-Daviess Cnty. Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013, 1017 & n.7

(6th Cir. 1975)). In Conti v. Universal Enterprises, Inc., we affirmed the grant of summary

judgment after finding that the plaintiff “ha[d] not come forward with evidence to show the specific

duties and responsibilities of the positions held by [male comparators] and whether those jobs and

[plaintiff’s] job required ‘equal skill, effort, and responsibility’ and were ‘performed under similar

working conditions.’” 50 F. App’x 690, 697 (6th Cir. 2002). There, the plaintiff had “made only

a conclusory allegation on appeal that her ‘job duties were substantially equal to those of

comparable male employees that were paid significantly more.’” Id.

       Santiago’s evidence similarly falls short. In support of her wage discrimination claims,

Santiago presents her expert’s statistical analysis finding that male machinists were paid more, on

average, than female machinists. She also highlights that male employees hired in or around the

same year as her have received a higher average annual raise, year over year. Using this evidence,

she proclaims that “[d]uring the entire time she was employed by Meyer Tool, [she] was paid less

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

than comparable male machinists, including those trained by [her] and having much less

experience.” But despite this assertion, we cannot simply take Santiago’s word for it; she offers

no evidence about the respective skill, effort, and responsibility possessed by the male comparators

she names. Evidence that the higher-paid male employees were also classified as machinists or

that they have been employed at Meyer Tool for less time than Santiago does not adequately speak

to their job requirements and duties, and leaves the court with insufficient information to conduct

meaningful comparison. Nor does Santiago’s statement that she has trained several higher-paid

male employees facilitate comparison without evidence that this fact somehow speaks to the skill,

effort, and responsibility of their respective positions. Thus, the district court correctly concluded

that Santiago failed to make out a prima facie case of wage discrimination.

                               C. Hostile Work Environment - ADA

       Lastly, Santiago challenges the district court’s finding that she did not administratively

exhaust her ADA claim of hostile work environment due to her disability. Before suing an

employer under the ADA, an employee must first timely file a charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12117(a) (incorporating the charging requirements of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)); Russ

v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 720 F. App’x 229, 236 (6th Cir. 2017). “The charge must be

‘sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices

complained of.’” Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting

29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b)). Only those claims that were initially presented to the EEOC are

considered administratively exhausted. This rule’s purpose is twofold: it gives the employer

information regarding the employee’s complaint, and it provides both the EEOC and the employer

an opportunity to attempt reconciliation. See id. at 361-62.

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

          Nonetheless, in recognition of the fact that many employees file charges on a pro se basis,

the court construes the charge liberally and considers claims that are “reasonably related to or grow

out of the factual allegations in the EEOC charge.” Id. at 362. A claim is “reasonably related” to

an EEOC charge when it falls within the scope of that charge or includes language that “would

have put the EEOC or the employer on notice that [the employee] was alleging” that claim. Id. at

363; see Davis v. Sodexho, Cumberland Coll. Cafeteria, 157 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 1998)

(“[W]here facts related with respect to the charged claim would prompt the EEOC to investigate a

different, uncharged claim, the plaintiff is not precluded from bringing suit on that claim.”). A

hostile work environment exists where there is “harassment that ‘unreasonably interferes with [an

employee’s] work performance and creates an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive work

environment.” Younis, 610 F.3d at 362 (quoting Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 678 (6th Cir.

2008)).

          In her questionnaire, Santiago checked boxes indicating that she has a disability, that she

told her boss about her disability, and that she was told she was terminated due to poor

performance, but that other employees had deviated parts and still worked at Meyer Tool. 1 Then,

in her first charge, Santiago stated the following:

          I.     I have a disability. I was approved to take disability related leave. After 19
                 years of employment and returning from leave my work was highly
                 scrutinized by Supervisor Edwin Finn. On July 20, 2017, Supervisor Finn
                 informed me I was discharged for producing non-confirming [sic] parts. I
                 am aware that co-worker Ruth Clark and others have produced non-
                 confirming [sic] parts and were retained.

          II.    Supervisor Edwin Finn is responsible for the above discriminatory actions.

1
  Because Santiago’s second charge before the EEOC was untimely, only the contents of her first charge and her
EEOC questionnaire were properly before the district court for purposes of this exhaustion analysis. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); see also Santiago, 2022 WL 3908954 at *10 n.1 (citing Parry v. Mohawk
Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 309 (6th Cir. 2000)).

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Case No. 22-3800, Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc., et al.

       III.    I believe I have been discriminated against in violation of the Americans
               with Disabilities Act 1990, as amended.

       The district court found that the allegations included in the questionnaire and the first

charge of discrimination were not “reasonably related” to a claim for hostile work environment

under the ADA. We agree.

       In her charge, Santiago does not set forth any facts indicating that Finn’s alleged scrutiny

had any effect on her performance or work environment such that it rose to the level of a hostile

work environment. Instead, the alleged scrutiny is fairly read to relate only to Santiago’s ultimate

termination.   Also of note, although not dispositive, Santiago did not indicate that the

discrimination was a continuing action, but instead identified the date of discrimination as July 20,

2017, the date of her termination. See Younis, 610 F.3d at 362. Taken altogether, neither the

EEOC nor Defendants reasonably could have anticipated Santiago’s EEOC Charge to be alleging

a hostile work environment. It therefore follows that the district court did not err in granting

summary judgment on this claim.

                                                IV.

       For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment.

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