Court Opinion

ID: 9776121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:19:08.995074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:34.537561
License: Public Domain

COHEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s decision overruling point of error one and also its decision on point two that the judge abused her discretion by allowing the witness to testify without first allowing some time to prepare. Unlike the majority, however, I would reverse for this error.
In most cases that affirmed judgments when a trial judge allowed an unlisted witness to testify, either (1) the judge offered or granted a recess for the defendant to interview the surprise witness before he testified,1 (2) the witness did not testify the same day the State first revealed he would be called,2 (3) the defendant knew the witness would give that particular testimony,3 or (4) the defendant did not request or even declined a continuance or recess.4 None of those things happened here.
The State does not argue that Kevin Stephens’ testimony was harmless, and nothing suggests it was. The record suggests it was harmful. Appellant’s entire cross-examination of Stephens consisted of the following:
*638Defense counsel: Mr. Stephens, what are you in jail for? ...
Stephens: Aggravated robbery.
Defense counsel: Did you say your case is set for trial?
Stephens: Yes, it is.
Defense counsel: Are you in the process of trying to work out a deal with the State? ... Is the case set for trial?
Stephens: I have no idea. I imagine so, it is.
Defense counsel: Did you talk to your lawyer before you talked to [the prosecutor] today?
Stephens: No, I haven’t.
Moreover, the significance of Kevin Stephens’ testimony is apparent when considered in light of the other evidence. No physical evidence linked appellant to the crimes. No blood, DNA, semen, or other evidence of scientific testing was admitted. Although the complainants were promptly examined, the physician who testified for the State found one showed no bruising and no lacerations. The testimony of the complainants and that of Kevin Stephens was the only evidence that appellant committed a sex assault. Thus, the evidence was not so overwhelming as to render the error harmless.
In addition, the State emphasized the importance of the erroneously admitted evidence. It began its closing argument by discussing appellant’s confession to Kevin Stephens. Thus, I believe that the error affected substantial rights. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b); King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (holding a substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious affect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict).
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that if this were a civil case, reversal would undoubtedly be required, even though only money, not liberty, would be at stake. In Sharp v. Broadway National Bank, the Texas Supreme Court unanimously reversed an award of attorney’s fees because the witness was not identified in response to interrogatories. 784 S.W.2d 669, 670 (Tex.1990). The Court did so even though (1) the witness was deposed before trial, (2) he was orally identified more than once before trial, and (3) the only issue at trial was attorney’s fees. Id. at 671. None of these factors, even the admitted lack of surprise, was sufficient to show good cause for the unlisted witness to testify. Id. The sanction for failing to designate the known, deposed witness was “automatic exclusion” of his testimony. Id. The Court declared:
The fact that a witness’ identity is known to all parties is not itself good cause for failing to supplement discovery. A party is entitled to prepare for trial assured that a witness will not be called because opposing counsel has not listed him or her in response to a proper interrogatory.
Id. (emphasis added). I realize that the exclusion of testimony in civil cases is mandatory due to Tex.R. Crv. P. 215.5, and there is no such rule in criminal cases. Nevertheless, the contrast is too great to ignore, and it brings me to another reason this case should be reversed.
I have already analyzed all but one of the Harris factors, ie., the source of the error, the nature of the error, the error’s likely effect on the jury, and the record as a whole. Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587-88 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). There remains the final factor, whether declaring the error harmless will encourage its repetition. Id. at 587. I believe it will. We have a rare opportunity here to encourage compliance with a trial judge’s important pretrial discovery orders. I am not arguing for automatic exclusion of testimony, as in Sharp, nor for automatic reversal without harm. If this error were harmless, I would vote to affirm, and if appellant had had no reason to be surprised, I would also vote to affirm. Because appellant had more surprise and more harm than in Sharp, this case is much stronger for reversal. If this case is close on the issue of harm, then in my opinion, the final Harris factor pushes it over the edge. If we reverse, it will be noticed. It will encourage the State to comply with lawful orders. Everyone must do that, of course, but that is more than the State did here. It does not seem too much to ask.

. Nobles v. State, 843 S.W.2d 503, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 15-16 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Pinkerton v. State, 660 S.W.2d 58, 64 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).

. Nobles, 843 S.W.2d at 515; Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 816 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (9 days); Bridge v. State, 726 S.W.2d 558, 567 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Pinkerton, 660 S.W.2d at 64.

. Nobles, 843 S.W.2d at 515; Stoker, 788 S.W.2d at 15; Pinkerton, 660 S.W.2d at 64.

. Nobles, 843 S.W.2d at 515; Hernandez, 819 S.W.2d at 816; Richardson v. State, 744 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Bridge, 726 S.W.2d at 566-67.