Court Opinion

ID: 9580360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:04:24.224459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:14.088084
License: Public Domain

Ness, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I strongly disagree with the majority and therefore dissent. The repeal of the South Carolina Governmental Motor Vehicle Tort Claims Act cannot divest appellants Taylor and Mobley of rights which had vested prior to repeal.
The majority correctly states the general rule regarding repeal of a statute. The statement, however, is incomplete.
“The general rule ... is that repeal of a statute has the effect of blotting it out as completely as if it had never existed and of putting an end to all proceedings under it. [Citations omitted.] But it is equally well settled that a *320repealing act ought not be construed,____to affect rights which have already vested under the act repealed ...”
South Carolina Mental Health Commission v. May, 226 S. C. 108, 83 S. E. (2d) 713, 716 (1954), citing Duke Power Company, et al. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 81 F. (2d) 513, 516 (4th Cir. 1936) (emphasis added). See, City of Myrtle Beach v. Richardson, 280 S. C. 167, 311 S. E. (2d) 922, 926 (1984) [“[v]ested rights ... are not destroyed by repeal of a statute.”]; Vaughan v. Kalyvas, 288 S. C. 358, 342 S. E. (2d) 617 (Ct. App. 1986). See also, Hasell v. Medical Society of South Carolina, Inc., 288 S. C. 318, 342 S. E. (2d) 594, 595 (1986) [“[i]t is obvious that a statute enacted two years after the injury cannot be used to deny appellant rights which she enjoyed at the time of the injury.”]; Nohrden v. North Eastern R.R. Co., 54 S. C. 492, 32 S. E. 524 (1899).
This rule is consistent with the rule in other jurisdictions. A legislative act which establishes immunity for tortious acts cannot be applied retroactively to divest an injured party the right to recover in tort for his injuries. LaParre v. Y.M.C.A. of the Oranges, 30 N. J. 225, 152 A. (2d) 340 (1959); Cusick v. Feldpausch, 259 Mich. 349, 243 N. W. 226 (1932). Once a cause of action accrues, it becomes a vested right which cannot be extinguished by legislative act. Karl v. Bryant Air Conditioning Company, 705 F. (2d) 164 (6th Cir. 1983).
[A] right which has become vested is not dependent upon the common law or the statute under which it was acquired for its assertion. It has an independent existence. Consequently, the repeal of the statute or the abrogation of the common law from which it originated does not erase a vested right, but it remains enforceable without regard to the repeal.
1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. 1985) Section 23.34. See also, 73 Am. Jur. (2d) Statutes Section 385; Anno. 77 ALR 1338.
In these cases, appellants’ rights to recover in tort against the responsible governmental entity vested at the time they were injured. S. C. Code Ann. Sections 15-77-210 through 250 (1976) (repealed by 1986 Act No. 463, Section 2). The subsequent repeal of the statutes which granted the right to *321recover could not have divested rights which vested when the injuries occurred. South Carolina Mental Health Commission v. May, supra. Similarly, the reenactment of sovereign immunity in the Tort Claims Act, S. C. Code Ann. Section 15-78-20(c) (Supp. 1986), could not have divested appellants’ existing rights. Hasell v. Medical Society of South Carolina, supra.
I would reverse the order of the trial judge and remand to allow appellants’ actions to proceed.
Harwell, J., concurs.