Court Opinion

ID: 9789210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:30:35.168267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:20.602060
License: Public Domain

VOSS, Judge,
dissenting.
¶ 21 To the extent that Hickman’s motion to dismiss was treated as a motion for summary judgment, the following facts are either supported by the record or conceded by the majority.
¶ 22 Crowe has been a licensed contractor in Mississippi continuously since 1974. Crowe specialized in the construction of commercial hen houses and has been involved in this type of construction in several states. Hickman has been in the egg business in Arizona for decades and specifically sought out Crowe to construct new hen houses (“the project”).
¶23 The parties traveled back and forth between Arizona and Mississippi several times to discuss the project and an agreement was reached ultimately. The $2,310,000 construction contract, accepted October 28,1997, was subject to “final financing,” the approval of which was obtained in December of 1997.
¶24 Hickman knew Crowe did not have a contractor’s license when they entered into the contract and advised Crowe to obtain one. Hickman even forwarded licensing information to Crowe for his use. Crowe applied for the contractor’s license. Crowe passed the written portion of the licensing exam on October 1, 1997. Crowe was fully licensed as a general commercial contractor and bonded on February 23,1998. Hickman made many progress payments over the course of construction — and only ceased making payments called for under the contract when a dispute over the quality of the construction arose. The damages Crowe seeks to recover through this litigation represent less than 4 percent of the original contract amount and only involves work accomplished after Crowe was fully licensed and bonded.
¶ 25 The supreme court in Aesthetic Property Maintenance Inc. v. Capitol Indemnity Corp., 183 Ariz. 74, 900 P.2d 1210 (1995), recognized the manifest injustice that could occur through a strict application of the requirements of A.R.S. section 32-1153 and established a substantial compliance standard to be utilized when considering whether the *118requirements of A.R.S. section 32-1153 have been satisfied.
¶26 The majority and I disagree on what was important to the Aesthetic court. The majority applies the elements suggested by the court strictly while I look at the “policy and purpose” of the statute — what I believe is the driving force behind Aesthetic. The language of Aesthetic supports my position.
In short, whether substantial or strict compliance is required is largely a question of which test best promotes legislative purpose. See A.R.S. § 1-211(B) (“Statutes shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice.”)
Id. at 77, 900 P.2d at 1213 (emphasis added).
Substantial compliance “is adequate when it satisfies the general policy or purpose of the statute.”
Id. at 78, 900 P.2d at 1214.
¶ 27 The “policy or purpose” of A.R.S. section 32-1153 “is to protect the public from unscrupulous, unqualified, and financially irresponsible contractors.” Id. The public did not need protection from Crowe for any of the above. Indeed, the word unscrupulous only comes to mind when one considers Hickman’s involvement in this matter. Again, Hickman sought out Crowe, entered into a contract with him, although he knew he was not licensed, sent Crowe materials to help him obtain a license, let Crowe on the property to do the work, paid him millions of dollars on the contract, accepted the project, and, if you believe Crowe’s allegation, then refused to pay over $105,000 for work done. The first, and only time Crowe heard about his lack of a license “at the time he entered the contract” is when Hickman filed his answer and motion to dismiss.
¶ 28 The court in Aesthetic cited with approval the disposition of the court in Koehler v. Donnelly, 114 N.M. 363, 838 P.2d 980 (1992). There, like the court in Aesthetic, the court suggested certain elements that could be used in evaluating whether the requirements of substantial compliance were met. After listing the elements, however, the Koehler court recognized that each factor need not be present and that “the true test is whether the contractor’s substantial compliance with the licensing requirements satisfies the policy of the statute.” Id. at 982 (emphasis added).
¶ 29 The majority, citing Aesthetic, claims that “Crowe did not meet his burden of proof as to financial responsibility, and this alone eliminates his claim of substantial compliance.” Respectfully, the majority has read the holding of Aesthetic too narrowly. Aesthetic was decided in the context of the inadvertent suspension of a contractor’s license when its renewal notice was sent to the wrong address. The Aesthetic court found that, under those circumstances and in order to protect the public, substantial compliance required that the contractor remain financially responsible during the period of time its license was suspended. 183 Ariz. at 78, 900 P.2d at 1214. The court did not, however, limit the doctrine of substantial compliance to those circumstances only but extended it to other situations in which the “general policy or purpose of the statute” is satisfied. Id.
¶ 30 Here, the policy or purpose of section 32-1153 was satisfied and the public was protected because Crowe seeks payment only for the time he was licensed and bonded.3 Crowe has been a contractor since 1974 constructing specialized buildings. Hickman sought out Crowe because of this expertise. Hickman knew that Crowe did not have a license when he entered into the contract. Hickman paid out over $2,000,000 on the project over the course of a year and only complained about the lack of a license at the time the contract was entered into some two years previously, when Crowe sued for money he alleged was due.
¶ 31 It is clear to me from the language in Aesthetic and the eases cited therein that A.R.S. section 32-1153 is to be used as a shield, not a sword. I respectfully submit that the majority is wrongfully allowing the statute to be used as a sword to punish *119Crowe for acting in a fashion invited by Hickman.
¶ 32 I would follow the lead of Aesthetic and find that Crowe’s actions satisfy the requirements of substantial compliance. I, like the court in Aesthetic, would reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment for Crowe and against Hickman. This would allow the matter to proceed to trial on the construction claim.

. The majority’s footnote 1 is irrelevant. The duties cited end on February 22, 1998. Crowe’s Arizona contractor’s license and bond were issued effective February 23, 1998 and February 2, 1998 respectively. Crowe’s complaint sought damages for labor performed and materials supplied after February 23, 1998. Crowe seeks no relief whatsoever for the work performed during the period set forth in footnote 1.