Court Opinion

ID: 9526886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:25:40.159979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:16.721409
License: Public Domain

M. F. Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). For the reasons expressed in People v Grim, 65 Mich App 143, 145; 237 NW2d 221 (1975), and Judge Allen’s dissent in People v Lutzke, 68 Mich App 75, 82-83; 241 NW2d 765 (1976), (reversed at 399 Mich 870; 251 NW2d 691 [1977], on the basis of People v Crittle, 390 Mich 367; 212 NW2d 196 [1973]), I find the intoxication instruction herein to be erroneous.
I do not believe that the error here can be dismissed as harmless.
Defendant’s testimony was that, because of intoxication, he had no memory of the events in question. This is consistent with two factual theories, either of which would constitute a defense: (1) defendant did not have the requisite intent because of incapacity; and (2) though capable, defendant did not have a larcenous intent, but did have some other intent, which he can’t remember.
The error of the reasoning in People v Stephens, 71 Mich App 33, 35-37; 246 NW2d 429, 430-431 (1976), and People v Sizemore, 69 Mich App 672, 677-679; 245 NW2d 159, 162-163 (1976), is that, by equating a claimed lack of memory with a claimed lack of capacity, they overlook the possibility of *446defendant’s second line of defense. An instruction which emphasizes the capacity standard prejudices a defendant claiming lack of memory by leading a jury to overlook the same possibility.
For these reasons, I would reverse.