Court Opinion

ID: 9454239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:40:23.785645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:01.928204
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge
(concurring and dissenting in part):
I concur fully in Part II and so very, very much in Part I. But in the final analysis my difference as to Part I would call for reversal so I dissent to that extent.
What I do not disagree with sharpens my difference. Thus, I agree there is no ground to claim denial of due process from the standpoint of double jeopardy. The Texas law1 on that is extremely liberal and would afford the petitioner full protection as to every item and transaction making up the 15 to 20 thousand dollar diversions. Similarly, proof of other like activities to show motive, design, plan, scheme and the like exposes this sort of defendant to blunderbuss proof which, despite the law’s rationalization, undoubtedly poisons the mind of the jury on the isolated, charged incident.2 As Judge Goldberg so graphically portrays, the practical necessity for this sort of proof is augmented in situations of running embezzlement. The more sophisticated it is, with offsetting false entries which all have to be kited, proof of the crime must frequently have its alpha and end in its omega. In between may be, as there was here, evidence concerning 15 to 20 thousand dollars to establish a $312.35 diversion. Nor am I opposed to the general proposition recognized by Federal Law 3 and by the Texas Code 4 that “on or about” may encompass an act committed prior to the indictment but within the period of the statute of limitations. All of these developments are just part of the hazards of the trade of embezzlement or misapplication of public funds. It is risky business, and ought to be.
But this is not what concerns me. Here is a charge that has that rare precision which only figures permit. The charge is for the misapplication of $312.35, no more, no less. There is no charge of misapplication of 15 to 20 thousand dollars. Granted that virtually a 3-year period of time is allowed in which to show the misapplication of $312.35, the trial court did not limit it to that.
*630To be sure, in the early part of the State Court’s charge the jury was required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did misapply “all or some part of said $312.35 in money alleged in the indictment.” 5
But this simplicity which showed a matching of the indictment charge, the proof and any verdict of guilty was soon obliterated. I say obliterated because the acceptable and understandable “on or before” rule of Art. 21.02 was expanded somehow into allowing the jury to find the defendant guilty if, at any time in the 3-year period preceding the indictment, the defendant had misapplied so much as a single red cent! 6
I can assume that a state statute could define constitutionally a crime of misapplication of any sum of money under any circumstances within the 3-year period of the statute of limitation. That would at least supply fair notice to (a) nascent misappliers who want to know their “rights” before doing any till-dipping and, more likely, (b) those caught and charged. But here the statute defining the crime has no such broad reach. Nor is it changed by the “on or before” latitude of Art. 21.02. That pertains to time of the event, not a multiplicity of events.
The simple fact is that nobody — I mean no, no, nobody, a lawyer, party, or Judge of this or any other Court, high or low, — could take this record and with the most “perceptive antennae” Morgan v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 399 F.2d 93; Tillman v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d 930, 936 [Jan. 9, 1969 slip opinion at 11] ever penetrate the enigmatic riddle of the mystery wrapped verdict of guilty to ascertain the jury’s determination as to what money was taken, the amount of that money or when it was taken. One thing we know. The $312.35 was quite unimportant. What convicted the petitioner might have been a single dollar six months before that alleged event, or $10,000 2 years later.
Thus, by a simple, but now deceptively tragic charge of a specific sum at a specific time, the defendant finds after the fact, that he was obliged to defend against a charge of misapplying any sum at any time over a 3-year period.
We may come to legislative definition of crimes of such latitude,7 but until we do I do not think due process permits the exposure of a citizen to these unknown, unascertainable, indefinable risks, certainly not out of statutory construction or procedural rules, legislative or judge made.
*631Given counsel of the greatest skill and a trial before the fairest jury, presided over by the most meticulous Judge, the beginning is nevertheless a mystery. It is not until the trial is over that the defendant knows what he is charged with doing or when it took place.
For a man to know at the end, but not before, what he has been tried for and what has happened to him, simply does not square with ideas of fairness, fair play, and much less, constitutionally mandated due process.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. See Ellis v. State and related text in tlie Court's opinion.

. See Weiss v. United States and appended text in tlie Court’s opinion.

. See Owen v. United States and appended text in the Court’s opinion.

. See Art. 21.02 and text in the Court’s opinion.

. See the Court’s opinion at 624.

. The Court’s opinion sets it out but it bears repeating.
“You are instructed that, as a part of the law of this case, the State is not under the burden of establishing that the specific sum of $312.35, as alleged in the indictment, was unlawfully and fraudulently taken by the Defendant and converted to his own use, it being, on the contrary sufficient under the law if the State has established, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any sum of money was unlawfully and fraudulently taken by the Defendant and converted to his own use on or about the 31st day of July, 1959, as the term ‘on or about said date,’ as applied to this case, is construed as therein-above set forth, [set forth as any time from November 28, 1958 (the date the statute of limitations tolled the time) through November 27, 1961 (the date the grand jury returned the indictment)].” (Emphasis added.)

. Such a statute would be a shocker. It would read like this: “If any officer of any county, city, or town, or any person employed by such officer shall fraudulently take, misapply, or convert to his own use any money, that may have come into his custody or possession by virtue of his office at any time within three years prior to the date such person is indicted, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than ten years.”
An indictment drawn under such a statute would likewise be repulsive, abhorrent, despicable, dreadful, withering, and astounding. It would go like this; “It is hereby charged that Raymond Roe, being an officer of this county, did, within three years prior to the date of this indictment fraudulently misapply some sum of money belonging to this county, against the peace and dignity of the State.”