Court Opinion

ID: 9789260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:32:45.193539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:20.866309
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ,
dissenting.
Today, the majority eliminates Summit County's ability to exercise its land use authority to prohibit toxic cyanide mining operations in Summit County. The majority purports to reach this conclusion by application of our established preemption doctrine. However, the majority strays from our traditional preemption principles, blending different types of preemption analysis and different sections of the Mined Land Reclamation Act ("MLRA") to reach this result.
The majority contends Summit County's regulation is impliedly preempted, ultimately arguing the state has completely occupied the field of Designated Mining Operation ("DMO") regulation. However, seemingly unconvinced with this analysis, which would resolve this case, the majority goes on, attempting to draw support from the Board's argument that the regulation is an improper reclamation standard. The Board's argument is an alternative argument because promulgation of reclamation standards, by the plain language of the MLRA, is under the sole authority of the Reclamation Board. Thus, the majority also appears less than convinced by the Board's express preemption argument. It seems as though the majority wants it both ways; it claims the MLRA preempts the county regulation but nonetheless seems to believe counties should retain the authority to ban mining or mining techniques in some zoning districts, but not all *737zoning districts.1 This is inconsistent with our preemption doctrine because a county regulation may not be expressly or impliedly preempted only in part. .
In situations such as this, where a county regulation is neither impliedly nor expressly preempted yet some practical tension remains, our preemption doctrine provides a third prong-the county regulation may be preempted by operational conflict. However, a finding of operational conflict requires review upon a fully developed evidentiary record and, because this case reaches us on an appeal from a declaratory judgment of an issue of law, without an actual dispute over a mining operation permit, we have no such record here. Rather than waiting for a fully developed evidentiary record on a disputed operation that we could evaluate for the existence of an operational conflict, the majority applies a hybrid version of our preemption doctrine and, I believe, as a result, further confuses this area of law.
In contrast to the majority, I do not believe the county regulation is impliedly or expressly preempted by the MLRA. I would hold first, that the MLRA has not completely occupied the field of DMO, regulation and, thus, the county's regulation of locale determinations is not impliedly preempted. Second, I would hold the MLRA's grant of ex-elusive authority to the Board to promulgate reclamation standards does not expressly preempt the county regulation because the county regulation is not a reclamation standard. As such, I respectfully dissent.
1.
"Preemption" is a concept used, somewhat confusingly, to describe a variety of analyses undertaken to resolve conflicts of law. There are three types of preemption analyses; federal preemption, found in the United States Constitution; home-rule preemption, based on the Colorado Constitution; and statutory preemption, which is not a constitutional analysis at all, but rather is a specialized rule of statutory construction, concerned with the legislative intent behind conflicting state and county laws. Each type of preemption commences with its separate premise and utilizes its own distinctly different analysis. I believe the majority mingles and confuses these different analyses.
Federal preemption is a mechanism for resolving conflicts between state and federal laws. The federal constitution establishes the supremacy of federal laws over state laws, Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, and therefore, state laws that conflict with federal laws are "without effect." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981).
In contrast, our home-rule preemption doe-trine is based in our state constitution, and allows us to navigate conflicts between state laws and municipal laws enacted by home-rule cities. The Home-Rule Amendment, Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6, grants home-rule cities a "right of self-government in both local and municipal matters," and further provides these local ordinances "shall supersede within the territorial limits ... any law of the state in conflict therewith."
Despite the constitutional authority of home-rule cities, a state statute may nonetheless preempt a home-rule city ordinance. In determining when preemption occurs, this court has set forth a four-factor test: "whether there is a need for statewide uniformity of regulation; whether the municipal regulation has an extraterritorial impact; whether the subject matter is governed by state or local government; and whether the Colorado Constitution specifically commits the particular matter to state or local regulation." Voss v. Lundvall Brothers, Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Colo.1992).
Because this case involves a county, rather than a home-rule municipal regulation, Voss is inapplicable here. The majority reasons that a home-rule city, with constitutionally *738granted independent authority, must necessarily have more authority to ban an activity than a county. However, this reasoning is flawed. Conflicts between home-rule city and state laws raise constitutional questions regarding the extent of the grant of constitutional power to the home-rule city as opposed to the constitutional power of the state. By contrast, this case involves a conflict between actions of the state and a county. Counties are "political subdivisions of the state, existing only for the convenient administration of the state government, created to carry out the will of the state" Bd. of County Comm'rs of Dolores County v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 125, 470 P.2d 861, 862 (1970). As such, in contrast to home-rule cities, which have constitutional powers, a county is an arm of the state, and may enjoy the state's constitutional authority if that authority is properly granted to it by the state. The state may grant authority to a county that is not granted to a home-rule city by the Colorado Constitution. Thus, the majority's reliance on Voss to reach its conclusions is misplaced.
Our statutory preemption doctrine is the appropriate analytical tool to determine the extent of the authority granted by the state to the county and the Board, as it was developed to guide our evaluation of conflicts between state and county laws. See Bd. of County Comm'rs, La Plata County v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs. Inc., 830 P.2d 1045, 1055 (Colo.1992) ("The purpose of the preemption doctrine is to establish a priority between potentially conflicting laws enacted by various levels of government."). In essence, it serves as a series of guideposts to steer our interpretation of these state and county conflicts.
Unlike federal or home-rule preemption, conflicts between state and county laws are not subject to a constitutional analysis. As discussed above, while the level of government may be different in state-county conflicts, the underlying authority for each action is the same. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 125, 470 P.2d at 862. As such, we evaluate the conflict according to a set of statutory construction rules, which, like our resolution of the conflict itself, could be changed by the General Assembly at any time. Thus, while the federal or home-rule preemption analysis may look beyond the legislative authority, examining such factors as the subject matter at issue, this analysis examines the intent of the specific enactments involved.
There are three ways a state statute such as the MLRA can preempt a county regulation: express preemption, implied preemption, and operational conflict. The majority contends the county regulation is impliedly preempted because the state has completely occupied the field of DMO regulation, "factoring in" the Board's argument that the county regulation is expressly preempted because it is an improper reclamation standard. I will address each of these arguments in turn.
IL.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the county regulation is impliedly preempted by the MLRA. A state statute impliedly preempts county regulation when the statute "evinces a legislative intent to completely occupy a given field by reason of a dominant state interest." - Bowen/Edwards, 830 P.2d at 1056-57. A state statute does not impliedly preempt a county regulation by merely "addressing certain aspects of those activities." - Id. at 1058.
In order to determine whether a state statute impliedly preempts a county's authority to promulgate land use regulations, we must engage in a two-step analysis. First, whether the state statute and the county regulation occupy the same "field." Second, if they do occupy the same field, whether the state, by statute, has intended to occupy it completely, to the exclusion of other sources of regulation. Before applying this analysis, I believe it is helpful to clarify the county and state laws at issue here.
A.
Summit County issued a regulation pursuant to its land use authority, granted by the Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act ("Land Use Act"), § 29-20-104, CRS. (2008). The Land Use Act allows local governments to "plan for and regulate *739the use of land" by determining which activities are appropriate in a given location. Id. Inherent in this power to regulate the use of land is the authority to limit the amount or type of an activity, such as mining, that can occur on county lands. "[Llimitation on land use is 'one of the fundamental purposes of zoning." Colo. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs v. Colo. Mined Land Reclamation Bd., 809 P.2d 974, 985 (Colo.1991) (quoting Famularo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Adams County, 180 Colo. 333, 338, 505 P.2d 958, 960 (1973)).
Summit County's regulation is an exercise of its land use authority, as it reflects the county's locale determination for the activity of cyanide leach mining. It states: "Any mining or milling operation that utilizes eya-nide or other toxic/acidie ore-processing reagents in heap or vat leach applications shall not be allowed in any zoning district." Summit County, Colo. Land Use and Development Code § 3812 (2004). In other words, the regulation expresses the county's conclusion that, in all zoning districts in the county, mining operations utilizing this particular technique are not an appropriate use of land.2 Thus, the county regulation occupies the field of DMO locale determinations.
B.
The MLRA's regulation of DMOs is, by contrast, a broader permitting scheme. The MLRA states, "No governmental office of the state, other than the board, nor any political subdivision of the state shall have the authority to issue a reclamation permit pursuant to this article." § 34-32-109(6), C.R.S. (2008). This permitting process serves a gatekeeper function, ensuring only appropriate mining operations are allowed to move forward. Through this permitting authority, the Board regulates numerous aspects of all types of mining operations, including DMOs. The Reclamation Board evaluates each permit application according to the factors set out in section 34-82-115(4), including prerequisites such as adequate financial warranties and location concerns.
C.
The majority contends sections $4-82-1038), -112.5, and -116.5, C.R.S. (2008), have completely occupied the field of DMO regulation, to the exclusion of any type of local regulation. Maj. op. at 721. However, these sections merely define DMOs and set forth how the Board's general permitting authority, set forth in section 34-82-115(4), shall be specifically applied to DMOs. See § 34-32-103(8) (defining "Designated Mining Operations" as those utilizing "toxic or acidic chemicals"); § 34-82-1125 (describing the conditions the Board may require of DMOs seeking a reclamation permit); § 34-32-116.5 (vesting the Board with authority to specify the elements of environmental protection plans, necessary for the granting of a reclamation permit, pursuant to § 34-32-115(4)(g)). The majority's reasoning seems to be that, because the MLRA defines DMOs and sets forth permitting considerations for those operations, the Board enjoys sole authority to regulate DMOs, effectively crowding out local land use regulations such as Summit County enacted here. However, the MLRA contains no language that would evince an intent to completely occupy the field of DMO regulation through the permitting authority, to the exclusion of local land use regulations. Accordingly, because the majority's analysis hinges on the MLRA's permitting authority, I disagree with the majority's finding of implied preemption.
Applying the two-step implied preemption analysis to the MLRA's permitting authority, I would agree the county regulation occupies the same field as the permitting mechanism. However, the determination that the MLRA's permitting authority and the county regulation occupy the same field is merely the first step of our analysis. The second step of our implied preemption analysis con*740siders whether the state intended to occupy the field completely, to the exclusion of county regulation. The language of the MLRA does not indicate the state intended to occupy that field completely. Rather, the MLRA contemplates a sharing of authority between state and local governments.
The MLRA's permitting mechanism authorizes the Reclamation Board to consider some aspects of location in its permitting decisions. § 34-82-115(4). However, the language of the MLRA indicates the General Assembly did not intend the Board to control the field of mining operation regulation to the exclusion of county locale regulations. In fact, the statute explicitly contemplates the concurrent exercise of county land use authority. The MLRA states:
The board or the office shall not deny a permit if the operator demonstrates ... [njo part of the proposed mining operation, the reclamation program, or the proposed future use is or may be contrary to the laws or regulations of this state or the United States, including but not limited to all federal, state, and local permits, licenses, and approvals, as applicable to the specific operation.
§ 34-32-115(4)(c)(D) (emphasis added). Thus, while the MLRA grants some locale determination authority to the Reclamation Board, it also recognizes local land use regulations will be simultaneously applicable. As such, the MLRA does not completely occupy the field of DMO regulation, including DMO locale determinations, to the exclusion of all other regulation.
The majority argues the state has completely occupied the field of DMO regulation because, otherwise, "Summit County's ordinance would entirely displace the Board's authority to authorize the use of such mining techniques." Maj. op. at 721. I disagree. The state allows the Board to permit mining operations, but the MLRA does not require or necessitate the approval of those permits. Rather, the MLRA specifically directs the board to consider a myriad of factors in consideration of a permit, including compliance with "local permits, licenses and approvals." § 34-32-115(4)(c)(D).
Accordingly, the county's regulation is not impliedly preempted by the permitting mechanism contained within the MLRA, which specifically requires consideration of local regulations, regardless of the specific application of that mechanism to DMOs. As we stated in Bowen/Edwards, a state statute does not impliedly preempt a county regulation by merely "addressing certain aspects of those activities." 830 P.2d at 1058. Rather than existing in irreconcilable conflict, I believe the state and county authority can and do work harmoniously. See § 34-32-109(6), C.R.S. (2008) ("Any mining operator subject to this article shall also be subject to zoning and land use authority and regulation by political subdivisions as provided by law."); C & M Sand & Gravel v. Board of County Com'rs, 673 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Colo.App.1983) (determining the General Assembly intended "mining operations be subject to a multi-level regulatory and permitting system involving both state agencies and local government").
II.
While it is unclear from the majority's opinion to what extent, if any, it adopts the Board's reasoning, I also disagree with the Reclamation Board's contention that the county regulation is a reclamation standard and, thus, expressly preempted by the MLRA. A state statute expressly preempts a county regulation when the statute contains "express language" indicating "preemption of all local authority over the subject matter." Bowen/Edwards, 830 P.2d at 1057. Legislative intent to prohibit a county from exercising its land use authority should be "clear and unequivocal." Id.
The MLRA defines a reclamation standard as procedures utilized during and after mining to minimize environmental damage:
[The employment during and after a mining operation of procedures reasonably designed to minimize as much as practicable the disruption from the mining operation and to provide for the establishment of plant cover, stabilization of soil, the protection of water resources, or other measures appropriate to the subsequent beneficial use of such affected lands.
*741§ 34-82-1038(13). Under the MLRA, a "mining operation" is defined as "the development or extraction of a mineral from its natural occurrences on affected land," including "in situ leach mining." $ 34-32-108(8). Thus, the MLRA distinguishes between development and extraction on the one hand, and procedures used to minimize damage on the other.
The Board characterizes the county regulation as a reclamation standard. Although the majority relies primarily on the implied preemption analysis discussed above, they also stress the significance of the Reclamation Board's characterization of the county regulation as a reclamation standard. Maj. op. at 732. The majority reasons that, because the Board is the "expert agency established ... to promulgate ... reclamation standards, ... its expertise includes identifying what is or is not a reclamation standard." Id.
I do not agree with the Board's contention that the county regulation is a reclamation standard. Returning to the MLRA's definition, reclamation standards are procedures imposed on mining operations "during and after" the mining is taking place in an attempt to mitigate the negative environmental impacts of those operations Thus, not all aspects of mining operations are reclamation standards. - Rather, reclamation standards are only those elements of an existing or proposed mining operation implemented in order to minimize the operation's environmental consequences. In other words, a reclamation standard dictates how a mining operation must function.
In contrast to the role of reclamation standards, the county's regulation seeks to control where a certain type of mining operation may occur. This regulation, as discussed above, was issued by Summit County pursuant to its land use authority and constitutes a valid exercise of this authority. See $ 29-20-104. The field of locale determinations for mining operations is separate and distinct from the reclamation field entrusted to the Reclamation Board under the MLRA. The definition of reclamation does not evince an intent to vest the Reclamation Board with the authority to determine where mining is appropriate, or to identify those lands where mining may never be appropriate.
However, these are powers entrusted to counties through the Land Use Act. Under the Land Use Act, counties are authorized to regulate the use of land in various locations by "protecting lands from activities which would cause immediate or foreseeable material danger to significant wildlife habitat and would endanger a wildlife species"; "Irlegu-lating the location of activities and developments which may result in significant changes in population density" and "Irlegu-lating the use of land on the basis of the impact thereof on the community or surrounding areas." § 29-20-104(1), CRS. (2008). Locale determinations are land use decisions, properly left to local governments under section 29-20-104.
The regulation at issue here is not a reclamation standard; it seeks to regulate where a particular type of mining operation may occur, rather than how that mining operation must function. Thus, the Board's characterization of the county's regulation as a reclamation standard is incorrect and, to the extent the majority relies upon this characterization, that reliance is misplaced.
IV,
I believe the majority incorrectly concludes Summit County's regulation has been impliedly preempted by the MLRA. I do not believe the MLRA expressly or impliedly preempts the county regulation. According ly, I respectfully dissent.

. I see no legal distinction between a "ban" in one zoning district, or in all zoning districts. However, the majority also suggests any restriction on a type of mining is a reclamation standard, which may only be undertaken by the Reclamation Board. In my view, if the county has the authority to institute a "ban" on a type of mining in one zoning district, it necessarily enjoys the authority to make a determination as to the reasonableness of that method in all zoning districts.

. The majority suggests Summit County passed this regulation for the sole purpose of lessening the environmental impacts of cyanide leach mining. Yet, there are a variety of reasons why the county may have reached this result, such as public health, development, tourism, or other concerns related to the proper exercise of land use authority. The county planning staff's discussion of environmental and safety concerns addressed by the regulation seem to be an attempt to control public perceptions of risk, suggesting the primary purpose of the regulation is to lessen the effect of those concerns on Summit County's thriving tourism industry.