Court Opinion

ID: 9700892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:52:30.56578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:15.756130
License: Public Domain

O’HERN, J.,
dissenting.
In this case I am unable to concur that the trial error found by the Appellate Division and this Court was not capable of producing an unjust result. There is no litmus test that will answer such questions. In some cases the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that none can debate the fairness of sustaining a conviction despite error. See United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1976) (receipt of inadmissible evidence was harmless since other evidence of guilt was overwhelming).
Both defendants in this case presented alibi defenses. While their alibis were not airtight in every detail and contained internal inconsistencies, certain facts appear to be unassailable. Grice was in the Ironbound Boys Club at 7:30 p.m.; the disinterested supervisor in charge of the Ironbound Boys Club produced the score book for that night showing that Grice had played in a basketball game that began at 6:30 p.m. The score book also showed that there had been forfeiture of a second game, thereby corroborating the testimony that Grice had played in a pickup game and had not left the Boys Club until 8:45 p.m. on that night. The Ironbound Boys Club is located in the “Down Neck” section of Newark; the crime occurred in Belleville, north of Newark, at about 9:10 p.m.; the distance between the two sites is approximately five miles. The FDR Homes, where some of Grice’s teammates said they gathered with him after *391the game, are but a short distance from the Boys Club. One such witness testified that he recalled the second game because he had been guarding Grice when Grice shot the winning basket.
Crowley’s defense rested on both his own testimony and that of other witnesses. His alibi was that at the time of the crime he had been watching television at a friend’s apartment in the Christopher Columbus Homes. Four witnesses corroborated his account, including his friend’s mother. Crowley admitted having subsequently taken the crime car, which he claimed to have found abandoned at the intersection of Duryee and Orange Streets in Newark — a point midway between the Christopher Columbus Homes and his home at the Georgia King Village, and a point that he would have passed on his way home. The assisting officer, Avalone, testified that there had been a recent series of incidents in the North Newark area involving rapes “where the cars were dumped off.”
In challenging the State’s case, the defendants had to counter strong and forceful eyewitness identifications by the victim and by a police officer who had assisted her. Here, too, there were inconsistencies. At the time of the incident, neither the victim nor the officer was able to furnish detailed descriptions of the attackers. When first brought to the hospital, the victim could describe her assailants only as two black men with no “unusual” features; “one was tall and one was short.” However, Grice and Crowley are nearly identical in height. Admittedly, the brutalized victim of rape should not be expected to furnish an itemized recount of her assault, but the pursuing police officer, who was at one time within feet of the suspects, also gave no pre-arrest descriptions. The victim also testified that her assailants twice said, “[w]e don’t have to take the train now.” Yet, the defendants both lived relatively close to the crime scene. Although the victim’s menstrual blood was found on the back seat of the car, no blood, hairs, or fibers from the victim were found on any of the clothing or person of either defendant. (Concededly they could have had time to wash or *392dispose of the garments, but when arrested Crowley was wearing a track suit, which he said he had worn at track practice that day.)
Since the violence of the crime was admitted, the case involved not a question of what degree of crime was committed, but the most fundamental of all questions: were the defendants there? Did they commit the criminal acts? Of course I agree that such factual contests must be won or lost in the courtroom, but the defendants must be free to present to the jury all logical inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.
As strange as it may seem, eyewitness testimony is not as unassailable as we might wish. Both history and science have demonstrated this. “The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1158 (1967) (footnote omitted); see Barkowitz & Brigham, Recognition of Faces: Own-Race Bias, Incentive, and Time Delay, 12 J. Applied Soc. Psychology 255, 261 (1982); Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, SCI. AM., Dec. 1974, at 23; (Note that the victim did use her recollection of the assailants’ voices to bolster her identification.)
Still, one shred of scientific evidence would have provided the strongest link to demonstrate the defendants’ guilt: one telltale fiber, one human hair. See State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 194 (1985). “[A] criminal always leaves behind substances or impressions at the crime scene, and he always carries something away, no matter how minute that evidence might be.” Rapps, Scientific Evidence in Rape Prosecution, 48 UMKC Law Rev. 216, 227 (1980) (footnote omitted). Blood, hairs, and fibers are often “transferred from the victim to the assailant.” Tucker, The Use of Scientific Evidence in Rape Prosecutions, 18 U.Rich.L.Rev. 851, 860, 863, 867 (1984). In this case, the police had taken defendants’ underwear “for analysis.” Defense counsel should have been free to argue that there was no *393telltale scientific link between the defendants and the crime. Counsel for defendant Crowley was at a critical stage in seeking to influence the sensitive process of jury deliberations in this case. He had reached the point in his summation when he asked the jury to consider the relative credibility of the witnesses and then “once that determination is made, you have to determine whether or not there are any doubts.” When he started to say, “Let’s look at the scientific evidence — ,” the prosecutor objected. The court concluded that since both parties had the opportunity to produce scientific evidence, defense counsel could not comment on its absence.
After discussing the inconclusive nature of the scientific evidence [“there was no evidence either definitely linking defendants to or excluding them from participation in the crime”], the Appellate Division ruled:
Nonetheless, defendant should have been free to argue that no scientific evidence connected them with the crime. Since they were apprehended soon after the crime and were thoroughly examined for Caucasian hairs, blood and semen stains, the lack of such evidence on their persons and on the jacket introduced in evidence was at least relevant. The failure of the State to come forward with any scientific proof raised a fair inference that such proof was either unavailable or not probative of guilt. The jury was free to assume that if defendants were guilty, some forensic proof would tie them to the crime. Thus, counsel should have been free to urge such inference in summation. Also improper was the implication from the court’s statements that defense counsel had some duty to present scientific evidence and that if any party wished to have such evidence introduced he “should have done so.” These statements by the court were in error, but not so grievous to have affected the results, since during the extended trial the identification issue was squarely placed before the jury.
Of course, the identification issue was for the jury, but counsel should have been free to address the jury as entitled by law.
This Court recognizes the same errors, but it too believes that the errors were incapable of producing an unjust result. The prosecutor knew the significance of this issue. In her closing, she made reference to the fact that “the State didn’t produce scientific evidence. Why?” She answered her own question this way: “Because they got up and said to you there is no question there was a rape.” That was not the effect that *394comment about scientific evidence might have had on the jury, for everyone knew that there had been a rape. The defendants should have been free to. argue that the absence of any scientific evidence connecting them to the rape cast doubt on the reliability of the identifications and gave credence to their alibi defenses.
The significance of the trial court’s ruling was highlighted in a later exchange between the State and the defense. When defense counsel objected to the State’s being permitted to infer that stains on the perpetrators’ coats were blood, counsel for defendant Grice protested:
Your Honor, we were barred from making any comments on scientific evidence. THE COURT: It’s true.
COUNSEL: -The Court knows if I wanted to I could load up the 12 gauge shotgun and fire it anyway and have the Judge yell at me, impose sanctions or whatever it wants.
Indeed, the Appellate Division and this Court hold that the the jacket itself was erroneously admitted into evidence, since it was Crowley’s father’s jacket and there was no reliable proof that Crowley had ever worn it, much less that it had blood on it.
Of course, none of this establishes that defendants are innocent. I realize that the human horror of this case makes us recoil from the order of a retrial. Still, “[t]he accused, no matter how abhorrent the offense charged nor how seemingly evident the guilt, is entitled to a fair trial * * State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954). I simply cannot determine with certainty how the jury would have resolved this case had counsel been free to argue the issues as they wished. As we explained in State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 (1987),
errors which impact substantially and directly on fundamental procedural safeguards, and particularly upon the sensitive process of jury deliberations, are not amenable to harmless error rehabilitation. Their prejudicial effect “cannot be readily measured by the empirical or objective assessment of the evidence bearing upon defendant’s guilt.” A defendant confronted with this kind of trial error need not demonstrate actual prejudice in order to reacquire his right to a fair trial.
[State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 312 (quoting State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 404 (1980) (citations omitted)).]
*395This Court has always placed an extraordinarily high premium on the jury’s correct understanding that defendants have no burden to clear themselves of guilt. See State v. Spano, 64 N.J. 566 (1974). Thus, I cannot conclude with certainty that the error that the Court recognizes could not have affected the outcome of the trial or have led “the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.” State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971).
For affirmance — Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 4.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD and O’HERN — 3.