Court Opinion

ID: 9929323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:04:59.601796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:17.386373
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-1784
                  LT Case No. 2022-CA-006818
                 _____________________________

THE WALSH GROUP d/b/a Archer
Western Contractors, LLC,

    Appellant,

    v.

ZION JACKSONVILLE, LLC,
FLORIDA ROADS TRUCKING, LLC,
GEC TRUCKING AND
CONSTRUCTION, INC., f/k/a GEC
Trucking, Inc., CAPPS LAND
MANAGEMENT AND TRUCKING
INC., et al.,

    Appellees.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Bruce R. Anderson, Jr., Judge.

Timothy D. Woodward and Alyssa Cory, of Shutts & Bowen LLP,
Tampa, for Appellant.

Niels P. Murphy and Davis D. Balz, of Murphy & Anderson, P.A.,
and Andrew P. Brigham and Trevor S. Hutson, of Brigham
Property Rights Law Firm, PLLC, St. Augustine, for Appellee,
Zion Jacksonville, LLC.

No Appearance for Remaining Appellees.
                         February 2, 2024

JAY, J.

     Appellee (“Zion”) sued Appellant (“Archer”). Archer moved to
compel the arbitration of Zion’s claims. The trial court only
partially granted Archer’s motion, ruling that just two of Zion’s
claims are subject to arbitration. We agree with Archer that the
trial court should have granted the motion in full.

                                  I.

     The Florida Department of Transportation hired Archer to
make road improvements in Jacksonville. Zion owns land in the
vicinity of the project. Archer and Zion formed a contract under
which Archer would pay Zion to enter Zion’s property to export
certain sand that is useful for road construction. The contract
included an arbitration clause. In relevant part, the clause
provided that “[a]ny controversy or claim” by Archer against Zion
or Zion against Archer “shall, at the option of [Archer] or [Archer’s]
surety and at any time, be resolved by arbitration pursuant to
rules determined by [Archer].”

    Zion later sued Archer for littering, trespass, organized fraud,
gross negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Zion
attached the Archer contract to its complaint and incorporated the
contract into its allegations. Zion’s reliance on the contract is
evident throughout the complaint. Indeed, one particularly
representative section reads:

    127. Archer Western and employees, representatives,
    and/or agents of Archer Western, including the Trucking
    Companies, were not authorized to enter to Zion Property
    for any purpose other than what was explicitly
    spelled out in the Purchase Order Contract. See
    Exhibit B.

    128. Archer Western and employees, representatives,
    and/or agents of Archer Western, including the Trucking
    Companies, were never authorized, by contract or

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otherwise, to dump imported, unsuitable, non-native fill
material, or debris of any kind (collectively, “Material”),
on the Zion Property.

129. The Purchase Order Contract was for the export
of A-3, Select Fill from the Zion Property and not for the
import of any type of materials whatsoever to the Zion
Property.

130. Archer Western’s or its respective Trucking
Companies’ intentional deceptive dumping and
concealment practices and other tortious conduct, were
entirely    outside     of     the     consideration,
contemplation, or expectation of the parties to the
Purchase Order Contract.

131. Archer Western and employees, representatives,
and/or agents of Archer Western, including the Trucking
Companies, acted, collectively, ultra vires to violate
Zion’s private property rights.

132. Yet, it was the Purchase Order Contract, and
the authorization to be present upon and use the Zion
Property in order to remove and export A-3, Select Fill
material from the Zion Property, that provided a “front”
or “cover” for Archer Western and its respective Trucking
Companies to use the Zion Property as a hidden dump
site.

133. Zion, as the owner of private property, never gave its
consent     to   Archer     Western     and    employees,
representatives, and/or agents of Archer Western,
including the Trucking Companies, to dump the
imported, unsuitable, non-native fill material or debris.

134. Archer Western and employees, representatives,
and/or agents of Archer Western, including the Trucking
Companies, exceeded the authorization granted in
the Purchase Order Contract to use the Zion Property
in a completely different manner and for a completely

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    different purpose than what was explicitly spelled
    out in the Purchase Order Contract.

    135. Archer Western and employees, representatives,
    and/or agents of Archer Western, including the Trucking
    Companies, violated Zion’s property rights by trespassing
    on the Zion Property, exceeding the authorization
    granted to use the property pursuant to the
    Purchase Order Contract, and dumping imported,
    unsuitable, non-native fill material and debris from the
    North I Project.

(Bolding of “Exhibit B” in original, all other bold font added).

     Zion expressly reasserted, realleged, and incorporated these
paragraphs into each of its claims against Archer. Zion did the
same as to its allegation that “[a]ll conditions precedent to the
bringing of this action, both legal and contractual, have been
performed, excused, or waived.” (Emphasis added).

     Based on these allegations and the arbitration clause in the
parties’ contract, Archer moved to compel arbitration. Zion
conceded that arbitration was appropriate for the breach of
contract and unjust enrichment claims, but it opposed arbitration
of the remaining claims.

     The trial court agreed with Zion. The court observed that
while the arbitration clause was “broad,” arbitration of a given
claim still required the claim to have a nexus with Archer and
Zion’s agreement. While the court found a nexus as to the claims
for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, it determined that
Zion’s claims for littering, trespass, organized fraud, and gross
negligence “could have arisen without the existence of a contract
and stem from the alleged violation of duties that are imposed
wholly independent of the Contract.” (Emphasis added). As
such, the court determined that these claims were not subject to
the contract’s broad arbitration clause. Archer challenges that
portion of the court’s order.

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                                 II.

   “The standard of review of a trial court’s order on a motion to
compel arbitration is de novo.” Northport Health Servs. of Fla.,
LLC v. Louis, 240 So. 3d 120, 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018).

                                 A.

      Under Florida and federal law, courts generally favor the use
of arbitration agreements. Fort Walton Rehab. Ctr., LLC v. Est. of
Etheleene Galloway Gordon, 340 So. 3d 533, 535 (Fla. 1st DCA
2022). When faced with a motion to compel arbitration, a court
considers three elements: “(1) whether a valid written agreement
to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3)
whether the right to arbitration was waived.” Seifert v. U.S. Home
Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999). Here, the parties do not
dispute the first and third elements. Instead, their disagreement
is all about the second element, which is whether Zion’s claims are
arbitrable issues. To resolve this disagreement, we must examine
the connection between Zion’s claims “as [they are] alleged in the
complaint” and the parties’ contract. See id. at 640.

      In Seifert, the Supreme Court of Florida held that “even in
contracts containing broad arbitration provisions, the
determination of whether a particular claim must be submitted to
arbitration necessarily depends on the existence of some nexus
between the dispute and the contract containing the arbitration
clause.” Id. at 638. As such, arbitration is appropriate if there is a
“significant relationship” between the claim and the contract—i.e.,
“if the claim presents circumstances in which the resolution of the
disputed issue requires either reference to, or construction of, a
portion of the contract.” Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108
So. 3d 587, 593 (Fla. 2013). This test applies when, as in this case,
“the arbitration agreement uses broad language that does not
expressly include the claim at issue.” Lennar Homes, LLC v.
Wilkinsky, 353 So. 3d 654, 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).*

    * In its briefs, Archer suggested that the wording of the
parties’ arbitration clause was so broad that it need not undergo a
contractual nexus/significant relationship analysis. During oral
argument, Archer rightly acknowledged that this argument

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                                 B.

     Thus, our task is to decide whether Zion’s claims for littering,
trespass, organized fraud, and gross negligence, as pleaded,
“present[] circumstances in which the resolution of the disputed
issue requires either reference to, or construction of, a portion of
the contract.” Jackson, 108 So. 3d at 593. If they do, they are
subject to the contract’s broad arbitration clause. See id.

     “The purpose of pleadings is to present, define, and narrow
the issues” that are in dispute. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Davis, 336 So. 3d 392, 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (quoting White v.
Fletcher, 90 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1956)); see also Parker v. Panama
City, 151 So. 2d 469, 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) (“[T]he function of
the complaint is to accurately inform the defendant and the court
of the nature of plaintiff’s claim.”). Indeed, “pleadings function as
a safeguard of due process by ensuring that the parties will have
prior, meaningful notice of the claims, defenses, rights, and
obligations that will be at issue when they come before a court.”
Tracey v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Tr. for Certificateholders of
Banc of Am. Mortg. Sec., Inc., 264 So. 3d 1152, 1155 (Fla. 2d DCA
2019). This notice includes the fact that “[a]ny exhibit attached to
a pleading must be considered a part thereof for all purposes.”
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.130(b) (emphasis added).

     Here, as we referenced above, Zion attached the contract as
an exhibit to the complaint and incorporated the contract into all
of its claims. The pervasive theme of Zion’s complaint is that
Archer deviated from what the parties’ contract authorized. That
is, Zion alleges that Archer’s conduct was improper because it
differed from what the agreement permitted. And that may be
true. But the question of whether Archer colored outside the lines
can only be answered by referring to the agreement. See Jackson,
108 So. 3d at 593. Having anchored its complaint to the
contract―and repeatedly trafficked in its provisions―Zion cannot
now divorce its claims from the language of the agreement. Thus,

becomes superfluous if all of Zion’s claims have a nexus to the
parties’ contract.

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Zion’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the contract. See
id. at 594–95.

                                III.

     Archer and Zion formed an agreement that included a broad
arbitration clause. Zion then filed a complaint against Archer that
attached and incorporated the contract in every claim. Because
adjudicating Zion’s claims against Archer for littering, trespass,
organized fraud, and gross negligence “requires either reference to,
or construction of, a portion of the contract,” those claims are
captured by the contract’s broad arbitration clause. See id. at 593.
Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s order that
ruled those claims are not subject to arbitration, and remand with
directions to grant Archer’s motion to compel the arbitration of all
Zion’s claims against Archer.

    AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

EDWARDS, C.J., and LAMBERT, J., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
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