Court Opinion

ID: 9452230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:33:32.02369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:07.251915
License: Public Domain

BOREMAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The majority opinion holds that the District Court was in error in ruling that the dismissal of William Dalton from Southern’s state court suit was a judgment-estoppel of Lumbermens to reexamine the question as to whether Ray Dalton was an agent of his father, William Dalton. On this point I agree with the majority holding that Lumbermens was not so estopped and for the same reasons. I further agree with the majority decision that no claim of contribution may be successfully pressed against Harleysville because the indemnity furnished by the uninsured motorist endorsement on Gertrude Southern’s policy did not inure to the benefit of anyone other than Gertrude Southern.
My disagreement is with the majority view that Ray’s car was covered under the State Farm policy as a “temporary substitute automobile.” I agree with the court below that there was no such coverage.
My brothers base their determination that State Farm was Ray’s insurer upon the stipulation filed by the parties. They reach their conclusion from the statement therein that William suggested that Ray “would have to take his car to work and pick up these passengers.” From this they hold that “William was employing Ray’s car to perform William’s undertaking,” and that Ray’s car was being used by his father as a “temporary substitute” for the father’s car which was then disabled. I think they overlook or disregard certain portions of the stipulation from which it appears that, following the accident, William and Ray went to the office of State Farm’s counsel and each gave a statement covering the details of the accident.1 The stipulation provides: “These statements, or copies of the same, have agreed to be filed by Mr. Campbell [counsel for State Farm] and made a part of this stipulation.” We are informed that the statement given by William is consistent in one particular re*257spect with his testimony at the trial. William put it this way:
“Ray was there at the time and was fixing to go to work. He said, well, we’ll just take his, which anybody else would have done, I guess.”
Again he testified: “His [Ray’s] ear was there and he said we’d take his.”
At most, according to the stipulation, there was only a suggestion by William that Ray’s ear be used. As the District Judge pointed out, the record is silent as to whether William was to receive any financial benefit for the trip that day. The court below accepted and followed the case of Tanner v. Pennsylvania, etc., 226 F.2d 498 (6 Cir. 1955), as authority for the rule applied — that “substitute car” means a car which was in the possession or under the control of the insured to the same extent and effect as the disabled car of the insured would have been except for its disablement.
Of course, as the majority opinion notes, the Tanner case is factually different from the case at bar and is in that respect distinguishable. But the holding in Tanner has been interpreted as follows:
“Nor did coverage apply where the insured borrowed his brother’s car but the accident occurred while it was being operated by the owner for the benefit of the insured.” (Emphasis added.) Appleman Insurance Law and Practice (Vol. 7, See. 4293.5 at page 96.)
My fellow judges make much of a statement which they quote from Judge Soper’s opinion in Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co., 310 F. 2d 618, 622 (4 Cir. 1962):
“It is obviously the purpose of the ordinary substitute clause to cover an automobile temporarily used to the same extent as the automobile described in the policy but not to give the substitute automobile a wider coverage.”
This observation by Judge Soper was pure dictum and was volunteered following his statement that there was no clause to be found in the policy there under consideration relating to the use of a “substitute automobile.” The crucial question here raised was not involved in that case and the facts there bore no similarity to the facts in the instant case.
I find it very difficult to reject the District Judge’s findings and ultimate conclusions. He characterized the use of Ray’s own car as nothing more than an accommodation to his father, William, resulting from the father and son relationship. Their trip was being made because they both worked at the same place and they were scheduled to reach their jobs at the same time. I would attach little importance to William’s alleged “contract” to carry other fellow workers to their place of employment. Such an agreement wtih “riders” is generally a very loose sort of an arrangement, is so recognized, and would provide a very flimsy basis for a finding that William was contractually bound to furnish them transportation. There is no evidence that their route of travel was dictated by any pre-existing obligation to transport passengers or that they took other than the most direct route from their home to the plant. So far as disclosed their route was of necessity dictated by the Daltons’ desire to get to their place of employment on time. There is no showing that William exercised or attempted to exercise even the slightest degree of control or direction over the operation by Ray of Ray’s own automobile. Ray simply offered to use his car for the trip as a matter of accommodation. It was his undertaking on that particular occasion and, under the circumstances, I cannot accept the conclusion that it was William who was using Ray’s car. I agree with the District Judge’s observation that the very nature of filial and paternal relationships encourages “such accommodations. A contrary-behavior pattern would be, I think, the exception.”
*258The burden of proof was on Lumbermens Mutual to show that Ray’s car was a “temporary substitute automobile” within the meaning and intendment of the State Farm policy. In my opinion Lumbermens failed to meet its burden. I would affirm the judgment below as I think the result reached by the court was eminently correct.

. Each then stated that William was driving Ray’s car at the time. They later changed their stories and stated that Ray was driving.