Court Opinion

ID: 9471412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:31:48.858317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:23.905947
License: Public Domain

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises out of the denial of damages to plaintiff James DePass for alleged increased risk of cardiovascular disease and loss of life expectancy. The district court, in a bench trial, found that DePass had not proved the injury by a preponderance of the evidence. This appeal requires us to determine whether the district court was “clearly erroneous” in its finding. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). For the reasons set out below, we affirm the district court.
I
On December 9, 1978, DePass was struck by a car driven by an employee of the defendant United States. DePass sustained severe injuries, including a traumatic amputation of his left leg below the knee. De-Pass brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. The United States admitted liability, and the case was tried as to damages only.
At trial, DePass introduced evidence as to the nature and extent of his injuries, and as to past and future pain and suffering. De-*204Pass’s witnesses included Dr. Jerome D. Cohen, a medical doctor.1 Dr. Cohen testified that he had examined DePass and found that DePass had had a traumatic amputation of the left leg just below the knee. Dr. Cohen then testified that he had read an article, “Traumatic Limb Amputation and the Subsequent Mortality from Cardiovascular Disease and Other Causes,” published in volume 33 of the Journal of Chronic Diseases, by Zdenek Hrubec and Richard Ryder (“the Hrubec and Ryder study”) (Pl.Ex. 10).2 This article involved a study of 3,890 Americans who had suffered traumatic limb amputations during World War II. The study established a statistical connection between traumatic limb amputations and future cardiovascular problems and decreased life expectancy.
Dr. Cohen testified that DePass fits within the class of persons who had sustained a traumatic amputation of a limb. He testified that, based on his own experience, his examination of DePass, and his analysis of the Hrubec and Ryder study, because De-Pass is a traumatic amputee he has a greater risk of cardiovascular problems and decreased life expectancy. At the conclusion of Dr. Cohen’s testimony, the trial court questioned him as follows:
The Court: Is it your testimony that based on your examination of this plaintiff, Mr. DePass, plus your knowledge in the field of cardiovascular disease and including your analysis and a reading of the article which is Exhibit 10, is your opinion that he, because he is the amputee that he is on the left leg below the knee, that he has a greater risk for developing cardiovascular disease in the future and also a greater risk for shorter mortality, shorter longevity? Is that what you’re saying, that he is a risk for that?
[Dr. Cohen]: Yes, that’s correct.
The Court: And you’re not saying that he will develop it or that he will live shorter, but he is a greater risk for both of those?
[Dr. Cohen]: That’s correct.
(Tr. at 289-90).
On cross-examination, Dr. Cohen testified to the existence of several other studies on the relationship between traumatic limb amputation and decreased life expectancy. In particular, he testified as to a 1954 English study of 27,000 amputees that showed no statistical connection between amputation and decreased life expectancy. Several studies conducted on a smaller scale also failed to show a connection. One study, done in Finland, found a statistical connection. He testified that he had not personally reviewed any of the other studies. Dr. Cohen testified that no one knows if in fact the Hrubec and Ryder study is correct. Dr. Cohen then read from the study, “The reasons for the statistically significant relationship demonstrated between limb amputation and cardiovascular disorders are not obvious. Stringent deadlines set by Congress for the completion of this work made impossible detailed studies of individuals.” (Tr. at 285).3
The district court, in its order, awarded DePass $800,000 for the nature and extent of his injuries and for his past and future pain and suffering. In its findings of fact, *205the court found no evidence demonstrating by a preponderance that DePass had suffered a loss of life expectancy. The court found that Dr. Cohen’s testimony dealt with “possibilities and speculation.”4
On appeal, DePass argues that the district court was clearly erroneous in its findings of fact. He argues that his evidence was clear, convincing, and uncontradicted. He also argues that the United States is bound by the Hrubec and Ryder study as an admission by the government. The United States argues that the district court could reject Dr. Cohen’s testimony and the Hru-bec and Ryder study. The United States also argues that the evidence at best establishes only that DePass is, on the average, at an increased risk of injury, and that this increased risk is not compensable under Illinois law.
II
An appellate court will only set aside the findings of a district court when those findings are clearly erroneous. The standard of review is clear. The Supreme Court has stated that “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). See also Lee v. National Can Co., 699 F.2d 932, 936 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 148, 78 L.Ed.2d 138 (1983). The appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence. West v. Schwarz, 182 F.2d 721, 722 (7th Cir.1950). The inquiry is whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings. Id.
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the district court was clearly erroneous. The findings of fact demonstrate that the district court considered the Hrubec and Ryder study and Dr. Cohen’s testimony. The court, however, declined to accept the study and the testimony as establishing the fact of injury by a preponderance. There is substantial evidence in the record to support this. Dr. Cohen testified that he based certain of his conclusions on the Hrubec and Ryder study. The study itself states, and Dr. Cohen testified, that other studies exist that reach a different conclusion. Dr. Cohen stated that no one knows if the Hrubec and Ryder study is correct. The study does not establish a reason for the statistical relationship between amputation and decreased life expectancy.
There was conflicting evidence in the record as to the conclusiveness of the Hrubec and Ryder study. It was for the district court to weigh the evidence; the court did not find the evidence strong enough to be a preponderance.
Moreover, even if there were no contradictory evidence on this point, the district court could still reject the conclusions of the Hrubec and Ryder study. The plaintiff had the burden of proving injury. The court could reject the evidence even when the defendant introduces no contradictory evidence. Nicholl v. Scaletta, 104 Ill.App.3d 642, 60 Ill.Dec. 368, 432 N.E.2d 1267 (1982).
Because we find that the district court could reject the Hrubec and Ryder study as inconclusive, we do not reach the issue of whether merely placing plaintiff in a class *206of persons subject, on the average, to an increased risk of injury is sufficient to establish a compensable injury under Illinois law. We note, however, that Illinois law is not settled as to whether increased risk of future injury is compensable. Compare Lindsay v. Appleby, 91 Ill.App.3d 705, 46 Ill.Dec. 832, 414 N.E.2d 885 (1980) with Morrissy v. Eli Lilly and Co., 76 Ill.App.3d 753, 32 Ill.Dec. 30, 394 N.E.2d 1369 (1979).
We have considered appellant’s other arguments and determine them to be without merit.
Affirmed.

. The record reveals that Dr. Cohen is board certified in internal medicine. Dr. Cohen’s testimony at trial, and his curriculum vitae (Pl.Ex. 9), fail to establish whether he is certified in cardiology or in the subspecialty of cardiovascular diseases.

. The study was mandated by the United States Congress, Pub.L. 94-433 (1976), and it was carried out by the Medical Follow-up Agency of the National Research Council’s Assembly of Life Sciences. (Pl.Ex. 10 at 240).

. The study goes on to state:
Pilot surveys indicated that for few of those in our sample could one determine from existing hard-copy records the epidemiologic variables of possible importance. A definitive clarification of the mechanisms which relate traumatic amputation to later cardiovascular disease will require detailed investigation of the particular circumstances of individual subjects.
Pl.Ex. 10 at 247-48. The study outlines several possible causes of the increased risk of decreased life expectancy. It then states, “The study was not designed to test specific hypotheses about the causes of the increased risk.” Id. at 249.

. The court’s Finding of Fact No. 14 reads as follows:
The Court finds that there is no evidence demonstrating by a preponderance a loss of life expectancy due to the traumatic limb amputation. The Court heard the testimony of Dr. Jerome D. Cohen of St. Louis, Missouri, who testified to an American study of 3,600 traumatic single limb amputations, in which the researchers found a thirty percent higher than normal incidence of cardiovascular disease in the amputees. However, the doctor admitted to the existence of an English study of 27,000 traumatic limb amputations in the earlier part of the century which reached an opposite conclusion. More fundamentally, the doctor never established that this individual plaintiff would suffer a loss of life expectancy, or even that it was more likely than not that he would suffer the loss. At best, his testimony dealt with possibilities and speculation and failed to establish the existence of such a loss in plaintiff.