Court Opinion

ID: 9555823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 13:11:28.633811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:14.221929
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges O’Brien and Lorish
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Lexington, Virginia

              KEVIN JOSEPH SCHANDEL
                                                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0707-22-3                                 JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN
                                                                                AUGUST 15, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY
                                               James J. Reynolds, Judge

                              Jennifer T. Stanton, Senior Appellate Attorney (Indigent Defense
                              Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

                              Jason D. Reed, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Kevin Joseph Schandel (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of assault and battery of

              a law enforcement officer and sentenced to five years’ incarceration with three years suspended.

              Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because “he

              committed no overt act or attempt, with force or violence, to do physical injury to the officer.”

              Alternatively, he argues that the officer “abandoned his status as a law enforcement officer” and

              engaged him in “mutual combat.”

                                                         BACKGROUND

                     On appeal, we recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the

              prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)

              (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). In doing so, we “discard the evidence

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible

evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Cady, 300

Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 323-24 (2018)).

       On May 18, 2021, Virginia State Police Trooper Matthew Zola stopped appellant’s

vehicle and arrested him for driving under the influence. Appellant was “a little irate” with

Trooper Zola after the field sobriety tests. Henry County Sheriff’s Deputy Isaiah Hairston

transported appellant to the magistrate’s office for a breath test. During the transport, appellant

became angry with Deputy Hairston after “confusing [him] with somebody else.”

       A video from Deputy Hairston’s body-worn camera showed that after arriving at the

magistrate’s office, appellant was upset and complained to Trooper Zola that Deputy Hairston

had verbally harassed him. Appellant also claimed that Deputy Hairston had been at his home

recently, called him “white trash,” and “threatened to shoot his dog.” When Deputy Hairston

denied ever having met appellant before, appellant lunged towards him and cursed at him.

       Trooper Zola brought appellant into another room to administer a breath test while

Deputy Hairston stood in the doorway. Appellant ignored commands to sit down, repeatedly

demanded that Deputy Hairston leave, and threatened to “headbutt” the deputy. When appellant

stood and threatened to “kick [Deputy Hairston] in his fucking face,” Trooper Zola stepped

between the men, put his hand on appellant and told him to sit down. Appellant disregarded

Trooper Zola’s command, moved toward Deputy Hairston again, and said that he would “take a

year” for “assaulting an officer.”

       Although Trooper Zola persuaded appellant to return to his chair, appellant stood again,

repeated that Deputy Hairston needed to leave, and threatened to “fuck him up bad.” Deputy

Hairston left the room, and Trooper Zola closed the door so that he could administer the breath

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test. A few minutes later, however, appellant started yelling and “kicking stuff,” so Deputy

Hairston returned.

       Appellant continued to demand that Deputy Hairston “get away from [him]” and referred

to Deputy Hairston by a racial epithet. Appellant stood up and “kicked a chair towards” Deputy

Hairston. Deputy Hairston repeatedly told appellant to sit down, but appellant ignored the

commands and threatened to kick the deputy in the jaw. Deputy Hairston approached appellant,

put his hands on appellant’s shoulders, and “forced him . . . back down into his chair.” Appellant

resisted and kneed Deputy Hairston in the groin, screamed at Deputy Hairston to get his “hand

off” of him, and tried to bite Deputy Hairston’s hand. Deputy Hairston struck appellant’s “jaw to

prevent [appellant] from biting” his hand. Appellant kicked the breathalyzer and told Deputy

Hairston, “next time I see you, you won’t wake up.”

       At the conclusion of the case, the court convicted appellant of assault and battery of a law

enforcement officer.

                                            ANALYSIS

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “[T]he relevant question [on

appeal] is, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 (2010). “[W]e do not

‘substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.’” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13,

29 (2012) (quoting Wactor v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380 (2002)).

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                                             I. Overt Act

        Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed an “overt

act or attempt[ed] to do physical injury to Deputy Hairston.” He contends that the body-worn

camera footage does not support the officers’ version of events, and claims that it “shows an

absence of any overt act on [appellant’s] part to harm Deputy Hairston.”

        “[I]f any person commits an assault or an assault and battery against another knowing or

having reason to know that such other person is . . . a law-enforcement officer . . . engaged in the

performance of his public duties . . . such person is guilty of a Class 6 felony.” Code § 18.2-57(C).

The crime of assault and the crime of battery are independent, common law crimes, “although they

are linked in Code § 18.2-57.” Parish v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 324, 329 (2010).

        “To sustain a conviction for assault, the Commonwealth must prove ‘an attempt or offer,

with force and violence, to do some bodily hurt to another.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. Commonwealth,

33 Va. App. 463, 468 (2000)). “The attempt or offer . . . ‘occurs when an assailant engages in an

overt act intended to inflict bodily harm [while he] has the present ability to inflict such harm or

engages in an overt act intended to place the victim in fear or apprehension of bodily harm.’” Id.

(second alteration in original) (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 641 (2010)). Battery

is “the actual infliction of corporal hurt on another that is done willfully or in anger.” Montague v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 532, 541 (2009). Thus, “[t]o sustain a conviction for battery, the

Commonwealth must prove a ‘wil[l]ful or unlawful touching’ of another.” Parish, 56 Va. App.

at 330 (second alteration in original) (quoting Wood v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 401, 404

(1927)). “Proof sufficient to establish any one of these theories is sufficient to establish the crime

of assault and battery.” Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 608, 620 (2020).

        The evidence shows that appellant was belligerent throughout the entire encounter. After

arriving at the magistrate’s office, appellant repeatedly threatened Deputy Hairston, lunged at
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him, and kicked a chair toward him. Both Deputy Hairston and Trooper Zola testified that

consistent with his threats, appellant kneed Deputy Hairston in the groin and attempted to bite his

hand. See Montague, 278 Va. at 541 (affirming a conviction for assault and battery of a law

enforcement officer when the defendant tried “to prevent the officers from taking him into

custody” by “push[ing]” and “strik[ing] [one officer] in the chest with an elbow”). These overt

actions were sufficient for the fact finder to conclude that appellant had committed both an

assault and battery.

       Appellant acknowledges Deputy Hairston’s testimony, but argues that the body-worn

camera footage, which was “the best evidence of what actually occurred,” did not depict him

kneeing Deputy Hairston or attempting to bite his hand.

       It is well-established that this Court “owe[s] deference to the trial court’s interpretation of

all of the evidence, including video evidence that we are able to observe as much as the trial

court did.” Lucas v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 334, 343 (2022) (quoting Meade v.

Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 796, 806 (2022)). The “fact[]finder . . . views video and other

evidence to determine what it believes happened;” on appeal, this Court “view[s] video evidence

not to determine what we think happened, but for the limited purpose of determining whether

any rational fact[]finder could have viewed it as the trial court did.” Id. (quoting Meade, 74

Va. App. at 806).

       Deputy Hairston’s body-worn camera provided only an obscure perspective during the

portion of the affray when appellant kneed his groin, because it depicted only a limited view of

both men’s bodies. Indeed, the video neither confirms nor disproves that appellant kneed Deputy

Hairston’s groin. Instead, it establishes that a scuffle occurred as Deputy Hairston put his hands

on appellant’s shoulders to maintain control of him by returning him to his chair. Deputy

Hairston testified that appellant kneed him in the groin during the scuffle, and Trooper Zola
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corroborated that testimony. The court credited the officers’ testimony, and “this Court will not

disturb the fact finder’s determination of the credibility of witness testimony unless, ‘as a matter

of law, the testimony is inherently incredible.’” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 526

(2015) (quoting Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70-71 (1999)). Deputy Hairston’s

testimony that appellant kneed him in the groin is not plainly contradicted by the video, and a

“rational fact[]finder could have viewed it as the trial court did.” Lucas, 75 Va. App. at 343

(quoting Meade, 74 Va. App. at 806). The video also captured appellant’s numerous threats

directed toward Deputy Hairston, including threatening to headbutt, kick, and even specifically

to “assault” Deputy Hairston. What’s more, and contrary to appellant’s assertion, the video

clearly showed appellant trying to bite Deputy Hairston.

       Thus, a rational fact finder could conclude from the officers’ testimony and the

body-worn camera video that appellant’s actions were sufficient to sustain his conviction for

assault and battery of a law enforcement officer, and the trial court’s judgment was not “plainly

wrong or without evidence to support it.” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Smith, 296

Va. at 460).

                                        II. Mutual Combat

       Appellant also argues that even if he committed an overt act, his conviction should be

reversed because “the doctrine of mutual combat applies.” He asserts that Deputy Hairston

caused the affray by verbally and physically harassing him. He also maintains that he

“retreat[ed] to the wall” during the affray and, being handcuffed, had “no way to defend

himself.”1 We disagree.

       1
         To the extent appellant argues that his actions were excusable self-defense, that
argument is barred by Rule 5A:18 as it was not presented to the trial court below. Appellant
does not invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18 in his opening brief,
Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 761 (2003) (en banc).
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       “For combat to be ‘mutual,’ it must have been voluntarily and mutually entered into by

both or all parties to the affray.” Connell v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 429, 439 (2001)

(quoting Lynn v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 336, 356 (1998)). “One who is assaulted may and

usually does defend himself, but the ensuing struggle cannot be accurately described as a mutual

combat.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 68, 72-73 (1993)). “Otherwise,

‘every fight would be a mutual combat.’” Smith, 17 Va. App. at 73 (quoting Harper v.

Commonwealth, 165 Va. 816, 820 (1936)).

       Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the record shows that appellant

kneed Deputy Hairston’s groin and tried to bite his hand and Deputy Hairston struck appellant in

the jaw to prevent being bitten. From those circumstances, the fact finder could reasonably

conclude that Deputy Hairston only acted to defend himself from appellant’s physical aggression

and did not enter into the altercation voluntarily. See Lynn, 27 Va. App. at 356 (rejecting the

defendant’s mutual combat argument when the “jury could have reasonably concluded” that the

victim, who “started fighting with [defendant] after [defendant] struck” him, did not “enter the

altercation . . . voluntarily”). Accordingly, the court did not err by rejecting appellant’s argument

that he and Deputy Hairston had engaged in mutual combat.2

                                               CONCLUSION

       For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

       2
         Relying on a case from the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals,
appellant also argues that he cannot be guilty of the “greater assault of a law enforcement
officer” because Deputy Hairston “abandoned” his “status as a law enforcement officer” and was
acting as a civilian. As appellant did not present this argument to the trial court, Rule 5A:18 bars
us from considering it for the first time on appeal. Appellant does not invoke the good cause or
ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18, and this Court will not consider the exceptions sua
sponte. Edwards, 41 Va. App. at 761.
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