Court Opinion

ID: 9388452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 16:11:12.079834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:20.398287
License: Public Domain

J-S43042-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SCOTT BISHOP                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2450 EDA 2021

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 29, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0003894-2015

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                               FILED APRIL 20, 2023

        Scott Bishop appeals from the order denying his timely first petition for

relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 Appellant claims that

both trial counsel and direct appeal counsel were ineffective and argues that

the PCRA court erred in denying Appellant’s petition without a hearing. After

review, we reverse the PCRA court’s order and remand for further

proceedings.

        The PCRA court set forth the following factual and procedural history:

        On March 28, 2015, Parole Agent Brandon Smith made an
        unannounced visit to Appellant at his apartment, where he had
        just moved the prior month. After chatting briefly, Smith informed
        Appellant that he was due for a drug screening test pursuant to
        his parole agreement; Appellant complied. A urine test was then
        administered, which came back positive for methamphetamines.
        Because this was a violation of the terms of Appellant’s parole, the
        Agent handcuffed Appellant and placed him into custody while he
____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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     phoned his supervisor for approval to conduct a search of
     Appellant’s property for contraband in light of the positive drug
     test.

     Once he had obtained approval to search the apartment, Agent
     Smith asked Appellant whether he had anything in the home that
     Smith should know about, to which Appellant replied that he had
     a gun. When prompted, Appellant then told the Agent that the
     gun was in the hallway closet. In the closet, Smith detected the
     smell of marijuana and observed a black trash bag, inside of which
     he found a revolver, some spent shell casings, two electronic
     scales, packaging materials and marijuana. In addition to the
     marijuana in the closet, parole agents at the scene then recovered
     marijuana from Appellant’s bedroom.

     Agent Smith called for support from Parole Agent Eric Brown.
     Agent Brown arrived and secured the residence. Once inside, he
     observed keys on a dresser in Appellant’s bedroom. Brown asked
     Appellant where his car was, and Appellant responded that it was
     “on the corner.” The vehicle was located; it was registered to
     Appellant. While searching Appellant’s vehicle, Agent Brown
     recovered bullets in the center console that matched the guns and
     bullets which Agent Smith had recovered from Appellant’s closet.

     Appellant was charged with prohibited possession of a firearm in
     violation of the Uniform Firearms Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105;
     possession of marijuana, [35 P.S.] § 780-113(a)(32).            On
     November 19 and November 25, 2015, Appellant appeared before
     the Honorable Daniel J. Anders to litigate his motion to suppress
     statements and physical evidence.          Judge Anders granted
     suppression of Appellant’s statement to Parole Agent Brandon
     Smith as to the location of the revolver but denied the suppression
     of Appellant’s statement as to the location of his car and denied
     suppression of all physical evidence recovered from both the
     apartment and the car.

     On January 28, 2016, Appellant appeared before [the trial court]
     for a waiver trial and was found guilty on all counts. On April 15,
     2016, [the trial court] sentenced Appellant to three to eight years
     of incarceration, followed by one year of probation. Appellant
     timely appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed Appellant’s
     judgment of sentence in an unpublished [memorandum] on June
     18, 2018. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 1193 EDA 2016, 2018 WL
     3015333 (Pa. Super. filed 2018) (unpublished mem.).             The

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        Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Appellant’s petition for
        allowance of appeal to address the scope of protection against
        self-incrimination offered by the Pennsylvania Constitution
        relative   to    that  of  the  United   States   Constitution.
        Commonwealth v. Bishop, 196 A.3d 129 (Pa. 2018) (per
        curiam). In September of 2019, the Supreme Court affirmed the
        Superior Court’s order in a 6-1 decision, declining to directly
        address the question after determining that it had not been
        properly preserved in the courts below. Commonwealth v.
        Bishop, 217 A.3d 833 (Pa. 2019).

        Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on June 6, 2020.
        Thereafter, the PCRA [c]ourt appointed counsel, who filed an
        amended petition on January 22, 2021. After receiving briefs from
        the Commonwealth and Appellant, the [PCRA court] gave notice
        of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition pursuant to
        Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and it dismissed the petition without a hearing
        on October 29, 2021.

PCRA Ct. Op., 5/26/22, at 1-3 (citations to the record omitted, formatting

altered). Appellant filed a timely appeal. Both the PCRA court and Appellant

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

        Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which we have

reordered as follows:

        1. Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary
           hearing[?]

        2. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
           when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
           that trial counsel was ineffective for failing at the suppression
           hearing to distinguish between the protections provided by
           Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; failing to
           object to the Commonwealth’s non-disclosure of Brady[2]
           material; and failing to protect [Appellant’s] constitutional
           rights pursuant to the Confrontation Clause[?]

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2   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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      3. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
         when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
         that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
         Article I, Section 8 claim on appeal, leading to a determination
         that the claim was waived[?]

      4. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition
         when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish
         that Appellant’s constitutional rights were violated by trial and
         appellate    counsel’s      deficient     performances,       the
         Commonwealth’s non-disclosure of Brady material, and
         unreasonable search and seizure[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 9 (formatting altered).

      In his first issue, Appellant contends that the PCRA court erred when it

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition without first holding an evidentiary

hearing.    Appellant claims that he “raised significant claims of trial and

appellate counsels’ ineffectiveness and violations of his constitutional

rights[,]” and Appellant further describes those claims as “legitimate, based

on fact and supported by legal precedent.” Appellant’s Brief at 22. As noted

by the PCRA court, an evidentiary hearing in this matter would have revolved

around the question of “whether deeper exploration of the field [drug] test

might have led to its suppression and consequently the suppression of the

statements and the contraband, which in this case would have made it

virtually impossible for the Commonwealth to convict Appellant.” PCRA Ct.

Op. at 8.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court agrees with Appellant and

concedes that it erred when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Specifically, the PCRA court notes that there are genuine issues of material

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fact that, should they be resolved in Appellant’s favor, may entitle him to

relief.     Id. at 8.   Accordingly, the PCRA court requests that its order be

reversed and that this case be remanded with instructions to hold an

evidentiary hearing. Id.

          Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “[W]e

apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal determinations.”

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014) (citation

omitted).

          As stated previously, Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred when

it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying his PCRA petition. The

decision of whether to hold a PCRA evidentiary hearing is an exercise of

discretion on the part of the PCRA court, and we review for an abuse of that

discretion.     Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super.

2019).

          [T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition
          is not absolute. It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline
          to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and
          has no support either in the record or other evidence. It is the
          responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine each
          issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record certified
          before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its
          determination that there were no genuine issues of material fact
          in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an
          evidentiary hearing.

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                                   *    *    *

      Generally, if there are factual issues to be resolved, the PCRA
      court should hold an evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1054-55 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).         This Court has cautioned,

however, that, “an evidentiary hearing is not meant to function as a fishing

expedition for any possible evidence that may support some speculative

claim.” Commonwealth v. Grove, 170 A.3d 1127, 1149 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      In the instant case, the determinative issue before us is whether

Appellant’s claim that a challenge to and information concerning the drug test

administered by parole agents “might have led to its suppression and

consequently the suppression of the statements and the contraband, which in

this case would have made it virtually impossible for the Commonwealth to

convict Appellant.” PCRA Ct. Op. at 8. Indeed, Appellant argues that

      trial counsel was obligated to insist that the [parole] agent provide
      corroborating evidence [as to the positive urine test.] At the very
      least, it was incumbent upon trial counsel to inquire of the witness
      about the lack of documentation for a positive field test. Although
      the field test may not have generated a corresponding written
      report, the agent could have provided photographic evidence of
      the field test results. Counsel’s omission was not reasonably
      designed to advance the interests of [Appellant]. The lack of
      documentation for the positive field test undermined the
      credibility of the parole agent, yet trial counsel failed to raise this
      vital issue during the suppression hearing.

Appellant’s Brief at 15-16.

      The PCRA court further noted:

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       It may be that no written documentation or photographs exist,
       that trying to impeach Agent Smith about it would not have
       changed the outcome, and that even if it would have, trial counsel
       had latitude to pursue a different strategy. But these are genuine
       issues of material fact that, if resolved in Appellant’s favor, could
       entitle him to a new proceeding or other relief, be it because there
       is exculpatory evidence in the form of favorable written
       documentation or photographs or because trial counsel’s strategy
       not to impeach the Agent’s credibility was deficient, either of
       which could have led to a different outcome.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 8.

       On this record, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s challenge

rises to the level of a genuine issue of material fact, as resolution in Appellant’s

favor could entitle him to relief.             See Grayson, 212 A.3d at 1054-55.

Accordingly, we reverse the PCRA court’s order and remand this case for the

PCRA court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s PCRA petition.3

       Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2023

____________________________________________

3 In light of our conclusion that the PCRA court erred in denying Appellant’s
petition without a hearing, we do not reach the merits of Appellant’s remaining
issues, as they all relate to whether the results of the field drug test provided
the parole agents with reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless search
of Appellant’s residence.

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