Court Opinion

ID: 9703868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:11:00.555707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:52.513707
License: Public Domain

Riley J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority in Franks v White Pine Copper Division concerning the nonapplicability of the two-year-back rule, however, I do so for a different reason.
In Kleinsehrodt v General Motors Corp, 402 Mich 381, 384; 263 NW2d 246 (1978), this Court held "that the one-year-back provision [MCL 418.833; MSA 17.237(833)] is a defense, akin to the statute of limitations, which can be waived. It is not jurisdictional.” Also in Kleinsehrodt, Justice Ryan concurred with Justice Coleman in dissent, viewing the one-year-back provision as a limitation on the authority of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board to order the payment of benefits. The dissenting opinion further stated that the majority had overruled prior Michigan case law on unconvincing legal and policy grounds, citing Loucks v Bauman, 356 Mich 514; 97 NW2d 321 *685(1959), and Baldwin v Chrysler Corp, 67 Mich App 61; 240 NW2d 266 (1976). 402 Mich 384-386 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
The majority opinion in Franks discusses the Kleinschrodt ruling regarding the one-year-back provision pursuant to the Court of Appeals opinion in Franks v White Pine Copper Division, 122 Mich App 177, 187; 332 NW2d 447 (1982), applying the Kleinschrodt holding in determining that defendant’s challenge to the appeal board’s decision had been waived, but determines that it is unnecessary for this Court to decide whether the rationale of the Kleinschrodt majority should be applied to the two-year-back rule which was raised in the Franks case. Ante, pp 676-677, n 27.1 Rather, the majority states that "assuming arguendo that the two-year-back rule is waivable, the Court of Appeals ruling that it was waived in this case is clearly erroneous.” Id. This conclusion was reached on the basis of the fact that the two-year-back provision did not have to be raised by defendant White Pine because disability benefits were not ordered by the hearing referee covering any time period more than two years prior to the time Mr. Franks filed his application for a hearing with the bureau. Consequently, there was no reason for the defendant to raise the "defense” because the two-year-back rule was not an issue on appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. The majority also notes that White Pine did not stipulate that the only issue before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board was one other than the two-year-back rule, *686as the defendant had in Kleinschrodt. Ante, pp 676-677.2
While I believe the majority’s reasoning is legally sound under the facts and circumstances presented in Franks, I also believe the remedial effect the two-year-back rule has on workers’ disability compensation benefits is ripe for review in Franks and should be decided by this Court.
The two-year-back provision is set forth in MCL 418.381(2); MSA 17.237(381X2):
If any compensation is sought under this act, payment shall not be made for any period of time earlier than 2 years immediately preceding the date on which the employee filed an application for a hearing with the bureau. [Emphasis added.]
I believe this language "shall not be made” clearly indicates a legislative intent to limit the authority of the hearing referee and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in awarding the payment of benefits.3
*687Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Franks and remand that case to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board pursuant to the direction that the two-year-back rule limits the authority of the hearing referee and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board to order benefits, rather than the majority’s ruling that the particular facts and circumstances of Franks preclude the necessity of the defendant from raising the two-year-back provision before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board.
Ryan, J., concurred with Riley, J.
Cavan agh, J., took no part in the decision of Franks._

 The majority also cites other cases in n 27 that have applied the Kleinschrodt rationale to the two-year-back rule including Howard v General Motors Corp, 132 Mich App 639; 348 NW2d 286 (1984), remanded on other grounds 419 Mich 948 (1984), and Kingery v Ford Motor Co, 116 Mich App 606; 323 NW2d 318 (1982).

 The defendant in Kleinschrodt stipulated that the only issue on appeal was whether or not the plaintiffs right hand was useless for any type of work. Thus, the defendant in Kleinschrodt did not raise the one-year-back rule as an issue on appeal. Kleinschrodt, supra, 384. While the majority erroneously associates both Kleinschrodt and Franks to the two-year-back rule on this point, I believe for the purposes of the majority opinion, the difference is irrelevant.

 I would also apply the ruling in this concurrence concerning the two-year-back provision to the one-year-back provision. While I realize the one-year-back and two-year-back provisions are applicable to different factual situations occurring in workers’ disability compensation cases, I also believe for the purposes of this opinion that they can be considered synonymously. The one-year-back provision is set forth in part in MCL 418.833(1); MSA 17.237(833X1).
"If payment of compensation is made, other than medical expenses, and an application for further compensation is later filed with the bureau, no compensation shall be ordered for any period which is more than 1 year prior to the date of filing of such application.” (Emphasis added.)
The language "no compensation shall be ordered” evidences a legislative intent to limit the authority of the hearing referee and *687Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in ordering benefits. Therefore, I am in agreement with Justice Coleman’s dissent in Kleinschrodt, supra, and would extend her reasoning to include proceedings before the hearing referee.