Court Opinion

ID: 9535731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:52:20.460247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:18.928975
License: Public Domain

*87Bashara, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. As stated in the majority opinion, "occupancy implies an actual use of the house as a dwelling place”. Bonenfant v American Fire Ins Co, 76 Mich 653, 659; 43 NW 682 (1889). Although the courts have held that a temporary absence for business, vacation, or illness does not render the premises "unoccupied”, the case at bar is distinguishable. There was clearly a permanent discontinuance of residency by Mr. Lynas without tender of possession to the plaintiff. Until possession was given to plaintiff, the home was "vacant” and "unoccupied” within the meaning of the insurance contract. Richards v Continental Ins Co of the City of New York, 83 Mich 508; 47 NW 350 (1890).
However, my conclusion is not based on the occupancy requirement alone. Another provision of the insurance agreement reads:
"Conditions suspending or restricting insurance. Unless otherwise provided in writing added hereto this Company shall not be liable for loss occurring
"(a) while the hazard is increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the insured * * *.”
Mr. Lynas, a named insured, deliberately informed the fuel supplier to discontinue service in the dead of winter. Such action on the part of the insured, which surely caused the pipes to freeze and the resulting damages, acted to relieve the defendant from liability. Therefore, even if the premises were "occupied”, it is my feeling that the trial court should have rejected plaintiff’s motion for declaratory judgment. Plaintiff’s recourse is properly against Mr. Lynas.
I would reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendant.