Court Opinion

ID: 9561212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:05:29.080349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:41.468911
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in judgment only.
Both in this Court and in the court below, Roberson has contended only that the mother’s testimony improperly bolstered the credibility of the victim. That is the error that is before us. In that regard, the defense specifically objected to only one question from the prosecution and the subsequent answer from the victim’s mother:
[D.A.:] Have you ever had any problem with her lying to you?
[Mother:] You know, normal things that children lie about.
[Defense:] Your Honor, it’s improper for the State to use another witness to bolster the credibility of yet another witness with regard to whether she lies or not.
That was it. And that is all Roberson claims on appeal.3 Because the mother’s statement that the victim lies about things other children lie about neither bolstered the credibility of the victim nor contributed to the verdict, the judgment should be affirmed.
However, the bulk of the majority’s analysis goes to the impropriety of the State’s attempt to bolster the credibility of the victim by proving the “indicia of reliability” before the jury pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-16, the Child Victim Hearsay Statute. I agree with the majority that the State cannot get credibility evidence before the jury in this “backdoor” fashion, but nowhere before this Court has Roberson raised this issue or even mentioned the Child Victim Hearsay Statute. It has long been a guiding principle of this Court that “our consideration is necessarily limited to such specific objections to the admission of that evidence as were raised below.” Hunter v. State, 202 *232Ga. App. 195, 197 (413 SE2d 526) (1991); Carridine v. State, 234 Ga. App. 330, 331 (506 SE2d 688) (1998); Altman v. State, 229 Ga. App. 769 (1) (495 SE2d 106) (1997). In my view, taking the State (or the defense) to task on the basis of unenumerated and unpreserved issues only undermines the credibility of this Court.
Decided December 2, 1999.
Hal T. Peel, for appellant.
J. Thomas Durden, Jr., District Attorney, Ross H. Pittman III, Jeffery N. Osteen, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

 The defense did not object to the State’s prior two questions asking (1) whether the mother had taught the victim the difference between right and wrong and (2) whether the mother had taught the victim to tell the truth. Moreover, the mother’s testimony that she “taught” her child these principles is not the same as testimony that the child employs them, especially when — in the next instant — the mother states the child has lied to her.