Court Opinion

ID: 9834809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 01:54:02.684957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:54.620553
License: Public Domain

Barros, J.,
dissents, and votes to reverse the order, on the law, and deny the motion of the defendant Brentwood Union Free School District for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, with the following memorandum: “[T]he prima facie showing which a defendant must make on a motion for summary judgment is governed by the allegations of liability made by the plaintiff in the pleadings” (Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp., 76 AD3d 210, 214 [2010]; see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 325 [1986]; Miller v Village of E. Hampton, 98 AD3d 1007, 1008 [2012]; Braver v Village of Cedarhurst, 94 AD3d 933, 934 [2012]). In their complaint and verified bill of particulars, the plaintiffs allege that despite the notice that the defendant Brentwood Union Free School District (hereinafter the defendant) had of the presence of gang members directly outside of the high school of the plaintiff Shaquille Wilson (hereinafter the infant plaintiff), the defendant negligently supervised him by “directing [him] to proceed down a street where a dangerous gang was present and into the hands of said gang members.” The gang members stabbed the infant plaintiff in the shoulder, and struck him multiple times in the head with an object, causing him to sustain severe injuries to his brain, left shoulder, and right arm.
In support of its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendant submitted, among other things, the infant plaintiff’s deposition testimony, as well as his General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing testimony in which he testified that, as he was leaving the school premises, he told the school’s security officers, who were stationed at sawhorse barricades outside the school, that gang members were present. The infant plaintiff observed the gang members park a car a block away from the school, and saw six of the gang members approaching the students while loudly screaming, “Where are the Bloods?” The infant plaintiff testified that the security offi*560cers responded that they “don’t care” about the presence of the gang members, and continued to direct the students off the premises and toward the gang members. Prior to being assaulted, the infant plaintiff requested, and was denied, permission by the security officers to reenter the school premises. The infant plaintiff testified that he was attacked 10 feet away from the school premises in the vicinity of the barricades.
“Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]). The standard for determining whether the school has breached its duty is to compare the school’s supervision and protection to that of a parent of ordinary prudence placed in the same situation and armed with the same information (see David v County of Suffolk, 1 NY3d 525, 526 [2003]; Kelly G. v Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 99 AD3d 756, 758 [2012]). The adequacy of a school’s supervision of its students is generally a question left to the trier of fact to resolve, as is the question of whether inadequate supervision was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury (see DiGiacomo v Town of Babylon, 124 AD3d 828, 829 [2015]; Osmanzai v Sports & Arts in Schools Found., Inc., 116 AD3d 937, 938 [2014]; Palmer v City of New York, 109 AD3d 526, 527 [2013]; Braunstein v Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 104 AD3d 893, 894 [2013]).
Here, the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of the absence of a triable issue of fact as to whether it provided adequate supervision, and whether inadequate supervision was a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s injuries. Notably, the defendant did not even submit the deposition testimony or affidavit of any of the security officers stationed at the barricades to rebut the infant plaintiff’s allegations.
Contrary to the determination of my colleagues in the majority, the fact that an assault occurs outside the school gate does not relieve the school of its duty to provide adequate supervision to students as they are leaving the school premises, nor is it a license for school personnel to knowingly direct students off the school premises in the face of an immediate risk of harm. While “[a] school’s custodial duty ceases once the student has passed out of its orbit of authority” (Vernali v Harrison Cent. School Dist., 51 AD3d 782, 783 [2008]; see Pratt v Robinson, 39 NY2d 554, 560 [1976]), here, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant’s negligence, i.e., directing the infant plaintiff off the school premises toward gang members shouting threats, occurred while the infant plaintiff was still within the defendant’s “orbit of authority.”
*561Also, contrary to the majority’s determination, whether the infant plaintiff failed to sufficiently perceive the danger of harm to himself from the gang members’ threats has no bearing on the relevant inquiries, i.e., whether the school provided adequate supervision and whether the harm to the infant plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of inadequate supervision.
The Supreme Court erred in resolving issues of credibility against the infant plaintiff. “The function of the court on a motion for summary judgment is not to resolve issues of fact or determine matters of credibility, but merely to determine whether such issues exist” (Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18, 23 [2011], quoting Kolivas v Kirchoff, 14 AD3d 493, 493 [2005]). Any inconsistencies within the infant plaintiff’s testimony merely presented credibility issues for trial (see Mejia v Kennedy, 124 AD3d 731, 732 [2015]; Knepka v Tollman, 278 AD2d 811 [2000]).
Since the defendant failed to meet its prima facie burden, the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider whether the infant plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition raised only feigned issues of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
Accordingly, I vote to reverse the order, and deny the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.