Court Opinion

ID: 9629091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:36:50.065315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:33.029493
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting separately and concurring in the views of HUNTLEY, Justice.
For reasons, documented in the record, set forth in my dissenting opinion in Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 612 P.2d 142 (1980), I saw the Court’s opinion in that case as a clear travesty of justice, perhaps the ultimate. Today the Court’s opinion goes one better. In Huyck the plaintiff was merely injured; in this case there was a fatality, the needless death of a working man who left surviving him a widow and two minor children.
There is little to gain by again pointing to the fallacies of the Huyck decision, but a starting point for criticism of the Court’s opinion today is some of the majority language in the Huyck decision: “We are cited to no rule of law which requires the owner or possessor of real property to place signs thereon indicating its status as private property.” Huyck, 101 Idaho at 300, 612 P.2d at 143. While it may be that a statute is not technically a “rule of law,” it is nevertheless a law. I.C. § 36-1603 specifically provides for “signs legibly printed or painted in the English language warning persons not to trespass thereon” and makes it “a misdemeanor for any person to enter upon said enclosed land ... without the consent of the owner.” The forerunner of this act has been on the books since 1915 (I.C. § 36-2502, repealed in 1976 and reenacted as I.C. § 36-1603), having application to enclosed lands and affording land, owners protection from the intrusion of hunters and fishermen. Absent the placing of signs, the intruder, though apparently nonetheless a trespasser, was not subject to criminal prosecution. Given consent, of course, he was not a trespasser. With or without consent he was not fair game for the wanton and willful spring-guns and concealed pits. All of this, if we didn’t earlier know it, we learned in law school.
Then, in 1965 the legislature, by the passage of S.B. No. 113, enacted what became I.C. § 36-2502, and which, with little *875change other than style, continued on as I.C. § 36-1604. In now almost twenty years, no case has reached this Court wherein a land owner has sought to escape liability for his own allegedly wrongful actions on the basis of the statute. Unfortunately, so it will seem to many, the land owner has found the right court, a Court which will construe a statute, which was declared in its statement of purpose as being a limitation of liability, to be an outright immunity from liability. Not to be confused with the statement of purpose which is part and parcel, in fact a preamble, to I.C. § 36-1604, is the Title1 of H.B. No. 518, which on enactment became ch. 95 of the 1976 Session Laws. A broad act, recodifying Fish and Game laws, its lengthy title, as applicable to § 36-1604 was: “PROVIDING FOR RECREATIONAL TRESPASS AND LIMITING LANDHOLDER LIABILITY.”
36-2503. Limitation of liability of landowner. — 1. The purpose of this act is to encourage owners of land to make private land and water areas available to the public without charge for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon, for such purposes.
2. As used in this act:
(a) “Land” means private land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty.
(b) “Owner” means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises.
(c) “Recreational purpose” includes, but is not limited to, any of the following, or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites, when done without charge of the owner.
3. An owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes.
4. An owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use such property for recreational purposes does not thereby:
(a) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose.
(b) Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed.
(c) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons.
5. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the provisions of this act shall be deemed applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any subdivision thereof for recreational purposes.
6. Nothing in this act shall be construed to:
(a) Create a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to persons or property.
(b) Relieve any person using the land of another for recreational purposes from any obligation which he may have in the absence of this act to exercise care in his use of such land and in his activities thereon, or from legal consequences of failure to employ such care.
(c)Apply to any person or persons who for compensation permits the land to be used for recreational purposes.
7.Any person using the land of another for recreational purposes, with or without permission shall be liable for any damages to property, livestock or crops which he may incur while on said property. [I.C., § 36-2503, as added by 1965, ch. 275, § 1, p. 715.]
Compiler's notes. The words “this act" would seem to be limited to this section. ^ Section 2 of S.U1965, ch. 275, reads. “The provisions of this act are severable. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or provision of this act is held invalid, the remainder of the act shall not be affected."
Comp. left. Cal. Peering'.* Codes, Civil Code, 846.
Mich.Comp.Laws 1948, 300-201.
Minn.Stat.1961, »?§ 87.01-87.05.
Nev.Rev.StaL, 41.510.
N.H.Rcv.SULt»55. *> 212:-34.
NJ.Rev.SULAnn. 2A:-42A-1.
N.Y. McKinney’s Consol. Laws, Conservation Istw, *» 370.
N.Car.Gen.StaL, ***» 113-120.5 — 113-120.7.
Ohio. Page’s Rev.Code, *5*» 1533.18, 1533.18.1.
Ore.Rev.SUL, »» 30-790.
Pa.Purdon's SUL. tit. 12, i) 1629.
Tenn.Code Ann., •»*» 51-801-51-805.
Va.Code 1950, * H-654.2.
WÍS.SUL1963, 29.68.
36-1604. Limitation of liability of landowner. — (a) Statement of Purpose. The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make private land and water areas available to the public without charge for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.
(b) Definitions. As used in this section:
1. “Land” means private land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty.
2. “Owner” means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises.
3. “Recreational purposes” includes, but is not limited to, any of the following or any combination thereof: Hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites, when done without charge of the owner.
(c)l Owner Exempt from Warning] An owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes.
(d)l Owner Assumes No Liability.! An owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or *876permits without charge any person to use such property for recreational purposes does not thereby:
1. Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose.
2. Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed.
3. Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons.
(e) Provisions Apply to Leased Public Land. Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the provisions of this section shall be deemed applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any subdivision thereof for recreational purposes. _
_ (flIOwner Not Required to Keep Land Safe! Nothing in this section shall be construed to:
1. Create a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to persons or property.
2. Relieve any person using the land of another for recreational purposes from any obligation which he may have in the absence of this section to exercise care in his use of such land and in his activities thereon, or from legal consequences or failure to employ such care.
3. Apply to any person or persons who for compensation permits the land to be used for recreational purposes.
(g)lUser Liable for Damages^ I Any person using the land of another for recreational purposes, with or without permission, shall be liable for any damage to property, livestock or crops which he mav Í cause! while on said property. [I.C., § 36-1604, as added by 1976, ch. 95, § 2, p. 315.]
Comp.leg.Cal. Decring’s Codes. Civil Code. *» 846.
It has been said that this provision was aimed at the prevention of fraud and deception and to reasonably notify legislators and people of legislative intent in enacting a law. Kerner v. Johnson, 99 Idaho 433, 583 P.2d 360 (1978); Hammond v. Bingham, 83 Idaho 314, 362 P.2d 1078 (1961).
Having laid out side by side the 1976 act and the earlier 1965 act, it is inescapable that in 1976 the legislators who voted favorably were doubly deceived — first by the title couched in terms of limiting liability, but then also by the statement of purpose likewise couched in terms of limiting liability. But that isn’t the end, because there is yet a third deception!
I.C. § 36-2503 may have had laudable goals when it became law in 1965, although there is reason to doubt that it should have been enacted as an amendment to the fish and game law, its scope being far broader than to encourage access to hunting and fishing areas. Those legislators who supported the concept in 1965 (including Justice Huntley) and unsuspecting 1976 legislators may be justifiably concerned that in passing I.C. § 36-1604 the legislature was not merely reenacting the 1965 act. Sections 36-2503 and 36-1604 are not identical, although at a glance they appear to be so. It will be observed that I have circled four phrases2 which are found in § 36-1604 for the first time. Incomplete sentences, these phrases apparently must have been inserted into the reenactment of § 36-2503 into § 36-1604 by someone representing some interest group who thereby sought to expand upon § 36-2503. For certain, the phrase “owner assumes no liability” goes beyond the sentence — found as 4(c) in § 36-2503 and d(l) in § 36-1604— which declares that an owner, having limited liability under the act, “does not thereby assume responsibility for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons.”
The plain reading of this section does not absolve the land owner at all from his own negligence or willful act. Quite the contrary, it absolves him from any liability which might otherwise attach to him by reason of his having allowed the use of his liable therefore, the injured party cannot in turn also pass that liability off to the land owner. In that manner it is similar and compatible with § 36-2503(7) and its counterpart § 36-1604(g). Without further belaboring the point, it should be abundantly clear that the 1976 legislature was deceived, whether intentionally or unintentionally being of no moment, when it enacted § 36-1604 into law — a plain violation of the Idaho Constitution, and, being a “substantial, plain, clear and unmistakable” vio*877lation “warrants the nullification” of the statute. Bakes, J., writing for a unanimous Court in Kerner v. Johnson, supra, at 452, 583 P.2d at 379.
By far, in my view, the worst of § 36-1604 is the language which grants respite from liability to the owner who “either directly or indirectly invites or permits” the use of his property for recreational purposes. Before delving into this proposition, however, it is essential to observe that defendant’s answer to the complaint did not plead I.C. § 36-1604. Instead, in apparent reliance upon Huyck, it merely alleged as an affirmative defense that defendant’s negligence, if any, is less than the negligence of the decedent, and that decedent was a trespasser on property owned by the defendant to whom was owed no duty since he was trespassing. Affirmative Defenses II, III and IV, R., p. 20. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment was its first pleading claiming immunity under § 36-1604, a defense which was not pleaded in Huyck. Knowledge of that statute may not have been known to the plaintiffs, but it must be candidly observed that the complaint alleged both a recreational use of the roadway in question at the time of the tragedy, and prior thereto, and the defendant’s knowledge that the “roadway was in constant use by motorcyclists and other recreational users____”
With that predicate I mention a strong concern as to the constitutionality of language which does not place upon an owner an obligation to directly, and in some positive manner, signify that his lands are open for recreational purposes. It is readily foreseeable that, in many cases, whether the land owner had or had not elected to come under the act will be an after-the-fact determination. On that basis it is grossly unfair to the recreational user who, after his recreational trespass, may then be informed that he was guilty of a misdemean- or under § 36-1603 for nonconsensual trespass, or was a permitted trespasser under § 36-1604, depending on what has occurred, and at the owner’s election. This is an intolerable state of uncertainty, and hence suggestive of being so vague and indefinite as to be unconstitutional. A trespasser is entitled to know beforehand whether he is being regarded as a criminal trespasser or a recreational trespasser. Putting that problem aside for another day, I express my amazement that the views of Justice Huntley have failed to command a majority of the Court.
There is no language in § 36-1604 which can properly be said to absolve the defendant from its liability, should a jury so find, in having created the dangerous situation which caused the injuries and resultant death of the plaintiff’s decedent. Part (c) of § 36-1604 speaks in terms of no duty to keep the premises safe, or no duty to warn of a dangerous condition. As in the used vehicle world, it is not difficult to accept taking the use of someone else’s premises on an “as is,” warrantless basis. Other than with problems already discussed, the concept of not having to grade a roadway, remove snow, or patrol for snags which have fallen across a roadway, present no difficulty. But, to say that there is within § 36-1604 language which is properly there and which immunizes the owner for his own acts which create a previously non-existent hazard, is beyond my ken. The district court wrote that “There is no contention made here, nor would the facts support any inference, that the defendant’s excavation was an intentional act to cause injury to the deceased or other trespassers.” To my mind, that view, while undoubtedly correct, missed the whole point. It is not whether the defendant intended to injure or kill someone by cutting the roadway with a trench, but whether it was foreseeable that taking out part of the roadway, without erecting either barrier or warning, would result in injury to some person. That is the law of tort.
It would seem, too, that if one accepts, arguendo, the validity of an implied acceptance by a land owner of I.C. § 36-1604, that is, a land owner who “indirectly invites” by not locking out recreational trespassers, in this particular case, the allowed continued use of the roadway for recreational purposes abruptly was “indirectly *878terminated” when the defendant’s bulldozer ripped a part of that roadway out. If some action can “indirectly” amount to an invitation, conversely other action can amount to a withdrawal. At the time that the plaintiffs’ decedent fell into the ditch the indirect invitation had been withdrawn. I can think of no clearer way to tell the public that they are not free to make recreational use out of a road than by tearing out a piece of it, or maiming one or two people by putting an invisible small cable across it.
In closing, I simply cannot believe that there could be found anyone in the state of Idaho who would equate the non-responsibility to warn of an existing danger with the danger that is man-created. It is ridiculous to say that tearing out a section of the roadway was a “use” of the roadway, and equally absurd to say that dozing out is to engage in an activity which is protected by the statute. For certain, it is a far cry from pitching horseshoes or birdwatching. I am put more in mind of a school bus full of children looking for artifacts, or simply picnicking, on the bombing ranges used by the Mountain Home Air Force Base. Any liability? No, says the Idaho Supreme Court, if the owner of the land indirectly or directly invited the young recreational trespassers.

. Art. 3, § 16 of the Idaho Constitution provides:
"Unity of subject and title. — Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be embraced in the title.”

. Also circled in § 36-1604 is the word “cause” which in § 36-2503 was "incur." This has to do only with, respectively “g" and "7" in the two acts — wherein the drafters continued to impose liability on recreational trespassers for their actions.