Court Opinion

ID: 9380853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 16:00:44.451037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.009674
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11184    Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 03/21/2023    Page: 1 of 12

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11184
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        PATRICK DABNEY,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
        OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.
                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00336-CAP
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court               22-11184

        Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Patrick Dabney appeals from the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment for the Department of Homeland Security
        (“DHS”) on his claims of hostile work environment and race and
        color discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
        (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Dabney maintains that DHS
        violated Title VII by not selecting him for two promotion positions
        and by subsequently investigating anonymous workplace sexual
        harassment allegations against him, which resulted in a cease-and-
        desist order and a letter of reprimand. For the reasons discussed
        below, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
               I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
              Dabney is an African American, Black male. Dabney began
        working at the Atlanta Field Office of the Transportation Security
        Administration (“TSA”), a component of DHS, in 2002. Dabney
        was promoted to Supervisory Federal Air Marshal (“SFAM”) in
        2008.
              Approximately fifteen to eighteen months after being pro-
        moted to SFAM, Dabney was selected to serve as an Administrative
        SFAM. In that role, Dabney rotated with other SFAMs to serve as
        the Acting Assistant Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge (“ASAC”).
        The ASAC is second-in-command to the Supervisory Air Marshal
        in Charge (“SAC”). At all material times, the SAC of the Atlanta
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        22-11184               Opinion of the Court                        3

        Field Office, and Dabney’ direct supervisor, was Arnold Cole. Like
        Dabney, Cole is an African American (Black) male.
               In 2016, Dabney formally applied for two ASAC positions—
        one at the Atlanta Field Office, and one at the Miami Field Office.
        This application process was overseen by the Promotion Panel,
        which comprised of four voting members—two of whom are Afri-
        can American—and two non-voting members. Dabney was
        deemed qualified and placed on a referral list, along with other can-
        didates. And Cole had recommended Dabney to the Panel as his
        top choice for the Atlanta Field Office ASAC position. Meanwhile,
        the SAC of the Miami Field Office, Maria Perez, had ranked Dab-
        ney as her fifth choice for the Miami position.
               After considering these recommendations, along with each
        candidate’s level of experience, the Promotion Panel ultimately did
        not select Dabney for either ASAC position. Instead, the Promo-
        tion Panel voted unanimously to select Cole’s second choice for
        the Atlanta position and Perez’ first choice for the Miami position.
        Both selected individuals are Caucasian (White) males. These se-
        lections were announced on February 17, 2017.
                Subsequently, on March 29, 2017, the TSA received an anon-
        ymous letter signed by “Atlanta Field Office employees.” The let-
        ter is dated March 13, 2017, and alleges that Dabney “uses his posi-
        tion to harass and intimidate women at every level of the [Atlanta]
        Field Office” and “has blackmailed, sexually harassed and even re-
        taliated for not submitting to his advances.” The letter goes so far
        as to say that “[e]very female in [the Atlanta Field Office] has been
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11184

        personally affected by, and/or witnessed [Dabney’s] aggressive
        sexual harassment and abusive office demeanor” and that Dabney
        was “the catalyst for every female in [the] office’s separation or
        transfer in the past five years.” The letter further alleges that Dab-
        ney is “favored and shielded by SAC Cole,” and that complaints to
        senior management have resulted only in “sentiments of retalia-
        tion.” The letter concludes with a request that the TSA “look into
        these allegations and finally take steps to protect the women of the
        Atlanta Field Office.”
               Upon receiving this anonymous letter, the TSA referred the
        matter to its Office of Inspections (“OOI”) for an investigation and
        sent Dabney a cease-and-desist order notifying him of the allega-
        tions and directing him to refrain from any misconduct and from
        discussing the matter with anyone other than his supervisors.
        These steps were recommended by Kevin Hulse, the TSA’s Sexual
        Harassment Prevention Coordinator and an African American.
        Dabney received the cease-and-desist order on April 6, 2017.
               The next day, Dabney contacted a TSA Equal Employment
        Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor regarding his non-selection for the
        two ASAC positions and the cease-and-desist order. Then, on June
        28, 2017, Dabney filed a formal EEO complaint of discrimination.
        The EEO complaint alleges that Dabney was discriminated against
        on the bases of race, color, and sex.
              Meanwhile, between April 18, 2017, and July 3, 2017, OOI
        conducted its investigation into the conduct of Dabney and Cole
        based on the allegations in the anonymous letter. This three-
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        22-11184               Opinion of the Court                        5

        month process included interviewing around sixty former and cur-
        rent employees at the Atlanta Field Office. OOI ultimately for-
        warded its Report of Investigation to the TSA’s Office of Profes-
        sional Responsibility (“OPR”), which subsequently sent Dabney a
        Letter of Reprimand (“LOR”) dated March 16, 2018.
               The LOR outlines the findings of the OOI investigation and
        concludes that Dabney’s conduct violated office policy and was
        “unbecoming a supervisor.” The LOR also explains that it will be
        kept in Dabney’s personnel file for up to two years—during which
        it may be cited as a prior formal disciplinary action—and then may
        be retained by the TSA as proof of notice or to rebut a claim of no
        prior misconduct. Dabney denies the allegations against him and
        contends that the OOI investigation and LOR detrimentally af-
        fected his reputation and career advancement.
                On January 23, 2020, Dabney filed suit in the Northern Dis-
        trict of Georgia, bringing three claims under Title VII of the Civil
        Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The com-
        plaint alleges that DHS (1) created a hostile work environment
        based on race, color, sex, and protected activity (Count I); (2) dis-
        criminated against Dabney on the basis of race, color, and sex when
        it did not promote him, sent him a cease-and-desist order, and
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-11184

        investigated him for sexual harassment (Count II); and (3) retali-
        ated against Dabney for engaging in protected speech. 1
                On April 30, 2021, DHS moved for summary judgment on
        all of Dabney’s claims. After full briefing, the magistrate judge rec-
        ommended that DHS’s motion be granted in full. As to Count I
        (hostile work environment), the magistrate judge concluded that
        there was not sufficient evidence of any “severe or pervasive” har-
        assment by DHS or its agents. As to Count II (discrimination), the
        magistrate judge determined that Dabney had established a prima
        facie case of race discrimination only for the ASAC selection deci-
        sions, but that DHS overcame Dabney’s showing with sufficient
        evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its deci-
        sions. 2 Lastly, as to Count III (retaliation), the magistrate judge

        1 We note that Dabney’s complaint is a textbook example of the most com-
        mon type of “shotgun pleading” because it “contain[s] multiple counts where
        each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each succes-
        sive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination
        of the entire complaint.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d
        1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015).
        2 The magistrate judge considered the claims based on Dabney’s sex (part of
        Counts I and II) to be abandoned, given that Dabney did not defend or other-
        wise address those claims in his response to DHS’s motion for summary judg-
        ment. Dabney did not object to this determination, and the district court sub-
        sequently adopted it. Nor does Dabney present any arguments relating to his
        sex on appeal. Thus, as recognized below, any claims based on Dabney’ sex
        have been abandoned. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871–75
        (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
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        22-11184                   Opinion of the Court                          7

        concluded that Dabney had failed to make a prima facie showing
        of any retaliatory conduct.
               On November 22, 2021, Dabney filed his objections to the
        magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. In that filing, Dab-
        ney insisted that (1) the OOI investigation constituted an adverse
        employment action, retaliation, and severe and pervasive harass-
        ment; (2) the LOR constituted an adverse employment action; and
        (3) the record presents genuine issues of material fact regarding the
        propriety of DHS’s ASAC selection decisions.
                On February 7, 2022, the district court adopted the magis-
        trate judge’s report and recommendation. In doing so, the district
        court addressed and overruled each of Dabney’s objections. The
        next day, judgment was entered in favor of DHS. Dabney timely
        appealed. 3
                          II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg-
        ment. Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019).
        Summary judgment is proper when the evidence, viewed in a light
        most favorable to the non-moving party, “presents no genuine is-
        sue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law in
        favor of the moving party.” Id. (quoting Caldwell v. Warden, 748
        F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014)). An issue of material fact is

        3 Dabney filed the Opening Brief on June 17, 2022, and DHS filed the Appel-
        lee’s Brief on September 19, 2022. Dabney never filed a Reply Brief.
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                      22-11184

        genuine if it has “a real basis in the record” and “the evidence is
        such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-mo-
        vant.” Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th
        Cir. 1993)
                                     III.    ANALYSIS
               On appeal, Dabney contends that the record presents genu-
        ine issues of material fact related to his hostile work environment
        and discrimination claims (Counts I and II). 4 We address these
        claims in turn.
                           A.      Hostile Work Environment
               The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
        to DHS on Dabney’s hostile work environment claim because Dab-
        ney failed to show that the alleged harassment was based on a pro-
        tected characteristic and that the alleged harassment was severe or
        pervasive.
               To prevail on a substantive hostile work environment
        claim,5 a plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected
        group; (2) he has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the
        harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (4) the

        4 Dabney  does not address the retaliation claim (Count III) on appeal. Dabney
        therefore abandoned any challenges to the district court’s ruling on that claim.
        See Campbell, 26 F.4th at 871–75.
        5A  more lenient standard applies to “retaliatory” hostile work environment
        claims, see Tonkyro v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828, 835 (11th
        Cir. 2021), but this case does not involve such a claim.
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        22-11184               Opinion of the Court                         9

        harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms
        and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abu-
        sive working environment”; and (5) his employer is responsible for
        such environment under a theory of either vicarious or direct lia-
        bility. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275
        (11th Cir. 2002). The fourth element—i.e., whether the harass-
        ment was sufficiently severe or pervasive—contains both a subjec-
        tive component and an objective component. Mendoza v. Borden,
        Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). In other words, the plain-
        tiff must subjectively perceive the harassment as sufficiently severe
        or pervasive, and that perception must be objectively reasonable,
        factoring in “all the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sun-
        downer Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)). The objective
        component thus requires consideration of, among other things,
        “(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct;
        (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or
        a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreason-
        ably interferes with the [plaintiff’s] job performance.” Id.
               In this case, no reasonable jury could find that the OOI in-
        vestigation, the cease-and-desist order, or the LOR was based on a
        protected characteristic. It is undisputed that the investigation was
        launched in response to the anonymous allegations of harassment
        by Dabney, and that the cease-and-desist order and the LOR were
        based on that investigation. Dabney, however, insists that the in-
        vestigation was racially motivated because only he and Cole—two
        African American males—were investigated, even though the
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11184

        anonymous letter also implicated other employees (e.g., the Om-
        budsman). 6 But the anonymous letter specifically accuses Dabney
        of demonstrating a “repeated pattern of hostility towards women
        under his chain of command” and Cole of “shield[ing]” Dabney’s
        conduct; it does not specifically identify wrongdoing by any other
        employee. Aside from this unavailing argument, Dabney has made
        no showing that the investigation, the cease-and-desist order, or
        the LOR was racially motivated. We thus conclude that Dabney
        cannot establish the third essential element for his hostile work en-
        vironment claim.
                Similarly, no reasonable jury could find that the OOI inves-
        tigation, the cease-and-desist order, or the LOR constituted severe
        or pervasive harassment. As to the investigation, Dabney insists
        that DHS’s conduct was severe because it damaged his reputation,
        particularly with female coworkers, and caused him to be treated
        “like a pariah.” But Dabney has failed to produce evidence show-
        ing that the investigation was needlessly publicized, lengthy, or in-
        vasive, or that the investigators acted inappropriately. As to the
        cease-and-desist order, Dabney highlights the order’s restriction on
        his ability to discuss the allegations with subordinates but has failed
        to show why that restriction is severe. Lastly, as to the LOR, Dab-
        ney contends that DHS’s conduct was severe because it “negatively

        6 The anonymous letter alleges that “nothing ever happen[ed]” when com-
        plaints about Dabney’s conduct were made to the Ombudsman and OOI, and
        that senior management responded with “sentiments of retaliation.” The Om-
        budsman and the leadership of OOI are not African American.
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        22-11184                  Opinion of the Court                                  11

        impacted his potential for promotion.” But, as the district court
        highlighted, “[t]here is no evidence that [Dabney] applied for any
        jobs following the investigation or that he was not hired because of
        the [LOR].” As such, the record does not support the notion that
        DHS’s conduct was severe or pervasive, and we thus conclude that
        Dabney cannot establish the fourth essential element for his hostile
        work environment claim.
                                  B.      Discrimination
               The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
        to DHS on Dabney’s discrimination claim because Dabney failed
        to show that the OOI investigation, the cease-and-desist order, the
        LOR, or his non-selection for an ASAC position constituted an ad-
        verse action motivated by race or color discrimination.
              Under Title VII’s federal-sector provision, “[a]ll personnel
        actions affecting employees . . . shall be made free from any dis-
        crimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
        42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). 7 Personnel actions include most employ-
        ment-related decisions, such as appointments, promotions, work
        assignments, compensation, and performance reviews. Babb v.
        Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1172–73 (2020).
               In this case, Dabney has failed to produce sufficient evidence
        that race or color discrimination played any role in any of the

        7 It is undisputed that Dabney is covered by   Title VII’s federal-sector provision
        as an employee of the TSA.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court               22-11184

        challenged decisions. With respect to the OOI investigation, the
        cease-and-desist order, and the LOR, as discussed above, the record
        establishes that each of those decisions was part of DHS’s response
        to the anonymous allegations of sexual harassment by Dabney, and
        Dabney has not made an adequate showing that discrimination
        played any role in that response. See supra-Part III(A). Dabney
        likewise has failed to make any such showing with respect to DHS’s
        decision not to select him for an ASAC position. Rather, the record
        establishes that both of the selected individuals were highly quali-
        fied and, unlike Dabney, had experience working in multiple of-
        fices, which the Promotion Panel highly valued. The record fur-
        ther establishes that two of the voting members of the Promotion
        Panel were African American and that the Panel’s selection deci-
        sions were unanimous. Against this backdrop, Dabney’s conclu-
        sory allegations of discrimination do not establish a genuine issue
        of material fact.
                              IV.    CONCLUSION
            For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment for DHS.
              AFFIRMED.